title: Quaest. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines rerum, an per earum essentiam.*

Supposito, quod Deus cognoscat infinita, quaeritur, utrum cognoscat illa quae cognoscit per *similitudines* rerum, an per earum essentiam[^p6-7]. Et quod per *similitudines*, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Scripturae. Ioannis primo[^p6-8]: *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*: ergo omnia, quae facta sunt, prius erant in Deo cognoscente: ergo vel per similitudinem, vel per veritatem; sed non per veritatem, cum nondum aliquid esset: ergo per similitudinem.

2. Item, Augustinus sexto de Trinitate[^p6-9] dicit, quod « Filius est ars plena omnium rationum viven-

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tium incommutabilium »; sed rationes in arte nihil aliud sunt quam similitudines rerum artificiatarum et ab artifice cognitarum: ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo[^p7-1], dicit: « Omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei, quam novit »; sed divina cognitio, cum non sit secundum privationem, est secundum speciem: ergo necesse est, quod sit similis ei rei, quam novit. Sed non esset similis, nisi haberet rei similitudinem: ergo etc.

4. Item, Philosophus[^p7-2] dicit, « quod intellectus quodam modo est omnia »; sed hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia intelligens hoc ipso, quod intelligit, assimilatur intellecto: ergo si hoc est de generali ratione intelligendi; si Deus aliquid intelligit et cognoscit, necesse est, quod habeat similitudines rerum, quas cognoscit: ergo etc.

5. Item, ad hoc, quod aliquid perfecte cognoscatur, necesse est, esse adaequationem intellectus ad intelligibile[^p7-3]; sed res creata non potest adaequari intellectui creanti per propriam naturam, cum ille sit simplex, et ipsa composita: ergo necesse est, quod adaequetur ei per similitudinem aliquam simplicem et ab omni materia separatam: ergo etc.

6. Item, eodem modo cognoscit Deus res, postquam factae sunt, quo modo cognoscebat, antequam fierent, quia divina notitia non mutatur; sed antequam fierent, non poterat eas cognoscere per proprias essentias; et cognoscebat eas vel per similitudines earum, vel per essentias; et non per essentias: ergo per similitudines. Et eodem modo cognoscit nunc, quo tunc, ergo etc.

7. Item, Deus est *agens a proposito*[^p7-4]; sed omne agens a proposito praeconcipit illud quod facturum est; omne autem, quod praeconcipit aliquid, habet aliquo modo illud penes se vel per veritatem, vel per similitudinem: ergo si, antequam res fierent, non habebat eas Deus penes se quantum ad suas essentias, ergo quantum ad earum similitudines.

8. Item, Deus est *exemplar* vere et proprie, sicut vere et proprie est *efficiens* et *finis*; sed exemplar vere et proprie non est, nisi quod habet similitudines rerum exemplatarum, per quas illas cognoscit et facit: ergo sicut Deo competit ratio exemplaritatis, sic et ratio similitudinis[^p7-5].

9. Item, Deus vere[^p7-6] est *speculum* aeternum, ductivum in omne aliud cognoscibile cognoscendum; sed speculum non ducit in aliud cognoscendum, nisi eius habeat similitudinem; ergo idem quod prius.

10. Item, Deus vere et proprie est *verbum*; sed verbum est similitudo eius quod dicitur: ergo si Filius Dei est verbum, quo dicuntur omnia[^p7-7], necesse est, quod in ipso sint similitudines omnium dictorum.

11. Item, ad perfectionem cognitionis duo concurrunt, scilicet *lux* et *similitudo*; sed ratio perfectissimae lucis omnino salvatur in divina cognitione: ergo similiter et ratio expressivae similitudinis.

**Contra:** 1. Anselmus in Monologio, trigesimo primo capitulo: « Manifestum est, in Verbo, *per quod facta sunt omnia*[^p7-8], non esse ipsorum similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam »: ergo si Deus non cognoscit per aliquid extra se, non cognoscit per similitudinem, sed potius per essentiam.

2. Item, ubicumque est *similitudo*, ibi est *convenientia*, ubicumque autem est *convenientia*, ibi est *communicatio* alicuius unius a pluribus; sed Deus et creatura nihil unum communicant, quia tunc illud esset simplicius[^p7-9] Creatore; ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua sit similitudo in Creatore respectu creaturae, vel e converso.

3. Item, similitudo est relatio aequiparantiae[^p7-10]; sed inter Creatorem et creaturam nulla potest esse relatio aequiparantiae: ergo nec similitudo.

4. Item, sicut *aequalitas* causatur ab unitate in *quantitate*, sic *similitudo* causatur ab unitate in *qualitate*[^p7-11]; sed inter Creatorem et creaturam nullo modo reperitur *aequalitas*, nec vere nec transumtive: ergo nec *similitudo* consimili ratione; aut si ibi reperitur *similitudo* et non *aequalitas*, quaeritur, unde hoc sit.

5. Item, si aliqua est similitudo inter Creatorem et creaturam, minima est: ergo si similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, per se loquendo, ubi maior similitudo, ibi maior ratio cognoscendi, et ubi minima, minima: si ergo Deus cognoscit res per similitudines, sequitur ex hoc, quod minimam habeat rerum cognitionem; quod blasphemum est dicere.

6. Item, una creatura magis assimilatur Deo quam alia, sicut illa quae est, vivit et sentit, quam

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illa quae tantum est: si ergo[^p8-1] maior similitudo est maior ratio cognoscendi, ergo Deus magis cognoscit unam creaturam quam aliam.

7. Item, si intellectus noster esset omnino in actu, non indigeret similitudine: ergo cum divinus intellectus omnino sit in actu[^p8-2] et lux respectu omnis cognoscibilis, videtur, quod ad Dei cognitionem nulla requiritur ratio similitudinis.

8. Item, similitudo est ratio ductiva in aliud, scilicet in illud cuius est similitudo; ubi autem est talis ductio, ibi est decursus et collatio ratiocinativa, hoc autem nullo modo competit divinae cognitioni: ergo nec ratio similitudinis.

9. Item, veritas est ratio cognoscendi, ergo in potissima cognitione potissime salvatur intentio veritatis; sed veritas magis salvatur in ipsa re quam in eius similitudine: ergo si divina cognitio est nobilissima, non cognoscit res per similitudines, sed per essentias.

10. Item, Philosophus, in tertio de Anima[^p8-3]: « In separatis a materia idem est *quod* intelligitur et *quo* »; sed Deus est omnino separatus a materia: ergo *quod* cognoscit et *quo* cognoscit est idem. Sed cognoscit res extra: ergo cognoscit eas per suas essentias, non per similitudines aliquas.

11. Item, ubicumque est immediata et indivisa coniunctio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis, non est opus similitudine; sed Deus est intimus cuilibet rei creatae: ergo ad eius cognitionem non indiget aliqua similitudine.

12. Item, nobilior est modus cognoscendi per essentiam quam per similitudinem; quod patet, quia iste modus cognoscendi spectat ad tertium caelum, sicut dicit Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram[^p8-4]: ergo si nobiliora sunt Deo tribuenda, videtur, quod magis conveniens sit ponere, quod Deus cognoscat res per essentias quam per similitudines.

13. Item, quanto cognitio est nobilior, tanto immediatior est coniunctio et unio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile; sed divina cognitio habet omnimodam nobilitatem: ergo et perfectissimam unionem. Sed immediatior est coniunctio[^p8-5] et unio, quando cognoscens unitur cognoscibili quantum ad eius essentiam, quam quantum ad eius similitudinem: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas, quae sunt rerum similitudines exemplares et perfectissime repraesentativae ac expressivae atque idem essentialiter, quod est ipse Deus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum beatum Dionysium et secundum beatum Augustinum in pluribus locis, Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas. Ait enim beatus Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto[^p8-6]: « *Exemplaria* dicimus esse in Deo existentium rationes substantificatas et singulariter praeexistentes, quas theologia *praedefinitiones* vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium determinativas et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit ». Item, Augustinus in primo Confessionum, circa principium, ad Deum loquens, ait sic: « Deus et dominus omnium quae creasti, et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae, et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines, et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes ». Item, in undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo[^p8-7], ait idem: « Non multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infinita quaedam eique finiti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt, quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit » etc.

Hae autem sempiternae rationes non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates, cum non sint aliud a Creatore; creatura autem et Creator necessario habent essentias differentes: et ideo necesse est, quod sint formae exemplares, ac per hoc ipsarum rerum similitudines repraesentativae; et ideo cognoscendi rationes sunt, quia cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognitio, assimilationem dicit et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile. Et ideo ponendum est, secundum quod Sancti dicunt et rationes ostendunt, Deum cognoscere res per earum similitudines.

Ad intelligentiam autem ipsius quaestionis et obiectorum notandum est, quod *similitudo* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo per convenientiam duorum in ter-

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tio, per quem modum dicitur esse « similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas[^p9-1] ». Alio modo dicitur *similitudo*, quia unum est similitudo alterius; et hoc est dupliciter: quaedam est similitudo *imitativa*, et sic creatura est similitudo Creatoris; quaedam autem est similitudo *exemplativa*, et sic in Creatore ratio exemplaris est similitudo creaturae. Utroque autem modo dicta similitudo, videlicet *imitativa* et *exemplativa*, est *exprimens et expressiva*[^p9-2]; et haec est similitudo, quae requiritur ad rerum notitiam habendam. — Sed *notitia* quaedam est *causans res*, quaedam est *causata a rebus*. Ad notitiam *causatam a rebus* requiritur similitudo *imitativa*[^p9-3]; et haec similitudo est ab extra, et ideo aliquam compositionem et additionem ponit circa intellectum cognoscentem; et inde est, quod attestatur imperfectioni. — Ad notitiam autem *causantem res* requiritur similitudo *exemplativa*, et haec quidem non est ab extra nec inducit aliquam compositionem nec attestatur alicui imperfectioni, sed omnimodae perfectioni. Quia enim ipse intellectus divinus est summa lux et veritas plena et actus purus; sicut divina virtus in causando res sufficiens est se ipsa omnia producere, sic divina lux et veritas omnia exprimere; et quia *exprimere* est actus intrinsecus, ideo aeternus; et quia expressio est quaedam assimilatio, ideo divinus intellectus, sua summa veritate omnia aeternaliter exprimens, habet aeternaliter omnium rerum similitudines exemplares, quae non sunt *aliud* ab ipso, sed sunt quod est essentialiter[^p9-4]. — *Rursus*, quia exprimit in quantum summa lux et actus purus, ideo exprimit lucidissime, expressissime, perfectissime, ac per hoc aequaliter et secundum intentionem similitudinis in nullo diminutae; et hinc est, quod omnia cognoscit perfectissime, distinctissime et integerrime. — His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Anselmo, dicendum, quod Anselmus loquitur ibi de similitudine, quae est causata a rei veritate; unde accipit ibi *similitudinem*, secundum quod exprimit sub ratione imitationis potius quam exemplaritatis; et hoc modo ponitur in producto respectu *producentis*, et non e converso, sicut subdit[^p9-5]; alio vero modo nihil impedit poni in producente respectu *producti*.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubicumque est similitudo, ibi est convenientia etc.; dicendum, quod similitudo, quae est convenientia duorum in tertio, non ponitur in Deo respectu creaturae; sed similitudinem, qua aliquid dicitur esse *imitativum* alicuius, bene contingit ponere in *creatura* respectu Creatoris, et similitudinem, qua aliquid dicitur esse *exemplativum* alicuius, in *Creatore* respectu creaturae. Ad hanc enim similitudinem non requiritur convenientia per participationem alicuius *communis*, sed sufficit convenientia *ordinis* secundum rationem causantis et causati, exprimentis et expressi.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est relatio aequiparantiae etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de illa similitudine, quae causatur per convenientiam unius tertii participati; et hoc modo non ponimus eam hic. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur de aequalitate. — Quod tamen quaeritur: cur non est aliquo modo aequalitas, sicut similitudo? dicendum, quod *aequalitas* includit in se commensurationem, quae nullo modo potest esse inter finitum et infinitum; *similitudo* autem dicit expressionem, et haec bene potest esse inter Creatorem et creaturam. Unde sicut non sequitur: hoc non aequatur illi, ergo non imitatur illud, vel non exemplatur ab illo; sic intelligendum est in proposito.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aliqua est similitudo inter Creatorem et creaturam, minima est etc.; iam patet responsio: quia similitudo per *participationem* non solum minima est, verum etiam nulla; similitudo vero per *imitationem* est maior et minor in creatura, secundum quod ipsa plus vel minus accedit ad bonitatem divinam; similitudo autem per *exemplationem* et *expressionem* summa est in Creatore respectu omnis creaturae, quia ipsa veritas, cum sit summa lux, summe exprimit omnia; et ideo non sequitur, quod magis cognoscat unam creaturam quam aliam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una creatura magis assimilatur Deo quam alia etc.; iam similiter patet responsio: hoc enim verum est de similitudine *imitativa* ex parte creaturae; sed haec non est ratio cognoscendi, sed altera, videlicet *exemplativa*, quae summe[^p9-6] et aequaliter exprimit omnia.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si intellectus noster esset omnino in actu, non indigeret similitudine etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indigeret similitudine accepta vel recepta *ab extra*, sed nihilominus ipse uteretur *se* ut similitudine ad cognoscendum alia; et hoc modo, non alio, ponimus similitudinem in cognitione divina.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est ratio ductiva in aliud etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de similitudine, quae dependet a re *extra*; de

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alia autem similitudine non est verum, quod per modum decursus et viae, sed solum per modum lucis perfecte exprimentis et quietantis ipsum[^p10-1] cognoscentem.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est ratio cognoscendi etc.; dicendum, quod veritas dupliciter dicitur: uno modo *veritas* idem est quod *rei entitas*, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis[^p10-2], quod « verum est id quod est ». Alio modo veritas est *lux expressiva in cognitione intellectuali*, secundum quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Veritate[^p10-3], quod « veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis ». Primo modo *veritas* est ratio cognoscendi, sed remota; secundo modo est ratio cognoscendi proxima et immediata. Cum ergo dicitur, quod veritas magis salvatur in ipsa rei entitate quam in similitudine; verum est de veritate primo modo, non secundo. Sed veritas illa, quae est ratio cognoscendi proxima et immediata, illa magis salvatur in similitudine, quae est apud intellectum, maxime et potissime in illa similitudine, quae est *exemplativa* rerum; illa enim similitudo exemplaris perfectius exprimit rem, quam ipsa res causata exprimat se ipsam. Et propter hoc Deus perfectius cognoscit res per similitudines illas, quam cognosceret per suas essentias; et Angeli perfectius cognoscunt in Verbo quam in proprio genere. Propter quod et Augustinus frequenter dicit[^p10-4], quod cognitio in Verbo assimilatur luci diei, cognitio autem in proprio genere assimilatur vesperi, propter hoc quod omnis creatura tenebra est respectu divinae lucis.

10. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod in separatis a materia non differt etc.; dicendum, quod verbum illud non tantum intelligitur de separatis a materia a parte intelligentium[^p10-5], verum etiam intelligibilium, utpote quando separatum a materia intelligit separatum a materia, tunc idem erit *quod intelligit* et *quo intelligitur*; et hoc non semper, sed quando intellectus convertitur in se ipsum. Et hoc locum habet, quando Deus intelligit se; non autem habet locum in ipso respectu creaturae, quia, licet Deus sit separatus a materia, non tamen res intellectae.

11. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod ubi est immediatio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis etc.; dicendum, quod unio cognoscentis et cognoscibilis dupliciter potest esse: aut secundum rationem *essendi* et *conservandi* et *causandi*; aut secundum rationem *cognoscendi*. Tunc autem est immediata coniunctio secundum rationem *causandi*, quando causa immediate producit et causat et tenet effectum; tunc autem est immediata coniunctio secundum rationem *cognoscendi*, quando cognoscens cognoscit cognoscibile vel per essentiam cognoscentis, vel per essentiam cogniti; et tunc non est opus similitudine intermedia, quae differat ab utroque extremorum. Nihilominus tamen ipsa essentia, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi, tenet rationem similitudinis; et hoc modo ponimus similitudinem circa divinam cognitionem, quae non est aliud quam ipsa essentia cognoscentis.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est cognitio per essentiam quam per similitudinem etc.; dicendum, quod verum est de illa similitudine, quae est abstracta et causata ab ipsa rei essentia, cuiusmodi requiritur similitudo ad cognitionem causatam; sed non est verum de similitudine, quae est idem quod essentia cognoscentis. Perfectior enim est cognitio, qua cognoscens utitur se ipso ut similitudine ad cognoscendum aliquid, quam cognitio, qua cognoscens recipit aliquid ex parte cogniti[^p10-6].

13. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod quanto cognitio est nobilior, tanto immediatior est coniunctio et unio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile etc.; iam patet responsio: quia similitudo, quae non est aliud quam ipsum cognoscens, non ponit distantiam aliquam secundum rem nec etiam secundum rationem, quia cognoscens in quantum cognoscens dicit rationem similitudinis; et ideo similitudo, quae est ratio[^p10-7] cognoscendi, in nullo egreditur extra rationem cognoscentis et cognoscibilis.

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### Question II. *Whether God knows things through the likenesses of things, or through their essence.*

Granted that God knows infinite things, it is asked whether he knows those things which he knows through the *likenesses* of things, or through their essence[^p6-7]. And that it is through *likenesses* seems to be shown thus:

1. First, by the authority of Scripture. John, chapter one[^p6-8]: *That which was made, in him was life*: therefore all things which have been made were beforehand in God as knowing them: therefore either through a likeness or through their truth; but not through their truth, since as yet nothing existed: therefore through a likeness.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* VI[^p6-9] says that "the Son is an art full of all the living

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and unchangeable accounts"; but the accounts in an art are nothing else than the likenesses of the things made by art and known by the artificer: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* IX, chapter eleven[^p7-1], says: "All knowledge according to species is like to that thing which it knows"; but divine cognition, since it is not according to privation, is according to species: therefore it is necessary that it be like to that thing which it knows. But it would not be like unless it had the likeness of the thing: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher[^p7-2] says "that the understanding is in a certain way all things"; but this is for no other reason than that the one understanding, by the very fact that he understands, is made like to the thing understood: therefore if this belongs to the general account of understanding, then if God understands and knows anything, it is necessary that he have the likenesses of the things which he knows: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, for anything to be perfectly known it is necessary that there be an adequation of the understanding to the intelligible[^p7-3]; but a created thing cannot be made adequate to the creating understanding by its own nature, since that understanding is simple and the thing itself composite: therefore it is necessary that it be made adequate to it through some likeness that is simple and separated from all matter: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, God knows things in the same way after they have been made in which he knew them before they came to be, because divine knowledge does not change; but before they came to be, he could not know them through their proper essences; and he knew them either through their likenesses or through their essences; and not through their essences: therefore through likenesses. And he knows now in the same way in which he knew then; therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, God is an *agent acting from a purpose*[^p7-4]; but every agent acting from a purpose preconceives that which it is going to make; and everything which preconceives something has that thing in some manner in its own keeping, either through its truth or through its likeness: therefore if, before things came to be, God did not have them in his keeping as to their essences, then he had them as to their likenesses.

8. Likewise, God is *exemplar* truly and properly, just as he is truly and properly *efficient cause* and *end*; but nothing is exemplar truly and properly except what has the likenesses of the things exemplified, through which it knows and makes them: therefore, as the account of exemplarity belongs to God, so also does the account of likeness[^p7-5].

9. Likewise, God truly[^p7-6] is the eternal *mirror*, leading to the knowing of every other knowable thing; but a mirror does not lead to the knowing of another thing unless it has that thing's likeness; therefore the same as before.

10. Likewise, God is truly and properly *word*; but a word is the likeness of that which is said: therefore if the Son of God is the Word by which all things are said[^p7-7], it is necessary that in him there be the likenesses of all the things said.

11. Likewise, two things concur for the perfection of cognition, namely *light* and *likeness*; but the account of the most perfect light is wholly preserved in the divine cognition: therefore likewise also the account of expressive likeness.

**Contra:** 1. Anselm in the *Monologion*, chapter thirty-one: "It is manifest that in the Word, *through which all things were made*[^p7-8], there is not the likeness of those things, but their true and simple essence": therefore if God does not know through anything outside himself, he does not know through a likeness, but rather through their essence.

2. Likewise, wherever there is *likeness*, there is *agreement*, and wherever there is *agreement*, there is a *sharing* of some one thing by several; but God and the creature share nothing as one, since then that thing would be simpler[^p7-9] than the Creator; therefore it is impossible that there be any likeness in the Creator with respect to the creature, or conversely.

3. Likewise, likeness is a relation of equiparance[^p7-10]; but between the Creator and the creature there can be no relation of equiparance: therefore neither any likeness.

4. Likewise, just as *equality* is caused by unity in *quantity*, so *likeness* is caused by unity in *quality*[^p7-11]; but between the Creator and the creature *equality* is in no way found, neither truly nor by transference: therefore neither is *likeness*, by the like account; or if *likeness* is found there and not *equality*, it is asked whence this comes.

5. Likewise, if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is the least: therefore if likeness is the account of knowing, then, speaking as such, where there is greater likeness there is a greater account of knowing, and where there is least likeness, least: if therefore God knows things through likenesses, it follows from this that he has the least cognition of things; which it is blasphemous to say.

6. Likewise, one creature is more assimilated to God than another, as that which exists, lives and senses is more assimilated than

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that which only exists: if therefore[^p8-1] a greater likeness is a greater account of knowing, then God knows one creature more than another.

7. Likewise, if our understanding were wholly in act, it would not need a likeness: therefore since the divine understanding is wholly in act[^p8-2] and is light with respect to everything knowable, it seems that no account of likeness is required for God's cognition.

8. Likewise, a likeness is an account leading to something else, namely to that of which it is the likeness; but where there is such a leading, there is a running-through and a ratiocinative comparison, and this in no way belongs to divine cognition: therefore neither does the account of likeness.

9. Likewise, truth is the account of knowing; therefore in the most powerful cognition the intention of truth is most powerfully preserved; but truth is more preserved in the thing itself than in its likeness: therefore if divine cognition is the most noble, it does not know things through likenesses, but through their essences.

10. Likewise, the Philosopher, in *On the Soul* III[^p8-3]: "In things separated from matter, that *which* is understood and that *by which* it is understood are the same"; but God is wholly separated from matter: therefore that *which* he knows and that *by which* he knows are the same. But he knows things outside himself: therefore he knows them through their own essences, not through any likenesses.

11. Likewise, wherever there is an immediate and undivided conjunction of the knower and the knowable, there is no need of a likeness; but God is most inward to every created thing: therefore for the cognition of it he does not need any likeness.

12. Likewise, the mode of knowing through the essence is more noble than that through a likeness; which is clear, because that mode of knowing pertains to the third heaven, as Augustine says in *On Genesis to the Letter* XII[^p8-4]: therefore, if what is more noble is to be attributed to God, it seems more fitting to hold that God knows things through their essences rather than through likenesses.

13. Likewise, the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable; but divine cognition has nobility in every way: therefore also the most perfect union. But the conjunction[^p8-5] and union is more immediate when the knower is united to the knowable as to its essence than as to its likeness: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusio.** God knows things through the eternal accounts, which are the exemplar likenesses of things, most perfectly representative and expressive, and essentially the same as what God himself is.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to blessed Dionysius and according to blessed Augustine in many places, God knows things through the eternal accounts. For blessed Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*, chapter five[^p8-6]: "We call *exemplars* those substantified and singularly pre-existing accounts of existing things which theology calls *predefinitions*, and the divine and good wills, determinative and effective of existing things, according to which the supersubstantial existence predefined and produced all things." Likewise, Augustine in *Confessions* I, near the beginning, speaking to God, says thus: "O God and Lord of all things which thou hast created, with thee stand the causes of all unstable things, and the unchangeable origins of all changeable things abide, and the everlasting accounts of all irrational and temporal things live." Likewise, in *On the City of God* XI, chapter ten[^p8-7], the same man says: "There are not many wisdoms, but one wisdom, in which are certain infinite and, to it, finite treasures of intelligible things, in which are all the invisible and unchangeable accounts of things, even of visible and changeable things, which were made through it, since God made nothing unknowingly," etc.

But these everlasting accounts are not the true essences and quiddities of things, since they are not other than the Creator; whereas the creature and the Creator necessarily have differing essences: and therefore it is necessary that they be exemplar forms, and through this representative likenesses of the things themselves; and therefore they are accounts of knowing, since cognition, by the very fact that it is cognition, bespeaks an assimilation and an expression between the knower and the knowable. And therefore it must be held, according as the Saints say and reasons show, that God knows things through their likenesses.

But for the understanding of the question itself and of the objections, it must be noted that *likeness* is said in two ways: in one way through the agreement of two things in a

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third, in which way it is said that "likeness is the same quality of differing things[^p9-1]." In another way *likeness* is said because one thing is the likeness of another; and this is twofold: one likeness is *imitative*, and thus the creature is the likeness of the Creator; another is *exemplative*, and thus in the Creator the exemplar account is the likeness of the creature. But likeness spoken of in either way, namely *imitative* and *exemplative*, is *expressing and expressive*[^p9-2]; and this is the likeness which is required for having knowledge of things. — But some *knowledge causes things* and some is *caused by things*. For knowledge *caused by things* an *imitative* likeness is required[^p9-3]; and this likeness is from without, and therefore it posits some composition and addition about the knowing understanding; and hence it is that it bears witness to imperfection. — But for knowledge *causing things* an *exemplative* likeness is required, and this indeed is not from without, nor does it induce any composition, nor does it bear witness to any imperfection, but to perfection in every way. For since the divine understanding itself is the highest light and full truth and pure act, then, just as the divine power in causing things is of itself sufficient to produce all things, so the divine light and truth is sufficient to express all things; and since *to express* is an intrinsic act, it is therefore eternal; and since expression is a kind of assimilation, therefore the divine understanding, expressing all things eternally by its own highest truth, has eternally the exemplar likenesses of all things, which are not *other* than himself, but are essentially what he is[^p9-4]. — *Again*, since he expresses inasmuch as he is the highest light and pure act, he therefore expresses most lucidly, most expressly, most perfectly, and through this equally and according to an intention of likeness in no way diminished; and hence it is that he knows all things most perfectly, most distinctly and most entirely. — These things seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

1. To that, then, which is objected in the first place from Anselm, it must be said that Anselm is there speaking of the likeness which is caused by the truth of the thing; whence he there takes *likeness* according as it expresses under the account of imitation rather than of exemplarity; and in this way it is posited in the product with respect to the *producer*, and not conversely, as he adds[^p9-5]; but in the other way nothing prevents its being posited in the producer with respect to the *product*.

2. To that which is objected — wherever there is likeness, there is agreement, etc. — it must be said that the likeness which is the agreement of two things in a third is not posited in God with respect to the creature; but the likeness by which something is said to be *imitative* of another may well be posited in the *creature* with respect to the Creator, and the likeness by which something is said to be *exemplative* of another, in the *Creator* with respect to the creature. For this likeness does not require agreement through the participation of something *common*, but agreement of *order* suffices, according to the account of causing and caused, of expressing and expressed.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that likeness is a relation of equiparance, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is caused through the agreement of one participated third; and in this way we do not posit it here. — And through this the answer is clear to that which is objected concerning equality. — But as to what is asked — why there is not equality in some way, as there is likeness — it must be said that *equality* includes in itself a commensuration which can in no way exist between the finite and the infinite; whereas *likeness* bespeaks expression, and this can well exist between the Creator and the creature. Hence, just as it does not follow: this is not equal to that, therefore it does not imitate it, or is not exemplified by it; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature it is the least, etc., the answer is already clear: because likeness through *participation* is not only the least but rather none at all; whereas likeness through *imitation* is greater and less in the creature, according as the creature approaches more or less to the divine goodness; but likeness through *exemplation* and *expression* is highest in the Creator with respect to every creature, since truth itself, being the highest light, expresses all things in the highest degree; and therefore it does not follow that he knows one creature more than another.

6. To that which is objected, that one creature is more assimilated to God than another, etc., the answer is likewise already clear: for this is true of *imitative* likeness on the part of the creature; but this is not the account of knowing, but the other, namely the *exemplative*, which in the highest degree[^p9-6] and equally expresses all things.

7. To that which is objected, that if our understanding were wholly in act it would not need a likeness, etc., it must be said that it is true that it would not need a likeness taken or received *from without*, but nonetheless it would use *itself* as a likeness for knowing other things; and in this way, and no other, do we posit a likeness in the divine cognition.

8. To that which is objected, that a likeness is an account leading to something else, etc., it must be said that this is true of the likeness which depends on a thing *outside*; but of

<!-- page 10 -->

the other likeness it is not true — not, that is, after the manner of a running-through and a way, but only after the manner of a light perfectly expressing and quieting the knower himself[^p10-1].

9. To that which is objected, that truth is the account of knowing, etc., it must be said that truth is spoken of in two ways: in one way *truth* is the same as *the entity of the thing*, according as Augustine says in the *Soliloquies*[^p10-2] that "the true is that which is." In another way truth is *the expressive light in intellectual cognition*, according as Anselm says in the book *On Truth*[^p10-3] that "truth is a rightness perceptible by the mind alone." In the first way *truth* is the account of knowing, but a remote one; in the second way it is the proximate and immediate account of knowing. When therefore it is said that truth is more preserved in the very entity of the thing than in a likeness, this is true of truth in the first way, not in the second. But that truth which is the proximate and immediate account of knowing is more preserved in the likeness which is present to the understanding, and most of all and most powerfully in that likeness which is *exemplative* of things; for that exemplar likeness expresses the thing more perfectly than the caused thing itself expresses itself. And on this account God knows things more perfectly through those likenesses than he would know them through their own essences; and the Angels know more perfectly in the Word than in the proper genus. On which account Augustine also frequently says[^p10-4] that cognition in the Word is likened to the light of day, whereas cognition in the proper genus is likened to evening, for the reason that every creature is darkness with respect to the divine light.

10. But to that which is objected, that in things separated from matter there is no difference, etc., it must be said that that saying is understood not only of things separated from matter on the side of the things understanding[^p10-5], but also on the side of the things intelligible — as, for instance, when what is separated from matter understands what is separated from matter, then that *which* it understands and that *by which* it is understood will be the same; and this not always, but when the understanding is turned back upon itself. And this has place when God understands himself; but it does not have place in him with respect to the creature, since, although God is separated from matter, the things understood are not.

11. But to that which is objected, that where there is immediacy of the knower and the knowable, etc., it must be said that the union of knower and knowable can be twofold: either according to the account of *being* and of *conserving* and of *causing*; or according to the account of *knowing*. Now the conjunction is immediate according to the account of *causing* when the cause immediately produces and causes and sustains the effect; and the conjunction is immediate according to the account of *knowing* when the knower knows the knowable either through the essence of the knower or through the essence of the thing known; and then there is no need of an intermediate likeness differing from both of the extremes. Nevertheless the essence itself, inasmuch as it is the account of knowing, holds the account of likeness; and in this way we posit a likeness about the divine cognition, which is nothing other than the very essence of the knower.

12. To that which is objected, that cognition through the essence is more noble than through a likeness, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is abstracted and caused from the essence of the thing itself, of which sort is the likeness required for a caused cognition; but it is not true of the likeness which is the same as the essence of the knower. For that cognition is more perfect by which the knower uses himself as a likeness for knowing something, than the cognition by which the knower receives something from the side of the thing known[^p10-6].

13. But to that which is objected, that the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable, etc., the answer is already clear: because a likeness which is nothing other than the knower himself posits no distance either in reality or even in account, since the knower inasmuch as he is a knower bespeaks the account of likeness; and therefore the likeness which is the account[^p10-7] of knowing in no way goes out beyond the account of the knower and the knowable.

---

la: De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. — Pro *earum essentiam* D *ipsas essentias*, F *earum essentias*, C falso *essentiam suam*.

en: On this question compare I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 1. — In place of *earum essentiam*, D has *ipsas essentias*, F *earum essentias*, C wrongly *essentiam suam*.

la: Vers. 3. seq. — Inferius pro *aliquid esset* cod. F *aliquid essent*.

en: Verse 3 f. — Below, in place of *aliquid esset*, codex F has *aliquid essent*.

la: Cap. 10. n. 11. — Inferius A B C F omittunt *et*.

en: Chapter 10, n. 11. — Below, A B C F omit *et*.

la: Ibid. n. 16, ubi verbis praedictis addit: Est enim alia notitia secundum *privationem*, quam cum improbamus, loquimur; et haec privationis improbatio speciem laudat, ideoque approbatur.

en: Ibid., n. 16, where to the aforesaid words he adds: For there is another knowledge according to *privation*, of which we speak when we disapprove; and this disapproval of privation praises the species, and is therefore approved.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.). — Pro *intellectus* textus originalis *anima*, A *intelligens*.

en: *On the Soul* III, text 37 (c. 8). — In place of *intellectus* the original text has *anima*, and A has *intelligens*.

la: In qua adaequatione consistit *veritas*; cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.

en: In which adequation *truth* consists; compare tome I, p. 707, note 5.

la: De hac dictione cfr. tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.

en: On this expression compare tome I, p. 714, note 3.

la: Respicitur in hoc arg. definitio *ideae* i. e. exemplaris, ad quod respiciens artifex id quod proposuit effecit. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 7.

en: In this argument regard is had to the definition of the *idea*, i.e. of the exemplar, looking to which the artificer brings about what he has purposed. Compare tome I, p. 600, note 7.

la: Cod. D *vere et proprie*.

en: Codex D has *vere et proprie*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — In fine arg. D *cognitorum* pro *dictorum*.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 27, p. II, q. 2. — At the end of the argument D has *cognitorum* for *dictorum*.

la: Ioan. 1, 3: Omnia per ipsum facta sunt. — Verbo *Manifestum* D F praemittunt *Satis* (textus originalis *Satis itaque*).

en: John 1:3: All things were made through him. — Before the word *Manifestum*, D F prefix *Satis* (the original text has *Satis itaque*).

la: Quia universalius, sicut genus simplicius est speciebus; cfr. Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.).

en: Because more universal, as the genus is simpler than the species; compare Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1).

la: Scilicet in qua sunt eiusdem rationis et eodem nomine denominantur extrema; cfr. tom. I. pag. 346, nota 5.

en: Namely, one in which the extremes are of the same account and are denominated by the same name; compare tome I, p. 346, note 5.

la: Ut docet Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.). — Inferius pro *transumtive* D F H *interpretative*.

en: As Aristotle teaches, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV, c. 15). — Below, in place of *transumtive*, D F H have *interpretative*.

la: C addit *similitudo in Deo est ratio cognoscendi*, et in fine arg. subiungit *sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.*

en: C adds *similitudo in Deo est ratio cognoscendi*, and at the end of the argument subjoins *sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.*

la: D E H *sit actus*.

en: D E H have *sit actus*.

la: Text. 15. (c. 4.), ubi docet, in substantiis immaterialibus idem esse intelligens ac intelligibile, et sic idem a se et per se intelligi. — In fine arg. pro *aliquas* F *suas*.

en: Text 15 (c. 4), where he teaches that in immaterial substances the one understanding and the intelligible are the same, and that thus the same thing is understood by itself and through itself. — At the end of the argument, in place of *aliquas*, F has *suas*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 15. seqq., ubi distinguit triplicem visionem, scil. corporalem (per corporis sensus), spiritualem et intellectualem; ultima respondet *tertio caelo*, in quod raptus est Apostolus Paulus (II. Cor. 12, 2.).

en: Chapter 6, n. 15 ff., where he distinguishes a threefold vision, namely bodily (through the senses of the body), spiritual and intellectual; the last answers to the *third heaven*, into which the Apostle Paul was caught up (II Cor. 12:2).

la: Ita H, in aliis *cognitio*.

en: So H; in the others, *cognitio*.

la: Paragr. 8. — D H haec verba Dionysii omittunt et verborum August., I. Confess. c. 6. n. 9, principium sic exhibent: Tu Domine, qui et semper vivis, et nihil moritur in te, quoniam ante primordia saeculorum et ante omne, quod vel ante dici potest, tu es et Deus es etc.

en: Paragraph 8. — D H omit these words of Dionysius and give the beginning of the words of Augustine, *Confessions* I, c. 6, n. 9, thus: Thou, Lord, who both ever livest, and in whom nothing dies, since before the beginnings of the ages and before everything that can even be called "before," thou art and thou art God, etc.

la: Num. 3. Post *Non*, pro quo H cum textu originali *Neque*, E H, textu originali approbante, addunt *enim*. Subinde post *in qua sunt* textus originalis prosequitur *immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri* (Col. 2, 3.); de hoc loco cfr. supra pag. 1, nota 2.

en: Number 3. After *Non* — for which H, with the original text, has *Neque* — E H, with the approval of the original text, add *enim*. Then, after *in qua sunt*, the original text continues *immensi quidam atque infiniti thesauri* (Col. 2:3); on this passage compare above, p. 1, note 2.

la: Ut ait Boeth. III. de Differentiis topic. Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 139, nota 5. — De duplici hac similitudine cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. in corp. et ad 2, ubi refertur similitudo *univocationis* (duorum in tertio), *imitationis* et *expressionis*.

en: As Boethius says, *On Topical Differences* III. Compare tome IV, p. 139, note 5. — On this twofold likeness compare I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 1, in the body and ad 2, where the likeness of *univocation* (of two things in a third), of *imitation* and of *expression* is reported.

la: Scilicet quatenus intellectui facit obiecta cognoscere; cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. in corp., et Hexaëm. Serm. 12. et etiam solut. ad 9.

en: Namely, inasmuch as it makes the objects known to the understanding; compare I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 1, in the body, and the *Hexaëmeron,* Sermon 12, and also the solution ad 9.

la: Ita recte A G, alii *exemplativa*.

en: So rightly A G; the others have *exemplativa*.

la: Ita B E G (G supplet *id* ante *quod*), qui tamen perperam omittunt *aliud* ante *ab ipso*, refragantibus aliis codd., sed hi deinde corrupte varia exhibent.

en: So B E G (G supplies *id* before *quod*), which however wrongly omit *aliud* before *ab ipso*, the other codices opposing; but these latter then present various corrupt readings.

la: Loc. cit.: In factis vero non esse simplicem absolutamque essentiam, sed verae illius essentiae vix aliquam imitationem. Unde necesse est, non idem Verbum secundum rerum creatarum similitudinem magis vel minus esse verum, sed omnem creatam naturam eo altiori gradu essentiae dignitatisque consistere, quo magis illi propinquare videtur.

en: Loc. cit.: But in the things made there is not a simple and absolute essence, but scarcely any imitation of that true essence. Whence it is necessary that the same Word be not more or less true according to the likeness of created things, but that every created nature stand at a higher degree of essence and of dignity in proportion as it is seen to approach nearer to it.

la: C *simul similiter*, F *similiter*.

en: C has *simul similiter*, F *similiter*.

la: F *spiritum*.

en: F has *spiritum*.

la: Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.

en: Book II, c. 5, n. 8: The true seems to me to be that which is.

la: Sive in Dialogo de veritate, c. 11.

en: Or rather in the *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 11.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3. q. 2, ubi diversi loci August. in nota 5. allegati sunt. — Superius vocibus *quam cognosceret* D H interserunt *si*, et post *cognoscunt* A supplet *res*.

en: Compare II *Sentences,* d. 4, a. 3, q. 2, where various passages of Augustine are alleged in note 5. — Above, between the words *quam cognosceret*, D H insert *si*, and after *cognoscunt* A supplies *res*.

la: A B *intellectus*. Inferius post *tunc* F prosequitur *enim idem intelligit se, non autem habet* etc. Pro *quod intelligit* D H *quod intelligitur*.

en: A B have *intellectus*. Below, after *tunc*, F continues *enim idem intelligit se, non autem habet* etc. In place of *quod intelligit*, D H have *quod intelligitur*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1. ad 3.

en: See I *Sentences,* d. 35, q. 1, ad 3.

la: F *medium*.

en: F has *medium*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi plate of pp. 6–10 (`extract-pages.py --volume vol5 --pages 7,8,9,10 --dpi 450`; p. 6 was already on disk from `bon-qsc-q1`). Page size verified at 2571×3823 for all five leaves. Read via `colcrop.py` column bands at 1.6× (three bands per column, each read left column top-to-bottom then right column), plus a full-width reduced overview of p. 10 to fix the boundary and targeted 2–3× crops for the p. 6 and p. 8 registers. English translated fresh and literally against the corrected Latin.

**⭐ BOUNDARY AT p. 10 MEASURED — AND IT FORWARDS.** The second of this work's five unmeasured boundaries, taken on the plate. p. 10 is shared: Q. II's replies 9–13 fill both columns down to ~63 % of the leaf; `QUAESTIO III.` then stands full-measure across the leaf with its italic subtitle *Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines realiter differentes.*; and **Q. III's own numbered body begins on the same leaf** — the opening *Supposito, quod Deus cognoscat res per similitudines exemplares, quaeritur…* in the left column, and argument 1 (*Auctoritate.* Augustinus, Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quaestione de ideis) in the right, running to the foot. By the p. 498 rule — a shared page forwards only when the incoming unit's numbered *body* reaches it — **p. 10 FORWARDS.** The leaf's eight footnotes split by anchor accordingly: **nn. 1–7 are Q. II's** (n. 1 → reply 8's *ipsum*¹; n. 2 → reply 9's *Soliloquiis*²; n. 3 → *de Veritate*³; n. 4 → *frequenter dicit*⁴; n. 5 → reply 10's *intelligentium*⁵; n. 6 → reply 12's *cogniti*⁶; n. 7 → reply 13's *ratio*⁷) and **n. 8 is Q. III's**, answering its argument 1's *de ideis*⁸. This chunk closes its register at **p. 10 n. 7**; `bon-qsc-q3` opens at n. 8. ⚠ **Two boundaries measured in this work, two "yes" answers — that is still not a pattern.** The remaining four (pp. 17, 27, 32, 37) stay UNMEASURED; re-ask the rule on the plate at each.

**Hand-off picked up at p. 6.** `bon-qsc-q1` forwarded p. 6 nn. 7–9 with its register closed at n. 6, and this chunk opens at n. 7 exactly as predicted: n. 7 anchors the opening sentence's *essentiam*⁷ (and is the work's own back-reference *De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.*), n. 8 the *Ioannis primo*⁸ of argument 1, n. 9 the *sexto de Trinitate*⁹ of argument 2. `tools/check-vol5-apparatus.py`'s PENDING line for p. 6 nn. 7–9 clears with this chunk.

**Gutter, measured per leaf; the parity model was not used as a predictor.**
- **p. 6: ADOPT 1424, re-derived for THIS chunk's region.** `bon-qsc-q1` measured 1424 above the `QUAESTIO II.` heading (rows 0.20–0.50) and only corroborated it below. Re-profiled here in 0.05-step windows across the whole leaf: rows 0.15–0.55 return **1423–1424 on 60–61 px runs** at every step, and the two-column band that carries Q. II's own opening block sits on the same rule. ⚠ The default 0.45–0.92 body window returns **1398 on a 2 px run** and rows 0.62–0.90 return **1242 on a 316 px run** — both nonsense, both for the reason the frozen rule names.
- **p. 7: 1141.** Sound and unambiguous, the only leaf of the five where the default window is safe: 0.20–0.50 gives 1140/61 px, 0.45–0.92 gives 1145/53 px, 0.30–0.70 gives 1141/58 px, 0.62–0.90 gives 1146/56 px — four independent windows within 6 px, all on 53–61 px runs.
- **p. 8: 1397.** ⚠ **The default is unsafe here too:** rows 0.45–0.92 return 1418 on a **2 px** run, and 0.62–0.90 the same. Profiling the body rows 0.20–0.50 and 0.30–0.70 returns **1396–1397 on 59 px runs**, and that is the reading adopted.
- **p. 9: 1214.** ⚠ Same failure: the default returns 1226 on a **3 px** run. Rows 0.20–0.50 give 1214/61 px and 0.30–0.70 give 1210/56 px; **1214** adopted.
- **p. 10: 1354.** Rows 0.20–0.50 give 1354 on a 59 px run; the wider windows give 1362 on a 38 px run. The narrower, longer run is the reading; the 8 px spread is well inside tolerance and the crop at 1354 splits both columns cleanly.
- ⭐ **The lesson generalises beyond a mid-leaf `QUAESTIO` heading.** `bon-qsc-q1` found the default window unsafe on p. 6 and attributed it to the full-measure heading sitting inside that window. pp. 8 and 9 carry **no** heading and the default fails on them exactly the same way — a 2–3 px run. **In this work, profile rows 0.20–0.50 on every leaf and treat the default as advisory**, heading or no heading.

**⚠ Digits — read off the plate, as the work requires.** Every `pag. N`, `d. N. a. M. q. K`, `text. N` and `c. N` in this chunk's thirty-four entries was read from the 450 dpi plate rather than from the djvu OCR, per the rule frozen after `bon-qsc-q1` caught five such defects on pp. 3–5. The OCR's visible garbles in this band (`Cap. 10. n. M.` for p. 6 n. 9's **n. 11**; `Vei's. 3. seq.` for p. 6 n. 8; `.\ristol.` and `tlictione` on p. 6's left-column register) are all resolved on the plate. **No new digit defect was found in this chunk's own eleven cross-references** — which is a negative result, not a licence to trust the OCR at the next chunk.

**⚠ ONE Quaracchi-side digit oddity, transcribed exactly as printed and logged, not corrected.** p. 8 n. 7 ends *de hoc loco cfr. supra pag. 1, nota 2*. The glyph is unambiguously the font's **1** at 3× (the same bare vertical with a top-left flag that prints in *q. 1.* and *n. 11.* on p. 6's register), but **p. 1 is the three questions' shared half-title and carries no notes**, and the locus the note points to is beyond doubt **p. 3, note 2** — that note is precisely the one that records this same Augustine text (*XI De civ. Dei* c. 10) and its variant *immensi quidam atque infiniti*, and it says of itself *Idem locus occurrit infra q. 2. in corp.*, i.e. here. This is a Quaracchi typographical slip, not an OCR defect and not an ambiguous reading, so it is transcribed as printed and recorded here — the same disposition as `bon-praec-c6`'s dangling `IV. Sent. d. 25. a. 4. q. 3.` cross-reference. **Non-blocking; logged for the work-close gate.**

**⚠ ONE footnote DOES run over the gutter, and it is the first in this work.** p. 9 n. 4 begins in the left-column register (*Ita B E G (G supplet* id *ante* quod*), qui tamen perperam*) and completes in the right-column register (*omittunt* aliud *ante* ab ipso*, refragantibus aliis codd., sed hi deinde corrupte varia exhibent.*). It is transcribed here as the single entry it is. `bon-qsc-q1` recorded that no entry ran over a boundary or the gutter anywhere in pp. 3–6; that is now false for the work as a whole, so **do not carry `q1`'s observation forward as a work-level rule**. No entry runs over a *page* boundary in this chunk.

**⚠ A dropped full stop on p. 10, restored silently and recorded here.** Reply 9 ends *…propter hoc quod omnis creatura tenebra est respectu divinae lucis* with **no terminal period in the print** (verified on the plate at the foot of the left column, immediately above reply 10). The period is supplied in both the Latin and the English. This is a typographic accident, not a textual variant, so it is recorded rather than carried as a `[?]` flag.

**Register.**
- ***intellectus* → understanding · *intelligentia* → intelligence — HELD, and this chunk is the harder test of the two so far.** Where `bon-qsc-q1` put the rule under pressure by setting *intellectus humanus* against *intellectus divinus*, this question makes *intellectus* the running subject of the whole solution — *intellectus divinus est summa lux*, *intellectus noster … omnino in actu*, *intellectui creanti*, *adaequatio intellectus ad intelligibile*, *quando intellectus convertitur in se ipsum* — nineteen occurrences, every one "understanding," **with no departure and the ratified narrow exception not reached for.** The Aristotelian *quod intellectus quodam modo est omnia* (CONTRA 4's *anima* variant is in p. 7 n. 2) is the site where "intellect" is most idiomatic in received English; the rule was followed there too.
- ***Ad intelligentiam ipsius quaestionis* → "for the understanding of the question" — following `bon-qsc-q1`, not departing from the rule.** `q1` rendered the identical formula *Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum* as "For the understanding of the foregoing." The rule governs *intelligentia* as the term of art (the faculty and mode — *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*, "the knowledge of simple intelligence"); this is the ordinary Latin idiom "so that X may be understood," and it is not the term of art. **Recorded so that a third chunk does not read the formula as an unlogged departure.**
- ***similitudo* → likeness throughout — the chunk's load-bearing word, ~90 occurrences, no variation.** The three-way distinction the *Respondeo* turns on comes across without strain: *similitudo imitativa* → "imitative likeness," *similitudo exemplativa* → "exemplative likeness," *exprimens et expressiva* → "expressing and expressive." *exemplatur* → "is exemplified," *exemplatio* → "exemplation" (a coinage the Latin itself is coining). **No table entry proposed; recorded so it is not re-decided.**
- ***ratio* → account, per the standing table, and it is exercised to the limit here.** *ratio cognoscendi* → "the account of knowing"; *ratio exemplaritatis* / *ratio similitudinis* → "the account of exemplarity" / "of likeness"; *rationes aeternae* → "the eternal accounts" (the fixed Bonaventurean term); *rationes in arte* → "the accounts in an art"; *relatio aequiparantiae* → "a relation of equiparance"; *collatio ratiocinativa* → "a ratiocinative comparison"; *secundum rationem essendi et conservandi et causandi* → "according to the account of being and of conserving and of causing." Reply 13 carries *ratio* five times in three lines and the single English word carries all five. **No new rule proposed.**
- ***notitia* → knowledge · *cognitio* → cognition — a distinction the chunk forces and the tables do not yet cover.** The *Respondeo*'s hinge is *notitia quaedam est causans res, quaedam est causata a rebus*, and two sentences later *cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognitio, assimilationem dicit*. Holding *notitia* = "knowledge" and *cognitio* = "cognition" keeps the two Latin words visibly distinct in English at the one place in the work where the distinction does argumentative work. ⚠ **Cost disclosed:** *scientia* in the work's title is also "knowledge," so "knowledge" translates two Latin words across the chunk. The collision is confined to the title and never occurs inside a single sentence. **Offered to the work-close gate; not proposed as a table entry on one chunk's evidence.**
- ***vacatio* / *quies* — NOT TESTED, by the pilot's measurement, not by oversight.** Neither family occurs on the band. But ⚠ **the *quietans* family that the pilot flagged as "a different word" does occur here**, at reply 8's *lucis perfecte exprimentis et quietantis ipsum cognoscentem* → "a light perfectly expressing and quieting the knower himself." As the pilot said, **this is not a datum on the open *vacatio*/*quies* question**, and it is recorded only so that a later chunk does not mistake it for one. The question still carries forward untested into a second work.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention, listed here in body order):
p. 6 — Fundamenta.
p. 7 — Ad oppositum.
p. 8 — Conclusio 1. · Conclusio 2. · Similitudo duplex.
p. 9 — Subdistinctio. · Notitia duplex. · De prima. · De secunda. · Notandum. · Solutio oppositorum. · Notandum. · Notandum.
p. 10 — Veritas duplex. · Notandum. · Unio duplex. · Notandum.

Seventeen across five leaves — denser still than `bon-qsc-q1`'s eleven across four, and p. 9 alone carries eight. Every one was read off the plate. None printed defectively in this span (contrast p. 5's `tinctio.`).

**Structure — three things worth recording.**
1. **The `CONTRA` series runs to THIRTEEN**, against eleven affirmative arguments; `bon-qsc-q1` had eleven and eleven. The replies match the *contra* series one-for-one, so the numbering does not drift.
2. **Replies 3 and 4 are printed as a single combined reply, headed `3. 4.`** — Quaracchi's own combination, not an omission. It is preserved verbatim as `3. 4.` rather than split, so a reader counting replies finds thirteen numbers over twelve paragraphs.
3. **`CONCLUSIO.` prints correctly here**, in full-measure letter-spaced small capitals with the conclusion itself in italic beneath — the first of the pilot's four recognisable spellings to appear undamaged. ⚠ **This does not retire the "find it by content, never by header grep" rule**; the pilot counted four spellings over seven questions, so five questions remain.

**No `SUMMARIUM`, no scholion, no articuli** — all three confirmed again on this chunk's own five leaves.

**Apparatus count: 34 entries** — p. 6 three (nn. 7–9, picked up from `bon-qsc-q1`) · p. 7 eleven (nn. 1–11) · p. 8 seven (nn. 1–7) · p. 9 six (nn. 1–6) · p. 10 seven (nn. 1–7, the leaf's n. 8 forwarded to `bon-qsc-q3`). Every marker is paired: thirty-four definitions, each cited exactly twice (Latin and English). The per-leaf spread (11 · 7 · 6 · 8-with-one-forwarded · 9-with-six-spent) straddles the pilot's ~9/page planning figure in both directions, which is what a planning figure is for.

**Zero `[?]` flags.** Nothing in this span was left ambiguous: the two anomalies above (p. 8 n. 7's `pag. 1` and p. 10's dropped period) are both *resolved* readings with a recorded disposition, not open questions.

**Registry.** `WORKS["scientia-christi"].divisions` gains division 2 with this chunk. The title was verified in place, word for word, against the italic subtitle printed under `QUAESTIO II.` on p. 6 and again against the running head `DE SCIENTIA CHRISTI QUAEST. II.` on pp. 7 and 9. No change to `buildWorkChunkTitle` is needed — the `Quaest. ${meta.division}` branch went in with `bon-qsc-q1`.

**Cadence, unchanged. TWO gates.** ▶ **Shakedown gate at the close of `bon-qsc-q4` (p. 27)**, then the **work-close gate at p. 43**. **Deploy boundary = work close**, not before; nothing in this work has been deployed. Next front is `bon-qsc-q3` (pp. 10–17), which **picks up p. 10 n. 8** and whose closing boundary at p. 17 is UNMEASURED. ⚠ `bon-qsc-q4` (pp. 17–27, 11 printed pp.) remains the largest single chunk Vol V has attempted, is not to be split, and needs the small-incremental-append content-filter discipline from the start. **Plates per quaestio, never in bulk.**