title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Levitici decimo nono[^2]: *Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum;* Glossa: «Proximus non propinquitate sanguinis intelligendus est, sed societate rationis»; sed daemones sunt rationales: ergo daemones sunt proximi nostri. Si ergo proximi sunt ex caritate diligendi, videtur, quod et daemones.

2. Item, ratio diligendi proximum est, quia est ad Dei imaginem[^3]; sed haec est in daemonibus reperire: ergo cum in eis reperiatur ratio diligendi, videtur, quod eos debeamus ex caritate diligere.

3. Item, Angeli, antequam peccarent, ex caritate diligendi erant, propter ea quae habebant in se; sed Dionysius[^4] dicit, quod «daemones habent sibi data integra et splendidissima»: ergo si tunc ex caritate diligendi erant propter ea quae tunc habebant, pari ratione videtur, quod nunc debeamus ex caritate eos diligere.

4. Item, ex caritate debemus diligere quaecumque faciunt ad cumulum nostri meriti; sed daemones nos tentantes et vexantes faciunt ad nostri meriti cumulum: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligendi sunt.

Item, ex caritate diligendum est omne quod facit ad Dei honorem et decorem divinae iustitiae; sed daemones de caelo deiecti et poenis subiecti faciunt ad manifestationem decoris divinae iustitiae: ergo videtur, quod sint ex caritate diligendi. Prima sic probatur: quia caritas diligit beatitudinem et appetit beatificari[^5]; ideo diligit omne illud, quod est ad beatitudinem ordinatum: ergo pari ratione, cum

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caritas diligat Dei honorem et laudem, diligit omne illud quod facit ad amplificationem laudis divinae. *Minor* est manifesta per se.

**Sed contra:** 1. In mandato dilectionis proximi praecipitur, ut homo diligat proximum sicut se ipsum; quod exponens Augustinus[^6] dicit: «Sicut te ipsum, id est ad quod te ipsum»; nos ipsos autem debemus diligere ad summi Boni participationem: si ergo daemones ad hanc non possunt pervenire, videtur, quod non sint diligendi ex caritate.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo[^7]: *Quis tibi videtur proximus esse?* Glossa: «Proximus est cui impenditur, vel qui impendit misericordiam»; sed daemones non sunt tales: ergo non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

3. Item, Augustinus, octavo de Trinitate[^8]: «Qui diligit homines, vel quia iusti sunt, vel ut iusti sint, amare debet»; sed daemones non sunt iusti nec possunt esse iusti: ergo non sunt ex caritate amandi.

4. Item, curia caelestis daemones non diligit, quin potius odit et detestatur: ergo si in eis est caritas maxime perfecta, et tanto perfectior est in via, quanto conformior est illis qui sunt in patria; videtur, quod nulla caritas se ad daemonum dilectionem extendere debeat.

5. Item, nihil est caritatis vinculo amplectendum, quod est perpetualiter separatum ab his quae[^9] caritate ligantur; sed daemones a membris Christi sunt sempiternaliter separati: ergo nullo modo sunt ex caritate diligendi.

> **Conclusio.** Daemones et damnati non sunt diligendi ex caritate elicitive et proprie; sumendo caritatem large, sive ex caritate imperante, ratione naturae sunt diligendi, ratione culpae odiendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut irrationalia ex caritate non sunt diligenda elicitive, quia non sunt ordinata ad illius summi Boni assecutionem, quod suis dilectis caritas optat; sic daemones, quia sunt obstinati in malitia et impossibiles effecti ad perveniendum in beatitudinem aeternam, diligendi non sunt ex caritate elicitive. — Caritas enim nullos facit diligere elicitive, nisi eos quos optat ad summam beatitudinem pervenire. Nullos autem optat pervenire ad illam supernam beatitudinem, cum moveatur rationabiliter et discrete, nisi eos qui sunt habiles ad perveniendum et secundum ordinem naturae et secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae. Quoniam ergo daemones, etsi sint apti nati per naturam felicitari et in Deo beatificari, quia tamen divina iustitia repugnat, per quam sunt damnati ad sempiternam miseriam; hinc est, quod caritas summum Bonum eisdem non optat. Et ideo concedendum est, quod daemones non sunt ex caritate diligendi.

Eodem etiam modo dicendum est de damnatis, secundum quod ex caritate diligere accipitur proprie. Si vero ex caritate diligere accipiatur large, prout actus diligendi est ex caritate imperante[^10]; sic daemones quodam modo sunt diligendi et quodam modo odiendi: odiendi ratione culpae, qua sunt Deo dissimiles, diligendi ratione naturae. Imago enim summi Regis, secundum naturam suam considerata, quantum est de se, pulcra est et formosa et naturali affectu amabilis a consimili natura[^11]. — Verumtamen, quia habens caritatem multum detestatur eorum culpam; et culpa eorum totaliter et inseparabiliter possidet eorum naturam: hinc est, quod caritas magis movet affectum naturalem ad diligendum creaturas irrationales quam ad diligendum daemones. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod daemones non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod proximus est qui communicat in ratione; dicendum, quod communicare in ratione est dupliciter: vel secundum ipsius rationis naturam puram, vel secundum ordinem et habilitatem ipsius ad gratiam. Dico ergo, quod proximitas secundum rationis naturam non est sufficiens ad hoc, quod aliquis dicatur esse proximus respectu actus diligendi; dilectio enim gratuita respicit ordinem[^12] ad gratiam. Et quoniam daemones hac proximitate carent, quia redditi sunt ad gratiam impossibiles; ideo sub nomine proximorum non continentur. Et ideo ex illa ratione non sequitur, quod diligendi sint ex caritate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est ratio diligendi in creatura[^13]; dicendum, quod imago non est sufficiens ratio diligendi, nisi in quantum

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est ordinata ad gratiam et gloriam, ad quam ordinat caritas. Et quia hoc modo non est in daemonibus, immo omnino deordinata; ideo non cogit illa ratio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod angeli, antequam peccarent, ex caritate erant diligendi; dicendum, quod hoc erat, quia tunc habilitatem et idoneitatem habebant ad assequendum gloriam; sed hanc non habuerunt post lapsum: et ideo non sunt nunc, sicut tunc, ex caritate diligendi. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod «habent sibi data integra et splendidissima»; dicendum, quod illud dicitur quantum ad potentias respectu *naturalium* operationum, non autem quantum ad habilitates earundem respectu *gratuitarum*. Inhabiles enim facti sunt ad bene faciendum: tales enim habilitates corrumpuntur per peccatum, secundum quod vult Augustinus, et in secundo libro[^1] fuit ostensum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid facit ad cumulum nostri meriti, est ex caritate diligendum; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel *secundum principalem intentionem*, vel *per occasionem*. Quamvis ergo praedicta propositio veritatem possit habere de eo quod facit ad cumulum nostri meriti secundum principalem intentionem et primariam ordinationem; de eo tamen, quod facit ad cumulum meriti per occasionem, non oportet habere veritatem, quia ex multis malis et peccatis Deus viris iustis elicit bona; et hoc modo daemones faciunt ad nostri meriti promotionem, quia, dum intendunt nos pervertere ad peccatum, virtute divina eorum exercitium convertitur viris iustis et sanctis ad meriti additamentum[^2b].

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod omne quod facit ad Dei honorem et decorem iustitiae, est diligendum ex caritate; dicendum, quod sicut ex praecedentibus[^3b] patet, si *proprie* accipiatur diligere ex caritate, propositio non habet veritatem. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod ordinatum ad *beatitudinem* est diligendum ex caritate, ergo similiter ordinatum ad *laudem*; dicendum, quod dupliciter est aliquid ordinatum ad *beatitudinem*: aut quia *ipsum de se* ordinatum est, ut perveniat ad beatitudinem; aut quia *per ipsum aliud* ordinatum est pervenire. Et quod *primo* modo ordinatum est ad beatitudinem, diligendum est ex caritate; quod *secundo* modo ordinatum est, non debet diligi ex caritate, accipiendo *proprie*[^4b]. — Similiter aliquid ordinatum ad *laudem* Dei potest esse dupliciter: aut quia *ipsum* laudat et magnificat Deum et gloriatur in laude Dei, aut quia est *materia* laudis divinae. Et quod *primo* modo ordinatum est ad Dei laudem ex caritate diligendum est; quod vero *secundo* modo ordinatum est, non oportet, quod diligatur ex caritate, nisi dicatur diligi ex caritate imperante. Caritas enim imperat homini, ut velit, omne illud esse in universo, quod excitat virum iustum ad laudandum et magnificandum Deum suum[^5b].

---

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether demons are to be loved out of charity.*

Secondly it is asked whether demons are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Leviticus, nineteenth chapter[^2]: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;* the Gloss: «The neighbor is to be understood not by closeness of blood, but by the fellowship of reason»; but demons are rational: therefore demons are our neighbors. If then neighbors are to be loved out of charity, it seems that demons are too.

2. Likewise, the ground for loving the neighbor is that he is unto the image of God[^3]; but this is to be found in demons: therefore since the ground for loving is found in them, it seems that we ought to love them out of charity.

3. Likewise, the Angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity, on account of those things which they had in themselves; but Dionysius[^4] says that «demons have the things given to them whole and most splendid»: therefore if they were then to be loved out of charity on account of those things which they then had, by parity of reasoning it seems that we ought now to love them out of charity.

4. Likewise, we ought to love out of charity whatever things contribute to the increase of our merit; but demons, by tempting and vexing us, contribute to the increase of our merit: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

Likewise, everything that contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of divine justice is to be loved out of charity; but demons, cast down from heaven and subjected to punishments, contribute to the manifestation of the adornment of divine justice: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity. The first [premise] is proved thus: because charity loves beatitude and desires to be beatified[^5]; therefore it loves everything which is ordered to beatitude: therefore by parity of reasoning, since

charity loves the honor and praise of God, it loves everything which contributes to the amplification of the divine praise. The *minor* is manifest of itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the commandment of love of neighbor it is commanded that a man love his neighbor as himself; expounding which Augustine[^6] says: «As thyself, that is, unto that unto which thyself»; but we ought to love ourselves unto participation in the supreme Good: if then demons cannot attain to this, it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, upon that passage of Luke, tenth chapter[^7]: *Who seems to thee to be neighbor?* the Gloss: «The neighbor is he to whom mercy is shown, or who shows mercy»; but demons are not such: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, Augustine, eighth book *On the Trinity*[^8]: «He who loves men ought to love them either because they are just, or that they may be just»; but demons are not just nor can they be just: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the heavenly court does not love demons, but rather hates and detests them: therefore if charity is most perfect in them, and is so much the more perfect on the way insofar as it is more conformed to those who are in the fatherland; it seems that no charity ought to extend itself to the love of demons.

5. Likewise, nothing is to be embraced by the bond of charity which is perpetually separated from those things which[^9] are bound by charity; but demons are everlastingly separated from the members of Christ: therefore in no way are they to be loved out of charity.

> **Conclusion.** Demons and the damned are not to be loved out of charity elicitively and properly; taking charity broadly, that is, out of commanding charity, they are to be loved by reason of nature, hated by reason of fault.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as irrational things are not to be loved out of charity elicitively, because they are not ordered to the attainment of that supreme Good which charity desires for its beloved; so demons, because they are obstinate in malice and rendered incapable of attaining eternal beatitude, are not to be loved out of charity elicitively. — For charity makes none be loved elicitively except those whom it desires to attain to supreme beatitude. But it desires none to attain to that supernal beatitude, since it is moved rationally and discreetly, except those who are fit for attaining it both according to the order of nature and according to the order of divine justice. Therefore since demons, although they are by nature apt to be made happy and beatified in God, yet because divine justice resists, by which they are damned to everlasting misery; hence it is that charity does not desire the supreme Good for them. And therefore it must be granted that demons are not to be loved out of charity.

In the same way too it must be said of the damned, according as to love out of charity is taken *properly*. But if to love out of charity be taken *broadly*, inasmuch as the act of loving is from commanding charity[^10]; thus demons are in a certain way to be loved and in a certain way to be hated: to be hated by reason of fault, by which they are unlike God, to be loved by reason of nature. For the image of the supreme King, considered according to its own nature, as far as it is of itself, is fair and beautiful and by natural affection lovable to a like nature[^11]. — Nevertheless, because one having charity greatly detests their fault; and their fault totally and inseparably possesses their nature: hence it is that charity moves the natural affection more toward loving irrational creatures than toward loving demons. — Therefore the reasons showing that demons are not to be loved out of charity are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the neighbor is he who shares in reason; it must be said that to share in reason is twofold: either according to the pure nature of reason itself, or according to its order and fitness toward grace. I say therefore that proximity according to the nature of reason is not sufficient for this, that someone be called a neighbor in respect of the act of loving; for gratuitous love regards the order[^12] toward grace. And since demons lack this proximity, because they have been rendered incapable of grace; therefore they are not contained under the name of neighbors. And therefore from that reasoning it does not follow that they are to be loved out of charity.

2. To that which is objected, that the image is the ground for loving in a creature[^13]; it must be said that the image is not a sufficient ground for loving, except insofar as

it is ordered to grace and glory, to which charity orders. And because in this way it is not in demons, but rather wholly disordered; therefore that reasoning does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that the angels, before they sinned, were to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this was because they then had the fitness and suitability for attaining glory; but this they did not have after the fall: and therefore they are not now, as then, to be loved out of charity. And *if you object* that «they have the things given to them whole and most splendid»; it must be said that that is said as regards their powers in respect of *natural* operations, but not as regards the fitnesses of the same in respect of *gratuitous* ones. For they were rendered unfit for doing well: for such fitnesses are corrupted by sin, according as Augustine holds, and was shown in the second book[^1].

4. To that which is objected, that whatever contributes to the increase of our merit is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that this can be twofold: either *according to principal intention*, or *by occasion*. Although therefore the aforesaid proposition can have truth concerning that which contributes to the increase of our merit according to principal intention and primary ordination; nevertheless concerning that which contributes to the increase of merit by occasion, it need not have truth, because out of many evils and sins God draws forth goods for just men; and in this way demons contribute to the furtherance of our merit, because, while they intend to pervert us to sin, by divine power their exertion is turned to just and holy men unto the increase of merit[^2b].

5. To that which is last objected, that everything which contributes to the honor of God and the adornment of justice is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that, as is plain from the foregoing[^3b], if to love out of charity be taken *properly*, the proposition does not have truth. And *if you object* that what is ordered to *beatitude* is to be loved out of charity, therefore likewise what is ordered to *praise*; it must be said that a thing is ordered to *beatitude* in two ways: either because *it of itself* is ordered to attain beatitude; or because *through it something else* is ordered to attain it. And what is ordered to beatitude in the *first* way is to be loved out of charity; what is ordered in the *second* way is not to be loved out of charity, taking it *properly*[^4b]. — Likewise a thing ordered to the *praise* of God can be twofold: either because *it itself* praises and magnifies God and glories in the praise of God, or because it is the *matter* of the divine praise. And what is ordered to the praise of God in the *first* way is to be loved out of charity; but what is ordered in the *second* way, it is not necessary that it be loved out of charity, unless it be said to be loved out of commanding charity. For charity commands a man to will that everything be in the universe which arouses the just man to praise and magnify his God[^5b].

---

la: Vers. 18, qui versus in Vulgata sic sonat: *Dilige amicum tuum sicut te ipsum.* S. Bonav. versum istum hic exhibet secundum translationem Septuaginta interpretum. Glossa delibata est ex August., Epist. 155. (alias 52.) ad Maced. c. 4. n. 14, ubi s. Doctor illud Matth. 22, 40: *In his duobus praeceptis* etc. exponens ait: *Proximus sane hoc loco non sanguinis propinquitate, sed rationis societate pensandus est, in qua socii sunt omnes homines.* — Pro *propinquitate,* quae lectio et in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 63. a. 2. habetur, edd. cum plurimis codd. *proprietate.* (P. 624, n. 2.)

en: Verse 18, which verse in the Vulgate sounds thus: *Love thy friend as thyself.* St. Bonaventure here gives this verse according to the translation of the Septuagint interpreters. The Gloss is drawn from Augustine, *Epist.* 155 (otherwise 52) to Macedonius, c. 4, n. 14, where the holy Doctor, expounding that of Matt. 22:40: *On these two commandments* etc., says: *The neighbor surely in this place is to be weighed not by closeness of blood, but by the fellowship of reason, in which all men are companions.* — For *propinquitate* (closeness), which reading is also found in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collat. 63, a. 2, the editions with most codices read *proprietate* (property). (P. 624, n. 2.)

la: Vide August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 22. n. 20. seq. (P. 624, n. 3.)

en: See Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 22, n. 20 f. (P. 624, n. 3.)

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 23. Cf. vol. II, p. 122, note 8. (P. 624, n. 4.)

la: Multi codd. supplent *in Deo* et omittunt deinde *ideo;* edd. quoque supplent *in Deo,* sed omittunt paulo superius *decoris* ante *divinae iustitiae.* (P. 624, n. 5.)

en: Many codices supply *in Deo* and then omit *ideo;* the editions too supply *in Deo,* but omit a little above *decoris* before *divinae iustitiae.* (P. 624, n. 5.)

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 5. Verba a Magistro Augustino tributa re vera sunt Magistri, qui his verbis breviter complectitur quod August., l. de Doctr. christ. c. 21. n. 21. fusius exponit. — In initio arg. pro *dilectionis* cod. W *dilectioni.* (P. 625, n. 1.)

en: See above, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. The words attributed to Augustine by the Master are in reality the Master's own, who in these words briefly comprises what Augustine, in the book *On Christian Doctrine* c. 21, n. 21, expounds more fully. — At the beginning of the argument, for *dilectionis* cod. W reads *dilectioni.* (P. 625, n. 1.)

la: Vers. 36. — Glossa habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum in Luc. 10, 29. et 37; est secundum August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 30. n. 31. (cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 18. serm. I. n. 14.). — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. seqq. (P. 625, n. 2.)

en: Verse 36. — The Gloss is found in Strabo and Lyra on Luke 10:29 and 37; it is according to Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 30, n. 31 (cf. *Enarrat. in Ps.* 18, sermon 1, n. 14). — See here the text of the Master, c. 2 ff. (P. 625, n. 2.)

en: Chapter 6, n. 9, at the end. (P. 625, n. 3.)

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *qui.* (P. 625, n. 4.)

en: The editions with some codices read *qui.* (P. 625, n. 4.)

la: Vide quaest. praeced. — De obstinatione daemonum cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. q. I. seq. Mox pro *obstinati* cod. A *confirmati,* cod. K *obstinati vel confirmati.* Post pauca pro *Caritas enim* edd. cum paucis codd. *Caritas autem.* Deinde pro *supernam beatitudinem* codd. M O R S W X *summam beatitudinem,* edd. *sempiternam beatitudinem.* (P. 625, n. 5.)

en: See the preceding question. — On the obstinacy of demons cf. II Sent., d. 7, p. 1, q. 1 f. Soon, for *obstinati* cod. A reads *confirmati,* cod. K *obstinati vel confirmati.* After a little, for *Caritas enim* the editions with a few codices read *Caritas autem.* Then, for *supernam beatitudinem* codd. M O R S W X read *summam beatitudinem,* the editions *sempiternam beatitudinem.* (P. 625, n. 5.)

la: Vide quaest. praeced. (P. 625, n. 6.)

en: See the preceding question. (P. 625, n. 6.)

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 1. — Paulo superius pro *culpae, qua* edd. cum compluribus codd. *culpae, in qua.* Paulo inferius post *hinc est, quod caritas* edd. 1, 2 addunt *nihil,* Vat. *naturalis.* (P. 625, n. 7.)

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 1. — A little above, for *culpae, qua* the editions with several codices read *culpae, in qua.* A little below, after *hinc est, quod caritas* editions 1, 2 add *nihil,* the Vatican [edition] *naturalis.* (P. 625, n. 7.)

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd. *ordinationem.* Superius post *diligendi* non pauci codd. omittunt *esse.* Mox pro *sub nomine* edd. *sub ratione.* (P. 625, n. 8.)

en: The editions with some codices read *ordinationem.* Above, after *diligendi* not a few codices omit *esse.* Soon, for *sub nomine* the editions [read] *sub ratione.* (P. 625, n. 8.)

la: Cod. A *ad diligendi ex caritate.* (P. 625, n. 9.) [Marker on *gratiam* in obj.-reply 2; OCR fragments the entry.]

en: Cod. A reads *ad diligendi ex caritate.* (P. 625, n. 9.)

la: Dist. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. per totum, ubi etiam Augustini dicta occurrunt. (P. 626, n. 1.)

en: D. 35, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2 throughout, where also the sayings of Augustine occur. (P. 626, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Cod. Z *augmentum.* (P. 626, n. 2.)

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 2 f. — Cod. Z reads *augmentum.* (P. 626, n. 2.)

la: Scil. ex hac et praeced. quaest. — Paulo ante pro *decorem iustitiae* cod. Z *decorem divinae iustitiae.* (P. 626, n. 3.)

en: Namely, from this and the preceding question. — A little before, for *decorem iustitiae* cod. Z reads *decorem divinae iustitiae.* (P. 626, n. 3.)

la: Simul audi: *diligi ex caritate.* Edd. perperam supplent *ordinatum.* — Vide etiam scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 626, nn. 4–5.)

en: Understand at the same time: *to be loved out of charity.* The editions wrongly supply *ordinatum.* — See also the scholion to the preceding question. (P. 626, nn. 4–5.)

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines ~43410–43539) with 450 dpi column-band PDF (pp. 624–626 = PDF 646–648, offset +22) authoritative for the Respondeo and all three page footers. OCR for this chunk was clean (running prose reflows cleanly); PDF used to verify Respondeo/footer cascade-prone regions and the per-page footnote-marker numbering per the Vol III directive. Body fully agrees with OCR.

**Page-split map.**
- Title + objections 1–4 + last objection through *Prima sic probatur... cum*: p. 624 (q2 opens at the foot of p. 624-L, after q1's Ad-5 + scholion §I–II which occupy p. 624-R).
- *caritas diligat Dei honorem... Minor est manifesta*, Sed contra 1–5, Conclusio, Respondeo (whole), *Concedendae sunt... rationes*, Ad 1, Ad 2 through *nisi in quantum*: p. 625.
- *est ordinata ad gratiam... ideo non cogit illa ratio* (Ad 2 tail), Ad 3, Ad 4, Ad 5 through *et magnificandum Deum suum*: p. 626 (q2 ends at the foot of p. 626-R, immediately before QUAESTIO III).

**Apparatus split (per-page restart, 14 entries total).**
- p. 624: nn. 2–5 (`[^2]`–`[^5]`). **n. 1 (`Codd. A K S affectum suum`) belongs to q1's body tail** (the *affectum specialem* variant) — picked up correctly in q1.
- p. 625: nn. 1–9 (`[^6]`–`[^13]`, then `[^1]` for n. 9). All 9 p. 625 footers are within q2's body.
- p. 626: nn. 1–5 (`[^2]`–`[^5]`, second sequence; n. 4 and n. 5 merged into one entry `[^5]` since both attach at the q2 tail — n. 4 = *Simul audi*, n. 5 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, the `Deum suum⁵` marker). p. 626 nn. 6–9 belong to q3 (*mali homines*) and are NOT in this chunk.

**Hand-off picked up (from d28-a1-q1, *creaturae irrationales*):** q1 kept p. 624 n. 1 only; q2 takes **p. 624 nn. 2–5** (n. 2 *Vers. 18, qui versus in Vulgata sic sonat...*). Confirmed — n. 1 *Codd. A K S affectum suum* stays with q1. The q2 videtur begins at the bottom of p. 624-L; q1's Ad-5 tail + scholion §I–II occupy p. 624-R.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d28-a1-q3, *mali homines*):** q3 opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines. Et quod sic, videtur* (QUAESTIO III header at raw ~43540–43543). Title `Utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines`. q3 begins at the foot of p. 626-R (running head `DIST. XXVIII. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III. 627`) and spans pp. 626–628. **Footer split: q3 takes p. 626 nn. 6–9** (n. 6 *Vers. 44 — Mox pro iniquus codd. A K iniustus*; q2 kept nn. 1–5). q3 HAS its own SCHOLION (§I–II at raw ~43649, p. 628).

**Scholion:** **absent** in q2 (no SCHOLION header between raw 43410 and 43539). This is the sibling-redirect case: **q2 is covered by q1's scholion §II** ("Circa sequentem (2.) quaestionem Petr. a Tar. ... S. Thom. ... we can love even the nature of demons out of charity"). The `has_scholion: false` frontmatter reflects this; no `### Scholion` subsection is added.

**Alignment:** verified — q2 title and opener both read *daemones*; opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint daemones* (raw line 43413, foot of p. 624-L). No q-swap.

**[?] flags:** none remaining — both RESOLVED at 600 dpi (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p625-foot-R.png`, `/tmp/hires/p625-n78-zoom.png`).
- `[^12]` (p. 625 n. 7) tail: the word edd. 1, 2 add after *hinc est, quod caritas* reads **`nihil`** (NOT *affectum*), followed by `Vat. *naturalis*` — i.e. `edd. 1, 2 addunt *nihil,* Vat. *naturalis.*` Corrected.
- `[^13]` (p. 625 n. 8) tail: the *sub nomine* variant reads `Mox pro *sub nomine* edd. *sub ratione.*` Corrected. (Also corrected `pauci`→`non pauci codd. omittunt esse`.)
- (p. 625 n. 9 / `[^1]` confirmed `Cod. A ad diligendi ex caritate`; rendered as such — no flag.)


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 626 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligendi sint mali homines. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei quinto[^1]: *Diligite inimicos vestros* etc.; sed qui odit iustos absque dubio est iniquus et malus: ergo si talis est ex caritate diligendus iuxta mandatum dominicum, mali homines ex caritate diligendi sunt.

2. Item, omnes praedestinati diligendi sunt ex caritate; sed multi, qui sunt mali, sunt praedestinati: ergo aliqui mali ex caritate diligendi sunt. Sed nescimus, qui sint praedestinati, qui praesciti, dum in via sunt: ergo omnes mali sunt ex caritate diligendi.

3. Item, omnes, pro quibus est orandum, sunt ex caritate diligendi; sed orandum est pro peccatoribus: ergo tales ex caritate sunt diligendi.

4. Item, perfectissima caritas fuit in Christo; sed Christus, cum essemus iniusti et peccatores, dilexit nos[^2]: si ergo omnis amor rectus debet caritatem Christi imitari, tunc videtur, quod peccatores et impii ex caritate sint diligendi.

**Sed contra:**
1. In Psalmo[^3]: *Nonne qui oderunt te, Domine, oderam, et super inimicos tuos tabescebam?* sed omnes viri iniusti Deum offendunt et ipsi Deo inimicantur: ergo omnes peccatores odiendi sunt: non ergo ex caritate diligendi.

2. Item, caritas facit voluntatem nostram conformem voluntati divinae; sed peccatores et iniusti sunt Deo odibiles, secundum illud Ecclesiastici duodecimo[^4]: *Altissimus odio habet peccatores;* et illud: *Similiter abominabilis est Deo impius et impietas eius:* ergo videtur, quod secundum legem caritatis mali sunt odiendi: non ergo ex caritate diligendi.

<!-- page 627 -->

3. Item, « in contrariis sequitur consequentia in ipso[^5] », et sicut se habet bonitas ad dilectionem, sic malitia ad odium; sed haec est per se vera: boni sunt diligendi, ergo et haec: mali sunt odiendi; sed odiendum non est diligendum: ergo mali non sunt ex caritate diligendi.

4. Item, caritas est vinculum unitatis[^6]: ergo illi soli sunt ex caritate diligendi, qui sunt ex unitate corporis mystici; sed mali non sunt de unitate corporis mystici: ergo non sunt diligendi ex caritate.

> **Conclusio.** Mali homines ex caritate diligendi sunt, quatenus sunt homines ad imaginem Dei facti et beatitudinis capaces; quatenus autem sunt mali, potius detestandi sunt quam diligendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de malis hominibus dupliciter contingit loqui et dupliciter etiam eos contingit considerare: vel in quantum sunt homines, vel in quantum sunt mali; sive in quantum habent in se rationem divinae imaginis, secundum quam sunt capaces beatitudinis, vel in quantum carent perfectione divinae similitudinis.

Si primo modo consideremus homines malos, in quantum videlicet sunt homines et ad Dei imaginem, secundum quam sunt capaces beatitudinis; sic ex caritate diligendi sunt, pro eo quod liberalitas caritatis et eius amplitudo omnes recolligit[^7], qui ad illam summam beatitudinem habent idoneitatem. — Si vero consideremus homines malos, secundum quod mali sunt et privati perfectione divinae similitudinis; sic potius sunt detestandi quam diligendi. Et sic iidem homines et odiendi sunt et diligendi: odiendi quidem ratione inordinationis culpae, diligendi vero ratione ordinationis naturae, quae possibilis est ad perfectionem gratiae. Et hoc est quod dicit Gregorius in quadam Homilia[^8], « quod etsi indignationem debemus vitiis, compassionem debemus naturae ». Et Isidorus in libro de Virtutibus[^9]: « Totum Christum non diligit qui hominem odit; bonum est non odire naturam, sed culpam ». Licet ergo malorum culpam odiamus, ipsos tamen diligere debemus. — Et sic concedendum est, quod licet malorum hominum malitia sit detestanda, ipsi tamen mali homines, in quantum sunt ad beatitudinem ordinati, sunt ex caritate diligendi. Unde et rationes, quae ad hoc inducuntur, concedi possunt.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod Propheta odio habebat odientes Deum; dicendum, quod Propheta non odiebat naturam, sed eorum culpam; propter quod subiungit: *Perfecto odio oderam illos*[^10]; Glossa: « id est, iniquitates eorum odivi, non naturam; hoc est enim perfecto odio odisse, ut nec propter vitia homines oderis, nec propter homines vitia diligas ».

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus odit peccatores; iam patet responsio: quia Deus non odit eos ratione naturae, sed ratione vitii. Licet enim ratione vitii puniantur a divina iustitia, ratione tamen naturae ad bonum ordinatae foventur et attrahuntur a divina misericordia, secundum illud quod dicitur ad Romanos quinto[^11]: *Commendat autem caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quia, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est;* sic enim Deus dilexit mundum, ut dicitur Ioannis tertio, *ut Filium suum unigenitum* etc.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod « si propositum de proposito, et oppositum de opposito[^12] »; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, intelligendo per se; et ideo in ratione illa est duplex defectus. *Primum,* quia boni homines sunt diligendi, non solum quia boni, sed etiam quia ad bonum ordinati, sive non solum quia boni in actu, sed etiam quia boni in aptitudine et habilitate; et ideo non sequitur, quod mali sint odiendi, quia mali, etsi non sint boni in actu, sunt tamen boni in aptitudine[^13]. *Praeterea,* esto quod hoc sit verum, quod boni, in quantum boni, sunt diligendi; ex hoc non sequitur, nisi quod mali, in quantum mali, sunt odiendi. Et hoc quidem verum est; sed ex hoc ulterius non est inferendum, quod mali homines non sunt diligendi, quia, quamvis sit in eis malitia culpae, quae est ratio odiendi, est tamen in eis bonitas naturae, quae est ratio diligendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est vinculum unitatis; dicendum, quod vinculum dilectionis, licet respiciat duo extrema, unum tamen illorum respicit sicut subiectum, alterum autem sicut

<!-- page 628 -->

terminum; nec oportet, quod utrumque respiciat sicut subiectum, nisi ubi reperitur perfecta ratio unionis. Quoniam ergo habens caritatem est de unitate corporis[^14], alius vero actu malus potest esse de unitate corporis illius, quamvis actu non sit; hinc est, quod caritas potest esse in uno respectu alterius, pro eo quod vinculum amicitiae ad sui esse non necessario exigit extremorum mutuam coniunctionem; multi enim diligunt, qui non diliguntur. Unde ad hoc, quod caritas sit vinculum unionis, non oportet, quod ponat utrumque extremorum in actu uniendi; sed sufficit, quod ponat unum in actu, scilicet subiectum, in quo est, reliquum vero in habitu, scilicet obiectum, sicut scientia ponit scientem in actu, scibile vero ponit in habitu[^15].

english:
### Question III. *Whether evil men are to be loved out of charity.*

Thirdly it is asked whether evil men are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems.

1. Matthew the fifth[^1]: *Love your enemies* etc.; but he who hates the just is without doubt iniquitous and evil: therefore if such a one is to be loved out of charity according to the dominical command, evil men are to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, all the predestined are to be loved out of charity; but many who are evil are predestined: therefore some evil men are to be loved out of charity. But we do not know who are the predestined and who the foreknown, while they are on the way: therefore all evil men are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, all those for whom one ought to pray are to be loved out of charity; but one ought to pray for sinners: therefore such persons are to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the most perfect charity was in Christ; but Christ, while we were unjust and sinners, loved us[^2]: if therefore every right love ought to imitate the charity of Christ, then it seems that sinners and the impious are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Psalm[^3]: *Did not I hate them, O Lord, that hated thee, and pined away because of thy enemies?* but all unjust men offend God and are themselves enemies to God: therefore all sinners are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, charity makes our will conformed to the divine will; but sinners and the unjust are hateful to God, according to that of Ecclesiasticus the twelfth[^4]: *The Most High hates sinners;* and that: *In like manner the impious man and his impiety are abominable to God:* therefore it seems that according to the law of charity the evil are to be hated: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, « in contraries the consequence follows in the same way[^5] », and as goodness stands to love, so malice stands to hatred; but this is true of itself: the good are to be loved, therefore also this: the evil are to be hated; but what is to be hated is not to be loved: therefore the evil are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, charity is the bond of unity[^6]: therefore those alone are to be loved out of charity who are of the unity of the mystical body; but the evil are not of the unity of the mystical body: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

> **Conclusion.** Evil men are to be loved out of charity, inasmuch as they are men made to the image of God and capable of beatitude; but inasmuch as they are evil, they are rather to be detested than loved.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of evil men in two ways, and one may also consider them in two ways: either inasmuch as they are men, or inasmuch as they are evil; that is, inasmuch as they have in themselves the character of the divine image, according to which they are capable of beatitude, or inasmuch as they lack the perfection of the divine likeness.

If we consider evil men in the first way, namely inasmuch as they are men and to the image of God, according to which they are capable of beatitude; then they are to be loved out of charity, because the liberality of charity and its amplitude gathers up all[^7] who have the aptitude for that highest beatitude. — But if we consider evil men according as they are evil and deprived of the perfection of the divine likeness; then they are rather to be detested than loved. And thus the same men are both to be hated and to be loved: to be hated indeed by reason of the disorder of fault, but to be loved by reason of the ordering of nature, which is capable of the perfection of grace. And this is what Gregory says in a certain Homily[^8], « that although we owe indignation to vices, we owe compassion to nature ». And Isidore in the book On the Virtues[^9]: « He does not love the whole Christ who hates the man; it is good not to hate nature, but fault ». Therefore although we hate the fault of the evil, we ought nevertheless to love them. — And thus it must be conceded that, although the malice of evil men is to be detested, yet the evil men themselves, inasmuch as they are ordered to beatitude, are to be loved out of charity. Hence also the reasons which are brought forward for this can be conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:**
1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Prophet held in hatred those who hate God; it must be said that the Prophet did not hate nature, but their fault; on account of which he adds: *With a perfect hatred I hated them*[^10]; the Gloss: « that is, I hated their iniquities, not their nature; for this is to hate with a perfect hatred, that you neither hate men on account of their vices, nor love vices on account of men ».

2. To that which is objected, that God hates sinners; the response is already clear: because God does not hate them by reason of nature, but by reason of vice. For although by reason of vice they are punished by the divine justice, yet by reason of nature, ordered to the good, they are cherished and drawn by the divine mercy, according to that which is said to the Romans the fifth[^11]: *But God commends his charity towards us, because, when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us;* for so God loved the world, as is said in John the third, *that he gave his only-begotten Son* etc.

3. To that which is objected, that « if the proposed of the proposed, then the opposite of the opposite[^12] »; it must be said that this holds true when understood of itself; and therefore in that reasoning there is a twofold defect. *First,* because good men are to be loved not only because they are good, but also because they are ordered to the good, that is, not only because they are good in act, but also because they are good in aptitude and capacity; and therefore it does not follow that the evil are to be hated, because the evil, even if they are not good in act, are nevertheless good in aptitude[^13]. *Moreover,* granted that this be true, that the good, inasmuch as they are good, are to be loved; from this it follows only that the evil, inasmuch as they are evil, are to be hated. And this indeed is true; but from this it is not further to be inferred that evil men are not to be loved, because, although there is in them the malice of fault, which is the ground of hatred, there is nevertheless in them the goodness of nature, which is the ground of love.

4. To that which is objected, that charity is the bond of unity; it must be said that the bond of love, although it regards two extremes, yet regards one of them as subject, but the other as

terminus; nor is it necessary that it regard both as subject, except where a perfect character of union is found. Since therefore one having charity is of the unity of the body[^14], but another, actually evil, can be of the unity of that body, although he is not so in act; hence it is that charity can be in one with respect to another, because the bond of friendship does not necessarily require for its being the mutual conjunction of the extremes; for many love who are not loved. Hence, for charity to be the bond of union, it is not necessary that it place both of the extremes in the act of uniting; but it suffices that it place one in act, namely the subject in which it is, and the other in habit, namely the object, just as knowledge places the knower in act, but places the knowable in habit[^15].

la: Vers. 44. — Mox pro *iniquus* codd. A K *iniustus*. (P. 626, n. 6.)

en: Verse 44. — Soon for *iniquus* ("iniquitous") codices A K read *iniustus* ("unjust"). (P. 626, n. 6.)

en: Reference is to Rom. 5:8 ff.; John 4:10 and 19. (P. 626, n. 7.)

la: Psalm. 138, 21. — Post pauca pro *inimicantur* edd. *iniuriantur*. (P. 626, n. 8.)

en: Psalm 138:21. — A little after, for *inimicantur* ("are enemies") the editions read *iniuriantur* ("do injury"). (P. 626, n. 8.)

la: Vers. 3. — Seq. Script. locus est Sap. 14, 9: *Similiter autem odio sunt Deo impius* etc. (P. 626, n. 9.)

en: Verse 3. — The following Scripture passage is Wisdom 14:9: *In like manner the impious and his impiety are hateful to God* etc. (P. 626, n. 9.)

la: Vide supra pag. 570, nota 2. — Verba *in ipso*, et desiderantur in edd. (P. 627, n. 1.)

en: See above p. 570, note 2. — The words *in ipso* ("in the same way") and [the following] are wanting in the editions. (P. 627, n. 1.)

la: Cod. Z *unionis*. Deinde pro *ex unitate* edd. *de unitate*. (P. 627, n. 2.)

en: Codex Z reads *unionis* ("of union"). Then for *ex unitate* the editions read *de unitate* ("of the unity"). (P. 627, n. 2.)

la: De *amplitudine* caritatis, omnes in sinu amoris recipientis, cfr. Gregor., II. in Ezech. hom. 2. n. 15. (P. 627, n. 3.)

en: On the *amplitude* of charity, receiving all into the bosom of love, cf. Gregory, II *On Ezekiel*, homily 2, n. 15. (P. 627, n. 3.)

la: Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 33. n. 3: *Quia distrionem [districtionem] debemus vitiis, compassionem naturae.* — Aliquanto superius pro *ordinationis naturae*, quam lectionem ex codd. A K restituimus, edd. *ordinabilitatis naturae*, codd. B D Z *et ordine naturae*; alii codd., voce *ordinationis* omissa, *ratione naturae*. (P. 627, n. 4.)

en: Book II of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 33, n. 3: *Because we owe severity to vices, compassion to nature.* — Somewhat above, for *ordinationis naturae* ("the ordering of nature"), which reading we have restored from codices A K, the editions read *ordinabilitatis naturae*, codices B D Z *et ordine naturae*; other codices, the word *ordinationis* omitted, *ratione naturae*. (P. 627, n. 4.)

la: Sive II. Sent. c. 3. n. 7. seq.: *Totum ergo Christum non diligit qui hominem odit. Bonorum discretionis est non odire* [culpam]. (P. 627, n. 5.)

en: Or *Sentences* II, c. 3, n. 7 f.: *Therefore he does not love the whole Christ who hates the man. It belongs to the discernment of good men not to hate* [the fault]. (P. 627, n. 5.)

la: Psalm. 138, 22. — Glossa formata est ex verbis August., Enarrat. in hunc loc. n. 28: *Quid est perfecto odio? Oderam in eis iniquitates eorum, diligebam conditionem tuam. Hoc est perfecto odio* etc. (P. 627, n. 6.)

en: Psalm 138:22. — The Gloss is formed from the words of Augustine, *Enarration* on this passage, n. 28: *What is "with a perfect hatred"? I hated in them their iniquities, I loved your creation. This is "with a perfect hatred"* etc. (P. 627, n. 6.)

la: Vers. 8. — Seq. testimonium est Ioan. 3, 16. (P. 627, n. 7.)

en: Verse 8. — The following testimony is John 3:16. (P. 627, n. 7.)

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 505, nota 1, ubi pro *de proposito* et pro *de opposito* textus origin. et etiam edd. *in proposito et in opposito*. Inferius pro *Primum* codd. O Z *au Primus*. (P. 627, n. 8.)

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 4. Cf. above p. 505, note 1, where for *de proposito* and for *de opposito* the original text and also the editions read *in proposito et in opposito*. Below, for *Primum* codices O Z read *Primus*. (P. 627, n. 8.)

la: Edd. addunt *et habilitate*; et mox pro *ex hoc non sequitur* exhibent *ex hoc tamen non sequitur.* (P. 627, n. 9.)

en: The editions add *et habilitate* ("and capacity"); and soon, for *ex hoc non sequitur* ("from this it does not follow") they exhibit *ex hoc tamen non sequitur* ("from this, however, it does not follow"). (P. 627, n. 9.)

la: Cod. W supplet *mystici*. Subinde pro *actu malus* edd. cum paucis codd. *actu non habens caritatem*. (P. 628, n. 1.)

en: Codex W supplies *mystici* ("mystical"). Thereupon for *actu malus* ("actually evil") the editions, with a few codices, read *actu non habens caritatem* ("not actually having charity"). (P. 628, n. 1.)

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de his quae ad aliquid*, ubi mediante eodem exemplo monstratur, quod non in omnibus, quae sunt *ad aliquid*, verum videatur, ipsa esse simul natura. (P. 628, n. 2.)

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On those things which are toward something* [relatives], where by means of the same example it is shown that it does not seem true in all things which are *toward something* that they are by nature simultaneous. (P. 628, n. 2.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Antiqui doctores in solvenda hac quaestione iisdem principiis et distinctionibus utuntur et etiam in conclusione consentiunt. De dilectione inimicorum speciali quaestione diffuse agitur infra d. 30. q. 4. — De hac (3.) quaestione distincte tractant: S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

**II.** Etiam in sequenti (4.) quaestione et obiectionibus solvendis theologi idem omnes sentiunt. — Observatione digna est doctrina (in corp.), quod triplici modo aliquid possit esse beatum. — De eadem quaestione specialiter agunt: S. Thom., hic a. 7; S. loc. cit. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The ancient doctors in solving this question use the same principles and distinctions and also agree in the conclusion. On the love of enemies a special question is treated at length below, d. 30, q. 4. — On this (3rd) question treat distinctly: St. Thomas, here a. 4; S. II–II, q. 25, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3.

**II.** Also in the following (4th) question and in solving the objections all the theologians think the same. — Worthy of note is the teaching (in the body) that in a threefold manner something may be blessed. — On the same question they treat specially: St. Thomas, here a. 7; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set with the column-band PDF (pp. 626–628, PDF 648–650) authoritative for the Respondeo, Ad-replies, and all footers (Vol III two-column OCR cascade-fragments these), raw OCR lines 43543–43658 as the base for clean running prose. Fresh literal English. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`.
- **Page span:** pp. 626–628 (PDF 648–650). The question opens on p. 626 R-column tail and closes on p. 628 just before `QUAESTIO IV` (*Utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra*, raw 43662).
- **Footer split with q. 2 (p. 626).** p. 626 restarts notes 1–9. Notes **1–5** belong to q. 2's body (held in the q. 2 chunk): n. 5 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* anchors q. 2's item 4 ("diligi ex caritate"). Notes **6–9** anchor in q. 3's body (obj. 1 *Matthaei*, obj. 4 *dilexit nos*, Sed contra 1 *In Psalmo*, Sed contra 2 *Ecclesiastici*) and are carried here. p. 627 (nn. 1–9) and p. 628 (nn. 1–2 only; nn. 3–4 belong to q. 4) follow their own per-page restarts.
- **Scholion** present in full, §I–II, placed last in each language block per the parser requirement.
- **Apparatus count:** 15 entries / 15 body markers [^1]–[^15] (p. 626 nn. 6–9 = 4; p. 627 nn. 1–9 = 9; p. 628 nn. 1–2 = 2). All markers resolve in both languages.
- **[?] flags:** none remaining. `[^13]` (p. 627 n. 9) **RESOLVED at 600 dpi** (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p627-foot-R.png`, `/tmp/hires/p627-n9-zoom.png`/`p627-n9b-zoom.png`): the footer reads `⁹ Edd. addunt *et habilitate* et mox pro *ex hoc non sequitur* exhibent *ex hoc tamen non sequitur.*` The second variant lemma is *ex hoc non sequitur* (corrected from the conservative reconstruction *non sequitur, quod mali sint odiendi*); the editions exhibit *ex hoc tamen non sequitur.* Body reading (*aptitudine et habilitate*) is secure.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
<!-- page 628 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Ioannis duodecimo[^1]: *Qui amat animam suam perdet eam;* sed constat, quod anima non stat ibi nisi pro « vita carnali »: ergo si vita carnalis in hoc mundo est odienda, videtur, quod odienda sint corpora nostra, non ergo ex caritate diligenda.

2. Item, nihil est ex caritate diligendum, quod impedit hominem ab assecutione beatitudinis; sed caro nostra est huiusmodi, quia caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, secundum quod dicitur ad Galatas quinto; et ad Romanos septimo[^2]: *Invenio in membris meis quod legem repugnat* etc.: ergo si corpora nostra impediunt nos a beatitudine assequenda, videtur, quod non sint ex caritate diligenda.

3. Item, caritas nunquam excidit[^3]: ergo illa sunt ex caritate diligenda, quae nunquam excidunt; sed corpora corrumpuntur: ergo ex caritate diligenda non sunt.

4. Item, ratio imaginis sive expressa assimilatio ad Deum est illud quod facit, creaturam rationalem ex caritate diligi, sicut ex praecedentibus[^4] patet; sed in corpore communicamus cum brutis, nec perfectio imaginis invenitur in nobis ex parte corporis: videtur ergo, quod corpora nostra non sint ex caritate diligenda, sicut nec bruta animalia.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Ephesios quinto[^5]: *Viri debent diligere uxores suas sicut corpora sua:* si ergo hortatur Apostolus ad diligendas uxores ex caritate; cum similiter diligendae sint ut corpora, videtur, quod corpora nostra sint ex caritate diligenda.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana[^6]: « Quatuor sunt diligenda », et tribus praemissis, subdit: « quartum, quod infra nos est, scilicet corpus nostrum »: si ergo Augustinus enumerat ibi diligenda ex caritate praecise et proprie, videtur, quod corpora nostra sint diligenda ex caritate.

3. Item, omne beatificabile est ex caritate diligibile; sed corpus nostrum cum anima communicabit in participatione felicitatis[^7]: ergo similiter communicare debet in dilectione caritatis.

4. Item, in ordine caritatis consanguinei praemittendi sunt extraneis secundum Ambrosium[^8]; sed consanguinitas non est nisi ex parte corporum: si ergo haec conditio reddit homines magis amabiles, videtur, quod corpora nostra inter ea connumerantur, quae sunt ex caritate diligenda.

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> **Conclusio.** Corpora nostra, cum capacia sint beatitudinis per quandam redundantiam, ex caritate sunt diligenda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum caritas sit pondus inclinans[^9] ad summum Bonum et perfectam beatitudinem, omne illud facit diligere, quod est beatum, vel beatificabile. Quoniam ergo contingit aliquid esse beatum tripliciter, scilicet per essentiam et per primam influentiam et per quandam redundantiam; hinc est, quod omnia ista sunt ex caritate diligenda, secundum prius et posterius, secundum magis et minus. Beatum autem per essentiam est solus Deus; beatum vero per primam influentiam est rationalis spiritus; beatum denique per quandam redundantiam est corpus humanum, in quod gaudium gloriae redundat per coniunctionem sui ad animam beatam. Hinc est, quod caritas non solum facit nos diligere Deum et rationalem spiritum, sed etiam corpus nostrum. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut probatum est, quod corpora nostra diligenda sunt ex caritate; concedendae sunt etiam rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus hortatur nos in Evangelio ad vitam carnalem odiendam; dicendum, quod in corpore nostro est vitiositas concupiscentiae et bonitas naturae. Et quia vitiositas concupiscentiae inclinat ad malum, ideo est odienda; et si quis eam diligit, odit animam suam[^10]; quia vero bonitas naturae ordinata est ad summum Bonum quodam modo comparticipandum, ideo est diligenda. Cum ergo Dominus hortatur ad odiendam animam nostram sive vitam carnalem; dicendum, quod hoc non concludit, quod corpora nostra non sint diligenda simpliciter[^11], sed quod non sunt diligenda quantum ad vitiositatem concupiscentiae.

2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad rationem sequentem: quia caro non repugnat spiritui nec impedit ab assequenda beatitudine propter conditionem naturae, sed propter vitiositatem concupiscentiae contractae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non debent diligi ex caritate ea quae corrumpuntur, cum caritas nunquam excidat; dicendum, quod quamvis corpus nostrum sit corruptibile ad tempus et secundum praesentem statum, est tamen ad perpetuam incorruptionem ordinatum. Unde quamvis nunc seminetur in corruptione, resurget in incorruptione[^12]; et ideo, quamvis corpus sit corruptibile quantum ad naturae lapsae infirmitatem, non sequitur, quod non sit diligibile ex caritate quantum ad veritatem naturae, secundum quam ordinatum est ad perpetuam incorruptionem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio imaginis et expressa assimilatio, quae facit, creaturam rationalem diligi ex caritate, non invenitur in corpore; dicendum, quod verum est, per se loquendo, quod ratio imaginis sic facit. Licet autem corpus humanum non sit ad Dei imaginem per se, est tamen unitum animae, quae est ad Dei imaginem, unitum, inquam, in unitate naturae; et ratione illius est beatitudinis comparticipabile; et sicut est beatitudinis comparticipabile, ita est diligendum ex caritate, ea videlicet ratione, qua est animae rationali unitum; et hoc est proprium corporis humani respectu cuiuslibet alterius corporis. Propterea non est simile de aliis corporibus et animalibus[^13] irrationalibus.

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether our bodies are to be loved out of charity.*

Fourthly it is asked whether our bodies are to be loved out of charity. And it seems that they are not.

1. John, chapter twelve[^1]: *He who loves his soul shall lose it;* but it is agreed that "soul" stands there only for "carnal life": therefore if carnal life in this world is to be hated, it seems that our bodies are to be hated, and therefore not to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, nothing is to be loved out of charity which hinders a man from the attainment of beatitude; but our flesh is of this kind, because the flesh lusts against the spirit, according to what is said in Galatians, chapter five; and in Romans, chapter seven[^2]: *I find in my members that which opposes the law* etc.: therefore if our bodies hinder us from attaining beatitude, it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, charity never fails[^3]: therefore those things are to be loved out of charity which never fail; but bodies are corrupted: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity.

4. Likewise, the character of image, or the express assimilation to God, is that which causes a rational creature to be loved out of charity, as is clear from what precedes[^4]; but in the body we have something in common with the brutes, nor is the perfection of the image found in us on the side of the body: it seems therefore that our bodies are not to be loved out of charity, just as neither are the brute animals.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Ephesians, chapter five[^5]: *Husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies:* if therefore the Apostle exhorts to the loving of wives out of charity; since they are to be loved in like manner as bodies, it seems that our bodies are to be loved out of charity.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^6]: « There are four things to be loved », and having set down three, he adds: « the fourth, that which is below us, namely our body »: if therefore Augustine there enumerates the things to be loved out of charity precisely and properly, it seems that our bodies are to be loved out of charity.

3. Likewise, everything capable of being made blessed is capable of being loved out of charity; but our body will share with the soul in the participation of felicity[^7]: therefore it ought likewise to share in the love of charity.

4. Likewise, in the order of charity blood-relations are to be put before strangers according to Ambrose[^8]; but consanguinity exists only on the side of bodies: if therefore this condition renders men more lovable, it seems that our bodies are numbered among those things which are to be loved out of charity.

> **Conclusion.** Our bodies, since they are capable of beatitude by a certain overflow, are to be loved out of charity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since charity is a weight inclining[^9] toward the highest Good and perfect beatitude, it causes everything to be loved which is blessed or capable of being made blessed. Since therefore it happens that something is blessed in a threefold way, namely by essence and by a primary influx and by a certain overflow; hence it is that all these things are to be loved out of charity, according to before and after, according to more and less. Now blessed by essence is God alone; blessed by a primary influx is the rational spirit; blessed finally by a certain overflow is the human body, into which the joy of glory overflows through the conjunction of itself to the blessed soul. Hence it is that charity causes us to love not only God and the rational spirit, but also our body. — It must therefore be conceded, as has been proved, that our bodies are to be loved out of charity; and the reasons adduced for this side are also to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that God exhorts us in the Gospel to hate the carnal life; it must be said that in our body there is the viciousness of concupiscence and the goodness of nature. And because the viciousness of concupiscence inclines toward evil, therefore it is to be hated; and if anyone loves it, he hates his own soul[^10]; but because the goodness of nature is ordered toward the highest Good to be in a certain way co-participated, therefore it is to be loved. Since therefore the Lord exhorts to the hating of our soul or carnal life; it must be said that this does not conclude that our bodies are not to be loved absolutely[^11], but that they are not to be loved as regards the viciousness of concupiscence.

2. And by this is made clear the response to the following reason: because the flesh does not oppose the spirit nor hinder from attaining beatitude on account of the condition of nature, but on account of the viciousness of contracted concupiscence.

3. To that which is objected, that those things which are corrupted ought not to be loved out of charity, since charity never fails; it must be said that, although our body is corruptible for a time and according to the present state, it is nevertheless ordained to perpetual incorruption. Hence although it is now sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption[^12]; and therefore, although the body is corruptible as regards the infirmity of fallen nature, it does not follow that it is not lovable out of charity as regards the truth of nature, according to which it is ordained to perpetual incorruption.

4. To that which is objected, that the character of image and express assimilation, which causes a rational creature to be loved out of charity, is not found in the body; it must be said that it is true, speaking per se, that the character of image does this. But although the human body is not unto the image of God per se, it is nevertheless united to the soul, which is unto the image of God — united, I say, in the unity of nature; and by reason of that it is capable of co-participating beatitude; and as it is capable of co-participating beatitude, so it is to be loved out of charity, namely by that account by which it is united to the rational soul; and this is proper to the human body in respect of any other body whatever. Therefore the case is not the same with regard to other bodies and irrational animals[^13].

---

la: Vers. 25. — In *minori* respicitur Glossa interlinearis in versum laudatum, quae habetur apud Lyranum. (P. 628, n. 3.)

en: Verse 25. — In the *minor* [premise] reference is had to the interlinear Gloss on the cited verse, which is found in Lyra. (P. 628, n. 3.)

la: Vers. 17. — Alter Scripturae locus est Rom. 7, 23: *Video autem aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae* etc. Lectionem *quod legem repugnat* (*repugnare aliquem* idem significat ac *oppugnare aliquem*, cfr. Forcellini, Totius Latin. Lexicon), quae omnium codd. est, edd. 1, 2 mutarunt in *quod legi repugnat*, Vat. in *legem repugnantem legi*. (P. 628, n. 4.)

en: Verse 17. — The other Scripture passage is Rom. 7:23: *But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind* etc. The reading *quod legem repugnat* (*repugnare aliquem* means the same as *oppugnare aliquem*, "to fight against someone," cf. Forcellini, *Lexicon of the Whole Latin Tongue*), which is that of all the codices, the editions 1 and 2 changed into *quod legi repugnat*, the Vatican into *legem repugnantem legi*. (P. 628, n. 4.)

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 8. — Deinde edd. *ergo videtur, quod illa ex caritate sunt* [Vat. *sint*] *diligenda... sed corpora nostra corrumpentur* etc. (P. 628, n. 5.)

en: First Letter to the Corinthians 13:8. — Then the editions read *therefore it seems that those things are to be loved out of charity... but our bodies will be corrupted* etc. [the Vatican: *sint*]. (P. 628, n. 5.)

en: Question 1 [of this article]. (P. 628, n. 6.)

la: Libr. I. c. 23. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. (P. 628, n. 8.)

en: Book I, c. 23, n. 22. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1. (P. 628, n. 8.)

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. a. I. princip. a. 1. q. I. seq. — Pro *diligibile* cod. Z *diligendum*. (P. 628, n. 9.)

en: Cf. *Sentences* IV, d. 49, p. II, a. I, principal a. 1, q. I and following. — For *diligibile* ("lovable") codex Z reads *diligendum* ("to be loved"). (P. 628, n. 9.)

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 2; attamen verba Ambrosio ibi tributa sunt Origenis, in Cantic. homil. 2. n. 8. (P. 628, n. 10.)

en: See below the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 2; nevertheless the words there attributed to Ambrose are those of Origen, *On the Canticle*, homily 2, n. 8. (P. 628, n. 10.)

la: Psalm. 10, 6: *Qui diligit iniquitatem* etc. (P. 629, n. 2.)

en: Psalm 10:6: *He who loves iniquity* etc. (P. 629, n. 2.)

la: Post *simpliciter* codd. B X an addunt *quantum ad bonitatem naturae;* in edd. legitur: *quod corpora nostra non sint diligenda quantum ad bonitatem naturae, sed quantum ad vitiositatem concupiscentiae.* (P. 629, n. 3.)

en: After *simpliciter* ("absolutely") codices B X add *quantum ad bonitatem naturae* ("as regards the goodness of nature"); in the editions it reads: *that our bodies are not to be loved as regards the goodness of nature, but as regards the viciousness of concupiscence.* (P. 629, n. 3.)

la: Epist. I. Cor. 15, 42. — Post *resurget* edd. subdunt *tamen*, cod. N *etiam*. — Paulo interius pro *veritatem naturae* (ita codd. I bb, cod. A *virtutem naturae*, cod. G *voluntatem naturae*), alii codd. cum edd. *necessitatem naturae*, denique supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 63. a. 4. *nobilitatem naturae*. (P. 629, n. 4.)

en: First Letter to the Corinthians 15:42. — After *resurget* ("it shall rise") the editions add *tamen* ("nevertheless"), codex N *etiam* ("also"). — A little within, for *veritatem naturae* ("the truth of nature") (thus codices I bb; codex A *virtutem naturae* "the power of nature," codex G *voluntatem naturae* "the will of nature"), other codices with the editions read *necessitatem naturae* ("the necessity of nature"), and finally the supplement to the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, collation 63, a. 4, *nobilitatem naturae* ("the nobility of nature"). (P. 629, n. 4.)

la: Edd. omittunt *et animalibus*. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (P. 629, n. 5.)

en: The editions omit *et animalibus* ("and animals"). — See the scholion on the preceding question. (P. 629, n. 5.)

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set with the column-band PDF (pp. 628–629, PDF 650–651) authoritative for the Respondeo, Ad-replies, and all footers (Vol III two-column OCR cascade-fragments these), raw OCR lines 43659–43753 as the base for clean running prose. Fresh literal English. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`.
- **Page span:** pp. 628–629 (PDF 650–651). The question opens on p. 628 (left-column objections 1–4, right-column *Sed contra* 1–4) and closes on p. 629 just before `QUAESTIO V` (*Utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita*, raw 43757).
- **Alignment verified.** Opener `Quarto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate sint diligenda corpora nostra` (raw 43662); next question opener `Quinto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita` (raw 43757). Order *corpora nostra* (q.4) → *dona gratuita* (q.5) → *de diligendorum numero et sufficientia* (q.6) confirmed. No q-swap.
- **Footer split with q. 3 (p. 628).** p. 628 restarts notes 1–10. Notes **1–2** belong to q. 3's body (held in the q. 3 chunk: n. 1 *Cod. W supplet mystici*, n. 2 *Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam.*). Notes **3–10** anchor in q. 4's body and are carried here: n. 3 (Ioan. 12, obj. 1), n. 4 (Rom. 7, obj. 2), n. 5 (Cor. 13:8, obj. 3 *nunquam excidit*), n. 6 (Quaest. 1, obj. 4), n. 7 (Eph. 5, *Sed contra* 1), n. 8 (de Doctr. christ., *Sed contra* 2), n. 9 (IV Sent. d. 49, *Sed contra* 3), n. 10 (Ambrosius/Origenes, *Sed contra* 4). The hand-off note had estimated q. 4 = nn. 3–4 only; ground-truth printed footer gives q. 4 = nn. 3–10. q. 3's Notes already correctly reserve only nn. 1–2 to itself.
- **Footer split with q. 5 (p. 629).** p. 629 restarts notes 1–6. Notes **1–5** anchor in q. 4's body (Respondeo + Ad-replies) and are carried here. Note **6** (*Libr. VII. c. 7. n. 10. Cfr. in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 9. n. 10...* — de Trinitate) anchors q. 5's Fundamentum 1 and is left for the q. 5 chunk.
- **Scholion: absent (redirect).** This question has no scholion of its own. The sibling q. 3's Scholion **§II** explicitly covers it (« *Etiam in sequenti (4.) quaestione et obiectionibus solvendis theologi idem omnes sentiunt...* »); and apparatus n. 5 here (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms the redirect. `has_scholion: false`.
- **Apparatus count:** 13 entries / 13 body markers [^1]–[^13] (p. 628 nn. 3–10 = 8; p. 629 nn. 1–5 = 5). All markers resolve in both languages.
- **[?] flags:** none. All footers read cleanly off the column bands.


title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum ex caritate diligenda sint dona gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Augustinum, in libro de Trinitate[^1]: « Qui diligit proximum ipsam praecipue dilectionem diligat »: ergo si proximum diligit ex caritate, dilectionem diligit ex caritate; sed dilectio, qua diligit proximum, est donum gratuitum: ergo dona gratuita sunt ex caritate diligenda.

2. *Item*, omne quod ordinat ad beatitudinem et ad eam perducit, diligendum est ex caritate; sed dona gratuita sunt huiusmodi: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligenda sunt.

3. *Item*, constans est, quod dona spiritualia sunt amanda et a Deo petenda, et qui illa diligit diligendo meretur: si ergo dilectio meritoria est dilectio caritatis, videtur, quod talia dona sint ex caritate diligenda.

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4. *Item*, sicut se habet dilectio gratuita ad dona gratuita, sic[^2] se habet dilectio naturalis ad bona naturalia; sed bona naturalia diliguntur naturali dilectione: ergo pari ratione dona gratuita diliguntur dilectione gratuita. Sed dilectio gratuita est dilectio caritatis: ergo videtur, quod dona gratuita sint ex caritate diligenda.

**Contra:**
1. Nulla creatura carens ratione est diligenda ex caritate[^3]; sed huiusmodi dona gratuita rationem non habent: ergo non debent diligi ex caritate.

2. *Item*, « diligere est velle alicui bonum[^4] »; sed stultus est qui vult alicui virtuti vel caritati bonum: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi dona gratuita ex caritate non sunt diligenda.

3. *Item*, illud solum est ex caritate diligibile, quod est aliquo modo beatificabile; sed huiusmodi dona gratuita non sunt beatificabilia: ergo non sunt ex caritate diligenda[^5].

4. *Item*, Augustinus[^6] sufficienter enumerat ea quae sunt ex caritate diligenda; sed dona gratuita non sunt de illis quae Augustinus enumerat: ergo videtur, quod ex caritate diligenda non sunt.

> ### Conclusio.
> Bona gratuita ex caritate sunt diligenda, non quidem amore amicitiae, sed concupiscentiae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, dona gratuita non esse ex caritate diligenda, secundum quod diligere ex caritate est motus caritatis ut elicientis; sed si ex caritate diliguntur, hoc est secundum quod diligere est ipsius caritatis imperantis[^7]. Nam in hoc differt caritas ab affectu naturali, quod naturalis affectus quaerit proprium commodum, « caritas vero, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^8], protenditur in alterum »; et quia commodum nostrum recte et proprie consistit in spiritualibus donis, quae ordinant nos ad beatitudinem: ideo amor talium donorum est a dilectione naturali elicitive, sed a caritate imperative, cuius est imperare affectibus nostris, ut recte moveantur in suum finem. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere: primum quidem, quia caritas non semper in alterum tendit; habens enim caritatem, per ipsam frui Deo desiderat. Secundo vero, quia, quamvis sit naturae quaerere et amare commoda naturalia, spiritualia tamen dona perfecte amare, hoc non potest esse nisi dilectionis gratuitae.

Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod cum bonum sit obiectum caritatis, et actus recipiat speciem ab obiecto[^9]; intentio actus diligendi variari habet secundum rationem boni. Bonum autem dicitur aliquid dupliciter: uno modo *concretive*, quia est ordinatum ad beatitudinem et in finem[^10]; alio modo *abstractive*, quia est illud quo quid ordinatur in finem. Dona igitur gratuita non dicuntur esse bona *primo* modo, sed *secundo*, quia mediantibus illis substantiae rationales habent in finem ordinari; ideo, proprie loquendo, magis sunt *bonitates* quam *bona*, et magis *rationes diligendi* quam *diligibilia*. Et ideo dicunt isti, quod *susceptiva* horum donorum spiritualium sunt ex caritate diligenda, ipsa vero *dona gratuita* non sunt proprie ex caritate diligenda[^11], sed magis *rationes diligendi* ex caritate sua subiecta. Et quia accidens cum subiecto est unum, ideo dilectio istorum donorum cum dilectione creaturarum rationalium non ponit in numerum. — Sed illud adhuc calumniabile est, pro eo quod Deus, qui est ipsa summa Bonitas per essentiam, connumeratur inter ea quae sunt ex caritate diligenda. Et iterum: « Si propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis[^12] » — sed talia dona spiritualia sunt bona, propter quae homines diliguntur — multo fortius ex caritate diligenda ipsa videntur.

Et ideo est adhuc tertius modus dicendi, quod sicut in praecedentibus[^13] tactum est, duplex est caritatis motus et affectus. Est enim dilectio amicitiae et dilectio concupiscentiae. Dilectione amicitiae illa diliguntur, quibus optatur bonum; dilectione vero concupiscentiae illa dicuntur diligi, quae desiderantur. Quoniam ergo desiderium bonorum spiritualium est ipsius caritatis, secundum quod Sancti[^14] dicunt, quia bona spiritualia tenent rationem honesti; concedendum est, quod bona gratuita ex caritate diligenda sunt.

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Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus in octavo de Trinitate[^15], cum dicit, quod « ipsa caritas ex caritate diligenda est ». Expresse etiam docet ipsa experientia viros spirituales, qui nihil tam desiderant post Deum, quam habere perfectam Dei dilectionem. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nulla creatura carens ratione diligenda est ex caritate; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de dilectione amicitiae, verum est; si vero de dilectione concupiscentiae, non est verum. Et si tu obiicias, quod tunc bona temporalia erunt[^16] diligenda ex caritate, cum caritas faciat, illa bona concupisci propter obsequium Dei; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia illa bona temporalia habent tantum rationem commodi, sed bona spiritualia habent rationem honesti; et ideo concupiscentia *sapientiae* in Scriptura[^17] laudatur, quamvis concupiscentia *pecuniae* vituperetur. Praeterea, « bona temporalia sunt minima bona », sicut dicit Augustinus[^18]; sed dona gratuita connumerantur inter bona maxima; et ideo de his et istis non est simile.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diligere est velle alicui bonum; iam patet responsio: quia loquitur de diligere, secundum quod est actus amicitiae; secundum enim quod est actus concupiscentiae, diligere non est velle alicui bonum, sed magis est aliquod bonum desiderare vel aliquod bonum acceptare. Et quamvis non sit concedendum, quod caritas faciat sibi velle bonum; facit tamen, se desiderari et acceptari tanquam verum bonum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est amandum ex caritate nisi beatificabile; dicendum, quod illud prima fronte habet instantiam in Deo, qui est ipsa beatitudo[^19]. Praeterea, etsi in creaturis aliquo modo habeat veritatem, hoc verum est in his quae diligenda sunt dilectione amicitiae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod Augustinus non enumerat quaecumque diligenda, sed diligenda dilectione amicitiae. Et si tu quaeras rationem, quare; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia motus amicitiae maioris liberalitatis est quam motus concupiscentiae; et secundum illum caritas protenditur in alterum: et ideo secundum illum modum magis diligibilia distinguuntur, et quae diligenda sunt diligi praecipiuntur. Nec est diminutio, quia in illis ista includuntur[^20].

english:
### Question V. *Whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.*

Fifth, it is asked whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, through Augustine, in the book *On the Trinity*[^1]: « Let him who loves his neighbor love love itself especially »: therefore if he loves his neighbor out of charity, he loves love out of charity; but the love by which he loves his neighbor is a gratuitous gift: therefore gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

2. *Likewise*, everything that orders toward beatitude and leads to it is to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are of this kind: therefore it seems that they are to be loved out of charity.

3. *Likewise*, it is established that spiritual gifts are to be loved and sought from God, and that he who loves them merits by loving; if then a meritorious love is the love of charity, it seems that such gifts are to be loved out of charity.

4. *Likewise*, as gratuitous love stands to gratuitous gifts, so[^2] natural love stands to natural goods; but natural goods are loved by a natural love: therefore by parity of reasoning gratuitous gifts are loved by a gratuitous love. But gratuitous love is the love of charity: therefore it seems that gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity.

**On the contrary:**
1. No creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity[^3]; but gifts of this kind have no reason: therefore they ought not to be loved out of charity.

2. *Likewise*, « to love is to will good to someone[^4] »; but he is foolish who wills good to some virtue or to charity: therefore it seems that gifts of this kind are not to be loved out of charity.

3. *Likewise*, that alone is lovable out of charity which is in some way capable of beatitude; but gifts of this kind are not capable of beatitude: therefore they are not to be loved out of charity[^5].

4. *Likewise*, Augustine[^6] sufficiently enumerates the things that are to be loved out of charity; but gratuitous gifts are not among those that Augustine enumerates: therefore it seems that they are not to be loved out of charity.

> ### Conclusion.
> Gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity, not indeed with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that gratuitous gifts are not to be loved out of charity, insofar as to love out of charity is a motion of charity as eliciting; but if they are loved out of charity, this is insofar as to love belongs to charity as commanding[^7]. For in this charity differs from natural affection, that natural affection seeks its own advantage, « but charity, as Gregory says[^8], reaches out toward another »; and since our advantage rightly and properly consists in spiritual gifts, which order us to beatitude: therefore the love of such gifts is from natural love eliciting, but from charity commanding, whose office is to command our affections, so that they may be rightly moved toward their end. — But it does not suffice to say this: first indeed, because charity does not always tend toward another; for one having charity desires through it to enjoy God. And second, because, although it belongs to nature to seek and love natural conveniences, yet to love spiritual gifts perfectly cannot be except of gratuitous love.

And therefore there is another way of speaking: that since good is the object of charity, and the act receives its species from the object[^9]; the intention of the act of loving must be varied according to the account of the good. Now a thing is called good in two ways: in one way *concretively*, because it is ordered to beatitude and toward the end[^10]; in another way *abstractively*, because it is that by which something is ordered to the end. Gratuitous gifts, therefore, are not called goods in the *first* way, but in the *second*, because through them rational substances have to be ordered to the end; therefore, properly speaking, they are rather *goodnesses* than *goods*, and rather *grounds of loving* than *lovable things*. And therefore these say that the *subjects capable* of these spiritual gifts are to be loved out of charity, but the *gratuitous gifts* themselves are not properly to be loved out of charity[^11], but rather are *grounds of loving* out of charity their subjects. And since an accident is one with its subject, therefore the love of these gifts together with the love of rational creatures does not constitute a separate count. — But this too is still open to objection, in that God, who is the very highest Goodness by essence, is counted among the things that are to be loved out of charity. And again: « If on account of which each thing [is such], then that thing more so[^12] » — but such spiritual gifts are the goods on account of which men are loved — much more strongly do they themselves seem to be loved out of charity.

And therefore there is yet a third way of speaking, that, as was touched on in the preceding[^13], the motion and affection of charity is twofold. For there is the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence. By the love of friendship those things are loved for which good is desired; but by the love of concupiscence those things are said to be loved which are desired. Since therefore the desire of spiritual goods belongs to charity itself, inasmuch as the Saints[^14] say that spiritual goods hold the account of the honorable; it must be granted that gratuitous goods are to be loved out of charity.

And this Augustine expressly says in the eighth book of *On the Trinity*[^15], when he says that « charity itself is to be loved out of charity ». Experience itself also expressly teaches this of spiritual men, who desire nothing so much after God as to have a perfect love of God. — Whence the reasonings that are for this part are to be granted.

**To the solution of the contrary arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, that no creature lacking reason is to be loved out of charity; it must be said that if it is understood of the love of friendship, it is true; but if of the love of concupiscence, it is not true. And if you object that then temporal goods will[^16] be loved out of charity, since charity causes those goods to be desired for the service of God; it must be said that it is not the same: because those temporal goods have only the account of convenience, but spiritual goods have the account of the honorable; and therefore the desire of *wisdom* is praised in Scripture[^17], although the desire of *money* is blamed. Moreover, « temporal goods are the least goods », as Augustine says[^18]; but gratuitous gifts are counted among the greatest goods; and therefore there is no likeness between these and those.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that to love is to will good to someone; the response is already clear: because it speaks of loving insofar as it is an act of friendship; for insofar as it is an act of concupiscence, to love is not to will good to someone, but rather is to desire some good or to accept some good. And although it is not to be granted that charity causes [a man] to will good to itself; yet it causes itself to be desired and accepted as a true good.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that nothing is to be loved out of charity except what is capable of beatitude; it must be said that this at first sight has an instance in God, who is beatitude itself[^19]. Moreover, even if it has truth in creatures in some way, this is true in those things which are to be loved with the love of friendship.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, it must be said that Augustine does not enumerate whatever things are to be loved, but the things to be loved with the love of friendship. And if you ask the reason why; it must be said that this is because the motion of friendship is of greater generosity than the motion of concupiscence; and according to it charity reaches out toward another: and therefore according to that mode the more lovable things are distinguished, and the things that are to be loved are commanded to be loved. Nor is there any diminution, because in those the latter are included[^20].

la: *(P. 629, n. 6.)* Libr. VII. c. 7. n. 10. Cfr. in I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 9. n. 10. — Mox pro *ergo si proximum diligit* plures codd. *ergo si proximum diligat.* In conclus. post *dona gratuita sunt* codd. 11. interserunt *similiter.*

en: *(P. 629, n. 6.)* Book VII, c. 7, n. 10. Cf. on the First Epistle of John, tract 9, n. 10. — Soon, for *therefore if he loves his neighbor* several codices read *therefore if he should love his neighbor.* In the conclusion, after *gratuitous gifts are*, codices 11 insert *likewise.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 1.)* Codd. FHNT *Item sic se... gratuita, sicut se* etc. Post pauca pro *naturali dilectione* cod. Z *naturali affectione.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 1.)* Codices FHNT [read] *Likewise so it stands... gratuitous, as it stands* etc. A little after, for *natural love* codex Z [reads] *natural affection.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 2.)* Cfr. supra quaest. I.

en: *(P. 630, n. 2.)* Cf. above, question I.

la: *(P. 630, n. 3.)* De qua definitione ab Aristot. data vide supra pag. 574, nota 5.

en: *(P. 630, n. 3.)* On this definition given by Aristotle see above p. 574, note 5.

la: *(P. 630, n. 4.)* Edd. *diligibilia.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 4.)* The editions [read] *lovable.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 5.)* Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 23. n. 22. Vide quaest. seq. et hic lit. Magistri, c. I. — Subinde pro *ea quae* cod. K *omnia quae.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 5.)* Book I, *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 23, n. 22. See the following question and here the text of the Master, c. I. — Subsequently, for *those things which* codex K [reads] *all things which.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 6.)* De caritate ut eliciente et imperante vide supra quaest. I.

en: *(P. 630, n. 6.)* On charity as eliciting and commanding see above, question I.

la: *(P. 630, n. 7.)* Libr. I. Homil. in Evang. homil. 17. n. I: *Dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 7.)* Book I, *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 17, n. I: *Love tends toward another, that it may be able to be charity.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 8.)* Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.). Vide tom. II. pag. 361, nota 3. — Subinde pro *intentio actus* non pauci codd. *intentio tantum.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 8.)* Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4). See vol. II, p. 361, note 3. — Subsequently, for *the intention of the act* not a few codices [read] *the intention only.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 9.)* Cod. K addit *ut est substantia rationalis.* Mox pro *quo quid* codd. AK bb *quo aliquid*, edd. *quo quis.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 9.)* Codex K adds *as is a rational substance.* Soon, for *that by which something* codices AK bb [read] *that by which a certain thing*, the editions *that by which someone.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 10.)* Supple: *sunt.* — Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 8.) inter ea quae unum numero sunt, recenset suppositum cum accidentibus. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 7. (IV. c. 6.). — Deinde pro *ideo dilectio... non ponit* edd. *ideo dilectionem... non est ponere.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 10.)* Supply: *are.* — Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 6 (c. 8), among the things that are one in number, reckons the supposit together with its accidents. Cf. *Metaphysics* V, text 7 (IV, c. 6). — Then, for *therefore the love... does not constitute* the editions [read] *therefore the love... is not to be constituted.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 11.)* Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2. — Edd. sic: *Et iterum: Propter quod unumquodque tale, et ipsum magis; sed talia... diliguntur: ergo multo fortius* etc. Pro *sed talia* cod. A *si talia.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 11.)* Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 2. — The editions thus: *And again: That on account of which each thing is such, that thing itself more so; but such things... are loved: therefore much more strongly* etc. For *but such things* codex A [reads] *if such things.*

la: *(P. 630, n. 12.)* Dist. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad 6; et d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, nec non I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 2, ubi idem problema proponitur.

en: *(P. 630, n. 12.)* Distinction 27, a. I, q. 2, ad 6; and d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, ad 3, as well as I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 2, where the same problem is proposed.

la: *(P. 630, n. 13.)* Sufficiat citare Bedam, qui III. Expos. in Cantic. 3, 5. n. II. ait: *Nec mirandum, quod somno comparetur amor, quia visibilium appetitu sensum mentis avertit atque ad invisibilia appetenda convertit* etc. — Inferius nomine *honesti* intellige id quod propter se expetendum est. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 34, nota 4. et pag. 40, nota 5. — Pro *quia bona*, quod a codd. AK Z bb commendatur, alii codd. cum edd. *quod bona.*

en: *(P. 630, n. 13.)* Let it suffice to cite Bede, who in *Exposition on the Canticle* III, on 3, 5, n. II, says: *Nor is it to be wondered at that love is compared to sleep, since by the appetite of visible things it turns away the sense of the mind and converts it to the seeking of invisible things* etc. — Below, by the name of *the honorable* understand that which is to be sought for its own sake. Cf. vol. I, p. 34, note 4, and p. 40, note 5. — For *since they are goods*, which is commended by codices AK Z bb, other codices with the editions [read] *because they are goods.*

la: *(P. 631, n. 1.)* Cap. 8. n. 12. — Inferius pro *qui nihil* cod. A *quod nihil*, et pro *tam... quam* codd. AFW *tantum... quantum.*

en: *(P. 631, n. 1.)* Chapter 8, n. 12. — Below, for *who [desire] nothing* codex A [reads] *that nothing*, and for *so much... as* codices AFW [read] *as much... as.*

la: *(P. 631, n. 2.)* Cod. C *essent*, codd. AT *erant*, qui etiam cum codd. FGHIL pro *diligenda* exhibent *diligibilia.*

en: *(P. 631, n. 2.)* Codex C [reads] *would be*, codices AT *were*, which also with codices FGHIL display *lovable* for *to be loved.*

la: *(P. 631, n. 3.)* Sap. 6. 21: *Concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum perpetuum.* Cfr. Eccli. 6, 37. De concupiscentia pecuniae vide Act. 5, 1. seqq., et I. Tim. 6, 9. Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 30. — Pro *pecuniae* cod. Z *potentiae.*

en: *(P. 631, n. 3.)* Wisdom 6:21: *The desire of wisdom therefore leads to the everlasting kingdom.* Cf. Sirach 6:37. On the desire of money see Acts 5:1 ff., and I Timothy 6:9. Cf. Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 30. — For *of money* codex Z [reads] *of power.*

la: *(P. 631, n. 4.)* Libr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 3. seq.

en: *(P. 631, n. 4.)* Book II, *On Free Will*, c. 19, n. 50. Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3 f.

la: *(P. 631, n. 5.)* Verba *qui est ipsa beatitudo* desunt in edd.

en: *(P. 631, n. 5.)* The words *who is beatitude itself* are absent in the editions.

la: *(P. 631, n. 6.)* Verbo *includuntur* cod. W praemittit *diligantur vel.* Paulo superius pro *diligibilia* cod. bb *diligenda.*

en: *(P. 631, n. 6.)* Before the word *are included* codex W prefixes *are loved, or.* A little above, for *lovable* codex bb [reads] *to be loved.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quae hic generaliter de donis gratuitis docentur, haec iam I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. speciatim de caritate tractata sunt, ubi etiam alii commentatores in scholio citati sunt. In responsione omnes satis conveniunt. De hac (5.) quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. I; S. II. II. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

**II.** De sufficientia diligendorum ex caritate, tractata in seq. (6.) quaestione, secundum primam viam ab auctore relatam explicite agunt: S. Thom., S. loc. cit. a. 12. (cfr. hic a. 7; Qq. disp. de caritate, a. 7.). — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Item tangit Petr. a Tar., hic a. 9, ubi arg. S. ad oppos. speciali quaestione discutit. — Secundam viam sequitur Richard. a Med., qui (a. I. q. 1-4.) totam doctrinam de obiectis caritatis secundum haec quatuor membra dividit et distinctis quaestionibus absolvit; de qua divisione cfr. etiam infra d. 29. dub. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** What is taught here generally concerning gratuitous gifts has already been treated specially concerning charity in I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, where also other commentators were cited in the scholion. In the response all agree well enough. On this (5th) question: St. Thomas, here a. I; S. II II q. 25, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, the single question.

**II.** On the sufficiency of the things to be loved out of charity, treated in the following (6th) question, the following deal explicitly according to the first way related by the author: St. Thomas, at the place cited a. 12 (cf. here a. 7; *Disputed Questions on Charity*, a. 7). — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise also touches on it, here a. 9, where he discusses argument 8 to the contrary in a special question. — Richard of Mediavilla follows the second way, who (a. I, q. 1-4) divides the whole doctrine of the objects of charity according to these four members and resolves it in distinct questions; on which division cf. also below d. 29, dub. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (printed pp.629–631; pdf 651–653; offset +22), reading each page L-column then R-column, body bands then footer bands. This is a two-column page whose IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo and every footer, so the column-band PDF is authoritative (Vol III PDF-priority inversion).

**Page span.** q5 opens at the foot of p.629 L-column (*Quinto quaeritur*), the videtur args 1–3 finishing the page; args 4 + Contra + Conclusio + Respondeo + Ad-replies + Scholion run through p.630 and into p.631, closing immediately before QUAESTIO VI on p.631 R-column.

**Footer split (per Vol II/III override step 4).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering per page.
- **p.629:** nn.1–5 anchor in q.4's body → belong to **q.4**. Only **n.6** (Augustine *de Trinitate* VII) anchors in q.5's first objection → captured here as `[^1]`.
- **p.630:** nn.1–13 all anchor in q.5 → `[^2]`–`[^14]`.
- **p.631:** nn.1–6 anchor in q.5 → `[^15]`–`[^20]`. **nn.7–9** (Augustine *de Doctr. christ.*; Aristotle *Metaph.*; Matth. 22) anchor in q.6's opener → belong to **q.6** (hand-off forwarded).

**Scholion.** Present (parts I–II), printed at the foot of p.631 L+R columns between the Ad-replies and QUAESTIO VI. Part I treats this (5th) question; part II points forward to the (6th) question — confirming the scholion is q5's, not q6's. Placed body-then-scholion per the parser gotcha.

**Hand-off forwarded to q6 (d28-a1-q6, *De diligendorum numero et sufficientia*):** opener *Sexto quaeritur de diligendorum numero et sufficientia* begins p.631 R-column lower; q6 inherits **p.631 footer nn.7–9** (q6's body markers Augustinus⁷, etc.).

**`[?]` flags:** none — all readings resolved against the column-band PDF.