title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura. Et quod sic, videtur:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. *Per simile*, quia astronomi et mathematici per cursum astrorum praecognoscunt et dicunt multa futura, et videmus, quod in multis vera dicunt: ergo si maior est intelligentia et cognitio in daemonibus, videtur etc.

2. Item, hoc ostenditur *ab effectu*, quia isti magi et divini per pacta cum daemonibus multa vera praedicunt; et non possunt nisi per revelationem daemonum: ergo videtur, quod ipsi futura praecognoscant.

3. Item, videtur hoc *a minori*, quia intellectus agens in somniis et in ecstasi multa vera futura praevidet, sicut patet, quia frequenter somniamus quod evenit nobis post longa tempora: sed daemones sunt omnino abstracti a sensibus: ergo etc.

4. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia « *anima quodam modo est omnia*[^1] », quia in ea est « quo est omnia fieri », quantum est ex parte intellectus possibilis; et quantum est ex parte intellectus agentis, est in ea « *quo est omnia facere* »: ergo si intellectus agens esset liber, vel possibilis reductus ad actum per agentem; tunc non solum esset in potentia ad cognoscendum futura, sed etiam in actu. Et hoc est in daemonibus, qui creati sunt in actualitate plenae cognitionis, et quorum intellectus agens est liber a corpore: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. Quod non praesciant futura contingentia, videtur. Quanto aliquid magis est praesens alicui, tanto certius est ei; sed voluntas uniuscuiusque sibi praesentior est quam alii: ergo certior est sibi, quid velle debeat, quam alii. Sed nullus homo certitudinaliter scit, quid debeat cras velle vel cogitare: ergo multo minus nec alia creatura, quantum est de se, potest scire.

2. Item, omnis cognitio creaturae pendet a re scita, quia scibile non se habet in comparatione ad scientem creatum per modum *possibilis*, sed potius per modum *actualis* et *motivi*[^2]; sed nulla cognitio pendens a cognoscibili potest esse certa de re incerta; sed futurum contingens est res incerta: ergo non potest certitudinaliter ab Angelo cognosci.

3. Item, si cognoscit futura, aut ergo scientia *acquisita*, aut *innata*. Si *acquisita*; sed haec incipit ab existentia rei, quia a re ipsa generatur in cognoscente: cum ergo res nondum sit, non potest cognitionem eius acquirere. Si *innata*: ergo non potest ignorare aliqua eorum quae futura sunt: ergo praescivit casum suum, antequam caderet, quod supra[^3] improbatum est tanquam impossibile: ergo etc.

4. Item, si praescit futura, ergo scit, quis debeat vincere, utrum ipse, an is quem tentat: ergo cum ipse refugiat victoriam bonorum, nunquam tentaret nisi illos quos praesciret sibi succumbere; sed alios tentat, sicut patet in Iob[^4]: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Daemones futurorum contingentium non possunt certam habere praecognitionem, cum hoc solius sit Dei, licet ob ingenii acrimoniam, longam experientiam, dolosam cautelam et alienam doctrinam aliquando possint vera praedicere.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod futurorum triplex est genus. Quaedam enim sunt futura, quae habent causam determinatam et infallibilem, utpote sunt illa quae attenduntur circa motum corporum superiorum, in quibus est determinatio et omnis impedimenti remotio. Talia possunt certitudinaliter sciri non solum a Deo et in Deo, sed a creatura; et hoc in sua causa, sicut tempus eclypsis et consimilium. Quaedam sunt, quae habent causam determinatam, sed tamen fallibilem, utpote sunt illa quae sunt secundum inferiorem naturam; quae ideo habent causam *determinatam*, quia intentio naturae movet determinate ad unum[^5], ideo vero *fallibilem*, quia multiplex potest occurrere impedimentum: utpote quod ager seminatus, si terra pinguis est et bona dispositio superiorum corporum, afferat pinguem fructum. Et ista possunt quodam modo sciri et praesciri non tantum a Deo, sed etiam a creatura, quae novit naturas rerum superiorum et inferiorum, non tamen ita certitudinaliter, sicut praedicta. Quaedam autem sunt, quae habent causam *indeterminatam* et *fallibilem*, sicut sunt ea quae sunt a voluntate nostra, quae *indeterminata* est propter hoc, quod est ad opposita, *fallibilis* etiam, quia possunt etiam volenti perficere occurrere multa impedimenta. Et talia non possunt certitudinaliter sciri ab aliqua creatura in se ipsa, sed solum a Deo, vel per revelationem divinam.

*Ratio* autem huius est ista, quia cognitio *creaturae* pendet *ex re*[^6]; quoniam igitur res incerta est et *in se* et in *sua causa*, ideo creatura non potest

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illam certitudinaliter nosse aut praescire. Divina autem cognitio non pendet a re aliqua, immo omnia quae novit, secundum modum suae veritatis novit; et quia veritas sua est certissima, certissime cognoscit contingentia, ut necessaria; et hoc melius explanatum fuit in primo libro[^7]. Et sicut certissime novit, ita potest certitudinaliter demonstrare et revelare; ideo haec praecognitio futurorum, vel Dei est vel a Deo. Et ideo, cum talia futura praedicuntur, praedictio dicitur *divinatio*, quia talis est actus divinus; et quia daemones superbi maxime desiderant honorari ut Deus, maxime conantur ostendere hoc in se habere. — Et ideo dicere, quod daemones per se ipsos futura contingentia praesciant certitudinaliter, hoc est eis attribuere quod Dei est. Ideo est ibi *infidelitas* et infidelitati frequenter annexa *idololatria*; ideo divinatio est prohibita[^8]. — Quamvis autem daemones non possint per se ipsos futura contingentia scire certitudinaliter, tamen frequenter vera praedicunt, quia eventum futurorum aliquo modo praesentiunt. Hoc autem est quadrupliciter, sicut dicit Augustinus in *secundo super Genesim ad litteram*[^9]: « *Aut enim sensus vel ingenii acrimonia, aut multa experientia, aut dolosa cautela, aut aliena doctrina* ». *Sensus acrimonia*, ut quando vident diligenter et considerant, ad quid inclinetur affectio nostra, vel quae sint inducentia vel retrahentia; *experientia temporum*, quia ex talibus vident accidere talia; *dolosa cautela*, quando proponit aliquid facere et praedicit, quod aliquid sit futurum[^10]; *aliena doctrina*, quando iusto Dei iudicio permittitur addiscere ab Angelis. — Et sic patet, quod daemones futura contingentia, etsi possunt praesentire probabiliter, non possunt certitudinaliter praescire, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de astronomis sive mathematicis, quod frequenter dicunt vera; dicendum, quod hoc solum est coniecturando, sive secundum *legem astrorum*, sive secundum *diabolica commercia*: secundum *legem astrorum*, utpote quando dominatur stella, quae habet impressionem super diversos humores, disponit secundum hoc hominem ad diversos mores et affectiones[^11]; secundum *diabolica commercia*, ut quando volunt vim astrorum ultra protendere[^12] quam ad illud, super quod possunt; tunc enim, nisi diabolus adesset, ita frequenter falsum sicut verum dicerent[^13]; nunc autem cum toto auxilio daemonum frequenter falsa praedicunt et decipiuntur. Sed tanta est daemonum astutia, quod ita sciunt occultare fraudem suam, ut ostendant, errorem sive defectum fuisse in astronomo considerante, non in arte aut diabolo assistente. — In hoc igitur stat responsio, quod astronomi de contingentibus habentibus causam fallibilem et indeterminatam non praesciunt vera nisi ex coniectura; et diabolus ex maiori coniectura illa praesentit, non tamen certitudinaliter praescit.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de magis et divinis, quod dicunt vera; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen, quia aliquando dicunt falsa, patet, quod potius dicunt verum casualiter quam certitudinaliter, potius coniectura quam scientia. Qui enim semel dicit futurum in verbo Domini, et non evenit, sicut in *Lege*[^14] dicitur, *somniator* est, et non propheta Domini; et ideo praecipitur occidi.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de somniis, in quibus praevidentur futura; dicendum, quod quidquid de hoc senserint philosophi[^15], quorum positiones longum esset hic retexere, quod de eis dicit sacra Scriptura indubitanter est tenendum. Reprehendit enim eos qui confidentiam habent in somniis; unde Ecclesiastici trigesimo quarto[^16]: *Sicut parturientis cor tuum phantasias patitur, nisi ab Altissimo fuerit missa visitatio*; ideo intelligendum, quod *quinque ex causis fiunt somnia*. Quaedam ex dispositione corporis, quaedam ex sollicitudine mentis, quaedam ex illusione diabolica, quaedam ex revelatione angelica, quaedam ex visitatione divina. Prima duo somnia sunt praesagia futurorum, quae habent causam in nobis, ut somnia, quae contingunt ex causis corporis, sunt signa infirmitatis; somnia, quae contingunt ex sollicitudine mentis, sunt signa eorum, ad quae facienda vel desideranda nostra inclinatur affectio; aliorum vero non sunt signa de se, immo, si ad alia applicentur, potius praebent occasionem errandi quam praesciendi. Somnia vero, quae sunt a diabolica illusione, nullius sunt roboris, sicut nec divinationes haruspicum. Somnia vero, quae ab *Angelis bonis*, aut a *Deo* sunt in nobis, signa sunt vera. Et ita ex hoc non habetur, quod praecognitio futurorum contingentium aliter habeatur quam a Deo, nisi per aliquam coniecturam[^17].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *anima quodam modo est omnia*; dicendum, quod intellectus

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agens non est ens actu plene respectu omnium, quia non est plene agens; et ideo indiget iuvari a cognoscibili ad hoc, quod sit in actu, vel a Deo, qui est omnino actus respectu omnium entium et verorum. Et quia futurum contingens non habet esse nisi indeterminatum, ideo non potest intellectum iuvare ad certitudinalem cognitionem habendam de se. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *agens est in actu respectu omnium, ad quae possibilis est in potentia*; solvendum est *per interemptionem*[^18], non solum in hominibus, verum etiam in Angelis. Quaedam enim sunt, ad quae *etiam* agens divinum *possibilis est in potentia*, quia sunt supra posse creaturae. Unde illa propositio non habet veritatem nisi de his tantum, quae sunt infra posse intellectus creati, respectu quorum habet intellectus se et in ratione *agentis* et *possibilis*; non autem respectu eorum quae sunt supra. Et sic patet illud[^19].

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### Question III. *Whether in the demons there is foreknowledge concerning future things.*

In the third place it is asked whether there is in the demons foreknowledge concerning future things. And that there is, seems thus:

**For the opposite side:**

1. *From a likeness*: astronomers and mathematicians by the course of the stars foreknow and predict many future things, and we see that in many things they speak truly: therefore if the intellect and cognition in the demons is greater, it seems etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown *from effect*: for these magicians and diviners by pacts with the demons predict many true things; and they cannot do so except by revelation from the demons: therefore it seems that the demons themselves foreknow future things.

3. Likewise, this seems *from the lesser case*, because the active intellect in dreams and in ecstasy foresees many true future things, as is plain because we frequently dream what happens to us long afterward: but the demons are wholly abstracted from the senses: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *by reason* it seems: because « *the soul is in a certain way all things*[^1] », for in it is « that by which all things come to be », so far as the possible intellect is concerned; and as for the active intellect, in it is « *that by which it makes all things* »: therefore if the active intellect were free, or the possible were reduced to act by the agent, then it would be not only in potency to knowing future things but also in act. And this is so in the demons, who were created in the actuality of full cognition, and whose active intellect is free from the body: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. That they do not foreknow future contingents, this seems thus. The more present anything is to someone, the more certain it is to him; but the will of each one is more present to himself than to another: therefore he is more certain to himself what he ought to will than another is. But no man certainly knows what he ought to will or to think tomorrow: therefore much less can any other creature, of itself, know it.

2. Likewise, every cognition of a creature depends upon the thing known, since the knowable does not stand in relation to a created knower after the manner of the *possible*, but rather after the manner of the *actual* and *motive*[^2]; but no cognition depending upon a knowable can be certain about an uncertain thing; but a future contingent is an uncertain thing: therefore it cannot be certainly known by an Angel.

3. Likewise, if he knows future things, it is either by *acquired* knowledge or by *innate* knowledge. If *acquired*; but this begins from the existence of a thing, since it is generated in the knower from the thing itself: since therefore the thing does not yet exist, he cannot acquire the cognition of it. If *innate*: then he cannot be ignorant of any of the things which are future: therefore he foreknew his own fall before he fell, which has been disproved above[^3] as impossible: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if he foreknows future things, then he knows who ought to win, whether he himself, or the one whom he tempts: therefore since he himself refuses victory for the good, he would never tempt anyone except those whom he foreknew would yield to him; but he tempts others, as is plain in Job[^4]: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *The demons cannot have certain foreknowledge of future contingents, since this belongs to God alone, although by sharpness of wit, long experience, crafty stratagem, and another's teaching they can sometimes predict true things.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a threefold kind of future things. For some future things have a *determinate and infallible* cause, such as those that pertain to the motion of the higher bodies, in which there is determination and the removal of every impediment. Such things can be known with certainty not only by God and in God, but also by a creature; and this in their cause, as the time of an eclipse and the like. Some have a *determinate but fallible* cause, such as those that occur according to lower nature; which have a *determinate* cause because nature's intention moves determinately to one thing[^5], but a *fallible* one because manifold impediments can occur: as for instance that a sown field, if the soil is rich and the disposition of the higher bodies is good, brings forth a rich crop. And these things can in some way be known and foreknown not only by God but also by a creature that knows the natures of higher and lower things, yet not so certainly as the former. Some, however, have an *indeterminate and fallible* cause, as those which are from our will, which is *indeterminate* because it is open to opposites, and *fallible* because even for one who wills to accomplish them many impediments can occur. And such things cannot be known with certainty by any creature in themselves, but only by God, or by divine revelation.

The *reason* for this is that the cognition of *the creature* depends *on the thing*[^6]; since therefore the thing is uncertain both *in itself* and in *its cause*, the creature cannot

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know or foreknow it with certainty. But the divine cognition does not depend on any thing — rather, all things which it knows it knows according to the mode of its own truth; and since its truth is most certain, it most certainly knows contingent things as necessary; and this was better explained in the first book[^7]. And just as it knows most certainly, so it can certainly demonstrate and reveal; therefore this foreknowledge of future things is either God's or from God. And therefore, when such future things are predicted, the prediction is called *divination*, because such an act is divine; and since the proud demons most of all desire to be honored as God, they most of all strive to make it appear that they have this in themselves. — And therefore to say that the demons by themselves foreknow future contingents with certainty is to attribute to them what is God's. Hence there is here *unfaithfulness*, and to unfaithfulness *idolatry* is frequently annexed; therefore divination is forbidden[^8]. — Although, however, the demons cannot of themselves know future contingents with certainty, they nevertheless frequently predict true things, because they in some way foresense the event of the future. This happens in a fourfold manner, as Augustine says in the second book of his *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^9]: « *Either by sharpness of sense or wit, or by much experience, or by crafty stratagem, or by another's teaching* ». By *sharpness of sense*, as when they see diligently and consider toward what our affection is inclined, or what things are leading or holding back; by *experience of seasons*, since they see such things follow from such; by *crafty stratagem*, when one proposes to do something and predicts that something will be done[^10]; by *another's teaching*, when by God's just judgment it is permitted to be learned from the Angels. — And so it is plain that the demons, although they can foresense future contingents probably, cannot foreknow them with certainty, as the reasons brought forward show.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To the objection about the astronomers or mathematicians, that they frequently speak truly, it must be said that this is only by conjecture, either according to the *law of the stars* or according to *diabolical commerce*: according to the *law of the stars*, as when a star rules which has an impression on the various humors, and so disposes the man to various manners and affections[^11]; according to *diabolical commerce*, as when they wish to stretch the power of the stars beyond[^12] that which they can do; for then, unless the devil were present, they would say what is false as often as what is true[^13]; but now, with the full help of the demons, they frequently predict what is false and are deceived. But so great is the astuteness of the demons that they know how to hide their fraud, making it appear that the error or failure was in the astronomer's consideration, not in the art or in the assisting devil. — In this then stands the answer: that the astronomers, regarding contingents which have a fallible and indeterminate cause, do not foreknow true things except by conjecture; and the devil, by a greater conjecture, foresenses those things, but does not foreknow them with certainty.

*To 2.* To the objection about magicians and diviners, that they speak truly, it must be said that this is true; but yet, since they sometimes speak falsely, it is clear that they rather speak the truth by chance than with certainty, by conjecture rather than by knowledge. For whoever once predicts a future thing in the name of the Lord, and it does not come to pass, as is said in the *Law*[^14], is a *dreamer* and not a prophet of the Lord; and therefore he is commanded to be killed.

*To 3.* To the objection about dreams, in which future things are foreseen, it must be said that whatever the philosophers[^15] may have thought about this — whose positions it would be long to recount here — what Sacred Scripture says about them must without doubt be held. For it reproves those who place confidence in dreams; whence in Ecclesiasticus chapter thirty-four[^16]: *As the heart of a woman in travail, so thy heart suffers fantasies, unless a visitation be sent from the Most High*; therefore it must be understood that *dreams arise from five causes*. Some from the disposition of the body, some from solicitude of mind, some from diabolical illusion, some from angelic revelation, some from divine visitation. The first two kinds of dreams are presages of future things which have their cause in us — as dreams that come from bodily causes are signs of sickness; dreams that come from solicitude of mind are signs of those things to the doing or desiring of which our affection is inclined; of others they are not signs of themselves — rather, if they are applied to other things, they offer occasion for erring rather than for foreknowing. Dreams which are from diabolical illusion have no force, just as neither do the divinations of soothsayers. But dreams which are from the *good Angels*, or from *God*, are true signs in us. And so from this it is not had that the foreknowledge of future contingents is had otherwise than from God, except by some conjecture[^17].

*To 4.* To the objection that *the soul is in a certain way all things*, it must be said that the intellect

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agent is not a being fully in act with respect to all things, because it is not fully an agent; and therefore it needs to be aided by the knowable in order that it may be in act, or by God, who is wholly act with respect to all beings and true things. And because the future contingent has no being except an indeterminate one, therefore it cannot aid the intellect in attaining certain cognition of itself. — To the objection that *the agent is in act with respect to all those things to which the possible is in potency*, this must be solved *by exception*[^18], not only in men but also in the Angels. For there are some things to which *even the divine* agent is *possible in potency*, because they are above the power of a creature. Hence that proposition has no truth except about those things only which are within the power of the created intellect, in respect to which the intellect stands both in the character of *agent* and of *possible*; but not in respect to those things which are above. And thus the point is plain[^19].

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 37. (c. 8.). Ea quae sequuntur, inveniuntur ibid. text. 18. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 37 (c. 8). What follows is found in the same place, text 18 (c. 5).

la: Cfr. August., X. *de Trin.* c. 3. n. 5. et c. 10. n. 16.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* X, c. 3, n. 5, and c. 10, n. 16.

en: See *1. Sent.*, dist. 38 and 39.

en: Dist. 4, art. 2, quest. 2.

la: Hoc argumentum habet August., XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 17. n. 34.

en: This argument is from Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XII, c. 17, n. 34.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 153, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 153, note 5.

en: Dist. 38 and 39.

la: Lev. 19, 26. et 31; Num. 23, 23; Deut. 18, 10. Cfr. August., VII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 35, et XXI. c. 8. n. 5; Isidor., VIII. *Etymol.* c. 9. n. 31.

en: Lev. 19:26 and 31; Num. 23:23; Deut. 18:10. Cf. Augustine, *City of God* VII, c. 35, and XXI, c. 8, n. 5; Isidore, *Etymologies* VIII, c. 9, n. 31.

la: Cap. 17. n. 37. Cfr. etiam *de Divinatione daemonum*, c. 3. n. 7. seqq. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Chapter 17, n. 37. Cf. also *On the Divination of Demons*, c. 3, n. 7 and following. See here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Ita codd. A cc et ed. 1; alii codd. et [ex parte] Vat. *quasi aliquid* [cod. aa *alius*] *sit facturus*. Paulo superius cod. F *experientia ipsorum* pro *experientia temporum*.

en: So read codices A, cc, and edition 1; the other codices and (in part) the Vatican edition read *as if something* [codex aa *another*] *were going to be done*. A little above, codex F reads *experience of them themselves* for *experience of seasons*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. below dist. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vat. *volunt vi astrorum ultra procedere*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *they wish by the force of the stars to proceed further*.

la: Cfr. August., V. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 1–11.

en: Cf. Augustine, *City of God* V, c. 1–11.

la: Deut. 13, 1. seqq.

en: Deut. 13:1 and following.

la: Vide Aristot., *de Somniis* et *de Divinatione per somnum*; Avicennam, IV. *de Anima* seu libri sexti *Naturalium*, c. 2.

en: See Aristotle, *On Dreams* and *On Divination by Dreams*; Avicenna, *On the Soul* IV, or book 6 of the *Naturalia*, c. 2.

la: Vers. 6.

en: Verse 6.

la: Cfr. August., XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 13. n. 27. seqq. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. et Vat. post *vera* subiungunt *et recta*. Cod. F dein prosequitur *ex hoc tamen non habetur* etc.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XII, c. 13, n. 27 and following. — A little above, some codices and the Vatican edition after *true* add *and right*. Codex F then continues *yet from this it is not had* etc.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. — Paulo inferius aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *quae sunt supra* pro *quia sunt supra*.

en: Cf. tome I, p. 87, note 4. — A little below, some codices with edition 1 read *which are above* for *because they are above*.

la: Eodem modo verbum Philosophi explicatur *1. Sent.* d. ... p. I. dub. 8. Cfr. etiam infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: In the same way the Philosopher's saying is explained in *1. Sent.* d. ..., p. I, dub. 8. Cf. also below d. 28, a. 2, q. 3 in the body. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio ideo maioris momenti est, quia in ea agitur de fundamento *divinationis* sive illius superstitionis, quae tentat futura contingentia certo indagare et praedicere (cfr. definitio eius hic in corp.), quo saltem implicite auxilium daemonum provocatur. Haec superstitio antiquis temporibus totum mundum invasit nec unquam post Christum penitus cessavit, immo nostra aetate late serpens denuo e tenebris emersit.

Quod autem daemones (et idem obtinet de *naturali* cognitione bonorum Angelorum) ex se res futuras nec in se ipsis, nec in causis, quatenus in eis non sunt determinatae, nequeant cognoscere, S. Doctor hac fundamentali ratione probat, quod cognitio creaturarum pendet a re cognita; res autem futura, dum nondum est, non potest in se esse obiectum cognitionis nisi intellectui divino (cfr. *1. Sent.* d. 38. a. 1.). In suis causis autem futura certo cognosci nequeunt, nisi ea quae pendent a causis determinatis et non fallibilibus (cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.).

**II.** Quoad primum et tertium futurorum genus in corp. distinctum omnes doctores conveniunt; quoad secundum autem duae sunt opiniones, a Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) cum earum argumentis relatae. Prima opinio contendit, quod, cum effectus causarum naturalium, quae *necessario* operantur, alia interdum naturali causa impediatur, et concursus causae impedientis quandoque sit per accidens et a casu; eventus tunc a daemonibus non nisi per coniecturam sciri possit. Secunda vero opinio asserit, omnes effectus naturales *necessario* evenire, nisi a libera voluntate sive divina sive creata impediantur. Hinc *omnes* effectus naturales futuros, nulla libertate impeditos, daemonibus notos esse putant. Contra hanc opinionem primae sententiae fautores, teste eodem Richardo, opponebant articulum a Stephano Parisiensi episc. a. 1276 condemnatum (Collect. iudic. pag. 198, cap. 14. n. 1.): « *Quod nihil fit a casu, sed omnia ex necessitate eveniunt sic; et quod omnia futura, quae erunt, ex necessitate erunt; et quod non erit, impossibile est esse; et quod nihil evenit contingenter, considerando omnes causas* ». (Censura) « *Error, quia concursus causarum est de definitione casualis, Boethius de Consolatione* ». Sed secundae sententiae adhaerentes replicabant, hanc censuram non apte applicari. — S. Thom. (S. I. q. 57. a. 3.) docet, futura, quae non necessario ex causis suis eveniant, a daemonibus non cognosci nisi per coniecturam, « *si ex suis causis proveniunt ut in pluribus. Quae vero proveniunt ex causis suis ut in paucioribus, penitus sunt ignota, sicut casualia et fortuita* ». Consentiunt Scot. (Quodl. q. 21.), Aegid. R. aliique. Etiam S. Bonav. primae opinioni magis favet, ut patet ex ipsius verbis in corp. — De *casu* cfr. *1. Sent.* d. 39. dub. 4, et infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2; de *divinatione* infra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 5.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 26. m. 4. — Scot. in *Sum. Hier.* de Muntefortino, l. II, q. 57. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 57. a. 3, q. 86. a. 4; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 154; *de Verit.* q. 8. a. 12; *de Malo*, q. 16. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 3. a. 2. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is of greater moment because in it is treated the foundation of *divination* or of that superstition which attempts to investigate and predict future contingents with certainty (cf. its definition here in the body), and by which at least implicitly the help of the demons is invoked. This superstition in ancient times invaded the whole world and has never wholly ceased after Christ — rather in our age, creeping broadly, it has emerged again from the shadows.

That the demons (and the same holds of the *natural* cognition of the good Angels) cannot of themselves know future things in themselves, nor in their causes insofar as in them they are not determined — the holy Doctor proves by this fundamental reason: that the cognition of creatures depends on the thing known; but a future thing, while it does not yet exist, cannot in itself be the object of cognition except to the divine intellect (cf. *1. Sent.* d. 38, a. 1). And in their causes future things cannot be known with certainty except those that depend on determinate and non-fallible causes (cf. above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2).

**II.** As to the first and third genus of future things distinguished in the body, all the doctors agree; but as to the second there are two opinions, related by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) with their arguments. The first opinion contends that, since the effects of natural causes which act *necessarily* are sometimes impeded by another natural cause, and the concurrence of an impeding cause is sometimes per accidens and from chance, the event then cannot be known by the demons except by conjecture. The second opinion asserts that all natural effects come about *necessarily*, unless they are impeded by a free will, either divine or created. Hence they hold that *all* natural future effects, impeded by no liberty, are known to the demons. Against this opinion the supporters of the first view — Richard himself being witness — would urge the article condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in the year 1276 (*Collect. iudic.* p. 198, c. 14, n. 1): « *That nothing happens by chance, but all things come about thus by necessity; and that all future things which will be, will be by necessity; and that what will not be, is impossible to be; and that nothing happens contingently, considering all causes* ». (Censure) « *Error, because the concurrence of causes belongs to the definition of the casual — Boethius, On Consolation* ». But those adhering to the second opinion would reply that this censure is not aptly applied. — St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 57, a. 3) teaches that future things which do not come about of necessity from their causes are not known by the demons except by conjecture, « *if from their causes they come about as in the majority of cases. But those things which come about from their causes only in the minority, are wholly unknown, like things casual and fortuitous* ». Scotus (Quodl. q. 21), Aegidius Romanus and others agree. St. Bonaventure also favors the first opinion more, as is plain from his words in the body. — On *chance* cf. *1. Sent.* d. 39 dub. 4, and below d. 37 a. 2 q. 2; on *divination* below d. 14 p. II a. 2 q. 5.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II q. 26 m. 4. — Scotus in *Sum. Hier.* of Montefortino, l. II, q. 57 a. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 2; *Summa* I q. 57 a. 3, q. 86 a. 4; *S. c. Gent.* III c. 154; *de Verit.* q. 8 a. 12; *de Malo* q. 16 a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; *S.* p. II tr. 4 q. 18 m. 3 a. 2 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, *loc. cit.* — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO III** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars II** — *Utrum in daemonibus sit praecognitio quoad futura* (whether there is foreknowledge of the future in the demons). Structure: 4 *videtur* + 4 **Sed Contra/Fundamenta** + *Conclusio* + **Respondeo** (the *triplex genus futurorum* — causa determinata+infallibilis [motus corporum] / determinata+fallibilis [natura inferior] / indeterminata+fallibilis [voluntate nostra] — and the *Ratio* of demon-divination as *actus divinus* + the Aug. *de Gen. ad lit.* II c.17 *quadrupliciter* sensus/experientia/dolosa-cautela/aliena-doctrina) + 4-block **Solutio** + editorial **Scholion I–III** (I doctrinal note on *divinatio* + S.Doctor's fundamental-ratio argument; II *duae opiniones* survey via Richard. a Med. + the Stephanus-Parisiensis-1276-condemnation refutation + S.Thom. position; III doctor list).

- **`has_scholion: true`.** Own editorial SCHOLION I–III with **no numbered apparatus** (only inline cross-refs to *1. Sent.* d. 38 a. 1 / supra d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 1 ad 2 / Stephanus Parisiensis 1276 *Collect. iudic.* / S.Thom. S.I.q.57.a.3 / *1. Sent.* d. 39 dub. 4 + infra d. 37 a. 2 q. 2 / infra d. 14 p. II a. 2 q. 5 + the doctor list). The sibling-scholion arrangement of d7-p2-a1-q2 does NOT apply here — this quaestio carries its own scholion, and the next chunk `d7-p2-a2-q1` opens a new ARTICULUS so cannot be a sibling-coverage candidate.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De virtute daemonum.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet *de virtute daemonum*. De qua quaeritur secundum tria.

Primum est quasi praeambulum, utrum omnis formae inductio sit a Creatore[^1], an aliquae sint ab agente creato.

Secundum est, utrum verarum formarum inductio sit a spiritu maligno.

Tertium est, utrum ministerio daemonum possit quis uti in huiusmodi operibus sine peccato.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum omnes formae inducantur a Creatore, vel ab agente creato.*

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum omnis formae inductio sit a Creatore, an aliquod agens particulare sive creatum possit aliquam inducere. Et quod omnis sit a Creatore, videtur:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Primo *auctoritate* Domini in Ioanne[^2]: *Pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor*; sed si res producerentur quantum ad formam a natura, non propter hoc diceretur Deus *usque modo operari*: ergo videtur, quod omnis forma sit ab ipso.

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2. Item, *ratione* videtur. Nobilius principium est forma quam materia, et magis dicit *quid* divinum[^3]: ergo cum natura non possit in minus, quia non potest in productionem materiae, immo est a sola creatione, multo fortius videtur de forma.

3. Item, « *principia rerum sunt incorruptibilia* », ut vult Philosophus[^4]; ergo tam materia quam forma; sed incorruptibile est ingenerabile: ergo tam materia quam forma est ingenerabilis: ergo si producitur in esse, hoc non erit a natura, sed solum per creationem.

4. Item, omnis actio creaturae terminatur ad *hoc aliquid*[^5]; sed forma non est *hoc aliquid*: ergo non terminatur ad formam. Ergo cum productio naturalis terminetur ad illud quod producitur per naturam, impossibile est, formam produci ab agente creato; nec materiam, hoc constat; et omne quod producitur, secundum aliquod horum producitur: ergo nihil.

5. Item, cum producitur forma, aut ex aliquo, aut ex nihilo. Si *ex aliquo*; sed omne quod est ex aliquo, habet aliquid sui constitutivum tanquam principium intrinsecum: ergo forma est composita ex materia et forma, quod absurdum est. Si *ex nihilo*; sed omne quod ex nihilo creatur, est a Creatore: ergo nulla forma est ab agente creato.

6. Item, cum forma est in potentia materiae, aut est in potentia *in qua*, aut *a qua*, aut *ex qua*. Non *ex qua*; hoc probatum est[^6], cum forma non habeat materiale principium, ex quo constet, immo sit « *in simplici essentia consistens* »: ergo *in qua*, vel *a qua*. Non *a qua*, quia materiae non est agere: ergo solum *in potentia ut in qua*. Sed forma, quae solum est in potentia *ut in qua*, totaliter est ab extrinseco; et nulla talis forma est naturalis vel a natura: ergo nullum agens creatum potest naturalem formam producere.

**Contra:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. Omnis res, sicut vult Damascenus[^7] et Philosophus, habet propriam operationem, alioquin aliquid esset otiosum in natura; sed omnis operatio boni alicuius est *operatrix*, alioquin est frustra: ergo videtur, quod omnis res aliquid possit producere sive operari ad alicuius productionem; aut ergo materiae, aut formae; non materiae: ergo formae.

2. Item, « *unius corruptio est contrarii generatio*[^8] » — nunquam enim abiicitur frigus, nisi per introductionem caloris, nec e converso — sed constat, quod agens creatum potest abiicere et corrumpere contrarium: ergo potest se vel sibi simile inducere.

3. Item, certum est, quod calidum calefacit — qui hoc non novit indiget sensu — ergo calor ignis generat calorem: ergo pari ratione, qua calidum generat calidum, ignis generat ignem, cum non sit minoris virtutis.

4. Item, certum est, quod obiectum generat sibi similitudinem in speculo — quod patet: si obiectum amoveatur, nullo modo resultabit ibi similitudo — ergo pari ratione, si adsit materia disposita, agens potest generare sibi *simile*[^9] in natura: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Agens creatum particulare potest educere formas substantiales, saltem corporales, quae sunt in potentia materiae, non solum* in qua *et* a qua *aliquo modo, sed etiam* ex qua, *quatenus in materia sunt secundum rationes seminales.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad hoc, quod de eductione formae in esse quadruplex fuit positio.

**Quidam enim posuerunt latitationem formarum**, sicut imponitur Anaxagorae. Et illud quod ipse poneret, dupliciter potest intelligi: aut formas posse sensu actualiter existere in materia, sed non apparere extrinsecus, sicut pictura operta panno; et iste modus impossibilis est omnino, quia tunc contraria

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simul ponerentur in eodem. Alio modo potest intelligi sic, ut essentiae formarum sint in materia in potentia non solum *latentes*, sed *entes*[^10] in potentia, ut materia habeat in se seminales omnium formarum rationes, sibi a primaria conditione inditas — et illud concordat et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae — et per actionem agentis educerentur in actum. Sed hic intellectus non fuit huius positionis, sed primus, secundum quod expositores dicunt. Haec enim positio fuit, quod agens particulare *nihil agat, sed tantum detegat*[^11].

**Alia fuit positio philosophorum magis modernorum, quod omnes formae sunt a Creatore.** Et haec positio potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo, quod Deus sit *principaliter* agens et producens in omnis rei eductione, et sic habet veritatem; vel ita, quod Deus sit *tota causa efficiens*, et agens particulare non faciat nisi materiam adaptare, ut, sicut producit animam rationalem, ita et alias formas; et iste intellectus videtur fuisse illorum philosophorum. — Et iste intellectus est impossibilis, quia agens particulare aut inducit *aliquid*, aut *nihil*. Et si nihil: ergo nihil agit. Si aliquid inducit: ergo videtur, quod aliquam efficiat dispositionem; sed qua ratione potest in unam, et in aliam. Quare ista positio non est rationabilis[^12].

**Tertia positio est, quod formae naturales fere omnes, ad minus corporales, cuiusmodi sunt formae elementares et formae mixtionis, sunt in potentia materiae et per actionem agentis particularis educuntur in actum**; et ista est positio, quam videtur tenuisse Philosophus, et modo tenent communiter doctores in philosophia et theologia[^13]. — Sed tamen haec duas habet vias.

Nam quidam dicunt, quod huiusmodi formae sunt in materia in potentia *receptiva* et quodam modo *activa* sive *cooperativa*; quoniam materia et habet possibilitatem ad recipiendum, et etiam inclinationem ad cooperandum, et in agente est huiusmodi forma producenda sicut in principio effectivo et originali, quia omnis forma per naturam suae speciei recipit virtutem multiplicandi se; unde inductio formae est ab agente formam suam multiplicante. Et ponunt exemplum in candela, quo[^14] modo una inflammat multas, et ab uno obiecto relucent multae imagines in pluribus speculis. Et huiusmodi formae, ut dicunt, non habent, *ex quo* sint *materialiter*, sed *ex quo originaliter*; et ideo non dicuntur creari nec dicuntur esse ex nihilo. Illud enim creatur, quod nullo modo est; sed talis forma sic producta aliquo modo est, tum ratione agentis tum ratione materiae.

**Alia via est, quod formae sunt in potentia materiae, non solum** in qua **et** a qua **aliquo modo, sed etiam** ex qua. Et hoc dicunt, non quia ipsa essentia materiae sit, ex qua res producitur, sed quod in ipsa materia aliquid est concreatum, ex quo agens, dum agit in ipsam, educit formam; non, inquam, ex illo tanquam ex aliquo, quod sit tanquam aliqua pars formae producendae, sed quia illud potest esse forma et fit forma, sicut globus rosae fit rosa. Et ista positio ponit, quod in materia sint *veritates* omnium formarum producendarum naturaliter; et cum producitur, nulla[^15] *quidditas*, nulla *veritas* essentiae inducitur de novo, sed datur ei *nova dispositio*, ut quod erat in potentia fiat in actu. Differunt enim *actus* a *potentia*, non quia dicant diversas *quidditates*, sed *dispositiones* diversas eiusdem; non tamen sunt dispositiones *accidentales*, sed *substantiales*. Et hoc non est magnum, si est in potentia agentis creati, ut quod est uno modo faciat esse alio modo.

Et haec positio inter omnes praedictas videtur esse intelligibilior et veritati vicinior. Hanc positionem credo esse tenendam, non solum quia eam suadeat ratio, sed etiam quia confirmat auctoritas Augustini super Genesim ad litteram, quam Magister[^16] allegat: quod « *quae producuntur a natura secundum rationes seminales producuntur* ». Quid autem sint istae *rationes seminales*, videbitur infra[^17], quando de eis erit sermo. — Secundum hanc igitur positionem sustinendum est, quod agens particulare educit for-

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mas et inducit et res naturales producit. Et rationes ad hoc inductae sunt concedendae.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus operatur *usque modo*; dicendum, quod verum est, quia vel per se operatur, vel cum aliis: unde argumentum non valet: Deus usque modo operatur, ergo agens creatum ei non cooperatur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest in materiam; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia *materiale principium* non est in alio ut in potentia, cum sit de se potentia: tunc enim potentia esset in potentia, et educeretur potentia de potentia, quod non est intelligibile. Secus est in forma, ut visum est; et ideo non est simile. — Potest etiam sumi ratio ex parte *agentis*, quia productio creaturae, cum sit agens *limitatum*, est productio *similis a simili*: sed constat, quod nihil agit ratione *materiae*, sed *formae*: ideo magis potest in formam quam in materiam.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principia rerum sunt incorruptibilia; illud intelligitur *in universali*, non *in particulari*; vel intelligitur secundum *essentiam*, non secundum *esse*; et ideo forma in particulari generatur et corrumpitur[^18]. — Vel potest dici, quod *essentia* eius manet in potentia post corruptionem, sicut ante generationem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actio naturae ad *hoc aliquid* terminatur; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus[^19], proprie loquendo, « *forma non generatur, sed compositum* ». Cum enim producitur forma, non producitur *in se* nec *per se*, sed ut *in materia*; et sic facit compositum, et ad illud terminatur generatio; nihilominus generatio vel productio naturalis respicit compositum *principaliter gratia formae*.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum *ex aliquo* aut *ex nihilo*; dicendum, quod secundum tertiam positionem[^20] formae producuntur *ex aliquo*, sed non ex aliquo *materialiter* vel *constitutive*, sed ex aliquo *originaliter*. Vel secundum quartam opinionem fiunt ex aliquo: non quod *ex* dicat *partem*, sed dicit *consubstantialitatem*, sicut rosa ex globo, quia globus fit rosa.

*Ad 6.* Et per hoc patet *ultimum*. Concedo enim, quod formae naturales sunt in materia quantum ad potentiam et *in qua*, et *ex qua*, et *a qua*[^21], secundum praedictum modum. Et si tu obiicias, quod materia non agit nec constituit; dicendum, quod *essentia* materiae solum se habet *per modum receptivi*; sed *seminarium* inditum se habet quodam modo per modum *activi*, quodam modo per modum *passivi*, quoniam cooperatur agenti, et nihilominus ipsum variatur ab una dispositione in aliam, ut dictum est. — Haec igitur est summa positionis, quod agens creatum *nullam quidditatem*, nec *substantialem* nec *accidentalem*, omnino producit, sed *entem*[^22] sub una dispositione facit esse sub alia.

english:
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### Article II. *On the power of the demons.*

Next, it is asked concerning the second article, namely *on the power of the demons*. Concerning which there are three things sought.

The first is, as it were, a preamble: whether the induction of every form is from the Creator[^1], or whether some are from a created agent.

The second is whether the induction of true forms is from the evil spirit.

The third is whether anyone can use the ministry of the demons in such works without sin.

### Question I. *Whether all forms are induced by the Creator, or by a created agent.*

First, then, it is asked whether the induction of every form is from the Creator, or whether some particular or created agent can induce one. And that every form is from the Creator, seems thus:

**For the opposite side:**

1. First, by the *authority* of the Lord in John[^2]: *My Father works until now, and I also work*; but if things were produced as to their form by nature, God would not on that account be said to *work until now*: therefore it seems that every form is from him.

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2. Likewise, by *reason* it seems thus. The form is a nobler principle than matter, and says something more divine[^3]: therefore since nature cannot do the lesser thing — for she cannot produce matter, which is by creation alone — much more does it seem so of form.

3. Likewise, « *the principles of things are incorruptible* », as the Philosopher holds[^4]; therefore both matter and form; but the incorruptible is ungenerable: therefore both matter and form are ungenerable: therefore if it is brought into being, this will not be by nature, but only by creation.

4. Likewise, every action of a creature is terminated at *this something*[^5]; but form is not *this something*: therefore it is not terminated at form. Therefore since natural production is terminated at that which is produced by nature, it is impossible for form to be produced by a created agent; nor matter — this is plain; and everything which is produced is produced according to one of these: therefore nothing.

5. Likewise, when a form is produced, it is either *from something* or *from nothing*. If *from something*; but everything which is from something has something constitutive of itself as an intrinsic principle: therefore form is composed of matter and form, which is absurd. If *from nothing*; but everything which is created from nothing is from the Creator: therefore no form is from a created agent.

6. Likewise, when a form is in the potency of matter, it is either in the potency *in which*, or *by which*, or *out of which*. Not *out of which*; this has been proved[^6], since form has no material principle of which it is constituted, but rather *consists in a simple essence*: therefore *in which* or *by which*. Not *by which*, because it is not the function of matter to act: therefore only in potency *as in which*. But a form which is only in potency *as in which* is wholly from outside; and no such form is natural or from nature: therefore no created agent can produce a natural form.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. Every thing, as Damascene and the Philosopher will have it[^7], has its own operation; otherwise something in nature would be idle; but every operation of a good thing is *operative*, otherwise it is in vain: therefore it seems that every thing can produce something or can operate toward the production of something — either of matter or of form; not of matter: therefore of form.

2. Likewise, « *the corruption of one is the generation of its contrary*[^8] » — for cold is never cast out except by the introduction of heat, nor the reverse — but it is plain that a created agent can cast out and corrupt the contrary: therefore it can introduce itself or its like.

3. Likewise, it is certain that the hot heats — he who does not know this lacks sense — therefore the heat of fire generates heat: therefore by parity of reason by which the hot generates the hot, fire generates fire, since it is of no lesser power.

4. Likewise, it is certain that an object generates a likeness of itself in a mirror — which is clear: if the object is removed, no likeness will reflect there — therefore by parity of reason, if disposed matter is at hand, an agent can generate the *like*[^9] of itself in nature: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *A particular created agent can educe substantial forms — at least corporeal ones — which are in the potency of matter, not only* in which *and* by which *in some manner, but also* out of which, *insofar as they are in matter according to seminal reasons.*

**I respond:** It must be said on this point that there were four positions concerning the eduction of form into being.

**Some posited a hiding of forms**, as is imputed to Anaxagoras. And what he posited can be understood in two ways: either that forms actually exist in matter perceptibly, but do not appear outwardly, like a picture covered by a cloth; and this mode is altogether impossible, because then contraries

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would be placed at once in the same thing. The other way it can be understood is that the essences of forms are in matter in potency, not only *latent*, but *existing*[^10] in potency — so that matter has in itself the seminal reasons of all forms, implanted in it from its primary condition; and this accords with philosophy and with sacred Scripture; and by the agent's action they are educed into act. But this was not the meaning of this position, but the first, according to what the expositors say. For this position was that a particular agent *does nothing, but only uncovers*[^11].

**The second position was that of more modern philosophers, that all forms are from the Creator.** And this position can be understood in two ways: in one way, that God is *principally* the agent and producer in the eduction of every thing — and so it holds true; or that God is *the whole efficient cause*, and the particular agent does nothing except adapt matter — as he produces the rational soul, so also the other forms; and this meaning seems to have been that of those philosophers. — And this meaning is impossible, because a particular agent either induces *something*, or *nothing*. And if nothing: then it does nothing. If it induces something: then it seems that it produces some disposition; but by what reason it can do this for one, it can also for another. Therefore that position is not reasonable[^12].

**The third position is that the natural forms — almost all of them, at least the corporeal — such as the forms of the elements and the forms of mixtures, are in the potency of matter and by the action of the particular agent are educed into act**; and this is the position which the Philosopher seems to have held, and which now the doctors in philosophy and theology commonly hold[^13]. — But yet this has two ways.

For some say that such forms are in matter in a *receptive* potency and in some way *active* or *cooperative*; because matter both has the possibility of receiving, and also an inclination to cooperate; and in the agent there is the form to be produced as in an effective and original principle, because every form by the nature of its species receives the power of multiplying itself; whence the induction of the form is from the agent multiplying its form. And they give the example of a candle, in which manner[^14] one ignites many, and from one object many images shine forth in many mirrors. And such forms, as they say, have *that out of which* they are not *materially*, but *that out of which originally*; and therefore they are not said to be created, nor to be from nothing. For that is created which in no way is; but such a form thus produced is in some way — both by reason of the agent and by reason of the matter.

**The other way is that forms are in the potency of matter not only** in which **and** by which **in some manner, but also** out of which. And this they say, not because the essence itself of matter is that out of which the thing is produced, but because in matter itself there is something concreated, out of which the agent, while it acts on matter, educes form; not, I say, out of that as out of something which is, as it were, some part of the form to be produced, but because it can be form and becomes form — as the bud of a rose becomes a rose. And this position holds that in matter there are the *truths* of all forms to be produced naturally; and when one is produced, no[^15] *quiddity*, no *truth* of essence is induced anew, but a *new disposition* is given to it, so that what was in potency may become in act. For *act* and *potency* differ, not because they bespeak different *quiddities*, but different *dispositions* of the same; yet these dispositions are not *accidental* but *substantial*. And this is no great matter, if it is in the power of a created agent that what is in one way may be made to be in another.

And this position, among all the foregoing, seems to be more intelligible and closer to the truth. This position I believe must be held, not only because reason recommends it, but also because the authority of Augustine on *Genesis according to the Letter*, which the Master[^16] cites, confirms it: that « *what are produced by nature are produced according to seminal reasons* ». But what these *seminal reasons* are, will be seen below[^17], when the discourse will be of them. — According to this position, then, it must be held that the particular agent educes for-

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ms and induces and produces natural things. And the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To the objection that God works *until now*: it must be said that this is true, since either he works by himself or together with others; whence the argument is not valid: God works until now, therefore the created agent does not cooperate with him.

*To 2.* To the objection that it cannot act upon matter: it must be said that the case is not parallel, because the *material principle* is not in another as in a potency, since it is of itself potency: for then potency would be in potency, and potency would be educed from potency — which is unintelligible. It is otherwise with form, as has been seen; and therefore the case is not parallel. — One may also take a reason from the side of the *agent*, because the production of a creature, since it is a *limited* agent, is the production of *like from like*: but it is clear that nothing acts by reason of *matter* but by reason of *form*: therefore it has more power over form than over matter.

*To 3.* To the objection that the principles of things are incorruptible: this is understood *in the universal*, not *in the particular*; or it is understood according to *essence*, not according to *being*; and therefore the form in the particular is generated and corrupted[^18]. — Or it can be said that its *essence* remains in potency after corruption, as it did before generation.

*To 4.* To the objection that the action of nature is terminated at *this something*: it must be said that, as the Philosopher says[^19], properly speaking, « *form is not generated, but the composite* ». For when form is produced, it is not produced *in itself* nor *per se*, but as *in matter*; and so it makes the composite, and generation is terminated at that; nevertheless natural generation or production looks to the composite *principally for the sake of form*.

*To 5.* To the objection whether *from something* or *from nothing*: it must be said that according to the third position[^20] forms are produced *from something*, but not from something *materially* or *constitutively*, but from something *originally*. Or according to the fourth opinion they come about *from something*: not that *from* signifies a *part*, but signifies *consubstantiality*, as a rose from a bud, because the bud becomes a rose.

*To 6.* And by this is plain the *last point*. For I concede that natural forms are in matter as to potency both *in which*, and *out of which*, and *by which*[^21], according to the aforesaid mode. And if you object that matter does not act or constitute: it must be said that the *essence* of matter only holds itself *after the manner of the receptive*; but the implanted *seedbed* holds itself in some way after the manner of the *active*, in some way after the manner of the *passive*, because it cooperates with the agent, and nevertheless is itself varied from one disposition into another, as has been said. — This therefore is the sum of the position: that the created agent produces *no quiddity* at all, neither *substantial* nor *accidental*, but makes that which is[^22] under one disposition to be under another.

la: Hic et in principio primae quaest. multi codd. cum ed. 1 *datore*, quo alluditur ad sententiam Avicennae, de qua in prima quaest.

en: Here and at the beginning of the first quaestio, many codices with edition 1 read *giver*, by which is alluded the opinion of Avicenna, of which in the first quaestio.

en: Chapter 5, verse 17.

la: De quo vide Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 81. (c. 9.).

en: On which see Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9).

la: Libr. I. *Phys.* text. 30. (c. 6.): *Principia autem semper oportet manere*. Ibid. text. 82. (c. 9.) specialiter de materia probat, quod « *incorruptibilem et ingenitam necesse est ipsam esse* ». — Quod incorruptibile sit ingenerabile, Aristoteles fuse ostendit in I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 110–140. (c. 11. seq.).

en: Book I of the *Physics*, text 30 (c. 6): *The principles must always abide*. Likewise text 82 (c. 9) specifically about matter proves that « *it must be incorruptible and ungenerated* ». — That the incorruptible is ungenerable, Aristotle shows at length in I. *On the Heavens*, text 110–140 (c. 11 and following).

la: Id est, ad primam substantiam, compositam ex materia et forma. Aristoteles, VII. *Metaph.* text. 2-4. seqq. (VI. c. 7. seq.) ad ostendendum contra Platonem, quod formae separatae non sint causae generationis rerum, probat, quod neque materia fiat neque forma, sed *compositum*. « *Hoc aliquid enim facere ex omnino subiecto* [i. e. materia], *hoc facere est. Dico autem, quod aes facere rotundum, est non rotundum aut sphaeram facere, sed aliquid aliud, ut puta formam hanc in alio* ». — In fine argumenti Vat. addit *producitur ab agente creato*.

en: That is, the first substance, composed of matter and form. Aristotle, VII. *Metaphysics*, text 2–4 and following (VI, c. 7 and following), in order to show against Plato that separated forms are not causes of the generation of things, proves that neither matter nor form is made, but the *composite*. « *For to make this something out of a wholly underlying subject* [i.e. matter] *is to make it. I mean that to make bronze round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something else, namely this form in another* ». — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds *is produced by a created agent*.

la: In arg. praeced. — Sequens definitio formae est Gilberti Porret., *de Sex Princip.* c. 1. — Quod materiae non conveniat agere, docet Aristot., II. *de Gener. et corrupt.* text. 33. (c. 9.).

en: In the preceding argument. — The following definition of form is from Gilbert Porretanus, *On the Six Principles*, c. 1. — That it is not fitting to matter to act, Aristotle teaches in II. *On Generation and Corruption*, text 33 (c. 9).

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 23: « *Actus* ἐνέργειαι *quippe est naturalis cuiusque substantiae vis et motus... fieri enim non potest, quod substantia careat naturali actu. Iterum, actus naturalis est illa vis, qua cuiusque natura declaratur... Actus naturalis est vis motioque cuiusque substantiae, qua caret illud solum quod non est* ». Aristot., I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 31. seq. (c. 4.) demonstrat, quod motui circulari motus circularis non possit esse contrarius; deinde dicit, quod unus vel ambo frustra essent, si oppositum statueretur, quia vel unus alterum, vel ambo se invicem impedirent. « *Frustra enim calceamentum hoc dicimus, cuius non est calceatio; Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt* ». In cuius textus explicatione Averroes ait: *Natura igitur fecisset ens otiosum, cum fuisset ens sine actione omnino*. Cfr. etiam IV. *Meteor.* c. ult. — Unus alterque cod. cum Vat. post *sicut vult* addit *Augustinus*.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 23: « *For act* ἐνέργειαι *is the natural power and motion of each substance... for it cannot be that a substance lack its natural act. Again, natural act is that power by which the nature of each is declared... Natural act is the power and motion of each substance, which only that lacks which is not* ». Aristotle, I. *On the Heavens*, text 31 and following (c. 4) demonstrates that circular motion cannot have a circular motion as its contrary; and then he says that one or both would be in vain if the opposite were posited, since either one would impede the other, or both each other. « *For we call that shoe in vain whose shoeing is not; but God and nature do nothing in vain* ». In the explanation of which text Averroes says: *Nature therefore would have made a being idle, since it would have been a being entirely without action*. Cf. also IV. *Meteorologica*, last c. — One or another codex with the Vatican edition after *as Damascene will have it* adds *Augustine*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Gener. et corrupt.* text. 17. (c. 3.) generaliter ait: « *Huius corruptio alterius est generatio, et huius generatio alterius est corruptio* ». Et I. *Phys.* text. 81. (c. 9.): *Corruptiva enim sunt sui invicem contraria*. — In fine argumenti plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *vel sibi similem* (*similitudinem?*) pro *vel sibi simile*, et dein Vat. *introducere* pro *inducere*.

en: Aristotle, I. *On Generation and Corruption*, text 17 (c. 3), says in general: « *The corruption of this is the generation of another, and the generation of this is the corruption of another* ». And I. *Physics*, text 81 (c. 9): *For corruptives are contrary to one another*. — At the end of the argument many codices with editions 2, 3 read *or its like* (*likeness?*) for *or its like*, and then the Vatican edition reads *to introduce* for *to induce*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *similitudinem*; alii plurimi codd. *similem*. Cod. cc et ed. 1 *materiae dispositio* pro *materia disposita*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *likeness*; many other codices read *like*. Codex cc and edition 1 read *disposition of matter* for *disposed matter*.

la: Ed. 1 cum cod. cc *existentes*. Paulo inferius cod. H substituit *virtutum* pro *formarum*, ubi legit cod. F *virtutum et formarum*, codd. or *virtutum formarum*, cod. Z vero *seminalem causam vel virtutem formarum per seminales rationes sibi* etc.

en: Edition 1 with codex cc reads *existing ones*. A little below codex H substitutes *of virtues* for *of forms*, where codex F reads *of virtues and forms*, codices or *of the virtues of forms*, codex Z indeed *seminal cause or virtue of forms through seminal reasons to itself* etc.

la: De quo vide Aristot., I. *Phys.* text. 32. seqq. (c. 4.); I. *de Gener. et corrup.* text. 1. seqq. (c. 1.); I. *Metaph.* c. 4. seq. (c. 3.).

en: On which see Aristotle, I. *Physics*, text 32 and following (c. 4); I. *On Generation and Corruption*, text 1 and following (c. 1); I. *Metaphysics*, c. 4 and following (c. 3).

la: Averroes, IX. *Metaph.* text. 7. ait: « *Moderni autem ponunt unum agens omnia entia sine medio, scilicet Deum; et contingit istis, ut nullum ens habeat actionem propriam naturaliter; et cum entia non habuerint actiones proprias, non habebunt essentias proprias; actiones enim non diversantur nisi per essentias diversas. Et ista opinio est valde extranea a natura hominis, et qui recipiunt huiusmodi non habent cerebrum habilitatum naturaliter ad bonum* ». Libr. VII. *Metaph.* text. 31. dicit: « *Et ideo, quia Avicenna obedit istis propositionibus, credidit, omnes formas esse ab intelligentia agente, quam vocat datorem formarum* [de quo cfr. Avicenna, IX. *Metaph.* c. 3.]; *et existimatur etiam, quod Themistius dicat hoc... dubitat Galenus et dicit: nescio utrum ista virtus sit Creator, aut non... erraverunt in hoc, quia non intellexerunt demonstrationem Aristotelis; et non est mirum de Avicenna, sed de Alfarabio. Videtur enim in suo libro de Duabus Philosophiis dubitare* ». Libr. XII. *Metaph.* text. 18, loquens de generatione aequivoca, dicit Themistium et forte etiam Alfarabium sensisse, non omnes formas, sed solum illas, quae producuntur in generatione aequivoca, dari ab agente abstracto a materia.

en: Averroes, IX. *Metaphysics*, text 7, says: « *But the moderns posit one agent of all beings without intermediary, namely God; and it happens to these that no being has its own action naturally; and since beings will not have their own actions, they will not have their own essences; for actions are not diversified except by diverse essences. And this opinion is very alien to the nature of man, and those who accept this kind of thing have brains not naturally fitted for the good* ». Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, text 31, he says: « *And therefore, because Avicenna obeys these propositions, he believed that all forms are from the agent intelligence, which he calls* the giver of forms [on which cf. Avicenna, IX. *Metaph.* c. 3]; *and it is also thought that Themistius says this... Galen doubts and says: I do not know whether this virtue is the Creator or not... they have erred in this, because they have not understood Aristotle's demonstration; and it is no wonder concerning Avicenna, but concerning Alfarabius. For he seems to be in doubt in his book* On Two Philosophies ». Book XII of the *Metaphysics*, text 18, speaking of equivocal generation, says that Themistius and perhaps also Alfarabius held that not all forms, but only those which are produced in equivocal generation, are given by an agent abstracted from matter.

la: Cfr. VII. *Metaph.* text. 28. seqq. et XII. text. 13. seqq. (VI. c. 8. et XI. c. 3.) et I. ac II. *de Gener. et corrupt.* — Post *theologia* cod. cc et ed. 1 prosequuntur *et rhetores*. Sed Magister hic duas habet vias.

en: Cf. VII. *Metaphysics*, text 28 and following, and XII, text 13 and following (VI, c. 8, and XI, c. 3) and I. and II. *On Generation and Corruption*. — After *theology* codex cc and edition 1 continue *and rhetoricians*. But the Master here has two ways.

la: Cod. F *sicut*, cod. T *quoniam*; cod. cc et ed. 1 *de candela, quando*.

en: Codex F reads *as*; codex T *since*; codex cc and edition 1 read *of a candle, when*.

la: Vat. *naturaliter*, quae etiam paulo superius post *formae producendae* cum uno alteroque cod. perperam omittit *sed*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *naturally*, which also a little above, after *of the form to be produced*, with one or another codex, wrongly omits *but*.

la: Infra d. XVIII. c. 6.

en: Below dist. XVIII, c. 6.

en: Dist. 18, art. 1, quest. 2 and following.

la: Libr. VII. *Metaph.* text. 27. (VI. c. 8.). — Paulo superius pro *actio naturae* Vat. ponit *actio creaturae*, quod etiam in ipsa obiectione habetur.

en: Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, text 27 (VI, c. 8). — A little above for *the action of nature* the Vatican edition has *the action of the creature*, which also is in the objection itself.

la: In Vat. additur *tenendo primam viam illius positionis*, quae etiam paulo inferius legit: *Vel secundum tertiam opinionem, tenendo viam secundam illius positionis* pro *Vel secundum quartam opinionem*, quod habent codd. A i K L V; ceteri *Vel secundum tertiam opinionem*.

en: In the Vatican edition there is added *holding to the first way of that position*, which also a little below reads: *Or according to the third opinion, holding the second way of that position* for *Or according to the fourth opinion*, which is found in codices A, i, K, L, V; the rest read *Or according to the third opinion*.

la: In nonnullis codd. ut U aa bb cc ed. 1 deest *et a qua*.

en: In several codices such as U, aa, bb, cc, and edition 1, *and by which* is wanting.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *existentem*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *existing thing*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem, quae est magni momenti magnisque difficultatibus obstructa, praemittit S. Doctor, ut viam sibi paret ad solvenda dubia, quae commentatores Lombardi hic tractare solebant. Ceteri autem commentatores eandem hanc quaestionem tangunt in sequenti quaest., et diffusius de eadem agunt infra d. 18, ubi disputant de *rationibus seminalibus*, vel etiam d. 13. — Experientia constat, novas semper oriri corporalium rerum formas naturales, tum per generationem perfectam et propriedictam, quae definitur: *origo viventis a principio vivente, coniuncto in similitudinem naturae* (S. Thom., S. I. q. 27. a. 2; S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 9. a. 1. q. 1.), tum per generationem imperfectam, qualis est in mixtionibus, quando ex diversarum substantiarum combinationibus chimicis novum aliquod corpus resultat. — Praenotandum est, quod non agitur de prima formarum naturalium origine, de qua sermo est in Genesi c. 1, nec de productione *animae humanae*, de quibus cfr. hic dub. 3. 4, infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — In hac autem quaestione solvenda est difficultas, quae valde vexavit ingenia, quomodo formae illae, quae iuxta mentem Scholasticorum important aliquid *substantiale*, licet *incompletum*, produci possint ab agente creato, cum constet, quod agens creatum *nullatenus* possit aliquid producere ex nihilo. Hinc exortae sunt primae duae opiniones extremae, hic commemoratae et communiter a Scholasticis reprobatae, quarum prima asseruit, has formas *nullatenus* produci, sed eas, cum formaliter praeexi-

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stant, tantum manifestari; secunda vero putavit, eas omnes a Creatore de nihilo creari. Contra istos errores principales auctores communi suffragio haec statuunt: **1.** Natura in productione formarum vere aliquid agit. **2.** Formae non praeexistunt formaliter, sed tantum *in potentia*. **3.** Formae illae, cum non subsistant nisi *in composito*, proprie loquendo non *fiunt*, sed ipsum compositum fit, et quidem *ex materia*, et non *ex nihilo* (S. Thom., S. I. q. 63. a. 4; S. Bonav., hic ad 4.). **4.** Formae sunt *in potentia materiae* et virtute agentium corporalium educi possunt in actum. **5.** Ad hanc eductionem concursus Dei necessarius est, quod egregie S. Thomas explicat et probat *de Potentia* q. 3. a. 7. (cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.).

**II.** Si autem ulterius quaeratur de modo, quo formae sint in potentia materiae, et quo inde educantur, doctores et antiqui et recentes diversas ingrediuntur vias, quae fere reducuntur ad illas duas, in expositione tertiae opinionis a S. Bonav. explicatas.

**1.** Primam illam sententiam S. Thom. haud ambigue propugnat, et post eum multi, quam etiam S. Bonav. esse *probabilem* aestimat, ut patet hic ex solut. ad 5. Clarius eandem explicat S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. a. 2, ex quo iuvat aliqua excerpere. Relata enim quarta sententia, idem ita prosequitur: « *Hoc autem verum non videtur, quia, quamvis formae educantur de potentia materiae, illa tamen potentia materiae non est activa, sed passiva tantum... Nec tamen sequitur, si in materia est potentia passiva tantum, quod non sit generatio naturalis; quia materia coadiuvat ad generationem, non agendo, sed in quantum est habilis ad recipiendum talem actionem, quae etiam habilitas appetitus materiae dicitur et inchoatio formae... Et ideo concedo, quod in materia nulla potentia activa est, sed pure passiva; et quod rationes seminales dicuntur* virtutes activae, *completae in mixto cum propriis* passivis, *ut calor et frigus et forma ignis et virtus solis et huiusmodi. Et dicuntur seminales non propter esse imperfectum, quod habent, sicut virtus formativa in semine; sed quia rerum individuis primo creatis huiusmodi virtutes collatae sunt per opera sex dierum, ut ex eis, quasi ex quibusdam seminibus, producerentur et multiplicarentur res naturales* » (cfr. S. I. q. 115. a. 2, q. 63. a. 4; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 8.). — Haec igitur sententia statuit, quod formae sint in materia tantum ut *in qua* et aliquo modo *a qua*, sed nullatenus *ex qua*, quia nihil praecedit in materia, ex quo fiat forma. Hanc sententiam ita explicat Aegid. R. (II. Sent. d. 12. q. 3. n. 2.): « *Tripliciter dicitur materia esse in potentia ad formam: vel prout recipit formam, vel prout desiderat formam, vel prout transmutatur ad formam. — Si quaeratur ergo, per quid recipit? dicetur, quod per essentiam suam... Sed accipiendo potentiam materiae, prout desiderat formam, dici potest, causam huius desiderii esse privationem... Privatio vero nullam rem addit ultra materiam... Tertio modo potest accipi potentia materiae pro transmutatione ad formam, ut ex hoc sit materia in potentia ad formam, quia transmutatur ad illam; et sic adhuc differt materia a tali potentia, sicut differebat a privatione... Si autem quaeratur, ...quid addat potentia sic accepta supra materiam, dicemus, quod addit aliquam dispositionem ad formam. Nam hoc modo transmutatur materia ad formam et per agens disponitur ad illam. Quanto ergo plus habet de huiusmodi transmutatione, tanto plus habet de huiusmodi dispositione. Quando ergo est perfecte transmutata vel perfecte disposita, tunc est formae inductio* » etc. Cfr. idem de rationibus seminalibus d. 18. q. 2. a. 1. 2.

**2.** S. Bonaventurae vero visa est « *intelligibilior et veritati vicinior* » secunda explicatio, quae praeter potentiam *passivam* (*receptivam*) materiae, et virtutem *activam* sive principium *effectivum* in agentibus naturalibus, insuper supponit aliquod *principium concreatum* materiae, ex quo agens naturale educit formam. Hoc autem putat esse idem cum illo quod S. Augustinus vocat *rationes seminales*, scil. in sensu largiore. Pro maiore explicatione huius positionis cfr. hic quaest. seq. et dub. 3; infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3, d. 15. a. 1. et praecipue d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3, ubi agitur de *rationibus seminalibus*. Perspicue eandem doctrinam tradit IV. Sent. d. 43. a. 1. q. 4, ubi agitur de resurrectione corporum, his verbis: « *Supponamus nunc, quod natura aliquid agat, et illud non agit ex nihilo, et cum agat in materiam, oportet, quod producat formam. Et cum materia non sit pars formae, nec forma fiat pars materiae, necesse est, aliquo modo formas naturales esse in materia, antequam producantur; et substantia materiae praegnans est omnibus; ergo rationes seminales omnium formarum sunt in ipsa. Sed ad illud stat resolutio, a quo incipit generatio; ergo nulla forma omnino corrumpitur, sed manet in materia post corruptionem, sicut manebat, antequam produceretur; et sic dicit Augustinus. Unde formas in materia ante productionem dicit esse quantum ad rationes seminales; dicit etiam resolvi ad materiam sicut ad occultissimos sinus naturae, idem utroque nomine secundum alteram et alteram rationem intelligi volens... Quamvis forma ibi sit aliquo modo post corruptionem, tamen natura non potest producere ad idem esse, quod habuit prius. Et ratio huius est, quia agens naturale agit influendo et impertiendo aliquid sui, quo mediante perficit illud quod erat in materia. Et illud quod influitur a parte agentis, fit aliquid de completo esse ipsius producti; et ideo necesse est, quod natura det aliquid novi quantum ad modum essendi substantialem, qui est esse in actu. Quamvis enim natura non det novam essentiam, dat tamen novum modum essendi, non tantum accidentalem, immo etiam substantialem, sicut esse in actu, secundum quem potest res substantialiter numerari et diversificari* ». Ibidem q. 5. ad 6. legitur: « *Semper manet substantia materiae cum ratione seminali* ».

**III.** Opinioni S. Bonaventurae vel omnino adhaerent vel favent Alex. Hal., praecipue S. p. II. q. 86. m. 2. § 2, q. 42. m. 5. a. 1-6. (de rationibus seminalibus), q. 6. m. 2. n. 4, q. 9. m. 5, q. 10. praesertim m. 3; et B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 4. m. 2. a. 1.); Uldaricus, eius discipulus, Gulielmus Paris., relati a Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. — Uldaricus ibi ita concludit: « *Forma est in materia per essentiam secundum esse imperfectum et confusum atque potentiale; et ipsa eadem numero est ab extra secundum esse suum actuale, determinatum et perfectum per virtutem formativam agentis, immissum materiae... Cumque utrumque praedictorum dicat totam formam, quamvis non totaliter, hinc quidam sub eodem sensu dicunt, quod non sit formae pars ab intus et pars ab agente, sed quod tota forma est ab intus, et tota est ab extra secundum esse diversum* ». — Etiam Petr. a Tar. (infra d. 18. q. 1. a. 3.) eidem sententiae magis favet, cum solvat obiectiones contra eam ab aliis factas, licet utramque sententiam referat.

Alii autem posteriores Scholastici hanc sententiam impugnant, ut Scot., d. 18. q. unica, n. 4. seqq., d. 18 q. unica, in utroque Scripto, VII. Metaph. q. 12; Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11, qui diffuse disputat contra eandem. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. et infra d. 18. q. 2. — Sententiam S. Thomae sequitur etiam Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 12. q. 10, d. 18. a. 1. q. 2; Durand., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2; Biel, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question, which is of great moment and obstructed with great difficulties, the holy Doctor prefaces in order to prepare the way for solving the doubts which the commentators on Lombard used to treat here. The other commentators, however, touch on this same question in the following quaest., and treat of it more fully below at d. 18, where they dispute concerning the *seminal reasons*, or also at d. 13. — Experience makes it plain that there are always new natural forms of corporeal things arising — both through perfect and properly so-called generation, which is defined as: *the origin of a living thing from a living principle, joined into a likeness of nature* (St. Thom., S. I, q. 27, a. 2; S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 9, a. 1, q. 1) — and through imperfect generation, such as is in mixtures, when from the chemical combinations of diverse substances some new body results. — It must be noted in advance that the question is not about the first origin of natural forms, of which there is mention in Genesis c. 1, nor of the production of the *human soul*, of which see here dub. 3, 4, below d. 13, a. 1, q. 1; d. 17, a. 1, q. 2; and d. 18, a. 2, q. 3. — In this question, however, the difficulty must be solved which has very much vexed minds, how those forms which according to the mind of the Scholastics import something *substantial*, albeit *incomplete*, can be produced by a created agent, since it is clear that a created agent *in no way* can produce something out of nothing. Hence arose the first two extreme opinions, mentioned here and commonly disapproved by the Scholastics — of which the first asserted that these forms are *in no way* produced, but, since they formally pre-exi-

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st, are only manifested; while the second held that they are all created by the Creator out of nothing. Against these principal errors the authors by common consent establish the following: **1.** Nature truly does something in the production of forms. **2.** Forms do not pre-exist formally, but only *in potency*. **3.** Those forms, since they do not subsist except *in the composite*, properly speaking are not made — but the composite itself is made, and indeed *from matter* and not *from nothing* (St. Thom., S. I, q. 63, a. 4; S. Bonav., here ad 4). **4.** Forms are *in the potency of matter* and by the power of bodily agents can be educed into act. **5.** For this eduction the concurrence of God is necessary — which St. Thomas excellently explains and proves in *de Potentia* q. 3, a. 7 (cf. S. Bonav., below d. 37, a. 1, q. 1).

**II.** If, however, it is further asked about the mode in which forms are in the potency of matter, and in what way they are educed thence, the doctors — both ancient and recent — enter on diverse ways, which are nearly reduced to those two explained by St. Bonaventure in his exposition of the third opinion.

**1.** That first opinion St. Thomas not ambiguously upholds — and after him many — which St. Bonaventure too judges to be *probable*, as is plain here from the solution to objection 5. St. Thomas explains the same more clearly in *I. Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, from which it is helpful to extract some things. Having related the fourth opinion, he proceeds thus: « *But this does not seem true, because, although forms are educed from the potency of matter, that potency of matter nevertheless is not active, but passive only... Nor does it follow, if in matter there is only passive potency, that there is no natural generation; because matter coadjuvates generation not by acting, but inasmuch as it is fit to receive such an action — which fitness is also called the appetite of matter and the inchoation of form... And therefore I concede that in matter there is no active potency, but pure passive; and that the seminal reasons are called* active virtues *completed in the mixed body together with their own* passive ones, *like heat and cold and the form of fire and the power of the sun and the like. And they are called seminal not on account of the imperfect being which they have — as the formative virtue in the seed — but because to the individuals of things first created such virtues were conferred through the works of the six days, that from them, as from certain seeds, natural things might be produced and multiplied* » (cf. S. I, q. 115, a. 2; q. 63, a. 4; *de Potent.* q. 3, a. 8). — This opinion, then, holds that the forms are in matter only *in which* and in some way *by which*, but in no way *out of which*, because nothing precedes in matter out of which the form should come to be. This opinion Aegidius Romanus thus explains (II. Sent. d. 12, q. 3, n. 2): « *In three ways matter is said to be in potency to form: either as it receives the form, or as it desires the form, or as it is transmuted toward the form. — If, then, it be asked, by what does it receive? — it will be said, by its essence... But taking the potency of matter as it desires the form, it can be said that the cause of this desire is privation... Privation, however, adds no thing beyond matter... In a third way potency of matter can be taken for the transmutation toward form, so that thereby matter is in potency to form because it is transmuted toward it; and so matter still differs from such a potency as it differed from privation... But if it be asked... what such a potency adds beyond matter, we will say that it adds some disposition to form. For in this way matter is transmuted toward form and disposed to it by the agent. The more, therefore, it has of such transmutation, the more it has of such disposition. When, therefore, it is perfectly transmuted or perfectly disposed, then there is the induction of the form* » etc. Cf. the same on the seminal reasons d. 18, q. 2, a. 1–2.

**2.** To St. Bonaventure, however, the second explanation seemed « *more intelligible and closer to the truth* »: which besides the *passive* (*receptive*) potency of matter and the *active* virtue or *effective* principle in natural agents, further supposes some *concreated principle* in matter, from which a natural agent educes form. And this he holds to be the same with what St. Augustine calls *seminal reasons*, in the broader sense. For a fuller explanation of this position see here the next quaest. and dub. 3; below d. 12, a. 1, q. 3; d. 15, a. 1; and especially d. 18, a. 1, q. 2–3, where the *seminal reasons* are treated. He hands down the same doctrine perspicuously in IV. Sent. d. 43, a. 1, q. 4, where the resurrection of bodies is treated, in these words: « *Let us now suppose that nature does something, and that this is not from nothing; and since it acts upon matter, it must produce a form. And since matter is not part of the form, nor does the form become part of matter, it is necessary that natural forms be in some way in matter before they are produced; and the substance of matter is pregnant with all things; therefore the seminal reasons of all forms are in it. But upon that rests the resolution: from what generation begins; therefore no form is altogether corrupted, but remains in matter after corruption, as it remained before being produced; and so Augustine says. Whence he says that forms are in matter before production as to the seminal reasons; he says also that they are resolved back to matter as to the most hidden recesses of nature, wishing the same thing to be understood by either name according to one and the other consideration... Although form is there in some manner after corruption, yet nature cannot produce it to the same being which it had before. And the reason for this is that natural agency acts by inflowing and imparting something of itself, by which mediating it perfects what was in matter. And what is inflowed from the side of the agent becomes part of the complete being of the thing produced; and therefore it is necessary that nature give something new as to the substantial mode of being, which is to be in act. For although nature does not give a new essence, yet it gives a new mode of being — not only accidental but also substantial — like being in act, according to which a thing can be substantially numbered and diversified* ». In the same place, q. 5, ad 6, it is read: « *The substance of matter always remains with the seminal reason* ».

**III.** To the opinion of St. Bonaventure there adhere altogether or favor it Alex. Hal., especially *S.* p. II, q. 86, m. 2, § 2; q. 42, m. 5, a. 1–6 (on the seminal reasons); q. 6, m. 2, n. 4; q. 9, m. 5; q. 10, especially m. 3 — and Bl. Albert (*S.* p. II, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 2, a. 1); Uldaricus, his disciple; William of Paris, reported by Dionysius the Carthusian, II. Sent. d. 18, q. 2. — Uldaricus there thus concludes: « *Form is in matter through its essence according to an imperfect, confused and potential being; and the same form numerically is from outside according to its actual, determinate, and perfect being through the formative virtue of the agent, infused into the matter... And since each of the aforesaid is said to speak the whole form, although not totally, hence some, in the same sense, say that no part of the form is from within and no part from the agent — but rather that the whole form is from within, and the whole is from outside according to a diverse being* ». — Peter of Tarentaise too (below d. 18, q. 1, a. 3) is more favorable to the same opinion, since he solves the objections brought against it by others, although he relates both opinions.

But other later Scholastics impugn this opinion, such as Scotus, d. 18, q. unica, n. 4 and following, d. 18, q. unica, in both Scripta; VII. Metaph. q. 12; Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4, q. 11, who disputes diffusely against it. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5 and below d. 18, q. 2. — The opinion of St. Thomas is followed also by Richard of Mediavilla, II. Sent. d. 12, q. 10; d. 18, a. 1, q. 2; Durandus, II. Sent. d. 18, q. 2; Biel, II. Sent. d. 18, q. unica.

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translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO I** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars II** — *Utrum omnes formae inducantur a Creatore, vel ab agente creato* (whether all forms are induced by the Creator, or by a created agent). Per the locked Vol II chunking convention, the short **ARTICULUS II opener** (*De virtute daemonum* + 3-q sub-divisio: utrum-omnis-formae-inductio-a-Creatore / verarum-formarum-inductio-spiritu-maligno / ministerio-daemonum-sine-peccato, raw 14237–14246) is folded into this q1 chunk — there is no standalone `d7-p2-a2-divisio`. Structure: 6 *videtur* (auctoritate Domini John 5,17 / nobilius-principium-forma-quam-materia / principia-rerum-incorruptibilia / actio-creaturae-terminatur-ad-hoc-aliquid / cum-producitur-aut-ex-aliquo-aut-ex-nihilo / cum-forma-est-in-potentia-materiae the in-qua/a-qua/ex-qua trilemma) + 4 **Sed Contra/Fundamenta** (Damascenus+Philosophus omnis-res-propriam-operationem / unius-corruptio-est-contrarii-generatio / calidum-calefacit pari-ratione ignis-generat-ignem / obiectum-generat-similitudinem-in-speculo) + *Conclusio* (blockquote: agens creatum particulare potest educere formas substantiales corporales, non solum *in qua* et *a qua* sed etiam *ex qua* secundum rationes seminales) + **Respondeo** (the **quadruplex positio**: I latitatio Anaxagorae [2 sensus] / II omnes a Creatore [2 sensus] / III in potentia materiae per actionem agentis [Philosophus, communiter doctores; 2 vias: a receptiva-cooperativa with candela exemplum / b ex qua secundum rationes seminales — *Magisprobatur opinio 3a*-rubric-margin] / IV ex qua per rationes seminales [Augustine super Genesim, Magister allegat — *Magisprobatur opinio 4*, S.Bonav.'s own position, "intelligibilior et veritati vicinior"]) + 6-block **Solutio** (Ad 1 Deus operatur usque modo via cooperatio / Ad 2 materiale principium est de se potentia + agens-limitatum-productio-similis-a-simili / Ad 3 incorruptibilia in universali not particulari + essentia manet in potentia / Ad 4 forma non generatur sed compositum per Philosophus / Ad 5 secundum tertiam positionem ex aliquo originaliter, secundum quartam ex aliquo per consubstantialitatem [rosa ex globo] / Ad 6 essentia receptiva + seminarium inditum activum-passivum, epilogus: agens creatum nullam quidditatem producit sed entem sub una dispositione facit esse sub alia) + editorial **Scholion I–III** (I significance of the question + the *prima/secunda* extreme opinions reproved + the 5 *communi suffragio statuta*; II *modus quo formae sint in potentia materiae* survey — S.Thom. prima opinio [potentia passiva tantum, rationes seminales = virtutes activae completae in mixto] + S.Bonav. secunda opinio [aliquod principium concreatum materiae = rationes seminales in sensu largiore] + the IV.Sent. d.43 a.1 q.4 long quote on resurrection; III doctor list — Alex.Hal./B.Albert/Uldaricus/Guliel.Paris./Petr.a Tar. concord with S.Bonav.; Scot./Henr.Gand./Dionys.Carth./Richard.a Med./Durand./Biel sequuntur S.Thomae).

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0