title: Dist. 43

title_alt:
Littera Magistri — Distinctio XLIII.
The Master's Text — Distinction XLIII.

source_text:
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## DISTINCTIO XLIII.

### Cap. I.

#### *Invectio contra illos qui dicunt, Deum nil posse nisi quod vult et facit.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Quidam tamen de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt. Cum enim dicunt: *hucusque potest Deus et non amplius,* quid est hoc aliud, quam eius potentiam, quae infinita est, concludere et restringere ad mensuram? Aiunt enim: *Non potest Deus aliud facere, quam facit; nec melius facere id quod facit; nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit.* Istamque primam[^1] suam opinionem verisimilibus argumentis causisque commentitiis nec non et sacrarum auctoritatum testimoniis munire nituntur dicentes: *Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum fieri. Non est autem iustum et bonum fieri ab eo, nisi quod facit. Si enim aliud iustum est et bonum eum facere, quam facit, non ergo facit omne quod iustum est et bonum eum facere. Sed quis audeat hoc dicere?*

Addunt etiam: *Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia eius exigit[^2]; sed non exigit eius iustitia, ut faciat, nisi quod facit: non ergo potest facere, nisi quod facit. Eademque iustitia exigit, ut id non faciat, quod non facit; non autem potest facere contra iustitiam suam; non ergo potest aliquid eorum facere, quae dimittit.*

His autem respondemus duplicem verborum intelligentiam aperientes et ab eis involuta evolventes sic: *Non potest Deus facere, nisi quod bonum est et iustum,* id est, non potest facere, nisi illud quod, si faceret, bonum esset et iustum, verum est; sed multa potest facere, quae non bona sunt nec iusta, quia nec sunt nec erunt, nec bene fiunt nec fient, quia numquam fient.

Item, quod secundo propositum fuit: *Non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit; et non potest id* <!-- page 762 --> *facere, quod iustitia sua exigit, ut non fiat;* dicimus, quia *exactionis* verbum de Deo congrue non dicitur nec proprie accipitur. Et in illis locutionibus duplex est sensus. Si enim intelligas: *non potest facere, nisi quod iustitia sua exigit,* id est, nisi quod iusta voluntas sua vult, falsum dicis. Iustitia enim Dei ipsius aequissima voluntas accipitur, qualiter accipit Augustinus[^3], illa verba Domini in Genesi loquentis ad Lot *Non possum quidquam facere, donec illo introeas* exponens: «*Non posse*, inquit, *se dixit, quod sine dubio poterat per potentiam, sed non poterat per iustitiam»;* quasi diceret: poterat quidem, sed non volebat, et illa voluntas iusta erat. Si vero per haec verba intelligas, non posse facere nisi illud quod, si fieret, iustitiae eius conveniret, verum dicis. Similiter distingue illud; *Non potest facere quod sua iustitia exigit, ut non faciat,* id est, non potest facere id quod ipse, qui est summa iustitia, non vult facere, falsum est. Si autem intelligas his verbis, eum non posse facere id quod iustitiae eius convenire non potest, verum dicis.

Addunt quoque et alia dicentes: *Non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet; non autem debet facere nisi quod facit. Si enim debet alia facere, non ergo facit omne quod debet; si vero facit omne quod debet, nec potest facere nisi quod debet: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit.* — *Item, aut debet dimittere quod dimittit, ne faciat, aut non debet. Si non debet, non recte dimittit; si vero debet dimittere: ergo non debet facere. Si autem non debet, nec decet nec oportet eum facere; et si non decet nec oportet eum facere, ergo non potest facere: non ergo potest facere nisi quod facit. Nec potest illud dimittere quod facit, quin faciat, quia debet illud facere; et quod debet facere, non potest illud dimittere.* — Sed ut mihi videtur, hoc verbum *debet* venenum habet. Multiplicem enim et involutam continet intelligentiam; nec Deo proprie competit, qui non est debitor nullius, nisi forte ex promisso; nos vero et debitores sumus ex commisso. Ut autem venenum evacuetur, distingue verbi sensus: *non potest Deus facere nisi quod debet,* id est, nisi quod vult, falsum est; sic enim potest ipse dici *debere* aliquid, quia vult illud. Si autem dicatur: *non potest nisi quod debet,* id est, non potest nisi illud quod, si faceret, ei bene conveniret, verum est.

Item aliud adiungunt dicentes: *Nihil facit aut dimittit, nisi optima et rationabili causa, licet nobis occulta sit, secundum quam oportet eum facere ac dimittere quae facit vel dimittit. Ratio enim penes eum est, qua illa facit et illa dimittit; quae ratio aeterna est et semper manens, praeter quam non potest aliquid facere vel dimittere. Illa ergo manente, non potest quod facit dimittere, nec quod dimittit facere, et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit.* — Et ad hoc respondemus, ambiguitatem aperientes. *Causa* enim dicitur *ratio,* et hoc modo aptius dicimus, Deum causa optima facere quae facit, et dimittere ea quae dimittit; verum quidem est, quia in eo voluntas est aequissima, qua facit et dimittit quae vult. Qui non potest, nec praeter eam facere, nec ea quae facit dimittere, nec ea quae dimittit facere; sed eadem manente ratione potest et alia facere et dimittere. Licet ergo ratio sit penes eum, qua alia facit alia dimittit, potest tamen secundum eandem rationem et dimittere quae facit, et facere quae dimittit.

Ipsi autem adiungunt: *Ratio est, eum facere quae facit et non alia; et non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere: et ita non potest facere nisi quod facit. Item, ratio est, eum dimittere quod dimittit; et non potest non dimittere quod ratio est eum dimittere: et ita non potest non dimittere quod dimittit.* — Et ad hoc dicimus, locutiones ambiguas esse, et ideo determinandas. Si enim, cum dicitur: *non potest facere, nisi quod ratio est eum facere,* intelligas, eum non posse facere, nisi ea quae rationabilia sunt, et ea quae, si fierent, rationabilia essent, verus est sensus. Si autem intelligas, eum non posse facere alia rationabilia et bona, nisi ea quae vult et facit, falsus est intellectus.

Item aliud adiungunt dicentes: *Si potest Deus aliud facere quam facit, potest igitur facere quod non praescivit; et si potest facere quod non praescivit, potest sine praescientia operari, quia omne quod facturum se praescivit facit, nec facit aliquid quod non praescivit. Quod si praeter praescientiam eius aliquid fieri impossibile est, omne quod praescitum est, fieri necesse est: ergo aliud fieri, quam fit, nulla ratione possibile est: non ergo potest a Deo fieri, nisi quod fit.* — Haec autem quaestio de praescientia facile determinari potest per ea quae superius dicta sunt, cum de praescientia ageretur.

His autem illi scrutatores, *qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio,* Sanctorum annectunt testimonia. Dicit enim Augustinus in libro de Symbolo: «Hoc solum non potest Deus, quod non vult.» Per quod videtur non posse facere aliquid, nisi quod vult; sed non vult nisi quod facit: et ita videtur non posse nisi quod facit. — Illud autem ita intelligendum est: Id solum non potest Deus, quod non vult, scilicet se posse. — Idem in septimo libro Confessionum ad Deum loquens ait: «Nec cogeris invitus ad aliquid, quia voluntas tua non est maior quam potentia; esset autem maior, si te ipso tu ipse maior esses». Ex hoc videtur, quod Deus non possit plura, quam vult, sicut non vult plura, quam potest. Sicut enim voluntas non est maior potentia, ita <!-- page 763 --> nec potentia maior est voluntate. Ideoque, sicut plura non vult, quam potest, ita eum non plura posse quam velle dicunt. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quia nec voluntas potentia, nec potentia voluntate maior est, quia una et eadem res est potentia et voluntas, scilicet ipse Deus, qui esset maior se ipso, si voluntas esset maior potentia, vel potentia voluntate. Nec hac auctoritate negatur, Deum plura posse quam velle, quia plura sunt subiecta eius potentiae quam voluntati.

Fateamur itaque, Deum multa[^4] posse facere, quae non vult, et posse dimittere quae facit. Quod ut certius firmiusque teneatur, Scripturae testimoniis afferamus, Deum plura posse facere, quam faciat. Veritas ipsa secundum Matthaeum[^5] ait: *An putas, quia non possum rogare Patrem meum, et exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum?* Ex quibus verbis patenter innuitur, quia et Filius poterat rogare quod non rogabat, et Pater exhibere quod non exhibebat. Uterque igitur poterat facere quod non faciebat. Augustinus etiam in *Enchiridio*[^6] ait: *Omnipotentis voluntas multa potest facere, quae non vult nec facit: potuit enim facere, ut duodecim legiones Angelorum pugnarent contra illos qui Christum ceperunt.* Item in eodem[^7]: «Cur apud quosdam non factae sunt virtutes, quae si factae fuissent, egissent illi homines poenitentiam; et factae sunt apud eos qui non erant credituri? Tunc non latebit quod nunc latet. Nec utique iniuste Deus noluit salvos fieri, cum possent salvi esse, si vellet[^8]. Tunc in clarissima Sapientiae luce videbitur quod nunc piorum fides habet, antequam manifesta cognitione videatur, quam certa et immutabilis et efficacissima sit voluntas Dei, quae multa possit et[^9] non velit, nihil autem quod non possit, velit». Idem in libro de *Natura et gratia*[^10]: «Dominus Lazarum suscitavit in corpore. Numquid dicendum est, non potuit Iudam suscitare in mente? Potuit quidem, sed noluit».

His auctoritatibus aliisque multis aperte docetur, quod Deus multa possit facere, quae non vult. Quod etiam ratione probari potest. Non enim vult Deus omnes homines iustificare, et tamen quis dubitat, eum posse? Potest ergo Deus aliud facere, quam facit, et tamen, si aliud faceret, alius ipse non esset. Et potest aliud velle, quam vult, et tamen eius voluntas nec alia nec nova nec mutabilis aliquo modo esse potest. Etsi enim possit velle quod numquam voluit, non tamen noviter nec nova voluntate, sed sempiterna tantum voluntate velle potest. Potest enim velle quod ab aeterno potest voluisse. Habet enim potentiam volendi et nunc et ab aeterno, quod tamen nec modo vult nec ab aeterno voluit.

---

english:
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## DISTINCTION XLIII.

### Chapter I.

#### *An invective against those who say that God can do nothing except what he wills and does.*

That, however, certain men, glorying in their own sense, have tried to constrict God's power within a measure. For when they say: *"Up to this point God can [act] and no further,"* what else is this than to confine and restrict to a measure his power, which is infinite? For they say: *"God cannot do anything other than what he does; nor can he do better that which he does; nor can he omit anything from those things which he does."* And this their first[^1] opinion they strive to fortify with probable arguments and contrived reasons, and likewise with the testimonies of the sacred authorities, saying: *"God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just to be done. But it is not just and good to be done by him except what he does. For if some other thing is just and good for him to do than he does, then he does not do everything which is just and good for him to do. But who would dare to say this?"*

They add also: *"He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires[^2]; but his justice does not require him to do anything except what he does: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. And the same justice requires that he not do that which he does not do; nor can he do anything against his justice: therefore he cannot do any of those things which he omits."*

To these we reply, opening up a twofold understanding of the words and unrolling from them the things wrapped up, thus: *"God cannot do [anything] except what is good and just,"* that is, he cannot do [anything] except that which, if he did it, would be good and just — [this] is true; but he can do many things which are not good nor just, because they neither are nor will be, neither are well done nor will be done, because they will never be done.

Likewise, what was proposed in the second [argument]: *"He cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires; and he cannot do that* <!-- page 762 --> *which his justice requires, so that it not be done;"* we say that the word *"requires"* is not properly nor congruously said of God. And in those expressions there is a twofold sense. For if you understand: *"he cannot do [anything] except what his justice requires,"* that is, except what his just will wills, you say what is false. For the justice of God is taken to be his own most equitable will, in the way that Augustine[^3] takes it when, expounding those words of the Lord in Genesis spoken to Lot, *"I cannot do anything until you enter there"* [Gen. 19:22], he says: «*"Not to be able,"* he says, *"he said of himself — what without doubt he could do by power, but could not do by justice"»;* as if he meant: he could indeed, but he did not will, and that will was just. But if through these words you understand [it to mean] that he cannot do anything except that which, if it were done, would befit his justice, you speak truly. Similarly distinguish that: *"He cannot do what his justice requires, so that he not do it,"* that is, he cannot do that which he himself, who is supreme justice, does not will to do — this is false. But if by these words you understand that he cannot do what cannot befit his justice, you speak truly.

They add also other [things] saying: *"God cannot do [anything] except what he ought; but he ought not to do [anything] except what he does. For if he ought to do other [things], then he does not do everything which he ought; but if he does everything which he ought, then he cannot do [anything] except what he ought: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does."* — *"Likewise, either he ought to omit what he omits, so that he not do it, or he ought not. If he ought not, he does not rightly omit it; but if he ought to omit it, then he ought not to do it. But if he ought not, then it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it; and if it is neither becoming nor fitting for him to do it, then he cannot do it: therefore he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Nor can he omit that which he does, without doing it, because he ought to do it; and what he ought to do, he cannot omit."* — But as it seems to me, this word *"ought"* has venom. For it contains a manifold and convoluted understanding; nor does it properly belong to God, who is debtor to no one, unless perhaps by promise; whereas we are debtors by commission. But that the venom may be drained, distinguish the senses of the word: *"God cannot do [anything] except what he ought,"* that is, except what he wills — this is false; for thus he can himself be said *"to owe"* something, because he wills it. But if it is said: *"He cannot [do anything] except what he ought,"* that is, he cannot [do anything] except that which, if he did it, would well befit him — this is true.

Likewise they adjoin another [thing] saying: *"He neither does nor omits anything except by an optimal and rational cause, although it be hidden from us, according to which it is fitting for him to do or omit those things which he does or omits. For the ground is in him, by which he does these things and omits those; and this ground is eternal and ever-abiding, beyond which he cannot do or omit anything. With that [ground], therefore, remaining, he cannot omit what he does, nor do what he omits, and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does."* — And to this we reply, opening up the ambiguity. For *"cause"* is called *"ground,"* and in this mode it is more fitting to say that God by an optimal cause does what he does, and omits what he omits; it is indeed true, because in him there is a most equitable will, by which he does and omits what he wills. He cannot [act] otherwise, nor act apart from that [will], nor omit those things which he does, nor do those which he omits; but with the same ground remaining, he can do and omit other things. Although therefore the ground is in him, by which he does some things, omits others, nevertheless according to that same ground he can both omit what he does, and do what he omits.

They themselves moreover adjoin: *"It is the ground that he does what he does and not other things; and he cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do: and so he cannot do [anything] except what he does. Likewise, it is a ground that he omits what he omits; and he cannot not-omit what it is a ground for him to omit: and so he cannot not-omit what he omits."* — And to this we say that the expressions are ambiguous, and therefore must be determined. For if, when it is said: *"He cannot do [anything] except what it is a ground for him to do,"* you understand that he cannot do [anything] except those things which are rational, and those which, if they were done, would be rational — the sense is true. But if you understand that he cannot do other rational and good things, except those which he wills and does — the understanding is false.

Likewise they adjoin another, saying: *"If God can do anything other than he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow; and if he can do what he did not foreknow, he can act without foreknowledge, since everything which he foreknew himself to be about to do, he does, nor does he do anything which he did not foreknow. But if it is impossible for anything to come into being apart from his foreknowledge, then everything which is foreknown must necessarily come into being: therefore that another thing should come into being than what comes into being is by no reason possible: therefore nothing can be done by God except what is done."* — But this question concerning foreknowledge can easily be determined by the things which were said above, when we treated of foreknowledge.

To these moreover those searchers, *"who have failed in searching out the scrutiny,"* attach the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says in the book *On the Symbol*: «This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will.» By which it seems that he cannot do anything except what he wills; but he wills only what he does: and so it seems he cannot [do anything] except what he does. — But this must be understood thus: This alone God cannot [do], namely, what he does not will — namely, that he himself be able. — The same in the seventh book of the *Confessions*, speaking to God says: «Nor are you forced unwilling to anything, because your will is not greater than your power; but it would be greater, if you yourself were greater than yourself». From this it seems that God cannot [do] more than he wills, just as he does not will more than he can. For just as the will is not greater than the power, so <!-- page 763 --> neither is the power greater than the will. And therefore, as he does not will more than he can, so [they say] that he cannot [do] more than he wills. — But to this we say that neither is the will greater than the power, nor the power than the will, because the power and the will are one and the same reality, namely, God himself, who would be greater than himself if his will were greater than his power, or his power than his will. Nor is it denied by this authority that God can [do] more than he wills, since more things are subjects of his power than of his will.

Let us therefore confess that God can do many[^4] things which he does not will, and can omit those which he does. And that this may be the more certainly and firmly held, let us bring forward testimonies of Scripture, [showing] that God can do more than he does. Truth himself according to Matthew[^5] says: *"Do you think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will furnish me at once more than twelve legions of Angels?"* From which words it is patently signified that the Son could have asked what he was not asking, and the Father exhibit what he was not exhibiting. Each, therefore, was able to do what he was not doing. Augustine also in the *Enchiridion*[^6] says: *"The will of the Omnipotent can do many things which it neither wills nor does: for he could have made twelve legions of Angels fight against those who seized Christ."* Likewise in the same work[^7]: «Why have miracles not been done among certain men, which, if they had been done, would have brought those men to repentance; and have been done among those who were not to be believers? Then will not lie hidden what now lies hidden. Nor did God unjustly will not [those] to be saved who could have been saved, if he had willed[^8] [it]. Then in the most brilliant light of Wisdom will be seen what now the faith of the godly holds, before it is seen by manifest cognition — how certain and immutable and most efficacious is the will of God, who is able to do many things and[^9] does not will, but wills nothing which he cannot». The same in the book *On Nature and Grace*[^10]: «The Lord raised Lazarus in body. Is it to be said that he could not raise Judas in mind? He could indeed, but he did not will».

By these authorities and many others it is openly taught that God can do many things which he does not will. Which can also be proved by reason. For God does not will to justify all men, and yet who doubts that he can? God therefore can do other than he does, and yet, if he were to do otherwise, he himself would not be other. And he can will other than he wills, and yet his will can in no way be other or new or mutable. For even if he can will what he never willed, nevertheless [he can will it] not newly nor by a new will, but only by an eternal will. For he can will what from eternity he was able to have willed. For he has the power of willing both now and from eternity, that which nevertheless he neither now wills nor from eternity has willed.

---

la: Codd. 2, 5 *pravam*. Deinde Vat. et aliae edd., excepta I, *conantur* pro *nituntur*, contradicentibus omnibus codd.

en: Codices 2 and 5 [read] *pravam* ("depraved"). Then the Vatican edition and other editions, except I, [read] *conantur* in place of *nituntur*, against all the codices.

la: Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8 *oppositum*. Immediate post cod. r, *exigat, ut fiat*; et pro *exigit*; *et*.

en: Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, 8 [read] the opposite. Immediately afterwards codex r [reads] *exigat, ut fiat*; and [reads] *et* in place of *exigit*.

la: Libr. I. *contra Gaudentium*, c. 30, n. 53. — Locus s. Scripturae ad quem respicitur, est Gen. 19, 22.

en: Book I, *Against Gaudentius*, c. 30, n. 53. — The passage of sacred Scripture to which reference is made is Gen. 19:22.

la: Vat. cum plurimis edd. *plura*.

en: The Vatican edition with most editions [reads] *plura* ("more things") [in place of *multa*].

en: Chapter 26, [verse] 53.

la: Cap. 93, n. 24; et de *Spiritu et littera*, c. 1 et 35, ex quibus locis quae sequuntur secundum sensum sumta sunt. Eadem verba invenies apud Abaelardum, in libr. *Sic et Non* c. 35. (Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 178.).

en: Chapter 93, n. 24; and *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 1 and 35, from which places what follows has been taken according to the sense. The same words you will find in Abelard, in the book *Sic et Non*, c. 35 (Migne, Patrologia Latina vol. 178).

la: *Enchirid.* loc. cit., sed multis a Magistro omissis et transpositis. In textu respicitur illud Matth. 11, 21: *Quia si in Tyro et Sidone factae essent virtutes, quae factae sunt in vobis, olim in cilicio et cinere poenitentiam egissent.*

en: *Enchiridion* loc. cit., but with many things omitted and transposed by the Master. The passage referred to in the text is Matt. 11, 21: *"For if in Tyre and Sidon had been done the miracles that have been done in you, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes."*

la: Praeter Vat. et ed. 1 aliae edd. *vellent*; editio August. nunc *vellent*, alias *vellet*. Codd. nostri *vellet*, sed BC a secunda manu in margine *vellent*. Utraque lectio in bono sensu intelligi potest; unde nihil mutavimus, praesertim cum *vellet* magis convenit cum re, de qua sermo est.

en: Besides the Vatican edition and ed. 1, the other editions [read] *vellent*; the Augustine edition now [reads] *vellent*, elsewhere *vellet*. Our codices [read] *vellet*, but BC by a second hand in the margin [read] *vellent*. Either reading can be understood in a good sense; whence we have changed nothing, especially since *vellet* better fits the matter under discussion.

la: Codd. AC *quod*.

en: Codices A and C [read] *quod*.

la: Cap. 7, n. 8. — Locus s. Scripturae, ad quem respicitur, est Ioan. 11, 43.

en: Chapter 7, n. 8. — The passage of sacred Scripture to which reference is made is John 11, 43.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 43, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIII. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLIII. Division of the text.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 763 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLIII.

#### *De potentia divina quoad immensitatem.*

> *Quidam tamen de sensu suo gloriantes.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra ostendit Magister, *quid* Deus possit; in hac parte intendit ostendere, *quantum* possit. Et quoniam quidam Dei potentiam limitabant, ideo intendit Magister ostendere huius opinionis falsitatem, et huius positionis falsitate ostensa, reperitur[^1] Dei potentia esse infinita. Et habet haec pars tres partes.

In *prima* proponit sive narrat eorum erroneam opinionem[^NC]. In *secunda* dissolvit eorum multiplicem rationem, ibi: *Istamque suam opinionem verisi-* <!-- page 764 -->*milibus argumentis.* In *tertia* concludit et confirmat veritatis assertionem, quae est in huius opinionis contraria positione[^2], ibi: *Fateamur ergo, Deum multa posse facere* etc.

*Prima* et ultima parte remanentibus indivisis, media pars dividitur secundum numerum rationum quas adducit. *Prima* sumta est a ratione boni et iusti. Et hanc format duobus modis, et ponitur ibi: *Non potest Deus, nisi quod bonum est et iustum.* *Secunda* sumta est a ratione debiti, et hanc ponit ibi: *Addunt quoque alia di-* *cendum, si possit etc.* *Tertia* sumta est a ratione faciendi et dimittendi, et hanc format duobus modis, ibi: *Adiiciunt quoque illi dicentes* etc. *Quarta* sumta est ex ratione praescientiae Dei, et haec ponitur ibi: *Item aliud adiungunt dicentes* etc. *Quinta* sumta est ab auctoritate Augustini, et hoc a duplici auctoritate, et ponitur ibi: *His autem illi scrutatores.* Et in qualibet harum partium Magister ponit primo obiectiones, secundo vero ponit solutionem; et partes manifestae sunt.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de quantitate divinae potentiae sive de infinitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

Primo quaeritur, utrum potentia Dei sit infinita.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum ipsa essentia divina sit infinita, sicut potentia.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus possit producere opus infinitum.

Quarto, utrum ratio operandi sit infinita.

Prima quaestio respicit infinitatem in *possendo*, secunda in *essendo*, tertia in *operando*, quarta in *ratione operandi*.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XLIII.

#### *On the divine power as to its immensity.*

> *"Some however, glorying in their own sense."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master showed *what* God can [do]; in this part he intends to show *how much* he can [do]. And since certain men have limited the power of God, the Master accordingly intends to show the falsity of this opinion; and once the falsity of this position has been shown, God's[^1] power is found to be infinite. And this part has three parts.

In the *first* he sets forth or narrates their erroneous opinion[^NC]. In the *second* he dissolves their manifold reasoning, there: *"Yet this their opinion with verisi-"* <!-- page 764 -->*"milar arguments."* In the *third* he concludes and confirms the assertion of the truth, which lies in the position contrary to[^2] this opinion, there: *"Let us therefore confess that God can do many things,"* etc.

The *first* and last parts remaining undivided, the middle part is divided according to the number of reasons which he adduces. The *first* is taken from the account of the good and the just. And this he forms in two modes, and it is set there: *"God cannot [do anything] except what is good and just."* The *second* is taken from the account of what is due, and this he places there: *"They add also other [things] to be said, if he can,"* etc. The *third* is taken from the account of doing and omitting, and this he forms in two modes, there: *"Those men also add, saying,"* etc. The *fourth* is taken from the account of God's foreknowledge, and this is set there: *"Likewise they adjoin another, saying,"* etc. The *fifth* is taken from the authority of Augustine, and this from a twofold authority, and it is set there: *"To these things however those searchers."* And in each of these parts the Master first sets forth the objections, second he sets forth the solution; and the parts are manifest.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, [the question] is asked concerning the quantity of the divine power, or concerning its infinity. And on this point four [questions] are asked.

First, it is asked whether the power of God is infinite.

Second, granted that it is so, it is asked whether the divine essence itself is infinite, as is the power.

Third, it is asked whether God can produce an infinite work.

Fourth, whether the ground of operating is infinite.

The first question regards infinity in *being-able*, the second in *being*, the third in *operating*, the fourth in the *ground of operating*.

---

en: The Vatican edition with most editions [reads] *plura* ("many [things]").

la: Pro *contraria positione* Vat. *contrariam partem*.

en: In place of *contraria positione* the Vatican edition [reads] *contrariam partem*.

la: *Notae ad Commentarium.* — Cod. M *aperitur*. Paulo ante cod. V voci *opinionis* praemittit *positionis vel*; pro *huius opinionis* cod. X *huius positionis*.

en: *Notes on the Commentary.* — Codex M [reads] *aperitur*. A little earlier codex V prefixes to the word *opinionis* [the words] *positionis vel*; in place of *huius opinionis* codex X [reads] *huius positionis*. ---

translators_notes: Page-foot apparatus on printed p. 763 contains 9 numbered Quaracchi footnotes plus a *Notae ad Commentarium* block. Of these, only footnote 1 (`Vat. cum plurimis edd. plura`) anchors inside this divisio body — the OCR shows the body marker on *reperitur* (line 34169 of raw pt2). Footnotes 2–9 of p. 763 attach to the d43-littera (Lombard's text) which runs through the top of p. 763 before the COMMENTARIUS heading; those notes are accounted for in `bon-sent-I-d43-littera.md`, not here. On p. 764 the first per-page footer note (`Pro contraria positione Vat. contrariam partem`) anchors at *contraria positione* in the body of the divisio; the remaining p. 764 footer notes (2, 3, 4) attach to QUAESTIO I body and are accounted for in `bon-sent-I-d43-a1-q1.md`. The *Notae ad Commentarium* entry [^NC] anchors at *opinionem* in the divisio body; the variant readings from codices M, V, X recorded in the *Notae* (*aperitur*, *positionis vel*, *huius positionis*) all concern this word and the immediately preceding *opinionis* in the OCR. Body-anchor placement: the OCR-attested position of [^1] (between *reperitur* and *Dei*) is unambiguous; [^2] anchors at the OCR-attested marker on *positione* in raw line for p. 764 top. (Both anchors RESOLVED 2026-05-13 — see d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 43, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De infinitate divinae potentiae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum potentia Dei, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit infinita.*

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum Dei potentia sit infinita; et quod ipsa potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit infinita, ostenditur sic.

**Fundamenta.**

1. Infinitum dicitur quod non habet terminum[^1]; sed divina potentia quantum ad posse non habet terminum: ergo etc. Prima manifesta est; secunda patet per Chrysostomum in quadam Homilia[^2]: « Omnipotens dicitur, quia eius posse non invenit non posse »: ergo si semper invenit posse, semper quantitatem potentiae accipientibus est ultra accipere: ergo est infinita.

2. Item, omnis potentia activa, quae potest in effectus infinitos, est actu infinita; divina potentia est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Probatio primae: si potentia est pure in actu, ergo habet totum actualiter, quod potest habere: ergo si totum habet actualiter, et nihil potest ei accrescere nec de novo aliquid dari[^3], et potentia ut potens se extendebat ad infinita: ergo actu habet in se infinitatem. Minor patet, quia divina potentia nunquam potest in tot effectus, quin adhuc possit in plures: ergo manifestum est, quod est infinita.

3. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest in actum infinitum, si est omnino in actu, est simpliciter infinita; sed divina virtus est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Maior patet sic: sicut se habet potentia ad potentiam, sic actus ad actum; sed actus infinitus excedit finitum in infinitum, ergo et potentia potentiam:

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ergo si potentia est omnino in actu, est infinita. Minor patet, quia Deus dicitur durare in infinitum et potest creaturam conservare in infinitum: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis potentia, quae potest super extrema in infinitum distantia, est infinita; sed potentia divina est huiusmodi, quia de nihilo aliquid facit, et inter aliquid et nihil est infinita distantia: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis potentia, quae omnino indifferens est ab essentia, est infinita; sed divina potentia est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Probatio primae: quandocumque aliqua duo sunt omnino indistantia, ubicumque est unum, et reliquum[^4]: ergo si potentia est omnino indifferens ab essentia, ubicumque est potentia, et essentia. Sed ubi est essentia, ibi est centrum potentiae: ergo ubicumque potest potentia talis, potest ut in centro: ergo cum nulla potentia limitetur in centro suo, sed amplius possit, aut divina potentia nihil potest, aut potest quantum vult, et sic in infinitum: ergo, quantum est de se, potentia illa potest in infinitis[^5] operari. Sed potentia illa omnino est indifferens et simplex: ergo idem est ibi *factivum* et *intensum*: ergo si extensive est infinita, et intensive: ergo omnino est infinita. Et hoc est, quod dicit Philosophus in libro *de Causis*[^6] quod « virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita ». Cum ergo divina potentia sit unitissima, quia est omnino idem cum sua origine, ubique potest tanquam in sua origine: ergo nunquam invenit non posse.

**Contra:**

1. Omne illud est finitum, in quo est reperire statum; sed in divina potentia est reperire statum, quia est assignare aliquid, quod non potest, sicut supra ostensum est[^7], ut actus corporales et actus deformes: ergo etc.

2. Item, quod exceditur[^8] ab aliquo est finitum, quia infinitum nullo modo exceditur; sed scientia excedit potentiam respectu scibilium plurium; enim est scientia quam potentia: scit enim mala, et non potest: ergo etc.

3. Item, videmus in potentiis creatis, quod infinitas est a materia, sed finitas est a forma: ergo cum potentia Dei sit omnino forma sive formalis, nihil omnino habens possibilitatis, ergo simpliciter est finita et nullo modo infinita.

4. Item, inter contradictorie opposita est distantia infinita; sed creaturae virtus finitum unum reducit ad alterum, ut non currentem facit currere, et tamen est finita: ergo[^9].

5. Item, video[^10] quod anima habet potentiam omnino indifferentem ab essentia, sicut potentia vivificandi corpus; habet etiam potentiam ad actum infinitum, sicut ad durandum sive permanendum in infinitum; habet potentiam nihilominus ad actus infinitos[^11]; et tamen ipsa potentia est finita in se: ergo videtur pari ratione de divina potentia, cum anima sit expressa imago Dei. Unde videntur rationes praedictae nihil valere.

> **Conclusio.** Potentia divina est infinita in actu et in habitu.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod divinam potentiam est ponere omnino et in actu et in habitu infinitam; sicut probatum est[^12] per effectum a posteriori, quia habet effectum infinitum duratione et infinitos appositione, ad quos comparatur ut actus purus et ut tota causa. Et ideo est[^13] habens in se plenam et perfectam actualitatem respectu infinitorum; et necesse est, cum habeat totum, quod unquam habitura est, et ex se habeat, quod ipsa infinita sit.

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Alia ratio ostendit hoc quasi a priori. Propter summam enim indivisionem virtutis cum essentia[^14], et propter summam unitatem ipsius virtutis, ubicumque potest, tota potest, et tantum in extremo mundi quantum in medio, et tantum in summo quantum in imis, et omni modo infinitatis.

Nec est consimilis ratio in aliqua creatura nec quantum ad causalitatem effectus, nec quantum ad productionem actus[^15], nec quantum ad unitatem.

Non quantum ad causalitatem, quia nulla virtus creaturae respectu durationis infinitae est pure activa, immo necesse est per divinam influentiam conservari. — Similiter nec quantum ad productionem actus, unde habet infinitatem passivam etiam in recipiendo, et ideo nulla est *actu* infinita, sed solum *in potentia*. Et quia infinitum in potentia pendet ex infinito in actu, ideo omnis infinitas durationis creatae et operationis pendet ex infinitate virtutis increatae. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus in libro *de Causis*[^16], quod « omnes virtutes infinitae pendentes sunt per unum infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum ». — Similiter non est simile de simplicitate sive unitate. Nam potentia divina est omnino in se simplex et omnino habet essentiam sive substantiam simplicem, omnino etiam ab illa est indifferens; et ideo omnimoda unione est unitissima, et ideo infinita. Sed nullius creaturae, quantumcumque nobilis, potentia est omnino simplex, quia omnis talis potentia dicit aliquem respectum dependentiae; nec fundatur in substantia omnino simplici; nec omnino est indifferens, quia nulla creatura est sua potentia, loquendo essentialiter[^17]. — Et ideo quia deficit omnis creatura a ratione summae simplicitatis, et infinitatis per consequens. Et sic patet quod divina potentia est infinita[^18], et ratio infinitatis.

Et patet responsio ad ultimam rationem ostendentem, praedictas rationes non valere.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod invenit terminum, et quod invenit excessum; dicendum quod divina potentia est infinita respectu eorum quae *posse* est *posse*[^19]; respectu aliorum, quae *posse* est *impotentiae*, nec est finita nec est infinita, quia nihil eis potest. — Quando enim dicitur, quod invenit terminum vel excessum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia *creatura* et *passibilis rei* attenditur secundum ea ad quae *res se extendit*: et divina potentia se extendit solum ad bona, et quantum ad talia[^20] nunquam est plurium scientia quam potentia; nec quantum ad talia invenit terminum. Et ideo patet illud.

Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de potentia et scientia: aut *in se*, aut *per comparationem ad obiecta*. Si *in se*, sic una non excedit aliam, quia quidquid scit, potest scire, et quidquid potest, scit se posse. Vel[^21] per comparationem ad obiectum, et sic est loqui dupliciter, aut secundum *formam* sive *speciem*, aut secundum *numerum*. Si secundum numerum, sic, cum potentia possit infinita, non exceditur a scientia; si autem secundum formam, sic, quia potentia est respectu bonorum tantum[^22], exceditur; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quin sit infinita. — Et est exemplum: si quis imaginetur duas lineas infinitas, plures sunt duae quam una, quia non habebat una infinitatem secundum numerum, sed solum secundum longitudinem; et sic non sunt maiores vel longiores duae quam una. Similiter in proposito intelligitur. Potentia enim dicitur infinita respectu obiectorum secundum numerum, sed non secundum qualitatem, quia non potest in mala vel privatoria. — Et per hoc patet primum et secundum. Quamvis enim inveniat terminum respectu mali, non tamen respectu boni, et ille terminus vel excessus potius facit ad infinitatem, quia non est *posse*, sed *non-posse*; et ideo, quamvis hoc videatur dare terminum secundum rationem intelligendi, secundum veritatem non dat, quia quod non possit mala, hoc totum est propter immensitatem virtutis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum est passio potentiae materialis; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de infinito per privationem completionis sive completi esse; sed non est verum de infinito per privationem limitationis. Primum enim est infinitum potentia passiva sive receptiva, et ita primo

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inest materiae; secundum est infinitum actu, et ideo in illo solo vere est et proprie, qui est tantum actus et actus purus et perfectissimus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura potest super ea quae summe distant; dicendum, quod *ens* et *non-ens* non dicuntur summe distantia, quia opponuntur contradictorie, sed quoniam nihil habent commune nec quantum ad genus subiectum nec quantum ad genus praedicabile; sed quiescere et moveri, sive moveri et *non moveri*, quod pro eodem accipitur, utroque modo habent commune[^23]: et ita non est distantia infinita, nec est simile.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia vivendi[^24]; dicendum, quod *vivere* uno modo dicit actum consequentem, sicut moveri; et sic est ab anima mediantibus potentiis differentibus ab ipsa essentia. Alio modo dicitur *vivere*, secundum quod est actus primus, et est ab essentia animae ut in ratione formae, non in ratione *agentis*; et propter hoc non consideratur ibi esse tantum in operando, sicut albedo se ipsa dealbat, ita quod non notatur ibi nec est egressus alicuius, ut a potentia agente. Nos autem loquimur hic de potentia ut agente et producente aliquid, quae potentia, quantumcumque sit idem, tamen dicit aliquam inclinationem, et ideo dependentiam; et ideo privat simplicitatem, ac per hoc privat infinitatem. In Deo autem non sic; et ideo ratio illa non habet instantiam, recte intellecta.

english:
### Article Unique. *On the infinity of the divine power.*
### Question I. *Whether the power of God, considered as such, is infinite.*

First, then, it is asked whether the power of God is infinite; and that this power, considered as such, is infinite is shown thus.

**Fundamenta (arguments for).**

1. The infinite is said to be that which does not have a terminus[^1]; but the divine power, as to its capacity, does not have a terminus: therefore etc. The first [premise] is manifest; the second is clear from Chrysostom in a certain Homily[^2]: "He is called omnipotent because his power-to-do does not encounter inability"; therefore, if he always finds [a] power-to-do, the quantity of his power always lies beyond what those who measure it can receive: therefore it is infinite.

2. Likewise, every active power that can produce infinite effects is actually infinite; the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. Proof of the first [premise]: if a power is purely in act, then it has actually whatever it can have: therefore if it has the whole actually, and nothing can accrue to it nor anything be given to it anew[^3], and the power as having-the-power was extending itself to infinities: therefore it actually has in itself infinity. The minor [premise] is clear, because the divine power can never produce so many effects that it cannot still produce more: therefore it is manifest that it is infinite.

3. Likewise, every power that can [extend] to an infinite act, if it is wholly in act, is simply infinite; but the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. The major is clear thus: as power is to power, so act to act; but infinite act exceeds finite in infinity, therefore power also [exceeds] power:

ergo if a power is wholly in act, it is infinite. The minor is clear, because God is said to endure unto infinity and can preserve a creature unto infinity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every power that can [extend] over extremes infinitely distant is infinite; but the divine power is of this kind, because it makes something from nothing, and between something and nothing is an infinite distance: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every power that is wholly indifferent from its essence is infinite; but the divine power is of this kind: therefore etc. Proof of the first [premise]: whenever any two things are wholly without distance, wherever the one is, there too the other[^4]: therefore if power is wholly indifferent from essence, wherever power is, there too essence. But where essence is, there is the center of the power: therefore wherever such a power can act, it can [act] as if at the center: therefore since no power is limited within its own center but can do more, either the divine power can do nothing, or it can do as much as it wills, and so unto infinity: therefore, as far as itself is concerned, that power can operate upon infinities[^5]. But that power is wholly indifferent and simple: therefore *factive* and *intensive* are the same there: therefore if it is infinite extensively, also intensively: therefore it is wholly infinite. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book *On Causes*[^6], that "the more a power is unified, the more it is infinite." Since therefore the divine power is most unified, because it is wholly the same as its origin, everywhere it can act as if in its own origin: therefore it never encounters inability.

**On the contrary:**

1. Everything is finite in which a stopping-point can be found; but in the divine power a stopping-point can be found, because it is possible to point out something it cannot do, as was shown above[^7], such as corporeal acts and deformed acts: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, what is exceeded[^8] by something is finite, because the infinite is in no way exceeded; but knowledge exceeds power as regards more knowables; for there is more knowledge than power: for [God] knows evils, and cannot [do them]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, we see in created powers that infinity is from matter, but finitude from form: therefore since the power of God is wholly form or formal, having nothing at all of possibility, therefore it is simply finite and in no way infinite.

4. Likewise, between contradictorily opposed things is an infinite distance; but the virtue of a creature reduces one finite to another, as it makes a non-runner run, and yet it is finite: therefore[^9].

5. Likewise, I see[^10] that the soul has a power wholly indifferent from its essence, such as the power of vivifying the body; it also has a power for an infinite act, such as for enduring or persisting in infinity; it nonetheless has a power for infinite acts[^11]; and yet that power is itself finite in itself: therefore the same seems by parity of reason about the divine power, since the soul is the express image of God. Hence the aforesaid arguments seem to be of no value.

> **Conclusion.** The divine power is infinite in act and in habit.

**I respond:** It must be said that the divine power must be posited as wholly infinite both in act and in habit; as was proved[^12] by effect *a posteriori*, because it has an effect infinite in duration and infinite [effects] by addition, to which it is compared as pure act and as the whole cause. And therefore it is[^13] having in itself the full and perfect actuality with respect to infinities; and it is necessary, since it has the whole that it ever will have, and has it from itself, that it itself be infinite.

Another reasoning shows this as it were *a priori*. On account of the supreme indivision of [the divine] power from [the divine] essence[^14], and on account of the supreme unity of that power itself, wherever it can act, it acts wholly, and as much at the extremity of the world as in the middle, and as much in the highest as in the lowest, and in every mode of infinity.

Nor is there a like reasoning in any creature, neither as to the causality of the effect, nor as to the production of act[^15], nor as to unity.

Not as to causality, because no virtue of a creature is purely active in respect of infinite duration; rather it is necessary that it be preserved by divine influence. — Similarly neither as to the production of act, whence it has a passive infinity even in receiving, and therefore none is *actually* infinite, but only *in potency*. And since the infinite in potency depends on the infinite in act, therefore every infinity of created duration and of operation depends on the infinity of the uncreated virtue. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book *On Causes*[^16], that "all infinite virtues are dependent through one first infinite, which is the virtue of virtues." — Similarly the case is not the same as to simplicity or unity. For the divine power is wholly simple in itself and wholly has a simple essence or substance, and is wholly indifferent from it; and therefore by every kind of union it is most unified, and therefore infinite. But of no creature, however noble, is the power wholly simple, because every such power expresses some relation of dependence; nor is it founded in a wholly simple substance; nor is it wholly indifferent, because no creature is its own power, speaking essentially[^17]. — And therefore because every creature falls short of the character of supreme simplicity, and consequently of infinity. And thus it is clear that the divine power is infinite[^18], and is the ground of infinity.

And the response is clear to the last argument showing that the aforesaid reasonings are of no value.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* To what is objected, that it finds a terminus, and that it finds an excess; it must be said that the divine power is infinite with respect to those things of which the *can-be* is a *can-do*[^19]; with respect to other things, of which the *can-be* is of impotence, it is neither finite nor infinite, because it can do nothing of them. — For when it is said that it finds a terminus or an excess; it must be said that this is false, because the *creature* and the *passible thing* is regarded according to the things to which *the thing extends itself*: and the divine power extends itself only to good things, and as to such things[^20] there is never more knowledge than power; nor as to such things does it find a terminus. And so that argument is clear.

It can also be said another way, that there is a twofold way of speaking about power and knowledge: either *in themselves*, or *by comparison to objects*. If *in themselves*, then the one does not exceed the other, because whatever [God] knows, he can know, and whatever he can [do], he knows that he can. Or[^21] by comparison to the object, and so there are two ways of speaking, either according to *form* or *species*, or according to *number*. If according to number, then, since power can [extend to] infinities, it is not exceeded by knowledge; if however according to form, then, since the power is with respect to goods only[^22], it is exceeded; nevertheless from this it does not follow that it is not infinite. — And there is an example: if someone should imagine two infinite lines, two are more than one, because the one did not have its infinity according to number, but only according to length; and so two are not greater or longer than one. Similarly is it understood in the matter at hand. For the power is called infinite with respect to objects according to number, but not according to quality, because it cannot [extend] to evils or privative things. — And by this the first and second are clear. For although it finds a terminus with respect to evil, yet not with respect to good, and that terminus or excess contributes rather to infinity, because it is not a *can-do*, but a *non-can-do*; and therefore, although this seems to give a terminus according to the manner of understanding, in truth it does not, because [the fact] that it cannot [do] evil is wholly on account of the immensity of [its] power.

*To 3.* To what is objected, that the infinite is a passion of material power; it must be said that this is true of the infinite by privation of completion or of completed being; but it is not true of the infinite by privation of limitation. For the first is the infinite in passive or receptive potency, and so is primarily

in matter; the second is the infinite in act, and therefore is truly and properly only in that being who is only act and pure and most perfect act.

*To 4.* To what is objected, that a creature can [act] upon things which are supremely distant; it must be said that *being* and *non-being* are not called supremely distant because they are opposed contradictorily, but because they have nothing common neither as to a subject genus nor as to a predicable genus; but resting and moving, or moving and *not-moving*, which is taken for the same thing, have a common [genus] in either mode[^23]: and so the distance is not infinite, nor is it a like case.

*To 5.* To what is objected concerning the power of living[^24]; it must be said that *to live* in one mode signifies a consequent act, like to be moved; and thus it [proceeds] from the soul through powers different from the essence itself. In another mode *to live* is said, insofar as it is a primary act, and is from the essence of the soul as in the character of form, not in the character of *agent*; and on account of this it is not considered to consist there only in operating, just as whiteness whitens by itself, so that there is not noted there any going-forth of anything, as from an active power. But we are here speaking of power as agent and producing something, and such a power, however much it is the same [as the essence], nevertheless expresses some inclination, and therefore dependence; and therefore strips away simplicity, and through this strips away infinity. But in God it is not so; and therefore that argument has no force, rightly understood.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.), et XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 63 (c. 6), and *Metaphysics* XI c. 9 (X c. 10).

la: Vide lit. Magistri dist. praeced. c. 3. — In sequenti propositione definitio illa infiniti respicitur, quae habetur in Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.): *Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est.*

en: See the text of the Master (Lombard), preceding distinction, c. 3. — In the following proposition is regarded that definition of the infinite which is found in Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 63 (c. 6): "The infinite, therefore, is that of which, for those taking it according to quantity, there is always something more to take beyond."

la: Fide complurium codd., inter quos et cod. T, et suffragante ed. 1, substituimus *dari* pro *dare*, quod *Vat.* falso exhibet.

en: On the faith of several codices, among which is also cod. T, and with the support of ed. 1, we have substituted *dari* for *dare*, which the Vatican edition wrongly exhibits.

la: *Vat.* et cod. cc particulae *et* praefigunt *ibi*. Mox codd. F S, verbis transpositis, sic: *ubicumque est essentia, et potentia.* — Conclusio, quae adtexitur, nititur illo axiomate: idem est principium operandi et essendi, sive operari sequitur esse; de quo cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 7.

en: The Vatican edition and cod. cc prefix *ibi* to the particle *et*. Soon after, codd. F S, with the words transposed, read: *wherever there is essence, there is also power*. — The conclusion which is appended rests on the axiom: the principle of operating and of being is the same, or *operari sequitur esse*; on which cf. above p. 84, note 7.

la: *Vat.* cum aliquibus codd. *infinitum.*

en: The Vatican edition with some codices reads *infinitum*.

la: Prop. 17. — Mox, lectionem codd. L X secuti, *unitissima* substituimus pro *infinitissima*, quod *Vat.* perperam exhibet, quia vox *infinitissima* non respondet processui argumentationis.

en: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 17. — Soon after, following the reading of codd. L X, we have substituted *unitissima* for *infinitissima*, which the Vatican wrongly exhibits, because the word *infinitissima* does not correspond to the course of the argument.

en: Distinction 42, question 2.

la: Retinuimus cum *Vat.* *exceditur*, quod et in cod. T habetur, aliis codd. non paucis dissentientibus, qui ponunt *habet exitum*.

en: We have retained, with the Vatican, *exceditur*, which is also found in cod. T, although not a few other codices dissent, which place *habet exitum*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63-66. (c. 6.), et VII. Metaph. text. 40. (VI. c. 11.), ex quo libro iam supra pag. 612, nota 7. aliqua allata sunt. — Mox pro *possibilitatis Vat.* *materialitatis*, et non pauci codd. mendose *impossibilitatis.* — Cfr. de hac propos. Boeth., de Trin. c. 2, ubi divinam substantiam sine materia formam esse docetur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 63-66 (c. 6), and *Metaphysics* VII, text 40 (VI c. 11), from which book already above p. 612 note 7 some things have been adduced. — Soon after, for *possibilitatis* the Vatican has *materialitatis*, and not a few codices erroneously have *impossibilitatis.* — Cf. on this proposition Boethius, *De Trinitate* c. 2, where the divine substance is taught to be a form without matter.

la: Obiectio haec opposita est iis quae dicta sunt in fundam. 1; quare conclusio erit haec: ergo, licet Deus de nihilo faciat aliquid, potentia eius erit finita. — Paulo ante pro *finitum unum Vat.* *unum tantum.*

en: This objection is opposed to what was said in *fundamentum* 1; whence the conclusion will be: therefore, although God makes something from nothing, his power will be finite. — A little earlier, for *finitum unum* the Vatican has *unum tantum*.

la: Potentia enim intellectiva, quia in se incorruptibilis et perpetua, non tot actus elicere potest, quin non possit elicere plures (infinitos syncategorematice sive indefinitos). — In cod. hic additur *sicut dicitur tertio de Anima*, ubi text. 20. (c. 8.) intellectivae parti animae immortalitas attribuitur et perpetuitas. Subinde post *ipsa potentia* in codd. V X inseritur *eius*. Iidem codd. V X etiam in principio huius argumenti *Item, videtur* loco *Item, video.*

en: For an intellective power, because in itself incorruptible and perpetual, cannot elicit so many acts that it cannot still elicit more (infinite syncategorematically or indefinite). — In cod. here is added *as is said in book III of On the Soul*, where text 20 (c. 8) immortality and perpetuity is attributed to the intellective part of the soul. Then after *ipsa potentia* in codd. V X is inserted *eius*. The same codd. V X also at the beginning of this argument have *Item, videtur* instead of *Item, video*.

la: Hic fundam. 2. 4. Locutio, quae paulo post occurrit *infinitos (effectus) appositione*, apud Aristot. invenitur, III. Phys. text. 56. (c. 6.), ubi Philosophus infinitum distinguens sic ait: « Dicitur igitur ipsum (infinitum) esse aliud quidem potentia, aliud vero actu. Et infinitum est quidem appositione, est etiam ablatione. » Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: *Id est, et infinitum potentia invenitur in additione numerorum et in divisione mensurarum (magnitudinum)... non in actu.* Idem Averroes in libro *de Substantia orbis* duplicem distinguit potentiam infinitam, scil. infinitam duratione et infinitam vigore. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 1.

en: Here *fundam.* 2 and 4. The expression which occurs a little later, *infinite (effects) by addition*, is found in Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 56 (c. 6), where the Philosopher, distinguishing the infinite, says thus: "It is said therefore that the infinite is one thing in potency, another in act. And the infinite is by addition, and also by ablation." Which words Averroes thus expounds: *That is, the infinite in potency is found in the addition of numbers and in the division of measures (magnitudes)... not in act.* The same Averroes, in the book *On the Substance of the Orb*, distinguishes two kinds of infinite power, namely infinite in duration and infinite in vigor. Cf. also Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 6. m. 1. ad 1.

la: Pro *Et ideo est Vat.* cum cod. cc *Et ratio*, at maior pars codd. et ed. 1 *Et ideo*, ad quae verba ex cod. M (T in marg.) apposuimus *est*. Pro *est habens* codd. V X *habet*. Paulo inferius post *cum habeat* codd. V X Z interiiciunt *in se*.

en: For *Et ideo est* the Vatican with cod. cc reads *Et ratio*, but the majority of codices and ed. 1 read *Et ideo*, to which words from cod. M (T in margin) we have added *est*. For *est habens* codd. V X read *habet*. A little below, after *cum habeat* codd. V X Z insert *in se*.

la: Id est propter summam identitatem virtutis et essentiae. — Paulo ante *Vat.* cum cod. cc sic: *Alia ratione ostenditur hoc a priori. Propter summam* etc.

en: That is, on account of the supreme identity of [the divine] virtue and essence. — A little earlier the Vatican with cod. cc reads thus: *By another reasoning this is shown a priori. On account of the supreme* etc.

la: Ex codd. V X adiecimus verba *nec quantum ad productionem actus*, quae, ut ex sequentibus liquet, *Vat.* falso praetermisit. Mox post *causalitatem* supple cum *Vat.* et cod. cc *effectus*. Post pauca pro *creaturae* codd. X Z *creata*.

en: From codd. V X we have added the words *nor as to the production of act*, which, as is clear from what follows, the Vatican falsely omitted. Soon after *causalitatem* supply, with the Vatican and cod. cc, *effectus*. A little later for *creaturae* codd. X Z have *creata*.

la: Prop. 16: « Omnes virtutes, quibus non est finis, pendentes sunt » etc. Quam propositionem S. Thomas in suo Comment. in hunc librum sic exponit: *Ubi primo considerandum est, quod infinita potentia dicitur cuiuslibet semper existentis... in quantum scilicet videmus, quod quae plus durare possunt, habent maiorem virtutem essendi. Unde illa quae in infinitum durare possunt, habent quantum ad hoc infinitam potentiam... ideo secundum intentionem huius auctoris hoc primum infinitum, a quo omnes virtutes infinitae dependent, est primum simpliciter, quod est Deus.*

en: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 16: "All virtues for which there is no end are dependent" etc. Which proposition St. Thomas in his Commentary on this book expounds thus: "Where first it must be considered that infinite power is said of anything always existing... insofar, namely, as we see that those things which can endure longer have a greater virtue of being. Hence those which can endure unto infinity have, as to this, infinite power... therefore according to the intention of this author, this first infinite, on which all infinite virtues depend, is the first simply, which is God."

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, praecipue in solut. obiect., et d. 8. p. II. q. 2. per totam.

en: Cf. above d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, especially in the solution of the objections, and d. 8. p. II. q. 2 throughout.

la: *Vat.* cum ed. 1 hic addit *et quod sola est infinita*, et subinde post *infinitatis Vat.* adiungit verba *est summa simplicitas*.

en: The Vatican with ed. 1 here adds *and that it alone is infinite*, and then after *infinitatis* the Vatican adds the words *is supreme simplicity*.

la: Pro *est posse Vat.* *est potentiae*. Paulo superius pro *terminum* codd. L O *statum*.

en: For *est posse* the Vatican has *est potentiae*. A little above, for *terminum* codd. L O have *statum*.

la: Pro *talia Vat.* cum cod. cc perperam *alia*. In initio huius propos. pro *Quando enim* ed. 1 *Quando ergo*. — Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. et 22. (IV. c. 16. et 17.).

en: For *talia* the Vatican with cod. cc wrongly has *alia*. At the beginning of this proposition, for *Quando enim* ed. 1 has *Quando ergo*. — Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 and 22 (IV c. 16 and 17).

la: Pro *Vel* cod. C *Si*.

en: For *Vel* cod. C has *Si*.

la: *Vat.* et cod. cc hic adiungunt: *scientia vero bonorum et malorum, ideo*. Deinde paulo inferius pro *habebat una infinitatem Vat.* *habebant unam infinitatem.*

en: The Vatican and cod. cc here add: *but knowledge is of goods and evils, therefore*. Then a little below, for *habebat una infinitatem* the Vatican has *habebant unam infinitatem.*

la: Nam quies et motus fundantur in eadem reali potentia subiecti, ideoque et ad idem praedicamentum pertinent; cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): *at ens et non-ens non fundantur in eodem subiecto*: cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), ubi dicitur, *nihil nullam rationem sive proportionem habere ad ens*. — Post *commune* codd. V b adiiciunt: *scilicet ipsum subiectum motus et quietis*.

en: For rest and motion are founded in the same real potency of the subject, and so they belong to the same predicament; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 19 (VIII c. 9): "but being and non-being are not founded in the same subject": cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 67 (c. 8), where it is said that *nothing has no relation or proportion to being*. — After *commune* codd. V b add: *namely the very subject of motion and rest*.

la: *Vat.* cum cod. cc *vivificandi*. Mox post *actum consequen-tem* codd. aa bb addunt: *alio modo actum primum. Sed secundum quod dicit actum consequentem...* et consequenter post pauca pro *Alio modo dicitur vivere* substituunt *Secundum quod est actus primus, est*. Haec posterior lectio invenitur etiam in bene multis aliis codd. — De duplici significatione verbi *vivere* cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 8. seq., et text. 24. seq. (c. 1. et 2.). — *Vat.* adiungit *sed in informando*. — Voculae *quae* in plerisque codd. et ed. 1 falso omittitur; in cod. T ab alia manu eius loco vocabulo *potentia* praefigitur. Sciendum est primum, scil. ex dictis duobus modis vivendi. Pro *quae* cod. X *quia*, *Vat.* autem cum cod. cc verbo *potentia* adiungit *vero animae*. — Quae differentia sit inter potentias animae et ipsam animam, vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

en: The Vatican with cod. cc reads *vivificandi*. Soon after *actum consequentem* codd. aa bb add: *in another mode an act-first. But in the mode in which it says a consequent act…* and consequently, a little later, instead of *Alio modo dicitur vivere* they substitute *Insofar as it is a primary act, it is*. This latter reading is found also in quite a few other codices. — On the double signification of the verb *vivere* cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 8 ff., and text 24 ff. (c. 1 and 2). — The Vatican adds *but in informing*. — The little word *quae*, which in most codices and ed. 1 is wrongly omitted; in cod. T by another hand the word *potentia* is prefixed in its place. It must first be known, namely, from the two said modes of living. For *quae* cod. X has *quia*; the Vatican, however, with cod. cc adds to the word *potentia* the word *vero animae*. — On what the difference is between the powers of the soul and the soul itself, see above d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Definitiones et variae species infiniti, quae in hac distinctione occurrunt, plerumque ex Aristotele sumtae sunt, ut videri potest in notis nostris; vide etiam infra q. 2. — Pro explicatione terminorum servire potest locus Alexandri Hal. (S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1.): « Infinitum dicitur tripliciter, scil. negative, privative, contrarie sive disparate. Infinitum negative dicitur per abnegationem finis, et sic dicitur infinitum id quod non finitur: et hoc modo infinitum est quod non est natum finiri. Infinitum *privative* est quod natum est finiri, non tamen finitur. Infinitum *contrarie* est quod habet contrariam dispositionem sive disparatam ad finiendum. Primo modo essentia divina est infinita, quia non habet finem, sed est finiens omnia, neque est nata finiri. Similiter, si dicatur infinitum *disparate*, sic adhuc est infinita, quia habet disparatam dispositionem respectu simplicis; dicimus enim aliquid infinitum, quod in tot est, quod non potest esse in plura » etc. Et ibid. ad 1: « Cum finitum dicatur per inductionem finis, infinitum per ablationem finis; *finis* autem dicitur tripliciter, et *finitum* et *infinitum*. *Finis* enim dicitur *terminus*, et *finitum* et *infinitum*, secundum quod a fine accipiantur ; soli *quantitati* congruunt; ratione enim *termini* in quantitate sumuntur. Quia enim in continuo non est terminus suae *divisionis*, dicimus ipsum divisibile in infinitum sive *infinitum decisione*. Similiter, qui in numero non est terminus *additionis*, dicimus ipsum esse *infinitum additione*. Similiter iuxta formam dicitur finitum et infinitum *circumscriptione*; et circa tempus finitum et infinitum *duratione*. — Alio modo *finis* dicitur idem quod *perfectio*; nec dicitur sic infinitum nisi in habitudine ad finem; et sic dicitur materia secundum se infinita, quia caret perfectione. — Tertio modo dicitur *finis* secundum rationem propriam, quae quidem est id, propter quod unumquodque, et sic *finitum* dicitur a fine per ordinem ad finem, infinitum vero per deordinationem; et sic malum *culpae* dicitur infinitum. » Deinde auctor distinguit infinitatem secundum quantitatem dimensivam et aliam secundum quantitatem virtutis, quia illa Deo potest convenire. Infinitatem quae attribuitur materiae, S. Bonav., supra d. 30. a. 1. ad 1, nominat infinitatem per defectum, cui opponitur *infinitas per excessum*. S. Thomas (hic q. 2, a. 1; S. 1. q. 7. a. 1.) in eodem sensu distinguit infinitum ex parte materiae quod competit quantitati, et infinitum ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam quod habet rationem perfecti, unde Deo convenit. — De conceptu formali infiniti, quod convenit Deo, controvertitur inter scholam S. Thomae et Scoti, utrum consistat in negatione, quae tamen fundata sit in perfectione immensa Dei, ut prima schola vult, an potius in perfectione positiva omnis entitalis, ut Scotus dicit. Scoto favet S. Bonav., hic q. 2. praecipue ad 6. (cfr. quod idem supra d. 29. q. 1. docet de innascibilitate). Tamen Seraphicus non facit Scotisticam distinctionem inter infinitatem *intensivam*, ex qua Scotistae inferunt simplicitatem Dei, et infinitatem *formalem*; sed ipse (arg. 5. in fundam.) potius ex simplicitate divina ut priori infert infinitam potentiam (de quo cfr. supra d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 3, et d. 8. p. II. q. 1, 2.).

**II.** Deum « intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum » esse (Vatican. const. *de Fide*, c. 1.), ipsa quoque ratio docet. — Distinctio (in principio resp.) inter potentiam

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infinitam *in actu* et *in habitu*, explicatur infra q. 3, in corp., et accipitur tantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi, cum consideremus omnia in Deo esse per modum actus puri. — Arg. 1. in fundam., explicatur hic ad 1, et infra q. 3. ad 1, et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 2, q. 2. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) cum aliis negat, distantiam infinitam esse inter *aliquid* et *nihil*.

**III.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. 1. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. q. 1. 2; I. Report. d. 2. q. 3; Quodl. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 45. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1. in fine.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The definitions and various species of *infinite* that occur in this distinction are mostly taken from Aristotle, as can be seen in our notes; see also below q. 2. — For an explanation of the terms, the passage of Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, p. I. q. 6. m. 1.) can serve: "*Infinite* is said in three ways, namely negatively, privatively, and contrarily or disparately. *Negatively infinite* is said by negation of an end, and so what does not have an end is called infinite: and in this mode the infinite is what is not apt to be ended. *Privatively infinite* is what is apt to be ended, yet is not ended. *Contrarily infinite* is what has a contrary or disparate disposition to being ended. In the first mode the divine essence is infinite, because it does not have an end, but is what ends all things, nor is it apt to be ended. Similarly, if it be called infinite *disparately*, then likewise it is infinite, because it has a disparate disposition with respect to the simple; for we call something infinite which is so much that it cannot be in more" etc. And in the same place, *ad* 1: "Since the finite is called so by induction of an end, the infinite by removal of an end; and *end* is said in three ways, [in each of which there is both] *finite* and *infinite*. For *end* is said [first as] *terminus*, and *finite* and *infinite* [in this sense] insofar as they are taken from end; these belong only to *quantity*, for by reason of *terminus* they are taken in quantity. For since in a continuum there is no terminus of its *division*, we say it is divisible into infinity, that is, *infinite by decision*. Similarly, that in number which is no terminus of *addition*, we call *infinite by addition*. Likewise, according to form, finite and infinite are said *by circumscription*; and around time, finite and infinite *by duration*. — In another mode *end* is said as the same as *perfection*; and so a thing is not called infinite except in relation to an end; and thus matter is said in itself to be infinite, because it lacks perfection. — In a third mode *end* is called according to its proper notion, which indeed is that on account of which everything [is], and thus the *finite* is so called from end by ordering to an end, the infinite however by deordination; and thus the evil of *guilt* is called infinite." Then the author distinguishes infinity according to dimensive quantity from another infinity according to the quantity of power, because the latter can apply to God. The infinity which is attributed to matter, St. Bonaventure, above d. 30. a. 1. ad 1, names infinity by defect, to which is opposed *infinity by excess*. St. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. q. 7. a. 1.) in the same sense distinguishes infinity on the side of matter which pertains to quantity, and infinity on the side of form not determined by matter which has the character of the perfect, whence it belongs to God. — Concerning the formal concept of infinity which belongs to God, there is controversy between the school of St. Thomas and that of Scotus, whether it consists in a negation founded in the immense perfection of God (as the first school holds), or rather in the positive perfection of every entity (as Scotus says). The Seraphic favors Scotus here, q. 2 especially *ad* 6 (cf. what the same teaches above, d. 29. q. 1. on innascibility). Nevertheless, the Seraphic does not make the Scotistic distinction between *intensive* infinity, from which the Scotists infer the simplicity of God, and *formal* infinity; but he himself (arg. 5 in *fundam.*) rather, from the divine simplicity as prior, infers infinite power (on which see above d. 37. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. and *ad* 3, and d. 8. p. II. q. 1, 2.).

**II.** That God is "infinite in intellect and will and every perfection" (Vatican *Constitution on the Faith*, c. 1) — reason itself also teaches. — The distinction (at the beginning of the response) between power infinite *in act* and *in habit* is explained below at q. 3 *in corp.*, and is taken only according to our manner of understanding, since we consider all things in God to be by way of pure act. — *Arg.* 1 *in fundam.* is explained here *ad* 1, and below at q. 3 *ad* 1, and II *Sent.* d. 1. p. 1. a. 2, q. 2. Scotus however (IV *Sent.* d. 1. q. 1.) with others denies that an infinite distance lies between *something* and *nothing*.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *loc. cit.* — Scotus, on this and the following q. 1. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 2. q. 1. 2; I. *Reportata* d. 2. q. 3; *Quodlibetal* q. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; *Summa* 1. q. 25. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1; *Summa* p. I. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 45. q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 1. *in fine*.

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