title: Dist. 28, Art. 1, Q. 6

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. Quaestio VI. *An consensus debeat esse in carnalem copulam.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur[^1], in quid debeat esse consensus; et quod in carnalem copulam, videtur:

1. Quia ita dicit Hieronymus[^2], quod «voventibus virginitatem non solum nubere, sed etiam velle nubere damnabile est»; sed non esset damnabile, nisi esset contra votum; et non esset contra votum, nisi consentirent in opus carnis: ergo necesse erat in illud consentire.

2. Item, in omnia, in quae consentit vir et uxor, possunt consentire frater et soror licite, excepta copula carnali: ergo si inter fratrem et sororem non potest licite contrahi matrimonium, patet etc. Si tu dicas mihi, quod oportet consentire in copulam coniugalem; quaero, quid vocetur copula coniugalis; et tandem oportet ad hoc devenire, quod ibi includatur copula carnalis.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur infra distinctione trigesima[^3], et loquitur de purissima Virgine: «Committens virginitatem suam divinae dispositioni, consensit in carnalem copulam»: si ergo nullum matrimonium purius illo, nullum sanctius, in omni oportet consentire.

4. Item, si qua mulier dicat: consentio in te, ut tamen non cognoscas me, non est matrimonium: ergo si ista conditio est contra substantiam matrimonii[^4], ergo tenetur consentire in carnalem copulam.

5. Item, matrimonium ad hoc institutum est, ut sint duo in carne una[^5]: ergo necesse est ad hoc, quod sit matrimonium, quod carnaliter uniantur vel in carne, vel in voluntate: ergo non est matrimonium sine carnali copula.

**Contra:**
1. Magister dicit in littera[^6], quod «consensus cohabitationis vel carnalis copulae non facit coniugium».

2. Item, in distinctione trigesima[^7] dicitur: «Consensit Maria in copulam maritalem, sed non in copulam carnalem».

3. Item, hoc ipsum expresse dicit Hugo in libro de Virginitate Mariae[^8]; et tamen ex consensu suo matrimonium contraxit: ergo non oportet in carnalem copulam consentire.

4. Item, ratione videtur: quia nullus consentiens in actum carnis est virgo perfecte; beatus Ioannes est virgo perfecte: ergo non consensit in actum carnis. Et consensit in matrimonium quia de nuptiis est a Domino vocatus[^9]: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullus vovens continentiam virginalem potest sine peccato consentire in actum carnis; beata Virgo vovit, sicut dicit Augustinus[^10], et ipsa innuit in responsione sua, quam dixit: ergo peccavit, si in actum sive in carnalem copulam consensit. Et constat, quod sine peccato nupsit: ergo etc.

6. Item, possibile est, inter duos esse plenum matrimonium et perfectum sine commixtione carnali: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis consentiat in matrimonium, non consentiendo in commixtionem carnalem; si hoc potest esse in re et effectu, potest esse in consensu et causa[^11].

> **Conclusio.** Consensus, qui matrimonium facit, est consensus in mutuam suorum corporum potestatem, quae tamen aliter datur in contractione, et aliter in consummatione matrimonii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quorundam opinio fuit, quod ad hoc, quod contrahatur matrimonium, necesse est absolute consentire in copulam carnalem. Et dicunt hi, quod beata Virgo et Ioannes consenserit, tamen sine peccato; quia Ioannes[^12] nec voverat nec proposuerat virginitatem servare; beata Virgo, quia non voverat, sed tantum proposuerat. — Sed haec opinio iniuriam facit Virgini gloriosae, quia, quamvis excuset a culpa, minuit tamen

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virginitatis eius gloriam, ut iam non debeat Virgo super omnes virgines nuncupari; quod noster refugit animus pariter et auditus. Unde haec opinio satis convenienter a magistro Hugone reprobatur.

Aliorum opinio fuit, et istius fuit Antissiodorensis[^13], quod necesse est consentire in copulam carnalem non in particulari, sed in universali; non explicite, sed implicite. Oportet enim consentire in copulam coniugalem, quae continet in se quatuor, scilicet cohabitationem et mutuum obsequium et mutuam corporum potestatem et copulam carnalem. — Sed illud non videtur sufficiens, quia constat, quod beata Virgo bene sciebat legem coniugii et sciebat explicite et cogitabat de actu coniugum; aut ergo consentiebat, aut dissentiebat. Si consentiebat, redit primum inconveniens; si dissentiebat, ergo nec in generali nec in speciali consentiebat.

Tertia opinio est, quod oportet consentire in carnalem copulam vel absolute, vel sub conditione, videlicet nisi Deus aliter disponat, vel si placuerit Deo; et tali modo consensit Virgo beata, ut videtur dicere beatus Augustinus[^14], et hoc non repugnat virginitati. — Sed certe omnis, quicumque recte consentit, taliter consentit. Praeterea, non est consensus conditionatus, sed absolutus ille qui matrimonium facit, et maxime cum non stet conditio; Deus autem nolebat Virginem copulari carnaliter viro.

Et propterea dicendum, quod consensus, qui matrimonium facit, est consensus in mutuam suorum corporum potestatem; et hoc sonant verba, cum dicunt: accipio te in meum, vel in meam; et sic consensit beata Virgo et Ioseph. — Sed notandum, quod aliter datur potestas corporis in contractione matrimonii, aliter in consummatione. In contractione ita datur uni, ut non possit, illo vivente, dari alii; ita etiam datur illi, ut ius habeat petendi, et necesse sit reddere petenti, nisi moriatur mundo per votum castitatis solemne et ingressum in religionem[^15]. Quoniam igitur beata Virgo divina inspiratione noverat, vel fortassis ipsius Ioseph relatione, quod nunquam vellet uti eius corporis potestate, sed eius custodire virginitatem; ideo potuit et debuit ei committere sive dare. Sciebat etiam, quod si vellet exigere, quod posset publicando votum contraire; et sic patet illud. — Si ergo volumus istam mutuam corporum potestatem vocare copulam coniugalem; sic beata Virgo consensit in copulam, ut omnes nubentes. In matrimonii autem consummatione omnino transfertur potestas, ita quod nec voto privato nec solemni possit petenti debitum adversari. Unde gloriosa Virgo matrimonium consensit contrahere, sed certa fuit, quod nunquam matrimonium consummaret, et hoc scivit Spiritus sancti revelatione, vel Ioseph relatione, vel quia considerabat de voti publicatione; quia in Lege praeceptum erat servare, sed nullus fuerat ausus hoc vovere. Et hoc tangitur in libello illo, quem transtulit Hieronymus de Nativitate Mariae[^16], qui quamvis sit apocryphus, continet tamen multa verissima.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod velle nubere damnabile est; dicendum, quod Hieronymus loquitur de illis qui volunt nubere ex carnis petulantia, et tales magis appetunt coniunctionem corporum quam animorum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omnia frater et soror praeterquam in copulam carnalem possunt consentire; dicendum, quod falsum est; non enim possunt sibi suorum corporum dare mutuam potestatem; unde alter potest alii nubere, altero contradicente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicit Augustinus, quod consensit in copulam carnalem; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, quia consensit in mutuam corporum potestatem, quae ad carnalem copulam ordinatur, non tamen de necessitate; et beata Virgo[^17] in illam mutuam corporum potestatem absolute consensit, residuum vero, scilicet ordinationem in actum, divinae dispositioni commisit, credens semper[^18], quod Dominus ipsam servaret sine macula. Exemplum est de beata Caecilia[^19].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conditio illa impedit; dicendum, quod verum est[^20], contra collationem mutuae potestatis; in consensu enim in copulam coniugalem datur potestas petendi debitum, licet non teneatur ad statim, sed viam habet, per quam evadere possit; quae etsi non erat nota omnibus, erat tamen nota spiritualibus mentibus; sicut certum est nobis de gloriosa Virgine et probabilius praesumitur de Ioseph, quoniam hoc non est iuris positivi, sed magis est iuris divini.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est propter carnalem copulam; dicendum, quod verum est, quod prima et principalis institutio ad hoc fuit, et tamen hoc non est tota ratio sive causa matrimonii, sicut melius patebit infra[^21], immo etiam fidei et Sacramenti et mutuae educationis; et hoc supra determi-

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natum est, ubi agitur, utrum carnalis copula sit de integritate Sacramenti.

Haec autem sine praeiudicio dicta sint, maxime propter reverentiam Virginis; non enim possumus negare, quin inter Mariam et Ioseph fuerit verum coniugium, cum hoc dicat Scriptura evangelica[^22], et Sancti omnes in hoc consentiant. Rursus, pietas fidei et reverentia Virginis non patitur nos sentire, ipsius beatissimam et purissimam et integerrimam animam ad opus carnis fuisse aliquantulum inclinatam; nec credo, ipsam in dubio se super hoc posuisse. Si quis tamen aliter dicat, dum tamen Virgini non faciat iniuriam, non est magna vis facienda. Cavendum est enim diligenter, ut honor Dominae nostrae in nullo ab aliquo minuatur, qui etiam in periculo capitis debeat[^23] integer custodiri.

---

english:
### Article Unique. Question VI. *Whether consent ought to be to carnal intercourse.*

Sixth and last it is asked[^1], in what the consent [that makes marriage] ought to consist; and that it is in carnal intercourse, it seems:

1. Because Jerome[^2] thus says, that "for those who have vowed virginity, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry, is damnable"; but it would not be damnable, unless it were contrary to a vow; and it would not be contrary to a vow, unless they consented to the work of the flesh: therefore it was necessary to consent to that.

2. Likewise, in all the things to which husband and wife consent, brother and sister can licitly consent, except carnal intercourse: therefore if marriage cannot licitly be contracted between brother and sister, it is plain, etc. If you say to me that one must consent to conjugal intercourse, I ask what is called conjugal intercourse; and eventually one must come to this, that carnal intercourse is included there.

3. Likewise, Augustine says — and it is found below, in the thirtieth distinction[^3] — speaking of the most pure Virgin: "Committing her virginity to the divine disposition, she consented to carnal intercourse": if therefore no marriage is purer than that one, none holier, then in every case one ought to consent.

4. Likewise, if some woman should say: I consent to you, provided however that you do not know me, it is not marriage: therefore if that condition is contrary to the substance of marriage[^4], then one is bound to consent to carnal intercourse.

5. Likewise, marriage was instituted for this, that they be two in one flesh[^5]: therefore it is necessary for this, that it be marriage, that they be united carnally either in the flesh or in the will: therefore there is no marriage without carnal intercourse.

**On the contrary:**
1. The Master says in the text[^6], that "consent to cohabitation or to carnal intercourse does not make marriage."

2. Likewise, in the thirtieth distinction[^7] it is said: "Mary consented to marital intercourse, but not to carnal intercourse."

3. Likewise, Hugh expressly says this very thing in the book *On the Virginity of Mary*[^8]; and yet from her consent she contracted marriage: therefore it is not necessary to consent to carnal intercourse.

4. Likewise, it seems by reason: because no one who consents to the act of the flesh is a perfect virgin; blessed John was a perfect virgin: therefore he did not consent to the act of the flesh. And he consented to marriage because he was called by the Lord away from a wedding[^9]: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, no one who has vowed virginal continence can, without sin, consent to the act of the flesh; the blessed Virgin vowed [continence], as Augustine says[^10], and she herself hinted at this in her response, which she gave: therefore she sinned, if she consented to the act, or to carnal intercourse. And it is certain that she married without sin: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, it is possible for there to be between two persons a full and perfect marriage without carnal commingling: therefore it is possible for someone to consent to marriage without consenting to carnal commingling; if this can be so in reality and in effect, it can be so in consent and in cause[^11].

> **Conclusion.** The consent that makes marriage is consent to the mutual power over one another's bodies, which, however, is given in one way in the contracting [of marriage], and in another way in the consummation of marriage.

**I respond:** It must be said that the opinion of certain persons was that, for marriage to be contracted, it is necessary to consent absolutely to carnal intercourse. And these say that the blessed Virgin and John consented, yet without sin; because John[^12] had neither vowed nor purposed to keep virginity; the blessed Virgin, because she had not vowed, but only purposed. — But this opinion does harm to the glorious Virgin, because, although it excuses from fault, it nevertheless diminishes

the glory of her virginity, so that the Virgin ought no longer to be called above all virgins; which our mind and hearing alike shrink from. Hence this opinion is quite fittingly rejected by Master Hugh.

The opinion of others — and this was the opinion of the Bishop of Auxerre[^13] — was that it is necessary to consent to carnal intercourse not in particular, but in universal; not explicitly, but implicitly. For one must consent to conjugal intercourse, which contains in itself four things, namely cohabitation, and mutual service, and the mutual power over each other's bodies, and carnal intercourse. — But this does not seem sufficient, because it is certain that the blessed Virgin well knew the law of marriage, and knew it explicitly, and thought about the act of spouses; therefore she either consented or dissented. If she consented, the first inconsistency returns; if she dissented, then she consented neither in general nor in particular.

The third opinion is that one must consent to carnal intercourse either absolutely or under a condition, namely unless God should otherwise dispose, or if it should please God; and in this way the blessed Virgin consented, as blessed Augustine seems to say[^14], and this does not conflict with virginity. — But surely everyone who rightly consents, consents in this manner. Moreover, the consent that makes marriage is not conditional but absolute, especially since the condition does not hold; but God did not will the Virgin to be carnally joined to a man.

And therefore it must be said that the consent that makes marriage is consent to the mutual power over one another's bodies; and this is what the words mean when they say: I take you as mine [husband], or as mine [wife]; and thus the blessed Virgin and Joseph consented. — But it must be noted that the power over the body is given in one way in the contracting of marriage, and in another way in its consummation. In the contracting, it is given to one in such a way that it cannot, while that one lives, be given to another; it is likewise given to the other such that he has the right to ask [for the marital debt], and it is necessary to render it to the one asking, unless he should die to the world through the solemn vow of chastity and entrance into religious life[^15]. Since, then, the blessed Virgin knew by divine inspiration — or perhaps by Joseph's own report — that he would never wish to use the power over her body, but rather to guard her virginity; therefore she was able and bound to entrust or give it to him. She knew, too, that if he wished to exact it, he could contravene the vow by making it public; and thus that [difficulty] is resolved. — If, then, we wish to call this mutual power over the body "conjugal intercourse," in this way the blessed Virgin consented to intercourse, as do all who marry. But in the consummation of marriage the power is transferred altogether otherwise, in such a way that neither by private vow nor by solemn vow can it be opposed to the one asking for the debt. Hence the glorious Virgin consented to contract marriage, but she was certain that she would never consummate the marriage, and this she knew by revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by Joseph's report, or because she considered the publication of the vow; because in the Law it had been commanded to keep [a vow], but no one had dared to make this particular vow. And this is touched upon in that little book which Jerome translated, *On the Nativity of Mary*[^16], which, although it is apocryphal, nevertheless contains many very true things.

1. To that, then, which is objected — that to wish to marry is said to be damnable — it must be said that Jerome speaks of those who wish to marry out of the wantonness of the flesh, and such people desire the union of bodies more than of souls.

2. To that which is objected — that in all things brother and sister, except carnal intercourse, can consent — it must be said that this is false; for they cannot give to one another the mutual power over their bodies; hence one can marry another, the other objecting.

3. To that which is objected — that Augustine says she consented to carnal intercourse — it must be said that this is understood in the sense that she consented to the mutual power over the bodies, which is ordered to carnal intercourse, but not of necessity; and the blessed Virgin[^17] consented absolutely to that mutual power over bodies, while the remainder — namely, the ordering to the act — she committed to the divine disposition, believing always[^18] that the Lord would keep her without stain. An example is the blessed Cecilia[^19].

4. To that which is objected — that that condition impedes [marriage] — it must be said that this is true[^20] against the conferring of mutual power; for in consent to conjugal intercourse, power is given to ask for the debt, although one is not bound to render it at once, but has a way by which he may escape it; which, even though it was not known to all, was nevertheless known to spiritual minds; just as it is certain for us concerning the glorious Virgin, and it is more probably presumed concerning Joseph, since this is not a matter of positive law, but rather of divine law.

5. To that which is objected — that it is for the sake of carnal intercourse — it must be said that this is true, that the first and principal institution [of marriage] was for this, and yet this is not the whole reason or cause of marriage, as will be shown better below[^21]; indeed, it is also for the sake of faith, and of the sacrament, and of mutual upbringing; and this has been determined above, where it is treated whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of the sacrament.

But let these things be said without prejudice, chiefly out of reverence for the Virgin; for we cannot deny that between Mary and Joseph there was a true marriage, since the Gospel Scripture says this[^22], and all the Saints agree in this. Again, the piety of faith and reverence for the Virgin does not allow us to think that her most blessed and most pure and most whole soul was ever inclined, even a little, toward the act of the flesh; nor do I believe that she ever set herself in doubt about this. If anyone should say otherwise, provided he does no injury to the Virgin, no great effort need be made [to refute him]. One must, however, be diligent to see that the honor of Our Lady is in no way diminished by anyone, since even at the peril of life it ought[^23] to be kept whole.

---

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: Haec sententia a Gratiano, C. Voventibus (4.), d. 27. et C. 17. q. 4. c. 2, tribuitur Hieronymo, cum sit Augustini, de Bono viduitatis, c. 9. n. 12. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 2.

en: This saying is attributed to Jerome by Gratian, C. Voventibus (4), d. 27, and C. 17 q. 4 c. 2, though it is Augustine's, from *On the Good of Widowhood*, c. 9, n. 12. Cf. below, the Master's text, d. XXXVIII, c. 2.

la: Cap. 2. Vide C. Beata Maria (3.), C. 27. q. 2.

en: Chapter 2. See C. Beata Maria (3), C. 27 q. 2.

la: Cfr. C. Si conditiones (7.), X. de Conditionibus appositis in desponsatione etc. (lib. IV. tit. 5.). — Post ergo permulti codd. omittunt si.

en: Cf. C. Si conditiones (7), Decretals, On Conditions Attached in Betrothal, etc. (Bk. IV, tit. 5). — After "ergo," very many codices omit "si."

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

la: Cap. 2.

en: Chapter 2.

la: Cap. 1. et 4. — Post Hugo cod. L addit et probat.

en: Chapters 1 and 4. — After "Hugo," codex L adds "et probat" ("and proves it").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 683, nota 6. — Voci beatus cod. G praemittit sed.

en: Cf. above, p. 683, note 6. — Before the word "beatus," codex G prefixes "sed" ("but").

la: De Sancta Virginitate, c. 4. n. 4. Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXX. c. 2. et hic c. 3, ubi etiam responsio Mariae (Luc. I, 34.) habetur. — In maiori Vat. et aliquot codd. voci vovens [Vat. volens] praemittunt consentiens et.

en: *On Holy Virginity*, c. 4, n. 4. Cf. below, the Master's text, d. XXX, c. 2, and here, c. 3, where also the response of Mary (Luke 1:34) is given. — In the larger Vatican manuscript and several codices, before the word "vovens" ("volens" in the Vatican manuscript) they prefix "consentiens et" ("consenting, and").

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. ac a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. here, the Master's text, c. 4, and above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cod. L et Ioseph consenserunt, tamen sine peccato, quia Ioseph.

en: Codex L: "and Joseph consented, yet without sin, because Joseph..."

la: Locc. superius allegatis. — Opinio Guliel. Antissiodor. habetur in ipsius Summa aurea, lib. III. tr. 28. c. 2. q. 3.

en: The passages cited above. — The opinion of William of Auxerre is found in his own *Summa aurea*, Bk. III, tr. 28, c. 2, q. 3.

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXX. c. 2.

en: See below, the Master's text, d. XXX, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. — Inferius pro committere sive dare edd. committi sive dari.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. — Further below, for "committere sive dare" the editions read "committi sive dari."

la: Inter opera Hieron. Epist. 50. c. 8, ubi etiam allegatur Ps. 73, 12: Vovete et reddite. Libellus iste, ut in c. 1. dicitur, a Seleuco quodam conscriptus est Hebraice.

en: Among the works of Jerome, Letter 50, c. 8, where also Ps. 73:12 is cited: "Vow and pay." This little book, as is said in c. 1, was written in Hebrew by a certain Seleucus.

la: Cod. U supplet beata Virgo.

en: Codex U supplies "beata Virgo" ("the blessed Virgin").

la: Codd. LY addunt semper.

en: Codices L and Y add "semper" ("always").

la: Cfr. Breviar. Romanum, die 22. Nov. lect. 4. (Antiph. et Respons. pro festo S. Caeciliae inveniuntur in libro Responsali Gregorii Magni). — Post credens semper, quibus verbis codd. E M O W Z interserunt tamen, Vat. addit immo et sciens.

en: Cf. the Roman Breviary, Nov. 22, lect. 4 (the Antiphon and Responsory for the feast of St. Cecilia are found in the *Responsoriale* of Gregory the Great). — After "credens semper," words after which codices E, M, O, W, Z insert "tamen" ("nevertheless"), the Vatican manuscript adds "immo et sciens" ("nay, and knowing it").

la: Codd. S T addunt si sit (in cod. I secunda manus supplevit si fiat), codd. M O quia.

en: Codices S and T add "si sit" ("if it should be"; in codex I a second hand supplied "si fiat," "if it should happen"), codices M and O [add] "quia" ("because").

en: Dist. 31, a. 1, q. 2 and following, and above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Matth. I, 18. seqq., et Luc. I, 27. seqq.

en: Matt. 1:18ff., and Luke 1:27ff.

la: Plurimi codd. et ed. debebat. Pro capitis codd. N aa carnis. — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.

en: Very many codices and the edition read "debebat" ("ought to have been"). For "capitis" ("of life," lit. "of head") codices N and aa read "carnis" ("of flesh"). — See the scholion on the 1st question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
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- [^1]: anchor placed at the opening "quaeritur" by convention (a general note pointing back to the preceding question's scholion); the exact superscript position within the intro clause was not independently confirmed at the crop resolution used.
- [^17]–[^18]: on p. 696, the reply-3 sentence carries two close-set markers ("beata Virgo" supplied by cod. U; "credens semper" with codd. LY's addition) whose relative order was inferred from apparatus-note content rather than a clean pixel-level read of both superscripts; flagged for a future 600 dpi decade-polish pass (Vol IV's first gate is d.10, already past — this falls under the general `[?]`-walk, not a blocking gate).
- [^19]–[^20]: similarly placed by content-matching (Caecilia citation; the "si sit" variant in reply 4) rather than a confirmed superscript sighting at this crop resolution.

No hand-off was received from `d28-a1-q5` (still a skeleton; its own `## Notes` had not yet been populated at time of writing — the q5/q6 raw-line boundary at 75148/75149 was independently verified to align cleanly with the page-695 top-of-column text, so no cross-chunk issue there).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 28, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 697 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Si quis promittat alicui et iuret* etc.; quaeritur, utrum iuramentum addat ad promissionem. Si enim nihil addit, ergo frustra apponitur; si addit, ergo firmior est promissio et maius vinculum. **Sed contra:** maius vinculum superveniens solvit minus, ut votum privatum solvitur per matrimonium consummatum[^1]: ergo si aliquis spondeat alicui cum simplici fide, et post alii cum iuramento; videtur, quod teneatur ad secundam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in his quae sunt eiusdem fori generis[^2], quamvis unum sit maius alio, tamen non solvit. Unde matrimonium consummatum non solvit ratum, eo quod utrumque est matrimonium et ligat in facie Ecclesiae; similiter nec sponsalia solvunt sponsalia, sed matrimonium sponsalia solvit; et ideo standum est primae fidei et obligationi. Nam secundum iuramentum nullum est, eo quod contra id est, quod fideliter adimplere tenetur; unde faciendum est secundum illud Isidori[^3]: «In malis promissis rescinde fidem»: ideo iurando peccavit, sed non peccavit adhaerendo primae.

### Dub. II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non autem sic est, quando iuramentum coniugii praesentis consensus attestatione firmatur.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia matrimonium ante copulam solvitur per votum solemne: ergo cum matrimonium consummatum tantae sit obligationis, ut votum; videtur, quod similiter solvere debeat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod non est simile, quia hic sunt obligationes eiusdem generis[^4]; praeterea, uterque vivit mundo; et iterum, in sequenti matrimonio fides promittitur et datur mulieri. In voto autem solemni est obligatio alterius generis; praeterea, moritur homo mundo, quod solvit tale vinculum[^5]; et iterum, fides et obsequium promittitur Deo, cui plus tenemur quam alii: et ideo non est simile. Status perfectionis assumitur; et ideo tale votum licitum est ac per hoc obligatorium; secundum autem matrimonium non est licitum, et ideo nec robur habet nec obligationem. Et sic patet, quod non est simile.

### Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod sine benedictione non fit coniugium quantum ad honestatem Sacramenti. Videtur enim falsum, quia in secundis nuptiis est Sacramentum honestum, et tamen non est benedictio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in secundis nuptiis, maxime quando mulier est vidua, non fit benedictio propter defectum Sacramenti, sicut infra[^6] patebit. Fit autem benedictio et celebratur Missa de Trinitate propter triplex bonum matrimonii, quod tribus personis appropriatur: bonum prolis Patri, bonum fidei Filio, bonum Sacramenti sive vinculi indivisibilis Spiritui sancto appropriatur.

---

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what it says: *If someone promises something to another and swears,* etc.; it is asked whether the oath adds anything to the promise. For if it adds nothing, then it is applied in vain; if it does add something, then the promise and the bond are firmer. **But on the contrary:** a greater bond arising afterward dissolves a lesser one, as a private vow is dissolved by a consummated marriage[^1]: therefore if someone should pledge himself to one person with simple faith, and afterward to another with an oath, it seems that he would be bound to the second.

**I respond:** It must be said that among things that are of the same kind of forum[^2], although one is greater than another, nevertheless it does not dissolve [the other]. Hence a consummated marriage does not dissolve a ratified one, because each is a marriage and binds in the face of the Church; likewise, betrothal-vows do not dissolve betrothal-vows, but marriage dissolves betrothal; and therefore one must stand by the first faith and obligation. For the second oath is null, because it is contrary to what one is bound faithfully to fulfill; hence it must be done according to that saying of Isidore[^3]: "In evil promises, rescind your faith": therefore he sinned in swearing, but did not sin in adhering to the first.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked concerning what it says: *But it is not so, when the oath of a present marriage is confirmed by the attestation of consent.* For it seems wrong to say this, because a marriage before consummation is dissolved by a solemn vow: therefore, since a consummated marriage is of as great an obligation as a vow, it seems that it likewise ought to dissolve [it].

**I respond:** It must be said that it is not alike, because here the obligations are of the same kind[^4]; moreover, each of the two [spouses] remains alive to the world; and again, in the subsequent marriage faith is promised and given to the woman. But in a solemn vow the obligation is of another kind; moreover, a man dies to the world, which dissolves such a bond[^5]; and again, faith and service are promised to God, to whom we are more bound than to others: and therefore it is not alike. A state of perfection is taken on; and therefore such a vow is licit and thereby binding; but the second marriage is not licit, and therefore has neither force nor obligation. And thus it is plain that it is not alike.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked concerning what it says, that without a blessing marriage does not come about as regards the honorableness of the Sacrament. This seems false, because in second marriages the Sacrament is honorable, and yet there is no blessing.

**I respond:** It must be said that in second marriages, especially when the woman is a widow, the blessing is not given, on account of a defect in the Sacrament, as will appear below[^6]. But a blessing is given and the Mass of the Trinity is celebrated, on account of the threefold good of marriage, which is appropriated to the three Persons: the good of offspring is appropriated to the Father, the good of faith to the Son, and the good of the Sacrament, or of the indivisible bond, to the Holy Spirit.

---

la: Cfr. infra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Codd. K L P Q Y (I a secunda manu) *fori et generis.*

en: Codices K, L, P, Q, Y (I by a second hand) read *fori et generis* ("of the forum and of kind").

la: Libr. II. Synonim. n. 58. Cfr. C. *In malis* (5.), C. 22. q. 4. Cod. aa secundum textum originalem addit *in turpi voto muta decretum.* — Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. ad 4.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Bk. II of the *Synonyms,* n. 58. Cf. chap. *In malis* (5), C. 22, q. 4. Codex aa, following the original text, adds *in turpi voto muta decretum* ("in a shameful vow, alter the decree"). — On this dubium see Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1, ad 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.

la: Cfr. dub. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding dubium.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. — Inferius voci *status* edd. cum paucis codd. praemittunt *quia,* cod. aa addit *enim.*

en: As was shown above, d. 27, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. — Further below, before the word *status* the editions, with a few codices, prefix *quia* ("because"); codex aa adds *enim* ("for").

la: Dist. 42. a. 3. q. 2. ad 4. — Mox pro *de Trinitate,* edd. *determinate* (nunc pro sponsis non Trinitate, sed Missa specialis), et pro *indivisibilis* codd. I K R *indissolubilis.* — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Dist. 42, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4. — Shortly after, for *de Trinitate* ("of the Trinity") the editions read *determinate* ("determinate"; now, for the couple, not the Mass of the Trinity, but a special Mass), and for *indivisibilis* ("indivisible") codices I, K, R read *indissolubilis* ("indissoluble"). — St. Thomas resolves the same doubt here, near the text. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance (2026-07-10):** Rebuilt from the auto-chunked skeleton per the per-chunk Tier-2 recipe, Vol IV / Vol-II-override (PDF-priority in cascade-shattered regions). The raw OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 75345–75422) is badly cascade-shattered for this whole page (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation splicing the two columns together); the Latin body and apparatus were re-set from 400 dpi column-band crops of `raw/doctorisseraphic04bona.pdf` p. 717 = printed p. 697 (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol4 --pages 697-699 --dpi 400` + `tools/colcrop.py vol4 697 1880`), cross-checked against the raw OCR only for confirming word forms in clean stretches. The default extraction for pp. 697–699 had been previously generated at a lower, inconsistent dpi (1653 px wide, incompatible with the split_x=1880 convention); those stale PNGs were deleted and regenerated at `--dpi 400` (3306 px wide) before cropping.

**This is the LAST chunk of Distinctio XXVIII.** The entire "Dubia circa litteram Magistri" section for d.28 — all three dubia (Dub. I–III) plus their full apparatus — fits on a single printed page, p. 697. Confirmed against the PDF that printed p. 698 opens directly with `DISTINCTIO XXIX.` / `Cap. unicum.` / *Quod non est consensus legitimus, ubi est coactio* — no dubia material bleeds onto p. 698. No forwarding hand-off is needed to a next chunk within d.28; Distinctio XXIX is a wholly separate distinction starting fresh on the next page.

**Column-flow reconstruction (the key to untangling this page):** p.697 opens with `d28-a1-q6`'s own closing paragraphs, which run left column top → right column top (both above the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` heading, which spans the full page width). After that heading, the two columns each carry independent dubia content, but they are **not** parallel/simultaneous — the correct order is the full left column top-to-bottom, then the full right column top-to-bottom:
- **Left column:** `Dub. I` heading → Dub. I's complete quaeritur + Sed contra + Respondeo (ending "...non peccavit adhaerendo primae") → `Dub. II` heading → Dub. II's opening fragment, cut off mid-sentence at "...quia matrimonium ante copulam solvitur" when the column reaches the footnote block (notes 1–5, i.e. p.697's own notes 1–5, of which notes 1–2 belong to q6 and notes 3–5 are captured here as [^1]–[^3]).
- **Right column:** picks up **exactly** where the left column's Dub. II fragment left off — "per votum solemne: ergo cum matrimonium consummatum..." — completing Dub. II's Sed-contra-style objection and Respondeo (with [^4]–[^5]), then `Dub. III` heading, Dub. III's full quaeritur + Respondeo (with [^6]), then the footnote block for notes 6–8 (captured here as [^4]–[^6]), then the signature mark "88" at the foot of the page.

This left-then-right (not row-by-row) reading order was verified against grammatical continuity: "matrimonium ante copulam solvitur" (end of left column) + "per votum solemne" (start of right column) forms one continuous sentence, which would not parse if the columns were read in parallel by vertical position.

**Apparatus hand-off from `d28-a1-q6` (per its own `## Notes`, confirmed here):** p.697's footer block has 8 numbered notes total. Notes 1–2 anchor to q6's own closing paragraphs (captured there as its [^22]–[^23]) and are **not** repeated here. Notes 3–8 anchor to this dubia section and are renumbered locally [^1]–[^6] in this file, in printed order.

**No further hand-off:** this chunk's own apparatus block (notes 3–8/[^1]–[^6]) is now fully captured; no notes remain unaccounted for on p.697.

**`[?]` flags:** none. All three dubia and all six apparatus entries were read directly off clean 400 dpi column-band crops with no ambiguous glyphs; footnote-anchor positions (superscript digits 1–8 in the printed text) were independently confirmed against the crops rather than inferred from raw OCR garble.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. The distinction's entire littera — cap. unicum, its single chapter — and its footer fall on a single printed page (698); the four notes are Quaracchi's own numbering, unaltered.

<!-- page 698 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXIX.

### Cap. unicum. *Quod non est consensus legitimus, ubi est coactio.*

Oportet autem, consensum coniugalem liberum esse a coactione. Coactus enim consensus, qui nec consensus appellari debet, coniugium non facit, sicut testatur Urbanus Papa[^1], scribens Sanctio, regi Arragonum, in haec verba: «De neptis tuae coniugio, quam te cuidam militi daturum, necessitatis instante articulo, sub fidei pollicitatione firmasti, hoc, aequitate dictante, decrevimus, ut, si illa virum illum omnino, ut dicitur, renuit et in eadem voluntatis auctoritate persistit, ut viro illi se prorsus deneget nupturam; nequaquam eam invitam ac renitentem eiusdem viri cogas coniugio copulari». Item[^2]: «Si verum esse constiterit quod nobis legati Iordanis principis retulerunt, scilicet quod ipse coactus et dolens filiam suam nolentem, flentem et pro viribus renitentem Rainaldo desponsaverit; quoniam legum et canonum auctoritas talia sponsalia non approbat; ne ignorantibus leges et canones nimis durum videatur, ita sententiam temperamus, ut, si princeps cum assensu filiae id quod coeptum est, perficere voluerit, concedamus. Sin autem legatus noster utrasque partes audiat, et si nihil fuerit ex parte Rainaldi, quod amplius impediat; ab ipso Iordane Sacramentum, quo constent haec quae dicta sunt, accipiat. Et nos canonum ac legum scripta sequentes, deinceps non prohibemus, quin alii viro, si voluerit, praedicta eius filia, tantum in Domino, nubat». Ex his apparet, «coniugium fieri inter consentientes et spontaneos, non inter renitentes et invitos; verumtamen qui inviti et coacti coniuncti sunt, si postea ab aliquo temporis spatio sine contradictione et querimonia cohabitaverint, facultate discedendi vel reclamandi habita, consentire videntur, et consensus ille consequens supplet quod praecedens coactio tulerat[^3]». Consentire autem probatur qui evidenter non contradicit, secundum illud: «In sponsalibus eorum consensus exigendus est, quorum in nuptiis desideratur. Intelligitur tamen semper patri filia consentire, nisi evidenter dissentiat[^4]». Item: «Sponsalia, sicut nuptiae, consensu fiunt contrahentium. Et ideo, sicut in nuptiis, ita et in sponsalibus filiam familias consentire oportet»; «quae, si patris voluntati non repugnat, consentire intelligitur».

---

english:
<!-- page 698 -->

### DISTINCTION XXIX.

### Chapter, the only one. *That there is no lawful consent where there is coercion.*

Now, conjugal consent ought to be free from coercion. For a coerced consent, which ought not even to be called consent, does not make a marriage, as Pope Urban attests[^1], writing to Sancho, king of Aragon, in these words: «Concerning the marriage of your niece, whom, at a moment of pressing necessity, you pledged under a promise of faith that you would give to a certain soldier — this, equity dictating, we have decreed: that if she altogether refuses that man, as is said, and persists in that same resolve of will, so that she utterly denies that she will marry that man, you should by no means force her, unwilling and resisting, to be joined to that same man in marriage». Likewise[^2]: «If it should be established as true what the envoys of Prince Jordan reported to us — namely, that he himself, under compulsion and grieving, betrothed his unwilling, weeping daughter, who resisted with all her strength, to Rainald; since the authority of the laws and the canons does not approve such betrothals; lest it should seem too harsh to those ignorant of the laws and canons, we so temper our judgment that, if the prince, with the consent of his daughter, should wish to carry through what has been begun, we grant it. But if not, let our legate hear both parties, and if nothing shall be found on Rainald's side to hinder it further, let him receive from Jordan himself a pledge, by which the things that have been said may be made secure. And we, following the writings of the canons and the laws, henceforth do not forbid that his aforesaid daughter, if she wishes, marry another man, only in the Lord». From these things it appears that «marriage comes about between those who consent and are willing, not between those who resist and are unwilling; nevertheless, those who have been joined while unwilling and coerced, if afterward, for some space of time, they have lived together without contradiction or complaint, having had the opportunity of departing or of protesting, are seen to consent, and that ensuing consent supplies what the preceding coercion had taken away[^3]». Now a person is proved to consent who does not evidently contradict, according to that saying: «In their betrothals, the consent of those is required whose consent is required in marriages. Yet a daughter is always understood to consent to her father, unless she evidently dissents[^4]». Likewise: «Betrothals, like marriages, come about by the consent of the contracting parties. And therefore, just as in marriages, so also in betrothals it is fitting that a daughter of the family consent»; «and she is understood to consent, if she does not resist her father's will».

---

la: Can. *De neptis tuae* (3.), C. 31. q. 2. — Pro *firmasti* pleraeque edd. *confirmasti,* et *voluntate* pro *voluntatis auctoritate,* refragantibus codd., ed. 4 et canone.

en: Canon *De neptis tuae* (3), C. 31 q. 2. — For *firmasti* [you pledged], most editions read *confirmasti* [you confirmed], and *voluntate* [by will] for *voluntatis auctoritate* [by the authority of will] — the manuscripts, edition 4, and the canon itself opposing this reading.

la: Can. *Si verum esse* (1.), ibid. — Codd. et edd., exceptis S. et Vat., omittunt *nolentem* ante *flentem,* refragante etiam canone.

en: Canon *Si verum esse* (1), ibid. — The manuscripts and editions, except S and the Vatican [edition], omit *nolentem* [unwilling] before *flentem* [weeping] — the canon itself likewise opposing this omission.

la: De his et praecedentibus cfr. Hug., Sum. Sent. tr. 7. c. 6.

en: On these and the preceding matters, cf. Hugh [of St. Victor], *Summa Sententiarum,* tr. 7, c. 6.

la: Digest. XXIII. de Sponsalibus C. 7. (tit. I.) lex. — Seq. locus ibid. lex 11; tertius ibid. lex 12. — In secundo loco ante *filiam familias,* codd. cum ed. I, aliae edd. *patris familias filiam.*

en: Digest XXIII, *De Sponsalibus,* C. 7 (tit. I), lex [the law cited]. — The following passage is ibid., lex 11; the third again ibid., lex 12. — In the second passage, before *filiam familias* [daughter of the family], the manuscripts together with edition I [read thus]; the other editions read *patris familias filiam* [the daughter of the father of the family].

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 75423–75457), cross-verified word-for-word against 450 dpi PDF column-band crops (`colcrop.py vol4 698 1880` → `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p698-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; printed p.698 = PDF p.718, offset +20). The raw OCR here is heavily letter-garbled (`coiisensus`→consensus, `aiilem`→autem, `renitentem`/`reniteutem`, `Diibinm`→Dubium, `principcps`/`principps`→princeps, `nupliis`→nuptiis, etc.) but preserves word order and footnote-marker positions correctly; the PDF crops were used as the authoritative visual read for every word, per the VOL IV override.

**Single-page distinction.** Distinctio XXIX has only one chapter (*Cap. unicum*) and is unusually short: the entire littera, both printed columns, and its 4-note footer all sit on **printed page 698** alone. The running head confirms this (`698 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.` at the top of the page, before the `DISTINCTIO XXIX.` title, which itself spans the full page width above the two-column body). No page break occurs inside the littera.

**Boundary/hand-off to `bon-sent-IV-d29-divisio`.** The littera's own text ends mid-page-698 at "...quae, si patris voluntati non repugnat, consentire intelligitur»." (raw line 75455). Immediately following (raw line 75458), still on the same printed page 698, the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX.` heading begins, followed by `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` and the start of the divisio's two-column body ("Supra egit Magister de consensu..."). **The entire page-698 footer (footnotes 1–4) belongs to this littera chunk**, not to the divisio — the divisio's own footer (the "Clarius codd. L Y..." note under `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM`) is a separate, later footer keyed to the divisio's own footnote marker (`arctationem¹`) and was already captured correctly in `bon-sent-IV-d29-divisio.md`. No footer content needs to move either direction at this seam.

**Marginalia trimmed.** Four printed side-glosses (source/topic tags in the page margin, not part of Lombard's running text) were removed from the body per convention: `Dubium 1.` (beside "Oportet autem, consensum..."), `Urbanus.` (beside the Pope Urban citation), `Dubium 2.` / `Canon.` (beside "quam eam invitam..." / the "Si verum esse" canon), and — in the right column — marginal source tags corresponding to footnotes 3 and 4 (`Hug.` for the Hugh of St. Victor cross-reference, `Dig.` for the Digest citation). The `Dubium 1` / `Dubium 2` tags mark the source passages taken up in `bon-sent-IV-d29-dubia.md`.

**[?] flags.** None. The 450 dpi PDF column-band crops are fully legible throughout; no genuinely ambiguous readings remain.


title: Dist. 29, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 698 -->

### Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX.
### *De consensu quoad defectum interiorem per coactionem.*

> *Oportet autem, consensum coniugalem liberum esse a coactione* etc.

### Divisio textus.

Supra egit Magister de consensu, qui deficit a parte exteriori. Hic agit de consensu, qui deficit defectu interiori, scilicet a ratione voluntarii; tamen iste et praecedens et interius et exterius deficit, sed hoc per arctationem[^1] dictum esse intelligendum est.

Consensus autem dupliciter deficit, aut a parte voluntatis per coactionem, aut a parte rationis per errorem. Ideo primo quaerit, utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium. Secundo, utrum erroneus, infra distinctione trigesima: *Nec solum coactio impedit vel excludit consensum* etc.

Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima veritatem determinat. In secunda explanat, ibi: *Ex his apparet, coniugia fieri* etc. In tertia vero illud quod determinavit circa matrimonium, applicat ad sponsalia, ibi: *Consentire autem probatur qui evidenter non contradicit.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium.

Secundo, utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium.

Tertio, utrum aliquis possit compelli per praeceptum patris ad matrimonium contrahendum.

<!-- page 699 -->

### Articulus unicus.
### *De consensu coacto.*

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXIX.
### *On consent as regards the interior defect, through coercion.*

> *It behooves, moreover, that conjugal consent be free from coercion,* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of consent that is lacking on the exterior side. Here he treats of consent that is lacking through an interior defect, namely from the standpoint of the voluntary; yet this defect, as well as the preceding one, fails both interiorly and exteriorly — but this is to be understood as said by way of restriction[^1].

Consent, moreover, fails in a twofold way: either on the part of the will, through coercion, or on the part of reason, through error. Therefore he first asks whether coerced consent makes a marriage. Second, whether erroneous [consent does] — below, in the thirtieth distinction: *"Not only does coercion impede or exclude consent,"* etc.

The first part has three parts. In the first he determines the truth. In the second he explains, at the point: *"From this it appears that marriages come about,"* etc. In the third, however, he applies what he had determined concerning marriage to betrothals, at the point: *"That one consents is proven who does not evidently gainsay it."*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction three things are asked.

First it is asked whether coerced consent makes a marriage.

Second, whether one who consents in the face of a resisting party thereby brings prejudice upon himself.

Third, whether anyone can be compelled, by a father's command, to contract marriage.

### The sole article.
### *On coerced consent.*

---

la: Notae ad Commentarium. Clarius codd. L Y (F a secunda manu) *per appropriationem*, codd. P Q *per arctationem sive appropriationem*.

en: Notes on the Commentary. More clearly, codd. L Y (F by a second hand read) "by appropriation," codd. P Q "by restriction or appropriation."

translators_notes:
**Provenance (2026-07-10):** Re-set Tier 2 from raw IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 75458–75512) cross-checked against 400 dpi column-band PDF crops of printed pp. 698–699 (pdf pp. 718–719, `colcrop.py vol4 {698,699} 1880`). The auto-chunked skeleton's `line_start`/`line_end` (75465–75507) omitted the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX.` heading + epigraph (raw lines 75458–75464), which fell in the gap between `d29-littera.md` (ending 75457) and the old divisio skeleton — folded into this chunk since it belongs to neither the Littera nor a1-q1.

**Page-split note (printed p. 698):** the page is two-column. This chunk's Latin is the **right column** of p. 698 (COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) plus the top of p. 699 (ARTICULUS UNICUS heading only, before QUAESTIO I). The **left column** of p. 698 is the tail of `d29-littera` (Urbanus Papa citation, Dubium 1–2) with its own four canon-law footnotes (`Can. De neptis tuae...`, `Can. Si verum esse...`, `De his et praecedentibus cfr. Hug...`, `Digest. XXIII. de Sponsalibus...`) — those belong to `d29-littera.md`'s apparatus, NOT this chunk; verify `d29-littera` picks them up when it is promoted (it is still an unpromoted skeleton as of this session, so flagging here as a forward hand-off). This chunk's own apparatus is only the single `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` note (restarts numbering at 1, as is standard where Quaracchi switches from Littera-apparatus to Commentary-notes on the same page).

**Chunking boundary confirmed:** `QUAESTIO I.` and its title (`Utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium`) begin at raw line 75513, matching `bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q1.md`'s existing `line_start: 75513` — no overlap, no gap.

**No `[?]` flags.** Both columns of pp. 698–699 read cleanly against the OCR; no ambiguous OCR garbles remained after the PDF cross-check.

**Hand-off to `d29-littera` (forward):** when `d29-littera.md` is promoted, its apparatus should include the four canon-law footnotes described above (raw lines ~75492–75502, left column of printed p. 698 / pdf p. 718), which this session did not capture in `d29-littera` itself since re-setting that chunk's body was out of scope here.


title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De consensu coacto.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod consensus coactus faciat matrimonium; et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Augustinus[^1] dicit, quod «coacta voluntas voluntas est»: ergo cum consensus sit voluntatis, consensus est; sed «posita causa, ponitur effectus»: ergo posito tali consensu, est matrimonium.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione per simile: quia qui baptizari consentit timore mortis, baptizatus est et pro baptizato habetur[^2]: ergo similiter est in matrimonio.

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem: quia consensus non potest cogi, sed tantum induci[^3], sed sicut inducitur minis, ita inducitur blanditiis; sed si aliquis inductus blanditiis consentiat in matrimonium, matrimonium tenet: ergo similiter, si inducitur minis.

4. Item, qui negat Christum timore mortis, peccat; sed nullus peccat nisi liber[^4]: ergo consentiens in aliquid timore mortis libere consentit. Sed consensus liber facit matrimonium: ergo qui consentit timore mortis etc.

**Contra:**

1. Decretalis, de Sponsalibus et matrimonio[^5]: «Cum locum non habeat consensus, ubi metus, vel coactio intercedit, necesse est, ut ubi consensus communis requiritur, coactionis materia repellatur»: ergo etc.

2. Item, consensus matrimonialis signum est coniunctionis animae et Dei[^6]; sed anima non coniungitur Deo consensu coacto: ergo si signum est congruum, matrimonium non contrahitur consensu timore coacto.

3. Item, nunquam anima fit sponsa Dei, nisi uniatur per amorem: ergo mulier[^7] nunquam fit sponsa viri, nisi uniatur per amorem; sed unio, quae est per consensum coactum, non fit per amorem: ergo etc.

4. Item, in consensu matrimonii acquiritur potestas[^8] in alterutrum: ergo necesse est, quod in consentiendo sint aequales; sed cum alter cogit alterum ad consentiendum, non sunt aequales: ergo tali consensu non contrahitur matrimonium.

> **Conclusio.** Consensus coactus vel vi, vel metu cadente in virum constantem non facit matrimonium, nisi post coactionem in carnalem copulam consentiatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod consensus coactus potest esse dupliciter, scilicet vi, vel metu. «Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest[^9]»; metus est instantis periculi trepidatio. Tunc autem fit vis, quando capitur, ducitur, trahitur invitus, vel ligatus, ipso reclamante et renitente; haec est coactio, in qua non est consensus, et in hac omnino non est matrimonium. — Est et alia coactio per metum, ut cum aliquis minatur mortem vel intentat, nisi consentiat; et de hac coactione distinguunt aliqui, quod talis consentiens aut consentit ore, sed non corde, et tunc non est matrimonium aliquo modo; aut corde consentit, quamvis coactus, et tunc matrimonium est in conspectu Dei, quia «voluntas coacta voluntas est»; sed non est in conspectu Ecclesiae, quae praesumit, quod talis non consenserit corde; et ideo sic iudicat et sententiat, ut uterque alteri in Domino nubat[^10]. — Sed certe istud non videtur consentire decretali praedictae, quae dicit, quod «consensus non habet locum, ubi metus, vel coactio intercedit».

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Et ideo distinguitur aliter, quod metus duplex est, quidam levis, quidam iustus: iustus, utpote «qui in virum constantem cadere potest[^11]»; levis est, cum quis parvum malum minatur, vel cum talis minatur, de quo praesumitur, quod implere non possit; et talis metus non facit consensum adeo defectivum, quod impediat matrimonium contrahendum, vel dirimat iam contractum, sed consensus cum tali metu facit matrimonium. Tunc autem est metus iustus, quando aliquis comminatur damnum mortis, mutilationis, servitutis et stupri[^12]; tunc autem cadit in virum constantem, quando praesumitur probabiliter, quod ille qui minatur, possit minas implere; non enim esset timendum, si simplex rusticus minaretur duci. In hoc metu dicunt iura consensum non facere matrimonium.

Sed ratio huius sumitur a diversis diversimode. Quidam enim dicunt, quod hoc est ex indulgentia iuris. Iura enim indulgent, tales separari, primum, quia praesumunt, consentientem ore non consensisse corde, et quia verbum solum dixit, ut poenam redimeret; vel etiam ratione finis, quia coacta matrimonia pessimos exitus consueverunt habere[^13]. — Alii dicunt, quod non ex iuris indulgentia, sed hoc facit defectus perfecti et liberi consensus, qui debet esse in matrimonio, quia, sicut ostensum est, plenus debet ibi esse consensus; et hoc videtur probabilius. Si tamen post coactionem in carnalem copulam consensit, ex tunc incipit esse matrimonium[^14].

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod coacta voluntas voluntas est; dicendum, quod verum est; sed nunquam sufficit talis voluntas ad faciendum bonum[^15], nec etiam ad contrahendum matrimonium, pro eo quod Dominus voluit, hoc Sacramentum contrahi per consensum liberum, non coactum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui coactus consentit in baptismum baptizatur; respondetur, quod baptismus est opus Dei, non hominum, sed matrimonium est a consensu hominum. — Aliter potest dici, quod non est simile: quia non tanta libertas ibi requiritur, quanta in matrimonio; totum enim esse matrimonii a consensu causatur[^16].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consensus inducitur per blanditias; dicendum, quod blanditiae non ita detrahunt de ratione consensus, sicut minae, quia blanditiae ad amorem excitant, sed minae ad terrorem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui negat Christum timore, dicendum, quod facilius est peccare quam bene facere[^17], unde plura exiguntur ad construendum bonum quam ad faciendum malum. — Praeterea, nullus timor respectu peccati perpetrandi potest nec debet cadere rationabiliter in virum constantem, sed respectu alicuius rei faciendae, quae non est nostrae saluti contraria; sicut vir constans rationabiliter prius deberet permittere, se interfici, quam Deum negaret[^18]; sed non rationabiliter ageret, si dimitteret, se interfici, antequam in aliquid indifferens consentiret; matrimonium autem non est de his quae sunt saluti contraria vel contra salutem. Et sic patet, quomodo intelligitur de metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum.

english:
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### Article Unique. *On coerced consent.*
### Question I. *Whether a coerced consent effects marriage.*

Concerning the first it is shown that a coerced consent effects marriage; and that it is so, it seems:

1. Because Augustine[^1] says that "a coerced will is [still] a will": therefore, since consent is of the will, it is a consent; but "a cause being posited, an effect is posited": therefore, such a consent being posited, marriage exists.

2. Likewise, this seems so by an argument from a like case: because one who consents to be baptized out of fear of death is baptized and is held as baptized[^2]: therefore it is likewise in marriage.

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because consent cannot be coerced, but only induced[^3]; but just as it is induced by threats, so it is induced by blandishments; but if someone induced by blandishments consents to marriage, the marriage holds: therefore likewise if he is induced by threats.

4. Likewise, one who denies Christ out of fear of death sins; but no one sins unless free[^4]: therefore one who consents to something out of fear of death consents freely. But a free consent effects marriage: therefore one who consents out of fear of death, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Decretal, On Betrothals and Marriage[^5]: "Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that, where a common consent is required, the matter of coercion be excluded": therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the matrimonial consent is a sign of the conjoining of the soul and God[^6]; but the soul is not conjoined to God by a coerced consent: therefore, if it is a fitting sign, marriage is not contracted by a consent coerced through fear.

3. Likewise, the soul never becomes the bride of God unless it is united through love: therefore the woman[^7] never becomes the bride of the man unless she is united through love; but a union which comes about through a coerced consent does not come about through love: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, in the consent of marriage a power[^8] is acquired over one another: therefore it is necessary that they be equal in consenting; but since one compels the other to consent, they are not equal: therefore marriage is not contracted by such a consent.

> **Conclusion.** A consent coerced either by force, or by fear falling upon a steadfast man, does not effect marriage, unless after the coercion consent is given to the carnal union.

**I respond:** It must be said that a coerced consent can be twofold, namely by force, or by fear. "Force is the onset of a greater thing, which cannot be repelled[^9]"; fear is the trepidation of an imminent danger. Now force occurs when one is seized, led, dragged unwilling, or bound, while he himself protests and resists; this is coercion in which there is no consent, and in this case there is absolutely no marriage. — There is also another coercion through fear, as when someone threatens or intends death unless [the other] consents; and concerning this coercion some distinguish, that one who thus consents either consents with the mouth but not with the heart, and then there is no marriage in any way; or he consents with the heart, although coerced, and then the marriage exists in the sight of God, because "a coerced will is [still] a will"; but it is not in the sight of the Church, which presumes that such a one has not consented with the heart; and therefore it so judges and pronounces, that each may marry the other in the Lord[^10]. — But surely this does not seem to agree with the aforesaid decretal, which says that "consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes."

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And therefore it is distinguished otherwise, that fear is twofold, one light, another just: just, as being one "which can fall upon a steadfast man[^11]"; it is light when someone threatens a small evil, or when such a one threatens of whom it is presumed that he cannot carry it out; and such fear does not make the consent so defective as to impede the contracting of marriage, or to dissolve one already contracted, but a consent given under such fear effects marriage. Now the fear is just when someone threatens the harm of death, mutilation, servitude, and violation[^12]; and it falls upon a steadfast man when it is probably presumed that he who threatens can carry out the threats; for it would not need to be feared, if a simple rustic were to threaten to be led away. In this fear the laws say that consent does not effect marriage.

But the reason for this is taken by different people in different ways. For some say that this is from an indulgence of the law. For the laws indulge that such persons be separated, first, because they presume that one who consents with the mouth has not consented with the heart, and because he said the word only that he might buy off the penalty; or also by reason of the end, because coerced marriages are wont to have the worst outcomes[^13]. — Others say that this comes not from an indulgence of the law, but from a defect of a perfect and free consent, which ought to be present in marriage, because, as has been shown, a full consent ought to be there; and this seems more probable. If, however, after the coercion he consents to the carnal union, from then it begins to be a marriage[^14].

*To the first.* To the first, then, which was objected, that a coerced will is [still] a will: it must be said that this is true; but such a will never suffices to do good[^15], nor even to contract marriage, since it is the Lord's will that this Sacrament be contracted through a free consent, not a coerced one.

*To the second.* To that which is objected, that one who is coerced and consents to baptism is baptized: it is answered that baptism is a work of God, not of men, but marriage is from the consent of men. — It can be said otherwise, that it is not similar: because as much freedom is not required there as in marriage; for the whole being of marriage is caused by consent[^16].

*To the third.* To that which is objected, that consent is induced through blandishments: it must be said that blandishments do not detract from the nature of consent as much as threats do, because blandishments incite to love, but threats to terror.

*To the fourth.* To that which is objected concerning one who denies Christ out of fear: it must be said that it is easier to sin than to do good[^17], whence more is required for the building up of good than for the doing of evil. — Moreover, no fear with respect to the perpetrating of a sin can or ought reasonably to fall upon a steadfast man, but only with respect to some deed which is not contrary to our salvation; just as a steadfast man ought reasonably first to allow himself to be killed, rather than deny God[^18]; but he would not act reasonably if he allowed himself to be killed before consenting to something indifferent; but marriage is not among the things which are contrary to salvation or against salvation. And thus it is clear how this is to be understood concerning the fear which can fall upon a steadfast man.

la: Augustinus, *De Spiritu et littera*, c. 31, n. 53. Verba vide tom. III. pag. 877, nota 2. — De seq. axiomate (*posita causa* etc.) cfr. supra pag. 102, nota 3. — Post primum *ergo* edd. legunt *a simili consensus coactus consensus est*.

en: Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter*, c. 31, n. 53. See the words in tom. III, p. 877, note 2. — On the following axiom ("a cause being posited," etc.) cf. above, p. 102, note 3. — After the first "therefore" the editions read: "by a like [reasoning], a coerced consent is [still] a consent."

la: Vide supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Plurimi codd. et ed. I addunt *sicut*.

en: Very many codices and edition I add "just as."

la: Plures codd. *libere*, codd. K R T (I a secunda manu) *libere consentiat*.

en: Several codices read "freely"; codices K, R, T (I in a second hand) read "freely consents."

la: Extra lib. IV. tit. I. c. 14. Pro *communis* codd. L aa cum textu originali *cuiusquam*, cod. A *purus*.

en: Extra, lib. IV, tit. 1, c. 14. For "common" codices L, aa, along with the original text, read "of anyone whatsoever"; codex A [reads] "pure."

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — In fine arg. ex cod. R posuimus *consensu timore* pro *timore*, cod. E tantum *consensu*.

en: As was shown above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1. — At the end of the argument, from codex R we have put "by a consent [given] out of fear" for "out of fear"; codex E [reads] only "consent."

la: Ex cod. U supplevimus *mulier*.

en: From codex U we have supplied "the woman."

la: Cod. L *aequa potestas*. Cfr. I. Cor. 7, 4.

en: Codex L [reads] "equal power." Cf. 1 Cor. 7:4.

la: Secundum Iustinian., D. IV. de Eo quod metus causa etc. (tit. 2.), lex 2. (Plurimi codd. et edd. *quae* pro *qui*). Seq. definitio metus insinuatur ibid. lege *Ait praetor* (I.) sic: *instantis vel futuri periculi causa mentis trepidatio*. (Post *instantis* Val. etiam addit *vel futuri*, et post *periculi* codd. L Y *mentis*). — Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. coactionem sive violentiam definit: *Videtur autem violentum id esse, cuius principium extrinsecus est, nihilque ad id confert ille qui cogitur*.

en: According to Justinian, Digest IV, *On him who acts from fear, etc.* (tit. 2), law 2. (Very many codices and editions read "which" for "who.") The following definition of fear is likewise suggested there, in the law "The praetor says" (1), thus: "trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger." (After "imminent" the Vatican edition also adds "or future," and after "danger" codices L, Y add "of mind.") — Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 1, defines coercion or violence thus: "That seems to be violent whose principle is extrinsic, and to which he who is compelled contributes nothing."

la: Respicitur I. Cor. 7, 39: *Cui vult nubat, tantum in Domino*.

en: Reference is to 1 Cor. 7:39: "Let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord."

la: Ut dicitur in C. *Veniens ad nos* (15.) et C. *Consultationi tuae* (28.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.). Cfr. Iustinian., D. IV. de Eo quod metus causa etc. (tit. 2.), lex *Metum autem* non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in homine constantissimo cadat (6.). Vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6. seqq.

en: As is said in c. *Veniens ad nos* (15) and c. *Consultationi tuae* (28), X, *De sponsalibus et matrimoniis* (lib. IV, tit. 1). Cf. Justinian, Digest IV, *On him who acts from fear, etc.* (tit. 2), the law "But fear [is] not that of a vain man, but such as may justly fall even upon a most steadfast man" (6). See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 6ff.

la: Cfr. Glossa in C. *Cum dilectus filius* (6.), X. de his quae vi metuve etc. (lib. I. tit. 40.), in qua tam ex iure canonico quam civili afferuntur casus, in quibus metus sit iustus sive excuset.

en: Cf. the Gloss on c. *Cum dilectus filius* (6), X, *De his quae vi metuve etc.* (lib. I, tit. 40), in which cases are adduced, both from canon and from civil law, in which fear is just, or excuses.

la: Sive, ut habetur in *Comment. in I. Cor.* 7, 39. (olim Ambrosio tributo): *Quia invitae nuptiae solent malos proventus habere* (Cfr. Gratian. C. 31. q. 2. introduct. Vide C. *Praeterea* (12.), C. *Cum locum* (14.) et C. *Nequisivit* (17.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).

en: Or, as it is found in the *Commentary on 1 Cor.* 7:39 (formerly attributed to Ambrose): "Because unwilling marriages are wont to have bad outcomes" (cf. Gratian, C. 31, q. 2, introd. See c. *Praeterea* (12), c. *Cum locum* (14), and c. *Nequisivit* (17), X, *De sponsalibus et matrimoniis*, lib. IV, tit. 1).

la: Cfr. C. *Ad id quod* (21.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim.

en: Cf. c. *Ad id quod* (21), X, *De sponsalibus et matrimoniis*.

la: August., *II. contra Litteras Petiliani*, c. 83. n. 184: «Nam bene facere nemo potest, nisi elegerit, nisi amaverit quod est in libera voluntate». Haec verba habentur apud Gratian., C. *Ad fidem* (33.), C. 23. q. 5, ubi Glossa dicit: *Potest enim aliquis male facere propter voluntatem coactam, ut [habetur] C. 15. q. 1. C. Merito* (1), *sed non potest bene facere propter voluntatem coactam*, ut hic dicitur.

en: Augustine, *Against the Letters of Petilian* II, c. 83, n. 184: "For no one can do good unless he has chosen it, unless he has loved what lies in free will." These words are found in Gratian, c. *Ad fidem* (33), C. 23, q. 5, where the Gloss says: "For a man can indeed do evil on account of a coerced will, as [is found] C. 15, q. 1, c. *Merito* (1), but he cannot do good on account of a coerced will," as is said here.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2; ibid. q. 3. ad 1. tangitur prima solutio.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; ibid., q. 3, ad 1, where the first solution is touched upon.

la: Cod. aa addit verba Aristot., supra pag. 19, nota 7. allegata, *quia facilius destruere quam construere*. Pro *unde* cod. A *cum*.

en: Codex aa adds the words of Aristotle cited above, p. 19, note 7: "because it is easier to destroy than to build." For "whence" codex A reads "with."

la: Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1: *Quaedam autem fortasse sunt, ad quae perpetranda nemo cogi compellive potest, sed potius extrema quaeque pati ac mori convenit*. Cfr. ibid. c. 6. seqq. — Post *contraria* cod. K (I a secunda manu) supplet *bene potest in eum cadere*, substituto dein *unde vir* pro *sicut vir*; Val. substituit: *Nam talis timor est tantum respectu* pro *sed respectu*.

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 1: "But there are perhaps some things to the perpetration of which no one can be compelled or coerced, but rather it is fitting to suffer the extremity of all things, even death." Cf. ibid., c. 6ff. — After "contraria," codex K (I in a second hand) supplies "it can indeed fall upon him," substituting thereafter "whence a man" for "just as a man"; the Vatican edition substitutes "for such fear is only with respect to" for "but with respect to."

latin_scholion:
**I.** Distinctio duplicis consensus coacti est communis. De relatione utriusque ad voluntarium plura vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 5; d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. — In controversia illa antiqua, utrum consensus coactus per metum cadentem in constantem virum tantum iure ecclesiastico, an etiam iure divino irritum faciat matrimonium, pro prima parte stat Durandus cum non paucis posterioribus; sed quod iure divino irritet, cum S. Thoma, Scoto, Petro a Tar., Richardo a Med. aliisque tenet S. Bonav. ut magis probabile. Cfr. etiam infra dub. 2. 3. — De 1. quaestione: Scot. (de hac et 2. seqq. qq.), in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. 2. 3.; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Quaestionem 2. ita exprimit S. Thom. (locis citt. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. a. 4.): utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium ex parte cogentis. De eadem explicite agit etiam Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.

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**III.** Circa solutionem 3. quaestionis omnes conveniunt. Quod autem in solut. ad 3. determinatur de potestate Summi Pontificis, quod possit praecipere acceptationem episcopatus, hoc approbat S. Thomas (locis citt. a. 4. ad 4; a. 6. ad 4.), sed ibi non facit mentionem de illa restrictione, quam ponit Bonav., scilicet de eo qui insufficientiam suam scit et periculum animae suae rationabiliter timet. — De ipsa quaestione praeter S. Thom.: Scot., loc. cit. n. 12. — [?] Albert., supra d. 28. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4.

english_scholion:
**I.** The distinction of a twofold coerced consent is common [to the doctors]. On the relation of each to the voluntary, see more in II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 5; d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — In that ancient controversy, whether a consent coerced by a fear falling upon a steadfast man renders marriage void by ecclesiastical law only, or also by divine law, Durandus stands for the first part along with not a few later writers; but that it is voided by divine law is held — along with St. Thomas, Scotus, Peter of Tarantaise, Richard of Middleton, and others — by St. Bonaventure, as more probable. Cf. also below, dub. 2, 3. — On question 1: Scotus (on this and the two following questions), in both Scripta, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, 2, 3; Suppl., q. 47, a. 1, 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1–4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. unica.

**II.** St. Thomas expresses question 2 thus (in the places cited, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2; Suppl., a. 4): whether a coerced consent effects marriage on the part of the one who coerces. Richard of Middleton also treats the same question explicitly, here a. 1, q. 3.

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**III.** Concerning the solution to question 3, all agree. But what is determined in the solution to [question] 3 concerning the power of the Supreme Pontiff, that he can command the acceptance of a bishopric — this St. Thomas approves (in the places cited, a. 4, ad 4; a. 6, ad 4), but there he makes no mention of that restriction which Bonaventure lays down, namely concerning one who knows his own insufficiency and reasonably fears the peril of his soul. — On the question itself, besides St. Thomas: Scotus, loc. cit., n. 12. — [?] Albert, above, d. 28, a. 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 75513–75730), cross-checked against 400 dpi PDF column-band crops (`tools/colcrop.py vol4 {699,700,701} 1880`) for the Respondeo, Solutio, and Scholion per the Vol II/IV PDF-priority override — the OCR was already close to verbatim-correct for this chunk's clean prose (videtur/contra arguments), so the PDF pass mainly confirmed footnote-marker positions and the Scholion's roman-numeral note boundaries rather than surfacing cascade damage.

**Page span:** printed pp. 699–701 (pdf = printed + 20 → pdf pp. 719–721). Only the top of p. 701 belongs to this chunk — Scholion Note III ends with "Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4."; `QUAESTIO II.` begins immediately below on the same printed page (confirmed against both raw OCR line 75731 and the PDF crop `vol4-p701-L-0.png`). No footnotes anchor on the p. 701 portion of this chunk — the cross-chunk footer split is trivial (nothing to hand off to q2 from p. 701's footer, since q1's share of that page carries no apparatus).

**Apparatus:** 18 entries total, renumbered continuously from Quaracchi's per-page series (p. 699 nn. 1–10 → chunk [^1]–[^10]; p. 700 nn. 1–8 → chunk [^11]–[^18]).

**Scholion structure:** Three roman-numeral notes (I, II, III), each followed by its own "De ... quaestione" bibliography paragraph rather than a single trailing bibliography block — this matches the printed layout exactly (confirmed via PDF column bands) and differs from a simple "notes then one bibliography" pattern; preserved as printed.

**[?] flag:** Scholion III bibliography, "— [?] Albert., supra d. 28. a. 4." — the raw OCR and the 400 dpi PDF both show a stray "13." (or similar digit fragment) immediately before "Albert." where the printed pattern (an em-dash introducing each successive citation, as with "— Petr. a Tar." and "— Richard. a Med." in the same list) suggests it should simply read "— Albert." The "13." does not fit the citation's own structure (Albert's citation is "supra d. 28. a. 4.", not a section/question number) and most likely bleeds in from an adjacent running annotation or a mis-OCR'd page-number fragment. Rendered as `[?] Albert.` pending a fresh eyes-on pass at the d.21–d.30 decade polish-blocker (600 dpi flag-resolution gate).

**Hand-offs:** None inherited from `d29-divisio.md` (its `## Notes` section is still skeleton — no hand-off addressed to this chunk). None forwarded to `d29-a1-q2` — the printed page 701 content captured here is exhaustive of Q1's share of that page, and q2 begins cleanly at its own `QUAESTIO II.` heading with no shared footer notes to migrate.