title: Dist. 36, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati
Whether sin is the penalty of sin

source_text:
<!-- page 842 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

### *Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.*

*Sciendum est tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra determinavit Magister, quid sit peccatum secundum rem et definitionem. In hac parte inquirit, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In quarum prima Magister movet quaestionem illam et determinat secundum opinionem aliorum. In secunda vero secundum opinionem propriam, ibi: *In nullo tamen praeiudicium fieri veritati* etc.

Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima adducit Magister auctoritates, in quibus ostendit, quod unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena. In secunda vero movet quaestionem[^1] et determinat iuxta aliorum opinionem, ibi: *Et ideo merito quaeri potest.* In tertia vero subiungit illius opinionis maiorem explanationem, ibi: *Et licet ex hoc sensu omne peccatum mortale possit dici* etc.

Similiter secunda pars principalis, in qua istam quaestionem determinat secundum propriam opinionem, dividitur in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat propositam quaestionem secundum propriam opinionem, confirmans eam auctoritate Sanctorum. In secunda vero determinat quoddam dubium, in praedictis auctoritatibus propositum, ibi: *Illud autem diligenter est notandum, quod supra positis* etc. In tertia vero breviter epilogat ea quae praedicta sunt, ibi: *Satis diligenter eorum posuimus* etc. — Et sic in hac totali parte agitur principaliter de comparatione culpae ad poenam, utrum videlicet culpa sit poena causaliter tantum, an causaliter simul et essentialiter. Et quamvis secundum aliquorum opinionem peccatum sit poena tantum causaliter, secundum tamen opinionem Magistri, quam in littera innuit, non tantum *causaliter*, sed etiam *essentialiter* poena est.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam igitur huius partis circa tria incidit hic quaestio.

Primo quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem.

Secundo vero quaeritur de comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem.

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI.

### *Whether sin is the penalty of sin.*

*It must nevertheless be known that certain things are sins in this way* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master determined what sin is according to the thing itself and according to its definition. In this part he inquires whether sin is the penalty of sin. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these the Master raises that question and determines it according to the opinion of others. In the second according to his own opinion, there: *Yet without prejudice being done in any way to the truth* etc.

The first part has three parts. In the first the Master brings forward authorities in which he shows that one sin is the penalty of another sin. In the second he raises the question[^1] and determines it according to the opinion of others, there: *And therefore it can rightly be asked.* In the third he subjoins a fuller explanation of that opinion, there: *And although from this sense every mortal sin can be called* etc.

Likewise the second principal part, in which he determines this question according to his own opinion, is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines the proposed question according to his own opinion, confirming it by the authority of the Saints. In the second he determines a certain doubt, raised in the aforesaid authorities, there: *But this must be diligently noted, that with respect to the things set forth above* etc. In the third he briefly epilogizes the things that have been said, there: *We have set forth their views diligently enough* etc. — And thus in this whole part the principal matter treated is the comparison of fault to penalty, namely whether fault is a penalty causally only, or causally and at the same time essentially. And although according to the opinion of some sin is a penalty causally only, nevertheless according to the opinion of the Master, which he intimates in the text, it is a penalty not only *causally*, but also *essentially*.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, a question falls here concerning three matters.

First it is asked concerning the comparison of fault to penalty according to identity.

Secondly it is asked concerning the comparison of fault to penalty according to inseparability.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the comparison of penalty to the equity of divine justice.

Concerning the first, two things are asked.

First it is asked whether one sin is the penalty of another sin.

Secondly it is asked whether the passions of the soul are penalties only, or penalties and at the same time sins.

---

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et nonnulli codd. addunt: *utrum peccatum secundum idem sit culpa et poena, an secundum diversa.*

en: The Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4 and several codices, adds: *utrum peccatum secundum idem sit culpa et poena, an secundum diversa* ("whether sin in respect of the same thing is fault and penalty, or in respect of diverse things"). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 58643–58686) cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed p.842 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p842-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Single printed page (842 = pdf 864, offset +22). The COMMENTARIUS begins on the lower band of p.842 L-col, directly below the d36-littera Epilogus; the DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO reflow L-col bottom → full R-col. Running head of p.843 already reads `DIST. XXXVI. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` (into a1-q1).
- **Content captured:** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI opener + lemma title (*Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati* / *Sciendum est tamen…*), full DIVISIO TEXTUS (both columns reflowed L→R), full TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (three-comparison listing + art. I's "circa primum quaeruntur duo" two-question sub-listing).
- **DEFINITIVE d.36 STRUCTURE (3 articles, 2 quaestiones each = 6 total), verified from TRACTATIO + each ARTICULUS opener at 450 dpi:**
  - **ARTICULUS I** — *De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem* (raw 58687):
    - Q1 (raw 58691) — *Utrum unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena*
    - Q2 (raw 58856) — *Utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata*
  - **ARTICULUS II** — *De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem* (raw 59017):
    - Q1 (raw 59026) — *Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente*
    - Q2 (raw 59454?) — *Utrum contingat in aliquo reperire poenam sine merito praecedentis culpae* (opener lists 2 qq; Q2 header location to confirm at promotion)
  - **ARTICULUS III** — *De comparatione poenae ad divinae iustitiae aequitatem* (raw 59326):
    - Q1 (raw 59335) — *Utrum aliqua poena sit a Deo*
    - Q2 (raw 59454) — *Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo*
- **Page-split / boundary:** Chunk ends immediately before `ARTICULUS I.` / `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 58687/58691); those headers and the body beginning *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati* belong to d36-a1-q1 (on p.843).
- **Apparatus page-split map (p.842 footers):** p.842 has TWO footer note-groups. The **text/littera footnotes 1–3** (`1 Cap. 18. n. 51; de Dono perseverant. c. 11. n. 27; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5` / `2 Vat. et edd. 1, 8 cum cod. C addunt bonas. — De hac re actum est supra d. XXXV. c. 3` / `3 Codd. omnes operis`) anchor in the d36-littera body (Magister's text, Cap. VI + Epilogus) — claimed by d36-littera per hand-off-in. The separate **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM note 1** (`Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et nonnulli codd. addunt: utrum peccatum…`) anchors at *movet quaestionem¹* in this DIVISIO TEXTUS and is THIS chunk's only apparatus entry.
- **Hand-off forwarded to d36-a1-q1:** NONE. p.842 commentary footers are fully consumed by this divisio (1 entry). a1-q1's footers begin on p.843.
- **OCR corrections:** `IN DISTmCTIONEM`→*IN DISTINCTIONEM*, `deterininavit`→*determinavit*, `defmitionem`→*definitionem*, `peccatura`→*peccatum*, `partes ditas`→*partes duas*, `priraa`→*prima*, `alioruin`→*aliorum*, `propriara`→*propriam*, `praeiurdicium`→*praeiudicium*, `addurcit`→*adducit*, `raovet quaestionera`→*movet quaestionem*, `determiuat`→*determinat*, `principaiis`→*principalis*, `qtiaestionem`→*quaestionem*, `sccunduin`→*secundum*, `opinionera`/`opinio-nera`→*opinionem*, `conflrinans`→*confirmans*, `deterininat quoddara dubiura`→*determinat quoddam dubium*, `proposil.um`→*propositum*, `coraparationeculp:iead`→*comparatione culpae ad*, `utrnm`→*utrum*, `causaliler`→*causaliter*, `aliquoruni`→*aliquorum*, `cunduin tanien`→*cundum tamen*, `iiinuit`→*innuit*, `essenlialiter`→*essentialiter*, `igitur huius`/`circa tria incidit hlc`→*hic*, `Prirao`→*Primo*, `coraparatione`→*comparatione*, `secundura inseparabililatem`→*secundum inseparabilitatem*, `coinparatione`→*comparatione*, `di-`/`vinae`→*divinae*, `qnaeritnr`→*quaeritur*, `peccatnm`→*peccatum*. Footnote marker `'` confirmed as commentary superscript ¹ against the 450 dpi PDF (R-2 band NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM).
- No scholion (divisio chunk). No `[?]` flags.
</content>
</invoke>


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum unum peccatum sit alterius peccati poena

title_alt: Whether one sin is the punishment of another sin

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 843 -->

### ARTICULUS I.
### *De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum identitatem.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum peccatum sit poena peccati.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit poena peccati. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Apocalypsis ultimo[^1]: *Qui in sordibus est, sordescat adhuc*; Glossa: « iustum est ». Sed esse in sordibus non est aliud quam esse in peccatis, et sordescere non est aliud quam peccare: ergo peccatum est meritum alterius peccati: igitur *a relativis*, peccatum sequens est retributio praecedentis; sed retributio peccati non est nisi poena: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius expressius dicit, et habetur in littera[^2]: « Inter primum peccatum apostasiae et ultimam poenam ignis aeterni media quae sunt, et peccata sunt et poena peccati ».

3. Item, Isidorus[^3]: « Deus occultam superbiam clericorum vindicat per manifestam luxuriam »; sed vindicta peccati est poena: ergo manifesta luxuria est poena superbiae.

4. Item, ex hoc, quod homo peccat, meretur a Deo relinqui; sed ex hoc, quod relinquitur, cadit consequenter in aliud peccatum: ergo si hoc iustum est, qui unum peccatum commisit meretur per consequens dimitti cadere in aliud: ergo si dimissus cadit in aliud peccatum, illud quod secundo perpetratur, ordinem habet ad primum sicut ad meritum. Sed omne tale est poena peccati[^4]: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne illud est peccati poena, in quo homo damnificatur et laeditur, et in quod per illud peccatum inducitur; sed superbus hoc ipso, quod vult alium excellere, necessario cadit in invidiam, quando videt, alium superare. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione[^5]: « Necesse habet alii invidere qui non vult ab alio superari ». Ergo videtur, quod invidia sit poena superbiae; et invidia absque dubio est peccatum: ergo peccatum est poena peccati.

**Sed contra:**

1. Omnis poena peccati est laudabilis; nulla culpa est laudabilis: ergo nulla culpa est poena peccati. Maior probatur, quia omne quod iustum est, laudabile est; sed « omnis poena peccati iusta est », sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^6]. Minor vero per se patet.

2. Item, omnis poena est ordinativa culpae, et per hoc faciens ad universi decorem[^7]; sed culpa subsequens non ordinat culpam praecedentem nec decorat, immo magis deturpat: ergo culpa non est peccati poena.

3. Item, si culpa subsequens est poena praecedentis: ergo *a relativis*, culpa praecedens est meritum sequentis: pari ratione, illa culpa, quae est subsequens, est meritum alterius, et sic deinceps. Si ergo nullum peccatum debet remanere impunitum[^8], videtur, quod homo debeat peccare in aeternum. Si ergo hoc est inconveniens et indignum, patet, quod peccatum non est peccati meritum: ergo nec unum peccatum est alterius punitivum.

4. Item, si sequens peccatum punit praecedens: ergo cum Deus *non puniat bis in id ipsum*[^9], culpa sequenti perpetrata, culpa praecedens non debet puniri; aut si punitur, non debet tantum puniri. Quodsi hoc esset verum, reportaret quis commodum de malitia; quodsi hoc est inconveniens, patet etc.

5. Item, si peccatum est poena peccati, et Deus non punit supra condignum, nunquam peccatum sequens esset maius peccatum praecedenti. Quodsi hoc de plano est falsum, quia de minori peccato devenitur ad maius, planum est, quod peccatum non est poena peccati.

### Conclusio.

> Peccatum sequens non tantum causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter est poena praecedentis peccati.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut auctoritates Sanctorum expresse dicunt, tenendum est, quod peccatum est poena peccati.

<!-- page 844 -->

Sed attendendum est, quod circa hoc est duplex modus intelligendi, secundum quod Magister in littera[^10] innuit. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod peccatum est poena peccati; non tamen essentialiter, sive secundum id quod est, sed ratione eius quod concomitatur, vel ratione eius quod consequitur; sicut patet, quod peccatum manifestum, ex quo consurgit infamia, dicitur esse vindicta peccati occulti, non ratione ipsius transgressionis, sed ratione infamiae consequentis; vel peccatum, in quo est manifesta ignominia, est poena peccati superbiae, sicut peccatum contra naturam et alia huiusmodi, quae vocat Apostolus[^11] *passiones ignominiae*, poena est ratione ignominiae, non ratione culpae. Et breviter quodlibet peccatum potest dici poena peccati praecedentis ratione *laesionis*, quam infert; et sic idem dicitur *peccatum* et *poena* peccati, ita tamen, quod peccatum dicitur *essentialiter*, et poena peccati *causaliter*.

Sed quoniam secundum istum modum non tantum unum peccatum posset dici poena *alterius*, sed etiam unum peccatum posset dici poena *sui*, causaliter loquendo, quia peccans se ipsum laedit; et iterum, sicut ostensum fuit in praecedentibus[^12], non tantum *actio inordinata* est culpa, verum etiam ipsa *deformitas*, quae *remanet* in anima, et ipsa animae deformatio non modica est ei poena; et rursus, sicut rationes primae ostendunt, quaedam ordinatio meriti et retributionis est inter culpam praecedentem et sequentem, etiam quantum ad id quod *culpae* sunt: ideo est alia opinio, cui magis videtur consentire Magister, quod peccatum sequens non tantum *causaliter*, sed etiam *essentialiter*, ut sic loquamur, est poena peccati praecedentis. Et hoc dicendo, sicut Magister[^13] dicit, in nullo fit praeiudicium veritati, immo hoc est satis planum. Nam *poena* duo dicit: et dicit *malum* sive *damnum*, et dicit *ordinem* ad praecedens meritum; et haec duo contingit reperire circa sequens peccatum. *Damnificatio* enim et nocumentum est in ipso, secundum quod *peccatum*; eo enim est peccatum, quo nocet[^14]; et magnum malum incurrit quis, cum incidit in peccatum, etiam si nihil aliud deberet habere posterius. *Ordinationem* vero habet in eo, quod *sequens*; hoc ipso enim, quod homo est in peccato, dignus est dimitti cadere in aliud, iuxta illud Apocalypsis ultimo[^15], sicut dicitur in Glossa: « Iustum est », ut *qui in sordibus est sordescat adhuc*. — Concedendum est igitur simpliciter, quod peccatum potest esse poena peccati, ut expresse dicunt auctoritates Sanctorum.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod omnis poena est laudabilis; dicendum, quod illa propositio dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod laus attribuatur poenae, secundum *id quod est*; aut in *quantum poena*. Si attribuatur poenae secundum *id quod est*, sic est falsa; multae enim sunt poenae, quae sunt passiones ignominiae et non sunt laudabiles, sed vituperabiles. Si autem attribuatur poenae sub ratione poenae, hoc est, in quantum est praecedentis peccati punitiva; sic omnis poena est laudabilis, propter hoc quod est ordinata. Et per eundem modum intelligenda est haec propositio: omnis poena est iusta. Cum ergo infertur, quod peccatum sit iustum vel quod sit laudabile, est ibi sophisma *secundum accidens*[^16], quia proceditur a laudabilitate *ordinis* ad laudem *rei ordinabilis*. Hoc autem non sequitur, quia frequenter laus *ordinis* extranea est *ordinabili*, maxime cum illud quod est vituperabile, ordinatur convenienter et laudabiliter.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena est ordinativa culpae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod eo modo ordinat, quo modo punit; et illa quae *simpliciter* est poena et simpliciter punit, est *simpliciter* ordinativa; et illa, quae *sufficienter* punit, *sufficienter* ordinat. Quae vero est poena *secundum quid* et non punit sufficienter, ordinat solum *secundum quid*. Et verum est illud, quod sicut quidam ordo laudabilis est — licet magis manifestus — poenae infernalis ad culpam; ita quidam ordo est laudabilis — licet minus manifestus — peccati subsequentis ad peccatum praecedens; et in hoc ordine laudatur divina iustitia, quae committentem unum peccatum iusto iudicio permisit labi in aliud.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod culpa praecedens non[^17] est meritum sequentis; dicendum, quod est meritum congrui, et est meritum condigni. Et cum dicitur culpa praecedens esse meritum sequentis, hoc non est quantum ad meritum condigni, sed congrui, quae quidem congruitas in alia congruitate de facili potest recompensari. Sicut enim est congruum, quod Deus peccatorem permittat labi in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut, quia male usus est vita, eam sibi auferat et in infernum demergat. Sicut etiam congruum est, ut dimittat eum cadere in aliud peccatum, sic etiam congruum est, ut si velit abstinere, det ei auxilium, ut in aliam culpam non corruat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non punit bis in id ipsum; dicendum, quod peccatum sequens non erat poena, in qua fieret retributio *de condigno*, sed solum *de congruo*. Et sicut[^18] retri-

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butio eius quod meretur quis quantum ad meritum *congrui*, non praeiudicat ei quod meretur quantum ad meritum *condigni* — dat enim Deus iustis bona in praesenti, non propter hoc dat minora in futuro — sic intelligendum est se habere in proposito.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deus non punit supra condignum etc.; iam patet responsio. Hoc enim intelligitur de poena, quae a Deo infligitur *proprie*, et de ea, quae circa peccatum praecedens respicit meritum *condigni*; utrumque autem horum deficit in proposito. Nam culpa sequens, secundum *id quod est*, non est a Deo; culpa etiam sequens non ordinatur ad praecedens peccatum secundum rationem *condigni*, sed secundum rationem *congrui*. Congruit enim hoc ordini divinae iustitiae, sicut ostensum est.

english:
### ARTICLE I.
### *On the comparison of guilt to punishment with respect to identity.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether sin is the punishment of sin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin is the punishment of sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. The Apocalypse, last [chapter][^1]: *Let him who is in filth be filthy still*; the Gloss: « it is just ». But to be in filth is nothing other than to be in sins, and to grow filthy is nothing other than to sin: therefore sin is the merit of another sin: therefore, *from relatives*, the following sin is the retribution of the preceding; but the retribution of sin is nothing other than punishment: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory says it more expressly, and it is had in the text[^2]: « Between the first sin of apostasy and the last punishment of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both sins and the punishment of sin ».

3. Likewise, Isidore[^3]: « God avenges the hidden pride of clerics through manifest lust »; but the avenging of sin is punishment: therefore manifest lust is the punishment of pride.

4. Likewise, from the fact that the human sins, he merits to be abandoned by God; but from the fact that he is abandoned, he consequently falls into another sin: therefore if this is just, he who has committed one sin consequently merits to be allowed to fall into another: therefore if, abandoned, he falls into another sin, that which is perpetrated in the second place has an ordering to the first as to a merit. But every such thing is the punishment of sin[^4]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, everything is the punishment of sin in which the human is damaged and harmed, and into which he is led through that sin; but the proud man, by the very fact that he wishes to excel another, necessarily falls into envy, when he sees another surpass [him]. For as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*[^5]: « He who does not wish to be surpassed by another necessarily envies another ». Therefore it seems that envy is the punishment of pride; and envy is without doubt a sin: therefore sin is the punishment of sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every punishment of sin is praiseworthy; no guilt is praiseworthy: therefore no guilt is the punishment of sin. The major is proved, because everything that is just is praiseworthy; but « every punishment of sin is just », as Augustine says, and it is had in the text[^6]. The minor is plain of itself.

2. Likewise, every punishment is ordinative of guilt, and through this contributes to the beauty of the universe[^7]; but the subsequent guilt does not order the preceding guilt nor adorn [it], but rather more disfigures [it]: therefore guilt is not the punishment of sin.

3. Likewise, if the subsequent guilt is the punishment of the preceding: therefore, *from relatives*, the preceding guilt is the merit of the following: by parity of reasoning, that guilt which is subsequent is the merit of another, and so on. If therefore no sin ought to remain unpunished[^8], it seems that the human ought to sin forever. If therefore this is unfitting and unworthy, it is plain that sin is not the merit of sin: therefore neither is one sin punitive of another.

4. Likewise, if the following sin punishes the preceding: therefore since God *does not punish twice in the self-same thing*[^9], once the following guilt has been perpetrated, the preceding guilt ought not to be punished; or if it is punished, it ought not to be punished as much. But if this were true, one would derive an advantage from malice; but if this is unfitting, the point is plain etc.

5. Likewise, if sin is the punishment of sin, and God does not punish beyond the condign, the following sin would never be a greater sin than the preceding. But if this is plainly false, because one passes from a lesser sin to a greater, it is plain that sin is not the punishment of sin.

### Conclusion.

> The following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only causally, but also essentially.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say, it must be held that sin is the punishment of sin.

<!-- page 844 -->

But it is to be attended to that concerning this there is a twofold mode of understanding, according to what the Master intimates in the text[^10]. For some have wished to say that sin is the punishment of sin; yet not essentially, that is, according to that which it is, but by reason of that which accompanies [it], or by reason of that which follows [it]; just as it is clear that a manifest sin, from which there arises infamy, is said to be the avenging of a hidden sin, not by reason of the transgression itself, but by reason of the consequent infamy; or a sin, in which there is manifest ignominy, is the punishment of the sin of pride, just as the sin against nature and other things of this kind, which the Apostle[^11] calls *passions of ignominy*, is punishment by reason of the ignominy, not by reason of the guilt. And in brief any sin can be called the punishment of a preceding sin by reason of the *harm* which it inflicts; and thus the same thing is called *sin* and *the punishment* of sin, yet in such a way that it is called *sin* essentially, and the punishment of sin *causally*.

But since according to this mode not only could one sin be called the punishment of *another*, but also one sin could be called the punishment of *itself*, speaking causally, since the one who sins harms himself; and again, as was shown in the preceding[^12], not only is the *disordered action* guilt, but also the very *deformity* which *remains* in the soul, and the deformation of the soul itself is no small punishment to it; and again, as the first reasons show, there is a certain ordering of merit and retribution between the preceding guilt and the following, even as regards that which they are as *guilt*: therefore there is another opinion, to which the Master seems rather to consent, that the following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only *causally*, but also *essentially*, so to speak. And in saying this, as the Master[^13] says, no prejudice at all is done to the truth, but rather this is plain enough. For *punishment* states two things: it states *evil* or *harm*, and it states an *ordering* to a preceding merit; and these two things are found to occur in the following sin. For *damage* and harm is in it, insofar as it is *sin*; for it is sin by the very thing whereby it harms[^14]; and one incurs a great evil when one falls into sin, even if he ought to have nothing else afterward. But it has *ordering* in that it is *following*; for by the very fact that the human is in sin, he is worthy to be allowed to fall into another, according to that of the Apocalypse, last [chapter][^15], as is said in the Gloss: « It is just », that *he who is in filth be filthy still*. — It must therefore be granted simply that sin can be the punishment of sin, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say.

1. To that, however, which is first objected, that every punishment is praiseworthy; it must be said that that proposition can be understood in two ways: either that praise be attributed to punishment according to *that which it is*; or insofar as it is *punishment*. If it is attributed to punishment according to *that which it is*, thus it is false; for there are many punishments which are passions of ignominy and are not praiseworthy, but blameworthy. But if it is attributed to punishment under the character of punishment, that is, insofar as it is punitive of a preceding sin; thus every punishment is praiseworthy, because it is ordered. And in the same way is this proposition to be understood: every punishment is just. When therefore it is inferred that sin is just or that it is praiseworthy, there is here a fallacy *of accident*[^16], because one proceeds from the praiseworthiness of the *order* to the praise of the *orderable thing*. But this does not follow, because frequently the praise of the *order* is foreign to the *orderable thing*, especially when that which is blameworthy is ordered fittingly and praiseworthily.

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is ordinative of guilt; it must be said that it is true, that it orders in the same way in which it punishes; and that which is *simply* punishment and simply punishes, is *simply* ordinative; and that which punishes *sufficiently*, orders *sufficiently*. But that which is punishment *in a certain respect* and does not punish sufficiently, orders only *in a certain respect*. And that is true, that just as a certain order is praiseworthy — though more manifest — of the infernal punishment to guilt; so a certain order is praiseworthy — though less manifest — of the subsequent sin to the preceding sin; and in this order the divine justice is praised, which by a just judgment permitted him who committed one sin to slip into another.

3. To that which is objected, that the preceding guilt is not[^17] the merit of the following; it must be said that there is a merit of congruity, and there is a merit of condignity. And when the preceding guilt is said to be the merit of the following, this is not as regards the merit of condignity, but of congruity, which congruity indeed can easily be recompensed by another congruity. For just as it is congruous that God permit the sinner to slip into another sin, so also it is congruous that, because he has used life ill, He take it away from him and plunge [him] into hell. Just as it is also congruous that He let him fall into another sin, so also it is congruous that, if he wishes to abstain, He give him help, that he may not fall into another guilt.

4. To that which is objected, that God does not punish twice in the self-same thing; it must be said that the following sin was not a punishment in which a retribution *of condignity* should be made, but only *of congruity*. And just as[^18] the retri-

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bution of that which one merits as regards the merit of *congruity* does not prejudice that which he merits as regards the merit of *condignity* — for God gives the just good things in the present, [and] does not on this account give them lesser ones in the future — so it is to be understood to be in the case at hand.

5. To that which is objected last, that God does not punish beyond the condign etc.; the response is now plain. For this is understood of the punishment which is inflicted by God *properly*, and of that which, concerning the preceding sin, regards the merit *of condignity*; but both of these are lacking in the case at hand. For the following guilt, according to *that which it is*, is not from God; the following guilt also is not ordered to the preceding sin according to the character *of condignity*, but according to the character *of congruity*. For this is congruous to the order of divine justice, as has been shown.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossa tam ordinaria quam interlinearis verba allata adiungit. Cfr. Strabus et Lyranus. — Quoad modum argumentandi *a relativis* Boeth., III. de Differ. topic. dicit: « In relativis, absque se relativa esse non posse ». Et Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topicis: Locus *a relativis* est habitudo unius relativorum ad aliud; et est constructivus et destructivus. Constructive sic: pater est, ergo filius est; item: filius est, ergo pater est. Locus a relativis: Maxima: posito uno relativorum, necessario ponitur et reliquum. Destructive sic: pater non est, ergo filius non est, et e converso. Maxima: remoto uno relativorum, removetur et reliquum.

en: Verse 11. — Both the ordinary and the interlinear Gloss add the words adduced. Cfr. Strabus and Lyranus. — As to the mode of arguing *from relatives*, Boethius, III. *On Topical Differences*, says: « Among relatives, the relatives cannot be without one another ». And Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae*, tr. *On Topical Places*: The place *from relatives* is the relation of one of the relatives to the other; and it is constructive and destructive. Constructively thus: the father exists, therefore the son exists; likewise: the son exists, therefore the father exists. The place from relatives: Maxim: one of the relatives being posited, the other is necessarily posited also. Destructively thus: the father does not exist, therefore the son does not exist, and conversely. Maxim: one of the relatives being removed, the other is removed also.

la: Hic c. 1. — Verba hic Gregorio tributa sunt Augustini.

en: Here c. 1. — The words here attributed to Gregory are Augustine's.

la: Libr. II. Sent. c. 39. n. 1: Deus autem nonnunquam deiicit occultam mentis superbiam per carnis manifestam ruinam.

en: *Sentences* book II. c. 39. n. 1: But God sometimes casts down the hidden pride of the mind through the manifest ruin of the flesh.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Cfr. here the Master's text, c. 3.

la: Cap. 45. n. 85. Verba vide supra pag. 683, nota 7. in fine. — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 verbo *superare* praefigit *se*.

en: Chapter 45. n. 85. For the words see above p. 683, note 7, at the end. — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 prefixes *se* to the word *superare*.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here c. 2.

la: Cfr. loc. ex August. supra pag. 769, nota 5. et pag. 770, nota 1. citt. — In *minori* post *decorat* Vat. supplet *universum*.

en: Cfr. the passages from Augustine cited above p. 769, note 5. and p. 770, note 1. — In the *minor* after *decorat* the Vatican [edition] supplies *universum*.

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 44. n. 18: Puniendum est peccatum; si puniendum non esset, nec peccatum esset. Praeveni illum [Deum]; non vis, ut ipse puniat, tu puni. Cfr. ibid. in Ps. 38. serm. 1. n. 13; Richard. a S. Vict., V. in Apocal. prolog.

en: Augustine, *Enarrations on the Psalms*, on Ps. 44. n. 18: Sin must be punished; if it were not to be punished, neither would it be sin. Forestall Him [God]; you do not wish that He himself punish, [then] you punish. Cfr. ibid. on Ps. 38. serm. 1. n. 13; Richard of St. Victor, V. *on the Apocalypse*, prologue.

la: Nahum 1, 9, ex versione secundum Septuag.: Non vindicabit bis id ipsum in tribulatione. Vulgata: Non consurget duplex tribulatio. — Immediate post Vat. *culpa sequentis peccati* pro *culpa sequenti*.

en: Nahum 1, 9, from the version according to the Septuagint: He will not avenge the self-same thing twice in tribulation. The Vulgate: A double tribulation shall not rise up. — Immediately after, the Vatican [edition] [reads] *culpa sequentis peccati* for *culpa sequenti*.

la: Hic c. 2. seqq.

en: Here c. 2. and following.

la: Rom. 1, 26. — Paulo ante pro *peccatum contra naturam* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *peccatum haeresis*.

en: Rom. 1, 26. — A little before, for *peccatum contra naturam* ("sin against nature") the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *peccatum haeresis* ("the sin of heresy").

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here c. 4.

la: Vide supra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2.

en: See above d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. fundamentum 2.

la: Vers. 11.

en: Verse 11.

la: Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 58, nota 5. — Mox pro *laudabilitate* cod. F *laude*.

en: Cfr. tom. 1. p. 58, note 5. — Soon, for *laudabilitate* cod. F [reads] *laude*.

la: Edd., excepta 2, omittunt *non*; utraque lectio explicari potest. Paulo inferius pro *esse meritum* codd. F K T cc et alii cum ed. 1 *est meritum*.

en: The editions, except 2, omit *non*; either reading can be explained. A little below, for *esse meritum* codd. F K T cc and others, with ed. 1, [read] *est meritum*.

la: Vat. *sic*; nostra lectio defenditur a cod. cc et ed. 1; cod. Y pro *sic* habet *si*, et subinde pro *eius* cum codd. F K T et aliis *est*. Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 in fine solut. ante *habere* omittunt *se*.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *sic*; our reading is defended by cod. cc and ed. 1; cod. Y for *sic* has *si*, and thereafter for *eius* with codd. F K T and others [reads] *est*. Most codices and edd. 1, 2 at the end of the solution before *habere* omit *se*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Difficultas, quae hic solvitur, praesupponit solutionem generalioris quaestionis, utrum scilicet peccatum possit esse *causa* alterius peccati; de qua breviter agit Seraphicus hic dub. 1, et fusius Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9.); alii autem commentatores Magistri cum S. Thoma (hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 75. a. 4.) in speciali quaestione docent, quod peccatum possit esse causa alterius peccati in genere causae *efficientis*, *per accidens* tamen, non *per se* (ut removendo prohibens), *finalis*, *materialis* et etiam aliquo modo (scilicet per reductionem) *formalis*. — Quaestio autem hic tractata est, utrum peccatum ab alio peccato causatum habeat rationem poenae respectu praecedentis peccati, et qua ratione. Prima opinio vult, quod peccatum habeat rationem poenae, non quatenus est *essentialiter* peccatum, sed *causaliter*, id est, quatenus habet plura *annexa*, ab ipso causata, quae rationem poenae manifeste habent. Secunda opinio communis sequitur Magistrum et tenet, quod peccatum, etiam *essentialiter* sumtum, induat rationem *poenae*. Res satis difficilis et subtilis est, cum peccatum, ut peccatum est, sit voluntarium, sit iniustum, sit non a Deo; poena autem, ut poena, sit voluntati contraria, sit iusta, sit a Deo. Solutio difficultatis eruitur ex eo, quod idem possit esse culpa et poena, non tamen secundum eandem rationem (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2.); sicut in eodem actu voluntatis est actio et passio, ut actio ab agente, ut passio a patiente; tamen ut actio non est passio, et e converso (Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Hinc illa deformitas, quae causatur in anima per *ipsum actum* peccati, habet rationem tum culpae tum poenae (supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Similiter deformitas peccati, *ex praecedenti* peccato orti, *essentialiter*, et non tantum *causaliter*, est *laesio animae* per se involuntaria et ad aliquid praecedens demeritum ordinata; et sub hac ratione est poena, ut explicatur in textu. Contraria sententia late proponitur a Magistro hic c. 2. 3.

**II.** Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 87. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 131. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1, a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The difficulty which is here solved presupposes the solution of a more general question, namely whether sin can be the *cause* of another sin; concerning which the Seraphic [Doctor] treats briefly here in dub. 1, and more fully Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. II. q. 94. m. 9.); but the other commentators on the Master, with St. Thomas (here a. 1; *Summa* I. II. q. 75. a. 4.), teach in a special question that sin can be the cause of another sin in the genus of the *efficient* cause, yet *per accidens*, not *per se* (as removing an impediment), [in the genus] of the *final*, the *material*, and also in some manner (namely by reduction) of the *formal*. — But the question here treated is whether sin caused by another sin has the character of punishment with respect to the preceding sin, and on what account. The first opinion holds that sin has the character of punishment, not insofar as it is *essentially* sin, but *causally*, that is, insofar as it has several things *annexed*, caused by it, which manifestly have the character of punishment. The second, common, opinion follows the Master and holds that sin, even taken *essentially*, puts on the character of *punishment*. The matter is difficult and subtle enough, since sin, as it is sin, is voluntary, is unjust, is not from God; but punishment, as it is punishment, is contrary to the will, is just, is from God. The solution of the difficulty is drawn from this, that the same thing can be guilt and punishment, yet not according to the same character (cfr. below a. 2. q. 2.); just as in the same act of the will there is action and passion, as action from the agent, as passion from the patient; yet as action it is not passion, and conversely (Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2.). Hence that deformity which is caused in the soul by the *act itself* of sin has the character both of guilt and of punishment (above d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. 2.). Similarly the deformity of a sin sprung *from a preceding* sin is, *essentially* and not only *causally*, a *harm of the soul* per se involuntary and ordered to some preceding demerit; and under this character it is punishment, as is explained in the text. The contrary opinion is set forth at length by the Master here c. 2. 3.

**II.** Scotus, in each *Scriptum*, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; *Summa* I. II. q. 87. a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1. 3; *Summa* p. II. tr. 22. q. 131. m. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 58691–58855), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Solutio (replies 1–5), SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 843–845, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 865–867). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

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**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 843–845.
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- p. 844 (verso, running head `844 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): Respondeo (opinio 1 + opinio 3) + replies 1–4 (reply 4 cut at *Et sicut retri-*). Footers 1–9 → continuous [^10]–[^18]. L-column footers 1–7 then R-column footers 8–9: [^10] Magister/littera (Sed attendendum, "Hic c. 2. seqq."), [^11] Apostolus/Rom. 1,26 (passiones ignominiae), [^12] in praecedentibus (d.33), [^13] Magister (Hic c. 4), [^14] quo nocet (d.33 fund 2), [^15] Apocalypsis ultimo (Ordinationem), [^16] sophisma secundum accidens (reply 1), [^17] culpa praecedens non (reply 3), [^18] Et sicut (reply 4, Vat. sic variant).
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**Hand-off received.** NONE. d36-divisio fully consumed the p.842 commentary footer (1 entry); a1-q1's footers begin fresh on p.843 footer 1.

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**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 845, raw ~58843–58855), items I, II. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats the *peccatum causa alterius peccati* generalior quaestio + the two opinions (causaliter vs essentialiter) + the *idem culpa et poena* solution (cross-ref a. 2. q. 2.). Item II is the commentator roll. q2 may legitimately lack its own scholion per Override §5.

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**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum passiones animae poenae tantum sint, an poenae simul et peccata.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum passiones animae sint poenae tantum, an poenae simul et peccata. Et quod sint poenae et peccata, videtur.

1. Omne illud, pro quo quis meretur mortem aeternam, est peccatum; sed pro passionibus animae meretur quis mortem aeternam, Matthaei quinto[^1]: *Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit gehennae ignis*: ergo ira, quae est passio animae, est culpa; pari ratione et aliae passiones animae.

2. Item, omne illud, quod directe repugnat virtuti, est culpa; sed ira et invidia et aliae passiones animae repugnant virtutibus: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne illud, quod est contra rationem rectam, est culpa; sed passio animae, quae « est dolor de alieno bono[^2] », est contra rationem rectam, quae de illo iudicat esse gaudendum: ergo etc.

4. Item, illud maxime tenet rationem culpae, quod maxime est impugnativum gratiae; sed invidentia gratiae fraternae maxime repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti[^3]: ergo cum haec sit passio animae et poena, videtur, quod passiones animae sint peccata.

5. Item, ad hoc ipsum est ratio Augustini, in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^4]. Arguit enim sic: « Omnis perturbatio est passio; omnis cupiditas est perturbatio: ergo omnis cupiditas est passio »; sed planum est, quod cupiditas est culpa: ergo peccatum est passio, et e converso; redit igitur idem quod prius.

**Sed contra:**
1. « In omni peccato, sicut vult Augustinus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^5] regnat libido »; ubicumque autem regnat libido, ibi est improba delectatio: ergo omne peccatum, in quantum peccatum, delectat. Sed huiusmodi passiones animae eam puniunt et contristant: ergo videtur, quod non sint peccata.

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2. Item, omnis culpa actualis est voluntaria; sed istae passiones animae non sunt voluntariae[^6]: ergo non sunt culpa, sed tantum poena.

3. Item, omni culpa vituperamur; « passionibus autem animae non laudamur nec vituperamur », sicut vult Philosophus[^7]: ergo passiones animae non sunt peccata.

4. Item, « opposita sunt nata esse in eodem genere[^8] », sed nulla virtus est passio, cum omnis virtus sit in genere habitus: ergo nullum vitium sive peccatum est passio.

5. Item, in omni peccato est conversio ad commutabile bonum; in huiusmodi autem passionibus animae, quae sunt invidia, ira, tristitia, potius est taedium boni et aversio quam conversio: ergo tales passiones animae non sunt culpae.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Passiones quaedam animae et poenae et peccata sunt, quatenus oriuntur vel ex corruptione concupiscentiae, vel ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut expresse dicit Magister in littera[^9] et probat per auctoritatem Augustini, multae sunt passiones animae, quae sunt non solum poenales, verum etiam culpabiles, sicut ira et invidia. Licet autem huiusmodi passiones peccata sint, tamen peccata non sunt in quantum passiones, sicut idem Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^10]: « Omnis autem passio, in quantum ipsa aliquis patitur, non est peccatum »; sed huiusmodi passiones peccata sunt ratione inordinationis voluntatis coniunctae vel antecedenter, vel consequenter.

Propter quod notandum est, quod quaedam est passio illata ab extrinseco, et circa hanc non consistit meritum nec demeritum, nisi in quantum a voluntate respuitur vel acceptatur. Unde occidi pro Christo non est meritorium, nisi in quantum volitum est ab eo qui occiditur. Unde proprie loquendo, in talibus passionibus passio non est meritoria[^11], sed sufferentia passionis.

Est et alia passio, quae ortum habet ab intrinseco. Et haec dupliciter potest oriri, quia quaedam oritur ex corruptione naturae, quaedam vero ex conversione voluntatis liberae. — Et illa quae oritur ex corruptione naturae, in duplici differentia est; quoniam natura corrupta est vitiosa corruptione per concupiscentiam, et corrupta est corruptione poenali per mortalitatem inflictam. Illae igitur passiones, quae oriuntur ex corruptione naturae, ut est corrupta poenali corruptione, tenent rationem poenae tantum, ut fames et sitis; illae vero, quae oriuntur ab ipsa, ut est corrupta corruptione vitiosa, non tantum habent rationem poenae, sed etiam culpae; sicut sunt inordinatae affectiones animae, quae consurgunt ex morbo concupiscentiae, et tales sunt passiones irae et invidiae et consimiles[^12].

Secundum autem quod huiusmodi passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad aliquod bonum amabile, sic, secundum quod voluntas habet converti dupliciter, passiones huiusmodi sunt in duplici genere. Voluntas enim aliquando convertitur ad bonum simpliciter, et tunc detestatur et odit quod adversatur illi bono, utpote peccatum; et hoc modo passiones inde consurgentes sunt iustae et meritoriae. — Convertitur etiam voluntas aliquando ad bonum proprium et ad bonum ut nunc; et tunc passiones, quae inde consurgunt, culpabiles sunt et malae, sicut et voluntas, a qua oriuntur; sed non habent plenam rationem mali et culpae, nisi quando in voluntate consummantur, utpote cum aliquis vult irasci et invidere et etiam contristari. — Et sic patet, quod huiusmodi passiones animae peccata sunt, et in quantum oriuntur ex corruptione concupiscentiae[^13], et in quantum ortum habent ex inordinato amore voluntatis deliberativae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, aliquas passiones animae esse peccata.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod libido regnat in omni peccato; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod libido dicitur improba voluntas; sed non oportet, secundum quod libido dicitur immoderata delectatio[^14][^15]. — Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod et in istis peccatis reperitur libido respectu proprii motivi. Nam invidus delectatur in boni singularitate, et iracundus delectatur in adeptione vindictae. Immo quod plus est, sicut vir iustus ex rectitudine voluntatis delectatur dolendo de malo culpae, sic etiam invidus quandam refectionem invenit in dolendo de aliena prosperitate, ita quod delectatio est de uno, et tristitia est de altero. Quemadmodum enim aliquis, dum amisit illud quod multum dilexit, vehementer tristatur, et magna est illi consolatio posse tristari, et ibi solum invenit quietem in fletu et dolore, sicut Augustinus in quarto Confessionum[^16] dicit de se; sic invidus in dolendo de bono alieno in illa passione

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invenit quandam delectationem in eo, quod placet sibi de bono alieno contabescere; illa tamen delectatio multum est respersa amaritudine.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passiones sunt involuntariae; dicendum, quod involuntarium dicitur dupliciter, sicut et voluntarium: uno modo dicitur voluntarium, cuius principium est voluntas; alio modo dicitur voluntarium, quod concomitatur voluntas[^17]. Et secundum hunc duplicem modum dupliciter dicitur involuntarium: uno modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non est a voluntate efficiente; alio modo, ut dicatur involuntarium, quod non fit cum voluntate concomitante. Primo igitur modo accipiendo involuntarium, sic veritatem habet de passionibus, quae fiunt ab extrinseco, quia earum[^18] principium est extra; voluntarium autem est, cuius principium est in ipso. Non autem habet veritatem in passionibus, quae sunt ab intrinseco, sicut prius ostensum est, immo possunt esse voluntariae, non solum sicut a voluntate concomitante, immo sicut a voluntate causante, dum diligit aliquid inordinate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passionibus non laudamur nec vituperamur; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, per se loquendo; prout tamen radicem habent ex voluntate, et voluntas concomitatur eis, et laudari possumus et vituperari, sicut prius ostensum est. Ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod huiusmodi passiones non sint peccata, sed quod peccata non sint, in quantum eis patimur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla virtus est passio; iam patet responsio. Nam aliqua virtus potest circa passiones consistere, sicut patientia et fortitudo, prout illae passiones efficiuntur voluntariae. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est esse. — Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod quamvis passio non sit virtus nisi ex actu voluntatis simul coexistentis, potest tamen aliqua passio, in quantum egreditur a natura vitiata et corrupta, esse peccatum. Nec valet illa ratio, cum plura exigantur ad complendum bonum quam ad committendum malum[^19].

5. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio. Nam istae passiones oriuntur ex conversione voluntatis ad commutabile bonum, et ideo peccata sunt; nunquam enim quis invideret alicui, nisi nimis amaret proprium bonum; et ut vult Damascenus[^20], « ira vindex est laesae concupiscentiae »; immo generaliter, sicut ostendit Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei, omnes huiusmodi passiones ortum habent ex amore.

### SCHOLION

**I.** Quaestio est de passionibus poenalibus generaliter sumtis, quatenus omnes poenales affectiones animae comprehendunt, ut explicatur in textu. Passio, qua passio, non est nec peccatum nec meritum, sed tantum quatenus multipliciter relationem habet ad voluntatem. — Quomodo autem anima pati possit, explicatur IV. Sent. d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; quomodo per passionem quis meretur, III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. De passionibus, ut sunt animae affectiones, cfr. III. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. et praecipue S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 22. et seqq.

**II.** S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 24. a. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 132. m. 1. a. 3. et m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether the passions of the soul are punishments only, or punishments and sins at once.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the passions of the soul are punishments only, or punishments and sins at once. And that they are punishments and sins, it seems.

1. Everything for which one merits eternal death is sin; but for the passions of the soul one merits eternal death, Matthew the fifth[^1]: *He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna*: therefore anger, which is a passion of the soul, is guilt; by parity of reasoning, the other passions of the soul also.

2. Likewise, everything which directly opposes a virtue is guilt; but anger and envy and the other passions of the soul oppose the virtues: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is against right reason is guilt; but a passion of the soul, which « is grief over another's good[^2] », is against right reason, which judges concerning that [good] that it ought to be rejoiced over: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that most holds the character of guilt which is most impugnative of grace; but envy of a brotherly grace is most opposed to the grace of the Holy Spirit[^3]: therefore since this is a passion of the soul and a punishment, it seems that the passions of the soul are sins.

5. Likewise, to this same point there is the reasoning of Augustine, in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*[^4]. For he argues thus: « Every disturbance is a passion; every desire is a disturbance: therefore every desire is a passion »; but it is plain that desire is guilt: therefore sin is a passion, and conversely; the same thing therefore returns as before.

**On the contrary:**
1. « In every sin, as Augustine holds in the book *On Free Will*[^5], lust reigns »; but wherever lust reigns, there is wicked delight: therefore every sin, insofar as it is sin, delights. But passions of this kind punish and sadden it [the soul]: therefore it seems that they are not sins.

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2. Likewise, every actual guilt is voluntary; but these passions of the soul are not voluntary[^6]: therefore they are not guilt, but only punishment.

3. Likewise, by every guilt we are blamed; « but by the passions of the soul we are neither praised nor blamed », as the Philosopher holds[^7]: therefore the passions of the soul are not sins.

4. Likewise, « opposites are by nature in the same genus[^8] », but no virtue is a passion, since every virtue is in the genus of habit: therefore no vice or sin is a passion.

5. Likewise, in every sin there is a conversion to a changeable good; but in passions of the soul of this kind, which are envy, anger, sadness, there is rather a weariness of the good and an aversion than a conversion: therefore such passions of the soul are not guilts.

### CONCLUSION.

> Certain passions of the soul are both punishments and sins, insofar as they arise either from the corruption of concupiscence, or from the disordered love of the deliberative will.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master expressly says in the text[^9] and proves through the authority of Augustine, there are many passions of the soul which are not only penal, but also culpable, such as anger and envy. But although passions of this kind are sins, nevertheless they are not sins insofar as they are passions, as the same Augustine says, and it is had in the text[^10]: « But every passion, insofar as one undergoes it, is not sin »; rather passions of this kind are sins by reason of the disorder of the will joined [to them] either antecedently, or consequently.

On account of which it is to be noted that a certain passion is brought in from without, and around this there consists neither merit nor demerit, except insofar as it is rejected or accepted by the will. Hence to be killed for Christ is not meritorious, except insofar as it is willed by him who is killed. Hence properly speaking, in such passions the passion is not meritorious[^11], but the suffering of the passion [is].

There is also another passion, which has its origin from within. And this can arise in two ways, because one arises from the corruption of nature, but another from the conversion of the free will. — And that which arises from the corruption of nature is in a twofold difference; since nature is corrupt with a vicious corruption through concupiscence, and is corrupt with a penal corruption through inflicted mortality. Those passions, therefore, which arise from the corruption of nature, as it is corrupt with a penal corruption, hold the character of punishment only, such as hunger and thirst; but those which arise from it [nature], as it is corrupt with a vicious corruption, hold not only the character of punishment, but also of guilt; such as are the disordered affections of the soul, which spring up from the disease of concupiscence, and such are the passions of anger and of envy and the like[^12].

But according as passions of this kind arise from the conversion of the will to some lovable good, thus, according as the will has to convert itself in two ways, passions of this kind are in a twofold genus. For the will sometimes converts itself to the good simply, and then it detests and hates what is adverse to that good, namely sin; and in this way the passions arising therefrom are just and meritorious. — The will sometimes also converts itself to its own good and to the good as-now; and then the passions which arise therefrom are culpable and evil, just as also the will from which they arise; but they do not have the full character of evil and of guilt, except when they are consummated in the will, namely when someone wills to be angry and to envy and even to be saddened. — And thus it is clear that passions of this kind of the soul are sins, both insofar as they arise from the corruption of concupiscence[^13], and insofar as they have their origin from the disordered love of the deliberative will. — The reasons, therefore, showing that some passions of the soul are sins, are to be granted.

1. But to that which is first objected to the contrary, that lust reigns in every sin; it must be said that this is true, according as lust is called a wicked will; but it is not necessary, according as lust is called immoderate delight[^14][^15]. — Nevertheless it can be said that even in these sins lust is found with respect to its proper motive. For the envious man delights in the singularity of [his own] good, and the angry man delights in the obtaining of vengeance. Indeed, what is more, just as the just man from the rectitude of his will delights in grieving over the evil of guilt, so also the envious man finds a certain refreshment in grieving over another's prosperity, so that the delight is over one thing, and the sadness over another. For just as someone, when he has lost that which he greatly loved, is vehemently saddened, and it is a great consolation to him to be able to be saddened, and there alone does he find rest in weeping and grief, as Augustine in the fourth [book] of the *Confessions*[^16] says of himself; so the envious man, in grieving over another's good, in that passion

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finds a certain delight in this, that it pleases him to waste away over another's good; that delight, nevertheless, is much sprinkled with bitterness.

2. To that which is objected, that the passions are involuntary; it must be said that the involuntary is said in two ways, just as also the voluntary: in one way that is called voluntary whose principle is the will; in another way that is called voluntary which the will accompanies[^17]. And according to this twofold mode the involuntary is said in two ways: in one way, that the involuntary be that which is not from an efficient will; in another way, that the involuntary be that which does not come about with an accompanying will. Taking the involuntary, therefore, in the first way, thus it holds the truth concerning the passions which come about from without, because their[^18] principle is outside; but the voluntary is that whose principle is in itself. But it does not hold the truth in the passions which are from within, as was shown before, but rather they can be voluntary, not only as from an accompanying will, but rather as from a causing will, while it loves something in a disordered way.

3. To that which is objected, that by the passions we are neither praised nor blamed; it must be said that this is true, speaking per se; yet inasmuch as they have their root from the will, and the will accompanies them, we can be both praised and blamed, as was shown before. Therefore that reasoning does not conclude that passions of this kind are not sins, but that they are not sins, insofar as we undergo them.

4. To that which is objected, that no virtue is a passion; the response is now plain. For some virtue can consist around the passions, such as patience and fortitude, inasmuch as those passions are made voluntary. So also in the matter at hand it is to be understood to be. — Nevertheless it can be said that, although a passion is not a virtue except from the act of a will simultaneously coexisting, yet some passion, insofar as it issues from a vitiated and corrupt nature, can be sin. Nor is that reasoning valid, since more things are required to complete the good than to commit the evil[^19].

5. To the last [objection] the response is now plain. For these passions arise from the conversion of the will to a changeable good, and therefore they are sins; for no one would ever envy another, unless he loved his own good too much; and as Damascene holds[^20], « anger is the avenger of injured concupiscence »; indeed generally, as Augustine shows in the fourteenth [book] *On the City of God*, all passions of this kind have their origin from love.

### SCHOLION

**I.** The question is about penal passions taken generally, inasmuch as they comprehend all the penal affections of the soul, as is explained in the text. A passion, as passion, is neither sin nor merit, but only insofar as it has a manifold relation to the will. — But how the soul can undergo [passion] is explained in IV. *Sent.* d. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2; how one merits through passion, in III. *Sent.* d. 18. a. 1. q. 3. Concerning the passions, as they are affections of the soul, cfr. III. *Sent.* d. 26. a. 1. q. 1. and especially St. Thomas, *Summa* I. II. q. 22. and following.

**II.** St. Thomas, here a. 2; *Summa* I. II. q. 24. a. 1-4. — B. Albert, here a. 5; *Summa* p. II. tr. 22. q. 132. m. 1. a. 3. and m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

la: Vers. 22: Qui irascitur fratri suo reus erit iudicio. Qui autem dixerit fratri suo: raca reus erit concilio. Qui autem dixerit: fatue, reus erit gehennae ignis.

en: Verse 22: He who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment. But he who shall say to his brother: raca, shall be liable to the council. But he who shall say: fool, shall be liable to the fire of Gehenna.

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 14, ubi haec definitio invidiae ponitur. — Pro animae, quam vocem exhibent edd. cum multis codd., codd. I V W Z invidiae.

en: Damascene, II. *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14, where this definition of envy is set down. — For *animae* ("of the soul"), which word the editions exhibit with many codices, codd. I V W Z [read] *invidiae* ("of envy").

la: Vide infra d. 43. a. 3. q. 1. — Pro fraternae codd. T bb ee et alii cum ed. 2 supernae. Subinde pro repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti codd. K W X Z bb etc. impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam, cod. F repugnat Spiritui sancto, alii codd. repugnat gratiam (1).

en: See below d. 43. a. 3. q. 1. — For *fraternae* ("brotherly") codd. T bb ee and others, with ed. 2, [read] *supernae* ("heavenly"). Thereafter, for *repugnat gratiae Spiritus sancti* codd. K W X Z bb etc. [read] *impugnat Spiritus sancti gratiam*, cod. F *repugnat Spiritui sancto*, other codd. *repugnat gratiam* (1).

la: Quaest. 77. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — In non paucis codd., ut F H I L O R S etc., et in edd. 1, 2 habetur tantum maior cum testimonio Augustini; minor et conclusio desunt.

en: Question 77. Cfr. here the Master's text, c. 6. — In not a few codices, such as F H I L O R S etc., and in edd. 1, 2 there is had only the major [premise] with the testimony of Augustine; the minor and the conclusion are lacking.

la: Libr. I. c. 3. n. 8; Clarum est enim, iam nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto male faciendi genere dominari. Cfr. supra pag. 734, nota 9.

en: Book I. c. 3. n. 8: For it is clear that now nothing other than lust dominates in the whole kind of evil-doing. Cfr. above p. 734, note 9.

la: Vide supra pag. 719, nota 1.

en: See above p. 719, note 1.

la: Verba Philosophi vide supra pag. 113, nota 8.

en: For the words of the Philosopher see above p. 113, note 8.

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 814, nota 8. — De minori cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, et II. Ethic. c. 5.

en: According to Aristotle, concerning whom see above p. 814, note 8. — On the minor cfr. Aristotle, *On the Categories* c. *On Quality*, and II. *Ethics* c. 5.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 839, nota 1.

en: Cfr. above p. 839, note 1.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here c. 6.

la: Hic c. 6. — Mox pro ipsa cod. cc et ed. 1 ipsam.

en: Here c. 6. — Soon, for *ipsa* cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *ipsam*.

la: In codd. K Iv P (Q a prima manu) Z et aliis nec non in Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 deest passio et pro meritoria legitur meritorium, cui verbo Vat. et edd. 3, 4 insuper praefigunt quid. — Cfr. August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4-8.

en: In codd. K Iv P (Q from the first hand) Z and others, as well as in the Vatican [edition] and edd. 2, 3, 4 *passio* is lacking and for *meritoria* there is read *meritorium*, to which word the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 moreover prefix *quid*. — Cfr. Augustine, XIII. *On the City of God*, c. 4-8.

la: Cfr. supra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox voci passiones edd., excepta 1, addunt animae.

en: Cfr. above d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. and following. — Soon, to the word *passiones* the editions, except 1, add *animae*.

la: Cfr. August., IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. seq. et XIV. c. 3-11. et 15. n. 2.

en: Cfr. Augustine, IX. *On the City of God*, c. 4. and following, and XIV. c. 3-11. and 15. n. 2.

la: De hac duplici significatione vocis libidinis vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: Concerning this twofold signification of the word *libido* see above d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in the body.

en: Chapter 6. n. 11.

la: De hac duplici distinctione voluntarii vide supra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opposit., et de definitione voluntarii, quae in seqq. occurrit, cfr. supra pag. 592, nota 3. Damascenus, II. de Fide orthod. c. 24. ait: Quaecumque propter iram agimus, non praeconsiliantes, *voluntarie* facimus, non tamen secundum electionem.

en: Concerning this twofold distinction of the voluntary see above d. 25. p. II. q. 4. arg. 1. to the contrary, and concerning the definition of the voluntary, which occurs in the following, cfr. above p. 592, note 3. Damascene, II. *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 24, says: Whatever we do on account of anger, not deliberating beforehand, we do *voluntarily*, yet not according to choice.

la: Primae edd. cum multis codd. eorum; perperam.

en: The first editions, with many codices, [read] *eorum*; wrongly.

la: Bonum enim ex integra causa, malum ex quovis defectu. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, et Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 30. — Paulo superius codd. F bb existentis pro coexistentis.

en: For the good is from an entire cause, the evil from any defect whatever. Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 6, and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 30. — A little above, codd. F bb [read] *existentis* for *coexistentis*.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 16. Cfr. supra pag. 560, nota 2. — Testimonium Augustini, quod mox signatur, habetur loc. cit. c. 7. n. 2.

en: Book II. *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 16. Cfr. above p. 560, note 2. — The testimony of Augustine, which is soon noted, is had at the cited place c. 7. n. 2.

translators_notes:
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**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 845–847.
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- p. 847 (recto, running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 847` — head already advanced to ART II because ART II QUAESTIO I opens on this page): tail of reply 1 + replies 2–5 + SCHOLION (I, II). Footers 1–4 of p.847 anchor in q2 → [^17]–[^20]: [^17] De hac duplici distinctione voluntarii d.25 + Damasc. de Fide orth. c.24 (reply 2 *concomitatur voluntas*), [^18] Primae edd. *eorum* perperam (reply 2 *quia earum*), [^19] Bonum ex integra causa (reply 4 *plura exigantur ad complendum bonum*), [^20] Libr. II de Fide orth. c.16 / Testimonium Augustini (reply 5 *ut vult Damascenus*). p.847 footers 5 (Codd. K X Y bb cc *poenae ad culpam*) and 6 (Vers. 4) anchor in ARTICULUS II QUAESTIO I and are forwarded to a2-q1.

**Hand-off received.** p.845 footers 1–3 from a1-q1 (Matthaei *reus erit iudicio*; Damasc. de Fide orth. invidiae; Vide infra d.43 fraternae) — populated as [^1]–[^3], anchored in q2 fundamenta 1, 3, 4. a1-q1's NOTES correctly forwarded these.

**Hand-off forwarded to a2-q1.** (a) The `ARTICULUS II` header (raw 59017, *De comparatione culpae ad poenam secundum inseparabilitatem*) + its short `quaeruntur duo` opener + `QUAESTIO I` (*Utrum in aliquo contingat ponere culpam sine poena subsequente*) all belong to a2-q1; this chunk ends before raw 59017. (b) p.847 footers **5** (`Codd. K X Y bb cc et ed. 1 poenae ad culpam.`) and **6** (`Vers. 4.` — Ecclesiastici quinto, ART II q1 fund 1) anchor in a2-q1's body and are forwarded — this q2 claims only p.847 footers 1–4. NOTE for next agent: raw line order is two-column interleaved (ART III header at raw 59326 precedes ART II's Q2 at raw ~59454); re-derive the a2-q1/a2-q2 boundary at 450 dpi.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT at q2 (p.847, raw ~59010–59016), items I, II. `has_scholion: true`. Item I states the question's scope (penal passions taken generally; passio-qua-passio neither sin nor merit) + cross-refs (IV Sent. d.44, III Sent. d.18, III Sent. d.26, S. Thom. S. I. II. q.22). Item II is the commentator roll (S. Thom. hic a.2; Albert; Petr. a Tar.; Richard.; Aegid.; Dionys.).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of pp. 845, 846, 847 read top→bottom. The p.845/846 seam (inside Sed contra 1→2, at *delectatio: ergo omne peccatum… / 2. omnis culpa actualis*) and the p.846/847 seam (inside reply 1, at *in illa passione / invenit quandam delectationem*) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph cascade-merge splice signature found. The OCR's heavily fragmented Respondeo region was wholly re-set from PDF; the conclusio-1/conclusio-2 + Duplex/Subdistinctio + duplex-conversio segments all verified contiguous against the L-column body bands.

**[?] flags.** None.