title: Dist. 16, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XVI)

title_alt: Doubts on the Letter of the Master (Distinction XVI)

source_text:
<!-- page 406 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de ratione, quam reddit Magister, cum ait: *In eo quod dicit:* Faciamus, *una operatio trium personarum ostenditur.* Cum enim indivisa sint opera Trinitatis[^1], et tres personae ita operatae sint simul omnia alia, sicut fecerunt hominem; quemadmodum in productione hominis dicitur: *Faciamus,* ita deberet dici in productione aliorum. — Item, quaeritur, quare in productione hominis utitur legislator verbo primae personae, scilicet *faciamus,* in productione aliorum verbo tertiae personae, scilicet *dixit* et *fecit?* — Iuxta hoc etiam est quaestio, quare distinguit inter productionem hominis et bestiarum, cum eodem die[^2] producta sint ad ornatum eiusdem elementi?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in productione hominis non tantum erat manifestatio Trinitatis in vestigio, sed etiam secundum *imaginem;* ideo tribus personis pluraliter attribuitur productio hominis ut ostendatur, quod in homine Trinitas repraesentatur *expresse,* in aliis vero insinuatur Trinitas *quoquo modo,* licet non ita explicite. — Et quia ratio imaginis non convenit nisi personae, quae potest *loqui per se*[^3]; ideo in productione eius utitur verbo primae personae. — *Et iterum,* quia haec creatura praecellit alias in gradu et dignitate, ideo productionem hominis distinguit a productione bestiarum, licet propter convenientiam in ornando terram in opus unius diei conveniant[^4]. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dei et Angelorum non est una et eadem imago.* Contra hoc est: quia, cum Angelus sit imago Dei, quod conformatur Angelo, per consequens conformatur Deo: ergo quod est imago Angeli est imago Dei. — Item, unum opus potest esse Dei et Angeli[^5]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod eadem imago.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia imago dicit ordinem ad illud cuius est imago, tanquam in finem et ordinem *immediatum;* cum impossibile sit, Deum et Angelum eiusdem rei esse finem immediatum et ultimum: impossibile est, eandem *imaginem* esse Angeli et Dei. — Quia vero Deus cooperatur Angelo, et omne quod est ab Angelo est a Deo; ideo possibile est, unum *opus* simul esse et Angeli et Dei. — Nec valet illud quod obiicit, quod si aliquis repraesentat Angelum, per consequens repraesentat Deum. Quamvis enim inferri valeat, quod creatura, quae repraesentat Angelum, repraesentat Deum *mediate,* non tamen potest inferri, quod repraesentet *immediate*[^6].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Fuerunt nonnulli, qui ita distinxerunt, ut in hoc loco imaginem intelligerent Filium,* quos etiam consequenter reprehendit. Videtur enim, quod convenienter dixerint, per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos octavo[^7]: *Quos praedestinavit, conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui.* — Item, quod ita oporteat intelligi, videtur. Aut enim *imago* stat ibi pro re *creata,* aut pro re *increata.* Si pro creata: ergo idem est dicere: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem*[^8], quod: faciamus hominem ad se ipsum. Si pro increata; sed illa non est nisi Filius: ergo videtur, quod expositio illa sit recta. — Propter hoc *Quaestio incidens.* quaeritur, quae istarum expositionum, quas Magister assignat in littera[^9], sit tenenda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplex est modus *Duplex expositio.* exponendi istam auctoritatem: *Faciamus hominem* etc.: unus intelligendo de imagine *increata,* alter vero intelligendo de imagine *creata.* — *Prima fit Primus* modus triplicatur. Unus est, ut *imago* et *similitudo iter triplex.* referantur ad idem, scilicet ad *essentiam* in tribus personis. Secundus modus est, ut *imago* et *similitudo* referantur ad idem, scilicet ad *personam Filii.* Tertius modus exponendi est, ut *imago* referatur ad Filium, et *similitudo* ad Spiritum sanctum. Ita hos omnes modos ponit Magister, quos tamen non approbat, licet sustineri possint. Primum enim arguit de *improprietate,* quia divina essentia non est proprie imago. Secundum de *falsitate,* quia Filius non est imago *nostra;* et de hoc etiam, quod dicit, quod homo non est imago, sed *ad imaginem.* Tertium arguit de *incertitudine,* quia auctoritatem ex Scriptura non habet.

Alius modus exponendi est de imagine *creata, Secunda* et iste triplex est. — Unus, qui sic exponit, ut *imago item triplex.* praecedat *similitudinem;* et dicit, quod *imago* est in naturalibus, et *similitudo* in gratuitis. Secundus, qui sic exponit, ut *similitudo* concomitetur *imaginem;* et iste est, quod *imago* sit in potentia cognoscendi, *similitudo* in potentia diligendi. Tertius modus, qui sic exponit, ut *imago* sequatur *similitudinem* secundum rem; et iste dicit, quod *similitudo* est in natura, et *imago* in forma[^10].

Omnes hos modos approbat Magister et susti- *Ad quaest.* net; et satis videtur probabile, quod Scriptura de *incidentem.* imagine *creata* intelligat, quamvis etiam possit intelligi de *increata.* Verum est enim, quod homo praedestinatus est, ut conformetur imagini Filii Dei; nec ideo Magister illam positionem redarguit, quod hoc non sit verum, sed quia illa imago non potest proprie dici *nostra;* vel etiam, quia non solummodo *Filius* est imago, sed etiam *homo,* cuius contrarium dicebatur in illo modo exponendi.

Ad illud vero, quod obiicitur, quod *imago* non potest stare pro *creata* imagine; dicendum, quod immo, quia *imago* accipitur in abstractione; et sic *Notandum.* potest dici homo fieri *ad imaginem,* sicut tabula dicitur fieri ad imaginem, quando sibi imprimitur imago Herculis. Hinc est, quod homo non tantum est imago, sed etiam *ad imaginem,* quia non secundum omne quod est[^11], est imago, immo differt ab imagine; Filius vero secundum omne quod est, est imago Patris, et ideo solum est *imago,* non *ad imaginem.*

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non omnino aequalis fiebat illa imago, tanquam non ab illo nata, sed ab eo creata.* Quod enim creatur non est per *naturam,* sed per *artem;* sed quod est per artem non univocatur cum eo, quod est per naturam, immo aequivocatur[^12]: ergo aequivoce dicitur imago de Filio Dei et de homine.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum est, quod imago de Filio Dei et homine nec dicitur *aequivoce,* nec dicitur *Notandum.* *univoce,* sed *analogice* secundum prius et posterius. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod illud, quod creatur, est ab *arte;* dicendum quod quaedam est ars, cuius operatio consequitur *naturam;* et opus istius artis sic est *artificiale,* quod non est *naturale;* et

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ideo opus istius artis cum opere naturae in eodem nomine faciunt aequivocationem, sicut homo *pictus* et homo *verus.* Quaedam est ars, quae est fundamentum *naturae,* et opus istius artis bene est *naturale,* quia fabricat ipsam naturam, et talis est ars, cuius opus est *creare*[^13]; et ideo non oportebit esse aequivocationem. — *Alia solutio.* Vel dicendum, quod ideo est aequivocatio, quando dicitur homo *pictus* et homo *verus,* quia hoc nomen *homo* primo et principaliter imponitur homini *vero;* et ideo, cum dicitur de homine *picto,* alia est acceptio et alia significatio. Non sic *imago* primo et principaliter imponitur Dei Filio, sed omni ei, quod expresse repraesentat alterum[^14].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts concerning the letter, and the first inquiry is about the reason which the Master gives, when he says: *In that he says,* Let us make, *one operation of the three persons is shown.* For since the works of the Trinity are undivided[^1], and the three persons have worked together all other things, just as they made man; in the way that in the production of man it is said, *Let us make,* so it should also be said in the production of other things. — Likewise, it is asked why in the production of man the lawgiver uses the verb of the first person, namely *let us make,* but in the production of other things uses the verb of the third person, namely *he said* and *he made.* — In line with this, there is also the question, why he distinguishes between the production of man and of the beasts, since on the same day[^2] they were produced for the adornment of the same element?

**I respond:** It must be said that in the production of man there was not only a manifestation of the Trinity in *vestige,* but also according to *image;* and therefore the production of man is attributed in the plural to the three persons in order to show that in man the Trinity is represented *expressly,* whereas in other things the Trinity is intimated in some way, although not so explicitly. — And because the account of image does not befit anything except a person, who can *speak by himself*[^3]; therefore in his production he uses the verb of the first person. — *And again,* because this creature surpasses the others in rank and dignity, therefore he distinguishes the production of man from the production of beasts, although they agree in adorning the earth in the work of one day[^4]. And thus the response to the queries is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *The image of God and of the Angels is not one and the same.* Against this is: that, since the Angel is the image of God, what is conformed to the Angel is consequently conformed to God: therefore what is the image of the Angel is the image of God. — Likewise, one work can be of God and of an Angel[^5]: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the same is the image.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because *image* signifies an ordering to that of which it is the image, as to an end and an *immediate* ordering; since it is impossible for God and an Angel to be the immediate and ultimate end of the same thing: it is impossible for the same *image* to be of an Angel and of God. — But because God cooperates with the Angel, and everything which is from the Angel is from God; therefore it is possible for one *work* simultaneously to be of an Angel and of God. — Nor does the objection avail, which urges that if someone represents an Angel, he consequently represents God. For although it may be inferred that a creature which represents an Angel represents God *mediately,* yet it cannot be inferred that it represents him *immediately*[^6].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *There were some, who so distinguished, that in this place they understood by* image *the Son,* whom he consequently rebukes. For it seems that they had spoken fittingly, on account of what is said in Romans 8[^7]: *Whom he predestined, to be conformed to the image of his Son.* — Likewise, that it must be so understood seems clear. For either *image* there stands for the *created* thing, or for the *uncreated* thing. If for the created: then it is the same to say, *Let us make man to the image*[^8], as: let us make man to himself. If for the uncreated; but that is none other than the Son: therefore it seems that this exposition is correct. — On account of this, an *incidental question:* it is asked, which of these expositions, which the Master assigns in the letter[^9], is to be held.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold *Twofold exposition.* manner of expounding this authority: *Let us make man* etc.: one understanding it of the *uncreated* image, the other understanding it of the *created* image. — *The first* mode is threefold. One way is that *image* and *similitude* be referred to the same thing, namely to the *essence* in three persons. The second mode is that *image* and *similitude* be referred to the same thing, namely to the *person of the Son.* The third mode of exposition is that *image* be referred to the Son, and *similitude* to the Holy Spirit. So all these modes the Master sets forth, which however he does not approve, although they can be sustained. For the first he refutes on the ground of *impropriety,* because the divine essence is not properly an image. The second on the ground of *falsity,* because the Son is not *our* image; and also concerning what he says, that man is not image, but *to the image.* The third he refutes on the ground of *uncertainty,* because he has no authority for it from Scripture.

Another mode of exposition is of the *created The second mode* image, and this is threefold. — One, who so expounds *likewise threefold.* that *image* precedes *similitude;* and says that *image* is in natural things, and *similitude* in gratuitous things. A second, who so expounds that *similitude* accompanies *image;* and this one holds that *image* is in the power of knowing, *similitude* in the power of loving. A third mode, who so expounds that *image* follows *similitude* according to the thing; and this one says that *similitude* is in nature, and *image* in form[^10].

All these modes the Master approves and *To the incidental* sustains; and it seems probable enough that Scripture *question.* understands [the text] of the *created* image, although it can also be understood of the *uncreated.* For it is true that man is predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son of God; nor does the Master refute that position on the ground that this is not true, but because that image cannot properly be called *ours;* or also, because not only the *Son* is image, but also *man,* the contrary of which was being said in that mode of exposition.

To that, however, which is objected, that *image* cannot stand for the *created* image; it must be said that, on the contrary, *image* is taken in abstraction; and so *Note.* it can be said that man comes to be *to the image,* just as a tablet is said to come to be to the image, when the image of Hercules is impressed upon it. Hence it is that man is not only image, but also *to the image,* because not according to everything which he is[^11] is he image, indeed he differs from the image; whereas the Son according to everything which he is, is the image of the Father, and therefore he alone is *image,* not *to the image.*

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *That image was not made altogether equal, as not born from him, but created by him.* For what is created is not by *nature,* but by *art;* but what is by art is not univocated with what is by nature, indeed it is equivocated[^12]: therefore *image* is said equivocally of the Son of God and of man.

**I respond:** It must be said that *image,* concerning the Son of God and concerning man, is neither said *equivocally,* nor said *Note.* *univocally,* but *analogically* according to prior and posterior. — To what therefore is objected, that that which is created is from *art;* it must be said that there is a certain art whose operation follows *nature;* and the work of that art is *artificial* in such a way that it is not *natural;* and therefore the work of that art together with the work of nature in the same name produce an equivocation, as a *painted* man and a *true* man. There is a certain art which is the *foundation* of nature, and the work of that art is indeed *natural,* because it fabricates nature itself, and such is the art whose work is *to create*[^13]; and therefore there will not need to be an equivocation. — *Another solution.* Or it must be said that the reason there is an equivocation, when it is said *painted* man and *true* man, is because this name *man* is primarily and principally imposed upon the *true* man; and therefore, when it is said of the *painted* man, the acceptation is different and the signification is different. Not so is *image* primarily and principally imposed upon the Son of God, but upon everything which expressly represents another[^14].

---

la: August., II. de Trin. c. 10. n. 18: *Trinitas quippe inseparabiliter operatur.* Cfr. ibid. l. c. 4. n. 7. et c. 6. n. 12.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* II, c. 10, n. 18: *For the Trinity works inseparably.* Cf. ibid., l. c. 4, n. 7 and c. 6, n. 12.

la: Scilicet sexto. Cfr. Gen. 1, 24. seqq. et supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Namely, the sixth. Cf. Genesis 1, 24 ff. and above, dist. 15, art. 2, q. 2.

la: Alluditur ad etymologiam nominis *persona,* a Boethio, *de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi,* c. 3, datam: *Persona vero dicta est a personando* etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. — Vat. perperam *ulli personae* pro *nisi personae.*

en: Allusion is made to the etymology of the name *person,* given by Boethius, *On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ,* c. 3: *Person, however, is so called from "to person" (personando)* etc. Cf. I Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1. — The Vatican edition wrongly reads *ulli personae* for *nisi personae.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. — Vat. *unius Dei* pro *unius diei.* — Idem dubium resolvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 55. m. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. II. q. 64; Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above, dist. 15, art. 2, q. 2. — The Vatican edition reads *unius Dei* for *unius diei.* — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 55, m. 2; Blessed Albert, *Summa* part II, tract II, q. 64; Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the letter.

la: Vide supra d. 10. a. 3. q. 2.

en: See above, dist. 10, art. 3, q. 2.

la: Hoc dubium proponitur etiam a Petro a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also proposed by Peter of Tarentaise, here on the letter.

la: Vers. 29: *Nam quos praescivit et praedestinavit* etc.

en: Verse 29: *For whom he foreknew, he also predestined* etc.

en: Genesis 1, 26.

la: Hic c. 3.

en: Here at c. 3.

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 3. — Vat. *secundum esse* pro *secundum rem.*

en: Cf. above, art. 2, q. 3. — The Vatican edition reads *secundum esse* for *secundum rem.*

la: In pluribus codd. et in Vat. desideratur *est.* — De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 55. m. 3. et q. 62. m. 5. a. 1. et 3; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 64; S. Thom., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 7. seq.

en: In several codices and in the Vatican edition *est* is wanting. — On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part II, q. 55, m. 3 and q. 62, m. 5, a. 1 and 3; Blessed Albert, *Summa* part II, tract 11, q. 64; St. Thomas, here on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here, dub. lit. 7 seq.

la: Boeth., I. de Praedicam. sive in Categorias Aristotelis, c. *de Aequivocis: Alia vero, quae nomine quidem congruunt, definitionibus discrepant: ut est homo vivens et homo pictus... et haec vocantur aequivoca.*

en: Boethius, I *On the Predicaments* or *On Aristotle's Categories,* c. *On Equivocals: But others, which agree indeed in name, differ in definitions: as is a living man and a painted man... and these are called equivocals.*

la: Sub hoc respectu August., VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11. de Filio Dei ait, quod sit «ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium». — Vat. *fabricat ipsum natura* pro *fabricat ipsam naturam.*

en: Under this aspect Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI, c. 10, n. 11, says of the Son of God, that he is «a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the unchangeable living reasons». — The Vatican edition reads *fabricat ipsum natura* for *fabricat ipsam naturam.*

la: Hoc dubium solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 61. m. 3. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 7.

en: This doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part I, q. 61, m. 3, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 7. ---

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 17

title_alt:
Distinctio XVII — Littera Magistri
Distinction 17 — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 408 -->

### DISTINCTIO XVII.

### Cap. I.
### *De creatione animae, an de aliquo facta sit.*

Hic de origine animae plura quaeri solent, scilicet unde creata fuerit, et *quando*, et *quam gratiam* habuerit in creatione. — Sicut hominis formatio secundum corpus describitur, cum dicitur[^1]: *Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae*, ita eiusdem secundum animam factura describitur, cum subditur: *Et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae.*

### Cap. II.
### *De insufflatione et inspiratione Dei; quando facta fuerit anima, an in corpore, an extra*[^2].

*Quaestio 1.* Corpus enim de limo terrae formavit Deus, et *animam inspiravit*; vel secundum aliam litteram *flavit*, vel *sufflavit*, non quod faucibus sufflaverit, vel manibus corporeis corpus formaverit; spiritus enim non est lineamentis membrorum compositus. *Opinio haeretica.* Non carnaliter putemus, Deum corporeis manibus formasse corpus, vel faucibus inspirasse animam, sed pro homine de limo terrae secundum corpus formando iubendo, volendo, id est voluit et verbo suo iussit ut ita fieret; *et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae*, id est substantiam animae, in qua viveret, creavit, non de materia aliqua corporali vel spirituali, sed de nihilo.

Putaverunt enim quidam haeretici, Deum de sua substantia animam creasse, verbis Scripturae pertinaciter inhaerentes, quibus dicitur: *Inspiravit* vel *insufflavit* etc. Cum flat, inquiunt, vel spirat homo, de flatum emittit; sic ergo, cum dicitur Deus *flasse* vel *spirasse spiraculum in faciem hominis*, ex se spiritum hominis emisisse intelligitur, id est de sua substantia. *Impugnatur.* Qui hoc dicunt, non capiunt, tropica locutione dici esse *sufflavit* vel *flavit*, id est flatum hominis, scilicet animam fecit. *Flare* enim est flatum facere, *flasse* est animam facere. Unde Dominus per Isaiam[^3]: *Omnem flatum ego feci.* Non sunt ergo audiendi qui putant, animam esse partem Dei. Si enim hoc esset, nec a se nec ab alio decipi posset, nec ad malum faciendum vel patiendum compelli, nec in melius vel deterius mutari. Flatus ergo, quo hominem animavit, factus est *a Deo*, non *de Deo* nec de aliqua materia, sed de nihilo.

*Quaestio 2.* Sed utrum *in corpore*, an *extra* corpus, etiam inter doctos scrupulosa quaestio est. — Augustinus enim super Genesim[^4] tradit, animam cum Angelis *Opinio 1.* sine corpore fuisse creatam, postea vero ad corpus accessisse: «Neque compulsa est incorporari, sed naturaliter illud voluit, id est sic creata fuit, ut vellet; sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere. Male autem velle vivere, non naturae, sed voluntatis est perversae». *Opinio 2.* Alii vero dicunt, animam primi hominis in corpore fuisse creatam, ita exponentes verba illa: *Inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae*, id est animam in corpore creavit, quae totum corpus animaret; *faciem* tamen specialiter expressit, quia haec pars sensibus ornata est ad intuenda superiora. Sed quidquid de anima primi hominis aestimetur, de aliis certissime sentiendum est, quod in corpore creantur. Creando enim infundit eas Deus et infundendo creat. Dicendum est etiam, animam illam non sic esse creatam, ut praescia esset operis futuri iusti, vel iniusti[^5].

### Cap. III.
### *In qua aetate factus fuit homo.*

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum Deus hominem repente in virili aetate fecerit, an perficiendo et aetates augendo, sicut nunc format in matris utero. — *Augustinus.* Augustinus super Genesim[^6] dicit, quod Adam in virili aetate continuo factus est, et hoc secundum superiores, non *Causae superiores.* inferiores causas, id est secundum voluntatem et potentiam Dei, quam naturae generibus non alligavit, qualiter et virga Moysi conversa est in draconem. Nec

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talia contra naturam fiunt nisi *nobis*, quibus aliter naturae cursus innotuit; *Deo* autem natura est quod facit. Non ergo contra dispositionem suam illud fecit Deus. Erat enim in prima causarum[^7] conditione, sic hominem *posse* fieri, sed non ibi erat necesse, ut sic *Dubium 1.* fieret; «hoc enim non erat in conditione creaturae, sed in beneplacito Creatoris, cuius voluntas necessitas est». «Hoc enim necessario futurum est quod vult et praescit. Multa vero secundum inferiores causas futura sunt, sed in praescientia Dei futura non sunt. Si autem ibi aliter futura sunt, potius futura sunt, sicut ibi sunt, ubi praescit ille qui non potest falli». «Sic ergo factus est Adam non secundum *inferiores* causas, quia non erat in rerum causis seminalibus, ut ita fieret, sed secundum *superiores*, non *contra* naturam operantes, quia in rerum causis naturalibus erat, ut ita posset fieri».

### Cap. IV.
### *Quare homo, extra paradisum creatus, in paradiso sit positus.*

*Hominem autem ita formatum tulit Deus*, ut Scriptura[^8] docet, *et posuit in paradiso voluptatis, quem plantaverat a principio*. His verbis aperte Moyses insinuat, quod homo, extra paradisum creatus, postmodum *Dubium 2.* in paradiso sit positus. Quod ideo factum dicitur, quia non erat in eo permansurus, vel ut non naturae, sed gratiae hoc assignaretur.

### Cap. V.
### *Quibus modis paradisus accipiatur.*

Intelligitur autem paradisus localis et corporalis, in quo homo locatus est. «Tres enim generales de paradiso sententiae sunt: una eorum qui corporaliter intelligi volunt tantum; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo paradisum accipiunt. Tertiam mihi placere fateor, ut homo in corporali paradiso sit positus[^9]», qui ab illo principio plantatus accipi potest, quo terram omnem, remotis aquis, herbas et ligna producere iussit. «Qui etsi praesentis Ecclesiae vel futurae typum tenet, ad litteram tamen intelligendum est, esse locum amoenissimum, fructuosis arboribus magnum et magno fonte fecundum. Quod dicimus *a principio* antiqua translatio[^10] dicit *ad orientem*. *Dubium 3.* Unde volunt, in orientali parte esse paradisum, longo interiacente spatio vel maris vel terrae, a regionibus, quas incolunt homines, secretum et in alto situm, usque ad lunarem circulum pertingentem; unde nec aqua diluvii illuc pervenerunt[^11]».

In hoc autem paradiso erant ligna diversi generis, inter quae unum erat, quod vocatum est *lignum* *Dubium 4.* *vitae*, alterum vero *lignum scientiae boni et mali*.

### Cap. VI.
### *De ligno vitae.*

*Lignum* autem *vitae* dictum est, sicut docet Beda[^12] et Strabus, «quia divinitus accepit hanc vim, ut qui ex eius fructu comederet, corpus eius stabili sanitate et perpetua soliditate firmaretur nec ulla infirmitate vel aetatis imbecillitate in deterius vel in occasum laberetur».

### Cap. VII.
### *De ligno scientiae boni et mali.*

*Lignum* autem *scientiae boni et mali* non a natura hoc nomen accepit, sed ab occasione rei postea secutae. «Arbor enim illa non erat mala, sed *scientiae* *Glossa.* *boni et mali* ideo dicta est, quia post prohibitionem erat in illa transgressio futura, qua homo experiendo disceret, quid esset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Non ergo de fructu, qui nasceretur inde, positum est illud nomen, sed de *re transgressionem secutae*[^13]». *Notandum.* Cognovit enim homo, priusquam tangeret hoc lignum, bonum et malum; sed bonum per *prudentiam* et *experientiam*, malum vero per *prudentiam* tantum; quod etiam per *experientiam* novit, usurpato ligno vetito, quia per experientiam mali didicit, quid sit inter bonum obedientiae et malum inobedientiae. Si vero primi parentes obedientes essent nec contra praeceptum peccassent; non ideo tamen minus diceretur *lignum scientiae boni et mali*, quia hoc[^14] ex eius tactu accideret, si usurparetur. A ligno igitur pro- *Dubium 5.* hibitus est, quod malum non erat, ut ipsa praecepti conservatio bonum illi esset, transgressio malum. Nec melius consideratur, quantum malum sit inobedientia quam hoc modo, cum scilicet ideo reus factus esse homo intelligitur, quia prohibitus rem tetigit, quam si non prohibitus tetigisset, nec peccasset nec poenam sensisset. Si enim venenosam herbam prohibitus tetigeris, poena sequitur, etsi nemo prohibuisset[^15]; similiter sequeretur, si etiam prohiberetur res tangi, quae non tangenti tantum, sed prohibenti obest, sicut aliena pecunia: ideo prohibitum est peccatum, quia prohibenti est damnosum. Cum vero tangitur quod nec tangenti obest, si non prohibetur, nec cuilibet, si tangatur; ideo prohibetur, ut per se bonum obedientiae et malum inobedientiae monstretur; sicut primus homo, a re bona prohibitus, poenam incurrit, ut non ex re mala, sed ex inobedientia poena esse monstretur, sicut ex obedientia palma.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XVII.

### Chap. I.
### *On the creation of the soul, whether it was made from something.*

Concerning the origin of the soul many questions are wont to be raised, namely *whence* it was created, and *when*, and *what grace* it had at its creation. — Just as the formation of man with respect to the body is described, when it is said[^1]: *God formed man of the slime of the earth*, so the making of the same with respect to the soul is described, when it is added: *And he breathed into his face the breath of life.*

### Chap. II.
### *On God's inbreathing and inspiration; when the soul came to be, whether in the body, or outside it*[^2].

*Question 1.* For God formed the body from the slime of the earth, and *breathed in* the soul; or, according to another reading, *blew*, or *blew upon* — not that he blew through any throat, nor that he formed the body with bodily hands; for the spirit is not composed of the lineaments of bodily members. *Heretical opinion.* Let us not think carnally that God formed the body with bodily hands, or breathed in the soul through some mouth; rather, in respect of forming man's body from the slime of the earth, "by commanding and willing" — that is, he willed it and by his word commanded that it be so; *and he breathed into his face the breath of life*, that is, he created the substance of the soul, in which it might live, not from any bodily or spiritual matter, but from nothing.

For certain heretics supposed that God created the soul from his own substance, clinging stubbornly to the words of Scripture by which it is said: he "breathed in" or "breathed upon," etc. When a man blows or breathes — they say — he emits breath out of himself; so therefore, when God is said to have *blown* or *breathed* a breath into the face of man, he is understood to have emitted the spirit of man out of himself, that is, of his own substance. *Refuted.* Those who say this do not perceive that the phrases "he breathed upon" or "he blew" are spoken figuratively — that is, he made the breath of man, namely the soul. For to *blow* is to make a breath, and to have *blown* is to have made a soul. Hence the Lord through Isaiah[^3]: *Every breath have I made.* Therefore those are not to be heard who hold that the soul is a part of God. For if it were so, it could be deceived neither by itself nor by another, nor be compelled to do or suffer evil, nor be changed for the better or for the worse. The breath therefore by which he gave life to man was made *by God*, not *of God* nor of any matter, but from nothing.

*Question 2.* But whether *in the body* or *outside* the body is a scrupulous question even among the learned. — For Augustine on Genesis[^4] hands down that the soul *Opinion 1.* was created together with the angels apart from a body, and afterwards came to the body: "Nor was it compelled to be incorporated, but naturally willed it" — that is, it was so created that it should will it; "just as it is natural to us to will to live. But to will to live ill belongs not to nature but to a perverse will." *Opinion 2.* Others, however, say that the soul of the first man was created in the body, thus expounding those words *He breathed into his face the breath of life*, that is, he created in the body a soul which should animate the whole body; yet he specifically named the *face*, because this part is adorned with senses for gazing on higher things. But whatever may be thought concerning the soul of the first man, of the rest it is to be held most certainly that they are created in the body. For in creating them God infuses them, and in infusing he creates. It must also be said that that soul was not so created as to be foreknowing of a future just or unjust work[^5].

### Chap. III.
### *In what age man was made.*

It is also wont to be asked whether God made man at once in the prime of manhood, or by perfecting him and advancing him through the ages, as he now forms him in the mother's womb. — *Augustine.* Augustine on Genesis[^6] says that Adam was made at once in the prime of manhood, and this according to the higher *Higher causes.* and not the lower causes — that is, according to the will and power of God, which he did not bind to the kinds of nature, just as Moses's rod also was turned into a serpent. Nor

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are such things done against nature except *for us*, to whom the course of nature has become known otherwise; but to *God* nature is what he does. God therefore did not do that against his own disposition. For it was in the first condition of the causes[^7] that man should *be able* to come to be in this way, yet there it was not necessary that he should so come to be; *Doubt 1.* "for this was not in the condition of the creature, but in the good pleasure of the Creator, whose will is necessity." "For that is necessarily to come which he both wills and foreknows. Many things, however, are 'to come' according to lower causes, but in the foreknowledge of God they are not to come. But if there they are otherwise to come, they are rather to come as they are there, where he foreknows them who cannot be deceived." "So therefore Adam was made not according to the *lower* causes — because it was not in the seminal causes of things that he should so be made — but according to the *higher*, which do not work *against* nature, because it was in the natural causes of things that he should be able so to be made."

### Chap. IV.
### *Why man, having been created outside paradise, was placed in paradise.*

*And God took man thus formed* — as Scripture[^8] teaches — *and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, which he had planted from the beginning.* By these words Moses plainly intimates that man, having been created outside paradise, was afterwards placed in paradise. *Doubt 2.* And this is said to have been done because he was not to remain in it, or in order that this might be ascribed not to nature but to grace.

### Chap. V.
### *In what senses paradise is to be taken.*

Now paradise is understood as a local and bodily place, in which man was set. "For there are three general opinions concerning paradise: one of those who would have it understood only bodily; another of those who would have it only spiritually; a third of those who take paradise in both ways. The third pleases me, I confess, so that man was set in a bodily paradise[^9]" — which can be taken to be from that beginning when, the waters being removed, he commanded the whole earth to bring forth grasses and trees. "Which, although it bears the figure of the present or future Church, must nevertheless be understood according to the letter to be a most pleasant place, great with fruitful trees and abounding with a great fountain. What we say *from the beginning* the ancient translation[^10] says *toward the east*. *Doubt 3.* Whence they hold that paradise is in the eastern part, secluded by a long intervening space, whether of sea or of land, from the regions which men inhabit, and set on high, reaching up to the lunar circle; whence even the waters of the flood did not reach to that place[^11]."

In this paradise, moreover, there were trees of various kinds, among which there was one which was called the *tree* *Doubt 4.* *of life*, and another the *tree of the knowledge of good and evil*.

### Chap. VI.
### *On the tree of life.*

The *tree* of *life* was so called, as Bede[^12] and Strabus teach, "because it received divinely this power, that whoever should eat of its fruit, his body should be made firm with stable health and perpetual soundness, and should not slip into the worse or into decay through any infirmity or weakness of age."

### Chap. VII.
### *On the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

The *tree* of *the knowledge of good and evil* did not receive this name from nature, but from the occasion of the thing which afterwards followed. "For that tree was not evil, but was called *of the knowledge* *Gloss.* *of good and evil* because, after the prohibition, the transgression was to be in it, by which man, by experience, should learn what was the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. The name therefore was not placed upon it from the fruit which would be born from it, but from *the thing that followed the transgression*[^13]." *Note.* For man knew, before he touched this tree, good and evil — but the good by *prudence* and *experience*, the evil by *prudence* only; which also he came to know by *experience*, the forbidden tree having been usurped, because by the experience of evil he learned what lies between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. Yet even if the first parents had been obedient and had not sinned against the precept, it would nonetheless have been called the *tree of the knowledge of good and evil*, since this[^14] would befall through the touch of it, if it should be usurped. From the tree, therefore, *Doubt 5.* he was forbidden — a thing which was not evil — so that the very keeping of the precept should be a good to him, and the transgression an evil. Nor is it better considered how great an evil disobedience is than in this manner: when, that is, man is understood to have been made guilty for this reason, that, having been forbidden, he touched a thing which, if he had not been forbidden, he would neither have sinned in touching nor would have suffered any penalty. For if you touch, having been forbidden, a poisonous herb, the penalty follows even though no one had forbidden it[^15]; likewise it would follow if a thing should be forbidden to be touched which is harmful, not only to the one touching but to the one forbidding, as is another's money: a thing is therefore forbidden as sinful because it is harmful to him who forbids. But when there is touched something which is not harmful to the one touching if it be not forbidden, nor to anyone whatsoever if it be touched, then it is forbidden in order that the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience may be made manifest through it itself; just as the first man, forbidden from a good thing, incurred a penalty, so that the penalty might be shown to be not from an evil thing but from the disobedience — as the palm of victory is from obedience.

---

la: Gen. 2, 7. — Hoc et seq. cap. Magister sumsit ex August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. 2. 3; et deinde a verbis *Sed utrum in corpore* etc. ex eodem libro, c. 24. Cfr. et Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. 6. c. 3; cod. Erf. remittit ad Gandolph. II. Sent.

en: Gen. 2, 7. — This and the following chapter the Master took from Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, cc. 1, 2, 3; and thereafter, from the words *But whether in the body* etc., from the same book, c. 24. Cf. also Hugh, *On the Sacraments* I, p. 6, c. 3; codex Erf. refers it to Gandulph, *II Sent.*

la: Secundum codd. Magister incipit cap. II. in media propositione ultima capituli I., scil. cum verbis: *ita eiusdem factura* etc.

en: According to the codices the Master begins chap. II in the middle of the last sentence of chap. I, namely with the words *so the making of the same* etc.

la: Cap. 57, 16, secundum Septuaginta; Vulgata: *Et flatus ego faciam.*

en: Isaiah 57, 16, according to the Septuagint; the Vulgate reads: *Et flatus ego faciam* ("And I shall make breath").

la: Loc. cit. c. 25. 27. Cod. Erf. addit: *Hoc non asserit Augustinus.* — Paulo superius post *extra corpus* cod. C adiicit *sit anima*. — Quae sequuntur inveniuntur loc. cit. c. 28.

en: Loc. cit. cc. 25, 27. Codex Erf. adds: *Augustine does not assert this.* — A little earlier, after *outside the body*, codex C inserts *be the soul*. — What follows is found at the same place, c. 28.

la: Cfr. supra dist. IV. et infra dist. XXIII. c. 4. — Propositio praecedens est Augustini, loc. cit. c. 26.

en: Cf. above, dist. IV, and below, dist. XXIII, c. 4. — The preceding proposition is Augustine's, loc. cit. c. 26.

la: Libr. VI. c. 13. 14. 15. 17. — Postea alluditur ad Exod. 7, 10.

en: Book VI, cc. 13, 14, 15, 17. — Afterwards there is an allusion to Exodus 7, 10.

la: Plurimae edd. cum Vat. *creaturarum*, refragantibus codd.

en: Very many editions with the Vatican read *creaturarum* ("of creatures"), against the codices.

la: August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 1. 4., et habetur in Glossa ord.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 1, nn. 1, 4, and it is contained in the *Glossa ordinaria*.

la: Id est Septuag. Cfr. August., loc. cit. c. 3. — Subinde, post *volunt* edd. 1. 8 subiiciunt *quidam*.

en: That is, the Septuagint. Cf. Augustine, loc. cit. c. 3. — Immediately after, following *they hold*, editions 1 and 8 insert *certain (people)*.

la: Beda, Hexaem. ad Gen. 2, 9, et est in Glossa. Ad verba *in alto situm* etc. cod. Erf. annotat: *Illud non est Bedae, sed Strabi in quadam Glossa ibid.* *Lunarem* hyperbolice dictum est, i. e. altius omni terra, secundum Damascenum. cfr. Coment. dub. 3.

en: Bede, *Hexaemeron* on Gen. 2, 9, and it is in the *Gloss*. To the words *set on high* etc. codex Erf. notes: *This is not from Bede but from Strabus in a certain Gloss on the same passage.* *Lunar* is said hyperbolically, that is, higher than all the earth, according to Damascene. Cf. the *Commentary* dub. 3.

la: Beda, Hexaem. ad Gen. 2, 9, et habetur hoc sicut et Strabi sententia in Glossa ord. Sumtae sunt hae sententiae ex August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3.

en: Bede, *Hexaemeron* on Gen. 2, 9; and this, like the opinion of Strabus, is contained in the *Glossa ordinaria*. These opinions are taken from Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 3.

la: Ex Glossa ord. ad Gen. 2, 9. Cfr. August., XIV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 31. In eod. libr. c. 15. invenies et quae sequuntur. Cfr. August., ibid. c. 13. n. 28. 29. Ultima verba cap. respiciunt Prov. 21, 28: *Vir obediens loquetur victoriam.*

en: From the *Glossa ordinaria* on Gen. 2, 9. Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* XIV, c. 14, n. 31. In the same book, c. 15, you will also find what follows. Cf. Augustine, ibid. c. 13, nn. 28, 29. The closing words of the chapter regard Prov. 21, 28: *The obedient man shall speak of victory.*

la: Solummodo Vat. *haec.*

en: Only the Vatican edition reads *haec* ("these things").

la: Edd. 1–9 ita habent: *prohibuisset, similiter sequeretur. Si etiam.* Subinde Vat. et codd. A C *prohibetur* pro *prohiberetur*.

en: Editions 1–9 read: *prohibuisset, similiter sequeretur. Si etiam.* Likewise, the Vatican and codices A, C read *prohibetur* in place of *prohiberetur*. ---

translators_notes:
- **Capitula count.** 7 capitula (Cap. I–VII): I *De creatione animae*; II *De insufflatione et inspiratione Dei*; III *In qua aetate factus fuit homo*; IV *Quare homo, extra paradisum creatus, in paradiso sit positus*; V *Quibus modis paradisus accipiatur*; VI *De ligno vitae*; VII *De ligno scientiae boni et mali*.
- **Page span.** Printed pp. 408–409 (PDF pp. 430–431). Opens on p. 408 L band 0 bottom with `DISTINCTIO XVII. — Cap. I.` immediately after d16-dubia DUB IV close (*Vel dicendum, quod...*). Closes on p. 409 R band 1 bottom at *...sicut ex obedientia palma.*, immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.` opener at raw 28895 / p. 410 L band 0.
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  - p. 408 R band 2 footers 2–6 = [^2]–[^6] (codex variant; Isa. 57, 16 LXX/Vulg.; Aug. *de Gen. ad lit.* VIII c. 25. 27 + codd. variants; cross-ref to d. IV / d. XXIII; Aug. VI c. 13–17 + Exod. 7, 10).
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  - p. 409 R band 2 footers 6–9 = [^12]–[^15] (Bede + Strabus on Gen. 2, 9; *Glossa ord.* on Gen. 2, 9 + Aug. XIV cc. 13–15 + Prov. 21, 28; Vat. *haec* variant; edd. 1–9 *prohibuisset, similiter sequeretur. Si etiam* + Vat./codd. A C *prohibetur* variant).
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XVII — De productione Adae quoad principia constituentia.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XVII — On the production of Adam with respect to his constituent principles.

source_text:
<!-- page 410 -->

# COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.
## *De productione Adae quoad principia constituentia.*

*Hic de origine animae plura quaeri solent etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de productione hominis in comparatione ad principium *extra*; in hac vero parte agit de productione eius quantum ad principia constitutiva[^1], scilicet quantum ad corpus et animam. Dividitur autem ista pars in duas. In prima determinat de productione viri; in secunda vero de productione mulieris ex viro, infra: *In eodem quoque paradiso mulierem formavit* etc., distinctione decima octava, in principio.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de hominis formatione; in secunda de hominis formati[^2] locatione, ibi: *Hominem autem ita formatum* etc.

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat de productione animae in se; in secunda vero in relatione ad corpus, ibi: *Sed utrum in corpore, an extra corpus* etc.

Pars autem illa, in qua determinat de productione animae in se, habet duas. In prima determinat veritatem; in secunda removet errorem, ibi: *Putaverunt enim quidam haeretici* etc.

Similiter illa pars, in qua determinat de productione animae in comparatione ad corpus, habet duas. In prima determinat, utrum Deus creaverit animam in corpore, an extra corpus. In secunda quaerit, utrum Deus fecerit hominem in aetate perfecta, ibi: *Solet etiam quaeri, utrum Deus hominem repente* etc.

Similiter pars illa, in qua determinat de locatione iam formati, habet duas. In prima determinat de loco eius in se. In secunda vero determinat in comparatione ad contenta, ibi: *In hoc autem paradiso erant ligna* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio de productione hominis quantum ad duo.

Primo quaeritur de productione ipsius, quantum est ex parte animae.

Secundo, quantum est ex parte corporis.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum anima primi hominis producta sit de Dei substantia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum producta fuerit ex aliqua materia.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum producta fuerit ante corpus, vel post, sive in corpore, an extra.

### ARTICULUS I.
#### *De productione hominis quoad animam.*

---

english:
<!-- page 410 -->

# COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII.
## *On the production of Adam with respect to his constituent principles.*

*Concerning the origin of the soul many things are wont to be asked, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the production of man in relation to the principle *from without*; in this part, however, he treats of his production with respect to his constituent principles[^1], namely with respect to body and soul. Now this part is divided into two. In the first he determines concerning the production of the man; in the second concerning the production of the woman from the man, below: *In the same paradise also he formed the woman* etc., in distinction eighteen, at the beginning.

The first part has two [sections]. In the first he determines concerning the formation of man; in the second concerning the placing of the man already formed[^2], at: *But the man having been thus formed* etc.

The first part has two [sections]. In the first he determines concerning the production of the soul in itself; in the second concerning [its production] in relation to the body, at: *But whether in the body, or outside the body* etc.

Now that part in which he determines concerning the production of the soul in itself has two [sections]. In the first he determines the truth; in the second he removes an error, at: *For certain heretics have supposed* etc.

Likewise that part in which he determines concerning the production of the soul in relation to the body has two [sections]. In the first he determines whether God created the soul in the body or outside the body. In the second he asks whether God made man at the perfect age, at: *It is also wont to be asked whether God [made] man all at once* etc.

Likewise that part in which he determines concerning the placing of [man] already formed has two [sections]. In the first he determines concerning his place in itself. In the second he determines [it] in comparison with its contents, at: *Moreover in this paradise there were trees* etc.

### TRACTATION OF QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, a question arises here concerning the production of man with respect to two [things].

First, there is asked concerning the production of him insofar as it is on the part of the soul.

Second, insofar as it is on the part of the body.

Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked.

First, it is asked whether the soul of the first man was produced from the substance of God.

Second, it is asked whether it was produced from some matter.

Third, it is asked whether it was produced before the body, or after, or in the body, or outside.

### ARTICLE I.
#### *On the production of man with respect to the soul.*

---

la: Plures codd. *constituentia.*

en: Several codices [read] *constituentia* [in the neuter plural].

la: Vat. *hominis iam formati.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *of the man already formed.* ---

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title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De productione hominis quoad animam.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum anima humana sit ex Dei substantia.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima humana sit ex Dei substantia:

**Ad oppositum:**

1. *Primo* auctoritate, Genesis secundo[^1]: *Inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae*; sed inspiratio est per egressum alicuius ab intrinseco: ergo sicut Spiritus sanctus, qui est eiusdem naturae cum spirante, sic humanus spiritus, qui fuit inspiratus a Deo, est de natura divina. Si tu dicas, quod insufflatio vel inspiratio potest esse rei diversae per naturam; *obiicitur*, quia Glossa dicit super illud Ioannis[^2]: *Insufflavit eos et dixit eis: Accipite* etc.: Augustinus dicit ibi, quod in hoc ostendit, ex se procedere Spiritum sanctum: si ergo Deus insufflavit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae, videtur, quod spiritum hominis produxit ex se.

2. *Item*, Ecclesiastis ultimo[^3]: *Donec pulvis re-*
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*vertatur in terram, unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum*: si igitur spiritus redit ad Deum, sicut pulvis redit ad terram, sicut homo quantum ad carnem est de terra, ita videtur, quod quantum ad spiritum est de Dei substantia.

3. *Item*, Actuum decimo septimo[^4]: *Genus enim Dei sumus, sicut quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt*; sed quae sunt eiusdem generis sunt eiusdem naturae: ergo nos et Deus sumus eiusdem naturae. Sed non quantum ad corpus; ergo quantum ad animam: ergo anima est de Dei substantia.

4. *Item*, *ratione* videtur. Omnia corporalia producuntur ex aliqua materia, quae est in omnibus corporalibus una: ergo pari ratione spiritualia producuntur ex aliqua spirituali natura, quae in omnibus spiritibus sit una; sed spiritualis substantia, in omnibus reperta per identitatem, non est nisi divina: ergo anima facta est ex Dei substantia[^5].

5. *Item*, solus Deus est immortalis per naturam[^6], ergo nulli convenit immortalitas per naturam, nisi quod est vel Deus, vel ex Deo; nulli autem convenit esse imaginem Dei, nisi cui convenit esse immortalem per naturam — «non enim esset imago, sicut dicit Augustinus, si mortis termino clauderetur» — si igitur anima rationalis naturaliter est imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis: ergo de Dei substantia producta fuit.

6. *Item*, Deus est lux spiritualis, quae est fons omnis illuminationis spiritualis, sicut sol est fons illuminationis corporalis; sed corpora luminosa sunt eiusdem naturae cum luce et cum sole: ergo pari ratione spiritus naturaliter luminosi sunt eiusdem naturae cum fonte lucis spiritualis[^7]. Sed quidquid est eiusdem naturae cum Deo, vel est Deus, vel de Deo: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

*Fundamenta.*

1. Genesis primo[^8]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram*; hoc non est dictum secundum corpus, ergo secundum animam: ergo anima hominis est facta; et circa divinam naturam non cadit factio vel mutatio: ergo non est ex Dei natura sive substantia.

2. *Item*, si anima est ex Dei natura, cum anima sit pars hominis, Dei natura venit ad constitutionem hominis; sed pars est minus nobilis quam totum: ergo Deus est minus nobilis quam homo. Sed hoc est falsum et impium[^9]: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, si anima est ex divina natura, aut ergo habet aliquam formam superinductam illi naturae, ex qua est, aut nullam. Si nullam: ergo non videtur esse nec facta nec a Deo diversa. Si aliquam: ergo divina natura est ipsius animae materia. Sed quod est materiale principium alicuius est minus completum et imperfectum[^10]: ergo Deus est incompletus et imperfectus per naturam; quod est blasphemia.

4. *Item*, si anima est ex Dei substantia; et anima depravatur: ergo contingit, divinam substantiam depravari; et si contingit, Dei substantiam depravari, Deus non est summe bonus. Cum igitur rationalis spiritus peccare possit, sicut patet, rationalis spiritus non est ex Deo.

5. *Item*, si anima est ex Deo, aut igitur per *generationem*, aut per *spirationem*. Si *primo* modo, tunc anima nihil aliud est quam Verbum; si *secundo*, tunc anima non est aliud quam Spiritus sanctus: ergo omnis homo esset Deus.

6. *Item*, si anima hominis esset ex Deo, aut de *toto* Deo, aut de *parte*. Si de *parte*: ergo Deus est compositus et habet partem et partem; quod est omnino falsum[^11]. Si de *toto*; sed Deus est immensus et infinitus: ergo cuiuslibet hominis anima est immensa et infinita. Et si hoc, quilibet homo est omnipotens; quod nullus dubitat esse falsum.

### Conclusio.

> Anima humana non est producta ex Dei substantia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquorum positio fuit, *Opinio 1.* quod intellectus humanus non erat aliud quam intellectus divinus; sed divinus intellectus dicebatur, prout considerabatur in se, humanus vero, prout perficiebat corpus aliquod. — *Improbatur.* Sed cum Deus nullius sit pars constitutiva propter suam summam perfectionem et absolutionem, positio haec fuit stulta et erronea.

Est et alia positio non minus stulta et impia, *Opinio 2.*
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Manichaeorum videlicet, quod spiritus rationalis sit de Dei substantia et natura. Dicunt enim, quod in homine est duplex anima, sicut recitat Augustinus in libro *de Duabus Animabus*[^12], quarum una inclinat ad bona, et alia inclinat ad mala; et illa quae facit bona, nunquam potest facere mala; et illa quae facit mala, nunquam potest facere bona; et illa quae inclinat ad faciendum bonum, est de Dei natura. — *Refellitur.* Sed haec positio multipliciter a veritate est aliena. Primum, quia ponit, Deum eiusdem naturae esse cum creatura et alicuius creaturae esse materiam, cum ponit, creaturam fieri ex Dei substantia. Et ad hanc positionem sequuntur innumerabilia inconvenientia, et hoc praecipuum est, quia implicat in se duo opposita, dum ponit, animam a Deo esse factam, et eam esse de substantia divina. — Deviat etiam a veritate in hoc, quod ponit in nobis duas animas; sed huius improbatio melius tangetur infra[^13].

Et ideo tertia positio est vera et catholica. *Sententia catholica et conclusio.* Anima non est producta de Dei substantia. Deus enim ad creaturas se habet in ratione *efficientis* et *formalis*[^14] et *finis*; sed nullo modo potest se habere in ratione *materialis*, quantumcumque creatura sit nobilis. Et ideo rationes hoc probantes concedendae sunt.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

1. *Ad illud* vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod *inspiravit in faciem eius* etc.; dicendum, quod *inspirare* idem est ibi quod spiritum facere et factum corpori infundere; similiter et *insufflare* est flatum hominis facere et factum corpori infundere[^15]. Unde sicut, quando Deus res produxit *dicendo*, non fuit ibi vox materialis, sic, quando *insufflavit*, non fuit mediantibus faucibus et instrumentis corporalibus. Et ideo non valet illud simile de Ioannis vigesimo[^16], ubi ad litteram: *sufflavit*, et illa insufflatio erat processionis Spiritus sancti signatio et ostensio.

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur de Ecclesiaste: *Et spiritus redeat ad Deum* etc.; dicendum, quod sicut corporis resolutio stat, cum perventum est ad terram, sic mutabilitas animae tunc demum stat, quando coniungitur ei, secundum quem facta est. In solo enim Deo invenit perfectam quietem[^17]. Et ideo non vult Sapiens dicere, quod spiritus redeat ad Deum per corruptionem, sicut corpus in terram; sed similitudo est quantum ad quietationem.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod *genus Dei sumus*; dicendum, quod *genus* dupliciter accipi potest: *Genus dupliciter.* uno modo *proprie*; et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, quae conveniunt in aliqua forma et natura communi. Alio modo accipitur *large*; et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, in quibus est aliqua convenientia specialis secundum habitudinem analogiae. Et sic dicit Augustinus duodecimo *de Trinitate*[^18], quod anima *Notandum de luce creata.* «cognoscit in quadam luce sui generis»; et vocat illam lucem *lucem increatam*, quam dicit esse *sui generis* propter hoc, quod est spiritualis, sicut anima. Et sic intelligitur verbum Apostoli.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod corporalia sunt ex aliquo uno; respondendum est, quod hoc non concludit, quod spiritus rationales fiant ex Deo: illud enim unum, ex quo fiunt corporalia, est *ens in potentia* respectu illorum; Deus autem respectu nullius potest esse in potentia; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod spirituales substantiae producantur de divina natura.

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod solus Deus est immortalis per naturam; dicendum, quantum sufficit ad praesens — quia infra[^19] habebitur de immortalitate — quod immortalitas per naturam, dicta de Deo, intelligitur per privationem omnis gratiae, sive gratia dicat aliquid superadditum naturae, sive dicat gratuitam influentiam, per quam conservatur natura; quia Deus se ipso permanet, anima autem, etsi de sui natura sit ad permanendum idonea, tamen nunquam permaneret, nisi conservaretur per gratuitam Dei influentiam.

6. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod Deus est lux spiritualis etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile *Lux corporalis differt a spirituali.* de luce *spirituali* et *corporali* omnino. Lux enim *spiritualis*, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum. Cum autem sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem creatam aliquo modo sibi conformem; quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam
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producta est, nisi adsit ei summae lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendum est in anima humana, quod ipsa habet *lucem propriam*, scilicet creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et conservatur. Lux autem corporalis in diversis corporibus potest reperiri ut perfectio, cum non sit forma omnino simplex, sed sit nata coniungi materiae.

english:
### Article I. *On the production of man with regard to the soul.*
### Question I. *Whether the human soul is from the substance of God.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the human soul is from the substance of God:

**To the opposite [side]:**

1. *First*, by authority, Genesis chapter two[^1]: *He breathed into his face the breath of life*; but inspiration is by the going-forth of something from within: therefore just as the Holy Spirit, who is of the same nature with the one breathing forth, so the human spirit, which was breathed into [man] by God, is of the divine nature. If you say that an in-breathing or inspiration can belong to a thing of a different nature; the objection is raised, because the Gloss says on that text of John[^2]: *He breathed on them and said to them: Receive* etc.: Augustine says there that in this he shows that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself: if therefore God breathed into the face of man the breath of life, it seems that he produced the spirit of man from himself.

2. *Likewise*, the last [chapter] of Ecclesiastes[^3]: *Until the dust return to the earth, whence it was, and the spirit return to God who gave it*: if therefore the spirit returns to God just as the dust returns to the earth, just as man with respect to his flesh is of the earth, so it seems that with respect to his spirit he is of the substance of God.

3. *Likewise*, Acts chapter seventeen[^4]: *For we are of the race of God, as also certain of your poets have said*; but things which are of the same race (genus) are of the same nature: therefore we and God are of the same nature. But not with respect to the body; therefore with respect to the soul: therefore the soul is of the substance of God.

4. *Likewise*, it seems by reason. All corporeal things are produced from some matter, which is one in all corporeal things: therefore by parity of reasoning spiritual things are produced from some spiritual nature, which is one in all spirits; but a spiritual substance, found in all things by identity, is none other than the divine: therefore the soul has been made from the substance of God[^5].

5. *Likewise*, God alone is immortal by nature[^6]; therefore immortality by nature befits nothing save what is either God or from God; but nothing befits being the image of God except what befits being immortal by nature — «for it would not be an image, as Augustine says, if it were enclosed by the boundary of death» — if therefore the rational soul is naturally an image, it is therefore naturally immortal: therefore it was produced from the substance of God.

6. *Likewise*, God is a spiritual light, who is the fount of all spiritual illumination, just as the sun is the fount of corporeal illumination; but luminous bodies are of the same nature with light and with the sun: therefore by parity of reasoning naturally luminous spirits are of the same nature with the fount of spiritual light[^7]. But whatever is of the same nature with God is either God or from God: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

*Foundations.*

1. Genesis chapter one[^8]: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*; this is not said with respect to the body, therefore with respect to the soul: therefore the soul of man is made; and making or change does not fall upon the divine nature: therefore it is not from the nature or substance of God.

2. *Likewise*, if the soul is from the nature of God, since the soul is a part of man, the nature of God comes into the constitution of man; but a part is less noble than the whole: therefore God is less noble than man. But this is false and impious[^9]: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, if the soul is from the divine nature, either it has some form superinduced upon that nature from which it is, or none. If none: therefore it appears not to be made nor distinct from God. If some: therefore the divine nature is the matter of the soul itself. But that which is the material principle of something is less complete and imperfect[^10]: therefore God is incomplete and imperfect by nature; which is blasphemy.

4. *Likewise*, if the soul is from the substance of God; and the soul is depraved: therefore it happens that the divine substance is depraved; and if it happens that the substance of God is depraved, God is not the highest good. Since therefore the rational spirit can sin, as is plain, the rational spirit is not from God.

5. *Likewise*, if the soul is from God, then either by *generation*, or by *spiration*. If in the first way, then the soul is nothing other than the Word; if in the second, then the soul is nothing other than the Holy Spirit: therefore every man would be God.

6. *Likewise*, if the soul of man were from God, either from *all* of God, or from a *part*. If from a part: therefore God is composite and has part and part; which is wholly false[^11]. If from the whole; but God is immense and infinite: therefore the soul of any man is immense and infinite. And if this, then any man is omnipotent; which no one doubts to be false.

### Conclusion.

> The human soul is not produced from the substance of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the position of some was, *Opinion 1.* that the human intellect was nothing other than the divine intellect; but the divine intellect was so called insofar as it was considered in itself, the human, insofar as it perfected some body. — *It is refuted.* But since God is the constitutive part of nothing on account of his highest perfection and absoluteness, this position was foolish and erroneous.

There is also another position no less foolish and impious, *Opinion 2.* namely of the Manichaeans, that the rational spirit is of the substance and nature of God. For they say that in man there is a double soul, as Augustine recounts in the book *On the Two Souls*[^12], of which one inclines to the good, and the other inclines to evils; and that which does good can never do evil; and that which does evil can never do good; and that which inclines toward doing good is of the nature of God. — *It is refuted.* But this position is in many ways foreign to the truth. First, because it posits that God is of the same nature with the creature and that he is the matter of some creature, when it posits that the creature is made from the substance of God. And from this position there follow innumerable incongruities, and this is chief, that it implies in itself two opposites, when it posits that the soul is made by God, and that it is of the divine substance. — It also deviates from the truth in this, that it posits two souls in us; but the refutation of this is better treated below[^13].

And therefore the third position is true and catholic: *Catholic opinion and conclusion.* the soul is not produced from the substance of God. For God is related to creatures in the character of *efficient* and *formal*[^14] and *final* [cause]; but in no way can he be related in the character of *material*, however noble the creature be. And therefore the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposing [arguments].**

1. *To that* which is objected on the contrary, that *he breathed into his face* etc.; it must be said that *to inspire* is the same here as to make a spirit and to infuse what is made into a body; similarly *to breathe in* is to make the breath of man and to infuse what is made into the body[^15]. Hence just as, when God produced things *by speaking*, there was no material voice there, so, when he *breathed in*, it was not by means of jaws and corporeal instruments. And therefore that similarity drawn from John chapter twenty[^16] does not hold, where literally: *he breathed*, and that breathing-in was a signification and showing of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

2. *To that* which is objected from Ecclesiastes: *And the spirit return to God* etc.; it must be said that just as the resolution of the body stops when it has come to the earth, so the mutability of the soul finally stops when it is joined to him according to whom it was made. For in God alone does it find perfect rest[^17]. And therefore the Wise Man does not mean that the spirit returns to God by corruption, as the body to the earth; but the likeness is with respect to coming-to-rest.

3. *To that* which is objected, that *we are of the race of God*; it must be said that *race* (*genus*) can be taken in two ways: *Genus twofold.* in one way *properly*; and so some things are said to agree in genus, which agree in some common form and nature. In another way it is taken *broadly*; and so some things are said to agree in genus in which there is some special agreement according to the disposition of analogy. And so Augustine says in the twelfth [book] *On the Trinity*[^18] that the soul *Note on created light.* «knows in a certain light of its own kind»; and he calls that light an *uncreated light*, which he says is *of its own kind* on this account, that it is spiritual, just as the soul is. And so the word of the Apostle is to be understood.

4. *To that* which is objected, that corporeal things are from some one [thing]; it must be answered that this does not conclude that rational spirits come into being from God: for that one [thing], from which corporeal things come into being, is *being in potency* with respect to them; but God can be in potency with respect to nothing; and therefore from this it does not follow that spiritual substances are produced from the divine nature.

5. *To that* which is objected, that God alone is immortal by nature; it must be said, so far as suffices for the present — since immortality will be treated below[^19] — that immortality by nature, said of God, is understood by the privation of all grace, whether grace mean something superadded to nature, or whether it mean the gratuitous influence by which nature is conserved; because God remains by himself, but the soul, although by its own nature it is fit to remain, nevertheless would never remain unless it were conserved by the gratuitous influence of God.

6. *To that* which is objected, that God is a spiritual light etc.; it must be said that the case is not entirely alike *Corporeal light differs from spiritual.* concerning *spiritual* and *corporeal* light. For the *spiritual* light which God is, since it is most simple, cannot be the perfection of things of diverse natures. But since it is most omnipotent, it can produce and make a created light in some way conformed to itself; which nevertheless does not suffice for itself, even after it has been produced, unless the influence of the highest light be present to it. And so it must be understood in the human soul, that it has its *own light*, namely a created one, by which it is completed, which from the eternal light is both produced and conserved. But corporeal light can be found in diverse bodies as a perfection, since it is not a wholly simple form, but is born to be joined to matter.

la: Vers. 7. — Cfr. August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 3, et II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 8. n. 11, ubi hoc arg. tribuit Manichaeis.

en: Verse 7. — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter*, VII, c. 2, n. 3, and *On Genesis against the Manichaeans*, II, c. 8, n. 11, where he attributes this argument to the Manichaeans.

la: Cap. 20. 22: Insufflavit et dixit etc. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, sumta est ex August., in Ioan. tract. 121. n. 4: Insufflando significavit, Spiritum sanctum non Patris solius esse Spiritum, sed et suum.

en: Ch. 20, v. 22: «He breathed and said» etc. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is drawn from Augustine, *Tractates on John* 121, n. 4: «By breathing he signified that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father alone, but also his own».

la: Vers. 7: Et revertatur pulvis in terram etc.

en: Verse 7: «And let the dust return to the earth» etc.

la: Vers. 28: Sicut et quidam vestrorum poetarum dixerunt: Ipsius enim et genus sumus. — Vat. et ed. 4 *philosophorum nostrorum*, codd. cum ed. 1 *poetarum nostrorum* pro *poetarum vestrorum*.

en: Verse 28: «As also certain of your poets have said: For we are also his offspring». — The Vatican edition and edition 4 read *of our philosophers*; the codices with edition 1 read *of our poets* instead of *of your poets*.

la: Hoc arg. usus est David de Dinanto (circa an. 1204) in suo libro de tomis, hoc est de divisionibus, in quo docet, Deum esse principium materiale omnium, ut refert B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2. q. incid. et p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 2. Cfr. S. Thom., I. S. contr. Gent. c. 17; hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 3. a. 8.

en: This argument was used by David of Dinant (circa 1204) in his book *On Sections*, that is *On Divisions*, in which he teaches that God is the material principle of all things, as B. Albert reports, *Summa* p. I, tr. 4, q. 20, m. 2, q. incid., and p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 2. Cf. S. Thomas, I, *Summa contra Gentes*, c. 17; here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 3, a. 8.

la: Epist. 1. Tim. 6. 16: Qui solus habet immortalitatem. — Seq. textus Augustini invenitur in libro de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 18: Non enim poterat esse imago et similitudo Dei, si mortis termino clauderetur. Eadem propositio occurrit in Cassiodori libro de Anima, c. 8, et formata esse videtur ex iis quae dicit August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6.

en: Epistle 1 Tim. 6:16: «Who alone hath immortality». — The following text of Augustine is found in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 18: «For it could not be the image and likeness of God, if it were enclosed by the boundary of death». The same proposition occurs in Cassiodorus, *On the Soul*, c. 8, and seems to be formed from what Augustine says, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 3, n. 6.

la: Alluditur in hoc arg. ad opinionem Manichaeorum dicentium, Deum esse lucem visibilem. Cfr. August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 3. n. 6. et de Haeresibus, c. 46. — In maiori plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 bis habent *finis* pro *fons*.

en: In this argument allusion is made to the opinion of the Manichaeans saying that God is a visible light. Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manichaeans* I, c. 3, n. 6, and *On Heresies*, c. 46. — In the major [premise] many codices with edition 1 twice have *end* (*finis*) for *fount* (*fons*).

la: Vers. 26. — Cfr. de hoc et 4. arg. August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 3; c. 11. n. 17; II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 8. n. 11; I. de Anima et eius origine, c. 4. n. 4; Disput. contra Fortun. Manich. primae diei n. 11.

en: Verse 26. — Cf. on this and on the 4th argument Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 2, n. 3; c. 11, n. 17; *On Genesis against the Manichaeans* II, c. 8, n. 11; *On the Soul and its origin* I, c. 4, n. 4; *Disputation against Fortunatus the Manichaean*, of the first day, n. 11.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.

en: See I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 19, p. II, q. 3.

la: Non pauci codd. incongrue addunt *hoc*.

en: Not a few codices incongruously add *this* (*hoc*).

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. seqq. Cfr. I. Retract. c. 15. n. 1. — Paulo inferius in paucis codd. et in omnibus edd., excepta secunda, desideratur *et illa quae facit bona, nunquam potest facere mala*.

en: Ch. 1, n. 1 and following. Cf. *Retractations* I, c. 15, n. 1. — A little below, in a few codices and in all editions except the second, the phrase *and that which does good can never do evil* is lacking.

en: Distinction 31, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 34, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Intellige *exemplaris*, quod indicant codd. Y aa legendo *et formalis exemplaris*. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Paulo inferius post *nobilis* ed. 4 et Vat. subiungunt *quia quod se habet ut materiale respectu alicuius, est minus completum ipso*.

en: Understand *exemplary*, which codices Y aa indicate by reading *and exemplary formal*. Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — A little below, after *noble*, edition 4 and the Vatican edition add *because that which is related as material with respect to something is less complete than it*.

la: Eodem modo explicat August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 24. — Paulo superius post *et factum corpori* plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *insinuare*, Vat. cum ed. 4 *insinuare vel infundere* pro *infundere*. Paulo inferius Vat. *verbo* pro *dicendo*.

en: Augustine explains in the same way, *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 3, nn. 5 and following, and *On the City of God* XIII, c. 24. — A little above, after *and what is made into the body*, many codices with editions 2 and 3 read *to insinuate*; the Vatican edition with edition 4 reads *to insinuate or to infuse* instead of *to infuse*. A little below the Vatican edition reads *by a word* instead of *by speaking*.

la: Vers. 22. Textus graecus ἐνεφύσησε; idem verbum habetur in hac propositione ex Gen. 2, 7, de qua August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2: Ac primum illud videamus, quod scriptum est Flavit vel Sufflavit in faciem eius flatum vitae. Nonnulli enim codices habent Spiravit vel Inspiravit in faciem eius. Sed cum Graeci habeant ἐνεφύσησεν, non dubitatur, *flavit* vel *sufflavit* esse dicendum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Vat., omisso *ubi*, dein substituit *Insufflavit; nam illa pro sufflavit et illa*.

en: Verse 22. The Greek text [reads] ἐνεφύσησε; the same word occurs in the proposition from Gen. 2:7, on which Augustine, *On Genesis according to the letter* VII, c. 1, n. 2: «Let us first see what is written: *He breathed* or *He breathed in* into his face the breath of life. For some codices have *He inspired* or *He inspired into his face*. But since the Greeks have ἐνεφύσησεν, there is no doubt that one must say *flavit* or *sufflavit*». Cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 2. — The Vatican edition, omitting *ubi*, then substitutes *Insufflavit; nam illa* for *sufflavit et illa*.

la: August., I. Confess. c. 1. n. 1: Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.

en: Augustine, *Confessions* I, c. 1, n. 1: «Because thou hast made us toward thee, and our heart is restless until it rests in thee».

la: Cap. 15. n. 24. Cfr. opusculum a nobis editum de Humanae Cognitionis ratione. — Plures codd. cum Vat. *convenientia spiritualis* pro *convenientia specialis*.

en: Ch. 15, n. 24. Cf. the little work edited by us *On the Method of Human Knowledge*. — Many codices with the Vatican edition read *spiritual agreement* instead of *special agreement*.

en: Distinction 19, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De errore nefando hic notato, qui ultimis saeculis sub variis formis renovatus est, dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1.): «Iam quoque a philosophis atque theologis plenissime est probatum et demonstrative ostensum, quod supergloriosissimus Deus sit purus actus, bonitas pura, incommutabile, incircumscriptibile penitusque perfectum ens, universis et singulis prorsus in infinitum sublimior... Ideo superstultissimum et ineffabiliter rudissimum ac imperitissimum est putare, aliquid factum esse, aut fieri posse de substantia Dei; quoniam sequeretur, Dei substantiam esse mutatam, aut rem factam Deo esse consubstantialem». In solutione ad 3. notanda est expositio verborum S. Augustini, quod «anima cognoscit in quadam luce sui generis»; quae interpretatio respondet sententiae S. Bonaventurae de modo, quo intelligibilia cognoscuntur per rationes aeternas (cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. I, scholion). Alii aliter haec verba interpretantur. — Item notanda est in solut. ad 6. differentia inter lucem corporalem et duplicem lucem spiritualem, scil. increatam et creatam. De luce ut forma cfr. supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 90. a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 85. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the wicked error here noted, which in recent ages has been renewed in various forms, Dionysius the Carthusian says (here q. 1.): «It has now also been most fully proved by philosophers and theologians and demonstratively shown that the most superlatively glorious God is pure act, pure goodness, an incommutable, incircumscribable and utterly perfect being, sublimer beyond all things and each thing infinitely... Therefore it is most super-foolish and unspeakably crude and most ignorant to think that anything has been made, or can come into being, from the substance of God; since it would follow that the substance of God is changed, or that the thing made is consubstantial with God». In the solution to 3, the exposition of the words of St. Augustine is to be noted, that «the soul knows in a certain light of its own kind»; which interpretation answers to the teaching of St. Bonaventure on the mode by which intelligibles are known through eternal reasons (cfr. I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1, scholion). Others interpret these words otherwise. — Likewise to be noted in the solution to 6 is the difference between corporeal light and the twofold spiritual light, namely uncreated and created. On light as form cfr. above d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 1. — Scot., in each *Scriptum*, here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 90. a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 85. — B. Albert., here a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
Tier-2 promotion 2026-05-25 (session 14 of d.17). Page span pp. 410–413 (PDF 432–435, offset +22). Body opens at p.410 R band 1 with `QUAESTIO I.` + italic title *Utrum anima humana sit ex Dei substantia.* + opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima humana sit ex Dei substantia.` (immediately after d17-divisio ARTICULUS I header + subtitle close); closes at p.413 L band 0 / R band 0 with `…sit nata coniungi materiae.` (immediately before SCHOLION I + II between Q1 body close and QUAESTIO II opener `Utrum anima Adae fuerit producta ex materia.` on p.413 L band 1).

**Cross-chunk hand-off RECEIVED from d17-divisio:** p.410 R band 2 footers 3–5 = [^1]–[^3] here (Vers. 7 + August. tribute to Manichaeans / Cap. 20, 22 Glossa interlinearis from August. in Ioan. tract. 121 / Vers. 7 Eccles. *Et revertatur pulvis*). Confirmed d17-divisio's p.410 L footers 1–2 (*Plures codd. constituentia* / *Vat. hominis iam formati*) belong to the divisio body (DIVISIO TEXTUS paras 1+2 anchors) and do NOT migrate here.

**Forward hand-off to d17-a1-q2:** none. p.413 carries no q1 footer after the L-0 final anchor [^19] = *Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1.* on p.412 R band 2. The p.413 SCHOLION block is q1's own (commentator list II is `hic q. 1.`-tagged); q2 opens p.413 L band 1 with its own *Ad oppositum* argg. and a fresh per-page footer sequence on p.414.

**Apparatus map (19 entries, continuously renumbered):** p.410 R footers 3–5 = [^1]–[^3] (received per hand-off); p.411 L footers 1–4 = [^4]–[^7] (Acts 17:28 Vat. variant / David of Dinant cit. / 1 Tim. 6:16 + de Spiritu et anima / Manichaean visible-light allusion); p.411 R footers 5–9 = [^8]–[^11] + [^12-deferred] (Gen 1:26 / I Sent d.8 p.II q.2 / d.19 p.II q.3 / `Non pauci codd. hoc`); p.412 L footers 1–4 = [^12]–[^15] (Aug. de Duabus Animabus c.1 + Retract. cross-ref / d.31 + d.34 cross-ref / `Intellige exemplaris` Y aa codex variant / Aug. VII de Gen ad lit + XIII de Civ. Dei + Vat. *verbo* variant); p.412 R footers 5–8 = [^16]–[^19] (John 20:22 Greek ἐνεφύσησε + Aug. VII de Gen ad lit / Confess. *inquietum cor* / Cap. 15 n. 24 + Vat. *spiritualis* variant / d.19 a.1 q.1 cross-ref). p.413 carries no body apparatus (SCHOLION-only column).

**Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention:** *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Opinio 1.*, *Improbatur.*, *Opinio 2.*, *Refellitur.*, *Sententia catholica et conclusio.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Genus dupliciter.*, *Notandum de luce creata.*, *Lux corporalis differt a spirituali.*

**`has_scholion: true`** — substantial doctrinal SCHOLION I citing Dionysius the Carthusian on the David-of-Dinant / Manichaean error + cross-reference to I Sent. d. 3 p. I q. 1 on the *lux sui generis* exposition + cross-reference to d. 13 a. 2 q. 2 on light as form; SCHOLION II is the q1 commentator list (Alex. Hal., Scotus, Thomas, Albert, Petr. a Tar., Aegid. R., Biel).

No `[?]` flags — all 19 anchors + 11 marginal labels crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 410–413. OCR around raw 28950–29100 is two-column cascade-fragmented (the `c 0 N c L D s I 0.` rendering of CONCLUSIO at raw ~29000 is a classic R-column splice with L-column tail); column-band PDF read authoritative per Vol II Override.