site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 483 -->

### Quaestio V. *De definitione fidei ab Apostolo assignata.*

Quinto quaeritur de descriptione fidei ab Apostolo assignata, quoniam ipsa inter ceteras est magis authentica. Definit autem Apostolus fidem sic, ad Hebraeos undecimo[^p483-2]: *Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium.* Ostenditur autem ista descriptio inconvenienter assignata propter quadruplicem defectum, qui videtur esse in ea, videlicet propter defectum *veritatis,* propter defectum *convertibilitatis,* propter defectum *evidentiae* et propter defectum *sufficientiae.* — Quod autem sit in ea defectus *veritatis,* ostenditur:

1. Primo in hoc, quod dicit, fidem esse *substantiam;* aut enim ibi accipitur substantia *proprie,* aut *communiter.* Si accipitur ibi *proprie,* cum substantia dividatur contra *accidens*[^p483-3], et fides sit accidens, falsum est, fidem esse substantiam. Si autem substantia ibi accipitur *communiter* pro essentia, et essentia uniuscuiusque non differt ab eo, cuius est essentia, fides autem differt a rebus sperandis; impossibile est, fidem esse substantiam rerum sperandarum.

2. Item, videtur *falsa* esse in hoc, quod dicit, fidem non tantum esse *substantiam,* sed etiam *argumentum,* quoniam nulla *virtus* est *argumentum,* nec e converso: si ergo fides est *virtus,* non ergo potest esse *argumentum.* Si tu dicas, quod argumentum sumitur ibi *transsumtive;* videtur, quod nec *transsumtive,* nec *proprie* debeat dici fides *argumentum non apparentium.* Si enim proprietas argumenti est, quod arguit ipsam mentem et convincit eam de eo ad quod est, faciens illud esse clarum et apertum[^p483-1]; videtur, quod sit ibi implicatio dupli<!-- page 484 -->cis contradictionis, cum dicit, fidem esse *argumentum non apparentium.* Quae enim habent argumentum, hoc ipso quod habent argumentum, *apparent* esse vera; quae etiam habent argumentum, hoc ipso quod habent argumentum, *convincuntur* esse vera: igitur ratio *argumenti* repugnat tam rei *non apparenti* quam ipsi *habitui fidei:* ergo est ibi implicatio oppositorum in praedicta descriptione: videtur igitur, quod praedicta definitio redargui possit de defectu *veritatis.*

3. Item, videtur, quod possit reprehendi ob defectum *convertibilitatis*[^p484-1]. Nam haec descriptio potest convenire ipsi *spei.* Spes enim est *substantia rerum sperandarum,* et etiam *argumentum non apparentium,* quia per spem certificamur, nos esse habituros res, quas non videmus: ergo videtur, quod si tota ista descriptio convenit *spei,* quod non convertatur cum ipsa *fide.*

4. Item, credere, poenam aeternam esse futuram, hoc pertinet ad ipsam fidem, ergo credulitas poenae aeternae fides est; sed credulitas poenae aeternae non est substantia rerum sperandarum, sed potius timendarum: ergo videtur, quod ista descriptio generaliter non conveniat ipsi fidei: ergo nec omni nec soli: videtur ergo posse reprehendi propter defectum *convertibilitatis.*

5. Item, videtur posse reprehendi ob defectum *evidentiae,* quia non debet prius definiri per posterius, nec ignotum per ignotius[^p484-2]; sed fides prior est quam spes, fides etiam, quae est in corde, notior est, quam ea quae non apparent: ergo male definitur fides per *res sperandas,* et per *res non apparentes.*

6. Item, ad *evidentiam* definitionis spectat, quod priora praemittantur posterioribus: si ergo cognitio praecedit affectionem, et fides, in quantum *argumentum,* respicit cognitionem, in quantum vero *substantia rerum sperandarum,* respicit affectionem; videtur, quod praedicta definitio assignata sit sicut per posterius et confuse: et ita redargui posse videtur propter defectum *evidentiae.*

7. Item, reprehensibilis videtur propter defectum *sufficientiae,* quia fides non tantummodo est de futuris, verum etiam de praesentibus et praeteritis, ut dicit Augustinus[^p484-3]: si ergo speranda solummodo sunt futura, videtur, quod insufficienter definiatur, cum definitur solummodo per res sperandas.

8. Item, fides non tantummodo est fundamentum *spei,* immo etiam *caritatis* et totius aedificii spiritualis: ergo ita est substantia vel fundamentum *caritatis* et rerum diligendarum, sicut *spei* et sperandarum: videtur ergo insufficienter dixisse, cum dixit, eam esse fundamentum rerum sperandarum. Cum enim nobilior sit caritas quam spes[^p484-4], magis deberet definiri fides per res *diligendas* quam per res *sperandas.* — Et ita propter quatuor dictos defectus praedicta descriptio videtur esse penitus abiicienda et repudianda.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Fidei definitio data ab Apostolo est convenienter et secundum artem assignata.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod tunc definitio sive notificatio est recte assignata, quando nihil continet superfluum, nihil etiam diminutum[^p484-5]. Et hoc est, quando per ipsam notificationem ipsius definiti essentia plene indicatur et aperte manifestatur et ab omnibus aliis separatur; hoc autem est reperire in proposito, si quis attendat.

Nam ipsa fides secundum essentiam suam aliquid respicit ex parte intellectus et aliquid ex parte affectus[^p484-6]. Habet enim affectum stabilire et intellectum illuminare. Et in quantum affectum stabilit, dicitur *substantia* sive *fundamentum;* in quantum autem intellectum illuminat, dicitur *argumentum.* Ut ergo plene fidei essentia explicaretur, oportuit eam definiri sive notificari, ut diceretur esse *substantia* simul et *argumentum;* debet enim definitio totam essentiam definiti in se claudere.

Debet etiam nihilominus aperte notificare; et quoniam habitus virtutis dupliciter notificari habet, videlicet per finem ultimum et per suum obiectum[^p484-7]; finis autem ipsius fidei consistit in aeterna beatitudine, quam speramus, et ita in *rebus sperandis;* obiectum autem consistit in veritate non visa, et ita in *rebus non apparentibus:* ideo opportunum fuit, fidem definiri per *res sperandas* et non appa<!-- page 485 -->rentes, ut sic notificatio fidei non solum essentiam definiti explicaret plene per *intellectum* et *affectum,* sed etiam manifestaret aperte per *finem* et *obiectum.*

Debet etiam definitio definitum ab omnibus aliis *separare.* Et quoniam *fides formata* distingui habet a *fide informi,* distingui etiam habet ab habitu cuiuslibet alterius virtutis; a fide, inquam, *informi* distinguitur, in quantum sustentat totam fabricam spiritualem, ab aliis autem virtutibus, in quantum *veritati non visae* facit adhaerere: ideo quantum ad haec duo dicitur *substantia rerum sperandarum,* ut distinguatur a fide informi, et *argumentum non apparentium,* ut distinguatur ab habitibus aliarum virtutum.

Et sic patet, quod praedicta notificatio nihil continet *superfluum,* nihil *diminutum;* nec est in ea clausula nec dictio, immo etiam nec syllaba otiosa. Fatendum est igitur, ipsam esse convenienter et secundum artem assignatam, ita quod in se habet *veritatem, convertibilitatem, evidentiam* et *sufficientiam* adeo perfecte et complete, ut nec peritissimi philosophorum possent eam artificialius et completius assignare.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod falso dicitur fides esse *substantia;* dicendum, quod *substantia* dicitur dupliciter, scilicet *proprie* et *transsumtive.* Proprie quidem dicitur quatuor modis, scilicet *substantia-materia, substantia-forma, substantia-compositum, substantia* quae est essentia uniuscuiusque[^p485-1]. *Transsumtive* dicitur *substantia* illud quod habet aliquam proprietatem substantiae dictae aliquo istorum modorum. Cum autem dicitur: fides est *substantia,* hoc non dicitur, secundum quod hoc nomen *substantia* sumitur in significatione propria, sed secundum quod sumitur in significatione *transsumtiva.* Dicitur enim *substantia,* quia est fundamentum fabricae spiritualis ad similitudinem materiae, quae praebet fulcimentum formis et accidentibus. Et quod ita accipiatur, patet per notificationem Damasceni[^p485-2], qui loco eius quod dicit Apostolus: *Fides est substantia,* dicit *hypostasis.* Ait enim sic: « Fides est eorum quae sperantur, *hypostasis,* et redargutio earum rerum, quae non videntur »:

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod falso etiam dicitur esse *argumentum;* dicendum similiter, quod *argumentum* dicitur dupliciter, videlicet *proprie* et *transsumtive.* Proprie quidem *argumentum* accipitur secundum quadruplicem acceptionem[^p485-3]. Nam uno modo dicitur *argumentum ratiocinatio,* secundum quod dividitur in quatuor species, videlicet in *syllogismum, inductionem, enthymema* et *exemplum.* Alio modo dicitur *argumentum* prolixae sententiae brevis collectio. Tertio modo dicitur *argumentum* ipsum *medium,* in quo consistit tota vis argumentationis. Quarto modo dicitur *argumentum* ipsa *maxima propositio,* in qua consistit firmitas totius illationis. In omnibus autem his acceptionibus *argumentum* dicitur, quia mentem *arguit* et *illuminat* ad aliquid intuendum et ei firmiter adhaerendum. — Et secundum hanc proprietatem potest *transsumtive* dici *argumentum* quidquid illud sit, quod mentem arguit et illuminat ad videndum aliquid occultum. Et hoc modo fides dicitur esse *argumentum rerum non apparentium,* quoniam ita facit intellectum eis assentire, sicut argumentum verum facit assentire conclusioni probatae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa quae arguebant praedictam definitionem ob defectum *veritatis.*

*Ad 3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod in praeassignata definitione est defectus *convertibilitatis;* dicendum, quod praedicta notificatio non convenit *spei,* quoniam, etsi ipsa spes aliquo modo possit dici *substantia rerum sperandarum,* non tamen potest dici *fundamentum,* sicut fides, quia non est prima virtutum. Licet autem hoc aliquo modo possit ei attribui, tamen sequens pars definitionis, quae est *argumentum non apparentium,* convenit soli *fidei,* quae intellectum facit assentire ipsi Veritati; hoc autem nec *spei* competit nec *caritati,* licet eis competat quoddam genus certitudinis experimentalis, maxime ipsi *spei*[^p485-4].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credulitas suppliciorum non est substantia rerum sperandarum, sed magis ti<!-- page 486 -->mendarum; dicendum, quod fides dicitur esse substantia rerum sperandarum non tanquam *subiecti*[^p486-1], sed tanquam *finis,* sicut praedictum est. Quamvis autem credulitas suppliciorum sit rerum *timendarum* per modum *obiecti,* est tamen rerum *sperandarum* per modum *finis.* Ideo enim quis credit aeterna supplicia, ut assequatur bona speranda.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi defectus *evidentiae,* quia fides definitur per posteriora et ignota; dicendum, quod falsum est; definitur enim per *finem* et *obiectum,* sicut prius visum est. Licet autem finis ipsius fidei, qui consistit in rebus sperandis, sit posterior ipsa fide quantum ad *assecutionem,* est tamen prior quantum ad *intentionem*[^p486-2]. Licet etiam obiectum ipsius fidei, quod consistit in veritate non apparente, sit homini infideli incognitum, nihilominus cognitum est homini fidem habenti; quamvis etiam sit incognitum, quale sit, notum tamen est, ipsum *non apparere.* Et sic patens est, quod praedicta notificatio non est per posterius et incognitum, immo per prius et notius.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in ea est praeposteratio, quia prius deberet dici *argumentum* quam *fundamentum* ob hoc, quod intellectus praecedit affectum; dicendum, quod etsi actus intellectus *praecedit* actum affectus, nihil tamen impedit, quin intellectus aliquando *sequatur* affectum, utpote quando inclinatur ad assentiendum alicui rei secundum imperium voluntatis. Et hoc modo dictum est superius[^p486-3] se habere in actu fidei, quae ideo habet rationem virtutis, quia assensus ille est a principio voluntatis; et ideo Apostolus rectissime ordinavit, quando illud fidei, quod respicit affectivam, praemisit ei quod respicit cognitivam.

*Ad 7. 8.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu *sufficientiae,* quia deberet definiri per *diligenda,* sicut per *speranda,* ita per *praeterita,* sicut per *futura;* iam patet responsio: quia, quamvis[^p486-4] fides sit de praeteritis et futuris, sive etiam de sperandis et amandis, de solis sperandis est tanquam de *fine,* ad quem tendit; et per hoc, quod definitur hic fides per comparationem ad finem et complementum totius aedificii spiritualis, datur per consequens intelligi eiusdem aedificii tota fabrica. Et per hoc patent illa duo obiecta. Patet etiam, quare magis dicitur esse *fundamentum rerum sperandarum* quam *credendarum,* vel *timendarum.* Per hoc enim, quod dicitur *sperandarum,* magis datur intelligi *finis* virtutis, qui est ipsa beatitudo exspectata, quam per hoc, quod dicitur *credendum,* vel *amandum,* vel *timendum.* Nam isti actus non tantummodo sunt in finem, sed etiam in ea quae sunt ad finem.

english:
### Question V. *On the definition of faith assigned by the Apostle.*

Fifth, inquiry is made concerning the description of faith assigned by the Apostle, since it is the most authentic among the rest. Now the Apostle defines faith thus, to the Hebrews, chapter eleven[^p483-2]: *Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing.* But it is shown that this description is inconveniently assigned on account of a fourfold defect, which seems to be in it, namely on account of a defect of *truth,* on account of a defect of *convertibility,* on account of a defect of *evidence,* and on account of a defect of *sufficiency.* — That there is in it a defect of *truth* is shown:

1. First, in this, that it says faith is a *substance;* for either *substance* is taken there *properly,* or *commonly.* If it is taken there *properly,* since substance is divided against *accident*[^p483-3], and faith is an accident, it is false that faith is a substance. But if substance is taken there *commonly* for essence, and the essence of each thing does not differ from that of which it is the essence, but faith differs from the things to be hoped for, it is impossible that faith be the substance of the things to be hoped for.

2. Likewise, it seems to be *false* in this, that it says faith is not only a *substance,* but also an *argument,* since no *virtue* is an *argument,* nor conversely: if therefore faith is a *virtue,* it cannot then be an *argument.* If you say that argument is taken there *transumptively;* it seems that faith ought to be called *argument of things not appearing* neither *transumptively* nor *properly.* For if it is the property of an argument that it argues the mind itself and convinces it of that to which it is directed, making that thing to be clear and open[^p483-1]; it seems that there is in it an implication of a twofold<!-- page 484 -->contradiction, when it says faith is the *argument of things not appearing.* For things which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, *appear* to be true; things also which have an argument, by this very fact that they have an argument, *are convinced* to be true: therefore the account of *argument* is repugnant both to a thing *not appearing* and to the very *habit of faith:* therefore there is in the aforesaid description an implication of opposites: it seems therefore that the aforesaid definition can be refuted for a defect of *truth.*

3. Likewise, it seems that it can be censured for a defect of *convertibility*[^p484-1]. For this description can fit *hope* itself. For hope is the *substance of things to be hoped for,* and also the *argument of things not appearing,* since by hope we are made certain that we shall have the things which we do not see: therefore it seems that, if this whole description fits *hope,* then it is not convertible with *faith* itself.

4. Likewise, to believe that eternal punishment is to come pertains to faith itself, therefore the believing of eternal punishment is faith; but the believing of eternal punishment is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be feared: therefore it seems that this description does not fit faith itself generally: therefore it fits neither all nor it alone: therefore it seems able to be censured on account of a defect of *convertibility.*

5. Likewise, it seems able to be censured for a defect of *evidence,* because that which is prior ought not to be defined through that which is posterior, nor the unknown through the more unknown[^p484-2]; but faith is prior to hope, faith too, which is in the heart, is better known than those things which do not appear: therefore faith is badly defined through *things to be hoped for,* and through *things not appearing.*

6. Likewise, it pertains to the *evidence* of a definition that what is prior be set before what is posterior: if therefore cognition precedes affection, and faith, insofar as it is *argument,* regards cognition, but insofar as it is *substance of things to be hoped for,* regards affection; it seems that the aforesaid definition is assigned as it were through what is posterior and confusedly: and so it seems able to be refuted on account of a defect of *evidence.*

7. Likewise, it seems reprehensible on account of a defect of *sufficiency,* because faith is not only of things future, but also of things present and past, as Augustine says[^p484-3]: if therefore the things to be hoped for are only future, it seems that it is insufficiently defined, since it is defined only through things to be hoped for.

8. Likewise, faith is not only the foundation of *hope,* but even of *charity* and of the whole spiritual edifice: therefore it is the substance or foundation of *charity* and of the things to be loved, just as of *hope* and of the things to be hoped for: it seems therefore that he spoke insufficiently, when he said it is the foundation of the things to be hoped for. For since charity is nobler than hope[^p484-4], faith ought rather to be defined through the things *to be loved* than through the things *to be hoped for.* — And so on account of the four said defects the aforesaid description seems to be utterly cast off and repudiated.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The definition of faith given by the Apostle is conveniently and according to art assigned.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that a definition or notification is then rightly assigned, when it contains nothing superfluous, nothing also diminished[^p484-5]. And this is, when through that notification the essence of the thing defined is fully indicated and openly manifested and separated from all others; but this is found in the matter proposed, if one attends.

For faith itself according to its essence regards something on the part of the intellect and something on the part of the affect[^p484-6]. For it has to stabilize the affect and to illuminate the intellect. And insofar as it stabilizes the affect, it is called *substance* or *foundation;* but insofar as it illuminates the intellect, it is called *argument.* In order, therefore, that the essence of faith might be fully explicated, it was necessary that it be defined or notified so that it be said to be *substance* and *argument* together; for a definition ought to enclose in itself the whole essence of the thing defined.

It ought also nonetheless to notify openly; and since the habit of a virtue is to be notified in two ways, namely through its ultimate end and through its object[^p484-7]; now the end of faith itself consists in the eternal beatitude which we hope for, and so in the *things to be hoped for;* but its object consists in truth not seen, and so in the *things not appearing:* therefore it was fitting that faith be defined through the *things to be hoped for* and not appea<!-- page 485 -->ring, so that thus the notification of faith might not only explicate fully the essence of the thing defined through the *intellect* and the *affect,* but might also manifest it openly through the *end* and the *object.*

A definition ought also to *separate* the thing defined from all others. And since *formed faith* is to be distinguished from *unformed faith,* it is also to be distinguished from the habit of any other virtue; from *unformed* faith, I say, it is distinguished insofar as it sustains the whole spiritual fabric, but from the other virtues insofar as it makes one adhere to *truth not seen:* therefore with respect to these two it is called *substance of things to be hoped for,* that it may be distinguished from unformed faith, and *argument of things not appearing,* that it may be distinguished from the habits of the other virtues.

And so it is clear that the aforesaid notification contains nothing *superfluous,* nothing *diminished;* nor is there in it a clause nor a word, indeed not even a syllable idle. It must therefore be confessed that it is conveniently and according to art assigned, so that it has in itself *truth, convertibility, evidence,* and *sufficiency* so perfectly and completely that not even the most skilled of the philosophers could assign it more artfully and more completely.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that faith is falsely said to be a *substance;* it must be said that *substance* is said in two ways, namely *properly* and *transumptively.* Properly indeed it is said in four ways, namely *substance-matter, substance-form, substance-composite, substance* which is the essence of each thing[^p485-1]. *Transumptively* that is called *substance* which has some property of substance said in one of those ways. But when it is said: faith is a *substance,* this is not said insofar as this noun *substance* is taken in its proper signification, but insofar as it is taken in its *transumptive* signification. For it is called *substance* because it is the foundation of the spiritual fabric after the likeness of matter, which provides support for forms and accidents. And that it is so taken is clear through the notification of Damascene[^p485-2], who, in place of that which the Apostle says: *Faith is a substance,* says *hypostasis.* For he says thus: « Faith is the *hypostasis* of the things which are hoped for, and the refutation of those things which are not seen »:

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is also falsely said to be an *argument;* it must be said similarly that *argument* is said in two ways, namely *properly* and *transumptively.* Properly indeed *argument* is taken according to a fourfold acceptation[^p485-3]. For in one way *argument* is called a *ratiocination,* according as it is divided into four species, namely into the *syllogism, induction, enthymeme,* and *example.* In another way *argument* is called the brief collection of a lengthy discourse. In a third way *argument* is called the *middle* itself, in which consists the whole force of the argumentation. In a fourth way *argument* is called the *maximal proposition* itself, in which consists the firmness of the whole inference. But in all these acceptations it is called *argument,* because it *argues* and *illuminates* the mind to intuit something and firmly to adhere to it. — And according to this property whatever it be that argues and illuminates the mind to see something hidden can *transumptively* be called *argument.* And in this way faith is said to be the *argument of things not appearing,* since it so makes the intellect assent to them as a true argument makes one assent to a proved conclusion. — And through this is clear the response to those things which argued against the aforesaid definition for a defect of *truth.*

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that in the aforesaid definition there is a defect of *convertibility;* it must be said that the aforesaid notification does not fit *hope,* since, although hope itself can in some way be called *substance of things to be hoped for,* it cannot nevertheless be called *foundation,* like faith, because it is not the first of the virtues. But although this can in some way be attributed to it, nevertheless the following part of the definition, which is *argument of things not appearing,* fits faith *alone,* which makes the intellect assent to Truth itself; but this belongs neither to *hope* nor to *charity,* although there belongs to them a certain kind of experiential certitude, most of all to *hope* itself[^p485-4].

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the believing of punishments is not the substance of things to be hoped for, but rather of things to be fea<!-- page 486 -->red; it must be said that faith is called the substance of things to be hoped for not as of a *subject*[^p486-1], but as of an *end,* as has been said before. But although the believing of punishments is of things *to be feared* by way of *object,* it is nevertheless of things *to be hoped for* by way of *end.* For one believes in eternal punishments in order that he may attain the goods to be hoped for.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that there is there a defect of *evidence,* because faith is defined through things posterior and unknown; it must be said that this is false; for it is defined through the *end* and the *object,* as was seen before. But although the end of faith itself, which consists in the things to be hoped for, is posterior to faith itself with respect to *attainment,* it is nevertheless prior with respect to *intention*[^p486-2]. And although the object of faith itself, which consists in truth not appearing, is unknown to the unbelieving man, it is nonetheless known to the man having faith; and although it be unknown what it is, it is nevertheless known that it itself *does not appear.* And so it is plain that the aforesaid notification is not through what is posterior and unknown, but rather through what is prior and better known.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that in it there is a preposterous order, because *argument* ought to be said before *foundation* on the ground that the intellect precedes the affect; it must be said that, although the act of the intellect *precedes* the act of the affect, nothing nevertheless prevents the intellect from sometimes *following* the affect, as for instance when it is inclined to assent to something according to the command of the will. And in this way it was said above[^p486-3] to be the case in the act of faith, which therefore has the account of a virtue, because that assent is from the principle of the will; and therefore the Apostle most rightly ordered [it], when he set that of faith which regards the affective before that which regards the cognitive.

*To 7 and 8.* To that which is objected concerning a defect of *sufficiency,* that it ought to be defined through things *to be loved,* just as through things *to be hoped for,* so through things *past,* just as through things *future;* the response is already clear: because, although[^p486-4] faith is of things past and future, or even of things to be hoped for and to be loved, it is of the things to be hoped for alone as of an *end,* toward which it tends; and through this, that faith is here defined by comparison to the end and the completion of the whole spiritual edifice, there is given consequently to understand the whole fabric of that same edifice. And through this those two objections are clear. It is clear also why it is rather said to be the *foundation of things to be hoped for* than of things *to be believed,* or *to be feared.* For through this, that it is said *of things to be hoped for,* there is rather given to understand the *end* of the virtue, which is the very beatitude awaited, than through this, that it is said *to be believed,* or *to be loved,* or *to be feared.* For those acts are not only toward the end, but also toward the things which are toward the end.

la: Boeth., I. *Comment. in Topic. Cicer.* ait: *Argumentum namque est, quod rem arguit, id est probat* (ed. Migne, Patr. lat. tom. 64. col. 1048). Isidor., VI. *Etymolog.* c. 8. n. 16: *Argumentum vero dictum quasi argutum vel quasi argute inventum ad comprobandas res.* — Mox pro *contradictionis* cod. F *oppositionis.* In fine arg. pro *de defectu* Vat. *ob defectum.*

en: Boethius, I *Commentary on Cicero's Topics* says: *For an argument is that which argues a matter, that is, proves it* (ed. Migne, Patr. lat. tom. 64. col. 1048). Isidore, VI *Etymologies* c. 8. n. 16: *But "argument" is so called as it were "argute" [clever] or as it were cleverly found out for the proving of matters.* — Then for *of contradiction* cod. F [reads] *of opposition.* At the end of the argument, for *concerning a defect* the Vatican [edition reads] *on account of a defect.*

la: Vers. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *ista descriptio inconvenienter* codd. G I L V *ista definitio non bene.*

en: Verse 1. — A little below, for *this description inconveniently* codd. G I L V [read] *this definition not well.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 2. (VI. c. 1.). Ibid. text. 11. (c. 1.) docetur, quod essentia *« uno quidem modo substantiam et quod quid significat, alio vero singula eorum, quae praedicantur, quantitatem, qualitatem et quaecumque cetera talia sunt »,* i. e. uno modo essentia idem est ac substantia, alio modo etiam accidentibus convenit. Hoc secundo modo paulo inferius accipitur, ut secundi membri arg. suppositio sit: fides est accidens, cuius essentia consistit in rebus sperandis.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VII *Metaphysics* text 2. (VI. c. 1.). Ibid. text 11. (c. 1.) it is taught that essence *« in one way signifies substance and the what-it-is, but in another the individual things which are predicated, quantity, quality, and whatever other such things there are »,* i.e. in one way essence is the same as substance, in another way it also belongs to accidents. In this second way it is taken a little below, so that the supposition of the second member of the argument is: faith is an accident, whose essence consists in the things to be hoped for.

la: Boeth., I. *Dialog. in Porphyr.* c. de Genere circa finem: *Quascumque definitiones convertere potes, illae verae atque pares sunt; quascumque convertere non potes, aut maiores aut minores sunt, pares inveniri non possunt.* — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. — Codd. A K Z verbo *reprehendi* praemittunt *etiam.*

en: Boethius, I *Dialogue on Porphyry,* c. on Genus, near the end: *Whatever definitions you can convert, those are true and equal; whatever you cannot convert, are either greater or lesser, they cannot be found equal.* — On the minor cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8. — Codd. A K Z prefix to the word *censured* [the word] *also.*

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 4.) ostendit, definitionem faciendam esse per *notiora,* et adiungit, quod unus locus probandi, definitionem non factam esse per notiora, sit, « quod [si definitio] per posteriora, priora indicat ». De minori vide supra q. 1. in corp. et q. 4. ad 1. — Mox ante *spes* codd. A K inserunt *sit.*

en: Aristotle, VI *Topics* c. 3. (c. 4.) shows that a definition is to be made through things *better known,* and adds that one place for proving that a definition has not been made through things better known is, « that [if the definition is] through what is posterior, it indicates what is prior ». On the minor see above q. 1. in the body and q. 4. ad 1. — Then before *hope* codd. A K insert *be.*

la: *Enchirid.* c. 8. n. 2: *Est etiam fides et praeteritarum rerum et praesentium et futurarum.*

en: *Enchiridion* c. 8. n. 2: *Faith is also of things past and present and future.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13: *Fides, spes, caritas, tria haec, maior autem horum est caritas.* — Quomodo fides *fundamentum* sit fabricae spiritualis, exponit Gregor., XXVIII. *Moral.* c. 9. n. 20. — Superius post *sicut spei et* codd. F U supplent *rerum.*

en: Epistle, I Cor. 13, 13: *Faith, hope, charity, these three, but the greater of these is charity.* — How faith is the *foundation* of the spiritual fabric, Gregory expounds, XXVIII *Morals* c. 9. n. 20. — Above, after *just as of hope and* codd. F U supply *of the things.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI Topic. c. 1. seq., et VII. *Metaph.* text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), ubi etiam aliae proprietates definitionis infra occurrentes tanguntur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VI Topics c. 1. ff., and VII *Metaphysics* text 43. (VI. c. 12.), where also the other properties of a definition occurring below are touched upon.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. — Paulo inferius pro *stabilit* [Hebr. 13, 9: *Optimum est enim gratia stabilire cor*] plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *stabilitat.*

en: Cf. above q. 2. — A little below, for *stabilizes* [Heb. 13, 9: *For it is best that the heart be stabilized by grace*] very many codd. and edd. 1, 2 [read] *establishes.*

la: Vide Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 1. et 7. seqq.; II. c. 1, et II. *de Anima,* text. 33. (c. 4.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3. et pag. 683, nota 6. — Pro *et quoniam* edd. *quoniam ergo.*

en: See Aristotle, I *Ethics* c. 1. and 7. ff.; II. c. 1, and II *On the Soul,* text 33. (c. 4.). Cf. tom. II. p. 561, note 3. and p. 683, note 6. — For *and since* the editions [read] *since therefore.*

la: Ut docet Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 7. (VI. c. 3.). Cfr. ibid. V. text. 15. (IV. c. 8.) et II. *de Anima,* text. 2. (c. 1.).

en: As Aristotle teaches, VII *Metaphysics* text 7. (VI. c. 3.). Cf. ibid. V. text 15. (IV. c. 8.) and II *On the Soul,* text 2. (c. 1.).

la: Libr. IV. *de Fide orthod.* c. 10. Vide infra dub. 1. — Paulo ante pro *praebet* codd. G I L T V aa *pluribus,* quae lectio mutila integrari posset addito verbo *praestat,* quod cod. F post *accidentibus* exhibet.

en: Book IV *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 10. See below dub. 1. — A little before, for *provides* codd. G I L T V aa [read] *to many,* which mutilated reading could be made whole by adding the verb *furnishes,* which cod. F exhibits after *accidents.*

la: De his agit Aristot., I. *Prior.* c. 1. et II. c. 23. seqq. (c. 23. seqq.) nec non Boeth., II. *de Different. topic.* — Quod ad secundum modum attinet, quo *argumentum* sumitur, dicit Quintilian., V. *Institut. orat.* c. 10: *Sed argumentum quoque plura significat. Nam... et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens Pedianus, « argumentum, inquit, tale est ».* — Quoad tertium modum nota illud Boeth., I. *Comment. in Topic. Cicer.* (ed. Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 64. col. 1050.): *Quoniam igitur extremi termini medii interpositione copulantur, eoque modo quaestionis inter se membra conveniunt, adhibitaque probatione solvitur dubitatio, nihil est aliud argumentum quam medietatis inventio; haec enim vel coniungere, si affirmatio defendatur, vel disiungere, si negatio vindicetur, poterit extremos.* — Ibid. etiam quarta acceptio *argumenti* profertur. Definitis enim maximis propositionibus, scil. *« quae et universales sunt et ita notae atque manifestae, ut probatione non egeant eaque potius quae in dubitatione sunt probent »,* auctor, diversas argumentationis et argumenti acceptationes recensens ait: *Aut argumentatio quidem vocabitur tota contextio syllogismi cum sententia, sed argumentum maxima propositio etc.* (col. 1053). Cfr. II. *de Different. topic.* — Paulo superius pro *accipitur* cod. A *sumitur,* cod. U *dicitur.* In fine solut. cod. O plura addit, quae propter varias lacunas etc. non digna sunt commemoratu.

en: Aristotle treats of these, I *Prior [Analytics]* c. 1. and II. c. 23. ff. (c. 23. ff.), and also Boethius, II *On Topical Differences.* — As to the second way in which *argument* is taken, Quintilian says, V *Institutes of Oratory* c. 10: *But "argument" too signifies several things. For... Pedianus, expounding the very theme as it were of Cicero's orations, says, « the argument is such-and-such ».* — As to the third way note that of Boethius, I *Commentary on Cicero's Topics* (ed. Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 64. col. 1050.): *Since therefore the extreme terms are coupled by the interposition of a middle, and in that way the members of the question agree among themselves, and, proof being applied, the doubt is resolved, an argument is nothing other than the finding of the middle; for this will be able either to join, if an affirmation is defended, or to disjoin, if a negation is vindicated, the extremes.* — There also a fourth acceptation of *argument* is brought forward. For, the maximal propositions being defined, namely *« which are both universal and so known and manifest that they need no proof and rather prove those things which are in doubt »,* the author, reviewing the diverse acceptations of argumentation and of argument, says: *Either the whole texture of the syllogism with the sentence will be called argumentation, but the maximal proposition [will be called] argument etc.* (col. 1053). Cf. II *On Topical Differences.* — A little above, for *is taken* cod. A [reads] *is assumed,* cod. U *is called.* At the end of the solution cod. O adds more, which on account of various lacunae etc. are not worthy of mention.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq. — In prima solutionis propos. pro *aliquo modo possit* codd. A H K *aliquo modo posset.*

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 8. f. — In the first proposition of the solution, for *can in some way* codd. A H K [read] *could in some way.*

la: Sive, quod in idem redit, *obiecti,* quam lectionem exhibent codd. B C D (K primitus) M O P R cc. In edd. legitur: *dicendum, quod verum est, quod non est substantia rerum sperandarum tanquam subiecti* etc.

en: Or, what comes to the same, *of an object,* which reading codd. B C D (K originally) M O P R cc exhibit. In the editions one reads: *it must be said that it is true that it is not the substance of things to be hoped for as of a subject* etc.

la: Finem priorem esse secundum *intentionem,* docet Aristot., II. *de Generat. animal.* c. 4. (c. 6.); IX. *Metaph.* text. 15. (VIII. c. 8.) et III. *Ethic.* c. 3. nec non VI. c. 9. — Pro *assecutionem* codd. A H K L Z *exsecutionem.* Mox codd. M O voci *veritate* praefigunt *ipsa.*

en: That the end is prior according to *intention,* Aristotle teaches, II *On the Generation of Animals* c. 4. (c. 6.); IX *Metaphysics* text 15. (VIII. c. 8.) and III *Ethics* c. 3. and also VI. c. 9. — For *attainment* codd. A H K L Z [read] *execution.* Then codd. M O prefix to the word *truth* [the word] *the very.*

la: Quaest. 2. — Paulo superius pro *impedit, quin* multi codd. et edd. *impedit, quod.*

en: Question 2. — A little above, for *prevents... from* many codd. and edd. [read] *prevents... that.*

la: Cod. U *quamvis enim.*

en: Cod. U [reads] *for although.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ut notat S. Thom. (locc. infra citt.), quidam asserebant, S. Paulum in verbis propositis intendere tantum ostendere, quid fides caritate formata *faciat,* non quid *sit.* Sed communiter antiqui doctores docent, « quod haec fidei notificatio sit completissima eius definitio, non ita quod sit secundum debitam formam definitionis tradita, sed quia in ea sufficienter tanguntur omnia quae exiguntur ad fidei definitionem » (S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 14. a. 2.), ut ibi et brevius in *Sum.* et in *Comment.* exponitur. Quae omnia dicta sunt ad mentem S. Bonaventurae, in hac quaestione ingeniose et copiose expositam, licet hic dicat, hanc definitionem etiam secundum artem convenientissime esse assignatam, id est, si spectatur substantia, non autem vulgo tradita forma. Unde S. Thom. (de Verit. loc. cit.) sensum verborum Apostoli hac formula exprimit: « Fides est habitus mentis, quo inchoatur vita aeterna in nobis, faciens intellectum non apparentibus assentire ».

**II.** De obiecto fidei, quod hic tangitur, plura vide infra d. 24. a. 1. per totam; passim autem repetitur, hoc obiectum esse primam Veritatem non visam, non apparentem; quod intelligendum est non tantum de obiecto materiali, sed etiam de formali; et recte hic subiungitur, quod in hoc (fides) « distinguitur ab aliis virtutibus, in quantum veritati non visae facit adhaerere », quod etiam S. Thom. passim docet. Sed veritas non visa non determinat vel « movet intellectum ex propria virtute, sed ex inclinatione voluntatis » (S. Thom. de Verit. q. 14. a. 2, ad 13.). Unde primae Veritati sive obiecto formali fidei adhaeremus ex pio voluntatis affectu. Hinc recte dicitur, quod voluntas in fide quodam modo « praesidet » (S. Bonav.), vel, ut verbis S. Thomae utamur, « principalitatem habet », quod iam supra in scholio ad 2. quaest. notavimus.

Iuvat autem hic in fine I. articuli pauca commemorare, quae in scholis tractantur de analysi actus fidei et de ratione, qua obiectum formale eius a mente attingitur, ut credendo assentiamur ipsi primae Veritati in se et super omnia. In qua subtili quaestione plura sunt certa, alia cadunt in controversiam.

1. Certum est, quod ratio obiectiva assensus fidei divinae est *auctoritas Dei revelantis;* quod expresse docet Concil. Vatican. (c. 3. de Fide) dicens, nos credere vera esse, quae divinitus revelantur propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis.

2. Communiter etiam distinguitur prima Veritas tripliciter: in *essendo* (quasi ultima ratio omnium), in *cognoscendo* et in *dicendo* (veracitas), quae tria, quatenus sunt aliquid Deo intrinsecum et in re unum idemque, ad obiectivam fidei rationem spectant, licet veritas in cognoscendo primario et formalissime sit ratio assensus in fide theologica. Revelatio autem externe et in tempore facta, qua interna Veritas divina manifestatur (per se considerata), item motiva credibilitatis et ipsa Ecclesiae auctoritas (sive in se consideratur, sive quatenus divinam locutionem integrat), haec omnia non sunt ipsa ratio motiva, sed potius conditio quaedam, dispositio, vel etiam medium, quo obiectum formale applicatur sive cum obiecto materiali connectitur. Attamen nonnulli cum celeberrimo theologo cardinali Lugo actum externum revelationis et motiva credibilitatis volunt esse partiale et secundarium motivum fidei. S. Bonav. (infra d. 24. dub. 2.) dicit, verbum externum, per auditum receptum, tantum ad materiale fidei spectare.

3. Item concorditer docetur, in actu fidei implicari multos actus et intellectus et voluntatis: imprimis ipsum *velle credere* sive voluntatem imperantem assensum; hunc autem actum voluntatis iterum praecedere *motivum,* id est aliquod bonum cognitum ut appetendum, et *iudicium,* quod omnia revelata sint credibilia et credenda. In hoc iudicio iam supponitur vel implicatur, tum quod Deus sit et sit prima Veritas et suprema Auctoritas, tum quod de facto revelaverit credenda et fidei obedientiam imperaverit. Motiva autem credibilitatis aliquo modo sciri possunt et debent, antequam voluntas possit rationabiliter imperare fidem. Denique hi actus intellectus et voluntatis non possunt esse dispositio proxima ad fidem supernaturalem, nisi, Deo illuminante et inspirante, eliciantur. — Haec omnia praecedunt actum fidei eumque comitantur, sed ut conditio, vel dispositio, non ut causa proprie dicta, saltem principalis (cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 3.). Nihil autem obstat, quin praedicta motiva credibilitatis et ipsa Dei auctoritas et revelatio sub alia ratione etiam sint obiectum materiale fidei (cfr. supra q. 3. ad 1.).

4. Assensus in materiale obiectum fidei, v. g. quod Deus est trinus, totam suam rationem habet in obiecto formali, scilicet in auctoritate Dei revelantis; unde recte dicitur: credo, Deum esse trinum, *quia prima Veritas hoc revelavit.* In tali igitur actu simul attingitur et auctoritas Dei et eius revelatio (cfr. supra q. 3. in fine corp.).

**III.** Sed si ulterius quaerimus, quae sit ratio, propter quam in fide theologica assentimur ipsi divinae auctoritati revelanti; iam ab aetate Scoti inter doctissimos theologos est dissensus; et praecipue notandae sunt duae oppositae opiniones cardinalis Lugo S. I. et eximii Suarez. Remittentes lectorem ad recentiores auctores, obiter tantum notamus quasdam principales eorum assertiones. Cardinalis Lugo putat, nos assentiri formali obiecto fidei, prout post cognita praeambula fidei auctoritas Dei et revelatio Dei ex terminorum apprehensione sunt immediate notae; motiva autem extrinseca esse partim rationem formalem fidei saltem partialem, partim vero esse tantum conditionem; assensum autem in obiectum materiale non tantum in praeparatione ad actum fidei, sed etiam in ipso actu fundari in discursu logico (sive formali sive virtuali) ex auctoritate Dei et ex facto revelationis, quo discursu obiectum materiale cum formali nectitur, ita tamen, ut bonitas illationis, supernaturaliter et immediate in ipso formali assensu fidei cognita, sit tantum partiale motivum assentiendi obiecto revelato. — Econtra Suarez cum plurimis aliis vult, auctoritatem Dei revelantis eatenus esse obiectum formale, quatenus per se ipsam creditur ut revelata in actu exercito, eodem modo, quo obiectum materiale, revelatum in actu signato, creditur ob obiectum formale. — Tertia sententia, quam nuperrime propugnat cl. Professor C. Mazzella S. I. in tertia sua editione tractatus de Virtutibus infusis, reformans praecedentium editionum doctrinam, non parum restringit praedictam Suarezii doctrinam, ut progressus in infinitum vel circulus vitiosus manifeste evitetur; ipse autem, allatis multis locis, S. Thomae doctrinam (§ VI.) ita explicat: « Supposito iudicio certo de existentia et credibilitate revelationis, quo totum obiectum credendum fit menti praesens, immerito quaeri, arbitramur, novam ex parte intellectus obiectivam rationem, ob quam Dei revelantis auctoritati assentiamur: cum assensus in veritates revelatas unice in eius obsequium praestitus, « quem comitatur, sed cuius non est causa cognitio » (S. Thom., Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 1. ad 6.), a voluntate determinatur (S. II. II. q. 2. a. 1. ad 3.); ut illud cui assentitur intellectus, non moveat intellectum ex propria virtute, sed ex inclinatione voluntatis » (Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 2. ad 13.) etc. — Eandem fere sententiam diffuse et subtiliter propugnat cl. Prof. Dr. I. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik. Friburgi tom. I. 1873, libr. I., praesertim n. 633-652, 684-700). — Quidquid autem sit de veritate vel probabilitate harum sententiarum, exploratum est, nec S. Thomam nec Bonaventuram nec alios antiquos Scholasticos primam ut secundam opinionem, saltem explicite, docere. — Quoad analysim fidei S. Bonav. haec satis clare docet: si loquimur de fidei causa formali, fides resolvitur ultimo in primam Veritatem revelantem et dictantem; si vero de causa efficiente, haec ex parte Dei est « per infusionem vel divinam illustrationem » (infra a. 2. q. 2.), sive « per doctrinam Spiritus sancti loquentis per aurem cordis » (infra d. 24. dub. 2.), ex parte credentis est per imperium et adhaesionem voluntatis; si de causa materiali et disponente agitur, haec est per auditum locutionis exterioris, scilicet per verbum Dei in s. Scriptura et traditione cum magisterio Ecclesiae (cfr. locc. citt.), per motiva credibilitatis, et praecipue per Ecclesiam proponentem, « quae per se ipsam... magnum quoddam et perpetuum est motivum credibilitatis et divinae suae legationis testimonium irrefragabile » (Concil. Vatican. c. 3. de Fide), quae etiam credenda infallibiliter discernit a non credendis eaque proponit (cfr. infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in corp., d. 40. p. II. q. 3. ad ult.; Hexaem. Serm. 1. et 9.). De ipsa definitione Apostoli: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; de Verit. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** As S. Thomas notes (in the passages cited below), some asserted that S. Paul in the words proposed intended only to show what faith formed by charity *does,* not what it *is.* But the ancient doctors commonly teach « that this notification of faith is its most complete definition, not in such a way that it is handed down according to the due form of a definition, but because in it are sufficiently touched all the things that are required for the definition of faith » (S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 14. a. 2.), as is there and more briefly in the *Summa* and in the *Commentary* expounded. All these things have been said according to the mind of S. Bonaventure, expounded in this question ingeniously and copiously, although he here says that this definition is even according to art most conveniently assigned, that is, if substance is regarded, but not the form commonly handed down. Whence S. Thomas (de Verit. loc. cit.) expresses the sense of the words of the Apostle by this formula: « Faith is a habit of the mind, by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing ».

**II.** Concerning the object of faith, which is here touched upon, see more below at d. 24. a. 1. throughout; but it is repeated here and there that this object is the first Truth not seen, not appearing; which is to be understood not only of the material object, but also of the formal; and it is rightly added here that in this (faith) « is distinguished from the other virtues, insofar as it makes one adhere to truth not seen », which S. Thomas also teaches here and there. But truth not seen does not determine or « move the intellect by its own power, but by the inclination of the will » (S. Thom. de Verit. q. 14. a. 2, ad 13.). Whence we adhere to the first Truth or to the formal object of faith by a pious affect of the will. Hence it is rightly said that the will in faith in a certain way « presides » (S. Bonav.), or, to use the words of S. Thomas, « has the principality », which we have already noted above in the scholion to the 2nd question.

It is helpful here at the end of the first article to recall a few things which are treated in the schools concerning the analysis of the act of faith and concerning the account by which its formal object is attained by the mind, so that by believing we may assent to the first Truth itself in itself and above all things. In which subtle question many things are certain, others fall into controversy.

1. It is certain that the objective ground of the assent of divine faith is the *authority of God revealing;* which the Vatican Council expressly teaches (c. 3. de Fide), saying that we believe to be true those things which are divinely revealed on account of the authority of God revealing.

2. It is also commonly distinguished that the first Truth is threefold: in *being* (as it were the ultimate ground of all), in *knowing,* and in *speaking* (veracity), which three, inasmuch as they are something intrinsic to God and in reality one and the same, pertain to the objective ground of faith, although truth in knowing is primarily and most formally the ground of assent in theological faith. But the revelation made externally and in time, by which the internal divine Truth is manifested (considered in itself), likewise the motives of credibility and the very authority of the Church (whether considered in itself, or insofar as it integrates the divine locution), all these are not the motive ground itself, but rather a certain condition, disposition, or even medium, by which the formal object is applied or connected with the material object. Nevertheless some, with the most celebrated theologian cardinal Lugo, hold the external act of revelation and the motives of credibility to be a partial and secondary motive of faith. S. Bonaventure (below d. 24. dub. 2.) says that the external word, received through hearing, pertains only to the material of faith.

3. Likewise it is harmoniously taught that in the act of faith many acts both of intellect and of will are implicated: first of all the very *willing to believe* or the will commanding the assent; and that this act of the will is again preceded by a *motive,* that is, some good known as to be sought, and by a *judgment,* that all revealed things are credible and to be believed. In this judgment it is already supposed or implicated, both that God exists and is the first Truth and supreme Authority, and that he has in fact revealed things to be believed and commanded the obedience of faith. But the motives of credibility can and ought in some way to be known, before the will can reasonably command faith. Finally these acts of intellect and will cannot be the proximate disposition to supernatural faith, unless, with God illuminating and inspiring, they be elicited. — All these precede the act of faith and accompany it, but as a condition, or disposition, not as a cause properly so called, at least a principal one (cf. below d. 24. dub. 3.). But nothing prevents the aforesaid motives of credibility and the very authority and revelation of God, under another aspect, from being also the material object of faith (cf. above q. 3. ad 1.).

4. The assent to the material object of faith, e.g. that God is triune, has its whole ground in the formal object, namely in the authority of God revealing; whence it is rightly said: I believe that God is triune, *because the first Truth has revealed this.* In such an act, therefore, both the authority of God and his revelation are simultaneously attained (cf. above q. 3. at the end of the body).

**III.** But if we ask further what is the ground on account of which in theological faith we assent to the divine authority itself revealing; from the age of Scotus there has been disagreement among the most learned theologians; and to be noted especially are the two opposed opinions of cardinal Lugo S. I. and the eminent Suarez. Referring the reader to more recent authors, we note only in passing some of their principal assertions. Cardinal Lugo holds that we assent to the formal object of faith, inasmuch as, after the preambles of faith have been known, the authority of God and the revelation of God are immediately known from the apprehension of the terms; but that the extrinsic motives are partly the formal ground of faith, at least a partial one, and partly are only a condition; and that the assent to the material object is founded, not only in the preparation for the act of faith, but also in the act itself, in a logical discourse (whether formal or virtual) from the authority of God and from the fact of revelation, by which discourse the material object is joined with the formal, yet in such a way that the goodness of the inference, supernaturally and immediately known in the very formal assent of faith, is only a partial motive of assenting to the revealed object. — On the contrary, Suarez with very many others holds that the authority of God revealing is the formal object, inasmuch as it is believed through itself as revealed in the exercised act, in the same way in which the material object, revealed in the signified act, is believed on account of the formal object. — A third opinion, which most recently the distinguished Professor C. Mazzella S. I. defends in the third edition of his treatise on the Infused Virtues, reforming the doctrine of the preceding editions, not a little restricts the aforesaid doctrine of Suarez, that progress to infinity or a vicious circle may be manifestly avoided; he himself, however, with many passages adduced, thus explains the doctrine of S. Thomas (§ VI.): « Supposing a certain judgment concerning the existence and credibility of revelation, by which the whole object to be believed is made present to the mind, we judge that it is wrongly sought to find a new objective ground on the part of the intellect on account of which we assent to the authority of God revealing: since the assent to revealed truths, given solely in his obedience, « which cognition accompanies but of which it is not the cause » (S. Thom., Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 1. ad 6.), is determined by the will (S. II. II. q. 2. a. 1. ad 3.); so that that to which the intellect assents does not move the intellect by its own power, but by the inclination of the will » (Qq. disp. q. 14. de Fide a. 2. ad 13.) etc. — Nearly the same opinion is defended diffusely and subtly by the distinguished Prof. Dr. I. Scheeben (Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik. Freiburg, tom. I. 1873, libr. I., especially nn. 633-652, 684-700). — But whatever may be of the truth or probability of these opinions, it is established that neither S. Thomas nor Bonaventure nor the other ancient Scholastics taught either the first or the second opinion, at least explicitly. — As to the analysis of faith, S. Bonaventure teaches this clearly enough: if we speak of the formal cause of faith, faith is resolved ultimately into the first Truth revealing and dictating; but if of the efficient cause, this on the part of God is « through infusion or divine illustration » (below a. 2. q. 2.), or « through the teaching of the Holy Spirit speaking through the ear of the heart » (below d. 24. dub. 2.), on the part of the believer it is through the command and adhesion of the will; if it is a question of the material and disposing cause, this is through the hearing of the external locution, namely through the word of God in sacred Scripture and tradition with the magisterium of the Church (cf. the passages cited), through the motives of credibility, and especially through the Church proposing, « which by itself... is a certain great and perpetual motive of credibility and an irrefragable testimony of its divine legation » (Vatican Council c. 3. de Fide), which also infallibly discerns the things to be believed from those not to be believed and proposes them (cf. below d. 25. a. 1. q. 1; IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. in the body, d. 40. p. II. q. 3. at the end; Hexaem. Serm. 1. and 9.). Concerning the very definition of the Apostle: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — S. Thom., here q. 2. a. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 1; de Verit. loc. cit. — B. Albert., here a. 18. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 4. q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{483,484,485,486,487}-{L,R}-*.png`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 33577–33901). Fresh literal English. Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied: the Respondeo (esp. p.484-R and p.485-L) is heavily OCR-cascade-shattered with bleeding marginal glosses (`indicator essentiae`, `requisita ad definitionem`, `notificatur eadem`, `Separatur eadem ab aliis`), so the body there was set from the PDF columns, not from the OCR raster.

**Opener alignment VERIFIED** on PDF p.483-L (band 1) and p.483-R (band 1): *Quinto quaeritur de descriptione fidei ab Apostolo assignata, quoniam ipsa inter ceteras est magis authentica. Definit autem Apostolus fidem sic, ad Hebraeos undecimo: Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparentium.* — confirmed q5 (the description-of-faith question; TRACTATIO a.1 q5 = *de notificatione/descriptione fidei ab Apostolo assignata,* Heb 11:1). The four defects (*veritatis / convertibilitatis / evidentiae / sufficientiae*) and their replies are all present.

**Printed pp.483–487** (PDF 505–509; pdf = printed + 22). q5 opens at the foot of **p.483-L**, immediately after q4's scholion §I–II close at the top of p.483 (q4's body+scholion held the upper portion of p.483). q5 runs through pp.484–485 (body) and pp.486–487 (the close of the Solutiones at the foot of p.486-R, then the SCHOLION §§ I–III, which spills onto p.487 and closes at the foot of **p.487-L**). The p.483 running head reads `DIST. XXIII. ART. I. QUAEST. V.` and p.487's reads `DIST. XXIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` (the latter because Art. II begins lower on p.487); both upper portions belong to q5.

**Page-split map:**
- p.483→484 at *implicatio dupli|cis contradictionis* (mid-arg 2).
- p.484→485 at *non appa|rentes* (mid-Respondeo).
- p.485→486 at *credulitas suppliciorum non est substantia rerum sperandarum, sed magis ti|mendarum* (mid-Solutio ad 4).

**Apparatus 18 entries**, per-page restart:
- **p.483 ×3** — `[^p483-1]` (Boeth./Isidor. on *argumentum*, keying *apertum*), `[^p483-2]` (Heb. 11:1 *Vers. 1,* keying *undecimo*), `[^p483-3]` (Aristot. VII *Metaph.,* keying *accidens*). These start the per-page sequence at n.1 because q4's scholion is unfooted, so **nothing migrated in** from p.483's q4 portion.
- **p.484 ×7** — `[^p484-1..7]` (Boeth. *Dialog. in Porphyr.* / Aristot. VI *Topic.* / Augustine *Enchirid.* / I Cor. 13:13+Gregor. / Aristot. VI *Topic.*+VII *Metaph.* / supra q.2+Heb. 13:9 / Aristot. I *Ethic.*+II *de Anima*).
- **p.485 ×4** — `[^p485-1..4]` (Aristot. VII *Metaph.* / Damascene *de Fide orthod.* / Aristot.+Boeth.+Quintilian on *argumentum* [long note 3, footer text spans both columns] / lit. Magistri c.8).
- **p.486 ×4** — `[^p486-1..4]` (Sive *obiecti* / Aristot. on *intentio* / Quaest. 2 / Cod. U *quamvis enim*).
- The **scholion (§§ I–III) carries NO footers** (consistent with q4's unfooted scholion).

**Footer ownership / migration:**
- **IN: NONE.** q4's scholion is unfooted; p.483's q5 footers begin fresh at n.1.
- **OUT: NONE.** q5's scholion is unfooted and the scholion §III closes at the foot of p.487-L, immediately before ARTICULUS II. No footer carries past the seam; the next chunk (a2-q1) opens its own per-page sequence on p.487.

**SCHOLION FINDING: q5 HAS its own scholion** (`SCHOLION.` on PDF p.486-R; OCR header clean at raw 33817). It is unusually long: **§ I** (S. Thom. *de Verit.* — definition vs. due form, *« faith is a habit of the mind »*); **§ II** (object of faith = first Truth not seen, will « presides »; then four numbered points on the analysis of the act of faith: objective ground = authority of God revealing; first Truth threefold *in essendo/cognoscendo/dicendo*; the implicated acts of intellect & will; assent to the material object grounded in the formal); **§ III** (the post-Scotus dispute Lugo vs. Suarez vs. Mazzella vs. Scheeben on the formal ground of faith, then the author-list *De ipsa definitione Apostoli:* Alex. Hal. / S. Thom. / B. Albert. / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med.).

**Seam CLEAN both ends:** opens at the QUAESTIO V header (raw 33577) / body opener (raw 33580), continuous from q4's scholion close; closes at the end of scholion §III (raw ~33901) immediately before **ARTICULUS II** (header raw 33902, *De fide informi* raw 33904).

**No [?] flags** (450 dpi legible throughout, including the cascade-shattered Respondeo, recovered cleanly from the PDF columns).

**J2 2026-07-13:** `[^p486-4]` was missing from the English body; inserted after "although" in Ad 7/8, mirroring the Latin marker's position after *quamvis*.

**HAND-OFF TO d23-a2-q1 (forwarded):** **ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO I** — *Utrum fides informis sit in genere virtutis, an non* ("Whether unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, or not"), `type: quaestio`, `articulus: 2`, `quaestio: 1`. **ARTICULUS II header at raw 33902** (`ARTICULUS II.`), article title *De fide informi* at raw 33904, and the **short article opener at raw 33906:** *"Consequenter quaeritur de fide informi, circa quam quaeruntur quinque."* followed by the TRACTATIO listing the five questions (*Primo quaeritur de eius genere... Tertio quaeritur de eius subiecto... Quarto quaeritur de eius duratione... Quinto et ultima quaeritur de eius forma...*). Per the Vol II/III convention (a short ARTICULUS opener folds into its q1), **fold the ARTICULUS II opener + the 5-question TRACTATIO into a2-q1**, no standalone divisio chunk. **QUAESTIO I header at raw 33912** (`QUAESTIO 1.`); **q1 title** *Utrum fides informis sit in genere virtutis, an non* (raw 33913); **q1 body opener** *Circa primum quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad genus suum, utrum videatur...* (raw 33916). **Verify the opener alignment on PDF — STOP and report if misaligned.** **Printed p.487 onward** (PDF 509+; pdf = printed + 22) — Art. II + q1 open at the foot of **p.487-L**, right after q5's scholion §III. q1 has a scholion (`SCHOLION.` at raw 34035). Upper boundary: **QUAESTIO II at raw 34083** (`An fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita`). Grep for it to fix q1's end. **FOOTERS MIGRATING IN: NONE** — q5's scholion is unfooted; p.487's a2-q1 footer sequence starts its own per-page restart. **d23-a1-q5 is COMPLETE.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 487 -->

### Articulus II. *De fide informi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de fide informi, circa quam quaeruntur quinque.

Primo quaeritur de eius genere.

Secundo quaeritur de eius origine.

Tertio quaeritur de eius subiecto.

Quarto quaeritur de eius duratione.

Quinto et ultimo quaeritur de eius informatione.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum fides informis sit in genere virtutis, an non.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad genus suum, utrum videlicet sit in genere virtutis, an non. Et quod sit in genere virtutis, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicit Augustinus in libro, qui intitulatur ab aliquibus *de Vera Innocentia*[^p487-1]: « Cum ceterae virtutes possint bonis et malis esse communes, sola dilectio est propria et specialis

<!-- page 488 -->

virtus piorum atque Sanctorum »; ergo fides virtus est communis bonis et malis; sed in malis non reperitur nisi fides informis: ergo fides informis est virtus.

2. Item, secundum quod vult Philosophus[^p488-1], circa difficilia et ardua necessaria est ipsi menti rationali ars et virtus: ergo cum articuli fidei difficiles sint ad credendum, ad hoc quod facile credantur, necessaria est ars, vel virtus; sed fides informis facit, articulos facile credi, sicut patet in multis peccatoribus: ergo fides informis vel est ars, vel virtus; sed non est ars nec scientia: ergo videtur, quod sit virtus.

3. Item, maioris difficultatis est credere articulos fidei, quam continere ab actu libidinis, quoniam illud potest ratio non elevata; hoc autem, scilicet credere, non potest, nisi super se elevetur; sed continere, caritate circumscripta, est actus virtutis: ergo et credere. Sed illud credere est fidei informis: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod directe opponitur vitio et peccato virtus est[^p488-2]; sed habitus fidei informis directe opponitur ipsi haeresi et infidelitati, quae sunt vitia et peccata, nec potest cum eis stare: ergo necesse est, fidem informem esse virtutem.

5. Item, humilitas, qua quis humiliat se vel affectum suum sub mandatis divinae Maiestatis, habet rationem virtutis: ergo pari ratione et illa humilitas, qua quis se humiliat sub regulis divinae Veritatis, etiam praeter caritatem habet rationem virtutis; sed fides informis est huiusmodi, per quam captivatur *intellectus in obsequium Christi*[^p488-3] ad assentiendum ei in omnibus articulis: ergo fides informis est in genere virtutis.

**Sed contra:** 1. Iacobi secundo[^p488-4]: *Fides sine operibus mortua est;* sed nihil, quod est mortuum, habet in se rationem virtutis: si ergo fides sine gratia et caritate caret operibus fructuosis et sic mortua est, iam ergo non habet rationem virtutis.

2. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habitum est supra in secundo libro, distinctione vigesima septima[^p488-5]: « Virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nemo male utitur »; sed fide informi non recte vivitur, et multi male utuntur: ergo fides informis sub genere virtutis non continetur.

3. Item, omnis virtus aut est cardinalis, aut theologica[^p488-6]: si ergo fides informis est virtus, aut est cardinalis, aut theologica; sed non est theologica, cum non tendat in Deum, non est cardinalis, cum non sit circa bonum creatum: ergo non est in genere virtutis.

4. Item, quando unus haereticus credit decem articulos et alios discredit, quamvis illi articuli sint supra rationem, tamen fides, qua credit illos, non dicitur virtus esse[^p488-7]: ergo si eadem fide, qua creduntur decem articuli, possunt etiam omnes credi, videtur, quod fides informis in malis Christianis nullo modo teneat rationem virtutis.

5. Item, cum discipulus credit et assentit magistro in his quae sibi non videntur et sunt supra suum intellectum, quamvis assentiat in his quae sunt supra se, non tamen illa credulitas dicitur esse virtus: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod homo non indigeat aliqua virtute ad hoc, quod ipsi[^p488-8] primae Veritati assentiat; sed fides informis nihil aliud facit, nisi quod facit assentire primae Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo videtur, quod fides informis non sit virtus.

### Conclusio

> Fides informis est in genere virtutis communiter dictae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod virtus dupliciter consuevit accipi, cum dicimus, aliquem habitum esse virtutem, proprie videlicet et communiter. *Proprie* namque dicitur virtus recta ratio perducens in finem[^p488-9]; et hoc modo virtus est principium operis meritorii et dicitur solummodo de habitu gratia informato, sine quo non contingit pervenire ad finem gloriae. *Alio modo* dicitur virtus communiter habitus rectificans potentiam aliqua rectitudine iustitiae et vigorans eam circa opus difficile, quamvis non perducat eam in finem[^p488-10]. Et hoc modo accipiendo virtutem, habitus politici informes dicuntur esse virtutes; hoc etiam modo fides informis, quae quidem est in malis Christianis, habet esse in genere virtutis. — Per illum enim habitum quodam modo rectificatur intellectus hominis, dum captivatur *in obsequium Christi* ad assentiendum primae Veritati propter se et super omnia; vigoratur etiam, ut cre-

<!-- page 489 -->

dat vera non apparentia et vitet erronea et phantastica; sicut apparet in multis Christianis carentibus caritate, qui libenter et humiliter audiunt verba spectantia ad doctrinam fidei et constanter et viriliter abhorrent haereticam pravitatem. Et sic concedi potest, quod fides informis sit in genere virtutis, secundum quod nomen virtutis accipitur *large* et extenditur ad habitum rectificantem et vigorantem potentiam in his actibus, circa quos consistit via iustitiae[^p489-1]. — Et quia hoc modo procedunt rationes ad partem primam, ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides sine operibus mortua est; dicendum, quod non dicitur *mortua*, quia careat[^p489-2] omni utilitate et efficacia, sed quia caret vita gratuita, quae est vita perfecta; et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod non sit *simpliciter* virtus, sed quod non sit virtus *proprie* dicta.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis etc.; dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi definit virtutem *proprie* dictam, scilicet virtutem gratuitam; et hoc modo concedendum est, fidem informem non contineri sub virtutis genere. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, nullo modo eam contineri[^p489-3], secundum quod virtus *large* accipitur: immo est ibi locus sophisticus *consequentis*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis virtus aut est cardinalis, aut theologica; dicendum, quod illa divisio est virtutis *formatae*, secundum quod *proprie* accipitur virtus cardinalis et theologica: et sic fides informis non continetur sub genere virtutis. — Posset tamen dici, quod sicut fides[^p489-4] habet rationem virtutis incompletae, sic habet rationem virtutis theologicae, quia quodam modo in Deum dirigit, licet semiplene.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de haeretico, qui credit decem articulos; dicendum, quod etsi haereticus habeat aliquam illuminationem respectu illorum articulorum verorum, quos credit, et aliquam habilitatem ad illos credendos; illa tamen habilitas et credulitas non debet dici virtus, quia nec potentiam rectificat nec vigorat: non *rectificat* potentiam, quia non captivatur intellectus eius plene in obsequium Veritatis summae; non *vigorat*, quia per illam non respuit falsitatem oppositam veritati. Et haec duo requirebantur ad hoc, quod habitus sortiretur nomen et rationem virtutis. — Non sic autem est de fide informi, quae est in malis Christianis, quia ipsi assentiunt et adhaerent primae Veritati propter se et super omnia, ita quod in illo habitu est rectificatio et vigor, et ex hoc quaedam perfectio[^p489-5]. Unde sola illa fides informis est in genere virtutis, qua creduntur omnes articuli vel explicite, vel implicite, qua etiam respuuntur omnes errores. Haec enim sola est, quae habet in se quandam perfectionem rectitudinis et vigoris.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de discipulo assentiente magistro, quod non indiget habitu virtutis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia credulitas illa, qua discipulus assentit magistro, ita potest esse via in falsitatem, sicut in veritatem, pro eo quod magister eius potest vera et falsa asserere. Non sic autem est de credulitate, qua quis assentit primae Veritati, quae nullo modo potest esse via nisi in veritatem et rectitudinem. Et propter hoc, quia de se est[^p489-6] rectificativa mentis; et credulitas, qua Christianus assentit Deo, est via salutis, ita quod nullo modo de se ordinatur ad oppositum: ideo magis sortitur rationem virtutis quam illa credulitas, qua discipulus assentit magistro, quae quidem potest esse erroris occasio.

english:
### Article II. *On unformed faith.*

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning unformed faith, about which five things are asked.

First, inquiry is made concerning its genus.

Second, inquiry is made concerning its origin.

Third, inquiry is made concerning its subject.

Fourth, inquiry is made concerning its duration.

Fifth and last, inquiry is made concerning its taking-of-form.

### Question I. *Whether unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, or not.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning unformed faith as regards its genus, namely whether it is in the genus of virtue, or not. And that it is in the genus of virtue seems so:

1. *First*, from what Augustine says in the book which is entitled by some *On True Innocence*[^p487-1]: "Whereas the other virtues can be common to the good and the wicked, love alone is the proper and special

virtue of the godly and of the Saints"; therefore faith is a virtue common to the good and the wicked; but in the wicked nothing is found except unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is a virtue.

2. Likewise, according to what the Philosopher holds[^p488-1], for things difficult and arduous art and virtue are necessary to the rational mind itself: therefore, since the articles of faith are difficult to believe, that they may be believed easily, art or virtue is necessary; but unformed faith makes the articles to be believed easily, as is evident in many sinners: therefore unformed faith is either art or virtue; but it is not art nor science: therefore it seems that it is a virtue.

3. Likewise, it is of greater difficulty to believe the articles of faith than to refrain from the act of lust, since the latter unraised reason can do; but the former, namely to believe, it cannot do unless it be raised above itself; but to refrain, charity being set aside, is an act of virtue: therefore also to believe. But that believing belongs to unformed faith: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that which is directly opposed to vice and sin is a virtue[^p488-2]; but the habit of unformed faith is directly opposed to heresy and unbelief themselves, which are vices and sins, nor can it stand together with them: therefore it is necessary that unformed faith be a virtue.

5. Likewise, the humility by which one humbles himself or his affection under the commands of the divine Majesty has the character of a virtue: therefore by like reasoning that humility too, by which one humbles himself under the rules of the divine Truth, even apart from charity has the character of a virtue; but unformed faith is of this sort, by which *the intellect is taken captive into the obedience of Christ*[^p488-3] so as to assent to him in all the articles: therefore unformed faith is in the genus of virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. James, chapter two[^p488-4]: *Faith without works is dead;* but nothing that is dead has in itself the character of a virtue: if therefore faith without grace and charity lacks fruitful works and is thus dead, then it no longer has the character of a virtue.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says, and as was treated above in the second book, distinction twenty-seven[^p488-5]: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill"; but by unformed faith one does not live rightly, and many use it ill: therefore unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue.

3. Likewise, every virtue is either cardinal or theological[^p488-6]: if therefore unformed faith is a virtue, it is either cardinal or theological; but it is not theological, since it does not tend toward God, nor is it cardinal, since it is not concerned with a created good: therefore it is not in the genus of virtue.

4. Likewise, when one heretic believes ten articles and disbelieves others, although those articles are above reason, nevertheless the faith by which he believes them is not said to be a virtue[^p488-7]: therefore if by the same faith by which ten articles are believed all can also be believed, it seems that unformed faith in wicked Christians in no way holds the character of a virtue.

5. Likewise, when a disciple believes and assents to a master in those things which are not seen by him and are above his understanding, although he assents in things which are above himself, nevertheless that believing is not said to be a virtue: therefore by like reasoning it seems that a man does not need any virtue for assenting to[^p488-8] the first Truth itself; but unformed faith does nothing other than make one assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things: therefore it seems that unformed faith is not a virtue.

### Conclusion

> Unformed faith is in the genus of virtue commonly so called.

**I respond:** It must be said that virtue is wont to be taken in two ways, when we say that some habit is a virtue, namely properly and commonly. For *properly* virtue is called a right reason leading to the end[^p488-9]; and in this way virtue is the principle of a meritorious work and is said only of a habit informed by grace, without which one cannot attain to the end of glory. *In another way* virtue is called commonly a habit rectifying a power by some rectitude of justice and strengthening it about a difficult work, although it does not lead it to the end[^p488-10]. And taking virtue in this way, unformed political habits are said to be virtues; in this way too unformed faith, which indeed is in wicked Christians, has its being in the genus of virtue. — For through that habit the intellect of man is in a certain way rectified, while it is taken captive *into the obedience of Christ* so as to assent to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things; it is also strengthened, that it may be-

lieve true things not apparent and shun things erroneous and fantastic; as appears in many Christians lacking charity, who willingly and humbly hear the words pertaining to the doctrine of faith and steadfastly and manfully abhor heretical depravity. And thus it can be granted that unformed faith is in the genus of virtue, insofar as the name of virtue is taken *broadly* and is extended to a habit rectifying and strengthening a power in those acts about which the way of justice consists[^p489-1]. — And since the arguments for the first part proceed in this way, they are therefore to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that faith without works is dead; it must be said that it is not called *dead* because it lacks[^p489-2] all usefulness and efficacy, but because it lacks the gratuitous life, which is the perfect life; and therefore from this it cannot be concluded that it is not a virtue *simply*, but that it is not a virtue *properly* so called.

2. To that which is objected, that virtue is a good quality of the mind etc.; it must be said that Augustine there defines virtue *properly* so called, namely gratuitous virtue; and in this way it is to be granted that unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. From this, however, it does not follow that it is in no way contained[^p489-3], insofar as virtue is taken *broadly*: rather there is here the sophism of the *consequent*.

3. To that which is objected, that every virtue is either cardinal or theological; it must be said that that division is of *formed* virtue, insofar as cardinal and theological virtue is taken *properly*: and thus unformed faith is not contained under the genus of virtue. — Yet it could be said that, just as faith[^p489-4] has the character of an incomplete virtue, so it has the character of a theological virtue, since in a certain way it directs toward God, though only half-fully.

4. To that which is objected concerning the heretic who believes ten articles; it must be said that even if the heretic has some illumination with respect to those true articles which he believes, and some aptitude for believing them; nevertheless that aptitude and believing ought not to be called a virtue, because it neither rectifies the power nor strengthens it: it does not *rectify* the power, because his intellect is not taken captive fully into the obedience of the highest Truth; it does not *strengthen*, because through it he does not reject the falsehood opposed to truth. And these two things were required for a habit to obtain the name and character of a virtue. — But it is not so with unformed faith, which is in wicked Christians, because they assent and adhere to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things, so that in that habit there is rectification and strength, and from this a certain perfection[^p489-5]. Hence that unformed faith alone is in the genus of virtue, by which all the articles are believed either explicitly or implicitly, by which also all errors are rejected. For this alone is that which has in itself a certain perfection of rectitude and strength.

5. To that which is objected concerning the disciple assenting to a master, that he does not need a habit of virtue; it must be said that it is not similar, because that believing by which a disciple assents to a master can be a way into falsehood just as into truth, for the reason that his master can assert both true and false things. But it is not so with the believing by which one assents to the first Truth, which can in no way be a way except into truth and rectitude. And on account of this, because in itself it is[^p489-6] rectifying of the mind; and the believing by which a Christian assents to God is the way of salvation, so that in no way is it of itself ordered to the opposite: therefore it obtains the character of a virtue more than that believing by which a disciple assents to a master, which indeed can be an occasion of error.

la: Ab aliis: Prosperi Aquil. *sententiae ex Augusti delibatae* (quarum prima incipit: *Innocentia vera est* etc.). Sententia hic allata est n. 7. estque formata ex dict. August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 103. serm. I. n. 9. In textu origin. pro *sola dilectio* habetur *dilectio Dei et proximi.*

en: By others: Prosper of Aquitaine, *Sentences gleaned from Augustine* (of which the first begins: *True innocence is* etc.). The sentence cited here is n. 7, and is formed from the saying of Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 103, sermon I, n. 9. In the original text, for *love alone* there is found *the love of God and of neighbor.*

la: Libr. II. *Ethic.* c. 3: *Praeterea voluptati repugnare difficilius est quam irae, ut Heraclitus inquit; at circa id quod difficilius est, semper et ars et virtus versatur* etc. — Infra codd. A K bis *faciliter* pro *facile.*

en: Bk. II *Ethics* c. 3: "Moreover it is more difficult to resist pleasure than anger, as Heraclitus says; but art and virtue are always concerned with that which is more difficult" etc. — Below, codd. A K twice have *faciliter* for *facile.*

la: Vide Aristot., X. *Metaph.* text. 16. (IX. c. 4.) et VII. *Ethic.* c. 1.

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 16 (IX, c. 4) and *Ethics* VII, c. 1.

la: Epist. II. Cor. 10, 3.

en: Epistle II Cor. 10:3.

la: Vers. 26. — *Minor* illustratur illis verbis August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 57. n. 20: *Quare autem non dixit viventes, sed tanquam viventes, nisi quia falsa est haec vita impiorum? Neque enim vivunt, sed vivere sibi videntur.* Cfr. etiam supra pag. 213, nota 5.

en: Verse 26. — The *minor* is illustrated by those words of Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 57, n. 20: "But why did he not say 'living,' but 'as if living,' except because this life of the wicked is false? For neither do they live, but they seem to themselves to live." Cf. also above p. 213, note 5.

la: In lit. Magistri, c. 5, et in Comment. dub. 3.

en: In the text of the Master, c. 5, and in the Commentary dub. 3.

la: Vide infra d. 33. q. 1.

en: See below d. 33. q. 1.

la: Siquidem haereticus infidelis est i. e. virtute fidei privatus. — Paulo ante post *decem articulos* edd. subdunt *fidei.*

en: Since indeed the heretic is an unbeliever, i.e. deprived of the virtue of faith. — A little before, after *ten articles* the editions add *of faith.*

la: Edd. *ipse.*

en: The editions read *ipse* ["he himself"].

la: August., I. *Soliloq.* c. 6. n. 13: *Haec est vere perfecta virtus: ratio perveniens ad finem suum, quam beata vita consequitur.* Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 27. dub. 3. — Paulo inferius post *pervenire* cod. U interiicit *aliquem.*

en: Augustine, I *Soliloquies* c. 6. n. 13: "This is truly perfect virtue: reason arriving at its end, which the blessed life follows." Cf. II *Sent.* d. 27. dub. 3. — A little below, after *pervenire* cod. U inserts *aliquem.*

la: Praeter verba Aristot., paulo superius nota 1 allata, cfr. etiam pag. 388, nota 2. De habitibus politicis vide infra d. 33. dub. 5. — Paulo superius post *potentiam* cod. F addit *vel animam.* Pro *potentiam aliqua rectitudine* cod. V *potentiam aliquam ratione.*

en: Besides the words of Aristotle cited a little above in note 1, cf. also p. 388, note 2. On political habits see below d. 33. dub. 5. — A little above, after *potentiam* cod. F adds *vel animam.* For *potentiam aliqua rectitudine* cod. V reads *potentiam aliquam ratione.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 1.

en: Cf. below d. 33. dub. 1.

la: Codd. A L U V aa bb *caret.* Subinde pro *utilitate* cod. A *virtute*, et pro *quae est* codd. A K *id est.*

en: Codd. A L U V aa bb read *caret.* Then for *utilitate* cod. A has *virtute*, and for *quae est* codd. A K *id est.*

la: Edd. supplent *sub virtutis genere.* — De sophismate *consequentis* vide supra pag. 92, nota 2.

en: The editions supply *under the genus of virtue.* — On the sophism of the *consequent* see above p. 92, note 2.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. clarius *fides informis.* Inferius *incompletae* scribi posset etiam *incomplete.*

en: The editions, with some codices, more clearly read *unformed faith.* Below, *incompletae* could also be written *incomplete.*

la: Virtus enim, secundum Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 17. (c. 3.), est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Cfr. II. *Sent.* d. 27. dub. 3. — Pro *perfectio* cod. K *rectitudo.*

en: For virtue, according to Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 17 (c. 3), is a disposition of the perfected toward the best. Cf. II *Sent.* d. 27. dub. 3. — For *perfectio* cod. K reads *rectitudo.*

la: Edd. 1. 2 *de se non est*, quam falsam lectionem Vat., absque tamen auctoritate codd., correxit, post *quia* addendo: *credulitas illa, qua discipulus assentit magistro.* Pro *quia* codd. A U *quod.* Mox pro *Christianus* cod. A *quis.*

en: Editions 1 and 2 read *de se non est*, which false reading the Vatican edition, yet without the authority of the codices, corrected by adding after *quia*: *that believing, by which a disciple assents to a master.* For *quia* codd. A U read *quod.* Soon after, for *Christianus* cod. A reads *quis.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec et duae seqq. quaestiones intime cohaerent; conclusiones confirmantur doctrina in Concilio Vatic. (c. 3. *de Fide*) exposita, ubi dicitur: « Hanc fidem... Ecclesia catholica profitetur *virtutem esse supernaturalem* ». Et inferius: « Quare fides ipsa in se, etiam si per caritatem non operetur, *donum Dei* est, et actus eius est opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo *liberam* praestat ipsi Deo *obedientiam*, gratiae eius, cui resistere posset, consentiendo et cooperando ». Et in can. 5. (*de Fide*) anathemati subiiciuntur qui dicunt: « Ad solam fidem vivam, quae per caritatem operatur, gratiam Dei necessariam esse ». Non nisi in modo loquendi antiqui doctores a recentioribus recedunt, cum passim, Augustini vestigia secuti, per nomen virtutis non nisi virtutem *perfectam* et aeterna retributione dignam intelligunt; secundum quem sensum cum Magistro aliisque S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 4. a. 5.) dicit: « Fides autem informis non est virtus »; sed simul haec verba ita explicat, sicut S. Bonav. in hac quaestione. Hic autem etiam bene distinguit duplicem effectum huius virtutis, quod scilicet intellectum *rectificat* respectu Dei per debitam subiectionem, et *vigorat* tum ad vera non apparentia credenda, tum ad falsitatem apparentem respuendam.

De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 3. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 14. seq. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. loc. cit.; de Verit. q. 14. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

**II.** Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem notandum est id quod in Concilio Arausic. II. (an. 529) can. 5. contra Semipelagianos, *initium fidei* et *pium affectum* naturalibus viribus attribuentes, decretum est quoad « *initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum* », scilicet quod fides, etiam sic considerata, est « per gratiae donum, id est per inspirationem Spiritus sancti corrigentem voluntatem ab infidelitate ad fidem » etc. Eo magis quoad intellectum in ipso formali actu fidei tenendum est, « quod nemo evangelicae praedicationi consentire potest, sicut oportet ad salutem consequendam, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus sancti » (Vatic. c. 3.). — Non defuerunt Scholastici, praesertim ex schola Scoti, qui illum *pium affectum* voluntatis voluerunt esse quidem supernaturalem, sed secundum modum, non secundum substantiam, quod communius non approbatur, nec principiis S. Bonaventurae est conforme. — Notanda est hic duplex distinctio inter obiectum materiale fidei et formale, inter fidem simpliciter acquisitam virtutisque expertem et infusam. Idem docet S. Thomas. — Quoad solutionem ad 1. cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 2.

De eadem 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 6. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. ad 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 2.

**III.** In responsione ad 3. quaestionem communiter docetur, in daemonibus esse fidem informem in sensu largiore, ita ut includat intellectus assensum ad non apparentia, per evidentiam probationis extortum. Ad rem non inepte Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 7. ad 2.) distinguit *sentire* veritatem, *assentire* veritati, *consentire* veritati et subiungit: « Fides daemonis in suo credere habet *sentire*, sed non *assentire*, vel *consentire*; fides informis habet *sentire* et *assentire*; fides vero formata habet *sentire, assentire* et *consentire* » etc.

De eadem 3. quaestione praeter Alexandrum: S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 5. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This and the two following questions cohere intimately; the conclusions are confirmed by the doctrine set forth in the Vatican Council (c. 3. *On Faith*), where it is said: "This faith... the Catholic Church professes to be *a supernatural virtue*." And below: "Wherefore faith itself in itself, even if it does not work through charity, is *a gift of God*, and its act is a work pertaining to salvation, by which a man renders to God himself a *free obedience*, by consenting and cooperating with his grace, which he could resist." And in canon 5 (*On Faith*) those are subjected to anathema who say: "That for faith alive alone, which works through charity, the grace of God is necessary." The ancient doctors depart from the more recent only in their manner of speaking, since, following everywhere the footsteps of Augustine, by the name of virtue they understand only a *perfect* virtue and one worthy of eternal reward; according to which sense, with the Master and others, St. Thomas (S. II. II. q. 4. a. 5.) says: "But unformed faith is not a virtue"; yet he at the same time explains these words just as St. Bonaventure does in this question. And here too he well distinguishes the twofold effect of this virtue, namely that it *rectifies* the intellect with respect to God by due subjection, and *strengthens* it both for believing true things not apparent and for rejecting apparent falsehood.

On this first question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. III. q. 64. m. 3. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 14 ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. 3; S. loc. cit.; *On Truth* q. 14. a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 2.

**II.** As regards the following (2.) question, it must be noted what was decreed in the Council of Orange II (a.D. 529) canon 5, against the Semipelagians who attributed the *beginning of faith* and the *pious affect* to natural powers, concerning "*the beginning of faith and the very affect of believing*," namely that faith, even thus considered, is "through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting the will from unbelief to faith" etc. So much the more, as regards the intellect in the formal act of faith itself, must it be held "that no one can consent to the evangelical preaching, as is required for attaining salvation, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit" (Vatican c. 3.). — Nor were there lacking Scholastics, especially from the school of Scotus, who wished that *pious affect* of the will to be indeed supernatural, but according to mode, not according to substance, which is more commonly not approved, nor is it conformable to the principles of St. Bonaventure. — There is to be noted here a twofold distinction between the material object of faith and the formal, between faith simply acquired and devoid of virtue and infused faith. St. Thomas teaches the same. — As regards the solution to 1, cf. below d. 24. dub. 2.

On the same second question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 6. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. ad 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 7. q. 2.

**III.** In the response to the third question it is commonly taught that there is in the demons an unformed faith in the broader sense, such that it includes the intellect's assent to things not apparent, extorted by the evidence of proof. To the point Alex. of Hales (loc. cit. m. 7. ad 2.) not unfittingly distinguishes *to perceive* the truth, *to assent to* the truth, *to consent to* the truth, and adds: "The faith of the demon in its believing has *perceiving*, but not *assenting* or *consenting*; unformed faith has *perceiving* and *assenting*; but formed faith has *perceiving, assenting,* and *consenting*" etc.

On the same third question, besides Alexander: St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 5. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 6. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{487,488,489}-{L,R}-*.png`, 450 dpi) with IA djvu OCR base (raw 33902–34082). Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-shattered Respondeo + marginal-gloss bleed (the OCR merged the marginal labels `Fundamenta.`, `Virtus dicitur dupliciter.`, `Conclusio.`, `Ratio.`, `Ad opposita.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`, `Notandum.`, `Aliter.` inline — trimmed as editorial marginalia per CLAUDE.md). pdf = printed + 22.

**ARTICULUS II opener folded.** Per the Vol II/III chunking convention (CLAUDE.md Vol II Override step 5), the short ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de fide informi… quaeruntur quinque* + the 5-question TRACTATIO) is folded into the head of this q1 — no standalone `d23-a2-divisio` chunk. Rendered: ART. II header + *De fide informi* + opener + 5-question list, then QUAESTIO I header + body.

**Page span:** printed 487 (foot) → 488 → 489. ART. II header + q1 opener + arg 1 open at the foot of p.487-L/R, right after q5's scholion §III closed at the foot of p.487-L.

**Page-break map:**
- p.487→488: mid-arg 1, after *propria et specialis* | *virtus piorum atque Sanctorum*.
- p.488→489: mid-Respondeo, after *vigoratur etiam, ut cre-* | *dat vera non apparentia*.

**Apparatus per-page restart (17 entries):**
- **p.487 ×1** (`[^p487-1]`): Quaracchi note 1 (Prosper of Aquitaine source of the Augustine quotation). Only one footer note on p.487 belongs to this chunk; the rest of p.487's footers were claimed by q5 (which closed at foot of p.487-L).
- **p.488 ×10** (`[^p488-1..10]`): notes 1–5 (left col footer), 6–10 (right col footer).
- **p.489 ×6** (`[^p489-1..6]`): notes 1–4 (left col footer), 5–6 (right col footer).
- **Scholion §§ I–III carries NO footers.**

**Footers IN:** NONE — q5's scholion (the prior chunk) was unfooted, so q1's p.487 footer sequence starts its own per-page restart at note 1.
**Footers OUT:** NONE — this chunk's scholion §III closes the printed block; the next page (490) opens QUAESTIO II's own footer sequence. (Note: p.490's footer continues scholion §II/§III text but those are running scholion prose, not footnote markers; the scholion is unfooted throughout.)

**Scholion finding:** q1 HAS its own SCHOLION (`SCHOLION.` raw 34029, PDF p.489-L bottom), §§ I–III. §I = Vatican Council c.3 *de Fide* (faith a supernatural virtue / donum Dei / free obedience) + Augustine's "perfect virtue" usage + S.Thom. *fides informis non est virtus* reconciled + Bonaventure's twofold effect (rectificat/vigorat) + author list. §II = anticipates q2 (Council of Orange II a.529 can.5 vs Semipelagians; initium fidei / pius affectus; Scotus-school supernatural-secundum-modum dispute) + author list. §III = anticipates q3 (unformed faith in demons in broader sense; Alex. Hal. sentire/assentire/consentire triad) + author list.

**Alignment:** opener VERIFIED on PDF (p.487-R band): *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad genus suum, utrum videlicet sit in genere virtutis, an non* — matches ART. II's first question (*Primo quaeritur de eius genere*). Aligned.

**Seam:** opens at ARTICULUS II header (raw 33902) continuous from q5's scholion §III close (raw ~33901); closes at end of scholion §III (raw ~34082) immediately before QUAESTIO II (header raw 34085, *An fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita*).

**[?] flags:** NONE — all bands legible at 450 dpi.

**Hand-off forwarded → d23-a2-q2:** see `next-session-resume.md`.