title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum personalis proprietas in Angelis sit substantialis, vel accidentalis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum personalis proprietas sit in Angelis accidentalis, vel substantialis. Et quod accidentalis, videtur sic.

1. Boethius[^1] dicit, quod « omne proprium manat de genere accidentium, non solum proprium individui, sed etiam speciei »; sed individuum magis approximat accidentibus quam species: ergo multo fortius proprietas individualis de genere accidentium est. Sed discretio personalis est proprietas individualis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore[^2] ait, « quod in divinis est personalis discretio per *originem*, in Angelis per *qualitatem*, in hominibus *utroque modo* »: si ergo tam *qualitas* quam *origo* dicit proprietatem accidentalem in creaturis, patet etc.

3. Item, Porphyrius[^3] dicit, « quod individuum constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in altero reperire »: sed tales sunt proprietates accidentales: ergo individuatio est per accidentia. Sed per eadem est personalis discretio, per quae est individuatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, humana natura in Christo non habuit personalitatem nec discretionem personalem; sed constat, quod habuit quae sunt essentialia substantiae rationali: ergo personalis discretio non est substantialis sive essentialis nec homini nec Angelo.

5. Item, circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, res non cadit in sensu, sed solum in intellectu; sed « universale, dum intelligitur, singulare, dum sentitur[^4] »: ergo circumscriptis accidentibus, circumscribitur individuatio, ergo et personalis discretio, et sic idem quod prius.

6. Item, discretio personalis est discretio secundum *numerum*; sed circumscripta quantitate, non est intelligere numerum[^5]: ergo nec discretionem personalem. Sed *substantiale* intelligitur, circumscripto accidentali: ergo si discretio personalis non potest intelligi, accidentibus circumscriptis, ergo non est substantialis Angelo, sed potius accidentalis.

**Contra:** 1. Arguitur primo per textum. Magister[^6] enim dicit, quod « prima consideratio est de substantia », et sub prima consideratione comprehendit personalem discretionem: ergo videtur, quod personalis discretio est Angelo substantialis.

2. Item, « persona non est aliud quam individua substantia rationalis naturae[^7] »; sed individua substantia, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae non per reductionem, sed directe, secundum rectam lineam: ergo, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae: ergo personalitas non est in genere accidentis, quia in eodem genere est album, in quantum album, et albedo: ergo in eodem genere personalitas et persona.

3. Item, « nullum accidens est nisi in substantia individua[^8] »: ergo omne accidens consequitur individuitatem essentiae, et tam in rationali quam in irrationali hoc habet veritatem: ergo prius per naturam est aliquid individuum substantiae rationalis, quam habeat accidens: ergo per prius persona: ergo et discretio in personalitate.

4. Item, quae differunt personalitate[^9] differunt in suis principiis substantialibus, sicut patet in Petro et Paulo; et quae sic differunt substantialiter discernuntur: ergo discretio personalis dicit differentiam substantialem: ergo non est proprietas accidentalis.

5. Item, non est maior discretio in accidentibus quam inter opposita; sed opposita non faciunt discretionem personalem, quia unus homo prius est albus, postea niger, prius puer, postea senex; et tamen idem individuum est et una persona[^10]: ergo etc.

6. Item, accidentia diversa, cum sunt in uno <!-- page 106 --> supposito, sunt unum numero, ut grammaticum et musicum[^11]: sed hoc non esset, si diversitas secundum numerum vel secundum discretionem personalem veniret ab accidentibus: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Personalis proprietas non causatur ab accidentibus, sed ab actuali coniunctione principiorum, et in se est aliquid substantiale; quod autem ad hoc consequitur, hoc est aliquo modo in genere accidentium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod personalis discretio est accidentalis proprietas, quia dicunt[^12], quod *est* in genere accidentis, et quod etiam *causatur* ab accidentibus, sicut discretio numeralis. Sed in hoc differentia est, quia discretio *numeralis* causatur a diversitate proprietatum, in quibus communicat creatura rationalis et irrationalis; sed discretio *personalis* a proprietatibus, quae insunt proprie rationali creaturae. — Sed illud improbatur in opponendo per multas rationes. Nec potest habere veritatem, quod distinctio *individualis* sit ab accidentibus, cum individua differant secundum substantiam, non solum secundum accidens; et similiter de discretione *personali* intelligendum est.

Et ideo alius modus est dicendi, quod discretio *personalis* dicit proprietatem accidentalem, quae tamen non *causatur* ab accidentibus, sed a substantia[^13] sive principiis substantialibus; sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, est in genere accidentis, tamen immediate habet ortum a substantia. — Sed cum *persona* dicat idem quod suppositum rationalis naturae, ut est in genere substantiae; non videtur probabile, quod personalis discretio dicat proprietatem accidentalem solum.

Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod discretio *personalis*, etsi videatur dicere accidens, quia dicit per modum accidentis, tamen principaliter dicit quid substantiale; et si aliquo modo importat accidens, hoc est consequenter; illud tamen immediate *habet ortum* a principiis substantialibus. — Et hoc patet sic. Discretio personalis addit supra discretionem individualem; discretio autem individualis duo dicit, scilicet *individuationem* et consequenter *distinctionem.* Individuatio autem est ex principiorum indivisione[^14] et appropriatione; ipsa enim rei principia, dum coniunguntur, invicem se appropriant et faciunt individuum. Sed ad hoc consequitur esse *discretum* sive esse distinctum ab alio, et surgit ex hoc *numerus*, et ita *accidentalis* proprietas[^15], consequens ad substantiam. — Et sic *individualis* discretio dicit aliquid accidentale, et aliquid substantiale; *personalis* autem addit supra hanc dignitatem personalitatis. Dignitas autem illa duo dicit, scilicet *nobilitatem rationalis naturae*, quae est, quod natura rationalis tenet principatum inter naturas creatas; unde non est ordinabilis ad perfectiorem formam. Et haec nobilitas, etsi per modum qualitatis habeat intelligi, tamen *essentialis* est naturae rationali. — Dicit etiam illa nobilitas *actualem eminentiam*, ita quod in supposito nulla sit alia natura ita principalis, ut natura rationalis, ut quasi sit per se sonans[^16]. Et ideo, quia hoc deficit ei in Christo, natura rationalis creata non facit personalitatem, et hoc est *accidentale.* — Dicendum igitur, quod quemadmodum individualis discretio est ex existentia formae naturalis in materia, sic *personalis* discretio ex existentia naturae *nobilis* et *supereminentis* in supposito. Et ideo, quamvis utrobique importetur *quid substantiale*, et similiter *accidentale consequens* — hoc dico in creatura — non tamen importatur accidentale, quod *causetur* vel ortum habeat ab accidente, sed potius consequitur formam in materia, vel naturam in supposito.

Ex his patet veritas problematis et dissolutio obiectionum pro parte. Si enim quaeratur, utrum personalis discretio sit proprietas *substantialis*, vel *accidentalis*; si *substantialis* proprietas dicatur, quia immediate sequitur substantiam; sic dicendum est, esse substantiale. Si *substantiale* dicatur, quia non exit genus substantiae; dicendum, quod quodammodo *sic*, et quodammodo *non.* Similiter si dicatur *accidentalis* proprietas, quia *causatur* ab accidentibus; sic dicendum simpliciter, quod *non*; si vero *accidentalis*, quia *est* in genere accidentis; sic potest dici, quod quodammodo *sic*, quodammodo *non*, secundum distinctionem primo factam.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod personalis discretio pertinet ad substantiam, et non causatur ab accidentibus; hoc totum concedendum est.

1. Quod obiicitur in oppositum, quod proprium omne manat de genere accidentium; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de *propria passione*, et hanc <!-- page 107 --> dicit manare de genere accidentium, non quia non causetur ex principiis subiecti, sed quia, etsi ex ipsis *causetur*, formaliter tamen *est* in genere accidentium[^17]. Dupliciter ergo deficit illa ratio. Primo, quia peccat in intellectu huius nominis *proprium.* Est enim proprietas quantum ad *rem*, et est proprietas quantum ad *modum*; et Boethius intelligit de eo quod *realiter* est propria passio, non de eo quod est proprietas quantum ad *modum.* Proprietas autem *individualis* aut proprietas *personalis*, etsi videatur dicere proprietatem consequentem *esse*, sicut accidens, realiter tamen non dicit nisi appropriationem principiorum per indivisionem; hoc dico quantum ad proprietatem *individualem.* Similiter proprietas *personalis* non dicit ultra hoc nisi dignitatem sive nobilitatem naturae rationalis, quae nobilitas non est ei accidentalis, immo simpliciter et omnino essentialis.

Peccat *etiam* praedicta ratio in malo intellectu *praedicati*, quia *proprium* dicitur *manare* de genere accidentium, non quia manat ab *accidentibus*, sed quia manat a *substantia*, existens de genere accidentium; sic in proposito. Unde sicut *unitas*, quae est principium numeri, ortum habet a principiis *substantiae*, accidentaliter ad ipsam relatis, non autem a principio aliquo, quod sit in genere *accidentis*; sic intelligi potest de discretione *personali*, secundum id quod in ea accidentale est, utpote *comparatio ad alteram* personam, respectu cuius habet distingui et numerari; et *eminentia dignitatis* in supposito respectu alterius naturae, quam non habuit humana natura in Christo.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod discretio personalis est per qualitatem; dicendum, quod intelligitur de qualitate, quae est in genere qualitatis quantum ad *modum*, non autem quantum ad *rem.* His enim duobus[^18] distinguuntur praedicamenta vel quantum ad *essentiam*, vel quantum ad *modum*; et aliquid est in genere substantiae, quod nihilominus habet modum accidentis; unde etiam consuevit distingui qualitas duplex, scilicet substantialis et accidentalis[^19]. — Vel dicendum, quod Richardus loquitur de distinctione personali quantum ad nostram cognitionem; et quia cognitio nostra est per accidentales qualitates, dixit, personas creatas distingui qualitate. — Et per hunc modum intelligitur verbum Porphyrii, qui dicit, individuum constare ex collectione proprietatum; loquitur enim secundum *rationem* et cognitionem, non secundum *rem*; et sic patet tertium.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod in Christo humana natura non habuit personalitatem; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione illius eminentiae, quae *consequitur* ad nobilitatem; et illa supereminentia dicit quandam dignitatem accidentalem, sicut prius ostensum est, quae amitti potest non solum per *deperditionem*, sed etiam per dignioris *superinductionem*, sicut alibi melius dicetur[^20].

5. Quod obiicitur de sensu et intellectu, dicendum, quod etsi sensus solummodo sit singularium, intellectus tamen potest esse non solum universalium, sed etiam singularium; unde non est intelligenda illa differentia cum praecisione. Et hoc patet, quia solus intellectus comprehendit intrinseca principia Petri et Platonis; et circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, dicit, eos esse discretos et distinctos[^21].

6. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod sicut *unitatem substantialem* consequitur unitas *accidentalis* inseparabiliter, quae non est principium *indivisionis*, sed consequens ad illam; sic *diversitatem substantialem* consequitur *numerus* inseparabiliter; tamen secundum rem et naturam distinctio illa est a substantiali principio, non accidentali[^22]. Et sic patet totum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the personal property in the angels is substantial, or accidental.*

Secondly it is asked whether the personal property is in the angels accidental, or substantial. And that [it is] accidental, seems [so] thus.

1. Boethius[^1] says that « every property flows from the genus of accidents, not only the property of an individual, but also of a species »; but the individual approximates accidents more than the species [does]: therefore much more strongly is an individual property of the genus of accidents. But personal distinction is an individual property: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor[^2] says, « that in divine [things] there is personal distinction by *origin*, in the angels by *quality*, in men by *either mode* »: if therefore both *quality* and *origin* state an accidental property in creatures, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, Porphyry[^3] says, « that the individual is constituted from properties, the collection of which it is impossible to find in another »: but such are accidental properties: therefore individuation is through accidents. But personal distinction is through the same [things] through which individuation is: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, human nature in Christ did not have personality nor personal distinction; but it is established that it had the [things] which are essential to a rational substance: therefore personal distinction is not substantial or essential either to man or to angel.

5. Likewise, all accidents being circumscribed, a thing does not fall under sense, but only under intellect; but « the universal [is grasped] while it is understood, the singular while it is sensed[^4] »: therefore, accidents being circumscribed, individuation is circumscribed, therefore also personal distinction, and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, personal distinction is a distinction according to *number*; but, quantity being circumscribed, it is not [possible] to understand number[^5]: therefore neither [to understand] personal distinction. But the *substantial* is understood, the accidental being circumscribed: therefore if personal distinction cannot be understood, accidents being circumscribed, therefore it is not substantial to an angel, but rather accidental.

**On the contrary:** 1. It is argued first through the text. For the Master[^6] says that « the first consideration is concerning substance », and under the first consideration he comprehends personal distinction: therefore it seems that personal distinction is substantial to an angel.

2. Likewise, « a person is nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature[^7] »; but an individual substance, insofar as [it is] of this kind, is in the genus of substance not by reduction, but directly, according to a straight line: therefore, insofar as [it is] of this kind, it is in the genus of substance: therefore personality is not in the genus of accident, because in the same genus is the white, insofar as white, and whiteness: therefore personality and person [are] in the same genus.

3. Likewise, « no accident is except in an individual substance[^8] »: therefore every accident follows the individuality of the essence, and both in the rational and in the irrational this holds true: therefore prior by nature is something individual of a rational substance, before it has an accident: therefore prior [is] the person: therefore also the distinction in personality.

4. Likewise, [things] which differ in personality[^9] differ in their substantial principles, as is plain in Peter and Paul; and [things] which thus differ are discerned substantially: therefore personal distinction states a substantial difference: therefore it is not an accidental property.

5. Likewise, there is no greater distinction in accidents than between opposites; but opposites do not make personal distinction, because one man is first white, afterwards black, first a boy, afterwards an old man; and yet he is the same individual and one person[^10]: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, diverse accidents, when they are in one <!-- page 106 --> supposit, are one in number, like the grammatical and the musical[^11]: but this would not be [so], if diversity according to number or according to personal distinction came from accidents: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The personal property is not caused from accidents, but from the actual conjunction of principles, and in itself is something substantial; but that which follows upon this is in some mode in the genus of accidents.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that about this there is a threefold mode of speaking.

For some wished to say that personal distinction is an accidental property, because they say[^12] that it *is* in the genus of accident, and that it is also *caused* from accidents, like numerical distinction. But in this there is a difference, because *numerical* distinction is caused from a diversity of properties in which rational and irrational creature share; but *personal* distinction [is caused] from properties which are present properly to a rational creature. — But that is disproved in objecting through many reasons. Nor can it hold true that *individual* distinction is from accidents, since individuals differ according to substance, not only according to accident; and likewise it is to be understood concerning *personal* distinction.

And therefore another mode is of speaking, that *personal* distinction states an accidental property, which however is not *caused* from accidents, but from substance[^13] or substantial principles; just as unity, which is the principle of number, is in the genus of accident, yet immediately has its rise from substance. — But since *person* states the same as a supposit of a rational nature, as it is in the genus of substance; it does not seem probable that personal distinction states an accidental property only.

And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that *personal* distinction, although it seems to state an accident, because it states [it] through the mode of an accident, yet principally states something substantial; and if in some mode it imports an accident, this is consequently; that [accident] however immediately *has its rise* from substantial principles. — And this is plain thus. Personal distinction adds upon individual distinction; but individual distinction states two [things], namely *individuation* and consequently *distinction.* But individuation is from the indivision[^14] and appropriation of the principles; for the principles of a thing themselves, while they are conjoined, mutually appropriate one another and make an individual. But upon this follows being *discrete* or being distinct from another, and from this arises *number*, and so an *accidental* property[^15], consequent upon substance. — And so *individual* distinction states something accidental, and something substantial; but the *personal* adds upon this the dignity of personality. But that dignity states two [things], namely the *nobility of a rational nature*, which is that a rational nature holds the primacy among created natures; whence it is not orderable to a more perfect form. And this nobility, although it be understood through the mode of a quality, yet is *essential* to a rational nature. — That nobility also states an *actual eminence*, so that in the supposit there be no other nature so principal as the rational nature, so that it be as it were *per se sonans* [self-sounding][^16]. And therefore, because this is lacking to it in Christ, created rational nature does not make personality, and this is *accidental.* — It must be said therefore that, just as individual distinction is from the existence of a natural form in matter, so *personal* distinction [is] from the existence of a *noble* and *supereminent* nature in a supposit. And therefore, although on both sides *something substantial* be imported, and likewise *an accidental consequent* — this I say in a creature — yet there is not imported an accidental [thing] which is *caused* or has its rise from an accident, but rather it follows the form in matter, or the nature in the supposit.

From these [things] is plain the truth of the problem and the dissolution of the objections in part. For if it be asked whether personal distinction is a *substantial*, or an *accidental*, property; if it be called a *substantial* property, because it immediately follows substance; thus it must be said to be substantial. If it be called *substantial*, because it does not exit the genus of substance; it must be said that in a certain mode *yes*, and in a certain mode *no.* Likewise if it be called an *accidental* property, because it is *caused* from accidents; thus it must be said simply that *no*; but if [it be called] *accidental*, because it *is* in the genus of accident; thus it can be said that in a certain mode *yes*, in a certain mode *no*, according to the distinction first made.

As to what therefore is objected, that personal distinction pertains to substance, and is not caused from accidents; this whole [thing] is to be conceded.

1. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that every property flows from the genus of accidents; it must be said that Boethius speaks of a *proper passion*, and says that this <!-- page 107 --> flows from the genus of accidents, not because it is not caused from the principles of the subject, but because, although it be *caused* from them, formally it is nevertheless *in* the genus of accidents[^17]. In two ways therefore that reason is defective. First, because it errs in the understanding of this name *property.* For there is a property as to the *thing*, and there is a property as to the *mode*; and Boethius understands of that which *really* is a proper passion, not of that which is a property as to the *mode.* But an *individual* property or a *personal* property, although it seem to state a property consequent upon *being*, like an accident, really nevertheless states nothing but the appropriation of principles through indivision; this I say as to the *individual* property. Likewise the *personal* property states beyond this nothing but the dignity or nobility of a rational nature, which nobility is not accidental to it, but rather simply and altogether essential.

The aforesaid reason also errs in the bad understanding of the *predicate*, because *property* is said to *flow* from the genus of accidents, not because it flows from *accidents*, but because it flows from *substance*, existing of the genus of accidents; so in the matter proposed. Whence just as *unity*, which is the principle of number, has its rise from the principles of *substance*, accidentally related to it, but not from any principle which is in the genus of *accident*; so it can be understood concerning *personal* distinction, according to that which in it is accidental, namely the *comparison to another* person, with respect to which it has to be distinguished and numbered; and the *eminence of dignity* in the supposit with respect to another nature, which human nature did not have in Christ.

2. 3. As to what is objected, that personal distinction is through quality; it must be said that it is understood of a quality which is in the genus of quality as to the *mode*, but not as to the *thing.* For by these two[^18] the predicaments are distinguished either as to *essence*, or as to *mode*; and something is in the genus of substance which nevertheless has the mode of an accident; whence also it has been customary to distinguish a twofold quality, namely substantial and accidental[^19]. — Or it must be said that Richard speaks of personal distinction as to our cognition; and because our cognition is through accidental qualities, he said that created persons are distinguished by quality. — And through this mode is understood the word of Porphyry, who says that the individual is constituted from a collection of properties; for he speaks according to *reason* and cognition, not according to the *thing*; and thus the third [objection] is plain.

4. As to what is objected, that in Christ human nature did not have personality; it must be said that this is by reason of that eminence which *follows* upon nobility; and that supereminence states a certain accidental dignity, as was shown before, which can be lost not only through *loss*, but also through the *super-induction* of a worthier [nature], as will be better said elsewhere[^20].

5. As to what is objected concerning sense and intellect, it must be said that although sense is only of singulars, the intellect nevertheless can be not only of universals, but also of singulars; whence that difference is not to be understood with precision. And this is plain, because the intellect alone comprehends the intrinsic principles of Peter and Plato; and, all accidents being circumscribed, it says them to be discrete and distinct[^21].

6. As to what is objected concerning number, it must be said that just as upon *substantial unity* there follows *accidental* unity inseparably, which is not the principle of *indivision*, but consequent upon it; so upon *substantial diversity* there follows *number* inseparably; yet according to the thing and nature that distinction is from a substantial principle, not an accidental [one][^22]. And so the whole is plain.

la: Comment. in Porphyr. (a se ipso translat.), libr. III. *de Specie* circa finem; libr. IV. c. *de Proprio*; libr. V. *de Communit. et differentiis speciei et proprii.*

en: Commentary on Porphyry (translated by himself), book III *On Species* near the end; book IV, the chapter *On the Proper*; book V *On the Community and Differences of Species and of the Proper.*

la: Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 13.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity* c. 13.

la: De Praedicab. c. *de Specie.*

en: *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species.*

la: In cod. T in marg. additur *Boethius in Commentario super Praedicamenta* (! *Praedicabilia Porphyrii*), ubi in fine libri I. ait: *Ita quoque generibus et speciebus, id est singularitati et universalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo universale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his, in quibus habet esse suum.* — Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 post *universale* subiungunt *est.*

en: In codex T, in the margin, is added *Boethius in [his] Commentary on the Categories* (! *the Predicables of Porphyry*), where at the end of book I he says: *So too to genera and species, that is to singularity and universality, there is indeed one subject, but in another mode it is universal, when it is thought, in another singular, when it is sensed in those things in which it has its being.* — Codices aa cc and ed. 1 after *universale* subjoin *est.*

la: Nam secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quantitate*, numerus est discreta quantitas; et secundum Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 5, numerus significat quantitatem dumtaxat earum rerum, quae in numerum cadunt.

en: For according to Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quantity*, number is discrete quantity; and according to Damascene, III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 5, number signifies the quantity only of those things which fall into number.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. — De prop. seq. cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1.

en: Boethius, *On the Two Natures and the One Person*, c. 3. — On the following proposition cf. above p. 48, note 1.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia*, in cuius expositione Boeth. ait: « *Principaliter vero individuae substantiae dictae sunt, quod omne accidens prius in individua, post vero in secundas substantias venit. Nam quoniam Aristarchus grammaticus est, homo vero est Aristarchus, est homo grammaticus: ita prius omne accidens in individuum venit, secundo vero loco etiam in species generaque substantiarum accidens illud venire putabitur* ». Aristoteles ibidem hanc rationem addit: *Color in corpore est; ergo et in quodam corpore; nam si non in aliquo esset singulorum, nec omnino in corpore.* — Paulo inferius cod. L *substantiae rationali, quam habet* pro *substantiae rationalis, quam habeat.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance*, in the exposition of which Boethius says: « *But individual substances are said [to be substances] principally, because every accident comes first into individuals, and then into second substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, and a man is Aristarchus, a man is a grammarian: so first every accident comes into the individual, but in the second place that accident will be thought to come also into the species and genera of substances* ». Aristotle in the same place adds this reason: *Color is in a body; therefore also in some [particular] body; for if it were not in some one of the singulars, it would not be in body at all.* — A little below codex L [reads] *substantiae rationali, quam habet* for *substantiae rationalis, quam habeat.*

la: Codd. I bb *in personalitate.*

en: Codices I bb [read] *in personalitate.*

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia*: *Substantia vero, cum unum et idem numero sit, susceptiva contrariorum est, ut quidam homo, cum unus et idem sit, aliquando quidem albus, aliquando fit niger etc.* A Porphyrio, de Praedicab. c. *de Differentia*, haec discretio vocatur *alteritas.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance*: *But substance, since it is one and the same in number, is receptive of contraries, as a certain man, since he is one and the same, is sometimes white, sometimes becomes black, etc.* By Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Difference*, this distinction is called *otherness.*

la: Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.): *Tertium vero [aliquid idem dicitur], quando ab accidente, ut sedens vel musicum Socrati; omnia enim haec unum numero volunt significare.* Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.).

en: Aristotle, I *Topics* c. 6 (c. 5): *But a third [thing is said to be the same], when [it is so] from an accident, like the sitting or the musical to Socrates; for all these wish to signify [something] one in number.* Cf. V *Metaphysics* text 16 (IV, c. 9).

la: Multi codd. dubiae sunt lectionis: legi siquidem potest *dicunt* vel *dicit*, quod etiam edd. 2, 3 ponunt.

en: Many codices are of doubtful reading: for it can be read *dicunt* or *dicit*, which edd. 2, 3 also put.

la: In cod. T additur *sive substantiis.*

en: In codex T is added *sive substantiis.*

la: Cod. U subiungit *quae sunt materia et forma*, cod. M *coniunctione.* Sola Vat. bis substituit *indivisio* pro *individuatio.*

en: Codex U subjoins *quae sunt materia et forma*, codex M *coniunctione.* The Vatican [edition] alone twice substitutes *indivisio* for *individuatio.*

la: Vat. hic interserit *dicit.*

en: The Vatican [edition] here interposes *dicit.*

la: Haec etymologia nominis *personae* invenitur in Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. Cfr. tom. I. p. 405, nota 11. Plura de re, quae hic proponitur, vide I. Sent. d. 34. per totam, et III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seqq. ac d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius cod. V *specialem eminentiam* pro *actualem eminentiam.* Aliquanto inferius Vat. bis omittit particulam *ex* voci *existentia* praefixam.

en: This etymology of the name *persona* is found in Boethius, *On the Two Natures and the One Person*, c. 3. Cf. tom. I, p. 405, note 11. For more on the matter which is here proposed, see I *Sent.* d. 34 throughout, and III *Sent.* d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 ff., and d. 10, a. 1, q. 2 f. — A little above codex V [reads] *specialem eminentiam* for *actualem eminentiam.* Somewhat below the Vatican [edition] twice omits the particle *ex* prefixed to the word *existentia.*

la: Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, *etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen est* etc., quae etiam in fine solutionis post *non habuit* addit *nec habet.*

en: The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and ed. 1 contradicting [it, reads] *etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen est* etc., which also at the end of the solution after *non habuit* adds *nec habet.*

la: Supple cum codd. K Y *modis.* Dein cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt *praedicata* pro *praedicamenta.*

en: Supply, with codices K Y, *modis.* Then codex cc and ed. 1 substitute *praedicata* for *praedicamenta.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 19. (IV. c. 14.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, V *Metaphysics* text 19 (IV, c. 14).

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seqq. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq.

en: Book III *Sentences* d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 ff., and d. 10, a. 1, q. 2 f.

en: Cf. I *Sentences* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to 2.

la: Vat. *individuationis.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *individuationis.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hanc quaestionem incidit problema de *principio individuationis* in substantiis sive corporalibus sive spiritualibus, quod famosum est magis infinitis disputationibus quam evidenti solutione, cum recte dicat Phil. de Ss. Trinitate in sua celebri Summa philosophica, p. III. q. 5. in princ.: « In hac re quot capita, tot sensus ».

1. Scotus (hic q. 1-5.) quoad substantias *corporales* quinque enumerat opiniones, quas distinctis quaestionibus nititur evertere, et sunt haec: 1. Substantia naturalis ex ipsa sua natura est individua vel singularis; quae est sententia Nominalium. — 2. Individuatio fit non per aliquod positivum, sed per duplicem negationem; ita Henr. Gand., Quodl. 2. q. 8. — 3. Individuatio fit per actualem existentiam, ita Durand. (hic q. 2.), qui dicit: « Natura communis et individuum solum differunt ut concepta et existens ». — 4. Ipsa fit per quantitatem in materia; quae opinio attribuitur Ægidio R. — 5. Ipsa fit per materiam, ut vult S. Thomas. — Tandem Scotus (q. 6.), dissentiens a SS. Thoma et Bonav., ponit, quod substantia materialis est individua per entitatem quandam essentiae specificae superadditam et ex parte rei formaliter ab ipsa distinctam, quae est *differentia individualis*, a nonnullis vocata *haecceitas*, per quam simili modo constituitur *individuum*, sicut *natura specifica* per differentiam specificam. Eadem principia Scotus applicat ad individua in *spiritualibus* creaturis.

2. Quoad sententiam S. Thomae discipuli eius conveniunt in hoc, quod secundum ipsum *formae substantiales* individuantur per materiam, ita ut materia individua sit radix individuationis formae, et quod formaliter individuantur per ordinem intrinsecum <!-- page 108 --> et essentialem ad materiam individuam; item, quod *substantiae materialis completae* primum principium individuationis sit materia prima signata quantitate. Sed quomodo hoc fiat, non eodem modo ab omnibus explicatur. — Quoad puros spiritus, cum secundum Angelicum non sint plures in *una specie*, iam non requiritur aliud principium individuationis; unde ipse dicit (hic q. 1. a. 2.): « Incommunicabilitas [personalitas] est in homine ex hoc, quod ipsius natura receptibilis in materiae fundamento per materiam determinatur; sed in Angelo in se determinata est ex hoc, quod in aliquo sicut forma determinabilis recipi non potest; et ex hoc ipso satis incommunicabilis est, et non per determinationem recipientis » (cfr. S. I. q. 50. a. 4.). Idem de Angelis sentit Ægid. R. (hic p. 1. q. 2. a. 1.).

**II.** S. Bonav. (hic q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. 2.) non approbat opinionem Scoti, quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae sit forma individualis superaddita. In hoc praeter S. Thomam consentiunt etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3.), Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1.) et Durand. (loc. cit.). — Deinde S. Bonav., quippe qui etiam in spiritualibus creaturis ponat materiam, sed non extensam, hic docet, individuationem in omnibus creaturis consurgere ex duplicis principii coniunctione, qua unum sibi appropriat alterum, ut clare explicat in quaest. 3. in corp. — Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), aliorum referens opiniones, nihil determinat.

**III.** Quod autem principium individuationis non sit in genere *accidentis*, sed *substantiae*, communiter docetur. Nihilominus S. Bonav. etiam sententiae primo loco relatae aliquid veri inesse fatetur, quatenus id quod individuationem *consequitur*, scil. distinctio ab aliis et numerus, sit *accidentalis proprietas*; quod magis explicatur in solut. ad 1. De ratione unitatis et numeri cfr. I. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, Scholion.

**IV.** Discretionem *personalem* in homine distinctam esse a discretione *individuali*, constat, quia humana Christi natura est quidem *individua*, non autem est *persona* humana, unde (hic in corp.) dicitur: « Discretio personalis *addit* super discretionem individualem ». De hoc plura iam dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1. 2. et d. 34. q. 1, quae hic confirmantur et mira claritate et profunditate magis explicantur.

**V.** De seq. quaest. 3. commentatores Magistri explicite non tractant, praeter B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 2. et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2, qui tantum aliqua ex S. Bonav. transcribit); plurimi autem iam ideo de hoc non agunt, quia non admittunt principium materiale in Angelis. — Etiam de hac q. 2. pauci tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Into this question falls the problem of the *principle of individuation* in substances whether corporeal or spiritual, which is more famous for its infinite disputations than for an evident solution, since the Philosopher of the Holy Trinity rightly says, in his celebrated *philosophical Summa*, p. III, q. 5, in the beginning: « In this matter [there are] as many opinions as heads ».

1. Scotus (here q. 1-5) as to *corporeal* substances enumerates five opinions, which he strives to overthrow in distinct questions, and these are: 1. A natural substance from its very nature is individual or singular; which is the opinion of the Nominalists. — 2. Individuation is made not through anything positive, but through a twofold negation; thus Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 8. — 3. Individuation is made through actual existence, thus Durandus (here q. 2), who says: « The common nature and the individual differ only as conceived and existing ». — 4. It is made through quantity in matter; which opinion is attributed to Giles of Rome. — 5. It is made through matter, as St. Thomas holds. — Finally Scotus (q. 6), dissenting from Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, posits that a material substance is individual through a certain entity superadded to the specific essence and on the part of the thing formally distinct from it, which is the *individual difference*, by some called *haecceity*, through which the *individual* is constituted in a similar mode as the *specific nature* through the specific difference. The same principles Scotus applies to individuals in *spiritual* creatures.

2. As to the opinion of St. Thomas his disciples agree in this, that according to him *substantial forms* are individuated through matter, so that individual matter is the root of the individuation of the form, and that they are formally individuated through an intrinsic <!-- page 108 --> and essential order to individual matter; likewise, that of *a complete material substance* the first principle of individuation is prime matter signed by quantity. But how this comes about is not explained in the same mode by all. — As to pure spirits, since according to the Angelic [Doctor] there are not several in *one species*, another principle of individuation is now not required; whence he himself says (here q. 1, a. 2): « Incommunicability [personality] is in man from this, that its nature, receptible in the foundation of matter, is determined through matter; but in an angel it is in itself determined from this, that it cannot be received in something as a determinable form; and from this very [fact] it is sufficiently incommunicable, and not through the determination of a recipient » (cf. *Summa* I, q. 50, a. 4). The same of the angels Giles of Rome holds (here p. 1, q. 2, a. 1).

**II.** St. Bonaventure (here q. 3, in the body and in reply to 1, 2) does not approve the opinion of Scotus, that beyond the form of the most special species there is a superadded individual form. In this, besides St. Thomas, agree also Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3), Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 1), and Durandus (loc. cit.). — Then St. Bonaventure, inasmuch as he posits matter also in spiritual creatures, but not extended, here teaches that individuation in all creatures arises from the conjunction of a twofold principle, by which one appropriates the other to itself, as he clearly explains in question 3, in the body. — Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1), reporting the opinions of others, determines nothing.

**III.** That the principle of individuation is not in the genus of *accident*, but of *substance*, is commonly taught. Nevertheless St. Bonaventure confesses that there is also some truth in the opinion related in the first place, insofar as that which *follows* individuation, namely distinction from others and number, is an *accidental property*; which is more explained in the solution to 1. On the account of unity and number cf. I *Sent.* d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, Scholion.

**IV.** That personal distinction in man is distinct from individual distinction is established, because Christ's human nature is indeed individual, but is not a human person, whence (here in the body) it is said: « Personal distinction *adds* upon individual distinction ». On this many [things] have already been said, I *Sent.* d. 23, a. 1, q. 3; d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1, 2, and d. 34, q. 1, which here are confirmed and with wondrous clarity and profundity are more explained.

**V.** On the following question 3 the commentators of the Master do not explicitly treat, except Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 15, m. 2, and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2, who only transcribes some [things] from St. Bonaventure); but very many, for this very reason, do not deal with this, because they do not admit a material principle in the angels. — Also concerning this q. 2 few treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 15, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, little question 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 108 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis. Et quod a parte principii formalis:

1. Richardus[^1] dicit, « quod tam in Angelis, quam in hominibus est discretio personalis per qualitatem »; sed qualitas aut est forma, aut tenet se ex parte formae: ergo etc.

2. Item, si aliquid inest aliquibus et est in eis commune per analogiam, necesse est, quod insit per aliquid analogice repertum in eis[^2]. Personalis autem discretio est in divinis et in Angelis analogice; sed in divinis nullo modo est a materia, quia Deus est pura forma: ergo etc.

3. Item, personalis discretio in creatura dicit maximam nobilitatem; sed quod magis nobile est maxime elongatur a materia et maxime accedit ad formam: ergo etc.

4. Item, personalis discretio dicit maximam actualitatem[^3] in creatura, quia quod tale est nullo modo est ad alterum possibile; omne autem tale consequitur formam, non materiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, nihil quod est unum in omnibus, est principium discretionis; materia, quantum est de se, unica est[^4]: ergo nullo modo est principium discretionis: ergo nec discretionis personalis.

6. Item, « definitio, ut vult Philosophus[^5], est aggregati »: ergo cum definitur homo, non forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma definitur: ergo si homo in communi claudit in se materiam, et natura rationalis similiter; si persona addit aliquid super naturam, cum non possit addere materiam, oportet, quod addat aliquid formale.

**Contra:** 1. Boethius[^6]: « Species est totum *esse* individuorum »; sed *esse* est a forma: ergo *individuum* supra speciem non addit formam, ergo nec *persona* supra naturam. Si ergo aliquid addit, aut *materiam*, aut *accidentia*; sed per *accidentia* non potest esse discretio personalis vel individualis: ergo necesse est, quod per *materiam.*

2. Item, si persona adderet aliquam formam supra naturam, ergo sicut species est definibilis, quia addit differentiam et formam supra genus, ita <!-- page 109 --> etiam individuum esset definibile; quod falsum est[^7].

3. Item, si individuum sive persona addit formam individuantem supra speciem specialissimam, quaero, utrum Conditor[^8] possit facere aliam formam per omnia illi consimilem. Constat, quod sic, quia nulla est forma accidentalis, cuius similem non possumus cogitare: ergo similiter in substantiali. Sed si facit similem, illa est communis pluribus; sed nihil tale est individuum: ergo impossibile est, discretionem personalem esse a principio formali superaddito speciei.

4. Item, ab eodem est discretio personalis, a quo est distinctio secundum numerum; sed illa est a materia, sicut dicit Philosophus in prima Philosophia[^9]: « Omnino materia numerabiliter se habet »: ergo etc.

5. Item, ab eodem est personalis discretio, a quo est esse *hoc*, sive *hic et nunc*; sed hoc est materia, quia in libro de Caelo et mundo[^10] dicitur, « quod differt dicere *caelum* et *hoc caelum*, quia, cum dico *caelum*, dico formam; cum dico *hoc caelum*, dico materiam »: ergo etc.

6. Item, in creaturis, in quibus est personalis discretio per originem, non est ob aliud, nisi quia generans generat aliud; sed, ut dicit Philosophus[^11], « generans non generat aliud nisi propter materiam »: ergo in rebus creatis est personalis discretio propter materiam.

### Conclusio

> Quatenus personalis discretio dicit singularitatem, ipsa, sicut individuatio, consurgit ex coniunctione duplicis principii; quatenus dicit dignitatem, sequitur principaliter rationem formae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec eadem est quaestio de *individuatione*, quae nunc movetur de *personali discretione*; et de ipsa fuit contentio inter philosophicos viros[^12].

Quidam enim innitentes verbo Philosophi dixerunt, quod *individuatio* venit *a materia*, quia individuum supra speciem non addit nisi materiam. Et hoc ponebant, quia dixerunt, universalia solum dicere *formas*; et tunc primo tangitur *materia*, quando pervenitur ad *hoc aliquid*[^13].

Aliis vero aliter visum est, scilicet quod individuatio esset *a forma*, et dixerunt, quod ultra formam *speciei specialissimae* est forma *individualis.* Et quod movit hos ponere illud fuit, quod intellexerunt, ordinem in formis secundum generationem et naturam esse per eundem modum, per quem ordinantur in genere, ita quod forma generis generalissimi primo advenit materiae; et sic descendendo usque ad speciem. Et adhuc forma illa non constituit individuum, quia non est omnino in actu, sed ultra hanc formam *individualis* subsequitur, quae est omnino in actu, sicut materia fuit omnino in potentia[^14].

Quaelibet istarum positionum aliquid habet, quod homini non[^15] multum intelligenti rationabiliter videri poterit improbabile. Quomodo enim *materia*, quae omnibus est communis, erit principale principium et causa distinctionis, valde difficile est videre. *Rursus*, quomodo *forma* sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere, cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus[^16] dicit etiam in sole et luna esse. Vel quomodo dicemus, duos ignes differre formaliter, vel etiam alia, quae plurificantur et numero distinguuntur ex sola divisione continui, ubi nullius est novae formae inductio?

Ideo est tertia positio satis planior, quod individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum; sicut patet, cum impressio vel expressio fit multorum sigillorum in cera, quae prius erat una, nec sigilla plurificari possunt sine cera, nec cera numeratur, nisi quia fiunt in ea diversa sigilla. Si tamen quaeras, a quo veniat *principaliter*; dicendum, quod individuum est *hoc aliquid.* Quod sit *hoc*, principalius habet a *materia*, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore[^17]. Quod <!-- page 110 --> sit *aliquid*, habet a *forma.* Individuum enim habet *esse*, habet etiam *existere.* Existere[^18] dat materia formae, sed *essendi actum* dat forma materiae. — *Individuatio* igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio.

*Personalis* autem *discretio* dicit *singularitatem* et *dignitatem.* In quantum dicit *singularitatem*, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum *quod est.* Sed *dignitatem* dicit principaliter ratione *formae*; et sic patet, unde sit personalis discretio originaliter, in creaturis loquendo, sive in hominibus, sive in Angelis.

Quae ergo obiiciuntur ad primam partem, procedunt ratione *nobilitatis* et *dignitatis*, prout tamen est in ipso supposito, sive *quod est*, cuius distinctio venit in divinis ex *origine*, in creaturis ex *principiis originalibus*, sicut in primo libro[^19] fuit ostensum. Si autem quaeratur: quid est illud *commune*, secundum quod inest? dicendum, quod proprietas dignitatis incommunicabiliter existens in hypostasi; aliter tamen reperitur hic, aliter ibi[^20]. Omnes rationes sequentes procedunt via praedicta.

1. 2. 3. Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod non possit esse *a forma*, sed *a materia*; dicendum, quod rationes illae probant, ut patet, quod *non totaliter* est a forma, quia forma nulla est individua, nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia. Et *universalia* similiter, quia dicunt *formas*[^21], non concernunt materiam nisi ratione suorum individuorum, pro quibus supponunt, quando definiuntur vel subiiciuntur. Unde illae rationes concedendae sunt, quod individuum non addit aliam formam, quae sit individualis de se.

4. 5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod individuatio est a materia; dicendum, quod per illas auctoritates non datur intelligi, quod materia sit principium individuationis, nisi sicut causa *sine qua non*, non autem sicut *tota causa.* Nec tamen ita potest attribui materiae *personalis discretio*, sicut *individuatio*, propter hoc quod dicit dignitatem, quae principalius respicit formam, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem[^22].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material.*

Thirdly it is asked whether personal distinction is on the side of the formal principle, or the material. And that [it is] on the side of the formal principle:

1. Richard[^1] says, « that both in the angels and in men there is personal distinction by quality »; but quality is either form, or holds itself on the side of form: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if something is present in certain [things] and is common in them by analogy, it is necessary that it be present through something analogically found in them[^2]. But personal distinction is in divine [things] and in the angels analogically; but in divine [things] it is in no way from matter, because God is pure form: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, personal distinction in a creature states the greatest nobility; but what is more noble is most removed from matter and most approaches form: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, personal distinction states the greatest actuality[^3] in a creature, because what is such is in no way possible toward another; but everything such follows form, not matter: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, nothing which is one in all is a principle of distinction; matter, as far as it is of itself, is unique[^4]: therefore in no way is it a principle of distinction: therefore neither of personal distinction.

6. Likewise, « a definition, as the Philosopher holds[^5], is of an aggregate »: therefore since man is defined, not the form only, but the composite of matter and form is defined: therefore if man in common encloses matter in himself, and the rational nature likewise; if a person adds something upon the nature, since it cannot add matter, it must be that it adds something formal.

**On the contrary:** 1. Boethius[^6]: « The species is the whole *being* of individuals »; but *being* is from form: therefore the *individual* does not add form upon the species, therefore neither [does] the *person* [add form] upon the nature. If therefore it adds something, [it adds] either *matter*, or *accidents*; but through *accidents* there cannot be personal or individual distinction: therefore it is necessary that [it be] through *matter.*

2. Likewise, if a person added some form upon the nature, then just as the species is definable, because it adds a difference and form upon the genus, so <!-- page 109 --> too the individual would be definable; which is false[^7].

3. Likewise, if the individual or person adds an individuating form upon the most special species, I ask whether the Creator[^8] can make another form altogether like to it. It is established that [He] can, because there is no accidental form whose like we cannot conceive: therefore likewise in a substantial [form]. But if He makes a like [one], that is common to several; but no such [thing] is an individual: therefore it is impossible that personal distinction be from a formal principle superadded to the species.

4. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is distinction according to number; but that is from matter, as the Philosopher says in the first Philosophy[^9]: « Matter altogether behaves numerably »: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, personal distinction is from the same [source] from which is being *this*, or *here and now*; but this is matter, because in the book *On the Heaven and the World*[^10] it is said, « that it differs to say *heaven* and *this heaven*, because, when I say *heaven*, I say the form; when I say *this heaven*, I say the matter »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, in creatures in which there is personal distinction by origin, it is not on account of anything else, except because the generator generates another; but, as the Philosopher says[^11], « the generator does not generate another except on account of matter »: therefore in created things personal distinction is on account of matter.

### Conclusion

> Insofar as personal distinction states singularity, it, like individuation, arises from the conjunction of a twofold principle; insofar as it states dignity, it follows principally the account of form.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is the same question of *individuation* which is now moved concerning *personal distinction*; and concerning it there was a contention among philosophical men[^12].

For some, leaning on the word of the Philosopher, said that *individuation* comes *from matter*, because the individual does not add upon the species except matter. And they posited this because they said that universals state only *forms*; and then matter is first touched when one arrives at *this something*[^13].

But to others it seemed otherwise, namely that individuation is *from form*, and they said that beyond the form of the *most special species* there is an *individual* form. And what moved these to posit that was that they understood the order in forms according to generation and nature to be by the same mode by which they are ordered in the genus, so that the form of the most general genus comes first to matter; and so descending down to the species. And still that form does not constitute the individual, because it is not wholly in act, but beyond this form an *individual* [form] follows, which is wholly in act, just as matter was wholly in potency[^14].

Each of these positions has something which to a man not much understanding could reasonably[^15] seem improbable. For how *matter*, which is common to all, will be the principal principle and cause of distinction, is very difficult to see. *Again*, how *form* would be the whole and chief cause of numerical distinction is very difficult to grasp, since every created form, as far as is of its nature, is born to have another like [itself], just as the Philosopher[^16] himself says it to be even in the sun and the moon. Or how shall we say that two fires differ formally, or also the other [things] which are multiplied and distinguished in number from the mere division of the continuous, where there is no induction of a new form?

Therefore there is a third position, sufficiently plainer, that individuation arises from the actual conjunction of matter with form, from which conjunction one appropriates the other to itself; as is plain, when the impression or expression of many seals is made in wax which previously was one, and the seals cannot be multiplied without the wax, nor is the wax numbered, except because there come to be in it diverse seals. If however you ask from what it comes *principally*; it must be said that the individual is *this something.* That it be *this*, it has more principally from *matter*, by reason of which form has its position in place and time[^17]. That <!-- page 110 --> it be *something*, it has from *form.* For the individual has *being*, has also *to-exist.* To-exist[^18] matter gives to form, but the *act of being* form gives to matter. — *Individuation* therefore in creatures arises from a twofold principle.

But *personal* *distinction* states *singularity* and *dignity.* Insofar as it states *singularity*, this it states from the very conjunction of principles, from which results the *that-which-is* itself. But *dignity* it states principally by reason of *form*; and so it is plain whence personal distinction is originally, speaking in creatures, whether in men or in the angels.

What therefore is objected against the first part proceeds by reason of *nobility* and *dignity*, as it is however in that supposit, or *that-which-is*, whose distinction comes in divine [things] from *origin*, in creatures from *original principles*, as in the first book[^19] was shown. But if it be asked: what is that *common* [thing] according to which it is present? it must be said [that it is] the property of dignity incommunicably existing in the hypostasis; yet it is found otherwise here, otherwise there[^20]. All the following reasons proceed by the aforesaid way.

1. 2. 3. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that it cannot be *from form*, but *from matter*; it must be said that those reasons prove, as is plain, that it is *not wholly* from form, because no form is individual except through the conjunction of itself with matter. And *universals* likewise, because they state *forms*[^21], do not concern matter except by reason of their individuals, for which they stand when they are defined or made subjects. Whence those reasons are to be conceded, that the individual does not add another form which would be individual of itself.

4. 5. 6. As to what is objected, that individuation is from matter; it must be said that through those authorities it is not given to be understood that matter is the principle of individuation, except as a cause *without which not*, but not as the *whole cause.* Nor however can personal distinction be attributed to matter in the same way as individuation, on account of this, that it states dignity, which more principally regards form, as the reasons to the first part show[^22].

---

la: Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 14. Cfr. supra pag. 104, nota 5. *Minorem* insinuat Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 5. (X. c. 6.): *Substantia vero secundum quale, hoc enim determinatae naturae, quantum vero indeterminatae est.* — Paulo superius post *formalis* codd. U aa supplent *videtur.*

en: Book IV *On the Trinity* c. 14. Cf. above p. 104, note 5. The *minor* is insinuated by Aristotle, XI *Metaphysics* c. 5 (X, c. 6): *But substance [is] according to quale, for this [is] of a determinate nature, but the quantum is indeterminate.* — A little above, after *formalis*, codices U aa supply *videtur.*

la: Vide supra pag. 26, nota 5. *Minor* iam probata est I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.

en: See above p. 26, note 5. The *minor* has already been proved, I *Sentences* d. 25, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Ita codd. F U Y; alii codd. *auctoritatem*, Vat. *auctoritatem et actualitatem.* Verbum *auctoritas*, quod minus placet, intelligendum esset, ut sit *proprietas ad nobilitatem pertinens* (I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2.), vel *principalitas* (ibid. d. 9. dub. 11.).

en: Thus codices F U Y; other codices *auctoritatem*, the Vatican [edition] *auctoritatem et actualitatem.* The word *auctoritas*, which pleases less, would have to be understood so that it be *a property pertaining to nobility* (I *Sent.* d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2), or *principality* (ibid. d. 9, dub. 11).

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 2.

la: Libr. VIII. Metaph. text 9. (VII. c. 3.) dicit, substantiae compositae dari definitionem, non tamen eorum, ex quibus primo componitur, cum sint simplicia, « siquidem aliquid de aliquo significat ratio definitiva; et oportet hoc quidem ut materiam, illud vero ut formam esse ». Quae verba Averroes ita exponit: « Impossibile enim est, ut formae ultimae in definitionibus habeant definitionem; quoniam formae ultimae sunt simplices, et definitiones sunt compositorum; definitiones enim rerum sunt ex materiis et formis » etc. Idem dicit ibid. text. 16. respectu altissimorum generum, v. g. entis, unius. Cfr. text. 6. et VII. Metaph. text. 40. seqq. (VI. c. 11.). — Paulo inferius post *non forma tantum* codd. F K adiungunt *vel materia tantum.* Dein aliqui codd. ut F aa *et naturam* pro *et natura.*

en: Book VIII *Metaphysics* text 9 (VII, c. 3) says that to a composite substance a definition is given, yet not of those [things] from which it is first composed, since they are simple, « if indeed the definitive account signifies something of something; and it is necessary that this be as matter, that as form ». Which words Averroes thus expounds: « For it is impossible that the ultimate forms have a definition in definitions; because the ultimate forms are simple, and definitions are of composites; for definitions of things are from matters and forms » etc. He says the same ibid. text 16 with respect to the highest genera, e.g. of being, of one. Cf. text 6 and VII *Metaphysics* text 40 ff. (VI, c. 11). — A little below, after *non forma tantum*, codices F K add *vel materia tantum.* Then some codices, like F aa, [read] *et naturam* for *et natura.*

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de Specie ait: *Homo vero Socratis atque Ciceronis tota substantia est.* — Quod forma det esse, docet Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 60. (VI. c. 17.), et Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.

en: Book III of the Commentary on Porphyry, treating of Species, says: *But man is the whole substance of Socrates and of Cicero.* — That form gives being, Aristotle teaches, VII *Metaphysics* text 60 (VI, c. 17), and Boethius, *On Unity and the One.*

la: Ut ostendit Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 38-41. (VI. c. 10. seq.).

en: As Aristotle shows, VII *Metaphysics* text 38–41 (VI, c. 10 f.).

la: Plures codd. *conditio*, aliqui *cogitatio*, Vat. *additio*; perperam et contra maiorem partem mss. et ed. 1.

en: Several codices [read] *conditio*, some *cogitatio*, the Vatican [edition] *additio*; wrongly and against the greater part of the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 8. (XIII. c. 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 7.

en: Book XIV, c. 8 (XIII, c. 5). Cf. above p. 89, note 7.

en: Book I, text 92 and 93 (c. 9).

la: Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.), ubi impugnat formas Platonicas hac ratione, quod nihil prosint ad generationes, et dicit: *Sed generans sufficiens est, ut faciat et causa sit formae in materia; tota vero iam talis forma in his carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam* [versio Arabico-latina: *aliud propter materiam*] etc.

en: Book VII *Metaphysics* text 28 (VI, c. 8), where he attacks the Platonic forms by this reason, that they avail nothing toward generations, and says: *But the generator is sufficient, that it make and be the cause of the form in matter; but the whole such form [is] now in these flesh and bones, Callias and Socrates; and [they are] diverse indeed on account of matter* [the Arabic-Latin version: *another on account of matter*] etc.

la: Cod. aa *philosophos nostros*; ed. 1 *physicos viros.* Dein plures codd. cum ed. 1 *verbis* pro *verbo.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *philosophos nostros*; ed. 1 *physicos viros.* Then several codices, with ed. 1, [read] *verbis* for *verbo.*

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Substantia*: *Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare. In primis* [singularibus] *igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid* significant. *Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis* [generibus, speciebus] *videtur quidem similiter... non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant; neque enim unum est quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Substance*: *But every substance seems to signify this something. In the first* [singular] *substances therefore it is indubitable and true that they signify this something. For it is the individual and the one in number that is signified. But in the second substances* [genera, species] *it seems indeed similarly... yet it is not true, but rather they signify a what-of-a-certain-sort; for neither is that which is the subject one, just as a first substance, but man and animal are said of many.*

la: Hanc opinionem proponit Averroes, Comment. super I. Metaph. text. 17.

en: This opinion Averroes proposes, Commentary on I *Metaphysics* text 17.

la: Vat., contradicentibus mss. et tribus prioribus edd., *homini multum intelligenti*, omissa particula *non.* — Verba in textu nostro S. Doctori a sua humilitate inspirata sunt. — Aliquanto inferius codd. I bb post *quae omnibus* addunt *creaturis.*

en: The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and the three prior editions contradicting [it, reads] *homini multum intelligenti*, the particle *non* being omitted. — The words in our text were inspired in the Holy Doctor by his humility. — Somewhat below, codices I bb after *quae omnibus* add *creaturis.*

la: Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.). Cfr. etiam I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 92. (c. 9.).

en: Book VII *Metaphysics* text 55 (VI, c. 15). Cf. also I *On the Heaven and the World*, text 92 (c. 9).

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. De iis quae sequuntur, vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, in the body. On the [things] which follow, see here a. 1, q. 2, in the body.

la: In alio sensu ac recentiores s. Doctor intelligit terminum *existere*; cfr. p. 96, nota 5.

en: In another sense than the more recent [authors] the Holy Doctor understands the term *existere*; cf. p. 96, note 5.

la: Dist. 34. q. 1, cfr. Schol. ad q. 2. — Paulo supra nonnulli codd. *sive qui est* pro *sive quod est.*

en: Distinction 34, q. 1, cf. the Scholion to q. 2. — A little above some codices [read] *sive qui est* for *sive quod est.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. et etiam q. 2, ex qua insuper patet, quomodo intelligenda sint verba: quid est illud commune, secundum quod inest, scil. proprietas personalis. Nam v. g. Petrus et Paulus nomen *personae* habent commune.

en: Cf. I *Sentences* d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, and also q. 2, from which it is moreover plain how the words are to be understood: what is that common [thing] according to which it is present, namely the personal property. For e.g. Peter and Paul have the name *person* in common.

la: Fere omnes codd. in hac prop. omittunt coniunctionem *quia*, pro qua cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt *quae* ac hic addunt particulam *et*; cod. bb vero substituit *prout*; cod. F hic adiicit *quae*, cod. Q ponit *nec* pro *non*, cod. I *non tamen*, cod. I *non autem.*

en: Almost all codices in this proposition omit the conjunction *quia*, for which codex cc and ed. 1 substitute *quae* and here add the particle *et*; codex bb however substitutes *prout*; codex F here adds *quae*, codex Q puts *nec* for *non*, codex I *non tamen*, codex I *non autem.*

la: Vide Schol. ad praeced. quaest.

en: See the Scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- **Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 8198–8358) cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (pp.108–110), per the Vol II override. The *videtur*/*Contra* args are clean running prose in the OCR; the Respondeo (the three-position *individuatio a materia / a forma / ex actuali coniunctione* treatment) and the merged replies (1.2.3 / 4.5.6) cascade-shatter and were reflowed from the crops (L column then R column).
- **Page span / structure.** QUAESTIO III closes ARTICULUS II. It opens **low on p.108** (L column, beneath a2-q2's editorial Scholion II–V): header + intro + 6 *videtur* args (quod a parte formali; arg 3 has no marker) + 6 *Contra* args (a parte materiali); a one-sentence *Conclusio* (blockquote, p.109); a Respondeo of **three positions** (individuation *a materia*; *a forma*; the accepted *ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma* — the wax-and-seals image — with the *hoc aliquid* / *quod est + quod aliquid* corollary and the *personalis discretio = singularitas + dignitas* application); then the merged replies **1.2.3** and **4.5.6** (pp.109–110). **NO scholion** — note `[^22]` is the Quaracchi cross-reference *Vide Schol. ad praeced. quaest.*; a2-q2's editorial Scholion V (`De seq. quaest. 3. commentatores Magistri…`) already covered this question, per the CLAUDE.md sibling-scholion rule. Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `De individuatione opinio 1.`, `Opinio 2.`, `Neutra placet.`, `Positio 3. et conclusio 1.`, `Quaestio connexa 1./2.`, `Conclusio 2. bimembris.`, `Conclusio 3.`, `Notandum.`, `De personali discretione, quae dicit duo.`, `De argg. in fundam.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–22):** p.108 footer notes 1–6 → `[^1]`–`[^6]` (L col 1–5 → *videtur* 1/2/4/5/6; R col 6 → *Contra* 1); p.108 note 5 (`Libr. VIII. Metaph. text 9.…`) is an **L→R column-footer runover**, the R-col continuation (`primo componitur… et naturam pro et natura`) folded into `[^5]`. p.109 footer notes 1–11 → `[^7]`–`[^17]` (L col 1–7, R col 8–11); p.109 note 7 (`Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia…`) is an **L→R runover**, the R-col continuation (`significant. Individuum enim… homo dicitur et animal`) folded into `[^13]`. p.110 footer notes 1–5 → `[^18]`–`[^22]` (L col 1–4 → Respondeo tail / *in primo libro* / connexa / reply 1.2.3; R col 5 → reply 4.5.6).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a2-q2 → a2-q3): CLEAN.** Committed `d3-p1-a2-q2`'s editorial Scholion I–V has no numbered apparatus and tops p.108; QUAESTIO III opens below it on p.108. p.108's footer is wholly q3's (`[^1]`–`[^6]`). No backfill incoming.
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a2-q3 → d3-p1-dubia): SPLIT at p.110.** q3's Respondeo tail + the merged replies occupy the top of p.110 (L-col Respondeo tail + connexa "…existens in hypostasi"; R-col "aliter tamen reperitur hic, aliter ibi³…" + replies 1.2.3 / 4.5.6 ending "…rationes ad primam partem⁵"); `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` then begins on p.110 (raw 8359). p.110's footer has 9 notes: **notes 1–5 → this chunk** (`[^18]`–`[^22]`, anchoring q3's body — `Existere¹`, `primo libro²`, `aliter ibi³`, `dicunt formas⁴`, `ad primam partem⁵`); **notes 6–9 anchor the DUBIA's body** (`enumerat sex, sicut patet⁶`, etc.) and belong to `d3-p1-dubia` (next chunk). When building `d3-p1-dubia`, start its apparatus at p.110 footer note 6 and confirm this split by content.
- **Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the cascade Respondeo and the merged replies were verified on the pp.109–110 crops; the OCR base is reliable for the *videtur*/*Contra* prose. The two L→R runover notes (`[^5]`, `[^13]`) were recovered from the R-col footer head per the standard Vol II pattern; secure on content. Cascade-region marker positions in the three-position Respondeo are content-matched in source order; per-clause positions may be off by a few words where the two-column linearization is ambiguous — parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0