title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum matrimonium habeat impedimentum
Whether marriage has any impediment

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De impedimentis matrimonii in generali.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum matrimonium habeat impedimentum.*

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod matrimonium non habeat impedimentum:

1. Quia matrimonium est remedium contra morbum concupiscentiae: ergo si ille morbus ad omnes se extendit, nullo impediente; videtur similiter, quod matrimonium, cum medicina debeat ex opposito respondere morbo[^p767-1], et ita, quod matrimonium in omnibus esse possit, nullo impediente.

2. Item, nullum aliud Sacramentum habet impedimentum, quin, si aliquis suscipiat de facto, susceptum sit: ergo similiter videtur in matrimonio, quod qualiscumque sit aliquis, tamen, si de facto contrahit, suscipit matrimonii Sacramentum.

3. Item, matrimonium est insolubile vinculum, ut est supra[^p767-2] probatum: ergo si contrahatur, nunquam dirimitur: ergo nullum est impedimentum, quod dirimat iam contractum.

4. Item, matrimonium, cum sit Sacramentum, operatur Deus, unde coniuncti matrimonialiter dicuntur coniuncti a Deo[^p767-3]; sed divina operatio non habet impedimentum, cum Deus sit agens nobilissimus; ergo matrimonium nullum habet impedimentum.

**Contra:** 1. Matrimonium institutum est in *officium*[^p767-4]; sed multi sunt inepti ad officium, ut puta ad generandum per coitum: ergo multi sunt non idonei ad matrimonium: ergo etc.

2. Item, matrimonium institutum est in *remedium*; sed multi sunt, quibus non potest esse in remedium, quia non possunt convenire: ergo etc.

3. Item, multi sunt, qui non possunt unquam sine peccato actum illum exercere, ut puta qui voverunt continentiam, vel quibus est prohibitum coniungi ab eo qui potest; sed omne Sacramentum potest venire in usum sine peccato, cum ordinet[^p767-5] ad salutem: ergo aliqui sunt inepti ad matrimonium.

4. Item, nihil est sacrum, quod fit contra divinum mandatum; sed Sacramentum est sacrum signum: ergo nihil est Sacramentum, quod fit contra praeceptionem divinam; sed divinum praeceptum, Levitici decimo octavo[^p767-6], prohibet matrimonium fieri inter multa genera personarum: ergo si contrahant de facto, non est Sacramentum: ergo habet impedimenta.

### Conclusio.

> *Sacramentum matrimonii multa habet impedimenta.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Sacramentum matrimonii habet impedimentum multiplex, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae. — Ratio autem, quare hoc Sacramentum magis habet impedimenta quam alia, est duplex. Una est ratione causae *efficientis*, quia, quamvis omnia Sacramenta sint a divina institutione et humana dispensatione, tamen hoc Sacramentum maxime consistit in humana dispensatione, quia per consensum contrahentium oritur nec habet dispensatorem determinatum[^p767-7]. — Alia ratio est ratione *finis*, quia, cum omnia Sacramenta sint in *remedium*, istud non tantum est in remedium, sed etiam in *officium*; et cum alia sint spiritualia, huic coniuncta est actio carnalis, scilicet coniunctio, quae est per coitum. Et ideo facilius recipit impedimenta. — Ex his patent obiecta.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod nullus excluditur a morbo concupiscentiae; dicendum, quod morbus ille aliter remediabilis est quam per matrimonium, ut puta per continentiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alia Sacramenta se extendunt ad omnes; patet responsio, quia non est simile de hoc et de aliis, ut visum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est vinculum insolubile; dicendum, quod verum est, ex quo ligat; sed possibile est, aliquos ineptos esse, ita ut hoc vinculo non vinciantur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina operatio non potest impediri; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi Deus operatur ut *tota* causa; sed non est sic in matrimonio, immo necesse est, intervenire consensum legitimum. *Praeterea*, operatio ista praesupponit materiam *in qua*.

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english:
### Article I. *On the impediments of marriage in general.*
### Question I. *Whether marriage has any impediment.*

As to the first point, then, it is shown that marriage does not have any impediment:

1. Because marriage is a remedy against the disease of concupiscence: therefore if that disease extends itself to all, with nothing impeding; it seems likewise that marriage, since as a medicine it ought to answer over against its opposite to the disease[^p767-1], and so that marriage may exist in all, with nothing impeding.

2. Likewise, no other Sacrament has an impediment such that, if someone receives it in fact, it is not [thereby] received: therefore it seems likewise in marriage that, whatever sort a person may be, nevertheless, if he contracts in fact, he receives the Sacrament of marriage.

3. Likewise, marriage is an insoluble bond, as was proved above[^p767-2]: therefore if it be contracted, it is never dissolved: therefore there is no impediment which dissolves what has already been contracted.

4. Likewise, marriage, since it is a Sacrament, God works [it], whence those joined in marriage are said to be joined by God[^p767-3]; but the divine operation has no impediment, since God is the most noble agent; therefore marriage has no impediment.

**On the contrary:** 1. Marriage is instituted for a *duty*[^p767-4]; but many are unfit for the duty, as for instance for generating by intercourse: therefore many are not suited to marriage: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, marriage is instituted for a *remedy*; but there are many for whom it cannot be a remedy, because they cannot come together: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, there are many who can never exercise that act without sin, as for instance those who have vowed continence, or those who are forbidden to be joined by him who has the power; but every Sacrament can come into use without sin, since it is ordered[^p767-5] to salvation: therefore some are unfit for marriage.

4. Likewise, nothing is sacred which is done against a divine command; but a Sacrament is a sacred sign: therefore nothing is a Sacrament which is done against the divine precept; but the divine precept, in Leviticus eighteen[^p767-6], forbids marriage to be made among many kinds of persons: therefore if they contract in fact, it is not a Sacrament: therefore it has impediments.

### Conclusion.

> *The Sacrament of marriage has many impediments.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the Sacrament of marriage has a manifold impediment, as the reasons adduced for this show. — But the reason why this Sacrament has impediments more than the others is twofold. One is by reason of the *efficient* cause, because, although all the Sacraments are from divine institution and human dispensation, nevertheless this Sacrament consists most of all in human dispensation, because it arises through the consent of the contracting parties and has no determinate dispenser[^p767-7]. — The other reason is by reason of the *end*, because, since all the Sacraments are for a *remedy*, this one is not only for a remedy, but also for a *duty*; and since the others are spiritual, to this one a carnal action is joined, namely the union which is through intercourse. And therefore it more easily receives impediments. — From these things the objections are clear.

1. For as to what is objected, that no one is excluded from the disease of concupiscence; it must be said that that disease is remediable otherwise than by marriage, as for instance by continence.

2. To that which is objected, that the other Sacraments extend to all; the response is clear, because it is not the same with this one and with the others, as has been seen.

3. To that which is objected, that it is an insoluble bond; it must be said that it is true, from the moment it binds; but it is possible that some are unfit, so that they are not bound by this bond.

4. To that which is objected, that the divine operation cannot be impeded; it must be said that it is true where God operates as the *whole* cause; but it is not so in marriage, nay it is necessary that legitimate consent intervene. *Moreover*, that operation presupposes matter *in which* [it works].

la: Vide supra pag. 37, nota 4. — Immediate post ex cod. P posuimus *et ita*, pro quo cod. O *et ideo videtur*, edd. cum paucis codd. *ergo videtur.*

en: See above, p. 37, note 4. — Immediately after, from codex P, we put *et ita* ("and so"), for which codex O [reads] *et ideo videtur* ("and therefore it seems"), the editions with a few codices *ergo videtur* ("therefore it seems").

en: [Above,] Distinction 27, a. 3, q. 1 and 2.

la: Matth. 19, 6: *Quod ergo Deus coniunxit* etc.

en: Matthew 19:6: *What therefore God has joined together*, etc.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2, ubi etiam maior seq. arg. insinuatur. — Inferius pro *non idonei* codd. H Y *inepti*, cod. K (I a secunda manu) *qui non sunt idonei.*

en: Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2, where also the major [premise] of the following argument is intimated. — Below, for *non idonei* ("not suited") codices H Y [read] *inepti* ("unfit"), codex K (I by a second hand) *qui non sunt idonei* ("who are not suited").

la: Cod. O *ordinetur.*

en: Codex O [reads] *ordinetur* ("let it be ordered").

la: Vers. 6. seqq. — Inferius pro *Sacramentum* cod. U *contractum.*

en: [Leviticus 18,] vv. 6 ff. — Below, for *Sacramentum*, codex U [reads] *contractum* ("what is contracted").

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Concil. Trident. (Sess. XXIV. can. 4.) anathemate ferit docentes, «Ecclesiam non potuisse constituere impedimenta matrimonii dirimentia, vel in iis constituendis errasse». Duodecim impedimentis dirimentibus, ab auctore nostro enumeratis idem Concil. (Sess. XXIV. de Reform. c. 6.) addidit duo alia, scilicet raptus et clandestinitatis, de quibus cfr. auctores theologiae moralis et canonum.
De utraque huius articuli quaestione: Scot., infra d. 42. n. 7. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; Suppl. q. 50. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**II.** Quoad 1. quaestionem 2. articuli valet principium ab omnibus approbatum, quod quamvis usus matrimonii non sit matrimonio essentialis, tamen potentia ad usum essentialiter requiratur ad illud contrahendum. Cfr. de utraque quaestione hic dub. 3-6, et de furiosis dub. 7.
De hoc impedimento: Scot., hic q. unica n. 1-3. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; Suppl. q. 58. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4-7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**III.** Opinio 1. in seq. (2.) quaestione relata reiicitur ab omnibus antiquis theologis, et conclusiones circa hoc impedimentum sunt communes. Solummodo disputatur quoad impotentiam tantum *respectivam* (quae est tantum respectu *determinatae* personae, non vero omnium), utrum scilicet eadem possit simul esse *perpetua* et *naturalis*, et per consequens, utrum etiam in *frigidis*, sicut in *maleficiatis*, secundum matrimonium validum esse possit. S. Bonav. (in fine corporis) hoc generatim negat cum S. Thoma (loc. cit. a. 2. ad. 3.), Petro a Tar., aliisque, cum in iure canonico detur licentia cum altera muliere contrahendi maleficiato, non vero frigido. Alii autem multi cum Scoto (loc. cit. n. 3.), Durando et Dionys. Carth. censent, praesumtionem iuris, non dari naturaliter impotentiam tantum *respectivam*, fallere posse, et si hoc probari possit, tunc praesumtionem illam elidi, et secundum matrimonium valere.
De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 3 et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8-10. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., a. 3. q. 1. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The Council of Trent (Sess. XXIV, can. 4.) strikes with anathema those who teach «that the Church could not establish diriment impediments of marriage, or that it erred in establishing them». To the twelve diriment impediments enumerated by our author the same Council (Sess. XXIV, de Reform. c. 6.) added two others, namely of abduction and of clandestinity, concerning which cf. the authors of moral theology and of the canons.
On both questions of this article: Scotus, below d. 42, n. 7. seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; Suppl. q. 50. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**II.** As to the 1st question of the 2nd article, the principle approved by all holds good, that although the use of marriage is not essential to marriage, nevertheless the potency for use is essentially required for contracting it. Cf. on both questions here dub. 3-6, and on the insane dub. 7.
On this impediment: Scotus, here q. unica n. 1-3. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; Suppl. q. 58. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4-7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — On this and the following question Durandus, here q. 2; Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**III.** Opinion 1, reported in the following (2nd) question, is rejected by all the ancient theologians, and the conclusions concerning this impediment are common. Only this is disputed, as regards merely *relative* impotence (which is only in respect of a *determinate* person, and not of all), namely whether the same can at once be *perpetual* and *natural*, and consequently, whether even in the *cold* [*frigidi*], as in the *bewitched* [*maleficiati*], a second marriage can be valid. St. Bonaventure (at the end of the body) denies this in general, together with St. Thomas (loc. cit. a. 2. ad 3.), Peter of Tarentaise, and others, since in canon law license is granted to contract with another woman to one bewitched, but not to one cold. But many others, with Scotus (loc. cit. n. 3.), Durandus, and Denys the Carthusian, hold that the presumption of law — that merely *relative* impotence is not given naturally — can fail, and if this can be proved, then that presumption is set aside, and the second marriage holds good.
On the 2nd question: St. Thomas, in the places cited a. 3 and a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8-10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, a. 3. q. 1. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV PDF page-bands for printed pp. 767–768 (pdf 787–788; offset +20 confirmed by running heads: p. 767 recto "DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 767", p. 768 verso "768 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."). Raw IA OCR L82365–82483 (two-column cascade-shattered) used only for marker spacing and cross-check; the bands are authoritative per the Vol II Override. Bands read Left (split_x 2120) then Right (split_x 1780).

**Pages verified.** 767, 768 — both running heads confirmed. My first page (767) is shared with the d.34 divisio, but ARTICULUS I / QUAESTIO I open fresh partway down p. 767 (centered headers spanning both columns) and q1's body fills the rest of both columns; the divisio's DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM material sits on the preceding pages and none bleeds into my body. Contra-argument 4 runs across the column break, continuing at the top of the right column ("inter multa genera personarum…").

**Structure.** Videtur side = 4 arguments; **Contra** side = 4 arguments. CONCLUSIO (centered, italic) → `### Conclusio.` + blockquote. Respondeo gives a twofold reason (efficient cause / end), then four replies to the objections. Editorial marginal glosses printed in the Quaracchi side-margins (*Conclusio*, *Ratio 1*, *Ratio 2*, *Solutio oppositorum*) are omitted as editorial finding-aids per the project's marginalia rule.

**Scholion disposition.** The Article I SCHOLION (printed across both columns at the top of p. 768, header "SCHOLION" centered, between q1's replies and QUAESTIO II) is rendered here in full, both languages — the sibling a1-q2 renders NONE. It has **three** numbered sections §I–§III, each closed by a doctor-list: §I (Trent's anathema + the twelve diriment impediments; the "De utraque huius articuli quaestione" list explicitly covers both q1 and q2 of this article), §II (the principle that potency-for-use is required for contracting; a "De hoc impedimento" list whose cross-ref heading already points ahead — "Quoad 1. quaestionem 2. articuli," rendered as printed), §III (the dispute over merely relative impotence, S. Bonav. "in fine corporis"; a "De 2. quaestione" list). Placed as the last subsection of both the Latin and English blocks (body-then-scholion) so the parser reads a non-empty body.

**Footer hand-offs.** p. 767 (notes 1–7) falls wholly within my body — all claimed here. p. 768 carries no footers of mine: the scholion has no markers, and p. 768's per-page footer sequence (Dionysius, Philosophus, singularia, Magister, etc.) anchors in QUAESTIO II's body and is left for the a1-q2 agent. I forward nothing to a1-q2 and pick up nothing from the divisio. Total claimed apparatus: **7 entries** (all p. 767).

**[?] flags.** None. The bands were clean; footnote 4's cross-column split ("…ubi etiam maior" | "seq. arg. insinuatur") was reconciled by reading the L and R footer bands together. Note the scholion §II heading reads "Quoad 1. quaestionem 2. articuli" verbatim in the source (a forward cross-reference into art. 2) — rendered as printed, not an OCR error.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: De numero et sufficientia impedimentorum matrimonii

title_alt: On the number and sufficiency of the impediments of marriage

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *De numero et sufficientia impedimentorum.*

Secundo quaeritur de numero et sufficientia impedimentorum matrimonii. Et quod sint multa, videtur:

1. Quia impedimenta sunt propter privationem vel defectum boni matrimonii; sed defectus boni malum est et, ut dicit Dionysius[^1], «malum est infinitis modis, quamvis bonum sit uno modo»: ergo infinitis modis videtur quod possit impediri.

2. Item, impedimenta matrimonii accipiuntur secundum accidentia personarum; sed, ut vult Philosophus[^2], accidentia sunt infinita: ergo et impedimenta. *Maior* patet discurrendo in singulis; *minor* patet per Philosophum.

3. Item, impedimenta matrimonii respiciunt matrimonii conditionem, et illud respicit personas singulares; sed «singularia sunt infinita[^3]» et indeterminata: ergo et matrimonii impedimenta.

**Contra:** 1. Nihil impedit matrimonium nisi secundum institutionem Dei vel Ecclesiae; sed institutio Dei et Ecclesiae quantum ad matrimonium est in determinatis conditionibus: ergo etc.

2. Item, impossibile est scire legem matrimonii et vinculum, nisi sciantur illa quae illud vinculum solvunt; sed lex matrimonii est nobis determinata, ergo et impedimenta: ergo sunt in numero definito.

3. Item, hoc ipsum probatur per hoc quod Magister[^4] de huiusmodi determinat et doctrinam dat; sed si non essent in numero determinato, non daret: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Duplici via numerus et sufficientia impedimentorum ostenditur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc Sacramentum habet impedimenta plura; sed quaedam impediunt ex *congruitate*, et ista dicuntur impedire *contrahendum*, sed non dirimere iam *contractum*, ut est Ecclesiae interdictum et tempus feriatum, quia talia respiciunt solemnitatem matrimonii[^5]. Quaedam impediunt de *necessitate*, quia non stat cum eis Sacramentum; unde dicuntur impedire *contrahendum* et dirimere iam *contractum*; quia, quamvis esset contractum *de facto*, tamen in veritate non fuit Sacramentum nec matrimonium verum. — Impedimenta

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autem illa his versibus continentur, de quibus omnibus infra[^6] habebitur singillatim.

*Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen,*
*Cultus disparitas, vis, ordo, ligamen, honestas;*
*Si sis affinis, si forte coire nequibis:*
*Haec facienda vetant connubia, iuncta retractant.*

De sufficientia ergo impedimentorum dicendum, quod impedimentum fit sive potest fieri ex quadruplici causa. — Nam ex *efficiente* causa provenire possunt tria. Efficiens causa est consensus; ad consensum autem concurrit *ratio et voluntas*[^7]. Contra rationis actum est *error*; contra actum *voluntatis vis* vel violentia; contra actum *utriusque conditio servitutis*, quae impedit partim propter defectum libertatis, partim propter errorem.

Ex parte causae *materialis* tria: quia matrimonium est coniunctio *voluntarie* introducta, ergo est prius *naturaliter disparatorum*[^8], coniuncti ergo proximitate sunt inepti ad matrimonium. Sed *coniuncti* possunt esse tripliciter: *consanguinitate, affinitate, iustitia publicae honestatis*, quae contrahitur ex sponsalibus per verba de praesenti; et sic sunt alia tria impedimenta.

Ex parte causae *formalis* tria: quia matrimonium est vinculum, in quo est mutua potestas viri et uxoris; impedimentum autem contra hoc est, quando non potest dare sui corporis potestatem. Et hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quia tradidit alteri, qui adhuc vivit, et sic est *ligatio*; aut quia se dedicavit Deo, et sic est *sacer ordo*; aut quia Deo et praelato, et sic est *votum*, quando quis vovet ingredi religionem, vel continentiam solemnem.

Ex parte *finis* similiter tria: quia matrimonium est ad procreandam prolem ad cultum Dei, vel saltem in remedium honestatis. Contra rationem procreandi, vel remedii est *impotentia coeundi*; contra cultum Dei, qui est in *fide*, est *disparitas cultus*; qui[^9] est in *moribus*, est *criminis enormitas*. — Ita sunt duodecim impedimenta. Similiter aliqua recipiunt divisionem, ut impotentia coeundi et crimen, sicut melius patebit infra[^10].

Posset tamen aliter horum impedimentorum sumi sufficientia. In matrimonio enim considerantur *personae*, quae iunguntur, et ipsum *vinculum*, et illud *per quod* vinciuntur, et illud *ad quod* vinciuntur: quod vincitur, et vinculum, et *ad quod*, et *per quod*. Personae, quae vinciuntur, debent aliquo modo convenire in cultu Dei et fide, sed distare vinculo naturali et consimili, propter hoc quod natura abhorret, personas multum consimiles in actu illo sociari. Multum igitur distant, quando sunt *dispares in cultu*; multum appropinquant, quando sunt iuncti *cognatione*, vel *affinitate*, vel *publicae honestatis iustitia*. Propinquitas *consanguinitatis* est ex fructu matrimonii, sed *affinitatis* ex actu; iustitia publicae honestatis tenet medium inter utrumque. Et sic sunt quatuor impedimenta, scilicet cultus disparitas, cognatio, affinitas et publicae honestatis iustitia. — Consideratur iterum ipsum *vinculum*, quo vinciuntur individualiter; et ob hoc[^11] non possunt coniungi vel vinciri qui sunt aliis obligati. Obligari autem alii est dupliciter: aut *Deo*, aut homini. Et *homini* dupliciter: aut per matrimonium, et sic *ligamen*; aut per servitutem, et sic conditio. Obligari autem *Deo* est dupliciter: aut per votum, aut per illud quod habet *annexum votum*, ut sacer ordo. Et sic sunt alia quatuor: ligamen, conditio, votum et ordo. — Tertio circa matrimonium consideratur illud, *per quod* contrahitur, et sic est consensus; et hic respicit actum *rationis*, et contra hunc est *error*; et actum *voluntatis*, et contra hunc est *violentia*. Et sic sunt duo. — Quarto consideratur[^12] *usus* matrimonii, et hic dupliciter impeditur: aut per impossibilitatem utendi, et sic *impotentia coeundi*; aut per abusum, et sic *enormitas criminis*. — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia horum impedimentorum, et quod sunt in numero determinato, scilicet duodecim.

**Ad opposita:**
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est modis infinitis; dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de malo, quantum est *de se*, quia privatio et non-ens est et caret fine et determinatione. Si autem loquamur de malo, prout ei *substernitur actus*, vel per comparationem ad *bonum*, quod privat; sic ponitur in genere *per reductionem* et species determinatas habet, sicut patet in vitiis[^13]. — Verumtamen illud non valet ad propositum, quia impedimenta matrimonii non sunt defectus vel mala, sed et aliqua bona huic incompossibilia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo penes accidentia, dicendum, quod non penes quaecumque accidentia, utpote quod sit albus, vel niger, sed penes

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accidentia, quae directe respiciunt matrimonium quantum ad aliquod bonum; et ita sunt in numero determinato.

3. Ad illud, quod sunt circa singularia; dicendum, quod sicut operationes virtutum sunt circa singularia, tamen sermo et cognitio est de eis, prout reducuntur ad aliquod universale — primo modo non habet certitudinem, secundo modo habet[^14] — sic in proposito casus emergentes sunt multi et innumerabiles circa speciales personas; tamen omnes sub hac generalitate impedimentorum comprehenduntur. Et sic patet totum[^15].

---

english:
### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the impediments.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the impediments of marriage. And that they are many, it seems:

1. Because impediments exist on account of the privation or defect of the good of marriage; but the defect of the good is an evil, and, as Dionysius says[^1], «evil is in infinite ways, although the good is in one way»: therefore it seems that [marriage] can be impeded in infinite ways.

2. Likewise, the impediments of marriage are taken according to the accidents of persons; but, as the Philosopher holds[^2], accidents are infinite: therefore so also [are] the impediments. The *major* is plain by running through them one by one; the *minor* is plain through the Philosopher.

3. Likewise, the impediments of marriage regard the condition of marriage, and that regards singular persons; but «singulars are infinite[^3]» and indeterminate: therefore so also [are] the impediments of marriage.

**On the contrary:** 1. Nothing impedes marriage except according to the institution of God or of the Church; but the institution of God and of the Church, as regards marriage, [consists] in determinate conditions: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is impossible to know the law of marriage and the bond, unless those things be known which dissolve that bond; but the law of marriage is determinate for us, therefore so also [are] the impediments: therefore they are in a definite number.

3. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the fact that the Master[^4] determines concerning such matters and gives a teaching [about them]; but if they were not in a determinate number, he would not give [it]: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** By a twofold way the number and sufficiency of the impediments is shown.

**I respond:** It must be said that this Sacrament has many impediments; but some impede from *fittingness*, and these are said to impede the *contracting*, but not to annul what is *already contracted*, as is the interdict of the Church and a festal season, because such things regard the solemnity of marriage[^5]. Some impede from *necessity*, because the Sacrament does not stand together with them; whence they are said to impede the *contracting* and to annul what is *already contracted*; because, although it were contracted *in fact*, yet in truth it was not a Sacrament nor a true marriage. — But those impediments

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are contained in these verses, concerning all of which it will be treated below[^6] one by one.

*Error, condition, vow, kinship, crime,*
*Disparity of worship, force, [holy] order, [prior] bond, [public] decency;*
*If you be a kinsman by affinity, if perchance you be unable to have intercourse:*
*These things when done forbid marriages, and when joined undo them.*

Concerning the sufficiency, therefore, of the impediments it must be said that an impediment comes about, or can come about, from a fourfold cause. — For from the *efficient* cause three can arise. The efficient cause is consent; and to consent there concur *reason and will*[^7]. Against the act of reason is *error*; against the act of *will* [is] *force* or violence; against the act of *both* [is] the *condition of servitude*, which impedes partly on account of the defect of liberty, partly on account of error.

From the side of the *material* cause, three: because marriage is a union voluntarily introduced, therefore it is prior [as a union] of things *naturally* disparate[^8], and therefore those joined by [too great] proximity are unfit for marriage. But those *joined* can be [so] in three ways: by *consanguinity, affinity, [and] the justice of public decency*, which is contracted from a betrothal by words of the present [tense]; and thus there are another three impediments.

From the side of the *formal* cause, three: because marriage is a bond, in which there is a mutual power of the husband and of the wife; but the impediment against this is when one cannot give the power of one's own body. And this can be in three ways: either because he has handed [it] over to another, who is still living, and thus it is a *[prior] bond*; or because he has dedicated himself to God, and thus it is *holy order*; or because [he is bound] to God and to a prelate, and thus it is a *vow*, when one vows to enter religion, or solemn continence.

From the side of the *end* likewise three: because marriage is for the procreating of offspring for the worship of God, or at least as a remedy for decency. Against the ground of procreating, or of the remedy, is *impotence for intercourse*; against the worship of God, which consists in *faith*, is *disparity of worship*; [and against that worship] which consists in *morals*, is the *enormity of crime*[^9]. — Thus there are twelve impediments. Likewise some admit of a division, as impotence for intercourse and crime, as will better appear below[^10].

Yet the sufficiency of these impediments could be taken otherwise. For in marriage there are considered the *persons* who are joined, and the *bond* itself, and that *by which* they are bound, and that *unto which* they are bound: that which is bound, and the bond, and that *unto which*, and that *by which*. The persons who are bound ought in some way to agree in the worship of God and in faith, but to stand apart by a natural and like bond, on account of this, that nature abhors that persons very like [one another] be associated in that act. Much, therefore, do they stand apart, when they are *disparate in worship*; much do they draw near, when they are joined by *kinship*, or by *affinity*, or by the *justice of public decency*. Nearness of *consanguinity* is from the fruit of marriage, but [that] of *affinity* from the act; the justice of public decency holds the middle between the two. And thus there are four impediments, namely disparity of worship, kinship, affinity, and the justice of public decency. — Again there is considered the *bond* itself, by which they are bound individually; and on account of this[^11] those who are bound to others cannot be joined or bound [again]. But to be bound to others is [so] in two ways: either to *God* or to a man. And to a man in two ways: either through matrimony, and thus [it is] a *[prior] bond*; or through servitude, and thus [it is] condition. But to be bound to *God* is in two ways: either through a vow, or through that which has a vow annexed, as holy order. And thus there are another four: [prior] bond, condition, vow, and order. — Thirdly, concerning marriage there is considered that *by which* it is contracted, and thus it is consent; and this regards the act of *reason*, and against this is *error*; and the act of *will*, and against this is *violence*. And thus there are two. — Fourthly there is considered[^12] the *use* of marriage, and this is impeded in two ways: either through the impossibility of using [it], and thus [it is] *impotence for intercourse*; or through abuse, and thus [it is] the *enormity of crime*. — And thus the number and sufficiency of these impediments is plain, and that they are in a determinate number, namely twelve.

**To the objections:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite ways; it must be said that Dionysius is speaking of evil, insofar as it is *in itself*, because it is a privation and non-being, and lacks end and determination. But if we speak of evil, insofar as an *act underlies* it, or by comparison to the *good* which it deprives; thus it is placed in a genus *by reduction* and has determinate species, as is plain in the vices[^13]. — Nevertheless that does not avail for the point at issue, because the impediments of marriage are not defects or evils, but also certain goods incompatible with this [marriage].

2. To that which is objected secondly by way of accidents, it must be said that [they are taken] not by way of just any accidents, such as that [someone] be white or black, but by way of

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accidents which directly regard marriage as to some good; and thus they are in a determinate number.

3. To that [objection], that they are about singulars; it must be said that just as the operations of the virtues are about singulars, yet speech and knowledge are of them insofar as they are reduced to some universal — in the first way [knowledge] does not have certitude, in the second way it does[^14] — so in the matter at hand the emerging cases are many and innumerable concerning particular persons; yet all are comprehended under this generality of impediments. And thus the whole [matter] is plain[^15].

---

la: *De Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 31. seq. Verba magis respondent dicto Aristot. allegato tom. II. pag. 653, nota 3. Cfr. ibid. pag. 811, nota 4.

en: [Dionysius,] *On the Divine Names* c. 4, §31 ff. The words correspond rather to the saying of Aristotle cited in vol. II, p. 653, note 3. Compare ibid., p. 811, note 4.

la: Libr. IV. Metaph. text. 12. (III. c. 4.): *Impossibile namque est accidentia, cum infinita sint, percurrere.* Cfr. ibid. XI. c. 7. (X. c. 8.). Libr. II. Phys. text. 30. (c. 3.): *Infinita enim uni accidunt.*

en: [Aristotle,] *Metaphysics* Book IV, text 12 (III, c. 4): "For it is impossible to run through the accidents, since they are infinite." Compare ibid. XI, c. 7 (X, c. 8). *Physics* Book II, text 30 (c. 3): "For infinite things are accidental to one [thing]."

la: Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 12. et XI. c. 2. (II. c. 4. et X. c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, text 12, and XI, c. 2 (II, c. 4, and X, c. 2).

la: Hic in lit. c. 1. generaliter impedimenta recenset, quae in seqq. dist. explicantur.

en: Here in the text [of Lombard], c. 1, he enumerates the impediments in general, which are explained in the following distinctions.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 740, nota 6. — Superius pro *non dirimere* nonnulli codd. vel *dirimunt*, vel *dirimitur*. Post *interdictum* cod. V addit *si est ut clanculo*, edd. legunt *si fiat clanculo et tempore feriato*.

en: Compare above, p. 740, note 6. — Above, for *non dirimere* ("not to annul") some codices [read] either *dirimunt* ("they annul") or *dirimitur* ("it is annulled"). After *interdictum* ("interdict") codex V adds *si est ut clanculo* ("if it is, as it were, in secret"); the editions read *si fiat clanculo et tempore feriato* ("if it be done in secret and in a festal season").

la: Art. 2. huius dist. usque ad dist. 43. — Duodecim impedimentis, quae in seqq. versibus continentur, Concilium Tridentinum adiunxit alia duo his versibus expressa: *Si parochi et duplicis desit praesentia testis, / Raptave sit mulier nec parti reddita tutae.* Cfr. *Glossa* in Gratian. introductionem C. 27, et Petr. Blesens., Epist. 115. — Pro *facienda* Vat. *socianda*.

en: [From] article 2 of this distinction up to distinction 43. — To the twelve impediments, which are contained in the following verses, the Council of Trent added two others expressed in these verses: "If there be lacking the presence of the parish priest and of a double witness, / Or if the woman have been abducted and not restored to a safe place." Compare the *Gloss* on Gratian, introduction to C. 27, and Peter of Blois, Letter 115. — For *facienda* the Vatican [edition reads] *socianda*.

la: Vide locos supra pag. 707, nota 1. allegatos.

en: See the places cited above, p. 707, note 1.

la: Codd. PQ *disiunctorum*, edd. legunt *est personarum naturaliter disparatarum*.

en: Codices PQ [read] *disiunctorum* ("of things disjoined"); the editions read *est personarum naturaliter disparatarum* ("[it is a union] of persons naturally disparate").

la: Cod. K *contra honestatem*, quae pro *qui*.

en: Codex K [reads] *contra honestatem* ("against decency"), which [stands] for *qui* ("[that worship] which").

la: Art. seq. q. 1. 2. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 3. et dub. 3. — Pro *Similiter aliqua* (scil. impedimenta) edd. *Similiter aliquam*, et pro *divisionem* nonnulli codd. *divisiones*. Mox pro *aliter* cod. U *melius*.

en: The following article, qq. 1–2, and d. 37, a. 2, q. 3, and dubium 3. — For *Similiter aliqua* (namely, impediments) the editions [read] *Similiter aliquam*, and for *divisionem* some codices [read] *divisiones*. Next, for *aliter* codex U [reads] *melius*.

la: Permulti codd. *et hoc* (ablativus).

en: Very many codices [read] *et hoc* (in the ablative) [for *ob hoc*].

la: In cod. E secunda manus addidit *ad quod est, et sic est*.

en: In codex E a second hand added *ad quod est, et sic est* ("that unto which it is, and thus it is").

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 1. et dub. 2. — Inferius post *sed* cod. M supplet *sunt*, qui etiam subinde cum codd. L P Y (E a secunda manu) et ed. 1 praebet *huic*, pro quo alii codd. vel *habent* (Vat. *habet*), vel *habuit* (*habent huic*?). Pro *aliqua bona* multi codd. et ed. 1 *alia bona*.

en: Compare *Sentences* II, d. 42, a. 3, q. 1, and dubium 2. — Below, after *sed* ("but") codex M supplies *sunt* ("[they] are"); which [codex] also thereupon, together with codices L P Y (E by a second hand) and edition 1, gives *huic* ("to this"), for which other codices [read] either *habent* ("they have"; Vat. *habet*, "it has"), or *habuit* ("it had"; *habent huic*?). For *aliqua bona* ("certain goods") many codices and edition 1 [read] *alia bona* ("other goods").

la: Vide supra d. 20. p. II. dub. 3. — Si cod. A ultimo poneret *non habet*, lectio eius non esset reprobanda; legit enim: *primo modo habet incertitudinem, secundo modo habet*; plures codd. *primo modo non habet incertitudinem* etc., perperam. In principio solut. post *Ad illud* in codd. E G L aa additur *quod obiicitur*. Mox post *sic in proposito* cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit *est intelligendum; nam*.

en: See above, d. 20, part II, dubium 3. — If codex A were to put *non habet* ("does not have") at the end, its reading would not be to be rejected; for it reads: *primo modo habet incertitudinem, secundo modo habet* ("in the first way it has uncertainty, in the second way it has [it]"); several codices [read] *primo modo non habet incertitudinem* ("in the first way it does not have uncertainty"), etc., wrongly. At the beginning of the solution, after *Ad illud* ("To that") in codices E G L aa there is added *quod obiicitur* ("which is objected"). Next, after *sic in proposito* ("so in the matter at hand") codex K (I by a second hand) adds *est intelligendum; nam* ("it is to be understood; for").

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi Vol. IV PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{768,769,770}-*.png`; left columns re-cropped at split x=2120 and right columns at x=1780 to capture the full inner margin — the default split truncated both columns), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 82484–82651) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF is authoritative in the cascade-shattered Respondeo / footer regions. Offset `pdf = printed + 20`. Running heads verified: p769 "DIST. XXXIV. ART. I. QUAEST. II."; p770 "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." The opener "**Secundo quaeritur** de numero et sufficientia impedimentorum matrimonii" confirms this is the SECOND question of Article I — alignment correct, no q-swap.
- **Page-split map.** The QUAESTIO II heading is a full-width centered head on **p768** (below the a1-q1 scholion). p768: opener + args 1–3 + Contra 1 (left col), Contra 2–3 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo start (right col); footnotes 1–2 in the left-col footer, 3–5 in the right-col footer → rendered [^1]–[^5]. **p769**: the mnemonic verses + *De sufficientia* (fourfold-cause exposition) + the alternative *Posset tamen aliter* exposition + reply 1 and start of reply 2; footnotes 1–3 left-col footer, 4–8 right-col footer → [^6]–[^13]. **p770**: reply 2 tail (left-col top) + reply 3 conclusion (right-col top, ending *Et sic patet totum*); its two footnotes (*habet* variant; *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) are the FIRST two of the p770 footer → [^14]–[^15].
- **Marginalia trimmed** per CLAUDE.md corpus convention: the Quaracchi side-margin topic labels were omitted from the body — p768: `Ad oppositum.`, `Fundamenta.`; p769: `Quoad personas quatuor.`, `Item quoad vinculum.`, `Quoad consensum duo.`, `Quoad usum duo.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`, `Distinctio.`, `Nota.`, and the marginal cause-enumeration glyphs. The centered printed `CONCLUSIO.` head + its italic statement are retained as the `> **Conclusio.**` blockquote per convention.
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- **No `[?]` flags** — all readings legible at 450 dpi; the codex variants in [^5], [^8]–[^14] are transcribed verbatim from the printed footers.
- **Apparatus count:** 15 (p768: 5; p769: 8; p770: 2).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De impedimento impotentiae coeundi.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de impotentia coeundi. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum impotentia naturalis coeundi sit impedimentum matrimonii. Secundo quaeritur de impotentia coeundi accidentali, quae est per maleficium.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum impotentia naturalis coeundi sit impedimentum matrimonii.*

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod naturalis impotentia coeundi non impediat matrimonium:

1. Quia verum matrimonium est matrimonium sine carnali coitu[^p770-3]; sed quandocumque aliquid habet perfectum esse sine aliquo, non impeditur per defectum illius: ergo etc.

2. Item, voluntas continendi in utroque coniugum non solvit matrimonium, ergo nec necessitas continendi pari ratione; sed ubi est impotentia[^p770-4] etc.

3. Item, matrimonium est vinculum insolubile; sed possibile est, impotentiam coeundi accidentalem[^p770-5] contrahi: ergo si perpetuum non impeditur accidentali, nec matrimonium impeditur impotentia coeundi.

4. Item, naturalis impotentia venit ex frigiditate in viro; sed frigiditas est accidens: ergo potest expelli per caliditatem: ergo et talis impotentia. Sed accidens cito transiens non solvit vinculum perpetuum: ergo etc. Similiter obiicitur de arctatione ex parte mulieris.

**Contra:** 1. Extra, libro quarto[^p770-6], de Frigidis et maleficiatis: «Sicut puer, qui non potest reddere debitum, non est aptus coniugio; sic qui impotentes sunt minime apti ad contrahenda matrimonia reputantur».

2. Item, in matrimonio obligatur homo ad reddendum debitum; sed nullus potest se obligare ad impossibile[^p770-7]; sed impotens coire non potest debitum reddere: ergo non potest matrimonium contrahere.

3. Item, in matrimonio transit potestas corporis viri in mulierem, et e converso; sed quando alter est impotens, non transit potestas, quia «nemo dat quod non habet[^p770-8]»: ergo etc.

4. Item, si matrimonium est in remedium[^p770-9], ergo inter personas, inter quas nec officium nec remedium potest esse, non potest esse matrimonium; sed hoc est per impotentiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas iuris, Causa trigesima tertia, quaestione prima[^p770-10], quae dat licentiam contrahendi alteri personarum in casu isto: ergo non est matrimonium.

### Conclusio.

> *Impotentia coeundi naturalis et perpetua impedit matrimonium contrahendum et dirimit contractum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod impotentia coeundi naturalis aut est temporalis, aut perpetua. Si tem-
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poralis, non impedit; si perpetua, tunc impedit contrahendum et dirimit contractum; et si alter coniugum petat separationem, separandi sunt; si autem velint mutuo cohabitare, possunt, ut qui non potest mulierem habere ut uxorem, habeat ut sororem[^p771-1]. — Sed quia dubium est, utrum impotentia talis sit perpetua; ideo Ecclesia utrique adhibet debitam diligentiam ad sciendam perpetuitatem et indicit cohabitare per tres annos et experiri actum illum et remedia, si qua possunt esse contra talem impotentiam. — Ad sciendum autem, quod praecesserit, creditur iuramento septem testium, vel etiam inspectioni claustrorum; alioquin statur verbo viri. Decipitur tamen aliquando Ecclesia, et cum constat de deceptione, iubet, eos quos separaverat, ad priora iura redire. — Concedendum est igitur, quod impotentia coeundi, quae venit ex naturali frigiditate, matrimonium impedit, si sit perpetua secundum veritatem. Qualiter autem cognoscatur eius perpetuitas, et quae sit diligentia adhibenda; hoc est inferioris scientiae determinare, ut iuristarum, aut medicorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod verum matrimonium est sine copula carnali; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non est sine ordinabilitate ad carnalem copulam, quia, sicut supra[^p771-2] dictum fuit, necesse est consentire in mutuam corporum potestatem; hic autem consensus nullus est, nec talis obligatio in eo qui non habet *posse* exercendi actum illum. Et ideo argumentum non valet, quia *potentia* coeundi quantum ad legitimitatem personae contrahentis est de essentia, non sic *actus*.

2. Per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod voluntas continendi non impedit matrimonium, quoniam adhuc manet ordinabilitas ad actum cum voluntate; quia non necesse est, esse perpetuam, pro eo quod voluntas potest verti; et ideo non est simile de impotentia et voluntate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est vinculum insolubile; dicendum, quod istud verum est, postquam contractum est legitime; et ex tunc, si superveniat illegitimitas, non solvit matrimonium; sed si praevenit, impedit contractionem: et adeo impedit, quod etsi videatur matrimonium contrahi secundum faciem hominum, tamen secundum veritatem non contrahitur. Et ideo dicitur dirimere iam contractum, non quia illud vinculum infringat, sed tantum est impedimentum, quod etsi de facto consummetur in facie hominum, nullam tamen soliditatem habeat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frigiditas est accidens etc.; dicendum, quod frigiditas duplex est: quaedam accidentaliter, quaedam complexionaliter et per naturam. Illa quae est in homine accidentaliter, potest ut plurimum expelli, pro eo quod non est a prima complexione. Sed frigiditas, quae est ex complexione et naturaliter inest — sicut in his qui sunt insensibiles per naturam, vel per malam dispositionem membri alicuius ad hoc ordinati, ut arctitudo in muliere, si tanta est, quod nullum remedium adhiberi possit secundum iudicium bonarum matronarum — haec est quae impedit, et haec est inseparabilis et perpetua; et de hac non valet ratio. Quod enim dicitur, «contrarium expelli per contrarium»: verum est, ut dicit Philosophus[^p771-3], «nisi alterum insit per naturam».

---

english:
### Article II. *On the impediment of impotence for intercourse.*

Consequently, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning impotence for intercourse. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage. Secondly, inquiry is made concerning accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery.

### Question I. *Whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage.*

As to the first point, then, it is shown that natural impotence for intercourse does not impede marriage:

1. Because a true marriage is a marriage without carnal intercourse[^p770-3]; but whenever something has its perfect being without a certain thing, it is not impeded by the lack of that thing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the will to abstain in both spouses does not dissolve marriage, therefore neither does the necessity of abstaining, by parity of reasoning; but where there is impotence[^p770-4] etc.

3. Likewise, marriage is an insoluble bond; but it is possible for accidental impotence for intercourse[^p770-5] to be contracted: therefore if a perpetual [bond] is not impeded by an accidental [impotence], neither is marriage impeded by impotence for intercourse.

4. Likewise, natural impotence comes from coldness in the man; but coldness is an accident: therefore it can be driven out by heat: therefore so too can such impotence. But an accident quickly passing away does not dissolve a perpetual bond: therefore etc. A like objection is made concerning constriction on the woman's part.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the Decretals [Extra], Book Four[^p770-6], on the frigid and the bewitched: «Just as a boy, who cannot render the debt, is not fit for marriage, so those who are impotent are reckoned least fit to contract marriages».

2. Likewise, in marriage a man is bound to render the debt; but no one can bind himself to the impossible[^p770-7]; but one impotent to have intercourse cannot render the debt: therefore he cannot contract marriage.

3. Likewise, in marriage the power over the body of the man passes over to the woman, and conversely; but when one party is impotent, the power does not pass over, because «no one gives what he does not have[^p770-8]»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if marriage is for a remedy[^p770-9], then between persons among whom there can be neither duty nor remedy, there can be no marriage; but this is [the case] through impotence: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, to this effect there is the authority of the law, Cause thirty-three, question one[^p770-10], which grants license to one of the persons to contract in this case: therefore it is no marriage.

### Conclusion.

> *Natural and perpetual impotence for intercourse impedes marriage from being contracted and annuls the contract.*

**I respond:** It must be said that natural impotence for intercourse is either temporary or perpetual. If tempo-
rary, it does not impede; if perpetual, then it impedes the contracting and annuls the contract; and if one of the spouses seeks separation, they are to be separated; but if they wish to live together by mutual consent, they may, so that he who cannot have the woman as a wife may have her as a sister[^p771-1]. — But because it is doubtful whether such impotence is perpetual, therefore the Church applies due diligence to each party for ascertaining its perpetuity, and enjoins them to cohabit for three years and to try out that act and the remedies, if any there can be against such impotence. — But for ascertaining what has gone before, credence is given to the oath of seven witnesses, or also to the inspection of the private parts; otherwise the man's word is accepted. Yet the Church is sometimes deceived, and when the deception is established, it orders those whom it had separated to return to their former rights. — It must be granted, therefore, that impotence for intercourse which comes from natural coldness impedes marriage, if it be perpetual in truth. But in what way its perpetuity may be known, and what diligence is to be applied — this is for a lower science to determine, such as that of the jurists or of the physicians.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that a true marriage is without carnal union; it must be said that this is true; but it is not without an orderability toward carnal union, because, as was said above[^p771-2], it is necessary to consent to a mutual power over [each other's] bodies; but here there is no such consent, nor any such obligation in one who does not have the *ability* to exercise that act. And therefore the argument does not hold, because the *power* for intercourse, as regards the legitimacy of the contracting person, belongs to the essence [of marriage], but not so the *act*.

2. By this the response to the following [objection] is clear, [namely] that the will to abstain does not impede marriage, since the orderability to the act still remains together with the will; because it is not necessary that it be perpetual, since the will can be turned; and therefore the case of impotence and of the will is not alike.

3. To that which is objected, that it is an insoluble bond; it must be said that this is true after it has been contracted legitimately; and from then on, if illegitimacy supervenes, it does not dissolve the marriage; but if it precedes, it impedes the contracting: and it impedes to such a degree that, although marriage may seem to be contracted according to the appearance of men, yet in truth it is not contracted. And therefore it is said to annul what has already been contracted, not because it breaks that bond, but [because] it is only an impediment, such that even if it be consummated in fact in the sight of men, it nevertheless has no solidity.

4. To that which is objected, that coldness is an accident etc.; it must be said that coldness is twofold: one [kind] accidentally, another by complexion and by nature. That which is in a man accidentally can for the most part be driven out, inasmuch as it is not from his first complexion. But the coldness which is from the complexion and is naturally present — as in those who are insensible by nature, or by a bad disposition of some member ordered to this [act], as constriction in a woman, if it be so great that no remedy can be applied according to the judgment of good matrons — this is what impedes, and this is inseparable and perpetual; and against this the argument does not hold. For what is said, that «a contrary is driven out by its contrary»: this is true, as the Philosopher says[^p771-3], «unless the one is present by nature».

---

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. — Deinde ex codd. I U substituimus *aliquid* pro *aliquis*.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3. — Then, following codices I U, we have substituted *aliquid* ("something") for *aliquis* ("some").

la: In cod. bb secunda manus supplet: *ibi est necessitas continendi: ergo.*

en: In codex bb a second hand supplies: *ibi est necessitas continendi: ergo* ("there is the necessity of abstaining: therefore").

la: Cod. E L Y *accidentaliter.*

en: Codices E L Y [read] *accidentaliter* ("accidentally").

la: Tit. 15. C. *Quod sedem* (2.).

en: [Decretals of Gregory IX, Bk. IV,] title 15, the canon *Quod sedem* (2).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 234, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 234, note 6.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 22.). — Pro *nemo* plurimi codd. et ed. I *nihil*.

en: According to Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 3 (c. 22). — In place of *nemo* ("no one") very many codices and ed. I [read] *nihil* ("nothing").

la: Secunda manus in cod. E bene posuit *est in officium, et in remedium* (vide supra August., qui in lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. allegatur). Inferius pro *per impotentiam* cod. U *inter personas tales*.

en: A second hand in codex E rightly put *est in officium, et in remedium* ("it is for a duty, and for a remedy") — see above Augustine, who is cited in the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2. Further down, for *per impotentiam* ("through impotence") codex U [reads] *inter personas tales* ("among such persons").

la: Can. *Quod autem interrogasti* (I.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: The canon *Quod autem interrogasti* (1). Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Secundum Gregor., hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, et in C. *Laudabilem* (5.), X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 15.), ubi etiam de triennio et iuramento septem testium (cfr. infra dub. 4.). — Inferius pro *utrique adhibet* codd. L Y *statuit, ut uterque adhibeat*.

en: According to Gregory, here in the text of the Master, c. 2, and in the canon *Laudabilem* (5), X, on the frigid etc. (Bk. IV, tit. 15), where there is also treatment of the three-year period and the oath of seven witnesses (cf. below, dub. 4). — Further down, for *utrique adhibet* ("applies to each") codices L Y [read] *statuit, ut uterque adhibeat* ("determines that each should apply").

en: [Above,] Distinction 28, q. 6.

la: De Praedicam. c. de *Oppositis*. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 182, nota 9. — Vide scholion ad I. praecedentis articuli quaest.

en: [Aristotle,] *Categories*, the chapter on *Opposites*. Cf. vol. II, p. 182, note 9. — See the scholion on question I of the preceding article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p770-{Lwide,R}-*`, `vol4-p771-{L,R}-*`; offset pdf = printed + 20), which are authoritative for the cascade-shattered two-column OCR (raw L82652–82790). Running heads verified: p. 770 verso = "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." with visible folio "770"; p. 771 recto = "DIST. XXXIV. ART. II. QUAEST. [I.]" with visible folio "771". The raw OCR running head reading "QUAEST. II. 774" is a digit/numeral garble; the bands confirm 770–771 and QUAEST. I.

**Page span corrected.** Frontmatter originally listed printed_pages [770, 771, 772] / pdf [790, 791, 792]. The bands show q1 finishes in the **upper** two columns of p. 771 (Ad 4 ends "…nisi alterum insit per naturam"), after which QUAESTIO II opens in the lower half of the same page and runs onto p. 772. Corrected to printed_pages [770, 771] / pdf_pages [790, 791]; p. 772 belongs entirely to a2-q2.

**Article II opener** folded into this q1 per the locked chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk for a short "Consequenter … quaeruntur duo" opener). The "Secundo quaeritur…" clause names a2-q2's topic (impotence per maleficium).

**Scholion disposition — `has_scholion: false`, none rendered.** Grep/eyes scan of the range found no ARTICULUS II SCHOLION. The apparatus note p771-3 explicitly redirects: "Vide scholion ad I. praecedentis articuli quaest." — the governing scholion for this question is §II of the Article I scholion, which lives in `bon-sent-IV-d34-a1-q1.md` ("Quoad 1. quaestionem 2. articuli…"). Not duplicated here.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* On p. 770, notes 3–10 anchor in this question's body (arg. 1–4 of the "ad oppositum" set take 3–5; Contra 1–5 take 6–10); notes 1–2 anchor in a1-q2's closing sentence ("…secundo modo habet¹ … Et sic patet totum²") and remain a1-q2's, per the incoming hand-off.
- *Forwarded:* On p. 771, notes 4–6 anchor in a2-q2's opening arguments (lower half of the page: "quaestione prima⁴", "libro quarto⁵", "reddendi debitum⁶") and are **a2-q2's** to claim; this question claims p. 771 notes 1–3 (Respondeo "sororem¹", Ad-1 "supra²", Ad-4 "Philosophus³").

**Apparatus count:** 11 entries (p. 770: 8 [notes 3–10]; p. 771: 3 [notes 1–3]).

**Marginalia.** Quaracchi's outer-margin keyword tags (*Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Notandum.*, *Distinctio.*) are editorial marginalia and are omitted from the body, per project convention.

**[?] flags:** none.


title: Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 771 -->

### Articulus II. *De impotentia coeundi.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae est per maleficium, impediat matrimonium.*

Secundo quaeritur de impotentia coeundi accidentali, quae est per maleficium, utrum impediat matrimonium. Et quod sic, istud probatur:

1. Causa trigesima tertia, quaestione prima[^p771-4]: «Si per sortiarias vel maleficas, occulto, sed nunquam nisi iusto Dei iudicio permittente, et diabolo praeparante, concubitus non sequitur; hortandi sunt» etc.; et post: «Si sanari non poterunt, separari valebunt».

2. Item, Extra, libro quarto[^p771-5], de Frigidis et maleficiatis in decretali Honorii: *Litterae vestrae*, ubi est quaestio de eo qui alias mulieres poterat cognoscere, sed non propriam uxorem, in fine decretalis infertur: «Ipsis cum septima manu propinquorum iuramento firmantibus, se commisceri carnaliter nequisse, proferatis sententiam divortii inter eos».

3. Item, ubicumque talis causa, ibi talis effectus; sed frigiditas, vel arctitudo impediebat et dirimebat propter impotentiam reddendi debitum[^p771-6]: ergo cum talis causa sit in maleficiatis, videtur etc.

4. Item, maius periculum est in his qui possunt coniungi aliis et non sibi, quam in his qui nullis possunt coniungi, quia potest esse multis occasio adulterii et homicidii etc.: si ergo separantur propter impotentiam coeundi cum qualibet propter <!-- page 772 --> naturalem defectum, pari ratione propter impotentiam coeundi cum una propter maleficium.

5. Item, maleficia fiunt arte et potestate daemonum, sicut dicitur in auctoritate canonis prius proposita[^p772-1]; sed diabolus est potentior et versutior, quam sit homo: si ergo homo potest alterum omnino reddere inhabilem ad actum matrimonii vel castrando vel secando per violentiam, vel dando medicinam, vel per virtutem lapidis aliquam occultam, sicut aliqui medici narrant; videtur, quod multo fortius hoc diabolus possit: ergo per maleficium poterit praestari efficax impedimentum.

**Contra:** 1. Huiusmodi sortilegium est diabolicum maleficium, sed matrimonium est remedium et divinum beneficium; sed potentius est divinum beneficium quam diabolicum maleficium: ergo potius matrimonium solvit maleficium, quam maleficium excludat matrimonium.

2. Item, nihil impedit matrimonium, quod sit temporaneum; sed maleficium omne est dissolubile: ergo per maleficium non impeditur matrimonium. Quod autem sit dissolubile, probatur ex parte eius *qui facit* et *cui fit* et *modi faciendi*. Ex parte eius *cui fit*: quia talia maleficia fiunt per diabolica commercia, quae non habent *posse* super viros sanctos, quia ipsi sunt triumphatores diaboli: ergo solum super peccatores; sed iste potest desinere esse peccator: ergo etc. — Ex parte *modi, quo fit*: quia «omnis res, ut dicit Chrysostomus[^p772-2], per easdem res destruitur, per quas componitur»: ergo si hoc factum est per maleficium vel maleficia: ergo per illud vel illa potest destrui. — Ex parte eius, *per quem fit*: quia per diabolum; sed virtus diaboli expellitur ab homine per exorcismos, etiam quando obsidet corpora: ergo videtur, quod similiter quantum ad effectum maleficii.

3. Item, videtur, quod ista maleficia nullius vigoris sint, quia qua ratione habent effectum in actum illum, eadem ratione in actum omnem: ergo si per maleficia possunt impedire coitum, ita possent comestionem et gressum, et sic perimere totum mundum per suum sortilegium: quod credere est sacrilegium.

4. Item, si maleficium impedit, aut *debilitando vim generativam*, aut *auferendo facultatem exeundi in actum*. Si *primo* modo: ergo cum illa vis aequaliter se habeat ad omnes, si impedit coitum quantum ad unam, impedit quantum ad omnes: si ergo non impedit quantum ad omnes, ergo videtur, quod quantum ad nullam, et ita nihil videtur dicere, quod possit cognoscere alias mulieres et non suam. Similiter argue de *secundo* modo, scilicet auferendo facultatem exeundi in actum[^p772-3].

### Conclusio.

> *Impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae est per maleficium, contractum matrimonii impedit, quando est perpetua et praecedit.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui dixerunt, quod maleficium nihil erat in mundo nec alicuius vis nisi in sola aestimatione hominum, qui multos naturales defectus attribuunt maleficiis daemonum propter fidei defectum. — Sed ista positio derogat iuri et derogat opinioni vulgi, et quod maius est, experimento; et ideo istud non habet aliquam stabilitatem.

Fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, quod maleficium vere impedit coitum ad tempus, sed tamen nullum est perpetuum, quia quodlibet dissolvi potest vel per diabolum, vel per maleficium[^p772-4], vel per divinum auxilium; et dixerunt illud capitulum primo propositum abrogatum. — Sed certe adhuc istud est contra experimentum et contra ius novum: quia decretalis Honorii praecipit, in talibus fieri divortium, cum experimento probatum sit, multos habitasse simul per longum tempus et adhibuisse operam magnam et quaesiisse multa remedia, et nihil omnino valuisse; et ideo per experientiam coniicit Ecclesia, tale maleficium aliquando esse perpetuum. — *Rursus*, quia multi sunt, qui remedium invenerunt; coniicit, non semper esse perpetuum; et ideo hoc maleficium aliquando impedit, aliquando non.

Propterea secundum communem doctorum opinionem distinguendum est, quod impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae venit per maleficium, aut est *temporalis*, aut *perpetua*. Si *temporalis*, non impedit. Tunc autem praesumitur esse *temporalis*, quando infra spatium trium annorum cohabitantes et quam possunt operam dantes sive per ecclesiastica Sacramenta, sive per alia remedia, sanari possunt. Si autem non sanantur aliquo remedio, ex tunc praesumitur esse *perpetua*. — Haec autem impotentia perpetua aut *praecedit* contractionem matrimonii, aut *sequitur*. Si *praecedit*, facit personam illegitimam, ita quod impedit contrahendum et dirimit iam contractum; si *sequitur*, non impedit, sicut etiam de sectis dicitur Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione <!-- page 773 --> septima, ubi tale capitulum inscribitur et in littera[^p773-1] ponitur: «Illi qui matrimonium sani contraxerunt, et uni ex duobus aut amentia, aut furor, aut aliqua infirmitas accedit, ob hanc causam coniugia talium solvi non possunt. Similiter intelligendum de his qui ab adversariis excaecantur, aut membris truncantur, aut a barbaris secti sunt». Et sic concedendum, quod — sicut sectio, quae reddit impotentem ad coitum — facit personam illegitimam, si praecedat contractionem, non facit, si sequatur, quia matrimonium non potest solvi nisi per mortem vel spiritualem, vel carnalem; unde Extra, de Conversione coniugatorum[^p773-2], *Ex parte tua*, ubi dicit Innocentius: «Ex quo matrimonium inter legitimas personas per verba de praesenti contrahitur, in nullo potest casu dissolvi, ut vivente reliquo, alter possit ad secunda vota transire». Si igitur sequatur contractionem, non impedit, si vero praecedat, impedit, si sit perpetua[^p773-3].

Dupliciter autem fit maleficium perpetuum: aut respectu *omnis mulieris*, et sic reddit inhabilem ad omnem; aut respectu *uxoris*, et sic reddit inhabilem ad illam, sed non ad omnes; et tunc *tales separati* secundum iura possunt aliis copulari. Non sic est de *frigidis*, quia, si copulantur aliis, scit Ecclesia, se esse deceptam, et ideo retractat devortii sententiam. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod maleficium praestat impedimentum matrimonio.

1. Ad illud ergo, quod obiicitur, quod potentius est Dei beneficium; dicendum, quod verum est quoad id, contra quod ordinatur, ut matrimonium, quam morbus concupiscentiae, quia morbus non vitiat matrimonium, sed matrimonium excusat vitium[^p773-4]. Sed matrimonium non est ordinatum ad restituendam potentiam coeundi, et ideo maleficium non vincit nec expellit; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod maleficium sit potentius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dissolvi potest per causam etc.; dicendum, quod omne tale maleficium dissolvi potest per Deum, dissolvi etiam potest per diabolum; sed non omne dissolvi potest per maleficium, vel humanum consilium, quia malefici, sicut per confessionem eorum scitur, aliqua maleficia sciunt facere, quae ipsi, ad poenitentiam conversi, non possunt destruere, nec homines sciunt consilium adhibere, propter hoc quod industria diabolica superexcellit humanam. Et quoniam humanum consilium deficit, et Deus propter[^p773-5] meritum peccati praeteriti frequenter non exaudit, et diabolus ad hoc non debet invocari, nec eius patrocinium implorari; hinc est, quod tale maleficium dicitur esse perpetuum.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de culpa, dicendum, quod non semper remotio poenae sequitur remotionem culpae. — Et similiter ex parte facientis multa possunt destrui, quae non possunt construi[^p773-6]; et similiter ex parte exorcismi; non enim semper habet efficaciam in expulsionem diaboli, permittente iusto iudicio Dei.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sortilegium nullum aufert potentiam comedendi; dicendum, quod sicut diabolo permissa est a Deo potestas super serpentes magis quam super alia animalia in prioris facti memoriam — unde plus per incantationes serpentes quam aves capiuntur[^p773-7] — sic, quia actus ille vitiosus est et quodam modo foetens, et ut plurimum coniunguntur homines ad illum actum libidinose: ideo diabolus plus habet ibi *posse*, et plus ei permittitur. Et hoc probatur exemplo Scripturae et auctoritate, quoniam dicitur in Tobia[^p773-8], quod daemonium, nomine Asmodaeus, septem viros in *lecto* interfecit, non in *convivio*.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod aequaliter se habet vis illa ad omnes; dicendum breviter, quod verum est; et si impediretur *naturali* impedimento, aequaliter impediretur quantum ad omnes; sed quia *daemoniaco* impeditur — qui assistit et se obiicit secundum petitionem sortilegae mulieris, impetrante hoc merito infidelitatis, sicut fides impetrat, ut Deus assistat ad facienda miracula — cum[^p773-9] sortiaria respectu personae *determinatae* facit sortilegium, diabolus in actu illo praesto est et non in aliis; et tunc vel propria virtute, vel per herbam, vel lapidem, vel naturam occultam vim impedit, ne in actum exeat, non respectu *alterius* mulieris, quia ad hoc invitatus non fuit, aut quia Dominus non permittit; occultum enim Dei iudicium hic latet, sicut patet in uxore Tobiae[^p773-10].

---

english:
<!-- page 771 -->

### Article II. *On impotence for intercourse.*
### Question II. *Whether accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, impedes marriage.*

Secondly it is asked concerning accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, whether it impedes marriage. And that it does, this is proved:

1. Cause thirty-three, question one[^p771-4]: «If through sorceresses or witches — secretly, yet never save by the just judgment of God permitting it and the devil preparing it — intercourse does not follow, they are to be exhorted» etc.; and afterward: «If they cannot be healed, they will be permitted to be separated».

2. Likewise, in the *Extra*, book four[^p771-5], *On the Cold and the Bewitched*, in the decretal of Honorius: *Litterae vestrae* [Your letter], where there is a question about one who could know other women but not his own wife, at the end of the decretal it is inferred: «When they, with the seventh hand of kinsmen confirming it by oath, [affirm] that they were unable to be joined carnally, you shall pronounce the sentence of divorce between them».

3. Likewise, wherever there is such a cause, there is such an effect; but cold or constriction impeded and dissolved [marriage] on account of the impotence of rendering the debt[^p771-6]: therefore, since such a cause is present in the bewitched, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, there is greater danger in those who can be joined to others but not to each other, than in those who can be joined to none, because it can be for many an occasion of adultery and homicide etc.: if therefore they are separated on account of the impotence of intercourse with anyone whatever by reason of a <!-- page 772 --> natural defect, by parity of reasoning [they are separated] on account of the impotence of intercourse with one [woman] by reason of sorcery.

5. Likewise, acts of sorcery are done by the art and power of demons, as is said in the authority of the canon set forth above[^p772-1]; but the devil is more powerful and more cunning than man is: if therefore a man can render another altogether unfit for the act of marriage, whether by castrating or by cutting by violence, or by giving a medicine, or by some hidden power of a stone, as certain physicians relate, it seems that the devil can do this much more strongly: therefore through sorcery an efficacious impediment can be furnished.

**On the contrary:** 1. This kind of sorcery is a diabolical maleficence, but marriage is a remedy and a divine benefit; but a divine benefit is more powerful than a diabolical maleficence: therefore marriage rather dissolves sorcery than sorcery excludes marriage.

2. Likewise, nothing impedes marriage that is temporary; but every sorcery is dissoluble: therefore through sorcery marriage is not impeded. That it is dissoluble is proved from the side of him *who does it*, of him *to whom it is done*, and of the *manner of doing*. From the side of him *to whom it is done*: because such acts of sorcery are done through diabolical dealings, which have no *power* over holy men, since these are the triumphers over the devil: therefore only over sinners; but this one can cease to be a sinner: therefore etc. — From the side of the *manner in which it is done*: because «every thing, as Chrysostom says[^p772-2], is destroyed by the same things by which it is composed»: therefore if this has been done through sorcery or sorceries: therefore through it or them it can be destroyed. — From the side of him *through whom it is done*: because [it is done] through the devil; but the power of the devil is expelled from a man by exorcisms, even when it besets bodies: therefore it seems that [it is expelled] likewise as to the effect of the sorcery.

3. Likewise, it seems that these acts of sorcery are of no force, because by whatever reasoning they have an effect upon that act, by the same reasoning [they have it] upon every act: therefore if through acts of sorcery they can impede intercourse, so they could [impede] eating and walking, and thus destroy the whole world by their sorcery: which to believe is a sacrilege.

4. Likewise, if sorcery impedes, [it does so] either *by weakening the generative power*, or *by removing the faculty of going forth into the act*. If in the *first* way: then, since that power stands equally toward all, if it impedes intercourse as to one woman, it impedes as to all: if therefore it does not impede as to all, then it seems that [it impedes] as to none, and thus it seems to mean nothing to say that he can know other women and not his own. Argue similarly of the *second* way, namely by removing the faculty of going forth into the act[^p772-3].

### Conclusion.

> *Accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, impedes the contract of marriage, when it is perpetual and precedes [it].*

**I respond:** It must be said that some have said that sorcery was nothing in the world, nor was there any power in it save only in the estimation of men, who attribute many natural defects to the sorceries of demons on account of a defect of faith. — But that position derogates from the law and derogates from the opinion of the common people, and, what is greater, from experience; and therefore it has no stability.

There were also others who said that sorcery truly impedes intercourse for a time, but yet none is perpetual, because anything whatever can be dissolved either through the devil, or through sorcery[^p772-4], or through divine aid; and they said that the chapter first set forth was abrogated. — But surely this too is against experience and against the new law: for the decretal of Honorius commands that in such cases a divorce be made, since it has been proved by experience that many have dwelt together for a long time and have applied great effort and sought many remedies, and nothing at all has availed; and therefore by experience the Church infers that such sorcery is sometimes perpetual. — *Again*, because there are many who have found a remedy, it infers that it is not always perpetual; and therefore this sorcery sometimes impedes, sometimes not.

Therefore, according to the common opinion of the doctors, a distinction must be made, that accidental impotence for intercourse, which comes through sorcery, is either *temporal* or *perpetual*. If *temporal*, it does not impede. And it is presumed to be *temporal* when, within the space of three years, dwelling together and giving as much effort as they can, whether through the ecclesiastical Sacraments or through other remedies, they can be healed. But if they are not healed by any remedy, from then on it is presumed to be *perpetual*. — And this perpetual impotence either *precedes* the contracting of marriage or *follows* it. If it *precedes*, it makes the person illegitimate, so that it impedes the contracting and dissolves what is already contracted; if it *follows*, it does not impede, just as also is said concerning the amputated in Cause thirty-two, question <!-- page 773 --> seven, where such a chapter is entitled and set down in the text[^p773-1]: «Those who contracted marriage while sound, and to one of the two either madness, or fury, or some infirmity comes on, for this cause the marriages of such persons cannot be dissolved. The same is to be understood of those who are blinded by adversaries, or have their members cut off, or have been cut by barbarians». And so it must be granted that — just as amputation, which renders one impotent for intercourse — makes the person illegitimate if it precede the contracting, [but] does not make [it so] if it follow, because marriage cannot be dissolved save through death, either spiritual or carnal; whence in the *Extra*, *On the Conversion of the Married*[^p773-2], *Ex parte tua* [On your part], where Innocent says: «From the time that marriage is contracted between legitimate persons by words of the present, it can in no case be dissolved, so that, while one is living, the other could pass to second vows». If therefore it follow the contracting, it does not impede; but if it precede, it impedes, if it be perpetual[^p773-3].

In two ways, however, sorcery is made perpetual: either with respect to *every woman*, and thus it renders [him] unfit for every one; or with respect to *the wife*, and thus it renders [him] unfit for her but not for all; and then *such separated persons* may, according to the laws, be joined to others. It is not so with the *cold*, because, if they are joined to others, the Church knows itself to have been deceived, and therefore it retracts the sentence of divorce. — Therefore the arguments showing that sorcery furnishes an impediment to marriage are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that God's benefit is more powerful; it must be said that this is true as regards that against which it is ordained, namely marriage, [being more powerful] than the disease of concupiscence, because disease does not vitiate marriage, but marriage excuses the vice[^p773-4]. But marriage is not ordained to restore the power of intercourse, and therefore sorcery does not conquer nor expel [it]; nor from this does it follow that sorcery is more powerful.

2. To that which is objected, that it can be dissolved through the cause etc.; it must be said that every such sorcery can be dissolved through God, and can also be dissolved through the devil; but not every one can be dissolved through sorcery or human counsel, because sorcerers — as is known through their confession — know how to do certain acts of sorcery which they themselves, once converted to penance, cannot destroy, nor do men know how to apply counsel, on account of this, that diabolical cunning surpasses the human. And since human counsel fails, and God, on account of[^p773-5] the merit of past sin, frequently does not hearken, and the devil ought not to be invoked for this, nor his patronage implored; hence it is that such sorcery is said to be perpetual.

To that, then, which is objected concerning fault, it must be said that the removal of the penalty does not always follow the removal of fault. — And likewise on the side of the doer, many things can be destroyed which cannot be constructed[^p773-6]; and likewise on the side of the exorcism; for it does not always have efficacy for the expulsion of the devil, the just judgment of God permitting [it].

3. To that which is objected, that sorcery removes no power of eating; it must be said that, just as power over serpents was granted to the devil by God more than over other animals in memory of the first deed — whence more serpents are caught by incantations than birds[^p773-7] — so, because that act is vicious and in a certain manner foul, and for the most part men are joined to that act lustfully: therefore the devil has more *power* there, and more is permitted to him. And this is proved by the example of Scripture and by authority, since it is said in Tobit[^p773-8] that a demon, by name Asmodeus, killed seven husbands in the *bed*, not at the *banquet*.

4. To that which is objected last, that that power stands equally toward all; it must be said briefly that this is true; and if it were impeded by a *natural* impediment, it would be impeded equally as to all; but because it is impeded by a *demonic* [impediment] — [the devil] who assists and sets himself against [it] according to the petition of the sorceress-woman, this being obtained by the merit of infidelity, just as faith obtains that God assist for the working of miracles — since[^p773-9] the sorceress performs the sorcery with respect to a *determinate* person, the devil is present in that act and not in others; and then, whether by his own power, or through a herb, or a stone, or a hidden nature, he impedes the power, that it may not go forth into act, not with respect to *another* woman, because he was not invited to this, or because the Lord does not permit [it]; for the hidden judgment of God lies concealed here, as is manifest in the wife of Tobit[^p773-10].

---

la: Can. 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Canon 4. See here the text of the Master [Peter Lombard], c. 3.

en: Title 15, c. 7.

la: Ex quaest. praeced. — De *maiori* cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 8.

en: From the preceding question. — On the *greater* [danger], cf. above, p. 78, note 8.

la: In fundam. 1. — In fine arg. codd. L Y addunt *matrimonio*.

en: In fundamentum 1. — At the end of the argument codices L Y add *matrimonio* [to marriage].

la: Vide supra pag. 682, nota 1. — Pro *modi, quo fit* cod. K (I a secunda manu) *modi faciendi*, alii codd. *eius, a quo fit*, et mox non pauci codd. *per illum vel illam* pro *per illud vel illa*, in qua lectione fortasse substituendum esset *per maleficum vel maleficam* pro *maleficium vel maleficia*. Aliquanto superius pro *qui facit* edd. *et per quem*.

en: See above, p. 682, note 1. — For *the manner in which it is done* codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] *the manner of doing*, other codices *of him by whom it is done*, and shortly after not a few codices [read] *through him or her* for *through it or them*, in which reading perhaps one ought to substitute *through the sorcerer or the sorceress* for *the sorcery or the sorceries*. Somewhat above, for *who does it* the editions [read] *and through whom*.

la: In pluribus codd. desideratur haec ult. propositio.

en: In many codices this last proposition is lacking.

la: Codd. A B C D F P bene *maleficum*. — Haec et seq. opinio refertur in *Glossa* super C. *Fraternitatis* (6.), X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 13.) ad verba *divinum miraculum*.

en: Codices A B C D F P rightly [read] *maleficum* [the sorcerer]. — This and the following opinion are reported in the *Gloss* on the canon *Fraternitatis* (6), X, *On the Cold* etc. (bk. IV, tit. 13), at the words *divine miracle*.

la: Cap. 4, ubi allegatur Nicolai Papae C. *Hi qui matrimonium* (25.). De sensu vocis *excaecantur* cfr. Forcellini Lexicon.

en: Chapter 4, where the canon of Pope Nicholas *Hi qui matrimonium* (25) is cited. On the sense of the word *excaecantur* [are blinded], cf. Forcellini's *Lexicon*.

la: Libr. III. tit. 32. c. 14. Post *contrahitur* textus originalis addit *illis viventibus*.

en: Book III, tit. 32, c. 14. After *is contracted* the original text adds *while they are living*.

la: Ita cod. Z (supple: *impotentia*); in aliis et edd. *perpetuum*, minus bene, quia non facile suppletur: *maleficium*. Inferius pro *et tunc*, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, cod. Q (E a secunda manu) *unde*, ed. 1 cum nonnullis codd. *Chrysostomus*. Subinde pro *separati*, quod praebent codd. F L, alii codd. et edd. *separari*, incongrue, nisi cum cod. I (a secunda manu) post *possunt* addatur *et*.

en: So codex Z (supply: *impotence*); in others and in the editions *perpetuum* [perpetual, neuter], less well, since *maleficium* [sorcery] is not easily supplied. Below, for *and then*, which not a few codices omit, codex Q (E by a second hand) [reads] *whence*, edition 1 with several codices *Chrysostom*. Then for *separated*, which codices F L give, other codices and the editions [read] *to be separated*, incongruously, unless — with codex I (by a second hand) — *and* be added after *possunt*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 5.

en: Cf. above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 5.

la: Codd. T U X *propter peccatum et propter*. Pro *Et quoniam* codd. L Y *Nam aliquando*.

en: Codices T U X [read] *on account of sin and on account of*. For *And since* codices L Y [read] *For sometimes*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 19, note 7.

la: August., XI. de Gen. ad litt. c. 28. n. 33, dicit, quod «hoc magis habeat usus, serpentes moveri carminibus hominum, quam ullum aliud genus animantium. Etiam haec enim non parva testatio est, naturam primitus humanam serpentis seductam esse colloquio. Gaudent enim daemones, hanc sibi potestatem dari, ut ad incantationem hominum serpentes moveant, ut quolibet modo fallant quos possunt. Hoc autem permittuntur ad primi facti memoriam commendandam, quod sit eis quaedam cum hoc genere familiaritas». Cfr. Ps. 57, 5. seq.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, XI, c. 28, n. 33, says that «usage holds this more — that serpents are moved by the charms of men than any other kind of animal. For this too is no small testimony that human nature was first seduced by the serpent's conversation. For the demons rejoice that this power is granted them, that at the incantation of men they may move serpents, so that by any means they may deceive whom they can. And they are permitted this for the commemoration of the first deed, that there may be for them a certain familiarity with this kind [of creature]». Cf. Ps. 57:5 ff.

la: Cap. 3, 8. — Superius post *permittitur* cod. U addit *in illo actu quam in alio*.

en: Chapter 3, [verse] 8. — Above, after *is permitted* codex U adds *in that act than in another*.

la: Edd. *sic cum*, inferius post *sortilegium* addito *quia* cod. bb *sicut cum*. Superius post *daemoniaco* Vat. subiungit *ministerio*.

en: The editions [read] *sic cum* [thus... when], with *quia* added below after *sortilegium*; codex bb [reads] *sicut cum* [just as when]. Above, after *daemoniaco* [demonic] the Vatican [edition] adjoins *ministerio* [by ministry].

la: Vide scholion ad 1. praecedentis articuli quaestionem.

en: See the scholion on question 1 of the preceding article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF page-bands (`colcrop.py vol4 {771,772,773}`, L split 2120, R split 1780) per the Vol II/IV override (bands authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio/footers); the IA djvu OCR (raw L82791–83049) was used only to cross-check clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Literal English throughout.

**Page-span correction.** Frontmatter previously read `printed_pages: [772, 773, 774]`. Verified against the running heads that QUAESTIO II actually **opens mid-way down the left column of p.771** (the running head of p.771 is OCR-lost in the raw; p.770 marker at raw L82639, p.772 marker at L82818, with the "Secundo quaeritur…" opener at L82791 falling between them). The question **ends on p.773** at "sicut patet in uxore Tobiae" (p.773 note 10). ARTICULUS III (a3-q1, *Utrum furia impediat matrimonium*) begins on p.774. Corrected to `printed_pages: [771, 772, 773]` / `pdf_pages: [791, 792, 793]`. `line_start`/`line_end` kept as assigned.

**Alignment check.** The "Secundo quaeritur…" opener aligns correctly with this question (second question of Art. II); no q-swap. Confirmed.

**Cross-chunk hand-offs.**
- *First page (771) — shared with a2-q1.* The top of both columns of p.771 holds a2-q1's tail (its Solutio on *frigiditas naturalis/accidentalis*, ending "…nisi alterum insit per naturam"). My body begins at the centered QUAESTIO II header partway down the left column. **p.771 footers split by anchor:** notes **1–3 belong to a2-q1** (anchored in its tail: note 1 = *Secundum Gregor.*; note 2 = *Dist. 28. q. 6* at "sicut supra²"; note 3 = *De Praedicam. c. de Oppositis* at "ut dicit Philosophus³"). This chunk claims **only notes 4, 5, 6** (anchored at "quaestione prima⁴", "libro quarto⁵", "reddendi debitum⁶"). a2-q1 should carry notes 1–3 when it is promoted.
- *Last page (773).* All ten p.773 footers anchor in this chunk's Solutio; none carry over to a3-q1. Page 774 (a3-q1 opener) and its footers are **not** claimed here.

**Marginal rubrics omitted.** The Quaracchi side-margin finding-aids printed on these pages (*Ad oppositum*, *Distinctio*, *Opinio/Op.*, *Conclusio*, *Notandum*) are omitted as editorial marginalia per the project convention (a1-q1 precedent); "CONCLUSIO" is rendered as the `### Conclusio.` heading + blockquote, and the margin "Ad oppositum" as `**Contra:**`.

**Apparatus count:** 17 entries — p.771 ×3 (notes 4–6), p.772 ×4 (notes 1–4), p.773 ×10 (notes 1–10). No `[?]` flags: all readings resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi bands (including note p771-6 "supra pag. **78**", confirmed eyes-on against the p.771 R-2 footer band).

**Scholion:** none. Per the brief, Art. II's scholion coverage lives in a1-q1 (Art. I's scholion extends into Art. II); notes p771-6 and p773-10 both cross-refer "Vide scholion ad 1. praecedentis articuli quaest." `has_scholion: false`.