title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum proprietas de se ipsa denominative praedicari possit

title_alt: Whether a property can be predicated denominatively of itself

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum eadem proprietas de se ipsa denominative praedicari possit.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quarto quaeritur de comparatione eiusdem proprietatis ad se ipsam. Quaeritur igitur, utrum eadem proprietas sive notio praedicetur de se denominative[^1]. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per *simile*, quia adiectiva essentialia denominant abstracta, ut *magnitudo est magna*, et *bonitas est bona*: ergo pari ratione *generatio generat* et *spiratio spirat*.

2. Item, quia in *primis*[^2] est status, ideo se ipsis denominantur — unde *unitas se ipsa est una* — ergo cum proprietates personales non habeant priores, immo ipsae primae sint, tunc se ipsas denominant.

3. Item, indefinita affirmativa aequipollet particulari[^3], ergo simpliciter convertitur; sed haec conceditur: *generans est paternitas* sive *generatio*: ergo *generatio est generans*.

4. Item, si haec non conceditur: *paternitas est*[^4] *generans*, aut hoc est propter repugnantiam a parte rei, aut a parte modi: non a parte rei, quia eadem res est; non a parte modi, quia eadem proprietas et relatio importatur: ergo nullo modo est ibi repugnantia: ergo locutio simpliciter est vera.

**Contra:**

1. Sicut proprium proprietatis est distinguere, sic proprium est personae aliam producere; sed haec est falsa: *persona distinguit*, quia non distinguit, immo distinguitur: ergo et haec est falsa: *proprietas generat*.

2. Item, «omne quod refertur, est aliquid, excepto eo, quod relative dicitur»[^5]; sed proprietas non est nisi relatio: ergo proprietas non refertur. Sed *generare* est *referri*: ergo proprietas non generat.

3. Item, proprietas importat originem et relationem: ergo si supra se reflectitur et se ipsam denominat, tunc ergo originis erit origo et relationis relatio; quod habet Philosophus[^6] et omnis ratio pro inconvenienti.

4. Item, cum dicitur: *generatio generat*, aut verbum construitur ratione *suppositi*, aut ratione *formae*: non *formae*, quia respectus non agit[^7]; nec ratione *suppositi*, quia supposita notione non supponitur persona — aliquid enim convenit personae, quod non notioni, ut supra ostensum est[^8] — ergo locutio simpliciter est falsa.

### Conclusio.

> *Proprietas nulla se ipsam denominare potest.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedictae locutiones sunt falsae; nulla enim notio denominat se ipsam.

Et ratio huius est, quia denominatio notionis importat emanationem ut actum, importat etiam *relationem*[^9]. Et quoniam productio proprie est suppositi, non formae, similiter *relatio* est alicuius ut suppositi; ideo omnis talis denominatio concernit suppositum. Non sic est de proprietatibus essentialibus — vel ut est de primis[^10], ut de uno et vero — immo respiciunt formam; ideo denominant se ipsas. Quod quia non est in huiusmodi adiectivis notionibus, non possunt locutiones esse verae ratione *formae*. Ratione vero *suppositi* non possunt esse verae, quia notio non supponit personam, quia plures notiones sunt in eadem persona. Essentia tamen supponit substantiam, quia una est essentia et una substantia, et ideo haec est vera: *deitas creat*, quia *deitas* supponit *Deum*; haec autem falsa: *paternitas generat*, quia non supponit *Patrem*.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Quod obiicitur de conditionibus essentialibus, et de primis, patet, quod non est simile ratione[^11] iam dicta. — Potest tamen nihilominus alia ratio assignari, quia respectus reflexus supra absolutum ibi quietatur, ita quod absolutum respectui dat fundamentum, et respectus dat complementum. Sed cum respectus reflectitur supra se, quia uter-

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que dicit comparationem ad alterum, unus non potest dare fundamentum, nec alter complementum; et ideo non potest reflecti. Sed in simplicibus primis, cuiusmodi est veritas, quia aut non important relationem, aut si important, important relationem quae communiter[^12] respicit substantiam et eius proprietates, ut puta *esse a Deo*, ideo supra se reflectuntur; non sic in proposito, quia productio respicit personam.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: *generans est paternitas*; dicendum, quod *generans* subiicitur[^13] ratione hypostasis, et ita notatur praedicatio per identitatem; sed cum praedicatur, accipitur ratione formae, ideo mutatur modus accipiendi; ideo non sequitur. Si tamen intelligeretur ratione suppositi praedicari, vera esset; tunc enim esset sensus[^14]: *paternitas est ille qui generat*; sed tunc non sequitur, *generatio generat*, immo est ibi accidens.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod repugnantia non sit ibi[^15]; dicendum, quod est ibi repugnantia a parte modi intelligendi. Nam notio non denominat nisi suppositum, unde talis modus non convenit notioni. Unde sicut haec est falsa: *albedo est alba*, sic in proposito est intelligendum.

### Scholion.

**I.** Constat, eandem notionem de se ipsa praedicari posse per identitatem, id est in abstracto, unde dici potest: *paternitas est generatio activa*. Quaeritur tantum, utrum hoc fieri possit etiam in concreto seu *denominative*, v. g. dicendo: *generatio est generans* sive *generat*. A Richardo a Med. aliisque eadem quaestio his verbis proponitur: «Utrum adiectiva personalia praedicantur de proprietatibus». Rationes principales falsae opinionis sunt argg. 1. et 2. ad opposit., quae concludunt a paritate, quia videlicet adiectiva essentialia denominant abstracta; et etiam primae intentiones, id est transcendentales, ut *unum*, *verum*, *bonum*, denominative de se praedicantur. Non subsistere hanc paritatem, probatur in corp. et ad 1. 2. Sententiam Seraphici approbat et magis explicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.) his verbis: «Quamvis eandem rem significet *generatio* et *generare*, tamen diverso modo: quia *generare* significat actum et per modum actus, *generatio* vero non sic, sed per modum cuiusdam formae. Et quia actus sunt suppositorum (quamvis per formas), non autem proprie ipsarum formarum ut agentium, sed ut principiorum, per quae supposita agunt: ideo, quamvis haec sit concedenda: *Pater generat*, haec tamen non est concedenda: *Paternitas generat*». — Quod primae (transcendentales) intentiones super se reflectuntur, id est de se praedicantur, iam dictum est supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 3, et d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.

**II.** S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 40. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english:
### Question IV.
#### *Whether the same property can be predicated denominatively of itself.*

In the fourth place there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the same property to itself. The question, then, is whether the same property or notion is predicated of itself denominatively[^1]. And that it is so, seems to be the case:

1. By a *parallel*, since essential adjectives denominate abstracts, as *greatness is great* and *goodness is good*: therefore by parity of reason *generation generates* and *spiration spirates*.

2. Likewise, since in the *primaries*[^2] there is a stopping-point, they are denominated by themselves — whence *unity is itself one* — therefore since the personal properties have nothing prior to them, but rather are themselves primary, then they denominate themselves.

3. Likewise, an indefinite affirmative is equivalent to a particular[^3], therefore it converts simpliciter; but this is granted: *the generator is paternity* or *generation*: therefore *generation is generator*.

4. Likewise, if this is not granted: *paternity is*[^4] *generator*, either this is on account of an incompatibility on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode: not on the side of the thing, since it is the same thing; not on the side of the mode, since the same property and relation is involved: therefore in no way is there an incompatibility there: therefore the locution is simpliciter true.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as it is proper to a property to distinguish, so it is proper to a person to produce another; but this is false: *the person distinguishes*, since it does not distinguish but rather is distinguished: therefore this also is false: *the property generates*.

2. Likewise, "everything that is referred is something, except that which is said relatively"[^5]; but a property is nothing but a relation: therefore a property is not referred. But *to generate* is *to be referred*: therefore the property does not generate.

3. Likewise, a property involves origin and relation: therefore if it is reflected upon itself and denominates itself, then there will be an origin of an origin and a relation of a relation; which the Philosopher[^6] and every reasoning [holds] for an absurdity.

4. Likewise, when it is said: *generation generates*, the verb is construed either by reason of the *supposit*, or by reason of the *form*: not [by reason] of the *form*, since a relation does not act[^7]; nor by reason of the *supposit*, since when the notion is supposed [as subject] no person is supposed — for something pertains to the person which does not pertain to the notion, as has been shown above[^8] — therefore the locution is simpliciter false.

### Conclusion.

> *No property can denominate itself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the foresaid locutions are false; for no notion denominates itself.

And the reason for this is that the denomination of a notion involves an emanation as an act, and involves also a *relation*[^9]. And since production properly belongs to a supposit, not to a form, likewise *relation* is of something as of a supposit; therefore every such denomination concerns a supposit. It is not so with the essential properties — or as it is with the primaries[^10], such as *one* and *true* — but rather they regard the form; therefore they denominate themselves. Because this is not [the case] in adjectives of this notional kind, the locutions cannot be true by reason of the *form*. Nor can they be true by reason of the *supposit*, since a notion does not supposit a person, since several notions are in the same person. Yet essence supposits substance, since there is one essence and one substance, and therefore this is true: *the Godhead creates*, since *Godhead* supposits *God*; but this is false: *paternity generates*, since it does not supposit *the Father*.

**Replies to the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* What is objected concerning the essential conditions and the primaries is plain that it is not similar, by the reason[^11] already stated. — Yet there can nonetheless be assigned another reason, namely that a relation reflected upon an absolute comes to rest there, in such a way that the absolute gives the foundation to the relation, and the relation gives the completion. But when a relation is reflected upon itself, since each one bespeaks a comparison to another, the one cannot give the foundation, nor the other the completion;

and therefore it cannot be reflected. But in simple primaries, of which kind is truth, since either they do not involve a relation, or, if they do, they involve a relation which commonly[^12] regards substance and its properties, such as *to be from God*, therefore they are reflected upon themselves; not so in the case at hand, since production regards a person.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that this is true: *the generator is paternity*; it must be said that *generator* is taken as subject[^13] by reason of the hypostasis, and so a predication by identity is signified; but when it is predicated, it is taken by reason of the form, therefore the manner of taking is changed; therefore the inference does not follow. If, however, it were understood to be predicated by reason of the supposit, it would be true; for then the sense would be[^14]: *paternity is the one who generates*; but then it does not follow, *generation generates*; rather, there is an accidental fallacy there.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that there is no incompatibility there[^15]; it must be said that there is an incompatibility there on the side of the mode of understanding. For a notion does not denominate anything but a supposit, whence such a mode does not befit a notion. Whence just as this is false: *whiteness is white*, so it must be understood in the case at hand.

### Scholion.

**I.** It is established that the same notion can be predicated of itself by identity, that is, in the abstract, whence it can be said: *paternity is active generation*. The question is only whether this can also occur in the concrete, or *denominatively*, e.g. by saying: *generation is generator* or *generates*. By Richard of Mediavilla and others the same question is proposed in these words: "Whether personal adjectives are predicated of properties." The principal grounds of the false opinion are arguments 1 and 2 *ad oppositum*, which conclude from a parity, namely, that essential adjectives denominate abstracts; and also that the primary intentions, that is the transcendentals, such as *one*, *true*, *good*, are predicated denominatively of themselves. That this parity does not hold is proved in the body and in the replies to 1 and 2. The opinion of the Seraphic Doctor is approved and more fully explained by Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 3, q. 2) in these words: "Although *generation* and *to generate* signify the same thing, yet in a different manner: because *to generate* signifies an act and after the manner of an act, but *generation* not so, but after the manner of a certain form. And since acts belong to supposits (although through forms), and not properly to the forms themselves as agents, but as principles by which the supposits act: therefore, although this is to be granted: *the Father generates*, this nonetheless is not to be granted: *Paternity generates*." — That the primary (transcendental) intentions reflect upon themselves, that is, are predicated of themselves, has already been said above at d. 3, p. I, dub. 3, and d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad 4.

**II.** St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 40, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Giles of Rome, here 2. *princ.* q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

la: *Commutatis verbis*: utrum actus personales praedicentur de proprietatibus per modum denominativum, ita ut dici possit: *generatio generat*, *spiratio spirat*.

en: *With the words rephrased*: whether the personal acts are predicated of the properties after the denominative manner, so that it could be said: *generation generates*, *spiration spirates*.

la: Simul audi: *formis*, vel intentionibus sive conditionibus. Cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 13.

en: Understand together: *forms*, or intentions or conditions. Cf. above p. 78, n. 13.

la: Sic haec indefinita propositio affirmativa: *homo est iustus*, aequivalet huic alteri: *aliquis homo est iustus*. Nam prima propositio: *homo est iustus*, aequivalet suae propositioni conversae: *aliquod iustum est homo*, quae propositio ut particularis simpliciter convertitur in hanc: *aliquis homo est iustus*. Ex quo sequitur, ut et haec propositio: *homo est iustus*, simpliciter converti possit in illam: *iustus est homo*.

en: Thus this indefinite affirmative proposition: *a man is just*, is equivalent to this other: *some man is just*. For the first proposition: *a man is just*, is equivalent to its converted proposition: *some just [thing] is a man*, which proposition, as a particular, is converted simpliciter into this: *some man is just*. From which it follows that this proposition also: *a man is just*, can be converted simpliciter into that: *a just [one] is a man*.

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 verbo *est* praefigunt *non*, at perperam, ut iam ex argumento praecedenti liquet.

en: Not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, prefix *non* to the verb *est*, but wrongly, as is already clear from the preceding argument.

la: August., VII. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 2. — Mox multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post *non est* male omittunt *nisi*; codd. autem T Z ee cum ed. I legunt *sed proprietas est relatio*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII, c. 1, n. 2. — Soon, many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 after *non est* wrongly omit *nisi*; while codices T Z ee with edition I read *sed proprietas est relatio*.

la: De quo vide supra pag. 453, nota 8. — Paulo superius verba *si supra se reflectitur* idem significant ac *si de se praedicatur*.

en: Concerning which see above p. 453, n. 8. — A little higher up, the words *si supra se reflectitur* signify the same as *si de se praedicatur*.

la: *Actiones enim sunt suppositorum.* — Paulo ante pro *non formae* codd. V X *non ratione formae*. — De propositione sequenti vide pag. 576, nota 1.

en: *For actions belong to supposits.* — A little before, in place of *non formae*, codices V X [read] *non ratione formae*. — On the following proposition see p. 576, n. 1.

la: Hic q. 1. et 2. — Paulo ante verbis *quod non* cod. bb adiungit *convenit*.

en: Here q. 1 and 2. — A little before, to the words *quod non*, codex bb adds *convenit*.

la: Cod. Y addit *ut modum*.

en: Codex Y adds *ut modum* ["as a mode"].

la: Intellige: *intentionibus*.

en: Understand: *intentions*.

la: Multi codd. incongrue *de ratione*, cod. bb verius *ex*.

en: Many codices unfittingly [read] *de ratione*; codex bb more truly [reads] *ex*.

la: Per *communiter* cod. R *similiter*.

en: In place of *communiter*, codex R [reads] *similiter*.

la: *Sive*: subiectum est in ista propositione. Similiter verbo *praedicatur*, quod mox sequitur, vix subiicienda est: est *praedicatum* in hac propositione: *paternitas est generans*. — Post *praedicatur* plurimi codd. nec non edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 adiciunt *Pater*, ed. 1 *paternitas*; mendose.

en: *Or:* it is the subject in this proposition. Similarly, with the verb *praedicatur*, which immediately follows, [the subject] can scarcely be subjoined: it is the predicate in this proposition: *paternity is begetting*. — After *praedicatur*, very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5 add *Pater* (Father), edition 1 [adds] *paternitas* (paternity); erroneously.

la: Plures codd. ut G S T W cc ff cum ed. 1, immutata interpunctione, sic: *vera esset tunc, et esset sensus*.

en: Several codices such as G, S, T, W, cc, ff with edition 1, with the punctuation altered, [read] thus: *it would then be true, and the sense would be*.

la: Codd. A P Q T cum ed. 1 *quae repugnantia sit ibi*; alii codd. non pauci cum edd. 2, 3 *quod repugnantia sit ibi*. — De ultima propos. solutionis vide supra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. obiect. 4.

en: Codices A, P, Q, T with edition 1 [read] *quae repugnantia sit ibi* ("what contradiction there is in it"); not a few other codices, with editions 2 and 3, [read] *quod repugnantia sit ibi* ("that there is contradiction in it"). — On the last proposition of the solution, see above d. 17. p. 1. q. 2, objection 4.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 33, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de responsione Magistri, quam ponit ibi: *Horum doctrinis novis et humanis*. Videtur enim insufficienter respondere, quia non solvit argumentum, sed dicit, quod est incomprehensibile; et videtur, quod ista evasio nulla sit. Aut enim argumentum necessario concludit, aut sophistice: si necessario, tunc ergo, cum procedat ex veris, conclusio est vera; si non necessario, tunc ergo sophisticum est; sed unum sophisma non est incomprehensibile: et ita[^1] videtur, quod male applicet auctoritatem Hilarii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad argumentum facile est respondere, quia ibi est sophisma secundum accidens: proprietas est essentia; et essentia non distinguitur[^2]: ergo nec proprietas. Sed hoc Magister non dicit incomprehensibile, sed dimittit tanquam sophisticum et indignum discussione maiorum. Sed illa quaestio veritatis, quae sequitur incomprehensibilis est secundum statum viae: quoniam, si per omnimodam identitatem praedicatur essentia de proprietatibus et e converso, haec distinguitur, et illa non; et hoc est nobis incomprehensibile. Quia enim videmus per speculum[^3], intelligimus per similitudinem sumtam a creaturis; et hoc nullum sub caelo habet simile, immo solius Dei est proprium propter summam simplicitatem: ideo Magister dicit esse incomprehensibile. — Nec est simile de genere et differentia: quia genus praedicatur de differentia, et haec distinguit, et illud non, quia non praedicatur per identitatem. Ideo et nos cum Hilario dicit, quod est incomprehensibile, et describit incomprehensibilitatem quantum ad triplicem vim: quantum ad receptivam, cum dicit *incomprehensibile* etc.; quantum ad expressivam, cum dicit *extra sermonis significationem*; quantum ad iudicativam[^4], cum dicit *extra sensus intentionem*. Et alia, quae sequuntur, his tribus aptantur, ut patet inspicienti.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de responsione Magistri, quam facit ibi: *Quorum audaciae resistentes etc.* Dicit enim, quod proprietates sunt in hypostasibus et eas determinant; in essentia sunt, sed eam non determinant. Videtur enim esse oppositio, quia omnis proprietas est determinativa eius in quo est, alioquin in illo non est: ergo si proprietates non determinant essentiam, non sunt in essentia.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister[^5] bene respondet, quia haec praepositio *in* notat diversas habitudines. Aliter enim dicitur Pater in Filio, aliter paternitas in Patre. Pater enim in Filio esse dicitur non sicut proprietas distinctiva, sed sicut persona consubstantialis; paternitas in Patre, sicut proprietas distinctiva. Sic vult dicere Magister, quod aliter sunt sive dicuntur esse proprietates in *essentia* quam in *persona*. Nam in essentia dicuntur esse propter identitatem, ita quod *in* omnino dicit identitatem; in personis dicuntur esse, sicut verae proprietates in hypostasibus et determinationes in determinatis. In creaturis autem non est unus modus sine alio, quia proprietas non omnino idem est cum eo cuius est proprietas: et ideo in creaturis non dicitur esse proprietas in aliquo, nisi in eo cui inhaeret; non sic in divinis.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de alia responsione Magistri, quam facit ibi: *Respondeo et hic tibi cum Hilario etc.*[^6] Videtur enim falsum quod dicit, quod solutionem istius quaestionis Archangeli nesciunt. Cum enim sint comprehensores, constat quod omnia cognoscunt, quae sunt de substantia gloriae: ergo cognoscunt distinctionem personarum et essentiae unitatem et modum: ergo vident, quare proprietates determinant hypostasim, non essentiam. Et iterum, si comprehensio erit[^7] de quibus est modo fide tenemus: ergo in patria cognoscemus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Trinitate*[^8]: «Sicut fovea dicitur esse caeca, non quia ipsa non videat, sed quia quod habet non ostendit aliis»; sic Angeli dicuntur ignorare et Sancti propter hoc, quod non revelant talia, sed magis intelligibilia; et quia talia non habent simile in creatura, immo magis dissimile: ideo dicuntur nobis incomprehensibilia. Et removet Hilarius triplicem cognitionem, quam habemus de rebus divinis: una est per Angelorum revelationem, alia per Prophetarum illustrationem, tertia per Apostolorum praedicationem. Et dicit, Angelos non audire, quia ipsi recipiunt revelationem a maioribus et nobis non exprimunt[^9]. — Magister igitur bene respondet, ostendendo insufficientiam. Si enim quaeratur, quare proprietas est in persona ut distinguens, in essentia non; respondetur, quod persona se habet ad aliam et refertur et distinguitur. Et si hoc respondeatur, adhuc manet quaestio, quare persona refertur; et respondetur, quod una est essentia, tres personae. Si tu quaeras huiusmodi omnino simile, non invenies; et ideo in fundamento fidei oportet sistere.

#### DUB. IV.

Notandum super ista solutione Magistri quam ponit hic: *Nos autem ista aliter intelligenda fore dicimus*, quod locutiones istae, quas proponit Augustinus[^10], scilicet «Pater non eo est substantia, quo est Pater» et consimiles, duplices sunt, quia ablativus importat habitudinem in ratione *formae* sive *causae formalis*, quamvis in divinis non cadat vere habitudo causae quantum ad rem, tamen quantum ad rationem intelligendi. Potest igitur causalitas cadere sub negatione, ut sit negatio causalitatis; et tunc locutio est vera, et in hoc sensu accipit Augustinus, et Magister exponit. Est enim sensus: *non eo est Deus, quo Pater*; quia paternitate est Pater tanquam ratione dicendi vel intelligendi; non sic autem paternitas est ratio dicendi, ipsum esse Deum, vel intelligendi; et sic locutio vera est et nihil facit pro Porretano. Potest iterum esse causalitas negationis; et tunc est falsa, et est sensus: *non eo est Deus quo Pater*, id est quantum ad illud quod est Pater, non est Deus; et in hoc sensu accipit Porretanus, et ita est falsus intellectus, et sic non accipit Augustinus[^11].

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the response of the Master, which he sets down there: *By the new and human teachings of these men*. For he seems to respond insufficiently, because he does not solve the argument, but says that it is incomprehensible; and it seems that this evasion is none at all. For either the argument concludes necessarily, or sophistically: if necessarily, then since it proceeds from true [premises], the conclusion is true; if not necessarily, then it is sophistical; but a single sophism is not incomprehensible: and so[^1] it seems that he ill applies the authority of Hilary.

**I respond:** It must be said that to the argument it is easy to reply, because there is there a sophism according to accident: a property is the essence; and the essence is not distinguished[^2]: therefore neither is the property. But this the Master does not call incomprehensible, but dismisses as sophistical and unworthy of the discussion of greater minds. But that question of truth, which follows, is incomprehensible according to the state of the wayfarer: for if by complete identity essence is predicated of the properties and conversely, this is distinguished and that not; and this is for us incomprehensible. For because we see *through a glass*[^3], we understand by a likeness drawn from creatures; and this has nothing under heaven like it, rather it is the property of God alone on account of the highest simplicity: therefore the Master says it is incomprehensible. — Nor is it like the case of genus and difference: for the genus is predicated of the difference, and the latter distinguishes and the former does not, because it is not predicated by identity. Therefore he too with Hilary says that it is incomprehensible, and describes the incomprehensibility with respect to a threefold power: with respect to the receptive, when he says *incomprehensible* etc.; with respect to the expressive, when he says *beyond the signification of speech*; with respect to the judicative[^4], when he says *beyond the intention of the senses*. And the other things which follow are fitted to these three, as is plain to one who inspects.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning the response of the Master, which he makes there: *Resisting the audacity of these, etc.* For he says that the properties are in the hypostases and determine them; in the essence they are, but they do not determine it. For there seems to be opposition here, because every property is determinative of that in which it is, otherwise it is not in it: therefore if the properties do not determine the essence, they are not in the essence.

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**I respond:** It must be said that the Master[^5] answers well, because this preposition *in* signifies different relations. For it is said in one way that the Father is *in* the Son, in another that paternity is *in* the Father. For the Father is said to be in the Son not as a distinctive property, but as a consubstantial person; paternity in the Father, as a distinctive property. So the Master means to say that properties are or are said to be in *essence* otherwise than in *person*. For in the essence they are said to be on account of identity, so that *in* says identity altogether; in the persons they are said to be as true properties in hypostases and determinations in things determined. In creatures, however, the one mode is not without the other, because a property is not altogether the same as that of which it is the property: and therefore in creatures a property is not said to be in something, except in that to which it inheres; not so in divine things.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the other response of the Master, which he makes there: *I respond here also to you with Hilary, etc.*[^6] For what he says seems false, that the Archangels do not know the solution of this question. For since they are comprehenders, it is established that they know all things which are of the substance of glory: therefore they know the distinction of the persons and the unity and mode of the essence: therefore they see why the properties determine the hypostasis, not the essence. And again, if comprehension will be[^7] of those things of which we now hold by faith: therefore in the fatherland we shall know.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Augustine says *On the Trinity*[^8]: "As a pit is said to be blind, not because it does not itself see, but because it does not show to others what it has"; so the Angels are said to be ignorant, and the Saints, on this account, that they do not reveal such things, but rather things [more] intelligible; and because such things have nothing like in creation, indeed [they are] more unlike: therefore they are said to be incomprehensible to us. And Hilary removes the threefold cognition which we have of divine things: one is through the revelation of the Angels, another through the illumination of the Prophets, the third through the preaching of the Apostles. And he says that the Angels do not hear, because they receive revelation from greater ones and do not express it to us[^9]. — The Master therefore answers well, by showing the insufficiency. For if it is asked, why the property is in the person as distinguishing, [but] not in the essence; the answer is that the person comports itself toward another and is referred and distinguished. And if this is answered, the question still remains, why the person is referred; and it is answered that there is one essence, three persons. If you seek something altogether like this, you will not find it; and therefore in the foundation of faith one must stand fast.

#### DOUBT IV.

It is to be noted concerning that solution of the Master which he sets down here: *But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise*, that those locutions which Augustine[^10] proposes, namely "The Father *is not* substance by that by which he is Father" and the like, are twofold, because the ablative imports a relation in the account of *form* or of *formal cause*, although in divine things the relation of cause does not truly fall as regards the thing, yet as regards the account of understanding [it does]. Therefore causality can fall under negation, so that there is a negation of causality; and then the locution is true, and in this sense Augustine takes [it], and the Master expounds [it]. For the sense is: *God is not by that by which Father*; because by paternity he is Father as by an account of speaking or of understanding; but paternity is not in this way the account of speaking, viz. for [his] very being God, or of understanding; and so the locution is true and makes nothing for the Porretan. Again, there can be a causality of negation; and then it is false, and the sense is: *God is not by that by which Father*, that is, with respect to that which is Father, he is not God; and in this sense the Porretan takes [it], and so it is a false understanding, and Augustine does not take it so[^11].

---

la: In multis codd. deest *ita*, pro quo cod. X et ed. 1 *ideo*.

en: In many codices *ita* is wanting, for which cod. X and ed. 1 read *ideo*.

la: Vat. hic et inferius *distinguit*.

en: The Vatican edition here and below reads *distinguit*.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12. — Paulo superius voculae *haec* (scil. *proprietas*) codd. L praemittunt *cur*. Paulo inferius post *Dei* Vat. omittit *est*, quod in pluribus codd. ut I T aa etc. et in ed. 1 congrue adiungitur.

en: The Epistle 1 Corinthians 13, 12. — A little above, before the small word *haec* (i.e. *proprietas*) the L codices prefix *cur*. A little below, after *Dei* the Vatican edition omits *est*, which in many codices, as I T aa etc., and in ed. 1, is congruously added.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. et edd. *indicativam*, sed perperam, ut etiam ex Richardo, hic circa lit. apparet. De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 2.

en: The Vatican edition with many codices and editions reads *indicativam*, but wrongly, as is also clear from Richard, here on the text. On this doubt, cf. above q. 2.

la: Supple cum cod. *Magister*.

en: Supply, with [that] codex, *Magister*.

la: Plura de hoc invenies supra q. 1. et 2. Cfr. etiam S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: You will find more on this above q. 1 and 2. Cf. also St. Thomas and Richard, here on the text.

la: Cod. T *est*.

en: Cod. T reads *est*.

la: Libr. I. c. 12. n. 23: *Eo namque genere locutionis nescire quisque dicitur quod occultat, quo dicitur fossa caeca quae occulta est*. — Mox voci *Sancti* plures codd. ut X aa bb praemittunt *alii*.

en: Book I, c. 12, n. 23: *For by that kind of speech each one is said not to know what he hides, by which a pit is called blind which is hidden*. — Soon, before the word *Sancti*, several codices, as X aa bb, prefix *alii*.

la: Cod. B clarius sic: *quia licet ipsi recipiant revelationem a maioribus, tamen nobis non exprimunt*. Pro *quia ipsi* ed. 1 *quantum ipsi*. Ante *exprimunt* non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 falso omittunt *non*.

en: Cod. B more clearly thus: *because although they themselves receive revelation from greater ones, yet they do not express it to us*. For *quia ipsi* ed. 1 reads *quantum ipsi*. Before *exprimunt* not a few codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 falsely omit *non*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et in Comment. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opp.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2, and in the Commentary q. 2, arg. 1 ad opp.

la: Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas and Richard, here on the text.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34

title_alt: De diversis comparationibus personae ad naturam — littera Magistri

title_alt: Various comparisons of person to nature — text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXIV.

#### Cap. I.

*De verbis Hilarii, quibus secundum primorum intelligentiam videtur dicere, non idem esse divinam naturam et rem naturae, et non idem esse Deum et quod Dei est.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (*Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum*, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 582–584) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Praedictis est adiiciendum, quod quidam perversi sensus homines in tantam prosilierunt insaniam, ut dicerent, non idem esse naturam Dei et personam sive hypostasim, dicentes, eandem essentiam non posse esse Patrem et Filium sine personarum confusione. Si enim, inquiunt, ea essentia, quae Pater est, Filius est, idem sibi Pater est et Filius. Si hanc rem dicis esse Patrem, aliam quaere, quam dicas esse Filium. Si vero aliam non quaesieris, sed eandem dixeris; idem genuit et genitus est. Propter haec et huiusmodi inter naturam et personam dividunt, ita ut non recipiant unam deitatis naturam et simplicem esse tres personas. Idque testimonio Hilarii defendere nituntur, qui in octavo libro *de Trinitate*[^1] quaerens, utrum Apostolus, nominans spiritum Dei et spiritum Christi, idem significaverit utroque verbo, inquit ita: « Gentium praedicator, volens naturae unitatem in Patre et Filio docere, ait: *Spiritus Dei in vobis est. Si quis autem spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Si autem spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum* etc. *Spirituales omnes sumus, si in nobis est spiritus Dei*; sed et hic spiritus Dei est et spiritus Christi. Et cum Christi spiritus in nobis est, eius spiritus in nobis est, qui suscitavit Christum. Et cum eius qui suscitavit Christum in nobis est spiritus, et spiritus in nobis est Christi; nec tamen non Dei est spiritus, qui in nobis est. Discerne igitur, haeretice, spiritum Christi a spiritu Dei, et excitati a mortuis spiritum Christi a spiritu Dei Christum a mortuis excitantis; cum qui habitat in nobis spiritus Christi spiritus Dei sit, et spiritus Christi a mortuis excitati spiritus Dei tantum sit Christum a mortuis excitantis. Et quaero nunc, in spiritu Dei utrum naturam, an rem naturae significatam existimes. Non est enim idem natura quod res naturae, sicut non idem est homo et quod hominis est; nec idem est ignis et quod ipsius ignis est: et secundum hoc non idem est Deus et quod Dei est ». — Huius dicti occasione praefati haeretici dogmatizaverunt, non idem esse personam et naturam Dei, asserentes, naturam Dei non esse tres personas, intelligentes in his praemissis verbis Hilarii per *rem naturae* personam, et nomine *naturae* divinam naturam. Et ideo dicunt, Hilarium interrogasse haereticum, utrum per *spiritum Dei* putaret significatam esse naturam, an rem naturae, ut sic ostenderet, distinguendum esse inter naturam et rem naturae, id est personam.

Hoc quidem dicunt, non intelligentes[^2] pia diligentia Scripturae circumstantiam, qua considerata, percipi potest, quomodo praemissa dixerit Hilarius. Subsequenter enim in eadem serie ostendit, in spiritu Dei aliquando significari Patrem, ut cum dicitur[^3]: *Spiritus Domini super me*; aliquando significari Filium, ut cum dicitur: *In spiritu Dei eiicio daemonia*, naturae suae potestate se daemones eiicere demonstrans; aliquando Spiritum sanctum, ut ibi: *Effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem*. Quod dicit consummatum fuisse, cum Apostoli, Spiritu sancto misso, omnibus linguis locuti sunt. Deinde, quare hanc distinctionem fecerit, et quod in *superioribus verbis* Apostoli idem Spiritus significatus sit, et quod ipse sit res unius naturae Patris et Filii, aperte ostendit inquiens ita[^4]: « Haec idcirco sunt demonstrata, ut quacumque parte haeretica falsitas se contulisset, finibus veritatis concluderetur. Habitat enim in nobis Christus, quo habitante habitat Deus, et cum habitat in nobis spiritus Christi, non alius tamen[^5] habitat quam spiritus Dei. Quodsi per Spiritum sanctum Christus in nobis intelligitur esse, hunc tamen ita spiritum Dei ut spiritum Christi esse noscendum est. Et cum per naturam Dei natura ipsa habitet in nobis, indifferens natura Filii creditur esse a Patre, cum Spiritus sanctus, qui est spiritus Christi, et Spiritus Dei res naturae demonstretur unius. Quaero nunc igitur, quomodo non ex natura unum sunt. A Patre procedit Spiritus veritatis, a Filio mittitur et a Filio accipit. Sed omnia quae habet Pater, Filii sunt, et idcirco qui ab eo accipit Dei spiritus est, et idem spiritus Christi est. Res naturae Filii est, sed et eadem res et naturae Patris est, et Dei excitantis Christum a mortuis spiritus est, et idem spiritus Christi est a mortuis excitati. In aliquo differt Christi et Dei natura, ne eadem sit, si praestari potest, ut spiritus, qui Dei est, non sit et Christi ». « Est ergo in nobis spiritus Dei, et est in nobis spiritus Christi; et cum spiritus Christi inest, inest spiritus Dei. Ita cum quod Dei est et Christi est, et quod Christi est Dei est; non potest quid aliud diversum Christus esse, quam Deus est. Deus igitur Christus est unus cum Deo spiritus », « se-

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cundum illud: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. In quo docet Veritas, unitatem esse naturae, non solitudinem unionis[^6] ». — Ecce, si haec verba diligenter attendas, invenis, Spiritum sanctum *rem naturae* dici Patris et Filii, et eundem dici esse *naturam Dei*, ubi dicitur: *per naturam Dei natura ipsa habitat in nobis*, si per Spiritum sanctum Christus est in nobis. Itaque in Trinitate non ita distinguendum est inter *naturam* et *rem naturae*, sicut in rebus creatis, quia, ut ait Hilarius[^7]: « comparatio terrenorum ad Deum nulla est; et si qua comparationum exempla interdum afferuntur, nemo ea existimet absolute in se rationis perfectionem continere ». « Non enim humano sensu de Deo loquendum est ».

Ad naturam ergo rerum creatarum respiciens inquit[^8]: « Non idem est natura quod res naturae », subiiciens exempla de ipsis creaturis. Inde ostendens, errorem esse, sub mensura creaturarum metiri Creatorem, addit: Et secundum hoc « non idem est Deus, et quod Dei est », ac si diceret: si ad instar creaturarum de Creatore sentis, cogeris fateri, quia non idem est Deus et quod Dei est; quod dicere impium est, cum Spiritus Dei Deus sit, et Dei Filius sit Deus.

Non ergo secundum corporales modos, ut in eadem serie subdit, accipienda sunt haec quae de Deo dicuntur. Ubi evacuans opinionem eorum qui ita putant *aliud esse Deum, et aliud quod Dei est*[^9], aliudque naturam Dei et rem naturae, ut est in creaturis, aperte docet, non aliud esse Deum et quae sua sunt, ita ut insint illi, sic dicens[^10]: « Homo aut aliquid ei simile, cum alicubi erit, alibi non erit, quia id quod est illic continetur, ubi fuerit in forma, ut non ubique sit qui insistens alicubi sit. Deus autem immensae virtutis, vivens potestas, quae nusquam non adsit nec desit usquam, se omnem per sua edocet, et sua non aliud quam se esse significat, ut ubi sua insint, ipse esse per sua intelligatur. Non autem corporali modo, cum alicubi sit, non etiam ubique esse credatur, cum per sua in omnibus esse non desinat. Non aliud autem sint, quam quod est ipse, quae sua sunt. Et haec propter naturae intelligentiam dicta sunt ». His verbis aperte significat — si tamen intelligis, haeretice — quia divina natura non aliud est ab his quae sua sunt, ita ut insint, et per illa in omnibus est suis, quae non insunt. Sua enim sunt etiam quae non insunt, id est omnes creaturae; et sua sunt quae insunt, ut tres personae, quae sunt eiusdem naturae et eadem natura, sicut supra Augustini[^11] testimonio firmavimus dicentis: tres personas esse eiusdem essentiae vel eandem essentiam, sed non ex eadem essentia, ne aliud intelligatur essentia, aliud persona. — Non tamen diffitemur aliquam distinctionem habendam fore secundum intelligentiae rationem, cum dicitur *hypostasis*, et cum dicitur *essentia*; quia ibi significatur quod est commune tribus, hic vero non. Est tamen hypostasis essentia, et e converso. Fateamur ergo unum atque idem esse, tres personas secundum essentiam, differentes autem proprietatibus. Unde Augustinus super locum praetaxatum Psalmi[^12] ait: « Quaeris, quid sit Pater? Respondetur: *Deus*. Quaeris, quid sit Filius? Respondetur: *Deus*. Quaeris, quid sit Pater et Filius? Respondetur: *Deus*. De singulis interrogatus, *Deum* responde. De utroque interrogatus, non *deos*, sed *Deum* responde. Non sic in hominibus. Tanta enim ibi est substantiae unitas, ut aequalitatem admittat, pluralitatem non admittat. Si ergo tibi dictum fuerit, cum dicis, Filium esse quod Pater est: profecto Filius Pater est; responde: secundum substantiam tibi dixi hoc esse Filium quod Pater est, non secundum id quod ad aliud dicitur. Ad se enim dicitur Deus, ad Patrem Filius dicitur. Rursumque Pater ad se dicitur Deus, ad Filium dicitur Pater. Quod dicitur ad Filium Pater, non est Filius; quod dicitur Filius ad Patrem non est Pater; quod dicitur Pater ad se et Filius ad se, hoc est Pater et Filius, id est Deus ».

#### Cap. II.

*Utrum ita possit dici unus Deus trium personarum, ut dicitur una essentia trium personarum, et tres personae unius Dei, ut tres personae unius essentiae.*

Hic considerandum est, cum Deus sit divina essentia, et ita dicatur unus Deus esse tres personae sicut una essentia dicitur tres personae, utrum ita valeat sane dici, *unus Deus trium personarum*, vel *tres personae unius Dei*, sicut dicitur *una essentia trium personarum*, et *tres personae unius essentiae*. — In his locutionibus Scripturae usus nobis aemulandus videtur, ubi frequenter reperitur ita dictum: *una est essentia trium personarum*, et *tres sunt personae unius essentiae*; nusquam autem occurrit legisse, *unum Deum trium personarum*[^13], vel *tres personas unius Dei*. Quod ideo puto sanctos doctores vitasse, ne ita forte acciperetur in divinis personis, ut accipitur, cum de creaturis simile quid dicitur. Dicitur enim Deus Abraham, Isaac et Iacob[^14], et Deus omnis creaturae. Quod utique dicitur propter principium creationis vel gratiae[^15] privilegium, et creaturae subiectionem vel servitutem. Cum ergo in Trinitate nihil sit creatum vel serviens vel subiectum, non admisit fides in Trinitate talem

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locutionis modum. Ita etiam e converso non dicitur de Dei essentia, quod ipsa sit essentia Abraham, Isaac et Iacob vel alicuius creaturae, ne Creatoris et creaturae naturam confundere videamur.

#### Cap. III.

*Quod potentia, sapientia, bonitas in Scriptura interdum ad personas distincte referuntur.*

Ex praedictis[^16] constat, quod sicut essentia, ita potentia, sapientia, bonitas de Deo dicuntur secundum substantiam. Quae autem secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur tribus personis pariter conveniunt. Una est ergo potentia, sapientia, bonitas Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, et hi tres eadem potentia, eadem sapientia, eadem bonitas. Unde aperitur in Trinitate summa esse perfectio. Si enim ibi deesset potentia vel sapientia vel bonitas, non esset summum bonum. Sed quia ibi est perfecta potentia, infinita sapientia, incomprehensibilis bonitas, recte dicitur et creditur summum bonum. Cumque unum et idem penitus sit in Deo potentia, sapientia, bonitas; in sacra tamen Scriptura frequenter solent haec nomina distincte ad personas referri, ut Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui sancto bonitas attribuatur. Quod quare fiat, non est otiosum inquirere.

#### Cap. IV.

*Quare Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui sancto bonitas tribuatur, cum sit una potentia, sapientia, bonitas trium.*

«Id ergo sacri eloquii prudentia facere curavit, ne Dei immensitatem similitudine creaturae metiremur[^17]. Dicit enim Scriptura sacra, quia Deus Pater est, et quod Deus Filius est; et audivit hoc homo, qui hominem patrem viderat, Deum patrem non viderat, et cogitare coepit, ita esse in Creatore, ut viderat esse in creaturis, a quibus haec nomina translata sunt ad Creatorem, in quibus pater est prior filio, filius est posterior patre, et ex antiquitate in patre defectus, ex posteritate in filio imperfectio sensus solet notari. Ideo occurrit Scriptura dicens Patrem potentem, ne videatur prior Filio, et ideo minus potens, et Filium sapientem, ne videatur posterior Patre, et ideo minus sapiens[^18] ». « Dictus est etiam Spiritus sanctus Deus et dictus est habere spiritum Deus; et videbatur hoc quasi nomen inflationis et tumoris — unde humana conscientia ad Deum pro rigore et crudelitate accedere metuit — Ideo Scriptura temperavit sermonem suum spiritum bonum nominans, ne crudelis putaretur qui mitis erat; non quod Pater solus sit potens vel magis potens, et Filius solus sapiens vel magis sapiens, et Spiritus sanctus solus bonus vel magis bonus. Una est ergo potentia, sapientia, una bonitas trium, sicut essentia; ideoque, sicut dicitur Filius *homoousios*, id est consubstantialis Patri, ita et *coomnipotens* ».

#### Cap. V.

*De hoc nomine* homoousion*, ubi in auctoritate receptum sit, et quid significet.*

Hic non est praetermittendum, quod Augustinus in libro secundo[^19] *contra Maximinum* dicit de hoc nomine *homoousion*, quo Latini tractatores frequenter utuntur. « Pater, inquit, et Filius unius sunt eiusdemque substantiae. Hoc est illud *homoousion*, quod in Concilio Nicaeno adversus haereticos Arianos a catholicis Patribus veritatis auctoritate firmatum est; quod postea in Concilio Ariminensi, propter novitatem verbi, minus quam potuit intellectum — quam tamen fides antiqua pepererat — multis paucorum fraude deceptis haeretica impietas sub haeretico imperatore Constantio labefactare tentavit. Sed post non longum tempus libertate fidei catholicae praevalente, postquam vis verbi, sicut debuit, intellecta est, *homoousion* illud catholicae fidei sanitate longe lateque defensum est et diffusum. Quid enim est *homoousion* nisi unius eiusdemque substantiae? Quid est, inquam, *homoousion* nisi *Ego et Pater unum sumus*? Non ergo inter profanas vocum novitates hoc vitandum est ».

Praeterea sciendum est, quod in assignatione distinctionis nominum inter alia, quae supra diligenter executi sumus, quaedam diximus[^20] translative ac per similitudinem de Deo dici, ut speculum, splendor, character, figura et huiusmodi. De quibus pio lectori breviter trado quod sentio, ut scilicet, ratione similitudinis considerata, ex causis dicendi dictorum intelligentiam assumat, sed catholicam.

De sacramento Unitatis atque Trinitatis summae et ineffabilis multa iam diximus. Nihil tamen eius ineffabilitate dignum tradidisse profitemur, sed potius ex nobis mirificatam[^21] eius scientiam, nec potuisse nos ad illam pervenire.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXIV.

#### Chapter I.

*On the words of Hilary, by which, according to the understanding of certain earlier ones, he seems to say that the divine nature and the thing-of-the-nature are not the same, and that God and what is of God are not the same.*

It must be added to what has been said above, that certain men of perverse sense leapt forth into such great madness as to say that the nature of God and person — or *hypostasis* — are not the same, asserting that the same essence cannot be Father and Son without confusion of the persons. For if, they say, that essence which is Father is Son, then Father and Son are the same to themselves. If you say that this thing is Father, seek another which you may say is Son. But if you do not seek another, but say it is the same, then the same has begotten and has been begotten. On account of these and the like things, they divide between nature and person, so that they do not accept the deity to be one nature and the three persons to be simple. And they strive to defend this on the testimony of Hilary, who in the eighth book *On the Trinity*[^1], asking whether the Apostle, naming *the spirit of God* and *the spirit of Christ*, signified the same by both expressions, speaks thus: "The preacher of the Gentiles, wishing to teach the unity of nature in Father and Son, says: *The Spirit of God is in you. But if any one have not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus*, etc. *We are all spiritual, if the Spirit of God is in us*; but this same Spirit is the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. And when the Spirit of Christ is in us, His Spirit is in us, who raised up Christ. And when the Spirit of him who raised up Christ is in us, the Spirit of Christ is in us; nor yet is the Spirit who is in us not God's. Distinguish therefore, heretic, the Spirit of Christ from the Spirit of God, and [distinguish] the Spirit of Christ raised from the dead from the Spirit of God who raised Christ from the dead; since the Spirit who dwells in us, the Spirit of Christ, is the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of Christ raised from the dead is only the Spirit of God who raised Christ from the dead. And I now ask, by *the spirit of God* whether you reckon nature, or thing-of-the-nature, to be signified. For nature is not the same as thing-of-the-nature, just as a man and what is of man are not the same; nor is fire the same as what is of fire itself: and according to this God and what is of God are not the same." — Taking occasion from this saying, the aforesaid heretics laid down as dogma that person and nature of God are not the same, asserting that the nature of God is not three persons, understanding in these aforesaid words of Hilary by *thing-of-the-nature* the person, and by the name *nature* the divine nature. And therefore they say that Hilary asked the heretic whether by *the spirit of God* he reckoned nature, or thing-of-the-nature, to be signified, that he might thus show that one must distinguish between nature and thing-of-the-nature, that is, person.

This indeed they say, not understanding[^2] with pious diligence the circumstance of the Scripture; which once considered, it can be perceived how Hilary said the things above. For subsequently in the same passage he shows that by *the spirit of God* sometimes the Father is signified, as when it is said[^3]: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon me*; sometimes the Son is signified, as when it is said: *In the spirit of God I cast out demons*, demonstrating that He casts out demons by the power of His own nature; sometimes the Holy Spirit, as where: *I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh*. Which He says was fulfilled when the Apostles, the Holy Spirit having been sent, spoke in all tongues. Then, why he made this distinction, and that in *the words above* of the Apostle the same Spirit is signified, and that He Himself is the *thing of the one nature* of Father and Son, he plainly shows by speaking thus[^4]: "These things have been demonstrated for this reason, that on whatever side heretical falsity should betake itself, it might be enclosed by the boundaries of truth. For Christ dwells in us; with Him dwelling, God dwells; and when the Spirit of Christ dwells in us, no other dwells[^5] than the Spirit of God. But if through the Holy Spirit Christ is understood to be in us, yet He is to be known as the Spirit of God just as the Spirit of Christ. And since through the nature of God the same nature dwells in us, the nature of the Son is believed to be undifferentiated from the Father, since the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of God, is shown to be the thing of one nature. I ask now, then, how they are not one out of nature. From the Father proceeds the Spirit of truth, by the Son He is sent, and from the Son He receives. But all things which the Father has are the Son's, and therefore he who receives from Him is the Spirit of God, and is the same Spirit of Christ. He is the thing of the nature of the Son, but the same thing is also of the nature of the Father, and is the Spirit of God who raised up Christ from the dead, and the same is the Spirit of Christ raised from the dead. In something the nature of Christ and of God differ — lest it be the same — if it can be brought about, that the Spirit who is of God should not also be of Christ." "There is therefore in us the Spirit of God, and there is in us the Spirit of Christ; and when the Spirit of Christ is within, the Spirit of God is within. Thus, since what is of God is also of Christ, and what is of Christ is of God, Christ cannot be anything diverse, other than what God is. Therefore Christ is God, one Spirit with God,"

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"according to that: *I and the Father are one*. By which Truth teaches that the unity is of nature, not the solitude of union[^6]." — Behold, if you carefully attend to these words, you will find that the Holy Spirit is called the *thing of the nature* of Father and Son, and that the same is said to be the *nature of God*, where it is said: *through the nature of God the same nature dwells in us*, if through the Holy Spirit Christ is in us. Therefore in the Trinity one must not so distinguish between *nature* and *thing-of-the-nature* as in created things, since, as Hilary says[^7]: "the comparison of earthly things to God is null; and if any examples of comparisons are sometimes brought forward, let no one judge that they contain in themselves absolutely the perfection of the reasoning." "For one must not speak of God by human sense."

Looking therefore at the nature of created things, he says[^8]: "Nature is not the same as thing-of-the-nature," subjoining examples from the very creatures. Then, showing that it is an error to measure the Creator by the measure of creatures, he adds: And according to this "God and what is of God are not the same," as if he were saying: if you have a sense of the Creator on the model of creatures, you are forced to confess that God and what is of God are not the same; which to say is impious, since the Spirit of God is God, and the Son of God is God.

Therefore these things which are said of God are not to be received in bodily ways, as he subjoins in the same passage. There, evacuating the opinion of those who so think *that God is one thing, and what is of God is another*[^9], and the nature of God one thing and the thing-of-the-nature another, as is the case in creatures, he plainly teaches that God is not other than the things which are His, in such a way that they are in Him, speaking thus[^10]: "Man, or anything like him, when he is in some place, will not be elsewhere, since that which is is contained there, where he was in form, so that he is not everywhere who, while standing somewhere, is. But God of immeasurable strength, a living power, which is nowhere not present, nor anywhere lacking, teaches Himself wholly through what are His, and signifies that what are His are not other than Himself, so that, where what are His are within, He Himself is understood to be through what are His. Yet not in a corporeal mode — when He is somewhere, that He should not also be believed to be everywhere — since through what are His He does not cease to be in all things. Nor are what are His other than what He Himself is. And these things have been said for the sake of an understanding of the nature." By these words he plainly signifies — if at least you understand, heretic — that the divine nature is not other than these things which are His, in such a way that they are in [Him]; and through them He is in all His things which are not in [Him]. For *His* are also those things which are not in Him, that is, all creatures; and *His* are those things which are in Him, namely the three persons, who are of the same nature and are the same nature, just as we above confirmed by the testimony of Augustine[^11], who says: that the three persons are of the same essence, or the same essence — but not from the same essence — lest one thing be understood by *essence*, another by *person*. — Yet we do not deny that some distinction must be held according to the manner of understanding, when one says *hypostasis* and when one says *essence*; for in the latter is signified that which is common to the three, in the former not. Yet *hypostasis* is essence, and conversely. Let us therefore confess that to be one and the same — three persons according to essence, but differing in their properties. Whence Augustine, on the place of the Psalm marked above[^12], says: "Do you ask, what is the Father? It is answered: *God*. Do you ask, what is the Son? It is answered: *God*. Do you ask, what are Father and Son? It is answered: *God*. When asked of the singular, answer *God*. When asked of both, answer not *gods* but *God*. Not so among men. For so great is there the unity of substance, that it admits equality, but does not admit plurality. If therefore it shall have been said to you, when you say that the Son is what the Father is, 'so then the Son is the Father' — answer: *I said this to you according to substance, that the Son is what the Father is, not according to that which is said with reference to another*. For with reference to Himself He is called God, with reference to the Father the Son is called. And in turn the Father with reference to Himself is called God, with reference to the Son He is called Father. What is said with reference to the Son is *Father*, and is not Son; what is said with reference to the Father is *Son*, and is not Father; what is said of the Father with reference to Himself, and of the Son with reference to Himself, that is *Father* and *Son*, that is, *God*."

#### Chapter II.

*Whether *one God of three persons* can be said in the same way as *one essence of three persons*, and *three persons of one God* as *three persons of one essence*.*

Here it must be considered: since God is the divine essence, and one God is so said to be three persons just as one essence is said to be three persons, whether it can soundly be said *one God of three persons*, or *three persons of one God*, in the same way as one says *one essence of three persons* and *three persons of one essence*. — In these locutions the usage of Scripture seems to be one we should emulate, where one frequently finds it said: *one is the essence of three persons*, and *three are the persons of one essence*; but nowhere does it ever occur to have read, *one God of three persons*[^13], or *three persons of one God*. Which the holy doctors I think therefore avoided, lest perhaps it be understood in the divine persons as it is understood when something similar is said of creatures. For God is called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob[^14], and the God of every creature. Which assuredly is said on account of the principle of creation or the privilege of grace[^15], and the subjection or servitude of the creature. Since therefore in the Trinity nothing is created or serving or subject, the faith has not admitted such a manner of locution in the Trinity.

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So also conversely it is not said of the essence of God that itself is the essence of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or of any creature, lest we seem to confound the natures of Creator and creature.

#### Chapter III.

*That power, wisdom, [and] goodness in Scripture are sometimes referred distinctively to the persons.*

From what has been said above[^16] it is clear that, just as essence, so power, wisdom, [and] goodness are said of God according to substance. But those things which are said of God according to substance equally pertain to the three persons. There is therefore one power, wisdom, [and] goodness of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and these three are the same power, the same wisdom, the same goodness. Whence it is opened up that in the Trinity is supreme perfection. For if there power or wisdom or goodness were lacking, it would not be the highest good. But because there is perfect power, infinite wisdom, incomprehensible goodness, it is rightly said and believed [to be] the highest good. And though power, wisdom, [and] goodness are utterly one and the same in God, yet in sacred Scripture these names frequently are wont to be referred distinctively to the persons, so that to the Father power, to the Son wisdom, [and] to the Holy Spirit goodness is attributed. Why this is done, it is not idle to inquire.

#### Chapter IV.

*Why power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, [and] goodness to the Holy Spirit, although there is one power, wisdom, [and] goodness of the three.*

"This therefore the prudence of the sacred eloquence took care to do, lest we should measure the immeasurability of God by the likeness of a creature[^17]. For sacred Scripture says that God is Father, and that God is Son; and a man heard this who had seen a human father and had not seen a divine Father, and began to think that it is so in the Creator as he had seen it to be in the creatures from which these names have been transferred to the Creator — in whom the father is prior to the son, the son is posterior to the father, and from antiquity in the father a defect, and from posteriority in the son an imperfection of sense are wont to be noted. Therefore Scripture comes forward calling the Father *powerful*, lest He should seem prior to the Son, and therefore less powerful, and the Son *wise*, lest He should seem posterior to the Father, and therefore less wise[^18]." "The Holy Spirit too has been called God, and God has been said to have a Spirit; and this seemed to be as it were a name of inflation and swelling — whence the human conscience feared to approach God on account of His sternness and harshness — Therefore the Scripture tempered its speech, naming the Spirit *good*, lest He should be thought cruel who was meek; not as though the Father alone is powerful or more powerful, and the Son alone wise or more wise, and the Holy Spirit alone good or more good. There is therefore one power, wisdom, [and] one goodness of the three, just as essence; and therefore, as the Son is called *homoousios*, that is, consubstantial with the Father, so also *coomnipotens* [co-omnipotent]."

#### Chapter V.

*On this name *homoousion*: where it has been received in authority, and what it signifies.*

Here it must not be passed over: what Augustine in the second book[^19] *Against Maximinus* says of this name *homoousion*, which Latin treatise-writers frequently use. "The Father, he says, and the Son are of one and the same substance. This is that *homoousion* which in the Council of Nicaea against the Arian heretics was confirmed by the catholic Fathers on the authority of truth; which afterwards in the Council of Ariminum, on account of the novelty of the word, less than it was able to be understood — which yet the ancient faith had brought forth — was attempted to be undermined by heretical impiety under the heretical emperor Constantius, with many being deceived by the fraud of a few. But after no long time, with the freedom of the catholic faith prevailing, after the force of the word, as was right, was understood, that *homoousion* was far and wide defended and diffused by the soundness of the catholic faith. For what is *homoousion* but [being] of one and the same substance? What is, I say, *homoousion* but *I and the Father are one*? Therefore it is not to be avoided among the profane novelties of words."

It must moreover be known that, in the assignation of the distinction of names — among other things which we have above diligently pursued — we have said[^20] some things to be said of God transferentially and through likeness, such as *mirror*, *splendor*, *character*, *figure*, and the like. Concerning which I briefly hand over to the pious reader what I think: namely, that, with consideration of the reason of the likeness, he may take from the causes of saying [them] the understanding of what is said, but a catholic [understanding].

We have already said many things on the sacrament of the Unity and Trinity, supreme and ineffable. Yet we acknowledge that we have handed down nothing worthy of His ineffability, but rather that the knowledge of Him has been made wonderful[^21] beyond us, and that we have not been able to attain to it.

---

la: *Num.* 21. 22. — Locus s. Scripturae est Rom. 8, 9-11.

en: *n.* 21–22. — The Scripture passage is Romans 8:9–11. (*Note*: "Num." here = *numerus*, paragraph number, not the biblical book of Numbers.)

la: *Ibid.* n. 25. — Paulo ante cod. D bene *non intendentes* pro *non intelligentes*.

en: *Ibid.* n. 25. — A little before, codex D rightly [reads] *non intendentes* ("not attending") in place of *non intelligentes* ("not understanding").

la: *Isai.* 61, 1; secundus locus est *Matth.* 12, 28; tertius *Ioel* 2, 28: denique alluditur ad *Act.* 2, 17. — Deinde pro *superioribus verbis* Vat. et aliae edd. *superioribus per verba*, refragantibus codd. et ed. I.

en: Isaiah 61:1; the second passage is Matthew 12:28; the third Joel 2:28; finally allusion is made to Acts 2:17. — Then for *superioribus verbis* ("the words above") the Vatican and other editions [read] *superioribus per verba* ("by words above"), against the codices and ed. I.

la: *Ibid.* n. 26. In hoc textu respicitur ad *Ephes.* 3, 17: *Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris*; et *I. Cor.* 3, 16: *Et Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis*.

en: *Ibid.* n. 26. In this text reference is made to Ephesians 3:17: *That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts*; and 1 Corinthians 3:16: *And the Spirit of God dwells in you*.

la: Vat. cum plurimis edd. *aliud tamen* pro *alius tamen*, contradicentibus originali, codd. et edd. I, 5. Edit. Hilarii pro *per naturam Dei* habet *per naturam rei*.

en: The Vatican with most editions [reads] *aliud tamen* ("yet [something] other") in place of *alius tamen* ("yet another"), against the original, the codices, and editions I, 5. The edition of Hilary, in place of *per naturam Dei* ("through the nature of God"), has *per naturam rei* ("through the nature of the thing").

la: Quae praecedunt inveniuntur *ibid.* n. 27. et 28. — Locus s. Scripturae est *Ioan.* 10, 30.

en: What precedes is found *ibid.* nn. 27 and 28. — The Scripture passage is John 10:30.

la: *Libr.* I. *de Trin.* n. 19. Ultima propositio est VIII. *de Trin.* n. 41.

en: Book I *On the Trinity*, n. 19. The last proposition is from book VIII *On the Trinity*, n. 41.

la: De hoc et sequenti loco vide supra pag. 582, nota 1.

en: On this and the following passage, see above p. 582, note 1.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 6 addunt glossema: *et aliud, quod Dei est, aliudque naturam Dei*, refragantibus omnibus codd. et aliis edd.

en: The Vatican and editions 4, 6 add the gloss: *et aliud, quod Dei est, aliudque naturam Dei* ("and what is of God [is] another, and the nature of God [is] yet another"), against all the codices and the other editions.

la: *Ibid.* n. 24. In quo textu pro *fuerit in forma*, ut ed. Hilarii *fuerit; infirma ad id natura eius, ut*. Deinde Vat. cum plurimis edd. addit *quae* post *desit usquam*, sed contra originale, codd. et ed. I. In fine contra codd. Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 8, *autem aliud sunt* pro *aliud autem sint*.

en: *Ibid.* n. 24. In which text, in place of *fuerit in forma*, the edition of Hilary [reads] *fuerit; infirma ad id natura eius, ut*. Then the Vatican with most editions adds *quae* after *desit usquam*, but against the original, the codices, and ed. I. At the end, against the codices, the Vatican with the other editions (except 8) [reads] *autem aliud sunt* ("but they are another") in place of *aliud autem sint* ("but they should be other").

la: *Libr.* VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11. Cfr. d. V. c. 2. pag. 110, nota 7, et d. XXV. c. 1. pag. 432, nota 5.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 11. Cf. distinction V, c. 2, p. 110, note 7, and distinction XXV, c. 1, p. 432, note 5.

la: *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 68, sermo 1. n. 5. Cfr. d. XXXIII. c. 2.

en: *Exposition on Psalm* 68, sermon 1, n. 5. Cf. Distinction XXXIII, c. 2.

la: Codd. et edd. 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 omittunt *personarum*.

en: The codices and editions 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 omit *personarum* ("of the persons").

la: *Exod.* 3, 6; alius locus est *Iudith* 9, 17.

en: Exodus 3:6; another passage is Judith 9:17.

la: Sola Vat. *gloriae*.

en: The Vatican alone [reads] *gloriae* ("of glory") [in place of *gratiae*, "of grace"].

la: *Dist.* XXII. c. 4.

en: Distinction XXII, c. 4.

la: Omnia quae praecedunt, sumpta sunt ex Hugone a S. Vict. *I. de Sacram.* p. II. c. 8, paucis a Magistro mutatis vel transpositis. Etiam quae sequuntur ibidem leguntur.

en: All that precedes is taken from Hugh of Saint-Victor, *On the Sacraments*, book I, part II, c. 8, with a few things altered or transposed by the Master. Also what follows is read in the same place.

la: Codd. A B C E et ed. 1 *benignitas*.

en: Codices A B C E and ed. 1 [read] *benignitas* ("kindness").

la: Cap. II. n. 3. In quo textu ed. Augustini moderna habet *oportuit intellectum quod* pro *potuit intellectum quam*; sola Vat. *oportuit intellectam*. Antiquae edd. August. concordant cum textu nostro. Deinde omnes edd. perperam *Constantino* pro *Constantio*, refragantibus codd. Denique pro *defensum* Vat. et edd. 4, 8 *distensum*.

en: Chapter II, n. 3. In which text the modern edition of Augustine has *oportuit intellectum quod* in place of *potuit intellectum quam*; the Vatican alone [reads] *oportuit intellectam*. The ancient editions of Augustine agree with our text. Then all editions wrongly [read] *Constantino* in place of *Constantio*, against the codices. Finally, in place of *defensum* the Vatican and editions 4, 8 [read] *distensum* ("stretched out").

la: *Dist.* XXII. c. 1.

en: Distinction XXII, c. 1.

la: Solummodo Vat. et edd. 2, 3 *mirificam*. — Respicitur *Psalm.* 138, 6: *Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me: confortata est, et non potero ad eam.*

en: Only the Vatican and editions 2, 3 [read] *mirificam* ("wonderful") [in place of *mirificatam*, "made wonderful"]. — Reference is made to Psalm 138:6: *Your knowledge is become wonderful unto me: it is high, and I cannot reach to it.* ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


title: Dist. 34, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIV. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXIV. Division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIV.

#### *De comparatione personarum ad naturam.*

> *Praedictis adiiciendum est, quod quidam perversi sensus homines* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de comparatione proprietatum ad personas et essentiam; hic secundo agit de comparatione personarum ad essentiam. Et hoc facit in hac distinctione, quae in tres partes dividitur.

In prima agit de comparatione secundum praedicationem; in secunda secundum appropriationem, ibi: *Ex praedictis constat, quod sicut essentia, ita potentia* etc.; in tertia annectit capitulum de translatione, ut sic tractatum istum perducat ad consummationem, et hoc ibi: *Praeterea sciendum est, quod in assignatione* etc.

Prima pars habet tres partes[^1]. In prima ponit errorem quorundam dicentium, personas non esse naturam, et hoc cum sua confirmatione[^2], scilicet cum auctoritate Hilarii. In secunda ipsius auctoritatis sanum intellectum ex verbis Hilarii sequentibus elicit, per quae etiam errorem illorum elidit, ibi: *Hoc quidam dicunt, non intelligentes* etc. In tertia quandam oppositionem incidentem dissolvit, quare non dicuntur tres personae unius Dei, sicut dicuntur tres personae unius essentiae, ibi: *Hic considerandum est, cum Deus sit divina essentia* etc.

*Ex praedictis constat, quod sicut essentia* etc. Haec est secunda pars, in qua Magister agit de appropriatione, et habet ista pars tres partes. In prima dicit et ostendit, quod communia appropriantur. In secunda rationem reddit appropriationis, ibi: *Id ergo sacri eloquii prudentia* etc. In tertia, quia hoc nomen *homoousion* dicit comparationem essentiae sive naturae ad personas, usum eius determinat esse catholicum et veritati fidei esse consonum, ibi: *Hic non est praetermittendum, quod Augustinus* etc.

*Praeterea sciendum est, quod in assignatione distinctionis* etc. Haec est tertia particula, in qua agit Magister de nominum translatione, quae posset[^3] dividi contra totum tractatum praecedentem de divinis nominibus. Sed quia Magister parum aut nihil determinat de his nominibus, ideo potius incidenter cum epilogatione est positum[^4]. Unde haec particula duas habet partes. In prima quandam generalem de nominibus translativis tradit instructionem. In secunda vero ponit praedictorum epilogationem, in qua tractatum de sacramento Trinitatis et Unitatis finit, ostendens, se in hoc tractatu potius defecisse quam suffecisse propter materiae altitudinem, et hoc facit ibi: *De sacramento Unitatis atque Trinitatis* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere additionem.

Secundo, utrum in divinis sit ponere praedicationem.

Tertio, utrum sit ponere ibi appropriationem.

Quarto, utrum sit ibi ponere translationem.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXXIV.

#### *On the comparison of the persons to the nature.*

> *"To what has been said it must be added, that certain men of perverse sense"* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the comparison of the properties to the persons and to the essence; here in the second place he treats of the comparison of the persons to the essence. And this he does in this distinction, which is divided into three parts.

In the first he treats of the comparison according to predication; in the second according to appropriation, there: *"From what has been said it is clear, that just as the essence, so also the power"* etc.; in the third he annexes a chapter on translation [i.e. transferred names], so as thus to bring this whole treatise to its completion, and this there: *"Moreover it must be known, that in the assignment"* etc.

The first part has three divisions[^1]. In the first he sets down the error of certain men saying that the persons are not the nature, and this together with its confirmation[^2], namely with the authority of Hilary. In the second he draws out the sound understanding of that very authority from the following words of Hilary, by which he also strikes down their error, there: *"This certain men say, not understanding"* etc. In the third he resolves a certain incidental objection, [namely] why three persons are not said to be of one God, as three persons are said to be of one essence, there: *"Here it must be considered, since God is the divine essence"* etc.

*"From what has been said it is clear, that just as the essence"* etc. This is the second part, in which the Master treats of appropriation, and this part has three divisions. In the first he says and shows that things common are appropriated. In the second he gives the reason for the appropriation, there: *"Therefore the prudence of sacred eloquence"* etc. In the third, because this name *homoousion* expresses the comparison of the essence or nature to the persons, he determines that its use is catholic and consonant with the truth of the faith, there: *"Here it must not be passed over, that Augustine"* etc.

*"Moreover it must be known, that in the assignment of the distinction"* etc. This is the third little part, in which the Master treats of the translation [i.e. the transferred use] of names, which could[^3] be divided over against the whole preceding treatise on the divine names. But because the Master determines little or nothing about these names, it is therefore set down rather incidentally together with the epilogue[^4]. Hence this little part has two divisions. In the first he hands down a certain general instruction concerning translative names. In the second, however, he sets down the epilogue of what has been said, in which he ends the treatise on the mystery of the Trinity and of the Unity, showing that in this treatise he has rather fallen short than sufficed because of the loftiness of the matter, and this he does there: *"On the mystery of the Unity and Trinity"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction four things are asked.

First it is asked, whether in divine things addition is to be posited.

Second, whether in divine things predication is to be posited.

Third, whether appropriation is to be posited there.

Fourth, whether translation is to be posited there.

---

la: Codd. I bb et alii cum ed. 1 *particulas*. Mox pro *sua confirmatione*, quod ex codd. I T X et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. *summa confirmatione*.

en: Codices I, bb and others with edition 1 [read] *particulas* ("little parts"). Soon after, for *sua confirmatione* ("its confirmation"), which we have restored from codices I, T, X and edition 1, the Vatican edition [reads] *summa confirmatione* ("with the highest confirmation").

la: Pro *ipsius auctoritatis* cod. T *huius auctoritatis*.

en: For *ipsius auctoritatis* ("of that very authority") codex T [reads] *huius auctoritatis* ("of this authority").

la: Vat. *quaestionem*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *quaestionem* ("question").

la: Vat. *posita*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *posita* ("placed", feminine, agreeing with *particula*) [in place of *positum*]. ---