title: Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether flesh which is flesh in two men rises again in the first man or in the second

source_text:
<!-- page 910 -->

### ARTICULUS II. *Quid in quo resurgat.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur secundo, quid in quo resurgat. Et de hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, quid in quo resurgat quantum ad totum corpus.

Secundo, quid in quo quantum ad quodlibet membrum.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum caro, quae est in duobus hominibus caro, resurgat caro in primo, vel in secundo.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, cum caro est in duobus hominibus caro, utrum resurgat caro in primo, vel in secundo. Et quod in *primo*, videtur.

1. Augustinus, *de Civitate Dei*, et habetur in littera[^p910-6]: « Illi animae in puncto temporis redditur, quae eam primitus, ut ex ea homo fieret, viveret, cresceret, animavit ».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia « propria forma in propria materia nata est fieri[^p910-7] »: ergo si haec caro est propria materia huius animae, cui primo est unita; ergo semper anima appetit ei uniri: ergo si non potest, frustratur eius appetitus. Hoc autem est inconveniens: ergo etc.

3. Item, caro ex unione cum anima dispositionem contrahit sive ordinationem ad immortalitatem: ergo si haec caro unita est cum hac anima, necessitatem habet iterum ad unionem cum ipsa; et si hoc; cum haec necessitas non patiatur, ut haec caro ordinetur ad animam aliam: patet[^p910-8] etc.

4. Item, si non est necesse resurgere cum prima: ergo si tota caro hominis manducetur, privabitur omnino anima suo corpore, et ita dabitur ei aliud corpus: non ergo erit ei resurrectio, quia resurrectio est eiusdem numero[^p910-9].

**Sed contra:** 1. Costa fuit in Adam et in Eva[^p910-10]; quaero igitur: in quo resurget? Si in *Adam*: ergo cum tota Eva sit inde facta, nihil resurget in Eva. Si *non in Adam*; sed in Adam primo fuit costa: non ergo resurget, in quo *primo* fuit.

2. Item, homo est de semine patris, et Christus « ex purissimis sanguinibus Virginis[^p910-11] »: ergo si semen debet resurgere in patre, et sanguis in Vir- <!-- page 911 --> gine; tunc nullus homo generatus resurgeret, nec etiam Christus. Quodsi hoc non est verum: ergo caro resurget in eo, in quo *secundo* est caro.

3. Item, esto quod aliquis nutriatur ex carne humana, dicit Augustinus[^p911-1], quod redit ad primum; esto quod de illa generet, constat, quod si tunc redit ad primum, nihil remanebit generato; et hoc est inconveniens. Quodsi non redit: ergo non est necesse, quod resurgat in primo, sed in *secundo* potest.

4. Item, quod debeat resurgere in secundo, videtur: quia ab ultimo res denominatur et a fine[^p911-2] — unde statur in ultimo testamento, quod est in morte testatoris — ergo si caro ista fuit istius hominis finaliter et posterius: ergo ad ipsum magis spectat: ergo ad secundum et postremum debet redire, non ad primum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Caro, quae est in duobus, in uno sicut in principio, in alio sicut in individuo et toto suo, resurget in secundo; si est in ambobus secundum materiam, resurget in primo; si vero in hoc secundum materiam, in alio secundum speciem, resurget in secundo; impossibile est autem, quod in pluribus sit secundum speciem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod caro, quae est in duobus, potest esse dupliciter: aut ita quod sit in uno sicut in *principio*, in altero sicut in *individuo et toto suo*; aut in utroque sicut in *individuo*. Si sit in uno sicut in *principio*, in alio sicut in *individuo et toto*, resurget in secundo, quia non erat in primo ad ipsum[^p911-3], sed ad alterum ordinata, sicut fuit costa in Adam, quia ordinata ad propagationem Evae; sic semen in patre, quia ordinatum ad propagationem filii; sic illi sanguines in Virgine beata, quia ordinati erant ad conceptionem Christi. — Si autem in utroque sit sicut in *toto absoluto*, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi: aut ita, quod sit in utroque caro secundum *speciem*; aut in utroque secundum *materiam*; aut in uno secundum *speciem*, in altero secundum *materiam*[^p911-4]. — De primo est controversia. Nam aliqui dicunt, quod caro unius secundum speciem potest fieri caro alterius secundum speciem, utpote si homo de illa nutriatur et generet; et hoc dicunt, quia omnino est transmutabilis caro[^p911-5], ut alia, sicut experimento patet. — Et si quaeras: in quo resurget? dicunt, quod in illo, in quo maiorem et essentialem habet ordinationem, et Deus supplet alteri illud, ut verbi gratia, si de modica parte corporis unius quantum ad carnem secundum speciem sit aliquis generatus, ista resurget in generato, et Deus post supplebit in alio quod amissum est, sicut in Adam replevit carnem pro costa[^p911-6].

Alia positio est, quod de carne secundum speciem alius homo nec potest nutriri nec generari, sed solum de carne secundum materiam; et rationem huius reddunt ex parte *actualitatis* ipsius, quia transsubstantiatio haec *conversio* est, et *conversio* et transmutatio sive transsubstantiatio est ex ente in *potentia*; et quia est caro secundum speciem, ideo non est possibilis converti in carnem secundum speciem. — Sed quoniam hoc non habet stabile fundamentum, quia lupus nutritur de carnibus lupi[^p911-7], et in aliis animalibus eiusdem speciei hoc videmus; et iterum, caro secundum speciem potest fieri *non-caro*, et tunc erit in potentia: ideo rationem fundant super pulverum appetitum, qui plantatus est ad illam formam determinate et sempiternaliter, qui non patitur, ipsam carnem vivificari ab alia anima immortali. Et ideo respondent, quod istud est impossibile, quod in primo sit caro secundum speciem unius et postmodum fiat alterius.

Sed prima positio repugnare videtur resurrectioni eiusdem corporis: quia, si de una parte carnis meae secundum speciem posset fieri caro alterius secundum speciem, pari ratione et de alia, et sic de qualibet; et sic anima perderet suam carnem totam: quomodo ergo verum est quod dicit Iob[^p911-8]: *In carne mea videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum?* — Secunda positio non habet multum robur, tum quia videtur inconveniens dicere, quod homo non possit nutriri de carne secundum speciem, cum sint aptae ad nutriendum, et bestiae possint inde nutriri. — Amplius, nec istud est multum stabile, quod in corpore humano sit aliquid actu incorruptibile, et cum sit resolubile usque ad elementa, quod[^p911-9] ibi sit appetitus impediens transmutationem.

Unde sanius dici potest, quod sicut resurrectio fit per divinam virtutem; sic ordinatio carnis ad suam animam est secundum divinum decretum et dispositionem, quae, quoniam est inviolabilis[^p911-10], facit, <!-- page 912 --> quod caro secundum speciem unius ad carnem secundum speciem alterius hominis sit impossibilis. Dicamus ergo, quod in utroque secundum speciem esse omnino est impossibile, quia tunc esset de necessaria constitutione utriusque et necessario resurgeret in utroque; et hoc est impossibile — istam impossibilitatem non dico[^p912-1] venire de *virtute carnis* secundum speciem ipsius hominis, quia sic necessario est ordinata ad incorruptionem propter *appetitum ad animam primam* — et ideo non potest esse corporis alterius animae *principalis materia*, quia, sive sit ibi iste appetitus, sive non, sine calumnia potest dici, quod hoc venit ex ordinatione divina, quae carnem hominis sicut non dimittit perire, sic nec eius substantiam confundi nec permisceri. Unde sicut divina providentia faciebat Adam ab exteriori impassibilem[^p912-2]; sic etiam facit carnem secundum speciem unius in carnem secundum speciem alterius inconvertibilem.

Si autem caro sit in utroque secundum *materiam*, ut quando homo nutritur de carne alterius secundum materiam; dico, quod redit ad *primum*, quia ad utrumque ordinata est de congruo; et sequens ordinatio, cum non sit fortior, non solvit praecedentem. — Si autem in uno sit secundum *speciem*, in altero secundum *materiam*; resurgit in eo, in quo fuit secundum *speciem*, quia ad illum essentialiorem ordinationem habet, sive sit primus, sive secundus. Unde si aliquis nutritur de carnibus alterius secundum speciem, talis caro redit ad primum. Si autem generatur de carnibus secundum materiam, quia de his quae secundum speciem, non potest generari; dico, quod caro stat in secundo, et Deus recompensat primo. Et ratio huius est, quia[^p912-3] essentialiorem habet ordinationem ad animam in secundo.

Ex his patent obiecta: quia Augustinus loquitur in duobus casibus, scilicet quando in primo fuit caro secundum speciem; et hoc patet ex verbo suo: « Ut ex ea homo fieret » etc., vel etiam, quando in duobus est secundum materiam.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod debet denominari ab ultimo; dicendum, quod sequens ordinatio non solvit priorem, nisi sit fortior; et quia non est fortior, prior manet; maxime quando in primo fuit caro secundum speciem, habuit essentialem[^p912-4] ordinationem ad animam, quia caro secundum speciem, vivificata ab hac anima, habuit necessariam et indissolubilem ordinationem ad illam animam; et ideo, sicut matrimonium legitime contractum cum aliqua non potest solvi, si illa contrahit de facto cum aliquo; sic nec caro ordinationem ad primam carnem perdere. Quid autem sit caro secundum speciem, hoc habet locum in libro secundo, ubi agitur, utrum aliquid transeat in veritatem humanae naturae, et quaeratur distinctio trigesima[^p912-5].

english:
### ARTICLE II. *What rises again in what.*

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked, secondly, what rises again in what. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked, what rises again in what with respect to the whole body.

Secondly, what [rises] in what with respect to each member.

### QUESTION I. *Whether flesh which is flesh in two men rises again as flesh in the first, or in the second.*

As to the first, then, it is asked—since flesh is flesh in two men—whether it rises again as flesh in the first, or in the second. And that [it rises] in the *first*, seems [to be the case].

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, and it is had in the [Master's] text[^p910-6]: « To that soul is restored, in a point of time, [the flesh] which it first animated, that from it a man might be made, might live, and might grow ».

2. Likewise, by *reason* it seems: for « a proper form is born to come to be in its proper matter[^p910-7] »: therefore if this flesh is the proper matter of this soul, to which it was first united; therefore the soul always desires to be united to it: therefore if it cannot [be], its desire is frustrated. But this is unfitting: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, flesh from its union with the soul contracts a disposition or ordering to immortality: therefore if this flesh is united with this soul, it has again a necessity for union with it; and if this—since this necessity does not allow that this flesh be ordered to another soul: it is clear[^p910-8] etc.

4. Likewise, if it is not necessary to rise again with the first: therefore if the whole flesh of a man is eaten, the soul will be deprived entirely of its body, and thus another body will be given to it: therefore there will be no resurrection for it, because resurrection is of the same [body] in number[^p910-9].

**On the contrary:** 1. The rib was in Adam and in Eve[^p910-10]; I ask therefore: in which will it rise again? If in *Adam*: then, since the whole of Eve was made from it, nothing will rise again in Eve. If *not in Adam*; but the rib was first in Adam: therefore it will not rise again in that in which it *first* was.

2. Likewise, man is from the seed of the father, and Christ « from the most pure blood of the Virgin[^p910-11] »: therefore if the seed ought to rise again in the father, and the blood in the Vir- <!-- page 911 --> gin; then no begotten man would rise again, nor even Christ. But if this is not true: therefore flesh will rise again in that in which it is flesh *secondly*.

3. Likewise, suppose someone is nourished from human flesh, Augustine[^p911-1] says that it returns to the first; suppose that he begets from it, it is agreed that if it then returns to the first, nothing will remain to the begotten; and this is unfitting. But if it does not return: therefore it is not necessary that it rise again in the first, but it can [rise] in the *second*.

4. Likewise, that it ought to rise again in the second, seems [true]: because a thing is denominated from the last and from its end[^p911-2] — whence one stands by the last testament, which is at the death of the testator — therefore if this flesh was of this man finally and later: therefore it pertains more to him: therefore it ought to return to the second and last, not to the first.

### CONCLUSION.

> *The flesh which is in two—in one as in a beginning, in the other as in an individual and its whole—will rise again in the second; if it is in both according to matter, it will rise again in the first; but if in this one according to matter, in the other according to species, it will rise again in the second; but it is impossible that it be in several according to species.*

**I respond:** It must be said that flesh which is in two can be so in two ways: either so that it is in one as in a *beginning*, in the other as in an *individual and its whole*; or in both as in an *individual*. If it is in one as in a *beginning*, in the other as in an *individual and whole*, it will rise again in the second, because it was not, in the first, ordered to itself[^p911-3], but to the other, as the rib was in Adam, because ordered to the propagation of Eve; so the seed in the father, because ordered to the propagation of the son; so those bloods in the blessed Virgin, because they were ordered to the conception of Christ. — But if it is in both as in an *absolute whole*, this can be understood in three ways: either so that it is in both flesh according to *species*; or in both according to *matter*; or in one according to *species*, in the other according to *matter*[^p911-4]. — Concerning the first there is controversy. For some say that the flesh of one according to species can become the flesh of another according to species, as for instance if a man is nourished from it and begets; and they say this because flesh is entirely changeable[^p911-5], like anything else, as is clear by experience. — And if you ask: in which will it rise again? they say, in that in which it has the greater and essential ordering, and God supplies the other with that [which is lacking], as for example, if from a small part of one body, as to flesh according to species, someone is begotten, this [flesh] will rise again in the begotten, and God will afterward supply in the other what is lost, just as in Adam He filled up the flesh in place of the rib[^p911-6].

Another position is that from flesh according to species another man can neither be nourished nor begotten, but only from flesh according to matter; and they give the reason for this from the side of its *actuality*, because this transubstantiation is a *conversion*, and *conversion* and change or transubstantiation is from a being [in act] into [a being] in *potency*; and because it is flesh according to species, therefore it is not possible for it to be converted into flesh according to species. — But since this has no stable foundation, because a wolf is nourished from the flesh of a wolf[^p911-7], and we see this in other animals of the same species; and again, flesh according to species can become *non-flesh*, and then it will be in potency: therefore they base their reasoning upon the appetite of the dust, which is implanted toward that form determinately and everlastingly, [an appetite] which does not allow that same flesh to be vivified by another immortal soul. And therefore they respond that this is impossible, that in the first there be flesh according to species of one and afterward become another's.

But the first position seems to be repugnant to the resurrection of the same body: because, if from one part of my flesh according to species there could come to be flesh of another according to species, by parity of reasoning also from another, and so from any [part]; and thus the soul would lose its whole flesh: how then is it true what Job says[^p911-8]: *In my flesh I shall see God, my Savior?* — The second position does not have much strength, both because it seems unfitting to say that a man cannot be nourished from flesh according to species, since they are apt for nourishing, and beasts can be nourished from them. — Further, neither is this very stable, that in the human body there be something actually incorruptible, and, since it is dissoluble down to the elements, that[^p911-9] there be in it an appetite impeding change.

Whence it can more soundly be said that, just as the resurrection comes about by divine power; so the ordering of the flesh to its soul is according to the divine decree and disposition, which, since it is inviolable[^p911-10], brings it about, <!-- page 912 --> that [the conversion] of flesh according to species of one into flesh according to species of another man be impossible. Let us say therefore that for [flesh] to be in both according to species is altogether impossible, because then it would belong to the necessary constitution of both and would necessarily rise again in both; and this is impossible — this impossibility I do not say[^p912-1] comes from the *power of the flesh* according to species of the man himself, because it is thus necessarily ordered to incorruption on account of the *appetite toward the first soul* — and therefore it cannot be the *principal matter* of the body of another soul, because, whether that appetite be there or not, it can be said without cavil that this comes from the divine ordination, which, just as it does not let the flesh of a man perish, so [does not let] its substance be confounded nor commingled. Whence just as divine providence was making Adam impassible from the exterior[^p912-2]; so also it makes the flesh according to species of one inconvertible into the flesh according to species of another.

But if the flesh is in both according to *matter*, as when a man is nourished from the flesh of another according to matter; I say that it returns to the *first*, because it was ordered to both fittingly; and the subsequent ordering, since it is not stronger, does not dissolve the preceding one. — But if it is in one according to *species*, in the other according to *matter*; it rises again in that in which it was according to *species*, because it has toward that a more essential ordering, whether he be the first or the second. Whence if someone is nourished from the flesh of another according to species, such flesh returns to the first. But if he is begotten from flesh according to matter, since from those things which are according to species one cannot be begotten; I say that the flesh stands in the second, and God recompenses the first. And the reason for this is that[^p912-3] it has a more essential ordering to the soul in the second.

From these things the objections are clear: because Augustine speaks in two cases, namely when in the first there was flesh according to species; and this is clear from his own word: « That from it a man might be made » etc., or also, when in two [men] it is according to matter.

To that, then, which is objected, that it ought to be denominated from the last; it must be said that a subsequent ordering does not dissolve a prior one, unless it be stronger; and because it is not stronger, the prior remains; especially when in the first there was flesh according to species, [which] had an essential[^p912-4] ordering to the soul, because flesh according to species, vivified by this soul, had a necessary and indissoluble ordering to that soul; and therefore, just as a matrimony legitimately contracted with someone cannot be dissolved, if she contracts in fact with another; so neither [can] the flesh lose its ordering to the first flesh. But what flesh according to species is, this has its place in the second book, where it is treated whether anything passes over into the truth of human nature, and let distinction thirty be consulted[^p912-5].

la: Hic c. 2. Sententialiter habetur XXII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 20. n. 2. (vide infra pag. 911, nota 1.); verbotenus in *Enchirid.* Cfr. supra pag. 894, nota 3.

en: Here, c. 2. It is had in substance in [Book] XXII *On the City of God*, c. 20, n. 2 (see below, p. 911, note 1); word for word in the *Enchiridion*. Cf. above, p. 894, note 3.

la: Secundum Aristot.; vide supra pag. 888, nota 1.

en: According to Aristotle; see above, p. 888, note 1.

la: Explicatio huius arg. habetur supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 5. ad 6.

en: The explanation of this argument is had above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 5, ad 6.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 4.

en: As was shown above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4.

la: *Gen.* 2, 21. seq. — Inferius pro *nihil resurget* non pauci codd. *nihil resurgeret*.

en: *Genesis* 2:21 f. — Below, for *nihil resurget* not a few codices [read] *nihil resurgeret*.

la: Damasc., III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 2. et IV. c. 14. Cfr. III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. III. c. 1.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 2, and IV, c. 14. Cf. III Sent., text of the Master, d. III, c. 1.

la: Libr. XXII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 20. n. 2: *Reddetur ergo caro illa homini, in quo esse caro humana primitus coepit; ab illo quippe altero tanquam mutuo sumta deputanda est, quae sicut aes alienum ei redhibenda est* etc.

en: Book XXII *On the City of God*, c. 20, n. 2: « That flesh, then, will be restored to the man in whom human flesh first began to be; for by the other it must be reckoned as taken on loan, as it were, and, like a borrowed debt, must be repaid to him » etc.

la: Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 247, nota 8. et pag. 470, nota 7. allegatum.

en: According to Aristotle, cited above, p. 247, note 8, and p. 470, note 7.

la: Codd. G aa (F a secunda manu) *in primo ut ad ipsum*. Post pauca pro *sic semen* codd. G H V Z *sicut semen*.

en: Codices G aa (F by a second hand) [read] *in primo ut ad ipsum*. A little after, for *sic semen* codices G H V Z [read] *sicut semen*.

la: Vide supra pag. 908, nota 7.

en: See above, p. 908, note 7.

la: Cod. P *caro illa*. Inferius pro *maiorem et essentialem*, edd. *maiorem et essentialiorem*.

en: Codex P [reads] *caro illa*. Below, for *maiorem et essentialem*, the editions [read] *maiorem et essentialiorem*.

la: *Gen.* 2, 21. — Pro *in alio*, quod exhibet cod. M, cod. U *in altero*, alii codd. et edd. *in me* (cod. E a secunda manu *in primo*). Inferius plures codd., omisso *et conversio*, pro *sive transsubstantiatio* substituunt *sive transversio*.

en: *Genesis* 2:21. — For *in alio*, which codex M exhibits, codex U [reads] *in altero*, other codices and editions *in me* (codex E, by a second hand, *in primo*). Below, several codices, omitting *et conversio*, substitute *sive transversio* for *sive transsubstantiatio*.

la: Plures codd. perperam *hominis*.

en: Several codices wrongly [read] *hominis*.

la: Cap. 19, 26. Vulgata omittit *Salvatorem*.

en: Ch. 19:26. The Vulgate omits *Salvatorem*.

la: Edd. legunt: *actu corruptibile et tamen sit... elementa, et quod*. Eaedem edd. superius pro *sint aptae* substituunt *sit apta*, et pro *bestiae*, quod praebent codd. L Y bb (E a secunda manu), cum aliis codd. bene.

en: The editions read: *actu corruptibile et tamen sit... elementa, et quod*. The same editions, above, substitute *sit apta* for *sint aptae*, and for *bestiae*—which codices L Y bb (E by a second hand) offer, with the other codices, rightly.

la: Ita codd. I K bb, codd. A F G H aa *immobilis*, codd. R S *immutabilis*, alii codd. et edd. *immortalis*. Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6.

en: Thus codices I K bb; codices A F G H aa [read] *immobilis*; codices R S *immutabilis*; other codices and editions *immortalis*. Cf. above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6.

la: Cod. G *dubito*. Aliquanto inferius pro *dimittit* cod. L *permittit*.

en: Codex G [reads] *dubito*. Somewhat below, for *dimittit* codex L [reads] *permittit*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 19. a. 2. et 3.

en: See II Sent., d. 19, a. 2 and 3.

la: Edd. addunt *caro maiorem et*.

en: The editions add *caro maiorem et*.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *essentialiorem* (verbo *habuit* codd. F aa praemittunt *et*).

en: The editions, with some codices, [read] *essentialiorem* (before the word *habuit* codices F aa prefix *et*).

la: Art. 3. q. 1. seq. — Superius post *sic nec caro* edd. supplent *potest*.

en: Art. 3, q. 1 f. — Above, after *sic nec caro* the editions supply *potest*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Posito hoc principio, quod totum resurgat, quod pertinet ad veritatem naturae, exsurgit difficultas, quomodo hoc fieri possit, quando (v. g. in anthropophagis) eadem caro pertineat ad plures homines. Solutio eruitur ex duplici distinctione, quarum primam S. Thom. (*S. c. Gent.* IV. c. 81. ad 5.) eodem sensu ac S. Bonav., sed aliis verbis, sic explicat, scilicet ut aliud sit, quod pertinet ad *perfectionem individui*, aliud, quod est deputatum ad *perfectionem speciei*. De secundo idem docet, quod « resurget in eo, ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui, unde semen resurget in genito et non in generante, et costa Adam resurget in Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in *naturae principio*. Si autem secundum eundem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo, in quo primitus fuit ». — Altera distinctio est inter partes *formales* et *materiales* corporis, sive ut antiqui secundum Aristotelem loquebantur, inter carnem secundum *speciem* et carnem secundum *materiam*; quae distinctio a Scholasticis non eodem modo accuratius explicatur et applicatur; de quo vide II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. scholion n. 11.

S. Thom. (locis infra citt.) secundum tres opiniones circa id quod est *de veritate naturae*, ponit tres solutiones tanquam probabiles. — Durand. (hic q. 1.) alia via incedit et supponit, quod « materia de se nullam habeat identitatem vel diversitatem, nisi quam habet a forma; et sic, manente eadem forma, est eadem materia, undecumque veniat, et per consequens est idem compositum » (ibid. n. 7.). « Et secundum istam viam evaduntur multae difficultates, quae tanguntur secundum materiam resurrectionis, sicut est illa de costa Adae... et illa qua quaeritur, si aliquis homo nutriatur ex carnibus alterius » etc. (ibid. n. 10.). Sed cfr. infra dub. 4; de resurgendo eodem sexu dub. 2.

In hoc tamen omnes conveniunt, non resurrectura omnia quae in corpore fuerint materialiter, quia partes secundum materiam in hac vita fluunt et refluunt, quin propter hoc corpus desinat esse idem (cfr. infra dub. 3, et Scot., hic q. 1. n. 9. seqq.).

De eadem 1. quaestione: Scot., loc. cit. n. 15. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 4. 5; Suppl. q. 80. a. 4. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

**II.** Quaestio 2. a S. Thoma (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 79. a. 3.) et etiam ab aliis sic ponitur: « utrum oporteat, pulveres humani corporis ad eandem partem corporis, quae in eis resoluta est, per resurrectionem redire »; quod cum S. Bonaventura (hic et infra dub. 4.) etiam S. Thom. quoad *factum* affirmat tanquam « magis probabile ». Sed quoad id quod « *fieri possit* » sine identitatis praeiudicio, distinguit « diversas partes *homogenei* », sicut diversae partes carnis, et « diversas partes *diversarum specierum* totius *heterogenei* »; <!-- page 913 --> porro docet, mutationem situs quoad secundas mutare identitatem et partium, et etiam totius, « si loquimur de partibus *essentialibus*, non autem, si loquimur de partibus *accidentalibus*, sicut sunt capilli et ungues ». Tamen quoad partes homogenei mutatio situs, ut idem dicit, nullum generaret praeiudicium identitati. — Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 19.) putat, non ita constare, materiam singularum partium ad easdem redituram esse.

De eadem 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This principle being posited, that the whole rises again which pertains to the truth of nature, a difficulty arises: how this can come about, when (e.g., in cannibals) the same flesh pertains to several men. The solution is drawn from a twofold distinction, the first of which St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 81, ad 5) explains in the same sense as St. Bonaventure, but in other words, thus, namely, that one thing is what pertains to the *perfection of the individual*, another what is assigned to the *perfection of the species*. Concerning the second he teaches the same, that « it will rise again in that to which it belonged according to the perfection of the individual, whence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter, and the rib of Adam will rise again in Eve, not in Adam, in whom it was as in a *principle of nature*. But if according to the same mode of perfection it was in both, it will rise again in that in which it first was ». — The other distinction is between the *formal* and *material* parts of the body, or, as the ancients following Aristotle spoke, between flesh according to *species* and flesh according to *matter*; which distinction is not explained and applied by the Scholastics in the same more accurate way; concerning which see II Sent., d. 30, a. 3, scholion, n. 11.

St. Thomas (in the places cited below), according to three opinions concerning that which is *of the truth of nature*, sets down three solutions as probable. — Durandus (here, q. 1) proceeds by another way and supposes that « matter of itself has no identity or diversity, except what it has from form; and thus, the same form remaining, it is the same matter, from wherever it comes, and consequently it is the same composite » (ibid. n. 7). « And by this way many difficulties are evaded which are touched on according to the matter of the resurrection, as is that concerning the rib of Adam... and that in which it is asked, whether some man is nourished from the flesh of another » etc. (ibid. n. 10). But cf. below, dub. 4; concerning rising again in the same sex, dub. 2.

In this, however, all agree: that not all things which were in the body materially will rise again, because the parts according to matter in this life flow and flow back, without the body ceasing on this account to be the same (cf. below, dub. 3, and Scotus, here q. 1, n. 9 seqq.).

Concerning the same first question: Scotus, loc. cit. n. 15 seqq. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4, 5; Suppl. q. 80, a. 4, 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7, 8. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. unica.

**II.** Question 2 is put by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 79, a. 3) and also by others thus: « whether it is necessary that the dusts of the human body return through the resurrection to the same part of the body from which they were dissolved in them »; which, together with St. Bonaventure (here and below, dub. 4), St. Thomas also, as to the *fact*, affirms as « more probable ». But as to that which « *can come about* » without prejudice to identity, he distinguishes « the diverse parts of the *homogeneous* », as the diverse parts of flesh, and « the diverse parts *of diverse species* of the whole *heterogeneous* »; <!-- page 913 --> furthermore he teaches that change of place, as to the secondary [ones], changes the identity both of the parts and also of the whole, « if we speak of the *essential* parts, but not, if we speak of the *accidental* parts, such as are the hairs and nails ». Yet as to the homogeneous parts, change of place, as he himself says, would generate no prejudice to identity. — Scotus (here q. 1, n. 19) thinks that it is not so certain that the matter of the individual parts will return to those same [parts].

Concerning the same second question, besides those praised: Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarantaise, loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 5. — Durandus, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the Internet Archive djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, raw L96776–L97140) and cross-checked against the p.910–912 column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{910,911,912}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Vol IV is two-column; column bands are authoritative for the Respondeo/positiones/scholion and all footers per the VOL II OVERRIDE recipe. Offset pdf = printed + 20.
- **Page span corrected to 910–913.** Article II opens at the foot of p.910 (its header + title + the "Consequenter … duo quaeruntur" opener + Q I header/title + arg. 1); the q1 body runs across pp.911–912; the Article II scholion (which covers q1 AND q2) begins in the lower two columns of p.912 and its tail (from « porro docet, mutationem situs… » to « Durand., hic q. 1. ») runs onto p.913 under the QUAEST. II running head. No p.913 bands were read (disk-tight); the p.913 scholion tail is set from OCR only.
- **Footer hand-off (claimed).** Took p.910 footers **6–11** (anchored in this q1 body: littera⁶, fieri⁷, patet⁸, numero⁹, Eva¹⁰, Virginis¹¹); the prior chunk (a1-q2) retains p.910 footers 1–5. Plus all of p.911 footers **1–10** and p.912 footers **1–5**, every one anchored in this body. **Total apparatus = 21 entries.**
- **Scholion ownership.** The full Article II scholion (I–II) is rendered LAST in both language blocks per the parser rule; sibling p1-a2-q2 carries no scholion.
- **[?] flags.**
  - p.912 scholion II, « mutationem situs *quoad secundas* mutare identitatem » — *secundas* is unqualified in the source (likely *secundas [positiones]* or secondary/accidental parts); rendered literally as "as to the secondary [ones]". Not a reading ambiguity, a source ellipsis. `[?]`
  - Footer p911-10 references « d. 43. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6 » (OCR "q. 3"); the parallel footer p910-8 cites « d. 43. a. 1. q. 5. ad 6 » (band-confirmed q. 5). The p911 digit was not band-legible (right-column left edge cropped); OCR "q. 3" retained. `[?]`


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 913 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum materia uniuscuiusque membri resurgat in suo, an indifferenter in quolibet membro.*

Secundo quaeritur, quid in quo resurgat quantum ad membra, utrum scilicet materia uniuscuiusque membri in suo, an indifferenter in quolibet. Et quod *non in suo:*

1. Videtur Augustinus dicere, et habetur in littera[^p913-1], quod non refert, utrum pars materiae redeat in suum locum, sicut est in fusione statuae.

2. Item, ad hoc est *ratio ostensiva,* quia materia illa est in perfecta obedientia respectu Creatoris: ergo si ipsa nihil operatur[^p913-2], et Creator non facit vim, nisi quod totum reparetur et debite, sicut bonus artifex; ergo videtur, quod sine differentia materia unius membri in alio possit resurgere.

3. Item, alia ratio ad hoc est, quia dispositio contrahitur in corpore ad resurgendum ex unione ad animam: ergo cum quaelibet pars toti animae uniatur, quia anima tota est in qualibet parte[^p913-3], quaelibet pars habet indifferentiam ad totum.

4. Item, si necesse est, quod in eodem; sed esto, quod aliquis habeat nimis magnum caput, tunc necesse esset resurgere in eadem deformitate; sed hoc est inconveniens.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ezechielis trigesimo septimo[^p913-4]: *Accesserunt ossa ad ossa, unumquodque ad iuncturam suam:* ergo si est convenienter ibi signata forma resurrectionis futurae, patet etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia resurrectio est eiusdem; sed si manus fieret ex materia pedis, non esset eiusdem; sic nec alia aliqua pars, si fieret de alia, et sic nec totum idem: ergo cum hoc sit inconveniens[^p913-5], patet etc.

3. Item, resurrectio est ad remunerationem; sed contingit, unum membrum esse nobilius altero, et ulterius, magis mereri uno quam altero: ergo si non debet alicui praeiudicari, illa pars materiae in eo membro debet resurgere, quae prius ibi fuit.

4. Item, sicut se habet totum corpus ad totam animam, sic oculus ad potentiam visivam, ut dicit Philosophus[^p913-6]; sed necesse est, materiam totius corporis aptari animae huic, ita quod non alii: ergo et materiam potentiae visivae huic, et non alteri; et sic materia huius membri in hoc membro determinate resurget.

### Conclusio

> *Membrum unumquodque reformabitur ex sua propria materia, quatenus est de eius substantia, non de superfluitate.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in membro sive in eius materia est aliquid considerare, quod est de substantia et perfectione, aliquid, quod est de superfluitate, sicut aliqua membra plus habent de materia, quam conveniens sit formae membri. Si primo modo, sic dico, quod unumquodque membrum ex sua propria materia reformabitur; reformatio enim respondet formationi. Unde eiusdem[^p913-7] et de eodem est reformatio, cuius et de quo fuit formatio. — Si autem quantum ad superfluitatem, dicendum tunc, quod illud materiae, quod est superfluum in una parte, per totum dispergetur, ut sic non abundet unum membrum ab altero, nisi quantum debet.

1. Et sic loquitur Augustinus, quod patet; loquitur enim de superexcrescentia eorum quae debent resurgere[^p913-8].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia illa est in perfecta obedientia; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen Creator non vult facere, nisi quod congruit ipsum facere; et congruit, quod unumquodque membrum fiat de sua materia. — Et quidam reddunt de hoc rationem ex parte *diversorum appetituum,* qui sunt in pulvere. Quidquid tamen sit de hoc, tamen hoc venit ab ordinatione perfecti artificis, ut reparet de eadem materia et eodem ordine[^p913-9].

<!-- page 914 -->

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaelibet pars unitur toti animae; dicendum, quod anima est *perfectio*[^p914-1] quantum ad substantiam, et *motor* quantum ad potentias; etsi anima non sit composita, immo simplex quantum ad substantiam, habet tamen multitudinem potentiarum, ratione quarum ad diversa organa comparatur. Quoniam igitur corpus est ordinatum ad resurrectionem utroque modo, et in quantum respicit animam ut *perfectionem* et ut *motorem*; et quantum ad rationem motoris est distinctio: ideo distincte resurget materia membrorum in suis locis.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, iam patet responsio. Dico enim, quod illud per totum dispergetur, quod in aliqua parte est superfluum; nec illud faciet diversitatem in corpore, sed removebit deformitatem; et hoc intelligendum quantum ad corpora electorum[^p914-2].

Sic igitur patet, quid in quo resurgat secundum verba beati Augustini, quibus magis innitendum est, maxime in hac materia, quam etiam rationi. Attamen tam ad primum problema quam ad ultimum posset de facili responderi, si quis velit *seminales rationes* intueri, in quas fit resolutio, quae in una parte salvabuntur respectu totius, si sit artifex, qui possit educere; et ideo, cum Deus hoc operetur et supra naturam, quid mirum est, si, quantumcumque parum de carne remaneat, totum reficiat? Nec unquam poterat adeo dividi quin modicum sufficiat cuilibet; hoc dico secundum operationem Dei, non secundum operationem naturae, sicut alibi melius patet, scilicet in secundo libro[^p914-3].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the matter of each member rises again in its own member, or indifferently in any member.*

Secondly it is asked, as regards the members, what rises again in what — namely, whether the matter of each member [rises again] in its own, or indifferently in any. And [the arguments] that [it does] *not [rise] in its own:*

1. Augustine seems to say, and it is held in the text[^p913-1], that it does not matter whether a part of the matter returns to its own place, as is the case in the casting of a statue.

2. Likewise, there is a *demonstrative reason* for this, because that matter is in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator: therefore if it itself does nothing[^p913-2], and the Creator does no violence, but [wills] only that the whole be repaired and duly so, like a good craftsman; therefore it seems that without difference the matter of one member could rise again in another.

3. Likewise, another reason for this is that the disposition is contracted in the body for rising again from its union with the soul: therefore since any part is united to the whole soul, because the whole soul is in any part[^p913-3], any part has indifference toward the whole.

4. Likewise, if it is necessary that [it rise] in the same [member] — but suppose that someone has too large a head, then it would be necessary to rise again in the same deformity; but this is unfitting.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ezekiel 37[^p913-4]: *The bones came together to the bones, each one to its own joint:* therefore if the form of the future resurrection is fittingly signified there, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, it appears *by reason:* because the resurrection is of the same [body]; but if a hand were made from the matter of a foot, it would not be of the same; so neither would any other part [be the same], if it were made from another, and thus neither would the whole be the same: therefore since this is unfitting[^p913-5], it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, the resurrection is unto reward; but it happens that one member is nobler than another, and further, that one merits more by one than by another: therefore if no prejudice ought to be done to anyone, that part of matter ought to rise again in that member which was previously there.

4. Likewise, as the whole body stands to the whole soul, so the eye [stands] to the power of sight, as the Philosopher says[^p913-6]; but it is necessary that the matter of the whole body be fitted to this soul, such that [it is] not [fitted] to another: therefore also the matter of the power of sight [be fitted] to this [soul], and not to another; and thus the matter of this member will rise again determinately in this member.

### Conclusion

> *Each member will be reformed from its own proper matter, insofar as it is of its substance, not of its superfluity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in a member, or in its matter, there is something to consider that is of substance and perfection, [and] something that is of superfluity — just as some members have more of matter than is fitting for the form of the member. If [it be considered] in the first way, then I say that each member will be reformed from its own proper matter; for reformation corresponds to formation. Hence the reformation is of the same and from the same [thing] of which and from which the formation was[^p913-7]. — But if [it be considered] as regards superfluity, it must then be said that that [portion] of the matter which is superfluous in one part will be dispersed throughout the whole, so that thus one member may not abound over another, except as much as it ought.

1. And thus Augustine speaks, which is clear; for he speaks of the superabundant growth of those things which ought to rise again[^p913-8].

2. To that which is objected, that that matter is in perfect obedience; it must be said that it is true; yet the Creator does not will to do [anything] except what it is fitting for Him to do; and it is fitting that each member be made from its own matter. — And some render a reason for this from the *diverse appetites* which are in the dust. Whatever, however, may be the case about this, nevertheless this comes from the ordination of the perfect craftsman, that He may repair [it] from the same matter and in the same order[^p913-9].

<!-- page 914 -->

3. To that which is objected, that any part is united to the whole soul; it must be said that the soul is *perfection*[^p914-1] as regards substance, and *mover* as regards its powers; and although the soul is not composite, but rather simple as regards substance, it nevertheless has a multitude of powers, by reason of which it is related to diverse organs. Since therefore the body is ordered to resurrection in both ways — both inasmuch as it regards the soul as *perfection* and as *mover*; and as regards the aspect of mover there is distinction: therefore the matter of the members will rise again distinctly in their own places.

4. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear. For I say that that which is superfluous in some part will be dispersed throughout the whole; nor will it make diversity in the body, but will remove deformity; and this is to be understood as regards the bodies of the elect[^p914-2].

Thus therefore it is clear what rises again in what, according to the words of blessed Augustine, on which one ought rather to rely, especially in this matter, than even on reason. Nevertheless both to the first problem and to the last it could easily be responded, if one is willing to look to the *seminal reasons,* into which the resolution is made, which will be preserved in one part with respect to the whole, if there be a craftsman who can draw [them] out; and therefore, since God works this even above nature, what wonder is it if, however little of the flesh may remain, He should refashion the whole? Nor could it ever be so divided but that a little would suffice for each; this I say according to the operation of God, not according to the operation of nature, as is better shown elsewhere, namely in the second book[^p914-3].

---

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here [in] chapter 2.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 273, nota 3. in fine. — Edd. prosequuntur: *et creaturae non facit* etc.

en: Cf. above, p. 273, note 3, at the end. — The editions continue: *and does no [violence] to the creature,* etc.

la: Ut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: As was shown in I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 3.

la: Vers. 7.

en: Verse 7.

la: Vide supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 4. — In *maiori* post *eiusdem* cod. aa subiungit *numero.*

en: See above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4. — In the *major* [premise], after *eiusdem* codex aa adds *numero.*

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 9. (c. 1.): *Si enim esset oculus animal, anima utique ipsi visus esset... Oportet igitur accipere quod est in parte, in toto vivente corpore; proportionaliter namque se habet, sicut pars ad partem, totus sensus ad totum corpus sensitivum, secundum quod huiusmodi.* — Ibid. text. 26. (c. 2.) insinuatur *minor.*

en: Book II *On the Soul,* text 9 (c. 1): *For if the eye were an animal, sight would surely be its soul... One must therefore take what holds in a part [as holding] in the whole living body; for it stands proportionally, as part [stands] to part, so the whole sense-faculty [stands] to the whole sensitive body, insofar as it is such.* — Ibid., text 26 (c. 2), the *minor* [premise] is intimated.

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *eadem* (nonnulli codd. *de eadem*), inferius posito *eius* (nonnulli codd. *eius et*) pro *cuius et.* Subinde codd. R S T U X bb omittunt *materiae,* et post *quod* edd. addunt *modo,* ac post *totum* supplent *corpus.*

en: The editions, with several codices, [read] *eadem* (some codices *de eadem*), with *eius* placed below (some codices *eius et*) for *cuius et.* Then codices R S T U X bb omit *materiae,* and after *quod* the editions add *modo,* and after *totum* they supply *corpus.*

la: Cfr. infra dub. 4. — Superius pro *sic* codd. A F H I K aa (bb a secunda manu) *in hoc casu.*

en: Cf. below, dubium 4. — Above, for *sic,* codices A F H I K aa (bb by a second hand) [read] *in hoc casu.*

la: Vide quaest. praeced. et d. 43. a. 1. q. 5. ad 6.

en: See the preceding question, and d. 43, a. 1, q. 5, ad 6.

la: Sive forma corporis; cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. — Inferius pro *utroque modo* plures codd. vel cum edd. *in utroque* vel *utroque.* In fine solut. pro *distincte* cod. F *relinquitur, quod.*

en: Or the form of the body; cf. I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 3. — Below, for *utroque modo* several codices, or [reading] with the editions, [have] *in utroque* or *utroque.* At the end of the solution, for *distincte* codex F [reads] *relinquitur, quod.*

la: De quo in art. seq.

en: Concerning which [see] in the following article.

la: Dist. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. — Superius pro *poterat adeo* [cod. O *ita*] plures codd. *poterit adeo.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: [Book II,] dist. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 18, a. 1, q. 2. — Above, for *poterat adeo* [codex O *ita*] several codices [read] *poterit adeo.* — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Page span corrected.** The skeleton's `printed_pages: [913]` was under-scoped: the raw range (L97141–L97252) and the bands show this quaestio continuing onto p. 914, where replies 3–4 (left column) and the closing epilogue ("Sic igitur patet… in secundo libro," top of right column) sit before ARTICULUS III begins (raw L97253). Corrected to `printed_pages: [913, 914]` / `pdf_pages: [933, 934]`.
- **Apparatus provenance.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering per printed page. p. 913 footer carries a full ¹–⁹ sequence, all anchored in this q2 body (the a2-q1 scholion tail at the top of p. 913 carries no footer notes here — its notes fall on p. 912). p. 914 restarts: markers ¹ (*perfectio*), ² (*corpora electorum*), and ³ (*in secundo libro*) are anchored in this q2's tail; ⁴–⁸ on p. 914 belong to ARTICULUS III q1 and are left to `p1-a3-q1`. Total claimed: 12.
- **Resolved reading (not a live flag):** the closing marker `in secundo libro[^p914-3]` is faint in the band (could read as "8"), but content resolves it decisively to **3** — footnote 3 gives Book II cross-references ("Dist. 7… et d. 18…" = *secundo libro*) and the *poterat adeo → poterit adeo* variant, both of which fall in this closing sentence; p. 914 note ⁸ ("Cum codd. FLY supplevimus *quia*") instead anchors to Art III q1's *"sicut patet, quia⁸."*
- **Seam / scholion.** `has_scholion: false` — the Article II scholion (covering q1 + q2, incl. the "— Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 19.)… — Durand., hic q. 1." reference block at the top of p. 913 right column) lives in the sibling `p1-a2-q1`, not here.
- **Minor supplied reading:** "utroque modo, et **in** quantum respicit animam" (reply 3) — the *in* sits at the p. 914 left-column band edge; supplied from the IA djvu OCR, grammatically required ("inasmuch as").
- No unresolved `[?]` flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 914 -->

### Articulus III. *Qualia futura sint corpora resurgentium.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, qualia erunt corpora resurgentium. Et de hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de qualitate quantum ad electos. Secundo vero, quantum ad reprobos.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum corpora electorum resurgant cum deformitatibus.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum corpora electorum resurgant cum deformitatibus. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus, *de Civitate Dei* vigesimo secundo[^p914-4]: «Aberit a corporibus electorum omnis deformitas, omnis infirmitas omnisque tarditas»: ergo si haec pertinent ad deformitates, et carebunt his; patet etc.

2. Item, nihil resurget in electis, quod non sit de decore naturae; quia, ut dicit Augustinus[^p914-5], «a corporibus electorum vitia detrahentur, et natura servabitur»; sed deformitates non sunt de natura, ergo etc. *Probatio minoris*: super illud ad Ephesios secundo: *Eramus natura filii irae*; Glossa: «Natura vere ac proprie dicitur, qualis sine vitio fuit in primis parentibus»: ergo cum deformitates in ea non fuerint, patet etc.

3. Item, generans transmittit in prolem omne illud, quod est de veritate naturae suae, quando generat sine errore, pro eo quod per naturam generans generat sibi simile[^p914-6]; sed generans, habens deformitatem, sine errore naturae generat non habentem deformitatem: ergo deformitas non est in eo de veritate suae naturae: ergo si hoc solum resurget in electis, quod est de veritate naturae, deformitates non resurgent in eis.

4. Item, Anselmus in libro *de Veritate*[^p914-7] dicit, quod «veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis»: ergo quod non est de rectitudine naturae non est de veritate naturae; sed deformitas non est de naturae rectitudine, ergo non est de veritate naturae: ergo non resurget in electis.

**Contra:** 1. Caro contracta a generantibus est de veritate humanae naturae; sed gibbositas et aliae multae deformitates possunt a generantibus contrahi: ergo sunt de veritate humanae naturae. Sed omne tale resurget in electis: ergo etc.

2. Item, de veritate humanae naturae sunt membra non tantum officialia, verum etiam consimilia; sed in huiusmodi deformitatibus est aliquid de substantia membri consimilis, sicut patet, quia[^p914-8] in <!-- page 915 --> gibbo est aliquid de carnis substantia: ergo est aliquid de veritate humanae naturae: ergo etc.

3. Item, quia anima meruit in corpore, et in corpore debet remunerari, et hoc, quia corpus est sibi coniunctum: si ergo anima viri iusti meruit in deformitatibus et per deformitates, quas humiliter toleravit: ergo debet in eis remunerari.

4. Item, cicatrices, quae sunt inductae in Martyribus a violentia, manent in gloria in signum meriti et triumphi: ergo pari ratione deformitates, quae sunt a natura, in quibus meruit anima nostra.

> **Conclusio.** In corporibus electorum nulla resurget deformitas, resurget tamen alicuius deformitatis materia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod deformitates quaedam sunt qualitativae, sicut illae quae veniunt ex malo et inordinato situ membrorum[^p915-1]. Quaedam sunt quantitativae, sicut quando quis habet nimis magnum caput, vel nimis magna membra, ita quod aliis sunt improportionalia, vel habet gibbositates, vel talia, in quibus est aliquid de carnis substantia. Si de primis loquamur, quia non sunt de veritate humanae naturae, immo per errorem omnino contingunt; dicendum, quod in electis nullo modo resurgent. Si de secundis loquamur, quia aliquid est ibi substantiae, aliquid vitiositatis, quod est substantiae resurget, quod est vitiositatis auferetur; hoc est dicere, quod illius membri materia per alia membra diffundetur quantum ad superfluitatem[^p915-2], ita quod non aliquid peribit, et tamen totum per omnia reducetur ad proportionem. Et sic patet, quod in electis nulla resurget deformitas, resurget tamen alicuius deformitatis materia. — Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod non resurgent.

*Ad 1 et 2.* Concedendae nihilominus sunt duae ad oppositum inductae, quod illud quod est de substantia deformitatis, resurget, tamen sub ratione pulcritudinis.

*Ad 3.* Ad quod obiicitur, quod per deformitates merentur viri iusti; dicendum, quod per aliquid mereri est dupliciter: aut quod habet imperfectionem secundum statum meriti, non tamen secundum suam formam et naturam; aut quod habet imperfectionem secundum suam naturam, sicut patet, quod meretur per caritatem, cui inest imperfectio solum ratione status, et meretur per fidem, cui inest imperfectio ratione formae. In primo remuneramur per eius perfectionem; in secundo remuneramur per eius evacuationem, quia non est nata fides stare cum perfectione completa[^p915-3]. Per hunc modum in corporalibus oportet intelligi; unde cum corpus humanum statui perfectionis non repugnet quantum ad naturam, sed quantum ad statum; deformitas vero quantum ad propriam suam rationem repugnat perfectioni; hinc est, quod corpus debet resurgere et resumi, deformitas vero minime.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de cicatricibus, dicendum, quod aut cicatrices non resurgent aut, si resurgant, ita facient ad decorem et gloriam animae, quod non minuent pulcritudinem corporis, quia frequenter talia signa reddunt corpus magis decorum. Quoniam igitur cicatrix potest carere turpitudine, sed deformitas semper deformat; ideo non sic competit deformitas corporibus electorum, ut cicatrix.

english:
### Article III. *What the bodies of those rising again will be like.*

Next, as to the third article, it is asked what the bodies of those rising again will be like. And concerning this two questions are asked. First it is asked about their quality with respect to the elect. Second, with respect to the reprobate.

### Question I. *Whether the bodies of the elect rise again with deformities.*

As to the first, then, it is asked whether the bodies of the elect rise again with deformities. And that they do not, it seems.

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book twenty-two[^p914-4]: "From the bodies of the elect there will be absent every deformity, every infirmity, and all slowness": therefore if these pertain to deformities, they too will lack them; it is evident, etc.

2. Likewise, nothing will rise again in the elect that is not of the comeliness of nature; for, as Augustine says[^p914-5], "from the bodies of the elect the vices will be taken away, and nature will be preserved"; but deformities are not of nature, therefore etc. *Proof of the minor*: on that passage to the Ephesians, chapter two: *We were by nature children of wrath*; the Gloss: "Nature is said truly and properly [to be] such as it was without fault in the first parents": therefore since deformities were not in it, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, the begetter transmits into the offspring everything that is of the truth of its own nature, when it begets without error, inasmuch as by nature the begetter begets what is like itself[^p914-6]; but a begetter having a deformity, without error of nature begets one not having the deformity: therefore the deformity is not in it as of the truth of its own nature: therefore if only that will rise again in the elect which is of the truth of nature, deformities will not rise again in them.

4. Likewise, Anselm in the book *On Truth*[^p914-7] says that "truth is a rectitude perceptible by the mind alone": therefore what is not of the rectitude of nature is not of the truth of nature; but deformity is not of the rectitude of nature, therefore it is not of the truth of nature: therefore it will not rise again in the elect.

**On the contrary:** 1. Flesh contracted from the begetters is of the truth of human nature; but a hunched back and many other deformities can be contracted from the begetters: therefore they are of the truth of human nature. But every such thing will rise again in the elect: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, of the truth of human nature there are members not only functional but also homogeneous [*consimilia*]; but in deformities of this kind there is something of the substance of a homogeneous member, as is evident, since[^p914-8] in <!-- page 915 --> a hump there is something of the substance of the flesh: therefore there is something of the truth of human nature: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, since the soul merited in the body, it ought also to be rewarded in the body, and this because the body is joined to it: if therefore the soul of a just man merited in deformities and through the deformities which it humbly bore: therefore it ought to be rewarded in them.

4. Likewise, the scars which were inflicted on the Martyrs by violence remain in glory as a sign of merit and triumph: therefore by parity of reasoning the deformities which are from nature, in which our soul merited [remain likewise].

> **Conclusion.** In the bodies of the elect no deformity will rise again, yet the matter of some deformity will rise again.

**I respond:** It must be said that some deformities are qualitative, such as those which come from a bad and disordered position of the members[^p915-1]. Some are quantitative, as when someone has too large a head, or too large members, so that they are out of proportion to the others, or has humps, or such things in which there is something of the substance of the flesh. If we speak of the first, since they are not of the truth of human nature, but rather come about wholly through error, it must be said that they will in no way rise again in the elect. If we speak of the second, since there is there something of substance, something of viciousness, what is of substance will rise again, what is of viciousness will be taken away; that is to say, that the matter of that member will be diffused through the other members with respect to the superfluity[^p915-2], so that nothing will perish, and yet the whole will be reduced throughout to proportion. And thus it is evident that in the elect no deformity will rise again, yet the matter of some deformity will rise again. — And thus the arguments showing that they will not rise again are to be conceded.

*To 1 and 2.* The two [arguments] brought for the opposite are nonetheless to be conceded, [namely] that what is of the substance of the deformity will rise again, yet under the aspect of beauty.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that just men merit through deformities, it must be said that to merit through something is twofold: either [something] that has imperfection according to the state of merit, yet not according to its own form and nature; or [something] that has imperfection according to its own nature, as is evident, since one merits through charity, in which imperfection inheres only by reason of state, and merits through faith, in which imperfection inheres by reason of form. In the first we are rewarded through its perfection; in the second we are rewarded through its emptying-out, since faith is not apt to stand together with completed perfection[^p915-3]. In this way it must be understood in bodily things; whence, since the human body is not repugnant to the state of perfection with respect to nature, but with respect to state, whereas deformity, with respect to its own proper character, is repugnant to perfection; hence it is that the body ought to rise again and be resumed, but deformity by no means.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning scars, it must be said that either the scars will not rise again, or, if they do rise again, they will so contribute to the comeliness and glory of the soul that they will not diminish the beauty of the body, since often such marks render the body more comely. Since, therefore, a scar can be without ugliness, but a deformity always deforms, therefore deformity does not befit the bodies of the elect in the way a scar does.

la: Cap. 20. n. 3. — Pro *infirmitas* plures codd. *informitas*.

en: [City of God XXII] c. 20, n. 3. — For *infirmitas* ("infirmity") several codices [read] *informitas*.

la: Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Eph. 2, 3, et Glossa, quam exhibent Petr. Lombard. et Lyranus ut *ordinariam*, est secundum August., I. Retract. 10. n. 3, ubi pro *fuit in primis parentibus* legitur *primitus condita est*. — Subinde pro *in ea* cod. F *in eis*.

en: Book XXII of the City of God, c. 17. — The following scriptural passage is Eph. 2:3, and the Gloss, which Peter Lombard and Lyra present as the *ordinary* [gloss], is according to Augustine, Retractations I, 10, n. 3, where for *fuit in primis parentibus* ("was in the first parents") is read *primitus condita est* ("was first created"). — Then for *in ea* ("in it") cod. F [reads] *in eis* ("in them").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 847, nota 7. et pag. 860, nota 3. — Paulo ante voci *errore* cod. aa addit *naturae*.

en: Cf. above p. 847, note 7, and p. 860, note 3. — Shortly before, to the word *errore* ("error") cod. aa adds *naturae* ("of nature").

en: [Anselm, On Truth] chapter 11.

la: Cum codd. FLY supplevimus *quia*, codd. N aa *quod*.

en: With codices F, L, Y we have supplied *quia* ("since"); codices N, aa [read] *quod*.

la: Cod. aa subiungit: *sicut oculum habere in fronte, et huiusmodi*.

en: Cod. aa adds: *as to have an eye in the forehead, and the like*.

la: Cod. aa prosequitur: *ut ex illa materia superfluitatis cetera, quae reparari indigent, reparentur, ita* etc. Superius pro *resurgent* communior lectio codd. *resurgunt*.

en: Cod. aa continues: *so that from that matter of superfluity the rest, which need to be repaired, may be repaired, thus* etc. Above, for *resurgent* the more common reading of the codices [is] *resurgunt*.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. — Superius pro *meretur* Vat. bis *meremur*; econtra cod. Z bis *remuneratur* pro *remuneramur*. Vocibus *eius perfectionem* cod. F interserit *completionem et*. In fine solut. pro *resumi* codd. R S *restitui*.

en: Cf. III Sent. d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 and a. 3, q. 1. — Above, for *meretur* ("he merits") the Vatican [ed.] twice [reads] *meremur* ("we merit"); on the contrary cod. Z twice [reads] *remuneratur* for *remuneramur*. Into the words *eius perfectionem* cod. F inserts *completionem et*. At the end of the solution, for *resumi* ("to be resumed") codices R, S [read] *restitui* ("to be restored").

latin_scholion:
**I.** De corporibus glorificatis electorum eorumque dotibus multa docentur infra d. 49. p. II, quae a pluribus Lombardi commentatoribus in hac dist. (a S. Thom. q. 2.) tractantur, ubi etiam haec I. quaestio passim tangitur, sed a S. Thoma praecipue hic q. I. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1-4, a Scoto, hic q. I. n. 15. 16. Specialiter de eadem quaestione agunt: B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 6. — Durand. de hac, et seq. quaest. hic q. 3.

**II.** Quaestionem 2. aliter solvit cum B. Alberto S. Thomas (hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 86. a. 1.). Nam prima opinione, quam sequitur S. Bonav., improbata, prosequitur: «Alii rationabilius dicunt, quod auctor, qui naturam condidit, in resurrectione naturam corporis integre reparabit»; et hoc docet non tantum quoad deformitatem, quae ex defectu vel mutilatione alicuius membri resultat, sed etiam de ea quae oritur «ex indebita partium dispositione, vel indebita quantitate vel qualitate vel situ» etc. Hoc tamen non intelligit de defectibus, «qui ex naturalibus principiis in humano corpore naturaliter consequuntur». Durand. et Estius (hic § 10.) consentiunt Bonaventurae. De 2. quaestione praeter cit.: B. Albert., hic a. 33. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. a. 6.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the glorified bodies of the elect and their dowries much is taught below at d. 49, p. II, matters which are treated by many commentators on the Lombard in this distinction (by St. Thomas at q. 2), where also this first question is touched on here and there, but by St. Thomas chiefly here at q. I, a. 3, little-questions 1–4, by Scotus, here at q. I, nn. 15, 16. Treating specially of the same question are: Bl. Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4, little-question I. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 6. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

**II.** The second question St. Thomas, with Bl. Albert, solves otherwise (here q. 3, a. 1, little-question 1; Supplement q. 86, a. 1). For, the first opinion, which St. Bonaventure follows, having been disapproved, he proceeds: "Others more reasonably say that the Author who founded nature will in the resurrection wholly repair the nature of the body"; and this he teaches not only as regards the deformity which results from the defect or mutilation of some member, but also concerning that which arises "from an undue disposition of the parts, or undue quantity or quality or position," etc. This, however, he does not understand of the defects "which follow naturally from natural principles in the human body." Durandus and Estius (here § 10) agree with Bonaventure. On the second question, besides those cited: Bl. Albert, here a. 33. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., little-question 2. — Richard of Middleton, loc. cit., a. 6.

---

translators_notes:
**Corrected page span.** Skeleton frontmatter carried `printed_pages: [913, 914]` / `pdf_pages: [933, 934]`; corrected to **printed 914–915 / pdf 934–935** on band evidence. Printed p. 913 (running head *DIST. XLIV. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. II.*) is occupied entirely by the sibling a. 2, q. 2 (both columns: *Secundo quaeritur, quid in quo resurgat…* through its Conclusio/Respondeo). **Articulus III opens on p. 914** (verso; running head *914 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.*), mid-column, after a. 2, q. 2's replies and epilogue; the quaestio body runs through p. 915.

**Seam with a. 2, q. 2 (shared page 914).** The prior question's replies 3–4 and its concluding epilogue (*Sic igitur patet… scilicet in secundo libro*) fill the top of both columns of p. 914 before Art. III begins. Page 914's footnote block is two-column and split by body anchor: **notes 1–3 are a. 2, q. 2's** — note 1 (*Sive forma corporis*) glosses its *perfectio*; note 2 (*De quo in art. seq.*) its *superfluum*; note 3 (*…Superius pro* poterat adeo *…*) glosses its epilogue phrase *Nec unquam poterat adeo dividi*. **Notes 4–8 are this question's** (args 1–4 and contra 2), confirmed by visible marker digits in the p. 914 bands (arg 1 → 4, arg 2 → 5, arg 4 → 7, contra 2 → 8; arg 3 → 6 by *errore* content). The prior chunk should hold notes 1–3.

**Page 915 footnotes.** Notes 1–3 (respondeo/solutio markers, per-page restart) were read from the raw OCR footer immediately past the assigned slice (raw ~L97398–97402), since no p. 915 band was provided; they are unambiguous. Note 4 on p. 915 (*Cap. 92…*, Augustine's *Enchiridion*) anchors in q. 2's opening argument and belongs to the sibling a. 3, q. 2, not here.

**Scholion.** The Art. III SCHOLION (raw L97374 ff.) covers both q. 1 and q. 2; rendered here in full, last in both language blocks. Sibling a. 3, q. 2 carries no scholion.

**[?] flags.**
- Scholion II: *Estius (hic **§ 10**)* — OCR reads a garbled sigil (`g 10`), rendered as `§ 10`; the reference form (§ vs. q.) is not certain from the band. Low stakes (a citation locus only).
- Scholion I: *infra d. **49**. p. II* — OCR `i9`; read as **49** (Bk. IV d. 49 treats the dowries of glorified bodies), which fits the sense; recorded as a silent correction rather than a live ambiguity.


title: Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 915 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum deformitates resurgant in corporibus damnatorum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deformitates resurgant in corporibus damnatorum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum in Enchiridio[^p915-4]: «Nulla debet esse quaestio de pulcritudine, ubi est certitudo de damnatione»; si ergo certi sumus, quod reprobi damnabuntur, certi sumus etiam, quod pulcritudine non decorabuntur.

<!-- page 916 -->

2. Item, a corporibus damnatorum non tolletur tarditas nec passibilitas: ergo nec deformitas consimili ratione. *Prima* patet, quoniam passibilia erunt damnatorum corpora et gravia[^p916-1]: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod deformitates tollantur ab electis, hoc gratiae est; sed nulla gratia debet fieri damnatis: ergo ab eis deformitates non debent auferri.

4. Item, deformitates animarum ab animabus non tolluntur: ergo nec a corporibus ratione consimili, immo *a causa*[^p916-2], quia deformitas culpae est causa deformitatis poenae.

5. Item, corpus damnatis animabus redditur non propter perfectionem, sed propter maiorem punitionem; sed deformitas corporis redundat in poenam animae: cum ergo non debeat in eis poena minui, sed augeri; non debet corpus eorum deformitatibus exui, sed reindui.

**Contra:**
1. Deformitates in effectu veniunt ex errore virtutis producentis[^p916-3]; sed corpora resurgentium sola virtus divina reficiet: ergo si illa non potest errare, impossibile est, quod habeant deformitatem.

2. Item, artifex, qui effectum cum deformitatibus producit, non dicitur *reformator*, sed *deformator*: ergo si Deus corpora damnatorum cum deformitatibus facit resurgere, non debet dici *reformator*, sed *deformator*. Sed hoc est facere contumeliam ipsi artifici, quam oportet longe a Deo relegare: ergo nullo modo cum deformitatibus producit.

3. Item, «optimi est optimum producere»[^p916-4]: si ergo Deus optimus est artifex, ergo optima artificiata producit; sed ipse est artifex in resurrectione, et corpora deformia non sunt bene facta nec ordinata: ergo etc.

4. Item, est ordo partium in toto, et ordo rei ad finem, et primus respicit sapientiam, secundus respicit bonitatem[^p916-5]; sed Deus, cum sit bonus, non potest facere rem fine carentem sive a fine deordinatam: ergo cum sit summe sapiens, non potest rem producere deordinatam quantum ad ordinem, qui est partium in toto: ergo nec deformitates.

5. Item, a damnatis[^p916-6] auferetur deformitas quae est per diminutionem; unde si caret manu non carebit manu: ergo pari ratione et deformitas quae est ex superfluitate, et ita, ut videtur, omnis deformitas.

### Conclusio.

> *Corpora reproborum resurgent cum suis deformitatibus.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus in Enchiridio[^p916-7] istam quaestionem dimittit insolutam, quasi non sit magnae utilitatis; attamen cum assignet rationem, quare circa hoc non debet laborari, determinationem quaestionis nobis tribuit. Dum enim dicit, quod non debet nos molestare inquisitio circa pulcritudinem, ubi est certitudo circa damnationem; si enim ad hoc resurgunt, ut damnentur, non ut melioris, sed ut peioris sint conditionis; manifeste apparet, quod non dabitur eis pulcritudo, quam non habuerunt, nec auferetur deformitas, quam habuerunt. Unde Deus quantum ad eos est purus *reformator*, quia secundum eandem formam reformat, quam eis natura dedit in generatione primaria. — In qua reformatione apparet Dei *sapientia* et *iustitia*: *sapientia*, quia scit omnino eodem modo reparare, sicut ante fuit[^p916-8]; *iustitia*, ut, sicut qui meruit in corpore pulcro, remuneretur in eius pulcritudine; sic qui in turpi peccavit in eius turpitudine cruciari debet; nec debet auferri, sed potius confirmari. — Et rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod venit ex errore virtutis; dicendum, quod verum est in operatione *naturae*, quae producit effectum, quanto melius potest; sed non sic in operatione *Dei*, qui non reparat, secundum quod melius potest, sed secundum quod meritis eius melius congruit.

2. Ad illud, quod[^p916-9] producens effectum deformem est deformator; dicendum, quod effectus deformis productus potest dupliciter considerari: aut *absolute*, aut *in comparatione*. Si *absolute*, verum est; si autem *in comparatione* ad meritum, aut ad praecedentem statum, non est verum. Et quoniam effectus competit meritis damnatorum, competit nihilominus statui praeterito; ideo talis reparatio non *deformatio*, sed *reformatio* et *conformatio* debet dici. — Et est exemplum in artifice, qui picturam diaboli facit turpem; ipse enim non dicitur *deformator*, sed *conformator*, quia conformem statui diabolico picturam facit, quamvis in se pictura sit deformis. Sic etiam in proposito intelligendum.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod optimi est optima producere; dicendum, quod verum est in ordine[^p917-1], et corpus deforme optime ordinatur in inferno, sicut pulcrum in caelo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine duplici, dicendum quod ordo creaturae quantum ad finem est dupliciter: vel quantum ad finem creatum, vel quantum ad finem ultimum, qui Deus est, qui est finis universalis. Similiter ordo *partium* est duplex, scilicet partium in toto, et rerum in universo. Et sicut creatura non potest produci a Deo deordinata a fine ultimo, ita quod illam deordinationem habeat a Deo; sic nec ab ordinatione, quae est in universo; et quamvis deforme corpus sit deordinatum in se, est tamen ordinatum in mundo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod auferetur deformitas per diminutionem: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod hoc est propter perfectam punitionem voluntatis, quae, quoniam omnium membrorum fuit rectrix et omnia habere voluit, licet non habuerit; ideo in omnibus puniri debet et torqueri[^p917-2].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether deformities rise again in the bodies of the damned.*

Secondly it is asked, whether deformities rise again in the bodies of the damned. And that they do, it seems:

1. By Augustine in the Enchiridion[^p915-4]: «There ought to be no question about beauty, where there is certainty about damnation»; if therefore we are certain that the reprobate will be damned, we are certain also that they will not be adorned with beauty.

2. Likewise, from the bodies of the damned there will not be removed sluggishness nor passibility: therefore neither deformity, by like reasoning. *The first* is clear, because the bodies of the damned will be passible and heavy[^p916-1]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that deformities be removed from the elect, this is [a matter] of grace; but no grace ought to be shown to the damned: therefore from them deformities ought not to be removed.

4. Likewise, the deformities of souls are not removed from souls: therefore neither from bodies, by like reasoning; nay rather *from the cause*[^p916-2], because the deformity of guilt is the cause of the deformity of punishment.

5. Likewise, a body is restored to damned souls not for the sake of perfection, but for the sake of greater punishment; but the deformity of the body redounds to the punishment of the soul: since therefore the punishment in them ought not to be diminished, but increased; their body ought not to be stripped of deformities, but reclothed [with them].

**On the contrary:**
1. Deformities in an effect come from the error of the producing power[^p916-3]; but the bodies of the rising [dead] the divine power alone will restore: therefore if that [power] cannot err, it is impossible that they should have deformity.

2. Likewise, a craftsman who produces an effect with deformities is not called a *reformer*, but a *deformer*: therefore if God makes the bodies of the damned rise again with deformities, he ought not to be called a *reformer*, but a *deformer*. But this is to do insult to the craftsman himself, which must be set far from God: therefore in no way does he produce [them] with deformities.

3. Likewise, «it belongs to the best to produce the best»[^p916-4]: if therefore God is the best craftsman, therefore he produces the best works of craft; but he is the craftsman in the resurrection, and deformed bodies are not well made nor ordered: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, there is an order of the parts in the whole, and an order of the thing to its end, and the first regards wisdom, the second regards goodness[^p916-5]; but God, since he is good, cannot make a thing lacking an end or disordered from its end: therefore since he is supremely wise, he cannot produce a thing disordered as to the order which is of the parts in the whole: therefore neither deformities.

5. Likewise, from the damned[^p916-6] there will be removed the deformity which is by diminution; whence if one lacks a hand, he will not lack a hand: therefore by parity of reasoning also the deformity which is from superfluity, and thus, as it seems, every deformity.

### Conclusion.

> *The bodies of the reprobate will rise again with their deformities.*

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine in the Enchiridion[^p916-7] leaves this question unresolved, as though it were not of great usefulness; nevertheless, since he assigns a reason why one ought not to labor over this, he grants us the determination of the question. For when he says that the inquiry about beauty ought not to trouble us, where there is certainty about damnation; if indeed they rise again for this, that they be damned, not that they be of a better, but of a worse condition; it manifestly appears that there will not be given to them a beauty which they did not have, nor will there be removed a deformity which they had. Whence God, as regards them, is a pure *reformer*, because he reforms according to the same form which nature gave them in their first generation. — In which reformation there appears God's *wisdom* and *justice*: *wisdom*, because he knows how to repair altogether in the same way as it was before[^p916-8]; *justice*, that, just as he who merited in a beautiful body may be rewarded in its beauty, so he who sinned in a foul [body] ought to be tormented in its foulness; nor ought it to be removed, but rather confirmed. — And the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that [deformity] comes from the error of the power; it must be said that it is true in the operation of *nature*, which produces its effect as well as it can; but not so in the operation of *God*, who does not repair according to what is best possible, but according to what better befits their merits.

2. To that[^p916-9] [which objects] that one producing a deformed effect is a deformer; it must be said that a deformed effect, once produced, can be considered in two ways: either *absolutely*, or *in comparison*. If *absolutely*, it is true; but if *in comparison* to merit, or to a preceding state, it is not true. And since the effect befits the merits of the damned, it befits nonetheless the past state; therefore such a repair ought to be called not *deformation*, but *reformation* and *conformation*. — And there is an example in a craftsman who makes an ugly picture of the devil; for he himself is not called a *deformer*, but a *conformer*, because he makes the picture conformed to the diabolical state, although in itself the picture is deformed. So too it is to be understood in the matter proposed.

3. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the best to produce the best; it must be said that it is true in [respect of] order[^p917-1], and a deformed body is best ordered in hell, just as a beautiful one in heaven.

4. To that which is objected concerning the twofold order, it must be said that the order of a creature with respect to its end is twofold: either with respect to a created end, or with respect to the ultimate end, which is God, who is the universal end. Likewise the order of *parts* is twofold, namely of parts in the whole, and of things in the universe. And just as a creature cannot be produced by God disordered from its ultimate end, such that it should have that disordering from God; so neither from the ordering which is in the universe; and although a deformed body is disordered in itself, it is nonetheless ordered in the world.

5. To that which is objected, that the deformity which is by diminution will be removed: therefore etc.; it must be said that this is on account of the perfect punishment of the will, which, since it was the ruler of all the members and willed to have them all, though it did not have [them]; therefore in all it ought to be punished and tormented[^p917-2].

---

la: Cap. 92. n. 23. Verba vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Ch. 92, n. 23. See the words here in the Master's text, c. 4.

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XLIII. c. 7, et infra d. 49. p. II. sect. 2. a. 3. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, the Master's text, d. XLIII, c. 7, and below, d. 49, p. II, sect. 2, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 103, nota 10.

en: See above, p. 103, note 10.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 82. seqq. (c. 8.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 82ff. (c. 8).

la: Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 720, nota 7.

en: According to Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, § 19. Cf. vol. I, p. 720, note 7.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — Mox pro *deordinatam* edd. *deordinantem*.

en: See I *Sent.*, d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, in the body. — Shortly, for *deordinatam* the editions read *deordinantem*.

la: Cod. bb *reprobis*, alii codd. et ed. 1 *electis*, cod. F *electis et etiam reprobis*. Post *unde si* cod. O supplet *nunc*, Vat. *modo*, quae etiam verbis *non carebit* praemittit *tunc*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *reprobis*, other codices and ed. 1 *electis*, codex F *electis et etiam reprobis*. After *unde si* codex O supplies *nunc*, the Vatican [edition] *modo*, which also prefixes *tunc* to the words *non carebit*.

la: Cap. 92. n. 23. — Inferius pro *tribuit* edd. *innuit*.

en: Ch. 92, n. 23. — Below, for *tribuit* the editions read *innuit*.

la: Edd. *fecit*, cod. V *facit*.

en: The editions [read] *fecit*, codex V *facit*.

la: Codd. L Z aa addunt *obiicitur, quod*. Pro *deformis* edd. *deformiter*.

en: Codices L, Z, aa add *obiicitur, quod*. For *deformis* the editions read *deformiter*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Ibid. q. 3. agitur de seq. solut. (ad 4.).

en: Cf. I *Sent.*, d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. Ibid., q. 3, treats of the following solution (ad 4).

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, and following. — See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Page span corrected 915→915–917.** The auto-chunker set `printed_pages: [915, 916]`, but q2's tail (replies 3–5 of the Respondeo) overflows onto p. 917. Reply 3 straddles the 916/917 seam ("…quod optimi est | optima producere…"); replies 4–5 sit wholly at the top of p. 917. The p. 917 running head reads `DIST. XLIV. P. I. DUBIA.` because DUBIA dominates that recto, but the quaestio's replies occupy its head. The chunk stops at reply 5 ("…puniri debet et torqueri"); the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` content banner (raw L97560) begins the separate p1-dubia chunk and is NOT swallowed here.
- **Footer split at p. 915 (shared with a3-q1).** P. 915 carries footnotes 1–4. Notes 1–3 anchor in the *preceding* quaestio (a3-q1: `membrorum¹`, `superfluitatem²`, and the `meretur/remuneramur/completionem/resumi` variants at `perfectione completa³`). Only note **4** (Enchiridion, Cap. 92) anchors in this q2 (arg 1, `in Enchiridio⁴`), so only it is claimed here. The sibling a3-q1 chunk should hold p915 fn 1–3.
- **Apparatus = 12 entries**: p915-4, p916 1–9, plus p917 1–2. All twelve anchor in this body; markers paired in both languages.
- **p. 917 footers 1–2 sourced from p917-L bands (2026-07-18).** The p. 917 left-column top holds the tail of this quaestio's Respondeo (replies 3–5), above the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` banner. Footer **1** anchors at *ordine* (reply 3), footer **2** at *torqueri* (reply 5), read from `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p917-L-{0,2}.png`. Footers 3–6 of p. 917 belong to the DUB. I text below the banner (the separate p1-dubia chunk), not to this quaestio.
- **[?] p915-4 "c. 4"**: the p915-R-2 band reads "…in lit. Magistri, **c. 4**." where the raw OCR had "c. i"; band taken as authoritative but the final digit is worth a second look at 600 dpi.
- No scholion in this chunk: the Article III scholion (covering q1+q2) is printed in a3-q1 on p. 915; `has_scholion: false`.