title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 4

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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum sit connexio in vitiis et peccatis.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum sit connexio in vitiis et peccatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Ecclesiastis* nono[^1]: *Qui in uno peccaverit multa bona perdet*; sed hoc non esset, nisi plura mala concomitarentur unum malum perpetratum: ergo videtur, quod necessarium sit ponere connexionem vitiorum.

2. Item, *Iacobi* secundo[^2]: *Qui in uno offendit factus est reus omnium*; sed nemo iudicatur omnium mandatorum divinorum reus, nisi qui peccat contra omnia mandata: ergo qui peccat contra unum peccat contra cetera: videtur ergo, quod vitia sint connexa.

3. Item, sicut vitium non expellitur nisi per introductionem virtutis sibi oppositae, sic nec virtus nisi per introductionem vitii; sed cum quis committit unum peccatum, ceterae virtutes amittuntur: ergo cum quis unum peccatum committit, cetera peccata introducuntur: ergo sicut est connexio ex parte virtutum, ita videtur esse ex parte vitiorum.

4. Item, sicut per infusionem gratiae unius tota imago reformatur, sic per perpetrationem unius peccati tota imago deformatur; sed ad reformationem imaginis secundum totum necessario requiritur universitas virtutum[^3]: ergo similiter ad deformationem totius imaginis concurrit universitas vitiorum: ergo sicut gratiam imaginem reformantem consequuntur omnes virtutes, sic culpam, quae imaginem deformat[^4], consequuntur omnia vitia.

5. Item, sicut originaliter omnes virtutes na-
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scuntur a gratia et imperantur a caritate, sic omnia vitia nascuntur a concupiscentia et imperantur a superbia, quae est omnium vitiorum regina[^5]: ergo sicut ponitur connexio in virtutibus propter unitatem originis et radicis, sic videtur similiter, quod poni debeat ex parte vitiorum; quoniam ubicumque reperitur talis causa, ibi debet reperiri talis effectus.

6. Item, virtus et vitium sunt opposita immediata circa suum susceptibile — non est enim dare medium, quia aut homo est Dei amicus, aut Dei inimicus[^6] — ergo cum abest virtus, necesse est, inesse vitium sibi oppositum; sed cum virtus abest, universaliter abest: ergo cum vitium inest, universaliter inest: ergo et vitia connexionem habent, sicut et virtutes gratuitae.

**Sed contra:**

1. Secundum diversitatem vitiorum est diversitas poenarum[^7]: ergo si esset connexio in vitiis, ut qui haberet unum vitium haberet omnia; tunc qui haberet unum peccatum sustineret omnem poenam; quod manifeste est contra divinam iustitiam.

2. Item, vitia et peccata sunt ab opere nostro; sed non est connexio in operibus vitiorum exterius perpetratis: ergo nec connexio est in vitiis interius derelictis.

3. Item, nullus peccat aliquo genere peccati nisi volens[^8]; sed multi sunt, qui committunt aliquod vitium, et tamen omnino detestantur aliquod peccati genus, sicut multi peccatis spiritualibus impliciti omnino detestantur carnalia: ergo vitia non sunt connexa.

4. Item, vitia ad invicem opponuntur, sicut avaritia prodigalitati, et audacia pusillanimitati; sed *« duo opposita non possunt simul esse in eodem »*[^9]: ergo impossibile est, vitia et peccata habere connexionem.

> **Conclusio.** Vitia et peccata non habent connexionem; tamen dici potest, quod ex parte aversionis aliquo modo connectantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum ad peccatum duo concurrant, videlicet aversio et conversio[^10]; dupliciter contingit comparare vitia et peccata ad invicem: vel in quantum avertunt ab uno Bono incommutabili, vel in quantum convertunt ad bona commutabilia. — Si igitur loquamur de vitiis, secundum quod avertunt ab uno Bono incommutabili; sic privant hominem gratia et ceteris virtutibus gratuitis et faciunt hominem dignum privari gloria et praemio correspondente omnibus bonis meritis; et hoc quidem ita fit per unum vitium, sicut per cetera. *(Conclusio 1.)* Et quantum ad hoc vitia et peccata habent connexionem quandam, pro eo quod ab uno avertunt, et omnibus vitiis unus et idem Deus offenditur.

Si vero loquamur de vitiis quantum ad conversionem; sic per conversiones ad diversa bona commutabilia diversae oriuntur in nobis pronitates et vitia, per quae obligamur ad diversa poenarum supplicia. *(Conclusio 2.)* Et hoc modo in vitiis non est connexio, quia pro quolibet punietur homo speciali poena sibi debita; nec etiam possunt esse connexa propter repugnantiam pronitatum; nec habent causam, propter quam connectantur, quia ex diversis operibus oriuntur et ad diversos fines tendunt. Quoniam ergo vitia ex parte conversionis sumunt originem et distinctionem, et ex hac parte connexionem non habent, licet aliquo modo in aversione conveniant; *(Conclusio 3.)* simpliciter concedendum est, quod vitia et peccata non sunt connexa[^11], sicut ostendunt rationes ad partem istam.

**Ad oppositum:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate *Ecclesiastis* et auctoritate *Iacobi*, quod qui peccat in uno perdit multa bona, et etiam fit reus quantum ad omnia; dicendum, *(Ratio 1.)* quod hoc non dicitur, quia propter unum vitium incurrat aliquis aliorum vitiorum pronitates et defectibilitates necessario et immediate; sed hoc dicitur, quia qui peccat uno peccato caritatem perdit, in qua est plenitudo meritorum et impletio mandatorum[^12]. — *(Ratio 2.)* Aut certe dicitur, quod perdit multa bona et fit reus quantum ad omnia, pro eo quod privatur omnibus virtutibus gratuitis. — *(Ratio 3.)* Vel tertio modo, quia perdit omnia merita, quae prius habebat; efficiuntur enim ex uno peccato mortali omnia inutilia ad gloriam
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assequendam[^13]. — *(Ratio 4.)* Vel quarto modo dicitur multa bona perdere et omnium reus esse, quia merito unius peccati perdit aeterna praemia, quae omnibus virtutibus et meritis erant reddenda: hoc autem non est propter ipsorum vitiorum connexionem, sed magis propter connexionem virtutum et dotum sive praemiorum eis correspondentium; ob quam connexionem, si quis uno ipsorum bonorum privatur, necesse est, quod privetur et ceteris. Hoc autem non sufficit ad faciendam connexionem in vitiis, quia, sicut supra dictum est, vitia non tantum consistunt in aversione a Deo, sed etiam in conversione ad bonum commutabile.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus non expellitur nisi per introductionem vitii sibi oppositi, sicut nec vitium nisi per introductionem virtutis; dicendum, *(Ratio 1.)* quod non est simile: quia plura exiguntur ad construendum quam destruendum[^14], et plura sunt necessaria ad hoc, quod homo placeat Deo, quam ad hoc, quod displiceat, et per hoc etiam plura sunt necessaria ad rectificandum quam ad obliquandum. *(Notandum.)* Et ideo, quamvis obliquatio vitii non habeat excludi nisi per habitum directe sibi oppositum, tamen rectitudo virtutis potest auferri non solum per vitium sibi oppositum, sed etiam per unum[^15] oppositum alii virtuti; unde infidelitas, quae opponitur fidei, excludit caritatem. Et ideo non est simile hinc et inde. — *(Ratio 2.)* Praeterea, quia virtutes connexae sunt, ideo vitium, quod tollit unam, per consequens tollit reliquam; vitia vero, quia connexa non sunt, ideo auferri non possunt, nisi unumquodque expellatur per virtutem directe sibi oppositam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum deformat totam imaginem, sicut gratia reformat; dicendum, *(Duplex deformatio.)* quod imago dupliciter dicitur deformari: aut propter absentiam luminis gratiae, aut propter deordinationem in actibus illarum virium, in quibus imago attenditur. Primo quidem modo deformari habet tota imago per unum peccatum et vitium; secundo modo non, quia quodlibet vitium non respicit singularum potentiarum actus. Gratia vero, quando reformat animam, utroque modo reformat, et venustando faciem ipsius animae et rectificando quamlibet potentiam respectu operationis suae[^16]. Et ideo, quamvis in gratiae informatione concurrant ceterae virtutes, non tamen sic in deformatione unius peccati singula vitia comitantur.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia vitia nascuntur a concupiscentia et imperantur a superbia, sicut virtutes a caritate et gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: tum quia concupiscentia non est causa sufficiens respectu vitiorum, sed solum disponens[^17]; *(Notandum.)* tum etiam quia, cum concupiscentia ramificetur respectu diversorum concupiscibilium, ad diversos fines inspicit et frequenter ad contraria tendit; unde est ibi dispersio potius quam connexio. Gratia autem est sufficiens origo virtutum, et caritas movet et inclinat omnes ad finem unum[^18]. Et propterea non sic connectuntur vitia, ut virtutes gratuitae, tum ex defectu principii, tum etiam ex defectu vinculi unitivi.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus et vitium sunt opposita immediate; dicendum, *(Distinctio.)* quod de virtute et vitio contingit loqui dupliciter: vel in generali, vel in speciali. Si loquamur in generali, sic immediate opponuntur circa suum susceptibile; si vero in speciali, sic non immediate opponuntur, pro eo quod non est necessarium, aliquem habere continentiam gratuitam, aut esse luxuriosum[^19]; sic et de aliis vitiis et virtutibus est intelligendum. Et ideo, quamvis, absente virtute, necessario insit vitium, non tamen sequitur, quod absente omni virtute gratuita, propter hoc insint omnia vitia. — Et si tu obiicias, quod sicut se habet vitium respectu virtutis, ita se habet species huius vitii respectu virtutis sibi oppositae: dicendum, quod non est simile: *(Notandum.)* quia omnes virtutes gratuitae uniri[^20] habent in uno formali, ratione cuius omnia vitia sibi opponuntur et cum nullo stare possunt; sed cum distinguuntur in species, hoc est ratione habituum specialium, ratione quorum non quaelibet virtus opponitur cuilibet vitio, sed sibi opposito. Et ideo alius modus est comparandi vitium ad virtutem gratuitam in generali, et alius in speciali; et propterea ratio illa non cogit[^21].

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### Question IV. *Whether there is a connection among the vices and sins.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether there is a connection among the vices and sins. And that there is, it seems.

1. *Ecclesiastes* the ninth[^1]: *He who sins in one will lose many good things*; but this would not be, unless many evils accompanied one evil committed: therefore it seems that it is necessary to posit a connection of the vices.

2. Likewise, *James* the second[^2]: *He who offends in one is made guilty of all*; but no one is judged guilty of all the divine commandments, except him who sins against all the commandments: therefore he who sins against one sins against the rest: it seems therefore that the vices are connected.

3. Likewise, just as a vice is not expelled except by the introduction of the virtue opposed to it, so neither is a virtue except by the introduction of a vice; but when someone commits one sin, the other virtues are lost: therefore when someone commits one sin, the other sins are introduced: therefore just as there is a connection on the side of the virtues, so it seems there is on the side of the vices.

4. Likewise, just as by the infusion of one grace the whole image is reformed, so by the perpetration of one sin the whole image is deformed; but for the reformation of the image according to the whole there is necessarily required the totality of the virtues[^3]: therefore likewise to the deformation of the whole image there concurs the totality of the vices: therefore just as all the virtues follow upon the grace that reforms the image, so all the vices follow upon the fault that deforms the image[^4].

5. Likewise, just as originally all the virtues are
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born from grace and are commanded by charity, so all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, which is the queen of all the vices[^5]: therefore just as a connection is posited among the virtues on account of the unity of origin and root, so likewise it seems that it ought to be posited on the side of the vices; since wherever such a cause is found, there such an effect ought to be found.

6. Likewise, virtue and vice are immediate opposites concerning their subject — for there is no giving a middle, since a man is either God's friend or God's enemy[^6] — therefore when virtue is absent, vice opposed to it must be present; but when virtue is absent, it is absent universally: therefore when vice is present, it is present universally: therefore the vices too have a connection, just as the gratuitous virtues do.

**On the contrary:**

1. According to the diversity of vices there is a diversity of punishments[^7]: therefore if there were a connection among the vices, such that he who had one vice would have all; then he who had one sin would undergo every punishment; which is manifestly against the divine justice.

2. Likewise, the vices and sins are from our work; but there is no connection in the works of the vices outwardly perpetrated: therefore neither is there a connection in the vices inwardly left behind.

3. Likewise, no one sins by any kind of sin except willingly[^8]; but there are many who commit some vice, and yet utterly detest some kind of sin, as many entangled in spiritual sins utterly detest the carnal ones: therefore the vices are not connected.

4. Likewise, the vices are mutually opposed, as avarice to prodigality, and audacity to faint-heartedness; but *« two opposites cannot be at the same time in the same thing »*[^9]: therefore it is impossible for the vices and sins to have a connection.

> **Conclusion.** The vices and sins do not have a connection; yet it can be said that on the side of aversion they are in some way connected.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since to a sin two things concur, namely aversion and conversion[^10], it happens in two ways to compare the vices and sins to one another: either insofar as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, or insofar as they turn toward changeable goods. — If therefore we speak of the vices according as they turn away from the one unchangeable Good, then they deprive a man of grace and of the other gratuitous virtues and make a man deserving to be deprived of glory and of the reward corresponding to all good merits; and this indeed comes about through one vice just as through the rest. *(Conclusion 1.)* And as to this the vices and sins have a certain connection, for the reason that they turn away from one, and by all vices one and the same God is offended.

But if we speak of the vices as to conversion, then by conversions to diverse changeable goods there arise in us diverse proclivities and vices, by which we are bound to diverse penal sufferings. *(Conclusion 2.)* And in this way there is no connection among the vices, because for each one a man will be punished by a special punishment due to him; nor moreover can they be connected on account of the repugnance of the proclivities; nor do they have a cause on account of which they should be connected, because they arise from diverse works and tend to diverse ends. Since therefore the vices take their origin and distinction on the side of conversion, and on this side do not have a connection, although in some way they agree in aversion; *(Conclusion 3.)* it must be conceded without qualification that the vices and sins are not connected[^11], as the reasons for this side show.

**To the opposite:**

*To 1, 2.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary side from the authority of *Ecclesiastes* and the authority of *James* — that he who sins in one loses many good things, and even becomes guilty as to all — it must be said *(Reason 1.)* that this is not said because, on account of one vice, someone incurs the proclivities and defectibilities of the other vices necessarily and immediately; but this is said because he who sins by one sin loses charity, in which is the fullness of merits and the fulfillment of the commandments[^12]. — *(Reason 2.)* Or certainly it is said that he loses many good things and becomes guilty as to all, for the reason that he is deprived of all the gratuitous virtues. — *(Reason 3.)* Or in a third way, because he loses all the merits which he previously had; for by one mortal sin all things become useless for attaining
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glory[^13]. — *(Reason 4.)* Or in a fourth way he is said to lose many good things and to be guilty of all, because by the desert of one sin he loses the eternal rewards which were to be rendered to all the virtues and merits: but this is not on account of the connection of the vices themselves, but rather on account of the connection of the virtues and gifts or rewards corresponding to them; on account of which connection, if anyone is deprived of one of those goods, he must necessarily be deprived of the rest also. But this does not suffice to make a connection among the vices, because, as was said above, the vices consist not only in aversion from God, but also in conversion to a changeable good.

*To 3.* To that which is objected — that a virtue is not expelled except by the introduction of the vice opposed to it, just as neither is a vice except by the introduction of a virtue — it must be said *(Reason 1.)* that it is not alike: because more is required for building up than for destroying[^14], and more things are necessary for a man to please God than for him to displease, and through this too more things are necessary for setting straight than for bending awry. *(Note.)* And therefore, although the bending-awry of a vice cannot be excluded except by a habit directly opposed to it, nevertheless the rectitude of a virtue can be taken away not only by the vice opposed to it, but also by one[^15] opposed to another virtue; whence unbelief, which is opposed to faith, excludes charity. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other. — *(Reason 2.)* Moreover, because the virtues are connected, therefore a vice which removes one consequently removes the remaining one; but the vices, because they are not connected, cannot be removed except by each one being expelled by the virtue directly opposed to it.

*To 4.* To that which is objected — that a sin deforms the whole image, just as grace reforms it — it must be said *(Twofold deformation.)* that the image is said to be deformed in two ways: either on account of the absence of the light of grace, or on account of the disordering in the acts of those powers in which the image is regarded. In the first way indeed the whole image is deformed by one sin and vice; in the second way not, because not every vice regards the acts of the several powers. But grace, when it reforms the soul, reforms it in both ways, both by beautifying the face of the soul itself and by setting straight every power with respect to its operation[^16]. And therefore, although in the informing by grace the other virtues concur, nevertheless the several vices do not in this way accompany the deformation by one sin.

*To 5.* To that which is objected — that all the vices are born from concupiscence and are commanded by pride, just as the virtues from charity and grace — it must be said that it is not alike: both because concupiscence is not a sufficient cause with respect to the vices, but only a disposing one[^17]; *(Note.)* and also because, since concupiscence branches out with respect to diverse objects of desire, it looks toward diverse ends and frequently tends to contraries; whence there is there a dispersion rather than a connection. But grace is a sufficient origin of the virtues, and charity moves and inclines them all to one end[^18]. And therefore the vices are not connected as the gratuitous virtues are, both from the defect of principle and also from the defect of a uniting bond.

*To 6.* To that which is objected — that virtue and vice are immediate opposites — it must be said *(Distinction.)* that of virtue and vice it happens to speak in two ways: either in general, or in particular. If we speak in general, then they are immediately opposed concerning their subject; but if in particular, then they are not immediately opposed, for the reason that it is not necessary that someone have gratuitous continence, or be lustful[^19]; and so it is to be understood concerning the other vices and virtues. And therefore, although, virtue being absent, vice is necessarily present, it does not however follow that, every gratuitous virtue being absent, on account of this all the vices are present. — And if you object that, as a vice stands with respect to virtue, so a species of this vice stands with respect to the virtue opposed to it: it must be said that it is not alike: *(Note.)* because all the gratuitous virtues are[^20] to be united in one formal element, by reason of which all vices are opposed to it and can stand with none; but when they are distinguished into species, this is by reason of special habits, by reason of which not just any virtue is opposed to just any vice, but to the one opposed to it. And therefore there is one mode of comparing vice to gratuitous virtue in general, and another in particular; and therefore that reasoning does not compel[^21].

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la: Vers. 18. — Paulo inferius pro *concomitarentur* non pauci codd. *communicarentur*.

en: Verse 18. — A little below, for *concomitarentur* not a few codices read *communicarentur*.

la: Vers. 10.

en: Verse 10.

la: Vide supra q. 1. — August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 9: *Virtus vero, quo una ingressa fuerit, quoniam secum ceteras ducit, profecto vitia cedent omnia, quaecumque inerant.* — Subinde post *esse* edd. repetunt *connexio.*

en: See above q. 1. — Augustine, *Letter* 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 9: *But virtue, wherever it has once entered, since it draws the rest along with it, will assuredly cause all the vices, whatever were present, to depart.* — Thereafter, after *esse* the editions repeat *connexio.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 2. — August., de Duabus Animabus c. 6. n. 6: *Referamus nunc considerationem ad virtutem, cuius intelligibili luce splendere animum convenientissime dicimus. Porro ab hac luce virtutis defectus quidam non pertinens animum* [quantum ad *esse* naturale]*, sed obscurans, vitium vocatur.* De hac definitione vitii sive peccati cfr. tom. II. pag. 838, nota 9. in fine. — Paulo inferius pro *quae imaginem deformat* cod. Z *imaginem deformantem.*

en: Cf. above d. 33, q. 2, to 2. — Augustine, *On the Two Souls* c. 6, n. 6: *Let us now refer the consideration to virtue, by whose intelligible light we most fittingly say that the soul shines. Now a certain defect away from this light of virtue, not destroying the soul* [as to its natural *being*]*, but darkening it, is called vice.* Concerning this definition of vice or sin cf. tom. II, p. 838, note 9, at the end. — A little below, for *quae imaginem deformat* codex Z reads *imaginem deformantem.*

la: Gregor., XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87: *Ipsa namque vitiorum regina superbia, cum devictum plene cor ceperit, mox illud septem principalibus vitiis quasi quibusdam suis ducibus devastandum tradit.* — De connexione virtutum cfr. supra q. 1, de caritate vide infra q. 6.

en: Gregory, *Morals* bk. XXXI, c. 45, n. 87: *For pride, the very queen of the vices, when it has fully captured a heart it has subdued, presently hands it over to the seven principal vices, as to certain captains of its own, to be laid waste.* — On the connection of the virtues cf. above, q. 1; on charity see below, q. 6.

la: Matth. 12, 30: *Qui non est mecum contra me est* etc. Cfr. ibid. 6, 24.

en: Matthew 12:30: *He who is not with me is against me*, etc. Cf. ibid. 6:24.

la: Cfr. Luc. 12, 47. seq.

en: Cf. Luke 12:47 ff.

la: Vide supra pag. 265, nota 7. et pag. 657, nota 4. — Paulo post pro *impliciti* edd. *implicati*, et pro *omnino* codd. GKZ *omnia*.

en: See above, p. 265, note 7, and p. 657, note 4. — A little after, for *impliciti* the editions read *implicati*, and for *omnino* the codices GKZ read *omnia*.

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 85, nota 10. — Non pauci codd. omittunt *in eodem*.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom see above, p. 85, note 10. — Not a few codices omit *in eodem* ("in the same thing").

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 2. et ibid. pag. 839, nota 4. in fine.

en: Cf. *Sentences* bk. II, d. 42, a. 3, q. 2, and ibid. p. 839, note 4, at the end.

la: Vide August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 8. seq., ubi Stoicorum sententiam de connexione peccatorum refellit. — Aliquanto superius pro *et vitia* edd. *in vitia*. In fine corp. pro *connexa* permulti codd. *annexa*.

en: See Augustine, *Letter* 167 (formerly 29), c. 2, n. 8 ff., where he refutes the opinion of the Stoics concerning the connection of sins. — Somewhat above, for *et vitia* the editions read *in vitia*. At the end of the body, for *connexa* very many codices read *annexa*.

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 13, 8: *Qui enim diligit proximum Legem implevit*, et v. 10: *Plenitudo ergo Legis est dilectio.* — Explicatio locorum praenotatorum, quae hic exhibetur, est secundum August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 5. n. 16. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum hunc primum simulque et tertium seq. explicandi modum sic innuit: *Vere qui in uno offendit est transgressor totius Legis, quia qui peccat contra auctorem Legis facit, quem in sua Lege negligit, et contra caritatem, quae est causa et mater totius Legis. Hanc sententiam ex simili videamus. Si quis me offenderet, omnes fratres et amicos meos in me offenderet et quodam modo contra omnes peccaret. Sic qui unum mandatum negligit cetera, quae completa videbantur adiuvare, sibi inutilia reddit.* — Edd. addunt *Christi*.

en: There is regard to that of Rom. 13:8: *For he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the Law*, and v. 10: *Love therefore is the fullness of the Law.* — The explanation of the passages noted above, which is here presented, is according to Augustine, *Letter* 167 (formerly 29), c. 5, n. 16. The Ordinary Gloss, in Strabo, intimates this first and at the same time the third following manner of explaining thus: *Truly he who offends in one is a transgressor of the whole Law, because he who sins acts against the author of the Law, whom he neglects in his Law, and against charity, which is the cause and mother of the whole Law. Let us see this opinion from a likeness. If someone were to offend me, he would offend all my brothers and friends in me, and in a certain way would sin against all. So he who neglects one commandment renders the rest, which seemed completed, to be of help, useless to himself.* — The editions add *Christi* ("of Christ").

la: Hieronym., Comment. in Eccl. 9, 18: *Quia vero in Hebraeo potest legi: Et qui peccat unum perdet bonitatem multam, etiam sic sentiendum est, quod propter unum peccatum multae iustitiae retro pereant, et invicem se virtutes sequi, et qui unam habuerit, habere omnes, et qui in uno peccaverit, cum omnibus vitiis subiacere* (Iac. 2, 10.). — Quartus modus datur in V. Decret. Gregor. lit. 41. ubi c. 9. haec regula proponitur: *Committens unum peccatum reus est omnium quoad vitam aeternam.* — Paulo ante pro *ex uno* codd. WX *pro uno.*

en: Jerome, *Commentary on Ecclesiastes* 9, 18: *But because in the Hebrew it can be read: And he who sins in one shall lose much goodness, it must also be understood thus, that on account of one sin many righteous deeds perish backward, and that the virtues follow one another in turn, and that he who has had one has all, and that he who has sinned in one lies under all the vices* (James 2, 10). — The fourth mode is given in the Fifth Book of the Decretals of Gregory, title 41, where in c. 9 this rule is set forth: *He who commits one sin is guilty of all as to eternal life.* — A little before, for *ex uno* codices WX read *pro uno.*

la: Cfr. verba Aristot., supra pag. 189, nota 2. allata.

en: Cf. the words of Aristotle adduced above, p. 189, note 2.

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *vitium*. Paulo superius pro *rectitudo virtutis* cod. Q *rectificatio ipsius virtutis*. Inferius pro *reliquam*, cui voci codd. BCDMNO praefigunt *et*, Vat. *reliqua*.

en: The editions, with several codices, read *vitium* ("vice"). A little above, for *rectitudo virtutis* codex Q reads *rectificatio ipsius virtutis*. Below, for *reliquam* — to which word codices BCDMNO prefix *et* — the Vatican edition reads *reliqua*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — *Faciei animae* est secundum Gregor. *ipsa mens*; cfr. tom. II, pag. 641, nota 1. — Subinde pro *in gratiae informatione* [Vat. *reformatione*] codd. BCD *in genere in informatione*, cod. A *in genere gratiae informatione*, plures codd. *in genere informatione*, edd. ut supra.

en: Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, in the body. — "The face of the soul" is, according to Gregory, *the mind itself*; cf. tom. II, p. 641, note 1. — Thereupon, for *in gratiae informatione* [the Vatican: *reformatione*] codices BCD read *in genere in informatione*, codex A *in genere gratiae informatione*, several codices *in genere informatione*, the editions as above.

la: in genere. In fine arg. pro *comitantur* plures codd. *commutantur*, pauci *committuntur*, codd. SVZ *concomitantur*. Circa initium solut. pro *luminis gratiae* cod. B *ipsius gratiae*.

en: in general. At the end of the argument, for *comitantur* several codices read *commutantur*, a few *committuntur*, codices SVZ *concomitantur*. About the beginning of the solution, for *luminis gratiae* codex B reads *ipsius gratiae*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. seq.; Breviloq. p. III. c. 8, nec non Speculum animae, ubi etiam ramificatio vitiorum perhibetur. — Superius pro *omnia* cod. X *singula*. Mox pro *inspicit* cod. K *bene respicit*, edd. *inspicit vel inducit*.

en: See *Sentences* bk. II, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1 ff.; *Breviloquium* pt. III, c. 8, and also the *Mirror of the Soul*, where also the branching-out of the vices is set forth. — Above, for *omnia* codex X reads *singula*. Presently, for *inspicit* codex K reads *bene respicit*, the editions *inspicit vel inducit*.

la: Ut ostenditur infra q. 6.

en: As is shown below, q. 6.

la: Cod. X *uniri*, plures alii codd. *naturam*, edd. *convenientiam*; nostra lectio sumta est e codd. AKMPRSZ (aa a secunda manu) bb.

en: Codex X reads *uniri* ("to be united"), several other codices *naturam* ("a nature"), the editions *convenientiam* ("an agreement"); our reading is taken from codices AKMPRSZ (aa at second hand) bb.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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**`[?]` flags.** None — pp.799–801 fully legible at 450 dpi; all OCR garbles resolved against the PDF column bands (e.g. `quaerilur`→*quaeritur*, `peccaveril`→*peccaverit*, `vitiiim`→*vitium*, `connexionein`→*connexionem*, `o/fendil`→*offendit*).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 802 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum ponenda sit aequalitas in habitibus gratuitis.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum sit ponere aequalitatem in habitibus gratuitis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur *Apocalypsis* vigesimo primo[^1]: *Latera civitatis aequalia*; Glossa: id est, virtutes gratuitae sunt aequales. — Ad hoc ipsum habetur auctoritas in littera[^2], et superius habita fuit distinctione vigesima quinta auctoritas valde expressa.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Ubicumque est una ratio bonitatis, necesse est, quod sit bonitatis aequalitas; sed in omnibus habitibus gratuitis una est ratio bonitatis, videlicet gratia gratum faciens et ipsa caritas[^3]: ergo videtur, quod simpliciter sit in eis bonitatis aequalitas.

3. Item, aut virtutes in eodem sunt aequales, aut non. Si sic; habeo propositum. Si non: ergo meliori virtuti debetur maius praemium, et minori minus; sed motui virtutis debetur praemium substantiale[^4], illud autem est unum: ergo uni et eidem homini in eodem statu gratiae debetur maius et minus praemium; quod est inconveniens.

4. Item, una virtus denominat alteram, secundum quod vult Augustinus et Bernardus[^5] — est enim prudentia fortis, et fortitudo prudens — aut ergo prudentia et fortitudo sunt aequales, aut non. Si non; esto ergo, quod prudentia sit maior quam fortitudo, tunc arguitur sic: prudentia est maior quam fortitudo: ergo fortitudo est magis prudens, quam sit fortis in eodem, quia secundum quantitatem prudentiae in eodem est fortitudo prudens; sed quanto virtus fortitudinis est prudentior, tanto nobilior est et excellentior: si ergo magis est prudens quam fortis: ergo est nobilior et excellentior se ipsa. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. *Primae ad Corinthios* decimo tertio[^6]: *Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas*; et in praecedenti capitulo: *Adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro*: si igitur caritas est maior et excellentior aliis: ergo non est aequalitas in habitibus gratuitis.

2. Item, de quolibet Confessore cantatur[^7]: *Non est inventus similis illi, qui conservaret Legem Excelsi*; sed si omnia dona gratuita essent aequalia, tunc qui excederet in uno excederet in omnibus: ergo si verbum illud alicui posset vere attribui, nunquam conveniret alteri, quia *« quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit »*.

3. Item, maiori bono opponitur maius malum, et e converso, quia *« privationes cognoscuntur per habitus »*[^8]: ergo cum vitia opposita virtutibus non habeant aequalitatem, quia unum vitium est maius altero; pari ratione videtur, quod nec virtutes gratuitae.

4. Item, habitus crescunt et augmentantur in nobis, secundum quod plus et plus disponimus nos per bonos actus[^9]; sed nos videmus, quod aliquis plus se exercet in actu unius virtutis quam in actu alterius: ergo videtur, quod magis crescat virtus illa quam aliae: ergo necesse est, aliquando virtutem illam esse aliis inaequalem.

5. Item, caritas est vinculum personarum et est vinculum virtutum[^10] — plures enim personae
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ligantur per vinculum gratiae in una virtute, et plures virtutes in uno homine — sicut ergo se habet una virtus respectu diversarum personarum, sic unus homo respectu virtutum plurium; sed una virtus a diversis personis potest participari inaequaliter: ergo et plures virtutes ab eodem homine.

6. Item, habitus virtutis est habilitare ad actum suum, per se loquendo[^11]; ergo maioris virtutis magis habilitare, et aequalis aequaliter habilitare: si ergo omnes virtutes in eodem homine sunt aequales, necessario idem homo aequaliter erit habilis et facilis ad actus omnium virtutum, quod per experientiam deprehenditur esse falsum. Multi enim habiles sunt ad actum abstinentiae, qui tamen cum difficultate habent usum patientiae et obedientiae.

> **Conclusio.** Duplici via monstratur, quod virtutes gratuitae quodam modo sunt aequales, quodam modo inaequales, simpliciter tamen aequales dici possunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de ipsis habitibus gratuitis contingit loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad ipsum habitum, aut quantum ad exercitium[^12]. *(Via 1, cum distinctione.)* — Si loquamur de ipsis quantum ad habitum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: *(Subdistinctio.)* aut respectu gratiae informantis et quodam modo causantis, aut respectu liberi arbitrii suscipientis et cooperantis. — *(Conclusio 1.)* Si respectu gratiae informantis; sic omnes habent aequalitatem, pro eo quod gratia gratum faciens secundum quantitatem suam et excellentiam reddit gratam Deo animam et eius potentias et habitus, et operationes meritorias[^13]. — Si vero loquamur de ipsis respectu liberi arbitrii consentientis et suscipientis; sic, quia liberum arbitrium in actu unius virtutis maiorem invenit complacentiam quam in alio, et maiorem invenit repugnantiam in uno quam in altero, secundum diversas sui inclinationes et dispositiones; *(Conclusio 2.)* sic non aequaliter est omnimodam reperire aequalitatem in habitibus virtutum, pro eo quod liberum arbitrium magis fervet quantum ad unam virtutem quam ad aliam, magis etiam adhaeret uni virtuti quam alii.

Si vero loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad exercitium; *(Conclusio 3.)* sic vix vel nunquam aequantur nec in se nec in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii cooperationem. *(Rationes.)* — In se non, quia exercitium unius virtutis est fructuosius quam exercitium alterius, sicut exercitium pietatis[^14], quam abstinentiae; exercitium autem unius virtutis in eodem est securius quam exercitium alterius, sicut exercitium humilitatis et timoris, quam alterius virtutis. — Similiter non habent aequalitatem in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii cooperationem, quia nemo est, qui aequaliter se exerceat in actu omnium virtutum. Aliqui enim magis vacant circa activam, aliqui vero magis circa contemplativam.

*(Epilogus.)* Et sic concedi potest, quod habitus gratuiti quodam modo sunt aequales, et quodam modo inaequales: aequales quidem sunt quantum ad gratiam informantem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem[^15]; inaequales vero in comparatione ad liberi arbitrii consensum et exterius exercitium. Et secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes, quae ad utramque partem inducuntur.

*(Via 2, cum quadruplici distinctione et conclusione.)* Aliter potest dici, quod de virtutibus est loqui quadrupliciter: aut quantum ad *dignitatem* respectu obiecti; et sic una est excellentior altera, etiam in eodem, sicut virtutes theologicae, quam cardinales. Aut quantum ad *fervorem* et *facilitatem* respectu actus proprii; et sic adhuc non est necesse, quod habitus gratuiti in eodem adaequentur. Aut quantum ad *radicationem* et *stabilitatem* respectu subiecti; et sic adhuc non est necesse, aequalitatem esse, quia talis radicatio venit ex frequentia et assuefactione[^16] circa actum alicuius virtutis. Aut quantum ad *ordinem* et *efficaciam* respectu praemii; et quantum ad hoc habent aequalitatem in eodem; propter hoc quod quantitas meriti cuiuslibet virtutis mensuratur secundum quantitatem gratiae, quae facit opus Deo placitum, et secundum quantitatem caritatis, quae dat operi cuiuslibet virtutis valorem et pondus[^17]. *(Ratio duplex.)* Et quia una est gratia gratum faciens, ceteras virtutes informans in uno homine; una est etiam caritas per modum ponderis ad finem inclinans: hinc est, quod quantum ad ordinem in finem et efficaciam merendi necesse est, omnes virtutes in eodem aequari. — Rursus, quia bonitas principalis et essentialis virtutum in hoc attenditur, quod ordinant et disponunt ad summum praemium; et in hoc virtutes habent aequari: *(Conclusio 4.)* hinc est, quod Magister[^18] simpliciter concludit, et Sancti dicunt, in uno et eodem aequales esse omnes habitus gratuitos. — Et ideo simpliciter concedi possunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. Ad obiecta in contrarium satis de facili patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de caritate, quod est aliis eminentior; dicendum, quod hoc
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intelligitur ratione exercitii in actu suo, in quo plus hauritur de gratia, et minor est occasio periclitandi. *(Notandum.)* Affectus enim amoris divini, dum abstrahit a terrenis, facit recedere ab occasione peccati; dum vero unit caelestibus, facit inde hauriri humorem gratiae Spiritus sancti[^19]. Et ideo ex hoc non concluditur inaequalitas virtutum quantum ad meritum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cantatur de Confessoribus: *Non est inventus similis illi*; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur non ratione habitus, sed ratione alicuius exterioris usus; et hoc innuit ipsum vocabulum, cum dicitur: *qui conservaret Legem Excelsi*; ex quo innuit, excellentiam illam intelligendam fore in opere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maiori bono opponitur maius malum; dicendum, quod illud non est regulariter[^20] verum, immo aliquando contingit, minori bono opponi maius malum, sicut desperatio, quae opponitur spei, peior est quam odium, quod opponitur caritati. *(Notandum.)* Praeterea, aliunde habent virtutes aequalitatem, aliunde habent oppositorum diversitatem. Aequalitatem enim habent ex parte gratiae, ratione cuius quod opponitur uni virtuti per consequens opponitur omnibus; oppositorum autem diversitatem habent ratione specialium actuum et obiectorum; et ex illa parte non est necesse, habitus virtutum habere omnimodam aequalitatem, sicut prius tactum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus crescunt et augmentantur in nobis, secundum quod plus disponimus nos per actus; dicendum, quod crementum habitus quantum ad bonitatem essentialem in genere gratuiti attenditur ex augmento ipsius gratiae, qua augmentata, crescunt et ceterae virtutes[^21]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod magis nos exercemus in actu unius virtutis quam in actu alterius, ergo magis in illa crescimus; dicendum, quod non sequitur, pro eo quod debitus usus et exercitatio in actu unius virtutis disponit ad incrementum omnium. Unde sicut in communitate fraternitatis, licet unus magis negotietur in acquirendo quam alter, tamen bona acquisita omnibus distribuuntur aequaliter; sic et suo modo in proposito intelligendum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una virtus a diversis personis potest diversimode participari, ergo et diversae virtutes ab eodem; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod unius virtutis in diversis diversae sunt radices; diversarum vero virtutum in eodem non sunt diversae radices, sed una[^22], videlicet una gratia, per quam est acceptatio, et una caritas, per quam est meriti perfectio.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus virtutis est reddere potentiam facilem; dicendum, quod facilitas[^23] potentiae ad aliquem actum maior et minor non tantum venit ex parte perfectionis et bonitatis ipsius habitus, verum etiam ex parte dispositionis subiecti. *(Notandum.)* Unde secundum quod ad actus diversarum virtutum liberum arbitrium secundum plus et minus cooperatur, secundum hoc plus et minus facilitatur, licet etiam habitus virtutum, quantum est de se, adaequentur. *(Notandum.)* Unde nec ista ratio nec aliae probant inaequalitatem in habitibus gratuitis quantum ad bonitatem essentialem et completivam, sed solum quantum ad aliquid accidentale et annexum, sicut ex his quae praedicta sunt, satis est manifestum.

english:
### Question V. *Whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits.*

Fifthly it is asked whether equality is to be posited among the gratuitous habits. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, from that which is said in *Revelation* twenty-one[^1]: *The sides of the city are equal*; the Gloss: that is, the gratuitous virtues are equal. — For this very point an authority is had in the text[^2], and above, in the twenty-fifth distinction, a very express authority was had.

2. Likewise, this very thing seems [so] by reason. Wherever there is one account of goodness, it is necessary that there be an equality of goodness; but in all the gratuitous habits there is one account of goodness, namely grace making [one] pleasing and charity itself[^3]: therefore it seems that there is in them simply an equality of goodness.

3. Likewise, either the virtues in the same [man] are equal, or not. If so, I have what was proposed. If not: then to the better virtue is owed a greater reward, and to the lesser a lesser one; but to the motion of a virtue is owed a substantial reward[^4], and that is one: therefore to one and the same man in the same state of grace is owed a greater and a lesser reward; which is unfitting.

4. Likewise, one virtue denominates another, as Augustine and Bernard hold[^5] — for prudence is brave, and fortitude prudent — therefore either prudence and fortitude are equal, or not. If not, let it be then that prudence is greater than fortitude; then it is argued thus: prudence is greater than fortitude: therefore fortitude is more prudent than it is brave in the same [man], because according to the quantity of prudence in the same [man] is fortitude prudent; but the more the virtue of fortitude is the more prudent, the more noble and excellent it is: if therefore it is more prudent than brave: therefore it is more noble and excellent than itself. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *First to the Corinthians*, thirteen[^6]: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity*; and in the preceding chapter: *I yet show you a more excellent way*: if therefore charity is greater and more excellent than the others: therefore there is no equality among the gratuitous habits.

2. Likewise, of every Confessor it is sung[^7]: *There was not found one like him, who kept the Law of the Most High*; but if all the gratuitous gifts were equal, then he who excelled in one would excel in all: therefore if that word could truly be attributed to anyone, it would never fit another, because *« that which is said by superabundance belongs to one alone »*.

3. Likewise, to a greater good is opposed a greater evil, and conversely, because *« privations are known through habits »*[^8]: therefore since the vices opposed to the virtues do not have equality, since one vice is greater than another; by like reasoning it seems that neither [do] the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more and more by good acts[^9]; but we see that someone exercises himself more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another: therefore it seems that that virtue grows more than the others: therefore it is necessary that sometimes that virtue be unequal to the others.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of persons and is the bond of virtues[^10] — for many persons
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are bound by the bond of grace in one virtue, and many virtues in one man — as therefore one virtue stands with respect to diverse persons, so one man with respect to many virtues; but one virtue can be participated unequally by diverse persons: therefore also many virtues by the same man.

6. Likewise, [the function] of the habit of virtue is to enable for its own act, speaking *per se*[^11]; therefore [the function] of a greater virtue [is] to enable more, and of an equal one to enable equally: if therefore all the virtues in the same man are equal, necessarily the same man will be equally enabled and ready for the acts of all the virtues, which by experience is found to be false. For many are enabled for the act of abstinence, who nevertheless have the use of patience and obedience with difficulty.

> **Conclusion.** By a twofold way it is shown that the gratuitous virtues are in a certain manner equal, in a certain manner unequal, yet can simply be called equal.

**I respond:** It must be said that of the gratuitous habits themselves it happens to speak in two ways: either with respect to the habit itself, or with respect to its exercise[^12]. *(Way 1, with distinction.)* — If we speak of them with respect to the habit, this can be in two ways: *(Subdistinction.)* either with respect to the grace informing and in a certain manner causing [them], or with respect to free choice receiving and cooperating. — *(Conclusion 1.)* If with respect to the informing grace; thus all have equality, for the reason that grace making [one] pleasing, according to its own quantity and excellence, renders the soul pleasing to God, and its powers and habits, and meritorious operations[^13]. — But if we speak of them with respect to free choice consenting and receiving; thus, because free choice finds a greater complacency in the act of one virtue than in another, and finds a greater repugnance in one than in another, according to its diverse inclinations and dispositions; *(Conclusion 2.)* thus it is not so as to find in every way equality in the habits of the virtues, for the reason that free choice grows more fervent toward one virtue than toward another, and also adheres more to one virtue than to another.

But if we speak of the virtues with respect to exercise; *(Conclusion 3.)* thus they are scarcely or never made equal, neither in themselves nor in comparison to the cooperation of free choice. *(Reasons.)* — In themselves not, because the exercise of one virtue is more fruitful than the exercise of another, as the exercise of piety[^14] than [that] of abstinence; and the exercise of one virtue in the same [man] is more secure than the exercise of another, as the exercise of humility and of fear than [that] of another virtue. — Likewise they do not have equality in comparison to the cooperation of free choice, because there is no one who exercises himself equally in the act of all the virtues. For some are more free for the active [life], others rather for the contemplative.

*(Epilogue.)* And thus it can be granted that the gratuitous habits are in a certain manner equal, and in a certain manner unequal: equal indeed with respect to the informing grace, as the reasons for the first part show[^15]; but unequal in comparison to the consent of free choice and the exterior exercise. And according to this the reasons which are brought for either part can be resolved.

*(Way 2, with a fourfold distinction and conclusion.)* Otherwise it can be said that of the virtues there is to speak in a fourfold manner: either with respect to *dignity* in regard to the object; and thus one is more excellent than another, even in the same [man], as the theological virtues than the cardinal. Or with respect to *fervor* and *facility* in regard to the proper act; and thus it is still not necessary that the gratuitous habits be made equal in the same [man]. Or with respect to *rootedness* and *stability* in regard to the subject; and thus it is still not necessary that there be equality, because such rootedness comes from frequency and habituation[^16] about the act of some virtue. Or with respect to *order* and *efficacy* in regard to the reward; and with respect to this they have equality in the same [man]; on account of this, that the quantity of the merit of any virtue is measured according to the quantity of grace, which makes the work pleasing to God, and according to the quantity of charity, which gives to the work of any virtue value and weight[^17]. *(Twofold reason.)* And because there is one grace making [one] pleasing, informing the other virtues in one man; there is also one charity inclining to the end by way of weight: hence it is that, with respect to the order to the end and the efficacy of meriting, it is necessary that all the virtues in the same [man] be made equal. — Again, because the principal and essential goodness of the virtues is regarded in this, that they order and dispose to the highest reward; and in this the virtues are to be made equal: *(Conclusion 4.)* hence it is that the Master[^18] simply concludes, and the Saints say, that in one and the same [man] all the gratuitous habits are equal. — And therefore the reasons which show this can simply be granted. To the objections to the contrary the response is sufficiently easy through the things which have been said.

*(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)* 1. For to that which is first objected concerning charity, that it is more eminent than the others; it must be said that this
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is understood by reason of [its] exercise in its act, in which more is drawn from grace, and there is less occasion of being endangered. *(Note.)* For the affection of divine love, while it draws away from earthly things, makes [one] withdraw from the occasion of sin; while indeed it unites [one] to heavenly things, it makes the moisture of the grace of the Holy Spirit be drawn thence[^19]. And therefore from this no inequality of the virtues is concluded with respect to merit.

2. To that which is objected, that it is sung of the Confessors: *There was not found one like him*; it must be said that that is understood not by reason of habit, but by reason of some exterior use; and the very word suggests this, when it is said: *who kept the Law of the Most High*; from which it suggests that that excellence is to be understood in the work.

3. To that which is objected, that to a greater good is opposed a greater evil; it must be said that that is not regularly[^20] true, nay sometimes it happens that a greater evil is opposed to a lesser good, as despair, which is opposed to hope, is worse than hatred, which is opposed to charity. *(Note.)* Moreover, the virtues have their equality from one source, [and] the diversity of their opposites from another. For they have equality on the side of grace, by reason of which what is opposed to one virtue is consequently opposed to all; but they have the diversity of opposites by reason of special acts and objects; and from that side it is not necessary that the habits of the virtues have equality in every way, as was touched on before.

4. To that which is objected, that habits grow and are augmented in us, according as we dispose ourselves more by acts; it must be said that the increase of a habit with respect to essential goodness in the gratuitous genus is regarded from the augmentation of grace itself, which being augmented, the other virtues also grow[^21]. When therefore it is said that we exercise ourselves more in the act of one virtue than in the act of another, therefore we grow more in that one; it must be said that it does not follow, for the reason that the due use and exercise in the act of one virtue disposes to the increase of all. Whence just as in a community of brotherhood, although one trades more in acquiring than another, nevertheless the goods acquired are distributed equally to all; so also in its own manner is it to be understood in the matter at hand.

5. To that which is objected, that one virtue can be participated in diverse ways by diverse persons, therefore also diverse virtues by the same [man]; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that of one virtue in diverse [persons] the roots are diverse; but of diverse virtues in the same [man] the roots are not diverse, but one[^22], namely one grace, through which there is acceptance, and one charity, through which there is the perfection of merit.

6. To that which is objected, that [the function] of the habit of virtue is to render the power ready; it must be said that the greater and lesser facility[^23] of a power toward some act comes not only from the side of the perfection and goodness of the habit itself, but also from the side of the disposition of the subject. *(Note.)* Whence, according as free choice cooperates more and less toward the acts of diverse virtues, according to this it is made ready more and less, although the habits of the virtues, as far as is of themselves, are made equal. *(Note.)* Whence neither this reasoning nor the others prove inequality among the gratuitous habits with respect to essential and completive goodness, but only with respect to something accidental and annexed, as from the things which have been said before is sufficiently manifest.

la: Vers. 16: *Et civitas in quadro posita est... et longitudo et altitudo et latitudo eius aequalia sunt.* — Glossa est secundum Gregor., II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 10. n. 17. et 18, ubi s. Doctor per quatuor latera intelligi vult vel fidem, spem, caritatem et operationem (cfr. supra pag. 533, nota 1. et pag. 553, nota 5.), vel quatuor virtutes cardinales, quae ita, ut exponit, in quadro sunt, ut una aliam non excedat. — In pluribus codd. legitur sic: *Glossa, id est virtutes; igitur secundum Glossam virtutes gratuitae sunt aequales.* Superius pro *habitibus gratuitis* cod. A *virtutibus gratuitis*, Vat. omittit *gratuitis*.

en: Verse 16: *And the city is set foursquare... and its length and height and breadth are equal.* — The Gloss is according to Gregory, *Homilies on Ezekiel* bk. II, homily 10, nn. 17 and 18, where the holy Doctor wishes the four sides to be understood either of faith, hope, charity and operation (cf. above, p. 533, note 1, and p. 553, note 5), or of the four cardinal virtues, which, as he expounds, are so foursquare that one does not exceed another. — In several codices it reads thus: *The Gloss, that is the virtues; therefore according to the Gloss the gratuitous virtues are equal.* Above, for *gratuitous habits* cod. A [reads] *gratuitous virtues*, the Vatican [edition] omits *gratuitous*.

la: Hic c. 2. et supra d. XXV. c. 5, ubi Gregorii verba habentur, de quibus in nota praeced. sermo fuit.

en: Here, c. 2, and above, d. XXV, c. 5, where the words of Gregory are had, of which there was discussion in the preceding note.

la: Cfr. infra q. 6. et supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. nec non d. 27. a. I. q. 3.

en: Cf. below, q. 6, and above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 5, in the body, as well as d. 27, a. I, q. 3.

la: Quia penes ipsum motum virtutis gratuitae proprie consistit meritum; vide supra pag. 381, nota I. — Praemium substantiale est visio et possessio Dei, quae est una. — Pro *virtutis* cod. P *virtutum*.

en: Because in the very motion of gratuitous virtue the merit properly consists; see above, p. 381, note I. — The substantial reward is the vision and possession of God, which is one. — For *virtutis* cod. P [reads] *virtutum*.

la: Vide supra pag. 714, nota I. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See above, p. 714, note I. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Vers. 13, ubi pro *horum* plurimi codd. *his*. Seq. testimonium est ibid. 12, 31.

en: Verse 13, where for *horum* very many codices [read] *his*. The following testimony is ibid. 12:31.

la: In offic. scil. Confes. Pontif., Antiph. 2. ad Laudes, et sumta sunt haec verba ex Eccli. 44, 20. — In fine arg. adducitur dictum Aristot. ex eius V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.).

en: In the office, namely of a Confessor Pontiff, Antiphon 2 at Lauds, and these words are taken from Ecclesiasticus 44:20. — At the end of the argument is adduced a saying of Aristotle from his *Topics* bk. V, c. 3 (c. 5).

la: Averroes in III. de Anima, text. 25. (ubi Aristot. docet, animam cognoscere malum per suum oppositum) ait: *Et universaliter omnes privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per contraria, scilicet per cognitionem habitus et per cognitionem defectus habitus.* Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota I. — De opposito errore, *« omnia peccata esse paria »*, quem iam Cicero impugnavit IV. de Finibus bonor. et malor. c. 27. seq., August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 4. ait: *Hoc autem de paritate peccatorum soli Stoici ausi sunt disputare, contra omnem sensum generis humani; quam eorum vanitatem in Ioviniano illo, qui in hac sententia Stoicus erat, in aucupandis autem et defensandis voluptatibus Epicureus, de Scripturis sanctis dilucidissime convicisti (Hieronyme)* etc. Cfr. etiam eiusd. Epist. 104. (alias 254.) c. I. n. 13. seq., nec non infra dub. 2. et supra q. 3.

en: Averroes on III *On the Soul*, text 25 (where Aristotle teaches that the soul knows evil through its opposite) says: *And universally all privations are not known except through their contraries, namely through the knowledge of the habit and through the knowledge of the defect of the habit.* Cf. above, p. 720, note I. — On the opposite error, *« that all sins are equal »*, which Cicero already attacked in IV *On the Ends of goods and evils*, c. 27 ff., Augustine, *Letter* 167 (alias 29), c. 2, n. 4, says: *But this concerning the parity of sins only the Stoics have dared to dispute, against all the sense of the human race; whose vanity, [seen] in that Jovinian, who in this opinion was a Stoic, but an Epicurean in catching and defending pleasures, you (Jerome) most lucidly convicted from the sacred Scriptures*, etc. Cf. also the same [author's] *Letter* 104 (alias 254), c. I, n. 13 ff., as well as below, dub. 2, and above, q. 3.

la: Vide supra pag. 721, nota 6. et 7.

en: See above, p. 721, notes 6 and 7.

la: Col. 3, 14: *Super omnia autem haec caritatem habete, quod est vinculum perfectionis.* Hieronym., I. Dialog. adversus Pelagianos, n. 19. ostendens, nos, quamdiu simus in via, cunctas virtutes habere non posse, ait: *Quis non cunctis cupiat florere virtutibus? Si totum requiris ab omnibus, tollis rerum diversitatem et gratiarum distantiam et Creatoris artificis varietatem, cuius sacro Propheta sonat carmine: Omnia in sapientia fecisti (Ps. 103, 24.). Indignetur lucifer, quare fulgorem lunae non habeat* etc. — Mox pro *vinculum gratiae* Vat. *vinculum caritatis*.

en: Colossians 3:14: *But above all these have charity, which is the bond of perfection.* Jerome, *Dialogue against the Pelagians* bk. I, n. 19, showing that we, so long as we are on the way, cannot have all the virtues, says: *Who would not desire to flourish in all the virtues? If you require the whole from all, you take away the diversity of things and the distance of graces and the variety of the Creator-artificer, whose sacred song the Prophet sounds: Thou hast made all things in wisdom (Ps. 103:24). Let lucifer be indignant, that he does not have the splendor of the moon*, etc. — Presently, for *bond of grace* the Vatican [edition reads] *bond of charity*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 388, nota I. et pag. 474, nota 3. — Cod. K *habilitare secundum usum suum*.

en: Cf. above, p. 388, note I, and p. 474, note 3. — Cod. K [reads] *to enable according to its own use*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine, et supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Superius pro *habitibus gratuitis* codd. A U *virtutibus*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2, at the end, and above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — Above, for *gratuitous habits* codd. A U [read] *virtutibus*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. I. q. I. seq. — Paulo ante pro *quantitatem* cod. K *qualitatem*.

en: Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 42, a. I, q. I ff. — A little before, for *quantitatem* cod. K [reads] *qualitatem*.

la: Cod. K *humilitatis vel pietatis*.

en: Cod. K [reads] *of humility or of piety*.

la: Cod. A addit *inductae*.

en: Cod. A adds *inductae* ("brought forward").

la: In pluribus codd. *assuetudine* legi posset ex modo factae abbreviationis. Inferius post *et quantum ad hoc* codd. K V subiungunt *quidem*.

en: In several codices *assuetudine* could be read from the manner of the abbreviation made. Below, after *et quantum ad hoc* codd. K V add *quidem*.

la: Cfr. quaest. seq.

en: Cf. the following question.

la: Hic c. 2. — Post *hinc est* cod. U inserit *etiam*. Paulo superius pro *ordinant et disponunt* cod. Z *ordinat et disponit*.

en: Here, c. 2. — After *hinc est* cod. U inserts *etiam*. A little above, for *ordinant et disponunt* cod. Z [reads] *ordinat et disponit*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. I. q. 4. et a. 2. q. I. — Pro *unit* et dein pro *hauriri* edd. *unitur* et *haurire*, atque superius pro *periclitandi* cod. K *peccandi*, et post *exercitii* addit *et*.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. I, q. 4, and a. 2, q. I. — For *unit* and then for *hauriri* the editions [read] *unitur* and *haurire*, and above, for *periclitandi* cod. K [reads] *peccandi*, and after *exercitii* adds *et*.

la: Codd. K Z *bene generaliter*.

en: Codd. K Z [read] *bene generaliter* ("well, generally").

la: Plurimi codd. omittunt *sed una*; edd. vero omittunt *una* post *videlicet*.

en: Very many codices omit *sed una*; but the editions omit *una* after *videlicet*.

la: Ita codd. A K N U X Z aa, in aliis et edd. *facilitatio*.

en: Thus codd. A K N U X Z aa; in others and in the editions [it reads] *facilitatio*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec de virtutibus infusis proprie non intelligitur de aequalitate earum ratione speciei et obiecti, cum constet, quod sic una virtus etiam in eodem homine maior sit altera, *« sicut virtutes theologicae, quam cardinales »* (hic in corp.); sed quaestio intelligitur secundum participationem subiecti. Magister (hic c. 2.) verius esse putat, ita pares esse virtutes in unoquoque, ut qui in una par exstiterit alteri, hic in omnibus eidem sit aequalis. Quod S. Thom. (hic a. 4; S. 1. II. q. 66. a. 2.) accuratius ita determinat, ut omnes virtutes unius hominis sint *« aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, in quantum aequaliter crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum proportionabiliter augeantur »* (S. loc. cit.). Idem tamen addit (ibid.): *« Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis, potest esse unus homo magis promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius vel ex natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono »*. Ab hac doctrina non recedunt S. Bonav., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. aliique (excepto Durando), licet hi aliis distinctionibus et verbis utantur; concorditer enim docent, habitus virtutum, quatenus a Deo sunt infusi, aequales esse secundum proportionem (cfr. hic solutiones ad 4. 5. 6.). De eadem quaestione praeter S. Thomam: B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petri a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 17. circa finem. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**II.** Quoad ultimam quaestionem communiter docetur, quod caritas est *motor* et *forma* et *finis* omnium virtutum (cfr. hic dub. 3, supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. 3.): *motor* quidem, quia movet voluntatem, quae est motor universalis omnium animae facultatum et virtutum; *forma*, non quidem constitutiva singularum virtutum (hic ad 3.), sed forma directiva ad finem, qui, quatenus intenditur, in moralibus quasi loco formae est et recte dicitur esse principium in operabilibus (cfr. hic ad 4.); denique ipsa est etiam *finis* ratione ordinis ad finem ultimum, cui fines proximi singularum virtutum subordinantur. — Ab auctore tangitur hic etiam alia virtutum informatio, nempe per *gratiam*, de qua vide supra d. 33. q. 5. scholion. Ad rem et ad mentem S. Bonaventurae dicit Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 27. q. 5. a. 2, ubi de hac ipsa quaestione agit): *« Virtutum quippe singularum quasi triplex forma est: una quoad esse, scilicet propria differentia; altera quoad bene esse, scilicet gratia; altera quoad agere, scilicet caritas (cfr. hic ad 2.); sicut altero informatur color, ut sit color proprius et distinctus; altero, ut sit color vividus et gratiosus sive pulcher; altero, ut sit secundum actum motivus visus »*. — In solutione ad 5. notanda est doctrina auctoris nostri, quo sensu formae adhuc possit esse forma. De hac quaestione S. Thom. cum plerisque aliis Petri Lombardi commentatoribus agit III. Sent. d. 27.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question concerning the infused virtues is properly understood not of their equality by reason of species and object — since it is agreed that in this way one virtue, even in the same man, is greater than another, *« as the theological virtues than the cardinal »* (here in the body) — but the question is understood according to the participation of the subject. The Master (here, c. 2) thinks it the truer view, that the virtues are so equal in each one, that he who has been equal to another in one [virtue], is in all equal to the same. Which St. Thomas (here a. 4; S. I-II, q. 66, a. 2) determines more accurately thus, that all the virtues of one man are *« equal by a certain equality of proportion, inasmuch as they grow equally in the man, just as the fingers of the hand are unequal according to quantity, but are equal according to proportion, since they are increased proportionably »* (St. Th. loc. cit.). Yet the same [author] adds (ibid.): *« But as to that which is material in the moral virtues, namely the inclination itself to the act of virtue, one man can be more ready for the act of one virtue than for the act of another, whether from nature, or from custom, or even from the gift of grace »*. From this doctrine St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla and others (except Durandus) do not depart, although these use other distinctions and words; for they teach concordantly that the habits of the virtues, inasmuch as they are infused by God, are equal according to proportion (cf. here the solutions to 4, 5, 6). On the same question, besides St. Thomas: Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 5. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 5, q. 17, near the end. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**II.** As to the last question, it is commonly taught that charity is the *mover* and the *form* and the *end* of all the virtues (cf. here dub. 3; above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, 3): the *mover* indeed, because it moves the will, which is the universal mover of all the faculties and virtues of the soul; the *form*, not indeed constitutive of the several virtues (here, to 3), but a directive form toward the end, which, inasmuch as it is intended, in moral matters is as it were in place of a form and is rightly said to be a principle in things-to-be-done (cf. here, to 4); finally it is also the *end* by reason of the order to the ultimate end, to which the proximate ends of the several virtues are subordinated. — There is also touched here by the author another informing of the virtues, namely through *grace*, on which see above, d. 33, q. 5, scholion. To the point and to the mind of St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise says (III *Sent.*, d. 27, q. 5, a. 2, where he treats of this very question): *« For of each of the virtues there is as it were a threefold form: one as to being, namely the proper difference; another as to well-being, namely grace; another as to acting, namely charity (cf. here, to 2); just as by the one color is informed, so that it be a proper and distinct color; by another, so that it be a vivid and gracious or beautiful color; by another, so that it be, according to act, a mover of sight »*. — In the solution to 5 is to be noted the doctrine of our author, in what sense a form can still be a form. On this question St. Thomas, with very many others of the commentators on Peter Lombard, treats in III *Sent.*, d. 27.

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translators_notes:
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**Decade gate.** d.31–d.40 polish-blocker fires only when **d.40** closes (NOT now).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0