title: Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De gratia Christi ut singularis personae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in Christo gratia singularis personae sit creata, vel increata.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo gratia singularis personae sit gratia creata, vel increata. Et quod sit creata, videtur.

1. In nullo incipit habitare Spiritus sanctus nisi per aliquem effectum gratiae, qui de novo detur animae[^p276-2]; sed in anima Christi habitavit Spiritus sanctus, et hoc non semper, sed ex tempore: ergo anima Christi habuit in se effectum gratiae, per quem sive secundum quem dicitur Spiritus sanctus inhabitare. Sed illud donum dicitur gratia singularis personae et est donum creatum: ergo etc.

2. Item, nulla anima placet Deo, nisi Deo conformetur et assimiletur per gratiam informantem ipsam et efficientem deiformem; sed gratia animam informans et Deo conformans non potest esse nisi gratia creata: ergo nulla anima Deo placet, nisi gratiam creatam in se habeat. Sed anima Christi Deo placuit[^p276-3] per gratiam illam, quam dicimus gratiam singularis personae: ergo etc.

3. Item, meritum dicit ordinationem ad aliquod maius per aliquod, quod reddit Deo acceptum[^p276-4]; sed quod reddit acceptum non potest esse sine gratia, quod vero ordinatur ad maius non potest esse nisi creatum: ergo meritum non est nisi per donum gratiae creatae. Sed meritum fuit in Christo: ergo habuit gratiam creatam, per quam meruit; et illa est gratia singularis personae: ergo etc.

4. Item, Christus habuit duas voluntates, sicut inferius[^p276-5] patebit, creatam scilicet et increatam, et constat, quod utraque fuit perfecta; sed perfectio voluntatis creatae est per gratiam creatam, quae, inquam, dicitur gratia singularis personae: ergo in Christo non tantum gratiam increatam, sed etiam creatam necesse est ponere.

**Sed contra:** 1. Gratia creata non est nisi in substantia creata[^p276-6]: ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit in persona, gratia singularis personae creata non est nec potest esse nisi in persona creata; sed persona Christi non est creata, sed increata: ergo in Christo non est gratiam creatam reperire, quae, inquam, sit gratia singularis personae.

2. Item, quia Christus est filius naturalis, non potest esse filius per gratiam adoptionis ex parte naturae assumtae[^p276-7]: ergo cum Christus sit a Patre dilectus ut persona coaeterna, videtur, quod nulla sit ponenda in eo gratia creata, per quam fiat acceptus ut singularis persona.

3. Item, ad hoc datur nobis gratia singularis personae, ut per illam efficiamur Deo similes; sed ille non tantum est Deo similis, immo etiam Deus: ergo videtur, quod non egeat dono creatae gratiae[^p276-8].

4. Item, Verbum increatum, unitum animae Christi et eius potentiis, potest eas efficacissime regere et ad bona perficienda elevare; sed non oportet fieri per plura quod sufficienter et perfecte fieri potest per pauciora[^p277-1]: videtur ergo, quod in Christo non sit ponenda gratia creata.

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> **Conclusio.** In Christo ponendum est donum gratiae, quae dicitur singularis personae, et quae est donum creatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio in Christo est ponere donum gratiae, quae quidem gratia dicitur gratia singularis personae; et hoc quidem donum esse creatum[^p277-2]. — Et ratio huius est: quia tale donum gratiae animam Deo assimilat et ad bonas operationes et meritorias elevando habilitat. Quoniam igitur anima Christi fuit deiformis et ad bene operandum habilis, alioquin nec fuisset idonea ad unionem nec ad meriti perfectionem[^p277-3]; ideo necesse fuit, in Christi anima reperiri donum talis gratiae. — Et ex eadem causa necesse fuit, ipsum esse creatum, ut animam posset informare, tanquam perfectio suum perfectibile informare habet, et ut potentias habilitare posset, sicut qualitas suum subiectum habet qualificare[^p277-4]. — Et ideo sunt concedendae rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur, quod gratia singularis personae creata est in persona creata; dicendum, quod gratia singularis personae non dicitur, quod sit in persona secundum rationem personalitatis, in quantum persona, sed quia inest ei ratione alicuius partis; ita tamen, quod gratia sic dicta respicit illius personae merita propria. Quamvis autem in Christo sit personalitas increata, tamen illa persona habet naturam creatam, animam videlicet et carnem; et nihil impedit, quin gratia creata possit esse in Christo secundum eius animam, quae creata est, et quae est eius pars ratione humanae naturae. Ipse autem obiicit, ac si talis gratia esset in persona non ratione alicuius partis, sed ratione personalitatis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod filiatio adoptionis non potest stare cum filiatione per naturam etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia filiatio est proprietas, quae respicit ipsam personam[^p277-5]; et iterum adoptio importat aliquam extraneitatem et imperfectionem; et sic non est de gratia singularis personae, quae respicit ipsam animam, et non imperfectionem et extraneitatem, sed magis completionem et deiformitatem importat. Et propterea nullam omnino habet oppositionem ad illam aeternam acceptationem, sicut adoptio respectu filiationis naturalis. Et ideo non est simile.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cum Christus sit Deus, non indiget Deo assimilari; dicendum, quod ille non esset Deus, nisi corpus eius et anima assumeretur a Verbo; nec anima esset idonea, ut assumeretur a Verbo, nisi esset deiformis et Deo assimilata perfecte per gratiam: et ideo hoc, quod ille homo est Deus, deiformitatem gratiae et gloriae non excludit, quin potius praesupponit. Et si tu obiicias de carne, ad quam non requiritur gratuita dispositio ad hoc, quod uniatur Verbo; ad hoc fuit supra[^p277-6] responsum, quoniam caro habet congruentiam ad unionem ex ordinatione sui ad animam. Ideo non oportet, quod dispositionis congruentia reperiatur primo in carne, sed sufficit, quod sit ex parte animae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Verbo unito, quod potest regere; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est ex parte ipsius Verbi uniti, sed defectus est ex parte liberi arbitrii, quod indiget debita dispositione ad hoc, quod regimini ipsius Verbi se valeat conformare; indiget etiam dispositione debita, ut possit ipsi Verbo uniri in una persona. Unde absque dubio deiformior est illa anima per abundantiam gratiae sibi datam, quam sit alia creatura, ad hoc quod ad unionem sit idonea. — Ad haec autem intelligenda valent illa quae determinata sunt in primo libro[^p277-7] de caritate, et in secundo de gratia, ubi ostensum est, quae necessitas vel utilitas est ponere gratiam creatam.

english:
### Article I. *On the grace of Christ as a singular person.*
### Question I. *Whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is created or uncreated.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is a created grace or an uncreated one. And that it is created seems to be the case.

1. In no one does the Holy Spirit begin to dwell except through some effect of grace which is newly given to the soul[^p276-2]; but in the soul of Christ the Holy Spirit dwelt, and this not always, but from a [point in] time: therefore the soul of Christ had in itself an effect of grace, through which or according to which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell. But that gift is called the grace of his singular person and is a created gift: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no soul is pleasing to God unless it be conformed and made like to God through a grace informing it and making it deiform; but a grace informing the soul and conforming it to God can only be a created grace: therefore no soul is pleasing to God unless it have a created grace in itself. But the soul of Christ was pleasing to God[^p276-3] through that grace which we call the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, merit denotes an ordering toward something greater by means of something which renders [one] acceptable to God[^p276-4]; but that which renders [one] acceptable cannot exist without grace, while that which is ordered toward something greater can only be created: therefore merit exists only through a gift of created grace. But there was merit in Christ: therefore he had a created grace, through which he merited; and that is the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Christ had two wills, as will appear below[^p276-5], namely a created and an uncreated one, and it is agreed that each was perfect; but the perfection of the created will is through created grace, which, I say, is called the grace of his singular person: therefore in Christ one must posit not only an uncreated grace but also a created one.

**On the contrary:** 1. A created grace exists only in a created substance[^p276-6]: therefore, since the grace of a singular person is in a person, the grace of a singular person, [if] created, does not and cannot exist except in a created person; but the person of Christ is not created, but uncreated: therefore in Christ there is no created grace to be found which, I say, would be the grace of his singular person.

2. Likewise, since Christ is a natural son, he cannot be a son through the grace of adoption on the side of the assumed nature[^p276-7]: therefore, since Christ is loved by the Father as a coeternal person, it seems that no created grace is to be posited in him, through which he would be made accepted as a singular person.

3. Likewise, the grace of a singular person is given to us for this, that through it we may be made like to God; but he is not only like to God, but rather is even God: therefore it seems that he has no need of a gift of created grace[^p276-8].

4. Likewise, the uncreated Word, united to the soul of Christ and to its powers, can most efficaciously govern them and elevate them to the accomplishing of good things; but that which can be done sufficiently and perfectly through fewer [things] ought not to be done through more[^p277-1]: it seems therefore that no created grace is to be posited in Christ.

> **Conclusion.** In Christ there is to be posited a gift of grace which is called [the grace] of his singular person, and which is a created gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt in Christ a gift of grace is to be posited, which grace indeed is called the grace of his singular person; and this gift indeed is created[^p277-2]. — And the reason of this is: because such a gift of grace makes the soul like to God and renders it apt, by elevating it, for good and meritorious operations. Since therefore the soul of Christ was deiform and apt for acting well — otherwise it would not have been fit either for the union or for the perfection of merit[^p277-3] — therefore it was necessary that in the soul of Christ a gift of such grace be found. — And from the same cause it was necessary that it [the gift] be created, so that it might inform the soul, just as a perfection has [the property] of informing its perfectible, and so that it might render the powers apt, just as a quality has [the property] of qualifying its subject[^p277-4]. — And therefore the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the grace of a singular person, [being] created, is in a created person; it must be said that the grace of a singular person is not said to be in the person according to the formal character of personality, insofar as [it is] a person, but because it is in it by reason of some part; yet in such a way that the grace so called regards the proper merits of that person. Now although in Christ there is an uncreated personality, nevertheless that person has a created nature, namely a soul and flesh; and nothing prevents a created grace from being able to be in Christ according to his soul, which is created, and which is his part by reason of his human nature. But he objects as if such a grace were in the person not by reason of some part, but by reason of personality.

2. To that which is objected, that the sonship of adoption cannot stand together with sonship by nature etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because sonship is a property which regards the person itself[^p277-5]; and again adoption implies a certain extraneousness and imperfection; and so it is not so with the grace of a singular person, which regards the soul itself, and implies not imperfection and extraneousness, but rather completion and deiformity. And therefore it has no opposition at all to that eternal acceptation, as adoption does with respect to natural sonship. And therefore it is not similar.

3. To that which is objected, that since Christ is God, he has no need to be made like to God; it must be said that he would not be God unless his body and soul were assumed by the Word; nor would the soul be fit to be assumed by the Word unless it were deiform and made perfectly like to God through grace: and therefore the fact that this man is God does not exclude the deiformity of grace and glory, but rather presupposes it. And if you object concerning the flesh, for which no gratuitous disposition is required in order that it be united to the Word; to this it was answered above[^p277-6], that the flesh has a congruity to the union from its ordering toward the soul. Therefore it is not necessary that the congruity of disposition be found first in the flesh, but it suffices that it be on the side of the soul.

4. To that which is objected concerning the united Word, that it can govern; it must be said that it is true, as far as concerns the united Word itself, but the defect is on the side of the free will, which needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to conform itself to the governance of the Word itself; it also needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to be united to the Word itself in one person. Hence without doubt that soul is more deiform through the abundance of grace given to it than is any other creature, with respect to its being fit for the union. — And for understanding these matters, those things avail which were determined in the first book[^p277-7] concerning charity, and in the second concerning grace, where it was shown what is the necessity or usefulness of positing a created grace.

la: Cfr. 1. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. I, et II. d. 26. q. 2, ubi pluribus verbis ostenditur, gratiam in anima esse quid creatum; quo dogmate nititur solutio quaestionis, de qua hic agitur. — Pro *detur* edd. *datur*.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. I, and II [Sent.] d. 26. q. 2, where it is shown at greater length that grace in the soul is something created; on which dogma the solution of the question here treated rests. — For *detur* the editions read *datur*.

la: Codd. Z aa *placet.*

en: Codices Z, aa read *placet* ["is pleasing," present tense].

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. I. seqq. et d. 29. a. I. q. I. seq. — Pro *ordinationem* cod. K. *ordinem.*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. I. and following, and d. 29. a. I. q. I. and following. — For *ordinationem* codex K reads *ordinem.*

en: Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 1, and following.

la: Nam, ut II. Sent. d. 26. q. 3. expositum est, gratia creata est aliquod accidens, quod in Deo inveniri nequit. — Edd. primam conclus. sic truncarunt: *ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit creata, non est vel potest esse* etc. In cod. C sic scriptum est: *ergo cum gratia singularis personae sit creata, gratia singularis personae creata non est* etc., in pluribus aliis codd. sic: *ergo singularis personae creata non est* etc.

en: For, as was expounded in II Sent. d. 26. q. 3, created grace is a certain accident, which cannot be found in God. — The editions thus truncated the first conclusion: *therefore since the grace of a singular person is created, it is not nor can it be* etc. In codex C it is written thus: *therefore since the grace of a singular person is created, the created grace of a singular person is not* etc.; in several other codices thus: *therefore the created [grace] of a singular person is not* etc.

la: Cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1.

la: De hoc arg. vide supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.

en: On this argument see above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.

la: Aristot., VIII. Topic. c. 4. (c. 9.): *Est autem... peccatum, quando ostenditur per longiora quod contingit per breviora.* Cfr. I. Physic. text. 41. (c. 6.), et tom. II. pag. 741. nota 4. nec non pag. 778. nota 2. — Paulo superius pro *bona perficienda* codd. W bb *bonum perficiendum.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VIII. c. 4. (c. 9.): *It is a fault when it is shown by longer [means] what is attainable by shorter [means].* Cf. *Physics* I. text 41. (c. 6.), and vol. II. p. 741. note 4, as well as p. 778. note 2. — A little above, for *bona perficienda* codices W, bb read *bonum perficiendum.*

la: Edd. *et haec quidem donum est creatum*, et post pauca pro *elevando* cum paucis codd. *exercendas.* Mox pro *bene operandum* codd. A N *bonum operandum.*

en: The editions [read] *et haec quidem donum est creatum* ["and this indeed is a created gift"], and a little after, for *elevando* with a few codices [read] *exercendas.* Presently, for *bene operandum* codices A, N [read] *bonum operandum.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *donum talis gratiae* cod. W *tale donum gratiae.* Paulo inferius pro *perfectio*, quae lectio confirmatur codd. P Q U bb (N a secunda manu), codd. B C D M O *perfectivum*, alii codd. atque edd. 1, 2 *perfectum*, Vat. *perfectissimum.* Subinde post *suum perfectibile* Vat. subdit *quod*, et edd. 1, 2 cum cod. K omittunt *informare habet.*

en: Cf. above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Presently, for *donum talis gratiae* codex W reads *tale donum gratiae.* A little below, for *perfectio*, which reading is confirmed by codices P, Q, U, bb (N by a second hand), codices B, C, D, M, O [read] *perfectivum*, other codices and the editions 1, 2 [read] *perfectum*, the Vatican [edition reads] *perfectissimum.* Then after *suum perfectibile* the Vatican [edition] adds *quod*, and the editions 1, 2 with codex K omit *informare habet.*

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali: *Qualitatem vero dico, secundum quam quales quidam esse dicuntur.*

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter «On Quality»: *I call quality that according to which certain things are said to be of such a sort.*

la: Vide supra d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. De enuntiato seq. cfr. supra d. 10. a. 2. q. I. — Post *personam* codd. K O addunt *et non imperfectionem, et sic non est de gratia.* Mox pro *et sic non* est codd. A bb *sed non sic est.*

en: See above, d. 8. a. 2. q. 2. On the following statement cf. above, d. 10. a. 2. q. I. — After *personam* codices K, O add *et non imperfectionem, et sic non est de gratia.* Presently, for *et sic non est* codices A, bb read *sed non sic est.*

la: Dist. 2. a. 3. q. I. — Paulo inferius pro *habet* edd. *habuit*, et deinde cum aliquot codd. *ex origine* pro *ex ordinatione.* Cod. K *ad ipsam animam* pro *ad animam.*

en: Distinction 2, a. 3, q. I. — A little below, for *habet* the editions [read] *habuit*, and then, with several codices, *ex origine* for *ex ordinatione.* Codex K [reads] *ad ipsam animam* for *ad animam.*

la: Dist. 17. p. I. q. I, et II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2.

en: Distinction 17, p. I, q. I, and II Sent. d. 26. q. 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter distinguitur in Christo quadruplex gratia, scilicet secundum quod est *singularis* homo (de quo agitur in hoc articulo), secundum quod est *caput* Ecclesiae (de quo disputatur in 2. art.), porro *gratia unionis* (de qua supra d. 6. a. 2. et passim), denique *gratia gratis data*. — Iam notavimus (supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2, d. 1. a. 2. q. 3.), quod ab Alexandro

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Hal. (S. p. III. q. 12. m. I. a. I.) distinguitur duplex gratia unionis, scilicet gratia unionis *disponens*, quae est creata, et *complens* sive perficiens, quae est increata. Nec S. Thom. abhorret ab hoc usu nominis, in Comment. (hic q. 3. a. I.) dicens, gratiam unionis posse vocari «omne illud quod decet naturam humanam Deo unitam, sic ex parte corporis, sicut ex parte animae; et sic etiam gratia unionis est quid creatum». Eodem modo loquuntur S. Bonav. (passim, ut locc. citt. et infra a. 2. q. 2.) aliique antiqui. — De relatione, quae est inter tres priores species gratiae, cfr. infra a. 2. q. I. 2.

Duo autem omnino constant, scilicet *primo*, quod anima Christi ornata fuit habitu gratiae *creatae* et *accidentalis*, licet hoc antiquitus a paucis obscuris theologis negatum esse dicatur; *secundo*, quod in Christo ratione divinae personae fuit sanctitas *increata*, *substantialis* et *personalis*. Facile etiam intelligitur, hanc gratiam substantialem personae vi unionis hypostaticae esse quasi *radicem* nec non *causam efficientem* gratiae creatae, quae ab ipsa oritur, dependet, dignificatur et quasi informatur. — Attamen quoad sanctificationem ipsius animae Christi ab antiquo fuit celebris controversia, et quoad subtiliores quaestiones variae inter posteriores theologos ortae sunt opiniones. De quibus haec notamus.

**II.** 1. Nunc communiter *sanctificatio substantialis* sive *unctio substantialis*, qua anima Christi fit absolute sancta, distinguitur a sanctificatione *accidentali* vi gratiae habitualis. Haec autem sanctitas *substantialis* non intelligitur in hoc sensu, quasi anima secundum suam *substantiam* vel *essentiam* sit sancta, sed in hoc, quod habeat sanctitatem substantialem sibi unitam in *esse personali*. Ipsius Scoti discipulus Frassenius (Scotus academicus, de incarn. tr. I. disp. 2. a. 2. sect. I. q. I.) defendit hanc conclusionem: «Anima Christi Domini, seclusa omni gratia, tam actuali quam habituali, revera erat sancta, Deo grata et accepta in ordine ad beatitudinem per sanctitatem *personalem* ac *substantialem*». Huic contradicit Durand. (III. Sent. d. 12. q. 2.), sanctificationem restringendo ad gratiam creatam, simulque nititur subvertere fundamentale principium: «Actiones sunt suppositorum», quasi hoc intelligendum sit tantum secundum *denominationem*; quod est contra S. Thom. (S. III. q. 7. a. 13.) aliosque. Etiam plurimi inter Scotistas et Nominales sanctificationem *humanitatis* substantialem, saltem in sensu formali, negabant, atque verba Ss. Patrum, quod humanitas Christi a divinitate fuerit sanctificata, uncta, deificata (θεωθεῖσα), explicabant in sensu *causali*, vel *morali*. Qui autem proprie sanctificationem substantialem admittunt, iterum dissident in ulteriori quaestione, utrum haec sanctificatio formaliter sit a *natura* divina, an a *personalitate* Verbi seorsim, an ab *utraque* coniunctim, an ab ipsa *unione* hypostatica, prout dicit nexum divinitatis cum humanitate (pro qua parte De Barberiis explicat S. Bonaventuram).

2. Scoti igitur discipuli cum Richardo a Med. et aliis non paucis contendebant, Christi humanitatem sanctificari *formaliter* per gratiam habitualem, non vi unionis hypostaticae nisi *causaliter* et *moraliter*; ex quo concludebant, gratiam habitualem fuisse *necessariam*, ut anima Christi sanctificetur *formaliter*. Iidem provocant ad ipsius S. Thomae verba (hic q. I. a. I.), qui loquens de necessitate gratiae, ut anima Christi perficiatur formaliter in esse spirituali, subiungit: «Deitas autem non est formaliter, sed effective perficiens ipsam; unde oportet aliam formam creatam in ipso ponere, qua formaliter perficiatur; et haec est gratia». Et ibidem ad 3: «Lux solis et lux candelae, utrumque est active illuminans; sed Deitas et gratia non sic se habent, sed unum illuminat active, alterum formaliter». Sed cum haec dicta sint contra eos qui gratiam habitualem Christo omnino denegant, alii videntur verba non formaliter interpretari de tali perfectione formali, quae fit per formam inhaerentem. — Nonnulli admittunt quidem, quod divinitas per se ipsam, quatenus personaliter unitur animae Christi, eam sanctificet, sed extrinsecus tantum et moraliter, non intrinsecus et physice. — Alii denique ponunt, vi unionis hypostaticae cum Verbo animam Christi sanctificari non tantum radicaliter et causaliter, vel moraliter et extrinsecus, sed etiam formaliter, intrinsecus et physice. Hoc autem explicant docentes, quod sanctitas substantialis modo eminentissimo idem praestat et amplius, quod forma creata sanctitatis, licet non sit forma inhaerens. Et pro confirmatione haec addunt: sicut anima Christi per subsistentiam Verbi est formaliter subsistens, quin ista subsistentia ei uniatur ut forma inhaerens et proprie informans; sic eadem est formaliter sancta per communicationem sanctitatis divinae, quin haec subeat imperfectionem formae inhaerentis. Hic ultimus modus dicendi videtur conformior esse verbis Ss. Patrum, praesertim Graecorum.

3. Qui putant, quod anima Christi vi unionis non sanctificetur *formaliter*, absolutam necessitatem gratiae habitualis statuunt, ut anima Christi sit formaliter sancta. Etiam contrariae sententiae patroni quandam eiusdem necessitatem admittunt ad hoc, ut sanctitas Christi sit *completa* et *consummata* ex parte naturae humanae, et ut anima eius tanquam *principium quo* operandi connaturaliter eliciat actus ordinis supernaturalis et meritorios. In hoc autem sensu loquitur S. Bonav. (et similiter S. Thom.) de necessitate huius gratiae creatae, ut patet ex eiusdem doctrina supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 4. a. 2. q. 3. explicata.

**III.** S. Bonav. hic non intendit nisi probare, sanctitatem *creatam* Christo inesse; de praedicta controversia, per quid anima Christi formaliter sanctificetur, explicite non loquitur, immo de ipsa sanctitate substantiali cum aliis antiquis Scholasticis distinctam quaestionem non habet. Nihilominus satis mentem suam manifestat in favorem eiusdem hic solut. ad 2. 3. et a. 2. q. 1. 2, nec non supra d. 4. dub. 4, d. 12. a. 2. q. I. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 8. m. 3. a. 4. in fine, q. II. m. 3. et q. 12. m. I. a. I. Nec dissentit S. Thomas, S. III. q. 7. a. I. et 13; tamen quoad ordinem, qui est inter gratiam unionis et habitualem, explicite docet, illum ratione sive natura esse priorem.

**IV.** De ipsa quaestione praeter locos citatos: Scot., Report. III. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. et (de formali sanctificatione) d. 2. q. I. n. 3 — B. Albert., hic a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 13. q. 5. — Durand., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Commonly a fourfold grace is distinguished in Christ, namely according as he is a *singular* man (which is treated in this article), according as he is the *head* of the Church (which is disputed in the 2nd article), further the *grace of union* (concerning which, above, d. 6. a. 2. and passim), and finally *freely-given grace* (gratia gratis data). — We have already noted (above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2, d. 1. a. 2. q. 3.) that by Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. III. q. 12. m. I. a. I.) a twofold grace of union is distinguished, namely a *disposing* grace of union, which is created, and a *completing* or perfecting [grace], which is uncreated. Nor does St. Thomas shrink from this use of the term, in his Commentary (here, q. 3. a. I.), saying that the grace of union can be called «everything that befits a human nature united to God, both on the side of the body and on the side of the soul; and thus the grace of union too is something created». In the same way speak St. Bonaventure (passim, as in the places cited, and below a. 2. q. 2.) and the other ancients. — Concerning the relation which obtains among the three prior species of grace, cf. below a. 2. q. I. 2.

But two things are altogether established, namely *first*, that the soul of Christ was adorned with a habit of *created* and *accidental* grace, although this is said anciently to have been denied by a few obscure theologians; *second*, that in Christ, by reason of the divine person, there was an *uncreated*, *substantial*, and *personal* sanctity. It is also easily understood that this substantial sanctity of the person, by the power of the hypostatic union, is as it were the *root* and also the *efficient cause* of the created grace, which arises from it, depends [on it], is dignified [by it], and is as it were informed [by it]. — Nevertheless, concerning the sanctification of the soul of Christ itself there was from of old a celebrated controversy, and concerning the more subtle questions various opinions arose among later theologians. Of these we note the following.

**II.** 1. Now commonly *substantial sanctification* or *substantial unction*, by which the soul of Christ is made absolutely holy, is distinguished from *accidental* sanctification by the power of habitual grace. But this *substantial* sanctity is not understood in this sense, as though the soul were holy according to its *substance* or *essence*, but in this, that it has a substantial sanctity united to it in *personal being*. Scotus's own disciple Frassen (Scotus academicus, on the incarnation, tr. I. disp. 2. a. 2. sect. I. q. I.) defends this conclusion: «The soul of Christ the Lord, every grace, both actual and habitual, being set aside, was truly holy, pleasing and acceptable to God in the order to beatitude through a *personal* and *substantial* sanctity». Durandus (III. Sent. d. 12. q. 2.) contradicts this, restricting sanctification to created grace, and at the same time he tries to subvert the fundamental principle: «Actions belong to supposits», as if this were to be understood only according to *denomination*; which is against St. Thomas (Summa III. q. 7. a. 13.) and others. Also very many among the Scotists and Nominalists denied the substantial sanctification of the *humanity*, at least in the formal sense, and explained the words of the holy Fathers — that the humanity of Christ was sanctified, anointed, deified (θεωθεῖσα) by the divinity — in a *causal* or *moral* sense. But those who properly admit substantial sanctification are again divided in a further question, whether this sanctification is formally from the divine *nature*, or from the *personality* of the Word taken separately, or from *both* conjointly, or from the hypostatic *union* itself, insofar as it denotes the bond of the divinity with the humanity (on which side De Barberiis explains St. Bonaventure).

2. Scotus's disciples therefore, with Richard of Mediavilla and not a few others, contended that the humanity of Christ is sanctified *formally* through habitual grace, and by the power of the hypostatic union only *causally* and *morally*; from which they concluded that habitual grace was *necessary* in order that the soul of Christ be sanctified *formally*. These same appeal to the very words of St. Thomas (here, q. I. a. I.), who, speaking of the necessity of grace, that the soul of Christ be perfected formally in spiritual being, adds: «But the Deity perfects it not formally, but effectively; hence one must posit another created form in it, by which it is formally perfected; and this is grace». And in the same place, to the 3rd: «The light of the sun and the light of a candle, each is actively illuminating; but the Deity and grace are not so disposed, but the one illuminates actively, the other formally». But since these things are said against those who altogether deny habitual grace to Christ, others seem to interpret the words not [as said] formally concerning such a formal perfection as comes about through an inhering form. — Some indeed admit that the divinity by itself, inasmuch as it is personally united to the soul of Christ, sanctifies it, but only extrinsically and morally, not intrinsically and physically. — Others finally hold that, by the power of the hypostatic union with the Word, the soul of Christ is sanctified not only radically and causally, or morally and extrinsically, but also formally, intrinsically, and physically. And this they explain by teaching that the substantial sanctity in a most eminent manner provides the same and more than the created form of sanctity provides, although it is not an inhering form. And for confirmation they add this: just as the soul of Christ through the subsistence of the Word is formally subsisting, without that subsistence being united to it as an inhering and properly informing form; so the same [soul] is formally holy through the communication of the divine sanctity, without this undergoing the imperfection of an inhering form. This last manner of speaking seems to be more conformed to the words of the holy Fathers, especially the Greeks.

3. Those who hold that the soul of Christ is not sanctified *formally* by the power of the union, posit an absolute necessity of habitual grace, in order that the soul of Christ be formally holy. Even the patrons of the contrary opinion admit a certain necessity of the same, in order that the sanctity of Christ be *complete* and *consummated* on the side of the human nature, and that his soul, as a *principle by which* of operating, may connaturally elicit acts of the supernatural and meritorious order. And in this sense St. Bonaventure (and similarly St. Thomas) speaks of the necessity of this created grace, as is clear from the same [author's] doctrine explained above, d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. and d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.

**III.** St. Bonaventure here intends only to prove that a *created* sanctity is in Christ; concerning the aforesaid controversy — by what the soul of Christ is formally sanctified — he does not speak explicitly, indeed concerning substantial sanctity itself he does not, with the other ancient Scholastics, hold a distinct question. Nevertheless he manifests his mind sufficiently in favor of the same here in the solutions to the 2nd, 3rd, and a. 2. q. 1. 2, as well as above d. 4. dub. 4, d. 12. a. 2. q. I. The same is taught by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 8. m. 3. a. 4. at the end, q. II. m. 3. and q. 12. m. I. a. I. Nor does St. Thomas dissent, Summa III. q. 7. a. I. and 13; yet as to the order which obtains between the grace of union and the habitual [grace], he explicitly teaches that the former is prior in reason or nature.

**IV.** Concerning the question itself, besides the places cited: Scotus, Report. III. Sent. d. 18. q. 3. and (on formal sanctification) d. 2. q. I. n. 3 — Bl. Albert, here a. I. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. I. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 13. q. 5. — Durandus, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. I. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{276,277,278}-{L,R}-*.png`), raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 19464–19640) used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Running heads confirmed eyes-on via low-band crops: `276 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` / `DIST. XIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 277` / `278 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` — never OCR'd digits.

**Page-split map.**
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- **p.277** (PDF 299): tail of *Sed contra* arg 4; Conclusio; Respondeo; replies Ad 1–4; Scholion I begins. Footers nn.1–7 (`[^p277-1]`–`[^p277-7]`).
- **p.278** (PDF 300): Scholion I (tail) → IV; ends at `…hic q. unica.` (Scholion IV) just before QUAESTIO II opens on the same R column. **q1 carries NO footers on p.278** — the two p.278 footers (`Vers. 34.`, `Hic circa initium…`) anchor to QUAESTIO II's body and are forwarded to d13-a1-q2.

**Hand-offs picked up (from d13-divisio, commits 2f600d8 + 83177e5):**
- (a) the ARTICULUS I opener + subtitle (*De gratia Christi ut singularis personae.*, raw 19464–19466), folded into this q1 per the locked Vol II/III convention.
- (b) the printed **p.276 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footers nn.2–8** — they anchor in this q1's body (the four *quod sit creata* arguments + *Sed contra*). The divisio correctly consumed only p.276 n.1 (`Dist. 14.` = the TRACTATIO's `infra¹` marker), which is NOT re-claimed here.

**Hand-offs forwarded (to d13-a1-q2, QUAESTIO II, raw 19641):** the two **p.278 footers** — n.1 (`Vers. 34. — Augustinus in hunc loc. tr. 14. n. 10.…`) and n.2 (`Hic circa initium. — In minori pro sed omni finito…`) — both anchor to QUAESTIO II's body (`Ioannis tertio¹`, `Magister in littera²`), which begins on the lower half of p.278's L/R columns. q2 leads its apparatus with these.

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true`. Scholion I–IV prints after q1's replies (p.277 R → p.278). It is q1's own scholion on the *creata* question (sections I–III treat the substantial-vs-created-grace controversy; IV is the bibliography *de ipsa quaestione* = this question). It does **not** carry `pro quaest. seq.` / `De seq. quaest.` forward-cover language — q2 and q3 carry their own. No sibling-shared scholion.

**Alignment.** PASS. Opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum in Christo gratia singularis personae sit gratia creata, vel increata` = ART. I q1 (the *creata* question per d13-divisio TRACTATIO: q1 = *creata vel increata*); NOT q2 (*finita/immensa*) or q3 (*gratia plena*). No q-swap.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR for this region is clean and was confirmed line-by-line against the 450 dpi crops; all variant-note footers (`[^p276-6]`, `[^p277-3]`, `[^p277-5]`) were re-read directly from the printed footer bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 278 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum in Christo sit gratia finita, vel immensa.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit gratia finita, vel immensa. Et quod in Christo fuerit gratia sine mensura, videtur sic:

1. Ioannis tertio[^p278-1]: *Non ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum*; et Augustinus dicit, quod illi homini datus est Spiritus non ad mensuram; sed quod caret mensura est immensum et infinitum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Magister in littera[^p278-2]: «Sane dici po-
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test, ipsum tantam gratiae accepisse plenitudinem, ut ei conferre Deus plenius non potuerit»; sed omni finito potest Deus aliquid maius facere: ergo videtur, quod ille acceperit gratiam infinitam.

3. Item, tanta est gratia, quantum est meritum procedens ex ipsa; sed meritum Christi fuit infinitum, quia nullatenus potest exhauriri, et suffecisset infinitis millibus hominum, sicut dicit Anselmus[^p279-1]: ergo gratia, per quam meruit, videtur habere immensitatem.

4. Item, finitum non excedit aliud finitum in infinitum in eodem genere: si ergo gratia Christi est finita, ergo proportionaliter excedit gratias aliorum hominum: ergo si alii homines possent[^p279-2] continue proficere, videtur, quod Christo possent adaequari per gratiam et ipsum excedere. Quodsi nullus unquam ad perfectionem eius potest attingere, quantumcumque proficiat; videtur, quod eius gratia sit immensa.

5. Item, tanta est gratia disponens, quantum est, illud ad quod disponit secundum rectam habitudinem et proportionem; sed gratia illius hominis disposuit ipsum ad hoc, quod esset Deus[^p279-3]; gratiae aliorum hominum disponunt ad hoc, quod fruantur Deo: si ergo esse Deum est bonum infinitum, et maius in infinitum esse Deum quam habere Deum; videtur, quod gratia illius hominis sit infinita in se et quod omnes gratias in infinitum excedat.

6. Item, anima Christi aut potest ampliorem gratiam desiderare, aut non. Si potest desiderare ampliorem gratiam: ergo videtur, quod non sit perfecta, cum ei possit fieri additio[^p279-4]. Si non potest: cum ergo omni finito possit aliquid maius desiderari, videtur, quod eius gratia sit immensa.

**Sed contra:** 1. Omne creatum habet certum pondus, numerum et mensuram, secundum illud quod dicitur Sapientiae undecimo[^p279-5]; sed gratia illius hominis, scilicet Christi, est creata: ergo etc.

2. Item, quamvis gratia non semper respondeat naturalibus per *aequalitatem*, respondet tamen secundum debitam *proportionem*, ubi non est defectus a parte suscipientis[^p279-6]; sed naturalia Christi non sunt infinita nec excedunt in infinitum naturalia cuiuslibet hominis: ergo nec gratuita.

3. Item, infinitas in creatura tollit bonum et perfectionem, quia quod est infinitum caret fine et termino[^p279-7], ergo bonitate et complemento; sed gratia Christi haec duo praecipue habuit: ergo videtur, quod conditio finitatis ei praecipue competat.

4. Item, infinito nihil maius est[^p279-8]: ergo si gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, esset infinita; ergo gratia increata non esset maior illa: ergo Creator et creatura aequarentur in nobilitate et excellentia; quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat etc.

### Conclusio.

> Gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, in se considerata est finita; tamen in comparatione ad gratias aliorum hominum excedit in infinitum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid mensura carere sive immensum esse dupliciter est: vel absolute in se, vel in comparatione. Si igitur loquamur de gratia Christo collata, secundum quod est singularis persona, in se; sic, cum dicat donum creatum, necessario finitum est et mensuratum. Finitas enim et mensuratio circa creaturam potius dicit complementum quam imperfectionem[^p279-9]. — Si autem loquamur de ipsa in comparatione ad gratias aliorum hominum; sic improportionabiliter excedit ratione unionis ad personam Verbi, ad quam unionem gratia illa disposuit animam Christi. Gratia enim illa propter coniunctionem summam cum Verbo aeterno habet excedere in infinitum, id est incommensurabiliter, gratias aliorum hominum tripliciter, scilicet quantum ad virtutum *habitus* et quantum ad *usus* et quantum ad *effectus*. Quantum ad habitus: nunquam enim aliqua creatura potest tantum proficere, quod tam nobilis et perfecti habitus sit capax, sicut anima coniuncta Deo in unitate personae. — Quantum ad usus virtutum: quia omnes virtutes in Christo habuerunt usus suos, qui spectant ad perfectionem; et propterea dicuntur fuisse in eo *omnes sensus*[^p279-10], quia usum habuit completum omnium donorum excellentiori modo, quam unquam ad hoc pertingi possit ab aliquo. — Quantum ad effectum similiter improportionabiliter excedit gratia Christi; quia propter hoc, quod ille homo erat Dei Filius, meritum illius pensatur secundum dignitatem illius personae, a qua exit opus; et propterea meritum passionis suae in infinitum excedit merita passionum nostrarum; et ob hoc, quod Deus erat, mors eius pensata fuit a Deo, quantus erat ille qui moriebatur. Et ideo quantum ad sufficientiam, si infinita millia hominum essent reatu originalis astricta, per illius passionis effectum potuissent esse liberata.
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Concedendum est igitur, quod gratia Christi, secundum quod homo, est finita et mensurata, quia creata est in numero, pondere et mensura. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur primo, quod datus est Christo spiritus non ad mensuram; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de datione *aeterna*, vel de datione per *idiomatum communicationem*, tunc privatur ibi mensura *simpliciter*. Si autem per *spiritum datum* intelligamus ipsam donationem *donorum Spiritus sancti*, sic non privatur ibi mensura *simpliciter*, sed commensuratio *respectu nostri*, quibus datur Spiritus sanctus ad usus aliquorum donorum determinate secundum spiritus distributionem, quemadmodum dicitur primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^p280-1]: *Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae* etc. Sed Christo omnia data sunt illa dona sine aliqua arctatione; et pro tanto dicitur ei dedisse spiritum sine mensura.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potuit dare plenius; dicendum, quod Deus non posse aliquid maius facere[^p280-2], hoc potest intelligi triplici ex causa: quoniam aut est ratio ex parte Dei *operantis*, aut ex parte *producti*, aut certe propter *limitationem suscipientis*. Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potuit plenius conferre, hoc non est intelligendum propter *immensitatem rei collatae*, vel *finitatem divinae potentiae*, sed propter *limitationem potentiae susceptivae*, quia, cum sit creata, est capacitatis finitae et non potest nisi finitum suscipere[^p280-3]. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod potuit dare capacitatem maiorem; dicendum, quod necesse est, quod creatura, eo ipso quod *creatura* est, habeat capacitatem finitam; et rursus, quia creatura est *in tali specie* vel genere, limitationem habet, ultra quam genus illud vel species se non potest extendere. Et sic in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum Christi est infinitum; dicendum, quod infinitas meriti consurgit ex unione illius animae ad personam divinam — ob quam unionem non tantum homo, sed etiam Deus mori dicitur — propter quod meritum illud est infinitum, non ratione gratiae *creatae in se*, sed ratione infinitae *dignitatis personae*. Unde et hoc vult Anselmus[^p280-4] dicere, cum dicit, quod oportuerit illum qui satisfacere posset, esse Deum et hominem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finitum non excedit aliud finitum nisi finite; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando omnino sunt eiusdem generis; nam si non sunt eiusdem generis proximi, falsitatem habet, sicut patet, quod linea in infinitum excedit punctum, et superficies lineam[^p280-5]. Gratia autem Christi non tantum disponit ad *fruitionem*, secundum quod aliae gratiae, verum etiam ad *unionem*. Et hinc est, quod cum *uniri cum deitate* sit novus et singularis modus divinae existentiae et habitationis in creatura, quantum ad hoc potest attendi excessus sine mensura.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanta est gratia, quantum est illud, ad quod disponit; dicendum, quod illud habere potest veritatem, si disponat per modum *necessitatis* sive condignitatis[^p280-6], sicut meritum ad praemium; sed gratia singularis personae disponit ad unionem dispositione *congruitatis*. Illa enim unio non tantum *gratuita* fuit, sed inter omnes gratias, ut dicit Augustinus, potissime tenuit rationem *gratiae*, sicut habitum est supra distinctione quarta[^p280-7], quia nulla merita sufficientia potuerunt eam praevenire. Propter hoc non oportet, quodsi *esse Deum* sit bonum infinitum simpliciter, quod gratia ad hoc praeparans sit infinita. — Posset etiam et aliter dici, quod *esse Deum* dupliciter dicitur de aliquo: aut praedicatione per *essentiam*, aut per *unionem*[^p280-8]. Si praedicatione per *essentiam*, tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum *in rectitudine*. Si per *unionem*, tunc praedicat infinitum bonum non circa illud, *de quo* praedicatur, sed circa illud *quod* praedicatur. Unde cum dicitur: *iste homo est Deus*, vel: *iste homo est bonum infinitum*, idem est, ac si diceretur: *iste homo est unitus Deo immenso in unitatem personae*; et tamen homo remanet in sua finitate, et Deus in sua immensitate. Quamvis enim humana natura exaltetur, non tamen desinit esse creatura.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum anima Christi possit ampliorem gratiam appetere; dicendum, quod non, quia adeo per illam gratiam Deo unita[^p280-9]
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est, ut omnis eius appetitus sit in ipso bono immenso quietatus et terminatus quietatione perfecta. — Quod ergo obiicit, quod omni finito potest aliquid maius appeti: dicendum, quod verum est de finito *in se*, sed de illo finito, quod *ordinat* et *unit* bono infinito iunctura et ordinatione perfecta, non habet veritatem, quia quietare potest et stabilire ratione eius *a quo* et *ad quod*. Unde sicut gratia, quamvis sit vanitas, in quantum creatura, habet tamen animam stabilire ratione eius boni, a quo procedit et a quo non separatur nec recedit, sic etiam quietare potest ratione eius, cui immediate et inseparabiliter coniungit.

english:
### Question II. *Whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace.*

Secondly it is asked whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace. And that in Christ there was grace without measure seems [to be the case] thus:

1. John, chapter three[^p278-1]: *God does not give the Spirit by measure*; and Augustine says that to that man the Spirit was given not by measure; but what lacks measure is immense and infinite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text[^p278-2]: «Indeed it can be said that he received so great a fullness of grace that God could not confer upon him a greater»; but than anything finite God can make something greater: therefore it seems that he received infinite grace.

3. Likewise, grace is as great as is the merit proceeding from it; but Christ's merit was infinite, since it can in no way be exhausted, and would have sufficed for infinite thousands of men, as Anselm says[^p279-1]: therefore the grace by which he merited seems to have immensity.

4. Likewise, a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing infinitely within the same genus: if therefore Christ's grace is finite, then it exceeds the graces of other men proportionately: therefore if other men could[^p279-2] continually advance, it seems that they could be made equal to Christ through grace and exceed him. But if no one ever can attain to his perfection, however much he advances, it seems that his grace is immense.

5. Likewise, the disposing grace is as great as is that to which it disposes according to right relation and proportion; but the grace of that man disposed him to this, that he should be God[^p279-3]; the graces of other men dispose [them] to this, that they should enjoy God: if therefore to be God is an infinite good, and infinitely greater to be God than to have God, it seems that the grace of that man is infinite in itself and that it exceeds all graces infinitely.

6. Likewise, the soul of Christ either can desire a greater grace, or not. If it can desire a greater grace: then it seems that it is not perfect, since an addition can be made to it[^p279-4]. If it cannot: since then to anything finite something greater can be desired, it seems that his grace is immense.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every created thing has a fixed weight, number, and measure, according to that which is said in Wisdom, chapter eleven[^p279-5]; but the grace of that man, namely of Christ, is created: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, although grace does not always correspond to natural [endowments] by *equality*, it corresponds nevertheless according to due *proportion*, where there is no defect on the part of the recipient[^p279-6]; but the natural [endowments] of Christ are not infinite nor do they exceed the natural [endowments] of any man infinitely: therefore neither do the gratuitous [ones].

3. Likewise, infinity in a creature takes away good and perfection, because what is infinite lacks end and term[^p279-7], therefore [lacks] goodness and completeness; but Christ's grace had these two pre-eminently: therefore it seems that the condition of finitude befits it pre-eminently.

4. Likewise, than the infinite nothing is greater[^p279-8]: therefore if Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, were infinite; then uncreated grace would not be greater than it: therefore Creator and creature would be made equal in nobility and excellence; but if this is impossible, it remains etc.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, considered in itself, is finite; yet in comparison to the graces of other men it exceeds [them] infinitely.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to lack measure or to be immense is [so] in two ways: either absolutely in itself, or in comparison. If therefore we speak of the grace conferred on Christ, insofar as he is a singular person, in itself; thus, since it implies a *created gift*, it is necessarily finite and measured. For finitude and measurement, with respect to a creature, express completeness rather than imperfection[^p279-9]. — But if we speak of it in comparison to the graces of other men; thus it exceeds [them] disproportionately by reason of the union to the person of the Word, to which union that grace disposed the soul of Christ. For that grace, on account of its supreme conjunction with the eternal Word, must exceed infinitely, that is, incommensurably, the graces of other men in three ways, namely as to the *habits* of the virtues, and as to their *uses*, and as to their *effects*. As to the habits: for no creature can ever advance so far as to be capable of so noble and perfect a habit as the soul conjoined to God in unity of person. — As to the uses of the virtues: because all the virtues in Christ had their uses, which pertain to perfection; and therefore *all the senses*[^p279-10] are said to have been in him, because he had complete use of all the gifts in a more excellent mode than could ever be attained to by anyone. — As to the effect likewise the grace of Christ exceeds [other grace] disproportionately; because on account of this, that that man was the Son of God, his merit is weighed according to the dignity of that person from whom the work proceeds; and therefore the merit of his passion exceeds infinitely the merits of our passions; and on account of this, that he was God, his death was weighed by God [according to] how great was he who was dying. And therefore as to sufficiency, if infinite thousands of men were bound by the guilt of original [sin], through the effect of that passion they could have been freed.
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It must therefore be granted that Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, is finite and measured, because it was created in number, weight, and measure. And the reasonings for this side must be granted.

1. To that, however, which is objected first, that the Spirit was given to Christ not by measure; it must be said that if it be understood of the *eternal* giving, or of the giving by the *communication of idioms*, then measure is denied [to it] *simply*. But if by *the Spirit given* we understand the very donation of *the gifts of the Holy Spirit*, thus measure is not denied there *simply*, but [denied is] commensuration *with respect to us*, to whom the Holy Spirit is given for the uses of certain gifts determinately according to the distribution of the Spirit, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter twelve[^p280-1]: *To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge*, etc. But to Christ all those gifts were given without any restriction; and to that extent he is said to have given him the Spirit without measure.

2. To that which is objected, that God could not give more fully; it must be said that God's not being able to make something greater[^p280-2] can be understood from a threefold cause: namely, either it is by reason on the part of God *operating*, or on the part of the *thing produced*, or indeed on account of the *limitation of the recipient*. When therefore it is said that he could not confer more fully, this must not be understood on account of the *immensity of the thing conferred*, or [on account of] the *finitude of the divine power*, but on account of the *limitation of the receptive power*, because, since it is created, it is of finite capacity and cannot receive [anything] but the finite[^p280-3]. And *if you object* that he could have given a greater capacity; it must be said that it is necessary that a creature, by the very fact that it is a *creature*, have a finite capacity; and again, because the creature is *in such a species* or genus, it has a limitation, beyond which that genus or species cannot extend itself. And thus it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ's merit is infinite; it must be said that the infinity of the merit arises from the union of that soul to the divine person — by reason of which union not only man, but also God is said to die — on account of which that merit is infinite, not by reason of the *created grace in itself*, but by reason of the infinite *dignity of the person*. Whence Anselm too means to say this[^p280-4], when he says that it behooved him who could make satisfaction to be God and man.

4. To that which is objected, that a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing except finitely; it must be said that that holds true when they are altogether of the same genus; for if they are not of the same proximate genus, it holds falsehood, as is plain, that a line exceeds a point infinitely, and a surface a line[^p280-5]. But Christ's grace not only disposes to *fruition*, as do other graces, but also to *union*. And hence it is, that since *to be united with the deity* is a new and singular mode of divine existence and indwelling in a creature, as regards this an excess without measure can be observed.

5. To that which is objected, that grace is as great as that to which it disposes; it must be said that this can hold true if it dispose by way of *necessity* or condignity[^p280-6], as merit [disposes] to reward; but the grace of a singular person disposes to union by a disposition of *congruity*. For that union was not only *gratuitous*, but among all graces, as Augustine says, it held pre-eminently the character of *grace*, as was held above in distinction four[^p280-7], because no sufficient merits could anticipate it. On account of this it is not necessary, even if *to be God* be simply an infinite good, that the grace preparing for this be infinite. — It could also be said otherwise, that *to be God* is said of something in two ways: either by predication through *essence*, or through *union*[^p280-8]. If by predication through *essence*, then the predicate predicates an infinite good *in rectitude*. If through *union*, then it predicates an infinite good not concerning that *of which* it is predicated, but concerning that *which* is predicated. Whence when it is said: *this man is God*, or: *this man is an infinite good*, it is the same as if it were said: *this man is united to the immense God in unity of person*; and yet the man remains in his finitude, and God in his immensity. For although human nature is exalted, nevertheless it does not cease to be a creature.

6. To that which is asked, whether the soul of Christ can desire a greater grace; it must be said, no, because through that grace it is so united to God[^p280-9]
<!-- page 281 -->
that all its appetite is quieted in that immense good itself and terminated by a perfect quieting. — As to what it then objects, that than anything finite something greater can be desired: it must be said that this is true of the finite *in itself*, but of that finite which *orders* and *unites* to the infinite good by a perfect joining and ordering, it does not hold true, because it can quiet and stabilize by reason of that *from which* and *to which*. Whence just as grace, although it be a vanity, insofar as it is a creature, has nevertheless [the power] to stabilize the soul by reason of that good from which it proceeds and from which it is not separated nor recedes, so also it can quiet by reason of that to which it immediately and inseparably conjoins [it].

la: Vers. 34. — August. in hunc loc. (tr. 14. n. 10.) ait: *Hominibus ad mensuram dat, unico Filio non dat ad mensuram... Christus, qui dat, non ad mensuram accipit.* Cfr. 1. Retract. c. 19. n. 3, et hic lit. Magistri, in principio.

en: Verse 34. — Augustine on this passage (*Tractate* 14. n. 10.) says: *To men he gives by measure, to the only Son he does not give by measure... Christ, who gives, does not receive by measure.* Cf. *Retractations* I. c. 19. n. 3, and here the text of the Master, at the beginning.

la: Hic circa initium. — In minori pro *sed omni finito potest* edd. cum pluribus codd. *sed cum finito possit* (edd. 1, 2 *potest*).

en: Here near the beginning. — In the minor [premise], for *sed omni finito potest* the editions with several codices [read] *sed cum finito possit* (editions 1, 2 [read] *potest*).

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 14.

en: Book II, *Cur Deus homo* [Why God Became Man], c. 14.

la: Non pauci codd. *possint.*

en: Not a few codices [read] *possint.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 173, nota 6. et d. 2. n. 3. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above, p. 173, note 6, and d. 2. [a.] 3. q. 2. in the body [of the text].

la: Secundum Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16), *perfectum dicitur extra quod non est ullam accipere particulam.* Cfr. III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.).

en: According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V. text 21. (IV. c. 16), *that is called perfect outside of which it is not [possible] to take any part.* Cf. *Physics* III. text 63. and following (c. 6.).

la: Vers. 21: *Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.*

en: Verse 21: *Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 9. q. 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. seqq. (c. 6.), et II. Metaph. text. 8. (I. brevior c. 2.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III. text 63. and following (c. 6.), and *Metaphysics* II. text 8. (I. shorter [recension] c. 2.).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 130. (c. 12.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the Earth* I. text 130. (c. 12.).

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *sic cum dicat* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 *sic cum dicit*, codd. A H bb *sic cum sit.* Paulo inferius pro *ad gratias* codd. A G H K T *ad gratiam*, et inferius etiam pro *id est* edd. cum paucis codd. *et.*

en: See I Sent. d. 43. q. 3. — A little above, for *sic cum dicat* not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *sic cum dicit*, codices A, H, bb [read] *sic cum sit.* A little below, for *ad gratias* codices A, G, H, K, T [read] *ad gratiam*, and further below also, for *id est* the editions with a few codices [read] *et.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, in principio et Bonav. infra a. 2. q. I. — Mox pro *ad hoc* edd. *adhuc.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, at the beginning, and Bonaventure below, a. 2. q. I. — Presently, for *ad hoc* the editions [read] *adhuc.*

la: Vers. 8. — Superius post *ipsam donationem* cod. O adiicit *creatam vel temporalem.* In fine solut. pro *dicitur ei* [complures codd. perperam *eis*] *dedisse spiritum* edd. *dicitur ei datus spiritus.*

en: Verse 8. — Above, after *ipsam donationem* codex O adds *creatam vel temporalem.* At the end of the solution, for *dicitur ei* [several codices wrongly *eis*] *dedisse spiritum* the editions [read] *dicitur ei datus spiritus.*

la: Edd. *quod Deum non posse aliquid plenius vel maius dare vel facere.* Paulo inferius pro *suscipientis* cod. M *potentiae susceptivae.* Deinde post *plenius* cod. N supplet *ei.*

en: The editions [read] *quod Deum non posse aliquid plenius vel maius dare vel facere* ["that God's not being able to give or make anything more fully or greater"]. A little below, for *suscipientis* codex M [reads] *potentiae susceptivae.* Then after *plenius* codex N supplies *ei.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. I. ad 4, d. 17. p. II. q. 4. in corp., d. 44. a. I. q. 3. ad I.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 2. q. I. ad 4, d. 17. p. II. q. 4. in the body [of the text], d. 44. a. I. q. 3. ad I.

la: Libr. II. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 6. — Paulo superius pro *mori* edd. *mereri.*

en: Book II, *Cur Deus homo*, c. 6. — A little above, for *mori* the editions [read] *mereri.*

la: Nam punctus est absque dimensione; linea vero extenditur in longum, neque unquam ex punctis fieri potest linea, neque ex lineis superficies. Quod respiciens Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 71. (c. 8.) docet, lineae ad punctum nullam esse proportionem excessus, cum omnino differant. Cfr. I. Metaph. text. 43. (c. 9.), et lib. de Lineis insecabilibus. — Paulo superius post *omnino sunt eiusdem generis* Vat. supplet *proximi.* In fine solut. pro *sine mensura* edd. cum paucis codd. *sive mensura.* — De singulari modo existentiae divinae cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 2.

en: For a point is without dimension; a line, however, extends in length, nor can a line ever be made out of points, nor a surface out of lines. Regarding which Aristotle, *Physics* IV. text 71. (c. 8.), teaches that there is no proportion of excess of a line to a point, since they differ altogether. Cf. *Metaphysics* I. text 43. (c. 9.), and the book *On Indivisible Lines.* — A little above, after *omnino sunt eiusdem generis* the Vatican [edition] supplies *proximi.* At the end of the solution, for *sine mensura* the editions with a few codices [read] *sive mensura.* — On the singular mode of divine existence cf. above, d. 6. a. 2. q. 2.

la: Vat. *condignationis*, edd. 1, 2 perperam *congruitatis.* Mox pro *congruitatis* cod. U *congruentiae.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *condignationis*, editions 1, 2 wrongly *congruitatis.* Presently, for *congruitatis* codex U [reads] *congruentiae.*

la: Art. 2. q. I. — Verba Augustini ibid. q. 2. arg. I. et 3. ad oppos., nec non lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Article 2, q. I. — The words of Augustine [are] in the same place, q. 2. arg. I. and 3. on the contrary, as well as in the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: De divisione praedicationis hic relata, nec non de subnexis cfr. supra d. 7. a. I. q. I. — Mox pro *tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum* edd. *tunc infinitum praedicat bonum*, codd. A H *tunc praedicat infinitum bonum.* Plurimi autem codd. non bene omittunt *infinitum* ante *bonum.* Aliquanto inferius pro *in unitatem* cod. G *in unitate.*

en: On the division of predication here reported, as well as on what follows, cf. above, d. 7. a. I. q. I. — Presently, for *tunc praedicatum praedicat infinitum bonum* the editions [read] *tunc infinitum praedicat bonum*, codices A, H [read] *tunc praedicat infinitum bonum.* But most codices not well omit *infinitum* before *bonum.* Somewhat below, for *in unitatem* codex G [reads] *in unitate.*

la: Non pauci codd. falso *unitus.* Inferius pro *omni finito* bene multi codd. *cum finito.*

en: Not a few codices falsely [read] *unitus.* Below, for *omni finito* rightly many codices [read] *cum finito.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communiter theologi in duobus consentiunt, scilicet quod gratia creata Christi non sit infinita in ratione entis et qualitatis nec possit dici *simpliciter infinita*; item, quod sola anima Christi habeat *simpliciter plenitudinem gratiae*, ita ut de facto ei collata sit *summa gratia* et *quodam modo infinita*. In explicatione secundae propositionis non conveniunt theologi, praesertim in solvenda quaestione, utrum gratia Christi augeri possit. S. Bonav. cum B. Alberto, Richardo a Med., Scoto, Durando (hic q. I.), Caietano aliisque docet, gratiam Christi absolute non posse augeri, tum ex natura ipsius gratiae tum ex parte capacitatis subiecti (cfr. hic praesertim fundamenta, solut. ad 2, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I.). Etiam S. Thom. (S. III. q. 7. a. 12.) explicite dicit: «Sic igitur manifestum est, quod gratia Christi non potest augeri ex parte ipsius gratiae, sed neque ex parte subiecti». In Comment. (hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) de gratia creata dicit, quod licet secundum essentiam sit finita, tamen dici possit infinita tripliciter, tum ex coniunctione ad divinitatem, tum secundum rationem gratiae, tum quoad effectus. Et ibid. quaestiunc. 3. disertis verbis dicit, quod gratia Christi crescere non potuit. Etiam Quaest. disp. de Verit. q. 29. a. 3. concludit, gratiam Christi esse in perfectione gratiae infinitam. Nihilominus discipuli S. Thomae in vera ipsius mente explicanda non consentiunt. Plurimi autem eorum putant, praedicta debere intelligi solummodo de potentia Dei *ordinaria*, non de *absoluta*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. III. q. 12. m. 3. a. I. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. 1-4. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2.

**III.** In responsione ad seq. (3.) quaestionem omnes antiqui consentiunt, simulque docent, hanc plenitudinem gratiae simul cum visione beatifica ab instanti conceptionis fuisse in Christo consummatam eique soli propriam. De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. I; S. loc. cit. a. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Commonly the theologians agree in two things, namely that the created grace of Christ is not infinite in the character of being and of quality, nor can be called *simply infinite*; likewise, that the soul of Christ alone has *simply the fullness of grace*, so that in fact there was conferred on it the *highest grace* and one *in a certain way infinite*. In the explanation of the second proposition the theologians do not agree, especially in resolving the question whether Christ's grace can be increased. St. Bonaventure, with Bl. Albert, Richard of Mediavilla, Scotus, Durandus (here q. I.), Cajetan, and others, teaches that Christ's grace absolutely cannot be increased, both from the nature of the grace itself and on the part of the capacity of the subject (cf. here especially the fundamenta, the solution to [objection] 2, and I Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. I.). St. Thomas too (Summa III. q. 7. a. 12.) explicitly says: «Thus therefore it is manifest that Christ's grace cannot be increased on the part of the grace itself, nor on the part of the subject». In the Commentary (here q. I. a. 2. little-question 2.) he says of created grace that although according to essence it is finite, yet it can be called infinite in three ways: both from its conjunction to the divinity, and according to the character of grace, and as regards effects. And in the same place, little-question 3, he says in express words that Christ's grace could not grow. Likewise in the *Disputed Questions on Truth* q. 29. a. 3. he concludes that Christ's grace is infinite in the perfection of grace. Nevertheless the disciples of St. Thomas do not agree in explaining his true mind. But most of them think that the aforesaid must be understood only of God's *ordinary* power, not of his *absolute* [power].

**II.** Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, [Summa] p. III. q. 12. m. 3. a. I. — Scotus, on this and the following question, in both Writings, here q. 1-4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I. a. 2. little-questions 2. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I. q. 2.

**III.** In the response to the following (3rd) question all the ancients agree, and they likewise teach that this fullness of grace, together with the beatific vision, was consummated in Christ from the instant of conception and was proper to him alone. On this question: St. Thomas, here q. I. a. 2. little-question I; St. [Thomas] loc. cit. a. 9. 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. little-question I. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{278,279,280,281}-{L,R}-*.png`), raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` lines 19641–19824) used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Running heads confirmed eyes-on via the band crops: `278 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` / `DIST. XIII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 279` / `280 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` / `QUAEST. III. 281` (the p.281 running head reads QUAEST. III because QUAESTIO III opens lower on that same page; the q2 material on p.281 is the tail of reply Ad 6 plus the entire Scholion) — never OCR'd digits.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.278** (PDF 300): QUAESTIO II opener + title; *quod fuerit sine mensura* arg 1 + start of arg 2 (the lower half of the page; q1's Scholion IV occupies the top). Footers nn.1–2 (`[^p278-1]`–`[^p278-2]`) — **picked up from d13-a1-q1's forward hand-off**.
- **p.279** (PDF 301): tail of arg 2 (Magister quotation); args 3–6; *Sed contra* args 1–4; Conclusio; Respondeo (the *finita in se* / *improportionabiliter excedit* threefold-excess body). Footers nn.1–10 (`[^p279-1]`–`[^p279-10]`).
- **p.280** (PDF 302): *Concedendum est igitur* + replies Ad 1–5 + start of Ad 6 (reply 6's tail spills onto p.281). Footers nn.1–9 (`[^p280-1]`–`[^p280-9]`).
- **p.281** (PDF 303): tail of reply Ad 6; then **Scholion I–III**; ends just before QUAESTIO III opens on the same page. **q2 carries NO footers on p.281** — the SCHOLION block follows the body directly and there is no numbered footer sequence between it and the QUAESTIO III header. The p.281 footers belong to QUAESTIO III (forwarded to d13-a1-q3).

**Hand-offs picked up (from d13-a1-q1, commits 398a01d + 108b6d0):** the two **p.278 footers** — n.1 (`Vers. 34. — Augustinus in hunc loc. tr. 14. n. 10.…` → `[^p278-1]`, anchoring at *Ioannis tertio*) and n.2 (`Hic circa initium. — In minori pro sed omni finito…` → `[^p278-2]`, anchoring at *Magister in littera*). q1's footers ended on p.277; these two anchor in q2's body and are its first body-footers, as flagged in the hand-off.

**Hand-offs forwarded (to d13-a1-q3, QUAESTIO III, raw 19825):** the p.281 footers (the numbered footer sequence beginning with `'undamenta moris Domini` and the scriptural references for `Isaiae undecimo²`, `Ioannis primo³`, etc.) all anchor in QUAESTIO III's *fundamenta*, which open on the lower half of p.281. The Scholion of this q2 is the **last** q2 material on p.281; the next numbered footer block is q3's.

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true`. The SCHOLION (I–III) prints after q2's reply Ad 6 (p.281 L/R) and is **q2's own** scholion on the *finita/immensa* question: §I treats the controversy whether Christ's grace can be increased (St. Bonaventure: absolutely cannot be increased); §II is the bibliography for *this and the following question*; §III explicitly looks ahead — *In responsione ad seq. (3.) quaestionem omnes antiqui consentiunt* — but is anchored here, in q2, not forwarded. q3 (the *gratia plena* question) carries its own scholion. No sibling-shared scholion held here for q3.

**Alignment.** PASS. Opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit gratia finita, vel immensa` = ART. I q2 (the *finita/immensa* question per d13-divisio TRACTATIO: q2 = whether the grace is finite or measured); NOT q1 (*creata vel increata*, raw 19464) or q3 (*gratia plena atque perfecta*, raw 19825). No q-swap. Confirmed against the QUAESTIO III opener at raw 19825 (`Tertio quaeritur, utrum gratia singularis personae… fuerit gratia plena atque perfecta`).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR for this region is clean and was confirmed column-by-column against the 450 dpi crops; all variant-note footers (`[^p279-9]`, `[^p280-2]`, `[^p280-5]`, `[^p280-8]`) were re-read directly from the printed footer bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0