title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum mundus potuerit fieri melior quantum ad proprietates partium integrantium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum mundus potuit fieri melior quantum ad partium integrantium proprietates. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Isaiae trigesimo[^1]: *Erit lux lunae sicut lux solis, et lux solis sicut lux septem dierum*; hoc et Magister adducit hanc auctoritatem[^2]: « Potuit,

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inquit, Deus talem facere hominem qui nec peccare vellet nec posset; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse »: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*, et Magister adducit hanc auctoritatem: erit; ergo potest esse, ergo Deus potuit condere, et ita de aliis corporibus: et si hoc, essent utique res meliores: ergo etc.

3. Item, melior est proprietas incorruptibilitatis et quietis quam corruptionis et motus[^3]; sed omnia quae fecit Deus, aut fecit corruptibilia, aut aliquo modo mobilia: ergo omnia potuit facere meliora.

4. Item, si non potuerunt creaturae fieri meliores, hoc fuit, aut quia Deus non potuit dare plus, aut quia creaturae non potuerunt plus capere. Si quia Deus non potuit amplius dare, ergo divina potentia est limitata; si quia creaturae non potuerunt amplius capere; contra: videmus tota die creaturas meliorari et deteriorari, salva substantia et capacitate: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. « Optimi est optima adducere », sicut dicit Dionysius[^4]; sed optimo non potest esse melius: ergo si Deus, cum sit optimus, adduxit res optime, patet etc.

2. Item, Plato[^5] addit rationem: « Porro quia optimus est, ab optimo vero omnis invidia relegata erat »; et ideo dedit unicuique creaturae tantum de bonitate, quantum potuit capere. Si tu dicas, quod Platonis verbum non valet, quia invidia non est respectu inferioris; contra: Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*[^6]: « Si bona facere non posset, nulla esset potentia; si posset, sed nollet, magna esset invidentia »: ergo pari ratione, si posset facere meliora et nollet, esset invidus.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne agens ex tota sua substantia[^7] facit rem optimo modo, quo potest fieri, si potentiam eius nihil omnino impedit; sed Deus est agens ex tota sua potentia in omni sua actione, et potentia eius nullam habet indigentiam nec resistentiam: ergo quidquid facit, ita bonum facit, quod nullo modo potest fieri melius.

4. Item, haec est vera per se: « bonum est diffusivum sui[^8] », ergo magis bonum magis diffusivum, et maxime bonum maxime diffusivum; sed Deus est agens maximae bonitatis, ergo maxime se diffundit: ergo videtur, quod unumquodque optime facit et quantum ad substantiam et quantum ad proprietates.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Partes huius mundi transeuntes quoad proprietates fieri meliores possent; item partes permanentes, si absolute considerantur, non autem in relatione ad finem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de melioritate partium universi, potest quaeri quantum ad duplex genus partium: aut quantum ad partes permanentes, sicut natura intellectualis, rationalis, caelestis et elementaris: aut quantum ad partes transeuntes, sicut hic homo et hic equus.

Si quantum ad partes transeuntes, sic sine distinctione concedo, quod possunt ut in pluribus quantum ad proprietates fieri meliores, quia non sunt de substantia universi, nec sunt a solo Deo, sed a Deo simul operante cum agente particulari, quod impeditur et deficit. Si autem intelligamus de partibus quae sunt de constitutione et integritate mundi, et immediate sunt a Deo, cum quaeritur, utrum potuerint fieri meliores quantum ad proprietates, distinguendum est: quia aut loqueris de ipsis absolute, aut de ipsis in relatione ad finem. Si de ipsis absolute, patet, quod meliores conditiones potuerunt habere; si de ipsis in relatione adinvicem vel ad finem, optimas habuerunt proprietates: quod patet, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus[^9]: « Meliores iudicavit Deus homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent ». Similiter melius fuit, quod omnes homines essent ex uno, et ita quod haberent corpus animale; et secundum exigentiam eius necesse fuit, alias creaturas corporales disponi in motu et corruptibilitate.

Ex his patent rationes inductae ad primam partem; procedunt enim de proprietatibus rerum secundum se consideratarum.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium de Dionysio, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur secundum ordinem, sicut iam patebit[^10].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Platone, dicendum, quod non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur salvo ordine universi, et hoc quantum ad bonitatem essentialem, considerata dispositione in materia. Nec ratio sua est necessaria, sed solum persuasio in simili: sicut in homine, qui potest alii benefacere et

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non facit, quod hoc iudicatur invidia, et frequenter dimittit propter invidiam, et qui caret invidia e converso facit; sic Deus carens invidia fecit; et sic intelligitur verbum Augustini.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod agens ex tota potentia producit optime: dicendum, quod agens ex tota potentia quidam agit secundum impetum, quidam secundum artem et sapientiam. Et qui secundum impetum agit facit quanto melius potest; qui agit secundum artem et sapientiam agit quantum vult et quantum congruit, salvo ordine, quia « sapientis est ordinare ». Ideo quaedam facit bona, quaedam meliora, quaedam optima. Et sic patet, quod illud non sequitur.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum summum summe se diffundit; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de diffusione naturali, de voluntaria sive a proposito non est verum. Primo modo est diffusio in productione personarum, secundo modo in productione creaturarum.

english:
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### Question II. *Whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the world could have been made better as to the properties of its integral parts. And that it could, is shown as follows.

1. Isaiah 30[^1]: *The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be as the light of seven days*; this also the Master adduces along with this authority[^2]: « God could,

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he says, have made such a man who would neither will nor be able to sin; and if he had made such a one, who doubts that he would have been better »: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Genesis according to the Letter*, and the Master adduces this authority: it will be; therefore it can be; therefore God could establish [it], and so of other bodies: and if this is so, things would surely be better: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the property of incorruptibility and rest is better than that of corruption and motion[^3]; but everything that God made, he made either corruptible or in some way mobile: therefore he could have made all things better.

4. Likewise, if creatures could not have been made better, this was either because God could not give more, or because creatures could not receive more. If because God could not give more, then the divine power is limited; if because creatures could not receive more — on the contrary: we see all day long creatures being made better and worse, while their substance and capacity remain: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. « It belongs to the best to bring forth the best things », as Dionysius says[^4]; but nothing can be better than the best: therefore if God, since he is the best, brought forth things in the best way, the matter is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, Plato[^5] adds the reason: « Moreover, because he is best, and from the best all envy was banished »; and therefore he gave to each creature as much goodness as it was able to receive. If you say that Plato's word is not valid, because envy is not with respect to one's inferior; on the contrary: Augustine *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^6]: « If he could not have made good things, there would be no power; if he could, but would not, there would be great envy »: therefore by parallel reasoning, if he could have made better things and would not, he would be envious.

3. Likewise, it appears from reason: because every agent acting from its whole substance[^7] makes a thing in the best mode in which it can be made, if nothing impedes its power; but God is an agent [acting] from his whole power in every action, and his power has no deficiency or resistance: therefore whatever he makes, he makes so good that it can in no way be made better.

4. Likewise, this is true *per se*: « good is diffusive of itself[^8] »; therefore the more good, the more diffusive, and the supremely good, supremely diffusive; but God is an agent of supreme goodness, therefore he diffuses himself supremely: therefore it seems that he makes each thing in the best way both as to substance and as to properties.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The transient parts of this world could have been made better as to their properties; likewise the permanent parts, if considered absolutely, but not in relation to the end.

**I respond:** It must be said that when one asks about the betterment of the parts of the universe, one can ask about two kinds of parts: either as to the permanent parts, such as intellectual, rational, celestial, and elemental nature; or as to the transient parts, such as this man and this horse.

If as to the transient parts, then without distinction I concede that they can in most cases be made better as to their properties, since they do not belong to the substance of the universe, nor are they from God alone, but from God acting together with a particular agent, which is impeded and defective. But if we understand it of those parts which are of the constitution and integrity of the world and are immediately from God — when it is asked whether they could have been made better as to their properties, a distinction must be drawn: because either you speak of them absolutely, or of them in relation to the end. If of them absolutely, it is clear that they could have had better conditions; if of them in relation to one another or to the end, they had the best properties: which is clear because, as Augustine says[^9]: « God judged men to be better, if they should serve him freely ». Likewise it was better that all men should be from one, and so that they should have an animal body; and according to its exigency it was necessary that other corporeal creatures be disposed in motion and corruptibility.

From these things the reasons brought forward to the first part are clear; for they proceed from the properties of things considered in themselves.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Dionysius, it must be said that this is to be understood according to order, as will soon appear[^10].

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected concerning Plato, it must be said that it does not have truth unless it is understood with the order of the universe preserved, and this as to essential goodness, the disposition in matter being considered. Nor is his reasoning necessary, but only a persuasion by likeness: just as in the case of a man, who can do good to another and

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does not, [in which case] this is judged envy, and he often refrains on account of envy, and one who lacks envy does the opposite; so God, lacking envy, made [things]; and so is Augustine's word to be understood.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that an agent [acting] from its whole power produces in the best way: it must be said that an agent [acting] from its whole power acts in one of two ways: some act according to impulse, some according to art and wisdom. And he who acts according to impulse makes [a thing] as good as he can; he who acts according to art and wisdom acts as much as he wills and as much as is fitting, with order preserved, since « it belongs to the wise man to set things in order ». Therefore he makes some things good, some better, some best. And thus it is clear that this does not follow.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that the supreme good supremely diffuses itself: it must be said that this is true of natural diffusion; of voluntary or purposeful [diffusion] it is not true. In the first mode the diffusion is in the production of [the divine] persons; in the second mode, in the production of creatures.

la: Vers. 26. — Mox pro *potuit* Vat. *potest*.

en: Verse 26. — Soon afterward, for *potuit* the Vatican edition reads *potest*.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here c. 1.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. *Phys.* text. 73 (c. 9), et supra pag. 654, nota 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 73 (c. 9), and above p. 654, note 1.

la: Libr. *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 19.

en: [Pseudo-Dionysius], *On the Divine Names*, c. 4 § 19.

la: In *Timaeo* (ed. Serrani, 1578 pag. 29): « ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος », Latine: *Bonitate videlicet praestabat; in bonum autem nulla de ulla unquam re cadit invidia.*

en: In the *Timaeus* (ed. Serranus, 1578, p. 29): « ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος » — in Latin: *Namely, he excelled in goodness; but upon the good no envy ever falls concerning anything whatsoever.*

la: Libr. IV. c. 16. n. 27, ubi ed. oper. August. *si autem posset nec faceret* pro *si posset, sed nollet*, et plures codd. cum ed. 1 *et nollet* pro *sed nollet*. Paulo superius codd. K P Q V X Y *quia invidia est respectu superioris, non inferioris*; aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *quia invidia est respectu inferioris*. Cfr. d. 20. dub. 1.

en: Book IV, c. 16, n. 27, where the edition of Augustine's works has *si autem posset nec faceret* for *si posset, sed nollet*, and several codices with edition 1 have *et nollet* for *sed nollet*. A little above, codices K P Q V X Y read *because envy is with respect to one's superior, not to one's inferior*; some codices with edition 1 read *because envy is with respect to one's inferior*. Cf. d. 20, dub. 1.

la: Pro *substantia* cod. M cum ed. 1 *potentia*, et e converso paulo inferius pro *sua potentia* cod. A *sua substantia*, cod. K *sua substantia et potentia*.

en: For *substantia* codex M with edition 1 reads *potentia*, and conversely a little below, for *sua potentia* codex A has *sua substantia*, codex K has *sua substantia et potentia*.

la: De hac Dionysii propositione cfr. supra pag. 746, nota 5. — Paulo inferius pro *optime facit* Vat. cum cod. cc *optimum facit*.

en: On this proposition of Dionysius see above, p. 746, note 5. — A little below, for *optime facit* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *optimum facit*.

la: Libr. *de Vera Relig.* c. 14. n. 27: *Tales enim servos meliores esse Deus iudicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter.* Cfr. *de Agone christ.* c. 10. n. 11. — Paulo superius multi codd. omittunt *vel* ante *ad finem*. Pro *hoc vel* cod. T substituit *sive*, cod. F cum ed. 1 *et*; codd. R X omittunt tum *vel* tum vocem antecedentem *ad invicem*.

en: Book *On True Religion* c. 14, n. 27: *For God judged such servants to be better, if they served him freely.* Cf. *On the Christian Combat*, c. 10, n. 11. — A little above, many codices omit *vel* before *ad finem*. For *hoc vel* codex T substitutes *sive*, codex F with edition 1 has *et*; codices R and X omit both *vel* and the preceding word *ad invicem*.

la: Quaest. seq.

en: The following question.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec intelligitur de proprietatibus accidentalibus partium mundi et quidem huius mundi, non alicuius mundi possibilis. — Pro explicatione sententiae Dionysii in solut. ad 1. dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 1. ad 3.): « Dicendum, quod optimum dicitur simpliciter, et optimum secundum genus et secundum statum, et secundum ordinem. Optimum simpliciter est Deus; optimum secundum genus et statum, ut in genere creaturae et conditionis statu Christus, optimum in ordine et non simpliciter, rerum universitas. Optimi ergo est optima adducere, hoc potest intelligi et quantum ad optimum simpliciter, ut in processione personali, et quantum ad optimum in genere et statu conditionis, ut in productione Christi; et quantum ad optimum in ordine, ut in productione universi ».

**II.** Auctores vide in Scholio hic ad 1. quaestionem, et praeterea: Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica, a. 2. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is to be understood concerning the accidental properties of the parts of the world — and indeed of this world, not of some [other] possible world. — For the explanation of the opinion of Dionysius in the reply to objection 1, Alexander of Hales says (*Summa* p. I q. 21 m. 3 a. 1 ad 3): « It must be said that 'best' is spoken of [in three ways]: best absolutely, and best according to genus and according to state, and according to order. Best absolutely is God; best according to genus and state — namely in the genus of creature and in the state of [its] condition — is Christ; best in order and not absolutely is the totality of things. Therefore '*it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things*' can be understood both as to the best absolutely, as in the personal procession, and as to the best in genus and in the state of condition, as in the production of Christ; and as to the best in order, as in the production of the universe ».

**II.** For [other] authors see in the Scholion here on question 1, and moreover: Peter of Tarentaise on this and the following question, here q. unica, a. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, on this and the following question, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum meliorem quantum ad ordinem partium.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit mundum facere meliorem quantum ad ordinem partium. Et quod non, primo videtur auctoritate.

1. Genesis primo[^1]: *Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*; Glossa Augustini: « Singula quaeque bona in se, sed in universo optima ». Sed optimo nihil est melius: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus[^2] dicit, « quod quamvis alius modus nostrae liberationis esset Deo possibilis, nullus fuit nostrae salvandae miseriae congruentior ». Sed sicut Deus fuit sapientissimus redemptor, ita et sapientissimus conditor: ergo si ordinatissime redemit, ita quod nullus modus melior nec congruentior esse potuit, ergo similiter se habuit in faciendo res: et sic patet etc.

3. Item, si consideremus ordinem elementorum in mundo, constat ea optime esse ordinata. Unde non potest cogitari, quod illa quatuor corpora ordinentur melius, sive secundum qualitates, sive secundum formas nobiles, sive secundum proportiones numerales, sicut ligantur octo et viginti septem, qui sunt duo primi numeri solidi quadrati: ligantur per duos intermedios, scilicet duodecim et octodecim[^3]: ergo etc.

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4. Item, « sapientis est ordinare[^4] »: ergo summe sapientis summe sive optime ordinare: ergo Deus res ita bene ordinavit, quod nullo modo potuit ordinare melius.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ordo ille est bonitatis finitae: ergo si sapientia Dei est infinita, et infinitum excedit finitum, ergo Deus scivit melius ordinare. Sed quidquid scivit, potuit: ergo etc.

2. Item, melior est et nobilior ordo, in quo nulla cadit inordinatio, quam in quo cadit[^5]; sed in universo cadunt multae inordinationes et deformitates: ergo alius ordo potuit fieri melior.

3. Item, quod propinquius est fini, melius est ordinatum[^6]: ergo si omnia sunt optime ordinata, omnia sunt aequaliter coniuncta fini: ergo omnia participant beatitudinem; quod absurdum est.

4. Item, bonitas ordinis pendet ex bonitate partium, sicut respectivum ab absoluto; sed res secundum esse absolutum non sunt optimae: ergo nec in ordine[^7].

> **Conclusio.** Quoad ordinem partium in universo, primae et substantiales partes optime sunt ordinatae; partes vero corruptibiles absolute quidem melius potuerunt ordinari, non autem in relatione ad finem. Quoad ordinem in finem res, salvo ordine universi, optime ordinatae sunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est ordo partium *in toto*, et est ordo partium *in finem*. Primus ordo respicit sapientiam, secundus ordo respicit bonitatem. Et sunt isti duo ordines ita coniuncti, ut unus alteri conformetur, et ordo partium *in universo* est propter ordinationem *ad finem*.

Si ergo loquamur de ordine partium in universo, aut hoc est quantum ad partes primas substantiales; et sic absque distinctione optime sunt ordinatae, ita quod melius ordinari non potuerunt, quia in eis consistit *ordo substantialis* et *pulcritudo universi immutabilis*. Vel quantum ad partes corruptibiles et remotas, et hoc dupliciter: aut absolute et ut nunc; et sic potuerunt melius ordinari et aliquando[^8] erunt melius ordinatae; aut simpliciter et in relatione ad finem; et sic sunt res optime ordinatae in universo, secundum quod convenit ordini in finem.

Similiter optime ordinatae sunt res in finem, salvo ordine universi, quia universum est tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, quod decurrit secundum optimas consonantias, aliis partibus succedentibus aliis, quousque res perfecte ordinentur in finem[^9]. Unde sicut in productione rerum manifestatur potentia sed in comparatione sive in ordine ad non-ens ostenditur summa potentia, creans ex nihilo[^10]: sic ordo rerum in universo in se ostendit sapientiam, et ordo ad finem bonitatem; sed in comparatione unius ad alterum ostenditur summa sapientia et summa bonitas, quia nihil potest hunc ordinem deordinare, sicut melius infra patebit[^11].

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes quod res sunt optime ordinatae, quia respiciunt utrumque ordinem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia est infinita; dicendum, quod quamvis sapientia sit infinita, tamen res non sunt capaces nisi ordinis finiti; et ipsa sapientia summa summum dat ordinem quem habere possunt.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cadit inordinatio; dicendum, quod, si consideremus hos ordines, scilicet ad finem et in universo, ita se ad invicem complectuntur, quod non potest ibi esse inordinatio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de propinquitate, dicendum, quod hoc est verum secundum *propriam ordinationem*[^12], sed secundum *decursum universi* necesse est, quod res sit primo longe a fine, et post appropinquet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo[^13] pendet ex partibus; dicendum, quod sicut aliqua contingentia in se habent *esse absolutum contingens*

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sed ordinem necessarium: sic et in proposito intelligendum, quod quamvis aliquid non sit optimum in se, tamen optime ordinatur. Et exemplum huius patet in partibus corporis et in re artificiali, in qua est consonantia et harmonia, sicut in cithara. Quamvis enim nobilior sit situs oculi quam pedis, tamen si consideremus utrumque secundum suum officium, tam oculus quam pes optime situati sunt in toto, ita quod nec oculus melius pede, nec e converso. Et ita dicit Augustinus super Ioannem[^14], quod sicut Angelus optime in caelo, ita vermiculus optime in imo, sicut in terra. Et similiter apparet in cithara: possunt enim omnes chordae ita proportionari, quod si aliqua tendatur, ut detur ei melior sonus, nunquam remanebit consonantia. Similiter dictiones possunt ordinari ad faciendum versum, ita quod ex illis dictionibus impossibile est fieri versum melius ordinatum: sic in proposito intelligendum.

english:
### Question III. *Whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether God could have made the world better as to the order of its parts. And that he could not, seems first from authority.

1. Genesis 1[^1]: *God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good*; Augustine's Gloss: "Each thing good in itself, but in the whole most good." But than the most good nothing is better: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^2] says, "that although another mode of our liberation was possible for God, none was more congruent for healing our miserable state in need of salvation." But just as God was the wisest redeemer, so also the wisest founder: therefore if he redeemed in the most ordered way, such that no mode could have been better or more congruent, then likewise he did so in making things: and thus the matter is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, if we consider the order of the elements in the world, it is clear that they have been most well ordered. Hence it cannot be conceived that those four bodies should be ordered better, whether according to qualities, or according to noble forms, or according to numerical proportions, as eight and twenty-seven are bound together — which are the first two solid square numbers — they are bound together by two intermediates, namely twelve and eighteen[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, "it belongs to the wise man to order[^4]": therefore to the highest wise man it belongs to order in the highest or best way: therefore God so well ordered things that in no way could he have ordered better.

**On the contrary:**

1. That order is of finite goodness: therefore if the wisdom of God is infinite, and the infinite exceeds the finite, then God knew how to order better. But whatever he knew, he could do: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, an order in which no disorder falls is better and nobler than one in which disorder does fall[^5]; but in the universe many disorders and deformities fall: therefore another order could have been made better.

3. Likewise, that which is nearer to the end is better ordered[^6]: therefore if all things are most well ordered, all things are equally conjoined to the end: therefore all things share in beatitude; which is absurd.

4. Likewise, the goodness of order depends on the goodness of the parts, as the relative on the absolute; but things according to absolute being are not optimal: therefore neither in order[^7].

> **Conclusion.** As to the order of parts in the universe, the first and substantial parts are most well ordered; the corruptible parts, taken absolutely, could indeed have been ordered better, but not in relation to the end. As to the order to the end, things, saving the order of the universe, are most well ordered.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is an order of parts *in the whole*, and an order of parts *to the end*. The first order respects wisdom, the second respects goodness. And these two orders are so conjoined that the one conforms to the other, and the order of parts *in the universe* exists for the sake of the ordering *to the end*.

If, then, we speak of the order of parts in the universe, this is either as to the first substantial parts; and these without distinction are most well ordered, so that they could not have been ordered better, because in them consists the *substantial order* and the *unchanging beauty of the universe*. Or as to the corruptible and remote parts, and this in two ways: either absolutely and as of now; and so they could have been ordered better, and at some time[^8] will be ordered better; or simply and in relation to the end; and so things are most well ordered in the universe, insofar as it accords with the ordering to the end.

Likewise, things are most well ordered to the end, saving the order of the universe, because the universe is like a most beautiful song which proceeds according to the best consonances, with some parts succeeding others, until things are perfectly ordered to the end[^9]. Hence, just as in the production of things power is manifested, but in the comparison or in the order to non-being is shown highest power, creating from nothing[^10]: so the order of things in the universe in itself shows wisdom, and the order to the end shows goodness; but in the comparison of the one to the other is shown highest wisdom and highest goodness, because nothing can disorder this order, as will appear better below[^11].

The arguments proving that things are most well ordered are therefore to be conceded, because they regard each order.

1. To what is objected, that wisdom is infinite; it must be said that although wisdom is infinite, yet things are not capable of more than a finite order; and the highest wisdom itself gives the highest order which they are able to have.

2. To what is objected, that disorder falls; it must be said that, if we consider these orders, namely to the end and in the universe, they so embrace each other mutually that there cannot be any disorder there.

3. To what is objected concerning nearness, it must be said that this is true according to *proper ordering*[^12], but according to *the course of the universe* it is necessary that the thing first be far from the end, and afterward draw near.

4. To what is objected, that order[^13] depends on the parts; it must be said that just as certain contingent things have in themselves *absolute contingent being*

but a necessary order: so also in the matter at hand it must be understood that although something is not optimum in itself, yet it is most well ordered. And an example of this appears in the parts of the body and in an artificial thing, in which there is consonance and harmony, as in a harp. For although the place of the eye is nobler than that of the foot, yet if we consider each according to its office, both the eye and the foot are most well situated in the whole, so that neither is the eye better than the foot, nor conversely. And so Augustine says on John[^14], that just as the angel is most well in heaven, so the little worm is most well in the lowest, as on earth. And likewise it appears in the harp: for all the strings can be so proportioned that if any one were tightened in order to give it a better sound, the consonance would not remain. Likewise, words can be ordered for making a verse, in such a way that from those words it is impossible that a better-ordered verse should come to be: so in the matter at hand it must be understood.

la: Vers. 31. — Glossa subinde allata sumta est ex August., III. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 24. n. 37, et sic ibi sonat: « Et singula bona, et in universo bona valde sunt ». Similiter S. August. loquitur in *Enchir.* c. 10. n. 3: *Sed tamen bona etiam singula; simul vero universa valde bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo.*

en: Verse 31. — The Gloss next adduced is taken from Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* III, c. 24, n. 37, and reads thus there: "Both the single things are good, and in the universe they are very good." Similarly St. Augustine speaks in the *Enchiridion* c. 10, n. 3: *Yet the single things are also good; but together the whole is very good, because from all of them is composed the admirable beauty of the universe.*

la: Libr. XIII. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 13. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In textu cit. post *nullus* Vat. interiicit *tamen*, et deinde pro *salvandae* codd. K P Q cum ed. 1 et cum ed. oper. August. *sanandae*, Vat. *levandae*.

en: Book XIII *On the Trinity* c. 10, n. 13. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — In the cited text, after *nullus* the Vatican edition inserts *tamen*, and then for *salvandae* codd. K P Q, with ed. 1 and the edition of Augustine's works, have *sanandae*; the Vatican has *levandae*.

la: Cfr. August., IV. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 2. n. 8, et Boeth., I. *de Arithmet.* c. 20, et hic Scholion. — Paulo superius pro *numerales* non pauci codd. perperam *numerabiles*. Mox pro *solidi quadrati* Vat. *solidi cubi*, cod. O *solidi cubici*. Idem cod. O deinde verbo *intermedios* adiungit *solidos quadratos*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* IV, c. 2, n. 8; and Boethius, *On Arithmetic* I, c. 20; and here the Scholion. — A little above, for *numerales* not a few codices wrongly read *numerabiles*. Soon after, for *solidi quadrati* the Vatican has *solidi cubi*, and cod. O *solidi cubici*. The same cod. O then adds after the word *intermedios* the words *solidos quadratos*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 685, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 685, note 1.

la: Nam, ut ait Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 1. (c. 5.): *Quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, sunt magis talia, ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius*. — Codd. et ed. 1 arg. 3. ponunt 4. loco.

en: For, as Aristotle says, *Topics* III, c. 1 (c. 5): *Those things which are less mixed with their contraries are more such, as the whiter is the more unmixed with black.* — The codices and ed. 1 place argument 3 in the 4th position.

la: Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 1: *Et duorum (melius est), quod propinquius est fini.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 1: *And of two [things, the better is] that which is nearer to the end.*

la: Pro *in ordine* ed. 1 *ordinatae*.

en: For *in ordine* ed. 1 has *ordinatae*.

la: Cod. R *ordinem*. Proxime post pro *ergo* Vat. cum cod. cc *autem*.

en: Cod. R has *ordinem*. Soon after, for *ergo* the Vatican with cod. cc has *autem*.

la: Scilicet post iudicium finale.

en: Namely after the final judgment.

la: August., XI. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 18: *Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi pariter nosset, quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque ita ordinem saeculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret... Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita sermonis pulcritudinem reddunt, ita quadam non verborum, sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pulcritudo componitur.* Cfr. ibid. c. 22, et *de Vera Relig.* c. 22. n. 52. seq. et c. 41. n. 77. — In principio huius propositionis pro *Similiter* sola Vat. *Simpliciter enim*, quae et aliquanto inferius cum cod. cc *in ordine non-entia* exit eas pro *in ordine ad non-ens*. Mox plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt *creans*. Loco huius verbi *creans* codd. K P Q T V X. ponunt *prius*, et tunc supplendum est: *producit*.

en: Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 18: *For God would not have created any — I do not say of the Angels, but even of men — whom he foresaw was going to be evil, unless he equally knew with what good uses he would put them to service, and so adorned the order of the ages, like a most beautiful song, by certain quasi-antitheses... Just as therefore those contraries set against contraries give the speech its beauty, so by a certain eloquence not of words but of things, the beauty of the world is composed by the opposition of contraries.* Cf. *ibid.* c. 22, and *On True Religion* c. 22, n. 52 ff., and c. 41, n. 77. — At the beginning of this proposition, for *Similiter* the Vatican alone reads *Simpliciter enim*, which a little further on, with cod. cc, also has *in ordine non-entia exit eas* for *in ordine ad non-ens*. Soon after, very many codices, with the first six editions, omit *creans*. In place of the word *creans*, codd. K P Q T V X have *prius*, and then must be supplied: *producit*.

la: Dist. 46. q. 3. C, n. 4, cl. 17. q. 1. nec non II. *Sent.* d. 12. n. 3. q. 1. praesertim per E.

en: Distinction 46, q. 3, C, n. 4, cl. 17, q. 1, and also II *Sent.*, d. 12, n. 3, q. 1, especially through E.

la: Plures codd. ac F P V Z cum ed. 1 *bene id*.

en: Several codices, including F P V Z, with ed. 1, read *bene id*.

la: In cod. T hic additur: *cum enim res sit quid in ipsam, nullum perfectius est posse, quod eo perpetuo melius ordinetur*. Loco *proprium ordinationem* ed. 1 *primum ordinationem*. — Supple cum Vat. *in universo*. Paulo inferius codd. cum ed. primis edd. omittunt *et cum in universo*.

en: In cod. T is here added: *for since the thing is something into itself, no power is more perfect than that by which it is perpetually ordered the better*. In place of *proprium ordinationem* ed. 1 has *primum ordinationem*. — Supply with the Vatican *in universo*. A little below, the codices with the first editions omit *et cum in universo*.

la: Cap. 1. tract. 1. n. 13. — Vat. *ordinis bonitas*.

en: Chapter 1, tractate 1, n. 13. — The Vatican has *ordinis bonitas*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro intelligentia praeclarae doctrinae huius quaestionis attendendum est ad plures distinctiones circa ordinem alicuius rei. Non agitur de ordine particulari alicuius rei, sive « secundum propriam ordinationem », ut dicitur in solut. ad 3, sed de ordine universali partium mundi, quae ordinantur non tantum ad proprios actus et ad propriam perfectionem, sed etiam ordinantur tum ad invicem, quia ignobiliora ordinata sunt tanquam media ad nobiliora, tum ad perfectionem totius, tum ad finem toto universo superiorem, ut est salus electorum et gloria Dei. Scholastici acceperunt has distinctiones praecipue ex Aristotele (XII. Metaph. text. 32.). Cfr. etiam infra d. 46. q. 3, et praecipue S. Thom., S. I. q. 65. a. 2.

**II.** In arg. 3. fundam., ubi sermo est de mundo elementari, supponitur iuxta sententiam tunc communem, quatuor esse elementa, et ea esse ordinata tum secundum quatuor qualitates (calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum) tum secundum multas formas nobiles, tum « secundum proportiones numerales ». Has proportiones elementorum, quae respondent proportionibus numeralibus, hic paucis verbis potius insinuantur, quam explicantur. Unde praeter ea quae supra d. 2. q. 4. in Scholio dicta sunt, haec ex Brulifero notamus. Ignis et terra, ut extrema inter se colligantur per duo intermedia (scil. aer et aqua), et similem inter se proportionem habent, ac numeri extremi 8 et 27 et intermedii 12 et 18. Scilicet *numerus quadratus solidus* oritur, quando idem numerus ducitur in se ipsum, ut 2 × 2 × 2 = 8; 3 × 3 × 3 = 27; unde 8 et 27 sunt duo primi numeri quadrati solidi (cubi). Si autem aliquis numerus bis ducitur in alium numerum, tum oritur quidem solidus (cubus), sed non quadratus, ut 2 × 2 × 3 = 12; et 2 × 3 × 3 = 18. Sic eficiuntur duo numeri intermedii inter primum et secundum numerum solidum quadratum. Eandem autem proportionem habet 8 ad 12, quam 12 ad 18, et 18 ad 27. Nam 12 = 8 + 4; 18 = 12 + 6; 27 = 18 + 9. Simili modo distribuebantur qualitates elementorum, ut ignis sit simul calidus et siccus; aer calidus et humidus, aqua frigida et humida, terra frigida et sicca.

Auctores ut in Scholio ad 1. quaestionem, et praeterea B. Albert., hic a. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For grasping the splendid doctrine of this question, attention must be paid to several distinctions concerning the order of some thing. The question is not about the particular order of some thing, or "according to *proper ordering*," as is said in the solution to 3, but about the universal order of the parts of the world, which are ordered not only to their own acts and to their own perfection, but are also ordered mutually, because the less noble are ordered as means to the more noble; and to the perfection of the whole; and to an end higher than the whole universe, namely the salvation of the elect and the glory of God. The Scholastics took these distinctions chiefly from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* XII, text 32). Cf. also below d. 46, q. 3, and especially St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 65, a. 2.

**II.** In *argumentum* 3 of the *fundamenta*, where the discussion concerns the elemental world, it is supposed, according to the then-common opinion, that there are four elements, and that they are ordered both according to four qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) and according to many noble forms, and "according to numerical proportions." These proportions of the elements, which correspond to numerical proportions, are here insinuated in a few words rather than explained. Hence, besides what was said above at d. 2, q. 4 in the *Scholion*, we note these things from Brulifer. Fire and earth, as extremes, are bound together by two intermediates (namely air and water), and have a similar proportion to each other as the extreme numbers 8 and 27 and the intermediates 12 and 18. Namely, a *solid square number* arises when the same number is multiplied by itself, as 2 × 2 × 2 = 8; 3 × 3 × 3 = 27; whence 8 and 27 are the first two solid square (cube) numbers. But if any number is multiplied twice into another number, then a solid (cube) arises indeed, but not a square, as 2 × 2 × 3 = 12; and 2 × 3 × 3 = 18. Thus two intermediate numbers are produced between the first and second solid square number. And the same proportion holds of 8 to 12 as of 12 to 18, and 18 to 27. For 12 = 8 + 4; 18 = 12 + 6; 27 = 18 + 9. In a similar way the qualities of the elements were distributed, so that fire is at once hot and dry; air hot and moist; water cold and moist; earth cold and dry.

Authors as in the Scholion to the 1st question, and besides, B. Albert, here a. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quarto quaeritur, utrum potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Secundae Petri ultimo: *Mille anni apud Deum sicut una dies.* Et in Psalmo: *Mille anni ante oculos tuos tanquam dies hesterna, quae praeteriit;* pari ratione centum millia annorum: ergo si Deus potuit facere mundum ante diem hesternam, potuit per centum millia annorum ante. Et si hoc, esset antiquior: ergo etc.

2. Item, divina potentia et operatio non dependet nec a materia nec a tempore: ergo qua ratione potest in uno instanti, potest in alio; sed qua ratione in posteriori, eadem ratione in priori. Et si hoc, mundus potuit fieri antiquior: ergo etc.

3. Item, divina essentia et potentia fuit ante temporis principium; aut ergo fuit potens producere ante, aut non. Si non: ergo erat impotens; si sic: ergo potuit facere mundum, antequam faceret.

4. Item, ego quaero, utrum potuerit facere post. Si sic; sed non est maior ratio de post quam de ante: ergo pari ratione potuit facere ante. Aut si non potuit post, nec ante, et ita necesse fuit quod tunc: ergo videtur, quod compulsus et non voluntarius mundum fecerit tunc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ante principium temporis nihil erat nisi aeternitas[^1]: ergo si potuit mundum facere ante principium temporis, potuit facere et in aeternitate; sed quod habet esse in aeternitate caret principio, et nihil tale potest esse creatum ex nihilo: ergo etc.

2. Item, si potuit facere ante; ponatur. Similiter ergo quaero, utrum ante? et sic in infinitum; sed infinitum a parte ante est aeternum: ergo si potuit in infinitum ante facere, potuit etiam ab aeterno. Si ergo non potuit facere mundum aeternum, quia non esset factus, nec[^2] antiquiorem.

3. Item, necesse est, mundum habere finitam durationem a parte ante; sed in omni finito necesse est alicubi stare, ultra quod non potest fieri progressus; sed qua ratione statur in aliquo instanti finito, statur in illo, in quo conditus est mundus: ergo etc.

4. Item, principio totius antiquitatis non potest aliquid fieri vel cogitari antiquius: sed tempus vel aevum, quod incepit cum mundo, est totius antiquitatis principium: ergo eo[^3] non potuit aliquid esse antiquius.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus non potuit mundum sic facere antiquiorem, ut sit ab aeterno, nec sic, ut sit sine tempore; bene tamen potuit facere tempus ante hoc et in illo facere mundum.*

**Respondeo:** Quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum antiquiorem; potest intelligi dupliciter: aut[^4] quod ipsum creaverit ab aeterno, cum produxerit ex tempore, et tunc esset antiquior; aut ita quod mundus durasset tempore longiori, tamen finito.

Primum credo impossibile simpliciter, quoniam implicat in se contradictionem. Ex hoc enim, quod ponitur fieri, ponitur habere principium. Ex hoc autem, quod ponitur aeternus, ponitur non habere principium. Unde idem est quaerere, utrum Deus potuerit ante mundum[^5] facere, quod mundus habendo principium non haberet principium: et hoc includit contradictionis utramque partem.

Similiter quantum ad secundum sensum videtur aliquibus impossibile, quia implicat in se oppositionem, quoniam anterioritas sive antiquitas incipit simul cum tempore. Nam in aeternitate non est ante et post; et tempus incipit de necessitate simul cum mundo, sicut situs incipit simul cum loco, et locus cum orbe primo. Unde sicut, si quaereretur, utrum primus orbis potuerit fieri altior, nulla esset omnino[^6] quaestio, immo implicat contradictionem, scilicet extra omnem locum esse locum — et venit ex falsa imaginatione, quia imaginatur, totum mundum esse in locali spatio, sicut imaginamur, terram circumdari aqua — similiter intelligendum in proposito, quod est implicatio contradictionis et venit ex falsa imaginatione, quia imaginamur, ante principium mundi fuisse durationem temporis, in qua mundus potuisset ante fieri. Unde sicut[^7], si quaeratur, utrum totus mundus potuisset fieri extra totum mundum, vel supra, vel infra fieri, stulta est quaestio et implicans opposita et veniens ex mala imaginatione: per hunc modum respondent, si quaeratur, utrum mundus potuerit fieri ante vel antiquior. Unde dicunt, quod, si aliquid praecessisset, ante mensurans temporaliter, potuisset utique ante fieri[^8]; similiter si locus esset extra, potuisset altior fieri. — Ratio autem istius malae imaginationis est: cum enim imaginamur, aeternitatem in infinitum ante tempus fuisse, intelligimus eam quasi durationem extensam, in qua sunt diversa nunc, in quorum quolibet potuisset fieri tempus. Sed hoc omnino nihil est, quia aeternitas est nunc simplicissimum, in quo nulla omnino cadit diversitas[^9]. — Concedendum ergo, sicut probant rationes inductae ad hoc, quod, sicut non potuit mundum facere in alio loco, quia non est in loco[^10], sic nec ante, quia nulla est antiquitas nisi in eo. — Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud Deum non est vis aliqua in aliquanto tempore, et quod potentia eius non dependet etc.; dicunt ad omnia unica responsione, quod quamvis divina virtus ad nihil arctetur, tamen

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principiatum non potest facere sine principio, et temporale non sine tempore, et primum temporale non potest facere nisi in principio temporis, et principium temporis non nisi in principio temporis. Oppositum enim non dicit potentiam, sed magis contradictionem et repugnantiam. Nec tamen arctatur ad sic faciendum, quia posset omnino non facere. Unde sicut stulta est quaestio si quaeratur, utrum potuerit[^11] facere principium temporis ante principium temporis; similiter et praedicta.

Sed quoniam durum videtur dicere, quod Deus non potuit facere mundum antiquiorem, et quia[^12] alium mundum facere potuerit, sed tantum istum; propterea dicunt alii, quod, sicut Deus potuit facere mundum ampliorem, ita etiam potuit facere antiquiorem sine omni distinctione. — Sed tamen istud non est omnino simile, quia Deus posset facere caelum amplius et magis distare a terra, salva utriusque natura; sed si Deus intelligatur fecisse, quod istud nunc magis distet a principio temporis, intelligitur illud nunc esse aliud[^13], quia etiamsi intelligatur mundus factus ante, adhuc non esset antiquior respectu istius nunc, quia tantum distaret, quantum distat a principio; et ita non esset antiquior.

Et ideo non est simpliciter neganda nec simpliciter concedenda, sicut nec ista: Deus potuit facere mundum altiorem. Si enim intelligas de hoc absolute, falsum est[^14], sicut dicit prima opinio, et non intelligibile, et implicatio contradictionis. Si autem intelligas per concomitantiam alterius loci, scilicet quia Deus potuit facere alium mundum amplectentem istum, in quo situm posset habere magis altum et minus, verum est. Similiter iudicandum de antiquitate. — Et ideo si quaeratur, utrum Deus potuerit ante facere mundum, distinguendum est sicut et haec: utrum Deus potuerit facere mundum in alio loco vel alibi; quia adverbialis determinatio potest cadere sub ampliatione verbi, vel extra[^15]. Si sub ampliatione verbi, tunc est vera et est sensus, quod Deus potuit alium locum facere et in illo mundum istum totum ponere. Potuit enim facere centum tales mundos, et adhuc unum complectentem omnes, et unum in loco altiori quam alium. Sic et in tempore intelligendum est, quod Deus potuit facere tempus ante hoc, et in illo facere mundum.

Alio modo potest cadere adverbialis determinatio extra ampliationem de ly[^16] *potest*, et est sensus, quod Deus potest facere mundum istum in alio loco, qui est extra mundum: et hic[^17] est implicatio falsi, quia non est locus nisi intra mundum; et similiter de tempore intelligendum.

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ante non erat nisi aeternitas; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen Deus poterat facere, quod ante esset tempus.

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito a parte ante, dicendum, quod infinitum a parte ante potest esse apponendo aut secundum actum, aut secundum potentiam. Primo modo dicit aeternitatem; secundo modo minime, quia aeternitas dicit infinitum actu.

**3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necesse est ponere statum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed status possunt esse infiniti; et licet in potentia[^18] sit ponere statum, tamen quia actus non consequitur totam potentiam, sed in aliquo statu est, ideo in statu finito. Sed quare magis in hoc quam in alio, ratio summa et potissima est voluntas facientis.

**4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod antiquitas coepit cum mundo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed Deus potuit facere, quod ante inciperet; ideo non valet ratio illa. Rationes ad oppositum sunt concedendae: procedunt enim secundum primam viam.

### Scholion.

**I.** Praeter quaestionem principalem breviter resolvitur alia quaestio, scil. utrum potuerit mundus creari ab aeterno. Si verba *ab aeterno* non copulantur cum verbo *potuit*, sed cum terminis *mundus creari*, sive, ut hic dicitur (ad 2.), apponendo *infinitum a parte ante* non secundum *potentiam*, sed secundum *actum*; tunc S. Doctor hic et II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. omnino negat, possibile esse, aliquid creari ab aeterno. Ipsi consentiunt Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand. aliique plurimi, praesertim nostrae aetatis. Alii vero cum S. Thoma et Scoto (qui tamen dubius haeret), duce Aristotele, argumenta ex ratione sumta non sufficienter istam impossibilitatem probare censent.

**II.** Ad quaestionem autem, utrum mundus, qui supponitur

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creatus *non ab aeterno*, potuerit creari *prius*, quam in hoc ordine providentiae creatus est, prima opinio respondet negative; vel potius nonnulli ipsam quaestionem in se irrationalem esse affirmant, quippe quia ipsa quaestio falso supponat, esse tempus ante initium mundi. Sed quaestionem rationabiliter poni posse, patet, si initium mensurandi durationem ponimus non in *initio mundi nostri*, sed in *hoc momento*, quo nos vivimus, si scil. quaerimus, utrum duratio mundi ab instanti praesenti usque ad initium mundi possit esse maior. Recte ad hoc respondet S. Doctor cum distinctione. Nam *nunc* praesentis temporis, si magis distaret a principio temporis (et etiam *primum nunc*) non esset *idem nunc*, sed *aliud*; quia ad mundum, qui supponitur ante decursum nostri temporis, etiam *aliud tempus* ordinatum esset, et tunc esset etiam *alius mundus*, quem Deus facere potuisset. Si autem *idem nunc* praesens et *idem initium* temporis esse supponitur, tunc creatio mundi caderet *extra tempus*, si mundus realis antiquior esset; quod est impossibile.

Explicite et in eadem cum Seraphico sententia hanc quaestionem tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. *unica*, a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.

---

english:
### Question IV.
#### *Whether God could have made the world older.*

In the fourth place it is asked whether [God] could have made the world older. And that he could, it seems.

1. Second [Letter] of Peter, last [chapter]: *A thousand years before God are as one day*. And in the Psalm: *A thousand years before thy eyes are as yesterday's day, which is past;* by parallel reasoning, a hundred thousand years also: therefore if God could make the world before yesterday, he could [make it] a hundred thousand years before. And if this, it would be older: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, divine power and operation does not depend either on matter or on time: therefore by whatever reason [he can act] in one instant, [he can act] in another; but by whatever reason in a later [instant], by the same reason in an earlier; and if this, the world could have been made older: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the divine essence and power existed before the beginning of time; therefore either it was able to produce before, or not. If not, then it was impotent; if so, then it could have made the world before he made it.

4. Likewise, I ask whether he could have made [it] later. If so, but there is no greater reason about "later" than about "earlier": therefore by parallel reasoning he could have made [it] earlier. Or if he could not [make it] later, neither earlier, and so it was necessary that [it be] then: therefore it seems that he made the world then under compulsion and not voluntarily.

**On the contrary:**

1. Before the beginning of time there was nothing except eternity[^1]: therefore if he could have made the world before the beginning of time, he could have made [it] also in eternity; but what has being in eternity lacks a beginning, and no such [thing] can be created out of nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if he could have made [it] before; let it be posited. Similarly therefore I ask, whether before [that]? and so on to infinity; but the infinite on the prior side is eternal: therefore if he could have made [it] infinitely before, he could also [have made it] from eternity. If therefore he could not make the world eternal, since it would not be made, neither[^2] [could he have made it] older.

3. Likewise, it is necessary that the world have a finite duration on the prior side; but in everything finite it is necessary to stop somewhere, beyond which no progress can be made; but by whatever reason a halt is made at some finite instant, [a halt] is made at that [instant] in which the world was founded: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, than the beginning of all antiquity nothing can be made or thought more ancient: but time or aevum, which began with the world, is the beginning of all antiquity: therefore than it[^3] nothing could be more ancient.

### Conclusion.

> *God could not so make the world older that it be from eternity, nor so that it be without time; he could nevertheless well have made time before this [time] and in it have made the world.*

**I respond:** That when it is asked whether God could have made the world older, [the question] can be understood in two ways: either[^4] that he created it from eternity, while producing it [in fact] from time, and then it would be older; or so that the world endured for a longer time, yet finite.

The first I believe to be impossible without qualification, since it implies a contradiction in itself. For from this, that [the world] is posited to be made, it is posited to have a beginning. But from this, that it is posited to be eternal, it is posited not to have a beginning. Hence it is the same to ask whether God could have made [the world] before the world[^5], [as to ask] whether the world, having a beginning, would not have a beginning: and this includes both parts of a contradiction.

Similarly, as to the second sense, it seems impossible to some, because it implies in itself an opposition, since priority or antiquity begins together with time. For in eternity there is no before and after; and time begins of necessity together with the world, just as situation begins together with place, and place [together] with the first sphere. Hence just as, if it were asked whether the first sphere could be made higher, there would be no question at all[^6], indeed it would imply a contradiction, namely that outside every place there be a place — and this comes from a false imagination, because one imagines the whole world to be in local space, just as we imagine the earth to be surrounded by water — likewise it must be understood in the present case, that it is an implication of contradiction and comes from a false imagination, because we imagine a duration of time to have existed before the beginning of the world, in which the world could have been made before. Hence just as[^7], if it be asked whether the whole world could be made outside the whole world, or above, or below, [it is asked], the question is foolish and implies opposites and comes from a bad imagination: in this way they respond, if it be asked whether the world could be made before or older. Hence they say that, if something had preceded, measuring beforehand temporally, [the world] could indeed have been made before[^8]; similarly, if there were a place outside, [the world] could have been made higher. — But the reason for this bad imagination is: for when we imagine eternity to have existed for an infinity before time, we understand it as a kind of extended duration, in which there are diverse "nows", in any one of which time could have been made. But this is altogether nothing, because eternity is a most simple "now", in which no diversity at all falls[^9]. — Therefore it must be granted, as the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] prove, that just as he could not make the world in another place, since [the world] is not in a place[^10], so neither before, since there is no antiquity except in [the world]. — To that which is objected, that with God there is no force in any amount of time, and that his power does not depend etc.; they say to all [these objections] by a single response, that although the divine power is bound to nothing, nevertheless

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a thing having a beginning cannot be made without a beginning, and a temporal [thing] not without time, and the first temporal [thing] cannot be made except in the beginning of time, and the beginning of time only in the beginning of time. For the opposite does not state a power, but rather a contradiction and a repugnance. Yet it is not bound to make in this way [only], because it could entirely not make. Hence just as the question is foolish if it be asked whether he could[^11] have made the beginning of time before the beginning of time; similarly also the aforesaid.

But since it seems harsh to say that God could not make the world older, and that[^12] he could have made another world, but only this one; therefore others say that, just as God could make the world larger, so also he could make it older without any distinction. — Yet this is not entirely similar, because God could make heaven larger and more distant from the earth, the nature of each being preserved; but if God be understood to have made it so that this *now* be further removed from the beginning of time, that *now* is understood to be another[^13], because even if the world be understood to have been made before, still it would not be older with respect to this *now*, since it would be just as distant as it is from the beginning; and so it would not be older.

And therefore [the question] is neither to be denied absolutely nor granted absolutely, just as neither this: that God could make the world higher. For if you understand [this] of *this* [world] absolutely, it is false[^14], as the first opinion says, and unintelligible, and an implication of contradiction. But if you understand [it] by way of the concomitance of another place, namely because God could make another world enclosing this one, in which it could have a position more high or [less] low, it is true. The same is to be judged concerning antiquity. — And therefore if it be asked whether God could have made the world before, distinction must be made, just as also concerning this: whether God could have made the world in another place or elsewhere; because an adverbial determination can fall under the *ampliatio* of the verb, or outside [it][^15]. If under the *ampliatio* of the verb, then it is true and the sense is that God could have made another place and in it have set this whole world. For he could have made a hundred such worlds, and yet one [more] enclosing them all, and one in a place higher than another. So also it must be understood in [the matter of] time, that God could have made time before this, and in it have made the world.

In another mode the adverbial determination can fall outside the *ampliatio* of [the word] *potest*[^16], and the sense is that God can make this world in another place which is outside the [actual] world: and this[^17] is an implication of falsity, since there is no place except within the world; and likewise [it] must be understood concerning time.

**1.** To that therefore which is objected, that before [there] was nothing except eternity; it must be said that it is true, yet nevertheless God could have made [it so] that before [the world] there be time.

**2.** To that which is objected concerning the infinite on the prior side, it must be said that the infinite on the prior side can be [understood] by adding, either according to act, or according to potency. In the first mode it states eternity; in the second mode by no means, because eternity states an infinite in act.

**3.** To that which is objected, that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; it must be said that it is true; but stopping-points can be infinite [in number]; and although in potency[^18] there is to posit a stopping-point, nevertheless because act does not follow the whole of potency, but is in some [particular] state, therefore [it stops] in a finite state. But why rather in this [state] than in another, the supreme and most powerful reason is the will of the maker.

**4.** To that which is objected, that antiquity began with the world; it must be said that it is true; but God could have made [it so] that it began earlier; therefore that reasoning is not valid. The reasonings to the contrary are to be granted: for they proceed according to the first way.

### Scholion.

**I.** Besides the principal question, another question is briefly resolved, namely whether the world could be created from eternity. If the words *from eternity* are not joined with the verb *could*, but with the terms *the world be created*, that is, as is said here (at 2.), by adding *the infinite on the prior side* not according to *potency*, but according to *act*; then the holy Doctor here and in II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, altogether denies that it is possible for anything to be created from eternity. To him consent Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent, and very many others, especially of our age. Others, however, with St. Thomas and Scotus (who however remains in doubt), with Aristotle as guide, judge that the arguments drawn from reason do not sufficiently prove this impossibility.

**II.** As for the question whether the world, which is supposed to be created

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*not from eternity*, could have been created *earlier* than it has been created in this order of providence, the first opinion responds negatively; or rather some affirm the question itself to be irrational, inasmuch as the question itself falsely supposes that there was time before the beginning of the world. But that the question can be reasonably posed is clear, if we place the beginning of measuring duration not in *the beginning of our world*, but in *this moment* in which we live, that is, if we ask whether the duration of the world from the present instant up to the beginning of the world could be greater. To this the holy Doctor rightly responds with a distinction. For the *now* of present time, if it were further distant from the beginning of time (and also the *first now*), would not be the *same now*, but *another*; because to the world, which is supposed [to exist] before the course of our time, also *another time* would be ordered, and then there would also be *another world*, which God could have made. But if the *same now* present and the *same beginning* of time is supposed, then the creation of the world would fall *outside time*, if the real world were older; which is impossible.

Explicitly and in the same opinion as the Seraphic [Doctor], the following treat this question: Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. *unica*, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3.

---

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 5. et 6.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 5 and 6.

la: Vat. particulae *nec* praefigit *ergo*.

en: The Vatican [edition] prefixes *ergo* ("therefore") to the particle *nec* ("nor").

la: Revocavimus voculam *eo* ex cod. T, ubi a secunda quidem, sed antiqua manu scripta exstat. Pro *eo* multi codd. (etiam cod. T a prima manu) *et*, Vat. *etiam*. Alii codd. cum ed. 1, omisso *eo*, nihil substituunt.

en: We have restored the little word *eo* ("than it") from codex T, where it stands written by a second hand indeed, but an ancient one. In place of *eo* many codices (including codex T from the first hand) [read] *et*, the Vatican [edition] *etiam*. Other codices with the first edition, omitting *eo*, substitute nothing.

la: Vat. post *aut* addit *ita*.

en: The Vatican [edition] after *aut* ("either") adds *ita* ("so").

la: Cod. R hic bene inserit *producere, quod est, utrum potuerit*. Paulo superius pro *credo impossibile* cod. V *est Deo impossibile*. — Plura quae ad hanc quaestionem pertinent, invenies II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Codex R here rightly inserts *producere, quod est, utrum potuerit* ("to produce, that is, whether he could have"). Slightly above, in place of *credo impossibile* ("I believe to be impossible") codex V [reads] *est Deo impossibile* ("is impossible to God"). — Many things which pertain to this question will be found in II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Pro *omnino* codd. cum sex primis edd. *in mundo*. Mox pro *quia imaginatur*, Vat. *quia imaginamur*.

en: In place of *omnino* ("at all") the codices with the first six editions [read] *in mundo* ("in the world"). Soon, in place of *quia imaginatur* ("because [one] imagines"), the Vatican [reads] *quia imaginamur* ("because we imagine").

la: In Vat. et nonnullis mss. deest *sicut*. Paulo post pro *stulta est* cod. R *stulta esset*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and several manuscripts *sicut* ("just as") is lacking. A little later, in place of *stulta est* ("is foolish") codex R [reads] *stulta esset* ("would be foolish").

la: Cod. R addit *vel antiquior*. In sequenti propositione pro *durationem extensam* codd. T W cc *duratione extensam*.

en: Codex R adds *vel antiquior* ("or older"). In the following sentence, in place of *durationem extensam* ("an extended duration") codices T, W, cc [read] *duratione extensam* ("extended in duration").

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 5. seq., ubi principia huius quaest. insinuantur. — Paulo ante Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *nunc* ante *simplicissimum*. Paulo inferius post *quod*, *sicut* cod. R inserit *Deus*, et dein pro *in alio loco* codd. tO *in aliquo loco* et Vat. *in loco altiore*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XI, c. 5 and following, where the principles of this question are intimated. — Slightly before, the Vatican and codex cc omit *nunc* ("now") before *simplicissimum* ("most simple"). Slightly below, after *quod*, before *sicut* codex R inserts *Deus* ("God"), and then in place of *in alio loco* ("in another place") codices t, O [read] *in aliquo loco* ("in some place") and the Vatican [reads] *in loco altiore* ("in a higher place").

la: Id est, ipsum continente. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 43. (c. 5.): *Illud corpus est in loco, extra quod est aliquod aliud corpus, quod ipsum continet; illud vero non est in loco, extra quod non est ullum corpus.*

en: That is, [no place] containing it. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 43 (c. 5): "*That body is in a place, outside of which is some other body containing it; but that [body] is not in a place, outside of which is no body.*"

la: Cod. T cum pluribus aliis *potuit*.

en: Codex T with many others [reads] *potuit* ("he could have").

la: Id est: quod non. Paulo ante pro *potuit* Vat. *potuerit*. Paulo inferius pro *sed tantum* cod. T cum bene multis aliis codd. *et tantum*, cod. R *nisi tantum*, codd. MF ee *etiam ante*.

en: That is: that [he could] not. Slightly before, in place of *potuit* the Vatican [reads] *potuerit*. Slightly below, in place of *sed tantum* ("but only") codex T with very many other codices [reads] *et tantum* ("and only"), codex R [reads] *nisi tantum* ("except only"), codices MF, ee [read] *etiam ante* ("also before").

la: Vel aliis verbis: istud *nunc*, quod ab actuali principio mundi in praesenti tempore secundum certam distantiam numeratur, adiuncto tempore a parte ante, non esset idem. — Mox pro *quia* cod. R *et*.

en: Or in other words: this *now*, which is numbered from the actual beginning of the world in the present time according to a certain distance, with time added on the prior side, would not be the same. — Soon, in place of *quia* ("because") codex R [reads] *et* ("and").

la: Cod. R hic subiicit *iste*, et paulo post pro *verum est* exhibet *sic habet veritatem*. Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. perperam omittunt *verum est*.

en: Codex R here subjoins *iste* ("this one"), and a little later, in place of *verum est* ("it is true") it gives *sic habet veritatem* ("thus it holds the truth"). Very many codices with the first six editions wrongly omit *verum est*.

la: Scilicet extra ampliationem verbi *potuerit* (*potest*). Cfr. supra d. 43. dub. 1.

en: That is, outside the *ampliatio* of the verb *potuerit* (*potest*). Cf. above d. 43, *dub.* 1.

la: In lingua Gallica antiqua pro articulo *le* in usu erat *ly* vel *li*. Ita *de ly* usurpatur pro τοῦ.

en: In the old French language, in place of the article *le*, *ly* or *li* was in use. Thus *de ly* is employed for τοῦ (i.e. the Greek genitive article, marking what follows as a quoted term).

la: Cod. T cum pluribus aliis *haec*. Mox pro *nisi intra* cod. O *extra*.

en: Codex T with many others [reads] *haec* ("this [fem.]"). Soon, in place of *nisi intra* ("except within") codex O [reads] *extra* ("outside").

la: Pro *Sed* Vat. *Si quaeratur*. Proxime ante pro *in statu finito* cod. O *in statu aliquo in instanti finito*.

en: In place of *Sed* ("But") the Vatican [reads] *Si quaeratur* ("If it be asked"). Just before, in place of *in statu finito* ("in a finite state") codex O [reads] *in statu aliquo in instanti finito* ("in some state in a finite instant").


title: Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De immutabilitate divinae potentiae.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de immutabilitate divinae potentiae, utrum videlicet quod semel potest semper possit.

### Quaestio Unica.
#### *Utrum Deus quod semel potest semper possit.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia omnis potentia, quae est idem cum essentia, habet idem posse quod esse[^1], et omne illud cuius posse est idem quod esse, si habet esse immutabile et aeternum, habet et posse; sed quod Deus semel est semper est, quia eius esse est immutabile: ergo et quod semel potest semper potest.

2. Item, omnis potentia, quae est infinita et non potest non esse infinita, semper est respectu aequalium[^2], quia si respectu paucorum esset, aliquando desineret esse infinita et desineret esse omnipotens; sed divina potentia semper est infinita et omnipotens: ergo nihil possibilium accrescit ei nec decrescit: ergo quod semel potest semper potest.

3. Item, omnis potentia, quae est omnino sufficiens et nullo modo dependens a possibili, omne quod potest[^3] semper potest, si in se ipsa maneat non mutata; sed divina potentia est huiusmodi, et non mutatur in se: ergo etc.

4. Item, quidquid Deus potuit, adhuc potest, si nihil de eo factum est[^4]; sed nihil potest fieri ab ipso, quod non subiaceat divinae virtuti: ergo propter illud factum non impeditur, quin adhuc possit: ergo potest quidquid potuit.

**Sed contra:**

1. Si Deus potest semper quidquid potuit semel[^5]; sed potuit[^6] Christum resuscitare a mortuis et mundum creare: ergo et modo potest; quod stultum est dicere.

2. Item, si quidquid semel potest semper potuit; sed modo potest mundum creasse: ergo ab aeterno potuit creasse.

3. Item, si quidquid potest semel, et semper; sed ante mundum potuit facere quod mundus non fuisset: ergo et modo potest facere, quod mundus non fuisset.

4. Item, cum dicitur: Deus potest hoc sive potest facere hoc[^7], aliquo demonstrato, aut connotatur aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo aeque vere potest dici quod Deus potest malum ut bonum. Si autem aliquid connotatur, hoc non est nisi possibilitas ad fieri; sed quod factum est, idem ipsum non habet possibilitatem ad fieri: ergo Deus non potest facere quod factum est: et prius potuit: ergo non potest quidquid potuit.

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> **Conclusio.** Quamvis divina potentia in se sit immutabilis, ratione tamen connotati, quod fuit aliquando possibile et postea factum est impossibile, Deus non quidquid potuit semper potest.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc est duplex modus respondendi, sicut ad sophisma de scientia[^8]. Concesso enim, quod divina potentia secundum veritatem omnino sit immutabilis, secundum positionem tamen Nominalium concedunt hanc: potest quidquid potuit. Et respondent illationi: sed potuit Christum suscitare: ergo et modo potest; respondent, quod non debet inferri sub illo tempore, sed sub alio: ergo potest Christum suscitasse, quia hoc enuntiabile, adiunctum verbis diversorum temporum, non[^9] est idem. Ideo dicunt, quod propositio est vera, et si aliter inferatur, assignant peccatum in processu secundum figuram dictionis sive secundum accidens.

Tamen, sicut supra probatum fuit[^10], haec positio non habet veritatem — quamvis ista positio videatur fuisse probabilis, et Magister fuerit huius positionis — quia per hoc non solvit; et iterum non solvit in proposito. Primum, quia si diceretur Deus posse quidquid potuit, quia potest fecisse quod[^11] potuit facere; pari ratione qui nunc est caecus potest quidquid potuit, et truncatus, quia potest fecisse quod potuit facere, et potest nunc vidisse, quod potuit videre. Praeterea, dantem oppositum huius solutionis adhuc contingit solvere[^12], hoc modo formata ratione: potest quidquid potuit; sed potuit non fecisse mundum, antequam faceret: ergo et modo potest non fecisse: loco eius quod est non fecisse non est aliud dare aequivalens. — Ergo illa responsio non solvit, maxime cum ipse Magister dicat in littera[^13], quod Deus non potest facere omne quod potuit aliquando facere, nec vult facere vel esse vel fieri quod aliquando voluit facere vel esse vel fieri.

Ideo dicendum, sicut dictum fuit de scientia[^14], quod divina scientia, in se omnino immutabilis, desinit scire aliquod enuntiabile ratione connotati, quia scibile desinit esse verum, et ipsa scientia sive scire connotat uno modo in cognito veritatem. Similiter intelligendum, quod divina potentia connotat in re, respectu cuius dicitur, possibilitatem; et talem, inquam, possibilitatem, quae respicit potentiam agentem sub ratione potentiae, non impotentiae. Quoniam igitur ita est, quod multa possibilia fiunt impossibilia per accidens[^15] et multa possibilia fiunt entia et iam sunt impossibilia ad fieri — facere enim, quod non-ens non sit, nihil est facere; similiter facere quod factum est nihil est facere, et ita impossibile est fieri — hinc est, quod[^16] quia Deus non potest nisi possibile, quod posse est potentiae, quod nulla mutatione facta in potentia, sed aequaliter Deo existente potente, fit aliquid Deo impossibile propter mutationem a parte rei. Et haec concedenda est, quod divina potentia est immutabilis, et haec neganda: *quidquid Deus semel potest, semper potest.*

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod divinum posse est esse et infinitum et independens; totum illud concludit, quod ipsa[^17] non mutetur; sed nihil sequitur de connotato. Verum est tamen, quod posse Dei respectu connotati semper est infinitum, quia si auferatur finitum ab infinito, nihilominus remanet infinitum: et ideo quamvis desinat aliquid posse facere, semper tamen infinita potest.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo — quia alia patent — ex hoc, quod divina potentia dominatur omnibus quae sunt; dicendum, quod omnia ei subsunt; tamen non sequitur, quod possit facere et quod factum est; potest tamen illud destruere, sed facere non potest, quia faciendo aut facit aliquid, aut nihil. Si aliquid: ergo aliquid plus est nunc quam prius: ergo non facit quod factum est. Si nihil: ergo faciendo nihil facit. Similiter, de eo quod fuit quod non fuerit, aut facit hoc quiescendo aut operando, aut destruendo. Quiescendo non: si enim Deus nihil faciat, cum hoc[^18] est praeteritum, semper est praeteritum.

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Si vero faciat operando, cum nihil ex hoc fiat — hoc enim non fuisse praeteritum non est aliquid — ergo faciendo nihil facit. Si vero destruendo, cum praeteritum sive quod fuit non sit, nihil facit destruendo, et destruendo nihil destruit[^19]. — Concedendum est ergo, quod non potest quidquid potuit, quia fuit aliquando possibile quod factum est impossibile, non propter arctationem potentiae, sed propter hoc, quod necessario connotat impotentiam. Et sic patent obiecta.

english:
### Article II. *On the immutability of the divine power.*

Next, with respect to the second article, the question is asked concerning the immutability of the divine power, namely whether what He once can do, He can always do.

### Question Unica.
#### *Whether God can always do what He once can do.*

That He can, it seems:

1. Because every power which is the same as essence has the same *can-be* as *being*[^1], and everything whose *can-be* is the same as its *being*, if it has immutable and eternal being, has also its power; but what God once is, He always is, since His being is immutable: therefore also what He once can, He always can.

2. Likewise, every power which is infinite and cannot fail to be infinite is always exercised with respect to equal things[^2], because if it were with respect to fewer, at some time it would cease to be infinite and would cease to be omnipotent; but the divine power is always infinite and omnipotent: therefore nothing among the possibles is added to it nor subtracted from it: therefore what He once can, He always can.

3. Likewise, every power which is altogether sufficient and in no way dependent on the possible, whatever it can, it always can[^3], if it remains itself unchanged; but the divine power is of this kind, and is not changed in itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, whatever God once could, He still can, if nothing has come of it[^4]; but nothing can be done by Him which is not subject to the divine power: therefore on account of that having-been-done He is not hindered from still being able: therefore He can do whatever He once could.

**On the contrary:**

1. If God can always [do] whatever He once[^5] could; but He could[^6] raise Christ from the dead and create the world: therefore He can also now; which is foolish to say.

2. Likewise, if whatever He once can, He always could; but now He can have-created the world: therefore from eternity He could have created it.

3. Likewise, if whatever He can once, also always; but before the world He could bring it about that the world should not have existed: therefore even now He can bring it about that the world should not have existed.

4. Likewise, when it is said: *God can [do] this* or *He can do this*[^7], something being indicated, either something is connoted, or nothing. If nothing: then it can be said equally truly that God can [do] evil as good. But if something is connoted, this is nothing other than the possibility of coming-to-be; but what has been done does not itself have possibility of coming-to-be: therefore God cannot do what has been done: and previously He could: therefore He cannot [do] whatever He could.

> **Conclusion.** Although the divine power is in itself immutable, nevertheless by reason of what is connoted — which was once possible and afterward became impossible — God cannot always [do] whatever He could.

**I respond:** To this there is a twofold mode of replying, as to the sophism concerning knowledge[^8]. For granting that the divine power according to truth is altogether immutable, according to the position of the Nominalists they concede this: He can [do] whatever He could. And they reply to the inference: but He could raise Christ: therefore He also now can; they reply that it ought not to be inferred under that tense, but under another: therefore He can have-raised Christ, since this proposition, joined to verbs of different tenses, is not[^9] the same. Therefore they say that the proposition is true, and if it is inferred otherwise, they assign a fault in the inferential process according to figure of speech or according to accident.

Nevertheless, as has been proved above[^10], this position does not have truth — although that position may have seemed probable, and the Master held this position — because by it he does not solve [the problem]; and again it does not solve the matter at hand. First, because if it were said that God can [do] whatever He could, because He can have-done what[^11] He could do; by parallel reasoning he who is now blind can [do] whatever he could, and the maimed man too, because he can have-done what he could do, and can now have-seen what he could see. Furthermore, even granting the opposite of this solution, it can still be solved[^12], with the reasoning formed thus: He can [do] whatever He could; but He could not-have-made the world before He made it: therefore even now He can not-have-made it: in place of *not-having-made* there is nothing equivalent to give. — Therefore that response does not solve [the matter], especially since the Master himself says in the text[^13], that God cannot do everything which He at some time could do, nor does He will to do or to be or to come-to-be what He at some time willed to do or to be or to come-to-be.

Therefore it must be said, as was said concerning knowledge[^14], that the divine knowledge, in itself altogether immutable, ceases to know some enunciable by reason of what is connoted, because the knowable ceases to be true, and the knowledge itself or *to-know* connotes in one mode in the cognized the truth. Similarly it must be understood that the divine power connotes in the thing, with respect to which it is spoken, a possibility; and such, I say, a possibility, which regards the agent power under the character of power, not of impotence. Therefore since it is so, that many possible things become impossible by accident[^15] and many possibles become beings and now are impossible to-be-made — for to make that the non-being should not be is to do nothing; likewise to make what has been done is to do nothing, and so it is impossible to come-to-be — hence it is that[^16], because God cannot [do] except the possible, that *can* belongs to power, because with no change made in the power, but with God existing equally able, something becomes impossible to God on account of a change on the part of the thing. And this is to be conceded, that the divine power is immutable, and this to be denied: *whatever God once can, He always can.*

**Replies to the affirmative arguments:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* To what is objected, that the divine *can-be* is both being and infinite and independent: all that concludes only that it itself[^17] is not changed; but nothing follows about what is connoted. Yet it is true that the *can-be* of God with respect to what is connoted is always infinite, because if a finite be subtracted from an infinite, the infinite still remains: and therefore, although He cease to be able to do some thing, He can still always [do] infinite things.

*To 4.* To what is objected last — since the other points are clear — from the fact that the divine power dominates all things that are; it must be said that all things are subject to it; nevertheless it does not follow that He can also do what has been done; He can however destroy it, but cannot do it, because in doing He either does something or nothing. If something: then there is now something more than before: therefore He is not doing what has been done. If nothing: then doing nothing He does nothing. Similarly, concerning that-which-was being made not-to-have-been, He either does this by being still, or by operating, or by destroying. By being still — no: for if God should do nothing, since this[^18] is past, it is always past.

If however He should do [it] by operating, since nothing comes about from this — for *this not having been past* is not anything — therefore in doing He does nothing. But if by destroying, since the past or what was is not, He does nothing by destroying, and by destroying He destroys nothing[^19]. — Therefore it must be conceded, that He cannot [do] whatever He could, because what was once possible has become impossible — not on account of a constriction of the power, but on account of this, that it necessarily connotes impotence. And thus the objections are clear.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): *Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 4): "For *to-be-able* differs in no way from *being* in eternal things."

la: Sive infinitorum.

en: Or: of infinite things.

la: Pro *potest* cod. Y cum ed. I *semel potest.* Mox Vat. verbo *huiusmodi* praefigit *semper.*

en: For *potest* codex Y with ed. I reads *semel potest.* Soon after, the Vatican edition prefixes *semper* to the word *huiusmodi.*

la: Vat., omissis voculis *de eo*, hic praeter fidem vetustiorum codd. et ed. I adiungit *quod non subsit eius virtuti*, et paulo post supprimit *ab ipso.*

en: The Vatican edition, omitting the words *de eo*, here against the witness of the older codices and ed. I adds *quod non subsit eius virtuti*, and shortly thereafter suppresses *ab ipso.*

la: Vat. *nec non* cod. cc et ed. I adiiciunt *Deus.*

en: The Vatican edition together with codex cc and ed. I add *Deus.*

la: Cod. V addit *semel.*

en: Codex V adds *semel.*

la: Vat. cum ed. I brevius sic: *Deus potest hoc facere, aliquo* etc.

en: The Vatican edition with ed. I [reads] more briefly thus: *Deus potest hoc facere, aliquo* etc.

la: Vide supra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2, ubi sententia Nominalium exponitur et refutatur. — Cod. R *sophismata.* Paulo inferius cod. V verbis *potest quidquid potuit* praemittit *Deus*, ed. scilicet.

en: See above d. 41, a. 1, q. 2, where the position of the Nominalists is set forth and refuted. — Codex R reads *sophismata.* Slightly below, codex V prefixes *Deus* to the words *potest quidquid potuit*, and the edition similarly.

la: In sola Vat. desideratur *non*, et paulo superius in ipsa et cod. cc ponitur *et* pro *quia.*

en: Only in the Vatican edition is *non* missing, and slightly above in the same and in codex cc *et* is set in place of *quia.*

la: Dist. 41. a. 2. q. 2, ubi etiam ratio habetur, quare hic sit fallacia figurae dictionis, scil. quia procedit ab identitate in modo significandi ad identitatem rei. — Sententiam Magistri invenies hic in lit. c. 2. — Paulo inferius in propositione *quia per hoc non solvit* [supple: *in quaestione de scientia*] particulam *non* restituimus ex cod. T, quae lectio ut vera tum ex contextu tum ex subsequentibus verbis *et iterum non solvit* comprobatur. Pro *et iterum non solvit* cod. X *et tamen non solvit.*

en: Dist. 41, a. 2, q. 2, where also the reason is given why here there is a fallacy of figure of speech, namely because it proceeds from identity in the mode of signifying to identity of thing. — You will find the Master's position here in *lit.* c. 2. — Slightly below, in the phrase *quia per hoc non solvit* [supply: *in the question on knowledge*], we have restored the particle *non* from codex T, which reading is shown to be true both from the context and from the subsequent words *et iterum non solvit.* For *et iterum non solvit* codex X [reads] *et tamen non solvit.*

la: Pro *quod* codd. F V W et alii *quidquid.* Item cod. W paulo inferius post *quia potest fecisse* substituit *quidquid* pro *quod.* Subinde post *et potest nunc* cod. Y subiicit *caecus.*

en: For *quod* codices F, V, W and others read *quidquid.* Likewise codex W slightly below after *quia potest fecisse* substitutes *quidquid* for *quod.* Then after *et potest nunc* codex Y adds *caecus.*

la: De hac Aristotelica propositione vide supra pag. 104, nota II.

en: On this Aristotelian proposition see above p. 104, note II.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 3. — Mox post *fiunt entia* codd. F Q adiungunt *quae cum sunt.* Aliquanto superius pro *connotat in re* Vat. *connotat in eo.*

en: Cf. above d. 42, q. 3. — Soon after *fiunt entia* codices F, Q add *quae cum sunt.* Somewhat earlier, for *connotat in re* the Vatican edition reads *connotat in eo.*

la: Coniunctio *quod* hic repetitur ex locutione praecedenti *hinc est quod.* Multi codd. cum ed. I pro *quod* perperam substituunt *quia*, Vat. *et quia.* Mox post verba *propter mutationem* cod. K inserit *factam.*

en: The conjunction *quod* is here repeated from the preceding phrase *hinc est quod.* Many codices with ed. I wrongly substitute *quia* for *quod*, and the Vatican edition reads *et quia.* Soon after the words *propter mutationem* codex K inserts *factam.*

la: Supple cum cod. R *divina potentia.*

en: Supply with codex R: *divina potentia.*

la: Pro *cum hoc* cod. T *tamen hoc quod.* Idem cod. T cum pluribus aliis codd. et ed. I paulo post minus bene omittit *operando.*

en: For *cum hoc* codex T reads *tamen hoc quod.* The same codex T with several other codices and ed. I shortly after less aptly omits *operando.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 3.

en: Cf. above d. 42, q. 3.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem Magister (hic c. 2.) non sufficienter solvit. Eadem principia, quae supra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. declarata sunt, etiam in hac quaestione determinanda a Seraphico adhibentur. — Antiqui doctores non nisi in modo loquendi aliquatenus dissentire videntur. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 25. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. I. q. 77. m. 3. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The Master (here c. 2) does not solve this question sufficiently. The same principles which were set forth above at d. 41, a. 2, q. 2 are also applied by the Seraphic Doctor in determining this question. — The ancient doctors seem to differ only in the mode of speaking, to some extent. Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 25, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *Summa* p. I, q. 77, m. 3, a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2nd princ., q. unica. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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