title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De his quae mortem Christi consequuntur.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus in triduo fuerit homo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus[^p450-1]: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, quae faceret Deum hominem et hominem Deum»; sed susceptio non mutata mansit in triduo, sicut prius ostensum est: ergo Christus in triduo fuit homo.

2. Item, magister Hugo de sancto Victore[^p450-2]: «Quid stultius, quam quod homo tunc esse desinat, quando vere esse incipit»! Ex hoc arguit ita: cum ergo homo sanctus incipiat esse beatus, quod est esse verissimum, stultissimum est dicere, quod tunc desinat esse: ergo de quolibet homine post mortem verum est dicere, quod sit homo: ergo multo fortius hoc debet concedi et dici de Christo.

3. Item, omne habens humanam naturam est homo; sed Christus in triduo erat habens humanam naturam: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo[^p450-3]. Maior et minor per se manifestae sunt.

4. Item, quotiescumque anima et corpus uniuntur in unam hypostasim, faciunt hominem; sed in triduo anima et corpus uniebantur in unam hypostasim in Christo: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo.

5. Item, haec est vera: Christus in triduo iacebat in sepulcro; aut ergo secundum quod Deus, aut secundum quod homo; sed non secundum quod Deus: ergo secundum quod homo: ergo Christus in triduo erat homo[^p450-4].

6. Item, Christus in triduo non desiit esse sacerdos: ergo Christus in triduo non desiit esse homo. Prima patet per hoc quod dicitur in Psalmo[^p450-5]: *Tu es sacerdos in aeternum;* et ad Hebraeos septimo: *Christus habet sempiternum sacerdotium.* Necessitas illationis in hoc ostenditur, quod sacerdos erat, secundum quod homo.

7. Item, Christus propter assumtionem animae rationalis, rationalis erat rationalitate creata; sed Christus in triduo habuit animam rationalem sibi unitam: ergo Christus in triduo erat rationalis rationalitate creata: ergo erat Angelus, vel anima, vel homo. Sed non erat Angelus, vel anima: ergo erat homo.

**Sed contra:** 1. «Mortuus diminuit de ratione hominis[^p450-6]»: ergo quicumque est homo mortuus, est deficiens a completa ratione hominis; sed completum non praedicatur de diminuto: ergo si Christus in triduo erat homo mortuus, haec est falsa: Christus in triduo erat homo.

2. Item, secundum naturalem philosophum homo est compositum ex anima rationali et carne; sed Christus in triduo non erat compositum ex anima rationali et carne[^p450-7]: ergo Christus in triduo non erat homo vere.

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3. Item, nulla forma praedicatur de toto, quia forma, sed quia est forma consequens totum compositum: si ergo homo praedicatur de Christo, necesse est, quod nominet formam consequentem totum compositum; sed in Christo soluta erat compositio in triduo: ergo in triduo non poterat dici homo. Maior propositio manifesta est per inductionem et per auctoritatem Avicennae[^p451-1], qui eam ponit, et per auctoritatem Boethii, qui dicit, quod «species est totum esse individui».

4. Item, corrupto superiori essentiali, necesse est, corrumpi inferius; sed esse vivum superius est ad esse hominem et est ei essentiale, quia «vivere est esse viventis[^p451-2]»: ergo si Christus in triduo desiit esse vivus, Christus in triduo desiit esse homo: non ergo Christus in triduo erat homo.

5. Item, Christus in triduo nec videre poterat nec audire nec loqui: ergo si erat homo, erat homo caecus, surdus et mutus; sed hoc est absurdum dicere de Christo: ergo falsum est dicere, quod Christus in triduo fuerit homo[^p451-3].

6. Item, sicut unio divinae naturae et humanae facit, Deum esse hominem, ita unio animae ad carnem facit, esse animatum: ergo cessante unione animae ad carnem, cessat esse animatum; et si cessat esse animatum, cessat esse animal; et si cessat esse animal, necessario cessat esse homo[^p451-9]: ergo a primo, cum in Christo fuerit separatio animae a carne in triduo, Christus desiit esse homo in triduo: non ergo fuit homo in triduo.

7. Item, ad hoc ipsum sunt rationes Magistri in littera[^p451-4], quae super hoc fundantur: omnis homo aut est mortalis, aut immortalis, omnis etiam homo est alicubi homo; sed Christus in triduo nec erat mortalis nec erat immortalis nec erat alicubi homo — quia non in sepulcro, cum non esset ibi nisi corpus; non in inferno, cum non esset ibi nisi anima — ergo Christus non fuit homo in triduo.

### Conclusio.

> Christus in triduo non fuit homo, si loquamur de praedicatione simpliciter actuali.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex modus dicendi. — Primus est, quod non solum vere Christus in triduo possit dici homo, sed etiam hoc potest dici de quolibet homine mortuo. — Secundus vero modus dicendi est, quod hoc non debet concedi de aliis; potest tamen concedi de Christo. — Tertius vero modus dicendi est, quod illud non debet concedi de Christo nec de aliis hominibus. Et primum modum dicendi tenuit magister Hugo de sancto Victore; secundum modum tenuit Magister Sententiarum; tertium vero tenet communis opinio doctorum Parisiensium.

Si quis autem velit diligenter considerare, quilibet modorum praedictorum habet aliquid de veritate. Cum enim dicitur hoc de hoc[^p451-5], tripliciter potest dici: aut secundum esse actuale, aut secundum esse aptitudinale, aut partim secundum esse actuale, partim secundum aptitudinale. Praedicatum enim aut dicit essentiam subiecti, aut actum subiecti. Tunc est praedicatio secundum esse actuale, quando subiectum est ens in actu, et forma praedicati actu inhaeret subiecto et est eius actus; sicut, homine existente, dicitur: homo est animal. — Tunc autem est praedicatio secundum esse aptitudinale, quando nec subiectum est actu, nec forma praedicati actu inhaeret subiecto, sed necessaria est ordinatio unius ad alterum, fundata super principia naturae; sicut, nulla rosa existente, conceditur, quod rosa sit flos. — Tunc autem est praedicatio partim secundum esse aptitudinale, partim secundum esse actuale, quando suppositum est in actu, forma vero praedicati non inest ei secundum actum, sed secundum necessariam ordinationem, fundatam super principia naturae.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum Christus sit homo in triduo; si loquamur de praedicatione secundum esse aptitudinale, non tantum est verum de ipso, sed etiam de omni homine mortuo, quia secundum veritatem fidei nostrae et scientiam theologiae, quando homo moritur, remanent principia eius, in quibus salva est ordinatio non solum respectu formae hominis, sed etiam huius hominis; alioquin non esset vera resurrectio[^p451-6]. — Si autem loquamur de praedicatione partim actuali, partim aptitudinali; sic potest concedi de Christo, quod fuerit homo in triduo, quia erat persona in actu, quamvis forma humanitatis servaretur in aptitudine coniunctionis animae et carnis; sed hoc non potest dici de aliquo alio homine[^p451-7]. — Si autem loquamur de praedicatione simpliciter actuali, nec de Christo, nec de alio homine est verum dicere, quod sit homo, quamdiu est anima separata a carne. Nihil enim facit, hominem esse actu, nisi actualis coniunctio animae cum carne[^p451-8].

Si igitur isti tres modi dicendi intelliguntur secundum tres praedictos modos praedicandi, sic in omnibus reperitur veritas, et nulla est inter eos

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contrarietas; et verum sensit Hugo de sancto Victore, et verum dixit Magister, si intellexerunt[^p452-1] iuxta praeassignatos modos, et verum tenet communis opinio. Et per hoc ad omnes rationes ad utramque partem adductas satis potest patere responsio.

Verumtamen, si verba Hugonis velimus amplius considerare, invenimus, eum sensisse, Christum fuisse hominem in triduo, et quemcumque alium hominem mortuum, non solum quantum ad esse aptitudinale, sed etiam quantum ad esse actuale. Posuit enim, quod post mortem salvaretur esse hominis; et quod anima separata esset persona; et quod iterum multo fortius deberet homo dici anima quam corpus, si hoc admitteret usus. Unde arguit in hunc modum[^p452-2]: cum homo ex anima et corpore constet, tamen propter unam partem, quae est corpus, dicitur homo corpus, multo ergo magis propter partem illam, quae est anima, debet dici anima. — Et in hoc dicto magister Hugo communiter non sustinetur. Nec enim anima separata est persona, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^p452-3]; nec homo est anima sua; nec verius est homo, cum moritur, quam cum vivit, quantum ad esse naturae, licet fortassis possit augeri in eo esse gratiae; nec corpus, secundum quod est pars integralis hominis, praedicatur de homine: et ideo non sine causa opinionem magistri Hugonis communis opinio non approbat in parte ista.

Magister autem Sententiarum non solum voluit dicere, quod Christus in triduo fuisset homo praedicatione partim actuali, partim aptitudinali, immo[^p452-4] vere et actualiter. Et volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quod hoc dixit, quia fuit de tertia opinione, quae dixit Christum hominem secundum habitum. Unde volebat dicere, quod actu esset homo, quia actu habebat naturam humanam. — Sed hoc non est imponendum Magistro, quia error est, sicut in praecedentibus[^p452-5] ostensum fuit; nec ex verbis Magistri potest expresse haberi, sed alia de causa hoc dixit. Intellexit enim, in Christo duas fuisse uniones et vere, videlicet unionem animae ad carnem, et unionem divinae naturae et humanae. Et unio divinae naturae et humanae faciebat, Christum esse hominem, iuxta illud quod dicit Augustinus: «Talis fuit illa susceptio, ut faceret Deum hominem». Unio vero animae ad carnem faciebat, hominem illum vivere. Quia ergo in triduo mansit unio Divinitatis ad humanitatem, et soluta fuit unio animae ad carnem; hinc est, quod posuit Magister, quod Christus in triduo non desiit esse homo, sed desiit vivere; ideo verum est secundum ipsum dicere de Christo, quod fuit homo in triduo, et quod fuit homo mortuus, quamvis non possit dici de aliquo alio. — Et in hoc etiam Magister defecit, quia ad hoc, quod aliquis sit homo, necessario praeexigitur et coexigitur unio animae ad carnem, cum homo dicat formam totius sive consequentem totum compositum. Unde nequaquam illa susceptio fecisset Deum hominem et hominem Deum, nisi Deus assumsisset corpus et animam, ut coniuncta ad invicem. — Et propter hoc positio Magistri communiter non sustinetur in parte ista, nec positio etiam magistri Hugonis, non quia omni modo[^p452-6] sit falsa locutio praedicta: Christus in triduo fuit homo, sed quia falsitatem habet intelligendo de praedicatione secundum esse actuale, secundum quam praedicationem versatur inquisitio circa praedictam locutionem; et isto modo videtur eam tractasse magister Hugo et Magister Sententiarum et communis opinio magistrorum, et secundum istum modum currit praesens inquisitio. — Ideo rationes ostendentes, locutionem praedictam esse falsam, concedendae sunt; procedunt enim secundum hanc viam.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod talis fuit[^p452-7] illa susceptio etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non fuit, quia assumsit corpus et animam tantum, sed etiam, quia assumsit corpus et animam unita; et ideo desiit esse homo, non quia sit mutata unio Divinitatis ad carnem, sed quia soluta fuit unio animae et carnis ad invicem.

2. Ad illam auctoritatem Hugonis, qua dicitur, quod nemo desinit esse[^p452-8], quando verius esse incipit; dicendum, quod nihil prohibet, quod veritas esse moralis augeatur cum diminutione veritatis esse naturalis; sicut videmus, quod in debilitatione virtutis naturalis frequenter fortificatur virtus moralis. Et ideo non oportet, quodsi homo incipit esse beatus secundum animam, quod propter hoc non desinat esse homo.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens humanam naturam est homo; dicendum, quod nomine humanae naturae aliquando intelliguntur principia constituentia hominem; aliquando intelligitur forma hominis completiva, quae dat ipsi supposito complementum et operationem debitam illi speciei, secundum illud quod dicit Boethius[^p453-1]: «Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia». Si ergo accipiatur natura primo modo, locutio est falsa; si secundo modo, locutio est vera; sed isto modo non habuit Christus humanam naturam in triduo: et ideo non sequitur, quod fuerit homo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quando anima et corpus uniuntur in eandem hypostasim, faciunt hominem; dicendum, quod uniri animam et corpus in eandem hypostasim, hoc potest esse dupliciter[^p453-2]: aut ita, quod illa hypostasis sit ex eis constituta, et sic talis hypostasis, quae sit hic et nunc; et isto modo non possunt uniri in eandem hypostasim, quin uniantur ad invicem, ac per hoc quin faciant hominem. Alio modo possunt uniri in eandem hypostasim, ita tamen, quod illa hypostasis ex eis non constituitur, immo unitur eis etiam localiter separatis; et hoc modo uniri in eandem hypostasim non necessario facit hominem, quia non est ibi unio per constitutionem naturae tertiae, qualis est unio materiae et formae, qualis etiam requiritur ad hominis esse. Et quia isto modo unita erant anima et corpus in Christo in triduo, non modo praemisso; ideo non sequitur, quod Christus in triduo fuerit homo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in triduo iacebat in sepulcro; dicendum, quod talis locutio est vera per synecdochen[^p453-3]. Dicitur enim Christus iacuisse in sepulcro, quia pars humanitatis eius iacuit in sepulcro. Unde nec iacuit ibi secundum quod homo nec secundum quod Deus, sed secundum aliquid hominis. Sicut ergo non sequitur: Petrus est in tumulo, ergo Petrus est homo; sic etiam intelligendum est in proposito.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in sempiternum fuit sacerdos; dicendum, quod sacerdotium Christi dicitur fuisse sempiternum, non quia semper fuerit sacerdos in actu, sed quia illi sacerdotio nullum aliud successit[^p453-4].

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus in triduo habebat animam rationalem sibi unitam, ergo erat rationalis; dicendum, quod hoc non sequitur, nisi intelligatur per synecdochen, pro eo quod idiomata partium hominis non communicantur hypostasi Verbi nisi mediante toto coniuncto, communicatione propria[^p453-5]. Et quoniam Christus tunc non erat homo, ideo nec poterat dici albus ratione corporis, nec rationalis ratione animae, nisi per synecdochen, videlicet quod habebat corpus album et animam ratiocinantem. Quod ergo dicit: quod[^p453-6] habet animam rationalem sibi unitam est rationale; dicendum, quod hoc habet veritatem, si intelligatur de unione, quae est formae ad materiam; hoc autem modo non uniebatur anima Christi Christo in triduo. Unde non sequitur, quod fuisset homo in triduo.

english:
### Article, Single. *On the things that follow upon the death of Christ.*
### Question I. *Whether Christ in the three days was a man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ was a man in the three days. And that he was, it seems.

1. Augustine[^p450-1]: «Such was that assumption, which would make God man and man God»; but the assumption remained unchanged in the three days, as was shown before: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, master Hugh of St. Victor[^p450-2]: «What is more foolish than that a man should then cease to be, when he truly begins to be»! From this he argues thus: since therefore a holy man begins to be blessed, which is to be most truly, it is most foolish to say that he then ceases to be: therefore of any man whatever after death it is true to say that he is a man: therefore much more must this be conceded and said of Christ.

3. Likewise, everything having a human nature is a man; but Christ in the three days was having a human nature: therefore Christ in the three days was a man[^p450-3]. The major and the minor are manifest of themselves.

4. Likewise, whenever soul and body are united into one hypostasis, they make a man; but in the three days soul and body were united into one hypostasis in Christ: therefore Christ in the three days was a man.

5. Likewise, this is true: Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; therefore either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; but not insofar as he is God: therefore insofar as he is man: therefore Christ in the three days was a man[^p450-4].

6. Likewise, Christ in the three days did not cease to be a priest: therefore Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man. The first is clear from what is said in the Psalm[^p450-5]: *Thou art a priest forever;* and in Hebrews, the seventh chapter: *Christ has an everlasting priesthood.* The necessity of the inference is shown in this, that he was a priest insofar as he was man.

7. Likewise, Christ, on account of the assumption of a rational soul, was rational by a created rationality; but Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself: therefore Christ in the three days was rational by a created rationality: therefore he was an angel, or a soul, or a man. But he was not an angel, or a soul: therefore he was a man.

**On the contrary:** 1. «The dead man is diminished in respect to the account of man[^p450-6]»: therefore whoever is a dead man is deficient from the complete account of man; but the complete is not predicated of the diminished: therefore if Christ in the three days was a dead man, this is false: Christ in the three days was a man.

2. Likewise, according to the natural philosopher, man is a composite of rational soul and flesh; but Christ in the three days was not a composite of rational soul and flesh[^p450-7]: therefore Christ in the three days was not truly a man.

3. Likewise, no form is predicated of the whole because it is a form, but because it is a form following upon the whole composite: if therefore man is predicated of Christ, it is necessary that it name a form following upon the whole composite; but in Christ the composition was dissolved in the three days: therefore in the three days he could not be called a man. The major proposition is manifest by induction and by the authority of Avicenna[^p451-1], who posits it, and by the authority of Boethius, who says that «the species is the whole being of the individual».

4. Likewise, the higher essential thing being corrupted, the lower must of necessity be corrupted; but living-being is higher than being-a-man and is essential to it, because «to live is the being of the living thing[^p451-2]»: therefore if Christ in the three days ceased to be living, Christ in the three days ceased to be a man: therefore Christ in the three days was not a man.

5. Likewise, Christ in the three days could neither see nor hear nor speak: therefore if he was a man, he was a blind, deaf, and mute man; but it is absurd to say this of Christ: therefore it is false to say that Christ in the three days was a man[^p451-3].

6. Likewise, just as the union of the divine nature and the human makes God to be man, so the union of soul to flesh makes [a thing] to be animate: therefore, the union of soul to flesh ceasing, the being-animate ceases; and if the being-animate ceases, the being-an-animal ceases; and if the being-an-animal ceases, of necessity the being-a-man ceases[^p451-9]: therefore, from the first, since in Christ there was a separation of soul from flesh in the three days, Christ ceased to be a man in the three days: therefore he was not a man in the three days.

7. Likewise, to this same point are the reasons of the Master in the text[^p451-4], which are founded upon this: every man is either mortal or immortal, every man also is a man somewhere; but Christ in the three days was neither mortal nor immortal nor a man anywhere — because not in the tomb, since there was nothing there but the body; not in the underworld, since there was nothing there but the soul — therefore Christ was not a man in the three days.

### Conclusion.

> Christ in the three days was not a man, if we speak of predication simply actual.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold manner of speaking. — The first is that not only can Christ truly be called a man in the three days, but this can also be said of any dead man whatever. — The second manner of speaking is that this must not be conceded of others; it can nevertheless be conceded of Christ. — The third manner of speaking is that it must not be conceded of Christ nor of other men. And the first manner of speaking master Hugh of St. Victor held; the second manner the Master of the Sentences held; the third the common opinion of the Parisian doctors holds.

But if anyone should wish to consider diligently, each of the aforesaid manners has something of truth. For when this is predicated of this[^p451-5], it can be said in three ways: either according to actual being, or according to aptitudinal being, or partly according to actual being, partly according to aptitudinal. For the predicate either states the essence of the subject, or the act of the subject. Then predication is according to actual being when the subject is a being in act, and the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject and is its act; as, a man existing, it is said: man is an animal. — But predication is according to aptitudinal being when neither the subject is in act, nor the form of the predicate actually inheres in the subject, but there is a necessary ordering of one to the other, founded upon the principles of nature; as, no rose existing, it is conceded that the rose is a flower. — But predication is partly according to aptitudinal being, partly according to actual being, when the supposit is in act, but the form of the predicate is not in it according to act, but according to a necessary ordering, founded upon the principles of nature.

When therefore it is asked whether Christ is a man in the three days; if we speak of predication according to aptitudinal being, it is true not only of him, but also of every dead man, because according to the truth of our faith and the science of theology, when a man dies, his principles remain, in which the ordering is preserved not only with respect to the form of man, but also of this man; otherwise there would not be a true resurrection[^p451-6]. — But if we speak of predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal; thus it can be conceded of Christ that he was a man in the three days, because he was a person in act, although the form of humanity was preserved in the aptitude of the conjunction of soul and flesh; but this cannot be said of any other man[^p451-7]. — But if we speak of predication simply actual, neither of Christ, nor of another man is it true to say that he is a man, so long as the soul is separated from the flesh. For nothing makes a man to be in act except the actual conjunction of soul with flesh[^p451-8].

If therefore these three manners of speaking are understood according to the three aforesaid modes of predication, thus in all of them truth is found, and there is no

contrariety among them; and Hugh of St. Victor thought truly, and the Master spoke truly, if they understood[^p452-1] according to the modes assigned beforehand, and the common opinion holds truly. And by this the response can sufficiently be clear to all the reasons adduced for either side.

Nevertheless, if we wish to consider further the words of Hugh, we find that he held that Christ was a man in the three days, and any other dead man whatever, not only as to aptitudinal being, but also as to actual being. For he posited that after death the being of man is preserved; and that the separated soul is a person; and that again much more ought the soul to be called man than the body, if usage admitted this. Hence he argues in this manner[^p452-2]: since man is composed of soul and body, yet on account of the one part, which is body, the man is called body, much more therefore on account of that part, which is soul, ought he to be called soul. — And in this saying master Hugh is not commonly upheld. For neither is the separated soul a person, as was shown above[^p452-3]; nor is a man his soul; nor is he more truly a man when he dies than when he lives, as to the being of nature, though perhaps the being of grace can be increased in him; nor is the body, insofar as it is an integral part of man, predicated of man: and therefore not without cause does the common opinion not approve the opinion of master Hugh in this part.

But the Master of the Sentences not only wished to say that Christ in the three days was a man by a predication partly actual, partly aptitudinal, but rather[^p452-4] truly and actually. And some wish to impute to him that he said this because he was of the third opinion, which said that Christ was man according to habit. Hence he wished to say that he was a man in act, because he actually had a human nature. — But this must not be imputed to the Master, because it is an error, as was shown in what precedes[^p452-5]; nor can it be expressly gathered from the words of the Master, but for another reason he said this. For he understood that in Christ there were two unions, and truly so, namely the union of soul to flesh, and the union of the divine nature and the human. And the union of the divine nature and the human made Christ to be man, according to that which Augustine says: «Such was that assumption, that it would make God man». But the union of soul to flesh made that man to live. Since therefore in the three days the union of the Divinity to the humanity remained, and the union of soul to flesh was dissolved; hence it is that the Master posited that Christ in the three days did not cease to be a man, but ceased to live; therefore it is true according to him to say of Christ that he was a man in the three days, and that he was a dead man, although it cannot be said of any other. — And in this also the Master failed, because for someone to be a man there is necessarily prerequired and co-required the union of soul to flesh, since man names the form of the whole, or that which follows upon the whole composite. Hence in no way would that assumption have made God man and man God, unless God had assumed body and soul, as joined to one another. — And on account of this the position of the Master is not commonly upheld in this part, nor the position of master Hugh either, not because the aforesaid expression: Christ in the three days was a man, is in every way[^p452-6] false, but because it has falsity in being understood of predication according to actual being, according to which predication the inquiry turns concerning the aforesaid expression; and in this way master Hugh and the Master of the Sentences and the common opinion of the masters seem to have treated it, and according to this mode the present inquiry runs. — Therefore the reasons showing the aforesaid expression to be false are to be conceded; for they proceed according to this way.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that such was[^p452-7] that assumption etc.; it must be said that this was so, not because he assumed body and soul only, but also because he assumed body and soul united; and therefore he ceased to be a man, not because the union of the Divinity to the flesh was changed, but because the union of soul and flesh to one another was dissolved.

2. To that authority of Hugh, by which it is said that no one ceases to be[^p452-8] when he more truly begins to be; it must be said that nothing prevents the truth of moral being from being increased with the diminution of the truth of natural being; as we see that in the weakening of natural power moral virtue is frequently strengthened. And therefore it does not follow that, if a man begins to be blessed according to the soul, on account of this he does not cease to be a man.

3. To that which is objected, that what has a human nature is a man; it must be said that by the name of human nature are sometimes understood the principles constituting man; sometimes is understood the completive form of man, which gives to the supposit itself the complement and operation due to that species, according to that which Boethius says[^p453-1]: «Nature is the specific difference informing each single thing». If therefore nature be taken in the first way, the expression is false; if in the second way, the expression is true; but in this way Christ did not have a human nature in the three days: and therefore it does not follow that he was a man.

4. To that which is objected, that when soul and body are united into the same hypostasis, they make a man; it must be said that for soul and body to be united into the same hypostasis can be twofold[^p453-2]: either thus, that that hypostasis be constituted out of them, and thus such a hypostasis as is here and now; and in this way they cannot be united into the same hypostasis without being united to one another, and thereby without making a man. In another way they can be united into the same hypostasis, yet so that that hypostasis is not constituted out of them, but rather is united to them even when they are locally separated; and in this way to be united into the same hypostasis does not necessarily make a man, because there is not there a union through the constitution of a third nature, such as is the union of matter and form, such as is also required for the being of man. And because in this way soul and body were united in Christ in the three days, not in the manner set forth before; therefore it does not follow that Christ in the three days was a man.

5. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days lay in the tomb; it must be said that such an expression is true by synecdoche[^p453-3]. For Christ is said to have lain in the tomb because a part of his humanity lay in the tomb. Hence he lay there neither insofar as he is man nor insofar as he is God, but according to something of man. As therefore it does not follow: Peter is in the grave, therefore Peter is a man; so also it must be understood in the matter at hand.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ was a priest forever; it must be said that the priesthood of Christ is said to have been everlasting, not because he was always a priest in act, but because no other succeeded to that priesthood[^p453-4].

7. To that which is objected, that Christ in the three days had a rational soul united to himself, therefore he was rational; it must be said that this does not follow, unless it be understood by synecdoche, inasmuch as the idioms of the parts of man are not communicated to the hypostasis of the Word except through the mediation of the whole conjoined [nature], by a proper communication[^p453-5]. And since Christ then was not a man, therefore he could not be called white by reason of the body, nor rational by reason of the soul, except by synecdoche, namely that he had a white body and a reasoning soul. As to what it says, then: that[^p453-6] he has a rational soul united to himself, [therefore he] is rational; it must be said that this has truth, if it be understood of the union which is of form to matter; but in this way the soul of Christ was not united to Christ in the three days. Hence it does not follow that he was a man in the three days.

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. — De minori infr. supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Book I, On the Trinity, c. 13, n. 28. — On the minor, see below, above d. 21, a. 1, q. 1 and following, and here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Libr. II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11, ubi post verba hic allata Hugo sic prosequitur: *Et tanto utique verius est, quanto est verius in quo esse incipit! Non, inquiunt, sed figura est, quando Sancti cum Christo esse dicuntur. Bene. Quando vobiscum sunt, veritas est, et quando cum Christo sunt, figura est. In hoc vobis credite. Nos enim non credimus. Nos scimus, quia Christus veritas est. Qui ad Christum vadunt, non ad figuram vadunt, sed ad veritatem vadunt et figuram evadunt etc.* — Proxime post testimon. allatum Vat. cum aliquot codd. pro *arguit* exhibet *arguitur,* et deinde sola omittit conclusionem *ergo de quolibet... quod sit homo.*

en: Book II, On the Sacraments, p. I, c. 11, where after the words here cited Hugh continues thus: *And it is by so much the more truly, by how much it is more truly in that which begins to be! Not so, they say, but it is a figure, when the Saints are said to be with Christ. Good. When they are with you, it is truth, and when they are with Christ, it is a figure. In this believe yourselves. For we do not believe. We know, because Christ is truth. They who go to Christ go not to a figure, but go to the truth and escape the figure, etc.* — Immediately after the testimony cited, the Vatican [edition] with some codices, for *arguit,* gives *arguitur,* and then it alone omits the conclusion *therefore of any... that he is a man.*

la: Recte dicimus, ait Hugo a S. Vict. loc. cit., quod Verbum, ex quo homo factum est, nunquam postea homo esse desiit, quia se nec in morte carnis suae ab assumta humanitate unquam divisit.

en: Rightly do we say, says Hugh of St. Victor in the place cited, that the Word, from the time it was made man, never afterward ceased to be man, because it never divided itself, even in the death of its flesh, from the assumed humanity.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Psalm. 109, 4. — Seq. Scripturae loc. est Hebr. 7, 24, ubi edd., Vulgatam sequentes, post *Christus* addunt *eo quod maneat in aeternum.* — Subinde pro *Necessitas illationis* edd. *Veritas illationis.*

en: Psalm 109:4. — The following scriptural passage is Hebrews 7:24, where the editions, following the Vulgate, after *Christus* add *eo quod maneat in aeternum* (because he continues forever). — Thereafter, for *Necessitas illationis,* the editions read *Veritas illationis.*

la: Verba sunt Petri Hisp., de quibus videsis supra pag. 258, nota 2. — Pro *diminuit* codd. B C D W Y *deficit.* Subinde pro *deficiens* edd. *diminutus.*

en: The words are Peter of Spain's, on which see above, p. 258, note 2. — For *diminuit,* codices B C D W Y read *deficit.* Thereafter, for *deficiens,* the editions read *diminutus.*

la: Cod. U *non erat talis, ergo,* Vat. *non erat huiusmodi, ergo.* Pro *compositum* codd. F N P Q *compositus.* Edd. 1, 2 omittunt minorem.

en: Codex U reads *non erat talis, ergo;* the Vatican [edition] *non erat huiusmodi, ergo.* For *compositum,* codices F N P Q read *compositus.* Editions 1 and 2 omit the minor.

la: In Metaph., tr. 5. c. 3. 5. 7. Ratio, cui Avicenna innititur, est, quia forma ut forma est pars; «impossibile est autem, ipsam partem praedicari de toto». — De sententia Boethii vide supra pag. 48, nota 7.

en: In the Metaphysics, tr. 5, cc. 3, 5, 7. The reason on which Avicenna relies is that the form, as form, is a part; «but it is impossible that the part itself be predicated of the whole». — On the opinion of Boethius, see above, p. 48, note 7.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 4.). — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 438, nota 3. — Mox pro *vivus, Christus in* edd. *vivens, ergo in.*

en: Aristotle, On the Soul, Book II, text 37 (c. 4). — On the major, cf. above, p. 438, note 3. — Soon, for *vivus, Christus in,* the editions read *vivens, ergo in.*

la: Hoc arg. proponitur etiam a Praepositivo, S. p. III.

en: This argument is proposed also by Praepositinus, Summa, p. III.

la: Hic c. 1. seq.

en: Here, c. 1 and following.

la: Pro *dicitur hoc de hoc* codd. G I K L T aa *dicitur hic de hoc,* codd. M O *dicitur homo.*

en: For *dicitur hoc de hoc,* codices G I K L T aa read *dicitur hic de hoc;* codices M O *dicitur homo.*

en: Cf. Sentences IV, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4.

la: Codd. A N *ad carnem* et subinde cum codd. R U *intelligantur* pro *intelliguntur.*

en: Codices A N read *ad carnem,* and thereafter, with codices R U, *intelligantur* for *intelliguntur.*

la: Vide verba Porphyrii, tom. II. pag. 99, nota 2. allegata.

en: See the words of Porphyry cited in vol. II, p. 99, note 2.

la: Ita codd. A I K L M N T, codd. B O *intellexerit;* edd. *intelligunt.* Paulo inferius pro *potest patere* codd. A K *posset patere.*

en: Thus codices A I K L M N T; codices B O read *intellexerit;* the editions *intelligunt.* A little below, for *potest patere,* codices A K read *posset patere.*

la: Libr. II. de Sacram. p. I. c. 11: *Omnis homo est animal, et omne animal est corpus: igitur omnis homo est corpus. Nullam contradictionem hic esse putas. Auctoritas enim hoc dicit... Dic ergo, hoc totum quare magis dicis esse corpus quam animam, cum ex anima simul et corpore constet? Si propter partem unam, quia corpus est, totum ipsum corpus dicitur, nonne multo magis dicendum est anima propter partem alteram, quae anima est? Si enim a parte totum naturam et nomen trahere dicitur, ab illa procul dubio parte, quae melior est et dignior, rectius et naturam et nomen trahere dicetur. Sed non habet usus loquendi, inquis, ut homo anima dicatur. Ecce, concedo secundum usum loquendi... Usus loquendi ab hominibus inventus est etc.*

en: Book II, On the Sacraments, p. I, c. 11: *Every man is an animal, and every animal is a body: therefore every man is a body. You think there is no contradiction here. For the authority says this... Say then, why do you call this whole a body rather than a soul, since it is composed of soul and body together? If on account of the one part, because it is body, the whole itself is called body, ought it not much more be called soul on account of the other part, which is soul? For if the whole is said to draw its nature and name from a part, it will more rightly be said to draw both nature and name from that part which is better and worthier. But usage of speech does not have it, you say, that a man be called soul. Behold, I concede according to the usage of speech... The usage of speech was invented by men, etc.*

la: Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *Nec enim* codd. A K *Nec etiam;* paulo inferius pro *possit* multi codd. *posset.*

en: Distinction 5, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, for *Nec enim,* codices A K read *Nec etiam;* a little below, for *possit,* many codices read *posset.*

la: Codd. P Q subiiciunt *quod.* Edd. sibi indulserunt quae sequuntur sic depravare: *immo quod hoc dixerit vere et actualiter, volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quia fuit etc.* Pro *hoc dixit* codd. E P Q X *hoc dixerit.*

en: Codices P Q add *quod.* The editions allowed themselves to corrupt what follows thus: *immo quod hoc dixerit vere et actualiter, volunt aliqui hoc imponere ei, quia fuit etc.* For *hoc dixit,* codices E P Q X read *hoc dixerit.*

la: Dist. 6. a. 1. q. 3. et dub. 2. — De seqq. vide lit. Magistri, c. 1. seq. et supra d. V. c. 3. — Paulo inferius edd. omittunt *et vere.*

en: Distinction 6, a. 1, q. 3, and dub. 2. — On what follows, see the text of the Master, c. 1 and following, and above d. 5, c. 3. — A little below, the editions omit *et vere.*

la: Pro *omni modo* codd. A U *omnino.*

en: For *omni modo,* codices A U read *omnino.*

la: Codd. B C D M O X *fuisset.* — Paulo inferius pro *unita* multi codd. *unitam.*

en: Codices B C D M O X read *fuisset.* — A little below, for *unita,* many codices read *unitam.*

la: Codd. M O supplent *homo.* Mox pro *moralis* plurimi codd. *moris,* et subinde pro *diminutione veritatis* codd. A K U bb *diminutione virtutis.*

en: Codices M O supply *homo.* Soon, for *moralis,* very many codices read *moris,* and thereafter, for *diminutione veritatis,* codices A K U bb read *diminutione virtutis.*

la: De Una Persona et duab. natur. c. 1. Cfr. supra d. 3. a. 2. q. 1. arg. 4. ad oppos. — Circa finem solut. codd. B D U omittunt *non* ante *habuit;* perperam.

en: On the One Person and Two Natures, c. 1. Cf. above, d. 3, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 to the contrary. — Near the end of the solution, codices B D U omit *non* before *habuit;* wrongly.

la: Vel aliis verbis: *et sic talis sit hypostasis, quae sit particularis sive singularis.* Dictio etenim *hic et nunc* opponitur locutioni *semper et ubique,* qua universale designatur. Vide Aristot., 1. Poster. c. 21. (c. 31.), quem locum iam tom. I. pag. 642, nota 4. allegavimus. — In hac solut. cod. A pro *in eandem hypostasim* constanter exhibet *in eadem hypostasi.* Paulo inferius post *ex eis* edd. subdunt *unitis,* et subinde cum uno alteroque cod. pro *constituitur* habent *constituatur.* Circa finem solut. pro *ad hominis esse* codd. A T *ab hominis esse.*

en: Or in other words: *and thus let such a hypostasis be one which is particular or singular.* For the expression *here and now* is opposed to the locution *always and everywhere,* by which the universal is designated. See Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics], Book 1, c. 21 (c. 31), which passage we already cited in vol. I, p. 642, note 4. — In this solution, codex A for *in eandem hypostasim* consistently gives *in eadem hypostasi.* A little below, after *ex eis,* the editions add *unitis,* and thereafter, with one or another codex, for *constituitur* they have *constituatur.* Near the end of the solution, for *ad hominis esse,* codices A T read *ab hominis esse.*

la: Vide supra pag. 239, nota 8, et tom. II. pag. 319, nota 3.

en: See above, p. 239, note 8, and vol. II, p. 319, note 3.

la: Cfr. Hebr. 7, 11. seq.

en: Cf. Hebrews 7:11 and following.

la: Vide supra d. 21. a. 1. q. 1, ad 2. — Paulo inferius pro *videlicet quod* codd. A N *videlicet quia.*

en: See above, d. 21, a. 1, q. 1, to the second. — A little below, for *videlicet quod,* codices A N read *videlicet quia.*

la: Post *quod* cod. bb subiicit *omne quod,* et subinde pro *habet* edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. *habebat.*

en: After *quod,* codex bb adds *omne quod,* and thereafter, for *habet,* editions 1 and 2 with several codices read *habebat.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius quaestionis dependet a duobus principiis, iam supra contra aliter sentientes stabilitis. Primum eorum est, quod Christus assumsit animam et corpus ita unita, ut inde resultaret una natura, nempe humana (vide supra d. 6. praenotata post divisionem textus et ibid. a. 1. q. 1, scholion). Secundum est, quod anima separata non est persona, quod negarunt Hugo a S. Vict. et Magister (cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 3.), diversis tamen ducti rationibus. Idem confessi quidem sunt dogma fidei, quod Christus secundum humanam naturam vere in triduo illo fuerit mortuus; nihilominus tenuerunt, eum tunc fuisse hominem «secundum actualem praedicationem». Sed haec doctrina ab omnibus posterioribus dicitur esse falsa in se et orta ex falsis principiis philosophicis. Hugo enim putabat, animam per se esse personam et hominem; Magister vero opinabatur, in Christo propter divinum suppositum coniunctionem animae et corporis non fuisse necessariam, ut esset homo; immo idem, secundum Alexandrum, Henricum Gand. aliosque, putabat, nec ante mortem Christi animam et corpus fuisse ad invicem formaliter unita; a quo tamen errore S. Thomas aliique eum alienum fuisse dicunt. S. Thom. (locc. infra citt.) dicit, Hugonem et etiam Magistrum in hac quaestione verba quidem habuisse erronea, non tamen sensum erroris in fide, sed falsa principia in philosophia. S. Bonav. etiam docet, quo sano sensu (alieno tamen a mente utriusque magistri) dici possit, Christum in triduo fuisse hominem. Idem fere repetunt Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. — Scotus hic multis rationibus philosophicis opinionem praedictam utriusque impugnat; sed de his rationibus non omnes conveniunt.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 19. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. III. q. 50. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. I. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this question depends upon two principles, already established above against those who hold otherwise. The first of them is that Christ assumed soul and body so united that from them there resulted one nature, namely the human (see above, d. 6, the things noted beforehand after the division of the text, and ibid., a. 1, q. 1, scholion). The second is that the separated soul is not a person, which Hugh of St. Victor and the Master denied (cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3), though led by different reasons. They indeed both confessed the dogma of faith, that Christ according to his human nature truly died in that three days; nevertheless they held that he was then a man «according to actual predication». But this doctrine is said by all later [doctors] to be false in itself and to have arisen from false philosophical principles. For Hugh thought that the soul is of itself a person and a man; the Master, however, was of the opinion that in Christ, on account of the divine supposit, the conjunction of soul and body was not necessary for him to be a man; indeed the same [Master], according to Alexander, Henry of Ghent, and others, thought that not even before the death of Christ were soul and body formally united to one another; from which error, however, St. Thomas and others say he was free. St. Thomas (in the places cited below) says that Hugh and also the Master in this question had words indeed erroneous, yet not the sense of error in the faith, but false principles in philosophy. St. Bonaventure also teaches in what sound sense (alien, however, from the mind of both masters) it can be said that Christ in the three days was a man. Almost the same things Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton repeat. — Scotus here attacks by many philosophical reasons the aforesaid opinion of both; but on these reasons not all agree.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 19, m. 3. — Scotus, in each Writing, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; Summa III, q. 50, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.450–453 (PDF 472–475) per the Vol II/III override (Respondeo, Conclusiones, Solutiones, and all footers cascade-shattered in the IA djvu OCR), with the IA OCR (raw 31268–31558) used as the base for clean running prose (the *videtur* and *sed contra* arguments) and for footnote-marker spacing. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**Structure.** ARTICULUS UNICUS opener (*De his quae mortem Christi consequuntur*, raw 31268) folds into q1 per the chunking convention — no standalone a1-divisio chunk. Body order: 7 *videtur* args + 7 *sed contra* args + Conclusio + Respondeo (triplex modus dicendi + threefold mode of predication + the real opinions of Hugh and the Master) + 7 Solutiones, then Scholion (§I–II) LAST.

**Page-split map.**
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- p.451: *sed contra* arg 3 (top) through arg 7 + Conclusio + Respondeo opening (L col); the threefold-predication exposition + Conclusiones 1–3 (R col). Footer nn.1–9.
- p.452: continuation of Respondeo — *contrarietas*-resolution, the discussion of Hugh's real view (*Non approbatur*), the Master's real view (*De reali sententia Magistri*, *Defenditur / Non tenditur Magister*, *De utraque positione*), Solutiones 1–2 (*Solutio oppositorum*). Footer nn.1–8.
- p.453: Solutiones 3–7 + SCHOLION §I–II. Footer nn.1–6.

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**Footers in/out.** No footers migrate IN from p.449 — all p.449 notes were dispositioned in the d22-divisio promotion (4 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM to the divisio; 3 source-notes to the littera tail). Each printed page's footer sequence is captured in full and keyed page-by-page (per-page restart): p.450 nn.1–7, p.451 nn.1–9, p.452 nn.1–8, p.453 nn.1–6 = **30 apparatus entries**. The scholion §I–II carries inline doctor-citations (Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Scotus, etc.), not numbered footnote markers, so it adds no apparatus entries.

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**Marginal sigla trimmed** (editorial side-notes, not Bonaventure's text): *Ad oppositum.* (at *videtur* arg 1), *Fundamenta.* (at *sed contra*), *Triplex opinio.* / *Triplex praedicatio explicatur.* (Respondeo), *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *De 3 opinionibus.*, *De reali sententia Hugonis.* / *Non approbatur.* / *De reali sententia Magistri.* / *Defenditur Magister.* / *Non tenditur Magister.* / *Improbatur Magister.* / *De utraque positione.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.* (×several in the Solutiones), *Duplex unio in hypostasi.*

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**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 454 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, fuerit in loco determinato, an ubique.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, fuerit in loco determinato, an ubique. Et quod fuerit in loco determinato, videtur:

1. Quia Christus, secundum quod homo, non fuit, nisi ubi fuit anima eius, vel caro; sed anima eius, vel caro non fuit nisi in loco determinato: ergo nec Christus, secundum quod homo[^p454-1].

2. Item, Christus, secundum quod homo, «assumsit humanam naturam in atomo[^p454-2]»; sed humana natura in atomo est humana natura in individuo, et individuum est necessario *hic et nunc*, et ita in loco determinato: ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est in loco determinato.

3. Item, cuicumque convenit moveri secundum locum, convenit ei esse in loco determinato; sed Christus, secundum quod homo, descendit ad inferos et ascendit ad caelos[^p454-3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod Christus sit in pluribus locis, secundum quod homo, hoc non habet, nisi quia sub Sacramento[^p454-4]: si ergo tunc sub Sacramento non erat, ergo in aliquo loco ipsum existere oportebat.

**Sed contra:** 1. Quaecumque sunt unita inseparabiliter, ubicumque unum est, et reliquum[^p454-5]; sed humana natura unita est inseparabiliter et erat tunc Verbo Dei unita, quod est ubique: ergo si Verbum est ubique, et humana natura in Verbo.

2. Item, quaecumque sunt idem in supposito, ubicumque est unum, et reliquum — si enim aliqua duo accidentia uniantur in uno subiecto, impossibile est, unum esse alicubi, ubi non sit reliquum — sed humana natura et divina uniuntur in una hypostasi[^p454-6]: si ergo *divina* natura est ubique et non in loco determinato, necessario sequitur, quod et *humana* natura in Christo.

3. Item, haec est vera: iste homo est Filius Dei ubique, ergo *a simplici conversa*[^p454-7]: Filius Dei est ubique homo; sed ubicumque est homo, ibi est eius humanitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, demonstretur quicumque locus, Christus est ibi; aut ergo est ibi homo, aut non-homo — homo enim et non-homo opponuntur immediate — sed non est ibi non-homo: ergo est ibi homo: ergo Christus est ubique homo: igitur secundum humanam naturam non est in loco determinato nec fuit in triduo.

5. Item, bene sequitur: hoc est, et non est homo, ergo est non-homo: ergo similiter bene sequitur: Christus fuit ubique, et non fuit ubique homo, ergo fuit ubique non-homo; sed haec est falsa: ergo aliqua praemissarum; sed non nisi ista: Christus non fuit ubique homo: ergo eius opposita vera: Christus fuit ubique homo: ergo idem quod prius.

6. Item, «quidquid convenit Filio Dei per naturam, convenit illi homini per gratiam[^p454-8]»: cum ergo haec sit vera: Filius Dei est ubique; haec similiter erit vera: iste homo est ubique; sed bene sequitur: homo albus est ubique, ergo est ubique homo, et est ubique albus: ergo similiter bene sequitur: iste homo est ubique: ergo est ubique homo: redit ergo idem quod prius, scilicet quod Christus secundum humanitatem nec nunc nec in triduo fuit in loco determinato.

### Conclusio

> Christus, secundum quod homo, non fuit ubique, sed in loco determinato.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaestio ista potest esse de re, et potest esse de sermone. Tunc est quaestio de re, quando quaeritur, utrum humanitas Christi fuerit, ubicumque fuit Divinitas; et ad istam quaestionem de plano respondendum est, quod non; quia divina natura est immensa et infinita, unde nullum locum sibi determinat; sed humana natura, cum sit creata et finita, locum sibi determinat. Unde non erat, ubicumque Divinitas erat, sed vel in sepulcro ratione corporis, vel in inferno ratione animae, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^p454-9]. — Et nunc similiter; ratione humanitatis, quantum est *de se*, in uno tantum loco est; quod vero sit in pluribus, hoc est sub Sacramento, secundum quod dicit Innocentius[^p454-10],

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scilicet quod Christus dicitur esse alicubi *sacramentaliter*, alicubi *personaliter*, alicubi *localiter*: localiter est in caelo, sacramentaliter est in altari, personaliter ubique. Et sic humana natura in Christo habet, ut sit in loco determinato; et si de re fiat quaestio, satis plana est responsio.

Si autem fiat quaestio de *sermone*, hoc est, si quaeratur de veritate istius: iste homo est ubique, et iste est ubique homo; hic respondendum est, quod iste terminus *homo* potest *subiici*, vel *praedicari*. Quando *subiicitur*, tunc est locutio vera. Et ratio huius est: quia cum dicitur: iste homo est ubique, hoc pronomen *iste* potest demonstrare *personam* Christi, vel *singulare* hominis[^p455-1]. Si *personam* Christi, sic absque dubio vera est: iste homo est ubique. Si vero *singulare* hominis, adhuc vera est, sed non per propriam naturam, sed per communicationem idiomatum, quia «quod convenit Filio Dei per naturam, convenit isti homini per gratiam.»

Si autem ponatur ex parte *praedicati*, tunc est locutio falsa, quia iste terminus *homo* praedicatur ratione formae, et hoc adverbium *ubique* determinat praedicatum; et ita significatur per hoc, quod forma humanitatis se extendat ad omnem locum in Christo; et hoc quidem falsum est, eo[^p455-2] quod habet locum determinatum. Unde sicut haec est falsa: Christus *semper* fuit homo, quia significatur ex hoc, quod humanitas Christi non habuit principium in tempore; ita similiter haec est falsa: Christus est *ubique* homo, quia ex hoc significatur, quod humana natura Christi sit ubique. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod humana natura Christi sit in loco determinato et fuerit in triduo.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque sunt unita inseparabiliter, extendunt se ad omnem locum aequaliter; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando aliqua duo unibilia sic uniuntur, quod unum non excedit reliquum. Quando autem unum est maioris ambitus quam reliquum, non habet veritatem: et sic est in proposito; natura enim divina est immensa, sed natura humana est limitata. Et est simile: quia *animal* inseparabiliter praedicatur de homine, et tamen alicubi est *animal*, ubi non est *homo*[^p455-3].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa quae sunt unum in supposito, concomitantur[^p455-4] se in omni loco inseparabiliter; dicendum, quod quoddam est suppositum, quod non excedit formam suam; et de tali supposito habet veritatem sermo praemissus. Quoddam vero est suppositum, quod excedit aliquam formam, cuius est suppositum, sicut hypostasis Christi se habet respectu humanae naturae, quia primum esse non habet a natura humana, sed a natura divina[^p455-5]; et de tali supposito non habet veritatem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: iste homo est Filius Dei ubique, ergo conversa est vera: Dei Filius est homo ubique; dicendum, quod haec, si quis attendat, non est eius conversa; et hoc patet, quia in conversione alicuius propositionis quod determinabat praedicatum debet fieri determinatio ex parte subiecti, alioquin non fiet recta conversio, sicut patet aspicienti. Et ideo, cum in hac locutione: homo est Filius Dei ubique, adverbium illud determinat praedicatum ratione istius attributi, quod est esse Filius Dei; eius conversa non est haec: Filius Dei est homo ubique, secundum quod ubique determinat hoc attributum, quod est esse hominem; sed haec: Filius Dei, existens ubique, est homo; et haec quidem est vera, unde quamvis in ratione praedicta videatur arguere *a simplici conversa*, non tamen arguit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Christus est hic et non est homo, ergo est hic non-homo; dicendum, quod illud tenet in his quae sunt unius naturae tantum, ratione cuius sunt, ubicumque sunt. In Christo vero non tenet, quia non solum habet naturam humanam, sed divinam, per quam potest esse alicubi, ubi non est per humanam. Unde in processu illo est peccatum *secundum consequens*[^p455-6]: non est hic homo, ergo est hic non-homo. Ista enim habet tres causas veritatis: non est hic homo: aut quia non est hic, aut quia non est homo, aut quia est hic et est homo, sed tamen humanitas eius non est in isto loco; et in isto sensu habet locutio veritatem. Et si obiiciat, quod homo et non-homo opponuntur immediate; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est de se, sed non est verum, addita determinatione. Haec enim duo non opponuntur immediate: albus homo et albus non-homo, quia neutrum horum vere praedicatur de homine nigro[^p455-7].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bene sequitur: est, et non est homo, ergo est non-homo, ergo similiter bene sequitur: est hic, et non est hic homo, ergo est hic non-homo; dicendum, quod non est simile,

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quia pluribus de causis potest ista verificari de aliquo: iste non est hic homo, quam ista: iste non est homo, propter determinationem adiunctam. Et ideo in praedicto processu est deceptio *secundum consequens*, a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam[^p456-1].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: iste homo est ubique, ergo iste est ubique homo; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia in prima attribuitur ei esse ubique ratione divinae naturae, in secunda ratione humanae. Nec est simile de hoc quod obiicit de homine albo, quia suppositum istius termini *album*, cum sit hic et nunc, non se extendit ad aliquem locum, ad quem non extendit se eius proprietas; non sic autem est de persona Verbi et de natura humana.

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### Question II. *Whether Christ, insofar as he is man, was in a determinate place or everywhere.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ, insofar as he is man, was in a determinate place or everywhere. And that he was in a determinate place seems to be the case:

1. Because Christ, insofar as he is man, was not except where his soul or flesh was; but his soul or flesh was only in a determinate place: therefore neither was Christ, insofar as he is man[^p454-1].

2. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he is man, «assumed human nature in an atom[^p454-2]»; but human nature in an atom is human nature in an individual, and an individual is necessarily *here and now*, and thus in a determinate place: therefore Christ, insofar as he is man, is in a determinate place.

3. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be moved with respect to place, it belongs to it to be in a determinate place; but Christ, insofar as he is man, descended to the lower regions and ascended to the heavens[^p454-3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that Christ is in several places, insofar as he is man, this he does not have except because he is under the Sacrament[^p454-4]: if therefore he was not then under the Sacrament, then it was necessary for him to exist in some place.

**On the contrary:** 1. Whatever things are united inseparably, wherever one is, there is also the other[^p454-5]; but human nature was united inseparably and was then united to the Word of God, which is everywhere: therefore if the Word is everywhere, the human nature is also in the Word.

2. Likewise, whatever things are the same in supposit, wherever the one is, there is also the other — for if any two accidents are united in one subject, it is impossible for one to be somewhere where the other is not — but human nature and divine nature are united in one hypostasis[^p454-6]: if therefore the *divine* nature is everywhere and not in a determinate place, it necessarily follows that the *human* nature in Christ is too.

3. Likewise, this is true: this man is the Son of God everywhere, therefore *by simple conversion*[^p454-7]: the Son of God is everywhere man; but wherever man is, there is his humanity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, let any place whatever be pointed out, Christ is there; either therefore man is there, or non-man — for man and non-man are immediately opposed — but non-man is not there: therefore man is there: therefore Christ is everywhere man: therefore according to his human nature he is not in a determinate place, nor was he in the triduum.

5. Likewise, this follows validly: this is, and is not man, therefore it is non-man: therefore likewise this follows validly: Christ was everywhere, and was not everywhere man, therefore he was everywhere non-man; but this is false: therefore some one of the premises is; but it is none except this one: Christ was not everywhere man: therefore its opposite is true: Christ was everywhere man: therefore the same as before.

6. Likewise, «whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to that man by grace[^p454-8]»: since therefore this is true: the Son of God is everywhere; this likewise will be true: this man is everywhere; but this follows validly: a white man is everywhere, therefore he is everywhere a man, and is everywhere white: therefore likewise this follows validly: this man is everywhere: therefore he is everywhere man: therefore the same returns as before, namely that Christ according to his humanity was in a determinate place neither now nor in the triduum.

### Conclusion

> Christ, insofar as he is man, was not everywhere, but in a determinate place.

**I respond:** It must be said that this question can be about the thing (*de re*) and can be about the expression (*de sermone*). The question is about the thing when it is asked whether the humanity of Christ was wherever the Divinity was; and to this question it must be answered plainly that it was not; because the divine nature is immense and infinite, whence it determines no place for itself; but the human nature, since it is created and finite, determines a place for itself. Hence it was not wherever the Divinity was, but either in the tomb by reason of the body, or in the lower regions by reason of the soul, as the Master says in the text[^p454-9]. — And now likewise; by reason of the humanity, insofar as it is *of itself*, it is in only one place; but that it is in several places, this is under the Sacrament, according to what Innocent says[^p454-10],

namely that Christ is said to be somewhere *sacramentally*, somewhere *personally*, somewhere *locally*: locally he is in heaven, sacramentally he is on the altar, personally everywhere. And thus the human nature in Christ has it that it is in a determinate place; and if the question be made about the thing, the response is plain enough.

But if the question be made about the *expression*, that is, if it be asked about the truth of this statement: this man is everywhere, and this one is everywhere man; here it must be answered that this term *man* can be *made the subject* or *predicated*. When it is *made the subject*, then the statement is true. And the reason for this is: that when it is said, this man is everywhere, this pronoun *this* can point to the *person* of Christ, or to the *singular* of man[^p455-1]. If the *person* of Christ, then without doubt it is true: this man is everywhere. But if the *singular* of man, it is still true, yet not by its proper nature, but by the communication of idioms, because «what belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to this man by grace.»

But if it be placed on the side of the *predicate*, then the statement is false, because this term *man* is predicated by reason of the form, and this adverb *everywhere* determines the predicate; and thus it is signified by this that the form of humanity extends itself to every place in Christ; and this indeed is false, since[^p455-2] it has a determinate place. Hence just as this is false: Christ was *always* man, because it is signified by this that the humanity of Christ had no beginning in time; so likewise this is false: Christ is *everywhere* man, because by this it is signified that the human nature of Christ is everywhere. — The arguments are therefore to be granted which show that the human nature of Christ is in a determinate place and was so in the triduum.

1. To that which is objected, that whatever things are united inseparably extend themselves to every place equally; it must be said that that holds true when any two unitable things are so united that the one does not exceed the other. But when the one is of greater extent than the other, it does not hold true: and so it is in the case at hand; for the divine nature is immense, but the human nature is limited. And there is a parallel: because *animal* is inseparably predicated of man, and yet *animal* is somewhere where *man* is not[^p455-3].

2. To that which is objected, that those things which are one in supposit accompany[^p455-4] one another inseparably in every place; it must be said that there is a certain supposit which does not exceed its form; and of such a supposit the foregoing statement holds true. But there is a certain supposit which exceeds some form of which it is the supposit, as the hypostasis of Christ stands with respect to the human nature, because it does not have its first being from the human nature, but from the divine nature[^p455-5]; and of such a supposit it does not hold true.

3. To that which is objected, that this is true: this man is the Son of God everywhere, therefore the converse is true: the Son of God is man everywhere; it must be said that this, if one attends carefully, is not its converse; and this is clear, because in the conversion of any proposition that which determined the predicate must become a determination on the side of the subject, otherwise there will not be a correct conversion, as is clear to one who looks. And therefore, since in this statement: man is the Son of God everywhere, that adverb determines the predicate by reason of that attribute which is to be the Son of God; its converse is not this: the Son of God is man everywhere, insofar as *everywhere* determines this attribute, which is to be man; but rather this: the Son of God, existing everywhere, is man; and this indeed is true, whence although in the aforesaid reasoning it seems to argue *by simple conversion*, nevertheless it does not so argue.

4. To that which is objected, that if Christ is here and is not man, therefore he is here non-man; it must be said that that holds in those things which are of one nature only, by reason of which they are wherever they are. But in Christ it does not hold, because he has not only a human nature, but a divine, through which he can be somewhere where he is not through the human. Hence in that process there is a fallacy *of the consequent*[^p455-6]: he is not here man, therefore he is here non-man. For this has three causes of truth: he is not here man: either because he is not here, or because he is not man, or because he is here and is man, but nevertheless his humanity is not in that place; and in that sense the statement has truth. And if one objects that man and non-man are immediately opposed; it must be said that this is true, insofar as it is of itself, but it is not true once a determination is added. For these two are not immediately opposed: a white man and a white non-man, because neither of these is truly predicated of a black man[^p455-7].

5. To that which is objected, that this follows validly: it is, and is not man, therefore it is non-man, therefore likewise this follows validly: it is here, and is not here man, therefore it is here non-man; it must be said that it is not parallel,

because this can be verified of something for several causes: this one is not here man, than this: this one is not man, on account of the determination adjoined. And therefore in the aforesaid process there is a deception *of the consequent*, from several causes of truth to one[^p456-1].

6. To that which is objected, that this is true: this man is everywhere, therefore this one is everywhere man; it must be said that it does not follow, because in the first there is attributed to him to be everywhere by reason of the divine nature, in the second by reason of the human. Nor is it parallel with what he objects about the white man, because the supposit of this term *white*, since it is here and now, does not extend itself to any place to which its property does not extend itself; but it is not so with the person of the Word and the human nature.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Ut dicit Damascenus, III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 4, et d. 5. a. 2. q. I. arg. 4. ad oppos. in fine. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 453, nota 2.

en: As Damascene says, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 11. Cf. above p. 15, note 4, and d. 5, a. 2, q. I, arg. 4, at the end of the reply to the opposed. — On the minor [premise] cf. above p. 453, note 2.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 2. et 4. — Sententia maioris ab Aristot., V. Phys. text. 8. (c. 1.) sic exprimitur: «Omne quod movetur, in loco est». Damascen., IV. de Fide orthod. c. I: Ascendere e terra in caelum et rursus descendere actiones sunt circumscripti corporis. Sic enim, inquit, rursus veniet ad vos, quemadmodum vidistis eum euntem in caelum (Act. 1, 11.).

en: See here the text of the Master, cc. 2 and 4. — The thought of the major [premise] is expressed by Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 8 (c. 1) thus: «Everything that is moved is in a place». Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* IV, c. I: To ascend from earth into heaven and again to descend are the actions of a circumscribed body. For thus, he says, he will come again to you, just as you saw him going into heaven (Acts 1:11).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 10. p. I. q. 3. — Mox codd. A K N verbis *in aliquo loco* adiungunt *determinato*.

en: Cf. *IV Sent.* d. 10, p. I, q. 3. — Shortly after, codices A K N add *determinate* to the words *in some place*.

la: Codd. AKU *ubicumque est unum, est et reliquum*. In fine arg. cod. S addit *ubique*; ante *humana* in edd. et codd. deficit *et*.

en: Codices A K U read *wherever one is, there is also the other*. At the end of the argument, codex S adds *everywhere*; before *human* in the editions and codices the word *and* is lacking.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 2. q. I.

en: Cf. above d. 6, a. 2, q. I.

la: Vide supra pag. 175, nota 10.

en: See above p. 175, note 10.

la: Haec propositio a Scholasticis modo Ambrosio tribuitur (cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIV. c. 2.), modo Augustino (cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. IV. c. 2. et d. VI. c. 2.).

en: This proposition is attributed by the Scholastics now to Ambrose (cf. above the text of the Master, d. XIV, c. 2), now to Augustine (cf. above the text of the Master, d. IV, c. 2, and d. VI, c. 2).

la: Hic c. 2. Cfr. Athanas., Oratio de incarnat. Verbi, n. 17; Hilar., X. de Trin. n. 16; Fulgent., II. ad Trasim. c. 17. seq. — Proxime post edd. omittunt *Et nunc*.

en: Here c. 2. Cf. Athanasius, *Oration on the Incarnation of the Word*, n. 17; Hilary, *On the Trinity* X, n. 16; Fulgentius, *To Trasimund* II, c. 17 ff. — Immediately after, the editions omit *And now*.

la: Libr. IV. de Sacro Altaris mysterio, c. 8, ubi haec quaestio ponitur: licet autem corpus dominicum sit in loco [scil. in caelo] locale, quaeritur tamen, utrum in Sacramento sit locatum localiter etc. Cfr. ibid. c. 27. Vide etiam IV. Sent. d. X., ubi ex III. Decret. de Consecrat. d. 2. c. 44. illud Augustini (in Ioan. Evang. tr. 30. n. I.) affertur: «Donec saeculum finiatur, sursum est Dominus; sed tamen etiam hic nobiscum est veritas Domini. Corpus enim, in quo resurrexit, in uno loco esse oportet; veritas autem eius ubique diffusa est». Item illud: «Una persona est Deus et homo, ubique per id quod est Deus, in caelo per id quod homo est» (August., Epist. 187. alias 57. c. 3. n. 10.).

en: Book IV, *On the Sacred Mystery of the Altar*, c. 8, where this question is raised: although the Lord's body is local in place [namely in heaven], it is nevertheless asked whether in the Sacrament it is placed locally, etc. Cf. ibid. c. 27. See also *IV Sent.* d. X, where from the *Decretum* III, *On Consecration*, d. 2, c. 44, that saying of Augustine (*On the Gospel of John*, tract 30, n. I) is cited: «Until the world is ended, the Lord is above; but nevertheless even here with us is the truth of the Lord. For the body in which he rose again must be in one place; but his truth is diffused everywhere». Likewise that saying: «One person is God and man, everywhere by that which he is God, in heaven by that which he is man» (Augustine, *Epist.* 187, alias 57, c. 3, n. 10).

la: Cfr. supra d. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi ad solvendam huic similem quaestionem (ad quam infra circa finem corp. spectatur) pronomen *iste* in similem modum distinguitur.

en: Cf. above d. II, a. 2, q. 2, where, in order to solve a question similar to this (to which reference is made below near the end of the body), the pronoun *this* is distinguished in a similar way.

la: Codd. A K S pro *eo quod*. Paulo inferius pro *non habuit* codd. G H I L aa *non habuerit*, cod. K *non habet*.

en: Codices A K S read *because* in place of [*since*]. A little below, for *did not have* codices G H I L aa read *should not have had*, codex K *does not have*.

la: Aliud exemplum est ipse homo, in quo, licet corpus et anima intime sint coniuncta, tamen anima tota est in toto corpore et tota in singulis eius partibus, quod de corpore non valet.

en: Another example is man himself, in whom, although body and soul are intimately joined, nevertheless the whole soul is in the whole body and whole in each of its parts, which does not hold for the body.

la: Cod. T *concomitant*, plures codd. inepte vel *communicant* vel *communicantur*.

en: Codex T reads *accompany* [active], several codices ineptly read either *communicate* or *are communicated*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 6. a. I. q. I. ad 4.

en: Cf. above d. 6, a. I, q. I, to obj. 4.

la: Vide supra pag. 99, nota 7. De seqq. cfr. supra pag. 252, nota 7. — In initio solut. pro *et non est homo* edd. *et non est hic homo* et subinde *illius naturae* pro *unius naturae* nec non paulo post *sed etiam divinam* pro *sed divinam*. Circa finem solut. pro *quantum est de se* edd. *quantum est de re*.

en: See above p. 99, note 7. On what follows cf. above p. 252, note 7. — At the beginning of the solution, for *and is not man* the editions read *and is not here man*, and then *of that nature* for *of one nature*, and likewise a little after *but also divine* for *but divine*. Near the end of the solution, for *insofar as it is of itself* the editions read *insofar as it is of the thing*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. I. (c. 10.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. I (c. 10).

la: Vide solut. ad 4.

en: See the solution to obj. 4.

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Ubiquistarum* error, ex Eutychetis fontibus, vel ex male intellecta doctrina de communicatione idiomatum manans et olim inter Protestantes late diffusus, reprobatus est iam an. 787 a Synodo oecumenica VII. (Sess. 8.) hoc anathematismo: «Si quis Christum, Deum nostrum, circumscriptum (περιγραπτόν) non confitetur secundum humanitatem, a. s.». — Argumentum primarium Ubiquistarum exploditur hic in solut. ad I. — Quaestio autem principalis Scholasticorum hoc loco versatur tantum circa veritatem sermonis sive quarundam locutionum huc spectantium. Conveniunt autem iidem in hoc, quod falsa sit locutio: Christus est homo ubique sive ubique homo; vera autem: iste homo est ubique. S. Thom. (hic a. 2.) etiam locutionem: Christus, secundum quod homo, est ubique, non penitus reprobat, scilicet quatenus veritatem suppositi importat, non autem, quatenus importat veritatem naturae. — Ratio, quam hic S. Bonav. affert, a Petr. a Tar. (hic q. I. a. 2.) sic exprimitur: «Terminus *homo* a parte subiecti supponit pro *persona*, a parte praedicati pro *natura*, quia in praedicato est locus formae ratione inhaerentiae praedicati ad subiectum». — Solutio ad 2. confirmatur a S. Thoma (S. c. Gent. IV. c. 49. ad 3. obiect.): «Hypostasis non extenditur extra terminos illius naturae, *ex qua subsistentiam habet*. Non autem Verbum Dei subsistentiam habet ex natura humana, sed magis naturam humanam ad suam subsistentiam vel personalitatem trahit; non enim *per illam*, sed *in illa* subsistit. Unde nihil prohibet, Verbum Dei esse ubique, licet humana natura, a Verbo Dei assumta, ubique non sit» (cfr. hic dub. 3. in fine). — De communicatione idiomatum et de regula, quod attributa unius naturae non possint praedicari de altera in abstracto sumta, cfr. supra d. 6. a. I. q. I, praesertim ad 6, d. 7. 8. passim, d. 11. a. 2. q. I; S. Thom., S. III. q. 16. a. 4-6.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 19. m. 5. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; cfr. S. III. q. 16. a. 5. ad 3, et q. 52. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

**III.** Quoad seq. (3.) quaestionem multi antiqui Scholastici conveniunt in opinione, quod intercesserint horae 40 a morte Christi ad momentum resurrectionis (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 23. m. 5. q. incid.); alii cum S. Bonav. computant horas 36; item docent, quod Salvator probabilius non prius resurrexerit quam in aurora. De diversis circa hanc rem opinionibus antiquorum vide hic pag. 457, nota 9; de difficultatibus exegeticis respectu harum aliarumque quaestionum, quae tempus passionis et resurrectionis respiciunt, consule etiam auctores recentiores. De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 20. m. 3. a. 1-3. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 21. q. 2. a. I. 2; S. III. q. 53. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 21. q. 3. a. I. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The *Ubiquist* error, springing from the sources of Eutyches, or from a misunderstood doctrine of the communication of idioms, and once widely diffused among the Protestants, was already condemned in the year 787 by the Seventh Ecumenical Synod (Session 8) with this anathema: «If anyone does not confess that Christ, our God, is circumscribed (περιγραπτόν) according to his humanity, let him be anathema». — The primary argument of the Ubiquists is exploded here in the solution to the first [objection]. — But the principal question of the Scholastics in this place turns only on the truth of the expression, or of certain locutions pertaining to it. They agree, moreover, in this, that the locution is false: Christ is man everywhere or everywhere man; but true: this man is everywhere. St. Thomas (here a. 2) does not entirely reject even the locution: Christ, insofar as he is man, is everywhere, namely insofar as it imports the truth of the supposit, but not insofar as it imports the truth of the nature. — The reason which St. Bonaventure here adduces is expressed by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. I, a. 2) thus: «The term *man*, on the side of the subject, supposits for the *person*, on the side of the predicate for the *nature*, because in the predicate there is place for the form by reason of the inherence of the predicate in the subject». — The solution to the second [objection] is confirmed by St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 49, reply to obj. 3): «The hypostasis is not extended beyond the limits of that nature *from which it has subsistence*. But the Word of God does not have subsistence from the human nature, but rather draws the human nature to its own subsistence or personality; for it subsists not *through it*, but *in it*. Hence nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature, assumed by the Word of God, is not everywhere» (cf. here dubium 3, at the end). — On the communication of idioms and on the rule that the attributes of one nature cannot be predicated of the other taken in the abstract, cf. above d. 6, a. I, q. I, especially at obj. 6, d. 7, 8 *passim*, d. 11, a. 2, q. I; St. Thomas, *Summa* III, q. 16, a. 4-6.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 19, m. 5. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; cf. *Summa* III, q. 16, a. 5, ad 3, and q. 52, a. 1-3. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. — Richard of Middleton, here a. I, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

**III.** As to the following (3rd) question, many ancient Scholastics agree in the opinion that 40 hours intervened from the death of Christ to the moment of the resurrection (cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 23, m. 5, q. incid.); others with St. Bonaventure reckon 36 hours; likewise they teach that the Savior more probably did not rise before the dawn. On the various opinions of the ancients concerning this matter, see here p. 457, note 9; on the exegetical difficulties with respect to these and other questions which regard the time of the passion and resurrection, consult also more recent authors. On this 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 20, m. 3, a. 1-3. — St. Thomas, *III Sent.* d. 21, q. 2, a. I, 2; *Summa* III, q. 53, a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, *III Sent.* d. 21, q. 3, a. I, 2. — Richard of Middleton, *III Sent.* d. 21, a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here the single question.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.454–456 (PDF 476–478; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 31559–31732. Per the Vol II/III override, the PDF bands are authoritative for the cascade-shattered Respondeo, Solutiones, footers, and the scholion; OCR is base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing.

**Opener alignment VERIFIED.** Opener (raw 31562) reads *Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus, secundum quod homo, fuerit in loco determinato, an ubique* = TRACTATIO q2. This is q2, not q3 (q3 = QUAESTIO III raw 31733, *Tertio quaeritur de quiete corporis in sepulcro*). q2 body = raw 31559–31732.

**Scholion finding — HAND-OFF CORRECTION.** The prior hand-off predicted `has_scholion: false`. **This is WRONG: q2 HAS a scholion (§I–III), set `has_scholion: true`.** The SCHOLION (OCR `SCHOJLION.`) prints at raw 31705 (PDF p.456, below a rule under the body), confirmed on the p.456 L-1/L-2/R-0 bands. §I = the Ubiquist error + the *de re/de sermone* doctrine (St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, SCG IV c.49); §II = parallel-author list for q2; §III = forward-looks to q3 (the 40-vs-36-hour triduum reckoning). The scholion carries inline doctor-citations only — **no numbered footnote markers** in scholion text. Body-then-scholion order observed.

**Page-split map (per-page footnote restart):**
- **p.454** (raw 31559–31650): *videtur* 1–4 + *sed contra* 1–4 + arg 5–6 + Conclusio + Respondeo opening. Footnotes nn.1–10 (left col nn.1–5, right col nn.6–10). n.10 (Innocentius) runs over onto the top of p.455's left footer.
- **p.455** (raw 31650–31700): Respondeo *de sermone* + Solutiones ad 1, ad 2, ad 3, ad 4, ad 5 (opening). Footnotes nn.1–7 (left col nn.1–3, right col nn.4–7); marker n.5 is in the *de sermone* body, nn.1–4, 6–7 in the solutiones.
- **p.456** (raw 31700–31732): Solutio ad 5 (tail) + ad 6 + Scholion §I–III. **Only footnote n.1** (`Vide solut. ad 4.`, keyed to *ad unam* in the ad-5 tail) belongs to q2; p.456's footer nn.2–5 belong to QUAESTIO III (which opens further down p.456) and were NOT captured here.

**Page breaks.** p.454→455 mid-Respondeo (*…secundum quod dicit Innocentius[^p454-10],* | *scilicet quod Christus dicitur esse alicubi sacramentaliter…*); p.455→456 mid-Solutio-ad-5 (*…dicendum, quod non est simile,* | *quia pluribus de causis potest ista verificari…*).

**Footers migrating IN: none** — per the prior hand-off, q1's last footers are on p.453 and were fully captured in the a1-q1 promotion. q2 opens fresh on p.454.
**Footers migrating OUT: none migrate to q3** — p.456 nn.2–5 (q3's) stay with q3; this chunk takes only p.456 n.1.

**Marginal sigla trimmed** (editorial, not Bonaventure's text): *Fundamenta.* (videtur args) / *Ad oppositum.* (sed contra) / *Quaestio io[…] intelligitur dupliciter.* / *Conclusio 1.* / *Corollarium.* / *Quaestio de locutione.* / *Distinctio.* / *Conclusio 2.* / *Conclusio 3.* / *Solutio oppositorum.* / *Notandum.* (×several) / *Simile.* / *Distinctio notanda.* / *Tres causae veritatis.*

**[?] flags:** none. Seam IN (q1 scholion §II … *Biel, hic q. unica* raw 31558 → QUAESTIO II raw 31559) CLEAN; seam OUT (q2 scholion §III → QUAESTIO III raw 31733) CLEAN.

**J2 2026-07-13:** `[^p455-4]` was missing from the English body; inserted after "accompany" in Solutio ad 2, mirroring the Latin marker's position after *concomitantur*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0