site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 4, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum possint stare simul trinitas et infinitas.*

Deinde quaeritur, utrum possint simul stare trinitas et infinitas sive immensitas[^p84-2]. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur sic.

1. Quia creatura est finita, quidquid est in ea est finitum: ergo cum divinum esse sit immensum, quidquid est in eo est actu infinitum; sed in divinis est numerus sive pluralitas personarum: ergo necesse est, quod se protendat ad infinitatem: non ergo stat in trinitate.

2. Item, cum sit duplex infinitas, scilicet *virtualis* et *numeralis*[^p84-3], impossibile est, divinum *esse* carere infinitate *virtutis*: ergo pari ratione, si in Deo ponimus veram pluralitatem, sicut et veram virtutem; ergo necesse est, ipsam habere infinitatem.

3. Item, virtus omnino infinita, cum emanat secundum omnem modum suae potestatis et infinitatis, emanat infinite per omnem modum[^p84-4]; sed divina virtus est sic infinita et secundum omnem modum suae infinitatis emanat in productione personarum: ergo idem quod prius.

4. Item, persona producens duas aut *potest* plures producere, aut *non potest*. Si *non potest*: ergo producendo amittit *posse*; si vero *potest*: ergo aut non est summae liberalitatis, aut necesse est producere ita, quod non sit stare.

5. Item, si lux solis esset immensa, generaret ex se infinitos splendores: ergo cum lux aeterna sit immensa, et splendor ex ipsa procedens sit vera persona[^p84-5]; necesse est, ibi esse personarum infinitatem: ergo non stant simul trinitas et infinitas.

6. Item, aut productio personarum *attestatur virtuti*, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo non debet poni in summe virtuoso; si *sic*: ergo maior plurificatio maiori virtuti, et maxima maximae, et infinita infinitae: non ergo stat trinitas cum infinitate.

7. Item, si divina virtus esset in sua omnimoda actualitate respectu productionis creaturarum, necesse esset, ipsam producere infinitas creaturas: ergo cum sic sit respectu personarum, necesse est, si est infinita, quod producat infinitas personas.

8. Item, quia divinus intellectus est infinitus, necesse est, ipsum intelligere infinita: ergo cum divinum *dicere* sit infinitum, necesse est, quod dicat infinita; sed quot sunt dicta, tot sunt verba; quot verba, tot personae: ergo infinitae.

9. Item, ad hoc quod intellectus sit perfectus, non sufficit, quod intelligat se, sed etiam, quod intelligat se intelligere: ergo ad hoc, quod intellectus sit infinitae completionis; necesse est, quod super se reflectatur infinitis reflexionibus; sed intelligendo se generat verbum: ergo secunda reflexione secundum verbum, et sic in infinitum: ergo si est ponere in Deo infinitatem, non ergo trinitatem.

10. Item, aut Deus *potest* plures tribus personis intelligere, aut *non potest*. Si *non potest*: ergo intellectus eius finitus est et limitatus; si *potest* plures intelligere; sed nihil intelligitur, quod non sit aliquo modo vel in se vel in suo principio proximo vel remoto: ergo necesse est, aut divinum *intelligere* limitatum esse, aut plures tribus personis ponere circa divinum *esse*, vel actualiter, vel potentialiter.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Summa immensitas non tollit summam perfectionem virtutis producentis, nec per modum naturae, nec per modum voluntatis seu liberalitatis[^p84-6], igitur nec summam perfectionem productionis; sed perfectio productionis necessario requirit statum sicut a parte principii, ita a parte termini; sed non esset status, si procederet in infinitum: ergo summa infinitas *esse* divini non ponit infinitatem in personis.

2. Item, infinitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem ordinis — non enim sequitur, quodsi Deus est infinitus, quod propter hoc sit inordinatus — sed ordo perfectionis necessario ponit primum, medium et ultimum[^p84-7]; ubi autem haec sunt, non est innumerabilitas, sed tantum trinitas: ergo etc.

3. Item, infinitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem connexionis, hoc enim facit ad summam dilectionem; sed connexio perfecta non potest esse, nisi una persona immediate procedat ab alia, alioquin non est

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germanitas summa; sed haec non procedit ultra ternarium[^p85-1]: ergo etc.

4. Item, immensitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem beatitudinis; sed cuiuslibet personae cognitio est de essentia beatitudinis[^p85-2]: ergo si creatura non potest simul et semel cognoscere personas infinitas, impossibile est, aliquam animam unquam in Deo esse beatam: si ergo stat immensitas cum beatitudinis perfectione, stat cum personarum pluralitate. Sed nulla pluralitas magis competit animae beatificabili quam trinitas: ergo etc.

5. Item, infinitas divini *esse* non excludit unitatem essentiae; est enim Deus unus et immensus: si ergo magis recedit ab immensitate unitas quam pluralitas quantumcumque parva; si immensitas potest stare cum unitate, multo magis potest stare cum trinitate.

6. Item, immensitas[^p85-3] divini *esse* non excludit simplicitatem naturae: si ergo plus repugnat immensitati omnimoda simplicitas quam quantulacumque pluralitas; si infinitas stat cum simplicitate, multo fortius stabit cum trinitate.

7. Item, infinitas divini *esse* non excludit proprietatem personae, ergo nec veram distinctionem earundem: ergo non ponit confusionem; sed ubi numerositas infinita, ibi confusio; ubi confusio, ibi indistinctio: quodsi hoc non est ponere in *esse* divino, stat ergo personarum pluralitas in numero finito: ergo trinitati infinitas non repugnat in Deo.

8. Item, infinitas divini *esse* non *excludit* causalitatem secundum triplex genus causae, scilicet efficientis, formalis et finalis; nec *ponit* plures modos causalitatis in Deo infinitas, quae est in ipso: ergo si potest stare cum triplici genere causae, potest etiam pariter stare cum trinitate personae, maxime cum sit correspondentia horum ad invicem secundum appropriationem potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis, quae respondent tribus personis et triplici modo causandi[^p85-4].

9. Item, infinitas divini *esse* non excludit conformitatem Creatoris et creaturae secundum duplicem repraesentationem, scilicet vestigii et imaginis: si ergo in imagine fit repraesentatio distinctionis et originis divinarum personarum, secundum correspondentiam personarum; si in Trinitate essent infinitae personae, deberent in imagine esse infinitae; quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat, quod trinitas personarum non repugnat immensitati divinae[^p85-5].

10. Item, immensitas divini *esse* non excludit habitationem Dei in mente per Spiritus sancti donationem[^p85-6]; sed si infinitae essent personae producentes et productae; cum quaelibet persona producens mittat et donet productam, tunc ergo in unius animae gratificatione necesse esset, quod inciderent infinitae personae inter animam gratificatam et personam primo mittentem seu gratificantem. Si ergo non contingit infinita pertransire, impossibile esset, quod anima per gratificationem in primum principium rediret, si esset infinitas personarum: cum ergo immensitas Dei stet cum inhabitatione gratiae, in qua Filius, qui est imago Patris, per Spiritus sancti donum et nexum nos reducit ad Patrem; stat igitur ipsa immensitas circa *esse* divinum cum trinitate personarum.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*In Deo simul stat summa infinitas cum personarum trinitate.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod absque dubio simul stant in Deo summa infinitas et personarum pluralitas; et hoc patet sic.

Infinitas ponitur in Deo non per *defectum*, sed per *excessum*, excessum, inquam, non *superfluitatis*, sed *perfectionis* et nobilitatis[^p85-7]. Quia igitur infinitas in Deo non ponit superfluitatem vel diminutionem, sed summam perfectionem; ideo in emanatione divinarum personarum est ponere immensitatem quantum ad *producentem* et *productum* et *producendi modum*, non autem infinitatem quantum ad *numerum*. Si enim infinitae secundum *numerum* essent personae in divinis, haec infinitas necessario induceret *defectum*, aut *superfluitatem*. Cum enim sint duo modi nobiles emanandi, per modum *naturae* et per modum *liberalitatis*[^p85-8]; aut duae personae his modis emanantes non perfecte caperent totam producentis virtutis immensitatem, et ita essent *imperfectae*; aut si caperent, aliae *superabundarent*. Quodsi in divino *esse*, eo ipso quod immensum est, impossibile est, aliquid esse superfluum aut diminutum: necesse est ponere Deum trinum et immensum.

*Rursus*, quia infinitas divini *esse* ponit immensitatem ex parte *producentis* et *producti* et *modi producendi*; sicut divinum *esse*, quia immensum, non potest esse geminatum, sed unum solum, ita necesse est, in divinis unam solam esse paternitatem, unam solam filiationem, unam solam processionem, et ita unum solum Patrem, unum solum Filium, unum solum Spiritum sanctum; ac per hoc necesse

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est ponere Deum immensum et trinum. Sicut autem, si plures essent dii, neuter haberet in se totius immensitatem divinitatis, immo partem omnipotentiae et nobilitatis; ita si plures patres, neuter haberet immensitatem paternitatis; si plures filii, nullus immensitatem filiationis, sed secundum partem. Si enim quilibet haberet totam paternitatis plenitudinem et immensitatem, non posset esse in eis nisi una paternitas, sicut in pluribus personis non potest esse nisi una deitas. Restat igitur, quodsi in divino *esse* vera est infinitas et vera pluralitas, ut pluralitas per infinitatem protendi non valeat ultra trinitatem, secundum quod asserit pia fides.

*Postremo*, quia illa infinitas dicit completionem omnimodam, hinc est, quod non excludit perfectionem virtutis, ordinis, connexionis, beatitudinis, repraesentationis et inhabitationis. Et quoniam haec omnia trinitatem necessario dant intelligi in tribus personis, sicut patet ex prius obiectis[^p86-1]; manifestum est, quod summa immensitas in nullo repugnat, sed consonat cum trinitate aeterna. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod sicut in creatura, quia finita, quidquid est ibi est finitum, ita debet esse in Deo, quod quidquid est in ipso ratione infinitatis debet esse infinitum; dicendum, quod, sicut iam tactum est, divino *esse* competit infinitas *virtutis* et *dignitatis*, non *molis* seu *numerositatis*; et talis infinitas reperitur tam in essentia quam in personis, sive producentibus, sive productis, sive in se ipsis, sive in emanationibus suis; quod totum reperitur perfecte et integre in tribus personis: et ideo non oportet, eas ad infinitatem numerositatis protendi ratione infinitatis *esse* divini[^p86-2].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potest carere infinitate virtutis etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile de hac infinitate et de illa: quia, cum magnitudo *virtutis* dicat potius accessum ad simplicitatem quam recessum, multitudo vero *numerositatis* dicat recessum ab uno et simplici; et Deus et divinum *esse* sic sit immensum, quod simul cum hoc est simplex et summe unum: hinc est, quod competit sibi infinitas *virtutis*, non autem *numerositatis*[^p86-3] personalis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus omnino infinita, cum secundum omnem modum potestatis emanat infinite, per omnem modum se diffundit; dicendum, quod cum simul maneat in Deo perfectio cum infinitate, illud veritatem habet de omni modo emanationis et diffusionis, qui competit perfectioni summae; hoc autem est secundum duplicem modum producendi perfectum, scilicet naturae et liberalitatis, quorum utrumque necesse est esse unicum in se ipso, non geminatum nec bis nec ter, nedum procedat in infinitum, quia[^p86-4] hoc induceret superabundantiam et defectum, sicut in praecedentibus fuit ostensum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona producens duas, aut potest plures producere, aut non; dicendum, quod *non posse ultra illas duas producere* non dicit potentiae defectum, sed potius complementum: quia in illis duabus productionibus virtus productiva perfectissime et infinitissime se manifestat tum quantum ad immensitatem personarum productarum, tum quantum ad actualitatem ipsarum productionum; quia eodem modo et non aliter virtus generativa et spirativa in Patre actualitatem habet in generando et spirando, per quem modum habuit ab aeterno. Sicut enim splendor continue manat a sole, sic Filius, qui est *splendor Patris*[^p86-5], immo multo excellentius continue manat a Patre.

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si lux solis esset immensa, generaret ex se infinitos splendores; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia splendor manans a sole nec est omnino perfectus nec aequatur suae origini; et ideo non capit intra se ex unica productione totam virtutem et claritatem lucis irradiativae, immo secundum gradus approximationis et elongationis secundum plus et minus sapit et capit de plenitudine lucis fontalis. Secus autem est in Filio, qui est verbum Patris et splendor perfectissimus, per omnia Patri aequalis, accipiens a Patre totum, quod Pater habet intra se: et ideo, sicut infinitas lucis aeternae non tollit adaequationem cum splendore aeterno ab ipsa emanante, sic non introducit infinitam splendorum multiplicationem, cum unicus splendor totam illam immensitatem capiat intra se[^p86-6].

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi divina virtus esset in omnimoda sua actualitate respectu creaturarum, quod produceret infinitas etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ratione: tum quia creatura finita est, et ideo nulla ex aequo respondet virtuti producenti; tum quia creatura essentialiter distinguitur a producente, et etiam ab aliis creaturis secundum distinctionem in suis principiis intrinsecis et accidentibus coaffixis; non sic autem est in divinis personis, tum quia producta est infinita, sicut producens, tum quia non distinguuntur essentia, sed origine[^p86-7]: et ideo, cum duae tantum sint origines, distinctae et distinctivae, duae tantum sunt et intelligi possunt personae emanantes, in quibus sufficientissime relucet immensitas virtutis fontalis productivae.

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8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divinus intellectus intelligit infinita, cum sit infinitus; dicendum, quod licet Deus infinita intelligat, se ipso uno omnia comprehendit, quia intelligendo se intelligit omnia; sic etiam, licet dicat multa, uno tamen Verbo omnia dicit. Nam eodem Verbo, quo Pater dicit se, dicit quaecumque dicit[^p87-1]; nam Pater se ipsum intelligendo intellectu completissimo et unico, in quo intellectus adaequatur intelligenti, et e converso, Verbum generat, quod est Patris similitudo per omnia aequalis cum ipso. Unde sicut Pater intelligendo se intelligit quidquid potest intelligere; sic dicendo Verbum dicit quidquid potest dicere et quidquid dici potest in deitate. Unde nec ipse aliud verbum dicere potest, nec aliqua persona in Trinitate, pro eo quod illo dicitur quidquid dici potest. — Et *si tu obiicias*, quod sicut Deus habet infinitas rationes respectu intelligibilium, quod similiter infinita debet habere verba; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *ratio* et *idea* dicunt respectum et similitudinem intelligibilium creandorum et producendorum seu possibilium produci, quae multiformiter et innumerabiliter sunt possibilia multiplicari; *verbum* autem dicit respectum ad dicentem et ad primum intellectum et summum principium, cuius est hypostatica similitudo: et ideo nullo modo, nec re nec intellectu, competit ei multitudo, sicut nec primo principio primo et principaliter a se ipso intellecto[^p87-2].

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus infinitae completionis reflectitur supra se infinitis reflexionibus etc.; dicendum, quod in divino intellectu idem est *intelligere* et *intelligere se intelligere*, etsi millies et infinities iteraretur *intelligere*, pro eo quod in Deo idem est intelligens et intellectum et actus intelligendi; et ideo primus ipse actus, quo se Deus Pater intelligit, est actualissimus et completissimus, sicut et Verbum illi correspondens: et ideo non est necesse ex hoc introducere in divinis verborum pluralitatem. Secus autem est in intellectu creato, cuius actus et operatio differt ab intelligente et intellecto, et ideo multiplicari potest et iterari et numerari magis et magis ex frequenti conversione intellectus super se ipsum *intelligentem* et super suum *intelligere* nec non et super alia a se.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod aut Deus potest plures personas intelligere, aut non; dicendum, quod *non posse plures personas intelligere*, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: aut propter intellectus *limitationem in actu intelligendi*, aut propter *rectitudinem iudicii* et impossibilitatem declinandi a via[^p87-3] veritatis. Primo modo non competit intellectui divino, cum sit immensus, sed secundo modo competit. Unde quod plures personas intelligere non possit, hoc est, quia talis intellectus, licet videatur in intelligendo potens, secundum rem tamen hoc intelligendo declinat a veritate et incidit in errorem. Unde sicut immensitas *veritatis* est omnino impermixta falsitati, sic et immensitas *lucis* intelligentis reddit intellectum divinum ab omni errore penitus alienum; propter quod nec aliquid maius se nec alium Deum nec pluralitatem personarum ultra numerum trinum capit divinus intellectus, non quia limitatus, sed quia perfectissime infinitus. — Et ex his patet solutio ad totum.

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english:
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and infinity can stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and infinity, or immensity, can stand together[^p84-2]. And that they are incompossible seems to follow thus.

1. Because a creature is finite, whatever is in it is finite: therefore, since the divine being is immense, whatever is in it is actually infinite; but in the divine there is number, or a plurality of persons: therefore it is necessary that this extend itself to infinity: therefore it does not stop at trinity.

2. Again, since infinity is twofold, namely *of power* and *of number*[^p84-3], it is impossible that the divine *being* should lack infinity *of power*: therefore by the same reasoning, if we place in God a true plurality, as we do a true power; therefore it is necessary that that plurality too have infinity.

3. Again, a power altogether infinite, when it emanates according to every mode of its own potency and infinity, emanates infinitely through every mode[^p84-4]; but the divine power is infinite in this way, and according to every mode of its infinity it emanates in the production of the persons: therefore the same as before.

4. Again, a person producing two either *can* produce more, or *cannot*. If it *cannot*: then by producing it loses its *power*; but if it *can*: then either it is not of the highest liberality, or it must produce in such a way that there is no stopping.

5. Again, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate out of itself infinite radiances: therefore, since the eternal light is immense, and the radiance proceeding from it is a true person[^p84-5]; it is necessary that there be there an infinity of persons: therefore trinity and infinity do not stand together.

6. Again, either the production of the persons *bears witness to power*, or it *does not*. If it *does not*: then it ought not to be placed in the one supremely powerful; if it *does*: then a greater multiplication answers to a greater power, and the greatest to the greatest, and an infinite to an infinite: therefore trinity does not stand with infinity.

7. Again, if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to the production of creatures, it would be necessary that it produce infinite creatures: therefore since it is so with respect to the persons, it is necessary, if it is infinite, that it produce infinite persons.

8. Again, because the divine understanding is infinite, it is necessary that it understand infinite things: therefore, since the divine *saying* is infinite, it is necessary that it say infinite things; but as many as are the things said, so many are the words; as many words, so many persons: therefore infinite persons.

9. Again, for an understanding to be perfect, it does not suffice that it understand itself, but also that it understand itself understanding: therefore for an understanding to be of infinite completeness, it is necessary that it be reflected upon itself by infinite reflections; but by understanding itself it generates a word: therefore by a second reflection a second word, and so on to infinity: therefore if infinity is to be placed in God, trinity is not.

10. Again, either God *can* understand more persons than three, or he *cannot*. If he *cannot*: then his understanding is finite and limited; if he *can* understand more; but nothing is understood which is not in some way either in itself or in its principle, proximate or remote: therefore it is necessary either that the divine *understanding* be limited, or that more than three persons be placed about the divine *being*, either actually or potentially.

Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀʀʏ: 1. The highest immensity does not take away the highest perfection of the producing power, neither by way of nature nor by way of will or liberality[^p84-6], therefore neither the highest perfection of production; but the perfection of production necessarily requires a stopping-point on the side of the term as well as on the side of the principle; but there would be no stopping-point if it proceeded to infinity: therefore the highest infinity of the divine *being* does not place infinity in the persons.

2. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of order — for it does not follow that if God is infinite he is on that account disordered — but the order of perfection necessarily places a first, a middle and a last[^p84-7]; and where these are, there is no innumerability, but only trinity: therefore etc.

3. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of connection, for this makes for the highest love; but a perfect connection cannot be unless one person proceeds immediately from another, otherwise there is no

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highest kinship; but this does not proceed beyond a threefold[^p85-1]: therefore etc.

4. Again, immensity in God does not take away the perfection of beatitude; but the knowledge of each person belongs to the essence of beatitude[^p85-2]: therefore if a creature cannot know infinite persons at once and at one stroke, it is impossible that any soul should ever be beatified in God: if therefore immensity stands with the perfection of beatitude, it stands with a plurality of persons. But no plurality is more fitting to a soul capable of beatitude than trinity: therefore etc.

5. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the unity of the essence; for God is one and immense: if therefore unity recedes further from immensity than does a plurality, however small; if immensity can stand with unity, much more can it stand with trinity.

6. Again, the immensity[^p85-3] of the divine *being* does not exclude the simplicity of the nature: if therefore an every-way simplicity is more repugnant to immensity than a plurality however slight; if infinity stands with simplicity, much more strongly will it stand with trinity.

7. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the property of a person, therefore neither the true distinction of the persons: therefore it does not place confusion; but where there is infinite numerosity, there is confusion; where there is confusion, there is indistinction: and if this is not to be placed in the divine *being*, then a plurality of persons stands in a finite number: therefore infinity is not repugnant to trinity in God.

8. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not *exclude* causality according to the threefold genus of cause, namely efficient, formal and final; nor does the infinity which is in him *place* several modes of causality in God: therefore if it can stand with the threefold genus of cause, it can equally stand with a trinity of person as well, especially since there is a correspondence of these to one another according to the appropriation of power, wisdom and goodness, which answer to the three persons and to the threefold mode of causing[^p85-4].

9. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the conformity of Creator and creature according to a twofold representation, namely of vestige and of image: if therefore in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons, according to a correspondence of persons; if in the Trinity there were infinite persons, they would have to be infinite in the image; and if this is impossible, it remains that a trinity of persons is not repugnant to the divine immensity[^p85-5].

10. Again, the immensity of the divine *being* does not exclude the indwelling of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy Spirit[^p85-6]; but if the persons producing and produced were infinite; since any producing person sends and gives the one produced, then in the making-gracious of a single soul it would be necessary that infinite persons fall between the soul made gracious and the person first sending or making gracious. If therefore it does not happen that infinite things are traversed, it would be impossible that the soul return through grace into the first principle, if there were an infinity of persons: since therefore the immensity of God stands with the indwelling of grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, leads us back to the Father through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit; that immensity therefore stands about the divine *being* together with a trinity of persons.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏɴ.

*In God the highest infinity stands together with a trinity of persons.*

I ʀᴇᴘʟʏ: It must be said that without doubt the highest infinity and a plurality of persons stand together in God; and this is clear as follows.

Infinity is placed in God not by *defect*, but by *excess* — an excess, I say, not of *superfluity*, but of *perfection* and nobility[^p85-7]. Since therefore infinity in God does not place superfluity or diminution, but the highest perfection; therefore in the emanation of the divine persons immensity is to be placed with respect to the *producer* and the *produced* and the *mode of producing*, but not infinity with respect to *number*. For if the persons in the divine were infinite according to *number*, this infinity would necessarily introduce *defect* or *superfluity*. For since there are two noble modes of emanating, by way of *nature* and by way of *liberality*[^p85-8]; either the two persons emanating in these modes would not perfectly take in the whole immensity of the producer's power, and so they would be *imperfect*; or if they did take it in, the others would *superabound*. And if in the divine *being*, by the very fact that it is immense, it is impossible that anything be superfluous or diminished: it is necessary to place God as three and immense.

*Again*, since the infinity of the divine *being* places immensity on the side of the *producer* and of the *produced* and of the *mode of producing*; just as the divine *being*, because immense, cannot be doubled, but is one alone, so it is necessary that in the divine there be one sole paternity, one sole filiation, one sole procession, and thus one sole Father, one sole Son, one sole Holy Spirit; and by this it is necessary

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to place God immense and three. But just as, if there were several gods, neither would have in himself the immensity of the whole godhead, but rather a part of the omnipotence and nobility; so if there were several fathers, neither would have the immensity of paternity; if several sons, none would have the immensity of filiation, but only according to a part. For if each one had the whole plenitude and immensity of paternity, there could be in them only one paternity, just as in several persons there can be only one deity. It remains therefore that if in the divine *being* there is a true infinity and a true plurality, the plurality cannot be extended by infinity beyond trinity, according to what pious faith asserts.

*Lastly*, because that infinity states an every-way completeness, hence it is that it does not exclude the perfection of power, of order, of connection, of beatitude, of representation and of indwelling. And since all these necessarily give trinity to be understood in three persons, as is clear from what was objected earlier[^p86-1]; it is manifest that the highest immensity is in nothing repugnant to, but consonant with, the eternal trinity. — And therefore the reasons for that side are to be conceded.

1. To what is objected on the contrary, that just as in a creature, because it is finite, whatever is there is finite, so it must be in God that whatever is in him by reason of infinity must be infinite; it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, there belongs to the divine *being* an infinity *of power* and *of dignity*, not *of mass* or *of numerosity*; and such an infinity is found as much in the essence as in the persons, whether producing or produced, whether in themselves or in their emanations; all of which is found perfectly and entirely in three persons: and therefore it is not necessary that they be extended to an infinity of numerosity by reason of the infinity of the divine *being*[^p86-2].

2. To what is objected, that God cannot lack an infinity of power etc.; it must be said that this infinity and that are not alike: because, since magnitude *of power* states rather an approach to simplicity than a receding from it, whereas a multitude *of numerosity* states a receding from the one and the simple; and God and the divine *being* are immense in such a way that together with this it is simple and supremely one: hence it is that an infinity *of power* belongs to him, but not one of personal *numerosity*[^p86-3].

3. To what is objected, that a power altogether infinite, since according to every mode of potency it emanates infinitely, diffuses itself through every mode; it must be said that, since perfection remains in God together with infinity, that holds true of every mode of emanation and diffusion which belongs to the highest perfection; and this is according to the twofold mode of producing perfectly, namely of nature and of liberality, each of which must be unique in itself, not doubled, neither twice nor three times, much less proceeding to infinity, because[^p86-4] this would introduce superabundance and defect, as was shown in what precedes.

4. To what is objected, that a person producing two either can produce more, or not; it must be said that *not being able to produce beyond those two* does not state a defect of potency, but rather its completion: because in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and most infinitely, both as regards the immensity of the persons produced and as regards the actuality of the productions themselves; because in the same way and not otherwise the generative and spirative power in the Father has actuality in generating and spirating, in which mode it had it from eternity. For just as radiance continually flows from the sun, so the Son, who is the *radiance of the Father*[^p86-5], but far more excellently, continually flows from the Father.

5. 6. To what is objected, that if the light of the sun were immense it would generate out of itself infinite radiances; it must be said that it is not alike: because the radiance flowing from the sun is neither altogether perfect nor equal to its origin; and therefore it does not take into itself from a single production the whole power and clarity of the irradiating light, but rather according to the degrees of nearness and distance it tastes and takes more or less of the fullness of the fontal light. But it is otherwise in the Son, who is the word of the Father and the most perfect radiance, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father the whole of what the Father has within himself: and therefore, just as the infinity of the eternal light does not take away its adequation with the eternal radiance emanating from it, so it does not introduce an infinite multiplication of radiances, since a single radiance takes that whole immensity into itself[^p86-6].

7. To what is objected, that if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to creatures, it would produce infinite creatures etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason: both because a creature is finite, and therefore none answers on equal terms to the producing power; and because a creature is essentially distinguished from its producer, and also from other creatures, by a distinction in its intrinsic principles and in the accidents fastened to them; but it is not so in the divine persons, both because what is produced is infinite, as is the producer, and because they are not distinguished by essence, but by origin[^p86-7]: and therefore, since there are only two origins, distinct and distinguishing, there are and can be understood only two emanating persons, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines out most sufficiently.

<!-- page 87 -->

8. To what is objected, that the divine understanding understands infinite things, since it is infinite; it must be said that although God understands infinite things, he comprehends all things by his one self, because in understanding himself he understands all things; so also, although he says many things, yet by one Word he says all things. For by the same Word by which the Father says himself, he says whatever he says[^p87-1]; for the Father, understanding himself by a most complete and single understanding, in which the understanding is made equal to the one understanding, and conversely, generates the Word, which is the likeness of the Father in all things equal to himself. Hence just as the Father in understanding himself understands whatever he can understand, so in saying the Word he says whatever he can say and whatever can be said in the godhead. Hence neither can he say another word, nor can any person in the Trinity, for the reason that in that Word is said whatever can be said. — And *if you object* that, just as God has infinite ideas with respect to the intelligibles, so likewise he must have infinite words; it must be said that it is not alike: because *reason* and *idea* state a relation and likeness to intelligibles to be created and produced, or possible to be produced, which are in manifold and innumerable ways able to be multiplied; whereas a *word* states a relation to the one saying and to the first understanding and highest principle, of which it is the hypostatic likeness: and therefore in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, does multitude belong to it, just as it does not belong to the first principle understood first and principally by itself[^p87-2].

9. To what is objected, that an understanding of infinite completeness is reflected upon itself by infinite reflections etc.; it must be said that in the divine understanding *to understand* and *to understand oneself understanding* are the same, even if *to understand* were repeated a thousand times and infinitely, for the reason that in God the one understanding and the thing understood and the act of understanding are the same; and therefore that first act by which God the Father understands himself is most actual and most complete, as is also the Word corresponding to it: and therefore it is not necessary on this account to introduce a plurality of words in the divine. But it is otherwise in a created understanding, whose act and operation differs from the one understanding and from the thing understood, and therefore it can be multiplied and repeated and numbered more and more by the frequent turning of the understanding upon itself *understanding* and upon its own *understanding*, and also upon things other than itself.

10. To what is objected last, that either God can understand more persons, or not; it must be said that *not being able to understand more persons* can be understood in two ways: either on account of a *limitation of the understanding in the act of understanding*, or on account of the *rectitude of judgement* and the impossibility of turning aside from the way[^p87-3] of truth. In the first way it does not belong to the divine understanding, since it is immense, but in the second way it does belong. Hence that it cannot understand more persons is because such an understanding, although it seem powerful in understanding, in fact by so understanding turns aside from truth and falls into error. Hence, just as the immensity of *truth* is altogether unmixed with falsity, so also the immensity of the understanding *light* renders the divine understanding wholly a stranger to every error; on account of which the divine understanding takes in neither anything greater than itself, nor another God, nor a plurality of persons beyond the number three — not because it is limited, but because it is most perfectly infinite. — And from these things the solution to the whole is clear.

---

la: De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. et 4.

en: On this question compare I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 3 and 4.

la: Vide supra pag. 35, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 35, note 2.

la: In I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. arg. 3. ad oppos. dicitur: non tantum producit infinitum *intensive*, sed etiam *extensive*. — Pro *potestatis* G *possibilitatis*, omisso *et infinitatis*.

en: In I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 3, argument 3 of the opposing series it is said: it produces an infinite not only *intensively*, but also *extensively*. — For *potestatis* G has *possibilitatis*, omitting *et infinitatis*.

la: Hebr. 1, 3: [Qui Filius] cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius etc.

en: Hebrews 1:3: "[The Son] who, being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance," etc.

la: De hoc duplici *modo* productionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6, et de *statu* in productione vide supra pag. 12, nota 9.

en: On this twofold *mode* of production compare vol. I, p. 56, note 6, and on the *stopping-point* in production see above, p. 12, note 9.

la: Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. ad 6. — De ratione addita *maiori* vide supra pag. 82, nota 5.

en: Compare above, the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 1, ad 6. — On the reason added to the *major* see above, p. 82, note 5.

en: According to Richard of St. Victor, *On the Trinity* IV, c. 2 and following.

la: Cum tota bonitas, ut dicit S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. fundam. 4, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet personarum. — Ibid. q. 4. fundam. 1. et in corp. ostenditur, quod ad *beatitudinem* divinam tres personae requiruntur, et quod secundum trinitatem imaginis [animae] summa attenditur creaturae perfectio, scilicet beatitudo. Cfr. infra fundam. 9.

en: Since the whole goodness, as St. Bonaventure says, I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 3, fundamentum 4, which is the substantial reward, is in each of the persons. — Ibid., q. 4, fundamentum 1, and in the body it is shown that three persons are required for the divine *beatitude*, and that it is according to the trinity of the image [of the soul] that the highest perfection of the creature, namely beatitude, is regarded. Compare below, fundamentum 9.

la: D G H *infinitas*.

en: D G H read *infinitas*.

la: De quo vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. seq. et d. 34. q. 3.

en: On which see I *Sentences*, d. 3, p. I, dubium 3 and following, and d. 34, q. 3.

la: D *restat, quod infinitas personarum repugnat immensitati divinae*.

en: D reads *restat, quod infinitas personarum repugnat immensitati divinae*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. — Quod infinitum sit impertransibile, iam occurrit supra pag. 4, nota 2. et pag. 5, nota 7. — Inferius pro *inciderent* G *interciderent*.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1. — That an infinite is untraversable has already occurred above, p. 4, note 2, and p. 5, note 7. — Further down, for *inciderent* G has *interciderent*.

la: Vide quaest. praeced.

en: See the preceding question.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6.

en: Compare vol. I, p. 56, note 6.

la: Scilicet in fundamentis.

en: Namely in the *fundamenta*.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. et I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. ad 1, ubi etiam (in corp. et ad 3. 4.) tres seqq. solutiones insinuantur.

en: Compare the preceding question and I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 3, ad 1, where also (in the body and in ad 3 and 4) the three following solutions are intimated.

la: Ita A B, alii *numerositas*.

en: So A B; the others read *numerositas*.

la: A B omittunt *quia*.

en: A B omit *quia*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 5. — De ipsa solut. vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. et d. 9. q. 4.

en: Compare above, p. 84, note 5. — On the solution itself see I *Sentences*, d. 7, q. 2, and d. 9, q. 4.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. ad 4.

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 7, q. 2, ad 4.

en: As was said above, p. 75, note 7, out of Richard of St. Victor.

la: August., XI. Confess. c. 7. n. 9: Verbo Tibi coaeterno simul et sempiterne dicis omnia quae dicis etc. — Paulo inferius pro *intellectus adaequatur* B *intellectum adaequatur* (cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.).

en: Augustine, *Confessions* XI, c. 7, n. 9: "By a Word coeternal with thee thou sayest all that thou sayest at once and sempiternally," etc. — A little further down, for *intellectus adaequatur* B has *intellectum adaequatur* (compare vol. I, p. 707, note 5).

la: Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. ad 19.

en: See above, the *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 3, ad 19.

la: B E *regula*.

en: B E read *regula*. ---

translators_notes:
**Structure.** `ARTICULUS II.` stands **full measure across p. 84**, below the five lines in which Article I closes in the right column, with its italic subtitle *Utrum possint stare simul trinitas et infinitas* — **both unanchored**, the work's frozen heading rule holding for the eleventh and twelfth headings running. Then a one-sentence opener, which **is** anchored (*immensitas*²); **ten arguments** that trinity and infinity are incompossible, under the single marginale `Ad oppositum.` standing beside argument 1; a **`Contra`** series of **ten arguments**, printed as a running `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1.` in letter-spaced small caps **in-column**, under the single marginale `Fundamenta.`; **`CONCLUSIO`**, also in-column, with its two-line italic subtitle; a **`Respondeo`** in three declared moves (`Ratio 1.` on infinity as excess not defect · `Rursus` on the singleness of paternity, filiation and procession · `Postremo` gathering the six perfections the *Contra* series named); and **nine reply paragraphs answering the ten opening arguments**, 5 and 6 printed combined as `5. 6.`

⭐ **The replies answer the OPENING series, and that is checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam* — conceding the `Contra`/`Fundamenta` side — so the replies dispose of the ten arguments for incompossibility, and reply 1 opens *Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod sicut in creatura, quia finita…*, quoting argument 1 word for word. ⛔ **This is the inverse of `bon-qmt-q4-a1`, one chunk earlier, whose replies answered the `Contra` series** — and the two articles of a single question disagree. The pairing is taken from the replies' own quoted lemmata every time.

### ⛔⛔ THE SPAN IS pp. 84–87, NOT 84–85 — QUARACCHI'S OWN INDEX IS WRONG BY A LEAF AT ITS *START*

The banked prediction was `q4-a2 84–85`, the shortest unit in the work. **It is four printed pages.** Article II runs to the top of p. 87, closing *— Et ex his patet solutio ad totum.* about two-fifths down the right column, after which `QUAESTIO V.` stands full measure on the same leaf.

⚠⚠ **And the failure is a NEW class, because the index's derived END was not the thing that was wrong.** The frozen note says an index span's last page is the page on which the *next* unit's heading falls, which says nothing about where the previous unit ends — that is the `q2-a2` failure and it is a failure of *derivation*. Here the index's own printed number is wrong: the volume index (p. 582 of the volume, read at 8× on the plate) gives **`Art. I. Utrum divinum esse sit aeternum … 86`** for Quaestio V, and Quaestio V opens on **87**. The leaves are numbered 84, 85, 86, 87 in an unbroken run, every numeral surviving, and Article II's text runs continuously across all four. ⭐ **The raw band was exact where the page numbers were not**: the banked `L21831 → L22321` ends at *…patet solutio ad totum*, the article's last word, and `QUAESTIO V.` opens at L22322.

▶ **Consequence for `q5-a1`, and it is the only place this can be recorded:** its index page of **86 is wrong; it opens on 87**, and its index end of 93 is now doubly untrustworthy. ⛔ **The standing order — extract the last leaf alone and read it before pulling the rest — has now paid a FIFTH time, and this is the first time it caught an error of two leaves rather than one.** It is also the first time the index has been shown wrong about a unit's *first* page; until now only the derived last page was suspect. **Neither number in an index line is evidence. The raw band is.**

### ⚠⚠ A RULING VIOLATION IN THE TWO CHUNKS BEFORE THIS ONE, REPAIRED HERE

Ruling 5 (ratified at the *scientia Christi* work-close gate, 2026-09-05) is that **in the apparatus, `fundam. N` is retained as `fundamentum N` / `fundamenta N`**, on a corpus convention of ~135 sites against 4 exceptions. p. 85 n. 2 carries three of them (*fundam. 4*, *fundam. 1*, *infra fundam. 9*) and is the first place in this work the formula has been met.

⛔ **It had already been met twice, and both times it was Englished.** `bon-qmt-q3-a2` p. 75 n. 5 (*Art. 1. fundam. 6.*) and p. 77 n. 5 (*Vide supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 7.*) render "foundation 6" and "foundation 7"; `bon-qmt-q4-a1` p. 79 n. 11 (*II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3.*) renders "foundation 3". **All three repaired in place.**

⭐⭐ **The mechanism is worth more than the three fixes, because it will recur with any ruling carried between works.** The four chunks of this work that had **no** `fundam.` site all wrote a tracking line into their Notes — *Ruling 5 is not reached: the formula does not occur in this span's apparatus.* **The two chunks that actually met the site are the two that dropped the line.** A register line asserting that a ruling was not exercised is cheap to write when it is true and is silently omitted by exactly the chunk that has to obey it. ▶ **Turn the line round: a chunk that meets a reserved site must say so and quote its own rendering.** This chunk does, below.

### ⭐ BOUNDARY 8 (p. 87) MEASURED: IT FORWARDS, SPLIT 3/2 — AND BLOCK AND ANCHOR DIVIDE 1/4

Of p. 87's **five** register entries, **nn. 1–3 are this chunk's** — n. 1 on reply 8's *quaecumque dicit*¹, n. 2 on its close *a se ipso intellecto*², n. 3 on reply 10's *a via*³ — and **nn. 4–5 forward to `bon-qmt-q5-a1`**, pairing with Quaestio V's first argument (*Exodi decimo quinto*⁴, and *Vers. 18. — Seq. locus est Rom. 1, 20.*) and its third (Richard, *Libr. I. de Trin. c. 6. 8. et 11.*⁵).

⚠ **The left footer block holds n. 1 alone and the right block holds nn. 2–5**, so the block split is **1/4** against an anchor split of **3/2**. Read anchors, only anchors.

⭐ **n. 3 is the cleanest anchor confirmation the work has produced**, because the note is a variant and its lemma is the anchor word: `B E *regula*` sits on reply 10's *impossibilitatem declinandi a via*³ *veritatis*. **The register tells you where its own anchor is.**

▶ **Eight boundaries measured now, in SEVEN shapes: 5/1 · LEAF EDGE · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2.** ⛔ The ratio still carries no rule.

### ▶ THE INCOMING-LEAF TEST, RUN POSITIVELY ON ALL THREE LEAVES

Per the rule `bon-qmt-q4-a1` paid for on `q3-a2`: the register of every incoming leaf was read **from the top, before its first numeral**. **pp. 85, 86 and 87 each open with a numbered, indented n. 1** — `Secundum Richard. a S. Vict.` · `Scilicet in fundamentis.` · `August., XI. Confess. c. 7. n. 9` — with no flush-left unnumbered paragraph above it in any of the three. **There is no page-crossing runover anywhere on this span, and that is a reading, not a silence.**

There is likewise **no gutter-crossing runover**: on each of the four leaves the last entry of the left block closes before the block ends (p. 84 n. 4, p. 85 n. 3, p. 86 n. 4, p. 87 n. 1), and the right block opens on a fresh numeral.

### ⚠ A PRINTED POINT THAT IS A COMMA, CAUGHT ONLY AT 7×

p. 86 reply 7 appears at ⅓ scale and in a 1.7× column band to read *…cum duae tantum sint origines***.** *distinctae et distinctivae…* — a full point followed by a lower-case word — and **the raw agrees**, giving `origines. distinctae`. At **7×** the mark carries a descending tail identical to the comma after *essentia* two lines above and unlike any point on the leaf. It is a **comma**, and the sentence is unbroken: *cum duae tantum sint origines, distinctae et distinctivae, duae tantum sunt…*

⛔ **The raw and a mid-zoom plate read agreeing are ONE witness read twice**, exactly as at `q3-a2`'s `Ethic.`/`Ethic:` — the OCR is reading the same ink at the same resolution. **A punctuation mark that makes the sentence ungrammatical is a reason to raise the magnification, not a defect to record.**

### ▶ GUTTERS, ALL FOUR MEASURED — AND THE DEFAULT'S WORST FAILURE IN THE WORK

84 **1358** *(Article II's region; `q4-a1` measured 1351 for the five-line region above the heading)* · 85 **1126** · 86 **1369** · 87 **1168**.

⚠⚠ **p. 86 is the largest default error this work has produced: `colcrop.py` returns 1297 against a true 1369, 72 px out.** The tell was in the run width, not the value — **362 px**, six times the sound 58–64 px band — and it is the failure signature the frozen note names as *the same species of nonsense* as a 5 px run. The direct per-column profile settles it: blank band **1338–1401 (64 px)**, midpoint 1369, with the printed centre rule inside it at 1368–1371 peaking at only **15**, the most lightly inked rule on the span.

· p. 85 returned 1129 on a **45 px** run; the band is 1097–1155 (59 px) with a heavily inked centre rule at 1121–1128 (peak **467**) truncating it — the diagnostic case the frozen note describes, and **1126** was adopted from the band midpoint. · p. 87 failed outright at **1171 on a 3 px run**, because `QUAESTIO V.` stands full measure across the middle of the leaf; profiled by region, Article II's rows 0.06–0.43 give **1168** on a 61 px band with twenty windows agreeing, and Quaestio V's region below agrees within 4 px, so one split serves the leaf. ⛔ **A gutter is a property of a region — and on this span the default was right on none of the four leaves.**

### ⭐ THE MARGINALIA ARE **NOT** CLIPPED ON THIS SPAN — A THIRD SCOPING

Full-image-width strips of the gutter-side margin of every leaf, read at 2.5–3×, show every gloss complete with clean paper before the scan's dark edge: p. 84's `Fundamenta.` and p. 86's `Notandum.`/`Ratio duplex.` at the right edge of their versos, p. 87's `Differunt idea et verbum.` and `Intellectus divinus uno actu intelligit.` at the left edge of its recto. **The clipping remains a property of leaves 69–73 alone**, now scoped by `q3-a2` (73–78), `q4-a1` (79–84) and this chunk (84–87). ⚠ Keep checking it; the failure mode is silent and the check is symmetrical in both directions.

### ⚠ RAW QUALITY MOVES INSIDE THE SPAN, AND p. 85 IS THE BAD LEAF

Graded per page and per region, as the standing rule requires. **p. 84 body clean · p. 85 body BADLY degraded · p. 86 body clean · p. 87 body clean; footers clean on all four.** p. 85's OCR returns *gennanitas suniina* for *germanitas summa*, *heatitudinis* for *beatitudinis*, *aliquam* as *aliqiiam*, *superahundarenl* for *superabundarent*, *impios-sibile* for *impossibile* — the whole leaf is soft, and its Latin was re-set from the plate rather than corrected off the raw. ⛔ **"The raw is usable" is not a page-level fact, let alone a span-level one.**

### ⚠ FOUR RAW-VS-PLATE DEFECTS, ALL DIGITS

`et i.` → **`et 4.`** (p. 84 n. 2) · `fundam. I.` → **`fundam. 1.`** (p. 85 n. 2) · `pag. 36` → **`pag. 56`** (p. 85 n. 8) · `d. 14. a. 2. q. I.` → **`q. 1.`** (p. 85 n. 6). ⭐ **The third was settled by the TARGET, not by the type**: p. 85 n. 8 and p. 84 n. 6 cite the same place for the same *duplex modus productionis*, and p. 84 n. 6 prints *tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6* unambiguously — **Quaracchi's own doubled citation is a free control, and it is the cheapest one this work has offered.** The other three were settled at 5× or better against a control in the same line; p. 85 n. 2 sets a true `4` (*fundam. 4*) and a true `1` (*fundam. 1*) eleven words apart on adjacent lines, which is as good a calibration pair as the leaf can give.

### ⭐ SIX CROSS-REFERENCES OPENED AS CONTROLS

- ⭐⭐ **p. 86 n. 5 → p. 84 n. 5, and it lands inside this chunk.** The note on reply 4's *splendor Patris*⁵ says only *Cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 5*; p. 84 n. 5, three leaves back and this chunk's own, is **Hebr. 1, 3** — the very verse the reply is quoting. **The argument's proof-text and the reply's are wired together by the register, and both ends are ours.** Second internal closure in two chunks.
- **p. 86 n. 7 → `bon-qmt-q3-a2` p. 75 n. 7** and **p. 85 n. 1 → the same Richard**: *Ut dictum est supra pag. 75, nota 7. ex Richardo a S. Vict.* against *Secundum Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 2. seqq.* Both notes stand on the same doctrine — that a perfect connection requires the *condilectus*, and so stops at three — and one of them is on our own built page.
- **p. 84 n. 7 → `bon-qsc-q1` ad 6** and **p. 87 n. 2 → `bon-qsc-q3` ad 19**, both in the deployed *QD de scientia Christi*.
- **p. 84 n. 3 → p. 35 n. 2**, the *quantitas molis* / *quantitas virtutis* note that `bon-qmt-q4-a1`'s p. 81 n. 1 also cites — the same editorial pointer serving both articles of the question, on the distinction the *Respondeo* of each turns on.
- **p. 87 n. 1's `tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.`** is an outbound reference into our own deployed Volume I.

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**Argument 8 of the `Contra` series (p. 85) sets *excludit* and *ponit* in ITALIC**, alone among the ten arguments of that series, all of which open with the same *non excludit* — recorded as printed, not normalised. · **Reply 5. 6. prints its two numerals with points and a space**, `5. 6.`, matching `q1-a2`'s combined reply and unlike `q4-a1`'s colon-bearing `3:`. · **p. 87 n. 1's quotation is left with Quaracchi's `etc.` inside the quotation marks in the Latin and outside them in the English**, on the house form set at `q4-a1` p. 81 n. 3. · ⭐ **Both the `Contra` heading and the `Conclusio` are in-column again** — the fourth shape this work has printed for the opposing series (`q1-a1` no heading · `q1-a2` `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` · `q4-a1` running `Contra:` with `Ad oppositum.` beside it · here `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1.` with `Fundamenta.` beside it). ⛔ **And the two marginalia have swapped sides between the two articles of one question**: in `q4-a1` `Fundamenta.` stood on the opening series and `Ad oppositum.` on the `Contra`; here it is the reverse. **Find the series by content; the marginale names the side, and the side changes.**

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

The multiset agrees exactly between the Latin and English sections once the apparatus labels are stripped — no spelled-out chapter numbers occur on this span, so the false-positive class `q4-a1` isolated does not fire. ▶ **The test itself was still run directly**: both sections carry **the same four `<!-- page N -->` markers, 84–87, in the same order**, and each falls at a word boundary in both languages (`est | germanitas` · `necesse | est` · `productivae. | 8.` — and *no | highest* · *necessary | to place* · *sufficiently. | 8.*).

### Marginalia, in body order

**p. 84** — `Ad oppositum.` · `Fundamenta.`
**p. 85** — `Conclusio.` · `Ratio 1.` · `Triplex immensitas.` · `Duo modi emanandi.` · `Ratio 2.`
**p. 86** — `Ratio 3.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Differt duplex infinitas.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.` · `Ratio duplex.`
**p. 87** — `Notandum.` · `Differunt idea et verbum.` · `Intellectus divinus uno actu intelligit.` · `Aliter intellectus creatus.` · `Dupliciter intelligitur.` · `Notandum.`

**Nineteen in all, none clipped.** ⭐ **The solution-heavy split holds a fifth time and is again total in one direction:** the twenty arguments of the two series, filling p. 84 and the whole left column of p. 85, carry **two** glosses between them, one at the head of each series; the *Conclusio*, the *Respondeo* and the nine replies carry **seventeen**.

### Translation choices

- ⭐⭐ ***lux* / *lucis* → "light" at all seven sites, and *lumen* does not occur on the span** — the first chunk of this work in which ruling 2's pair is exercised **on one side only**. The sites are argument 5's *lux solis* and *lux aeterna* (p. 84), reply 5. 6.'s *lux solis*, *claritatem lucis irradiativae*, *plenitudine lucis fontalis* and *infinitas lucis aeternae* (p. 86), and reply 10's *immensitas lucis intelligentis* (p. 87). **Every one goes to "light" and none is a transliteration, because the transliteration is *lumen*'s alone.** ⚠ The pilot's census gives the work *lux* 26 / *lumen* 15; a quarter of the *lux* total stands on these four leaves and **the two words are nowhere opposed on the span**, so ruling 2 does its work here by producing no visible effect at all — which is exactly why it must be recorded, or a later reader will find seven bare "light"s and take them for a lapse.
- ***intellect-* takes "understanding" at every one of its twenty-one occurrences, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English** — this chunk is the heaviest *intellect-* span the work has yet produced, and the frozen register makes the rendering mechanical: *intellectus agens* / *possibilis* occur nowhere in the work's 71 printed pages, so the ratified narrow exception is unreachable and a bare "intellect" would be a defect by construction. ⚠ The hardest sites are reply 9's chain *idem est intelligens et intellectum et actus intelligendi* → "the one understanding and the thing understood and the act of understanding are the same", and reply 8's *in quo intellectus adaequatur intelligenti* → "in which the understanding is made equal to the one understanding"; the English is clumsier than "intellect" would be, and the ruling was followed anyway.
- ⭐ ***fundam. N* → *fundamentum N*, RETAINED, per ruling 5** — p. 85 n. 2's three sites read "fundamentum 4", "fundamentum 1" and "below, fundamentum 9". **This is the reserved site being met, and it is recorded here rather than being passed over in silence**, per the mechanism set out above. p. 86 n. 1's *Scilicet in fundamentis* likewise keeps the Latin (*"Namely in the* fundamenta*"*), because the note is pointing at the argument series by the name the marginale gives it.
- ***splendor* → "radiance" throughout**, against "brightness" in the Hebrews quotation of p. 84 n. 5, where the Douay wording stands. The body is arguing from the sun's *splendor* as a physical emanation and needs a word that works for light and for the Son alike; the scripture quotation is quoted as a verse and keeps its received English. ⚠ Both words therefore stand in one chunk for one Latin word, and that is deliberate.
- ***status* → "stopping-point"** in the `Contra` series' first argument and in p. 84 n. 6, not "state" — the whole argument is that production must *stop* (*non esset status, si procederet in infinitum*), and "state" loses it.
- ***gratificatio* / *gratificare* → "making-gracious" / "made gracious"** in argument 10, kept awkward on purpose: the argument turns on a soul being *made* gracious by a person who is *sent*, and "justification" would import a different doctrine.
- ***germanitas summa* → "highest kinship"**, following Richard of St. Victor's own vocabulary as p. 85 n. 1 identifies it.
- ⛔ ***vacatio* / *quies* is NOT tested here** — neither family occurs on these four leaves. The deciding sites remain `q5-a2` (raw L23636, L23645) and `q7-a2` (raw L25824, L25900), of which L25824 holds both in one clause. ⚠ `q4-a1`'s *quietatur* was a verb and was left undecided there; nothing on this span bears on it either.
- **Ruling 3 (*contuit-*) is absent from the work**, and no `[?]` flag was raised anywhere on the span.

### Ledger

**24 entries** (p. 84 nn. 2–7 of seven, n. 1 being `bon-qmt-q4-a1`'s · p. 85 all eight · p. 86 all seven · p. 87 nn. 1–3 of five). **Zero `[?]` flags. ZERO runovers — neither gutter-crossing nor page-crossing — and that negative was established by reading the head of every incoming register before its first numeral, not by silence.** What this chunk inherits from p. 84 is **body** (`ARTICULUS II.`, its subtitle, its opener and the first arguments) **together with six of that leaf's seven register entries**; what it forwards to `bon-qmt-q5-a1` is **p. 87's `QUAESTIO V.`, its subtitle, its opener, its two *praeambula*, `ARTICULUS I.` with its subtitle and its first arguments, together with nn. 4–5 of that leaf's five register entries.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0