title: Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum modus unionis duarum naturarum sit singularis, an reperiatur aliquis unionis modus ei consimilis.*

Secundo quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad modum; et est quaestio, utrum modus illius unionis sit singularis, an reperiatur aliquis unionis modus ei consimilis. Et quod sit singularis, videtur:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) *Auctoritate* ipsius Algazelis in sua Metaphysica[^3], ubi ponit modos unius. Ibi enim dividit *unum simpliciter* et *unum secundum quid*. Unum sim<!-- page 160 -->pliciter dividit in tres differentias: primo in unum, (*Modi unius.*) in quo non est multitudo nec actu nec potentia, ut punctus et unitas; secundo in unum, in quo non est multitudo actu, quamvis sit potentia, sicut est linea; tertio in unum, in quo est multitudo actu et potentia, ut lectus et membrum, in quibus sunt actu multa. Unum autem secundum quid in quinque differentias habet dividi, videlicet: in unum genere, ut est homo et bos; in unum specie, ut Socrates et Plato; in unum accidente, ut est nix et cerussa; in unum proportione, ut sunt auriga et nauta; in unum subiecto, sicut dulce et album in aliqua substantia una. Sed nullo istorum modorum, ut patet discurrenti per singula, est illa unio, quae est in Christo: ergo videtur, quod modus illius unionis excedat omnes unionis modos.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Aristotelis, qui dividit unum in *Prima Philosophia*[^1b] (*Modi unius sec. Aristot.*) in *unum per se* et *unum per accidens*. Unum per accidens dicitur sicut duo accidentia in uno subiecto. Unum autem per se dicitur decem modis, scilicet continuatione, quorum terminus unus; unum specie vel forma, ut Socrates et Plato in homine; unum genere, ut homo et bos in animali; unum definitione, ut illa quae habent eandem definitionem, vel quorum unum est definitio alterius; unum indivisibilitate, ut punctus; unum numero, ut singulare; unum simplicitate vel essentia, ut universale[^2b]; unum totalitate vel perfectione, ut circulus; unum proportione, ut auriga et nauta; unum materia, ut omnia corporalia. Sed nullo istorum modorum est unio in persona in Christo: ergo videtur, quod sit unio modo singulari et proprio.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Bernardi *ad Eugenium quinto*[^3b], (*Modi unius sec. Bernard.*) ubi distinguit unum novem modis, scilicet ubi ait sic: « Est unitas *collectiva*, ut videlicet multi lapides faciunt unum acervum; est unitas *constitutiva*, ut cum multae partes unumquodque totum constituunt; est unitas *coniugativa*, qua fit, ut duo iam non duo, sed una caro sint[^4b]; est unitas *nativa*, qua anima et carne unus homo nascitur; est unitas *potestativa*, qua homo virtutis non instabilis, non dissimilis, sed unus sibimet nititur inveniri; est unitas *consentanea*, cum per caritatem multorum hominum est cor unum et anima una[^5b]; est unitas *votiva*, cum anima omnibus votis Deo adhaerens unus spiritus est; est unitas *dignativa*, qua limus noster a Dei Verbo in unam assumtus est personam ». Est et postrema unitas *Trinitatis*, de qua ipse Bernardus subdit[^6b]: « Verum et quid sunt ad illud unum »? ergo si unitas ista, qua Dei Verbum unitum est carni speciali differentia, dicitur unitas dignativa; videtur ergo, quod unio praedicta singularem modum habeat.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate prophetici verbi; dicitur enim *Ieremiae trigesimo primo*[^7b]: *Novum faciet Dominus super terram*, hoc, inquam, dicitur de illa unione creata; sed non esset novum, si simile haberet: videtur ergo, quod inter omnes uniones sit unio una singularis.

**Sed contra:**
1. (*Ad oppositum.*) *Ad Ephesios quinto*[^8b]: *Erunt duo in carne una; Sacramentum hoc magnum est; ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia*; Glossa: « Quia Christus, qui Deus erat apud Patrem, per quem et facti sumus, factus est per carnem particeps noster, ut illius capitis corpus essemus »: ergo videtur, quod unitas illa, quae est Verbi ad carnem, sit consimilis illi, quae est viri ad uxorem: non igitur est unitas singularis.

2. Item, illa unitas, qua Verbum est unitum carni, est unitas personalis, sicut supra[^9b] ostensum est; sed unitas illa, qua anima unitur carni, quae est unitas nativa, est unitas personalis: ergo videtur, quod illa unitas communis sit cum aliis creaturis.

3. Item, unitas illa, qua Deus unitur carni, est ex summa potestate Dei — unde in quadam Sequentia[^1c]: « Potestate, non natura, fit Creator creatura »:<!-- page 161 --> — ergo videtur, quod illa sit unitas potestativa; sed ille modus competit et reperitur in creatura: ergo etc.

4. Item, aut illa unio, qua divinitas unitur humanitati, est naturalis, aut gratuita; si naturalis: ergo continetur sub unitatibus illis, quae a Philosopho[^2c] assignantur; si gratuita: ergo cum unitas gratuita sit unitas votiva, sicut dicit Bernardus, videtur, quod iste modus unitatis divinae non faciat specialem unitatis differentiam.

### Conclusio.

> Unio duarum naturarum in personae unitate quoad omnes condiciones simul collectas superexcedit omnem naturam et gratiam communem et philosophicam rationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut nulla creatura perfecte Deo assimilatur, sed quodam modo est similis, quodam modo dissimilis; et ubi una creatura habet similitudinem, frequenter alia[^3c] habet dissimilitudinem: per hunc modum intelligendum est circa hanc sacratissimam unionem. (*Conclusio 1.*) Si enim loquamur de ipsa quantum ad speciales eius conditiones singillatim acceptas, sic potest habere convenientiam cum modis unitatum in creaturis repertis; si autem loquamur quantum ad collectionem suarum proprietatum, sic dicit modum unitatis singularis.

Et hoc patet sic. In hac enim unione est[^4c] (*Quatuor consideranda.*) considerare distantiam unibilium, unionis principium, unionis terminum et unitorum vinculum. Quantum ad distantiam unibilium, qua unitur Creator creaturae, convenit cum unitate[^5c] votiva. Quantum ad unionis principium convenit cum unitate potestativa; quia talis unitas est ex divina virtute et mera gratia. Quantum autem ad unionis terminum convenit cum unitate nativa, quae quidem terminatur ad unitatem personae. Quantum autem ad unionis vinculum convenit cum unitate coniugativa, in qua est vinculum perpetuum et individua copula. (*Conclusio 2.*) Quantum autem ad omnes condiciones simul collectas nullum modum habet unitatis sibi consimilem, quia superexcedit omnem naturam et omnem aliam gratiam communem, videlicet quod divina natura et humana uniantur in unam personam indissolubiliter per Dei potentiam.

Et ideo concedendum est, quod talis unio superexcellit[^6c] (*Conclusio 3.*) omnem considerationem philosophicam; nec mirum, quia ad ipsam vix pertingit ratio per fidem elevata. Et ideo Bernardus secundum istam unionem assignavit specialem unitatis differentiam, vocans eam unitatem dignativam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

**Ad oppositum:** (*Solutio oppositorum.*)
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod similis est unioni coniugativae; iam patet responsio: quia, etsi sit similitudo quantum ad vinculum, non tamen est similitudo quantum ad terminum, vel distantiam unibilium.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similis est unitati nativae, pro eo quod est unio in persona; dicendum, quod etsi sit similitudo quantum ad terminum, non tamen quantum ad vinculum, vel distantiam unibilium.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similis unitati potestativae; dicendum, quod etsi sit similitudo quantum ad principium, quia utraque est ex virtute divina, dissimilitudo tamen est quantum ad vinculum et quantum ad terminum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similis unitati votivae, cum sit per gratiam; dicendum, quod est alia gratiae differentia, qua anima unitur Deo per caritatem perfectam, et qua natura humana unitur Verbo in unitatem personae; nec tantum quantum ad hoc est differentia, sed etiam quantum ad vinculum et quantum ad terminum; et ideo ista unio facit singularem modum[^7c].

Si autem quaeratur sufficientia unitatum modorum assignatorum; (*Quaestio incidens.*) dicendum, quod ista quaestio alibi[^8c] habet suum locum, et singula suis locis tractanda sunt. (*Solvitur ex parte.*) Illorum tamen novem modorum unitatum, quos Bernardus assignat, potest sic sumi sufficientia. Est enim unitas naturalis et gratuita, et unitas super utramque constituta. (*Unitas naturalis.*) Unitas autem naturalis est in quadruplici differentia. Quaedam enim est per aggregationem rerum differentium distinctarum, sicut unitas collectiva. Quaedam[^9c] est per colligationem rerum formaliter differentium, sive partium heterogenearum; et sic est unitas constitutiva. Quaedam per coniunctionem differentium sexu, operatione convenientium; et sic est unitas coniugativa. Quaedam per unionem differentium naturarum in unionem concurrentium; et sic est unitas nativa. (*Unitas gratuita.*) — Unitas autem gratuita similiter quatuor habet differentias: aut enim est unitas eiusdem animae ad se secundum statuum diversitatem, et sic est<!-- page 162 --> unitas potestativa; aut multorum hominum ad invicem secundum caritatem, et sic est unitas consentanea; aut animae ad Deum per voluntatis conformitatem, et sic est unitas votiva; aut humanae naturae ad divinam secundum personae unitatem, et sic est unitas dignativa. (*Unitas super utramque constituta.*) — Unitas autem super utramque constituta, videlicet super naturalem et gratuitam, est una sola, videlicet unitas Trinitatis, quam quidem unam esse decet solam, ut in ea sit status omnium unitatum.

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### Question II. *Whether the mode of the union of the two natures is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that union with respect to its mode; and the question is whether the mode of that union is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found. And that it is singular seems to be the case:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) By the *authority* of Algazel himself in his *Metaphysics*[^3], where he sets out the modes of the one. For there he divides *the one absolutely* and *the one in a qualified sense*. The one absolutely he divides<!-- page 160 --> into three differences: first into a one (*The modes of the one.*) in which there is no multitude either in act or in potency, as a point and a unit; secondly into a one in which there is no multitude in act, although there is in potency, as is a line; thirdly into a one in which there is a multitude both in act and in potency, as a bed and a limb, in which there are many things in act. But the one in a qualified sense is to be divided into five differences, namely: into a one in genus, as a man and an ox; into a one in species, as Socrates and Plato; into a one in accident, as snow and white-lead; into a one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; into a one in subject, as the sweet and the white in some one substance. But by none of these modes, as is plain to one running through them singly, is that union which is in Christ: therefore it seems that the mode of that union exceeds all the modes of union.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Aristotle, who in the *First Philosophy*[^1b] divides the one (*The modes of the one according to Aristotle.*) into *one per se* and *one per accidens*. One per accidens is said as two accidents in one subject. But one per se is said in ten modes, namely: by continuation, of which the terminus is one; one in species or form, as Socrates and Plato in man; one in genus, as a man and an ox in animal; one in definition, as those things which have the same definition, or of which one is the definition of the other; one in indivisibility, as a point; one in number, as a singular; one in simplicity or essence, as a universal[^2b]; one in totality or perfection, as a circle; one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; one in matter, as all corporeal things. But by none of these modes is the union in the person in Christ: therefore it seems that it is a union in a singular and proper mode.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Bernard, *to Eugene, book five*[^3b], (*The modes of the one according to Bernard.*) where he distinguishes the one in nine modes, namely where he speaks thus: « There is a *collective* unity, as namely many stones make one heap; there is a *constitutive* unity, as when many parts constitute each whole; there is a *conjugal* unity, by which it comes about that two are now not two, but one flesh[^4b]; there is a *native* unity, by which from soul and flesh one man is born; there is a *potestative* unity, by which the man of virtue, not unstable, not dissimilar, but one, strives to be found at one with himself; there is a *consentaneous* unity, when through charity of many men there is one heart and one soul[^5b]; there is a *votive* unity, when the soul, cleaving to God with all its desires, is one spirit; there is a *dignative* unity, by which our clay has been assumed by the Word of God into one person ». And there is a last unity, that *of the Trinity*, concerning which Bernard himself adds[^6b]: « But what are they compared to that one »? Therefore if that unity, by which the Word of God is united to the flesh by a special difference, is called the dignative unity; it therefore seems that the aforesaid union has a singular mode.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of the prophetic word; for it is said in *Jeremiah, chapter thirty-one*[^7b]: *The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth*, this, I say, is said of that created union; but it would not be new, if it had something like it: it therefore seems that among all unions there is one singular union.

**On the contrary:**
1. (*To the opposite.*) *Ephesians five*[^8b]: *They shall be two in one flesh; this is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church*; the Gloss: « Because Christ, who was God with the Father, through whom also we were made, was made through the flesh a partaker of us, that we might be the body of that head »: therefore it seems that the unity which is of the Word to the flesh is like that which is of husband to wife: therefore it is not a singular unity.

2. Likewise, that unity by which the Word is united to the flesh is a personal unity, as was shown above[^9b]; but that unity by which the soul is united to the flesh, which is the native unity, is a personal unity: therefore it seems that that unity is common with other creatures.

3. Likewise, that unity by which God is united to the flesh is from the highest power of God — whence in a certain Sequence[^1c]: « By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature »:<!-- page 161 --> — therefore it seems that it is a potestative unity; but that mode is found and met with in a creature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, either that union, by which the divinity is united to the humanity, is natural or gratuitous; if natural: then it is contained under those unities which are assigned by the Philosopher[^2c]; if gratuitous: then, since the gratuitous unity is the votive unity, as Bernard says, it seems that this mode of the divine unity does not make a special difference of unity.

### Conclusion.

> The union of the two natures in the unity of the person, with respect to all its conditions taken together, superexceeds every nature and every common grace and philosophical reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as no creature is perfectly assimilated to God, but in some way is like, in some way unlike; and where one creature has a likeness, frequently another[^3c] has an unlikeness: in this manner is it to be understood concerning this most sacred union. (*Conclusion 1.*) For if we speak of it with respect to its special conditions taken singly, thus it can have an agreement with the modes of unities found in creatures; but if we speak with respect to the collection of its properties, thus it bespeaks a singular mode of unity.

And this is plain thus. For in this union there is[^4c] (*Four things to be considered.*) to be considered the distance of the unitables, the principle of the union, the terminus of the union, and the bond of the things united. As to the distance of the unitables, by which the Creator is united to the creature, it agrees with the votive[^5c] unity. As to the principle of the union, it agrees with the potestative unity; because such a unity is from the divine power and from sheer grace. But as to the terminus of the union, it agrees with the native unity, which indeed is terminated at the unity of the person. But as to the bond of the union, it agrees with the conjugal unity, in which there is a perpetual bond and an individual coupling. (*Conclusion 2.*) But as to all its conditions taken together, it has no mode of unity like itself, because it superexceeds every nature and every other common grace, namely that the divine nature and the human are united into one person indissolubly by the power of God.

And therefore it must be conceded that such a union superexcels[^6c] (*Conclusion 3.*) every philosophical consideration; nor is this a wonder, since reason, even elevated by faith, scarcely attains to it. And therefore Bernard, according to this union, assigned a special difference of unity, calling it the dignative unity. — The reasons therefore which are on that side are to be conceded.

**To the opposite:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)
*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that it is like the conjugal union; the response is already plain: because, even though there is a likeness as to the bond, there is nevertheless not a likeness as to the terminus, or the distance of the unitables.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that it is like the native unity, for the reason that it is a union in a person; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the terminus, there is nevertheless not as to the bond, or the distance of the unitables.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is like the potestative unity; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the principle, because each is from the divine power, there is nevertheless an unlikeness as to the bond and as to the terminus.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is like the votive unity, since it is through grace; it must be said that there is another difference of grace, by which the soul is united to God through perfect charity, and by which the human nature is united to the Word into the unity of the person; nor is there only a difference as to this, but also as to the bond and as to the terminus; and therefore this union makes a singular mode[^7c].

But if it be asked concerning the sufficiency of the modes of unity assigned; (*An incidental question.*) it must be said that this question has its place elsewhere[^8c], and the singulars are to be treated in their own places. (*Resolved in part.*) Nevertheless, of those nine modes of unities which Bernard assigns, the sufficiency can be gathered thus. For there is a natural and a gratuitous unity, and a unity constituted over both. (*Natural unity.*) But the natural unity is in a fourfold difference. For one is by an aggregation of distinct differing things, as the collective unity. One[^9c] is by a binding-together of things formally differing, or of heterogeneous parts; and thus it is the constitutive unity. One is by a conjunction of things differing in sex, agreeing in operation; and thus it is the conjugal unity. One is by a union of differing natures concurring into one union; and thus it is the native unity. (*Gratuitous unity.*) — But the gratuitous unity likewise has four differences: for either it is a unity of the same soul to itself according to the diversity of states, and thus it is<!-- page 162 --> the potestative unity; or of many men to one another according to charity, and thus it is the consentaneous unity; or of the soul to God through conformity of will, and thus it is the votive unity; or of the human nature to the divine according to the unity of the person, and thus it is the dignative unity. (*Unity constituted over both.*) — But the unity constituted over both, namely over the natural and the gratuitous, is one alone, namely the unity of the Trinity, which alone indeed it befits to be one, that in it may be the rest of all unities.

la: Libr. I. c. 8. Qui liber est secunda pars operis philosophici ab Algazele compositi et Venetiis an. 1536 sub nomine *Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis* in lucem editi. In hoc secunda parte, quae inscribitur *liber philosophiae*, a cap. 1–7 tractatur de divisionibus entis, scil. in causam et causatum, in universale et particulare; cap. 8. agit de tertia divisione entis, in unum scil. et multa, et exponitur ibi, quod unum « dicitur vere et proprie, aliud improprie, unum vero proprie dicitur quodlibet singulare signatum, et hoc quidem tribus modis. Primo dicitur unum verissime id unum singulare, in quo non est multitudo in potentia nec effectu, ut punctus et essentia Creatoris, quoniam Deus nec dividitur nec est receptibilis divisionis... Secundo dicitur unum continuatione, in quo non est multitudo in effectu, sed in potentia, quoniam receptibile est multitudinis, ut cum dicitur: haec linea est una et duae, et: hoc corpus est unum et duo corpora; si enim fuerit in eis incisio, dicetur in eis dualitas... Tertio dicitur unum secundum ligationem, in quo est multitudo in effectu, sicut lectus unus et quodlibet singulare compositum ex diversis partibus, sicut compositio membrorum hominis ex osse et carnibus et venis... Unum autem improprie dicitur, cum nomen unius dicitur de multis, quae sunt sub uno universali; et haec sunt quinque. Primum est unum genere... secundo unum in specie... tertio unum in communi accidente... quarto dicitur unum proportione... quinto dicitur unum in subiecto » etc. — Mox pro *unius* edd. perperam *unionis*, et subinde post *dividit unum* Vat. addit *in unum*. Aliquanto inferius pro *in unum accidente* codd. AFHILT aa *unum in accidente*, edd. 1, 2 *in unum in accidente*.

en: Book I, c. 8. This book is the second part of the philosophical work composed by Algazel and published at Venice in the year 1536 under the title *Logic and philosophy of Algazel the Arab*. In this second part, which is entitled *the book of philosophy*, from chapters 1–7 the divisions of being are treated, namely into cause and caused, into universal and particular; chapter 8 treats of the third division of being, namely into one and many, and it is there expounded that the one « is said truly and properly, and otherwise improperly; the one properly is said of any signate singular, and this indeed in three modes. First, that one singular is most truly called one in which there is no multitude in potency or in effect, as a point and the essence of the Creator, since God is neither divided nor is receptive of division... Secondly, one is said by continuation, in which there is no multitude in effect but in potency, since it is receptive of multitude, as when it is said: this line is one and two, and: this body is one and two bodies; for if there be a cutting in them, a duality will be said to be in them... Thirdly, one is said according to binding, in which there is a multitude in effect, as one bed and any singular thing composed of diverse parts, as the composition of a man's members from bone and flesh and veins... But one is said improperly, when the name of "one" is said of many things which are under one universal; and these are five. The first is one in genus... secondly one in species... thirdly one in a common accident... fourthly one is said by proportion... fifthly one is said in subject » etc. — Shortly after, for *unius* the editions wrongly read *unionis*, and just after, following *dividit unum*, the Vatican edition adds *in unum*. Somewhat below, for *in unum accidente* codd. AFHILT aa read *unum in accidente*, edd. 1, 2 *in unum in accidente*.

la: Libr. V. text. 7. seqq. et X. text. 1. (IV. c. 6. et IX. c. 1.). — Paulo inferius sola Vat. verbis *sicut duo accidentia in uno subiecto* praemittit *sicut accidens in suo subiecto, vel*. Aeque iuste illis verbis addere potuit: *sicut unum accidens in duobus subiectis*, v. gr. albedo, quae accidit Socrati et Platoni, et in qua conveniunt sive unum sunt. — Mox pro *decem modis* cod. bb etiam habet *novem modis*, quam lectionem contextus exigit, alii codd. et edd. *novem modis*.

en: Book V, text 7 ff. and X, text 1 (IV, c. 6 and IX, c. 1). — A little below the Vatican edition alone prefixes to the words *as two accidents in one subject* the words *as an accident in its subject, or*. With equal right it could have added to those words: *as one accident in two subjects*, e.g. whiteness, which befalls both Socrates and Plato, and in which they agree or are one. — Shortly after, for *ten modes* cod. bb also has *nine modes*, which reading the context requires; other codd. and edd. read *nine modes*.

la: Edd. *ut essentia vel universale*. Paulo inferius pro *in Christo* codd. K Z bb *Christi*.

en: The editions read *as essence or universal*. A little below, for *in Christ* codd. K Z bb read *of Christ*.

la: De Consider. c. 8. n. 18. Cfr. Serm. 80. de Diversis (alias 44. ex Parvis).

en: *On Consideration*, c. 8, n. 18. Cf. *Sermon* 80 *on Various Subjects* (otherwise 44 of the *Short Ones*).

la: Gen. 2, 24; Matth. 19, 5. — Paulo ante pro *unumquodque* codd. GUIKLTUZ aa cc *quodque*, codd. NX *quodcumque*, edd. *unum*.

en: Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:5. — A little before, for *each* codd. GUIKLTUZ aa cc read *which*, codd. NX *whatsoever*, edd. *one*.

la: Act. 4, 32. — In propos. seq., quae respicit I. Cor. 6, 17, codd. MO post *votiva* adiiciunt *vel voluntaria*, et dein post *spiritus est* Vat. subdit *cum eo*. Mox pro *a Dei Verbo* Vat. *a Deo Verbo* et plurimi codd. *Dei Verbo*. Edd. 1, 2 ultimam propositionem allegatae sententiae sic exhibent: *Est unitas dignativa, qua Filius Dei dignatus est assumere nostram naturam*.

en: Acts 4:32. — In the following clause, which regards I Cor. 6:17, codd. MO add after *votive* the words *or voluntary*, and then after *is spirit* the Vatican edition adds *with him*. Shortly after, for *by the Word of God* (*a Dei Verbo*) the Vatican edition reads *a Deo Verbo* and very many codd. *Dei Verbo*. Edd. 1, 2 give the last clause of the cited sentence thus: *There is a dignative unity, by which the Son of God deigned to assume our nature*.

la: Loc. cit. n. 19, ubi textus origin., cui etiam cod. II assentitur, sic: *Verum haec omnia quid ad illud summum atque, ut ita dicam, unice Unum?*

en: Loc. cit., n. 19, where the original text, with which cod. II also agrees, runs thus: *But what are all these compared to that highest and, so to speak, uniquely One?*

la: Vers. 22. — In fine arg. pro *unio una* codd. K P Q Z bb *unio illa*, Vat. *unio ista*.

en: Verse 22. — At the end of the argument, for *one union* codd. K P Q Z bb read *that union* (*illa*), the Vatican edition *that union* (*ista*).

la: Vers. 31. seq. — Glossa hic allegata, quae invenitur apud Rabanum in hunc locum, sumta est ex August., XII. contra Faustum, c. 8.

en: Verse 31 f. — The Gloss here cited, which is found in Rabanus on this passage, is taken from Augustine, *Against Faustus* XII, c. 8.

la: Quaest. praeced. — In fine arg. pro *communis sit* Vat. *communicet*.

en: The preceding question. — At the end of the argument, for *be common* (*communis sit*) the Vatican edition reads *communicate* (*communicet*).

la: In fest. Nativ. Domini. Cfr. Franc. Ios. Mone, Hymni latini medii aevi, tom. 2. n. 389: *Potestate, non natura, / Fit Creator creatura, / Reportetur ut factura / Factoris in gloria.*

en: In the feast of the Lord's Nativity. Cf. F. J. Mone, *Latin Hymns of the Middle Ages*, vol. 2, n. 389: *By power, not by nature, / The Creator becomes a creature, / That the making may be brought back / Into the glory of the Maker.*

la: Hic in fundam. 2. Verba Bernardi videsis in fundam. 3. — Voci *unitatibus* Vat. praemittit *naturalibus*.

en: Here in fundamentum 2. The words of Bernard you may see in fundamentum 3. — To the word *unities* the Vatican edition prefixes *natural*.

la: Codd. I L aa cc *aliam*, Vat. *in alio*, quae et paulo ante *in uno* substituit pro *una*.

en: Codd. I L aa cc read *another* (acc. *aliam*), the Vatican edition *in another*, which also a little before substitutes *in one* for *one*.

la: Codd. A G H I K L N T U Z aa *et est*.

en: Codd. A G H I K L N T U Z aa read *and is* (*et est*).

la: Plurimi codd. *convenit unitas votiva*; in qua lectione supple *cum ipsa*. Paulo inferius pro *mera gratia* codd. K Z *magna gratia*.

en: Very many codd. read *the votive unity agrees*; in which reading supply *with it*. A little below, for *sheer grace* codd. K Z read *great grace*.

la: Codd. G H I K L N T U X Z aa *superexcessit*, cod. A *superexcrescit*. Paulo inferius pro *istam unionem* edd. 1, 2 exhibent *istam opinionem* et dein pro *unitatem dignativam* posuerunt *animam unitatis dignativam* (!).

en: Codd. G H I K L N T U X Z aa read *superexceeded*, cod. A *over-grows*. A little below, for *this union* edd. 1, 2 give *this opinion* and then for *the dignative unity* they put *the soul of dignative unity* (!).

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.

la: Scilicet in metaphysica.

en: Namely, in metaphysics.

la: Plurimi codd. hic inepte repetunt *enim*.

en: Very many codd. here ineptly repeat *enim* ("for").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusio non est dubia. Observatione digna sunt quae ex philosophis et S. Bernardo afferuntur de variis unitatum speciebus. — De ipsa quaestione alii commentatores non instituunt explicite disquisitionem, sed eandem plerumque tangunt in solutione seq. (3.) quaestionis.

**II.** Distinctiones et conclusiones S. Bonaventurae in seq. (3.) quaestione satis sunt manifestae. S. Thom. hic non utitur nisi una distinctione, scilicet ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur, et ex parte eius in quo coniunguntur, quod est divina persona, quae excellit maxima et simplicissima unitate. Doctrina autem S. Bonaventurae, quod simplicitas et eminens unitas divinae personae sit radix et prima causa excellentissimae huius unionis, videtur esse mens etiam aliorum doctorum. Quae ratio magis explicatur notabili applicatione, quam inde eruit Aegid. R. (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. 2.). Nam secundum ipsum ex simplicitate assumentis personae sequitur, quod sit « intimior creaturae quam ipsa sibi, iuxta illud Augustini, III. Confessionum: « Deus est intimior nobis intimo nostro » [cfr. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 37. p. I.]... « Ex ista ergo tanta intimitate dicemus, istam unionem superare omnes alias uniones post illam unionem supremam sanctae et individuae Trinitatis ». Etiam S. Bonav. ad idem principium recurrit supra d. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 4.

**III.** De hac 3. quaestione (vel de utraque): Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. 3. — Scoti loci collecti apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. IV. q. 2. a. 9. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 9. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusion is not in doubt. Worthy of observation are the things which are brought forward from the philosophers and from St. Bernard concerning the various species of unities. — Concerning the question itself, other commentators do not institute an explicit disquisition, but for the most part touch it in the solution of the following (3rd) question.

**II.** The distinctions and conclusions of St. Bonaventure in the following (3rd) question are sufficiently manifest. St. Thomas here uses only one distinction, namely on the part of the things which are conjoined, and on the part of that in which they are conjoined, which is the divine person, which excels by a greatest and most simple unity. But the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, that the simplicity and eminent unity of the divine person is the root and first cause of this most excellent union, seems to be the mind also of the other doctors. This account is more fully explained by the notable application which Aegidius Romanus draws from it (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. 2.). For according to him, from the simplicity of the assuming person it follows that it is « more inward to the creature than it is to itself, according to that saying of Augustine, III. Confessions: « God is more inward to us than our inmost » [cf. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 37. p. I.]... « From this so great inwardness, therefore, we shall say that this union surpasses all other unions after that supreme union of the holy and undivided Trinity ». St. Bonaventure too recurs to the same principle above, d. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 4.

**III.** Concerning this 3rd question (or concerning both): Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. 3. — Scotus's passages collected in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. IV. q. 2. a. 9. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 9. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. — Durandus, III. Sent. d. 5. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 162 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum illa unitas quantum ad gradum excellat omnes unitates creatas.*

Tertio quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad gradum, et est quaestio, utrum illa unitas excellat omnes unitates creatas. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. (*Fundamenta.*) Auctoritate Bernardi, ad Eugenium in quinto[^1]: « Inter omnia, quae vere dicuntur unum, arcem tenet unitas Trinitatis. Secundo illa praecellit, qua tres substantiae in Christo sunt una persona »: ergo unitas, qua Christus est unus, omnes unitates creatas excellit.

2. Item, tanto magis aliqua uniuntur, quanto inseparabilius sunt unita; sed naturae illae in Christo uniuntur tanta inseparabilitate, qua maior esse non potest[^2]: ergo videtur, quod unitas illa, ad quam terminatur unio illa, maxima sit inter omnes unitates creatas.

3. Item, tanto magis aliqua uniuntur, quanto magis communicant sibi suas proprietates et idiomata; sed in Christo est perfecta idiomatum communicatio[^3]: ergo videtur, quod ad summam unionem terminetur illa unio.

4. Item, unio illa terminatur ad unitatem in persona, persona autem illa est persona Verbi[^4]; sed persona Verbi in simplicitate et nobilitate in infinitum excellit omnem unitatem creatam: ergo videtur similiter, quod illa unitas, ad quam terminatur unio, dignativa.

**Sed contra:** (*Ad oppositum.*)
1. Quae maxime distant minime sunt unibilia, et quae minime sunt unibilia minime faciunt unum; sed talia sunt divinitas et humanitas: ergo videtur, quod unio, quae est in Christo, terminetur ad gradum unitatis infimum.

2. Item, quanto aliquid ex paucioribus constat, tanto magis est unum; sed in Christo reperitur maior naturarum pluralitas, quam sit sub caelo: ergo videtur, quod unitas illa infimum teneat unitatis locum.

3. Item, magis est unum quod est unum in natura et persona, quam quod est in persona tantum[^5]; sed quilibet homo unitatem habet in persona et natura, Christus autem unitatem habet in persona tantum, non in natura: ergo maior unitatis perfectio reperitur in quolibet homine quam in Christo.

4. Item, magis est unum quod non est multiplicabile nec multiplicatum, quam quod est multiplicabile et multiplicatum; sed unitas et punctus habent unitatem, quae nec est multiplicabilis nec
<!-- page 163 -->
multiplicata[^1b]; in Christo autem reperitur actu naturarum multitudo et differentia: ergo videtur, quod in Christo sit unitas minima.

### Conclusio.

> Unitas, quae est in Christo, omnem unitatem creatam, simpliciter loquendo, superexcedit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de unitate (*Duplex unitas.*), qua aliqua dicuntur unum per convenientiam in natura, et est loqui de unitate, qua aliqua dicuntur unum per convenientiam in persona. Si autem[^2b] loquamur de unitate, qua aliqua dicuntur unum per convenientiam in natura, sic est dicere (*Conclusio 1.*), quod in Christo talis unitas quodam modo est nulla, quodam modo est magna, quodam modo est parva, quodam modo est summa. — Si enim comparemus divinam naturam ad humanam, sic nulla est in Christo unitas naturae, pro eo quod istae duae naturae non possunt simul in unam naturam concurrere. — Si autem loquamur de natura Christi ex parte corporis, sic parva est unitas propter partium multiplicitatem. — Si autem loquamur de unitate quantum ad animam, sic est in eo unitas magna propter animae simplicitatem. — Si autem loquamur de eo quantum ad divinam naturam, sic summa est in eo unitas propter illius naturae simplicitatem superexcellentissimam.

Quantum igitur ad unitatem naturae, secundum diversas considerationes est in Christo unitas summa, unitas nulla, unitas parva, unitas magna. (*Corollarium.*) Sic enim decet reperiri in eo, qui est super omnia exaltatus et infra omnes humiliatus.

Si vero[^3b] fiat sermo de unitate, qua aliqua dicuntur unum per convenientiam in persona, sic (*Conclusio 2.*), simpliciter loquendo, unitas illa, quae est in Christo, unitas est super omnes unitates suprema; et hoc (*Ratio quadruplex.*) quadruplici ex causa: videlicet propter illius personae simplicitatem, propter unibilium dignitatem, propter unitorum inseparabilitatem et propter unionis singularitatem. — Propter personae simplicitatem, quia unio est in persona Verbi, quae quidem est simplicissima. — Propter unibilium dignitatem, quia tam natura assumens quam assumta inter cetera, quae sunt, habet excellentiam. — Propter inseparabilitatem, quia tanto vinculo fortificata est illarum naturarum unio, ut nunquam fiat nec possit fieri separatio. Natura enim illa inter ceteras naturas adhaesit aeterno Verbo (*Notandum.*), quo portatur et sustentatur omne quod est sub Deo. — Propter singularitatem, quia nunquam ulla unio fuit huic unioni similis. Haec enim fuit excellentissimae dignationis; et ideo nomen dignitatis et dignationis sibi appropriat, ut dicatur unitas dignativa[^4b]. Et quoniam, cum de unitate Christi loquimur, ad quam unio terminatur, est sermo de unitate personae (*Conclusio 3.*), non de unitate naturae; ideo simpliciter concedendum est, unitatem, quae est in Christo, omnem unitatem creatam superexcedere. — Unde etiam concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

**Ad oppositum:** (*Solutio oppositorum.*)
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod quae maxime distant minime sunt unibilia; dicendum, quod Deus ab omni creatura maximam habet differentiam in natura, quantum tamen ad influentiam et creaturae sustentationem (*Notandum.*) maximam habet approximationem; et ideo maxima potest esse unitas inter Creatorem et creaturam, quamvis naturalis unitas nulla intercidat[^5b].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est unum illud quod ex paucioribus constituitur; dicendum, quod verum est de illa unione, cuius unitas resultat ex partium constitutione. Unitas autem, quae est in Christo, ex partium constitutione non resultat; et ideo, quamvis in eo sit naturarum pluralitas, non sequitur, quod sit in eo unitas diminuta[^6b].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est unum, quod est unum in persona et natura; dicendum, quod verum est, quando unitas personae sequitur unitatem naturae; tunc enim compositio in natura facit compositionem in persona; non sic autem est in proposito, quia unitas personae in Christo antecedit unitatem naturae assumtae, ita quod nullam inducit compositionem natura assumta, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^7b].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est unum quod non est multiplicatum etc.: dicendum, quod verum est de illa unitate et multiplicatione, quae habent aliquam oppositionem — minuitur enim oppositum, cum suo opposito permiscetur — non sic autem est in proposito, quia ut saepe dictum est[^8b], multiplicitas in natura non repugnat unitati in persona. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia quaesita[^9b].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether that unity, with respect to its degree, excels all created unities.*

In the third place, inquiry is made about that union with respect to its degree, and the question is whether that unity excels all created unities. And that it does seems so:

1. (*Foundations.*) On the authority of Bernard, *To Eugenius*, in book five[^1]: « Among all the things that are truly called one, the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel. In the second place that unity excels, by which three substances in Christ are one person »: therefore the unity by which Christ is one excels all created unities.

2. Likewise, things are united the more, the more inseparably they are joined; but those natures in Christ are united with so great an inseparability that none could be greater[^2]: therefore it seems that that unity, at which that union is terminated, is the greatest among all created unities.

3. Likewise, things are united the more, the more they communicate to one another their properties and idioms; but in Christ there is a perfect communication of idioms[^3]: therefore it seems that that union is terminated at the highest union.

4. Likewise, that union is terminated at a unity in a person, but that person is the person of the Word[^4]; but the person of the Word in simplicity and nobility infinitely excels every created unity: therefore it seems likewise that that unity, at which the union is terminated, is a unity of dignity.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*)
1. Things that are most distant are least unitable, and the things that are least unitable least make one; but such are divinity and humanity: therefore it seems that the union which is in Christ is terminated at the lowest degree of unity.

2. Likewise, the fewer the things of which something is constituted, the more it is one; but in Christ is found a greater plurality of natures than is found beneath heaven: therefore it seems that that unity holds the lowest place of unity.

3. Likewise, that is more one which is one in nature and person, than that which is one in person only[^5]; but every man has unity in person and nature, whereas Christ has unity in person only, not in nature: therefore a greater perfection of unity is found in any man than in Christ.

4. Likewise, that is more one which is neither multipliable nor multiplied, than that which is multipliable and multiplied; but unity and a point have a unity which is neither multipliable nor
multiplied[^1b]; whereas in Christ is found in act a multitude and difference of natures: therefore it seems that in Christ there is the least unity.

### Conclusion.

> The unity which is in Christ, simply speaking, surpasses every created unity.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is to speak of the unity (*A twofold unity.*) by which things are called one through a coming-together in nature, and there is to speak of the unity by which things are called one through a coming-together in person. Now if[^2b] we speak of the unity by which things are called one through a coming-together in nature, then it is to be said (*Conclusion 1.*) that in Christ such a unity is in one way none, in one way great, in one way small, in one way supreme. — For if we compare the divine nature to the human, then there is in Christ no unity of nature, for the reason that these two natures cannot concur at once into one nature. — But if we speak of the nature of Christ on the side of the body, then the unity is small on account of the multiplicity of parts. — But if we speak of the unity as regards the soul, then there is in him a great unity on account of the simplicity of the soul. — But if we speak of him as regards the divine nature, then there is in him a supreme unity on account of the most-surpassing simplicity of that nature.

As regards the unity of nature, therefore, according to diverse considerations there is in Christ a supreme unity, no unity, a small unity, a great unity. (*Corollary.*) For thus it befits to be found in him who is exalted above all things and humbled beneath all.

But if[^3b] there be discourse about the unity by which things are called one through a coming-together in person, then (*Conclusion 2.*), simply speaking, that unity which is in Christ is a unity supreme above all unities; and this (*A fourfold ground.*) from a fourfold cause: namely on account of the simplicity of that person, on account of the dignity of the things united, on account of the inseparability of the things united, and on account of the singularity of the union. — On account of the simplicity of the person, because the union is in the person of the Word, which indeed is most simple. — On account of the dignity of the things united, because both the assuming nature and the assumed have excellence among the things that are. — On account of the inseparability, because the union of those natures is fortified by so great a bond that separation never happens nor can happen. For that nature, among the other natures, adhered to the eternal Word (*Note.*), by whom is carried and sustained everything that is beneath God. — On account of the singularity, because never was any union like to this union. For this was of the most excellent condescension; and therefore it appropriates to itself the name of dignity and condescension, so that it is called a unity of dignity[^4b]. And since, when we speak of the unity of Christ at which the union is terminated, there is discourse about the unity of the person (*Conclusion 3.*), not about the unity of nature; therefore it is simply to be conceded that the unity which is in Christ surpasses every created unity. — Whence also the reasons adduced for this side are to be conceded.

**To the opposite:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)
1. To that which is objected, that things which are most distant are least unitable; it must be said that God has the greatest difference from every creature in nature, yet as regards influence and the sustaining of the creature (*Note.*) he has the greatest nearness; and therefore there can be the greatest unity between Creator and creature, although no natural unity intervenes[^5b].

2. To that which is objected, that that is more one which is constituted of fewer parts; it must be said that this is true of that union whose unity results from the constitution of parts. But the unity which is in Christ does not result from the constitution of parts; and therefore, although in him there be a plurality of natures, it does not follow that there is in him a diminished unity[^6b].

3. To that which is objected, that that is more one which is one in person and nature; it must be said that this is true when the unity of person follows the unity of nature; for then composition in nature makes composition in person; but it is not so in the case at hand, because the unity of person in Christ precedes the unity of the assumed nature, so that the assumed nature induces no composition, as was shown above[^7b].

4. To that which is objected, that that is more one which is not multiplied, etc.: it must be said that this is true of that unity and multiplication which have some opposition — for the opposite is diminished when it is mixed with its opposite — but it is not so in the case at hand, because, as has often been said[^8b], multiplicity in nature is not repugnant to unity in person. — And so the reply to all that is asked is clear[^9b].

---

la: Sive *de Consider.* c. 8. n. 19. In testimonio allato post *Trinitatis* textus originalis addit *qua tres personae una substantia sunt*, et dein pro *Secundo* exhibet *Secundo loco*, ac post *qua* inserit *e converso*.

en: That is, *On Consideration* c. 8, n. 19. In the testimony cited, after *Trinitatis* the original text adds *qua tres personae una substantia sunt* ("by which three persons are one substance"), and then for *Secundo* it presents *Secundo loco*, and after *qua* inserts *e converso*.

la: Leo I. in *Serm.* 17. c. 1. *de Passione* ait: *In tantam unitatem Dei et hominis natura convenit, ut nec supplicio potuerit dirimi nec morte disiungi.* Cfr. Bernard., V. *de Consider.* c. 9. n. 21; *Serm.* 2. in Nativ. Domini, n. 4. seq., et supra pag. 138, nota 8.

en: Leo I, in *Sermon* 17, c. 1, *On the Passion*, says: "Into so great a unity did the nature of God and of man come together, that it could neither be parted by torment nor disjoined by death." Cf. Bernard, *On Consideration* V, c. 9, n. 21; *Sermon* 2 on the Nativity of the Lord, n. 4 ff., and above p. 138, note 8.

la: Vide supra pag. 14, nota 3; August., I. *de Trin.* c. 13. n. 28; *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 15. n. 31; Bernard., V. *de Consider.* c. 9. n. 21.

en: See above p. 14, note 3; Augustine, *On the Trinity* I, c. 13, n. 28; *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 15, n. 31; Bernard, *On Consideration* V, c. 9, n. 21.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. I.

en: As was shown above in question I.

la: Cod. Z addit *non in natura*.

en: Codex Z adds *non in natura* ("not in nature").

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. fundam. 1. — Mox edd. omittunt *actu*.

en: Cf. above, q. 2, foundation 1. — Just after, the editions omit *actu* ("in act").

la: Edd. *enim*.

en: The editions read *enim* ("for").

la: Pro *vero* plurimi codd. *ergo*; non convenienter.

en: For *vero* very many codices read *ergo* ("therefore"); not fittingly.

la: Cfr. q. praeced. fundam. 3. — Paulo superius pro *ulla unio* cod. Q *aliqua unio*.

en: Cf. the preceding question, foundation 3. — A little above, for *ulla unio* ("any union") codex Q reads *aliqua unio* ("some union").

la: Vide supra d. I. a. I. q. I. ad 5. Ad rem dicit Rusticus Diaconus in sua disputatione contra Acephalos (ed. Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 67. col. 1230), circa finem: *Admirando enim ego tecum confiteor, quia et maior unitio est in Domino Christo et quae multo maius effecit, et unam tamen naturam minime fecit. Tanto enim unitio Deitatis et humanitatis, quae in Domino Christo facta est, et ipse effectus unitionis, illam quae fit in homine superexcellit, quanto longius a se distantia univit... Si igitur Dei quidem virtus infinita est, nostrae autem substantiae finita, magna illa et supereffulgens unitio est, quae valuit inter illa tantum discrepantia unam personam facere etc.* — Pro *naturalis unitas* codd. A E G I N T U X *naturalis veritas*; perperam.

en: See above d. 1, a. 1, q. 1, to the 5th. To the point Rusticus the Deacon says, in his *Disputation against the Acephali* (ed. Migne, *Patrol. Lat.* tom. 67, col. 1230), near the end: "For marvelling I confess together with you that there is both a greater uniting in the Lord Christ, and one which effected much more, and yet it by no means made one nature. For the uniting of the Godhead and the humanity which took place in the Lord Christ, and the very effect of the uniting, surpasses that which takes place in man by as much as it united things farther distant from one another... If therefore the power of God is indeed infinite, but that of our substance finite, that uniting is great and over-shining, which had power to make of things so discrepant one person," etc. — For *naturalis unitas* ("natural unity") codices A E G I N T U X read *naturalis veritas* ("natural truth"); wrongly.

la: Vide supra a. I. q. I. — Pro *non sequitur* edd. *non tamen sequitur*.

en: See above a. 1, q. 1. — For *non sequitur* ("it does not follow") the editions read *non tamen sequitur* ("it does not however follow").

la: Hic a. I. q. I. ad 3. et q. 2. ad 3. seq.

en: Here a. 1, q. 1, to the 3rd, and q. 2, to the 3rd, following.

la: Praesertim hic (a. 2.) q. I; a. I. q. I; d. 5. a. I. q. 2. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1.

en: Especially here (a. 2) q. 1; a. 1, q. 1; d. 5, a. 1, q. 2. See also I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 1.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (vol3 pp. 162–163 = PDF 184–185, offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 11725–11835. The OCR here is clean (no cascade-shatter), but the raw is interleaved in two-column raw-line order; the PDF column bands were authoritative for reflow. Alignment **VERIFIED**: q3 opener reads *Tertio quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad **gradum**, et est quaestio, utrum illa unitas excellat omnes unitates creatas* — concerns the **degree (gradum)** of the union, NOT *terminum* (q1) or *modum* (q2). This is the LAST quaestio of Articulus II → **d.6 Articulus II is now COMPLETE q1–q3**.

**Page-split map.**
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- **p.162-R**: tail of q2's scholion source-list (Thom./Albert/Petr. a Tar./Richard/Aegid./Durand./Dionys. Carth. hic q. 7 — markerless, belongs to q2) above the spanning QUAESTIO III header; then q3 arg.1 tail + Sed contra (Ad oppositum) args 1–4. Footer band held p.162 notes 2-tail/3/4/5.
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- **p.163-R**: Conclusio 2/3 + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–4. Footer band: p.163 notes 5-tail/6/7/8/9.

**Apparatus (14 entries; per-page restart):** p.162 notes **1–5** (`[^1]`–`[^5]`; markers *ad Eugenium in quinto¹* / *non potest²* [OCR "z"] / *idiomatum communicatio³* / *persona Verbi⁴* / Sed-contra *in persona tantum⁵*); p.163 notes **1–9** (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`; markers *multiplicata¹ᵇ* / *Si autem²ᵇ* / *Si vero³ᵇ* / *unitas dignativa⁴ᵇ* / *intercidat⁵ᵇ* / *diminuta⁶ᵇ* / *ostensum fuit supra⁷ᵇ* / *saepe dictum est⁸ᵇ* / *quaesita⁹ᵇ*). Note `[^5b]` = the long Rusticus Diaconus *contra Acephalos* citation (spans p.163-L→R footer). The OCR mislabelled the Leo footer as "4" (digit-mangle); the printed page shows superscript `²` — corrected.

**Footer hand-off.**
- **PICKED UP from d6-a2-q2:** p.162 footer notes 1–2 (Bernard *de Consider.* c. 8 n. 19 / Leo *Serm.* 17 c. 1 *de Passione*), which key q3's body (*ad Eugenium in quinto¹* + the *persona Verbi*/inseparability area). These are q3's FIRST footers (per the received hand-off). q2's p.159 n.3 + p.160 n.1–9 + p.161 n.1–9 were already fully exhausted — NOT reused.
- **FORWARDED to d6-dubia:** NONE. q3's p.162 notes 1–5 + p.163 notes 1–9 are fully exhausted; the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI block (raw 11836, foot of p.164) opens its own footer sequences.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. q3 carries **NO** standalone scholion: after the Solutio ad 4, the apparatus note `[^9b]` reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion on the preceding question"). This confirms the forecast — q2's scholion section I noted other commentators treat the matter *in solutione seq. (3.) quaestionis*, and its source-list was rubricated *De hac 3. quaestione (vel de utraque)*, i.e. the parallel-commentator material for q3 was already absorbed into q2's scholion. No SCHOLION header prints between q3's replies and DUBIA (raw 11836).

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 6, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio VI)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction VI)

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, *Sacrificium Ecclesiae duobus constare, visibili elementorum specie et invisibili Domini Iesu Christi carne et sanguine.* In hoc enim verbo[^1] primo videtur esse insufficientia, quia ad constitutionem Sacramenti altaris non solum concurrunt duo, immo tria, videlicet, elementum exterius, corpus Christi verum et corpus Christi mysticum. — Item, videtur in verbo suo esse repugnantia, cum dicit *invisibili carne et sanguine*; caro enim et sanguis vere sunt corpora: ergo et vere visibilia. Si ergo caro Christi vera fuit, restat igitur, quod fuit visibilis. — Item, tertio videtur, quod illa similitudo sit inepta, quoniam *Sacramentum* et *res Sacramenti* in unitatem personae non concurrunt, secundum quod Deus et homo: ergo non videtur ibi fieri recta assimilatio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in Sacramento altaris duplex est res, videlicet signata et contenta, et signata tantum. Et Augustinus[^2] in parte ista non loquitur de re signata tantum, cuiusmodi est corpus Christi mysticum, sed de re signata et contenta, cuiusmodi est corpus Christi verum. Haec enim sola est, quae facit ad propositum, videlicet ad intelligendum unionis et incarnationis mysterium, et hoc propter similitudinem utrobique repertam. (*Notandum.*)

Reperitur autem ibi similitudo triplex, videlicet quantum ad extremorum unitatem, quantum ad distinctionem sive diversitatem, et quantum ad finem sive utilitatem. (*Similitudo triplex.*) Sicut enim in Sacramento altaris est species visibilis et caro Christi invisibilis, prout est sub illo Sacramento; sic in Christo est humana natura vera sensibilis, et divina, quae solum est intelligibilis. — Similitudo etiam est quantum ad distinctionem, quoniam exterior species visibilis et res interior non concurrunt ad constituendum unum per naturam, sed concurrunt ad unum Sacramentum, quod est unum per ordinem et respectum signi ad signatum. Sic et in Christo divina natura et humana non constituunt aliquid tertium, sed uniuntur in unam hypostasim, quae utriusque naturae est suppositum, et in qua utraque natura suo modo substantificatur. Et quantum ad hoc non est omnimoda similitudo, sed partim similitudo, et partim dissimilitudo. — Tertio similitudo est, quia, sicut res Sacramenti unitur exteriori signo, ut mediante illo cognoscatur et ad utilitatem veram convertatur; sic divina natura unitur humanae, ut in ea cognosceretur; et inde est etiam, quod talis unitas[^3] similis est illi unioni, qua copulatur verbum ipsi voci, ut ab aliis possit cognosci.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Non enim valet quod obiicit de insufficientia, quoniam ad propositum sufficiunt illa duo membra. — Nec valet quod obiicit de repugnantia, quia non dicit haec duo, videlicet carnem et sanguinem, invisibilia *simpliciter*[^4], sed prout sunt *sub Sacramento contenta.* — Nec illud quod obiicit de illarum unionum disconvenientia, quia non vult dicere, quod illa sint omnino similia, sed quod similitudinem habent quantum ad tria praedicta[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item circa tertiam opinionem, quae ibi ponitur: *Sunt et alii, qui in incarnatione Verbi* etc., notandum, quod tria insinuantur in littera illius opinionis, quae valde sunt improbabilia. (*In 3. opinione tria improbabilia.*)

Primum vero, cum dicit: *Ex carne et anima aliquam substantiam compositam diffitentur.* (*Primum.*) Et illud convincitur esse[^6] improbabile, quoniam ex forma et materia resultat unum compositum. Si ergo anima habet naturalem inclinationem ad corpus sicut ad propriam materiam, quam perficit; necessarium erat, ex anima et carne in Christo aliquod tertium constitui. Illud autem aut est *substantia*, aut *accidens*; accidens non; constat, quia substantia non est pars accidentis[^7]: necesse est igitur, quod fiat inde substantia.

Aliud improbabile est in hoc quod dicit: *Illis duobus velut indumento Verbum Dei vestiretur, ut mortalium oculis congruenter appareret.* (*Secundum.*) Si enim hoc verum esset, cum anima non appareat oculis, non assumsisset animam. Et iterum, si Christus apparebat esse homo, et non erat verus homo, alius apparebat, quam esset: ergo aliqua falsitas et aliqua deceptio fuit in Christo, quod omnino absurdissimum est. Veritas enim nec falli potest nec fallere[^8].
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Item, tertium improbabile est in hoc quod dicit, illa *duo in singularitatem personae Verbum Dei assumsisse, quia illis duobus accidentibus non est personarum numerus auctus.* (*Tertium.*) Si enim hoc verum esset, cum columba, in qua Spiritus sanctus apparuit, non auxerit numerum personarum in divinis; assumta est[^1b] in unitatem personae, quod nefarium est dicere. Et iterum, cum aliqua anima unitur Deo per voluntatis conformitatem, et nullo modo ex hoc crescat in Trinitate numerus personarum; quaelibet anima sancta assumeretur a Verbo in unitatem personae: ergo quilibet Sanctus esset Deus, quod quidem dicere est omnino perversum.

Et propterea iste modus dicendi, sicut ex littera[^2b] colligitur, repudiatus est tanquam erroneus; (*Reprobatur opinio.*) nec credendum est, Magistrum fuisse de opinione ista, nec dicere hoc asserendo vel approbando, sed aliorum opinionem recitando. (*Excusatur Magister.*) Hanc autem opinionem, sicut et alias, nec omnino reprobat nec omnino approbat. Nondum enim claruerat eius falsitas, maxime cum videatur super verba Sanctorum esse fundata[^3b].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Multis modis habitum dicimus* etc. Primo enim distinguit habitum in tria membra; secundo vero distinguit alia distinctione per quatuor membra: igitur vel una est *superflua*, vel altera *diminuta*. — Item, videntur aliqua membra secundae divisionis esse impossibilia. Dicit enim, quod *quaedam accedunt*[^4b]*, quae mutant, sed non mutantur, sicut sapientia.* Hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia, si ex aliquo accidente adveniente mutatur subiectum, videtur, quod ipsum multo magis debeat dici mutatum, quia de *ente in potentia* fit *ens in actu.* — Item, aliud membrum similiter, quod dicit, quod *quaedam accedunt, quae nec mutant nec mutantur*, videtur impossibile. Nihil enim novum acquiri potest sine aliqua mutatione acquirentis, vel acquisiti: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua differentia habitus introducatur in esse, qua[^5b] non fiat mutatio in habito, vel habente.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus[^6b] distinguit habitum dupliciter: uno modo in se per differentias proprias, quae respiciunt habitum quantum ad esse. (*Primus modus distinguendi tripliciter.*) Et istae sunt tres. Omne enim quod habetur, aut habetur *interius*, aut *exterius*, aut *partim interius, partim exterius.* Si omnino interius; sic dicimus habitum animae, ut scientiam et disciplinam. Si omnino exterius; sic dicimus habitum eorum quae exterius corpori accommodantur, sicut esse vestitum et calceatum. Si quodam modo interius, et quodam modo exterius; sic dicimus alium alio validiorem vel fortiorem. Et hoc quasi tenet medium inter differentias duas prius positas. (*Notandum.*) Et ad istas tres differentias reduci possunt septem illi modi habendi, quos assignat Philosophus in Postpraedicamentis[^7b].

Sed quia iste modus distinguendi parum valet ad propositum, ideo sumit Augustinus alium modum distinguendi per quatuor membra, qui respicit ipsum habitum quantum ad *fieri.* (*Secundus modus distinguendi quadrupliciter.*) Et haec divisio est quadrimembris secundum quatuor combinationes[^8b] sufficientes et immediatas. Omne enim quod accedit alicui, aut *mutat tantum et non mutatur*, sicut sapientia; aut *mutat et mutatur*, ut cibus; aut *nec mutat nec mutatur*, ut anulus; aut *mutatur, sed non mutat*, ut vestimentum. — Et illud quartum membrum valet ad propositum, et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum. (*Ad 1. obiectionem.*) Istae enim quatuor differentiae reducuntur ad illas tres; ideo nec istae sunt superfluae, nec illae diminutae.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia mutat, sed non mutatur; (*Ad 2. obi.*) dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod quis fiat *sapiens*, concurrit sapientia creata et increata, sicut ad hoc, quod fiat *gratus*, concurrit caritas creata et increata. Cum autem Augustinus dicit, quod « sapientia non mutatur »; non intelligit de sapientia *creata*, quae est accidens animae, sed de sapientia *increata.* — Et hoc frequenter advertendum est in verbis Augustini, cum loquitur de sapientia et gratia, quia modo loquitur de increata, modo de creata. (*Notandum de August.*) — Potest etiam hoc verbum intelligi de sapientia *creata.* (*Aliter.*) Sed tunc non loquitur Augustinus de quocumque genere mutationis, sed de illa mutatione, quae est de una dispositione ad alteram, utpote de mutatione, quae est secundum *formam*; et tunc non habet instantiam in sapientia, quia sapientia accidens non alteratur, quamvis sapiens secundum illam alteretur[^9b].
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Et per hoc patet tertium obiectum: (*Ad 3. obi.*) non enim excludit omnem motum Augustinus, sed illum motum alterationis, qui est secundum qualitatem absolutam. Haec autem non est in coniunctione anuli ad digitum, sed solum quae est mutatio secundum locum vel situm[^1c].

---

english:
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry about what he says, that *the Sacrifice of the Church consists of two things, the visible species of the elements and the invisible flesh and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ.* For in this statement[^1] there seems, first, to be an insufficiency, because to the constitution of the Sacrament of the altar not only two things concur, but rather three, namely, the exterior element, the true body of Christ, and the mystical body of Christ. — Likewise, there seems to be a repugnance in his statement, when he says *the invisible flesh and blood*; for flesh and blood are truly bodies: therefore they are also truly visible. If, then, the flesh of Christ was true, it remains, therefore, that it was visible. — Likewise, third, it seems that this likeness is unfitting, since *the Sacrament* and *the reality of the Sacrament* do not concur into the unity of a person, in the way that God and man do: therefore a right assimilation does not seem to be made there.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the Sacrament of the altar there is a twofold reality, namely, that which is both signified and contained, and that which is signified only. And Augustine[^2] in this passage does not speak of the reality that is signified only, of which kind is the mystical body of Christ, but of the reality both signified and contained, of which kind is the true body of Christ. For this alone is what bears on the matter, namely, on understanding the mystery of the union and incarnation, and this on account of the likeness found on both sides. (*Note.*)

Now there is found there a threefold likeness, namely, with respect to the unity of the extremes, with respect to the distinction or diversity, and with respect to the end or usefulness. (*Threefold likeness.*) For just as in the Sacrament of the altar there is a visible species and the invisible flesh of Christ, insofar as it is under that Sacrament; so in Christ there is a true sensible human nature, and the divine, which is only intelligible. — There is a likeness also with respect to the distinction, since the exterior visible species and the interior reality do not concur to constitute one thing by nature, but they concur into one Sacrament, which is one by the order and relation of sign to signified. So too in Christ the divine nature and the human do not constitute some third thing, but are united into one hypostasis, which is the supposit of both natures, and in which each nature is substantiated in its own way. And with respect to this there is not an entire likeness, but partly likeness and partly unlikeness. — Third, there is a likeness, because, just as the reality of the Sacrament is united to the exterior sign, so that through it it may be known and turned to true usefulness; so the divine nature is united to the human, so that it might be known in it; and hence it is also that such a unity[^3] is like that union by which the word is joined to the voice itself, so that it can be known by others.

And through this the response to the objections is clear. For what he objects about insufficiency does not hold, since for the matter at hand those two members suffice. — Nor does what he objects about repugnance hold, because he does not call these two, namely the flesh and blood, invisible *simply*[^4], but insofar as they are *contained under the Sacrament.* — Nor does that which he objects about the disconvenience of those unions, because he does not mean to say that they are entirely alike, but that they have a likeness with respect to the three things aforesaid[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise, concerning the third opinion, which is set down there: *There are also others who, in the incarnation of the Word,* etc., it is to be noted that three things are insinuated in the text of that opinion which are very much improbable. (*In the third opinion three improbable things.*)

The first indeed, when he says: *They acknowledge from the flesh and the soul some composite substance.* (*The first.*) And that is shown to be[^6] improbable, since from form and matter there results one composite. If, then, the soul has a natural inclination toward the body as toward its proper matter, which it perfects; it was necessary that from the soul and the flesh in Christ some third thing be constituted. But that is either *a substance* or *an accident*; an accident it is not; this is established, because a substance is not a part of an accident[^7]: it is necessary, therefore, that thence a substance be made.

Another improbable thing is in what he says: *That by those two, as by a garment, the Word of God was clothed, so that he might appear fittingly to mortal eyes.* (*The second.*) For if this were true, since the soul does not appear to the eyes, he would not have assumed a soul. And again, if Christ appeared to be a man, and was not a true man, another appeared than he was: therefore there was some falsity and some deception in Christ, which is altogether most absurd. For Truth can neither be deceived nor deceive[^8].
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Likewise, the third improbable thing is in what he says, that the *two were assumed into the singularity of the person of the Word of God, because by those two accidents the number of persons was not increased.* (*The third.*) For if this were true, since the dove, in which the Holy Spirit appeared, did not increase the number of persons in the divine; [yet] it was assumed[^1b] into the unity of the person, which it is nefarious to say. And again, since some soul is united to God by conformity of will, and in no way does the number of persons in the Trinity thereby increase; any holy soul would be assumed by the Word into the unity of the person: therefore any saint would be God, which indeed to say is altogether perverse.

And therefore this manner of speaking, as is gathered from the text[^2b], has been repudiated as erroneous; (*The opinion is reproved.*) nor is it to be believed that the Master was of this opinion, nor that he says this asserting or approving it, but rehearsing the opinion of others. (*The Master is excused.*) But this opinion, like the others also, he neither wholly reproves nor wholly approves. For its falsity had not yet become clear, especially since it seemed to be founded upon the words of the Saints[^3b].

### Doubt III.

Likewise, there is inquiry about what he says: *In many ways we speak of "habit,"* etc. For first he distinguishes habit into three members; but second he distinguishes by another division into four members: therefore either the one is *superfluous*, or the other *deficient*. — Likewise, some members of the second division seem to be impossible. For he says that *certain things accrue*[^4b]*, which change but are not changed, as wisdom.* This seems to be impossible, because, if by some accruing accident a subject is changed, it seems that the subject itself much more ought to be called changed, because from *being in potency* it becomes *being in act.* — Likewise, another member similarly, where he says that *certain things accrue, which neither change nor are changed*, seems impossible. For nothing new can be acquired without some change of the acquirer or of the acquired: therefore it is impossible that some difference of habit be introduced into being, by which[^5b] there be made no change in the thing had, or in the haver.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine[^6b] distinguishes habit in two ways: in one way in itself, through proper differences which regard the habit with respect to *being.* (*The first way of distinguishing, threefold.*) And these are three. For everything that is had is had either *interiorly*, or *exteriorly*, or *partly interiorly, partly exteriorly.* If wholly interiorly; thus we speak of a habit of the soul, as knowledge and discipline. If wholly exteriorly; thus we speak of a habit of those things which are accommodated to the body exteriorly, as being clothed and shod. If in a certain way interiorly, and in a certain way exteriorly; thus we speak of one [as] stronger or mightier than another. And this holds, as it were, the mean between the two differences set down before. (*Note.*) And to these three differences can be reduced those seven modes of having which the Philosopher assigns in the *Postpredicaments*[^7b].

But because this way of distinguishing avails little for the matter at hand, therefore Augustine takes another way of distinguishing through four members, which regards the habit itself with respect to its *coming-to-be.* (*The second way of distinguishing, fourfold.*) And this division is four-membered according to four sufficient and immediate combinations[^8b]. For everything that accrues to something either *changes only and is not changed*, as wisdom; or *changes and is changed*, as food; or *neither changes nor is changed*, as a ring; or *is changed, but does not change*, as clothing. — And that fourth member avails for the matter at hand, and through this the response to the first objection is clear. (*To the first objection.*) For these four differences are reduced to those three; therefore neither are these superfluous, nor those deficient.

To that which is objected, that wisdom changes but is not changed; (*To the second objection.*) it must be said that for this, that someone become *wise*, created and uncreated wisdom concur, just as for this, that he become *pleasing [to God]*, created and uncreated charity concur. But when Augustine says that « wisdom is not changed »; he does not understand it of *created* wisdom, which is an accident of the soul, but of *uncreated* wisdom. — And this is frequently to be noted in the words of Augustine, when he speaks of wisdom and grace, because now he speaks of the uncreated, now of the created. (*Note concerning Augustine.*) — This statement can also be understood of *created* wisdom. (*Otherwise.*) But then Augustine is not speaking of any kind of change whatsoever, but of that change which is from one disposition to another, as for example of the change which is according to *form*; and then it has no instance in wisdom, because wisdom, an accident, is not altered, although the wise person is altered according to it[^9b].
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And through this the third objection is clear: (*To the third objection.*) for Augustine does not exclude every motion, but that motion of alteration which is according to absolute quality. But this is not in the conjoining of a ring to a finger, but only that which is a change according to place or situation[^1c].

---

la: Pro *suo* edd. *secundo.*

en: Instead of *suo* (his), the editions read *secundo* (second).

la: Ex cuius verbis textus huius dubii sumtus est; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: From whose words the text of this doubt is taken; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Codd. K Z bb *unio.* Paulo inferius pro *primo obiicit* codd. A B F G I L X *ostendit*, codd. C M O *ostenditur*, cod. bb *dicit.*

en: Codices K, Z, bb read *unio* (union). A little below, instead of *primo obiicit* (he first objects) codices A B F G I L X read *ostendit*, codices C M O *ostenditur*, codex bb *dicit.*

la: Codd. A E G I L N T X aa minus congrue *non simpliciter.*

en: Codices A E G I L N T X aa, less fittingly, *non simpliciter* (not simply).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 2. q. I.

en: Cf. *Sentences*, Book IV, dist. 8, part II, art. 2, q. 1.

la: Edd. *et illud communiter est.*

en: The editions read *et illud communiter est* (and that commonly is).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 154, nota 8.

en: Cf. above, p. 154, note 8.

la: Vide supra d. 2. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

en: See above, dist. 2, art. 2, q. 1 and following.

la: Cfr. supra d. I. dub. 1. — Pro *assumta est* Vat. *assumta esset.*

en: Cf. above, dist. 1, doubt 1. — Instead of *assumta est* (it was assumed) the Vatican edition reads *assumta esset* (it would have been assumed).

la: Hic c. 4. seq. et d. VII. c. 2. seq. — Mox pro *repudiatus* cod. U *repudiandus.*

en: Here, c. 4 and following, and dist. VII, c. 2 and following. — Soon, instead of *repudiatus* (repudiated) codex U reads *repudiandus* (to be repudiated).

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 3. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: See above, art. 1, q. 3. — On this doubt cf. Blessed Albert, here, art. 8; St. Thomas, here, on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the text.

la: Codd. U Z bb et alii hic et paulo inferius *accidunt* pro *accedunt.* Mox pro *quia si* plurimi codd. vitiose *quia etsi.*

en: Codices U Z bb and others here and a little below read *accidunt* (befall) instead of *accedunt* (accrue). Soon, instead of *quia si* (because if) very many codices read corruptly *quia etsi* (because even if).

la: Pro *qua* edd. *quod* et subinde *in habitu* pro *in habito.*

en: Instead of *qua* (by which) the editions read *quod*, and thereupon *in habitu* instead of *in habito* (in the thing had).

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 73. n. 1., unde sumtus est textus huius dubii.

en: *Book of 83 Questions*, q. 73, n. 1, whence the text of this doubt is taken.

la: Cap. de Habere. De Postpraedicamentis Aristoteles tractat in tertia parte sui libri, qui inscribitur de Praedicamentis. Postquam in prima istius libri parte egit de Antepraedicamentis i. e. de quibusdam suppositis ad Praedicamentorum doctrinam conferentibus v. gr. de definitione aequivocorum, univocorum etc., et in secunda de Praedicamentis i. e. substantia, quantitate, relatione, actione et passione; in tertia, ut diximus, agit de Postpraedicamentis i. e. de quibusdam consequentibus ad ipsa praedicamenta v. gr. de oppositione, de priori, simul, habere etc. Octo qui in cap. de Habere assignantur modi habendi a Petro Hispano hoc disticho exprimuntur: *Affectum [qualitatem v. gr. virtutem] quantum, vestitum, dic velut aurum [anulum in digito], Membrum, contentum [in vase], possessum, vir mulierem.* De octavo horum modorum Aristot. profitetur, quod « modus alienissimus est eius quod est habere; nihil enim aliud uxorem habere significamur, quam quod cohabitant ». — Codd. A F I L N aa *in Praedicamentis.*

en: Chapter "On Having." Aristotle treats of the Postpredicaments in the third part of his book entitled *On the Predicaments [Categories].* After, in the first part of that book, he treated of the Antepredicaments, i.e. of certain things presupposed and conducing to the doctrine of the Predicaments, e.g. on the definition of equivocals, univocals, etc., and in the second part of the Predicaments themselves, i.e. substance, quantity, relation, action, and passion; in the third, as we said, he treats of the Postpredicaments, i.e. of certain things consequent upon the predicaments themselves, e.g. on opposition, on the prior, the simultaneous, having, etc. The eight modes of having which are assigned in the chapter "On Having" are expressed by Peter of Spain in this distich: *Disposition [quality, e.g. virtue], quantity, the clothed — say [it] as gold [a ring on the finger], member, content [in a vessel], the possessed, a man a woman.* Concerning the eighth of these modes Aristotle declares that « it is the most alien mode of that which is having; for by 'having a wife' we are signified nothing else than that they cohabit ». — Codices A F I L N aa read *in Praedicamentis* (in the Predicaments).

la: Codd. M O *conditiones.* Mox pro *Omne* codd. A B C D E M O Z cc *Esse*, edd. *Hoc.* Subinde pro *accedit* codd. N U *accidit.*

en: Codices M O read *conditiones* (conditions). Soon, instead of *Omne* (everything) codices A B C D E M O Z cc read *Esse* (being), the editions *Hoc* (this). Thereupon, instead of *accedit* (accrues) codices N U read *accidit* (befalls).

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. dub. 2. et 1. — Codd. A G I L N T U aa *secundum illum*, cod. P *secundum illud.* Aliquanto inferius pro *Haec [alteratio] autem* plurimi codd. *Hoc autem.*

en: Cf. *Sentences*, Book I, dist. 37, part II, doubts 2 and 1. — Codices A G I L N T U aa read *secundum illum* (according to him), codex P *secundum illud* (according to it). Somewhat below, instead of *Haec [alteratio] autem* (but this [alteration]) very many codices read *Hoc autem* (but this).

la: Cfr. de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.

en: Cf. on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, here, on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 5. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.164–166 (PDF 186–188; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right per the Vol II/III override, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 11836–11981). The OCR is reasonably clean here but heavily fragments the running heads and footers; the PDF column bands are authoritative for the footer apparatus and the marginal labels.

**Structure.** This is the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` block closing DISTINCTIO VI. **3 dubia verified eyes-on** against the PDF column bands and raw OCR: **Dub. I** (raw 11838, p.164-L — on *Sacrificium Ecclesiae duobus constare*: twofold reality signified-and-contained vs signified-only; threefold likeness extremes/distinction/end); **Dub. II** (raw 11854, foot of p.164-R → p.165-L — on the third opinion's *Sunt et alii qui in incarnatione Verbi*: three improbable points — composite substance, garment-clothing, no increase in number of persons; the opinion repudiated, the Master excused as merely rehearsing); **Dub. III** (raw 11926, foot of p.165-L → p.166-L — on *Multis modis habitum dicimus*: reconciles Augustine's threefold (per *esse*) and fourfold (per *fieri*) divisions of habit, with the Postpredicaments/ring analogy). `type: dubia`, **no articulus/quaestio frontmatter, no scholion** — verified that NO `SCHOLION` header prints anywhere in the block before DISTINCTIO VII. `has_scholion: false`.

**Page-split map (apparatus, 18 entries — Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page):**
- **p.164** (`SENTENTIARUM LIB. III. / DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` running head) — notes 1–8 → `[^1]`–`[^8]`. Markers: *verbo¹* (Pro *suo* edd. *secundo*), *Augustinus²*, *unitas³* (Codd. unio), *simpliciter⁴*, *praedicta⁵* (IV Sent. d.8), *esse⁶* (Edd. *et illud communiter est*), *accidentis⁷* (cf. p.154 n.8), *fallere⁸* (d.2 a.2 q.1).
- **p.165** (`DIST. VI. DUBIA.` running head) — notes 1–9 → `[^1b]`–`[^9b]`. Markers: *assumta est¹ᵇ* (d.1 dub.1; Vat. *assumta esset*), *littera²ᵇ*, *fundata³ᵇ* (a.1 q.3; Albert/Thom/Richard), *accedunt⁴ᵇ* (codd. *accidunt*), *qua⁵ᵇ*, *Augustinus⁶ᵇ* (Libr. 83 Qq. q.73), *Postpraedicamentis⁷ᵇ* (the long Aristotle/Peter-of-Spain distich note), *combinationes⁸ᵇ*, *altereturᵇ⁹* (I Sent. d.37 p.II).
- **p.166** (`SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` running head) — dubia note 1 → `[^1c]`. Marker *situm¹ᶜ* (Cfr. de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar. / Richard / Aegid. R.).

**Footer hand-off.** PICKED UP from d6-a2-q3: **NONE** (q3's p.162 nn.1–5 + p.163 nn.1–9 fully exhausted; the dubia block opens its own per-page footer sequences). FORWARDED: **NONE** — the dubia's footers are fully exhausted at `[^1c]` (p.166 dubia note 1, the *anulus*/Ad-3 *situm* reference).

**Boundary lock at DISTINCTIO VII (raw 11982).** Dub. III ends at the **top of p.166-L** (`Ad 3. obi.` ... *secundum locum vel situm*, just 3 lines), after which **DISTINCTIO VII begins immediately** on p.166 (`Cap. I. Deinde quae singulis sententiis adversari videntur, ponit` → *Secundum primam vero dicitur: Deus factus homo* — the Lombard littera of dist. 7). **Confirmed NO footer leak into d.7:** the dist. 7 littera footers print under a separate `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` header at the foot of p.166-L (notes 1–6: *In Epist. ad Rom. 1, 3, n.5 (Patrolog. Graec. t.14)* etc.) — these belong to **d7-littera**, not the dubia. The single dubia footer on p.166 (`Cfr. de hoc dub. Petr. a Tar. …`, captured here as `[^1c]`) sits **above** the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` rule.

**DISTINCTIO VI is now COMPLETE** (9/9 chunks: littera, divisio, a1-q1/q2/q3, a2-q1/q2/q3, dubia).

**`[?]` flags:** none.