title: Dist. 31, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Pars II)

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de situ huius partis, quia cum Magister agat de appropriatione distinctione trigesima quarta, et de appropriatis distinctione trigesima quinta usque ad finem, videtur, quod male situet hic[^1] tractatum de appropriatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplici de causa ponit hic Magister tractatum de appropriatis. Una *[Ratio 1]* est, quia egerat de nominibus, quae dicunt relationem secundum[^2] relationem communem, secundum quae attenditur appropriatio, sicut sunt *similis* et *aequalis*; et ita incidenter haec pars hic introducitur. Alia *[Ratio 2]* ratio est, quia appropriata faciunt ad evidentiam propriorum; et ideo statim post tractatum de propriis, egit de appropriatis, et hoc maxime prout faciunt ad evidentiam propriorum. Ideo de his agit hic, quae non dicunt respectum ad creaturas; infra vero agit de his appropriatis, quae respectum ad creaturas dicunt: et ita patet distinctio huius partis ab illa. Unde tria appropriata Hilarii manifestant nobis personarum emanationem, tria vero appropriata Augustini nobis manifestant personarum ordinem, si quis inspiciat.

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#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *est ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis* etc. Videtur enim maledicere, quia unusquisque, non intellecta arte, est iners: ergo si Filius est ars Patris, non intellecto Filio esse, Pater est iners: ergo videtur, quod rationabiliter operari habeat Pater a Filio suo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo, quia non dicit, quod sit *ars* simpliciter, sed quod sit *ars quaedam*, quia non est ars, qua Pater novit, sed *ubi* novit; non est ars Patris, qua Pater sit sapiens, sed quae est a Patre sapiente, per quam Pater omnia operatur, quia omnia produxit per Filium. Et notandum *[Quid sit ars]*, quod cum *ars* includat intentionem virtutis et sapientiae, et similiter et *verbum*; tamen differenter, quia verbum dicit emanationem et respectum, ideo est proprium, ars autem appropriatum.

#### DUB. III.[^3]

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus *ingenti largitate perfundit ceteras creaturas*; ergo secundum hoc videtur, quod omnibus donetur Spiritus sanctus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus non dicitur *dari*[^4] ratione cuiuslibet effectus, sed proprie ratione eius, qui facit Spiritum sanctum haberi et ita inhabitare in aliquo ut in templo[^5]. Et quia huiusmodi sola rationalis creatura capax est, et soli iusti capiunt; ideo patet, quod illis solis Spiritus sanctus datur. Ideo autem Spiritus sanctus dicitur perfundere ceteras creaturas, non quia ei attribuatur actus creandi, sed quia attribuitur ei actus conservandi.

#### DUB. IV.[^6]

Item quaeritur de ratione Hilarii, quae ponitur in notula: *Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens.* Primo videtur ratio ista non esse convertibilis, quia totum videtur convenire Spiritui sancto. — Item, *species* aut accipitur essentialiter, aut personaliter. Si essentialiter: ergo idem sensus est qui est[^7] *species indifferens*, qui etiam est, si diceretur *essentia indifferens*; sed hoc convenit Patri, non tantum Filio. Et iterum, essentia non dicitur ut alicuius. Si stat pro persona: ergo idem sensus est *species indifferens*, qui est, cum dicitur *persona indifferens*, hoc autem falsum.

Item de secunda ratione obiicitur, quae talis[^8] est: *Imago est rei ad rem coaequandam imaginata et indiscreta*[^9] *similitudo.* Videtur enim falsa, quia frequenter imago non aequatur ei cuius est imago. — Item, si est ad rem coaequandam, tunc videtur esse aequalitas, non similitudo. — Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit *indistincta similitudo*, quoniam omnis imago et similitudo distinguitur ab eo cuius est imago.

Item, cum unius rei una sit definitio[^10], quaeritur, quomodo differenter istae rationes assignentur?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic definitur imago *[Ad quaesitum I]* increata, prout est proprium solius Filii, et sic semper dicit respectum ad Patrem; et in prima ratione ponitur genitivus ut in ratione principii, in secunda ponitur ut in ratione termini: quoniam imago habet comparari ad Patrem, non solum tanquam ad aliquem, ad quem sive in quem ducit[^11], sed etiam *a quo* emanat. Et ita patet harum rationum distinctio et ordo.

Et prima ratio tres conditiones continet. Per *[Per 1. rationem]* primam notatur Filius esse ab alio — cum dicitur *imago eius rei, ad quam imaginatur* — et per genitivum, et verbum, quod est passivum. Per secundam notatur, quod est secundum modum expressum[^12] emanandi, scilicet per hoc quod dicitur *species*, quae includit perfectam similitudinem cognoscendi.

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Per tertiam vero notatur, quod sit *indifferens* secundum substantiam, scilicet per hoc quod est *indifferens*. Et per primam conditionem differt et ab essentia et a Patre, per secundam a Spiritu sancto, per tertiam ab imagine creata.

Et per hoc patet[^13], quod *species*, etsi de se sit essentiale, tamen accipitur hic ut tractum ad personam; et *indifferens* non dicit indistinctionem in hoc nomine *species*, sed in substantia. Et sic patent obiecta de ratione prima.

Hac visa, similiter patet ratio secunda, quae datur in comparatione ad ipsum Patrem ut ad terminum *[Ad 2. rationem]*. Et hoc patet, cum dicitur *ad rem coaequandam* rei, id est personam Filii personae Patris, et per hoc excluditur persona Patris; per hoc quod dicitur *imaginata*, excluditur persona Spiritus sancti; per hoc quod dicitur *indiscreta*, excluditur ipsa imago creata, et *indiscreta* non dicit indifferentiam personalem, sed solum essentialem.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de aequalitate *[Coaequatio non in creata imagine]*, dicendum, quod illud non est necessarium de creata imagine. Et rursus, quoniam imago de ratione sui nominis dicit qualitatem in quantitate, ideo[^14] prima dicitur similitudo *ad rem coaequandam*, id est similitudo, secundum quam res coaequatur rei.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de differentia horum trium, quae attribuit[^15], scilicet *speciem, naturam* et *essentiam*, quomodo haec distinguantur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod uniuscuiusque forma substantialis et completiva dicitur *species, natura* et *essentia*, et hoc *[Species, natura, et essentia ad invicem]* secundum triplicem considerationem. Potest[^16] enim considerari in se, et sic dicitur *essentia*; potest considerari in comparatione ad operationem propriam, et sic dicitur *natura*; potest iterum considerari in comparatione ad nostram cognitionem, et sic dicitur *species*[^17]. Speciem habet imago auctoris, eo quod similitudo est eius; naturam autem habet, quia similitudo genita vel imaginata naturaliter; essentiam vero, quia similitudo indiscreta, scilicet per substantiam.

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si quis innascibilem et sine initio dicat Filium*. Videtur enim, quod Hilarius non dicat bene, quod qui dicit duos innascibiles, dicit duos deos; quia innascibilitas in divinis non est proprietas essentiae, sed personae: ergo non sequitur, quod si sunt duo innascibiles, quod duae essentiae, sed quod duae personae. — Item, innascibilitas dicit privationem eius quod est natus, unde tantum valet *innascibilis*, quantum *non-filius*; sed non sequitur: sunt duo filii in divinis, ergo duo dii: ergo pari ratione non sequitur, sunt duo innascibiles, ergo duo dii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *innascibilis*, sicut *[Defenditur ratio Hilarii]* supra dictum est[^18], privat sive negat *esse ab alio*, et ex hoc ponit fontalem plenitudinem in illo qui *innascibilis* dicitur; et ex utraque parte concluditur, quod si sint duo innascibiles, quod sunt duo dii. Sequitur enim: sunt duo, quorum quilibet non est ab alio, ergo non distinguuntur per originem: ergo necesse est, quod distinguantur per substantiam. Item, si sunt duo, in quorum quolibet est fontalis plenitudo: ergo quilibet potest esse Trinitatis principium et est «principium totius deitatis»[^19], sicut dicitur de Patre. Sed si principia sunt distincta, et principiata: ergo si quilibet est principium totius deitatis, et sunt duo: ergo duae deitates. Quamvis ergo *ingenitus* non sit proprietas substantiae, sed personae, quia tamen est primae personae, et in unica persona non potest esse nisi una innascibilitas: ideo de necessitate ponit deorum diversitatem[^20].

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Caput enim omnium Filius est*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut dicitur *caput* ratione deitatis, aut ratione conformitatis in natura. Si ratione deitatis, eadem ratione Spiritus sanctus potest dici caput. Item, si ratione deitatis, tunc Filii caput non potest dici Deus, quia caput superexcellit et maioritatem tenet nobilitatis, quam non habet Pater respectu Filii. Si tu dicas, quod *caput* non dicit nobilitatem sive superexcellentiam; obiicitur ex littera sequenti ubi dicitur: «hoc gradu omnia referuntur»; sed constat, quod inter Patrem et Filium ratione deitatis non est gradus: ergo non potest accipi ratione deitatis. — Si ratione conformitatis, cum Filius non habeat conformitatem in natura cum omnibus, sed tantum cum hominibus, non erit caput omnium.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *caput*, secundum quod proprie accipitur, importat rationem influentiae et conformitatis naturae: et sic dicitur Christus caput esse totius Ecclesiae; sed Hilarius extensiori modo accipit, prout *caput* dicit originale principium. Et quoniam Deus Pater est principium Filii, et Filius principium omnium, ita quod Filius producitur et producit, ideo est caput, et habet caput. Sed Pater, quoniam caput non habet, cum sit innascibilis, est caput omnium: et ideo dicitur fontale principium, a quo omnia et in quem omnia per Filium reducuntur. Et in hac reductione gradus est, comparando creaturas ad Filium; sed ultra comparando Filium ad Patrem non est gradus, sed ordo et origo. Et ideo Hilarius non dicit *his gradibus*, sed *hoc gradu*. — Quod obiicitur de Spiritu sancto, dicendum, quod ipse Spiritus sanctus, cum procedat a Filio, per Filium cum aliis ad Patrem reducitur: et propterea Filio appropriatur reductio.

#### DUB. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ut sint per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum*[^21], quia videtur haec confessio fidei non esse conveniens, quia de tribus hominibus concordantibus[^22] potest illud dici, quod per substantiam sunt tria, per consonantiam vero unum.

Item quaeritur de ratione Hilarii, qua dicit, quod debet dici *per consonantiam* propter Spiritum sanctum, quia scilicet, Spiritu sancto nominato, consonantiae potius quam essentiae praedicari convenit unitatem. Videtur enim istud falsum, quia Spiritus sanctus est eiusdem essentiae cum Patre, sicut Filius.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Hilarius intendit ostendere catholicam Patrum confessionem cum dixerunt, quod «sunt per substantiam tria, per consonantiam unum». Sancti enim Patres, volentes elidere haeresim Sabellianam — quae elidebat[^23], id est evacuabat veritatem Patris et Filii per nominationem solam, quam dicebat ibi esse, non rem — confessi sunt adeo expresse pluralitatem, ut minus expresse confiterentur essentiae unitatem; non tamen recesserunt a veritate, quia per *tres res* intelliguntur, id est tres hypostases; per *substantiam*[^24] vero non *usia* intelligitur, sed *persona*: et ideo ex hac parte verum dixerunt. — Ex parte consonantiae similiter verum dixerunt et irreprehensibiliter. Nam, sicut per Patris et Filii nomen innuitur unitas naturae, quia Filius est connaturalis Patri, ita per Spiritum sanctum, qui est amor, datur intelligi unitas consonantiae. Et ideo verbum non habebat calumniam, et propter hoc ipsum dixerunt: et hoc vult dicere Hilarius, cum dicit, quod potius consonantiae quam essentiae; non quia[^25] utrumque non sit verum, sed quia hoc est expressius et minorem habet calumniam. Tamen adhuc sequitur illud, quod si Pater et Filius unum ex se producunt spiritum, ratione cuius est ibi unitas per consonantiam, necesse est, quod unitatem habeant in essentia.

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english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the placement of this part: for since the Master treats of *appropriation* in the thirty-fourth distinction, and of the *appropriated [names]* from the thirty-fifth distinction to the end, it seems that he places the treatise on *appropriated [names]* badly here[^1].

**I respond:** It must be said that for a twofold cause the Master places the treatise on appropriated [names] here. One *[Reason 1]* is that he had been treating of names which signify a relation according to[^2] common relation, according to which appropriation is observed, such as *like* and *equal*; and so this part is incidentally introduced here. Another *[Reason 2]* reason is that the appropriated [names] serve to make manifest the proper [names]; and therefore immediately after the treatise on the proper [names], he treated of the appropriated [names], and especially insofar as they serve to manifest the proper ones. Therefore he treats here of those that do not signify a relation to creatures; below, however, he treats of those appropriated [names] which do signify a relation to creatures: and thus the distinction of this part from that one is plain. Whence the three appropriations of Hilary make manifest to us the *emanation* of the persons, while the three appropriations of Augustine make manifest to us the *order* of the persons, if anyone considers them.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that [the Son] *is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise* etc. For he seems to speak ill, since each one, when the art is not understood, is sluggish: therefore if the Son is the art of the Father, when the Son's being is not understood, the Father is sluggish: therefore it seems that the Father has rationally to operate from his Son.

**I respond:** It must be said that emphasis must be placed on the wording, because he does not say that he is *art* simply, but that he is *a certain art*, because he is not the art *by which* the Father knows, but [the art] *where* he knows; he is not the Father's art *by which* the Father is wise, but [the art] which is *from* the wise Father, through which the Father works all things, since he produced all things through the Son. And it should be noted *[What art is]* that, since *art* includes the intention of power and wisdom, and likewise also *the Word*; nevertheless they differ, because the Word signifies emanation and respect, and so it is *proper*, while *art* is *appropriated*.

#### DOUBT III.[^3]

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Holy Spirit *with a vast bounty pours forth upon the other creatures*; therefore according to this it seems that the Holy Spirit is given to all.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Holy Spirit is not said to be *given*[^4] by reason of any effect whatever, but properly by reason of him who causes the Holy Spirit to be possessed and so to indwell in someone as in a temple[^5]. And because the rational creature alone is capable of this, and only the just receive him; therefore it is plain that to those alone is the Holy Spirit given. The Holy Spirit is, however, said to pour forth upon the other creatures, not because the act of creating is attributed to him, but because the act of conserving is attributed to him.

#### DOUBT IV.[^6]

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, which is set down in the gloss: *An image is of that thing of which it is the image, an undifferentiated species*. First, that account seems not to be convertible, because the whole seems to fit the Holy Spirit. — Likewise, *species* is taken either essentially or personally. If essentially: then the same sense is the one that is[^7] *undifferentiated species*, which is also so if one were to say *undifferentiated essence*; but this fits the Father, not only the Son. And again, *essence* is not said as *of* something. If it stands for *person*: then the same sense is *undifferentiated species*, which is so when one says *undifferentiated person*, but this is false.

Likewise, against the second account it is objected, which is as such[^8]: *An image is a likeness imagined unto the equating of a thing to a thing, and undivided*[^9]. For it seems false, because frequently an image is not equated to that of which it is the image. — Likewise, if it is *unto the equating of a thing*, then it seems to be equality, not likeness. — Likewise, it seems false to say *undistinguished likeness*, since every image and likeness is distinguished from that of which it is the image.

Likewise, since of one thing there is one definition[^10], it is asked, how are these accounts assigned differently?

**I respond:** It must be said that here is defined the *uncreated* image *[To the first question]*, insofar as it belongs to the Son alone, and so it always signifies a relation to the Father; and in the first account the genitive is set down as in the account of *principle*, in the second it is set down as in the account of *term*: since the image must be compared to the Father not only as to one to whom or unto whom it leads[^11], but also as to one *from whom* it emanates. And thus the distinction and order of these accounts is plain.

And the first account contains three conditions. By *[By the first account]* the first, the Son is noted as being *from another* — when it is said *image of that thing of which it is the image* — and through the genitive, and the verb, which is passive. By the second is noted that it is according to an expressed[^12] mode of emanating, namely by the fact that it is called *species*, which includes a perfect likeness of cognition.

Through the third is noted that it is *undifferentiated* according to substance, namely by the fact that it is *undifferentiated*. And by the first condition it differs both from essence and from the Father, by the second from the Holy Spirit, by the third from the created image.

And by this it is plain[^13] that *species*, although in itself essential, is here taken as drawn over to the person; and *undifferentiated* does not signify indistinction in this name *species*, but in substance. And thus the objections against the first account are plain.

This being seen, the second account is similarly plain, which is given by comparison to the Father himself as to the *term* *[To the second account]*. And this is plain when it is said *unto the equating of a thing* to a thing, that is, of the person of the Son to the person of the Father, and by this the person of the Father is excluded; by what is said *imagined*, the person of the Holy Spirit is excluded; by what is said *undivided*, the created image itself is excluded, and *undivided* does not signify personal indifference, but only essential.

To that, then, which is objected concerning equality *[Equating not [present] in the created image]*, it must be said that this is not necessary in the case of the created image. And again, since *image* by reason of its very name signifies *quality in quantity*, therefore the first[^14] is called a likeness *unto the equating of a thing*, that is, a likeness according to which a thing is equated to a thing.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of these three which he attributes[^15], namely *species, nature*, and *essence*, how these are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that the substantial and completive form of each thing is called *species, nature*, and *essence*, and this *[Species, nature, and essence in relation to one another]* according to a threefold consideration. For it can[^16] be considered in itself, and so it is called *essence*; it can be considered in comparison to its own operation, and so it is called *nature*; it can again be considered in comparison to our cognition, and so it is called *species*[^17]. The image of the Author has *species*, because it is his likeness; it has *nature*, because [it is] a likeness begotten or imagined naturally; *essence* truly, because [it is] a likeness undivided, namely through substance.

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *If anyone should call the Son unbegotten and without beginning*. For it seems that Hilary does not say well, that one who says two unbegottens says two gods; because *unbegottenness* in divine things is not a property of the essence, but of the person: therefore it does not follow, if there are two unbegottens, that there are two essences, but [only] that there are two persons. — Likewise, *unbegottenness* signifies the privation of that which is begotten, whence *unbegotten* is worth as much as *non-son*; but it does not follow: there are two sons in divine things, therefore two gods: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow, there are two unbegottens, therefore two gods.

**I respond:** It must be said that *unbegotten*, as *[Hilary's reasoning is defended]* was said above[^18], denies or negates *being from another*, and from this it places fontal fullness in him who is called *unbegotten*; and from each side it is concluded that, if there be two unbegottens, there are two gods. For it follows: there are two, of whom each is not from another, therefore they are not distinguished by origin: therefore it is necessary that they be distinguished by substance. Likewise, if there are two, in each of whom there is fontal fullness: therefore each can be the principle of the Trinity and is «the principle of the whole deity»[^19], as is said of the Father. But if the principles are distinct, then so also are the things principled: therefore if each is the principle of the whole deity, and there are two, then there are two deities. Although, then, *unbegotten* is not a property of the substance, but of the person, since it is, however, [a property] of the first person, and in a single person there cannot be more than one unbegottenness: therefore of necessity it posits a diversity of gods[^20].

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *For the Son is the head of all*. For he seems to speak ill, because either he is called *head* by reason of the deity, or by reason of conformity in nature. If by reason of the deity, by the same reason the Holy Spirit can be called *head*. Likewise, if by reason of the deity, then God cannot be called the head of the Son, because the head surpasses and holds majority of nobility, which the Father does not have with respect to the Son. If you say that *head* does not signify nobility or surpassing-eminence; the objection is brought from the following text where it is said: «in this gradation all things are referred back»; but it is established that between Father and Son by reason of the deity there is no *gradation*: therefore it cannot be taken by reason of the deity. — If by reason of conformity, since the Son does not have conformity in nature with all things, but only with men, he will not be the head of all.

**I respond:** It must be said that *head*, according as it is properly taken, conveys the account of *influence* and of *conformity of nature*: and thus Christ is called the head of the whole Church; but Hilary takes [it] in a more extended way, insofar as *head* signifies *original principle*. And since God the Father is the principle of the Son, and the Son the principle of all things, in such wise that the Son is produced and produces, therefore he is *head*, and *has* a head. But the Father, since he does not have a head, being unbegotten, is the head of all: and therefore he is called *fontal principle*, from whom all things [proceed] and unto whom all things are led back through the Son. And in this leading-back there is *gradation*, comparing creatures to the Son; but further, comparing the Son to the Father, there is no *gradation*, but *order* and *origin*. And therefore Hilary does not say *by these gradations*, but *by this gradation*. — As to what is objected concerning the Holy Spirit, it must be said that the Holy Spirit himself, since he proceeds from the Son, through the Son together with the others is led back to the Father: and on this account the leading-back is appropriated to the Son.

#### DOUBT VIII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *That [they may be] three by substance, but one by consonance*[^21], because this confession of faith seems not to be fitting, because of three concordant[^22] men this can be said, that they are three by substance, but one by consonance.

Likewise it is asked concerning Hilary's account, by which he says that one ought to say *by consonance* on account of the Holy Spirit, namely because, the Holy Spirit having been named, it fits to predicate unity of consonance rather than of essence. For this seems false, since the Holy Spirit is of the same essence with the Father, just as the Son [is].

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary intends to show the catholic confession of the Fathers when they said that «they are three by substance, by consonance one». For the holy Fathers, wishing to dash the Sabellian heresy — which would dash[^23], that is, evacuate the truth of the Father and the Son by mere naming, which it said was there, but not the reality — confessed plurality so expressly that they confessed essential unity less expressly; nevertheless they did not depart from the truth, since by *three things* are understood, that is, three hypostases; by *substance*[^24] truly is understood not *ousia*, but *person*: and therefore on this side they spoke truly. — On the side of consonance similarly they spoke truly and irreprehensibly. For just as by the name *Father* and *Son* the unity of nature is intimated, since the Son is connatural to the Father, so by the *Holy Spirit*, who is love, is given to be understood the unity of consonance. And therefore the wording incurred no calumny, and on this account they said it: and this is what Hilary wishes to say when he says, *rather of consonance than of essence*; not because[^25] both are not true, but because this [way of speaking] is more express and incurs less calumny. Yet there still follows this, that if the Father and the Son produce the Spirit one from themselves, by reason of which there is unity *by consonance* there, it is necessary that they have unity *in essence*.

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la: Cod. bb *hunc*.

en: Codex bb reads *hunc*.

la: Cod. T omittit *relationem. secundum*. Mox pro *quae* Vat., plerisque codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *quam*.

en: Codex T omits *relationem. secundum*. Shortly after, in place of *quae*, the Vatican edition reads *quam*, with most of the codices and ed. 1 standing against [it].

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. 1.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Bl. Albert, here a. 1.

la: Cod. W *rationem*.

en: Codex W reads *rationem*.

la: Cfr. *Breviloq.* p. I. c. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 39. a. 8.

en: Cf. *Breviloquium* p. I, c. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — St. Thomas, *Summa* p. I, q. 39, a. 8.

la: Vide supra d. 11 a. 2. q. 1, et d. 18. p. II. q. 1[?]. — Paulo post ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 restituimus vocem *sola*, a Vat. suppressam. Absque auctoritate codd. Vat. hoc dubium cum praecedenti transponit post dubium quintum.

en: See above d. 11, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 18, p. II, q. 1[?]. — Shortly after, from the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we restored the word *sola*, suppressed by the Vatican edition. Without the authority of the codices, the Vatican edition transposes this doubt together with the preceding one to after the fifth doubt.

la: Codd. dd ee omittunt *qui est*. Mox pro *etiam est* Vat. *esset etiam*.

en: Codices dd, ee omit *qui est*. Shortly after, in place of *etiam est*, the Vatican edition reads *esset etiam*.

la: Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis adiicit *est*[?].

en: Codex T together with several others adds *est*[?].

la: Multi codd. *indistincta*, sed infra in explicatione huius verbi habent *indiscreta*.

en: Many codices read *indistincta*, but below in the explanation of this word they have *indiscreta*.

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic*. c. 3. (c. 4.), ubi et hanc rationem addit: *Nam unicuique eorum quae sunt, unum est esse id ipsum quod est*. — Immediate ante pro *una* cod. T *unica*; cod. X post *una* interserit *tantum*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 4), where he also adds this account: *For of each of those things which are, there is one being-that-very-thing-which-it-is*. — Immediately before, in place of *una*, codex T reads *unica*; codex X inserts *tantum* after *una*.

la: Nostra lectio, quae plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 auctoritate fulcitur, non paulo differt a lect. Vat. et cod. cc, quae haec est: *ad aliquam rem sive ad quid sive in quid ducit*. Codd. F T X, ceteroquin cum nostra lect. consentientes, omittunt *ad aliquem*, dum cod. S his verbis adiungit vocem *terminum*. — Paulo inferius pro *rationum distinctio* Vat. *definitionum ratio*, omnibus ferme codd. et ed. 1 dissuadentibus.

en: Our reading, which is supported by the authority of most of the codices and ed. 1, differs not a little from the reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, which is as follows: *ad aliquam rem sive ad quid sive in quid ducit*. Codices F, T, X, otherwise consenting with our reading, omit *ad aliquem*, while codex S adds to these words the word *terminum*. — A little below, in place of *rationum distinctio*, the Vatican edition reads *definitionum ratio*, with almost all the codices and ed. 1 dissuading.

la: Cod. M *expressam*.

en: Codex M reads *expressam*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *patet*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc *patet* is wanting.

la: Cod. T (in marg.) addit *in*. — De his imaginis definitionibus cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 61. m. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. — Scot., I. *Sent.* d. 28. q. 2. a. 1.

en: Codex T (in the margin) adds *in*. — On these definitions of the image cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 61, m. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here ad litteram. — Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 28, q. 2, a. 1.

la: Intellige: *Hilarius*, ex quo etiam dubia, quae sequuntur, sumta sunt. — Pro *essentiam* codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *imaginem*.

en: Understand [as the subject of *attribuit*]: *Hilary*, from whom also the doubts which follow are taken. — In place of *essentiam* the codices with ed. 1 wrongly read *imaginem*.

la: Verbo *potest* non pauci codd. cum ed. 1, 2, 3 adiungunt *iterum*.

en: To the word *potest* not a few codices, with ed. 1, 2, 3, add *iterum*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Physic*. text. 11. seqq., et text. 28. seqq. (c. 1. et 3.); V. *Metaph*. text. 3. et 5. (IV. c. 2. et 4.), ubi forma substantialis vocatur ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι (*ratio essentiae*), ἡ φύσις (*natura*) et τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα (*species et exemplar*).

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Physics* text 11 ff., and text 28 ff. (c. 1 and 3); V *Metaphysics* text 3 and 5 (IV, c. 2 and 4), where the substantial form is called ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι (*account of essence*), ἡ φύσις (*nature*), and τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα (*species and exemplar*).

en: Distinction 27, p. I, n. 1, q. 2, ad 3; and d. 28, q. 1.

la: Est textus August., IV. *de Trin*. c. 20. n. 29; in quo textu post vocem *principium* plurimi codd. et ed. 1 cum originali subiiciunt *est*, quod omittitur a Vat.

en: It is the text of Augustine, *de Trinitate* IV, c. 20, n. 29; in which text, after the word *principium*, very many codices and ed. 1 with the original add *est*, which is omitted by the Vatican edition.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 69. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 14, ubi et de dub. seq. — S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 69, m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 14, where also concerning the following doubt. — St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here ad litteram.

la: Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. notula. — Pro *ubi* codd. cum ed. 1 *quia*, et dein in ipso textu pro *referuntur*, quod et in originali et in Magistro legitur, alii cum ed. 1 *deferuntur*, alii *differuntur*, alii, quos et Vat. sequitur, *differunt*.

en: See here in the text of the Master, c. 3, the gloss. — In place of *ubi*, the codices with ed. 1 read *quia*, and then in the text itself in place of *referuntur* (which is read both in the original and in the Master), others with ed. 1 read *deferuntur*, others *differuntur*, others (which the Vatican edition also follows) read *differunt*.

la: Multi codd. ut A F G H I S T etc. cum ed. 1 *concordibus*.

en: Many codices, such as A, F, G, H, I, S, T, etc., with ed. 1 read *concordibus*.

la: Vat. nec non plurimi codd. hic valde incongrue subiiciunt *sicut*, quam incongruitatem Vat. sola vano conatu tollere nititur, coniungendo sequentem propositionem cum hac et omittendo post *Sancti* particulam *enim*. Nostra lectio nititur praecipue auctoritate cod. Y. Paulo post pro *elidebat* Vat. cum codd. A L T X Y Z et ed. 1 *eludebat*.

en: The Vatican edition and very many codices here most incongruously add *sicut*, which incongruity the Vatican edition alone, with vain effort, attempts to remove by joining the following proposition to this one and omitting after *Sancti* the particle *enim*. Our reading rests chiefly on the authority of codex Y. Shortly after, in place of *elidebat*, the Vatican edition with codices A, L, T, X, Y, Z and ed. 1 reads *eludebat*.

la: Pro *substantiam* fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *consonantiam*; perperam, ut ex subnexis claret. — Huius dubii solutio habetur etiam apud S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: In place of *substantiam* almost all the codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 read *consonantiam*; mistakenly, as is plain from what follows. — The solution of this doubt is also found in St. Thomas, here ad litteram.

la: Complures codd., inter quos G H S, cum ed. 1 *quin*[?].

en: Several codices, among which G, H, S, with ed. 1 read *quin*[?].


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 32

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXII.

#### Cap. I

*Utrum Pater vel Filius ea dilectione diligant, quae procedit ab utroque, id est Spiritu sancto.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* editorial-content stream (right-column footer band) on printed pp. 553–556, in Latin followed by an English rendering. Per-page distribution: p. 553 = 2 entries (1–2); p. 554 = 8 entries (3–10); p. 555 = 4 entries (11–14); p. 556 = 1 entry (15). The parallel left-column text-critical band on Lombard's body text (variant readings: `Spiritu sancto`/`substantiam`/`concordibus`/`incongrue`/Hilary-quotation codex variants) is omitted by convention, matching the d8-littera and d37-littera precedent.

Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis deducta. Dictum est enim supra[^1] atque Sanctorum auctoritatibus ostensum, quod Spiritus sanctus est communio Patris et Filii et amor, quo Pater et Filius se invicem diligunt. Ideo quaeritur, utrum Pater vel Filius per Spiritum sanctum vel Spiritu sancto[^2] diligat. Quod utique videtur oportere dici secundum auctoritates supra positas, quibus ostenditur, Spiritum sanctum esse quo genitus a gignente diligatur genitoremque suum diligat. Sed contra: si Pater vel Filius dicatur diligere per Spiritum sanctum, videtur esse per Spiritum sanctum, quia

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non est aliud Deo esse et aliud diligere, sed idem; quia, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Quidquid secundum qualitates in illa simplici natura dici videtur, secundum essentiam est intelligendum», ut bonus, magnus, immortalis, sapiens, diligens et huiusmodi. Ideoque, si Pater vel Filius diligit per Spiritum sanctum, per ipsum Spiritum esse videtur. Neque tantum essentia sua diligit, sed etiam Dono. Huic quaestioni, cum altitudinem nimiae profunditatis contineat, id solum respondemus, quod Augustinus significare videtur, scilicet quod Pater et Filius se diligant et unitatem servent non solum essentia sua, sed suo dono proprio; quod licet supra[^4] positum sit, iterare tamen non piget, quia sic expedit. Ait ergo Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^5] ita: «Manifestum est, quod non aliquis duorum est, quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur genitoremque suum diligat, sintque non participatione sed essentia sua, neque dono superioris alicuius, sed suo proprio servantes unitatem pacis[^6]». Ecce hic dicit, quod essentia sua et Dono suo servant unitatem. Idem in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^7] ait: «In illa Trinitate, quis audeat dicere, Patrem nec se nec Filium nec Spiritum sanctum diligere nisi per Spiritum sanctum»? — Hic aperte ostendit, Patrem non tantum per Spiritum sanctum diligere; non autem simpliciter dicit, Patrem non diligere per Spiritum sanctum.

#### Cap. II

*Utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia, quam genuit.*

Praeterea diligenter investigari oportet, utrum Pater sapiens sit sapientia, quam genuit, quae tantum Filius est. Quod videtur a simili posse probari. Si enim Pater diligit amore, qui ab ipso procedit, cur non et sapientia vel intelligentia, quam ipse genuit, sapit vel intelligit? — «Hanc quaestionem urgere videtur, ut ait Augustinus in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^8], quod scripsit Apostolus dicens Christum, *Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam*, ubi quaeritur, utrum ita sit Pater sapientiae et virtutis suae, ut hac sapientia sapiens sit, quam genuit, et hac virtute potens, quam genuit. — Sed absit, ut ita sit; quia si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam, quam genuit, sapiens est Pater, alioquin non ipsa ab illo, sed ille ab ipsa est. Si enim sapientia, quam genuit, causa est illi, ut sapiens sit, etiam ut sit, ipsa illi causa est; quod fieri non potest, nisi gignendo eum aut faciendo; sed nec genitricem nec conditricem Patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam. Quid enim est insanius? Ergo et Pater ipsa sapientia est, qua sapiens est; Filius vero dicitur sapientia Patris et virtus Patris, non quia Pater per eum sit sapiens vel potens, sed quia Filius, sapientia et virtus, est de Patre, sapientia et virtute». — Ex his ergo patet, quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia genita, sed se ipso sapientia ingenita.

*Notula.* Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^9]: «Cum sapiens Deus dicitur et sapientia sapiens dicitur, sine qua eum vel fuisse aliquando vel esse posse, nefas est credere, non participatione sapientiae sapiens dicitur, sicut anima, quae et esse et non esse sapiens potest; sed quod ipse eam genuerit, qua sapiens dicitur sapientia». — Animadverte, lector, Patrem dici sapientem genita sapientia, quod aliis obviat testimoniis. Verum hoc Augustinus corrigit in libro primo *Retractationum* inquiens: «Dixi in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*, quaestione vigesima tertia, quae est de Patre, quod eam genuit qua sapiens dicitur sapientiam; sed melius istam quaestionem in libro postea *de Trinitate* tractavi».

Post haec quaeri solet a quibusdam, utrum Filius sit sapiens sapientia genita, vel ingenita. Si enim non est sapiens sapientia genita, nec se ipso sapiens est; si vero sapientia genita sapiens est, non videtur esse sapiens sapientia ingenita; et ita non videtur esse sapiens a Patre, cum a Patre habeat omnia. — *Responsio.* Ad quod dicimus, quod una est sapientia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, sicut una essentia, quia sapientia in illius naturae simplicitate est essentia; et tamen Filius est tantum sapientia genita, et Pater tantum sapientia ingenita; et sapientia genita est *de sapientia ingenita* vel *a sapientia ingenita*. Et cum idem sit ibi esse quod sapientem esse, relinquitur, ut sapientia genita sit sapiens de sapientia ingenita. Non ergo Filius dicitur sapientia Dei, tanquam ipse solus sit intelligens vel sapiens sibi et Patri et Spiritui sancto; quia, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^10]: «Si solus ibi Filius intelligit et sibi et Patri et Spiritui sancto, ad illam reditur absurditatem, ut Pater non sit sapiens de se ipso, sed de Filio, nec sapientia sapientiam genuerit, sed ea sapientia Pater dicatur sapiens esse, quam genuit. Ubi enim non est intelligentia, nec sapientia potest esse. Ideoque, si Pater non intelligit ipse sibi, sed Filius intelligit Patri, profecto Filius Patrem sapientem facit. Et si hoc est Deo esse quod sapere et ea illi essentia est quae sapientia; non Filius a Patre, quod verum est, sed a Filio potius Pater habet essentiam; quod absurdissimum atque falsissimum est. Est ergo Deus Pater sapiens ea quae ipse est sua sapientia; et Filius, sapientia Patris, est sapiens de sapientia, quae est Pater, de quo est genitus Filius. Ita et Pater est intelligens ea quae ipse est sua intelligentia. Non enim esset sapiens, qui non esset intelligens. Filius autem, intelligentia Patris, de intelligentia genitus est, quae est Pater, de qua intelligens est».

*Epilogus.* Proinde Pater est sapientia et Filius sapientia, et uterque una sapientia, et tamen solus Pater est ingenita sapientia, et Filius solus genita sapientia; nec tamen alia sapientia Pater, alia Filius, sed una eademque est:

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sicut Pater est Deus ingenitus, et Filius est Deus genitus, neque Deus genitus est Deus ingenitus; non ideo tamen alius Deus est Pater, alius Filius, sed unus Deus uterque, non autem unus. Alius est enim genitus, alius ingenitus, sed non alius Deus, immo uterque unum sive unus Deus. Ita non est sapientia genita sapientia ingenita, sed alia est sapientia genita, alia ingenita; non est tamen alia sapientia, sed una eademque sapientia.

#### Cap. III

*An Filius sit sapiens se ipso vel per se ipsum.*

Ex praedictis constat, quod Filius non est sapiens a se neque de se, sed a Patre et de Patre. Quaeri autem solet, utrum Filius sit sapiens se ipso vel per se ipsum. — *Opinio prima.* Quidam dicunt, multiplicem hic fieri intelligentiam, et ideo distinguendum fore, ita ut, cum dicis Filium esse sapientem se ipso vel per se ipsum, si sui natura et essentia sapientem intelligas, verus sit intellectus; si vero a se ipso vel de se ipso sapientem esse intelligas, falsitati subiectam habes intelligentiam. — *Opinio secunda.* Alii vero simpliciter et absque determinatione concedunt huiusmodi locutiones: Filius est sapiens *per se*, sed non a se vel de se; et Filius est *Deus per se* et est *per se*, sed non a se vel de se; hoc confirmantes verbis Hilarii[^11], qui Filium non a se, sed per se agere, in libro nono *de Trinitate* ait: «Naturae, inquit, cui contradicis, haeretice, haec unitas est, ut ita per se agat Filius, ne a se agat, et ita non a se agat, ut per se agat. Intellige Filium agentem, et per eum Patrem agentem. Non a se agit, cum Pater in eo manere monstratur; per se agit, cum secundum nativitatem Filii agit ipse quae placita sunt. Infirmus sit non a se agendo, nisi a Deo ipse agit; non sit vero in unitate naturae, si quae agit et in quibus placet non per se agit». Sicut ergo, inquiunt, Filius per se agit, sed non a se, ita Filius debet dici sapiens *per se*, sed non a se; sic et *per se Deus* est vel esse dicendus est, ut aiunt, sed non a se vel de se.

#### Cap. IV

*An una tantum sit sapientia Patris.*

Post haec a quibusdam solet quaeri, utrum una tantum sit sapientia Patris; quod non esse nituntur probare hoc modo: Filius, inquiunt, est sapientia Patris genita, qua Pater sapiens non est: est igitur aliqua sapientia Patris, qua sapiens non est; est autem et sapientia Patris ingenita, et ea Pater sapiens est: est ergo quaedam sapientia Patris, qua sapiens est, et ipsa non est illa sapientia Patris, qua Pater sapiens non est: non est ergo una tantum sapientia Patris. — Item, sapientia ingenita est sapientia Patris, et sapientia genita est sapientia Patris; non est autem sapientia ingenita sapientia genita: non est igitur una tantum sapientia Patris. — *Improbatur.* Haec et his similia tanquam sophistica et a veritate longinqua cunctisque in theologia peritis patentia abiicimus, responso[^12] indigna advertentes, id tamen adiicientes, quia una est tantum sapientia Patris, sed non uno modo dicitur. Nam sapientia Patris dicitur illa quam genuit, et sapientia Patris dicitur ea qua sapiens est: diversa est ergo ratio dicti. Illa enim dicitur Patris, quia eam genuit; et ea dicitur Patris, quia ea sapit. Una est tamen sapientia Patris, quia sapientia genita est eadem sapientia et ea qua sapiens est, sive ea qua sapiens est intelligatur persona Patris, sive essentia Patris; quia persona Patris, quae intelligitur, cum dicitur sapientia ingenita, et persona Filii, quae significatur, cum dicitur sapientia genita, una eademque sapientia est, quae essentia divina intelligitur communis tribus personis.

#### Cap. V

Sicut in Trinitate est dilectio, quae est Trinitas, et tamen Spiritus sanctus est dilectio, quae non est Trinitas, nec ideo duae sunt dilectiones; ita et de sapientia. Et sicut in Trinitate dilectio est, quae est Pater, Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quae est ipsa essentia deitatis; et tamen Spiritus sanctus dilectio est, quae non est Pater vel Filius, nec ideo duae dilectiones sunt in Trinitate — quia dilectio, quae proprie Spiritus sanctus est, est dilectio, quae Trinitas est, non tamen ipsa Trinitas est; sicut Spiritus sanctus est essentia, quae Trinitas est, non tamen ipse[^13] Trinitas est — ita in Trinitate sapientia est, quae est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quae est essentia divina; et tamen Filius est sapientia, quae non est Pater vel Spiritus sanctus. Nec ideo duae sapientiae ibi sunt, quia sapientia, quae proprie est Filius, est sapientia, quae est Trinitas, ipsa tamen non est Trinitas; sicut Filius est essentia, quae est Trinitas, ipse tamen non est Trinitas.

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#### Cap. VI

*Quare Pater non dicitur sapiens sapientia genita, sicut dicitur diligens dilectione, quae ab ipso procedit.*

Praeterea diligenter notandum est, quod ea ratione, qua Pater non dicitur sapiens esse sapientia, quam genuit, videtur fore dicendum, quod Pater non diligat Filium, vel Filius Patrem ea dilectione, quae ab utroque procedit, scilicet quae proprie Spiritus sanctus est. Sicut enim idem est Deo sapere quod esse, ita idem est ei diligere quod esse. Ideoque, sicut negatur Pater esse sapiens sapientia, quam genuit — quia si ea diceretur sapiens, non ipsa ab eo, sed ipse ab ea intelligeretur esse — ita videtur non debere concedi, quod Pater vel Filius diligat dilectione, quae tantum Spiritus sanctus est; quia si ea diligit Pater vel Filius, non Spiritus sanctus videtur esse a Patre et Filio, sed Pater et Filius a Spiritu sancto, quia idem est ibi diligere quod esse. — At supra dictum est atque auctoritate Augustini sancitum, «quod in Trinitate tria sunt: unus diligens eum qui de illo est, et unus diligens eum de quo est, et ipsa dilectio», «et non est aliquis duorum, quo genitus a gignente diligitur et genitorem suum diligit». Quibus verbis aperte significatur, Patrem Filium, et Filium Patrem diligere ea etiam[^14] dilectione, quae non est aliquis eorum, sed tantum Spiritus sanctus. Cum igitur idem sit ibi *diligere* quod *esse*, quomodo dicitur Pater vel Filius non esse ea dilectione, qua alter alterum diligit, cum ideo Pater negetur sapere sapientia, quam genuit, ne ea esse intelligatur?

*Difficilis quaestio.* Difficilem esse mihi fateor hanc quaestionem praecipue, cum ex praedictis oriatur, quae similem habere rationem videtur, quod meae intelligentiae attendens infirmitas turbatur, cupiens magis ex dictis Sanctorum *referre* quam *afferre*. «Optimus enim lector est, inquit Hilarius in primo libro *de Trinitate*[^15], qui dictorum intelligentiam exspectet ex dictis potius quam imponat, retulerit magis, quam attulerit, neque cogat id videri dictis contineri, quod ante lectionem praesumserit intelligendum. Cum igitur de rebus Dei sermo est, concedamus Deo sui cognitionem dictisque eius pia veneratione famulemur». — *Quaestionem relinquit.* Investiget ergo diligenter pius lector rationem dictorum, si forte dictorum aliquam valeat reperire causam, qua nota praemissa quaestio aliquatenus explicari valeat. Ego autem quaestionem non absolvens, sed errorem excludens profiteor, non ita dictum esse, Patrem diligere Filium, vel Filium Patrem ea dilectione, quae ab utroque procedit, quae non est aliquis eorum, sed tantum Spiritus sanctus, tanquam ea dilectione Pater sit vel Filius. Sed sic ea Pater diligit Filium, et Filius Patrem, ut etiam Pater per se ea quae ipse est dilectione diligat — sic et Filius — non autem sic, ut Pater per se non diligat et Filius, sed per eam tantum. «Quis haec in illa Trinitate, inquit Augustinus, opinari vel affirmare praesumat»? — Eam tamen quaestionem lectorum diligentiae plenius diiudicandam atque absolvendam relinquimus, ad hoc minus sufficientes.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXII.

#### Chapter I

*Whether the Father or the Son loves with that love which proceeds from both, that is, the Holy Spirit.*

Here a question arises drawn from what has been said. For it has been said above[^1] and shown by the authorities of the Saints that the Holy Spirit is the communion of the Father and the Son, and the love by which the Father and the Son love one another. Therefore it is asked whether the Father or the Son loves through the Holy Spirit or by the Holy Spirit[^2]. Which indeed seems necessary to be said according to the authorities placed above, by which it is shown that the Holy Spirit is that by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and loves His own Begetter. But on the contrary: if the Father or the Son is said to love through the Holy Spirit, it seems to be through the Holy Spirit, because

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it is not one thing for God to be and another to love, but the same; because, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^3]: "Whatever seems to be said according to qualities in that simple nature is to be understood according to essence" — such as good, great, immortal, wise, loving, and the like. Therefore, if the Father or the Son loves through the Holy Spirit, He seems to be through the very Spirit. Nor does He love by His essence alone, but also by the Gift. To this question, since it contains the height of an excessive depth, we respond only this much, which Augustine seems to signify: namely, that the Father and the Son love one another and preserve unity not only by their essence but by their own proper Gift; which, although it has been set down above[^4], it is not irksome to repeat, because it is so expedient. Augustine says, then, in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^5] thus: "It is manifest that He is not someone of the two by whom each is conjoined, by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter, and loves His Begetter, and that they are not by participation but by their own essence, nor by the gift of any superior, but by their own proper [gift] preserving the unity of peace[^6]." Behold, here he says that they preserve unity by their essence and by their Gift. The same in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^7] says: "In that Trinity, who would dare to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit except through the Holy Spirit?" — Here he plainly shows that the Father does not love only through the Holy Spirit; but he does not say simply that the Father does not love through the Holy Spirit.

#### Chapter II

*Whether the Father is wise with the wisdom He begot.*

It must furthermore be diligently investigated whether the Father is wise with the wisdom He begot, which is only the Son. This seems to be capable of proof from a parallel. For if the Father loves with the love which proceeds from Him, why does He not also know or understand with the wisdom or intelligence which He Himself begot? — "This question seems to press upon us, as Augustine says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^8], from what the Apostle wrote calling Christ *the Power of God and the Wisdom of God*, where it is asked whether the Father stands so to His own wisdom and power that He is wise with this wisdom which He begot, and powerful with this power which He begot. — But far be it that it should be so; because if it is the same thing there to be as to know, then the Father is not wise through that wisdom which He begot — otherwise she is not from him, but he from her. For if the wisdom He begot is the cause to Him of being wise, it is also the cause to Him of being; which cannot happen unless by begetting Him or making Him; but no one would in any way call wisdom the begetter or maker of the Father. For what is more insane? Therefore the Father Himself is the very wisdom by which He is wise; but the Son is called the wisdom of the Father and the power of the Father, not because the Father is wise or powerful through Him, but because the Son, [being] wisdom and power, is from the Father, [who is] wisdom and power." — From these things therefore it is clear that the Father is not wise with begotten wisdom, but by Himself, with unbegotten wisdom.

*Notula.* Augustine in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*[^9]: "When God is called wise, and Wisdom is called wise, without which it is impious to believe that He could ever have been or could be, He is not called wise by participation of wisdom — as a soul, which both can and cannot be wise — but [He is called wise] because He Himself begot her, by whom He is called wise — [who is] wisdom." — Take note, reader, that the Father is said to be wise with begotten wisdom, which conflicts with other testimonies. But Augustine corrects this in the first book of the *Retractations*, saying: "I said in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*, in question twenty-three, which is about the Father, that He begot her by whom He is called wise — wisdom; but I treated this question better in the book afterwards *On the Trinity*."

After this it is wont to be asked by some whether the Son is wise with begotten or unbegotten wisdom. For if He is not wise with begotten wisdom, then He is not wise by Himself; but if He is wise with begotten wisdom, He does not seem to be wise with unbegotten wisdom; and so He does not seem to be wise from the Father, although He has all things from the Father. — *Response.* To which we say that there is one wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, just as there is one essence, because in the simplicity of that nature wisdom is essence; and yet the Son is only begotten wisdom, and the Father is only unbegotten wisdom; and begotten wisdom is *from unbegotten wisdom* or *by unbegotten wisdom*. And since to be there is the same as to be wise, it remains that begotten wisdom is wise from unbegotten wisdom. Therefore the Son is not called the Wisdom of God as though He alone is the one understanding or knowing for Himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit; because, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^10]: "If only the Son there understands both for Himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, one returns to that absurdity that the Father is not wise from Himself, but from the Son; nor did wisdom beget wisdom, but the Father is said to be wise with that wisdom which He begot. For where there is no understanding, neither can there be wisdom. And so, if the Father does not understand for Himself, but the Son understands for the Father, then the Son surely makes the Father wise. And if for God to be is the same as to know, and the same essence is to Him which is wisdom, then not the Son from the Father — which is true — but rather the Father from the Son has His essence; which is most absurd and most false. Therefore God the Father is wise with that which He Himself is, His own wisdom; and the Son, the wisdom of the Father, is wise from the wisdom which is the Father, from whom the Son is begotten. So too the Father is understanding with that which He Himself is, His own intelligence. For He would not be wise who was not understanding. But the Son, the intelligence of the Father, is begotten of the intelligence which is the Father, of which He is understanding."

*Epilogue.* Accordingly the Father is wisdom and the Son is wisdom, and each is one wisdom, and yet only the Father is unbegotten wisdom, and only the Son is begotten wisdom; nor for that reason is the Father one wisdom and the Son another, but it is one and the same:

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just as the Father is unbegotten God, and the Son is begotten God — neither is begotten God unbegotten God; nor for that reason, however, is the Father one God and the Son another, but each is one God, though not one [person]. For [one is] begotten and [the other] unbegotten, but not one God [is one thing] and another [another thing], rather each is one or one God. So begotten wisdom is not unbegotten wisdom, but begotten wisdom is one thing and unbegotten another; yet there is not another wisdom, but one and the same wisdom.

#### Chapter III

*Whether the Son is wise by Himself or through Himself.*

From what has been said it is clear that the Son is not wise from Himself or of Himself, but from the Father and of the Father. But it is wont to be asked whether the Son is wise by Himself or through Himself. — *First opinion.* Some say that a manifold understanding arises here, and that therefore a distinction must be made: so that when you say that the Son is wise by Himself or through Himself, if you understand Him to be wise by His own nature and essence, the understanding is true; but if you understand Him to be wise from Himself or of Himself, your understanding is subject to falsity. — *Second opinion.* Others, however, simply and without qualification grant such expressions: the Son is wise *through Himself*, but not from Himself or of Himself; and the Son is *God through Himself* and is *through Himself*, but not from Himself or of Himself; confirming this from the words of Hilary[^11], who says, in book nine *On the Trinity*, that the Son acts not from Himself but through Himself: "There belongs to the nature, [Hilary] says, which you contradict, heretic, this unity, that the Son so acts through Himself that He does not act from Himself, and so does not act from Himself that He may act through Himself. Understand the Son to be acting, and the Father to be acting through Him. He does not act from Himself, since the Father is shown to remain in Him; He acts through Himself, since according to the nativity of the Son He Himself does what is pleasing. Let Him be weak by not acting from Himself, unless God Himself acts; but let Him not be in unity of nature, if what He acts and in what He pleases He does not act through Himself." Just as therefore — they say — the Son acts through Himself but not from Himself, so the Son must be called wise *through Himself*, but not from Himself; and so He is or must be said to be *God through Himself*, as they say, but not from Himself or of Himself.

#### Chapter IV

*Whether there is only one wisdom of the Father.*

After this it is wont to be asked by some whether there is only one wisdom of the Father; which they strive to prove not to be so in this way: the Son, they say, is the begotten wisdom of the Father, by which the Father is not wise: there is therefore some wisdom of the Father by which He is not wise; but there is also unbegotten wisdom of the Father, and by it the Father is wise: there is therefore a certain wisdom of the Father by which He is wise, and it is not that wisdom of the Father by which the Father is not wise: therefore there is not only one wisdom of the Father. — Likewise, the unbegotten wisdom is the wisdom of the Father, and the begotten wisdom is the wisdom of the Father; but the unbegotten wisdom is not the begotten wisdom: therefore there is not only one wisdom of the Father. — *It is refuted.* These and like things, as sophistical and far from the truth and obvious to all those skilled in theology, we cast aside, judging them unworthy of a reply[^12], adding nevertheless this: that there is only one wisdom of the Father, but it is not said in one mode. For the wisdom of the Father is said to be that which He begot, and the wisdom of the Father is said to be that by which He is wise: the *ratio* of the saying is therefore diverse. For the former is called the Father's because He begot her; and the latter is called the Father's because by it He is wise. There is, however, one wisdom of the Father, because the begotten wisdom is the same wisdom and the very [wisdom] by which He is wise — whether the [wisdom] by which He is wise be understood as the person of the Father, or as the essence of the Father; because the person of the Father, which is understood when *unbegotten wisdom* is said, and the person of the Son, which is signified when *begotten wisdom* is said, are one and the same wisdom, which is understood as the divine essence common to the three persons.

#### Chapter V

Just as in the Trinity there is the love which is the Trinity, and yet the Holy Spirit is the love which is not the Trinity, nor for that reason are there two loves; so also concerning wisdom. And just as in the Trinity there is the love which is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is the very essence of deity; and yet the Holy Spirit is the love which is not the Father or the Son, nor for that reason are there two loves in the Trinity — because the love which is properly the Holy Spirit is the love which is the Trinity, but is not the Trinity itself; just as the Holy Spirit is the essence which is the Trinity, but is not Himself[^13] the Trinity — so in the Trinity there is the wisdom which is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, which is the divine essence; and yet the Son is the wisdom which is not the Father or the Holy Spirit. Nor for that reason are there two wisdoms there, because the wisdom which is properly the Son is the wisdom which is the Trinity, but it itself is not the Trinity; just as the Son is the essence which is the Trinity, but He Himself is not the Trinity.

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#### Chapter VI

*Why the Father is not said to be wise with begotten wisdom, just as He is said to be loving with the love which proceeds from Him.*

Furthermore, it must be diligently noted that, by the same reasoning by which the Father is not said to be wise with the wisdom He begot, it would seem to be said that the Father does not love the Son, nor the Son the Father, with that love which proceeds from both — namely, that which properly is the Holy Spirit. For just as for God to know is the same as to be, so for Him to love is the same as to be. And therefore, just as the Father is denied to be wise with the wisdom He begot — because if He were said to be wise with her, she would not be understood to be from him, but he from her — so it seems that it ought not to be granted that the Father or the Son loves with that love which is only the Holy Spirit; because if the Father or the Son loves with her, the Holy Spirit does not seem to be from the Father and the Son, but the Father and the Son [seem to be] from the Holy Spirit, since to love there is the same as to be. — But it has been said above and confirmed by the authority of Augustine "that in the Trinity there are three: one loving Him who is from Him, and one loving Him from whom He is, and the love itself," "and there is none of the two by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves His Begetter." By which words it is openly signified that the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father, also[^14] with that love which is none of them but only the Holy Spirit. Since therefore there *to love* is the same as *to be*, how is the Father or the Son said not to be that love by which one loves the other, when for that very reason the Father is denied to know with the wisdom which He begot — lest He be understood to be by her?

*A difficult question.* I confess this question to be especially difficult to me, since it arises from what has been said, [a question] which seems to have a similar *ratio*; so that the weakness of my understanding, attending to this, is troubled, desiring rather to *report* than to *bring forward* from the sayings of the Saints. "For the best reader, says Hilary in the first book *On the Trinity*[^15], is he who awaits the understanding of words from the words rather than imposes [it], who has reported rather than brought, and does not compel that to seem to be contained in the words which he had presumed before reading was to be understood. When therefore the speech is about things of God, let us grant to God the knowledge of Himself, and let us serve His words with pious veneration." — *He leaves the question.* Let the pious reader therefore diligently investigate the *ratio* of the words, if perchance he can find some cause for the words by which, having been noted, the foregoing question may to some extent be explained. But I, not absolving the question but excluding error, profess that it is not so said that the Father loves the Son, or the Son the Father, with that love which proceeds from both — which is none of them but only the Holy Spirit — as though the Father or the Son were [constituted] by that love. But the Father so loves the Son with her, and the Son the Father, that even the Father loves through Himself, with that love which He Himself is — and so too the Son — yet not in such a way that the Father does not love through Himself, and the Son [does not] either, but only through her. "Who," says Augustine, "would presume to opine or affirm these things in that Trinity?" — Yet we leave that question to the diligence of readers to be more fully judged and resolved, being for this purpose less than sufficient.

---

la: *Dist.* XXXI. c. 6.

en: Distinction XXXI, c. 6.

la: Vat. aliaeque edd., refragantibus codd. et ed. 1, omittunt *vel Spiritu sancto*; deinde codd. C D et ed. 8 *diligant* pro *diligat*, et insuper cod. C addit *se*.

en: The Vatican and other editions, contrary to the codices and ed. 1, omit *vel Spiritu sancto*; further, codices C D and ed. 8 [read] *diligant* in place of *diligat*, and codex C in addition adds *se*.

en: Chapter 5, n. 8.

en: Distinction X, c. 2.

la: Cap. 5. n. 7. — Paulo superius post *sed* cod. D bene adiicit *etiam*, deinde codd. B E *iungebit* pro *piget*.

en: Chapter 5, n. 7. — A little above, after *sed*, codex D rightly adds *etiam*; further, codices B E [read] *iungebit* in place of *piget*.

la: *Ephes.* 4, 3. Codd. A B D E addunt *in vinculo* ante *pacis*. Vulgata: *Solliciti servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis*.

en: *Ephesians* 4:3. Codices A B D E add *in vinculo* before *pacis*. Vulgate: *Solliciti servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis* ("Careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace").

en: Chapter 7, n. 12.

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. Ultima propositio est ibi ex n. 2. — Locus Scripturae est *I. Cor.* 1, 24.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1. The last sentence is there from n. 2. — The Scripture passage is *1 Corinthians* 1:24.

la: Quaest. 23. — Locus ex libro *Retractationum* est c. 26. In libris *de Trinitate* agitur de hac quaestione in VI. c. 1. n. seqq.; VII. c. 1–4; et XV. c. 7. n. 12.

en: Question 23. — The passage from the *Retractations* is c. 26. In the books *On the Trinity* this question is treated in VI, c. 1, nn. following; VII, cc. 1–4; and XV, c. 7, n. 12.

la: Hilarius, *de Trin.* IX, in principio: «Naturae, qui contradicis, haereticae, haec unitas est ... non a se agendo nisi adeo ipse agit, ut quia ...» [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder not transcribed in this chunk.] — Lectio Magistri magis placet. Cod. (n.n.) addit *ipse*, et paulo ante et post *ita*.

en: Hilary, *On the Trinity* IX, at the beginning: "There belongs to the nature, you who contradict, heretical [one], this unity ... not by acting from Himself unless to such a degree He Himself acts, that because ..." [Quaracchi quotation truncated mid-clause; remainder not transcribed.] — The Master's reading is preferable. A codex (n.n.) adds *ipse*, both a little before and after *ita*.

la: Vat. perperam *responsio*; cod. D [paulo post]. Paulo post Vat. cum pluribus edd. addit *sapientia ea dicitur*.

en: The Vatican wrongly [reads] *responsio*; codex D [a little after]. A little later the Vatican with several editions adds *sapientia ea dicitur*.

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 8, 9 *ipsa*.

en: The Vatican and editions 1, 8, 9 [read] *ipsa*.

la: Ita codd.; Vat. cum pluribus edd. *ea*.

en: Thus the codices; the Vatican with several editions [reads] *ea*.

la: *Num.* 1, 18. (n. = numerus, paragraph number; not biblical Numbers.)

en: *n.* 1, 18 — that is, *paragraph 1, n. 18*. (*Note*: "Num." in Quaracchi apparatus = *numerus*, paragraph number, not the biblical book of Numbers.)

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 (J4 Class D/E triage):** Health-scan flagged `defs=15 la=22 en=15`. Diagnosed as the
§2 backtick-blockquote false-positive pattern from `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` — except
here the offending example ranges are NOT even backtick-fenced. The intro blockquote at the top of
`## Latin` (the "Per-page distribution: p. 553 = 2 entries (`[^1]`–`[^2]`); p. 554 = 8 entries
(`[^3]`–`[^10]`); p. 555 = 4 entries (`[^11]`–`[^14]`); p. 556 = 1 entry (`[^15]`)" sentence)
contains bare `[^N]` tokens for labels 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 15 — exactly the 7 "extra" Latin-side
anchors the classifier counted. All 15 real body anchors (both languages) and all 15 apparatus
defs are correctly paired 1:1; content-checked against the printed pp. 553–556 distribution
already documented in the frontmatter `transcription_status` (2/8/4/1 per page) — no relabel, no
missing content, no real defect. Per the handoff's §2 instruction, this is reported as a false
positive and NOT fixed here (fixing the underlying blockquote-notation convention needs Wilson's
decision, since the live-site renderer is also regex-based and would turn these same bracket
tokens into spurious clickable footnote superscripts inside the explanatory prose — same bug
class as `IV-d21-p1-littera`/`III-d33-dubia`, but worse here since there are no backticks at all
to protect it even from a backtick-aware fix). No apparatus, body, or wording changes made in
this pass.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 32, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXII — Solvuntur dubitationes circa duas locutiones ad appropriationem spectantes. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXII — Doubts are resolved concerning two locutions pertaining to appropriation. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 555 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXII.

#### *Solvuntur dubitationes circa duas locutiones ad appropriationem spectantes.*

> *Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis deducta.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra posuit Magister appropriata, in quorum explanatione dixit, Spiritum sanctum esse concordiam, quia Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto; ideo hic movet quaestionem de illa locutione. Et hoc facit in ista distinctione. Habet autem haec distinctio tres[^1] partes.

In prima movet Magister principalem quaestionem prius positam, scilicet[^2] utrum Pater et Filius diligant se Spiritu sancto. In secunda vero movet aliam quaestionem huic consimilem, quae facit ad eius explanationem, et hoc facit ibi: *Praeterea diligenter investigari oportet*, et est illa quaestio: utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita. In tertia redit ad principalem quaestionem determinandam, et hoc facit ibi: *Praeterea diligenter notandum est*.

Prima pars habet duas partes. In prima Magister movet quaestionem et opponit. In secunda vero respondet quaestioni, sed non respondet obiectioni, ibi: *Huic quaestioni, cum altitudinem*.

*Praeterea diligenter investigari oportet*. Haec est secunda particula, in qua determinat Magister quaestionem annexam, scilicet utrum Pater sit sapiens[^3] sapientia genita. Et quia ad determinationem

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huius quaestionis tria alia dubia concurrunt, ideo habet haec pars quatuor partes secundum quatuor dubitationes, quas movet et determinat. Et primo determinat istam quaestionem: utrum Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita, quam determinat in partem negativam. Secundo vero determinat aliam quaestionem: utrum Filius sit sapiens sapientia ingenita, quam determinat in partem affirmativam[^4], ibi: *Post haec quaeri solet* etc. Tertio movet hanc quaestionem: utrum Filius sit sapiens per se ipsum vel se ipso, quam determinat per distinctionem, quod *se ipso* potest teneri originaliter, vel formaliter, et hoc ibi: *Quaeri autem solet, utrum Filius* etc. Quarto movet hanc quaestionem: utrum Pater duplicem habeat sapientiam, quam determinat in partem negativam ostendens, hanc quaestionem et eius rationem non esse responsione dignam, et hoc facit ibi: *Post haec quaeri solet a quibusdam, utrum una tantum sit sapientia*[^5].

*Praeterea diligenter notandum est.* Haec est particula tertia, in qua redit Magister ad quaestionem primo positam, et habet haec pars duas partes. In prima obiicit accipiens rationem ex determinatione alterius quaestionis. In secunda vero loco solutionis suam insufficientiam ostendit et hanc quaestionem determinandam lectori relinquit, et hoc ibi: *Difficillimam mihi hanc quaestionem fateor*[^6].

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur secundum duas quaestiones, quas determinat Magister.

Primo quaeritur de hac locutione: *Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto*.

Secundo quaeritur de ista alia: *Pater est sapiens sapientia genita*.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum illa locutio sit admittenda.

Secundo quaeritur, in qua habitudine construatur ille ablativus.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXXII.

#### *Doubts are resolved concerning two locutions pertaining to appropriation.*

> *"Here arises a question deduced from what has been said before."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master set forth the appropriations, in the explanation of which he said that the Holy Spirit is *concord*, because the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit; therefore here he raises a question about that locution. And this he does in this distinction. Now this distinction has three[^1] parts.

In the first the Master raises the principal question previously posed, namely[^2] whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit. In the second, however, he raises another question similar to this one, which serves for its explanation, and he does this there: *"Furthermore, it must be diligently investigated"*, and that is the question: whether the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom. In the third he returns to the principal question to be determined, and this he does there: *"Furthermore, it must be diligently noted."*

The first part has two divisions. In the first the Master raises the question and objects. In the second, however, he answers the question, but does not answer the objection, there: *"To this question, since the depth..."*.

*"Furthermore, it must be diligently investigated."* This is the second little section, in which the Master determines the annexed question, namely whether the Father is wise[^3] by a begotten wisdom. And because for the determination

<!-- page 556 -->

of this question three other doubts concur, therefore this part has four divisions according to the four doubts which he raises and determines. And first he determines this question: whether the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, which he determines in the negative. Second, however, he determines another question: whether the Son is wise by an unbegotten wisdom, which he determines in the affirmative[^4], there: *"After these things it is wont to be asked"* etc. Third, he raises this question: whether the Son is wise through himself or by himself, which he determines by means of a distinction, namely that *by himself* can be taken originatively or formally, and this there: *"It is wont to be asked, however, whether the Son"* etc. Fourth, he raises this question: whether the Father has a twofold wisdom, which he determines in the negative, showing that this question and its reasoning are not worthy of a response, and this he does there: *"After these things it is wont to be asked by some, whether there is only one wisdom"*[^5].

*"Furthermore, it must be diligently noted."* This is the third little section, in which the Master returns to the question first posed, and this part has two divisions. In the first he raises an objection, taking his reason from the determination of the other question. In the second, however, in place of a solution he shows his own insufficiency and leaves this question to be determined by the reader, and this there: *"I confess that this question is most difficult for me"*[^6].

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction two things are principally asked according to the two questions which the Master determines.

First it is asked concerning this locution: *"The Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit."*

Second it is asked concerning this other one: *"The Father is wise by a begotten wisdom."*

As regards the first, two things are asked.

First it is asked whether that locution is to be admitted.

Second it is asked, in what construction that ablative is to be construed.

---

la: Mss. cum ed. I *quattuor*; perperam.

en: The manuscripts together with edition I read *quattuor* ("four"); wrongly.

la: Vat. cum pluribus edd. *scilicet*.

en: The Vatican edition with several [other] editions [reads/has] *scilicet* ("namely").

la: Vat. ampliat addendo post *sapiens* verba *scilicet* [...]; et subinde post *genita* verba *vel sapientia* [...].

en: The Vatican edition expands [the text] by adding after *sapiens* ("wise") the words *scilicet* ("namely") [...]; and likewise after *genita* ("begotten") the words *vel sapientia* ("or wisdom") [...].

la: Vat. et ed. 2 *tamen*; paulo ante eadem omittit *ita* ante *dictum*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 2 read *tamen* ("nevertheless"); a little before, the same [edition] omits *ita* ("thus") before *dictum* ("said").

la: Codd. B E *cognita*. Vat. cum pluribus edd. addit *ipsa* ante *praemissa*, et deinde *hanc* ante *quaestionem*.

en: Codices B and E read *cognita* ("known"). The Vatican edition with several [other] editions adds *ipsa* ("itself") before *praemissa* ("the things mentioned"), and then *hanc* ("this") before *quaestionem* ("question").

la: Vat. *Difficillimam mihi*; codd. BE cum ed. I *Difficile est mihi fateor hanc quaestionem solvere*; cod. C *Difficile esse mihi* etc.; cod. D cum edd. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 *Difficilem mihi hanc fateor quaestionem*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *Difficillimam mihi* ("Most difficult for me"); codices B and E with edition I read *Difficile est mihi fateor hanc quaestionem solvere* ("It is difficult, I confess, for me to solve this question"); codex C reads *Difficile esse mihi* ("That it is difficult for me") etc.; codex D with editions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 reads *Difficilem mihi hanc fateor quaestionem* ("I confess this question to be difficult for me"). ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above. The "NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM" block at the foot of p. 555 has been folded into the apparatus entries [^1]–[^3] above; later entries of that block are heavily OCR-garbled and only their legible substance has been retained — see `manual-review/tier2-ambiguities-d32-divisio.md`.]