title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 55 -->

### Articulus I. *De mensura angelicae naturae in se.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum spiritualia habeant propriam mensuram.*

Circa primum sic proceditur. Quod habeant propriam mensuram, primo videtur:

1. Per Philosophum in libro de Causis, in penultima propositione: «Inter rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in aeternitate, et rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in tempore, est res media, cuius substantia est in aeternitate et actio in tempore»; sed hoc non potest intelligi de aeternitate increata: ergo de creata; et hanc distinguit a tempore et ponit[^1] mensuram substantiarum spiritualium et incorruptibilium: ergo videtur etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici primo[^2]: *Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est*, usque ibi, *ante aevum*: ergo si *ante aevum* dicit quid increatum, *aevum* dicit quid creatum; non substantiam: ergo mensuram; non rerum materialium, sed spiritualium; et haec differt a tempore, unde Boethius de Consolatione[^3]:

> *Qui tempus ab aevo*
> *Ire iubes*:

ergo etc. Omne enim quod exit ab alio, differt ab eo.

3. Item, Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus in capitulo de aevo[^4]: «Proprietas aevi est antiquum, inveteratum, secundum totum esse mensurans, temporis vero in alteratione aliter et aliter se habens»: ergo si idem non se habet sic et aliter simul et semel, non est eadem mensura tempus et aevum. Sed aevum est mensura durantium perpetuo, et talis est natura angelica: ergo.

4. Item, sicut se habet *unitas* ad distinctionem, ita *nunc* ad durationem; sed in spiritualibus non solum est reperire distinctionem secundum substantiam, verum etiam[^5] eius mensuram: ergo pari ratione et esse Angeli mensuram durationis habet; sed non tempus, cum non varietur nec mutetur: ergo aliam mensuram propriam.

5. Item, omne quod habet esse limitatum actu, habet mensuram[^6], per quam potest cognosci eius limitatio; sed tale est esse omnis creati: ergo etc.; arguatur ut prius.

6. Item, mensura durationis respicit modum durandi; sed spiritualia habent modum suae durationis differentem a corporalibus, maxime a mutabilibus, cum durent perpetualiter et immutabiliter: ergo per istam mensuram habent mensurari.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus ad Orosium[^7]: «Deus movet spiritualem naturam per tempora, corporalem vero per loca et tempora»: ergo spiritualis naturae mensura est tempus.

2. Item, Beda[^8]: «Quatuor fuerunt primo creata: angelica natura, materia prima, caelum empyreum et tempus». Si ergo tempus stat pro mensura, ergo aut spiritualia in principio non habuerunt mensuram, aut non habuerunt aliam a corporalibus, aut Beda fuit insufficiens in illa enumeratione.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur. Unus est locus, qui est continentia visibilium et invisibilium, ut empyreum: ergo si mensura, quae est tempus, non est minoris[^9] appropriationis quam locus, ergo videtur quod unum sit tempus, in quo sint spiritualia et corporalia: non ergo habent mensuram propriam.

4. Item, sicut[^10] idem est numerus, quo mensurantur decem canes et decem homines, sic idem est numerus, quo numerantur decem Angeli et decem homines: si ergo spiritualia non habent aliam mensuram distinctionis quam corporalia, ergo nec aliam mensuram durationis.

5. Item, homo beatus et Angelus mensurantur eadem mensura, quia omnes beati; sed homo beatus habet idem *esse* cum se non beato, ergo et eandem mensuram: ergo eadem mensura mensuratur homo viator, qua Angelus, ergo et quaelibet natura corporalis: non ergo habet mensuram propriam.

<!-- page 56 -->

6. Item, *per impossibile*: si habet mensuram, aut est *substantia*, aut est *accidens*; non *substantia*: ergo *accidens*. Si *accidens*, in quo genere? Non nisi in genere *quantitatis*; non *discretae*: ergo *continuae*. Sed non est linea neque superficies, nec corpus nec locus: ergo vel est tempus, vel nihil[^11]: aut ergo angelica natura nullam habet mensuram, aut si habet, non habet propriam.

### Conclusio

> Creaturae spirituales secundum earum esse immutabile habent propriam mensuram, diversam a tempore, quae dicitur aeviternitas.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum angelica natura habeat mensuram propriam, diversam a tempore, distinguendum est, quia aut loquimur de mensura spiritualium secundum *esse*, quod non mutatur, aut secundum *affectiones*. Si ergo de mensura loquimur, quae respicit *esse*, quae dicitur aevum, hoc modo consuevit ab antiquis doctoribus responderi: aut loqueris de diversitate in genere *mensurae*, aut in genere *entis*. Si in genere *mensurae*, sic oportet ponere differentiam, sicut ostendunt auctoritates et rationes ad primam partem[^12] inductae. Si vero loqueris de diversitate in genere *entis*, sic triplex fuit opinio.

Nam quidam dixerunt, quod sicut locus et superficies idem sunt per essentiam, differentia secundum comparationem, sic idem est *nunc aevi* et *temporis*, sola comparatione differens. *Nunc* enim respicit substantiam rei[^13]; substantia autem primi mobilis quantum ad *esse* omnino est immobilis: comparata autem ad *situm*, est mobilis. Et primo modo mensuratur *nunc aevi*, secundo modo *nunc temporis*, ita quod idem est *nunc*, diversimode comparatum, sicut idem ultimum, comparatum ad corpus ambiens, est superficies, comparatum ad corpus ambitum, est locus[^14]. — Sed illud non potest stare, quia circa ultimum corporis illae duae comparationes non sunt incompossibiles; sed *nunc temporis* et aevi habent proprietates incompossibiles circa idem. Nam, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^15], hoc, scilicet *nunc aevi*, est stabile, illud, scilicet *nunc temporis*, est fluxibile; sed impossibile est, quod unum et idem et secundum idem simul moveatur et stet.

Et ideo est secunda positio, quod ipsum *nunc* sequitur essentiam materiae primae. Sicut igitur materia in omnibus est eadem per *essentiam*, differens per *esse*[^16]; sic *nunc* temporis et aevi idem est per essentiam, non sicut individuum, sed ad modum materiae idem per *essentiam*[^17], differens autem solum quantum ad *esse*. Et hi posuerunt, quod omnis rei quidditas mensura eadem per essentiam mensuratur. — Sed nec illud multum est intelligibile. Cum enim aevum *esse* stabile et quietum respiciat, quod quidem habet materia a forma perfecta, et haec mensura non respiciat nisi *esse actuale* et modum essendi completum; videtur, quod aevum non possit sic accipi ex parte materiae, quidquid sit de tempore. Cum ergo modus durandi *essentialiter* et *formaliter* differat hinc inde, patet etiam, quod mensura propria.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod spiritualia habent mensuram diversam a tempore, non solum in genere *mensurae*, verum etiam in genere *entis*; et hoc non solum *comparatione*, sed etiam secundum *substantiam* et formam. Quidquid autem sit de diversitate in genere *entis*, diversitatem tamen secundum modum *mensurandi* nemo est qui negare possit. Et hoc sufficit quaestioni praesenti, qua quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram diversam a corporalibus. Dicendum enim, quod sic.

Quod si quaeras, quae sit illa; respondendum secundum Sanctos et philosophos[^18], quod dicitur *aeternitas creata* aut *aevum*; sed quoniam *aeternitas* proprie accipitur pro increato, et *aevum* frequenter accipitur pro tempore, ideo proprio nomine potest *aeviternitas* appellari. Sic respondendum est, si quaeratur de mensura, quae respicit ipsum *esse* spiritualis creaturae, *esse*, inquam, immutabile et perpetuum.

<!-- page 57 -->

— Si autem quaeratur de mensura angelicarum *affectionum*, utrum illa sit a tempore diversa; hoc habebit quaestionem infra[^19]. Nunc autem planum est, quod illa mensura, quae dicitur *aeviternitas*, variationem affectionum non mensurat, ut dicit Augustinus ad Orosium[^20]. *Aevum* enim solius *esse* incommutabilis est mensura.

Concedendum igitur, sicut ostendunt rationes, quod aliquo modo spiritualia habent mensuram propriam respectu temporis et temporalium.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod spiritualis natura movetur per tempora; iam patet responsio: hoc enim dicit quantum ad *affectiones*, non quantum ad *esse*.

2. Quod obiicitur de quatuor primo creatis, dicendum, quod nomen *temporis* extenditur ibi ad omnis durationis mensuram, cuius est ponere principium; unde valde large accipitur et comprehendit aevum, ut melius infra patebit[^21].

3. Quod obiicitur de loco, non valet, quia *locus* corporalis non est mensura spiritualium, quamvis contineat[^22]; *aevum* autem mensurat et conformatur; ideo non valet: est unus locus non mensurans, ergo unum tempus mensurans. — Si quaeras a me, unde hoc; dicendum, quod Angelus vere habet durationem, sed non habet extensionem; et ideo habet mensuram durationis, non extensionis.

4. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia idem est modus *distinctionis* in spiritualibus et corporalibus; sed non est idem modus *durationis*. Ideo eadem est secundum speciem mensura *distinctionis*, non sic eadem mensura *durationis*.

5. Quod obiicitur de homine beato et Angelo, dicendum, quod mensura consimili mensurantur, scilicet aevo, quia consimilem habent modum durandi; sed homo viator non mensuratur consimili mensura, quia, quamvis habeat idem *esse*, habet tamen *modum* essendi et durandi alium; et mensura non tantum *esse*, sed etiam *modum* durandi respicit.

6. Quod quaeritur: in quo genere sit mensura angelicae durationis; aliqui dicunt, quod non est quantitas nisi quantitas virtutis, et ideo non est in genere quantitatis proprie[^23]. — Sed si vere mensura est, quomodo non est quantitas vera?

Ideo dicunt alii, quod est in genere quantitatis sicut principium. — Si tamen quaeratur, cuius sit principium, cum dicat mensuram diversam a tempore, ut ostensum est; difficile erit assignare[^24].

Et ideo sanius potest dici, quod sicut tempus ponitur in substantiis spiritualibus quantum ad affectiones, secundum Augustinum, licet consideratio Philosophi ad illud non conscenderit; sic et[^25] mensura ponitur differens specie ab aliis quantitatibus, licet de illa non loquatur Philosophus, quia mensuras rerum inferiorum determinare intendebat. Nec ponitur ex hoc in ipso insufficientia; et si etiam poneretur, non esset propter hoc a veritatis tramite aliquatenus discedendum[^26].

english:
### Article I. *On the measure of the angelic nature in itself.*
### Question I. *Whether spiritual things have their own proper measure.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus. That they have their own proper measure seems true, first:

1. Through the Philosopher in the book *de Causis*, in the next-to-last proposition: «Between a thing whose substance and operation is in eternity, and a thing whose substance and operation is in time, there is a middle thing, whose substance is in eternity and whose action is in time»; but this cannot be understood of uncreated eternity: therefore of created [eternity]; and he distinguishes this from time and posits[^1] it as the measure of spiritual and incorruptible substances: therefore it seems so, etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter one[^2]: *All wisdom is from the Lord God*, up to the place, *before the ages*: therefore if *before the ages* signifies something uncreated, *the age* (*aevum*) signifies something created; not a substance: therefore a measure; not of material things, but of spiritual ones; and this differs from time, whence Boethius, *On Consolation*[^3]:

> *You who bid time*
> *go forth from the age*:

therefore, etc. For everything that goes forth from another differs from it.

3. Likewise, Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, in the chapter on the age[^4]: «It is the property of the age to be ancient, of old standing, measuring according to its whole being, but [the property] of time to hold itself otherwise and otherwise in alteration»: therefore if the same thing does not hold itself thus and otherwise at once and at the same moment, time and the age are not the same measure. But the age is the measure of things enduring perpetually, and such is the angelic nature: therefore [it has its own measure].

4. Likewise, as *unity* stands to distinction, so *now* stands to duration; but in spiritual things one finds not only distinction according to substance, but also[^5] its measure: therefore by parity of reasoning the being of an Angel also has a measure of duration; but not time, since it is not varied nor changed: therefore [it has] another, proper measure.

5. Likewise, everything that has a being limited in act has a measure[^6], by which its limitation can be known; but such is the being of everything created: therefore, etc.; let it be argued as before.

6. Likewise, the measure of duration regards the mode of enduring; but spiritual things have a mode of their duration differing from corporeal things, especially from changeable ones, since they endure perpetually and immutably: therefore they must be measured by that measure.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine to Orosius[^7]: «God moves the spiritual nature through times, but the corporeal nature through places and times»: therefore the measure of the spiritual nature is time.

2. Likewise, Bede[^8]: «Four things were created first: the angelic nature, prime matter, the empyrean heaven, and time». If, then, time stands for the measure, then either spiritual things in the beginning had no measure, or they had none other than corporeal things, or Bede was deficient in that enumeration.

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*. There is one place that is the container of visible and invisible things, namely the empyrean: therefore if the measure, which is time, is not of less[^9] appropriation than place, then it seems that there is one time in which spiritual and corporeal things exist: therefore they do not have their own proper measure.

4. Likewise, just as[^10] it is the same number by which ten dogs and ten men are measured, so it is the same number by which ten Angels and ten men are numbered: if, then, spiritual things do not have a measure of distinction other than corporeal things, then neither another measure of duration.

5. Likewise, a beatified man and an Angel are measured by the same measure, since all the blessed [are]; but a beatified man has the same *being* as himself not beatified, therefore also the same measure: therefore a wayfaring man is measured by the same measure as an Angel, therefore also any corporeal nature: therefore it does not have its own proper measure.

<!-- page 56 -->

6. Likewise, *by way of the impossible*: if it has a measure, it is either a *substance* or an *accident*; not a *substance*: therefore an *accident*. If an *accident*, in what genus? In none but the genus of *quantity*; not *discrete*: therefore *continuous*. But it is not a line nor a surface, nor a body nor place: therefore it is either time, or nothing[^11]: therefore either the angelic nature has no measure, or, if it has one, it does not have its own proper one.

### Conclusio

> Spiritual creatures, according to their immutable being, have their own proper measure, distinct from time, which is called aeviternity.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether the angelic nature has its own proper measure, distinct from time, a distinction must be made, because either we are speaking of the measure of spiritual things according to *being*, which is not changed, or according to *affections*. If, then, we are speaking of the measure that regards *being*, which is called the age, in this mode it has been customary among the ancient doctors to reply: either you are speaking of diversity in the genus of *measure*, or in the genus of *being*. If in the genus of *measure*, then a difference must be posited, as the authorities and reasons adduced for the first part[^12] show. But if you are speaking of diversity in the genus of *being*, then there was a threefold opinion.

For some have said that, just as place and surface are the same by essence, differing according to comparison, so *the now of the age* and *of time* are the same, differing by comparison alone. For *the now* regards the substance of the thing[^13]; but the substance of the first movable, as to *being*, is wholly immobile: yet compared to position, it is mobile. And in the first mode *the now of the age* is measured, in the second mode *the now of time*, so that the *now* is the same, compared in diverse ways, just as the same outermost [surface], compared to the containing body, is a surface, [and] compared to the contained body, is place[^14]. — But that cannot stand, because around the outermost [point] of a body those two comparisons are not incompossible; whereas *the now of time* and of the age have incompossible properties about the same thing. For, as Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*[^15], the one, namely *the now of the age*, is stable, the other, namely *the now of time*, is flowing; but it is impossible that one and the same thing, and in the same respect, should at once be moved and stand still.

And therefore there is a second position, that the *now* itself follows the essence of prime matter. As, therefore, matter is the same in all things by *essence*, differing by *being*[^16]; so the *now* of time and of the age is the same by essence, not as an individual, but after the manner of matter the same by *essence*[^17], differing however only as to *being*. And these have held that the quiddity of every thing is measured by a measure the same by essence. — But neither is that very intelligible. For since the age regards stable and quiet *being*, which indeed matter has from a perfected form, and this measure regards only *actual being* and the completed mode of being; it seems that the age cannot be taken thus from the side of matter, whatever may be the case concerning time. Since, then, the mode of enduring differs *essentially* and *formally* on both sides, it is also clear that [there is] a proper measure.

And therefore there is a third position, that spiritual things have a measure distinct from time, not only in the genus of *measure*, but also in the genus of *being*; and this not only by *comparison*, but also according to *substance* and form. But whatever may be the case concerning diversity in the genus of *being*, the diversity according to the mode of *measuring* there is no one who can deny. And this suffices for the present question, in which it is asked whether spiritual things have a measure distinct from corporeal things. For it must be said that they do.

But if you ask what that [measure] is; it must be answered, according to the Saints and the philosophers[^18], that it is called *created eternity* or *the age*; but since *eternity* is properly taken for the uncreated, and *the age* is frequently taken for time, therefore by its proper name it can be called *aeviternity*. Thus it must be answered, if it is asked about the measure that regards the very *being* of a spiritual creature — *being*, I say, immutable and perpetual.

<!-- page 57 -->

— But if it is asked about the measure of angelic *affections*, whether that is distinct from time; this will have its question below[^19]. Now, however, it is plain that the measure called *aeviternity* does not measure the variation of affections, as Augustine says to Orosius[^20]. For the age is the measure of immutable *being* alone.

It must therefore be conceded, as the reasons show, that in some way spiritual things have their own proper measure with respect to time and temporal things.

1. As to what is objected, then, that the spiritual nature is moved through times; the response is already clear: for this is said as to *affections*, not as to *being*.

2. As to what is objected about the four things created first, it must be said that the name *time* is there extended to the measure of every duration that has a beginning; whence it is taken very broadly and includes the age, as will better appear below[^21].

3. As to what is objected about place, it does not hold, because corporeal *place* is not the measure of spiritual things, although it contains them[^22]; but the age measures and conforms; therefore it does not hold: there is one place that does not measure, therefore one time that measures. — If you ask me whence this; it must be said that an Angel truly has duration, but does not have extension; and therefore it has a measure of duration, not of extension.

4. As to what is objected about number, it must be said that it is not similar, because the mode of *distinction* is the same in spiritual and corporeal things; but the mode of *duration* is not the same. Therefore the measure of *distinction* is the same according to species, [but] the measure of *duration* is not the same in that way.

5. As to what is objected about a beatified man and an Angel, it must be said that they are measured by a like measure, namely the age, because they have a like mode of enduring; but a wayfaring man is not measured by a like measure, because, although he has the same *being*, he yet has another *mode* of being and of enduring; and the measure regards not only *being*, but also the *mode* of enduring.

6. As to what is asked, in what genus the measure of angelic duration is; some say that it is not a quantity except a quantity of power, and therefore it is not properly in the genus of quantity[^23]. — But if it is truly a measure, how is it not a true quantity?

Therefore others say that it is in the genus of quantity as a principle. — Yet if it is asked of what it is the principle, since it states a measure distinct from time, as has been shown, it will be difficult to assign[^24].

And therefore it can more soundly be said that, just as time is posited in spiritual substances as to affections, according to Augustine, although the consideration of the Philosopher did not ascend to that; so too[^25] a measure is posited differing in species from the other quantities, although the Philosopher does not speak of it, because he intended to determine the measures of lower things. Nor on this account is there posited any insufficiency in him; and even if it were posited, one would not on this account have to depart in any way from the path of truth[^26].

la: Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 interserunt *esse.*

en: Some codices, with ed. 1, insert *esse.*

la: Vers. 1: *Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum illo fuit semper et est ante aevum.* — In sequente propositione ex cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus verba *si ante aevum dicit quid increatum*, quibus additis argumentatio redditur planior et magis congruit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. arg. 1.

en: Verse 1: *All wisdom is from the Lord God and was always with Him and is before the ages.* — In the following proposition, from codex cc and ed. 1 we have supplied the words *if "before the ages" signifies something uncreated*, with which added the argument is rendered plainer and agrees better with Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, arg. 1.

la: Libr. III. Metro 9. — Paulo inferius codd. P Q *exit ab aliquo* pro *exit ab alio.*

en: Book III, metre 9. — A little below, codices P Q [read] *goes forth from something* for *goes forth from another.*

en: Chapter 10, § 3.

la: Plures codd. ut F L U cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt *secundum.* — De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 105. (c. 11.).

en: Several codices, as F L U cc and ed. 1, add *according to.* — On the *major*, cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 105 (c. 11).

la: Cod. aa *limitatam habet mensuram*; in cod. F autem hic additur *propriam.*

en: Codex aa [reads] *has a limited measure*; but in codex F there is here added *proper.*

la: Quaest. 63 ad Oros. q. 40: *Movet itaque se ipsum sine tempore et loco, movet creatum spiritum sine loco temporaliter, movet creaturam corpoream temporaliter et localiter.* Cfr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 39.

en: Question 63 to Orosius, q. 40: *He therefore moves Himself without time and place, He moves the created spirit without place, temporally, He moves the corporeal creature temporally and locally.* Cf. *On Genesis to the Letter* VIII, c. 20, n. 39.

la: Exposit. in c. 1. Gen., ubi etiam a Lyrano allegatur.

en: Exposition on Genesis ch. 1, where it is also cited by [Nicholas of] Lyra.

la: Vat. *maioris.* In multis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur particula *non.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *of greater.* In many manuscripts and ed. 1 the particle *not* is omitted.

la: Cod. O *sicut vult Philosophus*, qui IV. Phys. text. 134. (c. 14.) ait: *Dicitur autem recte, quod numerus quidem est idem ovium [versio Arabico-latina hominum] et canum, si aequalis uterque sit; denarius autem non idem, neque decem eadem.* Cfr. ibid. text. 132. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post *mensurantur* adiungit *et numerantur.*

en: Codex O [reads] *just as the Philosopher holds*, who in *Physics* IV, text 134 (c. 14) says: *But it is rightly said that the number is indeed the same of sheep [the Arabic-Latin version: of men] and of dogs, if each is equal; but ten is not the same, nor are ten [units] the same.* Cf. ibid., text 132. — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, after *are measured* adds *and are numbered.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quantitate*, ubi hae species enumerantur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quantity*, where these species are enumerated.

la: Verba *ad primam partem* supplevimus fide cod. cc et ed. 1.

en: The words *for the first part* we have supplied on the faith of codex cc and ed. 1.

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104. (c. 11.): «*Nunc* sequitur id quod fertur, ut tempus motum». Quae verba S. Thomas in Commentario super hunc locum (lect. 18.) ita exponit: «Sicut *tempus* ad motum (se habet), ita et *nunc* ad mobile... Ex hac autem consideratione de facili potest accipi intellectus aeternitatis. Ipsum enim *nunc*, in quantum respondet mobili se habenti aliter et aliter, discernit prius et posterius in tempore et suo fluxu tempus facit, sicut punctus lineam. Sublata igitur alia et alia dispositione a mobili, remanet substantia semper eodem modo se habens; unde intelligitur *nunc* ut semper stans, et non ut fluens nec habens prius et posterius». Secundum Fr. Gulielmum de Marra, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. propositio de substantia primi mobilis, quae modo sequitur, est Averrois (VIII. Metaph. text. 12. et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 95.), qui etiam IV. Phys. text. 104. ait: *Instans quodammodo est quasi idem et nunquam transmutabile, et quodammodo est transmutabile et multiplicabile, et causa in hoc est, quia translatum est tale.* — Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *Nunc aevi* pro *Nunc enim.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 104 (c. 11): «*The now* follows that which is carried along, as time [follows] motion». Which words St. Thomas, in his Commentary on this passage (lect. 18), expounds thus: «As *time* (is disposed) to motion, so too *the now* to the movable... And from this consideration the understanding of eternity can easily be grasped. For *the now* itself, insofar as it answers to the movable disposed otherwise and otherwise, discerns before and after in time and by its flux makes time, as a point [makes] a line. When, therefore, the one and the other disposition is removed from the movable, the substance remains, ever disposed in the same way; whence *the now* is understood as ever standing, and not as flowing nor as having before and after». According to Friar William of Marra, II Sent., d. 2, q. 1, the proposition concerning the substance of the first movable, which now follows, is Averroes' (*Metaphysics* VIII, text 12, and *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 95), who also in *Physics* IV, text 104 says: *The instant is in a way as it were the same and never transmutable, and in a way it is transmutable and multipliable, and the cause of this is that what is transferred is such.* — The Vatican edition, against almost all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] *the now of the age* for *for the now.*

la: Qui ideo ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.) definitur: *terminus corporis continentis.*

en: Which therefore by Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 39 ff. (c. 4), is defined: *the limit of the containing body.*

la: Quaest. 72: *An tempora aeterna aevum significavit, inter quod et tempus, hoc distat, quod illud stabile est, tempus autem mutabile?*

en: Question 72: *Whether "eternal times" signified the age, between which and time this is the difference, that the former is stable, but time mutable?*

la: Solummodo Vat. omittit *idem per essentiam.*

en: Only the Vatican edition omits *the same by essence.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 100. (c. 9.), ubi caelo et rebus caelestibus attribuit hoc nomen αἰών, quod diversimode vertitur: *aeternitas, sempiternitas, saeculum, aevum.* — Paulo superius Vat. *a tempore* pro *a corporalibus.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 100 (c. 9), where he attributes to the heaven and to celestial things this name αἰών, which is variously rendered: *eternity, sempiternity, saeculum, the age.* — A little above, the Vatican edition [reads] *from time* for *from corporeal things.*

en: Article 2, q. 1 and 2.

la: Quaest. 40. et 41, ubi affectionibus Angelorum assignat tempus tanquam mensuram earum. Cfr. supra argum. 1. ad opp. et eius solutio, una cum verbis Augustini, 83 Qq. q. 72, hic in corp. citatis.

en: Questions 40 and 41, where he assigns time to the affections of the Angels as their measure. Cf. above, argument 1 to the contrary and its solution, together with the words of Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 72, cited here in the body.

en: Article 2, q. 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 115. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi ostendit, *in tempore esse* idem esse ac tempore mensurari, non autem idem esse *cum tempore esse*, sicut nec idem est *in loco esse* et *cum loco esse*, adeoque sempiterna, licet sint *cum tempore*, non esse in tempore. — Mox aliqui codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 in sensu obiectionis *mensurans* pro *non mensurans*, quod explicat Vat. ponendo *continens.* Paulo superius post *quamvis contineat* supplet cod. N *spiritualia.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 115 ff. (c. 12), where he shows that *to be in time* is the same as to be measured by time, but not the same as *to be with time*, just as neither is *to be in a place* the same as *to be with a place*, and so sempiternal things, although they are *with time*, are not in time. — Soon after, some codices with editions 2, 3, 4 [read], in the sense of the objection, *measuring* for *not measuring*, which the Vatican edition explains by putting *containing.* A little above, after *although it contains*, codex N supplies *spiritual things.*

la: Huius sententiae videtur fuisse Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. ad 3. Cfr. infra q. 3. fund. 4. et in corp. — De *quantitate virtutis* I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1, d. 19. p. I. q. 2; infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 3.

en: Of this opinion Alexander of Hales seems to have been, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, ad 3. Cf. below, q. 3, fund. 4, and in the body. — On the *quantity of power*, I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, d. 19, p. I, q. 2; below, d. 15, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Cod. aa *rationem assignare.* — Cfr. q. 3. fundam. 4.

en: Codex aa [reads] *to assign the account.* — Cf. q. 3, fundamentum 4.

la: Subaudi: *quantum ad esse substantiarum spiritualium.* Hinc cod. O mox perperam *indifferens* pro *differens.*

en: Understand: *as to the being of spiritual substances.* Hence codex O soon after wrongly [reads] *indifferent* for *differing.*

la: Guliel. de Mara (Marra) hic q. 1, ad eandem obiectionem respondet: *Dicendum, quod Philosophus non enumerat omnes species quantitatis in libro Praedicamentorum, sed tantum famosas, sicut ait Commentator (Averroes), V. Metaph. cap. de Quantitate (text. 18.), ubi ponit Philosophus, motum esse speciem quantitatis.*

en: William of Mara (Marra) here, q. 1, to the same objection replies: *It must be said that the Philosopher does not enumerate all the species of quantity in the book of the Categories, but only the famous ones, as the Commentator (Averroes) says, Metaphysics V, the chapter on Quantity (text 18), where the Philosopher posits motion to be a species of quantity.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De multis *mensurae* speciebus copiose tractat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Mensura, de qua hic agitur, refertur ad *existentiam actualem*. Differt autem valde *existentia* in creatis rebus corruptibilibus, in incorruptibilibus et in Deo. Hinc est etiam triplex existentiae *duratio*, quae importat permanentiam existentiae, et triplex durationis *mensura*, scil. *tempus, aevum, aeternitas.* — Patet autem, quod etiam rerum corruptibilium motibus continuo fluentibus substat aliquod *esse permanens*, licet variabile et transmutabile tum secundum existentiam, tum secundum operationem. Harum propria mensura est tempus, quod secundum Aristotelem definitur: *numerus motus secundum prius et posterius* (cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 1). — In Deo vero essentia, existentia, operatio idem sunt et invariabile; unde divinae existentiae mensura est *aeternitas*, carens initio, fine, mutabilitate, unde cum Boethio apte definitur: *interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio* (cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.). — *Aevum* denique, quasi medium tenens inter tempus et aeternitatem, mensurat durationem entis creati, quod quidem naturaliter quoad *esse* habet incorruptibilitatem, *initium* tamen, et quoad operationes et affectiones *variationem.* — Doctores, exceptis paucis Nominalibus, recte tenent, tum aevum realiter differre a tempore, tum rationi aevi et temporis respondere aliquid reale, sive, ut dicit S. Bonav. (hic q. 2. in corp.), est «dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae», licet actualis numeratio sit a parte animae. Hinc a Stephano Parisiensi Episc. a 1276 condemnata est thesis, «quod aevum et tempus nihil sunt in re, sed solum in apprehensione». (Collect. iudic. t. I. pag. 197 Cap. XI. Errores de mundo etc. n. 19.).

<!-- page 58 -->

**II.** Pro faciliore intelligentia plurium locorum in hac et seqq. quaest., ex Richardo a Med. (loc. cit.) notamus, quod in existentia rerum corruptibilium est triplex mensura: «una *intrinseca* existens in ipso [scil. in *esse* variabili] sicut in *subiecto*. Haec est *propria continuatio illius*, quae extenso nomine temporis *tempus* posset vocari [apud recentiores *tempus intrinsecum*], quamvis improprie, quia sic possent dici multa tempora, eo quod numerantur secundum numerationem motuum. — Alia *extrinseca et in genere*; et illa est tempus proprie dictum, quod idem est quod continuatio durationis motus, *ab anima numerata*, qua, mediante motu, cuius est passio, mensurat anima durationes motuum aliorum [*tempus extrinsecum*]. Et haec est in motu primi mobilis manifeste nobis noti, sicut in subiecto. Ad alios autem motus non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde illius solius motus, in quo est sicut in subiecto, est mensura *intrinseca*; aliorum autem motuum est mensura *extrinseca*. — Praedicto etiam *esse* debetur mensura *extrinseca et extra genus*, et illa Deus est sub ratione, qua est in se habens superexcellenter quidquid est perfectionis in durationibus omnium motionum». — Simili modo Richardus in *esse uniformiter se habente et stabili* sive aeviterno triplicem distinguit mensuram: «una *intrinseca*, scil. propria duratio cuiuslibet aeviterni, existens in suo esse sicut in subiecto, quae extenso nomine aevi posset vocari *aevum*, quamvis non proprie; et sic tot sunt aeva, quot aeviterna. Alia est *extrinseca et in genere*; et illa est duratio nobilissimi aeviterni, existens in *esse* illius sicut in subiecto, ad *esse* autem aliorum aeviternorum non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum [in hoc non consentit S. Bonav., hic q. 2.], quamvis non ita plene habeat rationem mensurae, sicut tempus respectu temporalium... *Tertia* est *extrinseca et extra genus*; et illa est ipse Deus, sub ratione qua aeternitas». Ex his facile intelligitur, quid Seraphico sit «diversitas in genere entis et in genere mensurandi» (hic in corp.).

**III.** In solutione huius quaestionis doctores communiter conveniunt; sed in determinandis seqq. et aliis quaestionibus de aevo diversae fuerunt opiniones. Ad rem Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.): «Multa, quae de ea materia dicuntur, certitudine carent et opinative promuntur magis quam assertive». — Alii auctores plerumque hanc praecise quaestionem non explicite tractant, excepto Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.); plures de eadem re loquuntur in duabus seqq. qq., vel in quaest. de differentia aeternitatis, aevi et temporis, ut Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 4. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. dub. lat. 6. 7. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Of the many species of *measure* Richard of Middleton treats copiously (here a. 2, q. 1). The measure here treated of is referred to *actual existence*. Now *existence* differs greatly in created corruptible things, in incorruptible things, and in God. Hence there is also a threefold *duration* of existence, which implies the permanence of existence, and a threefold *measure* of duration, namely *time, the age, eternity.* — Now it is plain that even under the continuously flowing motions of corruptible things there underlies some *permanent being*, though variable and transmutable both according to existence and according to operation. The proper measure of these is time, which according to Aristotle is defined: *the number of motion according to before and after* (cf. above p. 20, note 1). — But in God essence, existence, operation are the same and invariable; whence the measure of the divine existence is *eternity*, lacking beginning, end, mutability, whence with Boethius it is aptly defined: *the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life* (cf. I Sent., d. 9, q. 3). — *The age*, finally, as holding a kind of middle between time and eternity, measures the duration of created being, which indeed naturally has incorruptibility as to *being*, yet a *beginning*, and as to operations and affections *variation.* — The doctors, except a few Nominalists, rightly hold both that the age really differs from time, and that to the formal account of the age and of time there corresponds something real, or, as St. Bonaventure says (here q. 2, in the body), it is «a disposition of the thing outside, not a fiction of the soul», although the actual numbering is on the part of the soul. Hence by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in the year 1276, the thesis was condemned, «that the age and time are nothing in reality, but only in apprehension». (Collect. iudic., t. I, p. 197, Cap. XI, *Errors concerning the world etc.*, n. 19.).

<!-- page 58 -->

**II.** For the easier understanding of several passages in this and the following questions, we note from Richard of Middleton (loc. cit.) that in the existence of corruptible things there is a threefold measure: «one *intrinsic*, existing in the thing itself [namely, in variable *being*] as in a *subject*. This is *the proper continuation of that thing*, which by an extended use of the name of time could be called *time* [among more recent [writers], *intrinsic time*], though improperly, because in this way many times could be spoken of, in that they are numbered according to the numbering of motions. — Another *extrinsic and in a genus*; and this is time properly so called, which is the same as the continuation of the duration of motion, *numbered by the soul*, by which, through the mediation of motion, of which it is a property, the soul measures the durations of other motions [*extrinsic time*]. And this is in the motion of the first movable, manifestly known to us, as in a subject. But to other motions it is not compared as an accident to a subject, but as a measure to the measured. Whence of that motion alone, in which it is as in a subject, it is the *intrinsic* measure; but of other motions it is the *extrinsic* measure. — To the aforesaid *being* also there is owed an *extrinsic and extra-generic* measure, and that is God, under the account by which He is in Himself possessing super-excellently whatever there is of perfection in the durations of all motions». — In a like manner Richard, in *being uniformly disposed and stable*, that is, in the aeviternal, distinguishes a threefold measure: «one *intrinsic*, namely the proper duration of each aeviternal thing, existing in its own being as in a subject, which by an extended use of the name of the age could be called *the age*, though not properly; and thus there are as many ages as there are aeviternal things. Another is *extrinsic and in a genus*; and this is the duration of the noblest aeviternal thing, existing in its *being* as in a subject, but to the *being* of other aeviternal things it is not compared as an accident to a subject, but as a measure to the measured [in this St. Bonaventure does not agree, here q. 2], though it does not so fully have the account of a measure as time [has] with respect to temporal things... *The third* is *extrinsic and extra-generic*; and this is God Himself, under the account by which [He is] eternity». From these things it is easily understood what for the Seraphic [Doctor] is «the diversity in the genus of being and in the genus of measuring» (here in the body).

**III.** In the solution of this question the doctors commonly agree; but in determining the following and other questions about the age the opinions were diverse. To the point, Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2): «Many things that are said about that matter lack certitude and are put forward by way of opinion rather than assertively». — Other authors for the most part do not explicitly treat this question precisely, except Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1); several speak of the same matter in the two following questions, or in the question on the difference of eternity, the age, and time, as Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 10, a. 4, 5. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, dub. lat. 6, 7. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 9, q. 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 55-58 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {55,56,57,58}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 4463–4696), per the Vol II override: the OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, the three *opiniones*, the scholion, and every page-footer (two-column small type). Each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands. The 450 dpi crops were clean throughout — no `[?]` flags parked for this chunk.

**Page span / structure.** q1 body occupies printed pp. 55–57 (running heads `. I. QUAEST. I. 55` / `58 SENTEN…` = p.56 / `… I. QUAEST. I. 57`). The Scholion (I–III) is set in small two-column type at the foot of p.57 and the top of p.58; **the Scholion has no numbered apparatus** (all its references are inline parentheticals). q1 body ends on p.57 R (`…a veritatis tramite aliquatenus discedendum⁸`). 6 *videtur* arguments + 6 *contra* arguments; three-*opinio* Respondeo with two `Improbatur` rebuttals; six numbered `Solutio oppositorum` replies (the 6th branching into Solutio 1 / Solutio 2 / Solutio auctoris). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `Distinctio 1/2`, `Opinio 1/2/3`, `Conclusio 1/2`, `Improbatur`, `Quaestio connexa`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Solutio 1/2 non probata`, `Solutio auctoris`, `Quaestio incidens`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–26:
- **p. 55** footer, L col notes 1–6 → `[^1]`–`[^6]`; R col notes 7–10 → `[^7]`–`[^10]`. (10 notes total.)
- **p. 56** footer, L col notes 1–3 → `[^11]`–`[^13]`; R col notes 3-cont, 4–8 → `[^13]`(continuation)–`[^18]`. **Note 3 (`[^13]`) spans the L→R column footer** (begins L col `Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104…`, runs over into R col `…Metaph. text. 12. et I. de Caelo…`); reassembled as one entry. (8 notes total.)
- **p. 57** footer, L col notes 1–4 → `[^19]`–`[^22]`; R col notes 5–8 → `[^23]`–`[^26]`. (8 notes total.)

**Cross-chunk footer boundary (CLEAN — no split).** q1's last apparatus page is p.57, fully captured here. q1's Scholion sits physically at the foot of p.58 but carries no apparatus. p.58's footer apparatus block (L col notes 1–5: `Cap. 5. § 5…`; `Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6…`; `Cod. Q interserit Angelis…`; `Plurimi codd. minus congrue enim`; `Dialog. de Veritate, c. 13…`) anchors in the **q2** body (`QUAESTIO II`, raw 4698+), which begins in normal type at the top of p.58 above its own footer — that block belongs to the next chunk (`d2-p1-a1-q2`), not here. No backfill into or out of this chunk is required. The next session must capture p.58 footer notes 1–5 (and onward) for q2 starting from its body anchors.

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No `[?]` flags from this chunk. One low-confidence item to eyes-on at 600 dpi with the d.1–d.10 batch: `[^18]` Greek `αἰών` was legible in the 450 dpi p.56 R footer crop and is rendered as read; confirm the breathing/accent at 600 dpi (non-blocking). **RESOLVED 2026-05-22** — 600 dpi p.56 R footer (note 8) confirms `αἰών` exactly as transcribed.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 58 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum omnium aeviternorum sit unum aevum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram *unam* per essentiam; et hoc est quaerere, utrum sit *unum aevum* omnium aeviternorum. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus[^1]: «Ipse est aevum aevorum»: ergo plura sunt aeva: non per interruptionem, ita quod unum post aliud: ergo per diversitatem simul existentium.

2. Item, unitas accidentis venit ab unitate subiecti[^2]; sed non est ponere unum subiectum omnium aeviternorum, cum quaedam spiritualia non habeant aliquod commune, ad cuius aspectum mensurentur: ergo non est ponere, aevum esse unum. Quod autem nullum habeant tale subiectum, quod sit contentivum spiritualium, hoc apparet, quia illud haberet excellentiam et influentiam et continentiam respectu aeviternorum, sicut primum mobile respectu temporalium; sed tale respectu substantiarum spiritualium inveniri non potest, ut patet discurrenti per singula: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnibus aliis[^3] corruptis, possibile est unicum Angelum remanere, cum non dependeat ab aliis; et si remanet in *esse* completo, habet mensuram consequentem illud *esse*, et hoc est aevum: ergo remanet aevum, quolibet Angelo remanente, et totum remanet et perfectum: ergo quot sunt Angeli, tot sunt aeva.

4. Item, aevum est mensura rei perfectae et multum habentis de specie sive de forma: si ergo[^4] aevum maxime consequitur *esse* completum, cum illud non sit unum numero, sed tantum specie, videtur, quod aevum sit unum tantum secundum speciem.

**Contra hoc:**

1. Arguitur *a simili*. Sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia, ita aevum ad aeviterna; sed tempus est unum, quod mensurat omnia temporalia, sicut Anselmus[^5] dicit et Philosophus: ergo similiter unum est aevum, quod mensurat omnia aeviterna.

2. Item, hoc videtur *a minori*. Maior est varietas et difformitas in rebus mutabilibus quam in rebus immutabilibus: si ergo mutabilia omnia possunt unica mensura per essentiam mensurari, ergo multo fortius aeviterna.

3. Item, hoc videtur *a causa*. Positio enim multorum est, quare *tempus* unum potest esse: quia, quamvis sit accidens, tamen est mensura extrinseca, sicut locus, et quia non est accidens situale; sed hoc totum invenitur in *aevo*: ergo etc.

<!-- page 59 -->

4. Item, si plura sunt aeva, aut ergo *simul*, aut *consequenter*. Non *consequenter*, quia quodlibet sit infinitum a parte post; non *simul*, quia quae sunt simul, sunt in eodem instanti, ergo si aeviterna sunt simul, sunt in eodem *nunc* aevi: ergo si omnium aeviternorum est unum *nunc*, ergo unum *aevum* per essentiam.

### Conclusio

> Licet omnium temporalium sit unum tempus, tamen quot sunt aeviterna, tot sunt aeva.

**Respondeo:** Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam praenotandum est, qualiter intelligitur unitas in *tempore*. Sciendum autem, quod tripliciter tentaverunt aliqui unitatem *temporis* accipere, secundum quod accidens habet tripliciter comparari ad subiectum. Habet enim ibi *causam*, *existentiam* et *apparentiam*.

Dixerunt ergo aliqui, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo *est* et per se, quo remoto, removetur et tempus. Unde dixerunt, quod tempus est unum, quia est in primo mobili, cuius motu cessante, cessat et tempus[^6]. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, si cessaret motus primi mobilis, adhuc posset moveri rota figuli; et constat, quod mensuraretur ille motus: ergo non tantum est ibi, immo et in aliis rebus mobilibus. *Item*, tempus est in affectionibus et cogitationibus liberi arbitrii, quod non subest motui caelesti, sicut vult Augustinus[^7].

Et ideo dixerunt alii, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo *apparet*. Cum enim tempus sit numerus sive mensura motuum, et numerus iste secundum *essentiam* et *habitum* sit in re mobili vel mota, in qua est prius et posterius, secundum *actualem* vero *numerationem* sit a parte animae, sicut vult Philosophus[^8] et Augustinus, cum anima omnes motus et mutationes numeret aspiciendo ad mensuram motus primi mobilis, scilicet per diem, annum et horam; voluerunt dicere, quod unum est tempus ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet; quia, etsi omnia habeant proprias periodos, tamen omnia numerantur et mensurantur per mensuram motus regularis et certi et nobis notissimi, scilicet motus mobilis primi. — Sed illud non sufficit, quia dicit Philosophus de Caelo et mundo[^9], quod si essent duo mobilia prima, adhuc unum esset tempus. Tunc non posset dici unum ratione *subiecti*, in quo primo *esset*, nec in quo primo *appareret*, cum utrumque esset aeque primum et evidens; nec ratione *animae*, quia tempus non est numerus numerans, sed numeratus, ut Philosophus[^10] vult, et tempus est dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae.

Et ideo dixerunt tertii profundius, quod unitas temporis sumitur ab unitate subiecti, a quo *causatur*; subiectum autem, a quo causatur, est materia ut mutabilis, et ita ut ens in potentia. Nam materia, ut est in acquisitione formae, mutatur, et sic est ens in potentia; et ideo tempus maxime inter omnia accidentia se tenet plus cum materia. Sicut igitur materia una est per *essentiam*, differens per *esse*, una non unitate *universalitatis* nec *singularitatis*, sed *medio* modo, sic et tempus in omnibus temporalibus[^11].

*Et si quaeras*, unde est hoc, quod *tempus* est unum, cum tamen *motus* sint varii; dicendum, quod *motus* definitur per id ad quod est[^12], unde motus respicit motorem et mobile et terminum; *tempus* autem respicit ipsam durationem variam et successivam, quae venit ex potentia rei mobilis. Et quia motus naturae durantis consimilis est[^13], et natura una, supra quam fundatur, est una numero; ideo tempus non tantum est unum *specie* in omnibus temporalibus, immo etiam quantum ad *essentiam* unum *numero*, differens per *esse*, sicut posuerunt omnes sapientes, qui circa hanc materiam locuti sunt.

*Si autem quaeras*, quare non sic est in aliis *quantitatibus*[^14]; omnes respiciunt materiam; dicendum, quod omnes aliae, etsi *esse incompletum* habeant in materia — nam sunt in materia dimensiones infinitae — tamen *esse completum* ipsarum est a materia existente sub forma. Tempus autem habet *esse* ex hoc, quod materia tendit ad formam, propter hoc quod causatur a motu, qui est «entelechia existentis in potentia[^15]», et ideo tenet se maxime ex parte materiae, et ideo minime distinctum.

<!-- page 60 -->

Nec dico, quod tempus sit in ipsa materia, omni forma circumscripta, quia hoc esset contra Augustinum, duodecimo Confessionum[^16], quia non est vicissitudo aliqua in materia, nisi cum in ea est aliqua forma; sed quamvis sit in materia, quae est sub forma et ab ipsa causatur, magis tamen causatur a materia, ut tendit ad formam, et hoc est in materia ratione suae potentiae.

Secundum hunc triplicem modum nisi sunt aliqui qui unitatem in *aevo* ponere, primo ratione subiecti, in quo primo *est*. Posuerunt enim ordinem in intelligentiis secundum continentiam virtualem, sicut in visibilibus est reperire continentiam localem. Et sicut tempus in primo mobili fundatur, sic aevum[^17] in prima intelligentia, quae virtualiter alias continet, in alias influit. — Sed ista positio non potest stare. Primo, quia omnes intelligentiae in incorruptione habent aequalitatem, sicut in sequenti distinctione dicitur[^18]. Secundo, quia conservatio intelligentiarum immediate pendet ex Deo. Tertio, quia, si illa intelligentia destrueretur, tunc fundamentum aevi periret; et possibile fuit, illam peccasse, immo forte peccavit, cum diabolus credatur fuisse excellentissimus Angelorum[^19].

Et ideo alii conati sunt assignare unitatem ratione subiecti, in quo primo *apparet*, quod quidem est caelum empyreum, in quo non cadit variatio; immo omnimode quietum est[^20]. — Sed nec illud sufficit, quoniam immortalitas et immutabilitas per prius est in substantiis spiritualibus quam corporalibus, cum sint digniores; et dignius non habeat mensurari per aspectum ad minus dignum.

Et ideo tentaverunt alii accipere unitatem ex parte *causae*, qui dixerunt, quod duratio intelligentiarum continuatur et conservatur per *divinam* influentiam, quae quoniam una est, unum est aevum mensurans ipsam. — Sed nec illud potest stare, quoniam influentia illa aut *active*, aut *passive* intelligitur. Si de *activa*, non est aliud quam Deus, qui non habet aevum mensuram. Si de *passiva*, tot sunt aeva, quot sunt suscipientes.

Et ideo non restat alius modus nisi per unitatem *materiae*, sicut prius dictum est de tempore. Sed multi negant, intelligentias habere materiam, et ideo minime distinctum. Nec dico, quod tempus sit in ipsa materia, omni forma circumscripta, quia hoc esset contra Augustinum, duodecimo Confessionum, quia non est vicissitudo aliqua in materia, nisi cum in ea est aliqua forma; sed quidquid sit de hoc, tamen *aevum* respicit *esse actuale* et *esse stabile*, sed *tempus* materiam ut in *potentia*. Et ideo sicut unitas temporis conformatur materiae, sic unitas aevi conformatur formae, non inquam formae, in quantum haec vel illa, sed in quantum immutabilis.

Unde sicut linea in corporibus quantumcumque diversis ponitur eadem *specie*, sic aevum habet unitatem *universalis*, non unitatem, quam habet tempus.

Et sic concedendae sunt rationes probantes, non esse unum aevum aeviternorum, sed multa[^21].

1. Quod ergo obiicitur: sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum *tempus*, quantum est de se, respiciat variationem et motum, consequitur ipsa, quorum est mensura, ratione illius principii[^22], per quod sunt entia in potentia; et quia illud unicum dicitur esse per essentiam, ideo et tempus. *Aevum* autem de sui ratione propria respicit *esse completum* et *stabile*, et ideo magis respicit formam: et ideo non habet unitatem nisi *universalitatis* sive conformitatis, sicut et alia accidentia.

2. Quod arguitur *a minori*, quod temporalia habent unam mensuram; iam patet[^23], quod non est locus *a minori*, quia illa variatio, ratione qua dicitur esse in potentia, respicit ipsum materiale principium, et ideo facit recedere a distinctione; non sic est in aevo.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod tempus est unum, quia est accidens extrinsecum, non situatum vel situale; dicendum, quod falsum est: ista enim non est causa, sed magis illa quae praedicta est.

4. Quod obiicitur: si sunt plura aeva, aut simul, aut non simul; dicendum, quod *simul*. — Quod ergo obiicitur: ergo in eodem *nunc*; dicendum, quod esse simul in duratione est dupliciter: aut per mensurae *concomitantiam*, aut per mensurae *unitatem* et indifferentiam. Cum autem dicitur Deus, homo et Angelus esse simul; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur per mensurae *concomitantiam*. Cum autem dicitur: Petrus et Paulus simul sunt vel currunt, hoc potest dici per mensurae *unitatem* et indifferentiam; et ideo non sequitur, quod si aeva aeviternorum sunt simul, quod sint unum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether of all aeviternal things there is one age.*

Secondly it is asked whether spiritual things have *one* measure by essence; and this is to ask whether there is *one age* of all aeviternal things. And that there is not seems true.

1. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^1]: «He is the age of ages»: therefore there are several ages: not by interruption, so that one [is] after another: therefore by the diversity of things existing simultaneously.

2. Likewise, the unity of an accident comes from the unity of the subject[^2]; but one cannot posit one subject of all aeviternal things, since certain spiritual things do not have anything in common at the regard of which they would be measured: therefore one cannot posit that the age is one. And that they have no such subject which would be containing of spiritual things, this appears, because that [subject] would have an excellence and an influence and a containment with respect to aeviternal things, just as the first movable [has] with respect to temporal things; but no such thing can be found with respect to spiritual substances, as is plain to one running through them singly: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, all other things being corrupted, it is possible for a single Angel to remain, since it does not depend on the others[^3]; and if it remains in complete *being*, it has a measure consequent upon that *being*, and this is the age: therefore the age remains, with any Angel whatever remaining, and it remains whole and perfect: therefore as many as the Angels are, so many are the ages.

4. Likewise, the age is the measure of a perfect thing and of one having much of species or of form: if therefore[^4] the age most of all follows complete *being*, since that is not one in number, but only in species, it seems that the age is one only according to species.

**Against this:**

1. It is argued *from a likeness*. As time stands to temporal things, so the age to aeviternal things; but time is one, which measures all temporal things, as Anselm[^5] says, and the Philosopher: therefore likewise the age is one, which measures all aeviternal things.

2. Likewise, this seems so *from the lesser*. There is greater variety and disformity in changeable things than in unchangeable things: if therefore all changeable things can be measured by a single measure by essence, then much more so aeviternal things.

3. Likewise, this seems so *from the cause*. For it is the position of many why *time* can be one: because, although it is an accident, it is nevertheless an extrinsic measure, like place, and because it is not a positional accident; but all this is found in *the age*: therefore, etc.

<!-- page 59 -->

4. Likewise, if there are several ages, then either *simultaneously* or *successively*. Not *successively*, because each would be infinite on the side of the after; not *simultaneously*, because things that are simultaneous are in the same instant, therefore if aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are in the same *now* of the age: therefore if of all aeviternal things there is one *now*, then one *age* by essence.

### Conclusio

> Although of all temporal things there is one time, nevertheless as many as the aeviternal things are, so many are the ages.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this question it must be premised how unity is understood in *time*. Now it must be known that in three ways some have attempted to take the unity of *time*, according as an accident can be compared in three ways to its subject. For it has there a *cause*, an *existence*, and an *appearance*.

Some, then, have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily and *per se is*, on the removal of which time too is removed. Whence they said that time is one because it is in the first movable, on whose motion ceasing, time too ceases[^6]. — But it does not suffice to say that, because, as Augustine says, if the motion of the first movable were to cease, a potter's wheel could still be moved; and it is evident that that motion would be measured: therefore it is not only there, but also in other movable things. *Likewise*, time is in the affections and thoughts of free choice, which is not subject to the celestial motion, as Augustine holds[^7].

And therefore others have said that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily *appears*. For since time is the number or measure of motions, and that number, according to *essence* and *habit*, is in the movable or moved thing, in which there is before and after, but according to *actual numbering* is on the part of the soul, as the Philosopher holds[^8] and Augustine — since the soul numbers all motions and changes by looking to the measure of the motion of the first movable, namely by day, year, and hour — they wished to say that time is one by reason of the subject in which it primarily appears; because, even if all things have their own periods, nevertheless all are numbered and measured by the measure of the regular and certain motion best known to us, namely the motion of the first movable. — But that does not suffice, because the Philosopher says, *On the Heavens and the World*[^9], that if there were two first movables, there would still be one time. Then it could not be called one by reason of the *subject* in which it primarily *was*, nor in which it primarily *appeared*, since each would be equally primary and evident; nor by reason of the *soul*, because time is not numbering number, but numbered, as the Philosopher[^10] holds, and time is a disposition of the thing outside, not a fiction of the soul.

And therefore a third group said more profoundly that the unity of time is taken from the unity of the subject by which it is *caused*; but the subject by which it is caused is matter as changeable, and so as a being in potency. For matter, as it is in the acquisition of form, is changed, and so is a being in potency; and therefore time, among all accidents, holds itself most with matter. As, therefore, matter is one by *essence*, differing by *being*, one not by the unity of *universality* nor of *singularity*, but in a *middle* way, so too time in all temporal things[^11].

*And if you ask* whence this is, that *time* is one, while yet *the motions* are various; it must be said that *motion* is defined by that to which it tends[^12], whence motion regards the mover and the movable and the terminus; but *time* regards the very duration, varied and successive, which comes from the potency of the movable thing. And because the motion of an enduring nature is alike[^13], and the one nature on which it is founded is one in number; therefore time is not only one in *species* in all temporal things, but even as to *essence* one in *number*, differing by *being*, as all the wise have held who have spoken about this matter.

*But if you ask* why it is not so in the other *quantities*[^14] — they all regard matter — it must be said that all the others, even if they have *incomplete being* in matter — for there are infinite dimensions in matter — nevertheless their *complete being* is from matter existing under form. But time has *being* from this, that matter tends toward form, on account of the fact that it is caused by motion, which is «the entelechy of what exists in potency[^15]», and therefore it holds itself most on the side of matter, and therefore is least distinct.

<!-- page 60 -->

Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*[^16], since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but although it is in matter, which is under form and is caused by it, it is nevertheless caused more by matter, as it tends toward form, and this is in matter by reason of its potency.

According to this threefold mode there were some who [tried] to posit the unity in *the age*, first by reason of the subject in which it primarily *is*. For they posited an order in the intelligences according to virtual containment, just as among visible things one finds local containment. And as time is founded in the first movable, so the age[^17] in the first intelligence, which virtually contains the others [and] flows into the others. — But this position cannot stand. First, because all the intelligences in incorruption have equality, as is said in the following distinction[^18]. Second, because the conservation of the intelligences depends immediately on God. Third, because, if that intelligence were destroyed, then the foundation of the age would perish; and it was possible for it to have sinned, indeed perhaps it did sin, since the devil is believed to have been the most excellent of the Angels[^19].

And therefore others tried to assign the unity by reason of the subject in which it primarily *appears*, which indeed is the empyrean heaven, in which no variation falls; rather it is wholly at rest[^20]. — But neither does that suffice, since immortality and immutability is prior in spiritual substances than in corporeal ones, since they are worthier; and the worthier should not be measured by regard to the less worthy.

And therefore others attempted to take the unity on the side of the *cause*, who said that the duration of the intelligences is continued and conserved by the *divine* influence, which, since it is one, the age measuring it is one. — But neither can that stand, since that influence is understood either *actively* or *passively*. If of the *active*, it is nothing other than God, who does not have the age as a measure. If of the *passive*, there are as many ages as there are receivers.

And therefore no other mode remains except by the unity of *matter*, as was said before about time. But many deny that the intelligences have matter, and therefore [it is] least distinct. Nor do I say that time is in matter itself, all form set aside, because this would be against Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*, since there is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form in it; but whatever may be the case concerning this, *the age* nevertheless regards *actual being* and *stable being*, but *time* [regards] matter as in *potency*. And therefore, just as the unity of time is conformed to matter, so the unity of the age is conformed to form — not, I say, to form insofar as it is this or that, but insofar as it is immutable.

Whence just as a line in bodies however diverse is posited as the same in *species*, so the age has the unity of a *universal*, not the unity which time has.

And thus the reasons proving that there is not one age of aeviternal things, but many, are to be conceded[^21].

1. As to what is objected, then: as time stands to temporal things; it must be said that it is not similar, because, since *time*, so far as it is of itself, regards variation and motion, it follows the very things of which it is the measure, by reason of that principle[^22] by which they are beings in potency; and because that single [principle] is said to be by essence, therefore time too [is one]. But *the age*, from its own proper account, regards *complete* and *stable being*, and therefore regards form more: and therefore it does not have unity except of *universality* or of conformity, like the other accidents.

2. As to what is argued *from the lesser*, that temporal things have one measure; it is already clear[^23] that there is no place for [an argument] *from the lesser*, because that variation, by reason of which it is said to be in potency, regards the material principle itself, and therefore makes [it] recede from distinction; it is not so in the age.

3. As to what is objected, that time is one because it is an extrinsic accident, not situated or positional; it must be said that it is false: for this is not the cause, but rather that which has been said before.

4. As to what is objected: if there are several ages, then either simultaneously or not simultaneously; it must be said *simultaneously*. — As to what is then objected: therefore in the same *now*; it must be said that to be simultaneous in duration is twofold: either by *concomitance* of measure, or by *unity* and indifference of measure. When it is said that God, man, and Angel are simultaneous, it must be said that this is said by *concomitance* of measure. But when it is said: Peter and Paul are or run simultaneously, this can be said by *unity* and indifference of measure; and therefore it does not follow that, if the ages of aeviternal things are simultaneous, they are one.

la: Cap. 5. § 5, et c. 10. § 3. in fine, ubi loquitur de Deo ut est origo et auctor omnis temporis et aevi.

en: Chapter 5, § 5, and c. 10, § 3, at the end, where he speaks of God as the origin and author of all time and of the age.

la: Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.), de quo vide tom. I. pag. 511, nota 6. Cfr. etiam Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 6 (c. 5), on which see vol. I, p. 511, note 6. Cf. also Boethius, *On Unity and the One.*

la: Cod. Q interserit *Angelis*, quod Vat. ponit inferius post *ab aliis.*

en: Codex Q inserts *to the Angels*, which the Vatican edition places lower down, after *on the others.*

la: Plurimi codd. minus congrue *enim.*

en: Very many codices, less fittingly, [read] *for* (*enim*).

la: Dialog. de Veritate, c. 13. in fine, ubi ad probandum quod veritas improprie dicatur huius vel illius rei, cum secundum illam sint, adducit simile de tempore: «Quemadmodum dicitur tempus huius vel illius rei, cum unum et idem sit tempus omnium, quae sunt in eodem tempore simul; et si non esset haec vel illa res, non minus esset idem tempus». Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 93. (c. 10.), contra opinionem Platonis, secundum quam tempus est motus totius caeli, et partes eius sunt partes temporis, arguit sic: «Si plures essent caeli, similiter utique esset tempus cuiuslibet ipsorum motus; quare multa tempora simul». Ex quibus verbis deducitur, iuxta mentem Aristotelis unum tantum esse tempus, etiamsi essent plures caeli. Cfr. etiam XII. Metaph. text. 49. (XI. c. 8.).

en: *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 13, at the end, where, to prove that truth is improperly said [to be] of this or that thing, since they are according to it, he brings forward a likeness from time: «Just as the time of this or that thing is spoken of, although the time of all things that are simultaneously in the same time is one and the same; and if this or that thing did not exist, it would be no less the same time». Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 93 (c. 10), against the opinion of Plato, according to which time is the motion of the whole heaven, and its parts are parts of time, argues thus: «If there were several heavens, likewise there would be the time of the motion of any one of them; wherefore many times simultaneously». From which words it is deduced that, according to the mind of Aristotle, there is only one time, even if there were several heavens. Cf. also *Metaphysics* XII, text 49 (XI, c. 8).

la: Cfr. Averroes, IV. Phys. text. 98. et 130, ubi dicit, tempus sequi motum corporis caelestis et primo inveniri in caelo. — Verba Augustini, quae mox allegantur, sumta sunt ex XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 29: *Audivi a quodam homine docto, quod solis et lunae ac siderum motus ipsa sunt tempora; et nil annui. Cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora? An vero, si cessarent caeli lumina, et moveretur rota figuli, non esset tempus, quo metiremur eos gyros?* etc.

en: Cf. Averroes, *Physics* IV, text 98 and 130, where he says that time follows the motion of the celestial body and is primarily found in the heaven. — The words of Augustine that are soon adduced are taken from *Confessions* XI, c. 23, n. 29: *I heard from a certain learned man that the motions of the sun and moon and stars are themselves the times; and I did not assent. For why are the motions of all bodies not rather the times? Or indeed, if the lights of heaven were to cease, and a potter's wheel were moved, would there not be a time by which we might measure its turns?* etc.

la: Libr. XI. Confess. c. 27. n. 36; VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. 24. 26; Quaest. 65 ad Orosium, q. 41.

en: *Confessions* XI, c. 27, n. 36; *On Genesis to the Letter* VIII, c. 20, 24, 26; *Questions to Orosius* 65, q. 41.

la: Libr. IV. Phys. text. 100. seqq. et 130. seq. (c. 11. et 14.). — August., XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 30. seqq. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 1. seq.

en: *Physics* IV, text 100 ff. and 130 f. (c. 11 and 14). — Augustine, *Confessions* XI, c. 23, n. 30 ff., and *On the City of God* XII, c. 15, n. 1 f.

la: In cod. T ad marg. a manu quasi suppari habetur: *Immo hoc dicit Philosophus quarto Physicorum (text. 93.); unde haec auctoritas male citatur hic.* Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 58, nota 5. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *recti* pro *certi.*

en: In codex T, at the margin, by an almost contemporary hand, there stands: *Rather, the Philosopher says this in the fourth [book] of the Physics (text 93); whence this authority is wrongly cited here.* For the words of Aristotle see above, p. 58, note 5. — A little above, codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *right* (*recti*) for *certain* (*certi*).

en: *Physics* IV, text 102 and 131 f. (c. 11 and 14).

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 adiungit *est unum per essentiam*, differens per esse. Paulo superius plures codd. cum ed. 1 *universalis nec singularis* pro *universalitatis nec singularitatis.* — De unitate materiae cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

en: Codex cc with ed. 1 adds *is one by essence*, differing by being. A little above, several codices with ed. 1 [read] *universal nor singular* for *of universality nor of singularity.* — On the unity of matter cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3.

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 4: *Magis autem ab eo in quod, quam ex quo movetur, denominatur mutatio.*

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 4: *But change is denominated more from that into which than from that out of which it is moved.*

la: Vat. *Et quia tempus naturae duranti consimilius est;* collectioni etiam cod. bb concordat in verbis *naturae duranti.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *And because time is more alike to an enduring nature;* codex bb too agrees with this collation in the words *to an enduring nature.*

la: Quae supra q. 1. argum. ult. ad opp. enumeratae sunt.

en: Which were enumerated above, q. 1, in the last argument to the contrary.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.). Cfr. supra pag. 34, nota 6.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 6 (c. 1). Cf. above, p. 34, note 6.

la: Cap. 12. n. 15: *Duo reperio, quae fecisti carentia temporibus, cum tibi neutrum coaeternum sit. Unum, quod ita formatum est, ut sine ullo defectu contemplationis, sine ullo intervallo mutationis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua aeternitate atque incommutabilitate perfruatur. Alterum, quod ita informe erat, ut ex qua forma in quam formam mutationis vel stationis mutaretur, quo tempori subderetur, non haberet.* — Aliquanto inferius Vat. *et sic est* pro *et hoc est.*

en: Chapter 12, n. 15: *I find two things which Thou hast made lacking times, although neither is coeternal with Thee. One, which is so formed that, without any defect of contemplation, without any interval of change, although changeable, yet unchanged, it enjoys to the full Thy eternity and immutability. The other, which was so formless that it had not [the means] by which it might be changed from what form into what form of change or of rest, by which it might be subject to time.* — Somewhat lower the Vatican edition [reads] *and so it is* for *and this is.*

la: Non pauci codd. supplent *est.*

en: Not a few codices supply *is.*

en: Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and dub. 4.

la: Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Vide p. II. huius dist. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See p. II of this distinction, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. adiungunt *sicut sunt plures formae.*

en: Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition add *just as there are several forms.*

la: Scilicet *materiae*, quae per *essentiam* una dicitur, infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

en: Namely, *of matter*, which is said to be one by *essence*, below, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, 3.

la: Ed. 1 cum cod. cc *patet responsio.* Dein non pauci codd. *quia* pro *quod.*

en: Ed. 1 with codex cc [reads] *the response is clear.* Then not a few codices [read] *because* (*quia*) for *that* (*quod*). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hic agitur de unitate tum temporis, tum aevi, et non de unitate *specifica*, sed de unitate *secundum numerum*, ut pluries notatur in corp. — Loquendo de *tempore*, quatenus est *mensura* rei successivae et non eiusdem *intrinseca* duratio, communior sententia unitatem temporis affirmabat. In quo autem huiusmodi unitas *rationem* suam habeat, disputabatur.

<!-- page 61 -->

Tres opiniones hic recensitas affert etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 10. a. 6.), et ipse cum Richard. a Med. primam opinionem approbat, quae rationem unitatis ponit in unitate primi mobilis; tertia vero (quam praefert S. Bonav.), quae hanc unitatem repetit ab unitate subiecti, a quo *causatur*, quod est materia, iuxta eundem «non sufficiens videtur». Sententiae S. Thomae adhaeret B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2.), et quoad *perfectam* rationem temporis etiam Scotus, IV. Sent. d. 48. q. 2, et praecipue de Rerum princ. q. 20, in quo opere a quaestione 18. usque ad q. 24. de tempore et annexis quaestionibus diffuse et subtiliter disputat.

**II.** Quoad unitatem *aevi*, utrum sit admittenda, et quae sit eius ratio, maior fuit opinionum dissensus. Et praenotandum est, opinionem Aristotelis, quod etiam corpora caelestia, saltem primum mobile, inter incorruptibilia et aeviterna locum obtineant, illa aetate communiter receptam fuisse. S. Thom. in Commentar. et cum quadam restrictione etiam in Summa («concedimus ad praesens») docet, quod aevum «est unum ab unitate *esse* simplicissimi aeviternorum, quod est primus Angelus». Hanc sententiam aliquatenus approbat Richard. a Med. («quodam modo habet rationem mensurae, quamvis non plenam»). Sed Petr. a Tar. praefert opinionem secundam, «quod primum subiectum aevi est primum immobile, id est caelum empyreum». Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 2.) unitatem aevi sustinet, et quoad *rationem* eius tertiae opinioni innititur. — E contrario S. Bonav. negat unitatem aevi et aevum ut mensuram *extrinsecam*. Si autem accipitur aevum pro mensura *intrinseca*, patet quod tot sunt admittenda aeva, quot aeviterna. Huic sententiae assentit etiam Aegid. R., et favet etiam Scotus, quia praefert opinionem, non esse unum aevum omnium aeviternorum ut mensura *extrinseca*, sicut est unum tempus omnium temporalium (hic q. 3. n. 5, q. 2. n. 10; Report. hic q. 1. n. 2, ubi dicit: «Mensurare Angelum inferiorem per *esse* Angeli superioris est aequivocare vocabulum ad mensuram perfectionis»). Tamen idem censet, etiam opinionem S. Thomae esse probabilem, si intelligitur de mensura *extrinseca*.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here the subject is the unity both of time and of the age, and not the *specific* unity, but the unity *according to number*, as is noted several times in the body. — Speaking of *time*, insofar as it is a *measure* of a successive thing and not the *intrinsic* duration of that thing, the more common opinion affirmed the unity of time. But in what this unity has its *ground* was disputed.

<!-- page 61 -->

The three opinions here reviewed are also reported by St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2; S. I, q. 10, a. 6), and he himself, with Richard of Middleton, approves the first opinion, which places the ground of the unity in the unity of the first movable; but the third (which St. Bonaventure prefers), which traces this unity back to the unity of the subject by which it is *caused*, which is matter, according to the same [Thomas] «seems insufficient». To the opinion of St. Thomas adheres Bl. Albert (S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 3, a. 2), and as to the *perfect* account of time also Scotus, IV Sent., d. 48, q. 2, and especially *On the Principle of Things*, q. 20, in which work from question 18 to q. 24 he disputes about time and annexed questions diffusely and subtly.

**II.** As to the unity of *the age*, whether it is to be admitted, and what its ground is, there was greater dissension of opinions. And it must be premised that the opinion of Aristotle, that even the celestial bodies, at least the first movable, hold a place among incorruptible and aeviternal things, was commonly received in that age. St. Thomas, in the Commentary and, with a certain restriction, also in the Summa («we concede for the present»), teaches that the age «is one by the unity of the *being* of the simplest of aeviternal things, which is the first Angel». This opinion Richard of Middleton in some measure approves («it has in a certain way the account of a measure, though not a full one»). But Peter of Tarentaise prefers the second opinion, «that the first subject of the age is the first immobile [thing], that is, the empyrean heaven». Alexander of Hales too (S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 2) maintains the unity of the age, and as to its *ground* relies on the third opinion. — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure denies the unity of the age and the age as an *extrinsic* measure. But if the age is taken for an *intrinsic* measure, it is plain that as many ages are to be admitted as there are aeviternal things. To this opinion Giles of Rome also assents, and Scotus too favors it, because he prefers the opinion that there is not one age of all aeviternal things as an *extrinsic* measure, just as there is one time of all temporal things (here q. 3, n. 5, q. 2, n. 10; Reportatio, here q. 1, n. 2, where he says: «To measure a lower Angel by the *being* of a higher Angel is to equivocate the term as to a measure of perfection»). Yet the same [Scotus] judges that the opinion of St. Thomas also is probable, if it is understood of an *extrinsic* measure.

**III.** Besides those praised: Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 58-61 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {58,59,60,61}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 4697–4912), per the Vol II override: the OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo (a long three-opinion treatment of the unity of time, then a parallel three-opinion treatment of the unity of the age), the four Solutio replies, the scholion, and every page-footer (two-column small type). Each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands.

**Page span / structure.** q2 body occupies printed pp. 58–60. q2 opens in normal type at the top of **p.58** (above its own footer), beneath q1's small-type scholion tail — the q1→q2 boundary noted in `d2-p1-a1-q1`. 4 *videtur* arguments (quod non) + 4 *Contra hoc* arguments; Respondeo with a preliminary three-opinion analysis of the unity of *time* (subject *quo est* / *quo apparet* / *quo causatur*, the third — material — accepted) followed by the principal three-opinion analysis of the unity of the *age* (all rejected: *quo est* / *quo apparet* / *causa*, then the material mode); the age has the unity of a universal, not numerical unity; four numbered *Solutio oppositorum* replies. Scholion I–III set in small two-column type at the foot of p.60 → top of p.61; **the Scholion has no numbered apparatus** (all references inline). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `Opinio 1/2/3`, `Conclusio 1`, `Quaestio incidens 1/2`, `Praenotandum`, `Non sufficit`, `Improbatur`, `Notandum`, `Quaest. principalis de unitate aevi`, `Nec 4. modus sufficit`, `Conclusio principalis`, `Solutio oppositorum`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–23:
- **p. 58** footer (q2 side): L col notes 1–4 → `[^1]`–`[^4]`; note 5 → `[^5]`, **spans the L→R column footer** (begins L col `Dialog. de Veritate, c. 13…`, runs over into R col `…dum dicitur tempus huius vel illius rei…`). (5 notes total.)
- **p. 59** footer: L col notes 1–4 → `[^6]`–`[^9]`; note 4 (`[^9]`) **spans the L→R column footer** (begins L col `In cod. T ad marg.… Immo hoc dicit Philosophus quarto Physicorum`, runs over into R col `…sed haec auctoritas male citatur hic…`); R col notes 5–10 → `[^10]`–`[^15]`. (10 notes total.)
- **p. 60** footer: L col notes 1–2 → `[^16]`–`[^17]`; R col notes 3–8 → `[^18]`–`[^23]`. (8 notes total.)

**Cross-chunk footer boundary (CLEAN — no split).** Same pattern as q1→q2: q2's last apparatus page is p.60, fully captured here. q2's Scholion sits physically at the foot of p.61 but carries no apparatus. p.61's footer apparatus block anchors in the **q3** body (`QUAESTIO III`, *Utrum spiritualia habeant permanentem, vel successivam mensuram*, raw 4913+), which begins in normal type at the top of p.61 above its own footer — that block belongs to the next chunk (`d2-p1-a1-q3`), not here. Likewise, p.58's footer (notes 1–5) is q2's, not q1's — confirmed and used here (no backfill into the committed `d2-p1-a1-q1`, whose 26 entries close at p.57). No backfill in either direction.

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** One `[?]` flag: `[^9]` (p.59 note 4) — the colcrop L/R split clipped the far-left of the R-column footer continuation; rendered `sed haec auctoritas male citatur hic` (standard phrase; the visible glyph was `…e haec auctoritas`). Low-confidence, non-blocking; confirm the opening word (`sed` vs. another connective) at 600 dpi with the d.1–d.10 batch. No other ambiguities — the 450 dpi crops were otherwise clean. **RESOLVED 2026-05-22** — 600 dpi p.59 shows the word is *unde* (not *sed*), and the cod. T marginal quotation runs in italic through *…unde haec auctoritas male citatur hic.*; corrected (`text. 93` confirmed).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0