title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *De numero et sufficientia voluntatum in Christo.*

Secundo quaeritur de voluntatum numero et sufficientia; dividit enim Magister[^p365-5] voluntates Christi in tria membra, quorum unum est voluntas divinitatis, aliud voluntas rationis et tertium voluntas carnis seu sensualitatis. Sed quod ista divisio[^p365-1] sit superflua[^p365-2][^p365-3][^p365-4], videtur:

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**Argumenta pro parte 1:**

1. Primo auctoritate Damasceni in tertio libro[^p366-1]: « Duas, inquit, naturas Christi, duas eius voluntates naturales et naturales actus aimus »: ergo si divisio Damasceni est completa, quae est per duo membra, videtur, quod praedicta divisio sit superflua.

2. Item, Philosophus dicit in tertio de Anima et etiam in Topicis[^p366-2], quod « voluntas est in sola rationali »: ergo nulla voluntas videtur esse sensualitatis; et si hoc, tertium membrum praedictae divisionis superfluit.

3. Item, penes voluntatem attenditur liberum arbitrium[^p366-3]; sed in Christo non sunt nisi duo libera arbitria: ergo non nisi duae voluntates: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas consequitur naturam[^p366-4]; sed in Christo sunt tantum duae naturae: ergo tantum duae voluntates.

**Sed contra:** Quod sint non tantum duae, sed etiam plures quam tres, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Hugonis in libello, quem fecit de Voluntatibus Christi[^p366-5], ubi ait sic: « Fuit in Christo voluntas Deitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis »: ergo quatuor differentiae voluntatis.

2. Item, sicut Christus habuit sensualitatem, ita habuit synderesim; et sicut sensualitatis est appetere bonum carnis, ita synderesis est appetere bonum honestatis[^p366-6]: ergo sicut ponitur aliqua voluntas in Christo secundum sensualitatem, ita videtur, quod deberet poni secundum synderesim, et ita quatuor voluntatis differentiae.

3. Item, voluntas secundum Damascenum[^p366-7] dividitur prima divisione in thelesim et bulesim, hoc est in naturalem et deliberativam; istae duae differentiae constat quod fuerunt in Christo, sicut et praedictae: ergo videtur, quod Christus habuerit voluntates plures quam tres.

4. Item, voluntas sequitur cognitionem; sed in Christo est reperire quatuor genera virtutum cognoscitivarum, quia in ipso cognoscebat sensus exterior, cognoscebat sensus interior, cognoscebat intellectus humanus, cognoscebat intellectus divinus[^p366-8]: si ergo cuilibet cognitioni respondet affectio, et cuilibet affectioni voluntas; videtur, quod in Christo fuerit quadruplex voluntatis differentia.

Est igitur quaestio de praedictae divisionis sufficientia.

> ### Conclusio.
> Secundum duas naturas in Christo sunt duae voluntates, secundum potentias sunt tres, secundum actum volendi vero quatuor.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod voluntas[^p366-9] tripliciter habet considerari: aut secundum naturam, aut secundum potentiam, per quam quis vult, aut secundum modum volendi. Et secundum istam triplicem considerationem tripliciter habet dividi voluntas in Christo. — Secundum enim comparationem ad naturam dividi habet divisione bimembri. Duplex enim in Christo est voluntas, divina videlicet et humana secundum duas naturas; et sic considerat Damascenus voluntatem Christi, cum eam dividit in duo membra.

Si autem consideretur voluntas secundum potentias[^p366-10], per quas quis vult, sic dividi habet divisione trimembri. Nam in Christo fuit potentia divina et potentia rationalis creata et potentia sensitiva, per quarum quamlibet in actum volendi exibat. Et sic dividit Magister in littera per tria membra, ita quod illa tria habent reduci ad divisiones duas bimembres, quae sunt per differentias immediatas, quia voluntas in Christo fuit aut divina, aut humana; et si humana, aut sequens cognitionem sensitivam, aut sequens cognitionem intellectivam. Et sic patet sufficientia praedictae divisionis in tria membra.

Per comparationem autem voluntatis ad modum volendi habet multiplicari voluntas in Christo divisione quadrimembri; et sic consideravit magister Hugo voluntatem Christi, cum eam per quatuor membra divisit. Ait enim sic[^p366-11]: « In Christo fuit voluntas Divinitatis et voluntas rationis et voluntas pietatis et voluntas carnis: voluntas Divinitatis per iustitiam sententiam dictabat, voluntas rationalis per obedientiam veritatem approbabat, voluntas pietatis per compassionem in malo alieno suspirabat, voluntas carnis per passionem in malo proprio murmurabat ». — Et sic patet secundum[^p366-12] diversos modos dividendi voluntatum Christi numerus et sufficientia, quia secundum diversas considerationes multiplicari habet modo divisione bimembri, modo divisione trimembri, modo divisione quadrimembri sine aliqua repugnantia. Et in hoc manifesta est responsio ad

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obiecta, praecipue ad auctoritatem Hugonis et Damasceni.

**Ad argumenta pro parte 1:**

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de verbo Philosophi, quod voluntas est in sola rationali; dicendum, quod Philosophus accipit voluntatem stricte, videlicet pro appetitu ratiocinativo[^p367-1]; Magister autem et Sancti accipiunt voluntatem large ad omnem humanum affectum, sive procedat ex ratione, sive procedat ex sensu.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod penes voluntatem attenditur liberum arbitrium; consimili modo respondendum est, quod hoc intelligitur de voluntate proprie dicta; et sic verum est, quod in Christo non habet nisi duas differentias; Magister autem accipit nomen voluntatis pro appetitu[^p367-2].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod voluntas consequitur naturam, sicut potentia consequitur substantiam; et quia in una substantia possunt esse plures potentiae, nihil impedit, in Christo reperiri plures voluntates[^p367-3] ex parte unius naturae, scilicet naturae humanae, et unam ex parte divinae naturae, et ita in universo tres.

**Ad argumenta pro parte 2:**

1. 2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multo plures deberent esse per auctoritatem Hugonis[^p367-4] et propter synderesim et thelesim et bulesim; dicendum, quod ex illis auctoritatibus non potest argui, quod in Christo sint plures voluntates quam tres, nisi accipiatur divisio voluntatis secundum modos volendi; per quem modum rationalis voluntas multiplicari habet in voluntatem rationis et pietatis, hoc est secundum conditionalem et absolutam[^p367-5], dividi etiam habet in naturalem et deliberativam. Sed per hoc non potest argui, quod praedicta divisio sit insufficiens, quia accepta est secundum potentias; uni enim potentiae possunt respondere plures modi volendi.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quadruplex est in Christo cognitio, et ita quadruplex debet esse affectio; dicendum, quod cognitio sensitiva exterior non habet perfectionem absque interiori. Sicut enim vult Augustinus, non est perfecta visio ex concursu organi et obiecti, nisi adsit interior intentio copulans unum cum altero, sicut dicitur in libro de Trinitate undecimo[^p367-6]. Illam autem intentionem vocat Augustinus sensualitatem, dicens, quod sensualitas est illa, « per quam intenditur in corporis sensus »; et penes hanc attenditur appetitus carnis. Et ideo Magister ex parte cognitionis sensitivae unam tantum ponit voluntatem, scilicet voluntatem sensualitatis; si enim acciperet secundum sensus exteriores, iam non una, sed quinque essent voluntates secundum quinque differentias sensuum exteriorum[^p367-7].

---

english:
### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the wills in Christ.*

Secondly it is asked about the number and sufficiency of the wills; for the Master[^p365-5] divides the wills of Christ into three members, of which one is the will of the divinity, another the will of reason, and the third the will of the flesh or sensuality. But that this division[^p365-1] is superfluous[^p365-2][^p365-3][^p365-4] seems [to be the case]:

**Arguments for part 1:**

1. First by the authority of Damascene in the third book[^p366-1]: « We affirm, he says, two natures of Christ, two natural wills of his and natural acts »: therefore if Damascene's division is complete, which is by two members, it seems that the aforesaid division is superfluous.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher says in the third book *On the Soul* and also in the *Topics*[^p366-2], that « will is only in the rational [part] »: therefore no will seems to be of sensuality; and if this is so, the third member of the aforesaid division is superfluous.

3. Likewise, free choice is regarded in respect of the will[^p366-3]; but in Christ there are only two free choices: therefore only two wills: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the will follows nature[^p366-4]; but in Christ there are only two natures: therefore only two wills.

**On the contrary:** That there are not only two, but even more than three, seems [to be the case]:

1. By the authority of Hugh in the little book which he made *On the Wills of Christ*[^p366-5], where he says thus: « There was in Christ the will of the Deity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh »: therefore four differences of will.

2. Likewise, just as Christ had sensuality, so he had synderesis; and just as it belongs to sensuality to desire the good of the flesh, so it belongs to synderesis to desire the good of moral uprightness[^p366-6]: therefore just as some will is posited in Christ according to sensuality, so it seems that one ought to be posited according to synderesis, and thus four differences of will.

3. Likewise, the will according to Damascene[^p366-7] is divided by the first division into *thelesis* and *bulesis*, that is, into natural and deliberative; it is agreed that these two differences were in Christ, just as the aforesaid ones: therefore it seems that Christ had more than three wills.

4. Likewise, the will follows cognition; but in Christ four kinds of cognitive powers are to be found, for in him the exterior sense knew, the interior sense knew, the human intellect knew, the divine intellect knew[^p366-8]: if therefore to every cognition there corresponds an affection, and to every affection a will; it seems that in Christ there was a fourfold difference of will.

There is therefore a question concerning the sufficiency of the aforesaid division.

> ### Conclusion.
> According to the two natures in Christ there are two wills, according to the powers there are three, and according to the act of willing four.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the will[^p366-9] can be considered in three ways: either according to nature, or according to the power by which one wills, or according to the mode of willing. And according to this threefold consideration the will in Christ is to be divided in three ways. — For according to comparison with nature it is to be divided by a two-membered division. For twofold is the will in Christ, namely divine and human according to the two natures; and thus Damascene considers the will of Christ, when he divides it into two members.

But if the will be considered according to the powers[^p366-10] by which one wills, then it is to be divided by a three-membered division. For in Christ there was a divine power and a created rational power and a sensitive power, by each of which he went forth into the act of willing. And thus the Master divides in the text by three members, in such a way that those three are to be reduced to two two-membered divisions, which are by immediate differences, because the will in Christ was either divine or human; and if human, either following sensitive cognition or following intellective cognition. And thus the sufficiency of the aforesaid division into three members is evident.

But by comparison of the will with the mode of willing, the will in Christ is to be multiplied by a four-membered division; and thus master Hugh considered the will of Christ, when he divided it by four members. For he says thus[^p366-11]: « In Christ there was the will of the Divinity and the will of reason and the will of piety and the will of the flesh: the will of the Divinity by justice dictated the sentence, the will of reason by obedience approved the truth, the will of piety by compassion sighed at another's evil, the will of the flesh by passion murmured at its own evil ». — And thus is evident, according to[^p366-12] the diverse modes of dividing, the number and sufficiency of the wills of Christ, since according to the diverse considerations they are to be multiplied now by a two-membered division, now by a three-membered division, now by a four-membered division without any contradiction. And in this is the manifest reply to

obiections, especially to the authority of Hugh and Damascene.

**To the arguments for part 1:**

2. But to that which is objected concerning the word of the Philosopher, that the will is only in the rational [part]; it must be said that the Philosopher takes the will strictly, namely for the ratiocinative appetite[^p367-1]; but the Master and the Saints take the will broadly for every human affection, whether it proceed from reason or proceed from sense.

3. To that which is objected, that free choice is regarded in respect of the will; in a similar manner it must be responded that this is understood of the will properly so called; and thus it is true that in Christ it has only two differences; but the Master takes the name of will for appetite[^p367-2].

4. To that which is objected, that the will follows nature; it must be said that the will follows nature, just as a power follows substance; and because in one substance there can be several powers, nothing prevents several wills[^p367-3] being found in Christ from the part of one nature, namely the human nature, and one from the part of the divine nature, and thus three in all.

**To the arguments for part 2:**

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected, that there ought to be many more by the authority of Hugh[^p367-4] and on account of synderesis and *thelesis* and *bulesis*; it must be said that from those authorities it cannot be argued that in Christ there are more than three wills, unless the division of the will be taken according to the modes of willing; by which mode the rational will is to be multiplied into the will of reason and of piety, that is, according to the conditional and the absolute[^p367-5], and it is also to be divided into natural and deliberative. But by this it cannot be argued that the aforesaid division is insufficient, because it was taken according to the powers; for to one power several modes of willing can correspond.

4. To that which is objected, that the cognition in Christ is fourfold, and so the affection ought to be fourfold; it must be said that the exterior sensitive cognition does not have perfection without the interior. For as Augustine holds, vision is not perfect from the concurrence of the organ and the object, unless there be present an interior intention coupling the one with the other, as is said in the eleventh book *On the Trinity*[^p367-6]. And that intention Augustine calls sensuality, saying that sensuality is that « by which there is an attending to the senses of the body »; and in respect of this the appetite of the flesh is regarded. And therefore the Master, from the part of sensitive cognition, posits only one will, namely the will of sensuality; for if he were to take it according to the exterior senses, then there would be not one, but five wills according to the five differences of the exterior senses[^p367-7].

---

la: Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 14: Quoniam igitur duae Christi naturae sunt, duas proinde eius etc. (ed. Migne). — Maximus, Disputat. cum Pyrrho, argumentum retorquens respondet: Si enim concedatur una cum voluntatibus induci volentes, omnino etiam consentanea reciprocatione cum volentibus inducendae erunt voluntates occurrentque, vestra sententia... Deitatis [in Deo]; idcirco quidem quod eius una voluntas, una quoque hypostasis ac persona, errore Sabellii; quod vero tres personae, tres etiam voluntates, ac proinde tres naturae, errore Arii; siquidem, ut Patrum definitiones habent atque regulae, voluntatum distinctio distinctionem quoque naturarum infert.

en: Book III of *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14: Since therefore the two natures of Christ exist, [we affirm] consequently two of his etc. (Migne edition). — Maximus, *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, turning the argument back, replies: For if it be granted that, along with the wills, willers are introduced, then by an entirely consistent reciprocation willers must also be introduced along with the willing, and they will occur — your view... of the Deity [in God]; for this reason indeed, that his will is one, [there is] also one hypostasis and person, by the error of Sabellius; but that [there are] three persons, [there are] also three wills, and consequently three natures, by the error of Arius; since, as the definitions and rules of the Fathers hold, a distinction of wills also implies a distinction of natures.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et q. 4. seq. — Paulo superius pro *regimen* edd. *regnum*.

en: Cf. II *Sentences* d. 25, part II, q. 1 in the body and q. 4 following. — A little above, for *regimen* the editions [read] *regnum*.

la: Maximus, loc. cit., eandem obiectionem paulo aliter solvit.

en: Maximus, in the place cited, resolves the same objection a little differently.

la: Sicut docet Priscian., de quo vide tom. II. pag. 399, nota 4. Cfr. etiam Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. — Paulo superius pro *omnium* cod. K *hominum*.

en: As Priscian teaches, concerning whom see vol. II, p. 399, note 4. Cf. also Aristotle, *Topics* VII c. 1. — A little above, for *omnium* codex K [reads] *hominum*.

la: Hic in lit. c. 2.

en: Here in the text [of the Master], c. 2.

la: De Fide orthod. c. 14. Vide supra pag. 365, nota 1.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14. See above, p. 365, note 1.

la: Libr. III. de Anima, text. 42. (c. 9.) et IV. Topic. c. 5. Vide supra pag. 364, nota 2.

en: Book III *On the Soul*, text 42 (c. 9), and *Topics* IV c. 5. See above, p. 364, note 2.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 2. seqq.

en: Cf. II *Sentences* d. 25, part I, q. 2 and following.

la: Vide supra pag. 364, nota 2.

en: See above, p. 364, note 2.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 858, nota 6. — In fine arg. post *ergo quatuor* cod. K supplet *sunt*.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 858, note 6. — At the end of the argument, after *ergo quatuor* codex K supplies *sunt*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See II *Sentences* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. et III. c. 14. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 565, nota 1.

en: Book II of *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 22 and book III c. 14. Cf. vol. II, p. 565, note 1.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 1.

en: As was shown above, d. 14, a. 3, q. 1.

la: Vat. adiicit *Christi*. Mox pro *secundum naturam*, quam lectionem ut veriorem et subnexis congruentem ex cod. T restituimus, edd. nec non complures codd. *secundum naturalem voluntatem*, alii codd. *secundum naturam voluntatem*, cod. A *secundum voluntatum*, scil. *naturam*, quae vox supplenda erit. Nobis non sine veritatis specie esse videtur, quod librarii vocem *voluntatem* substituerint pro *volentem*, et quod prima lectio fuerit haec: *secundum naturam volentem*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *Christi*. Shortly after, for *secundum naturam* — which reading, as truer and consistent with what follows, we have restored from codex T — the editions and also several codices [read] *secundum naturalem voluntatem*, other codices *secundum naturam voluntatem*, codex A *secundum voluntatum*, namely *naturam*, which word will have to be supplied. It seems to us not without a semblance of truth that the copyists substituted the word *voluntatem* for *volentem*, and that the first reading was this: *secundum naturam volentem*.

la: Cod. X *potentiam, per quam*.

en: Codex X [reads] *potentiam, per quam*.

la: Libell. de Quatuor Voluntat. in Christo. Cod. K cum textu origin. *voluntas rationis* pro *voluntas rationalis*.

en: The little book *On the Four Wills in Christ*. Codex K, with the original text, [reads] *voluntas rationis* for *voluntas rationalis*.

la: Ita codd. A (K a secunda manu) N Q in aliis et edd. *per*.

en: Thus codices A (K by a second hand) N Q; in others and in the editions [read] *per*.

la: Multi codd. *ratiocinato*.

en: Many codices [read] *ratiocinato*.

la: Appetitus autem sequitur sensum, ut Aristot. docet, II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.) dicens: Si autem sensum [habet], et imaginationem et appetitum; ubi enim sensus est, et dolor et voluptas consequitur; ubi autem haec sunt, ex necessitate et desiderium est.

en: But appetite follows sense, as Aristotle teaches in *On the Soul* II, text 20 (c. 2), saying: But if [it has] sense, [it has] also imagination and appetite; for where there is sense, pain and pleasure also follow; but where these are, there is of necessity also desire.

la: Post *voluntates* edd., posito commate, inserunt *duas*.

en: After *voluntates* the editions, placing a comma, insert *duas*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et inconvenienter hic subiicit *Damasceni*; inconvenienter, aimus, quippe cum in divisione voluntatis a Damasc. facta non sit sermo de *synderesi*.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and inappropriately, here subjoins *Damasceni* [Damascene]; inappropriately, we say, seeing that in the division of the will made by Damascene there is no mention of *synderesis*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2: Voluntate *rationis* debemus etiam velle malum poenae, quod scimus Deum velle; sed voluntate *pietatis* possumus *conditionaliter*, sive quantum est in nobis, si Deo placet, non velle. Nam et ipse Deus, quantum in se est, non vult etc. Vide etiam ibid. dub. 4. — Subinde pro *etiam habet* cod. K *etiam potest*.

en: Cf. I *Sentences* d. 48, a. 2, q. 2: By the will of *reason* we ought also to will the evil of punishment, which we know God wills; but by the will of *piety* we can *conditionally*, that is, so far as is in us, if it please God, not will [it]. For God himself too, so far as is in himself, does not will [it] etc. See also there, dub. 4. — Just after, for *etiam habet* codex K [reads] *etiam potest*.

la: Cap. 2. n. 2. seqq. — Definitio sensualitatis deinde ex August. allata invenitur in eius lib. XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17: Qui in corporis sensus intenditur sensualis animae motus. Cfr. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 4. seq. et ibid. Comment. p. dub. 3. — Paulo superius pro *interior intentio* edd. 1, 2 *interior attentio*, Vat. *interior attentio seu intentio*. Paulo inferius pro *intentionem* edd. cum non paucis codd. *attentionem*. Inferius etiam post *attenditur* Vat. adiungit *sive intenditur*.

en: Chapter 2, n. 2 and following. — The definition of sensuality then adduced from Augustine is found in his book XII *On the Trinity* c. 12, n. 17: That motion of the soul, [called] sensual, which is directed to the senses of the body. Cf. the text of the Master's *Sentences*, d. XXIV, c. 4 and following, and the Commentary on the same place, p[receding] dub. 3. — A little above, for *interior intentio* editions 1, 2 [read] *interior attentio*, the Vatican [edition] *interior attentio seu intentio*. A little below, for *intentionem* the editions, with not a few codices, [read] *attentionem*. Below too, after *attenditur* the Vatican [edition] adds *sive intenditur*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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**Scholion status.** `has_scholion: false`. q2 carries no scholion of its own; q1's scholion (§§I–III) forward-covers it (`De 2. quaestione...`). Confirmed on the page by p.367 note 7 (`[^p367-7]`, *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* = "See the scholion to the preceding question"). Treating the missing q2 scholion as normal per the sibling-pattern rule, not as an error.

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**Hand-offs.**
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De pluralitate voluntatum in Christo.*
### Quaestio III. *Utrum istae voluntates in Christo fuerint conformes, vel repugnantes.*

Tertio quaeritur de illarum voluntatum conformitate et concordia, et quaeritur, utrum istae voluntates fuerint in Christo conformes, vel repugnantes. Et quod sint repugnantes, videtur:

1. Ex ipsa dominica oratione, qua dicebat: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis*[^p367-8]: ergo aliud volebat Christus, secundum quod homo, et oppositum, secundum quod Deus: ergo voluntas humana non erat conformis divinae.

2. Item, Augustinus, super Psalmum trigesimum secundum[^p367-9]: « Quantum distat Deus ab homine, tantum distat voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis; unde gerens hominem, Christus ostendit privatam quandam hominis voluntatem »: ergo si privata voluntas est voluntas repugnans voluntati divinae, videtur etc.

3. Item, Christus flebat de destructione Ierusalem[^p367-10], ergo volebat Ierusalem non destrui; et secundum divinam iustitiam volebat eam destrui: ergo voluntas humana adversabatur divinae.

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4. Item, videtur, quod voluntas rationis et sensualitatis adversentur sibi invicem, quia, secundum quod dicit Augustinus *de Trinitate*[^p368-1], voluntates sunt contrariae, quae sunt contrariorum volitorum; sed voluntas rationis volebat mori, voluntas sensualitatis volebat vivere: ergo sensualitatis et rationis erant voluntates contrariae.

5. Item, pavor et securitas sunt affectiones contrariae; sed in voluntate rationis erat securitas, in voluntate sensualitatis erat timiditas[^p368-2]: ergo contrario modo afficiebatur voluntas rationalis et voluntas sensualis. Sed tales sunt voluntates sibi invicem adversantes: ergo etc.

6. Item, aut ratio assentiebat sensualitati refutanti[^p368-3] mortem, aut repugnabat. Si assentiebat: ergo assentiebat in contrarium voluntati divinae: ergo peccabat mortaliter. Si repugnabat: ergo voluntas rationis et sensualitatis fuerunt in Christo repugnantes.

**Sed contra:** 1. Voluntas humana secundum rectum ordinem debet esse subiecta divinae: ergo si in Christo repugnabat, videtur, quod in Christo erat inordinatio et culpa.

2. Item, omnis motus, qui adversatur voluntati divinae, est motus ad illicitum, et omnis talis motus est peccatum: ergo si Christus secundum humanam voluntatem aliquid volebat adversum voluntati divinae, ergo in Christo erat peccatum. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut voluntas sensualitatis in Christo subiacebat omnino rationi, aut adversabatur. Si omnino subiacebat: ergo nulla erat ibi repugnantia. Si adversabatur in aliquo: ergo caro in Christo concupiscebat adversus spiritum. Sed « nonnullum vitium est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum[^p368-4] »: ergo in Christo fuisset vitium et peccatum.

4. Item, aeque ordinatus vel ordinatior fuit Christus in se ipso, sicut Adam in statu innocentiae; sed in statu innocentiae nulla fuit in Adam repugnantia voluntatum[^p368-5]: ergo nec in Christo fuit aliqua repugnantia voluntatis sensualitatis ad rationalem, nec rationis ad divinam: ergo nulla.

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### Conclusio.

> In Christo fuit voluntatum concordia, quamvis ex parte voliti non esset identitas.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem in duobus consistit, videlicet in volito et in ratione volendi. Conformitatem in volito dico, quando diversae voluntates unum et idem volunt. Conformitatem in ratione volendi dico, quando idem eodem modo volunt, vel altera earum vult illud eodem modo, quo superior vult eam velle. Cum igitur ad perfectam conformitatem ista duo concurrant, alterum eorum est de necessitate conformitatis, videlicet conformitas in modo, alterum vero aliquando de necessitate, aliquando de congruitate, aliquando praeter necessitatem et congruitatem, videlicet conformitas in volito. Possibile est enim, quod voluntates sint conformes, ita quod una subsit alteri; et tamen non volunt idem, quia voluntas superior non vult inferiorem velle, quod ipsa vult, sed magis velle contrarium.

Quoniam igitur conformitas in ratione volendi fuit in omnibus voluntatibus Christi, quia sic volebat sensualitas, sicut volebat ratio eam velle; sic volebat etiam ratio Christi, sicut divina voluntas volebat ipsam velle: ideo concedendum est, quod in Christo fuit voluntatum concordia et consonantia, quamvis ex parte voliti non esset identitas, quia unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat volebat. — Et hoc est quod dicit magister Hugo[^p368-6]: « Secundum divinam voluntatem quod iustum erat voluit; secundum voluntatem rationis iustitiae consensit et iustitiam approbavit; secundum autem voluntatem pietatis sine odio intime condoluit miseriae, quemadmodum secundum voluntatem carnis iustitiam non accusabat, sed poenam recusabat. Unaquaeque voluntas quod suum erat operabatur, et quod ad se pertinebat sequebatur: voluntas divina iustitiam, voluntas rationalis obedientiam, voluntas humanitatis misericordiam, voluntas carnis naturam; neque

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altera alteri contraria erat. Sicut enim Deitati natura erat iustitiam non deserere, sic carni intererat naturam servare, et pietati alienam miseriam non amare. Iustum itaque carni erat, quod passionem suam noluit, quia hoc erat secundum naturam; et iustum Deo erat, quod passionem illius voluit, quia hoc erat secundum iustitiam ». Et sic patet, quod licet diversa essent volita, voluntates tamen in Christo habuerunt consonantiam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod voluntates in Christo non fuerunt repugnantes, nec humana voluntas divinae, nec sensualis rationali; alioquin sequeretur, in Christo fuisse peccatum transgressionis et vitium corruptionis, sicut obiectum fuit; quorum utrumque est alienum a Christo, in quo fuerunt omnes motus rationales recti, et omnes motus sensualitatis pacati, iuxta illud, quod dicit Augustinus[^p369-1] signatum fuisse per animalia, quae fuerunt in arca Noe quieta et pacata.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de oratione Domini: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis*; respondent aliqui[^p369-2], quod ex hoc non concluditur, contrarietatem voluntatum fuisse in Christo, pro eo quod alius et alius modus volendi non inducunt contrarietatem, nisi prout considerantur secundum idem. Unde quia alius et alius modus volendi consideratur circa aliam et aliam voluntatem, ideo non inducunt contrarietatem nec repugnantiam. — Sed iste modus respondendi non sufficit, quoniam, si aliqui duo homines, qui habent diversas voluntates, contrario modo se habeant circa aliquod volitum, dicuntur habere voluntates contrarias.

Et propterea potest aliter dici, quod conformitas voluntatis ad voluntatem dupliciter attenditur, vel secundum assimilationem, vel secundum subiectionem. Dominus autem a voluntate sensualitatis non requirebat conformitatem assimilationis, ut idem vellet, quod ipse vellet; sed conformitatem subiectionis, ut id vellet, quod Deus ordinavit eam velle; et Dominus in praedicta petitione tollit conformitatem assimilationis, cum dicit: *Non sicut ego*[^p369-3], et

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ponit conformitatem subiectionis in hoc, quod ostendit, se velle divinae voluntati subesse. Unde in praedicto verbo insinuatur duplex voluntas in Christo, una videlicet rationis, quae erat similis et subiecta divinae voluntati; altera vero sensualitatis, quam ratio subiiciebat voluntati divinae, licet ipsa sensualitas contrarium appeteret; et ita, quamvis non esset similis, erat tamen subiecta, ac per hoc non erat contraria.

2. Ad illud Augustini quo dicitur, quod voluntas humana in Christo distabat a voluntate divina; dicendum, quod Augustinus intendit ibi ponere distantiam quantum ad diversitatem voluntatum et quantum ad distantiam volitorum, non autem quantum ad subiectionis ordinem in volendo; et ideo illa distantia non ponit controversiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus nolebat Ierusalem destrui, voluntate humana; dicendum, sicut Hugo[^p369-4] dicit, quod illa erat voluntas pietatis, quae ideo flebat, quia misericordiam diligebat; et quia Deus sic volebat eam velle, ideo divinae voluntati non repugnabat; erat enim ibi conformitas in ratione volendi, quamvis non esset in volito. Quod enim sic vellet, hoc habebat a Deo, et Deus volebat eam sic velle.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas sensualitatis repugnabat[^p369-5] rationi, quia volebat contrarium; dicendum, quod contrarietas ex parte voliti non dicit contrarietatem in voluntate, nisi sint tales voluntates, quae non tantum sunt natae conformari per subiectionem, sed etiam per identitatem ex parte voliti.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrariis affectionibus disponebantur, utpote securitate, timore, gaudio et tristitia; dicendum, quod una illarum affectionum subiecta erat alteri et quodam modo materialis; sicut dictum fuit supra[^p369-6], quod gaudium in Christo non contrariebatur dolori, quia gaudebat de ipso dolore; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio consentiebat sensualitati, aut dissentiebat; dicendum, quod

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quodam modo consentiebat, quodam modo dissentiebat, secundum quod aliquis potest alicui dupliciter consentire, aut volendo *idem*, quod ipse vult, aut volendo *ipsum*[^p370-marginal] velle. Ratio autem sensualitati consentiebat volendo, eam sic moveri, et hoc idem erat licitum sensualitati, unde non volebat nisi licitum; non autem consentiebat volendo idem ipsum, quod sensualitas, hoc enim esset illicitum voluntati rationis. Et hoc non ponebat, carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum, sive rebellionem sensualitatis ad rationem; illa enim rebellio ponit utrumque dissensum.

english:
### Article I. *On the plurality of wills in Christ.*
### Question III. *Whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the conformity and concord of those wills, and it is asked whether these wills in Christ were conformed, or in conflict. And that they are in conflict seems to be the case:

1. From the Lord's prayer itself, in which he said: *Not as I will, but as you will*[^p367-8]: therefore Christ willed one thing insofar as he was man, and the opposite insofar as he was God: therefore the human will was not conformed to the divine.

2. Likewise, Augustine, on the thirty-second Psalm[^p367-9]: « As far as God is distant from man, so far is the will of God distant from the will of man; whence, bearing man, Christ showed a certain private will of man »: therefore if a private will is a will in conflict with the divine will, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, Christ wept over the destruction of Jerusalem[^p367-10], therefore he willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed; and according to the divine justice he willed it to be destroyed: therefore the human will was opposed to the divine.

4. Likewise, it seems that the will of reason and that of sensuality are opposed to each other, because, according to what Augustine says *On the Trinity*[^p368-1], those wills are contrary which are of contrary things-willed; but the will of reason willed to die, the will of sensuality willed to live: therefore the wills of sensuality and of reason were contrary.

5. Likewise, fear and security are contrary affections; but in the will of reason there was security, in the will of sensuality there was timidity[^p368-2]: therefore the rational will and the sensual will were affected in a contrary manner. But such wills are mutually opposed to each other: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, either reason assented to sensuality refusing[^p368-3] death, or it resisted. If it assented: then it assented to what was contrary to the divine will: therefore it sinned mortally. If it resisted: then the will of reason and that of sensuality were in conflict in Christ.

**On the contrary:** 1. The human will according to right order ought to be subject to the divine: therefore if in Christ it was in conflict, it seems that in Christ there was disorder and fault.

2. Likewise, every motion which is opposed to the divine will is a motion toward the illicit, and every such motion is sin: therefore if Christ according to his human will willed something contrary to the divine will, then in Christ there was sin. But this is false: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either the will of sensuality in Christ was wholly subject to reason, or it was opposed. If it was wholly subject: then there was no conflict there. If it was opposed in anything: then the flesh in Christ lusted against the spirit. But « it is no small fault, when the flesh lusts against the spirit[^p368-4] »: therefore in Christ there would have been fault and sin.

4. Likewise, Christ was equally well-ordered, or better ordered, in himself, as was Adam in the state of innocence; but in the state of innocence there was in Adam no conflict of wills[^p368-5]: therefore neither in Christ was there any conflict of the will of sensuality toward the rational, nor of reason toward the divine: therefore none.

### Conclusion.

> In Christ there was concord of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that conformity of one will to another consists in two things, namely in the thing-willed and in the ground of willing. I call conformity in the thing-willed when diverse wills will one and the same thing. I call conformity in the ground of willing when they will the same thing in the same manner, or when one of them wills that thing in the same manner in which the superior wills it to will. Since therefore for perfect conformity these two concur, one of them is of the necessity of conformity, namely conformity in manner, while the other is sometimes of necessity, sometimes of congruity, sometimes beyond necessity and congruity, namely conformity in the thing-willed. For it is possible that wills be conformed, such that one is subordinate to the other; and yet they do not will the same, because the superior will does not will the inferior to will what it itself wills, but rather to will the contrary.

Since therefore conformity in the ground of willing was in all the wills of Christ, because sensuality so willed as reason willed it to will; so also the reason of Christ willed as the divine will willed it to will: therefore it must be granted that in Christ there was concord and consonance of wills, although on the part of the thing-willed there was not identity, because each will willed what was its own. — And this is what master Hugh says[^p368-6]: « According to the divine will he willed what was just; according to the will of reason he consented to justice and approved justice; but according to the will of piety he intimately grieved without hatred at the misery, just as according to the will of the flesh he did not accuse justice, but refused the punishment. Each will worked what was its own, and followed what pertained to itself: the divine will justice, the rational will obedience, the will of humanity mercy, the will of the flesh nature; nor

was one contrary to the other. For just as it belonged to the Deity not to abandon justice, so it pertained to the flesh to preserve nature, and to piety not to love another's misery. It was therefore just for the flesh that he did not will his own passion, because this was according to nature; and it was just for God that he willed that passion, because this was according to justice ». And so it is clear that, although the things-willed were diverse, the wills nevertheless in Christ had consonance. — Therefore the arguments showing that the wills in Christ were not in conflict, neither the human will to the divine, nor the sensual to the rational, are to be granted; otherwise it would follow that in Christ there was the sin of transgression and the fault of corruption, as was objected; both of which are foreign to Christ, in whom all rational motions were upright, and all motions of sensuality were peaceful, according to what Augustine says[^p369-1] was signified by the animals which were quiet and peaceful in Noah's ark.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the Lord's prayer: *Not as I will, but as you will*; some respond[^p369-2] that from this it is not concluded that there was contrariety of wills in Christ, for the reason that one manner of willing and another do not induce contrariety, except insofar as they are considered according to the same thing. Whence, because one manner of willing and another is considered with regard to one will and another, therefore they do not induce contrariety nor conflict. — But this manner of responding does not suffice, since, if any two men, who have diverse wills, behave in a contrary manner with regard to some thing-willed, they are said to have contrary wills.

And therefore it can be said otherwise, that conformity of one will to another is regarded in two ways, either according to assimilation, or according to subjection. But the Lord did not require of the will of sensuality conformity of assimilation, that it should will the same thing which he willed; but conformity of subjection, that it should will what God ordained it to will; and the Lord in the aforesaid petition removes conformity of assimilation, when he says: *Not as I [will]*[^p369-3], and

posits conformity of subjection in this, that he shows that he wills to be subject to the divine will. Whence in the aforesaid word a twofold will in Christ is intimated, one namely of reason, which was similar to and subject to the divine will; the other indeed of sensuality, which reason subjected to the divine will, although sensuality itself sought the contrary; and so, although it was not similar, it was nevertheless subject, and thereby it was not contrary.

2. To that of Augustine by which it is said that the human will in Christ was distant from the divine will; it must be said that Augustine there intends to posit distance with respect to the diversity of the wills and with respect to the distance of the things-willed, but not with respect to the order of subjection in willing; and therefore that distance does not posit controversy.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ willed Jerusalem not to be destroyed by his human will; it must be said, as Hugh says[^p369-4], that this was the will of piety, which therefore wept because it loved mercy; and because God so willed it to will, therefore it was not in conflict with the divine will; for there was there conformity in the ground of willing, although there was not in the thing-willed. For that it should so will, this it had from God, and God willed it so to will.

4. To that which is objected, that the will of sensuality was in conflict[^p369-5] with reason, because it willed the contrary; it must be said that contrariety on the part of the thing-willed does not bespeak contrariety in the will, unless they be such wills as are born to be conformed not only by subjection, but also by identity on the part of the thing-willed.

5. To that which is objected, that they were disposed by contrary affections, namely security, fear, joy and sadness; it must be said that one of those affections was subject to the other and in a certain manner material; just as was said above[^p369-6], that joy in Christ was not contrary to sorrow, because he rejoiced over the sorrow itself; so also it must be understood in the present matter.

6. To that which is objected, that reason consented to sensuality, or dissented; it must be said that

in a certain manner it consented, in a certain manner it dissented, according as one can consent to another in two ways, either by willing the *same* thing which he himself wills, or by willing *him*[^p370-marginal] to will. Now reason consented to sensuality by willing that it should be so moved, and this same thing was licit for sensuality, whence it willed nothing but the licit; but it did not consent by willing the same thing as sensuality, for this would be illicit to the will of reason. And this did not posit the flesh's lusting against the spirit, or the rebellion of sensuality against reason; for that rebellion posits each kind of dissent.

la: Matth. 26, 39. — Paulo superius ante *istae voluntates* cod. A interserit *omnes*, et plerique codd. pro *fuerint* substituunt *essent*. Etiam postea pro *sint* codd. A K bb exhibent *essent*.

en: Matthew 26:39. — A little above, before *these wills*, codex A inserts *all*, and most codices substitute *were (essent)* for *were (fuerint)*. Also afterward, for *be (sint)*, codices A K bb give *be (essent)*.

la: Vers. 1: *Exsultate iusti in Domino, rectos* etc., in *Enarrat.* 2. n. 2. Textus origin. post *Christus* [edd. *homo Christus*] sic prosequitur: *et regulam nobis proponens, docens nos vivere, et praestans nobis vivere, ostendit hominis quandam privatam voluntatem.* Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 2. — Codd. et edd. falso allegant Ps. 35.

en: Verse 1: *Rejoice in the Lord, O you righteous, [praise befits] the upright* etc., in *Enarration* 2, n. 2. The original text after *Christ* [the editions: *the man Christ*] continues thus: *and proposing to us a rule, teaching us to live, and bestowing on us to live, he showed a certain private will of man.* Cf. the Master's text, here c. 2. — The codices and editions falsely cite Ps. 35.

la: Libr. XI. c. 6. n. 10, hoc utens exemplo: « Voluntas videndi fenestram, finem habet fenestrae visionem; altera est enim quae ex ista nectitur voluntas per fenestras videndi transeuntes, cuius item finis est visio transeuntium ». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 38. lit. Magistri, c. 3. Planius de hac re August. loquitur XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6: *Omnes [motus voluntatis] nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt... Et omnino pro varietate rerum, quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur.* Cfr. etiam 83 Qq. q. 40. Demum lectorem remittimus ad consulendos illos locos, quibus August. refutat sententiam Manichaeorum, qui, ut causam explicarent pugnae inter carnem et spiritum, duas animas in homine statuebant, bonam aliam, et malam alteram; de quo videsis VIII. Confess. c. 10. n. 22. seqq.

en: Book XI, c. 6, n. 10, using this example: « The will to see a window has as its end the seeing of the window; for there is another will linked to that one, of seeing through the windows those passing by, whose end likewise is the seeing of the passers-by ». Cf. II Sent., d. 38, the Master's text, c. 3. Augustine speaks more plainly on this matter in *On the City of God* XIV, c. 6: *All [motions of the will] are nothing other than wills... And entirely, according to the variety of things which are sought after and fled, just as the will of man is allured or offended, so it is changed and turned into these or those affections.* Cf. also *83 Questions*, q. 40. Finally we refer the reader to consult those passages in which Augustine refutes the opinion of the Manichaeans, who, to explain the cause of the conflict between flesh and spirit, posited two souls in man, one good and the other evil; on which see *Confessions* VIII, c. 10, n. 22 ff.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, et supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 2. nec non dub. 3. — Mox pro *rationalis et sensualis* codd. A H K *rationis et sensualitatis*. Deinde pro *adversantes* codd. U X *repugnantes*.

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, and above d. 15, a. 2, q. 2, as also dub. 3. — Presently, for *rational and sensual*, codices A H K read *of reason and of sensuality*. Then, for *opposed (adversantes)*, codices U X read *in conflict (repugnantes)*.

la: Cod. K *recusanti*. Hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. legitur: *Sensu autem carnis refugit et recusat.* Secundum Du Cange, *Glossar.* etc., *refutare* idem est ac respuere, reiicere, repellere; in quo sensu occurrit apud S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. arg. 2.

en: Codex K *refusing (recusanti)*. Here in the Master's text, c. 2, it is read: *But by the sense of the flesh he shrinks back and refuses.* According to Du Cange, *Glossary* etc., *refutare* is the same as to spurn, reject, repel; in which sense it occurs in St. Thomas, here a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, arg. 2.

la: August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 4. n. 3: *Neque enim nullum est vitium, cum, sicut dicit Apostolus (Gal. 5, 17.), caro concupiscit* etc.

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 4, n. 3: *For it is not no fault, when, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5:17), the flesh lusts* etc.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius cod. bb *vel etiam ordinatior*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 30, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above, codex bb reads *or even better ordered*.

la: In libello *de Quatuor Voluntat. in Christo*. Textus origin. in testimonio allegato post *sine odio* adiicit (etiam cod. U) *iustitiae*, et deinde inferius tum post *contraria erat*, tum post *miseriam non amare* non pauca addit, quae in codd. et edd. desiderantur.

en: In the little book *On the Four Wills in Christ*. The original text in the testimony cited adds, after *without hatred* (also codex U), *of justice*, and then below, both after *was contrary*, and after *not to love misery*, adds not a few things which are lacking in the codices and editions.

la: In locis, ubi August. de arca eiusque significatione tractat, scil. I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 4. seqq., XII. contra Faustum, c. 14. seqq., et XV. de Civ. Dei, c. 27, sententia Augustino hic tributa non occurrit. Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 1, Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 15. m. 2, et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, qui etiam Augustinum pro hac sententia allegant, subiungunt *super Genesim*; sed « nec ibi, nec alibi, ut P. Nicolai in ed. Commentarii S. Thom. observat, occurrit. Insinuat de iustis vetus Glossa ». Cfr. Gregor., II. in Ezech. homil. 4. n. 10. seq. — Post *Augustinus* codd. K O inserunt *hoc*, et pro *signatum* codd. V X exhibent *significandum*.

en: In the passages where Augustine treats of the ark and its signification, namely *Questions on the Pentateuch* I, q. 4 ff., *Against Faustus* XII, c. 14 ff., and *On the City of God* XV, c. 27, the opinion here attributed to Augustine does not occur. William of Auxerre, *Summa*, p. III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 1, Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 15, m. 2, and St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, who also cite Augustine for this opinion, add *on Genesis*; but « neither there, nor elsewhere, as P. Nicolai observes in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas, does it occur. The old Gloss intimates it concerning the just ». Cf. Gregory, *On Ezechiel* II, homily 4, n. 10 f. — After *Augustine*, codices K O insert *this*, and for *signified*, codices V X give *to be signified*.

la: Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 1: *Dicimus, quod penes diversitatem vel contrarietatem volitorum attendenda est diversitas vel contrarietas voluntatum, nec tamen quolibet modo nec quarumlibet voluntatum, sed earum tantum, quae sunt in eodem susceptibili; sed voluntas rationis, qua Christus voluit mori, erat in vi rationali... voluntas autem sensualitatis erat in vi brutali... Voluntas etiam sensualitatis non proprie dicitur voluntas... unde tales duae voluntates non sunt positae sub eodem genere proximo. Praeterea, voluntate sensualitatis vult homo non mori, sive fugit mortem secundum se, non propter aliud; voluntate vero rationis vult homo mori non secundum se, sed secundum accidens, nec propter se, sed propter aliud... et ideo, quia illarum voluntatum secundum se non sunt contraria secundum se volita, patet, quod non sunt contraria* (contrariae?).

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa*, p. III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 1: *We say that according to the diversity or contrariety of the things-willed the diversity or contrariety of the wills is to be regarded, yet not in any manner whatever nor of any wills whatever, but only of those which are in the same subject; but the will of reason, by which Christ willed to die, was in the rational power... while the will of sensuality was in the brute power... The will of sensuality also is not properly called a will... whence such two wills are not placed under the same proximate genus. Moreover, by the will of sensuality a man wills not to die, or flees death in itself, not for the sake of another; but by the will of reason a man wills to die not in itself, but accidentally, nor for its own sake, but for the sake of another... and therefore, since the things-willed of those wills are not in themselves contrary in themselves, it is clear that they are not contrary* (contrary [contrariae]?).

la: Edd., paulo ante pro *petitione* substituta voce *locutione*, cum paucis codd. adiiciunt *volo*. Paulo superius pro *ut id vellet* codd. A H K N bb *ut idem vellet*.

en: The editions, a little before having substituted the word *speech (locutione)* for *petition*, with a few codices add *I will*. A little above, for *that it should will it (ut id vellet)*, codices A H K N bb read *that it should will the same (ut idem vellet)*.

la: Vide in corp. quaest. — In fine solut. pro *eam sic velle* edd. *finit sic velle*.

en: See in the body of the question. — At the end of the solution, for *it so to will (eam sic velle)*, the editions read *finit sic velle*.

la: Ita codd. A K M O; alii et edd. *repugnat*.

en: So codices A K M O; the others and the editions read *is in conflict (repugnat)*.

la: Dist. 16. a. 2. q. 2. — Post *materialis* edd. supplent *fuit talis tristitia* (?).

en: Dist. 16, a. 2, q. 2. — After *material*, the editions supply *was such sadness* (?).

la: Marginal gloss to the body, set beside note 2 of p.370: *De triplici statu quoad consensum et dissensum.* (The numbered apparatus of p.370 — notes 3–5 on *petitione/locutione*, *Vide in corp. quaest.*, and *Cap. 5* — belongs to the following Article II, q. 1, not to this question.)

en: Marginal gloss to the body, set beside note 2 of p.370: *On the threefold state with respect to consent and dissent.* (The numbered apparatus of p.370 — notes 3–5 — annotates the body of the following Article II, q. 1, and so is carried into that chunk.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec procedit de conformitate voluntatum in praecedenti quaestione enumeratarum; et supponitur distinctio inter velle efficaciter et absolute et velle imperfecte (velleitas) et sub conditione. Constat autem, ut supra d. 12. a. 2. q. I. tactum est, actum efficacem voluntatis rationalis in Christo semper fuisse divinae voluntati conformem tum in ratione volendi (obiecto formali) tum in volito (obiecto materiali). Item constat, quod nec ipse Deus vult, creatam voluntatem semper in volito idem actu velle, quod ipse, salva tamen conformitate respectu supremae rationis volendi (cfr. I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2.); aliis verbis, ut praeclare dicitur (hic ad I.), Deus vult conformitatem secundum subiectionem, sed non semper secundum assimilationem. Unde sequitur, quod hoc modo etiam in Christo voluntas sensualitatis, voluntas rationalis ut natura, voluntas pietatis (quae est in comparatione ad sua membra) aliquid aliud velle potuerunt ac Deus, quin tamen simpliciter fuerit contrarietas voluntatum. — In solutione ad 1. primus modus, quem sequuntur Alex. Hal., S. Thom. aliique, non placet nostro auctori nec B. Alberto. S. Thomas (S. III. q. 18. a. 6.) axioma, cui innititur ista solutio, ita exprimit: « Contrarietas non potest esse, nisi oppositio attendatur in eodem et secundum idem; si autem secundum diversa et in diversis existat diversitas, non sufficit hoc ad rationem contrarietatis, sicut nec ad rationem contradictionis ». Tamen in sequentibus idem ita explicat hoc axioma, ut minime neget, posse interdum esse contrarietatem voluntatis, licet agatur de diversis voluntatibus. — Solutio autem S. Bonaventurae bona est, quidquid quidam dixerint, dummodo attendatur mens ipsius, quae est, quod voluntas humana Christi ut natura refugiebat inefficaciter mortem, sed ut deliberativa tum mortem tum horrorem naturalem mortis efficaciter acceptabat.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 15. m. 2. — Scot., III. Sent. d. 15. n. 22. seqq., et Report. ibid. n. 8. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1-3; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1-3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. 3. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question proceeds concerning the conformity of the wills enumerated in the preceding question; and the distinction is presupposed between willing efficaciously and absolutely and willing imperfectly (velleity) and under condition. Now it is established, as was touched above at d. 12, a. 2, q. I, that the efficacious act of the rational will in Christ was always conformed to the divine will, both in the ground of willing (the formal object) and in the thing-willed (the material object). Likewise it is established that not even God himself wills that the created will should always actually will in the thing-willed the same thing which he wills, with conformity nevertheless preserved with respect to the supreme ground of willing (cf. I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, q. 2); in other words, as is excellently said (here to 1), God wills conformity according to subjection, but not always according to assimilation. Whence it follows that in this way also in Christ the will of sensuality, the rational will as nature, the will of piety (which is in comparison to its members) could will something other than God, without there being simply a contrariety of wills. — In the solution to 1, the first manner, which Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas and others follow, does not please our author nor blessed Albert. St. Thomas (S. III, q. 18, a. 6) expresses the axiom on which this solution rests thus: « There cannot be contrariety unless the opposition is regarded in the same thing and according to the same; but if there exists diversity according to diverse things and in diverse things, this does not suffice for the character of contrariety, just as neither for the character of contradiction ». Yet in what follows he so explains this axiom that he by no means denies that there can sometimes be a contrariety of will, even though it is a matter of diverse wills. — But the solution of St. Bonaventure is good, whatever certain men may have said, provided his own mind be attended to, which is, that the human will of Christ as nature inefficaciously shrank from death, but as deliberative efficaciously accepted both death and the natural horror of death.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 15, m. 2. — Scotus, III Sent., d. 15, n. 22 ff., and *Reportata* ibid. n. 8. — St. Thomas, here a. 2, quaestiunculae 1–3; *Summa* loc. cit. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1–3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, 3, 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column-band crops of printed pp.367–370 (PDF pp.389–392; offset pdf = printed + 22), per the Vol II/III override (PDF authoritative over cascade-fragmented IA djvu OCR). Raw OCR span 25660→25866. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Alignment confirmed.** Opener reads *Tertio quaeritur de illarum voluntatum conformitate et concordia… utrum istae voluntates fuerint in Christo conformes, vel repugnantes* — i.e. the **concord/conformity of the wills** (q3), not q1 (*plures voluntates*) nor q2 (*numero et sufficientia*). Next semantic boundary = ARTICULUS II (*De oratione Christi*) at raw line 25867.

**Page-split map (apparatus, 15 numbered entries + 1 marginal gloss):**
- **p.367** (L body = q3 args 1–2 head; R body = arg-2 quote + arg 3; footer): notes **8, 9, 10** PICKED UP into this question (8 = Matth. 26,39; 9 = *Exsultate iusti* Enarrat. 2; 10 = Luc. 19,41). Notes 1–7 of p.367 belonged to a1-q2 (note 7 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*); held there.
- **p.368** (L body = args 4–6 + Sed contra 1–4; R body = Conclusio + Respondeo + Hugo quote): own footer block notes **1–6** (note 1 long August. *de Trin.* XI; note 2 spans the L→R column break: *…Mox pro rationalis et sensualis codd. A | H K rationis et sensualitatis…*).
- **p.369** (L body = Hugo quote tail + Epilogus + Sol. 1; R body = Sol. 1 tail + Sol. 2–6 head): own footer block notes **1–6** (note 1 = long August.-arca survey; note 2 = long Guliel. Antissiodor.; note 6 = Dist. 16 a.2 q.2). Note 6 carries Quaracchi's own query glyph `(contrariae?)` inside note 2 — preserved verbatim, not a [?] flag.
- **p.370** (L body = Sol. 6 tail + start of SCHOLION I; R body = Scholion I tail + Scholion II; then ARTICULUS II begins): **no numbered apparatus belongs to q3.** p.370's footer notes 3, 4, 5 (*petitione/locutione*; *Vide in corp. quaest.*; *Cap. 5,1*) annotate Article II q1's body and are FORWARDED to d17-a2-q1. The body's marginal label *De triplici statu quoad consensum et dissensum* is recorded as `[^p370-marginal]`.

**Scholion (verified, source-first).** q3 has its OWN scholion (printed at the foot of p.370, sections **I–II**), distinct from q1's forward-covering scholion. §I situates the question, presupposes the velle-efficaciter/imperfecte/sub-conditione distinction, cross-refs d.12 a.2 q.1 and I Sent. d.48 a.2 q.2, and rebuts Alex. Hal./S. Thom.'s first solution-mode quoting S. Thom. S. III q.18 a.6. §II is the parallel-loci list. Both translated.

**`has_scholion`: true** (q3-specific scholion present on p.370). p.367–369 carry no scholion; the scholion is wholly on p.370.

**Hand-offs:**
- *Picked up:* p.367 footer notes 8–10 (per the a1-q2 hand-off).
- *Forwarded to d17-a2-q1:* **ARTICULUS II (*De oratione Christi*) opener** begins at **raw line 25867**, printed **p.370 L-column lower** (*Consequenter quaeritur de oratione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum decuerit Christum orare…*). Per the locked Vol II/III chunking convention, this short ARTICULUS-opener (*Consequenter… quaeruntur tria*) **folds into a2-q1**, no standalone divisio chunk. **Migrating footers INTO a2-q1:** p.370 footer notes **3** (*Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2*), **4** (*Vers. 12*), **5** (*Cap. 5, 1. seqq. et 6, 17. seqq. — Subinde pro ergo sibi edd. ergo ei*), plus p.371's own footer sequence. Seam is clean: q3 ends at *…illa enim rebellio ponit utrumque dissensum* followed by the q3 SCHOLION; ARTICULUS II opens grammatically fresh further down p.370.

**[?] flags:** none. All four pages were fully legible at 450 dpi. The two `(?)` marks rendered in the apparatus (`(contrariae?)` in `[^p369-2]`, `fuit talis tristitia (?)` in `[^p369-6]`) are **Quaracchi's own editorial queries reproduced verbatim**, not transcription ambiguities.

**d.20 is the next Vol III decade-polish gate — NOT YET.**

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De oratione Christi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de oratione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum decuerit Christum orare. Secundo quaeritur, utrum in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus. Tertio quaeritur, utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, fuerit sensualitatis, aut rationis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum decuerit Christum orare.*[^p370-3]

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum decuerit Christum orare. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Lucae* sexto[^p370-4]: *Exivit in montem orare et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei*; sed Christus nihil fecit, nisi quod ipsum decuit: ergo conveniens fuit, ipsum orare.

2. Item, cui competit sacrificium offerre, eidem competit orare; sed Christo maxime competebat oblatio sacrificii pro salute generis humani: ergo ei maxime competebat orare.

3. Item, nulli magis competit orare, quam ei qui est pontifex et sacerdos; sed Christus fuit pontifex noster et sacerdos, secundum quod dicitur ad *Hebraeos*[^p370-5]: ergo sibi maxime competebat oratio.

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4. Item, oratio spectat ad perfectionem[^p371-1] vitae contemplativae; sed decuit Christum habere perfectionem in utraque vita: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullum decet magis orare, quam eum qui est dignus exaudiri et facilius potest impetrare; sed nullus est dignior exauditione quam Christus[^p371-2]: ergo videtur, quod sibi maxime convenit orationis usus.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus *de Correptione et gratia*[^p371-3]: « Nemo quaerit ab alio quod per se potest »; sed Christus omnia poterat per se: ergo nihil debebat ab alio petere, ergo nec orare.

2. Item, oratio est actus personae inferioris respectu eius quem orat; sed persona Christi est aequalis Patri: ergo non decuit Christum orationem fundere ad Deum[^p371-4].

3. Item, « oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum[^p371-5] »; sed intellectus Christi semper erat sursum, sicut Deo unitus, et in continuo fruitionis actu: ergo non videtur, quod competeret ei usus orationis.

4. Item, « indivisa sunt opera Trinitatis[^p371-6] », ergo impletio petitionum spectat ad totam Trinitatem, ergo qui petit aliquid ab una persona, petit et ab omnibus; sed non decet Christum petere aliquid a se — nullus enim se ipsum orat, vel petit aliquid a se ipso — ergo non videtur, quod decuerit Christum aliquid a Patre per orationem impetrare.

5. Item, voluntas Christi hominis erat per omnia conformis voluntati Patris, ergo nihil petebat, nisi quod sciebat Patrem velle: ergo etiam si non peteret, nihilominus quod petebat impleretur: ergo frustra petebat aliquid. Sed nihil decuit Christum frustra facere: ergo non decuit Christum orare.

> **Conclusio.** Christum absque dubio decuit orare, maxime in diebus carnis suae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio decens fuit, Christum orare, maxime *in diebus carnis suae*[^p371-7]. — Ratio autem huius condecentiae potest quadruplex assignari, videlicet propter meritum, propter virtutis exemplum, propter veritatis argumentum et propter officium explendum.

Propter *meritum*: quia sua petitione et postulatione merebatur nobis, qui minus idonei eramus ad susceptionem beneficiorum Dei[^p371-8]. — Propter *exemplum*, ut scilicet discipulos suos, et per consequens alios invitaret ad orationis studium, in cuius exercitio maxime superatur adversarius; propter quod Dominus dicebat discipulis, *Matthaei* vigesimo sexto[^p371-9]: *Vigilate et orate, ut non intretis in tentationem*. — Propter *veritatis argumentum*, ut ostenderet, se esse verum hominem et vere a Deo missum; propter quod dicitur *Ioannis* undecimo[^p371-10]: *Gratias ago tibi, Domine, quoniam audisti me; ego autem sciebam, quoniam me semper audis; sed propter populum istum, qui circumstat, dixi, ut credant, quia tu me misisti*. — Propter *officium*, quia Christus habebat dignitatem sacerdotis et pontificis; unde sicut ad ipsius officium pertinebat sacrificium offerre pro peccatis, ita et pro peccatoribus exorare. Unde ad *Hebraeos* quinto[^p371-11]: *Omnis pontifex ab hominibus assumtus pro hominibus constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum*; et post, infra septimo: *Talis decebat ut esset nobis pontifex sanctus, innocens, impollutus, segregatus a peccatoribus et excelsior caelis factus*. — His igitur de causis congruum fuit et decens, usum orationis in Christo reperiri; unde et rationes ad hoc inductae sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nemo petit ab alio, si possit illud implere, quod petit; dicendum, quod illud verum est, secundum quod petitio et impletio attribuuntur eidem ratione eiusdem naturae; sic autem non est in proposito. Nam petere et orare competit Christo secundum naturam assumtam; sed posse implere debetur ei secundum naturam assumentem[^p371-12]. — Vel aliter potest dici, quod sicut motus aliquando est propter supplendam indigentiam pro-

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priam, aliquando propter supplendam indigentiam alienam; sic et petitio et oratio. Cum autem aliquis orat propter propriam indigentiam supplendam, verum est quod dicit Augustinus: « Nemo petit ab alio quod ipse potest per se implere ». Cum autem petit propter supplendam indigentiam alienam, non requiritur defectus potestatis in petente, sed defectus potestatis, aut idoneitatis in eo, pro quo petitur, qui quidem defectus suppletur ex merito ipsius orationis. Cum enim aliquis dignus orat pro indigno, quodam modo acquirit sibi idoneitatem ex suae orationis merito.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod oratio est actus personae inferioris; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, attribuendo inferioritatem personae secundum eam naturam, secundum quam competit ei oratio. Oratio enim est actus conveniens personae ratione naturae; et sic non habet instantiam in proposito, quia, quamvis persona Christi ratione Divinitatis sit aequalis Patri, secundum tamen humanitatem minor est Patre, iuxta illud *Ioannis* decimo quarto[^p372-1]: *Pater maior me est*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum, secundum Damascenum; dicendum, quod ascensus potest dici *large*, vel *stricte*. Secundum quod *large* dicitur, sic potest dici intellectus ascendere in Deum, quando fertur in eum qui supra se est, implorando misericordiam, quae est supra se, aut relevando[^p372-2] miseriam, quae est infra se; et hoc modo accipiendo, non tantum competit nobis, verum etiam Christo; et sic cadit in definitione orationis. Alio modo ascensus in Deum dicit novam Dei considerationem, prout dicit elevationem intellectus nostri ad Deum, procedentem gradatim a consideratione creaturae ad considerationem Creatoris. Et hoc modo non cadit in notificatione orationis nisi secundum statum viatoris. Primo modo accipiendo ascensum, fuit in Christo[^p372-3]; secundo vero modo accipiendo, quodam modo fuit, et quodam modo non fuit. Fuit quidem quantum ad hoc, quod Christus in actu orationis se revocabat ab occupatione vitae activae, ut totus esset intentus operationi vitae contemplativae. Quantum autem ad hoc, quod Christus erat continue comprehensor, sive vacaret actioni, sive cessaret ab actione; sic non dicitur fuisse in eo innovatio ascensionis per eum modum, per quem est in nobis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod postulatio orationis respicit totam Trinitatem; dicendum, quod verum est ex consequenti, licet quaedam orationes dirigantur ad Patrem, quaedam ad Filium. — Quod autem subiungitur, quod nemo petit aliquid a se; dicendum, quod verum est in eo qui est unius tantum naturae; sed qui est diversarum naturarum bene potest petere aliquid a se, ita quod secundum unam naturam sit petens, et secundum aliam sit exaudiens. Et sic est in Christo, qui erat Pontifex petens secundum humanam naturam, et erat Rex et Princeps exaudiens secundum divinam[^p372-4].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus nihil petebat, nisi quod sciebat Deum velle; dicendum, quod verum est; sed Christus bene sciebat, quod Deus quaedam volebat, quia sciebat[^p372-5], Christum ea nobis impetraturum per suam orationem; et ideo, orando et petendo quod Deus volebat, non frustra orabat, quia hoc ipsum, quod Deus disposuerat, nobis sua oratione impetrabat. Cum enim Deus disponit vel vult aliquid facere, non disponit in omnem eventum, sed praesuppositis congruentibus antecedentibus; sicut disponit nos salvare, si tamen velimus per bona merita salutem acquirere; sic et in proposito intelligendum est[^p372-6].

english:
### Article II. *On the prayer of Christ.*

Next, inquiry is made concerning the prayer of Christ. And concerning this, three questions are asked. First it is asked, whether it was fitting for Christ to pray. Second it is asked, whether in all his prayer he was heard. Third it is asked, whether that prayer, by which he prayed in the passion, was of the sensuality, or of the reason.

### Question I. *Whether it was fitting for Christ to pray.*[^p370-3]

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether it was fitting for Christ to pray. And that it was so, it seems.

1. *Luke* the sixth[^p370-4]: *He went out into the mountain to pray, and he passed the whole night in the prayer of God*; but Christ did nothing except what was fitting for him: therefore it was suitable that he should pray.

2. Likewise, to him to whom it belongs to offer sacrifice, to the same it belongs to pray; but to Christ above all it belonged to offer the sacrifice for the salvation of the human race: therefore to him above all it belonged to pray.

3. Likewise, to no one does it belong to pray more than to him who is high priest and priest; but Christ was our high priest and priest, according to what is said to the *Hebrews*[^p370-5]: therefore to him above all prayer belonged.

4. Likewise, prayer pertains to the perfection[^p371-1] of the contemplative life; but it was fitting for Christ to have perfection in each life: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, none is more befitted to pray than he who is worthy to be heard and can more easily obtain; but no one is more worthy of being heard than Christ[^p371-2]: therefore it seems that the use of prayer most of all befits him.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On Correction and Grace*[^p371-3]: « No one seeks from another what he can do by himself »; but Christ could do all things by himself: therefore he ought to seek nothing from another, therefore neither to pray.

2. Likewise, prayer is the act of an inferior person with respect to the one whom he prays to; but the person of Christ is equal to the Father: therefore it was not fitting for Christ to pour forth prayer to God[^p371-4].

3. Likewise, « prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God[^p371-5] »; but the intellect of Christ was always on high, as united to God, and in a continuous act of fruition: therefore it does not seem that the use of prayer belonged to him.

4. Likewise, « the works of the Trinity are undivided[^p371-6] », therefore the fulfilment of petitions pertains to the whole Trinity, therefore whoever asks something from one person, asks also from all; but it is not fitting for Christ to ask something from himself — for no one prays to himself, or asks something from himself — therefore it does not seem that it was fitting for Christ to obtain anything from the Father through prayer.

5. Likewise, the will of Christ the man was in all things conformed to the will of the Father, therefore he asked nothing except what he knew the Father willed: therefore even if he did not ask, nevertheless what he asked would be fulfilled: therefore he asked something in vain. But it was fitting for Christ to do nothing in vain: therefore it was not fitting for Christ to pray.

> **Conclusion.** It was beyond doubt fitting for Christ to pray, above all in the days of his flesh.

**I respond:** It must be said that beyond doubt it was fitting for Christ to pray, above all *in the days of his flesh*[^p371-7]. — And the ground of this fittingness can be assigned as fourfold, namely on account of merit, on account of the example of virtue, on account of the argument of truth, and on account of the office to be discharged.

On account of *merit*: because by his petition and supplication he merited for us, who were less fit for the reception of the benefits of God[^p371-8]. — On account of *example*, namely that he might invite his disciples, and consequently others, to the pursuit of prayer, in whose exercise the adversary is most of all overcome; on account of which the Lord said to the disciples, *Matthew* the twenty-sixth[^p371-9]: *Watch and pray, that you enter not into temptation*. — On account of the *argument of truth*, that he might show himself to be a true man and truly sent by God; on account of which it is said in *John* the eleventh[^p371-10]: *I give thanks to thee, Lord, that thou hast heard me; and I knew that thou hearest me always; but on account of this people who stand around, I have said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me*. — On account of *office*, because Christ had the dignity of priest and high priest; whence just as it belonged to his office to offer sacrifice for sins, so also to pray earnestly for sinners. Whence to the *Hebrews* the fifth[^p371-11]: *Every high priest taken from among men is constituted for men in the things that pertain to God*; and afterward, below in the seventh: *Such a one it was fitting that he should be our high priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens*. — For these causes, therefore, it was congruous and fitting that the use of prayer be found in Christ; whence also the reasons adduced to this effect are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that no one seeks from another, if he can himself fulfil what he asks; it must be said that this is true insofar as the petition and the fulfilment are attributed to the same one by reason of the same nature; but it is not so in the case at hand. For to ask and to pray belongs to Christ according to the assumed nature; but the ability to fulfil is owed to him according to the assuming nature[^p371-12]. — Or it can be said otherwise, that just as motion is sometimes on account of supplying one's own

priam need, sometimes on account of supplying another's need; so also petition and prayer. But when someone prays on account of supplying his own need, what Augustine says is true: « No one asks from another what he can fulfil by himself ». But when he asks on account of supplying another's need, there is not required a defect of power in the one petitioning, but a defect of power, or of fitness, in the one for whom it is asked, which defect indeed is supplied from the merit of the prayer itself. For when someone worthy prays for one unworthy, he in some way acquires fitness for him from the merit of his prayer.

2. To that which is objected, that prayer is the act of an inferior person; it must be said that this is true by attributing inferiority to the person according to that nature, according to which prayer belongs to him. For prayer is an act befitting a person by reason of a nature; and thus it has no force as an instance in the case at hand, because, although the person of Christ by reason of his Divinity is equal to the Father, nevertheless according to his humanity he is less than the Father, according to that of *John* the fourteenth[^p372-1]: *The Father is greater than I*.

3. To that which is objected, that prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God, according to the Damascene; it must be said that ascent can be spoken of *broadly*, or *strictly*. According as it is said *broadly*, thus the intellect can be said to ascend into God when it is borne into him who is above it, imploring mercy, which is above it, or relieving[^p372-2] misery, which is below it; and taking it in this way, it belongs not only to us, but also to Christ; and thus it falls within the definition of prayer. In another way, ascent into God denotes a new consideration of God, inasmuch as it denotes an elevation of our intellect to God, proceeding step by step from the consideration of the creature to the consideration of the Creator. And in this way it does not fall within the notification of prayer except according to the state of the wayfarer. Taking ascent in the first way, it was in Christ[^p372-3]; but taking it in the second way, in some way it was, and in some way it was not. It was indeed, as to this, that Christ in the act of prayer recalled himself from the occupation of the active life, that he might be wholly intent on the operation of the contemplative life. But as to this, that Christ was continually a comprehensor, whether he was free for action, or ceased from action; thus there is not said to have been in him a renewal of ascension by that mode by which it is in us.

4. To that which is objected, that the petition of prayer regards the whole Trinity; it must be said that this is true consequently, although certain prayers are directed to the Father, certain to the Son. — But as to what is added, that no one asks something from himself; it must be said that this is true in one who is of only one nature; but one who is of diverse natures can well ask something from himself, in such a way that according to one nature he is the one petitioning, and according to the other he is the one hearing. And so it is in Christ, who was the Priest petitioning according to the human nature, and was the King and Prince hearing according to the divine[^p372-4].

5. To that which is objected, that Christ asked nothing except what he knew God willed; it must be said that this is true; but Christ well knew that God willed certain things, because he knew[^p372-5] that Christ would obtain them for us through his prayer; and therefore, by praying and asking what God willed, he did not pray in vain, because this very thing which God had disposed, he obtained for us by his prayer. For when God disposes or wills to do something, he does not dispose it for every outcome, but with congruous antecedents presupposed; just as he disposes to save us, provided nevertheless that we are willing to acquire salvation by good merits; so also in the case at hand it must be understood[^p372-6].

la: Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 16, a. 1, q. 3, in the reply to 2.

la: Vers. 12.

la: Cap. 5, 1. seqq. et 6, 17. seqq. — Subinde pro *ergo sibi* edd. *ergo ei*.

en: Chap. 5, 1 and following, and 6, 17 and following. — Thereupon, for *ergo sibi* ("therefore to him") the editions read *ergo ei* ("therefore to him").

la: Pro *perfectionem* codd. F H *rationem*, codd. G I L N T V *orationem*. Verbo *spectat* edd. praemittunt *maxime*.

en: For *perfectionem* ("perfection") codices F H read *rationem* ("ground"), codices G I L N T V *orationem* ("prayer"). Before the word *spectat* ("pertains") the editions prefix *maxime* ("most of all").

la: Hebr. 5, 7: *Qui in diebus carnis suae... exauditus est pro sua reverentia*.

en: Heb. 5:7: *Who in the days of his flesh... was heard for his reverence*.

la: In dicto libro verba allegata non inveniuntur; sententialiter tamen habentur in August. libro de Natura et gratia contra Pelagium, ubi c. 18. n. 20. legitur sic: *Nam quid stultius quam orare, ut facias quod in potestate habeas?* — Edd. sententiam August. sic exhibent: *Nemo petit ab alio quod per se potest implere*.

en: In the said book the alleged words are not found; in sense, however, they are had in Augustine's book *On Nature and Grace* against Pelagius, where in c. 18, n. 20 it reads thus: *For what is more foolish than to pray, that you may do what you have in your power?* — The editions present Augustine's sentence thus: *No one asks from another what he can fulfil by himself*.

la: Augustin., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 29. enarrat. 2. n. 1: *Quis orat? ad quem orat? quare orat? Orat Deus? orat ad aequalem? Causam autem orandi quam habet semper beatus, semper omnipotens, semper incommutabilis, aeternus et Patri coaeternus?*

en: Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 29, enarration 2, n. 1: *Who prays? to whom does he pray? why does he pray? Does God pray? does he pray to an equal? But what cause for praying has one who is ever blessed, ever omnipotent, ever unchangeable, eternal and coeternal with the Father?*

la: Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24, ubi etiam *minor* insinuatur. Cfr. supra pag. 201, nota 7. — Pro *in Deum* codd. L Z aa *ad Deum*.

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 24, where also the *lesser* is intimated. Cf. above, p. 201, note 7. — For *in Deum* ("into God") codices L Z aa read *ad Deum* ("toward God").

la: Vide supra pag. 12, nota 2. — Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24. orationem definit « petitionem decentium a Deo ».

en: See above, p. 12, note 2. — Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 24, defines prayer as « the petition of fitting things from God ».

la: Hebr. 5, 7. — Cod. O *in carne sua* vel *in diebus carnis suae*.

en: Heb. 5:7. — Codex O reads *in his flesh* or *in the days of his flesh*.

la: Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24: *Quemadmodum enim passionis sustinuit, nobis adversus ipsas victoriam tribuens, ita et orat, nobis viam faciens, ut dixi, ad ascensionem in Deum, et pro nobis omnem iustitiam adimplens.*

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 24: *For just as he sustained the sufferings, granting us victory against them, so also he prays, making for us, as I said, the way to ascension into God, and fulfilling for us all righteousness.*

la: Vers. 41. — Haec ratio prae ceteris a Ss. Patribus in medium profertur; cfr. Ambros., in Ps. 118, 147; serm. 19. n. 18; V. Expos. Evang. Luc. 5, 18. n. 10. et 6, 12. n. 42. seq.; August., Enarrat. in Ps. 56. n. 5; Damasc. loc. cit. — Paulo ante cod. F: *in cuius exercitio caro superatur et adversarius*.

en: Verse 41. — This reason above the others is brought forward by the holy Fathers; cf. Ambrose, *on Psalm* 118, 147; sermon 19, n. 18; book V, *Exposition of the Gospel of Luke* 5, 18, n. 10, and 6, 12, n. 42 and following; Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 56, n. 5; the Damascene at the cited place. — A little before, codex F reads: *in whose exercise the flesh is overcome and the adversary*.

la: Vers. 41. seq. — Hilar., X. de Trin. n. 71: « *Nobis itaque oravit, ne Filius ignoraretur* ». Cfr. Damasc. loc. cit.

en: Verse 41 and following. — Hilary, *On the Trinity* X, n. 71: « *For us therefore he prayed, lest the Son be unknown* ». Cf. the Damascene at the cited place.

la: Vers. 1. — Seq. Script. locus ibid. 7, 26, quem plurimi codd. et edd. 1. 2 paululum mutilarunt omittentes *sanctus, innocens* et *a peccatoribus*. — August., Enarrat. in Ps. 85. n. 1: *Orat [Christus] pro nobis ut sacerdos noster; orat in nobis ut caput nostrum; oratur a nobis ut Deus noster.*

en: Verse 1. — The following Scriptural passage is in the same place, 7, 26, which very many codices and editions 1 and 2 mutilated a little, omitting *holy, innocent* and *from sinners*. — Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 85, n. 1: *He [Christ] prays for us as our priest; he prays in us as our head; he is prayed to by us as our God.*

la: Augustin., Enarrat. in Ps. 29. enarrat. 2. n. 1: *Ex quo enim [Iesus] homo, ex hoc et infirmus; ex quo infirmus, ex hoc et orans... Si divinitatem Domini nostri Iesu Christi consideres, quis orat? ad quem orat? quare orat?... Sed... Et Verbum caro factum est... habes maiestatem, ad quam ores; habes humanitatem, quae pro te oret.* — Paulo inferius pro *Cum autem* (cod. Z omittit *autem*) *aliquis* edd. *Cum enim aliquis*. In fine solut. Vat. omittit *sibi*, scil. indigno.

en: Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 29, enarration 2, n. 1: *For from the fact that [Jesus] is man, from this also he is weak; from the fact that he is weak, from this also he is praying... If you consider the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, who prays? to whom does he pray? why does he pray?... But... And the Word was made flesh... you have majesty, to which you may pray; you have humanity, which may pray for you.* — A little below, for *Cum autem aliquis* ("But when someone") (codex Z omits *autem*) the editions read *Cum enim aliquis* ("For when someone"). At the end of the solution the Vatican edition omits *sibi* ("for him"), namely for the unworthy one.

la: Vers. 28. — In Glossa interlineari (apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum) super Hebr. 7, 25. legitur: *Semper vivens ad interpellandum pro nobis, repraesentatione sui; ex ea enim natura, qua pontifex est, i. e. humana, quam caelis intulit, interpellat pro nobis.* Cfr. Haymo in hunc loc.

en: Verse 28. — In the interlinear Gloss (in Peter Lombard and Lyra) on Heb. 7:25 it reads: *Ever living to make intercession for us, by the representation of himself; for from that nature by which he is high priest, that is, the human, which he carried into the heavens, he makes intercession for us.* Cf. Haymo on this place.

la: Vat. *revelando*, quod nobis, respectu habito ad verba *infra se*, minus conveniens visum est. Si legeretur *intra se*, lectio illa intelligi posset in sensu Dan. 9, 18 expresso et infra pag. 374, nota 10. explicato.

en: The Vatican edition reads *revelando* ("revealing"), which seemed to us less suitable, with regard to the words *below it*. If *intra se* ("within it") were read, that reading could be understood in the sense expressed in Dan. 9:18 and explained below on p. 374, note 10.

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 34. enarrat. 2. n. 5: *In sinum meum convertetur oratio mea*, hoc intelligo dictum [de Christo], quia in sinu suo habebat Patrem. *Deus enim erat in Christo, mundum reconcilians sibi* (II. Cor. 5, 19.). In se habebat quem deprecaretur; non erat ab illo longe, quia ipse dixerat: *Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est* (Ioan. 14, 10.). Sed quia oratio ad ipsum magis hominem pertinet; secundum enim quod Verbum est Christus, non orat, sed exaudit, et non sibi subveniri quaerit, sed cum Patre omnibus subvenit; quid est: *Oratio mea in sinum meum convertetur*, nisi in me ipso humanitas in me ipso interpellat Divinitatem?

en: Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 34, enarration 2, n. 5: *My prayer shall be turned into my own bosom* — this I understand to be said [of Christ], because in his bosom he had the Father. *For God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself* (2 Cor. 5:19). In himself he had the one whom he might beseech; he was not far from him, because he himself had said: *I am in the Father, and the Father in me* (John 14:10). But because prayer pertains rather to him as man; for according as Christ is the Word, he does not pray, but hears, and does not seek to be helped for himself, but with the Father helps all; what is: *My prayer shall be turned into my own bosom*, except that in me myself the humanity in me myself makes intercession to the Divinity?

la: Ambros., III. de Fide, c. 2. n. 8: *Quasi Altissimus donat, quasi homo precatur, aliud Creatoris, aliud Redemptoris est.* Ibid. c. 4. n. 32: *Rogat quasi filius hominis, imperat quasi Dei Filius.*

en: Ambrose, *On the Faith* III, c. 2, n. 8: *As the Most High he gives, as a man he prays; the one is of the Creator, the other of the Redeemer.* In the same place, c. 4, n. 32: *He asks as the son of man, he commands as the Son of God.*

la: Intellige: praesciebat Deus.

en: Understand: God foreknew.

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 2. q. I. ad 1. et I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6. — In hoc ultimo enuntiato cod. A ter substituit *disposuit* pro *disponit*.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, a. 2, q. I, in the reply to 1, and I *Sent.* d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, in the reply to 6. — In this last statement codex A three times substituted *disposuit* ("disposed") for *disponit* ("disposes"). ---

latin_scholion:
Patet, quod Christo ut homini competebat et competit orare pro aliis. Etiam pro se potuit orare, quatenus erat viator, ut aperte constat ex s. Scriptura (cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 21. a. 3.). Item, secundum s. Scripturam (Ioan. 14, 16; Hebr. 7, 25.) Christus etiam in caelis Patrem pro nobis orat, saltem interpretative et tacite, ut nonnulli putant. Sed secundum S. Bonaventuram (hic praesertim ad I; IV. Sent. d. 11. p. I. dub. 4, d. 45. a. 3. q. I. fundam. 1. 2.), S. Thomam (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. 4. a. 6. quaestiunc. 2. ad I.) multosque alios Christus etiam formaliter pro nobis orat. Aliud est enim meritum, aliud actus impetrandi (IV. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad I. 2.); et in nobis virtus impetrandi ad plura se extendit quam virtus merendi. Non sic autem est in Christo, qui insuper ea quae in forma servi merebatur vel impetrabat, ipse idem in forma Dei largiebatur sive faciebat.

---

english_scholion:
It is evident that to Christ as man it belonged and belongs to pray for others. He could also pray for himself, inasmuch as he was a wayfarer, as is openly clear from sacred Scripture (cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* III. q. 21. a. 3.). Likewise, according to sacred Scripture (John 14:16; Heb. 7:25) Christ also in the heavens prays to the Father for us, at least interpretatively and tacitly, as some suppose. But according to St. Bonaventure (here especially in the reply to 1; IV *Sent.* d. 11, p. I, dub. 4; d. 45, a. 3, q. I, fundam. 1, 2), St. Thomas (IV *Sent.* d. 15, q. 4, a. 6, quaestiuncula 2, ad 1), and many others, Christ also formally prays for us. For merit is one thing, the act of obtaining another (IV *Sent.* d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1, 2); and in us the power of obtaining extends to more things than the power of meriting. But it is not so in Christ, who moreover the very things that in the form of a servant he merited or obtained, he himself in the form of God bestowed or did.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (Vol III = Vol II PDF-priority override: the PDF is authoritative wherever the IA djvu OCR is cascade-fragmented — i.e. the Respondeo, the *Ad argumenta* replies, the scholion, and every page-footer). Clean running prose (fundamenta, *sed contra*) checked against the raw OCR for marker spacing. Raw span **25867–26040** (ART. II opener at raw 25867 → just before QUAESTIO II at raw 26041). Printed **pp. 370–372** (PDF 392–394; offset pdf = printed + 22).

**ARTICULUS II (*De oratione Christi*) opener FOLDED IN.** Per the locked Vol II/III chunking convention, the short article opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de oratione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria…*) is folded into a2-q1 — no standalone divisio chunk. The three questions of ART. II are:
- **q1:** *Utrum decuerit Christum orare* (whether it was fitting for Christ to pray) — this chunk.
- **q2:** *Utrum in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus* (whether in all his prayer he was heard).
- **q3:** *Utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, fuerit sensualitatis, aut rationis* (whether that prayer, by which he prayed in the passion, was of the sensuality or of the reason).

**Alignment check PASSED.** The opener's listing (Primo… utrum decuerit Christum orare) and q1's *Circa primum… utrum decuerit Christum orare* agree; body is *decuerit Christum orare*. No q-swap.

**Page-split map (per-page footer restart):**
- **p.370** — ART. II opener + q1 title + fundamenta 1–3. Footer block has 5 notes; notes 1–2 belonged to the preceding **a1-q3** (held there). **Notes 3–5 picked up here** (3 = *Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2*; 4 = *Vers. 12*; 5 = *Cap. 5, 1. seqq. et 6, 17. seqq.* + *ergo sibi* / *ergo ei* variant). Body markers on p.370: note 4 anchors *Lucae sexto*, note 5 anchors *ad Hebraeos*; note 3 anchored at the q1 title (Quaracchi editorial cross-ref to d.16 — no in-line superscript visible on p.370 body, so placed at the question opening).
- **p.371** — fundamenta 4–5, *Sed contra* 1–3, *Conclusio*, *Respondeo* (the fourfold ground), reply 1 (begins). Own footer block **notes 1–12** (note 12 = the long Augustine *Enarrat. in Ps. 29* on the assuming/assumed nature, attached to *secundum naturam assumentem*; runs from L into R column).
- **p.372** — reply 1 (concludes), replies 2–5, **SCHOLION** (q1's own). Own footer block **notes 1–6** (notes 1–6 carry the scholion + reply apparatus: note 3 = Augustine on *In sinum meum*; note 6 = cross-ref to d.4 + I Sent. d.40 with cod. A *disposuit* variant).

**Scholion.** q1 **HAS its own scholion** (printed at the foot of p.372): on whether/how Christ prays formally for us (Bonaventure vs. some who hold only interpretative/tacit intercession). It does **not** forward-cover q2/q3.

**Hand-offs:**
- **Picked up:** p.370 footer **notes 3–5** (forwarded from a1-q3's report) — rendered as `[^p370-3..5]`. Notes 1–2 of p.370 stay with a1-q3.
- **Forwarded to d17-a2-q2:** **QUAESTIO II (*Utrum in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus*) begins at raw line 26041 / printed p.373** (running head *DIST. XVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.* confirmed at raw 26175). The seam is clean: a2-q1 ends with its SCHOLION at the foot of p.372; q2 opens grammatically fresh on p.373. **No shared-page footer migrates** — p.372's footer block (notes 1–6) is fully consumed by a2-q1's body + scholion; q2 begins on a fresh printed page (p.373) with its own footer sequence.

**[?] flags:** none. 450 dpi bands fully legible; the Quaracchi `(?)`-type editorial queries do not occur in this chunk. (Minor: note 3's body anchor placed at the q1 title since no superscript "3" is printed in the p.370 body — Quaracchi cross-ref convention, not an ambiguity.)