title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 794 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum conditio prolis sequatur patrem, an matrem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; page-labelled markers keep the two pages' sequences distinct.

Tertio quaeritur, cuius conditionem sequatur proles, utrum patris, an matris. Et quod *patris,* videtur:

1. Quoniam denominatio fieri debet a principaliori et digniori[^p794-2]; sed pater est nobilius et dignius principium quam mater, et principalius: ergo si magis debet principiatum regulari secundum regulas dignioris principii, videtur, quod partus debeat sequi patrem.

2. Item, in sacra Scriptura[^p794-3] nunquam ponitur genealogia mulierum, sed potius virorum: ergo generatio principaliter spectat ad viros: ergo et germen generationis.

3. Item, repromissio de semine benedicto, scilicet Christo, facta est viris principaliter, quamvis nasci deberet de muliere — non enim facta est repromissio Sarae, vel Bersabee, sed Abraham et David[^p794-4] — ergo videtur, quod proles magis sit ipsius viri quam mulieris: ergo etc.

4. Item, unumquodque principiatum, quod producitur secundum unitionem, plus sequitur illud cui plus assimilatur; sed filii plus assimilantur patri[^p794-5]: ergo magis debent sequi patres.

**Contra:** 1. De Coniugio servorum[^p794-6] dicit decretalis: « Indecens videtur, ut geniti ex libera filii ad serviendum retrahantur »: ergo qui nascuntur ex matre libera sunt liberi: ergo sequuntur *matrem.*

2. Item, si quis seminat in terra aliena, fructus est domini terrae, non seminantis[^p794-7]; sed venter mulieris respectu seminis viri est sicut terra respectu sementis: ergo videtur, quod sicut fructus sequitur terram, ita partus sequatur ventrem.

3. Item, hoc videtur in animalibus, quoniam si animal masculini sexus impraegnat animal feminini sexus, ut equus equam, pullus sequitur equam, non equum[^p794-8]: ergo pari ratione videtur in proposito.

4. Item, hoc videtur *per simile* in artificialibus: quia, si quis aedificat in terra aliena, aedificium cedit solo, non solum aedificio[^p794-9]: ergo si quis generat in alieno ventre, proles sequitur ventrem.

### Conclusio

> **CONCLUSIO.** Conditio prolis congrue sequitur matrem, licet in aliquibus regionibus alia sit consuetudo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum leges civiles sive ius imperiale[^p794-10] « partus sequitur ventrem ». — Et ratio huius est valde conveniens, quoniam prolis duplex est principium, pater scilicet et mater. Pater est principium *honorabilius,* sed mater est principium *substantialius;* et ideo in *honoribus* et *municipiis* filius sequitur patrem, quoniam illa acquiruntur paterna sollicitudine et in *hereditate* patrimoniali[^p794-11]. Sed quoniam mater est principium *substantialius,* quantum ad id quod *est,* sequitur matrem; et quoniam libertas et servitus respiciunt hominem secundum id quod *est,* non secundum id quod *habet:* hinc est, quod secundum *leges civiles* rationabiliter valde institutum est, ut partus sequatur ventrem; et hinc est, quod coniunctio ad prolem generandam *matrimonium* appellatur[^p794-12]. — Et huic concordat *ius canonicum,* sicut patet in decretali prius posita; concordat etiam *ius divinum,* scriptum in lege Moysaica, ubi dicitur Exodi vigesimo primo[^p794-13], quodsi dederit dominus uxorem alicui, quem emerit, et ille postmodum egredietur <!-- page 795 --> liber, quod filii debent remanere domino, qui dedit ei uxorem, licet ipse egrediatur liber; concordat etiam *multiplex ratio* et *similitudo naturalis.* Et ideo, quia hoc *dictat* ius civile, et ius canonicum *approbat,* et divinum *confirmat,* et naturale *commendat;* ideo recte dicendum, quod partus debet sequi ventrem.

Verumtamen aliquae partes, quae non sunt huiusmodi legibus subiectae, non servant hanc consuetudinem, immo partus sequitur conditionem deterioris[^p795-1]; unde si alter est servus, filii sunt servi, et similiter, si mater ancilla; et si ambo sint diversorum dominorum, filii dividuntur. Hunc morem servat Francia in aliquibus partibus, licet non ubique; sed tamen constitutio legalis multo nobilior est et rationabilior quam haec consuetudo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod pater est dignius principium; dicendum, quod verum est, non tamen *substantialius;* et ideo in dignitatibus patrem debet sequi, non in substantia sive in libertate corporis sui[^p795-2]. Et est exemplum: quia nobilius principium fructuum agriculturae est cultor quam ager; fructus tamen est agri, sive domini agri.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sacra Scriptura genealogias attribuit viris; dicendum, quod verum est et conveniens — nam et hunc modum habemus, quod filium denominamus a patre, unde dicitur Petrus Martini, non Berthae, ut in pluribus — similiter repromissio fit viris; tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod proles debeat sequi virum secundum conditionem *libertatis,* vel *servitutis,* sed secundum conditionem *dignitatis* et *honoris,* quae non substantiam respicit, sed potius *qualitatem.*

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod filius assimilatur patri; dicendum, quod assimilatio non venit a substantia, sed a *virtute formativa,* quae principaliter viget in semine viri, quando masculus generatur; et ideo frequentius filii assimilantur patribus[^p795-3]. Attamen, quantumcumque sit patri similior in *figura* et *proprietatibus,* plus tamen traxit a matre de *substantia;* et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod in libertate patrem sequatur[^p795-4].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether the condition of the offspring follows the father or the mother.*

Third, it is asked whose condition the offspring follows, whether the father's or the mother's. And that it follows the *father* seems to be the case:

1. Because denomination ought to be made from the more principal and more worthy [principle][^p794-2]; but the father is a nobler and more worthy principle than the mother, and more principal: therefore, if the thing originated ought rather to be regulated according to the rules of the more worthy principle, it seems that the birth ought to follow the father.

2. Likewise, in sacred Scripture[^p794-3] a genealogy of women is never set down, but rather of men: therefore generation principally regards men: therefore also the germ of generation.

3. Likewise, the promise concerning the blessed seed, namely Christ, was made principally to men, although he was to be born of a woman — for the promise was not made to Sarah, or Bathsheba, but to Abraham and David[^p794-4] — therefore it seems that the offspring belongs rather to the man than to the woman: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, everything originated that is produced according to union follows more that to which it is more assimilated; but sons are more assimilated to the father[^p794-5]: therefore they ought rather to follow the fathers.

**On the contrary:** 1. Concerning the Marriage of slaves[^p794-6] the decretal says: "It seems unfitting that sons begotten of a free woman should be dragged back into servitude": therefore those who are born of a free mother are free: therefore they follow the *mother.*

2. Likewise, if someone sows in another's land, the fruit belongs to the owner of the land, not to the sower[^p794-7]; but the woman's womb, with respect to the man's seed, is as land with respect to the sowing: therefore it seems that, just as the fruit follows the land, so the birth should follow the womb.

3. Likewise, this is seen in animals, since if an animal of the male sex impregnates an animal of the female sex, as a horse [impregnates] a mare, the foal follows the mare, not the [male] horse[^p794-8]: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems so in the matter proposed.

4. Likewise, this is seen *by a similitude* in artificial things: because, if someone builds on another's land, the building yields to the soil, not the soil to the building[^p794-9]: therefore if someone generates in another's womb, the offspring follows the womb.

### Conclusion

> **CONCLUSION.** The condition of the offspring fittingly follows the mother, although in some regions there is a different custom.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the civil laws or imperial law[^p794-10], "the birth follows the womb." — And the reason for this is very fitting, since the offspring has a twofold principle, namely the father and the mother. The father is the *more honorable* principle, but the mother is the *more substantial* principle; and therefore in *honors* and *municipal offices* the son follows the father, since these are acquired by the father's care and in the patrimonial *inheritance*[^p794-11]. But since the mother is the *more substantial* principle, as regards that which a thing *is,* [the offspring] follows the mother; and since liberty and servitude regard the human being according to what he *is,* not according to what he *has:* hence it is that, according to the *civil laws,* it has been very reasonably established that the birth should follow the womb; and hence it is that the union for generating offspring is called *matrimony*[^p794-12]. — And with this the *canon law* agrees, as is clear in the decretal set down before; the *divine law* also agrees, written in the Mosaic law, where it is said in Exodus, chapter twenty-one[^p794-13], that if a master gives a wife to someone whom he has bought, and the man afterward goes out <!-- page 795 --> free, the sons ought to remain with the master who gave him the wife, although he himself goes out free; there agrees also *manifold reasoning* and *natural likeness.* And therefore, since the civil law *dictates* this, and the canon law *approves* it, and the divine [law] *confirms* it, and the natural [law] *commends* it; therefore it must rightly be said that the birth ought to follow the womb.

Nevertheless, some regions, which are not subject to laws of this kind, do not keep this custom, but rather the birth follows the condition of the worse [parent][^p795-1]; whence if one [parent] is a slave, the sons are slaves, and likewise if the mother is a bondwoman; and if both belong to different masters, the sons are divided. This custom France keeps in some parts, though not everywhere; but nevertheless the legal ordinance is far nobler and more reasonable than this custom.

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that the father is the more worthy principle; it must be said that this is true, yet not *more substantial;* and therefore in dignities [the offspring] ought to follow the father, not in substance or in the liberty of its own body[^p795-2]. And there is an example: because the more noble principle of the fruits of agriculture is the cultivator than the field; yet the fruit belongs to the field, or to the owner of the field.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that sacred Scripture attributes genealogies to men; it must be said that this is true and fitting — for we also have this manner [of speaking], that we name a son from the father, whence one is called Peter [son] of Martin, not of Bertha, as in most cases — likewise the promise is made to men; yet from this it does not follow that the offspring ought to follow the man according to the condition of *liberty* or *servitude,* but according to the condition of *dignity* and *honor,* which does not regard substance, but rather *quality.*

4. To that which is objected, that the son is assimilated to the father; it must be said that assimilation does not come from substance, but from the *formative power,* which is chiefly vigorous in the man's seed, when a male is generated; and therefore more frequently sons are assimilated to their fathers[^p795-3]. Nevertheless, however much [a son] may be more similar to the father in *figure* and *properties,* he has drawn more from the mother as regards *substance;* and therefore from this it does not follow that in liberty he should follow the father[^p795-4].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 247, nota 8. et pag. 470, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 247, note 8, and p. 470, note 7.

la: Matth. 1, 1. seqq., et Luc. 3, 23. seqq.

en: Matt. 1:1ff., and Luke 3:23ff.

en: Gen. 17:4ff.; 18:18; 22:17f.; II Kings [2 Samuel] 7:12; 12:24f. and III Kings [1 Kings] 2:4. Cf. Ps. 88:36f. (Vulgate numbering).

la: Aristot., VII. de Histor. animal. c. 6: *Feminae magna ex parte matri, mares patri proveniunt similes.* — Superius pro *unitionem* [duorum principiorum generantium], quod habent codd. AVW, cod. M *unionem,* cod. O *intentionem,* alii vel cum Vat. *imitationem* (ed. 1 *commixtionem*), vel *univocationem* (cui opponitur generatio *aequivoca* i. e. qua aliqua ex non similibus sive ex non-semine fieri dicuntur), cod. E *univocationem per imitationem.*

en: Aristotle, *History of Animals* VII, c. 6: "Females for the most part turn out similar to the mother, males to the father." — Above, for *unitionem* [of the two generating principles], which codd. AVW have, cod. M [reads] *unionem,* cod. O *intentionem,* others (with the Vatican ed.) *imitationem* (ed. 1 *commixtionem*), or *univocationem* (to which is opposed *equivocal* generation, i.e. that by which some things are said to come to be from unlike things or from non-seed), cod. E *univocationem per imitationem.*

la: Potius cum Vat. substituendum *De natis ex libero ventre* [X. lib. IV. tit. 10.], *capitulo unico.* Textus originalis pro *libera* ponit *liberta* sive *libera,* et *servitium* pro *serviendum.* Cfr. C. *Dilectus* (8.), X. de Servis non ordinandis (lib. I. tit. 18.).

en: Rather, with the Vatican ed., one should substitute *De natis ex libero ventre* [Decretals of Gregory IX, book IV, tit. 10], *sole chapter.* The original text, for *libera,* puts *liberta* or *libera,* and *servitium* for *serviendum.* Cf. c. *Dilectus* (8), X, *de Servis non ordinandis* (book I, tit. 18).

la: Iustinian., C. III. de Rei vindicatione (tit. 32.), lex *Si quis sciens alienum agrum sevit* (11.). — In fine arg. codd. A K bb *matrem,* codd. NZ *mulierem* pro *ventrem.*

en: Justinian, *Codex* III, *de Rei vindicatione* (tit. 32), the law *Si quis sciens alienum agrum sevit* (11). — At the end of the argument codd. A K bb [read] *matrem,* codd. NZ *mulierem* for *ventrem.*

la: Iustinian., D. VI. de Rei vindicatione (tit. 1.), lex *Idem Pomponius* (5.), § *Idem scribit, si equam.*

en: Justinian, *Digest* VI, *de Rei vindicatione* (tit. 1), the law *Idem Pomponius* (5), § *Idem scribit, si equam.*

la: Iustinian., II. Institut. de Rerum divis. etc. Superiore § *Cum in* tit. 1: *Omne quod solo inaedificatur, solo cedit.*

en: Justinian, *Institutes* II, *de Rerum divisione* etc., in the earlier § *Cum,* in tit. 1: "Everything that is built upon the soil yields to the soil."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 793, nota 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 793, note 4.

la: Vide *Glossam* in Iustinian., C. III. de Rei vindicatione (tit. 32.), lex *Partum* (7.), ubi hoc ex aliis locis probatur.

en: See the *Gloss* on Justinian, *Codex* III, *de Rei vindicatione* (tit. 32), the law *Partum* (7), where this is proved from other passages.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2.

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Sive ut dicitur in C. *Liberi* (15.), C. 32. q. 4: *Semper enim qui nascitur deteriorem parentis statum sumit* (Isidor., IX. Etymolog. c. 5. n. 18.). Aliquanto inferius pro *morem* edd. substituunt *modum.*

en: Or as it is said in c. *Liberi* (15), C. 32 q. 4: "For he who is born always takes the worse status of the parent" (Isidore, *Etymologies* IX, c. 5, n. 18). A little further below, for *morem* the editions substitute *modum.*

la: Edd., paulo ante omisso *non,* hic addunt *matrem.* Subinde pro *agriculturae* cod. G *agri* (non pauci codd. et ed. 1 *agnoscere*), et pro *fructus tamen* multi codd. et ed. 1 *tamen servitus.*

en: The editions, having omitted *non* a little before, here add *matrem.* Then, for *agriculturae* cod. G [reads] *agri* (not a few codd. and ed. 1 *agnoscere*), and for *fructus tamen* many codd. and ed. 1 [read] *tamen servitus.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 3.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Generation of Animals* IV, c. 3.

en: See the scholion on the 1st question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the vol4 PDF column bands for printed pp. 794–795 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{794,795}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR L85107–85225. The two-column OCR was cascade-shattered through the Respondeo and footers, so the PDF bands are authoritative per the VOL II OVERRIDE.

**Alignment verified.** The raw opener "Tertio quaeritur, cuius conditionem sequatur proles, utrum patris, an matris" (raw L85115) matches this quaestio; the garbled `QU.\ESTIO III.` header (L85107) and title (L85112) confirm q3. No misalignment.

**Page-span verification.** q3 opens on p. 794 (below the tail of a1-q2's ad-4, which ends "…potest expelli¹" on p. 794 R col.) and runs to the end of the solutions on p. 795, immediately before `ARTICULUS II. De impedimento ex defectu aetatis` (raw L85225+). The running head on p. 795 reads `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` because Art II begins near the foot of that page; the q3 body still occupies the top of p. 795.

**Scholion.** has_scholion = false. This quaestio renders no scholion; the Art I scholion lives in a1-q1 and covers q1–q3 (footer p795-4, "Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.," points back to it).

**Apparatus split (16 entries).** p. 794 → 12 entries (footers 2–13); p. 795 → 4 entries (footers 1–4). Numbering restarts each page; labelled `[^p794-N]` / `[^p795-N]`.

**Footer hand-offs.**
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**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved from the PDF bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 795 -->

### Articulus II. *De impedimento ex defectu aetatis.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de impedimento, quod venit ex defectu aetatis. Et circa hoc tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum status aetatis impediat matrimonium.

Secundo, utrum defectus aetatis impediat contractionem sponsalium.

Tertio, utrum sponsalia contracta post septennium possint dissolvi per mutuum consensum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum status aetatis impediat matrimonium.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod status aetatis impediat matrimonium:

1. Quia statum aetatis sequitur impotentia coeundi; sed impotentia coeundi impedit matrimonium: ergo et status aetatis.

2. Item, statum aetatis consequitur indiscretio[^p795-5]; sed discretio requiritur ad consensum legitimum, et consensus ad matrimonium: ergo talis potest esse status aetatis, quod impedit matrimonium.

3. Item, iura canonica[^p795-6] et civilia dicunt, quod impuberes non possunt contrahere matrimonium; sed impuberes iudicantur ratione aetatis, ut masculus ante decimum quartum annum et femina ante duodecimum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Status pubertatis non impedit susceptionem alicuius alterius Sacramenti, quae etiam maioris sunt perfectionis: ergo nec matrimonium.

2. Item, quare non possunt contrahere ante tempus pubertatis? Aut propter impotentiam coeundi, aut propter defectum discretionis. Si propter impotentiam; sed multi infirmi sunt impotentes reddere debitum, et tamen possunt contrahere; prae-<!-- page 796 -->terea, multi senio confecti sunt impotentes, et tamen possunt contrahere; praeterea, multi etiam ante annum decimum quartum coeunt. Si propter defectum discretionis; contra hoc est, quod multi sunt discretiores in decennio, quam alii in vigesimo anno, qui possunt contrahere: ergo etc.

Item, quaeritur, quare tempus pubertatis citius completur in muliere quam in viro? Et videtur, quod non deberet, quia quantum ad sponsalia contrahenda ad par tempus et aequale masculus et femina iudicantur, ut puta ad septennium[^p796-1]: ergo pari ratione ad matrimonium contrahendum.

> **Conclusio.** Ante tempus pubertatis de iure non potest contrahi matrimonium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod matrimonium est in officium et in remedium et in Sacramentum vel signum: in officium, inquam, procreandi prolem, in remedium contra impulsum libidinis, et in Sacramentum insolubilis coniunctionis naturarum Christi[^p796-2]. Quoniam igitur ante tempus pubertatis non possunt masculus et femina generare, nec fervore libidinis excitantur tanquam impotentes ad eius actum; quia etiam ante tempus illud sunt variabiles, et matrimonium est immutabile: decreverunt iura, tales personas non esse legitimas, antequam ad tempus veniant pubertatis.

**Ad obiecta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Sacramentis aliis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia utilia et necessaria sunt ante tempus pubertatis.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid impediat; dicendum, quod defectus aetatis ratione instabilitatis puerilis et impotentia coeundi naturalis. — Quod obiicit de sene et infirmo non est simile, quia stabiles sunt in sensu et in affectu. — Sed quod dicit, quod ante possunt; dicendum, quod iura iudicant et instituunt non ea quae *semper*, sed ea quae fiunt *frequenter*[^p796-3], et quia, licet ante tempus indictum aliqui possint coire propter accelerationem naturae, tamen ut frequenter ante illud tempus non possunt. Quia tamen iura viderunt, quod aliqui possent; ideo non tantum arctaverunt, quin etiam proximi pubertati circa medium annum possint contrahere[^p796-4].

Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare citius completur tempus pubertatis in muliere? dicendum, quod tempus sponsalium determinatur quantum ad *discretionem*, sed tempus pubertatis quantum ad *potentiam coeundi*; et quia citius potest coire femina quam masculus: ideo etc. — *Si tu quaeras:* quare mulier citius potest quam masculus? responderi potest, quod hoc fit multis rationibus: primo, quia prius fit solutio viscositatis propter meatus largiores; secundo, quia difficilius est agere quam pati; tertio, quia natura imperfecta in muliere appetit virum, sicut materia formam[^p796-5]; unde propter maiorem appetitum naturae maior fit acceleratio.

english:
### Article II. *On the impediment arising from defect of age.*

Next, concerning the second article, there is inquiry about the impediment that arises from defect of age. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether the state of age impedes marriage.

Second, whether defect of age impedes the contracting of a betrothal.

Third, whether a betrothal contracted after the seventh year can be dissolved by mutual consent.

### Question I. *Whether the state of age impedes marriage.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the state of age impedes marriage:

1. Because impotence for intercourse follows upon the state of [immature] age; but impotence for intercourse impedes marriage: therefore so also does the state of age.

2. Likewise, indiscretion follows upon the state of age[^p795-5]; but discretion is required for legitimate consent, and consent is required for marriage: therefore the state of age can be such that it impedes marriage.

3. Likewise, the canon laws[^p795-6] and the civil laws say that those below puberty cannot contract marriage; but they are judged to be below puberty by reason of age, as a male before his fourteenth year and a female before her twelfth: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The state of puberty does not impede the reception of any other Sacrament, which are even of greater perfection: therefore neither [does it impede] marriage.

2. Likewise, why can they not contract before the time of puberty? Either on account of impotence for intercourse, or on account of a defect of discretion. If on account of impotence — but many sick men are impotent to render the debt, and yet they can contract; more<!-- page 796 -->over, many worn out with age are impotent, and yet they can contract; moreover, many even before the fourteenth year have intercourse. If on account of a defect of discretion — against this is the fact that many are more discreet in their tenth year than others in their twentieth year, who [nonetheless] can contract: therefore, etc.

Likewise, it is asked why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman than in a man. And it seems that it ought not to be so, because, as regards the contracting of a betrothal, a male and a female are judged [fit] at an equal and identical time, namely at the seventh year[^p796-1]: therefore, by parallel reasoning, [they should be judged equal] as regards the contracting of marriage.

> **Conclusion.** Before the time of puberty, marriage cannot lawfully be contracted.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that marriage is [ordained] to a duty and to a remedy and to a Sacrament or sign: to a duty, I say, of procreating offspring; to a remedy against the impulse of lust; and to a Sacrament of the indissoluble joining of the natures in Christ[^p796-2]. Since, therefore, before the time of puberty a male and a female cannot generate, nor are they stirred by the ardor of lust, being as it were impotent for its act; and since also before that time they are changeable, whereas marriage is unchangeable: the laws decreed that such persons are not legitimate [to marry] until they come to the time of puberty.

**To the objections:**

1. To that which is objected concerning the other Sacraments, it must be said that it is not alike, because they are useful and necessary before the time of puberty.

2. To that which is asked, what impedes [marriage], it must be said that [it is] the defect of age, by reason of childish instability and of natural impotence for intercourse. — As for what is objected concerning the old man and the sick man, it is not alike, because they are stable in sense and in affection. — But as for what he says, that they can [have intercourse] beforehand, it must be said that the laws judge and establish things not according to what happens *always*, but according to what happens *frequently*[^p796-3]; and because, although before the appointed time some can have intercourse on account of a hastening of nature, nevertheless for the most part they cannot before that time. Yet because the laws saw that some could, they did not restrict it so far but that those close to puberty, around the middle of the [fourteenth] year, may also contract[^p796-4].

To that which is asked — why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman — it must be said that the time of betrothal is determined with regard to *discretion*, but the time of puberty with regard to the *power of intercourse*; and because a woman can have intercourse sooner than a man: therefore, etc. — *If you should ask:* why can a woman [do so] sooner than a man? It can be answered that this happens for many reasons: first, because the dissolving of the [bodily] viscosity occurs earlier on account of wider passages; second, because it is more difficult to act than to be acted upon; third, because imperfect nature in the woman desires the man, as matter [desires] form[^p796-5]; whence, on account of the greater appetite of nature, a greater hastening takes place.

la: Codd. et ed. 1 *discretio*. In multis codd. plura in toto hoc arg. non bene omittuntur; retinuimus lectionem Vaticanae.

en: The codices and ed. 1 read *discretio*. In many codices several words in this whole argument are, not well, omitted; we have retained the reading of the Vatican [edition].

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4; C. *Puberes* (3.) et C. *Attestationes* (10.), X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.). De iure civili vide Iustinian., D. XXIII. de Rit. nuptiar. (tit. 2.); lex *Minorem* (4.). Cfr. etiam C. V. de Nuptiis (tit. 4.), lex *Sancimus, si quis* (24.) et ibid. *Quando tutores* etc. (tit. 60.), lex *Indecoram* (3.). Aristot., VII. Polit. c. 16. (c. 14.) annum 18. pro feminis et annum 37. pro viris ad matrimonium contrahendum aptum esse censet.

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 4; the chapter *Puberes* (3) and the chapter *Attestationes* (10), X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2). On the civil law see Justinian, Digest XXIII, On the Rite of Marriages (tit. 2); the law *Minorem* (4). Cf. also Codex V, On Marriages (tit. 4), the law *Sancimus, si quis* (24) and, in the same place, *Quando tutores* etc. (tit. 60), the law *Indecoram* (3). Aristotle, *Politics* VII, c. 16 (c. 14), judges the age of 18 for women and the age of 37 for men to be fit for contracting marriage.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et C. *Litteras* (4.), seq., X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).

en: See here the Master's text, c. 4, and the chapter *Litteras* (4) and following, X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2).

la: Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. et 6. — Inferius pro *ad eius* edd. *ad hunc*.

en: Cf. above the Master's text, d. 26, c. 2 and 6. — Below, for *ad eius* the editions read *ad hunc*.

la: Vide infra dub. 5. — Edd. superius substituunt perperam *quod non possunt* pro *quod ante* [nonnulli codd. *quandoque*, codd. P Q *quidem ante*, cod. G *quandoque ante*] *possunt* [cod. O addit *coire*], et subinde post *instituunt* prosequuntur *non secundum ea... sed secundum ea*.

en: See below, dubium 5. — Above, the editions wrongly substitute *quod non possunt* for *quod ante* [some codices *quandoque*, codices P Q *quidem ante*, codex G *quandoque ante*] *possunt* [codex O adds *coire*], and then, after *instituunt*, continue *non secundum ea... sed secundum ea*.

la: Cfr. C. *De illis* (9.), X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).

en: Cf. the chapter *De illis* (9), X [Decretals], On the Betrothal of Those Below Puberty (bk. IV, tit. 2).

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.). Cfr. IV. de [Generat. animal. c. 3.]

en: According to Aristotle, *Physics* I, text 81 (c. 9). Cf. [*On the Generation of Animals*] IV, [c. 3]. [The note breaks off at "Cfr. IV. de" at the trimmed outer margin of p. 796 — the tail is absent from the scan at 600 dpi and from the IA OCR alike; the bracketed continuation is supplied from the parallel note on p. 795, fn. 3, "Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 3."] ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** De 1. quaestione sive de impedimento *aetatis* lex positiva omnia satis determinavit.

De eadem: Scot., hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 5; Suppl. q. 58. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1.

**II.** De *sponsalibus* in genere alii Lombardi commentatores plerumque agunt supra d. 27.

De hac 2. quaestione: S. Thom., d. 27. q. 2. a. 2; Suppl. q. 43. a. 2. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., d. 27. q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., d. 27. a. 3. q. 1. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., d. 27. q. 3; Dionys. Carth., d. 27. q. 3.

**III.** De dissolutione sponsalium (q. 3.) notandum est, quod cum S. Alphonso Liguori (Theol. Moral. VI. c. 1. dub. 3. n. 855.) communiter docetur, sponsalia etiam iurata solvi per verum, mutuum consensum non tantum *valide*, sed etiam *licite*, dummodo adsit rationabilis causa; qua deficiente, solutionem esse saltem veniale peccatum. Etiam S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 89. a. 9. ad 2.) docet, promissionem iuratam, quando promittitur aliquid *pertinens ad utilitatem alterius*, posse solvi consensu utriusque. — Quoad quaest. 2. incidentem Richard. a Med. octo illis casibus addit alios duos: «Nonus, si probetur fama de impedimento inter eos, vel scandalum de eorum coniunctione, Extra, de Sponsalibus, *Cum in tua*. Decimus, ut aliqui dicunt, si sponsalibus superveniat simplex continentiae votum» etc.

De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 3. — B. Albert., d. 27. a. 16. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the first question, that is, concerning the impediment of *age*, positive law has determined everything sufficiently.

On the same: Scotus, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 5; Suppl. q. 58, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 6, q. 1.

**II.** Concerning *betrothals* in general, the other commentators on Lombard generally treat above at d. 27.

On this second question: St. Thomas, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2; Suppl. q. 43, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 14. — Peter of Tarentaise, d. 27, q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1. — On this and the following question: Durandus, d. 27, q. 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 27, q. 3.

**III.** Concerning the dissolution of betrothals (q. 3) it must be noted that, with St. Alphonsus Liguori (*Moral Theology* VI, c. 1, dub. 3, n. 855), it is commonly taught that even sworn betrothals may be dissolved by true, mutual consent not only *validly*, but even *licitly*, provided a reasonable cause is present; and, this being lacking, that the dissolution is at least a venial sin. St. Thomas also (*Summa* II-II, q. 89, a. 9, ad 2) teaches that a sworn promise, when something *pertaining to the advantage of another* is promised, can be dissolved by the consent of both parties. — As regards the second, incidental question, Richard of Middleton adds two others to those eight cases: «The ninth, if a report of an impediment between them, or a scandal concerning their union, be proved — *Extra*, On Betrothals, *Cum in tua*. The tenth, as some say, if a simple vow of continence supervene upon the betrothal» etc.

Concerning the third question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, d. 27, a. 16. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, at the place cited, q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{795,796}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`, split regenerated at 1780/2120/2480 to recover the clipped right column and the bottom footnote block); raw OCR L85226–85353 used as cross-check. Running heads verified: p. 795 = `DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`; p. 796 = `SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.` / `796`. `printed_pages [795, 796]` confirmed unchanged. This chunk folds in the ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter… tria quaeruntur`) per the single-standalone-divisio convention.

**Scholion disposition.** The Art. II scholion (printed at the foot of p. 796, spanning both columns) has three numbered sections: **§I** covers q. 1 (impediment of age), **§II** covers q. 2 (betrothal), **§III** covers q. 3 (dissolution of betrothals). It is rendered in full here (both languages) as owner of the article's first question; siblings a2-q2 and a2-q3 render no scholion.

**Apparatus count / page split.** 7 entries. p. 795: footnotes 5–6 only (`indiscretio`, `iura canonica` — videtur args 2–3). p. 796: footnotes 1–5 (`septennium`, `Christi`, `frequenter`, `contrahere`, `formam`).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Received / not claimed:* p. 795 footnotes 1–4 (`deterioris`, `sui`, `patribus`, `sequatur`) anchor in the servitude/filiation body of **a1-q3** (Art. I, q. 3), which shares the top of p. 795 with this chunk. They are that chunk's, not claimed here.
- *Forwarded:* p. 796 footnote block sits physically below the a2-q1 scholion, but its markers 1–5 all anchor in this q1 body, so all are claimed here. The `QUAESTIO II.` opener + first videtur arg. that begin at the foot of p. 796 belong to **a2-q2** (not rendered here).

**[?] flags.**
- `[^p796-5]` — **ACCEPT-ILLEGIBLE (physically absent from the source scan), with the first half RESOLVED.** Read at 600 dpi from `raw/vision/vol4/p-hires-796-r600-0816.png` (right footer column; crops y 0.78–0.94 × x 0.50–1.0 and y 0.855–0.93 × x 0.55–1.0, autocontrast). The note is legible as far as: "⁵ Secundum Aristot., **I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.). Cfr. IV. de**" — confirming the *Physics* reference exactly as transcribed. The line then runs into the **trimmed outer margin of the scanned page and stops**; there is no wrap line below it (the footer block ends there), and the IA djvu OCR breaks off at the identical point ("Cfr. IV. de", raw L85370). The tail is therefore **not recoverable from any available source at any dpi** — accepted as illegible.
  - Editorial supply: the continuation is rendered bracketed, `Cfr. IV. de [Generat. animal. c. 3.]`, on the authority of the parallel note one page earlier (p. 795, fn. 3: "Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 3.", raw L85271). The inline `[?]` is removed; the uncertainty is now carried by the square brackets plus this note. Resolving it further would require a different (untrimmed) copy of the Quaracchi Vol. IV scan.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 796 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum defectus aetatis impediat contractionem sponsalium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum defectus aetatis impediat contractionem sponsalium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia sponsalia de necessitate obligant ad matrimonium; sed matrimonium non contrahitur nisi propria voluntate: ergo sponsalia non contrahuntur, nisi placeant sponso et sponsae. Sed non habent usum rationis nisi in determinata aetate: ergo etc.

<!-- page 797 -->

2. Item, iura canonica dicunt, sicut patet Extra, de Desponsatione impuberum[^p797-1], per totum, quod qui contrahunt sponsalia ante septennium nihil faciunt: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. In Sacramento baptismi obligatur parvulus per alium ad renuntiandum saeculo[^p797-2] et ad contrahendum matrimonium cum Deo: ergo pari ratione possunt parvuli per alios ad matrimonium obligari.

2. Item, ubi deficit fides propria, succurrit fides parentum[^p797-3]: ergo pari ratione, ubi deficit discretio parvulorum, supplet discretio parentum, et sic etc.

Item, quaeritur: quare[^p797-4] tempus septennii est determinatum ad sponsalia contrahenda? Et videtur, quod non sit conveniens: quia quod ante non possunt contrahi, aut hoc est propter defectum *discretionis*, aut *locutionis*. Si *discretionis*; sed etiam tunc discretio deficit. Si *locutionis*; sed ante sciunt parvuli loqui: ergo etc.

### Conclusio
> *Sponsalia de iure non possunt contrahi ante septimum annum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sponsalia de iure non possunt contrahi ante septimum annum; et si contrahantur de facto, nihil fit; permittitur tamen ipsum *nihil in re*[^p797-5], quod est *aliquid in spe*, propter bonum pacis.

Ratio temporis haec est, quia, sicut non possunt aliqui matrimonium contrahere nisi proprio consensu et proprio signo exprimente consensum, sic non possunt ad matrimonium obligari, nisi placeat et complacentiam verbo vel signo exprimant; et quia[^p797-6] ut frequenter ab illo tempore incipiunt intelligere quae dicunt, et loqui secundum proprium affectum: ideo ex tunc incipiunt valere.

1. Ex his patent obiecta, quia non est simile de obligatione matrimonii et Sacramento baptismi, quia illa est necessaria ad salutem; ideo merito per alium subvenitur aegroto.

Patet etiam ratio temporis, quia, quamvis non sit plena discretio ad discernendum bonum a malo in eis; tamen est discretio ad intelligendum quod dicitur, et respondendum, quod libeat, vel non libeat.

2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Sacramento baptismi, patet responsio, quod non est simile, sicut saepe dictum est[^p797-7], propter hoc quod est contra originale, quod non est per voluntatem perpetratum; et *ulterius*, in baptismo non obligatur parvulus nisi ad ea, ad quae tenetur de iure naturali; unde non est ibi votum nisi valde large. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod parvulus potest obligari, ubi est bonum suum, dicendum, quod verum est in *possessionibus*; sed in *matrimonio*, ubi est servitus corporis, et debet esse mutuus amor, decrevit Deus, ut nullus possit nec debeat nisi propria voluntate obligari. — Est enim ibi quoddam mirabile, quia homo[^p797-8] invenit in muliere aliquam complacentiam, quam nunquam posset in alia invenire, ut dicunt experti.

---

english:
<!-- page 796 -->

### Question II. *Whether defect of age impedes the contracting of betrothal.*

Secondly it is asked, whether defect of age impedes the contracting of betrothal. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because betrothal of necessity binds to matrimony; but matrimony is not contracted except by one's own will: therefore betrothal is not contracted unless it be pleasing to the betrothed man and the betrothed woman. But they do not have the use of reason except at a determinate age: therefore etc.

<!-- page 797 -->

2. Likewise, the canon laws say, as is clear in the Decretals [Extra], *On the Betrothal of Minors*[^p797-1], throughout, that those who contract betrothal before the seventh year do nothing: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Sacrament of baptism an infant is bound through another to renounce the world[^p797-2] and to contract matrimony with God: therefore by parity of reasoning infants can be bound to matrimony through others.

2. Likewise, where one's own faith is lacking, the faith of the parents comes to the aid[^p797-3]: therefore by parity of reasoning, where the discretion of infants is lacking, the discretion of the parents supplies it, and so on.

Likewise, it is asked: why[^p797-4] is the term of seven years determined for contracting betrothal? And it seems that it is not fitting: because [as to the fact] that beforehand they cannot be contracted, this is either on account of a defect of *discretion*, or of *speech*. If of *discretion*; but even then discretion is lacking. If of *speech*; but even beforehand infants know how to speak: therefore etc.

### Conclusion
> *Betrothal by law cannot be contracted before the seventh year.*

**I respond:** It must be said that betrothal by law cannot be contracted before the seventh year; and if they are contracted in fact, nothing is done; nevertheless the very "nothing" is permitted *in reality*[^p797-5], which is *something in hope*, on account of the good of peace.

The reason for the term is this: because, just as some cannot contract matrimony except by their own consent and by their own sign expressing consent, so they cannot be bound to matrimony unless it be pleasing [to them] and they express their complacency by word or sign; and because[^p797-6] as a rule from that time they begin to understand what they say, and to speak according to their own affection: therefore from then [betrothals] begin to have force.

1. From these things the objections are answered, because there is no likeness between the obligation of matrimony and the Sacrament of baptism, because the latter is necessary for salvation; therefore the sick person is deservedly aided through another.

The reason for the term is also clear, because, although there is not full discretion for discerning good from evil in them; nevertheless there is discretion for understanding what is said, and for responding [as to] what may please, or may not please.

2. To that, then, which is objected concerning the Sacrament of baptism, the response is clear, that there is no likeness, as has often been said[^p797-7], on account of this: that [baptism] is against the original [sin], which is not perpetrated through the will; and *furthermore*, in baptism an infant is bound only to those things to which he is held by natural law; whence there is no vow there except very broadly [speaking]. And *if you object* that an infant can be bound where his own good is at stake, it must be said that this is true in the case of *possessions*; but in *matrimony*, where there is servitude of the body, and there ought to be mutual love, God decreed that no one can or ought to be bound except by his own will. — For there is something wonderful there, because a man[^p797-8] finds in a woman a certain complacency which he could never find in another, as those who have experience say.

---

la: Libr. IV. tit. 2. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Book IV, title 2 [of the Decretals, *De desponsatione impuberum*]. Cf. here the Master's text, ch. 4.

la: Cod. K (I a secunda manu) *mundo,* codd. R X *diabolo,* codd. S aa *satanae.*

en: Codex K (I, by a second hand) [reads] *mundo* [the world]; codices R X *diabolo* [the devil]; codices S aa *satanae* [Satan].

la: Cfr. supra d. 4. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 4.

en: Cf. above, d. 4, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, and doubt 4.

la: Cod. G addit *magis.*

en: Codex G adds *magis* [rather].

la: Nonnulli codd. omittunt *ipsum* et substituunt *de iure* pro *in re.*

en: Several codices omit *ipsum* and substitute *de iure* [by law] for *in re* [in reality].

la: Ita cod. G (E a secunda manu), cod. K (I a secunda manu) *quia igitur,* in aliis et edd. omittitur *et.*

en: So codex G (E, by a second hand) and codex K (I, by a second hand) [read] *quia igitur* [because therefore]; in the other [codices] and the editions the *et* is omitted.

la: Dist. 29. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4. — De secunda ratione cfr. supra d. 6. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. circa finem.

en: Distinction 29, q. 1, ad 2, and d. 34, a. 3, q. 1, ad 4. — On the second reason cf. above, d. 6, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, near the end.

la: Cod. K *vir.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Codex K [reads] *vir* [husband]. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the vol4 PDF column bands for printed pages 796–797 (pdf 816–817; offset pdf = printed + 20), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (cascade-shattered two-column OCR; PDF bands authoritative). Raw OCR range L85354–85425 confirmed aligned: the "Secundo quaeritur…" opener sits at raw L85358, and QUAESTIO III ("Tertio quaeritur…") begins at raw L85426 — the chunk boundary is clean.

**Page layout.** The question opens at the very bottom of printed p. 796 (below the Art II scholion, which belongs to a2-q1): the centered QUAESTIO II heading + title, the opener ("Secundo quaeritur… videtur:") in the left column, and argument 1 beginning in the right column ("Quia sponsalia de necessitate…"). No footnote markers fall in the p. 796 portion of this body. The bulk of the question (arg. 1 continuation, arg. 2, Contra 1–2, the incidental question, Conclusio, and the full Respondeo with replies) runs on p. 797. The p. 797 running head reads "DIST. XXXVI. ART. II. QUAEST. III." because QUAESTIO III also begins low in the p. 797 right column — but that content is a2-q3, not rendered here.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *First page (796), shared with a2-q1:* p. 796's five footers (1–5) anchor in a2-q1's body (matrimonium Respondeo + incidental question); this question's p. 796 body carries no markers, so **no p. 796 footer is claimed here** — a2-q1 owns all five.
- *This question's footers:* all 8 markers (¹–⁵ in the p. 797 left column; ⁶–⁸ in the p. 797 right column) and all 8 definitions are on printed p. 797 → labelled p797-1 … p797-8. Footnote-numbering restarts per printed page (p. 796 ran 1–5 for a2-q1; p. 797 runs 1–11).
- *Last page (797), shared with a2-q3:* p. 797 footers **9, 10, 11** anchor in QUAESTIO III's body (marker ⁹ = *Matth. 5, 32*; ¹⁰ = *de Sponsalibus et matrimonio*; ¹¹ = decretal *Commisso*) → **hand off to a2-q3**. Also note: the small unnumbered footer fragment at the top of p. 797's left-column footer block ("Generat. animal. c. 6. — Superius pro *viscositatis* Vat. *virtuositatis.*") is the tail of p. 796's footnote 5 (Aristotle) and belongs to a2-q1, not to this question.

**[?] flags.** None. All eight footer definitions and all body readings were legible in the 450 dpi bands (left column re-cropped at split_x=2120, right column at split_x=1780 to defeat the default-split clipping).


title: Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 797 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum sponsalia contracta post septennium possint dissolvi per mutuum consensum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sponsalia contracta post septennium possint dissolvi per mutuum consensum. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut se habet aetas puberum ad contrahendum matrimonium, ita aetas impuberum ad contrahenda sponsalia; sed puberes contrahentes matrimonium non possunt solvere: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut Dominus instituit, matrimonium non solvi, ita praecepit non periurare et fide non mentiri[^p797-9]: ergo si contracta sunt sponsalia per iuramentum interpositum, videtur, quod necessario teneantur consummare.

3. Item, de Sponsalibus et matrimonio[^p797-10] dicitur in decretali secunda, quod « hoc potest tolerari »: si ergo permissio non est boni, sed mali; videtur, quod hoc sit malum.

4. Item, in eodem in titulo decretalis *Commissum*[^p797-11], quia iuravit aliquam ducere in uxorem, propter iuramentum, si vult intrare religionem, prius deberet contrahere; sed si liceret alicui pertransire,

<!-- page 798 -->

liceret maxime tali: ergo si huic non licet, multo minus nec alicui.

**Contra:** 1. Si promitto tibi dare centum, si absolvas me, sum absolutus nec periuro, si non do: ergo pari ratione in proposito.

2. Item, si duo iurent simul ire Romam et post poeniteant et mutuo se absolvant, absoluti sunt: ergo etc.

Quaeritur igitur, qualiter sponsalia contrahantur, et quibus modis solvantur, et tertio, quis sit effectus sponsalium.

> **Conclusio.** Sponsalia etiam iurata multis modis solvi possunt, et etiam mutuo et voluntario consensu, accedente causa rationabili.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sponsalia multis modis solvi possunt, sicut iam patebit; et unus inter illos modos est, quando mutuo se absolvunt. De isto autem modo dicunt aliqui, ut Hugutio[^p798-1], quod modus iste non est *licitus*, quia non fit sine peccato propter fidem iuramenti; sed solum est *permissus*, quia coacta coniugia malos habent exitus, et hoc dicit propter illud quod dicit decretalis, « quod potest in patientia tolerari ». Alii dicunt, quod cum iuramentum obligatorium nunquam obliget nisi ad voluntatem eius cui fit, videtur, quod ad instar illorum qui iurant simul ire ad aliquem locum — sicut ipsa decretalis[^p798-2] dicit — quod mutuo se possunt absolvere; et si veniat ex causa aliquo modo rationabili, dicunt esse licitum, licet sit minoris perfectionis, sicut sonat decretalis; et haec positio videtur magis probabilis, quidquid dicat *Apparatus*[^p798-3].

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de matrimonio, dicendum, quod non est simile propter significationem.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de iuramento, dicendum, quod non obligat nisi sub conditione.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quomodo *contrahantur*; dicendum, quod quatuor modis: simplici promissione, fidei datione sive iuramenti interpositione, datis arrhis sponsalitiis, anuli subarrhatione[^p798-4].

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quibus modis *solvantur*; dicendum, quod in octo casibus. Primus est, voto solemni superveniente, puta si alter sponsorum intravit religionem[^p798-5]. — Secundus, superveniente matrimonio, puta si contrahat cum aliqua per verba de praesenti post sponsalia. — Tertius, superveniente affinitate, puta si cognovit consanguineam sponsae, et hoc facto vel fama probari potest. — Quartus, superveniente incurabili infirmitate, puta lepra, vel mutilatione alicuius membri. — Quintus, altero se absentante, puta cum vadit in regionem longinquam sine licentia. — Sextus, altero fornicante, puta cum alter cognoscit alteram quam sponsam suam. — Septimus, utroque volente, puta cum ambo consentiunt. — Octavus est, minore petente, puta si contracta sunt sponsalia inter aliquos duos, quorum alter est in aetate debita, alter est minor.

Primis duobus modis solvuntur sponsalia ipso facto, aliis per iudicium Ecclesiae.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quis sit sponsalium *effectus*; dicendum, quod duplex: unus obligationis ad matrimonium, ad quod astringuntur per promissionem, quae est in sponsalibus — unde dicuntur a *spondeo, spondes*[^p798-6] — unde compellendi sunt ad matrimonium contrahendum, nisi timeatur de uxoricidio, vel aliquis dictorum casuum interveniat. — Alius effectus est publicae honestatis iustitia, quae est, quod nullus consanguineorum propinquorum sponsi potest contrahere cum sponsa, vel e converso[^p798-7].

---

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### Question III. *Whether betrothals contracted after the seventh year can be dissolved by mutual consent.*

Third, it is asked whether betrothals contracted after the seventh year can be dissolved by mutual consent. And that they cannot, it seems:

1. Because, as the age of those past puberty stands to the contracting of matrimony, so the age of those under puberty stands to the contracting of betrothals; but those past puberty who contract matrimony cannot dissolve it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, just as the Lord ordained that matrimony not be dissolved, so He commanded not to perjure oneself and not to break faith[^p797-9]: therefore if betrothals have been contracted through an interposed oath, it seems that the parties are necessarily bound to consummate.

3. Likewise, concerning Betrothals and matrimony[^p797-10] it is said in the second decretal that "this can be tolerated": if therefore the permission is not of a good, but of an evil, it seems that this is evil.

4. Likewise, in the same [book], in the title, the decretal *Commissum*[^p797-11] [holds] that, because he swore to take a certain woman to wife, on account of the oath, if he wishes to enter religion, he ought first to contract; but if it were permitted to anyone to pass over,

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it would be permitted most of all to such a one: therefore if it is not permitted to him, much less to anyone else.

**On the contrary:** 1. If I promise to give you a hundred [coins] provided you release me, I am released and do not perjure myself if I do not give: therefore by parity of reasoning in the case at hand.

2. Likewise, if two swear to go together to Rome and afterwards repent and mutually release each other, they are released: therefore etc.

It is asked, therefore, in what manner betrothals are contracted, and by what modes they are dissolved, and thirdly, what is the effect of betrothals.

> **Conclusion.** Betrothals, even sworn ones, can be dissolved in many ways, and also by mutual and voluntary consent, when a reasonable cause is added.

**I respond:** It must be said that betrothals can be dissolved in many ways, as will now become clear; and one among those modes is when the parties mutually release each other. But concerning this mode some say, as Huguccio[^p798-1], that this mode is not *licit*, because it is not done without sin on account of the fidelity of the oath; but it is only *permitted*, because coerced marriages have bad outcomes, and he says this on account of that which the decretal says, "that it can be tolerated in patience." Others say that, since a binding oath never binds except to the will of the one to whom it is made, it seems that, after the manner of those who swear to go together to some place — as the decretal itself[^p798-2] says — they can mutually release each other; and if it comes about from a cause reasonable in some way, they say it is licit, although it is of lesser perfection, as the decretal sounds; and this position seems more probable, whatever the *Apparatus*[^p798-3] may say.

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning matrimony, it must be said that it is not similar, on account of the signification.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the oath, it must be said that it does not bind except under a condition.

To that which is asked, in what manner they are *contracted*; it must be said, in four modes: by a simple promise, by the giving of faith or the interposition of an oath, by the giving of betrothal-pledges, by the earnest-pledge of a ring[^p798-4].

To that which is asked, by what modes they are *dissolved*; it must be said, in eight cases. The first is, a solemn vow supervening, as if one of the betrothed entered religion[^p798-5]. — The second, matrimony supervening, as if he contract with some other woman through words of the present [tense] after the betrothal. — The third, affinity supervening, as if he knew a blood-relation of the betrothed woman, and this can be proved by the deed or by report. — The fourth, an incurable infirmity supervening, such as leprosy, or the mutilation of some member. — The fifth, one party absenting himself, as when he goes into a distant region without leave. — The sixth, one party fornicating, as when one knows a woman other than his betrothed. — The seventh, both being willing, as when both consent. — The eighth is, the lesser party petitioning, as if betrothals have been contracted between two persons, of whom one is of the due age, the other is a minor.

By the first two modes betrothals are dissolved by the fact itself, by the others through the judgment of the Church.

To that which is asked, what is the *effect* of betrothals; it must be said that it is twofold: one is of obligation to matrimony, to which they are bound by the promise which is in betrothals — whence they are called from *spondeo, spondes* ("I pledge, you pledge")[^p798-6] — whence they are to be compelled to contract matrimony, unless there be fear of wife-murder, or one of the said cases intervene. — The other effect is the justice of public honesty, which is, that no one of the blood-relations near to the betrothed man can contract with the betrothed woman, or conversely[^p798-7].

---

la: Matth. 5, 32. seqq. — Pro *periurare* plures codd. *iurare*.

en: Matthew 5:32 ff. — For *periurare* ("to perjure oneself") several codices read *iurare* ("to swear").

la: Extra, lib. IV. tit. 1. C. *Praeterea hi* (2.), ubi dicitur: *Videtur, quod... hoc* [solutio sponsalium ex mutuo consensu] *possit in patientia tolerari*.

en: *Extra* [the Decretals], book IV, title 1, chap. *Praeterea hi* (2), where it is said: "It seems that... this" [the dissolution of betrothals by mutual consent] "can be tolerated in patience."

la: Cap. 16: *Tutius est ei, religione iuramenti servata, prius contrahere et postea, si elegerit, ad religionem migrare* etc. — Pro *quia iuravit* E *qui iuravit*, in cod. bb secunda manus substituit: *quia iuravit, quod aliquam velit ducere* etc.

en: Chap. 16: "It is safer for him, the sanctity of the oath being preserved, first to contract and afterwards, if he shall choose, to migrate to religion," etc. — For *quia iuravit* ("because he swore") E reads *qui iuravit* ("who swore"); in codex bb a second hand substitutes: *quia iuravit, quod aliquam velit ducere* ("because he swore that he wished to take a certain woman"), etc.

la: *Glossa* in praeallegatum C. *Praeterea hi* (vide penultimam notam) ad verba *in patientia tolerari* dicit: *Hoc ideo dicit, quia ex quo non est processum ad matrimonium contraria voluntate accedente, possunt se invicem absolvere*, ut videtur; quia « *omnis res, per quascumque causas nascitur* » etc. [cfr. supra pag. 682, nota 1.]... *Haec fuit opinio Tanc. dicentis, quod haec decretalis continebat ius commune. Bug. dicebat, et bene, quod loquitur de comparativa permissione*... *et loquitur dispensative*; et hoc aperte indicant ista verba: « *Hoc possit in patientia tolerari* », *ne deterius inde contingat. Nam multa per patientiam toleramus* etc. — De sententia, quod *coacta coniugia malos habent exitus*, vide supra pag. 700, nota 3.

en: The *Gloss* on the aforecited C. *Praeterea hi* (see the penultimate note), on the words *in patientia tolerari* ("to be tolerated in patience"), says: "It says this for the reason that, since there has been no proceeding to matrimony with a contrary will supervening, they can mutually release each other," as it seems; because "every thing is dissolved by whatever causes it comes to be," etc. [cf. above p. 682, note 1]... "This was the opinion of Tancred, saying that this decretal contained the common law. Bug[uccio] said, and rightly, that it speaks of a comparative permission"... "and it speaks by way of dispensation"; and these words plainly indicate this: "that this can be tolerated in patience," lest something worse thereby ensue. "For we tolerate many things through patience," etc. — On the maxim that *coerced marriages have bad outcomes*, see above p. 700, note 3.

la: *In ipsa* (Praeterea hi) *dicitur: Quod ad instar eorum qui societatem interpositione fidei contrahunt et postea eandem sibi remittunt.*

en: In it (*Praeterea hi*) it is said: That [it is] after the manner of those who enter a partnership by the interposition of faith and afterwards mutually remit the same to each other.

la: Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc.: *Apparatus*, ita appellata est Glossa Accursii ad Digestum et Codicem [Iustiniani]; sed et quivis commentarius [hoc loco: *Glossa in C. Praeterea hi*].

en: Du Cange, *Glossarium* etc.: *Apparatus*, so is named the Gloss of Accursius on the Digest and the Code [of Justinian]; but also any commentary whatever [here: the *Gloss on C. Praeterea hi*].

la: Cfr. C. *Nostrates* (3.), C. 30. q. 5, ubi etiam sponsalia definiuntur, quod « *futurarum sunt nuptiarum promissa* (alias: *promissio*) ».

en: Cf. C. *Nostrates* (3), Causa 30, q. 5, where betrothals are also defined, that "they are the promise (var.: *promissio*, promising) of future nuptials."

la: Quia ita solvitur matrimonium ratum seu sponsalia de praesenti; cfr. supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 2. — Secundus casus insinuatur C. *Si inter* (31.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.); tertius C. *Super eo* (2.), X. de Consanguinit. et affin. (lib. IV. tit. 14.); quartus C. *Litteras* (3.), X. de Coniugio leprosorum (lib. IV. tit. 8.) et C. *Quemadmodum* (25.), X. de iureiurando (lib. II. tit. 24.); quintus C. *De illis autem* (5.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.); sextus C. *Quemadmodum* modo paulo ante citato; de septimo et octavo, praeter ea quae in hac quaest. dicta sunt, cfr. X. de Desponsal. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).

en: Because thus is dissolved a ratified marriage or a betrothal of the present [tense]; cf. above d. 27, a. 3, q. 2. — The second case is intimated in C. *Si inter* (31), X. On Betrothals and matrimony (book IV, title 1); the third in C. *Super eo* (2), X. On Consanguinity and affinity (book IV, title 14); the fourth in C. *Litteras* (3), X. On the Marriage of lepers (book IV, title 8) and C. *Quemadmodum* (25), X. On the oath (book II, title 24); the fifth in C. *De illis autem* (5), X. On Betrothals and matrimony (book IV, title 1); the sixth in C. *Quemadmodum*, in the chapter cited a little before; concerning the seventh and eighth, besides those things which have been said in this question, cf. X. On the Betrothal of the under-age (book IV, title 2).

la: Iustinian., D. XXXIII. de Sponsalibus (tit. 1.), lex *Sponsalia autem dicta sunt a spondendo; nam moris fuit veteribus stipulari et spondere sibi uxores futuras* (2.). — De secundo effectu vide C. *Ad audientiam* (1.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).

en: Justinian, Digest XXXIII, On Betrothals (title 1), the law "Betrothals, moreover, are named from pledging (*a spondendo*); for it was the custom among the ancients to stipulate and to pledge future wives to themselves" (2). — On the second effect see C. *Ad audientiam* (1), X. On Betrothals and matrimony (book IV, title 1).

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaest.

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands for printed pp. 797–798 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{797,798}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative for the cascade-shattered two-column OCR). Raw OCR range L85426–85586 used only as a cross-check. Alignment verified: the opener "Tertio quaeritur, utrum sponsalia contracta post septennium possint dissolvi per mutuum consensum" is correctly aligned at raw L85430 (title "QUAESTIO III." at L85428) — no q-swap.
- **Page layout.** On p.797 the "QUAESTIO III." heading and the italic title are set **centered across both columns**; below the title the q3 body reads left-column-below-title (args 1–2 + tail) then right-column-below-title (arg 2 tail, args 3–4). The material **above** the centered title on p.797 (both columns: the videtur/contra + Respondeo/Ratio/Solutio of Quaestio II) belongs to chunk a2-q2, not here.
- **printed_pages corrected** from [797, 798, 799] to **[797, 798]** (pdf_pages [817, 818]). Quaestio III ends at the foot of p.798's right column ("...vel e converso."); p.799 opens `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. DUB. I.` (the separate dubia chunk). This q3 does not touch p.799.
- **Footer hand-offs.** p.797 footnotes **1–8 belong to a2-q2** (shared page, above the title); this chunk claims only p.797 nn. **9–11**. p.798 footnotes **1–7 all belong to this q3**. No footers forwarded to the dubia chunk (dubia footers begin on p.799).
- **Apparatus:** 10 entries total — p.797: 3 (nn. 9–11); p.798: 7 (nn. 1–7).
- **Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. n. p798-7 ("Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaest.") confirms the Article II scholion lives on chunk a2-q1 and covers all Art. II questions; none is rendered here.
- **[?] flags:** none. Minor silent OCR cleanups (e.g. *raentiri*→*mentiri*, *Slatlh.*→*Matth.*, *pracullegalum*→*praeallegatum*, *conlrahere*→*contrahere*, *til.*→*tit.*) made where context is unambiguous.


title: Dist. 36, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: *Si ipsa femina fuerit in servitute detecta* etc.; quaeritur, si, antequam plene detegatur, sunt in causa et lite, utrum debeat sibi reddere debitum. Et quod non, videtur: quia aut *cognoscit* eam affectu maritali, aut *non*. Si *sic*, generat sibi praeiudicium et consentiens reputatur. Si *non cognoscit* affectu maritali, peccat mortaliter. — Sed *contra* hoc est, quia nullus debet spoliari iure suo ante causae cognitionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod talis potest dupliciter nosse, quod illa sit ancilla, quam liberam credidit: aut levi suspicione, aut probabili vel vehementi praesumtione sive certa cognitione. Primo, non debet petere, quousque inquirat; sed tamen, si Ecclesia compellat, debet reddere, quia ignorantia eum excusat, si non est uxor[^p799-1]; nescit enim, utrum sit uxor. — Secundo modo, sive Ecclesia compellat sive non, non debet, quia aut tunc sibi praeiudicat necessario, aut fornicatur; et propter mandatum Ecclesiae non est fornicandum. — Aliter iudicandum est de uxore fornicaria, quae vere uxor est, cui, cum ex mandato Ecclesiae redditur debitum, non generatur praeiudicium, nec incurritur[^p799-2] aliquod peccatum.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Uno coniugio permanentes, dominis suis serviant.* Videtur enim male dicere: quia ponatur, quod unus dominorum vendat servum ad remotas terras; si ancilla sequitur virum, privatur iure suo dominus eius; si non tenetur sequi; tunc ergo non fuit verum coniugium. — Item, ponatur, quod uxor sit libera, et servus venundetur gentilibus; quaeritur, utrum debeat sequi eum. Et quod sic, videtur per legem matrimonii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si servus et ancilla contraxerunt, dominis *contradicentibus*, ipsi sibi praeiudicant, non dominis suis; et ideo, si dominus indiget, potest ancillam vendere, et si non potest vendere in terra sua, potest vendere in aliena. Si tamen in terra sua possit vendere, tenetur; alioquin manifeste iniuriatur viro et abutitur re sua in praeiudicium alienum. — Si vero dominis *consentientibus*; tunc simpliciter dicendum, quod non potest aliquis eorum vendi a domino in praeiudicium coniugis; et si alter[^p799-3] vendat, debet alter compelli, vel quod redimat, vel debet eum emere, vel ancillae licentiam dare, quod virum sequatur.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum debeat sequi virum, si venundetur hominibus gentilibus; dicendum, quod dominus suus non debet eum vendere gentilibus, pro eo quod est ibi periculum fidei. Si tamen vendat de facto; si uxor non timet periculum peccati, quod sit in contumeliam Dei, vel alicuius fornicationis alterius, potest et debet virum sequi; sed vix video, quomodo possit eum sequi sine periculo fidei, aut aliquo alio peccato moris[^p799-4].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si mulier virum liberum acceperit* etc., utrum aliquis possit se ipsum vendere. Et quod non, videtur primae ad Corinthios sexto[^p799-5]: *Non estis vestri; empti enim estis pretio magno*: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est emptio, vel venditio ad *obsequium humanum* et ad *servitium divinum*. *Divino* autem *servitio* non repugnat obsequium hominis sive servitus corporalis, sed servitus spiritualis, quae est servitus peccati[^p799-6]. Dicendum ergo, quod quia fideles redempti sunt et Dei templa facti sunt, non possunt se vendere, ut faciant mala; possunt tamen se vendere ad obsequia.

Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum pater possit vendere prolem suam, uxore invita. Et quod sic, videtur: quia ad ipsum spectat regimen domus. — Ad *oppositum* autem est, quia partus plus sequitur matrem[^p799-7].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod filii non debent vendi nec possunt vendi sine culpa, nisi sit paupertatis et famis necessitas, in quo casu uxor debet viro consentire. Quod si in alio casu velit, non potest, cum uxor dissentit, sicut vir non potest vendere nec alienare dotem uxoris, quamvis sit dominus domus; sic in proposito. Et quod in tempore necessitatis et famis vendi possint, probatur per id quod scribitur Nehemiae quinto[^p799-8].

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### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Iudicatum est, uxorem minime debere dimitti*; utrum vir possit se vendere, uxore invita. Et quod non, videtur: quia *vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed mulier*[^p800-1]: ergo etc. Item, mulier non potest se vendere, viro invito: ergo cum ad paria iudicentur, patet etc.

Item, quaeritur, utrum, si uxor consentiat, per hoc efficiatur serva.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si uxor contraxit cum libero, ita quod uterque est liber, uxore dissentiente, non debet vir nec potest se facere servum eatenus, ut praeiudicium generetur aliquod mulieri, quin reddat sibi debitum, cum petit; unde sicut servus contrahens contra voluntatem domini non potest facere contractum matrimonii in praeiudicium domini; sic nec vir in praeiudicium uxoris nihilominus tamen, quia *caput est mulieris*[^p800-2], quantum ad alia, excepto debito, potest servum se facere, quamvis uxor non possit, cum sit *sub potestate viri*.

Si vero uxor consentiat in venditionem viri, tantum tunc vir potest se vendere in omne obsequium domini, et mulier praeiudicat sibi; tamen nec mulier nec proles vendi potest a viro, nisi ipsa consentiat, nisi forte in articulo necessitatis; hoc dico de prole, ut praedictum est[^p800-3]. Et sic patet, quomodo littera illa intelligitur.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur, si ante quatuordecim annos puer contraheret per verba de praesenti et de facto corrumpat sponsam; utrum separari queat. Et quod non, videtur, quia est matrimonium ratum et consummatum. — *Contrarium* videtur per illud quod dicitur in littera[^p800-4]: *Si ante praedicta tempora* etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in hoc differunt *constitutiones iuris* et *demonstrationes disciplinarum*: quia *demonstrationes* fiunt de his quae fiunt *semper*, et si fiant de his quae *frequenter*, non tamen ut *frequenter*, sed ut *semper* — exemplum est de eclipsi[^p800-5] — sed *constitutiones iuris* de his quae sunt *saepe*. Si ergo aliquis sit exceptus a generalitate hominum, pro eo quod in eo «malitia supplet aetatem[^p800-6]»; iudicandum est, sicut si haberet aetatem. Et sic est in casu proposito intelligendum et in aliis consimilibus.

---

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this which he says: *If the woman herself shall have been detected in servitude* etc.; it is asked whether, before she is fully detected, while they are in suit and litigation, he ought to render her the [conjugal] debt. And that he ought not, it seems: because either he *knows* her with marital affection, or *not*. If *so*, he generates a prejudice against himself and is reckoned as consenting. If he *does not know* [her] with marital affection, he sins mortally. — But *against* this is that no one ought to be despoiled of his right before cognizance of the case.

**I respond:** It must be said that such a one can know in two ways that she is a bondwoman whom he had believed free: either by a slight suspicion, or by a probable or vehement presumption, or by certain knowledge. In the first [way], he ought not to seek [the debt], until he inquires; but nevertheless, if the Church compels [him], he ought to render it, because ignorance excuses him, if she is not [his] wife[^p799-1]; for he does not know whether she is [his] wife. — In the second way, whether the Church compels or not, he ought not, because either then he prejudices himself necessarily, or he fornicates; and on account of the Church's mandate one must not fornicate. — Otherwise it must be judged concerning a fornicating wife, who truly is a wife, to whom, when the debt is rendered by the mandate of the Church, no prejudice is generated, nor is any sin incurred[^p799-2].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *Remaining in one marriage, let them serve their masters.* For it seems to speak wrongly: because let it be supposed that one of the masters sells a slave to distant lands; if the bondwoman follows her husband, her master is deprived of his right; if she is not bound to follow; then therefore it was not a true marriage. — Likewise, let it be supposed that the wife is free, and the slave is sold to gentiles; it is asked whether she ought to follow him. And that [she ought] so, it seems by the law of matrimony.

**I respond:** It must be said that if a male and female slave contracted [marriage], their masters *contradicting* [it], they prejudice themselves, not their masters; and therefore, if the master is in need, he can sell the bondwoman, and if he cannot sell [her] in his own land, he can sell [her] in another's. If, however, in his own land he can sell [her], he is bound [to do so]; otherwise he manifestly wrongs the husband and abuses his own property to another's prejudice. — But if [it be] with the masters *consenting*; then it must be said simply that none of them can be sold by the master to the prejudice of the spouse; and if the one[^p799-3] should sell, the other ought to be compelled either to redeem [the slave], or he ought to buy him, or to give the bondwoman leave to follow her husband.

To that which is asked, whether she ought to follow her husband, if he is sold to gentile men; it must be said that his master ought not to sell him to gentiles, for the reason that there is there a peril to the faith. If, however, he does sell [him] in fact; if the wife does not fear the peril of sin, that it be to the contumely of God, or of some other fornication, she can and ought to follow her husband; but I scarcely see how she can follow him without peril to the faith, or without some other sin of morals[^p799-4].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *If a woman shall have taken a free man* etc., whether anyone can sell himself. And that [he can] not, it seems from the first to the Corinthians, the sixth [chapter][^p799-5]: *You are not your own; for you were bought at a great price*: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a buying, or selling, unto *human service* and unto *divine service*. But to *divine service* there is no repugnance in the service of a man, or bodily servitude, but [only] spiritual servitude, which is the servitude of sin[^p799-6]. It must be said therefore that, since the faithful have been redeemed and made temples of God, they cannot sell themselves so as to do evil; they can nevertheless sell themselves unto services.

Likewise, in connection with this it is asked, whether a father can sell his offspring, the wife being unwilling. And that [he can] so, it seems: because the governance of the household pertains to him. — But to the *contrary* is that the offspring follows the mother more[^p799-7].

**I respond:** It must be said that children ought not to be sold nor can be sold without fault, unless there be a necessity of poverty and hunger, in which case the wife ought to consent with the husband. But if in another case he should wish [to], he cannot, when the wife dissents, just as a husband cannot sell nor alienate the dowry of his wife, although he is master of the household; so in the matter proposed. And that in a time of necessity and hunger they can be sold, is proved by that which is written in Nehemiah, the fifth [chapter][^p799-8].

<!-- page 800 -->

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says: *It is adjudged that a wife ought by no means to be dismissed*; whether a husband can sell himself, the wife being unwilling. And that [he can] not, it seems: because *the husband does not have power over his own body, but the wife*[^p800-1]: therefore etc. Likewise, a wife cannot sell herself, the husband being unwilling: therefore, since they are judged to be on a par, it is evident etc.

Likewise, it is asked whether, if the wife consents, she is thereby made a bondwoman.

**I respond:** It must be said that if the wife contracted [marriage] with a free man, so that each is free, the wife dissenting, the husband neither ought nor can make himself a slave to such a degree that any prejudice be generated against the wife, so as not to render her the debt when she seeks it; whence, just as a slave contracting against the will of the master cannot make a contract of matrimony to the prejudice of the master; so neither [can] the husband to the prejudice of the wife — nevertheless, because *the husband is the head of the wife*[^p800-2], as to other things, the debt excepted, he can make himself a slave, although the wife cannot, since she is *under the power of the husband*.

But if the wife consents to the selling of the husband, then only can the husband sell himself unto every service of a master, and the woman prejudices herself; yet neither the woman nor the offspring can be sold by the husband, unless she herself consents, unless perhaps in a moment of necessity; this I say concerning the offspring, as was said before[^p800-3]. And thus it is evident how that text is to be understood.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked, if before fourteen years a boy should contract by words of the present [tense] and in fact should corrupt his betrothed; whether they can be separated. And that [they can] not, it seems, because it is a ratified and consummated marriage. — The *contrary* seems [true] through that which is said in the text[^p800-4]: *If before the aforesaid times* etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this the *constitutions of law* and the *demonstrations of the disciplines* differ: because *demonstrations* are made concerning those things which happen *always*, and if they are made concerning those things which [happen] *frequently*, yet not as *frequently* [merely], but as *always* — an example is that of an eclipse[^p800-5] — but the *constitutions of law* [are made] concerning those things which are *often*. If therefore anyone be excepted from the generality of men, for the reason that in him «malice supplies for age[^p800-6]», it must be judged [of him] just as if he had the [requisite] age. And so it is to be understood in the case proposed and in others of the like kind.

---

la: Edd. omittunt *si non est uxor*.

en: The editions omit *si non est uxor* ("if she is not [his] wife").

la: Communissima lectio codd. ponit *incurrit*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio *Glossa* in C. *Proposuit* (2.), X. de Coniugio servorum (lib. IV. tit. 9.), et supra a. 1. q. 2; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: The most common reading of the codices puts *incurrit* ("he incurs"). — Cf. on this doubt the *Gloss* on C. *Proposuit* (2), X [the Decretals], On the Marriage of slaves (book IV, title 9), and above, a. 1, q. 2; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Intellige: *alter* dominorum; edd., hoc non attendentes, mox pro *vendat* perperam substituunt *vendatur*.

en: Understand: *the one* of the masters; the editions, not attending to this, presently for *vendat* ("[if] he should sell") wrongly substitute *vendatur* ("[if] he should be sold").

la: Cfr. *Glossa* in C. *Dignum est* (1.), X. de Coniugio servorum (lib. IV. tit. 9.), et infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 4; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 4. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2.

en: Cf. the *Gloss* on C. *Dignum est* (1), X, On the Marriage of slaves (book IV, title 9), and below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, ad 4 and on the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 2.

la: Vers. 19. seq.

en: Verse 19 f. [I Corinthians 6:19–20].

la: Ioan. 8, 34; Rom. 6, 16. et II. Petr. 2, 19. — Mox respicitur I. Cor. 3, 16: *Nescitis, quia templum Dei estis* etc.

en: John 8:34; Romans 6:16 and II Peter 2:19. — Presently there is a reference to I Corinthians 3:16: *Do you not know that you are the temple of God?* etc.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 3.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Sive II. Esdrae 5, 5. Idem dicit Iustinian., C. IV. de Patribus, qui filios etc. (tit. 43.), lex *Si quis* (2.). — De hoc dubio cfr. Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Or II Esdras 5:5. Justinian says the same, Code, book IV, On Fathers who [have sold] their children etc. (title 43), the law *Si quis* (2). — On this doubt cf. Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 7, 4.

en: Epistle, I Corinthians 7:4.

la: Eph. 5, 23. et I. Cor. 11, 3. — Seq. locus est Gen. 3, 16: *Sub viri potestate eris.*

en: Ephesians 5:23 and I Corinthians 11:3. — The following passage is Genesis 3:16: *You shall be under the power of [your] husband.*

la: Dub. praeced. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1.

en: The preceding doubt. — The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3; Richard of Middleton, here a. 5, q. 1.

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, chapter 4 [of the Master's text].

la: Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 7. (c. 8.). Cfr. ibid. c. 24. (c. 30.), ubi ostendit, rerum fortuitarum non esse scientiam: VI. Metaph. text. 5. seq. et XI. c. 7. (V. c. 2. et X. c. 8.). — Superius pro *disciplinarum* cod. F *disciplinales* [i. e. scientificae].

en: According to Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 7 (c. 8). Cf. ibid. c. 24 (c. 30), where he shows that there is no science of fortuitous things: *Metaphysics* VI, text 5 f. and XI, c. 7 (V, c. 2 and X, c. 8). — Above, for *disciplinarum* ("of the disciplines") codex F [reads] *disciplinales* [i.e. scientific].

la: Ut dicit Iustinian., supra pag. 683, nota 1. allegatus, et C. *De illis, qui in minori* (9.), X. de Desponsat. impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.). — Mox post *sicut si* multi codd. perperam addunt *non*, cod. A *homo*. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1, ubi etiam in scholio allegantur alii auctores, qui de hoc tractant.

en: As Justinian says, cited above p. 683, note 1, and C. *De illis, qui in minori* (9), X, On the Betrothal of the under-age (book IV, title 2). — Presently, after *sicut si* ("just as if"), many codices wrongly add *non* ("not"); codex A [reads] *homo* ("man"). — On this doubt cf. above, a. 2, q. 1, where in the scholion other authors are also cited who treat of this. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF bands for printed pp. 799–800 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{799,800}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, right columns regenerated at split_x=1780), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative for the cascade-shattered two-column OCR). Raw OCR range L85587–85792 used as a cross-check. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (819, 820), verified against the running heads "DIST. XXXVI. DUBIA. 799" and "800 SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."
- **Dubia count: 5** (Dub. I–V), all present and complete. Dub. I–III are on p.799; Dub. IV–V on p.800. Each has its own Respondeo (Dub. III has two — one for the self-sale question, one for the father-selling-offspring incidental question).
- **Seam verification (d.36 → d.37).** The final dubium (Dub. V) closes cleanly at "…et in aliis consimilibus." at the foot of p.800's dubia region (right column), immediately before the full-width heading **DISTINCTIO XXXVII. / Cap. I.** (which opens the d.37 littera, chunked separately). The last Respondeo is fully rendered; no truncation at the seam. The d.37 littera and its "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" apparatus (p.800 right-footer, nn. 1–3) are **not** part of this chunk.
- **Footer hand-offs.** No footers incoming: chunk a2-q3 (printed_pages corrected to [797, 798]) does not touch p.799, so **all** p.799 footers (nn. 1–8) and **all** p.800 dubia footers (nn. 1–6) are claimed here. p.799: nn. 1–4 in the left footer column (Dub. I–II), nn. 5–8 in the right footer column (Dub. II–III). p.800: nn. 1–6 all in the left footer column (Dub. IV–V); note **p800-6 (Justinian) runs across into the top of the right footer column** ("(lib. IV. tit. 2.)… tractant."). Forwarded to d.37: the p.800 right-footer NOTAE nn. 1–3 (Leo Papa / Carthaginensi Concilio / Epist. 167) plus the two Leo-Papa/Carthaginensi/Synod anchors in the d.37 Cap. I littera.
- **Apparatus: 14 entries** — p.799: 8 (nn. 1–8); p.800: 6 (nn. 1–6).
- **Marginalia trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses printed in the outer margins (*Distinctio.*, *Casus 2.*, *Ad quaest. incid.*, *Quaest. incid. solvitur.*, *Quaestio incidens.*, the *Nota…* note by Dub. V, and abbreviated *sp.* labels) are not Bonaventure's text and are omitted from the body per project convention.
- **`has_scholion: false`** — the Dubia carry no scholion.
- **[?] flags:** none. Minor silent OCR cleanups made where context is unambiguous (e.g. *praesumtione* kept as printed; *iniuriatur*, *abutitur*, *contumeliam*, *Nehemiae* restored from garbled bands). One low-risk reading: p800-6 cross-reference "supra pag. **683**" follows the ABBYY raw OCR (the 450 dpi band digit is slightly ambiguous 653/683); accepted, not flagged.

- **[?] REOPENED 2026-07-18 — `p800-6` cross-reference digit, 683 vs 653.** This chunk's writer read **683** from the ABBYY OCR, noting the 450 dpi band digit was "slightly ambiguous 653/683", and accepted it. During the d.37 littera truncation repair (same printed page, band regenerated at `split_x=2120`) a second reader reported **653** as legible. Rendered text left as **683** — not flipped on a single passing read by an agent whose task was elsewhere. Content test is inconclusive: the note reads *Ut dicit Iustinian., supra pag. NNN, nota 1*, but the only Iustinianus citation in the raw anywhere near either candidate sits on printed p.576 (raw L63198), so neither 653 nor 683 is corroborated by a matching *nota 1*. **Resolve at 600 dpi.**