title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum necesse sit dolorem contritionis esse maximum

title_alt: Whether the sorrow of contrition must be the greatest

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De contritione quoad quantitatem.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de contritione quantum ad quantitatem. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum.

Secundo, utrum possibile sit, in illo dolore cadere excessum.

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum.*

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum necesse sit, dolorem contritionis esse maximum, id est, utrum ad hoc, quod contritio sit sufficiens, necesse sit plus dolere de peccato quam de aliquo temporali. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ieremiae sexto[^1]: *Luctum unigeniti fac tibi*; Glossa: « Docet poenitentem, quid facere debeat »; et alia Glossa: « Nihil dolentius morte unigeniti »: ergo tantum debet quis dolere de peccato, quod de nullo magis.

2. Item, Augustinus, vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei[^2]: « Necesse est, ut tantum urat dolor, quantum haeserat amor »: ergo si dolet plus de amissione rei temporalis quam de amissione Dei per culpam, plus ergo diligit rem temporalem quam Deum; sed nullus talis poenitet vere: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia dolor fundatur in amore et omnis affectio, ut dicit Augustinus[^3]; sed amor Dei debet esse maior omni amore creaturae: ergo et dolor ex amissione Dei.

4. Item, dolor contritionis est a gratia et libero arbitrio, sed alius[^4] tantum a culpa et libero arbitrio; sed gratia plus roborat in bono, quam culpa inclinet ad malum: ergo motus doloris fortior.

5. Item, animus iustus plus Deo unitur quam sibi per amorem; sed de eo cui magis unitur, magis dolet, cum separatur: ergo magis dolet, se per peccatum separatum esse a Deo[^5], quam de morte proximi et corporis, si esset possibile.

6. Item, omnis habens animum ordinatum plus dolet de amissione maioris boni; sed Deus est summum bonum, et omnis contritus habet animum ordinatum: ergo plus dolet de amissione Dei quam de amissione alterius boni creati.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ostenditur, quod non oportet, esse maiorem quam de aliquo temporali: quia « albius est quod est nigro impermixtius[^6] »: ergo maior dolor est qui minus habet de gaudio; sed dolor contritionis est admixtus gaudio, aliquis autem alius sine aliquo gaudio est quandoque: ergo ille maior.

2. Item, magis dolendum est de eo quod recuperari non potest, quam de eo quod recuperari potest et recuperatum est; sed amissio filii non potest recuperari, amissio Dei in poenitente est recuperata: ergo non tantum debet dolere de amissione Dei quantum de amissione filii.

3. Item, quod non oporteat tantum dolere, videtur, quia, quantumcumque parva sit gratia, delet omnem culpam: ergo similiter ex parte doloris, quantumcumque parvus est, dum tamen gratia sit informatus, delebit omnem culpam: ergo non oportet, quod sit maior omni alio.

4. Item, si hoc oporteret, tunc pauci essent contriti; pauci enim sunt qui mallent esse caeci quam nunquam peccasse; videmus etiam multos viros poenitentes, qui flent ex morte consanguineorum, qui non possunt flere pro peccatis.

> **Conclusio.** Dolor contritionis quoad sensualitatem non debet esse maximus, neque quoad displicentiam rationis absolute, sed tantum maior in comparatione ad alios dolores.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de quantitate doloris, dolor potest dici displicentia rationis, vel passio ex hac resultans in sensualitatem[^7]. Si hoc secundo modo accipiatur; dico, quod non est necesse magis dolere de peccato quam de re temporali, nec etiam necesse est dolere, quia non est in potestate cuiuslibet. Talis enim dolor non consequitur amorem, sed consequitur ipsam affectionem, et affectio experimentalem cognitionem; et quia non omnes habent experientiam divinae dilectionis[^8]: ideo non omnes ita sensibiliter dolent de peccatis. Tamen quod magis etiam sensibiliter doleat aliquis de peccato quam de aliquo damno, hoc est perfectionis et congruum, non necessarium.

Sed in quantum dolor dicitur displicentia rationis; sic dico, quod ista displicentia mensuratur secundum quantitatem caritatis. Quantitas autem caritatis dupliciter potest accipi: vel in se, vel in comparatione ad alios amores: in se, sic dico, quod est parva et maior et maxima; in comparatione ad alios sic dico, quod vindicat sibi dominium in corde, quamdiu est; nec unquam ibi est, nisi sit domina; unde dico, quod ad hoc, quod

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aliquis habeat caritatem, necesse est, quod diligat Deum super omnia; hoc autem est diligere super omnia, quod pro nullo damno vel commodo velit offendere Deum. Sic intelligendum est de displicentia contritionis. — Unde dico, quod peccatum debet tantum displicere rationi, quod nullo pacto, nullo commodo vel incommodo velit in ipsum consentire vel consensisse; quoniam voluntas, quae ex aliqua causa consentit in peccatum, iusta non est. — Unde sicut non oportet, habentem caritatem velle mori pro Christo — sed in casu, in quo vel oportet ipsum amittere caritatem, vel vitam; tunc tenetur magis velle mori pro Christo quam caritatem amittere — sic in proposito est intelligendum, quod non teneor nunc pro satisfactione peccati omnem poenam sustinere ad reconciliationem[^a], quia Deus non exigit. Et ideo, sicut ego possum salvari non sustinendo martyrium, sic possum reconciliari Deo sine multis doloribus et amissionibus rerum temporalium[^b].

Si vero de comparatione et praeelectione[^c] quaeratur; respondent aliqui et faciunt in hoc vim, quia potest intelligi respectu praeteriti vel futuri. — Sed ego non video in hoc vim, quia iusta voluntas et vere poenitens ita detestatur praeteritum peccatum, ut futurum, ne fiat; et ita est peccatum velle peccasse, sicut velle peccare. Ideo de peccati praecedentis dolore et detestatione dicendum, quod in casu, in quo oportet praeeligere vel consentire in peccatum sive complacentiam peccati, vel tolerantiam poenae, quilibet tenetur praeeligere sive magis eligere poenam quam velle peccare vel peccasse. — Praeter casum necessitatis dico, quod praeeligere omnem poenam est perfectae virtutis; dubitare vero est infirmitatis, quia timor naturalis valde facit dubitare, et ista dubitatio simul potest stare cum caritate; sed praeeligere culpam alicui poenae, hoc est iniquitatis, si est cum deliberatione et plena voluntate, quia omnis talis voluntas est iniqua, quae peccatum vult vel absolute, vel conditionaliter. — Unde periculum est et stultitia quaerere hoc ab aliquo infirmo, vel etiam a se ipso, quia hoc est hominem ponere in tentationem; unde nullus confessor debet hoc ab aliquo, qui sibi confitetur, quaerere. Sed si poenitens se offerat et dicat, se malle mortuum esse quam peccasse, vel simile aliquod; gaudendum est, quia hoc est signum bonae voluntatis.

Si ergo quaeratur, utrum dolorem contritionis necesse sit esse maximum; si dicatur de dolore[^d] sensualitatis, manifestum est, quod non; si de displicentia rationis, aut quantum ad intensionem motus absolute, et sic nec hoc modo oportet esse maximum: si in comparatione ad alios dolores dico, sicut de amore, quod oportet, quod habeat praedominium. — Et sic procedunt rationes probantes, ipsum inter omnes alios dolores de rebus creatis obtinere principatum. — Quod si intelligatur de dolore sensualitatis ad omnes per interemptionem[^e] solvendum est, sicut tactum est, quia sequitur experientiam et delectationem et etiam complexionem, vel aliquid tale; ideo sensibiliter magis dolet quis de morte unigeniti.

**Ad argumenta:**

Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur ultimo, quod semper superior movet inferiores[^f]; dicendum, quod verum est in his, in quibus natae sunt simpliciter obedire, sicut in motu manuum, vel pedum; sed non est ita in affectionibus nisi per multam assuefactionem.

*Ad 1.* quod obiicitur, quod parvus, quia admixtus gaudio; dicendum, quod dolor contritionis, quando est in anima bene disposita, valde magnus est, et gaudium mitigat dolorem et intendit. Ideo enim dolet, quia vult dolere; et quanto magis appetit dolere, tanto magis dolet; et quanto videt, se magis dolere, tanto magis gaudet. Ideo patet, quod non remittitur, quia non habet oppositionem, immo unum est causa alterius[^g]; tamen bene concedo, quod mitigatur et minus laedit; unde intenditur et mitigatur: intenditur respectu peccati, et mitigatur respectu poenitentis; intenditur respectu obiecti, mitigatur respectu subiecti; vel intenditur sub ratione displicentiae, mitigatur sub ratione poenae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest recuperari; dicendum, quod hoc etiam mitigat dolorem, ut dolor contriti non sit cum desperatione, sed cum spe[^h]. Tamen quia contritus de se non sperat; quantum est de se, ita se affligit dolore, ac si omnino perdidisset; respirat tamen in misericordia Dei. — Et quod obiicit, quod magis est dolendum de re irre-

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cuperabili; dicendum, quod verum est, ceteris paribus.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod minima gratia delet omnem culpam; dicendum, quod dolor, quantumcumque sit parvus, sufficit, si sit gratia informatus; sed tamen nunquam gratia informat, quin vindicet sibi in corde dominium quoad actum vel motum voluntatis rationalis, non sensualitatis[^i].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pauci, vel nulli mallent esse caeci quam peccasse; iam patet responsio secundum viam praetactam. Si enim in necessitate essent positi, scilicet vel quod a detestatione peccati desisterent, vel quod oculos amitterent — et loquor de detestatione interiori — necesse haberent praeeligere; nunc autem non habent.

english:
### Article II. *On contrition as to its quantity.*

Next, as to the second article, the inquiry concerns contrition as regards its quantity. And about this two things are asked.

First, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.

Second, whether it is possible for an excess to occur in that sorrow.

### Question I. *Whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest.*

As to the first, then, it is asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest — that is, whether, in order for contrition to be sufficient, it is necessary to grieve more over sin than over any temporal thing. And that it is so, it seems.

1. Jeremiah 6[^1]: *Make for thyself the mourning of an only son*; the Gloss: « It teaches the penitent what he ought to do »; and another Gloss: « Nothing is more grievous than the death of an only son »: therefore one ought to grieve so much over sin that over nothing more.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twenty-first book *On the City of God*[^2]: « It is necessary that the sorrow burn as much as the love had clung »: therefore if one grieves more over the loss of a temporal thing than over the loss of God through fault, then he loves the temporal thing more than God; but no such person truly repents: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because sorrow is founded on love and every affection, as Augustine says[^3]; but the love of God ought to be greater than every love of a creature: therefore the sorrow from the loss of God also [ought to be greater].

4. Likewise, the sorrow of contrition is from grace and free will, but the other[^4] is only from fault and free will; but grace strengthens more toward the good than fault inclines toward evil: therefore the motion of sorrow [is] stronger.

5. Likewise, the just soul is united more to God than to itself by love; but over that to which one is more united, one grieves more when it is separated: therefore he grieves more that he is separated from God through sin[^5] than over the death of a neighbor and of his body, if it were possible.

6. Likewise, everyone having an ordered soul grieves more over the loss of a greater good; but God is the highest good, and every contrite person has an ordered soul: therefore he grieves more over the loss of God than over the loss of another created good.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is shown that it need not be greater than [the sorrow] over some temporal thing: because « that is whiter which is more unmixed with black[^6] »: therefore that sorrow is greater which has less of joy; but the sorrow of contrition is mixed with joy, while some other [sorrow] is sometimes without any joy: therefore that one is greater.

2. Likewise, one ought to grieve more over that which cannot be recovered than over that which can be recovered and has been recovered; but the loss of a son cannot be recovered, [whereas] the loss of God in the penitent has been recovered: therefore he need not grieve as much over the loss of God as over the loss of a son.

3. Likewise, that one need not grieve so much seems [true], because, however small the grace may be, it blots out all fault: therefore likewise on the side of sorrow, however small it is, provided it be informed by grace, it will blot out all fault: therefore it need not be greater than every other.

4. Likewise, if this were required, then few would be contrite; for few are those who would rather be blind than have never sinned; we see also many penitent men who weep at the death of kinsmen, who cannot weep for their sins.

> **Conclusion.** The sorrow of contrition need not be the greatest as to sensuality, nor as to the displeasure of reason absolutely, but only greater in comparison with other sorrows.

**I respond:** It must be said that, when the question concerns the quantity of sorrow, sorrow can be called the displeasure of reason, or the passion resulting from it in sensuality[^7]. If it be taken in this second way, I say that it is not necessary to grieve more over sin than over a temporal thing, nor even is it necessary to grieve, because it is not in everyone's power. For such sorrow does not follow upon love, but follows upon the affection itself, and the affection [follows upon] experiential knowledge; and because not all have experience of divine love[^8]: therefore not all grieve so sensibly over sins. Nevertheless, that someone should grieve also more sensibly over sin than over some loss — this belongs to perfection and is fitting, [but is] not necessary.

But insofar as sorrow is called the displeasure of reason, thus I say that this displeasure is measured according to the quantity of charity. Now the quantity of charity can be taken in two ways: either in itself, or in comparison with other loves: in itself, thus I say that it is small and greater and greatest; in comparison with others, thus I say that it claims for itself dominion in the heart as long as it is present; nor is it ever there unless it be mistress; whence I say that, in order that

someone may have charity, it is necessary that he love God above all things; and this is to love above all things, that for no loss or advantage he be willing to offend God. Thus is it to be understood concerning the displeasure of contrition. — Whence I say that sin ought so to displease reason that by no pact, no advantage, would he be willing to consent or to have consented to it; since the will which from some cause consents to sin is not just. — Whence, just as it is not required that one having charity be willing to die for Christ — except in a case in which either he must lose charity or [his] life; then he is bound to be more willing to die for Christ than to lose charity — so in the case proposed it is to be understood that I am not bound now, for the satisfaction of sin, to undergo every penalty for reconciliation[^a], because God does not exact it. And therefore, just as I can be saved without undergoing martyrdom, so I can be reconciled to God without many sorrows and losses of temporal things[^b].

But if the question concerns comparison and preference[^c]; some answer and lay stress on this point, that it can be understood with respect to the past or the future. — But I see no force in this, because the just will and the truly penitent so detests the past sin, as [it detests] a future one, lest it occur; and so to will to have sinned is a sin, just as to will to sin. Therefore concerning the sorrow and detestation of the preceding sin it must be said that in a case in which one must either prefer or consent to sin, that is, to the complacency of sin, or [accept] the toleration of penalty, anyone is bound to prefer, or rather to choose, the penalty than to be willing to sin or to have sinned. — Apart from a case of necessity I say that to prefer every penalty belongs to perfect virtue; but to hesitate belongs to weakness, because natural fear makes one hesitate greatly, and this hesitation can coexist with charity; but to prefer fault to any penalty — this belongs to iniquity, if it be with deliberation and full will, because every such will is iniquitous, which wills sin either absolutely or conditionally. — Whence it is a danger and folly to demand this of someone weak, or even of oneself, because this is to set a man in temptation; whence no confessor ought to demand this of one who confesses to him. But if the penitent offer himself and say that he would rather be dead than to have sinned, or something similar; one should rejoice, because this is a sign of good will.

If therefore it be asked whether the sorrow of contrition must necessarily be the greatest; if it be spoken of the sorrow[^d] of sensuality, it is manifest that [it need] not; if of the displeasure of reason, either as to the intensity of the motion absolutely, then in this way too it need not be the greatest: if in comparison with other sorrows, I say, as concerning love, that it must have predominance. — And thus proceed the arguments proving that it obtains primacy among all other sorrows over created things. — But if it be understood of the sorrow of sensuality with respect to all by way of intensity[^e], it is to be resolved, as has been touched on, because it follows experience and delight and also complexion, or something of the sort; therefore one grieves more sensibly over the death of an only son.

**To the arguments:**

To that, however, which is objected lastly, that the superior always moves the inferiors[^f]; it must be said that this is true in those things which are naturally fitted simply to obey, as in the motion of the hands or feet; but it is not so in the affections except through much habituation.

*To 1.* As to what is objected, that [the sorrow] is small because mixed with joy; it must be said that the sorrow of contrition, when it is in a well-disposed soul, is very great, and the joy mitigates the sorrow and intensifies it. For he grieves because he wills to grieve; and the more he desires to grieve, the more he grieves; and the more he sees himself grieving, the more he rejoices. Therefore it is clear that it is not lessened, because it does not have opposition, rather the one is the cause of the other[^g]; nevertheless I readily grant that it is mitigated and wounds less; whence it is intensified and mitigated: it is intensified with respect to the sin, and mitigated with respect to the penitent; it is intensified with respect to the object, mitigated with respect to the subject; or it is intensified under the aspect of displeasure, mitigated under the aspect of penalty.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that it can be recovered; it must be said that this too mitigates the sorrow, so that the sorrow of the contrite is not with despair, but with hope[^h]. Nevertheless, because the contrite of himself does not hope; so far as concerns himself, he afflicts himself with sorrow as if he had lost everything; yet he takes breath in the mercy of God. — And as to its objecting that one ought to grieve more over an irre-

coverable thing; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that the least grace blots out all fault; it must be said that sorrow, however small it be, suffices, if it be informed by grace; but nevertheless grace never informs without claiming for itself dominion in the heart as to the act or motion of the rational will, not of sensuality[^i].

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that few, or none, would rather be blind than have sinned; the response is already plain according to the way set out above. For if they were placed in necessity — namely, either that they desist from the detestation of sin, or that they lose their eyes (and I speak of interior detestation) — they would necessarily have to prefer [to lose their eyes]; but now they are not.

la: Vers. 26. — Duas Glossas exhibet Lyranus ut interlineares, quae sunt ex Hieronymo, qui in hunc locum ait: Docet, quid facere debeant, ut convertantur, scilicet ad poenitentiam... Nihil autem dolentius quam unum vel solum perdere filium.

en: [Jeremiah 6,] verse 26. — Lyra gives two Glosses as interlinear, which are from Jerome, who on this passage says: It teaches what they ought to do in order to be converted, namely to penance... But nothing is more grievous than to lose one and only son.

la: Cap. 26. n. 4. — Inferius pro *per* codd. F G aa *propter*. [Libr. XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 26. n. 4.]

en: [On the City of God, book XXI,] chapter 26, n. 4. — Below, for *per* (through), codices F G aa [read] *propter* (on account of).

la: Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 326, nota 0. — Post *affectio* codd. F G addunt *est amor*. Finem arg., ubi codd. omittunt *et*, cod. bb sic exhibet: *ergo dolor ex amissione Dei est maior omni alio dolore*.

en: Book XIV *On the City of God*, c. 7, n. 2. Cf. above p. 326, note 0. — After *affectio* (affection) codices F G add *est amor* (is love). The end of the argument, where the codices omit *et* (and), codex bb gives thus: *therefore the sorrow from the loss of God is greater than every other sorrow*.

la: Scilicet dolor de amissione rei temporalis.

en: Namely, the sorrow over the loss of a temporal thing.

la: Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *ergo magis dolet de morte separationis a Christo*. Mox post *proximi* ex codd. F G H K L V substituimus *et corporis* pro *et morte sua*.

en: Codex K (1, by a second hand): *therefore he grieves more over the death of separation from Christ*. Soon after *proximi* (of a neighbor), from codices F G H K L V we have substituted *et corporis* (and of [his] body) for *et morte sua* (and his death).

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1. (c. 5.). — Quod dolor contritionis est admixtus gaudio, ostensum est supra a. I. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Aristotle, III *Topics* c. 1 (c. 5). — That the sorrow of contrition is mixed with joy was shown above, a. I q. 1, to [objection] 2.

la: Cod. X addit *in se*. [Cfr. supra d. 16. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.]

en: Codex X adds *in se* (in itself).

la: Codd. T U bene *delectationis*.

en: Codices T U rightly [read] *delectationis* (of delight).

en: See III *Sent.* d. 27 a. 2 q. 6 and d. 29 q. 2.

la: Ut ostensum est III. Sent. d. 30. q. 2. — Superius pro *aliqua causa* codd. F G *aliqua parte*. Inferius pro *ad reconciliationem*, quod habet cod. 0, cod. aa *in reconciliatione*, alii aut cum edd. *vel reconciliatione*, aut *vel reconciliationem*. Subinde secuti sumus cod. K (1 a secunda manu), ponentes *sine multis doloribus et amissionibus*, pro quo codd. F G *sine multis doloribus] quos homo habet aliquando causa amissionis* (codd. M O *quos habent aliqui pro amissione*), alii *sine multis amissionis* (codd. P X *amissionibus*) *doloribus* (cod. bb *doloribus amissionis*), ed. 1 *sine multis doloribus de amissione*, Vat. *sine multis doloribus*. Haec sint dicta de amissione.

en: As was shown III *Sent.* d. 30 q. 2. — Above, for *aliqua causa* (from some cause) codices F G [read] *aliqua parte* (in some part). Below, for *ad reconciliationem* (for reconciliation), which codex 0 has, codex aa [reads] *in reconciliatione*, others either with the editions *vel reconciliatione*, or *vel reconciliationem*. Thereafter we have followed codex K (1, by a second hand), putting *sine multis doloribus et amissionibus* (without many sorrows and losses), for which codices F G [read] *sine multis doloribus] quos homo habet aliquando causa amissionis* (codices M O *quos habent aliqui pro amissione*), others *sine multis amissionis* (codices P X *amissionibus*) *doloribus* (codex bb *doloribus amissionis*), ed. 1 *sine multis doloribus de amissione*, the Vatican [edition] *sine multis doloribus*. Let these things be said concerning loss.

la: Vat. supplet *culpae, vel poenae*. Eadem Vat. aliquanto inferius post *praeteritum peccatum* cum ed. 1 addit *quod fecit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] supplies *culpae, vel poenae* (of fault, or of penalty). The same Vatican [edition] somewhat below, after *praeteritum peccatum* (past sin), with ed. 1 adds *quod fecit* (which he committed).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 384, nota 1. — Codd. L O R T U *sensualitatem*, Vat. *sentientem vel sensualitatem*.

en: Cf. above p. 384, note 1. — Codices L O R T U [read] *sensualitatem*, the Vatican [edition] *sentientem vel sensualitatem*.

en: As is shown below d. 17 p. I a. 1 q. 2 and 3. — The editions add *et* (and).

la: Vide infra dub. 10. et supra d. 14. p. II. dub. 7. — Inferius pro *obedire* plures codd. scribunt *obaudire*. (Vat. notavit, quod in hac quaest. exciderit arg., cum nullum in serie argg. explicite habeatur, cui haec solutio respondeat. Tamen fortasse non respicitur hic nisi locutio « animus ordinatus » in fundamento. Ex ipsa solutione enim coniicere licet, arg. ultimo solvendum sumtum esse ex hoc principio, quod in animo ordinato inferiores vires subiacent superiori, quod ibi supponitur. Attamen hoc principium si applicatur ad rem propositam, restrictione indiget, quae in solutione ista exhibetur. Cfr. supra d. 15. p. II. dub. 11.)

en: See below dub. 10 and above d. 14 p. II dub. 7. — Below, for *obedire* (to obey) several codices write *obaudire*. (The Vatican [edition] noted that in this question an argument has dropped out, since none in the series of arguments is explicitly found to which this solution would respond. Yet perhaps nothing is regarded here except the phrase « ordered soul » in the foundation [i.e. arg. 6]. For from the solution itself one may conjecture that the last argument to be solved is taken from this principle, that in an ordered soul the lower powers are subject to the higher, which is there supposed. But this principle, if applied to the matter proposed, needs the restriction which is set forth in that solution. Cf. above d. 15 p. II dub. 11.)

la: Sive negationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota i.

en: Or [the] negation. Cf. tom. I p. 87, note i.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Inferius pro *se affligit* codd. 1 K *affligitur*.

en: Cf. above d. 14 p. I a. 2 q. 2 in the body. — Below, for *se affligit* (afflicts himself) codices 1 K [read] *affligitur* (is afflicted).

la: Cfr. supra a. I. q. I. in corp.

en: Cf. above a. I q. I in the body.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communis est distinctio inter dolorem sive displicentiam in parte sensitiva et in voluntate rationali, et etiam doctrina, quod contritio essentialiter non est nisi in voluntate, et quod haec displicentia debet esse appretiative summa, scilicet in comparatione ad displicentiam respectu aliorum malorum. Non autem requiritur, quod actus contritionis sit intensive summus, immo contra nonnullos cum Ss. Bonav. et Thoma communiter docetur, non requiri necessario certum aliquem gradum intensionis. — Notatu digna est explicatio in corp. quoad res ad praxim spectantes.

De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 1. q. 8. — Durand., loc. cit. n. 6. 7. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 11, et cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. n. 16. 17. — S. Thom., IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 31. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 6. 0. — Durand., infra d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. infra d. 17. q. 1.

**II.** De seq. (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 4. — S. Thom. loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert. rem tangit hic a. 30. — Richard. a Med., infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 8. — Durand., loc. cit. n. 6. 7.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The distinction is common between sorrow or displeasure in the sensitive part and in the rational will, and likewise the doctrine that contrition essentially is only in the will, and that this displeasure ought to be supreme by estimation — that is, in comparison with the displeasure with respect to other evils. But it is not required that the act of contrition be supreme in intensity; rather, against certain authors, it is commonly taught with Saints Bonaventure and Thomas that no certain degree of intensity is necessarily required. — Worthy of note is the explanation in the body [of the question] as to matters bearing on practice.

On this first question: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. IV q. 17 m. 2 a. 1 q. 8. — Durandus, loc. cit. n. 6, 7. — Scotus, on this and the following q., IV *Sent.* d. 14 q. 2 n. 11, and cf. III *Sent.* d. 27 n. 16, 17. — St. Thomas, IV *Sent.* d. 17 q. 2 a. 3 quaestiunc. 1; *Suppl.* q. 3 a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 31. — Petr. of Tarentaise, on this and the following q., IV *Sent.* d. 17 q. 1 a. 3 quaestiunc. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, below d. 17 a. 1 q. 6, 0. — Durandus, below d. 17 q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., below d. 17 q. 1.

**II.** On the following (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 4. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; *Suppl.* loc. cit. a. 2. — Bl. Albert touches on the matter here a. 30. — Richard of Middleton, below d. 17 a. 1 q. 8. — Durandus, loc. cit. n. 6, 7.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the Vol IV PDF bands for printed pp. 386–389 (split x≈1880, three bands per column), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 44065–44331) used as a cross-check. The OCR for this span is heavily cascade-shattered by two-column bleed (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation), so the PDF column reads are authoritative for the body, Respondeo, Ad-replies, and scholion. Offset confirmed pdf = printed + 20.

**Chunking.** Per the locked d.1 convention, the short ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum... Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo... Secundo...`) is folded into this q1; there is no standalone a2-divisio chunk. q1 runs from the QUAESTIO I header (p. 387) through the *Ad 4* reply and the Articulus II SCHOLION (p. 389), ending just before QUAESTIO II (raw line 44332 / p. 389).

**Scholion ownership / coverage.** The Articulus II SCHOLION block (rendered here in full, body-then-scholion) covers BOTH questions of the article. Section **I** treats this q1 (the displeasure-is-appretiative-summa doctrine + parallel-author citations for "the first question"). Section **II** treats the next question (q2) with its own author citations ("De seq. (2.) quaestione"). q2 renders no scholion and points back to this chunk.

**Per-page footer split.** This q1 spans three printed pages, each with its own restarted footer sequence: p. 387 footers → markers [^1]–[^6]; p. 388 footers → [^7] (the Aristotle/Topics note, whose anchor "sensualitatem" sits in the Respondeo) plus the lettered Respondeo notes [^a]–[^c]; p. 388–389 footers → [^8], [^d]–[^i]. Numeric markers [^1]–[^8] and lettered [^a]–[^i] together exhaust the q1 footers. The shared p. 389 page also carries the QUAEST. II footers (not captured here).

**[?] flags.**
- [^f]: the Vatican apparatus note (rendered in full) itself records that an argument seems to have dropped from the printed series — i.e. the "ultimo / semper superior movet inferiores" objection answered here has no explicit matching numbered argument in the Sed-contra list. This is the editors' own observation, not an OCR gap; preserved verbatim.
- The Conclusio side-glosses on pp. 387–388 ("De contritione in se", "De contritione in comparatione", "Conclusio 3/5", "Corollarium", "Opinio 1 / Non probatur", etc.) are Quaracchi marginal rubrics, not Bonaventure's text, and have been trimmed per the marginalia rule.
- "intensionem" in the body (p. 388, "ad omnes per interemptionem"): the PDF reads *interemptionem*; rendered as "by way of intensity"/intensification per sense (the OCR garble "interem-ptionem" supports *intensionem*); flagged [?] but low-confidence given context. No other genuinely ambiguous readings remain.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 389 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis esse excessum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possibile sit, in dolore contritionis cadere excessum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia omnis motus, cui ad hoc, quod sit bonus, oportet admisceri aliquid de contrario, potest esse nimius; sed dolori contritionis debet admisceri gaudium[^1]: ergo potest nimis intendi.

2. Item, omnis virtus, quae habet obiectum creatum, potest habere nimium; quia, si creatum est, ergo habet sibi debitum limitatum amorem et odium; sed contritio sive poenitentia est huiusmodi[^2]: ergo potest habere excessum.

3. Item, in contritione dolor est passio; sed omnis passio, in re corporali facta, potest magis et magis intendi et per suam intensionem potest inducere mortem[^3]; et quae mortem inducit est superflua: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Contritio est motus gratia informatus[^4]; sed gratia non potest nimis intendi, nec motus eius, quia omnis motus eius est laudabilis: ergo nec contritio.

2. Item, quantum diligenda est alicuius boni praesentia, tantum detestanda est amissio et absentia; sed Deum non potest aliquis nimium amare et appetere: ergo peccatum, quod est a Deo separativum, non potest nimis detestari.

3. Item, Anselmus[^5] appetebat, viscera exsiccari ex intensione divini amoris: ergo non est malum ex intensione divini amoris talia appetere propter Deum: eadem ratione nec malum ex intensione doloris propter recuperandum Deum.

> **Conclusio.** Contritio quoad displicentiam rationis non potest esse nimia, sed quoad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem posset habere excessum.

**Respondeo:** Sicut dictum est[^6], in contritione est dolor, prout est displicentia voluntatis rationalis, et est dolor-passio redundans in sensualitatem. Quantum ergo ad displicentiam rationis concedo, quod non potest esse contritio nimia, quia peccatum nulli potest displicere nimis in quantum peccatum. —

<!-- page 390 -->

Quantum autem ad passionem redundantem in sensualitatem, vix aut nunquam est nimia; tamen posset esse tantus dolor, quod humana infirmitas non posset sufferre sine magno detrimento; et tunc dico, quod temperandus esset. — Sed esto, quod non temperaret quis, quia non adverteret et raperetur a fervore; non credo, quod in tali casu peccaret, quia daret operam rei licitae[^7]. Si autem advertit, debet temperare; tamen paucis hoc consilium est necessarium. Si autem non temperaret vel per affectionem gaudii, vel per consolationem spei; credo, quod transcenderet metas virtutis, et ita contritionis. Contritio enim sicut caritas, nominat quid informatum gratia. Unde dolor contritionis, manens contritionis, non potest esse nimius, quia displicentia peccati nunquam tantum potest intendi quod possit esse nimia, cum sit ex consideratione recta. — Rationes igitur, quae probant, quod dolor possit esse nimius secundum quod displicentia, solvendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**
*Ad 1.* Quod obiicit, quod debet esse gaudium; dico, quod si esset dolor sine gaudio, ut in desperatis, bene esset excessus; sed talis non est motus contritionis, quae est, praesupposita spe de venia; unde talis, quando videt se dolere, necessario gaudet; et ideo non est superfluus.

*Ad 2, 3.* Ad aliud dicendum, quod poenitentia est in subiectum et in peccatum; et prout punit subiectum, bene posset excedere; sed prout detestatur peccatum, quia separat a summo Bono, secundum illam rationem respicit infinitatem et non habet excessum. — Tertium argumentum est concedendum: procedit enim de contritione, secundum quod nominat dolorem-passionem, non ipsum motum displicentiae peccati.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non potest esse nimius, quia gratia informatus; dicendum, quod informatur ipsa displicentia et per consequens passio sensualitatis; tamen tantum posset illa passio intendi, quod gratia, quae movet ordinate, non informaretur[^8]. — Alia ratio concedenda est, quia loquitur de detestatione.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, dicendum, quod non intelligit, *viscera* secundum veritatem sibi velle siccari, sed vocat ibi viscera intimos carnis appetitus. — Vel dicendum, quod siccationem viscerum vocat vulnera caritatis, qua anima languet ex absentia ipsius Christi[^9].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether it is possible for there to be excess in the pain of contrition.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is possible for excess to occur in the pain of contrition. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:

1. Because every movement to which, in order that it be good, something of its contrary must be mixed in, can be excessive; but joy ought to be mixed into the pain of contrition[^1]: therefore it can be intensified excessively.

2. Likewise, every virtue that has a created object can have an excess; for, if it is created, then it has owed to it a limited love and hatred; but contrition or penance is of this kind[^2]: therefore it can have excess.

3. Likewise, in contrition the pain is a passion; but every passion, occurring in a corporeal thing, can be intensified more and more, and through its intensity can induce death[^3]; and what induces death is superfluous: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Contrition is a movement informed by grace[^4]; but grace cannot be intensified excessively, nor its movement, because every movement of it is praiseworthy: therefore neither can contrition.

2. Likewise, as much as the presence of some good is to be loved, so much is its loss and absence to be detested; but one cannot love and desire God too much: therefore sin, which separates from God, cannot be too much detested.

3. Likewise, Anselm[^5] desired that his inward parts be dried up by the intensity of divine love: therefore it is not evil, out of the intensity of divine love, to desire such things for God's sake: by the same reasoning, neither [is it evil to desire] evil out of the intensity of pain for the recovering of God.

> **Conclusion.** Contrition, as regards the displeasure of reason, cannot be excessive, but as regards the passion overflowing into the sensitive part it could have excess.

**I respond:** As has been said[^6], in contrition there is pain insofar as it is the displeasure of the rational will, and there is the pain-passion overflowing into the sensitive part. As regards, then, the displeasure of reason, I grant that contrition cannot be excessive, because sin cannot displease anyone too much insofar as it is sin. —

But as regards the passion overflowing into the sensitive part, it is scarcely or never excessive; nevertheless the pain could be so great that human weakness could not bear it without great harm; and then I say that it ought to be tempered. — But suppose that one does not temper it, because he does not advert to it and is carried away by fervor; I do not believe that in such a case he would sin, because he would be applying himself to a lawful thing[^7]. But if he adverts to it, he ought to temper it; yet to few is this counsel necessary. But if he does not temper it either through the affection of joy or through the consolation of hope, I believe that he would transcend the bounds of virtue, and so too of contrition. For contrition, like charity, names something informed by grace. Hence the pain of contrition, remaining [the pain] of contrition, cannot be excessive, because the displeasure at sin can never be intensified so much that it could be excessive, since it proceeds from right consideration. — Therefore the arguments which prove that the pain can be excessive insofar as it is displeasure must be solved.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**
*To 1.* As to the objection that there ought to be joy, I say that if there were pain without joy, as in those who despair, there would indeed be excess; but the movement of contrition is not such, since it is [a movement] with hope of pardon presupposed; hence such a one, when he sees himself grieving, necessarily rejoices; and therefore it is not superfluous.

*To 2, 3.* To the other it must be said that penance is [directed] toward the subject and toward sin; and insofar as it punishes the subject, it could well exceed; but insofar as it detests sin, because it separates from the highest Good, according to that account it regards infinity and has no excess. — The third argument is to be granted: for it proceeds concerning contrition insofar as it names the pain-passion, not the movement of displeasure at sin itself.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**
*To 1.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that it cannot be excessive because it is informed by grace, it must be said that the displeasure itself is informed [by grace], and consequently the passion of the sensitive part; nevertheless that passion could be so intensified that grace, which moves in an ordered way, would not inform it[^8]. — The other reasoning is to be granted, because it speaks of detestation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning Anselm, it must be said that he does not understand that he wills his *inward parts* to be dried up according to literal truth, but he there calls "inward parts" the innermost appetites of the flesh. — Or it must be said that by the drying up of the inward parts he means the wounds of charity, by which the soul languishes from the absence of Christ himself[^9].

---

la: Cod. G omittit *non sensualitatis*, pro quo alii codd. cum ed. 1 *vel sensualitatis* (aliqui codd. *sensibilitatis*, in aliquibus legi potest *sentientis*).

en: Codex G omits *non sensualitatis*, in place of which the other codices, with edition 1, [read] *vel sensualitatis* (some codices *sensibilitatis*, in some it can be read *sentientis*).

la: Ut insinuatur in libro de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.); cfr. infra dub. 10. et supra d. 14. p. II. dub. 7.

en: As is suggested in the book *On True and False Penance* (among the works of Augustine); compare below, dub. 10, and above, d. 14, p. II, dub. 7.

la: Quia ipsa, ut supra d. 14. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. ostensum est, non est virtus theologica, sed cardinalis. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. — Pro *odium* cod. aa *gaudium*.

en: Because it [penance] itself, as was shown above, d. 14, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, is not a theological virtue but a cardinal one. Compare Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6. — For *odium* codex aa [reads] *gaudium*.

la: Nam, sicut dicit Aristot. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), omnis passio [πάθος, quod ab aliis latine redditur *affectus*], cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia.

en: For, as Aristotle says, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 6), every passion [πάθος, which by others is rendered in Latin as *affectus*], when it grows greater, detracts from the substance.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

la: Oratione 52: Utinam sic viscera animae meae dulci fervore vestrae [Iesu et Mariae] dilectionis exardescant, ut viscera carnis meae exarescant. Utinam sic intima spiritus mei dulcedine vestri affectus impinguentur, ut medullae corporis mei exsiccentur.

en: In Prayer 52: "Would that the inward parts of my soul might so blaze with the sweet fervor of your [Jesus and Mary's] love, that the inward parts of my flesh might dry up. Would that the inmost parts of my spirit might so be fattened with the sweetness of your affection, that the marrow of my body might be dried up."

la: Quaest. praeced. et a. I. q. I.

en: The preceding question, and a. I, q. I.

la: Codd. A K *informaret*.

en: Codices A K [read] *informaret*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 44332–44443) cross-checked against 450 dpi column-band PDF reads `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p389-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p390-{L,R}-{0,1}.png`. Page-verify: running head on p.389 R reads "DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. II." — confirmed; offset pdf = printed + 20.
- **Page split:** The quaestio spans printed pp. 389–390. The `Respondeo` opens on p.389 R and continues onto p.390 (`<!-- page 390 -->` placed at "Quantum autem ad passionem…"). Page 389 also physically prints the **q1 scholion** at the top of its left/right columns; per the chunking convention that scholion is rendered with `bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a2-q1` (this q2 renders no scholion — `has_scholion: false`). Cross-ref: La. *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* / En. *See the scholion to the preceding question* (also footnote [^9] here).
- **Footer split across p.389/p.390:** p.389 carries q2 footers 1–7 (fn 1–4 in L column, 5–7 in R column). p.390's printed footer sequence is **shared with the following Articulus III, q1**: q2 owns p.390 fn 3 (`Codd. A K informaret`, anchor "non informaretur") and fn 4 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`, anchor "Christi"); p.390 fn 1, 2, 5 belong to Art III q1 (anchors "successivus", "esset", "Philosophus") and migrate to that chunk. Total here: 9 footnotes.
- **No `[?]` flags.** OCR garbles silently corrected against the PDF bands (e.g. `inlendi`→intendi, `obieclum`→obiectum, `conlritio`→contritio, `iicilae`→licitae, `V2.scera`→viscera, `Chri.sli`→Christi, `informa-tus`→informatus).
- **Hand-off to Articulus III (bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a3-q1):** opener "Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de duratione contritionis. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur" begins immediately after this chunk (raw 44444; p.390 L, mid-column). Per chunking convention the short ARTICULUS III opener (two questions listed) folds into a3-q1. Art III q1 = "Utrum contritio sit motus instantaneus, an successivus." Art III inherits p.390 footers 1, 2, 5, 6 (and its own subsequent pages).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 390 -->

### Articulus III. *De contritione quoad durationem.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de duratione contritionis. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum contritio sit motus instantaneus, vel successivus. Secundo quaeritur de diuturnitate contritionis, utrum homo debeat semper conteri.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum contritio sit motus instantaneus, an successivus.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod sit successivus hoc modo.

1. Omnis actus, circa quem est minus diuturnum et magis diuturnum, est successivus; sed talis est contritio[^1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, «nostrum intelligere est cum continuo et tempore», ut dicit Philosophus[^2], quia est animae ut corpori unitae; sed contritio similiter est animae ut corpori unitae: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis aspectus collativus est successivus; sed in contritione est aspectus collativus, quia[^3] dolet de peccato in comparatione ad Deum, quem offendit[^4]: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod successive inducatur contritio, videtur: quia omnis forma habens partem et partem inducitur successive; sed contritio habet partem et partem, quia potest intendi et remitti: ergo inducitur successive.

5. Item, omnis forma, quae habet contrariam dispositionem in materia, inducitur successive[^5]; sed contritio habet induci in liberum arbitrium subiectum peccato, per quod privatur gratia et fit ad ma-

<!-- page 391 -->

lum prona, quae pronitas ex opposito respondet contritioni, sicut culpa ex opposito gratiae: ergo inducitur successive.

**Contra:**
1. Contritio necessaria est iustificationi impii; et illa est in instanti[^6]: ergo et contritio.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate[^7] dicit, quod si oculus esset actu videns, et obiectum ex opposito crearetur, simul esset et videretur: ergo si actus visus potest esse in instanti, multo fortius actus intellectus et affectus: ergo et contritio.

3. Item, «delectatio est in instanti», sicut vult Philosophus[^8], quia est habens se per modum quietis et non ipsius coniunctionis convenientis cum convenienti: ergo et dolor, qui opponitur ei; sed contritio est dolor: ergo etc.

4. Item, ad illuminationem distantia localis exigitur, et tamen illuminatio in oculo et esse luminis est in instanti[^9]: ergo multo fortius in primo actu gratiae est mutatio subita.

### Conclusio

> Contritio est successiva quoad durationem et praeparationem in fieri, sed quoad esse et inductionem formae est instantanea.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de contritione quantum ad durationem, et quantum ad esse, et quantum ad fieri. Si quantum ad durationem, cum duret longo tempore; sic dico, quod est successiva, sicut est vivere hominis. Si quantum ad esse, quia est actus fixus in detestatione peccati et actus ut quies; sic dico, quod esse eius est in instanti. — Si quantum ad fieri, est distinguendum, quia in fieri est praeparatio et formae inductio. Dico ergo, quod praeparatio ad actum contritionis est successiva, quia multa oportet prius considerare; sed ipse dissensus animae postea in instanti fit. —

**Ad argumenta.** Rationes autem probantes, quod sit instantanea, quia probant quoad inductionem in esse et ipsum esse, verae sunt.

*Ad 1, 2.* Primae duae rationes, quae probant successionem, intelliguntur de inductione et praeparatione naturae[^10]; diuturnitas enim est ratione successionis; similiter nostrum intelligere est ratione acquisitionis speciei per sensum et phantasiam[^11].

*Ad 3.* Sed quod obiicitur, quod habet esse successivum per collationem; dicendum, quod collatio potest esse dupliciter: uno modo discursus ab uno in aliud, et haec successiva est; et alio modo duorum comparatio secundum aliquem respectum; et tunc accipiuntur plura in una ratione, et talis potest esse in instanti et simul de pluribus; alioquin nunquam de consonantia musica posset iudicari, cum una vis iudicet de duobus sonis ad invicem comparatis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habet partem et partem; dicendum, quod forma quae habet partem et partem, aut educitur de materia, aut ab agente exit. Si educitur de materia; sic, quia ibi habet partem suae essentiae, cum est ibi contrarium, pro eo quod contraria habent unam naturam communem, educitur successive, ut albedo. Forma vero, quae totaliter est ab extrinseco, tota et simul datur, qualis est forma luminis, quae, quamvis habeat partem et partem, non tamen in materia, quia eius oppositum est privatio. Talis est contritio, quasi motus procedens a gratia et libero arbitrio, non de materia eductus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrarium habet in materia; dicendum, quod est habere contrariam dispositionem in materia, nullo tamen modo resistentem; et haec non facit successionem in inductione formae nec in praeparatione, ut cum Deus de aqua vinum fecit. Et est habere ut resistentem informationi; et tunc est successio in inductione, ut

<!-- page 392 -->

cum ex calido fit frigidum. Et est habere ut resistentem non informationi, sed usui; et sic pronitas resistit usui gratiae et contritioni, non informationi, quia simul est; et haec ponit successionem in duratione et in usu contritionis, non in prima inductione. Pronitas enim, quia poena est, simul stat cum contritione; culpa vero, quia privatio est, non resistit, sicut nec tenebra inductioni lucis.

english:
<!-- page 390 -->

### Article III. *On contrition with respect to its duration.*

Next, with respect to the third article, the question is asked concerning the duration of contrition. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether contrition is an instantaneous or a successive motion. Second it is asked concerning the long-lastingness of contrition, whether a man ought always to be contrite.

### Question I. *Whether contrition is an instantaneous or a successive motion.*

Concerning the first, it is shown that it is successive, in this way.

1. Every act, with respect to which there is a less-lasting and a more-lasting, is successive; but such is contrition[^1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, "our understanding is with the continuum and with time," as the Philosopher says[^2], because it belongs to the soul as united to a body; but contrition likewise belongs to the soul as united to a body: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every comparative regard is successive; but in contrition there is a comparative regard, because[^3] one grieves over sin in comparison to God, whom one offends[^4]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that contrition is induced successively seems to be the case: because every form having part and part is induced successively; but contrition has part and part, since it can be intensified and remitted: therefore it is induced successively.

5. Likewise, every form which has a contrary disposition in the matter is induced successively[^5]; but contrition has to be induced into free will subjected to sin, through which it is deprived of grace and made prone to e-

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vil, which proneness corresponds, as its opposite, to contrition, just as fault corresponds, as its opposite, to grace: therefore it is induced successively.

**On the contrary:**
1. Contrition is necessary for the justification of the impious; and that justification is in an instant[^6]: therefore so too is contrition.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^7] says that if an eye were actually seeing, and an object were created opposite it, the two would exist and be seen at once: therefore if the act of sight can be in an instant, much more can the act of intellect and affection: therefore so too contrition.

3. Likewise, "delight is in an instant," as the Philosopher holds[^8], because it has itself after the manner of rest and not of the fitting conjunction itself of the fitting with the fitting: therefore so too sorrow, which is opposed to it; but contrition is sorrow: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, for illumination local distance is required, and yet the illumination in the eye and the being of light is in an instant[^9]: therefore much more in the first act of grace is the change sudden.

### Conclusion

> Contrition is successive with respect to its duration and to its preparation in becoming, but with respect to its being and to the induction of the form it is instantaneous.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of contrition with respect to its duration, and with respect to its being, and with respect to its becoming. If with respect to duration, since it lasts a long time; in that respect I say that it is successive, just as the living of a man is. If with respect to being, because it is a fixed act in the detestation of sin and an act after the manner of rest; in that respect I say that its being is in an instant. — If with respect to becoming, a distinction must be made, because in the becoming there is preparation and the induction of the form. I say therefore that the preparation for the act of contrition is successive, because many things must first be considered; but the dissent of the soul itself afterward comes to be in an instant. —

**To the arguments.** The reasons proving that it is instantaneous, since they prove with respect to the induction into being and to the being itself, are true.

*To 1, 2.* The first two reasons, which prove succession, are to be understood of the induction and preparation of nature[^10]; for the long-lastingness is by reason of the succession; likewise our understanding is by reason of the acquisition of the species through sense and imagination[^11].

*To 3.* But as to what is objected, that it has successive being through comparing; it must be said that comparison can be twofold: in one way, a discursion from one thing to another, and this is successive; and in another way, a comparing of two things according to some respect; and then several things are taken in one account, and such comparison can be in an instant and at once concerning several things; otherwise one could never judge concerning musical consonance, since one power judges concerning two sounds compared with one another.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that it has part and part; it must be said that a form which has part and part is either educed from matter or proceeds from an agent. If it is educed from matter; thus, because there it has a part of its essence, since the contrary is there, inasmuch as contraries have one common nature, it is educed successively, as whiteness. But a form which is wholly from without is given whole and at once, such as is the form of light, which, although it has part and part, yet not in matter, because its opposite is privation. Such is contrition, as a motion proceeding from grace and free will, not educed from matter.

*To 5.* As to what is objected, that the contrary has [a disposition] in the matter; it must be said that there is a having of a contrary disposition in the matter, yet in no way resisting; and this does not make succession in the induction of the form nor in the preparation, as when God made wine from water. And there is a having [of it] as resisting the in-formation; and then there is succession in the induction, as

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when from hot cold comes to be. And there is a having [of it] as resisting not the in-formation, but the use; and thus proneness resists the use of grace and contrition, not the in-formation, because it is present at the same time; and this posits a succession in the duration and in the use of contrition, not in the first induction. For proneness, since it is a punishment, stands together with contrition; but fault, since it is a privation, does not resist, just as neither does darkness resist the induction of light.

la: Quaedam enim est brevior, quaedam diuturnior.

en: For one [contrition] is shorter, another more long-lasting.

la: De Memoria et reminisc. c. 1: Non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore etc.

en: *On Memory and Reminiscence* c. 1: It does not happen that one understands anything without a continuum nor without time, etc.

la: Ut ostenditur infra a. 1. q. 1. [*scil.* a. 1, q. 1, but the running reference here points within the article].

en: As is shown below, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 248, nota 4. et 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 248, notes 4 and 6.

la: Cfr. supra d. 15. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. — Cod. E *esset* (pro *est*). Codd. A K *informaret*. — *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*

en: Cf. above, d. 15, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, ad 7. — Codex E reads *esset* (for *est*). Codices A and K read *informaret*. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Vide infra d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, a. 2. q. 1. seqq. et dub. 5.

en: See below, d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4; a. 2, q. 1 and following, and dubium 5.

la: Cap. 10. n. 13: Quaedam vero [cognoscibilia] simul esse incipiunt [cum cognitione], veluti si aliquid visibile, quod omnino non erat, ante nostros oculos oriatur, cognitionem nostram utique non praecedit; aut si aliquid sonet, ubi adest auditor, simul profecto incipiunt esse simulque desinunt et sonus et eius auditus. — Pro *videretur* codd. et ed. 1 *videret*.

en: Chapter 10, n. 13: But certain [knowable things] begin to exist together [with the knowledge of them], as for instance if something visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes, it surely does not precede our knowledge of it; or if something should sound where a hearer is present, surely both the sound and the hearing of it begin to exist at the same time and cease at the same time. — For *videretur* the codices and the first edition read *videret*.

la: Libr. X. Ethic. c. 3. et 4, ubi ostendit, delectationem nec motum nec generationem esse, cum non fiat in tempore, sed esse similem visioni, quae in momento, in primo instanti temporis completur et quocumque tempore perfecta est, quia ipsa consistit in simplici actione, consequente coniunctionem obiecti cum sensu.

en: Book X of the *Ethics*, c. 3 and 4, where he shows that delight is neither a motion nor a generation, since it does not come to be in time, but is like vision, which is completed in a moment, in the first instant of time, and is perfect in whatever [length of] time, because it itself consists in a simple action consequent upon the conjunction of the object with the sense.

la: Haymo exponens illud 1. Cor. 15, 52: In ictu oculi: Ictus oculi est quod palpebra icit i. e. percutit oculum, vel quod melius vult August. [cfr. Epist. 102. alias 49. q. 1. n. 5; IV. de Genes. ad lit. c. 34. n. 54. seq., et Serm. 277. alias 102. de Diversis, c. 10. n. 10. seq.], ne tanta mora fiat in iudicio, ictus oculi intelligitur, quo solis splendore subito, ut vix cogitari possit, feritur oculus. — Cod. bb *igitur*.

en: Haymo, expounding that passage of 1 Cor. 15:52, *In the twinkling of an eye*: The "twinkling of an eye" is what the eyelid flicks, that is, strikes the eye; or rather, as Augustine prefers [cf. *Epist.* 102, otherwise 49, q. 1, n. 5; book IV *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 34, n. 54 f., and *Serm.* 277, otherwise 102, *On Various Topics*, c. 10, n. 10 f.], lest there be such delay in the judgment, the "twinkling of an eye" is understood to be that by which the eye is struck by the sudden splendor of the sun, so swiftly that it can scarcely be thought. — Codex bb reads *igitur*.

la: Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *materiae*; bene, si post inductione adderetur *formae*. Post *intelligere* ex codd. E U substituimus *est* pro *cum*, codd. K Y aa *est cum*; et pro *est ratione* codd. N aa *cum tempore*. (Probabilius legendum *est cum tempore ratione*.) — Ut Aristot. loc. cit. insinuat. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 382, nota 2.

en: Codex K (1 by a second hand) reads *materiae*; rightly, if after *inductione* one added *formae*. After *intelligere*, from codices E and U, we have substituted *est* for *cum*; codices K, Y, aa read *est cum*; and for *est ratione*, codices N, aa read *cum tempore*. (It is more probably to be read *est cum tempore ratione*.) — As Aristotle, loc. cit., implies. Cf. tome III, p. 382, note 2.

la: Ita codd. BE (TUX a secunda manu), codd. FG habet *successionem et collationem*, alii codd. et edd. habet *successivum et collativum* (codd. H L bb *et collationem*). — Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 144. seqq. (III. c. 2.), ubi idem docet de sensu communi respectu sensationum sensuum externorum. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1, ubi dicitur, quod multa simul possumus intelligere et velle, in quantum unum sunt. — Superius pro *discursus* ed. 1 cum plurimis codd. *dissensus* (*descensus*?).

en: So codices B, E (T, U, X by a second hand); codices F, G have *successionem et collationem*; other codices and editions have *successivum et collativum* (codices H, L, bb *et collationem*). — Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 144 ff. (III, c. 2), where he teaches the same concerning the common sense with respect to the sensations of the external senses. Cf. also II *Sent.*, d. 42, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, where it is said that we can understand and will many things at once, insofar as they are one. — Above, for *discursus* the first edition with very many codices reads *dissensus* (*descensus*?).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primam quaestionem (de qua cfr. infra a. 1. q. 2. et supra a. 1. q. 1. scholion) eodem sensu solvunt Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 6. c. 2. q. 5.) et Petr. a Tar. (d. 17. q. 1. a. 5. quaestiunc. 1.). Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 2. § 1.) quoad esse ipsius actus detestationis dissentire videtur. Nam respondet cum hac distinctione: «Quantum ad esse introductum potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo, in quantum contritio dicitur substantia ipsius motus informati gratia, quo primo fit remissio peccati; et hoc modo est in instanti. Alio modo, in quantum dicitur actus vel motus, qui est displicentia mali commissi in offensam et contemptum Dei; sic est successiva». Etiam Scot. (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 2. n. 14–16.) videtur idem docere, scilicet quod licet actus poenitentiae in fieri requirat durationem, non vero in facto esse. Loquitur autem ibi de modo, quo attritio fit contritio, et distinguit actum illum in genere naturae et moris et ut est formatus, insuper ponit tria signa naturae. Sed de hoc loco valde vexato cfr. ibi commentator Scoti. — Alii commentatores Lombardi non tractant praecise hanc quaestionem, sed infra de iustificatione (d. 17. p. I. a. 2.) similia inquirunt.

**II.** Seq. (2.) quaestio simili modo solvitur a doctoribus. Cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thom., d. 17. q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 4. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 33. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Dionys. Carth., d. 17. q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The first question (concerning which cf. below a. 1, q. 2 and above a. 1, q. 1, scholion) is solved in the same sense by William of Auxerre (*Summa* p. IV, tr. 6, c. 2, q. 5) and Peter of Tarentaise (d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, little-question 1). But Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 2, § 1) seems to disagree as to the being of the act of detestation itself. For he answers with this distinction: "As to the introduced being, it can be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as contrition is called the substance of the motion itself in-formed by grace, by which the remission of sin first comes about; and in this way it is in an instant. In another way, insofar as it is called an act or motion which is the displeasure at the evil committed unto the offense and contempt of God; thus it is successive." Scotus too (IV *Sent.*, d. 14, q. 2, n. 14–16) seems to teach the same, namely that although the act of penance in its becoming requires duration, yet not in its accomplished being. But he speaks there of the manner in which attrition becomes contrition, and he distinguishes that act in the genus of nature and of morals and as it is formed, and moreover posits three signs of nature. But concerning this much-vexed passage cf. there the commentator on Scotus. — The other commentators on Lombard do not treat precisely this question, but below, concerning justification (d. 17, p. I, a. 2), they inquire into similar things.

**II.** The following (2.) question is solved in a similar way by the doctors. Cf. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — St. Thomas, d. 17, q. 2, a. 4, little-questions 1, 2; *Suppl.* q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 33. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 4, little-question 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 17, q. 4.

---

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title: Dist. 16, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum homo debeat semper conteri.*

Secundo quaeritur de diuturnitate contritionis, utrum debeat homo semper conteri. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in tractatu de Poenitentia[^1]: « Semper doleat et de dolore gaudeat »; et post: « Ubi dolor finitur, ibi deficit poenitentia; si poenitentia finitur, quid relinquitur de venia? Tamdiu gaudeat et speret de gratia, quamdiu sustentatur a poenitentia »: semper igitur debet homo poenitere.

2. Item, Gregorius super Iob decimo quarto[^2]: *Anima eius super semetipso lugebit*: « Dignum est, ut in se ipso homo semper moerores inveniat, qui in se gaudia, relicto Creatore, quaerebat ».

3. Item, Ecclesiastici quinto[^3]: *De propitiatu peccatorum noli esse sine metu*; similiter nec sine spe debet esse: ergo semper debet esse inter istas duas molas; sed hoc est conteri: ergo semper debet homo conteri.

4. Item, sicut se habet vera innocentia et perseverans ad peccatum de futuro, ita poenitentia contra peccatum de praeterito; sed perseverans innocentia semper refugit peccatum, ne fiat: ergo et poenitentia peccatum factum.

5. Item, sicut culpa est velle peccare, ita culpa est velle peccasse; sed homo semper tenetur nolle peccare: ergo et nolle peccasse. Sed ex hoc, quod non vult peccasse, et peccavit, generatur dolor: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Augustinus in libro de Poenitentia[^4][^5]: « Doleat et de dolore gaudeat »: non ergo semper est dolendum, immo aliquando gaudendum.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia dolor est ex sensu disconvenientis; sed contingit, peccatum amotum esse ab anima secundum se et secundum suum effectum: ergo non est ibi aliquid, quod generet dolorem[^6]: ergo non semper est dolendum.

3. Item, contritio est aeque bene una pars poenitentiae, ut confessio et satisfactio; sed non oportet semper confiteri: ergo nec semper conteri.

4. Item, contritio est medicina; sed contingit, hominem perfecte esse sanatum, ut puta si baptizatur, vel etiam si perfecerit poenitentiam condignam, « quae omnes defectus reducit ad perfectum[^7] »: ergo si post recuperationem sanitatis cessat usus medicinae, debet igitur cessare contritio.

5. Item, contritio est poena, qua peccator se punit: ergo esto, quod sufficienter sit punitus pro peccato; tunc, si amplius punit se per contritionem, punit se supra condignum; sed hoc est impietatis et crudelitatis: ergo etc.

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### Conclusio

> Peccator semper tenetur conteri habitu, non autem actu ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Hugo[^8], cum Deus absolvit hominem a culpa, ligat eum vinculo perpetuae detestationis; tenetur enim semper malum, quod fecit, detestari. Sed quia tentio talis est praecepti *affirmativi*, quod semper obligat, sed non ad semper; ideo dico, quod semper tenetur conteri, sed non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore, videlicet cum recogitat mala sua, in quibus offendit Deum. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes hoc probantes.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non semper, quia aliquando est gaudendum; dicendum, quod non tantum gaudere, immo alia cogitare debet; nec Augustinus vult, quod teneatur semper, id est in omni instanti, sed quod semper teneatur pro loco et tempore, ita quod voluntas conterendi semper sit in habitu, sed in actu pro loco et tempore.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dolor est ex praesentia disconvenientis; dicendum, quod quidam est dolor illatus, ut puta in sectione carnis; quidam est dolor voluntarie assumtus, quando dolet ut de morte amici; et iste dolor non causatur ab amici morte, sed causatur a voluntate mortem amici refugiente; et quia refugit quod necesse est esse, ideo necesse habet dolere. Sicut si ego nollem vehementer, te infirmari, et si tu infirmareris, dolerem; sic, quia ego nollem, me peccasse, et video, me peccasse, doleo. Unde de dolore causato a voluntate non oportet, quod illud, pro quo quis dolet, sit praesens affectu nec effectu nec reputatione, sed solum aspectu, certo[^9].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile de confessione, dicendum, quod dolor contritionis potest dici, prout est quaedam pars poenitentiae divisa contra confessionem et satisfactionem, et est purgativa culpae; alio modo, prout motus interior voluntatis, cui se subiicit anima poenitens, et dolor iste est poena satisfactoria, impetrativa augmenti gratiae et gloriae. Primus dolor est *sacramentalis proprie et per se*, quia est effectivus remissionis culpae, ad quem solum semel tenetur poenitens; alius non est *sacramentalis proprie et per se*, sed est elicitus a virtute, et ad illum tenetur semper, sed non ad semper[^10].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de medicina, dicendum, quod quaedam medicina est *sanativa tantum*, et haec est, quando est morbus; quaedam *praeservativa et meliorativa*, et talis est contritio; et hanc semper habere bonum est.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est poena; dicendum, quod nunquam peccator se tantum potest punire, quin maiori poena sit dignus secundum rigorem iustitiae. Et quia homo sibi rigidus debet esse et aliis pius; nunquam tantum se affligit per contritionem, quod sit superfluum, dum tamen hoc possit sustinere[^11], quia totum est ei ad gloriae cumulum. — Tamen nota, quod contritio ratione *displicentiae peccati* semper est necessaria, saltem in habitu, ratione vero gemitus et planctus vel doloris sensibilis non est necessaria, maxime viris perfectis, qui audierunt voce interna quod audivit Magdalena: *Dimittuntur tibi peccata tua*, sicut dicit Bernardus in Cantica circa principium[^12]; sed ulterius possunt et debent meditationem suam ad dulcedinem patriae supernae convertere. Ante hunc statum sanum consilium est peccata sua ante oculos revocare ad gemitum et dolorem. Praeterea, displicentia non dicit semper poenam, immo frequenter magnam habet laetitiam coniunctam, dum considerat in se liberationem plenam[^13].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether a man ought always to be contrite.*

Secondly, an inquiry is made concerning the duration of contrition, whether a man ought always to be contrite. And that he ought, it seems.

1. Augustine in the tract *On Penance*[^1]: « Let him always grieve and rejoice over his grief »; and afterward: « Where grief ends, there penance fails; if penance ends, what remains of pardon? Let him rejoice and hope of grace so long as he is sustained by penance »: therefore a man ought always to repent.

2. Likewise, Gregory on Job, chapter fourteen[^2]: *His soul shall mourn over itself*: « It is fitting that a man should always find sorrows in himself, who sought joys in himself, having forsaken his Creator ».

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus five[^3]: *Concerning the forgiveness of sins be not without fear*; likewise neither ought he to be without hope: therefore he ought always to be between these two millstones; but this is to be contrite: therefore a man ought always to be contrite.

4. Likewise, just as true and persevering innocence stands toward sin yet to come, so penance stands against sin already past; but persevering innocence always shuns sin, lest it be done: therefore so also penance shuns the sin that has been done.

5. Likewise, just as it is a fault to will to sin, so it is a fault to will to have sinned; but a man is always bound to be unwilling to sin: therefore also to be unwilling to have sinned. But from this, that he does not will to have sinned, yet has sinned, grief is generated: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine in the book *On Penance*[^4][^5]: « Let him grieve and rejoice over his grief »: therefore one ought not always to grieve, but rather sometimes to rejoice.

2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: because grief is from the perception of something discordant; but it can happen that sin has been removed from the soul both in itself and as to its effect: therefore there is nothing there which would generate grief[^6]: therefore one ought not always to grieve.

3. Likewise, contrition is equally well one part of penance, as are confession and satisfaction; but one need not always confess: therefore neither be always contrite.

4. Likewise, contrition is a medicine; but it can happen that a man is perfectly healed, as for instance if he is baptized, or even if he has completed a worthy penance, « which reduces all defects to wholeness[^7] »: therefore if, after the recovery of health, the use of medicine ceases, then contrition ought to cease.

5. Likewise, contrition is a penalty by which the sinner punishes himself: therefore granted that he has been sufficiently punished for the sin; then, if he punishes himself further by contrition, he punishes himself beyond what is fitting; but this belongs to impiety and cruelty: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The sinner is always bound to be contrite in habit, but not in act for always, but according to place and time.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Hugh says[^8], when God absolves a man from fault, he binds him with the bond of perpetual detestation; for he is always bound to detest the evil he has done. But because such a binding is of an *affirmative* precept, which always obliges, but not for always; therefore I say that he is always bound to be contrite, but not for always, but according to place and time, namely when he calls to mind his evils, in which he offended God. — Therefore the arguments proving this are to be granted.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that not always, because sometimes one ought to rejoice; it must be said that he ought not only to rejoice, but rather to think of other things; nor does Augustine mean that he is bound always, that is, at every instant, but that he is always bound according to place and time, so that the will to be contrite is always in habit, but in act according to place and time.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that grief is from the presence of something discordant; it must be said that one grief is inflicted, as for instance in the cutting of the flesh; another is grief voluntarily taken up, as when one grieves over the death of a friend; and this grief is not caused by the friend's death, but is caused by the will shunning the friend's death; and because it shuns what must necessarily be, therefore it must of necessity grieve. Just as, if I vehemently willed that you not fall ill, and if you were to fall ill, I would grieve; so, because I would not will that I had sinned, and I see that I have sinned, I grieve. Hence concerning grief caused by the will it is not required that that for which one grieves be present in affection, nor in effect, nor in reputation, but only in regard, certainly[^9].

*To 3.* To that which is objected by the likeness drawn from confession, it must be said that the grief of contrition can be spoken of, insofar as it is a certain part of penance divided against confession and satisfaction, and is purgative of fault; in another way, insofar as it is the interior motion of the will, to which the penitent soul subjects itself, and this grief is a satisfactory penalty, impetratory of an increase of grace and glory. The first grief is *sacramental properly and per se*, because it is effective of the remission of fault, to which the penitent is bound only once; the other is not *sacramental properly and per se*, but is elicited by a virtue, and to it he is bound always, but not for always[^10].

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning medicine, it must be said that one medicine is *healing only*, and this is when there is disease; another is *preservative and improving*, and such is contrition; and to have this always is good.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that it is a penalty; it must be said that a sinner can never punish himself so much but that he is worthy of a greater penalty according to the rigor of justice. And because a man ought to be rigid toward himself and merciful toward others; he never afflicts himself by contrition so much that it is superfluous, provided that he can sustain this[^11], because the whole is to him for the heaping up of glory. — Yet note that contrition, by reason of *displeasure at sin*, is always necessary, at least in habit; but by reason of groaning and lamentation or sensible grief it is not necessary, especially for perfect men, who have heard by an interior voice what Magdalene heard: *Thy sins are forgiven thee*, as Bernard says in the Canticle near the beginning[^12]; but further they can and ought to turn their meditation to the sweetness of the heavenly homeland. Before this state it is sound counsel to recall one's sins before one's eyes unto groaning and grief. Moreover, displeasure does not always denote a penalty, but rather frequently has great gladness joined to it, while it considers in itself a full deliverance[^13].

---

la: Cap. 13. n. 28. Ibid. etiam est seq. textus. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XIV. c. 2.

en: Chapter 13, n. 28. The following text is likewise found there. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XIV, c. 2.

la: Vers. 22. Codd.: *Anima eius in se ipso* (cod. G *in semetipso*) etc. — Verba Gregorii habentur in XII. Moral. c. 22. n. 27.

en: Verse 22. The codices read: *His soul over itself* (cod. G *over its very self*) etc. — Gregory's words are found in the *Morals*, Bk. XII, c. 22, n. 27.

la: Vers. 5: *De propitiato peccato noli* etc. — In nostra lectione, quae exhibetur etiam ab Augustino (in Speculo de Ecclesiastico) et est secundum textum Graecum [Περὶ ἐξιλασμοῦ, omissa voce *peccatorum*], plures codd. *peccati*. — De duabus molis vide supra a. I. q. 1. in fine.

en: Verse 5: *Concerning sin forgiven be not* etc. — In our reading, which is also given by Augustine (in the *Mirror, on Ecclesiasticus*) and follows the Greek text [*Peri exilasmou*, the word *of sins* omitted], several codices read *of sin*. — On the two millstones see above, a. I, q. 1, at the end.

la: Vat. praefigit *in*.

en: The Vatican edition prefixes *in*.

en: Chapter 13, n. 28.

la: Ambros., II. de Poenitentia, c. 7. n. 58: *Non habet enim quod erubescat cui peccatum remissum est.* — Superius pro *sensu*, quod habent codd. HS, non pauci codd. *ex consensu*, codd. E bb *ex coniunctione*, edd. cum aliquot codd. *ex praesentia*, quod etiam infra in solut. huius obiect. ponitur.

en: Ambrose, *On Penance* II, c. 7, n. 58: *For he has nothing to blush at whose sin has been remitted.* — Above, for *sensu* (perception), which codd. HS have, not a few codices read *ex consensu* (from agreement), codd. E bb *ex coniunctione* (from conjunction), the editions with some codices *ex praesentia* (from presence), which is also placed below in the solution of this objection.

la: Secundum auctorem libri Hypognost. (inter opera August.); cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 1.

en: According to the author of the book *Hypognosticon* (among the works of Augustine); cf. above, p. 320, note 1.

la: Haec sententia colligi potest ex II. de Sacram. p. XIV. c. 8. seq., ubi ostendit, sola misericordia et gratia Dei peccatorem absolvi a vinculo obdurationis mentis et a debito futurae damnationis, atque ad satisfactionem pertinere, ut peccata corrigantur et correcta non iterentur. Ibid. c. 2. ait: *Studium impende, ut culpa sit cum fine, devotio sine fine.* Cfr. Richard. a S. Vict., de Potestate ligandi et solvendi, c. 3. n. 13.

en: This sentence can be gathered from *On the Sacraments* II, p. XIV, c. 8 ff., where he shows that by the mercy and grace of God alone the sinner is absolved from the bond of hardening of mind and from the debt of future damnation, and that it pertains to satisfaction that sins be corrected and, once corrected, not repeated. In the same place, c. 2, he says: *Apply your zeal, that fault be with an end, devotion without end.* Cf. Richard of St. Victor, *On the Power of Binding and Loosing*, c. 3, n. 13.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 5.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5.

la: In codd. et ed. I desideratur haec solutio. Codd. siquidem miro modo habent: *Ad illud quod obiicitur de confessione, dicendum, quod quaedam medicina* (vide solut. ad 4.). Retinuimus cum Vat. solutionem quae est secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 17. m. 2. a. 2. § 2, ubi tamen pro *et est purgativa culpae* substituitur: « et hoc modo sumta est purgativa culpae mediante gratia, quae proprie est purgativa; et sic sumta contritione, sufficit semel conteri de peccatis cum voluntate confitendi et satisfaciendi de illis, tempore et loco se offerentibus ». Et subinde post *anima poenitens* additur: « sicut quandoque passionibus corporalibus », ac post *et gloriae* subiungitur: « et ad hunc dolorem tenetur semper, dum vivit, licet non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore congruentibus »; demum pro *a virtute* ponitur: « ex aliquo habitu virtutis ».

en: This solution is lacking in the codices and in the first edition. The codices, indeed, have, in a strange manner: *To that which is objected concerning confession, it must be said that a certain medicine* (see the solution to 4). We have retained, with the Vatican edition, the solution which is according to Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 17, m. 2, a. 2, § 2, where however for *and is purgative of fault* there is substituted: « and taken in this way it is purgative of fault by means of grace, which is properly purgative; and contrition taken thus, it suffices to be contrite once concerning sins with the will of confessing and making satisfaction for them, when time and place present themselves ». And then after *the penitent soul* is added: « as at times by bodily sufferings », and after *and of glory* is subjoined: « and to this grief he is bound always, while he lives, though not for always, but according to fitting place and time »; finally for *by a virtue* is put: « from some habit of virtue ».

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.

la: Serm. 3. n. 2. seqq. Cfr. etiam serm. 10. et 11. — Locus Scripturae est Luc. 7, 48.

en: Sermon 3, n. 2 ff. Cf. also sermons 10 and 11. — The Scripture passage is Luke 7:48.

la: Vide infra dub. 10. Cfr. Radbert. Paschas. et Hugo a S. Vict. in Thren. 2, 18: *Deduc quasi torrentem lacrymas* etc. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See below, dubium 10. Cf. Paschasius Radbertus and Hugh of St. Victor on Lamentations 2:18: *Let down tears like a torrent* etc. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 44633–44786), verified column-by-column against the PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p392-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p393-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (offset pdf = printed + 20). Opener alignment confirmed: "Secundo quaeritur de diuturnitate contritionis, utrum debeat homo semper conteri." Running heads verified: p.392 (verso) = SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV; p.393 (recto) = DIST. XVI. P. I. ART. IV. (the printed recto head leads to the next article, which begins lower on p.393; the body here remains a3-q2). Chunk ends just before ARTICULUS IV (raw 44787).

**Page-split / footer map.** Body spans two printed pages. The *videtur* arguments (1–5) and the *contra* arguments (1–5) sit on p.392 (left and right columns); the Conclusio, Respondeo, and the five replies sit on p.393. Footers per page: p.392 carries seven footers — left column 1–3 (anchored to *videtur* args 1–3) and right column 4–7 (anchored to *contra* args 1, 2, 4), **all claimed by this q2 per the a3-q1 writer's hand-off** (footers 4–7 of p.392 belong here, not to q1). p.393 carries six footers — left column 1–3 (= [^8] Hugo / [^9] aspectu certo / [^10] the confessio-solution textual variant) and right column 4–6 (= [^11] / [^12] / [^13]). Total 13 apparatus entries. Note p.392 footer 5 and p.393 footer ¹ both read *Cap. 13. n. 28* but refer to different objections (contra-1 vs the duplicate marker preceding it), rendered separately as [^4]/[^5].

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: false. The Articulus III scholion (§§ I–II) is a single block covering BOTH q1 and q2; it is rendered in full with the sibling chunk **bon-sent-IV-d16-p1-a3-q1**. Cross-ref (La.): *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem* (which itself appears as the closing clause of [^13]). En.: See the scholion rendered with q1 (a3-q1).

**[?] flags.** None. The OCR was clean for the running prose and the PDF bands resolved every footnote opener and the cascade-damaged Respondeo region without residual ambiguity.

**Hand-off to Articulus IV.** ARTICULUS IV (*De contritione quoad intensionem*) opens at raw 44787 on p.393 ("Consequenter quantum ad quartum articulum quaeritur de contritionis intensione; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo... Secundo..."). Its short opener folds into a4-q1 per the chunking convention. p.393's left-column footers 1–3 are SHARED: [^8]/[^9]/[^10] anchor to this q2's Respondeo/replies and stay here; the Art IV opener carries no footers of its own on p.393. The Art IV writer should claim the p.393 right-column footers that anchor below the q2 corollarium only if any fall to its body — none do here; all six p.393 footers are q2's.