title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De principii unitate.*

Consequenter quaeritur de principii unitate. Circa quod duo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum res productae sint in esse a pluribus principiis. Secundo, dato quod ab uno principio, quaeritur, utrum illud produxerit omnia a se ipso, an mediante alio.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum res productae sint in esse a pluribus principiis.*

Quod autem a pluribus principiis sint productae res, dicunt Manichaei, qui ponunt aliud esse principium spiritualium et incorporalium sive invisibilium, aliud corporalium et corruptibilium sive visibilium; et primum vocant *Deum lucis*, secundum vocant *Deum tenebrarum*[^1]. Et quod positio eorum sit vera et catholica, videtur:

**1.** Per sacram Scripturam. Ioannis decimo octavo[^2]: *Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo*, dicit ipse Rex gloriae et Deus lucis: ergo mundus iste visibilis ad Deum lucis non spectat: non ergo est conditus ab eo.

**2.** Item, Ioannis decimo quarto[^3]: *Venit princeps mundi huius*. Rursus, Ioannes duodecimo vocat diabolum *principem huius mundi*; et ille est Deus tenebrarum: ergo videtur etc.

**3.** Item, Apostolus secundae ad Corinthios quarto[^4] et ad Ephesios secundo vocat diabolum *Deum huius saeculi*; sed non meretur aliquis dici Deus alicuius, nisi eius quod condidit: ergo etc. Alias plurimas adducunt auctoritates de Scriptura; sed his solutis, solvuntur et aliae.

**4.** Item, rationibus probant id ipsum hoc modo: «oppositorum oppositae sunt causae[^5]»; sed spiritualia et corporalia habent repugnantiam. Unde ad Romanos septimo[^6]: *Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae*, et ad Galatas quinto: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum* etc. Item, novum et vetus Testamentum adversantur, sicut patet Matthaei quinto, quia ibi praecipiuntur directe contraria, sicut iurare et non iurare, occidere et non occidere. Ergo necesse est ponere duo principia prima, unum spiritualium, aliud corporalium, unum veteris Testamenti[^7], aliud novi.

**5.** Item, «idem similiter se habens semper natum est facere idem[^8]»: ergo cum Deus bonus uniformiter se habeat, et similiter semper facit idem. Ergo, cum sit causa conditiva, nullius est destructiva, et cum sit causa productionis, non erit causa destructionis nec corruptionis: ergo corruptibilia sunt ab alio principio.

**6.** Tertia ratio est: omne quod bonus Deus facit, est bonum; omne quod est bonum, est diligendum, et nihil omnino quod fecit est odiendum; sed iste mundus est odiendus et spernendus; similiter et vita carnalis, primae Ioannis secundo[^9]: *Nolite diligere mundum*; et iterum Ioannis duodecimo: *Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam*: ergo etc.

In contrarium autem sunt rationes et auctoritates.

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**1.** Ioannis primo[^10] dicitur de Verbo: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt*; sed Verbum est bonus Deus: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod *omnia* non distribuit pro visibilibus; contra: statim post sequitur: *mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit*. Constat, quod de hoc mundo loquitur etc.

**2.** Item, Matthaei ultimo[^11]: *Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra*, dicit Deus bonus: aut ergo iuste data, aut iniuste. Si iuste; ergo caelum et terra sua sunt, et ipse fecit. Si iniuste: ergo videtur, quod ipse Deus bonus iniuste usurpaverit sibi alienum, et ita quod fuerit iniustus.

**3.** Item, ille fuit conditor rerum visibilium, qui dedit vetus Testamentum. Probatio: Actuum decimo tertio[^12] dicit Paulus: *Viri fratres, Deus plebis nostrae elegit patres nostros*. Et post: *Qui habitant Ierusalem principes hunc ignorantes et iudicantes impleverunt*. Sed iste fuit Deus lucis: ergo etc.

**4.** Item, rationibus ostenditur: Omne bonum et pulchrum est a Deo bono; sed omnia visibilia bona sunt et pulchra: ergo etc. Probatio[^13]: aut bona sunt, aut mala. Si bona, habeo propositum; si mala: ergo eorum corruptio bona: ergo corruptio est a Deo bono, quoniam omne bonum ab ipso: ergo etc.

**5.** Item, quaecumque ad invicem coniunguntur, necesse est coniungi per aliquid, in quo communicant[^14]; sed in nullo communicant quae differunt in principiis primis: si ergo anima et corpus coniunguntur, necesse est, quod ab eodem Deo producantur; sed anima est a Deo lucis: ergo etc.

**6.** Item, quaero de istis duobus principiis, qualiter se habeant ad invicem: aut enim habent pacem, aut bellum[^15] — aliter enim non video, quomodo possit esse — sed Deus lucis non potest bellare, cum in eo sit summa pax et quies; Deus tenebrarum, cum in eo sit omnimoda malitia, non potest quiescere: ergo videtur, quod nec bellant nec quiescunt.

### *Conclusio.*

> Error Manichaeorum, quod duo sint rerum principia prima, et a fide et a ratione reprobatur.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaestio de pluralitate principiorum tripliciter potest intelligi, et secundum hoc in diversis locis tractanda est. Potest enim quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, quorum utrumque bonum; et illud habet determinari in primo libro, ubi quaeritur de unitate divinae essentiae[^16]. Potest nihilominus quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, ita quod unum sit summe bonum, alterum vero summe malum, ita quod ab uno sit omne bonum, ab alio omne malum; et illud habet determinari in tractatu de malo[^17]; non enim potest haec quaestio sciri, nisi sciatur primo, quid sit malum. Potest etiam quaeri, utrum plura sint principia, quorum unum sit principium incorruptibilium et spiritualium, aliud sit principium corruptibilium et visibilium: et hoc habet determinari nunc, ubi quaeritur de exitu rerum in esse.

Ad hanc autem quaestionem dicendum, quod error iste de positione duorum principiorum non solum est contra fidem, immo adeo contra rationem, ut vix credam, hominem, qui aliquid de philosophia scivit, hunc errorem aut posuisse, aut defendisse. — Tamen[^18] iste error est pessimus, quia praetendit aliquam speciem pietatis. Videtur enim Deo bono attribuere bona et pulchra et nobilia, et alii principio alia. Ideo[^19] magis subintravit et Ecclesiam Dei magis foedavit, et quia etiam a simplicibus magis potest capi et falsa imaginatione cogitari. — Et ad istum errorem pessimum de multitudine[^20] principiorum innumerabiles errores consequuntur et vanissimi, sicut illis est notum, qui sectam Manichaeorum novere, sicut de iuramento, matrimonio, homicidio et aliis pluribus, quae omnia suas habent improbationes per Scripturam.

Caput autem et principium erroris damnat omnis philosophia, quod duo sint rerum principia prima[^21]: tum quia ordo universi destruitur, hoc posito, tum etiam quia divina potentia limitatur ex hoc, ut non possit corporalia producere, tum etiam quia ex hoc divina essentia circumscriptibilis ponitur, ut tantum sit in regione lucis; et si haec vera sunt, nec Deus est Deus, nec aliquid est bonum.

**Ad argumenta.**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Ad auctoritates, quas adducunt, dicendum, quod mundus dupliciter accipitur in Scriptura, videlicet pro mundana conversatione, quae vana est et immunda, et pro mundana creatura. Primo modo damnatur in Scripturis, et non dicitur esse a Deo tanquam malum, quia peccatum non est a Deo, sicut alibi patebit[^22]; secundo modo commendatur tanquam bonum et pulchrum, sicut dicitur Genesis primo[^23]: *Vidit Deus omnia quae fecerat, et erant valde bona*, et hoc modo est a Deo. Secundum hanc distinctionem solvuntur obiecta. Nam quod dicitur, regnum Christi non esse de hoc mundo, intelligitur de mundana conversatione, quia ipse non regnat in malis, sed in bonis, *quorum conversatio est in caelis*[^24]. Similiter, quod dicitur diabolus *princeps mundi* et *Deus*, intelligitur de mundane et saeculariter conversantibus. — Patet ergo, quod deceptus est stultus et impius Manichaeus, quia nescivit distinguere. Et iterum, peccavit in illatione[^25]; non enim sequitur: est princeps, ergo conditor; si enim sequeretur, cum rex Franciae sit princeps Franciae; ergo fecit eam. Qui sic argueret, stultus iudicaretur; certe multo stultius arguit Manichaeus. Rursus, non sequitur: est Deus, ergo conditor. Nam si sic, cum dicatur ad Philippenses tertio[^26]: *Quorum Deus venter est*, ergo venter creavit illos. Stulta igitur est haec ratio, quare et Manichaei.

*Ad 4.* Quod obiicitur, quod contrariorum contrariae sunt causae; illud intelligitur de causis proximis intrinsecis — nam de causa extrinseca[^27] non habet veritatem — et ideo, quia nescivit distinguere, deceptus est pessimus Manichaeus. Et quod ita sit, patet. Si enim contrariorum contrariae sunt causae primae producentes, tot essent principia, quot sunt genera contrarietatum: ergo alius Deus fecisset calidum, et alius frigidum, et sic de aliis contrarietatibus. Si quis ita argueret, ab omnibus deridendus esset; quanto magis stultissimus Manichaeus.

Quod tamen dicitur, quod caro contrariatur spiritui; dicendum, quod nomen carnis aliquando accipitur pro natura, sicut ad Ephesios quinto[^28]: *Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit*; et sic non contrariatur, immo miro amore nectuntur. Accipitur etiam pro vitio et corruptione, quae est in carne: et ratione huius contrariatur; nec tamen habet causam contrariam, quia non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem.

*Ad 5.* Quod obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens etc.; dicendum, quod aliquod est agens, quod agit se ipso; et illud impossibile est, quod producendo diversa diversificetur; immo uno et eodem[^29] producit multa. Aliud est agens, quod agit per aliud a se, et illud variatur in agendo diversa. Deus autem est agens primo modo, et non secundo. Et quia hoc non intellexit Manichaeus, posuit diversa principia et diversos legislatores, cum videat in legibus diversitatem et in rebus. — Et quod stulte motus fuerit, sensibiliter patet. Videmus enim, quod idem artifex per eandem artem domificandi facit aulam et cloacam; numquid duos artifices oportuit ad haec facienda invenire? Rursus, idem medicus secundum eandem artem medicinae diversa eidem aegroto secundum diversos status apponit medicamenta, et diversa dat praecepta et contraria secundum diversitates infirmorum; immo stultus esset medicus, qui eadem semper daret medicamenta et mandata. Si ergo diversus fuit status hominum incipientium, ut Iudaeorum, et virorum evangelicorum, quid prohibet, unum et eundem diversa et contraria praecepisse? Attamen contraria non sunt, spiritualiter intellecta.

*Ad 6.* Quod ultimo obiicitur, iam solutum est, quia vitiositas mundanorum est contemnenda, sed creatura amanda, et Deus in ea laudandus; et omnes creaturae laudant Deum et bonae sunt. Et haec sufficiant.

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### Article II. *On the unity of the principle.*

Next, the question is about the unity of the principle. Concerning which two things are asked. First, whether things were produced in being from several principles. Second, granted that from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things from itself, or by means of another.

### Question I. *Whether things were produced in being from several principles.*

That things were produced from several principles is what the Manichaeans say, who posit one principle of spiritual and incorporeal or invisible things, and another of corporeal and corruptible or visible things; and the first they call the *God of light*, the second they call the *God of darkness*[^1]. And that their position is true and catholic, it seems:

**1.** From sacred Scripture. John 18[^2]: *My kingdom is not of this world*, says the King of glory and the God of light himself: therefore this visible world does not belong to the God of light: therefore it was not founded by him.

**2.** Likewise, John 14[^3]: *The prince of this world is coming*. Again, John 12 calls the devil *the prince of this world*; and that one is the God of darkness: therefore it seems etc.

**3.** Likewise, the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 4[^4] and in Ephesians 2 calls the devil *the God of this age*; but no one merits being called the God of something unless of that which he founded: therefore etc. They adduce many other authorities from Scripture; but when these are solved, the others are solved too.

**4.** Likewise, they prove the same thing by reasons in this way: «the causes of opposites are opposed[^5]»; but spiritual and corporeal things have a mutual repugnance. Hence Romans 7[^6]: *I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind*; and Galatians 5: *The flesh lusts against the spirit* etc. Likewise, the New and Old Testaments are opposed, as is plain from Matthew 5, because there directly contrary things are commanded — like to swear and not to swear, to kill and not to kill. Therefore one must posit two first principles: one of spiritual things, the other of corporeal; one of the Old Testament[^7], the other of the New.

**5.** Likewise, «what remains the same in the same way is naturally fitted always to do the same[^8]»: therefore since the good God remains uniformly, he likewise always does the same. Therefore, since he is the cause of founding, he is the cause of destroying nothing; and since he is the cause of production, he will not be the cause of destruction or of corruption: therefore corruptible things are from another principle.

**6.** The third reason is: everything which the good God makes is good; everything which is good is to be loved, and nothing at all that he made is to be hated; but this world is to be hated and spurned; likewise also the carnal life, as 1 John 2[^9]: *Do not love the world*; and again John 12: *He who loves his soul will lose it*: therefore etc.

But on the contrary side there are reasons and authorities.

**1.** John 1[^10] says of the Word: *All things were made through him*; but the Word is the good God: therefore etc. If you say that *all* does not distribute over visible things, the contrary: immediately afterwards follows: *the world was made through him, and the world knew him not*. It is clear that he is speaking of this world etc.

**2.** Likewise, the last chapter of Matthew[^11]: *All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth*, says the good God: therefore either it was given justly or unjustly. If justly, then heaven and earth are his, and he made them. If unjustly, then it seems that the good God himself unjustly usurped what belonged to another, and so was unjust.

**3.** Likewise, he was the founder of visible things who gave the Old Testament. Proof: Acts 13[^12] Paul says: *Brothers, men, the God of our people chose our fathers*. And afterwards: *The dwellers in Jerusalem, and their princes, in ignorance and by judging him fulfilled [the prophecies]*. But that one was the God of light: therefore etc.

**4.** Likewise, it is shown by reasons: Everything good and beautiful is from the good God; but all visible things are good and beautiful: therefore etc. Proof[^13]: they are either good or bad. If good, I have my point; if bad, then their corruption is good; therefore the corruption is from the good God, since every good is from him: therefore etc.

**5.** Likewise, whatever things are joined to one another, must necessarily be joined through something in which they communicate[^14]; but things which differ in their first principles communicate in nothing: therefore if soul and body are joined, it is necessary that they be produced by the same God; but the soul is from the God of light: therefore etc.

**6.** Likewise, I ask concerning these two principles, how they stand toward one another: for either they have peace or war[^15] — for otherwise I do not see how it can be — but the God of light cannot wage war, since in him is the highest peace and rest; the God of darkness, since in him is total malice, cannot rest: therefore it seems that they neither wage war nor rest.

### *Conclusion.*

> The error of the Manichaeans, that there are two first principles of things, is rejected by both faith and reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that the question of the plurality of principles can be understood in three ways, and accordingly is to be treated in different places. For it can be asked whether there are several principles, each of which is good; and that is to be determined in the first book, where the question is asked about the unity of the divine essence[^16]. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, such that one is supremely good and the other supremely bad, so that from the one is every good, from the other every bad; and that is to be determined in the treatise on evil[^17]; for this question cannot be known unless one first knows what evil is. It can also be asked whether there are several principles, of which one is the principle of incorruptible and spiritual things, the other the principle of corruptible and visible things: and this is to be determined now, where the question is asked about the procession of things into being.

To this question it must be said that this error of positing two principles is not only against the faith but is so much against reason that I can scarcely believe that any man who knew anything of philosophy posited or defended this error. — Nevertheless[^18], this error is the worst, because it puts forward some appearance of piety. For it seems to attribute to the good God the good, beautiful, and noble things, and to the other principle the rest. For that reason[^19] it crept in further and defiled the Church of God more deeply, and also because it can more easily be grasped and pictured by simple folk through false imagination. — And from this worst error about a multitude[^20] of principles innumerable and most empty errors follow, as is known to those who are acquainted with the sect of the Manichaeans — about oaths, marriage, homicide, and many other things, all of which have their refutations from Scripture.

But all philosophy condemns the head and source of the error, namely that there are two first principles of things[^21]: both because the order of the universe is destroyed on this supposition, and also because divine power is limited by this — so that it cannot produce corporeal things — and also because by this the divine essence is rendered circumscribable, so as to be only in the region of light; and if these things are true, then God is not God, and nothing is good.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1, 2, 3.* To the authorities they adduce, it must be said that *world* is taken in Scripture in two ways, namely for *worldly conduct*, which is vain and unclean, and for the *worldly creation*. In the first way it is condemned in the Scriptures, and is not said to be from God as evil, because sin is not from God, as will be made plain elsewhere[^22]; in the second way it is commended as good and beautiful, as it is said in Genesis 1[^23]: *God saw all the things which he had made, and they were very good*, and in this way it is from God. According to this distinction the objections are solved. For when it is said that Christ's kingdom is not of this world, it is understood of *worldly conduct*, because he does not reign in the wicked, but in the good, *whose conversation is in the heavens*[^24]. Likewise, when the devil is called *prince of the world* and *God*, it is understood of those who live in a worldly and secular manner. — It is plain therefore that the foolish and impious Manichaean is deceived, because he knew not how to distinguish. And again, he sinned in the inference[^25]; for it does not follow: he is prince, therefore founder; since if it followed, then since the king of France is prince of France, therefore he made it. He who argued so would be judged a fool; but much more foolishly does the Manichaean argue. Again, it does not follow: he is god, therefore founder. For if so, since it is said to the Philippians 3[^26]: *Their god is the belly*, therefore the belly created them. Foolish therefore is this reasoning, and so are the Manichaeans.

*To 4.* What is objected, that the causes of opposites are opposed; that is understood of proximate intrinsic causes — for it does not hold of the extrinsic cause[^27] — and therefore, because he knew not how to distinguish, the worst Manichaean was deceived. And that it is so is plain. For if the causes of opposites were opposed first producing causes, there would be as many principles as there are kinds of contraries: therefore one God would have made the hot, another the cold, and so for the other contraries. If anyone argued thus he would be derided by all; how much more the most foolish Manichaean.

But what is said, that the flesh is contrary to the spirit, it must be said that the name *flesh* is sometimes taken for nature, as Ephesians 5[^28]: *No one ever hated his own flesh*; and so it is not contrary, but on the contrary they are bound by wondrous love. It is also taken for the vice and corruption that is in the flesh: and by reason of this it is contrary; yet it has no contrary cause, because it has no efficient cause, but a deficient one.

*To 5.* What is objected, that what remains the same in the same way etc.; it must be said that there is one kind of agent which acts by itself, and it is impossible for this one to be diversified by producing diverse things; rather, by one and the same[^29] it produces many. There is another kind of agent which acts through something other than itself, and this one is varied in doing diverse things. Now God is an agent of the first kind, and not of the second. And because the Manichaean did not understand this, he posited diverse principles and diverse lawgivers, since he saw diversity in laws and in things. — And that he was foolishly moved is plain to the senses. For we see that the same craftsman by the same art of building makes hall and sewer; was it necessary to find two craftsmen to make these? Again, the same physician by the same art of medicine applies diverse medicines to the same sick person according to his diverse states, and gives diverse and contrary precepts according to the diversities of the sick; rather, a physician who always gave the same medicines and commands would be a fool. If, therefore, the state of men in their beginnings was different — like the Jews and the men of the Gospel — what prevents one and the same [God] from prescribing diverse and contrary things? And yet they are not contrary, spiritually understood.

*To 6.* What is finally objected has already been solved, because the viciousness of worldly things is to be despised, but the creature to be loved, and God in it to be praised; and all creatures praise God and are good. And let these things suffice.

la: Cfr. August., *de Moribus Manichaeorum*; *de Genesi contra Manichaeos*; *de Natura boni*; liber contra Faustum etc. — Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 paulo superius omittunt *sive invisibilium*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Manners of the Manichaeans*; *On Genesis against the Manichaeans*; *On the Nature of the Good*; the book *Against Faustus* etc. — Most codices with ed. 1 a little above omit *sive invisibilium* ("or invisible").

la: Vers. 36.

en: Verse 36.

la: Vers. 30. — Sequens textus est loc. cit. v. 31: *Nunc princeps huius mundi eiicietur foras*.

en: Verse 30. — The following text is the same place, v. 31: *Now the prince of this world will be cast out*.

la: Vers. 4: *Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium*. — Ad Eph. v. 2: *Ambulastis... secundum principem potestatis aeris huius*.

en: Verse 4: *The god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers*. — At Ephesians, v. 2: *You walked... according to the prince of the power of this air*.

la: Codd. P Q in marg. bene addunt *Aristoteles, II. de Generatione, text. 56. (c. 10.)*. Cfr. IV. *Meteor.* text. 41. (c. 7.).

en: Codices P, Q rightly add in the margin *Aristotle, On Generation II, text 56 (c. 10)*. Cf. *Meteorology* IV, text 41 (c. 7).

la: Vers. 23. — Sequens textus est Gal. 3, 17. — Alius textus est Matth. 5, 21.

en: Verse 23. — The following text is Galatians 3:17. — The other text is Matthew 5:21.

la: Fide codd. K M (bb a secunda manu) cc et ed. 1 adiecimus *Testamenti*.

en: On the faith of codices K, M (*bb* by a second hand), *cc*, and ed. 1 we added *Testamenti* ("of the Testament").

la: Aristot., II. *de Gener. et corrupt.* text. 56. (c. 10). — De seq. prop. cfr. *Liber de Causis*, prop. 20 et 24, ubi docetur, causam primam, stando in sua unitate, regere omnia et existere in omnibus secundum unam dispositionem. — Edd. 3, 4 *Secunda ratio* pro *Item*. Circa finem argumenti Vat. *nec corruptibilitatis* pro *nec corruptionis*.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 56 (c. 10). — On the following proposition cf. the *Book of Causes*, props. 20 and 24, where it is taught that the first cause, standing in its unity, rules all things and exists in all of them according to a single disposition. — Editions 3 and 4 read *Secunda ratio* for *Item*. Near the end of the argument the Vatican ms. reads *nec corruptibilitatis* for *nec corruptionis*.

la: Vers. 15. — Sequens textus est Ioan. 12, 25, ex quo non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 aliam partem allegant, scil. *qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo* etc.; sensus in idem recidit. — Aliquanto superius ex codd. F P Q substituimus *fecit* pro *fecerit*.

en: Verse 15. — The following text is John 12:25, from which not a few codices with ed. 1 cite another part, namely *He who hates his soul in this world* etc.; the sense comes to the same. — A little above, on the faith of codices F, P, Q we substituted *fecit* ("made") for *fecerit*.

la: Vers. 3; alius locus est v. 10.

en: Verse 3; the other place is v. 10.

la: Vers. 18.

en: Verse 18.

la: Vers. 16, ubi Vulgata: *Viri Israelitae et qui timetis Deum, audite: Deus plebis Israel elegit patres nostros*. Quae dein allegantur sunt ibid. v. 27: *Qui enim habitabant Ierusalem et principes eius hunc ignorantes et voces prophetarum, quae per omne sabbatum leguntur, iudicantes impleverunt.* — Sola Vat. minorem transponit: *sed iste fuit Deus lucis* post verba *vetus Testamentum*.

en: Verse 16, where the Vulgate reads: *Israelite men, and you who fear God, hear: the God of the people of Israel chose our fathers.* What is then cited is the same place, v. 27: *For the dwellers in Jerusalem and their princes, in ignorance of him and of the voices of the prophets which are read every sabbath, in judging him fulfilled them.* — Only the Vatican ms. transposes the minor: *but that one was the God of light* after the words *Old Testament*.

la: Cod. M *Probatio minoris*. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum pluribus mss. post *ergo corruptio* adiicit *eorum*.

en: Codex M reads *Probatio minoris* ("Proof of the minor"). Near the end of the argument the Vatican ms. with several mss. adds *eorum* ("of them") after *ergo corruptio*.

la: Averroes, IV. *Phys.* text. 71: *Universaliter omnia duo, quae non communicant in eadem natura, non habent comparationem ad invicem.*

en: Averroes, *Physics* IV, text 71: *Universally, any two things which do not communicate in the same nature have no comparison with one another.*

la: In cod. F additur *et hoc argumentum facit Damascenus primo libro*, scil. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3, et diffusius IV. c. 20.

en: In codex F is added *and Damascene makes this argument in the first book*, namely *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 3, and more at length in IV, c. 20.

en: Distinction 2, question 1 [of the first book of the *Sentences*].

la: Infra d. 34.

en: Below at distinction 34.

la: Codd. X Z interserunt hic *error*: non pauci codd. vero indebite omittunt *Ideo*, pro quo cod. *aa* ponit *Sed*, qui deinde post *foedavit* omittit particulam *et*. Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut B E F *Cum* pro *Tamen* et *item sit* pro *est*.

en: Codices X, Z insert *error* here; not a few codices wrongly omit *Ideo*, for which codex *aa* puts *Sed*, which then after *foedavit* omits the particle *et*. A little above some codices (B, E, F) read *Cum* for *Tamen* and *item sit* for *est*.

la: Vide annotationem praecedentem (de variantibus circa *Ideo* / *Sed*).

en: See the preceding annotation on the variants concerning *Ideo* / *Sed*.

la: Plures codd. ut C H I O R S *multiplicatione* [pro *multitudine*].

en: Several codices (C, H, I, O, R, S) read *multiplicatione* ("multiplication") [for *multitudine*].

la: In cod. A additur: *cum omnia sint ordinatissima, ut patet, quia motus inferiorum est a motu superiorum, et motus superiorum a motu intelligentiarum, et unus sine altero esse non possit. Hic ordo ex propriis naturis esse non potest propter diversitatem et oppositionem earum, quae magis facerent distinctionem quam unionem, ut a diversis principiis et contrariis ordinantibus, quia non intenderent unum ordinem ex se ipsis sive finem; ergo oportet, quod reducantur ad unum principium ordinans omnia ad unum finem, aut quod hic ordo sit per accidens; sed per accidens esse non potest, cum non possit abesse, sed habeat semper esse: ergo etc. Item, in quolibet genere multitudo reducitur ad unum illius generis: ergo cum omnia in esse conveniant, oportet esse unum ens principium omnium, a quo dependeant, tum quia ordo universi etc.* — De prima ratione, quam S. Doctor adducit, cfr. Aristot., XII. *Metaph.* text. 32-56. (XI. c. 10.), ubi concludit: *At entia nolunt male gubernari; non est bonum pluralitas: unus ergo princeps.*

en: In codex A is added: *Since all things are most well-ordered, as is plain, because the motion of lower things is from the motion of higher things, and the motion of higher things from the motion of the intelligences, and the one cannot exist without the other. This order cannot come from their own natures on account of their diversity and opposition, which would rather produce distinction than union — as [we should expect] from diverse and contrary principles doing the ordering, since they would not intend one order out of themselves nor one end; therefore it is necessary that they be reduced to one principle ordering all things to one end, or else that this order be by accident; but it cannot be by accident, since it cannot fail to be, but always has being: therefore etc. Likewise, in any genus multitude is reduced to one in that genus: therefore since all things converge in being, there must be one being which is the principle of all, on which they depend, both because the order of the universe etc.* — On the first reason which the Holy Doctor adduces, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 32-56 (XI, c. 10), where he concludes: *But beings refuse to be ill-governed; plurality is no good: therefore [let there be] one ruler.*

en: Below at distinction 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vers. 31: *Viditque Deus cuncta, quae fecerat* etc.

en: Verse 31: *And God saw all the things which he had made* etc.

la: Alluditur ad illud Philipp. 3, 20: *Nostra autem conversatio in caelis est*. — Aliquanto inferius plures codd. ut B D E F H I N Q post *saeculariter* adnectunt *viventibus et*.

en: An allusion to Philippians 3:20: *But our conversation is in the heavens*. — A little below, several codices (B, D, E, F, H, I, N, Q) after *saeculariter* add *viventibus et* ("living, and").

la: Codd. O *aa* *in illa ratione*. Dein Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post *est princeps* subdit *mundi*. Paulo post Vat. *Sic enim sequeretur* pro *si enim sequeretur*.

en: Codices O and *aa* read *in illa ratione* ("in that reasoning"). Then the Vatican ms. with one or two other codices after *est princeps* adds *mundi* ("of the world"). A little later the Vatican ms. reads *Sic enim sequeretur* ("For it would thus follow") for *si enim sequeretur*.

la: Vers. 19. — Post *ergo* nonnulli codd. cum Vat. repetunt *Deus*.

en: Verse 19. — After *ergo* some codices with the Vatican ms. repeat *Deus*.

la: Vat. cum plurimis mss. *extra*; secuti sumus codd. T X *cc* et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican ms. with most mss. reads *extra* ("outside"); we follow codices T, X, *cc*, and ed. 1 [reading *extrinseca*].

la: Vers. 29. — Mox Vat. cum plurimis codd. *non contrariantur* pro *non contrariatur*, quod tamen exstat in codd. *aa cc* et ed. 1. Idem cod. *cc* cum ed. 1 ponit *hoc modo* pro *sic*, quod a plurimis mss. abest. Paulo inferius Vat. modo plurali *contrariantur* pro *contrariatur*, sed contra mss. et primas edd. Eadem Vat. dein cum plurimis codd. bis *habent* pro *habet*, contradicentibus contextu et cod. *cc* cum ed. 1; cod. H legit *habuit*.

en: Verse 29. — Then the Vatican ms. with most codices reads *non contrariantur* (plural) for *non contrariatur* (singular), which however stands in codices *aa*, *cc* and ed. 1. The same codex *cc* with ed. 1 puts *hoc modo* for *sic*, which is absent from most mss. A little below the Vatican ms. has the plural *contrariantur* for *contrariatur*, but against the mss. and first editions. The same Vatican ms. then with most codices twice reads *habent* (plural) for *habet*, against the context and codex *cc* with ed. 1; codex H reads *habuit*.

la: Codd. T *aa* supplent *modo*; forsan melius, si quid supplendum, suppleretur *actu*, qui identificatur cum divina essentia. Cfr. supra a. 1, q. 2 in fine et I. *Sent.* d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — Paulo inferius Cod. *aa* *diversos status*. Paulo inferius pro *et mandata* aliqui codd. ut F III Z ponunt *et praecepta*.

en: Codices T, *aa* supply *modo* ("in a manner"); perhaps better, if anything is to be supplied, would be *actu* ("by an act"), which is identified with the divine essence. Cf. above at a. 1, q. 2 *in fine* and I *Sent.* d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. — A little below codex *aa* reads *diversos status*. A little below, for *et mandata* some codices (F, III, Z) put *et praecepta*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec militat contra immanem errorem Manichaeorum et contra omnes, qui plura principia absolute prima statuerunt. De Manichaeorum erroribus agitur hic dub. 2; de vana eorundem opinione circa originem animarum infra d. 18, a. 2, q. 2; item de origine mali d. 34, a. 1, q. 1; de carnis repugnantia adversus spiritum d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, et III. *Sent.* d. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

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**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scot., *de Rerum princip.* q. 1, a. 1-4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 41, a. 1, 2; *de Potent.* q. 3, a. 3; S. c. Gent. II, c. 15, 16, III, c. 15. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2, a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question wars against the monstrous error of the Manichaeans and against all who posited several absolutely first principles. The errors of the Manichaeans are treated here in dub. 2; their vain opinion about the origin of souls is below at d. 18, a. 2, q. 2; likewise the origin of evil at d. 34, a. 1, q. 1; the repugnance of the flesh against the spirit at d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, and III *Sent.* d. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Scotus, *On the Principles of Things* q. 1, a. 1–4. — St Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 41, a. 1, 2; *De Potentia* q. 3, a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 15, 16, III, c. 15. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; *Summa* p. I, tr. 6, q. 29, m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
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**Articulus II preamble.** The brief *Consequenter quaeritur de principii unitate* paragraph at raw line 2412 belongs to ART. II as a structural opening and is rendered here as the prefatory paragraph under the *Articulus II* heading.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum primum principium produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.*

Secundo, supposito quod omnia sint ab uno principio, quaeritur, utrum illud produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.

**1.** Et quod mediante alio, videtur congruum. De liberalitate agentis est, ut non tantum communicet[^1] alii actum, sed etiam potentiam multiplicandi et diffundendi; sed Deus est agens liberalissimum: ergo videtur, quod primae creaturae, quam fecit, dederit potentiam faciendi aliam, et illa dat alii, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimam. Si dicas, quod creatura non est capax tantae potentiae; contra: maius est facere aliquid, cum[^2] est resistentia, quam ubi nulla; sed creatura in faciendo ex contrario habet resistentiam, in faciendo ex nihilo, nullam: ergo si capax est primae potentiae, et secundae.

**2.** Item, de nobilitate agentis est facere nobiliora opera per se ipsum, et minus nobilia per ministrum[^3], ut patet — decet enim regem iudicare, sed non decet eum coquinam facere — ergo si primus rex est nobilissimus et producit res, secundum quod decet eius nobilitatem, videtur, quod ipse debuerit unum producere, et per illud minus nobilia, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimum. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile de Deo et aliquo agente creato, quia Deus non perficitur ab aliquo opere; obiicitur, quod opus regiminis, propagationis et gubernationis divinum est, et tamen Deus regit et gubernat unam creaturam per aliam; et hoc est ad ostensionem suae nobilitatis: quare non similiter creat[^4]?

**3.** Item, ostenditur, quod necessarium sit ita esse, sic: omnis effectus, qui exit ab aliqua causa universali, exit ab ea vel per aliam causam propriam, vel per se ipsam appropriatam; sed Deus est causa universalissima, non valens arctari nec appropriari, cum nulla possit ei fieri additio: ergo cum producit multa, producit per aliam causam propriam.

**4.** Item, ego video, quod virtus unitatis est ad numeros infinitos; tamen unitas nullum numerum producit, quin producatur pariter a numero, qui immediate ipsam sequitur, scilicet dualitate — unde nullo modo unitas faceret ternarium numerum nisi per dualitatem, et sic in aliis procedendo — ergo videtur similiter, quod non procedit a Deo multitudo rerum, cum ipse sit summe unus, nisi per ipsas res[^5].

**Sed contra:**

**1.** Quod illud non sit congruum, videtur. Quantum homo recipit ab alio, in tantum ei tenetur; sed ad solum Deum tenetur creatura ex toto — solum enim Deum debet diligere homo ex toto corde[^6], et nihil aliud aequaliter — ergo solus Deus dat totum. Sed creatio est actio, in qua totum producitur: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, maius est rem de non-esse ad esse producere quam conservare et perficere: ergo si Deus mediante alio produceret res, videtur, quod mediante alio conservaret et perficeret: ergo res nullo modo Deo indigerent, ergo nec ad Deum tenderent. Sed omnia sunt bona, quia tendunt ad ipsum, et ordinata[^7]: ergo nihil esset bonum nec ordinatum; in quo enim principaliter est ratio finis, in eodem est ratio boni.

**3.** Item, quod sit impossibile, videtur. Impossibile est, creaturam agere se tota, cum nulla sit omnino simplex[^8]: ergo impossibile est, quod agat totum, ergo solum partem.

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**4.** Item, impossibile est, creaturam agere per potentiam infinitam; sed inter omnino nihil et aliquid est distantia infinita: ergo non potest reduci nisi ab agente virtutis infinitae; tale autem est solus Deus: ergo[^9] etc.

### *Conclusio.*

> Deus omnia immediate produxit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ponere, quod Deus produxerit res per aliud agens, est contra veritatem et contra fidem, sed solum per Filium suum: *Dixit enim, et facta sunt*[^10]; nec solum contra fidem, verum etiam contra rationem.

Et ponenti res omnes productas ex nihilo, omnino est contra rationem, ita ut non possit capi, quomodo agens potentiae finitae aliquid ex nihilo producat. Nec credo, aliquem philosophorum hoc posuisse.

Sed supposito potentiali sive materiali principio, plures fuerunt philosophi[^11] qui posuerunt ordinem in producendo gradatim descendendo hoc modo: Deus, cum sit omnino simplex, cuius actus est intelligere, non produxit nisi intelligentiam primam et unicam. Illa vero propter distare a primo[^12] intellexit se et primum, et ita aliquo modo fuit composita, et ita produxit orbem suum et intelligentiam secundi orbis; et sic deinceps usque ad orbem lunae et intelligentiam decimam, quae irradiat super animas rationales; et sicut ordo est in producendo, ita in irradiando.

— Sed iste error falsum habet fundamentum, videlicet quod materiale principium non sit productum, sicut supra probatum est[^13]. Item, falsam habet rationem. Dicit enim, quod, quia simplicissimus est Deus, non producit nisi unum; sed hoc magis est ad oppositum, quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius[^14], et quanto potentius, tanto in plura potest: ergo si Deus simplicissimus, hoc ipso potest in omnia sine medio.

Rursus, haec ratio repugnat eis. Si enim propter simplicitatem non producit nisi unum, cum intelligentia secunda sit simplicior inter omnes, unde venit[^15] in orbe eius maior varietas stellarum, quam in aliquo orbium inferiorum? Quia videtur per rationem suam, quod uniformes sint; et ita ratio positionis contradicit positioni.

Propter hoc dicendum, sicut dicit fides nostra, quod omnia in prima conditione immediate a Deo sunt producta. Quia enim creatio est totius substantiae secundum totum, ideo decuit esse solius Dei, nec potuit esse alterius sive per alterum, ut probant rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

**Ad argumenta.**

*Ad 1, 2.* Quod obiicitur de liberalitate et nobilitate, dicendum, quod tam liberalitas quam nobilitas supponit ordinem et possibilitatem in actu[^16]. In actu autem creationis non attenditur ordo; aequalis enim virtutis et dignitatis est producere asinum ex nihilo et Angelum, quia utrumque est infinitae potentiae. Non est etiam in hoc actu possibilitas creaturae, ut visum est[^17], propter infinitatem. Non sic est de actu regiminis et propagationis; ideo patet, quod non est simile.

Quod obiicitur, quod creatura est capax, quia non habet resistens; dicendum, quod in contrariis resistentia confert ad operationem. Praeterea, esto quod impediat, nihilominus habet iuvans, scilicet fundamentum et appetitum materiae; sed in creatione nullum habet iuvamentum; ideo difficilius: ideo non est locus a minori[^18], ut patet.

*Ad 3.* Quod obiicitur, quod causa universalis non potest in effectus proprios; dicendum, quod causa universalis, quae non est actus purus, indiget actualitate causae particularis; sed illa quae omnino est actus, simul habet in se rationem universalis causae et particularis, quia simul habet primitatem et actualitatem: ideo potest in multa, et secundum totum potest in illa[^19].

*Ad 4.* Quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unitas non potest in numeros posteriores sine prioribus; dicendum, quod nec in puncto est omnino potentia activa et sufficiens ad lineam, nec in unitate ad numerum. Nam ipsa unitas est potentia omnis numeri[^20], non potentia sufficiens per se, et ideo non omnino actualis, verum etiam aliquo modo passiva, quoniam est pars numeri.

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Deus autem in omnia potest potentia omnino activa, et ideo sine omni medio potest creare omnia.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the first principle produced all things by itself, or by means of another.*

Second, granted that all things are from one principle, the question is whether it produced all things by itself, or by means of another.

**1.** That it should be by means of another seems fitting. It belongs to the liberality of an agent not only to communicate[^1] an act to another, but also the power of multiplying and spreading; but God is the most liberal of agents: therefore it seems that to the first creature he made he gave the power of making another, and that one gives it to another, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that the creature is not capable of so great a power, the contrary: it is greater to make something where[^2] there is resistance than where there is none; but the creature in making out of a contrary has resistance, in making out of nothing has none: therefore if it is capable of the first power, it is also capable of the second.

**2.** Likewise, it belongs to the nobility of an agent to do the nobler works by itself and the less noble through a servant[^3], as is plain — for it befits a king to judge, but it does not befit him to do the cooking — therefore if the first king is the most noble and produces things in a manner befitting his nobility, it seems that he himself ought to produce one [creature], and through that [produce] the less noble ones, and so proceeding on to the last. If you say that it is not the same with God as with some created agent, because God is not perfected by any work, the objection is that the work of governing, propagating, and ruling is divine, and yet God rules and governs one creature through another; and this is to display his nobility: why does he not similarly create[^4]?

**3.** Likewise, it is shown that it is necessarily so, thus: every effect which proceeds from a universal cause proceeds from it either through another proper cause or through itself as appropriated; but God is the most universal cause, who cannot be narrowed or appropriated, since no addition can be made to him: therefore when he produces many things, he produces through another proper cause.

**4.** Likewise, I see that the power of unity reaches to infinite numbers; yet unity produces no number except that it be produced equally by the number which immediately follows it, namely duality — whence unity in no way would make the number three except through duality, and so proceeding in the rest — therefore similarly it seems that the multitude of things does not proceed from God, since he is supremely one, except through the things themselves[^5].

**On the contrary:**

**1.** That this should not be fitting, it seems. As much as a man receives from another, so much is he bound to him; but the creature is bound wholly to God alone — for man ought to love God alone with his whole heart[^6], and nothing else equally — therefore God alone gives the whole. But creation is an action in which the whole is produced: therefore etc.

**2.** Likewise, it is greater to produce a thing from non-being into being than to preserve and perfect it: therefore if God produced things by means of another, it seems that he would also preserve and perfect them by means of another: therefore things would in no way need God, therefore would not tend toward God. But all things are good because they tend toward him and are ordered[^7]: therefore nothing would be good or ordered; for in that in which the account of end principally lies, in the same lies the account of good.

**3.** Likewise, that it is impossible, it seems. It is impossible for a creature to act with its whole self, since none is wholly simple[^8]: therefore it is impossible that it act as a whole, therefore only as to a part.

**4.** Likewise, it is impossible for a creature to act through an infinite power; but between utter nothing and something there is an infinite distance: therefore it cannot be brought about except by an agent of infinite power; and such is God alone: therefore[^9] etc.

### *Conclusion.*

> God produced all things immediately.

**I respond:** It must be said that to posit that God produced things through another agent is against the truth and against the faith — except through his Son: *For he spoke, and they were made*[^10]; nor only against faith but also against reason.

And for one who posits that all things have been produced from nothing, it is altogether against reason — so much so that it cannot be conceived how an agent of finite power could produce anything from nothing. Nor do I believe any philosopher posited this.

But on the supposition of a potential or material principle, there were several philosophers[^11] who posited an order of production descending step by step in this way: God, since he is altogether simple, whose act is to understand, produced only one and unique first intelligence. That intelligence, on account of standing apart from the First[^12], understood itself and the First, and thus was in some way composite, and so produced its own sphere and the intelligence of the second sphere; and so on down to the sphere of the moon and the tenth intelligence, which irradiates upon rational souls; and as the order is in producing, so it is in irradiating.

— But this error has a false foundation, namely that the material principle is not produced, as has been proved above[^13]. Likewise, it has a false reasoning. For it says that, because God is most simple, he produces only one; but this rather tells against [their position], since the simpler something is, the more powerful[^14] it is, and the more powerful, the more it can do: therefore if God is most simple, by that very fact he can do everything without an intermediary.

Again, this reasoning is repugnant to them. For if on account of simplicity he produces only one, since the second intelligence is the simplest among them all, whence comes[^15] in its sphere a greater variety of stars than in any of the lower spheres? For by their own reasoning it seems that they should be uniform; and so the reasoning of the position contradicts the position itself.

On account of this it must be said, as our faith says, that all things in the first foundation were produced immediately by God. For since creation is of the whole substance as to its whole, it was therefore fitting that it belong to God alone, nor could it belong to another or be through another — as the reasons brought forward on this side prove.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1, 2.* What is objected concerning liberality and nobility, it must be said that both liberality and nobility presuppose order and possibility in act[^16]. But in the act of creation no order is regarded; for it is of equal power and dignity to produce an ass from nothing and an Angel, since either is [the work] of infinite power. Nor is there in this act any possibility on the part of the creature, as has been seen[^17], because of the infinity. It is not so with the act of governing and propagating; therefore it is plain that the cases are not alike.

What is objected, that the creature is capable [of creating], because it has no resistance; it must be said that in contrary things resistance contributes to operation. Besides, granted that it impedes, nonetheless one has helps, namely the foundation and the appetite of matter; but in creation there is no help; therefore it is more difficult: therefore there is no argument from the lesser[^18], as is plain.

*To 3.* What is objected, that a universal cause cannot reach to its proper effects; it must be said that a universal cause which is not pure act needs the actuality of a particular cause; but that which is altogether act has in itself at once the account of universal cause and particular cause, because it has at once priority and actuality: therefore it can reach to many things, and reach to them as to the whole[^19].

*To 4.* What is finally objected, that unity cannot reach to later numbers without the prior ones; it must be said that neither in the point is there an altogether active and sufficient power for the line, nor in unity for the number. For unity itself is the power of every number[^20], not a power sufficient by itself, and therefore not altogether actual but in some way also passive, since it is part of the number.

But God reaches to all things by an altogether active power, and therefore can create all things without any intermediary.

la: Vat. addit *se*.

en: The Vatican ms. adds *se* ("itself").

la: Nonnulli codd. ut P V W *aa* *nihil*. Paulo inferius Vat. verbis *ex contrario* praemittit *aliquid*.

en: Some codices (P, V, W, *aa*) read *nihil* ("nothing"). A little below the Vatican ms. before the words *ex contrario* prefaces *aliquid* ("something").

la: Sub simili respectu Dionys., *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 4. § 3. ait: *Quasi id ordo divinae legis sanxerit, ut per superiora ista quae inferiora sunt, ad divinum numen adducantur*.

en: With a similar regard Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 4, § 3, says: *As if the order of divine law had so sanctioned, that through these higher things those which are lower might be led to the divine majesty*.

la: Codd. *aa cc* et ed. 1 *creatur*.

en: Codices *aa*, *cc* and ed. 1 read *creatur* ("is he created" / passive).

la: Processus creaturarum a primo comparatur processui numeri ab unitate secundum Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 5. § 6: *Siquidem in unitate omnis numerus uniformiter praeexstitit, habetque unitas in se ipsa singulariter omnem numerum, et omnis numerus in unum copulatus est et in unitate est, et quanto longius ab unitate procedit, tanto magis dividitur et multiplicatur*. — Aliquanto superius post *ternarium* plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *numerum*, pro quo aliqui ut C L R T ponunt *et novum*, cod. *bb* *et nonum*, cui lectioni assentit Vat. legens *et novum, procedendo*; cod. Y exhibet lectionem nostram.

en: The procession of creatures from the First is compared to the procession of number from unity, according to Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 5, § 6: *Since in unity every number pre-exists uniformly, and unity has in itself singularly every number, and every number is coupled into one and is in unity, and the further it proceeds from unity, the more it is divided and multiplied*. — A little above, after *ternarium* several codices with ed. 1 omit *numerum*, for which some (C, L, R, T) put *et novum*, codex *bb* *et nonum*, with which reading the Vatican ms. agrees, reading *et novum, procedendo*; codex Y exhibits our reading.

la: Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. Cfr. August., *de Quant. animae*, c. 34. n. 78: *Deus igitur solus ei colendus est, qui solus eius est auctor*. — Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 4 *Deus creat* pro *Deus dat*, quod maior pars codd. cum edd. 1, 2 exhibet.

en: Deuteronomy 6:5; Matthew 22:37. Cf. Augustine, *On the Greatness of the Soul* c. 34, n. 78: *God alone, therefore, is to be worshipped by him whose author God alone is*. — Then not a few codices with ed. 4 read *Deus creat* ("God creates") for *Deus dat* ("God gives"), which the greater part of codices with eds. 1, 2 exhibits.

la: Cfr. August., *de Natura boni*, c. 1. seqq., et Boeth., *de Hebdomad.* seu *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint*. — De ultima prop. argumenti cfr. Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 2. seqq. et I. *Magn. Moral.* c. 2. seq., ubi ostendit, in ultimo fine summum consistere bonum. — Vat. *ut ordinata* pro *et ordinata*. Paulo inferius codd. Z *cc* cum ed. 1 *principalis* pro *principaliter*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good* c. 1ff., and Boethius, *De Hebdomadibus* or *How Substances are Good in That They Are*. — On the last proposition of the argument cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 2ff., and *Magna Moralia* I, c. 2f., where he shows that in the ultimate end the highest good consists. — The Vatican ms. reads *ut ordinata* for *et ordinata*. A little below codices Z, *cc* with ed. 1 read *principalis* for *principaliter*.

la: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 8. p. I. q. 2. et hic a. 1. q. 1. fund. 3.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 8, p. I, q. 2, and here at a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3.

la: Vide I. *Sent.* d. 43. q. 1. ad 4, ubi obiectio contra hoc argumentum solvitur.

en: See I *Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, ad 4, where an objection against this argument is resolved.

la: Psalm. 148, 5: *Ipse dixit, et facta sunt*. — Mox Vat. *Ponere enim* pro *Et ponenti*.

en: Psalm 148:5: *He spoke, and they were made*. — Then the Vatican ms. reads *Ponere enim* ("For to posit") for *Et ponenti* ("And for one positing").

la: Scil. Neoplatonici, inter quos eminent Plotinus (205-270 p. Chr.) et Proclus (411-485), ex cuius libro στοιχείωσις θεολογική etiam compositus est *liber de Causis*, in quo prop. 3, 9 et 16 eadem insinuatur opinio; nec non Arabes, quorum praecipui sunt: Alfarabi († 950), cuius opinionem invenies in eius operibus *de Intellectu et intellecto* (invenitur in ed. Venet. operum Avicennae, 1508) et in eiusdem *Fontibus quaestionum*, c. 6. seqq. (habetur in opere: *Documenta philosophiae Arabum*, auct. Schmoelders, Bonnae 1833); Avicenna, qui de hac re tractat in sua *Metaph.* IX. c. 4; Avicebron, qui de hac re scripsit in suo libro *de Forma et materia* sive *de Fonte vitae*, de quo cfr. B. Albert., *de Caus. et processu universitatis* I. tract. 1. c. 0; Averroes, qui Avicennae et suam opinionem breviter proponit in suo *Epitome in libros Metaph.* tract. 4.

en: Namely the Neoplatonists, among whom Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) and Proclus (411-485) are eminent — from whose book *Elements of Theology* (στοιχείωσις θεολογική) the *Book of Causes* was also composed, in which props. 3, 9, and 16 suggest the same opinion; likewise the Arabs, whose principal figures are: Alfarabi († 950), whose opinion you will find in his works *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* (found in the Venetian ed. of Avicenna's works, 1508) and in his *Fountains of Questions* c. 6ff. (contained in the work *Documents of Arabian Philosophy* by Schmoelders, Bonn 1833); Avicenna, who treats of this in his *Metaphysics* IX, c. 4; Avicebron, who wrote on this in his book *On Form and Matter* or *On the Fountain of Life*, on which cf. Bl. Albert, *On the Causes and Procession of the Universe* I, tract 1, c. 0; Averroes, who briefly proposes Avicenna's opinion and his own in his *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, tract 4.

la: Haec phrasis «*propter distare a primo*» iam occurrit in Aristot., II. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 59. (c. 10.): διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 180, nota 8. — Plures codd. ut I N X Z post *primo* adiungunt *principio*; dein cod. *cc* et ed. 1 ponunt *intellexit se ipsam* pro *intellexit se*, et paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H O R cum edd. 3, 4 *irradiabat* pro *irradiat*.

en: This phrase «*propter distare a primo*» ("on account of standing apart from the First") already occurs in Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 59 (c. 10): διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι ("on account of standing far off from the principle"). Cf. tom. I, p. 180, note 8. — Several codices (I, N, X, Z) after *primo* add *principio*; then codex *cc* and ed. 1 put *intellexit se ipsam* for *intellexit se*, and a little below several codices (C, H, O, R) with eds. 3, 4 read *irradiabat* ("was irradiating") for *irradiat* ("irradiates").

en: Article 1, question 1 [above].

la: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 3, ubi haec propositio explicatur.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 17, p. II, q. 2, ad 3, where this proposition is explained.

la: Cod. K *unde non erit*. — Ante *uniformes* supple *stellae*.

en: Codex K reads *unde non erit* ("whence it will not be"). — Before *uniformes* supply *stellae* ("the stars").

la: Scilicet in illo actu, in quo se manifestat liberalitas, et qui alteri communicatur. — Plures codd. ut F S *cc* cum edd. 1, 4 *in actum*; plures codd. ut R X Z *aa bb* omittunt *in actu*. Paulo inferius ex codd. I M Q U Z *aa cc* et ed. 1 pro *infinite* substituimus *est infinitae potentiae*; codd. F K *infinitae virtutis*.

en: Namely in that act in which liberality is manifested and which is communicated to another. — Several codices (F, S, *cc*, with eds. 1, 4) read *in actum* ("into act"); several codices (R, X, Z, *aa*, *bb*) omit *in actu*. A little below, on the faith of codices I, M, Q, U, Z, *aa*, *cc* and ed. 1, for *infinite* we substituted *est infinitae potentiae* ("it is of infinite power"); codices F, K read *infinitae virtutis* ("of infinite strength").

la: Hic in fundam. 4. — Sententia est: *Actus creandi nec est possibilis creaturae*.

en: Here at fundamentum 4 [of this question]. — The meaning is: *The act of creating is not even possible to a creature*.

la: De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: On this manner of arguing cf. tom. I, p. 835, note 5.

la: Plura de hoc vide I. *Sent.* d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 40. dub. 7.

en: See more on this at I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 2, ad 3, and d. 40, dub. 7.

la: Sequimur codd. F N *bb* ponentes *omnis numeri* pro *omnis numerus*, quae lectio non bene retineri potest propter constructionem grammaticalem sequentium propositionum, respectu quarum etiam in codd. invenitur mira varietas; sic cod. V *sufficiens per se et omnino actualis*, cod. M *sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis (omnino?) actualis*; plures codd. *et ideo actualis*; Vat. cum pluribus codd. *et ideo non solum actualis*; eadem Vat. cum paucis mss. post *actualis* addit *et omnino activa*. Dein aliqui codd. ut P Q *potestas numeri*, plures cum Vat. *potentia numeri* pro *quoniam est pars numeri*, quam lectionem ex codd. M *aa* (*bb* a secunda manu) in textum recepimus, et a qua cod. V cum ed. 1 in hoc recedit, quod omittit *quoniam est*.

en: We follow codices F, N, *bb*, which read *omnis numeri* ("of every number," genitive) for *omnis numerus* ("every number," nominative), since that reading cannot well be kept on account of the grammatical construction of the following propositions; with respect to which a marvellous variety is also found in the codices: thus codex V *sufficiens per se et omnino actualis* ("sufficient by itself and altogether actual"), codex M *sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis (omnino?) actualis* ("sufficient by itself, and therefore not every / wholly? actual"); several codices *et ideo actualis* ("and therefore actual"); the Vatican ms. with several codices *et ideo non solum actualis* ("and therefore not only actual"); the same Vatican ms. with a few mss. after *actualis* adds *et omnino activa* ("and altogether active"). Then some codices (P, Q) read *potestas numeri* ("the power of number"), several with the Vatican ms. *potentia numeri* ("the potency of number") for *quoniam est pars numeri* ("since it is part of the number"), which reading we have admitted into the text on the faith of codices M, *aa* (*bb* by a second hand), and from which codex V with ed. 1 departs in this, that it omits *quoniam est* ("since it is"). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex libris philosophorum Arabum multi errores irrepserunt etiam in scholas catholicas medii aevi, inter quos condemnatus fuit a Stephano Tempier, Parisiensi Episcopo, etiam hic: «Quod primum principium non potest immediate producere generabilia, quia sunt effectus novi. Effectus autem novi exigunt causam immediatam, quae potest aliter se habere» (D'Argentré, *Collect. iudicior.* t. I, pag. 190, cap. VI *de Deo*, n. 27.) et (ibid. n. 36.): «Quod effectus immediatus a primo debet esse unus tantum et simillimus primo» (cfr. etiam n. 30.).

Cum saepius articulorum censuratorum ab Episcopis Parisiensibus, cum consilio theologorum, mentionem fecerimus et facturi simus, non inutile erit, pauca de eis hic annotare. Prima istarum censurarum facta est a Gulielmo, Episcopo Parisiensi, a. 1240 in octava Epiphaniae, cum consilio doctorum, inter quos eminebat Alexander Hal. Haec censura reprobat 10 articulos, infra d. 23 in fine a S. Bonaventura integre recensitos; ipsa autem ab omnibus est recepta. Secundam censuram promulgavit Stephanus Tempier a. 1270, die Mercurii post festum S. Nicolai hiemalis, contra 13 articulos communiter reprobatos. Tertia ab eodem facta est post mortem SS. Thomae et Bonaventurae, a. 1276, dominica Laetare; et cum modo nominatis 13 reprobavit articulos 219. Hi articuli cum litteris Episcopi Stephani impressi sunt in citato libro *Collectio iudicior.* pag. 175-184. — Adiectis pluribus aliis in Anglia condemnatis, postea facta est collectio harum censurarum, secundum materiam in 22 capitula distributa. Haec autem collectio saepissime impressa est, praesertim in plurimis editionibus libri *Sententiarum* et in antiquis editionibus Commentatorum Lombardi. Magis correcti et cum multis observationibus editi sunt iterum in *Collectio iudicior.* pag. 184-225. — Sed imprimis observandum est, secundam Stephani censuram, licet plerumque manifestos errores philosophorum praesertim Arabum reprobet, tamen in nonnullis thesibus condemnandis limites veritatis et moderationis excessisse.

Nonnullae enim positiones S. Thomae, v. g. de Angelis, de unitate formae substantialis, vel directe vel indirecte impetuntur, ut videri potest in libro *Collectio iudiciorum*. Unde a non paucis viris doctis illius aetatis contra has censuras instantiae factae sunt, et a. 1324 vel 1325 (iuxta computationem anni civilis) ab altero Stephano Episc. Paris. omnes censurae revocatae sunt, «in quantum doctrinam B. Thomae praedicti, doctoris eximii, tangere possunt». — Hinc patet, ex istis censuris nullum praeiudicium fieri posse auctoritati doctrinae Angelici; nec nos, quando interdum veritatis historicae causa praedictos articulos citamus, ullam eis contra doctrinam S. Thomae auctoritatem tribuimus. Hoc semel dictum sufficiat.

**II.** Constat apud omnes doctores, soli Deo propriam esse potentiam creativam, et de facto ipsum solum omnia immediate creasse. Sed de quaestione, utrum possibile sit, quod Deus alicui creaturae communicet potentiam vel actum creandi, non eodem modo omnes sentiebant. Durandus (hic q. 4.) putat, probari non posse, impossibile esse, quod Deus suae creaturae communicet potentiam et actum creandi, non quidem secundum totum suum ambitum, sed ad aliquem specialem effectum. Alii ut Magister (IV. *Sent.* d. 5. c. 3.) docent, repugnare quidem, creaturam fieri causam creandi principalem, non vero, fieri causam instrumentalem. Alii recentiores iterum potentiam instrumentalem distinguunt in naturalem et obedientialem, de qua ultima opinantur, eam a Deo communicari posse. Quidquid sit de hac ultima opinione, communior sententia, cui suffragantur Alex. Hal., S. Thom., S. Bonav., Scot. aliique, simpliciter negat, hoc esse possibile. Cfr. S. Bonav., hic fundam. 3, 4, et d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in fine; III. *Sent.* d. 11. dub. 1, d. 40. dub. 3; I. *Sent.* d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad 6; IV. *Sent* d. 1. p. I. q. 4. in fine; et Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4; de Scoto cfr. Montefortino *Sum.* t. II. q. 65. a. 5.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 9. m. 7. 8. — Scot., IV. *Sent.* d. 1. q. 1; et *de Rerum princip.* q. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 6; Quodl. 4. q. 37. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** From the books of the Arab philosophers many errors crept also into the catholic schools of the Middle Ages, among which the following was condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in this very place: «That the first principle cannot immediately produce things that come to be, because they are new effects. But new effects require an immediate cause which can be otherwise» (D'Argentré, *Collectio iudiciorum* t. I, p. 190, ch. VI *On God*, n. 27); and (ibid. n. 36): «That an effect immediate from the First must be only one and most like the First» (cf. also n. 30).

Since we have often, and shall often, make mention of the articles censured by the Bishops of Paris with the counsel of the theologians, it will not be useless to note a few things about them here. The first of these censures was made by William, Bishop of Paris, in 1240 on the octave of Epiphany, with the counsel of doctors among whom Alexander of Hales was eminent. This censure rejects 10 articles, listed in full by St Bonaventure below at the end of d. 23; and it was received by all. The second censure was promulgated by Stephen Tempier in 1270, on the Wednesday after the feast of St Nicholas of winter, against 13 commonly rejected articles. The third was made by the same after the death of SS. Thomas and Bonaventure, in 1276, on Laetare Sunday; and along with the 13 already named, it rejected 219 articles. These articles together with Bishop Stephen's letters were printed in the cited book, *Collectio iudiciorum* pp. 175-184. — With many others condemned in England being added, a collection of these censures was afterward made, divided by subject matter into 22 chapters. This collection was very often printed, especially in many editions of the *Sentences* and in the old editions of the Commentators on Lombard. More correctly and with many observations it was again edited in the *Collectio iudiciorum* pp. 184-225. — But it must above all be noted that the second censure of Stephen, although for the most part it rejects manifest errors of the philosophers, especially the Arabs, nevertheless in some of its condemned theses exceeded the limits of truth and moderation.

For several positions of St Thomas — for example on the Angels, on the unity of the substantial form — are directly or indirectly attacked, as can be seen in the *Collectio iudiciorum*. Hence not a few learned men of that age lodged protests against these censures, and in 1324 or 1325 (according to the civil-year reckoning) all the censures were revoked by another Stephen, Bishop of Paris, «inasmuch as they can touch the doctrine of the said Blessed Thomas, that pre-eminent doctor». — Hence it is plain that no prejudice against the authority of the Angelic Doctor's teaching can come from those censures; nor do we, when we cite the said articles now and then for the sake of historical truth, attribute to them any authority against the doctrine of St Thomas. Let this once said suffice.

**II.** It is agreed among all the doctors that creative power belongs to God alone and that in fact he alone created all things immediately. But on the question whether it is possible that God should communicate the power or the act of creating to some creature, not all held the same view. Durandus (here q. 4) thinks that it cannot be proved impossible that God should communicate to his creature the power and act of creating — not indeed in its whole scope, but for some special effect. Others, like the Master (IV *Sent.* d. 5, c. 3), teach that it is repugnant indeed that a creature become a principal cause of creating, but not that it become an instrumental cause. Others among the more recent again distinguish the instrumental power into natural and obediential, and they hold that this last can be communicated by God. Whatever may be the case with this last opinion, the more common opinion, supported by Alexander of Hales, St Thomas, St Bonaventure, Scotus, and others, simply denies that this is possible. Cf. St Bonaventure, here at fundam. 3, 4, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 *in fine*; III *Sent.* d. 11, dub. 1; d. 40, dub. 3; I *Sent.* d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6; IV *Sent.* d. 1, p. I, q. 4 *in fine*; and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 4; for Scotus cf. Montefortino *Summa* t. II, q. 65, a. 5.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 9, m. 7, 8. — Scotus, IV *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1; and *On the Principles of Things* q. 6. — St Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 45, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 5. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 28, q. 6; Quodl. 4, q. 37. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 4.

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translators_notes:
**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** The Quaracchi edition restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk uses a single sequence 1–19 spanning pp. 28–29 for readability. Crosswalk:

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**Page-break placement.** Page-28 ↔ page-29 break placed before the fourth *sed contra* (after fundamentum 3 of *sed contra*) per the running-head transition at raw line 2691 (which reads *DIST. 1. P. I. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 29*). Page-29 ↔ page-30 placed before *Deus autem in omnia potest potentia omnino activa* per the running-head transition at raw line 2768 (*30 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.*).

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** The OCR contains editorial marginal glosses bleeding inline (e.g. `Ad oppositum`, `Sed contra`, `Conclusio`, `Respondeo`, `Error 1`, `Error 2`, `Dupliciter improbatur`, `Epilogus`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Ad confirmationem`); per CLAUDE.md these are not rendered as text or headings. Structural division is surfaced via bold numbering and `### Conclusio` / `### Scholion` section headings only.

**Open [?] flags for d.10 polish-blocker.** The dropped page-30 footer marker noted above. Otherwise the OCR for the q2 body and apparatus was clean.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0