title: Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether the name 'person' in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I. *De quidditate nominis persona.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomen persona in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.*

Et quod persona dicatur secundum substantiam, videtur:

1. Ex verbis Augustini septimo *de Trinitate*[^1]: «Idem est Deo esse et personam esse». Et iterum: «Cum dicimus personam Patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris»: ergo persona nihil aliud dicit quam substantiam, ergo persona dicitur secundum substantiam.

2. Item, Anselmus in fine *Monologii*[^2]: «Quot sunt personae, tot sunt substantiae»: ergo nomen personae dicitur secundum substantiam.

3. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore in libro *de Sacramentis*, in prima parte libri secundi[^3]: «Unum solum nomen est substantiale, quod de singulis dicitur singulariter, in summa tamen non dicitur singulariter, sed pluraliter pronuntiatur, ut *persona*»: ergo hoc nomen *persona* est nomen substantiale.

4. Item, Boethius in libro *de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi*[^4] personam definiens dicit, quod «est rationalis naturae individua substantia»; sed si substantia praedicatur in recto, et non per accidens, sed secundum se: tunc ergo persona dicit substantiam secundum omnes doctores.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, et hoc per divisionem. Boethius[^5] enim venando definitionem personae dicit, quod aut est substantia, aut accidens; et dicit, quod non est accidens: ergo substantia. Si igitur persona in his inferioribus dicit substantiam et quid per se existens: ergo et in Deo.

6. Item, hoc videtur per eius absolutionem, quoniam omne nomen, quod dicitur ad se, dicit substantiam in divinis, quia tale non secundum relationem dicitur; sed hoc nomen *persona* est huiusmodi. Hoc patet; et Augustinus dicit septimo *de Trinitate*[^6]: «Ad se quippe dicitur persona, ut *bonus* et *magnus*»: ergo etc.

7. Item, hoc videtur per Ecclesiae responsionem: quia omne nomen, quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam *per quid*, indicat substantiam, quia *quid* quaerit substantiam[^7]; sed hoc nomen *persona* ab Ecclesia haereticis responsum est quaerentibus, quid tres, sicut dicit[^8] Augustinus et Magister: ergo indicat substantiam.

8. Item, hoc videtur relationis abstractione. Intelligamus, quod nulla relatio sit in divinis, et quod in una sola hypostasi sit divina natura, sicut intelligunt gentiles; tunc constat[^9], quod adhuc est intelligere naturam intellectualem et habentem illam: ergo et personam et naturam: ergo si, circumscripta omni relatione, salvus est intellectus personae, persona non dicitur secundum relationem. Et dicitur secundum relationem vel secundum substantiam: ergo dicitur secundum substantiam.

**Contra:**

1. Boethius in libro *de Trinitate*[^10], in fine: «Si personae divisae sunt, necesse est vocabulum, quod ex personis trahit originem, ad substantiam non pertinere». Si ergo quae trahunt originem a personis non pertinent ad substantiam, multo fortius nec nomen personae.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore[^11] dicit, quod «persona idem est, quod per se existens, iuxta quendam singularis existentiae modum naturae rationalis»; sed singularis modus existentiae est relatio in divinis: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne nomen quod recipit multitudinem vel plurificationem, pertinet ad relationem, quia secundum omnes substantia semper remanet indivisa. Et Boethius[^12] dicit, quod «substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem»: si ergo nomen personae est multiplicabile, patet quod dicitur secundum relationem.

4. Item, omne nomen de se importans distinctionem dicitur secundum relationem; sed nomen personae de se importat distinctionem, quia persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta; et Boethius[^13] dicit, quod «est individua», et individuatio non est aliud quam distinctio: ergo etc.

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> **Conclusio.** *Persona in divinis dicitur tum secundum substantiam, tum secundum relationem; de generali intellectu dicitur principalius secundum substantiam quam secundum relationem; de speciali vero intellectu dicitur in Deo secundum relationem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt solvere distinguendo significationem *personae* secundum diversitatem numeri, ut in singulari diceretur secundum substantiam, in plurali secundum relationem[^14]. *(Opinio quorundam.)* — Sed haec solutio neque valet in se, neque ad propositum. *(Non probatur.)* In se quidem non valet, quia omne plurale geminat suum singulare[^15], ergo non mutat significationem. Ad propositum non valet, quia dicitur in singulari: *alia persona Patris, alia Filii*, quod dici non posset, si esset terminus substantialis, cum non sit *alia substantia Patris, alia Filii*.

Alii voluerunt solvere per distinctionem significationis secundum diversa tempora, videlicet, quod ante responsionem Ecclesiae diceretur substantialiter et secundum substantiam, post responsionem diceretur secundum relationem. *(Opinio aliorum.)* — Sed haec solutio in se non valet nec ad propositum. *(Improbatur.)* In se non valet, quia Ecclesia aliqua ratione respondit[^16] magis illud nomen quam aliud substantiale; et tunc non imposuit significationem: ergo responsio Ecclesiae nihil facit ad mutationem significationis. Ad propositum non valet, quia secundum significationem, quam habet post responsionem Ecclesiae, loquuntur doctores, et currunt rationes ad utramque partem.

Et propterea est intelligendum, quod *persona* dicitur *rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum*, secundum omnes, qui intelligunt eius significationem specialem; sed suppositum rationalis naturae constat esse substantiam, proprietatem distinguentem constat esse relationem. *(Sententia.)* Cum ergo persona utrumque importet, scilicet suppositum et proprietatem, necesse est dici secundum substantiam et secundum relationem. Et cum dicatur secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, principalius dicitur secundum substantiam, quantum est de generali et primo nominis intellectu. Persona enim dicit suppositum certum substantiae, sive in Deo, sive in creaturis. Et huic consonat ipse[^17] modus dicendi a parte nominis.

Sed quantum est ex speciali et ultimo nominis intellectu, quia dicit suppositum distinctum proprietate, quae est relatio, dicitur in Deo secundum relationem. Et hinc est, quod Sancti et doctores dicunt, nomen personae secundum substantiam dici, licet etiam secundum relationem dicatur.

Sed obiiciet aliquis: cum isti modi, scilicet *dici secundum substantiam*, et *dici secundum relationem*, dividant nomina divina[^18] ex opposito, ut videtur; aut non poterunt inveniri in eodem, aut illud nomen implicat in se opposita. — Et propterea intelligendum, quod, sicut dicit Richardus de sancto Victore[^19], *dici secundum substantiam* est dupliciter: aut indicando substantiam secundum naturam communem, et sic dicitur *homo* secundum substantiam; aut indicando substantiam ut suppositum certum, ut *quidam homo*. Primo modo dicere substantiam est dicere *quid*, secundo modo est dicere *aliquem*. Dico ergo, quod nomen essentiae vel substantiae dicitur secundum substantiam, quia indicat naturam communem; sed persona dicitur secundum substantiam, quia indicat suppositum certum et distinctum. Natura autem communis non multiplicatur nec refertur; et ideo quod dicit substantiam secundum naturam communem, ita dicitur ad se, quod nullo modo potest dici secundum relationem; et hoc quidem modo dividitur ex opposito. Suppositum autem sive hypostasis natum est plurificari et ad aliud comparari et ita referri. Et quod sic dicitur secundum substantiam, nihil impedit ratione relationis superadditae dici secundum relationem; et hoc vult dicere Richardus de sancto Victore.

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Patet ergo responsio ad obiecta omnia secundum utramque partem. Concedendum est enim, nomen personae secundum substantiam dici, ut explicatum est, sicut dicunt Sancti et rationes probant; ita enim intelligunt dici secundum substantiam. Concedendum est nihilominus, dici secundum relationem, licet non ita principaliter, sicut probant rationes sequentes, quoniam multitudo relationum plurificat ipsam personam.

*(Solutio ad 7.)* 7. Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur, quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam *per quid*, quia ex hoc[^20] posset concludi, quod non tantum dicit substantiam ut suppositum, sed etiam ut naturam communem: dicendum, quod *quid* aliquando quaerit essentiam supposito, *quid est quod per nomen dicitur*, ut: *quid est homo?* Et quod respondetur ad hanc quaestionem indicat substantiam pure et essentiam, quando est quaestio de substantia. Aliquando, supposita voce indeterminate, quaerit, *quid per nomen dicitur*, sicut si dicatur: *Brunellus currit*, et quaeratur: *quid Brunellus?* utrum scilicet homo, vel asinus. Aliquando, supposita quidditate et significatione, quaerit de eo, respectu cuius dicitur nomen dependens, ut si dicatur: *albi currunt*, et[^21] quaeratur, *quid albi?* potest responderi: *homines*, vel *asini*. Et hoc modo quaesierunt haeretici: *quid tres?* Quia beatus Ioannes dixerat in prima Canonica, capitulo quinto[^22]: *Tres sunt qui testimonium dant* etc., quaesierunt: *quid tres?* — cum sit adiectivum sine substantivo; et tunc magis quaerit suppositum quam essentiam — et ideo suppositum est responsum, et hoc per nomen *persona*. Unde, Spiritu sancto suggerente, peroptime et nobiliter et catholice, sicut dicit Richardus[^23], respondit Ecclesia; et valde bene et instinctu Spiritus sancti, sicut dicit Richardus, magis respondit hoc nomen quam aliud.

*(Quaestio incidens.)* Sed tunc posset quaeri: quare haereticus non quaesivit per hoc interrogativum *qui*? et videtur quod debuisset. Si enim quaerebat de supposito, et *qui* quaerit de supposito; debuit quaerere: *qui tres*?

*(Solutio.)* Et ad hoc est responsio, quod *qui* quaerit de supposito certo, sive reali; et de illo non quaerebant, quia in eadem auctoritate subditur[^24]: *Pater, Verbum et Spiritus sanctus*; sed quaerebant de supposito, respectu cuius hoc quod est *tres* significatur in adiacentia: et ideo magis quaesierunt: *quid tres*, quam *qui tres*. Sic enim oportuit unico nomine respondere, et ipsi hoc quaerebant.

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8. Ad ultimum argumentum, quia non recte procedit, patebit melius infra[^25] responsio. Tamen haec potest dici, quod, etsi intellectus personae possit abstrahi ab hac proprietate determinate, tamen de suo generali[^26] intellectu, claudit intellectum proprietatis; et quia in divinis proprietas est relatio, ideo intellectu[^27] claudit relationem. Unde sicut haec persona in divinis, quae est Pater, non potest abstrahi a paternitate, quae est relatio personalis, salva sua personalitate; sic nec persona a relationis intellectu in generali. Et sic patet, quod non sequitur, quod dicatur secundum substantiam tantum.

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the quiddity of the name "person."*

### Question I. *Whether the name "person" in the divine is said according to substance or according to relation.*

And that "person" is said according to substance is shown thus:

1. From the words of Augustine in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*[^1]: «It is the same for God to be and to be a person». And again: «When we say the person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father»: therefore "person" says nothing other than substance, therefore "person" is said according to substance.

2. Likewise, Anselm at the end of the *Monologion*[^2]: «As many as are the persons, so many are the substances»: therefore the name "person" is said according to substance.

3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor in his book *On the Sacraments*, in the first part of the second book[^3]: «The only substantial name there is, which is said of singulars singularly but in the sum total is not said singularly but is pronounced plurally, is *persona*»: therefore this name *persona* is a substantial name.

4. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*[^4], defining "person," says that «it is an individual substance of rational nature»; but if "substance" is predicated in the direct case [*in recto*], and not by accident but according to itself: then therefore "person" expresses substance according to all the doctors.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, and this through division. For Boethius[^5], hunting out the definition of "person," says that it is either a substance or an accident; and he says that it is not an accident: therefore a substance. If therefore "person" in these lower things expresses substance and a "what" existing through itself: therefore also in God.

6. Likewise, this is shown through its absolute character, since every name which is said *of itself* [*ad se*] expresses substance in the divine, because such a name is not said according to relation; but this name "person" is of this kind. This is plain; and Augustine says in the seventh [book] *On the Trinity*[^6]: «For "person" is said *of itself*, like *good* and *great*»: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, this is shown through the response of the Church: because every name which is conveniently given in answer to a question made *through what* [*per quid*] indicates substance, since *what* asks for substance[^7]; but this name "person" was given by the Church in answer to the heretics asking *what are the three?*, as Augustine and the Master[^8] say: therefore it indicates substance.

8. Likewise, this is shown by the abstraction of relation. Let us understand that there is no relation in the divine, and that the divine nature is in one sole hypostasis, as the gentiles understand; then it is plain[^9] that there is still to be understood an intellectual nature and one having that [nature]: therefore both a person and a nature: therefore if, with all relation circumscribed, the understanding of "person" is preserved, "person" is not said according to relation. And it is said either according to relation or according to substance: therefore it is said according to substance.

**On the contrary:**

1. Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*[^10], at the end: «If the persons are divided, it is necessary that the term which draws its origin from the persons does not pertain to substance». If therefore those things which draw their origin from the persons do not pertain to substance, much more so does not the name "person."

2. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor[^11] says that «"person" is the same as that which exists through itself, according to a certain singular mode of existence of rational nature»; but the singular mode of existence in the divine is relation: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is shown by reason, since every name which receives multitude or plurification pertains to relation, because according to all [doctors] substance always remains undivided. And Boethius[^12] says that «substance contains unity, [and] relation multiplies the trinity»: if therefore the name "person" is multipliable, it is plain that it is said according to relation.

4. Likewise, every name importing distinction of itself is said according to relation; but the name "person" of itself imports distinction, since "person" is a hypostasis distinct by a property; and Boethius[^13] says that «it is individual», and individuation is nothing other than distinction: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *"Person" in the divine is said both according to substance and according to relation; in its general understanding it is said more principally according to substance than according to relation; but in its special understanding it is said in God according to relation.*

**I respond:** It must be said that some have wished to resolve [this] by distinguishing the signification of "person" according to diversity of number, so that in the singular it would be said according to substance, in the plural according to relation[^14]. *(Opinion of certain ones.)* — But this solution is valid neither in itself nor for the matter at hand. *(Not proved.)* In itself it is not valid, because every plural doubles its singular[^15], therefore it does not change its signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because it is said in the singular: *the person of the Father is one, [the person] of the Son is another*, which could not be said if it were a substantial term, since *the substance of the Father is not one, [the substance] of the Son another*.

Others have wished to resolve [it] by a distinction of signification according to different times, namely that before the response of the Church it would be said substantially and according to substance, [but] after the response it would be said according to relation. *(Opinion of others.)* — But this solution is not valid in itself nor for the matter at hand. *(Disproved.)* In itself it is not valid, because the Church for some reason gave[^16] that name [as response] rather than another substantial one; and then it did not impose the signification: therefore the response of the Church does nothing for the change of signification. For the matter at hand it is not valid, because the doctors speak according to the signification which it has after the response of the Church, and the reasonings on either side proceed.

And therefore it must be understood that *"person"* is said [to be] *a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property*, according to all who understand its special signification; but it is established that the supposit of rational nature is substance, [and] it is established that the distinguishing property is relation. *(The author's view.)* Since therefore "person" imports both, namely the supposit and the property, it must be said both according to substance and according to relation. And while it is said according to substance and according to relation, it is said more principally according to substance, as far as concerns the general and primary understanding of the name. For "person" expresses a definite supposit of substance, whether in God or in creatures. And to this corresponds the very[^17] mode of speaking on the side of the name.

But as far as concerns the special and ultimate understanding of the name, since it expresses a supposit distinct by a property, which is relation, it is said in God according to relation. And hence it is that the Saints and doctors say that the name "person" is said according to substance, although it is also said according to relation.

But someone will object: since these modes, namely *being said according to substance* and *being said according to relation*, divide the divine names[^18] oppositionally, as it seems; either they will not be able to be found in the same [name], or that name implies opposites in itself. — And therefore it must be understood that, as Richard of St. Victor[^19] says, *being said according to substance* is twofold: either by indicating substance according to the common nature, and thus *man* is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a definite supposit, like *a certain man*. In the first mode, to express substance is to express a *what*; in the second mode it is to express a *someone*. I say therefore that the name of essence or substance is said according to substance, because it indicates the common nature; but "person" is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit. The common nature, however, is not multiplied nor referred; and therefore that which expresses substance according to the common nature is so said *of itself* [*ad se*] that it can in no way be said according to relation; and in this mode indeed it is divided oppositionally. But the supposit or hypostasis is by nature plurified and compared to another and so referred. And what is so said according to substance, nothing prevents [it] from being said according to relation by reason of a superadded relation; and this is what Richard of St. Victor wishes to say.

The response, then, is plain to all the objections on either side. For it must be conceded that the name "person" is said according to substance, as has been explained, as the Saints say and the reasons prove; for thus they understand "to be said according to substance." Nevertheless it must be conceded that it is said according to relation, although not so principally, as the following reasonings prove, since the multitude of relations plurifies the person itself.

*(Solution to 7.)* 7. To that, however, which is objected, that it is given in answer to a question made *through what*, since from this[^20] it could be concluded that it expresses substance not only as supposit but also as common nature: it must be said that *what* sometimes asks for the essence with a supposit assumed, *what is that which is said by the name?*, as: *what is man?* And what is given in answer to this question indicates substance purely and essence, when it is a question concerning substance. Sometimes, with the term assumed indeterminately, it asks *what is said by the name?*, as if it be said: *Brunellus is running*, and one asks: *what [is] Brunellus?*, namely whether man or ass. Sometimes, with the quiddity and signification assumed, it asks concerning that with respect to which the dependent name is said, as if it be said: *the white things are running*, and[^21] it be asked, *what [are] the white things?* — one can answer: *men*, or *asses*. And in this mode the heretics asked: *what [are] the three?* Because the blessed John had said in the first Canonical [letter], chapter five[^22]: *There are three who give testimony* etc., they asked: *what [are] the three?* — since it is an adjective without a substantive; and then it asks for the supposit more than for the essence — and therefore the supposit was the answer, and this through the name "person." Whence, the Holy Spirit prompting, the Church responded most excellently and nobly and catholically, as Richard[^23] says; and very well and by the prompting of the Holy Spirit, as Richard says, it answered with this name rather than with another.

*(Incidental question.)* But then it could be asked: why did the heretic not ask through this interrogative *who*? and it seems that he ought to have. For if he was asking concerning the supposit, and *who* asks concerning the supposit, he ought to have asked: *who [are] the three?*

*(Solution.)* And to this the response is that *who* asks concerning a definite or real supposit; and concerning that they were not asking, because in the same authority is added[^24]: *the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit*; but they were asking concerning the supposit with respect to which this which is *three* is signified in adjacency: and therefore they asked rather *what [are] the three* than *who [are] the three*. For thus it was fitting to answer with a single name, and they were asking this.

8. To the last argument, since it does not proceed rightly, the response will appear better below[^25]. Yet this can be said, that, even if the understanding of "person" can be abstracted from this property determinately, nevertheless from its general[^26] understanding it includes the understanding of property; and since in the divine the property is relation, therefore [in this] understanding[^27] it includes relation. Whence just as this person in the divine, which is the Father, cannot be abstracted from paternity, which is the personal relation, with its personality preserved; so neither [can] "person" [be abstracted] from the understanding of relation in general. And thus it is plain that it does not follow that it is said according to substance only.

la: Cap. 6. n. 11. — Etiam textus subsequens invenitur ibid. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 2. — Vat. omittit primam conclusionem: *ergo persona* etc.

en: Chapter 6, no. 11. — The text following is also found there. Cf. here the *littera* of the Master, c. 1 and 2. — The Vatican [edition] omits the first conclusion: *therefore "person"* etc.

en: Chapter 78.

la: Cap. 4: *Ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut Deus et similia. Hoc enim solum nomen est, quod cum dicatur de singulis ad se, pluraliter non singulariter accipiatur in summa. Dicimus namque, quod Pater est persona, et Filius persona, et Spiritus sanctus persona. Pater tamen et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non una persona, sed tres.*

en: Chapter 4: *For "person" is said of itself, not toward the Son or toward the Holy Spirit, as "God" and similar [names]. For this is the only name which, although it is said of singulars of itself, is received in the sum total plurally, not singularly. For we say that the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person. Yet the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one person, but three.*

la: Cap. 3. — Paulo inferius post *in recto* codd. H bb addunt *et*.

en: Chapter 3. — A little below, after *in recto* codices H bb add *et* ("and").

la: Loc. cit. c. 2: *Investiganda igitur sunt haec inquirentibus hoc modo: quoniam praeter naturam non potest esse persona, quoniam quae naturae dicuntur, aliae substantiae sunt, aliae accidentes; et videmus, personam in accidentibus non posse constitui. Quis enim dicat, ullam albedinis vel nigredinis vel magnitudinis esse personam? Relinquitur ergo, ut personam in substantiis dici conveniat.* — Immediate ante Vat. male et praeter fidem codd., excepto solo cod. cc, *definitionem* pro *divisionem*.

en: Loc. cit. c. 2: *These things therefore are to be investigated by inquirers in this manner: since besides nature there cannot be a person, [and] since of those things which are called natures, some are substances, others accidents; and we see that a person cannot be constituted among accidents. For who would say that there is any person of whiteness or blackness or magnitude? It remains therefore that "person" be fittingly said among substances.* — Immediately before, the Vatican [edition], wrongly and against the faith of the codices (with the sole exception of cod. cc), [reads] *definitionem* in place of *divisionem*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 11. — De maiori huius argumenti vide August., V. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 9. *Per absolutionem eius*, intellige: quia habet esse absolutum, non relativum. — Paulo superius post *tale* cod. W addit *nomen*.

en: Chapter 6, no. 11. — On the major of this argument, see Augustine, V *On the Trinity* c. 8, no. 9. *Through its absolute character* — understand: because it has absolute being, not relative. — A little before, after *tale* ("such") cod. W adds *nomen* ("name").

la: Cfr. Aristot., II *Poster.* c. 1. seq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 1 ff.

la: Hic in lit. c. 2, ubi et verba Augustini indicantur.

en: Here in the *littera* c. 2, where the words of Augustine are also indicated.

la: Vat. cum solo cod. cc *contingit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc [reads] *contingit* ("it happens") [in place of *constat*].

la: Melius in libro: «*Utrum Pater et Filius ac Spiritus sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur*», seu «*de Praedicatione trium personarum*», quem scripsit ad Ioannem, diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae. In ipso textu editio post *divisae sunt* adiungit: *substantia vero indivisa*; plures codd. ut IS ee H cum ed. 1 *trahat* pro *trahit*.

en: Better [referenced] in the book «*Whether the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are predicated of the divinity substantially*», or «*On the Predication of the Three Persons*», which he wrote to John, deacon of the Roman Church. In the text itself the edition after *divisae sunt* ("they are divided") adds: *substantia vero indivisa* ("but the substance undivided"); many codices such as IS ee H with ed. 1 [read] *trahat* in place of *trahit*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 24: *Fortassis erit planius et ad intelligentiam expeditius, si dicimus, quod persona sit existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum.* — Vat. cum cod. cc *unde* pro *Item*.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity*, c. 24: *Perhaps it will be plainer and more expeditious for understanding if we say that a person is that which exists through itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence.* — The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *unde* ("whence") in place of *Item* ("likewise").

la: Libr. *de Trin.* c. 6; in quo textu post *relatio* cod. bb cum antiquioribus edd. Boethii addit *vero*. — Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *semper*.

en: Book *On the Trinity*, c. 6; in which text, after *relatio* cod. bb with the older editions of Boethius adds *vero* ("indeed"). — A little before, the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc omits *semper* ("always").

la: Libr. *de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, c. 3. Vide supra arg. 1. ad opp. — De definitione personae immediate praemissa cfr. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et infra a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo superius post *sed* aliqui codd. ut G K P Q aa bb inserunt *hoc*, et codd. aa bb post *nomen* adiiciunt *scilicet*; dein Vat. cum solo cod. cc post *personae* omittit *de se*.

en: Book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*, c. 3. See above arg. 1 *ad oppositum*. — On the definition of "person" immediately preceding, cf. the *littera* of the Master, c. 3, and below a. 1, q. 2, ad 1. — A little above, after *sed* some codices such as G K P Q aa bb insert *hoc* ("this"), and codices aa bb after *nomen* add *scilicet* ("namely"); then the Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc after *personae* omits *de se* ("of itself").

la: Huius nec non et secundae sententiae, infra subsequentis, fuisse videtur Magister, hic c. 2. Cfr. S. Thom., *de Potent.* q. 9. a. 1.

en: Of this view, and likewise of the second view following below, the Master here, c. 2, seems to have been [the source]. Cf. St. Thomas, *On the Power [of God]*, q. 9, a. 1.

la: Vide Priscian., V. *Grammat.* c. 9.

en: See Priscian, V *Grammar*, c. 9.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *respondet*; mox cod. R *aliquod nomen substantiale* pro *aliud substantiale*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] *respondet* ("responds") [in place of *respondit* ("responded")]; soon after, cod. R [reads] *aliquod nomen substantiale* ("some substantial name") in place of *aliud substantiale* ("another substantial [name]").

la: Vat. cum solo cod. cc omittit *ipse*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc omits *ipse* ("itself").

la: Multi codd. ut A C F K L O T Y etc. cum antiquis edd. (exc. 1.) *nomen divinum*. Dein non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent *potuerunt* pro *poterunt*, omisso insuper primo *aut*.

en: Many codices such as A C F K L O T Y etc. with the old editions (except ed. 1) [read] *nomen divinum* ("the divine name") [in place of *nomina divina*]. Then not a few codices with ed. 1 exhibit *potuerunt* in place of *poterunt*, with the first *aut* ("either") moreover omitted.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 19, ubi dicit: *Timentes itaque, ubi non est timor, recte timerent fateri, personas secundum substantiam dici, si persona simpliciter substantiale esse significaret, nec aliquid consignificaret. Significat autem, habentem substantiale esse ex aliqua singulari proprietate. Ideo ergo fidenter fatemur, personas in divinitate secundum substantiam dictas et substantiam significare, et plures ibi personas, non plures substantias esse; quia sunt ibi plures habentes unum et indifferens esse ex differenti proprietate. Unitas itaque ibi est iuxta modum essendi, pluralitas iuxta modum existendi; unitas essentiae, quia unum et indifferens esse; plures personae, quia plures existentiae.*

en: Book IV *On the Trinity*, c. 19, where he says: *Fearing therefore where there is no fear, they would rightly fear to confess that the persons are said according to substance, if "person" simply signified substantial being, and did not co-signify anything else. But it does signify [a being] having substantial being from some singular property. Therefore we confidently confess that the persons in the divinity are said according to substance and signify substance, and [we confess] that there are several persons there, [but] not several substances; because there are there several [supposits] having one and indifferent being out of differing property. So unity there is according to the mode of being, plurality according to the mode of existence; unity of essence, because [one] one and indifferent being; many persons, because many existences.*

la: Vat., refragantibus codd. et ed. I, *et ex hoc potest concludi*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with the codices and ed. I resisting, [reads] *et ex hoc potest concludi* ("and from this it can be concluded") [in place of *quia ex hoc posset concludi*].

la: Vat. cum cod. cc non incongrue hic repetit *si*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, not incongruously, here repeats *si* ("if").

la: Vers. 7.

en: Verse 7.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* c. 5. (quoad sensum), ubi et sequens textus exstat. — In primo textu cod. *notabiliter* pro *nobiliter*, et aliquot codd. cum Vat. hic et in secundo textu *respondet* pro *respondit*. — Paulo ante Vat. cum cod. cc *et sic per hoc nomen* pro *et hoc per nomen*.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity*, c. 5 (as to sense), where the following text also stands. — In the first text a codex [reads] *notabiliter* ("notably") in place of *nobiliter* ("nobly"), and a few codices with the Vatican here and in the second text [read] *respondet* in place of *respondit*. — A little before, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] *et sic per hoc nomen* ("and thus through this name") in place of *et hoc per nomen* ("and this through the name").

la: *Epist. I. Ioan.* c. 5, 7. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 *significat* pro *significatur*.

en: *First Epistle of John*, c. 5, [v.] 7. — Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the faith of the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *significat* ("it signifies") in place of *significatur* ("it is signified").

la: Dist. 27. p. I. q. 3. — Paulo ante Vat., paucis codd. suffragantibus, *quod non recte procedat* pro *quia non recte procedit*.

en: Distinction 27, p. I, q. 3. — A little before, the Vatican [edition], with a few codices supporting, [reads] *quod non recte procedat* ("that it does not proceed rightly") in place of *quia non recte procedit* ("since it does not proceed rightly").

la: Vat. *speciali*, refragantibus codd. nec non sex primis edd., insuper et repugnante contextu.

en: The Vatican [edition] [reads] *speciali* ("special"), with the codices and the first six editions resisting, and moreover with the context conflicting.

la: Codd. et edd. *speciali*. Sed ex contextu et doctrina in respons. explicata visum est nobis constare, ponendum esse *in generali*.

en: The codices and editions [read] *speciali* ("special"). But from the context and the doctrine explained in the response, it has seemed to us evident that *in generali* ("in the general") must be put.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supra, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1, iam nonnulla de etymologia et significatione termini *persona* dicta sunt. Hic speciales de eadem re quaestiones solvuntur, et non pauca de ipsa ratione personae ponuntur. Non inutile esse putamus, iis quae supra in Scholio ad d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. de conceptu huius termini dicta sunt, haec addere.

1. In respons. legitur, «*quod persona dicitur rationalis naturae suppositum proprietate distinctum*». Haec definitio, saepius a Seraphico repetita, sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 3. De Angelis S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. dicit: «*Quemadmodum individualis discretio est existentia formae naturalis in materia, sic personalis discretio est existentia naturae nobilis et supereminentis in supposito*»; et ibid. q. 3: «*Individuatio igitur in creatura consurgit ex duplici principio; personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem. In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum ex quibus resultat ipsum quod est; secundum dignitatem dicit principaliter rationem formae*». Attendendum etiam est, quod iuxta Seraphicum substantiae spirituales altiorem gradum in genere substantiae et subsistentiae obtinent quam corporales. Nam II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. ait: «*Et quoniam quod pure est in genere substantiae plus participat de natura per se stantis et independentis, quod autem plus accedit ad naturam accidentium magis elongatur: hinc est, quod substantiae spirituales per prius et verius sunt substantiae, deinde corpora superiora, postremo corpora inferiora*». Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1, et ibid. d. 5. passim, sed praecipue a. 2. q. 2. ad 1, ubi S. Doctor, totam suam de hac re doctrinam in epitomen colligens, dicit, quod «*individuum in notificatione personae tripliciter importat distinctionem, videlicet singularitatis, incommunicabilitatis et supereminentis dignitatis*», quae membra divisionis deinde accuratius explicantur.

2. Fides orthodoxa de Trinitate et Incarnatione docet, faciendam esse aliquam distinctionem tum in Deo, tum in creaturis intellectualibus inter personam et naturam. Loquendo de personis creatis, talis esse debet haec distinctio, quod in Christo completa esse possit singularis natura humana, quin habeat personam humanam; ex quo patet, personalitatem sive subsistentiam non pertinere ad praedicatum constitutivum naturae. In hoc etiam omnes doctores conveniunt, ipsam importare aliquem ultimum actum, substantiam perficientem vel terminantem, quo ipsa redditur omnino incommunicabilis. Quid autem praecise sit illud, quod persona addat super naturam, utrum aliquid reale, an ens rationis; utrum res, an modus; utrum quid positivum, an negativum, haec quaestio et doctores et scholas magnopere divisit. Duae opiniones extremae communiter reprobantur, scilicet et opinio, quae tribuitur Durando, quod illud additum nihil sit nisi ens rationis, et opposita Caietani, quod ipsum naturae addat entitatem absolutam, realiter a natura distinctam. Scotus probabile esse putat, rationem formalem personae consistere in privatione duplicis communicabilitatis, scilicet ut *quod est* et ut *quo est* (cfr. hic in quaest. sequente ad 3.), quae tamen connotat realitatem positivam, super quam istae negationes fundantur. Scotum autem etiam aliam sententiam probabilem aestimare, patet ex ipsius verbis (III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) et testimoniis plurium Scotistarum, ut Lycheti, Rada (controv. 22. a. 2.), Mastrii et aliorum. Communior sententia, cui favent S. Bonaventura et S. Thomas, asserit, personam addere super naturam aliquid positivum, quod a natura distinguitur non ut res a re, sed ut modus substantialis (Bonav., I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. in corp. circa finem). S. Bonav. (hic a. 2. q. 1. in corp.) respectu opinionis a Scoto approbatae explicite dicit: «*Quia privatio illa in persona magis est positio quam privatio*» (cfr. ibid. q. 2. ad. 3, a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 2; et de persona in Deo I. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 1.). Utramque sententiam longiore discursu in concordiam redigere conatur Hauzeur (*Collatio* tom. II. col. 267–277).

**II.** Prima huius distinctionis quaestio duas partes habet. In prima parte problema, in titulo quaestionis indicatum, reiectis duabus falsis solutionibus, resolvitur in eo sensu, quod persona utrumque importat, i. e. suppositum (sive substantiam primam) et relationem. Sed quid principalius? Respondet S. Bonav. cum eadem distinctione, qua utitur S. Thom. (S. I. q. 29. a. 4.), scilicet quod persona accepta in generali et primo intellectu huius nominis (S. Thomas: «in communi») principalius dicit substantiam, in speciali vero, ut haec persona divina, significat relationem.

In secunda parte solvitur obiectio, quod modi praedicandi secundum substantiam et relationem ita sint oppositi, ut non sint compossibiles in eodem subiecto. Responsio eruitur ex distinctione Aristotelica inter substantiam *primam* («suppositum certum») et secundam («essentiam»). Ex verbis S. Doctoris minime sequitur (quod nonnulli ei voluerunt impingere), personas divinas constitui per absolutas realitates. Constanter enim docet Seraphicus, quod in intellectu suppositi divini clauditur intellectus proprietatis, quae in divinis est relatio. Etiamsi igitur persona dicat substantiam primam in recto, tamen connotat relationem (cfr. solut. ad 1. et ult.). — Notandum autem, quod sicut substantia in duplici sensu accipitur, sic etiam relatio: vel enim, quatenus est relatio actu referens, vel ut est relatio subsistens, sive per modum hypostasis (S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 4.). Si accipitur primo modo, relatio in ratione personae manifeste importatur tantum in obliquo; si autem accipitur secundo modo, recte dicitur cum S. Thoma (ibid.), quod persona in Deo significat relationem in recto et essentiam in obliquo. Hac supposita distinctione, explicatur diversus modus de hac re loquendi apud ipsum S. Thomam (*De potent.* q. 9. a. 4.) et S. Bonaventuram.

Obiect. 7. eodem modo solvitur a S. Thoma (loc. cit. *Summae* ad 2.).

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 36. m. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 1. 2. — Durand., I. Sent. q. 29. a. 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 23. a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, some things have already been said about the etymology and signification of the term *persona*. Here special questions on the same matter are resolved, and not a few things are set down concerning the very ratio of person. We think it not useless to add these things to those which were said above in the Scholion to d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 concerning the concept of this term.

1. In the response it is read, «*that "person" is said [to be] a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property*». This definition, often repeated by the Seraphic [Doctor], is taken from Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 36, m. 3. On the Angels, St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, says: «*Just as individual discreteness is the existence of natural form in matter, so personal discreteness is the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in a supposit*»; and ibid. q. 3: «*Individuation, then, in a creature arises from a twofold principle; but personal discretion expresses singularity and dignity. Insofar as it expresses singularity, it expresses this from the very conjunction of principles from which results that-which-is; according to dignity it expresses principally the account of the form*». It must also be attended to that according to the Seraphic [Doctor] spiritual substances obtain a higher grade in the genus of substance and subsistence than do bodily ones. For in II *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in corp. he says: «*And since what is purely in the genus of substance participates more in the nature of that which stands through itself and is independent, while that which approaches more to the nature of accidents is more remote: hence it is that spiritual substances are by priority and more truly substances, then the higher bodies, lastly the lower bodies*». Cf. III *Sent.* d. 1, a. 1, and ibid. d. 5 throughout, but especially a. 2, q. 2, ad 1, where the Holy Doctor, gathering his whole doctrine on this matter into an epitome, says that «*the individual in the notification of "person" imports threefold distinction, namely of singularity, incommunicability, and supereminent dignity*», which members of the division are then more accurately explained.

2. The orthodox faith concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation teaches that some distinction must be made, both in God and in intellectual creatures, between person and nature. Speaking of created persons, this distinction must be such that in Christ there can be a complete singular human nature without His having a human person; from which it is plain that personality or subsistence does not pertain to the constitutive predicate of nature. In this also all the doctors agree, that it [personality] imports some ultimate act, perfecting or terminating substance, by which it is rendered altogether incommunicable. But what precisely it is that "person" adds beyond nature — whether something real or a being of reason; whether thing or mode; whether something positive or negative — this question has greatly divided both doctors and schools. Two extreme opinions are commonly rejected, namely the opinion attributed to Durandus, that the addition is nothing but a being of reason, and the opposing opinion of Cajetan, that it adds to the nature an absolute entity, really distinct from the nature. Scotus thinks it probable that the formal account of person consists in the privation of a twofold communicability, namely as *that which is* and as *that by which it is* (cf. here in the following question, ad 3), which nevertheless connotes a positive reality upon which these negations are founded. That Scotus also esteemed another opinion probable is plain from his own words (III *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1) and from the testimonies of several Scotists, such as Lychetus, Rada (*controv.* 22, a. 2), Mastrius and others. The more common opinion, which St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas favor, asserts that "person" adds beyond nature something positive, which is distinguished from nature not as thing from thing, but as a substantial mode (Bonav., I *Sent.* d. 34, q. 1, in corp. near the end). St. Bonaventure (here a. 2, q. 1, in corp.), with regard to the opinion approved by Scotus, explicitly says: «*Because that privation in person is more a position than a privation*» (cf. ibid. q. 2, ad 3; a. 1, q. 2; III *Sent.* d. 10, a. 1, q. 2; and on person in God, I *Sent.* d. 34, a. 1, q. 1). To reduce both opinions into harmony in a longer discourse Hauzeur attempts (*Collatio* tom. II, col. 267–277).

**II.** The first question of this distinction has two parts. In the first part the problem indicated in the title of the question, two false solutions having been rejected, is resolved in this sense: that "person" imports both, i.e. supposit (or first substance) and relation. But which is more principal? St. Bonaventure replies with the same distinction which St. Thomas uses (*Summa* I, q. 29, a. 4), namely that "person" taken in the general and primary understanding of this name (St. Thomas: «in common») more principally expresses substance, but in the special [understanding], as this divine person, signifies relation.

In the second part is resolved an objection, that the modes of predicating according to substance and according to relation are so opposed that they are not compatible in the same subject. The response is drawn from the Aristotelian distinction between *first* substance («definite supposit») and second («essence»). From the words of the Holy Doctor it does not follow in the least (which some have wished to fasten upon him), that the divine persons are constituted by absolute realities. For the Seraphic [Doctor] constantly teaches that in the understanding of the divine supposit is included the understanding of the property, which in the divine is relation. Although therefore "person" expresses first substance in the direct case, nevertheless it connotes relation (cf. solut. ad 1 and last). — But it is to be noted that just as substance is taken in a twofold sense, so also relation: either, namely, insofar as it is a relation actually referring, or as it is a subsistent relation, or by the mode of a hypostasis (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 29, a. 4). If it is taken in the first mode, relation in the account of person is manifestly imported only in the oblique [case]; but if it is taken in the second mode, it is rightly said with St. Thomas (ibid.) that "person" in God signifies relation in the direct case and essence in the oblique. With this distinction supposed, the diverse mode of speaking concerning this matter in St. Thomas himself (*De potentia* q. 9, a. 4) and St. Bonaventure is explained.

Objection 7 is solved in the same way by St. Thomas (loc. cit. of the *Summa*, ad 2).

**III.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 36, m. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica; *Reportata* here q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1, a. 3; *Summa* I, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 53, q. 1, 2. — Durandus, I *Sent.* q. 29, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, I *Sent.* d. 23, a. 2; *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 25, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as 'an individual substance of rational nature,' and whether this account fits the divine persons

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum recte a Boethio definita sit persona, quod sit rationalis naturae individua substantia, et utrum haec ratio conveniat divinis personis.*

Secundo quaeritur de hoc nomine *persona*, quid sit secundum definitionem; et definit eam Boethius[^1] sic: «*Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*». Et quod ista definitio sit conveniens divinae personae, ostenditur:

1. Per intentionem auctoris, quia Boethius intendit agere de persona Christi; constat autem, personam Christi esse increatam: ergo intendit assignare rationem personae divinae sive increatae.

2. Item, quod haec sit ratio personae[^2] in divinis, videtur: nam in Deo constat ponendum esse suppositum incommunicabile, et hoc suppositum est substantia divina, et hoc etiam est rationalis naturae; et non convenit ei, nisi de quo dicitur *persona*: ergo est eius ratio, ut videtur.

**Contra:**

1. Omnis definitio dicit aggregationem, cum constet ex pluribus[^3], alioquin esset ibi nugatio; in simplici autem nulla est aggregatio: ergo nullum simplex est definibile. Sed persona in divinis est omnino simplex: ergo etc. Si dicas, secundum quod dicunt aliqui, quod quamvis sit simplex secundum rem, tamen non est simplex secundum rationem; *contra*: aut illi rationi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; si aliquid: ergo aliqua compositio est in re; si nihil: ergo ratio omnino vana est. Sed propter rationem vanam non est aliquid definiendum: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione suarum partium non videtur convenire divinae personae. Nam *rationale* est differentia animalis: ergo cui non convenit esse animal, non convenit natura rationalis. Sed animal non convenit Deo, cum sit species corporis: ergo nec hoc quod est *rationale*.

3. Item, videtur quod *substantia* non dicatur in recto de persona, quia, multiplicato definito, necesse est multiplicari[^4] definitionem et partes definitionis: ergo si persona est substantia, cum sint plures personae, ergo plures substantiae. — Si tu dicas, quod *substantia* stat ibi pro hypostasi; *contra*: hypostasis dicitur substantia individua, sicut dicit Boethius[^5]: ergo sicut est nugatio, si diceretur: *homo rationalis*, sic et in praedicta notificatione. — Quaeritur ergo, utrum hoc nomen *substantia* stet pro communi, vel pro hypostasi[^6].

4. Item, videtur non esse convertibilis. Nam anima hominis est naturae rationalis substantia individua: ergo etc. — Ultimo quaeritur, cum assignentur diversae definitiones de *persona*, quomodo differunt.

> **Conclusio.** *Definitio illa Boethii est bona et conveniens divinis personis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex intentione auctoris, haec definitio personae convenit et assignatur divinae personae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod *simplex non est definibile*; dicunt aliqui, quod dupliciter est aliquid definire. Uno modo in recto et per differentiam dicentem positionem, ut cum dicitur: *homo est animal rationale, mortale*; et hoc modo verum est, quod definitio dicit aggregationem et compositionem, et hoc modo solum[^7] aggregatum est definibile. Alio modo contingit aliquid definire in obliquo et per differentiam dicentem privationem, ut cum dicitur: *simitas est curvitas nasi*; et tunc non significatur, substantiam rei aggregari ex diversis, quoniam quod ponitur in obliquo non intrat essentiam de necessitate. Ulterius, differentia privans non ponit aliquam compositionem sive appositionem; et talis est dicta

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ratio. Nam hoc quod *rationalis naturae*[^8] cadit in obliquo, et haec differentia *individua* non ponit, sed privat. — Sed haec responsio non potest stare. Primum quidem, quia quod definitur per obliquum, aut definitur sicut *accidens* per substantiam, aut sicut per *rem eiusdem generis*; sed sive sic, sive sic, est ibi additio. Nam definitiones accidentium, sicut dicit Philosophus[^9], sunt ex additamento. Similiter, si per *rem eiusdem generis*; tunc ergo intrat essentiam et non dicit totam, cum sit pars definitionis: ergo necesse est, illud quod apponitur, aliquid addere secundum rem, et ita sive in recto, sive in obliquo necesse est dicere aggregationem.

Et propter hoc dicendum aliter, quod haec ratio, intellecta de persona creata, est notificatio dicens aggregationem. In Deo autem non dicit aggregationem secundum rem, sed secundum intelligendi rationem; quae tamen non est vana, eo quod omnia, quae dicuntur in ratione personae, inveniuntur in Deo, licet non per diversitatem. — Et hoc quidem potest intelligi sic. In creaturis specificatio per additionem complentem est[^10], individuatio per additionem sive appositionem contrahentem. Et ideo, cum dicitur *substantia individua*, *individuum* realiter addit supra substantiam, unde[^11] et substantia individua supra naturam; et ideo necesse est, esse compositam personam in creatura. Sed in Deo est individuatio vel distinctio per solam originem. Et quia persona oritur se ipsa, ideo nulla est ibi omnino[^12] additio, sed plurificatio, et per plurificationem distinctio et individuatio; et ideo nec *individua* addit supra *substantiam*, nec *substantia* supra *naturam*. Ideo vere dicitur[^13] et vera est ratio intelligendi; et notificatio ista convenit personae divinae, nec significatur in ea aliqua compositio; unde tenet rationem cuiusdam notificationis et cadit a ratione definitionis, quia nec Deus nec divina persona est definibilis, est tamen cognoscibilis et notificabilis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de differentiis positis, sive de membris, dicendum, quod *rationale* dicitur uno modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi bonum a malo, verum a falso — et sic Deo et creaturae convenit; alio modo, quod habet potentiam discernendi per inquisitionem et collationem et discursum — et hoc est animae coniunctae carni. Et sic differentia talis primo modo ponitur in definitione, sed secundo modo obiicit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *substantia individua* dicitur in recto; dicendum, quod numeratur, sicut persona. Nam, sicut dicit Anselmus[^14], plures substantiae sunt individuae, sicut plures personae.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *substantia* stet pro communi aut pro hypostasi, consuevit tripliciter responderi.

Primo modo sic, quod *substantia* stet pro communi. Et si tu obiicias, quod illa non individuatur; dicunt, quod differentia adveniens respicit substantiam ratione suppositi, non ratione formae, ut patet, cum dicitur: *animal individuum*. — Sed haec responsio non videtur conveniens, quia[^15] hoc nomen *substantia*, secundum quod stat pro communi, non supponit personam. Unde haec est falsa: *essentia generat*; et haec: *substantia generat*.

Secundo modo dicitur, quod *substantia* ibi tantum valet quantum *hypostasis*; nec est nugatio. Nam individuatio attenditur in persona quantum ad triplicem incommunicabilitatem[^16], scilicet *per praedicationem*, et haec convenit hypostasi; et *per compositionem*, quia non est alteri componibilis; et *per unionem*, prout aliquid unitur digniori. Et ita differentia *individua* dicit istas duas incommunicabilitates[^17]. Unde patet, quod non est ibi nugatio: patet

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etiam, quod definitio est convertibilis. Per istam duplicem incommunicabilitatem excluditur anima hominis, quae est alii componibilis, et humana natura in Christo, quae est unita digniori. — Sed tamen, licet illud rationabiliter sit dictum, adhuc restat quaestio de hypostasi, quia hypostasis est *substantia individua*. Quaeritur similiter, quomodo ibi accipiatur *substantia*, et non potest accipi pro communi, nec pro hypostasi.

Et propter hoc dicitur tertio, quod hoc nomen *substantia* stat ibi, secundum quod *substantia* dividitur in substantiam primam et secundam, et ita in quadam communitate ad substantiam universalem et particularem; et illud colligunt ex verbis Boethii, quando venatur definitionem personae per praedictam divisionem substantiae, ut ibi patet. Unde hoc nomen *individua* coarctat illam indifferentiam illius nominis, ut stet pro substantia prima; et sic non est ibi nugatio nec substantiae communis individuatio.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de assignatione definitionum, dicendum, quod persona definitur a Boethio sic: *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*; a Richardo sic: *persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia*. Definitur etiam alio modo sic: *persona est existens per se solum iuxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum*. A magistris definitur sic: *persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente*. — Et notanda est differentia harum definitionum: quia Boethius et magistri definiunt *personam*, secundum quod communiter dicitur in Deo et in creaturis; sed Boethius magis considerat rationem rei, magistri vero adhuc rationem translationis. Definitiones vero Richardi sunt personae, prout est in divinis praecipue; sed una est propria assignatio, alia vero definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio. — Posset tamen dici, quod omnes idem dicunt, differunt tamen secundum modum dicendi; quia definitio Boethii fuit data et videbatur improprietatem sonare; ideo posuit Richardus aliam magis per propria verba; et sic usque ad quartam.

english:
### Question II. *Whether person is rightly defined by Boethius as «an individual substance of rational nature», and whether this account fits the divine persons.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning this name *person*, what it is according to definition; and Boethius[^1] defines it thus: «*Person is an individual substance of rational nature*». And that this definition is fitting for the divine person is shown:

1. By the intention of the author, since Boethius intends to treat of the person of Christ; but it is established that the person of Christ is uncreated: therefore he intends to assign the account of the divine or uncreated person.

2. Likewise, that this is the account of person[^2] in the divine, is shown thus: for in God it is established that there must be posited an incommunicable supposit, and this supposit is the divine substance, and this is also of rational nature; and it [the account] does not fit anything except that of which *person* is said: therefore it is its account, as it seems.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every definition expresses an aggregation, since it consists of several [parts][^3], otherwise there would be empty repetition there; but in what is simple there is no aggregation: therefore nothing simple is definable. But person in the divine is altogether simple: therefore etc. If you say, according to what some say, that although it is simple in reality, yet it is not simple in account; *on the contrary*: either to that account something corresponds in reality, or nothing; if something: therefore there is some composition in reality; if nothing: therefore the account is altogether empty. But on account of an empty account nothing is to be defined: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, by reason of its parts it does not seem to fit the divine person. For *rational* is the differentia of *animal*: therefore for that to which it does not fit to be an animal, rational nature does not fit. But *animal* does not fit God, since it is a species of body: therefore neither does this which is *rational*.

3. Likewise, it seems that *substance* is not said in the direct case of person, because, the defined being multiplied, the definition and the parts of the definition must be multiplied[^4]: therefore if person is a substance, since there are several persons, therefore [there will be] several substances. — If you say that *substance* there stands for *hypostasis*; *on the contrary*: hypostasis is called an individual substance, as Boethius[^5] says: therefore just as it is empty repetition if one were to say *rational man*, so also in the aforesaid notification. — It is asked therefore, whether this name *substance* stands for the common [nature] or for *hypostasis*[^6].

4. Likewise, it seems not to be convertible. For the soul of man is an individual substance of rational nature: therefore etc. — Lastly inquiry is made, since diverse definitions of *person* are assigned, how they differ.

> **Conclusion.** *That definition of Boethius is good and fitting for the divine persons.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is plain from the intention of the author, this definition of person is fitting and is assigned to the divine person.

1. To that, however, which is objected, that *what is simple is not definable*; some say that to define something is twofold. In one mode, in the direct case and through a differentia expressing position, as when it is said: *man is a rational, mortal animal*; and in this mode it is true that the definition expresses aggregation and composition, and in this mode only[^7] what is aggregated is definable. In another mode, it happens that something is defined in the oblique case and through a differentia expressing privation, as when it is said: *snubness is curvature of the nose*; and then it is not signified that the substance of the thing is aggregated from diverse [things], since what is placed in the oblique case does not necessarily enter into the essence. Further, a privative differentia does not posit any composition or apposition; and such is the account in question.

For this which is *of rational nature*[^8] falls in the oblique case, and this differentia *individual* does not posit but privates. — But this response cannot stand. First, indeed, because what is defined through the oblique [case] is either defined as *accident* through substance, or as through a *thing of the same genus*; but whether thus or thus, there is addition there. For the definitions of accidents, as the Philosopher[^9] says, are by way of addition. Likewise, if through a *thing of the same genus*; then therefore it enters into the essence and does not express the whole, since it is part of the definition: therefore it is necessary that what is added add something according to the thing, and so whether in the direct or in the oblique case it is necessary to express aggregation.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, that this account, understood of created person, is a notification expressing aggregation. But in God it does not express aggregation according to the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; which nevertheless is not empty, because all things which are said in the account of person are found in God, although not by way of diversity. — And this indeed can be understood thus. In creatures specification is by completing addition[^10], individuation by contracting addition or apposition. And therefore, when it is said *individual substance*, *individual* really adds beyond *substance*, whence[^11] also *individual substance* [adds] beyond *nature*; and therefore it is necessary that the person in a creature be composite. But in God individuation or distinction is by origin alone. And since the [divine] person arises from itself, therefore there is no addition there at all[^12], but plurification, and through plurification distinction and individuation; and therefore neither does *individual* add beyond *substance*, nor *substance* beyond *nature*. Therefore truly it is said[^13] and it is a true account of understanding; and this notification fits the divine person, nor is any composition signified in it; whence it holds the account of a certain notification and falls short of the account of definition, since neither God nor the divine person is definable, yet [each] is knowable and notifiable.

2. To that which is objected concerning the differentiae set down, or concerning the members [of the definition], it must be said that *rational* is said in one way [of that] which has the power of discerning good from evil, true from false — and thus it fits both God and creature; in another way [of that] which has the power of discerning by inquiry and collation and discourse — and this belongs to the soul joined to flesh. And so such a differentia in the first mode is placed in the definition, but in the second mode the objection raises [its difficulty].

3. To that which is objected, that *individual substance* is said in the direct case; it must be said that it is numbered, just as person [is]. For, as Anselm[^14] says, there are many individual substances, just as there are many persons.

To that which is asked, whether this name *substance* stands for the common [nature] or for *hypostasis*, it has been customary to respond in three ways.

In the first way thus, that *substance* stands for the common. And if you object that that [common nature] is not individuated; they say that the supervening differentia regards substance by reason of the supposit, not by reason of the form, as is plain when it is said: *individual animal*. — But this response does not seem fitting, because[^15] this name *substance*, insofar as it stands for the common, does not supposit for [a] person. Whence this is false: *the essence generates*; and this: *the substance generates*.

In the second way it is said that *substance* there is worth as much as *hypostasis*; nor is there empty repetition. For individuation in person is regarded with respect to a threefold incommunicability[^16], namely *by predication* — and this fits the hypostasis; and *by composition*, since [the hypostasis] is not combinable with another; and *by union*, insofar as something is united to a more worthy [nature]. And thus the differentia *individual* expresses these two incommunicabilities[^17]. Whence it is plain that there is no empty repetition there: it is plain

also that the definition is convertible. By this twofold incommunicability is excluded the soul of man, which is combinable with another, and the human nature in Christ, which is united to a more worthy [nature]. — But yet, although that has been reasonably said, there still remains the question concerning *hypostasis*, since hypostasis is *individual substance*. Likewise it is asked how *substance* is taken there, and it cannot be taken for the common [nature], nor for the hypostasis.

And on account of this it is said in a third way, that this name *substance* stands there in the way that *substance* is divided into first and second substance, and so in a certain commonness toward universal and particular substance; and they gather this from the words of Boethius, when he hunts the definition of person through the aforesaid division of substance, as is plain there. Whence this name *individual* contracts that indifference of that name, so that it stands for first substance; and thus there is neither empty repetition there nor individuation of common substance.

4. To that which is lastly asked concerning the assignation of definitions, it must be said that person is defined by Boethius thus: *person is an individual substance of rational nature*; by Richard thus: *person is an incommunicable existence of intellectual nature*. It is also defined in another way thus: *person is something existing through itself alone according to a certain singular mode of rational existence*. By the masters it is defined thus: *person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility*. — And the difference of these definitions is to be noted: because Boethius and the masters define *person* according as it is said commonly in God and in creatures; but Boethius considers more the account of the thing, while the masters [consider] further the account of the transferred [signification]. But Richard's definitions are of person as it is in the divine especially; but one is the proper assignation, the other [is] the exposition or correction of Boethius's definition. — Yet it could be said that all say the same thing, [but] differ according to the manner of speaking; because Boethius's definition was given and seemed to sound an impropriety; therefore Richard set down another more by proper words; and so on up to the fourth.

la: Libr. *de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, c. 3.

en: Book *On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ*, c. 3.

la: Adiecimus ex cod. W *personae*. — Paulo inferius cod. M cum ed. 1 *individua* pro *divina*; cod. T in marg. exhibet: *hoc suppositum est idem quod substantia divina*.

en: We have added *personae* ("of person") from cod. W. — A little below, cod. M with ed. 1 [reads] *individua* in place of *divina*; cod. T in the margin exhibits: *this supposit is the same as the divine substance*.

la: Secundum Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 33. et 43. (VI. c. 10. 12.), definitio est ratio (sermo) habens partes, quae sunt genus et differentia.

en: According to Aristotle, VII *Metaphysics*, text 33 and 43 (VI, c. 10, 12), a definition is a ratio (account) having parts, which are genus and differentia.

la: Vat. cum uno vel altero cod. *multiplicare*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] *multiplicare* ("to multiply") [in place of *multiplicari* ("to be multiplied")].

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt hanc quaestionem, ad quam tamen infra in solutione ad 3. datur responsio; quare cum Vat. eam in textum recepimus.

en: The codices with ed. 1 omit this question, to which nevertheless below in the solution to 3 a response is given; for which reason with the Vatican [edition] we have received it into the text.

la: Vat., favente solo cod. cc, *cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with only cod. cc favoring, [reads] *cum diversae sint definitiones sive assignentur de persona* ("since there are diverse definitions or [they] are assigned of person").

la: In compluribus codd. desideratur *naturae*, et mox post vocem *differentia* ed. I addit *quae est*.

en: In several codices *naturae* ("of nature") is missing, and soon after, after the word *differentia* ed. I adds *quae est* ("which is").

la: Libr. VII. *Metaph.* text. 12. (VI. c. 4.). — Paulo superius aliqui codd. ut S T Z, *per subiectum* pro *per substantiam*. Inferius post *totam* cod. R adiungit *rationem*.

en: Book VII *Metaphysics*, text 12 (VI, c. 4). — A little above, some codices such as S T Z [read] *per subiectum* ("through the subject") in place of *per substantiam* ("through the substance"). Below, after *totam* ("the whole"), cod. R adds *rationem* ("the account").

la: Cod. Y: *In creaturis specificatio fit per differentiam vel per additionem complentem*.

en: Cod. Y: *In creatures specification takes place through a differentia or through completing addition*.

la: A cod. abest *unde*.

en: From a codex *unde* ("whence") is absent.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, voci *ideo* praemisso *et*, omittit omnino. Immediate ante cod. O originem *habet a se ipsa* pro *oritur se ipsa*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, with *et* ("and") prefixed to the word *ideo* ("therefore"), omits [*omnino* ("at all")] altogether. Immediately before, cod. O [reads] *habet a se ipsa* ("has [its origin] from itself") in place of *oritur se ipsa* ("arises from itself") for *originem*.

la: Supple: *definitio illa Boethii*. — Mox vocula *ista* desideratur in plurimis mss. nec non in ed. I.

en: Supply: *that definition of Boethius*. — Soon after, the little word *ista* ("this") is missing in very many mss. and also in ed. I.

la: *Monolog.* c. 78: *Quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae*.

en: *Monologion* c. 78: *As many as are the persons, so many are the individual substances*.

la: Complures codd. ut G H T Z *cum*, et consequenter deinde *supponat* pro *supponit*.

en: Several codices such as G H T Z [read] *cum* ("when/since"), and consequently then *supponat* (subjunctive) in place of *supponit* (indicative).

la: *Incommunicabilitas* opponitur *communicabilitati*, quae duplex est, scilicet *ut quod* et *ut quo*. Per primam communicatur superius inferiori per identitatem et essentialiter, ut animal communicatur homini et praedicatur de homine. *Communicabilitas ut quo* fit per informationem, vel saltem ad modum formae. Haec est triplex, cui opponitur triplex incommunicabilitas. Prima fit per identitatem, ut natura communicatur suis suppositis et universale inferioribus; et tunc quod communicatur *ut quo* est etiam communicatum *ut quod*; unde est etiam praedicatio in primo modo dicendi, ut *Petrus est homo*. Secunda fit per compositionem in ratione formae et materiae, vel accidentis et subiecti. Hac communicatione id cui communicatur, non fit ipsum communicatum, sed aliquid tale, v. g. corpus, vivens etc. Tertia fit per unionem, ut natura humana Christi communicatur Verbo, ut ab illo sustentetur; quae unio non est proprie per informationem nisi secundum quandam analogiam. His tribus modis communicabilitatis respondet triplex incommunicabilitas; et his tribus modis persona est incommunicabilis. Cfr. S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. ad 7, et Scotus, III. Sent. d. I. q. 1. n. 9. et seqq. — Paulo infra pro *alteri* cod. S *alii*.

en: *Incommunicability* is opposed to *communicability*, which is twofold, namely *as that which* [*ut quod*] and *as that by which* [*ut quo*]. By the first, the superior is communicated to the inferior by identity and essentially, as *animal* is communicated to *man* and is predicated of *man*. *Communicability as that by which* takes place by information, or at least after the manner of form. This [latter] is threefold, to which is opposed a threefold incommunicability. The first takes place by identity, as a nature is communicated to its supposits and a universal to its inferiors; and then what is communicated *as that by which* is also communicated *as that which*; whence there is also predication in the first mode of saying, as *Peter is man*. The second takes place by composition in the account of form and matter, or of accident and subject. By this communication, that to which it is communicated does not become the very communicated [thing], but something such, e.g. body, living thing, etc. The third takes place by union, as the human nature of Christ is communicated to the Word, so as to be sustained by Him; which union is not properly by information except according to a certain analogy. To these three modes of communicability corresponds a threefold incommunicability; and in these three modes person is incommunicable. Cf. St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1, ad 7, and Scotus, III *Sent.* d. I, q. 1, n. 9 and following. — A little below, in place of *alteri* ("to another") cod. S [reads] *alii* (synonymous "to another").

la: Scil. secundam et tertiam. — Vat. cum pluribus codd. hic et paulo infra *incommunitates* pro *incommunicabilitates*.

en: Namely the second and the third. — The Vatican [edition] with several codices here and a little below [reads] *incommunitates* in place of *incommunicabilitates*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Scotus (I. *Sent.* d. 23. q. unic.) definitionem Boethii hic positam reprobat eique aliam Richardi substituit, quod «*persona est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia*». Haec tamen, ut dicit S. Bonav. (ad 1.), est «*definitionis Boethii expositio sive correctio*». Cum aliqua expositione definitio Boethii communiter recipitur, et eodem modo explicatur ab Angelico et Seraphico. In specie explicatione indigent vocabula *substantia* et *individua*, de quo vide solut. ad 3. De primo vocabulo S. Doctor cum S. Thoma (S. I. q. 29. a. 1. ad 2.) asserit, quod accipitur «nec praecise pro substantia prima (hypostasi), nec pro substantia secunda («pro communi», id est essentia), sed accipitur communiter, prout dividitur per primam et secundam» (S. Thom. loc. cit.). — Vocabulum *individua* non potest hic significare *singulare*; tunc enim sequeretur, quod humana Christi natura esset persona humana, quod est haeresis; et insuper, quod anima separata esset persona, quod communiter non approbatur. Dicendum igitur, quod *individua* stat pro *incommunicabilis*.

Notanda sunt ultima verba solutionis ad 1. — Ultima obiectio ideo non est soluta, quia ex dictis iam manifestum est, quod *individua* ibi dicitur pro *incommunicabilis*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; S. I. q. 29. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. I; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. Med., a. hic a. I. q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. q. I. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 23. q. I.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 23, q. unica) rejects the definition of Boethius set down here and substitutes for it another of Richard, namely that «*person is an incommunicable existence of intellectual nature*». This [definition], however, as St. Bonaventure says (ad 1), is «*the exposition or correction of the definition of Boethius*». With some exposition the definition of Boethius is commonly received, and is explained in the same way by the Angelic [Doctor] and the Seraphic [Doctor]. In particular, the words *substance* and *individual* require explanation, on which see solut. ad 3. On the first word the Holy Doctor with St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2) asserts that it is taken «neither precisely for first substance (hypostasis), nor for second substance ('for the common,' that is, the essence), but is taken commonly, insofar as it is divided through first and second» (St. Thomas, loc. cit.). — The word *individual* cannot here signify *singular*; for then it would follow that the human nature of Christ would be a human person, which is heresy; and moreover, that the separated soul would be a person, which is not commonly approved. It must therefore be said that *individual* stands for *incommunicable*.

The last words of the solution to 1 are to be noted. — The last objection is therefore not [explicitly] resolved, since from what has been said it is already manifest that *individual* there is said for *incommunicable*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 56, m. 3. — Scot., in both *Scripta* I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. I; *Summa* I, q. 29, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. I; *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 2. — Petrus a Tar., here q. I, a. I. — Richard. Med., here a. I, q. 2, 3. — Aegidius Rom., here I, princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 33, q. I. — Durand., I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., I *Sent.* d. 23, q. 2. — Biel, I *Sent.* d. 23, q. I.

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