title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum essentiale sit mendacio esse peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Augustini, contra Mendacium[^1], qui dicit sic: « Videtur mihi omne genus mendacii esse peccatum ».

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^2]:

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« Aut non est credendum bonis, aut credendum est eis quos credimus debere aliquando mentiri, aut non est credendum, bonos aliquando mentiri; quorum primum est *pernitiosum*, secundum *stultum*: restat ergo, ut nunquam mentiantur boni ». Si ergo aliquis mentitur, necesse est, in quantum mentitur, esse malum: ergo essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse peccatum.

3. Item, Augustinus ibidem[^3]: « Quisquis aliquod genus mendacii, quod peccatum non sit, esse putaverit, semetipsum turpiter decipit »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: quia essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse privationem veritatis et respectu *rei* et respectu *intentionis*[^4]; sed ubicumque est intentionis obliquitas, ibi necessario est culpa: ergo necessarium est, ipsum mendacium esse peccatum.

5. Item, omnis iniquitas, essentialiter loquendo, est peccatum[^5]; ubicumque autem est mendacium, ibi dolositas est, quia aliud gerit homo in corde, aliud dicit ore; ubi autem dolositas est, ibi iniquitas: ergo *a primo*, impossibile est, aliquod mendacium non esse peccatum.

6. Item, verba instituta sunt ad hoc, quod homo exprimat per illa illud quod mente gerit[^6]; sed quicumque mentitur, utitur verbis ad contrarium eius quod mente gerit: ergo quicumque mentitur, utitur verbis ad contrarium eius, ad quod instituta sunt; et omnis qui utitur re ad contrarium eius, ad quod instituta est, necessario illa abutitur; et omnis qui abutitur, peccat: ergo omnis qui dicit mendacium, peccat.

**Sed contra** hoc obiicitur: 1. *Primo* per *exempla*: quia, Genesis vigesimo secundo[^7], Abraham, cum intenderet puerum immolare, dixit, se cum puero reversurum ad servos; et Isaac de uxore sua dixit, quod soror eius esset, Genesis vigesimo sexto; et de Ioseph similiter habetur exemplum, Genesis quadragesimo secundo et quadragesimo quarto. Si ergo facta Patriarcharum narrat Scriptura non sicut reprehendenda, sed sicut imitanda; et ipsi mentiti fuerunt; videtur, quod mentiri possit aliquis sine peccato.

2. Item, in Scripturis proponuntur multae *locutiones*, quae secundum intentionem litterae falsae sunt, sicut patet de eo quod dicitur Iudicum nono[^8]: quod *ierunt ligna ad rhamnum* etc.; et disputantes proponunt multa, quae sciunt esse falsa: cum ergo sacra *Scriptura* absque aliquo peccato fuerit data et scripta et inspirata, et *disputatio* ad veritatem inquirendam sit laudabilis et meritoria; videtur, quod aliqua mendacia dici possint absque ulla culpa: ergo non est essentiale ipsi mendacio esse peccatum.

3. Item, secundum quod dicit Ambrosius[^9], « non solum est mendacium in *verbis*, sed etiam in *operibus* simulatis »; sed contingit facere opera simulata absque aliquo peccato, sicut fecit Iosue, qui simulavit, se fugere ante habitatores Hai; et David, qui simulavit se stultum ante regem Achis; et Iehu, qui simulavit se cultorem Baal; et isti non peccaverunt, sed potius commendantur: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod possit fieri mendacium in verbis sine peccato.

4. Item, maius malum est homicidium et furtum, quam sit mendacium; sed furtum et homicidium potest bene fieri, nec est necessarium semper esse peccatum — sicut patet de his qui occidunt auctoritate legis, et furantur tempore necessitatis, vel ex praecepto Domini, sicut filii Israel[^10] — ergo videtur multo fortius, quod mendacium aliquod possit bene fieri: ergo non est essentiale ei esse peccatum.

5. Item, mendacium, quo quis mentitur proximo, est contra mandatum secundae tabulae; sed in mandatis secundae tabulae, ut dicit Bernardus[^11], potest Dominus dispensare, ut bene fiant: ergo et in ipso mendacio: igitur non videtur, quod essentiale sit ei esse peccatum.

6. Item, possibile est, quod quis mentiatur propter castitatem alterius conservandam, quem diligit ex caritate; sed omne quod fit ex caritate, fit bene et meritorie[^12], et tale non est peccatum: ergo si possibile est mentiri ex caritate, possibile est, mendacium non esse peccatum.

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### Conclusio.

> Omne mendacium est peccatum; immo hoc ipsi ita est essentiale, ut nullo pacto, nullo fine, nulla dispensatione, sive humana sive divina, possit bene fieri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio omne mendacium est peccatum; et adeo est ipsi mendacio essentiale esse peccatum, ut nullo pacto, nullo fine, nulla dispensatione, nec humana nec divina, possit fieri bene. Et hoc Augustinus[^13] dicit expresse et nititur multipliciter probare; et in hoc communiter concordant doctores. Sed *rationem* huius difficile est assignare, et ad hoc possumus niti diversimode.

Una namque ratio reddi potest ex parte eius, *contra quod* est mendacium. Mendacium enim est contra *Veritatem*, homicidium vero et furtum contra *creaturam*. Deus autem contra suam veritatem non potest facere[^14] — nec aliquis iuste contra divinam veritatem ire — quamvis possit quamlibet *creaturam* alii pro voto subiicere et eam disponere et ordinare. Ideo licet possibile sit dispensare in homicidio et furto, non tamen in mendacio. — Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficere, quia non omne mendacium est contra *Veritatem increatam*. Sicut enim est *bonitas* creata et increata, ita etiam et *veritas*; et sicut Deus est supra *creatam bonitatem*, ita etiam est supra *creatam veritatem*: ergo sicut potest dispensare, ut aliquis destruat aliquod bonum creatum, ita tamen quod nullum fiat praeiudicium suae bonitati; ita videtur similiter de veritate.

Ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod mendacium nullo modo potest bene fieri, nec aliquo *fine* nec aliquo *praecepto dispensativo*[^15], quia semper manet in eo deordinatio, quae quidem est ex *discordia* vocis et intellectus; non sic autem est reperire in aliis — nam divinum mandatum superveniens tollit deordinationem illam quae est in homicidio et in furto — ideo magis adhaeret malitia ipsi mendacio quam furto, vel homicidio. — Sed nec adhuc videtur istud sufficere: quoniam, si Deus potest facere, duos homines discordare ab invicem sine peccato, sicut dicimus de Paulo et Barnaba[^16]; videtur similiter, quod manente intellectus et sermonis discordia, possit ex dispensatione divina amoveri omnis culpa. Et ideo non videtur ratio sufficiens sumi ex parte *discordiae* intentionis et sermonis.

Et ideo adhuc est *tertius* modus dicendi, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse malum: aut ex *genere actus*, utpote cum transit actus super materiam indebitam, aut ex *malitia intentionis*[^17]. Cum autem transit actus super materiam indebitam, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel respectu Dei, vel respectu proximi. Si respectu Dei; sic est malum *in se* et *secundum se*, nec ullo modo potest bene fieri, sicut est odire summum Bonum et blasphemare Deum. — Si respectu proximi, sicut est nocumentum inferre proximo in persona vel in rebus; sic est malum *in se*, et potest aliquo fine[^18] bene fieri, quia potest recta intentio supervenire ex dispensatione. — Cum autem aliquid est malum ex *malitia intentionis*, tunc sive sit respectu Dei, sive respectu proximi, *simpliciter* malum est et nullo fine potest bene fieri, quia dicit privationem debiti finis. Unde facere, hoc malum esse bonum, nihil aliud est facere, quam aliquid simul esse bonum et malum. Tale autem est mendacium. — Nam mendacium non solummodo dicit malum ex hoc, quod actus transit super materiam indebitam, sed etiam ex *intentione indirecta*[^19]; quoniam ad *esse* mendacii ista duo concurrunt, videlicet dicere falsum et intentio fallendi. Et primum est malum *in se* et potest bene fieri ab eo qui ignoranter dicit falsum; ratione vero secundi est malum *secundum se* et nullo fine potest bene fieri, nec circa ipsum potest dispensari; sicut nullo modo potest bene fieri, quod aliquis cognoscat alienam intentione adulterandi sive ex improbitate voluntatis. — Concedendae sunt igitur secundum hoc rationes ostendentes, quod essentiale est ipsi mendacio esse peccatum, et quod ipsum mendacium est malum *secundum se*, sicut dicit Augustinus, quoniam de ratione sui nominis includit inordinatam intentionem, sicut ostensum est.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium per *exempla* veteris Testamenti, de mendacio Abrahae, Isaac et Ioseph; dicendum, quod nullus eorum mentitus est. Nam etsi Abraham vellet filium suum immolare, credebat tamen ex magnitudine fidei suae, sicut dicit Apostolus[^20], quod Dominus eum suscitaret; sciebat enim, quod firma erat promissio, qua dictum fuerat: *In Isaac vocabitur tibi semen*. — Similiter nec Isaac mentitus

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fuit, quia Rebecca soror erat et uxor, et dicendo, ipsam esse suam sororem, veritatem utique tacuit, sed tamen falsitatem non dixit[^21]. — Similiter etiam nec Ioseph mentitus fuit, quia verba illa non dicebat affirmando, sed potius tentando, cum dicebat, eos esse exploratores. Unde potius intelligenda sunt *interrogative* quam *affirmative*. Cum autem dixit, se peritum esse in *augurandi scientia*; large accipitur verbum *augurandi* pro futurorum praevisione. *Praeterea*, hoc ipsum etiam *interrogative* dixit, potius exprimens famam populi, quam de hoc habebat, quam sibi attribuere volens famam illam[^22]. Sic etiam et de consimilibus iudicandum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *locutionibus* positis in Scriptura, dicendum, quod ea quae *transumptive* dicuntur, referuntur ad consequentem intellectum et pro illo intelliguntur; et quando pro illo habent veritatem, nullum est ibi mendacium. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Mendacio[^23]: « Quidquid *figurative* fit aut dicitur, non est mendacium; omnis enim enuntiatio ad id quod enuntiat, referenda est. Omne autem *figurative* factum aut dictum hoc enuntiat, quod significat eis quibus intelligendum prolatum est »; et sic nullum est ibi mendacium, quia non enuntiantur pro intellectu *primo*, sed pro *secundo*, qui verus est. — Sic nec in *disputatione* est mendacium, cum proponuntur aliqua falsa ad hoc, quod per illa deducat homo ad maius falsum, et deducendo ad maius falsum reducat ad verum. In disputationibus enim propositiones magis sunt interrogationes quam veritatis assertiones, nisi forte in *doctrinalibus* disputationibus, in quibus « oportet discentem credere[^24] », ubi sola vera proponuntur, probantur et supponuntur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *simulatione* in *facto*, dicendum, quod est simulatio *cautelae*, et *instructionis* et *duplicitatis*. Simulatio cautelae fuit in Iehu, cum finxit se cultorem Baal, et David, qui finxit se stultum. Simulatio vero *doctrinae* fuit in Christo, cum *finxit se longius ire*, sicut dicitur Lucae ultimo[^25]; in quo erudivit discipulos officium hospitalitatis, quo coegerunt illum apud se manere, per quod meruerunt etiam illum cognoscere. Simulatio vero *duplicitatis* est in hypocritis, qui in signo exteriori ostendunt, se esse bonos, et interius replentur malitia[^26]. Primae duae simulationes non tenent rationem mendacii, sed tertia rationem mendacii tenet; et illa non est sine peccato. — *Praeterea*, non est simile de *verbo* et *facto*, quia *factum* non est principaliter institutum ad significandum mentis conceptum. *Sermo* autem ad hoc institutus est, ut sit « *nuntius et interpres ipsius mentis*[^27] », et ut homo significet alteri quod est apud se, et ut constituatur veritas apud audientem, quae est apud loquentem; et ideo qui ad aliud utitur ipso sermone abutitur et incurrit peccatum mendacii. Non sic autem est semper ex parte *facti*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maius peccatum est furtum et homicidium quam mendacium; dicendum, quod quamvis gravius peccatum sit utrumque eorum, quando fit mala intentione et malo fine; quia tamen contingit, illa a malo fine separari, ideo possunt fieri. Non sic autem est in mendacio reperire, quia de ipsa *nominis ratione*[^28] nominat intentionis obliquationem.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est contra mandatum secundae tabulae; dicendum, quod in mandatis secundae tabulae quantum ad *actum* bene contingit, Deum dispensare, sed quantum ad *deordinationem intentionis* nunquam, ut aliquis excusetur a peccato propter divinum praeceptum, manente intentione deordinata.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui ex caritate movetur ad mentiendum; dicendum, quod caritas praesupponit veritatem, unde ad nihil movet, quod veritati repugnet, veritati dico ex parte animae. Unde dicit Bernardus[^29], quod ad hoc, quod opus sit laudabile, necesse est, quod sit « caritas in intentione et veritas in electione ». Et quia veritas non servatur in prolatione mendacii; hinc est, quod mendacium ex caritate non potest dici. Sicut enim ex caritate non potest scienter committi malum, quod quidem maneat malum, ut inde eveniat bonum[^30]; sic etiam non potest ex caritate dici falsum,

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ut inde sequatur verum aut bonum. Et est simile: quoniam, sicut vis *operativa* deservit *affectivae*, sic vis *interpretativa* deservit *intellectivae*; et sicut finis *affectionis* est bonum, ita finis *intelligentiae* est verum[^31]. Sicut ergo nullum opus potest ex caritate fieri, nisi quis intendat *bonum*, et illud opus sit ordinabile ad *bonum*; sic etiam nullus sermo potest ex caritate proferri, nisi in illius sermonis prolatione primo intendat[^32] *verum*. Et quia mendacium ordinatum est ad contrarium veri, videlicet ad indicandum falsum ex ipsa intentione proferentis; ideo non potest fieri ex caritate nec meritorie, sed semper male. Et haec ratio tacta fuit in ipsa responsione facta ad quaestionem[^33] 3.

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english:
### Question II. *Whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether it is essential to a lie to be a sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Augustine, *Against Lying*[^1], who says thus: « It seems to me that every kind of lie is a sin ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Lying*[^2]:

« Either one must not believe good men, or one must believe that those whom we believe ought sometimes to lie, or one must not believe that good men ever lie; of which the first is *pernicious*, the second *foolish*: it remains, then, that good men never lie ». If therefore someone lies, it is necessary, insofar as he lies, that he be evil: therefore it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the same place[^3]: « Whoever shall have thought that there is some kind of lie which is not a sin, basely deceives himself »: therefore the same returns as before.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*: because it is essential to a lie itself to be a privation of truth both with respect to the *thing* and with respect to the *intention*[^4]; but wherever there is obliquity of intention, there is necessarily fault: therefore it is necessary that the lie itself be a sin.

5. Likewise, every iniquity, speaking essentially, is a sin[^5]; but wherever there is a lie, there is deceit, because a man bears one thing in his heart, says another with his mouth; but where there is deceit, there is iniquity: therefore *from the first*, it is impossible that any lie not be a sin.

6. Likewise, words were instituted for this, that a man should express through them what he bears in his mind[^6]; but whoever lies uses words contrary to what he bears in his mind: therefore whoever lies uses words contrary to that for which they were instituted; and everyone who uses a thing contrary to that for which it was instituted, necessarily abuses it; and everyone who abuses [a thing], sins: therefore everyone who utters a lie, sins.

**On the contrary**, it is objected: 1. *First*, by *examples*: because, in Genesis 22[^7], Abraham, when he intended to immolate the boy, said that he would return to the servants with the boy; and Isaac said of his wife that she was his sister, in Genesis 26; and concerning Joseph likewise an example is had, in Genesis 42 and 44. If therefore Scripture narrates the deeds of the Patriarchs not as to be reprehended, but as to be imitated; and they themselves lied; it seems that someone can lie without sin.

2. Likewise, in the Scriptures many *expressions* are set forth which according to the intention of the letter are false, as is plain from what is said in Judges 9[^8]: that *the trees went to the bramble* etc.; and disputants set forth many things which they know to be false: since therefore sacred *Scripture* was given and written and inspired without any sin, and *disputation* for inquiring after truth is praiseworthy and meritorious; it seems that some lies can be told without any fault: therefore it is not essential to a lie itself to be a sin.

3. Likewise, according as Ambrose says[^9], « there is a lie not only in *words*, but also in simulated *deeds* »; but it happens that one does simulated deeds without any sin, as Joshua did, who simulated that he fled before the inhabitants of Ai; and David, who simulated that he was mad before King Achish; and Jehu, who simulated that he was a worshipper of Baal; and these did not sin, but are rather commended: therefore it seems by like reasoning that a lie can be made in words without sin.

4. Likewise, homicide and theft are a greater evil than a lie is; but theft and homicide can be done well, nor is it necessary that they always be a sin — as is plain concerning those who kill by the authority of the law, and steal in time of necessity, or by the command of the Lord, as did the children of Israel[^10] — therefore it seems much more strongly that some lie can be done well: therefore it is not essential to it to be a sin.

5. Likewise, the lie by which one lies to a neighbor is against a commandment of the second table; but in the commandments of the second table, as Bernard says[^11], the Lord can dispense, so that they may be done well: therefore also in the lie itself: therefore it does not seem that it is essential to it to be a sin.

6. Likewise, it is possible that someone lie for the sake of preserving the chastity of another, whom he loves out of charity; but everything that is done out of charity is done well and meritoriously[^12], and such a thing is not a sin: therefore if it is possible to lie out of charity, it is possible that a lie not be a sin.

### Conclusion.

> Every lie is a sin; nay, this is so essential to it that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, whether human or divine, can it be done well.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt every lie is a sin; and it is so essential to a lie itself to be a sin that by no means, by no end, by no dispensation, neither human nor divine, can it be done well. And this Augustine[^13] says expressly and strives to prove in many ways; and in this the doctors commonly agree. But the *reason* for this is difficult to assign, and toward this we can strive in diverse ways.

For one reason can be rendered on the part of that *against which* a lie is. For a lie is against *Truth*, but homicide and theft are against a *creature*. Now God cannot act against his own truth[^14] — nor can anyone justly go against the divine truth — although he can subject any *creature* to another at his pleasure and dispose and order it. Therefore although it is possible to dispense in homicide and theft, nevertheless not in a lie. — But this reason does not seem to suffice, because not every lie is against *uncreated Truth*. For just as there is created and uncreated *goodness*, so too is there created and uncreated *truth*; and just as God is above *created goodness*, so too is he above *created truth*: therefore just as he can dispense that someone destroy some created good, yet so that no prejudice be done to his goodness; so it seems likewise concerning truth.

Therefore there is another way of speaking, that a lie can in no way be done well, neither by any *end* nor by any *dispensative precept*[^15], because there always remains in it a disorder, which indeed is from the *discord* of voice and understanding; but it is not so to be found in the others — for a supervening divine command takes away that disorder which is in homicide and theft — therefore malice adheres more to a lie itself than to theft or homicide. — But not even this yet seems to suffice: because, if God can make two men disagree with one another without sin, as we say of Paul and Barnabas[^16]; it seems likewise that, the discord of understanding and speech remaining, all fault could be removed by divine dispensation. And therefore a sufficient reason does not seem to be taken on the part of the *discord* of intention and speech.

And therefore there is still a *third* way of speaking, that a thing is said to be evil in two ways: either from the *kind of act*, as when the act passes upon an undue matter, or from the *malice of the intention*[^17]. But when the act passes upon an undue matter, this can be in two ways: either with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor. If with respect to God; thus it is evil *in itself* and *according to itself*, nor can it in any way be done well, as is to hate the highest Good and to blaspheme God. — If with respect to a neighbor, as is to inflict harm on a neighbor in person or in goods; thus it is evil *in itself*, and can by some end[^18] be done well, because a right intention can supervene from a dispensation. — But when a thing is evil from the *malice of the intention*, then whether it be with respect to God, or with respect to a neighbor, it is *absolutely* evil and can by no end be done well, because it names a privation of the due end. Hence to make this evil to be good is nothing other than to make some one thing be at once good and evil. But such is a lie. — For a lie names an evil not only from this, that the act passes upon an undue matter, but also from an *indirect intention*[^19]; for to the *being* of a lie these two concur, namely to say what is false and the intention of deceiving. And the first is evil *in itself* and can be done well by one who ignorantly says what is false; but by reason of the second it is evil *according to itself* and can by no end be done well, nor can there be a dispensation concerning it; just as in no way can it be done well that someone know another [woman] with the intention of adultery or out of depravity of will. — One must therefore concede, according to this, the reasons showing that it is essential to a lie itself to be a sin, and that the lie itself is evil *according to itself*, as Augustine says, since from the account of its name it includes a disordered intention, as has been shown.

1. To that indeed which is objected first to the contrary by the *examples* of the Old Testament, concerning the lie of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph; it must be said that none of them lied. For although Abraham was willing to immolate his son, nevertheless he believed, from the greatness of his faith, as the Apostle says[^20], that the Lord would raise him up; for he knew that the promise was firm, by which it had been said: *In Isaac shall thy seed be called*. — Likewise neither did Isaac lie,

because Rebecca was a sister and a wife, and by saying that she was his sister, he indeed kept silent the truth, but yet did not utter a falsehood[^21]. — Likewise too neither did Joseph lie, because he was not saying those words by affirming, but rather by testing, when he was saying that they were spies. Hence they are rather to be understood *interrogatively* than *affirmatively*. And when he said that he was skilled in the *science of divining*; the word *divining* is taken broadly for the foresight of future things. *Moreover*, this same thing too he said *interrogatively*, rather expressing the report of the people which he had concerning this, than willing to attribute that report to himself[^22]. So too concerning similar matters one must judge.

2. To that which is objected concerning the *expressions* set down in Scripture, it must be said that the things which are said *by transference* are referred to the consequent meaning and are understood for that; and when they hold truth for that, there is no lie there. And this is what Augustine says in the book *On Lying*[^23]: « Whatever is done or said *figuratively* is not a lie; for every enunciation is to be referred to that which it enunciates. But everything done or said *figuratively* enunciates this, which it signifies to those for whom it has been brought forth to be understood »; and so there is no lie there, because they are not enunciated for the *first* meaning, but for the *second*, which is true. — So too neither in *disputation* is there a lie, when certain false things are set forth so that through them a man may lead [another] to a greater falsehood, and by leading to a greater falsehood may lead back to truth. For in disputations the propositions are rather interrogations than assertions of truth, unless perhaps in *doctrinal* disputations, in which « the learner must believe[^24] », where only true things are set forth, proved, and supposed.

3. To that which is objected concerning *simulation* in a *deed*, it must be said that there is a simulation of *caution*, and of *instruction*, and of *duplicity*. Simulation of caution was in Jehu, when he pretended to be a worshipper of Baal, and in David, who pretended to be mad. But simulation of *teaching* was in Christ, when he *pretended to go further*, as is said in the last [chapter] of Luke[^25]; in which he instructed his disciples in the office of hospitality, by which they compelled him to remain with them, through which they merited also to recognize him. But simulation of *duplicity* is in hypocrites, who in an exterior sign show that they are good, and inwardly are filled with malice[^26]. The first two simulations do not hold the account of a lie, but the third holds the account of a lie; and that is not without sin. — *Moreover*, it is not similar concerning *word* and *deed*, because a *deed* is not principally instituted to signify the concept of the mind. But *speech* is instituted for this, that it be « the *messenger and interpreter of the mind itself*[^27] », and that a man signify to another what is with him, and that truth be constituted in the hearer, which is in the speaker; and therefore he who uses speech itself for another purpose abuses it and incurs the sin of a lie. But it is not always so on the part of a *deed*.

4. To that which is objected, that theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie; it must be said that although each of them is a graver sin when it is done with a bad intention and a bad end; nevertheless, because it happens that they are separated from a bad end, therefore they can be done. But it is not so to be found in a lie, because from the very *account of its name*[^28] it names the obliquity of intention.

5. To that which is objected, that it is against a commandment of the second table; it must be said that in the commandments of the second table as regards the *act* it happens well that God dispense, but as regards the *disorder of the intention* never, so that someone be excused from sin on account of the divine precept, the disordered intention remaining.

6. To that which is objected concerning him who is moved out of charity to lie; it must be said that charity presupposes truth, whence it moves to nothing that is repugnant to truth — to truth, I say, on the part of the soul. Hence Bernard says[^29] that for a work to be praiseworthy, it is necessary that there be « charity in the intention and truth in the choice ». And because truth is not preserved in the uttering of a lie; hence it is that a lie cannot be told out of charity. For just as out of charity an evil cannot knowingly be committed, which indeed would remain evil, so that good might come of it[^30]; so too out of charity what is false cannot be said,

so that truth or good might follow from it. And there is a likeness: because, just as the *operative* power serves the *affective*, so the *interpretative* power serves the *intellective*; and just as the end of *affection* is good, so the end of *understanding* is truth[^31]. Just as therefore no work can be done out of charity unless one intends the *good*, and that work be orderable to the *good*; so too no speech can be uttered out of charity unless in the uttering of that speech one first intends[^32] the *true*. And because a lie is ordered to the contrary of the true, namely to the indicating of what is false from the very intention of the one bringing it forth; therefore it cannot be done out of charity nor meritoriously, but always badly. And this reason was touched upon in the very response made to question[^33] 3.

---

la: Cap. 3. n. 4. et c. 15. n. 31., sed tantum quoad sensum (cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.); verba ipsa occurrunt in Enchirid. c. 18. n. 6.

en: *Against Lying*, c. 3, n. 4, and c. 15, n. 31, but only as to the sense (cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2); the words themselves occur in the *Enchiridion*, c. 18, n. 6.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Inferius pro *necessarium est* cod. A *necesse est.*

en: Cf. the preceding question. — Below, for *it is necessary* codex A reads *it is needful.*

la: August., VII. Confess. c. 16. n. 22: Et quaesivi, quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortae in infima voluntatis perversitatem, proiicientis intima sua et tumescentis foras. Cfr. Gregor., XVIII. Moral. c. 3. n. 5.

en: Augustine, *Confessions* VII, c. 16, n. 22: And I sought what iniquity was, and I found no substance, but a perversity of the will turned aside from the highest substance, thee O God, to the lowest, casting away its inmost things and swelling outward. Cf. Gregory, *Morals* XVIII, c. 3, n. 5.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est ibid. 26, 7; tertius ibid. 42, 9. seqq., et quartus ibid. 44, 15. — August., contra Mendacium, c. 14. n. 29: Quia ergo non inveniunt mendaces haeretici in Testamenti novi litteris imitanda exempla mendacii, copiosissimos se esse existimant in hac disputatione, qua opinantur esse mentiendum, cum de veteribus propheticis libris etc. — Aliquanto inferius pro *narrat Scriptura non sicut reprehendenda, sed sicut imitanda* cod. K *narrante Scriptura, non sunt reprehendenda, sed sunt imitanda.*

en: Verse 5. — The following text is ibid. 26:7; the third ibid. 42:9ff., and the fourth ibid. 44:15. — Augustine, *Against Lying*, c. 14, n. 29: Because therefore lying heretics do not find in the writings of the New Testament examples of a lie to be imitated, they reckon themselves most copious in this disputation, in which they hold that one must lie, since [they argue] from the ancient prophetic books etc. — Somewhat below, for *Scripture narrates not as to be reprehended, but as to be imitated* codex K reads *Scripture narrating, they are not to be reprehended, but are to be imitated.*

la: Vers. 8: *Ierunt ligna, ut ungerent super se regem, dixeruntque olivae: Impera nobis;* ibid. v. 14: *Dixeruntque omnia ligna ad rhamnum: Veni et impera super nos.* — Aliquanto inferius pro *scripta* plures codd. *inscripta.*

en: Verse 8: *The trees went to anoint a king over themselves, and they said to the olive: Reign over us;* ibid. v. 14: *And all the trees said to the bramble: Come and reign over us.* — Somewhat below, for *written* several codices read *inscribed.*

la: Serm. 30. n. 3: Omnis simulatio et omnis duplicitas mendacium est; ergo non solum in falsis verbis, sed etiam in simulatis operibus mendacium comprobatur. — De primo facto narrat Scriptura Iosue 8, 5. seqq.; de secundo, I. Reg. 21, 13; de tertio, IV. Reg. 10, 19. — Inferius pro *contingit* edd. *potest aliquis.*

en: *Sermon* 30, n. 3: Every simulation and every duplicity is a lie; therefore a lie is proved not only in false words, but also in simulated deeds. — Of the first deed Scripture narrates in Joshua 8:5ff.; of the second, 1 Kings [1 Sam.] 21:13; of the third, 4 Kings [2 Kings] 10:19. — Below, for *it happens* the editions read *someone can.*

la: Exod. 3, 22; 11, 2; 12, 35. seq. — Edd. cum uno alteroque cod. omittunt *Domini.*

en: Exodus 3:22; 11:2; 12:35f. — The editions, with one or another codex, omit *of the Lord.*

la: De Praecepto et dispens. c. 3. n. 6.

en: *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 3, n. 6.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro *sed* edd. *si ergo.*

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1. — For *but* the editions read *if therefore.*

la: Praecipue in libro de Mendacio, in quo affert octo genera mendaciorum, iisque discussis et omnino reiectis, concludit, nunquam esse mentiendum. Et in libro contra Mendacium, quem scripsit ad refellendum Priscillianistarum errorem, scilicet pro occultanda religione religiosos debere mentiri. — Mox pro *multipliciter* edd. 1, 2 cum aliquot codd. *Magister, quod,* attenta abbreviatione, etiam in aliis codd. legi posset.

en: Especially in the book *On Lying*, in which he brings forward the eight kinds of lies, and these being discussed and altogether rejected, concludes that one must never lie. And in the book *Against Lying*, which he wrote to refute the error of the Priscillianists, namely that the religious ought to lie in order to conceal religion. — Soon, for *in many ways* editions 1, 2 with several codices read *the Master, which,* a reading that, given the abbreviation, could also be read in other codices.

la: Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13: Negare se ipsum non potest. — Inferius post *nec* edd. supplent *potest,* et pro *fin* Vat. *toto.*

en: Epistle, 2 Timothy 2:13: He cannot deny himself. — Below, after *nor* the editions supply *can,* and for *end* the Vatican edition reads *whole.*

la: Codd. U Z *nec aliqua praecepti dispensatione.*

en: Codices U Z read *nor by any dispensation of a precept.*

la: Act. 15, 39. — Pro *dicimus* cod. U *dicitur.*

en: Acts 15:39. — For *we say* codex U reads *it is said.*

la: Sive *non recta*, sive ut cod. N *inordinata.* Mox pro *esse mendacii* permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 *esse mendacium,* Vat. *omne mendacium.*

en: Either *not right*, or as codex N *disordered.* Soon, for *the being of a lie* very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *to be a lie,* the Vatican edition *every lie.*

la: Codd. U Z *potest aliquando.* Paulo inferius pro *simpliciter* cod. G *semper.*

en: Codices U Z read *can sometimes.* A little below, for *absolutely* codex G reads *always.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5.

en: Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 36, dub. 5.

la: Hebr. 11, 18. seq., ubi etiam sequens textus invenitur, de quo vide insuper Gen. 21, 12, et Rom. 9, 7. — Cfr. Ambros., I. de Abraham, c. 8. n. 71. — August., Serm. 106. (alias 46. de Tempore) c. 4. n. 6. (inter opera August.). — Beda in Gen. 22, 5. — Alcuin., Interrog. et Respons. in Gen. interrog. 205.

en: Hebrews 11:18f., where the following text is also found, concerning which see further Genesis 21:12 and Romans 9:7. — Cf. Ambrose, *On Abraham* I, c. 8, n. 71. — Augustine, *Sermon* 106 (otherwise 46 *On the Season*) c. 4, n. 6 (among the works of Augustine). — Bede on Genesis 22:5. — Alcuin, *Interrogations and Responses on Genesis*, interrog. 205.

la: August., contra Mendacium, c. 10. n. 23, loquens de Abraham dicit: Aliquid ergo veri tacuit, non falsi aliquid dixit, quando tacuit uxorem, dixit sororem. Hoc et filius eius fecit Isaac; nam et ipsum novimus propinquam suam coniugem fuisse sortitum. Non est ergo mendacium, cum silendo absconditur verum, sed cum loquendo promitur falsum.

en: Augustine, *Against Lying*, c. 10, n. 23, speaking of Abraham says: He kept silent therefore something of the truth, he did not say anything of falsehood, when he kept silent that she was his wife, and said she was his sister. This his son Isaac did too; for him also we know to have obtained as wife a kinswoman of his. There is therefore no lie when by keeping silent the truth is hidden, but when by speaking what is false is brought forth.

la: Vide August., I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 139. et 145-148. — In fine solut. pro *iudicandum* permulti codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *videndum,* codd. R S *intelligendum,* Vat. *dicendum.*

en: See Augustine, *Questions on the Pentateuch* I, q. 139 and 145–148. — At the end of the solution, for *one must judge* very many codices with editions 1, 2 read *one must see,* codices R S *one must understand,* the Vatican edition *one must say.*

la: Cap. 5. n. 7, ubi textus originalis bis *figurate* pro *figurative.* — Paulo superius pro *et quando* edd. *et quoniam.* Aliquanto inferius pro *quia non enuntiantur* codd. A U *quia non enuntiatur.*

en: *On Lying*, c. 5, n. 7, where the original text twice has *figurately* for *figuratively.* — A little above, for *and when* the editions read *and since.* Somewhat below, for *because they are not enunciated* codices A U read *because it is not enunciated.*

la: Aristot., I. Elench. c. 2, recensens quatuor genera disputationis, scilicet doctrinalem, dialecticam, tentativam et contentiosam, doctrinalem sic describit: Et doctrinales quidem sunt, quae ex propriis principiis cuiusque disciplinae, et non ex iis quae videntur respondenti, colligunt. Nam oportet, credere eum qui discit [Versio Boethii *dicit,* sed textus Graecus: δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα i. e. oportet enim credere discentem]. — Superius pro *interrogationes* edd. 1, 2 *dubiae,* Vat. *interrogationes et dubiae.*

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 2, reviewing the four kinds of disputation, namely doctrinal, dialectical, tentative, and contentious, describes the doctrinal thus: And doctrinal indeed are those which gather from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from those things which seem [right] to the respondent. For he who learns must believe [the version of Boethius reads *says,* but the Greek text: δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα, i.e. for the learner must believe]. — Above, for *interrogations* editions 1, 2 read *doubtful [statements],* the Vatican edition *interrogations and doubtful ones.*

la: Vers. 28. Cfr. August., contra Mendacium, c. 13. n. 28, et Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 23. n. 1. — Mox pro *officium* edd. *in officio;* subinde pro *quo* codd. *Obliqui,* cod. R *quia,* Vat. *in quo.*

en: Verse 28. Cf. Augustine, *Against Lying*, c. 13, n. 28, and Gregory, *Homilies on the Gospel* II, homily 23, n. 1. — Soon, for *office* the editions read *in office;* then for *by which* codices read *Obliqui,* codex R *because,* the Vatican edition *in which.*

la: Cfr. Matth. 23, 27. seq. — Cod. A *malevolentia.*

en: Cf. Matthew 23:27f. — Codex A reads *malevolence.*

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 21. — Mox pro *constituatur,* quod habent codd. A F G U Z bb, plures alii *construatur,* edd. *astruatur.*

en: Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 21. — Soon, for *be constituted,* which codices A F G U Z bb have, several others read *be construed,* the editions *be added.*

la: Codd. U Z *impositione,* ceteri *intentione,* edd. legunt *de ipsius nominis ratione.* Subinde pro *nominat* codd. U Z *significat.* Paulo superius plurimi codd. *separare* pro *separari.*

en: Codices U Z read *imposition,* the rest *intention,* the editions read *from the account of its very name.* Then for *it names* codices U Z read *it signifies.* A little above, very many codices read *to separate* for *to be separated.*

la: De Praecepto et dispens. c. 14. n. 36. — Superius pro *repugnet* edd. cum pluribus codd. *repugnat.*

en: *On Precept and Dispensation*, c. 14, n. 36. — Above, for *be repugnant* the editions with several codices read *is repugnant.*

la: Respicitur Rom. 3, 8.

en: Reference is made to Romans 3:8.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Pro *affectionis et intelligentiae* edd. *affective et intellectivae.*

en: Cf. above p. 470, note 8. — For *of affection and of understanding* the editions read *affective and intellective.*

la: Edd. *intendatur.* Mox pro *indicandum* Vat. *iudicandum,* quod et plures codd. legere videntur.

en: The editions read *let it be intended.* Soon, for *indicating* the Vatican edition reads *judging,* which several codices also seem to read.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum mendacium sit peccatum mortale ratione sui generis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur in Psalmo[^1]: *Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium*; Glossa: « Plus est perdere quam odire »; sed Deus neminem odit nisi propter peccatum mortale: ergo omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.

2. Item, Sapientiae primo[^2]: *Os, quod mentitur, occidit animam*; quod verbum tractans Augustinus dicit in libro de Conflictu vitiorum et virtutum: « Nec officioso mendacio nec simplici verbo oportet quemquam decipere, quia, quomodolibet mentiatur quis, occidit animam »; sed non occiditur aliquis nisi per mortale peccatum: ergo quomodocumque mentiatur quis, peccat mortaliter.

3. Item, super illud[^3]: *Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium*; ibi Glossa: « Si quis non vult hominem ad mortem prodere, verum taceat, sed non falsum dicat, ne pro corpore alterius animam suam occidat »; sed nullum mendacium est levius peccatum quam mendacium officiosum: ergo si illud occidit animam, et omne aliud. Cum ergo anima non occidatur nisi per mortale peccatum, videtur etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *ratione*. Omne quod est contrarium veritati et eius peremptorium[^4], est peccatum mortale; sed omne mendacium repugnat veritati, sicut fornicatio castitati: ergo sicut fornicatio est peccatum mortale de ratione sui generis, ita et mendacium.

5. Item, « omnis qui facit contra conscientiam, aedificat ad gehennam[^5] »; sed omnis mentiens contra conscientiam loquitur, quia dicit falsum cum intentione fallendi: ergo proferens mendacium aedificat ad gehennam; sed non dicitur homo aedificare ad gehennam nisi per peccatum mortale: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne peccatum, in quo est plenus consensus, et quod fit ex certa scientia, est peccatum mortale, quia in peccato, in quo est plenus consensus, superior portio rationis manducat[^6]; peccatum autem, quod est ex certa scientia, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quod est gravissimum: cum ergo omne mendacium de ratione sui generis sit peccatum ex certa scientia, et in quo est plenus consensus; videtur, quod omne mendacium sit peccatum mortale.

**Sed contra:** 1. *Primo* Glossa super primum Exodi[^7]: « Infirmis mentiri conceditur »; sed nullum mortale alicui conceditur: ergo mendacium non est mortale peccatum.

2. Item, Gregorius[^8] loquens de mendacio obstetricum dicit: « Hoc peccati genus facile credimus relaxari »; sed peccatum, quod facile relaxatur, est in genere venialis: ergo etc.

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3. Item, nihil est peccatum mortale, nisi ubi libido intervenit, vel contemptus[^9]; sed mendacium officiosum de sua ratione non dicit libidinem nec contemptum: ergo non videtur, quod sit mortale peccatum.

4. Item, cum quis iocat[^10] cum proximo suo dicendo ei fabulam, non facit contra aliquam prohibitionem: ergo non videtur, quod peccet mortaliter; sed mentitur mendacio iocoso: ergo non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale.

### Conclusio.

> Non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale, sed de ratione sui generis indifferens est et ad mortale et ad veniale.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio non omne mendacium est peccatum mortale, immo quantum est de ratione sui generis, indifferens est et ad mortale et ad veniale. — Et ratio huius est: quia lingua posita est in lubrico[^11], et facilius est loqui quam tacere; ideo non semper ponderatur actus linguae nec ponderari potest faciliter. Propter quod dicitur Iacobi tertio[^12]: *Qui non offendit in verbo, hic perfectus est vir*; propter quod etiam peccatum mendacii non est generaliter mortale. — Sed mortale fit ratione *materiae circa quam* et ratione *contemptus* et ratione *nocumenti* et etiam ratione *libidinis* mentiendi, quae faciunt, mendacium esse perniciosum et mortale peccatum; et quia haec non semper concurrunt ad *esse* mendacii: ideo potest esse aliquando veniale, aliquando mortale, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem adductae.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, quod omnes perduntur, qui loquuntur mendacium; dicendum, quod, sicut Glossa[^13] exponit, non intelligitur hoc dictum de mendacio *generaliter*, sed *secundum differentiam mendacii perniciosi*; unde distributio illa non refertur ad ipsum mendacium, sed ad personas mentientes illo genere mendacii. Ideo et in processu illo est fallacia *figurae dictionis* propter commutationem suppositionis eius quod dico *mendacium*, quia fit processus a determinata ad confusam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Sapientiae, dici potest, quod similiter auctoritas illa non intelligitur de quolibet mendacio, sed de mendacio *pernicioso*. — Et *si obiiciat*, quod Augustinus exponit, quod quocumque modo mentitur quis, occidit animam; dicendum, quod nec ibi intendit Augustinus distribuere pro omnibus differentiis mendacii; sed intelligens de mendacio *pernicioso*, quod est in doctrina religionis, dicit, quod nullo pacto, nullo fine potest quis mentiri, quin occidat animam; et illud melius potest colligi ex littera sequenti[^14].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo non debet mentiri pro salute alterius, ne animam suam occidat; potest dici, quod verbum illud solummodo ad *perfectos* se extendit, de quibus loquitur Augustinus in originali[^15], unde Glossa illa sumta est. — Posset etiam dici, quod verbum illud est dictum *consultorie*, quia homo non tenetur mentiri pro aliquo nec tenetur animam suam laedere pro salute alterius corporali. Quoniam ergo quodlibet mendacium, etsi non inducat mortem, quia tamen peccatum est, ad mortem disponit; ideo consulit, ut non mentiatur pro salute corporis alterius servanda. Et sic ex hoc non habetur, quod omne mendacium sit mortale peccatum, sed quod est mortale peccatum, vel praeparat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne mendacium est peremptorium virtutis veritatis; dicendum, quod *virtus veritatis* potius est voluntas dicendi verum, cum oportet et expedit, quam sit continua enuntiatio veri[^16]. Quamvis autem prolatio ipsius mendacii repugnet *actui* dicendi verum, non tamen repugnat ipsi *veritati*, qua quis refugit mendacium *perniciosum*. — Nec est simile de fornicatione respectu castitatis, quoniam actus ille universaliter est prohibitus; non sic autem omnis differentia mendacii, et hoc est propter lubricum ipsius linguae. Unde quaedam sunt mendacia exteriora, quae non opponuntur ipsi virtuti-veritati, sicut peccata venialia, et sicut primi motus castitati. Quaedam vero opponuntur sicut pec-

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cata mortalia; et ista prohibentur in quinto mandato, in quo dicit Magister[^17], mendacium et periurium prohiberi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit contra conscientiam aedificat ad gehennam; dicendum, quod conscientia aliquid dictat refugiendum sicut contrarium iustitiae, aliquid sicut quod facit aliquo modo a iustitia declinare. Qui primo modo facit contra dictamen conscientiae peccat mortaliter propter contemptum intervenientem, et ille est qui aedificat ad gehennam. Qui vero secundo modo, non aedificat ad gehennam nec proprie dicitur facere contra conscientiam, sed *praeter* conscientiam[^18]. Et primo modo sunt contra conscientiam mendacia *perniciosa*, secundo modo *alia*. Conscientia enim non dictat, omnia mendacia aequaliter esse vitanda, sed quaedam sicut mortalia, quaedam sicut venialia. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod omnis mentiens, quocumque genere mendacii mentiatur, semper dicit directe contrarium ei quod conscientia dictat; dicendum, quod conscientia dictat de aliquo, quod sit verum, et de aliquo, quod sit[^19] dicendum, vel eius contrarium. Et cum quis profert falsum scienter, etsi directe faciat contra conscientiam, quae dictat aliquid esse verum; non tamen facit contra conscientiam illam, quae dictat, aliquid non esse dicendum. Et quantum ad secundum dictamen conscientiae, quod dirigit in agendis, pensatur quantitas peccati, non quantum ad iudicium conscientiae, quod regit in cognoscendis[^20].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omni mendacio superior pars rationis comedit, et certa scientia concurrit; dicendum, quod, sicut in secundo libro[^21] fuit determinatum, manducatio superioris portionis facit peccatum mortale solum in his quorum actus sunt *simpliciter* et *universaliter* prohibiti, sicut in peccato carnis; hoc autem locum non habet in peccato mendacii. — Similiter non omne peccatum, quod fit ex certa scientia, est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed illud, in quo cum certa scientia concurrit ipsa malitia[^22]. — Et si tu obiicias, quod omne mendacium impugnat veritatem agnitam, quae est una species peccati in Spiritum sanctum; dicendum, quod non qualiscumque *veritatis* impugnatio nec qualiscumque *impugnatio* est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, sed impugnatio veritatis secundum *pietatem*, et ulterius impugnatio, quae est cum quadam *protervitate* et mentis *obfirmatione*[^23], quam non est in quolibet mendacio reperire. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod omne mendacium sit peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, nec etiam, quod universaliter sit mortale peccatum[^24].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a lie is a mortal sin by reason of its kind. And that it is, it seems:

1. *First*, by that which is said in the Psalm[^1]: *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie*; the Gloss: « To destroy is more than to hate »; but God hates no one except on account of mortal sin: therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Wisdom 1[^2]: *The mouth that lieth killeth the soul*; treating which word Augustine says in the book *On the Conflict of the Vices and Virtues*: « Neither by an officious lie nor by a simple word ought one to deceive anyone, because, in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul »; but no one is killed except by a mortal sin: therefore in whatever way one lies, he sins mortally.

3. Likewise, on that text[^3]: *Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie*; there the Gloss: « If anyone does not wish to betray a man to death, let him keep silent the truth, but let him not utter a falsehood, lest for the body of another he kill his own soul »; but no lie is a lighter sin than an officious lie: therefore if that one kills the soul, so does every other. Since therefore the soul is not killed except by a mortal sin, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason*. Everything that is contrary to truth and destructive of it[^4] is a mortal sin; but every lie is repugnant to truth, as fornication to chastity: therefore just as fornication is a mortal sin by reason of its kind, so too is a lie.

5. Likewise, « everyone who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna[^5] »; but everyone who lies speaks against conscience, because he says what is false with the intention of deceiving: therefore one who utters a lie builds toward Gehenna; but a man is not said to build toward Gehenna except by mortal sin: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every sin in which there is full consent, and which is done from certain knowledge, is a mortal sin, because in a sin in which there is full consent, the higher portion of reason eats[^6]; but a sin which is from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, which is the gravest: since therefore every lie by reason of its kind is a sin from certain knowledge, and one in which there is full consent; it seems that every lie is a mortal sin.

**On the contrary:** 1. *First*, the Gloss on the first [chapter] of Exodus[^7]: « To the weak it is granted to lie »; but no mortal [sin] is granted to anyone: therefore a lie is not a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, Gregory[^8], speaking of the lie of the midwives, says: « This kind of sin we readily believe to be remitted »; but a sin which is readily remitted is in the genus of the venial: therefore etc.

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3. Likewise, nothing is a mortal sin except where lust intervenes, or contempt[^9]; but an officious lie of its own account does not name lust nor contempt: therefore it does not seem that it is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, when someone jests[^10] with his neighbor by telling him a tale, he does not act against any prohibition: therefore it does not seem that he sins mortally; but he lies with a jesting lie: therefore not every lie is a mortal sin.

### Conclusion.

> Not every lie is a mortal sin, but by reason of its kind it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt not every lie is a mortal sin; nay, as regards what is by reason of its kind, it is indifferent both to the mortal and to the venial. — And the reason for this is: because the tongue is set on a slippery place[^11], and it is easier to speak than to be silent; therefore the act of the tongue is not always weighed, nor can it easily be weighed. On account of which it is said in James 3[^12]: *He that offendeth not in word, this man is a perfect man*; on account of which also the sin of a lie is not generally mortal. — But it becomes mortal by reason of the *matter about which* and by reason of *contempt* and by reason of *harm* and also by reason of the *lust* of lying, which make a lie to be pernicious and a mortal sin; and because these do not always concur to the *being* of a lie: therefore it can be sometimes venial, sometimes mortal, as the reasons brought forward to this side show.

1. To that indeed which is objected from the authority of the Psalm, that all are destroyed who speak a lie; it must be said that, as the Gloss[^13] explains, this is not understood as said of a lie *generally*, but *according to the difference of the pernicious lie*; whence that distribution is not referred to the lie itself, but to the persons who lie with that kind of lie. And so in that process there is the fallacy of *figure of speech* on account of the change of the supposition of that which I call *lie*, because a process is made from the determinate to the confused.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of Wisdom, it can be said that likewise that authority is not understood of every lie, but of the *pernicious* lie. — And *if it be objected* that Augustine explains that in whatever way one lies, he kills the soul; it must be said that not even there does Augustine intend to distribute over all the differences of a lie; but understanding it of the *pernicious* lie, which is in the teaching of religion, he says that by no means, by no end, can one lie without killing the soul; and that can better be gathered from the text that follows[^14].

3. To that which is objected, that a man ought not to lie for the salvation of another, lest he kill his own soul; it can be said that that word extends only to the *perfect*, of whom Augustine speaks in the original[^15], whence that Gloss is taken. — It could also be said that that word is said *by way of counsel*, because a man is not bound to lie for anyone, nor is he bound to harm his own soul for the bodily welfare of another. Since therefore any lie whatever, even if it does not induce death, because nevertheless it is a sin, disposes toward death; therefore he counsels that one not lie for the preserving of the bodily welfare of another. And so from this it is not had that every lie is a mortal sin, but that it is a mortal sin, or prepares [for it].

4. To that which is objected, that every lie is destructive of the virtue of truth; it must be said that the *virtue of truth* is rather the will of speaking the truth, when it is fitting and expedient, than that it is a continual enunciation of the true[^16]. But although the uttering of the lie itself is repugnant to the *act* of speaking the truth, nevertheless it is not repugnant to *truth* itself, by which one shuns the *pernicious* lie. — Nor is it similar concerning fornication with respect to chastity, since that act is universally prohibited; but not so every difference of a lie, and this is on account of the slipperiness of the tongue itself. Whence there are certain exterior lies which are not opposed to the virtue-of-truth itself, like venial sins, and like the first motions to chastity. But certain ones are opposed like mor-

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tal sins; and these are prohibited in the fifth commandment, in which the Master says[^17] that lying and perjury are prohibited.

5. To that which is objected, that he who acts against conscience builds toward Gehenna; it must be said that conscience dictates that something be shunned as contrary to justice, and something as that which makes [one] in some way turn aside from justice. He who in the first way acts against the dictate of conscience sins mortally on account of the intervening contempt, and he is the one who builds toward Gehenna. But he who [acts] in the second way does not build toward Gehenna nor is he properly said to act against conscience, but *beside* conscience[^18]. And in the first way pernicious lies are against conscience, in the second way the *others*. For conscience does not dictate that all lies are equally to be avoided, but some as mortal, some as venial. And *if thou object* that everyone who lies, with whatever kind of lie he lies, always says directly the contrary of that which conscience dictates; it must be said that conscience dictates concerning something that it is true, and concerning something that it is[^19] to be said, or the contrary of it. And when someone utters what is false knowingly, although he acts directly against the conscience which dictates that something is true, nevertheless he does not act against that conscience which dictates that something is not to be said. And as regards the second dictate of conscience, which directs in things to be done, the magnitude of the sin is weighed, not as regards the judgment of conscience, which governs in things to be known[^20].

6. To that which is objected, that in every lie the higher part of reason eats, and certain knowledge concurs; it must be said that, as was determined in the second book[^21], the eating of the higher portion makes a mortal sin only in those whose acts are *simply* and *universally* prohibited, as in the sin of the flesh; but this has no place in the sin of a lie. — Likewise not every sin which is done from certain knowledge is a sin against the Holy Spirit, but that in which malice itself concurs together with certain knowledge[^22]. — And if thou object that every lie impugns the truth that is recognized, which is one species of the sin against the Holy Spirit; it must be said that not any kind of impugning of *truth* nor any kind of *impugning* is the sin against the Holy Spirit, but the impugning of truth according to *piety*, and further an impugning which is with a certain *insolence* and *obstinacy* of mind[^23], which is not to be found in every lie. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that every lie is a sin against the Holy Spirit, nor even that it is universally a mortal sin[^24].

---

la: Psalm. 5, 7. — Glossa invenitur in Comment. super Psalmos, quod est inter opera Bedae. Cfr. August., de Mendacio, c. 6, n. 9.

en: Psalm 5:7. — The Gloss is found in the *Commentary on the Psalms* which is among the works of Bede. Cf. Augustine, *On Lying*, c. 6, n. 9.

la: Vers. 11. — In libro de Conflictu vitiorum etc. (inter opera August.) c. 19. habetur: Nec artificioso ingenio nec simplici... quia, quolibet modo mentiatur, os, quod mentitur, occidit animam. — Pro *quomodolibet* codd. A N *quomodocumque.*

en: Verse 11. — In the book *On the Conflict of the Vices* etc. (among the works of Augustine) c. 19 it is found: Neither by skillful contrivance nor by a simple [word]... because, in whatever way one lies, the mouth that lieth killeth the soul. — For *in whatever way* codices A N read *in whatsoever way.*

la: Psalm. 5, 7. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, delibata est ex August., Enarrat. in hunc locum. — Pro *prodere* non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 contra textum originalem *perdere.* Inferius verbis *et omne* edd. praemittunt *ergo.*

en: Psalm 5:7. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra, is drawn from Augustine, *Exposition* on this passage. — For *to betray* not a few codices and editions 1, 2, against the original text, read *to destroy.* Below, the words *and every* the editions prefix with *therefore.*

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. I. — Superius pro *peremptorium* codd. H W Z *peremptio,* edd. *peremptio.*

en: As was shown above in q. I. — Above, for *destructive* codices H W Z read *destruction,* the editions *destruction.*

la: Secundum Innocent. III; cfr. tom. II. pag. 907, nota 2.

en: According to Innocent III; cf. tome II, p. 907, note 2.

la: Explicationem vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 9. seqq., et ibid. Comment. p. II. per totam. — De peccato in Spiritum S. vide ibid. d. 43. — Pro *ex certa scientia* non pauci codd. ter *ex certa conscientia.*

en: For the explanation see *II Sent.*, the text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 9ff., and ibid. the Commentary, p. II, throughout. — On the sin against the Holy Spirit see ibid., d. 43. — For *from certain knowledge* not a few codices three times [read] *from certain conscience.*

la: Vers. 19. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 123. m. 4, idem arg. adducit his verbis: Exod. 1, ubi loquitur de obstetricibus et mendacio earum, dicit Glossa, quae est Augustini [II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 1.]: « Quorundam vita longe inferior est a perfectione Sanctorum, si habeat ista peccata mendaciorum, provectu ipso et indole sustinentur [textus originalis: feruntur] ». Et dicitur ibi, quod *infirmis mentiri conceditur* etc. Ultima haec verba in Glossa ordinaria, prout a Strabo et Lyrano exhibetur, non inveniuntur; cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 5, 7. n. 7, ubi dicit: Falsum autem dicere non invenitur concessum esse perfectis. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Verse 19. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 123, m. 4, adduces the same argument in these words: Exodus 1, where it speaks of the midwives and their lie, the Gloss, which is Augustine's [*Questions on the Pentateuch* II, q. 1], says: « The life of certain ones is far inferior to the perfection of the Saints, if it has those sins of lies; by their very advancement and natural disposition they are borne with [the original text: are borne] ». And it is said there that *to the weak it is granted to lie* etc. These last words are not found in the ordinary Gloss as it is presented by Strabo and Lyra; cf. Augustine, *Exposition on Psalm* 5:7, n. 7, where he says: But to say what is false is not found to be granted to the perfect. See here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Libr. XVIII. Moral. c. 3. n. 5. Textus originalis *facillime,* Vat. *de facili* pro *facile.*

en: *Morals* XVIII, c. 3, n. 5. The original text [reads] *most easily,* the Vatican edition *with ease* for *easily.*

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 965, nota 2. et pag. 971, nota 5.

en: Cf. tome II, p. 965, note 2, and p. 971, note 5.

la: Cod. A et edd. 1, 2 *loquitur,* cod. X *ludit,* Vat. *loquitur vel ludit.*

en: Codex A and editions 1, 2 read *speaks,* codex X *plays,* the Vatican edition *speaks or plays.*

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 38. n. 3: Non enim lingua frustra in udo est, nisi quia facile labitur. Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 11. n. 12: Lingua facilitatem habet motus, in udo posita est, facile in lubrico labitur. — Superius post *indifferens est* edd. addunt *peccatum.* Mox pro *tacere,* quod est in cod. Y, in aliis et edd. *facere,* sed minus congrue, ut videtur.

en: Augustine, *Exposition on Psalm* 38, n. 3: For the tongue is not in a moist place in vain, except because it slips easily. *Sermon* 180 (otherwise 28 *On the Words of the Apostle*) c. 11, n. 12: The tongue has facility of motion, it is set in a moist place, it easily slips on a slippery [place]. — Above, after *it is indifferent* the editions add *sin.* Soon, for *to be silent,* which is in codex Y, in others and the editions [read] *to do,* but less fittingly, as it seems.

la: Vers. 2. — Cfr. Alan. ab Insulis, II. contra Haereticos, c. 15. seq., ubi refellit errorem Waldensium asserentium, omne mendacium esse peccatum mortale.

en: Verse 2. — Cf. Alan of Lille, *Against the Heretics* II, c. 15ff., where he refutes the error of the Waldensians who assert that every lie is a mortal sin.

la: Verba Glossae sunt: Dicit Salomon de mendacio, quia omne os, quod mentitur, occidit animam. Sciendum tamen, duo esse mendacia, quae, licet a culpa penitus libera non sint, parvam tamen culpam habent. Quorum alterum fit causa iocandi... Alterum vero est officiale, id est, fit causa benevolentiae etc. Cfr. etiam Glossa ordinaria in praedictum textum Ps. 5, 7; et August., de Mendacio, c. 17. n. 35. — De fallacia figurae dictionis cfr. supra pag. 151, nota 3, et de suppositione determinata et confusa vide I. Sent. d. I. q. I. scholion. — Paulo inferius pro *unde distributio illa,* scil. terminus *omnes,* fere omnes codd. *distinctio,* cod. Z *descriptio.*

en: The words of the Gloss are: Solomon says of a lie, that every mouth that lieth killeth the soul. It must be known, however, that there are two lies which, although they are not entirely free from fault, nevertheless have a small fault. Of which the one is made for the sake of jesting... But the other is officious, that is, is made for the sake of benevolence etc. Cf. also the ordinary Gloss on the aforesaid text of Psalm 5:7; and Augustine, *On Lying*, c. 17, n. 35. — On the fallacy of figure of speech cf. above p. 151, note 3, and on determinate and confused supposition see *I Sent.*, d. I, q. I, scholion. — A little below, for *whence that distribution,* namely the term *all,* nearly all codices [read] *distinction,* codex Z *description.*

la: Scilicet libri de Conflictu vitiorum etc. c. 19, ubi praenotatis verbis subiungitur illud Apoc. 21, 8: Et omnibus mendacibus pars illorum erit in stagno ignis ardentis sulphure [Vulgata: ardenti igne et sulphure]. — Pro *potest colligi* cod. K *colligitur,* et paulo superius pro *nullo fine* cod. A *nullo modo.*

en: Namely the book *On the Conflict of the Vices* etc., c. 19, where to the aforenoted words is subjoined that of Apocalypse 21:8: And to all liars their part shall be in the pool of fire burning with sulphur [Vulgate: with burning fire and sulphur]. — For *can be gathered* codex K [reads] *is gathered,* and a little above, for *by no end* codex A *in no way.*

la: Enarrat. in Ps. 5, 7. n. 7: Nam in his qui perfecti sunt, nec ista mendacia inveniuntur etc. — Aliquanto inferius pro *corporali* cod. A *corporis,* et in fine solut. cod. K addit *ad mortem,* edd. *ad illud.*

en: *Exposition on Psalm* 5:7, n. 7: For in those who are perfect, not even those lies are found etc. — Somewhat below, for *bodily* codex A [reads] *of the body,* and at the end of the solution codex K adds *unto death,* the editions *to that.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 7. — Mox pro *repugnet* multi codd. *repugnat,* et subinde pro *virtuti* Val. *veritati virtuti.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* IV, c. 7. — Soon, for *be repugnant* many codices [read] *is repugnant,* and then for *to the virtue* the Vatican edition *to truth, to the virtue.*

la: Dist. praeced. c. 5. in fine. — Paulo superius pro *virtuti-veritati* codd. K M O U W Z bb *virtuti veritatis,* et subinde Vat. *sicut nec* pro *et sicut.*

en: The preceding distinction, c. 5, at the end. — A little above, for *virtue-of-truth* codices K M O U W Z bb read *of the virtue of truth,* and then the Vatican edition *just as neither* for *and just as.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4. pro parte affirmativa.

en: Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4, for the affirmative side.

la: Edd. *non sit.*

en: The editions [read] *not be.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3, et Alan. ab Insulis, loc. cit.

en: Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, and Alan of Lille, loc. cit.

la: Dist. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Mox pro *determinatum* cod. W *declaratum.*

en: Distinction 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1ff. — Soon, for *determined* codex W [reads] *declared.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 43. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1. seq., ubi de speciebus peccati in Spiritum S. — Paulo ante pro *est peccatum* codd. 1, 2 *fit.*

en: See *II Sent.*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1ff., where [it treats] of the species of the sin against the Holy Spirit. — A little before, for *is a sin* codices 1, 2 [read] *becomes.*

la: Cod. K *obstinatione,* alii codd. perperam *affirmatione.*

en: Codex K [reads] *obstinacy,* other codices wrongly *affirmation.*

la: Vide scholion ad 1. quaest.

en: See the scholion to the first question.

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0