title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *An fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita.*

Secundo quaeritur de fide informi quantum ad originem, et quaeritur, utrum fides informis sit infusa, an acquisita. Et quod infusa, videtur:

1. Primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^p490-1]: *Alii datur fides in eodem Spiritu* etc.; et constat, quod Apostolus ibi loquitur de donis gratiae gratis datae: ergo loquitur de fide, circumscripta caritate; et haec est fides informis: ergo fides informis est a Spiritu sancto.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^p490-2]: *Si habuero fidem, ita ut montes transferam*; ibi Glossa: « *Quae fides donum Dei dici potest, quia in malis quaedam dona Dei sunt* »: si ergo illa est fides informis: ergo fides informis est a dono Dei.

3. Item, ad Romanos octavo[^p490-3]: *Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore*; Glossa: « *Est timor servilis et filialis, et uterque est a Spiritu sancto* »: si ergo timor servilis est donum Spiritus sancti, et timor servilis oritur ex fide informi: ergo fides informis est donum Spiritus sancti.

4. Item, per nullum habitum naturalem, vel acquisitum elevatur intellectus supra se; sed per habitum fidei informis elevatur intellectus supra se[^p490-4], ut assentiat primae Veritati propter se et super omnia: ergo habitus fidei informis non est acquisitus, vel innatus; et est acquisitus, vel innatus, vel infusus: ergo est habitus infusus.

5. Item, quod potest in ea quae sunt contra naturam nec est a natura nec est ab acquisitione; sed habitus fidei informis potest in miracula facienda, sicut patet per Evangelia, quod mali faciunt miracula, et expresse dicitur Matthaei septimo[^p490-5] et primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio: igitur fides informis nec est innata nec acquisita: sequitur ergo, quod sit infusa.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ad Romanos decimo[^p490-6]: *Fides est ex auditu*; sed quae novimus audiendo ab aliis novimus per acquisitionem: ergo si fidem habemus per auditum, fidem habemus per acquisitionem.

2. Item, Augustinus[^p490-7]: « *Quod credimus, debemus auctoritati; quod intelligimus, rationi* »; sed doctrina, quae auctoritati alienae innititur, ab alio acquiritur: si ergo cognitio fidei innititur auctoritati, videtur, quod per acquisitionem habeat in nobis oriri.

3. Item, alias virtutes informes possumus habere per acquisitionem, sicut continentiam et iustitiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et fidem informem per acquisitionem similiter possumus habere.

4. Item, aliquis transiens de infidelitate[^p490-8] ad haeresim credit aliquos articulos fidei, et hoc quidem sine aliqua infusione habitus, cum Deus non infundat haeresim, sed per solam acquisitionem doctrinae; sed qua ratione potest cognoscere unum articulum, eadem ratione potest cognoscere alterum: ergo si per acquisitionem potest cognoscere aliquos, eadem ratione videtur, quod possit cognoscere omnes: ergo videtur, quod fides informis de omnibus articulis per acquisitionem possit haberi.

5. Item, si fides informis est habitus infusus,

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cum habitus infusi ita infundantur parvulis, sicut adultis, ita erit habitus fidei informis in parvulo baptizato, sicut est in Christiano iam provecto; sed in Christiano iam provecto, si peccet mortaliter, nihilominus tamen remanet in eo fides informis, esto quod nihil ultra addiscat: ergo pari ratione parvulus, si peccet, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit, fidem informem habebit, si[^p491-1] nihil ab aliis doceatur; et hoc est manifeste falsum, quia si talis poneretur inter Saracenos, antequam aliquid didicisset, nihil plus haberet de fide, quam si nunquam baptizatus fuisset.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Fides informis quoad suum formale, et ut est virtus, est donum divinum et habitus infusus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum credere, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p491-2], sit « cogitare cum assensione », ad hoc quod habitus fidei plene et integre habeatur, necesse est, quod intellectus instruatur de credibilibus, ut possit illa cogitare, et inclinetur, ut possit illis assentire; et primum quidem est materiale in fide, secundum vero est *formale*, et utrumque reperitur tam in fide informi quam in fide formata[^p491-3]. Non enim dicitur informis, quia careat omni forma, sed quia caret forma gratiae gratum facientis.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum fides sit habitus acquisitus, vel infusus; respondendum est, quod si loquamur de fide quantum ad illud quod est materiale in ea, videlicet quantum ad cognitionem illam, qua cognoscimus, qui sunt articuli fidei, et scimus, « *quid est quod per nomen dicitur*[^p491-4] »: sic concedendum est, quod fides est per auditum et per acquisitionem secundum legem communem. Nemo enim scit, qui et quot sint articuli fidei, nisi didicerit legendo vel audiendo, nisi forte hoc habeat per privilegium speciale.

Si autem loquamur de fide quantum ad *formale*, videlicet quantum ad illud quod facit assentire; sic dicendum est, quod quaedam fides informis est per acquisitionem, quaedam per infusionem. Nam quidam assentiunt veritati auditae, *moti humana persuasione*, utpote propter amorem et reverentiam dicentis, vel propter miracula[^p491-5], vel propter rationes et argumenta; et talis fides est simpliciter acquisita nec dicenda est habere rationem virtutis, quia nullius est vigoris nec roboris, sublata de medio ipsa humana ratione. — Quidam autem assentiunt veritati fidei *propter divinam illustrationem*, sicut illi qui innituntur primae Veritati super omnia et propter se, sicut multi Christiani, qui caritatem non habent; et in talibus fides est *per infusionem*. Voluntarie enim assentiunt, concomitante divina illuminatione, illuminatione, inquam, quae rationem elevat in his quae sunt supra ipsam. — Unde sicut illuminationem ad *futura praecognoscenda* dicimus esse infusam propter hoc, quod in ipsa elevatur anima supra ea quae sunt ei naturalia; sic intelligendum est etiam in parte ista[^p491-6]. — Concedendum est igitur, fidem informem, secundum quod virtus est, esse donum divinitus collatum et habitum infusum. Unde concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod fides est ex auditu; dicendum, quod illud dicitur de fide, non ratione eius quod est formale et completivum, sed ratione eius quod est materiale, utpote ratione illius cognitionis, qua cognoscitur[^p491-7], « *quid est quod per nomen dicitur* », quae communiter non habetur nec in fide formata nec in informi nisi per acquisitionem. — Aliter etiam videtur aliquibus esse dicendum, quod illud verbum Apostoli intelligitur de fide informi, quae innititur humanae rationi, quae quidem non habet in se rationem virtutis. Sed primus modus dicendi rationabilior esse videtur, considerato intellectu Apostoli.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credere debetur auctoritati; dicendum, quod credere, secundum quod est actus fidei-virtutis, debetur auctoritati, non cuilibet, sed auctoritati divinae, cui quidem auctoritati nemo assentit propter se et super omnia, nisi per divinam illuminationem; et sic talis credulitas non est acquisita, sed infusa. Illa vero credulitas, quae innititur rationi creatae principaliter, non spectat ad ipsam fidem, secundum quod fides est virtus; et de hac verum est, quod potest esse per acquisitionem. — Unde attendendum est, quod dupliciter potest aliquis per fidem suam inniti sacrae Scripturae: aut quia credit, sacram Scripturam a Spiritu sancto fuisse inspiratam et editam, iuxta quod dicitur secundae Petri primo[^p491-8]: *Spiritu san-*

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*cto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines*, et sic talis credulitas spectat ad fidem-virtutem; aut ideo credit sacrae Scripturae, quia patres sui crediderunt, a quorum semitis non vult recedere, et hoc modo humanam respicit rationem, nec est talis credulitas *fidei-virtutis*, sed potius cuiusdam assuetudinis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliae virtutes informes habentur per acquisitionem; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod actus aliarum virtutum concordant ipsi rationi secundum naturale dictamen. Unde iustitia naturalis dirigit ad opera virtutum politicarum[^p492-1]; non sic autem est de fide, quae dirigit ad aliqua credenda, quae sunt *praeter* et *contra* et *supra* iudicium rationis; ideo non sic subiacet nostrae acquisitioni, secundum quod aliae virtutes morales.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquis de infidelitate transiens ad haeresim acquirit cognitionem aliquorum articulorum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, sicut idem ipsum potest amari amore divinitus infuso et amore etiam innato et libidinoso, et multum refert, utrum aliquid sic vel sic ametur: sic etiam intelligendum est in cognitione, quod idem ipsum aliter et aliter potest credi: vel ex persuasione veritatis humanae, vel ex illustratione Veritatis aeternae. Et haeretici quidem, si cognoscunt aliquos articulos, hoc est ex quadam persuasione humanae rationis, immo fictionis suae; et si secundum illam omnibus articulis fidei assentirent, adhuc tamen virtutem fidei non haberent, cuius est *intellectum in Christi obsequium captivare*[^p492-2]. Ideo non est simile de cognitione articulorum in viro fideli et in viro infideli; et pro tanto non sequitur, quod si illa cognitio in haereticis est acquisita, quod propter hoc in fidelibus non sit infusa. — Si quis tamen de fideli et Catholico fiat haereticus et remaneat sibi cognitio alicuius articuli; non habet eam omnino per acquisitionem; nec tamen dicendus est habere virtutem, quia ibi illuminatio prior permixta est quodam modo falsitati erroris, et ideo non habet perfectionem competentem virtuti.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de parvulo, qui cadit de gratia[^p492-3], antequam aliquid de fide acquirat; dicendum, quod parvulus habet habitum fidei quantum ad illud quod est in ea formale; habet enim aliquid quo promptus erit et facilis ad assentiendum omnibus articulis fidei, si ei proponantur, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit. Caret tamen ea cognitione, quae est materialis respectu fidei, sine qua, etsi illud formale possit in animam parvuli infundi, non tamen potest radicari et stabiliri. Et propterea, si, cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit, proponatur ei error sub ratione credibili, facillime expellitur habitus fidei, et ita de facili assentit, ac si habitum fidei nunquam habuisset, propter hoc quod liberum arbitrium propter inassuetudinem nescit illo uti, et ille habitus non fuit in potentia radicatus, quamvis esset in ea infusus. De hoc autem in quarto libro[^p492-4] habetur sufficientius[^p492-5].

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### Question II. *Whether unformed faith is infused or acquired.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning unformed faith with respect to its origin, and the question is whether unformed faith is infused or acquired. And that it is infused seems to follow:

1. First to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^p490-1]: *To another is given faith in the same Spirit*, etc.; and it is agreed that the Apostle there speaks of the gifts of grace freely given: therefore he speaks of faith circumscribed apart from charity; and this is unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is from the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen[^p490-2]: *If I should have faith, so that I might move mountains*; there the Gloss: « *Which faith can be called a gift of God, because in evil persons there are certain gifts of God* »: if therefore that is unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is from a gift of God.

3. Likewise, to the Romans, chapter eight[^p490-3]: *You have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear*; the Gloss: « *There is a servile fear and a filial fear, and each is from the Holy Spirit* »: if therefore servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and servile fear arises from unformed faith: therefore unformed faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

4. Likewise, through no natural or acquired habit is the intellect elevated above itself; but through the habit of unformed faith the intellect is elevated above itself[^p490-4], so that it assents to the first Truth for its own sake and above all things: therefore the habit of unformed faith is not acquired, nor innate; and it is either acquired, or innate, or infused: therefore it is an infused habit.

5. Likewise, that which has power over things which are contrary to nature is neither from nature nor from acquisition; but the habit of unformed faith has power to work miracles, as is clear from the Gospels, that evil persons work miracles, and it is expressly said in Matthew, chapter seven[^p490-5], and First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen: therefore unformed faith is neither innate nor acquired: it follows therefore that it is infused.

**On the contrary:**

1. To the Romans, chapter ten[^p490-6]: *Faith is from hearing*; but the things we come to know by hearing from others we come to know by acquisition: therefore if we have faith through hearing, we have faith through acquisition.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^p490-7]: « *What we believe, we owe to authority; what we understand, to reason* »; but a teaching which rests upon another's authority is acquired from another: if therefore the cognition of faith rests upon authority, it seems that it arises in us through acquisition.

3. Likewise, we can have other unformed virtues through acquisition, such as continence and justice: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that we can likewise have unformed faith through acquisition.

4. Likewise, someone passing from unbelief[^p490-8] to heresy believes some articles of faith, and this indeed without any infusion of a habit, since God does not infuse heresy, but only through the acquisition of teaching; but by the same reasoning by which he can know one article, by the same he can know another: therefore if through acquisition he can know some, by the same reasoning it seems that he can know all: therefore it seems that unformed faith concerning all the articles can be had through acquisition.

5. Likewise, if unformed faith is an infused habit,

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since infused habits are infused into little ones just as into adults, so the habit of unformed faith will be in a baptized little one just as it is in a Christian already advanced; but in a Christian already advanced, if he sins mortally, nevertheless unformed faith remains in him, even though he learns nothing further: therefore by parity of reasoning a little one, if he sins, when he has reached adult age, will have unformed faith, if[^p491-1] he is taught nothing by others; and this is manifestly false, because if such a one were set among the Saracens, before he had learned anything, he would have no more of faith than if he had never been baptized.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Unformed faith, as regards its formal element, and insofar as it is a virtue, is a divine gift and an infused habit.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that since to believe, as Augustine says[^p491-2], is « to think with assent », in order that the habit of faith be had fully and entirely, it is necessary that the intellect be instructed concerning the things to be believed, so that it can think upon them, and be inclined, so that it can assent to them; and the first of these is the material element in faith, while the second is the *formal* element, and both are found as much in unformed faith as in formed faith[^p491-3]. For it is not called unformed because it lacks every form, but because it lacks the form of sanctifying grace.

When therefore it is asked whether faith is an acquired or an infused habit; the answer must be that if we speak of faith as regards that which is material in it, namely as regards that cognition by which we know which are the articles of faith, and know « *what it is that is signified by the name*[^p491-4] »: thus it must be granted that faith is through hearing and through acquisition according to the common law. For no one knows which and how many are the articles of faith, unless he has learned them by reading or hearing, unless perhaps he has this by a special privilege.

But if we speak of faith as regards its *formal* element, namely as regards that which makes one assent; thus it must be said that some unformed faith is through acquisition, some through infusion. For some assent to a heard truth, *moved by human persuasion*, as on account of love and reverence for the one speaking, or on account of miracles[^p491-5], or on account of reasons and arguments; and such faith is simply acquired and is not to be said to have the character of a virtue, because it is of no vigor nor strength, once human reasoning itself is removed from the midst. — But some assent to the truth of faith *on account of divine illumination*, such as those who rely upon the first Truth above all things and for its own sake, like many Christians who do not have charity; and in such persons faith is *through infusion*. For they assent voluntarily, with divine illumination accompanying — illumination, I say, which elevates the reason in those things which are above it. — Whence, just as we say that the illumination for *foreknowing future things* is infused on account of this, that in it the soul is elevated above those things which are natural to it; so it must be understood also in this present matter[^p491-6]. — It must therefore be granted that unformed faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is a gift divinely conferred and an infused habit. Whence the arguments which show this are also to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that faith is from hearing; it must be said that this is said of faith, not by reason of that which is formal and completive, but by reason of that which is material, namely by reason of that cognition by which is known[^p491-7] « *what it is that is signified by the name* », which commonly is not had either in formed faith or in unformed faith except through acquisition. — Otherwise also it seems to some that it must be said that that word of the Apostle is understood of unformed faith, which rests upon human reason, which indeed does not have in itself the character of a virtue. But the first manner of speaking seems more reasonable, considering the Apostle's meaning.

2. To that which is objected, that to believe is owed to authority; it must be said that to believe, insofar as it is an act of faith-as-virtue, is owed to authority, not to any whatever, but to divine authority, to which authority indeed no one assents for its own sake and above all things, except through divine illumination; and thus such belief is not acquired, but infused. But that belief which rests principally upon created reason does not pertain to faith itself, insofar as faith is a virtue; and of this it is true that it can be through acquisition. — Whence it must be attended to that a person can rely upon sacred Scripture through his faith in two ways: either because he believes that sacred Scripture was inspired and set forth by the Holy Spirit, according to what is said in Second Peter, chapter one[^p491-8]: *By the Holy Spi-*

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*rit inspired, the holy men of God spoke*, and thus such belief pertains to faith-as-virtue; or because he believes sacred Scripture for the reason that his fathers believed, from whose paths he does not wish to depart, and in this manner he regards human reason, nor is such belief that of *faith-as-virtue*, but rather of a certain habituation.

3. To that which is objected, that the other unformed virtues are had through acquisition; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that the acts of the other virtues accord with reason itself according to the natural dictate. Whence natural justice directs toward the works of the political virtues[^p492-1]; but it is not so concerning faith, which directs toward certain things to be believed which are *beside* and *contrary to* and *above* the judgment of reason; therefore it is not subject to our acquisition in the way that the other moral virtues are.

4. To that which is objected, that someone passing from unbelief to heresy acquires cognition of some articles; it must be said that it is not alike, because, just as the very same thing can be loved with a love divinely infused and also with an innate and libidinous love, and it matters greatly whether something is loved in this way or in that: so also it must be understood in cognition, that the very same thing can be believed in one way and another: either from persuasion of human truth, or from the illumination of eternal Truth. And heretics indeed, if they know some articles, this is from a certain persuasion of human reason, indeed of their own fabrication; and even if according to it they were to assent to all the articles of faith, still they would not have the virtue of faith, whose office is *to take captive the intellect unto obedience to Christ*[^p492-2]. Therefore it is not alike concerning the cognition of the articles in a believing man and in an unbelieving man; and to that extent it does not follow that if that cognition in heretics is acquired, that on this account it is not infused in the faithful. — If, however, someone who is faithful and Catholic should become a heretic and there should remain to him the cognition of some article; he does not have it altogether through acquisition; nor yet is he to be said to have the virtue, because there the prior illumination is mixed in a certain way with the falsity of error, and therefore he does not have the perfection befitting a virtue.

5. To that which is objected concerning the little one who falls from grace[^p492-3] before he acquires anything of faith; it must be said that the little one has the habit of faith as regards that which is formal in it; for he has something whereby he will be ready and easy to assent to all the articles of faith, if they are proposed to him, when he has reached adult age. He lacks, however, that cognition which is material with respect to faith, without which, even though that formal element can be infused into the soul of the little one, it nevertheless cannot be rooted and stabilized. And therefore, if, when he has reached adult age, an error is proposed to him under the aspect of something credible, the habit of faith is most easily expelled, and so he readily assents, as if he had never had the habit of faith, on account of this, that the free choice on account of disuse does not know how to use it, and that habit was not rooted in the power, although it was infused in it. But concerning this, in the fourth book[^p492-4], it is treated more sufficiently[^p492-5].

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la: Vers. 9. — Mox pro *datae* codd. G I K V *datis*.

en: Verse 9. — Soon, for *datae* ("given"), codices G I K V read *datis*.

la: Vers. 2. Verba, quae hic (et etiam a S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2.) Glossae appellatione notantur, Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 2, ipsi Magistro tribuere videtur, cum dicat: *quod probat Magister Sententiarum*. Et revera exstant etiam hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. exhibentque summam illorum testimoniorum (Glossae ordinariae et praesertim S. Augustini), quae Magister in suo Commentario in s. Scripturam super hunc locum affert. Cfr. August., Serm. 95. n. 7. — In fine arg. Vat. addit *vel donum Dei*.

en: Verse 2. The words which here (and also in St. Thomas, here q. 3 a. 2) are marked under the name of the Gloss, Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III q. 64 m. 2, seems to attribute to the Master himself, since he says: *which the Master of the Sentences proves*. And indeed they are extant here too in the Master's text, c. 4, and present the substance of those testimonies (of the ordinary Gloss and especially of St. Augustine) which the Master adduces in his Commentary on sacred Scripture upon this passage. Cf. Augustine, *Sermon* 95 n. 7. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds *or a gift of God*.

la: Vers. 15. De Glossa, quae est ordinaria et plenius quum hic a Strabo exhibetur, vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et Comment. ibid. p. II. a. I. q. I. seqq.

en: Verse 15. Concerning the Gloss, which is the ordinary Gloss and is presented more fully than here by Strabo, see below in the Master's text, d. XXXIV c. 4 ff., and the Commentary there, p. II a. I q. I ff.

la: Verba *sed per habitum fidei informis elevatur intellectus supra se* desiderantur in edd.

en: The words *but through the habit of unformed faith the intellect is elevated above itself* are wanting in the editions.

la: Vers. 22. Seq. Script. locus est I. Cor. 13, 2. (iam in 2. arg. allat.). — Codd. E H I N T U V X et edd. 1, 2 bis *mirabilia* pro *miracula*.

en: Verse 22. The following scriptural passage is I Cor. 13:2 (already adduced in the second argument). — Codices E H I N T U V X and editions 1, 2 read *mirabilia* twice for *miracula*.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: De Utilitate credendi, c. II. n. 25. Cfr. I. Retract. c. 14. n. 3. — In fine arg. pro *oriri* cod. U *originem*.

en: *On the Usefulness of Believing*, c. II n. 25. Cf. *Retractations* I c. 14 n. 3. — At the end of the argument, for *oriri*, codex U reads *originem*.

la: Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 hic perperam *fidelitate*, dum infra in solut. fere omnes recte exhibent *infidelitate*.

en: Most codices and editions 1, 2 here wrongly read *fidelitate*, while below in the solution nearly all correctly present *infidelitate*.

la: Edd. non bene *etiam si*. Mox pro *et hoc* codd. A K Z *sed hoc*; in fine arg. pro *fuisset* cod. A *esset*.

en: The editions wrongly read *etiam si*. Soon, for *et hoc*, codices A K Z read *sed hoc*; at the end of the argument, for *fuisset*, codex A reads *esset*.

la: De Praedest. Sanctor. c. 2. n. 5. — Pro *assensione* codd. A H I N Z et alii, sicut supra, pag. 474, nota 1, iam monuimus, *assertione*.

en: *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 2 n. 5. — For *assensione* ("assent") codices A H I N Z and others, as we already noted above, p. 474 note 1, read *assertione*.

la: Cfr. supra a. I. q. 2. in corp. De seq. propos. cfr. d. 36. q. 6. — Subinde ante *informis* codd. A H Z bb supplent *fides*, et proxime post pro *quia careat* codd. A G U exhibent *quia caret*. Mox pro *sed quia caret* edd. cum non paucis codd. *sed quia careat*.

en: Cf. above a. I q. 2 in the body. On the following proposition cf. d. 36 q. 6. — Then before *informis* codices A H Z bb supply *fides*, and just after, for *quia careat*, codices A G U present *quia caret*. Soon, for *sed quia caret*, the editions with not a few codices read *sed quia careat*.

la: His verbis Arist., II. Poster. c. 7. et 10. (c. 9.), describit vim definitionis nominalis.

en: With these words Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II c. 7 and 10 (c. 9), describes the force of a nominal definition.

la: Edd. 1, 2 et aliquot codd. *mirabilia*.

en: Editions 1, 2 and several codices read *mirabilia*.

la: Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 10: *Fides duplex est; est enim fides ex auditu* (Rom. 10, 17.); *audientes enim divinas Scripturas credimus doctrinae Spiritus sancti... Est autem rursus fides eorum quae sperantur hypostasis, rerum redargutio, quae non videntur, vel est indistabilis et iniudicabilis spes eorum quae a Deo nobis annuntiata sunt... Prior mentis nostrae est, secunda charismatum Spiritus.* Cfr. infra dub. 1. et 5.

en: John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* IV c. 10: *Faith is twofold; for there is a faith from hearing* (Rom. 10:17); *for hearing the divine Scriptures we believe the teaching of the Holy Spirit... But again there is a faith which is the substance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen, or it is the unwavering and unjudging hope of those things which are announced to us by God... The former is of our mind, the latter of the charisms of the Spirit.* Cf. below dub. 1 and 5.

la: Edd. *cognoscit*.

en: The editions read *cognoscit* ("he knows").

la: Vers. 21. — Mox pro *ad fidem-virtutem* edd. cum cod. A *ad fidei virtutem*.

en: Verse 21. — Soon, for *ad fidem-virtutem* ("to faith-as-virtue"), the editions with codex A read *ad fidei virtutem* ("to the virtue of faith").

la: Cfr. infra d. 33. dub. 1. et 5. — Paulo inferius pro *praeter et contra* edd. *praeter naturam*. Mox post *non sic* [cod. A *sic non*] *subiacet* cod. O supplet *fides informis*.

en: Cf. below d. 33 dub. 1 and 5. — A little below, for *praeter et contra* ("beside and contrary to"), the editions read *praeter naturam* ("beside nature"). Soon after *non sic* [codex A: *sic non*] *subiacet*, codex O supplies *fides informis* ("unformed faith").

la: Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5. — Pro *assentirent et haberent* multi codd. *assentiret et haberet*. Paulo superius pro *illustratione* cod. Z *illuminatione*. Paulo inferius edd. 1, 2 bis *in vero* pro *in viro*, et deinde pro *quod propter hoc* cum Vat. *quod haec*.

en: The Epistle II Cor. 10:5. — For *assentirent et haberent* many codices read *assentiret et haberet*. A little above, for *illustratione*, codex Z reads *illuminatione*. A little below editions 1, 2 read twice *in vero* for *in viro*, and then for *quod propter hoc* with the Vatican edition *quod haec*.

la: Codd. A K (N a secunda manu) P Q *a gratia*. Subinde pro *in ea* cod. F *in eo*. Aliquanto inferius pro *sine qua* (deest in codd. B C D O et edd. 1, 2) cod. H *suae*. In hac solut. edd. cum nonnullis codd. pro *proponere* perperam exhibent *praeponere*.

en: Codices A K (N by a second hand) P Q read *a gratia*. Then for *in ea* codex F reads *in eo*. Somewhat below, for *sine qua* (lacking in codices B C D O and editions 1, 2) codex H reads *suae*. In this solution the editions with some codices wrongly present *praeponere* for *proponere*.

la: Dist. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro *propter hoc quod* plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *propter quod*, cod. bb *sed propter quod*.

en: Dist. 4 p. I a. 2 q. 2. — For *propter hoc quod* most codices and editions 1, 2 read *propter quod*, codex bb *sed propter quod*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum fides informis sit in daemonibus
Whether unformed faith is in the demons

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 492 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum fides informis sit in daemonibus.*

Tertio quaeritur de subiecto fidei informis, et est quaestio, utrum fides informis sit in daemonibus. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Iacobi secundo[^p492-6]: *Daemones credunt et contremiscunt*: si ergo fides, quae est principium timoris, haec est fides, quae est virtus informis; videtur, quod fides, secundum quod est virtus, sit in daemonibus.

2. Item, super illud ad Romanos primo[^p492-7]: *Iustitia Dei revelatur ex fide in fidem*; Glossa: « Fides daemonum est et nominetenus Christianorum »; sed in Christianis, qui sunt nominetenus Christiani, est fides informis tanquam in subiecto: ergo et in daemonibus.

3. Item, Marci primo[^p492-8]: *Quid nobis et tibi, Iesu Nazarene?* et saepe in Evangelio daemones clamabant, Christum esse Filium Dei; sed constat, quod eius Divinitatem non poterant intueri, et hoc est super rationem, quod Deus fieret homo: ergo videtur, quod hoc non noverant nisi cognitione fidei: ergo videtur, quod habuerunt fidem.

4. Item, cognitio Trinitatis et Unitatis supra rationem est, sicut in primo libro[^p492-9] ostensum fuit; sed daemones cognoscunt, Deum esse trinum et unum;

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et talis cognitio, qua cognoscitur Deus esse trinus et unus, vel est cognitio fidei, vel est cognitio comprehensionis: cum ergo daemones non habeant cognitionem comprehensionis de ipsa Trinitate, habent ergo cognitionem fidei.

**Sed contra:**
1. Super illud secundae ad Corinthios sexto[^p493-1]: *Quae conventio Christi ad Belial?* dicit Glossa: « Sicut Christus omnia bene, sic diabolus omnia male »; sed *credere* fidei informis est actus virtutis et actus bonus: ergo si daemonis est omnia male facere, videtur, quod ad ipsum non spectet ipsum *credere*, ergo nec habere fidem informem.

2. Item, fides informis est habitus infusus et donum Dei[^p493-2]: si ergo daemones habent fidem, aut infusa est eis *ante* lapsum, aut *post*; *ante* lapsum non, quia tunc non erant in statu, in quo esset eis fides opportuna; *post* lapsum non, quia obstinati sunt, ut dona Dei non possint suscipere: ergo si nunquam habuerunt habitum fidei infusum, et fides informis est per infusionem; non ergo habent fidem informem.

3. Item, *credere*, quod est actus fidei informis, est voluntarium, quia, « cum cetera possit homo *nolens*, credere non potest nisi *volens*[^p493-3] »; sed daemones, quantum est ex parte voluntatis suae, repugnant omni veritati et omni bono: si igitur ipsa fides informis facit credere voluntarie, videtur, quod daemones non habeant ipsam.

4. Item, fides informis est principium timoris servilis, et timor servilis facit peccatum fugere[^p493-4]: si ergo fides informis esset in daemonibus, esset in eis fuga alicuius peccati: si ergo nullum peccatum fugiunt, videtur, quod habitus informis in eis non reperiatur.

### Conclusio.

> In daemonibus est aliqua fides informis, prout tamen caret non tantum forma virtutis gratuitae, sed etiam forma habitus virtuosi, infusi et voluntarii.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut ex praecedentibus[^p493-5] patet, fides informis dicitur duobus modis: quaedam, quae innititur primae Veritati propter se, quamvis in ipsam non tendat amando; alia est fides informis, quae innititur ipsi veritati articulorum propter aliquam rationem creatam. Et prima quidem dicitur fides informis, non quia careat forma fidei, secundum quod est virtus, sed solum secundum quod est virtus gratuita; et de hac dictum est prius[^p493-6], quod est habitus virtuosus et habitus infusus. Secundo vero modo dicitur fides informis, quia caret forma fidei, et secundum quod virtus est, et secundum quod gratuita est. Nam illa credulitas, qua quis assentit articulis propter rationem creatam principaliter, non solum caret intentione habitus gratuiti, sed etiam intentione habitus virtuosi. Nullius enim virtutis videtur esse[^p493-7] *credere*, cum quis credit innitendo persuasioni, quam videt.

Si igitur hoc secundo modo accipiatur informis fides, sic concedi potest, eam reperiri in daemonibus. Habent enim aliquam notitiam et credulitatem de articulis et credibilibus, quae quidem *fides* potest dici sive *credulitas*, propter hoc quod non est in eis visio aperta. — Et illa quidem cognitio partim fuit eis indita a prima conditione, partim est ex acquisitione. A prima enim conditione sua habuerunt cognitionem aliquam de articulis pertinentibus ad Trinitatem, quae etsi tunc non mereretur[^p493-8] dici *fides*, immo potius *cognitio contemplationis*, propter absentiam aenigmatis, peccato tamen superveniente et aenigmate subsequente, illa cognitio meruit dici *fides*, cum sit cognitio aenigmatica de his quae spectant ad divina. — Quantum autem ad articulos spectantes ad humanitatem est in eis cognitio *acquisita* per multa miracula et experimenta et quasi extorta necessitate quadam. Dum enim daemones vident aperte, eos qui Christum[^p493-9] credunt et ei conformantur, non posse damnari; manifesta ratione coguntur credere, fidem credentium in Christum veram esse; ac per hoc per consequens credunt, omnia esse vera, quae Christiani credunt; et ex hoc etiam perterrentur, propter quod dicit beatus Iacobus, quod *credunt et contremiscunt*.

Si vero loquamur de fide informi, secundum quod accipitur primo modo, videlicet prout est habitus virtuosus et habitus infusus et etiam voluntarius; hoc modo, etsi reperiatur in christianis viatoribus, non tamen potest reperiri in daemonibus, tum quia ipsi non sunt apti ad suscipiendos habitus infusos, tum quia voluntas eorum magis prona est ad impugnandum veritatem secundum pietatem[^p493-10], quam ad assentiendum ei. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

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**Ad oppositum:**

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Iacobi, et de Glossa, quod informis qualitas est in daemonibus[^p494-1]; dicendum, quod in utrisque reperitur fides, sed tamen aliter et aliter, sicut prius dictum est. Christiani enim nominetenus voluntarie assentiunt, et illa fides potest eis esse *via* ad virtutem, et quodam modo *rectificat* eorum mentem, etsi *non plene*; non sic autem est in daemonibus, quia ipsi credunt *coacti* et quasi cum quodam murmure.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod confitebantur, Christum esse Filium Dei; dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei[^p494-2], « ipse Christus innotuit daemonibus non per id quod est veritas et lux, sed per quaedam suae virtutis effecta ». Unde quia ipsi videbant miram Christi virtutem in suis effectibus, cui nullatenus possent resistere; cognoscebant, ipsum non purum hominem, sed etiam Deum esse. Illa tamen credulitas non erat fides informis, secundum quod fides informis est *virtus*, quia non adhaerebant ipsi primae Veritati propter se.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognoscebant, Deum esse trinum et unum; dicendum, quod illa cognitio in daemonibus erat derelicta ex cognitione, quam habuerunt ex prima sui conditione. Secundum enim quod dicit Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quarto[^p494-3]: « Data daemonibus dona nequaquam ipsa mutata esse dicimus, sed sunt integra et splendidissima, quamvis ipsi non videant, claudentes in se boni inspectivas virtutes ». Et sic non oportet in daemonibus ponere habitum fidei infusae, cum talem notitiam habuerint a prima naturali sua conditione, licet eam habeant quodam modo minus perfecte propter suarum mentium obcaecationem[^p494-4].

---

english:
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### Question III. *Whether unformed faith is in the demons.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the subject of unformed faith, and the question is whether unformed faith is in the demons. And that it is, seems [the case].

1. James 2[^p492-6]: *The demons believe and tremble*: if therefore faith, which is the principle of fear, is this faith, which is an unformed virtue; it seems that faith, insofar as it is a virtue, is in the demons.

2. Likewise, on that text of Romans 1[^p492-7]: *The justice of God is revealed from faith unto faith*; the Gloss [says]: « The faith of the demons exists, and that of Christians in name only »; but in Christians who are Christians in name only, unformed faith exists as in a subject: therefore [it exists] also in the demons.

3. Likewise, Mark 1[^p492-8]: *What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth?* and often in the Gospel the demons cried out that Christ was the Son of God; but it is established that they could not behold his Divinity, and this is above reason, that God should become man: therefore it seems that they knew this only by the cognition of faith: therefore it seems that they had faith.

4. Likewise, the cognition of the Trinity and the Unity is above reason, as was shown in the first book[^p492-9]; but the demons know that God is three and one;

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and such a cognition, by which it is known that God is three and one, is either a cognition of faith, or a cognition of comprehension: since therefore the demons do not have a cognition of comprehension concerning the Trinity itself, they have therefore a cognition of faith.

**On the contrary:**
1. On that text of Second Corinthians 6[^p493-1]: *What concord hath Christ with Belial?* the Gloss says: « As Christ [does] all things well, so the devil [does] all things ill »; but *to believe* belongs to unformed faith [as] an act of virtue and a good act: therefore if it belongs to a demon to do all things ill, it seems that *to believe* does not pertain to him, and therefore neither to have unformed faith.

2. Likewise, unformed faith is an infused habit and a gift of God[^p493-2]: if therefore the demons have faith, either it was infused into them *before* the fall, or *after*; not *before* the fall, since then they were not in a state in which faith would be fitting for them; not *after* the fall, since they are obstinate, so that they cannot receive the gifts of God: therefore if they never had the infused habit of faith, and unformed faith is by infusion; they do not therefore have unformed faith.

3. Likewise, *to believe*, which is the act of unformed faith, is voluntary, since, « although a man can do other things *unwillingly*, he cannot believe except *willingly*[^p493-3] »; but the demons, as far as is on the part of their will, are repugnant to all truth and all good: if therefore unformed faith itself causes one to believe voluntarily, it seems that the demons do not have it.

4. Likewise, unformed faith is the principle of servile fear, and servile fear causes one to flee sin[^p493-4]: if therefore unformed faith were in the demons, there would be in them a fleeing of some sin: if therefore they flee no sin, it seems that the unformed habit is not found in them.

### Conclusion.

> In the demons there is some unformed faith, yet inasmuch as it lacks not only the form of gratuitous virtue, but also the form of a virtuous, infused, and voluntary habit.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is clear from the foregoing[^p493-5], unformed faith is spoken of in two ways: one, which leans upon the First Truth for its own sake, although it does not tend toward it by loving; the other is unformed faith, which leans upon the truth of the articles themselves on account of some created reason. And the first indeed is called unformed faith, not because it lacks the form of faith insofar as it is a virtue, but only insofar as it is a gratuitous virtue; and of this it was said before[^p493-6] that it is a virtuous habit and an infused habit. But in the second way faith is called unformed because it lacks the form of faith, both insofar as it is a virtue, and insofar as it is gratuitous. For that credulity by which someone assents to the articles principally on account of a created reason lacks not only the intention of a gratuitous habit, but also the intention of a virtuous habit. For *to believe* seems to belong to no virtue[^p493-7] when someone believes by leaning upon a persuasion which he sees.

If therefore unformed faith be taken in this second way, then it can be granted that it is found in the demons. For they have some knowledge and credulity concerning the articles and the things to be believed, which indeed can be called *faith* or *credulity*, on account of the fact that there is not in them an open vision. — And that cognition was partly imparted to them from their first condition, [and] partly is from acquisition. For from their first condition they had some cognition concerning the articles pertaining to the Trinity, which, although then it did not deserve[^p493-8] to be called *faith*, but rather *the cognition of contemplation*, on account of the absence of the enigma, yet, sin supervening and the enigma following, that cognition deserved to be called *faith*, since it is an enigmatic cognition concerning the things that pertain to the divine. — But as regards the articles pertaining to the humanity, there is in them a cognition *acquired* through many miracles and experiences and as it were wrung out by a certain necessity. For when the demons see openly that those who believe in Christ[^p493-9] and are conformed to him cannot be damned; they are compelled by manifest reason to believe that the faith of believers in Christ is true; and through this, consequently, they believe that all things are true which Christians believe; and from this also they are terrified, on account of which the blessed James says that they *believe and tremble*.

But if we speak of unformed faith according as it is taken in the first way, namely insofar as it is a virtuous habit and an infused habit and also voluntary; in this way, although it be found in Christian wayfarers, it nevertheless cannot be found in the demons, both because they are not apt to receive infused habits, and because their will is more inclined to assail the truth as regards piety[^p493-10] than to assent to it. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

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**To the opposite:**

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of James, and from the Gloss, that the unformed quality is in the demons[^p494-1]; it must be said that in both faith is found, but yet in one way and another, as was said before. For Christians in name believe voluntarily, and that faith can be for them a *way* to virtue, and in a certain manner *rectifies* their mind, though *not fully*; but it is not so in the demons, since they believe *under compulsion* and as it were with a certain murmuring.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that they confessed Christ to be the Son of God; it must be said that, as Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*[^p494-2], « Christ himself became known to the demons not through that which is truth and light, but through certain effects of his power ». Hence, because they saw the wondrous power of Christ in its effects, which they could in no way resist; they knew him to be not a mere man, but also God. Yet that credulity was not unformed faith, according as unformed faith is a *virtue*, since they did not adhere to the First Truth itself for its own sake.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that they knew God to be three and one; it must be said that that cognition in the demons was left over from the cognition which they had from their first condition. For, according as Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*, chapter four[^p494-3]: « We say that the gifts given to the demons were by no means themselves changed, but are entire and most splendid, although they themselves do not see, closing within themselves the powers that are inspective of the good ». And so it is not necessary to posit in the demons an infused habit of faith, since they had such knowledge from their first natural condition, although they have it in a certain way less perfectly on account of the blinding of their minds[^p494-4].

---

la: Vers. 19. — De propos. seq. cfr. infra d. 34. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Verse 19. — On the following proposition cf. below, d. 34, p. II, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Vers. 17. — Glossa apud Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc. sic sonat: Haec [fides cum caritate] fideles facit et vere Christianos. Alia vero daemonum est et nominetenus Christianorum; nam et daemones credunt et contremiscunt (Iac. 2, 19.). Haec est informis qualitas mentis, quae dicitur informis, quia sociam non habet caritatem, quae est forma omnium virtutum. Cfr. August., in Epist. Ioan. tr. 10. n. 1; Serm. 53. (alias 14. ex Paris.) c. 10. n. 10. seq., nec non hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Verse 17. — The Gloss in Peter Lombard on this passage reads thus: This [faith with charity] makes [men] faithful and truly Christian. But the other [faith] is that of the demons and of Christians in name only; for the demons also believe and tremble (James 2:19). This is the unformed quality of the mind, which is called unformed because it does not have charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues. Cf. Augustine, *On the Epistle of John*, tr. 10, n. 1; *Sermon* 53 (elsewhere 14, from the Paris [edition]), c. 10, n. 10 ff., and also here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Vers. 15. Glossa invenitur apud Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum; apud Strabum et Lyranum habetur in Matth. 12, 35. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 178, nota 1. In Glossa Petrus Lombard. post *bene* supplet *agit*, Vat. *facit*. — De minori cfr. supra q. 1.

en: Verse 15. The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this passage; in Strabus and Lyranus it is given on Matthew 12:35. Cf. tom. II, p. 178, note 1. In the Gloss Peter Lombard, after *bene* [well], supplies *agit* [acts]; the Vatican [edition], *facit* [does]. — On the minor [premise] cf. above, q. 1.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Ut dicit August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 26. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 475, nota 3.

en: As Augustine says, *On the Gospel of John*, tr. 26, n. 2. Cf. above, p. 475, note 3.

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4.

en: See below, the text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. 4.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Codd. A I K L Z *in praecedentibus*. Mox post *quaedam* cod. F addit *enim est fides informis*.

en: The preceding question. — Codices A I K L Z [read] *in the preceding [questions]*. Soon after *quaedam* [one (kind)], codex F adds *enim est fides informis* [for it is unformed faith].

la: Quaest. 1. seq. — Paulo ante pro *careat forma fidei* cod. 0 *careat omni forma*.

en: Question 1 ff. — Shortly before, for *careat forma fidei* [it should lack the form of faith] codex 0 [reads] *careat omni forma* [it should lack every form].

la: Pro *videtur esse* codd. A K *est*.

en: For *videtur esse* [seems to be] codices A K [read] *est* [is].

la: Cod. U *merebatur*, edd. *meretur*. Paulo superius pro *habuerunt* cod. A *habet*. — S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 5. a. 1.) Angelis ante confirmationem et lapsum attribuit donum gratiae et per consequens fidem; de hac controversia cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. et scholion.

en: Codex U [reads] *merebatur* [was deserving]; the editions, *meretur* [deserves]. A little above, for *habuerunt* [they had] codex A [reads] *habet* [has]. — St. Thomas (*Summa* II-II, q. 5, a. 1) attributes to the angels, before their confirmation and fall, the gift of grace and consequently faith; on this controversy cf. *II Sent.*, d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, and the scholion.

la: Cod. aa *Christo*, Vat. cum nonnullis codd. (codd. N T a secunda manu) *in Christum*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *Christo*; the Vatican [edition] with several codices (codices N T by a second hand) [reads] *in Christum* [in Christ].

la: Epist. ad Tit. 1, 1.

en: Epistle to Titus 1:1.

la: Necessario ex Glossa hic supplendum erit: *et in nominetenus Christianis*. — Paulo inferius pro *ad virtutem* codd. A U *ad veritatem*.

en: It will necessarily have to be supplied here from the Gloss: *and in Christians in name only*. — A little below, for *ad virtutem* [to virtue] codices A U [read] *ad veritatem* [to truth].

la: Libr. IX. c. 21: Innotuit ergo daemonibus non per id quod est vita aeterna et lumen incommutabile, quod illuminat pios, cui videndo per fidem, quae in illo est, corda mundantur, sed per quaedam temporalia suae virtutis effecta et occultissimae signa praesentiae etc. — Inferius pro *possent* cod. bb *possunt*, edd. 1, 2 *potuerunt*, Vat. *poterant*.

en: Book IX, c. 21: He became known therefore to the demons not through that which is eternal life and the unchangeable light, which illumines the pious, by seeing whom through the faith that is in him hearts are cleansed, but through certain temporal effects of his power and through the most hidden signs of his presence, etc. — Below, for *possent* [could] codex bb [reads] *possunt* [can]; editions 1, 2, *potuerunt* [were able]; the Vatican [edition], *poterant* [were able].

la: Paragr. 23. In textu Graeco ultima huius testimonii verba sic sonant: καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ὁρῶσιν, ἀπομύσαντες αὐτῶν [in aliis edd. ἑαυτῶν] τὰς ἀγαθοπτικὰς δυνάμεις; qua verba S. Thom. in suo Comment. lect. 19. ita interpretatur: Sed quod ipsi non vident, hoc provenit ex hoc, quod ipsi per liberum arbitrium clauserunt « suas virtutes inspectivas boni », id est, averterunt voluntarie suum intellectum non a consideratione veri, sed ab inspectione boni, in quantum est bonum, quia scilicet nolunt illud sequi. — Pro *inspectivas* plures codd. *in speculativis*, alii et edd. *speculativas*. Vat. pro *virtutes* substituit *veritates*, omisso prius cum edd. 1, 2 *boni*.

en: Paragraph 23. In the Greek text the last words of this testimony read thus: καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ὁρῶσιν, ἀπομύσαντες αὐτῶν [in other editions ἑαυτῶν] τὰς ἀγαθοπτικὰς δυνάμεις; which words St. Thomas in his Commentary, lect. 19, interprets thus: But that they themselves do not see, this arises from the fact that they themselves by free will closed up « their powers inspective of the good », that is, they voluntarily turned away their intellect not from the consideration of the true, but from the inspection of the good insofar as it is good, namely because they will not follow it. — For *inspectivas* [inspective] several codices [read] *in speculativis* [in speculative things]; others and the editions, *speculativas* [speculative]. The Vatican [edition], for *virtutes* [powers] substitutes *veritates* [truths], having omitted before, with editions 1, 2, *boni* [of the good].

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaestionem.

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article.

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 23, Art. 2, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum fides informis expellatur per adventum gratiae.*

Quarto quaeritur de ipsius fidei informis duratione, et est quaestio, utrum fides informis omnino expellatur per adventum gratiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Maior est convenientia fidei formatae ad gloriam, quam sit fidei formatae ad fidem informem, pro eo quod gloria non est aliud quam gratia consummata; sed gloria superveniens evacuat habitum fidei formatae, sicut vult Apostolus[^p494-5]: ergo superveniente fide formata, tollitur fides informis et evacuatur.

2. Item, maius lumen absorbet minus lumen: ergo si lumen gratiae gratum facientis superexcellit incomparabiliter lumen gratiae gratis datae, videtur ergo, quod fides informis per gratiam supervenientem habeat expelli[^p494-6].

3. Item, fides informis nunquam est nisi in peccatore, nam in omni iusto est fides formata; sed gratia gratum faciens nunquam potest esse cum peccato: ergo nunquam potest esse cum fide informi: ergo necessario eam in adventu suo expellit.

4. Item, omnes virtutes simul infunduntur[^p494-7], ergo cum infunditur caritas, infunditur fides formata; sed impossibile est, duo accidentia eiusdem speciei esse in eodem subiecto: ergo impossibile est, duas fides esse in eadem anima: ergo necesse est, fidem informem expelli ad adventum gratiae.

5. Item, aut lumen gratiae gratum facientis sufficit ad credendum, aut non; si non: ergo gratia gratum faciens non sufficit ad promerendum salutem; si sufficit, et superfluum est facere per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora[^p494-8]: ergo videtur, quod superveniente gratia gratum faciente, superfluat habere fidem informem.

**Sed contra:**
1. Gratia non expellit nisi culpam, vel consequens ad culpam; sed fides informis nec est culpa nec consequens ad culpam: ergo fides informis non expellitur a gratia superveniente.

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2. Item, sicut se habet actus ad actum, ita se habet habitus ad habitum; sed gratia gratum faciens facit credere in Deum, gratia vero gratis data facit Deo credere[^p495-1]: si igitur credere in Deum non expellit credere Deo, sed potius praesupponit; videtur, quod gratia gratum faciens non expellat fidem informem.

3. Item, magis conveniunt dona infusa cum infusis, quam infusa cum acquisitis; sed gratia gratum faciens, cum infunditur, non expellit habitus acquisitos[^p495-2]: ergo multo fortius non expellit habitum fidei informis, qui est infusus.

4. Item, sicut se habet culpa ad fidem formatam, ita se habet gratia ad fidem informem; sed culpa, cum superinducitur, etsi expellat formam fidei[^p495-3], non tamen expellit ipsam fidem, quia iam faceret hominem infidelem: ergo pari ratione gratia gratum faciens, cum superinducitur, etsi tollat informitatem fidei, non tamen tollit substantiam habitus.

5. Item, si habitus fidei informis tollitur in iustificatione impii, ergo cum aliquis recidivat in peccatum, aut efficitur infidelis, aut datur ei novus habitus fidei; sed infidelis non efficitur, sicut patet, nec novus habitus datur, quia non decet, ut peccanti in ipso actu peccati infundatur donum[^p495-4] gratis datum: ergo non videtur, quod habitus fidei informis per gratiam supervenientem habeat expelli.

> **Conclusio.** Fides informis per gratiae adventum non expellitur quoad habitum et usum, sed tantum quoad defectum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum dico fidem informem, dico in fide tria, videlicet habitum et ipsius habitus usum et defectum annexum; et quantum ad haec tria potest tripliciter intelligi, quod fides informis expellatur sive evacuetur per gratiam supervenientem. Et secundum hunc triplicem modum intelligendi tres fuerunt circa hoc opiniones.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod a gratia superveniente fides informis expellitur non solum quantum ad informitatis defectum, sed etiam quantum ad usum et quantum ad habitum. Et hoc quidem dixerunt propterea, quia gratia superveniens secum fert omnes virtutes; et quia non est opportunum nec[^p495-5] est possibile, in uno et eodem esse duas fides; cum fides formata superinducatur cum gratia et quantum ad formae complementum et quantum ad usum et quantum ad habitum: ideo ad eius ingressum fides informis omnino expellitur. Et sic ponunt, eam expelli propter incompossibilitatem et inutilitatem[^p495-6]. Et si tu obiicias eis, quod tunc per culpam efficitur homo infidelis; respondent breviter, quod Deus sua gratuita bonitate, quia non permittit, hominem totaliter cadere, infundit ei habitum fidei informis, ne omnino pereat in eo fundamentum spiritualis aedificii; unde sicut ex malis eliciuntur bona, sic contingit, in culpae transgressione alicui infundi habitum informem.

Sed quia illud non videtur multum rationabile, quod Deus dona gratiae ipsi peccanti et se[^p495-7] a se avertenti infundat in ipsa aversione; ideo alius modus est dicendi, quod sicut per peccatum non introducitur habitus fidei informis, sed introducitur defectus et alius credendi modus; sic etiam per gratiam non excluditur ipsius fidei informis habitus, sed solum usus et defectus. Et si tu obiicias, quod frustra erit habitus sine usu; respondent, quod non frustra est, pro eo quod cedit[^p495-8] in dispositionem respectu fidei formatae; et praeterea remanet, ut homo utilitatem habeat de eo in tempore opportuno. — Sed quoniam actus et usus fidei informis est credere et assentire primae Veritati in omnibus articulis, et iste usus potissime competit usui gratiae; cum aliquid non tollatur nisi per suum oppositum, non videtur rationabile usquequaque dicere, quod per adventum gratiae tollatur usus fidei informis, cum potius videatur in ea perfici et compleri.

Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, qui videtur probabilior esse praedictis, quod fides informis per adventum gratiae excluditur quantum ad solum defectum, salvo habitu et usu; et hoc quidem videtur satis rationabile, cum gratia opponatur habitui illi infuso solum ratione informitatis, sicut habitus opponitur privationi[^p495-9]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, habitum fidei informis per supervenientem gratiam non expelli.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod maior est convenientia fidei formatae ad gloriam quam informis ad gratiam; dicendum, quod maior convenientia dupliciter potest attendi: aut secundum comparationem aliquorum in genere gratuiti, aut secundum ordinationem habitus ad

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actum. Si primo modo; sic maior est convenientia fidei formatae ad gloriam quam[^p496-1] ad fidem informem, quia utrumque est gratiae gratum facientis. Si secundo modo; sic maior est convenientia fidei formatae ad informem, quam fidei formatae ad gloriam, pro eo quod actus fidei informis non habet oppositionem cum actu fidei formatae, sed actus fidei formatae, qui quidem est credere non apparentia et videre per speculum et in aenigmate[^p496-2], magnam repugnantiam habet cum statu gloriae; ideo non sic evacuat, sicut evacuatur. Hoc autem infra melius manifestabitur, cum de evacuatione fidei agetur.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maius lumen absorbet minus lumen; dicendum, quod illud non intelligitur de luminibus, quae sunt ad invicem ordinata, sed de his quae habent quandam oppositionem et repugnantiam, nisi intelligatur absorbere quantum ad apparentiam. Et quoniam lumen fidei informis ordinem habet ad lumen gratiae, non oppositionem; hinc est, quod ab ipso non absorbetur, sed magis in esse salvatur[^p496-3].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides informis non est nisi in peccatoribus et cum peccato; dicendum, quod hoc verum est ea ratione, qua fides informis nominat defectum formae, non secundum quod nominat habitum. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod per gratiam advenientem tollatur fidei informis habitus, sed solum quod tollatur informitatis defectus.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes virtutes simul infunduntur; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad illud quod est in eis formale; quantum autem ad materiale sive ad habitum substratum, non habet veritatem, nisi quando non invenit habitum in subiecto, quem informet[^p496-4]; et ideo cum gratia adveniens invenit habitum fidei informis, non oportet, quod superinducatur nova fides. — Praeterea, ratio illa in alio deficit, quia gratia gratum faciens cum gratia gratis data non est eiusdem speciei; et ita procedit ex falsa suppositione.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lumen gratiae gratum facientis debet sufficere ad credendum; dicendum, quod sufficit gratia gratum faciens, cum praesuppositione tamen gratiae gratis datae. Dona enim gratiae gratum facientis non excludunt dona gratiae gratis datae, immo magis illa in suo adventu complent et perficiunt, et quodam modo ab eis vigorantur et perficiuntur. Ideo non sequitur, quod adveniente gratia gratum faciente, superfluat habitus fidei informis; nec remanente habitu informi, propter hoc lumen gratiae gratum facientis sit insufficiens. Unumquodque enim donum Dei sufficiens est secundum id, ad quod habet ordinem[^p496-5].

english:
### Question IV. *Whether unformed faith is expelled by the coming of grace.*

Fourthly, inquiry is made concerning the duration of unformed faith itself, and the question is whether unformed faith is wholly expelled by the coming of grace. And that it is, seems [to be the case].

1. There is a greater agreement of formed faith with glory than there is of formed faith with unformed faith, because glory is nothing other than consummated grace; but supervening glory empties out the habit of formed faith, as the Apostle holds[^p494-5]: therefore, when formed faith supervenes, unformed faith is taken away and emptied out.

2. Likewise, a greater light absorbs a lesser light: therefore, if the light of sanctifying grace incomparably surpasses the light of grace freely given, it seems therefore that unformed faith must be expelled by supervening grace[^p494-6].

3. Likewise, unformed faith is never except in a sinner, for in every just person there is formed faith; but sanctifying grace can never be together with sin: therefore it can never be together with unformed faith: therefore it necessarily expels it at its coming.

4. Likewise, all the virtues are infused together[^p494-7], therefore when charity is infused, formed faith is infused; but it is impossible for two accidents of the same species to be in the same subject: therefore it is impossible for two faiths to be in the same soul: therefore it is necessary that unformed faith be expelled at the coming of grace.

5. Likewise, either the light of sanctifying grace suffices for believing, or it does not; if not: then sanctifying grace does not suffice for meriting salvation; if it does suffice, then it is superfluous to do through more what can be done through fewer[^p494-8]: therefore it seems that, when sanctifying grace supervenes, it is superfluous to have unformed faith.

**On the contrary:**
1. Grace expels nothing but fault, or what follows upon fault; but unformed faith is neither a fault nor a consequence of fault: therefore unformed faith is not expelled by supervening grace.

2. Likewise, as act stands to act, so habit stands to habit; but sanctifying grace makes one *believe in God* (credere in Deum), whereas grace freely given makes one *believe God* (Deo credere)[^p495-1]: if therefore *believing in God* does not expel *believing God*, but rather presupposes it; it seems that sanctifying grace does not expel unformed faith.

3. Likewise, infused gifts agree more with infused gifts than infused with acquired; but sanctifying grace, when it is infused, does not expel acquired habits[^p495-2]: therefore much more does it not expel the habit of unformed faith, which is infused.

4. Likewise, as fault stands to formed faith, so grace stands to unformed faith; but fault, when it is superinduced, although it expels the form of faith[^p495-3], nevertheless does not expel faith itself, since [otherwise] it would already make the man an unbeliever: therefore by parity of reasoning sanctifying grace, when it is superinduced, although it takes away the unformedness of faith, nevertheless does not take away the substance of the habit.

5. Likewise, if the habit of unformed faith is taken away in the justification of the ungodly, then when someone relapses into sin, either he is made an unbeliever, or a new habit of faith is given to him; but he is not made an unbeliever, as is evident, nor is a new habit given, since it is not fitting that to one sinning in the very act of sin a gift[^p495-4] freely given should be infused: therefore it does not seem that the habit of unformed faith must be expelled by supervening grace.

> **Conclusion.** Unformed faith is not expelled by the coming of grace with respect to its habit and use, but only with respect to its defect.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, when I say *unformed faith*, I name in faith three things, namely the habit, and the use of that habit, and the defect annexed to it; and with respect to these three things it can be understood in three ways that unformed faith is expelled or emptied out by supervening grace. And according to this threefold manner of understanding there have been three opinions on this point.

For some have wished to say that by supervening grace unformed faith is expelled not only with respect to the defect of unformedness, but also with respect to its use and with respect to its habit. And this indeed they said because supervening grace brings with itself all the virtues; and because it is neither fitting nor[^p495-5] possible that there be two faiths in one and the same [subject]; since formed faith is superinduced together with grace both as to the completion of form and as to use and as to habit: therefore at its entrance unformed faith is wholly expelled. And so they hold that it is expelled on account of incompossibility and uselessness[^p495-6]. And if you object against them that then through fault a man is made an unbeliever; they answer briefly that God, by His gratuitous goodness, because He does not permit man to fall totally, infuses into him the habit of unformed faith, lest the foundation of the spiritual edifice perish utterly in him; whence, just as from evils goods are drawn out, so it happens that in the transgression of fault the unformed habit is infused into someone.

But because this does not seem very reasonable—that God should infuse the gifts of grace into the sinner himself, and into one[^p495-7] turning away from Him, in the very turning-away; therefore there is another way of speaking: that just as through sin the habit of unformed faith is not introduced, but rather a defect and another mode of believing is introduced; so also through grace the habit of unformed faith itself is not excluded, but only its use and defect. And if you object that a habit without use will be in vain; they answer that it is not in vain, because it yields[^p495-8] toward a disposition with respect to formed faith; and besides, it remains so that the man may have the benefit of it at the opportune time. — But since the act and use of unformed faith is to believe and to assent to the First Truth in all the articles, and this use most belongs to the use of grace; since nothing is taken away except by its opposite, it does not seem reasonable to say in every respect that by the coming of grace the use of unformed faith is taken away, since rather it would seem to be perfected and completed in it.

And therefore there is a third way of speaking, which seems more probable than the foregoing: that unformed faith is excluded by the coming of grace only with respect to the defect, the habit and use being preserved; and this indeed seems sufficiently reasonable, since grace is opposed to that infused habit only by reason of unformedness, just as a habit is opposed to a privation[^p495-9]. — Therefore the arguments showing that the habit of unformed faith is not expelled by supervening grace are to be granted.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that there is a greater agreement of formed faith with glory than of unformed [faith] with grace; it must be said that greater agreement can be considered in two ways: either according to a comparison of certain things in the genus of the gratuitous, or according to the ordering of the habit to

the act. If in the first way; thus there is a greater agreement of formed faith with glory than[^p496-1] with unformed faith, because each belongs to sanctifying grace. If in the second way; thus there is a greater agreement of formed faith with unformed [faith] than of formed faith with glory, because the act of unformed faith does not have opposition with the act of formed faith, but the act of formed faith, which indeed is to believe things not apparent and to see *through a mirror and in an enigma*[^p496-2], has a great repugnance with the state of glory; therefore it does not so empty out, as it is emptied out. But this will be better manifested below, when the emptying-out of faith is treated.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a greater light absorbs a lesser light; it must be said that this is not understood of lights which are ordered to one another, but of those which have a certain opposition and repugnance, unless it be understood to absorb with respect to appearance. And since the light of unformed faith has ordering to the light of grace, not opposition; hence it is that it is not absorbed by it, but rather is preserved in being[^p496-3].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that unformed faith is only in sinners and with sin; it must be said that this is true by the reason whereby unformed faith names a defect of form, not according as it names a habit. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that by the coming of grace the habit of unformed faith is taken away, but only that the defect of unformedness is taken away.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that all the virtues are infused together; it must be said that this is true with respect to that which is formal in them; but with respect to the material, or to the underlying habit, it does not hold true, except when it does not find a habit in the subject which it may inform[^p496-4]; and therefore when supervening grace finds the habit of unformed faith, it is not necessary that a new faith be superinduced. — Moreover, that argument fails in another respect, because sanctifying grace is not of the same species as grace freely given; and so it proceeds from a false supposition.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the light of sanctifying grace ought to suffice for believing; it must be said that sanctifying grace suffices, yet with the presupposition of grace freely given. For the gifts of sanctifying grace do not exclude the gifts of grace freely given, but rather complete and perfect them at their coming, and in a certain way are invigorated and perfected by them. Therefore it does not follow that, when sanctifying grace supervenes, the habit of unformed faith is superfluous; nor, the unformed habit remaining, is the light of sanctifying grace on this account insufficient. For each gift of God is sufficient according to that to which it has ordering[^p496-5].

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.

en: First Letter to the Corinthians 13:10ff.

la: Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 19. q. 3. ait: Sicut enim, sole lucente, cessat lumen lunae et stellarum, sic, lucente in microcosmo sole iustitiae per veram fidem, cessat lumen omnium virtutum informium, quae sunt ad modum stellarum aliquantulum lucentium in nocte peccati. — Paulo ante pro *ergo si* cod. U *sed.*

en: William of Auxerre, Summa p. III, tr. 19, q. 3, says: For just as, while the sun shines, the light of the moon and stars ceases, so, when the sun of justice shines in the microcosm through true faith, the light of all the unformed virtues ceases, which are after the manner of stars shining somewhat in the night of sin. — A little before, for *ergo si* codex U [reads] *sed.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 1. — Quod impossibile sit, plura accidentia eiusdem speciei esse in eodem subiecto, monstratum est tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. Cfr. Aristot. V. Phys. text. 35. seqq. (c. 4.). — In codd. hoc quartum arg. exhibetur quinto loco.

en: Cf. below d. 36, q. 1. — That it is impossible for several accidents of the same species to be in the same subject was shown in tom. II, p. 119, note 8. Cf. Aristotle, Physics V, text 35ff. (c. 4). — In the codices this fourth argument is presented in the fifth place.

la: Vide supra pag. 277, nota 1. — Paulo ante pro *si sufficit* codd.; U V et alii *si sufficeret* et dein pro *superfluum est* codd. U V soli *superfluum esset;* cum codd. A K Z ante *superfluum est* supplevimus *et.* Paulo inferius pro *superfluat* codd. A K U *superfluum est* [cod. K *sit*].

en: See above p. 277, note 1. — A little before, for *si sufficit* the codices [read thus]; U V and others *si sufficeret*, and then for *superfluum est* codices U V alone *superfluum esset;* with codices A K Z we supplied *et* before *superfluum est.* A little below, for *superfluat* codices A K U [read] *superfluum est* [cod. K *sit*].

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. et infra dub. 3. — In fine arg. pro *expellat* multi codd. *expellit.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, and below dub. 3. — At the end of the argument, for *expellat* many codices [read] *expellit.*

la: Vide infra d. 33. q. 1. et 3.

en: See below d. 33, q. 1 and 3.

la: Scil. caritatem. Cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6.

en: Namely charity. Cf. below d. 36, q. 6.

la: Codd. A K T *adiungunt gratiae.*

en: Codices A K T *add* gratiae.

la: Codd. A K U Z *adtexunt etiam.*

en: Codices A K U Z *append* etiam.

la: Edd. 1, 2 omittunt *et inutilitatem.* Pro *inutilitatem* cod. G substituit *innibilitatem*, Vat. *unitatem.* Mox pro *efficitur* edd. 1, 2 *fit*, Vat. *fieret.* Subinde pro *respondent* codd. A K *respondetur*, cod. Z *respondebunt*, qui cod. etiam proxime post omittit *breviter.* Paulo inferius pro *quia* edd. *qua.*

en: Editions 1, 2 omit *et inutilitatem.* For *inutilitatem* codex G substitutes *innibilitatem*, the Vatican [ed.] *unitatem.* Soon, for *efficitur* editions 1, 2 [read] *fit*, the Vatican [ed.] *fieret.* Thereupon, for *respondent* codices A K [read] *respondetur*, codex Z *respondebunt*, which codex also immediately after omits *breviter.* A little below, for *quia* the editions [read] *qua.*

la: Codd. non habent *se*, quod edd. non male suppleverunt; tamen, teste Forcellini, accusativus *se* interdum omittitur. Inferius pro *credendi modus* Vat. *credendi motus.*

en: The codices do not have *se*, which the editions not badly supplied; nevertheless, according to Forcellini, the accusative *se* is sometimes omitted. Below, for *credendi modus* the Vatican [ed. reads] *credendi motus.*

la: Pro *cedit* codd. A P Q *cadit.* Paulo inferius pro *utilitatem* codd. N (K a secunda manu) aa *necessitatem*, quod et in cit. *Supplemento* ad Sum. Alex. Hal., collat. 38. a. 3, habetur. Deinde pro *competit* complures codd. *competat.*

en: For *cedit* codices A P Q [read] *cadit.* A little below, for *utilitatem* codices N (K by a second hand) aa [read] *necessitatem*, which is also found in the cited *Supplement* to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 38, a. 3. Then, for *competit* several codices [read] *competat.*

la: Quomodo habitus opponatur privationi, exponit Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et X. Metaph. text. 15. seqq. (IX. c. 4.).

en: How a habit is opposed to a privation Aristotle explains, Categories, in the chapter on Opposites, and Metaphysics X, text 15ff. (IX, c. 4).

la: Cod. Z subdit *gratiae.*

en: Codex Z adds *gratiae.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12. Codd. Z bb cum Vulgata omittunt *et* post *speculum.* — De evacuatione fidei cfr. infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.

en: First Letter to the Corinthians 13:12. Codices Z bb, with the Vulgate, omit *et* after *speculum.* — On the emptying-out of faith cf. below d. 31, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 320, nota 5.

en: Cf. above p. 320, note 5.

la: Ita codd. A K L; in aliis et edd. *informat.*

en: Thus codices A K L; in the others and the editions [it reads] *informat.*

la: Cod. li ordinare.

en: Codex li [reads] *ordinare.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec et seq. (5.) quaestio intime cohaerent earumque solutio dependet a principiis, quae ponuntur in quaestione generali, quomodo caritas sit forma virtutum, vel in speciali quaestione, « utrum fides formata et informis specie differant » (S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.). — Hanc 4. quaestionem S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 4. a. 4.) aliique etiam hac formula exprimunt: Utrum eadem numero sit fides formata et informis. — Primam in corp. relatam opinionem tenuit Guliel. Antissiodorensis (Summa aurea, p. III. tr. 5. c. 1. q. 4.), cum explicite doceat, fidem informem, adveniente fide formata, perire tum quoad actum tum quoad habitum. Fundamentalis ratio ipsius est eiusdem assertio, quod utriusque fidei habitus essentialiter differant, quia secundum ipsum fides informis « innititur testimoniis Scripturarum et miraculorum »; fides gratuita vero est per illuminationem, qua « anima assentit primae Veritati propter se et super omnia ». Sed hoc ipsum fundamentum primae opinionis a S. Bonav. aliisque reprobatur; econtra communiter tenetur: « Fides formata et informis non distinguuntur sicut diversi habitus, sed sicut habitus perfectus et imperfectus » (S. Thom., de Verit. q. 14. a. 4.). Hoc dicitur de isto habitu in genere moris, sed in genere naturae hi « habitus sunt penitus idem » (idem hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.). Denique cum S. Bonav. communiter docetur, quod caritas est fidei forma non intrinseca et essentialis, sed extrinseca et accidentalis (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 4. a. 3. ad 3.; cfr. infra d. 36. q. 6, praesertim ad 3.). — De hac 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal. (de hac et seq. q.), S. p. III. q. 64. m. 6. — S. Thom., locc. citt. et hic q. 3. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.

**II.** De seq. (5.) quaestione, quae est maioris momenti, cfr. hic dub. 3, infra d. 25. dub. 4, d. 27. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 3, q. 3. ad 3; II. Sent. d. 41. dub. 1. — Informatio fidei aliarumque virtutum, quae fit per gratiam vel caritatem sive, ut dicit S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. ad 3.), a gratia mediante caritate, intelligitur secundum quandam analogiam, quam habet cum informatione intrinseca et proprie dicta, qua in rebus naturalibus ex materia et forma fit unum per essentiam. Ex caritate autem et fide non fit unum essentialiter, sed unum « secundum quandam ordinationem et directionem in finem » (hic ad 4.), dum gratia superveniens communicat fidei tum in ordine ad meritum tum in recte intendendo fine ultimo (vide finem corp.) eandem perfectionem et rectitudinem, quae caritati est essentialis. Sed fidei extrinsecus haec perfectio advenit, ut explicatur exemplo lucis, quae superfunditur coloribus. Sed de hoc et de solutione ad 6. cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. et scholion et praecipue infra d. 36. q. 6. — De hac 5. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question and the following (5th) are intimately connected, and their solution depends on the principles set down in the general question, how charity is the form of the virtues, or in the special question, "whether formed and unformed faith differ in species" (St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, subquaestion 3). — This 4th question St. Thomas (Summa II-II, q. 4, a. 4) and others also express by this formula: Whether formed and unformed faith are numerically the same. — The first opinion reported in the corpus was held by William of Auxerre (Summa aurea, p. III, tr. 5, c. 1, q. 4), since he explicitly teaches that unformed faith, when formed faith supervenes, perishes both as to act and as to habit. His fundamental reason is his own assertion that the habits of the two faiths differ essentially, because according to him unformed faith "leans on the testimonies of the Scriptures and of miracles"; whereas gratuitous faith is through illumination, by which "the soul assents to the First Truth for its own sake and above all things." But this very foundation of the first opinion is rejected by St. Bonaventure and others; on the contrary it is commonly held: "Formed and unformed faith are not distinguished as diverse habits, but as a perfect and an imperfect habit" (St. Thomas, de Veritate q. 14, a. 4). This is said of that habit in the genus of morals, but in the genus of nature these "habits are entirely the same" (the same, here q. 3, a. 1, subquaestion 3). Finally, with St. Bonaventure it is commonly taught that charity is the form of faith not intrinsically and essentially, but extrinsically and accidentally (St. Thomas, Summa II-II, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3; cf. below d. 36, q. 6, especially ad 3). — On this 4th question: Alexander of Hales (on this and the following q.), Summa p. III, q. 64, m. 6. — St. Thomas, the places cited, and here q. 3, a. 4, subquaestions 1-3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 4, subquaestions 1, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q., here q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., here q. 3.

**II.** On the following (5th) question, which is of greater moment, cf. here dub. 3, below d. 25, dub. 4, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, especially ad 3, q. 3 ad 3; II Sent. d. 41, dub. 1. — The informing of faith and of the other virtues, which is brought about through grace or charity, or as St. Thomas says (here q. 3, a. 1, subquaestion 1, ad 3), by grace mediating charity, is understood according to a certain analogy which it has with the intrinsic and properly-so-called informing, by which in natural things from matter and form one thing is made per essence. But from charity and faith one thing is not made essentially, but one thing "according to a certain ordering and direction toward an end" (here ad 4), while supervening grace communicates to faith—both in the order toward merit and in rightly intending the ultimate end (see the end of the corpus)—the same perfection and rectitude which is essential to charity. But this perfection comes to faith from without, as is explained by the example of light, which is poured over colors. But on this and on the solution to [argument] 6, cf. II Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, and the scholion, and especially below d. 36, q. 6. — On this 5th question: St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, subquaestion 1; Summa III, q. 4, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10, 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 4, subquaestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{494,495,496}-{L,R}-*.png` (Vol III PDF-priority inversion on the cascade-shattered Respondeo + three-opinion corpus + Solutiones), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 34348–34525) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Marginalia trimmed (`Ad opposi-tum.`/`Tria in fide informi.`/`Conclusio.`/`Opinio 1.`/`Opinio 2.`/`Non probatur.`/`Opinio auctoris et conclusio.`/`Solutio oppositorum.`/`Distinctio notanda.`/`Notandum.`/`Alia ratio.`). pdf = printed + 22.

**Page span:** printed pp.494–496 (PDF 516–518). q4 opens on p.494 right after q3's Solutio-4 (head `494 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`), runs through p.495 and closes on p.496 with the Scholion (q5 — QUAESTIO V — opens on p.497).

**Opener alignment VERIFIED on PDF (p.494-L band):** *Quarto quaeritur de ipsius fidei informis duratione, et est quaestio, utrum fides informis omnino expellatur per adventum gratiae. Et quod sic, videtur* — matches ART. II's fourth question (*Quarto de eius duratione*).

**Apparatus 18 entries, per-page restart:**
- **p.494 ×4** (`[^p494-5..8]`) — **MIGRATED IN** from the boundary with q3; q3 kept p.494 nn.1–4 (n.4 = *Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaestionem*), q4 owns nn.5–8. Confirmed on PDF footer bands (n.5 = 1 Cor 13:10ff; n.6 = William of Auxerre sun/stars simile; n.7 = d.36 q.1 + "fourth arg. shown in fifth place"; n.8 = p.277 n.1 cross-ref).
- **p.495 ×9** (`[^p495-1..9]`) — nn.1–6 L-column, nn.7–9 R-column.
- **p.496 ×5** (`[^p496-1..5]`) — nn.1–2 L-column, nn.3–5 R-column.

**Page breaks:** p.494→495 falls mid-Sed contra (after arg 1, before arg 2 *Item, sicut se habet actus ad actum*); p.495→496 falls mid-Solutio 1 (*…secundum ordinationem habitus ad | actum. Si primo modo*).

**Footers IN: p.494 nn.5–8** (from q3 hand-off, confirmed on PDF band `vol3-p494-{L,R}-2.png`). **Footers OUT: NONE** — q4's last footer is p.496 n.5; p.497's footer band (nn.1–8) belongs to QUAESTIO V.

**SCHOLION FINDING: q4 HAS a standalone scholion** (OCR-garbled header `SCHOLIOK` = `SCHOLION.`, raw ~34487) on p.496, sections **I–II**: I treats this 4th question (the three opinions, William of Auxerre's rejected ground); II treats the following 5th question's matter (informing of faith by analogy with matter-form). Verified on PDF bands `vol3-p496-{L,R}-2.png`.

**Seam:** opens at QUAESTIO IV header (raw 34348), continuous from q3's Solutio-4 close (raw 34347, *…obcaecationem⁴*); closes at end of Scholion §II before QUAESTIO V (raw 34526).

**No [?] flags** — all bands legible at 450 dpi; no Greek in q4's footers (the Greek of q3's p.494 n.3 stayed with q3).

**HAND-OFF TO d23-a2-q5 (forwarded):** see `next-session-resume.md`.