title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. Quaestio III. *Utrum nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum ea quae sic dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem, quae sit vera relatio[^1]. Et quod secundum relationem, videtur hoc modo.

1. Sicut Pater se ipso generat, ita se ipso creat; tamen, quamvis se ipso generet, generatio et paternitas dicitur vere in ipso secundum relationem: ergo pari ratione, quamvis se ipso creet et dominetur.

2. Item, nomina huiusmodi aut pure dicunt divinam substantiam, aut superaddunt aliquem respectum. Si pure divinam substantiam dicunt; sed substantia est aeterna et ab aeterno: ergo dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, quod falsum est. Ergo superaddunt aliquem respectum, ergo relationem. Si dicas, quod non addunt respectum secundum rem, sed secundum modum[^2]; contra: aut illi modo respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si aliquid in re: ergo realiter dicuntur relative; si nihil: ergo falsus est modus intelligendi et inconveniens modus dicendi.

3. Item, sunt quaedam relativa secundum esse, quaedam secundum dici. Sed in relativis secundum dici est modus respectus, in relativis secundum esse est veritas respectus; sed dominus et servus sunt relativa secundum esse: ergo utrumque importat respectum, non tantum secundum modum, sed etiam secundum rem: ergo etc.

4. Item, dominium dictum de Deo ita bene dicit superpositionem[^3], sicut dictum de creatura: illa igitur superpositio aut ponitur in Deo, aut in creatura; non in creatura — constat, quia tunc idem sibi superponeretur — ergo ponitur in Deo. Sed superpositio est vere relatio: ergo etc.

5. Item, cum dico: *Deus creat*, hic notatur duplex respectus, scilicet causae ad effectum, et e converso. Aut ergo uterque est in creatura, aut uterque in Deo, aut unus in Deo, alter in creatura. Constat quod impossibile est utrumque esse in Deo, quia Deus non est effectus; et similiter in creatura, quia creatura non est sui causa, ergo necesse est quod alter in Deo: ergo etc.

6. Item, cum dico: *Deus creat*, Deus verissime est causa: et si vera ratio causae ponit veram relationem, huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo ponunt veram relationem.

**Contra:**

1. Dionysius[^4]: «In causalibus et causis non recipimus reciprocationem»: ergo cum Deus sit causa perfectissima creaturae, non refertur ad creaturam, quamvis e converso creatura referatur ad ipsum.

2. Item, Philosophus[^5] dicit, quod scientia secundum esse refertur ad scibile, sed non convertitur: ergo si minor est dependentia Dei ad creaturam quam scibilis ad scientiam, ergo nulla in eo est relatio.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia huiusmodi nomina si dicunt relationem circa Deum, aut illa est pure divina essentia, aut aliquid superadditum. Si pure Dei essentia, ergo aeternum quid, ergo respectus huiusmodi nominum est aeternus: ergo de necessitate dicuntur ab aeterno. Si autem dicunt aliquid superadditum: ergo in Deo est aliqua compositio.

4. Item, omnis relatio dicit dependentiam vel saltem ordinem et habitudinem ad illud, respectu cuius dicitur; sed Deus non ordinatur nec terminatur[^6]: ergo nihil dicitur de Deo relative respectu creaturae.

### Conclusio.

> Nomina, quae de Deo ex tempore dicuntur, non important aliquam relationem secundum rem in Deo, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc intelligendum est[^7], quod dici secundum relationem est dupliciter: aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum. Realis autem relatio triplex est. Aliquando enim fundatur super substantiam proprietatem accidentalem, ut similitudo in duplici albedine[^8]; aliquando super dependentiam essentialem, sicut respectus vel relatio materiae ad formam — nam, sicut dicit Philosophus[^10], «materia hoc ipsum quod est, ad alterum est» — aliquando super originem naturalem, sicut effectus ad causam et filii ad patrem[^11].

Prima relatio non potest esse in Deo, quia in Deo nulla est proprietas accidentalis. Secunda non potest esse in eo, quia nulla in Deo est dependentia. Tertia est in Deo, sed non respectu creaturae, sed respectu personae; haec enim non dicit compositionem nec dependentiae inclinationem, sicut prima et secunda, sed ponit distinctionem et ordinem. Et quoniam vere una persona ordinatur ad aliam et habitudinem habet et alio modo secundum rem se habet ad unam quam ad aliam; ideo haec relatio est in persona respectu personae[^9], sed non respectu creaturae. Nam Deus ad creaturam non habet

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ordinem nec habet aliam et aliam habitudinem. Et ideo nullo modo est realiter in Deo relatio respectu creaturae. — Creatura autem ad Deum habet ordinem et habitudinem, mediante proprietate accidentali et dependentia essentiali et origine naturali[^2s]: ideo secundum omnem modum refertur creatura ad Deum.

Quoniam igitur intellectus noster, cum intelligit aliquid referri ad aliquid, intelligit etiam illud comparari ad illud: ideo intelligit Deum per modum respectus et relationis, cui respectui in Deo nihil respondet nisi divina essentia; ex parte creaturae respondet[^1s], et ideo non est vanus. — Concedendum ergo, quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo non important relationem in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi. Ex his patent quaesita.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Quod enim obiicitur de Patre, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia Patris ad Filium est ordo et habitudo, et alia habitudo ad Filium quam ad Spiritum sanctum: Deus autem, sicut dicit Philosophus[^3s], non habet ordinem nec aliquam habitudinem. Nam «prima causa eodem modo se habet ad omnia, quamvis alia alio et alio modo se habeant ad ipsam», et in duodecimo primae Philosophiae[^4s] dicit, quod primum et summum bonum non ordinatur ad haec creata.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si non dicunt relationem, ergo pure substantiam; dicendum, quod pure circa Deum dicunt substantiam secundum rem, sed relationem secundum modum intelligendi; in creatura vero secundum rem[^5s]. Et quod obiicit, quod vanus est intellectus; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia intellectus fundatur super aliquid, scilicet super relationem creaturae, cui respondet relatio secundum dici in Deo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam sunt relativa secundum esse etc.; dicendum, quod quaedam sunt relativa secundum esse ex parte utriusque extremi, ut dominus et servus in creatura: quaedam ex parte alterius, ut scibile et scientia, et mensurabile et mensura[^6s]; sic in proposito.

*Ad 4. 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominus dicit superpositionem, et similiter creator[^7s] causalitatem; dicendum, quod superpositio in Deo est vere superpositio, et vere causalitas, quia vere alii superponitur Deus, et vere efficit. Tamen illa superpositio non est vere relatio, similiter nec causalitas, sed est vere divina essentia, quia se ipsa[^8s] superponitur et efficit.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi respectus causae et effectus; dicendum, quod respectus effectus ibi est vere respectus et vere relatio, sed respectus causae non est respectus nec relatio in Deo secundum rem, sed secundum modum intelligendi, secundum rem vero substantia vel essentia.

english:
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### Article Unicus. Question III. *Whether the names which are predicated of God in time are predicated according to substance or according to relation.*

Third, it is asked whether those things which are thus predicated of God in time are predicated according to substance or according to relation, which would be a true relation[^1]. And that it is according to relation is shown in this way.

1. Just as the Father generates by himself, so he creates by himself; yet, although he generates by himself, generation and paternity are truly said of him according to relation: therefore by the same reasoning, although he creates and exercises lordship by himself [the same would follow].

2. Likewise, names of this sort either predicate purely the divine substance, or they add some respect over and above it. If they predicate purely the divine substance: but substance is eternal and from eternity: therefore [these names] are predicated of God from eternity, which is false. Therefore they add some respect, and therefore a relation. If you say that they do not add a respect according to reality, but according to a mode[^2]; on the contrary: either something in reality corresponds to that mode, or nothing. If something in reality: then they are predicated relatively in a real sense; if nothing: then the mode of understanding is false and the mode of speaking is unsuitable.

3. Likewise, some things are relative according to being, others according to predication. But in things relative according to predication there is a mode of respect, while in things relative according to being there is the truth of respect; but lord and servant are relative according to being: therefore both import a respect, not merely according to mode but also according to reality: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, lordship predicated of God signifies a superposition[^3] just as well as when predicated of a creature: therefore that superposition is either posited in God or in the creature; not in the creature — that is evident, because then the same thing would be superposed over itself — therefore it is posited in God. But superposition is a true relation: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, when I say *God creates*, a twofold respect is indicated, namely of cause to effect and conversely. Therefore either both are in the creature, or both in God, or one in God and the other in the creature. It is evident that it is impossible for both to be in God, because God is not an effect; and similarly [impossible for both] in the creature, because the creature is not its own cause; therefore it is necessary that one be in God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when I say *God creates*, God is most truly a cause: and if the true account of cause posits a true relation, then names of this sort predicated of God posit a true relation.

**On the contrary:**

1. Dionysius[^4]: «In causes and caused things we do not accept reciprocation»: therefore, since God is the most perfect cause of the creature, he is not referred to the creature, although conversely the creature is referred to him.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^5] says that knowledge according to being is referred to the knowable, but not conversely: therefore if God's dependence upon the creature is less than that of the knowable upon knowledge, then there is no relation in him.

3. Likewise, this is shown from reason, because if names of this sort predicate a relation about God, then either that relation is the pure divine essence, or something added over and above it. If it is the pure essence of God, then it is something eternal, and therefore the respect of such names is eternal: therefore they are necessarily predicated from eternity. But if they predicate something added over and above: then there is some composition in God.

4. Likewise, every relation expresses a dependence or at least an order and orientation toward that with respect to which it is predicated; but God is neither ordered nor terminated[^6]: therefore nothing is predicated of God relatively with respect to the creature.

### Conclusion.

> The names which are predicated of God in time do not import any relation according to reality in God, but only according to a mode of understanding.

**I respond:** For understanding this[^7], it must be said that to be predicated according to relation is twofold: either according to reality or according to mode. Real relation, moreover, is threefold. For sometimes it is founded upon an accidental property of substance, as similarity in two instances of whiteness[^8]; sometimes upon an essential dependence, as the respect or relation of matter to form — for, as the Philosopher[^10] says, «matter, this very thing that it is, is toward another» — sometimes upon a natural origin, as effect to cause and children to father[^11].

The first relation cannot be in God, because in God there is no accidental property. The second cannot be in him, because there is no dependence in God. The third is in God, but not with respect to the creature but with respect to the person; for this relation does not express composition nor an inclination of dependence, as the first and second do, but posits distinction and order. And since one person is truly ordered toward another and has an orientation and according to reality relates differently to one than to another, therefore this relation is in a person with respect to a person[^9], but not with respect to the creature. For God toward the creature has no

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order, nor does he have one orientation and another orientation. And therefore in no way is there really in God a relation with respect to the creature. — The creature, however, has order and orientation toward God, by means of an accidental property and an essential dependence and a natural origin[^2s]: therefore according to every mode the creature is referred to God.

Since therefore our intellect, when it understands something as related to something, also understands that thing as compared to that thing: therefore it understands God in the manner of a respect and a relation, to which respect in God nothing corresponds except the divine essence; from the side of the creature something corresponds[^1s], and therefore it is not empty. — It must be conceded, therefore, that names of this sort predicated of God do not import a relation in God according to reality, but only according to a mode of understanding. From these considerations the questions are resolved.

**Replies to the arguments on the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* As for what is objected concerning the Father: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the Father's [relation] to the Son is an order and an orientation, and a different orientation toward the Son than toward the Holy Spirit; but God, as the Philosopher[^3s] says, has no order nor any orientation. For «the first cause relates in the same way to all things, although other things relate to it in one way and another», and in the twelfth [book] of the primary Philosophy[^4s] he says that the first and highest good is not ordered toward these created things.

*To 2.* As for what is objected — if [these names] do not predicate a relation, then they predicate purely substance — it must be said that about God they purely predicate substance according to reality, but a relation according to a mode of understanding; in the creature, however, [they also predicate relation] according to reality[^5s]. And as for the objection that the intellect is empty: it must be said that this is false, because the intellect is founded upon something, namely upon the relation of the creature, to which there corresponds a relation according to predication in God.

*To 3.* As for what is objected — that some things are relative according to being, etc. — it must be said that some things are relative according to being from the side of both extremes, as lord and servant in the creature: some only from the side of one, as the knowable and knowledge, and the measurable and the measure[^6s]; so it is in the present case.

*To 4. 5.* As for what is objected — that lord expresses a superposition, and similarly creator[^7s] expresses causality — it must be said that the superposition in God is a true superposition, and truly a causality, because God is truly set over another and truly effects. Nevertheless that superposition is not a true relation, nor similarly is causality, but is truly the divine essence, because by itself[^8s] [God] is set over and effects.

*To 6.* As for what is objected — that there is in this case a respect of cause and effect — it must be said that the respect of effect is there a true respect and a true relation, but the respect of cause is not a respect nor a relation in God according to reality, but according to a mode of understanding; according to reality, however, it is substance or essence.

la: Ed. I addit ista.

en: Ed. I adds *ista* [i.e., the word "ista"].

la: Scilicet intelligendi sive dicendi. Notamus, quod in hac quaestione S. Doctor verbis: *relatio secundum modum, secundum rationem, secundum dici* promiscue utitur ad significandam eandem rem, nempe relationem rationis, quae opponitur relationi reali, ut ex corp. q. et ex solut. argum. apparet. Idem occurrit supra d. 28. dub. 3, et infra d. 31. q. 2. ad 6. — Multi codd. in hac propositione omittunt *non* ante *addunt*, et dein pro *sed* substituunt *et etiam*; perperam.

en: That is, according to a mode of understanding or of speaking. We note that in this question the holy Doctor uses the terms *relation according to mode*, *according to reason*, *according to predication* interchangeably to signify the same thing, namely a relation of reason, which is opposed to a real relation, as appears from the body of the question and from the solution of the arguments. The same occurs above at d. 28. dub. 3, and below at d. 31. q. 2. to 6. — Many codices in this proposition omit *non* before *addunt*, and then substitute *et etiam* for *sed*; incorrectly.

la: Id est, ordinem superioritatis.

en: That is, an order of superiority.

la: De Divin. Nom. c. 9. § 6. Cfr. supra pag. 346, nota 4.

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 9. § 6. Cf. above p. 346, n. 4.

la: De Praedicam. c. de Relatione, et V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.).

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on Relation, and *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV. c. 15.).

la: Simul audi: a creatura. — Vide supra pag. 453, nota 4.

en: Understand simultaneously: "by the creature." — See above p. 453, n. 4.

la: Vat., mutata interpunctione, addit *sciendum*, pro quo codd. X Z *notandum*.

en: The Vatican edition, with changed punctuation, adds *sciendum* [i.e., "it is to be known"], in place of which codices X Z read *notandum* [i.e., "it is to be noted"].

la: Hinc et Aristot. similia vocat «quae sunt unum in qualitate». Cfr. supra pag. 342, nota 6.

en: Hence Aristotle also calls similar things "those which are one in quality." Cf. above p. 342, n. 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 453, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 453, n. 6.

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV. c. 15.).

la: Supple: aliquid. — Solummodo Vat.: *ex parte tamen creaturae bene aliquid respondet*.

en: Supply: "something." — The Vatican edition alone reads: *from the side of the creature, however, something indeed corresponds*.

la: Cfr. infra dub. 4.

en: Cf. below, dub. 4.

la: Intellige auctorem libri de Causis, qui prop. 24. ait: «Causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non existunt in causa prima secundum unam dispositionem». Richard. a Mediavilla, hic q. i. verbis istis haec adiungit: «Sed si ea quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ponerent in Deo reales relationes ad creaturam, non existeret in omnibus secundum dispositionem unam: ergo non ponunt in Deo aliquam realem relationem ad creaturam». — Paulo superius post *alia habitudo* vetustiores codd. cum ed. I omittunt *ad Filium*.

en: Understand the author of the *Book of Causes*, who at prop. 24 says: "The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition." Richard of Middleton, here q. i., adds these words to that text: "But if those things which are predicated of God in time were to posit in God real relations to the creature, [the first cause] would not exist in all things according to one disposition: therefore they do not posit in God any real relation to the creature." — A little above, after *alia habitudo*, older codices with ed. I omit *ad Filium*.

la: Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 52. Verba ipsa invenies supra pag. 453, nota 4.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, text 52. The very words can be found above p. 453, n. 4.

la: Pro *rem* Vat. cum cod. cc *esse*.

en: In place of *rem* [reality], the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *esse* [being].

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.): *Mensurabile autem et scibile et intelligibile, eo quod aliud ad illud dicitur, ad aliquid (i. e. relativa) dicuntur. Nam intelligibile significat quod eius est intellectus; non est autem intellectus ad illud cuius intellectus est: idem enim profecto bis dictum esset.* — Pro *mensurabile* multi codd. *mensuratio*, cod. Iv et ed. I *mensuratum*; sed incongrue.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20 (IV. c. 15.): *But the measurable and the knowable and the intelligible are said to be in relation to something, because another is related to them. For the intelligible signifies that there is a knowledge of it; but knowledge is not related to that of which it is the knowledge: for then the same thing would have been said twice.* — In place of *mensurabile* [measurable], many codices read *mensuratio* [measuring], codex Iv and ed. I read *mensuratum* [measured thing]; but inaptly.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *creatio*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *creatio* [creation] [in place of *creator*].

la: Codd. A S T V X Z et alii cum ed. I *se ipso*.

en: Codices A S T V X Z and others with ed. I read *se ipso* [by himself] [in place of *se ipsa*].

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quae hic dicuntur de diversis speciebus relationis, ab Aristotele docentur et satis explicantur a S. Thom., S. 1. q. 13. a. 7. Quod relatio non semper inducat mutationem in utroque extremo, explanatur hic dub. 3, et diffusius a Ricardo, hic q. 1. — Pro intelligentia solutionum ad argg. opposita notandum quod licet relatio ipsa ad creaturam in Deo sit tantum rationis, fundamentum tamen habet reale in ipso (cfr. solut. ad 2. 5.).

**II.** Conclusioni solummodo Nominales contradicunt asserentes, in Deo esse realem relationem ad creaturas, acquisitam in tempore, sed sine mutatione ipsius. — Scotus non negat quod in Deo sit relatio rationis ad creaturas (ut perperam asserit Caietanus ad S. I. q. 13. a. 7.), sed potius in ipsa re cum Angelico et Seraphico convenit, licet aliquid objiciat contra formam rationis a S. Thoma allatae (cfr. Lychetus ad Scot., hic q. 2.).

**III.** Scot., loc. cit.; et Report. hic q. unica. — Thom. S. hic a. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 12. 13. — B. Albert. hic a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. i. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. i. — R. Aegid. hic I. princ. q. 2. 3. l. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 29. q. 3. n. i. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** What is said here about the different species of relation is taught by Aristotle and sufficiently explained by St. Thomas, *Summa* I. q. 13. a. 7. That relation does not always induce a change in both extremes is explained here in dub. 3, and more diffusely by Richard, here q. 1. — For understanding the solutions to the opposing arguments, it must be noted that although the relation itself to the creature in God is only of reason, it nevertheless has a real foundation in him (cf. solut. to 2. 5.).

**II.** Only the Nominalists contradict the Conclusion, asserting that in God there is a real relation to creatures, acquired in time, but without change in him. — Scotus does not deny that in God there is a relation of reason to creatures (as Cajetan wrongly asserts at *Summa* I. q. 13. a. 7.), but rather agrees in the matter itself with the Angelic and Seraphic [Doctors], although he objects something against the form of the argument put forward by St. Thomas (cf. Lychetus on Scotus, here q. 2.).

**III.** Scotus, loc. cit.; and *Reportata*, here q. unica. — Thomas, *Summa*, here a. 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 7; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 12. 13. — B. Albert., here a. 8; *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 1. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 3. i. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3. i. — Aegidius Romanus, here I. princ. q. 2. 3. l. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 29. q. 3. n. i. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 30, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de his nominibus creator, dominus huiusmodi, quae dicit Magister: dici de Deo ex tempore. Videtur enim falsum, quia «dominium, ut dicit Boethius[^1], est potestas coercendi subditos» sed haec est in Deo ab aeterno: ergo etc. — Item, «Dominus, ut dicit Ambrosius, est nomen naturae»: ergo si natura est aeterna, ergo et dominium. — Item, de hoc nomine creator obiicitur, quia non dicitur lector, quia actu legit, sed quia habilis est ad legendum; sed Deus ab aeterno habilis est ad creandum: ergo etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de horum nominum significatione et connotatione, et unde habent rationem connotandi, cum divina essentia sit principale significatum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis divina essentia non habeat vere[^2] respectum ad creaturam, tamen contingit eam intelligere et significare per modum respectus; nec tamen intellectus est vanus, propter hoc quod totam rationem respectus realis ponit in creatura[^3]. Quoniam igitur huiusmodi nomina dicunt respectum, a quo imponuntur — quamvis imponantur essentiae secundum — ideo dicuntur[^4] exigentiam illius respectus. Ideo intelligendum, quod quaedam dicunt respectum solum, ut dominus; quaedam[^5] effectum, ut creator et iustus, et utraque sunt sub duplici differentia, quia aut important respectum ad rem praesentem, aut ad rem futuram sive ad rem in actu vel in habitu. Primo modo, quia ponunt creaturam in actu, dicunt solum respectum[^6], cum creatura incipit; secundo modo ab aeterno.

Secundum hoc ergo, si dominus et creator important respectum in actu, ab aeterno non possunt dici; si autem in habitu, possunt. Tamen usus communis accipit huiusmodi nomina, ut connotant in actu; et ideo dicit Augustinus[^7], ea dici cum tempore. — Quod ergo intelligendum dicit Boethius, quod[^8] «coercendi subditos est potestas sed habitos, et non habendos». — Quod Ambrosius quod dicit, patet non cogit, quia quamvis imponatur naturae, tamen imponitur a proprietate[^9] naturae, ut dicit respectum ad creaturas, et ideo connotat quid creatum. — Et sic patent omnia, quia ratio connotandi est modus significandi[^10].

---

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[^11], quod tempus non coepit ex tempore. Videtur enim falsum, quia omne quod incipit, est temporale, et omne temporale mensuratur tempore, et omne tale coepit in tempore: ergo etc. Si tu das instantiam in imperitis, obiicitur, quod nihil magis est variabile quam tempus; sed omne tale est temporale: ergo etc. — Item, tempus non coepit in tempore, ergo si coepit extra tempus, ergo fuit tempus extra omne tempus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quantum ad praesens pertinet — quia de initio temporis debet dici in secundo[^12] — differt incipere ex tempore et in tempore et cum tempore, quia *ex* dicit ordinem, et ita praesupponit tempus tanquam anterius; et ideo nihil coepit ex tempore nisi quod sequitur tempus. *In tempore* dicit temporis existentiam[^13]; sed tempus non fuit in sui initio, cum sit successivum. Ideo quae sunt aequalis durationis cum tempore non coeperunt nec ex tempore, nec in tempore, sed cum tempore, id est, cum tempus coepit.

Si quaeras, quomodo tempus coepit; breviter dicendum, quod nullo praedictorum modorum, sed coepit in sui principio, et ideo non coepit extra tempus.

*Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tempore mensuratur temporale;* dicendum, quod temporale, quod

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exceditur[^14] a tempore, mensuratur et incipit in tempore, sed illud quod non exceditur, incipit cum tempore; et ratio praedicta est[^15].

---

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod nummus mutatus non est, cum coeperit esse pretium. Videtur enim falsum, quia esse pretium est accidens nummi, et modo inest, et prius non inerat, ergo nummus mutatus est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod relatio non praedicat quid absolutum, sed praedicat ordinem ad alterum; ordo autem respicit dispositionem ordinatorum. Quaedam igitur sunt ordinabilia quod utrumque est in potentia; et tunc relatio introducitur per mutationem factam in utroque. Quaedam sunt ordinabilia, ita quod alterum quantum est de se, in actu est, sed alterum in potentia; sicut patet de duobus, quorum unus, qui est actu albus, actu habet proprietatem, secundum quam attenditur similitudo, et ideo, altero de non albo facto albo, fit perfecta similitudo. — Non ergo oportet, quod relatio semper inducat mutationem in utroque extremorum propter sui corruptionem vel inceptionem[^16]; sed sufficit, quod in altero. Et ratio visa est, quia respicit duplex extremum, et quia potest unum esse de se in actu, altero existente in potentia: sicut in nummo, qui est in potestate possidentis, quod sit pignus vel pretium vel arrha secundum mutationem factam in ipso; nec advenit nummo aliquid absolutum, sed ordo, qui ex parte nummi erat in actu, ex parte illius quod erat in potentia, fit in actu; et ideo mutatur illud, non mutato nummo.

---

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod accidens est in creatura, cum relatio est creaturae ad Creatorem. Videtur enim falsum, quia contingit rem intelligi, accidente remoto: ergo si relatio ad Creatorem accidit creaturae, ergo illo remoto[^17], contingit rem creatam esse intelligi, etiam circumscripto respectu ad Creatorem. — Item, si relatio, qua creatura refertur ad Creatorem, est accidens, cum illud sit creatum, refertur, et ita per accidens: et sic de alio, et ita est[^18] abire in infinitum.

Dicendum, quod creatura quantum ad esse primum essentialiter dependet; et talis relatio, quae exprimit illam dependentiam, non est creaturae accidentalis, sed magis essentialis. Quantum autem ad esse secundum sive ad bene esse non dependet essentialiter, quia illud bene esse accidentale est; ideo talis relatio secundum accidens dicitur, ut filiatio, secundum quod dicit adoptionem; et de tali intelligit Augustinus.

*Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio relatione alia refertur;* aliqui volunt dicere, quod creatura[^19] se ipsa refertur. — Tamen illud non videtur esse dicendum, quia nulla creatura est sua relatio, cum non sit summe simplex, immo hoc ipsum, quod refertur, aufert simplicitatem. — Ideo dicendum, quod sicut relativa referuntur proprie, quae dicunt rem substratam cum respectu, ipsae autem relationes sive respectus non referuntur, immo magis illa alia referunt, quia non sunt entia, sed entium[^20]: sic in proposito dicendum, quod ipsae relationes per se non referuntur, sed cum subiectis, ita quod unum cum alio et per aliud. Ideo non est ultra quaerere aliud, quo referuntur.

---

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nec tamen dicimus, Spiritum sanctum referri ad se. Videtur enim posse referri[^21], quia Spiritus sanctus est donum, et donum refertur ad donantem: et ipse est donans: ergo necessario concluditur, quod refertur ad se.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc nomen spiritus dicit relationem secundum esse; et ideo, quia relatione secundum esse nihil refertur ad se ipsum secundum idem, nullo modo Spiritus sanctus, in quantum spiritus, ad se refertur. Sed donum non tantum importat relationem secundum esse, ut puta cum dicit auctoritatem in dante, sed etiam secundum modum dicendi, ut quando dicit largitatem et potestatem in communicante[^22]; et quia taliter potest secundum modum intelligendi comparari ad se ut datum, in quantum datum, dicitur ad se, in quantum dans, non. Ideo concedit[^23], quod appellatio dati vel donati refertur ad Spiritum sanctum, non autem spiritus sanctus.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this section there are doubts about the text, and first concerning those names — creator, *dominus* (lord), and names of this kind — which the Master says are said of God *from time*. For this seems false, because "lordship (*dominium*), as Boethius says[^1], is the power of coercing subjects," but this is in God from eternity: therefore, etc. — Likewise, "Lord (*Dominus*), as Ambrose says, is a name of nature": therefore, if nature is eternal, so also is lordship. — Likewise, concerning the name *creator*, the objection is raised that one is not called a reader because he actually reads, but because he is able to read; but God is from eternity able to create: therefore, etc.

In connection with this, inquiry is made concerning the signification and connotation of these names, and whence they have the ground of connoting, given that the divine essence is their principal significate.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although the divine essence does not truly[^2] have a respect toward the creature, yet it is possible to understand and signify it by the mode of respect; nor is the intellect therefore vain, on account of its placing the whole ground of real respect in the creature[^3]. Since, therefore, names of this kind say a respect — by which they are imposed, even though they are imposed upon the essence — they are therefore said[^4] according to the exigency of that respect. Therefore it must be understood that certain names say respect alone, as "lord" (*dominus*); certain others[^5] say an effect, as "creator" and "just," and both kinds are under a twofold difference, because they either import a respect to a present thing, or to a future thing, whether to a thing in act or in habit. In the first mode, because they posit the creature in act, they say respect alone[^6] when the creature begins; in the second mode, from eternity.

According to this, therefore, if "lord" and "creator" import respect in act, they cannot be said from eternity; but if in habit, they can. Yet common usage takes names of this kind as connoting in act; and therefore Augustine says[^7] they are said *with time*. — Now, what Boethius is understood to say is that[^8] "it is the power of coercing subjects, but of those already subject, and not of those not yet so." — What Ambrose says, it is evident, does not compel, because, even though it is imposed upon nature, yet it is imposed from a property[^9] of nature, as it says a respect toward creatures, and therefore connotes something created. — And thus all things are clear, because the ground of connoting is the mode of signifying[^10].

---

#### Doubt II.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says[^11], that time did not begin *from time*. For this seems false, because everything that begins is temporal, and every temporal thing is measured by time, and everything such began in time: therefore, etc. If you give an instance in things at their very beginning, the objection is raised that nothing is more variable than time; but everything such is temporal: therefore, etc. — Likewise, time did not begin in time, therefore if it began outside time, therefore there was time outside all time.

**I respond:** It must be said that, insofar as it pertains to the present — because concerning the beginning of time it must be discussed in the second [book][^12] — there is a difference between beginning *from time*, *in time*, and *with time*, because *from* (*ex*) says order and so presupposes time as prior; and therefore nothing began *from time* except what follows upon time. *In time* says the existence of time[^13]; but time was not in its own beginning, since it is successive. Therefore, things that are of equal duration with time began neither *from time* nor *in time*, but *with time*, that is, when time began.

If you ask how time began: briefly, it must be said that in none of the aforesaid modes, but it began at its own principle, and therefore did not begin outside time.

*To the objection that the temporal is measured by time:* it must be said that the temporal which

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is exceeded[^14] by time is measured and begins in time, but that which is not exceeded begins *with time*; and the reason given above holds[^15].

---

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says, that the coin (*nummus*) has not been changed when it has come to be a price (*pretium*). For this seems false, because being a price is an accident of the coin, and it is present now and was not present before, therefore the coin has been changed.

**I respond:** It must be said that a relation does not predicate something absolute, but predicates order toward another; order, however, regards the disposition of the things ordered. Certain things, therefore, are orderable such that both are in potency; and then the relation is introduced by a change made in both. Certain things are orderable such that one, insofar as it is of itself, is in act, but the other is in potency; as is evident in the case of two things, one of which, being actually white, actually has the property in accordance with which similarity is observed, and therefore, when the other is made white from non-white, perfect similarity comes about. — Therefore it is not necessary that a relation should always bring about a change in both extremes by reason of its corruption or inception[^16]; it suffices that it do so in one. And the reason is evident: because it regards a double extreme, and because one can be of itself in act while the other exists in potency — as in the case of the coin, which is in the power of the possessor, such that it is a pledge (*pignus*) or price (*pretium*) or earnest-money (*arrha*) by reason of a change made in him; nor does anything absolute come to the coin, but the order which, on the part of the coin, was in act, comes into act on the part of that which was in potency; and therefore *that* is changed, without the coin being changed.

---

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says, that it is an accident in the creature when a relation is the creature's relation to the Creator. For this seems false, because it is possible to understand a thing with its accident removed: therefore, if the relation to the Creator is accidental to the creature, then with it removed[^17], it is possible to understand the created thing to exist, even with the respect to the Creator abstracted away. — Likewise, if the relation by which the creature is referred to the Creator is an accident, since that is a created thing, it is referred, and thus by accident: and so it is with another, and thus it[^18] is to proceed to infinity.

It must be said that the creature depends essentially upon the Creator as regards its first being (*esse primum*); and such a relation, which expresses that dependence, is not accidental to the creature but rather essential. But as regards the second being (*esse secundum*) or well-being (*bene esse*), it does not depend essentially, because that well-being is accidental; therefore such a relation is said to be according to accident, as filiation insofar as it says adoption; and of such Augustine speaks.

*To the objection that a relation is referred by another relation:* some wish to say that the creature[^19] is referred by itself. — Yet that does not seem to be what should be said, because no creature is its own relation, since it is not supremely simple; indeed, the very fact that it is referred takes away simplicity. — Therefore it must be said that, just as relatives are properly referred — which say a thing underlying with its respect — whereas the relations themselves or respects are not referred, but rather they refer those other things, because they are not beings but of beings[^20]: so in the present case it must be said that the relations themselves are not referred *per se*, but together with their subjects, such that one is with another and through another. Therefore one need not seek further for something else by which they are referred.

---

#### Doubt V.

Likewise, inquiry is made concerning what the Master says: "And yet we do not say that the Holy Spirit is referred to itself." For it seems it can be referred[^21], because the Holy Spirit is a gift (*donum*), and a gift is referred to the giver; and the Holy Spirit itself is the giver: therefore it is necessarily concluded that it is referred to itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that the name "spirit" (*spiritus*) says a relation according to being (*relatio secundum esse*); and therefore, since by a relation according to being nothing is referred to itself in the same respect, in no way is the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is spirit, referred to itself. But "gift" (*donum*) does not import only a relation according to being — as when it says authority in the giver — but also according to a mode of speaking, as when it says largeness and power in the communicator[^22]; and because in this way it can, according to the mode of understanding, be compared to itself as given (*datum*), it is said toward itself insofar as it is given, but not insofar as it is giving. Therefore the Master concedes[^23] that the appellation of "that given" or "the gift" (*dati vel donati*) is referred to the Holy Spirit, but not "Holy Spirit" (*spiritus sanctus*) as such.

---

la: Textum integrum Boethii habes supra pag. 522, nota 2. et textum integrum Ambrosii mox citati invenies supra pag. 47, nota 3.

en: The full text of Boethius you have above, p. 522, n. 2. And the full text of Ambrose cited below you will find above, p. 47, n. 3.

la: Cod. S *qvod* [= *quod*].

en: Codex S reads *qvod* [= *quod*].

la: Ed. 1 *verum*.

en: Edition 1 reads *verum* [for *vere*].

la: Plura de hoc vide hic q. 3. — Paulo post pro *ideo dicuntur* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *ideo dicunt*; evidenter corrupte.

en: For more on this see here, q. 3. — A little further on, for *ideo dicuntur*, many codices with edition 1 read *ideo dicunt*; evidently corrupt.

la: Sola Vat. addit *etiam*.

en: The Vatican edition alone adds *etiam*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut H cc ff, omissa voce *respectum*, pro *dicunt* substituunt *dicuntur*; lectio minus congrua. Paulo inferius codd. F G I T V Y cum ed. 1 *important* pro *important*.

en: Some codices, as H, cc, ff, omitting the word *respectum*, substitute *dicuntur* for *dicunt*; a less fitting reading. A little below, codices F G I T V Y with edition 1 read *important* [variant spelling].

la: Libr. V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Book V, *On the Trinity*, c. 16, n. 17. See here the littera of the Master, c. 1.

la: Supple: *dominium*. — Vat. praeter fidem codd. et edd. post *quod* subiicit *non*, eandem particulam mox post *sed* supprimens. Nonnulli codd. cum edd. 4, 5 bis *non* exhibent et post *quod* et post *sed*; quod evidenter falsum est.

en: Supply: *dominium*. — The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the codices and editions, after *quod* inserts *non*, suppressing the same particle a little later after *sed*. A number of codices with editions 4 and 5 exhibit *non* twice, both after *quod* and after *sed*; which is evidently false.

la: Codd. A T Y et alii cum ed. 1 *appropriato*.

en: Codices A T Y and others with edition 1 read *appropriato*.

la: Cfr. hic q. I. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 83. m. 1. B. — Albert., hic a. 6; et *S.* I. tract. 13. q. 82. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard., hic q. 3. — Paulo ante pro *omnia* cod. Y' *obiecta*.

en: Cf. here, q. I. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, q. 83, m. 1, B. — Albert, here, a. 6; and *Summa* I, tract. 13, q. 82. — Thomas Aquinas, here, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 5. — Richard, here, q. 3. — A little before, for *omnia*, codex Y' reads *obiecta*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 114. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi et quae hic sequuntur, insinuantur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 114ff. (c. 12.), where the matters that follow here are also indicated.

la: Scilicet II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3.

en: Namely, II *Sent.*, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3.

la: Pro verbis *temporis existentiam* cod. [?] exhibet *temporis continentiam* vel saltem *temporis coexistentiam*, et subinde post *successivum* addit *ideo non coepit in tempore tanquam coexistente. Item tempus non fuit ante sui initium, ideo non coepit in tempore tanquam in continente, ideo etiam quae* etc.

en: For the words *temporis existentiam*, codex [?] reads *temporis continentiam* or at least *temporis coexistentiam*, and thereafter after *successivum* adds: "therefore it did not begin in time as coexistent. Likewise, time was not before its own beginning, therefore it did not begin in time as in a container, therefore also those things" etc.

la: Pro *exceditur* multi codd. hic et paulo post *extollitur*, codd. L cum ed. 1 *excellitur*. Mox sola Vat. corrupte sic incipit: *a tempore; sed illud nisi exceditur quod*.

en: For *exceditur*, many codices here and a little after read *extollitur*; codices L with edition 1 read *excellitur*. Immediately after, the Vatican edition alone corruptly begins: *a tempore; sed illud nisi exceditur quod*.

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 83. m. 2. B. — Albert., hic a. 1. et 7. — S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I, q. 83, m. 2, B. — Albert, here, a. 1 and 7. — Thomas Aquinas, here, around the littera.

la: Sic bene maior pars codd. cum ed. 1; Vat. *defectionem*; cod. L *desitionem*.

en: So correctly the greater part of the codices with edition 1; the Vatican edition reads *defectionem*; codex L reads *desitionem*.

la: Intellige: *accidente*; vel lege: *illa remota*, scil. *relatione*.

en: Understand: *accidente*; or read: *illa remota*, sc. *relatione* [i.e., "with it removed" = "with the relation removed"].

la: Cod. W *ent*.

en: Codex W reads *ent* [for *est*].

la: Cfr. supra pag. 169, nota 4.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 2. (VI. c. I.) de accidentibus generatim dicit, quod solummodo «entia dicuntur, eo quod sint quid vere entis» (substantiae), sive, ut communiter dicitur, accidentia non sunt entia, sed quid entis. Inter accidentia autem, sicut supra d. 26. q. 2. ad ult. dictum est, relatio «minimum habet de entitate», cuius unicum officium est, illa quibus accidit, ad invicem referre.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1), says of accidents in general that they are called "beings" only in the sense that they are "something of a true being" (substance), or, as it is commonly said, accidents are not beings but something of beings. Among accidents, moreover, as was said above, d. 26, q. 2, ad ult., relation "has the minimum of being (*entitas*)," whose sole function is to refer to one another those things to which it is accidental.

la: Supple cum Vat. *ad se*. — In fine obiectionis plures codd. cum ed. 1 *referatur* pro *refertur*.

en: Supply with the Vatican edition *ad se* [to complete "posse referri ad se"]. — At the end of the objection, several codices with edition 1 read *referatur* for *refertur*.

la: Pro *communicante* Vat. cum cod. cc *donante*.

en: For *communicante*, the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *donante*.

la: Intellige: Magister. — Cod. dd cum ed. 1 *conceditur*. In fine solut. post *autem* codd. N X Z aa bb addunt *ipse*. — Principia, in quibus haec solutio fundatur, fusius explicata inveniuntur supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., et d. XV. c. I, nec non d. 18. q. 1. in corp.

en: Understand: the Master. — Codex dd with edition 1 reads *conceditur*. At the end of the solution, after *autem*, codices N X Z aa bb add *ipse*. — The principles on which this solution is founded are explained at greater length above, d. 10, a. 2, q. 3, in the body, and d. XV, c. I, as well as d. 18, q. 1, in the body.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 31

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXI.

#### Cap. I

*An Filius dicatur aequalis vel similis Patri secundum substantiam.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (*Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum*, reflowed from the two-column footnote bands on printed pp. 529–532; per-page distribution 5 / 6 / 7 / 3 = 21 entries total, including the three notes printed at the foot of p. 532 which continue the Hilarius-notulae apparatus deferred from the p1-divisio chunk) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Praeterea considerari oportet, cum tres personae coaequales sibi sint, utrum relative hoc dicatur, an secundum substantiam; et si relative, utrum secundum relationem, an secundum essentiam consideranda sit aequalitas; deinde, quid sit ipsa aequalitas. — Ad quod dicimus, quia, sicut simile nihil sibi est; «similitudo enim, ut ait Hilarius[^1], sibi ipsi non est»; ita et aequale aliquid sibi non dicitur, ac per hoc, sicut simile, ita et aequale relative dicitur. Dicitur ergo relative Filius aequalis Patri et utrique Spiritus sanctus. — Est tamen aequalis Patri Filius et utrique Spiritus sanctus propter summam simplicitatem essentiae et unitatem. *Aequalis est ergo Filius Patri secundum substantiam, non secundum relationem.* Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^2] ait: «Quaerimus, secundum quid aequalis sit Patri Filius. Non secundum hoc, quod ad Patrem dicitur, Filius aequalis est Patri; restat ergo, ut secundum id aequalis sit, quod ad se dicitur. Quidquid autem ad se dicitur, secundum substantiam dicitur. Restat ergo, ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis. Eadem est igitur utriusque substantia». Item in sexto libro[^3]: «Satis est videre, nullo modo Filium aequalem esse Patri, si in aliquo, scilicet quod pertineat ad significandam eius substantiam, inaequalis invenitur. In omnibus ergo aequalis est Patri Filius et est eiusdem substantiae». «Aequalis est etiam Spiritus sanctus Patri et Filio et in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem illius substantiae». Ex his perspicuum fit, quod secundum substantiam Filius est aequalis Patri et utrique Spiritus sanctus, et appellatio tantum relativa est. — Aequalitas ergo Patris et Filii non est relatio vel notio, sed propter naturae unitatem indisparitas[^4].

Hoc idem etiam dicimus de simili et similitudine. Cum enim dicitur Filius similis Patri, relative quidem dicitur, sed similis est Patri propter unitatem essentiae. Est ergo appellatio tantum relativa, similitudo vero «indifferens essentia[^5]». Unde quibusdam non indocte videtur, nomine aequalitatis vel similitudinis non aliquid poni, sed removeri, ut ea ratione dicatur Filius aequalis Patri, quia nec maior est eo nec minor, et hoc propter unitatem essentiae. Ita et similis dicitur, quia nec diversus nec alienus nec in aliquo dissimilis, et hoc propter essentiae simplicitatem. Non ergo secundum quod Filius est genitus a Patre, aequalis vel inaequalis est Patri, nec similis vel dissimilis, sed aequalis et similis secundum substantiam.

#### Cap. II

*Sententia sancti Hilarii, qua in Trinitate personarum propria ostendit.*

Non est hic praetermittendum, quod illustris vir Hilarius proprietates personarum assignans dicit[^6] aeternitatem esse in Patre, speciem in Imagine, usum in Munere. Quae tantae difficultatis sunt verba, ut in eorum intelligentia atque explanatione vehementer laboraverit Augustinus, ut ipse ostendit in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^7] ita dicens: «Quidam, cum vellet brevissime singularum in Trinitate personarum insinuare propria, *aeternitas* est, inquit, *in Patre, species in Imagine,*

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*usus in Munere*. Et quia non mediocris auctoritatis in tractatione Scripturarum et assertione fidei vir extitit — Hilarius enim hoc in libris suis posuit — horum verborum, id est *Patris* et *Imaginis* et *Muneris*, *aeternitatis*, *speciei* et *usus*, abditam scrutatus intelligentiam, quantum valeo, non eum secutum arbitror in *aeternitatis* vocabulo, nisi quod Pater non habet patrem, de quo sit; Filius autem de Patre est, ut sit atque ut illi coaeternus sit. *Imago* enim, si perfecte implet illud cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae; in qua imagine *Speciem* nominavit, credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi est tanta congruentia et prima aequalitas et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens et nullo modo inaequalis et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identitatem respondens ei cuius imago est; ubi est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem; et primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intelligere, sed idem, hoc est unum, tanquam *verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid*, et ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum; ibi novit omnia Deus, quae fecit per ipsam».

*Notula.* Hilarius in libro *de Synodis*[^8]: «Imago eius, ad quem imaginatur, species indifferens est. Neque enim ipse sibi quisquam imago est; sed eum cuius imago est, necesse est ut imago demonstret. *Imago* ergo est rei ad rem coaequandam et imaginata et indiscreta similitudo. Est ergo Pater, est etiam Filius, quia imago Patris est Filius; et quia imago est, ut rei imago sit, speciem necesse est et naturam et essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habeat auctoris».

«Est autem ineffabilis quidam complexus Patris et Imaginis, qui non est sine perfruitione, sine caritate, sine gaudio. Illa ergo dilectio, delectatio, felicitas vel beatitudo — si tamen aliqua humana voce digne dicitur — *usus* ab illo appellata est breviter, et est in Trinitate Spiritus sanctus non genitus, sed genitoris genitique suavitas, ingenti largitate atque ubertate perfundens omnes creaturas pro captu earum. Itaque illa tria et a se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt. Qui videt hoc vel ex parte vel *per speculum et in aenigmate*[^9], gaudeat cognoscens Deum et gratias agat. Qui vero non videt, tendat per pietatem ad videndum, non per caecitatem ad calumniandum, quoniam unus est Deus, sed tamen Trinitas[^10]». — Ecce habes, qualiter verba Hilarii praemissa accipienda sint, licet tantae sint profunditatis, ut etiam adhibita expositione, vix aliquatenus ea intelligere valeat humanus sensus, cum et ipsa eorum explanatio, quam hic Augustinus edidit, plurimum in se habeat difficultatis et ambiguitatis.

*Diluuntur tres proprietates a Hilario assignatae.* Non enim secundum praemissam expositionem distinguuntur hic tres illae proprietates superius assignatae, sed ipsae hypostases distinctae ab invicem monstrantur. *Aeternitatis* tamen nomine eadem videtur designata proprietas, quam notat hoc nomen *ingenitus*. — Sed videamus, quid sit quod ait: «*Imago si perfecte implet illud cuius imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae*». Videtur enim dicere, quod Filius, qui est imago Patris, coaequatur Patri, non Pater Filio, cum et Filius dicatur aequalis Patri in Scriptura, et Pater Filio; sed Filius hoc habet a Patre, ut sit ei aequalis, Pater autem non habet a Filio, et tamen Filius plene ac perfecte aequalis est Patri, id est imago ei cuius est imago.

*Propria ergo personarum in praedictis verbis assignasse dicitur Hilarius*, quia relativa nomina personarum posuit, scilicet *patris*[^11], *imaginis* et *muneris*, quae relative dicuntur de personis et proprietates notant quibus distinguuntur personae. — Ita enim dicitur Spiritus sanctus *munus* relative, sicut *donum*. Verumtamen ipsas proprietates aliis tribus nominibus non significavit, iuxta praedictam Augustini expositionem, nisi solo nomine *aeternitatis*, quo non ipsam paternitatem, sed eam voluit intelligi notionem, qua dicitur *ingenitus*.

*Similiter Augustinus tres in Trinitate personas distinguit per tria nomina.* Illud etiam sciri oportet, quod earundem trium personarum distinctionem Augustinus ostendere volens sine expressione illarum trium proprietatum superius commemoratarum, in primo libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^12] sic ait: «In Patre est unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia: et tria haec unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, connexa omnia propter Spiritum sanctum. Itaque Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et singulus quisque horum Deus est, et simul omnes unus Deus, et singulus quisque horum plena substantia est, et simul omnes una substantia. Pater nec Filius est nec Spiritus sanctus; Filius nec Pater est nec Spiritus sanctus; Spiritus sanctus nec Pater est nec Filius, sed Pater tantum pater, et Filius tantum filius, et Spiritus sanctus tantum spiritus sanctus. Eadem tribus aeternitas, eadem incommutabilitas, eadem maiestas, eadem potestas». — In his verbis aperte insinuatur personarum trium distinctio.

#### Cap. III

*Quare Patri attribuitur unitas.*

Sed plurimos movet, quod Patri attribuit unitatem, Filio aequalitatem. Cum enim unitas dicatur secundum substantiam, non tantum in Patre est, sed etiam in Filio et in Spiritu sancto; et aequalitas una

### Pars II.

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est Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Cur ergo Patri attribuitur unitas et Filio aequalitas? Forte eadem ratione attribuitur Patri unitas secundum Augustinum, qua supra eidem aeternitas secundum Hilarium: quia videlicet Pater ita est, ut ab alio non sit, et quia Filium genuit unum secum Deum, et Spiritus sanctus ab eo procedit unus cum eo Deus. Unitas ergo in Patre esse dicitur, quia nec est aliquid aliud, a quo sit — non enim ab alio est — nec ab eo aliquid vel aliquis est ab aeterno, quod unum cum eo non sit; Filius enim et Spiritus sanctus unum sunt cum Patre. Unde Veritas ait: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*[^13].

*Notula ad textum.* Hilarius in libro *de Synodis*[^14]: «Si quis innascibilem et sine initio dicat Filium, quasi duo sine principio et duo innascibilia et duo innata dicens duos faciat deos: anathema sit. Caput enim, quod est principium omnium, Filius; caput autem, quod est principium Christi, Deus. Sic enim ad unum inintiabile omnium initium per Filium universa referimus. Filium innascibilem confiteri, impiissimum est. Iam enim non erit Deus unus, quia Deum unum praedicari, natura unius innascibilis Dei exigit. Cum ergo Deus unus sit, duo innascibiles esse non possunt; cum idcirco Deus unus sit — cum Pater Deus sit, et Filius Dei Deus sit — quia innascibilitas sola penes unum sit. Filius autem idcirco Deus, quia ex innascibili essentia natus existat. Respuit ergo innascibilem Filium praedicari fides sancta, ut per unum innascibilem Deum unum Deum praedicet, naturam ut unigenitam, ex innascibili genitam essentia, in uno innascibilis Dei nomine complectatur. Caput enim omnium Filius est, sed caput Filii Deus est, et ad unum Deum omnia hoc gradu et hac confessione referuntur, cum ab eo sumant universa principium, cui ipse principium sit». Idem in eodem: «Omnibus creaturis substantiam voluntas Dei attulit, sed naturam dedit Filio ex innascibili ac non nata substantia perfecta nativitas. Talia enim cuncta creata sunt, qualia Deus esse voluit. Filius autem natus ex Deo subsistit talis, qualis Deus est, nec dissimilem sui edidit natura naturam; sed ex substantia Dei genitus naturae secundum originem attulit essentiam, non secundum creaturam voluntatis essentiam».

#### Cap. IV

*Quare Pater et Filius dicantur esse unum vel unus Deus, sed non unus.*

Hic dici oportet, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus recte dicuntur esse *unum* et *unus Deus*, sed non *unus*. Res enim duae vel plures recte possunt dici unum esse, si sint unius essentiae, et earum una sit natura. Unus autem vel una non potest dici de diversis rebus, nisi addatur, quid unus vel una; quo addito, recte potest dici de rebus et unius et diversae substantiae. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate* capitulo tertio[^15] ait sic: «Nescio, utrum inveniatur in Scripturis *Aliqua unum sunt*, quorum est diversa natura. Si autem et aliqua plura sint eiusdem naturae et diversa sentiant, non sunt unum, in quantum diversa sentiunt. Cum ergo sic dicitur *unum*, ut non addatur, quid unum, et plura unum dicuntur; eadem natura atque essentia, non dissidens neque dissentiens significatur». «Unde Paulus et Apollo, qui et ambo homines erant et idem sentiebant, unum esse dicuntur, cum dicitur: *Qui plantat et qui rigat unum sunt*[^16]. Cum vero additur, quid unum, potest significari aliquid ex pluribus unum factum, quamvis diversa natura: sicut anima et corpus non possunt utique dici unum — quid enim tam diversum? — nisi addatur vel subintelligatur, quid unum, id est unus homo. Unde Apostolus: *Qui adhaeret*, inquit, *Domino, unus spiritus est*. Non dixit: unus est, vel unum sunt, sed addidit *spiritus*. Diversi sunt enim natura spiritus hominis et spiritus Dei, sed inhaerendo fit spiritus hominis unus spiritus cum Deo», quia particeps fit veritatis et beatitudinis illius. Si ergo de his quae diversae substantiae sunt, recte dicitur, quod sint *unus spiritus*, quanto magis qui unius substantiae sunt recte dicuntur *unus Deus* esse? «Pater ergo et Filius unum sunt, utique secundum unitatem substantiae et unus Deus». In quo et Ariana haeresis damnatur, quae Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, ut ait Augustinus in libro *de Haeresibus*[^17], non vult esse unius eiusdemque substantiae atque naturae vel, ut expressius dicatur, essentiae, quae Graece dicitur *usia*, sed Filium esse creaturam. Nec non et Sabelliana, quae, ut ait Augustinus in eodem libro, dicebat, Christum eundem ipsum et Patrem et Spiritum sanctum esse, ut esset trinitas nominum sine subsistentia personarum. «Utramque pestem, ut ait Augustinus *super Ioannem*[^18], elidit Veritas dicens: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Utrumque audi et adverte et *unum*, et *sumus*, et a Charybdi et a Scylla liberaberis. Quod enim dixit *unum*, liberat te ab Ario; quod dixit *sumus*, liberat te a Sabellio. Si *unum*: ergo non diversum; si *sumus*: ergo Pater et Filius. *Sumus* enim non diceret de uno, nec *unum* de diverso. Erubescant ergo Sabelliani, qui dicunt, ipsum esse Patrem, qui[^19] est Filius, confundentes personas, qui et dicti sunt Patripassiani, qui dicunt, Patrem fuisse passum. Ariani vero dicunt, aliud Patrem esse, aliud Filium, non unam substantiam, sed duas; Patrem maiorem, Filium minorem. Noli hoc dicere, tu catholice! In medio ergo naviga, utrumque periculosum latus devita, et dic: Pater pater est, et Filius filius est: alius Pater, alius Filius, sed non aliud, immo hoc ipsum, quia unus Deus». — Ecce ostensum est, quare unitas in Patre esse dicatur, cum tres illi unum sint.

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*Notula.* Hilarius in libro *de Synodis*[^20]: «Melius forte expresse videtur de innascente similitudine Patris et Filii fides locuta esse, cum de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto ita senserit significatam in nominibus propriam uniuscuiusque nominatorum substantiam et ordinem et gloriam, ut sint quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum. Volens igitur congregata sanctorum Synodus impietatem eam perimere, quae unitatem Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti nominum numero eluderet, ut, non subsistente causa uniuscuiusque nominis, triplex nuncupatio obtineret sub falsitate nominum unionem, et Pater solus atque unus idem et ipse haberet et Spiritus sancti nomen et Filii. Idcirco *tres substantias esse dixerunt*, subsistentium personas per substantias edocentes, non substantiam Patris et Filii diversitate dissimilis essentiae separantes. Quod autem dictum est, *ut sint quidem per substantiam tria, per consonantiam vero unum*, non habet calumniam; quia connominato Spiritu, id est Paracleto, consonantiae potius quam essentiae per similitudinem substantiae praedicari convenit unitatem». Item in eodem: «Cum Deum Patrem confitemur, et Christum Dei Filium praedicamus, et inter haec duum deorum sit irreligiosa confessio; non possunt secundum naturae indifferentiam et nomen indifferens non unum esse in essentiae genere, quorum essentiae nomen non licet esse nisi unum». «Non enim religiosa unitas nominis ex indifferentis naturae essentia constituta personam genitae ademit essentiae, ut unica ac singularis Dei substantia per unionem nominis intelligatur, cum utriusque essentiae nomen unum, id est unus Deus, ob indiscretae in utroque naturae indissimilem substantiam praedicetur».

#### Cap. V

*Quare dicatur esse aequalitas in Filio.*

Nunc videamus, quare aequalitas dicatur esse in Filio, cum una et summa aequalitas sit trium. Hoc ideo forte dictum est, quia Filius genitus est a Patre aequalis Gignenti et Dono, quod ab utroque procedit, et ideo illa tria dicuntur esse aequalia propter Filium. Filius enim habet a Patre, ut sit ei aequalis et Spiritui sancto; et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque habet, ut sit aequalis utrique. Hoc autem sine assertionis supercilio et maioris intelligentiae praeiudicio dicimus, malentes in apertione tam clausorum sermonum peritiores audire quam aliquid aliis influere.

#### Cap. VI

*Quare in Spiritu sancto dicitur esse concordia vel connexio.*

Quod autem in Spiritu sancto dicitur esse utriusque concordia et per eum omnia connexa, facilior est intelligentia nobis praemissa ad mentem revocantibus. Supra enim secundum auctoritates Sanctorum dictum est, quod Spiritus sanctus amor est, quo Pater diligit Filium, et Filius Patrem. Recte igitur Spiritus sanctus dicitur connexio vel concordia Patris et Filii, et per eum omnia connexa. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^21]: «Communio quaedam consubstantialis Patris et Filii est amborum Spiritus sanctus». Idem in septimo libro *de Trinitate*: «Spiritus sanctus est summa caritas, utrumque coniungens nosque subiungens».

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### DISTINCTION XXXI.

#### Chapter I

*Whether the Son is said to be equal or like the Father according to substance.*

It must furthermore be considered, since the three persons are co-equal to one another, whether this is said relatively or according to substance; and if relatively, whether equality is to be considered according to relation or according to essence; and finally, what equality itself is. — To which we say that, just as nothing is *like* itself — "for likeness," as Hilary says[^1], "is not to itself" — so neither is anything called *equal* to itself; and accordingly, just like *like*, so also *equal* is said relatively. Therefore the Son is said relatively to be equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit equal to both. — Yet the Son is equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit equal to both, on account of the supreme simplicity and unity of the essence. *The Son is therefore equal to the Father according to substance, not according to relation.* Whence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^2] says: "We ask, according to what the Son is equal to the Father. Not according to that which is said in relation to the Father is the Son equal to the Father; it remains, therefore, that He is equal according to that which is said in relation to Himself. But whatever is said in relation to itself is said according to substance. It remains therefore that He is equal according to substance. The substance of both is therefore the same." Likewise in the sixth book[^3]: "It is enough to see that the Son is in no way equal to the Father, if in any respect — namely in what pertains to signifying His substance — He be found unequal. In all things therefore the Son is equal to the Father and is of the same substance." "The Holy Spirit also is equal to the Father and to the Son, and equal in all things on account of the supreme simplicity of that substance." From these things it is clear that according to substance the Son is equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit equal to both, and the appellation only is relative. — The equality therefore of Father and Son is not a relation or notion, but on account of the unity of nature is *non-disparity*[^4].

We say the same thing also of *like* and *likeness*. For when the Son is said to be like the Father, it is indeed said relatively, but He is like the Father on account of the unity of essence. There is therefore an appellation that is only relative, but the likeness is "an essence not differing[^5]." Whence to certain men it seems, not unlearnedly, that by the name of *equality* or *likeness* nothing is posited but [something] is removed, so that for this reason the Son is called equal to the Father — because He is neither greater than He nor less, and this on account of the unity of essence. So also He is called *like*, because He is neither different nor alien nor in anything dissimilar, and this on account of the simplicity of essence. Therefore not according to that the Son is begotten by the Father is He equal or unequal to the Father, nor like or unlike, but equal and like according to substance.

#### Chapter II

*Hilary's statement, in which he sets forth the proper attributes of the persons in the Trinity.*

It must not here be passed over that the illustrious man Hilary, assigning the proper attributes of the persons, says[^6] that *eternity* is in the Father, *species* in the Image, *use* in the Gift. These are words of such great difficulty that Augustine labored mightily over their understanding and explanation, as he himself shows in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^7], speaking thus: "When a certain man wished most briefly to suggest the proper attributes of the individual persons in the Trinity, *eternity*, he says, *is in the Father, species in the Image,*

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*use in the Gift*. And since he was a man of no mediocre authority in the treatment of the Scriptures and the assertion of the faith — for Hilary set this down in his books — having scrutinized as best I can the hidden meaning of these words — that is, of *Father* and *Image* and *Gift*, of *eternity*, *species* and *use* — I do not think he meant by the term *eternity* anything other than that the Father has no father from whom He should come; whereas the Son is from the Father, that He may be and that He may be co-eternal to Him. For an *Image*, if it perfectly fills out that of which it is the image, is itself made equal to it, and not the other to its image; and in this image he named *Species*, I believe, on account of beauty, where there is so great a congruence and the first equality and the first likeness, in nothing dissenting and in no way unequal and in no part dissimilar, but answering to identity with that of which it is the image; where there is the first and supreme life, in which to live and to be are not different but the same; and the first and supreme intellect, in which to live and to understand are not different but the same — that is, one — as it were a *perfect Word in which nothing is lacking*, and a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the unchangeable living *rationes*, and all things one in it, just as it itself is one from one with whom it is one; there God knows all things which He has made through it."

*Notula.* Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^8]: "An image of that of which it is imaged is a species not differing. For no one is an image to himself; but the image must show forth Him whose image it is. An *image* therefore is the imaged and undivided likeness of one thing made equal to another. There is therefore the Father, there is also the Son, because the Son is the image of the Father; and because He is image — that He may be the image of the thing — He must necessarily have in Himself the species and the nature and the essence of His author, in respect of which He is image."

"There is, moreover, a certain ineffable embrace of the Father and the Image, which is not without enjoyment, without charity, without joy. That love, then, that delight, that felicity or beatitude — if it can worthily be expressed by any human voice — was briefly called *use* by him, and is in the Trinity the Holy Spirit, not begotten, but the sweetness of begetter and begotten, with vast bounty and richness pouring Himself upon all creatures according to their capacity. Therefore those three both seem to be limited in regard to one another, and are in themselves infinite. He who sees this either in part or *through a glass and in a riddle*[^9], let him rejoice that he knows God and give thanks. But he who does not see, let him strive through piety to see, not through blindness to slander, since God is one, yet is the Trinity[^10]." — Behold, you have how Hilary's words quoted above are to be taken, although they are of such depth that, even with the explanation applied, the human sense can scarcely understand them at all, since the very explanation of them which Augustine here published has in itself much of difficulty and ambiguity.

*The three properties assigned by Hilary are explained.* For according to the foregoing exposition the three properties assigned above are not here distinguished, but the hypostases themselves are shown to be distinguished from one another. By the name of *eternity*, however, the same property seems to be designated which is noted by this name *unbegotten*. — But let us see what he means when he says: "*An Image, if it perfectly fills out that of which it is the image, is itself made equal to it, and not the other to its image*." For he seems to say that the Son, who is the image of the Father, is made equal to the Father, but not the Father to the Son, although the Son is said in Scripture to be equal to the Father, and the Father to the Son; but the Son has from the Father that He should be equal to Him, while the Father does not have it from the Son, and yet the Son is fully and perfectly equal to the Father, that is, an image to Him whose image He is.

*Hilary therefore is said to have assigned the proper attributes of the persons in the aforesaid words*, since he placed the relative names of the persons, namely *father*[^11], *image* and *gift*, which are said relatively of the persons and note the properties by which the persons are distinguished. — For thus the Holy Spirit is called *gift* relatively, just as *donation*. Yet he did not signify the properties themselves by those other three names, according to the aforesaid exposition of Augustine, except by the single name of *eternity* — by which he wished to be understood not paternity itself, but that notion by which He is called *unbegotten*.

*Likewise Augustine distinguishes the three persons in the Trinity by three names.* This too must be known, that Augustine, wishing to show the distinction of the same three persons without expressing those three properties mentioned above, in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*[^12] speaks thus: "In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality: and these three are all *one* on account of the Father, all *equal* on account of the Son, all *connected* on account of the Holy Spirit. So therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and each one of them is God, and at the same time all are one God; and each one of them is full substance, and at the same time all are one substance. The Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit; the Son is neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son; but the Father is only father, and the Son is only son, and the Holy Spirit is only holy spirit. The same eternity belongs to the three, the same unchangeableness, the same majesty, the same power." — In these words the distinction of the three persons is plainly suggested.

#### Chapter III

*Why unity is attributed to the Father.*

But it troubles many that he attributes *unity* to the Father, *equality* to the Son. For since *unity* is said according to substance, it is not only in the Father but also in the Son and in the Holy Spirit; and there is one equality

### Pars II.

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of Father and of Son and of Holy Spirit. Why then is *unity* attributed to the Father and *equality* to the Son? Perhaps for the same reason that, according to Augustine, *unity* is attributed to the Father by which, according to Hilary, *eternity* was attributed to Him above: namely, because the Father is such that He is from no other, and because He has begotten the Son as one God with Himself, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him as one God with Him. Therefore *unity* is said to be in the Father, because there is nothing else from which He is — for He is not from another — nor anything or anyone from Him from eternity which is not one with Him; for the Son and the Holy Spirit are one with the Father. Whence Truth says: *I and the Father are one*[^13].

*A note on the text.* Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^14]: "If anyone should say the Son is unbegotten and without beginning, as though saying that there were two without principle and two unbegottens and two unborn ones, he would make two gods: let him be anathema. For the head, which is the principle of all things, is the Son; but the head, which is the principle of Christ, is God. For thus to one un-initiate principle of all we refer all things through the Son. To confess the Son unbegotten is most impious. For God will no longer be one, since to declare one God demands the nature of one unbegotten God. Since therefore God is one, there cannot be two unbegottens; since for this reason God is one — since the Father is God, and the Son of God is God — because unbegottenness alone resides in one. The Son, however, [is] God for this reason, because He exists begotten from unbegotten essence. The holy faith therefore rejects that the Son be declared unbegotten, that through one unbegotten God it may declare one God, that it may embrace the only-begotten nature, begotten from unbegotten essence, in the one name of unbegotten God. For the head of all is the Son, but the head of the Son is God; and to one God all things are referred by this gradation and confession, since from Him all things derive their principle, to whom He Himself is principle." The same in the same: "To all creatures the will of God brought substance, but to the Son a perfect nativity gave nature from unbegotten and unborn substance. For all things have been created such as God willed them to be. But the Son, born of God, subsists such as God is, and did not bring forth a nature dissimilar to His own; but, begotten from the substance of God, brought essence according to nature by origin, not essence according to a creature of will."

#### Chapter IV

*Why the Father and the Son are said to be one [thing] or one God, but not one [person].*

Here it must be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are rightly said to be *one* and *one God*, but not *one* [masculine, sc. one person]. For two or more things can rightly be said to be *one*, if they are of one essence, and there is one nature of them. But *one* (masculine or feminine) cannot be said of diverse things unless there be added what they are *one* [as]; once that is added, it can rightly be said of things both of one and of diverse substance. Whence Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity* chapter three[^15] speaks thus: "I do not know whether it is found in the Scriptures, *Some are one*, when their nature is diverse. But if any several things are of the same nature and have diverse opinions, they are not one in so far as they have diverse opinions. When therefore *one* is said in such a way that it is not added, *one as what*, then several things are also called one; the same nature and essence, not dissenting nor disagreeing, is signified." "Whence Paul and Apollos, who were both men and held the same opinion, are said to be *one*, when it is said: *He who plants and he who waters are one*[^16]. But when it is added what they are *one* [as], something can be signified that is made one out of many, although of diverse nature: as soul and body certainly cannot be called *one* — for what is so diverse? — unless it be added or understood, *one as what*, that is, *one man*. Whence the Apostle: *He who clings*, he says, *to the Lord, is one spirit*. He did not say: he is one [masculine], or they are one [thing], but he added *spirit*. For diverse in nature are the spirit of man and the spirit of God, but by clinging the spirit of man becomes one spirit with God," because he becomes a partaker of His truth and beatitude. If then of those things which are of diverse substance it is rightly said that they are *one spirit*, how much more are those who are of one substance rightly said to be *one God*? "The Father therefore and the Son are one, namely according to the unity of substance and one God." In which also the Arian heresy is condemned, which holds that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Augustine says in the book *On Heresies*[^17], are not of one and the same substance and nature — or, to speak more expressly, essence, which in Greek is called *ousia* — but [holds] that the Son is a creature. So too the Sabellian, which, as Augustine says in the same book, said that Christ Himself was both the Father and the Holy Spirit, so that there was a trinity of names without subsistence of persons. "Both pestilences, as Augustine says *On John*[^18], the Truth crushes when He says: *I and the Father are one*. Hear both, attend, both *one* and *we are*, and you will be freed from both Charybdis and Scylla. For what He said, *one*, frees you from Arius; what He said, *we are*, frees you from Sabellius. If *one*: therefore not diverse; if *we are*: therefore Father and Son. For He would not say *we are* of one, nor *one* of diverse [things]. Let the Sabellians therefore be ashamed, who say that He is the Father who[^19] is the Son, confounding the persons — who are also called Patripassians, who say that the Father suffered. The Arians, on the other hand, say that the Father is one thing, the Son another, [that they are] not one substance but two; the Father greater, the Son lesser. Do not say this, you Catholic! Sail therefore in the middle, avoid each dangerous side, and say: The Father is father, and the Son is son: another [is] the Father, another the Son, but not another [thing], rather the same very thing, because [there is] one God." — Behold, it has been shown why *unity* is said to be in the Father, since those three are one.

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*Notula.* Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^20]: "Better, perhaps, the faith seems to have spoken expressly of the inhering likeness of the Father and the Son, when concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit it so understood that there was signified in the names the proper substance and order and glory of each one of those named, so that they are indeed three by substance, but one by consonance. The assembled synod of the saints therefore, willing to destroy that impiety which would dissolve the unity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit by the number of names — so that, with no cause for each name subsisting, a triple appellation might obtain a union of names under the falsity of the names, and the Father alone, being one and the same, would have both the name of the Holy Spirit and of the Son — therefore declared *that there are three substances*, teaching the persons of the subsisting [ones] through substances, not separating the substance of the Father and the Son by the diversity of a dissimilar essence. But what was said, *that they are indeed three by substance, but one by consonance*, has nothing to be slandered; because, the Spirit, that is the Paraclete, being co-named, it is fitting that unity be predicated rather by consonance than by essence through likeness of substance." Likewise in the same: "When we confess God the Father, and proclaim Christ the Son of God, and yet between these the confession of two gods would be irreligious; they cannot, according to the indifference of nature and the indifferent name, not be one in the genus of essence, of which the name of essence cannot be other than one." "For the religious unity of the name, established from the essence of an undifferentiated nature, did not take away the person of the begotten essence, so that the unique and singular substance of God might be understood through the union of the name, since the name of the essence of both — that is, *one God* — is predicated on account of the un-dissimilar substance of the un-discernible nature in each."

#### Chapter V

*Why equality is said to be in the Son.*

Now let us see why *equality* is said to be in the Son, although there is one and supreme equality of the three. Perhaps this was said because the Son is begotten by the Father equal to the Begetter and to the Gift, who proceeds from both, and therefore those three are said to be equal on account of the Son. For the Son has from the Father that He should be equal to Him and to the Holy Spirit; and the Holy Spirit has from both that He should be equal to both. We say this without the haughtiness of assertion and without prejudice to a greater understanding, preferring in the opening of such hidden discourses to hear those more skilled rather than to pour anything upon others.

#### Chapter VI

*Why concord or connection is said to be in the Holy Spirit.*

That in the Holy Spirit there is said to be the concord of both, and through Him all things are connected, is easier of understanding for us when we recall to mind what has been said before. For above, according to the authorities of the Saints, it has been said that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father. Rightly therefore the Holy Spirit is called the connection or concord of the Father and the Son, and through Him all things are connected. Whence Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^21]: "A certain consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit of both." The same in the seventh book *On the Trinity*: "The Holy Spirit is the supreme charity, joining each [of the two] together and joining us to them."

---

la: *De Trin.* IV. n. 23.

en: *On the Trinity* IV, n. 23.

la: Cap. 6. n. 7. — Paulo superius Vat. et edd. *1, 6* cum cod. D *secundum essentiam* pro *secundum substantiam*.

en: Chapter 6, n. 7. — A little above, the Vatican [edition] and editions *1, 6*, together with codex D, [read] *secundum essentiam* in place of *secundum substantiam*.

la: Cap. 4. n. 6. Sequens textus ibid. c. 5. n. 7.

en: Chapter 4, n. 6. The following text [is] in the same place, c. 5, n. 7.

la: Auctoritate omnium codd. et ed. 1 (5 in margine) posuimus *propter naturae unitatem indisparitas* pro *naturalis unitas et identitas*, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd. Lectio nostra differt a lectione, quam sequitur S. Bonaventura, hic a. I. q. 2. arg. 1. ad opposit.; cfr. nota seq.

en: On the authority of all the codices and edition 1 (5 in the margin) we have placed *propter naturae unitatem indisparitas* in place of *naturalis unitas et identitas*, which the Vatican [edition] and other editions have. Our reading differs from the reading which St. Bonaventure follows, here art. I, q. 2, arg. 1, ad opposit.; cf. the following note.

la: Haec definitio sumta est ex Hilario (*de Synodis* n. 73.): «Similitudo res ipsas naturalis consequitur per similitudinem non indifferentis essentiae» (cfr. ibid. n. 13–19.). Ad hunc locum referunt quod Alexander Hal. (S. p. 1. q. 54. m. I. a. 1.) de Lombardo dicit: «Quidam dicunt, quod haec nomina *aequalis*, *similis* tantum remotive accipiuntur, ut cum dicitur: Pater et Filius sunt aequales, id est, non sunt inaequales; et sunt similes, id est, non sunt dissimiles. In qua sententia videtur cum Lombardus. *In prima enim editione Sententiarum dixit:* Similitudo est indifferens substantia; *et in secunda quasi corrigens dixit:* Similitudo est indifferentia, quasi dicat: Pater et Filius dicuntur similes, quia non sunt differentes».

en: This definition is taken from Hilary (*On the Synods* n. 73): "Likeness pursues the things themselves naturally through a likeness of an essence not undifferentiated" (cf. ibid. nn. 13–19). To this passage they refer what Alexander of Hales (S., p. 1, q. 54, m. I, a. 1) says of Lombard: "Some say that these names *equal*, *like* are taken only privatively, as when it is said: The Father and the Son are equal, that is, are not unequal; and are alike, that is, not unlike. In which view Lombard seems to side. *In the first edition of the Sentences he said:* 'Likeness is undifferenced substance'; *and in the second, as it were correcting himself, he said:* 'Likeness is undifferenceness', as if to say: The Father and the Son are called *like* because they are not different»."

la: Propositio I. n. 13. Haec et duae sequentes notulae in nonnullis editionibus (ut 8) desunt, in aliis (ut in Vat. et 7) ad marginem exhibentur, in aliis (ed. 9) ipsi textui inseruntur. Etiam in codicibus nostris non in eodem loco positae sunt. Antiquiores Lombardi Commentatores saepius earum mentionem faciunt. Ipsae videntur pertinere ad secundam editionem Lombardi, de qua pag. 329, nota *o* locuti sumus.

en: Proposition I, n. 13. This and the two following notulae are missing in some editions (such as 8), are exhibited in the margin in others (such as the Vatican and 7), and in others (ed. 9) are inserted into the text itself. Even in our codices they are not placed in the same location. The older commentators on Lombard frequently make mention of them. They themselves appear to belong to the second edition of Lombard, of which we spoke on p. 329, note *o*.

la: *I. Cor.* 13, 12. Vulgata et etiam plurimae edd. cum Vat. in hoc textu omittunt *et*, contra codd. et originale.

en: *1 Corinthians* 13:12. The Vulgate and also most editions, with the Vatican, omit *et* in this text, against the codices and the original.

la: August., VI. *de Trin.* c. 10. n. 11. et 12; in quo ed. August. *ad se invicem* pro *a se invicem* (ut antiquae edd.). Post *per pietatem* Vat. et edd. *1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9* addunt *Dei*, refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI, c. 10, nn. 11 and 12; in which the Augustine edition [reads] *ad se invicem* in place of *a se invicem* (as the old editions do). After *per pietatem* the Vatican and editions *1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9* add *Dei*, against the codices and the original.

la: *Dist.* XXVI.

en: Distinction XXVI.

la: Vat. omittit *patris*, et paulo post perperam ponit *ponit* pro *notent*.

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *patris*, and a little later wrongly places *ponit* in place of *notent*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 5, nonnullis omissis vel additis.

en: Chapter 5, n. 5, with several things omitted or added.

la: Propositio 26. n. 39. 60, et sequens locus est propos. 24. n. 38. In originali *ex impassibili* pro *ex innascibili*.

en: Proposition 26, nn. 39 and 60, and the following passage is from proposition 24, n. 38. In the original, *ex impassibili* in place of *ex innascibili*.

la: *Num.* 4, sed pluribus a Magistro interpolatis et mutatis.

en: *n.* 4, but with many things interpolated and changed by the Master. *(Note: "Num." here = "numerus", the paragraph number, not the biblical book of Numbers.)*

la: *I. Cor.* 3, 8. Sequens locus est ibid. c. 6, 17. — Circa finem huius textus Augustini ante *et unus Deus* Vat. cum aliis edd. *essentiae* pro *substantiae*.

en: *1 Corinthians* 3:8. The following passage is in the same place, c. 6:17. — Near the end of this text of Augustine, before *et unus Deus*, the Vatican with other editions [reads] *essentiae* in place of *substantiae*.

la: Art. 49; sequens locus est art. 36. et 41.

en: Article 49; the following passage is articles 36 and 41.

en: *Tractate* 36, n. 9.

la: [Body anchor [^19] is an OCR-noise marker preserved here for chunk-numbering consistency; the printed Quaracchi apparatus has no corresponding gloss at this locus. PDF p. 531 col. b at 600 dpi confirms the only printed footnote in this clause is at *qui dicunt, Patrem fuisse passum* (= [^18] *quia* variant).]

la: Notula sumta est ex tribus locis huius libri; scilicet n. 31. 32, n. 41. et n. 42. Circa finem notulae pro *unica ac singularis* ed. Hilarii *unici ac singularis*.

en: This notula is taken from three places in this book; namely n. 31, 32, n. 41 and n. 42. Near the end of the notula, in place of *unica ac singularis* the edition of Hilary [reads] *unici ac singularis*.

la: Cap. 5. n. 7: «Spiritus ergo sanctus commune aliquid est Patris et Filii, quidquid illud est. At ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna». Et V. c. 11. n. 12: «Ergo Spiritus sanctus ineffabilis est quaedam Patris Filiique communio». — Sequens locus est ibid. VII. c. 3. n. 6.

en: Chapter 5, n. 7: "The Holy Spirit therefore is something common of the Father and the Son, whatever that may be. But that very communion is consubstantial and co-eternal." And V, c. 11, n. 12: "Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son." — The following passage is in the same place, VII, c. 3, n. 6.


title: Dist. 31, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXI — De relativis quae de Deo dicuntur communiter et aeternaliter. Pars I, divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXI — On relatives said of God commonly and eternally. Pars I, division of the text.

source_text:
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## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXI.

#### *De relativis, quae de Deo dicuntur communiter et aeternaliter.*

### Pars I.

#### *De horum nominum significatione.*

> *Praeterea considerari oportet, cum tres personae coaequales sibi sint* etc.

### Divisio textus.

In praecedenti proxima particula egit Magister de relativis, quae dicuntur de Deo proprie et temporaliter. In hac parte agit de his, quae dicuntur de Deo communiter et aeternaliter. Et quoniam haec sunt appropriabilia, ideo haec pars habet duas partes. In prima determinat eorum significationem; in secunda eorum appropriationem, ibi: *Non est praetermittendum hic* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat significationem huius nominis *aequalis*; in secunda huius nominis *similis*, et hoc facit secundo capitulo: *Hoc etiam dicimus de simili et similitudine*.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis est quaestio de his nominibus *similis* et *aequalis*, et circa haec tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum haec nomina dicantur secundum positionem, an secundum privationem.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum dicant mutuam relationem in Patre et Filio.

---

english:
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## Commentary on Distinction XXXI.

#### *On relative names which are said of God commonly and eternally.*

### Part I.

#### *On the signification of these names.*

> *Furthermore, it must be considered, since the three persons are coequal among themselves* etc.

### Division of the text.

In the immediately preceding section the Master treated of relatives that are said of God properly and temporally. In this part he treats of those that are said of God commonly and eternally. And because these are appropriable, this part has two divisions. In the first he determines their signification; in the second their appropriation, at: *It must not be passed over here in silence* etc. The first part has two further divisions. In the first he determines the signification of this name *equal*; in the second of this name *like*, and this he does in the second chapter: *We say the same also of 'like' and 'likeness'*.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part there is a question concerning these names *like* and *equal*, and concerning these three things are asked.

First it is asked whether these names are said according to position, or according to privation.

Second it is asked whether they are said according to substance, or according to relation.

Third it is asked whether they express a mutual relation in the Father and the Son.

---

translators_notes: [No notes.]