title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
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### Quaestio V. *Utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum omnes teneantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate veteris Testamenti, Exodi vigesimo tertio[^1]: *Si videris asinum odientis te iacere sub onere, non pertransibis, sed sublevabis cum eo*; et hoc ipsum dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo quinto: *Si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum; si sitierit, potum da illi*: si ergo mandata ista omnibus proponebantur, videtur, quod omnes tenebantur diligere inimicos quantum ad effectum.

2. *Item*, hoc videtur ex auctoritate novi Testamenti, Matthaei quinto[^2]: *Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite his qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus vos* etc.; ibi dicit quaedam Glossa: « Tribus modis peccatur contra Ecclesiam: odio, verbis, cruciatu corporis. Econtra Ecclesia facit tria: diligit, benefacit et orat »: ergo non est membrum Ecclesiae, qui non diligit inimicos et affectu et effectu: ergo omnes tenentur isto modo diligere.

3. *Item*, hoc videtur per *rationem*, quia dilectio affectus sine dilectione effectus non est dilectio vera; « probatio enim dilectionis exhibitio est operis[^3] »: si ergo veraci dilectione omnes tenentur inimicos diligere, videtur, quod omnes teneantur non solum affectu, sed etiam effectu inimicos amare.

4. *Item*, perniciosior inimicus est caro nostra quam aliquis proximus noster; sed carnem nostram repugnantem tenemur nutrire et fovere quantum ad eius naturam: ergo si magis tenemur proximos diligere[^4], videtur multo fortius, quod debeamus eos non solum affectu amare, sed etiam effectu eos nutrire et fovere et beneficia eis communicare.

5. *Item*, non solum sumit homo vindictam de alio, infligendo malum, sed etiam subtrahendo bonum; sed omnes tenentur non quaerere ultionem, secundum quod dicitur Levitici decimo nono[^5], et ad Romanos duodecimo: *Non vos vindicantes*: ergo omnes tenentur non subtrahere aliquod bonum propter acceptam iniuriam. Si ergo omnes tenentur diligere eos qui non sunt inimici, affectu pariter et effectu; videtur, quod similiter omnes utroque modo teneantur inimicos diligere.

**Sed contra:**
1. Frequenter praecipitur in Lege, quod ipsi interficiant inimicos suos, sicut praecipitur Exodi vigesimo tertio[^6]: *Non inibis cum eis foedus* etc.: ergo videtur, quod in veteri Lege non tenebantur inimicos diligere quantum ad effectum: ergo pari ratione nec imperfecti tenentur in nova.

2. *Item*, super illud Matthaei quinto[^7]: *Diligite inimicos vestros*; dicit quaedam Glossa: « Cumulus perfectionis est diligere inimicos et orare pro ipsis »: si ergo non omnes tenentur ad cumulum perfectionis, non omnes tenentur inimicos diligere effectu.

3. *Item*, Augustinus in Enchiridio — et habetur in littera[^8] — dicit, quod diligere inimicos et benefacere eis non est tantorum, quanti exaudiuntur in oratione dominica: si ergo in oratione dominica non exaudiuntur nisi boni, videtur, quod non omnes boni teneantur inimicos diligere affectu pariter et effectu.

4. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur per regulam Philosophi[^9]: « Si oppositum in opposito, et propositum in proposito »: cum ergo amicis sit benefaciendum, per se loquendo, videtur, quod inimicis sit malefaciendum.

5. *Item*, videmus in omni natura, tam animata quam inanimata, quod inimicitia est causa pugnae, sicut amicitia est causa concordiae[^10]: si ergo nemo debet facere contra naturalem rectitudinem, videtur, quod magis sit rectum secundum rationis ordinem inimicos expugnare quam eos adiuvare: ergo non videtur, quod omnes teneantur ipsos effectu diligere.

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### Conclusio.

> *Diligere inimicos effectu est generalis et necessariae obligationis, quando incumbit necessitas; sed est perfectionis, quando se offert tantum temporis opportunitas.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt[^11], quod etsi diligere inimicos *affectu* sit necessitatis, ita quod ad illud obligantur tam perfecti quam imperfecti; diligere tamen *affectu* simul et *effectu* supererogationis et perfectionis est; nec ad illud obligantur imperfecti, sed tantum perfecti. — Sed iste modus dicendi in se ipso includit repugnantiam: *primum* quidem, quia eodem mandato praecipitur diligere inimicos et eis benefacere[^12]. Si ergo mandatum illud generale est, videtur, quod generaliter omnes obligentur ad utrumque. — Et *iterum*, perfecti quantum ad obligationem, quae est per mandatum, ad nihil obligantur, ad quod non obligantur imperfecti, quia mandata Dei omnibus generaliter proponuntur. Si ergo per illud mandatum obligantur perfecti ad diligendum inimicum tam affectu quam effectu, videtur similiter, de imperfectis idem esse dicendum. — *Amplius*, si dilectio vera non tantum consistit in corde, sed etiam manifestatur in opere[^13]; dicere, quod ceteri tantum obligantur ad diligendum corde, non ad diligendum opere, cum se offert temporis et loci opportunitas, idem videtur dicere, ac si teneamur inimicos diligere *ficte*. — *Praeter haec*, dilectio inimicorum clauditur in mandato de dilectione proximi; et constat, quod mandatum illud intelligitur quantum ad affectum et effectum[^14], et ad illud mandatum omnes obligantur. Et propterea praedicta responsio non potest habere locum.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod diligere in effectu exteriori hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut quandocumque se offert temporis opportunitas, aut quando incumbit necessitas. Si loquamur de exhibitione operis exterioris generaliter, quando se offert temporis opportunitas; sic diligere inimicos effectu « cumulus est perfectionis[^15] ». Si autem loquamur de exhibitione operis, quando incumbit necessitas; sic diligere inimicos effectu est generalis et necessariae obligationis; quia, si quis videt proximum suum, sive amicum sive inimicum, necessitatem habere, et claudit viscera sua ab eo, iuxta sententiam beati Ioannis[^16], iam amplius non est caritas Dei in eo. — Sic igitur patet, quod sicut diligere affectu uno modo necessitatis est, alio modo perfectionis[^17]; sic diligere effectu, uno modo necessitatis est, alio modo perfectionis et supererogationis. Et secundum hunc modum possunt solvi diversae auctoritates Sanctorum, quae sibi videntur obviare de dilectione inimicorum.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam pro magna parte responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod omnes tenentur inimicos suos diligere effectu, intelliguntur in casu necessitatis. Auctoritates vero, quae in oppositum adducuntur, intelliguntur de exhibitione operis magis generali[^18], videlicet cum se offert opportunitas congruitatis.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**
*Ad 4.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod si benefaciendum est amicis, quod malefaciendum est inimicis; dicendum, quod non sequitur, propter hoc quod amicis non solum benefaciendum est propter illud, in quo repugnant inimicis, verum etiam propter illud, in quo conveniunt, videlicet quia sunt ad imaginem Dei. Unde sicut illud argumentum non valet: *album est visibile, ergo nigrum est invisibile*; quia album est visibile per illud, in quo communicat cum nigro: sic nec ratio praemissa[^19].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum ordinem naturae inimicitia inducit pugnam; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi inimicitia ordinata est secundum ordinem naturae, sicut calidum inimicatur frigido, et humidum sicco[^20]; sed ubi est inimicitia praeter naturae ordinem, ibi non est pugna secundum naturam, sed magis contra naturam. Taliter autem est in hominibus; quia, cum « homo
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sit animal mansuetum natura[^21] », secundum naturalem ordinem cum omnibus debet habere pacem et concordiam. Unde in inimico suo non debet homo odire naturam, sed solum culpam; quia non persequitur ipsum natura, quam fecit Deus, sed malitia, quam fecit homo, ut dicit Augustinus[^22]. Cetera autem, quae opponuntur, satis manifestantur per ea quae dicta sunt[^23].

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english:
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### Question V. *Whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect.*

Fifthly it is asked whether all are bound to love enemies as to effect. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Old Testament, Exodus twenty-three[^1]: *If you see the ass of one who hates you lying under a burden, you shall not pass by, but you shall lift it up with him*; and this same thing is said in Proverbs twenty-five: *If your enemy is hungry, feed him; if he thirsts, give him drink*: if therefore these commands were set forth to all, it seems that all were bound to love enemies as to effect.

2. *Likewise*, this seems from the authority of the New Testament, Matthew five[^2]: *Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you*, etc.; there a certain Gloss says: « In three ways one sins against the Church: by hatred, by words, by torment of the body. On the contrary the Church does three things: it loves, it does good, and it prays »: therefore he is not a member of the Church who does not love enemies both in affection and in effect: therefore all are bound to love in this way.

3. *Likewise*, this seems by *reason*, because the love of affection without the love of effect is not true love; « for the proof of love is the showing forth of work[^3] »: if therefore all are bound to love enemies with a true love, it seems that all are bound to love enemies not only in affection, but also in effect.

4. *Likewise*, our own flesh is a more pernicious enemy than any neighbor of ours; but we are bound to nourish and cherish our rebellious flesh as to its nature: therefore if we are bound the more to love our neighbors[^4], it seems all the more forcibly that we ought not only to love them in affection, but also in effect to nourish and cherish them and to share benefits with them.

5. *Likewise*, a man takes vengeance on another not only by inflicting evil, but also by withholding good; but all are bound not to seek vengeance, according to what is said in Leviticus nineteen[^5], and to the Romans twelve: *Not avenging yourselves*: therefore all are bound not to withhold any good on account of an injury received. If therefore all are bound to love those who are not enemies, in affection equally and in effect; it seems that likewise all are bound to love enemies in both ways.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is frequently commanded in the Law that they should kill their enemies, as is commanded in Exodus twenty-three[^6]: *You shall not enter into a covenant with them*, etc.: therefore it seems that in the old Law they were not bound to love enemies as to effect: therefore by parity of reasoning neither are the imperfect bound in the new.

2. *Likewise*, on that text of Matthew five[^7]: *Love your enemies*; a certain Gloss says: « The summit of perfection is to love enemies and to pray for them »: if therefore not all are bound to the summit of perfection, not all are bound to love enemies in effect.

3. *Likewise*, Augustine in the Enchiridion — and it is contained in the text[^8] — says that to love enemies and to do good to them does not belong to as many as are heard in the Lord's Prayer: if therefore in the Lord's Prayer none but the good are heard, it seems that not all the good are bound to love enemies in affection equally and in effect.

4. *Likewise*, this same thing seems by the rule of the Philosopher[^9]: « If the opposite [is] in the opposite, then the proposed [is] in the proposed »: since therefore good is to be done to friends, properly speaking, it seems that evil is to be done to enemies.

5. *Likewise*, we see in every nature, both animate and inanimate, that enmity is the cause of strife, just as friendship is the cause of concord[^10]: if therefore no one ought to act against natural rectitude, it seems that it is more right according to the order of reason to fight enemies than to help them: therefore it does not seem that all are bound to love them in effect.

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### Conclusion.

> *To love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation when necessity presses; but it is of perfection when only the opportunity of time presents itself.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For some have wished to say[^11] that although to love enemies *in affection* is of necessity, so that both the perfect and the imperfect are bound to it; yet to love *in affection* together with *in effect* is of supererogation and perfection; nor are the imperfect bound to it, but only the perfect. — But this manner of speaking includes in itself a contradiction: *first* indeed, because by the same command it is commanded to love enemies and to do good to them[^12]. If therefore that command is general, it seems that generally all are bound to both. — And *again*, the perfect, as to the obligation which is through a command, are bound to nothing to which the imperfect are not bound, because the commands of God are set forth to all generally. If therefore by that command the perfect are bound to love an enemy both in affection and in effect, it seems likewise that the same is to be said of the imperfect. — *Further*, if true love consists not only in the heart, but is also manifested in work[^13]; to say that the rest are bound only to love in heart, not to love in work, when the opportunity of time and place presents itself, seems to say the same as if we were bound to love enemies *feignedly*. — *Besides these*, the love of enemies is included in the command concerning love of neighbor; and it is established that that command is understood as to affection and effect[^14], and to that command all are bound. And therefore the aforesaid response cannot stand.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that to love in exterior effect can be twofold: either whenever the opportunity of time presents itself, or when necessity presses. If we speak of the showing forth of exterior work generally, when the opportunity of time presents itself; thus to love enemies in effect is « the summit of perfection[^15] ». But if we speak of the showing forth of work when necessity presses; thus to love enemies in effect is of general and necessary obligation; because, if anyone sees his neighbor, whether friend or enemy, to be in need, and shuts his heart against him, according to the saying of blessed John[^16], the charity of God is no longer in him. — Thus therefore it is clear that, just as to love in affection is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection[^17]; so to love in effect is in one way of necessity, in another way of perfection and supererogation. And according to this manner the diverse authorities of the Saints, which seem to conflict with one another concerning the love of enemies, can be resolved.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear, and the response to the objections is also for the greater part clear. For the reasons which show that all are bound to love their enemies in effect are to be understood in the case of necessity. But the authorities which are adduced to the contrary are to be understood of the showing forth of work more generally[^18], namely when the opportunity of fittingness presents itself.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that if good is to be done to friends, then evil is to be done to enemies; it must be said that it does not follow, on account of the fact that good is to be done to friends not only on account of that in which they differ from enemies, but also on account of that in which they agree, namely because they are to the image of God. Hence just as that argument is not valid: *white is visible, therefore black is invisible*; because white is visible through that in which it shares with black: so neither is the foregoing reasoning[^19].

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that according to the order of nature enmity induces strife; it must be said that this is true where the enmity is ordered according to the order of nature, as hot is at enmity with cold, and moist with dry[^20]; but where there is an enmity beyond the order of nature, there is no strife according to nature, but rather against nature. And such is the case in men; because, since « man
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is by nature a gentle animal[^21] », according to the natural order he ought to have peace and concord with all. Hence in his enemy a man ought not to hate the nature, but only the fault; because it is not the nature, which God made, that pursues him, but the malice, which man made, as Augustine says[^22]. But the other things which are objected are sufficiently made clear by the things which have been said[^23].

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. locus est Prov. 25, 21, ubi Vulgata loco verborum *potum da illi* exhibet *da ei aquam bibere*. — In fine arg. pro *tenebantur* edd. 1, 2 *teneantur*, Vat. *tenentur*, et deinde multi codd. *diligere inimicum quoad effectum*.

en: Verse 5. — The following passage is Prov. 25, 21, where the Vulgate, in place of the words *give him drink*, reads *give him water to drink*. — At the end of the argument, for *were bound* the editions 1, 2 [read] *are bound*, the Vatican [edition] *are held*, and then many codices [read] *to love an enemy as to effect*.

la: Vers. 44. Vulgata post *persequentibus* addit *et calumniantibus*. — In Glossa, quae est ordinaria, Strabus pro *peccatur* substituit *pugnatur*.

en: Verse 44. The Vulgate after *those who persecute* adds *and slander*. — In the Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss], Strabo substitutes *one fights* for *one sins*.

la: Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 30. n. 1. — Subinde pro *veraci* edd. cum aliquot codd. *vera*.

en: Gregory, Homilies on the Gospel, Book II, homily 30, n. 1. — Thereupon for *true* (abl.) the editions with several codices [read] *true* (instr.).

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 1.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XXIX, c. 1.

la: Vers. 18: *Non quaeras ultionem*; Rom. 12, 19: *Non vosmetipsos defendentes*.

en: Verse 18: *You shall not seek vengeance*; Rom. 12, 19: *Not defending yourselves*.

en: Verse 32. Cf. Deut. 7, 2 and 20, 16 ff.

la: Vers. 44. — Glossa habetur ut ordinaria penes Strabum et Lyranum, sed in vers. 48. loc. cit.

en: Verse 44. — The Gloss is found as the ordinary [Gloss] in Strabo and Lyra, but at verse 48 in the place cited.

la: Huius distinctionis. — Pro *non est tantorum, quanti exaudiuntur* Vat. cum textu origin. *hoc tam magnum bonum tantae multitudinis non est, quantam credimus exaudiri*.

en: Of this distinction. — For *does not belong to as many as are heard* the Vatican [edition] with the original text [reads] *this so great good is not of so great a multitude as we believe to be heard*.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4. — Pro *regulam* cod. K *rationem*.

en: Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 4. — For *rule* codex K [reads] *reasoning*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 15. (c. 1.), ubi docet, amicitiae essentialiter convenire congregare, inimicitiae vero disgregare. — Paulo ante pro *in omni natura* edd. *in omni creatura*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 15 (c. 1), where he teaches that to gather belongs essentially to friendship, but to scatter to enmity. — A little before, for *in every nature* the editions [read] *in every creature*.

la: Pro *dicere voluerunt* codd. C D O V *voluerunt tantum*, cod. N *dicunt*. Post pauca verbo *obligantur* cod. Z praemittit *omnes*.

en: For *have wished to say* codices C D O V [read] *have wished* only, codex N *say*. Shortly after, to the word *are bound* codex Z prefixes *all*.

la: Vide hic fundam. 2. — Pro *praecipitur* edd. *praecipimur*.

en: See here fundament 2. — For *it is commanded* the editions [read] *we are commanded*.

la: Epist. I. Ioan. 3, 18: *Non diligamus verbo neque lingua, sed opere et veritate*. — Mox pro *non* edd. *non autem*.

en: 1 John 3, 18: *Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in work and in truth*. — Soon after, for *not* the editions [read] *but not*.

la: Vide supra d. 28. q. 3. et 6. nec non d. 29. q. 6.

en: See above d. 28, q. 3 and 6, and also d. 29, q. 6.

la: Cfr. arg. 2. ad oppos. — Post *effectu* Vat. adiungit *et affectu*.

en: Cf. argument 2 to the contrary. — After *in effect* the Vatican [edition] adds *and in affection*.

la: Vide quaest. praeced.

en: See the preceding question.

la: Cod. U *generaliter*.

en: Codex U [reads] *generally*.

la: Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): « Id quod est amicis benefacere, et quod est inimicis malefacere non est contrarium: utraque enim eligenda sunt vel eiusdem moris ». Quae verba B. Albert. exponens ait (tr. 2. c. 2.): « Haec sunt ergo duae complexiones, quae contrarietatem non faciunt: amicis benefacere et inimicis malefacere, quae ideo contraria non sunt, quia sunt unius complexionis, quia sunt eiusdem moris; quia secundum ius naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ut in Zenone dicit Socrates, et Plato dicit de Socrate… Propter quod in definitione hominis posuit Socrates, quod homo est animal ratione [?] amicis benefaciens et inimicis malefaciens, sicut legitur in primo Zenonis. Et si aliquis instet per hoc quod dicit Lex, quod inimicis benefiat; non habemus contra hoc dicere: quia hoc ex principio philosophiae non probatur, sed potius ex gratia supergreditur ad naturam et ad rationem, et ad maiorem ordinat perfectionem, ad quam non potest se extendere philosophus ». Cfr. solut. seq. — Pro *ratio praemissa* codd. E I L Z *ratiocinatio praemissa*.

en: Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7): « That which is to do good to friends, and that which is to do evil to enemies, is not contrary: for both are to be chosen or [belong] to the same character ». Expounding which words, B. Albert says (tr. 2, c. 2): « These therefore are two combinations which do not make a contrariety: to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies, which are not contrary for this reason, that they are of one combination, because they are of the same character; because it is according to natural right, which nature has taught to all animals, as Socrates says in [the work of] Zeno, and Plato says of Socrates… On account of which, in the definition of man Socrates laid down that man is an animal [endowed] with reason [?] doing good to friends and evil to enemies, as is read in the first [book] of Zeno. And if anyone presses [the point] by what the Law says, that good is to be done to enemies; we have nothing to say against this: because this is not proved from a principle of philosophy, but rather from grace it transcends nature and reason, and orders [man] to a greater perfection, to which the philosopher cannot extend himself ». Cf. the following solution. — For *the foregoing reasoning* codices E I L Z [read] *the foregoing ratiocination*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 7. seqq. (c. 2. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 7 ff. (c. 2 f.).

la: Plato, Sophista (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 222), et VI. de Legibus (tom. II. pag. 766). Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 1. etiam dicit, quod « familiaris etiam atque amica res sit homini unusquisque homo ».

en: Plato, Sophist (ed. Serranus, vol. I, p. 222), and Laws VI (vol. II, p. 766). Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 1, also says that « every man is to a man a familiar and friendly thing ».

la: In I. Ioan. tr. 8. n. 10. seq. Cfr. Enarrat. in Ps. 100. n. 5. et in Ps. 139. n. 2; cfr. etiam Serm. 13. (alias 94. de Tempore) c. 7. n. 8.

en: On 1 John, treatise 8, n. 10 ff. Cf. Enarration on Psalm 100, n. 5, and on Psalm 139, n. 2; cf. also Sermon 13 (alias 94 On the Season), c. 7, n. 8.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

english_scholion:
*No own scholion.* Quaestio V carries no scholion of its own; the editors' scholion treating this question's *casu necessitatis* distinction (with Petrus a Tarantasia, S. Thomas, B. Albert) is printed at the close of the preceding question — see the scholion §I–II at d30-a1-q4. App. n.23 (*Cetera… per ea quae dicta sunt*) redirects to it.

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**Scholion disposition — REDIRECT.** q5 has NO scholion of its own. Between the Ad-replies and QUAESTIO VI (read eyes-on on `vol3-p668-L-0/R-0`) there is no `SCHOLION.` header — q5 ends directly at *…per ea quae dicta sunt³*. The editors' scholion that treats q5's *casu necessitatis* distinction is printed at the close of q4 (q4 §II, *casu necessitatis* / B. Albert; §III the cross-author *De utraque quaestione* list). App. n.23 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is the in-apparatus redirect. `has_scholion: false`; `### Scholion` block carries the redirect note.

**Apparatus — 18 entries across three per-page NOTAE restarts, flattened to `[^1]`–`[^23]` (continuous):**
- **p.666 nn.1–5** → `[^1]`–`[^5]` (PICKED UP from the q4→q5 hand-off; q4 owned p.666 nn. only through its scholion, and forwarded these five effect-objection notes). Confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p666-L-2` + `vol3-p666-R-1`.
- **p.667 nn.1–10** → `[^11]`–`[^20]` (the Respondeo + Ad-replies notes; n.5 = *cumulus est perfectionis* / Vat. *et affectu*, n.9 = the long Aristotle/Albert Topics quotation with Quaracchi's own printed *ratione [?]* editorial query, n.10 = de Generat. et corrupt.). Read from `vol3-p667-L-2` + `vol3-p667-R-2`.
- **p.668 nn.1–3** → `[^21]`–`[^23]` (q5's tail markers ¹²³: *animal mansuetum natura* = Aristot. Politic., the Augustine nature/malice note, and the *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* redirect). Read from `vol3-p668-L-2`. q6 begins its NOTAE at p.668 n.4 (Matt 5:46 Glossa interlinearis).

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q4:* **p.666 nn.1–5** (q4 owned p.666 only through its scholion §II–III; these five effect-objection notes were forwarded). Now claimed as `[^1]`–`[^5]`.
- *Forwarded to q6:* **p.668 nn.4–6** — n.4 Matt 5:46 (Glossa interlinearis, Lyra; edd. *maior*), n.5 Matt 5, 43 seq. (*Audistis, quia dictum est: Diliges proximum… ego autem dico vobis: Diligite inimicos*), n.6 Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 3 (Cfr. supra pag. 488 nota 1; codd. *et*). These cite q6's *diligere amicum an inimicum* arguments, not q5's. Confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p668-L-2`.

**`[?]` flags:** none remaining — `[^19]` (p.667 n.9) **RESOLVED at 600 dpi** (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p667-foot-R.png`). The bracketed `[?]` is **Quaracchi's OWN printed editorial query mark**, not our transcription ambiguity: the printed footer reads `…quod homo est animal **ratione [?]** amicis benefaciens et inimicis malefaciens…`, with Quaracchi setting `[?]` after *ratione* in its own apparatus (they could not certainly read Albert's source). The word IS *ratione*; the `[?]` is reproduced verbatim as printed (now spaced `ratione [?]` to match the print). Not a flag to clear — a faithful transcription of an editorial query.

**OPEN (not this chunk):** d.27 q6 footer gap (p.615 nn.1–4 owed to `d27-a2-q6` tail) still pending for the d.21–d.30 polish gate.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 6

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 668 -->

### Quaestio VI. *Utrum sit maioris perfectionis et meriti diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum.*

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit maioris perfectionis et meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum. Et quod diligere inimicum, videtur.

1. Matthaei quinto[^1]: *Si diligitis illos qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis?* Glossa, ibi: « Nullam in caelo »; sed constat, quod de dilectione inimicorum magna merces habetur: ergo maioris perfectionis et meriti est diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos.

2. Item, diligere inimicos est de superadditis a Domino in Evangelio[^2]; sed Dominus non superaddidit, nisi ea quae maioris perfectionis erant: videtur ergo, quod maioris perfectionis sit diligere inimicos quam diligere amicos.

3. Item, ubi est maior pugna, ibi gloriosior est victoria; et ubi maior difficultas, ibi maior est ratio virtutis et meriti, pro eo quod « ars et virtus est circa difficilia[^3] »; sed maior est pugna et difficultas in diligendo inimicos quam in diligendo amicos: ergo maior residet perfectio et meritum circa dilectionem inimicorum quam circa dilectionem amicorum.

4. Item, quanto homo magis supra se elevatur in aliquo motu virtutis, tanto motus ille et actio est perfectior et excellentior; sed in dilectione inimicorum plus elevatur homo supra se et supra ea quae sunt naturae, quam in dilectione amicorum: ergo motus dilectionis circa inimicos est magis meritorius et perfectus quam motus dilectionis erga amicos[^4].

5. Item, quanto motus dilectionis est perfectior, tanto est liberalior et purior — amor enim spiritualis purus est et liberalis — sed motus dilectionis erga inimicos purior est et liberalior quam erga amicos: purior quidem, quia minus habet admixtum de carnalitate; liberalior, quia minus habet de obligationis necessitate: ergo videtur, quod sit multo perfectior et Deo acceptior et ad merendum efficacior[^5].

**Sed contra:** 1. Dilectio inimicorum ponitur ab Ambrosio[^6] in ultimo gradu: ergo dilectio illa maxime recedit a primo gradu dilectionis, qui est maximus et nobilissimus; sed quanto aliquid recedit a primo et summo in illo genere, tanto minus habet de perfectione et complemento: si ergo dilectio inimicorum magis recedit, et dilectio amicorum magis accedit; ergo videtur, quod multo perfectior et excellentior sit motus dilectionis erga amicos quam erga inimicos.

2. Item, quanto dilectio est excellentior, tanto dilectioni Dei similior; sed Deus magis diligit diligentes se, iuxta illud quod dicitur Proverbiorum octavo[^7]: *Ego diligentes me diligo:* igitur dilectio amicorum magis assimilatur dilectioni Dei quam dilectio inimicorum; ergo est multo perfectior.

3. Item, motus dilectionis tanto melior est et excellentior, quanto ferventior et frequentior; sed motus caritatis erga amicos ferventior et frequentior est quam erga inimicos[^8]: ergo etc.

4. Item, quanto motus dilectionis rectior est et plus habet de rectitudine et aequitate, tanto melior et excellentior est in se; sed magis aequum et iustum est diligere amicos quam inimicos: ergo motus iste dilectionis est melior illo.

5. Item, in eo quod melius et perfectius est, magis debet homo se exercere: ergo si motus dilectionis erga inimicos esset melior et perfectior, frequentius deberet homo circa ipsos affici et pro ipsis orare. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens dicere, quod magis debeat homo orare pro inimicis quam pro amicis, quia hoc esset ordinem caritatis pervertere: ergo restat, quod non est maius bonum inimicos quam amicos diligere.

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### Conclusio

> Si actus utriusque dilectionis comparantur ad diversos habitus, excellentius est diligere inimicos quam amicos; si vero ad eundem, mutuo se excedunt secundum diversas conditiones.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur de comparatione istorum duorum motuum dilectionis, quorum unus est erga amicos, alter erga inimicos; dupliciter potest quaeri: aut prout comparantur ad diversos habitus et radices, aut prout comparantur ad eundem. — Si prout ad diversas radices et habitus comparantur, ita quod unus habitus habilitat tantum ad amicos, alter vero se extendit usque ad inimicos; sic absque dubio multo maius et excellentius est diligere inimicos quam amicos; et multo perfectiori habitu indigemus ad hoc, quod possimus exire in istum actum, quam ad hoc, ut exeamus in alterum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, et habetur in littera[^9]: « Magnum est erga eum qui tibi nihil mali fecit, esse benevolum et beneficum; illud vero multo grandius et magnificentissimae bonitatis est, ut tuum quoque inimicum diligas ».

Si vero loquamur de istis actibus, prout ad eandem radicem comparantur et ab eadem caritate procedunt; sic quodam modo sunt aequales et quodam modo mutuo se excedunt. Quantum enim ad rationem merendi respectu praemii substantialis aequalitatem habent, quia quantitas illius praemii respondet quantitati radicis[^10]; quantum vero ad rationem merendi respectu praemii accidentalis et quantum ad vigorem ipsius actus et motus mutuo se excedunt. Nam motus dilectionis erga amicos excedit quantum ad fervorem et frequentationem; motus vero dilectionis erga inimicos est purior et difficilior; et ita quodam modo unus istorum motuum est maior[^11] alio, et e converso, secundum varium modum accipiendi magnitudinem. Nam in dilectione amicorum virtus caritatis magis exercetur intensive, sed in dilectione inimicorum magis exercetur extensive; sicut virtus caloris ignis amplius calefacit propinquiora quam remotiora, et quodam modo plus apparet efficacia illius virtutis in his quae sunt propinqua, quodam modo in his quae sunt longinqua: ratione intensionis plus in calefactione propinquorum, et ratione extensionis plus in calefactione longinquorum[^12]. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod dilectio amicorum et dilectio inimicorum, prout ab eadem radice procedunt, secundum diversas conditiones et respectus mutuo se excedunt. — Et secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes, quae ad diversas partes adducuntur; diversis enim viis procedunt, secundum quas utraeque verum sine repugnantia concludere possunt.

Sed si ulterius quaeratur, quis istorum duorum motuum, omnibus pensatis, excedat reliquum; hic sunt diversae opiniones. Nam quidam volunt dicere, quod motus ille, qui est in amicum, melior est, quia intensior est, et plus habet de ratione boni; et istum modum dicendi videtur Magister approbare in littera[^13]. — Et si hunc modum, qui satis videtur probabilis, sustinere velimus, responderi potest ad rationes, quae primo inducuntur, quod ab insufficienti procedunt. Cum enim dicitur, quod motus, quanto difficilior et purior et magis supra vires naturae, tanto perfectior et excellentior; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ceteris paribus. Sed cum assumit[^14] de motu dilectionis inimicorum, quod est huiusmodi; responderi potest, quod non sunt cetera paria, quia multo maior et ferventior est motus dilectionis erga amicos, quam ille sit.

Alius vero est hic modus dicendi, quod dilectio inimicorum est excellentior, simpliciter loquendo, et magis in ea exercitatur perfectio caritatis. Et si hunc modum dicendi sustinere velimus, quoniam videtur auctoritas Augustini[^15] ipsum satis probabilem facere, potest responderi ad ea quae in contrarium adducuntur.

1. Ad primum quod obiicitur de ordine diligendorum, dici potest, quod Ambrosius in gradibus illis non intendit ponere vel assignare gradus perfectionis in dilectione, sed gradus exhibitionis secundum maiorem et minorem obligationem[^16].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dilectio amicorum est dilectioni Dei similior; responderi potest per interemptionem; quia perfectio dilectionis divinae magis manifestata est in hoc, quod dilexit nos, cum essemus inimici, quam si essemus amici, iuxta illud Apostoli ad Romanos quinto[^17]: *Commendat autem Deus caritatem suam in nobis, quia, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, secundum tempus Christus pro nobis mortuus est.* Unde etsi in dilectione amicorum caritas Dei ostendatur esse magna, in dilectione inimicorum ostenditur esse nimia;

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iuxta illud ad Ephesios secundo: *Propter nimiam caritatem suam, qua dilexit nos* etc.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanto motus dilectionis est melior, quanto ferventior; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi est par difficultas et resistentia. Ubi autem non est par difficultas, sicut in proposito, non habet veritatem; quod patet, quia modicus ignis citius adurit foenum, quam magnus ignis adurat forte lignum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto motus dilectionis est rectior, tanto perfectior; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed cum assumit, quod motus dilectionis erga amicum magis est rectus et aequus; respondendum est per distinctionem, quod maior aequitas potest esse dupliciter: aut propter exigentiam meritorum et dignitatis a parte dilecti, et sic magis est aequum diligere amicum quam inimicum; aut propter abundantiorem rectitudinem a parte diligentis, et sic non est magis aequum diligere amicum quam inimicum, immo magis e converso, quia hoc est abundantioris[^18] iustitiae quam illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis debet homo se exercere in eo quod est maioris perfectionis; responderi potest, quod in exhibitione alicuius beneficii et exsecutione alicuius actus duplici intentione potest homo se exercere: aut propter profectum alterius, aut propter meritum suum; nec debet homo in operibus suis tantum meritum suum intueri, sed etiam profectum proximi. Licet ergo in exercitatione circa dilectionem inimici maior sit via proficiendi et lucrandi et ad perfectionem perveniendi; quia tamen magis obligatur homo amico quam inimico, frequentius debet in dilectione amici se exercere. Unde quod dicit, quod magis nos debemus exercere in his quae sunt maioris perfectionis; dicendum, quod illud non est usquequaque verum, immo magis debemus nos exercere in his quae sunt maioris obligationis. — Et sic patet, quomodo potest[^19] satis rationabiliter utralibet pars sustineri.

english:
### Question VI. *Whether it is of greater perfection and merit to love a friend, or to love an enemy.*

Sixth and last it is asked, which is of greater perfection and merit, whether to love a friend, or to love an enemy. And that to love an enemy [is so], it seems.

1. Matthew chapter five[^1]: *If you love those who love you, what reward shall you have?* The Gloss, there: « None in heaven »; but it is established that for the love of enemies a great reward is had: therefore it is of greater perfection and merit to love enemies than to love friends.

2. Likewise, to love enemies is among the things superadded by the Lord in the Gospel[^2]; but the Lord superadded only those things which were of greater perfection: it seems therefore that it is of greater perfection to love enemies than to love friends.

3. Likewise, where there is greater struggle, there the victory is more glorious; and where there is greater difficulty, there is the greater account of virtue and of merit, on the ground that « art and virtue are concerned with what is difficult[^3] »; but the struggle and difficulty in loving enemies is greater than in loving friends: therefore greater perfection and merit reside in the love of enemies than in the love of friends.

4. Likewise, the more a man is raised above himself in some movement of virtue, the more that movement and action is more perfect and more excellent; but in the love of enemies a man is raised more above himself and above the things that belong to nature than in the love of friends: therefore the movement of love toward enemies is more meritorious and perfect than the movement of love toward friends[^4].

5. Likewise, the more the movement of love is perfect, the more it is liberal and pure — for spiritual love is pure and liberal — but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more liberal than toward friends: purer indeed, because it has less admixture of carnality; more liberal, because it has less of the necessity of obligation: therefore it seems that it is much more perfect and more acceptable to God and more efficacious for meriting[^5].

**On the contrary:** 1. The love of enemies is placed by Ambrose[^6] in the last degree: therefore that love recedes most from the first degree of love, which is the greatest and most noble; but the more anything recedes from the first and highest in that genus, the less it has of perfection and completion: if then the love of enemies recedes more, and the love of friends approaches more; therefore it seems that the movement of love toward friends is much more perfect and more excellent than toward enemies.

2. Likewise, the more excellent love is, the more like to the love of God; but God loves more those who love him, according to that which is said in Proverbs chapter eight[^7]: *I love those who love me:* therefore the love of friends is more assimilated to the love of God than the love of enemies; therefore it is much more perfect.

3. Likewise, the movement of love is so much better and more excellent, the more fervent and more frequent it is; but the movement of charity toward friends is more fervent and more frequent than toward enemies[^8]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more the movement of love is right and has of rectitude and equity, the better and more excellent it is in itself; but it is more equitable and just to love friends than enemies: therefore this movement of love is better than that.

5. Likewise, in that which is better and more perfect a man ought more to exercise himself: therefore if the movement of love toward enemies were better and more perfect, more frequently ought a man to be affected toward them and to pray for them. But if this is unfitting to say, that a man ought more to pray for enemies than for friends, because this would be to pervert the order of charity: therefore it remains that it is not a greater good to love enemies than friends.

### Conclusion

> If the acts of either love are compared to diverse habits, it is more excellent to love enemies than friends; but if [compared] to the same [habit], they mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since it is asked concerning the comparison of these two movements of love, of which one is toward friends, the other toward enemies; it can be asked in two ways: either insofar as they are compared to diverse habits and roots, or insofar as they are compared to the same. — If they are compared as to diverse roots and habits, such that one habit qualifies only for friends, while the other extends even to enemies; then without doubt it is much greater and more excellent to love enemies than friends; and we have need of a much more perfect habit for this, that we may go forth into this act, than for this, that we may go forth into the other. And this is what Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, and is found in the [Master's] text[^9]: « It is a great thing to be benevolent and beneficent toward one who has done you no evil; but that other is far greater and of most magnificent goodness, that you love even your enemy ».

But if we speak of these acts insofar as they are compared to the same root and proceed from the same charity; then in a certain way they are equal and in a certain way mutually exceed one another. For as to the account of meriting with respect to the substantial reward they have equality, because the quantity of that reward corresponds to the quantity of the root[^10]; but as to the account of meriting with respect to the accidental reward and as to the vigor of the act and movement itself, they mutually exceed one another. For the movement of love toward friends exceeds as to fervor and frequency; but the movement of love toward enemies is purer and more difficult; and so in a certain way one of these movements is greater[^11] than the other, and conversely, according to the varying mode of taking greatness. For in the love of friends the virtue of charity is exercised more intensively, but in the love of enemies it is exercised more extensively; just as the virtue of the heat of fire warms nearer things more amply than more remote ones, and in a certain way the efficacy of that virtue appears more in those things which are near, in a certain way in those which are far off: by reason of intensity more in the warming of near things, and by reason of extension more in the warming of distant things[^12]. So also in the matter proposed it is to be understood that the love of friends and the love of enemies, insofar as they proceed from the same root, mutually exceed one another according to diverse conditions and respects. — And according to this the arguments which are adduced to the diverse sides can be resolved; for they proceed by diverse ways, according to which both can conclude the truth without contradiction.

But if it be further asked, which of these two movements, all things weighed, exceeds the other; here there are diverse opinions. For some wish to say that that movement which is toward a friend is better, because it is more intense, and has more of the account of the good; and this manner of speaking the Master seems to approve in the text[^13]. — And if we should wish to maintain this manner, which seems probable enough, it can be replied to the arguments which are first adduced, that they proceed from an insufficient [ground]. For when it is said that a movement, the more difficult and purer and more above the powers of nature it is, the more perfect and excellent; it must be said that this is true, other things being equal. But when one assumes[^14] concerning the movement of love of enemies that it is of this kind; it can be replied that other things are not equal, because the movement of love toward friends is much greater and more fervent than that one is.

But there is another manner of speaking, that the love of enemies is more excellent, speaking absolutely, and in it the perfection of charity is more exercised. And if we should wish to maintain this manner, since the authority of Augustine[^15] seems to make it probable enough, it can be replied to the things which are adduced to the contrary.

1. To the first which is objected concerning the order of those to be loved, it can be said that Ambrose in those degrees does not intend to lay down or assign degrees of perfection in love, but degrees of exhibition according to greater and lesser obligation[^16].

2. To that which is objected, that the love of friends is more like to the love of God; it can be replied by interception; because the perfection of the divine love is more manifested in this, that he loved us when we were enemies, than if we were friends, according to that of the Apostle to the Romans chapter five[^17]: *But God commends his charity in us, in that, while we were yet sinners, in due time Christ died for us.* Hence although in the love of friends the charity of God be shown to be great, in the love of enemies it is shown to be exceeding;

according to that to the Ephesians chapter two: *On account of his exceeding charity, with which he loved us* etc.

3. To that which is objected, that the movement of love is so much better, the more fervent; it must be said that this is true, where there is equal difficulty and resistance. But where there is not equal difficulty, as in the matter proposed, it does not hold true; which is plain, because a small fire burns up hay sooner than a great fire perhaps burns up wood.

4. To that which is objected, that the more the movement of love is right, the more perfect; it must be said that it is true. But when one assumes that the movement of love toward a friend is more right and equitable; it must be answered by a distinction, that greater equity can be in two ways: either on account of the exigency of merits and of dignity on the part of the one loved, and thus it is more equitable to love a friend than an enemy; or on account of more abundant rectitude on the part of the one loving, and thus it is not more equitable to love a friend than an enemy, but rather the converse, because this is of a more abundant[^18] justice than that.

5. To that which is objected, that a man ought more to exercise himself in that which is of greater perfection; it can be replied that in the exhibition of some benefit and the execution of some act a man can exercise himself with a double intention: either for the advancement of another, or for his own merit; nor ought a man in his works to regard only his own merit, but also the advancement of his neighbor. Although therefore in the exercise concerning the love of an enemy there is a greater way of advancing and gaining and arriving at perfection; yet because a man is more obligated to a friend than to an enemy, he ought more frequently to exercise himself in the love of a friend. Hence as to what he says, that we ought more to exercise ourselves in those things which are of greater perfection; it must be said that this is not everywhere true, but rather we ought to exercise ourselves more in those things which are of greater obligation. — And thus it is plain how[^19] either side can quite reasonably be maintained.

la: Vers. 46. — Glossa, quae interlinearis est, habetur apud Lyranum. — Paulo inferius pro *magna* edd. *maior.*

en: Verse 46. — The Gloss, which is the interlinear gloss, is found in Lyra. — A little below, for *magna* the editions read *maior.*

la: Matth. 5, 43. seq.: *Audistis, quia dictum est: Diliges proximum tuum et odio habebis inimicum tuum, ego autem dico vobis: Diligite inimicos vestros* etc.

en: Matthew 5:43 ff.: *You have heard that it was said: You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy, but I say to you: Love your enemies* etc.

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 488, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro *ergo* non pauci codd. *et.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 3. Cf. above, p. 488, note 1. — A little below, for *ergo* not a few codices [read] *et.*

la: Cfr. hic in lit. Magistri verba August. ex eius Enchirid. c. 73. n. 19. transcripta.

en: Cf. here in the Master's text the words of Augustine transcribed from his *Enchiridion* c. 73, n. 19.

la: August., I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 21. n. 69: *Perfectio autem misericordiae... ultra dilectionem inimici porrigi non potest, et ideo sic clauditur (Matth. 5, 48.): Estote ergo vos perfecti, sicut et Pater vester* etc. — Superius pro *primo quia minus* edd. *quia nihil.*

en: Augustine, *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* I, c. 21, n. 69: *But the perfection of mercy... cannot be extended beyond the love of an enemy, and therefore it is thus closed (Matt. 5:48): Be you therefore perfect, as also your Father* etc. — Above, for *primo quia minus* the editions [read] *quia nihil.*

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIX. c. 2. De minori conferri post axioma Aristotelis relatum tom. II. pag. 94, nota 4. — Aliquanto inferius pro *complemento* cod. U habet *completione.*

en: See above, the Master's text, d. XXIX, c. 2. On the *minor* [degree], to be compared after the axiom of Aristotle reported in tom. II, p. 94, note 4. — Somewhat below, for *complemento* codex U has *completione.*

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, in principio, et Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 5. — Pro *excellentior* edd. *perfectior.* Deinde pro *caritatis* cod. K *dilectionis.*

en: Cf. here the Master's text, at the beginning, and Aristotle, *Ethics* VIII, c. 5. — For *excellentior* the editions [read] *perfectior.* Then for *caritatis* codex K [reads] *dilectionis.*

la: Huius distinctionis. Pro *Magnum est* Vat. cum textu origin. *Minus magnum est.*

en: Of this distinction. For *Magnum est* the Vatican edition, with the original text, [reads] *Minus magnum est.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 387, note 3.

la: Edd. *melior.*

en: The editions [read] *melior.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 647, nota 4. — Superius pro *quae sunt propinqua* codd. BCDIL (N a secunda manu) *quae sunt propinquam.* Deinde post *quodam modo* interserunt *quam*, quem vocabulum nonnulli codd. et Supplement. Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 72. a. 6. substituunt pro *quodam modo.*

en: Cf. above, p. 647, note 4. — Above, for *quae sunt propinqua* codices BCDIL (N by a second hand) [read] *quae sunt propinquam.* Then after *quodam modo* they insert *quam*, which word some codices and the *Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales*, collat. 72, a. 6, substitute for *quodam modo.*

la: Huius distinctionis. — Superius post *motus ille* cod. Z supplet *dilectionis.*

en: Of this distinction. — Above, after *motus ille* codex Z supplies *dilectionis.*

la: Nimirum in *minori* argumentorum. — Mox pro *quod est* edd. *qui est.* Paulo inferius pro *quam ille sit* cod. K *quam erga inimicos*, cod. Y (a secunda manu) *quam ille qui sit erga inimicos.*

en: Namely in the *minor* of the arguments. — Soon, for *quod est* the editions [read] *qui est.* A little below, for *quam ille sit* codex K [reads] *quam erga inimicos*, codex Y (by a second hand) *quam ille qui sit erga inimicos.*

en: That one [is] in the Master's text. — Soon, after *potest* codex Z inserts *sic*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 6. et dub. 3. — Codd. A F bis *gradus.*

en: Cf. above, d. 29, q. 6, and dub. 3. — Codices A, F twice [read] *gradus.*

la: Vers. 8. — Pro *caritatem suam* non pauci codd. *misericordiam suam.* — Seq. Scripturae locus est Eph. 2, 4.

en: Verse 8. — For *caritatem suam* not a few codices [read] *misericordiam suam.* — The following Scripture passage is Eph. 2:4.

la: Edd. *maioris et abundantioris.*

en: The editions [read] *maioris et abundantioris.*

la: Cod. K *possit.*

en: Codex K [reads] *possit.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ad quaestionem principalem antiqui doctores fere idem respondent, cum diversis tamen distinctionibus. Quoad quaestionem in fine responsionis annexam Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 59. m. 5. a. 3.) resolvit, quod « absolute maioris virtutis est diligere inimicum quam amicum »; et ipsi consentiens, B. Albert. (hic a. 3.) asserit, quod « meo iudicio melius absolute et simpliciter est diligere inimicum quam diligere amicum »; cui opinioni favet etiam Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. I.) et Durand. (hic q. 2.). Sed S. Thom. (S. II. II. q. 27. a. 7; cfr. hic a. 3.) contrarium censet, cum sub rubrica *Sed contra* dicat absolute: « Diligere amicum est magis meritorium quam diligere inimicum »; et etiam rationes ad oppos. solvat. Ipsi consentit Richard. a Med. (hic q. 3.), qui proprias distinctiones satis aptas applicat; tamen solvit argumenta pro utraque parte, sicut S. Bonav., qui, ut patet, utramque sententiam iudicat esse probabilem. Dionys. Carth. (hic q. I.) favet solutioni S. Thomae.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** To the principal question the ancient doctors respond almost the same, yet with diverse distinctions. As to the question annexed at the end of the response, Alexander of Hales (*Summa* pt. III, q. 59, m. 5, a. 3) resolves that « absolutely it is of greater virtue to love an enemy than a friend »; and in agreement with him, Bl. Albert (here, a. 3) asserts that « in my judgment it is better, absolutely and simply, to love an enemy than to love a friend »; to which opinion Peter of Tarentaise (here, q. 2, a. 1) and Durandus (here, q. 2) also favor. But St. Thomas (*Summa* II–II, q. 27, a. 7; cf. here, a. 3) judges the contrary, since under the rubric *Sed contra* he says absolutely: « To love a friend is more meritorious than to love an enemy »; and he also solves the arguments to the opposite. Richard of Mediavilla (here, q. 3) agrees with him, who applies his own distinctions fittingly enough; yet he solves the arguments for either side, as does St. Bonaventure, who, as is plain, judges either opinion to be probable. Denis the Carthusian (here, q. 1) favors the solution of St. Thomas.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p668-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p669-{L,R}-*.png`, `vol3-p670-{L,R}-*.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw 46429–46599) as base for clean running prose (videtur / Sed contra args) and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol III PDF-priority inversion, the column-band PDF read is authoritative for the cascade-shattered Conclusio + Respondeo + footers. Offset pdf = printed + 22. Running heads confirm pp.668–670 (p.669 head `DIST. XXX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. VI.`); trust the +22 offset over OCR'd digits.

**Page span.** Printed 668–670 (PDF 690–692). This is the LAST question (q6) of d.30's ARTICULUS UNICUS.

**Alignment check — PASS.** Opener *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, quid sit maioris perfectionis et meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum* (raw 46432; QUAESTIO VI header raw 46429) matches `title_la` and the d30-divisio TRACTATIO sixth item (*Sextum est, quid sit melius et maioris meriti, utrum diligere amicum, an diligere inimicum*). No q-swap. Upper boundary = DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (raw 46600), then DISTINCTIO XXXI (raw 46627).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.668** (PDF 690): q6 opens lower L-col (header + title, below q5's tail). videtur obj.1–5 (L→R), Sed contra 1 (R-col, marg. *Ad oppositum*) → Sed contra 2–5 (R-col). Footers nn.1–11 (q6 owns nn.4–11; nn.1–3 belong to q5).
- **p.669** (PDF 691): Conclusio (marg. *Conclusio 1 / 2 bimembris / 3*) + Respondeo + the *duae opiniones* + Ad arg. 1–2 begin. Footers nn.1–9.
- **p.670** (PDF 692): Ad 2 tail + Ad 3–5 close (top→mid L-col), then SCHOLION (single §I), then DUBIA boundary. q6 owns p.670 footers nn.1–2; nn.3–6 belong to the Dubia.

**Scholion disposition.** q6 HAS its own scholion — a single section §I (no §II), surveying the *antiqui doctores* on the annexed question (Alex. Hal., Albert, Petr. a Tar., Durand. for love-of-enemy; Thomas + Richard a Med. + Dionys. Carth. for love-of-friend). Bonaventure judges either opinion probable. Rendered LAST in each language block per parser rule.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q5:* **p.668 nn.4–6** (Matt 5:46 Glossa interlinearis; Matt 5:43; Aristot. II Ethic.) — forwarded by q5, which owned p.668 only through its tail nn.1–3. Now claimed here as the leading apparatus entries.
- *Forwarded to d30-dubia:* **p.670 nn.3–6** — n.3 (Aristot. II de Anima text. 33), n.4 (Cfr. supra p.311 nota 1; *amicum et* omission), n.5 (Edd. *esse*; cod. F *circa Deum et hominem*), n.6 (Hic in principio lit.; cod. K *unus et idem*). These cite the Dub. 1 body (obiecta / convertit / diligendum / Magister markers), which opens on p.670 immediately after the scholion. q6 keeps only p.670 nn.1–2.

**`[?]` flags.** None remaining. App. `[^15]` (p.669 n.7) **RESOLVED at 600 dpi** (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11; `/tmp/hires/p669-foot-R.png`): the p.669-R footer 7 prints `⁷ Ille in lit. Magistri. — Mox post *potest* cod. Z inserit *sic*.` exactly. The provisional reading *inserit sic* is confirmed; `[?]` removed. No other flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 30, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 670 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Obscura est responsio, quia non est facile iudicium, an unus et idem motus sit erga amicum et erga inimicum.* Hoc enim videtur esse simpliciter falsum, quia, cum actus diversificentur per obiecta[^1], et amicus et inimicus sint diversa obiecta et diversa diligibilia; impossibile est, quod amicum et inimicum quis diligat uno motu. — Item, virtus simplex et finita, ad quaecumque se convertit, totaliter se convertit[^2]; sed homo diligendo amicum convertit se ad ipsum: ergo non videtur, quod uno et eodem motu simul et semel possit diligere amicum et inimicum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis illud quod dicit Magister hic, non sit usquequaque bene intelligibile: possumus tamen utrumque exponere et ipsum salvare dupliciter. Primo sic: contingit enim erga aliquem affici dupliciter: vel proprie et distincte et sub propria ratione, vel in quadam generalitate cum aliis; sicut verbi gratia dupliciter potest aliquis affici in amando Petrum: aut quia specialiter afficitur circa ipsum, aut quia generaliter cogitat, omnem hominem diligendum[^3], et generaliter circa omnem hominem afficitur, secundum quod exigit ordo caritatis. — Si primo modo accipiatur motus dilectionis in amicum, sic non potest unus et idem motus, qui est in amicum, esse in inimicum, sicut rationes inductae ostendunt. Si vero secundo modo, sic potest esse idem; et hoc modo accipit Magister[^4], cum dicit, quod potest esse unus respectu utriusque.

Aliter autem potest sustineri, ut distinguamus, quod dupliciter contingit, vim aliquam moveri in obiectum: aut motu simplici et absoluto, aut motu collativo et quodam modo composito. Si loquamur de motu simplici et absoluto; sic non potest unus

<!-- page 671 -->

et idem esse in amicum et inimicum, immo diversi sunt, quorum unus est intensior et alter remissior. — Si vero de motu collativo, quo quis afficitur circa aliqua duo, unum alteri praeponendo; sic potest esse motus unus, secundum quod dicit Magister[^5], secundum aliquid sui intensior, secundum vero aliquid remissior. — Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad ea quae obiiciuntur. Nam illa duo procedunt de actu simplici et absoluto, qui est respectu unius obiecti tantum, actus vero collativus potest esse respectu duorum sub ratione unius.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus affectionis non potest simul converti; patet responsio. Ex hoc enim non concluditur, quod non possit esse unus motus collativus, quia in eo est reperire prius et posterius[^6].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de verbis Augustini, quae dicit in littera: *Procul dubio verba sponsionis huius implentur, si homo, qui non ita profecit, ut diligat inimicum, tamen quando rogatur ab homine, qui peccavit, dimittit.* Sed *contra* hoc est: quia, si non dimittit, antequam rogetur, servat iram proximo; et si servat iram, caritatem non habet: ergo in oratione sua non est dignus exauditione, nec videtur, quod oret recte. — Item, sicut in praecedentibus[^7] probatum est, omnes tenentur inimicos suos diligere, etiam inimicitias exercentes: ergo omnes tenentur eis, etiam non rogati, offensas dimittere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est dimittere *rancorem*, et est dimittere *signa rancoris*. Dimittere rancorem necessitatis est; et ad hoc omnes obligantur, et ad hoc tenetur homo, sive inimicus impugnet, sive veniam petat. Dimittere autem non solum rancorem, sed etiam signa rancoris, hoc perfectionis est, nec ad hoc tenetur homo nisi in casu[^8], videlicet quando devote et humiliter venia postulatur. — Et de hac dimissione loquitur Augustinus; obiectiones vero currunt de alia. Et per hoc patent tam littera quam obiecta[^9].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quisquis roganti non dimittit, non existimet, a Domino sua peccata dimitti.* Videtur ergo secundum hoc, quod omnis qui servat rancorem erga proximum, quod contra se ipsum oret, quia, cum nolit alii dimittere, iam petit ex consequenti, quod nec Deus dimittat sibi: et qui petit, quod Deus non dimittat[^10], peccat mortaliter: ergo omnis qui est in rancore et dicit orationem dominicam, videtur mortaliter peccare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnis qui orationem dominicam ex corde dicit, intendit per eam impetrare collationem bonorum et remissionem malorum; et qui hoc intendit a Domino assequi[^11], constans est, quod aut poenitet, aut proponit aliquando poenitere. Licet igitur aliquis odium habeat, tamen in dicendo orationem dominicam non incurrit mortalem offensam, quia non intendit petere, quod fiat sibi secundum voluntatem[^12] malam, quam nunc habet, sed secundum voluntatem bonam, quam, etsi tunc non habeat, intendit tamen Dei auxilio aliquando obtinere. Si quis autem illam orationem diceret, nunquam proponens ab odio fratris recedere, quamvis non intenderet iram petere, culpam tamen suam absque dubio aggravaret. — Aliter tamen posset dici, quod istam orationem, quando aliquis dicit, non dicit in persona sua, sed in persona Ecclesiae, cuius vult esse membrum. Et quantum ad hoc nihil petit contra se ipsum, nec intentione principali nec ex consequenti[^13].

---

english:
<!-- page 670 -->

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which he says: *The answer is obscure, because the judgment is not easy, whether one and the same movement is toward a friend and toward an enemy.* For this seems to be simply false, because, since acts are diversified by their objects[^1], and a friend and an enemy are diverse objects and diverse things-to-be-loved; it is impossible that one should love a friend and an enemy by one movement. — Likewise, a simple and finite power, to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly[^2]; but a man, by loving a friend, turns himself to him: therefore it does not seem that by one and the same movement, simultaneously and at once, he can love a friend and an enemy.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although what the Master says here is not altogether well intelligible, we can nevertheless expound both [statements] and uphold him in two ways. First thus: for it happens that one is affected toward someone in two ways: either properly and distinctly and under a proper account, or in a certain generality together with others; as, for example, one can be affected in two ways in loving Peter: either because he is affected specially with respect to him, or because he thinks generally that every man is to be loved[^3], and is affected generally with respect to every man, according as the order of charity requires. — If the movement of love toward a friend is taken in the first way, then one and the same movement which is toward a friend cannot be toward an enemy, as the reasons adduced show. But if in the second way, then it can be the same; and in this way the Master takes it[^4], when he says that there can be one [movement] with respect to both.

But it can be upheld otherwise, by distinguishing that it happens in two ways that some power is moved toward an object: either by a simple and absolute movement, or by a comparative movement and one in a certain way composite. If we speak of a simple and absolute movement, then there cannot be one

<!-- page 671 -->

and the same [movement] toward a friend and an enemy; rather they are diverse, of which one is more intense and the other more remiss. — But if [we speak] of a comparative movement, by which one is affected concerning two things, preferring one to the other; then there can be one movement, according as the Master says[^5], in some respect of itself more intense, but in some respect more remiss. — And according to this the response to the things objected is clear. For those two [objections] proceed from a simple and absolute act, which is with respect to one object only; but a comparative act can be with respect to two under the account of one.

To that which is objected, that the power of affection cannot be turned simultaneously, the response is clear. For from this it is not concluded that there cannot be one comparative movement, because in it there is to be found a before and an after[^6].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about the words of Augustine, which he says in the text: *Without doubt the words of this promise are fulfilled, if a man, who has not so far advanced as to love his enemy, nevertheless forgives when he is asked by the man who has sinned.* But against this is: because, if he does not forgive before he is asked, he keeps anger toward his neighbor; and if he keeps anger, he does not have charity: therefore in his prayer he is not worthy of being heard, nor does it seem that he prays rightly. — Likewise, as was proved in what precedes[^7], all are bound to love their enemies, even those who exercise enmities: therefore all are bound, even unasked, to forgive them offenses.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is forgiving *rancor*, and there is forgiving *the signs of rancor*. To forgive rancor is of necessity; and to this all are obliged, and to this a man is bound, whether the enemy attacks or asks pardon. But to forgive not only rancor, but also the signs of rancor, this is of perfection, nor is a man bound to this except in a [particular] case[^8], namely when pardon is sought devoutly and humbly. — And of this forgiveness Augustine speaks; but the objections run on another [kind]. And through this both the text and the objections are clear[^9].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Whoever does not forgive one who asks, let him not suppose that his sins are forgiven by the Lord.* It seems therefore, according to this, that everyone who keeps rancor toward his neighbor prays against himself, because, since he is unwilling to forgive another, he already asks by consequence that neither should God forgive him: and one who asks that God should not forgive[^10] sins mortally: therefore everyone who is in rancor and says the Lord's Prayer seems to sin mortally.

**I respond:** It must be said that everyone who says the Lord's Prayer from the heart intends by it to obtain the bestowal of goods and the remission of evils; and one who intends to attain this from the Lord[^11], it is certain that either he repents, or he proposes to repent at some time. Although therefore someone may have hatred, nevertheless in saying the Lord's Prayer he does not incur a mortal offense, because he does not intend to ask that it be done to him according to the evil will[^12] which he now has, but according to the good will which, although he does not have it then, he nevertheless intends at some time to obtain by God's help. But if someone were to say that prayer, never proposing to withdraw from hatred of his brother, although he would not intend to ask for anger, he would nevertheless without doubt aggravate his own fault. — Yet it could be said otherwise, that when someone says this prayer, he does not say it in his own person, but in the person of the Church, of which he wishes to be a member. And as to this he asks nothing against himself, neither by a principal intention nor by consequence[^13].

---

la: Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.).

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 311, nota 1. — In fine arg. multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *amicum et*.

en: Cf. above, p. 311, note 1. — At the end of the argument many codices and editions 1, 2 omit *amicum et*.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. supplent *esse*. Subinde pro *circa omnem hominem* cod. F *circa Deum et hominem*.

en: The editions, with several codices, supply *esse*. Thereupon, for *circa omnem hominem* (with respect to every man), codex F reads *circa Deum et hominem* (with respect to God and man).

la: Hic in principio lit., sed sententialiter tantum. — Deinde pro *unus* cod. K *unus et idem*.

en: Here at the beginning of the text, but only in sense. — Then, for *unus* (one), codex K reads *unus et idem* (one and the same).

la: Hic in lit. — Paulo superius post *Si vero* cod. G repetit *loquamur*.

en: Here in the text. — A little above, after *Si vero* (But if), codex G repeats *loquamur* (we speak).

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic circa lit. (dicit: Hoc est impossibile, nisi unus propter alterum diligatur et actuali consideratione referatur in illud); Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt B. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here on the text (he says: This is impossible, unless the one is loved on account of the other and is referred to it by an actual consideration); Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Quaest. 4. seq. et d. 28. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *exauditione* cod. G *exaudiri*. Paulo inferius pro *non rogati* cod. K *non rogantibus*.

en: Question 4 following, and d. 28, q. 3. — A little above, for *exauditione* (being heard) codex G reads *exaudiri* (to be heard). A little below, for *non rogati* (unasked) codex K reads *non rogantibus*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 4. et 5. — Paulo ante pro *in casu* cod. F *in hoc casu*.

en: Cf. above, qq. 4 and 5. — A little before, for *in casu* (in a case) codex F reads *in hoc casu* (in this case).

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3, et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Codd. Z aa adiungunt *sibi*.

en: Codices Z, aa add *sibi* (to himself).

la: Edd. *exsequi*.

en: The editions read *exsequi* (to carry out).

la: Cod. Z admittit *suam* et paulo inferius pro *tunc* substituit *nunc*. Deinde pro *nunquam* cod. K exhibet *nec*.

en: Codex Z admits *suam* (his own) and a little below substitutes *nunc* (now) for *tunc* (then). Then, for *nunquam* (never), codex K exhibits *nec* (nor).

la: Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 6, et S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is solved also by B. Albert, here a. 6, and St. Thomas, here on the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi column-band PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{670,671}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) per the Vol III PDF-priority inversion: raw OCR lines 46600–46672 are two-column cascade-shattered (Dub. I/II/III bodies interleaved across columns, footers fragmented). PDF read authoritative; offset pdf = printed + 22 (p.670 = pdf 692, p.671 = pdf 693). Running-head TEXT ("670", "671") trusted over OCR'd digits (the OCR running head at raw 46627 reads "DISTINCTIO XXXI. 07." — a mangled page number, NOT a real distinction start).

**Number of dubia: 3** (Dub. I, II, III). Confirmed against PDF: no Dub. IV — DISTINCTIO XXXI (Cap. I, *Si caritas semel habita amittatur*) begins on p.671 (L-column bottom for the Lombard littera caption; R-column bottom for the commentary opener). **This chunk CLOSES DISTINCTIO XXX.**

**Page-split map.**
- p.670 (L→R): DUBIA header; Dub. I objections + Respondeo (first exposition, "Primo sic") + start of second exposition ("Aliter autem… simplici et absoluto; sic non potest unus" → continues on p.671).
- p.671 (L→R): Dub. I tail ("et idem esse… posterius²"); Dub. II (objections + Respondeo, full); Dub. III (objections + Respondeo, full, ending "nec ex consequenti⁹"). DISTINCTIO XXXI littera begins below this on the same printed page.

**Apparatus = 13 entries.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering per printed page.
- **Hand-off picked up:** p.670 nn.3–6 forwarded from d30-a1-q6 (Dub. I body markers — n.3 *obiecta*, n.4 *convertit*, n.5 *diligendum*, n.6 *Magister*). p.670 nn.1–2 belong to q6's body/scholion tail (top of p.670 L) and are NOT this chunk's — q6 retains them. Renumbered here as local [^1]–[^4].
- p.671 nn.1–9 are this chunk's (Dub. I tail, Dub. II, Dub. III): renumbered local [^5]–[^13]. Body-marker map: [^5]=Magister(p671 n.1), [^6]=posterius(n.2), [^7]=praecedentibus(n.3), [^8]=casu(n.4), [^9]=obiecta(n.5), [^10]=dimittat(n.6), [^11]=assequi(n.7), [^12]=voluntatem(n.8), [^13]=consequenti(n.9).

**Forwarded to d31-littera:** the p.671 **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** block (n.1 *Epist. 1 Cor. 13, 8…* etc.) prints in the p.671 R-column footer but belongs to DISTINCTIO XXXI's Lombard littera, NOT to these dubia. The next chunk (`bon-sent-III-d31-littera`) should claim it as its leading apparatus.

**Dubia have no scholion** (`has_scholion: false`) — the SCHOLION at the top of p.670 L belongs to d30-a1-q6.

**`[?]` flags:** none remaining — both RESOLVED at 600 dpi (d.21–d.30 polish gate, 2026-06-11).
- Dub. I [^2] (p.670 n.4; `/tmp/hires/p670-foot-L.png`): the p.670-L footer prints `⁴ Cfr. supra pag. **311**, nota 1. — In fine arg. multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *amicum et.*` — the cross-reference page number **311** is confirmed. Reading correct as printed.
- Dub. III [^10] (p.671 n.6; `/tmp/hires/p671-foot-R.png`, `/tmp/hires/p671-n6b-zoom.png`): the p.671-R footer prints `⁶ Codd. **Z aa** adiungunt *sibi*.` — the second siglum is clearly **aa** (the doubled minuscule codex siglum cited elsewhere on this page), NOT "ad". Reading correct as printed.