title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Distinctio XXV. Pars I. Articulus unicus. Quaestio III.
### *Utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur simul rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus *de Quinque Responsionibus*[^1][^2]: « Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota[^4] »: ergo non tantummodo comprehendit cognitivam, immo etiam affectivam.

2. Item, Damascenus[^5]: « Anima libero arbitrio appetit, libere iudicat[^3], libere impetum facit, libere disponit, libere vult, libere eligit »; sed hic concernuntur actus rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum per obiectum[^6]; hoc nihil est, quia ipse idem dicit, quod « in eo coniugatae sunt virtutes cognitivae et vitales »: complectitur ergo liberum arbitrium et vim motivam et vim cognitivam.

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3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per *definitionem liberi arbitrii*, quam ponit Bernardus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^7], quod definiens dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis indeclinabile iudicium »: ergo simul complectitur rationem et voluntatem.

4. Item, per aliam *definitionem* Augustini, quam Magister posuit distinctione praecedenti[^8], quae talis est: « Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis »; sed facultas voluntatis surgit ex ipsa voluntate, facultas rationis ex ipsa ratione: ergo facultas voluntatis et rationis comprehendit utramque potentiam. Sed liberum arbitrium est talis facultas: ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia peccatum et culpa est in solo libero arbitrio[^9]; sed aliquod peccatum est in ratione, ut peccatum infidelitatis, aliquod in voluntate: ergo liberum arbitrium comprehendit in se rationem et voluntatem.

6. Item, gratia et virtus est in solo libero arbitrio; sed tres virtutes theologicae dicuntur esse in rationali, concupiscibili et irascibili[^10]: ergo liberum arbitrium omnes illas potentias habet circumplecti.

**Sed contra:** 1. Liberum arbitrium non potest cogi, ratio autem potest cogi: ergo liberum arbitrium rationem ipsam non comprehendit. Quod autem ratio aliquando cogatur, planum est; quod liberum arbitrium non possit cogi, hoc indicat ipsum nomen; si enim posset cogi, non esset liberum[^11].

2. Item, ratio est eorum quae sunt a nobis, et quae non sunt a nobis; sed liberum arbitrium solum est respectu eorum quae sunt a nobis: ergo in plus est ratio quam liberum arbitrium; ergo liberum arbitrium non comprehendit in se rationem.

3. Item, quod non comprehendat voluntatem, videtur. — Voluntas nostra respectu aliquorum est impermutabilis; sed quidquid liberum arbitrium nostrum appetit, permutabiliter appetit[^12]: ergo etc.

4. Item, voluntas est possibilium et impossibilium; sed liberum arbitrium est possibilium tantum[^13]: ergo ad plura se extendit voluntas quam liberum arbitrium: ergo liberum arbitrium non comprehendit in se rationem et voluntatem.

5. Item, ratio et voluntas sunt diversae potentiae[^14]; sed liberum arbitrium est una potentia, cum habeat actum unum, videlicet *eligere* sive *consentire*: ergo impossibile est, liberum arbitrium comprehendere in se *rationem et voluntatem*.

6. Item, si liberum arbitrium comprehendit in se *rationem et voluntatem*: aut ergo sicut partes *subiectivas*, aut sicut partes *integrantes*[^15]. Si sicut partes *subiectivas*: ergo tota ratio liberi arbitrii salvatur in *ratione*, et tota ratio in *voluntate*. Cum igitur alia potentia sit ratio, et alia voluntas; et numerato inferiori, numeratur superius: videtur ergo, quod in quolibet homine sint duo libera arbitria; quod manifeste falsum est. Si autem sicut partes *integrantes*; sed contra: ex duabus potentiis nunquam fit una tertia potentia, maxime cum illae potentiae manent distinctae, et actus earum sunt ad invicem ordinati, ita quod unus est ante alterum[^16]. Si ergo ratio et voluntas sunt potentiae distinctae, et actus earum sunt ordinati ad invicem secundum prius et posterius; videtur, quod liberum arbitrium ex his integrari non possit tanquam ex principiis constitutivis; et ita videtur, quod liberum arbitrium voluntatem et rationem non possit comprehendere.

### Conclusio

> Liberum arbitrium comprehendit simul rationem atque voluntatem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod liberum arbitrium simul comprehendit et *rationem* et *voluntatem*; et hoc manifestat ipsa *nominatio*[^17], ipsa etiam *notificatio*, manifestat etiam suae *proprietatis inquisitio*. — *Nominatio* manifestat. Dicitur enim *liberum*, et dicitur *arbitrium*; et arbitrium est ipsius rationis, libertas vero ipsius voluntatis, ad cuius nutum et imperium moveri habent cetera, quae sunt in nobis. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus *de Quinque Responsionibus*[^18]: « Liberum arbitrium dicitur ab *arbitrando*, quia a rationali parte, quid eligat quidve recuset, nomen accepit ».

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Hoc etiam patet per eius *notificationem*. Dicitur enim esse facultas voluntatis et rationis, sive consensus rationis et voluntatis.

Postremo illud amplius manifestatur per suae *proprietatis inquisitionem*. Liberum enim arbitrium, sive nominet potentiam sive habitum, nominat ipsam potentiam ut dominam, vel dominium illius potentiae; et hoc planum est ex ipso nomine *libertatis*. — Attendendum autem, quod dominium alicuius potentiae[^19] potest esse dupliciter; aut respectu *obiecti*, aut respectu *actus*. Dominium potentiae respectu obiecti attenditur in hoc, quod possit in illud et in amplius, sicut equus, qui potest ferre decem modios, dominium habet super tres modios ad portandum, quia praevalet et cum facilitate portat. Dominium autem potentiae respectu actus attenditur in hoc, quod potentia potest esse in actu et cessare ab actu secundum suum imperium et secundum proprium motum. Ad hoc autem, quod aliqua potentia hoc dominium habeat, necesse est, quod ipsa possit *movere se ipsam*, et quod possit se super actum suum *reflectere*. Nisi enim posset se super actum suum reflectere, nunquam posset illum refrenare; nisi posset se ipsam movere, nec posset in illum exire, quando vellet. Reflectere autem se super se, hoc est virtutis *cognitivae*, sublimatae a materia, quae quidem est ratio. *Movere autem se*, hoc est virtutis *appetitivae*, rationem consequentis.

Ad hoc igitur, ut illud dominium sit in anima, necesse est, quod habeat et rationem et voluntatem. Nam si rationem tantum haberet et non voluntatem, per quam moveret; posset se super actum suum reflectere, sed non posset movere[^20] vel imperare. Si vero appetitum solum haberet et non rationem, posset utique movere et in actum exire; sed quia non posset se super actum suum reflectere, non posset utique refrenare, et ita dominium non haberet. — Sicut igitur ex concursu virtutis duorum hominum resultat quaedam[^21] facultas ad portandum unum lapidem, quem non posset ferre alter eorum; et sicut ex concursu patris familias et matris familias ad disponendum regimen domus resultat una potestas, ita quod altera non sufficeret; et sicut ex concursu virtutis manus et oculi resultat potestas scribendi, ad quod altera earum non sufficeret: sic ex concursu *rationis et voluntatis* resultat quaedam libertas sive quoddam dominium ad aliquid faciendum et disponendum.

Et sic patet, quod liberum arbitrium rationem complectitur et voluntatem. Patet etiam, quod cum liberum arbitrium sit quaedam potestas sive quoddam dominium resultans ex coniunctione istarum duarum potentiarum, scilicet rationis et voluntatis, quod optime nominatur per hoc, quod dicitur *liberum arbitrium*, non uno nomine, sed composito, ut unum nomen respondeat rationi, et alterum voluntati. — Optime etiam[^22] *definitur*, cum dicitur esse facultas rationis et voluntatis. *Facultas* enim non tantum nominat potentiam, immo facilitatem potentiae, ex qua non tantum *potens* est, sed etiam *praepotens* est ad exeundum in actum; et ideo *facultas* dicit potestatem sive dominium, quod quidem dicitur esse rationis simul et voluntatis, quia non est unius, nisi concomitante altera. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod liberum arbitrium rationem comprehendit et voluntatem.

**Ad argumenta ad oppositum:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3, 4.* Ad rationes vero ad oppositum facile est respondere. Quod enim obiicitur, quod non comprehendit totam rationem, nec totam voluntatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed comprehendit solum ipsam potentiam *cognitivam*, in quantum iuncta est *affectivae*, et *affectivam*, in quantum iuncta est *cognitivae*; unde dicit affectum deliberativum, vel deliberationem voluntariam. Et propterea, quia ratio nominat ipsam potentiam cognitivam ut ordinatam ad affectivam, et voluntas ipsam affectivam ut regulatam et ratiocinatam a cognitiva; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium potius dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis quam intellectus et affectus. Non enim comprehendit totam cognitivam, sicut duae primae rationes ostendunt, nec totam affectivam, sicut ostendunt duae sequentes, sed aliquid huius et aliquid illius, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium est potentia una, cum habeat actum unum; dicendum, quod quamvis actus liberi arbitrii, utpote *eligere* et *consentire*, unus esse videatur; nihilominus tamen implicat in se actus diversos. Consensus enim dicit concordiam aliquorum duorum, et ita concursum actuum rationis et voluntatis in unum. Eligere etiam includit in se rationis iudicium et voluntatis appetitum[^23]; et ita, quemadmodum *consentire* et *eligere*, etsi unus actus esse videatur, tamen diversos actus in se includit: sic liberum arbitrium, etsi videatur una potentia, tamen diversas in se potentias complectitur, ita quod ex concursu illarum se invicem adiuvantium resultat in nobis regimen potestatis perfectae.

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*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, utrum complectatur eas sicut partes integrales aut subiectivas; dicendum, quod non complectitur eas omnino sicut *totum integrale*, nec omnino sicut *totum universale*, sed sicut *totum potentiale*[^24], quod partim habet naturam *totius integri*, partim naturam *totius universalis*: naturam *totius integri* in hoc, quod in una potentiarum non potest salvari absque altera; naturam vero *totius universalis* habet, quia ex earum concursu ad invicem quamlibet earum denominat. Unde, sicut duo homines facultatem habent ferendi lapidem, quam neuter per se habet, et illa[^25] facultate potentia cuiuslibet eorum dicitur esse facilis, nec tamen est una sine altera; sic intelligendum est in proposito. Et rursus, sicut similitudo est in duobus similibus, ita quod non est in uno sine altero, et tamen quilibet eorum denominatur similis nec dicuntur esse duae similitudines, sed una; sic libertas dicitur esse in ratione et voluntate, ita quod utraque illarum potentiarum est libera ex coniunctione sui cum alia; nec tamen sunt in eis duae libertates, sed una. Et sic patent obiecta[^26].

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english:
### Distinction XXV. Part I. Sole Article. Question III.
### *Whether free choice embraces reason and will together.*

Third, it is asked whether free choice embraces reason and will together. And that it does, is shown.

1. Augustine, *On the Five Responses*[^1][^2]: « When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but of the whole[^4] »: therefore it does not comprehend only the cognitive [power], but indeed also the affective.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^5]: « By free choice the soul desires, freely judges[^3], freely makes its impulse, freely disposes, freely wills, freely chooses »; but here the acts of reason and of will are concerned: therefore etc. If you should say that this is said by reason of the object[^6]; this is nothing, because the same author himself says that « in it the cognitive and the vital powers are conjoined »: therefore free choice embraces both the motive power and the cognitive power.

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen from the *definition of free choice* which Bernard sets down in his book *On Free Choice*[^7], who in defining it says that « free choice is consent on account of the will's inamissible liberty and reason's undeviating judgment »: therefore it embraces reason and will together.

4. Likewise, from another *definition* of Augustine, which the Master set down in the preceding distinction[^8], which is this: « Free choice is a faculty of will and of reason »; but the faculty of will arises from the will itself, the faculty of reason from reason itself: therefore the faculty of will and of reason comprehends both powers. But free choice is such a faculty: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same thing is seen by *reason*, because sin and fault is in free choice alone[^9]; but some sin is in the reason, as the sin of unbelief, some in the will: therefore free choice comprehends in itself reason and will.

6. Likewise, grace and virtue is in free choice alone; but the three theological virtues are said to be in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible[^10]: therefore free choice has the power to embrace all those faculties.

**On the contrary:** 1. Free choice cannot be compelled, but reason can be compelled: therefore free choice does not comprehend reason itself. That reason is sometimes compelled is plain; that free choice cannot be compelled, the very name indicates this; for if it could be compelled, it would not be free[^11].

2. Likewise, reason is of those things which are in our power, and of those which are not in our power; but free choice is only with respect to those things which are in our power: therefore reason is more extensive than free choice; therefore free choice does not comprehend reason in itself.

3. Likewise, that it does not comprehend will is seen. — Our will with respect to certain things is unchangeable; but whatever our free choice desires, it desires changeably[^12]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, will is of the possible and the impossible; but free choice is of the possible only[^13]: therefore will extends to more things than free choice: therefore free choice does not comprehend in itself reason and will.

5. Likewise, reason and will are diverse powers[^14]; but free choice is one power, since it has one act, namely *to choose* or *to consent*: therefore it is impossible that free choice comprehend in itself *reason and will*.

6. Likewise, if free choice comprehends in itself *reason and will*: then either as *subjective* parts, or as *integral* parts[^15]. If as *subjective* parts: then the whole account of free choice is preserved in *reason*, and the whole account in *will*. Since therefore reason is one power, and will another; and when the inferior is numbered, the superior is numbered: it seems therefore that in any man there are two free choices; which is manifestly false. But if as *integral* parts; then on the contrary: from two powers there is never made a third power, especially when those powers remain distinct, and their acts are ordered to one another, so that one is before the other[^16]. If therefore reason and will are distinct powers, and their acts are ordered to one another according to prior and posterior; it seems that free choice cannot be made integral out of these as out of constitutive principles; and so it seems that free choice cannot comprehend will and reason.

### Conclusion

> Free choice embraces reason and will together.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that free choice comprehends together both *reason* and *will*; and this the very *naming*[^17] makes manifest, the very *notification* also, and the *inquiry into its property* also makes it manifest. — The *naming* makes it manifest. For it is called *free*, and it is called *choice*; and choice belongs to reason, but liberty to will, at whose beck and command the other things that are in us are moved. And this is what Augustine says *On the Five Responses*[^18]: « Free choice is so called from *judging* [arbitrando], because from the rational part it has received its name, [namely] what it should choose and what it should refuse ».

This is also plain from its *notification*. For it is said to be a faculty of will and of reason, or a consent of reason and will.

Lastly that is more fully made manifest through the *inquiry into its property*. For free choice, whether it name a power or a habit, names that power as mistress, or the dominion of that power; and this is plain from the very name of *liberty*. — But it must be attended to that the dominion of any power[^19] can be of two kinds; either with respect to the *object*, or with respect to the *act*. The dominion of a power with respect to the object is regarded in this, that it can [extend] to that object and to more, as a horse which can carry ten measures has dominion over three measures to carry, because it prevails and carries them with ease. But the dominion of a power with respect to the act is regarded in this, that the power can be in act and cease from act according to its own command and according to its own motion. Now, for any power to have this dominion, it is necessary that it be able to *move itself*, and that it be able to *reflect upon* its own act. For unless it could reflect upon its own act, it could never restrain it; unless it could move itself, it could not go forth into [the act] when it willed. But to reflect upon oneself, this belongs to the *cognitive* power, sublimated above matter, which indeed is reason. *To move oneself*, this belongs to the *appetitive* power, which follows upon reason.

To the end, therefore, that this dominion be in the soul, it is necessary that it have both reason and will. For if it had reason only and not will, by which it might move; it could reflect upon its own act, but could not move[^20] or command. But if it had appetite alone and not reason, it could indeed move and go forth into act; but because it could not reflect upon its own act, it could not indeed restrain, and so would not have dominion. — As therefore from the concurrence of the strength of two men there results a certain[^21] capacity for carrying a stone which neither of them could carry; and as from the concurrence of the father of the family and the mother of the family for arranging the governance of the house there results one authority, such that the one alone would not suffice; and as from the concurrence of the strength of the hand and of the eye there results the power of writing, for which neither of them alone would suffice: so from the concurrence of *reason and will* there results a certain liberty or a certain dominion for doing and disposing something.

And so it is plain that free choice embraces reason and will. It is also plain that, since free choice is a certain authority or a certain dominion resulting from the conjunction of these two powers, namely reason and will, it is best named by this, that it is called *free choice*, not by one name, but by a composite one, so that one name corresponds to reason, and the other to will. — It is also best[^22] *defined* when it is said to be a faculty of reason and of will. For *faculty* names not only the power, but rather the facility of the power, from which it is not only *able*, but is even *pre-eminently able* to go forth into act; and therefore *faculty* expresses an authority or dominion, which indeed is said to be of reason and of will together, because it is not of the one without the other accompanying. — The arguments proving that free choice comprehends reason and will are therefore to be granted.

**To the arguments to the opposite:**

*To 1, 2, 3, 4.* It is easy to respond to the arguments to the opposite. For as to what is objected, that it does not comprehend the whole of reason, nor the whole of will; it must be said that this is true; but it comprehends only the cognitive power itself, insofar as it is joined to the *affective*, and the *affective*, insofar as it is joined to the *cognitive*; whence it expresses a deliberative affect, or a voluntary deliberation. And on that account, because reason names the cognitive power itself as ordered to the affective, and will [names] the affective itself as regulated and reasoned by the cognitive; hence it is that free choice is rather called a faculty of will and of reason than of intellect and of affect. For it does not comprehend the whole of the cognitive [power], as the two first arguments show, nor the whole of the affective, as the two following ones show, but something of this and something of that, as the arguments adduced for the first part show.

*To 5.* As to what is objected, that free choice is one power since it has one act; it must be said that, although the act of free choice, namely *to choose* and *to consent*, is seen to be one; nevertheless it implies in itself diverse acts. For consent expresses the concord of two certain things, and so the concurrence of the acts of reason and will into one. To choose also includes in itself the judgment of reason and the appetite of will[^23]; and so, just as *to consent* and *to choose*, although they are seen to be one act, nevertheless include in themselves diverse acts: so free choice, although it is seen to be one power, nevertheless embraces in itself diverse powers, so that from the concurrence of those helping one another there results in us the governance of a perfect authority.

*To 6.* As to what is objected lastly, whether it embraces them as integral or as subjective parts; it must be said that it does not embrace them altogether as an *integral whole*, nor altogether as a *universal whole*, but as a *potential whole*[^24], which partly has the nature of *an integral whole*, partly the nature of *a universal whole*: the nature of *an integral whole* in this, that in one of the powers it cannot be preserved without the other; but it has the nature of *a universal whole* because from their concurrence with one another it denominates each of them. Whence, as two men have the capacity of carrying a stone which neither has of himself, and by that[^25] capacity the power of each of them is said to be facile, yet it is not one without the other; so it must be understood in the case at hand. And again, as a likeness is in two like things, so that it is not in the one without the other, and yet each of them is denominated like, nor are they said to be two likenesses, but one; so liberty is said to be in reason and will, so that each of those powers is free by the conjunction of itself with the other; nor yet are there in them two liberties, but one. And so the objections are clear[^26].

---

la: Hic q. 5. — Paulo inferius pro *quod faciat* Vat. cum edd. 1, 4 *quae faciat*, et dein pro *ipsum* Vat. cum ed. 4 perperam *ipsam*.

en: Here, in question 5. — A little below, for *quod faciat* [that it may do] the Vatican edition with editions 1 and 4 [reads] *quae faciat* [which it may do], and then for *ipsum* the Vatican edition with edition 4 wrongly [reads] *ipsam*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 560, nota 12.

en: Compare above, page 560, note 12.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *et quae iudicat*. Paulo inferius post *officium* cod. A adiicit *et nomen*; dein pro *iudicati* cod. T ponit *iudicandi*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit *and which judges*. A little below, after *office* codex A adds *and name*; then for *of the judged* codex T puts *of the one to be judged*.

la: Sive Hypognosticon, libr. III. c. 5: Cum de libero arbitrio agimus, non de parte hominis agimus, sed de toto.

en: Or the *Hypognosticon*, book III, c. 5: When we treat of free choice, we do not treat of a part of man, but of the whole.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, ubi et seq. textus; originale in primo textu plures alios actus libero arbitrio subiectos affert. — Pro *Anima libero arbitrio* sola Vat. *Anima libere arbitratur*, quae et dein pro *impetum facit* cum edd. 2, 3, 4 substituit *imperat et facit*. Deinde eadem cum edd. 3, 4 *sed haec concernunt* pro *sed hic concernuntur*.

en: Book II of *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22, where also the following text [is found]; the original in the first text brings forward several other acts subject to free choice. — For *Anima libero arbitrio* [the soul by free choice] the Vatican edition alone [reads] *Anima libere arbitratur* [the soul freely deliberates], which [edition], then, for *impetum facit* [makes its impulse], together with editions 2, 3, 4, substitutes *imperat et facit* [commands and does]. Then the same [edition], with editions 3, 4, [reads] *sed haec concernunt* [but these concern] for *sed hic concernuntur* [but here are concerned].

la: Vat. cum codd. FLbbee et edd. 3, 4 *per causam*, cod. aa *per obiecta*.

en: The Vatican edition with codices F L bb ee and editions 3, 4 [reads] *per causam* [by cause], codex aa *per obiecta* [by objects].

la: Cap. 2. n. 4: Is ergo talis consensus ob voluntatis inamissibilem libertatem et rationis quod secum semper et ubique portat indeclinabile iudicium, non incongrue dicetur, ut arbitror, liberum arbitrium. Cfr. infra dub. 2.

en: Chapter 2, n. 4: Such a consent, then, on account of the will's inamissible liberty and the undeviating judgment of reason which it always and everywhere carries with it, will not unfittingly be called, as I think, free choice. Compare below, doubt 2.

la: Cap. 3. Vide supra pag. 592, nota 6.

en: Chapter 3. See above, page 592, note 6.

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Compare below, distinction 41, article 2, question 2.

en: See III Sentences, distinction 23, article 1, question 2; distinction 26, article 2, question 2; and distinction 27, article 1, question 1. — On the *major* compare ibid., distinction 33, article 1, question 3.

la: Ut fusius ostenditur infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. seq. — Cod. aa *non posset dici nec esse liberum*.

en: As is shown more fully below, in part II of this distinction, question 1 and following. — Codex aa [reads] *it could not be called nor be free*.

la: Cfr. de hoc arg. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Compare on this argument above, distinction 24, part I, article 2, question 3.

la: Idem docet Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2, de *voluntate* et *electione*. Vide etiam supra pag. 563, nota 1.

en: Aristotle teaches the same, *Ethics* III, c. 2, concerning *will* and *choice*. See also above, page 563, note 1.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. De *minori* cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 6. a. 4, ubi ostendit, quod *eligere* sit ex parte voluntatis principalis actus eorum, quos Damasc., supra pag. 565, nota 1, enumerat.

en: As was shown above, distinction 24, part I, article 2, question 1. On the *minor* compare Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, part II, question 72, member 6, article 4, where he shows that *to choose* is, on the side of the will, the principal act of those which Damascene, above page 565, note 1, enumerates.

la: Petr. Hispanus, Summul. tract. de Locis argum. ait: *Totum universale*, ut hic sumitur, est quodlibet superius et substantiale, sumtum ad suum inferius, ut animal ad hominem, et homo ad Socratem. *Pars subiectiva* dicitur quodlibet inferius, sub *toto universali* sumtum... *Totum integrale* est, quod est compositum ex partibus, quantitatem habentibus, et pars eius dicitur *pars integralis*. *Pars integralis* est, quae cum aliis partibus reddit quantitatem totius.

en: Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, the treatise on the loci of argument, says: A *universal whole*, as it is taken here, is anything superior and substantial, taken in relation to its inferior, as animal to man, and man to Socrates. A *subjective part* is said to be anything inferior, taken under a *universal whole*... An *integral whole* is that which is composed of parts having quantity, and a part of it is called an *integral part*. An *integral part* is that which together with the other parts renders the quantity of the whole.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). Avicenna, de Anima sive Sexti Natural. p. V. c. 7: Impossibile est autem, duas virtutes esse unam.

en: Compare Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 49 (VI, c. 13). Avicenna, *On the Soul* or part VI of the *Naturals*, part V, c. 7: But it is impossible that two powers be one.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et codd. OR et aliis sic: *et hoc non solum manifestat ipsa nominatio, sed etiam ipsa* etc. Mox post *Dicitur enim* codd. 1 W addunt *liberum arbitrium*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and codices O R and others [reads] thus: *and this not only the very naming makes manifest, but also the very* etc. Soon after *For it is called* codices 1 W add *free choice*.

la: Sive Hypognosticon, libr. III. c. 4. Vide supra pag. 593, nota 5. — Pro *quia a rationali* codd. F K T Vaa ccco et plures alii nec non ed. 1 *quod a rationali*.

en: Or the *Hypognosticon*, book III, c. 4. See above, page 593, note 5. — For *because from the rational* codices F K T V aa ccco and several others, and also edition 1, [read] *that from the rational*.

la: In codd. C F I K L O R S W et pluribus aliis atque in ed. 1 desiderantur *potentiae*, pro qua voce cod. T substituit *rei*. Paulo inferius post *attenditur in hoc, quod* cod. O interserit *potentia potest esse in actu et cessare ab actu et quod*, quae verba ex sequente divisionis membro perperam anticipata sunt. Dein pro *praevalet et cum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *praevalet ad illud quod cum*.

en: In codices C F I K L O R S W and several others, and in edition 1, *of the power* is wanting, for which word codex T substitutes *of the thing*. A little below, after *is regarded in this, that* codex O inserts *the power can be in act and cease from act and that*, which words are wrongly anticipated from the following member of the division. Then for *it prevails and with* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] *it prevails for that which with*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *movere se*. Mox pro *solum* codd. F K P Q T W bb ec *suum*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *to move itself*. Soon, for *only* codices F K P Q T W bb ec [read] *its own*.

la: Vat. voci *quaedam* praefigit *una*.

en: The Vatican edition prefixes *one* to the word *a certain*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *autem*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] *however*.

la: Ab Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 2, *electio* definitur « consultatrix appetitio », et dicit idem ibidem: Idcirco vel appetitivus intellectus vel intellectivus appetitus electio est. Cfr. et ibid. III. c. 2.

en: By Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, c. 2, *choice* is defined as « a deliberative appetite », and he says the same in the same place: Therefore choice is either appetitive intellect or intellective appetite. Compare also ibid., III, c. 2.

la: Hoc *totum potentiale*, quod etiam *virtuale* nuncupatur, et quod tunc habetur, quando plures potentiae sive virtutes congregantur in uno actu, quoad significationem propinquum et finitimum est illi quod vocatur *totum potestativum* (a quo saepe, sed perperam, sumitur pro *toto universali*). Hoc dominium esse illud, cui plures potentiae inter se distinctae insunt, ut v. g. animae insunt potentia vegetativa, sensitiva etc., quo S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. ait: *Totum potentiale* adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam *essentiam*, sed non secundum totam *virtutem*. Et ideo quodam modo potest praedicari de qualibet parte, sed non ita proprie, sicut *totum universale*. — Paulo superius pro *totum integrale* codd. 1 W aa bb cc ee et nonnulli alii cum ed. 1 ponunt *totum integrum*, dum econtra cod. Y in seqq. bis *integralis* substituit pro *integri*.

en: This *potential whole*, which is also called *virtual*, and which is had when several powers or faculties are gathered in one act, is in its signification near and akin to that which is called *the whole of power [totum potestativum]* (from which often, but wrongly, it is taken for *the universal whole*). This is the dominion to which several mutually distinct powers belong, as for example to the soul belong the vegetative, sensitive [powers] etc., concerning which St. Thomas, *Summa*, part I, question 77, article 1, reply 1, says: *A potential whole* is present to its single parts according to its whole *essence*, but not according to its whole *power*. And therefore in a certain way it can be predicated of any part, but not so properly as *a universal whole*. — A little above, for *integral whole* codices 1 W aa bb cc ee and some others, with edition 1, put *integral whole [totum integrum]*, while on the contrary codex Y in what follows twice substitutes *integral* for *of the integral*.

la: Vat. *ex illa*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *from that*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 600 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit nomen habitus, vel potentiae.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur rationem et voluntatem per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus. Et quod per modum potentiae, videtur:

I. Primo per Anselmum in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^1], ubi ait sic: « Liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem »; sed potestas est in genere potentiae: ergo etc.

2. Item, Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio[^2]: « Tolle liberum arbitrium; iam non erit quod salvetur »; sed salvari non dicitur nisi substantia, vel potentia ratione substantiae; ergo liberum arbitrium vel est nomen substantiae, vel potentiae; sed non est substantiae: ergo est potentiae.

3. Item, in nobis est ponere aliquam potentiam, quae semper inclinat ad bonum simpliciter, utpote synderesim, et aliquam, quae semper inclinat ad bonum ut nunc, quantum est de se, utpote sensualitatem: ergo est ponere potentiam medio modo se habentem; hanc autem dicimus liberum arbitrium: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne quod est susceptibile habitus, est potentia; sed liberum arbitrium est susceptibile habitus, utpote gratiae: ergo est potentia. Media patet per Augustinum[^3], qui dicit, quod « gratia se habet ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum ».

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^4]: « Libero arbitrio male utens, homo et se perdidit et ipsum »; sed nulla potentia peccando perditur: ergo liberum arbitrium non est potentia.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium sic definitur ab Augustino, cuius definitio posita est distinctione praecedenti[^5]: « Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis »; sed facultas est illud, quo potentia efficitur facilis: ergo cum omne illud quod reddit potentiam facilem ad opus, reddat eam habilem, et tale sit habitus; videtur etc.

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3. Item, Bernardus de Libero Arbitrio[^6]: « Liberum arbitrium est habitus animi liber sui »; sed si haec definitio recte est assignata, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium essentialiter sit habitus; sed non nisi rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium non est aliud, sicut Magister dicit in littera[^7], et philosophi definiunt, quam liberum iudicium; sed iudicium non est potentia, sed actus vel habitus: ergo etc.

5. Item, potentiae non est potentia[^8], nec potentia dicitur esse in potentia; sed liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, et est in ratione et voluntate: ergo non videtur, quod sit potentia aliqua; et est potentia vel habitus: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne quod habet diminui et augeri, potius habet rationem habitus quam potentiae; sed liberum arbitrium est huiusmodi, sicut Magister dicit in littera[^9], quod maior libertas est in Beatis quam in confirmatis: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus habitus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit nomen habitus an potentiae, hoc dupliciter potest quaeri: aut ita, quod quaeratur, utrum praecise nominet habitum, vel praecise nominet potentiam; et talis quaestio parum habet difficultatis, pro eo quod fere omnia nomina potentiarum animae aliquando accipiuntur pro potentiis, aliquando pro habitibus, aliquando pro actibus. Sicut enim vult Philosophus[^10], intellectus vocatur aliquando potentia intellectiva, aliquando habitus intelligendi, aliquando actus. Et Anselmus[^11] dicit, quod « voluntas aliquando dicitur instrumentum, aliquando affectus, aliquando usus ». Et ideo hoc in proposita quaestione non intenditur.

Alio modo potest intelligi praedicta quaestio, ut hoc innuatur, cui videlicet primo et principaliter nomen liberi arbitrii imponatur, secundum quod de eo sacri doctores loquuntur. Et ad istam quaestionem triplex est modus respondendi secundum[^12] diversos.

Quidam enim senserunt, quod liberum arbitrium nomen est potentiae, quae se habet per modum universalis ad rationem et voluntatem, et comprehendit eas, sicut totum universale comprehendit partes. Unde sicut potentia rationalis rationi et voluntati dicitur esse communis, sic et libertas arbitrii, secundum istum modum dicendi. — Sed istud supra[^13] improbatum est. Si enim nominaret potentiam universalem ad rationem et voluntatem, iam, cum ratio et voluntas sint duae potentiae rationales, iam essent in eis duae libertates, et duo libera arbitria essent in quolibet homine.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod liberum arbitrium nominat potentiam ex voluntate et ratione constitutam ad aliquid faciendum, ad[^14] quod neutra illarum per se poterat. Et quia una iuncta alteri non tantummodo reddit potentiam potentem, immo etiam facilem; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium non tantummodo nominat potentiam, sed etiam nominat facilem potentiam et habilitatem. Et propterea nomen illud, quamvis sit nomen impositum potentiae, videtur tamen esse nomen habitus.

Sed quoniam difficile est intelligere, qualiter ex duabus potentiis una constituatur, vel quomodo liberum arbitrium, loquendo formaliter et proprie, sit duae potentiae, maxime cum non dicatur esse ratio et voluntas, sed facultas rationis et voluntatis: ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod liberum arbitrium est nomen principaliter impositum habitui. — Et hoc plane manifestat ipsa nominis impositio. Arbitrium enim non dicit potentiam, sed habitum. Manifestat etiam ipsa notificatio. Non enim dicitur liberum arbitrium esse potentia facilis, sed facultas potentiarum. Quemadmodum autem, cum dico potentiam facilem[^15], dico potentiam habilitatam, sic, cum dico facultatem potentiae, dico habitum eiusdem. Quoniam igitur liberum arbitrium secundum propriam suam assignationem facultas rationis et voluntatis recte esse dicitur; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus

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habitus, qui quidem recte dicitur facultas et dominium; qui consurgit ex coniunctione utriusque[^16] et potens est super actus utriusque potentiae, per se et in se consideratae, sicut arbitraria potestas in duabus personis regimen habet super actus utriusque in se consideratae.

Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod liberum arbitrium nominat habitum[^17]; verum enim concludunt, quia habitui principaliter imponitur. Unde essentialiter loquendo, haec est vera: liberum arbitrium est habitus animae sive facultas voluntatis et rationis.

**Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur,** de facili respondetur. Concedo enim, quod liberum arbitrium aliquando supponit potentiam et accipitur pro potentia; sed hoc non est de sua principali significatione, sed sicut nomen potentiae[^18] trahitur ad nomen habitus, sic nomen habitus frequenter ad nomen potentiae. Et sic patent ad utramque partem obiecta.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether free choice is the name of a habit or of a power.*

Fourthly it is asked whether free choice embraces reason and will after the manner of a power, or after the manner of a habit. And that it does so after the manner of a power is shown:

I. First, through Anselm in the book *On Free Choice*[^1], where he says thus: "Free choice is the power of preserving rectitude"; but power belongs to the genus of potency: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Bernard *On Free Choice*[^2]: "Take away free choice; there will then be nothing that is saved"; but only a substance, or a power by reason of a substance, is said to be saved; therefore free choice is either the name of a substance or of a power; but it is not [the name] of a substance: therefore it is [the name] of a power.

3. Likewise, in us there is to be posited some power that always inclines toward the good simply, namely synderesis, and another that always inclines toward the good as-of-now, so far as it depends on itself, namely sensuality: therefore there is to be posited a power standing in a middle way; but this we call free choice: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything that is receptive of a habit is a power; but free choice is receptive of a habit, namely of grace: therefore it is a power. The middle [premise] is clear through Augustine[^3], who says that "grace stands to free choice as a rider to a horse."

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^4]: "By using free choice badly, man destroyed both himself and it"; but no power is destroyed by sinning: therefore free choice is not a power.

2. Likewise, free choice is thus defined by Augustine, whose definition was set down in the preceding distinction[^5]: "Free choice is the faculty of will and reason"; but a faculty is that by which a power is made facile: therefore since everything that renders a power facile for the work renders it apt, and such a thing is a habit; it seems etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard *On Free Choice*[^6]: "Free choice is a habit of the mind free over itself"; but if this definition has been rightly assigned, it seems that free choice is essentially a habit; but [it is a habit] only of reason and will: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, free choice is nothing else, as the Master says in the text[^7], and the philosophers define, than free judgment; but judgment is not a power, but an act or a habit: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, of a power there is no power[^8], nor is a power said to be in a power; but free choice is the faculty of reason and will, and is in reason and will: therefore it does not seem that it is any power; and it is either a power or a habit: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything that can be diminished and increased has rather the character of a habit than of a power; but free choice is of this kind, as the Master says in the text[^9], that there is greater freedom in the Blessed than in those confirmed [in grace]: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> Free choice principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one habit.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether free choice is the name of a habit or of a power, this can be asked in two ways: either so that it is asked whether it names precisely a habit, or precisely a power; and such a question has little difficulty, since nearly all the names of the powers of the soul are sometimes taken for powers, sometimes for habits, sometimes for acts. For as the Philosopher holds[^10], the intellect is called sometimes the intellective power, sometimes the habit of understanding, sometimes the act. And Anselm[^11] says that "the will is sometimes called an instrument, sometimes an affection, sometimes a use." And therefore this is not intended in the proposed question.

In another way the aforesaid question can be understood, so that this is intimated: namely, to what the name of free choice is first and principally imposed, according as the holy doctors speak of it. And to this question there is a threefold manner of responding according to[^12] different [authors].

For some held that free choice is the name of a power that stands as a universal to reason and will, and comprehends them, as a universal whole comprehends its parts. Hence, as the rational power is said to be common to reason and to will, so also is the freedom of choice, according to this manner of speaking. — But this was disproved above[^13]. For if it named a universal power [extending] to reason and will, then, since reason and will are two rational powers, there would now be in them two freedoms, and there would be two free choices in any one man.

And therefore there is another position: that free choice names a power constituted out of will and reason for doing something to[^14] which neither of them by itself was able. And because one joined to the other does not only render the power potent, but also facile; hence it is that free choice does not only name a power, but also names a facile power and an aptitude. And on that account that name, although it is a name imposed on a power, nevertheless seems to be the name of a habit.

But since it is difficult to understand how out of two powers one is constituted, or how free choice, speaking formally and properly, is two powers — especially since it is not said to be reason and will, but the faculty of reason and will — therefore there is a third manner of speaking: that free choice is a name principally imposed on a habit. — And the very imposition of the name plainly manifests this. For "arbitrium" (choice) does not signify a power, but a habit. The very notification also manifests it. For free choice is not said to be a facile power, but the faculty of the powers. Now just as, when I say a facile power[^15], I say a power made apt, so, when I say the faculty of a power, I say the habit of the same. Since therefore free choice is rightly said, according to its proper assignation, to be the faculty of reason and will; hence it is that free choice principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one

habit, which indeed is rightly called a faculty and a dominion; which arises from the conjunction of both[^16] and is powerful over the acts of both powers, considered in themselves and by themselves, just as arbitral authority has rule, in two persons, over the acts of each considered in itself.

The reasonings that show that free choice names a habit[^17] are therefore to be conceded; for they conclude truly, since [the name] is principally imposed on the habit. Hence, speaking essentially, this is true: free choice is a habit of the soul, or the faculty of will and reason.

**But to the things urged on the contrary,** the reply is easy. For I concede that free choice sometimes supposes a power and is taken for a power; but this is not of its principal signification, but just as the name of a power[^18] is drawn over to the name of a habit, so the name of a habit is frequently [drawn over] to the name of a power. And thus the objections on both sides are clear.

la: Cap. 3: Illa libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem.

en: Ch. 3: "That freedom of choice is the power of preserving rectitude."

la: Cap. 1. n. 2, ubi textus original. *et* pro *iam.* — Paulo inferius pro *ratione substantiae* Vat. *ratione potentiae,* refragantibus codd. E F H M T Y aa bb ee, quos nos secuti sumus.

en: Ch. 1, n. 2, where the original text reads *et* for *iam.* — A little below, for *by reason of substance* (*ratione substantiae*) the Vatican edition reads *by reason of power* (*ratione potentiae*), against codices E F H M T Y aa bb ee, which we have followed.

la: Hypognosticon (inter opera August.), libr. III. c. 11: Recte namque arbitror comparari liberum arbitrium iumento; unde et dictum est: Velut iumentum factus sum apud te (Ps. 72, 23.): gratiam vero sessori. Cfr. etiam Sermo 30. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, sermo 12.) c. 8. n. 10: Tollite iugum meum super vos (Matth. 11, 29.). Tulisti hoc iugum? Tulisti? Sentis te habere sessorem? — Pro *Media* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Quod autem liberum arbitrium sit susceptibile gratiae.*

en: *Hypognosticon* (among the works of Augustine), bk. III, c. 11: "For rightly, I think, free choice is compared to a beast of burden; whence also it has been said: 'I am become as a beast before thee' (Ps. 72:23); and grace [is compared] to the rider." Cf. also Sermon 30 (otherwise *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 12), c. 8, n. 10: "Take my yoke upon you (Matt. 11:29). Have you taken this yoke? Have you taken it? Do you feel that you have a rider?" — For *Media* ("The middle [premise]"), the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *Quod autem liberum arbitrium sit susceptibile gratiae* ("But that free choice is receptive of grace").

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 392, nota 6. — Quoad seq. propos. delegamus lectorem ad illud Ciceron. I. Rhetor. c. 26: « Facultates sunt aut quibus facilius fit, aut sine quibus aliquid confici non potest ». In hac nec non in seqq. quaest. pluries respicitur illa sententia, quae ex F. M. Victorini expositione in I. Rhetor. c. 2. et 23, et II. c. 56. sumta ac formata est, quamque attulimus tom. I. pag. 31, nota 2, illa nimirum: Natura habilem facit, ars facilem, usus potentem, vel iuxta prolationem B. Alberti: Natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem.

en: The text of the Master, c. 3. Cf. above p. 392, note 6. — As to the following proposition, we refer the reader to that [saying] of Cicero, *Rhetoric* I, c. 26: "Faculties are either those by which a thing is more easily done, or those without which something cannot be accomplished." In this and in the following questions that maxim is repeatedly had in view which was taken and formed from the exposition of F. M. Victorinus on the *Rhetoric* I, cc. 2 and 23, and II, c. 56, and which we adduced in vol. I, p. 31, note 2, namely this: "Nature makes [one] apt, art [makes one] facile, use [makes one] potent," or, according to the wording of B. Albert: "Nature makes [one] apt, art [makes one] potent, use [makes one] facile."

la: Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 593, nota 3. — In minori pro *sed iudicium* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *sed liberum iudicium.*

en: Here, c. 1. Cf. above p. 593, note 3. — In the minor [premise], for *but judgment* (*sed iudicium*) the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *but free judgment* (*sed liberum iudicium*).

la: Cfr. supra pag. 33, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 33, note 6.

la: Hic c. 1. — Pro *confirmatis,* scil. in gratia, cod. Q *damnatis.*

en: Here, c. 1. — For *confirmatis* (those confirmed), namely in grace, codex Q reads *damnatis* (the damned).

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 2.) et III. text. 2. seqq., text. 18. seqq., text. 39. et text. 46. seqq. (c. 4. seq. c. 8. seqq.).

en: *On the Soul*, bk. II, text 21 (c. 2) and bk. III, text 2 ff., text 18 ff., text 39, and text 46 ff. (c. 4 f., c. 8 ff.).

la: De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11: Voluntas itaque dici videtur aequivoce tripliciter. Aliud enim est instrumentum volendi, aliud affectio instrumenti, aliud usus eiusdem instrumenti... Dicitur autem voluntas et instrumentum volendi et affectio eius et usus eius.

en: *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 11: "The will, then, seems to be said equivocally in three ways. For one thing is the instrument of willing, another the affection of the instrument, another the use of the same instrument... Now the will is called both the instrument of willing and its affection and its use."

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *per.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *per* ("through").

la: Quaest. praeced. in solut. ad 6. — Mox Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 bis *diversae* pro *duae.*

en: The preceding question, in the solution to [objection] 6. — Soon after, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads, twice, *diversae* (diverse) for *duae* (two).

la: Vat. et aliqui codd. omittunt *ad.* Post pauca pro *immo etiam facilem* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 substituit *sed etiam habilem et facilem,* et deinde *habilem potentiam et facilem* pro *facilem potentiam et habilitatem.* Cod. aa pro *habilitatem* bene *habilitatam.*

en: The Vatican edition and some codices omit *ad* ("to"). A little later, for *immo etiam facilem* ("but also facile") the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 substitutes *sed etiam habilem et facilem* ("but also apt and facile"), and then *habilem potentiam et facilem* ("an apt and facile power") for *facilem potentiam et habilitatem* ("a facile power and an aptitude"). Codex aa, for *habilitatem,* well [reads] *habilitatam* (made apt).

la: Pro *facilem,* quae lectio invenitur in codd. C F H K L O S T W aa bb ee et in ed. 1, Vat. cum ceteris edd. *habilem.*

en: For *facilem* (facile), which reading is found in codices C F H K L O S T W aa bb ee and in edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions reads *habilem* (apt).

la: Cod. aa *virtutis utriusque.* Paulo inferius pro *super [actus]* codd. F H W Y cum ed. 2 *super actum.*

en: Codex aa reads *virtutis utriusque* ("of the power of both"). A little below, for *super [actus]* ("over the acts"), codices F H W Y with edition 2 read *super actum* ("over the act").

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt *verum.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 add *verum* ("truly").

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 subiungit *frequenter.*

en: The Vatican edition with edition 4 subjoins *frequenter* ("frequently").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Opinio secunda, hic relata, est Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 72. m. 2. a. 1.), qui dicit, quod « liberum arbitrium est potentia habitualis, pro libitu eligentis, et ex hoc, quod habitualis est, habet, quod facile exeat in actum ». Consentit B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 1.); « Revera liberum arbitrium est potentia perfecta per habitum naturalem, et habitus ille libertas est » (cfr. idem II. Sent. d. 24. a. 11.). — Sed cum Scoto, Richardo, Aegidio aliisque docet S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 1; S. 1. q. 84. a. 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 4.), quod illud nullatenus sit habitus. — E contrario S. Bonav., secutus verba S. Bernardi, docuit, quod « principaliter dicit habitum et complectitur rationem et voluntatem, non tanquam una potentia ex eis constituta, sed tanquam unus habitus » etc. Favet autem eidem opinioni Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 24. q. 2. a. 1.

**II.** Sed observandum, quod S. Bonav. termino habitus utitur non in stricto sensu, ut S. Thom., quod patet ex seq. (5.) quaestione, ubi distinguit triplicem modum, quo habitus inesse possit potentiae. S. Thom. vero loquitur de habitu potentiae realiter superaddito; tamen verbum S. Bernardi admittit in sensu largo « pro habitudine quadam » (II. Sent. loc. cit. ad 1; Sum. loc. cit. ad 2; de Verit. loc. cit. ad 8.). Hinc nobis videtur, differentiam inter utrumque Doctorem esse potius de modo loquendi, praesertim de usu termini habitus, quam de reali sententiarum oppositione.

**III.** De seq. quaestione alii explicite non tractant; cuius solutio aliquantulum luminis affert ad intelligendam sententiam S. Doctoris. Non in verbis, sed in sensu cum Seraphico convenire videtur Durand. (II. Sent. d. 24. q. 1.) dicens: « Quod liberum arbitrium nominat proprietatem potentiae vel potentiam sub proprietate », pro quo hanc rationem affert, quia scilicet in utraque potentia specialem habitudinem importat. Praeter laudatos: Scot., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 4. n. 21, et hic. q. unica, n. 6. — Aegid. Rom., II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 1. a. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The second opinion, related here, is that of Alexander (Summa, pt. II, q. 72, m. 2, a. 1), who says that "free choice is a habitual power, at the pleasure of the one choosing, and from the fact that it is habitual it has that it readily issues into act." B. Albert agrees (Summa, pt. II, tr. 14, q. 91, m. 1): "Truly free choice is a power perfected by a natural habit, and that habit is freedom" (cf. the same, II Sent., d. 24, a. 11). — But with Scotus, Richard, Giles, and others, St. Thomas teaches (II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 84, a. 2; *de Veritate* q. 24, a. 4) that it is in no way a habit. — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure, following the words of St. Bernard, taught that "it principally signifies a habit and embraces reason and will, not as one power constituted out of them, but as one habit," etc. Peter of Tarentaise favors the same opinion (II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1).

**II.** But it must be observed that St. Bonaventure uses the term "habit" not in the strict sense, as St. Thomas does, which is clear from the following (5th) question, where he distinguishes a threefold manner in which a habit can inhere in a power. St. Thomas, however, speaks of a habit really superadded to a power; yet he admits St. Bernard's word in the broad sense "for a certain habitude" (II Sent., loc. cit., ad 1; Summa, loc. cit., ad 2; *de Veritate*, loc. cit., ad 8). Hence it seems to us that the difference between the two Doctors is rather one of manner of speaking, especially of the use of the term "habit," than a real opposition of opinions.

**III.** Concerning the following question, others do not treat explicitly; its solution brings some little light for understanding the opinion of the holy Doctor. Not in words, but in sense, Durandus seems to agree with the Seraphic [Doctor] (II Sent., d. 24, q. 1), saying that "free choice names a property of a power or a power under a property," for which he brings forward this reason: namely, that it imports a special habitude in each power. Besides those praised: Scotus, I Sent., Prologue, q. 4, n. 21, and here, q. unica, n. 6. — Giles of Rome, II Sent., d. 24, p. I, q. 1, a. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 600–602 (PDF pp. 622–624; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 41986–42148. QUAESTIO IV opener at raw 41986 ("Quarto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium complectatur rationem et voluntatem per modum potentiae, an per modum habitus"); QUAESTIO V begins at raw ~42150. Alignment **confirmed** against the resume hand-off (sub-question 4 = *per modum potentiae an per modum habitus*). The Quaracchi printed title for q4 is *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit nomen habitus, vel potentiae*; both phrasings name the same question.

**Page-split map:**
- p.600 (R-col bottom into next): QUAESTIO IV header, args I–4 *pro potentia*, *Sed contra* 1–2.
- p.601: args 3–6 *pro habitu* (continuation), CONCLUSIO, Respondeo through the three *opiniones*, ending "...sed tanquam unus" (carries over).
- p.602: "habitus..." conclusion of Respondeo, *Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur*, then SCHOLION I–III. QUAESTIO V begins below.

**Apparatus split map (18 entries):**
- p.600 footers **4–8** → [^1]–[^5]. **RECEIVED via hand-off from a1-q3** (q3 consumed p.600 footers 1–3 → its [^24]–[^26], the last being "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."). Footer 4 (Anselm "Cap. 3") onward are q4's source-notes, exactly as forwarded.
- p.601 footers **1–10** → [^6]–[^15].
- p.602 footers **1–3** → [^16]–[^18]. p.602 footer **4** ("Quaest. praeced. — De maiori cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 73...") and following belong to QUAESTIO V's body (*Si ergo omne contrahens... addit*) — **FORWARDED to a1-q5**.

**Hand-offs:**
- RECEIVED (from a1-q3): p.600 footers 4–8.
- FORWARDED (to a1-q5): p.602 footers 4+ (q5 begins raw ~42150, "Quinto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium aliquid addat supra rationem et voluntatem").

**has_scholion:** TRUE — q4 has its own SCHOLION I–III (printed p.602, raw 41131–41162 region of the dump; lines 146–162 of the prior skeleton). SCHOLION II/III explicitly forward-point to "the following (5th) question."

**[?] flags:** none. Latin fully resolved against the PDF column bands; all OCR garbles (*liabitus*→habitus, *arhitrium*→arbitrium, *Eiichiridio*→Enchiridio, *innuiratur*→innuatur, *secl*→sed, *umis*→unus) silently corrected per OCR-cleanup rules with PDF confirmation.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 602 -->

### Quaestio V. *Utrum liberum arbitrium addat aliquid supra rationem et voluntatem.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium aliquid addat supra rationem et voluntatem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omnis habitus addit aliquid supra potentiam; sed liberum arbitrium est habitus, sicut probatum est[^1]: ergo aliquid addit supra potentiam; sed est habitus rationis et voluntatis: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut se habet potentia ad substantiam, sic se habet facultas ad potentiam — sicut enim substantia per potentiam dicitur potens, sic potentia per facultatem dicitur facilis[^2] — sed potentia addit aliquid supra substantiam: ergo et facultas supra potentiam, cuius est facultas. Sed liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod contrahit aliquid, addit aliquid supra illud; sed liberum arbitrium non complectitur omnem actum rationis nec omnem actum voluntatis[^3]; et si hoc, ergo aliquo modo contrahit. Si ergo omne contrahens aliquo modo addit, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium super rationem et voluntatem aliquid addat.

4. Item, intellecto, quod aliquis haberet rationem praeter voluntatem, non haberet liberum arbitrium; similiter, si haberet appetitum praeter rationem, non haberet liberum arbitrium: si ergo non salvatur in ratione per se nec in voluntate, videtur, quod aliquid addat supra utramque.

**Sed contra:**
1. Omnis habitus, qui addit aliquid supra potentiam, determinat potentiam ad aliquem actum[^4]; sed liberum arbitrium potius ampliat potentiam, in qua est respectu actuum, quam addat: ergo etc.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, respicit actum moris; sed nullus habitus moralis, qui addit aliquid supra potentiam, est indifferens ad bonum et malum; liberum arbitrium est <!-- page 603 -->ad bonum et ad malum indifferens: ergo supra rationem et voluntatem nihil addit.

3. Praeterea[^5], possibile est intelligere potentiam, circumscripto omni habitu, qui addit aliquid supra ipsam; sed impossibile est esse vel intelligi aliquem habere rationem et voluntatem, qui non intelligatur habere liberum arbitrium: ergo liberum arbitrium super rationem et voluntatem nihil addit novum.

4. Item, aeque essentiale est animae habere libertatem arbitrii[^6], sicut esse ad imaginem Dei; sed cum dico, animam esse ad imaginem Dei, non dico aliquid additum substantiae et potentiis: ergo pari ratione nihil superaddo rationi et voluntati, cum dico, animam habere liberum arbitrium.

5. Item, si liberum arbitrium adderet aliquid supra rationem et voluntatem, aut ergo illud haberet ortum ab eis, aut non. Si non: ergo esset habitus infusus, vel acquisitus, quod absurdum est dicere. Si sic: ergo cum illud quod addit supra alterum et ortum habet ab eo, dependentiam habeat ab illo; et quod dependet et ortum habet ab altero, potius habeat ab illo regi quam ipsum regere, potius habeat subiici quam dominari: ideo liberum arbitrium in homine non imperaret.

6. Item, si liberum arbitrium diceret habitum, qui adderet supra rationem et voluntatem; cum unum accidens non possit esse in duobus subiectis[^7]: videtur, quod ille habitus haberet tunc plurificari propter plurificationem subiecti primi, et quod plura arbitria essent in uno homine; quod omnino deviat a recta ratione.

### Conclusio

> Liberum arbitrium secundum essentiam nihil addit supra rationem et voluntatem, addit tamen aliquo modo secundum esse sive secundum relationem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum habitus reddat potentiam facilem, et tribus modis potentia habeat esse facilis, tribus modis habet habitus ad potentiam comparari.

Quaedam namque potentia respectu alicuius actus est facilis per se ipsam, ut patet, cum dicitur mens esse nata ad meminendum sui ipsius, vel intelligendum se[^8]; et tunc talis habitus non differt a potentia secundum rem, sed secundum rationem et modum dicendi; et tunc non addit aliquid secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum rationem. — Quaedam est potentia, quae respectu alicuius actus est habilis per aliquid sui, sicut potentia intellectiva ad cognitionem figurarum geometricarum non est habilis per se ipsam, sed potius per aliquod accidens[^9], quod habet esse in ea; et tunc habitus talis addit supra potentiam non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum essentiam et rem. — Aliqua vero potentia facilis est ad aliquem actum per se ipsam, non tamen sola, sed cum alia; et sic potentia rationalis sine aliquo habitu superaddito ex sola coniunctione sui cum appetitu nata est in actum consentiendi et eligendi exire. Et hoc modo habitus vel facultas non addit aliquid diversum secundum essentiam, nec addit solum secundum rationem intelligendi, sed medio modo addit, secundum esse[^10], quia non addit aliquid absolutum, sed respectivum; sicut patet: cum dico rationem per se et rationem associatam sive adiunctam voluntati, non addo aliquid novum supra ipsam rationem secundum se, sed solum coniunctionem sui ad alterum, quantum ad aliquem consequentem actum. Unde sicut, quando plures concurrunt ad trahendam navem vel ferendum lapidem, potentia unius reddit potentiam alterius facilem, ita quod nulla nova virtus vel habilitas advenit potentiae alicuius trahentis in se; sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

— Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi accidens esse videatur, in quantum sonat in rationem habitus, secundum rem tamen non est accidens potentiae superadditum. Et iterum, licet sit habitus, quia tamen non dicit habitum unius potentiae absolute, sed cum relatione unius ad alteram[^11]; in duabus potentiis sive respectu duarum potentiarum potest esse unus. Non enim est habitus superadditus per gratiae infusionem, vel per innatam dispositionem, sed potius dicitur esse habitus, quo ratio et voluntas suis actibus dominantur; qui quidem est in eis ex sua naturali origine, pro eo quod naturaliter istae duae potentiae in eadem substantia sunt radicatae, nec contingit, unam ab altera separari[^12]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod liberum arbitrium secundum essentiam nihil addit supra rationem et voluntatem; addit tamen aliquo modo secundum esse sive secundum relationem, quae quidem non ponit, aliquam novam qualitatem esse in ratione vel voluntate, sed ponit, rationem et voluntatem ad unum actum concurrere secundum naturalem aptitudinem.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**
<!-- page 604 -->
*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis habitus addit aliquid supra potentiam; dicendum, quod illud non est verum, intelligendo de additione essentiali, maxime ubi potentia est habilis[^13] per se ipsam.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis potentia addit supra substantiam: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod facultas essentialior potest esse potentiae, quam sit potentia substantiae; nihilominus tamen aliqua potentia est, quae ad idem genus habet reduci cum substantia, sicut habitum fuit supra[^14].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium aliquo modo contrahit rationem et voluntatem; dicendum, quod hoc non est per additionem alicuius absoluti, sed propter concomitantiam rationis et voluntatis, quae simul concurrunt ad dominium liberi arbitrii; non tamen se concomitantur in productione cuiuslibet actus proprii. Aliquid enim appetit appetitus, circa quod non est deliberatio, et aliquid novimus et credimus esse verum, sive voluntas velit credere, sive non.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum iam patet responsio, quoniam illud non concludit additionem alicuius qualitatis novae super rationem, sed solum concomitantiam voluntatis, quoniam sine voluntate ratio libera non esset, nec etiam e converso. Si autem istae duae potentiae ponantur in aliquo quantumcumque nudae, necesse est in eo ponere arbitrii libertatem; et sic planum est, quod liberum arbitrium, etsi dicat habitum complectentem rationem et voluntatem, non tamen dicit habitum accidentalem, sicut gratia vel virtus, immo potius dicit illarum duarum potentiarum dominium naturale respectu eius actus, qui est eligere sive consentire. Et propterea Sancti magis vocant liberum arbitrium facultatem vel potestatem, quam vocent habilitatem[^15], ostendentes differentiam eius ad alios habitus animae.

---

english:
### Question V. *Whether free choice adds anything over reason and will.*

In the fifth place it is asked whether free choice adds anything over reason and will. And that it does seems [to be the case].

1. Every habit adds something over a power; but free choice is a habit, as has been proved[^1]: therefore it adds something over a power; but it is a habit of reason and will: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, as a power is related to a substance, so a faculty is related to a power — for just as a substance is said to be potent through a power, so a power is said to be facile through a faculty[^2] — but a power adds something over a substance: therefore a faculty too [adds something] over the power whose faculty it is. But free choice is a faculty of will and reason: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that contracts something adds something to it; but free choice does not embrace every act of reason nor every act of will[^3]; and if so, then it contracts in some way. If therefore everything that contracts adds in some way, it seems that free choice adds something over reason and will.

4. Likewise, granting that someone had reason apart from will, he would not have free choice; likewise, if he had appetite apart from reason, he would not have free choice: if therefore it is preserved neither in reason by itself nor in will, it seems that it adds something over both.

**On the contrary:**
1. Every habit that adds something over a power determines the power to some act[^4]; but free choice rather enlarges the power in which it is, with respect to acts, than adds [to it]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, free choice, so far as it is of itself, regards a moral act; but no moral habit that adds something over a power is indifferent to good and evil; free choice is indifferent to good and to evil: therefore it adds nothing over reason and will.

3. Furthermore[^5], it is possible to understand a power with every habit that adds something over it set aside; but it is impossible that one should be, or be understood to, have reason and will who is not understood to have free choice: therefore free choice adds nothing new over reason and will.

4. Likewise, it is equally essential to the soul to have freedom of choice[^6] as to be in the image of God; but when I say that the soul is in the image of God, I do not say anything added to the substance and the powers: therefore by parity of reasoning I add nothing over reason and will when I say that the soul has free choice.

5. Likewise, if free choice were to add something over reason and will, then either it would have its origin from them, or not. If not: then it would be an infused or an acquired habit, which is absurd to say. If so: then since that which adds [something] over another and has its origin from it would have a dependence on it; and what depends on and has its origin from another should rather be governed by it than govern it, should rather be subjected than dominate: therefore free choice would not command in man.

6. Likewise, if free choice were to name a habit that added [something] over reason and will; since one accident cannot be in two subjects[^7]: it seems that this habit would then have to be multiplied on account of the multiplication of its primary subject, and that there would be several [acts of] choice in one man; which entirely departs from right reason.

### Conclusion

> Free choice according to essence adds nothing over reason and will, yet it adds something in a certain way according to being, or according to relation.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, since a habit renders a power facile, and a power has being-facile in three ways, a habit is related to a power in three ways.

For a certain power is facile with respect to some act by itself, as is clear when the mind is said to be born to remember itself or to understand itself[^8]; and then such a habit does not differ from the power in reality, but according to account and the manner of speaking; and then it adds nothing according to essence, but only according to account. — There is a [second kind of] power that, with respect to some act, is apt through something of itself, as the intellective power is not apt for the cognition of geometrical figures by itself, but rather through some accident[^9] that has being in it; and then such a habit adds [something] over the power not only according to account, but also according to essence and reality. — But there is some power facile for some act by itself, yet not alone, but with another; and thus the rational power, without any superadded habit, from the sole conjunction of itself with appetite is born to go forth into the act of consenting and choosing. And in this way a habit or faculty does not add anything diverse according to essence, nor does it add only according to the account of understanding, but in a middle way it adds, according to being[^10], because it does not add anything absolute, but [something] relative; as is clear: when I say "reason by itself" and "reason associated with or joined to will," I do not add anything new over reason itself taken in itself, but only the conjunction of itself with another, as regards some consequent act. Hence, just as, when several [men] combine to draw a ship or to carry a stone, the power of one renders the power of the other facile, in such a way that no new virtue or aptness accrues to the power of any of those drawing in itself; so too in the matter at hand it must be understood to be.

— And hence it is that free choice, although it seems to be an accident, in so far as it has the sound of the notion of a habit, nevertheless according to reality is not an accident superadded to the power. And again, although it is a habit, yet because it does not name the habit of one power absolutely, but with a relation of one to the other[^11]; in two powers, or with respect to two powers, it can be one. For it is not a habit superadded through the infusion of grace, or through an innate disposition, but is rather called a habit by which reason and will dominate their acts; which indeed is in them from their natural origin, for the reason that these two powers are naturally rooted in the same substance, nor does it happen that the one is separated from the other[^12]. — Therefore the reasonings showing that free choice according to essence adds nothing over reason and will are to be conceded; yet it adds something in a certain way according to being, or according to relation, which indeed does not posit any new quality to be in reason or will, but posits that reason and will concur toward one act according to a natural aptitude.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To what is objected, that every habit adds something over a power; it must be said that this is not true, understanding it of an essential addition, especially where the power is apt[^13] by itself.

*To 2.* To what is objected, that every power adds [something] over a substance: therefore, etc.; it must be said that the case is not the same, for the reason that a faculty can be more essential to a power than a power is to a substance; nevertheless there is some power that has to be reduced to the same genus with a substance, as was held above[^14].

*To 3.* To what is objected, that free choice in some way contracts reason and will; it must be said that this is not through the addition of anything absolute, but on account of the concomitance of reason and will, which concur together toward the dominion of free choice; yet they do not accompany each other in the production of every proper act. For appetite desires something concerning which there is no deliberation, and we know and believe something to be true, whether the will wills to believe or not.

*To 4.* To the last [argument] the reply is now clear, since it does not conclude to the addition of any new quality over reason, but only to the concomitance of will, since without will reason would not be free, nor conversely either. But if these two powers be posited in something, however bare, it is necessary to posit in it freedom of choice; and thus it is plain that free choice, although it names a habit embracing reason and will, nevertheless does not name an accidental habit, like grace or virtue, but rather names the natural dominion of those two powers with respect to that act which is to choose or to consent. And therefore the Saints rather call free choice a faculty or a power than call it an aptness[^15], showing its difference from the other habits of the soul.

---

la: Quaest. praeced. — De maiori cfr. August., *83 Qq.* q. 73. n. 1. — Cod. T, hic in propos. minori, voci *habitus* adiunctis verbis *rationis et voluntatis,* omittit reliqua verba huius arg.; cod. F omittit conclusiones *ergo aliquid... ergo etc.*

en: The preceding question. — On the major premise cf. Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 73, n. 1. — Codex T, here in the minor proposition, having joined to the word *habitus* the words *rationis et voluntatis* ("of reason and will"), omits the remaining words of this argument; codex F omits the conclusions *ergo aliquid... ergo etc.* ("therefore it adds something... therefore, etc.").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 600, nota 8.

en: Cf. above, p. 600, note 8.

la: Sicut ostensum est supra q. 3. ad 1.

en: As was shown above, q. 3, ad 1.

la: In hac enim determinatione, scil. ut aliqua potentia actum specialem cum facilitate producat, ratio consistit ponendi habitum in potentiis rationalibus, non in potentiis naturalibus, quae per se determinatae sunt ad unum. Cfr. Aristot., *II. Ethic.* c. 1. seqq. — Mox post *ampliat* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 adiicit *subiectum sive.* Deinde pro *addat* cod. A *determinet.*

en: For in this determination — namely, that some power produce a special act with facility — consists the ground for positing a habit in the rational powers, and not in the natural powers, which are by themselves determined to one [thing]. Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 1 ff. — Just after *ampliat* ("enlarges") the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 adds *subiectum sive* ("the subject, or"). Then for *addat* ("adds") codex A [reads] *determinet* ("determines").

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et aliqui codd. *Item.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and some codices [read] *Item* ("Likewise").

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *liberum arbitrium.* — De minori cfr. supra d. 16. a. I. q. 1. seq.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [read] *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice"). — On the minor premise cf. above, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, and following.

la: Rationem vide supra pag. 119, nota 8. — Pro *in duobus subiectis* codd. E K W aa bb *in duabus substantiis.*

en: For the ground see above, p. 119, note 8. — For *in duobus subiectis* ("in two subjects") codices E K W aa bb [read] *in duabus substantiis* ("in two substances").

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. I. ad I. — Pro *mens esse nata,* quae lectio convenit cum lect. codd. F H K T Y aa ee, Vat. *mens est nata.*

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1. — For *mens esse nata* ("the mind to be born"), which reading agrees with the reading of codices F H K T Y aa ee, the Vatican edition [reads] *mens est nata* ("the mind is born").

la: Cod. Y addit *scilicet scientiam geometricam.*

en: Codex Y adds *scilicet scientiam geometricam* ("namely, geometrical knowledge").

la: Vel, ut in fine corp. dicitur, *secundum relationem.* — Mox post *respectivum* codd. X ee subiiciunt *tantum;* dein cod. X post *cum* interserit *enim.*

en: Or, as is said at the end of the body [of the article], *according to relation.* — Just after *respectivum* ("relative") codices X ee subjoin *tantum* ("only"); then codex X inserts *enim* ("for") after *cum* ("when").

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum paucis codd. *alterum.*

en: The editions, except for edition 1, with a few codices [read] *alterum* ("the other").

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *separare.* Paulo superius Vat. voci *radicatae* praemittit *inditae vel.*

en: The editions with several codices [read] *separare* ("to separate"). A little above, the Vatican edition prefixes *inditae vel* ("implanted, or") to the word *radicatae* ("rooted").

la: Edd. cum non paucis codd. *habitualis,* nostram lectionem defendunt codd. A (a secunda manu) D E F I K M N P Y aa.

en: The editions with not a few codices [read] *habitualis* ("habitual"); our reading is defended by codices A (by a second hand) D E F I K M N P Y aa.

la: Dist. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. et ad 8. — Versus initium solut. pro *omnis* Vat. cum ed. 4 perperam *hominis.*

en: Distinction 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body and ad 8. — Toward the beginning of the solution, for *omnis* ("every") the Vatican edition with edition 4 [reads], wrongly, *hominis* ("of man").

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 *habitum.*

en: The Vatican edition with edition 4 [reads] *habitum* ("habit").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (pp. 602–604 printed = PDF 624–626, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 42150–42280). The Respondeo's three-modes passage (Modus 1/2/3) was cascade-shattered into diagonal one-token-per-line fragments in the OCR (raw lines ~42232–42258), so the PDF column bands are authoritative there per the Vol II override.

**Alignment.** Opener "Quinto quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium aliquid addat supra rationem et voluntatem" = sub-question 5 of ARTICULUS UNICUS. Confirmed. Boundary to QUAESTIO VI ("Utrum liberi arbitrii facultas insit principalius rationi, an voluntati") at raw ~42281, on p.604 (q5 solutio ends "…ostendentes differentiam eius ad alios habitus animae." just before the q6 header).

**Page-split map.**
- p.602: q5 header + title; arguments 1–4 (videtur); Sed contra args 1–2 (arg.2 runs onto p.603). Footers 4–7 belong to q5.
- p.603: Sed contra arg.2 tail; args 3–6; Conclusio; Respondeo (three modes); end of corpus. Footers 1–8 belong to q5.
- p.604: solutio oppositorum *Ad 1–4*; ends just before QUAESTIO VI. Footers 1–3 belong to q5; footers 4–8 belong to q6 (forwarded).

**Apparatus provenance / hand-offs.**
- [^1]–[^4] = p.602 footers 4–7, **RECEIVED via hand-off from a1-q4** (q4 took p.602 footers 1–3 → its [^16]–[^18], which anchor to q4's body *super actus utriusque / verum / frequenter*; footers 4–7 anchor to q5's args *probatum est / facilis / voluntatis / determinat ad aliquem actum*).
- [^5]–[^12] = p.603 footers 1–8 (args 4/4-bis/6 + Respondeo markers; all map cleanly by content).
- [^13]–[^15] = p.604 footers 1–3 (solutio markers *habilis / habitum fuit supra / habilitatem*).
- **FORWARDED to a1-q6:** p.604 footers 4–8 (habitualis-cross-refs, Aristot. *Polit./Ethic.*, Boethius's *liberum de voluntate iudicium* definition, *quam penes voluntatem* variant, *infra p. II huius dist.*) belong to q6's body, which opens at raw ~42281.

**has_scholion = false.** This quaestio has no scholion of its own; the article's commentator-roll scholion is held under `d25-p1-a1-q4` (SCHOLION I–III, printed p.602), whose SCHOLION II/III forward-point to the matter of q5 (S. Bonav.'s non-strict use of *habitus*, the triplex modus distinguished here).

**[?] flags.** None. The marginal labels *Conclusio 1./2./generalis.* and *Modus 1./2./3.* printed in the corpus are Quaracchi editorial side-notes, not apparatus footnotes, and are not separately rendered.