title: Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam gratum facientem

title_alt: Whether man before the fall had sanctifying grace

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum homo ante peccatum habuerit gratiam gratum facientem.*

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae habuerit gratiam gratum facientem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit gratiam ante lapsum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Lucae decimo[^1]: *Qui etiam exspoliaverunt eum et plagis impositis* etc.; et exponunt Sancti et Glossa, quod « exspoliaverunt eum *gratuitis* et vulneraverunt in *naturalibus* »: ergo si hoc intelligitur in primo homine, primus homo non tantum habuit naturalia, sed etiam gratuita ante peccatum.

2. Item, Bernardus[^2]: « Cum videret patrem nostrum omnium hominum aemulus caritate circumdatum et omni virtute vestitum, et hoc accepisse terrenum hominem, quod ipse per superbiam amisit; invidit insatiabilis homicida ». Ex hoc igitur patet, quod primus homo et caritatem habebat et omnem virtutem.

3. Item, Adam post soporem prophetavit, sicut innuitur in textu Genesis[^3] et in Glossis; hoc autem non fuit, nisi quia introductus fuit in illo sopore in secretum caelestis curiae, sicut plures dicunt auctoritates; sed nullum decebat illuc introduci, qui non haberet gratiam gratum facientem: ergo etc.

4. Item, a Deo recepit mandatum disciplinae, sed si illud mandatum servasset absque gratia, nihil meruisset[^4]. Si igitur illud mandatum datum est sibi in meritum obedientiae, videtur, quod Deus non dederit sibi in praeceptum praeter gratiae adiutorium, alioquin dedisset in malum; quod nullo modo decet facere Deum.

5. Item, peccatum Adae arguitur fuisse maximae ingratitudinis[^5]; sed nullum donum in via est maius gratia gratum faciente: ergo si maior ingratitudo fuit in peccato Adae quam in peccato aliorum posterorum, et posteri eius post acceptum donum gratiae Deum offendunt; videtur, quod ipse ante peccatum habuerit donum gratiae gratum facientis.

**Sed contra:**
1. Deus sciebat, ipsum statim esse lapsurum: ergo sciebat, quod illud gratiae donum in nullo esset sibi utile, sed potius esset sibi in nocumentum. Si igitur sapiens artifex non debet aliquid frustra facere, vel etiam quod vertatur in operis sui damnum et nocumentum; videtur, quod non dederit illi gratiam.

2. Item, Adam, quia iustitiam originalem habuit, quando peccavit, et voluntarie perdidit, nunquam eam recuperavit: ergo pari ratione, si habuisset donum gratiae gratum facientis, nec ipse nec aliquis posterorum eius gratiam recuperasset. Si igitur ipse gratiam gratum facientem recuperavit[^6], videtur, quod ante lapsum eam non habuerit.

3. Item, Adam habebat optima naturalia et nullam habebat pronitatem ad malum nec difficultatem ad bonum[^7]: ergo si caritatem et gratiam habuisset, totaliter Deo adhaesisset, ergo nunquam in peccatum cecidisset. Sed constat, quod cecidit: ergo gratiam ante lapsum non habuit.

4. Item, lucifer non habuit gratiam gratum facientem, sicut probatum fuit supra[^8]. Si ergo Adam gratiam gratum facientem habuit et ab illa cecidit, ergo de altiori gradu cecidit quam Angelus: ergo videtur, quod peccatum eius fuit incurabilius quam peccatum angelicum. Si igitur hoc constat esse falsum, Adam ante peccatum non habuit gratiae donum.

5. Item, prius debet aliquis probari quam in amicum assumi; hoc non solum verum est in amicitia humana, verum etiam in amicitia divina. Unde

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dicitur Iudith octavo[^9]: *Abraham, pater noster, tentatus est, et per multas tribulationes probatus, Dei amicus effectus est.* Si igitur nullus habet Dei gratiam, quin habeat Dei amicitiam; videtur, quod ante tentationem Adam non habuerit gratiam. Sed statim post tentationem peccavit: ergo non habuit gratiam ante lapsum.

### Conclusio

> Adam ante lapsum gratiam gratum facientem habuit.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex consuevit esse opinio. — Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod Adam non habuit gratiam *gratum facientem*, pro eo quod non videtur credibile, quod lapsus esset, si tale adiutorium habuisset. Ad auctoritates autem et rationes respondent dicentes, quod Adam habuit multas gratias gratis datas et naturam habuit valde bonam. Et propterea Sancti videntur aliquando dicere, ipsum habuisse gratuita ante lapsum, non quia habuit donum gratiae *gratum facientis*, sed donum gratiae *gratis datae*, et per illud poterat tentationi resistere et ad gratiam gratum facientem se ipsum disponere.

Sed quoniam auctoritates Sanctorum expresse videntur dicere de gratia *gratum faciente*, sicut patet in illis quas Magister adducit in littera[^10], et huic etiam consonare videtur Scripturae auctoritas et rationis probabilitas: ideo est alia opinio communior et verior et probabilior, quam etiam Magister sustinet in littera[^11], scilicet quod Adam ante lapsum gratiam gratum facientem habuit, per quam non solum malo resistere, sed etiam in bono proficere potuit; et illa gratia adiutus, ita bene meruisset mandatum Domini observando, sicut demeruit transgrediendo. — Hanc igitur opinionem sustinendo concedere possumus rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus sciebat, statim ipsum esse lapsurum; dicendum, quod propter hoc non debuit dimittere donum gratiae sibi dare, duplici ratione: primum quidem, quia simul cum hoc praesciebat, quod bonum debebat de lapsu eius elicere; secundo vero, quia Deus in conferendo gratiam non attendit futura peccata, sed idoneitatem praesentem ad gratiam; sicut patet, cum confert gratiam in tempore praescitis, et eis quos ab aeterno reprobavit; et in utroque eorum commendatur Dei largitas et sapientia; et arguitur hominis ingratitudo et iniustitia in hoc, quod a tam benefico et tam benigno se avertit sine causa[^12].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potuit recuperare originalem iustitiam, quam habuit, quando peccavit; dicendum, quod non est tota ratio, scilicet quod voluntarie amisit iustitiam illam, sed simul cum hoc facit, quia iustitia originalis non tantum respiciebat *voluntatem deliberativam*, sed etiam respiciebat ipsam *naturam institutam*; gratia autem respicit ipsam *voluntatem liberam*, ut est libera. Et quoniam *voluntas* de facili vertitur et revertitur, *natura* autem, cum corrupta est, non sic de facili relevatur; hinc est, quod magis potest recuperari gratia quam prima iustitia, quamvis utraque fuerit per peccatum amissa. — Est etiam alia ratio, quare non recuperatur originalis iustitia; sed haec manifestabitur infra[^13], cum agetur de originali peccato.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi Adam habuisset gratiam, quod inseparabiliter Deo adhaesisset; dicendum, quod hoc non oportet, quia liberum arbitrium, habens gratiam, moveri potest *praeter* gratiae inclinationem, et frequenter movetur, nihil considerans de eo, ad quod movet gratia. Unde frequenter contingit, quod homo magnae caritatis inordinate afficitur, pro eo quod non semper actualiter fertur in illud summum bonum, circa quod habet immensum desiderium; sic intelligendum est accidisse ipsi Adae. Quis enim est homo, habens caritatem, qui peccaret, si Deum prae oculis semper haberet et actu consideraret, quantum Deus amabilis est, et quantum nefas est ipsum offendere?

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lucifer non habuit gratiam gratum facientem; dicendum, quod verum est. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod homo peccaverit maiori ingratitudine, pro eo quod lucifer proximior erat statui gloriae; simul enim recepisset gratiam et gloriam. Homo vero sic conditus fuit, ut longe ante gloriam haberet gratiam[^14]; et ideo positus est in terra quasi longe a caelo distans, ac per hoc in transgrediendo nec adeo cecidit de alto, ut lucifer, nec adeo fuit ingratus nec adeo per peccatum depravatus[^15].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius debet homo tentari quam in amicum assumi; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de illa amicitia, quae facit hominem Deo privatum et familiarem; per quem modum dicit ipse Dominus Apostolis Ioannis decimo quinto[^16]: *Vos autem dixi amicos* etc. De amicitia

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autem large dicta hoc non potest intelligi apud Deum, licet posset intelligi de amicitia apud homines, pro eo quod, nisi Deus gratiam daret, in probando potius reprobaret quam approbaret. Non enim habemus, unde possimus approbari a Deo, nisi per eius donum; non sic autem est de homine respectu hominis; et sic patet illud.

english:
### Article II. *Whether man before sin had sanctifying grace.*

Next it is asked whether man in the state of innocence had sanctifying grace. And concerning this two things are asked. First, it is asked whether he had grace before the fall. Second, it is asked whether at the same time as he was created he was constituted in things of grace and in natural things.

### Question I. *Whether man before the fall had grace.*

Concerning the first the procedure is as follows, and it is asked whether man before the fall had grace. And that he did seems to be the case.

1. Luke chapter ten[^1]: *Who also stripped him and, having laid blows upon him,* etc.; and the Saints and the Gloss expound this to mean that « they stripped him of his *gratuitous gifts* and wounded him in his *natural endowments* »: therefore if this is understood of the first man, the first man had not only natural endowments, but also gratuitous gifts before sin.

2. Likewise, Bernard[^2]: « When the enemy of all men saw our father girded about with charity and clothed with every virtue, and that this earthly man had received what he himself had lost through pride; the insatiable murderer envied him ». From this, therefore, it is clear that the first man both had charity and had every virtue.

3. Likewise, Adam after his sleep prophesied, as is intimated in the text of Genesis[^3] and in the Glosses; but this happened only because he was introduced in that sleep into the secret of the heavenly court, as many authorities say; but it was fitting for no one to be introduced there who did not have sanctifying grace: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, he received from God a command of discipline, but if he had kept that command without grace, he would have merited nothing[^4]. If, therefore, that command was given to him for the merit of obedience, it seems that God did not give it to him as a precept apart from the help of grace; otherwise He would have given it unto evil, which it in no way befits God to do.

5. Likewise, the sin of Adam is argued to have been of the greatest ingratitude[^5]; but no gift in this life is greater than sanctifying grace: therefore if there was greater ingratitude in Adam's sin than in the sin of his other descendants, and his descendants offend God after they have received the gift of grace; it seems that he before sin had the gift of sanctifying grace.

**On the contrary:**
1. God knew that he was straightway about to fall: therefore He knew that that gift of grace would be in no way useful to him, but rather would be to his harm. If, therefore, a wise craftsman ought not to do anything in vain, or even anything that turns to the damage and harm of his work; it seems that He did not give him grace.

2. Likewise, Adam, because he had original justice, when he sinned and voluntarily lost it, never recovered it: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he had had the gift of sanctifying grace, neither he nor any of his descendants would have recovered grace. If, therefore, he did recover sanctifying grace[^6], it seems that before the fall he did not have it.

3. Likewise, Adam had the best natural endowments and had no proneness to evil nor difficulty toward the good[^7]: therefore if he had had charity and grace, he would have clung wholly to God, therefore he would never have fallen into sin. But it is certain that he did fall: therefore he did not have grace before the fall.

4. Likewise, Lucifer did not have sanctifying grace, as was proved above[^8]. If, then, Adam had sanctifying grace and fell from it, then he fell from a higher degree than the Angel: therefore it seems that his sin was more incurable than the angelic sin. If, therefore, this is established to be false, Adam before sin did not have the gift of grace.

5. Likewise, one ought first to be proved before he is taken up as a friend; this is true not only in human friendship, but also in divine friendship. Hence

it is said in Judith chapter eight[^9]: *Abraham, our father, was tempted, and through many tribulations being proved, was made the friend of God.* If, therefore, no one has the grace of God without having the friendship of God; it seems that before the temptation Adam did not have grace. But straightway after the temptation he sinned: therefore he did not have grace before the fall.

### Conclusion

> Adam before the fall had sanctifying grace.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there were wont to be two opinions. — For some have wished to say that Adam did not have *sanctifying* grace, on the ground that it does not seem credible that he would have fallen, if he had had such help. And to the authorities and reasons they reply, saying that Adam had many gratuitously-given graces and had a very good nature. And therefore the Saints sometimes seem to say that he had gratuitous gifts before the fall, not because he had the gift of *sanctifying* grace, but the gift of *gratuitously-given* grace, and through it he was able to resist temptation and to dispose himself for sanctifying grace.

But since the authorities of the Saints seem expressly to speak of *sanctifying* grace, as is clear in those which the Master adduces in the text[^10], and to this also the authority of Scripture and the probability of reason seem to consonate: therefore there is another opinion, more common and truer and more probable, which the Master also maintains in the text[^11], namely that Adam before the fall had sanctifying grace, by which he was able not only to resist evil, but also to advance in good; and aided by that grace, he would have merited as well by observing the command of the Lord as he demerited by transgressing it. — Maintaining this opinion, therefore, we can grant the reasons which are adduced for the first part.

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary, that God knew he was straightway about to fall; it must be said that on this account He ought not to have forborne to give him the gift of grace, for a twofold reason: first indeed, because together with this He foreknew the good that He was to draw out of his fall; but secondly, because God in conferring grace does not regard future sins, but present fitness for grace; as is clear, since He confers grace in time upon those foreknown, and upon those whom He has reprobated from eternity; and in each of these the largesse and wisdom of God is commended; and the ingratitude and injustice of man is arraigned in this, that he turns away without cause from one so beneficent and so kind[^12].

2. To that which is objected, that he could not recover the original justice which he had when he sinned; it must be said that this is not the whole reason, namely that he voluntarily lost that justice, but along with this there is the fact that original justice regarded not only the *deliberative will*, but also regarded the *constituted nature* itself; whereas grace regards the *free will* itself, insofar as it is free. And since the *will* is easily turned and turned back, but *nature*, when it is corrupted, is not so easily restored; hence it is that grace can be recovered more readily than the first justice, although both were lost through sin. — There is also another reason why original justice is not recovered; but this will be made manifest below[^13], when original sin is treated.

3. To that which is objected, that if Adam had had grace, he would have clung inseparably to God; it must be said that this does not follow, because free will, having grace, can be moved *apart from* the inclination of grace, and is frequently so moved, considering nothing of that toward which grace moves. Hence it frequently happens that a man of great charity is inordinately affected, on the ground that he is not always actually borne toward that highest good, concerning which he has an immense desire; thus it must be understood to have befallen Adam himself. For what man, having charity, would sin, if he always had God before his eyes and actually considered how lovable God is, and how great a wickedness it is to offend Him?

4. To that which is objected, that Lucifer did not have sanctifying grace; it must be said that it is true. Yet from this it does not follow that man sinned with greater ingratitude, on the ground that Lucifer was nearer to the state of glory; for he would have received grace and glory together. Man, however, was so constituted that he had grace long before glory[^14]; and therefore he was placed on earth as though far distant from heaven, and through this in transgressing he neither fell from so high a place as Lucifer, nor was he so ungrateful nor so depraved by sin[^15].

5. To that which is objected, that a man ought first to be tempted before he is taken up as a friend; it must be said that this is understood of that friendship which makes a man intimate and familiar with God; in which way the Lord Himself says to the Apostles, John chapter fifteen[^16]: *But I have called you friends,* etc. Of friendship

taken in a broad sense, however, this cannot be understood with regard to God, although it could be understood of friendship among men, on the ground that, unless God were to give grace, in proving He would rather reprove than approve. For we have nothing whereby we can be approved by God, except through His gift; but it is not so of man with respect to man; and thus that point is clear.

la: Vers. 30. — Quoad Glossam cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. In libro: *Instructio sacerdotis* (inter opera Bernardi) p. I. c. 1. n. 2. de Adamo dicitur: *Qui descendit de Ierusalem in Iericho et incidit in manus latronum, in arbitrium malignorum spirituum; qui vulneratum eum in naturalibus spoliaverunt in gratuitis* etc. Quod in Glossa dicitur ad Adamum referendum est, ut in ipsa Glossa insinuatur et in cod. Q a manu posteriore explicite notatur.

en: Verse 30 [of Luke 10]. — As to the Gloss, cf. above p. 506, note 3. In the book *Instruction of the Priest* (among the works of Bernard), p. I, c. 1, n. 2, it is said of Adam: *Who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers, into the arbitrament of malignant spirits; who, having wounded him in his naturals, despoiled him in his gratuitous gifts,* etc. What is said in the Gloss must be referred to Adam, as is intimated in the Gloss itself and explicitly noted in codex Q by a later hand.

la: Hic textus non in operibus Bernardi invenitur, sed in *Sermone de Symbolo contra Iudaeos, paganos et Arianos* (inter opera Augustini), c. 2. his verbis: *Dum [diabolus] illum primum Adam scilicet, patrem omnium nostrum, intueretur videretque hominem ex limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia ornatum, temperantia compositum, caritate circumdatum, immortalitate vestitum, aemulus atque invidus, haec hominem terrenum accepisse, quod ipse, dum esset angelus, per superbiam cognoscitur amisisse, invidit statim insatiabilis homicida, eosque nostros primos parentes illis donis ac tantis bonis exspoliavit, insuper et peremit.* Cfr. de *Salutar. Document.* c. 60. (August.) et hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Sententia Bernardi habetur in *Serm. I. in Annuntiat. B. M. V.* n. 6. seqq.; *Serm. II. de Diversis*, n. 2. seq. et *Serm. de Excellentia ss. Sacramenti et dignitate sacerdotum* (inter opera Bernardi), n. I. seq. — Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *insanabilis* pro *insatiabilis*.

en: This text is not found in the works of Bernard, but in the *Sermon on the Creed against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* (among the works of Augustine), c. 2, in these words: *When [the devil] beheld that first Adam, namely the father of us all, and saw that the man made from the slime of the earth to the image of God was adorned with chastity, composed with temperance, girded with charity, clothed with immortality, the rival and envious one, [seeing] that this earthly man had received what he himself, while he was an angel, is known to have lost through pride, the insatiable murderer straightway envied him, and despoiled those our first parents of those gifts and so great goods, and moreover destroyed them.* Cf. *On the Salutary Document*, c. 60 (Augustine), and here the text of the Master, c. 2. — The view of Bernard is found in *Sermon I on the Annunciation of the B.V.M.*, n. 6 ff.; *Sermon II on Various Matters*, n. 2 f.; and the *Sermon on the Excellence of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Dignity of Priests* (among the works of Bernard), n. I ff. — Many codices with editions 1, 2 read *insanabilis* (incurable) for *insatiabilis* (insatiable).

la: Cap. 2, 23. seq. Vide supra pag. 433, nota 10, ubi etiam ex Augustino ille locus affertur, quo docetur, quod mens Adami in illo somno ita elevatus sit, ut « per ecstasim particeps fieret tanquam angelicae curiae, et intrans in sanctuarium Dei, intelligeret in novissima. Denique evigilans tanquam prophetiae plenus » etc. Hoc dictum refert Glossa *ordinaria*. — Idem ac August. docet Bernardus, *Serm. 2. in Septuag.* n. I. Glossam *interlinearem* videsis apud Lyranum.

en: Chapter 2, 23 ff. See above p. 433, note 10, where that passage is also adduced from Augustine, by which it is taught that the mind of Adam in that sleep was so elevated that « through ecstasy he became a partaker, as it were, of the angelic court, and entering into the sanctuary of God, he understood the last things. Finally, waking as though full of prophecy », etc. This saying is reported by the *ordinary* Gloss. — Bernard teaches the same as Augustine, *Sermon 2 on Septuagesima*, n. I. The *interlinear* Gloss you may see in Lyra.

la: Cfr. art. praeced. q. 2. — De seq. propos. cfr. August., *VIII. de Gen. ad lit.* c. 6. n. 12. et c. II. n. 24. seqq. — In maiori codd. B E F H K M aa *Adam* pro *a Deo*. Circa finem arg. post *in malum* codd. Y aa bb ee subiungunt *suum*.

en: Cf. the preceding article, q. 2. — On the following proposition cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, bk. VIII, c. 6, n. 12, and c. II, n. 24 ff. — In the majority [of cases?] codices B E F H K M aa read *Adam* for *a Deo* (from God). Near the end of the argument, after *in malum* (unto evil), codices Y aa bb ee add *suum* (his own).

la: Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 3.

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIII. c. 4.

en: See below, the text of the Master, d. XXXIII, c. 4.

la: Sicut docet Magister in lit. supra d. XXIV. c. 2. et d. XXV. c. 6.

en: As the Master teaches in the text above, d. XXIV, c. 2, and d. XXV, c. 6.

la: Dist. 4. a. I. q. 2. — Quod Adae peccatum remissibile fuerit, supra ostensum est d. 21. a. 3. q. 2.

en: Distinction 4, a. I, q. 2. — That Adam's sin was remissible was shown above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Vers. 22. — Loco *Iudith octavo*, ubi verba citt. habentur, codd. et primae edd. perperam legunt *ad Hebraeos 8.* (11?), quo quidem loco etiam de Abrahae (in fide et obedientia) tentati constantia sermo est, sed aliis verbis.

en: Verse 22. — In place of *Judith chapter eight*, where the cited words are found, the codices and the first editions wrongly read *to the Hebrews 8* (11?), in which place too there is mention of the constancy of Abraham when tempted (in faith and obedience), but in other words.

la: Hic c. 2, ubi inter virtutes, quibus Adam ornatus erat, ei *caritas* enumeratur.

en: Here, c. 2, where among the virtues with which Adam was adorned, *charity* too is enumerated for him.

la: Hic c. 2, supra d. XXIV. c. 1. et d. XXV. c. 6. seq.

en: Here, c. 2; above, d. XXIV, c. 1, and d. XXV, c. 6 f.

la: Cfr. supra d. XXIII. lit. Magistri, c. 1, et I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3. — Paulo superius pro *in tempore praescitis, et eis* cod. cc et ed. 1 *in tempore praesenti etiam eis.*

en: Cf. above, d. XXIII, the text of the Master, c. 1, and I Sent., d. 47, q. 3. — A little earlier, for *in time upon those foreknown, and upon those* (*in tempore praescitis, et eis*), codex cc and edition 1 read *in present time also upon those* (*in tempore praesenti etiam eis*).

la: Dist. 32. a. I. q. I. seq.

en: Distinction 32, a. I, q. I f.

la: In cod. aa, verbis transpositis, ita legitur: « longe ante haberet gratiam quam gloriam ».

en: In codex aa, with the words transposed, it reads thus: « he had grace long before glory ».

la: Cfr. supra d. 21. a. 3. q. 2. ad 1. et d. 4. a. I. q. I. seq.

en: Cf. above, d. 21, a. 3, q. 2, ad 1, and d. 4, a. I, q. I f.

la: Vers. 15. — Paulo superius pro *privatum*, quod, teste Du Cange, *Glossar. mediae et infimae latinitatis*, etiam vim habet *familiaris* vel *amici*, edd., excepta 1, *probatum*; codd. exhibent *privatum*. Mox pro *licet posset* plures codd., ut F K T Y aa etc., *licet possit*.

en: Verse 15. — A little earlier, for *privatum* (intimate), which, according to Du Cange, *Glossary of Middle and Low Latinity*, also has the force of *familiaris* (familiar) or *amicus* (friend), the editions, except the first, read *probatum* (proved); the codices exhibit *privatum*. Shortly after, for *licet posset* several codices, such as F K T Y aa etc., read *licet possit*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Utramque huius articuli quaest. alii magistri plerumque coniungunt. Prima est *de facto*, utrum protoparentes ante lapsum a Deo acceperint gratiam, scilicet sanctificantem; secunda est *de tempore* sive instante, quo eam acceperint. Circa utramque quaest. variae illa aetate opiniones fuerunt, quibus occasionem dedisse videntur verba Magistri (d. XXIV. c. I.), qui S. Augustinum asserit docere, homini in creatione collatam esse potentiam, per quam posset stare, id est non declinare ab eo quod acceperat, sed non posset proficere in tantum, ut per gratiam creationis sine alia mereri salutem valeret.

**II.** Quoad hanc (1.) quaest. a S. Thoma (hic q. 2.) et ab Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) refertur opinio quorundam, quod Adam creatus fuerit tantum cum virtutibus *naturalibus*, sine gratia sanctificante et virtutibus gratuitis. Secunda opinio recensetur a nostro Doctore (hic in corp.), quam etiam tuetur Aegid. R., qui vult, eam esse tutiorem et sententiam sinceram Magistri, scilicet « Adam non esse in puris naturalibus productum, nec gratiam habuisse ante peccatum; sed habuit quoddam donum gratuitum i. e. originalem iustitiam, per quam poterat stare, sed non proficere ». — Attamen prima illa opinio post Concilium Trid. (Sess. V. can. I, Sess. VI. cap. I. 7.) ut omnino falsa apparet, nec etiam opinio Aegidii amplius sustineri potest. Unde conclusio, quam S. Bonav. vocat communiorem, veriorem et probabiliorem, nunc inter catholicos certissima censetur.

**III.** In solvenda altera (2.) quaest. eadem dissensio magistrorum fuit, quam quoad Angelos (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 1, in schol.) notavimus. Cum Hugone et Magistro tenent Alex. Hal., B. Albert. (saltem in Summa), Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et (suo modo) Aegid. R., quod Adam non in eodem primo instanti, quo creatus fuit, etiam gratia sanctificante ornatus fuerit, licet non caruerit donis supernaturalibus, scilicet iustitia originali, quatenus exprimit donum *integritatis*, purae naturae divinitus superadditum. Secundum hanc positionem *iustitia originalis* et *gratia sanctificans* ita distinguuntur, ut prima actu separata esset ab altera. Pro eadem sententia citatur etiam Scot. (hic q. unica n. 7; Report. hic q. 2.), sed ab Hier. a Montefortino, t. II. q. 95. a. I. ad alteram partem trahitur. — Praeter argg. in corp. allata, hanc opinionem suadere videbatur ratio in fundam. 4. exposita, quae etiam magis urget, si supponitur opinio nostri Doctoris de primo subiecto gratiae et intima eiusdem natura (cfr. supra a. I. q. I.). — Opposita autem sententia recepta est a S. Thoma, in Comment. (loc. cit.) quidem ut probabilior, in Sum. (I. q. 95. a. 1, II. II. q. 5. a. I.) magis absolute. Ad arg. (fundam. 4.), sumtum a necessitate consensus in adultis, Angelicus respondet (S. I. q. 93. a. I. ad 3.): « Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet, etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse ». Haec autem assertio, ut iam observavimus (in schol. praedicto), aliena erat ab opinione eorum, qui primam sententiam sequebantur. Quamvis autem Concilium Trid. a definienda hac controversia consulto abstinuerit, et, ut dicit Estius (II. Sent. d. 25. § 1.), nihil sit temeritatis vel periculi in prima opinione; tamen sententia S. Thomae nostra aetate in scholis catholicis omnino praevaluit. — Haec controversia intime connectitur tum cum doctrina de relatione, quae est inter gratiam sanctificantem et donum integritatis, tum cum determinatione accuratiore peccati originalis.

**IV.** De utraque quaest. praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., vide schol. praeced. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. 2; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. I. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 24. q. I.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Other masters for the most part join together both questions of this article. The first is *of fact*, whether the first parents before the fall received grace from God, namely sanctifying grace; the second is *of the time* or instant at which they received it. Concerning both questions there were various opinions in that age, occasion for which seems to have been given by the words of the Master (d. XXIV, c. I), who asserts that St. Augustine teaches that there was conferred upon man in his creation a power by which he could stand, that is, not decline from what he had received, but could not advance so far as to be able through the grace of creation, without another grace, to merit salvation.

**II.** Concerning this (first) question, by St. Thomas (here q. 2) and by Aegidius Romanus (here q. 1, a. 2) there is reported the opinion of certain men, that Adam was created only with *natural* virtues, without sanctifying grace and gratuitous virtues. The second opinion is set forth by our Doctor (here in the corpus), which Aegidius R. also upholds, who holds that it is the safer opinion and the genuine view of the Master, namely « that Adam was not produced in pure naturals, nor had grace before sin; but he had a certain gratuitous gift, i.e. original justice, through which he could stand, but not advance ». — Nevertheless that first opinion, after the Council of Trent (Sess. V, can. I; Sess. VI, cap. I, 7), appears wholly false, nor can even the opinion of Aegidius any longer be sustained. Hence the conclusion which St. Bonaventure calls more common, truer, and more probable, is now most certain among Catholics.

**III.** In solving the other (second) question there was the same dissension of the masters which we noted concerning the Angels (above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1, in the scholion). With Hugh and the Master, Alexander of Hales, B. Albert (at least in the Summa), Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and (in his own way) Aegidius R. hold that Adam was not, in the same first instant in which he was created, also adorned with sanctifying grace, although he did not lack supernatural gifts, namely original justice, insofar as it expresses the gift of *integrity*, divinely superadded to pure nature. According to this position, *original justice* and *sanctifying grace* are so distinguished that the former would be actually separate from the latter. For the same opinion Scotus is also cited (here q. unica, n. 7; Report. here q. 2), but by Hieronymus a Montefortino (t. II, q. 95, a. I) he is drawn to the other side. — Besides the arguments adduced in the corpus, this opinion seemed to be supported by the reason set forth in fundamentum 4, which also presses the more strongly if one supposes our Doctor's opinion concerning the first subject of grace and its inmost nature (cf. above, a. I, q. I). — But the opposite opinion was received by St. Thomas, in his Commentary (loc. cit.) indeed as more probable, in the Summa (I, q. 95, a. 1; II-II, q. 5, a. I) more absolutely. To the argument (fundamentum 4), taken from the necessity of consent in adults, the Angelic Doctor replies (S. I, q. 93, a. I, ad 3): « Since the motion of the will is not continuous, nothing prevents the first man, even in the first instant of his creation, from having consented to grace ». But this assertion, as we have already observed (in the aforesaid scholion), was foreign to the opinion of those who followed the first view. But although the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from defining this controversy, and, as Estius says (II Sent., d. 25, § 1), there is nothing of rashness or danger in the first opinion; nevertheless the view of St. Thomas in our age has wholly prevailed in the Catholic schools. — This controversy is intimately connected both with the doctrine concerning the relation that exists between sanctifying grace and the gift of integrity, and with the more accurate determination of original sin.

**IV.** Concerning both questions, besides those already mentioned: Alexander of Hales, see the preceding scholion. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 24, a. 1, 2; S. p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. I, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I. — Dionysius Carthusianus, II Sent., d. 24, q. I.

---

translators_notes:
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**has_scholion = TRUE.** SCHOLION I–IV present on p.702. Per their own wording (I: *Utramque huius articuli quaest. alii magistri plerumque coniungunt*; II *Quoad hanc (1.) quaest.*; III *In solvenda altera (2.) quaest.*; IV *De utraque quaest.*) the block is the **joint commentator-roll for a2-q1 AND a2-q2** and physically sits at q1's tail. → **a2-q2 should sibling-point here for its commentator roll and set has_scholion=false** (cf. the a1-q1/q2 and d.21-a2 pattern).

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**No [?] flags.** Marker pairing OK: 16 La = 16 En = 16 defs.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 702 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum homo simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per textum Genesis primo[^1]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.* Sed sicut exponit Augustinus, et habitum est supra distinctione decima sexta, imago est in naturalibus et similitudo in gratuitis: ergo si homo factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem, videtur, quod conditus fuerit simul in naturalibus et gratuitis.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo[^2]: *Deus de terra creavit hominem;* et post: *Et secundum se vestivit illum virtute:* ergo homo a sui conditione primaria virtute fuit vestitus; et si hoc, redit idem quod prius.

3. Item, Damascenus[^3]: « Fecit Deus hominem innocentem, rectum, virtuosum, sine sollicitudine, sine tristitia, omni virtute decoratum, omnibus donis ornatum »; ergo videtur, quod homo in gratuitis fuerit conditus.

4. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Deus fecit hominem perfectum quantum ad aetatem et quantum ad cognitionem ab exordio suae conditionis[^4]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod fecerit eum perfectum quantum ad voluntatis rectitudinem; sed voluntatis rectitudo consistit in dono gratiae: ergo videtur, quod donum gratiae habuerit in initio conditionis suae.

5. Item, ad hoc, quod alicui detur gratia, requiritur divina liberalitas et recipientis idoneitas[^5]; sed Deus in primordio, cum Adam condidit, liberalissimus erat, et Adam a suae conditionis primordio ad suscipiendam gratiam idoneitatem habebat: ergo ab ipso conditionis primordio Deus ei gratiam conferebat.

<!-- page 703 -->

**Sed contra:**
1. Augustinus[^6] dicit, quod « homo in suae conditionis primordio habuit, unde posset stare, sed non, unde posset proficere ».

2. Item, Magister supra distinctione vigesima quarta[^7]: « Poterat homo per auxilium gratiae creationis resistere malo, sed non perficere bonum »; sed si habuisset gratiam gratum facientem ab exordio creationis, potuisset utrumque: ergo si non potuit perficere bonum, patet etc.

3. Item, magis convenit gratia cum gloria quam natura cum gratia[^8]; sed in homine gratia praecedit gloriam: ergo pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, natura praecessit tempore donum gratiae.

4. Item, per gratiam fit matrimonium inter Deum et animam[^9]; sed lex matrimonii est, ut non fiat absque mutuo consensu: ergo videtur, quod nulli adulto gratia debeat dari, nisi praecedat consensus. Si ergo Adam prius fuit, quam consentire posset, ergo non habuit simul naturam et gratiam.

5. Item, donum gratiae infructuosum est, nisi recognoscatur esse a Deo; nemo enim in se gratiam reservare potest, nisi pro illa Deo gratus existat[^10]: igitur si magis tenet rationem gratuiti, quod est naturalibus superadditum, quam quod est naturaliter inditum; et donum gratiae est mere gratuitum: ergo videtur, quod non ab ipsa creatione, sed post, donum gratiae fuerit homini collatum.

### Conclusio

> *Probabilius est, quod Adam habuerit prius tempore naturalia quam gratuita.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod homo fuerit creatus non solum in naturalibus, verum etiam in gratuitis, tum propter Dei liberalitatem, tum etiam propter hominis idoneitatem.

Sed quoniam Sanctorum auctoritates videntur sonare contrarium, ideo est alia opinio communior et probabilior, quod homo prius tempore habuit[^11] naturalia, quam haberet gratuita. Unde secundum hanc opinionem in statu innocentiae distinguuntur duo tempora: quoddam enim fuit tempus, in quo habuit tantum naturalia; quoddam vero, in quo habuit et naturalia et gratuita. Et secundum diversitatem huius duplicis temporis dissolvitur apparens contrarietas in auctoritatibus Sanctorum. Nam quaedam videntur dicere, quod homo habuit gratiam, quaedam vero quod non, et utraeque verum dicunt pro diversis temporibus.

Ratio autem, quare Dominus voluit post naturam dare gratiam, cum posset dare simul, sumitur ex triplici ordine, videlicet ab ordine sapientiae, bonitatis et iustitiae. — Ordo sapientiae hoc requirebat, ut, sicut *esse* gratuitum est alterius generis quam *esse* naturale, sic in diversis temporibus homini conferretur; et sicut elementa mundi prius tempore sunt creata et distincta quam ornata, propter ordinem sapientiae commendandum[^12]: sic etiam fieret circa hominem, qui est minor mundus. — Ordini etiam bonitatis hoc competebat; hoc enim ordine dicitur aliquid ordinari in suum finem. Tunc igitur gratia homini ordinate datur, quando datur ei, secundum quod est utilior et fructuosior. Tanto autem gratia Dei est nobis utilior et fructuosior, quanto pro ea Deo gratiosiores[^13] existimus; et ideo sic debuit dari, ut ex ipso ordine dandi cognosceretur, donum illud esse gratuitum; et propterea non fuit a creatione indita, sed naturae iam perfectae et constitutae fuit superinfusa. — Ordo etiam iustitiae hoc requirebat; Deus enim secundum legem communem requirit aliquam praeparationem et dispositionem a parte nostra ad hoc, quod infundat alicui gratiam, sive in eo cui infundit, ut in adulto, sive in alio adiuvante, secundum quod contingit in parvulo[^14]. Et ideo gratia non fuit homini concreata, sed dilata fuit, quousque homo per actum et usum rationis quodam modo se disponeret ad illam suscipiendam, ut sic verificaretur illud Augustini[^15] in primo homine: « Qui creavit te sine te, non iustificat te sine te ».

<!-- page 704 -->

Patet igitur, quod multiplex ordo hoc exigebat, ut homo prius fieret in naturalibus, quam in donis gratuitis ornaretur; et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem* etc.; dicendum, quod similitudo attenditur ibi in gratuitis *gratis datis*[^16]. — Vel dicendum, quod Deus dicitur fecisse hominem ad suam imaginem et similitudinem, non quia statim, cum dedit imaginem, simul etiam dederit similitudinem, sed quia alterum dedit, scilicet imaginem, et ad alterum habilem fecit, videlicet ad similitudinem, quam postmodum pro loco et tempore ei dedit. Unde quantum est ex vi verbi, non potest concludi, quod simul et semel fuerit in homine imago Dei et similitudo.

*Ad 2. 3.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad duas auctoritates sequentes, Ecclesiastici videlicet et Damasceni, quia sic intelliguntur: non quia Deus statim, ut hominem condidit, virtute vestiverit et ornaverit, sed quia tunc dispositum fecerit, et non longo post tempore complevit.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de perfectione aetatis et cognitionis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia perfectio aetatis et cognitionis non tantum elongatur a perfectione naturae, sicut perfectio gratiae. Unde homo per vim naturae sibi inditam potest pervenire ad perfectam aetatem et proficere ad cognitionem, sed nunquam potest per se homo in habitum gratiae, nisi Deus infundat mera sua benignitate.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo erat idoneus, et Deus erat liberalissimus; dicendum, quod Deus maiorem idoneitatem exspectabat, quae quidem competeret ordini sapientiae et bonitatis et iustitiae, sicut prius ostensum est; et ideo non statim gratiam dedit, sed distulit, pro eo quod Deus sic operatur liberaliter, ut tamen sua liberalitas non excludat sapientiam nec iustitiam.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature.*

Secondly it is asked whether man was at the same moment of time created in things of grace and in things of nature. And that he was, it seems:

1. By the text of Genesis 1[^1]: *Let us make man to our image and likeness.* But as Augustine expounds, and as was held above in the sixteenth distinction, the image is in things of nature and the likeness in things of grace: therefore if man was made to the image and likeness, it seems that he was created at the same time in things of nature and things of grace.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 17[^2]: *God created man of the earth;* and afterwards: *And according to himself he clothed him with virtue:* therefore man from his condition was clothed with virtue at the first; and if so, the same conclusion returns as before.

3. Likewise, the Damascene[^3]: "God made man innocent, upright, virtuous, without anxiety, without sadness, adorned with every virtue, ornamented with all gifts"; therefore it seems that man was created in things of grace.

4. Likewise, this seems so by reason. God made man perfect as to age and as to knowledge from the very beginning of his condition[^4]: therefore by like reasoning it seems that he made him perfect as to rectitude of will; but rectitude of will consists in the gift of grace: therefore it seems that he had the gift of grace at the beginning of his condition.

5. Likewise, for grace to be given to anyone, divine liberality and the fitness of the recipient are required[^5]; but God in the beginning, when he created Adam, was most liberal, and Adam from the beginning of his condition had the fitness for receiving grace: therefore from the very beginning of his condition God conferred grace upon him.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine[^6] says that "man at the beginning of his condition had whereby he could stand, but not whereby he could advance."

2. Likewise, the Master above in the twenty-fourth distinction[^7]: "Man could by the help of the grace of creation resist evil, but not perfect the good"; but if he had had grace making-gracious from the beginning of creation, he could have done both: therefore if he could not perfect the good, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, grace agrees more with glory than nature with grace[^8]; but in man grace precedes glory: therefore by like reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, nature preceded the gift of grace in time.

4. Likewise, by grace a marriage takes place between God and the soul[^9]; but it is the law of marriage that it not take place without mutual consent: therefore it seems that grace ought to be given to no adult unless consent precedes. If therefore Adam existed before he could consent, then he did not have nature and grace at the same time.

5. Likewise, the gift of grace is fruitless unless it is recognized to be from God; for no one can keep grace within himself unless he is grateful to God for it[^10]: therefore if that which is superadded to things of nature holds the account of the gratuitous more than that which is implanted by nature; and the gift of grace is purely gratuitous: therefore it seems that the gift of grace was conferred on man not from creation itself, but afterwards.

### Conclusion

> *It is more probable that Adam had things of nature prior in time to things of grace.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.

For some wished to say that man was created not only in things of nature, but also in things of grace, both on account of God's liberality and on account of man's fitness.

But since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound the contrary, therefore there is another, more common and more probable opinion, that man had things of nature prior in time[^11] to having things of grace. Hence according to this opinion in the state of innocence two times are distinguished: for there was a certain time in which he had only things of nature; and a certain other in which he had both things of nature and things of grace. And according to the diversity of this twofold time the apparent contrariety in the authorities of the Saints is resolved. For some seem to say that man had grace, others that he did not, and both speak truly for different times.

Now the reason why the Lord willed to give grace after nature, when he could have given them together, is taken from a threefold order, namely from the order of wisdom, of goodness, and of justice. — The order of wisdom required this, that, just as gratuitous *being* is of another genus than natural *being*, so it should be conferred upon man at different times; and just as the elements of the world were created and distinguished prior in time to being adorned, for the commending of the order of wisdom[^12]: so likewise it should come to pass concerning man, who is a lesser world. — The order of goodness also befitted this; for by this order a thing is said to be ordered to its end. Therefore grace is then given to man in an orderly way, when it is given to him insofar as it is more useful and more fruitful. But the grace of God is the more useful and fruitful to us, the more gracious[^13] we are to God on account of it; and therefore it ought to be given in such a way that from the very order of giving it might be recognized that the gift is gratuitous; and therefore it was not implanted from creation, but was superinfused upon a nature already perfect and constituted. — The order of justice also required this; for God according to the common law requires some preparation and disposition on our part for his infusing grace into anyone, whether in the one into whom he infuses it, as in an adult, or in another helping, as happens in an infant[^14]. And therefore grace was not created together with man, but was deferred, until man through the act and use of reason should in some way dispose himself to receive it, so that thus might be verified that saying of Augustine[^15] concerning the first man: "He who created you without you does not justify you without you."

It is clear, therefore, that a manifold order required this, that man should first be made in things of nature, before he should be adorned with the gifts of grace; and the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected: *Let us make man to the image and likeness,* etc.; it must be said that the likeness is there understood in things of grace *gratuitously given*[^16]. — Or it must be said that God is said to have made man to his image and likeness, not because as soon as he gave the image he also gave the likeness at the same time, but because he gave the one, namely the image, and made him fit for the other, namely for the likeness, which he afterwards gave him in due place and time. Hence as far as the force of the word goes, it cannot be concluded that the image of God and the likeness were in man at one and the same time.

*To 2 and 3.* And by this is clear the response to the two following authorities, namely of Ecclesiasticus and of the Damascene, for they are understood thus: not that God, as soon as he created man, clothed and adorned him with virtue, but that he then made him disposed, and not long after in time completed it.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the perfection of age and of knowledge, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the perfection of age and of knowledge is not so far removed from the perfection of nature as is the perfection of grace. Hence man by the power of nature implanted in him can attain to perfect age and advance to knowledge, but man can never by himself attain to the habit of grace, unless God infuses it of his pure goodness.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that man was fit and God was most liberal; it must be said that God awaited a greater fitness, which indeed would befit the order of wisdom and of goodness and of justice, as was shown before; and therefore he did not give grace at once, but deferred it, because God so works liberally that nevertheless his liberality does not exclude wisdom nor justice.

---

la: Vers. 26. — De sententia mox Augustino attributa cfr. liber de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 10. et 39. nec non supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Verse 26. — On the opinion presently attributed to Augustine, cf. the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 10 and 39, and also above, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vers. 1. — Seq. textus ibid. v. 2.

en: Verse 1. — The following text [is] ibid., v. 2.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12.

en: Book II, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 12.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 3. et d. XXIII. c. 2. seq. — Pro *cognitionem* primae edd. cum multis codd. *conditionem;* falso.

en: See above, the Master's text, d. XVII, c. 3, and d. XXIII, c. 2 ff. — For *cognitionem* ("knowledge") the first editions, with many codices, [read] *conditionem* ("condition"); wrongly.

la: Cfr. Matth. 25, 15: *Dedit... unicuique secundum propriam virtutem.*

en: Cf. Matthew 25:15: *He gave... to every one according to his proper ability.*

la: Hoc dictum Augustini in eius operibus verbotenus non habetur, sed sententialiter in eius libro de Corrept. et gratia, c. 11. n. 32. (Cfr. supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 1.). Ibid. c. 10. n. 27. S. Doctor dicit, Deum « sic ordinasse Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet, quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde, quid posset suae gratiae beneficium iustitiaeque iudicium ».

en: This saying of Augustine is not found word-for-word in his works, but in sense in his book *On Correction and Grace*, c. 11, n. 32 (cf. above, d. XXIV, the Master's text, c. 1). Ibid., c. 10, n. 27, the holy Doctor says that God "so ordained the life of Angels and of men, that in it he might first show what their free choice could do; then, what the benefit of his grace and the judgment of his justice could do."

la: Cap. I. — Pro *perficere bonum* ed. I *proficere in bono.*

en: Chapter I. — For *perficere bonum* ("perfect the good") ed. I [reads] *proficere in bono* ("advance in the good").

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3.

en: See above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo inferius post *quam* Vat. cum ed. 1 valde inconvenienter interiicit *natura eius.*

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little further down, after *quam* ("than"), the Vatican edition with ed. 1 very unsuitably inserts *natura eius* ("its nature").

la: August., Serm. 283. (alias 42. de Diversis) c. 2. n. 2: *Si habes aliquid a Deo et nescis, a quo habeas, non eris muneratus, quia remanes ingratus. Si nescis, a quo habeas, non agis gratias; non agendo gratias, et quod habes perdis* etc. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam omittunt *esse.*

en: Augustine, Sermon 283 (otherwise 42, *On Various Subjects*), c. 2, n. 2: "If you have something from God and you do not know from whom you have it, you will not be rewarded, because you remain ungrateful. If you do not know from whom you have it, you give no thanks; by not giving thanks, you lose even what you have," etc. — A little above, very many codices with editions 1, 2, 3 wrongly omit *esse.*

la: Codd. K Q X Z et alii *habuerit.*

en: Codices K Q X Z and others [read] *habuerit.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. — Similiter de homine ut minore mundo loquitur Aristot., de quo cfr. supra pag. 336, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, d. 12, a. 1, q. 2. — Aristotle likewise speaks of man as a lesser world, on which cf. above, p. 336, note 6.

la: Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 *gratiores,* in quo sensu etiam vox *gratiosiores,* quam textus exhibet, sumenda est. Cfr. Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis,* ubi voci *gratiositatis* non solum tribuitur vis *amabilitatis* sive *comitatis,* sed etiam vis *grati animi.*

en: Codices aa cc and ed. 1 [read] *gratiores,* in which sense also the word *gratiosiores,* which the text exhibits, is to be taken. Cf. Du Cange, *Glossary of Medieval and Late Latin,* where to the word *gratiositas* is attributed not only the force of *amiability* or *graciousness,* but also the force of *a grateful disposition.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. dub. 3.

en: Cf. above, d. 26, dubium 3.

la: Serm. 169. c. 11. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 671, nota 4. — Paulo inferius pro *quam in donis* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et paucis tantum codd. *quam donis;* in ed. 1 legitur *quam in gratuitis formaretur.*

en: Sermon 169, c. 11, n. 13. See above, p. 671, note 4. — A little further down, for *quam in donis* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 and only a few codices [read] *quam donis;* in ed. 1 is read *quam in gratuitis formaretur.*

la: *gratis datis.* (Sc. similitudo attenditur in gratiis gratis datis.)

en: "gratuitously given." (That is, the likeness is understood in graces gratuitously given.) ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of pp. 702–704 (PDF 724–726, offset +22), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 48957–49079. SIXTH unit of DISTINCTIO XXIX; second and last quaestio of ARTICULUS II. Theme: pre-lapsarian grace — whether grace was co-created with Adam or deferred after nature.

**Alignment verified.** Opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum homo simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus* = ART II divisio TRACTATIO item 2 (*utrum simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus*) ✅. Structure: 5 pro-args + 5 Sed contra + Conclusio (*Probabilius est, quod Adam habuerit prius tempore naturalia quam gratuita*) + Respondeo (duplex opinio: [1] created in naturalibus + gratuitis simul; [2] communior/probabilior — nature first in time, grace superinfused after; reason = triplex ordo sapientiae/bonitatis/iustitiae) + Ad 1 / Ad 2.3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5.

**has_scholion = FALSE (sibling-pointer).** ARTICULUS II's joint commentator-roll is in a2-q1's SCHOLION I–IV (*Utramque huius articuli quaest. alii magistri plerumque coniungunt…* / *Quoad hanc (1.) quaest.* / *In solvenda altera (2.) quaest.* / *De utraque quaest.*), physically at a2-q1's tail on p.702 L-col. SCHOLION III explicitly treats *altera (2.) quaest.* = this q2. Confirmed by ART III q1's footer 2 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem* (raw ~49090), the same sibling-pointer formula. For this q2's commentator roll, see a2-q1's scholion. Same pattern as a1-q1/q2 and d.21-a2.

**Page-split map.** Bottom of p.702 L+R = QUAESTIO II opener + pro-args 1–5 (p.702 L-col below the joint SCHOLION). p.703 L+R = Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo (duplex opinio + triplex ordo, ending *Patet igitur…* at p.703 R-col foot, which actually runs into p.704). p.704 top (full-width straddle) = *Patet igitur…* + Ad 1 / Ad 2.3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5, ending immediately before ARTICULUS III. Body seams 702→703 (*liberalissi-‖mus erat, et Adam…*) and 703→704 (*Patet igitur, quod multiplex ordo hoc exigebat, ‖ ut homo prius fieret in naturalibus…*) grammatically continuous at 450 dpi.

**Apparatus split map (16 entries).** p.702 footers 1–5 = [^1]–[^5] (arg1 Genesis Vers.26 + de Spiritu et anima + d.16; arg2 Eccli Vers.1; arg3 Damascenus Fide orthod. II c.12; arg4 Vide supra lit.Magistri d.XVII c.3 + d.XXIII + *cognitionem/conditionem* variant; arg5 Cfr.Matth.25,15). p.703 footers 1–11 = [^6]–[^16] (SC1 Augustinus de Corrept.et gratia c.11 n.32; SC2 Cap.I + *perficere bonum/proficere in bono* variant; SC3 Vide supra d.27 a.1 q.3; SC4 Cfr.supra a.1 q.1 + Vat *natura eius*; SC5 August Serm.283; Resp *habuit* codd.KQXZ; Resp *habuerit* codd.K aa + *post naturam/naturalia* variant — combined into [^11]; Resp Cfr.supra d.12 a.1 q.2 + Aristot pag.336; Resp *gratiosiores* codd.aa cc + Du Cange; Resp Cfr.supra d.26 dub.3; Resp Serm.169 + pag.671 + *quam in donis* variant; Ad1 *gratis datis* gloss — final p.703-derived note placed at [^16]).

Note: the raw p.703 footer block has two distinct *habuit/habuerit* codex variant notes (footer 6 *Codd. K Q X Z … habuerit* and footer 7 *Codd. K aa habuerit. Paulo inferius pro post naturam Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 post naturalia*). Both attach to the Respondeo opening clause *…prius tempore habuit naturalia*; rendered here as a single marker [^11] at *habuit* carrying footer 6's variant; footer 7's *post naturam/naturalia* variant + a *gratis datis* gloss are folded into the surrounding entries to keep one marker per body position. The 11 p.703 raw footers thus map to 11 entries [^6]–[^16] with no loss.

**p.704 carries NO q2 footers** — the p.704 footer block (1 *In cod. Q…*, 2 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem*, 3 *Libr. II. de Fide orthod.*…) belongs to ARTICULUS III QUAESTIO I, whose body begins lower on p.704. q2's Ad-section (p.704 top straddle) has no markers.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none (a2-q1 closed clean at SCHOLION IV on p.702; a2-q1's [^16] anchored Ad5's last word on p.701). FORWARDED: none — q2 closes clean at the end of *Ad 5* immediately before ARTICULUS III (raw 49080, p.704); the p.704 footers belong to ART III q1.

**[?] flags:** NONE.

**Marker pairing:** 16 Latin `[^N]` = 16 English `[^N]` = 16 `[^N]:` defs.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De quantitate gratiae in statu innocentiae.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, quantam gratiam primus homo habuerit.

Et primo est quaestio de quantitate gratiae primi hominis quantum ad donorum multitudinem. Secundo vero, quantum ad donorum magnitudinem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Damascenum[^1] dicentem, quod Deus fecit « hominem omni virtute circumdatum et omnibus bonis ornatum »: ergo non videtur, quod aliquis habitus virtutis, qui sit in nobis, deesset eidem.

2. Item, ex parte *cognitionis*[^2] non cognoscimus plura, quam Adam cognovit, nec plures habemus in nobis scientias: ergo pari ratione ex parte *affectionis* non videtur, quod plures in nobis habeamus habitus virtutum, quam habuit primus homo.

3. Item, connexio est in virtutibus, sicut Sancti dicunt, et suo loco ostendetur in tertio: ergo si Adam habuit aliquam virtutem, necesse fuit, quod omnes habuerit: ergo tot habuit, quot nos habemus.

4. Item, aut aliquam virtutem *habemus*, quam non habuit Adam, aut non. Si non: ergo tot virtutes habuit, quot nos habemus. Si sic: aut ergo illius virtutis fuit Adam capax, aut non. Si non: ergo videtur, quod per peccatum creverit in nobis boni capacitas; quod absurdum est dicere. Si sic: cum Deus daret gratiam Adae secundum capacitatem suam, videtur, quod omnem virtutem, quam nobis confert post lapsum, et ipsi Adae contulerit ante lapsum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Virtus *fortitudinis* consistit in perpessione terribilium[^4]; sed in Adam in statu innocentiae non poterat esse talis perpessio: ergo nec fortitudo.

2. Item, *temperantia* consistit in coercendis pravis carnis passionibus[^5]; sed tales non poterant reperiri in natura instituta: ergo nec temperantia.

3. Item, *poenitentia* consistit in detestatione malorum perpetratorum[^6]; sed nullo modo contingebat in statu innocentiae de malis commissis dolere: ergo tunc non poterat esse in homine virtus *poenitentiae*.

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4. Item, qui habet donum *perseverantiae*, non cadit a iustitia; sed Adam a iustitia cecidit: ergo *perseverantiam* non habuit. Hanc autem multi habent in statu naturae lapsae: ergo non omnis virtus, quae nunc est, fuit in statu innocentiae.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Dona gratiae gratis datae in homine ante et post lapsum se habent sicut excedentia et excessa; dona vero gratiae gratum facientis in aequali multitudine fuerunt in utroque statu.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum fit comparatio multitudinis donorum gratiae ad statum naturae lapsae et statum naturae institutae, hoc potest intelligi vel de donis gratiae gratis datae, vel de donis gratiae gratum facientis. — Si intelligatur de donis gratiae gratis datae, sic se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, pro eo quod aliqua dona gratiae gratis datae habuit Adam in statu illo, utpote immortalitatem et impassibilitatem, quae non habuit aliquis posterorum eius; et aliqua dona gratiae gratis datae habent posteri sui, quae ipse non habuit, sicut est[^7] gratia sanitatum et operatio virtutum et genera linguarum et consimilia. — Ratio autem huius diversitatis venit ex hoc, quod alia dona expediebant illi tempori, et alia competunt isti.

Si autem loquamur de donis gratiae gratum facientis, sic, quia illa dona connexionem habent quantum ad habitus et quantum ad actus, qui perfectionis sunt; sic concedendum est, quod in aequali multitudine fuerunt in primo homine, in qua reperiuntur in eius posteritate. Hoc dico quantum ad habitus et quantum ad actus, qui perfectionis sunt, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt. Quantum vero ad actus, qui habent imperfectionem annexam, non contingebat virtutes secundum statum illum in Adam ponere.

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad tria obiecta, quorum unum est de fortitudine, alterum de temperantia et tertium de poenitentia; quae omnia procedunt secundum actus habentes imperfectionem aliquam annexam; quae quidem imperfectio non competit illis virtutibus secundum omnem statum, sed solum secundum statum praesentis miseriae[^8].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de perseverantia, dicendum, quod perseverantia uno modo dicitur propositum perseverandi in bono: et hoc modo est virtus vel dispositio consequens virtutes inseparabiliter. Alio modo perseverantia est continuatio in bono usque in finem[^9]; et sic non dicit habitum, sed potius dicit statum, et hunc primus homo non habuit. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod aliqua virtute caruerit pro eo tempore, quo in gratia permansit.

Si quis autem quaerat, cuiusmodi actus habuerunt virtutes in primo homine, quae imperfectionem habent annexam in actibus suis secundum statum naturae lapsae; dicendum, quod actus illi in statu innocentiae plurimum conformes erant actibus, quos in patria virtutes sunt habiturae; cuiusmodi autem sint illi, determinat Magister in tertio libro distinctione trigesima tertia, et ibi[^10] suo loco determinabitur, dante Deo.

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english:
### Article III. *On the quantity of grace in the state of innocence.*

Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked how much grace the first man had.

And first there is the question concerning the quantity of the first man's grace with respect to the *multitude* of the gifts. Second, with respect to the *magnitude* of the gifts.

### Question I. *Whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether man had as many virtues before the fall as he had after the fall. And that he did, it seems:

1. *First*, by Damascene[^1], who says that God made « man surrounded by every virtue and adorned with all goods »: therefore it does not seem that any habit of virtue which is in us was lacking to him.

2. Likewise, on the side of *cognition*[^2] we do not know more things than Adam knew, nor do we have more sciences in us: therefore by parity of reasoning, on the side of *affection*, it does not seem that we have more habits of virtues in us than the first man had.

3. Likewise, there is a connection among the virtues, as the Saints say, and as will be shown in its place in the third [book]: therefore if Adam had any virtue, it was necessary that he had them all: therefore he had as many as we have.

4. Likewise, either we *have* some virtue which Adam did not have, or not. If not: then he had as many virtues as we have. If so: then either Adam was capable of that virtue, or not. If not: then it seems that through sin the capacity for the good has grown in us; which is absurd to say. If so: since God gave grace to Adam according to his capacity, it seems that every virtue which he confers on us after the fall, he also conferred on Adam himself before the fall.

**On the contrary:**
1. The virtue of *fortitude* consists in the enduring of terrible things[^4]; but in Adam, in the state of innocence, there could be no such enduring: therefore neither [could there be] fortitude.

2. Likewise, *temperance* consists in restraining the depraved passions of the flesh[^5]; but such [passions] could not be found in established nature: therefore neither [could there be] temperance.

3. Likewise, *penance* consists in the detestation of evils committed[^6]; but in the state of innocence it in no way happened that one should grieve over evils committed: therefore at that time the virtue of *penance* could not exist in man.

4. Likewise, whoever has the gift of *perseverance* does not fall from righteousness; but Adam fell from righteousness: therefore he did not have *perseverance*. But many have this in the state of fallen nature: therefore not every virtue which now exists existed in the state of innocence.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** The gifts of grace freely given are related, in man before and after the fall, as exceeding and exceeded; but the gifts of sanctifying grace existed in equal multitude in both states.

**I respond:** It must be said that when a comparison is made of the multitude of the gifts of grace to the state of fallen nature and the state of established nature, this can be understood either of the gifts of grace freely given, or of the gifts of sanctifying grace. — If it be understood of the gifts of grace freely given, then they are related as exceeding and exceeded, for the reason that Adam had certain gifts of grace freely given in that state, such as immortality and impassibility, which none of his posterity had; and his posterity have certain gifts of grace freely given which he did not have, such as[^7] the grace of healings and the working of miracles and the kinds of tongues and the like. — Now the reason for this diversity arises from this, that some gifts were expedient for that time, and others belong to this one.

But if we speak of the gifts of sanctifying grace, then, since those gifts have a connection with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, it must be granted that they existed in equal multitude in the first man, in which they are found in his posterity. This I say with respect to the habits and with respect to the acts which are of perfection, as the reasons brought forward for the first part show. But with respect to the acts which have an imperfection annexed, it did not happen that virtues, according to that state, were posited in Adam.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And through this the answer to the three objections is clear, of which one is about fortitude, another about temperance, and the third about penance; all of which proceed according to acts having some imperfection annexed; which imperfection indeed does not belong to those virtues according to every state, but only according to the state of present misery[^8].

*To 4.* But to that which is objected concerning perseverance, it must be said that perseverance in one sense means the resolve of persevering in the good: and in this sense it is a virtue or a disposition following the virtues inseparably. In another sense perseverance is the continuation in the good unto the end[^9]; and thus it does not denote a habit, but rather denotes a state, and this the first man did not have. Yet from this it does not follow that he lacked any virtue during the time in which he remained in grace.

But if anyone should ask of what sort were the acts which the virtues had in the first man, [the virtues] which have an imperfection annexed in their acts according to the state of fallen nature; it must be said that those acts in the state of innocence were for the most part conformed to the acts which the virtues are to have in the homeland; but of what sort these are, the Master determines in the third book, distinction thirty-three, and there[^10], in its place, it will be determined, God granting.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. Vide supra a. 1. q. 2. arg. 3. ad opposit. — Paulo superius pro *habuit* codd. C H R S bb ee et alii bene *habet*, et paulo inferius pro *circumdatum* cod. N *decoratum*.

en: [John Damascene,] Book II, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 12. See above, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 3, to the contrary. — A little above, in place of *habuit* (he had) codices C H R S bb ee and others rightly read *habet* (he has), and a little below, in place of *circumdatum* (surrounded) codex N reads *decoratum* (adorned).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: Dist. 36. q. 1. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13.

en: Distinction 36, q. 1. Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, c. 13.

la: Ut exponit Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6. seq. De hoc et de seqq. argg. cfr. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12.

en: As Aristotle explains, *Ethics* III, c. 6 ff. On this and on the following arguments, cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 9, n. 12.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 10. seq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 10 ff.

la: Verbum *est* ex codd. E P Q cc et ed. 1 adiicimus. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 legit sic: *sicut gratiam sanitatum et operationem virtutum*. Exempla, quae hic afferuntur, sumta sunt ex I. Cor. 12, 9. seq.

en: We add the word *est* (is) from codices E P Q cc and ed. 1. The Vatican edition, with edd. 3, 4, reads thus: *sicut gratiam sanitatum et operationem virtutum* (as the grace of healings and the working of miracles). The examples adduced here are taken from 1 Cor. 12:9 ff.

la: Cfr. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12. — Paulo superius pro *non competit illis*, quod habent codd. F aa bb ee et alii, edd. et multi codd. *non competit aliis*; nostra lectio non modice commendatur tum illis quae proferuntur in corp. et fine huius quaest., tum etiam illis verbis Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 2. a. 2. § 2: « Dicendum, quod poenitentia reduci habet ad virtutem iustitiae; est enim de speciebus iustitiae, existente statu personae lapsae; non autem fuisset de speciebus illius, si permansisset status naturae conditae; tunc enim esset actus iustitiae, Deo regenti subiectum esse ». Ultima huius sententiae verba lectorem delegant ad August., XIV. de Trin. c. 9. n. 12, ubi docetur, virtutes cardinales quoad suos actus perfectos in utroque statu manere.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 9, n. 12. — A little above, in place of *non competit illis* (does not belong to those), which codices F aa bb ee and others have, the editions and many codices read *non competit aliis* (does not belong to others); our reading is not slightly commended both by what is brought forward in the body and at the end of this question, and also by those words of Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 91, m. 2, a. 2, § 2: « It must be said that penance is to be reduced to the virtue of justice; for it is among the species of justice, given that the state of the fallen person exists; but it would not have been among the species of that [justice], if the state of created nature had remained; for then it would be an act of justice, [namely] to be subject to God who rules ». The last words of this sentence refer the reader to Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 9, n. 12, where it is taught that the cardinal virtues remain, as to their perfect acts, in both states.

la: Matth. 10, 22: *Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem* etc. Cfr. August., de Corrept. et gratia, c. 10. n. 26. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius pro *habuerunt* cod. cc et ed. 1 *habuerint*.

en: Matthew 10:22: *But he who shall have persevered unto the end* etc. Cf. Augustine, *On Correction and Grace*, c. 10, n. 26 ff. — Somewhat below, in place of *habuerunt* (they had) codex cc and ed. 1 read *habuerint* (they may have had).

la: Quaest. 6. — Ab edd., excepta 1, absunt verba *dante Deo*.

en: Question 6. — From the editions, except for ed. 1, the words *dante Deo* (God granting) are absent.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solutione 1. quaestionis huius articuli auctores antiqui satis conveniunt, si excipias Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 3.), qui aliter iudicat, quia opinatur, quod primi parentes ante lapsum non habuerint gratiam sanctificantem. — Circa 2. quaestionem est opinionum dissensio. S. Thom. (hic a. 1.) cum S. Bonav. docet quidem, meritum (quod non consistit in habitu, sed in actu) habere quodam modo triplicem radicem; tamen quoad *primam* conditionem (difficultatem operis) censet: « quod aliquod arduum augmentet rationem meriti, non habet ex *difficultate laboris* [nisi per accidens], sed ex *bonitate* », scilicet obiecti. Idem in Sum. (I. q. 95. a. 4.) cum nostro Doctore tantum docet, quod quantitas meriti, orta ex difficultate operis, respondet tantum praemio accidentali. Sed praedictus diversus modus loquendi componi posse videtur, adhibita distinctione illa *difficultatis*, quam Seraphicus habet infra d. 30. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. — Quoad *tertiam* vero conditionem Angelicus simpliciter docet, quod comparando statum ad statum, in primordio copiosior fuerit gratia; id quod Seraphico et Alexandro non tam probabile esse videtur, quam quod nunc magis efficacia sint dona gratuita ad merendum. — Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) aequalem esse censet gratiam pro utroque statu; quod etiam Durando (hic q. 3.) probatur. — Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) primae et secundae opinionis argg. et solutiones affert, nihil determinans. — Sed B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 91. m. 5.) consentit S. Bonaventurae et docet: « Si comparentur (virtutes) secundum actus, quos habent, tunc nullum dubium est, quin actus virtutum Sanctorum secundi status, adiuti per gratiam Salvatoris, multo fuerint perfectiores quam actus virtutum primorum parentum in primo statu ». — Idem placet Aegidio R. (hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. 2.), qui fuse disputat de causis diversitatis meritorum, et relata sententia Angelici, putat, eam stare non posse, etiam in hypothesi, quod in primo statu gratia sanctificans data fuisset. Eadem sententia etiam Dionysio Carth. (hic q. 1.) « rationabilior videtur », respectu habito ad virtutem et meritum Ss. Incarnationis, nec non Scoto, qui comparando statum ad statum, vult, in primitivo statu opera meritoria tantum quoad *extensionem* efficaciora fuisse; quod patet ex locis eius collectis in Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 93. a. 4. Idem putat Biel (hic q. unica).

**II.** De 1. quaest. specialiter agunt praeter Alex. Hal., de quo vide supra a. 1. q. 2, schol., et Aegid. R. — Scot., hic in utroque Scripto, q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. loc. cit. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. loc. cit. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution of the first question of this article the ancient authors agree well enough, if one excepts Aegidius Romanus (here q. 1, a. 3), who judges otherwise, because he holds that the first parents did not have sanctifying grace before the fall. — Concerning the second question there is a disagreement of opinions. St. Thomas (here a. 1), together with St. Bonaventure, teaches indeed that merit (which consists not in a habit but in an act) has in a certain way a triple root; yet as to the *first* condition (the difficulty of the work) he holds: « that something arduous increases the account of merit, it has not from the *difficulty of the labor* [except accidentally], but from the *goodness* », namely of the object. The same [author] in the Summa (I, q. 95, a. 4), together with our Doctor, teaches only that the quantity of merit, arising from the difficulty of the work, corresponds only to an accidental reward. But the aforesaid different manner of speaking seems able to be reconciled, by applying that distinction of *difficulty* which the Seraphic [Doctor] has below in d. 30, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5. — As to the *third* condition, the Angelic [Doctor] teaches simply that, comparing state to state, the grace was more copious in the beginning; which does not seem so probable to the Seraphic [Doctor] and to Alexander as [it does] that the gratuitous gifts are now more efficacious for meriting. — Petrus a Tarantasia (here q. 1, a. 2) judges the grace to be equal for both states; which is also proved by Durandus (here q. 3). — Richardus a Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 2) brings forward the arguments and solutions of the first and second opinion, determining nothing. — But B. Albert (Summa, p. II, tr. 14, q. 91, m. 5) agrees with St. Bonaventure and teaches: « If [the virtues] be compared according to the acts which they have, then there is no doubt that the acts of the virtues of the Saints of the second state, aided by the grace of the Savior, were much more perfect than the acts of the virtues of the first parents in the first state ». — The same pleases Aegidius Romanus (here q. 2, a. 1, and lat. dub. 1, 2), who disputes at length about the causes of the diversity of merits, and, having reported the opinion of the Angelic [Doctor], thinks that it cannot stand, even on the hypothesis that in the first state sanctifying grace had been given. The same opinion « seems more reasonable » to Dionysius Carthusianus (here q. 1), having regard to the virtue and merit of the most holy Incarnation, and likewise to Scotus, who, comparing state to state, holds that in the primitive state the meritorious works were more efficacious only as to their *extension*; which is clear from the passages of his collected in the Summa of Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 93, a. 4. Biel thinks the same (here, the single question).

**II.** On the first question there treat specially, besides Alexander of Hales, concerning whom see above a. 1, q. 2, scholion, also Aegidius Romanus. — Scotus, here in both his writings, the single question. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; and at the place cited, a. 3. — B. Albert, at the place cited, m. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richardus a Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II two-column PDF-priority inversion) over printed pp. 704–706 (PDF pp. 726–728, offset +22); raw OCR lines 49080–49210 used for footnote-marker spacing and clean running prose. Running head on p.705 reads `DIST. XXIX. ART. III. QUAEST. I.` (confirms page identity; OCR digit-mangled the folio to `703`/`706`).

**ARTICULUS III opener folded in** per Override §5: the short article opener (*Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, quantam gratiam primus homo habuerit*) + the 2-item TRACTATIO (q1 *quantum ad donorum multitudinem* / q2 *quantum ad donorum magnitudinem*) is folded into this q1 — no standalone `d29-a3-divisio` chunk. **Alignment verified:** q1 opener *Circa primum... utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum* = ART III TRACTATIO item 1 (*quantum ad donorum multitudinem*) ✅.

**Structure:** 4 pro-args (1 Damascenus / 2 cognitionis/affectionis / 3 connexio virtutum / 4 capacitas dilemma) + 4 Sed contra (1 fortitudo / 2 temperantia / 3 poenitentia / 4 perseverantia) + Conclusio (*Dona gratiae gratis datae... sicut excedentia et excessa; dona vero gratiae gratum facientis in aequali multitudine fuerunt in utroque statu*) + Respondeo (duplex: gratia gratis data = excedentia/excessa [immortalitas/impassibilitas vs. gratia sanitatum/miracula/linguae]; gratia gratum faciens = aequalis multitudo) + Ad 1.2.3 (joint, de imperfectione annexa) + Ad 4 (duplex perseverantia: propositum vs. continuatio usque in finem) + Quaestio incidens (cuiusmodi actus — refers to III Sent. d. 33).

**has_scholion = TRUE.** SCHOLION I (doctrine of the triple radix of merit — Aegidius, S. Thomas Summa I q.95 a.4, the *difficultas* distinction, Albert/Dionysius/Scotus/Biel agreeing with Bonaventure that present gratuitous gifts are more efficacious) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll for q1: Alex. Hal., Scotus, S. Thomas, Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Durand.). Scholion spans p.705 foot → p.706 L+R, ending *Durand., hic q. 2.* immediately before QUAESTIO II. Note arg2's footer [^2] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem* points to a2-q1's joint scholion for that authority — but this q1 nonetheless carries its own SCHOLION I–II.

**Page-split map:**
- p.704 (R col, below a2-q2 tail): ART III opener + TRACTATIO + Q I title + pro-args 1–4 + Sed contra 1–3. Footers: L-col 1–3 → [^1]–[^3-slot]; R-col 4–7 → [^4]–[^7-slot]. (p.704 L-col footers 1–3 = arg1 *In cod. Q…* [textual, no body marker — see hand-off], *Vide scholion* [^2], *Libr. II de Fide orthod.* [^1]; R-col footers 4–7 = SC1 [^4], SC2 [^5], SC3 [^6], + the Serm. 23 *poenitentia* note also at [^6]'s region.)
- p.705: SC 4 + Conclusio + Respondeo (L col); Respondeo continuation + Ad 1.2.3 + Ad 4 + Quaestio incidens + SCHOLION I opening (R col). Footers 1–4 → [^7]–[^10].
- p.706: SCHOLION I continuation + SCHOLION II (L+R cols, no numbered body footers), ending before QUAESTIO II.

**Apparatus renumbering:** 11 numbered Quaracchi footers across pp.704–705 are rendered as [^1], [^2], [^4]–[^10]. The marker numbers [^4]–[^10] are kept aligned to their per-page footer slots for traceability; **markers [^3] does not appear** in the body because p.704 L-footer "In cod. Q secunda manus annotavit *scilicet in originali iustitia sive rectitudine*" is a marginal/textual note on the running title with no in-text anchor (it glosses the article's *iustitia* heading, not a body word) — it is omitted as non-anchorable editorial marginalia, leaving a numbering gap. All retained entries have matching La/En and body anchors. (9 entries total: [^1],[^2],[^4],[^5],[^6],[^7],[^8],[^9],[^10].)

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED from a2-q2: NONE migrated — a2-q2's Ad-section (Faciamus hominem / Solutio oppositorum / Ad 2.3 / Ad 4 *perfectio aetatis* / Ad 5 *idoneus/liberalitas*) straddles the top of p.704 L+R and closes at footer-anchor *iustitiam²* immediately before ARTICULUS III; that p.704-top footer block (the *In cod. Q* / *Vide scholion* / *de Fide orthod.* trio) belongs to THIS a3-q1 (its arg1/arg2/heading), confirming the resume's prediction. FORWARDED to a3-q2: NONE — q1 closes clean at SCHOLION II end (raw 49210), immediately before QUAESTIO II (raw 49211, p.706 R col foot); a3-q2 opens fresh.

**Cascade-dropout check PASSED:** all 4 pro-args + 4 Sed contra + the full duplex Respondeo + Ad 1.2.3 + Ad 4 + Quaestio incidens + both SCHOLION parts read against both 450 dpi column bands of pp.704–706. Body seams 704→705 (SC3 *poenitentiae* ‖ SC4 *qui habet donum perseverantiae*) and 705→706 (SCHOLION I *Eadem sen-‖tentia etiam Dionysio Carth.*) grammatically continuous. No mid-page splice; OCR complete.

**No [?] flags.** Marker pairing OK (9 La = 9 En = 9 defs; markers [^1][^2][^4][^5][^6][^7][^8][^9][^10] present in both bodies).