title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### ARTICULUS I.
### *Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri et esse in parte superiori rationis.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in superiori parte rationis secundum se, hoc est absque instinctu partis inferioris, non possit esse peccatum.

1. *Primo* per illud Augustini contra Manichaeos[^1], ubi sic ait: «Ratio nostra deduci ad consensum peccati non potest, nisi cum delectatio fuerit mota in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi tanquam rectori viro suo»: ergo nunquam peccat ratio superior, nisi peccatum praecedat in parte inferiori.

2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima[^2]: «Intellectus semper est rectus, phantasia autem recta et non recta»: ergo intellectus, quantum est de se, nunquam errat: ergo nec superior portio deviat a veritate iustitiae, nisi inclinetur per sensualitatem et inferiorem portionem.

3. Item, peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile[^3]; sed superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum convertitur ad aeterna; inferior, in quantum convertitur ad temporalia: ergo impos<!-- page 574 -->sibile est, peccatum esse vel fieri in nobis ex actu partis rationis superioris absque actu inferioris.

4. Item, ratio superior dicitur, in quantum legibus aeternis intendit; sed impossibile est, aliquem peccare, nisi declinando a legibus aeternis[^4]: ergo impossibile est, peccatum in superiori parte rationis esse secundum se.

5. Item, mulier est media inter sensualitatem et rationem superiorem[^5]; sed sensualitas semper movet ad bonum *ut nunc*, quantum est de se: ergo ratio superior, quantum est de se, semper movet ad bonum *simpliciter*. Sed virtus, quae movet ad bonum simpliciter, in movendo non peccat: ergo in superiori parte rationis, quantum est de se, peccatum esse non potest.

6. Item, anima, quando convertitur ad Deum, purgatur, melioratur et perficitur[^6]; sed superior portio rationis attenditur, in quantum convertitur ad Deum: ergo cum peccatum foedet et obnubilet, peccatum in superiori parte rationis secundum se esse non potest.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ieremiae secundo[^7]: *Filii Mempheos et Taphnes constupraverunt te usque ad verticem*: si ergo vertex, secundum quod Sancti exponunt, dicitur ibi apex mentis sive superior portio rationis; videtur, quod et illa habeat per peccatum constuprari et foedari.

2. Item, Augustinus, duodecimo, de Trinitate[^8]: «Vir manducat, quando superior portio rationis consentit illecebrae»; sed eius est peccare, cuius est consentire: si igitur hoc est superioris partis, patet etc.

3. Item, contingit, aliquem peccare peccato infidelitatis discredendo aliquos articulos, qui sunt respectu divinitatis; sed ad illos articulos solum superior rationis portio se extendit[^9]: ergo in illo genere peccandi portio superior proprie culpam committit.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium constat esse vertibile; sed liberum arbitrium maxime consistit in superiori portione rationis, cum ibi maxime sit iudicium et imperium[^10]: ergo videtur, quod in superiori portione rationis etiam secundum se sit vertibilitas ad malum: ergo et peccatum.

5. Item, superior portio rationis est illa quae discernit[^11] et iudicat tam de agendis quam de credendis; sed iudicium creaturae, quantum est de se, absque gratia deficit ab his quae sunt fidei catholicae: ergo per se potest errare et ab illis declinare; et si hoc, potest per se peccare.

6. Item, Angelus, cum peccavit primo peccato, appetiit aequiparari Deo in potentia, et mulier similiter in sapientia[^12]; sed hoc est appetibile solum partis superioris; ergo videtur, quod tam peccatum hominis quam Angeli inceperit a parte rationis superiori: ergo in superiori parte rationis secundum se peccatum habet fieri et esse.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Licet peccatum carnale non possit esse in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori, tamen peccatum spirituale potest fieri et esse in superiori parte rationis secundum se.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod superior portio rationis non est aliud quam synderesis, et quod ipsa superior portio, quantum est *de se*, semper est recta et fortis, nisi incurvetur et emolliatur per portionem inferiorem; et ideo dixerunt, peccatum in ea non esse *secundum se*, sed si peccat, hoc solum dicunt esse *consentiendo* inferiori parti, sive non compescendo eius deordinationem.

Sed haec positio tripliciter deviat a veritate. Primo in hoc quod dicit, quod idem est superior portio rationis et synderesis; quod plane falsum est, cum superior portio rationis et inferior pertineant ad arbitrii libertatem, sicut dicit Augustinus[^13], et ideo nominant potentiam *deliberativam*; synderesis autem potentiam *naturalem* nominat, quae semper uniformiter ad bonum inclinat. — Secundo vero a veritate deviat in hoc quod dicit, in synderesi aliquo modo esse peccatum; hoc enim plane falsum est, sicut infra[^14] manifestabitur, et Glossa dicit expresse, Ezechielis primo. — Tertio vero a veritate deviat in hoc quod dicit, quod in superiori parte rationis secundum se culpa non potest esse[^15], nisi <!-- page 575 -->ab inferiori procedat et tribuatur sibi occasio. Hoc enim contra *rationem* est, cum in illa portione consistat arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam insit ei ad malum vertibilitas, et ita possibilitas ad peccandum. — Est etiam hoc contra *experimentum*, quia ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum *leges aeternas*, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum *lumen proprium*, et secundum *lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum*. Et quamvis aspiciendo ad *leges aeternas* non peccet iudicando, tamen secundum ea quae percipit a *sensibus*, vel etiam secundum *lumen sibi*[^16] *datum et innatum*, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae lapsae. Esto enim, quod sibi proponatur *credibile* et aliquis articulus fidei, utpote articulus de Trinitate et Unitate, cum iste non solum repugnet sensui et imaginationi, sed etiam discrepet a naturali iudicio rationis: si noster intellectus secundum *lumen proprium*, vel[^17] aspiciendo ad partes inferiores iudicaret, deficeret et discrederet et peccaret.

Et propter hoc est alius modus dicendi, quod duplex est genus peccati: quaedam enim sunt peccata *carnalia*, quaedam vero *spiritualia*. Si loquamur de peccatis *carnalibus*, sic fatendum est, quod non contingit esse peccatum in superiori parte rationis *absque inferiori*. Si autem de peccatis *spiritualibus* fiat sermo, tunc concedendum est, quod peccatum habet fieri et esse, licet non semper fiat, in superiori parte rationis[^18] *secundum se*; et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, sunt concedendae.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium. Nam Augustinus in proposita auctoritate loquitur de progressu in perpetratione[^19] peccatorum *carnalium*.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus semper est rectus; dicendum, quod verbum Philosophi intelligendum est in his, ad quae movet potentia intellectiva per modum *naturae*; in his vero, ad quae movet per modum *deliberationis*, non ha<!-- page 576 -->bet veritatem; unde idem vocat ipse intellectum quod nos vocamus conscientiam naturalem[^20].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quod non solum est peccatum, quando fit conversio ad id quod secundum veritatem est bonum commutabile, sed etiam quando fit conversio ad id quod est bonum incommutabile, et appetitur ut commutabile. — Aliter potest dici, quod superior portio, etsi differat ab inferiori in hoc, quod ipsa convertitur ad superna, nihilominus tamen habet converti ad inferiora, prout disponit et regit inferiores potentias: et sic potest deordinari male eas regendo, sive frena laxando, sive suo imperio eas incurvando.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio superior intendit legibus aeternis; dicendum, quod iste est actus nobilissimus superioris partis; sed non semper hunc actum exercet[^21], immo etiam intendit sibi et ad se convertitur, et sic potest nimie ad se converti, ac per hoc a Deo averti et deviare a legibus aeternis.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sensualitas inclinat ad bonum ut nunc; dicendum, quod sensualitas non semper movetur inordinate; et praeterea, esto quod semper inordinate moveretur, non tamen ex hoc concluditur, quod superior portio rationis semper ordinate moveatur; alia enim vis assignatur, secundum quam semper ordinate movetur, utpote synderesis, quae est scintilla conscientiae.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum convertitur[^22]; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, in quantum *actu* convertitur, sed in quantum est *nata* converti. Praeterea, *inordinate converti* potius est *averti* quam *converti*. Cum autem dicitur, quod conversio ad Deum purgat, illuminat et perficit; hoc intelligitur de *ordinata* conversione, quam non est semper necessarium invenire in actione superioris portionis.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Quaestionibus sex S. Doctor discutit dubium, in quibus potentiis animae et quomodo peccatum esse possit; alii commentatores Lombardi eandem rem plerumque paucioribus quaestionibus absolvunt, ast in solutione satis conveniunt. Communiter utuntur etiam modo metaphorico loquendi, quem ex S. Augustino sumsit Magister (hic c. 7. seq.), dum superiorem partem rationis vocant *virum*, inferiorem vero *mulierem*, sensualitatemque *serpentem*. — Pro faciliore intelligentia harum quaestionum haec praenotamus ex S. Thoma (hic q. 3. a. 1.): «Actus *appetitivarum* virtutum *motus* vocantur, non autem proprie actus *apprehensivarum*. Est autem in nobis triplex appetitus, scilicet *naturalis*, *sensitivus* et *rationalis*. Naturalis quidem appetitus, puta cibi, est, quem non imaginatio gignit, sed ipsa qualitatum naturalium dispositio, quibus naturales vires suas actiones exercent. Hic autem motus in nullo rationi subiacet nec obedit; unde nec in eo peccatum esse potest; et ideo hic praetermittitur. Appetitus autem *sensitivus* est, qui ex praecedenti *imaginatione*, vel *sensu* consequitur, et hic vocatur *motus sensualitatis*. Appetitus autem *rationalis* est, qui consequitur apprehensionem rationis: et hic dicitur *motus rationis*, qui est actus voluntatis. Sed rationis apprehensio dupliciter esse potest: una *simplex* et *absoluta*, quando scilicet statim sine discussione apprehensum diiudicat; et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas, quae dicitur non deliberata. Alia est *inquisitiva*… et talem apprehensionem sequitur voluntas *deliberata*. Ratio ergo *inferior*… utroque modo motum voluntatis circa terrena elicere potest… Ratio autem *superior* quia per se rebus terrenis non intendit, sed solum secundum quod regulatur rationibus aeternis, non sequitur ipsam aliquis motus nisi deliberatus, respectu scilicet horum terrenorum».

**II.** In solutione duarum huius articuli quaest. non est differentia opinionum inter principales Scholasticos nisi quoad I. conclusionem I. quaestionis, cum Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 2. 3.) probabile esse cum quibusdam putet, non *semper*, sed *ut plurimum*, peccata carnalia ex sensualitate, vel ratione inferiore oriri, quia homo, non incitatus aliqua passione, actum gulae vel luxuriae eligere possit. Hoc autem S. Bonav. non concedere videtur nisi respectu *inferioris* partis rationis (infra a. 2. q. 1.).

**III.** De hac et sequente quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 6. (quoad peccatum *veniale*). — Scot., II. Sent. d. 42. q. unica n. 13. seqq., et Report. ibid. q. 1. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 3. 5; S. I. II. q. 74. a. 5. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 12.; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 93. m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 5. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 6. q. 32. (de motibus primis). — De his et 4. seqq. qq. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6, et Biel, q. unica.

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### ARTICLE I.
### *In what manner sin has to come about and to be in the superior part of reason.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether in the superior part of reason there has to be sin in itself.*

About the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that in the superior part of reason in itself — that is, apart from the instinct of the inferior part — there cannot be sin.

1. *First*, through that saying of Augustine against the Manichees[^1], where he speaks thus: «Our reason cannot be led to consent to sin unless delight has first been stirred in that part of the soul which ought to obey reason as its governing husband»: therefore the superior reason never sins unless sin precedes in the inferior part.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third book *On the Soul*[^2]: «The intellect is always right, but imagination is right and not right»: therefore the intellect, so far as it is of itself, never errs: therefore neither does the superior portion deviate from the truth of justice unless it be inclined through sensuality and the inferior portion.

3. Likewise, sin is through conversion to a changeable good[^3]; but the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned to eternal things; the inferior, insofar as it is turned to temporal things: therefore it is impos<!-- page 574 -->sible that sin be or come about in us from an act of the superior part of reason without an act of the inferior.

4. Likewise, the superior reason is so called insofar as it attends to the eternal laws; but it is impossible for anyone to sin except by turning away from the eternal laws[^4]: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

5. Likewise, the woman is the mean between sensuality and the superior reason[^5]; but sensuality always moves toward the good *as for now*, so far as it is of itself: therefore the superior reason, so far as it is of itself, always moves toward the good *simply*. But a power which moves toward the good simply does not sin in moving: therefore in the superior part of reason, so far as it is of itself, there cannot be sin.

6. Likewise, the soul, when it is turned to God, is purged, bettered, and perfected[^6]; but the superior portion of reason is regarded insofar as it is turned to God: therefore, since sin defiles and beclouds, there cannot be sin in the superior part of reason in itself.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Jeremiah, chapter two[^7]: *The sons of Memphis and Taphnes have defiled thee even to the crown of the head*: if therefore the crown, according as the Saints expound it, is there called the apex of the mind or the superior portion of reason; it seems that this too is defiled and befouled through sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the twelfth book, *On the Trinity*[^8]: «The man eats, when the superior portion of reason consents to the enticement»; but to sin belongs to him to whom it belongs to consent: if therefore this belongs to the superior part, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, it happens that someone sins by the sin of unbelief in disbelieving certain articles which are in respect of the divinity; but to those articles only the superior portion of reason extends itself[^9]: therefore in that kind of sinning the superior portion properly commits fault.

4. Likewise, free choice is agreed to be capable of turning; but free choice consists chiefly in the superior portion of reason, since there are chiefly judgment and command[^10]: therefore it seems that in the superior portion of reason also in itself there is turnability toward evil: therefore also sin.

5. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is that which discerns[^11] and judges both about things to be done and things to be believed; but the judgment of a creature, so far as it is of itself, without grace fails of those things which are of the catholic faith: therefore of itself it can err and turn away from them; and if this, it can sin of itself.

6. Likewise, the Angel, when he sinned by the first sin, desired to be made equal to God in power, and the woman likewise in wisdom[^12]; but this is desirable only by the superior part; therefore it seems that both the sin of man and that of the Angel began from the superior part of reason: therefore in the superior part of reason in itself sin has to come about and to be.

### CONCLUSION.

> Although carnal sin cannot be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, nevertheless spiritual sin can come about and be in the superior part of reason in itself.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that the superior portion of reason is nothing other than synderesis, and that the superior portion itself, so far as it is *of itself*, is always right and strong, unless it be bent and softened through the inferior portion; and therefore they said that there is no sin in it *in itself*, but if it sins, this they say to be only by *consenting* to the inferior part, or by not restraining its disorder.

But this position deviates from the truth in three ways. First in this, that it says that the superior portion of reason and synderesis are the same; which is plainly false, since the superior portion of reason and the inferior pertain to the liberty of choice, as Augustine says[^13], and therefore they name the *deliberative* power; but synderesis names the *natural* power, which always uniformly inclines toward the good. — Secondly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says there is in some way sin in synderesis; for this is plainly false, as will be shown below[^14], and the Gloss says expressly, on the first chapter of Ezekiel. — Thirdly it deviates from the truth in this, that it says that in the superior part of reason in itself there cannot be fault[^15], unless <!-- page 575 -->it proceed from the inferior and the occasion be attributed to it. For this is contrary to *reason*, since in that portion consists the liberty of choice, and so by nature there is in it a turnability toward evil, and thus a possibility of sinning. — This is also contrary to *experience*, because the superior reason has to judge not only according to the *eternal laws*, but also has to judge according to its *own light*, and according to the *light acquired for it from the inferior*. And although in looking to the *eternal laws* it does not sin in judging, nevertheless according to those things which it perceives from the *senses*, or also according to the *light* given and innate to it[^16], it can fail and err, especially in the state of fallen nature. For grant that there be set before it something *credible* and some article of faith — for instance the article concerning the Trinity and the Unity, since this not only is repugnant to sense and imagination, but also disagrees with the natural judgment of reason: if our intellect were to judge according to its *own light*, or[^17] by looking to the inferior parts, it would fail and disbelieve and sin.

And on account of this there is another manner of speaking, namely that there is a twofold genus of sin: for some sins are *carnal*, but some *spiritual*. If we speak of *carnal* sins, then it must be granted that sin does not happen to be in the superior part of reason *without the inferior*. But if the discourse be of *spiritual* sins, then it must be conceded that sin has to come about and to be — although it does not always come about — in the superior part of reason[^18] *in itself*; and the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* And through this the reply is evident to that which is first objected to the contrary. For Augustine in the cited authority speaks of the progress in the perpetration[^19] of *carnal* sins.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the intellect is always right; it must be said that the word of the Philosopher is to be understood in those things toward which the intellective power moves by the mode of *nature*; but in those things toward which it moves by the mode of *deliberation*, it does not <!-- page 576 -->hold true; whence he calls "intellect" the same thing which we call the natural conscience[^20].

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that sin is through conversion to a changeable good; it can be answered in two ways: first, that there is sin not only when the conversion is to that which according to truth is a changeable good, but also when the conversion is to that which is an unchangeable good, and it is desired as changeable. — Otherwise it can be said that the superior portion, although it differs from the inferior in this, that it itself is turned to the supernal things, nonetheless still has to be turned to the inferior things, insofar as it disposes and rules the inferior powers: and thus it can be disordered by ruling them badly, whether by loosening the reins, or by bending them to its command.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the superior reason attends to the eternal laws; it must be said that this is the noblest act of the superior part; but it does not always exercise this act[^21], indeed it also attends to itself and is turned to itself, and thus it can be turned to itself excessively, and through this be turned away from God and deviate from the eternal laws.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that sensuality inclines toward the good as for now; it must be said that sensuality is not always moved inordinately; and besides, granted that it were always moved inordinately, yet it is not concluded from this that the superior portion of reason is always moved ordinately; for another power is assigned according to which it is always moved ordinately, namely synderesis, which is the spark of conscience.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the superior portion of reason is so called insofar as it is turned[^22]; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it is *actually* turned, but insofar as it is *born* to be turned. Moreover, *to be turned inordinately* is rather *to be turned away* than *to be turned*. And when it is said that conversion to God purges, illumines, and perfects; this is understood of *ordered* conversion, which it is not always necessary to find in the action of the superior portion.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** In six questions the holy Doctor discusses the doubtful matter of in which powers of the soul, and how, sin can be; other commentators on Lombard for the most part dispatch the same matter in fewer questions, but agree well enough in the solution. They also commonly use the metaphorical manner of speaking which the Master took from St. Augustine (here c. 7 ff.), when they call the superior part of reason the *man*, the inferior the *woman*, and sensuality the *serpent*. — For the easier understanding of these questions we note beforehand these things from St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1): «The acts of the *appetitive* powers are called *motions*, but not properly the acts of the *apprehensive* powers. Now there is in us a threefold appetite, namely the *natural*, the *sensitive*, and the *rational*. The natural appetite, such as for food, is that which imagination does not beget, but the very disposition of the natural qualities by which the natural powers exercise their actions. Now this motion in no way is subject to reason nor obeys it; whence neither can there be sin in it; and therefore it is here passed over. But the *sensitive* appetite is that which follows from a preceding *imagination*, or *sense*, and this is called the *motion of sensuality*. But the *rational* appetite is that which follows the apprehension of reason: and this is called the *motion of reason*, which is the act of the will. But the apprehension of reason can be twofold: one *simple* and *absolute*, namely when it at once without discussion adjudges what is apprehended; and the will, which is called non-deliberate, follows such an apprehension. The other is *inquisitive*… and the *deliberate* will follows such an apprehension. Reason therefore as *inferior*… can elicit the motion of the will about earthly things in either mode… But the *superior* reason, because of itself it does not attend to earthly things, but only insofar as it is regulated by the eternal grounds, no motion follows it except a deliberate one, in respect, that is, of these earthly things».

**II.** In the solution of the two questions of this article there is no difference of opinion among the principal Scholastics except as to the first conclusion of the first question, since Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 4, q. 2, 3) holds it probable, with certain men, that carnal sins arise from sensuality, or from the inferior reason, not *always*, but *for the most part*, because a man, not incited by any passion, can choose an act of gluttony or lust. But St. Bonaventure seems not to concede this except in respect of the *inferior* part of reason (below, a. 2, q. 1).

**III.** On this and the following question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 108, m. 6 (as to *venial* sin). — Scotus, II Sent. d. 42, q. unica, n. 13 ff., and *Reportata* ibid. q. 1, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 3, 5; *Summa* I-II, q. 74, a. 5, 9, 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12; *Summa* p. II, tr. 15, q. 93, m. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 5. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 1, 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 6, q. 32 (on the first motions). — On these and the four following questions, Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6, and Biel, q. unica.

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la: Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12.

en: Book II of *On Genesis against the Manichees*, c. 14, n. 20. See here the text of the Master, c. 12.

la: Text. 51 (c. 10.): *Intellectus igitur omnis (πᾶς) rectus est, appetitus autem et imaginatio recta et non recta.*

en: Text 51 (c. 10): *Every intellect therefore (πᾶς) is right, but appetite and imagination are right and not right.*

la: Secundum August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53, et de Vera Relig. c. 12. n. 23. Cfr. infra d. 38. dub. 6, et d. 42. a. 3. q. 2.

en: According to Augustine, *On Free Choice* II, c. 19, n. 53, and *On True Religion* c. 12, n. 23. Cf. below, d. 38, dub. 6, and d. 42, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Ambros., libr. de Paradiso, c. 8. n. 39, peccatum definit praevaricationem legis divinae et caelestium inobedientiam praeceptorum.

en: Ambrose, in the book *On Paradise*, c. 8, n. 39, defines sin as the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience of the heavenly precepts.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7, ubi per *mulierem* significatur ratio inferior.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7, where by the *woman* is signified the inferior reason.

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. et c. 13. n. 21. — Pro *melioratur* cod. V (F a secunda manu) *illuminatur*; lectio haud incongrua, cum et infra in solutione huius obiect. hoc verbum ab omnibus codd. et edd. exhibeatur nec non supra d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. in fine, ubi de triplici actu hierarchico Angelorum agitur, et etiam in p. I. huius d. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 7, n. 10, and c. 13, n. 21. — For *melioratur* (is bettered) cod. V (F in a second hand) [reads] *illuminatur* (is illumined); a reading not incongruous, since both below in the solution of this objection this word is exhibited by all the codices and editions, and likewise above at d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, at the end, where the threefold hierarchical act of the Angels is treated, and also in Part I of this distinction, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.

la: Vers. 16. Vide infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. arg. 2. ad opp., ubi verba Glossae super hunc locum afferuntur.

en: Verse 16. See below, d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, arg. 2 to the contrary, where the words of the Gloss on this place are adduced.

la: Cap. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 10. seq.

en: Chapter 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 10 f.

la: In cod. F subiungitur: Augustinus, XIII. de Trinitate [c. 1. n. 2. seqq.] dicit, quod ad superiorem portionem rationis spectat quod dicitur: *In principio erat Verbum* usque in verbum *Verbum caro factum est*.

en: In cod. F there is added: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII [c. 1, n. 2 ff.], says that to the superior portion of reason pertains that which is said: *In the beginning was the Word* up to the word *the Word was made flesh*.

la: Quod exponitur d. 25. p. 1. q. 2. seqq.

en: Which is expounded at d. 25, p. 1, q. 2 ff.

la: Plures codd., inter quos F I T Y aa, *decernit*; cod. ee *determinat*.

en: Several codices, among them F I T Y aa, [read] *decernit* (decides); cod. ee [reads] *determinat* (determines).

la: Libr. XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. et c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. 8. 11. — Paulo superius voci *synderesis* cod. X praefigit *ipsa*. Mox pro *et ideo nominant* nonnulli codd., ut aa cc, cum ed. 1 *et ideo nominat*.

en: Book XII of *On the Trinity*, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3, 8, 11. — A little above, to the word *synderesis* cod. X prefixes *ipsa*. Soon, for *et ideo nominant* (and therefore they name) some codices, such as aa cc, with ed. 1 [read] *et ideo nominat* (and therefore he names).

la: Dist. 39. a. 2. q. 3, ubi et Glossa (sumta ex Hieronymo, in Ezech. 1,7.) super Ezechielem 1,10. affertur, quae *synderesim* aquilae comparat et exponit, istam aliis potentiis non se immiscere, sed ipsas errantes corrigere.

en: Distinction 39, a. 2, q. 3, where also the Gloss (taken from Jerome, on Ezekiel 1:7) on Ezekiel 1:10 is adduced, which compares *synderesis* to the eagle and expounds that it does not mingle itself with the other powers, but corrects them when they err.

la: Cod. B *culpa non est nec esse potest*.

en: Cod. B [reads] *fault is not nor can be*.

la: Vat. *fidei*, quae lectio parum congruit, quare lectionem codd. F Q Y aa bb ee recepimus. Cod. K *fidei sibi*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *fidei* (of faith), which reading agrees little, wherefore we have received the reading of codices F Q Y aa bb ee. Cod. K [reads] *fidei sibi*.

la: Pro *vel*, quod ex cod. aa (F a secunda manu) restituimus, alii codd. cum Vat. et ceteris edd. falso habent *nihil*; aliter proxime post pro *partes inferiores* legendum esset *partes superiores*.

en: For *vel* (or), which we have restored from cod. aa (F in a second hand), the other codices, with the Vatican edition and the rest of the editions, wrongly have *nihil* (nothing); otherwise just after, for *partes inferiores* (inferior parts) one would have to read *partes superiores* (superior parts).

la: Cod. A hic addit: quia in ea est liberi arbitrii libertas, et ita per naturam vertibilitas ad malum, et sic possibilitas ad peccandum in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori.

en: Cod. A here adds: because in it is the liberty of free choice, and so by nature turnability toward evil, and thus a possibility of sinning in the superior part of reason without the inferior.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *in perpetrationem*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *in perpetrationem* (unto the perpetration).

la: Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Vat., pro *idem* substituto *ibidem*, post *vocat ipse* cum edd. 2, 3, 4 interiicit *secundum veritatem*.

en: Cf. below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1 f. — The Vatican edition, with *ibidem* substituted for *idem*, after *vocat ipse* inserts, with editions 2, 3, 4, *secundum veritatem* (according to truth).

la: Cod. aa: sed non semper homo illum actum exercet nec [pro] semper.

en: Cod. aa: but a man does not always exercise that act, nor [for] *semper* (always).

la: Nimirum, ut in codd. L O (F a secunda manu) bb, adiicitur *ad Deum*.

en: Namely, as in codices L O (F in a second hand) bb, there is added *ad Deum* (to God). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 573–576 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p57{3,4,5,6}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR span ~40168–40346. The IA djvu OCR for the running prose (arguments + Sed contra) is unusually clean here and was used as the base; the cascade-prone Respondeo three-opinion refutation (pp.574–575) and the SCHOLION I S. Thomae quotation (pp.575–576) were reflowed and verified column-by-column against the PDF bands. OCR digit-garbles corrected against the PDF: footer ³ (p.573) confirmed *Text. 51 (c. 10.)*; footer ⁴ (p.573) confirmed *de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53* (OCR had n.33).
- **Alignment confirmed.** ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I body opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in superiori parte rationis secundum se… non possit esse peccatum* (raw 40175) matches the TRACTATIO sub-question *Primo quaeritur, utrum in superiori parte rationis habeat esse peccatum secundum se*. The short ART I opener *Circa primum quaeruntur duo* lives in the TRACTATIO (held by `d24-p2-divisio`), NOT folded here, because ART I carries TWO full quaestiones (per the corrected Pars II structure). Question closes after SCHOLION III on p.576; QUAESTIO II *Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum* (raw 40346) opens immediately below on p.576.
- **Page span.** pp. 573–576 (PDF 595–598, offset +22; running heads `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. I.` / `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`). Page breaks placed mid-sentence: p.573→574 at *impos|sibile est* (arg 3); p.574→575 at *culpa non potest esse, nisi |ab inferiori procedat* (Respondeo, third deviation); p.575→576 at *non ha|bet veritatem* (Ad 2). The CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + replies Ad 1–6 + SCHOLION I (long) occupy pp.574–576; SCHOLION II–III close at the foot of p.576-L before QUAESTIO II.
- **Apparatus + footer-split map (22 entries [^1]–[^22], renumbered continuously):**
  - **p.573 footers ²–⁴ → [^1]–[^3]** (RECEIVED from `d24-p2-divisio`, which consumed only footer ¹). [^1]=² (de Gen. contra Manich., anchors arg 1 *contra Manichaeos*); [^2]=³ (Text. 51 de Anima, anchors arg 2); [^3]=⁴ (de Lib. Arb. commutabile, anchors arg 3).
  - **p.574 footers ¹–¹² → [^4]–[^15].** Left-col ¹–⁶ = [^4]–[^9] (¹ Ambros. de Paradiso → arg 4; ² lit. Magistri mulier → arg 5; ³ XII de Trin melioratur var. → arg 6; ⁴ Ierem. vers.16 → Sed contra 1; ⁵ Cap.12 n.17 → Sed contra 2; ⁶ cod.F Augustinus XIII → Sed contra 3). Right-col ⁷–¹² = [^10]–[^15] (⁷ d.25 p.1 q.2 → Sed contra 4 *iudicium et imperium*; ⁸ decernit var. → Respondeo arg 5 *discernit*; ⁹ supra d.5/d.22 → arg 6 *in sapientia*; ¹⁰ XII de Trin → Respondeo *sicut dicit Augustinus*; ¹¹ d.39 a.2 q.3 Glossa → Respondeo *sicut infra*; ¹² cod.B → Respondeo *culpa non potest esse*).
  - **p.575 footers ¹–⁷ → [^16]–[^22].** Left-col ¹–³ = [^16]–[^18] (¹ Vat. fidei var. → Respondeo *lumen sibi*; ² vel/nihil var. → Respondeo *vel aspiciendo*; ³ cod.A addit → Respondeo *in superiori parte rationis secundum se*). Right-col ⁴–⁷ = [^19]–[^22] (⁴ in perpetrationem var. → Ad 1 *perpetratione*; ⁵ d.39 a.1 q.1 / secundum veritatem var. → Ad 2 *conscientiam naturalem*; ⁶ cod.aa exercet → Ad 4 *hunc actum exercet*; ⁷ ad Deum addit → Ad 6 *convertitur*).
  - **SCHOLION carries NO numbered footers** — SCHOLION I (S. Thomae triplex appetitus), II (Richard. a Med. dissent), III (commentator-roll) all use inline citations only.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d24-p2-divisio`: p.573 footers ²–⁴ ([^1]–[^3]) + the ART I q1 body that opens on p.573 below the divisio. *Forwarded* to `d24-p2-a1-q2`: none — QUAESTIO II opens fresh at the foot of p.576 (raw 40346) with its own footer series; SCHOLION III closes q1 on p.576-L just above QUAESTIO II.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All headings, the nine arguments, the four Sed contra, the CONCLUSIO, the three-opinion Respondeo, the six replies, and SCHOLION I–III crisp at 450 dpi. Marginal side-glosses trimmed (*Opinio 1*, *Reprob. tripliciter*, *Alia solutio*, *Duplex resp.*, *Ratio opinionum*, *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*).
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I (long S. Thomae *triplex appetitus naturalis/sensitivus/rationalis* preamble for the whole six-question set), SCHOLION II (the sole inter-Scholastic dissent = Richard. a Med. on carnal sin *ut plurimum* vs *semper*), SCHOLION III (the doctor-roll for this and the following question).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 576 -->

### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia contingit circa aliquem articulum fidei ex surreptione dubitare; et constat, ibi esse peccatum, cum sit motus ad illicitum; constat etiam, esse in superiori parte, cum sit circa[^1] articulos fidei respectu aeternorum; constat etiam, esse veniale, cum sit ex surreptione: ergo etc.

2. Item, tunc peccat superior portio rationis, et *vir comedit*, quando est plenus consensus, et praebentur *arma iniquitatis peccato*[^2]; sed contingit, aliquem plene consentire in verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum, et haec non sunt nisi peccata venialia: ergo etc.

3. Item, superior portio rationis est corrupta, sicut et inferior, cum originale omnes vires animae inficiat et debilitet[^3]: ergo si peccatum veniale potest esse in aliis viribus, quae subsunt libero arbitrio, propter corruptionem, quam accepit ex originali, eadem ratione et in parte superiori.

4. Item, contingit, quod aliquis in convertendo se ad Deum per amorem est negligens; sed non magis tenetur homo ad hoc mandatum quam ad alia: ergo si negligentia in aliorum mandatorum observatione est venialis, ergo et negligentia in amando Deum est venialis. Sed hoc est in superiori parte rationis: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus dicit et Magister in littera[^4] recitat, quod, quando «superior pars rationis consentit illecebrae, tunc est peccatum damnabile et mortale»: ergo videtur, quod quandocumque peccatum superiorem partem attingit, statim sit mortale.

2. Item, penes superiorem partem rationis residet regula directionis in toto regno animae; sed facta obliquatione in regula, iam non remanet aliqua rectitudo nec species rectitudinis: igitur cum superior portio rationis peccat, deordinatur tota anima; ergo si plena deordinatio non est absque mortali peccato, videtur etc.

3. Item, nulla creatura est excellentior anima quantum ad superiorem portionem, sicut Augustinus in multis locis[^5] innuit et dicit expresse; sed Angelus propter suam dignitatem non potest peccare nisi mortaliter: ergo videtur pari ratione, quod nec peccatum veniale possit esse in superiori parte.

4. Item, «nihil est adeo veniale, quod non fiat[^6] peccatum mortale, dum placet»; sed complacentia tunc vere dicitur, quando superior pars rationis ad culpam incurvatur; hoc autem est, cum ipsa peccat: ergo non videtur, quod aliquod peccatum possit in ea esse, quin sit mortale.

<!-- page 577 -->

### CONCLUSIO.

> Probabilius est, quod peccatum veniale in ratione superiori possit esse.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod in superiori portione rationis non potest esse nisi mortale peccatum, et hoc propter elongationem sui a carne et a sensualitate, in qua consistit initium suggestionis malae, et ex cuius pronitate habet esse peccatum veniale secundum statum[^7] naturae lapsae. Et hi dixerunt, quod cum sint tres gradus in potentiis animae, correspondentes *serpenti*, *mulieri* et *viro*, videlicet *sensualitas*, *portio inferior* et *superior*; sensualitatis est tantum peccare venialiter, superioris partis tantum mortaliter, inferioris partis utroque modo. Cum enim sit media inter utramque, naturam sapit utriusque.

Sed quia planum est, in superiori portione rationis posse esse aliquo modo motus inordinatos ex surreptione; planum est etiam, in ea esse corruptionem aliquam ex originalis contractione: ideo aliis videtur probabilius et melius, quod peccatum veniale in ratione superiori habeat esse. Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

**Ad argumenta pro opposito:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quando *superior pars rationis comedit*[^8], damnabile est et mortale peccatum; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de *pleno consensu*, et hoc respectu illius peccati, cuius actus est in prohibitione, sicut est de peccato fornicationis.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod penes superiorem partem residet regula directionis; dicendum, quod regula directionis non tollitur per qualecumque peccatum, sed per illud quod inducit divinum contemptum et aversionem a Deo; hoc autem non est in quolibet peccato superioris partis, utpote in illo quod ex surreptione committitur.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla creatura est superior anima secundum mentem; dicendum, quod etsi nulla sit superior secundum ordinem *efficientis* et *finis*, est tamen aliqua maioris *dignitatis* et excellentis naturae, et propter hoc minorem habet excusationem. — Praeterea, nulla natura rationalis in statu innocentiae potest peccare venialiter, ut supra[^9] ostensum est; nulla autem natura rationalis lapsa de culpa potest consequi veniam, nisi homo propter fragilitatem carnis; et ideo non valet illud quod obiicit de Angelo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod complacentia facit de veniali mortale; dicendum, quod complacentia non dicit ibi quamcumque inclinationem, sed *plenum consensum* et deliberatum cum quadam plena quietatione; et ita ex hoc non concluditur, quod omnis deordinatio superioris partis cedat in genus[^10] peccati mortalis.

---

english:
<!-- page 576 -->

### QUESTION II.
### *Whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether in the superior portion of reason there can be venial sin. And that there can be, it seems:

1. Because it happens that someone doubts about some article of faith by surprise; and it is agreed that there is sin there, since it is a motion toward the illicit; it is agreed also that it is in the superior part, since it is about[^1] the articles of faith in respect of eternal things; it is agreed also that it is venial, since it is from surprise: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the superior portion of reason then sins, and *the man eats*, when there is full consent, and *the weapons of iniquity are furnished to sin*[^2]; but it happens that someone fully consents to an idle word and a jesting lie, and these are nothing but venial sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the superior portion of reason is corrupted, just as the inferior, since the original [sin] infects and weakens all the powers of the soul[^3]: therefore if venial sin can be in the other powers which are subject to free choice, on account of the corruption which it received from the original [sin], by the same reasoning also in the superior part.

4. Likewise, it happens that someone is negligent in turning himself to God through love; but a man is not bound more to this commandment than to the others: therefore if negligence in the observance of the other commandments is venial, then also negligence in loving God is venial. But this is in the superior part of reason: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine says, and the Master in the text[^4] recites, that, when «the superior part of reason consents to the enticement, then there is damnable and mortal sin»: therefore it seems that whenever sin reaches the superior part, it is straightway mortal.

2. Likewise, with the superior part of reason resides the rule of direction in the whole kingdom of the soul; but once a deflection has been made in the rule, there now remains no rectitude nor semblance of rectitude: therefore when the superior portion of reason sins, the whole soul is disordered; therefore if a full disorder is not without mortal sin, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, no creature is more excellent than the soul as to its superior portion, as Augustine in many places[^5] suggests and says expressly; but the Angel on account of its dignity cannot sin except mortally: therefore it seems by parity of reasoning that neither can venial sin be in the superior part.

4. Likewise, «nothing is so venial that it does not become[^6] mortal sin while it pleases»; but complacency is then truly so called when the superior part of reason is bent to fault; and this is when it itself sins: therefore it does not seem that any sin can be in it without being mortal.

<!-- page 577 -->

### CONCLUSION.

> It is more probable that venial sin can be in the superior reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that in the superior portion of reason there can be only mortal sin, and this on account of its remoteness from the flesh and from sensuality, in which consists the beginning of evil suggestion, and from whose proneness venial sin has its being according to the state[^7] of fallen nature. And these said that, since there are three grades in the powers of the soul, corresponding to the *serpent*, the *woman*, and the *man*, namely *sensuality*, the *inferior portion*, and the *superior*; it belongs to sensuality to sin only venially, to the superior part only mortally, to the inferior part in both modes. For since it is the mean between both, it tastes of the nature of each.

But since it is plain that in the superior portion of reason there can in some way be disordered motions from surprise; and it is plain also that there is in it some corruption from the contraction of the original [sin]: therefore to others it seems more probable and better that venial sin has its being in the superior reason. Hence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the opposite:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that when *the superior part of reason eats*[^8], the sin is damnable and mortal; it must be said that this is understood of *full consent*, and this in respect of that sin whose act lies in a prohibition, as is the case with the sin of fornication.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that with the superior part resides the rule of direction; it must be said that the rule of direction is not taken away by just any sin, but by that which induces divine contempt and turning away from God; but this is not in every sin of the superior part, such as in that which is committed from surprise.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that no creature is superior to the soul according to mind; it must be said that, although none is superior according to the order of *efficient [cause]* and *end*, there is nevertheless something of greater *dignity* and of more excellent nature, and on account of this it has less excuse. — Moreover, no rational nature in the state of innocence can sin venially, as was shown above[^9]; but no fallen rational nature can obtain pardon from fault, unless a man on account of the frailty of the flesh; and therefore that which it objects about the Angel does not hold.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that complacency makes a mortal [sin] out of a venial one; it must be said that complacency does not there mean any inclination whatever, but *full consent* and deliberate, with a certain full repose; and so from this it is not concluded that every disorder of the superior part passes over into the genus[^10] of mortal sin.

---

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et ed. 4 addit *aut contra*; ac subinde cum eisdem sociis post *fidei* subiicit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, with one or another codex and ed. 4, adds *aut contra* (or against); and thereupon, with the same companions, after *fidei* (of faith) it subjoins *et* (and).

la: Rom. 6, 13: Sed neque exhibeatis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato etc. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 11.

en: Romans 6:13: But neither yield ye your members as weapons of iniquity unto sin, etc. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 11.

la: Vide supra d. 22. a. I. q. I. in corp. et infra d. 31. a. I. q. 2. seq. — Contra meliores codd., ut C L O R S T bb, Vat. *debilitet*. Paulo inferius pro *quam accepit*, quae est lectio multorum codd. et ed. 2, Vat. *quam accipit*, codd. F V *quae accidit*. Cod. V subinde voci *originali* addit *peccato*.

en: See above, d. 22, a. I, q. I, in the body, and below, d. 31, a. I, q. 2 f. — Against the better codices, such as C L O R S T bb, the Vatican edition [reads] *debilitet* (weakens). A little below, for *quam accepit* (which it received), which is the reading of many codices and ed. 2, the Vatican edition [reads] *quam accipit* (which it receives), codices F V *quae accidit* (which befalls). Cod. V thereupon adds to the word *originali* the word *peccato* (sin).

la: Hic c. 11, quod est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. — In fine arg. ante *mortale* cum codd. F H W X V etc. contra Vat. aliasque edd. posuimus *sit* pro *fit*.

en: Here c. 11, which is from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17. — At the end of the argument, before *mortale* (mortal), with codices F H W X V etc., against the Vatican and the other editions, we have placed *sit* (be) for *fit* (becomes).

la: Libr. XIV. de Trin. c. 14. n. 20: *Sic enim [mens] ordinata est naturarum ordine, non locorum, ut supra illam non sit nisi ille.* Cfr. ibid. XV. c. 1. n. 1; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 25, et supra pag. 48, nota 3. De *minori*, quam cod. L cum propos. praeced. coniungit, substituens *quod* pro *sed*, vide supra d. 7. p. 1. a. I. q. I. et d. 21. a. 3. q. 1. seq.

en: Book XIV of *On the Trinity*, c. 14, n. 20: *For thus [the mind] is ordered by the order of natures, not of places, that there be nothing above it save He.* Cf. ibid. XV, c. 1, n. 1; VII of *On Genesis to the Letter*, c. 19, n. 25, and above p. 48, note 3. On the *minor* [premise], which cod. L joins with the preceding proposition, substituting *quod* for *sed*, see above, d. 7, p. 1, a. I, q. I, and d. 21, a. 3, q. 1 f.

la: De hac propositione, quae tum in Glossa, 1. Cor. 11, 29 tum in Iure can. 3. d. 25 (ubi in nota adiecta citatur hom. 24. in Ioan.), tum a Scholasticis Augustino tribuitur, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 12. In libro *de Sancta Virginit.* c. 30. n. 30 Augustinus ait: *Eadem ipsa [parva peccata] fiunt magna et gravia, si eis superbia incrementum et pondus adiecerit.*

en: On this proposition, which is attributed to Augustine both in the Gloss, 1 Corinthians 11:29, and in the Canon Law 3, d. 25 (where in an added note hom. 24 *On John* is cited), and also by the Scholastics, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 12. In the book *On Holy Virginity*, c. 30, n. 30, Augustine says: *Those very same [small sins] become great and grave, if pride add to them increase and weight.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 hic interserunt *tamen*.

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 here insert *tamen* (nevertheless).

la: Cod. aa *quod cum superior pars consentit*.

en: Cod. aa [reads] *quod cum superior pars consentit* (that when the superior part consents).

la: Dist. 21. a. 3. q. 1. — De praeced. ratione cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. et d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *excellentis* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *excellentioris*.

en: Distinction 21, a. 3, q. 1. — On the preceding reasoning cf. above, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, and d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, for *excellentis* (of more excellent) the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 [read] *excellentioris* (of a more excellent).

la: Ita cod. aa, alii non bene *in genere*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *cadat in genus*. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Thus cod. aa; others, not well, [read] *in genere* (in the genus), the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 *cadat in genus* (passes over into the genus). — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 576–577 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p57{6,7}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR span ~40346–40427. p.576 is two-column (q1 SCHOLION II–III in the top bands, then the QUAESTIO II header spanning both columns, then the q2 arguments in two columns: left = arg 1–4 openings, right = Sed contra 1–4); p.577 left column = CONCLUSIO + Respondeo two-opinion + replies Ad 1–2 opener, right column = replies Ad 2–4. Reflowed column-by-column against the bands; OCR running prose used only to confirm exact footnote-marker spacing.
- **Alignment confirmed.** Body opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum in superiori portione rationis possit esse veniale peccatum* (raw 40351) matches the TRACTATIO sub-question *Secundo quaeritur, utrum possit in ea esse veniale* (held by `d24-p2-divisio`). LAST quaestio of Pars II ARTICULUS I. Structure = 4 arguments + Sed contra (3 — the OCR/PDF show three *Sed contra* members, numbered 1–4 in print but member "1" carries the *Sed contra* lead and the count of contrary members is 4 by Quaracchi numbering) + CONCLUSIO (raw 40395, *Probabilius est…*) + Respondeo (two-opinion: the *only-mortal* opinion vs the *probabilius/melius* venial-possible opinion) + replies Ad 1–4. Closes after *Ad 4* on p.577; ARTICULUS II opener *Circa secundum principale… quaeruntur duo* (raw 40432) + QUAESTIO I (raw 40437) open immediately below on p.577.
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 577 -->

### ARTICULUS II.
### *Qualiter peccatum habeat fieri in inferiori parte rationis.*

Circa secundum principale, scilicet quo quaeritur, quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in inferiori parte rationis, quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte[^1] absque sensualitate.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum mortale possit esse in ea parte rationis, superiori non peccante.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod nullum peccatum possit esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini contra Manichaeos[^2], ubi ait sic: «In unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur nunc, cum ad peccatum quisque dilabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus: serpente, muliere et viro»: ergo si peccatum illud incepit a serpente, et sensualitas est serpens, ut ipse dicit, omne peccatum incipit a sensualitate.

2. Item, sicut omnem consensum praecedit delectatio, ita omnem delectationem praecedit aliqua suggestio; sed nullum peccatum rationis est absque aliqua delectatione: ergo nec delectatio sine suggestione; suggestio autem non est nisi partis sensibilis[^3] vel serpentis: ergo nullum peccatum est in <!-- page 578 -->inferiori parte rationis, quod non incipiat a sensualitate.

3. Item, inferior ratio non peccat, nisi quia appetit bonum *ut nunc*; sed vis, quae appetit bonum *ut nunc*, est sensualitas: ergo non peccat nisi praevia sensualitate.

4. Item, «nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu[^4]»: ergo pari ratione nihil est in ratione, quod prius non fuerit in sensualitate: ergo si ratio deordinatur, necesse fuit, sensualitatem prius deordinari.

5. Item, omnia peccata actualia ortum habent a peccato originali, et potissime a concupiscentia, quae ex originali peccato nobis inolevit; sed tam originale peccatum quam concupiscentia inest animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem[^5]; vis autem, secundum quam anima coniungitur carni, est ipsa sensualitas: ergo omne peccatum animae incipit a sensualitate: ergo absque ea in inferiori parte rationis peccatum non potest fieri.

**Sed contra:** 1. Magis est coniuncta superior portio inferiori, quam ipsa inferior portio sensualitati, cum ratio superior et inferior spectent ad eandem potentiam et naturam. Si ergo peccatum potest fieri in superiori parte rationis absque inferiori, sicut supra[^6] probatum est, videtur multo fortius, quod possit fieri in inferiori absque sensualitate.

2. Item, possibile est, inferiorem partem rationis peccare peccato spirituali, appetendo aliquod spirituale bonum; sed sensualitas non appetit nisi bonum sensuale: ergo potest peccare inferior portio absque sensualitate.

3. Item, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior[^7]: ergo si sensualitas potest de se moveri inordinate ad aliquod appetibile sine viribus superioribus, multo fortius superior potentia, utpote rationis pars inferior, inordinate moveri potest absque sensualitate.

4. Item, in diabolo non est sensualitas, cum non habeat coniungi cum carne; sed constat, quod ipse habet peccare non solum in Deum, sed etiam in hominem. Si ergo peccatum in creaturam attenditur secundum aspectum rationis, quem vocamus inferiorem partem rationis; videtur, quod absque sensualitate contingat illam portionem peccare.

Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc: quid est inferiorem portionem rationis *comedere*? Et quando delectatio transit a sensualitate in rationem? Si tu dicas, quod hoc est, quando ratio advertit et percipit, se delectari; tunc duplex est inconveniens: unum, quia frequenter homo consummat peccatum et nihil cogitat nisi de appetibili, nec advertit, se delectari vel tristari; et ita videtur, quod aliquis possit peccare mortaliter, ita quod inferior portio non comedat. Aliud etiam inconveniens concluditur, quia, cum *percipere* delectationem non sit malum nec peccati augmentativum, iam videtur, quod perceptio rationis post suggestionem sensualitatis culpam non aggravaret; quod plane et manifeste falsum nemo esse dubitat.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Inferior rationis portio aliquo genere peccati peccare potest absque suggestione sensualitatis; tamen in genere peccati carnalis vix, aut nunquam peccat sine sensualitatis motu.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut innuit Magister in fine huius distinctionis[^8], sensualitas dupliciter potest accipi. Aliquando accipitur pro vi, quae appetit bonum *ut nunc*; et haec non solummodo est in parte sensibili, immo etiam in rationali. Et sine motu sensualitatis hoc modo dictae nunquam contingit esse peccatum in inferiori parte rationis; semper enim, cum quis peccat, bonum *ut nunc* exoptat. — Alio modo dicitur sensualitas vis animae sensibilis, qua intenditur in corporis sensus, sicut habitum est supra[^9]. Et sine hac contingit esse peccatum in inferiori parte quantum ad peccata spiritualia; quantum autem ad carnalia vix, aut nunquam. In carnalibus enim[^10] corruptio venit ex foeditate carnis et concupiscentia partis sensibilis; et ita in eis peccatum incipit a *serpente* sive a sensualitate et pervenit ad *mulierem*.

Tunc autem dicitur esse in sensualitate, quando quis ex apprehensione delectabilis oblectatur et inclinatur ante adversionem[^11] et perceptionem suae delectationis; hoc enim ex surreptione est, nec dicitur ratio aliquo modo propter illam delectationem de vetito cibo gustasse. Sed tunc *ratio comedit*, et peccatum in ea esse incipit, quando post delectationis adversionem et perceptionem, sensualitati delectanti condelectatur et in delectatione persistit. Ex tunc enim, scilicet post delectationis adversionem, <!-- page 579 -->*ratio comedere* dicitur, et *peccatum transire a sensualitate in ipsam*; quoniam, etsi *iudicare* de delectabili et in eo *delectari*, hoc sit partis sensibilis, *percipere* tamen ipsam delectationem interiorem, hoc est partis rationalis. Et ideo *ratio comedere* dicitur, si post talem perceptionem parti sensibili condelectetur.

Sic igitur concedo, quod aliquo genere peccati peccare potest inferior rationis portio absque suggestione sensualitatis, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt. Aliquo vero genere peccati vix, aut nunquam peccat, utpote carnalis[^12], nisi motus sensualitatis praecedat et trahat. Et quantum ad hoc peccati genus loquitur Augustinus contra Manichaeos.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum, quod obiicitur in contrarium.

*Ad 2, 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnem delectationem praecedit suggestio; dicendum, quod si suggestio large accipitur ad omnem apprehensionem boni *ut nunc* sub ratione appetibilis, sic verum est, quod praecedit omnem delectationem. Si vero accipiatur stricte pro illo motu serpentino partis sensibilis, sic non habet veritatem in omnibus peccatis, sed solum in peccatis carnis. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod sensualitas est vis appetitiva *boni ut nunc*; ibi enim accipitur sensualitas large; et sic, ut praeostensum est, absque ea non potest esse peccatum in inferiori portione rationis, quamvis esse possit absque sensualitate dicta proprie, saltem peccatum spirituale.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu; dicendum, quod verum est vel *in se*, vel *in suo simili*[^13]. Multa tamen fingit homo, quae nunquam vidit; multa etiam, postquam vidit, cogitat, ita quod illa cogitatio non excitatur a potentia sensitiva movente. Ita etiam intelligi potest de ratione et sensualitate.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia peccata habent ortum ab originali concupiscentia; dicendum, quod etsi omne peccatum quodam modo ex originali ortum habeat, et originale ex carne; non tamen oportet, omne peccatum tanquam ex proximo movente ortum habere ex carne vel sensualitate, pro eo quod originale peccatum non tantum inficit partem *sensibilem*, immo inficit partem *rationalem* et corrumpit. Unde concupiscentia respersa est in omnibus viribus animae; et ideo, sive sensualitas sit praeambula, sive non, omnia mala nostra dicuntur provenire ex concupiscentia.

### SCHOLION

**I.** De termino *sensualitatis* observat S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), «quod differt sensualitas et sensibilitas. Sensibilitas enim omnes vires sensitivae partis comprehendit, tam apprehensivas de foris, quam apprehensivas de intus, quam etiam appetitivas. Sensualitas autem magis proprie illam tantum partem nominat, per quam movetur animal in aliquod appetendum vel fugiendum». Et ibid. ad 2. dicit: «Ad sensualitatem aliquid pertinet dupliciter: vel sicut existens de essentia eius, et sic videtur tantum *appetitivam* partem continere; vel sicut *praeambulum* ad ipsam, sicut ratio ad libertatem pertinet». — Paulo aliter S. Bonav. de *sensualitate* (non de sensibilitate) loquitur, hic dub. 3, cum asserat, quod sensualitas «simul comprehendit sensibiles cognitivas et motivas, sicut et arbitrii libertas». Eadem differentia inter utrumque Doctorem occurrit quoad arbitrii libertatem, de quo vide infra d. 23. p. I. q. 3. 4. De sensualitate diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. m. 1-4.

**II.** De hac quaest. explicite tractant Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 3.

**III.** Quoad sequentem quaest. omnes in conclusionibus consentiunt. Durand. (hic q. 6.) addit distinctionem inter delectationem, quae sequitur actum simplicem cogitationis de obiecto pravo, et aliam, quae sequitur actum *reflexum*, et quae potest esse tum de *obiecto principali*, tum de *secundario*, scilicet de *cogitatione* obiecti; et haec non semper est proprie delectatio morosa et peccatum mortale, immo potest esse sine peccato. — Attentione dignum est quod circa finem responsionis dicitur de consensu interpretativo in proprio sensu, ad quem requiritur, quod quis, postquam periculum satis advertit, delectationem non repellit. — De eadem quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 109. m. 9. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 4; S. I. II. q. 13. a. 4, q. 74. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 93. m. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 2.

---

english:
<!-- page 577 -->

### ARTICLE II.
### *In what manner sin comes to be in the inferior part of reason.*

Concerning the second principal [point], namely that in which it is asked in what manner sin comes to be and to exist in the inferior part of reason, two [questions] are raised.

First it is asked whether any sin has its being in the inferior part[^1] without sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether mortal sin can be in that part of reason, the superior part not sinning.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether any sin has its being in the inferior part of reason without sensuality.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that no sin can be in the inferior part of reason without sensuality:

1. First by the authority of Augustine *Against the Manichees*[^2], where he says thus: «In each one of us nothing else is now done, when anyone slips into sin, than was done then in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man»: therefore if that sin began from the serpent, and sensuality is the serpent, as he himself says, every sin begins from sensuality.

2. Likewise, just as delectation precedes every consent, so some suggestion precedes every delectation; but no sin of reason is without some delectation: therefore neither is delectation without suggestion; but suggestion belongs only to the sensible part[^3] or to the serpent: therefore no sin is in the <!-- page 578 -->inferior part of reason which does not begin from sensuality.

3. Likewise, the inferior reason does not sin except because it desires the good *as now*; but the power which desires the good *as now* is sensuality: therefore it does not sin except by sensuality going before.

4. Likewise, «there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense[^4]»: therefore by parity of reasoning there is nothing in reason which was not first in sensuality: therefore if reason is disordered, it was necessary that sensuality be disordered first.

5. Likewise, all actual sins have their origin from original sin, and especially from concupiscence, which has grown ingrained in us from original sin; but both original sin and concupiscence are in the soul from its conjunction to the flesh[^5]; but the power according to which the soul is conjoined to the flesh is sensuality itself: therefore every sin of the soul begins from sensuality: therefore without it sin cannot come to be in the inferior part of reason.

**On the contrary:** 1. The superior portion is more conjoined to the inferior than the inferior portion itself is to sensuality, since the superior and inferior reason pertain to the same power and nature. If therefore sin can come to be in the superior part of reason without the inferior, as was proved above[^6], it seems much more strongly that it can come to be in the inferior without sensuality.

2. Likewise, it is possible for the inferior part of reason to sin by a spiritual sin, by desiring some spiritual good; but sensuality desires nothing but a sensible good: therefore the inferior portion can sin without sensuality.

3. Likewise, whatever the inferior power can do, the superior power can do[^7]: therefore if sensuality can of itself be moved inordinately toward some object of desire without the superior powers, much more strongly can the superior power, namely the inferior part of reason, be moved inordinately without sensuality.

4. Likewise, in the devil there is no sensuality, since he is not [meant] to be conjoined with flesh; but it is agreed that he can sin not only against God, but also against man. If therefore sin against a creature is regarded according to the aspect of reason which we call the inferior part of reason, it seems that without sensuality it happens that that portion sins.

Likewise, in connection with this it is asked: what is it for the inferior portion of reason to *eat*? And when does delectation pass over from sensuality into reason? If you say that this is when reason notices and perceives that it is being delighted; then there is a twofold incongruity: one, because frequently a man consummates sin and thinks of nothing but the object of desire, nor notices that he is being delighted or saddened; and so it seems that someone could sin mortally in such a way that the inferior portion does not eat. Another incongruity is also concluded, because, since to *perceive* delectation is not evil nor augmentative of sin, it now seems that the perception of reason after the suggestion of sensuality would not aggravate the fault; which no one doubts to be plainly and manifestly false.

### CONCLUSION.

> The inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality; yet in the genus of carnal sin it scarcely, or never, sins without a motion of sensuality.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as the Master intimates at the end of this distinction[^8], sensuality can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the power which desires the good *as now*; and this is not only in the sensible part, but also in the rational. And without a motion of sensuality so understood it never happens that there is sin in the inferior part of reason; for always, when someone sins, he longs for the good *as now*. — In another way sensuality is called the power of the sensible soul by which one is bent toward the senses of the body, as was treated above[^9]. And without this it happens that there is sin in the inferior part as regards spiritual sins; but as regards carnal [sins] scarcely, or never. For in carnal [sins][^10] corruption comes from the foulness of the flesh and the concupiscence of the sensible part; and so in them sin begins from the *serpent*, that is from sensuality, and reaches the *woman*.

But it is then said to be in sensuality, when someone is delighted from the apprehension of something delectable and is inclined [to it] before the noticing[^11] and perception of his delectation; for this is from a stealthy onset, nor is reason said in any way, on account of that delectation, to have tasted of the forbidden food. But then *reason eats*, and sin begins to be in it, when after the noticing and perception of the delectation it takes delight together with the delighting sensuality and persists in the delectation. For from then, namely after the noticing of the delectation, <!-- page 579 -->*reason* is said *to eat*, and *sin to pass over from sensuality into it*; because, although *to judge* concerning something delectable and *to be delighted* in it belongs to the sensible part, yet *to perceive* that interior delectation belongs to the rational part. And therefore *reason* is said *to eat*, if after such perception it takes delight together with the sensible part.

Thus therefore I concede that the inferior portion of reason can sin by some genus of sin without the suggestion of sensuality, as the reasons adduced for the second part show. But by some genus of sin it scarcely, or never, sins, namely the carnal[^12], unless a motion of sensuality precede and draw it. And it is with regard to this genus of sin that Augustine speaks *Against the Manichees*.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* And by this the response to the first, which is objected to the contrary, is clear.

*To 2 and 3.* To that which is objected, that suggestion precedes every delectation; it must be said that if suggestion is taken broadly for every apprehension of the good *as now* under the aspect of the desirable, thus it is true that it precedes every delectation. But if it is taken strictly for that serpentine motion of the sensible part, thus it does not hold true in all sins, but only in sins of the flesh. — And by this the response to the following [objection] is clear, by which it is said that sensuality is the appetitive power of the *good as now*; for there sensuality is taken broadly; and thus, as was shown before, without it there cannot be sin in the inferior portion of reason, although there can be [sin] without sensuality properly so called, at least spiritual sin.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense; it must be said that this is true either *in itself* or *in its likeness*[^13]. Yet a man imagines many things which he never saw; many things also, after he has seen them, he thinks of, in such a way that that thinking is not excited by a moving sensitive power. So too it can be understood concerning reason and sensuality.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that all sins have their origin from original concupiscence; it must be said that, although every sin in some manner has its origin from the original [sin], and the original from the flesh; nevertheless it is not necessary that every sin have its origin from the flesh or sensuality as from a proximate mover, for the reason that original sin not only infects the *sensible* part, but rather infects and corrupts the *rational* part. Hence concupiscence is sprinkled throughout all the powers of the soul; and therefore, whether sensuality be the forerunner or not, all our evils are said to come from concupiscence.

la: Nempe, ut cod. bb supplet, *rationis*.

en: Namely, as cod. bb supplies, *rationis* (of reason).

la: Libr. II. c. 14. n. 21. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12. — In textu allegato multi codd. cum primis edd. omittunt *aliud*. Paulo post pro *sensualitas* plures codd., ut H T V W aa, cum ed. 2 perperam substituunt *peccatum*.

en: Book II [of *On Genesis Against the Manichees*], c. 14, n. 21. See here the text of the Master, c. 12. — In the quoted text many codices, with the first editions, omit *aliud* (else). A little after, for *sensualitas* (sensuality) several codices, such as H T V W aa, with ed. 2 wrongly substitute *peccatum* (sin).

la: Vat. et aliae edd. *sensualis* contra antiquiores codd. Utraque lectio defendi potest; cfr. pag. seq., nota 5.

en: The Vatican edition and the other editions [read] *sensualis* (of the sensual) against the older codices. Either reading can be defended; cf. the following page, note 5.

la: Secundum Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 39. (c. 8.), et de Sensu et sens. c. 6. Cfr. supra p. I. huius dist. a. 2. q. 4. et infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 39 (c. 8), and *On Sense and the Sensed* c. 6. Cf. above, p. I of this distinction, a. 2, q. 4, and below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. infra d. 31. a. I. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1.

la: Art. praeced. q. 1. — De *maiori* vide huius dist. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: The preceding article, q. 1. — On the *major* [premise] see this distinction, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. hoc explicat respectu virtutum intellectualium.

en: Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* V, prose 4, explains this with respect to the intellectual powers.

la: Cap. 12. — Paulo inferius pro *in parte sensibili* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *in parte sensuali*, quae permutatio vocis *sensualis* cum voce *sensibilis* in subsequentibus saepius occurrit in edd. et etiam in nonnullis codd. Secuti sumus semper antiquiores codd., quando utuntur voce *sensibilis*.

en: Chapter 12. — A little below, for *in parte sensibili* (in the sensible part) the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 [read] *in parte sensuali* (in the sensual part), which interchange of the word *sensualis* with the word *sensibilis* recurs rather often in what follows in the editions and also in some codices. We have always followed the older codices, when they use the word *sensibilis*.

la: Hic p. I. a. 2. q. 2, d. 21. a. 2. q. 1. seq., ibid. dub. 4. nec non infra dub. 3. huius dist.

en: Here, p. I, a. 2, q. 2; d. 21, a. 2, q. 1 f., ibid. dub. 4; and also below, dub. 3, of this distinction.

la: Plures codd., ut F aa, cum primis edd. *autem*.

en: Several codices, such as F aa, with the first editions [read] *autem* (however).

la: Sive *animadversionem*. Nam secundum Forcellini (Totius latin. Lexicon) «*adverso* idem est quod *adverto*, itaque *adversare animo* idem est quod *advertere*, *versare animo*, *animadvertere*». Et «*adversio animi* hoc est *animadversio*». — Paulo inferius pro *nec dicitur ratio* cod. cc cum ed. 1 *nec dicitur rationalis*.

en: Or *animadversionem* (advertence). For according to Forcellini (*Lexicon of the whole Latin tongue*) «*adverso* is the same as *adverto*, and so *adversare animo* is the same as *advertere*, *versare animo*, *animadvertere*». And «*adversio animi* is this *animadversio*». — A little below, for *nec dicitur ratio* (nor is reason said) cod. cc with ed. 1 [reads] *nec dicitur rationalis* (nor is it said rational).

la: Cod. aa voci *carnalis* praemittit *peccati*.

en: Cod. aa prefixes *peccati* (of sin) to the word *carnalis* (carnal).

la: Sicut v. g. in effectu est similitudo suae causae, et in creatura similitudo Dei. Haec responsio iuvat ad explicanda ea quae infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in fine de eadem re proponuntur.

en: As for example in an effect there is a likeness of its cause, and in a creature a likeness of God. This response helps to explain those things which are proposed below, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, on the same matter. ---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the term *sensuality* St. Thomas observes (here q. 2, a. 1) «that sensuality and sensibility differ. For sensibility comprehends all the powers of the sensitive part, both those apprehending from without and those apprehending from within, and also the appetitive [powers]. But sensuality more properly names only that part by which the animal is moved toward something to be desired or to be fled». And in the same place, ad 2, he says: «Something pertains to sensuality in two ways: either as existing from its essence, and thus it seems to contain only the *appetitive* part; or as a *forerunner* to it, as reason pertains to liberty». — A little differently does St. Bonaventure speak concerning *sensuality* (not concerning sensibility), here, dub. 3, when he asserts that sensuality «comprehends at once the sensible cognitive and motive [powers], just as the liberty of choice does». The same difference between the two Doctors occurs as to the liberty of choice, on which see below, d. 23, p. I, q. 3, 4. Alexander of Hales disputes at length concerning sensuality, S. p. II, q. 68, m. 1–4.

**II.** This question is explicitly treated by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 3.

**III.** As to the following question, all agree in their conclusions. Durandus (here q. 6) adds a distinction between the delectation which follows a simple act of thinking about an evil object, and another which follows a *reflex* act, and which can be either about the *principal object* or about the *secondary*, namely about the *thinking* of the object; and this is not always properly a morose delectation and a mortal sin, but rather can be without sin. — Worthy of attention is what is said toward the end of the response about interpretative consent in the proper sense, for which it is required that someone, after he has sufficiently noticed the danger, does not repel the delectation. — On the same question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 109, m. 9. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III, q. 74, a. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 4; S. I-II, q. 13, a. 4, q. 74, a. 7. — Bl. Albert, here a. 13; S. p. II, tr. 13, q. 93, m. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 2.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands of pp. 577–579 (crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p57{7,8,9}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR span ~40428–40585. This chunk was **created fresh** (the auto-chunker dropped `d24-p2-a2-q1`). All three pages are two-column; reflowed column-by-column (Left top→bottom, then Right), OCR running prose used only to confirm exact footnote-marker spacing. Running heads confirm pages: p.577 `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`, p.578 `578 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`, p.579 `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 579` (the p.579 running head already reads QUAEST. II because QUAESTIO II opens at the foot of that page). OCR digit-mangle: p.578 printed `878`, p.579 printed `b79` — trust the running-head text + offset (pdf = printed + 22), not OCR digits.
- **Alignment confirmed.** ART II opener *Circa secundum principale, scilicet quo quaeritur, quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in inferiori parte rationis, quaeruntur duo* (raw 40428) + TRACTATIO sub-questions (Primo *utrum aliquod peccatum habeat esse in inferiori parte absque sensualitate* = this q1; Secundo *utrum peccatum mortale possit esse in ea parte rationis, superiori non peccante* = a2-q2). Per Override §5 the short ART II opener is folded into this q1 (no standalone a2-divisio chunk). Body opener *Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod nullum peccatum possit esse in inferiori parte rationis absque sensualitate* (raw 40441) matches the TRACTATIO sub-q1. Structure = 5 arguments + Sed contra (4 members) + an incidental-questions paragraph (*Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc: quid est inferiorem portionem rationis comedere?*) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (two senses of *sensualitas*) + Epilogus (*Sic igitur concedo…*) + replies Ad 1 / Ad 2,3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5 + SCHOLION I–III. Closes after SCHOLION III at the foot of p.579; QUAESTIO II opens immediately below (raw 40582, body opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori*).
- **Page-break placement.** p.577→578 break placed mid-arg-2 (*…peccatum est in* | *inferiori parte rationis*), matching the printed column overflow. p.578→579 break placed mid-Respondeo (*…post delectationis adversionem,* | *ratio comedere dicitur*).
- **Apparatus + footer-split map (13 entries [^1]–[^13], renumbered continuously):**
  - **p.577 footers ⁵–⁷ → [^1]–[^3] (RECEIVED from `d24-p2-a1-q2`).** [^1]=⁵ (cod. bb supplet *rationis* → ART II opener TRACTATIO *in inferiori parte¹*); [^2]=⁶ (Libr II de Gen. contra Manich. c.14 / omittunt *aliud* → arg 1 *contra Manichaeos²*); [^3]=⁷ (Vat. *sensualis* var. → arg 2 *partis sensibilis³*).
  - **p.578 footers ¹–⁸ → [^4]–[^11].** Left-col ¹–⁴ + right-col ⁵–⁸. [^4]=¹ (Aristot. de Anima → arg 4 *in sensu⁴*); [^5]=² (Cfr. infra d.31 → arg 5 *coniunctione… ad carnem⁵*); [^6]=³ (Art. praeced. q.1 → Sed contra 1 *sicut supra⁶ probatum*); [^7]=⁴ (Boeth. de Consol. → Sed contra 3 *potest virtus superior⁷*); [^8]=⁵ (Cap. 12 / *in parte sensibili* var. → Respondeo *in fine huius distinctionis⁸*); [^9]=⁶ (Hic p.I a.2 q.2 etc. → Respondeo *sicut habitum est supra⁹*); [^10]=⁷ (Plures codd. *autem* → Respondeo *In carnalibus enim¹⁰*); [^11]=⁸ (Sive *animadversionem* / Forcellini → Respondeo *ante adversionem¹¹*).
  - **p.579 footers ¹–² → [^12]–[^13] (q1 share).** [^12]=¹ (cod. aa *carnalis* / *peccati* → Epilogus *utpote carnalis¹²*); [^13]=² (Sicut v.g. in effectu… similitudo → Ad 4 *vel in suo simili¹³*).
  - **p.579 footers ³–⁴ do NOT belong here** — they anchor in QUAESTIO II (³ Cfr. supra d.22 a.4 q.1 / cod. bb *etiam*; ⁴ Cap. 12 / August. XII de Trin c.12), which opens at the foot of p.579-R below this chunk → **forwarded to `d24-p2-a2-q2`.**
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs.** *Received* from `d24-p2-a1-q2`: p.577 footers ⁵–⁷ + the ARTICULUS II opener + the ART II q1 body that open on p.577 below a1-q2 (now → [^1]–[^3] above). *Forwarded* to `d24-p2-a2-q2`: p.579 footers ³–⁴ + the QUAESTIO II body that opens at the foot of p.579 (raw 40582). NOTE for the next agent: QUAESTIO II's body opener title is *Utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori* (p.579-R) while the TRACTATIO/resume lists it as *…superiori non peccante* — the two are the same question (verify alignment by the *Secundo quaeritur* lead at raw 40582).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All five arguments, the four contrary members, the incidental-questions paragraph, the CONCLUSIO, the two-sense Respondeo, the Epilogus, the four reply-blocks (Ad 1 / Ad 2,3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5), and SCHOLION I–III crisp at 450 dpi. Marginal side-glosses trimmed (*Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Quaestiones incidentes*, *Conclusio*, *Duplex sensualitas*, *Ad quam incidentem*, *Epilogus*, *Notandum*).
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I (S. Thomas on the *sensualitas* vs *sensibilitas* distinction + S. Bonaventure's differing usage), II (Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Aegid. R. who treat *this* question), III (Durandus on the *following* question + the full commentator-roll *De eadem quaest.*). SCHOLION carries no numbered footers (inline citations only).