title: Dist. 28, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 690 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit, redarguens verbum Pelagii: *Gratiam libero arbitrio infideli calliditate supponebat dicens, ad hoc eam dari hominibus* etc. Videtur enim, quod verum diceret Pelagius. Si enim gratia habitus est, et omnis habitus reddit potentiam facilem; videtur, quod ad hoc detur gratia libero arbitrio, ut *facilius* possit exire in bona opera. Si tu dicas, quod in hoc non repellit eum[^1], sed in hoc quod negabat[^2], quod nullum *posse* libero arbitrio conferebat; videtur, quod in hoc etiam verum dicebat, quoniam, si solius potentiae est *posse*, et gratia non est potentia: ergo non dat novum *posse*. — Item, nullus alius habitus affert novam[^3] potentiam ei in quo est: ergo videtur, quod nec gratia; aut si in gratia hoc est, quaero: quare magis in ipsa quam in aliis?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quidam est habitus, qui ortum habet a potentia, sicut ille qui per assuefactionem acquiritur ab eo in quo est; et de tali habitu verum est, quod non dat novam potentiam, sed priorem potentiam habilitat. Est et alius habitus, qui desursum descendit et non solum dependet ab eo in quo, sed magis ab eo a quo; et talis habitus habet potentiam nobilitare[^4], et potest etiam illud, in quo est,
<!-- page 691 -->
movere et supra se elevare, ratione illius *a quo procedit*; et talis habitus est ipsa gratia[^5]. Et quoniam Pelagius non attribuebat plus habitui gratiae quam aliis habitibus, hinc est, quod Augustinus et Magister arguunt eum tanquam haereticum. — Et per hoc patent ea quae obiecta sunt.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod reprehendit Pelagium in littera, in hoc scilicet quod dicebat, *gratiam Dei, qua liberantur homines ab impietate, secundum merita dari.* Videtur enim, quod verum diceret, per illud quod dicit Hieronymus de filio prodigo[^6]: « Nulla maior iustitia est quam ignoscere poenitenti et ad misericordiam revertenti misericordiae sinum aperire ». Si ergo iustitia retribuit unicuique secundum merita[^7], videtur, quod homo revertendo ad divinam misericordiam mereatur sibi gratiam Dei. — Item, nos videmus, quod homo potest mereri gratiam hominis per obsequia sibi impensa: ergo pari ratione videtur, et multo fortius, quod mereri possit gratiam Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod gratiam primam non contingit mereri, tum quia[^8] est fundamentum omnis meriti et principium, tum etiam, quia est donum pure gratuitum. Nisi enim quis habeat gratiam Dei, nihil apud Deum mereri potest merito condigni, quia sine illa nihil acceptat Deus in operibus nostris. Rursus, ipsa est ita donum gratuitum, quod non redditur meritis. Sicut enim dicit Apostolus ad Romanos undecimo[^9]: *Si gratia est ex meritis, iam gratia non est gratia.* — Et ex hoc patet, quantum Pelagius adversabatur divinae gratiae, qui dicebat, aliquem eam posse mereri. Auferebat enim ipsi gratiae suam *dignitatem* et excellentiam, dum eam meritis liberi arbitrii supponebat. Auferebat etiam suam *efficaciam*, dum potestatem merendi alii quam gratiae attribuebat.

Ad illud verbum Hieronymi dicendum, quod *iustitia* ibi dicitur divinae bonitatis condecentia, non prout respicit meritorum exigentiam[^10].

Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia hominis, dicendum, quod non est simile: tum quia acceptatio hominis non est ita mere gratuita, sicut divina; tum etiam, quia non est ita aequa ponderatrix, sicut illa.

Si autem quaeratur, utrum aliquis in statu gratiae existens possit sibi mereri primam gratiam post recidivum, et hoc orando et petendo, ut si caderet, Deus illum[^11] relevaret; dicendum, quod non potest ex merito *condigni*, sed solum ex merito *congrui*. Nam meritum *condigni* implicat perseverantiam, pro eo quod peccatum subsequens mortificat et in oblivionem ducit bona opera prius facta[^12].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Pelagii, quod ponit Magister in littera: *Si non potest homo facere ea quae iubentur, non est imputandum ei ad mortem.* Videtur enim, quod verum dicat Pelagius, quamvis Magister contradicat. Nam Hieronymus[^13] dicit: « Anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »: ergo si praecepit homini habenti liberum arbitrium, videtur, quod Pelagius verum dicat. Item, Augustinus in quodam Sermone[^14]: « Servum pigrum non damnaret, si ea quae fieri non poterant, imperaret »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

Quaeritur ergo, pro quanto verbum illud habeat veritatem, quod « nullus peccat in eo quod non potest facere, vel vitare[^15] ».

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod posse aliquid *facere, vel vitare* dupliciter alicui potest attribui. Uno modo dicitur aliquis aliquid posse, quia *per se ipsum* sine aliquo alieno suffragio potest illud, sicut aliquis potest comedere, cum est sanus et habet cibum. Alio modo dicitur aliquis aliquid posse, non solum quia potest illud *per se et in se,* sed quia potest *cum alio,* quod sibi praesto est; et *hoc modo* accipiendo *posse,* omne quod Deus praecipit, in nostra potestate est, quia ipse qui praecipit, praesto est praebere gratiam adiuvantem, per quam possumus perficere; *alio*[^16] modo accipiendo *posse,* non omne quod praecipit est in nostra potestate. Nec tamen ex hoc excusatur aliquis: sicut si praeciperet dominus servo, quod daret sibi ad bibendum, et ipse non haberet aquam, si posset eam acquirere, non excusaretur; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — *Secundo modo* accipiendo *posse,* sive aliquis possit in se, sive per divinum auxilium, intelligit Augustinus[^17], et hoc insinuat eius verbum:
<!-- page 692 -->
« Quis, inquit, peccat in eo, quod nullo modo evitari potest »? Et sic intellexit etiam Hieronymus, cum dixit, illum « esse anathema, qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile ». Pelagius autem accepit *primo modo,* et ideo erravit et plus attribuit libero arbitrio, quam posset. — Aliter etiam consuevit responderi, quod praedicta verba intelliguntur de impotentia *naturali,* non de illa impotentia, in quam homo ex *culpa sua* se ipsum intrusit: sicut Anselmus[^18] ponit exemplum de servo, qui debuit ire ad nundinas et praecipitavit se ipsum in foveam. Sed primus modus exponendi errorem Pelagii magis excludit.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Augustinus dicit in littera: *Nihil tam est in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas*. Hoc enim videtur esse falsum per experientiam. Facilius enim est homini ieiunare et magnos labores sustinere quam inimicum suum diligere; facilius est etiam omnia bona sua dispergere quam voluntatem suam subiugare. Item, si hoc verum esset, ergo videtur, quod cum bonitas hominis consistat in voluntate, quod homo posset se facere talem, qualem vellet.

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc dici potest, quod illud intelligitur cum[^19] auxilio gratiae Dei, pro eo quod bona voluntas quantum ad *actum volendi* non recipit impedimentum, si habeat auxilium gratiae, sed quantum ad *opus exterius* impedimentum recipit. Unde omnia bona possumus velle, non tamen omnia facere. Et sic videtur Augustinus intelligere, includendo auxilium gratiae, non excludendo, sicut excludebat Pelagius[^20].

Aliter potest responderi, quod *velle* in nobis dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, ut nominat actum potentiae affectivae, ut est quaedam potentia naturalis; alio modo, ut nominat actum liberi arbitrii. Primo modo *velle* aliquid idem est quod *affici* circa illud; alio modo *velle* idem est quod *eligere*[^21]. Unde secundum hos duos actus distinguitur in nobis voluntas *appetitus* et voluntas *eligentiae;* non quia sint in nobis istae duae voluntates essentialiter differentes, sed quia modus volendi est aliter et aliter. Dico ergo, quod verbum Augustini non intelligitur de voluntate *appetitus,* quae aliquando adeo adhaeret alicui rei, ut vix vel nunquam possit ab ea separari; sed hoc intelligitur de voluntate *eligentiae,* qua aliquis vult, se velle quod vult, vel nolle[^22]. Et hoc semper in nostra potestate est; non tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod *iustitia* sit in nostra voluntate, quia non est efficax, nisi in quantum praevalet voluntati appetitus; et illi non praevalet nisi per gratiam. Unde multi sunt peccatores, qui vellent esse iusti, et vellent, quod nunquam affectarent mala: nihilominus tamen in sua remanent iniustitia, quia non adiuvantur a gratia divina[^23].

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, refuting the word of Pelagius: *He cunningly substituted grace for the unbelieving free choice, saying that it is given to men for this purpose,* etc. For it seems that Pelagius spoke truly. For if grace is a habit, and every habit renders a power facile, it seems that grace is given to free choice for this, that it may *more easily* go forth into good works. But if you say that he does not rebuke him in this[^1], but in that he denied[^2] that he conferred any *power* upon free choice, it seems that in this too he spoke truly, since, if "to be able" belongs to power alone, and grace is not a power, then it gives no new *power*. — Likewise, no other habit brings a new[^3] power to that in which it is: therefore it seems that neither does grace; or if this is the case with grace, I ask: why rather in it than in others?

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a certain habit which has its origin from a power, like that which is acquired by habituation in the one in whom it is; and concerning such a habit it is true that it does not give a new power, but renders the prior power apt. And there is another habit which descends from above and depends not only on that in which it is, but more on that from which it is; and such a habit has the property of ennobling[^4] a power, and can also
<!-- page 691 -->
move and elevate above itself that in which it is, by reason of that *from which it proceeds*; and such a habit is grace itself[^5]. And because Pelagius did not attribute more to the habit of grace than to other habits, hence it is that Augustine and the Master argue against him as a heretic. — And through this what was objected is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he reproves in Pelagius in the text, namely in this, that he said that *the grace of God, by which men are freed from impiety, is given according to merits.* For it seems that he spoke truly, by that which Jerome says concerning the prodigal son[^6]: « There is no greater justice than to pardon the penitent and to open the bosom of mercy to one returning to mercy ». If therefore justice renders to each one according to merits[^7], it seems that a man, by returning to the divine mercy, merits for himself the grace of God. — Likewise, we see that a man can merit the favor of a man by services rendered to him: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems, and much more strongly, that he can merit the grace of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that first grace cannot be merited, both because[^8] it is the foundation and principle of all merit, and also because it is a purely gratuitous gift. For unless one has the grace of God, he can merit nothing before God by condign merit, since without it God accepts nothing in our works. Again, it is so a gratuitous gift that it is not given in return for merits. For as the Apostle says to the Romans, in the eleventh chapter[^9]: *If grace is from merits, then grace is no longer grace.* — And from this it is clear how greatly Pelagius opposed the divine grace, who said that someone could merit it. For he took away from grace itself its *dignity* and excellence, when he made it depend on the merits of free choice. He took away also its *efficacy,* when he attributed the power of meriting to another than to grace.

To that word of Jerome it must be said that *justice* is there called a befittingness of the divine goodness, not insofar as it regards the requirement of merits[^10].

To that which is objected concerning the favor of a man, it must be said that it is not similar: both because the acceptance of a man is not so purely gratuitous as the divine, and also because it is not so equal a weigher as that.

But if it be asked whether one existing in the state of grace can merit for himself first grace after a relapse, and this by praying and asking that, if he should fall, God would[^11] raise him up; it must be said that he cannot by merit of *condignity,* but only by merit of *congruity.* For merit of *condignity* implies perseverance, since a subsequent sin mortifies and leads into oblivion the good works previously done[^12].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of Pelagius, which the Master sets down in the text: *If a man cannot do those things which are commanded, it is not to be imputed to him unto death.* For it seems that Pelagius speaks truly, although the Master contradicts. For Jerome[^13] says: « Let him be anathema who says that God commanded the impossible »: therefore if He commanded a man having free choice, it seems that Pelagius speaks truly. Likewise, Augustine in a certain Sermon[^14]: « He would not condemn the lazy servant, if He commanded things that could not be done »: therefore the same returns as before.

It is asked therefore, to what extent that word has truth, namely that « no one sins in that which he cannot do, or avoid[^15] ».

**I respond:** It must be said that to be able to *do, or avoid* something can be attributed to someone in two ways. In one way someone is said to be able to do something, because *by himself,* without any external help, he can do it, as someone can eat when he is healthy and has food. In another way someone is said to be able to do something, not only because he can do it *by himself and in himself,* but because he can do it *together with another* which is at hand to him; and taking *posse* in *this way,* everything which God commands is in our power, because He who commands is at hand to furnish the helping grace through which we are able to accomplish it; taking *posse* in *another*[^16] way, not everything which He commands is in our power. Nor yet is anyone thereby excused: just as if a master should command a servant to give him something to drink, and the servant had no water, if he could acquire it he would not be excused; so it must be understood in the case at hand. — Taking *posse* in the *second way,* whether one can do it in himself or through divine help, Augustine understands[^17], and his word suggests this:
<!-- page 692 -->
« Who, he says, sins in that which can in no way be evaded »? And so Jerome too understood, when he said that he is « anathema who says that God commanded the impossible ». But Pelagius took it in the *first way,* and therefore he erred and attributed more to free choice than it could do. — In another way also it has been customary to respond, that the aforesaid words are understood of *natural* incapacity, not of that incapacity into which a man has thrust himself by *his own fault:* as Anselm[^18] gives the example of the servant who had to go to the market and threw himself headlong into a pit. But the first manner of explaining excludes the error of Pelagius more.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the text: *Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself*. For this seems to be false by experience. For it is easier for a man to fast and to bear great labors than to love his enemy; it is easier also to scatter all his goods than to subdue his own will. Likewise, if this were true, then it seems that, since the goodness of a man consists in the will, a man could make himself such as he would will.

**I respond:** To this it can be said that this is understood with[^19] the help of the grace of God, for this reason, that a good will, as to the *act of willing,* does not receive an impediment, if it has the help of grace, but as to the *exterior work* it does receive an impediment. Hence we can will all good things, but not do them all. And thus Augustine seems to understand it, by including the help of grace, not excluding it, as Pelagius excluded it[^20].

In another way it can be responded that *to will* is taken in us in two ways: in one way, as it names the act of the affective power, which is a certain natural power; in another way, as it names the act of free choice. In the first way to *will* something is the same as to be *affected* about it; in the other way to *will* is the same as to *choose*[^21]. Hence according to these two acts the will of *appetite* and the will of *choice* are distinguished in us; not because these two wills are essentially different in us, but because the manner of willing is in one way and in another. I say therefore that the word of Augustine is not understood of the will of *appetite,* which sometimes adheres so much to some thing that it can scarcely or never be separated from it; but this is understood of the will of *choice,* by which one wills, to will what he wills, or to nill[^22]. And this is always in our power; yet it does not follow from this that *justice* is in our will, because it is not efficacious except insofar as it prevails over the will of appetite; and it does not prevail over the latter except through grace. Hence there are many sinners who would wish to be just, and would wish that they might never crave evils: nevertheless they remain in their injustice, because they are not helped by the divine grace[^23].

---

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Supple cum cod. V *gratia.* Vat. sic: *non reprehendit eum, sed in hoc quod asserebat, scilicet quod.* Pro *repellit* cod. M *refellit.*

en: Supply with codex V *gratia.* The Vatican edition thus: *non reprehendit eum, sed in hoc quod asserebat, scilicet quod.* For *repellit* codex M reads *refellit.*

la: Edd., excepta I, omittunt *novam,* et pro *affert* ponunt *aufert.*

en: The editions, except the first, omit *novam,* and for *affert* put *aufert.*

la: Cod. F *et nobiliorem facere.*

en: Codex F: *et nobiliorem facere.*

la: Vide supra d. 26. q. 3. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.

en: See above, d. 26, q. 3. — Compare on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 2.

la: Epist. 21. ad Damasum de Duobus Filiis, n. 34: *Porro, quae maior iustitia Dei, quam ignoscere poenitentibus, filium suscipere redeuntem?*

en: Letter 21, to Damasus, On the Two Sons, n. 34: *For what greater justice of God is there than to pardon the penitent, to receive back the returning son?*

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Ethic. c. 5.

en: Compare Aristotle, *Ethics* V, c. 5.

la: Codd. Y aa addunt *ipsa.*

en: Codices Y aa add *ipsa.*

la: Vers. 6: *Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.* — Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Verse 6: *But if by grace, then not now by works; otherwise grace is no more grace.* — Compare above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vide verbum Anselmi supra pag. 667, nota 4.

en: See the word of Anselm above, page 667, note 4.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1. *ipsum.*

en: Codex cc and the first edition: *ipsum.*

la: Ezech. 18, 24: *Si autem averterit se iustus a iustitia sua... omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecerat, non recordabuntur.* — Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 3. a. 2. § 2.

en: Ezekiel 18:24: *But if the just man turn himself away from his justice... all his justices which he had done shall not be remembered.* — Compare above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. III, q. 61, m. 3, a. 2, § 2.

la: In Explanat. Symboli ad Damasum: *Exsecramur etiam eorum blasphemiam, qui dicunt, impossibile aliquid homini a Deo praeceptum esse.*

en: In the *Exposition of the Creed to Damasus:* *We also execrate the blasphemy of those who say that anything impossible has been commanded to man by God.*

la: Serm. 54. (alias 2. de Verbis Domini) c. 2. n. 2.

en: Sermon 54 (otherwise 2, *On the Words of the Lord*), c. 2, n. 2.

la: August., 1. Retract. c. 9. n. 5, et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: *Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest?* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 9, n. 5, and *On Free Choice* III, c. 18, n. 50: *For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against?* Compare here the Master's text, c. 3.

la: Intellige cum Vat. *primo.*

en: Understand with the Vatican edition *primo.*

la: Qui in eodem sensu in libro de Natura et gratia, contra Pelagium, c. 43. n. 50. dicit: *Non igitur Deus impossibilia iubet; sed iubendo admonet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis.* Cfr. ibid. c. 15. n. 16. — Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 *Primo modo* pro *Secundo modo;* non recte; Vat. nec unum nec alterum exhibet.

en: Who, in the same sense, in the book *On Nature and Grace, against Pelagius,* c. 43, n. 50, says: *God therefore does not command impossible things; but by commanding He admonishes both to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot.* Compare the same, c. 15, n. 16. — A little before, very many codices, with editions 1, 3, 4, read *Primo modo* for *Secundo modo;* not rightly; the Vatican edition exhibits neither one nor the other.

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 24. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: [Anselm,] *Cur Deus homo,* Book I, c. 24. — Compare on this doubt Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

la: Edd., excepta I, *de.*

en: The editions, except the first, read *de.*

la: Vide August., I. Retract. c. 9. n. 4.

en: See Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 9, n. 4.

la: Cfr. Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. qu. 3. c. 11, ubi voluntatem distinguit in voluntatem-affectionem et voluntatem-usum. Cfr. supra pag. 683, nota 3.

en: Compare Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice,* qu. 3, c. 11, where he distinguishes the will into will-as-affection and will-as-use. Compare above, page 683, note 3.

la: Cod. O bene adiungit *quod non vult.* Subinde pro *Et hoc* codd. C R S et alii *Et haec,* scil. voluntas eligentiae. Mox pro *in nostra voluntate* codd. E cc et ed. 1 *in nostra potestate,* cod. B *in nostra potestate et voluntate.*

en: Codex O well adds *quod non vult.* Then for *Et hoc* codices C R S and others read *Et haec,* namely the will of choice. Soon for *in nostra voluntate* codices E cc and the first edition read *in nostra potestate,* codex B *in nostra potestate et voluntate.*

la: Hoc dubium solvunt etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 8.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text 8.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (Vol II two-column inversion; PDF pp. 712–714 = printed pp. 690–692, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 48134–48281 (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk is the **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI** for DISTINCTIO XXVIII — the final unit of d.28. Four doubts: DUB. I (grace as ennobling habit / Pelagius' "no new power"), DUB. II (whether first grace can be merited, with the relapse/congruity quaestio incidens), DUB. III (Pelagius' "if a man cannot do what is commanded…" — the twofold sense of *posse*), DUB. IV (Augustine's *Nihil tam in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas* — voluntas appetitus vs. eligentiae). **Verified DUB count = 4** (DUB. I–IV; all four carry explicit headers in the PDF — DUB. IV's header is at p.692 L-col, confirmed at 450 dpi, contra the OCR which fragmented it).

**Page-split / footer map.**
- p.690 (R-col): DUB. I opens after q3's epilogue under the centered "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI". DUB. I body footers 5–8 → [^1]–[^4].
- p.690→691 seam: DUB. I body runs from p.690 R-col into p.691 L-col top (*…et potest etiam illud, in quo est, ‖ movere et supra se elevare…*) — grammatically continuous. DUB. I tail footer (p.691 L f1) → [^5].
- p.691 (L-col): DUB. II (footers 2–8 → [^6]–[^12], including the *quaestio incidens* on meriting first grace after relapse, p.691 R-col top). (R-col): DUB. III opens; footers 9–13 → [^13]–[^17].
- p.691→692 seam: DUB. III Respondeo runs from p.691 R-col into p.692 (*…intelligit Augustinus, et hoc insinuat eius verbum: ‖ « Quis, inquit, peccat…»*) — grammatically continuous.
- p.692 (L-col): DUB. III tail + DUB. IV. DUB. IV body runs into p.692 R-col (*…non recipit impedimentum… ‖ quantum ad opus exterius…*). p.692 footers run continuously across both columns 1–6: footer **1** (`Cur Deus homo I, c. 24`) → [^18], anchored on *Anselmus* in **DUB. III's tail** (servant/market/pit example), NOT the DUB. IV opener; footers **2–6** → [^19]–[^23] in DUB. IV. Block ends at *…non adiuvantur a gratia divina* (raw 48279), immediately before **DISTINCTIO XXIX** (raw 48282). (See RESOLVED [?] note below for the 2026-05-30 [^18] re-anchor.)

**Apparatus count = 23 entries** [^1]–[^23] (DUB. I = 5, DUB. II = 7, DUB. III = 6, DUB. IV = 5; [^18] = p.692 footer 1 re-anchored to DUB. III's *Anselmus* 2026-05-30, see RESOLVED [?] note).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none — a2-q3 closed clean before the DUBIA header; q3 owns its p.690 body footers 1–3 (de Magistro / Dionysii / Vat-variant) and footer 4 (Bernard *Cur Deus homo* / *de Lib. Arb.* c.14). FORWARDED: none — the chunk is clipped at DISTINCTIO XXIX. p.692 footer 1 (Anselm *Cur Deus homo* c.24) belongs to THIS chunk as DUB. III's [^18] (re-anchored 2026-05-30; see RESOLVED [?] note below); the NOTAE-AD-LIBR.-SENTENTIARUM block (footer 1 = *Cap. 106. n. 28* on *Augustinus in Enchiridio*) + the rest of DIST. XXIX cap. I footers belong to the next chunk (d.29).

**Dup-resolution.** The dubia was split across two auto-chunked skeletons: `bon-sent-II-d28-dubia` (raw 48136–48172 = DUB. I only) and `bon-sent-II-d28-dubia-dup2` (raw 48173–48311 = DUB. II/III/IV + an over-run tail into DISTINCTIO XXIX). Confirmed dup2 was a genuine over-range continuation, NOT a misfiled quaestio (the d.27 misfile pattern does not apply). Both have been merged into this single canonical chunk, clipped at raw 48281 (the over-run into DIST. XXIX dropped). `bon-sent-II-d28-dubia-dup2.md` is removed (`git rm`) in the same commit.

**[?] flags (1) — RESOLVED 2026-05-30 (decade polish-blocker, Pass 1).** The parked ambiguity was the assignment of p.692 footer 1 (`Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 24. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar.`), which had been anchored as DUB. IV's opener marker [^18] at the Augustine dictum *Nihil tam est in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas* — a source mismatch (Augustine dictum vs. an Anselm *Cur Deus homo* def). Resolved authoritatively against the 450 dpi PDF (`vol2-p692-{L-0,L-1,L-2,R-0,R-1,R-2}.png`):
- p.692 footer numbering restarts at the page top and runs continuously across both columns: **1–5 in the L-col footer band, 6 in the R-col band.**
- **Footer 1 (`Cur Deus homo I, c. 24`) anchors at the marker ¹ printed on *Anselmus* in DUB. III's tail** — `sicut Anselmus¹ ponit exemplum de servo, qui debuit ire ad nundinas et praecipitavit se ipsum in foveam` — which is precisely Anselm's servant-going-to-market / pit example from *Cur Deus homo* I, c. 24. NOT the DUB. IV opener, and NOT a DIST. XXIX footer. [^18] has been **moved** from the DUB. IV opener to *Anselmus* in DUB. III (both Latin and English bodies); the def text is unchanged (it was always footer 1 = Anselm) and the En now reads "[Anselm,] *Cur Deus homo*…".
- **The DUB. IV opener dictum *Nihil tam est in nostra potestate quam ipsa voluntas* carries NO printed footnote marker** (it is flagged inline as *in littera* = the Master's/Lombard text), so no Augustine source footer was missed; the marker was removed from the opener.
- DUB. IV's own markers on p.692 are **2–6**: ²=`Edd., excepta I, de.` at *cum² auxilio gratiae Dei* ([^19], unchanged, correct); ³=`Vide August., I. Retract. c. 9. n. 4` at *excludebat Pelagius* ([^20]); ⁴=`Cfr. Anselm., de Concord.` at *eligere* ([^21]); ⁵=`Cod. O… quod non vult` at *vel nolle* ([^22]); ⁶=`Hoc dubium solvunt… Petr. a Tar.` at *non adiuvantur a gratia divina* ([^23]). All five confirmed correctly placed.
- **"Cur Deus homo c.24" does NOT belong to DISTINCTIO XXIX.** DIST. XXIX cap. I begins on p.692 L-col and its first footnote is the centered **NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM** block footer 1 (`Cap. 106. n. 28…` on *Augustinus in Enchiridio*) in the R-col band — a separate numbering sequence belonging to the next chunk.
The result is 23 securely-placed entries; net effect = [^18] re-anchored (DUB. IV opener → DUB. III Anselmus). No body text was lost at any seam.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 29

title_alt: Distinction XXIX — The Text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 692 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXIX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Utrum homo ante peccatum eguerit gratia operante et cooperante.*

Post haec considerandum est, utrum homo ante peccatum eguerit gratia operante et cooperante. — Ad quod breviter dicimus, quia non cooperante tantum, sed etiam operante gratia indigebat, non quidem secundum omnem operandi modum operantis gratiae; operatur enim liberando et praeparando voluntatem hominis ad bonum. Egebat itaque homo ea non, ut liberaret voluntatem suam, quae peccati serva non fuerat; sed ut praepararet ad volendum efficaciter bonum, quod per se non poterat. Non enim poterat bonum mereri sine gratia, ut Augustinus in Enchiridio[^1] evidenter tradit: « Illam, inquit, immortalitatem, in qua poterat non mori, natura humana perdidit per liberum arbitrium; hanc vero, in qua non poterit mori, acceptura est per gratiam, quam fuerat, si non peccasset, acceptura per meritum; quamvis sine gratia nec tunc ullum meritum esse potuisset, quia, etsi peccatum in solo erat arbitrio constitutum, non tamen iustitiae habendae vel retinendae sufficiebat liberum arbitrium, nisi divinum praeberetur adiutorium ». — Ecce his verbis satis ostenditur, quod ante peccatum homo indigebat gratia operante et cooperante. Non enim habebat quo pedem movere posset sine gratiae operantis et cooperantis auxilio, habuit tamen quo poterat stare.

#### Cap. II.

#### *Si homo ante lapsum virtutes habuerit.*

« Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum homo ante lapsum virtutem habuerit. — Quibusdam videtur, quod non habuerit, id ita probare conantibus: iustitiam, inquiunt,

<!-- page 693 -->

non habuit, quia praeceptum Dei contempsit, nec prudentiam, quia sibi non providit, nec temperantiam, quia aliena appetiit, nec fortitudinem, quia pravae suggestioni cessit. — Quibus respondentes dicimus, eum quidem non tunc habuisse has virtutes, quando peccavit, sed ante, et tunc amisisse. Quod multis Sanctorum testimoniis comprobatur. Ait enim Augustinus in quadam Homilia[^2]: « Adam, perdita caritate, malus inventus est ». Item: « Princeps vitiorum, dum vidit Adam, de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperantia compositum, caritate splendidum, primos parentes illis donis ac tantis bonis exspoliavit pariterque peremit ». De hoc eodem Ambrosius ad Sabinum[^3] ait: « Quando Adam solus erat, non est praevaricatus, quia eius mens Deo adhaerebat ». Super Psalmum quoque dicit, quod « homo ante peccatum beatissimus auram carpebat aetheream ». Sed quomodo sine virtute beatissimus erat? Augustinus quoque super Genesim[^4] dicit, Adam ante peccatum « spiritali mente praeditum fuisse ». Non est ergo dubitandum, hominem ante peccatum virtutibus fulsisse, sed illis per peccatum exspoliatum fuisse.

#### Cap. III.

#### *De eiectione hominis de paradiso.*

In illius quoque peccati poenam eiectus est de paradiso in istum miseriarum locum, sicut in Genesi[^5] legitur: *Nunc ergo, ne forte mittat manum suam et sumat de ligno vitae et comedat et vivat in aeternum; emisit eum Deus de paradiso voluptatis.* — His verbis insinuari videtur, quod nunquam moreretur, si postea de illo sumsisset ligno.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Ne sumat de ligno vitae et vivat in aeternum.*

Sed quia per peccatum iam mortuum corpus[^6] habebat, illa verba ex tali intellectu accipi possunt. Deus, modo irati loquens, de homine superbo ait: *Videte, ne forte mittat manum suam* etc. id est, cavete, vos Angeli, ne comedat de ligno vitae, quo indignus est; de quo, si perstitisset, comederet et viveret in aeternum, sed modo propter inobedientiam indignus est comedere. Et sicut verbo dixit, ita opere exhibuit. « Emisit enim eum Deus de paradiso voluptatis in locum sibi congruum, sicut plerumque malus, cum inter bonos vivere coeperit, si in melius mutari noluerit, de bonorum congregatione pellitur, pondere pravae consuetudinis pressus[^7] ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *De flammeo gladio ante paradisum posito.*

Ne vero ad illud posset accedere, collocavit Deus ante paradisum Cherubim, et flammeum gladium atque versatilem, ad custodiendam viam ligni vitae[^8]. Quod iuxta litteram potest hoc modo accipi, quia per ministerium Angelorum ignea custodia ibi constituta fuit. « Hoc enim per caelestes potestates in paradiso visibili factum esse credendum est, ut per angelicum ministerium ibi esset quaedam ignea custodia; non tamen frustra, sed quia aliquid significat de paradiso spirituali[^9] ». « Cherubim enim interpretatur plenitudo scientiae, haec est caritas, quia plenitudo legis est dilectio. Gladius autem flammeus poenae temporales sunt, quae versatiles sunt, quoniam tempora volubilia sunt. Illa ergo ad custodiam ligni vitae ideo posita sunt ante paradisum, quia ad vitam non reditur nisi per Cherubim, scilicet plenitudinem scientiae, id est caritatem, et per gladium versatilem, id est tolerantiam passionum temporalium ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *An ante peccatum homo comederit de ligno vitae.*

Potest autem quaeri, utrum de ligno vitae ante peccatum comederit homo. De hoc Augustinus in libro de Baptismo parvulorum[^10] sic ait: « Recte profecto intelliguntur primi homines ante malignam diaboli persuasionem abstinuisse a cibo vetito atque usi fuisse concessis[^11] ». His verbis ostenditur, quod de ligno vitae ante peccatum sumserint: quibus praeceptum erat, ut de omni ligno paradisi comederent, nisi de ligno scientiae boni et mali.

Quare ergo perpetua soliditate et beata immortalitate vestiti non sunt, ut nulla infirmitate vel aetate in deterius mutarentur? Hanc enim virtutem naturaliter illud lignum habuisse dicitur. — Sed forte hoc non conferebat, nisi saepe de illo sumeretur. Potuit ergo fieri, ut de illo sumeret semel, et non saepius; qui per aliquam moram[^12] in paradiso fuisse intelligitur, cum Scriptura dicat, eum ibi soporatum fuisse, quando costa de latere eius assumta est, et inde formata mulier, et animalia ante eum ducta, quibus nomina imposuit.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXIX.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Whether man before sin needed operating and cooperating grace.*

After these things it must be considered whether man before sin needed operating and cooperating grace. — To which we briefly say that he needed not only cooperating, but also operating grace, not indeed according to every mode of operating of operating grace; for it operates by freeing and by preparing the will of man for the good. Man therefore needed it not in order to free his will, which had not been a slave of sin; but in order to prepare it to will the good efficaciously, which it could not do of itself. For he could not merit the good without grace, as Augustine in the Enchiridion[^1] evidently hands down: « That immortality, he says, in which he was able not to die, human nature lost through free choice; but this immortality, in which it shall not be able to die, it is to receive through grace, which it would have received, had it not sinned, through merit; although without grace not even then could there have been any merit, because, even though sin was constituted in the choice alone, yet free choice did not suffice for justice to be had or retained, unless divine help were furnished ». — Behold, by these words it is sufficiently shown that before sin man needed operating and cooperating grace. For he did not have that whereby he might move his foot without the help of operating and cooperating grace, yet he had that whereby he was able to stand.

#### Cap. II.

#### *Whether man before the fall had the virtues.*

« Moreover it is wont to be asked whether man before the fall had virtue. — To some it seems that he did not have it, who try to prove it thus: justice, they say,

<!-- page 693 -->

he did not have, because he despised the precept of God; nor prudence, because he did not provide for himself; nor temperance, because he coveted what belonged to another; nor fortitude, because he yielded to the wicked suggestion. — Answering whom we say that he indeed did not have these virtues then, when he sinned, but before, and then lost them. Which is proved by many testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says in a certain Homily[^2]: « Adam, charity being lost, was found evil ». Likewise: « The prince of vices, when he saw Adam, made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, armed with chastity, composed with temperance, splendid with charity, despoiled the first parents of those gifts and so great goods and likewise destroyed them ». Concerning this same matter Ambrose to Sabinus[^3] says: « When Adam was alone, he did not transgress, because his mind clung to God ». Upon the Psalm too he says that « man before sin, most blessed, drank in the ethereal air ». But how was he most blessed without virtue? Augustine also upon Genesis[^4] says that Adam before sin « was endowed with a spiritual mind ». It is therefore not to be doubted that man before sin shone with virtues, but that he was despoiled of them through sin.

#### Cap. III.

#### *On the expulsion of man from paradise.*

In punishment also of that sin he was cast out of paradise into this place of miseries, as is read in Genesis[^5]: *Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand and take of the tree of life and eat and live forever; God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.* — By these words it seems to be intimated that he would never die, if afterward he had taken of that tree.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *In what way that saying is to be understood: Lest he take of the tree of life and live forever.*

But because through sin he already had a mortal body[^6], those words can be taken according to such an understanding. God, speaking now as if angry, said of proud man: *See, lest perhaps he put forth his hand* etc. that is, beware, you Angels, lest he eat of the tree of life, of which he is unworthy; of which, if he had persisted, he would eat and live forever, but now on account of disobedience he is unworthy to eat. And as he said by word, so he showed forth by deed. « For God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure into a place fitting for him, just as for the most part the evil man, when he has begun to live among the good, if he is unwilling to be changed for the better, is driven from the congregation of the good, pressed by the weight of wicked custom[^7] ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *On the flaming sword set before paradise.*

But that he might not be able to approach it, God placed before paradise Cherubim, and a flaming and turning sword, to guard the way of the tree of life[^8]. Which according to the letter can be taken in this way, that through the ministry of the Angels a fiery guard was set up there. « For this is to be believed to have been done in the visible paradise through the heavenly powers, that through the angelic ministry there might be there a certain fiery guard; yet not in vain, but because it signifies something of the spiritual paradise[^9] ». « For Cherubim is interpreted fullness of knowledge, which is charity, because the fullness of the law is love. But the flaming sword is the temporal punishments, which are turning, because times are rolling. Those things therefore were set before paradise to guard the tree of life for this reason, because one does not return to life except through Cherubim, namely the fullness of knowledge, that is charity, and through the turning sword, that is the endurance of temporal sufferings ».

#### Cap. VI.

#### *Whether before sin man ate of the tree of life.*

But it can be asked whether before sin man ate of the tree of life. Concerning this Augustine in the book on the Baptism of Little Children[^10] says thus: « Rightly indeed are the first men understood to have abstained from the forbidden food before the malign persuasion of the devil, and to have used the things granted[^11] ». By these words it is shown that they ate of the tree of life before sin: to whom it was commanded that they should eat of every tree of paradise, except of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Why then were they not clothed with perpetual solidity and blessed immortality, so that they might not be changed for the worse by any infirmity or age? For that tree is said to have had this power naturally. — But perhaps it did not confer this, unless one ate of it often. It could therefore have come about that he ate of it once, and not more often; who is understood to have been for some delay[^12] in paradise, since Scripture says that he was put to sleep there, when the rib was taken from his side, and from it the woman was formed, and the animals were led before him, to which he gave names.

---

la: Cap. 106. n. 28. In quo textu pro *non poterit mori*, quod habent Vat. et ed. 6, in ceteris edd. et in codd. minus bene legitur *non poterat mori*. In originali August. desunt haec verba, quia in praecedentibus de his locutus est. — Quae sequuntur usque ad finem distinctionis magna ex parte excerpta sunt ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 7.

en: Chapter 106, n. 28. In which text, for *non poterit mori* [shall not be able to die], which the Vatican edition and edition 6 have, in the other editions and in the codices it is read less well as *non poterat mori* [was not able to die]. In Augustine's original these words are lacking, because in what precedes he has spoken of these matters. — What follows up to the end of the distinction is for the most part excerpted from Hugh, Summa Sententiarum, tr. 3, c. 7.

la: Serm. de Symbolo contra Iudaeos, etc. c. 2. (inter opera August.). Seq. locus ibid. parum superius, in quo codd. et edd., excepta I, male *vicit* pro *vidit*, quod secundum originale et Hugonem ponendum est.

en: Sermon on the Creed against the Jews, etc., c. 2 (among the works of Augustine). The following passage is in the same place a little above, in which the codices and editions, except I, wrongly read *vicit* for *vidit*, which according to the original and Hugh is to be set down.

la: Epist. 49. n. 2. Seq. locus est in Ps. 118. serm. 4. n. 3.

en: Letter 49, n. 2. The following passage is in [the commentary on] Psalm 118, sermon 4, n. 3.

la: Libr. XI. c. 42. n. 60; cfr. etiam VI. c. 27. n. 38.

la: Cap. 3, 22. 23. In Vulgata, quae incipit novam propositionem, additur *Et* ante *emisit*. — Hugo hic citat August., super XI. Gen. ad lit. c. 40. n. 34.

en: Chapter 3, 22. 23. In the Vulgate, which begins a new sentence, *Et* [And] is added before *emisit* [he sent out]. — Hugh here cites Augustine, on Book XI of Genesis according to the letter, c. 40, n. 34.

la: Respicitur Rom. 8, 10. — Verba, quae sequuntur, *Deus modo irati loquens*, sunt in Glossa Gen. 3, 20.

en: Reference is to Romans 8, 10. — The words which follow, *God speaking now as if angry*, are in the Gloss on Genesis 3, 20.

la: August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 22. n. 34.

en: Augustine, Book II on Genesis against the Manichees, c. 22, n. 34.

en: Genesis 3, 24.

la: August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 40. n. 35. Seq. locus est II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 23. n. 35. 36, in quo respicitur Rom. 13, 10.

en: Augustine, Book XI on Genesis according to the letter, c. 40, n. 35. The following passage is Book II on Genesis against the Manichees, c. 23, n. 35. 36, in which reference is made to Romans 13, 10.

la: Scil. II. de Peccatorum meritis et de bapt. parvul. c. 21. n. 35.

en: Namely, Book II on the Merits of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Children, c. 21, n. 35.

la: Sola Vat. addit: *ac per hoc et ceteris et praecipue ligno vitae*.

en: The Vatican edition alone adds: *and through this both with the others and especially with the tree of life*.

la: Cod. Erf. haec annotat: *Quia per sex horas, per septem horas dicitur in historiis* [Comestoris Historia scholastica c. 24.]. — Infra pro *assumta* codd. B C *sumta*.

en: Codex Erfurt notes this: *Because "for six hours," "for seven hours" is said in the histories* [Comestor's Scholastic History, c. 24]. — Below, for *assumta*, codices B C read *sumta*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 692–693 = PDF 714–715, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline; the IA djvu OCR (raw 48282–48382) was cascade-shattered by the two-column footer interleave and was used only to confirm footnote-marker spacing and the capitula sequence. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXIX. DISTINCTIO XXIX opens at the foot of p.692 L-column (immediately below the d.28 DUB. IV, which fills the upper half of p.692); the littera closes at the foot of p.693 R-column with "…quibus nomina imposuit.", immediately before the 694 running head + COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX (raw 48383, *DIVISIO TEXTUS* at raw 48388), which is the `d29-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (6).** Cap. I *Utrum homo ante peccatum eguerit gratia operante et cooperante*; Cap. II *Si homo ante lapsum virtutes habuerit*; Cap. III *De eiectione hominis de paradiso*; Cap. IV *Quomodo intelligendum sit illud: Ne sumat de ligno vitae et vivat in aeternum*; Cap. V *De flammeo gladio ante paradisum posito*; Cap. VI *An ante peccatum homo comederit de ligno vitae*. (Dispatch brief said "Cap. I–VI, verify count" — eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms exactly six capitula; the OCR-garbled headers `Cap. Y`/`Cap. YI` are V and VI.) Theme: pre-lapsarian grace and virtue, the expulsion from paradise, the Cherubim and flaming sword, and the tree of life. Material from Cap. II onward is excerpted largely from Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 3 c. 7 (per [^1]).

**Page-split map.** p.692 (lower half, below d.28 DUB. IV): DISTINCTIO XXIX header (spans both columns) + Cap. I full (L-col body *Post haec considerandum est … per libe-*, continuing into R-col *-rum arbitrium … quo poterat stare*) + Cap. II header + opener (R-col foot, *« Praeterea quaeri solet … iustitiam, inquiunt,*). p.693 (full, both columns): Cap. II tail (*non habuit … exspoliatum fuisse*) + Cap. III + Cap. IV (L→R) + Cap. V + Cap. VI (R-col), the text closing at the foot of the R-col with "…quibus nomina imposuit." Body seam 692→693 (*iustitiam, inquiunt, ‖ non habuit, quia praeceptum Dei contempsit*) grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**Apparatus split map (12 entries, body-anchor order).** p.692 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footer 1 → [^1] (Enchiridion Cap. 106 n.28, anchored at *in Enchiridio* in Cap. I — the only d.29 footer on p.692; the p.692 LEFT footer block ¹–⁶, incl. *Cur Deus homo* c.24, belongs to the d.28 DUB. IV above it, not to this littera). p.693 LEFT footer block 1–6 → [^2]–[^7] (Serm. de Symbolo → [^2] at *Homilia*; Epist. 49 → [^3] at *ad Sabinum*; de Gen. ad lit. XI → [^4] at *super Genesim*; Gen. 3,22.23 → [^5] at *in Genesi*; Rom. 8,10 + Glossa → [^6] at *mortuum corpus*; de Gen. contra Manich. II → [^7] at *pressus*, the Augustine quote closing Cap. IV which runs across the p.693 L→R col break). p.693 RIGHT footer block 7–11 → [^8]–[^12] (Gen. 3,24 → [^8] at *viam ligni vitae*; de Gen. ad lit. XI → [^9] at *paradiso spirituali*; de Pecc. mer. et bapt. parvul. II → [^10] at *de Baptismo parvulorum*; Sola Vat. addit → [^11] at *usi fuisse concessis*; Cod. Erf. + Comestor → [^12] at *per aliquam moram*). No merges; one printed footer per entry. Total = 1 (p.692) + 6 (p.693 L) + 5 (p.693 R) = 12.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED nothing into the body. The d28-dubia dispatch flagged the p.692 footer *Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 24. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar.* as possibly DIST. XXIX Cap. I's lead footer; **resolved here as genuinely d.28's** — it sits in the p.692 LEFT footer block directly under the d.28 DUB. IV body (the *Cfr. de hoc dubio* formula points back at the dubium), whereas the d.29 littera apparatus opens fresh with the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* header in the p.692 RIGHT footer block (Enchiridion). **No migration needed: d28-dubia [^18] correctly retains the *Cur Deus homo* footer; this littera starts at the NOTAE Enchiridion footer ([^1]).** FORWARDED nothing — the littera closes "…quibus nomina imposuit." at the foot of p.693 R immediately before the COMMENTARIUS; the COMMENTARIUS footer block belongs to `d29-divisio`.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. praeceplum→praeceptum, teaiperantiam→temperantiam, gkidium→gladium, versatikm→versatilem, scieutiae→scientiae, mortumn→mortuum, sumsisset / sumserint / assumta preserved as Quaracchi spellings, Cap. Y/YI → V/VI). The body markers *concessis ¹⁰* (Sola Vat. addit) and *moram ¹¹* (Cod. Erf.) both fall on p.693 R; rendered as [^11] and [^12] respectively (the per-page footer count restarts on each printed page, so p.693's footer 11 = the chunk's [^12]).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX — Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXIX — Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 694 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX.

### *De gratia secundum statum naturae institutae.*

*Post haec considerandum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, quantum liberum arbitrium indiget auxilio gratiae secundum statum naturae lapsae. In hac parte inquirit, utrum eguerit gratia operante et cooperante secundum statum naturae institutae. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In quarum prima determinat de auxilio gratiae, quod collatum fuit homini ante peccatum. In secunda per oppositum determinat de supplicio poenae, quod inflictum fuit homini post peccatum, ibi: *In illius quoque peccati poenam* etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima inquirit Magister, utrum liberum arbitrium hominis ante lapsum gratia eguerit. Secundo vero, utrum in statu illo gratiam et virtutes habuerit, ibi: *Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum homo ante lapsum* etc. Similiter secunda pars principalis duas habet. In prima determinat, cuiusmodi poena homo fuerit punitus propter peccatum, videlicet poena expulsionis de paradiso; ubi etiam explanat verba Scripturae circa hanc materiam. In secunda removet dubitationem, quae ex dictis[^1] habet originem, ibi: *Potest autem quaeri, utrum de ligno vitae* etc. — Et sic terminatur illa totalis pars, in qua egit Magister de primi hominis lapsu, et quantum ad peccatum, per quod cecidit, et quantum ad adiutorium, per quod stare potuit.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, in qua agitur de gratiae adiutorio secundum statum naturae institutae, incidit hic quaestio circa tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum homo ante peccatum gratia eguerit.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ante peccatum gratiam habuerit.

Tertio quaeritur de quantitate gratiae, quam in illo statu habuit.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae, circumscripto dono gratiae, esset Deo acceptus.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum absque gratia posset exire in opus meritorium.

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXIX.

### *On grace according to the state of instituted nature.*

*After these things it must be considered* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master showed how much free choice needs the help of grace according to the state of fallen nature. In this part he inquires whether it needed grace operating and cooperating according to the state of instituted nature. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the help of grace which was conferred on man before sin. In the second, conversely, he determines concerning the punishment of penalty which was inflicted on man after sin, there: *Into the penalty also of that sin* etc. The first part has two [parts]. In the first the Master inquires whether the free choice of man before the fall needed grace. Second, whether in that state he had grace and virtues, there: *Moreover it is wont to be asked, whether man before the fall* etc. Likewise the second principal part has two [parts]. In the first he determines with what kind of penalty man was punished on account of sin, namely the penalty of expulsion from paradise; where he also explains the words of Scripture concerning this matter. In the second he removes a doubt which arises from the things said[^1], there: *But it can be asked, whether of the tree of life* etc. — And so is brought to a close that whole part in which the Master treated of the fall of the first man, both as to the sin through which he fell, and as to the help through which he could have stood firm.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, in which there is treated the help of grace according to the state of instituted nature, there arises here a question regarding three [matters].

First it is asked whether man before sin needed grace.

Second it is asked whether before sin he had grace.

Third it is asked concerning the quantity of grace which he had in that state.

Concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether man in the state of innocence, the gift of grace being set aside, would be acceptable to God.

Second it is asked whether without grace he could go forth into a meritorious work.

---

la: Plures codd., ut T X aa ee etc., *praedictis*.

en: Several codices, such as T, X, aa, ee, etc., read *praedictis* ("from the aforesaid").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed p. 694 = PDF 716, offset `pdf = printed + 22`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 48383–48416 (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). This chunk holds the **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXIX** header + theme (*De gratia secundum statum naturae institutae*) + lemma (*Post haec considerandum* etc.) + **DIVISIO TEXTUS** + **TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM**. `has_scholion=false` (no scholion attaches to a divisio chunk). The Vol II PDF-priority inversion applies: the OCR cascade-shattered the two-column DIVISIO TEXTUS and TRACTATIO (e.g. *parle*, *adiulorio*, *quaerltur*, *coUatum*), so the Latin was reflowed from the 450 dpi column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p694-{L,R}-{0,1,2}`), reading each page Left column then Right column.

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio sits on **p.694** (running head `694 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): the COMMENTARIUS header + theme + lemma + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM are all full-width at the top of this single printed page, immediately after the d.29 littera closed at the foot of p.693 R (*…quibus nomina imposuit.*). The TRACTATIO question-list ends immediately before **ARTICULUS I / De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum / QUAESTIO I / Utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae** (raw 48417, p.694 R-col foot). QUAESTIO I body begins at raw **48419** (*Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.*). Per Override §5, the short ARTICULUS I opener (the article title + theme) folds into `d29-a1-q1` — no standalone article-opener chunk. Single page break (`<!-- page 694 -->`); no mid-chunk page transition.

**Apparatus split map (1 entry).** The divisio carries a single body marker and its footer, on **p.694**:
- [^1] = **p.694 footer 1** ("Plures codd., ut T X aa ee etc., *praedictis*"), anchored at the DIVISIO-TEXTUS word *dictis* ("quae ex dictis habet originem"). This is the only footer that anchors in the divisio body.
The remaining p.694 footers — footer 2 (*Vers. 31*, Gen. 1,31), footer 3 (*Vers. 25 … Domine Vulg. quae sunt*, Wisd.), footer 4 (*Vers. 17 … Eccl. 7,30 …*, Prov. 8,17) — all anchor in the ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I argument-1/2/3 chain and belong to `d29-a1-q1`, NOT duplicated here.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: the d29-littera build flagged a "p.693/694 COMMENTARIUS footer" as belonging here. Eyes-on at 450 dpi confirms the COMMENTARIUS header + theme + lemma (*Post haec considerandum* etc.) carry **no footnote marker** of their own; the p.693 footers (Gen. 3,24; de Gen. ad lit.; de Gen. contra Manich.; Sola-Vat-addit; Cod. Erf.-Comestor) are the littera's own footers and were correctly captured in `d29-littera` [^7]–[^12]. So nothing migrated across the seam — the divisio opens fresh with its own footer 1 (the *praedictis* variant). FORWARDED: none — the divisio closes clean at the end of the TRACTATIO question-list, immediately before ARTICULUS I QUAESTIO I (raw 48417); `d29-a1-q1` owns the QUAESTIO I body + p.694 footers 2–4 onward.

**TRACTATIO question-list (verbatim, verified at 450 dpi). Three principal questions = the three articles** (theme of the distinction: *De gratia secundum statum naturae institutae*):
- (ART. I) *Primo quaeritur, utrum homo ante peccatum gratia eguerit.*
- (ART. II) *Secundo quaeritur, utrum ante peccatum gratiam habuerit.*
- (ART. III) *Tertio quaeritur de quantitate gratiae, quam in illo statu habuit.*

*ARTICULUS I — two sub-questions ("Circa primum quaeruntur duo"; this list IS printed in the divisio TRACTATIO; theme De necessitate gratiae ante peccatum primorum hominum):*
1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum homo in statu innocentiae, circumscripto dono gratiae, esset Deo acceptus.*  (= a1-q1 — *Utrum absque dono gratiae homo esset Deo acceptus in statu innocentiae*, raw 48417)
2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum absque gratia posset exire in opus meritorium.*  (= a1-q2)

*ARTICULUS II — two sub-questions (printed at the ART II opener, raw ~48787, folded into a2-q1; theme De gratia ante peccatum habita — opener: "…quaeritur, utrum homo ante peccatum in statu innocentiae habuerit gratiam gratum facientem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo"):*
1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum habuerit gratiam ante lapsum.*  (= a2-q1 — *Utrum homo ante lapsum habuerit gratiam*, QUAESTIO I header raw ~48787)
2. *Secundo quaeritur, utrum simul tempore conditus fuerit in gratuitis et naturalibus.*  (= a2-q2)

*ARTICULUS III — two sub-questions (printed at the ART III opener, raw 49080, folded into a3-q1; theme De quantitate gratiae in statu innocentiae — opener: "Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, quantam gratiam primus homo habuerit. Et primo est quaestio de quantitate gratiae primi hominis quantum ad donorum multitudinem. Secundo vero, quantum ad donorum magnitudinem"):*
1. (multitudo) *Utrum homo habuerit tot virtutes ante lapsum, quot habuit post lapsum.*  (= a3-q1, QUAESTIO I header raw ~49088)
2. (magnitudo) (= a3-q2)

**d.29 chunk inventory** (DISTINCTIO XXIX at raw 48282 → DISTINCTIO XXX at raw 49478): littera ✅, divisio ✅ (this chunk) → ARTICULUS I (raw 48417) q1/q2 → ARTICULUS II (raw ~48787) q1/q2 → ARTICULUS III (raw 49080) q1/q2 → DUBIA (raw ~49356) + **dubia-dup2 (raw ~49404, stray — likely a genuine over-range continuation dup like the d.28 pattern; INSPECT at the dubia build, fold/`git rm`)**. Single-pars distinction (ARTICULUS I/II/III are article-level; no p1/p2 split). Offset +22.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. *arbi-trium*, *parle→parte*, *adiulorio→adiutorio*, *quaerltur→quaeritur*, *coUatum→collatum*, *agi-tur→agitur*). The single footer (*praedictis*) and its anchor (*dictis*) are unambiguous at 450 dpi.