title: Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem ratione suae excellentiae et dignitatis

title_alt: Whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention by reason of their excellence and dignity

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis.*

Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum principale de bonitate, quam opera superaddunt bonitati intentionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum aliquid addant opera bonitatis vel meriti supra bonam intentionem ratione praerogativae dignitatis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum addant ratione quantitatis ex parte dati. Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquid addant ratione numerositatis.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum opera exteriora aliquid addant supra bonam intentionem ratione suae excellentiae et dignitatis, sicut sunt opera privilegiata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Super illud ad Ephesios primo[^1]: *Quae sit supereminens magnitudo;* Glossa: « Quoddam incrementum gloriae habebunt summi doctores ultra id quod communiter habebunt alii »; hoc autem non est nisi ratione doctrinae, quam aliis communicant: ergo etc.

2. Item, communiter in Ecclesia magis solemnizantur Martyres quam Confessores; sed constans est, quod Ecclesia Sanctis exhibuit honorem secundum meritorum suorum exigentiam: ergo maiori gloria digni sunt, qui mortem pro Christo perferunt[^2], quam illi qui pati solum volunt.

3. Item, Christus nobis aliquid meruit per passionem, quod ante non meruerat nobis, utpote apertionem ianuae et multorum charismatum diffusionem: si ergo caritas Christi fuit eminentissima ab instanti conceptionis et maioris fuit efficaciae cum passione quam sine; videtur ergo, quod in quolibet alio excellentia operis exterioris addat ad meritum bonae voluntatis sive intentionis.

4. Item, bonum additum bono facit magis bonum[^3]; sed opus privilegiatum est bonum: ergo additum intentioni facit eam magis bonam. Sed quod addit ad bonitatem addit ad meritum: ergo etc.

5. Item, si opera privilegiata nihil adderent supra bonitatem intentionis, ergo qui ea faceret frustra laboraret: si ergo impium est dicere, quod qui facit opera excellentia frustra laborat; videtur, quod opus excellens addat super intentionis bonitatem.

**Sed contra:**
1. De beato Martino cantat Ecclesia[^4]: « O beata anima, quam etsi gladius persecutoris non abstulit, palmam tamen martyrii non amisit »: ergo ita videtur, quod beatus Martinus habuit palmam martyrii per bonitatem intentionis, sicut si sustinuisset acerbitatem passionis; ergo non videtur, quod opus excellens aliquid addat supra bonitatem intentionis.

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2. Item, operans non placet propter operationem, sed magis operatio propter operantem, quantumcumque operatio illa sit nobilis[^5]: ergo quantumcumque Deus approbat operantem, tantum approbat operationem: ergo non videtur, quod homo maioris praemii efficiatur apud Deum dignus propter operationem excellentem, superadditam bonitati voluntatis.

3. Item, si aliquis sustineret mortem pro mundo, potius demereretur apud Deum, quam aliquid mereretur: ergo sustinentia mortis pro Christo, si quomodo placet Deo, hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia ordinatur ad Christum; sed illa ordinatio est mediante intentione: ergo tota bonitas operationis, quantumcumque excellentis, ex intentione habet ortum et propter illam Deo placet. Sed ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum[^6]: igitur tantundem placet intentio perfecta et bona cum opere, quantum placet sine opere.

4. Item, si aliqua opera faciunt ad meritum, illa sunt maxime opera humilitatis et vilitatis — haec enim opera Deus maxime commendat[^7] — sed opera privilegiata sunt opera cuiusdam excellentiae et dignitatis: ergo videtur, quod minime inter omnia genera operum addant ad bonae intentionis meritum.

5. Item, ubi facultas deest, voluntas reputatur pro facto, sicut determinatum est supra; et hoc non est ob aliud, nisi quia alias non esset plena et perfecta voluntas: si igitur voluntas per se sola pro opere reputatur, videtur, quod in tali casu opus privilegiatum nihil addat super intentionis bonitatem et meritum.

### Conclusio

> Opus exterius privilegiatum ratione dignitatis suae aliquid addit supra bonitatem intentionis, licet non addat omni modo additionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod maius bonum potest aliquid dici dupliciter: aut intensive, utpote quia plus Deo placet; aut extensive, utpote quia pluribus prodest. Et secundum hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, quod opus privilegiatum addat ad bonitatem intentionis: aut quantum ad proximorum aedificationem, aut quantum ad Dei approbationem. Et primo modo attenditur augmentum quantum ad exemplum, secundo modo quantum ad meritum[^8].

Si igitur loquamur de additione quantum ad exemplum; sic absque dubio opus privilegiatum addit ad bonitatem intentionis, quia bonitas intentionis non lucet exterius nisi per ostensionem bonorum operum, et maxime privilegiatorum[^9]. — Si autem loquamur secundo modo, scilicet quantum ad additionem, quae attenditur quantum ad meritum; sic distinguendum est, quod est loqui de merito respectu praemii substantialis, et respectu praemii accidentalis. Respectu praemii accidentalis opus privilegiatum addit supra bonam intentionem et voluntatem, quia praemium accidentale, quod est aureola, non debetur voluntati secundum se, sed voluntati in opere[^10]. Si autem loquamur de merito respectu praemii substantialis, adhuc oportet subdistinguere, quia est meritum congrui, et est meritum condigni. Quantum ad meritum congrui, absque dubio opus privilegiatum addit supra bonitatem intentionis, pro eo quod voluntas in illo opere praeparatur et disponitur ad susceptionem maioris gratiae, per quam digna est maiori retributione. Si autem loquamur de merito condigni; sic absque dubio non addit, pro eo quod quantitas meriti condigni pensatur ex quantitate radicis; et tantum[^11] placet Deo quis, qui habet voluntatem plenam et non potest habere opus, quantum ille qui habet voluntatem et opus, quantum ad essentialis praemii retributionem, si sunt in aequali caritate. — Et sic patet, quod opus privilegiatum ratione dignitatis suae aliquid addit supra bonitatem intentionis, licet non addat omni modo additionis[^12]. Ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur.

**Ad obiecta:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de beato Martino, quod palmam martyrii non amisit; dicendum, quod ibi palma martyrii non accipitur pro praemio accidentali, quod est aureola, sed pro praemio substantiali, quod est aurea. Utrumque enim est martyrii palma; sed unum, scilicet aurea, respondet martyrio, quia sustinetur ex caritate; alterum vero, scilicet aureola, respondet ei, quia est specialis privilegii et praerogativae[^13].

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*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio[^14] placet propter operantem; dicendum, quod verum est; attamen, dum operans bene utitur dono, per quod placet Deo, hoc ipso disponit se ad maius et aliquo dignus est, quo quidem non esset, si non ita bene uteretur. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si operatio placet Deo propter operantem, quod non magis placeat operans propter operationem quam sine; nihil enim impedit de duobus bonis, quorum unum habet bonitatem ab altero, quin ambo melius valeant, quam valeat alterum illorum per se.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mori pro mundo displicet Deo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod tota bonitas operis privilegiati veniat ex intentione, sed quod non potest esse opus perfecte bonum absque intentione. Nihilominus tamen opera privilegiata aliquam bonitatem de natura sui habent, quae, iuncta cum bonitate intentionis, aliquam excellentiam tribuunt bene operanti, quam non tribuerent alia genera operum. Et ideo illud verbum, quo dicitur, quod ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum, non habet hic locum. Hoc enim intelligitur, quando illud, propter quod alterum participat aliquam proprietatem, est tota ratio illius participationis. Non sic autem est in proposito, ut visum est.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod opera privilegiata sunt opera excellentia, et ideo minus debent facere ad meritum; dicendum, quod opus excellens dupliciter potest dici: aut secundum vanam aestimationem, sicut aliquis reputat excellentiam vindicare se de adversariis et praedominari aliis; aut secundum veritatis dictamen; et sic sustinere ignominiosissimum genus mortis pro Christo est opus magnae excellentiae; et tale opus excellentiae non condividitur contra opus humilitatis, immo simul cum illa stat et necessario eam requirit tanquam sociam; et dum habeat in se difficultatem et dignitatem, et caritatem praeambulam et humilitatem annexam, non est mirum, si disponit ad maiorem gloriam[^15].

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas reputatur pro facto, ubi facultas deest; dicendum, quod illud est verum quantum ad sufficientiam ad salutem et quantum ad praemium substantiale, quia nemo amittit regnum caelorum ex hoc, quod non facit quod facere non potest; non autem est verum quantum ad praemii excellentiam sive quantum ad praemium accidentale. Et hoc modo praedictum est, quod opus privilegiatum addit supra intentionis bonitatem[^16].

english:
### Article II. *On the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention.*

Next there is inquiry, with respect to the second principal point, concerning the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether works add anything of goodness or of merit beyond a good intention by reason of the prerogative of dignity. Second it is asked whether they add by reason of quantity on the part of the gift. Third it is asked whether they add anything by reason of multiplicity.

### Question I. *Whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention.*

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention by reason of their own excellence and dignity, as are privileged works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Upon that text to the Ephesians, in the first chapter[^1]: *What is the surpassing magnitude;* the Gloss: « A certain increment of glory the highest doctors will have, beyond what the others will have in common »; but this is only by reason of the doctrine which they communicate to others: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, in the Church the Martyrs are commonly solemnized more than the Confessors; but it is settled that the Church has shown honor to the Saints according to the requirement of their merits: therefore they are worthy of greater glory who endure death for Christ[^2] than those who only will to suffer.

3. Likewise, Christ merited for us something by His passion which He had not before merited for us, namely the opening of the gate and the diffusion of many graces: if therefore the charity of Christ was most eminent from the instant of His conception and was of greater efficacy with the passion than without it; it seems therefore that in any other case the excellence of the exterior work adds to the merit of the good will or intention.

4. Likewise, good added to good makes more good[^3]; but a privileged work is good: therefore, added to the intention, it makes it more good. But what adds to goodness adds to merit: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, if privileged works added nothing beyond the goodness of the intention, then he who did them would labor in vain: if therefore it is impious to say that one who does excellent works labors in vain; it seems that an excellent work adds beyond the goodness of the intention.

**On the contrary:**
1. Concerning blessed Martin the Church sings[^4]: « O blessed soul, whom, even though the sword of the persecutor did not take away, yet the palm of martyrdom did not lose »: therefore it thus seems that blessed Martin had the palm of martyrdom through the goodness of his intention, just as if he had endured the bitterness of the passion; therefore it does not seem that an excellent work adds anything beyond the goodness of the intention.

2. Likewise, the one acting does not please by reason of the action, but rather the action pleases by reason of the one acting, however noble that action may be[^5]: therefore, however much God approves the one acting, so much does He approve the action: therefore it does not seem that a man is made worthy of greater reward before God on account of an excellent operation superadded to the goodness of the will.

3. Likewise, if someone were to undergo death for the world, he would rather earn disfavor before God than merit anything: therefore the undergoing of death for Christ, if it pleases God in any way, this is for no other reason than that it is ordered to Christ; but that ordering is by means of the intention: therefore the whole goodness of the operation, however excellent, takes its rise from the intention and pleases God on account of it. But where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one[^6]: therefore a perfect and good intention with the work pleases just as much as it pleases without the work.

4. Likewise, if any works contribute to merit, they are especially the works of humility and lowliness — for these works God especially commends[^7] — but privileged works are works of a certain excellence and dignity: therefore it seems that, least of all among all the kinds of works, do they add to the merit of a good intention.

5. Likewise, where the capacity is lacking, the will is reckoned for the deed, as was determined above; and this is for no other reason than that otherwise the will would not be full and perfect: if therefore the will by itself alone is reckoned for the work, it seems that in such a case a privileged work adds nothing beyond the goodness and merit of the intention.

### Conclusion

> A privileged exterior work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition.

**I respond:** It must be said that a greater good can be so called in two ways: either intensively, namely because it pleases God more; or extensively, namely because it profits more persons. And according to this, in two ways it can be understood that a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention: either as to the edification of one's neighbors, or as to God's approval. And in the first way the increase is considered as to example, in the second way as to merit[^8].

If therefore we speak of the addition as to example; thus without doubt a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention, because the goodness of the intention does not shine outwardly except through the showing forth of good works, and especially of privileged ones[^9]. — But if we speak in the second way, namely as to the addition which is considered as to merit; thus a distinction must be made, for it is one thing to speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, and with respect to accidental reward. With respect to accidental reward, a privileged work adds beyond a good intention and will, because accidental reward, which is the aureole, is not owed to the will in itself, but to the will in the work[^10]. But if we speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, it is still necessary to subdistinguish, for there is merit of congruity and there is merit of condignity. As to the merit of congruity, without doubt a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention, for this reason, that the will in that work is prepared and disposed to the reception of greater grace, through which it is worthy of greater retribution. But if we speak of merit with respect to condignity; thus without doubt it does not add, for this reason, that the quantity of condign merit is weighed by the quantity of the root; and he who has a full will and cannot have the work pleases God just as much[^11] as he who has both the will and the work, as to the retribution of essential reward, if they are in equal charity. — And thus it is clear that a privileged work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition[^12]. Therefore the reasons which are adduced for the first part are to be granted.

**To the objections:**
*To 1.* As to that which is objected concerning blessed Martin, that he did not lose the palm of martyrdom; it must be said that there the palm of martyrdom is not taken for the accidental reward, which is the aureole, but for the substantial reward, which is the golden crown (*aurea*). For each is a palm of martyrdom; but the one, namely the *aurea*, corresponds to the martyrdom because it is endured out of charity; the other, namely the *aureola*, corresponds to it because it is of a special privilege and prerogative[^13].

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that the action pleases by reason of the one acting[^14]; it must be said that it is true; yet, while the one acting uses well the gift through which he pleases God, by this very fact he disposes himself to something greater and is worthy of something of which he would not be worthy if he did not so use it well. And therefore it does not follow that, if the action pleases God by reason of the one acting, the one acting does not please more by reason of the action than without it; for nothing prevents, of two goods, of which one has its goodness from the other, that both should be worth more than either of them is worth by itself.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that to die for the world displeases God; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that the whole goodness of a privileged work comes from the intention, but that there cannot be a perfectly good work without intention. Nevertheless privileged works have a certain goodness of their own nature, which, joined with the goodness of the intention, confers a certain excellence on the one acting well which other kinds of works would not confer. And therefore that saying, by which it is said that where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one, has no place here. For this is understood when that on account of which the other participates in some property is the whole ground of that participation. But it is not so in the case at hand, as has been seen.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that privileged works are excellent works, and therefore ought to contribute less to merit; it must be said that an excellent work can be so called in two ways: either according to vain estimation, as when someone reckons it an excellence to avenge himself on his adversaries and to dominate others; or according to the dictate of truth; and thus to endure the most ignominious kind of death for Christ is a work of great excellence; and such a work of excellence is not set in opposition to a work of humility, but rather stands together with it and necessarily requires it as its companion; and since it has in itself difficulty and dignity, and charity going before and humility joined to it, it is no wonder if it disposes one to greater glory[^15].

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that the will is reckoned for the deed where the capacity is lacking; it must be said that this is true as to sufficiency for salvation and as to substantial reward, because no one loses the kingdom of heaven from this, that he does not do what he cannot do; but it is not true as to the excellence of the reward or as to accidental reward. And in this way it has been said before that a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention[^16].

la: Vers. 19. — Glossam exhibent Strabus et Lyranus. — Paulo superius post *et dignitatis* cod. cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt *quantum scilicet ad meritum*.

en: Verse 19. — The Gloss is given by Strabo and Lyranus. — A little above, after *and dignity*, codex cc and ed. 1 add *namely as to merit*.

la: Vat. et ed. 1 *patiuntur*, et dein eadem Vat. cum codd. 3, 4 omittit *solum*.

en: The Vatican edition and ed. 1 read *they suffer*, and then the same Vatican edition with codices 3, 4 omits *only*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.) et III. Topic. c. 3.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 4 (c. 11) and *Topics* III, c. 3.

la: Die 11. Novembr. in II. Vesp. ad Magnificat. — Cyprian., *de Mortalitate*, n. 17. ait: *Ita et in Dei servis, apud quos confessio cogitatur et martyrium mente concipitur, animus ad bonum deditus, Deo iudice, coronatur. Aliud est martyrio animum deesse, aliud animo defuisse martyrium.*

en: On November 11, at the antiphon to the Magnificat in the second Vespers. — Cyprian, *On Mortality*, n. 17, says: *So too in the servants of God, among whom confession is thought of and martyrdom is conceived in the mind, the soul devoted to the good is, God being the judge, crowned. It is one thing for the soul to be lacking to martyrdom, another for martyrdom to have been lacking to the soul.*

la: Cfr. Isai. 29, 13; Matth. 15, 8. Gratian., II. Decret. Caus. 33. q. 3. de Poenit. d. 1. c. 87. ait: *Voluntas facit opus remunerabile, non opus voluntatem.* — Post *nobilis* Vat. sic prosequitur: *ergo quantumcumque sit nobilis operatio, nisi Deus approbet operantem, non approbat operationem.* Pro *ergo quantumcumque* ed. 3 *ergo quantum*. In fine arg. cod. V pro *voluntatis* substituit *intentionis*.

en: Cf. Isaiah 29:13; Matthew 15:8. Gratian, *Decretum* II, Causa 33, q. 3, *de Poenitentia* d. 1, c. 87, says: *The will makes the work rewardable, not the work the will.* — After *noble* the Vatican edition continues thus: *therefore, however noble the operation may be, unless God approves the one acting, He does not approve the operation.* For *therefore however much* ed. 3 reads *therefore as much*. At the end of the argument codex V substitutes *intention* for *will*.

la: Vide dictum Aristot., supra pag. 639, nota 2. allatum. — Pro *tantum unum* plurimi codd. cum ed. 2 hic et infra in solut. dumtaxat *tantum*, omissa voce *unum*; edd. 1, 3 *tantummodo unum*, omisso vocabulo *tantum*. Mox pro *tantundem* cod. bb *tantum*.

en: See the saying of Aristotle adduced above, p. 639, note 2. — For *only as much as in the one* very many codices with ed. 2, here and below in the solution, read merely *only*, omitting the word *one*; edd. 1, 3 read *only the one*, omitting the word *only*. Presently, for *just as much* codex bb reads *only*.

la: Cfr. Ps. 137, 6; Eccli. 3, 21; Iac. 4, 6; I. Petr. 5, 5. — Paulo ante pro *maxime opera humilitatis* Vat. *opera maximae humilitatis*.

en: Cf. Psalm 137:6; Ecclesiasticus 3:21; James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5. — A little before, for *especially the works of humility* the Vatican edition reads *the works of the greatest humility*.

en: Article 1, question 3.

la: Matth. 5, 16: *Sic luceat lux vestra coram hominibus* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *quod est* cod. T *quia est*.

en: Matthew 5:16: *So let your light shine before men*, etc. — A little below, for *which is* codex T reads *because it is*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 924, nota 4.

en: Cf. above, p. 924, note 4.

la: Pro *tantum* codd. CKOS et alii *quando*, et deinde pro *quantum* iidem codd. *quam* (cod. V *tantum quantum*).

en: For *as much* codices CKOS and others read *when*, and then for *as* the same codices read *as* (codex V reads *as much as*).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 24. p. II. dub. 1. et d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. — Alanus ab Insulis, *Theolog. Regul.*, regul. 72, de hac re duplicem affert opinionem. *Sunt*, ait, *qui dicunt hoc generaliter esse verum in genere bonorum, exceptis operibus privilegiatis... Alii vero sine omni exceptione concedunt, hoc esse verum in genere bonorum* [scil. sola voluntate tantum mereri, quantum voluntate et opere].

en: Cf. IV Sent., d. 24, p. II, dub. 1, and d. 33, a. 2, q. 3. — Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 72, brings forward on this matter a twofold opinion. *There are*, he says, *those who say that this is generally true in the class of good works, with the exception of privileged works... But others without any exception concede that this is true in the class of good works* [namely, that by the will alone one merits as much as by will and work].

la: Vide IV. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4.

en: See IV Sent., d. 33, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4.

la: Cod. O addit *vel studium*, pro quo codd. C R S (T a prima manu) W ee et alii nec non ed. 2 perperam exhibent *ad studium*. Circa finem solut. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *unum* et deinde *alterum* mutavit in *unus* et *alter*, contextu repugnante. — Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 3. ad 2. et d. 30, a. 2. q. 2. ad 5.

en: Codex O adds *or zeal*, in place of which codices C R S (T in the first hand) W ee and others, as well as ed. 2, wrongly give *to zeal*. Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 changed *one* and then *the other* into *one (subject)* and *another*, against the context. — Cf. above, d. 26, q. 3, ad 2, and d. 30, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5.

la: *gloriam* cod. M *gratiam*. Paulo superius pro *dum habeat in se* in codd. F bb habetur *dum habet in se*, in Vat. *cum in se habeat*.

en: For *glory* codex M reads *grace*. A little above, for *since it has in itself*, codices F bb have *while it has in itself*, the Vatican edition *since it has in itself* (with a different construction).

la: Cod. A *supra intentionem, scilicet bonitatem*, codd. V W Z et edd. 2, 3 *supra intentionem voluntatis*.

en: Codex A reads *beyond the intention, namely the goodness*, codices V W Z and edd. 2, 3 *beyond the intention of the will*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Eadem quaestio, quae hic tractatur quoad opera bona, fit infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 2. quoad opera mala. In hoc autem articulo s. Doctor tria in operibus externis distinguit, scilicet operum dignitatem, dati quantitatem et operum numerositatem, et tribus distinctis quaestionibus inquirit, utrum et quid addant bonitati intentionis sive voluntatis. Tres huius articuli quaestiones et quaestionem distinctionis 42. S. Thom. (hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 20. a. 4.) unica quaestione comprehendit, quae est: « utrum actus exterior aliquid addat de bonitate, vel malitia supra actum interiorem ». De hac autem re est in scholis controversia, quae ut intelligatur, quaedam praenotanda sunt.
1. Quaestio agitur de actu exteriore, qui secundum se sive secundum materiam vel circumstantias bonitatem vel malitiam habet, et a S. Bonav. praecipue de opere privilegiato.
2. Actus exterior et interior sub diverso respectu sibi invicem communicant suam propriam bonitatem. Si enim actus interior ordinatur ad exteriorem ut eius obiectum, tunc actus interior ab exteriore, ut intentus et volitus est (non autem ut exercitus) sumit bonitatem vel malitiam obiectivam et specificam; exterior autem, ut est exercitus, ab interiore sumit rationem tum libertatis tum moralitatis.
3. Omnes concedunt, quod per accidens actus externus plerumque addat ad moralitatem actus interioris, vel ratione aedificationis sive scandali, vel quia intensive augeat bonitatem vel malitiam voluntatis. Supposita eadem voluntatis intensione, remanet quaestio de extensiva additione, sive utrum actus externus in eodem operante habeat aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam, distinctam a bonitate vel malitia interioris actus, ita ut, utraque iuncta, actus extensive maiorem exhibeat bonitatem vel malitiam.
4. Ad hoc affirmative respondet Scotus cum suis, et prorsus negative Nominales. Etiam S. Thom. (hic a. 3.) docet: « Loquendo igitur de illa bonitate, quam voluntas actui exteriori praebet, actus exterior nihil bonitatis addit, dummodo voluntas aeque intensa sit » (cfr. S. I. II. q. 20. a. 4. et 3.). Tamen ibid. duo addit; primo dicit: « Si autem loquamur de bonitate actus, quam actus exterior secundum se habet, sic actus exterior complet interiorem in bonitate vel malitia, sicut terminus motus complet motum ». Et concludit: « Ideo actus exterior nihil adiungit ad praemium essentiale » etc. Secundo addit: « Ad praemium autem accidentale ordinatur per bonitatem, quae est ipsius actus exterioris secundum se; et ideo actus exterior adiungit aliquid ad praemium accidentale ». — S. Bonav. ab hac Angelici doctrina vix discedit, licet (hic ad 3. et infra d. 42. q. 2.) asserat, quod opus exterius aliquo modo addat interiori in ratione bonitatis et malitiae. Nam quoad praemium accidentale S. Thomas disertis verbis ipsi consentit; nec putamus, eundem dissentire quoad dispositionem, quam (secundum S. Bonaventuram) opus privilegiatum respectu praemii substantialis ex congruo habere potest. Cfr. etiam alia quaest. infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. — In modo loquendi cum S. Bonav. conveniunt Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., et, ut dicit Dionys. Carth., etiam Guliel. Antissiodorensis.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. et a. 1. § 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 42. q. unica, et Quodl. 18. a. 3. — S. Thom., locc. citt. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 138. m. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2, d. 42. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

**III.** Solutio duarum sequentium quaestionum ex praedictis principiis facile intelligitur. Notandum tantum, quod in 3. quaestione respectu plurium operum praescinditur a merito interioris actus caritate informati, qui sane augmentum et ipsius gratiae habitualis et praemii substantialis importat, ut ipse s. Doctor in corp. dicit: « Maior caritas vel melior voluntas facit ad profectum meriti ». De his quaestionibus non invenimus explicite tractantes nisi Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 2. § 2; Petr. a Tar. hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. 2. et Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.; de 2. q. tantum Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The same question which is here treated with regard to good works is treated below in d. 42, a. 1, q. 2 with regard to evil works. In this article the holy Doctor distinguishes three things in external works, namely the dignity of the works, the quantity of the gift, and the multiplicity of the works, and in three distinct questions inquires whether and what they add to the goodness of the intention or will. The three questions of this article, and the question of distinction 42, St. Thomas (here a. 3; S. I-II, q. 20, a. 4) comprehends in a single question, which is: « whether the exterior act adds anything of goodness or of malice beyond the interior act ». But concerning this matter there is in the schools a controversy, which, that it may be understood, certain things must be premised.
1. The question concerns the exterior act which in itself, or according to its matter or circumstances, has goodness or malice, and is treated by St. Bonaventure especially concerning the privileged work.
2. The exterior and interior act, under different respects, communicate to each other their own proper goodness. For if the interior act is ordered to the exterior as to its object, then the interior act takes from the exterior, as it is intended and willed (but not as it is exercised), objective and specific goodness or malice; but the exterior, as it is exercised, takes from the interior the character both of liberty and of morality.
3. All concede that *per accidens* the external act for the most part adds to the morality of the interior act, either by reason of edification or scandal, or because it intensively increases the goodness or malice of the will. The same intensity of will being supposed, the question remains concerning extensive addition, that is, whether the external act in the same one acting has any goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, such that, the two being joined, the act extensively exhibits a greater goodness or malice.
4. To this Scotus with his followers responds affirmatively, and the Nominalists entirely negatively. St. Thomas too (here a. 3) teaches: « Speaking therefore of that goodness which the will gives to the exterior act, the exterior act adds nothing of goodness, provided the will is equally intense » (cf. S. I-II, q. 20, a. 4 and 3). Yet in the same place he adds two things; first he says: « But if we speak of the goodness of the act which the exterior act has of itself, thus the exterior act completes the interior in goodness or malice, as the term of a motion completes the motion ». And he concludes: « Therefore the exterior act adds nothing to essential reward », etc. Secondly he adds: « But to accidental reward it is ordered by the goodness which is of the exterior act itself; and therefore the exterior act adds something to accidental reward ». — St. Bonaventure scarcely departs from this Angelic doctrine, although (here, in reply 3, and below d. 42, q. 2) he asserts that the exterior work in some way adds to the interior in respect of goodness and malice. For as to accidental reward St. Thomas in express words agrees with him; nor do we think that he dissents as to the disposition which (according to St. Bonaventure) a privileged work can have congruously with respect to substantial reward. Cf. also the other question below, d. 42, a. 1, q. 1. — In manner of speaking with St. Bonaventure agree Alexander of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Giles of Rome, and, as Dionysius the Carthusian says, also William of Auxerre.

**II.** Alex. of Hales, S. p. II, q. 96, m. 3, a. 2, § 1 and a. 1, § 3. — Scotus, in both Scripts, d. 42, q. unica, and Quodl. 18, a. 3. — St. Thomas, places cited. — B. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 22, q. 138, m. 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2, d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, dub. lat. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 42, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

**III.** The solution of the two following questions is easily understood from the foregoing principles. It is only to be noted that in the third question, with respect to a multiplicity of works, abstraction is made from the merit of the interior act informed by charity, which indeed brings with it an increase both of habitual grace itself and of substantial reward, as the holy Doctor himself says in the body: « A greater charity or a better will contributes to the advance of merit ». Concerning these questions we have not found anyone treating explicitly except Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. a. 2, § 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 1, 2; and Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.; of the 2nd question only Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 64399–64592) with PDF column-band verification at 450 dpi (printed pp.926–928 = PDF 948–950, offset +22). The OCR body for this quaestio was unusually clean (single-pass usable); the PDF L/R footer bands were read to confirm the apparatus.

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener.** Per Vol II convention (Override §5), the short ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum principale... Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria...`) is folded into this q1; there is no standalone `d40-a2-divisio` chunk. The three sub-questions of Art. II are: q1 = ratione praerogativae dignitatis (this chunk); q2 = ratione quantitatis ex parte dati; q3 = ratione numerositatis.

**Alignment check (passed).** Opener `Circa primum sic proceditur... ratione suae excellentiae et dignitatis` = the FIRST of the "quaeruntur tria" (praerogativa dignitatis). No q-swap.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. This q1 holds the **article-level** SCHOLION (items I–III) printed on pp.928–929. Item III explicitly forward-references "the two following questions" (q2, q3), so **q2 and q3 likely have NO own scholion** — check each independently before setting has_scholion=false there.

**Apparatus page-split map** (per-page footer restart; 18 raw footers → 16 sequential `[^N]` markers):
- **p.926** footer nn.1–4 → [^1]–[^4]. n.4 (Cyprian, *de Mortalitate*) is the hand-off picked up from a1-q3, anchoring this q1's Sed contra 1 (de beato Martino).
- **p.927** footer nn.1–10 → [^5]–[^13]. Mapping: n.1→[^5] (Gratian/*nobilis*), n.2→[^6] (Aristot. *tantum unum*), n.3→[^7] (Ps.137/humilitas), n.4→[^8] (`Art. 1. q. 3.`), n.6→[^9] (Matth.5,16), n.5→[^10] (Cfr. supra pag.924 nota 4), n.8→[^11] (Pro *tantum* codd. CKOS), n.7+n.9→[^12] (Cfr. IV Sent d.24 **+** Alanus ab Insulis — two adjacent footers merged at the single body marker on *omni modo additionis*), n.10→[^13] (Vide IV Sent d.33 a.2 q.3 ad 4).
- **p.928** footer nn.1–4 → [^14]–[^16] (one merged). n.1→[^14] (Cod.O *vel studium*), n.2 (Cfr. supra d.26 q.3 ad 2 — an editorial cross-ref with no distinct body marker) folded into the *Ad 3* region, n.3→[^15] (*gloriam*/*gratiam* var.), n.4→[^16] (Cod.A *supra intentionem*).

**Footer-to-anchor note.** The consolidation from 18 raw footers to 16 markers merged two pairs of adjacent footers (p.927 n.7+n.9 at [^12]; p.928 n.2 absorbed near [^15]) where two footers fall at a single body marker position — this keeps every `[^N]` paired with a real body marker in both languages. The scholion (items I–III) carries no inline footnote markers.

**Hand-off forwarded to q2:** p.928 carries NO footer note belonging to q2 (q2 begins on p.929 — raw 64593). q2's first footers are the p.929 sequence. q2 opener (raw ~64595): `Secundo quaeritur, utrum quantum quis intendit, tantum faciat...` — wait, that is the Art. II second sub-q: `utrum opera... addant ratione quantitatis ex parte dati`. Verify the `Secundo quaeritur... ratione quantitatis ex parte dati` alignment at 450 dpi before translating. q2 `has_scholion`: likely FALSE per Scholion item III above — confirm independently.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 929 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum bona opera aliquid addant supra intentionem quantum ad quantitatem dati.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum bona opera addant supra bonam intentionem quantum ad quantitatem dati. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Secundae ad Corinthios* nono[^1]: *Qui parce seminat parce et metet; et qui seminat in benedictionibus de benedictionibus et metet.* Si igitur seminatio illa, de qua loquitur Apostolus, est in eleemosynae datione; videtur, quod magnitudo dati faciat ad excellentiam gloriae.

2. Item, *Tobiae* quarto[^2]: *Si multum tibi fuerit, abundanter tribue:* si ergo ista exhortatio non est inutilis, videtur, quod abundantia dati faciat ad incrementum meriti.

3. Item, quamvis Deus ex aequali bonitate conferat bona maiora et minora, tamen ille cui maiora contulit, tenetur ad maiorem gratiarum actionem: ergo pari ratione, si ex aequali caritate detur maius munus et minus munus, conveniens est, Deum pro maiori munere maiorem reddere retributionem.

4. Item, si non magis meretur qui plus tribuit, quam ille qui minus, ergo non plus meretur qui relinquit omnia pro Deo et dat pauperibus[^3] quam ille qui dat unum solidum: igitur omnes sunt stulti qui sequuntur divinum consilium. Quodsi impium est dicere, divinum consilium esse indiscretum; videtur, quod quantitas dati faciat ad amplificandum meritum.

**Sed contra:**
1. *Marci* duodecimo[^4]: *Amen dico vobis: quoniam haec plus omnibus misit in gazophylacium;* loquitur de vidua: ergo si Christus plus appretiabatur datum illius viduae, quod fuit valde parvum, sicut in textu innuitur, quam magna dona aliorum; videtur, quod Deus appretietur opera solum secundum quantitatem bonae intentionis, et nullo modo secundum quantitatem muneris exterioris.

2. Item, Glossa super illum locum[^5]: « *Non offerentium substantiam considerat Deus, sed conscientiam; nec perpendit, quantum offeras, sed ex quanto* »: si ergo merita tantum valent, quantum Deus illa ponderat; videtur, quod quantitas dati meritum intentionis bonae non augeat.

3. Item, super illud *secundae ad Corinthios* octavo[^6]: *Et qui multum habuit non abundavit;* ibi Glossa: « *Ubi aequa est voluntas, aequalem habebit mercedem* »: ergo sive aliquis det magnum, sive parvum, dum tamen ex aequali caritate; videtur, quod eis retribuatur aequaliter.

4. Item, si quantitas dati aliquid addit, aut addit ad meritum respectu praemii *substantialis*, aut respectu praemii *accidentalis*. Non respectu praemii *substantialis*, quia illud respicit caritatis radicem et quantitatem gratiae. Non respectu *accidentalis*, quia praemium accidentale debetur operibus excellentibus et privilegiatis[^7]; non enim meretur aliquis aureolam ex hoc, quod dat magnam eleemosynam. Videtur igitur, quod quantitas dati ad bonae intentionis meritum nihil omnino addat.

### Conclusio.

> Quantitas dati in bonis operibus addit ad praemium essentiale, non autem directe, sed dispositive.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod de quantitate dati est loqui dupliciter: aut comparando datum ad *datum solum*; aut comparando haec *ad invicem* et ad dantis facultatem. <!-- page 930 --> — Primo modo loquendo, maior quantitas dati aliquid addit ad bonitatem intentionis, non, inquam, respectu praemii *essentialis* directe, sed quia aliquo modo disponit hominem *ad proficiendum in bono*[^8] et *ad recedendum a malo*. Qui enim maius munus tribuit, ut *sibi faciat amicum de mammona iniquitatis*, magis recipientem obligat ad orandum pro se, et quodam modo in obligando illum obligat Deum; et ideo plus se *disponit ad gratiam*, quam ille qui dat minus munus. Similiter plus se disponit *ad recedendum a malo*, quia in hoc, quod facit maiorem eleemosynam, absolvi meretur a maiori poena, secundum quod dicitur *Lucae* undecimo[^9]: *Date eleemosynam, et omnia munda sunt vobis;* et *Tobiae* duodecimo: *Eleemosyna a morte liberat;* et propterea, *Danielis* quarto: *Redime peccata tua eleemosynis.*

Similiter, si comparemus quantitates datorum in comparatione ad *facultatem dantium*, maior quantitas non addit quantum ad meritum praemii *substantialis* directe, sed quodam modo *dispositive*. Qui enim, pensatis suis viribus, plus dat, quam alter, suis viribus pensatis, magis *ad donum gratiae* se disponit, magis etiam *a peccato recedit*. Et sic, generaliter loquendo, quantitas dati, praesupposita aequalitate bonae intentionis sive voluntatis, quantum ad praemium *essentiale* non addit *directe et proprie*, sed quodam modo *dispositive*: vel quia disponendo ad caritatem disponit ad maiorem gloriam, vel quia eripiendo a malo, celerius facit hominem pertingere ad coronam.

Et hoc quidem non habet instantiam, quando est excessus quantitatis dati et in comparatione ad *datum* et in comparatione *ad facultatem dantis*. Quando vero ex una parte datum unum *excedit* aliud in se, et econtra exceditur ab aliquo in comparatione ad facultatem dantis, per quem modum dixit Dominus[^10] quod vidua plus miserat in gazophylacium quam omnes divites, quia *totum victum suum* posuerat; tunc se habent sicut excedentia et excessa. Secundum enim diversas conditiones unum datum plus promovet quam reliquum. Maior enim quantitas dati plus valet ad evadendam poenam, quia, sicut dicitur decimo tertio *Proverbiorum*[^11]: *Redemptio animae viri sunt propriae divitiae.* Maior vero quantitas dati secundum *facultatem dantis* plus valet ad acquirendam gratiam, pro eo quod talis magis se disponit ad perfectionem beatitudinis, scilicet paupertatis. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod quantitas dati aliquid auget ad meritum bonae intentionis, scilicet *dispositive*.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**
*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod vidua illa plus dedit; dici potest, quod ibi loquitur Dominus de quantitate dati per comparationem *ad facultatem dantis*, quia illa totum dederat, quod patet per sequentem litteram. Praeterea, Deus, *qui scrutatur corda*[^12], vidit, quod vidua illa ex meliori voluntate oblationem suam dabat; et ideo magis donum eius appretiabatur ratione voluntatis eius melioris. Cum autem quaerimus nunc, utrum quantitas dati aliquid addat ad bonitatem intentionis; hoc quaerimus, praesupposita aequalitate bonae voluntatis; aliter enim nulla esset quaestio, quia planum est, quod plus valet magnitudo bonae voluntatis cum parvo dono, quam parvitas bonae voluntatis cum magno.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod Deus non considerat quantum, sed ex quanto; dicendum, quod verum est principaliter, scilicet quantum ad retributionem praemii *substantialis*; non negat tamen Glossa, quin quantitas dati aliquo modo disponat de *congruo* ad maiorem gloriam, vel ad gloriam celerius habendam.

*Ad 3, 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de alia Glossa, quod aequalis voluntas aequalem habet mercedem; iam patet responsio. Non enim fit maior retributio, voluntate remanente in sua aequalitate, sed quia quantitas dati disponit ad habendum meliorem[^13] voluntatem et puriorem; hinc est, quod aliquo modo facit ad augmentum gloriae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, quod aliquo modo facit ad praemium *substantiale*, licet non principaliter et per se, sed mediante gratia et caritate, ad quam disponit. Verumtamen illud quod obiicit de praemio *accidentali*, non cogit, pro eo quod meritum accidentale non tantum est aureola, sed etiam gaudium de aliquo bono creato, sive sit alicuius praerogativae et excellentiae, sive non. Et hoc melius manifestabitur in sequenti problemate[^14].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether good works add anything beyond intention as regards the quantity of what is given.*

Secondly it is asked whether good works add, beyond good intention, anything as regards the quantity of what is given. And that they do seems to be the case.

1. *Second to the Corinthians*, chapter nine[^1]: *He who sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly; and he who sows in blessings shall also reap of blessings.* If, therefore, that sowing of which the Apostle speaks lies in the giving of alms, it seems that the greatness of the gift contributes to the excellence of glory.

2. Likewise, *Tobit* four[^2]: *If thou have much, give abundantly:* if then this exhortation is not useless, it seems that the abundance of the gift contributes to the increase of merit.

3. Likewise, although God from equal goodness confers greater and lesser goods, nevertheless he to whom he has conferred greater things is bound to greater thanksgiving: therefore by parity of reasoning, if from equal charity a greater gift and a lesser gift be given, it is fitting that God render a greater recompense for the greater gift.

4. Likewise, if he who gives more does not merit more than he who gives less, then he who leaves all things for God and gives to the poor[^3] does not merit more than he who gives a single shilling: therefore all are fools who follow the divine counsel. But if it is impious to say that the divine counsel is undiscerning, it seems that the quantity of what is given contributes to the amplifying of merit.

**On the contrary:**
1. *Mark* twelve[^4]: *Amen I say to you, that this woman hath cast in more than all into the treasury;* he speaks of the widow: therefore if Christ valued more highly the gift of that widow, which was very small, as is intimated in the text, than the great gifts of others, it seems that God values works only according to the quantity of good intention, and in no way according to the quantity of the exterior offering.

2. Likewise, the Gloss upon that passage[^5]: « *God does not consider the substance of those who offer, but the conscience; nor does he weigh how much you offer, but out of how much* »: if therefore merits are worth only as much as God weighs them, it seems that the quantity of what is given does not increase the merit of good intention.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the *second to the Corinthians*, chapter eight[^6]: *And he that had much had nothing over;* there the Gloss: « *Where the will is equal, it shall have an equal reward* »: therefore whether one give much or little, provided it be from equal charity, it seems that they are recompensed equally.

4. Likewise, if the quantity of what is given adds anything, it either adds to merit in respect of the *substantial* reward, or in respect of the *accidental* reward. Not in respect of the *substantial* reward, because that regards the root of charity and the quantity of grace. Not in respect of the *accidental*, because the accidental reward is owed to excellent and privileged works[^7]; for no one merits the aureole from this, that he gives a great alms. It seems, therefore, that the quantity of what is given adds nothing whatever to the merit of good intention.

### Conclusion.

> The quantity of what is given in good works adds to the essential reward, yet not directly, but dispositively.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a twofold way of speaking about the quantity of what is given: either by comparing the gift to *the gift alone*; or by comparing these *to one another* and to the means of the giver. — Speaking in the first way, a greater quantity of the gift adds something to the goodness of intention — not, I say, in respect of the *essential* reward directly, but because it in some way disposes a man *to advance in good*[^8] and *to withdraw from evil*. For he who gives a greater gift, that he may *make himself a friend of the mammon of iniquity*, more obliges the recipient to pray for him, and in a certain way, in obliging him, obliges God; and therefore he more *disposes himself to grace* than he who gives a lesser gift. Likewise he disposes himself more *to withdraw from evil*, because in this, that he makes a greater alms, he merits to be absolved from a greater punishment, according to what is said in *Luke* eleven[^9]: *Give alms, and all things are clean unto you;* and *Tobit* twelve: *Alms delivereth from death;* and therefore, *Daniel* four: *Redeem thou thy sins with alms.*

Likewise, if we compare the quantities of gifts in comparison to *the means of the givers*, a greater quantity does not add as regards the merit of the *substantial* reward directly, but in a certain way *dispositively*. For he who, his own resources being weighed, gives more than another, his resources being weighed, disposes himself more *to the gift of grace*, and also *withdraws more from sin*. And thus, speaking generally, the quantity of what is given, granted equality of good intention or will, as regards the *essential* reward does not add *directly and properly*, but in a certain way *dispositively*: either because, by disposing to charity, it disposes to greater glory, or because, by snatching from evil, it makes a man reach the crown more quickly.

And this indeed admits of no exception, when there is an excess of the quantity given both in comparison to *the gift* and in comparison *to the means of the giver*. But when on one side one gift *exceeds* another in itself, and conversely is exceeded by some other in comparison to the means of the giver — in which manner the Lord said[^10] that the widow had cast more into the treasury than all the rich, because she had put in *her whole living* — then they stand as exceeding and exceeded. For according to diverse conditions one gift advances more than the other. For a greater quantity of the gift is worth more for escaping punishment, because, as is said in the thirteenth chapter of *Proverbs*[^11]: *The ransom of a man's life are his own riches.* But a greater quantity of the gift according to *the means of the giver* is worth more for acquiring grace, inasmuch as such a one disposes himself more to the perfection of beatitude, namely of poverty. — The arguments are therefore to be granted which show that the quantity of what is given increases something for the merit of good intention, namely *dispositively*.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that that widow gave more — it can be said that there the Lord speaks of the quantity of the gift by comparison *to the means of the giver*, because she had given the whole, as is clear from the following text. Moreover, God, *who searcheth the hearts*[^12], saw that that widow gave her offering from a better will; and therefore her gift was valued more by reason of her better will. But when we now ask whether the quantity of what is given adds anything to the goodness of intention, we ask this presupposing equality of good will; for otherwise there would be no question, since it is plain that the greatness of a good will with a small gift is worth more than the smallness of a good will with a great one.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected from the Gloss, that God does not consider how much, but out of how much — it must be said that this is true principally, namely as regards the recompense of the *substantial* reward; yet the Gloss does not deny that the quantity of what is given in some way disposes by *congruity* to greater glory, or to glory more quickly obtained.

*To 3, 4.* As to that which is objected from the other Gloss, that an equal will has an equal reward — the response is already clear. For no greater recompense is made while the will remains in its equality, but because the quantity of what is given disposes one to have a better[^13] and purer will; hence it is that it in some way contributes to the increase of glory. — And by this is clear the response to that which was asked last, namely that it in some way contributes to the *substantial* reward, though not principally and of itself, but by the mediation of grace and charity, to which it disposes. Nevertheless that which it objects concerning the *accidental* reward does not compel, inasmuch as accidental merit is not only the aureole, but also joy concerning some created good, whether it be of some prerogative and excellence or not. And this will be better made manifest in the following problem[^14].

---

la: Vers. 6.

la: Vers. 9.

en: Verse 9. [Tob. 4:9]

la: Respicitur illud Matth. 19, 21: *Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes, et da pauperibus* etc., nec non ibid. v. 27: *Ecce nos reliquimus omnia* etc. — Pro *unum solidum* (Italice *soldo*, Gallice *sou*) codd. et edd. 1, 2 corrupte *unum solum*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *unum solum obolum* (obolus erat moneta minutior, cfr. Du Cange.).

en: Reference is made to that text of Matthew 19:21: *If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor,* etc., and also ibid. v. 27: *Behold we have left all things,* etc. — For *unum solidum* (in Italian *soldo*, in French *sou*) the codices and editions 1, 2 corruptly read *unum solum*; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *unum solum obolum* (the obol was a smaller coin, cf. Du Cange).

la: Vers. 43. Cfr. verba Bedae, supra pag. 906, nota 6 allata.

en: Verse 43. Cf. the words of Bede, adduced above on page 906, note 6.

la: Scil. Marc. 12, 43. — Glossa, quae est Bedae, in hunc loc., habetur apud Lyranum. — Pro *super illum locum* cod. X *super illud Lucae 12. de vidua paupere*, cod. bb *super illud Lucae*, nonnulli alii codd., vocem *Lucae* male interpretantes, *super illud locum*; Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *super eundem locum*.

en: Namely Mark 12:43. — The Gloss, which is Bede's, on this passage, is found in Lyra. — For *super illum locum* (upon that passage) codex X reads *super illud Lucae 12. de vidua paupere* (upon that of Luke 12, on the poor widow), codex bb *super illud Lucae* (upon that of Luke), several other codices, misinterpreting the word *Lucae*, *super illud locum*; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 *super eundem locum* (upon the same passage).

la: Vers. 15. — Verba Glossae, quae est *ordinaria* et secundum August., Enarrat. in Ps. 125. n. 11, a Strabo et Lyrano sic redduntur: *Sic qui multum dat dives, et qui parum pauper, si aequa sit utriusque voluntas, aequalem habent mercedem.* — In fine arg. pro *eis* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 habet *ei*.

en: Verse 15. — The words of the Gloss, which is the *ordinary* Gloss and follows Augustine, *Commentary on the Psalms* 125, n. 11, are rendered thus by Strabo and Lyra: *Thus the rich man who gives much, and the poor man who gives little, if the will of each be equal, have an equal reward.* — At the end of the argument, for *eis* (to them) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has *ei* (to him).

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Pro *excellentibus* edd., excepta 1, *excellentioribus*.

en: Cf. the preceding question. — For *excellentibus* (excellent) the editions, except the first, read *excellentioribus* (more excellent).

la: Ut docet Apostolus, II. Cor. 9, 7. seq. dicens: *Hilarem enim datorem diligit Deus. Potens est autem Deus... ut in omnibus... abundetis in omne opus bonum.* — Deinde alluditur ad illud Luc. 16, 9: *Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis.*

en: As the Apostle teaches, 2 Cor. 9:7ff., saying: *For God loveth a cheerful giver. And God is able... that... you may abound to every good work.* — Then allusion is made to that of Luke 16:9: *Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.*

la: Vers. 41. — Seq. Script. locus est Tob. 12, 9, tertius Dan. 4, 24. — Pro *Similiter plus se* cod. T *igitur plus se.* Paulo inferius edd. 3, 4 et Vat. omittunt *propterea*, pro quo plures codd. et ed. 1, 2 *praeterea*.

en: Verse 41. — The following scriptural passage is Tob. 12:9, the third Dan. 4:24. — For *Similiter plus se* codex T reads *igitur plus se.* A little below, editions 3, 4 and the Vatican omit *propterea*, for which several codices and editions 1, 2 read *praeterea*.

la: Marc. 12, 43. seq., Luc. 21, 3. seq. — Mox pro *Secundum enim* cod. Y *Propter.*

en: Mark 12:43ff., Luke 21:3ff. — Presently, for *Secundum enim* codex Y reads *Propter.*

la: Vers. 8: *Redemptio animae viri divitiae suae.*

en: Verse 8: *The ransom of a man's life are his own riches.*

la: Rom. 8, 27; I. Paral. 28, 9; cfr. Ps. 7, 10. et Ier. 17, 10. — Paulo inferius pro *et ideo magis donum eius* codd. V W *et ideo maius donum* (cod. V *donum suum*).

en: Rom. 8:27; 1 Paral. 28:9; cf. Ps. 7:10 and Jer. 17:10. — A little below, for *et ideo magis donum eius* codices V W read *et ideo maius donum* (codex V *donum suum*).

la: Cod. ee *maiorem.*

en: Codex ee reads *maiorem* (greater).

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF crops of printed pp. 929–930 (PDF pp. 951–952; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 64593–64712). The OCR for this quaestio is unusually clean (single-column-style running prose); the PDF resolved the marginal Quaracchi running glosses (*Fundamenta.*, *Ad oppositum.*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Conclusio generalis.*, *Corollarium.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Notandum.*, *Distinctio.*) which are editorial marginalia, not Bonaventure's text, and have been trimmed.
- **Alignment confirmed.** Opener reads *Secundo quaeritur, utrum bona opera addant supra bonam intentionem quantum ad quantitatem dati* — matches the "quantity on the part of what is given" topic (second of the *quaeruntur tria* of a.2). No q-swap.
- **No scholion.** Verified via PDF: a.2-q.1's scholion item III states *Solutio duarum sequentium quaestionum ex praedictis principiis facile intelligitur*, and footnote [^14] (p.930) reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* Frontmatter `has_scholion: false`.
- **Page-split map.** The quaestio spans two printed pages. Footnote numbering restarts per page: p.929 carries notes 1–7 (chunk [^1]–[^7]); p.930 carries notes 1–7 (chunk [^8]–[^14]). The page break falls mid-Respondeo, between *...ad dantis facultatem.* (end p.929) and *— Primo modo loquendo...* (start p.930); inserted `<!-- page 930 -->` at that boundary.
- **Hand-offs.** Picked up from a.2-q.1: none (q.2 opens fresh at the top of p.929 L-column; no shared p.928 footer belonged to q.2 — confirmed by PDF). Forwarded to a.2-q.3: none — p.930's footer block (notes 1–7) is fully consumed by this quaestio; q.3 (*ratione numerositatis*) opens fresh at p.931 (PDF p.953), raw line 64713.
- **No [?] flags.** All readings resolved against the PDF.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum bonitas operum addat ad bonae intentionis meritum quantum ad numerositatem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonitas operum addat ad bonae intentionis meritum quantum ad numerositatem; et est quaestio, utrum bonum opus, additum operi, reddat operantem dignum maiori praemio essentiali. Et quod non, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud Zachariae quarto[^1]: *Exaequabit gratiam gratiae*: ergo ubi est aequalitas gratiae, erit aequalitas gloriae: igitur si aliqui duo ex aequali gratia inaequaliter operantur, nihilominus in mercede gloriae aequabuntur.

2. Item, super illud Iudicum secundo[^2]: *Qui longo tempore post eum vixerunt*; Glossa: « Solius Dei est nosse inter seniores, quis eorum post se maiorem lucem emiserit, utrum Paulus, an Petrus, an Bartholomaeus »; sed certum est, quod Paulus *plus omnibus laboravit*, sicut dicit primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto: ergo magnitudo praemii non pensatur secundum multitudinem operum.

3. Item, Augustinus[^3]: « Non multitudo operum, non diuturnitas temporum auget meritum, sed sola caritas et melior voluntas »; sed nihil hoc expressius dici potest.

4. Item, quantum homo diligit Deum, tantum diligitur a Deo[^4]; et quantum diligitur a Deo, tantum remuneratur a Deo: ergo si est aequalitas in dilectione, aequalitas est in remuneratione. Sed multi sunt aequales in dilectione, qui tamen non sunt aequales in opere: ergo videtur, quod multitudo operum non faciat ad meriti substantialis praemii incrementum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Ad Romanos quarto[^5]: *Ei*, ait, *qui operatur, merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum meritum*; Glossa: « Merces non dabitur secundum gratiam fidei tantum, sed secundum meritum operationis suae »: ergo videtur, quod pluribus operibus maiorem mercedem quis mereatur habere.

2. Item, super illud ad Galatas sexto[^6]: *Bonum autem facientes, non deficiamus*; Glossa: « Quantum seminaverimus in operibus, tantum metemus in fructibus »: ergo etc.

3. Item, per unum bonum opus homo meretur vitam aeternam: ergo si aliud sequens opus est ita bonum, sicut prius, tantundem merebitur, sicut primum; aut ergo meretur *illud idem*, aut aliquid *superadditum illi*. Si aliquid *superadditum illi*; habeo propositum, quod multitudo operum prosit ad augmentum meriti. Si *nihil*; ergo videtur, quod frustra operetur: ergo stultus est qui[^7], facto uno bono, amplius facit aliud. Quodsi hoc est impium dicere, restat etc.

4. Item, peccatum non est magis efficax ad merendum poenam, quam sit bonum opus ad merendum gloriam[^8]; sed peccatum sequens, additum praecedenti, si sit aequale ei, meretur duplo maiorem poenam: ergo bonum opus, additum praecedenti, meretur duplo maiorem gloriam.

5. Item, qui servit homini, quanto diutius ei servit, tanto maiorem assequitur mercedem: si ergo Deus in retribuendo et est iustior et liberalior, quam sit homo; videtur, quod quanto aliquis in pluribus ei servit et quanto plura opera pro Christo facit, tanto maiorem ab ipso recipiat retributionem.

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6. Item, iste qui multiplicat opera bona, *seminat in terra bona*[^9]: ergo necessario oportet, quod aliquem fructum praemii ex eo accipiat, aut igitur praemium substantiale, aut accidentale, aut aureae, aut aureolae. Sed non aureolae, cum illa debeatur operibus excellentibus: ergo recipiet maius praemium substantiale sive aureae.

Est igitur quaestio, quantum prosint bona opera multiplicata et quem fructum afferunt.

### Conclusio.

> Multiplicatio bonorum operum non valet ad profectum in merito respectu praemii essentialis nisi disponendo et conservando, ad profectum vero in praemio accidentali potest valere tripliciter.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod proficere in merito vel ad meritum, potest esse duobus modis secundum duplicem differentiam praemii. Quoddam enim est praemium substantiale, quod quidem consistit in visione et fruitione Dei; quod ideo dicitur praemium substantiale, quia fundamentum et substantia[^10] totius nostrae beatitudinis est Deus, et illo perfecte habito, perfecta est in nobis beatitudo. Aliud vero est praemium accidentale, quod quidem consistit in gaudio, quod habetur de bono creato, vel de liberatione ab aliquo malo. — Accipiendo igitur meritum respectu praemii substantialis, contingit dicere, quod aliquid valet ad profectum meriti tripliciter: aut quia per illud meretur homo maiorem gloriam, et hoc modo maior caritas vel melior voluntas facit ad profectum meriti; aut quia *disponit ad merendum* maiorem gloriam, et talia sunt opera perfectionis[^11], quae dicuntur facere ad meriti profectum; aut quia *conservat* illud, per quod meretur homo gloriam, et sic omnia bona opera proficiunt ad meritum, quia in ipsis caritas exercetur et conservatur et radicatur, ut homo finaliter perseveret in illa. Et hoc non est parvum, quia, quidquid homo faciat, non salvatur, nisi finaliter perseveret[^12]. Et sic patet, quod operum multiplicatio quodam modo valet ad profectum in merito respectu praemii substantialis; et hoc dico disponendo et conservando, non autem merendo maiorem gloriam ex condigno. — Similiter ad profectum maioris praemii accidentalis potest aliquid valere tripliciter: aut ratione adeptionis aureolae, et sic opera specialis excellentiae faciunt ad profectum meriti voluntatis bonae; aut ratione adeptionis alicuius delectationis internae, et sic omnia opera, quae fiunt ex gratia, quodam modo valent ad profectum praemii accidentalis, quia, secundum quod homo plura bona opera facit, secundum hoc de pluribus iucundabitur in conscientia sua; aut ratione diminutionis poenae, et sic opera difficilia et poenalia faciunt ad profectum meriti et addunt ad meritum bonae voluntatis, quia remissionem alicuius poenae meretur homo ex voluntate cum opere, quam non meretur[^13] ex sola voluntate.

Haec autem distinctio non solum valet ad terminandum quod dictum est, sed etiam ad duo praecedentia. Generaliter enim verum est, quod operum dignitas et dati quantitas et operum numerositas ad profectum meriti facit respectu praemii accidentalis, licet differenter. Verum est etiam generaliter, quod ista omnia opera non faciunt ad profectum meriti respectu praemii substantialis, nisi solum disponendo et conservando. — Unde rationes illae, quae ostendunt, quod non multiplicatur merces praemii substantialis secundum multiplicationem operum, concedendae sunt; verum enim concludunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ei qui operatur, merces imputatur secundum meritum; dicendum, quod textus ille, secundum quod Glossa exponit, non vult dicere, quod quantitas mercedis respondeat operi principaliter; sed hoc vult dicere, quod ubi est opportunitas operandi, non sufficit gratia fidei sine bona operatione; ubi autem opportunitas, vel facultas deest, sola gratia sufficit; unde sensus est: *ei qui operatur*, id est, ei qui habet tempus operandi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Glossa, quod quantum seminaverimus in operibus, tantum metemus in fructibus; dicendum, quod nomine fructuum intelligitur ibi gaudium, quod habebit quis de bonis operationibus[^14]; non praemium substantiale, quod consistit in Deo. Si autem de illo, scilicet substantiali praemio intelligatur, tunc *tantum* et *quantum* non dicunt commensurationem, nec etiam dicunt dispositionem necessitatis, sed congruitatis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per sequens opus meretur homo tantundem[^15], quantum per primum; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non meretur aliud, sed idem ipsum, quod prius meruerat, loquendo quantum ad essentiale praemium. Et non

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sequitur, quod in vanum laboret; quia, etsi primum opus erat meritorium vitae aeternae, non tamen merebatur efficaciter, nisi caritate perseverante; et caritas non potest in homine vivere, quin exeat in bonos actus, cum potest et debet. Ideo sequens opus frustra non fit, quia, quamvis non addat ad *praemii* excellentiam, addit tamen ad *meriti* efficaciam; disponit etiam nihilominus ad profectum et facit ad incrementum meriti respectu accidentalis praemii, sicut prius ostensum est.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum additum peccato duplat meritum et supplicium, ergo et bonum additum bono; dicendum, quod non est simile, propter hoc quod, quia mala facimus, mali sumus, sed non, quia bona facimus, boni sumus; immo potius e converso bonitas operum ortum habet ex bonitate operantis[^16]. Et hinc est, quod diversis peccatis meretur homo diversa supplicia, quamvis diversis bonis operibus mereatur homo unam gloriam, quia *ratio merendi* et acceptandi in pluribus bonis una est; *ratio* vero *displicendi* et demerendi est in pluribus peccatis diversa.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud hominem maius praemium meretur homo ex pluribus operibus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia homo non reputat opus dignum retributione propter bonitatem *operantis*, sed potius operantem propter bonitatem *operis*. Homo enim indiget alieno servitio; Deus autem, qui *bonorum nostrorum non indiget*[^17], non *operantem* propter opera, sed *opera* propter operantem acceptat et remunerat; et ideo non est simile ex parte ista et ex illa.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod opera multiplicata non valent ad praemium accidentale, quia non assequuntur aureolam; dicendum, quod accidentale praemium in plus est quam aureola. Nomine enim aureolae non intelligimus quodcumque praemium accidentale, sed illud quod habet quandam praerogativam et dignitatem, sicut et opus, cui respondet. Nihilominus tamen gaudium de bonorum operum multiplicatione ad accidentale praemium spectat, cum sine ipso possit haberi vita aeterna; et ad hoc quidem faciunt bona opera multiplicata; faciunt etiam ad essentiale praemium aliquo modo, sicut prius ostensum est. — Ex his patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur[^18].

---

english:
### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number; and the question is whether a good work, added to a work, renders the one acting worthy of a greater essential reward. And it seems that it does not:

1. *First*, by that text of Zechariah, chapter four[^1]: *He will make grace equal to grace*: therefore where there is equality of grace, there will be equality of glory: therefore if two persons, out of equal grace, act unequally, they will nonetheless be made equal in the reward of glory.

2. Likewise, on that text of Judges, chapter two[^2]: *Who lived a long time after him*; the Gloss: « It belongs to God alone to know, among the elders, which of them sent forth a greater light after himself, whether Paul, or Peter, or Bartholomew »; but it is certain that Paul *labored more than all*, as he says in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen: therefore the greatness of the reward is not weighed according to the multitude of works.

3. Likewise, Augustine[^3]: « Not the multitude of works, not the length of time, increases merit, but charity alone and a better will »; but nothing can be said more expressly than this.

4. Likewise, as much as a man loves God, so much is he loved by God[^4]; and as much as he is loved by God, so much is he rewarded by God: therefore if there is equality in love, there is equality in reward. But many are equal in love who nonetheless are not equal in work: therefore it seems that the multitude of works does not contribute to the increase of the reward of substantial merit.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter four[^5]: *To him*, he says, *who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to merit*; the Gloss: « The wage will not be given according to the grace of faith alone, but according to the merit of one's working »: therefore it seems that by more works one merits to have a greater wage.

2. Likewise, on that text to the Galatians, chapter six[^6]: *But doing good, let us not fail*; the Gloss: « As much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits »: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by one good work a man merits eternal life: therefore if another following work is as good as the prior one, he will merit just as much as by the first; therefore either he merits *that same thing*, or something *superadded to it*. If something *superadded to it*; I have my point, that the multitude of works avails for the increase of merit. If *nothing*; then it seems that he works in vain: therefore he is foolish who[^7], having done one good thing, does another in addition. But if it is impious to say this, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, sin is not more efficacious for meriting punishment than a good work is for meriting glory[^8]; but a following sin, added to a preceding one, if it is equal to it, merits twice as great a punishment: therefore a good work, added to a preceding one, merits twice as great a glory.

5. Likewise, whoever serves a man, the longer he serves him, the greater the wage he obtains: if therefore God in rewarding is both more just and more generous than a man is; it seems that the more anyone serves him in more things and the more works he does for Christ, the greater the reward he receives from him.

6. Likewise, he who multiplies good works *sows in good ground*[^9]: therefore it is necessary that he receive some fruit of reward from it, either therefore a substantial reward, or an accidental one, or of the aurea, or of the aureole. But not of the aureole, since that is owed to excellent works: therefore he will receive a greater substantial reward, that is, of the aurea.

The question, therefore, is how much multiplied good works avail and what fruit they bring.

### Conclusion.

> The multiplication of good works does not avail for progress in merit with respect to the essential reward except by disposing and conserving, but it can avail in three ways for progress in the accidental reward.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to progress in merit, or toward merit, can be in two ways according to the twofold difference of reward. For one reward is substantial, which indeed consists in the vision and enjoyment of God; and it is called the substantial reward because the foundation and substance[^10] of our whole beatitude is God, and once he is perfectly possessed, our beatitude is perfect. The other is the accidental reward, which indeed consists in the joy that is had from a created good, or from liberation from some evil. — Taking merit, therefore, with respect to the substantial reward, it can be said that something avails for the progress of merit in three ways: either because through it a man merits a greater glory, and in this way a greater charity or a better will contributes to the progress of merit; or because it *disposes toward meriting* a greater glory, and such are works of perfection[^11], which are said to contribute to the progress of merit; or because it *conserves* that by which a man merits glory, and thus all good works are profitable toward merit, because in them charity is exercised and conserved and rooted, so that a man may finally persevere in it. And this is no small thing, because, whatever a man may do, he is not saved unless he finally perseveres[^12]. And thus it is clear that the multiplication of works in a certain way avails for progress in merit with respect to the substantial reward; and this I say by disposing and conserving, but not by meriting a greater glory by condign merit. — Likewise, for progress toward a greater accidental reward something can avail in three ways: either by reason of the attainment of the aureole, and thus works of special excellence contribute to the progress of the merit of the good will; or by reason of the attainment of some internal delight, and thus all works that are done from grace in a certain way avail for the progress of the accidental reward, because, according as a man does more good works, accordingly will he rejoice over more things in his conscience; or by reason of the diminution of punishment, and thus difficult and penal works contribute to the progress of merit and add to the merit of the good will, because a man merits the remission of some punishment by the will together with the work, which he does not merit[^13] by the will alone.

This distinction, moreover, avails not only for settling what has been said, but also for the two preceding questions. For it is generally true that the worthiness of works and the quantity of what is given and the number of works contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the accidental reward, though in different ways. It is also generally true that all these works do not contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the substantial reward, except only by disposing and conserving. — Hence those arguments which show that the wage of the substantial reward is not multiplied according to the multiplication of works are to be conceded; for they conclude truly.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that to the one who works the wage is reckoned according to merit; it must be said that that text, according as the Gloss expounds it, does not mean that the quantity of the wage corresponds to the work principally; but it means this, that where there is opportunity for working, the grace of faith does not suffice without good working; but where opportunity or capacity is lacking, grace alone suffices; hence the sense is: *to him who works*, that is, to him who has time for working.

2. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that as much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits; it must be said that by the name of fruits is there understood the joy that one will have from good workings[^14]; not the substantial reward, which consists in God. But if it be understood of the latter, namely the substantial reward, then *as much* and *how much* do not signify commensuration, nor do they signify a disposition of necessity, but of congruity.

3. To that which is objected, that by a following work a man merits just as much[^15] as by the first; it must be said that this is true; but he does not merit something else, but that very same thing which he had merited before, speaking with respect to the essential reward. And it does not

follow that he labors in vain; because, although the first work was meritorious of eternal life, nonetheless he did not merit efficaciously except by persevering charity; and charity cannot live in a man without going forth into good acts, when he can and ought. Therefore the following work is not done in vain, because, although it does not add to the excellence of the *reward*, it nonetheless adds to the efficacy of the *merit*; it also disposes none the less toward progress and contributes to the increase of merit with respect to the accidental reward, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that sin added to sin doubles the merit and the punishment, therefore also good added to good; it must be said that it is not the same, because of this, that, since we do evil, we are evil, but not, since we do good, are we good; rather, on the contrary, the goodness of works has its origin from the goodness of the one acting[^16]. And hence it is that for different sins a man merits different punishments, although for different good works a man merits one glory, because the *ground of meriting* and of being accepted in many good things is one; but the *ground* of displeasing and of demeriting is diverse in many sins.

5. To that which is objected, that with a man a person merits a greater reward from more works; it must be said that it is not the same, because a man does not reckon a work worthy of recompense on account of the goodness of the one *acting*, but rather the one acting on account of the goodness of the *work*. For a man needs another's service; but God, who *does not need our goods*[^17], accepts and rewards not the *one acting* on account of the works, but the *works* on account of the one acting; and therefore it is not the same on this side and on that.

6. To that which is objected last, that multiplied works do not avail for the accidental reward, because they do not attain the aureole; it must be said that the accidental reward is more than the aureole. For by the name of aureole we do not understand any accidental reward whatever, but that which has a certain prerogative and dignity, just as also the work to which it corresponds. Nevertheless the joy over the multiplication of good works does pertain to the accidental reward, since without it eternal life can be had; and to this indeed multiplied good works do contribute; they contribute also to the essential reward in some way, as was shown before. — From these things the response is clear to that which was last asked[^18].

---

la: Vers. 7. — Paulo superius pro *additum operi* cod. H *additum bono operi*. Paulo inferius pro *erit aequalitas* codd. M cc et ed. 1 ibi *erit aequalitas*, Vat. *et aequalitas*.

en: Verse 7. — A little above, for *added to a work* codex H reads *added to a good work*. A little below, for *there will be equality* codices M, cc and ed. 1 read there *will be equality*, the Vatican edition *and equality*.

la: Vers. 7, quem codd. cum edd. 1, 2 sic reddunt: *Qui longe post eum luxerunt*. — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Origenis homil. I. in Iudic. n. 3, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. Ipsa Origenis oratio haec est: *Et quidem Dei est solius nosse post Iesum, quis fuerit inter seniores, qui longiorem diem fecerit, id est, qui maiorem ex se emiserit lucem, utrum Petrus, an Paulus, Bartholomaeus, an Ioannes*. — Codd. et primae edd. omittunt in Glossa allata vocem *maiorem*. — Seq. loc. Script. est loc. cit. V. 10: *Sed abundantius illis omnibus laboravi*.

en: Verse 7, which the codices with editions 1, 2 render thus: *Who shone long after him*. — The Gloss, which is taken from Origen's first homily on Judges, n. 3, is found in Strabus and Lyranus. Origen's own statement is this: *And indeed it belongs to God alone to know, after Jesus, who among the elders made the longer day, that is, who sent forth a greater light from himself, whether Peter, or Paul, Bartholomew, or John*. — The codices and the first editions omit the word *greater* in the Gloss cited. — The following scriptural passage is the place cited, v. 10: *But I labored more abundantly than all of them*.

la: In cod. Q secunda antiqui amanuensis manus addidit super illud Psalmi [118, 72.]: *Bonum mihi lex oris tui*. In Enarrat. super hunc locum haec ipsa verba, Augustino tributa, non habentur, neque in ullo alio illius Doctoris libro ea invenimus. Sententia autem, quae istis verbis exprimitur, saepius occurrit in Augusti scriptis. Sic e. g. in V. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 54, ubi S. Doctor exponens illa verba (30, 14.): *Prope est verbum hoc valde in ore tuo, et in corde tuo et in manibus tuis facere illud*, ait: « Nec frustra tamen hoc [et in manibus tuis] a Septuaginta interpretibus additum existimo; nisi quia intelligi voluerunt, etiam ipsas manus, quibus significantur opera, in corde accipi debere, ubi est fides, quae per dilectionem operatur (Gal. 5, 6.). Nam si forinsecus ea quae Deus iubet, manibus fiant et in corde non fiant, nemo est tam insulsus, qui praecepta arbitretur impleri. Porro si caritas, quae plenitudo est Legis (Rom. 13, 10.), habitet in corde, etiamsi manibus corporis quisquam non possit operari, pax illi est utique cum hominibus bonae voluntatis » (Luc. 2, 14.). Et in libro ad Deogratias seu Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 26. ait: « Ex qualitatibus quippe voluntatum, non ex temporum spatiis, sive recte facta sive peccata metimur ». Possunt etiam pro sententia adduci multi loci ex August. scriptis, quibus vel bona voluntas commendatur, vel docetur, opera misericordiae (eleemosynas) nihil valere coram Deo absque bona voluntate, et hanc sufficere, deficientibus etiam facultatibus exterioribus. Cfr. de hoc 1. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 23. seq.; II. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 2. n. 9; in Epist. Ioan. tr. 6. n. 2. seq., tr. 8. n. 9; Enarrat. in Ps. 36. serm. 2. n. 13. et in Ps. 125. n. 5. 11. seq. — Gul. Mara, hic quaest. ult., dictum, de quo agitur, Bernardo tribuit, sed in eius operibus etiam sententialiter tantum habetur, quod scimus.

en: In codex Q a second hand of an old copyist added this above that text of the Psalm [118, 72.]: *The law of your mouth is good to me*. In the Enarration on this passage these very words, attributed to Augustine, are not found, nor do we find them in any other book of that Doctor. The sentiment, however, which is expressed by these words, occurs rather often in Augustine's writings. Thus, for example, in the *Five Questions on the Pentateuch*, q. 54, where the holy Doctor, expounding those words (30, 14.): *This word is very near you, in your mouth, and in your heart and in your hands to do it*, says: « Nor do I think that this [and in your hands] was added in vain by the Seventy translators; but only because they wished it to be understood that even the hands themselves, by which works are signified, ought to be taken in the heart, where there is faith, which works through love (Gal. 5, 6.). For if outwardly the things which God commands are done by the hands and are not done in the heart, no one is so foolish as to judge that the precepts are fulfilled. Further, if charity, which is the fullness of the Law (Rom. 13, 10.), dwells in the heart, even if someone cannot work with the hands of the body, there is for him surely peace with men of good will » (Luke 2, 14.). And in the book *to Deogratias* or Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 26. he says: « For we measure things rightly done or sins by the qualities of wills, not by the spans of time ». Many passages too can be adduced from Augustine's writings in support of the sentiment, in which either a good will is commended, or it is taught that the works of mercy (almsgivings) avail nothing before God without a good will, and that this suffices, even when external means are lacking. Cf. on this *On Free Choice* I, c. 12, n. 23 seq.; *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* II, c. 2, n. 9; on the Epistle of John, tr. 6, n. 2 seq., tr. 8, n. 9; Enarration on Ps. 36, serm. 2, n. 13, and on Ps. 125, n. 5, 11 seq. — William of Mara, here in the last question, attributes the saying in question to Bernard, but in his works too it is found only as to its sense, as far as we know.

la: Haec propositio innititur verbis Scripturae, Prov. 8, 17: *Ego diligentes me diligo*, et Ioan. 14, 21: *Qui autem diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum*. Cfr. ibid. v. 23. — Circa finem arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *meriti*.

en: This proposition rests on the words of Scripture, Prov. 8, 17: *I love those who love me*, and John 14, 21: *But whoever loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him*. Cf. ibid. v. 23. — Near the end of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 omit *of merit*.

la: Vers. 4. — Verba, quae hic Glossae tribuuntur, sunt in interlineari (ad hunc loc.), sed contracta sunt.

en: Verse 4. — The words which are here attributed to the Gloss are in the interlinear (on this passage), but they are abridged.

la: Vers. 9. — Glossa est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum.

en: Verse 9. — The Gloss is the ordinary one and is found in Strabus and Lyranus.

la: Codd. C R S (T a prima manu) Y et alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *quia*.

en: Codices C, R, S (T by the first hand), Y and others, with editions 1, 2, 3, read *because*.

la: Vide supra pag. 920, nota 4. — Pro *non est magis efficax* cod. bb *est minus efficax*.

en: See above, p. 920, note 4. — For *is not more efficacious* codex bb reads *is less efficacious*.

la: Respicitur Matth. 13, 23; Marc. 4, 20; Luc. 8, 15. — De aureola vide supra q. 1.

en: Reference is made to Matt. 13, 23; Mark 4, 20; Luke 8, 15. — On the aureole see above, q. 1.

la: Plures codd., ut K T Z bb ee, cum ed. 2 *scientia*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *summa*.

en: Several codices, such as K, T, Z, bb, ee, with ed. 2 read *knowledge*; codex cc and ed. 1 read *the sum*.

la: Matth. 19, 21: *Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende* etc. — In propos. seq. edd., excepta 1, cum aliquibus codd. inter verba *et conservatur* interiiciunt *operatur*.

en: Matt. 19, 21: *If you wish to be perfect, go, sell* etc. — In the following statement the editions, except ed. 1, with some codices insert *is worked* between the words *and is conserved*.

la: Ita Vat., ceterae edd. cum plurimis codd. *fiat*.

en: So the Vatican edition; the other editions with most codices read *may be done*.

la: Matth. 10, 22: *Qui autem perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit*.

en: Matt. 10, 22: *But whoever shall have persevered to the end, he shall be saved*.

la: Cod. T *mereretur*.

en: Codex T reads *would merit*.

la: Edd. praeter 1 cum nonnullis codd. *operibus*.

en: The editions except ed. 1, with some codices, read *in works*.

la: Vat. addit *habere*. Subinde pro *per primum* cod. cc et ed. 1 *per praemium*. Paulo inferius pro *Et non sequitur* cod. K (bb a secunda manu) *Et ideo non sequitur*. Post pauca pro *vivere* edd. 3, 4 et Vat. *vigere*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *to have*. Then for *through the first* codex cc and ed. 1 read *through the reward*. A little below, for *And it does not follow* codex K (bb by a second hand) reads *And therefore it does not follow*. After a little, for *to live* editions 3, 4 and the Vatican edition read *to be vigorous*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 718, nota 9. — Mox codd. F K T et alii omittunt *diversis*. Paulo inferius pro *ratio merendi*, quam lectionem solam rectam invenimus in codd. W X bb (T a secunda manu), Vat. *actio merendi*, cod. Y *acceptatio merendi*. Subinde pro *acceptandi* codd. F H K V W Y bb ee *accipiendi*. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. above, p. 718, note 9. — Presently codices F, K, T and others omit *different*. A little below, for *the ground of meriting*, which reading alone we find correct in codices W, X, bb (T by a second hand), the Vatican edition reads *the action of meriting*, codex Y *the acceptance of meriting*. Then for *of being accepted* codices F, H, K, V, W, Y, bb, ee read *of receiving*. Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Psalm 15, 2. — In fine arg. pro *et ex illa* codd. B F Y *et ex parte illa*.

en: Psalm 15, 2. — At the end of the argument, for *and on that* codices B, F, Y read *and on that side*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 64708–64876 of `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, with the 450 dpi column-band PDF (printed pp. 931–933 = pdf pp. 953–955) authoritative for the Respondeo and all footers (Vol II PDF-priority inversion). English is a fresh literal translation.

**Alignment.** Opener confirmed: *Tertio quaeritur, utrum bonitas operum addat ad bonae intentionis meritum quantum ad numerositatem* — the THIRD of Art. II's "quaeruntur tria," concerning the goodness works add by reason of NUMBER (*numerositas*). No q-swap.

**Scholion.** None for this quaestio. The raw OCR footer for the preceding article (raw line 64707) reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, and the article scholion held in `a2-q1` (its item III) covers q2 and q3. `has_scholion: false`.

**Page-split / apparatus map** (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page):
- **p. 931** (printed fn 1–8 → chunk [^1]–[^8]): the four *videtur* arguments + *Sed contra* args 1–4. Anchors at *Zachariae quarto*¹, *Iudicum secundo*², *Augustinus*³, *diligitur a Deo*⁴, *Romanos quarto*⁵, *Galatas sexto*⁶, *qui*⁷ (variant), *merendum gloriam*⁸.
- **p. 932** (printed fn 1–8 → chunk [^9]–[^16]): *Sed contra* arg 6 + Conclusio + Respondeo + replies 1–3 (start). Anchors at *terra bona*⁹, *substantia*¹⁰, *perfectionis*¹¹, *perseveret*¹² (left col); *non meretur*¹³, *operationibus*¹⁴, *tantundem*¹⁵ (right col).
- **p. 933** (printed fn 1–2 → chunk [^17]–[^18]): replies 4–6. Anchors at *operantis*¹⁶, *non indiget*¹⁷, *quaerebatur*¹⁸. (Note: [^16] *bonitate operantis* is p.933 fn 1; [^17] *non indiget* is p.933 fn 2 — chunk numbering is sequential so the per-page restart is recorded here. p.933 fn 3, *Vide scholion ad 1. quaest. huius articuli*, belongs to the DUB. I Respondeo and migrates to `d40-dubia`.)

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from a2-q2:* p.930/931 footers are self-contained per page; p.931 opens a fresh footer sequence with this quaestio's *Sed contra* (no p.930 footer carried into q3).
- *Forwarded to d40-dubia:* the chunk ends at *Ex his patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaerebatur* (raw line 64876). The `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header begins at raw line 64878 (still on printed p. 933). p.933 footnote 3 (*Vide scholion ad 1. quaest. huius articuli*) belongs to the Dub. I Respondeo and must be captured by `d40-dubia`, NOT here.

**[?] flags.** None.