title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium
Whether every perjury is a lie

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De culpa periurii.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omni periurio conveniat esse mendacium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia periurium prohibetur per quintum mandatum secundae tabulae: *Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium*[^1]; sed ibi prohibetur falsitas in verbo, quae scienter non potest esse sine mendacio: ergo videtur, quod cum ibidem prohibeatur periurium, quod omne periurium includat in se mendacium.

2. Item, qui assumit summam Veritatem in testimonium veritatis recte eam assumit; et qui recte assumit non peccat: ergo quando summa Veritas adducitur ad confirmationem veritatis, nullum est periurium: ad hoc ergo, quod sit periurium, necesse est, ipsam Veritatem adduci ad confirmandum mendacium: redit ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, qui asserit quod animo sentit non peccat, quia utitur sermone ad id, ad quod institutus est[^2]; si ergo periurans in assertione sua peccat, aliud ergo gerit in animo, aliud asserit in ore. Sed omnis talis est mendax: ergo mendacium est de esse periurii.

4. Item, periurium est peccatum linguae; sed «linguam non facit ream nisi mens rea[^3]» et male sibi conscia: ergo ad hoc, quod committatur periurii culpa, necesse est, quod fallendi intentio praecedat. Sed illa facit hominem mentiri: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Hieronymus *super Ieremiam*[^4] *Fundamenta* dicit, quod «iuramentum tres habet comites, scilicet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem»; et sicut ex defectu veritatis contingit fieri iuramentum inordinatum, ita ex defectu iudicii et iustitiae: si ergo periurium generaliter complectitur iuramentum inordinatum, videtur, quod non omne periurium sit mendacium.

2. Item, aliquis, intendens facere adulterium et homicidium, hoc iuramento confirmat; esto ita; talis autem aut recte iurat, aut periurat; constat, quod non recte[^5]: ergo periurat, et tamen non mentitur: ergo non est essentiale omni periurio esse mendacium.

3. Item, qui iurat adducit Deum in testimonium veritatis[^6]; esto ergo, quod iuret falsum, quod credit esse verum, talis, cum adducat Veritatem in testimonium falsitatis, periurus est; sed quia credit et intendit verum dicere, non est mendax: ergo non omnis periurus mentitur, nec omne periurium est mendacium.

4. Item, ad *esse* mendacii non tantummodo requiritur intentio fallendi, sed etiam falsitas sermonis[^7]; sed contingit, aliquem incurrere periurii crimen, si verum iuret et intendat falsum iurare et per iuramentum illud proximum laedere: ergo videtur, quod alicubi reperiatur perfecta ratio periurii, ubi non reperitur plena ratio mendacii: ergo etc.

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### Conclusio.

> Non est essentiale omni periurio, sive assertorio sive promissorio, esse mendacium, si mendacium proprie accipitur; si autem large, tunc omne periurium includit mendacium.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est triplex modus dicendi.

Quidam namque dixerunt, quod periurium substernit sibi mendacium. Et isti dixerunt, quod si aliquis iurat falsum, quod credit esse verum, non periurat, quia non mentitur. — Sed haec positio improbatur per Augustinum[^8], qui dicit, quod «cum homo iurat quod putat esse verum, et tamen est falsum, temere iurat». Et ex hoc habetur, quod iuramentum illud est temerarium et inordinatum et ita periurium, et tamen non est ibi mendacium.

Ideo dixerunt alii, quod non omne periurium est mendacium, pro eo quod non solummodo contingit incurrere crimen periurii propter veritatis defectum, verum etiam propter defectum iustitiae et iudicii[^9]. — Sed instantia ista, quae fertur, videtur magis habere locum in iuramento *obligatorio* quam in iuramento *assertorio*. In illo enim proprie reperitur iudicium et iustitia. Et ideo adhuc remanet quaestio, utrum omne periurium, quod opponitur iuramento assertorio, sit mendacium, cum sit veritatis privativum.

Propterea tertio potest adhuc responderi, quod sicut patuit ex praecedenti distinctione[^10], aliquid est mendacium *simpliciter* et secundum rationem completam; aliquid est mendacium *secundum quid*, videlicet quantum ad ipsius mendacii *materiam*; aliquid est mendacium *secundum quid*, quia habet ipsius mendacii *formam*. Mendacium *simpliciter* est quod habet falsitatem *in voce* et *in intentione*. Mendacium vero *secundum quid* et secundum *materiam* est quod habet falsitatem *in voce*, sed *non in intentione*. Mendacium *secundum quid* et secundum *formam* est quod habet falsitatem *in intentione*, sed *non in voce*.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum periurium oppositum iuramento assertorio universaliter claudat in se mendacium; si *large* accipiatur mendacium, extenso nomine ad mendacium *simpliciter* et *secundum quid*; sic omne periurium in se includit mendacium. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera[^11], quod «periurium est vel iurando loqui falsum cum intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui falsum sine intentione fallendi, vel iurando loqui verum cum intentione fallendi». — Si autem *proprie* accipiatur mendacium, sic non est essentiale *omni* periurio, nec periurio, prout opponitur iuramento *obligatorio*, nec periurio, prout opponitur iuramento *assertorio*, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^12], et rationes probant prius adductae ad partem istam.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod periurium prohibetur in quinto mandato; dicendum, quod non solum ibi prohibetur, immo etiam prohibetur in secundo primae tabulae[^13], in quantum per ipsum periurium facit quis contumeliam summae Veritati, assumendo eam in vanum, dum assumit eam ad confirmationem falsi sciti, vel falsi opinati, vel etiam dubii. — Posset tamen dici, quod in quinto mandato prohibetur falsum testimonium non solum quantum ad falsitatem *sermonis*, sed etiam quantum ad falsitatem *intentionis*[^14], et coniunctim et divisim; et prout divisim prohibentur, non dicunt mendacium secundum plenam rationem, sed secundum semiplenam tantum, sicut patet ex praecedentibus.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui adducit divinam Veritatem in testimonium veritatis recte iurat; dicendum, quod illud non est semper verum[^15], quia potest eam adducere in testimonium veritatis, intendens eam adducere in testimonium falsitatis; et illa intentio perversa reatum periurii introducit, quamvis non habeat completam rationem mendacii. *Praeterea*, alius defectus est in ratione illa: quia non omne falsum est mendacium; et propterea non sequitur, quod si periurium includit falsum, quod propter hoc includat mendacium.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui asserit quod in animo sentit, non peccat; dicendum, quod verum est, si ita novit in animo, quod possit exterius asserere in sermone, et hoc est, quando est *certus*; sed quando *falsa credulitate decipitur*, si exterius audeat affirmare per iuramentum, non excusatur, quia, secundum quod *conscientia erronea* in moribus non excusat factum iniustum[^16], sic *aestimatio falsa* in his quae creduntur, non excusat iuramentum falsum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lingua non est

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rea, nisi mens prius sit rea; responderi potest dupliciter: quia illud verum est in sermonibus *indifferentibus*, sed in sermonibus *malis* et inordinatis et a Deo prohibitis excessus linguae introducit reatum mentis et conscientiae. — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod mens et intentio rea dicitur non solummodo, quia in iurando intendit[^17] fallere, sed etiam, si intendat iurare id, de quo non habet certitudinem, pro eo quod ipsi summae Veritati subtrahit debitum honorem.

english:
### Article I. *On the guilt of perjury.*
### Question I. *Whether every perjury is a lie.*

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it belongs to every perjury to be a lie. And that it is so seems true:

1. Because perjury is forbidden by the fifth precept of the second tablet: *You shall not speak against your neighbor false testimony*[^1]; but there falsity in word is forbidden, which knowingly cannot exist without a lie: therefore it seems that, since perjury is forbidden in that very place, every perjury includes in itself a lie.

2. Likewise, he who takes the supreme Truth as witness to truth takes it rightly; and he who takes it rightly does not sin: therefore when the supreme Truth is adduced for the confirmation of truth, there is no perjury: in order, therefore, that there be perjury, it is necessary that Truth itself be adduced to confirm a lie: there returns therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin, because he uses speech for that for which it was instituted[^2]; if then the one perjuring sins in his assertion, he therefore bears one thing in mind and asserts another with his mouth. But every such person is a liar: therefore a lie belongs to the being of perjury.

4. Likewise, perjury is a sin of the tongue; but «the tongue does not make [a man] guilty unless the mind be guilty[^3]» and ill-conscious to itself: therefore, in order that the guilt of perjury be committed, it is necessary that an intention of deceiving precede. But that makes a man lie: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jerome *on Jeremiah*[^4], on *Foundations*, says that «an oath has three companions, namely judgment and justice and truth»; and just as from a defect of truth it happens that an oath is made disordered, so [it happens] from a defect of judgment and justice: if therefore perjury generally embraces a disordered oath, it seems that not every perjury is a lie.

2. Likewise, someone, intending to commit adultery and homicide, confirms this by an oath; let it be so; but such a person either swears rightly, or perjures himself; it is agreed that he does not [swear] rightly[^5]: therefore he perjures himself, and yet does not lie: therefore it is not essential to every perjury to be a lie.

3. Likewise, he who swears adduces God as witness to truth[^6]; let it be then that he swears something false which he believes to be true: such a one, since he adduces Truth as witness to falsity, is a perjurer; but because he believes and intends to speak the truth, he is not a liar: therefore not every perjurer lies, nor is every perjury a lie.

4. Likewise, for the *being* of a lie there is required not only an intention of deceiving, but also falsity of speech[^7]; but it happens that someone incurs the crime of perjury, if he swears what is true and intends to swear what is false and to injure his neighbor by that oath: therefore it seems that somewhere the perfect account of perjury is found where the full account of a lie is not found: therefore etc.

### Conclusio.

> It is not essential to every perjury, whether assertory or promissory, to be a lie, if a lie is taken properly; but if [taken] broadly, then every perjury includes a lie.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there is a threefold way of speaking.

For some have said that perjury underlies a lie to itself. And these said that if someone swears something false which he believes to be true, he does not perjure himself, because he does not lie. — But this position is refuted through Augustine[^8], who says that «when a man swears what he thinks is true, and yet it is false, he swears rashly». And from this it is had that that oath is rash and disordered and so perjury, and yet there is no lie in it.

Therefore others said that not every perjury is a lie, for the reason that it happens that one incurs the crime of perjury not only on account of a defect of truth, but also on account of a defect of justice and judgment[^9]. — But this instance which is brought forward seems to have place rather in an *obligatory* oath than in an *assertory* oath. For in the former, judgment and justice are properly found. And therefore there still remains the question whether every perjury that is opposed to an assertory oath is a lie, since it is privative of truth.

Therefore in a third way it can still be answered that, as appeared from the preceding distinction[^10], something is a lie *simply* and according to the complete account; something is a lie *in a certain respect*, namely as to the *matter* of the lie itself; something is a lie *in a certain respect*, because it has the *form* of the lie itself. A lie *simply* is what has falsity *in word* and *in intention*. But a lie *in a certain respect* and according to *matter* is what has falsity *in word*, but *not in intention*. A lie *in a certain respect* and according to *form* is what has falsity *in intention*, but *not in word*.

When therefore it is asked whether perjury opposed to an assertory oath universally encloses a lie in itself; if a lie is taken *broadly*, the name extended to a lie *simply* and *in a certain respect*; thus every perjury includes a lie in itself. And this is what the Master says in the text[^11], that «perjury is either to speak something false while swearing with an intention of deceiving, or to speak something false while swearing without an intention of deceiving, or to speak something true while swearing with an intention of deceiving». — But if a lie is taken *properly*, thus it is not essential to *every* perjury, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an *obligatory* oath, nor to perjury as it is opposed to an *assertory* oath, as the Master says in the text[^12], and the reasons adduced before for this part prove it.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected to the contrary, that perjury is forbidden in the fifth precept; it must be said that it is not only forbidden there, but rather is also forbidden in the second [precept] of the first tablet[^13], inasmuch as through perjury itself one does insult to the supreme Truth, taking it in vain, while he takes it for the confirmation of something falsely known, or falsely opined, or even doubtful. — Yet it could be said that in the fifth precept false testimony is forbidden not only as to falsity of *speech*, but also as to falsity of *intention*[^14], both conjointly and severally; and as they are forbidden severally, they do not state a lie according to the full account, but only according to the half-full [account], as is clear from the foregoing.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that he who adduces the divine Truth as witness to truth swears rightly; it must be said that that is not always true[^15], because he can adduce it as witness to truth while intending to adduce it as witness to falsity; and that perverse intention introduces the guilt of perjury, although it does not have the complete account of a lie. *Moreover*, there is another defect in that reasoning: because not every falsehood is a lie; and therefore it does not follow that, if perjury includes falsehood, that on this account it includes a lie.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that he who asserts what he holds in mind does not sin; it must be said that it is true, if he so knows in mind that he can outwardly assert it in speech, and this is when he is *certain*; but when he *is deceived by a false belief*, if he dares outwardly to affirm by an oath, he is not excused, because, just as an *erroneous conscience* in morals does not excuse an unjust deed[^16], so a *false estimation* in the things that are believed does not excuse a false oath.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the tongue is not

guilty unless the mind first be guilty; it can be answered in two ways: because that is true in *indifferent* utterances, but in utterances that are *evil* and disordered and forbidden by God, the excess of the tongue introduces guilt of mind and conscience. — Otherwise it can also be said that the mind and intention are called guilty not only because in swearing one intends[^17] to deceive, but also if he intends to swear something concerning which he has no certitude, for the reason that he withdraws from the supreme Truth itself its due honor.

la: Exod. 20, 16. Cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 8. — Mox edd. omittunt *scienter*.

en: Exod. 20:16. Cf. above, d. 37, dub. 8. — Soon after, the editions omit *scienter* ("knowingly").

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXVIII. c. 5.

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XXXVIII, c. 5.

la: Ut dicit August. hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. allegatus. — Inferius pro *committatur* cod. K *contrahatur*.

en: As Augustine says, here cited in the text of the Master, c. 3. — Below, for *committatur* codex K reads *contrahatur*.

la: Libr. 1. c. 4, 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Book 1, c. 4, 2. See here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Codd. A Z bb repetunt *iurat*. Cod. A *peierat* pro *periurat*. In maiori cod. K *vel* pro *et*.

en: Codices A Z bb repeat *iurat*. Codex A reads *peierat* for *periurat*. In the larger [part], codex K reads *vel* for *et*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. — In conclusione arg. pro *periurus mentitur* cod. A *peierans est mentitus*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. — In the conclusion of the argument, for *periurus mentitur* codex A reads *peierans est mentitus*.

la: Ut ostensum est supra d. 38. q. 1. — De ipso arg. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: As was shown above, d. 38, q. 1. — On the argument itself, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 2. n. 2. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *periurat* cod. A *peierat*, et aliquanto superius pro *namque dixerunt* cod. K *namque dicere voluerunt*. Inferius pro *non est ibi* cod. A *illud non est*.

en: Sermon 180 (otherwise 28, on the Words of the Apostle), c. 2, n. 2. See here the text of the Master, c. 3. — A little before, for *periurat* codex A [reads] *peierat*, and somewhat above, for *namque dixerunt* codex K [reads] *namque dicere voluerunt*. Below, for *non est ibi* codex A [reads] *illud non est*.

la: Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., Sum. Sent. tr. 4. c. 5, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 1. a. 3: *Assertorium iuramentum est, quando iuratur, de praesenti aliquid esse vel non esse, vel de praeterito aliquid fuisse vel non fuisse. Promissorium vero, cum iurat aliquis de futuro facturum aliquid vel non facturum.*

en: Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *Sum. Sent.* tr. 4, c. 5, and here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 1. a. 3: «An assertory oath is when one swears that in the present something is or is not, or that in the past something was or was not. But a promissory [oath is] when someone swears concerning the future that he will do something or will not do [it]».

la: Quaest. 1. — Superius voci *tertio* codd. K bb adnectunt *modo*, et subinde pro *quod* plures codd. *quia*.

en: Question 1. — Above, to the word *tertio* codices K bb attach *modo*, and thereupon for *quod* many codices [read] *quia*.

la: Hic c. 3. — Pro *includit* cod. U *claudit*.

en: Here c. 3. — For *includit* codex U [reads] *claudit*.

la: Hic c. 3. — Pro ultimo *prout* edd. cum pluribus codd. *quod*.

en: Here c. 3. — For the last *prout*, the editions with many codices [read] *quod*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 2. et 8.

en: Cf. above, d. 37, dub. 2 and 8.

la: Vat. addit *et rei et sermonis*, edd. 1, 2 legunt: *non solum quantum ad falsitatem intentionis, sed et rei et sermonis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] adds *et rei et sermonis*; editions 1, 2 read: «not only as to falsity of intention, but also of the thing and of the speech».

la: Cod. A *non habet veritatem semper*. Inferius pro *et illa* Vat. *et sua*.

en: Codex A reads *non habet veritatem semper*. Below, for *et illa* the Vatican [edition reads] *et sua*.

la: Codd. A G H L aa bb *intendat*.

en: Codices A G H L aa bb [read] *intendat*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supponitur hic doctrina de iuramento, de quo infra a. 2. q. 1. 2. et in dubiis 1. 2. 3. agitur. — Doctrinam S. Thomae de hac quaestione sic paucis complectitur Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.): «Sicut a proprietate completiva principaliter denominatur res completa; ita a defectu proprietatis completivae res defectiva. Unde periurium recte describitur a falsitate: aut ergo a falsitate signi et significantis, ut quando iuratur falsum intentione fallendi; aut a falsitate significantis, sed non signi, ut quando quis, putans falsum quod verum est, iurat; aut a falsitate signi, sed non significantis, ut quando quis, putans verum quod falsum est, iurat. In primo est completa ratio periurii; in secundo minus completa; in tertio minime completa. Periurium ergo secundum completam et propriam acceptionem est mendacium iuramento firmatum». Haec autem manifeste dicta sunt de iuramento assertorio et quidem *large* accipiendo mendacium, ut auctor noster distinguit (in fine corp.). — Communiter enim distinguitur periurium *proprie* et *stricte* sumtum, quod est mendacium iuramento firmatum (cfr. Magister, hic c. 1, et S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1.), a periurio *latius* sumto pro omni iuramento illicito, videlicet destituto una vel altera trium conditionum requisitarum ad omne iuramentum licitum, quae sunt *veritas*, *iustitia* et *iudicium*. De his tribus «comitibus iuramenti», ut dicit Magister (hic c. 1.), vide hic dub. 1. Quod periurium stricte sumtum non admittat parvitatem materiae nec possit a peccato mortali excusari nisi imperfectione actus, est sententia prorsus certa et pluribus s. Sedis oraculis confirmata. Inter articulos 39, de quibus mandato Martini V. (Bulla, *Inter cunctas*) suspecti errorum Wikleff et Huss interrogandi erant, est art. 15: «Item, utrum credat, quod periurium scienter commissum, ex quacumque causa vel occasione, pro conservatione vitae corporalis propriae vel alterius, etiam in favorem fidei, sit mortale peccatum». Item, Innocentius XI. (Decret. 2. Mart. 1679) damnavit (prop. 24.) assertionem: «Vocare Deum in testem mendacii levis non est tanta irreverentia, propter quam velit aut possit damnare hominem»; et hanc (prop. 25.): «Cum causa licitum est iurare sine animo iurandi, sive res sit gravis, sive levis» (cfr. prop. 26. 27.). — Ex altera parte constat, quod non omne periurium, sensu *latiore* sumtum, scilicet destitutum aliqua trium illarum conditionum, sive quod sit vel *perversum*, vel *incautum*, dummodo non sit *temerarium*, semper sit peccatum *mortale*. De causis excusantibus iuramenta incauta a mortali agit Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3.), contra quem plura obiicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3. in fine). Plura et accuratiora de his et de iuramento promissorio quaere apud recentiores auctores de re morali tractantes, praesertim apud S. Alphonsum, Theol. moral. II. tr. 2. c. 2. De hac (1.) quaestione praeter laudatum: Scol., hic q. unica n. 8. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 2.

**II.** Duas seqq. (2. 3.) quaestiones commentatores Petri Lomb. plerumque simul tractant. — De utraque (2. 3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal. (rem tangendo), S. p. III. q. 31. m. 2. a. 2. i. — Scol., loc. cit. n. 2. et 4. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 8; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The doctrine concerning the oath is here presupposed, of which there is treatment below in a. 2, qq. 1, 2, and in doubts 1, 2, 3. — The doctrine of St. Thomas on this question Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1, a. 1) sums up briefly thus: «Just as a complete thing is principally denominated from its completive property, so a defective thing [is denominated] from a defect of the completive property. Hence perjury is rightly described from falsity: either, then, from a falsity of the sign and of the signifying, as when something false is sworn with an intention of deceiving; or from a falsity of the signifying, but not of the sign, as when someone, thinking that false which is true, swears; or from a falsity of the sign, but not of the signifying, as when someone, thinking that true which is false, swears. In the first the account of perjury is complete; in the second less complete; in the third least complete. Perjury therefore, according to the complete and proper acceptation, is a lie confirmed by an oath». But these things are manifestly said of an assertory oath, and indeed taking a lie *broadly*, as our author distinguishes (at the end of the body). — For perjury is commonly distinguished as taken *properly* and *strictly*, which is a lie confirmed by an oath (cf. the Master, here c. 1, and St. Thom., S. II. II. q. 98. a. 1.), from perjury taken *more broadly* for every illicit oath, namely one deprived of one or another of the three conditions required for every licit oath, which are *truth*, *justice*, and *judgment*. Concerning these three «companions of the oath», as the Master says (here c. 1.), see here dub. 1. That perjury taken strictly does not admit a smallness of matter, nor can be excused from mortal sin except by an imperfection of the act, is a sentence wholly certain and confirmed by many oracles of the holy See. Among the 39 articles, concerning which by the mandate of Martin V (Bull, *Inter cunctas*) those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Huss were to be interrogated, is art. 15: «Likewise, whether he believes that perjury knowingly committed, from whatever cause or occasion, for the preservation of one's own bodily life or another's, even in favor of the faith, is a mortal sin». Likewise, Innocent XI (Decree of 2 March 1679) condemned (prop. 24) the assertion: «To call God to witness a slight lie is not so great an irreverence that on its account He should will or be able to condemn a man»; and this (prop. 25): «With cause it is licit to swear without the mind to swear, whether the matter be grave or slight» (cf. prop. 26, 27). — On the other hand it is established that not every perjury, taken in the *broader* sense, namely deprived of some one of those three conditions, whether it be either *perverse* or *incautious*, provided it be not *rash*, is always a mortal sin. On the causes excusing incautious oaths from the mortal [grade] Scotus treats (here q. unica n. 3), against whom Dionysius the Carthusian objects many things (here q. 3, at the end). Seek out more things, and more accurate, concerning these matters and concerning the promissory oath among the more recent authors treating of moral matters, especially in St. Alphonsus, Theol. moral. II. tr. 2. c. 2. On this (first) question, besides the one praised: Scotus, here q. unica n. 8. — St. Thom., here a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following questions, here q. 2.

**II.** The two following (2, 3) questions the commentators on Peter Lombard for the most part treat together. — On both (2, 3) questions: Alex. Hal. (touching the matter), S. p. III. q. 31. m. 2. a. 2. i. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. 2 and 4 ff. — St. Thom., here a. 8; S. II. II. q. 98. a. 2, 3. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p86{1,2,3}-{L,R}-*.png`), Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR range **59756–59901** (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`), used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the Respondeo, Ad-replies, page footers, and Scholion were authoritatively set from the PDF bands.

**Alignment.** QUAESTIO I opener "Circa primum sic procedi[t]ur et quaeritur, utrum omni periurio conveniat esse mendacium" = TRACTATIO Art. I Q1 *Utrum omne periurium sit mendacium* — verified aligned. Forward bound QUAESTIO II *Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum* at raw 59902.

**Page-split map.**
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**Footer hand-offs.**
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**has_scholion: TRUE.** Article-master Scholion at raw 59870 (between QUAESTIO I 59756 and QUAESTIO II 59902), §I (doctrine of the oath + Petr. a Tar. + Martin V / Innocent XI + bibliography for q.1) and §II (bibliography for qq.2–3). OCR garbled the header `SCHOLIOK`; corrected. Body-then-scholion-LAST ordering observed.

**[?] flags.** None — pp.861–863 fully legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum
Whether all perjury is a sin

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk. The first three are picked up from the p.863 footer band (which opens beneath a1-q1's scholion).

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit peccatum, et ostenditur, quod aliquis possit periurare sine peccato.

1. Esto enim, quod aliquis iuret falsum, quod putat esse verum, propter utilitatem proximi; iuramentum illud non est in divinae Veritatis contemptum nec est in proximi nocumentum: ergo non repugnat mandato primae tabulae nec secundae: igitur non est peccatum; et tamen est periurium, sicut in praecedentibus[^1] fuit ostensum: ergo non omne periurium est peccatum.

2. Item, nullus venerando et amando Deum peccat; sed Augustinus[^2] dicit, quod «illud, per quod quis iurat, veneratur et amat»: cum ergo aliquis iurat falsum per Deum, veneratur et amat ipsum Deum: ergo non committit peccatum; et tamen committit periurium: ergo periurium non est peccatum.

3. Item, sicut peccatum opponitur bonitati, sic periurium opponitur veritati; sed veritas spectat ad *intellectum*, bonitas ad *affectum*[^3]; sic etiam falsum et malum differunt: cum ergo vitium et peccatum dicat oppositum virtuti et bonitati, quae se tenent ex parte *affectus*, et periurium sit oppositum veritati, quae se tenet ex parte *intellectus*, non videtur, quod aliquod periurium sit peccatum.

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4. Item, possibile est, aliquem cogi ad hoc, quod iuret falsum; sed necessitas non habet legem, immo quae alias sunt illicita necessitas facit licita, sicut patet de eo qui furatur et est in extrema necessitate[^4]: ergo videtur, quod saltem in tali casu periurium sit licitum, et sic non est essentiale ei esse peccatum.

**Sed contra:**
1. Gravius vitium et magis deforme est periurium quam simplex mendacium; sed «necesse est, omne mendacium esse peccatum» secundum quod Augustinus dicit, et habitum est in praecedentibus[^5]: videtur ergo, quod similiter sit circa ipsum periurium, immo, multo fortius.

2. Item, quicumque peierat, iurat inordinate, et qui iurat inordinate iurat iniuste vel temerarie[^6]; et omnis talis peccat: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis qui peierat, assumit nomen Dei in vanum[^7], et omnis talis facit contumeliam divinae Veritati; hoc autem est peccatum et malum *secundum se*: ergo necesse est, omne periurium malum esse.

4. Item, omne illud est malum, cui debetur poena; sed omni periurio debetur poena, secundum quod dicitur Proverbiorum decimo nono[^8]: *Testis falsus non erit impunitus*: ergo si periurium est falsa testificatio, videtur necessario, quod omne periurium sit peccatum.

### Conclusio.

> Periurium est malum non solummodo in se, sed etiam secundum se.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio periurium est malum non solummodo *in se*, sed etiam *secundum se*, ita quod nullo modo potest fieri bene. — Ratio autem huius est duplex: una propter hoc, quod plerumque periurium claudit in se mendacium, quod est secundum se malum; alia vero ratio est generalis, quia omnis periurans contumeliam facit summae Veritati, dum eam adducit[^9] ad eius confirmationem, ad quod non deberet assumi. Et ideo, quia non tantum deordinat hominem ad proximum, sed etiam deordinat hominem ad Deum; inde est, quod semper est malum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de eo qui iurat falsum, quod putat esse verum, propter utilitatem proximi; dicendum, quod talis peccat propter Veritatis contemptum; quamvis enim non contemnat ipsam Veritatem ex certa scientia, adducendo eam in testimonium falsitatis, contemnit tamen ex ipsa temeritate. Adeo enim est nomen Domini terribile et venerabile[^10], quod nullus debet ipsum in testimonium assumere, nisi noverit, quid loquatur. Unde ignorantia non excusat in tali iuramento. Hoc enim debet unusquisque scire, quod non debet iuramento aliquid firmare, nisi de illo sit certus. Unde etsi talis ignoret rem, de qua iurat, hoc ipso scit, se male iurare, si eam iuramento affirmat; et ideo non excusatur a culpa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud, per quod quis iurat, veneratur et amat; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando recte et ordinate per illud iurat; sed quando falso et inordinate per ipsum iurat, etsi videatur venerari per credulitatem, potius contemnit et contumeliam sibi facit per inordinatam locutionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod periurium opponitur veritati, quae est in intellectu; dicendum, quod secundum quod duplex est cognitio, *speculativa* et *practica*, sic dupliciter contingit loqui de ipsa veritate: aut prout est regula merae *speculationis*, aut prout est regula ipsius *locutionis* et *operationis*. Veritas enim fidei et prudentiae dictat, qualiter loquendum, et quid agendum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod mendacium et periurium opponitur veritati, hoc non intelligitur de veritate *primo* modo, sed de veritate *secundo* modo. Et ista veritas *secundo* modo dicta iuncta est bonitati et tenet rationem virtutis, et actus eius est in praecepto, secundum quod dicitur ad Ephesios quarto[^11]: *Loquimini unusquisque veritatem cum proximo suo*. Ipse autem obiicit de veritate, prout consistit in mera speculatione; ideo ratio illa non valet.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui peierat, necessitate compulsus, quod non peccat; dicendum, quod falsum est. Est enim necessitas *naturae* et necessitas *coactionis*. Necessitas, inquam, naturae legem non habet et potest *a toto* excusare; necessitas vero *coactionis* non excusat *a toto* in his quae secundum se mala sunt, sed excusat solum *a tanto*, quia voluntas sufficienter cogi non potest[^12]. Et propterea, quia periurium secundum se malum est, quantumcumque quis compellitur ad illud, non *omnino* a peccato excusatur, immo sibi a canone poena imponitur. Dicit enim canon[^13], quod «si quis

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peierat pro vita corporis servanda, quia magis dilexit corpus quam animam, ieiunet tres quadragesimas». Nec est simile de furto; quia furtum non est malum nisi propter rerum appropriationem; extrema autem necessitas omnia facit communia, nulla autem necessitas tollit periurii deformitatem, eo quod nulla necessitate licitum sit nomen Dei in vanum assumere: et ita non est simile hinc et inde. — De obligatione tamen iuramenti coacti infra[^14] determinabitur magis plane.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether all perjury is a sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether all perjury is a sin; and it is shown that someone can perjure himself without sin.

1. For suppose that someone swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; that oath is not in contempt of the divine Truth nor is it to the harm of the neighbor: therefore it does not conflict with the precept of the first table nor of the second: therefore it is not a sin; and yet it is perjury, as was shown in the preceding[^1]: therefore not all perjury is a sin.

2. Likewise, no one sins by venerating and loving God; but Augustine[^2] says that «that by which one swears, he venerates and loves»: when therefore someone swears what is false by God, he venerates and loves God himself: therefore he commits no sin; and yet he commits perjury: therefore perjury is not a sin.

3. Likewise, just as sin is opposed to goodness, so perjury is opposed to truth; but truth pertains to the *intellect*, goodness to the *affection*[^3]; so too the false and the evil differ: since therefore vice and sin name what is opposed to virtue and goodness, which hold by the side of the *affection*, and perjury is opposed to truth, which holds by the side of the *intellect*, it does not seem that any perjury is a sin.

4. Likewise, it is possible that someone be compelled to swear what is false; but necessity has no law, indeed necessity makes licit things which are otherwise illicit, as is plain of the one who steals and is in extreme necessity[^4]: therefore it seems that at least in such a case perjury is licit, and so it is not essential to it to be a sin.

**On the contrary:**
1. Perjury is a graver vice and more deformed than a simple lie; but «it is necessary that every lie be a sin» according as Augustine says, and as was had in the preceding[^5]: it seems therefore that it is similar concerning perjury itself, indeed, much more strongly.

2. Likewise, whoever perjures himself swears inordinately, and he who swears inordinately swears unjustly or rashly[^6]; and everyone such sins: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everyone who perjures himself takes the name of God in vain[^7], and everyone such does outrage to the divine Truth; but this is a sin and an evil *in itself*: therefore it is necessary that all perjury be evil.

4. Likewise, everything is evil to which a penalty is due; but a penalty is due to all perjury, according as it is said in Proverbs the nineteenth[^8]: *A false witness shall not be unpunished*: therefore if perjury is a false testimony, it seems of necessity that all perjury is a sin.

### Conclusion.

> Perjury is an evil not only in itself, but also of itself.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt perjury is an evil not only *in itself*, but also *of itself*, so that in no way can it be done well. — Now the reason of this is twofold: one on account of this, that for the most part perjury includes in itself a lie, which is of itself an evil; but the other reason is general, namely that everyone who perjures himself does outrage to the supreme Truth, while he adduces it[^9] for his confirmation, to which it ought not to be summoned. And therefore, because it not only disorders man toward his neighbor, but also disorders man toward God; hence it is that it is always evil. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning the one who swears what is false, which he thinks to be true, for the benefit of his neighbor; it must be said that such a one sins on account of the contempt of the Truth; for although he does not contemn the Truth itself out of certain knowledge, by adducing it as testimony of a falsehood, he yet contemns it out of his very rashness. For so terrible and venerable[^10] is the name of the Lord, that no one ought to summon it as testimony, unless he know what he is saying. Whence ignorance does not excuse in such an oath. For this each one ought to know, that he ought not to affirm anything by an oath, unless he be certain of it. Whence even if such a one is ignorant of the matter about which he swears, by this very fact he knows that he swears ill, if he affirms it by an oath; and therefore he is not excused from fault.

2. To that which is objected, that that by which one swears, he venerates and loves; it must be said that that is true, when he swears by it rightly and in order; but when he swears falsely and inordinately by it, even though he may seem to venerate by his belief, he rather contemns and does outrage to it by his inordinate utterance.

3. To that which is objected, that perjury is opposed to truth, which is in the intellect; it must be said that, according as cognition is twofold, *speculative* and *practical*, so it happens in two ways to speak of truth itself: either as it is the rule of mere *speculation*, or as it is the rule of *utterance* and *action* itself. For the truth of faith and of prudence dictates how one must speak, and what must be done. When therefore it is said that a lie and perjury are opposed to truth, this is not understood of truth in the *first* way, but of truth in the *second* way. And this truth said in the *second* way is joined to goodness and holds the character of a virtue, and its act is under precept, according as it is said to the Ephesians the fourth[^11]: *Speak, every one, the truth with his neighbor*. But he objects concerning truth as it consists in mere speculation; therefore that reasoning is not valid.

4. To that which is objected concerning the one who perjures himself, compelled by necessity, that he does not sin; it must be said that it is false. For there is a necessity of *nature* and a necessity of *coercion*. Necessity of nature, I say, has no law and can excuse *from the whole*; but necessity of *coercion* does not excuse *from the whole* in those things which are of themselves evil, but excuses only *from so much*, because the will cannot be sufficiently coerced[^12]. And therefore, because perjury is of itself an evil, however much one is compelled to it, he is not *altogether* excused from sin, but rather a penalty is imposed on him by the canon. For the canon[^13] says, that «if anyone

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perjures himself for the saving of the life of the body, because he loved the body more than the soul, let him fast three Lents». Nor is the case alike concerning theft; because theft is not evil except on account of the appropriation of things; but extreme necessity makes all things common, whereas no necessity removes the deformity of perjury, because by no necessity is it licit to take the name of God in vain: and so the case is not alike on the one side and the other. — But concerning the obligation of a coerced oath it will be determined more fully below[^14].

---

la: Quaest. 1.

en: Question 1.

la: Cfr. Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 12. n. 13, ubi ait: « Multi et in hoc falluntur et putant, quia nihil est, per quod cavere, nisi sint crimine teneri periurii. Prorsus periurus es, quia per id quod sanctum putas, falsum iuras ». Vide etiam I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 17. n. 52. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 3. a. 2. § 3, hanc sententiam attribuit Hieronymo, qui revera l. in Matth. 5, 34 dicit: *Qui iurat, aut veneratur, aut diligit eum per quem iurat.* Cfr. Glossa ordinaria in hunc loc. — Circa finem arg. Vat. omittit *peccatum, et tamen committit.*

en: Cf. *Sermon* 180 (alias 28, *On the Words of the Apostle*) c. 12, n. 13, where he says: « Many are deceived even in this, and think that it is nothing, by which to beware, unless they be held by the crime of perjury. Thou art altogether a perjurer, because by that which thou thinkest holy thou swearest falsely ». See also *On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount* I, c. 17, n. 52. Alexander of Hales, *S.* p. III, q. 31, m. 3, a. 2, § 3, attributes this opinion to Jerome, who in fact, l. *On Matthew* 5:34, says: *He who swears either venerates or loves him by whom he swears.* Cf. the Glossa ordinaria on this passage. — Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition omits *a sin, and yet he commits.*

la: Vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. — Paulo inferius pro *virtuti et bonitati* edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. perperam *veritati et bonitati,* Vat. tantum *bonitati, quae se tenet* etc.

en: See above, p. 470, note 8. — A little below, for *to virtue and goodness* editions 1 and 2 with not a few codices wrongly [read] *to truth and goodness,* the Vatican edition only *goodness, which holds* etc.

la: Beda, in Marc. 2, 27: *Discipulis esurientibus, quod licitum non erat in Lege necessitate famis factum est licitum.*

en: Bede, *On Mark* 2:27: *To the disciples being hungry, that which was not licit in the Law became licit by the necessity of hunger.*

la: Dist. praeced. q. 2, ubi in fundam. 1. sententia August. exhibetur. — Superius pro *deforme* cod. A *enorme.*

en: The preceding distinction, q. 2, where in the first fundament the opinion of Augustine is set forth. — Above, for *deformed* codex A [reads] *enormous.*

la: Cfr. supra q. 1. in corp. et infra dub. 1, nec non lit. Magistri, c. 1-3. — In hoc et in seq. arg. pro *peierat* edd. cum pluribus codd. *periurat.* Ipse Augustinus utraque forma utitur.

en: Cf. above q. 1 in the body, and below dub. 1, as well as the text of the Master, c. 1-3. — In this and in the following argument, for *peierat* the editions with several codices [read] *periurat.* Augustine himself uses both forms.

la: Respicitur Exod. 20, 7: *Non assumes nomen Domini Dei tui in vanum.* Cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 2. et 8.

en: It refers to Exodus 20:7: *Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.* Cf. above d. 37, dub. 2 and 8.

la: Vers. 5. — *Maiorem* insinuat August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 31: *Omnis autem poena si iusta est, peccati poena est.*

en: Verse 5. — Augustine intimates the *major* [premise], *On Free Will* III, c. 18, n. 31: *Now every penalty, if it is just, is the penalty of sin.*

la: Codd. UW *assumit.*

en: Codices UW [read] *takes up.*

la: Psalm. 98, 3: *Quoniam [nomen] terribile et sanctum est.* — In fine solut. pro *iuramento* cod. A *iurando.*

en: Psalm 98:3: *Because [the name] is terrible and holy.* — At the end of the solution, for *oath* codex A [reads] *swearing.*

la: Vers. 25. — Paulo superius pro *opponitur* codd. K Z *opponuntur.*

en: Verse 25. — A little above, for *is opposed* codices K Z [read] *are opposed.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq. — Inferius pro *compellitur* cod. Z *compellatur.*

en: Cf. *II Sent.* d. 25, p. II, q. 4 and following. — Below, for *is compelled* codex Z [reads] *let him be compelled.*

la: C. 3. c. 22. q. 5: *Si quis coactus pro vita redimenda vel pro qualibet causa vel necessitate periurat, quia plus corpus quam animam dilexit, tres quadragesimas poeniteat. Alii vero iudicant tres annos, unum ex his in pane et aqua.*

en: C. 3, C. 22, q. 5: *If anyone, coerced, perjures himself to redeem his life or for any cause or necessity whatever, because he loved the body more than the soul, let him do penance for three Lents. But others judge [it should be] three years, one of these on bread and water.*

la: Art. 3. q. 2. — Mox pro *magis plane* codd. K O U *magis plene.*

en: Article 3, q. 2. — Presently, for *more fully* (*magis plane*) codices K O U [read] *magis plene.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p86{3,4,5}-{L,R}-*.png`); raw OCR range 59902–60007 (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`) as base for clean running prose + footnote-marker spacing, with Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-fragmented body/Respondeo/Solutio/footers (the OCR diagonally interleaves the two columns — the p.863 body opener and p.864 ad-1…ad-4 solutions are shattered; the PDF column bands are authoritative). Offset pdf = printed + 22 → printed pp.863–865 = PDF 885–887 (running-head TEXT trusted over OCR'd digits: p.863 R-col head `I. QUAEST. II. 863`; p.864 L-col `864 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`; p.865 L-col head `DIST. XXXIX. ART. I. QU[AEST. III.]` [OCR digit `868` mangled — it is printed p.865, the page on which QUAESTIO III opens]).

**Alignment check — PASS.** TRACTATIO Art. I Q2 *utrum omne periurium sit peccatum* ↔ QUAESTIO II header *Utrum omne periurium sit peccatum* (body opens *Secundo quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit peccatum, et ostenditur, quod aliquis possit periurare sine peccato.*) maps 1:1. Opens at the bottom of p.863 (both columns) beneath a1-q1's article-master scholion §I–§II (the scholion fills the rest of p.863); header raw 59902; bound forward at `QUAESTIO III.` raw 60009 (*Utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum*, = scaffolded a1-q3), which opens on p.865 beneath q2's ad-4 tail. No misalignment.

**Page-split map (apparatus, 14 entries, per-page restart, renumbered continuous):**
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**Footer hand-offs.**
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**`[?]` flags:** none — pp.863–865 legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum[^1]. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in quodam sermone de iuramento[^2]: «Falsa iuratio perniciosa, vera periculosa, nulla secura»; sed quod est perniciosum est mortale peccatum: cum ergo omne periurium sit falsa iuratio: ergo periurium est mortale peccatum.

2. Item, quod directe est contra mandatum et prohibitionem est peccatum mortale[^3]; sed periurium directe est contra prohibitionem secundae tabulae et primae: ergo videtur, quod semper sit mortale peccatum; in utraque enim prohibetur periurium.

3. Item, contemptus introducit mortale peccatum; sed omnis peierans contemnit ipsam summam Veritatem, dum eam adducit in testimonium falsi[^4]: ergo omne periurium est peccatum mortale.

4. Item, mendacium de se, quando seriosum est, peccatum grave est: cum ergo iuramentum superadditum trahat ipsum mendacium in aliud genus[^5], videtur, quod qualecumque mendacium per iuramentum superadditum fiat mortale peccatum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Sicut contingit, aliquem iocose mentiri[^6], sic etiam contingit, aliquem iurare falsum; sed quod ioco fit non fit contemptu: si ergo aliquod periurium potest esse iocosum, non videtur, quod omne periurium sit mortale peccatum.

2. Item, sicut est aliquod mendacium, quod nulli obest et alicui prodest, ita potest esse aliquod periurium; sed tale periurium magis procedit ex pietate quam ex libidine: cum ergo libido sit radix omnis peccati mortalis[^7], videtur, quod non omne periurium necessario sit mortale peccatum.

3. Item, sicut contingit, aliquem impraemeditate loqui falsum, ita contingit, aliquem impraemeditate iurare falsum; sed peccatum non est mortale, nisi fiat ex deliberatione et consensu[^8]: ergo non omne periurium est mortale peccatum.

4. Item, sicut assumere nomen Dei super falsum repugnat mandato Decalogi, ita etiam assumere in vanum; sed non semper, cum quis assumit nomen Dei in vanum, peccat mortaliter, ut patet de his qui iurant praeter necessitatem[^9]: ergo videtur similiter, quod non semper mortaliter peccet qui assumit nomen Dei super falsum: ergo non omne periurium est mortale peccatum.

### Conclusio.

> Non omne periurium est mortale peccatum, deficiente scilicet sufficienti deliberatione.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod periurium duo dicit, videlicet iurationem et inordinationem. Est enim periurium iuramentum inordinatum et indebitum. Iuratio autem triplex est. Quaedam est deliberata et solemnizata, sicut quando testes iurant super sacrosancta Dei Evangelia in iudicis praesentia. Quaedam[^10] est deliberata, sed non solemnizata, quando quis in occulto iurat aliquid ex deliberatione, intendens illud per divinae Veritatis testimonium confirmare. Quaedam autem est nec deliberata nec solemnizata, sicut quando quis iurat in communi sermone, non attendens, quem invocat et ad quid, sed ex quadam consuetudine.

Et secundum hoc periurium potest committi tripliciter; et si committatur circa iurationem deliberatam et solemnizatam, sic est grave peccatum et enorme, ita quod reddit etiam hominem infamem[^11]. Si vero committatur circa iurationem nec solemnizatam nec deliberatam; sic non est peccatum mortale,

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sed veniale, propter hoc quod lingua in lubrico posita est[^12]. — Si vero committatur circa iurationem deliberatam, licet non solemnizatam; tunc distinguendum est: quia aut deliberat de dicto et de iuramento, utrum videlicet dictum sit verum, et utrum sit iuramento confirmandum; et tunc, si peierat, mortaliter peccat. Aut deliberat de dicto tantum, utrum sit verum, non tamen de iuramento superaddito; et tunc potest esse veniale peccatum. Valde tamen est cavendum, quia veniale illud periculosum est et multum appropinquat ad mortale peccatum. — Concedendum est igitur, quod non omne periurium est mortale peccatum, sicut illud quod non est deliberatum. Concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, licet aliquae ex eis non necessario cogant.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod falsa iuratio est perniciosa; dicendum, quod Augustinus non intelligit generaliter de omni iuratione, sed de illa quae fit cum deliberatione; et de illa verum est, quod mortale peccatum est.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne periurium directe repugnat divinae prohibitioni; dicendum, quod illud non est verum de quolibet, sed de illo solum, quod fit cum plena deliberatione et consensu. Et si tu obiicias, quod omnis actus fornicationis et adulterii repugnat illi praecepto: *Non moechaberis*, et ideo est peccatum mortale; dicendum, quod non est simile de verbo, quod facile evolat, et de perpetratione peccati carnalis, quoniam actus ille semper debet subiacere imperio rationis. Unde nunquam consummatur opus carnis, quin homo reputetur consensisse pleno consensu. Ideo magis generaliter repugnat prohibitioni[^13] quam actus periurii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omni periurio est contemptus summae Veritatis; dicendum, quod quando aliquis iurat ex quadam consuetudine vel ioco, non deliberans de excellentia Veritatis in testimonium invocatae, etsi aliquo modo possit dici contemnere, quia non adeo veneratur sicut debet; tamen proprie non contemnit, quia potius est ibi debiti honoris omissio quaedam et[^14] negligentia quam illatio contumeliae. Sed si ex deliberatione hoc faceret, absque dubio tunc graviter peccaret.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod iuramentum trahit mendacium in aliud genus; dicendum, quod illud est verum, quando iuramentum additur cum deliberatione ipsi mendacio; tunc enim habet plenam rationem iuramenti et trahit in aliud genus peccati. Quando vero praeter deliberationem additur, tunc quaedam est circumstantia aggravans, non necessario trahens in genus mortalis peccati, pro eo quod iuramentum illud superadditum non introducit plenum veritatis contemptum nec est ipsius veritatis destructivum, licet aliquo modo disponat ad veritatis contrarium, quia consuetudo frequenter parit libidinem et contemptum. Ideo valde cavendum est periurium; et quia propter incertitudinem sermonis frequenter periurium iuramento coniungitur: hinc est, quod ipsum iuramentum in christianis viris, et maxime perfectis, debet esse valde rarum, secundum consilium Ecclesiastici, vigesimo tertio[^15], qui dicit: *Iurationi non assuescat os tuum*, sunt enim multi casus in illa[^16].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether every perjury is a mortal sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether every perjury is a mortal sin[^1]. And that it is so, it seems.

1. Augustine, in a certain sermon on the oath[^2]: «A false oath is pernicious, a true one perilous, none secure»; but what is pernicious is a mortal sin: since therefore every perjury is a false oath: therefore perjury is a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, what is directly against a precept and prohibition is a mortal sin[^3]; but perjury is directly against the prohibition of the second tablet and of the first: therefore it seems that it is always a mortal sin; for in both perjury is forbidden.

3. Likewise, contempt introduces a mortal sin; but everyone who perjures himself contemns the supreme Truth itself, while he adduces it as testimony of a falsehood[^4]: therefore every perjury is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, a lie of itself, when it is serious, is a grave sin: since therefore the superadded oath draws the lie itself into another genus[^5], it seems that any lie whatsoever becomes, through the superadded oath, a mortal sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Just as it happens that someone lies in jest[^6], so too it happens that someone swears something false; but what is done in jest is not done out of contempt: if therefore some perjury can be jesting, it does not seem that every perjury is a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, just as there is some lie which harms no one and benefits someone, so there can be some perjury; but such perjury proceeds rather from piety than from lust: since therefore lust is the root of every mortal sin[^7], it seems that not every perjury is necessarily a mortal sin.

3. Likewise, just as it happens that someone speaks something false unpremeditatedly, so it happens that someone swears something false unpremeditatedly; but a sin is not mortal unless it be done from deliberation and consent[^8]: therefore not every perjury is a mortal sin.

4. Likewise, just as to take the name of God upon a falsehood conflicts with the precept of the Decalogue, so also to take it in vain; but not always, when someone takes the name of God in vain, does he sin mortally, as is plain concerning those who swear beyond necessity[^9]: therefore it seems likewise that he who takes the name of God upon a falsehood does not always sin mortally: therefore not every perjury is a mortal sin.

### Conclusion.

> Not every perjury is a mortal sin, namely when sufficient deliberation is lacking.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that perjury states two things, namely the swearing and the disorder. For perjury is a disordered and undue oath. Now an oath is threefold. One is deliberate and solemnized, as when witnesses swear upon the most holy Gospels of God in the presence of a judge. Another[^10] is deliberate, but not solemnized, when someone swears something in secret out of deliberation, intending to confirm it by the testimony of the divine Truth. But another is neither deliberate nor solemnized, as when someone swears in common speech, not attending to whom he invokes and for what, but out of a certain custom.

And according to this perjury can be committed in three ways; and if it be committed concerning a deliberate and solemnized oath, thus it is a grave and enormous sin, so much so that it even renders a man infamous[^11]. But if it be committed concerning an oath neither solemnized nor deliberate; thus it is not a mortal sin,

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but venial, on account of this, that the tongue is set in a slippery place[^12]. — But if it be committed concerning a deliberate oath, though not solemnized; then a distinction must be made: for either he deliberates about the saying and about the oath, namely whether the saying is true, and whether it is to be confirmed by an oath; and then, if he perjures himself, he sins mortally. Or he deliberates about the saying only, whether it is true, yet not about the superadded oath; and then it can be a venial sin. Yet great care must be taken, because that venial [sin] is perilous and approaches very near to mortal sin. — It is therefore to be granted that not every perjury is a mortal sin, such as that which is not deliberate. The reasons also which show this are to be granted, although some of them do not necessarily compel.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that a false oath is pernicious; it must be said that Augustine does not understand [it] generally of every oath, but of that which is done with deliberation; and of that it is true that it is a mortal sin.

2. To that which is objected, that every perjury directly conflicts with the divine prohibition; it must be said that that is not true of just any [perjury], but only of that which is done with full deliberation and consent. And if you object that every act of fornication and adultery conflicts with that precept: *You shall not commit adultery*, and therefore is a mortal sin; it must be said that the case is not alike concerning a word, which easily flies away, and concerning the perpetration of a carnal sin, since that act must always be subject to the rule of reason. Whence the work of the flesh is never consummated without a man being reckoned to have consented with full consent. Therefore it more generally conflicts with the prohibition[^13] than the act of perjury [does].

3. To that which is objected, that in every perjury there is contempt of the supreme Truth; it must be said that when someone swears out of a certain custom or in jest, not deliberating about the excellence of the Truth invoked in testimony, even though he can in some way be said to contemn, because he does not venerate as he ought; yet he does not properly contemn, because there is rather there a certain omission of due honor and[^14] negligence than the infliction of an affront. But if he were to do this out of deliberation, then without doubt he would sin grievously.

4. To that which is objected, that the oath draws the lie into another genus; it must be said that that is true when the oath is added with deliberation to the lie itself; for then it has the full account of an oath and draws [it] into another genus of sin. But when it is added apart from deliberation, then it is a certain aggravating circumstance, not necessarily drawing [it] into the genus of mortal sin, for the reason that that superadded oath does not introduce a full contempt of truth, nor is it destructive of truth itself, although in some way it disposes toward the contrary of truth, because custom frequently begets lust and contempt. Therefore perjury is greatly to be guarded against; and because, on account of the uncertainty of speech, perjury is frequently joined to an oath: hence it is that the oath itself, among Christian men, and most of all among the perfect, ought to be very rare, according to the counsel of Ecclesiasticus, the twenty-third [chapter][^15], who says: *Let not your mouth become accustomed to swearing*, for there are many occasions [of falling] in it[^16].

---

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Serm. 180. (alias 28. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 4. n. 4, ubi textus originalis pro *perniciosa* substituit *exitiosa*.

en: Sermon 180 (otherwise 28, on the Words of the Apostle), c. 4, n. 4, where the original text substitutes *exitiosa* ("destructive") for *perniciosa* ("pernicious").

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. — De minori cfr. supra d. 37. dub. 2. et 8. — Pro *contra mandatum et prohibitionem* cod. K *contra mandatorum prohibitionem*.

en: See II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. — On the minor [premise] cf. above, d. 37, dub. 2 and 8. — For *contra mandatum et prohibitionem* codex K [reads] *contra mandatorum prohibitionem*.

la: Ut monstratum est quaest. praeced. — De maiori cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As was shown in the preceding question. — On the major [premise] cf. II Sent., d. 42, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Scilicet *periurii*. Cfr. supra q. 1; et de maiori supra d. 38. q. 2. seq.

en: Namely *of perjury*. Cf. above, q. 1; and on the major [premise], above, d. 38, q. 2 and following.

la: Vide supra d. 38. q. 5, ubi etiam *maior* seq. arg. insinuatur. — Inferius voci *contemptu* cod. U praemittit *ex*.

en: See above, d. 38, q. 5, where also the *major* of the following argument is intimated. — Below, to the word *contemptu* codex U prefixes *ex*.

la: Videsis d. 38. dub. 2. — Cod. K *omnium mortalium peccatorum*.

en: See d. 38, dub. 2. — Codex K [reads] *omnium mortalium peccatorum* ("of all mortal sins").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 845, nota 9.

en: Cf. above, p. 845, note 9.

la: Vide supra d. 37. dub. 2.

en: See above, d. 37, dub. 2.

la: In codd. A F G H N T V aa additur *autem*, in codd. U Z bb *vero*. Mox verbo *quando* cod. Z praemittit *sicut*.

en: In codices A F G H N T V aa is added *autem*, in codices U Z bb *vero*. Presently, to the word *quando* codex Z prefixes *sicut*.

la: Can. 17. *Infames* c. 6. q. 1: *Infames esse eas personas dicimus, quae pro aliqua culpa notantur infamia, id est omnes qui christianae legis normam abiiciunt... periuros etc.* Cfr. ibid. C. *Praedicandum* c. 22. q. 1. — Superius pro *et si* edd. *num si*.

en: Canon 17, *Infames*, C. 6, q. 1: «We say that those persons are infamous who for some fault are branded with infamy, that is, all who cast off the norm of the Christian law... perjurers, etc.» Cf. ibid., C. *Praedicandum*, C. 22, q. 1. — Above, for *et si* the editions [read] *num si*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 846, nota 3. — Inferius pro *licet* codd. K bb *sed*.

en: Cf. above, p. 846, note 3. — Below, for *licet* codices K bb [read] *sed*.

la: Codd. F G L N V aa *prohibitum*, cod. T legit *ideo magis generaliter prohibitum*.

en: Codices F G L N V aa [read] *prohibitum*, codex T reads *ideo magis generaliter prohibitum*.

la: Cod. A *bene ex*, edd. legunt *est ibi debita honoris omissio, quaedam etiam*. Superius pro *possit dici* cod. A *posset dici*, et pro *veneratur* codd. U Z *reveretur*.

en: Codex A [reads] *bene ex*; the editions read *est ibi debita honoris omissio, quaedam etiam*. Above, for *possit dici* codex A [reads] *posset dici*, and for *veneratur* codices U Z [read] *reveretur*.

la: Vers. 9. — Pro *assuescat* codd. A K bb *assuescas*. Superius pro *Ideo* cod. G *et ideo*, et pro *cavendum* cod. Z *timendum*.

en: Verse 9. — For *assuescat* codices A K bb [read] *assuescas*. Above, for *Ideo* codex G [reads] *et ideo*, and for *cavendum* codex Z [reads] *timendum*.

la: Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem.

en: See the scholion to the first question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p86{5,6}-{L,R}-*.png`), Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion. Raw OCR range **60009–60105** (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`), used as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing; the Respondeo, Solutio (ad 1–4), page footers, and column reflow were authoritatively set from the PDF bands (the OCR diagonally interleaves the two columns — e.g. arg-4 R-col and contra-3 tail were shattered into the L-col stream).

**Alignment — PASS.** QUAESTIO III header at raw 60009; opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur.* = TRACTATIO Art. I Q3 *Utrum omne periurium sit mortale peccatum* — verified aligned. Bound forward at `ARTICULUS II.` (*De forma iurandi*) raw 60106 (its QUAESTIO I, *Utrum licitum sit iurare per Deum*, at raw 60115). q3 closes ARTICULUS I.

**Page-split map.**
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**Footer hand-offs.**
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**has_scholion: FALSE.** Range 60009–60105 contains NO scholion (grep-verified: no `SCHOLI`/`SOHOLI`/`SCHOLIOK` header in-range). The only "scholion" tokens in-range are the two redirect footers ([^1] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* → a1-q1's article-master scholion; [^16] *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaestionem* → same). The `SCHOLIOK` token at raw ~60297 is AFTER `ARTICULUS II.` (raw 60106) and belongs to ART. II q.1, not to this question — the original brief's claim that it was q3's scholion was wrong.

**[?] flags:** none — pp.865–866 fully legible at 450 dpi.