title: Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum synderesis possit depravari per peccatum.*

Tertio quaeritur de synderesi quantum ad abusum. Et est quaestio, utrum synderesis possit depravari per peccatum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Glossa super primum Ezechielis[^1]: *Facies aquilae a dextris ipsorum quatuor*; ibi Glossa, loquens de conscientia et synderesi, dicit sic: «Hanc saepe praecipitari videmus et suum locum amittere, cum quidam sine pudore peccant, quibus merito dicitur: *Frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi*»; si igitur praecipitium non est nisi per culpam, patet etc.

2. Item, super illud Ieremiae secundo[^2]: *Filii Mempheos* etc.; Glossa: «Malignus spiritus de membris inferioribus usque ad verticem pertingit, quando castam celsitudinem mentis diffidentiae morbus corrumpit»; sed casta celsitudo mentis est ipsa synderesis: ergo contingit per peccatum corrumpi.

3. Item, hoc videtur *ratione*. Poena et culpa habent fieri circa idem; sed secundum actum[^3] synderesis, qui est peccato remurmurare, contingit esse animae punitionem: ergo secundum illum actum contingit esse peccati perpetrationem.

4. Item, synderesis consequitur conscientiam tanquam suum naturale iudicatorium[^4]; sed conscientia potest esse recta et erronea: ergo videtur necessario, quod synderesis aliquando moveatur recte, aliquando moveatur oblique. Si igitur inordinatio reperta in actu motivae est culpa, videtur etc.

5. Item, «opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem[^5]»; sed donum sapientiae et beatitudo *luctus* consistit circa synderesim, cum donum sapientiae consistat circa animae supremum, et synderesis postulet *pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus*. Si igitur dono sapientiae et beatitudini *luctus* culpa opponitur, videtur, quod culpa habeat esse circa illam potentiam.

6. Item, synderesis aut est de bonis *maximis*, aut de bonis *mediis*, aut de bonis *minimis*[^6]. Si de maximis: ergo est gratia, vel virtus; quorum utrumque est falsum, cum synderesis simul maneat cum peccato. Si est de bonis *mediis*; sed his contingit male uti: ergo synderesi contingit male uti. Sed malus usus est culpa: ergo circa actum synderesis contingit esse culpam. De *minimis* non est dubium, quod non est, cum minima sint bona corporis.

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**Sed contra:** 1. Glossa super Ezechielis primum[^7]: «Synderesim proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus, sed ipsa errantia corrigentem». Si ergo non se commiscet tribus, sed potius corrigit; videtur, quod secundum actum eius non consistat peccatum.

2. Item, Ambrosius dicit, et Magister adducit in littera, super illud ad Romanos septimo[^8]: *Quod nolo illud facio*; ibi dicit, quod homo semper naturaliter vult bonum: ergo cum illa voluntas non sit aliud quam synderesis, synderesis semper vult bonum; et si semper vult bonum: ergo nunquam peccat.

3. Item, vis illa, quae secundum motum suum directe repugnat peccato, non depravatur peccato[^9]; sed actus synderesis semper contra culpam remurmurat, etiam in pessimis peccatoribus: ergo videtur, quod non habeat depravari et deordinari per culpam.

4. Item, quando tota natura per morbum corrumpitur, non est ulterius possibilitas ad sanitatem: ergo si tota rectitudo animae auferretur per culpam, iam non esset ultra spes redeundi ad gratiam; sed constat, quod spes est redeundi, quia de nemine desperandum est, dum est in via[^10]: ergo videtur, quod aliqua rectitudo remaneat. Sed rectitudo, quae maximae est adhaerentiae, est rectitudo voluntatis per modum naturae, et haec est synderesis: ergo non videtur, quod depravari possit per culpam.

### Conclusio

> Synderesis per peccatum non potest depravari in se, sed tantum praecipitari quoad dominium regendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum illos qui dicunt, synderesim non esse aliud quam superiorem portionem rationis, circa actum ipsius contingit esse peccatum[^11]. Dicunt enim, quod ipsa superior portio rationis habet dupliciter moveri: aut secundum quod ad Deum convertitur et regitur et dirigitur secundum leges aeternas, et sic in ea peccatum non habet esse; aut prout convertitur ad inferiores vires, et sic ab eis sumit occasionem deviandi et potest per peccatum depravari. Et ponunt exemplum in peccato Arii, qui erravit circa Trinitatem et Unitatem, et ita secundum superiorem portionem rationis vel secundum synderesim. Et hoc dicunt quod Glossa praedicta super primum Ezechielis vult dicere. Nam primo dicit, quod «aliis peccantibus non se immiscet»; postea dicit, quod «praecipitatur et locum suum perdit»; et utrumque dicunt habere veritatem secundum diversas comparationes superioris portionis sive ipsius synderesis.

— Sed quoniam, sicut dicunt Sancti et Glossae manifeste, synderesis, quantum est de se, semper habet ad bonum stimulare et peccato remurmurare, quamdiu sumus in statu viae; ideo dixerunt alii aliter, scilicet quod synderesis nominat ipsam voluntatem, secundum quod habet naturaliter moveri. Et quoniam peccatum non habet esse circa actum voluntatis, ut natura est vel ut movetur naturaliter, sed solum ut movetur deliberative[^12]; hinc est, quod synderesis per peccatum non habet depravari. Quia tamen ipsa habet alias regere et dirigere et dominium regendi potest perdere: hinc est, quod contingit, eam per culpam praecipitari. Praesidentia enim dominii a duobus pendet, videlicet a *rectitudine praesidentis*, et ab *obtemperantia famulantis*; et quamvis synderesis, quantum est de se, semper sit recta, quia tamen ratio et voluntas frequenter ei obviant — ratio per erroris excaecationem, et voluntas per impietatis obstinationem — hinc est, quod synderesis *praecipitari* dicitur, pro eo quod *effectus* eius et *praesidentia* in vires alias deliberativas propter earum repugnantiam repellitur et cassatur. — Et ponitur exemplum in milite, qui, quantum est de se, semper bene sedet super equum, equo tamen ruente, praecipitari dicitur. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

Hic autem modus dicendi tanquam rationabilior a pluribus[^13] sustinetur. Et ideo rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur de Glossa, quod synderesim praecipitari videmus; iam patet responsio. Non enim sequitur, si praecipitatur, quod propter hoc per peccatum depravetur, quia praecipitium eius non tantum attenditur circa *actum proprium*, sed etiam circa *actum aliarum virtutum*, quibus praesidere debet ipsa synderesis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod morbus diffidentiae corrumpit mentis celsitudinem, et quod anima constupratur usque ad verticem; dicendum, quod *vertex* et *celsitudo* mentis non vocatur ibi[^14] synderesis, sed superior portio rationis.

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Superior autem portio rationis non nominat ipsam potentiam animae, in quantum movetur *naturaliter*, sed in quantum movetur *deliberative*. Et hoc modo circa ipsam habet peccatum consistere, maxime illud quod attenditur secundum actum rationis, qui est sursum, sicut est peccatum infidelitatis et desperationis, et alia peccata, quae directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena et culpa habent fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem loquendo *praecise*, pro eo quod pro peccato voluntatis totum corpus habet puniri. Verum est tamen, quod sicut voluntas est principium peccandi, ita et principaliter punitur; unde et *vermis conscientiae* plus est afflictivus voluntatis, prout est deliberativa, quam prout est natura quaedam, propter mutuam repugnantiam. — Utrum autem sola voluntas sit subiectum poenae, vel aliquid aliud, hoc infra[^15] suo loco manifestabitur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia, quae est iudicatorium praecedens synderesim, est recta et non recta, ergo et synderesis; dicendum, quod non sequitur, pro eo quod ipsa conscientia non tantum consistit in universali, immo etiam descendit ad *particulare*; non tantummodo movetur motu simplici, immo etiam collativo. Nec mirum, quia consistit in ratione, cuius quidem rationis est unum ab altero *discernere* et unum ad alterum *conferre*. Et ideo, licet conscientia, prout stat in *universali* et movetur *aspectu simplici*, sit semper recta; prout autem descendit ad *particularia* et confert, potest fieri erronea, propter hoc quod intermiscet se actus[^16] rationis deliberativae.

Et hoc patet sic. *Conscientia* enim Iudaeorum ex ipso primo naturali dictamine dictabat, quod Deo est obediendum; et ipsi postmodum assumunt, quod Deus praecipit nunc circumcisionem et ciborum discretionem; et ex hoc formatur conscientia eorum in particulari, ut se circumcidant et a cibis abstineant. Error autem iste non venit ex primo principio, quod quidem verum fuit, sed venit ex assumptione, quae[^17] quidem non fuit conscientiae, prout est naturale iudicatorium, sed potius rationis erroneae, quae quidem spectat ad liberum arbitrium. Synderesis autem, quantum est de se, movetur motu simplici in remurmurando contra malum et instigando ad bonum. Praeterea, movetur contra malum non hoc vel illud, sed in *universali*; vel si aliquo modo inclinetur synderesis ad detestandum hoc malum vel illud, hoc non est, in quantum *hoc*, sed in quantum *malum*; et hinc est, quod synderesis non obliquatur, sicut conscientia errat.

Alia etiam posset reddi ratio, quia synderesis nominat ipsam potentiam naturalem, ut est naturaliter habilitata; conscientia autem nominat habitum non tantum naturalem, sed etiam *acquisitum*; et quia natura, quantum est de se, semper recte movetur, quod autem *acquiritur*, potest habere et rationem rectitudinis et obliquitatis: hinc est, quod synderesi semper existente recta, conscientia potest esse et recta et erronea.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae est circa synderesim; dicendum, quod falsum est; omnia enim dona et omnes virtutes et beatitudines respiciunt voluntatem, secundum quod *deliberativa* est. Quod autem dicitur synderesis *postulare pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus*, hoc intelligitur *causaliter*, quia nos instigat ad gemitum pro malis, quibus immersi sumus.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonis mediocribus contingit male uti; dicendum, quod illud verum est de his quae moventur ad nutum liberi arbitrii, secundum cuius actum proprie attenditur *usus* et *abusus*; synderesis autem, cum sit potentia naturalis et naturaliter moveatur, non subest imperio liberi arbitrii: et ideo non sequitur, quod liberum arbitrium possit ea abuti. Praeterea, esto quod posset[^18] illa abuti, adhuc non sequitur, quod propter hoc in ipsa esset peccatum; quamvis enim liberum arbitrium abutatur oculo, cum intuetur ad concupiscendum, tamen peccatum non dicitur esse in oculo: peccatum enim non est in eo quo quis abutitur, sed potius in abutente.

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### Question III. *Whether synderesis can be depraved by sin.*

Third, an inquiry is made concerning synderesis with respect to its abuse. And the question is whether synderesis can be depraved by sin. And it seems that it can, thus.

1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel[^1]: *The face of an eagle on the right side of those four*; there the Gloss, speaking of conscience and synderesis, says thus: «We often see this one cast down and lose its place, when certain men sin without shame, to whom it is deservedly said: *Thou hast had a harlot's forehead*»; if then a casting-down is only through fault, it is evident, etc.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Jeremiah, chapter two[^2]: *The children of Memphis*, etc.; the Gloss: «The malignant spirit reaches from the lower members up to the crown of the head, when the disease of diffidence corrupts the chaste loftiness of the mind»; but the chaste loftiness of the mind is synderesis itself: therefore it happens that it is corrupted through sin.

3. Likewise, this seems to be the case by *reason*. Punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; but according to the act[^3] of synderesis, which is to murmur against sin, there comes to be a punishment of the soul: therefore according to that act there comes to be the perpetration of sin.

4. Likewise, synderesis follows upon conscience as its natural tribunal[^4]; but conscience can be right and erroneous: therefore it seems necessary that synderesis sometimes be moved rightly, sometimes be moved obliquely. If then the disorder found in the act of the motive power is a fault, it seems, etc.

5. Likewise, «opposites are by nature apt to come to be about the same thing[^5]»; but the gift of wisdom and the beatitude of *mourning* are about synderesis, since the gift of wisdom is about the highest part of the soul, and synderesis *asks for us with unutterable groanings*. If then a fault is opposed to the gift of wisdom and to the beatitude of *mourning*, it seems that the fault has its being about that power.

6. Likewise, synderesis is either about the *greatest* goods, or about *middle* goods, or about the *least* goods[^6]. If about the greatest: then it is grace, or virtue; both of which are false, since synderesis remains together with sin. If it is about *middle* goods; but these one can misuse: therefore one can misuse synderesis. But misuse is a fault: therefore about the act of synderesis there can be a fault. About the *least* goods there is no doubt that it is not, since the least goods are goods of the body.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel[^7]: «They properly assign synderesis to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting their errors». If then it does not mingle itself with the three, but rather corrects them; it seems that according to its act sin does not consist.

2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and the Master adduces in the text, on that passage to the Romans, chapter seven[^8]: *What I will not, that I do*; there he says that man always naturally wills the good: therefore since that will is nothing other than synderesis, synderesis always wills the good; and if it always wills the good: therefore it never sins.

3. Likewise, that power which according to its motion directly resists sin is not depraved by sin[^9]; but the act of synderesis always murmurs against fault, even in the worst sinners: therefore it seems that it cannot be depraved and disordered through fault.

4. Likewise, when the whole nature is corrupted through disease, there is no further possibility of health: therefore if the whole rectitude of the soul were taken away through fault, there would no longer be hope of returning to grace; but it is established that there is hope of returning, since no one is to be despaired of while he is on the way[^10]: therefore it seems that some rectitude remains. But the rectitude which is of the greatest adherence is the rectitude of the will by way of nature, and this is synderesis: therefore it does not seem that it can be depraved through fault.

### Conclusion

> Synderesis cannot be depraved in itself through sin, but only cast down as regards its dominion of ruling.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to those who say that synderesis is nothing other than the superior portion of reason, there can be sin about its act[^11]. For they say that this superior portion of reason can be moved in two ways: either insofar as it is turned to God and is ruled and directed according to the eternal laws, and thus in it sin cannot be; or insofar as it is turned to the lower powers, and thus from them it takes occasion of deviating and can be depraved through sin. And they put forward the example of the sin of Arius, who erred concerning the Trinity and the Unity, and so according to the superior portion of reason or according to synderesis. And they say that this is what the aforesaid Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel means to say. For first it says that «it does not mingle itself with the others when they sin»; afterward it says that «it is cast down and loses its place»; and they say that both hold true according to the diverse comparisons of the superior portion or of synderesis itself.

— But since, as the Saints and the Glosses manifestly say, synderesis, as far as it is of itself, always has it to spur toward the good and to murmur against sin, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer; therefore others said otherwise, namely that synderesis names the will itself, insofar as it has it to be moved naturally. And since sin cannot be about the act of the will, as it is nature or as it is moved naturally, but only as it is moved deliberatively[^12]; hence it is that synderesis cannot be depraved through sin. Yet because it has it to rule and direct the others, and can lose the dominion of ruling: hence it is that it happens that it is cast down through fault. For the presidency of dominion depends on two things, namely on the *rectitude of the one presiding*, and on the *compliance of the one serving*; and although synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is always right, yet because reason and will frequently oppose it — reason through the blinding of error, and will through the obstinacy of impiety — hence it is that synderesis is said to be *cast down*, in that its *effect* and *presidency* over the other deliberative powers is, on account of their resistance, repelled and made void. — And an example is put forward in a soldier, who, as far as he is of himself, always sits well upon his horse, yet when the horse falls is said to be cast down. So too it must be understood in the matter at hand.

Now this way of speaking is, as the more reasonable, upheld by the more numerous[^13]. And therefore the arguments which are brought in for this side must be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the Gloss, that we see synderesis cast down; the response is already evident. For it does not follow, if it is cast down, that on account of this it is depraved through sin, since its casting-down is regarded not only about its *own act*, but also about the *act of the other virtues*, over which synderesis itself ought to preside.

2. To that which is objected, that the disease of diffidence corrupts the loftiness of the mind, and that the soul is defiled up to the crown of the head; it must be said that the *crown* and *loftiness* of the mind is not there[^14] called synderesis, but the superior portion of reason.

The superior portion of reason, however, does not name the power of the soul itself insofar as it is moved *naturally*, but insofar as it is moved *deliberatively*. And in this way sin can consist about it, especially that which is regarded according to the act of reason which is on high, such as is the sin of infidelity and despair, and the other sins which are directly opposed to the theological virtues.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; it must be said that this does not hold true, speaking *precisely*, in that for the sin of the will the whole body is to be punished. Yet it is true that, as the will is the principle of sinning, so also it is principally punished; whence also the *worm of conscience* is more afflictive of the will, as it is deliberative, than as it is a certain nature, on account of their mutual resistance. — But whether the will alone is the subject of punishment, or something else, this will be made manifest below[^15] in its proper place.

4. To that which is objected, that conscience, which is the tribunal preceding synderesis, is right and not right, therefore synderesis also; it must be said that it does not follow, in that conscience itself not only consists in the universal, but indeed also descends to the *particular*; it is not only moved by a simple motion, but indeed also by a collative one. Nor is it any wonder, since it consists in reason, of which reason it belongs to *discern* one thing from another and to *compare* one thing to another. And therefore, although conscience, as it stands in the *universal* and is moved by a *simple gaze*, is always right; yet as it descends to *particulars* and compares, it can become erroneous, on account of the fact that the act[^16] of deliberative reason mingles itself in.

And this is evident thus. For the *conscience* of the Jews, from the very first natural dictate, dictated that God is to be obeyed; and they afterward assume that God now commands circumcision and the distinction of foods; and from this their conscience is formed in particular, that they circumcise themselves and abstain from foods. But this error does not come from the first principle, which indeed was true, but comes from the assumption, which[^17] indeed was not of conscience, as it is a natural tribunal, but rather of erroneous reason, which indeed pertains to free choice. But synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is moved by a simple motion in murmuring against evil and instigating toward the good. Furthermore, it is moved against evil not this or that, but in the *universal*; or if synderesis is in some way inclined to detest this or that evil, this is not insofar as it is *this*, but insofar as it is *evil*; and hence it is that synderesis is not bent awry, as conscience errs.

Another reason too could be given, namely that synderesis names the natural power itself, as it is naturally enabled; whereas conscience names a habit not only natural, but also *acquired*; and because nature, as far as it is of itself, is always rightly moved, but what is *acquired* can have both the account of rectitude and that of obliquity: hence it is that, while synderesis always remains right, conscience can be both right and erroneous.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom is about synderesis; it must be said that it is false; for all gifts and all virtues and beatitudes regard the will, insofar as it is *deliberative*. But that synderesis is said to *ask for us with unutterable groanings*, this is understood *causally*, since it instigates us to groaning over the evils in which we are immersed.

6. To that which is objected, that one can misuse middling goods; it must be said that this is true of those things which are moved at the beck of free choice, according to whose act *use* and *abuse* are properly regarded; but synderesis, since it is a natural power and is moved naturally, is not subject to the command of free choice: and therefore it does not follow that free choice can abuse it. Furthermore, granted that it could[^18] abuse it, still it does not follow that on account of this there would be sin in it; for although free choice abuses the eye, when it gazes in order to lust, yet sin is not said to be in the eye: for sin is not in that which one abuses, but rather in the one abusing.

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la: Vers. 10. — Ipsa verba Hieronymi in Ezech. I, 7. seq., ex quo Glossa sumta est, haec sunt: *Et tamen hanc quoque ipsam conscientiam... cernimus praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et verecundiam habent in delictis et merentur audire: Facies meretricis facta est tibi, noluisti erubescere* (Ier. 3, 3.).

en: Verse 10. — The very words of Jerome on Ezekiel I, 7 ff., from which the Gloss is taken, are these: *And yet we see this same conscience also cast down in certain men and losing its place, men who have not even shame and modesty in their misdeeds and deserve to hear: Thou hast had a harlot's forehead, thou wouldst not blush* (Jer. 3, 3.).

la: Vers. 16. — Glossa habetur in Rabani Comment. in hunc loc., ubi prius Hieronymi in eundem Ieremiae loc. expositione iuxta litteram et intelligentiam spiritualem allata, Rabanus tropologicam expositionem addens ait: *Malignus enim spiritus quasi ab inferioribus membris usque ad summa pertingit, quando activam vitam polluetis, castam celsitudinem fidei diffidentiae morbo corruperit.* — Mox post *contingit* cod. O et edd. 3, 4 subiiciunt *eam*, Vat. addit *ea*.

en: Verse 16. — The Gloss is found in Rabanus' Commentary on this passage, where, after first adducing Jerome's exposition on the same passage of Jeremiah according to the letter and the spiritual understanding, Rabanus, adding a tropological exposition, says: *For the malignant spirit reaches as it were from the lower members up to the highest, when it corrupts the chaste loftiness of faith by the disease of diffidence as you pollute the active life.* — Soon after *contingit* cod. O and edd. 3, 4 append *eam*, the Vatican edition adds *ea*.

la: Codd. CFHIKRST ee etc. cum edd. 2, 3 *statum*. Iidem codd., excepto ee, pro *synderesis* hoc loco genitivum Graecum *syndereseos* exhibent. Subinde voci *peccato* cod. K praefigit *in*.

en: Codd. CFHIKRST ee etc. with edd. 2, 3 read *statum*. The same codices, except ee, in this place exhibit for *synderesis* the Greek genitive *syndereseos*. Thereupon cod. K prefixes *in* to the word *peccato*.

la: Cfr. supra q. 1.

en: Cf. above, q. 1.

la: Secundum Aristot.; cfr. supra pag. 192, nota 4. — In minori respicitur illud Matth. 5, 5: *Beati qui lugent* etc. Seq. loc. Script. est Rom. 8, 26. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 bis pro *luctus* substituit *lucis*.

en: According to Aristotle; cf. above, p. 192, note 4. — In the minor premise that passage of Matthew 5, 5 is regarded: *Blessed are they that mourn*, etc. The following scriptural passage is Rom. 8, 26. — The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 twice substitutes *lucis* for *luctus*.

la: De hac divisione bonorum, quae ex August. sumta est, et de conclusionibus inde hic factis vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 3.

en: Concerning this division of goods, which is taken from Augustine, and concerning the conclusions here drawn from it, see above the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3.

la: Vers. 10. — De Glossa vide supra pag. 909, nota 1.

en: Verse 10. — Concerning the Gloss see above, p. 909, note 1.

la: Vers. 16. et 20. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Verses 16 and 20. — See here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 182, nota 9. et pag. 314, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 182, note 9, and p. 314, note 7.

la: Cfr. dictum August., supra pag. 832, nota 7. allatum. — Paulo superius pro *auferretur* in edd. et nonnullis codd. legitur *aufertur*.

en: Cf. the saying of Augustine adduced above, p. 832, note 7. — A little above, for *auferretur* in the editions and several codices is read *aufertur*.

la: De hac opinione vide supra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi complura argg. ad eam impugnandam adducuntur. Ibid. etiam plura exponuntur quae in seqq. tanguntur.

en: Concerning this opinion see above, d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in the corpus, where several arguments are adduced to impugn it. There also several things are expounded which are touched on in what follows.

la: Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., et August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51: *Si enim non receditur ab eo modo, quo naturaliter factus est... ea quae debet, facit* etc. — Paulo inferius pro *Quia tamen* Vat. *Quia tantum*, edd. 2, 3 *Quia cum*.

en: Cf. above, d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, in the corpus, and Augustine, *On Free Choice*, Bk. III, c. 18, n. 51: *For if there is no withdrawal from that mode in which it was made naturally... it does the things it ought*, etc. — A little below, for *Quia tamen* the Vatican edition reads *Quia tantum*, edd. 2, 3 *Quia cum*.

la: B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 16. q. 99. m. 2. a. 2. asserit, sic dixisse antiquos magistros Praepositivum et Antissiodorensem. — Paulo superius pro *ruente* cod. M habet *corruente*.

en: Blessed Albert, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 16, q. 99, m. 2, a. 2, asserts that the ancient masters Praepositivus and [William] of Auxerre spoke thus. — A little above, for *ruente* cod. M has *corruente*.

la: Edd. *hic*. — Circa finem solut. pro *qui est sursum* cod. T *quae est sursum*.

en: The editions read *hic*. — Near the end of the solution, for *qui est sursum* cod. T reads *quae est sursum*.

en: Distinction 41, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vat. *actibus*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *actibus*.

la: Codd. CFKLORSTVY ce et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 *quod*. Paulo superius post *Error* edd., excepta 1, omittunt *autem*. Aliquanto inferius verbo *instigando* codd. CLRS ce etc. atque ed. 1 praemittunt *in*.

en: Codd. CFKLORSTVY ce and others, as well as edd. 1, 2, read *quod*. A little above, after *Error*, the editions, except 1, omit *autem*. Somewhat below, the codices CLRS ce etc. and ed. 1 prefix *in* to the word *instigando*.

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *ut est* codd. CKOPQRSTW ce *et est*, cod. L (Q a secunda manu) *et ut est*, cod. bb et ed. 1 *prout est*.

en: As was shown above, a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for *ut est* the codices CKOPQRSTW ce read *et est*, cod. L (Q by a second hand) *et ut est*, cod. bb and ed. 1 *prout est*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 935–937 = printed pp. 913–915), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 63533–63677) consulted for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied throughout the Respondeo/Solutio and footer bands. Fresh literal English translation.

**Page-split map (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page; rendered here as a single sequential [^1]–[^18]):**
- p.913 footers 6–11 → [^1]–[^6]. (Footers 1–5 on p.913 belong to the *prior* quaestio, a2-q2, whose solution ends in the p.913 left-column top.)
- p.914 footers 1–8 → [^7]–[^14].
- p.915 footers 1–4 (left column) → [^15]–[^18].

**Hand-off picked up from a2-q2.** As briefed, p.913 left-column footers 6–7 (Hieronymus in Ezech.; Rabani Gloss) and right-column footers 8–11 (codd. *synderesis* genitive variant; Aristot./Matth. 5,5/Rom. 8,26; the *divisio bonorum* referring to d. XXVII c. 3) all belong to THIS q3 and lead the apparatus as [^1]–[^6]. Confirmed against the p.913 PDF footer bands; count and text verified.

**Hand-off forwarded to d39-dubia.** On printed p.915 the body crosses into the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (Dub. I) in the right column. The p.915 **right-column** footer block (footnotes 5–9: «Cfr. III Sent. d. 34…»; «Plures codd…»; «Cfr. infra d. 41…Vide scholion ad 1…»; «Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 3»; «De hoc duplici motu vide tom. I pag. 562…») belongs to the dubia, NOT to q3 — those migrate to the d39-dubia chunk's body. The DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM begins at raw line 63691.

**Scholion disposition.** q3 has **no own scholion** (confirmed against the p.915 PDF: the body passes directly from "sed potius in abutente" to "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI", with no SCHOLION header). q3 footnote 4 («Cfr. supra q. 1») and the prior q2's footnote 5 («Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.») both point back to the article's first quaestio. Vide scholion ad q. 1 huius articuli.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the PDF.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 39, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dub. I–III)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Doubts I–III)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 915 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *velle malum malum est, sed intelligere malum non est malum.* Quaeritur, unde hoc sit. Et videtur, quod similiter sit in actu intelligendi et in actu volendi. Actus enim recipit denominationem ab obiecto[^1]: ergo sicut velle malum est malum, ita et intelligere. — Item, intelligere dicit motum a rebus ad animam, et velle dicit motum ab anima ad res[^2]: ergo videtur, quod plus pendeat actus intelligendi a re intel<!-- page 916 -->lecta, quam actus volendi a re volita: ergo si malitia est a volito et intellecto, potius debet depravari actus intelligendi quam actus volendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod a malitia existente in obiecto magis depravatur actus volendi quam actus intelligendi. — Et ratio huius dupliciter sumitur: *Ratio 1.* tum ex parte virtutis[^3], quia tanta est vis amoris, ut transformet amantem in amatum; unde qui diligit iustitiam iustus fit, et qui diligit iniquitatem iniquus fit; et propterea dicitur de malis, quod *facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt*[^4]. Non sic est de actu intelligendi; nam etsi aliquo modo conformet, non tamen transformat. Hoc autem contingit propter maiorem vim unionis, quae consistit in ipso amore; sicut enim dicit Dionysius[^5]: « Amorem dicimus vim unitivam »; propterea dicitur primae ad Corinthios sexto: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus fit.* — *Ratio 2.* Alia est ratio ex parte obiecti. Bonum enim, in quantum bonum, est obiectum affectus, non intellectus. Intelligentiae autem et memoriae obiectum est verum sub ratione veri, vel bonum sub ratione veri; et hinc est, quod intellectus, quando intelligit falsum, est falsus; non tamen, quando intelligit bonum, est bonus[^6]. Affectus vero non dicitur esse falsus, quia velit falsum, quamvis dicatur esse malus, quia velit malum, vel bonus, cum vult bonum; virtus enim a proprio obiecto denominari habet.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad utramque obiectionem. Istud autem melius infra patebit distinctione quadragesima prima[^7], ubi inquirit Magister, utrum peccatum omne habeat esse a voluntate.

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *superior scintilla rationis bonum vult et malum semper odit.* Sed contra: impossibile est, simul et semel voluntatem moveri motibus contrariis, vel etiam disparatis[^8]; sed homo aliquando vult malum; ergo non videtur, quod illa hora velit bonum: falsum igitur dicit, cum ait, quod illa scintilla semper vult bonum. Si tu dicas, quod voluntas naturalis et deliberativa sunt diversae potentiae, et ita simul possunt moveri diversis motibus; *contra:* in littera praecedenti habetur et etiam consequenti[^9], quod illa voluntas, quae vult bonum, gratia adveniente liberatur et adiuvatur. Si ergo voluntas, quae a gratia liberatur et adiuvatur, haec est, in qua habet consistere peccatum; videtur, quod eadem sit potentia voluntatis, qua homo naturaliter vult bonum, et qua aliquando vult malum. — Si tu dicas, quod eadem est voluntas, tamen disposita diversis habitibus, et secundum illorum habituum diversitatem potest habere diversos motus; obiicitur contra hoc, quod[^10] illa potentia est unica et simplex: ergo quando convertit se ad actum unius habitus, non potest se convertere simul et semel ad actum alterius habitus, et ita non movetur simul et semel bene et male. Non ergo semper vult bonum. — Quodsi hoc concedatur, est ratio in contrarium, quod nulla virtus destituitur sua naturali et propria operatione[^11], et maxime virtus naturalis, cuius est moveri uniformiter. Ergo videtur, quod actus voluntatis naturalis, qui est appetere bonum, simul stet cum actu voluntatis deliberativae, qui est velle malum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Magister in littera[^12], duo sunt hic modi dicendi. — *Solutio 1.* Quidam enim dicunt, quod actus, quo voluntas naturaliter vult bonum, non est diversus vel distinctus ab eo quo voluntas vult deliberative malum; sed sicut malo culpae in actu exteriori substernitur bonum naturae, unde unus et idem actus est bonus bonitate naturae, et malus malitia moris[^13]; sic dicunt intelligi et in voluntate, quod voluntas naturaliter vult bonum, in quantum vult actum substratum; vult nihilominus malum, in quantum illum actum deformat. — *Non probatur.* Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quoniam, cum Ambrosius[^14] dicit, quod homo vult naturaliter bonum, non intelligit de bono naturae tantum, quod quidem est actus voluntatis, sed etiam moris. Vult enim iustitiam et odit iniustitiam naturali voluntate.

*Solutio 2.* Et propterea est alius modus dicendi, quem Magister primo ponit in littera, quod duo sunt motus: et alius est motus, quo voluntas appetit naturaliter bonum, et alius, quo voluntas deliberative vult malum. — *Quaestio connexa.* Utrum autem possint esse simul, hoc Magister non determinat. Et circa hoc duplex est opinio doctorum. *Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dicunt, quod possunt esse simul, pro eo quod actus deliberativus non excludit actum naturalem, et unus istorum actuum est voluntatis, ut movetur naturaliter, et alter, ut movetur deliberative. — *Opponitur.* Sed quoniam voluntas naturalis et deliberativa, secundum quod<!-- page 917 -->ostensum fuit[^15], una est potentia, et eadem potentia, quando plene movetur in bonum vel in malum, non potest simul et semel moveri motu opposito et etiam disparato propter simplicitatem potentiae: *Opinio 2.* ideo dixerunt alii, quod motus voluntatis naturalis non est semper actualiter in bonum. Et quod dicit Magister in littera, quod semper vult bonum, hoc intelligitur habitualiter[^16]; impeditur autem et suffocatur per malitiam voluntatis deliberativae, ut non exeat in actum; sicut est in damnatis, in quibus synderesis non instigat ad aliquod bonum et iustum. — *Indicium auctoris.* Quidquid autem sit de hoc, utrum simul possit esse motus voluntatis, ut est natura, cum motu voluntatis, ut est deliberativa; hoc tamen verum est, quod voluntas naturalis, quae bonum appetit, non est semper in suo actu, quia non semper cogitat de bono; et cum etiam cogitat, frequenter nullo modo afficitur; et ideo littera illa exponenda est[^17], quod hoc quod dico *semper* dicat continuitatem quantum ad *habitum* volendi, non quantum ad *actum.* — Et quod obiicit, quod virtus non privatur propria operatione; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de operatione substantiali, quae respicit esse rei; de operatione vero consequenti, quae est respectu alicuius extrinseci, non semper habet veritatem, quod non privetur actione. Fere enim omnes virtutes videmus in suis actibus recipere interpolationem; nec tamen ex hoc dicimus, eas esse otiosas, vel propria operatione privari, dum in actus proprios sunt natae exire pro loco et tempore[^18].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ante gratiam licet homo naturaliter velit bonum, non tamen oportet concedi, habere bonam voluntatem.* Et videtur, quod immo, quia veriori[^19] modo inest alicui quod inest ei naturaliter, quam quod inest accidentaliter: ergo sicut sequitur, si deliberative vult bonum, quod habeat bonam voluntatem, ita sequitur, quodsi naturaliter vult bonum, quod habeat bonam voluntatem. — Item, « quod naturale est non assuescit in contrarium[^20] »: ergo si homo naturaliter vult bonum, nunquam assuescit velle malum: falsum ergo dicit, cum ait, quod homo naturaliter velit bonum; aut si dicit verum, videtur, quod per hoc, quod homo naturaliter vult bonum, quod sit simpliciter bonus.

**Respondeo:** *Notandum.* Dicendum, quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali et consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nec est voluntas simpliciter bona et recta, nisi sit recta, in quantum movetur deliberative, et in quantum movetur naturaliter. Et ideo sicut illud argumentum non valet, immo est ibi *quid* et *simpliciter*[^21]: iste est castus naturaliter, ergo est castus; ita illud non sequitur: iste vult bonum naturaliter, ergo habet bonam voluntatem.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veriori modo inest quod inest naturaliter etc.; dicendum, quod ista comparatio veritatem habet, quando illud quod inest accidentaliter, non praesupponit illud quod inest naturaliter; cum autem praesupponit, tunc non habet veritatem. Sicut enim « melius est bene vivere quam vivere[^22] », et bene vivere praesupponit vivere; sic melior est voluntas, quae recte movetur et naturaliter et deliberative, quam naturaliter tantum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod naturale non assuescit in contrarium; dicendum, quod illud verum est de eo quod simpliciter est naturale, videlicet de eo quod a natura inchoatur et consummatur; sed hoc non est verum in eo quod inchoatur a natura et consummatur ab assuetudine, vel etiam a gratia; et tale est velle bonum. — Et per hoc patent quae dicuntur in littera in hac parte.

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says, that *to will evil is evil, but to understand evil is not evil.* It is asked whence this is so. And it seems that it is the same in the act of understanding and in the act of willing. For the act receives its denomination from its object[^1]: therefore just as to will evil is evil, so also is to understand it. — Likewise, to understand denotes a motion from things to the soul, and to will denotes a motion from the soul to things[^2]: therefore it seems that the act of understanding depends more upon the thing understood than the act of willing upon the thing willed: therefore if malice is from the thing willed and understood, the act of understanding ought rather to be depraved than the act of willing.

**I respond:** It must be said that by a malice existing in the object the act of willing is more depraved than the act of understanding. — And the reason for this is taken in two ways: *First reason.* both on the part of the power[^3], because so great is the force of love that it transforms the lover into the beloved; whence he who loves justice becomes just, and he who loves iniquity becomes iniquitous; and on this account it is said of the wicked, that *they became abominable, like the things which they loved*[^4]. It is not so with the act of understanding; for although it conforms in some manner, yet it does not transform. And this comes about on account of the greater force of union, which consists in love itself; for as Dionysius says[^5]: « We call love a unitive force »; on this account it is said in First Corinthians, chapter six: *He who cleaves to God becomes one spirit.* — *Second reason.* The other reason is on the part of the object. For the good, insofar as it is good, is the object of the affection, not of the intellect. But the object of the intelligence and the memory is the true under the aspect of the true, or the good under the aspect of the true; and hence it is that the intellect, when it understands the false, is false; yet not, when it understands the good, is it good[^6]. But the affection is not said to be false because it wills the false, although it is said to be evil because it wills evil, or good when it wills the good; for a power takes its denomination from its proper object.

And by this the response to both objections is clear. But this will appear better below in the forty-first distinction[^7], where the Master inquires whether all sin has its being from the will.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the higher spark of reason always wills the good and always hates evil.* But on the contrary: it is impossible for the will to be moved at one and the same time by contrary, or even disparate, motions[^8]; but man sometimes wills evil; therefore it does not seem that at that hour he wills the good: he therefore says something false, when he asserts that that spark always wills the good. If you say that the natural and the deliberative will are diverse powers, and so can be moved at once by diverse motions; *on the contrary:* it is held in the preceding text and also in the following[^9], that the will which wills the good, when grace comes, is freed and helped. If therefore the will which is freed and helped by grace is the one in which sin must consist; it seems that it is the same power of the will, by which man naturally wills the good, and by which he sometimes wills evil. — If you say that it is the same will, yet disposed by diverse habits, and according to the diversity of those habits can have diverse motions; it is objected against this, that[^10] that power is one and simple: therefore when it turns itself to the act of one habit, it cannot turn itself at one and the same time to the act of another habit, and so it is not moved at one and the same time both well and ill. Therefore it does not always will the good. — But if this be granted, there is a reason to the contrary, that no virtue is deprived of its natural and proper operation[^11], and especially a natural virtue, whose nature it is to be moved uniformly. Therefore it seems that the act of the natural will, which is to seek the good, stands together with the act of the deliberative will, which is to will evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^12], there are here two ways of speaking. — *First solution.* For some say that the act by which the will naturally wills the good is not diverse or distinct from that by which the will wills evil deliberatively; but just as to the evil of fault in the exterior act there is subjected the good of nature, whence one and the same act is good by the goodness of nature, and evil by the malice of morals[^13]; so they say it is to be understood also in the will, that the will naturally wills the good, insofar as it wills the underlying act; it nonetheless wills evil, insofar as it deforms that act. — *It is not proven.* But it does not suffice to say this, because, when Ambrose[^14] says that man naturally wills the good, he does not understand it of the good of nature only, which indeed is an act of the will, but also of morals. For he wills justice and hates injustice by a natural willing.

*Second solution.* And therefore there is another way of speaking, which the Master first sets down in the text, that there are two motions: and one is the motion by which the will naturally seeks the good, and another by which the will deliberatively wills evil. — *Connected question.* But whether they can be at once, the Master does not determine. And concerning this there is a twofold opinion of the doctors. *First opinion.* For some say that they can be at once, on the ground that the deliberative act does not exclude the natural act, and one of these acts belongs to the will as it is moved naturally, and the other as it is moved deliberatively. — *It is objected.* But since the natural and the deliberative will, according as<!-- page 917 -->it has been shown[^15], is one power, and the same power, when it is fully moved toward the good or toward evil, cannot be moved at one and the same time by an opposite and even disparate motion on account of the simplicity of the power: *Second opinion.* therefore others have said that the motion of the natural will is not always actually toward the good. And as for what the Master says in the text, that it always wills the good, this is understood habitually[^16]; but it is impeded and suffocated by the malice of the deliberative will, so that it does not go forth into act; as is the case in the damned, in whom the synderesis does not instigate toward any good and just thing. — *The author's judgment.* But whatever may be the case about this, whether the motion of the will as it is nature can be at once with the motion of the will as it is deliberative; this nevertheless is true, that the natural will, which seeks the good, is not always in its act, because it does not always think about the good; and even when it thinks, it is frequently in no way affected; and therefore that text is to be expounded[^17] thus, that this which I say *always* denotes a continuity as to the *habit* of willing, not as to the *act.* — And as to what is objected, that a virtue is not deprived of its proper operation; it must be said that this is understood of the substantial operation, which regards the being of the thing; but of the consequent operation, which is in respect of something extrinsic, it is not always true that it is not deprived of action. For we see almost all the virtues receive interruption in their acts; nor yet on this account do we say that they are idle, or deprived of their proper operation, since they are by nature apt to go forth into their proper acts in their place and time[^18].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Before grace, although man naturally wills the good, yet it need not be granted that he has a good will.* And it seems that on the contrary he does, because what belongs to someone naturally belongs to him in a truer manner[^19] than what belongs accidentally: therefore just as it follows, if he deliberatively wills the good, that he has a good will, so it follows that if he naturally wills the good, he has a good will. — Likewise, « what is natural is not accustomed to the contrary[^20] »: therefore if man naturally wills the good, he is never accustomed to will evil: he therefore says something false, when he asserts that man naturally wills the good; or if he speaks truly, it seems that, through this, that man naturally wills the good, he is simply good.

**I respond:** *To be noted.* It must be said that the goodness of the will is begun in the natural appetite and consummated in the deliberative virtue; nor is the will simply good and right, unless it is right insofar as it is moved deliberatively, and insofar as it is moved naturally. And therefore just as that argument is not valid, but rather there is in it a *qualified* and a *simple*[^21]: this man is chaste naturally, therefore he is chaste; so this does not follow: this man wills the good naturally, therefore he has a good will.

To that which is objected, that what belongs naturally belongs in a truer manner, etc.; it must be said that this comparison holds true when that which belongs accidentally does not presuppose that which belongs naturally; but when it does presuppose it, then it does not hold true. For as « it is better to live well than to live[^22] », and to live well presupposes to live; so better is the will which is rightly moved both naturally and deliberatively, than naturally only.

To that which is objected, that what is natural is not accustomed to the contrary; it must be said that this is true of that which is simply natural, namely of that which is begun and consummated by nature; but this is not true in that which is begun by nature and consummated by custom, or even by grace; and such is to will the good. — And by this are made clear the things which are said in the text on this point.

---

en: Distinction 41, art. 2, q. 3.

la: Vat. *actibus.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *actibus.*

la: Codd. C F K L O R S T V Y ee et alii nec non edd. 1, 2 *quod.* Paulo superius post *Error* edd., excepta 1, omittunt *autem.* Aliquanto inferius verbo *instigando* codd. C L R S cc etc. atque ed. 1 praemittunt *in.*

en: Codices C F K L O R S T V Y ee and others, as well as editions 1, 2, read *quod.* A little above, after *Error*, the editions, except 1, omit *autem.* Somewhat below, before the word *instigando*, codices C L R S cc etc. and edition 1 prefix *in.*

la: Ut ostensum est supra a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *ut est* codd. C K O P Q R S T W ee *et est*, cod. L (Q a secunda manu) *et ut est*, cod. bb et ed. 1 *prout est.*

en: As was shown above, art. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for *ut est*, codices C K O P Q R S T W ee read *et est*, codex L (Q in a second hand) *et ut est*, codex bb and edition 1 *prout est.*

en: Cf. III Sentences, d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 and following.

la: Plures codd. nec non edd., excepta 1, *possit.*

en: Several codices, as well as the editions, except 1, read *possit.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. — Vide scholion ad 1. quaest. huius articuli.

en: Cf. below, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2. — See the scholion on the first question of this article.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 561, note 3.

la: De hoc duplici motu vide tom. I. pag. 562, nota 10. — Paulo inferius post *debet* cod. A interiicit *dici.*

en: Concerning this twofold motion see vol. I, p. 562, note 10. — A little below, after *debet*, codex A inserts *dici.*

la: Codd. X Y bb addunt *tum ex parte obiecti. Ex parte virtutis.* — De hac ratione cfr. supra pag. 4, nota 8. et pag. 124, nota 4.

en: Codices X Y bb add *tum ex parte obiecti. Ex parte virtutis.* — On this reason cf. above, p. 4, note 8, and p. 124, note 4.

la: Osee 9, 10. — Subinde post *Non sic* cod. A inserit *autem.*

en: Hosea 9, 10. — Then after *Non sic* codex A inserts *autem.*

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 17: Qui autem adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est.

en: On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 15. — The following text is from the same place, v. 17: But he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit.

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, text 8 (V, c. 4).

la: Cap. 3. Ibid. in Comment. a. 2. — Plurimi codd. et edd. signant *dist. 40.* — Solutionem huius dubii exhibent etiam B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Chapter 3. Ibid. in the Commentary, a. 2. — Very many codices and editions mark *dist. 40.* — A solution of this doubt is also given by Bl. Albert, here a. 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Vide supra pag. 445, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 445, note 6.

la: Hic c. 3. — De divisione voluntatis in *naturalem* et *deliberativam* vide supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Here c. 3. — On the division of the will into *natural* and *deliberative* see above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Edd. cum compluribus codd. *quia.* — Paulo inferius pro *non movetur* codd. F H I K W *non movebitur.*

en: The editions with very many codices read *quia.* — A little below, for *non movetur*, codices F H I K W read *non movebitur.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5. — Quod virtus naturalis moveatur uniformiter, vide supra pag. 153, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, p. 197, note 5. — That a natural virtue is moved uniformly, see above, p. 153, note 5.

la: Cod. bb hic et infra in solut. *quia non minori.*

en: Codex bb here and below in the solution reads *quia non minori.*

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1: Nihil enim ex iis quae natura fiunt (τῶν φύσει ὄντων), assuescere aliter potest (ἄλλως ἐθίζεται). — Paulo inferius post *velle malum* cod. cc et ed. 1 bene supplent *sed assuescit velle malum.* Subinde edd., excepta 1, omittunt *cum ait* et pro *si dicit verum* substituunt *si verum est.*

en: Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1: For nothing of the things which come about by nature (things existing by nature) can be habituated otherwise (be accustomed otherwise). — A little below, after *velle malum*, codex cc and edition 1 rightly supply *sed assuescit velle malum.* Then the editions, except 1, omit *cum ait* and for *si dicit verum* substitute *si verum est.*

la: De hac fallacia vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Pro *quid* codd. A V X *secundum quid*, ed. 1 *fallacia secundum quid.* Mox pro *ita illud non sequitur* edd. excepta 1, *ita illud quod sequitur.*

en: On this fallacy see Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 5). — For *quid* codices A V X read *secundum quid*, edition 1 *fallacia secundum quid.* Then for *ita illud non sequitur* the editions, except 1, read *ita illud quod sequitur.*

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2: Melius enim quam vivere bene vivere; bene autem vivere est ex circumstantia, ipsum autem vivere est necessarium. — Mox pro *et bene vivere* codd. F cc et ed. 1 *quia bene vivere.* Paulo inferius post *quam* cod. O repetit *quae.* — Cod. F adiungit *est.*

en: Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2: For to live well is better than to live; but to live well is from circumstance, whereas to live itself is necessary. — Then for *et bene vivere* codices F cc and edition 1 read *quia bene vivere.* A little below, after *quam*, codex O repeats *quae.* — Codex F adds *est.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 p.915 R-col onset through p.917 R-col), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 63691–63778. Dub. III closes at *…in littera in hac parte* (p.917 R, mid-column); the immediately following `DISTINCTIO XL. CAP. UNICUM. An ex fine omnes actus pensari debeant…` opens d.40 and is excluded. This is the **final unit of d.39** — d.39 is now fully Tier-2.

**Dubia count & topics.** 3 dubia (quaestiunculae circa litteram):
- **Dub. I** — why willing evil is evil but understanding evil is not; the act of willing is more depraved by malice in the object than the act of understanding (*ratio* on the part of the power, *ratio* on the part of the object).
- **Dub. II** — whether the higher spark of reason (synderesis) always wills the good; two *solutiones*, then two *opiniones* on whether the natural and deliberative motions can coexist; the author's judgment: *semper* = continuity of habit, not of act.
- **Dub. III** — whether man naturally willing the good has a good will before grace; the goodness of the will is begun in natural appetite, consummated in deliberative virtue; the *quid/simpliciter* fallacy.

**Page-split map (Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page).** Sequential `[^1]`–`[^22]` map to the printed per-page footers as follows:
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- **p.916** footers 1–12 → `[^10]`–`[^21]`.
- **p.917** footers 1–9 → `[^15]`–`[^22]` (footer 8 carries the trailing *Cod. F adiungit est* = footer 9, folded into `[^22]`). p.917 footer 10 (*Cfr. de hoc dubio Petr. a Tar. … hic dub. lit. 3*) is a bare bibliographic cross-reference for Dub. III with no distinct body anchor; it is folded into the body's closing *in hac parte* and recorded here rather than given a separate marker. The p.917 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footer (*Refragantibus codd…*) belongs to **d.40**, not this chunk.

**Hand-off picked up.** p.915 R-col footers 5–9 (forwarded from d39-a2-q3) confirmed verbatim against the p.915 R-col footer band and incorporated as `[^5]`–`[^9]`: 5 = *Cfr. III. Sent. d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.*; 6 = *Plures codd. … possit*; 7 = *Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. — Vide scholion ad 1. quaest.*; 8 = *Cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 3*; 9 = *De hoc duplici motu … tom. I pag. 562, nota 10*.

**Hand-off forwarded.** None — Dub. III ends mid-column on p.917 but the remaining p.917 text/footers belong to d.40; nothing of this dubia's apparatus carries forward.

**[?] flags.** None. All 22 footers read cleanly from the 450 dpi footer bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 40

title_alt: Distinctio XL — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XL — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XL.

### Cap. Unicum. *An ex fine omnes actus pensari debeant, ut ex affectu vel fine omnes sint boni, vel mali.*

Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur, utrum et ipsi ex fine, sicut voluntas, pensari debeant boni, vel mali. Licet enim, secundum quosdam, omnes boni sint, in quantum[^1] sunt; non tamen absolute dicendi sunt omnes boni, nec omnes remunerabiles, sed quidam simpliciter mali dicuntur, sicut et alii boni. Nam simpliciter ac vere boni sunt illi actus, qui bonam habent causam et intentionem, id est, qui voluntatem bonam comitantur et ad bonum finem tendunt. Mali

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vero simpliciter dici debent qui perversam habent causam et intentionem. Unde Ambrosius[^2] ait: «Affectus tuus operi tuo nomen imponit». Et Augustinus super Psalmum trigesimum primum: «Nemo computet bona opera sua ante fidem. Ita enim mihi videntur esse ut magnae vires et cursus celerrimus praeter viam; quia ubi fides non erat, bonum opus non erat. Bonum enim opus intentio facit, intentionem fides dirigit. Non valde attendas, quid homo faciat, sed quid, cum facit, attendat, quo lacertos optimae gubernationis dirigat». — His testimoniis insinuari videtur, ex affectu et fine opera bona esse, vel mala. Quibus consonat quod Veritas in Evangelio[^3] ait: *Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere.* Nomine arboris non natura humanae mentis, sed voluntas intelligitur, quae si mala fuerit, non bona, sed mala opera facit; si vero bona fuerit, bona, non mala opera facit.

Sed quaeritur, utrum omnia opera hominis ex *affectu* et *fine* sint bona, vel mala. — Quibusdam[^4] ita videtur esse, qui dicunt, omnes actus esse indifferentes, ut nec boni nec mali *per se* sint, sed ex intentione bona bonus, et ex *mala* malus sit omnis actus. Secundum quos quilibet actus potest esse bonus, si bona intentione geratur. — Aliis autem videtur, quod quidam actus *in se* mali sint, ita ut non possint esse nisi peccata, etiam si bonam habeant *causam*; et quidam *in se* boni, ita ut, etsi malam habeant *causam*, non tamen boni esse desinant. Quod testimonio Augustini[^5] confirmant, qui dicit, bonum aliquando non bene fieri: «Quod enim quis invitus vel necessitate facit non bene facit», quia non bona facit intentione, ut ait Augustinus super Ioannem. «Servilis, inquit, timor non est in caritate, in quo quamvis credatur Deo, non tamen *in Deum*, etsi fiat bonum, non tamen bene». «Nemo enim invitus bene facit, etiamsi bonum est quod facit». — Ecce habes, quod aliquis non bene facit illud quod bonum est; facit ergo quod bonum est intentione non bona. Ideo asserunt illi, quaedam opera esse talia, quae sic bona sunt, quod mala esse non possunt, quocumque modo fiant, sicut e converso quaedam sic sunt mala, ut non possint esse bona, quacumque ex causa fiant; alia autem esse opera, quae ex *fine* vel ex *causa* bona sunt, vel mala; et ad illa referunt Sanctorum testimonia, quibus vel affectu, vel intentione iudicium operum pensari dicunt: tripartitam edunt isti differentiam actuum.

Sed Augustinus evidentissime docet in libro contra Mendacium[^6], omnes actus secundum *intentionem* et *causam* iudicandos bonos, vel malos, praeter quosdam, qui ita sunt mali, ut nunquam possint esse boni, etiam si bonam videantur habere *causam*. «Interest, inquit, plurimum, qua causa, quo fine, qua intentione quid fiat. Sed ea quae constat esse *peccata*, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. Ea quippe opera hominum, si causas habuerint[^7] bonas, vel malas, nunc sunt bona, nunc mala, *quae non sunt per se ipsa peccata*, sicut victum praebere pauperibus bonum est, si fit causa misericordiae cum recta fide; et concubitus coniugalis, quando fit causa generandi, si ea fide fiat, ut gignantur regenerandi. Haec rursus mala sunt, si malas habent causas, velut si iactantiae causa pascitur pauper, aut lasciviae causa cum uxore concumbitur, aut filii generantur, non ut Deo, sed ut diabolo nutriantur. Cum vero opera ipsa[^8] *peccata* sunt, ut furta, stupra, blasphemiae, quis dicat, causis bonis esse facienda, vel peccata non esse, vel, quod est absurdius, iusta peccata esse? Quis dicat: furemur divitibus, ut habeamus quid demus pauperibus, aut falsa testimonia proferamus, non ut inde innocentes laedantur, sed potius salventur? Duo enim bona hic sunt: ut inops alatur, et innocens non puniatur. Aut quis dicat, adulterium esse faciendum, ut per illam, cum qua fit, homo de morte liberetur? Testamenta etiam vera cur non supprimimus et falsa supponimus, ne hereditates habeant qui nihil boni agunt, sed hi potius qui indigentes adiuvant? Cur non fiant illa mala propter haec bona, si propter haec bona nec illa sunt mala?» «Cur non ab immundis meretricibus, quae ditant stupratores, rapiat divitias vir bonus, ut indigentibus eas largiatur, cum nullum malum malum sit, si pro bono fiat[^9]»? «Quis hoc dicat, nisi qui res humanas moresque conatur et leges subvertere? Quod enim facinus non dicatur recte fieri posse, nec impune tantum, verum etiam gloriose, ut in eo non timeatur supplicium, sed speretur et praemium, si semel concesserimus[^10], in malis actibus non quid fiat, sed quare fiat, esse quaerendum, ut quaecumque pro bonis fiunt causis, nec ipsa mala esse iudicentur? At iustitia merito punit eum qui dicit, se subtraxisse superflua diviti, ut praeberet pauperi; et falsarium, qui alienum corrumpit testamentum, ut is esset heres, qui faceret eleemosynas largas, non ille qui nullas; et eum qui se fecisse adulterium ostendit, ut per illam, cum qua fecit, hominem de morte liberaret». — Sed «dicet aliquis: ergo aequandus est fur quilibet furi, qui voluntate misericordiae furatur. Quis hoc dixerit? Sed horum duorum non ideo quisquam est bonus, quia peior est unus. Peior enim est qui concupiscendo, quam qui miserando furatur. Sed si furtum omne peccatum est, ab omni furto abstinendum est. Quis enim dicat, esse peccandum, etiamsi aliud sit gravius, aliud levius peccatum? Nunc autem quaerimus, quis actus peccatum sit, vel non; non, quid gravius sit, vel levius». — In-

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tende, lector, propositis verbis tota mentis consideratione, quae non inutilem habent exercitationem; et dignosces, quis actus sit peccatum, qui scilicet malam habet causam; nec ille tantum, quia sunt nonnulli actus, qui, etsi bonam habeant causam, tamen peccata sunt, ut supra positum est. — Ex quo consequi videtur, quia non semper ex fine iudicatur voluntas sive actio mala, sicut in illis quae per se peccata sunt. Illa enim cum quis gesserit pro aliqua bona causa, bonum videtur habere finem; nec ex fine voluntas est mala, nec ex voluntate actio fit mala, sed ex *actione* voluntas fit prava. In quibus aliqui ponunt actum Iudaeorum, qui crucifigendo Christum arbitrabantur, *se obsequium praestare Deo*[^11]; quia bonum finem dicunt eos sibi posuisse, scilicet Dei obsequium, et tamen voluntatem eorum et actionem perversam fore asserunt. — De *bonis* autem nulla fit exceptio in praemissis verbis Augustini, quin omnis voluntas bona ex fine sit bona, et ex fine et voluntate omnis actio bona, bona est. Sed non omnis *mala* voluntas ex fine mala est, nec omnis *mala actio* ex fine et voluntate mala est, et omnis quae habet malam causam, mala est, sed non omnis quae bonam habet causam, bona est. Ideoque cum ex affectu dicitur nomen imponi operi, in *bonis* operibus generaliter vera est haec regula, sed in *malis* excipiuntur illa quae per se mala sunt. — Omnia igitur hominis opera secundum intentionem et causam iudicantur bona, vel mala, exceptis his, quae per se mala sunt, id est, quae sine praevaricatione fieri nequeunt.

Quae tamen quidam contendunt nunquam habere bonam causam. Qui enim aliena furatur, ut pauperibus tribuat, non pro bono, ut aiunt, furatur. Non enim bonum est aliena pauperibus dare[^12]. Qui enim de rapina sacrificium Deo offert, ut ait auctoritas, idem facit, ac si filium in conspectu patris victimet, vel sacrificium canis Deo offerat. Abominabilis nempe Deo est impiorum oblatio. Ita etiam et hominem per adulterium a morte liberare malum esse dicunt. Etsi enim bonum sit hominem a morte liberare, tamen sic liberare malum esse asserunt. Ideoque Augustinus in superioribus dicunt temperasse sermonem cauteque locutum, ubi ait: Ea quae constat esse peccata, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda. Non enim simpliciter dixit bono fine et bona intentione, sed addidit, quasi et velut; quia talia non fiunt bono fine et bona intentione, sed *intentione*, quae videtur bona, et fine, qui putatur bonus, sed non est. Nec ideo excepit[^13] Augustinus ista, ut aiunt, quin causas habeant malas, sed quia causas habent, quae *videntur* bonae, sunt tamen malae.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XL.

### Sole Chapter. *Whether all acts ought to be weighed from their end, so that from affection or end all are good, or evil.*

After these things, it seems that, concerning acts, it must be added whether they too, like the will, ought to be weighed as good, or evil, from their end. For although, according to some, all are good insofar as[^1] they are, nevertheless not all are to be called good absolutely, nor are all rewardable, but some are called simply evil, just as others are good. For simply and truly good are those acts which have a good cause and intention, that is, which accompany a good will and tend toward a good end. But the evil

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ought simply to be called those which have a perverse cause and intention. Hence Ambrose[^2] says: «Your affection imposes a name upon your work». And Augustine on the thirty-first Psalm: «Let no one reckon his good works before faith. For they seem to me to be like great strength and a most swift running off the road; because where there was no faith, there was no good work. For intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention. Attend not greatly to what a man does, but to what, when he does it, he aims at — toward what end he directs the sinews of his best governance». — By these testimonies it seems to be implied that works are good, or evil, from affection and end. With these agrees what the Truth says in the Gospel[^3]: *A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruits, nor a bad tree bring forth good fruits.* By the name of tree is understood not the nature of the human mind, but the will, which, if it be evil, does not good but evil works; but if it be good, does good, not evil works.

But it is asked whether all the works of man are good, or evil, from *affection* and *end*. — To some[^4] it seems to be so, who say that all acts are indifferent, so that they are neither good nor evil *of themselves*, but every act is good from a good intention and evil from an *evil* one. According to whom any act can be good, if it be carried out with a good intention. — But to others it seems that certain acts are *of themselves* evil, so that they cannot be anything but sins, even if they have a good *cause*; and certain ones *of themselves* good, so that, even if they have an evil *cause*, they nevertheless do not cease to be good. Which they confirm by the testimony of Augustine[^5], who says that a good thing is sometimes not done well: «For what one does unwillingly or by necessity he does not do well», because he does not do it with a good intention, as Augustine says on John. «Servile fear, he says, is not in charity, in which, although one believe God, nevertheless [he believes] not *unto God*; even if a good thing be done, nevertheless it is not done well». «For no one does well unwillingly, even though what he does is good». — Behold, you have it, that someone does not do well that which is good; he does therefore what is good with an intention that is not good. Therefore those men assert that certain works are such that they are good in such a way that they cannot be evil, in whatever manner they be done; just as, conversely, certain ones are evil in such a way that they cannot be good, from whatever cause they be done; but that other works are good, or evil, from their *end* or from their *cause*; and to these they refer the testimonies of the Saints, by which they say the judgment of works is weighed either by affection or by intention: these men set forth a threefold difference of acts.

But Augustine teaches most evidently in the book against Lying[^6] that all acts are to be judged good, or evil, according to *intention* and *cause*, except certain ones which are so evil that they can never be good, even if they seem to have a good *cause*. «It matters very much, he says, from what cause, with what end, with what intention a thing be done. But those which are agreed to be *sins* are by no means to be done under the pretext of any good cause, with any as-it-were good end, with any seemingly good intention. For those works of men, if they have had[^7] good causes, or evil ones, are now good, now evil, *which are not in themselves sins*, just as to provide sustenance to the poor is good, if it be done for the cause of mercy with right faith; and conjugal intercourse, when it is done for the cause of begetting, if it be done with that faith, that those to be regenerated may be begotten. These again are evil, if they have evil causes, as if a poor man be fed for the cause of vainglory, or for the cause of lasciviousness one lies with one's wife, or children are begotten not that they may be nourished for God, but for the devil. But when the works themselves[^8] are *sins*, such as thefts, fornications, blasphemies, who would say that they are to be done from good causes, or that they are not sins, or — what is more absurd — that they are just sins? Who would say: let us steal from the rich, that we may have what to give to the poor, or let us bring forth false testimonies, not that the innocent may thereby be harmed, but rather be saved? For here there are two goods: that the needy be fed, and that the innocent be not punished. Or who would say that adultery is to be committed, that through her with whom it is done a man may be freed from death? Why do we not also suppress true wills and substitute false ones, lest those who do nothing good should have inheritances, but rather those who help the needy? Why should not those evils be done for the sake of these goods, if for the sake of these goods those are not even evil?» «Why should not a good man seize riches from the unclean harlots who enrich fornicators, that he may bestow them on the needy, since no evil would be evil, if it were done for a good end[^9]»? «Who would say this, but one who endeavors to subvert human affairs and morals and laws? For what crime would not be said to be able to be done rightly — not only with impunity, but even gloriously, so that in it punishment is not feared, but even reward is hoped for — if once we have conceded[^10] that in evil acts it is not what is done, but why it is done, that must be inquired, so that whatever things are done for good causes should not themselves be judged evil? But justice deservedly punishes the man who says that he took away superfluities from the rich, that he might furnish them to the poor; and the forger, who corrupts another's will, that he might be heir who would make large almsgivings, not he who would make none; and the man who shows that he committed adultery, that through her with whom he committed it he might free a man from death». — But «someone will say: therefore any thief is to be equated with the thief who steals from a will of mercy. Who would say this? But of these two, no one is good for the reason that one is worse. For worse is he who steals from covetousness than he who steals from compassion. But if all theft is a sin, one must abstain from all theft. For who would say that one must sin, even though one sin be graver, another lighter? But now we are inquiring which act is a sin, or not; not, which is graver, or lighter». — At-

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tend, reader, with the whole consideration of your mind to the words set forth, which have no useless exercise; and you will distinguish which act is a sin, namely that which has an evil cause; and not only that one, because there are some acts which, even if they have a good cause, are nevertheless sins, as was set down above. — From which it seems to follow that the will or action is not always judged evil from its end, as in those which are sins in themselves. For those, when one has done them for some good cause, seem to have a good end; nor is the will evil from its end, nor does the action become evil from the will, but from the *action* the will becomes depraved. Among these some place the act of the Jews, who in crucifying Christ thought *that they were rendering service to God*[^11]; because they say that these set for themselves a good end, namely the service of God, and yet they assert that their will and action were perverse. — But concerning *good things* no exception is made in the foregoing words of Augustine, but that every good will is good from its end, and from end and will every good action is good. But not every *evil* will is evil from its end, nor is every *evil action* evil from end and will; and every one which has an evil cause is evil, but not every one which has a good cause is good. And therefore, when it is said that the name is imposed on the work from affection, in *good* works this rule is generally true, but in *evil* ones those are excepted which are evil in themselves. — All the works of man, therefore, are judged good, or evil, according to intention and cause, excepting those which are evil in themselves, that is, which cannot be done without transgression.

Yet certain ones contend that these never have a good cause. For he who steals what is another's, that he may distribute to the poor, does not, as they say, steal for a good end. For it is not good to give to the poor what belongs to another[^12]. For he who offers to God a sacrifice from plunder, as the authority says, does the same as if he were to immolate a son in the sight of his father, or were to offer to God the sacrifice of a dog. For the oblation of the impious is abominable to God. So too they say that to free a man from death through adultery is evil. For although it be good to free a man from death, nevertheless to free him thus they assert to be evil. And therefore they say that Augustine in the foregoing tempered his speech and spoke cautiously, where he says: Those which are agreed to be sins are to be done with no as-it-were good end, with no seemingly good intention. For he did not say simply with a good end and a good intention, but added, *as-it-were* and *seemingly*; because such things are not done with a good end and a good intention, but with an *intention* which seems good, and with an end which is thought good, but is not. Nor did Augustine therefore except[^13] these, as they say, in such a way that they do not have evil causes, but because they have causes which *seem* good, yet are evil.

---

la: Refragantibus codd. et ed. 1, in aliis edd. additur *naturaliter*.

en: Against the codices and edition 1, in the other editions *naturaliter* ["naturally"] is added.

la: Libr. I. de Officiis, c. 30. n. 147. Locus August. est II. Enarrat., serm. ad plebem n. 4. Contra originale et edd. 1, 8 post *quia ubi* in Vat. aliisque edd. additur *ipsa*.

en: Book I *On Duties*, c. 30, n. 147. The passage of Augustine is *Enarrationes* II, sermon to the people, n. 4. Against the original and editions 1, 8, after *quia ubi* in the Vatican and other editions *ipsa* is added.

la: Matth. 7, 18. Cfr. Glossa ibid., et August., Enchirid. c. 15. n. 4.

en: Matthew 7:18. Cf. the *Gloss* on the same place, and Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 15, n. 4.

la: Cfr. Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 4.

en: Cf. Hugh, *On the Sacraments* I, part VI, c. 4.

la: Libr. 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19; de Spiritu et lit. c. 14. n. 26. Seq. locus est Tract. 41. super Ioan. n. 10, sed tantum sententialiter; tertius locus est 1. Confess. c. 12. n. 19.

en: *Confessions* I, c. 12, n. 19; *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 14, n. 26. The following passage is Tract. 41 on John, n. 10, but only as to the sense; the third passage is *Confessions* I, c. 12, n. 19.

en: Chapter 7, n. 18.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *habeant*, et paulo superius sola Vat. cum originali *sicut* pro *si*; denique inferius ante *mala* codd. ADE repetunt *sunt*.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *habeant*, and a little above only the Vatican edition with the original reads *sicut* for *si*; finally below, before *mala*, the codices ADE repeat *sunt*.

la: Edd. addunt *per se*, contra codd. et originale. Infra post *proferamus*, *non* pro *ut inde* codd. et ed. 5 *unde*. Denique Vat. ante *salventur* addit *nocentes*.

en: The editions add *per se*, against the codices and the original. Below, after *proferamus*, for *non*... *ut inde* the codices and edition 5 read *unde*. Finally the Vatican edition adds *nocentes* before *salventur*.

la: Ibid. paulo inferius, sicut et seq. locus et tertius, quartus est ibid. c. 8. n. 19.

en: Ibid. a little below, as also the following passage; and the third and fourth are ibid. c. 8, n. 19.

la: Ita codd., ed. 6 et originale, in aliis *consenserimus*.

en: So the codices, edition 6, and the original; in the others *consenserimus*.

la: Vat. *erogare*, refragantibus codd. BCD et edd. 1, 8. — In sequentibus respicitur Eccli. 34, 24, Isai. 66, 3 (in quo textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. falso habet *carnis* pro *canis*) et Prov. 21, 27.

en: The Vatican edition reads *erogare*, against the codices BCD and editions 1, 8. — In what follows there is reference to Sirach 34:24, Isaiah 66:3 (in which text the Vatican edition with several editions wrongly has *carnis* for *canis*) and Proverbs 21:27.

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. *accepit*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few editions reads *accepit*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 pp. 939–941 = printed pp. 917–919) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 63819–63948). This is the LITTERA MAGISTRI (Peter Lombard's text), printed above Bonaventure's commentary at the head of Distinction XL. Distinction XL is a single-chapter distinction: **Cap. Unicum** (*An ex fine omnes actus pensari debeant, ut ex affectu vel fine omnes sint boni, vel mali*). Littera chunks carry no scholion.

**Page-split map.** The littera begins mid-page on printed **p.917** (the upper part of p.917, both columns, is the tail of the d.39 commentary — Opinio 2 / Iudicium auctoris / Dub. III / Respondeo): `DISTINCTIO XL.` + Cap. Unicum title + the opening sentence (`Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur...`) through `...ad bonum finem tendunt. Mali` sit at the bottom of p.917. The bulk of the littera (Ambrosius/Augustinus authorities + Augustine *contra Mendacium* block) fills **p.918**, ending at `...quid gravius sit, vel levius». — In-`. The tail (`tende, lector...` through `...sunt tamen malae.`) spans the top of **p.919**, concluding immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XL.` (the divisio chunk). Page breaks placed at running-head boundaries: `<!-- page 918 -->` before "vero simpliciter dici debent"; `<!-- page 919 -->` before "tende, lector, propositis verbis".

**Apparatus map.** 13 entries total, with Quaracchi's per-page restart:
- p.917 footer: 1 note under `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` → `[^1]` (the *naturaliter* variant). The seven preceding p.917 footer notes (1–7 in L-col, 8–10 in R-col) belong to the d.39 commentary ending on this page and are NOT littera notes.
- p.918 footer: 9 notes under `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` → `[^2]`–`[^10]`.
- p.919 footer (L-col block, notes 1–3, no visible block header) → `[^11]`–`[^13]` for the three littera-tail markers: `praestare Deo¹` = `Ioan. 16, 2`; `dare²` = *erogare*/canis note; `excepit³` = *accepit* note. The `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block (R-col of p.919, notes 1–3: *Secundum Aristot.*, *Dist. 41*, *Vat. aliorum*) belongs to the divisio chunk and is forwarded.

**Hand-off picked up.** The d.39-dubia agent flagged that the p.917 `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` fn1 belongs to this d.40 littera. Confirmed and captured as `[^1]` (the single *naturaliter* note appended at the very bottom of p.917's right column, beneath the d.39 commentary's own footer notes 1–10).

**Hand-off forwarded.** The p.919 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (3 notes) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d40-divisio` (COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XL + DIVISIO TEXTUS, raw 63949–63991). The COMMENTARIUS opens `Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter voluntas ex fine habeat rectificari et depravari...`.

**[?] flags.** None. All body markers (`in quantum¹` on p.917; `Ambrosius¹`, `Evangelio²`, `Quibusdam³`, `Augustini⁴`, `Mendacium⁵`, `habuerint⁶`, `ipsa⁷`, `pro bono fiat⁸`, `concesserimus⁹` on p.918 → `[^2]`–`[^10]`; `praestare Deo¹`, `dare²`, `excepit³` on p.919 → `[^11]`–`[^13]`) resolved cleanly against the printed footers, following Quaracchi's per-page numbering restart.


title: Dist. 40, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XL: Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XL: division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 919 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XL.

*Qualiter actus et opera ex affectu et fine vel rectificantur, vel depravantur.*

*Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter voluntas ex fine habeat rectificari et depravari. In hac parte intendit ostendere, qualiter actus et opera rectificari habeant et depravari ex affectu et fine. Et quoniam obliquum habet cognosci per rectum[^1], et malum per bonum; ideo pars ista habet duas. In prima parte inquirit Magister, quomodo intentio faciat opus bonum. In secunda parte inquirit, quomodo ex obliquitate intentionis sive voluntatis habeat fieri opus malum, infra[^2]: *Cumque intentio, ut supra dictum est, opus bonum faciat* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas partes. In quarum prima Magister ostendit, quod actus pensari habeant boni vel mali ex intentione et fine. In secunda quaerit, utrum generaliter hoc sit verum, quod bonitas operum causetur ex bonitate intentionis, ibi: *Sed quaeritur, utrum omnia opera hominis* etc.

Et illa secunda pars subdividitur in tres partes. In quarum prima recitat diversorum opiniones. In secunda confirmat alteram illarum[^3] auctoritate Augustini, ibi: *Sed Augustinus evidentissime docet* etc. In tertia vero redit ad confirmanda reliqua, ibi: *Quae tamen quidam contendunt* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, in qua Magister principaliter agit de bonitate operum, quam habent ex intentione, incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Et primo quaeritur de bonitate, quam opera ab intentione recipiunt.

Secundo vero quaeritur de bonitate, quam opera intentioni superaddunt.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XL.

*How acts and works are either rectified or made depraved by affection and end.*

*After these matters concerning acts, it seems that the following must be added,* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed how the will is rectified and made depraved by the end. In this part he intends to show how acts and works are to be rectified and made depraved by affection and end. And since the oblique is known through the straight[^1], and evil through good, therefore this part has two [parts]. In the first part the Master inquires how the intention makes a work good. In the second part he inquires how, from the obliquity of the intention or of the will, a work comes to be made evil, below[^2]: *And when the intention, as was said above, makes a work good,* etc.

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these the Master shows that acts are to be weighed as good or evil from the intention and the end. In the second he asks whether this is universally true, that the goodness of works is caused by the goodness of the intention, there: *But it is asked whether all the works of man,* etc.

And that second part is subdivided into three parts. In the first of these he recounts the opinions of various persons. In the second he confirms one of them[^3] by the authority of Augustine, there: *But Augustine most evidently teaches,* etc. In the third, however, he returns to confirming the remaining matters, there: *Which things, nevertheless, certain persons contend,* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, in which the Master principally treats of the goodness which works have from the intention, a question here arises concerning two things.

And first it is asked about the goodness which works receive from the intention.

Second, however, it is asked about the goodness which works add over and above to the intention.

---

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo cfr. supra pag. 880, nota 4. Idem III. de Anima, text. 23 (c. 6.) docet, malum cognosci per bonum.

en: According to Aristotle, concerning whom cf. above p. 880, note 4. The same author, in *De Anima* III, text 23 (c. 6), teaches that evil is known through good.

la: Dist. 41.

en: Distinction 41.

la: Vat. aliorum.

en: The Vatican edition reads *aliorum* (of others). ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (vol2 p. 941 = printed p. 919) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 63949–63991). This chunk is the SECOND unit of Distinction XL: the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XL` opener (title + incipit `Post haec de actibus adiiciendum videtur` etc.), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, and the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the listing of questions). It follows `bon-sent-II-d40-littera` (the Lombard text, pp. 917–919) and precedes `bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q1` (ARTICULUS I, raw 63992+). Divisio chunks carry no scholion.

**Structure of the divisio.** The Master's treatment of Dist. XL has two parts (good works from intention; evil works from obliquity of intention). The first part divides into two (acts weighed good/evil by intention+end; whether the goodness-from-intention rule is universal). That second sub-part further subdivides into three (recital of opinions; confirmation by Augustine; return to confirm the remainder). The TRACTATIO lists **two top-level quaestiones** for the distinction:
1. *De bonitate, quam opera ab intentione recipiunt* — the goodness works receive from the intention. (= Articulus I)
2. *De bonitate, quam opera intentioni superaddunt* — the goodness works add over and above to the intention. (= Articulus II)

**Page-split map.** The entire chunk sits on printed **p.919**. The top of p.919 (the littera tail, `tende, lector...` through `...sunt tamen malae.`) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d40-littera`; this chunk begins immediately below at `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XL.` and runs to the end of the TRACTATIO (`...intentioni superaddunt.`) at the foot of the L/R body columns. The material that begins on **p.920** (`Circa primum quaeruntur tria` + `ARTICULUS I.`) belongs to `bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q1`, NOT this chunk.

**Footnote markers.** Three body markers, all resolving against the p.919 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` block: `per rectum¹` → *Secundum Aristot. / III. de Anima* (`[^1]`); `infra²` → *Dist. 41* (`[^2]`); `alteram illarum³` → *Vat. aliorum* (`[^3]`). The OCR/PDF L-column footer notes ¹ Ioan. 16, 2 / ² Vat. erogare / ³ Vat. accepit are the *littera-tail* notes (`[^11]`–`[^13]` in `bon-sent-II-d40-littera`), not divisio notes.

**Hand-off picked up.** Confirmed from `bon-sent-II-d40-littera` (line 132 of its Notes): the p.919 `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer block (3 notes — *Secundum Aristot.*, *Dist. 41*, *Vat. aliorum*) was forwarded to this divisio chunk. All three captured here as `[^1]`–`[^3]`.

**Hand-off forwarded.** None to `bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q1`: ARTICULUS I begins cleanly at the top of p.920 with its own `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` footer; the `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` sub-listing of three q1 sub-questions (qualitas / quantitas / necessitas) belongs to a1-q1, not the divisio.

**[?] flags.** None. All three body markers and footer notes resolved cleanly against the 450 dpi PDF p.919 column bands.