collection: Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis

title: Quaest. 8

source_text:
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### Quaestio VIII. *Utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate.*

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia primitas *in essentia* excludit omnem aliam essentiam; impossibile enim est, duas esse essentias primas, quia sequeretur necessario, quod neutra esset prima[^p112-4]: ergo si primitas in *essentia* excludit pluralitatem essentiarum, pari ratione et primitas *in persona* excludit pluralitatem personarum: ergo impossibile est, quod simul se compatiantur circa Deum *esse primum* et *esse trinum*.

2. Item, primitas circa causalitatem excludit pluralitatem; necesse enim est, unam solam esse causam primam[^p112-5].

3. Item, sicut se habet *postremum esse* productionis activae, ita *primum esse* productionis passivae; sed *postremum*, eo quod postremum, non

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admittit productionem activam, ut aliquid ipsius producat aliquid: ergo nec *primum* productionem passivam: ergo impossibile est, aliquid esse summe primum et habere *esse productum*: si ergo trinitas includit productionem passivam, ergo excludit primitatem perfectam.

4. Item, aut illae tres personae *sunt* aeque primae, aut *non sunt* aeque primae. Si *sunt* aeque primae: ergo una non magis producit alteram, quam e converso; si *non sunt* aeque primae: ergo non est summa ratio primitatis in omnibus personis.

5. Item, aut *sunt aeque* principiantes, aut *non*. Si *sunt* aeque principiantes: ergo qua ratione una est principium alterius, eadem ratione e converso; si *non sunt* aeque principiantes: ergo non est aequaliter in eis ratio principii, ac per hoc nec ratio primitatis.

6. Item, unitas prior est re et intellectu quam pluralitas[^p113-1]: ergo summa primitas non convenit nisi ei, in quo est unitas absque pluralitate; sed trinitas includit pluralitatem veram: ergo excludit primitatem perfectam.

7. Item, quanto aliquid prius est, tanto magis tenet rationem fontalitatis in producendo: ergo ex eo quod est simpliciter primum necessario manat quidquid producitur: si ergo nulla persona potest manare a se ipsa, impossibile est, quod aliqua persona manet sive producatur et simul stet cum primitate perfecta.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Idem est primum et principium[^p113-2]: ergo si ab aeterno fuit primum, ab aeterno fuit et principium; sed principium secundum completissimam rationem est, quando est principians et producens secundum modum productionis perfectae: si ergo ab aeterno fuit in Deo ratio primitatis perfectae, fuit et veritas productionis intrinsecae. Sed hoc ponitur per trinitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, quanto aliquid prius, tanto potentius et actualius[^p113-3]: ergo primum principium necessario fuit actualissimum et potentissimum; sed actus primi principii, secundum quod principium, est principiare; ergo si in primo principio, hoc ipso quod primum, necessario ponitur ratio summae actualitatis et potentiae, necessario ponetur veritas productionis aeternae, ac per hoc et completio trinitatis perfectae.

3. Item, prius est omnino aequale quam jnaequale et re et intellectu[^p113-4]; ergo impossibile est intelligere productionem inaequalis, quin primo intelligatur productio aequalis: si ergo productio creaturae est productio in inaequalitatem, productio autem secundum aequalitatem non potest esse nisi in Trinitate beata; ergo productio creaturae omnis de necessitate praesupponit Trinitatem aeternam.

4. Item, prius est illud quod potest re vel intellectu ab aeterno intelligi, quam illud quod non re nec intellectu potest intelligi fuisse ab aeterno; sed productio alicuius de aliquo potest intelligi fuisse ab aeterno, productio autem alicuius de nihilo non potest fuisse aeternaliter[^p113-5]: ergo ante productionem omnis creaturae necessario est productio alicuius de aliquo praeintelligenda secundum rationem primitatis perfectae. Sed hoc non potest intelligi nisi in Trinitate increata: ergo etc.

5. Item, actus primi principii est primo principiare seu producere: ergo cum prius principians sit quam principiatum[^p113-6], ergo prior est principiatio seu productio principii principiantis quam solum rei principiatae; ergo si productio principii non est nisi in illa trinitate Dei, necesse est, quodsi illud principium sit primum, quod sit etiam trinum.

6. Item, primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est simplicissimum et spiritualissimum: ergo necesse est, quod intellectus[^p113-7]; sed omnis intellectus principians principiat per verbum et donum amoris intrinsecum; omne autem principians per verbum et amorem prius concipit verbum et spirat amorem, quam producat effectum exteriorem: ergo necessario est, quodsi primum principium est productivum *esse* extrinsecorum, quod prius producat[^p113-8]. Sed haec duplex productio ponit, Deum esse trinum: ergo necessario sequitur, quodsi primum principium est primum, quod etiam sit trinum.

7. Item, prius est principiare[^p113-9] naturale et intrinsecum quam voluntarium et extrinsecum; sed primo principio competit productio voluntaria et extrinseca: ergo necessario competit ei naturalis et intrinseca, et hoc non est nisi ponatur trinitas: ergo etc.

8. Item, prius est *perfectum* quam imperfectum et re et intellectu[^p113-10], *completum* quam diminutum,

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*unum* quam multum, *simplex* quam compositum, *infinitum* quam finitum, *actus* quam potentia, *immutabile* quam mutabile, *aeternum* quam temporale, *necessarium* quam possibile: si ergo omnis creatura producta est imperfecta, est deficiens ab unitate summa, est composita, est finita, est ens in potentia, est quodam modo temporalis, est variabilis, est possibilis, deficiens ab actualitate et necessitate summa: necesse est igitur, quod ante productionem creaturae sit productio rei perfectissimae, summae, indivisae, simplicissimae, infinitissimae, aeternae, immutabilis et necessariae; hoc autem non potest esse per productionem essentiae diversae: ergo necesse est, quod illud sit per productionem personae habentis unitatem essentiae cum persona producente et aequalis in potentia, in sapientia, in bonitate; hoc autem est ponere beatissimam Trinitatem.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Primitas non solum non excludit trinitatem, verum etiam eam includit.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod primitas non tantum non excludit trinitatem, verum etiam includit in tantum, ut primum principium eo ipso sit trinum, quo etiam est primum; quod sic manifestum est.

Nam primitas summa in summo et altissimo principio ponit summam *actualitatem*, summam *fontalitatem* et summam *fecunditatem*. Primum enim principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est *perfectissimum* in producendo, *fontalissimum* in emanando, *fecundissimum* in pullulando. Quoniam ergo perfecta productio, emanatio et pullulatio attenditur tantum secundum duos modos intrinsecos, scilicet per modum *naturae* et per modum *voluntatis*, verbi scilicet et amoris; hinc est, quod necesse est, ibi poni ratione summae *perfectionis*, *fontalitatis* et *fecunditatis* duplicem modum emanandi respectu duplicis hypostasis productae, emanantis a prima persona tanquam a primo principio producente; ac per hoc necesse est, ponere personas tres. — Et quia *perfectissima* productio[^p114-1] non est nisi respectu *aequalium*, *fontalissima* emanatio non est nisi respectu *coaeternalium*, *fecundissima* pullulatio non est nisi respectu *consubstantialium*: necesse est intelligere, quod primum principium includat intra se tres hypostases coaequales, coaeternales et consubstantiales. Ponit igitur *primitas* circa primum principium *trinitatem* perfectissimam secundum rationem ordinis, originis et distinctionis, coaequalitatis et coaeternitatis et consubstantialitatis; ponit etiam summam *unitatem*, *simplicitatem*, *immensitatem*, *aeternitatem*, *immutabilitatem* et *actualitatem*: ponit igitur primi principii trinitatem cum essentialibus conditionibus supradictis.

Quoniam igitur primum principium, hoc ipso quod primum, est summe *unum*, et hoc ipso summe *simplex* est et *immensum*, et hoc ipso est *aeternum*, *incommutabile* et *necessarium*, sicut ex praecedentibus[^p114-2] colligitur; et *rursus*, hoc ipso quod primum, est *perfectissimum* in producendo, *fontalissimum* in emanando et *fecundissimum* in pullulando, et hoc respectu aequalium, coaeternalium et consubstantialium, distinctorum, orientium et ordinatorum: hinc est, quod primum principium, quia primum, est *aeternum* cum plenitudine omnium nobilium conditionum; quare in ipso, in quantum primum, status est rerum et comprehensionum. — Ac per hoc Rachel, quae vitam designat contemplativam, interpretatur *visum principium*[^p114-3], quia qui illud videt in quantum primum principium, habet suae conditionis statum et desiderium terminatum; quod non terminabitur, nisi cum clare videbitur primum principium, ubi et trinum et summe unum. — Et rationes istae concedendae sunt, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur.

1. 2. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod primitas circa essentiam excludit pluralitatem; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia plures *essentiae* essentialiter differentes non possunt habere ordinem ad invicem nisi secundum rationem *prioris et posterioris;* sed plures *personae*, quia unam habent essentiam et unum *esse*, possunt ad invicem ordinari, ita quod, quamvis sit in eis ratio *originis*, nulla tamen interventio *posterioritatis:* et ideo haec pluralitas non tollit primitatem summam, quia nullam posterioritatem includit, quae directe primitati repugnat. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de causalitate; quia ordo causarum per essentialem diversitatem attenditur secundum comparationem posterioris ad primum, quod quidem non est reperire in origine[^p114-4] personarum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod postremo non convenit productio activa; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, cum *postremum* non possit habere comparationem, quae sit idem quod ipsum, nec producatur aliquid sibi per omnia adaequatum propter suam imperfectionem; ideo in ipso necessario repugnat, quod sit *postremum* et quod sit *productivum*, quia aliquid haberet post se posterius. Secus autem

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est ex parte *principii*, quia propter summam completionem tam in producente quam in producto non repugnat productio[^p115-1] activa et passiva, nulla interveniente posterioritate, per quam minuatur completio unitatis perfectae

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt aut aeque primae aut non; dicendum, quod *primae* dicit privationem *anterioris;* alio modo dicit privationem *originis*. Si ergo dicatur *primum* per privationem *anterioris;* sic sunt aeque primae, quia nihil est ibi ante et post. Si autem dicatur *primum* per privationem *originis*, quia scilicet a nullo oritur; sic ratio primitatis principaliter residet circa personam Patris, ratione cuius est in ipso fontalis plenitudo ad productionem omnium personarum. Unde et quia *innascibilitas* hanc proprietatem includit, ideo dicitur esse proprietas, quae est notio Patris; quod quidem non esset, nisi simul et nobilitatem diceret et innotescendi rationem, diceretur etiam relative[^p115-2].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut sunt aeque principiantes, aut non; dicendum, quod aeque principiantes *essentialiter*, sed non aeque *personaliter*, quia Pater est principium duorum, Filius unius, et Spiritus sanctus nullius. Quoniam ergo ratio primitatis, quae convenit essentialiter primo principio, est aequaliter in omnibus illis personis tribus; ideo simul stat trinitas cum primitate summa: quia, sicut *non posse generare* in Filio non ponit impotentiam[^p115-3], sic *non esse a se, sed a Patre* non ponit aliquam posterioritatem, ac per hoc non diminuit de ratione primitatis perfectae.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas prior est re et intellectu quam pluralitas; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa pluralitate, quae est ex aggregatione unitatum; de illa autem pluralitate, in qua eadem est unitas trium, veritatem non habet, quia una est in eis veritas, una lux, una ratio intelligendi ex parte ipsius Dei intellecti[^p115-4]. Quod autem nos prius intelligamus unitatem quam trinitatem, hoc est propter defectum intelligentiae ex parte nostra.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quanto aliquid est fontalius, tanto prius in producendo; dicendum, quod, sicut iam tactum est, *primum*, secundum quod dupliciter accipitur, et per privationem *anterioritatis essentialis* et privationem *originis personalis*, sic duplicem includit *fontalitatem*, secundum quod dicit *anterioritatis privationem essentialis* et *privationem originis personalis*[^p115-5]. Secundum quod dicit privationem *anterioritatis essentialis*, sic includit fontalitatem respectu effectuum et essentiarum producendarum; et sic, cum ista conditio aequaliter conveniat omnibus personis, aequaliter convenit eis *ratio fontalitatis* in *esse* creatorum productione, quia non sunt tria, sed unum principium creaturae. Secundum autem quod dicit privationem *originis personalis*, sic competit soli personae innascibili, scilicet Patri, in qua est plenitudo fontalitatis ad productionem Filii et Spiritus sancti. — Haec autem fontalitas quodam modo origo est alterius fontalitatis. Quia enim Pater producit Filium et per Filium et cum Filio producit Spiritum sanctum; ideo Deus Pater per Filium cum Spiritu sancto est principium omnium creatorum; nisi enim eos produceret *ab aeterno*, non per illos producere posset *ex tempore;* et ideo ratione illius productionis in Trinitate recte dicitur esse *fons vitae*[^p115-6]. *Sicut enim habet vitam in semetipso, sic dat Filio vitam habere in semetipso* etc. Hinc est, quod *vita aeterna* haec sola est, ut spiritus rationalis, qui manat a beatissima Trinitate et est imago Trinitatis, per modum cuiusdam circuli intelligibilis redeat per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, per deiformitatem gloriae in beatissimam Trinitatem.

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### Question VIII. *Whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy.*

Lastly it is asked whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. Because primacy *in essence* excludes every other essence; for it is impossible that there be two first essences, because it would follow necessarily that neither would be first[^p112-4]: therefore if primacy in *essence* excludes a plurality of essences, by equal reason primacy *in person* also excludes a plurality of persons: therefore it is impossible that *being first* and *being threefold* be compatible with each other together in God.

2. Likewise, primacy in causality excludes plurality; for it is necessary that there be one sole first cause[^p112-5].

3. Likewise, as the *last being* stands to active production, so the *first being* stands to passive production; but the *last*, by the fact that it is last, does not

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admit active production, such that something of it should produce something: therefore neither does the *first* admit passive production: therefore it is impossible that something be supremely first and have a *produced being*: if therefore trinity includes passive production, it therefore excludes perfect primacy.

4. Likewise, either those three persons *are* equally first, or they *are not* equally first. If they *are* equally first: then one does not produce another more than the converse; if they *are not* equally first: then the highest reason of primacy is not in all the persons.

5. Likewise, either they *are equally* principiating, or *not*. If they *are* equally principiating: then by the same reason by which one is the principle of another, the converse holds; if they *are not* equally principiating: then the reason of principle is not equally in them, and on this account neither is the reason of primacy.

6. Likewise, unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding[^p113-1]: therefore supreme primacy belongs only to that in which there is unity without plurality; but trinity includes true plurality: therefore it excludes perfect primacy.

7. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more it holds the reason of fontality in producing: therefore whatever is produced necessarily flows from that which is simply first: if therefore no person can flow from itself, it is impossible that any person should flow or be produced and at the same time stand with perfect primacy.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The first and the principle are the same[^p113-2]: therefore if from eternity there was a first, from eternity there was also a principle; but a principle is according to its most complete reason when it is principiating and producing according to the mode of perfect production: if therefore from eternity there was in God the reason of perfect primacy, there was also the truth of intrinsic production. But this is posited through trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more powerful and the more actual[^p113-3]: therefore the first principle was necessarily most actual and most powerful; but the act of the first principle, according as it is a principle, is to principiate; therefore if in the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, there is necessarily posited the reason of supreme actuality and power, there will necessarily be posited the truth of eternal production, and on this account also the completion of a perfect trinity.

3. Likewise, the altogether equal is prior to the unequal both in reality and in understanding[^p113-4]; therefore it is impossible to understand the production of the unequal without the production of the equal being understood first: if therefore the production of the creature is a production into inequality, while production according to equality can be only in the blessed Trinity, then every production of a creature of necessity presupposes the eternal Trinity.

4. Likewise, that which can be understood from eternity, in reality or in understanding, is prior to that which can be understood to have been from eternity neither in reality nor in understanding; but the production of something from something can be understood to have been from eternity, while the production of something from nothing cannot have been eternally[^p113-5]: therefore before the production of every creature there is necessarily to be understood beforehand the production of something from something, according to the reason of perfect primacy. But this cannot be understood except in the uncreated Trinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the act of the first principle is first to principiate or to produce: therefore, since the principiating is prior to the principiated[^p113-6], the principiation or production of a principiating principle is prior to that of a merely principiated thing; therefore if the production of a principle is only in that trinity of God, it is necessary that, if that principle is first, it is also threefold.

6. Likewise, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple and most spiritual: therefore it is necessary that it be an understanding[^p113-7]; but every understanding that principiates principiates through a word and an intrinsic gift of love; and everything that principiates through a word and love first conceives the word and breathes forth love before it produces an exterior effect: therefore it is necessarily so that, if the first principle is productive of the *being* of extrinsic things, it first produces[^p113-8]. But this twofold production posits that God is threefold: therefore it follows necessarily that, if the first principle is first, it is also threefold.

7. Likewise, to principiate[^p113-9] naturally and intrinsically is prior to doing so voluntarily and extrinsically; but voluntary and extrinsic production belongs to the first principle: therefore natural and intrinsic production necessarily belongs to it, and this is not so unless trinity is posited: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the *perfect* is prior to the imperfect both in reality and in understanding[^p113-10], the *complete* to the diminished,

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the *one* to the many, the *simple* to the composite, the *infinite* to the finite, *act* to potency, the *immutable* to the mutable, the *eternal* to the temporal, the *necessary* to the possible: if therefore every produced creature is imperfect, falls short of supreme unity, is composite, is finite, is a being in potency, is in a certain way temporal, is variable, is possible, falling short of supreme actuality and necessity: it is therefore necessary that before the production of the creature there be the production of a thing most perfect, supreme, undivided, most simple, most infinite, eternal, immutable and necessary; but this cannot be through the production of a different essence: therefore it is necessary that it be through the production of a person having unity of essence with the producing person and equal in power, in wisdom, in goodness; and this is to posit the most blessed Trinity.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it, to such a degree that the first principle is threefold by the very thing by which it is also first; which is made manifest thus.

For supreme primacy in the supreme and most high principle posits supreme *actuality*, supreme *fontality* and supreme *fecundity*. For the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is *most perfect* in producing, *most fontal* in emanating, *most fecund* in burgeoning. Since, therefore, perfect production, emanation and burgeoning are reckoned only according to two intrinsic modes, namely by the mode of *nature* and by the mode of *will*, that is, of word and of love; hence it is that it is necessary to posit there, by reason of supreme *perfection*, *fontality* and *fecundity*, a twofold mode of emanating with respect to a twofold hypostasis produced, emanating from the first person as from a first producing principle; and on this account it is necessary to posit three persons. — And because the *most perfect* production[^p114-1] is only with respect to *equals*, the *most fontal* emanation only with respect to *coeternals*, the *most fecund* burgeoning only with respect to *consubstantials*: it is necessary to understand that the first principle includes within itself three hypostases, coequal, coeternal and consubstantial. *Primacy* therefore posits in the first principle a most perfect *trinity*, according to the reason of order, of origin and of distinction, of coequality and coeternity and consubstantiality; it posits also supreme *unity*, *simplicity*, *immensity*, *eternity*, *immutability* and *actuality*: it posits therefore the trinity of the first principle together with the essential conditions spoken of above.

Since, therefore, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is supremely *one*, and by this very fact is supremely *simple* and *immense*, and by this very fact is *eternal*, *unchangeable* and *necessary*, as is gathered from the preceding[^p114-2]; and *again*, by the very fact that it is first, is *most perfect* in producing, *most fontal* in emanating and *most fecund* in burgeoning, and this with respect to equals, coeternals and consubstantials, distinct, arising and ordered: hence it is that the first principle, because it is first, is *eternal* with the fullness of all noble conditions; wherefore in it, inasmuch as it is first, is the stopping-point of things and of comprehensions. — And on this account Rachel, who designates the contemplative life, is interpreted *the principle seen*[^p114-3], because whoever sees it inasmuch as it is the first principle has the stopping-point of his condition and his desire brought to its term; which will not be brought to its term except when the first principle shall be clearly seen, where it is both threefold and supremely one. — And these reasons, which are brought forward for this side, are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that primacy in essence excludes plurality, it must be said that it is not alike: because several *essences* essentially differing cannot have order to one another except according to the reason of *prior and posterior;* but several *persons*, because they have one essence and one *being*, can be ordered to one another in such a way that, although there is in them the reason of *origin*, there is nevertheless no intervention of *posteriority:* and therefore this plurality does not take away supreme primacy, because it includes no posteriority, which is what is directly repugnant to primacy. — And by this the answer is plain to the following objection, which is made concerning causality; because the order of causes is reckoned through essential diversity, according to the comparison of the posterior to the first, which indeed is not to be found in the origin[^p114-4] of the persons.

3. To the objection that active production does not belong to the last, it must be said that it is not alike: because, since the *last* cannot have a comparison which is the same as itself, nor is anything produced wholly adequate to it, on account of its imperfection; therefore in it it is necessarily repugnant that it be *last* and that it be *productive*, because it would have something posterior after itself. But it is otherwise

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on the part of the *principle*, because, on account of the supreme completion both in the producer and in the produced, active and passive production[^p115-1] are not repugnant, no posteriority intervening by which the completion of perfect unity would be lessened

4. To the objection that they are either equally first or not, it must be said that *first* signifies the privation of *anything anterior;* in another way it signifies the privation of *origin*. If, therefore, *first* is said by privation of *anything anterior;* thus they are equally first, because there is nothing there before and after. But if *first* is said by privation of *origin*, namely because it arises from none; thus the reason of primacy resides principally in the person of the Father, by reason of whom there is in him the fontal plenitude for the production of all the persons. Whence also, because *innascibility* includes this property, it is therefore said to be a property which is a notion of the Father; which indeed would not be so unless it signified at once both nobility and the reason of making known; it would be said also relatively[^p115-2].

5. To the objection that either they are equally principiating or not, it must be said that they are equally principiating *essentially*, but not equally *personally*, because the Father is the principle of two, the Son of one, and the Holy Spirit of none. Since, therefore, the reason of primacy which belongs essentially to the first principle is equally in all those three persons; therefore trinity stands together with supreme primacy: because, just as *not being able to generate* does not posit impotence in the Son[^p115-3], so *not being from himself, but from the Father* does not posit any posteriority, and on this account does not diminish anything of the reason of perfect primacy.

6. To the objection that unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding, it must be said that this is true of that plurality which is from an aggregation of unities; but of that plurality in which there is the same unity of the three it has no truth, because in them there is one truth, one light, one reason of understanding on the part of God himself as understood[^p115-4]. That we understand unity before trinity, however, is on account of a defect of intelligence on our part.

7. To the objection: the more fontal something is, the more prior it is in producing; it must be said that, as has already been touched on, *first*, according as it is taken in two ways, both by privation of *essential anteriority* and by privation of *personal origin*, so includes a twofold *fontality*, according as it signifies *the privation of essential anteriority* and *the privation of personal origin*[^p115-5]. According as it signifies the privation of *essential anteriority*, it thus includes fontality with respect to effects and essences to be produced; and thus, since this condition belongs equally to all the persons, the *reason of fontality* belongs equally to them in the production of the *being* of created things, because they are not three, but one principle of the creature. But according as it signifies the privation of *personal origin*, it thus belongs to the innascible person alone, namely to the Father, in whom is the plenitude of fontality for the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit. — This fontality, moreover, is in a certain way the origin of the other fontality. For because the Father produces the Son, and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit; therefore God the Father through the Son with the Holy Spirit is the principle of all created things; for unless he produced them *from eternity*, he could not produce through them *in time;* and therefore, by reason of that production in the Trinity, he is rightly said to be *the fountain of life*[^p115-6]. *For as he has life in himself, so he gives the Son to have life in himself*, etc. Hence it is that *eternal life* is this alone: that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is the image of the Trinity, should return, by the manner of a certain intelligible circle, through memory, intelligence and will, through the deiformity of glory, into the most blessed Trinity.

---

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 6. — Superius post *Quia primitas* codicis lacunam supplevimus addendo *in essentia*.

en: Compare above, q. 2, a. 1, fundamentum 6. — Above, after *Quia primitas* ("Because primacy"), we have filled a gap in the codex by adding *in essentia* ("in essence").

la: Hoc arg., in quo apposuimus *pluralitatem*, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. arg. 4. ad oppos. a S. Doctore sic proponitur: Si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.

en: This argument, in which we have added *pluralitatem* ("plurality"), is put forward by the Holy Doctor in I *Sentences*, d. 2, q. 2, argument 4 for the opposite, thus: If there is supreme primacy there; then, since the stopping-point is in the first principle, and the stopping-point is in unity: therefore primacy posits not plurality but unity: therefore it seems that there is only one person.

la: Vide supra pag. 64, nota 4. — Inferius pro *nisi ei* D, terminis non bene transpositis, *ei nisi*.

en: See above, p. 64, note 4. — Below, for *nisi ei* ("only to that"), D, with the terms not well transposed, has *ei nisi*.

la: Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2: Idem enim dico primum et principium.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2: For I call the first and the principle the same.

la: Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 1, ubi exponitur, quod causa *prima* plus influat in causatum quam secunda. Vide tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3.

en: Compare the *Book of Causes*, proposition 1, where it is set out that the *first* cause flows more into what is caused than the second does. See tome I, p. 471, note 3.

la: Quia habitus, ut docet Aristot. II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3; cfr. tom. III. pag. 720, nota 4.), est ante privationem. Lib. VI. Topic. c. 4. (c. 9.) ipse ait: Quoniam autem quaedam contrariorum privatione alterius dicuntur, ut inaequalitas privatio aequalitatis videtur esse; inaequalia enim quae non aequalia sunt dicuntur: perspicuum, quoniam quod secundum privationem quidem dicitur contrarium, necessarium est definire per alterum; reliquum vero non iam oportet per id quod secundum privationem dicitur.

en: Because the habit, as Aristotle teaches in II *On the Heaven and the World*, text. 18 (c. 3; compare tome III, p. 720, note 4), is before the privation. In book VI of the *Topics*, c. 4 (c. 9), he himself says: But since some contraries are spoken of by the privation of the other, as inequality seems to be the privation of equality — for those things are called unequal which are not equal — it is plain that the contrary which is spoken of according to privation must be defined through the other; but the remaining one need no longer be defined through that which is spoken of according to privation.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Compare II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Sicut etiam Aristot. II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14) ait: Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.

en: As Aristotle also says in *Posterior Analytics* II, c. 17 (c. 14): For the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause.

la: Supple: sit. Vide Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 39. (XI. c. 7.). — *Maior* ostensa est supra q. 3. a. 1. — De seqq. cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12. seqq.

en: Supply: *sit* ("it be"). See Aristotle, XII *Metaphysics*, text. 39 (XI, c. 7). — The *major* was shown above, q. 3, a. 1. — On what follows, compare Augustine, IX *On the Trinity*, c. 7, n. 12 ff.

la: Supple: Verbum et Amorem.

en: Supply: the Word and Love.

la: Cod. noster perperam scribit *privare*.

en: Our codex wrongly writes *privare* ("to deprive").

la: Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 75. (c. 9.): Prius autem et natura et ratione et tempore quod perfectum quidem est imperfecto est, corruptibili autem incorruptibile. De seqq. cfr. supra pag. 12, nota 9. in fine et q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 12. seqq.

en: Aristotle, VIII *Physics*, text. 75 (c. 9): But the perfect is prior to the imperfect in nature and in reason and in time, and the incorruptible to the corruptible. On what follows, compare above, p. 12, note 9, at the end, and q. 1, a. 1, fundamentum 12 ff.

la: Supplevimus: productio. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.

en: We have supplied: *productio* ("production"). — Compare I *Sentences*, d. 19, p. I, q. 2, reply to 3.

la: Quaest. 2-7. Etiam hic respiciuntur praecedentes quaest.

en: Questions 2–7. Here too the preceding questions are in view.

la: August., I. de Consensu Evangelist. c. 5. n. 8: Hae duae virtutes [activa et contemplativa] in duabus uxoribus Iacob figuratae intelliguntur. De quibus adversus Faustum Manichaeum lib. XXII. c. 52. seq.] pro modulo meo... disserui. Lia quippe interpretatur *laborans*, Rachel autem *visum principium* [contra Faustum, loc. cit., additur: *sive verbum, ex quo videtur principium*. Cfr. Hieron., Lib. de Nominibus hebraicis, de Genesi, ubi legitur: Rachel ovis, vel videns principium, aut visio sceleris, sive videns Deum]. — Post pauca pro *habet* D *habere*.

en: Augustine, I *On the Harmony of the Evangelists*, c. 5, n. 8: These two virtues [the active and the contemplative] are understood to be figured in the two wives of Jacob. Of which, against Faustus the Manichaean, book XXII, c. 52 f.] I have discoursed according to my small measure... For Lia is interpreted *labouring*, but Rachel *the principle seen* [in *Against Faustus*, at the place cited, there is added: *or the word, from which the principle is seen*. Compare Jerome, *Book of Hebrew Names*, on Genesis, where one reads: Rachel, a sheep, or seeing the principle, or a vision of wickedness, or seeing God]. — A little after, for *habet* ("has"), D has *habere* ("to have").

la: Propter scriptionem compendiosam legi potest sive *origine* sive *ordine*. — Cfr. supra q. 5. a. 2. ad 2. et 7.

en: On account of the abbreviated writing, one can read either *origine* ("origin") or *ordine* ("order"). — Compare above, q. 5, a. 2, replies to 2 and 7.

la: Manifestum omissionem codicis (per saltum, a *producto* ad *activa*) supplevimus verbis *non repugnat productio*.

en: The manifest omission of the codex (by a leap, from *producto* to *activa*) we have supplied with the words *non repugnat productio* ("production is not repugnant").

la: Cfr. supra q. 5. a. 2. ad 3. et 6, ac I. Sent. d. 28. q. 1. seqq.

en: Compare above, q. 5, a. 2, replies to 3 and 6, and I *Sentences*, d. 28, q. 1 ff.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 7, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. ad 2. et a. 2. ad 16.

en: Compare above, q. 2, a. 1, reply to 2, and a. 2, reply to 16.

la: D perperam repetit *sic duplicem includit fontalitatem*.

en: D wrongly repeats *sic duplicem includit fontalitatem* ("so includes a twofold fontality").

la: Psalm. 35, 10: Apud te est fons vitae. — Seq. locus est Joan. 5, 26: Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio etc. — Superius pro *nisi enim eos... non per illos* D *non enim eos... nisi per illos*; et in fine *beatissima Trinitate*.

en: Psalm 35:10: With thee is the fountain of life. — The following place is John 5:26: For as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also, etc. — Above, for *nisi enim eos... non per illos* ("for unless… them… not through them"), D has *non enim eos... nisi per illos* ("for not… them… except through them"); and at the end *beatissima Trinitate* ("the most blessed Trinity", ablative).

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L26000–L26475**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-112..117.png`). Body raw usable on all four leaves (p. 114's left column and p. 115 are the noisiest — *%\immA.ii perfeetionis*, *inplkem*, *fontalmimmn*, *priiicipii* — every word re-read on the plate); footers usable, digits corrected below. Fresh literal English translation. **Four printed pages, 112–115; 22 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** The chunk opens on **p. 112**, a little past half-way down the leaf, below `bon-qmt-q7-a2`'s close: **`QUAESTIO VIII.`** full measure, its italic subtitle *Utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate*, the opener *Ultimo quaeritur…* and **arguments 1–3** — re-read here on a full-width crop (the heading and subtitle at 1×, the opener and args at 1×/1.8×), not adopted from the hand-off. **Neither the heading, the subtitle nor the opener is anchored**, as `q7-a2` predicted by count (five marks, five seats) — and confirmed here on the plate: nothing stands after `VIII.`, after *primitate.*, or after *videtur:*. **Eight quaestio openers in the work, two anchored (pp. 59, 106).** Q. VIII is **undivided** — no `ARTICULUS` heading anywhere on pp. 112–115, the volume index and the pilot's header grep agreeing. Then: **seven arguments** that trinity and supreme primacy are incompossible (marginale `Ad oppositum.`); a **`Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` series of eight** (marginale `Fundamenta.`), letter-spaced small caps, in-column; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column; a *Respondeo* in two movements — supreme primacy posits supreme **actuality, fontality and fecundity**, which require the two intrinsic modes of emanation (*naturae* / *voluntatis*, *verbi* / *amoris*) and therefore three hypostases **coequal, coeternal and consubstantial** (marginale `Ratio ex triplici suppositione.`), then a gathering of the whole work's results under the first principle (marginale `Corollaria.`), closing on **Rachel as *visum principium*** and the stopping-point of desire; and **seven replies in six paragraphs** (`1. 2.` printed combined), which answer the **OPENING** series. The chunk — and the work — closes on **p. 115**, three-fifths down the right column, *…per deiformitatem gloriae in beatissimam Trinitatem.*

### ⭐⭐⭐ THE WORK'S END FIXED POSITIVELY, FROM THE NEXT WORK'S HEADING — NOT FROM WHITE SPACE

**pp. 115, 116 and 117 were extracted and read FIRST, before pp. 113–114 were pulled**, per the standing order (its **twelfth** payment) and the frozen Vol V rule that an end is fixed from the next heading. **p. 115**: reply 7 fills both columns to about 0.55 of the leaf height and ends *…in beatissimam Trinitatem.*; the register (six entries, nn. 1–4 left, 5–6 right) follows; below it, centred, **an ornamental wavy rule** — the work's close, as at the Itinerarium's end. **NO colophon, no `EXPLICIUNT`** — the genre's close, as the pilot predicted. **p. 116**: blank; the plate shows only the scan's dark gutter band at the right edge (whole-leaf dark fraction **0.047 %** at threshold 110, against p. 115's 4.71 % and p. 117's 5.43 %; the pilot's 0.1333 % was taken at a different threshold, and **the plate, not the number, is the evidence** — read at ⅓ scale, nothing is printed). **p. 117**: `QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE` / **`DE PERFECTIONE EVANGELICA`** display heading and ornamental rule, then the proemium *Volentes¹ circa evangelicam perfectionem…*. **Body extent of the work confirmed: pp. 45–115, 71 printed pages; raw band L16037 → L26475.**

⭐ **Hand-off to work 4, not this chunk's business:** the raw's marker after p. 117's *Volentes* **is a real anchor** — p. 117 n. 1 reads *Hanc quaestionem sumsimus ex codicibus E D I…*, a work-level note on the sources hung on the proemium's first word. So *De perfectione evangelica*'s proemium is **anchored**, unlike this work's p. 45 proemium. A prediction for the work-4 pilot, confirmed on the plate; nothing built.

### ⭐⭐ RULING 5 MET TWICE — BOTH RENDERINGS QUOTED

The standing instruction: a chunk that **meets** a reserved site says so and quotes its rendering.

- **p. 112 n. 4 `Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 6.`** → ***"Compare above, q. 2, a. 1, fundamentum 6."*** The target is `bon-qmt-q2-a1` argument 6, *Ex parte summae causalitatis… Deus est causa prima… causa, in qua status est* — the very premiss of argument 2 here (*unam solam esse causam primam*). The work's **sixth** site.
- **p. 113 n. 10 `q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 12. seqq.`** → ***"q. 1, a. 1, fundamentum 12 ff."*** The target is `bon-qmt-q1-a1` argument 12 and the run it opens (*si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio… si est ens possibile, est ens necessarium… si est ens respectivum, est ens absolutum*) — the same *prius … quam …* ladder as Sed contra 8. The **seventh** site.

### ⭐ THE TEXT RESTS ON CODEX D ALONE TO THE LAST WORD, AND QUARACCHI'S HAND SHOWS

As from `q6-a2` p. 104 n. 4 on, every variant note names D or *cod.* in the singular — `Cod. noster` (p. 113 n. 9) says it outright. **Five editorial supplements shape the wording:** *in essentia* in argument 1 (p. 112 n. 4 — set in italic in the body, the supplement marked by the type); *pluralitatem* in argument 2 (p. 112 n. 5 — **set roman**, so the body alone does not show it); *productio* in the *Respondeo* (p. 114 n. 1); **a saut du même au même filled** in reply 3 (p. 115 n. 1, *per saltum, a producto ad activa*: *non repugnat productio*); and two readings in reply 7 (p. 115 n. 6, *nisi… non* for D's *non… nisi*, and *beatissimam Trinitatem* for D's ablative — **the work's last two words are Quaracchi's case, not D's**). D's own errors noted: *ei nisi* (p. 113 n. 1), *privare* (n. 9), *habere* (p. 114 n. 3), a repeated clause (p. 115 n. 5). ⭐ p. 114 n. 4 is **an editorial crux about an abbreviation** — D's compendium reads as *origine* or *ordine*; Quaracchi prints *origine* and says both are possible. The English follows the print ("origin"); the note carries the alternative.

### ⭐ PRINTING ANOMALIES — TWO WRONG SORTS, ONE SLIP, ONE UNMATCHED BRACKET, THE REST SPECKS

- ⭐ **p. 113 Sed contra 3 *jnaequale*** — the raw independently gives `jnae-`, and at **4×** the first letter is a **true *j***: a single continuous stroke with a leftward-hooked descender, where every *i* on the line (*omnino*, *quam*) has a foot serif. Not a fouled *i* with a detached blob (the `q6-a2` p. 105 *aliis* case was checked against). **An identifiable wrong sort → transcribed as printed** (the `q6-a1` rule); English "unequal".
- **p. 115 n. 6 `Joan. 5, 26`** — *J*, where the house form is *Ioan.* (p. 112 n. 1, p. 110's notes). Read at 1× on the column crop with a clear descender; **as printed**. *5* (raw `3`) fixed by the Vulgate: John 5:26 is *Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso*.
- ⭐ **p. 115 n. 1 `Manifestum omissionem`** — *Manifestum* for the grammatical *Manifestam*; at 4× the fourth-from-last letter is a *u* (open top, no bowl), matching the *u* of *omissionem*, and the raw agrees (`Manifestuni`). **A slip in Quaracchi's own Latin, as printed**; the English gives the sense. The *m* of *omissionem* is fouled by a stray stroke (raw `omissionerti`) — read plain.
- **p. 114 n. 3 `…lib. XXII. c. 52. seq.] pro modulo meo…`** — a closing bracket with **no opening bracket** (Quaracchi's insertion into Augustine's sentence is evidently *[adversus… seq.]*). Read on the plate at 1.8×: no `[` before *adversus*. **As printed**; neither bracket supplied nor removed.
- **p. 113 n. 3 `Lib. de Causis,¹ propos. 1,`** — a raised mark after *Causis,* that has the look of a superscript. **Not an anchor** (it is in the apparatus) and not a letter: **not transcribed**, disclosed here. The digit after *propos.* is a flagged bare **1** by pixel map (no bowl), followed by a comma whose faint upper speck is not a semicolon's point; `1` is confirmed by the target (below).
- **p. 113 n. 6 `(c. 14)`** — no point after *14*, as printed; three corpus parallels print `(c. 14.)`. **p. 115 reply 3 `…completio unitatis perfectae`** ends **without a final point** before reply 4 (plate and raw agree) — as printed. **p. 115 reply 4 `*primae* dicit privationem *anterioris;* alio modo…`** — the first member has no *uno modo*, though *alio modo* follows; as printed, no note, **not supplied**; the English follows ("…signifies the privation of anything anterior; in another way…").
- **Specks and stray marks, not transcribed:** p. 113 *productiońem* (a hairline over the *n*), *producat⁸.* (a faint speck above the point — a pixel map shows a full point on the baseline and a three-pixel speck above, so **a period, not a colon**), n. 5 *q.₍2.*, n. 7 *ostensà*, n. 9 *perperaзi*, n. 10 *tempore*, *ₐutem*; p. 114 *rei.perfectissimae*, *infinitissimae,`*, *et·fecunditatis*, *et·necessarium*, *praecedentibus².*; p. 115 *interve-*, *MYSTERIO´*.

### ⭐⭐ THE TARGETS BEAT THE GLYPH

Every citation naming a place we hold was opened; **every one lands on its note's subject**:

- ⭐ **p. 112 n. 5 `I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. arg. 4. ad oppos.`** (raw `arg. i.`) → `bon-sent-I-d2-a1-q2` *Utrum in Deo ponenda sit personarum pluralitas*, **argument 4 of the opposing series: *Item, contra quartam suppositionem sic: si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio…*** — **word for word what the note quotes.** The target's own opening names *summa primitas* as the fourth supposition.
- **p. 113 n. 3 `tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3`** (the `1` flagged at 2.5×) → `bon-sent-I-d27-p1-a1-q2`, whose note is the *Liber de causis* **propos. 1**, *Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum, quam causa universalis secunda* — confirming **both** the page and the proposition number (raw `4`).
- **p. 113 n. 4 `tom. III. pag. 720, nota 4`** → `bon-sent-III-d33-a1-q4`, p. 720 n. 4: *Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.)… habitus est ante privationem* — **the same text and the same `18`** (flagged `1`, closed-bowl `4` in `nota 4.` on the same line).
- **p. 113 n. 5 `II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.`** → `bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a1-q2` *Utrum mundus productus sit ab aeterno, an ex tempore* — Sed contra 4's *productio… de nihilo non potest fuisse aeternaliter*.
- **p. 113 n. 6 `II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14)`** — three corpus parallels print exactly `II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.): Causa enim prius est eo cuius est causa.`
- **p. 113 n. 10 `VIII. Phys. text. 75. (c. 9.)`** — corpus parallels `VIII. Phys. text. 75. seqq. (c. 9.)`. **`pag. 12, nota 9. in fine`** → `bon-qsc-q3` p. 12 n. 9, whose last clause is *Aristot., II. de Caelo… Prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis et simplex composito* — Sed contra 8's *unum quam multum, simplex quam compositum*.
- **p. 113 n. 1 `pag. 64, nota 4`** → `bon-qmt-q2-a2` p. 64 n. 4, *Vide supra pag. 12, nota 9…* — the same unity-before-plurality locus, for argument 6's *unitas prior est… quam pluralitas*.
- **p. 114 n. 1 `I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.`** → `bon-sent-I-d19-p1-a1-q2` *Utrum sit ibi summa aequalitas* — the *Respondeo*'s *perfectissima productio… respectu aequalium*. **p. 115 n. 2 `I. Sent. d. 28. q. 1.`** → `bon-sent-I-d28-a1-q1` *Utrum nomen ingenitus sive innascibilis…* — reply 4's *innascibilitas… notio Patris*. **p. 115 n. 3 `I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2.`** → `bon-sent-I-d7-a1-q2` *Utrum Pater communicet Filio potentiam generandi* — reply 5's *non posse generare in Filio non ponit impotentiam*.
- **Internal:** p. 112 n. 4 → `q2-a1` arg. 6 (above); p. 113 n. 7 `q. 3. a. 1.` → *Utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum* (Sed contra 6's *simplicissimum*); p. 113 n. 10 → `q1-a1` arg. 12 ff. (above); p. 114 n. 2 `Quaest. 2-7` — the *Corollaria* gather unity (Q. II), simplicity (III), immensity (IV), eternity (V), immutability (VI), necessity (VII); p. 114 n. 4 / p. 115 n. 2 `q. 5. a. 2. ad 2. et 7` / `ad 3. et 6` → `bon-qmt-q5-a2`, whose reply 3 is ***aut personae sunt ibi aeque primae, aut non… quantum ad privationem prioris et posterioris sunt aeque primae*** — reply 4 here in a sentence; p. 115 n. 4 `q. 2. a. 1. ad 2.` → `q2-a1` reply 2, *in omnibus personis una est natura…* (reply 6's *una est in eis veritas*).
- **Scripture fixed by the Vulgate wording:** p. 115 n. 6 **Ps. 35, 10** (*Apud te est fons vitae*; the `1` of `10` flagged) and **Ioh. 5, 26**.
- **Externally:** p. 114 n. 3 **`de Consensu Evangelist. c. 5. n. 8`** — I.5.8 is the Lia/Rachel passage (*Lia… laborans, Rachel… visum principium*); **`c. 52`** of *Contra Faustum* XXII is the same allegory. p. 113 n. 2 **`I. Poster. c. 2`** — *Idem enim dico primum et principium*, 72a6.

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT WAS 29 px OUT ON BOTH RECTOS

112 **1387** for Quaestio VIII's REGION *(rows 0.62–0.685 — too thin for window consensus; band 1355–1419, 65 px, rule 1388–1390 peak 104; `q7-a2` measured **1380** for Art. II's region above the heading, arrived at independently and 7 px away — a neighbour's measurement of the same leaf is checked, not adopted)* · 113 **1156** *(default **1127 on a 3 px run**, flagged WEAK, **29 px out**; twenty-four windows spread 1 px at 1155–1156 on 60–61 px; band 1126–1186, rule island 1155–1159 **peak 1301** — second only to p. 105's 1304 in the work; skew screen 3 px)* · 114 **1403** *(the only sound default, 59 px, reproduced; band 1373–1434, rule 1401–1406 peak 509; the skew screen's 219 px "drift" is one slice landing on the `Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ` stack, as the tool warns)* · 115 **1185** *(default **1156 on a 9 px run**, **29 px out**; twenty-four windows spread 1 px at 1184–1185 on 61–62 px; band 1155–1215, rule 1183–1188 peak 766; the 105 px "drift" is the 0.68 slice landing below the body's end)*.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**Two gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** The head of every incoming register (pp. 113–115) was read before its first numeral:

- **p. 113** opens numbered and indented at n. 1 (*Vide supra pag. 64…*) — **nothing runs over from p. 112**, whose right block ends on n. 5's *…quod una tantum sit persona.* **n. 4 runs over the gutter**: the left block ends *…necessarium* above the `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` signature line; the right block opens **flush left** *est definire per alterum…* before n. 5. ⚠ The signature line and the gathering signature `15` are **not apparatus**.
- **p. 114** opens numbered at n. 1. **n. 3 runs over the gutter**: the left block ends *…Lia quippe*; the right opens flush left *interpretatur laborans…*, and n. 4 follows it.
- **p. 115** opens numbered at n. 1; the left block holds nn. 1–4, the right nn. 5–6; nothing crosses.
- p. 112's inherited nn. 4–5 stand in the right block below `q7-a2`'s n. 3 runover and cross nothing.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q8	p.113 n.4:gutter,p.114 n.3:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER

**p. 112** — `Ad oppositum.` (printed `Ad opposi-` / `tum.`)
**p. 113** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 114** — `Conclusio.` · `Ratio ex triplici suppositione.` (printed `Ratio ex tri-` / `plici suppo-` / `sitione.`) · `Corollaria.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 115** — `Distinctio.` · `Distinctio.` · `Distinctio.` · `Duplex primum.` · `Duplex fontalitas.` · `De prima.` · `De secunda.`

**Fourteen in all, none clipped.** The gutter-side margin was checked on a **full-image-width strip** on both leaves that carry a gutter-side gloss — p. 114's right edge (verso: `Corollaria.`, `Solutio op-positorum.`, `Notandum.`, each with clean paper before the dark edge band) and p. 115's left edge (recto: the three `Distinctio.`, complete). ⭐ **The solution-heavy split is total a twelfth time**: the fifteen arguments of the two series carry **two** glosses, one at the head of each; the *Conclusio*, *Respondeo* and replies carry **twelve**. ⚠ **`Corollaria.` is plural** where `q7-a2` printed `Corollarium.` — as printed, and fitting: the paragraph gathers the conclusions of Questions II–VII (p. 114 n. 2).

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the OPENING series, checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Et rationes istae concedendae sunt, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur* — the side just argued, the `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` — and reply `1. 2.` quotes argument 1 (*primitas circa essentiam excludit pluralitatem*) and disposes of argument 2 in its second sentence (*Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de causalitate*); replies 3–7 each restate their argument. **Seven replies for seven arguments in six paragraphs.** The marginalia follow the side (`Ad oppositum.` on the opening series, `Fundamenta.` on the `Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ`), as in `q7-a2`. · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column, its italic sentence centred in the left column; the heading line follows the frozen flat-italic markup. · **The subtitle and the opener agree** (*utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate*), and **the registry subtitle is taken from the plate** (p. 112, read at 1×). · ⭐ **Reply 4 answers from `q5-a2` reply 3 almost verbatim** — the same *aeque primae* dilemma was met and resolved in Quaestio V; Quaracchi's p. 115 n. 2 points there. · ⭐ **The work ends by returning to its own first question**: *visum principium* and *cum clare videbitur primum principium* (the stopping-point of desire in seeing) close a work that opened (`q1-a1`) on the certitude with which God's existence is known.

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

**Both languages carry the same four `<!-- page N -->` markers, 112–115, in the same order**, each at a word boundary — p. 113's before *admittit* / *admit* (the page breaking *ad-* | *mittit*; the marker set before the split word, both languages at the same place), p. 114's mid-list after *completum quam diminutum,* (before *unum* / *the one*), p. 115's mid-sentence after *Secus autem* (before *est ex parte principii* / *on the part of the principle*). **22 anchors in each language, in the same order, each defined once.** The English carries no digit the Latin lacks: no spelled-out chapter number occurs in the body.

### Translation choices

- ***primitas* → "primacy"** (the `bon-qmt-q1-a1` / `bon-qsc` rendering); ***summa primitas* → "supreme primacy"**; ***primum* → "first"**, ***postremum* → "last"**. ***prius/posterius*, *anterioritas/posterioritas* → "prior/posterior", "anteriority/posteriority"**; *privatio anterioris* → "the privation of anything anterior".
- ***fontalitas* → "fontality"**, ***fontalis plenitudo* → "fontal plenitude"**, ***fontalissimum* → "most fontal"**, ***fontalius* → "more fontal"** (Vol I precedent: *fontality* ×2, *fontal plenitude* ×16). ***fecunditas* → "fecundity"**; ***pullulatio*/*pullulare* → "burgeoning"/"burgeon"** (corpus precedent); ***emanatio* → "emanation"**.
- ***principiare* → "to principiate"**, ***principians* / *principiatum* → "principiating" / "the principiated"**, ***principiatio* → "principiation"** — the corpus's standing forms. ***principium* → "principle"** throughout, including *visum principium* → "**the principle seen**" (Augustine's etymology; the English keeps *principium* one word).
- ***coaequales, coaeternales, consubstantiales* → "coequal, coeternal, consubstantial"**; ***status* → "stopping-point"** (*status est rerum et comprehensionum*; *status est in unitate* in p. 112 n. 5), the sense the note's *cum status sit in primo principio* requires.
- ⭐ ***intellect-* → "understanding" with ZERO bare "intellect"**: *re et intellectu* → "in reality and in understanding" (×4); *quod intellectus* → "that it be an understanding"; *omnis intellectus principians* → "every understanding that principiates"; *Dei intellecti* → "God himself as understood"; *ratio intelligendi* → "reason of understanding". ***intelligentia* → "intelligence"** at both body sites (*defectum intelligentiae ex parte nostra*; *per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem* — the triad, as at `q5-a1` p. 90); ***Ad praedictorum intelligentiam* → "For the understanding of the foregoing"**, the house formula (`q1-a1`, `q4-a1`).
- **Ruling 2 exercised on ONE side only**: *lux* once (reply 6, *una lux* → "one light"), *lumen* **zero**. **Record it, or a later reader finds a bare "light" and takes it for a lapse.** ⛔ **The Ps. 35:10 exemption is UNREACHED, as the pilot said**: p. 115 n. 6 quotes *Apud te est fons vitae*, not *In lumine tuo videbimus lumen*.
- ⛔ ***vacatio*/*quies* ZERO on a stem census (`vaca`, `quie`) over L26000–L26475**; `contuit-` zero. The *vacatio* question goes to the work-close gate on `q7-a2`'s evidence alone.
- **Ruling 5 MET twice** — see above: *fundamentum 6*, *fundamentum 12 ff.*
- **Scripture in the body** rendered plainly (*fons vitae* → "the fountain of life"; the John paraphrase *sic dat Filio vitam habere* → "so he gives the Son to have life in himself", keeping Bonaventure's present *dat* against the Vulgate's *dedit*); **in the apparatus, the Douay register** (*With thee is the fountain of life*; *hath given*), as the corpus does for scripture quoted inside notes.
- ***per modum cuiusdam circuli intelligibilis* → "by the manner of a certain intelligible circle"**; ***deiformitas gloriae* → "the deiformity of glory"**.

### Ledger

**22 entries** (p. 112 nn. 4–5 of five · p. 113 all ten · p. 114 all four · p. 115 all six). **Zero `[?]` flags. Two gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** What this chunk inherits from `bon-qmt-q7-a2` is **p. 112 nn. 4–5** (positions re-derived: n. 4 at argument 1's *prima*, left column; n. 5 at argument 2's *primam*, right column) and **`QUAESTIO VIII.`, its subtitle, the opener and arguments 1–3 on p. 112** (re-read at full width). It forwards **nothing**: the work ends on p. 115, and p. 116 is blank. **QUAESTIO VIII IS COMPLETE; THE *QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE MYSTERIO TRINITATIS* IS COMPLETE — fifteen chunks, pp. 45–115.** ▶ **Fourteen interior boundaries, twelve shapes, 12 forwarding / 2 leaf edges** — the full list stands in `q7-a2`'s Notes; this chunk adds no boundary, only the work's end.

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 12 RECORDS, ZERO DANGLING, NO INBOUND LINE CHANGES, ONE ANAPHORA ARTEFACT

`build-citations.py` returns **12 records from this chunk: 10 crossref (all `chunk` level) · 2 scripture verse (tier A); ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous.** Corpus QA stays at **202**. **No other chunk's record changed** — the `citations.tsv` diff is twelve insertions, all `bon-qmt-q8`. Named for the work-close gate, none edited here:

- ⚠ **p. 114 n. 3's `contra Faustum, loc. cit.`** is resolved by **cross-note anaphora** to p. 114 n. 1's `I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 2.` → `bon-sent-I-d19-p1-a1-q2`. **Wrong**: the `loc. cit.` is Augustine's *Contra Faustum* XXII.52, named two lines earlier in the same note. The `q5-a2` p. 94 n. 8 / `q6-a2` p. 103 n. 2 class (anaphora carried across notes, or past an intervening author) — **a sixth site in the work**.
- **Under-captured, not wrong:** p. 112 n. 5's `arg. 4. ad oppos.` resolves to the chunk, as it should (the argument number is display text); p. 113 n. 4's *de Caelo* / *Topic.*, nn. 2, 6, 7, 10's Aristotle and p. 114 n. 3's Augustine and Jerome are authorities (excluded); the six internal `q. N. a. M.` references and `fundam. N` produce no record — true of every chunk in the work.