title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum Deus sit ab omni loco separabilis vel extra omnem locum.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio loco quaeritur, utrum sit Deus ab omni loco separabilis vel extra omnem locum. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia extra omnem locum nihil est; ergo si Deus est extra omnem locum, ergo nihil est[^1] vel in nihilo[^2].

2. Item, hoc quod est extra adverbium loci est: ergo si Deus extra omnem locum est, est in loco et praeter omnem locum; sed hoc est falsum et non intelligibile: ergo Deus non potest nec re nec intellectu separari ab omni loco.

3. Item, cum dicitur: *Deus est extra mundum*, *extra* aut stat pro aliquo, aut pro nihilo: si pro nihilo, ergo chimaera est extra mundum;

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si pro aliquo, ergo pro creato, vel increato: non pro creato; constat[^3]: ergo pro increato: ergo esse extra mundum est esse in Deo. Sed omnia sunt in Deo: ergo omnia sunt extra mundum.

4. Item, in nullo est Deus, quod non sit in ipso: sed nihil, quod sit extra mundum, est in Deo: ergo Deus non est extra mundum.

**Contra:**

1. Quod locus possit separari a Deo secundum intellectum, videtur, quia possibile est secundum intellectum, locum privari omni locato et remanere vacuum; sed vacuum est privatio, Deus autem in nullo est, quod non sit in ipso; privatio autem non est in Deo: ergo nec Deus in privatione, ergo nec in vacuo, et sic est separabilis a loco.

2. Item, quod Deus separetur a loco secundum rem, videtur, quia, sicut se habet Dei aeternitas ad omne tempus, ita immensitas[^4] ad omnem locum; sed Dei aeternitas fuit ante omne tempus: ergo Dei immensitas fuit extra omnem locum. Sed quod est extra aliquid est separatum ab eo: ergo etc.

3. Item, si Deus est tantum in locis creatis, cum illa sint finitae dimensionis, et quod commensurat se finito est definibile et finitum: ergo Deus esset finitus.

4. Item, Deus est adeo bonus, quod melior cogitari non potest, ergo adeo magnus et immensus, quod maior eo cogitari non potest; sed toto mundo potest cogitari linea maior, si intelligatur protendi extra circumferentiam caeli: ergo si ibi est Deus, Deus est extra, aut non est maximum.

5. Item, Angelus potest esse extra mundum; sed non extra Deum: ergo Deus est extra mundum.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus secundum distantiam nec re nec intellectu separari potest ab omni loco, sed secundum independentiam et re et intellectu a loco est separatus.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid separari ab alio est dupliciter: vel secundum distantiam, vel secundum independentiam[^5]. Primo modo aliqua duo, quae sunt in eodem loco, separantur, cum unum elongatur ab alio. Et hoc modo impossibile est esse[^6], nec intelligi, Deum separari ab omni loco. Nam ista separatio includit distantiam spatii, et hoc de necessitate includit locum; et ita implicantur duo opposita, scilicet quod Deus sit in loco, et distet ab omni loco. Si autem loquamur de separatione per independentiam; sic dicendum, quod Deus et re et intellectu est separatus a loco, quia in se ipso omnino est independens a loco, sicut ante productionem loci. Locus autem econtra non est separabilis a Deo nec re nec intellectu, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae.

*Ad 1, 2.* Similiter, cum quaeritur, utrum Deus sit extra omnem locum; dicendum, quod *extra* uno modo dicit situm et positionem; et sic est impossibile, sicut impossibile est, si *ante* dicat tempus, quod sit ante tempus. Alio modo *ante* et *extra* dicunt excessum et superexcellentiam divinae aeternitatis et immensitatis respectu temporis et loci; et sic concedendum, quod Deus est ante tempus et extra omnem locum. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod separetur a loco, sed quod summa immensitas superexcedat omnem locum nec ad illum arctatur. Et hoc vult dicere Gregorius[^7], quod Deus est extra omnia, non exclusus, quia non distat; et infra omnia, non inclusus, quia non arctatur, quia in se ipso ens[^8] est omnino immensus, ita quod extra ipsum nihil potest esse nec cogitari, sive nihil potest cogitari ita immensum, sicut Deus est in se ipso.

*Ad 3.* Ex hoc patet sequens, quia quod non est extra, non est propter limitationem suam, sed loci defectionem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de linea, dicendum, quod statim, dum intelligitur aliquid extra mundum, ex hoc datur intelligi, quod Deus sit ibi, sicut si intelligatur novus mundus fieri, absque dubio Deus esset in illo. Tamen non sequitur, quod ibi sit, quia illud nihil est.

*Ad 5.* Similiter, si fiat Angelus extra mundum; Deus tunc est extra non secundum motum suum, sed Angeli. Sed forte hoc est magis fictionis quam veritatis, quod Angelus extra universum exeat, sicut patebit[^9]. Attamen illud quod cogitandum est, divinum esse, non potest cogitari habere terminum sicut in duratione, sic non potest cogitari nec debet habere terminum in existentia et praesentialitate; et sicut non potest cogitari habere intercisionem in duratione, sic nec in praesentialitate. Hic intellectus habendus est; caveat tamen, qualiter quis imaginetur et exprimat per sermonem.

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english:
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### Question III.
#### *Whether God is separable from every place or [is] outside every place.*

In the third place it is asked whether God is separable from every place, or is outside every place. And that he is not, it seems:

1. Because outside every place there is nothing; therefore if God is outside every place, then he is nothing[^1] or in nothing[^2].

2. Likewise, that which is *outside* is an adverb of place: therefore if God is outside every place, he is in a place and beyond every place; but this is false and unintelligible: therefore God can neither in reality nor in understanding be separated from every place.

3. Likewise, when it is said: *God is outside the world*, *outside* either stands for something, or for nothing: if for nothing, then a chimaera is outside the world;

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if for something, then either for a created or an uncreated [thing]: not for a created [thing]; that is established[^3]: therefore for an uncreated [thing]: therefore to be outside the world is to be in God. But all things are in God: therefore all things are outside the world.

4. Likewise, in nothing is God, which is not in him: but nothing which is outside the world is in God: therefore God is not outside the world.

**On the contrary:**

1. That a place can be separated from God according to the understanding, seems [so], because it is possible according to the understanding for a place to be deprived of every located thing and to remain empty; but the void is privation, and God is in nothing which is not in him; but privation is not in God: therefore neither is God in privation, therefore neither in the void, and thus he is separable from place.

2. Likewise, that God should be separated from place in reality seems [so], because, just as God's eternity stands to all time, so [his] immensity[^4] [stands] to every place; but God's eternity was before all time: therefore God's immensity was outside every place. But what is outside something is separated from it: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if God is only in created places, since these are of finite dimension, and what commensurates itself with the finite is definable and finite: therefore God would be finite.

4. Likewise, God is so good that one cannot be thought greater, therefore so great and immense that none greater than he can be thought; but a line greater than the whole world can be thought, if it is understood to extend beyond the circumference of the heaven: therefore if God is there, God is outside, or [he] is not the greatest.

5. Likewise, an Angel can be outside the world; but [it can]not [be] outside God: therefore God is outside the world.

### Conclusion.

> *God cannot be separated from every place according to distance, neither in reality nor in understanding, but according to independence he is separated from place both in reality and in understanding.*

**I respond:** It must be said that something is separated from another in two ways: either according to distance, or according to independence[^5]. In the first way, two things which are in the same place are separated when one is moved far from the other. And in this way it is impossible to be[^6], or to be understood, [that] God is separated from every place. For that separation includes a distance of space, and this of necessity includes a place; and thus two opposites are implied, namely that God is in a place, and is distant from every place. But if we speak of separation by independence, then it must be said that God is in reality and in understanding separated from place, since in himself he is wholly independent of place, just as before the production of place. But place, on the contrary, is not separable from God either in reality or in understanding, as the reasons brought to this point prove.

*To 1, 2.* Likewise, when it is asked whether God is outside every place, it must be said that *outside* in one way denotes situation and position; and in this way it is impossible, just as it is impossible, if *before* denotes time, that he be before time. In another way *before* and *outside* denote excess and superexcellence of the divine eternity and immensity in respect of time and place; and in this way it must be conceded that God is before time and outside every place. Nor does it follow from this that he is separated from place, but that the highest immensity superexcels every place and is not constrained to it. And this Gregory[^7] means [when he says] that God is outside all things, not excluded, since he is not distant; and within all things, not included, since he is not constrained, because in himself the [Being][^8] is wholly immense, in such a way that outside himself nothing can be or be thought, or rather nothing can be thought so immense as God is in himself.

*To 3.* From this what follows is clear: that what is not outside [him] is not on account of his limitation, but on account of the defect of place.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning the line, it must be said that as soon as something is understood [to be] outside the world, from this it is given to understand that God is there, just as if a new world were understood to be made, without doubt God would be in it. Yet it does not follow that he is there, since that [which is supposed] is nothing.

*To 5.* Likewise, if an Angel be made outside the world; God is then outside, not according to his own motion, but [the motion] of the Angel. But perhaps it is more of fiction than of truth, that an Angel should go forth outside the universe, as will appear[^9]. Nevertheless, that which must be thought, the divine being, cannot be thought to have a term [as in duration]; just as in duration [it cannot be thought to have a term], so neither can it be thought, nor ought it to have, a term in existence and presentiality; and as it cannot be thought to have an interruption in duration, so neither in presentiality. This understanding must be held; let one nonetheless take care how one imagines [it] and expresses [it] through speech.

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en: Only the Vatican [edition] omits *nihil est*.

en: And thus God would be in nothing, which it is absurd to say.

la: Codd. T V *hoc constat*.

en: Codices T V [read] *hoc constat*.

la: Cod. Y verbo *immensitas* praemittit *Dei*.

en: Codex Y prefixes to the word *immensitas* the word *Dei*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut M VV *dependentiam*; vitiose.

en: Some codices, such as M VV, [read] *dependentiam*; corruptly.

la: Intelligo: quod Deus sit extra omnem locum.

en: I understand: that God is outside every place.

la: Libr. II. *Moral.* c. 12. n. 20.

en: Book II *Moralia*, c. 12, n. 20.

la: Sive *existens*. — Vat. omittit *ens*. Paulo post pro *sive* — Vocabulum *mundum*, quod ex cod. Y restituimus, deest in ceteris codd. nec non in Vat.; in plerisque codd. deest etiam *extra*; in his lectionibus supplendum est *etc*.

en: Or *existens* ("existing"). — The Vatican [edition] omits *ens*. A little later, in place of *sive* — the word *mundum*, which we have restored from codex Y, is missing in the other codices and also in the Vatican [edition]; in most codices *extra* is also missing; in these readings *etc.* must be supplied.

la: Infra a. 2. q. 2. *ad ult.* et II. *Sent.*, d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. In his locis probatur, Angelos non posse in puncto indivisibili esse, ergo non possunt esse extra locum et per consequens non extra mundum.

en: Below a. 2. q. 2. *ad ult.* and II *Sent.*, d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. In these places it is proved that Angels cannot be at an indivisible point, therefore they cannot be outside place and consequently not outside the world.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex titulo huius quaestionis apparet, duo problemata hic tractari; sed cum his aliae quaestiones per modum corollariorum solvuntur. Prima quaestio principalis respicit locos realiter existentes, et utrum ab eis Deus sit separabilis. Ad hanc respondetur distinguendo terminum *separari*. Per modum corollarii solvitur quaestio, utrum locus a Deo sit separabilis. Huc spectant argg. 1. 2. *ad opposit.* — Secunda quaestio in *solut. ad 2.* respicit locos imaginarios, sive qui extra mundum esse supponuntur. Respondetur cum distinctione praepositionis *extra*. In solutione ad 4. 5. duae connexae quaestiones quoad mundum novum et Angelum creatum extra mundum determinantur. Quod autem Angelus revera extra locum in puncto indivisibili esse possit, et ita extra mundum, S. Doctor non concedit.

**II.** Responsio ad secundam quaestionem in *solut. ad 2.* magis explanatur a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.) his verbis: *«Deum esse extra mundum dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ita, quod immensitas eius excedit mundum nec dependet a mundo; et sic verum est, Deum extra mundum esse infinitum, quia excedit finitum, nec dependet a finito, nec concluditur a finito… Alio modo potest intelligi, Deum esse extra mundum ita quod sit dare spatium extra mundum, in quo sit Deus; et sic falsum est.»* Si autem dicatur, extra mundum non esse quidem spatium reale, sed imaginarium, ex mente Seraphici respondendum esset, hoc spatium esse actu nihil, et tantum in potentia locum esse, in quo etiam Deus tantum in potentia esse intelligatur, *«non propter limitationem suam, sed loci defectionem»*. Hic modus loquendi de praesentia Dei in spatiis imaginariis approbatur etiam ab Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 4.), a Scoto (hic q. unica) et a S. Thoma secundum communiorem expositionem (cfr. Gotti, *Theolog. scholastico-dogm.* tom. I. tr. 2. q. 1. d. 5. § 3.). Quidam tamen Thomistae praecipue ex *Quodl.* XI. 5. arguere volunt, Angelicum docere, Deum actu et vere in spatiis imaginariis esse; quod nobis videtur improbabile.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 10. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** From the title of this question it appears that two problems are treated here; but together with these other questions are solved by way of corollaries. The first principal question regards really existing places, and whether God is separable from them. To this it is replied by distinguishing the term *to-be-separated*. By way of corollary the question is solved whether place is separable from God. To this pertain the arguments 1, 2 *ad oppositum*. — The second question, in the *solut. ad 2*, regards imaginary places, or those which are supposed to be outside the world. It is answered with a distinction of the preposition *outside*. In the solution to 4, 5, two connected questions concerning a new world and a created Angel outside the world are determined. That, however, an Angel can really be outside place at an indivisible point, and so outside the world, the Holy Doctor does not concede.

**II.** The reply to the second question in the *solut. ad 2.* is more fully explained by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1. q. 4.) in these words: *"That God is outside the world can be understood in two ways: in one way, that his immensity exceeds the world and does not depend on the world; and thus it is true that God is infinite outside the world, since he exceeds the finite, neither depends on the finite, nor is bounded by the finite… In another way it can be understood, that God is outside the world in such a way that there is given a space outside the world in which God is; and thus it is false."* But if it be said that outside the world there is not indeed a real space, but an imaginary one, from the mind of the Seraphic [Doctor] it would have to be answered that this space is in act nothing, and only in potency a place, in which also God is to be understood [to be] only in potency, *"not on account of his limitation, but on account of the defect of place"*. This way of speaking about God's presence in imaginary spaces is approved also by Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. I. q. 9. m. 4.), by Scotus (here q. *unica*), and by St. Thomas according to the more common exposition (cf. Gotti, *Theolog. scholastico-dogm.* tom. I. tr. 2. q. 1. d. 5. § 3.). Some Thomists, however, especially from *Quodl.* XI. 5, want to argue that the Angelic [Doctor] teaches that God is actually and truly in imaginary spaces; which to us seems improbable.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 10. m. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 21. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 3. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 4. — Durand, here p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
#### *De mutabilitate Angelorum per locum.*

Consequenter de secundo articulo quaeritur, scilicet de mutatione[^1] Angeli, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter sine corpore.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum moveatur per medium, vel non.

Tertio, utrum pertranseat medium motu subito, vel successivo.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter sine corpore.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quantum ad primum, quod Angelus non possit moveri sine corpore, ostenditur sic.

1. Bernardus *super Cantica*[^2]: «Discurrere et de loco ad locum transire non est nisi corporum»: ergo si hoc convenit Angelo, non convenit nisi per corpus assumtum.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia quod movetur, aut movetur per se, aut per accidens[^3]; sed Angelus non movetur per se localiter, quoniam hoc est proprium corporum, et illi soli inest *res per se*, cui inest proprie: ergo si movetur, hoc est per accidens. Sed quod per accidens movetur, movetur alio moto, ut nauta mota navi: ergo videtur, quod Angelus non possit moveri, nisi moto corpore, et ita corpore assumto.

3. Item, omne quod movetur, movetur propter indigentiam[^4]; sed in Angelis beatis nulla est indigentia: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod propter indigentiam nostram; ergo, circumscripta indigentia nostra, non videtur, quod Angelus possit moveri: si ergo indigentia nostra nullam dat virtutem Angelo, patet etc.

4. Item, «omne quod movetur, differt a motore», sicut proponit *Philosophus*[^5]; sed Angelus non distat a se: ergo Angelus non movetur a se nec ab alio: ergo non potest moveri nisi movendo aliud, sicut movendo corpus.

**Contra:**

1. Ad Hebraeos primo[^6]: *Omnes sunt administratorii spiritus, missi propter eos* etc.; sed aliquod ministerium exsequuntur sine corpore, ut suggerere bona, et huiusmodi: ergo possunt sine corpore moveri.

2. Item, Damascenus[^7]: «Confestim inveniuntur ubi divinus iusserit nutus, velocitate naturae»: si ergo velocitas est dispositio ad motum, ex sui natura sunt mobiles.

3. Item, Angelus in uno loco tantum est et ibi est, ubi operatur: ergo virtus eius aut est ad unum tantum arctata, aut si non est arctata, nec substantia est arctata ad unum locum. Sed non potest esse in pluribus: ergo cum est in uno loco, est in potentia ad alterum. Sed quod est in potentia ad unum non fit actu in illo, nisi per motum secundum locum: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod moveatur sine corpore assumto, ostenditur per simile in anima. Anima enim, exuta a corpore, fertur in caelum vel descendit in infernum localiter; sed constat, quod anima non assumit aliud corpus quam suum: ergo movetur sine corpore, ergo pari ratione Angelus.

5. Item, Angelus in empyreo potest esse sine corpore, pari ratione et in terra: ergo si per eandem vim, per quam quiescit in terra, facit se esse in terra sive transfert[^8]: ergo videtur, quod sine corpore.

### Conclusio.

> Angelus moveri potest tum sine corpore, tum corpore assumto: sine corpore transeundo locum definitive, sed cum corpore assumto circumscriptive.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Angelus, sicut dicit Scriptura, habet moveri. Movetur autem non solum assumto corpore, sed etiam corpore non assumto, cum non sit minoris libertatis nec virtutis nec nobilitatis sine corpore, quam est cum corpore.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum est notandum, quod sicut esse in loco est dupliciter sive esse locale — sicut tangit Magister in littera — scilicet quia circumscribitur, et quia definitur; et illud proprie est locale quod circumscribitur, aliud autem quodam modo est locale, quodam modo non: ita moveri per locum uno modo est per circumscriptionem ferri de loco ad locum, et sic est tantum corporum; alio modo moveri est minus proprie secundum definitionem transire, et sic est spirituum. Proprie ergo per circumscriptionem non movetur Angelus, nisi corpore assumto, minus proprie per definitionem movetur Angelus etiam sine corpore.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1.* Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum, et Bernardus accipit *discurrere* et *transire* secundum proprietatem loci, quae est circumscriptio.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud ergo quod quaeritur, utrum per se aut per accidens; dicendum secundum praedictam distinctionem[^7-bis] de motu, quod secundum primum motum non movetur spirituale nisi per accidens, alio moto. Sicut enim nauta, mota navi, movetur, sic spiritus, moto corpore, in quo est. Quantum ad secundum motum, sicut Angelus per se ipsum et sine corpore definitur loco, ita per se ipsum transfertur, ita quod non alio movente, nec per alium motum. Ipse autem obiicit de primo motu tantum, qui per se convenit corpori soli.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod movetur, movetur propter indigentiam; dicendum, quod illud verum est in motu naturali, in quo natura non movet nisi per appetitum alicuius rei, qui ponit imperfectionem in natura — quia natura, habita perfectione sua, quiescit — sed non est verum in motu voluntario, in quo movetur aliquis sive propter aliud[^8-bis] acquirendum, sive ad virtutem demonstrandam, sicut movetur miles in stadio. — Vel dicendum, quod illud verum est in omni motu, generaliter accipiendo indigentiam ad suam indigentiam et alienam, et suam quantum ad illud cuius privatio ponit imperfectionem, vel cuius privatio non imperfectionem ponit, sed limitationem[^9]; et sic est in Angelo. Angelus enim, volens aliquid operari in terra, indiget transire ad terram, quia non potest simul esse in caelo et in terra propter hoc

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quod habet virtutem finitam. Et sic patet illud, quod limitatio non repugnat summae perfectioni creaturae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod movetur differt a motore; dicendum, quod in naturali motu verum est, ubi nihil movet se, quia nihil reflectitur supra se propter alligationem cum materia: sed non est verum in voluntate, quae est instrumentum se ipsum movens; et virtus, quae est in substantia spirituali, potest supra substantiam reflecti, et ita movens idem esse cum mobili, tamen non secundum idem: quia Angelus habilis est ad moveri ex parte ipsius *quod est* sive substantiae vel materiae, si habet materiam, sed ad movere ex parte formae, sive ipsius *quo est* vel virtutis activae.

english:
### Article II.
#### *On the changeableness of angels with respect to place.*

Next concerning the second article it is asked, namely about the change[^1] of an angel, and concerning this three things are inquired.

First it is asked whether an angel can be moved locally without a body.

Second it is asked whether he is moved through a medium, or not.

Third, whether he traverses the medium by a sudden motion, or by a successive one.

### Question I.
#### *Whether an angel can be moved locally without a body.*

As to the first, it is shown thus that an angel cannot be moved without a body.

1. Bernard, *On the Song of Songs*[^2]: "To run about and to pass from place to place belongs only to bodies": therefore, if this belongs to an angel, it does not belong save through an assumed body.

2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since whatever is moved is moved either *per se* or *per accidens*[^3]; but an angel is not moved *per se* locally, since this is proper to bodies, and that thing belongs *per se* alone in which it inheres properly: therefore if he is moved, this is *per accidens*. But what is moved *per accidens* is moved by something else being moved, as a sailor by the moved ship: therefore it appears that an angel cannot be moved unless a body is moved, and so an assumed body.

3. Likewise, everything that is moved is moved on account of need[^4]; but in the blessed angels there is no need: therefore etc. If you say, on account of our need; therefore, our need set aside, it does not appear that an angel can be moved: if therefore our need confers no power on the angel, the conclusion is plain.

4. Likewise, "everything that is moved differs from its mover," as the *Philosopher* proposes[^5]; but an angel is not distant from himself: therefore an angel is not moved by himself nor by another: therefore he cannot be moved except by moving something else, as by moving a body.

**On the contrary:**

1. *To the Hebrews*, chapter 1[^6]: *They are all ministering spirits, sent for those* etc.; but they perform some ministry without a body, such as suggesting good things and the like: therefore they can be moved without a body.

2. Likewise, Damascene[^7]: "Forthwith they are found wherever the divine bidding has commanded, by the swiftness of nature": if therefore swiftness is a disposition for motion, by their own nature they are mobile.

3. Likewise, an angel is in only one place, and is there where he operates: therefore his power is either restricted to one alone, or, if it is not restricted, neither is his substance restricted to one place. But he cannot be in many: therefore, when he is in one place, he is in potency to another. But what is in potency toward one does not become actual in it except through motion according to place: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that he is moved without an assumed body is shown by the parallel in the soul. For the soul, stripped of the body, is borne to heaven or descends to hell locally; but it is agreed that the soul does not assume any body other than its own: therefore it is moved without a body, therefore by parallel reasoning so is the angel.

5. Likewise, an angel can be in the empyrean without a body, by parallel reasoning also on earth: therefore if by the same power by which he rests on earth he makes himself to be on earth or transfers himself[^8]: therefore it appears that without a body.

### Conclusion.

> An angel can be moved both without a body and with an assumed body: without a body by passing through a place definitively, but with an assumed body circumscriptively.

**I respond:** It must be said that an angel, as Scripture says, has the property of being moved. He is moved, however, not only by an assumed body, but also without an assumed body, since he is not of less freedom or power or nobility without a body than he is with a body.

For the understanding of the objections it must be noted that, just as to be in a place is twofold, or to be local — as the Master touches in the text — namely because something is *circumscribed* and because it is *defined*; and that is properly local which is circumscribed, but the other is in one way local and in another way not: so to be moved through place in one way is to be borne by circumscription from place to place, and this belongs to bodies alone; in another way to be moved is, less properly, to pass according to definition, and this belongs to spirits. Properly therefore by circumscription an angel is not moved, except with an assumed body; less properly, by definition an angel is moved even without a body.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative:**

*To 1.* From this the response to the first objection is plain, and Bernard takes *to run about* and *to pass through* according to the property of place, which is circumscription.

*To 2.* To that which is asked, whether *per se* or *per accidens*; it must be said, according to the aforesaid distinction[^7-bis] concerning motion, that according to the first kind of motion a spiritual thing is not moved except *per accidens*, by something else being moved. For just as a sailor, by the moved ship, is moved, so a spirit, by the moved body in which he is. As to the second kind of motion, just as an angel by himself and without a body is defined to a place, so by himself he is transferred, so that nothing else is the mover, nor is it through another motion. He himself, however, raises the objection only about the first motion, which belongs *per se* to body alone.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everything which is moved is moved on account of need; it must be said that this is true in natural motion, in which nature does not move except by appetite for some thing, which posits imperfection in nature — because nature, having attained its perfection, comes to rest — but it is not true in voluntary motion, in which someone is moved either to acquire something else[^8-bis], or to display power, as a soldier is moved in the stadium. — Or it must be said that this is true in every motion, taking *need* generally as both one's own need and another's, and one's own as regards that whose privation posits imperfection, or whose privation does not posit imperfection but limitation[^9]; and so it is in the angel. For an angel, willing to do something on earth, needs to pass to earth, because he cannot be at the same time in heaven and on earth, on account of the fact that

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he has finite power. And so that point is plain, that limitation does not contradict the highest perfection of a creature.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that everything which is moved differs from its mover; it must be said that in natural motion this is true, where nothing moves itself, because nothing is reflected upon itself on account of its bond with matter: but it is not true in the will, which is an instrument moving itself; and the power which is in a spiritual substance can be reflected upon the substance, and so the mover can be the same as the moved, yet not in the same respect: because an angel is apt to be moved on the part of his *quod est* (that which he is) or substance or matter, if he has matter, but to move on the part of form, that is, of his *quo est* (that by which he is) or active power.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *mutabilitate*.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, reads *mutabilitate* ("changeableness").

la: Serm. 5. n. 2. <!-- Quaracchi p. 658 footnote-block uses ad-hoc per-page numbering; Bernard *Sermones in Cantica* serm. 5 standardly cited as locus of *discurrere et de loco ad locum transire* phrase -->

en: Sermon 5, n. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 1, VIII. *Phys.* text. 27. (c. 4.), de *Anima*, text. 37. seqq. (c. 3.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 1; *Physics* VIII, text 27 (c. 4); *On the Soul*, text 37 ff. (c. 3).

la: Cfr. Aristot., *de Animalium motu*, c. 4. seqq. (c. 6. seqq.), ubi finem motus constituit in bono aliquo consequendo.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, *On the Motion of Animals*, c. 4 ff. (c. 6 ff.), where he places the end of motion in attaining some good.

la: Libr. VIII. *Phys.* text. 27. seqq. (c. 4.); verbotenus autem est in *Comment. Averrois.* Ibi Aristot. recolligit quae diversis locis, praesertim in libr. VII. *Phys.* docuit.

en: Book VIII of the *Physics*, text 27 ff. (c. 4); but verbatim it is in Averroes' *Commentary*. There Aristotle gathers up what he has taught in various places, especially in book VII of the *Physics*.

la: Vers. 14, in quo textu Vulgata verbo *sunt* praemittit *in ministerium*. — Mox pro *exsequuntur*, quod ex codd. P Q bb et ed. 1 restituimus, Vat. male *consequuntur*. Dein post *bona* eadem Vat. cum cod. cc interiicit *et revelare secreta*.

en: Verse 14, in which text the Vulgate prefixes *in ministerium* to the word *sunt*. — Soon, in place of *exsequuntur*, which we have restored from codices P Q bb and edition 1, the Vatican edition has wrongly *consequuntur*. Then after *bona* the same Vatican edition, with codex cc, inserts *et revelare secreta* ("and to reveal secrets").

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3. Pro *inveniuntur*, quod et in textu originali et in codd. P Q et in ed. 1 exhibetur, Vat. *invenitur*.

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 3. In place of *inveniuntur*, which is given both in the original text and in codices P Q and in edition 1, the Vatican edition has *invenitur*.

la: Pro *distinctionem* plurimi codd. *definitionem*, pauci cum Vat. *divisionem*; nostrae lectioni suffragantur codd. D P Q R Y cc et ed. 1 nec non contextus. Subinde post *de motu* non pauci codd. omittunt *quod*, et post pauca Vat. verbis *alio modo* praefigit *scilicet*.

en: In place of *distinctionem* very many codices have *definitionem*, a few with the Vatican *divisionem*; codices D P Q R Y cc, edition 1, and the context support our reading. Further on, after *de motu* not a few codices omit *quod*, and a little later the Vatican edition prefixes *scilicet* to the words *alio modo*.

la: Sensus est: si Angelus potest esse in terra sine corpore, et consequenter sola vi spirituali, sequitur, ut et sola vi spirituali possit se transferre in terram.

en: The sense is: if an angel can be on earth without a body, and consequently by spiritual power alone, it follows that by spiritual power alone he can transfer himself to earth.

la: Pro *aliud* cod. T *aliquid*.

en: In place of *aliud* codex T has *aliquid*.

la: Hoc sibi vult: indigentia dicit in subiecto indigenti vel privationem proprie dictam, scil. carentiam perfectionis debitae, vel simplicem negationem ulterioris perfectionis sive limitationem; prior non est in Angelo, sed tantum posterior. — Aliquanto superius pro *et suam* cod. V *ad suam*.

en: This is the meaning: "need" in the needy subject signifies either privation properly so called, namely the lack of a perfection that is owed, or simple negation of further perfection, that is, limitation; the former is not in an angel, but only the latter. — Somewhat above, in place of *et suam*, codex V has *ad suam*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Vestigia Magistri secutus, S. Doctor hic incidenter agit de motu Angelorum quoad locum. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis supponenda est doctrina de modo, quo Angeli sunt in loco, unde remittimus lectorem ad II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1–4. Sufficiat hic breviter annotasse, quod, licet omnes concedant, Angelos esse in loco non *circumscriptive*, sed *definitive*, tamen de ratione formali praesentiae Angelorum in loco mire discrepant scholae et etiam eiusdem scholae auctores. Praescindendo ab opinione eorum qui cum Vasquez putant Angelos etiam in puncto indivisibili esse posse, ad duas principales positiones multitudo opinionum reduci potest: scil. fundamentum praesentiae ponitur vel in applicatione virtutis Angelorum, vel non in operatione, sed in propria et finita substantia Angelorum. Prima sententia est S. Thomae, quae tamen a suis discipulis non eodem modo explicatur; secunda est Scoti, Richardi a Med. et aliorum plurimorum, cui favet modus loquendi S. Bonaventurae. — Notanda est etiam thesis ab Universitate Parisiensi tempore Alexandri Hal. reprobata: *Angelus in uno instanti potest esse in diversis locis, et etiam ubique si voluerit* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine).

**II.** Angelos non tantum *per accidens*, sed etiam *per se* moveri, aliter tamen ac corpora, contra Peripateticos cum theologorum communi sententia Seraphicus hic tenet et bene explicat. — In solut. ad 4. S. Doctor supponit, quod substantia spiritualis potest super se reflecti ac se ipsam movere, non tamen secundum idem (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; d. 25. p. I. q. 1.), et quod se active moveat ex parte formae, passive ex parte materiae. Quoad ultimum autem problematice loquitur addens: «Si habet materiam». Hoc respicit sententiam, quam ipse II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3. tanquam probabilem defendit, scil. quod etiam in Angelis aliquo modo distinctio materiae et formae admittenda sit.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 33. m. I. 3. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1; S. I. q. 53. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic p. II. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Following the footsteps of the Master, the holy Doctor here treats incidentally of the motion of the angels with respect to place. For the understanding of this question one must presuppose the doctrine of the manner in which angels are in a place, for which we refer the reader to *II Sent.* d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1–4. Let it suffice here briefly to note that, although all concede that the angels are in a place not *circumscriptively* but *definitively*, yet concerning the formal account of the angels' presence in a place the schools, and even authors of the same school, marvelously disagree. Setting aside the opinion of those who, with Vasquez, think that angels can even be in an indivisible point, the multitude of opinions can be reduced to two principal positions: namely, the foundation of presence is placed either in the application of the angels' power, or not in operation but in their proper and finite substance. The first opinion is that of St. Thomas, which however is not explained in the same way by his disciples; the second is that of Scotus, Richard of Mediavilla, and very many others, which the manner of speaking of St. Bonaventure favors. — There is also to be noted the thesis reproved by the University of Paris in the time of Alexander of Hales: *An angel can in one instant be in different places, and even everywhere if he wills it* (cfr. *II Sent.* d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. at the end).

**II.** That angels are moved not only *per accidens* but also *per se*, yet otherwise than bodies, the Seraphic Doctor here, against the Peripatetics, holds and well explains, with the common opinion of the theologians. — In the reply to 4 the holy Doctor supposes that a spiritual substance can reflect upon itself and move itself, yet not in the same respect (cfr. *II Sent.* d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; d. 25. p. I. q. 1.), and that it moves itself actively on the part of form, passively on the part of matter. As to the last point, however, he speaks only problematically, adding: "If it has matter." This regards the opinion which he himself defends as probable in *II Sent.* d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3., namely, that even in angels some sort of distinction of matter and form is to be admitted.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 33. m. I. 3. — Scotus, *II Sent.* d. 2. q. 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 4. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 22. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 5. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the two following questions here p. II. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 4. — Biel, on this and the following questions here q. 3.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Angelus moveatur per medium.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Angelus moveatur per medium, vel non. Et quod per medium, videtur.

1. Damascenus dicit, quod «Angelus cito pertransit velocitate et potestate naturae»[^1]: sed pertransire est per medium transire: ergo etc.

2. Item, cum Angelus movetur a termino *a quo* ad terminum *in quem*, aut movetur in termino *a quo*, aut in termino *in quem*[^2]; sed in termino *a quo* est non motum esse; in termino vero *in quem* est motum esse: ergo cum moveri sit medium inter utrumque, oportet quod sit in spatio intermedio.

3. Item, quod possit moveri per medium, videtur, quia certum est, quod Angelus existens Parisius[^3], potest esse Romae, eadem virtute et in quolibet intermedio loco, et prius in propinquiori et deinde in singulis locis consequenter se habentibus; sed hoc est transire per medium: ergo etc.

4. Item, quandocumque inter aliqua extrema cadit medium, quod habet naturalem ordinem ad extrema, impossibile est, quod agens virtutis finitae possit pervenire ab extremo in extremum sine medio, ut patet — quia inter album et nigrum est medius color, impossibile est, quod aliquod agens creatum faciat de albo nigrum quin faciat per colorem medium[^4] — sed inter caelum et terram naturali ordine sunt alia corpora media: ergo impossibile est, quod a caelo in terram fiat sive moveatur sine medii transitione.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus *super Genesim ad litteram*, et Magister ponit in littera[^5]: *Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempora, non per loca:* ergo quamvis fiat de uno loco in alium, hoc non est per locum medium.

2. Item, conclusio probata est in *sexto Physicorum*[^6], quod impossibile est, impartibile moveri super magnitudinem; sed Angelus, non assumto corpore, est impartibilis: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia, si pertransit, aut ergo per simplicia, aut per composita: si per composita, ergo est compositus; si per simplicia; sed illa sunt infinita in quolibet continuo, et impossibile est infinita pertransire: ergo etc.

4. Item, si per simplicia; sed ex simplicibus non fit aliquod continuum[^7]: ergo motus ille non erit continuus, ergo pertranseundo illa nunquam pertransit spatium: ergo si per medium movetur, nunquam pervenit ad terminum.

5. Item, «impossibile est, quod aliquid pertranseat spatium maius se, quin prius pertranseat spatium minus vel aequale»[^8]: ergo si spiritus angelicus transit per spatium, prius transit aequale sibi vel minus quam maius. Sed aequale simplici non est nisi simplex; sed simplex additum simplici non facit maius: ergo in primo transitu tantum est, ac si nihil transeat, similiter nec in secundo transitu, ergo nec in tertio: et sic nunquam pertransit spatium aliquantum.

### Conclusio.

> *Rationabiliter dicitur, quod Angelus per medium movetur.*

**Respondeo:** Notandum est hic, quod circa hoc diversimode dixerunt diversi.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod cum Angelus sit simplex, non potest medium pertransire; unde movetur ab extremo in extremum sine medio, et omnis locus, ad quem movetur, se habet ad illum per modum immediati. Unde loci mutatio in Angelo non est motus, sed mutatio tantum sine medio. — Sed ista positio non videtur conveniens. Certum enim est, quod Angelus, qui est custos hominis, potest ita custodire, quod non deserat ipsum, et sine corpore custodire potest: ergo potest inseparabiliter comitari eum: ergo homo cum vadit per medium, et Angelus non deserit eum, pariter et Angelus vadit per medium.

Et ideo fuerunt alii qui dixerunt, quod Angelus et per medium et sine medio potest moveri, quia motus eius est ad nutum suae voluntatis secundum virtutem divinitus sibi collatam; et ideo, cum vult, facit se in extremum immediate, et cum vult, pertransit. Et ponunt simile, quod intellectus noster potest cogitare de Parisius et de Roma dupliciter: aut ita quod immediate cogitet de uno et post de alio, vel ita, quod primo de uno et post de via et tertio de tertio. Et quia Angelo ita facile est ferri, sicut nobis cogitare, cum non sit alligatus corpori, dicunt, quod sic et sic habet moveri. — Sed quidquid sit de positione, exemplum non est conveniens: quoniam cogitans penes se habet speciem Romae et speciem Parisiorum, nec ista habent situm in anima nec ordinem secundum situm, immo quaelibet aequaliter est praesens aspectui; et ideo ad libitum potest de una et alia cogitare. Sed in re est ordo et situs naturalis, et necessario interiacet medium inter unam civitatem et aliam. Et propter hoc exemplum illud non est conveniens, nec propter hoc aperitur nobis via ad intelligendum.

Et quoniam illud est intelligibile aliquo modo, quod feratur per medium, et ratio concordat et auctoritas; ideo videtur rationabiliter illud esse dicendum. Sed illud membrum, quod dicit, quod possit sine medio, arbitror reiiciendum, non quia asseram esse falsum, sed quia non est auctoritas in promptu, quae hoc dicat, et ratio non cogit, immo non capit. Possibile tamen est, quod Deus aliquid dederit substantiis illis spiritualibus, quod carnales intellectus non capiunt. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod Angelus moveatur per medium.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Deus non movet per locum Angelum; dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo secundum intellectum Augustini: quod patet ex littera. Ipse enim spiritum dixit non moveri per loca, quia *proprietates loci*, scilicet circumscriptionem et dimensionem, non obtinet, cum transfertur de loco ad locum; sed *proprietatem temporis*, quae est variatio et innovatio aliqua, vere et proprie admittit spiritus. Nam novae affectiones succedunt spiritibus per naturam et cogitationes, et

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ulterius illae intenduntur et remittuntur, ita quod vere potest esse partibilitas a parte formae sive proprietatis acquirendae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod impartibile non movetur supra magnitudinem; dicendum, quod Philosophus probat et concludit de impartibili, quod habet situm in magnitudine, quod est impartibile et situatur in impartibili. Hoc non potest moveri supra magnitudinem, quia si movetur, movetur ad acquirendum situm; et quod acquiritur per motum, acquiritur, ita quod pars post partem; et situs impartibilis non potest acquiri, ita quod pars post partem acquiratur: et ideo verum est, quod tale impartibile non potest moveri supra ipsam magnitudinem. Sed Angelus tale impartibile est, quod non habet situm in impartibili, nec est dicere, quod Angelus sit in loco impartibili, sicut patebit: et ideo demonstrationes Philosophi non habent hic locum.

3. 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut pertransit per simplicia, aut per composita; respondendum est, quod transit per *composita*, quia non est in loco simplici, sed composito; hoc suppono ad praesens, sed suo loco probabitur. Nec valet: transit per composita, ergo est compositus, sicut nec valet: anima est in composito, ergo est composita: quia sic est in illo, ut non sit pars in parte, sed ipsum totum simplex sit in qualibet parte, ita tamen quod illae partes sint unus locus.

Posset tamen dici, si quis vellet se huiusmodi implicare, quod etiamsi pertransiret per simplicia, tamen non propter hoc pertransiret infinita. Et hoc patet, quia si quis imaginetur, sphaeram moveri super planum, non tangit nisi in puncto: ergo non tangit nisi per simplicia, nec tamen pertransit infinita actu, quoniam sphaera illa fertur super planum et non quiescit in quolibet situ; et ita nulli puncto se commetitur, sed nec numerat puncta in illo, sed cum sit in continua latione, respicit illa indivisibilia ut unita, et ita ut sunt in continuo; et sic, cum continuum sit finitum actu et infinitum in potentia, et illa potentia non reducatur ad actum, non pertransit infinita actu, quia non respicit illa ut actu numerata. — Verumtamen, quia exemplum habet calumniam, et dictum non videtur esse consonum dicto Philosophi, qui omnino dicit, impartibile non moveri; priori responsioni magis adhaereo.

5. Et per illam patet sequens. Obiicit enim ac si Angelus esset in puncto, quod omnino falsum credo, quia non esset in loco, cum punctus non sit locus, nec sit actu in continuo. Sed hoc totum melius patebit in *secundo libro*.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether the angel is moved through a medium.*

Secondly it is asked whether the angel is moved through a medium, or not. And that he is moved through a medium, is shown.

1. Damascene says that "the angel quickly passes through, by the swiftness and power of his nature"[^1]: but to pass through is to pass through a medium: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, when the angel is moved from a *terminus from-which* to a *terminus to-which*, either he is moved at the *terminus from-which*, or at the *terminus to-which*[^2]; but at the *terminus from-which* it is not-to-have-been-moved; whereas at the *terminus to-which* it is to-have-been-moved: therefore, since to be moved is the middle between the two, it must be that he is in an intermediate space.

3. Likewise, that he can be moved through a medium is seen, because it is certain that the angel, while at Paris[^3], can be at Rome by the same power, and at any intermediate place — and first at the nearer place and then at the several places successively — but this is to pass through a medium: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, whenever between any extremes there falls a medium which has a natural order to the extremes, it is impossible that an agent of finite power should arrive from one extreme to the other without the medium, as is plain — for between white and black there is an intermediate color, and it is impossible that any created agent should make black from white without making it through the intermediate color[^4] — but between heaven and earth there are by natural order other bodies as media: therefore it is impossible that anything should come from heaven to earth, or be moved, without traversing the medium.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine *On Genesis according to the letter*, and the Master places it in the *littera*[^5]: *God moves spiritual creature through times, not through places:* therefore, although he passes from one place to another, this is not through a middle place.

2. Likewise, the conclusion is proved in the *sixth [book] of the Physics*[^6], that it is impossible that an indivisible be moved over a magnitude; but the angel, with no body assumed, is indivisible: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears that, if he passes through, then either through simples or through composites: if through composites, then he is composite; if through simples — but these are infinite in any continuum, and it is impossible to traverse infinites: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if through simples; but out of simples no continuum is made[^7]: therefore that motion will not be continuous, therefore by passing through them he never traverses a space: therefore if he is moved through a medium, he never reaches the terminus.

5. Likewise, "it is impossible that anything traverse a space greater than itself, unless it has first traversed a space less than or equal to itself"[^8]: therefore if the angelic spirit passes through a space, he first passes through one equal to himself or less than the greater. But what is equal to a simple is nothing but a simple; and a simple added to a simple does not make something greater: therefore in the first traversal there is just as much, as if nothing were traversed, and likewise in the second traversal, therefore not in the third either: and thus he never traverses any space at all.

### Conclusion.

> *It is reasonably said that the angel is moved through a medium.*

**I respond:** It must be noted here that, concerning this, different writers have spoken in different ways.

For some have said that, since the angel is simple, he cannot pass through a medium; whence he is moved from one extreme to the other without a medium, and every place to which he is moved is related to him in the manner of an immediate. Hence change of place in the angel is not a motion, but only a change without a medium. — But this position does not seem fitting. For it is certain that the angel who is the guardian of a man can guard him so as not to abandon him, and can guard him without a body: therefore he can accompany him inseparably: therefore, when a man goes through a medium, and the angel does not abandon him, equally the angel goes through the medium.

And therefore there were others who said that the angel can be moved both through a medium and without a medium, since his motion is at the bidding of his will according to the power divinely conferred on him; and therefore, when he wills, he places himself at the extreme immediately, and when he wills, he passes through. And they put forward an example, that our intellect can think of Paris and of Rome in two ways: either in such a way that it thinks immediately of one and afterwards of the other, or in such a way that it thinks first of one and afterwards of the way and thirdly of the third. And because for the angel motion is as easy as thinking is for us, since he is not bound to a body, they say that thus and thus he has to be moved. — But whatever is to be said of the position, the example is not fitting: because the thinker has within himself the species of Rome and the species of Paris, and these have no situation in the soul nor any order according to situation, but rather each is equally present to the gaze; and therefore at will he can think of the one or the other. But in reality there is a natural order and situation, and necessarily there lies a medium between one city and another. And on this account that example is not fitting, nor is a way opened to us through it for understanding.

And since it is in some way intelligible that he be carried through a medium, and reason agrees and authority too; therefore it seems reasonable that this should be said. But that limb [of the alternative] which says that he could [be moved] without a medium, I judge ought to be rejected — not because I would assert it false, but because there is no authority at hand which says this, and reason does not compel, indeed does not grasp [it]. It is, however, possible that God may have given to those spiritual substances something which carnal intellects do not grasp. — Therefore the reasons proving that the angel is moved through a medium ought to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that God does not move the angel through place; it must be said that force is to be done to the word according to Augustine's understanding: which appears from the *littera*. For he himself said that the spirit is not moved through places, because *the properties of place* — namely circumscription and dimension — it does not have, when transferred from place to place; but *the property of time*, which is some variation and innovation, the spirit truly and properly admits. For new affections succeed in spirits by nature and thoughts, and

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further they are intensified and remitted, so that there can truly be partibility on the side of form or of property to be acquired.

2. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that an indivisible is not moved over a magnitude; it must be said that the Philosopher proves and concludes about an indivisible which has a situation in a magnitude, that it is indivisible and is situated in an indivisible. This cannot be moved over a magnitude, because if it is moved, it is moved to acquire a situation; and what is acquired through motion is acquired in such a way that part comes after part; and the situation of the indivisible cannot be acquired in such a way that part is acquired after part: and therefore it is true that such an indivisible cannot be moved over the magnitude itself. But the angel is such an indivisible as does not have a situation in an indivisible, nor is it to be said that the angel is in an indivisible place, as will be made plain: and therefore the demonstrations of the Philosopher do not have a place here.

3. 4. To that which is asked: whether he passes through simples or through composites; the answer is that he passes through *composites*, since he is not in a simple place but in a composite [place]; this I suppose for the present, but in its [own] place it will be proved. Nor is it valid to say: he passes through composites, therefore he is composite — just as it is not valid to say: the soul is in a composite, therefore it is composite: because it is in it in such a way that there is no part in a part, but the simple itself as a whole is in any part, in such a way nevertheless that those parts are one place.

It could however be said, if anyone wished to embarrass himself with this kind [of objection], that even if he were to pass through simples, he would not on this account pass through infinites. And this appears thus: that if anyone imagine a sphere being moved over a plane, it does not touch except in a point: therefore it does not touch except through simples, and yet it does not actually traverse infinites — since that sphere is carried over the plane and does not rest in any situation; and so it commensurates itself with no point, but neither does it count the points in [the plane], but, since it is in continuous motion, it regards those indivisibles as united, and so as they are in a continuum; and thus, since the continuum is actually finite and infinite in potency, and that potency is not reduced to act, it does not actually traverse infinites, since it does not regard them as actually numbered. — Nevertheless, since the example bears a charge against it, and the saying does not seem consonant with the saying of the Philosopher, who absolutely says that an indivisible is not moved; I adhere rather to the prior response.

5. And by it the next [objection] is plain. For he objects as if the angel were in a point — which I believe is altogether false, since he would not be in a place, since a point is not a place, nor is it actually in the continuum. But all this will be made better plain in the *second book*.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 13.

en: Book I, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 13.

la: Anselm., *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. c. 11; *Unde (voluntas) dici potest instrumentum se ipsum movens.* Cfr. et supra d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. — Mox post *etiam movens* codd. T X repetunt *potest*, et subinde pro *esse* Vat. cum aliquibus mss. substituit *est*. Vat. tertium membrum adiungit *aut in spatio intermedio*. Cfr. de hoc argumento Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 7. (c. 1.).

en: Anselm, *On the Concordance of the Foreknowledge of God with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 11; *Whence (the will) can be called an instrument moving itself.* See also above d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. — Just after *etiam movens* codices T X repeat *potest*, and shortly after, in place of *esse*, the Vatican edition with some manuscripts substitutes *est*. The Vatican edition adds a third member, *or in an intermediate space*. On this argument see Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 7 (c. 1).

la: Codd. cum ed. I *Parisius*.

en: The codices, with the first edition, read *Parisius*.

la: Vide Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 32. (c. 4.). — Paulo inferius pro *fiat* Vat. *veniat*. In cod. V verbo *fiat* adiungitur *motus*.

en: See Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 32 (c. 4). — A little below, in place of *fiat* the Vatican reads *veniat*. In codex V the word *motus* is added to *fiat*.

la: Hic c. 6.

en: Here, c. 6.

la: Text. 86–90. (c. 10.), ubi plures rationes afferuntur. Verbum *impartibile* accipe «indivisibile secundum quantitatem», ut Aristot. interpretatur loc. cit., et verbis *super magnitudinem* subiice notionem: spatium extensum.

en: Texts 86–90 (c. 10), where several reasons are adduced. The word *impartibile* is to be taken as "indivisible according to quantity," as Aristotle interprets at the cited place; and beneath the words *super magnitudinem* understand the notion: extended space.

la: Aristot., I. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 35. (c. 5.), et III. text. 19. (c. 2.). — Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 1, et XI. *Metaph.* c. 9. (X. c. 10.).

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 35 (c. 5), and III, text 19 (c. 2). — Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 1, and *Metaphysics* XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10).

la: Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 89. (c. 10.). — Mox post *prius transit* codd. aa bb addunt *per spatium*. — Cfr. et Aristot., III. *Metaph.* text. 16. (II. c. 4.): *Cetera quodammodo quidem addita facient maius… punctum vero et unitas minime, sed plus efficit.* Cfr. I. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 8. (c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 89 (c. 10). — Just after *prius transit*, codices aa bb add *per spatium*. — See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, text 16 (II, c. 4): *Other things, in some way, when added do make something greater… but a point and a unity by no means, but [the addition] makes more.* See also *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 8 (c. 2).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro hac quaestione solvenda distinguendus est duplex motus, scil. *continuus*, quo mobile successive per partes deserit terminum *a quo* et per partes acquirit terminum *ad quem*, et *non continuus* (discretus), quo mobile deserit totum simul terminum *a quo* et immediate acquirit totum terminum *ad quem*. Modus continuus implicat transitum per loca intermedia; sed motus non continuus hunc transitum excludit, unde potius simplex mutatio loci quam motus esse videtur.

S. Bonav. hic loquitur tantum de motu Angelorum secundum modum eis naturalem, praescindendo a potentia divina. Circa hanc quaestionem tres hic ponuntur opiniones. Prima, quae hic et communiter reprobatur, asserit, Angelos non posse se movere nisi motu non continuo; secunda e contrario asserit, non nisi motu continuo; tertia vero utroque modo. Tertiam sententiam docet S. Thomas secundum principia, quae habet circa modum, quo Angeli sunt in loco. Secundam tenent Alex. Hal. et fere omnes extra scholam S. Thomae. Hanc cum quadam restrictione praefert S. Bonav., et quidem ob rationes attentione dignas. Scotus autem secundam opinionem cum distinctione approbat. Distinguit enim extrema in extrema continua, sive quae in toto loco virtuti Angeli adaequato includuntur, et extrema ita distantia, ut habeant medium distinctum ab extremis. His suppositis, docet, in loco cum extremis continuis Angelos posse, si velint, se movere sive locum mutare, non transito medio; in aliis vero «videtur probabiliter, quod non», ut ait *II. Sent.* d. 2. q. 12. n. 3.

**II.** Pro intelligentia solutionis ad 2. notanda est definitio puncti, quam habet Aristoteles (*I. de Anima*, text. 68, vide in hac pagina notam): «Punctum unitas est positionem habens». Tota solutio huius difficultatis fundata est in distinctione inter indivisibile (impartibile) in se et quoad locum, ut punctum, et inter indivisibile in se quidem, sed quoad virtutem occupandi locum quasi virtualiter divisibile, ut anima, quae, indivisibilis in se, coexistit quantitati totius corporis. Axioma Aristotelis verum est relate ad primum divisibile (cfr. *II. Sent.* d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3, et S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 53. a. 1. ad 1.). — Secunda solutio ad ult. eruitur ex hoc principio, quod quando corpus movetur per locum compositum per puncta indivisibilia et in potentia infinita, non movetur motu non continuo ab uno tali puncto ad aliud. Tunc enim sequeretur, ut observat S. Thom. (*loc. cit.* a. 2.), quod «vel non transeat omnia media vel quod actu numeret media infinita; quod est impossibile». Sed manifestum est, illud moveri motu continuo et per loca media, quae in potentia sunt infinita, sed actu sunt unita ad unum continuum finitum formandum.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 33. m. 2. — Scot., *II. Sent.* d. 2. q. 12. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. *princ.* q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the solution of this question a twofold motion is to be distinguished, namely *continuous*, by which a mobile successively, by parts, deserts the *terminus from-which* and by parts acquires the *terminus to-which*; and *not continuous* (discrete), by which a mobile deserts the whole *terminus from-which* at once and immediately acquires the whole *terminus to-which*. The continuous mode implies a transit through intermediate places; but the not-continuous motion excludes this transit, whence it seems rather a simple change of place than a motion.

S. Bonav. here speaks only of the motion of angels according to the mode natural to them, prescinding from the divine power. On this question three opinions are here set down. The first, which is here and commonly reproved, asserts that angels cannot move themselves except by a not-continuous motion; the second, on the contrary, asserts they can do so only by a continuous motion; but the third, by either mode. The third opinion S. Thomas teaches according to the principles he holds concerning the manner in which angels are in a place. The second is held by Alex. Hal. and almost all outside the school of S. Thomas. This, with a certain restriction, S. Bonav. prefers, and indeed for reasons worthy of attention. Scotus, however, approves the second opinion with a distinction. For he distinguishes extremes in continuous extremes — that is, those which are included in the whole place adequate to the angel's power — and extremes so distant that they have a medium distinct from the extremes. These things being supposed, he teaches that in a place with continuous extremes the angels can, if they will, move themselves or change place without traversing a medium; but in others "it seems probable that not", as he says in *II. Sent.* d. 2. q. 12. n. 3.

**II.** For the understanding of the solution to [arg.] 2., the definition of point that Aristotle has (*I. de Anima*, text. 68; see the note on this page) is to be noted: "A point is a unity having position." The whole solution of this difficulty is founded on the distinction between the indivisible (impartible) in itself and as to place — like a point — and the indivisible which is so in itself indeed, but, with respect to the power of occupying place, virtually divisible — like the soul, which, indivisible in itself, coexists with the quantity of the whole body. Aristotle's axiom is true relative to the first kind of indivisible (cfr. *II. Sent.* d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 3, and S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 53. a. 1. ad 1.). — The second solution, to the last [objection], is drawn from this principle: that when a body is moved through a place composed of indivisible points and infinite in potency, it is not moved by a not-continuous motion from one such point to another. For then it would follow, as S. Thom. observes (*loc. cit.* a. 2.), that "either it would not pass through all the media, or it would actually number infinite media; which is impossible." But it is manifest that that thing is moved with continuous motion and through intermediate places, which are infinite in potency, but actually are united to form one finite continuum.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 33. m. 2. — Scot., *II. Sent.* d. 2. q. 12. — S. Thom., here q. 4. a. 2; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 23. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 2. — Ægid. R., here 2. *princ.* q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum Angelus pertranseat medium motu subito, vel successivo.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum spiritus angelicus pertranseat medium motu[^1] subito, vel successivo. Et quod successivo, videtur.

1. In aliquo instanti est in termino *a quo*, et in alio instanti est in termino *ad quem*[^2]; sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium, et in medio illorum instantium est moveri: ergo moveri ipsius Angeli est in tempore: ergo movetur motu successivo.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte spatii sic: Angelus, si pertransit medium in aliquo instanti, est in medio et in partibus medii; sed impossibile est, quod aliquod unum praeter Deum et corpus Christi simul et semel sit in pluribus locis: ergo impossibile est, quod Angelus in eodem instanti sit in toto medio et in fine: ergo non movetur subito: ergo necessario oportet, quod successive.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur a parte virtutis. Sicut vult Philosophus[^3], si tanta virtus movet in tanto tempore, et maior in minori, et maxima in minimo, et infinita in *nunc*, ergo secundum quod est virtus, secundum hoc velocior est motus; sed instans excedit tempus improportionabiliter: ergo et virtus, quae movet in instanti, superexcedit illam, quae movet in tempore in infinitum. Sed nulla virtus creata superexcedit aliam in infinitum, et virtus angelica est creata: ergo cum omnis motus naturalis localis sit successivus, patet quod motus Angeli sit successivus.

4. Item, si Angelus movetur, aut ergo motus ille est vere motus, aut mutatio[^4]. Si mutatio: ergo generatio, vel corruptio, quod constat esse falsum. Si motus; sed omnis motus proprie dictus habet prius et posterius, et situm et tempus, et omne tale est successivum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in libro *Quinque Responsionum*[^5]: «Radius non citius pervenit ad loca propinquiora quam ad loca remotiora», et constat quod pertransit medium: ergo si virtus angelica non est minus potens, sed magis, patet etc.

2. Item, Philosophus[^6] probat, «quod si esset vacuum, non esset motus»; sed idem facit ipsum spatium Angelo, quod facit vacuum corpori moto, quia ei nullo modo resistit, sicut nec vacuum: ergo videtur, quod ipse Angelus subito ipsum pertranseat.

3. Item, omne quod successive movetur, partim est in termino *a quo*, partim in termino *ad quem*[^7]; sed omne tale est partibile: ergo necesse est, Angelum esse partibilem, aut non movetur successive.

4. Item, omne quod simul se transfert et totum simul, non successive movetur; sed Angelus simul se transfert, cum sit omnino simplex: ergo in instanti, et non successive movetur.

5. Item, motus successivus est compositus et accidens, et nullum accidens compositum est in subiecto simplici; sed Angelus est simplex: ergo non est subiectum motus successivi, sed mobile est subiectum motus, ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Angelus movetur per medium successivo motu, ratione distantiae spatii et ratione finitae virtutis moventis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc senserunt aliqui diversimode.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod quia Angelus est simplex, et spatium compositum, quod tam Angelus quam eius virtus est spatio improportionabilis[^8]; et ideo virtus eius omnino vincit supra spatium, adeo quod subito et motu improportionabili spatium pertransit, et est huiusmodi motus supra

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naturam. — Sed quoniam difficile videtur intelligere, quod pertranseat medium, quin sit in pluribus partibus medii; et ponere, quod subito moveatur et sit in pluribus partibus medii, est ponere in illo motu, quod sit in pluribus locis simul; et hoc omnino absurdum est dicere de Angelo, sicut dicunt Sancti, et philosophi et doctores catholici in hoc concordant: ideo dicendum est, quod Angelus non movetur per medium motu subito, sed successivo.

Propter quod notandum, quod in motu, qui successivus est successione perfecta, est successio ex quadruplici causa: prima est medii distantia, secunda medii resistentia, tertia est partibilitas mobilis, quarta est finitas virtutis, eo quod finitae virtutis proprie est movere in tempore, maxime per medium[^9]. Concedendum est igitur, quod motus Angeli per medium non est perfecta successione successivus, quia deficit ibi resistentia spatii et partibilitas mobilis; est tamen successivus ratione distantiae spatii, in qua non potest esse simul per totam, et finitatis virtutis moventis, quae non excedit medium improportionabiliter, ideo nec facit motum improportionalem medio omnino. — Et concedendae sunt rationes probantes, motum illum per spatium esse successivum. Tamen prima ratio sophistica est; sed alibi dissolvetur cum agetur de transitione panis in corpus Christi, ubi habet locum suum[^10].

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod radius non citius pervenit; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur secundum perceptionem sensus[^11], quia sensus non percipit, radium citius pervenire ad propinquiora loca quam ad remotiora, non quia secundum rem non sit ibi vere prius et posterius. Unde si dicatur radius moveri subito, intelligitur subito pro repente, et repentinum dicitur illud quod habet moveri in tempore imperceptibili. — Sed aliter potest dici, quod lux subito movetur, quia motus lucis in medio non est motus localis tantum, sed est motus diffusionis, qui est generatio, sicut generatur idolum[^12] ab obiecto; et quia lux simul est et lucet, simul cum est, generat splendorem, et ita in eodem instanti: similiter de illo intelligi potest, et sic deinceps. Unde si simul esset homo et generaret, in primo instanti fuisset mundus plenus hominibus. Hoc modo potest respondere qui nescit melius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de vacuo, quod si esset vacuum, non esset motus; dicendum, quod circa hoc multi multa dixerunt, quorum dicta longum esset dicere. Nunc autem, sustinendo Philosophum, dici potest, quod si esset vacuum, non esset motus successivus, recte intellecto vacuo, secundum quod credo Philosophum intelligere, quod dicit simpliciter privationem: si est vacuum ibi — ubi intelligimus vacuum, ibi intelligimus nihil esse — ergo non solum deest corporis resistentia, verum etiam nulla distantia est ibi; ubi autem nulla distantia est, non est prope nec longe; ubi autem est motus localis, necessario est approximatio vel elongatio: ergo si est vacuum, non est motus, non propter defectum resistentiae, sed distantiae. Sed quoniam medium comparatum ad Angelum habet rationem distantiae, quia vere facit distantiam inter extrema, ideo sufficit ad successionem qualemcumque propter distantiam; sed ubi est vacuum, non est distantia, et haec praeexigitur necessario ad motum localem. Partibilitas enim mobilis et finitas virtutis non faciunt successionem, nisi sit prius et posterius in magnitudine, supra quam est, sive in eo quod acquiritur per motum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod movetur successive, partim est in termino *a quo*, et partim in termino *ad quem*; dicendum, quod in successivo, ubi est plena successio, est ponere partem et partem et quantum ad magnitudinem substratam, et quantum ad magnitudinem motam et quantum ad dispositionem acquisitam. Quia naturalis motus ad situm est motus ad formam quodam modo; sed in motu Angeli non est successio secundum omnimodam completionem, et ideo non

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secundum omnes has differentias, sed solum secundum prioritatem et posterioritatem magnitudinis supra quam[^13]. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod partim est in termino *a quo*, partim in termino *ad quem*, hoc non est secundum diversitatem partium mobilis, sed est solum per accessum et recessum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simul se transfert totum: dicendum, quod quamvis ex parte sua se totum simul transferat, non tamen transfert se simul super totum, propter distantiam medii, in qua tota non potest esse simul.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod compositum accidens non potest esse in re simplici; dicendum, quod verum est de composito, quod habet partes actu: sed de composito, quod est in successione, non est verum. Sicut enim duratio successiva potest esse in Angelo, secundum quod manet, eo quod de illa nunquam est nisi *nunc*, ita motus successivus potest esse in eo, secundum quod fertur; et hoc quidem secum nullum habet inconveniens. His visis, patent obiecta.

Est enim praedictorum summa, quod Angelus movetur sine corpore assumto, et quod movetur in medio sive per medium, et quod movetur motu successivo, licet non omnimoda successione composito, ut praedictum est.

english:
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### Question III.
#### *Whether the Angel passes through the medium by a sudden or by a successive motion.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether the angelic spirit passes through the medium by a sudden motion[^1] or by a successive [motion]. And that [it does so] successively, [the following] is seen.

1. In one instant it is in the term *from which* (*a quo*), and in another instant it is in the term *to which* (*ad quem*)[^2]; but between any two instants there falls an intermediate time, and in the middle of those instants there is being-moved: therefore the being-moved of the Angel itself is in time: therefore it is moved by a successive motion.

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown on the part of the space, thus: the Angel, if it passes through the medium in some instant, is in the medium and in the parts of the medium; but it is impossible that any one [thing] except God and the body of Christ be at one and the same time in several places: therefore it is impossible that the Angel be in the same instant in the whole medium and at the end: therefore it is not moved suddenly: therefore necessarily it must [be moved] successively.

3. Likewise, this is shown on the part of [its] power. As the Philosopher holds[^3], if such-and-such a power moves in such-and-such a time, and a greater [power] in less [time], and the greatest in the least, and an infinite [power] in the *now*, then according as [something] is power, accordingly its motion is faster; but the instant exceeds time disproportionately: therefore also the power which moves in an instant exceeds, by an infinite [degree], that which moves in time. But no created power exceeds another infinitely, and the angelic power is created: therefore since every natural local motion is successive, it is plain that the Angel's motion is successive.

4. Likewise, if the Angel is moved, then either that motion is truly motion, or [it is] a *mutatio* (change)[^4]. If a *mutatio*: then [it is] generation or corruption, which is plainly false. If motion; but every motion properly so called has a before and an after, and place and time, and every such [thing] is successive: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the book *Five Responses*[^5]: "A ray does not arrive at nearer places more quickly than at remoter places", and it is plain that it passes through the medium: therefore if the angelic power is not less powerful, but more, the conclusion is plain etc.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher[^6] proves "that if there were a vacuum, there would be no motion"; but the same [thing] which a vacuum does for a moved body, the very space does for the Angel, since it in no way resists it, just as neither does a vacuum: therefore it seems that the Angel itself passes through it suddenly.

3. Likewise, everything which is moved successively is partly in the term *from which*, partly in the term *to which*[^7]; but every such [thing] is partible: therefore it is necessary either that the Angel be partible, or [that] it not be moved successively.

4. Likewise, everything which transfers itself all-at-once and as-a-whole-at-once is not moved successively; but the Angel transfers itself all-at-once, since it is wholly simple: therefore in an instant, and not successively, is it moved.

5. Likewise, successive motion is something composite and an accident, and no composite accident is in a simple subject; but the Angel is simple: therefore it is not the subject of successive motion, but the *mobile* is the subject of motion, therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The Angel is moved through the medium by a successive motion, by reason of the distance of the space and by reason of the finite power of the mover.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that on this [matter] some have held diverse views.

For some have said that, since the Angel is simple, and space composite, both the Angel and his power are disproportionate to space[^8]; and therefore his power altogether prevails over the space, to such a degree that he passes through the space suddenly and by a disproportionate motion, and such a motion is above

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nature. — But since it seems difficult to understand that he passes through the medium without being in several parts of the medium; and to posit that he is moved suddenly and is in several parts of the medium is to posit, in that motion, that he be in several places at once; and this is altogether absurd to say of the Angel, as the Saints say, and the philosophers and the Catholic doctors agree on this: therefore it must be said, that the Angel is not moved through the medium by a sudden motion, but by a successive [motion].

On account of which it should be noted, that in motion which is successive with perfect succession, the succession comes from a fourfold cause: the first is the distance of the medium, the second the resistance of the medium, the third is the partibility of the *mobile*, the fourth is the finitude of the power, since to a finite power it properly belongs to move in time, especially through a medium[^9]. It must be conceded therefore, that the Angel's motion through the medium is not successive with perfect succession, since there fails there the resistance of the space and the partibility of the *mobile*; it is nevertheless successive by reason of the distance of the space, in which he cannot be all at once throughout the whole, and by [reason of] the finitude of the moving power, which does not exceed the medium disproportionately, and therefore does not produce a motion altogether disproportionate to the medium. — And the reasons proving that motion through space [to be] successive must be conceded. Yet the first reason is sophistical; but it will be resolved elsewhere, when treatment is made of the transition of the bread into the body of Christ, where it has its [proper] place[^10].

1. To that, then, which is objected, that a ray does not arrive more quickly; it must be said, that Augustine speaks according to the perception of sense[^11], because sense does not perceive that a ray arrives more quickly at nearer places than at more distant ones, not because in fact there is not truly a before and after there. Hence if the ray be said to be moved suddenly, "suddenly" is to be understood for "instantly" (*pro repente*), and "instantaneous" (*repentinum*) is said of that which is to be moved in an imperceptible time. — But it can be said otherwise, that light is moved suddenly, since the motion of light in the medium is not only local motion, but is a motion of diffusion, which is generation, just as an *idolum* (*image*)[^12] is generated from an object; and since light is and shines simultaneously, simultaneously with its being it generates splendor, and so in the same instant: similarly the like can be understood [of the splendor], and so on. Hence if a man simultaneously [were] and generated [men], in the first instant the world would be full of men. In this way may answer one who knows no better.

2. To that which is objected concerning the vacuum, that if there were a vacuum, there would be no motion; it must be said, that on this [matter] many have said many things, and to recount their sayings would be long. But now, sustaining the Philosopher, it can be said that, if there were a vacuum, there would not be successive motion, the vacuum being rightly understood, in the sense in which I believe the Philosopher to understand it, [taking it] as he says, simply [as] a privation: if there is a vacuum there — where we understand a vacuum, there we understand nothing to be — therefore not only does the resistance of body fail, but also there is no distance there at all; but where there is no distance, there is neither near nor far; but where there is local motion, necessarily there is approach or recession: therefore if there is a vacuum, there is no motion, not on account of a defect of resistance, but of distance. But since the medium, compared to the Angel, has the character of distance, since it truly makes a distance between the extremes, therefore it suffices for some succession or other on account of the distance; but where there is a vacuum, there is no distance, and this is necessarily required beforehand for local motion. For the partibility of the *mobile* and the finitude of the power do not produce succession, unless there be a before and an after in the magnitude over which [the motion] is, or in that which is acquired through motion.

3. To that which is objected, that what is moved successively is partly in the term *from which* and partly in the term *to which*; it must be said, that in [a motion] successive, where there is full succession, one must posit a part-and-part both as regards the underlying magnitude, and as regards the magnitude moved-through, and as regards the disposition acquired. Since natural motion to *situs* (place) is motion to a form in a certain way; but in the motion of an Angel there is not succession according to every kind of completeness, and therefore not

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according to all these differences, but only according to the priority and posteriority of the magnitude over which[^13]. — As to what is therefore said, that [a thing in motion] is partly in the term *from which*, partly in the term *to which*, this is not according to a diversity of parts of the *mobile*, but is only by approach and recession.

4. To that which is objected, that [the Angel] transfers itself wholly at once: it must be said, that, although on its own part it transfers the whole of itself at once, it does not however transfer itself simultaneously over the whole [space], because of the distance of the medium, in which it cannot be all at once throughout the whole.

5. To that which is objected, that a composite accident cannot be in a simple thing; it must be said, that this is true of [something] composite which has parts in act: but of [something] composite which is in succession, it is not true. For just as successive duration can be in the Angel, according as he abides — since of [that duration] there is never anything except the *now* — so successive motion can be in him, according as he is borne along; and this indeed has nothing inappropriate about it. With these things seen, the objections are clear.

For the sum of the foregoing is, that the Angel is moved without an assumed body, and [that] he is moved in or through the medium, and [that] he is moved by a successive motion, although [a motion] not composed by every kind of succession, as has been said.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. I *actu*, quae lectio non congruit cum rubrica huius articuli.

en: Very many codices with ed. 1 [read] *actu* (*in act*), a reading which does not agree with the rubric of this article.

la: Verbo *est* Vat. praefigit *simul*.

en: Before the word *est* the Vatican [edition] prefixes *simul*.

la: Colligi potest ex VI. *Phys.* text. 13. seqq. (c. 2.), et VIII. text. 79. seq. (c. 10.). — Circa finem argumenti post *naturalis* cod. T interiicit *et*.

en: [The point] can be gathered from VI *Physics* text 13 ff. (c. 2), and VIII text 79 ff. (c. 10). — Near the end of the argument, after *naturalis*, codex T inserts *et*.

la: Secundum Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 7-9. (c. 1.) omnis transmutatio vel est a non-subiecto in subiectum, vel a subiecto in non-subiectum, vel a subiecto in subiectum; vocatur generatio, secunda corruptio, tertia motus. Duas priores transmutationis species S. Doctor hic comprehendit vocabulo *mutatio*. De sententia mox allata, quod in motu proprie dicto sit prius et posterius, cfr. Aristot., IV. *Phys.* text. 99. (c. 11.). — Post verba *Si motus* Vat. omittit *sed omnis motus*, et inter *Si* et *motus* interiicit *omnis*.

en: According to Aristotle, V *Physics* text 7–9 (c. 1), every transmutation is either from non-subject to subject, or from subject to non-subject, or from subject to subject; [the first] is called generation, the second corruption, the third motion. The first two species of transmutation the Holy Doctor here comprehends under the word *mutatio*. On the sentence next adduced, that in motion properly so called there is a before and an after, cf. Aristotle, IV *Physics* text 99 (c. 11). — After the words *Si motus*, the Vatican [edition] omits *sed omnis motus*, and between *Si* and *motus* it inserts *omnis*.

la: *Quaest.* I. n. 5. (sive *Epist.* 102. ad Deogratias): *Ut enim radius oculi nostri non citius pervenit ad propinquiora, tardius ad longinquiora, sed utraque intervalla pari celeritate contingit*.

en: *Quaest.* I, n. 5 (or *Letter* 102, *to Deogratias*): "For just as a ray of our eye does not arrive more quickly at nearer [places], more slowly at farther ones, but reaches both intervals with equal speed."

la: Libr. IV. *Phys.* text. 66. seqq. (c. 8.).

en: Book IV *Physics* text 66 ff. (c. 8).

la: Cfr. Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 32. (c. 4.). Vide etiam ibid. text. 87. (c. 10.), ubi ipse Aristoteles ex sententia allata prima probat, impartibile non posse moveri.

en: Cf. Aristotle, VI *Physics* text 32 (c. 4). See also ibid., text 87 (c. 10), where Aristotle himself, from the sentence adduced, proves first that the impartible cannot be moved.

la: Cod. T *improportionalis*. Mox pro *vincit* cod. R *dicitur esse*, et paulo inferius pro *Sed quoniam* Vat. et alii codd. praeter cod. Y et ed. 1 *Et quoniam*.

en: Codex T [reads] *improportionalis*. Soon after, in place of *vincit*, codex R [reads] *dicitur esse*, and a little below, in place of *Sed quoniam*, the Vatican [edition] and other codices, except codex Y and ed. 1, [read] *Et quoniam*.

la: Prima et secunda causa successionis in motu ab Aristot. insinuatur IV. *Phys.* text. 66. seqq. (c. 8.), ubi ex defectu huius duplicis condicionis ostenditur, motum successivum in vacuo esse impossibilem. Duae alterae causae successionis in argumentis huius quaestionis breviter tactae sunt. — Contextu repugnante, Vat. et cod. cc hic addunt *Quinta potest esse finitas et limitatio mobilis*.

en: The first and second cause of succession in motion is intimated by Aristotle in IV *Physics* text 66 ff. (c. 8), where, from the defect of this twofold condition, it is shown that successive motion in a vacuum is impossible. The two other causes of succession have been briefly touched on in the arguments of this question. — Against the context, the Vatican [edition] and codex cc here add *Quinta potest esse finitas et limitatio mobilis* ("The fifth can be the finitude and limitation of the *mobile*").

la: Libr. IV. *Sent.* d. 11. p. 1. q. 3. ad 4, ubi fusius de hac difficultate agitur.

en: Book IV of the *Sentences*, d. 11, p. 1, q. 3, *ad* 4, where this difficulty is treated more fully.

la: Vat. cum non paucis mss. minus bene *perceptibilitatem sensus*, et dein *quod sensus* pro *quia sensus*. Pro nostra lectione militant codd. A T V, pro *quia sensus* etiam cod. X.

en: The Vatican [edition], with not a few manuscripts, less correctly [reads] *perceptibilitatem sensus*, and then *quod sensus* in place of *quia sensus*. For our reading codices A T V militate, [and] for *quia sensus* codex X also.

la: Graece εἴδωλον (imago, simulacrum, species) significat hic in genere speciem rem exprimentem. — Paulo ante pro *sed est motus* codd. A T *sed etiam motus*. — Intellige: *splendorem*. Pro *illo* Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et ed. 1. *alio*.

en: In Greek εἴδωλον (image, simulacrum, *species*) here signifies in general a *species* representing a thing. — A little before, in place of *sed est motus*, codices A T [read] *sed etiam motus*. — Understand: *splendorem* (*splendor*). In place of *illo*, the Vatican [edition] together with several codices and ed. 1 [read] *alio*.

la: Pro *si est* codd. A G S T V I aa ff cum ed. 1 *sed est*; cod. H *quod si est*, Vat. *si esset*, cod. X *quia*, qui et subinde omittit verba proxima *vacuum ibi*. — Haec et quae sequuntur, clarius dicta sunt in fine solutionis praecedentis obiectionis. — De motu *ad situm* et de motu *ad formam*, qui mox commemorantur, cfr. hic dub. 2. Motus *ad formam* in latiore sensu dicuntur illi, per quos res vel disponitur ad receptionem vel corruptionem formae substantialis vel ipsam formam substantialem recipit aut amittit. Et sunt quinque: generatio et corruptio, augmentatio et diminutio (quae ambae respiciunt quantitatem) et alteratio (quae respicit qualitatem et in se comprehendit *intensionem*, *remissionem* et *alterationem* specialiter dictam). In sensu strictiore excluduntur generatio et corruptio. Motum *ad situm* intellige motum localem sive mutationem secundum locum. Cfr. Aristot., de *Praedicam.* c. *de Motu*, et V. *Phys.* text. 9–17. (c. 1. seq.). — Mox post *quodam modo* in cod. Y additur *quia completio est formae* (*completior est forma*), *cum pervenit ad suum locum naturalem*.

en: In place of *si est*, codices A G S T V I aa ff with ed. 1 [read] *sed est*; codex H [reads] *quod si est*, the Vatican [edition] *si esset*, codex X *quia*, which also straightway omits the next words *vacuum ibi*. — These [things] and what follows are said more clearly at the end of the solution to the preceding objection. — Concerning motion *to situs* and motion *to form*, which are mentioned soon after, cf. here *dub.* 2. Motions *to form* in the broader sense are said [to be] those by which a thing is either disposed to the reception or corruption of a substantial form, or receives or loses the substantial form itself. And they are five: generation and corruption, augmentation and diminution (both of which regard quantity), and alteration (which regards quality and contains within itself *intension*, *remission*, and *alteration* in the specialized sense). In the stricter sense, generation and corruption are excluded. By motion *to situs* understand local motion or change with respect to place. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter *de Motu*, and V *Physics* text 9–17 (c. 1 f.). — Soon after *quodam modo*, in codex Y is added *quia completio est formae* (*completior est forma*), *cum pervenit ad suum locum naturalem* ("since the completion is of the form" / "the form is more complete", "when it has reached its natural place").

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Omnis motus continuus est etiam successivus, sed non e converso. Motus successivus enim opponitur instantaneo; continuus autem non continuo sive discreto.* — Prima opinio, in textu memorata, recte reprobatur, quia ex ipsa sequeretur, quod Angelus posset simul esse definitive in pluribus locis sibi adaequatis. Docet igitur Seraphicus, Angelum moveri non in instanti, sed motu successivo, qui tamen differt a motu successivo corporum, sicut explicatur in corp. et ad 3. Etiam S. Thomas (hic q. 4. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3.) negat, motum localem Angelorum, sive sit continuus sive non continuus, fieri posse in eodem instanti; sed quoad motum non continuum, quem ipse Angelo vindicat, aliis rationibus utitur. Scotus iuxta distinctionem in Scholio praeced. commemoratam, putat solam simplicem mutationem loci intra sphaeram loci Angelo adaequati in instanti fieri posse. — In *solut.* ad 1. observatione dignum videtur, S. Doctorem iam coniectasse, motum lucis non fieri in instanti. Alteram eiusdem obiectionis solutionem approbat S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3. ad 2.

**II.** Scot., II. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 14. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 24. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. *princ.*

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english_scholion:
**I.** *Every continuous motion is also successive, but not conversely. Successive motion indeed is opposed to instantaneous; continuous, however, to non-continuous or discrete.* — The first opinion, recorded in the text, is rightly rejected, because from it would follow that the Angel could be at the same time definitively in several places adequate to himself. The Seraphic [Doctor] therefore teaches, that the Angel is moved not in an instant, but by a successive motion, which however differs from the successive motion of bodies, as is explained in the body [of the article] and *ad* 3. St. Thomas too (here q. 4. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3.) denies, that the local motion of Angels, whether continuous or non-continuous, can take place in the same instant; but with respect to non-continuous motion, which he claims for the Angel, he employs other reasons. Scotus, according to the distinction recalled in the preceding *Scholion*, holds that only a simple change of place within the sphere of a place adequate to the Angel can take place in an instant. — In the *solutio ad* 1. it seems worthy of observation that the Holy Doctor already conjectured that the motion of light does not occur in an instant. The other solution of the same objection St. Thomas approves, *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3. *ad* 2.

**II.** Scotus, II *Sent.* d. 2. q. 14. — St. Thomas, here q. 4. a. 3; *S.* I. q. 53. a. 3. — B. Albert., here a. 24. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., here 2. *princ.*

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