title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I. *De rerum distinctione.*
### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo.*

Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo. Et quod non, videtur primo sic:

1. Per Philosophum[^1]: «Idem, uniformiter se habens, natum est efficere idem»; sed efficiens primum unum est omnino uniformiter se habens: ergo videtur, quod nunquam[^2] multa facere potuerit, ergo unum solum.

2. Item, a summe bono nunquam possunt esse mala, a summe vero non possunt esse falsa: ergo a summe uno non possunt esse multa.

3. Item, mundus sensibilis dicitur assimilari mundo archetypo, qui est in mente divina — ad illius enim expressionem factus est — sed in illo omnia sunt unum: ergo et in hoc mundo: ergo videtur, quod ab illo non potuerit esse multitudo[^3].

4. Item, a Deo exitus est per generationem, per spirationem et per creationem; sed per generationem non emanat nisi una sola persona, et similiter per spirationem: ergo per creationem non egreditur nisi una sola creatura.

**Contra:**

1. Quanto substantia producens est melior, tanto magis est sui diffusiva[^4], et quanto magis est sui diffusiva, tanto pluribus nata est se communicare; sed primum efficiens est optimum inter omnia: ergo etc.

2. Item, quanto substantia spiritualior, tanto plurium est cognitiva[^5]; sed suprema substantia est spiritualissima: ergo multorum est cognitiva. Sed non est cognitiva multorum praecedentium se vel comitantium: ergo multorum ab ipsa exeuntium.

3. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto potentior, quia «virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita[^6]»; sed quanto potentior, tanto in plura potest: ergo si substantia primi principii est simplicissima, ergo potest et debet ad sui manifestationem producere multa, cum ipsa sit unica.

4. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, unde prima est universalissima[^7]; et quanto universalior, tanto plurium principium: ergo cum principium productivum universi sit simpliciter primum, debuit ergo et potuit exire ab ipso multitudo rerum.

> **Conclusio.** Multitudo rerum est a principio uno, quia est principium et primum et unice unum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod si de principio intrinseco quaeratur, unde veniat multitudo rerum, maxime secundum speciem, patet, quod a forma. Sed unde veniat multitudo formarum tanquam a principio effectivo

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extrinseco, patet, quod ab efficiente uno. — Sed qualiter potest venire multitudo a principio summe et perfectissime uno, difficile est intelligere. Et aliqui circa hoc erraverunt.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod quamvis unus esset rerum Conditor, tamen multa et varia facit propter multitudinem formarum idealium. — Sed illud improbatum est in primo libro[^8], ubi ostenditur, quod omnes illae unum sunt; nec est in Deo secundum rem alius numerus quam personarum.

Aliqui vero dicere voluerunt, quod hoc erat propter multitudinem mediorum. Deus enim, cum sit unus et summe simplex, intellexit se; et se intelligendo et nihil aliud, produxit primam Intelligentiam; et illa Intelligentia intellexit se et Deum, et ideo produxit duo, scilicet aliam Intelligentiam et orbem suum; et sic descendendo et multiplicando[^9]. — Et ista opinio in lectione praecedenti est improbata, ubi ostenditur, quod Deus immediate producit omnia.

Tertii dixerunt, quod multitudo rerum erat a principio unico propter multitudinem et infinitatem reflexionum quibus divinus intellectus supra se reflectitur et intelligit se, et intelligit se intelligere; et sic usque in infinitum. — Sed illud nihil est. Primum, quia falsum est, quod in Deo sit multitudo reflexionum, cum Deus sit suum intelligere[^10]. Item, ex hoc nunquam proveniret nisi diversitas secundum numerum.

Et ideo est positio recta, quod multitudo in rebus est a principio uno, quia est primum principium et unice unum. Quia enim est principium simpliciter primum, ideo fecundum et potens est fecunditate infinita et immensa. Si enim unitas, quae est prima in genere numeri, est principium, a quo possunt infiniti numeri egredi, et punctus, a quo infinitae lineae; quod est simpliciter primum est ita potens, quod omnino immensum[^11]. Propter ergo immensitatem infinita potest, sed propter immensitatis manifestationem multa de suis thesauris profert, non omnia, quia effectus non potest aequari virtuti ipsius primae causae. — Quia vero unice unum, ideo simplicissimum et spiritualissimum et perfectissimum: quia simplicissimum, maximae potentiae; quia spiritualissimum, maximae sapientiae; quia perfectissimum est, bonitatis summae; quia maximae potentiae, multa potest; quia maximae sapientiae, multa novit; quia summae bonitatis, multa vult producere et se communicare. — Et ideo a principio uno, quia primum et unum, exit[^12] multitudo.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens etc.; dicendum, quod intelligitur in his agentibus, quorum virtus est arctata et limitata; et hoc non habet locum in Deo[^13].

2. Quod obiicitur, quod a bono non sunt mala; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia mala et falsa dicunt[^14] privationes et defectus, et ideo non habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem, qualem non decet esse Deum; sed multitudo est positio, et ideo causam habet effectivam.

3. Quod obiicitur de archetypo et sensibili mundo, dicendum, quod iste imitatur illum in quantum potest, sed deficit. In illo enim est summa pulcritudo per omnimodam unitatem; hic autem, si esset unitas, non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nec perfectio. Et ideo, ut mundus hic imitaretur[^15] in perfectione et pulcritudine, oportuit, quod haberet multitudinem, ut multa facerent quod unum facere per se non posset.

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de generatione et spiratione, iam patet: quia genitus aequalis generanti per omnia implet et imitatur ipsum, similiter et Spiritus sanctus; et ideo superflueret aliam ponere personam[^16]. Sed non sic est in creatura, quae est bonitatis finitae; ideo quod non potuit capere creatura in se, accepit quodam modo in sibi socia, ut sic ex multis una perficeretur mundialis machina.

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the distinction of things.*
### QUESTION I. *Whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things.*

It is asked therefore first, whether from the first efficient [cause] there ought, or could, have been a multitude of things. And that there could not, it seems first thus:

1. Through the Philosopher[^1]: «The same thing, behaving uniformly, is of its nature apt to produce the same effect»; but the first efficient [cause], being one, behaves altogether uniformly: therefore it seems that it could never[^2] have made many things, therefore one only.

2. Likewise, from the supremely good evils can never come; from the supremely true, falsities cannot come: therefore from the supremely one, a multitude cannot come.

3. Likewise, the sensible world is said to be likened to the archetypal world, which is in the divine mind — for it was made unto the expression of that world — but in that [world] all things are one: therefore also in this world: therefore it seems that from it there could not have been a multitude[^3].

4. Likewise, from God there is a going-out by generation, by spiration, and by creation; but by generation only a single Person emanates, and likewise by spiration: therefore by creation only a single creature goes forth.

**On the contrary:**

1. The better a producing substance is, the more it is diffusive of itself[^4], and the more it is diffusive of itself, the more things it is of its nature apt to communicate itself to; but the first efficient [cause] is the best among all things: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the more spiritual a substance is, the more things it is cognizant of[^5]; but the supreme substance is the most spiritual: therefore it is cognizant of many things. But it is not cognizant of many things preceding it or accompanying it: therefore of many things going out from it.

3. Likewise, the simpler a substance is, the more powerful, because «a power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite[^6]»; but the more powerful, the more it can do as to many things: therefore if the substance of the first principle is the simplest, then it can and ought, for the manifestation of itself, to produce many things, since it is itself unique.

4. Likewise, the prior a cause is, the more universal, whence the first is the most universal[^7]; and the more universal, the principle of more things: therefore since the principle productive of the universe is simply first, it ought therefore and was able to bring forth from itself a multitude of things.

> **Conclusion.** The multitude of things is from one principle, because it is a principle both first and uniquely one.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, if it be asked concerning the intrinsic principle, whence comes the multitude of things — especially according to species — it is plain that [it comes] from form. But whence comes the multitude of forms, as from an effective principle

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extrinsic [to the things], it is plain that [it comes] from the one efficient [cause]. — But how a multitude can come from a principle supremely and most perfectly one is difficult to understand. And some have erred concerning this.

For certain men said that, although the Founder of things was one, nevertheless he makes many and varied things on account of the multitude of ideal forms. — But that was disproved in the first book[^8], where it is shown that all those [forms] are one; nor is there in God, according to reality, any number other than [that] of the Persons.

But some wished to say that this was on account of the multitude of intermediaries. For God, since he is one and supremely simple, understood himself; and understanding himself and nothing else, he produced the first Intelligence; and that Intelligence understood itself and God, and therefore produced two, namely another Intelligence and its own sphere; and so descending and multiplying[^9]. — And this opinion was disproved in the preceding lecture, where it is shown that God produces all things immediately.

A third group said that the multitude of things was from a single principle on account of the multitude and infinity of reflections by which the divine intellect reflects upon itself and understands itself, and understands itself to understand; and so on to infinity. — But that is nothing. First, because it is false that in God there is a multitude of reflections, since God is his own act of understanding[^10]. Likewise, from this there would never come anything but a diversity according to number.

And therefore the correct position is that the multitude in things is from one principle, because it is the first principle and uniquely one. For since it is the principle simply first, therefore it is fecund and powerful with an infinite and immense fecundity. For if unity, which is first in the genus of number, is a principle from which infinite numbers can go forth, and the point, from which infinite lines [go forth]; that which is simply first is so powerful that it is altogether immense[^11]. On account, therefore, of its immensity it can [do] infinite things, but on account of the manifestation of its immensity it brings forth many things from its treasures, not all, because the effect cannot be equalled to the power of the first cause itself. — But because it is uniquely one, therefore it is the simplest and most spiritual and most perfect: because the simplest, of the greatest power; because the most spiritual, of the greatest wisdom; because it is the most perfect, of the highest goodness; because of the greatest power, it can [do] many things; because of the greatest wisdom, it knows many things; because of the highest goodness, it wills to produce many things and to communicate itself. — And therefore from one principle, because first and one, a multitude goes out[^12].

1. As to the objection that the same thing behaving in like manner etc.; it must be said that this is understood of those agents whose power is constrained and limited; and this has no place in God[^13].

2. As to the objection that from the good there are no evils; it must be said that there is no parallel, because evils and falsities denote[^14] privations and defects, and therefore have no efficient cause, but a deficient one, such as it does not befit God to be; but a multitude is a position [a positive thing], and therefore has an effective cause.

3. As to the objection concerning the archetypal and the sensible world, it must be said that this [world] imitates that one insofar as it can, but falls short. For in that [world] there is the highest beauty through unity in every mode; here, however, if there were unity, there would not be beauty, because there would be neither order nor perfection. And therefore, that this world might imitate[^15] [it] in perfection and beauty, it was necessary that it should have a multitude, so that many things might do what one could not do by itself.

4. As to the last objection concerning generation and spiration, it is now plain: because the begotten, equal to the begetter, fulfils and imitates him in all things, and likewise the Holy Spirit; and therefore it would be superfluous to posit another Person[^16]. But it is not so in the creature, which is of finite goodness; therefore what the creature could not contain in itself, it received in a way in a fellow given to it, so that thus from many things one world-machine might be perfected.

la: Libr. II. *de Gener. et Corrupt.* text. 56. (c. 10.).

en: Book II *On Generation and Corruption*, text 56 (c. 10).

la: Aliqui codd. ut *aa bb nunquam*.

en: Some codices, as *aa* and *bb*, read *nunquam* ("never").

la: Plato, in *Timaeo* ait: *Unus (mundus) profecto est: siquidem factus sit ad exemplum... Ut autem hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco non duos vel infinitos mundos, sed singularem et unigenum mundum Deus procreavit, qui quidem et est et erit* (ed. Serrani, tom. III. pag. 31).

en: Plato, in the *Timaeus*, says: *There is assuredly one world: seeing that it was made unto an exemplar... But in order that this world might be most like to the absolute living being, for this very reason — that it should be alone and one — God did not make two or infinite worlds, but a singular and only-begotten world, which indeed both is and will be* (ed. Serranus, tom. III, p. 31).

la: Hoc argumentum fundatur in illa Dionysii propositione: *Bonum est diffusivum sui*; de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 804, nota 6.

en: This argument is founded on that proposition of Dionysius: *The good is diffusive of itself*; on which cf. tom. I, p. 804, note 6.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.) et *Liber de Causis*, prop. 10.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 3ff. (c. 4), and the *Book of Causes*, prop. 10.

la: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 17.

en: The *Book of Causes*, prop. 17.

la: Vide Libr. *de Causis*, prop. 1, de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 171, nota 3.

en: See the *Book of Causes*, prop. 1, on which cf. tom. I, p. 171, note 3.

la: Dist. 35. q. 2, ubi etiam haec positio fusius explicatur.

en: [I *Sent.*] d. 35, q. 2, where this position is also more fully explained.

la: Hic p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius codd. U bb *est multitudo*, cod. N *et intelligendo est multitudo*, cod. 1 *processit multiplicando* pro *et multiplicando*, cui cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt *ista*. Paulo inferius cod. bb *produxit omnia* pro *producit omnia*.

en: Here, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, codices U, bb read *est multitudo*; codex N *et intelligendo est multitudo*; codex 1 *processit multiplicando* for *et multiplicando*, to which codex *cc* and ed. 1 add *ista*. A little below, codex *bb* reads *produxit omnia* for *producit omnia*.

la: Ed. 3 prosequitur: *cum ratio vel causa ex parte Dei redditur ex parte creaturae, et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, quod Deus sit suum intelligere.*

en: Ed. 3 continues: *since the ground or cause on the side of God is rendered on the side of the creature, and this is the manifestation of the divine goodness in his work — that God is his own act of understanding.*

la: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. Pro sequentibus vide ibid. d. 42. q. 1, et d. 43. q. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 27, p. I, q. 2, ad 3. For what follows see ibid. d. 42, q. 1, and d. 43, q. 1ff.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. *exiit*.

en: Several codices, with the Vatican ms., read *exiit* ("went out", perfect).

la: Cod. F *in primo agente*.

en: Codex F reads *in primo agente* ("in the first agent") [for *in Deo*].

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 1 *dicuntur*. — Plura de hac solutione habentur infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: Many codices, with ed. 1, read *dicuntur* ("are said [to be]"). — More on this solution is had below, d. 34, a. 1, q. 1ff.

la: Cfr. August., *83 Qq.* q. 41. et XII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 12. — Paulo superius post *imitaretur* codd. A Y aa interserunt *illum*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 41, and *On the City of God* XII, c. 12. — A little above, after *imitaretur* codices A, Y, aa insert *illum*.

la: Vide I. *Sent.* d. 2. q. 3. seq., et d. 7. q. 2.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio cohaeret cum iis quae supra (p. I. a. 2. q. 1. 2.) disputata sunt, et militat contra multos philosophos Arabes. Ad rem Scotus (*de Rerum princip.* q. 2. a. 1. n. 7.): «Avicenna veritati catholicae videtur maxime contrarius esse. Nam IX. *Metaphysicae* suae c. 4. vult, quod a primo principio non possunt esse plura, nec secundum numerum, nec secundum divisionem». Huc spectant plures articuli condemnati Parisiis a. 1276 (cap. 6. de Deo, ut n. 15. 16; *Collect. iudic.* p. 189).

**II.** Contra istos errores diffuse disputant Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 11. m. 1. 2. — Scot., loc. cit., et IV. *Sent.* d. 1. q. 1. n. 16. — S. Thom., *S.* 1. q. 47. a. 1. 2; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 43, III. c. 97; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 16. — B. Albert., *S.* p. II. tr. I. q. 3. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. I. q. 3. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question coheres with the things which were disputed above (p. I, a. 2, q. 1, 2), and it militates against many Arab philosophers. To the point Scotus (*On the Principle of Things* q. 2, a. 1, n. 7): «Avicenna seems most contrary to Catholic truth. For in book IX of his *Metaphysics*, c. 4, he holds that from the first principle there cannot be many things, neither according to number nor according to division». Hither belong several articles condemned at Paris in 1276 (cap. 6, on God, as nn. 15, 16; *Collectio iudiciorum* p. 189).

**II.** Against these errors there dispute at length: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 11, m. 1, 2. — Scotus, loc. cit., and IV *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, n. 16. — St Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 47, a. 1, 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 43, III, c. 97; *De Potentia* q. 3, a. 16. — Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. II, tr. I, q. 3, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. I, q. 3, a. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. This chunk uses a single sequence 1–16: notes 1–7 are the page-39 footer (left col: [^1] *de Gen. et Corr.*, [^2] *aa bb nunquam*, [^3] Plato *Timaeus*; right col: [^4] Dionysius *bonum diffusivum*, [^5] *de Anima* III + *de Causis* 10, [^6] *de Causis* 17, [^7] *de Causis* 1), and notes 8–16 are the page-40 footer (left col: [^8] *Dist. 35 q. 2*, [^9] *Hic p. I a. 2 q. 2* + *multiplicando* variants, [^10] *Ed. 3 prosequitur*; right col: [^11] *I Sent. d. 27*, [^12] *exit/exiit*, [^13] *in Deo*/cod. F, [^14] *dicunt/dicuntur*, [^15] Augustine, [^16] *I Sent. d. 2 q. 3*).

**PDF verification.** The page-39 right-column footer and the Respondeo→p.40 bridge and the Ad-1 reply were heavily column-bled in the IA OCR (diagonal-cascade fragmentation of notes 5–7; marginal-gloss bleed *Praenotandum* / *Solutio oppositorum*). Resolved against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 39–40 = PDF pp. 61–62): [^1] reads *text. 56* (not OCR *text. 36*); [^5]=*de Causis* prop. 10, [^6]=prop. 17, [^7]=prop. 1 confirmed; Ad 1 reads *quod intelligitur in his agentibus* (OCR dropped the verb).

**Open [?] for d.10 polish-blocker.** None blocking — the PDF cleared the genuine garbles. Two low-confidence residuals to re-confirm at 600 dpi: [^1] *text. 56* vs *text. 36* for the *de Gen. et Corr.* locus of «idem uniformiter se habens»; and [^7] cross-ref page number *tom. I pag. 171* (left edge cropped in the 450 dpi extract, taken from OCR).

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses bleeding inline per CLAUDE.md are not rendered: *oppositum*, *Fundamenta 1*, *Conclusio 1/2*, *Quaestio mater*, *opinio 1/2/3*, *improbatur*, *Praenotandum*, *Notandum*, *Solutio oppositorum*.

**Conclusio.** Quaracchi sets the one-sentence *Conclusio* in italics under a centred *CONCLUSIO* head; rendered here as the blockquote convention. The marginal *conclusio 1* / *conclusio 2* labels (at the *a principio effectivo extrinseco* and *positio recta* sentences) are margin tags, not headings.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum rerum universitas triplici differentia distinguatur, scilicet substantia spirituali, corporali et ex utraque composita.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de differentiis, secundum quas res multiplicatae sunt, quas Magister ponit in littera[^1], scilicet substantiam spiritualem et corporalem et ex utraque compositam. Quaeritur ergo, utrum haec distinctio debeat esse in universo. Et videtur, quod non:

1. Primo de *corporali*. Nam, sicut tactum est[^2], omne quod Deus facit, facit salva ordinatione, ergo propter suam bonitatem, sed non facit propter bonitatem suam augendam, sed participandam: sed sola creatura spiritualis «Dei capax est et eius particeps esse potest[^3]»: ergo solam spiritualem debuit facere, non corporalem. Si tu dicas, quod corporalis est particeps in effectu, quamvis non in se; hoc nihil est, quia aliquid participare bonitatem divinam in effectu, non est aliud quam esse — hoc enim ipso quod est, participat effectum bonitatis — ergo idem est dicere, creaturam esse factam propter participationem divinae bonitatis, quod dicere, creaturam esse factam, ut sit; sed hoc nihil est: ergo etc.

2. Item, de *composito* videtur. Omne enim compositum, quod Deus facit, facit salva proportione — semper enim formam coniungit materiae summe proportionabili[^4] — sed creaturae spiritualis ad corporalem nulla aut valde modica et longinqua est proportio: ergo nullo modo deberet Deus haec unire ut perfectionem perfectibili. Quod non sit proportio, patet: spirituale enim est simplex, corporale habet partium infinitatem.

3. Item, corporale est corruptibile, et ita habet durationem finitam, spirituale autem incorruptibile, et ita habet durationem infinitam; si ergo «finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio[^5]», patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod corpus fuit incorruptibile a conditione prima: tunc ergo saltem, postquam corruptibile fuit, debet cessare unio.

4. Item, de *pure spirituali* videtur. Omne quod Deus facit, debet facere salva connexione naturarum; sed natura generis essentialiter est connexa differentiae: ergo si animatum et sensibile est connexum rationali, ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid fiat habens rationem, quin habeat vegetationem et sensum, sive quin sit animal. Sed animal est substantia composita ex spirituali et corporali: ergo etc. Et hoc videtur dicere Philosophus[^6], «quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono», et hoc in rationali, sicut tetragonum in pentagono; sed nunquam Deus facit tetragonum sine trigono, nec pentagonum sine tetragono et trigono: ergo etc.

5. Item, nihil facit Deus nisi ex magna dilectione[^7], ergo quod melius est naturae unicuique. Aut ergo naturae spirituali melius est esse separatum, aut melius est esse coniunctum: quocumque dato, altera differentia tollitur.

**Sed contra:**

1. Decuit Deum ita res facere, ut essent in manifestationem suae potentiae; sed potentia manifestatur in productione rerum multum distantium et in earum coniunctione — nam potentia tanto virtuosior ostenditur, quanto potest super magis distantia — sed prima et summa distantia substantiarum est inter corporeum et incorporeum, quia primae differentiae generis[^8] sunt: ergo ad hoc, quod divina potentia manifestetur plene, necesse fuit substantiam spiritualem et corporalem producere, rursus productas unire.

2. Item, decuit Deum sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius sapientia; sed sapientia artificis manifestatur in ordinis perfectione, omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium. Si ergo infimum est natura pure corporalis, summum natura spiritualis, medium composita ex utraque; nisi haec omnia fecisset, non ostenderetur perfecte Dei sapientia: oportuit igitur haec omnia fieri. Unde Augustinus duodecimo *Confessionum*[^9]: «Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil».

3. Item, Deum decuit sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius bonitas; sed bonitas consistit in diffusione et communicatione sui in alterum: si ergo sua bonitas consistit in communicatione actus nobilissimi, qui est vivere et intelligere, decuit, ut non tantum daret alii potentiam vivendi et intelligendi, sed etiam potentiam alii[^10] communicandi. Si

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ergo vivens et intelligens est substantia spiritualis, quod autem vivificatur et per intellectum perficitur est corpus: ergo ad perfectam bonitatis manifestationem necesse fuit, fieri substantiam spiritualem et corporalem. Sed hoc non perfecte manifestarent[^11], nisi una alteri communicaret, et hoc non potest esse nisi per unionem: ergo necesse fuit facere compositam ex utraque.

4. Item, hoc non solum videtur ratione theologica, sed etiam philosophica: quia si est ponere unam differentiam contrarietatis, et alteram[^12]: si ergo corporale, et spirituale; et si ponere est extrema componibilia, ergo et medium: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Triplex illud genus substantiae requiritur propter triplicem perfectionem universi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ad perfectionem universi hoc triplex genus substantiae[^13] requiritur: et hoc propter triplicem perfectionem universi, quae attenditur in amplitudine ambitus, sufficientia ordinis, influentia bonitatis, in quibus tribus exprimit in causa triplicem perfectionem, videlicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. Ad oppositas respondendum est. Quod obiicitur, quod in operibus salva debet esse ordinatio, ut omnia fiant propter divinam bonitatem participandam; dicendum, quod fieri propter divinam bonitatem est dupliciter: aut *ostendendam*, et sic facta sunt cuncta[^14]; omnia enim exprimunt divinam bonitatem; aut *participandam*, et hoc dupliciter: aut quia sunt nata participare, aut quia serviunt participantibus. Primo modo conditae sunt creaturae spirituales, secundo modo corporales; ipsae tamen aliquo modo participant; sed in earum participatione status non est, sed ordinantur ad ulteriorem.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod in omni coniunctione debet esse salva proportio; dicendum est, quod in coniunctione animae ad corpus salva est proportio, et absolute, et in relatione ad finem: absolute; nam quamvis supremum spiritus[^15] et infimum corporis multam habeant elongationem, tamen supremum corporis et infimum spiritus summam habent vicinitatem. Spiritus enim animalis sive rationalis habet potentiam vivificandi, potentiam vegetandi et sentiendi; corpus autem humanum habet complexionis aequalitatem, habet organorum multiplicitatem, habet rursus spirituum subtilitatem, et[^16] secundum triplicem differentiam: habet enim spiritum vitalem, spiritum naturalem et spiritum animalem. Comparando igitur complexionem aequalem ad vim vivificativam per medium et vinculum spiritus vitalis, optimus est nexus. Similiter comparando non solum complexionis aequalitatem, sed et organizationem[^17] et organizationis perfectionem ad vim vegetandi et sentiendi mediante spiritu naturali et animali, optima est proportio et mirabilis nexus. Unde sicut terra et ignis, quae multum distant, nectuntur duplici medio: uno, quod magis communicat cum terra, et reliquo, quod magis cum igne[^18]; similiter est in proposito.

Attenditur etiam perfecta proportio in relatione ad finem. Cum enim animae humanae data sit libertas arbitrii vertibilis et revertibilis, id est potens stare et cadere et resurgere; datum est ei corpus potens mori, et potens non mori, et deinde potens in sempiternum vivificari. Rursus, cum anima creata sit «veluti tabula rasa[^19]», datum est ei corpus habens organa multiplicia, ut in illo posset perfici scientiis. — Similiter ex parte corporis optima proportio est in relatione ad finem. Cum enim sit ordo in formis corporalibus — quod patet, quia forma elementi[^20] ad formam mixti, et forma mixtionis ad formam complexionis, et rursus vegetabilis ad sensibilem — et non sit status in re corporali et imperfecta; non est status ibi, sed ultimo disponunt huiusmodi formae ad animam rationalem, per quam etiam corpus et natura corporalis efficitur particeps aeternae beatitudinis. Aut ergo omnis intentio naturae corporalis solvitur, aut necesse est pervenire mediante anima rationali in ultimum finem.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod in opere Dei debet salvari naturarum colligatio; dicendum, quod verum

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est: sed sensibile et vegetabile non sunt de necessitate rationalis, nisi quod est rationale per unionem. Anima enim, ut prius tactum est[^21], cum sit spiritus simplex et purus, non potest uniri carni nisi duplici medio ex parte sui; similiter nec corpus complexionatum. Et ideo necesse est, quod interveniat natura vivificandi sive vegetandi, et natura ulterius sentiendi; et ideo in omni homine haec cadunt. Sed quia Angelus est spiritus purus, ideo istis non indiget. — Patet igitur, quod contra veritatem et fidem errant Sadducaei, qui negant, esse spiritum[^22]. Patet nihilominus, quod errant Manichaei, qui negant, animam uniri corpori ut perfectibili, sed ut carceri.

5. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod Deus dat unicuique quod melius est; dicendum, quod Deus non dat unicuique quod *simpliciter* melius, quia tunc non faceret res ordinatas, sed aequaliter perfectas; et hoc repugnaret perfectioni, «quia, si essent aequalia, non essent omnia», ut dicit Augustinus[^23]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod Deus dat unicuique quod sibi melius est, hoc intelligitur secundum *exigentiam ordinis et naturae*. Naturae autem animae competit uniri corpori, naturae autem angelicae, separatam esse a corpore. Et ideo illa ratio non valet, quia dilectio Dei non excludit ordinem.

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether the universe of things is distinguished by a threefold difference, namely by spiritual substance, by corporeal, and by [that] composed of both.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this, about the differences according to which things have been multiplied, which the Master sets down in the *littera*[^1] — namely spiritual substance, and corporeal, and [that] composed of both. It is asked therefore whether this distinction ought to be in the universe. And it seems that it ought not:

1. First, concerning the *corporeal*. For, as has been touched on[^2], everything that God makes, he makes with order preserved, therefore on account of his goodness; but he does not make [it] in order that his goodness be increased, but [in order that it be] shared: but only the spiritual creature «is capable of God and can be a partaker of him[^3]»: therefore he ought to have made only the spiritual [creature], not the corporeal. If you say that the corporeal is a partaker in effect, although not in itself; this is nothing, because for something to partake of the divine goodness in effect is nothing other than to be — for by this very fact that it is, it partakes of the effect of [his] goodness — therefore it is the same to say that a creature was made for the partaking of the divine goodness as to say that a creature was made in order that it might be; but this is nothing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so concerning the *composite*. For every composite that God makes, he makes with proportion preserved — for he always joins form to a matter supremely proportionable[^4] [to it] — but of the spiritual creature to the corporeal there is no proportion, or a very slight and remote one: therefore in no way ought God to unite these as a perfection to a perfectible thing. That there is no proportion is plain: for the spiritual is simple, the corporeal has an infinity of parts.

3. Likewise, the corporeal is corruptible, and so has a finite duration, but the spiritual is incorruptible, and so has an infinite duration; if therefore «of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion[^5]», it is plain etc. If you say that the body was incorruptible from its first condition: then at least, after it became corruptible, the union ought to cease.

4. Likewise, it seems so concerning the *purely spiritual*. Everything that God makes, he ought to make with the connection of natures preserved; but the nature of a genus is essentially connected to [its] difference: therefore if the animate and the sensible is connected to the rational, then it is impossible that anything be made having reason without its having vegetation and sense, that is, without its being an animal. But an animal is a substance composed of the spiritual and the corporeal: therefore etc. And the Philosopher seems to say this[^6], «that the vegetative is in the sensitive, as the triangle in the quadrilateral», and this [holds] in the rational, as the quadrilateral in the pentagon; but God never makes a quadrilateral without a triangle, nor a pentagon without a quadrilateral and a triangle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God makes nothing except out of great love[^7], therefore [he makes for] each [nature] what is better for it. Either, then, it is better for the spiritual nature to be separate, or it is better to be conjoined: on whichever supposition, the other difference is taken away.

**On the contrary:**

1. It was fitting for God so to make things that they should be unto the manifestation of his power; but power is manifested in the production of things greatly distant and in their conjunction — for a power is shown the more powerful, the more it can [reach] over things more distant — but the first and greatest distance of substances is between the corporeal and the incorporeal, because they are the primary differences of the genus[^8]: therefore, in order that the divine power be fully manifested, it was necessary to produce spiritual and corporeal substance, and again to unite the ones produced.

2. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his wisdom might be manifested; but the wisdom of a craftsman is manifested in the perfection of order, and every order has of necessity a lowest and a highest and a middle. If, then, the lowest is the purely corporeal nature, the highest the spiritual nature, the middle [that] composed of both; unless he had made all these, the wisdom of God would not be perfectly shown: it was therefore fitting that all these be made. Whence Augustine, in the twelfth book of the *Confessions*[^9]: «Two things hast thou made, O Lord, one near to thee and the other near to nothing».

3. Likewise, it was fitting for God so to produce things that his goodness might be manifested; but goodness consists in the diffusion and communication of itself to another: if therefore his goodness consists in the communication of the noblest act, which is to live and to understand, it was fitting that he should give to another not only the power of living and understanding, but also the power of communicating to another[^10]. If

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therefore the living and understanding [thing] is spiritual substance, and that which is vivified and perfected through intellect is body: therefore for the perfect manifestation of goodness it was necessary that spiritual and corporeal substance be made. But these would not manifest [it] perfectly[^11], unless the one communicated to the other, and this cannot be except through union: therefore it was necessary to make [a substance] composed of both.

4. Likewise, this seems [so] not only by a theological reason, but also by a philosophical one: because if one is to posit one difference of contrariety, [one must posit] also the other[^12]: if therefore the corporeal, then also the spiritual; and if the extremes that can be composed are to be posited, then also the middle: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** That threefold kind of substance is required on account of the threefold perfection of the universe.

**I respond:** It must be said that for the perfection of the universe this threefold kind of substance[^13] is required: and this on account of the threefold perfection of the universe, which is regarded in the amplitude of its compass, the sufficiency of its order, the inflowing of [its] goodness — in which three it expresses in [its] cause a threefold perfection, namely of power, of wisdom, and of goodness. Whence the reasons adduced to this [conclusion] are to be conceded.

1. To the opposing [arguments] it must be replied. As to the objection that in [God's] works order ought to be preserved, so that all things come to be for the divine goodness to be shared; it must be said that to be made for the divine goodness is twofold: either [for it] to be *shown*, and in this way all things were made[^14]; for all things express the divine goodness; or [for it] to be *shared*, and this in two ways: either because they are of a nature to partake, or because they serve those that partake. In the first way the spiritual creatures were founded, in the second way the corporeal; yet these too partake in some way; but in their partaking there is no [final] stopping-point, but they are ordered toward a further one.

2, 3. As to the objection that in every conjunction proportion ought to be preserved; it must be said that in the conjunction of the soul to the body proportion is preserved, both absolutely and in relation to the end: absolutely; for although the highest of the spirit[^15] and the lowest of the body have a great separation, nevertheless the highest of the body and the lowest of the spirit have the greatest nearness. For the animal or rational spirit has the power of vivifying, the power of vegetating and of sensing; and the human body has equality of complexion, has multiplicity of organs, has further subtlety of [its] spirits, and[^16] [this] according to a threefold difference: for it has a vital spirit, a natural spirit, and an animal spirit. Comparing, then, the equal complexion to the vivifying power through the medium and bond of the vital spirit, the bond is best. Likewise, comparing not only the equality of complexion, but also the organization[^17] and the perfection of organization, to the power of vegetating and sensing by means of the natural and animal spirit, the proportion is excellent and the bond marvellous. Whence, just as earth and fire, which are greatly distant, are bound by a double medium — one which communicates more with earth, and the other which [communicates] more with fire[^18] — so it is in the matter at hand.

A perfect proportion is also regarded in relation to the end. For since to the human soul has been given freedom of choice, turnable and re-turnable — that is, able to stand and to fall and to rise again — there has been given to it a body able to die, and able not to die, and thereafter able to be vivified everlastingly. Again, since the created soul is «as it were a blank tablet[^19]», there has been given to it a body having manifold organs, so that in it [the soul] might be perfected by the sciences. — Likewise, on the part of the body there is an excellent proportion in relation to the end. For since there is order in corporeal forms — which is plain, because the form of the element[^20] [is ordered] to the form of the mixed, and the form of mixture to the form of complexion, and again the vegetable to the sensible — and since there is no [stopping-point] in the corporeal and imperfect thing; there is no stopping-point there, but ultimately forms of this kind dispose [matter] toward the rational soul, through which also the body and corporeal nature is made a partaker of eternal beatitude. Either, then, every intention of corporeal nature is dissolved, or it is necessary to arrive, by means of the rational soul, at the ultimate end.

4. As to the objection that in the work of God the binding-together of natures ought to be preserved; it must be said that it is true

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[that it ought]: but the sensible and the vegetable are not of the necessity of the rational, except [in] that which is rational through union. For the soul, as was touched on before[^21], since it is a simple and pure spirit, cannot be united to the flesh except by a double medium on its own side; likewise neither [can] the complexioned body. And therefore it is necessary that there intervene a nature of vivifying or vegetating, and a nature further of sensing; and therefore in every man these occur. But because the Angel is a pure spirit, therefore it does not need these. — It is plain therefore that against truth and faith the Sadducees err, who deny that there is a spirit[^22]. It is plain nonetheless that the Manichaeans err, who deny that the soul is united to the body as to a perfectible thing, [holding rather that it is united] as to a prison.

5. As to the objection lastly made, that God gives to each what is better; it must be said that God does not give to each what is *absolutely* better, because then he would not make things ordered, but equally perfect; and this would be repugnant to perfection, «because, if they were equal, they would not be all [things]», as Augustine says[^23]. When therefore it is said that God gives to each what is better for it, this is understood according to the *requirement of order and of nature*. Now it befits the nature of the soul to be united to a body, but the nature of the angelic [creature] to be separate from a body. And therefore that reasoning is not valid, because the love of God does not exclude order.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, c. 1 [of the Master's *littera*].

la: Quaest. praec. et supra p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 5; a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2. — Mox post *ordinatione* ed. 1 cum cod. cc adiicit *ad finem*.

en: The preceding question, and above p. I, a. 1, q. 1, foundation 5; a. 2, q. 2, foundation 2. — Soon after *ordinatione* ed. 1 with codex cc adds *ad finem*.

la: August., XIV. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. et Aristot., I. *Eudem.* c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi dicit, reliqua animantia homine inferiora participare non posse felicitatem. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. *participare* pro *aliquid participare*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 8, n. 11. Cf. also Aristotle, *Eudemian [Ethics]* I, c. 4 (c. 7), where he says that the other living things, inferior to man, cannot partake of felicity. — A little below, the Vatican ms. with several mss. reads *participare* for *aliquid participare*.

la: Codd. W aa bb et ed. 3 *proportionali*.

en: Codices W, aa, bb and ed. 3 read *proportionali*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 52. (c. 6.). — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. paulo inferius post *conditione prima* adiungit *sed peccato factum est corruptibile*. Dein codd. H aa *debuit* pro *debet*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heaven and the World* I, text 52 (c. 6). — The Vatican ms. with one or two codices, a little below, after *conditione prima* adds *sed peccato factum est corruptibile* ("but by sin it was made corruptible"). Then codices H, aa read *debuit* for *debet*.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima*, text. 31. (c. 3.). — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *et si habet* pro *sive*.

en: Book II *On the Soul*, text 31 (c. 3). — A little above, codex cc and ed. 1 read *et si habet* for *sive*.

la: Vat. hic addit *aut summa deliberatione*, dein prosequitur *ergo quod semper facit melius est* etc. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *ex mera dilectione*. Cod. N post *melius est* subiungit *dat*.

en: The Vatican ms. here adds *aut summa deliberatione*, then continues *ergo quod semper facit melius est* etc. Several codices with ed. 1 read *ex mera dilectione*. Codex N after *melius est* adds *dat*.

la: Supple: *supremi*, i. e. substantiae.

en: Supply: *supremi* ("of the highest"), that is, of substance.

en: [*Confessions* XII,] c. 7, n. 7.

la: Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hic et paulo superius *aliis*, qui etiam hic addit *se*.

en: Codex cc with ed. 1, here and a little above, reads *aliis*; the same [codex] here also adds *se*.

la: Codd. V W bb cc et ed. 1 *manifestaretur*.

en: Codices V, W, bb, cc and ed. 1 read *manifestaretur*.

la: Aristot., II. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 18. (c. 3.): *At vero si tertium [necesse est esse], necesse est, et ignem esse; contrariorum enim, si alterum natura est, necesse, et alterum esse natura, si sit contrarium, et esse quandam ipsius naturam.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Heaven and the World* II, text 18 (c. 3): *But indeed if there must be a third, there must also be fire; for of contraries, if one is by nature, it is necessary that the other also be by nature, if it is contrary, and that there be a certain nature of it.*

la: In multis mss. deest *substantiae*, pro quo a cod. V *rerum*, a cod. aa *scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum* ponitur. Cod. bb legit *haec triplex differentia*.

en: In many mss. *substantiae* is missing, for which codex V puts *rerum*, codex aa *scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum*. Codex bb reads *haec triplex differentia*.

la: Fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. *cetera*, cod. W *omnia*.

en: Almost all codices, with the first editions, read *cetera*; codex W *omnia*.

la: Ed. 1 et cod. cc addunt *ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei*. — In sequentibus ostenditur, valere hic illam legem cosmicam, quae dicitur lex continuitatis, et quae a Dionysio sic enuntiatur: «Supremum inferioris naturae attingit infimum superioris», a Leibnitio autem: «Natura nunquam saltus facit». — Paulo inferius et in solutione ad 3. Vat. *sensificandi* pro *sentiendi*.

en: Ed. 1 and codex cc add *ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei* ("as the mind, according to which man is the image of God"). — In what follows it is shown that here that cosmic law holds which is called the law of continuity, and which is enunciated by Dionysius thus: «The highest of a lower nature attains the lowest of a higher», and by Leibniz: «Nature never makes a leap». — A little below, and in the solution to [argument] 3, the Vatican ms. reads *sensificandi* for *sentiendi*.

la: Cod. N *et hoc*; cod. aa *et secundum hanc triplicem* etc.

en: Codex N reads *et hoc*; codex aa *et secundum hanc triplicem* etc.

la: Cod. N *organum sentiendi*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *organa*.

en: Codex N reads *organum sentiendi*; codex cc and ed. 1 *organa*.

la: Aristot., II. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 18. (c. 3.), duplici ratione probat, quod, si terra est, necesse sit, etiam ignem esse, qui terrae contrarius est: *Eadem enim est materia contrariorum. Et privatione prior affirmatio; dico autem veluti calidum frigido; quies autem et gravitas [quae conveniunt terrae] dicuntur per privationem levitatis et motus [quae attribuuntur igni].* Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. et Schol.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heaven and the World* II, text 18 (c. 3), proves by a double reason that, if earth is, fire too must necessarily be, which is contrary to earth: *For the matter of contraries is the same. And affirmation is prior to privation; I mean, e.g., the hot to the cold; but rest and heaviness [which belong to earth] are said by the privation of lightness and motion [which are attributed to fire].* Cf. I *Sent.* d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, and the Scholion.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 14. (c. 4.): *Oportet autem sic [se habere], ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu;* quod quidem accidit in ipso intellectu. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. *ut illo* pro *ut in illo*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 14 (c. 4): *It must be so [disposed], as in a tablet on which nothing is actually written;* which indeed happens in the intellect itself. — A little below, very many codices read *ut illo* for *ut in illo*.

la: Codd. U Y supplent *ordinatur*, Vat. *est*, quae etiam paulo inferius *ulterius* substituit pro *ultimo*. Deinde cod. N post *per quam* adiicit *est*.

en: Codices U, Y supply *ordinatur*; the Vatican ms. *est*, which also a little below substitutes *ulterius* for *ultimo*. Then codex N after *per quam* adds *est*.

la: Hic ad 2. — Paulo superius pro *nisi quod* codd. F aa *nisi quantum*, cod. cc cum ed. 1 *nisi illius quod*, Vat. *nisi secundum quod*. Mox post *duplici* plures codd. ut A K N Y aa cc et ed. 1 addunt *vel triplici*.

en: Here, [in the reply] to [argument] 2. — A little above, for *nisi quod* codices F, aa read *nisi quantum*, codex cc with ed. 1 *nisi illius quod*, the Vatican ms. *nisi secundum quod*. Soon after *duplici* several codices, as A, K, N, Y, aa, cc and ed. 1, add *vel triplici*.

la: Matth. 22, 23: *Sadducaei, qui dicunt, non esse resurrectionem.* — Ultimam partem propositionis seq. aliqui codd. ut V Z sic exhibent: *qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili* etc. Vat. falso post *corpori* addit *id est non*. Cod. cc et ed. 1 post *seu* subiungunt *tantum dicunt uniri*.

en: Matthew 22:23: *the Sadducees, who say there is no resurrection.* — The last part of the following proposition some codices, as V, Z, exhibit thus: *qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili* etc. The Vatican ms. falsely after *corpori* adds *id est non*. Codex cc and ed. 1 after *seu* add *tantum dicunt uniri*.

la: Libr. *83 Qq.* q. 41. et 1. *contra Adversar. Leg. et Proph.* c. 4. n. 6: *Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia.* — Circa finem solut. plures codd. cum ed. 1 *separatum esse* pro *separatam esse*.

en: The book *83 Questions* q. 41, and [book] 1 *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* c. 4, n. 6: *Because they would not be all [things], if they were equal.* — Toward the end of the solution several codices with ed. 1 read *separatum esse* for *separatam esse*. ---

latin_scholion:
Definitum est a Concilio Later. IV. c. *Firmiter*, et iisdem verbis a Conc. Vatic. *de Fide* c. 1.: quod Deus «simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam». Rationes praeclaras et profundas, quibus Seraphicus conclusionem confirmat, esse potius magnae congruentiae quam stricte demonstrativas, verbum *decuit* in fundam. satis indicat. Cfr. *Breviloq.* p. II. c. 6. — Hanc quaestionem ab aliis non invenimus explicite tractatam. Tangitur tamen a pluribus in quaestione, utrum conveniens sit, animam uniri corpori, ut a Dionysio Carth., hic q. 9, vel in quaest. de existentia Angelorum sive in genere intellectualium creaturarum, ut a S. Thom., *S. c. Gent.* c. 46. et 91. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 11. m. 2, q. 18. m. 3; et B. Albert., *II. Sent.* d. 3. a. 1.

---

english_scholion:
It was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. *Firmiter*, and in the same words by the Vatican Council, *On the Faith*, c. 1: that God «from the beginning of time at once founded both creatures out of nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, namely the angelic and the mundane, and thereafter the human, as it were common, constituted of spirit and body». That the splendid and profound reasons by which the Seraphic [Doctor] confirms the conclusion are rather of great congruity than strictly demonstrative, the word *it was fitting* in the foundation [argument] sufficiently indicates. Cf. *Breviloquium* p. II, c. 6. — We have not found this question explicitly treated by others. It is nevertheless touched on by several in the question whether it is fitting that the soul be united to a body — as by Denis the Carthusian, here q. 9 — or in the question on the existence of Angels or in general of intellectual creatures — as by St Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* c. 46 and 91. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 11, m. 2, q. 18, m. 3; and Bl. Albert, *II Sent.* d. 3, a. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. This chunk uses a single sequence 1–23: notes 1–10 = the page-41 footer (intro [^1]; args [^2]–[^7]; Sed contra [^8]–[^10]); notes 11–20 = the page-42 footer (Sed contra tail [^11]–[^12]; Respondeo/Conclusio [^13]; replies [^14]–[^20]); notes 21–23 = the page-43 footer (reply 4 [^21]–[^22]; reply 5 [^23]).

**PDF verification (whole chunk).** This is the largest chunk in d.1 (~2160 words). The IA OCR was severely diagonal-cascade-fragmented through the Respondeo and the second reply (the *Proportio* sub-points 3565–3620 were broken one-token-per-line), and all three page-footers were two-column-bled. The entire chunk was re-set against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 41–43 = PDF pp. 63–65) via PIL column-band crops. Specific OCR repairs confirmed: the videtur-quod-non arguments number 1–5 (OCR mis-read the fifth "5." as "3."); the Respondeo→p.42 bridge ("Si ergo vivens et intelligens"); the *supremum spiritus / infimum corporis* nearness sentence; reply 5 (OCR "0." = "5."); the scholion is a single block (not I/II).

**Open [?] for d.10 polish-blocker.** None blocking — the PDF cleared the genuine garbles. Low-confidence residuals to re-confirm at 600 dpi: [^8] anchor (*Supple: supremi* — the body marker `8` sits ambiguously near *primae differentiae generis* in the two-column Sed-contra-1); [^20] body position (the `°` marker fell in the cascade-damaged *ordo in formis corporalibus* sentence and is content-matched to *forma elementi*).

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses bleeding inline per CLAUDE.md are not rendered: *Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio* (×2), *Solutio oppositorum*, *Distinctio* (×2), *Notandum*, *Proportio* / *Proportio absolute* / *Proportio ad finem quoad animam* / *Quoad corpus* / *Proportio in relatione ad finem*. The catchword *S. Bonav. — Tom. II.* and the gathering signature *6* at the foot of p. 41 are likewise dropped.

**Page breaks.** p.41 ↔ p.42 placed within Sed contra 3 (after *potentiam alii communicandi. Si*), per the running head at raw line 3563. p.42 ↔ p.43 placed within reply 4 (after *dicendum, quod verum*), per the running head at raw line 3645.

**Scholion numbering.** The Quaracchi text prints a single scholion paragraph opened by a marginal "1."; rendered here as one untitled Scholion block (there is no "II.").

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II. *De rerum ordine ad finem et ad invicem.*

Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur de rebus productis quantum ad ordinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primum est de ordine rerum in comparatione ad finem. Secundum est de ordine earum, quem habent ad invicem.

### QUAESTIO I. *Quis sit finis principalior rerum conditarum, utrum divina gloria, an utilitas nostra.*

Circa primum sic proceditur; cum omnes creaturae conditae sint propter divinam gloriam et utilitatem propriam, sicut dicit Magister[^1] et accipi potest ex Scriptura, et Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana, quod Deus nos fecit et diligit non propter utilitatem suam, sed propter bonitatem suam et utilitatem nostram; quaeritur ergo, quis sit finis principalior conditionis rerum, utrum divina gloria, vel utilitas nostra. Et quod gloria Dei, videtur.

1. Ille est finis principalior, qui est ulterior — finis enim ultimus est potissimus[^2] — sed ulterior finis est Dei gloria quam utilitas nostra — nam non gloria Dei propter utilitatem, sed utilitas ad gloriam ordinatur — ergo videtur, quod gloria Dei sit principalior.

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2. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est perfectior; sed gloria Dei est perfectior: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: perfectior finis est, qui perfectiorem reddit operationem ordinatam ad ipsum; sed multo melius est opus, quod quis facit propter gloriam Dei quam propter utilitatem suam. Unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo[^3]: *Omnia in gloriam Dei facite*: ergo etc.

3. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est essentialior; sed gloria Dei est essentialior unicuique rei conditae, maxime rationali, quam utilitas sua. Nam res propter malitiam potest privari sua utilitate, sed non potest unquam privari, quin sit ad Dei gloriam.

4. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est universalior, propter hoc quod principalis finis totum debet complecti[^4]: sed gloria Dei est finis, quem assequitur omnis natura, sive humana sive angelica, sive bona sive mala: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Ille est finis principalior rei conditae, quem efficiens magis intendit; sed Deus magis intendit in conditione creaturae eius utilitatem quam gloriam suam: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio[^5]: *Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sed quod alterius*; sed Deus quae agit facit ex perfectissima caritate: ergo nec quaerit nec intendit quod suum est, ergo non suam gloriam, sed utilitatem alienam.

2. Item, ille finis est principalior conditionis rei, quem res condita magis appetit; sed unaquaeque res ita appetit suum commodum vel utilitatem, quod nullo modo potest velle oppositum[^6]; sed oppositum gloriae divinae potest velle, sicut patet in blasphemis: ergo utilitas etc.

3. Item, ille finis est potior conditionis rei, ad quem efficiens non pervenit nisi per effectum; hoc patet, quia, si aeque bene defenderer a pluviis absque domo sicut cum domo, si facerem domum propter talem defensionem, facerem frustra. Si ergo Deus non est magis gloriosus post conditionem rerum quam ante, si faceret res principaliter propter gloriam suam, faceret frustra: quodsi non frustra facit[^7], non producit ergo principaliter propter gloriam suam, sed propter utilitatem alienam.

4. Item, ille finis principalior est, qui effectum magis perficit, cum ad ipsum pervenit; sed Dei fruitio magis animam perficit quam Dei laudatio: ergo principalius facta est anima propter fruitionem quam propter Dei gloriam et laudem.

> **Conclusio.** Rerum conditarum principalior finis est Dei gloria sive bonitas, non quidem acquirenda vel augenda, sed manifestanda et communicanda.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod finis conditionis rei sive rerum conditarum principalior est Dei gloria sive bonitas, quam creaturae utilitas. — Sicut enim patet Proverbiorum decimo sexto[^8]: *Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus*; sed non propter suam utilitatem vel indigentiam, quia Psalmus[^9]: *Dixi Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges*: ergo propter suam gloriam, non, inquam, propter gloriam augendam, sed propter gloriam manifestandam et propter gloriam suam communicandam; in cuius manifestatione et participatione attenditur summa utilitas creaturae, videlicet eius glorificatio sive beatificatio.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod caritas alienum commodum quaerit; dicendum, quod secus est in nobis et in Deo. Nam in nobis bonum proprium differt a bono communi; sed in Deo bonum suum est bonum commune, nam ipse est «bonum omnis boni[^10]». Si ergo effectum non ordinaret ad se vel non faceret propter se, cum ipse sit bonum, a quo omne bonum, iam effectus non esset bonus. Quoniam ergo utilitas creaturae tota attenditur in ordinatione ad bonum, quod Deus est; ideo caritas Dei omnia rectissime fecit et convertit ad se. Non sic est in nobis.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis appetit; dicendum, quod est loqui de natura dupliciter: aut de natura ut deficiente, vel ut perfecta. Dico ergo, quod natura deficiens in se recurvatur: ideo proprium bonum desiderat, et ideo suum commodum. Natura vero perfecta amore caritatis sursum elevatur, et multo magis improportionaliter Dei gloriam desiderat quam utilitatem propriam: ut patet in habentibus caritatem. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis desiderat; verum est de natura recta et perfecta[^11].

3. Quod obiicitur, quod ille est principalior finis conditionis rei, ad quem res facta[^12] pertingit;

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responderi potest dupliciter. *Primo*, quod hoc habet veritatem, quando operans operatur propter indigentiam alicuius finis, ad quem non potest pervenire nisi per opus, quod producit; sed talis operans non est Deus, sicut patet: et ideo non habet locum hic. — *Vel aliter* dicendum, quod res factae sunt propter Dei gloriam, non, inquam, *acquirendam* vel *ampliandam*, sed *ostendendam* et *communicandam*. Et quamvis gloria Dei sit sine rebus factis, non tamen communicatur vel manifestatur nisi per res productas.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod fruitio magis perficit; dicendum, quod laus dupliciter est, scilicet *perfecta* et *imperfecta*. Laus *imperfecta* minus perficit animam quam fruitio; sed non sic laus *perfecta*, quia anima magis laetatur in gloria et plus gaudebit de Dei gloria et honore quam de sua glorificatione, et plus iucundabitur in laudando[^13] quam in considerando proprium bonum. Et ideo patet, quod ille finis est ulterior.

english:
### ARTICLE II. *On the order of things to their end and to one another.*

Consequently, in the second place, inquiry is made concerning produced things as regards order. And concerning this two things are asked. The first is about the order of things in comparison to their end. The second is about the order they have to one another.

### QUESTION I. *Which is the more principal end of created things, whether the divine glory or our utility.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus: since all creatures have been created for the divine glory and for their own utility, as the Master says[^1] and as can be gathered from Scripture, and Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine* that God made us and loves us not for his own utility but for his goodness and our utility; the question therefore is, which is the more principal end of the creating of things, whether the divine glory or our utility. And that it is the glory of God, it seems:

1. That is the more principal end which is more remote — for the last end is the most powerful[^2] — but the more remote end is the glory of God rather than our utility — for the glory of God is not [ordered] for the sake of utility, but utility is ordered to glory — therefore it seems that the glory of God is the more principal.

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2. Again, that is the more principal end which is more perfect; but the glory of God is more perfect: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: that end is more perfect which renders the operation ordered to it more perfect; but the work which one does for the glory of God is far better than [that which one does] for his own utility. Whence the Apostle, First to the Corinthians, chapter ten[^3]: *Do all things to the glory of God*: therefore etc.

3. Again, that is the more principal end which is more essential; but the glory of God is more essential to each created thing, especially to the rational [creature], than its own utility. For a thing can, on account of malice, be deprived of its utility, but it can never be deprived of being [ordered] to the glory of God.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which is more universal, because the principal end ought to embrace the whole[^4]: but the glory of God is the end which every nature attains, whether human or angelic, whether good or evil: therefore etc.

**To the contrary:**

1. That is the more principal end of a created thing which the efficient [cause] more intends; but God intends in the creating of a creature its utility more than his own glory: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [term]: as the Apostle says, First to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen[^5]: *Charity seeks not the things that are its own, but those of another*; but God does what he does out of most perfect charity: therefore he neither seeks nor intends what is his own, therefore not his own glory, but the utility of another.

2. Again, that is the more principal end of a created thing which the created thing more desires; but every thing so desires its own advantage or utility that it can in no way will the opposite[^6]; but it can will the opposite of the divine glory, as is clear in blasphemers: therefore utility etc.

3. Again, that is the more powerful end of a created thing at which the efficient [cause] does not arrive except through the effect; this is clear, because, if I were equally well protected from the rains without a house as with a house, then, if I made a house for the sake of such protection, I would make it in vain. If therefore God is not more glorious after the creating of things than before, then, if he made things principally for the sake of his own glory, he would make [them] in vain: but if he does not make [them] in vain[^7], then he does not produce [them] principally for the sake of his own glory, but for the sake of another's utility.

4. Again, that is the more principal end which more perfects the effect when it arrives at it; but the enjoyment of God perfects the soul more than the praising of God: therefore the soul was made more principally for the sake of enjoyment than for the sake of the glory and praise of God.

> **Conclusion.** The more principal end of created things is the glory or goodness of God — not indeed to be acquired or increased, but to be manifested and communicated.

**I respond:** It must be said that the more principal end of the creating of a thing, or of created things, is the glory or goodness of God, rather than the utility of the creature. — For, as is clear from Proverbs, chapter sixteen[^8]: *The Lord has wrought all things for himself*; but not for his own utility or need, because the Psalm [says][^9]: *I have said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods*: therefore for the sake of his own glory — not, I say, for glory to be increased, but for glory to be manifested and for his glory to be communicated; in the manifesting and partaking of which is regarded the highest utility of the creature, namely its glorification or beatification.

1. To what is therefore objected, that charity seeks another's advantage; it must be said that it is otherwise in us and in God. For in us the proper good differs from the common good; but in God his own good is the common good, for he himself is «the good of every good[^10]». If therefore he did not order the effect to himself, or did not make it for the sake of himself — since he himself is the good from which is every good — then the effect would not be good. Since therefore the whole utility of the creature is regarded in [its] ordering to the good, which is God; therefore the charity of God most rightly made all things and turned [them] to himself. It is not so in us.

2. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it must be said that nature can be spoken of in two ways: either of nature as deficient, or as perfect. I say therefore that a deficient nature is curved back into itself: therefore it desires its proper good, and therefore its own advantage. But a perfect nature is, by the love of charity, lifted upward, and far more disproportionately desires the glory of God than its own utility: as is clear in those who have charity. — To what is therefore said, that that is the more principal end which nature more desires; it is true of a right and perfect nature[^11].

3. To what is objected, that that is the more principal end of a created thing at which the made thing arrives[^12];

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it can be answered in two ways. *First*, that this holds true when the agent operates on account of need for some end, at which it cannot arrive except through the work which it produces; but such an agent is not God, as is clear: and therefore it has no place here. — *Or otherwise* it must be said that things were made for the glory of God — not, I say, to be *acquired* or *enlarged*, but to be *shown* and *communicated*. And although the glory of God exists without the things made, nevertheless it is not communicated or manifested except through produced things.

4. To what is objected, that enjoyment more perfects [the soul]; it must be said that praise is twofold, namely *perfect* and *imperfect*. Imperfect praise perfects the soul less than enjoyment; but not so perfect praise, because the soul rejoices more in glory and will delight more in the glory and honor of God than in its own glorification, and will take more joy in praising[^13] than in considering its own good. And therefore it is clear that that end is more remote.

la: Hic c. 4, ubi etiam idem probatur ex s. Scriptura. — Textus Augustini est I. *de Doctr. christ.* c. 31. seq. n. 34. seq., ubi ostenditur, quod Deus nos diligendo nobis non fruatur, sed utatur: «Quia enim bonus est, sumus, et in quantum sumus, boni sumus... Ille igitur usus, qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem». Cfr. etiam liber *de Diligendo Deo*, c. 2, qui olim Augustino adscribebatur. — Aliquanto superius verbum *proceditur* deest in multis mss.

en: Here, c. 4 [of the Master's text], where the same is also proved from Sacred Scripture. — The text of Augustine is *On Christian Doctrine* I, c. 31 seq., n. 34 seq., where it is shown that God, in loving us, does not enjoy us but uses us: «For because he is good, we are; and inasmuch as we are, we are good... That use, therefore, which is called God's, by which he uses us, is referred not to his benefit but to ours, but to his goodness alone». Cf. also the book *On the Love of God*, c. 2, which was once ascribed to Augustine. — Somewhat above, the word *proceditur* is absent in many manuscripts.

la: Aristot., I. *Ethic.* c. 1. seq. Ibid. c. 7. ait: *Id autem, quod per se sectandum est, eo perfectius dicimus, quod propter aliud appetimus... absolute autem perfectum, quod semper per se, nunquam ob aliud expetendum est.*

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* I, c. 1 seq. Ibid. c. 7 he says: *But that which is to be pursued for its own sake we call more perfect than that which we desire for the sake of something else... but absolutely perfect is that which is always [pursued] for its own sake, never to be sought on account of anything else.*

la: Vers. 31. — De *maiori* cfr. Aristot., I. *Magn. Moral.* c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod ipsorum finium praestat semper qui perfectus est imperfecto... Imperfectus autem, cuius adventu alium desideramus.

en: Verse 31. — On the *major [premise]* cf. Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I, c. 3 (c. 2), where he says that, of ends themselves, the one that is perfect is always superior to the imperfect... but imperfect is that at whose coming we [still] desire another.

la: Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., X. *Metaph.* text. 13. (IX. c. 4.): *Extra finem autem nihil est; ultimum enim in re omni est et continet.*

en: In this respect Aristotle says, *Metaphysics* X, text 13 (IX, c. 4): *But outside the end there is nothing; for it is the last in every thing and contains [it].*

la: Vers. 5. — Mox cod. T *sed quae alterius* pro *sed quod alterius.*

en: Verse 5. — Soon, codex T reads *sed quae alterius* for *sed quod alterius.*

la: Cfr. Boeth., III. *de Consol.* prosa 11.

en: Cf. Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]* III, prose 11.

la: Aristot., I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 32. (c. 4.): *Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Heaven and the World* I, text 32 (c. 4): *But God and nature do nothing in vain.*

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

en: Psalm 15:2.

la: August., VIII. *de Trin.* c. 3. n. 4. Cfr. etiam *Enarrat. in Ps.* 134. n. 3. seqq., ubi haec fusius exponuntur.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VIII, c. 3, n. 4. Cf. also *Enarration on Psalm 134*, n. 3 seqq., where these things are expounded more fully.

la: Cod. I prosequitur *non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta.*

en: Codex I continues *non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta* ("but it is not true of a deficient and imperfect nature").

la: Vat. *per effectum.*

en: The Vatican ms. reads *per effectum* ("through the effect").

la: Subaudi cum cod. N *Deum.*

en: Supply, with codex N, *Deum* ("God") — i.e. "in praising [God]".

latin_scholion:
Finis distinguitur multipliciter; hoc loco notandus est duplex finis: finis *operantis*, qui est id quod principaliter intendit operans, et hic est semper in ipso operante; et finis *operis*, qui est ratio operis, ad quam opus natura sua ordinatur, et hic *saepe* est extra agentem in alio (cfr. infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6.). Tamen finis operis reducitur in finem *operantis* (S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1.). Hic autem dupliciter concipi potest: aut propter *desiderium* acquirendae rei non habitae, ut est in nobis; aut propter *complacentiam* finis iam habiti, quem operans intendit communicare aliis, ut est in Deo (ad 3.). — Facile intelligitur, finem ultimum, ex parte *creaturae* consideratum, non esse nisi in Deo, qui est eius primum principium. Omnia enim appetunt bonum sibi competens, quod non est nisi bonum a summo bono participatum et ad idem ultimo reducendum. — Maior difficultas est de fine ex parte Dei *operantis*, cum Deus nec *intrinsecus* aliquid acquirere, nec eius voluntas a bono aliquo *extra ipsum* ultimo moveri possit, sicut voluntas creata (cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 3; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1.). Unde Durandus, finem operantis in Deo esse, perperam negavit, arguens contra rationes S. Thomae (hic q. 2. a. 1.); aliique multi recentiores circa capitale hoc ethicae christianae fundamentum erraverunt. Hinc Conc. Vatican. *de Fide* non tantum in can. 5. *de Deo* anathemate percussit eum, qui «mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit», sed etiam in cap. 1. luculenter doctrinam communem explanavit sic: «Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur... de nihilo condidit creaturam». Quod decretum fere ad verbum convenit cum dictis a S. Bonaventura (hic in corp. et ad 3.). Cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 1. 2, et infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. — De *speciebus* finis cfr. hic d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, et ibid. dub. 1, d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6, d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 15; IV. Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

Alex. Hal., *S.* p. II. q. 1. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., *IV. Sent.* d. 49. q. 8. n. 7. ad arg. 4; de Rerum princ. q. 1. a. 3. n. 28. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; *S.* I. q. 44. a. 4, et q. 103. a. 2; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 17. 18. — B. Albert., *S.* p. I. tr. 13. q. 53. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 2. 3. 4. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 8.

---

english_scholion:
The end is distinguished in many ways; in this place a twofold end is to be noted: the end *of the agent*, which is that which the agent principally intends, and this is always in the agent itself; and the end *of the work*, which is the ratio of the work, to which the work by its own nature is ordered, and this is *often* outside the agent in another (cf. below, d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6). Yet the end of the work is reduced to the end *of the agent* (St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 1). This [latter] can be conceived in two ways: either on account of *desire* for a thing not possessed, to be acquired, as it is in us; or on account of *complacency* in an end already possessed, which the agent intends to communicate to others, as it is in God (ad 3). — It is easily understood that the last end, considered on the part of the *creature*, is nothing but in God, who is its first principle. For all things desire the good befitting them, which is nothing but a good shared from the highest good and ultimately to be led back to the same. — The greater difficulty is about the end on the part of God *the agent*, since God can neither *intrinsically* acquire anything, nor can his will be ultimately moved by any good *outside himself*, as a created will [can] (cf. I *Sent.* d. 45, dub. 3; *Breviloquium* p. II, c. 1). Whence Durandus wrongly denied that the end of the agent is in God, arguing against the reasons of St. Thomas (here, q. 2, a. 1); and many other more recent [authors] have erred concerning this capital foundation of Christian ethics. Hence the Vatican Council, *On the Faith*, not only in canon 5 *On God* struck with anathema him who «shall have denied that the world was created for the glory of God», but also in chapter 1 lucidly set forth the common doctrine thus: «This one true God, by his goodness and almighty power, not to increase his own beatitude, nor to acquire [it], but to manifest his perfection through the goods which he imparts to creatures... created the creature out of nothing». This decree agrees almost word for word with what was said by St. Bonaventure (here, in the body and ad 3). Cf. I *Sent.* d. 43, a. 2, q. 1–2, and below, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1. — On the *species* of the end cf. here, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1–3, and ibid. dub. 1; d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6; d. 40, a. 1, q. 1–2; I *Sent.* d. 1, dub. 15; IV *Sent.* d. 6, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 1, m. 1–3. — Scotus, *IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 8, n. 7, ad arg. 4; *On the Principle of Things* q. 1, a. 3, n. 28. — St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 1–2; *Summa* I, q. 44, a. 4, and q. 103, a. 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 17–18. — Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 13, q. 53, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 5, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, p. II, q. 1, a. 2–4. — Durandus, here, q. 6. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 8. — Biel, here, q. 8.

---

translators_notes:
**Re-chunking (ARTICULUS II opener absorbed).** The auto-chunker placed this chunk at raw 3681–3817, beginning at the *QUAESTIO I.* head and leaving the ARTICULUS II opener (raw 3672–3679: the `ARTICULUS II.` head, the title *De rerum ordine ad finem et ad invicem*, and the two-sentence sub-divisio *Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur...quem habent ad invicem*) unassigned. No separate `d1-p2-a2-divisio` chunk was created: ART. II's opener is ~40 words, and the parallel ART. I opener (*Circa primum quaeruntur duo...*) was folded into `d1-p2-divisio`'s TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, while `a1-q1` simply carries its own `### ARTICULUS I.` heading. This chunk follows the same pattern — it carries the `### ARTICULUS II.` heading plus the short opener, then `### QUAESTIO I.`. `line_start` accordingly moved 3681 → 3672.

**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. This chunk uses a single sequence 1–13: notes 1–2 = the page-43 footer **right column** (intro Magister+Augustine [^1]; Fundamentum 1 [^2]); notes 3–12 = the page-44 footer, all ten (Fundamentum 2 [^3]; Fundamentum 4 [^4]; Contra 1 [^5]; Contra 2 [^6]; Contra 3 [^7]; Respondeo Prov. [^8] and Ps. [^9]; reply 1 [^10]; reply 2 [^11]; reply 3 [^12]); note 13 = the page-45 footer **note 1** only (reply 4 [^13]).

**Cross-chunk footer splits (recurring pattern, confirmed again here).** Pages 43 and 45 footers each straddle a chunk boundary; their notes split by *body anchor*, not by which chunk physically holds the footer block.
- *Page-43 footer:* its **left-column** notes 1–3 (`Hic ad 2 / nisi quod codd.`; `Matth. 22, 23: Sadducaei...animam uniri corpori`; `Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41...separatam esse`) anchor in the preceding chunk **a1-q2** (its replies 4–5 on p. 43) and are already captured there as its [^21]–[^23]. Only the **right-column** notes 4–5 anchor a2-q1 (→ [^1]–[^2]). Verified against a1-q2's committed crosswalk ("notes 21–23 = the page-43 footer"); no backfill of a1-q2 required.
- *Page-45 footer:* only **note 1** (`Subaudi cum cod. N Deum`) anchors a2-q1 (reply 4, *iucundabitur in laudando* — laud requires an object; cod. N supplies *Deum*). The page-45 footer's **notes 2–5** (`Hic c. 6 in fine`; `Aristot. I. Rhetor. ... de Bono maiore et utili maiore`; `Aristot. III. Topic. c. 2`; `In multis locis ... de Lib. Arb.`) anchor in the **following** question a2-q2 (*Utrum natura spiritualis dignitate naturae praecellat compositam*), whose body begins at raw 3818 (bottom of printed p. 45). They are left for that chunk.

**PDF verification (whole chunk).** The IA djvu OCR was severely diagonal-cascade-fragmented from the Respondeo onward (raw 3733–3736 broke `1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod caritas alienum` one token per line; the *Solutio oppositorum* replies and all three page-footers were two-column-bled). The entire chunk was re-set against the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 43–45 = PDF pp. 65–67) via PIL column-band crops (`tools/colcrop.py`), reading each page left column then right column, body bands then footer bands. Confirmed reconstructions: the Respondeo opening; the four-fold *Solutio oppositorum* matched to the four Contra arguments; the reply-3 page-44↔45 bridge (*ad quem res facta pertingit* | *responderi potest dupliciter*); the scholion as the doctrinal paragraph plus the parallel-citations list.

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial side-glosses bleeding inline per CLAUDE.md are not rendered: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Distinctio*, *Alia solutio*. The scholion's marginal enumeration ("1." / "11.") is dropped per the established Vol II d.1 convention (single untitled Scholion block; the doctrinal paragraph and the comparative-bibliography list are kept as two paragraphs of the same block, the "II." numeral being editorial, not content).

**Page breaks.** Chunk opens on printed p. 43 (the p. 43 running head at raw 3645 falls within a1-q2's territory; no new running head until p. 44). p. 43 ↔ p. 44 placed between Fundamentum 1 and Fundamentum 2 (running head `44 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` at raw 3708). p. 44 ↔ p. 45 placed within reply 3, after *ad quem res facta pertingit;* (running head `DIST. I. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` — running-head lag, q2-labelled — at raw 3780).

**Open [?] for d.10 polish-blocker.** None blocking — the 450 dpi PDF cleared the genuine garbles. Low-confidence residuals to re-confirm at 600 dpi:
- [^1] anchor: the OCR marker sits after *Magister* (raw 3686); Quaracchi's note 4 (`Hic c. 4...`) opens with the Lombard reference and then carries the Scripture + Augustine *de Doctr. christ.* loci, so the single anchor after *Magister* covers all three — re-confirm the marker is not separately repeated after *Doctrina christiana*.
- [^13] (page-45 cross-chunk split): the *Subaudi...Deum* → *in laudando* content-match is strong but rests on the two-column footer linearization at the a2-q1/a2-q2 boundary; re-confirm at 600 dpi that p. 45 footer note 1 is not the opening note of q2.
- [^7] anchor: the OCR marker for *quodsi non frustra facit* surfaced as a stray `S` glyph (raw 3756); content-matched to Aristotle *de Caelo* "Deus et natura nihil frustra faciunt" (p. 44 note 5) — secure but worth an eyes-on at 600 dpi with the other p. 44 markers.