title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 596 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus, an aliquid addat ultra gratiam, sicut habitus aliarum virtutum. Et quod sit idem caritas omnino quod gratia, nihil addens ultra, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicit Ambrosius[^2]: « Caritas est mater omnium virtutum, quia omnes informat, sine qua nulla est vera virtus »; sed esse formam virtutum gratuitarum, secundum quod gratuitae sunt, est proprium ipsius gratiae gratum facientis: ergo si hoc competit ipsi caritati, videtur, quod in nullo differat a gratia.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate[^3] dicit, quod « excellentissimum inter dona Dei est caritas »; sed gratia gratum faciens est excellentior quam gratia gratis data: ergo videtur, quod si caritas est excellentissima inter cetera dona, quod ipsa sit mere et pure gratia gratum faciens, nihil habens ultra.

3. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore, in libro de Arrha sponsae[^4]: « Scio, anima mea, quod amor est vita tua »; sed animam vivificare quantum ad esse moris est proprium ipsius gratiae gratum facientis: ergo videtur, quod caritas sit ipsa gratia mere et pure.

4. Item, facere gratum et acceptum Deo est proprie proprium ipsius gratiae[^5]; sed caritas, eo ipso quod caritas est, reddit hominem Deo carum et acceptum et opus facit meritorium: ergo videtur, quod nihil aliud in se habeat, quod super gratiam gratum facientem aliquam additionem faciat, vel per quod a gratia differat.

5. Item, omnis habitus virtutum, qui aliquid addit super gratiam gratum facientem, aliquo modo manet cum culpa nec tollitur totaliter per peccatum; sed caritas omnino tollitur per culpam[^6]: ergo nihil omnino addit super gratiam.

**Contra:**

1. Bernardus, de Amore Dei, capitulo secundo[^7]: « Voluntas crescit in amorem, amor in caritatem et caritas in sapientiam »; et paulo post: « Nihil enim aliud est amor quam vehemens in bono voluntas; per se enim bona voluntas simplex est affectus ». Si ergo affectus vehemens est de essentia caritatis; et affectus huiusmodi aliud est quam gratia: ergo habitus caritatis addit aliquid ultra.

2. Item, nihil generale fit speciale nisi per aliquam additionem[^8]; sed gratia generalis et communis est ad omnem virtutem, caritas autem est specialis virtus: ergo necesse est, caritatem aliquid addere ultra gratiam.

3. Item, habitus, qui continue est in actu suo, differens est ab eo qui non est continue in suo actu; sed gratia est continue in actu gratificandi[^9], caritas autem non est continue in actu suo, qui est diligere: ergo caritas et gratia aliquo modo differunt: aliquid igitur habet in se caritas, quod est a gratia diversum. Cum ergo sit habitus gratuitus, videtur, quod aliquid addat super ipsam gratiam.

4. Item, habitus aliarum virtutum dantur ipsis potentiis ad ipsarum expeditionem ultra gratiam gratum facientem[^10]; sed vis concupiscibilis adeo indiget expediri, sicut rationalis, cum sit corrupta et infecta: si ergo virtus perficiens rationalem, ut fides, continet aliquid gratiae gratis datae; videtur pari ratione, immo multo fortiori, caritatem aliquid addere super gratiam gratum facientem.

5. Item, omnis habitus, qui per assuefactionem et frequentiam reddit potentiam faciliorem ad actum sine augmento gratiae gratum facientis, aliquid continet in se praeter gratiam gratum facientem; sed caritas est huiusmodi, sicut patet[^11]: ergo caritas aliquid addit super gratiam. Prima probatur per hoc, <!-- page 597 -->quod tanto habitus est perfectior, quanto potentiam reddit faciliorem et expeditiorem ad actum. Si ergo habitus caritatis aliquo modo potest proficere, non proficiente gratia gratum faciente, necessario oportet ponere, quod differat ab ea.

> ### Conclusio.
> Caritas ultra gratiam gratum facientem dicit aliquem habitum, quo mediante ipsa potentia diligendi apta fit ad actum proprium; licet opposita sententia non careat probabilitate.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi.

*Opinio I.* Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod caritas est omnino idem cum gratia per *essentiam*, differens sola *relatione*. Dicitur enim gratia, in quantum respicit totam animam, caritas vero, in quantum regit et dirigit voluntatem. *Tres rationes.* Et hoc videtur significare ipsum caritatis *nomen*, et *Apostolus* videtur innuere, et *ratio* approbare. *Prima.* Nomen ipsum significare videtur: quia caritas dicitur a *charis*[^1], quod apud Graecos idem est quod gratia. Unde cum haec virtus non habeat aliam nominationem a gratia, non videtur, quod aliquid addat secundum rem. — *Secunda.* Apostolus[^2b] autem insinuare videtur, cum eam ceteris virtutibus anteponit et superponit. Hoc enim non faceret, nisi magis pure haberet rationem boni. Et hoc ipsum ipsemet innuit, quod aliae virtutes possunt esse infructuosae et recipere admixtionem mali, caritas vero minime; et propterea videtur caritas secundum testimonium apostolicum esse mera et pura gratia gratum faciens, cum sit bonum purissimum et excellentissimum. — *Tertia.* Ratio etiam approbare videtur: quia, cum ipsa voluntas sit supremum in anima[^3b], a qua pendet tota rectitudo virium inferiorum, et quae immediate unitur ipsi Deo; ideo vindicat sibi totum principium rectitudinis; et hinc est, quod gratia, quae perficit alias potentias animae, specialiori modo perficit voluntatem. Et propterea, licet alias potentias perficiat cum habitu gratiae gratis datae, ipsam[^4b] potentiam diligendi perficit per se; et secundum quod illam perficit, sic caritas appellatur. — Et sic videtur satis rationabile dicere, quod gratia et caritas idem sunt per *essentiam*, differentes sola *relatione*. Et ratione illius *relationis* connumeratur cum aliis virtutibus et ab eis distinguitur et quodam modo specificatur. — *Ad argg.* Et per hoc declinari satis faciliter videntur[^5b] rationes ad oppositum, quae ostendunt, quod caritas aliquid addat super gratiam. Non enim concludere videntur necessario, quod addat aliquid *absolutum*. Unde ad omnia illa inconvenientia declinanda sufficiens videtur dicere, quod addat solum respectum ad opus determinatum.

*Opinio II.* Est et alius modus dicendi, quod caritas ultra gratiam gratum facientem dicit aliquem *habitum*, quo mediante assuescit ipsa potentia diligendi ad actum proprium. *Duae rationes.* Et hoc quidem dicunt esse necessarium, tum propter *essentialem differentiam*, quae est inter alias virtutes et caritatem, quae quidem non potest esse per diversitatem, quae sit in gratia gratum faciente, cum ipsa sit una, sicut in secundo libro[^6b] ostensum est; tum etiam propter *actus ipsius specialitatem et difficultatem*, respectu cuius requiritur habitus specificans et determinans gratiam ad talem usum et habilitans potentiam, ut exeat in actum suum. — *Et auctoritas Bernardi.* Et huic modo dicendi satis concordat *auctoritas Bernardi*, qua dicit in secundo capitulo[^7b] de Amore Dei, quod « libera voluntas data est homini, quae, cum adiuvanti concordat gratiae, virtutis accipit profectum et nomen et amor efficitur: cum vero sibi dimissa se ipsa frui vult, sui in se ipsa patitur defectum, et quot vitia, tot vitiorum sortitur nomina, ut cupiditatis, avaritiae, luxuriae ». Ex ipso innuitur, quod aliquid est ex parte voluntatis nostrae, quod adveniente gratia fit virtus; et non est nisi virtus caritatis, de qua loquitur ibi: ergo habitus caritatis ultra gratiam secundum ipsum aliquid dicit. — *Alia ratio.* Satis etiam videtur haec positio consona rationi: quia, sicut *fides* concernit assensum[^8b], sic *caritas* concernit affectum; et sicut cognitio aliquid est differens a gratia gratum faciente, sic etiam et dilectio; et sicut fides concernit cognitionem, ita caritas affectionem, secundum illud quod dicit Augustinus[^9b]: « Caritas est rectissima animi affectio, qua diligitur Deus propter se et proximus <!-- page 598 -->propter Deum ». Et idem ipsum dicitur in libro de Spiritu et anima circa principium[^1b]: « Ordinandi sunt animi affectus ad illud quod debent, ut in virtutes proficere possint ». Et paulo post: « Amor per odium sui proficit in amorem Dei et proximi ». *Conclusio.* Satis igitur videtur rationi consonum dicere, quod sicut virtus fidei aliquem habitum concernit praeter gratiam gratum facientem, sic et habitus caritatis. Et hoc satis videntur rationabiliter ostendere rationes ad istam partem adductae. Si quis igitur velit hanc partem sustinere, satis potest faciliter ad rationes, quae adducuntur in contrarium, respondere.

**Solutio oppositorum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod caritas informat ceteras virtutes, quod est proprium ipsius gratiae; dicendum, quod est loqui de virtutibus quantum ad *esse*, et quantum ad *bene esse*, et quantum ad *bene operari*. *Notandum.* Si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad *esse*, sic quaelibet virtus habet in se ipsa propriam formam, per quam distinguitur ab alia, ut fides a spe. Si autem loquamur de ipsis quantum ad *bene esse*, sic informantur a gratia, quae facit ipsas gratuitas et Deo acceptas. Si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad *bene operari*, sic informantur a caritate, quae est pondus inclinans et faciens tendere operationes omnium virtutum ad bonum finem[^2c]. Et sic alio modo informat gratia, alio modo caritas; et propterea non sequitur, quod inter caritatem et gratiam nulla sit essentialis differentia.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est donum excellentissimum; dicendum, quod quia caritas non separatur a gratia, quamvis aliquid addat ultra ipsam; ideo excellentia gratiae gratum facientis attribuitur caritati; et hinc est, quod sortitur etiam nomen gratiae et praeponitur omnibus virtutibus ab Apostolo quantum ad eius excellentiam et dignitatem. Et propterea non sequitur, quod ipsa nihil addat ultra gratiam, quia in illa comparatione non comparatur ad dona gratuita, secundum quod gratuita sunt, sed secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae; et in hoc illis praeponitur, quia nunquam caritas separatur a gratia, quamvis ab ea possint separari alia dona gratuita[^3c]; et ideo dicitur donum excellentissimum esse inter cetera.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor est vita animi; dicendum, quod sicut in *vita naturae* vivere dicitur dupliciter: uno modo, prout est actus *primus*, alio modo, prout est actus *secundus*; et primo modo est ab animae *essentia*, et secundo modo ab animae *potentia*: sic intelligendum est in *esse moris*, quod vivere, prout est actus primus, est ab ipsa gratia vivificante ipsam animam totam; sed prout est actus secundus, est ab ipsa virtute. Et quamvis possit attribui omni virtuti gratuitae, utpote ipsi fidei, secundum illud quod dicitur ad Romanos primo[^4c]: *Iustus ex fide vivit*; potissime tamen attribuitur ipsi caritati propter magnam affinitatem, quam habet ad gratiam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas reddit Deo acceptum et gratum; dicendum, quod hoc facit ratione *gratiae*; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod praecise sit gratia, quia caritas non tantummodo habet Deo acceptum reddere, sed etiam aliquam potentiam expedire et ad aliquem actum specialem et determinatum habilitare, ratione cuius aliquid addit ipsi gratiae, quod est ipsi gratiae substratum et materiale, sicut in praecedentibus[^5c] ostensum fuit de fide.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas omnino destruitur per peccatum; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia caritas nihil addat super gratiam gratum facientem, sed quia omne peccatum repugnat ipsi habitui substrato caritati. *Notandum.* Et ideo sicut fides totaliter tollitur per infidelitatem, quia non solum repugnat ei quantum ad id quod est in ea gratiae gratum facientis, sed etiam quantum ad habitum substratum[^6c]; per hunc modum intelligendum est, quod caritas tollitur per omne peccatum; illud autem in sequenti problemate clarius manifestabitur.

english:
<!-- page 596 -->

### Question III. *Whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the habit of charity is merely gratuitous, or adds something beyond grace, as the habit of the other virtues does. And that charity is altogether the same as grace, adding nothing beyond, seems [to be the case]:

1. From what Ambrose says[^2]: « Charity is the mother of all the virtues, because it informs them all, and without it there is no true virtue »; but to be the form of the gratuitous virtues, insofar as they are gratuitous, is proper to grace-making-pleasing [gratia gratum faciens] itself: therefore if this belongs to charity itself, it seems that it differs in nothing from grace.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^3] says that « the most excellent among the gifts of God is charity »; but grace-making-pleasing is more excellent than grace freely given [gratia gratis data]: therefore it seems that, if charity is the most excellent among the rest of the gifts, then it is merely and purely grace-making-pleasing, having nothing beyond.

3. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor, in the book *On the Betrothal-gift of the Bride*[^4]: « I know, my soul, that love is your life »; but to vivify the soul as to its moral being [esse moris] is proper to grace-making-pleasing itself: therefore it seems that charity is grace itself, merely and purely.

4. Likewise, to make pleasing and acceptable to God is properly proper to grace itself[^5]; but charity, by the very fact that it is charity, renders a man dear and acceptable to God and makes his work meritorious: therefore it seems that it has nothing else in itself by which it makes any addition over grace-making-pleasing, or by which it differs from grace.

5. Likewise, every habit of the virtues that adds something over grace-making-pleasing in some way remains together with fault and is not totally taken away by sin; but charity is altogether taken away by fault[^6]: therefore it adds nothing whatever over grace.

**On the contrary:**

1. Bernard, *On the Love of God*, chapter two[^7]: « The will grows into love, love into charity, and charity into wisdom »; and a little after: « For love is nothing else than a will vehement for the good; for of itself a good will is a simple affection ». If, then, vehement affection is of the essence of charity; and an affection of this kind is something other than grace: therefore the habit of charity adds something beyond.

2. Likewise, nothing general becomes special except through some addition[^8]; but grace is general and common to every virtue, whereas charity is a special virtue: therefore it is necessary that charity add something beyond grace.

3. Likewise, a habit that is continuously in its act is different from one that is not continuously in its act; but grace is continuously in the act of making-gracious[^9], whereas charity is not continuously in its own act, which is to love: therefore charity and grace differ in some way: charity therefore has something in itself that is diverse from grace. Since, then, it is a gratuitous habit, it seems that it adds something over grace itself.

4. Likewise, the habits of the other virtues are given to the powers themselves for their expediting, beyond grace-making-pleasing[^10]; but the concupiscible power is as much in need of being expedited as the rational, since it is corrupted and infected: if, then, the virtue perfecting the rational power, such as faith, contains something of grace-freely-given; it seems by parity of reasoning, indeed by a much stronger one, that charity adds something over grace-making-pleasing.

5. Likewise, every habit that by habituation and frequency renders a power more ready for its act without an increase of grace-making-pleasing contains something in itself beside grace-making-pleasing; but charity is of this kind, as is plain[^11]: therefore charity adds something over grace. The first [premise] is proved by this, <!-- page 597 -->that a habit is the more perfect the more it renders a power readier and more expedited for its act. If, then, the habit of charity can in some way advance while grace-making-pleasing does not advance, it is necessary to posit that it differs from it.

> ### Conclusion.
> Charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain habit by whose mediation the power of loving itself is made apt for its proper act; although the opposite opinion is not without probability.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking.

*Opinion I.* For some have wished to say that charity is altogether the same as grace by *essence*, differing by *relation* alone. For it is called grace inasmuch as it regards the whole soul, but charity inasmuch as it governs and directs the will. *Three reasons.* And this seems to be signified by the very *name* of charity, and the *Apostle* seems to hint at it, and *reason* to approve it. *First.* The name itself seems to signify it: because charity is called from *charis*[^1], which among the Greeks is the same as grace. Hence, since this virtue has no other designation than from grace, it does not seem that it adds anything in reality. — *Second.* But the Apostle[^2b] seems to imply it, when he sets it before and above the other virtues. For he would not do this unless it had more purely the character of the good. And he himself hints at this very thing, that the other virtues can be fruitless and receive an admixture of evil, but charity by no means; and therefore charity, according to the apostolic testimony, seems to be mere and pure grace-making-pleasing, since it is the purest and most excellent good. — *Third.* Reason also seems to approve it: because, since the will itself is the supreme [power] in the soul[^3b], on which depends all the rectitude of the lower powers, and which is immediately united to God himself; therefore it claims for itself the whole principle of rectitude; and hence it is that grace, which perfects the other powers of the soul, perfects the will in a more special way. And therefore, although it perfects the other powers together with the habit of grace-freely-given, it perfects the power of loving itself[^4b] through itself; and according as it perfects that [power], so it is called charity. — And thus it seems quite reasonable to say that grace and charity are the same by *essence*, differing by *relation* alone. And by reason of that *relation* it is numbered with the other virtues and is distinguished from them and is in a certain way specified. — *To the arguments.* And by this the reasons to the opposite, which show that charity adds something over grace, seem rather easily to be turned aside[^5b]. For they do not seem necessarily to conclude that it adds anything *absolute*. Hence, to turn aside all those incongruities, it seems sufficient to say that it adds only a *respect* [relation] to a determinate work.

*Opinion II.* There is also another manner of speaking, that charity, beyond grace-making-pleasing, denotes a certain *habit* by whose mediation the power of loving itself becomes habituated to its proper act. *Two reasons.* And this indeed they say to be necessary, both on account of the *essential difference* which is between the other virtues and charity—a difference which cannot indeed exist through a diversity that is in grace-making-pleasing, since it is one, as was shown in the second book[^6b]—and also on account of *the specialness and difficulty of its act*, with respect to which a habit is required specifying and determining grace to such a use and enabling the power to go forth into its act. — *And the authority of Bernard.* And to this manner of speaking the *authority of Bernard* sufficiently accords, where he says in the second chapter[^7b] *On the Love of God* that « free will was given to man, which, when it accords with assisting grace, receives the advance and the name of virtue and becomes love: but when, left to itself, it wishes to enjoy itself, it suffers a defect in itself, and as many vices as there are, it obtains the names of so many vices, as of cupidity, avarice, luxury ». From this it is hinted that there is something on the part of our will which, with grace coming, becomes virtue; and it is none other than the virtue of charity, of which he speaks there: therefore the habit of charity, according to him, denotes something beyond grace. — *Another reason.* This position also seems sufficiently consonant with reason: because, just as *faith* concerns assent[^8b], so *charity* concerns the affect; and just as cognition is something differing from grace-making-pleasing, so also is love; and as faith concerns cognition, so charity concerns affection, according to what Augustine says[^9b]: « Charity is the most upright affection of the soul, by which God is loved for his own sake and the neighbor <!-- page 598 -->for God's sake ». And the same is said in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* near the beginning[^1b]: « The affections of the soul are to be ordered to that to which they ought, so that they may be able to advance into virtues ». And a little after: « Love, through hatred of self, advances into the love of God and of neighbor ». *Conclusion.* It seems therefore sufficiently consonant with reason to say that, just as the virtue of faith concerns a certain habit beside grace-making-pleasing, so also does the habit of charity. And this the reasons brought forward to this side seem reasonably enough to show. If anyone, then, wishes to maintain this side, he can quite easily reply to the reasons which are brought forward to the contrary.

**Solution of the objections:**

*To 1.* For to that which is objected first, that charity informs the other virtues, which is proper to grace; it must be said that one may speak of the virtues as to *being* [esse], and as to *well-being* [bene esse], and as to *operating well* [bene operari]. *Note.* If we speak of the virtues as to *being*, then each virtue has in itself its own form, by which it is distinguished from another, as faith from hope. But if we speak of them as to *well-being*, then they are informed by grace, which makes them gratuitous and acceptable to God. If we speak of the virtues as to *operating well*, then they are informed by charity, which is the weight inclining and making the operations of all the virtues tend to a good end[^2c]. And thus grace informs in one way, charity in another; and therefore it does not follow that there is no essential difference between charity and grace.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that charity is the most excellent gift; it must be said that, because charity is not separated from grace, although it adds something beyond it; therefore the excellence of grace-making-pleasing is attributed to charity; and hence it is that it obtains also the name of grace and is set before all the virtues by the Apostle as to its excellence and dignity. And therefore it does not follow that it adds nothing beyond grace, because in that comparison it is not compared to the gratuitous gifts insofar as they are gratuitous, but insofar as they are gifts of grace-freely-given; and in this it is set before them, because charity is never separated from grace, although the other gratuitous gifts can be separated from it[^3c]; and therefore it is said to be the most excellent gift among the rest.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that love is the life of the soul; it must be said that, just as in the *life of nature* "to live" is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is the *first* act, in another way, insofar as it is the *second* act; and in the first way it is from the *essence* of the soul, and in the second way from the *power* of the soul: so it is to be understood in *moral being* [esse moris] that to live, insofar as it is the first act, is from grace itself vivifying the whole soul; but insofar as it is the second act, it is from the virtue itself. And although it can be attributed to every gratuitous virtue, such as to faith itself, according to what is said to the Romans first[^4c]: *The just man lives by faith*; nevertheless it is most especially attributed to charity itself on account of the great affinity which it has to grace.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that charity renders one acceptable and pleasing to God; it must be said that it does this by reason of *grace*; but from this it does not follow that it is precisely grace, because charity not only has [the function] of rendering one acceptable to God, but also of expediting some power and enabling it for some special and determinate act, by reason of which it adds something to grace itself, which is, as it were, the substrate and material to grace itself, as was shown in the preceding [questions][^5c] concerning faith.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that charity is altogether destroyed by sin; it must be said that this is not because charity adds nothing over grace-making-pleasing, but because every sin is repugnant to the very habit substrate to charity. *Note.* And therefore, just as faith is totally taken away by unbelief, because it is repugnant to it not only as to that which is in it of grace-making-pleasing, but also as to the substrate habit[^6c]; in this manner it is to be understood that charity is taken away by every sin; but that will be more clearly manifested in the following problem.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 3. — In fine arg. pro *in nullo* codd. A K *nullo modo*. *(P. 596, n. 2.)*

en: See above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 3. — At the end of the argument, for *in nullo* codices A K [read] *nullo modo*. *(P. 596, n. 2.)*

la: Cap. 18. n. 32: Nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Ibid. c. 19. n. 37: In donis Dei nihil maius est caritate. *(P. 596, n. 3.)*

en: Chapter 18, n. 32: Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God. Ibid., c. 19, n. 37: Among the gifts of God nothing is greater than charity. *(P. 596, n. 3.)*

la: Sive de Arrha animae, in principio: Scio, quod vita tua dilectio est. *(P. 596, n. 4.)*

en: Or *On the Betrothal-gift of the Soul*, at the beginning: I know that your life is love. *(P. 596, n. 4.)*

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. I and following, and d. 29, a. I, q. I. *(P. 596, n. 5.)*

la: Vide quaest. seq. — Codd. L Z bb: *omnes habitus... aliquid addunt... manent... nec tolluntur.* Pro *per culpam* codd. Z bb *per peccatum.* *(P. 596, n. 6.)*

en: See the following question. — Codices L Z bb [read]: *all habits... add something... remain... and are not taken away.* For *per culpam* codices Z bb [read] *per peccatum.* *(P. 596, n. 6.)*

la: Sive de Natura et dignitate amoris (inter opera Bernardi, sed auctor est Guliel., abbas S. Theodorici), c. 2. n. 3. — Seq. testimonium ibidem n. 4. invenitur; textus origin. ibi omittit *bonum*. — Codd. et edd. 1, 2 allegant cap. II. *(P. 596, n. 7.)*

en: Or *On the Nature and Dignity of Love* (among the works of Bernard, but the author is William, abbot of St. Thierry), c. 2, n. 3. — The following testimony is found in the same place, n. 4; the original text there omits *bonum*. — Codices and editions 1, 2 cite chapter II. *(P. 596, n. 7.)*

la: Sive, ut Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.) docet, differentia apposita generi sive cum genere speciem facit. — Quod caritas sit virtus specialis, ostensum est quaest. I. — Mox pro *omnem virtutem* cod. K *omnes virtutes.* *(P. 596, n. 8.)*

en: Or, as Aristotle teaches, *Topics* VI, c. 3 (c. 6), a difference added to a genus, or together with the genus, makes a species. — That charity is a special virtue was shown in question I. — Soon, for *omnem virtutem* codex K [reads] *omnes virtutes.* *(P. 596, n. 8.)*

la: Continue enim, ut II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2. fundam. 3. dicitur, vivificat et animam Deo reddit acceptam. *(P. 596, n. 9.)*

en: For continuously, as is said in II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, fundamentum 3, it vivifies and renders the soul acceptable to God. *(P. 596, n. 9.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 5. — De vi concupiscibili et rationali vide supra pag. 579, nota 9, et scholion ad d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. *(P. 596, n. 10.)*

en: Cf. above, p. 474, note 5. — On the concupiscible and rational power see above, p. 579, note 9, and the scholion to d. 26, a. 2, q. 5. *(P. 596, n. 10.)*

la: Cfr. hic corp. quaest. Cfr. etiam seq. quaestionem, ubi agitur de amore Dei ut auctoris naturae. *(P. 596, n. 11.)*

en: Cf. here the body of the question. Cf. also the following question, where there is treatment of the love of God as the author of nature. *(P. 596, n. 11.)*

la: *χάρις.* — Sed Isidor., VIII. Etymolog. c. 2. n. 6: *Caritas graece, latine dilectio interpretatur, quod duos illiget.* *(P. 597, n. 1.)*

en: *charis.* — But Isidore, *Etymologies* VIII, c. 2, n. 6: *Caritas* in Greek is interpreted in Latin as *dilectio* [love], because it binds two together. *(P. 597, n. 1.)*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13: Nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas. — In seqq. respicitur illud I. Cor. 13, 1: Si linguis hominum loquar... caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum etc. — Pro *Apostolus insinuare*, quod ex cod. A restauravimus, cod. T *Apostolus vero*, codd. K L bb *Apostolus etiam*, alii codd. cum edd. *Apostolus enim*, cod. X *Apostolus tantum.* *(P. 597, n. 2.)*

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 13:13: But now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greater of these is charity. — In what follows there is reference to 1 Cor. 13:1: If I should speak with the tongues of men... but have not charity, I am nothing, etc. — For *Apostolus insinuare*, which we have restored from codex A, codex T [reads] *Apostolus vero*, codices K L bb *Apostolus etiam*, other codices with the editions *Apostolus enim*, codex X *Apostolus tantum.* *(P. 597, n. 2.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 364, nota 7. — Tanto superius pro *purissimum* cod. G *initissimum.* Paulo inferius post *virium inferiorum* cod. aa repetit *in anima.* Post pauca pro *perficit voluntatem* cod. Z *perficit ipsam voluntatem.* *(P. 597, n. 3.)*

en: Cf. above, p. 364, note 7. — A little above, for *purissimum* codex G [reads] *initissimum.* A little below, after *virium inferiorum* codex aa repeats *in anima.* After a few [words], for *perficit voluntatem* codex Z [reads] *perficit ipsam voluntatem.* *(P. 597, n. 3.)*

la: Vat. post *ipsam* subdit *tamen.* *(P. 597, n. 4.)*

en: The Vatican [edition], after *ipsam*, adds *tamen.* *(P. 597, n. 4.)*

la: Codd. A F K *videntur posse.* Inferius pro *sufficiens* codd. A K O X *sufficienter.* Deinde pro *videtur dicere*, *quod* Vat. videtur hoc esse dicendum, scilicet quod, codd. B D N T aa et edit. 1, 2 *videtur esse, quod*, cod. G *videtur, quod.* *(P. 597, n. 5.)*

en: Codices A F K [read] *videntur posse.* Below, for *sufficiens* codices A K O X [read] *sufficienter.* Then, for *videtur dicere, quod*, the Vatican [edition reads] *videtur hoc esse dicendum, scilicet quod*, codices B D N T aa and editions 1, 2 *videtur esse, quod*, codex G *videtur, quod.* *(P. 597, n. 5.)*

la: Dist. 27. a. I. q. I. — Quomodo caritas diversa sit ab aliis virtutibus, supra expositum est q. I. *(P. 597, n. 6.)*

en: Dist. 27, a. I, q. I. — In what way charity is diverse from the other virtues was expounded above in q. I. *(P. 597, n. 6.)*

la: Nam. 4, in quo Bernardi testimonio textus origin. ante *frui* praemittit *secundum se ipsam* et post *et quot* inserit *habet.* — Codd. et edd. allegant II. cap. *(P. 597, n. 7.)*

en: N. 4, in which testimony of Bernard the original text, before *frui*, prefixes *secundum se ipsam*, and after *et quot* inserts *habet.* — Codices and editions cite chapter II. *(P. 597, n. 7.)*

la: Liber I. de Moribus Eccles. cathol. c. 11, n. 19. seqq., exponens Rom. 8, 38, ait: « Non separat virtus; nam si virtus hic illa nominata est, quae aliquam potestatem in hoc mundo habet, toto mundo est omnino sublimior mens inhaerens Deo. Sed virtus illa dicta est, quae ipsius animi nostri rectissima illa ratio est, et in alio est, favet, ut coniungamur Deo, si in nobis est, ipsa coniungit ». Deinde (c. 12. n. 20.) ostendit, quod animus noster, qui Deo caritate coniungendus est, per illam Deo coniungitur, cum Deo subiicitur; et tum, postquam docuit, omnem virtutem reduci ad amorem Dei, c. 26. n. 48. seqq. probat, amatorem Dei et se amare et proximum. Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 1. ait: Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum, et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum sicut etiam se ipsum, procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae, quae usitatius in Scripturis sacris caritas appellatur. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Edd. post *Augustinus* subiiciunt *in Soliloquiis.* *(P. 597, n. 9.)*

en: Book I *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, c. 11, n. 19 ff., expounding Rom. 8:38, says: « Virtue does not separate; for if that is here named virtue which has some power in this world, the mind cleaving to God is altogether more sublime than the whole world. But that is called virtue which is the most upright reason of our soul itself, and [which], when it is in another, gives favor that we be joined to God, [and] when it is in us, itself joins us ». Then (c. 12, n. 20) he shows that our soul, which is to be joined to God by charity, is joined to God through it, when it is subjected to God; and then, after he has taught that every virtue is reduced to the love of God, c. 26, n. 48 ff., he proves that the lover of God loves both himself and his neighbor. Book XIV *On the City of God*, c. 7, n. 1, says: For he whose purpose is to love God, and to love his neighbor not according to man but according to God, just as also himself, is without doubt said to be of good will, which more usually in the Sacred Scriptures is called charity. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2. — The editions, after *Augustinus*, add *in Soliloquiis.* *(P. 597, n. 9.)*

la: Cap. 4. Textus origin. post *quod debent* addit *et quomodo debent.* Subinde pro *in virtutes* Vat. *in virtutibus*, edd. 1, 2 solum *virtutibus.* In altero testimonio, sumto ex eodem cap. 4, textus origin. pro *odium sui* habet *odium mundi et sui.* — Inferius pro *ostendere* cod. Z substituit *dicere.* *(P. 598, n. 1.)*

en: Chapter 4. The original text, after *quod debent*, adds *et quomodo debent.* Thereupon, for *in virtutes* the Vatican [edition reads] *in virtutibus*, editions 1, 2 only *virtutibus.* In the other testimony, taken from the same chapter 4, the original text, for *odium sui*, has *odium mundi et sui.* — Below, for *ostendere* codex Z substitutes *dicere.* *(P. 598, n. 1.)*

la: Vide quaest. seq. et I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 4. — Superius non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2, verbis male transpositis, *et hoc in illis.* Pro *praeponitur* cod. Z *est prior.* *(P. 598, n. 3.)*

en: See the following question and I Sent. d. 17, p. I, dub. 4. — Above, not a few codices and editions 1, 2, with the words badly transposed, [read] *et hoc in illis.* For *praeponitur* codex Z [reads] *est prior.* *(P. 598, n. 3.)*

la: Vers. 17: Iustus autem ex fide vivit. — De duplici vi verbi *vivere*, prout significat actum primum vel actum secundum, cfr. supra pag. 444, nota 6. et 7. nec non pag. 431, nota 2. atque infra dub. 2. circa finem. — Pro *ipsi fidei* cod. O *iustorum fidei.* In initio solut. pro *animi* edd. et complures codd. *animae.* Circa finem solut. codd. omittunt *tamen.* *(P. 598, n. 4.)*

en: Verse 17: But the just man lives by faith. — On the twofold force of the word *vivere*, insofar as it signifies the first act or the second act, cf. above, p. 444, notes 6 and 7, and also p. 431, note 2, and below, dub. 2, near the end. — For *ipsi fidei* codex O [reads] *iustorum fidei.* At the beginning of the solution, for *animi* the editions and several codices [read] *animae.* Near the end of the solution, the codices omit *tamen.* *(P. 598, n. 4.)*

la: Dist. 23. a. I. q. 2; a. 2. q. I. 4. et 5. — Quoad solutionem cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2. ad 4. *(P. 598, n. 5.)*

en: Dist. 23, a. I, q. 2; a. 2, q. I, 4, and 5. — As to the solution cf. II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, ad 4. *(P. 598, n. 5.)*

latin_scholion:
**I.** De duplici opinione hic relata iam actum est II. Sent. d. 27. a. I. q. 2, ubi in scholio antiqui magistri pro utraque sententia stantes recensiti sunt (cfr. etiam ibid. d. 26. q. 5.). Licet in hac quaestione s. Doctor utramque opinionem exhibeat tanquam probabilem; ipse tamen revera sequitur secundam. Hinc explicite hic solvit argumenta ei opposita et in sequenti <!-- page 599 -->quaestione de prima opinione dicit, difficile esse eam sustinere, et loco II. libri cit. clare propriam opinionem manifestat. Notandum etiam, quod ibid. ad 6. asserit, in primo homine ante lapsum reapse amorem, quo Deus propter se et super omnia diligebatur, sine gratia habituali fuisse.

**II.** In solutione sequentis (4.) quaestionis supponitur, praeter habitum supernaturalem caritatis esse etiam amorem naturalem (sive acquisitum) in Deum, ut est auctor naturae, de quo cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 3, et praecipue II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. I. in corp. et ad 3.

**III.** Haec doctrina confirmatur reprobatione plurium erronearum propositionum, quas Baius ex fontibus novatorum saeculi XVI. hausit, inter quas est prop. 34: « Distinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus amatur ut beatificator, vana est et commentitia et ad illudendum sacris Litteris et plurimis veterum testimoniis excogitata » (cfr. prop. 36.). — Hinc idem Baius incidit in alium errorem reprobatum et ad hanc nostram quaestionem spectantem, scilicet prop. 32: « Caritas illa, quae est plenitudo Legis, non est semper coniuncta cum remissione peccatorum »; et prop. 31: « Caritas perfecta et sincera, quae est ex corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta, tam in catechumenis quam in poenitentibus, potest esse sine remissione peccatorum » (cfr. prop. 33. 70. 71.).

**IV.** De hac 4. quaestione praeter S. Thomam: B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med. rem tangit hic n. 9. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the twofold opinion related here it has already been treated in II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2, where in the scholion the ancient masters standing for either view are reviewed (cf. also ibid. d. 26, q. 5). Although in this question the holy Doctor presents both opinions as probable; he himself nevertheless really follows the second. Hence he here explicitly resolves the arguments opposed to it, and in the following <!-- page 599 -->question says, concerning the first opinion, that it is difficult to maintain, and in the cited passage of the second book clearly manifests his own opinion. It is also to be noted that there [II Sent. d. 27, a. I, q. 2] ad 6 he asserts that in the first man before the fall there was really a love by which God was loved for his own sake and above all things, without habitual grace.

**II.** In the solution of the following (4th) question it is supposed that, besides the supernatural habit of charity, there is also a natural (or acquired) love toward God as he is the author of nature, concerning which cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. I, q. 3, and especially II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. I, in the body and ad 3.

**III.** This doctrine is confirmed by the reprobation of several erroneous propositions which Baius drew from the sources of the innovators of the sixteenth century, among which is prop. 34: « That distinction of a twofold love, namely the natural, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and the gratuitous, by which God is loved as beatifier, is vain and fictitious and devised to delude the Sacred Scriptures and very many testimonies of the ancients » (cf. prop. 36). — Hence the same Baius fell into another reprobated error pertaining to this our question, namely prop. 32: « That charity which is the fullness of the Law is not always joined with the remission of sins »; and prop. 31: « Perfect and sincere charity, which is from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, can exist in catechumens as well as in penitents without the remission of sins » (cf. prop. 33, 70, 71).

**IV.** On this 4th question, besides St. Thomas: Bl. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla touches the matter here n. 9, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Page span.** Opens at the top of p.596 right column — but the question's own heading + opener (*Tertio quaeritur…*) and objections 1–5 actually sit in the LEFT column of p.596 (the page-596 top is q2's tail, *Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est*, ending q2). q3's body: p.596 (heading, opener, objections 1–5, *Contra* 1–5 begin), p.597 (Contra 5 close, Conclusio, Respondeo: opinio I full + opinio II begins), p.598 (opinio II conclusio, Solutio oppositorum Ad 1–5, Scholion §I begins), p.599 (Scholion §I close, §II, §III, §IV). q4 (QUAESTIO IV) opens at the foot of p.599 left column. pdf = printed + 22 (PDF 618–621). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion.

**Alignment.** Confirmed: raw line 41427 = `QUAESTIO III.`, opener at 41431 = `Tertio quaerilur, utrum habitus caritatis sit mere gratuitus…`. Title matches frontmatter. q4 opener at raw 41651–41654 = `QUAESTIO IV.` / `Utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus` / `Quarto quaeritur. utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis…`. No q-swap.

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (25 entries).**
- **p.596 (hand-off received):** q3 takes nn.2–11 ([^2]–[^11], 10 footers). n.1 of p.596 (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) is retained by q2 as its tail reference (`sicut prius ostensum est¹`), per the q2 hand-off. Body markers: obj.1 *Ambrosius²*, obj.2 *Trinitate³*, obj.3 *Arrha sponsae⁴*, obj.4 *gratiae⁵*, obj.5 *culpam⁶*; Contra 1 *secundo⁷*, 2 *additionem⁸*, 3 *gratificandi⁹*, 4 *facientem¹⁰*, 5 *patet¹¹*.
- **p.597:** nn.1–9 ([^1]–[^9], page restarts at 1). Markers: *charis¹* (opinio I, Prima), *Apostolus²* (Secunda), *anima³* (Tertia), *ipsam⁴*, *videntur⁵* (Ad argg.), *secundo libro⁶* (opinio II), *capitulo⁷* (Bernard), *assensum⁸*, *Augustinus⁹*.
- **p.598:** nn.1–6 ([^1]–[^6], page restarts). Markers: *principium¹* (opinio II close), *finem²* (Ad 1), *gratuita³* (Ad 2), *primo⁴* (Ad 3), *praecedentibus⁵* (Ad 4), *substratum⁶* (Ad 5).
- **p.599:** Scholion only (§I close, §II–IV); no body footnote markers on this page within q3's range (the p.599 footers visible in the band belong to q4, whose *Quarto quaeritur* objections begin in the p.599 left column below the scholion).

**Scholion.** PRESENT (§I–IV), spanning p.598 (§I opens, immediately after Ad 5) through p.599. Placed LAST in both Latin and English `## ` blocks per the `### Scholion`-must-be-last parser gotcha.

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a1-q4** (*informis an formata* — last question of ART. I): raw start **41651** (`QUAESTIO IV.`; title line 41652 `Utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus`; opener 41654 `Quarto quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus`). Page span: opens at foot of p.599 left column (objections 1–3 begin there), runs p.600+ (PDF 622+). **Footer split:** q4 takes **p.599 footers** (the band under the scholion has q4's objection footnotes; verify n.1 onward against the printed page) then p.600 per-page restart. q4 is the LAST question of ART. I (order: q1 distinctus / q2 indivisus / q3 mere gratuitus / q4 informis-formatus). Verify the *Quarto quaeritur* alignment before promoting.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All footers and body text resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 599 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus. Et quod semper sit formatus, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Augustinum, in libro de Vera Innocentia[^p599-1]: « Dilectio Dei et proximi est propria et specialis virtus piorum atque Sanctorum, cum ceterae virtutes bonis possint esse communes et malis »; sed aliae virtutes non sunt communes bonis et malis, nisi quia possunt esse informes: si ergo caritas non potest isto modo esse communis, videtur, quod nullo modo possit esse informis.

2. *Item*, Hugo[^p599-2]: « Caritatem nullus malus habere potest »; sed si posset esse informis, aliquis malus posset eam habere: impossibile est igitur, habitum caritatis informem esse.

3. *Item*, impossibile est, formam fieri informem; sed caritas est forma virtutum, secundum quod dicitur super illud ad Romanos primo[^p599-3]: *Iustitia Dei* etc.; Glossa: « Haec est informis qualitas mentis, quia sociam non habet caritatem, quae est forma omnium virtutum »: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, virtutis caritatis est diligere Deum propter se et super omnia[^p599-4]; sed istum actum nullus habere potest, qui habet in se mortale peccatum, cum in omni mortali peccato aliquid diligatur contra Deum: si ergo sola illa virtus potest esse informis, cuius actus potest reperiri in peccatore, sicut patet de fide; videtur, quod caritas nullo modo possit esse informis.

5. *Item*, sicut infidelitas repugnat fidei, sic libido et amor libidinosus repugnat caritati; sed impossibile est, habitum fidei nec informem nec formatum simul stare cum errore et infidelitate: ergo impossibile est, habitum caritatis nec informem nec formatum simul stare cum libidine. Sed omne peccatum est libido, vel ex libidine, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^p599-5]: ergo impossibile est, habitum caritatis nec informem nec formatum reperiri in peccatore; ergo non reperitur nisi in viro iusto. Sed in illo non habet esse informis, sed semper formatus: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Cum aliquis peccat, qui in Deum credidit et amavit, sicut in eo remanet credulitas, sic remanet in eo quaedam dilectio; sed non est minus nobilis illa dilectio vel amor, quam sit illa credulitas: ergo si credulitas illa sortitur nomen virtutis[^p600-1], pari ratione videtur, quod et illa dilectio. Sed non sortitur rationem et nomen alterius virtutis quam caritatis: ergo caritas potest esse informis.

<!-- page 600 -->

2. *Item*, aut potest aliquis diligere Deum informiter, aut non. Si non: ergo cum homo sciat, se Deum diligere, homo sciet, se habere caritatem et esse in gratia, quod apud multos est inconveniens[^p600-2]. Si potest; sed quales sunt actus, tales sunt habitus: ergo si actus diligendi potest esse informis, videtur, quod et habitus.

3. *Item*, ex fide formata oritur amor et timor, uterque formatus: ergo cum ex fide informi possit oriri timor servilis, qui est timor informis, qui etiam habet rationem doni[^p600-3]; videtur, quod ex ipsa possit oriri amor, qui etiam habet rationem virtutis: redit ergo idem quod prius, videlicet quod amor caritatis informis possit esse.

4. *Item*, caritas est virtus gratuita; constans est, quod haec differentia gratuita addit supra virtutem: ergo si remanere potest prius sine posteriori[^p600-4], videtur, quod caritate desinente esse gratuita, adhuc possit remanere virtus: ergo potest esse informis.

5. *Item*, homini cadenti in peccatum aliquid relinquitur in potentia rationali et irascibili, quo fit habilis ad resurgendum, ut fides et spes[^p600-5]: ergo pari ratione relinquitur aliquid in potentia concupiscibili, immo multo fortiori, cum ipsa magis indigeat; sed constat, quod illud non est minus nobile, quam illud quod est in aliis potentiis, cum ipsa habeat nobiliori virtute informari: si ergo aliae post lapsum in peccatum possident fidem et spem informem, videtur, quod et ipsa post peccatum habeat caritatem informem.

### Conclusio.

> Caritas nunquam potest esse informis; in afferendis tamen rationibus non consentiunt doctores.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum communem opinionem habitus caritatis semper est formatus et nunquam habet esse informis. — Et hoc indicat ipsum nomen ipsius; nominatur enim nomine gratiae[^p600-6]. Si ergo virtus informis dicitur esse illa virtus, quae est privata gratia, dicere caritatem informem nihil aliud est dicere, quam gratuitum esse gratia privatum; quod est falsum et non intelligibile, quia est ibi implicatio oppositorum. Et ideo communiter dicitur, quod caritas non potest esse informis.

— Licet autem doctores communiter in hoc consentiant, in ratione tamen, quare hoc dicunt, est inter eos differentia.

Nam quidam voluerunt dicere, quod ideo caritas non potest esse informis, quia est ipsum donum increatum, scilicet ipse Spiritus sanctus. Et huius opinionis fuit Magister Sententiarum. — Haec autem opinio communiter non tenetur nec est tenenda, sicut in primo libro[^p600-7] fuit ostensum.

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod caritas non potest esse informis, quia est habitus mere gratuitus, nihil habens ultra gratiam gratum facientem nisi solam relationem et ordinem ad actum et finem. Aliae vero virtutes, quae habitus substratos habent, informes esse possunt; sola vero caritas est, quae nihil absolutum addit: et ideo ipsa sola est, quae non potest fieri[^p600-8] informis. — Sed licet istud videatur satis probabile, est tamen non modicum calumniabile. Difficile enim est sustinere, pensatis auctoritatibus et rationibus, quod caritas non addat ultra gratiam aliquem habitum, qui concupiscibilem potentiam habilitet ad amandum, sicut in praecedenti problemate fuit ostensum.

Et ideo est adhuc tertius modus[^p600-9] reddendi rationem, quare caritas non potest esse informis, sicut aliae virtutes; hoc enim est, quia caritas non solum in quantum *gratuita*, sed etiam in quantum *affectio recta* sive quantum ad *habitum substratum* repugnat omni peccato, sicut fides specialiter repugnat peccato sibi opposito. Unde sicut fides simpliciter tollitur per errorem et infidelitatem, et spes per desperationem, ita quod non remanet qualitas nec virtus informis, sic habitus caritatis per *omnem* culpam habet tolli; et ideo nunquam remanet informis.

Quod autem *omne* peccatum oppositionem habeat cum caritate ratione *habitus substrati*, manifestum est sic. Sicut enim habitus ipsius fidei habilitat animam ad credendum omnia credenda et ad assentiendum primae Veritati propter se et super

<!-- page 601 -->

omnia: sic et habilitat[^p601-1] habitus caritatis ad amandum omnia amanda et adhaerendum primae Bonitati propter se et super omnia. Et ideo, sicut error circa quemcumque articulum oppositionem habet cum fidei habitu, sic amor libidinosus circa ea quae amanda sunt, oppositionem habet cum ipsa caritate ratione habitus substrati[^p601-2]. Quoniam ergo omne peccatum consistit in deordinata dilectione alicuius boni creati et in quadam libidine, quae oppositionem habet cum recto amore, sicut error cum recta credulitate; hinc est, quod omne peccatum simpliciter excludit caritatem. Et ideo, sicut fides informis non potest reperiri in infidelibus et haereticis; sic caritas informis non potest reperiri in aliquibus viris peccatoribus et iniquis; et[^p601-3] in solis illis habet reperiri virtus informis: hinc est, quod caritas nullo modo potest esse informis, quia secundum se totam opponitur culpae generaliter, quod non est reperire in aliqua alia virtute. — Et si tu quaeras rationem huius, Augustinus docet in decimo quarto libro de Civitate Dei[^p601-4], ubi dicit, quod « omnis affectio oritur ex amore »; ideo nihil potest obliquare aliquas affectiones animae, quin aliquo modo vel principaliter, vel ex consequenti opponatur ipsi amori et habitui affectum illum rectificanti[^p601-5]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod caritas non potest esse informis.

1. *Ad illud* vero quod primo obiicitur, quod in peccatore remanet credulitas et dilectio erga Deum; dicendum, quod quamvis utraque remaneat, non tamen uniformiter, quia *credulitas* habet rationem virtutis, *dilectio* vero non. Et ratio huius est: quia ad hoc, quod aliquis habitus sortiatur nomen et rationem virtutis, necesse est, quod habeat aliquam *perfectionem* et *vigorem* quendam respectu actus et obiecti; hoc autem habet credulitas in viro peccatore. Nam ipse peccator assentit primae Veritati propter se et super omnia et credit omnia credenda, secundum quod credenda sunt. Nullus autem peccator est, qui diligat Deum propter se et super omnia et diligat[^p601-6] omnia diligenda, secundum quod diligenda sunt; et ideo dilectio illa, quae est in peccatore, non ita habet rationem virtutis nec sortitur nomen caritatis, secundum quod credulitas habet rationem virtutis et nomen fidei sortitur[^p601-7].

2. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod contingit diligere informiter; dicendum, quod verum est; sed sicut *credere* aliquem articulum informiter, quando alii articuli discreduntur, secundum quod faciunt aliqui haeretici, non est actus virtutis informis, quia fides non est in eis virtus; sic *diligere* Deum in peccatore non est actus virtutis; deest enim ibi perfectio virtutis, quia talis non diligit omnia diligenda: deest etiam et *vigor*, quia per illum actum non superat nec excludit amorem libidinosum sibi oppositum; sicut est de illo qui credit unum articulum sine alio, qui[^p601-8] per illam credulitatem nec *perfecte* credit, quia non omnia credit, nec *vigorose* credit, quia errorem non convincit.

3. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod ex fide informi debet generari amor informis, sicut et timor; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod maioris perfectionis est amor quam timor, et magis rectificatur anima in recte amando quam in recte timendo: et hoc, quia amor est principium omnium affectionum, sicut dictum est superius. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod quamvis fides generet timorem[^p601-9] informem, quod possit generare caritatis amorem.

4. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod caritas est virtus gratuita, et *esse gratuitum* coarctat hoc quod est *esse virtutem*; dicendum, quod quamvis sit minus *esse gratuitum*, quam *esse virtutem*; nihil tamen prohibet, aliquam differentiam ita adhaerere generi respectu speciei, quod eadem sublata, aufertur per consequens quod ad essentiam generis spectat; sicut patet, quod homo est animal rationale[^p601-10] et si desinat esse rationalis, desinit esse animal. Per hunc modum potest intelligi et in caritate, quod ita adhaeret hoc quod est *gratuitum* virtuti, quod cum desinit esse gratuita, desinit esse virtus. Ratio autem, quare magis adhaeret in caritate quam in alia virtute, tacta est supra[^p601-11].

5. *Ad illud* quod obiicitur, quod homine cadente in peccatum, ita debet potentiae concupiscibili adiutorium remanere, sicut aliis viribus animae; dicendum, quod remanet sibi adiutorium aliquod se-

<!-- page 602 -->

cundum cursum communem. Multi enim peccant, qui habent affectionem dilectionis et pietatis erga Deum et homines bonos; verumtamen illud quod remanet eis, non sortitur nomen virtutis theologicae, secundum id quod remanet in aliis viribus. Et ratio huius est, quia ipsa[^p602-1] facilius corrumpitur et deordinatur quam aliae vires. Unde quamdiu peccatum est in anima, virtus rectificans eius affectiones non potest esse in ea. Quamvis enim peccator, manens peccator, possit esse rectus in credendo, non tamen potest esse rectus in diligendo[^p602-2].

english:
### Question IV. *Whether the habit of charity can be unformed, or is always formed.*

Fourthly, it is asked whether the habit of charity can be unformed, or is always formed. And that it is always formed seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, through Augustine, in the book *On True Innocence*[^p599-1]: « The love of God and of neighbor is the proper and special virtue of the pious and of the saints, since the other virtues can be common to the good and to the wicked »; but the other virtues are not common to the good and to the wicked except because they can be unformed: if therefore charity cannot in this way be common, it seems that it can in no way be unformed.

2. *Likewise*, Hugh[^p599-2]: « No wicked person can have charity »; but if it could be unformed, some wicked person could have it: it is therefore impossible that the habit of charity be unformed.

3. *Likewise*, it is impossible that a form become unformed; but charity is the form of the virtues, according to what is said upon that passage in Romans 1[^p599-3]: *The justice of God* etc.; the Gloss: « This is an unformed quality of the mind, because it does not have charity as its companion, which is the form of all the virtues »: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, it belongs to the virtue of charity to love God for his own sake and above all things[^p599-4]; but no one can have this act who has in himself mortal sin, since in every mortal sin something is loved against God: if therefore that virtue alone can be unformed whose act can be found in a sinner, as is clear concerning faith; it seems that charity can in no way be unformed.

5. *Likewise*, just as infidelity is repugnant to faith, so lust and lustful love is repugnant to charity; but it is impossible that the habit of faith, whether unformed or formed, stand together with error and infidelity: therefore it is impossible that the habit of charity, whether unformed or formed, stand together with lust. But every sin is lust, or is from lust, according to what Augustine says[^p599-5]: therefore it is impossible that the habit of charity, whether unformed or formed, be found in a sinner; therefore it is not found except in a just man. But in him it does not have being unformed, but is always formed: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. When someone sins, who has believed in God and loved [him], just as belief remains in him, so a certain love remains in him; but that love or affection is not less noble than that belief: therefore if that belief obtains the name of virtue[^p600-1], by parity of reasoning it seems that that love also [does]. But it does not obtain the account and name of any virtue other than charity: therefore charity can be unformed.

2. *Likewise*, either someone can love God unformedly, or [he can]not. If not: then since a man knows that he loves God, the man will know that he has charity and is in grace, which among many is unfitting[^p600-2]. If he can; but as the acts are, so are the habits: therefore if the act of loving can be unformed, it seems that the habit also [can].

3. *Likewise*, from formed faith arise love and fear, both formed: therefore since from unformed faith servile fear can arise, which is unformed fear, which also has the account of a gift[^p600-3]; it seems that from it can arise love, which also has the account of a virtue: there returns therefore the same as before, namely that the love of unformed charity can be.

4. *Likewise*, charity is a gratuitous virtue; it is established that this gratuitous difference adds above the virtue: therefore if the prior can remain without the posterior[^p600-4], it seems that, when charity ceases to be gratuitous, the virtue can still remain: therefore it can be unformed.

5. *Likewise*, to a man falling into sin something is left in the rational and irascible power, by which he is made apt to rise again, as faith and hope[^p600-5]: therefore by parity of reasoning something is left in the concupiscible power, indeed by a much stronger [reasoning], since it has more need; but it is established that that is not less noble than that which is in the other powers, since it has being informed by a nobler virtue: if therefore the others after the fall into sin possess unformed faith and hope, it seems that it too after sin has unformed charity.

### Conclusion.

> Charity can never be unformed; yet in adducing reasons the doctors do not agree.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the common opinion the habit of charity is always formed and never has being unformed. — And its very name indicates this; for it is named by the name of grace[^p600-6]. If therefore that virtue is said to be unformed which is deprived of grace, to call charity unformed is nothing other than to say that the gratuitous is deprived of grace; which is false and unintelligible, because there is in it an implication of opposites. And therefore it is commonly said that charity cannot be unformed.

— But although the doctors commonly agree in this, yet in the reason why they say it there is a difference among them.

For some wished to say that charity therefore cannot be unformed because it is the uncreated gift itself, namely the Holy Spirit himself. And of this opinion was the Master of the Sentences. — But this opinion is commonly not held nor is to be held, as was shown in the first book[^p600-7].

Others indeed wished to say that charity cannot be unformed because it is a merely gratuitous habit, having nothing beyond grace that makes [one] pleasing except only a relation and ordering to the act and the end. The other virtues, however, which have substrate habits, can be unformed; but charity alone is the one which adds nothing absolute: and therefore it alone is the one which cannot become[^p600-8] unformed. — But although this seems sufficiently probable, it is nevertheless not a little open to objection. For it is difficult to maintain, when the authorities and reasons are weighed, that charity does not add beyond grace some habit which makes the concupiscible power apt to love, as was shown in the preceding problem.

And therefore there is yet a third way[^p600-9] of rendering the reason why charity cannot be unformed, as the other virtues [can]; for this is because charity, not only insofar as it is *gratuitous*, but also insofar as it is *right affection* or with respect to the *substrate habit*, is repugnant to every sin, just as faith is specially repugnant to the sin opposed to it. Hence just as faith is simply taken away by error and infidelity, and hope by despair, so that no quality nor unformed virtue remains, so the habit of charity is to be taken away by *every* fault; and therefore it never remains unformed.

That, moreover, *every* sin has opposition with charity by reason of the *substrate habit* is manifest thus. For just as the habit of faith itself makes the soul apt to believe all that is to be believed and to assent to the First Truth for its own sake and above

omnia: so also the habit of charity makes [it] apt[^p601-1] to love all that is to be loved and to cleave to the First Goodness for its own sake and above all things. And therefore, just as error concerning any article has opposition with the habit of faith, so lustful love concerning the things that are to be loved has opposition with charity itself by reason of the substrate habit[^p601-2]. Since therefore every sin consists in a disordered love of some created good and in a certain lust, which has opposition with right love, just as error with right belief; hence it is that every sin simply excludes charity. And therefore, just as unformed faith cannot be found in the unbelieving and in heretics; so unformed charity cannot be found in any men who are sinners and wicked; and[^p601-3] in those alone can unformed virtue be found: hence it is that charity can in no way be unformed, because according to its whole self it is opposed to fault generally, which is not to be found in any other virtue. — And if you ask the reason for this, Augustine teaches in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*[^p601-4], where he says that « every affection arises from love »; therefore nothing can make crooked any affections of the soul without its being in some way, either principally or by consequence, opposed to love itself and to the habit rectifying that affection[^p601-5]. — The reasons showing that charity cannot be unformed are therefore to be conceded.

1. *To that* indeed which is first objected, that in a sinner belief and love toward God remain; it must be said that although both remain, yet not uniformly, because *belief* has the account of a virtue, but *love* does not. And the reason for this is: that for some habit to obtain the name and account of a virtue, it is necessary that it have some *perfection* and a certain *vigor* with respect to the act and the object; this, however, belief has in the sinful man. For the sinner himself assents to the First Truth for its own sake and above all things and believes all that is to be believed, according as they are to be believed. But there is no sinner who loves God for his own sake and above all things and loves[^p601-6] all that is to be loved, according as they are to be loved; and therefore that love which is in the sinner does not so have the account of a virtue nor obtain the name of charity, according as belief has the account of a virtue and obtains the name of faith[^p601-7].

2. *To that* which is objected, that it happens to love unformedly; it must be said that it is true; but just as to *believe* some article unformedly, when the other articles are disbelieved, according as some heretics do, is not an act of unformed virtue, because faith is not a virtue in them; so to *love* God in a sinner is not an act of virtue; for there is lacking there the perfection of virtue, because such a one does not love all that is to be loved: there is also lacking *vigor*, because by that act he does not overcome nor exclude the lustful love opposed to it; just as it is concerning him who believes one article without another, who[^p601-8] through that belief neither believes *perfectly*, because he does not believe all things, nor believes *vigorously*, because he does not overcome the error.

3. *To that* which is objected, that from unformed faith unformed love ought to be generated, as also [unformed] fear; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that love is of greater perfection than fear, and the soul is more rectified in loving rightly than in fearing rightly: and this, because love is the principle of all the affections, as was said above. And therefore from this it does not follow that, although faith generates unformed fear[^p601-9], it can generate the love of charity.

4. *To that* which is objected, that charity is a gratuitous virtue, and *being gratuitous* constrains that which is *being a virtue*; it must be said that although *being gratuitous* be less than *being a virtue*; nothing nevertheless prevents some difference from so adhering to the genus with respect to the species, that, this being removed, there is removed by consequence what pertains to the essence of the genus; just as it is clear that man is a rational animal[^p601-10], and if he ceases to be rational, he ceases to be an animal. In this way it can be understood also in charity, that the *gratuitous* so adheres to the virtue that, when it ceases to be gratuitous, it ceases to be a virtue. But the reason why it adheres more in charity than in another virtue has been touched on above[^p601-11].

5. *To that* which is objected, that, a man falling into sin, help ought to remain to the concupiscible power just as to the other powers of the soul; it must be said that some help remains to it ac-

cording to the common course. For many sin who have an affection of love and piety toward God and good men; nevertheless that which remains to them does not obtain the name of a theological virtue, according to that which remains in the other powers. And the reason for this is that it[^p602-1] is more easily corrupted and disordered than the other powers. Hence as long as sin is in the soul, the virtue rectifying its affections cannot be in it. For although a sinner, remaining a sinner, can be right in believing, yet he cannot be right in loving[^p602-2].

la: Num. 7. Vide supra pag. 487, nota I. *(P. 599, n. 1.)*

en: Number 7. See above, p. 487, note I. *(P. 599, n. 1.)*

la: Lib. II. de Sacram. p. XIII. c. 11: Caritatem malos habere non potest... quia caritatem habere et simul malus esse nemo potest. Cfr. opusc. de Laude caritatis, post medium. *(P. 599, n. 2.)*

en: Book II *On the Sacraments*, p. XIII, c. 11: He cannot have charity [together with] the wicked... because to have charity and at the same time be wicked no one can. Cf. the little work *On the Praise of Charity*, after the middle. *(P. 599, n. 2.)*

la: Vers. 17. — Integra Glossae verba habes supra pag. 592, nota 7. *(P. 599, n. 3.)*

en: Verse 17. — The complete words of the Gloss you have above, p. 592, note 7. *(P. 599, n. 3.)*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et 5. — De fide informi vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. seqq. — Paulo inferius pro *diligatur* edd. cum paucis codd. *rectigat*, et subinde pro *contra* cod. M *supra*, cod. bb *super.* *(P. 599, n. 4.)*

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2 and 5. — On unformed faith see above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I ff. — A little below, for *diligatur* the editions with a few codices [read] *rectigat*, and thereupon for *contra* codex M [reads] *supra*, codex bb *super.* *(P. 599, n. 4.)*

la: Libr. I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 8. seqq., ubi inter alia: « Nihil aliud quam libidinem in toto male faciendi genere dominari ». Ibidem (c. 4. n. 10.) etiam docet, « malefacta non ob aliud mala esse, nisi quod libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate, fiunt ». Et in libro de Mendacio, c. 7. n. 10. Idem August. dicit: Libido quoque ipsa recte definitur appetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur. Cfr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro *vero iusto* eod. iusto. *(P. 599, n. 5.)*

en: Book I *On Free Will*, c. 3, n. 8 ff., where among other things: « Nothing other than lust holds dominion in the whole class of doing evil ». In the same place (c. 4, n. 10) he also teaches that « misdeeds are evil for no other reason than that they are done from lust, that is, from blameworthy desire ». And in the book *On Lying*, c. 7, n. 10, the same Augustine says: Lust itself also is rightly defined as the appetite of the mind by which any temporal things whatever are preferred to eternal goods. Cf. XIV *On the City of God*, c. 15, n. 2. — Somewhat below, for *vero iusto* the same [reads] *iusto.* *(P. 599, n. 5.)* <!-- p. 600 -->

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. — Mox in conclus. post *ergo* cod. A subdit *et.* *(P. 600, n. 1.)*

en: See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I. — Presently in the conclusion, after *ergo* codex A adds *et.* *(P. 600, n. 1.)*

la: Vide supra d. 23. dub. 4. — Quae connexio sit inter *actum* et *habitum*, videsis supra pag. 470, nota 8; cfr. etiam tom. II. pag. 760, nota 6. *(P. 600, n. 2.)*

en: See above, d. 23, dub. 4. — What connection there is between *act* and *habit*, see above, p. 470, note 8; cf. also tom. II, p. 760, note 6. *(P. 600, n. 2.)*

la: Ut ostenditur infra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. seqq., et in Comment. p. II. q. I. seqq. *(P. 600, n. 3.)*

en: As is shown below in the Master's text, d. XXXIV, c. 4 ff., and in the Commentary, p. II, q. I ff. *(P. 600, n. 3.)*

la: Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.): Quaedam vero [priora dicuntur] secundum naturam et substantiam, quaecumque contingunt absque aliis [posterioribus] esse, ista vero sine illis minime; qua divisione usus est Plato. Cfr. supra pag. 575, nota 1. *(P. 600, n. 4.)*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 16 (IV, c. 11): But certain things [are said to be prior] according to nature and substance, namely whatever can be without others [posterior to them], but these [posterior things] not at all without those; by which division Plato made use. Cf. above, p. 575, note 1. *(P. 600, n. 4.)*

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. I. et d. 26. a. I. q. 4. — Pro *quo fit* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *quo sit.* Paulo inferius pro *multo fortiori* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *multo fortius*, et pro *constat* codd. A K *constans est.* *(P. 600, n. 5.)*

en: See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. I, and d. 26, a. I, q. 4. — For *quo fit* not a few codices with editions 1, 2 [read] *quo sit.* A little below, for *multo fortiori* the Vatican [edition] with one or another codex [reads] *multo fortius*, and for *constat* codices A K [read] *constans est.* *(P. 600, n. 5.)*

la: De quo vide auctorem in principio quaest. praeced., nec non scholion supra ad q. I. *(P. 600, n. 6.)*

en: Concerning which see the author at the beginning of the preceding question, and also the scholion above to q. I. *(P. 600, n. 6.)*

la: Codd. U Z addunt *dist. 17. [p. I. q. I.]*, ubi illa opinio erronea Magistri multis argumentis refutatur. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 2. *(P. 600, n. 7.)*

en: Codices U Z add *dist. 17 [p. I, q. I]*, where that erroneous opinion of the Master is refuted by many arguments. Cf. II Sent. d. 26, q. 2. *(P. 600, n. 7.)*

en: The editions [read] *esse.* *(P. 600, n. 8.)*

la: Cod. W hic interiicit *respondendi et.* *(P. 600, n. 9.)*

en: Codex W here inserts *respondendi et.* *(P. 600, n. 9.)* <!-- p. 601 -->

la: In codd. et edd. 1, 2 nec non in Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. collat. 37. a. 6. deest *habilitat*, quod Vat., quam secuti sumus, bene supplevit. Subinde pro *habitus caritatis* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 et laudato Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. *habilitatio.* *(P. 601, n. 1.)*

en: In the codices and editions 1, 2, and also in the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 37, a. 6, *habilitat* is lacking, which the Vatican [edition], which we have followed, well supplied. Thereupon for *habitus caritatis* not a few codices with editions 1, 2 and the cited Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] *habilitatio.* *(P. 601, n. 1.)*

la: Edd. *substrati boni.* Paulo inferius pro *recto amore* cod. Z *vero amore.* *(P. 601, n. 2.)*

en: The editions [read] *substrati boni.* A little below, for *recto amore* codex Z [reads] *vero amore.* *(P. 601, n. 2.)*

en: Codex K [reads] *et quoniam.* *(P. 601, n. 3.)*

la: Cap. 7. n. 2, ex quo iam supra pag. 338, nota 3. quaedam attulimus. — Paulo post pro *opponatur* complures codd. *opponitur*, Vat. *oppositum sit.* Deinde pro *affectum illum* cod. Z *affectionem illam.* *(P. 601, n. 4.)*

en: Chapter 7, n. 2, from which already above, p. 338, note 3, we adduced certain things. — A little after, for *opponatur* several codices [read] *opponitur*, the Vatican [edition] *oppositum sit.* Then for *affectum illum* codex Z [reads] *affectionem illam.* *(P. 601, n. 4.)*

la: Guliel. Antissiod., Sum. p. III. tr. 19. q. 2: Notandum est, quod omne peccatum habet oppositionem ad caritatem propter tres causas. Prima est, quia peccatum est offensa Dei; offendere autem Deum est contra amicitiam, quae est caritas; vera autem amicitia est idem velle, idem nolle. Secunda, quia peccatum separat a Deo; caritas vero unit Deo et coniungit; amor enim est coniunctio diligentis cum dilecto; qui enim adhaeret Domino per caritatem, unus spiritus efficitur cum ipso. Tertia causa est, quia peccatum mortale interficit proprium subiectum, et eo ipso quod homo interficit se, est inimicus sui, et ita non diligit se debito modo, et ita est caritas informis. *(P. 601, n. 5.)*

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa* p. III, tr. 19, q. 2: It must be noted that every sin has opposition to charity for three reasons. The first is because sin is an offense against God; but to offend God is against friendship, which is charity; and true friendship is to will the same, to refuse the same. The second, because sin separates from God; but charity unites and joins to God; for love is the conjunction of the lover with the beloved; for he who cleaves to the Lord through charity is made one spirit with him. The third reason is because mortal sin slays its own subject, and by the very fact that a man slays himself, he is an enemy of himself, and thus does not love himself in the due manner, and thus is charity unformed. *(P. 601, n. 5.)*

la: Complures codd. habent his *diligat*; alii tantum secundo loco; edd. 1, 2 cum Supplemento Sum. Alex. Hal. bis *diligit*, Vat. secundo loco *et qui diligit.* *(P. 601, n. 6.)*

en: Several codices have *diligat* twice; others only in the second place; editions 1, 2 with the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [have] *diligit* twice, the Vatican [edition] in the second place *et qui diligit.* *(P. 601, n. 6.)*

en: Codex A [reads] *qui aut.* *(P. 601, n. 8.)*

la: Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. perperam *amorem*, et mox cod. A pro *amorem* aeque perperam *timorem.* *(P. 601, n. 9.)*

en: Very many codices and also editions 1, 2 and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales wrongly [read] *amorem*, and presently codex A for *amorem* equally wrongly [reads] *timorem.* *(P. 601, n. 9.)*

la: Edd. *rationale mortale.* Paulo inferius pro *cum desinit* codd. F G H N T V *cum desinat.* *(P. 601, n. 10.)*

en: The editions [read] *rationale mortale.* A little below, for *cum desinit* codices F G H N T V [read] *cum desinat.* *(P. 601, n. 10.)*

la: Quaest. praeced. *(P. 601, n. 11.)*

la: Scil. vis concupiscibilis. — Post pauca pro *aliae vires* edd. 1, 2 substituerunt *aliae virtutes.* Paulo superius pro *remanet eis* multi codd. incongrue *remanet ei.* Paulo inferius pro *manens peccator* cod. aa *manens in peccato.* *(P. 602, n. 1.)*

en: Namely, the concupiscible power. — After a few [words], for *aliae vires* editions 1, 2 substituted *aliae virtutes.* A little above, for *remanet eis* many codices incongruously [read] *remanet ei.* A little below, for *manens peccator* codex aa [reads] *manens in peccato.* *(P. 602, n. 1.)*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. *(P. 602, n. 2.)*

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. *(P. 602, n. 2.)*

translators_notes:
**Page span.** q4 opens at the foot of p.599 **left** column (the heading *QUAESTIO IV.* and the opener *Quarto quaeritur…* sit immediately below the close of q3's scholion §IV). Body: p.599 (heading, opener, objections 1–5, *Sed contra* 1 begins at foot of R-col), p.600 (Sed contra 1 close + 2–5, Conclusio, Respondeo: opinio I [Magister] + opinio II + tertius modus + Confirmatur begins), p.601 (Confirmatur close + Concedendae rationes, then Solutio oppositorum Ad 1 + Ad 2–5 begin), p.602 (Ad 5 close at top of L-col). ARTICULUS II begins immediately below in p.602 L-col (next chunk d27-a2-q1). pdf = printed + 22 (PDF 621–624). Latin re-set verbatim from 450dpi PDF column bands per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion; clean running prose cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR.

**Alignment.** Confirmed against q3's hand-off and the raw: raw line 41651 = `QUAESTIO IV.`, title line 41652 = *Utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus*, opener line 41654 = `Quarto quaeritur, utrum habitus caritatis possit esse informis, an semper sit formatus`. Title matches frontmatter. No q-swap. End boundary: raw line 41846 = `ARTICULUS II.` (= ART. II opener `Consequenter quaeritur de ipsa caritate quantum ad actum et modum`); everything from 41846 onward belongs to the NEXT chunk.

**Apparatus / per-page footer split (27 entries).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page.
- **p.599 (nn.1–5):** body markers obj.1 *Innocentia¹*, obj.2 *Hugo²*, obj.3 *Romanos primo³*, obj.4 *omnia⁴*, obj.5 *Augustinus⁵*. (n.4 = "Cfr. hic lit. Magistri… De fide informi" attaches to obj.4's *patet de fide*; obj.5's OCR marker `6` is a digit-mangle of `5` — footer n.5 "Libr. I. de Lib. Arb… libido" matches obj.5's *omne peccatum est libido*.) The *Sed contra* opener n.1 is the same `Num. 7` reference; the p.599 footer band sits under q3's scholion, but every p.599 footer belongs to q4 (per the q3 hand-off, q3 had no body markers on p.599).
- **p.600 (nn.1–9):** Respondeo markers *gratiae⁶*→ rendered as p.600 n.6 region; in body: *primo libro²* (opinio I), *fieri⁸* (opinio II close), *modus⁹* (tertius modus). nn.1–5 are the Sed-contra/Conclusio references; nn.6–9 the Respondeo references.
- **p.601 (nn.1–11):** *habilitat¹*, *et²*, *Civitate Dei⁴*, *rectificanti⁵*; Solutio markers *diligat⁶*, *sortitur⁷* (Ad 1), *qui⁸* (Ad 2), *timorem⁹* (Ad 3), *rationale¹⁰* + *supra¹¹* (Ad 4). n.5 = the long William of Auxerre *Summa* note (three causes of sin's opposition to charity), spanning both columns' footer bands.
- **p.602 (nn.1–2):** *ipsa¹* (Ad 5), *diligendo²* (Ad 5 close). p.602 nn.3–5 belong to ART. II / q1 (next chunk).

**Scholion.** ABSENT for q4 — **sibling redirect.** q4 has no `### Scholion` of its own; its footers p.600 n.6 ("nec non scholion supra ad q. I") and p.602 n.2 ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") point back to the q1 scholion. Per the missing-scholion-is-normal convention, this is correct, not a dropout. `has_scholion: false`.

**Hand-off forwarded → d27-a2-q1** (ARTICULUS II opener + first question): ART. II raw start **41846** (`ARTICULUS II.` / *De caritate quantum ad actum et modum* / `Consequenter quaeritur de ipsa caritate quantum ad actum et modum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex`). The ART. II TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM lists six: q1 *utrum actus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum*; q2 *utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium*; q3 *utrum idem possit esse motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum*; q4 *quis eorum praecedat alterum*; q5 *utrum motus caritatis in Deum habeat modum*; q6 et ultimo *utrum teneamur ad illum modum implendum*. The ART. II opener + TRACTATIO fold into **q1** (no standalone divisio chunk). q1 raw `QUAESTIO I.` at line 41859, title *Utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum*, opener `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum`. Page span: ART. II opener + q1 begin at foot of p.602 L-col (PDF 624), running p.603+. **Footer split:** q1 takes p.602 footers **nn.3–5** (n.3 *Apostolus³*, n.4 Galatas Gloss, n.5 Gregorius) — q4 took only nn.1–2 of p.602 — then p.603 per-page restart. ⚠ Note a2-q3 (*Utrum idem motus dilectionis in Deum et proximum*, raw ~42214) is currently a **missing skeleton** to be created later in the a2 sequence.

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body text and 27 footers resolved cleanly from the 450dpi PDF column bands (the OCR garbles — obj.5 marker `6`→`5`, footer titles — are unambiguous in the bands).

**J4 Class-A disposition (2026-07-17).** Corrected duplicate-apparatus-number anchor binding (bare `[^1]`–`[^11]` restarting every printed page bound only the FIRST same-numbered def; the rest were silently dropped at render). Reconciled against 450dpi PDF column bands, printed pp. 599–602:
- **p.600:** the *Sed contra* objections 1–5 had NO body anchors at all (dropped entirely) — added `[^1]`–`[^5]` at *virtutis* (obj.1), *inconveniens* (obj.2), *doni* (obj.3), *posteriori* (obj.4), *spes* (obj.5), confirmed against each footer's content (d.23 xref, actus/habitus connexio, d.34 gifts-of-Spirit xref, Aristotle prius/posterius, `quo fit`/`multo fortiori`/`constat` variants). The Respondeo's existing `[^1]` (*gratiae*) and `[^2]` (*primo libro*) were relabeled to `[^6]`/`[^7]` — those numbers were needed for the Sed-contra anchors and the print confirms *gratiae*=n.6, *primo libro*=n.7. `[^8]` (*fieri*) and `[^9]` (*modus*) were already correct.
- **p.601:** a genuine **Trap-1 catch** — the body had `[^2]` on *et* (before "in solis illis"), but the print shows superscript **2** on *habitus substrati* and superscript **3** on *et*; the def content confirms it (`[^2]`: "Edd. substrati boni…"; `[^3]`: "Cod. K et quoniam"). Moved `[^2]` to *substrati* and relabeled the *et* anchor to `[^3]`. All other p.601 anchors (1,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11) were already correctly placed per the print.
- Re-ran `tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py --apply` after the reconciliation; the chunk's body partition now provably matches the apparatus groups per page, so the tool mechanically relabeled all 27 defs/anchors to the page-qualified `[^pNNN-M]` scheme. Verify: 27 defs, 27 Latin anchors, 27 English anchors, 0 duplicates, 0 orphans.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0