title: Dist. 7

title_alt: Distinctio VII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction VII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### Distinctio VII

#### Cap. I

*Utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit gignere Filium.*

Hic solet quaeri a quibusdam, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit generare Filium. Si enim, inquiunt, potuit et[^1] voluit generare Filium: ergo potuit aliquid et voluit, quod nec potuit nec voluit Filius; nam Filius nec potuit nec voluit generare Filium. Cui versutiae facile respondemus dicentes: posse vel velle generare Filium non est aliquid posse vel velle subiectum[^2] voluntati vel potentiae. Est tamen aliqua potentia vel voluntas, scilicet posse vel velle gignere Filium; et ideo distinguenda est intelligentia propositi[^3] verbi: posse vel velle gignere Filium est posse vel velle aliquid. Neque enim generatio Filii aliquid eorum est, quae subiecta sunt divinae potentiae et voluntati, nec est aliquid inter omnia vel de omnibus, sed super omnia et ante omnia. Non enim ante voluit vel potuit, quam genuit; sicut nec ante fuit, quam genuit, quia[^4] ab aeterno fuit et ab aeterno genuit. Ex simili quoque hoc videre possumus. Pater enim potest esse Pater et vult esse Pater; Filius autem nec[^5] potest nec vult esse Pater: ergo Pater potest vel vult esse aliquid, quod non potest vel vult esse Filius. Non sequitur, quia esse Patrem non est esse aliquid, sed est esse ad aliquid, ut in sequenti ostendetur[^6].

Sed vehementer nos movet quod ait Augustinus in secundo libro *contra Maximinum*[^7], qui asserebat Patrem potentiorem Filio, eo quod Filium genuit Deum creatorem, Filius autem non; dicebatque Patrem potuisse gignere non Filium; et ideo potentiorem esse Filio. Ad quod respondens Augustinus dicere videtur, quod Filius etiam potuit[^8] gignere, volens ostendere, Patrem non esse potentiorem Filio, his verbis: «Absit, ut ideo potentior sit Pater Filio, sicut putas, quia Creatorem genuit Pater, Filius autem non genuit Creatorem; neque enim non potuit, sed non oportuit». Vide et diligenter attende haec verba: *non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit*. Videtur enim dicere, quod Filius potuit gignere, sed non oportuit; et ita potuit quod non oportuit. Quare autem non oportuit, subdit dicens: «Immoderata enim esset divina generatio, si genitus Filius nepotem gigneret Patri, quia et ipse nepos, nisi avo suo pronepotem gigneret, secundum vestram mirabilem sapientiam impotens diceretur. Similiter etiam ille, si nepotem non gigneret avo suo et pronepotem proavo suo, non a vobis appellaretur omnipotens; nec impleretur generationis series, si semper alter ex altero nasceretur; nec eam perficeret ullus, si non sufficeret unus omnipotens. Itaque omnipotentem genuit Filium Patris natura, non fecit».

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Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam posse stare, scilicet quod Filius potuerit gignere. Si enim Filius potuit gignere, potuit esse pater; et si potuit esse pater, ergo potuit esse pater vel sui, vel Patris, vel Spiritus sancti, vel alicuius[^9] alius. Sed alius non, quia nullus alius semper fuit; nec Patris, quia Pater est ingenitus et innascibilis; nec sui, «quia nulla res se ipsam gignere potest»; nec Spiritus sancti, quia nasci non potuit. Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse filius, et ita mutabilis esse potuit.

Quomodo ergo accipietur[^10] quod supra dictum est: *non enim non potuit gignere, sed non oportuit*, quasi potuit, sed non oportuit? Non est nobis perspicuum aperire, quomodo sit hoc verum, et ideo sub silentio potius esset praetereundum, nisi me super hoc aliquid loqui cogeret instantia quaerentium.

Potest ergo[^11] sic intelligi: *non enim non potuit, sed non oportuit*, id est, non ex impotentia sui fuit, quod Filius non genuit, sed ei non conveniebat, sicut Deus Filius non est Deus Pater; nec tamen hoc ex impotentia sui est. Nam et Pater similiter non est Filius, nec hoc est ex impotentia Patris. Sed quaerit Maximinus, Arianorum Episcopus: unde ergo est, quod Pater non potest esse Filius, vel Filius Pater? Non utique ex impotentia, sed Pater[^12] proprietate generationis Pater est, qua oportet eum non esse Filium, et Filius proprietate nativitatis Filius est, qua oportet eum non esse Patrem. De quibus proprietatibus postea plenius tractabitur[^13].

#### Cap. II

*An posse gignere Filium sit aliqua potentia in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.*

Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit natura gignere Filium, et an haec[^14] sit aliqua potentia, quae non[^15] sit in Filio. Ad quod dicimus, quod Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia natura est vel essentia. At inquiunt illi, si potens est gignere, habet ergo potentiam gignendi; Filius autem non habet potentiam gignendi, si non potest gignere: habet ergo Pater aliquam potentiam, quam non habet Filius. Non sequitur. Eandem enim potentiam penitus habet Filius quam et Pater, qua Pater potuit gignere, et Filius potuit gigni. Eadem enim potentia est in Filio, qua potuit gigni, quae est in Patre, qua potuit gignere. Sed contra hoc opponitur: aliud est posse gignere, aliud est posse gigni; quia aliud est gignere, aliud gigni. Hic distinguendum est. Si enim, cum dicitur: *aliud est posse gignere, aliud posse gigni*, aliam significes[^16] potentiam, qua Pater potens est gignere, et aliam, qua Filius potens est gigni, falsus est intellectus. Si autem dicas, Patrem posse habere aliam proprietatem sive notionem, qua genitor est; et Filium aliam, qua genitus est, verus est intellectus. Aliam enim habet Pater proprietatem, qua Pater est, aliam Filius, qua Filius est. Ita etiam, cum dicitur: *Filius non habet potentiam generandi, quam habet Pater*, dupliciter intelligi potest. Si enim dicatur: Filius non habet potentiam generandi quam et Pater, id est[^17], qua potens sit ad generandum, id est, ut genuerit, vel ut generet sicut Pater, verum est. Si vero intelligatur sic: non habet potentiam, qua possit gigni vel genitus esse, qua eadem Pater potens est, ut genuerit vel ut generet, falsum est; sicut dicitur: Pater habet potentiam, qua potest esse Pater; Filius vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Pater; et e converso, Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius, Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius[^18]: habet ergo aliquam Pater, quam non habet Filius, et e converso. Absit; quia eadem est potentia Patris, qua potest esse Pater, et Filii, qua potest esse Filius. Ita etiam eadem est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater, non Filius, et Filius vult esse Filius, non Pater: et eadem est voluntas Filii, qua vult esse genitus, et Patrem genuisse; et Patris, qua vult esse genitor, et Filium genitum esse[^19].

---

english:
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### Distinction VII

#### Chapter I

*Whether the Father could or willed to beget the Son.*

Here it is wont to be asked by some, whether the Father could or willed to beget the Son. For if, they say, he could and[^1] willed to beget the Son: therefore he could and willed something which the Son neither could nor willed; for the Son neither could nor willed to beget a Son. To which subtlety we easily reply, saying: to be able or to will to beget the Son is not to be able or to will something subject[^2] to will or to power. There is, however, some power or will, namely, to be able or to will to beget the Son; and therefore the meaning of the proposed[^3] phrase is to be distinguished: to be able or to will to beget the Son is to be able or to will *something*. For neither is the generation of the Son any of those things which are subject to the divine power and will, nor is it any thing among all things or of all things, but above all and before all. For he did not will or have power before he begot; just as he did not exist before he begot, since[^4] from eternity he was and from eternity he begot. We can also see this from a similar case. For the Father can be Father and wills to be Father; the Son, however, neither[^5] can nor wills to be Father: therefore the Father can or wills to be something which the Son cannot or does not will to be. It does not follow, because to be Father is not to be *something*, but is to be *in relation to something*, as will be shown in what follows[^6].

But what Augustine says in the second book *Against Maximinus*[^7] greatly moves us — Maximinus, who asserted that the Father is more powerful than the Son, in that the Father begot the Son a Creator God, but the Son did not; and he said the Father could have begotten one not a Son; and therefore was more powerful than the Son. Replying to which, Augustine seems to say that the Son also could[^8] have begotten, wishing to show that the Father is not more powerful than the Son, in these words: «Far be it that the Father be therefore more powerful than the Son, as you suppose, because the Father begot a Creator, but the Son did not beget a Creator; for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not». See and diligently attend to these words: *for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not*. For he seems to say that the Son could have begotten, but ought not to have; and so could what he ought not. Why he ought not, Augustine adds, saying: «For the divine generation would be immoderate, if the begotten Son were to beget a grandson for the Father, since that grandson too, unless he were to beget a great-grandson for his grandfather, would, according to your wondrous wisdom, be called impotent. Likewise also that one, if he were not to beget a grandson for his grandfather and a great-grandson for his great-grandfather, would not be called by you omnipotent; nor would the series of generation be fulfilled, if always one were born from another; nor would any complete it, unless one omnipotent suffice. Therefore the Father's nature *begot* the Son omnipotent, it did not *make* him».

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This, however, does not seem to some able to stand, namely that the Son could have begotten. For if the Son could have begotten, he could have been a father; and if he could have been a father, then he could have been father either of himself, or of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit, or of some other[^9]. But not of another, because no other always was; nor of the Father, because the Father is unbegotten and innascible; nor of himself, «because no thing can beget itself»; nor of the Holy Spirit, because he could not be born. For if he could be born, he could be a son, and so could be mutable.

How then is to be taken[^10] what was said above: *for it is not that he could not beget, but that he ought not*, as if he could, but ought not? It is not clear to us how to explain how this is true, and so it should rather be passed over in silence, were not the importunity of those who ask compelling me to say something on it.

It can therefore[^11] be understood thus: *for it is not that he could not, but that he ought not*, that is, it was not from any impotence of his that the Son did not beget, but it did not befit him, just as God the Son is not God the Father; nor yet is this from any impotence of his. For likewise the Father is not the Son, nor is this from any impotence of the Father. But Maximinus, the Bishop of the Arians, asks: whence then is it, that the Father cannot be Son, or the Son Father? Surely not from impotence, but the Father[^12] is Father by the property of generation, by which it is fitting that he not be the Son, and the Son is Son by the property of nativity, by which it is fitting that he not be the Father. Of which properties more fully will be treated hereafter[^13].

#### Chapter II

*Whether to be able to beget the Son is some power in the Father which is not in the Son.*

Likewise it is asked by some, whether the Father is able by nature to beget the Son, and whether this[^14] is some power which is not[^15] in the Son. To which we say, that the Father is not able save by nature; for his power is nature or essence. But they say: if he is able to beget, therefore he has the power of begetting; the Son, however, does not have the power of begetting, if he cannot beget: therefore the Father has some power which the Son does not have. It does not follow. For the Son has wholly the same power as the Father, that by which the Father could beget, and the Son could be begotten. For the same power is in the Son, by which he could be begotten, which is in the Father, by which he could beget. But against this it is objected: to be able to beget is one thing, to be able to be begotten is another; for to beget is one thing, to be begotten another. Here a distinction must be made. For if, when it is said: *to be able to beget is one thing, to be able to be begotten another*, you signify[^16] one power, by which the Father is able to beget, and another, by which the Son is able to be begotten, the understanding is false. But if you say that the Father can have one property or notion, by which he is begetter; and the Son another, by which he is begotten, the understanding is true. For the Father has one property, by which he is Father, the Son another, by which he is Son. So also, when it is said: *the Son does not have the power of begetting which the Father has*, it can be understood in two ways. For if it be said: the Son does not have the power of begetting which the Father has, that is[^17], by which he is able to generation, that is, that he should have begotten, or that he should beget as the Father, it is true. But if it be understood thus: he does not have the power by which he could be begotten or be one begotten, by which same the Father is able, that he should have begotten or that he should beget, it is false; just as it is said: the Father has the power by which he can be Father; the Son, however, does not have the power by which he could be Father; and conversely, the Son has the power by which he can be Son, but the Father does not have the power by which he could be Son[^18]: therefore the Father has some which the Son does not have, and conversely. Far be it; for the same is the power of the Father, by which he can be Father, and of the Son, by which he can be Son. So too the same is the will, by which the Father wills to be Father, not Son, and the Son wills to be Son, not Father: and the same is the will of the Son, by which he wills to be begotten, and that the Father has begotten; and of the Father, by which he wills to be begetter, and that the Son is begotten[^19].

---

la: Vat. *vet*, sed contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.

en: The Vatican edition reads *vet*, but against the codices and editions 1, 6, 8.

la: Supple cum cod. A *divinae*.

en: Supply with codex A *divinae* ("of the divine [will or power]").

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 *et*. Paulo ante codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 3, 7 *praepositi* loco *propositi*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, reads *et*. A little before, codices A B C E with editions 1, 3, 7 read *praepositi* in place of *propositi*.

la: Edd. 1, 2, 8 addunt *et*.

en: Editions 1, 2, 8 add *et*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 1, 6 *non*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 1, 6 reads *non*.

la: Dist. XXVIII, c. 5. — Paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 omittunt propositionem *sed est esse ad aliquid*, quam edd. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 sic exhibent: *sed potest esse ad aliquid*.

en: Distinction XXVIII, c. 5. — A little before, codices A B C E and edition 1 omit the clause *sed est esse ad aliquid* ("but it is to be in relation to something"), which editions 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 give thus: *sed potest esse ad aliquid* ("but it can be in relation to something").

la: Cap. 12, n. 2. — Mox Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8, post *potentiorem* addit *esse*. Dein cod. C bene *genuerit* loco *genuit*.

en: Chapter 12, no. 2. — Next the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, adds *esse* after *potentiorem*. Then codex C rightly reads *genuerit* in place of *genuit*.

en: Editions 2, 3, 7, 9, 10 read *potuerit*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 hic repetit *alicuius*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, here repeats *alicuius*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6 *accipiatur*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 4, 5, 6 reads *accipiatur*.

la: Mendum Vat. omittentis *non*; castigatur ex codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. Paulo ante cod. D *Potest autem* loco *Potest ergo*.

en: A blunder of the Vatican edition omitting *non*; it is corrected from the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. A little before, codex D reads *Potest autem* in place of *Potest ergo*.

la: Codd. hic repetunt *ex*.

en: The codices here repeat *ex*.

la: Dist. XXVI.

en: Distinction XXVI.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10 *hoc*. Mox post *quae* fide codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 expunximus in Vat. additum *non*. Paulo infra post *dicimus quod* codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt *Pater*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, reads *hoc*. Next, after *quae*, on the witness of the codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, we have expunged the *non* added in the Vatican edition. A little below, after *dicimus quod*, the codices and editions 1, 8 omit *Pater*.

la: Vat., repugnantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 9, 10, addit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 9, 10, adds *et*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 *significas*. Paulo supra post *posse gignere* codd. A D E addunt *et*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 4, 6, 8 reads *significas*. A little above, after *posse gignere*, codices A D E add *et*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 *scilicet*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 8, reads *scilicet*.

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 indebite omittit *Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius*.

en: The Vatican edition with edition 4 unduly omits *Pater vero non habet potentiam, qua possit esse Filius* ("but the Father does not have the power by which he could be the Son").

la: In codd. B D E et ed. 1 deest *esse*.

en: In codices B D E and edition 1 *esse* is missing.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 7, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VII — Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VII — Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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# COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VII.

*De comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam.*

Hic solet quaeri, utrum Pater potuerit vel voluerit etc.

## DIVISIO TEXTUS.

In praesenti distinctione ponit Magister dubitationem ex comparatione potentiae generandi ad personam, utrum scilicet, sicut est in persona Patris, ita sit in persona Filii. Et habet haec pars duas: in prima Magister quaerit et determinat, utrum Filius possit generare; in secunda, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, ibi: *Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater potens sit etc.*

Item prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima movet quaestionem, utrum posse et velle

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generare similiter comparentur ad personam Patris et Filii. Secundo, opponit contra solutionem per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: *Sed vehementer nos movet, quod Augustinus etc.* Tertio, opponit contra praedictam auctoritatem per rationem, ibi: *Hoc autem non videtur quibusdam.* Quarto, redit supra auctoritatem, exponens ipsam[^1], ibi: *Quomodo ergo accipitur quod supra dictum est.*

*Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc.* Haec est[^2] secunda pars huius distinctionis, in qua quaerit Magister, utrum potentia generandi sit in Filio, et haec pars habet duas particulas. Primo, quaerit et determinat hanc quaestionem, utrum aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio. Si enim Pater natura potens est generare Filium, et Filius non, patet etc. Et[^3] ad hanc quaestionem respondet Magister, quod omnino eadem est potentia in Patre et Filio. Sed quia hoc erat dubium, ideo opponit contra praedictam solutionem et determinat per distinctionem. Secundo, respondet ad primam quaestionem distinguendo, utrum scilicet Filius habeat potentiam generandi, ibi: *Ita etiam cum dicitur, Filius non habet etc.* Si enim intelligatur active, falsus est intellectus, scilicet quod Filius possit generare. Si vero intelligatur[^4] passive, scilicet quod habeat potentiam, qua possit generari, vera est. Et fundatur ista distinctio secundum aliquos super hoc, quod ly *generandi* potest intelligi in significatione passiva, vel activa. Si in passiva, tunc vera est; et est sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est potentiam, qua generatur. Si[^5] in activa, hoc potest esse dupliciter, quia potest esse gerundium verbi personalis, et tunc habet suppositum determinatum et est falsa; est enim sensus: *Filius habet etc.* id est, Filius habet potentiam, qua ipse Filius generat; vel impersonalis; et tunc non habet certum suppositum et est locutio vera; est enim sensus: Filius habet potentiam generandi, id est, habet potentiam, qua aliquis generat[^6], tamen hunc sensum non ponit Magister.

## TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad evidentiam eorum quae dicit Magister de potentia generandi, quatuor quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum posse generare in divinis dicat *quid*, vel *ad aliquid*.

*Secundo*, utrum Pater communicet Filio[^7] potentiam generandi, id est, utrum in Filio sit potentia generandi.

*Tertio*, utrum posse generare et creare sit unicum posse, vel non.

*Quarto*, utrum posse generari et creari sit posse univocum[^8].

---

english:
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# COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VII.

*On the comparison of the power of generating with respect to the person.*

Here it is wont to be asked, whether the Father could or willed etc.

## DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

In the present distinction the Master sets out a doubt arising from the comparison of the power of generating to the person, namely whether, as it is in the person of the Father, so also it is in the person of the Son. And this part has two [sections]: in the first the Master asks and determines whether the Son can generate; in the second, whether the power of generating is in the Son, there: *Likewise it is asked by some, whether the Father is able etc.*

Likewise the first part has four particles. In the first he raises the question, whether to be able and to will

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to generate are similarly compared to the person of the Father and of the Son. Secondly, he objects against the solution by the authority of Augustine, there: *But it greatly disturbs us, that Augustine etc.* Thirdly, he objects against the aforesaid authority by reason, there: *But this does not seem [right] to certain men.* Fourthly, he returns to the authority, expounding it[^1], there: *How then is what was said above to be taken.*

*Likewise it is asked by some, if the Father etc.* This is[^2] the second part of this distinction, in which the Master asks whether the power of generating is in the Son, and this part has two particles. First, he asks and determines this question, whether there is any power in the Father which is not in the Son. For if the Father is by nature able to generate the Son, and the Son is not, it is plain etc. And[^3] to this question the Master responds that the power in the Father and in the Son is altogether the same. But because this was doubtful, therefore he objects against the aforesaid solution and determines [it] by a distinction. Secondly, he responds to the first question by distinguishing, namely whether the Son has the power of generating, there: *So also when it is said, The Son does not have etc.* For if it be understood actively, the understanding is false, namely that the Son can generate. But if it be understood[^4] passively, namely that he has the power by which he can be generated, it is true. And this distinction is founded, according to some, upon this, that the [particle] *generandi* can be understood in a passive signification, or in an active. If in the passive, then it is true; and the sense is: the Son has the power of generating, that is, the power by which he is generated. If[^5] in the active, this can be in two ways, because it can be the gerund of a personal verb, and then it has a determinate supposit and is false; for the sense is: *the Son has etc.* that is, the Son has the power by which the Son himself generates; or [it can be] impersonal; and then it does not have a fixed supposit and is a true expression; for the sense is: the Son has the power of generating, that is, has the power by which someone generates[^6], yet the Master does not put forward this sense.

## TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the elucidation of those things which the Master says about the power of generating, four [questions] are asked.

*First* it is asked, whether to be able to generate in divine [matters] expresses *something* [absolute] or *something relative* [literally: in relation to something].

*Secondly*, whether the Father communicates to the Son[^7] the power of generating, that is, whether in the Son there is a power of generating.

*Thirdly*, whether to be able to generate and to create is one single power, or not.

*Fourthly*, whether to be able to be generated and to be created is a univocal[^8] power.

---

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ipsam*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *ipsam*.

la: Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1, omittendo verba: *Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est*, mutat constructionem, quia postea eliminat verba *et haec pars*. Mox codd. cum ed. 1 *tres* loco *duas*, sed falso.

en: The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, omitting the words *Item quaeritur a quibusdam, si Pater etc. Haec est*, alters the construction, since afterwards it eliminates the words *et haec pars*. Shortly after, the codices with edition 1 [read] *tres* in place of *duas*, but falsely.

la: Ex mss. X Y bb et ed. 1 adiecimus *Et*, pro quo plurimi codd. non ita bene *Sed*; cod. Q vero *Secundo* et paulo infra *tertio* pro *secundo*, at falso, uti inspicienti textum Magistri et verba Bonaventurae patet.

en: From manuscripts X Y bb and edition 1 we have added *Et*, in place of which most codices [read], not so well, *Sed*; codex Q indeed [reads] *Secundo* and a little below *tertio* for *secundo*, but falsely, as is plain to one inspecting the Master's text and Bonaventure's words.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *intelligatur* pro *intelligitur* et mox *habeat* loco *habet* et paulo infra *ista* pro *illa* ac *aliquos* loco *alios*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *intelligatur* for *intelligitur* and shortly after *habeat* in place of *habet* and a little below *ista* for *illa* and *aliquos* in place of *alios*.

la: Vat. *Sed*, et paulo post omittit *hoc* contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1, qui *et* pro *gerundium* ponunt *gerundivum*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *Sed*, and a little after omits *hoc* against the older codices and edition 1, which put *gerundivum* for *gerundium*.

la: Cod. O glossando addit: *scilicet Pater, quia eadem est potentia in Patre et in Filio ad hoc ut generetur, nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod Filius generat, sed ex hoc sequitur, quod aliquis generat.*

en: Codex O, glossing, adds: *namely the Father, because the power in the Father and in the Son is the same, to the end that he be generated, nor however does it follow from this that the Son generates, but from this it follows that someone generates.*

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 restituimus omissum *Filio*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the omitted *Filio*.

la: Mendum Vat. fide mss. correximus substituendo *univocum* pro *unicum*.

en: A defect of the Vatican [edition] we have corrected on the faith of the manuscripts by substituting *univocum* for *unicum*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum vel relativum

source_text:
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### Quaestio I. *Utrum potentia generandi dicat aliquid absolutum, vel relativum.*

Circa primum, quod posse generare dicat *quid*, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Magistri in littera[^1]: quod « Pater non est potens nisi natura, eiusque potentia ipsa[^2] essentia est vel essentia »; sed natura et potentia dicunt *quid*, non *ad aliquid*: ergo et potentia generandi.

2. *Item*[^3], ratione ostenditur sic: generare est sibi simile in natura producere; sed secundum Philosophum[^4] « natura est vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans »: ergo vis generandi respicit ipsam naturam sive essentiam de se, non personam; sed omne tale dicit *quid*: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, « in perpetuis non differt esse et posse »[^5]: ergo multo fortius in aeternis; ergo idem est esse et posse, et potentia et essentia; sed esse et essentia in divinis dicunt *quid*, non *ad aliquid*, sive per se dicatur, sive cum adiuncto; unde essentia Patris dicit *quid*: ergo pari ratione potentia generandi.

4. *Item*, in divinis idem est secundum rem posse scire et velle; sed non est in divinis scientia propria sive *ad aliquid*[^6], immo scientia dicit *quid* et est trium, similiter et voluntas: ergo potentia generandi dicit *quid* sive essentiam.

**Sed contra:**

1. Magister dicit in littera, et habetur primo capitulo[^7]: *Posse generare non est posse aliquid*, ergo non dicit *quid*; et dicit *quid* vel *ad aliquid*: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, ratione ostenditur sic: potentiae distinguuntur per actus[^8]: ergo si actus potentiae dicit *quid*, et potentia; et si dicit *ad aliquid*, tunc et potentia similiter. Sed constat quod generare in divinis non dicit *quid*, sed *ad aliquid*: ergo nec posse generare.

3. *Item*, quamvis in creaturis differant virtus et operatio, tamen in Deo idem sunt, sicut vult Dionysius[^9]: ergo in Deo idem est posse generare et generare; sed generare in divinis dicit *ad aliquid* et non *quid*: ergo similiter posse.

4. *Item*, Pater generat et potest generare: aut ergo ideo potest, quia generat; aut ideo generat, quia potest. Constat quod non ideo potest generare, quia generat: ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare[^10]. Si ergo ratio proprii debet esse propria, ergo potentia generandi debet esse propria; et nihil est proprium in divinis, nisi quod dicit *ad aliquid*: ergo etc.

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5. *Item*, omnis potentia activa, quae inest creaturae, inest secundum aliquas conditiones sive[^11] proprietates, ut patet. Posse enim illuminare inest luminoso per lucem, posse calefacere calido per caliditatem. Quamvis autem potentia generandi non sit activa, tamen activae similis est: ergo cum insit Patri, inest per aliquam proprietatem; illa autem proprietas aut dicit *quid*, aut *ad aliquid*. Si *quid*: ergo[^12] inest omnibus personis, et ita posse generare, quod manifeste negat Magister: ergo dicit *ad aliquid*: ergo et potentia, quae inest secundum illam: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Inter tres de hac re opiniones videtur probabilior ea quae asserit, potentiam generandi significare tam relationem quam substantiam, sed in recto relationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc problema tres fuerunt positiones.

**Opinio 1.** Fuerunt[^13] quidam, qui distinxerunt potentiam generandi dicentes, quod potentia generandi potest dici potentia nuda, vel potentia disposita. Si dicatur potentia nuda, sic voluerunt[^14] dicere, quod dicit *quid* et in omnibus tribus personis est, quoniam haec potentia sic dicta consequitur naturam; unde cum natura sit in qualibet persona, similiter et potentia huiusmodi. Secundum autem quod dicit potentiam dispositam, quia non habet dispositionem nec convenientiam, ut exeat in actum generationis[^15] nisi in sola persona Patris, voluerunt dicere, quod dicit *ad aliquid*.

**Reprobatur.** Sed verba istius positionis non videntur vera nec sana. Non, inquam, vera, quoniam cuius potentia est nuda, nata est pariter esse disposita; si ergo trium[^16] est potentia generandi, ut est potentia nuda, similiter et disposita; et ita quaelibet posset generare. Praeterea non videtur sana: ponere enim potentiam nudam, quae similiter se habet ad esse et non esse respectu generationis, quam omnino necessarium est esse, non videtur sane dictum esse sive proprie.

**Opinio 2.** Fuerunt etiam alii, qui dixerunt, quod cum in divinis sit idem posse et esse, et potentia et essentia, quod, quemadmodum potentia et essentia dicunt *quid*, similiter esse et posse. Et quemadmodum, cum dico essentiam Patris et essentiam Filii et Spiritus sancti, sive esse Patrem[^17], esse Filium, esse Spiritum sanctum, non dico aliam essentiam nec aliud esse, sed alterius et alterius; ita quando dico potentiam Patris, sive Patrem posse generare et Filium posse gigni, non dico aliud et aliud posse, sed alterius. Et huius positionis fuit Magister, sicut evidenter apparet in littera[^18]. Unde isti dicebant, quod posse generare dicit *quid*, sed secundum respectum *ad aliquid*, quia est essentiale tractum ad personam. Cum enim non sit omnimodae abstractionis, potest ad personam trahi.

Et ista positio Magistri[^19] satis est probabilis et satis bene videtur sustineri posse.

**Opinio 3.** Fuerunt etiam tertii moderniores, qui dixerunt, quod potentia generandi dicit *ad aliquid* in divinis de se. Et ratio eorum est, quoniam potentia dicit habitudinem originalis principii ad principiatum. Et quoniam habitudo potest esse personae ad personam, et tunc vere est habitudo; et essentiae ad creaturam, et tunc secundum modum dicendi sive intelligendi: hinc est, quod principium de sui ratione non tantum est essentiale appropriatum per additionem, immo etiam dicit proprium personae. Pari ratione, cum potentia dicat originalem habitudinem, non tantum essentialem, non solum[^20] dicitur vel trahitur ad personam, ut dicat essentiam personaliter, immo dicit proprium, et ita *ad aliquid* de se.

Et positio ista sine praeiudicio videtur probabilior. Nam potentia generandi non videtur dicere nisi fecunditatem ad actum generationis; et illa est proprium personae, unde similiter et potentia[^21]. Nec est simile de posse et esse nisi uno modo. Hoc enim verbum *est* aliquando per se praedicatur, aliquando est tertium adiacens. Quando per se dicitur, tunc dicit actum absolutum, quia dicit actum entis ratione essentiae; et tunc oportet, quod dicatur absolute et quod dicat *quid*. Quando vero est tertium adiacens, ut cum dicitur *Pater est Deus*[^22], *Pater est Pater*, tunc hoc verbum *est* dicit habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum. Et quoniam potest dicere habitudinem ad praedicatum essentiale vel personale, ideo potest dicere esse essentiale et modum essendi personalem. Posse autem de sui ratione propria dicit habitudinem secundum originem; et hinc est, quod specificatur per adiunctum, ut dicat conditionem principii essentialis, vel personalis. Hanc ergo positionem sustinendo respondeo[^23] argumentis probantibus, quod dicit *quid*.

**Ad argumenta probantia quod dicit *quid*:**

*Ad 1.* Quod enim primum obiicitur, patet: concedo enim, Magistrum fuisse huius positionis. Unde dixerunt, quod eadem potentia potest Filius gigni, qua Pater potest gignere; quod non esset[^24], nisi potentia diceret *quid*. Unde dixit, quod potentia generandi est in Filio, sed non *ad generare*, sed *ad generari*. Haec autem positio[^25] dicit, quod est in solo Patre, quia non tantum respicit naturam, sed proprietatem personae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod[^26] generare consequitur naturam; dicendum, quod in divinis non consequitur naturam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in persona; quia non in qualibet persona est natura fecunda, sed solum in persona Patris, et hoc est per aliquam proprietatem, quae est solius illius personae; non sic est in inferioribus, sicut iam patebit[^27]: ideo patet quod illud non valet.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in aeternis est idem esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen argumentum nihil[^28] valet. Quamvis enim omnino sit idem in divinis esse et esse Patrem, non tamen sequitur, quod si esse Patrem est proprium, quod esse sit proprium. Similiter nec si esse sit commune, quod propter hoc esse Patrem[^29]. Similiter dicendum in proposito.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de scientia, quod dicit *quid*, sive per se dicatur, sive cum alio; dicendum, quod non est simile de scientia et potentia. Scientia enim, quantum est de se, dicit qualitatem absolutam, et ideo, quantum est de se, dicit *quid*, nisi trahatur; sed potentia dicit

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habitudinem ad[^30] originem, et ideo potest dicere habitudinem propriam et personae ad personam. Unde illud simile Magistri non valet secundum hanc positionem, quod[^31], sicut una est voluntas, qua Pater vult esse Pater et non vult esse Filius, et e converso, similiter una est potentia, ut videtur.

**Ad argumenta contra:** Si quis autem vult sustinere positionem Magistri, de facili potest ad omnes rationes in oppositum respondere.

*Ad 1.* Nam nulla ratio probat, quod potentia de se dicat proprium, sed quod potentia generandi active dicta sive *posse generare* dicat ex adiuncto respectum ad personam, et ita dicit *ad aliquid*; sed hoc est solum ratione additi. Unde[^32] notandum, quod quatuor sunt genera nominum in divinis. Quaedam enim essentialia sunt dicta essentialiter, ut *deitas* et *maiestas*; quaedam essentialia personaliter dicta, ut *potentia generandi*; quaedam personalia dicta personaliter, ut *generans* et *genitus*; quaedam personalia dicta essentialiter, ut *missus*, *incarnatus* et huiusmodi[^33], quae dicunt respectum ad personam, et ideo personalia, et effectum in creatura, et ideo essentialiter sunt dicta.

*Ad 2.* Duabus rationibus sequentibus facile est respondere, quia illud non habet veritatem, nisi quando actus complectitur totam potentiam[^34]; non sic est in potentia Dei, quia eadem est potentia gignere et gigni in Deo.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est posse generare et generare; dicendum, quod non valet. Quamvis enim idem sit Pater et substantia, non tamen sequitur, quod si Pater dicitur *ad aliquid*, quod et substantia, sicut melius patebit infra[^35].

*Ad 4 et 5.* Duabus ultimis rationibus difficile est bene respondere; tamen potest quis dicere, quod rationes illae non concludunt, quod potentia dicat *ad aliquid* de se, sed solum ratione adiuncti, quod est generare; et sic patent cetera[^36].

english:
### Question I. *Whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute or relative.*

Concerning the first, that "to be able to beget" signifies *something* (a *what*), is shown:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Master in the text[^1]: that « the Father is not powerful save by nature, and his power is the very[^2] essence, or essence »; but nature and power signify *something*, not *in relation to something*: therefore so also does the power of begetting.

2. *Likewise*[^3], it is shown by reason thus: to beget is to produce that which is similar to oneself in nature; but according to the Philosopher[^4] « nature is a force implanted in things which procreates like from like »: therefore the power of begetting regards nature itself or essence in itself, not the person; but every such thing signifies *something*: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, « in things perpetual, to be and to be able do not differ »[^5]: therefore much more strongly in things eternal; therefore being and being-able, and power and essence, are the same; but being and essence in divine matters signify *something*, not *in relation to something*, whether they are said by themselves or with an adjunct; hence the essence of the Father signifies *something*: therefore by parity of reasoning so does the power of begetting.

4. *Likewise*, in divine matters, the ability to know and the ability to will are really the same; but in divine matters there is no proper knowledge or knowledge *in relation to something*[^6], rather knowledge signifies *something* and is of the three [persons], and likewise the will: therefore the power of begetting signifies *something*, that is, essence.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Master says in the text, and it is found in the first chapter[^7]: *To be able to beget is not to be able [to do] something*, therefore it does not signify *something*; and it signifies either *something* or *in relation to something*: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, by reason it is shown thus: powers are distinguished by their acts[^8]: therefore if the act of a power signifies *something*, so does the power; and if it signifies *in relation to something*, then so does the power likewise. But it is established that to beget in divine matters does not signify *something* but *in relation to something*: therefore neither does the ability to beget.

3. *Likewise*, although in creatures power and operation differ, yet in God they are the same, as Dionysius will it[^9]: therefore in God it is the same to be-able-to-beget and to beget; but to beget in divine matters signifies *in relation to something* and not *something*: therefore likewise the ability.

4. *Likewise*, the Father begets and is able to beget: either, then, he is able because he begets, or he begets because he is able. It is established that he is not able to beget because he begets: therefore he begets because he is able to beget[^10]. If, then, the ground of a property must itself be proper, therefore the power of begetting must be proper; and nothing is proper in divine matters except what signifies *in relation to something*: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, every active power which is in a creature is in it according to certain conditions or[^11] properties, as is plain. For the ability to illuminate is in a luminous body through light, the ability to heat in a hot thing through heat. Now although the power of begetting is not active, yet it is similar to an active power: therefore since it is in the Father, it is there through some property; and that property either signifies *something* or *in relation to something*. If *something*: therefore[^12] it is in all the persons, and so likewise is the ability to beget — which the Master manifestly denies: therefore it signifies *in relation to something*: therefore so does the power which is in [the Father] according to it: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Among the three opinions on this matter, that one seems more probable which asserts that the power of begetting signifies both relation and substance, but in the direct sense [signifies] relation.

**I respond:** It must be said that, concerning this problem, there have been three positions.

**Opinion 1.** There were[^13] some who distinguished the power of begetting, saying that the power of begetting can be called a *bare* power or a *disposed* power. If it is called a bare power, then they wished[^14] to say that it signifies *something* and is in all three persons, since this power so understood follows nature; whence, since nature is in every person, so likewise is a power of this kind. But insofar as it is called a disposed power, since it does not have the disposition or fitness for it to issue into the act of generation[^15] except in the person of the Father alone, they wished to say that it signifies *in relation to something*.

**It is rejected.** But the words of this position do not seem true or sound. Not true, I say, because that whose power is bare is by nature equally apt to be disposed; if therefore the power of begetting belongs to the three[^16], inasmuch as it is a bare power, it likewise [belongs to them] as disposed; and so any [person] could beget. Moreover it does not seem sound: for to posit a bare power, which is indifferent to being and not-being with respect to a generation which it is altogether necessary should be, does not seem soundly or properly stated.

**Opinion 2.** There were also others who said that, since in divine matters being-able and being are the same, and power and essence are the same, then just as power and essence signify *something*, so likewise being and being-able. And just as, when I say "the essence of the Father" and "the essence of the Son" and "[the essence] of the Holy Spirit," or "for the Father to be"[^17], "for the Son to be," "for the Holy Spirit to be," I do not say another essence nor another being, but [the being] of one and of another; so when I say "the power of the Father," or "the Father can beget" and "the Son can be begotten," I do not say another and another being-able, but [the being-able] of one and of another. And of this position was the Master, as evidently appears in the text[^18]. Whence they said that to-be-able-to-beget signifies *something*, but with a respect to *something else*, because it is an essential drawn to the person. For since it is not of an utterly abstract sort, it can be drawn to the person.

And this position of the Master[^19] is sufficiently probable, and seems sufficiently well able to be sustained.

**Opinion 3.** There were also a third group, the more modern, who said that the power of begetting signifies *in relation to something* in divine matters of itself. And their reason is: because power signifies a relation of an originating principle to that which is principiated. And because a relation can be of person to person — and then it is truly a relation — and of essence to creature — and then it is according to the manner of speaking or of understanding — hence it is that "principle" by its very account is not only an essential [term] appropriated by addition, but rather also signifies a property of a person. By like reasoning, since power signifies an originating relation, not merely an essential one, it is not only[^20] said or drawn to the person so as to signify essence personally, but rather it signifies a property, and so [signifies] *in relation to something* of itself.

And this position, without prejudice, seems more probable. For the power of begetting does not seem to signify anything but the fecundity for the act of generation; and that is a property of a person, whence likewise so is the power[^21]. Nor is the case of being-able and being similar except in one mode. For this verb *is* is sometimes predicated by itself, sometimes is the third adjacent. When it is said by itself, then it signifies an absolute act, because it signifies the act of being by reason of essence; and then it must be said absolutely and must signify *something*. But when it is the third adjacent, as when it is said *the Father is God*[^22], *the Father is the Father*, then this verb *is* signifies a relation of predicate to subject. And because it can signify a relation to either an essential or a personal predicate, therefore it can signify essential being and a personal mode of being. But "to be able," by its own proper account, signifies a relation according to origin; and hence it is that it is specified by its adjunct, so as to signify the condition of an essential or of a personal principle. Sustaining this position, then, I respond[^23] to the arguments which prove that it signifies *something*.

**To the arguments proving that it signifies *something*:**

*To 1.* As to what is first objected, the matter is plain: for I concede that the Master was of this position. Whence they said that the Son can be begotten by the same power by which the Father can beget; which would not be so[^24] unless the power signified *something*. Whence he said that the power of begetting is in the Son, but not *for begetting*, but *for being begotten*. But this position[^25] says that it is in the Father alone, because it does not regard nature only, but a property of the person.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that[^26] begetting follows nature; it must be said that, in divine matters, it does not follow nature simply, but nature as in a person; because not in every person is there a fecund nature, but only in the person of the Father, and this is through some property which is of that person alone; it is not so in lower things, as will soon be plain[^27]: hence it is plain that that [argument] is not valid.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that in eternal things being and being-able are the same; it must be said that this is true; but nevertheless the argument is worth nothing[^28]. For although in divine matters being and being-the-Father are utterly the same, yet it does not follow that, if being-the-Father is proper, therefore being is proper. Likewise neither, if being is common, that on this account being-the-Father [is common][^29]. Likewise it must be said in the case proposed.

*To 4.* As to what is objected concerning knowledge, that it signifies *something* whether said by itself or with another; it must be said that knowledge and power are not alike. For knowledge, as far as concerns itself, signifies an absolute quality, and therefore, as far as concerns itself, signifies *something*, unless it be drawn [to a person]; but power signifies a relation to[^30] origin, and therefore can signify a proper relation, and one of person to person. Whence that comparison of the Master is not valid according to this position, namely[^31] that, just as there is one will by which the Father wills to be the Father and does not will to be the Son, and conversely, so likewise there is one power, as it seems.

**To the arguments on the contrary:** But if anyone wishes to sustain the position of the Master, he can easily reply to all the arguments on the opposite side.

*To 1.* For no reason proves that power of itself signifies a property, but only that the power of begetting taken actively, or "to be able to beget," signifies from the adjunct a respect to the person, and so signifies *in relation to something*; but this is only by reason of what is added. Whence[^32] it is to be noted that there are four kinds of names in divine matters. For some essential ones are said essentially, as *deity* and *majesty*; some essentials are said personally, as *power of begetting*; some personals are said personally, as *begetting* and *begotten*; some personals are said essentially, as *sent*, *incarnate*, and the like[^33], which signify a respect to the person, and therefore are personal, and an effect in the creature, and therefore are said essentially.

*To 2.* It is easy to reply to the two following arguments, since that does not have truth except when the act exhausts the whole power[^34]; it is not so in the power of God, since the same is the power to beget and to be begotten in God.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that to-be-able-to-beget and to beget are the same; it must be said that it is not valid. For although the Father and the substance are the same, yet it does not follow that, if the Father is said *in relation to something*, the substance also is, as will be better shown below[^35].

*To 4 and 5.* It is difficult to reply well to the two last arguments; nevertheless one can say that those reasons do not conclude that power signifies *in relation to something* of itself, but only by reason of the adjunct, which is "to beget"; and so the rest are clear[^36].

la: Cap. 2. in initio. — Mox Vat. contra multos codd. ut AGHISTVYZ bb ff et ed. 1 *quia eius* pro *eiusque* et in propositione minore contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 *et essentia* loco *et potentia*.

en: Chap. 2, at the beginning. — Then the Vatican edition, against many codices such as AGHISTVYZ bb ff and ed. 1, has *quia eius* for *eiusque*, and in the minor proposition, against all codices and ed. 1, *et essentia* in place of *et potentia*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *ipsam*.

en: From manuscripts X Y bb and ed. 1 we have added *Et*, in place of which most codices, less well, have *Sed*; codex Q indeed has *Secundo* and a little below *tertio* for *secundo*, but wrongly, as is plain to one who inspects the Master's text and Bonaventure's words.

la: Aristot., I. Magnor. Moral. c. 10. ait: *Omnis natura eius est essentiae procreatrix, qualis ipsa est*. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 5. (IV. c. 4.). — Vat. (cui consentit Richard. a Med., hic q. 1.) contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 ponit *Isaac* (in eius libro de definitionibus haec non inveniuntur) pro *Philosophus*. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 7. a. 2. et S. p. I. q. 30. m. 1. hanc definitionem attribuit Boethio, editores autem operum Henrici Gandav. Grammatico. Auctor libri *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 42. dicit: *Natura siquidem est quaedam vis et potentia divinitus rebus creandis insita, quae unicuique rei suum esse tribuit*.

en: Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I. c. 10., says: *Every nature is procreative of an essence such as it itself is*. Compare *Metaphysics* V. text 5 (IV. c. 4.). — The Vatican edition (with which Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1., agrees), against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, puts *Isaac* (in his book on definitions these things are not found) for *Philosophus*. — B. Albert, I Sent. d. 7. a. 2. and S. p. I. q. 30. m. 1. attributes this definition to Boethius, while the editors of the works of Henry of Ghent attribute it to "the Grammarian." The author of the book *On Spirit and Soul*, c. 42, says: *Nature is indeed a certain force and power divinely implanted in things to be created, which assigns to each thing its own being*.

la: Mutila Vat. et cod. cc lectio, in qua omittuntur verba *ergo multo* usque ad *et potentia*, restauratur ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. — De prima huius argumenti propositione vide supra d. 2. q. 1. argum. 1. ad opp.

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, in which the words *ergo multo* down to *et potentia* are omitted, is restored from the older manuscripts and ed. 1. — On the first proposition of this argument see above d. 2. q. 1., argum. 1, *ad opp.*

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. ut HIRSUXYZ bb ff et ed. 1 post *propria* addit *vel voluntas propria* et post *sive* Vat. sola adiungit *scientia et voluntas*; praeferimus tamen lectionem aliorum mss. ut ACFGLORT etc., quae et contextu probatur, quia secus superflue postea poneretur *similiter et voluntas*.

en: The Vatican edition, with several codices such as HIRSUXYZ bb ff and ed. 1, after *propria* adds *vel voluntas propria*, and after *sive* the Vatican edition alone adds *scientia et voluntas*; we prefer, however, the reading of the other manuscripts such as ACFGLORT etc., which is also confirmed by the context, since otherwise *similiter et voluntas* would later be set down superfluously.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 post *initium* loco *et* habetur *primo capitulo*. Mox Vat. male et contradicentibus mss. omittit *et dicit quid vel*; pauci codd. ut I cc pro *et* satis bene *sed*.

en: The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, after *initium*, in place of *et*, has *primo capitulo*. Then the Vatican edition, wrongly and against the manuscripts, omits *et dicit quid vel*; a few codices such as I and cc, for *et*, quite well [read] *sed*.

la: Communiter allegatur hac de re Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.): *Priores enim potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; si autem sic, his adhuc priora opposita* (i. e. obiecta). — Mox mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittitur *et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc*, redintegramus ope ceterorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: On this matter Aristotle, *De Anima* II. text 33 (c. 4.), is commonly cited: *For acts and operations are prior to powers in account; and if so, then prior still to these are the opposites* (i. e. objects). — Then we restore the mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc — in which is omitted *et potentia; et si dicit ad aliquid, tunc* — by the help of the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Libr. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. §. 1.

en: Book *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 11, and *On the Divine Names* c. 4. §. 1.

la: Postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, pro *sed e converso* posuimus *ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare*.

en: As the manuscripts and ed. 1 require, in place of *sed e converso* we have placed *ergo ideo generat, quia potest generare*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *et* loco *sive*, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, has *et* in place of *sive*, but against the older codices and ed. 1.

la: Ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ergo*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *ergo*.

la: Ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. addit *enim*.

en: Ed. 1, with one or another codex, adds *enim*.

la: Faventibus antiquis mss. et ed. 1, expunximus hic male additum *aliqui* moxque post *omnibus* adiecimus *tribus*.

en: With the support of the old manuscripts and ed. 1, we have here struck out the wrongly added *aliqui*, and shortly afterward, after *omnibus*, we have added *tribus*.

la: Cod. H satis bene addit *personarum*.

en: Codex H quite well adds *personarum*.

la: Cod. O glossando addit: *scilicet Pater, quia eadem est potentia in Patre et in Filio ad hoc ut generetur, nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod Filius generat, sed ex hoc sequitur, quod aliquis generat*.

en: Codex O, by way of gloss, adds: *namely the Father, because the same is the power in the Father and in the Son for the result that [the Son] is begotten; nor, however, does it follow from this that the Son begets, but it follows from this that someone begets*.

la: Vat. hic et post *Filium* contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 adiicit *sive* et paulo infra contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 omittit *et alterius* necnon post *generare* particulam *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, here and after *Filium*, against most codices and ed. 1, adds *sive*, and a little below, against the older codices and ed. 1, omits *et alterius* as well as the particle *et* after *generare*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have restored the omitted *Filio*.

en: A blunder of the Vatican edition we have corrected on the testimony of the manuscripts by substituting *univocum* for *unicum*.

la: Omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 *essentialem* pro *essentialiter*, quod Vat., mutata interpunctione, refert ad ea quae sequuntur; sed falso, quia opponitur verbo *originalem*. Ex mss. FHPQTY ee adiecimus *non solum*, quod alii codd. cum Vat. omittunt; ed. 1 non hic, sed paulo infra post *dicat* addit *non tantum*.

en: All codices, with editions 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, [read] *essentialem* for *essentialiter*, which the Vatican edition, with altered punctuation, refers to what follows; but wrongly, since it is set in opposition to the word *originalem*. From manuscripts FHPQTY ee we have added *non solum*, which the other codices, with the Vatican edition, omit; ed. 1, not here but a little below after *dicat*, adds *non tantum*.

la: Cod. bb addit *generandi*.

en: Codex bb adds *generandi*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Pater est Deus*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc omittit. — De tertio adiacente vide Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1. et Comment. S. Thomae in hunc locum (Lect. 2.), ubi et eadem distinctio de verbo *est* proponitur et explicatur: *Et non dicitur esse tertium, quia sit tertium praedicatum; sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enuntiatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *Pater est Deus*, which the Vatican edition with codex cc omits. — On the third adjacent see Aristotle, *Perihermeneias* II. c. 1, and the *Commentary* of St. Thomas on this passage (Lect. 2), where the same distinction concerning the verb *is* is proposed and explained: *And it is not called "third" because it is a third predicate, but because it is a third word placed in the enunciation, which together with the noun-predicate makes one predicate*.

la: Vat. *respondetur*, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition has *respondetur*, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cod. X addit *verum*. — Cfr. lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Codex X adds *verum*. — Compare the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Scilicet tertia opinio. — Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. loco *positio* habent *potentia*, cuius lectionis sensus est: *haec autem potentia*, scilicet generandi, iuxta praedicta dicit seu nominat illud quod est in solo Patre, nempe fecunditatem ad actum generationis. Melius legeretur: *haec autem positio dicit, quod potentia est in solo Patre*.

en: Namely, the third opinion. — Most codices, with the first six editions, in place of *positio* have *potentia*, the sense of which reading is: *this power*, namely [the power] of begetting, according to what has been said, signifies or names that which is in the Father alone, namely the fecundity for the act of generation. It would be better read: *but this position says that the power is in the Father alone*.

la: Antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 contra Vat. et cod. cc *quod* pro *quomodo*.

en: The older manuscripts and ed. 1, against the Vatican edition and codex cc, [read] *quod* for *quomodo*.

la: Hic q. 2. praesertim ad 6. et dub. 4. — Paulo ante codd. aa bb post *proprietatem* addunt *scilicet innascibilitatem*.

en: Here q. 2., especially *ad* 6., and *dub.* 4. — A little before, codices aa bb after *proprietatem* add *scilicet innascibilitatem*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, *non* loco *nihil*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *non* in place of *nihil*.

la: Supple: *sit commune*. — Mutilam lectionem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua omittuntur verba *Similiter* usque *Patrem*, restauravimus ope aliorum mss. et ed. 1.

en: Supply: *sit commune*. — The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, in which the words *Similiter* down to *Patrem* are omitted, we have restored by the help of the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 pro *et* substituimus *ad*, quod perfecte correspondet dictis in fine corp.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, in place of *et* we have substituted *ad*, which corresponds perfectly to what is said at the end of the body [of the article].

la: Reliquimus cum Vat. *quod*, licet plurimi codd. habeant *quia*, sed minus bene.

en: We have left, with the Vatican edition, *quod*, although most codices have *quia*, but less well.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *Item*, et paulo infra post *essentialiter* ut addit *dicuntur*, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] *Item*, and a little below after *essentialiter ut* adds *dicuntur*, but against the other codices and ed. 1.

la: Plures codd. ut AISTVY aa omittunt *incarnatus et huiusmodi*.

en: Several codices such as AISTVY aa omit *incarnatus et huiusmodi*.

la: Cod. I addit *quando scilicet potentia se habet determinate ad unum actum, ita quod non ad alium*.

en: Codex I adds *when, namely, the power is determinately ordered to one act, so that not to another*.

la: Dist. 9. q. 2. imprimis ad 3. 6. et d. 26. q. 1. 3.

en: Distinction 9, q. 2, especially *ad* 3., 6., and d. 26. q. 1., 3.

la: Codd. P Q *omnia* pro *cetera*; cod. V *patet solutio ad omnia obiecta*.

en: Codices P Q [read] *omnia* for *cetera*; codex V [reads] *patet solutio ad omnia obiecta* ("the solution to all the objections is plain").

latin_scholion:
**I.** In productione divinarum emanationum distinguitur *principium quod* et *principium quo*. Ipsae personae producentes sunt *principium quod*, cum actiones sint suppositorum. *Principium quo* (sive ratio, qua suppositum agit) divinarum productionum communiter asseritur esse potentiam generandi et spirandi. Sed disputatur, quid sit haec potentia, et circa hoc inquirit hic S. Bonaventura. Aliis verbis haec quaestio sic exprimitur: *utrum potentia generandi dicat quid absolutum (essentiam), an relativum sive relationem*. Eadem difficultas est circa potentiam spirandi, quae communis est Patri et Filio, de qua infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. Quaestio utraque est potius de modo loquendi quam de gravi aliqua differentia in re. — Si autem quaeritur de principio *quo* utriusque emanationis, quid sit in se, et quomodo alterum ab altero differat, communiter nunc respondetur, esse duplicem fecunditatem, scilicet per modum naturae sive intellectus et per modum voluntatis; de quo vide infra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion. — Quoad quaestionem hoc loco tractatam recte observat Scotus (*Report.*, hic q. 1.), quod « diversae sententiae forte possunt conciliari nec videntur contrariari nisi verbis ». Quia tamen contrarii modi loquendi, quos doctores in hac quaestione adhibent, non parum influunt in solutiones aliarum de Trinitate quaestionum, quae infra tractantur, iuvat hic aliqua de variis solutionibus huius quaestionis dicere. — S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 41. a. 5.) secundae opinioni hic in corp. positae favens asserit, quod potentia generandi significat « in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem », et in *Comment.* (hic q. 1. a. 1.) cum B. Albert. (hic a. 2.) affirmat, eam « esse quasi mediam inter essentiale et personale ». Hanc opinionem S. Bonav. dicit esse « satis probabilem, et satis bene videtur sustineri posse », immo ipse in fine solutionis obiectorum argumenta contra eam allata nititur solvere. — Huic positioni directe opponitur sententia Gulielmi Altissiodorensis (vel melius Autissiodorensis, quia nomen Latinum civitatis Auxerre est *Autissiodorum* vel *Autessiodorum*) et Durand. (hic q. 1.), qui volunt, hanc potentiam dicere solam relationem. Dionys. Carth. eandem hanc sententiam attribuit S. Bonaventurae ipsamque approbat his verbis: « Videtur verior, quod potentia generativa dicatur pure ad aliquid... cum enim dicitur generativa potentia, complexum hoc sumitur in virtute unius dictionis aut nominis; ideo quantumcumque potentia secundum se diceretur absolute, tamen ex tali limitatione et contractione sumitur respective ». Sed qui attente ponderat verba S. Doctoris, hic et in dubiis circa litteram §. 6. 7. scripta, iam perspiciet, ipsum mediam quandam viam eligere. Haec eius sententia clarius apparet ex anecdoto Prologo Seraphici ad II. Sent., ex quo supra d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in *Schol.*, iam aliquid exscripsimus, et nunc prosequimur: « Similiter nec in alio, scil. in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister d. VII. innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum substantiam, et quod alii dicunt, esse dictam secundum relationem et esse proprium, non est controversia, immo utrumque verum est, si quis attendat. Nam si divisim loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec duo nomina, sic, cum nomen *potentiae* de se sit essentiale et nomen *virtutis generativae* sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona. Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod connectantur in unius vocabuli intellectum, tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentia generandi quam fecunditas potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio potentia generandi vel posse generare dicitur secundum relationem. Et sic patet quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, alteri. Sed hanc sententiam magis approbavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere. In his igitur et aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens, debita servata reverentia (dicsunt aliqua verba) et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem ingenii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potero, sustinere, his tantum exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium. Haec autem sunt octo, ita quod in quolibet libro sunt duo » etc.

Secundum hanc explicationem essentia et proprietas personae constituunt *principium quo* productionum totale, et quidem sic, ut essentia sit quasi fundamentum et initium, proprietas vero ratio completiva et quasi formalis, sive ut Richard. a Med. (hic q. 1.) dicit: « Potentia generandi in divinis dicit *quid* et *ad aliquid*, formalius tamen *ad aliquid* videtur significare ». Consentiunt Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.), Alex. Hal. (*S.* p. 1. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. ad ult.). Nec Henr. Gand. (*S.* a. 53. q. 8. n. 27. et *Quodl.* 3. q. 14.) et ipse Scotus aliter sentire videntur, licet hic sub aliis distinctionibus respondeat. Et cum etiam S. Thom. doceat, potentiam generandi importare tum essentiam tum relationem, liquet, eos non dissentire nisi in quaestione, quid per prius intelligi debeat. Ceterum solutio S. Bonaventurae cohaeret cum principiis, quae infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2. diffuse defendit.

**II.** Valde notabilis est doctrina Seraphici (ad. 1.) de quadruplici genere divinorum nominum. Haec sumta sunt ex Alex. (loc. cit. a. 1.).

**III.** In solutione argumentorum a solito ordine receditur. Ut nempe opinionem Magistri defendat, S. Doctor argumenta pro propria sua sententia secundo loco adducta solvere nititur. Ordinem solutionum indicant postillae marginales. Auctoribus iam laudatis addantur: B. Albert., de hac et seq. q., *S.* p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In the production of the divine emanations, *principium quod* and *principium quo* are distinguished. The producing persons themselves are *principium quod*, since actions belong to supposits. *Principium quo* (or the ground by which a supposit acts) of the divine productions is commonly asserted to be the power of begetting and of spirating. But it is disputed what this power is, and concerning this St. Bonaventure here inquires. In other words, this question is so expressed: *whether the power of begetting signifies something absolute (the essence), or something relative or a relation*. The same difficulty obtains concerning the power of spirating, which is common to the Father and the Son, on which see below d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. and 2. Either question is rather about a manner of speaking than about any grave difference in the thing. — But if it be asked concerning the *principium quo* of either emanation, what it is in itself, and how the one differs from the other, it is now commonly answered that there is a twofold fecundity, namely by way of nature or intellect and by way of will; on which see below d. 13. q. 3. and *Scholion*. — As to the question here treated, Scotus rightly observes (*Report.*, here q. 1.) that « the diverse opinions can perhaps be reconciled, and seem to be at variance only in words ». Nevertheless, since the contrary modes of speaking which the doctors employ in this question have no small influence on the solutions of other Trinitarian questions which are treated below, it helps to say something here about the various solutions of this question. — St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 41. a. 5.), favoring the second opinion here placed in the body, asserts that the power of begetting signifies « in the direct sense the divine nature, but in the oblique relation », and in the *Comment.* (here q. 1. a. 1.) with B. Albert (here a. 2.) he affirms that it is « as it were a mean between the essential and the personal ». This opinion St. Bonaventure says is « sufficiently probable, and seems sufficiently well able to be sustained », and indeed he himself, at the end of the solution of the objections, strives to solve the arguments brought against it. — Directly opposed to this position is the opinion of William of Altissiodorum (or better Autissiodorum, since the Latin name of the city of Auxerre is *Autissiodorum* or *Autessiodorum*) and Durandus (here q. 1.), who hold that this power signifies relation alone. Dionysius the Carthusian attributes this same opinion to St. Bonaventure and approves it in these words: « It seems truer that the generative power is said purely *in relation to something*... for when "generative power" is said, this complex is taken with the force of one expression or noun; and therefore however much "power" by itself might be said absolutely, yet from such limitation and contraction it is taken relatively ». But whoever weighs attentively the words of the holy Doctor, both here and in the *dubia* on the text §. 6. 7., will perceive that he chooses a certain middle way. This opinion of his appears more clearly from the unpublished *Prologue of the Seraphic [Doctor] to II Sent.*, from which we have already excerpted something above at d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in the *Schol.*, and now we continue: « Likewise neither in another, namely in the power of begetting, did I disagree with him. The same the Master at d. VII. intimates: that the power of begetting is said according to substance, and that what others say — that it is said according to relation and is something proper — is not a controversy; rather both are true, if one attends. For if we speak separately of the power of begetting, according to what is signified by these two names, then, since the noun *potentia* is of itself essential, and the noun *generative virtue* is personal, it signifies essence or nature as in a person. But if we speak of that which is signified by those two terms taken so that they are connected into the understanding of one term, then, since the power of begetting is nothing other than the fecundity of power, and fecundity in producing some person is altogether said according to relation and is not common but proper — thus without doubt the power of begetting, or "to be able to beget," is said according to relation. And so it is plain that each of those opinions is true, [though] one [more than] the other. But this opinion I have approved more, because it more attains to the truth of the matter, although for the full expression of the truth it is necessary to sustain both. Therefore, adhering in these and other words of the Master, with due reverence preserved (some words are *dicsunt*), I have proposed and propose, according to the slenderness of my wit and the poverty of my knowledge, in those matters in which I shall be able, to sustain [him], with these only excepted in which more commonly he is not sustained, but the common opinion holds the contrary. These are eight, so that in each book there are two » etc.

According to this explanation, the essence and the property of the person constitute the total *principium quo* of the productions, and so indeed that the essence is as it were the foundation and beginning, but the property the completive and as it were formal account, or as Richard of Mediavilla (here q. 1.) says: « The power of begetting in divine matters signifies *something* and *in relation to something*, but more formally seems to signify *in relation to something* ». Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1. a. 2.), Alexander of Hales (*S.* p. 1. q. 42. m. 3. a. 2. *ad ult.*) agree. Nor do Henry of Ghent (*S.* a. 53. q. 8. n. 27. and *Quodl.* 3. q. 14.) and Scotus himself seem to feel otherwise, although the latter answers under other distinctions. And since St. Thomas also teaches that the power of begetting imports both essence and relation, it is plain that they do not dissent except on the question of which is to be understood as prior. Moreover the solution of St. Bonaventure coheres with the principles which he defends below at length at d. 27. p. I. q. 2.

**II.** Highly notable is the doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] (*ad* 1.) on the fourfold genus of divine names. These are taken from Alexander (*loc. cit.* a. 1.).

**III.** In the solution of the arguments, the usual order is departed from. Namely, in order to defend the opinion of the Master, the holy Doctor strives to solve the arguments adduced in the second place for his own opinion. The order of the solutions is indicated by the marginal *postillae*. To the authors already named are to be added: B. Albert, on this and the following q., *S.* p. I. tr. 7. q. 30. m. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. *princ.* q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1. 2.

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