title: Dist. 35

title_alt: Distinction XXXV — The Text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXV.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Quid sit peccatum.*

Post haec videndum est, quid sit peccatum. — Peccatum est, ut ait Augustinus[^1], « omne dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, quod fit contra legem Dei ». Idem in libro de Duabus Animabus: « Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat ». In utraque assignatione de actuali peccato agitur et mortali, non veniali. Ex prima descriptione ostenditur peccatum esse voluntas mala, sive locutio et operatio prava, id est actus malus tam interior quam exterior; ex altera vero tantum ostenditur esse actus interior; voluntas enim, ut in superioribus[^2] dictum est, motus animi est — actus ergo interior est. Ambrosius quoque in libro de Paradiso[^3] ait: « Quid est peccatum nisi praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia praeceptorum »? « Ergo in praevaricante peccatum est, sed in mandante culpa non est ». « Non enim consisteret peccatum, si interdictio non fuisset. Non consistente autem peccato, non solum malitia, sed etiam virtus fortasse non esset, quae, nisi aliqua malitiae fuissent semina, vel subsistere, vel eminere non posset ». — Ecce praevaricationem legis et inobedientiam definit Ambrosius esse peccatum.

#### Cap. II.

#### *De peccato.*

Quocirca, diversitatis huius verborum occasione de peccato plurimi diversa senserunt. — Alii enim dixerunt, voluntatem malam tantum esse peccatum et non actus exteriores; alii, voluntatem et actus; alii neutrum, dicentes, omnes actus esse bonos et a Deo et ex Deo auctore esse, malum autem nihil esse, ut ait Augustinus super Ioannem[^4]: « Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, id est peccatum, quod nihil est; et nihil fiunt homines, cum peccant ». Supra etiam dixit Augustinus, quod malum est privatio boni vel corruptio boni; quod etiam in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^5] ait: « Summum malum nullum modum habet, caret enim omni bono; at modus aliquid boni est: non igitur est, quia nulla specie continetur, totumque hoc nomen mali de speciei privatione repertum est ». Idem in Dogmatibus ecclesiasticis[^6] dicitur: « Malum vel malitiam non esse a Deo creatam, sed a diabolo inventam, qui et ipse bonus creatus est ». Idem etiam in libro contra Manichaeos, quid sit *peccare*, ostendit dicens: « Peccare quid aliud est, nisi in veritatis praeceptis vel in ipsa veritate errare? Quod si non voluntate faciunt peccatores, iniuste iudicantur ». Quid igitur in hac tanta varietate tenendum, quidve dicendum?

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Sane dici potest et libere tradi debet, peccatum esse actum malum interiorem et exteriorem, scilicet malam cogitationem, locutionem et operationem; praecipue tamen in voluntate consistit peccatum, ex qua tanquam ex *arbore mala* procedunt opera mala tanquam *fructus mali*[^7].

#### Cap. III.

#### *Utrum malus actus, in quantum peccatum est, sit corruptio vel privatio boni.*

Quidam autem, diligenter attendentes verba Augustini, quibus supra et in aliis Scripturae locis utitur, non indocte tradunt, voluntatem malam et actus malos, in quantum *sunt*, vel in quantum *actus* sunt, bona esse; in quantum vero *mala* sunt, peccata esse; qui voluntatem et actum quemcumque bonam Dei naturam esse dicunt, in quantum *actus* est, vel *voluntas*, et ex Deo auctore esse; in quantum vero inordinate et contra legem Dei fit et fine debito caret, peccatum est, et ita, in quantum peccatum est, nihil est. Nulla enim substantia est, nulla natura est.

Quod autem voluntas omnis et actio bonum sit, in quantum est, ex eo probant, quod ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^8]: « Deus boni tantummodo causa est; quocirca mali auctor non est, quia omnium quae sunt, auctor est, quae, in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt ». Idem probans, nihil casu fieri in mundo, ait in eodem: « Quidquid casu fit, temere fit; quidquid temere fit, non fit providentia. Si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non providentia universus mundus administratur; si non providentia universus mundus administratur, aliqua natura vel substantia est, quae ad opus providentiae non pertinet. Omne autem quod est, in quantum est, bonum est. Summe enim est illud bonum, cuius participatione sunt cetera bona; et omne quod mutabile est, non per se, sed boni illius participatione, in quantum est, bonum est, quod divinam etiam providentiam vocamus. Nihil igitur casu fit in mundo ». — His testimoniis innituntur ad ostendendum, omne quod est, in quantum est, bonum esse. Unde idem Augustinus in libro primo de Doctrina christiana[^9] ait: « Ille summe ac primitus est, qui omnino incommutabilis est; et cetera quae sunt, nisi ab illo esse non possunt, et in tantum bona sunt, in quantum acceperunt, ut sint ».

Ex praedictis colligitur atque infertur, quia, si mala voluntas et mala actio est, in quantum est, bona est. Sed quis est qui diffitetur, malam voluntatem esse et malam actionem? Mala igitur voluntas sive actio, in quantum est, bonum est, et in quantum voluntas est, vel actio, bonum similiter est; sed ex vitio mala est, quod vitium a Deo non est neque aliquid est. Quod Augustinus notasse videtur in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum dicens: « Vitium est voluntatis, quo est homo deterior; quod vitium longe abest a voluntate Dei, ut ratio docet ». — Ex hoc loco probant, voluntatem, in quantum vitiosa est, non esse a Deo; et in quantum vitiosa est, peccatum est; et peccatum est, ut aiunt, in quantum non habet ordinem nec finem debitum. Ita et actio, in quantum ex malo procedit, et ordinem non habet et ad malum tendit.

Item et aliter probant, omnem actum interiorem vel exteriorem, in quantum est, esse bonum; quia non esset actus malus, nisi esset res bona, quia non est aliqua res mala, nisi eadem res bona sit. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^10]: « Omnis natura bonum est, nec res aliqua mala esset, si res ipsa, quae mala est, natura non esset. Non igitur potest esse malum nisi aliquod bonum. Quod cum dici videatur absurde, connexio tamen ratiocinationis nos compellit hoc dicere ». — Ex praemissis testimoniis asserunt, omnes actus, in quantum sunt, esse res bonas, nec aliquid esse malum, id est peccatum, nisi idem quoque secundum aliquid bonum sit; et omnium quae sunt, in quantum sunt, Deum auctorem praedicant, et eius voluntate omnia esse quaecumque sunt, quae[^11], in quantum sunt, naturae sunt.

Quibus opponitur: si omnia quae sunt, in quantum sunt, bona sunt et naturae sunt: ergo adulterium et homicidium et similia, in quantum sunt, bona sunt et naturae sunt, et Deo volente fiunt. Quod si est, tunc illi qui faciunt illa, bona agunt; quod penitus absurdum est. — His vero sic illi respondent: dicunt equidem, adulterium, homicidium et huiusmodi non simpliciter actus denotare, sed actuum vitia; actusque ipsos adulterii et homicidii, in quantum sunt, vel in quantum actus sunt, a Deo esse et bonas naturas esse; sed non in quantum adulterium et homicidium sunt. Et ideo non sequi dicunt, si actus, qui homicidia et adulteria sunt, a Deo sunt, quod homicidia et adulteria a Deo sint[^12].

Item aliter eis opponitur: si aliquid non est malum, quod non sit natura vel res bona, quomodo igitur peccata sunt, non credere in Deum, non ire ad ecclesiam et huiusmodi, cum ista non sint naturae, immo omnino non sint? Non est enim aliquid vel res aliqua non ire ad ecclesiam, vel non credere et huiusmodi. — Ad quod dicunt, his atque huiusmodi dictionibus, quae videntur privationes simpliciter notare et nihil

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ponere, quia per negationem dicuntur, vere aliqua poni, actusque per eas significari. *Non credere* enim in Christum incredulitatem dicunt, et nomine *incredulitatis* malum mentis actum significari. Ita etiam, cum dicitur: *non ire ad ecclesiam* malum est, non-euntis contemptus significatur, id est voluntas mala vel propositum; hoc est enim *declinare a bono*, et ideo malum est, sicut e converso *declinare a malo* bonum est. Sicut ergo *declinatio a malo* aliquid ponit, scilicet voluntatem et propositum vitandi malum — non enim potest esse bonum quod omnino nihil est — ita *declinatio a bono* quod[^13] est significat, scilicet voluntatem et propositum mali. Et secundum hoc vera est et generalis illa peccati mortalis descriptio, quam supra[^14] posuit Augustinus.

Potest etiam quaeri ab eisdem, cum peccatum sit, ut supra dictum est, privatio vel corruptio boni, et omnis actus malus sit peccatum; utrum sit privatio vel corruptio boni, in quantum peccatum est, vel non. Si enim, in quantum peccatum est, corruptio boni est, cum corruptio vel privatio boni poena sit homini; in quantum igitur peccatum est, poena est. Quod si est, tunc, in quantum peccatum est, bonum esse videtur et a Deo esse. Si autem *non*, in quantum peccatum est, corruptio est, quaeritur ergo, secundum quid corruptio sit. Si enim corruptio est, et non in quantum peccatum est; cum non sit nisi bonum, praeterquam in eo quod peccatum est: ergo in quantum bonum est, corruptio vel privatio boni est. — Ad quod etiam ipsi dicunt, actum malum, non in quantum est neque in quantum bonum est, esse privationem vel corruptionem boni, sed in quantum peccatum est; non tamen, in quantum peccatum est, poena est, vel aliquid, quod a Deo sit. Ut enim ex verbis praemissis Augustini colligitur, peccatum dicitur corruptio vel privatio *active*, non *passive*. Nam ideo malum vel peccatum dicitur corruptio boni, quia naturam bonam qualicumque privat bono. Nam si non privat aliquo bono, non nocet, ut supra[^15] Augustinus ait; nocet autem: adimit ergo bonum. Non autem nocet, nisi in quantum peccatum est: ergo in quantum peccatum est, privat bono. Itaque in quantum peccatum est, privatio est vel corruptio boni.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quomodo peccatum possit corrumpere bonum, cum nihil sit.*

Sed cum nihil sit, in quantum peccatum est, quomodo potest bonum corrumpere vel adimere? Augustinus te hoc docet in libro de Natura et gratia[^16] dicens: « Abstinere a cibo non est aliqua substantia; tamen substantia corporis, si omnino abstineatur a cibo, languescit et frangitur; sic non est substantia peccatum, eo tamen natura animae corrumpitur ».

Peccatum vero, id est culpa, proprie animae corruptio est. — Si autem quaeritur, in quo possit corrumpi anima; in parabola[^17] illius qui incidit in latrones, qui eum spoliaverunt et vulneraverunt, clarescit. Incidit enim homo in latrones, quando per peccatum in *potestatem diaboli traditur*; et tunc per peccatum *exspoliatur gratuitis bonis*, id est virtutibus, et in *naturalibus bonis vulneratur*, quae sunt ratio, intellectus, memoria et ingenium et huiusmodi, quae per peccatum obtenebrantur et vitiantur. Per peccatum etiam privatur illo bono, cuius participatione cetera bona sunt; quo tanto magis privatur, quanto magis se ab eo elongat.

#### Cap. V.

#### *Qualiter homo se elongat a Deo.*

Ab eo autem se elongat homo per peccatum, non loci distantia, quia ubique totus et praesens est omnibus, et « omnia in ipso sunt, ut ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^18], et ipse locus non est. Locus tamen Dei abusive dicitur *templum Dei*, non quod eo contineatur, sed quod ei praesens sit et inhabitans; id autem anima munda intelligitur ». Per peccatum igitur non secundum locum aliquis longe fit a Deo, sed in eo longe fit, quod ab eius similitudine recedit, et tanto longius, quanto fit dissimilior. « Illa autem, ut Augustinus ait in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum, quae participatione similia sunt Deo, recipiunt dissimilitudinem. At ipsa similitudo nullo modo ex aliqua parte potest esse dissimilis. Unde fit, ut, cum similitudo Patris Filius sit, ex nulla parte Patri possit esse dissimilis, cuius participatione similia sunt quaecumque Deo similia sunt; et illa possunt recipere dissimilitudinem ». Nihil est autem, quod hominem adeo Deo dissimilem faciat, quemadmodum peccatum. Cum autem peccatum sit corruptio vel privatio boni, quae est in anima, est etiam privatio et corruptio *boni corporis*, sicut corpus hominis privavit beneficio illius immortalitatis et impassibilitatis, quam habuit ante peccatum.

#### Cap. VI.

#### *An poena sit privatio boni.*

Quaeri autem solet, utrum et *poena* sit privatio vel corruptio boni. — Ad quod facile responderi potest, si praedicta ad memoriam revocentur. Diximus enim supra, privationem vel corruptionem boni accipi *active*, vel *passive*, id est secundum efficientiam, vel effectum. Ideoque privatio vel corruptio boni dicitur et peccatum et poena; sed peccatum secundum efficientiam, quia privat vel corrumpit bonum; poena autem secundum effectum, id est secundum passionem, quae est effectus peccati. Aliud est enim culpa, aliud poena; alterum est Dei, id est poena, alterum diaboli vel hominis, id est culpa.

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### DISTINCTION XXXV.

#### Chapter I.

#### *What sin is.*

After these things it must be seen what sin is. — Sin is, as Augustine[^1] says, "every word, or deed, or desire, which is done against the law of God." The same, in the book On the Two Souls: "Sin is the will to retain or to pursue what justice forbids." In each definition there is treatment of actual and mortal sin, not venial. From the first description it is shown that sin is an evil will, or a depraved speech and action, that is, an evil act both interior and exterior; but from the other it is shown to be only an interior act; for the will, as has been said above[^2], is a motion of the mind — it is therefore an interior act. Ambrose too, in the book On Paradise[^3], says: "What is sin but the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly precepts?" "Therefore in the one transgressing there is sin, but in the one commanding there is no fault." "For sin would not exist if there had been no prohibition. But if sin did not exist, not only would there be no malice, but perhaps no virtue either, which, unless there had been certain seeds of malice, could neither subsist nor stand out." — Behold, Ambrose defines sin to be the transgression of the law and disobedience.

#### Chapter II.

#### *On sin.*

Wherefore, on the occasion of this diversity of words, very many have thought diverse things about sin. — For some have said that only the evil will is sin and not the exterior acts; others, the will and the acts; others, neither, saying that all acts are good and are from God and from God as author, but that evil is nothing, as Augustine says on John[^4]: "All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing, that is, sin, which is nothing; and men become nothing when they sin." Above, also, Augustine said that evil is the privation of good or the corruption of good; which also in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^5] he says: "The highest evil has no measure, for it lacks all good; but measure is something of good: therefore it is not, since it is contained under no species, and this whole name of 'evil' is found from the privation of species." The same is said in the Ecclesiastical Dogmas[^6]: "That evil or malice was not created by God, but invented by the devil, who himself also was created good." The same also, in the book against the Manichees, shows what it is to *sin*, saying: "What else is it to sin, but to err in the precepts of truth or in truth itself? But if sinners do not act by will, they are unjustly judged." What, therefore, in this great variety is to be held, and what is to be said?

Soundly it can be said, and ought freely to be handed down, that sin is an evil act, interior and exterior, namely an evil thought, speech, and action; chiefly, however, sin consists in the will, from which, as from an *evil tree*, evil works proceed as *evil fruits*[^7].

#### Chapter III.

#### *Whether an evil act, insofar as it is sin, is a corruption or privation of good.*

But some, diligently attending to the words of Augustine, which he uses above and in other places of Scripture, not unlearnedly hand down that an evil will and evil acts, insofar as they *are*, or insofar as they are *acts*, are good; but insofar as they are *evil*, are sins; who say that any will and act whatever is a good nature of God, insofar as it is *act* or *will*, and is from God as author; but insofar as it comes to be in a disordered way and against the law of God and lacks its due end, it is sin, and so, insofar as it is sin, it is nothing. For it is no substance, it is no nature.

But that every will and action is good, insofar as it is, they prove from this, that Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^8]: "God is the cause of good only; wherefore He is not the author of evil, because He is the author of all things which are, which, insofar as they are, to that extent are good." The same, proving that nothing happens by chance in the world, says in the same place: "Whatever happens by chance, happens at random; whatever happens at random, does not happen by providence. If, therefore, some things happen by chance in the world, the whole world is not administered by providence; if the whole world is not administered by providence, there is some nature or substance which does not pertain to the work of providence. But everything that is, insofar as it is, is good. For that good is supremely, by participation in which other things are good; and everything that is mutable is good, not of itself, but by participation in that good, insofar as it is — which we also call divine providence. Nothing therefore happens by chance in the world." — By these testimonies they rest their proof that everything which is, insofar as it is, is good. Whence the same Augustine, in the first book On Christian Doctrine[^9], says: "He is supremely and primarily, who is altogether immutable; and the other things which are cannot be except from Him, and they are good to that extent in which they have received that they be."

From the foregoing it is gathered and inferred that, if an evil will and an evil action is, then insofar as it is, it is good. But who is there who denies that there is an evil will and an evil action? Therefore an evil will or action, insofar as it is, is good, and insofar as it is will or action, it is likewise good; but from its defect it is evil, which defect is not from God nor is it anything. Which Augustine seems to have noted in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, saying: "Defect belongs to the will, by which a man is made worse; which defect is far from the will of God, as reason teaches." — From this place they prove that the will, insofar as it is vitiated, is not from God; and insofar as it is vitiated, it is sin; and it is sin, as they say, insofar as it does not have its due order and end. So too the action, insofar as it proceeds from evil, both lacks order and tends toward evil.

Likewise they prove also in another way that every act, interior or exterior, insofar as it is, is good; because there would be no evil act unless there were a good thing, for there is no evil thing unless the same thing be good. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion[^10]: "Every nature is good, nor would any thing be evil, if the thing itself, which is evil, were not a nature. There cannot therefore be evil except some good. And although this seems to be said absurdly, yet the connection of reasoning compels us to say this." — From the premised testimonies they assert that all acts, insofar as they are, are good things, nor is anything evil, that is, sin, unless the same be also good according to something; and of all things which are, insofar as they are, they proclaim God to be the author, and that by His will all things are whatever they are, which[^11], insofar as they are, are natures.

To which it is objected: if all things which are, insofar as they are, are good and are natures: therefore adultery and homicide and the like, insofar as they are, are good and are natures, and come to be by God's willing. And if this is so, then those who do them act well; which is utterly absurd. — But to this those men respond thus: they say indeed that adultery, homicide, and the like do not signify acts simply, but the defects of acts; and that the acts themselves of adultery and homicide, insofar as they are, or insofar as they are acts, are from God and are good natures; but not insofar as they are adultery and homicide. And therefore they say it does not follow, if the acts which are homicides and adulteries are from God, that homicides and adulteries are from God[^12].

Likewise in another way it is objected to them: if nothing is evil that is not a nature or a good thing, how then are these sins, not to believe in God, not to go to church, and the like, since these are not natures, nay, are altogether not? For not to go to church, or not to believe, and the like, is not anything or any thing. — To which they say that, by these and suchlike expressions, which seem simply to denote privations and to posit nothing,

#### Chapter III (continued).

because they are spoken by way of negation, truly something is posited, and acts are signified by them. For *not to believe* in Christ they call incredulity, and by the name of *incredulity* an evil act of the mind is signified. So too, when it is said that *not to go to church* is evil, the contempt of the one not going is signified, that is, an evil will or purpose; for this is to *turn away from good*, and therefore it is evil, just as, conversely, to *turn away from evil* is good. As, therefore, *turning away from evil* posits something, namely the will and purpose of avoiding evil — for that cannot be good which is altogether nothing — so *turning away from good* signifies something that[^13] is, namely the will and purpose of evil. And according to this, that general description of mortal sin which Augustine set down above[^14] is true.

It can also be asked by the same men, since sin is, as has been said above, the privation or corruption of good, and every evil act is sin, whether it is the privation or corruption of good insofar as it is sin, or not. For if, insofar as it is sin, it is the corruption of good, since the corruption or privation of good is a penalty to man, then insofar as it is sin, it is a penalty. And if this is so, then, insofar as it is sin, it seems to be good and to be from God. But if *not*, insofar as it is sin, it is corruption, then it is asked according to what it is corruption. For if it is corruption, and not insofar as it is sin; since there is nothing but good, except in that which is sin: therefore insofar as it is good, it is corruption or privation of good. — To which those same men also say that an evil act, not insofar as it is nor insofar as it is good, is the privation or corruption of good, but insofar as it is sin; yet not, insofar as it is sin, is it a penalty, or anything that is from God. For, as is gathered from the premised words of Augustine, sin is called corruption or privation *actively*, not *passively*. For evil or sin is called the corruption of good for this reason, that it deprives a good nature of some good. For if it does not deprive of some good, it does not harm, as Augustine says above[^15]; but it does harm: therefore it takes away good. But it does not harm except insofar as it is sin: therefore insofar as it is sin, it deprives of good. And so insofar as it is sin, it is privation or corruption of good.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *How sin can corrupt good, since it is nothing.*

But since it is nothing, insofar as it is sin, how can it corrupt or take away good? Augustine teaches you this in the book On Nature and Grace[^16], saying: "To abstain from food is not any substance; yet the substance of the body, if it altogether abstain from food, grows faint and is broken; thus sin is not a substance, yet by it the nature of the soul is corrupted."

But sin, that is fault, is properly the corruption of the soul. — But if it is asked in what the soul can be corrupted; it becomes clear in the parable[^17] of him who fell among robbers, who despoiled and wounded him. For man falls among robbers when through sin he is *handed over into the power of the devil*; and then through sin he is *despoiled of the gratuitous goods*, that is, the virtues, and is *wounded in his natural goods*, which are reason, intellect, memory, and wit and the like, which through sin are darkened and vitiated. Through sin also he is deprived of that good by participation in which the other goods are; and he is deprived of it the more, the more he removes himself far from it.

#### Chapter V.

#### *How man removes himself far from God.*

Now man removes himself far from God through sin, not by distance of place, since He is everywhere whole and present to all, and "all things are in Him, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^18], and He Himself is not a place. Yet the place of God is, by misuse, called the *temple of God*, not because He is contained by it, but because He is present to it and inhabits it; and this is understood to be a clean soul." Through sin, therefore, one becomes far from God, not according to place, but he becomes far in this, that he recedes from His likeness, and so much the farther, the more dissimilar he becomes. "But those, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions, which by participation are like God, receive dissimilarity. But likeness itself can in no way and in no part be dissimilar. Whence it comes about that, since the Son is the likeness of the Father, He can in no part be dissimilar to the Father, by participation in whom whatever things are like God are like; and those things can receive dissimilarity." But there is nothing that makes a man so dissimilar to God as sin does. And since sin is the corruption or privation of good, which is in the soul, it is also the privation and corruption of the *good of the body*, just as the body of man was deprived of the benefit of that immortality and impassibility which it had before sin.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *Whether penalty is the privation of good.*

It is usually asked whether *penalty* too is the privation or corruption of good. — To which it can easily be answered, if the foregoing be recalled to memory. For we said above that the privation or corruption of good is taken *actively*, or *passively*, that is, according to efficiency, or effect. And therefore the privation or corruption of good is called both sin and penalty; but sin according to efficiency, because it deprives or corrupts good; and penalty according to effect, that is, according to the passion which is the effect of sin. For one thing is fault, another penalty; the one is of God, that is, penalty, the other of the devil or of man, that is, fault.

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la: Libr. XXII. contra Faustum Manich. c. 27. Seq. locus libro cit. c. 11. n. 15.

en: Book XXII, against Faustus the Manichee, c. 27. The following passage is in the cited book, c. 11, n. 15.

la: Dist. XXVI. c. 2.

en: Distinction XXVI, c. 2.

la: Cap. 8. n. 39, ubi etiam seq. locus, parum superius, et tertius, parum inferius.

en: Chapter 8, n. 39, where also the following passage is found, a little above, and the third, a little below.

la: Tract. I. n. 3. in Ioan. 1, 3. — Mox verbum *Supra* refertur ad d. XXXIV. c. 4.

en: Tractate I, n. 3, on John 1, 3. — The word *Above* presently refers to Distinction XXXIV, c. 4.

la: Quaest. 6. — Immediate ante pro *quod* Vat. cum aliis edd. *qui*, refragantibus omnibus codd. et ed. 1.

en: Question 6. — Immediately before, for *quod* the Vatican edition with other editions reads *qui*, against all the codices and edition 1.

la: Cap. 27. (est liber Gennadii). Seq. locus est de Fine contra Manichaeos, c. 8. — Pro *quid sit peccare* Vat. cum ceteris edd., exceptis 1, 8, *quid sit peccatum.*

en: Chapter 27 (it is a book of Gennadius). The following passage is from On the End, against the Manichees, c. 8. — For *what it is to sin* the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1 and 8, reads *what sin is.*

la: Respicitur Matth. 7, 17.

en: Reference is made to Matthew 7, 17.

la: Quaest. 21, et seq. locus q. 24.

en: Question 21, and the following passage Question 24.

en: Chapter 32, n. 35.

la: Cap. 13. n. 4. Vide supra pag. 801, nota 2.

en: Chapter 13, n. 4. See above, page 801, note 2.

la: Codd. B C E *quia.*

en: Codices B, C, E read *quia.*

la: Ita cod. D, ceteri codd. et plures edd. *sunt;* immediate ante post *quod* cod. B addit *ideo.*

en: Thus codex D; the other codices and several editions read *sunt;* immediately before, after *quod,* codex B adds *ideo.*

la: Edd. 1, 8 praefigunt *aliquid.* In fine seq. propositionis Vat. ubiusque edd., exceptis 1, 2, 8, addunt *scil. peccatum est dictum* etc., ut est in principio distinctionis.

en: Editions 1, 8 prefix *aliquid.* At the end of the following sentence the Vatican edition, in both places, except editions 1, 2, 8, adds *namely, sin is something said* etc., as it is at the beginning of the distinction.

la: Ibi c. 2, et d. XXXIV. c. 4.

en: There, c. 2, and Distinction XXXIV, c. 4.

la: Dist. XXXIV. c. 4.

en: Distinction XXXIV, c. 4.

la: Cap. 20, n. 22. Vat. ceteraeque edd. in textu falso habent *de Natura boni;* sed in cod. Erf. verus operis titulus indicatur, unde ipsum in textum recepimus.

en: Chapter 20, n. 22. The Vatican edition and the other editions wrongly have in the text *On the Nature of the Good;* but in the Erfurt codex the true title of the work is indicated, whence we have received it into the text.

la: Luc. 10, 30; cfr. Ambros. et Beda in hunc locum, et August., II. Quaestion. evangelio. q. 19. — Paulo inferius post *diaboli* edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 *trahitur* pro *traditur.*

en: Luke 10, 30; cf. Ambrose and Bede on this passage, and Augustine, Questions on the Gospels II, q. 19. — A little below, after *of the devil,* editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 read *is drawn* for *is handed over.*

la: Quaest. 20, et seq. locus ibid. q. 23.

en: Question 20, and the following passage in the same place, q. 23. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 818–820 = PDF 840–842, offset `pdf = printed + 22`) authoritative wherever the two-column IA djvu OCR (raw 56986–57163) was cascade-fragmented, reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXXV (*Quid sit peccatum* / *De peccato* — what sin is, the definitions of Augustine and Ambrose, and the dialectic on whether an evil act, insofar as it is sin, is a corruption or privation of good), Cap. I–VI. The littera opens with the `DISTINCTIO XXXV.` header on the lower L-band of p.818 (raw 56986), immediately below where `d34-dubia` closed (DUB. III/IV at the top of p.818 L-col + R-col), and closes at the bottom of p.820 R-col with "…alterum diaboli vel hominis, id est culpa.", immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.` (raw ~57159) / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` (raw 57164), which is the `d35-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (6), order verified at 450 dpi.** Cap. I *Quid sit peccatum*; Cap. II *De peccato*; Cap. III *Utrum malus actus, in quantum peccatum est, sit corruptio vel privatio boni*; Cap. IV *Quomodo peccatum possit corrumpere bonum, cum nihil sit*; Cap. V *Qualiter homo se elongat a Deo*; Cap. VI *An poena sit privatio boni*. All six present and in printed reading order (L-column-then-R-column per page). Cap. III is long and runs across the p.819/p.820 page break; a continuation `#### Chapter III (continued).` heading marks the resumption in the English (printed text has no such heading — it is editorial here only, mirroring the page break). The editorial margin labels (*Sententia Magistri*, *Sententia probabilis*, *Probatio 1/2/3*, *Corollarium*, *Epilogus*, *Oppositio 1/2/3*, *Resp.*, *Dubium 1–6*, *Quid sit peccatum secundum rem*, *Privatio etiam boni corporis*, *Quomodo corrumpatur anima*, *Quaestio*) are Quaracchi cross-reference marginalia, not Lombard's text, and are omitted per the Vol II littera convention (cf. `d32-littera`).

**Page-split map.** Reading order is Left column top→bottom, then Right column top→bottom, per printed page. **p.818:** the L-col and R-col TOP bands hold the tail of d.34 DUB. III + DUB. IV (*integrum bonum / omnino carens malo* + *Vae! his qui dicunt*) — these belong to the already-complete `d34-dubia` chunk, NOT this littera. The littera begins at the **lower** band of the p.818 L-col (DISTINCTIO XXXV header + Cap. I *Post haec videndum est, quid sit peccatum… Non consistente autem peccato, non*) and continues at the bottom of the R-col ("solum malitia, sed etiam virtus fortasse non esset… Ambrosius esse peccatum") + the whole of Cap. II ("Quocirca, diversitatis huius verborum occasione… Summum malum nullum modum"). **p.819:** L-col = Cap. II tail ("habet, caret enim omni bono… tanquam fructus mali") + Cap. III opener through "Octoginta trium Quaestionum: Deus boni tantummodo causa est… in quantum est, bonum est, quod divinam etiam pro-"); R-col = Cap. III continued ("videntiam vocamus… non credere in Deum, non ire ad ec-"). **p.820:** L-col = Cap. III tail ("clesiam et huiusmodi… privatio est vel corruptio boni") + Cap. IV opener ("Sed cum nihil sit… in libro de Natura et gratia"); R-col = Cap. IV tail ("…in quo possit corrumpi anima; in parabola… quanto magis se ab eo elongat") + Cap. V (*Qualiter homo se elongat a Deo*) + Cap. VI (*An poena sit privatio boni*, closing "…alterum diaboli vel hominis, id est culpa."). Body seams across page/column breaks all grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified): 818 L(littera)→R ("…Non consistente autem peccato, non ‖ solum malitia, sed etiam virtus"); 818 R→819 L (Cap. II "…Summum malum nullum modum ‖ habet, caret enim omni bono"); 819 L→R (Cap. III "…quod divinam etiam pro‖videntiam vocamus"); 819 R→820 L (Cap. III "…non ire ad ec‖clesiam et huiusmodi"); 820 L→R (Cap. IV "…in quo possit corrumpi ‖ anima; in parabola").

**Apparatus split map (19 printed footer entries → 18 sequential markers; footer numbering restarts per printed page).** **p.818** (5 footers, the R-col `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` block — the p.818 L-col footer band 1–4, *Vide supra pag. 664* / *Alex. Hal.* / *Isai. 5, 22 Vae!* / *De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom.*, belongs to d.34's DUB. III/IV in `d34-dubia`, not claimed here): f1→[^1] (Libr. XXII contra Faustum Manich. c.27) at Cap. I *ut ait Augustinus*; f2→[^2] (Dist. XXVI c.2) at *in superioribus*; f3→[^3] (Cap. 8 n.39) at Ambrosius *de Paradiso*; f4→[^4] (Tract. I n.3 in Ioan.) at Cap. II *super Ioannem*; f5→[^5] (Quaest. 6) at *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*. **p.819** (8 footers): f1→[^6] (Cap. 27, liber Gennadii) at *Dogmatibus ecclesiasticis*; f2→[^7] (Matth. 7,17) at *fructus mali*; f3→[^8] (Quaest. 21/24) at Cap. III *Octoginta trium Quaestionum: Deus boni tantummodo*; f4→[^9] (Cap. 32 n.35) at *de Doctrina christiana*; **f5 (Quaest. 3, on the *Vitium est voluntatis* Octoginta-trium citation) has no distinct printed superscript — the print folds it into the body without a clean inline anchor, so it is the one footer not given a sequential marker**; f6→[^10] (Enchirid. c.13 n.4) at *in Enchiridio*; f7→[^11] (Codd. BCE *quia*) at *quae, in quantum sunt, naturae sunt*; f8→[^12] (Ita cod. D… *sunt*; cod. B addit *ideo*) at *a Deo sint*. **p.820** (6 footers): f1→[^13] (Edd. 1,8 *aliquid*) at *declinatio a bono quod est*; f2→[^14] (Ibi c.2 et d.XXXIV c.4) at *quam supra posuit Augustinus*; f3→[^15] (Dist. XXXIV c.4) at *ut supra Augustinus ait*; f4→[^16] (Cap. 20 n.22, de Natura et gratia / *de Natura boni* title note) at Cap. IV *de Natura et gratia*; f5→[^17] (Luc. 10,30) at *in parabola*; f6→[^18] (Quaest. 20/23) at Cap. V *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*. Total = 5 + 8 + 6 = 19 printed footers, covered by 18 sequential markers ([^1]–[^18]).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: nothing — DISTINCTIO XXXV opens fresh on the lower band of p.818 with its own R-col `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM` footer block; `d34-dubia` forwarded nothing (the p.818 L-col footer band 1–4 belongs to d.34's DUB. III/IV, claimed there). FORWARDED: nothing to `d35-divisio` — the littera closes cleanly at the bottom of p.820 R-col before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.` (raw ~57159); the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 57164) / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw 57188) and their footers all belong to `d35-divisio`.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. peccalum→peccatum, malltia→malitia, virlus→virtus, conslsleret→consisteret, inobedienlla→inobedientia, dilTitetur→diffitetur, Doclrina→Doctrina, ratiocinatioiiis→ratiocinationis, exspoliatur retained, obtenebrantur retained, incommutabilis retained). The OCR running-head digits (819/820/821) are clean; offset pdf=printed+22 confirmed against running-head text. Margin label *Dubium 5/6* etc. are editorial cross-references to the COMMENTARIUS dubia, omitted.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 35, Divisio Textus

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 821 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV.

### *De peccato actuali secundum eius quidditatem et definitionem.*

*Post haec videndum est, quid sit peccatum* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de peccati causalitate et origine; hic agit de peccati quidditate et definitione. Dividitur autem pars ista in tres partes. In quarum prima inquirit Magister, quid sit peccatum, utrum videlicet sit actus, vel privatio pura. In secunda, dato quod aliquo modo sit actus, et aliquo modo sit privatio, inquirit, utrum peccatum sit peccati poena, infra distinctione trigesima sexta: *Sciendum tamen, quaedam sic esse peccata.* In tertia vero inquirit, utrum actio substrata[^1] sit a Deo tanquam a causa, infra distinctione trigesima septima: *Sunt tamen et alii* etc.

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, dividitur in partes tres. In prima ponit Magister peccati notificationes. In secunda vero ex ipsis notificationibus inquirendo elicit, quid sit peccatum secundum rem. In tertia vero dissolvit rationes sive oppositiones, quae contrariae videntur veritati praedeterminatae. Primum facit ibi: *Post haec videndum, quid sit peccatum* etc. Secundum ibi: *Quocirca, diversitatis huius verborum* etc. Tertium ibi: *Quibus opponitur: si omnia quae sunt* etc.

Prima pars dividi posset in partes tres secundum tres notificationes peccati, sed ratione suae brevitatis remanet indivisa.

Secunda vero pars principalis dividitur in tres partes. In prima parte diversorum opiniones narrat. In secunda vero veritatem aperit et iuxta quorundam opinionem explanat, ibi: *Sane dici potest et libere* etc. In tertia vero auctoritatibus Sanctorum confirmat, ibi: *Quod autem voluntas omnis et actio* etc.

Similiter tertia pars principalis tres habet partes secundum tres dubitationes, quas movet, quarum prima sumta est ex hoc, quod dicebat illa positio, quod omnia quae sunt, bona sunt; secunda vero ex hoc, quod peccatum est corruptio boni; tertia vero sumta est ex hoc, quod corruptio boni est poena. Primam ponit ibi: *Quibus opponitur: si omnia, quae sunt* etc. Secundam ibi: *Potest etiam quaeri ab eisdem* etc. Tertiam ibi: *Quaeri autem solet, utrum* etc. Et in qualibet istarum partium primo opponit et secundo solvit.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, in qua inquiritur, quid sit peccatum, cum peccatum sit privatio magis quam positio, est hic quaestio de corruptione boni, quae habet fieri per peccatum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum bonum habeat per peccatum corrumpi.

Secundo vero quaeritur de modo corrumpendi.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum a peccato sit boni corruptio.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum peccatum, in quantum corrumpit[^2], contrarietur bono increato.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXV.

### *On actual sin according to its quiddity and definition.*

*After these matters it must be seen what sin is* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master treated of the causality and origin of sin; here he treats of the quiddity and definition of sin. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master inquires what sin is, namely whether it is an act, or pure privation. In the second, granted that in some way it is an act, and in some way a privation, he inquires whether sin is the penalty of sin, below in the thirty-sixth distinction: *It must nevertheless be known that certain things are sins in this way.* In the third he inquires whether the underlying action[^1] is from God as from a cause, below in the thirty-seventh distinction: *There are nevertheless also others* etc.

The first part, which contains the present distinction, is divided into three parts. In the first the Master sets forth the notifications of sin. In the second he draws out, by inquiring from those very notifications, what sin is according to the thing itself. In the third he resolves the reasons or objections which seem contrary to the truth already determined. The first he does there: *After these matters it must be seen what sin is* etc. The second there: *Wherefore, of the diversity of these words* etc. The third there: *To which it is objected: if all the things that are* etc.

The first part could be divided into three parts according to the three notifications of sin, but by reason of its brevity it remains undivided.

But the second principal part is divided into three parts. In the first part he narrates the opinions of various persons. In the second he opens up the truth and explains it according to the opinion of certain persons, there: *It can soundly and freely be said* etc. In the third he confirms it by the authorities of the Saints, there: *But that every will and action* etc.

Likewise the third principal part has three parts according to the three doubts which he raises, of which the first is taken from this, that that position said that all things which are, are good; the second from this, that sin is the corruption of good; the third is taken from this, that the corruption of good is a penalty. The first he sets forth there: *To which it is objected: if all the things that are* etc. The second there: *It can also be asked of the same persons* etc. The third there: *But it is wont to be asked, whether* etc. And in each of these parts he first objects and secondly resolves.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, in which it is inquired what sin is, since sin is a privation rather than a position, there is here a question concerning the corruption of good, which has to come about through sin. And concerning this, two things are asked.

First it is asked whether good has to be corrupted through sin.

Secondly it is asked concerning the mode of corrupting.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked whether from sin there is a corruption of good.

Secondly it is asked whether sin is the corruption-passion itself.

Thirdly it is asked whether sin, insofar as it corrupts[^2], is contrary to the uncreated good.

---

la: Vat. hic addit *in qua peccatum committitur*, et dein post *causa* subiungit *prima*.

en: The Vatican edition here adds *in qua peccatum committitur* ("in which sin is committed"), and then after *causa* subjoins *prima* ("first").

la: Edd. 3, 4 et Vat. addunt *bonum*.

en: Editions 3 and 4 and the Vatican edition add *bonum* ("good"). ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 57159–57197) cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed p.821 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p821-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Single printed page (821 = pdf 843, offset +22). Running head confirmed as `DIST. XXXV. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 821`.
- **Content captured:** COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXV opener + title (*De peccato actuali secundum eius quidditatem et definitionem*) + lemma, full DIVISIO TEXTUS (both columns reflowed L→R), full TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (the article-level "quaeruntur duo" listing + art. I's "circa primum quaeruntur tria" three-question sub-listing).
- **Page-split / boundary:** Chunk ends immediately before `ARTICULUS I.` / `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 57198/57202); those headers and the body beginning *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum aliquod bonum habeat corrumpere* belong to d35-a1-q1.
- **Apparatus page-split map (p.821 footers):** Footers **1** and **2** anchor in THIS divisio chunk — footer 1 at *actio substrata¹* in the DIVISIO TEXTUS (Vat. adds *in qua peccatum committitur*); footer 2 at *corrumpit²* in the TRACTATIO's third question (Edd. 3, 4 + Vat. add *bonum*). **Footer 3** (`Cap. 11, n. 3 — Testimonium subnexum ... habentur ibid. c. 12. n. 4. — In secundo testimonio pro minui malum edd. et plures codd. minus malum`) does NOT anchor here — it anchors at *1. Augustinus in Enchiridio³* in the a1-q1 body. **FORWARDS to d35-a1-q1 as that chunk's first apparatus entry** (along with the prior a1-q1 footers: Vat. *in qua peccatum committitur* additions etc. are NOT a1-q1's — see footer 1 above; a1-q1's footers begin at the Enchiridion note 3).
- **OCR corrections:** `deflnitione`→*definitione*, `notiflcationes`→*notificationes*, `corruptio-passio` kept hyphenated per Quaracchi, `secim-dum`→*secundum*, `parle`→*parte*, `ti^es`→*tres*, `priraa`→*prima*, `clicebat`→*dicebat*, `boc`→*hoc*, `cori'uptione`→*corruptione*, `fleri`→*fieri*, `peccalnm`→*peccatum*, `quld`→*quid*. Footnote markers `'` and `^` in OCR confirmed as superscripts ¹ and ² against the 450dpi PDF.
- No scholion (divisio chunk). No `[?]` flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether from sin there is a corruption of the good

source_text:
<!-- page 821 -->

### ARTICULUS I.
### *Utrum bonum per peccatum corrumpatur.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum peccatum sit boni corruptio.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum aliquod bonum habeat corrumpere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^1]: « Quid est aliud, quod dicitur malum, nisi privatio boni »? « Bonum enim minui malum est ». Cum ergo culpa commit-

<!-- page 822 -->

titur, necessario ibi aliquod bonum privatur; sed non est dare, quod privetur per aliud quam per culpam: ergo necesse est ponere, quod peccatum habeat bonum privare et privando corrumpere. Et hoc Augustinus insinuat expressius paulo post, cum subiungit: « Ideo malum corruptio est naturae, quia eam qualicumque privat bono ».

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostendit Augustinus[^2] tali ratione: « Quod nullo bono privat non nocet », ergo quod nocet aliquo bono privat; sed malum nocet, hoc manifestum est: ergo aliquod bonum adimit et aliquo bono privat; sed quod privat et adimit bonum, illud corrumpit: ergo etc.

3. Item, sicut se habent vitia corporum ad corpora, sic vitia animarum ad animas; sed vitia corporum laedunt et aliquo modo corrumpunt corpora: ergo vitia animarum aliquid corrumpunt circa ipsam animam[^3]; talia autem vitia sunt peccata: ergo etc.

4. Item, quando quis peccat, aut perdit aliquid boni, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo ita bonus est post, sicut ante: ergo ita bonus est qui peccat, sicut ille qui non peccat: ergo ita debet placere Deo unus, sicut alter; quod est manifeste falsum. Restat igitur, quod aliquid boni perdit. Sed illud bonum, quod perditur[^4], corrumpitur: ergo est alicuius boni corruptivum.

**Sed contra** hoc arguitur sic:

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini[^5], qui dicit, quod « peccatum est corruptio modi, speciei et ordinis »; sed corruptionis non est corrumpere — nam si corruptio corrumperet, pari ratione et alia corruptio, et sic in infinitum; et iterum, actionis non est agere — ergo videtur, quod si peccatum est corruptio, quod eius non sit corrumpere.

2. Item, si peccatum corrumpit — aut ratione boni substrati, aut ratione defectus. Ratione boni substrati non, quia, cum corrumpere bonum sit malum, bonum, in quantum bonum, esset causa mali; quod est[^6] falsum. Si ratione defectus; sed contra: corrumpere est agere; nullus defectus est principium actionis: ergo peccatum ratione defectus non corrumpit.

3. Item, si corrumpit, aut ergo corrumpit peccantem, aut alium. Alium non; constat, quia multa sunt peccata, quae non fiunt in alium. Si corrumpit peccantem; sed contra: nihil corrumpit se ipsum; et nihil secundum idem natum est esse agens et patiens[^7]; et iterum, nullum malum poenae corrumpit punientem: ergo videtur, quod malum culpae non corrumpit peccantem nec aliquem alium: ergo etc.

4. Item, si corrumpit, aut ex parte carnis, aut ex parte animae. Ex parte carnis, non, quia multa sunt peccata, quae conferunt ad regimen sanitatis corporalis et ad oblectationem carnis. Si ex parte animae; sed contra: anima est immortalis[^8], ergo in ea nulla cadit corruptio; nam si corruptio caderet, impossibile esset, ipsam esse perpetuam.

5. Item, si corrumpit, aut corrumpit quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad potentias, aut quantum ad actum. Quantum ad substantiam, non; hoc constat. Quantum ad potentias, non, ut videtur, quia potentiae sunt incorruptibiles, sicut et substantia[^9]; praeterea, nec intenduntur nec remittuntur, nec habet quis minorem potentiam voluntatis post culpam quam ante culpam. Quantum ad actum, non, ut videtur, quia peccatum substernit sibi actum et supponit; et nihil corrumpit illud, sine quo esse non potest et per quod egreditur in esse: ergo peccatum non corrumpit quantum ad actum nec quantum ad potentiam, ut visum est: ergo etc.

6. Item, si peccatum corrumpit aliquod bonum, aut ergo corrumpit bonum naturae, aut bonum gratiae. Non bonum naturae, quia ei non opponitur, et ut vult Dionysius[^10], « nihil existentium corrumpitur in eo quod est essentia vel natura ». Si igitur corrumpit bonum gratiae: ergo nullus potest peccare nisi habens gratiam, quia bonum non corrumpitur nisi in eo in quo est. Sed hoc est falsum, quia peccatores peccare possunt: ergo etc.

Est igitur quaestio, quod bonum est illud quod habet in nobis peccatum corrumpere?

### Conclusio.

> Malum culpae bonum corrumpit, non auferendo vel diminuendo potentiam, sed tollendo habitum rectitudinis et diminuendo habilitatem mediam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut Augustinus in pluribus locis[^11] dicit, peccatum corrumpit et aliquo bono privat. Cum enim per peccatum fiat animae deformatio et obscuratio, nec possit intelligi, aliquid deformari vel obscurari sine amissione alicuius luminis et pulcritudinis; necesse est intelligi, per peccatum aliquod in nobis bonum corrumpi.

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Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod peccatum non est qualiscumque privatio nec cuiuscumque boni nec in quacumque creatura reperta, sed peccatum sive culpa privatio est iustitiae. « Iustitia autem, ut dicit Anselmus[^12], est rectitudo voluntatis ». Voluntas autem est in sola rationali creatura, ac per hoc et iustitia; et sicut iustitia est voluntatis rectitudo, sic culpa, quae est iniustitia, est voluntatis obliquatio. Sicut igitur per obliquationem fit declinatio a rectitudine et quaedam rectitudinis exterminatio, sic in culpae commissione fit in anima quaedam rectitudinis ademptio sive corruptio. — Et est attendendum, quod cum ad rectitudinem voluntatis tria concurrunt, videlicet ipsa potentia rectificabilis et ipse habitus rectitudinis et ipsa habilitas media; peccatum non corrumpit ipsam potentiam, secundum quod potentia est, nec simpliciter nec secundum quid; ipsum vero habitum rectitudinis simpliciter tollit; ipsam vero habilitatem mediam quodam modo corrumpit et quodam modo relinquit. Ergo potentiam nec diminuit nec aufert, iustitiam simpliciter tollit, habilitatem vero mediam diminuit, dum homo per peccatum minus et minus redditur ad rectitudinem iustitiae habilis, secundum quod linea, quae magis et magis curvatur, minus est habilis ad dispositionem rectitudinis[^13]. — Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt, quod malum culpae habet bonum corrumpere.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod privationis non est privare, nec corruptionis corrumpere; dicendum, quod quamvis actus non habeat generare alium actum, tamen habitus habet generari ex actibus[^14]; et ideo malum culpae, prout est corruptio et deordinatio existens in actu, potest esse causa deordinationis voluntatis secundum habitum. Et ideo peccatum sive malum culpae dicitur corrumpere, quia actus inordinatus voluntatem reddit inhabilem; nec significatur ex hoc, quod actio sit ex actione, sed quod deordinatio in habitu sit ex deordinatione in actu.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum malum corrumpat ratione boni substrati, vel ratione defectus; dicendum, quod corrumpere duo dicit, videlicet agere et deficere; nam corruptio est actio cum defectu. Dico igitur, quod malum culpae habet corrumpere, ita quod ratione boni substrati est ratio agendi, ratione vero defectus est ratio deficiendi. Et istud patet: voluntas enim, dum peccat, corrumpit se, quia, dum se ipsam movet deordinate, reddit se inordinatam et ad bonum minus habilem; nec potest se deordinare nisi volendo et se ipsam movendo. Et quod dico se movere, dico aliquod bonum substratum; quod autem dico inordinatum, dico defectum. Et huius satis congruum exemplum ponit Augustinus, et Magister recitat in littera[^15], quod malitia corrumpit, sicut corrumpit abstinentia. Ad corruptionem autem abstinentiae et concurrit vis naturalis consumtiva et defectus alimenti, et ita actio cum defectu. Similiter in proposito est intelligendum.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: aut peccans corrumpit se, aut alterum; dicendum, quod corrumpit se. Quod vero subiungit, quod nihil corrumpit se ipsum; dicendum, quod verum est, si agat secundum operationem naturae suae debitam; culpa autem non fit secundum ordinem naturae, sed praeter naturam. Et si obiiciat, quod nihil est agens et patiens secundum idem; dicendum, quod istud falsum est in his potentiis, quae possunt super se ipsas reflecti. Nam, sicut dicit Anselmus[^16], « voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens »; et cum deordinate se ipsam movet, se laedit et sibi ipsi nocumentum infert, pro eo quod vel recto ordine se privat, vel a recto ordine se elongat.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, aut peccatum corrumpit ratione carnis, aut animae; dicendum, quod principaliter ratione animae. Nam etsi peccatum aliquod corrumpat ratione carnis, hoc accidit, sicut superfluitas coitus vel cibi et potus nocet corpori. In anima autem peccatum semper aliquam corruptionem facit non secundum substantiam, secundum quam est immortalis et incorruptibilis, sed secundum rectitudinem et habilitatem ad ipsam, secundum quam anima est variabilis et vix in eodem statu permanet[^17], sicut patet per experientiam, quamdiu sumus in hac miseria.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum corrumpat quantum ad substantiam, aut quantum ad potentiam, aut quantum ad actum; dicendum, quod malum culpae corrumpit quantum ad actum, non simpliciter, sed in quantum actus ille est ordinabilis in finem; non enim culpa privat ipsum actum, sed privat ordinem actus in finem. Et per hunc etiam modum dico, quod non corrumpit potentiam, sed habilitatem sive ordinabilitatem, per quam ordinatur ad suum complementum. Obiectio autem illa currit, ac si diminueret potentias sub ratione potentiae, et actum sub ratione actus; et ideo patet illud.

6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum corrumpat bonum gratiae, vel naturae; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo et generaliter, malum culpae est privatio habilitatis mediae inter bonum naturae et bonum gratiae, quae quodam modo tenet medium inter

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bonum gratiae et bonum naturae. Et ratione eius quod ad bonum gratiae ordinat, attenditur penes ipsam bonum et malum moris; ratione vero eius quod naturalis est, non tantum habet esse in iustis, sed etiam in peccatoribus; et ideo peccatum, sive fiat ab aliquo, qui habet iustitiam, sive fiat a peccatore, semper invenit aliquid, quod privet et corrumpat.

english:
### ARTICLE I.
### *Whether the good is corrupted through sin.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether sin is a corruption of the good.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin has the power to corrupt some good. And that it does, it seems.

1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^1]: « What else is that which is called evil, except the privation of good »? « For to lessen the good is evil ». Since therefore guilt is commit-

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ted, necessarily there some good is deprived; but it cannot be granted that it be deprived by anything other than by guilt: therefore it is necessary to posit that sin has [the power] to deprive the good and by depriving to corrupt it. And this Augustine intimates more expressly a little afterward, when he subjoins: « Therefore evil is a corruption of nature, because it deprives it of good in whatever way ».

2. Likewise, this same thing Augustine shows[^2] by such a reasoning: « That which deprives of no good does no harm », therefore that which harms deprives of some good; but evil harms, this is manifest: therefore it takes away some good and deprives of some good; but that which deprives and takes away good, that corrupts: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, as the vices of bodies stand to bodies, so the vices of souls to souls; but the vices of bodies injure and in some manner corrupt bodies: therefore the vices of souls corrupt something about the soul itself[^3]; but such vices are sins: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when someone sins, either he loses something of good, or nothing. If nothing: therefore he is as good afterward as before: therefore he who sins is as good as he who does not sin: therefore one ought to please God as much as the other; which is manifestly false. It remains therefore that he loses something of good. But that good which is lost[^4], is corrupted: therefore it is corruptive of some good.

**On the contrary** it is argued thus:

*To the opposite.*

1. First, by the authority of Augustine[^5], who says that « sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order »; but it does not belong to a corruption to corrupt — for if a corruption corrupted, by parity of reasoning so would another corruption, and so to infinity; and again, it does not belong to an action to act — therefore it seems that, if sin is a corruption, it does not belong to it to corrupt.

2. Likewise, if sin corrupts — either by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect. By reason of the underlying good, no, because, since to corrupt the good is evil, the good, insofar as it is good, would be the cause of evil; which is[^6] false. If by reason of the defect; but on the contrary: to corrupt is to act; no defect is a principle of action: therefore sin does not corrupt by reason of the defect.

3. Likewise, if it corrupts, then either it corrupts the one sinning, or another. Another, no; this is established, because there are many sins which are not committed against another. If it corrupts the one sinning; but on the contrary: nothing corrupts itself; and nothing is by nature apt to be agent and patient with respect to the same [thing][^7]; and again, no evil of punishment corrupts the one punishing: therefore it seems that the evil of guilt corrupts neither the one sinning nor any other: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if it corrupts, [it does so] either on the part of the flesh, or on the part of the soul. On the part of the flesh, no, because there are many sins which contribute to the regimen of bodily health and to the delight of the flesh. If on the part of the soul; but on the contrary: the soul is immortal[^8], therefore in it no corruption falls; for if corruption did fall, it would be impossible for it to be perpetual.

5. Likewise, if it corrupts, either it corrupts as to substance, or as to the powers, or as to the act. As to substance, no; this is established. As to the powers, no, as it seems, because the powers are incorruptible, like also the substance[^9]; furthermore, they are neither intensified nor remitted, nor does anyone have a lesser power of will after guilt than before guilt. As to the act, no, as it seems, because sin lays the act under itself and presupposes it; and nothing corrupts that without which it cannot be and through which it goes forth into being: therefore sin does not corrupt as to the act nor as to the power, as has been seen: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if sin corrupts some good, then either it corrupts the good of nature, or the good of grace. Not the good of nature, because it is not opposed to it, and as Dionysius holds[^10], « nothing of existing things is corrupted in that which is essence or nature ». If therefore it corrupts the good of grace: therefore no one can sin except one having grace, because good is not corrupted except in that in which it is. But this is false, because sinners can sin: therefore etc.

The question therefore is, what is that good which sin has [the power] to corrupt in us?

### Conclusion.

> The evil of guilt corrupts the good, not by taking away or diminishing the power, but by removing the habit of rectitude and diminishing the intermediate aptitude.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, as Augustine in many places[^11] says, sin corrupts and deprives of some good. For since through sin there comes about a deformation and darkening of the soul, nor can it be understood that anything is deformed or darkened without the loss of some light and beauty; it is necessary to understand that through sin some good in us is corrupted.

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For the understanding of which it is to be noted that sin is not just any privation, nor of just any good, nor found in just any creature, but sin or guilt is the privation of justice. « But justice, as Anselm says[^12], is the rectitude of the will ». But the will is in the rational creature alone, and through this also justice; and just as justice is the rectitude of the will, so guilt, which is injustice, is the bending-aside of the will. Just as therefore through the bending-aside there comes about a turning-away from rectitude and a certain destruction of rectitude, so in the commission of guilt there comes about in the soul a certain removal or corruption of rectitude. — And it is to be attended to that, since for the rectitude of the will three [things] concur, namely the rectifiable power itself and the habit of rectitude itself and the intermediate aptitude itself; sin does not corrupt the power itself, insofar as it is a power, neither simply nor in a qualified way; but the habit of rectitude itself it simply removes; the intermediate aptitude itself it in some manner corrupts and in some manner leaves. Therefore it neither diminishes nor takes away the power, it simply removes justice, but it diminishes the intermediate aptitude, while a human through sin is rendered less and less apt for the rectitude of justice, according as a line which is more and more curved is less apt for the disposition of rectitude[^13]. — It is to be granted therefore, as the reasons show, that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt the good.

1. To that indeed which is objected, that it does not belong to a privation to deprive, nor to a corruption to corrupt; it must be said that, although an act does not have [the power] to generate another act, yet a habit has [the power] to be generated from acts[^14]; and therefore the evil of guilt, insofar as it is a corruption and disorder existing in the act, can be the cause of the disorder of the will as to the habit. And therefore sin or the evil of guilt is said to corrupt, because the inordinate act renders the will unapt; nor is it signified by this that an action is from an action, but that the disorder in the habit is from the disorder in the act.

2. To that which is asked, whether evil corrupts by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect; it must be said that to corrupt states two [things], namely to act and to fail; for corruption is an action with a defect. I say therefore that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt, such that by reason of the underlying good there is the ground of acting, but by reason of the defect there is the ground of failing. And this is plain: for the will, while it sins, corrupts itself, because, while it moves itself inordinately, it renders itself disordered and less apt for the good; nor can it disorder itself except by willing and by moving itself. And when I say it moves itself, I state some underlying good; but when I say inordinate, I state a defect. And of this Augustine puts a sufficiently fitting example, and the Master recites it in the text[^15], that malice corrupts, just as abstinence corrupts. For toward the corruption of abstinence there concur both the natural consuming force and the defect of nourishment, and thus action with a defect. Similarly it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is asked: whether the one sinning corrupts himself, or another; it must be said that he corrupts himself. But as to what is subjoined, that nothing corrupts itself; it must be said that it is true, if it acts according to the operation due to its nature; but guilt does not come about according to the order of nature, but beside nature. And if one objects that nothing is agent and patient with respect to the same; it must be said that that is false in those powers which can reflect upon themselves. For, as Anselm says[^16], « the will is an instrument moving itself »; and when it moves itself inordinately, it injures itself and inflicts harm upon itself, for the reason that either it deprives itself of right order, or it withdraws itself from right order.

4. To that which is asked, whether sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, or of the soul; it must be said that [it does so] principally by reason of the soul. For even if some sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, this happens just as the superfluity of intercourse or of food and drink harms the body. But in the soul sin always makes some corruption, not as to substance, according to which it is immortal and incorruptible, but as to rectitude and the aptitude toward it, according to which the soul is changeable and scarcely remains in the same state[^17], as is plain by experience, as long as we are in this misery.

5. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts as to substance, or as to power, or as to act; it must be said that the evil of guilt corrupts as to the act, not simply, but insofar as that act is orderable to the end; for guilt does not deprive [it of] the act itself, but deprives [it of] the order of the act to the end. And in this same way I say that it does not corrupt the power, but the aptitude or orderability through which it is ordered to its completion. But that objection runs as if it diminished the powers under the character of power, and the act under the character of act; and therefore that [point] is plain.

6. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts the good of grace, or of nature; it must be said that, speaking properly and generally, the evil of guilt is the privation of the intermediate aptitude between the good of nature and the good of grace, which in some manner holds the middle between

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the good of grace and the good of nature. And by reason of that whereby it orders toward the good of grace, the moral good and evil are reckoned with respect to it; but by reason of that whereby it is natural, it has being not only in the just, but also in sinners; and therefore sin, whether it be done by someone who has justice, or be done by a sinner, always finds something which it deprives and corrupts.

la: Cap. 11. n. 3. — Testimonium subnexum sicut et illud quod in fine arg. allegatur, habentur ibid. c. 12. n. 4. — In secundo testimonio pro *minui malum* edd. et plures codd. *minus malum*.

en: Chapter 11, n. 3. — The testimony subjoined, as also that which is adduced at the end of the argument, are found in the same place c. 12. n. 4. — In the second testimony, for *minui malum* ("to lessen the good is evil") the editions and several codices [read] *minus malum* ("less evil").

la: Enchirid. c. 12. n. 4; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3; II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5. — In omnibus fere Augustini scriptis contra Manichaeos testimonia, quae hic in 1. et 2. fundam. memorantur, tanquam argumenta principalia ad refutandos istos sectarios recurrunt. — Codd. H K Y *nullo modo* substituunt pro *nullo bono*.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 12. n. 4; XII. *On the City of God*, c. 3; II. *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 3. n. 5. — In almost all of Augustine's writings against the Manichees the testimonies which here in the 1st and 2nd fundamentals are mentioned recur as principal arguments for refuting those sectaries. — Codd. H K Y substitute *nullo modo* ("in no way") for *nullo bono* ("of no good").

la: Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 11. n. 3, cuius verba supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 4. allata sunt.

en: Cfr. Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 11. n. 3, whose words were adduced above in the text of the Master, d. XXXIV. c. 4.

la: Edd., excepta 1, et pauci codd., inter quos est cod. ee, *perdit*.

en: The editions, except 1, and a few codices, among which is cod. ee, [read] *perdit* ("loses").

la: De Natura boni, c. 4. Cfr. 83 Qq. q. 6. — De seq. propos. vide supra pag. 33, nota 6, et Damasc., Dialog. contra Manichaeos, n. 61. Principium illud: *actionis non est agere*, innititur in axiomate: *actiones sunt suppositorum*.

en: *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4. Cfr. *83 Questions* q. 6. — On the following proposition see above p. 33, note 6, and Damascene, *Dialogue against the Manichees*, n. 61. That principle, *it does not belong to an action to act*, rests upon the axiom: *actions belong to supposits*.

la: Multi codd., ut F I K L O R S V W ee, cum ed. 2 *esset*.

en: Many codices, such as F I K L O R S V W ee, with ed. 2, [read] *esset*.

la: De prima parte huius propos. cfr. supra pag. 640, nota 4; de secunda supra pag. 347, nota 7.

en: On the first part of this proposition cfr. above p. 640, note 4; on the second, above p. 347, note 7.

la: Ut probatum est supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro *in ea* edd., excepta 2, *in eam*, quae verba Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 deinde post *nam si corruptio* iterum ponit.

en: As was proved above d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Thereupon for *in ea* the editions, except 2, [read] *in eam*, which words the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 then places again after *nam si corruptio*.

la: De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 813, nota 4.

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 4. § 23. See above p. 813, note 4.

la: Vide hic nota 1. et supra pag. 688, nota 2.

en: See here note 1 and above p. 688, note 2.

la: Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3. et 13. Cfr. de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3, ubi etiam quae sequuntur, insinuantur; et Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12.

en: *Dialogue on Free Choice* c. 3. and 13. Cfr. *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* c. 3, where also the things which follow are intimated; and *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 12.

la: Cfr. hic a. 2. q. 3, et supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cfr. here a. 2. q. 3, and above d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. in the body.

la: Verba Aristot. vide supra pag. 633, nota 6. — Aliquanto inferius pro *quia actus* cod. W *in quantum actus*, plures codd., ut B P V, omittunt *quia*, pro quo codd. C F *et*. Subinde pro *significatur* codd. C R S T et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *significat* (propter abbreviationem verbi in aliquibus codd. potest etiam legi « Hic *significat* », c. 4.). Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *sequitur*.

en: The words of Aristotle: see above p. 633, note 6. — Somewhat below, for *quia actus* cod. W [reads] *in quantum actus*; several codices, such as B P V, omit *quia*, in place of which codd. C F [have] *et*. Thereupon for *significatur* codd. C R S T and others, with edd. 1, 2, [read] *significat* (on account of the abbreviation of the verb in some codices it can also be read « Hic *significat* », c. 4.). The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, [reads] *sequitur*.

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here c. 4.

la: De Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. — In fine solutionis pro *vel a recto* edd., excepta 1, *vel contrario*.

en: *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice* q. 3. c. 11. — At the end of the solution, for *vel a recto* ("or from right [order]") the editions, except 1, [read] *vel contrario* ("or contrary").

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tota hac distinctione veritas catholica de corruptione, quae oritur ex peccato, copiose et profunde explanatur; unde eliminantur duo extreme oppositi errores, error scilicet Pelagianorum, qui talem corruptionem, praecipue quoad peccatum originale, negabant, et error novatorum saeculi XVI. et XVII, qui eandem ita exaggerabant, ut bona naturae praestantiora peccato exstincta esse opinarentur. — Quid sit peccatum, vide hic dub. 1. 3. 6; et quod tria includat, infra d. 42. dub. I, et IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1. — Effectus autem peccati, qui afficiunt ipsum subiectum, sunt vel formales, ut « deformitas et macula », vel simpliciter effectivi, qui sunt « secundum reatum [poenae] et sequelam » (infra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.). De primis effectibus agitur in hac dist., de secundis in sequente. — Inter effectus, qui sunt extra subiectum, principalis est, quod obiective violatur lex et ordo Dei, et offenditur ipse Deus, de quo cfr. infra q. 3; III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 3, IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** In subiecto peccante tria considerari possunt: gratia supernaturalis, quae perficit naturam; natura, quae perficitur, et habilitas naturae ad ipsam gratiam. De effectu peccati quoad gratiam non est difficultas, cum constet, quod gratia sanctificans et habitus caritatis peccato mortali essentialiter opponuntur; unde peccator « a semetipso fugat gratiam divinam, et Deus dicitur auferre » (supra d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.); quod magis explicatur infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — Natura autem ipsa in se nullatenus corrumpitur, quia est subiectum peccati, non ipsi contrarium. — Tota igitur difficultas et quaestio est de tertio, sive de habilitate, « quae est ordo boni naturalis ad gratiam » (S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 14.), vel, ut dicit S. Bonav. (hic a. 2. q. 3.), « est idoneitas animae ad suscipiendam gratiam et ad cooperandum gratiae iam susceptae ». De hoc resolvit S. Bonav. cum aliis doctoribus, quod ipsa peccato corrumpitur non in toto, sed in parte, non secundum id quod est, sed secundum id ad quod est (infra a. 2. q. 3. et hic in corp. et ad 4. 5.). Haec et alia in quaest. 1. et 2. dicta ut facilius intelligantur, pauca praenotamus.

1. Cum voluntas se ipsam moveat, actus voluntarius non tantum est a voluntate, sed etiam in voluntate, quia non tantum est emissio actus, sed etiam eius receptio (S. Thom., de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. ad 4.). Hinc est, quod dum actus naturalis nihil causat in agente, econtra « ex actibus moralibus potest causari aliquid in agente, ut habitus et dispositio, vel etiam aliquid oppositum » (ibid.). Porro actus malus est a voluntate ut actio, in voluntate ut passio, unde corruptio ipsius actus est a voluntate ut corruptio-actio, in voluntate ut corruptio-passio. Corruptio enim, active sumta, « est actio cum defectu »; nec « culpa privat ipsum actum, sed privat ordinem actus in finem » (hic q. 1. ad 2. 5; cfr. S. Thom., hic a. 3.).

2. Corruptio-actio est in se et directe volita et libera, unde in ipsa primo et per se invenitur ratio culpae sive culpa actualis. Corruptio-passio ordinarie non est volita nisi indirecte, quod sufficit, ut suo modo participet rationem culpae. Utraque autem corruptio, scilicet ipsius actus et voluntatis, unum quid constituunt, sive « culpa est differens comparatione, una tamen per essentiam » (hic q. 2.).

3. Corruptio-actio est aliquid transiens; corruptio-passio potest, transacto actu, remanere in voluntate ut peccatum habituale, quod est tum prava eiusdem dispositio et vitiatio, tum culpa, scilicet « in ordine ad suam causam » (S. Thom., S. 1. II. q. 86. a. 1. ad 3. et a. 2.). Peccatum igitur habituale in se, formaliter loquendo, non est a voluntate, sed in voluntate ut corruptio-passio, quae tamen a voluntate trahit et originem et rationem culpae. — Culpam autem hanc recentiores theologi cum S. Augustino vocant reatum culpae, ut distinguatur a culpa actuali. Antiqui autem Scholastici utramque nomine culpae exprimebant, vocem autem reatus reservabant pro reatu poenae sive obligatione ad poenam sustinendam (cfr. infra d. 42. dub. I.).

4. Sicut in peccato est aversio et conversio, « sic in ipso habitu peccati est privatio habitus boni [rectitudinis supernaturalis et naturalis] et quaedam habilitatio ad actum peccati... et privatio [scilicet per actum culpabilem] habilitatis bonae est ipsum peccatum, formaliter loquendo; ipsa vero habilitatio sive pronitas ad actum peccati non est peccatum, nisi materialiter loquendo, pro eo quod non est culpa, nisi quamdiu manet ibi privatio » (supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.). Hinc facile intelligitur, quod cum corruptio-actio essentialiter et semper sit culpa, non poena; corruptio-passio in peccato habituali sub diversa comparatione habeat rationem tum culpae, tum poenae (infra d. 36. dub. 2. et a. 1. 2.).

5. Scot. (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 6. 7.) videtur docere, quod peccatum habituale consistat in ordinatione passiva ad poenam; tamen non eodem modo explicatur, ut videri potest ibi in scholio et in Commentario (ed. Waddingi). — Nominales autem negabant, peccatum actuale esse corruptionem alicuius boni, quod sit in voluntate, sed voluerunt, esse tantum corruptionem alicuius rectitudinis, quae inesse deberet actui vel, ut vult Occham, voluntati (cfr. Biel, hic q. unica). — Iam supra (d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in schol.) observatum est, verba macula et deformitas non in eodem sensu sumi a S. Bonav. et a S. Thoma.

**III.** De 1. et 2. huius articuli quaest. alii magistri sub diversis titulis et plerumque unica quaestione tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 95. m. 2. a. 3. § 5, q. 104. m. 8. a. 4. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 5. et d. 34. a. 5; S. 1. II. q. 85. a. 1; de Malo, q. 2. a. 11. — B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3; d. 34. q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., d. 34. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this whole distinction the catholic truth concerning the corruption which arises from sin is copiously and profoundly explained; whence two extremely opposed errors are eliminated, namely the error of the Pelagians, who denied such corruption, especially as to original sin, and the error of the innovators of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who so exaggerated it that they opined the more excellent goods of nature to be extinguished by sin. — What sin is, see here dub. 1. 3. 6; and that it includes three [things], below d. 42. dub. I, and IV. Sent. d. 18. p. I. dub. 1. — But the effects of sin which affect the subject itself are either formal, like « deformity and stain », or simply effective, which are « as to the liability [of punishment] and the consequence » (below d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. in the body). The first effects are treated in this distinction, the second in the following. — Among the effects which are outside the subject, the principal is that objectively the law and order of God is violated, and God himself is offended, concerning which cfr. below q. 3; III. Sent. d. 20. a. 1. q. 3, IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

**II.** In the sinning subject three [things] can be considered: supernatural grace, which perfects nature; nature, which is perfected; and the aptitude of nature toward that grace. Concerning the effect of sin as to grace there is no difficulty, since it is established that sanctifying grace and the habit of charity are essentially opposed to mortal sin; whence the sinner « of himself drives away the divine grace, and God is said to take it away » (above d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4.); which is more explained below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — But nature itself in itself is in no way corrupted, because it is the subject of sin, not contrary to it. — The whole difficulty therefore and question is about the third, that is, about the aptitude, « which is the order of the natural good toward grace » (St. Thomas, *de Malo*, q. 2. a. 11. ad 14.), or, as S. Bonaventure says (here a. 2. q. 3.), « is the suitability of the soul for receiving grace and for cooperating with grace already received ». Concerning this S. Bonaventure resolves with the other doctors that it is corrupted by sin not in whole, but in part, not according to that which it is, but according to that toward which it is (below a. 2. q. 3. and here in the body and ad 4. 5.). That these and other things said in questions 1 and 2 may be more easily understood, we set down a few things beforehand.

1. Since the will moves itself, the voluntary act is not only from the will, but also in the will, because it is not only the emission of the act, but also its reception (St. Thomas, *de Malo*, q. 2. a. 11. ad 4.). Hence it is that, while a natural act causes nothing in the agent, on the contrary « from moral acts something can be caused in the agent, such as a habit and disposition, or even something opposed » (ibid.). Further, the evil act is from the will as action, in the will as passion, whence the corruption of the act itself is from the will as corruption-action, in the will as corruption-passion. For corruption, taken actively, « is an action with a defect »; nor does « guilt deprive [it of] the act itself, but deprive [it of] the order of the act to the end » (here q. 1. ad 2. 5; cfr. St. Thomas, here a. 3.).

2. Corruption-action is in itself and directly willed and free, whence in it primarily and per se is found the character of guilt or actual guilt. Corruption-passion is ordinarily not willed except indirectly, which suffices that it participate in its own way in the character of guilt. But both corruptions, namely of the act itself and of the will, constitute some one [thing], that is « guilt is differing in comparison, yet one by essence » (here q. 2.).

3. Corruption-action is something transient; corruption-passion can, the act being past, remain in the will as habitual sin, which is both the depraved disposition and vitiation of the same, and guilt, namely « in relation to its cause » (St. Thomas, *Summa* 1. II. q. 86. a. 1. ad 3. and a. 2.). Habitual sin therefore in itself, speaking formally, is not from the will, but in the will as corruption-passion, which nevertheless from the will draws both its origin and the character of guilt. — But this guilt the more recent theologians, with St. Augustine, call the liability of guilt, that it may be distinguished from actual guilt. But the ancient Scholastics expressed both by the name of guilt, and reserved the word liability for the liability of punishment or the obligation to undergo punishment (cfr. below d. 42. dub. I.).

4. Just as in sin there is turning-away and turning-toward, « so in the very habit of sin there is the privation of the good habit [of supernatural and natural rectitude] and a certain aptitude toward the act of sin... and the privation [namely through a culpable act] of the good aptitude is sin itself, speaking formally; but the aptitude itself or proneness toward the act of sin is not sin, except materially speaking, for the reason that it is not guilt, except as long as the privation remains there » (above d. 32. a. 1. q. 1.). Hence it is easily understood that, since corruption-action is essentially and always guilt, not punishment; corruption-passion in habitual sin under a diverse comparison has the character both of guilt and of punishment (below d. 36. dub. 2. and a. 1. 2.).

5. Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 14. q. 1. n. 6. 7.) seems to teach that habitual sin consists in a passive ordination to punishment; yet it is not explained in the same way, as can be seen there in the scholion and in the Commentary (ed. Wadding). — But the Nominalists denied that actual sin is a corruption of some good which is in the will, but held it to be only a corruption of some rectitude which ought to be present in the act or, as Occam holds, in the will (cfr. Biel, here q. unica). — Already above (d. 33. a. 1. q. 1. in the scholion) it was observed that the words stain and deformity are not taken in the same sense by S. Bonaventure and by St. Thomas.

**III.** On the 1. and 2. question of this article other masters treat under various titles and generally in a single question: Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. II. q. 95. m. 2. a. 3. § 5, q. 104. m. 8. a. 4. — Scot., in each *Scriptum*, here q. unica. — S. Thom., here a. 5. and d. 34. a. 5; *Summa* 1. II. q. 85. a. 1; *de Malo*, q. 2. a. 11. — B. Albert., *Summa* p. 1. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1. q. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 3; d. 34. q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., d. 34. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., here q. I.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 57202–57405), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 821–824, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 843–846). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Boundary (coordinator-verified, held).** This chunk = ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO I only. ALIGNMENT CHECK PASSED: ART I's `Circa primum quaeruntur tria` (raw 57198–57201, p. 821 R) lists (1) *utrum a peccato sit boni corruptio*; (2) *utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio*; (3) *utrum peccatum, in quantum corrumpit, contrarietur bono increato*. QUAESTIO I (raw 57202) opens `Utrum peccatum sit boni corruptio` / `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum peccatum aliquod bonum habeat corrumpere` — matches topic (1). The ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I openers (raw ~57198–57201) are folded in as headings per Override §5. The chunk ENDS at raw 57405, immediately before the `QUAESTIO II.` header (raw 57406, *Utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo*) — everything from 57406 onward is d35-a1-q2.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 821–824.
- p. 821 (running head `DIST. XXXV. ART. I. QUAEST. I. 821`): the COMMENTARIUS + DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM fill p. 821 (held by d35-divisio); ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I headers + fundamentum 1 opener (`1. Augustinus in Enchiridio³`) begin at the bottom-right of p. 821. p.821 footers 1–2 anchor in the divisio; footer 3 (Enchirid. Cap. 11 n. 3) anchors at *Augustinus in Enchiridio* in this q1's fundamentum 1 → [^1] (received from divisio).
- p. 822: fundamenta 1 (tail)–4 + Sed contra 1–6 + Conclusio + Respondeo (opener); footers 1–10 → continuous [^2]–[^11]. Markers: [^2] hoc ipsum ostendit Augustinus (fund 2), [^3] circa ipsam animam (fund 3), [^4] quod perditur (fund 4); [^5] auctoritatem Augustini (contra 1), [^6] quod est falsum (contra 2), [^7] agens et patiens (contra 3), [^8] anima est immortalis (contra 4), [^9] sicut et substantia (contra 5), [^10] ut vult Dionysius (contra 6), [^11] in pluribus locis (Respondeo opener).
- p. 823: Respondeo (Ad quod intelligendum + conclusiones) + Ad obiecta 1–6; footers 1–6 → continuous [^12]–[^17]. Markers: [^12] ut dicit Anselmus (iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis), [^13] dispositionem rectitudinis (linea curvatur), [^14] generari ex actibus (Aristot.), [^15] Magister recitat in littera (malitia/abstinentia), [^16] sicut dicit Anselmus (voluntas instrumentum se ipsum movens), [^17] vix in eodem statu permanet (Iob 14,2).
- p. 824 (top → bottom R): tail of Ad obiectum 6 + SCHOLION (items I, II [with sub-points 1–5], III). The SCHOLION carries only parenthetical/reference content (commentator roll, Trent-style cross-refs) — NO numbered footers. The p. 824 footer (`...gin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6. Cfr. supra pag. 722, nota 3` = De Casu diaboli) anchors at QUAESTIO II's fundamentum 1 (*Peccatum, sicut dicit Anselmus¹*) and is forwarded to d35-a1-q2.

**Hand-off received.** From d35-divisio: p.821 footer 3 (Enchiridion Cap. 11 n. 3 + the *minui malum / minus malum* variant), anchored at *Augustinus in Enchiridio* in fundamentum 1 → rendered as [^1].

**Hand-off forwarded to d35-a1-q2.** The `QUAESTIO II.` header (raw 57406, *Utrum peccatum sit ipsa corruptio-passio, essentialiter loquendo*) and everything below the SCHOLION on p. 824 belong to a1-q2. The p. 824 footer block — note 1 (`De Casu diaboli, c. 9. et 16; de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3. et 6. Cfr. supra pag. 722, nota 3`), anchoring at q2's fundamentum 1 (*Anselmus*) — is forwarded to a1-q2; this q1 claims no footer on p. 824.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 824, raw ~57366–57405), items I, II (with numbered sub-points 1–5), III. `has_scholion: true`. Item I treats the catholic doctrine on corruption from sin (Pelagian vs. 16th–17th c. innovator errors); item II the threefold consideration (gratia/natura/habilitas) with the corruptio-actio / corruptio-passio distinction; item III the commentator roll covering questions 1 and 2 of this article. q2 may legitimately lack its own scholion per Override §5.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 821–824 read top→bottom. The p.821/822 seam (inside fundamentum 1, `Cum ergo culpa commit-` → `titur, necessario...`), the p.822/823 seam (inside the Respondeo, `bonum corrumpi.` → `Ad quod intelligendum...`), and the p.823/824 seam (inside Ad obiectum 6, `inter bonum naturae et bo-` → `num gratiae`) are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.821 footer block is fully accounted across divisio (1–2) + this q1 (3); the shared p.824 footer block belongs wholly to a1-q2.

**[?] flags.** None.