title: Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Utrum hoc nomen «Deus» de se supponat personam vel naturam

title_alt: Whether the name «God» of itself supposits for a person or for the nature

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV

*Utrum hoc nomen Deus pro persona supponat, vel pro natura.*

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de suppositione huius nominis *Deus*. Et quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *Deus* de se supponat personam, vel naturam. Et quod personam, videtur:

**1.** Per illud Ambrosii super: *Benedicat nos Deus[^2] Deus noster, benedicat nos Deus*[^1]. Ambrosius[^3]: «Trina Dei confessio Trinitatem indicat personarum», ergo cum *Deus* sit ibi sine adiuncto, de se supponit personam.

**2.** Item, ratione obiicitur sic: Hoc nomen *homo* proprie[^4] supponit pro omni eo, cui inest humanitas: ergo a simili et hoc nomen *Deus* pro omni

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eo, cui inest deitas; sed hoc est persona: ergo etc.

**3.** Item, hoc nomen *Deus* significat deitatem in concretione; sed non nisi in concretione ad suppositum, quod est persona; sed terminus concretus proprie supponit pro eo, respectu cuius importat formam, ut *album* magis proprie supponit pro re alba quam pro forma: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

**1.** Pronomen refert rem pro proprio supposito[^5]; sed cum dicitur: *Benedicat nos Deus etc., Deus noster*, hoc pronomen *cum* refert naturam, non personam: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, quia iste terminus *homo* proprie[^6] supponit pro individuo, ista est falsa: *homo est Socrates et Plato*, quia idem individuum non recipit illam praedicationem; sed haec est vera: *Deus est Trinitas*, vel: *Deus est Pater et Filius*: ergo cum illud praedicatum non conveniat uni personae, patet etc.

**3.** Item, terminus, qui proprie supponit personam, addito sibi termino partitivo, stat solum pro uno, ut cum dicitur: *unus homo currit*: ergo similiter, cum dicitur *unus Deus*: ergo haec est simpliciter falsa: *unus Deus est Pater et Filius*.

### Conclusio

> *Nomen Deus, cum habeat naturam et termini communis et termini singularis, potest proprie supponere tam pro natura quam pro persona.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hic consuevit esse duplex opinio.

Una quidem est, quod hoc nomen *Deus* significat proprie naturam et supponit personam, aliquando[^7] unam, ut cum dicitur: *Deus generat*, aliquando duas, ut cum dicitur: *Deus spirat*, aliquando tres, ut cum dicitur: *Deus est Trinitas*. Et ratio huius est, ut dicunt, quia cum habeat multa supposita, habet naturam termini communis; terminus autem communis proprie supponit pro individuo, pro natura vero vel pro forma non supponit proprie, nisi trahatur, ut si dicatur: *homo est species*. Sic dicunt in proposito. Ulterius dicunt, quod quia supposita omnia sunt in illo unica suppositione, ideo simul potest supponere pro multis personis, licet illud non possit iste terminus *homo*, vel alius terminus communis; et sic solvunt obiecta.

Alia opinio est, quod proprie supponit naturam, sicut significat, et non supponit personam, nisi trahatur ab alio, ut cum dicitur: *Deus generat*; et hi dicunt, quod cum dicitur: *Deus est Trinitas*, ibi stat pro natura, non pro persona; et una natura est tres personae: ideo vera est locutio. Et ratio huius positionis est, quia hoc nomen *Deus* habet naturam termini discreti, cum non habeat plurale; ideo idem significat et supponit proprie; cum ergo significet naturam, illam proprie supponit.

Sed melius est dicere utrumque[^8] — quia habet naturam termini communis et termini discreti: termini communis propter pluralitatem suppositorum, termini discreti ratione formae immultiplicabilis — quod[^9] proprie supponit tam naturam quam personam. Tamen rationes ad utramque partem concludunt verum suo modo. Hoc autem non potest in alio termino inveniri, et ideo nec consimilis modus supponendi.

english:
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### Question IV

*Whether the name God supposits for a person, or for the nature.*

Fourth and last, the question is asked concerning the supposition of this name *God*. And it is asked whether this name *God* of itself supposits for a person, or for the nature. And that [it supposits] for a person, seems thus:

**1.** Through that [verse] of Ambrose upon: *May God[^2] our God bless us; may God bless us*[^1]. Ambrose[^3]: «The threefold confession of *God* indicates the Trinity of persons»; therefore, since *God* stands there without any adjunct, of itself it supposits for a person.

**2.** Likewise, it is objected by reason thus: this name *man* properly[^4] supposits for everything in which humanity inheres: therefore, by a similar [reasoning], also this name *God* [supposits] for everything

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in which deity inheres; but this is a person: therefore etc.

**3.** Likewise, this name *God* signifies deity in concretion; but not except in concretion to a supposit, which is a person; but a concrete term properly supposits for that with respect to which it imports the form, just as *white* more properly supposits for the white thing than for the form: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** A pronoun refers a thing for its proper supposit[^5]; but when it is said: *May God bless us etc., our God*, this pronoun *us* refers the nature, not the person: therefore etc.

**2.** Likewise, since this term *man* properly[^6] supposits for the individual, this is false: *man is Socrates and Plato*, because the same individual does not receive that predication; but this is true: *God is Trinity*, or: *God is the Father and the Son*: therefore, since that predicate does not belong to one person [alone], it is plain etc.

**3.** Likewise, a term that properly supposits for a person, when a partitive term is added to it, stands for one only, as when it is said: *one man is running*: therefore similarly, when it is said *one God*: therefore this is simply false: *one God is the Father and the Son*.

### Conclusion

> *The name God, since it has the nature both of a common term and of a singular term, can properly supposit both for the nature and for the person.*

**I respond:** It must be said that here there has customarily been a twofold opinion.

The one indeed is, that this name *God* properly signifies the nature and supposits for a person — sometimes[^7] for one, as when it is said: *God generates*; sometimes for two, as when it is said: *God spirates*; sometimes for three, as when it is said: *God is Trinity*. And the reason of this, as they say, is that since it has many supposits, it has the nature of a common term; but a common term properly supposits for the individual, but for the nature or for the form does not properly supposit, unless it be drawn [to do so], as if it be said: *man is a species*. So they speak in the proposed case. Further they say, that because all the supposits are in it by a single supposition, therefore it can at one and the same time supposit for many persons, although this the term *man*, or any other common term, cannot [do]; and thus they solve the objections.

Another opinion is, that it properly supposits for the nature, as it signifies, and does not supposit for a person, unless it be drawn [to do so] by another, as when it is said: *God generates*; and these say that when it is said: *God is Trinity*, there it stands for the nature, not for the person; and one nature is the three persons: therefore the locution is true. And the reason of this position is that this name *God* has the nature of a discrete term, since it has no plural; therefore it signifies and supposits properly for the same thing; therefore, since it signifies the nature, it properly supposits for that.

But it is better to say both[^8] — because it has the nature both of a common term and of a discrete term: of a common term on account of the plurality of supposits, of a discrete term by reason of the unmultipliable form — that[^9] it properly supposits for both the nature and the person. Nevertheless the reasons on both sides conclude what is true, each in its own way. But this cannot be found in any other term, and therefore neither [can] any similar mode of suppositing.

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8 [of Psalm 66].

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 minus apte sic *nec nomen Dei*.

en: The Vatican ed., against the faith of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] less aptly thus: *nec nomen Dei*.

la: Psalm. 66, 7. 8. — Verba, quae hic a S. Doctore attribuuntur S. Ambrosio, eidem etiam a Magistro supra d. II, c. 4 adscribuntur. Vide p. 48 nota 8. — In ipsis verbis Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *professio* loco *confessio*.

en: Psalm 66 (67), vv. 7–8. — The words here attributed by the Holy Doctor to St. Ambrose are also ascribed to him by the Master above at d. II, c. 4. See p. 48, note 8. — In the words themselves the Vatican ed., against the faith of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *professio* in place of *confessio*.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *proprie*. Paulo ante plures codd. cum ed. 1 *ostenditur* pro *obiicitur*. Mox post *Deus* Vat. contra codd. repetit *supponit*.

en: From the mss. and ed. 1 we have supplied *proprie*. A little earlier, several codd. with ed. 1 [read] *ostenditur* for *obiicitur*. Just after *Deus*, the Vatican ed., against the codd., repeats *supponit*.

la: Priscian., XVII *Grammat.* c. 2: *Substantiam enim significat loco nominis positum pronomen et personam verbo sibi adiuncto congruam indicat*.

en: Priscian, *Institutes of Grammar* XVII, c. 2: «For a pronoun placed in the place of a noun signifies substance, and indicates the person congruent with the verb joined to it».

la: Vat. hic omittit *proprie* et paulo post habet *dicamus* loco *dicatur*, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican ed. here omits *proprie*, and a little later has *dicamus* in place of *dicatur*, but the authority of the mss. and ed. 1 stands against [it].

la: Plerique codd. ut A C F G I K L O R X Z *una*. Paulo infra Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *solverunt*, aliqui tamen codd. ut K P Q X legunt *solvuntur*.

en: Most codd. (such as A C F G I K L O R X Z) [read] *una*. A little later the Vatican ed., against the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *solverunt*; yet some codd. (such as K P Q X) read *solvuntur*.

la: Cod. H addit *quia*.

en: Codex H adds *quia*.

la: Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, in quorum lectione *quod* refertur ad paulo supra positum *dicere utrumque*. Vat. loco *quod* ponit *ideo*, cuius lectionis sensus explicatur codice Z et *ideo dico quod proprie*. Paulo infra codd. O bb *Unde* pro *Tamen*.

en: So nearly all the codd. with ed. 1, in whose reading *quod* refers back to *dicere utrumque* placed a little above. The Vatican ed. puts *ideo* in place of *quod*; the sense of this reading is explained in cod. Z by *and therefore I say that properly*. A little later codd. O bb [read] *Unde* for *Tamen*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De differentia inter significationem et suppositionem cfr. Scholion hic ad q. 1. Terminus discretus, de quo loquitur S. Bonav., idem est ac terminus singularis et significat aliquod incommunicabile. Unde «terminus singularis idem significat et supponit» (S. Thom. *S.* I. q. 39. a. 4.). Terminus vero communis non oportet semper supponere pro eo quod per se significat, v. g. in propositione: *homo currit*, non supponit *homo* pro natura communi humana, sed pro aliquo indeterminato individuo.

**II.** Licet antiqui doctores de hac quaestione diversis modis loquantur, in re tamen parum dissentire videntur. S. Bonav. praefert tertiam sententiam, quae mediam viam tenet, scil. quod *Deus* proprie supponat tum pro natura tum pro persona. S. Thom. in *Comment.* (hic q. 1. a. 2.) sententiam primo loco positam docere videtur, secundam vero ibi et in *Summa* penitus reiicit. Illam vero primam opinionem in *Summa* (1. q. 39. a. 4.) ita explicat, ut cum tertia et media sententia S. Bonaventurae conveniat. Hoc patet, si sententia S. Bonaventurae distinctis propositionibus proponitur. *Propositio 1*: Nomini *Deus* convenit haec proprietas, ut partim sit terminus communis, partim singularis. Ratio est, quia significat simul tum formam non multiplicabilem, tum naturam communicabilem. Idem docet S. Thom. (*S.* loc. cit. ad 2.). *Propositio 2*: Hinc est, quod *Deus* aliquando supponit pro natura, aliquando pro persona. Hoc idem asserunt S. Thom. et Alex. Hal.; tamen Angelicus addit, quod «per se supponit pro natura communi» (ad 3.), sed «ex modo significandi» habet, ut proprie possit supponere pro persona (in corp.).

**III.** Circa ipsam quaestionem cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; *III. Sent.* d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., locis citt. — Scot., hic q. 2. in fine. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 6. et d. 32. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 54. q. 3. n. 40. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in princ. — Biel, hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the difference between signification and supposition, cf. the Scholion here at q. 1. A discrete term, of which St. Bonaventure speaks, is the same as a singular term and signifies something incommunicable. Hence «the singular term signifies and supposits for the same thing» (St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 39, a. 4). But a common term need not always supposit for that which it signifies per se — e.g. in the proposition *man runs*, *man* does not supposit for the common human nature, but for some indeterminate individual.

**II.** Although the ancient doctors speak of this question in diverse ways, in substance they seem to disagree little. St. Bonaventure prefers the third opinion, which holds the middle way, namely that *God* properly supposits both for the nature and for the person. St. Thomas in his *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 2) seems to teach the opinion placed in the first position; but the second [opinion] he there and in the *Summa* roundly rejects. That first opinion, however, he so explains in the *Summa* (I, q. 39, a. 4) that it agrees with the third and middle opinion of St. Bonaventure. This is clear, if the opinion of St. Bonaventure is set out in distinct propositions. *Proposition 1*: To the name *God* belongs this property, that it is partly a common term, partly a singular [term]. The reason is, that it signifies at once both an unmultipliable form and a communicable nature. The same St. Thomas teaches (loc. cit. ad 2). *Proposition 2*: Hence it is, that *God* sometimes supposits for the nature, sometimes for the person. This same St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales assert; yet the Angelic [Doctor] adds, that «per se it supposits for the common nature» (ad 3), but «from the mode of signifying» it has [it], that it can properly supposit for a person (in corp.).

**III.** Concerning the question itself, cf. St. Bonaventure, below d. 29, a. 1, q. 2; *III Sent.* d. 7, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, at the places cited. — Scotus, here q. 2 at the end. — Blessed Albert, here a. 5, 6, and d. 32, a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 54, q. 3, n. 40. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 at the beginning. — Biel, here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 4, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts concerning the Master's text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine*; quia cum praepositio *de* notet transitionem et ita diversitatem et distinctionem, videtur quod pari ratione et ab aequipollenti istae sunt verae: Deus est alius a Deo, Deus distinguitur a Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est importare distinctionem sive diversitatem, scilicet ut modum[^1] vel ut rem, vel ut exercitam vel ut conceptam. Quoniam igitur praepositiones important distinctionem ut exercitam, et distinctio est in divinis quantum ad supposita, *de*[^2] facit terminum stare pro diversis suppositis. Quoniam ergo circa id ponit modum, circa quod exercet distinctionem, et tales sunt personae: ideo est vera locutio. Quia vero hoc nomen *alius* importat distinctionem ut conceptam, similiter hoc verbum *distinguere*: ideo simpliciter ponit distinctionem circa terminum ratione suae formae; ideo sunt falsae[^3].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de responsione, quam ponit Magister, ibi: *Quod vero additur: Ergo genuit se Deum* etc., quia Magister solvit interimendo conclusionem et videtur non recte solvere. Cum enim idem et diversum sufficienter dividant *ens*[^4], videtur necessario sequi: genuit Deum: ergo se, vel alium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister sustinendo primam et interimendo conclusionem innuit, conclusionem non sequi ex praemissis: et quod non sequatur, ostendit ferendo instantiam[^5] contra illud disiunctum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod idem et diversum *sufficienter dividunt*[^6] ens; dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo falsum est. Nam pars nec est eadem toti omnino nec simpliciter diversa. Habet tamen veritatem secundum idem. Unde: «si non est idem alii, est diversum», verum est secundum illud, secundum quod non est idem[^7]. Filius autem non est idem Patri in persona, et ideo in persona alius; nec tamen sequitur: alius Deus, quia significatur alietas in essentia[^8].

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hac distinctione, quam ponit Magister de hoc praedicato *Deus Pater*, quod potest esse constructio appositiva et immediata, vel mediata[^9]. Primo enim videtur, quod ista distinctio non sit intelligibilis, quoniam quae ex eadem parte intransitive construuntur, videntur solum immediate construi. Item videtur, quod non solvat, quia recta solutio est, cuius dantem oppositum non contingit solvere[^10]; sed ista distinctione remota, adhuc manet sophisma, si loco eius quod est *Deus Pater*, solum ponatur *Pater*: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod distinctio Magistri bona est et secundum artem. Nam sicut vult Priscianus[^11], inter adiectivum et substantivum intelligitur media copula *est* vel *quod est ens*[^12]. Et quoniam hoc quod est *est* sive *quod est Pater* potest teneri implicative; et sic restringitur et tenet locum appositivae constructionis et aequivalet uni termino: ideo dicitur, quod potest teneri sive construi immediate; et sic *Deus Pater* non est aliud quam ipse Pater. Vel ipsum relativum potest intelligi relative, et ita in quadam distantia; et tunc non restringitur, et sensus est: *Deus Pater*, id est *Deus, qui est Pater*; quod tantum valet *est Deus, et ille est Pater*. Haec autem solutio Magistri solvit quidem sophisma quantum ad unam deceptionem, et ideo est bona. Sed rursus cadit ibi alia deceptio de relativo, et ideo adhuc oportet solvere, non ad illam deceptionem, sed ad aliam. Ideo Praepositivus[^13] solvit ad hoc argumentum alio modo: ergo Deum qui est Pater, vel qui non est Pater, et dicit, quod non sequitur, nec[^14] sunt contradictoriae, quia suppositio huius relativi non est eadem. In affirmativa enim supponit pro Deo genito, quia non confunditur[^15]; in negativa vero simpliciter. Unde sicut hae non contradicunt, sed ambae sunt falsae: *Nullus homo est Petrus, Ioannes est Petrus*, ita dicit in proposito, quia negatio confundit. Unde istae duae ambae sunt falsae: *Deus Filius est Pater, Deus non est Pater*. — Sed licet solutio Praepositivi locum habeat in proposito, quia non differt praeponere et postponere negationem huic termino *Deus*, tamen in aliis non habet locum. Negatio enim postposita relativo ipsum non confundit.

Et ideo moderni aliter solvunt distinguendo, quod[^16] hoc relativum *qui* potest facere relationem simplicem vel personalem. Si simplicem, affirmativa vera est, negativa falsa; si personalem, e converso negativa vera, affirmativa falsa. Quod patet, quia haec est falsa: *persona Filii est Pater*, et haec est vera: «*persona Filii non est Pater*»[^17].

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### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *unus Deus est tres personae*. Sed contra: Quaecumque praedicantur de uno et eodem, praedicantur de se invicem: ergo si unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius. Si tu dicas, quod verum est, quando praedicantur de uno singulari, sed non est verum, quando praedicantur de uno communi; contra: nihil subiicitur duobus in unica[^18] suppositione, quamvis sit commune ad illa. Unde haec est falsa: *homo est Socrates et Plato*: ergo similiter in proposito.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut patet, de suppositione huius nominis *Deus* secus est quam de suppositione alicuius alterius termini. Quia enim[^19] habet naturam termini communis et discreti, ideo simul stat pro pluribus, sicut pro uno: et ideo non sequitur: *Deus est Pater et Filius*: ergo *Deus Pater est Filius*, vel e converso[^20]. Similiter nec licet inferre ex hoc, quod Pater sit Filius. Et notandum, quod talis praedicatio est per identitatem[^21]: ideo suppositum de termino formali vere praedicatur.

### Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod Magister dicit: *Unum solum Deum verum esse Trinitatem*; quia videtur esse contra illud quod dicit inferius[^22], scilicet quod *trinitas* est nomen collectivum, *unus* et *solus* nomen partitivum et discretivum: ergo sicut haec est falsa: *unus solus homo est omnis homo*, ita et haec.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *trinitas* est[^23] collectivum personarum; *unus* autem et *solus*, addita huic termino *Deus*, non dicunt discretionem personae, sed naturae ab aliis. Unde unus

<!-- page 107 -->

solus Deus dicitur una sola natura; et quoniam in divinis est idem natura et res naturae sive suppositum, ideo praedicatione per identitatem *Trinitas* de Deo[^25] praedicatur. Nec est simile de hoc quod est *omnis homo* et *unus solus homo*. Nam iste terminus *homo* est terminus, qui potest confundi et multiplicari, et ideo haec est vera: *omnis homo est homo*, nec stat simul pro pluribus[^26], nisi confundatur; et ideo haec est falsa: *homo est omnis homo*, quia nec ratione supponendi est vera, nec per identitatem, nec est idem in homine natura et res naturae[^27].

### Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Satis est christiano rerum creatarum causam* etc. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quoniam aut dicit *satis* quantum ad fidem; et sic est falsum, quia multa alia oportet credere; aut *satis* quantum ad scientiam; et illud similiter est falsum, quia nunquam scitur ex hoc causa rei sufficienter.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod intelligitur *satis* quantum ad scientiam, non quamlibet, sed necessariam ad salutem.

### Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Pater genuit alterum se*. Videtur enim male coniungere illa duo, quia *se* dicit omnimodam identitatem, et *alterum* diversitatem, et ita sunt opposita, et ita[^28] opposita implicantur. Si dicas, quod unum diminuit de altero, quaero: quid et de quo?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod oppositio directa intelligitur semper circa idem. Quoniam ergo in divinis simul est identitas in natura et alietas in supposito, et hoc sine oppositione; ideo nomen identitatis et alietatis in sermone[^24] iunctae sine oppositione, immo ad singularis modi expressionem.

### Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Pater ut haberet Filium, non minuit se*, quia videtur dicere falsum; quia illud argumentum valet: quicumque generat unum filium, ut non possit amplius generare, minuitur eius potentia; sed sic est in Patre: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Quod illud verum est, si generare alterum sit potentiae; sed quod, uno genito, possit alterum generare, dicit imperfectionem potentiae in generando, quia ex hoc ostenditur, quod non totum dedit uni[^29].

### Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *De se alterum se genuit, sed non alterum deum, sed alteram personam*, utrum dicatur magis proprie *alterum*, vel *alium*; et[^30] videtur quod *alterum*, quia minorem dicit diversitatem, quia Socrates dicitur alter a se; sed in divinis minima est diversitas. Sed contra: differentiae accidentales faciunt dici alterum[^31]; sed in divinis nullum est accidens: ergo non debet dici *alterum*.

Item videtur, quod neutrum bene dicatur. Si enim differentiae substantiales faciunt dici *aliud*, et accidentales *alterum*, cum neutrum cadat in divinis, neutrum videtur esse dicendum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia Pater differt a Filio et in supposito et in proprietate, ideo potest dici *alius*, et potest dici *alter*. Sed quoniam proprietas illa non accidit personae, ideo magis proprie dicitur *alius*. Et quia *alius* respicit suppositum, *aliud* essentiam: ideo, etsi recipiatur[^32] ibi *alius* in masculino, non tamen *aliud* in neutro[^33].

---

english:
### Dub. I.

In this part concerning the text, a question is raised about what he says: *God from God, light from light*; for since the preposition *de* ("from") signifies transition and thus diversity and distinction, it seems that by parallel reasoning and from an equipollent expression these are true: God is other than God, God is distinguished from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold way of conveying distinction or diversity, namely as a mode[^1] or as a thing, or as exercised or as conceived. Since therefore prepositions convey distinction as exercised, and there is distinction in divine things with respect to the supposits, *de*[^2] makes the term stand for the diverse supposits. Since therefore it places a mode about that around which it exercises distinction, and such are the persons: therefore it is a true expression. But because this name *alius* ("other") conveys distinction as conceived, and likewise the verb *distinguere* ("to distinguish"): therefore it simply places distinction about the term by reason of its form; therefore they are false[^3].

### Dub. II.

Likewise a question is raised about the response which the Master gives, there: *But as to what is added: Therefore he begot himself God* etc., because the Master resolves it by overturning the conclusion and seems not to resolve it correctly. For since the same and the diverse sufficiently divide *being*[^4], it seems necessarily to follow: he begot God: therefore [he begot] himself, or another.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master, by upholding the first [premise] and overturning the conclusion, indicates that the conclusion does not follow from the premises: and that it does not follow, he shows by bringing an instance[^5] against that disjunct.

But to that which is objected, that the same and the diverse *sufficiently divide*[^6] being; it must be said that, simply speaking, this is false. For a part is neither altogether the same as the whole nor simply diverse from it. It has truth nevertheless according to the same [respect]. Whence: «if it is not the same as another, it is diverse», is true according to that respect according to which it is not the same[^7]. But the Son is not the same as the Father in person, and therefore in person other; nor however does it follow: another God, because otherness is signified in essence[^8].

### Dub. III.

Likewise a question is raised about this distinction which the Master sets forth concerning this predicate *Deus Pater* ("God the Father"), namely that it can be an appositive and immediate construction, or a mediate one[^9]. For first it seems that this distinction is not intelligible, since [terms] which on the same side are intransitively constructed seem only to be immediately constructed. Likewise it seems that he does not resolve [the difficulty], because a correct solution is one whose opposite he who grants cannot resolve[^10]; but with this distinction removed, the sophism still remains, if in place of *Deus Pater* there be set only *Pater*: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master's distinction is good and according to art. For as Priscian wishes[^11], between an adjective and a substantive there is understood a mediating copula *est* ("is") or *quod est ens* ("which is being")[^12]. And since this *est* or *quod est Pater* can be taken implicatively; and so it is restricted and holds the place of an appositive construction and is equivalent to one term: therefore it is said that it can be taken or constructed immediately; and so *Deus Pater* is nothing other than the Father himself. Or the relative itself can be understood relatively, and thus at a certain distance; and then it is not restricted, and the sense is: *Deus Pater*, that is, *Deus, qui est Pater* ("God, who is the Father"); which amounts to: *est Deus, et ille est Pater* ("there is God, and that one is the Father"). Now this solution of the Master indeed resolves the sophism with respect to one deception, and therefore is good. But again another deception falls there concerning the relative, and therefore it is still necessary to resolve [it], not against that deception, but against another. Therefore Praepositivus[^13] resolves this argument in another way: therefore [he begot] God who is the Father, or who is not the Father, and he says that it does not follow, nor[^14] are they contradictories, because the supposition of this relative is not the same. For in the affirmative it supposits for the begotten God, because it is not confounded[^15]; in the negative, however, simply. Whence as these do not contradict, but both are false: *No man is Peter, John is Peter*, so he says in the matter at hand, because the negation confounds. Whence these two are both false: *God the Son is the Father, God is not the Father*. — But although Praepositivus's solution has place in the matter at hand, because it makes no difference to put the negation before or after the term *Deus*, nevertheless in other [cases] it has no place. For a negation placed after the relative does not confound it.

And therefore the moderns resolve [it] otherwise by distinguishing, that[^16] this relative *qui* can effect a simple or a personal relation. If simple, the affirmative is true, the negative false; if personal, conversely the negative is true, the affirmative false. Which is plain, because this is false: *the person of the Son is the Father*, and this is true: «*the person of the Son is not the Father*»[^17].

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### Dub. IV.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says, that *one God is three persons*. But on the contrary: Whatever things are predicated of one and the same are predicated of one another: therefore if one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son. If you say, that this is true when they are predicated of one singular, but is not true when they are predicated of one common [thing]; on the contrary: nothing is subjected to two [predicates] in one[^18] supposition, although it be common to them. Whence this is false: *man is Socrates and Plato*: therefore likewise in the matter at hand.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is plain, concerning the supposition of this name *Deus* it is otherwise than concerning the supposition of any other term. For because[^19] it has the nature of a common and a discrete term, therefore it stands at once for many, just as for one: and therefore it does not follow: *God is the Father and the Son*: therefore *God the Father is the Son*, or conversely[^20]. Likewise neither is it permitted to infer from this, that the Father is the Son. And it must be noted that such predication is by identity[^21]: therefore the supposit of the formal term is truly predicated.

### Dub. V.

Likewise a question is raised about what the Master says: *That one only true God is the Trinity*; for it seems to be against what he says below[^22], namely that *trinitas* is a collective name, *unus* and *solus* a partitive and discretive name: therefore as this is false: *one sole man is every man*, so also this.

**I respond:** It must be said that this name *trinitas* is[^23] collective of the persons; but *unus* and *solus*, added to this term *Deus*, do not signify the distinction of person, but of nature from others. Whence one

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sole God is said [to be] one sole nature; and since in divine things the nature and the *res naturae* ("thing of the nature") or supposit are the same, therefore by predication through identity *Trinitas* is predicated of God[^25]. Nor is it like in the case of *every man* and *one sole man*. For this term *homo* is a term which can be confounded and multiplied, and therefore this is true: *every man is a man*, nor does it stand at once for many[^26] unless it is confounded; and therefore this is false: *man is every man*, because neither is it true by reason of supposition, nor by identity, nor is the nature and the *res naturae* the same in man[^27].

### Dub. VI.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: *It is enough for a Christian [to believe that] the cause of created things* etc. For he seems to say something false, since either he says *enough* with respect to faith; and so it is false, because many other things must be believed; or *enough* with respect to knowledge; and that likewise is false, because the cause of a thing is never sufficiently known from this.

**I respond:** It must be said that *enough* is understood with respect to knowledge, not any whatever, but [knowledge] necessary for salvation.

### Dub. VII.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says, that *the Father begot another self*. For he seems to conjoin those two badly, since *se* ("self") signifies altogether identity, and *alterum* ("another") diversity, and thus they are opposites, and thus[^28] opposites are implicated. If you say, that one diminishes from the other, I ask: what, and of what?

**I respond:** It must be said that direct opposition is always understood concerning the same. Since therefore in divine things there is at once identity in nature and otherness in supposit, and this without opposition; therefore the names of identity and of otherness in speech[^24] are joined without opposition, indeed for the expression of a singular mode.

### Dub. VIII.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: *That the Father might have a Son, he did not diminish himself*, for he seems to say something false; because that argument holds: whoever begets one son, in such a way that he can no longer beget, his power is diminished; but so it is in the Father: therefore etc.

**I respond:** That this is true, if to beget another belongs to power; but that, with one having been begotten, he should be able to beget another, signifies an imperfection of power in begetting, because by this it is shown that he did not give the whole to one[^29].

### Dub. IX.

Likewise a question is raised about what he says: *Of himself he begot another self, but not another god, but another person*, whether *alterum* or *alium* is more properly said; and[^30] it seems that *alterum*, because it signifies a lesser diversity, since Socrates is called *alter* from himself; but in divine things diversity is least. But on the contrary: accidental differences cause [things] to be called *alterum*[^31]; but in divine things there is no accident: therefore it ought not to be called *alterum*.

Likewise it seems that neither is well said. For if substantial differences cause [things] to be called *aliud*, and accidental [ones] *alterum*, since neither falls in divine things, neither seems fit to be said.

**I respond:** It must be said that because the Father differs from the Son both in supposit and in property, therefore he can be called *alius*, and he can be called *alter*. But since that property is not accidental to the person, therefore he is more properly called *alius*. And because *alius* regards the supposit, *aliud* the essence: therefore, although[^32] *alius* in the masculine be received there, nevertheless not *aliud* in the neuter[^33].

---

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit Vat. hic *ita*. Supple: *se habendi*. — De hac distinctione vide infra d. 26.

en: Against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican edition here repeats *ita*. Supply: *se habendi* ("of being so disposed"). — On this distinction see below d. 26.

la: In mss. et edd. excidit particula *de*, quam contextus requirit.

en: In the manuscripts and editions the particle *de* has dropped out, which the context requires.

la: Pro maiore intelligentia et explicatione huius dubii cfr. q. 1. et 2. huius distinctionis. — Quoad praepositionem *de* vide infra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.

en: For a fuller understanding and explanation of this doubt, cf. qq. 1 and 2 of this distinction. — Concerning the preposition *de*, see below d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Aristot., X. *Metaph.* text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): *Omne etenim, quodcumque sit ens, aut idem aut diversum.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): *For everything whatsoever that is being is either the same or diverse.*

la: Vide Aristot., II. *Prior.* c. 26. (c. 28.) de *Instantia*.

en: See Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* II, c. 26 (c. 28), on the *instance*.

la: Cod. S *dividant*.

en: Codex S [reads] *dividant* ("[that they] divide").

la: Codd. T aa bb satis bene addunt *non, secundum illud, secundum quod est idem*, a quibus cod. A in eo tantum divergit, quod particulam *non* minus bene transponit post *quod est*.

en: Codices T, aa, bb add, with reasonable propriety, *non, secundum illud, secundum quod est idem* ("not, according to that according to which it is the same"); from which codex A differs only in this, that it less well transposes the particle *non* after *quod est*.

la: De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 1; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 3.

en: On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 1; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

la: Vat. post *appositiva* omittit *et*, quod tamen cum ed. 1 habent codd., quorum nonnulli deinde indebite omittunt *vel mediata*; codd. V X omittunt *et immediata*, quod tamen propter subnexa melius retinetur, licet, quod ad rem attinet, omitti possit, cum *immediata* hic idem sit cum *appositiva*; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4. constructioni *appositivae* opponit *mediatam*. — Distinctio Magistri, de qua hic agitur, respicit istam propositionem: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater*. Si haec verba *Deus Pater* immediate coniuncta intelliguntur, ita quidem ut terminus *Pater*, tanquam determinans alterum terminum *Deus*, sit terminus principalis, tunc propositio est vera. Sensus enim est: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, sed Deus Filius*. Si vero disiunctim intelliguntur, ita ut terminus principalis sit *Deus*, cui deinceps adiungitur, *qui est Pater*, sic erit falsa; sensus siquidem est: *Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus, et Deus Pater est*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *et* after *appositiva*, which however the codices, with ed. 1, retain; some of these then improperly omit *vel mediata*; codices V, X omit *et immediata*, which however on account of what follows is better retained, though, as far as the matter goes, it could be omitted, since *immediata* here is the same as *appositiva*; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, opposes the *mediate* construction to the *appositive*. — The Master's distinction here at issue concerns this proposition: *He begot God, who is not God the Father*. If these words *Deus Pater* are understood as immediately joined, namely so that the term *Pater*, as determining the other term *Deus*, is the principal term, then the proposition is true. For the sense is: *He begot God, who is not God the Father, but God the Son*. But if they are understood disjunctively, namely so that the principal term is *Deus*, to which is then adjoined *qui est Pater*, then it will be false; for the sense is: *He begot God, who is not God, and God is the Father*.

la: Modus iste loquendi, qui occurrit etiam infra d. 15. p. II. q. 1. in corp. et d. 44. a. 2. q. unic. in corp., sumptus est ex Aristot., II. *Elench.* c. 3. secundum translationem Boethii: *Nam si esset haec solutio, dantem oppositum non possibile esset solvere*. Secundum translationem autem ed. Paris. (Firmin-Didot.) c. 22. sic habetur: *Nam si esset haec solutio, quam afferunt, qui contrarium daret solvere non posset*. — Paulo infra cod. X *maneret*, cod. Z *remaneret* loco *manet*.

en: This manner of speaking, which occurs also below d. 15, p. II, q. 1, in corp., and d. 44, a. 2, q. unic., in corp., is taken from Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 3, according to Boethius's translation: *For if this were the solution, it would not be possible for one granting the opposite to resolve it*. According to the translation of the Paris edition (Firmin-Didot), c. 22, it is given thus: *For if this were the solution which they bring forward, he who would grant the contrary could not resolve [it]*. — A little below codex X [reads] *maneret*, codex Z *remaneret* in place of *manet*.

la: Libr. XVIII. c. 1. post medium: *Subauditur enim participium verbi substantivi* ens, *quod in usu nunc nobis non est, pro quo possumus* qui est *vel* qui fuit *dicere vel subaudire. Similiter, aliis casibus nominativum consequentibus, vel supradictum participium vel quae pro eo accipiuntur subaudire necesse est ad nominativum.* — Hac Prisciani regula posita, S. Doctor eam applicat, ulteriore addita distinctione respectu ipsius copulae cum termino adiuncto. Nam appositio, si per participium *ens* sive per relativum (*quod est*, *qui est*) cum substantivo coniuncta est, respectu eiusdem potest teneri vel implicative, vel non implicative seu in quadam distantia (sive relativum ut relativum). Si implicative, tunc est constructio appositiva et immediata, et dictio haec: *Deus, qui est Pater* (Deus i. e. Pater) aequivalet huic: *Deus, qui est ipse Pater*; si non implicative, tunc constructio habetur mediata, et dictio haec: *Deus, qui est Pater* aequivalet huic: *Deus, et ille Deus est Pater*, sive etiam: *Deus, qualis est Pater*.

en: Book XVIII, c. 1, after the middle: *For there is understood the participle of the substantive verb* ens *("being"), which is no longer in use among us, in place of which we can say or understand* qui est *("who is") or* qui fuit *("who was"). Likewise, for other cases following the nominative, it is necessary to understand for the nominative either the aforesaid participle or what is taken in its place.* — With this rule of Priscian set down, the holy Doctor applies it, adding a further distinction with respect to the copula itself together with the adjoined term. For an apposition, if through the participle *ens* or through the relative (*quod est*, *qui est*) it is joined to the substantive, can be taken with respect to the same either implicatively or non-implicatively, that is, at a certain distance (or [taking] the relative as relative). If implicatively, then it is an appositive and immediate construction, and this expression: *Deus, qui est Pater* (God, that is, the Father) is equivalent to this: *Deus, qui est ipse Pater* ("God, who is the Father himself"); if non-implicatively, then the construction is had as mediate, and this expression: *Deus, qui est Pater* is equivalent to this: *Deus, et ille Deus est Pater* ("God, and that God is the Father"), or also: *Deus, qualis est Pater* ("God, such as the Father is").

la: *Ens* videtur hic esse superfluum iuxta verba Prisciani. — Mox ex codd. F T etc. addidimus *Et*. Paulo post nonnulli codd. ut H I P Q cum ed. 1 *et tunc* loco *et sic*.

en: *Ens* seems to be superfluous here according to the words of Priscian. — Soon after, from codices F, T, etc., we added *Et*. A little later some codices such as H, I, P, Q, with ed. 1, [read] *et tunc* in place of *et sic*.

la: Substituimus fide multorum codd. ut A F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1 *quidem* loco *quoddam*; lectio certe melior.

en: We have substituted, on the faith of many codices such as A, F, G, H, I, R, S, T, etc. and ed. 1, *quidem* in place of *quoddam*; certainly the better reading.

la: Natione Italus, ab an. 1206 Cancellarius Universitatis Parisiensis, scripsit *Summam theologicam* ex dictis SS. Patrum, a S. Bonav. et S. Thom. non raro allegatam et adhuc ineditam. De *Sermonibus* eiusdem cfr. Lecoy, *La chaire Française au moyen âge* p. 80. — Mox Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit *ad*. Paulo post codd. *ergo Deus*, sed minus conforme textui Magistri.

en: [Praepositivus,] an Italian by nation, from the year 1206 Chancellor of the University of Paris, wrote a *Summa theologica* drawn from the sayings of the holy Fathers, not infrequently cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, and as yet unedited. On his *Sermons* cf. Lecoy, *La chaire Française au moyen âge*, p. 80. — Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits *ad*. A little later the codices [read] *ergo Deus*, but less conformable to the Master's text.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *et quod non* pro *nec*. Mox cod. Z *contradictorie opposita* loco *contradictoriae*. Paulo infra post *relativi* supple: *qui*. — Mox codd. O Z post *eadem* satis bene addunt *in affirmativa et negativa*, supple: *propositione*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] *et quod non* in place of *nec*. Soon after, codex Z [reads] *contradictorie opposita* in place of *contradictoriae*. A little below, after *relativi* supply: *qui*. — Soon after, codices O, Z after *eadem* add, with reasonable propriety, *in affirmativa et negativa*, supplying: *propositione*.

la: Hoc est, non supponit confuse et indiscriminatim pro tribus personis, sed determinate solum pro persona Filii; e contra in negativa supponit simpliciter, i. e. indiscriminatim et confuse pro personis et etiam pro essentia. Cfr. hic q. 1. Hinc patet, quid sibi velit paulo infra *negatio confundit* (codd. *confunditur*), scil. negatio efficit, ut relativum *qui* supponere possit tam pro tribus personis quam pro essentia.

en: That is, it does not supposit confusedly and indiscriminately for the three persons, but determinately only for the person of the Son; on the contrary, in the negative it supposits simply, i. e. indiscriminately and confusedly for the persons and also for the essence. Cf. here q. 1. Hence it is clear what is meant a little below by *negatio confundit* ("the negation confounds") (codices *confunditur*), namely that the negation brings it about that the relative *qui* can supposit both for the three persons and for the essence.

la: Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, minus apte transponit *quod* post relativum *qui*. Paulo post plures codd. *distinctionem* pro *relationem*; ed. 1 vero *distinctionem vel relationem*. Retinuimus *relationem*, utpote quod supra dictis q. 1. in corp. magis correspondet. Ibidem et divisio *relationis* in *simplicem* et *personalem* occurrit.

en: The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the manuscripts and ed. 1, less aptly transposes *quod* after the relative *qui*. A little later several codices [read] *distinctionem* in place of *relationem*; but ed. 1 [reads] *distinctionem vel relationem*. We have retained *relationem*, inasmuch as it corresponds better to what was said above at q. 1, in corp. There also the division of *relatio* into *simplex* and *personalis* occurs.

la: De solutione huius dubii vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 4. et S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 5. — Biel, hic q. 1.

en: On the solution of this doubt see Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, and *Summa Theol.* I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 5. — Biel, here q. 1.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *una*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *una*.

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *cum* pro *enim*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] *cum* in place of *enim*.

la: Codd. inter se non conveniunt; cod. T quoad sensum cum Vat. convenit ponendo *vel Filius est Pater* loco *e converso*. Plures codd. ut A G N S V W aa bb *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter*; alii ut C O *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter*; alii aliter corrupte; sed nihil immutandum duximus.

en: The codices do not agree among themselves; codex T agrees with the Vatican edition as to the sense by placing *vel Filius est Pater* in place of *e converso*. Several codices such as A, G, N, S, V, W, aa, bb [read] *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est Pater vel Filius. Similiter*; others such as C, O [read] *ergo Deus Pater est vel Filius est. Similiter*; others otherwise corruptly; but we have judged nothing should be changed.

la: De praedicatione per identitatem vide infra d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; d. 33. q. 3. et d. 34. q. 2. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4. et Scot., hic q. 2.

en: On predication by identity see below d. 3, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; d. 33, q. 3, and d. 34, q. 2. — On this doubt cf. above q. 4, and Scotus, here q. 2.

la: Dist. XXII. c. 3. et dd. XXIV. et XXV.

en: Distinction XXII, c. 3, and Distinctions XXIV and XXV.

la: Cod. T addit *nomen*.

en: Codex T adds *nomen* ("name").

la: Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *po* pro *Deo*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] *po* in place of *Deo*.

la: Cod. W *omnibus*. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut F H T V cc cum edd. 2, 3 *suppositi* loco *supponendi*.

en: Codex W [reads] *omnibus*. A little below some codices such as F, H, T, V, cc, with edd. 2, 3, [read] *suppositi* in place of *supponendi*.

la: De *re naturae* sive *supposito* vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 34. q. 1. — Quoad ipsam solutionem cfr. infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 6.

en: On the *res naturae* or *supposit* see below d. 23, a. 1, q. 2 and d. 34, q. 1. — As to the solution itself cf. below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 7. — St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 39, a. 6.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes mss. et ed. 1 *illa* pro *ita*, quod unus vel alter codex omittit.

en: The Vatican edition, against nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] *illa* in place of *ita*, which one or another codex omits.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum *uno* et paulo post ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *immo*, loco cuius edd. 2, 3 *in uno*. — De hoc dubio cfr. hic q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 4.

en: On the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3 we have struck out the *uno* added here, and a little later from the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *immo*, in place of which edd. 2, 3 [read] *in uno*. — On this doubt cf. here q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 3. — St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. q. 3. ad ult.

en: Cf. above d. 2, q. 3, ad ult.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam *et*.

en: We have supplied from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the particle *et*.

la: Cfr. Porphyr. *de Praedicab.* c. de *Differentia*.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter on *Difference*.

la: Licet plurimi codd. et ed. 1 habeant *si*, praeferimus tamen cum codd. L R etc. *etsi*. Codd. cit. et ed. 1 deinde legunt *recipiatur* (multi codd. falso *respiciatur*) pro *recipitur*. — De solutione huius dubii cfr. hic q. 2. et infra d. 9. dub. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. ad ult. et a. 4. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 31. a. 2. ac S. III. q. 17. a. 1. ad 7, ubi de differentia inter *alium* et *alterum* eadem sententia profertur.

en: Although very many codices and ed. 1 have *si*, we prefer however with codices L, R etc. *etsi*. The codices cited and ed. 1 then read *recipiatur* (many codices wrongly *respiciatur*) in place of *recipitur*. — On the solution of this doubt cf. here q. 2 and below d. 9, dub. 1. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2, ad ult. and a. 4. — St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. 31, a. 2, and *Summa Theol.* III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 7, where the same opinion concerning the difference between *alius* and *alterum* is set forth.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5

title_alt: Distinctio V — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction V — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### Distinctio V.

*Utrum divina essentia genuerit Filium, vel genita sit a Patre, vel de ipsa natus sit Filius, vel Spiritus sanctus processerit.*

Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Pater genuit[^1] divinam essentiam, vel quod divina essentia genuit Filium, vel essentia genuit[^2] essentiam, an omnino non genuit nec genita est divina essentia.

Ad quod catholicis tractatoribus consentientes dicimus, quod nec Pater genuit divinam essentiam, nec divina essentia genuit Filium, nec divina essentia genuit essentiam. Hic autem nomine essentiae intelligimus divinam naturam, quae communis est tribus personis et tota in singulis. Ideo non est dicendum, quod Pater genuit divinam essentiam; quia si Pater diceretur genuisse divinam essentiam, essentia divina relative diceretur ad Patrem vel pro relativo poneretur. Si autem relative diceretur vel pro relativo poneretur, non indicaret essentiam. Ut enim ait Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^3]: «Quod relative dicitur, non indicat substantiam».

Item, cum Deus Pater sit divina essentia, si eius esset genitor, esset utique genitor eius rei, quae ipse est; et ita eadem res se ipsam genuisset, quod Augustinus negat, ut supra[^4] ostendimus.

Item, si Pater est genitor essentiae divinae, cum ipse essentia divina sit et Deus sit, eo ergo[^5] quod generat, et est et Deus est. Ita ergo non illud quod generatur, est a Patre Deus, sed Pater eo quod generat, et est et Deus est. Et si ita est, non genito gignens, sed gignenti genitus[^6] causa est, ut et sit et Deus sit. Simili ratione probat Augustinus in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^7], «quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia, quam genuit, quia si ea sapiens est, ea est; hoc enim est ibi esse quod sapere. Quodsi hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam, quam genuit, sapiens Pater est. Quid enim aliud dicimus, cum dicimus: hoc illi est esse quod sapere, nisi, eo est quo sapiens est? Ergo quae causa illi est, ut sapiens sit, etiam ipsa illi causa est, ut sit. Si ergo sapientia, quam genuit, illi causa est, ut sapiens sit, et causa illi est, ut sit. Sed causam Patri, qua sit, a Patre genitam, nullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam; quid enim est insanius? Ita ergo, si Pater genuit essentiam, qua est, essentia, quam genuit, causa est illi, ut sit». Non ergo ipsam, qua[^8] est, essentiam genuit. «Nam in illa simplicitate, inquit Augustinus[^9], quia non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem est ibi sapientia quae essentia»; ideoque quod de sapientia, hoc de essentia dicimus. Sicut ergo non genuit sapientiam, qua sapiens est, ita nec essentiam, qua est. Ut enim sapientia sapiens est et potentia potens, ita et essentia ipse est, eademque est sapientia et potentia, quae essentia. Patet itaque ex praedictis, quia[^10] Pater essentiam divinam non genuit.

Huic autem videtur contrarium quod Augustinus ait in libro unico *de Fide et symbolo*, capitulo tertio[^11]: «Deus, cum Verbum genuit, id quod ipse est genuit, nec de nihilo nec de aliqua iam facta conditaque materia, sed de se ipso id quod est ipse». Item[^12]: «Deus Pater, qui verissime se indicare animis cognituris et voluit et potuit, hoc ad se ipsum indicandum genuit, quod est ipse qui genuit». Ecce aperte dicit his verbis, Deum Patrem genuisse illud quod ipse est. Illud autem quod ipse est, non est nisi essentia divina: videtur ergo divinam essentiam genuisse. Ad quod respondemus, illa verba sic intelligenda esse dicentes: Pater de se ipso genuit illud quod ipse est, id est Filium, qui est illud quod Pater est. Nam quod Pater est, et Filius hoc est, sed non qui Pater est, et Filius hic est.

Ita etiam non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit Filium, quia cum Filius sit divina essentia, iam esset Filius res, a qua generatur; et ita eadem res se ipsam generaret. Ita etiam dicimus, quod essentia divina non genuit essentiam. Cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia, si divina essentia essentiam genuit, eadem res se ipsam genuit, quod omnino esse non potest; sed Pater solus genuit Filium, et a Patre et Filio procedit Spiritus sanctus[^13].

Praedictis autem videtur contrarium esse quod dicit Augustinus in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^14]: «Hoc, inquit, est Deo esse quod sapere; unde Pater et Filius simul sunt una sapientia, quia una essentia: et singillatim sapientia de sapientia, sicut essentia de essentia». Ecce his verbis aperte dicit Augustinus, sapientiam de sapientia et essentiam de essentia, ubi videtur significare, quod sapientia sapientiam et essentia es-

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sentiam genuerit. Idem in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^15] ait: «Sic Christum Dei Filium, id est unam ex Trinitate personam, Deum verum crede, ut divinitatem eius de natura Patris natam esse non dubites». Hic videtur dicere, quod natura Filii sit nata de natura Patris. Idem etiam in libro decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^16] ait: «Dicitur Filius consilium de consilio et voluntas de voluntate, sicut substantia de substantia, sapientia de sapientia». Et hic videtur dicere, quod substantia sit genita de substantia et sapientia de sapientia. Sed hoc[^17] ita determinamus: «sapientia de sapientia, et substantia de substantia est», id est Filius, qui est sapientia, qui est substantia, est de Patre, qui est eadem substantia et sapientia; et Filius, qui est divinitas, natus est de Patre, qui est natura divina. Et ut expressius dicamus, dicimus, Filium sapientiam esse de Patre sapientia, et dicimus, Filium substantiam esse genitum de Patre et a Patre substantia. Quod autem ita intelligi debeat Augustinus, ostendit in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^18] dicens: «Pater ipse sapientia est; et dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, quomodo dicitur lumen Patris, id est, sicut lumen de lumine et uterque unum lumen, sic intelligatur sapientia de sapientia; et uterque una sapientia et una essentia». Item[^19]: «Ideo Christus dicitur virtus et sapientia Dei, quia de Patre, virtute et sapientia, etiam ipse virtus et sapientia est, sicut ipse lumen de Patre lumine est, et ipse fons vitae est apud Deum Patrem, fontem vitae. Filius ergo sapientia de Patre sapientia est, sicut Filius lumen de Patre lumine, et Deus Filius de Deo Patre, ut et singulus sit lumen et singulus Deus et singulus sapientia, et simul unum lumen, unus Deus, una sapientia». Ecce his verbis manifeste aperit Augustinus, ex quo sensu accipienda sint praedicta verba et his similia, scilicet cum dicitur: substantia de substantia, vel substantia genuit substantiam.

Huic vero etiam id contrarium videtur, quod Hilarius ait in quarto libro *de Trinitate*[^20]: «Nihil, inquit, nisi natum habet Filius; et geniti honoris admiratio in honore generantis est». Cum ergo Filius essentiam habeat — tota enim in eo est divina essentia — videtur quod ipsa divina essentia nata sit. Item in quinto libro[^21] ait: «Nativitas Dei non potest eam ex qua profecta est non tenere naturam, nec enim aliud quam Deus subsistit, quod non aliunde quam de Deo subsistit». Ecce hic dicit nativitatem Dei profectam ex natura, et ita videtur ex his verbis atque praedictis natura Dei et genita et genuisse. Quod apertius dicit in libro nono *de Trinitate*[^22]: «Nos, inquit, unigenitum Deum, in forma Dei manentem, in natura hominis mansisse profitemur, nec unitatem formae servilis in naturam divinae unitatis refundimus, nec rursus corporali insinuatione Patrem in Filio praedicamus, sed ex eo eiusdem generis genitam naturam naturaliter in se gignentem habuisse naturam, quae in forma naturae se gignentis manens, formam naturae et infirmitatis corporalis accepit. Non enim defecerat Dei natura, ne esset; sed in se humilitatem terrenae nativitatis manens sibi Dei natura susceperat, generis sui potestatem in habitu assumtae humilitatis exercens». Ecce hic aperte dicit, et naturam genuisse, et naturam genitam, et naturam assumsisse naturam; quod a plerisque negatur. Item in eodem[^23]: «Nunquid unigenito Deo contumelia est, Patrem sibi innascibilem Deum esse, cum ex innascibili Deo nativitas unigenita in naturam unigenitam subsistat»? Ecce et hic dicit unigenitam naturam.

Sed quia haec verba sane vult intelligi, ipse idem dicit in quarto libro[^24]: «Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei est sermo subiectus». Haec ergo verba ita intelligi possunt: nihil habet Filius nisi natum, id est, nihil habet secundum quod Deus est, nisi quod nascendo accepit, et ipse nascendo Patris in se subsistentem habuit naturam. Unde idem Hilarius addit in quinto libro[^25]: «Eandem naturam habet genitus, quam ille qui genuit, ita tamen, ut natus non sit ille qui genuit (nam quomodo erit Pater ipse, cum genitus sit?), sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est, in quibus totus est ipse qui genuit; quia non est aliunde qui genitus est. Et ideo non refertur ad aliud quod in uno subsistit ex uno. Ac sic in generatione Filii et naturam suam, ut ita dicam, sequitur indemutabilis Deus indemutabilem gignens Deum, nec naturam suam deserit ex indemutabili Deo indemutabilis Dei perfecta nativitas. Subsistentem ergo in eo Dei naturam intelligamus, cum in Deo Deus insit; nec praeter eum qui Deus est, quisquam Deus alius sit, quia ipse Deus,

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et in eo Deus». Naturae ergo Dei Patris veritas in Deo Filio esse docetur, cum in eo Deus intelligatur[^26] esse, qui Deus est. Est enim unus in uno et unus ab uno.

Dicitur quoque et frequenter in Scriptura sacra legitur, Patrem de sua substantia genuisse Filium. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^27] ait: «Pater Deus, de nullo genitus Deo, semel de sua natura sine initio genuit Filium Deum sibi aequalem et eadem qua ipse naturaliter aeternus est divinitate coaeternum». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, Filium genitum de natura Patris. Est autem una natura Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Si ergo de natura Patris genitus est Filius, genitus est de natura Filii et Spiritus sancti, immo de natura trium personarum. Idem quoque Augustinus in libro decimo quinto *de Trinitate*[^28] dicit, Christum esse Filium substantiae Patris et de substantia Patris genitum, tractans illud verbum Apostoli loquentis de Deo Patre sic: *Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae*. «Quod dictum est, inquit, *Filii caritatis suae*, nihil aliud intelligatur[^29] quam *Filii sui dilecti*, quam *Filii substantiae suae*. Caritas quippe Patris, quae in natura eius est ineffabiliter simplici, nihil est aliud quam ipsa natura atque substantia, ut saepe diximus et saepe iterare non piget, ac per hoc Filius caritatis eius nullus est alius, quam qui de substantia eius est genitus». Ecce aperte hic dicit Augustinus, Filium esse genitum de substantia Patris et Filium substantiae Patris. Idem quoque Augustinus in libro secundo *contra Maximinum haereticum*[^30], substantiam Dei genuisse Filium, et Filium genitum de substantia Patris asserit dicens: «Carnalibus cogitationibus pleni, substantiam Dei de se ipsa gignere Filium non putatis, nisi hoc patiatur, quod substantia carnis patitur, quando gignit. *Erratis nescientes Scripturas neque virtutem Dei*[^31]. Nullo enim modo verum Dei Filium cogitatis, si eum natum esse de substantia Patris negatis. Non enim iam erat hominis Filius et Deo donante factus est Dei Filius, ex Deo natus gratia, non natura. An forte, etsi non hominis filius erat, tamen aliqua iam erat qualiscumque creatura et in Dei Filium, Deo mutante, conversa est? Sed nihil horum est: ergo aut de nihilo, aut de aliqua substantia natus est. Sed ne crederemus, vos putare de nihilo esse Dei Filium, affirmastis[^32], non vos dicere de nihilo esse Dei Filium. De aliqua ergo substantia est; et si non de substantia Patris, de qua sit, dicite; sed non invenietis. Iam igitur unigenitum Dei Filium, Iesum Christum, de Patris esse substantia, non vos nobiscum pigeat confiteri». Idem in eodem[^33]: «Utrique legimus, ut simus in vero Filio eius, Iesu Christo. Dicite ergo nobis, utrum iste verus Dei Filius ab eis qui gratia filii sunt, quadam proprietate discretus de nulla substantia sit, an de aliqua? Non dico, inquis, de nulla, nec dicam de nihilo: ergo de aliqua substantia est. Quaero, de qua? Si non de Patris substantia est, aliam quaere. Si aliam non invenis, Patris agnosce substantiam, et Filium cum Patre homoousion confitere». Item in eodem[^34]: «Confiteor, Deum Patrem omnino incorruptibiliter genuisse, sed quod est ipse genuisse. Item dico quod saepe dicendum est: aut de aliqua substantia natus est Dei Filius, aut de nulla; si de nulla: ergo de nihilo; quod vos iam non dicitis; si vero de aliqua, nec tamen de Patris substantia, non est verus Filius; si vero de Patris substantia, unius eiusdemque substantiae sunt Pater et Filius. Vos autem nec Filium[^35] de substantia Patris genitum vultis; et tamen eum nec ex nihilo nec ex aliqua materia, sed ex Patre esse conceditis; nec videtis, quam necesse sit, ut qui non est ex nihilo nec ex aliqua alia re, sed ex Deo, nisi ex Dei substantia esse non possit, et hoc esse quod Deus est, de quo est, id est Deus de Deo natus; quia non alius prius fuit, sed natura coaeterna de Deo est».

His verbis praemissis innui videtur, quod divina summa substantia[^36] Filium genuerit, et quod Filius sit genitus de substantia Patris, et quod de Deo est natura coaeterna, et quod Pater id quod ipse est genuit. Id autem quod ipse est, essentia divina est; et ita putari potest, divinam essentiam genuisse. Vehementer movent nos haec verba, quae quomodo intelligenda sint, mallem ab aliis audire quam tradere[^37]. Ut tamen sine praeiudicio atque temeritate loquar, ex hoc sensu dicta possunt accipi: natura coaeterna de Deo est, id est, Filius coaeternus Patri de Patre est, ita quod est eadem cum eo natura vel eiusdem naturae. Quem sensum confirmat Augustinus, ibidem[^38] subiiciens et quod dixerat quasi explanans. Dicto enim: «Natura coaeterna de Deo est», addidit: «Non est aliud Filius quam illud de quo est, id est, unius eiusdemque substantiae est». Deinde apertius talem intellectum ex praedictis verbis fore habendum aperit in eodem libro *contra Maximinum* dicens: «Trinitas haec unius eiusdemque substantiae est, quia non de aliqua materia vel de nihilo est Filius, sed de quo est genitus. Itemque Spiritus sanctus non de aliqua materia vel de nihilo est, sed inde est, unde procedit». His utique verbis aperte ostendit, ea ratione dici Filium esse de substantia Patris, quia est de Patre genitus, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae cum eo: et[^39] Spiritum sanctum esse de substantia Patris et Filii, quia ab utroque procedit, ita quod est eiusdem substantiae.

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english:
### Distinction V.

*Whether the divine essence has begotten the Son, or has been begotten by the Father, or whether the Son was born of it, or the Holy Spirit proceeded [from it].*

After these things it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Father begot[^1] the divine essence, or that the divine essence begot[^2] the Son, or that essence begot essence, or whether the divine essence has altogether neither begotten nor been begotten.

To which, agreeing with catholic teachers, we say that neither did the Father beget the divine essence, nor did the divine essence beget the Son, nor did the divine essence beget essence. Here, however, by the name "essence" we understand the divine nature, which is common to the three persons and whole in each. Therefore it is not to be said that the Father begot the divine essence; for if the Father were said to have begotten the divine essence, the divine essence would be spoken of relatively to the Father, or would be put in place of a relative term. But if it were spoken of relatively or put in place of a relative term, it would not signify essence. For as Augustine says in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^3]: «That which is said relatively does not signify substance.»

Likewise, since God the Father is the divine essence, if he were the begetter of it, he would assuredly be the begetter of that thing which he himself is; and so the same thing would have begotten itself, which Augustine denies, as we showed above[^4].

Likewise, if the Father is the begetter of the divine essence, since he himself is the divine essence and is God, then by that very fact[^5] by which he generates, both [it] is and is God. Thus, then, it is not that which is generated which is God from the Father, but the Father, by that by which he generates, both is and is God. And if it is so, the begetter is not the cause to the begotten, but the begotten[^6] [is the cause] to the begetter, that he both be and be God. By a similar reasoning Augustine proves in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^7] «that the Father is not wise by the wisdom which he begot, because if he is wise by it, he is by it; for there to-be is the same as to-be-wise. But if there to-be is the same as to-be-wise, the Father is not wise by that wisdom which he begot. For what else do we say, when we say: for him to-be is the same as to-be-wise, except that he is by that by which he is wise? Therefore whatever cause is to him, that he be wise, that very thing is also a cause to him that he be. If, then, the wisdom which he begot is the cause to him that he be wise, it is also a cause to him that he be. But that the cause to the Father by which he is should be a wisdom begotten by the Father — no one in any way would say so; for what is more insane? Thus then, if the Father begot the essence by which he is, the essence which he begot is the cause to him that he be.» Therefore he did not beget the very essence by which[^8] he is. «For in that simplicity», says Augustine[^9], «since to-be-wise is not other than to-be, the wisdom there is the same as the essence»; and therefore what we say of wisdom we say also of essence. As, therefore, he did not beget the wisdom by which he is wise, so neither the essence by which he is. For as he is wise by wisdom and powerful by power, so also he is essence by essence, and the same is wisdom and power as essence. It is therefore evident from what has been said that[^10] the Father did not beget the divine essence.

But to this it seems contrary that Augustine says in his sole book *On Faith and the Creed*, chapter three[^11]: «God, when he begot the Word, begot that which he himself is, neither from nothing nor from any matter already made and created, but from himself that which he himself is.» Likewise[^12]: «God the Father, who most truly both willed and was able to make himself known to minds about to know him, for the indicating of himself begot this, which is he himself who begot.» Behold, he plainly says in these words that God the Father begot that which he himself is. But that which he himself is, is nothing other than the divine essence: it seems, therefore, that he begot the divine essence. To which we respond, saying that those words are to be understood thus: the Father from himself begot that which he himself is, that is, the Son, who is that which the Father is. For what the Father is, the Son also is this, but not who the Father is, the Son is this.

So also it is not to be said that the divine essence begot the Son, because since the Son is the divine essence, the Son would already be the thing from which he is generated; and so the same thing would generate itself. So also we say that the divine essence did not beget essence. For since the divine essence is one and a certain supreme thing, if the divine essence begot essence, the same thing would have begotten itself, which can in no way be; but the Father alone begot the Son, and from the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit[^13].

But to what has been said it seems contrary that Augustine says in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^14]: «This», he says, «for God is to-be the same as to-be-wise; whence the Father and the Son together are one wisdom, because one essence: and severally wisdom from wisdom, just as essence from essence.» Behold, in these words Augustine plainly says wisdom from wisdom and essence from essence, where he seems to signify that wisdom begot wisdom and essence

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begot essence. The same in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^15] says: «So believe Christ the Son of God, that is, one person of the Trinity, true God, that you may not doubt his divinity to be born of the nature of the Father.» Here he seems to say that the nature of the Son was born of the nature of the Father. The same also in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^16] says: «The Son is called counsel from counsel and will from will, just as substance from substance, wisdom from wisdom.» And here he seems to say that substance was begotten from substance and wisdom from wisdom. But this[^17] we so determine: «Wisdom is from wisdom, and substance is from substance», that is, the Son, who is wisdom, who is substance, is from the Father, who is the same substance and wisdom; and the Son, who is divinity, was born of the Father, who is the divine nature. And to speak more expressly, we say that the Son is wisdom from the Father wisdom, and we say that the Son is substance begotten from the Father and by the Father substance. That this is so to be understood Augustine shows in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^18] saying: «The Father himself is wisdom; and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, in the manner in which he is called the light of the Father, that is, just as light from light and both one light, so let wisdom be understood from wisdom; and both one wisdom and one essence.» Likewise[^19]: «Therefore Christ is called the power and wisdom of God, because from the Father, [who is] power and wisdom, he himself also is power and wisdom, just as he himself is light from the Father light, and he himself is the fount of life with God the Father, the fount of life. The Son therefore is wisdom from the Father wisdom, just as the Son is light from the Father light, and God the Son from God the Father, so that each singly is light and singly God and singly wisdom, and together one light, one God, one wisdom.» Behold in these words Augustine manifestly opens up by what sense the aforesaid words and the like are to be received, namely when it is said: substance from substance, or substance begot substance.

But to this also that seems contrary which Hilary says in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^20]: «Nothing», he says, «does the Son have except as born; and the admiration of the begotten honor is in the honor of the begetter.» Since therefore the Son has essence — for the divine essence is whole in him — it seems that the divine essence itself was born. Likewise in the fifth book[^21] he says: «The nativity of God cannot fail to retain the nature from which it has come forth, for nothing else than God subsists, which subsists not otherwise than from God.» Behold, here he says that the nativity of God comes forth from the nature, and so from these words and what was said before it seems that the nature of God both was begotten and begot. Which he says more openly in the ninth book *On the Trinity*[^22]: «We», he says, «profess the only-begotten God, abiding in the form of God, to have abode in the nature of man, and we do not melt back the unity of the servile form into the nature of the divine unity, nor again do we preach the Father in the Son by bodily insinuation, but [we profess] that from him a nature begotten of the same kind naturally had a begotten nature in itself, which abiding in the form of the nature begetting itself, received the form of nature and of bodily infirmity. For the nature of God had not failed, so as not to be; but abiding in itself the lowliness of earthly nativity, the nature of God had taken to itself, exercising the power of its own kind in the habit of an assumed lowliness.» Behold, here he plainly says that nature both begot, and was begotten, and that nature took on nature; which is denied by very many. Likewise in the same place[^23]: «Surely is it a reproach to the only-begotten God, that the Father is to him an unbegotten God, since from the unbegotten God an only-begotten nativity subsists into an only-begotten nature?» Behold, here too he says only-begotten nature.

But because he wishes these words to be soundly understood, he himself says in the fourth book[^24]: «The understanding of things said is to be taken from the causes of speaking, because the thing is not subject to the speech, but the speech to the thing.» These words therefore can be so understood: the Son has nothing except as born, that is, he has nothing according to which he is God, except what he received in being born, and he himself in being born had the Father's nature subsisting in him. Whence the same Hilary adds in the fifth book[^25]: «The begotten has the same nature which he who begot has, yet so that he who begot is not born (for how will he himself be Father, if he is begotten?), but he who is begotten subsists in those very things in which he who begot is wholly himself; because he who is begotten is not from elsewhere. And therefore that which subsists in one from one is not referred to another. And so in the generation of the Son the unchangeable God, so to speak, follows his own nature, an unchangeable God begetting an unchangeable God, nor does the perfect nativity of the unchangeable God from the unchangeable God forsake its own nature. Therefore let us understand the nature of God subsisting in him, since in God God is within; and besides him who is God, there is no other God, because he himself is God,

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and in him is God.» The truth of the nature of God the Father is therefore taught to be in God the Son, since in him is understood[^26] to be God, who is God. For he is one in one and one from one.

It is also said and frequently read in sacred Scripture that the Father begot the Son of his own substance. Whence Augustine in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^27] says: «God the Father, begotten of no God, once from his own nature without beginning begot the Son God equal to himself and coeternal in the same divinity in which he himself is naturally eternal.» Behold, here Augustine says that the Son was begotten of the nature of the Father. But there is one nature of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. If, therefore, the Son is begotten of the nature of the Father, he is begotten of the nature of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, indeed of the nature of the three persons. The same Augustine also in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^28] says that Christ is the Son of the substance of the Father and begotten of the substance of the Father, treating that word of the Apostle speaking of God the Father thus: *Who delivered us from the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his charity*. «Which is said», he says, «*the Son of his charity*, let nothing else be understood[^29] than *the Son of his beloved*, than *the Son of his substance*. For the charity of the Father, which is in his ineffably simple nature, is nothing other than the very nature and substance, as we have often said and are not loath often to repeat, and through this the Son of his charity is none other than he who is begotten of his substance.» Behold, here Augustine plainly says that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father and is the Son of the substance of the Father. The same Augustine also in the second book *Against Maximinus the heretic*[^30] asserts that the substance of God begot the Son, and the Son was begotten of the substance of the Father, saying: «Full of carnal thoughts, you do not think that the substance of God begets the Son from itself, unless he should suffer that which the substance of flesh suffers when it begets. *You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God*[^31]. For in no way do you think the true Son of God, if you deny him to have been born of the substance of the Father. For he was not previously a son of man, and by God's gift was made the Son of God, born of God by grace, not by nature. Or perhaps, even if he was not the son of man, yet he was already some kind of creature, and was changed into the Son of God by God's changing him? But none of these is so: therefore either of nothing, or of some substance, he was born. But lest we should believe that you suppose the Son of God to be of nothing, you have affirmed[^32] that you do not say the Son of God is of nothing. Of some substance therefore he is; and if not of the substance of the Father, of what he be, say; but you will not find. Now therefore let it not irk you to confess with us that the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, is of the substance of the Father.» The same in the same place[^33]: «Both we read, that we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Tell us therefore, whether this true Son of God, distinguished by a certain property from those who are sons by grace, is from no substance or from some? I do not say, you say, from none, nor will I say from nothing: therefore from some substance he is. I ask, from what? If not from the substance of the Father, seek another. If you find no other, acknowledge the substance of the Father, and confess the Son with the Father homoousios.» Likewise in the same place[^34]: «I confess that God the Father altogether incorruptibly begot, but begot that which he himself is. Likewise I say what must often be said: either from some substance the Son of God was born, or from none; if from none: therefore from nothing; which you no longer say; if however from some, yet not from the substance of the Father, he is not the true Son; if however from the substance of the Father, the Father and the Son are of one and the same substance. But you do not wish even the Son[^35] to be begotten of the substance of the Father; and yet you concede him to be neither from nothing nor from any matter, but from the Father; nor do you see how necessary it is that he who is not from nothing nor from any other thing, but from God, cannot be except from the substance of God, and that what he is is what God is, from whom he is, that is, God born of God; because there was no other before, but a coeternal nature is from God.»

By these words just put forward it seems to be hinted that the divine supreme substance[^36] begot the Son, and that the Son is begotten of the substance of the Father, and that from God is the coeternal nature, and that the Father begot that which he himself is. But that which he himself is, is the divine essence; and so it can be supposed that he begot the divine essence. These words greatly move us, as to how they should be understood; I would prefer to hear from others rather than to deliver[^37]. Yet that I may speak without prejudice and rashness, in this sense the things said can be received: the coeternal nature is from God, that is, the Son coeternal with the Father is from the Father, in such a way that he is the same nature with him or of the same nature. Which sense Augustine confirms in the same place[^38], appending and as if explaining what he had said. For having said: «The coeternal nature is from God», he added: «The Son is no other than that from which he is, that is, he is of one and the same substance.» Then he opens more openly in the same book *Against Maximinus* that such an understanding is to be had from the aforesaid words, saying: «This Trinity is of one and the same substance, because the Son is not from any matter or from nothing, but from him from whom he is begotten. Likewise the Holy Spirit is not from any matter or from nothing, but is from there, whence he proceeds.» By these words he plainly shows that the Son is said to be of the substance of the Father by this reason, that he is begotten of the Father, in such wise that he is of the same substance with him: and[^39] the Holy Spirit is of the substance of the Father and the Son, because he proceeds from both, in such wise that he is of the same substance.

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la: Solus cod. A ter habet *genuerit* pro *genuit*.

en: Codex A alone has *genuerit* three times for *genuit*.

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 9 supervacue addunt *divinam*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 9 superfluously add *divinam*.

la: Cap. 7. n. 8, ubi: *Quod autem relative pronuntiatur* etc. Paulo supra edd. 1, 8 post *indicaret* addunt *divinam*.

en: Chapter 7, no. 8, where: *Quod autem relative pronuntiatur* etc. Slightly above, editions 1, 8 after *indicaret* add *divinam*.

la: Dist. IV. c. 1.

en: Distinction IV, chapter 1.

la: Vat. et ed. 4 non bene omittunt *ergo*; paulo ante codd. A B C E et ed. 1 addendo *et* legunt: *essentia divina et sit et Deus sit*; cod. vero D *etiam* pro *et*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 4 not well omit *ergo*; slightly before, codices A B C E and edition 1, by adding *et*, read: *essentia divina et sit et Deus sit*; codex D, however, has *etiam* in place of *et*.

la: Cod. D et edd. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 minus bene *genitum*; in principio huius propositionis cod. C *Quodsi* pro *Et si*.

en: Codex D and editions 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 less well [read] *genitum*; at the beginning of this proposition codex C [reads] *Quodsi* for *Et si*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 2; in quo textu Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 bis pro *ibi* legit *sibi*; ed. 5 bis *illi*; codd. bis *ibi*, exceptis D E, qui primo loco habent *ei*; ed. Augustini modo *ibi*, modo *illi*.

en: Chapter 1, no. 2; in which text the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 twice read *sibi* for *ibi*; edition 5 twice *illi*; the codices twice *ibi*, except D E, which in the first place have *ei*; the edition of Augustine sometimes *ibi*, sometimes *illi*.

la: Sola Vat. perperam *quae*.

en: The Vatican edition alone wrongly [reads] *quae*.

la: Loc. cit. — Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 9 addunt *ut* ante *inquit*.

en: The same passage. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 6, 9 add *ut* before *inquit*.

la: Cod. D cum edd. 1, 8 elegantius *quod*.

en: Codex D with editions 1, 8 more elegantly [reads] *quod*.

la: Num. 4. — Omnes codd. et edd., exceptis Vat. et edd. 4, 9, falso sic: *in libro de Fide ad Petrum*.

en: Number 4. — All codices and editions, except the Vatican edition and editions 4, 9, falsely thus: *in libro de Fide ad Petrum*.

la: Loc. cit., in quo textu codd. B D E *se* pro *se ipsum*; post *indicandum genuit* ed. 8 adiicit *id est*; edd. 1, 3 omittunt *quod est ipse, qui genuit*.

en: The same passage, in which text codices B D E [read] *se* for *se ipsum*; after *indicandum genuit* edition 8 adds *id est*; editions 1, 3 omit *quod est ipse, qui genuit*.

la: Haec doctrina Magistri oppugnata est ab abbate Ioachim, sed approbata a Concilio Lateranensi IV; cfr. infra Bonav. ad hanc dist. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 4.

en: This doctrine of the Master was attacked by Abbot Joachim, but approved by the Fourth Lateran Council; cf. below Bonaventure on this distinction, article 1, question 1, and dubium 4.

la: Ex cap. 1. n. 2 et c. 2. n. 3. passim excerptum. — Vat. omittit *in libro septimo de Trinitate*.

en: Excerpted passim from chapter 1, no. 2 and chapter 2, no. 3. — The Vatican edition omits *in libro septimo de Trinitate*.

en: Chapter 2, no. 15.

la: Cap. 19. n. 37. — Immediate ante Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 8, omittit *etiam*.

en: Chapter 19, no. 37. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 8, omits *etiam*.

la: Omnes codd. contra edd. bene *haec*.

en: All codices, against the editions, rightly [read] *haec*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 2; ubi post *sapientia de sapientia* edd. 1, 8 addunt *et essentia de essentia*.

en: Chapter 1, no. 2; where after *sapientia de sapientia* editions 1, 8 add *et essentia de essentia*.

la: Cap. 3. n. 4. — Circa finem huius textus codd. bis addendo *sit* legunt: *singulus sit Deus et singulus sit sap.*, quibus secundo loco accedunt edd. 1, 5, 6, 8. Pro *singulus* et *simul* edd. 2, 3, 7 quater legunt male *singulis*; in fine edd. 1, 8 addunt *et* post *unus Deus*.

en: Chapter 3, no. 4. — Toward the end of this text the codices, by twice adding *sit*, read: *singulus sit Deus et singulus sit sap.*, with which in the second place editions 1, 5, 6, 8 agree. For *singulus* and *simul* editions 2, 3, 7 four times wrongly read *singulis*; at the end editions 1, 8 add *et* after *unus Deus*.

en: Number 10.

la: Num. 37, in quo textu et paulo post Vat. et edd. 4, 7, 9 bis legunt *provecta* pro *profecta*, sed mendose.

en: Number 37, in which text and slightly after the Vatican edition and editions 4, 7, 9 twice read *provecta* for *profecta*, but erroneously.

la: Num. 51, in quo textu codd. A B C et edd. 5, 9 legunt: *in forma servi manentem in natura Dei mansisse*. Editores Maurini vero habent: *in forma Dei manentem in natura Dei mansisse*. Iidem lectionem nostram, quam praeter codd. D E et ceteras Magistri edd. etiam antiquae Hilarii edd. exhibent, depravatam esse censent, cum Hilarius formae nomine aliud a natura ipsa intellexerit, scil. habitum, quem prae se tulit Christus. Iuxta ipsos sensus est, Christum secundum formam Dei semper mansisse in natura, unitate et gloria Dei, etsi secundum formam servi non statim ab ipsa hominis assumtione naturae divinae assecutus sit gloriam, sed tantum per resurrectionem. Cfr. ibid. n. 38. Licet textus Maurinorum multo probabilior esse videatur, ipsum tamen contra codd. et edd. Magistro non obtrudendum esse censuimus. — In eodem textu cum Hilario codd. A C *acceperit* pro *accepit* et in fine pro *humilitatis* Vat. et plures edd. *humanitatis*.

en: Number 51, in which text codices A B C and editions 5, 9 read: *in forma servi manentem in natura Dei mansisse*. The Maurist editors however have: *in forma Dei manentem in natura Dei mansisse*. The same think our reading, which besides codices D E and the other editions of the Master also the old editions of Hilary exhibit, to be corrupted, since Hilary by the name "form" understood something other than the nature itself, namely the habit which Christ bore. According to them, the sense is that Christ according to the form of God always abode in the nature, unity, and glory of God, even though according to the form of a servant he did not at once from the very assumption of man attain the glory of the divine nature, but only through the resurrection. Cf. ibid., no. 38. Although the Maurist text seems much more probable, we have judged that it should not be forced upon the Master against the codices and editions. — In the same text, with Hilary, codices A C [read] *acceperit* for *accepit*, and at the end the Vatican edition and several editions [read] *humanitatis* for *humilitatis*.

la: Loc. cit. n. 53.

en: The same passage, no. 53.

la: Num. 14; cod. A et ed. 4 addunt *de Trinitate*.

en: Number 14; codex A and edition 4 add *de Trinitate*.

la: Num. 37, sed multis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. — Vat. et ed. 4 omittunt *idem* ante *Hilarius*. In ipsa auctoritate a codd., ed. 1 et textu Hilarii omittitur *Pater* post *quomodo erit*. Mox contra originale, codd. A B C E et ed. 1 Vat. cum ceteris edd., mutata constructione et reiectis signis parentheseos, legit *subsistit* pro *subsistat*. Denique eadem Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 9 addendo *et* habent *subsistit et ex uno*.

en: Number 37, but with many things changed and omitted by the Master. — The Vatican edition and edition 4 omit *idem* before *Hilarius*. In the very authority by the codices, edition 1 and the text of Hilary, *Pater* is omitted after *quomodo erit*. Soon thereafter, against the original, codices A B C E and edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions, the construction having been changed and the signs of parenthesis having been thrown out, read *subsistit* for *subsistat*. Finally the same Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 9, by adding *et*, have *subsistit et ex uno*.

la: Ita codd. A B E; ceteri codd. et edd. *intelligitur*.

en: So codices A B E; the other codices and editions [read] *intelligitur*.

la: Cap. 2. n. 10. — Paulo ante post *Scriptura* Vat. cum paucis edd. omittit *sacra*.

en: Chapter 2, no. 10. — Slightly before, after *Scriptura* the Vatican edition with a few editions omits *sacra*.

la: Cap. 19. n. 37. — Locus Apostoli est Col. 1, 13, in quo textu Vulgata habet *filii dilectionis*.

en: Chapter 19, no. 37. — The passage of the Apostle is Col. 1:13, in which text the Vulgate has *filii dilectionis*.

la: Vat. et edd. 4, 9 *intelligitur*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 4, 9 [read] *intelligitur*.

en: Chapter 14, no. 2.

la: Matth. 22, 29, ubi Vulgata: *errantes nescientes*, cui concordant nostri codd. et edd. 1, 8; Vat. cum aliis edd. *non scientes*.

en: Matthew 22:29, where the Vulgate has: *errantes nescientes*, with which our codices and editions 1, 8 agree; the Vatican edition with the other editions [has] *non scientes*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 *affirmatis*; Augustinus: *affirmasti*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 [reads] *affirmatis*; Augustine: *affirmasti*.

la: Loc. cit. n. 3. — Pro *utrique* codd. A B D et edd. 3, 7, 8 *utique*, sed contra originale. — Respicitur locus sacrae Scripturae 1 Ioan. 5, 20.

en: The same passage, no. 3. — For *utrique* codices A B D and editions 3, 7, 8 [read] *utique*, but against the original. — The passage of sacred Scripture referred to is 1 John 5:20.

la: Loc. cit. n. 4 et 2. — Immediate ante Vat. *idem* loco *item* contra codd. et edd. 1, 8.

en: The same passage, no. 4 and 2. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition [has] *idem* in place of *item* against the codices and editions 1, 8.

la: Vat. cum cod. A et paucis edd. hic adiicit *Dei*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex A and a few editions here adds *Dei*.

la: Codd. C D addunt *vel essentia*, et mox post *genuerit* codd. D E *vel* pro *et*.

en: Codices C D add *vel essentia*, and soon after *genuerit* codices D E [read] *vel* for *et*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 praemittit *ipse*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 4, 6, 8 prefixes *ipse*.

la: Libr. II. c. *Maxim*. c. 14. n. 2; quae sequuntur ibidem inveniuntur. — Paulo post Vat. addit *pro* addidit.

en: Book II *Against Maximinus*, chapter 14, no. 2; what follows is found in the same place. — Slightly after, the Vatican edition adds *pro* [for] *addidit*.

la: Sola Vat. omittit *et*; in principio huius propositionis loco *utique* cod. D *itaque*.

en: The Vatican edition alone omits *et*; at the beginning of this proposition, in place of *utique*, codex D [has] *itaque*.