collection: Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis

title: Quaest. 3, Art. 1

title_alt:
Utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum
Whether the divine being is most simple

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas.*

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primum est, utrum divinum *esse* sit simplicissimum. Secundo, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas.

### Articulus I. *Utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod divinum *esse* sit simplicissimum.

1. Augustinus, secundo Confessionum[^p68-2]: «Te simplicius nihil reperitur»: ergo est simplex in termino, ergo et in summo, ergo est simplicissimum.

2. Item, decimo tertio Confessionum[^p68-3]: «Tu solus simplex es, cui non est aliud *vivere*, et aliud *bene vivere*»: idem ergo est in Deo *esse* et *bene esse*; sed in quo sunt haec eadem, nulla est compositio, sed summa simplicitas: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne simpliciter primum est simplicissimum; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Maior* probatur: quia compositum est posterius componente, et simplex prius composito[^p68-4]: causa ergo praedicati est in subiecto in praedicta propositione: ergo est vera per se. *Minor* est manifesta, quia Deus est ens a se ipso, nam si aliunde haberet *esse*, iam illud esset sibi Deus, non ipse. Et *rursus*, si est stare et non est abire in infinitum, necesse est ponere, ens quoddam esse primum omnium.

4. Item, omne simpliciter necessarium est simplicissimum; sed divinum *esse* est simpliciter necessarium: ergo etc. *Maiorem* probant Avicenna et Algazel in suis Metaphysicis[^p68-5]; nam simpliciter necessarium est omnino independens et incorruptibile: omne autem compositum dependet a componentibus et in illa, quantum est de sui natura, est resolubile. *Minor* est manifesta, quia altera pars contrarietatis nobilior attribuenda est Deo: ergo cum nobilius sit simpliciter necessarium quam possibile sive contingens; videtur etc.

5. Item, omne nobilissimum est simplicissimum; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Minor* est manifesta; *maior* probatur, quia nobilissimo sunt attribuendae conditiones nobilitatis in summo, alioquin non esset nobilissimum; sed simplicitas est conditio spectans ad nobilitatem, ut patet: ergo necesse est, quod ponatur esse in Deo omnino in summo.

6. Item, omne potentissimum est simplicissimum; divinum *esse* est potentissimum: ergo etc.

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*Minor* manifesta est, quia ideo dicitur *Deus*, quia omnipotens. *Maior* probatur, quia «virtus unita plus est infinita», secundum quod dicitur in libro de Causis[^p69-1]: ergo virtus infinitissima est unitissima, ergo simplicissima; sed non est virtus simplicissima nisi etiam substantia sit talis: ergo etc.

7. Item, omne, quod est quidquid habet, est simplicissimum[^p69-2]; sed Deus est quidquid habet: ergo etc. *Maior* patet, quia si esset compositio aliqua, neutrum illorum esset alterum. *Minor* patet per inductionem et rationem: quia Deus habet sapientiam, aut igitur est sapientia, aut non, et sic de aliis, exceptis relativis. Si *est sapientia*, habeo propositum; si *non*; et est sapiens sapientia: ergo est sapiens alio, quam sit ipse: ergo si ab alio habet sapientiam, ab alio etiam habet perfectionem: ergo non est Deus etc.

8. Item, omne perfectissimum est simplicissimum; sed divinum *esse* est huiusmodi: ergo etc. *Minor* manifesta est, quia nulla conditio magis est consona divino *esse* quam perfectio. *Maior* probatur: quia perfectius est quod ipsum totum et secundum se totum est perfectio, quam id quod habet in se aliquid perfectibile; sed omne compositum vel componibile habet in se aliquid perfectibile: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid sit summe perfectum, nisi etiam sit simplicissimum: ergo idem quod prius.

9. Item, omne compositum est mutabile: ergo *a destructione consequentis*[^p69-3], omne immutabile est simplex, et simpliciter immutabile est omnimode simplex; sed divinum *esse* est omnino immutabile, quia nec in melius nec in aequale nec in peius mutari potest, cum sit omnino summum bonum: ergo divinum *esse* est simplicissimum.

10. Item, quanto aliquid magis est simplex, magis est unum; sed divinum *esse* summe est unum, sicut fuit in praecedentibus ostensum[^p69-4]: ergo necesse est, divinum *esse* simpliciter esse simplicissimum.

**Contra:** 1. Anselmus[^p69-5]: Quidquid competit Deo competit ei in summo; sed divinum *esse* differt ab *esse* creato: ergo summe differt. Sed quanto aliquid pluribus differentiis differt, tanto magis differt et tanto magis est compositum: ergo necesse est, divinum *esse* summe esse compositum.

2. Item, simplicius est *esse* omnino abstractum a supposito quam concretum; sed divinum *esse* non est abstractum, sed concretum[^p69-6] cum supposito, quia in divino *esse* est vera deitas et vera hypostasis deitatem habens: ergo etc. — *Si dicas*, quod differunt sola ratione; aut rationi illi respondet aliquid rei, aut nihil: si *aliquid*, habeo propositum; si *nihil*: ergo totum vanum et falsum.

3. Item, quod nobilitatis est in creatura attribuendum et Creatori[^p69-7]; sed creatura, quanto magis composita, tanto magis accedit ad conditionem nobilitatis; sicut patet in homine, qui est perfectissimus creaturarum, quae sunt in universo, qui etiam est Dei imago: videtur ergo etc.

4. Item, in formis ordinatis forma, quae se habet ex additione, est actualior, sicut patet in forma *generis* et *speciei*, quia actualior est forma *speciei*; sed quod se habet ex additione est compositum: ergo compositio attestatur maiori actualitati et completioni. Cum igitur divinum *esse* sit actualissimum et completissimum: ergo est compositissimum.

5. Item, proprietates divini *esse* sunt unitas et veritas et bonitas: aut ergo *idem est* veritas quod substantia, aut *non*. Si *omnino idem*: ergo veritas non est magis proprietas substantiae quam e converso, quod absurdum est; si *non omnino idem*: ergo aliquid addit: ergo est aliqua compositio.

6. Item, aut *est idem* veritas et bonitas, aut *non*. Si *idem*: ergo vestigium bonitatis est vestigium veritatis, quod falsum est; si vero aliquo modo *differunt*: ergo illud, in quo sunt, aliquo modo est compositum. — *Si dicas*, quod *ratione* differunt; quaeritur tunc, quid subsit illi rationi.

7. Item, actus diversificantur per obiecta[^p69-8]; sed anima ad Deum sub ratione *veri* convertitur per cognitionem, sub ratione *boni* per dilectionem: si ergo illa sunt obiecta formalia, et isti actus sunt formaliter differentes; videtur etc.

8. Item, in divino *esse* est potentia, sapientia et voluntas; aut ergo *aliquid plus* dico per haec tria quam per unum illorum, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo qui dicit, Deum habere solum *potentiam*, nihil detrahit Deo, quod falsum est; si *aliquid plus*, et illud totum est in Deo: ergo et compositio.

9. Item, aut potentia est *scientia*, aut *non*. Si *non*: ergo in divino *esse* sunt diversa; si *sic*: ergo *scire* est *posse*. Sed Deus *scit* mala: ergo *potest* mala; sed hoc absurdum est: restat igitur, quod sit aliud: ergo videtur, quod sit compositum.

10. Item, divina voluntas est arctativa[^p69-9] potentiae; non enim facit Deus omnia, quae scit et

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potest, sed solum quae vult; nihil autem est arctativum sui ipsius: ergo aliud et aliud sunt potentia et sapientia et voluntas: ergo divina natura est composita.

11. Item, nihil omnino simplex participatur secundum maius et minus; sed divinum *esse* participatur secundum maius et minus et a viatoribus et a Beatis, qui participant et vident ipsum in se: ergo impossibile est, quod sit omnino simplex.

12. Item, nihil omnino simplex est habens multiformem operationem, quia «idem, manens idem, semper est natum facere idem[^p70-1]»; et iterum, actio multiformis aut *est ipsum agens*, et sic non est simplex; aut *non*, et sic adhuc non est simplex; sed Deus habet operationem multiformem, scilicet *creare* et *gubernare* et *remunerare*: ergo etc. — *Si dicas*, quod differunt *ratione effectuum*; *contra*: non est actio ab effectu, sed potius e converso: ergo diversificatur illa potius secundum diversitatem actionum quam secundum varietatem effectuum.

13. Item, nihil omnino simplex simul exercet operationes omnino disparatas et infinitas, quia simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter convertit se[^p70-2], et ad actionem infinitam nulla virtus sufficit minor infinita; sed Deus simul creat animam unius et iustificat animam alterius, quae sunt actiones disparatae et infinitae: ergo etc.

14. Item, nihil omnino simplex est multiforme in specie sive assimilatione; sed in divino *esse* est pluralitas rationum idealium, quia «alia ratione conditus est homo, et alia equus[^p70-3]»: ergo divinum *esse* non est simplicissimum. — *Si dicas*, quod pluralitas idearum est pluralitas respectuum; *contra*: similitudo aliquorum attenditur non secundum respectum, sed secundum formam: si ergo ideae dicuntur similitudines in mente divina, et nihil idem et secundum idem habet similitudinem ad diversa; necesse est igitur, compositionem esse in arte divina et sapientia.

**CONCLUSIO.**

*Divinum esse est simplicissimum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod divinum *esse* est simplicissimum. — Ad cuius rei evidentiam duo oportet intueri[^p70-4], scilicet perfectionem conditionum divinarum et modos considerationum nostrarum.

Si consideramus modos divinarum conditionum, divinum *esse*, eo ipso quo est primum, est simplicissimum. Nam eo ipso quo est primum, omnia ab ipso fluunt, et eo ipso quo fluunt ab ipso, ad ipsum recurrunt et reducuntur tanquam ad finem ultimum; et ex hoc habet, quod sit *alpha* et *omega*, *primus* et *novissimus*, *principium* et *finis*[^p70-5]. Quia ergo haec, quae maxime videntur distantia, concurrunt in omnimode unum; necesse est, ipsum divinum *esse* esse perfectissimum, quasi quendam intelligibilem circulum; necesse est etiam, esse simplicissimum.

Tripliciter enim aliquid deficit a summa simplicitate: aut quia *compositum ex aliis*, aut quia *compositum alii*, aut quia *componibile in aptitudine*. Divinum autem *esse* ex hoc, quod est *primum*, non est *compositum ex aliis*, nihil enim habet prius ante se; ex hoc, quod est *perfectissimum*, non est *compositum alii*, perfectum enim non venit ad constitutionem tertii; ex hoc autem, quod *ultimum*, cetera ad ipsum ordinantur sicut ad terminum quietativum: et ita ipsum est absolutissimum, ac per hoc non solum caret compositione *actuali*, verum etiam *possibili*; et sic esse simplicissimum convenit[^p70-6] Deo *vere et proprie*, non enim est haec tria in aliquo alio reperire. — Competit etiam perfecte ex hac triplici conditione. Quia enim est *perfectissimum*, habet omnes conditiones nobilitatis; quia vero *ultimum* et optimum, propter quod sunt omnia, omnes illas conditiones habet in summo; quia *primum*, in quo nulla diversitas, necesse est, quod omnes sint in ipso unum et sic simplicissimum per exclusionem omnis compositionis et inclusionem omnis perfectionis. Sunt ergo in Deo omnes conditiones nobilitatis, scilicet potentia et sapientia et voluntas, bonitas, veritas et unitas, esse, vivere et intelligere et cetera similia vere, perfecte et summe sub propria et perfecta ratione; sunt tamen unum adeo, ut nullam inducant compositionem nec minuant de simplicitate. — Quod clare non videt, nisi qui similiter intelligit circa divinum *esse* summam simplicitatem cum summa *immensitate*; quod qualiter possit capi, in consequentibus[^p70-7] poterit indagari, sed nunc tanquam certum et indubitabile debet supponi, ut simplicitatem divinam recte intelligamus secundum exigentiam divinarum conditionum.

Oportet etiam videre diversos *modos nostrarum considerationum*. — Cum enim ad considerationem necessario concurrant tria, scilicet *intelligens*, *res intellecta* et *medium* sive *ratio intelligendi*; aliquis modus potest tripliciter attribui nostro intellectui: aut ita, quod illum modum ponat *circa rem*, et tunc est verus, si in re illa reperitur, ut

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spiritualiter intelligit spiritualia; aut ita, quod ponit illum modum *circa se*, ut cum abstracte intelligit coniuncta, et tamen non est mendax, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p71-1], «abstrahentium non est mendacium»; aut cum ponit circa *rationem*, per quam intelligit, ut cum multipliciter intelligit unum per multa. — Sciendum est igitur, quod intellectus noster omnem intellectum rei complete resolvit in intellectum eius *quo est* et *quod est*, et quando intelligit rem *compositam*, tunc illam resolutionem ponit *circa se* et *circa rem*; quando vero rem *simplicem* omnino, tunc ponit illam non *circa rem*, sed *circa se*, quia aliter non potest intelligere. Unde intellectus noster, cum Deum intelligit, omnino intelligit, quod in ipso est omnis simplicitas et nulla compositio, nulla concretio, tamen intelligit per modum *quo est* et *quod est*; nec tamen est falsus, quia non ponit modum illum *circa rem*, nec vanus, quia revera aliquid respondet ex parte Dei, licet non diversum. Vere enim est in Deo essentia et suppositum, sed tamen sunt unum; vere voluntas et potentia, tamen non sunt plura, sed cognoscuntur per plura. — Et hinc est, «quod verius est, quam intelligatur, et verius intelligitur, quam dicatur», ut dicit Augustinus[^p71-2]. Propterea a divino *esse* intelligendo deficit omnis intellectus, et tamen nihilominus intellectus fidelis circa ipsum non intelligit nisi *unum*, cum *unum* intelligit multiformiter, *abstractum* concrete, *simplex* complexe, *immensum* finite, *aeternum* temporaliter, quia, ut dictum est, modos istos non attribuit ipsi intelligibili, sed sibi intelligenti vel rationi intelligendi. Fatetur igitur intellectus verus proprio lumine rationis, divinum *esse* omnino simplicissimum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod divinum *esse* summe differt ab *esse* creato; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quod ultra infertur: *ergo pluribus differentiis differt*; dici potest, quod illud non sequitur, quia prima genera[^p71-3] summe differunt, et tamen se ipsis differunt. Differentiae etiam immediate dividentes ipsum genus se ipsis differunt, et tamen maxime a se ipsis distant. — Et *si obiicias*, quod quanto aliqua in pluribus conveniunt, tanto magis sunt similia: ergo quanto aliqua pluribus differunt, tanto magis sunt differentia; dici potest, quod divinum *esse* pluribus differentiis differt ab *esse* creato, quae quidem pluralitatem ponunt et realem differentiam ex parte creaturae, non tamen ex parte Dei, quia, quae in creatura sunt per multiformitatem et differentiam realem multo perfectius reperiuntur in Deo per simplicissimam identitatem, sicut patet ex his quae iam dicta sunt et infra dicentur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicius est *esse* omnino abstractum a supposito quam concretum; dicendum, quod duplex est suppositum: unum, quod *addit* supra naturam, alterum vero, quod *non addit*. De primo supposito, quod aliquid *addit* supra naturam contrahens et distinguens, veritatem habet; sed hoc modo non ponimus suppositum esse in divinis, quia non est ibi distinctio per *additionem* aliquam factam circa naturam, sed per *originem* unius personae ab alia; unde non est ibi concretio secundum *realem inhaerentiam*, sed solum secundum *nostram intelligentiam*. — Et *si obiiciat*, quod aut illi intelligentiae respondet aliquid ex parte rei, aut nihil; iam patet responsio, quod *aliquid respondet*. Est enim in divinis vere natura et vere suppositum, id est *deitas* et *habens deitatem*; unde licet intellectus hoc intelligat per modum cuiusdam differentiae, non tamen est falsus, quia modum illum ponit *circa se* vel *circa rationem intelligendi*, non autem *circa rem*, quam intelligit; aut si ponatur, ponitur aliqua differentia realis inter suppositum et naturam, et talis est, quod compositionem nullam inducit, sicut melius in sequenti quaestione patebit[^p71-4].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *quidquid* nobilitatis est in creatura, attribuendum est Creatori; dicendum, quod est nobilitas *simpliciter*, et est nobilitas *secundum quid*. Illud autem, quod in creatura dicit nobilitatem *simpliciter*, proprie et vere attribuendum est creatrici essentiae; quod autem dicit nobilitatem cum diminutione, illud non convenit Deo attribui[^p71-5]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod maior compositio in creatura facit ad perfectionem nobilitatis, sicut patet in homine; dicendum, quod ista est nobilitas diminuta, quae venit ex multorum aggregatione, quia quod non potest in se habere per unum habet per plura; et ideo talis nobilitas non est attribuenda divino *esse*, quod quidem est nobilissimum in fine nobilitatis perfectae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in formis ordinatis forma, quae se habet ex additione, est actualior; dicendum, quod est actualitas *in genere*, et est actualitas *extra genus*. Actualitas autem *in genere* est actualitas permixta potentiae, quae quidem

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potentia salvatur in natura generis et ad actum reducitur per superadditionem differentiae distinguentis et specificantis; et de hac actualitate habet praemissa propositio veritatem. — Est etiam praeter hoc actualitas *extra genus*, quae nihil habet admixtum de potentia, et talis est actus purus; et ideo non est ibi ponere unum additum alteri, sicut actus additur potentiae praeiacenti; et talis actualitas ponitur in Deo: et ideo non sequitur, quod ponatur aliqua additio sive compositio[^p72-1].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summum bonum se habet ex additione ad bonum; dicendum, quod per additionem se habet ex parte *intellectus*, quia in intellectu summi boni clauditur intellectus *boni*; non autem se habet per additionem ex parte *rei*: tum quia bonum creatum et increatum non communicant in aliqua natura communi; tum etiam, quia summum bonum maioris simplicitatis est, quam sit ipsa communis intentio, quae significatur nomine *boni*; tum etiam, quia summum bonum excedit omne creatum bonum excessu improportionali. Unde cum *bonum* dicitur de bono creato et increato, hoc non est nisi per quandam analogiam, quia omnis bonitas creata manat a bonitate increata tanquam a causa prima; unde posterior illa ac per hoc deficiens a simplicitate summa; illa vero tanquam prima, hoc ipso quia prima, est simplicissima. Unde sicut conditio simplicitatis addita super *ens*, utpote cum dico *ens simplex*, non ponit compositionem aliquam circa ipsum; sic nec *summitas* circa *bonum*[^p72-2].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietates divini *esse* sunt unitas, veritas, bonitas; dicendum, quod veritas dicitur proprietas divini *esse*, quia, quantum est de se, dicit modum entis; sed quia in divino *esse* non differt *esse* et *posse*[^p72-3], ideo non differt *esse* et *sic esse*, quia non potest sic et aliter esse. Et propterea, quia idem est ibi *esse* et *modus essendi*, ideo nulla est ibi compositio; quia vero *modus essendi* est proprietas ipsius entis, et non e converso: hinc est, quod *unitas*, *veritas* et *bonitas* dicuntur esse proprietates divinae essentiae; non autem *essentia* dici potest proprietas *veritatis* seu *bonitatis* vice versa, quia non nominat modum essendi, sicut et illa.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut idem est in Deo veritas et bonitas, aut non; dicendum est, quod, quantum est ex parte *principalis significati* seu rei per haec nomina intellectae, idem dicunt circa esse divinum, quia non alio est Deus bonus et alio verus, sed eo ipso bonus, quo verus. Quantum autem est ex parte *rationis intelligendi*, secundum quam intellectus[^p72-4] a creaturis ascendit ad intelligentiam Creatoris; sic differentia est: quia, cum veritas et bonitas increata intelligatur per creatam, et haec in creaturis habeant aliquo modo differentiam; ideo ista aliquo modo dicuntur distingui ex parte rationum intelligendi, licet idem sint ex parte rei; nec tamen est ibi falsitas vel error in intelligendo, quia haec vere et perfectissime sunt in Deo, licet non diversificentur realiter inter se, sicut in *esse* creato. Et hoc satis clarum est, si intelligatur illud quod dictum est in solutionis principio de multiplici nostrae considerationis modo.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus diversificantur per obiecta; iam patet responsio: quia, etsi illa sint *idem* secundum rem in Deo, dicuntur tamen *diversificari* secundum *rationem intelligendi* ex parte nostra. Unde sicut illis respondet alia et alia proprietas repraesentativa in vestigio creaturae repraesentantis, quia non est idem bonitas et veritas in natura creata; sic respondet ei alia et alia potentia in imagine apprehendente, in intellectiva et affectiva, quia tam in vestigio[^p72-5] quam in imagine sunt aliqua per diversitatem, correspondentia tamen aliquibus in Deo, quae habent omnimodam identitatem secundum rem.

8. Ad aliud, quod obiicitur, quod aut potentia et sapientia et voluntas plus dicunt quam unum aliquod horum, aut nihil; dicendum, quod *explicite* aliquid plus dicunt, sed *implicite* unum eorum clauditur in reliquo; non enim potest esse summa potentia, ubi non sit voluntas et sapientia; et ideo, si unum absque altero Deo attribuatur, diminute attribuitur; non quia sint realiter differentia, sed quia hoc ipso, quod ponuntur per impossibile separari, ponuntur etiam per impossibile diversificari; et ideo sicut diversificari nequeunt, sic separari non possunt.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut potentia est scientia, aut non; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de potentia et scientia: aut secundum *principale significatum*, aut secundum *connotatum*. Idem ergo sunt secundum *rem* et principalem significationem, differunt autem secundum *connotationem*; non enim est idem aliquid esse Deo *scibile* et *possibile*, sicut non est idem *sciri* et *fieri*. *Possibile* enim nominat quid, ut est in ratione emanantis vel emanabilis; *scibile* autem, ut in ratione praesentis apud intellectum cognoscentis; et quoniam in Deo non est aliud, quo est potens, et aliud, quo est sciens, quia se ipso competit ei utrumque: ideo, licet ista diversificentur *connotatione*, sunt tamen idem secundum *rem*.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas est arctativa potentiae; dicendum, quod tripliciter est loqui de potentia et voluntate: aut quantum ad

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*affectum*[^p73-1], aut quantum ad *effectum*, aut quantum ad *respectum*. *Primo* modo habent identitatem et aequalitatem, quia quidquid vult Deus potest velle, vel quidquid potest vult posse. *Ultimo* modo habent inaequalitatem, quia potentia dicitur respectu possibilium, et voluntas respectu volitorum, et plura sunt possibilia quam volita. *Medio* autem modo aequalitatem habent, scilicet quantum ad *effectum*, quia, licet potentia ad plura se extendat quam voluntas, quia tamen Deus nihil facit, nisi quod vult, aequari dicuntur voluntas et potentia quantum ad *effectum*: et ideo voluntas dicitur esse *arctativa potentiae*, non ratione eius *quod* sunt, sed ratione eius *ad quod* comparantur.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex participatur secundum plus et minus; dicendum, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid participari, scilicet secundum *formam*, sicut genus participatur a speciebus[^p73-2]; vel secundum *influentiam*, sicut causa participatur a suis effectibus. Primo modo habet propositio veritatem; hoc autem modo non dicitur divinum *esse* participari secundum plus et minus, sed solum secundo modo; et hoc non ponit diversitatem in ipso participato, sed in eo, per quod fit illa participatio, scilicet in aliquo dono creato.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex habet multiformem operationem; dicendum, quod operatio dicitur et ipsum *opus operans* et *opus operatum*, sive actus activus et effectus productus. Primo igitur modo operatio Dei est idem quod ipse Deus, et ideo non multiplicatur ratione sui in se, sed ratione effectus producti ex parte creaturae. Primo igitur modo habet propositio veritatem, secundo vero non: quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius, ac per hoc tanto magis est principium effectuum multiformium[^p73-3].

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex convertit se simul ad operationes disparatas et infinitas; dicendum, quod simplex contingit esse aliquid duplici modo: uno modo, in quo simplicitas *excludit immensitatem*; alio modo, in quo *includit*. De primo habet praedicta propositio veritatem, de secundo vero minime, pro eo quod infinitum, eo quod infinitum divinum *esse* est infinitissime infinitum, simul se ad omnia quantacumque et qualiacumque convertere potest absque coarctatione, cum nullam prorsus admittat limitationem.

14. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex est multiforme in specie vel in assimilatione; dicendum, quod est multiformitas secundum *rationem informandi* et secundum *rationem exprimendi*. Primo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet intra se diversarum formarum naturas; et sic non potest stare cum summa simplicitate. Secundo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet in se multarum formarum ideas, et hoc modo stat cum summa simplicitate. Sicut enim simplicissimum sua summa actualitate habet summam virtutem, qua omnia potest distincte et plene efficere; sic et summam veritatem, qua omnia potest aeternaliter repraesentare, sicut melius patuit supra in quaestione de rationibus aeternis[^p73-4].

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### Question III. *Whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together; and concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine *being* is most simple. Second, whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is most simple.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the divine *being* is most simple.

1. Augustine, *Confessions* II[^p68-2]: "Nothing more simple than you is found": therefore it is simple in the ultimate term, therefore also in the highest degree, therefore it is most simple.

2. Likewise, *Confessions* XIII[^p68-3]: "You alone are simple, for whom it is not one thing *to live* and another *to live well*": therefore in God *to be* and *to be well* are the same; but in that in which these are the same, there is no composition, but the highest simplicity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything simply first is most simple; but the divine *being* is of this sort: therefore etc. The *major* is proved: because the composite is posterior to what composes it, and the simple is prior to the composite[^p68-4]: therefore the cause of the predicate is in the subject in the aforesaid proposition: therefore it is true of itself. The *minor* is manifest, because God is a being from himself, for if he had *being* from elsewhere, that would then be God to him, and not he himself. And *again*, if there is a stopping-place and there is no going on to infinity, it is necessary to posit that some being is first of all.

4. Likewise, everything simply necessary is most simple; but the divine *being* is simply necessary: therefore etc. The *major* Avicenna and Algazel prove in their *Metaphysics*[^p68-5]; for what is simply necessary is altogether independent and incorruptible: but every composite depends on the things that compose it, and is resoluble into them so far as its own nature goes. The *minor* is manifest, because the nobler side of a contrariety is to be attributed to God: therefore since it is nobler to be simply necessary than possible or contingent; it seems etc.

5. Likewise, everything most noble is most simple; but the divine *being* is of this sort: therefore etc. The *minor* is manifest; the *major* is proved, because to what is most noble the conditions of nobility are to be attributed in the highest degree, otherwise it would not be most noble; but simplicity is a condition pertaining to nobility, as is evident: therefore it is necessary that it be posited to be in God altogether in the highest degree.

6. Likewise, everything most powerful is most simple; the divine *being* is most powerful: therefore etc. The

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*minor* is manifest, because he is called *God* precisely because he is omnipotent. The *major* is proved, because "a power united is more infinite," according to what is said in the *Book of Causes*[^p69-1]: therefore a power most infinite is most united, therefore most simple; but there is no power most simple unless the substance too be such: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, everything which is whatever it has is most simple[^p69-2]; but God is whatever he has: therefore etc. The *major* is evident, because if there were some composition, neither of them would be the other. The *minor* is evident by induction and by reason: because God has wisdom, therefore either he is wisdom, or not, and so of the rest, relatives excepted. If *he is wisdom*, I have what I proposed; if *not*; then he is wise by wisdom: therefore he is wise by something other than what he himself is: therefore if he has wisdom from another, from another also he has perfection: therefore he is not God, etc.

8. Likewise, everything most perfect is most simple; but the divine *being* is of this sort: therefore etc. The *minor* is manifest, because no condition is more consonant with the divine *being* than perfection. The *major* is proved: because that is more perfect which is itself as a whole and according to its whole self a perfection, than that which has in itself something perfectible; but every composite or composable thing has in itself something perfectible: therefore it is impossible that anything be supremely perfect unless it be also most simple: therefore the same as before.

9. Likewise, every composite is mutable: therefore, *by the destruction of the consequent*[^p69-3], everything immutable is simple, and what is simply immutable is in every way simple; but the divine *being* is altogether immutable, since it can be changed neither for the better nor for the equal nor for the worse, being altogether the highest good: therefore the divine *being* is most simple.

10. Likewise, the more simple a thing is, the more it is one; but the divine *being* is supremely one, as was shown in what precedes[^p69-4]: therefore it is necessary that the divine *being* be simply most simple.

**Contra:** 1. Anselm[^p69-5]: Whatever belongs to God belongs to him in the highest degree; but the divine *being* differs from created *being*: therefore it differs supremely. But the more differences a thing differs by, the more it differs and the more it is composite: therefore it is necessary that the divine *being* be supremely composite.

2. Likewise, *being* altogether abstracted from a supposit is more simple than concrete *being*; but the divine *being* is not abstract, but concrete[^p69-6] with a supposit, because in the divine *being* there is a true deity and a true hypostasis having the deity: therefore etc. — *If you say* that they differ by account alone; then either something of the thing corresponds to that account, or nothing: if *something*, I have what I proposed; if *nothing*: therefore the whole is empty and false.

3. Likewise, what belongs to nobility in the creature is to be attributed also to the Creator[^p69-7]; but the more composite a creature is, the more it approaches the condition of nobility; as is evident in man, who is the most perfect of the creatures that are in the universe, who is also the image of God: it seems therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in ordered forms the form that stands by addition is more actual, as is evident in the form of the *genus* and of the *species*, because the form of the *species* is more actual; but what stands by addition is composite: therefore composition witnesses to greater actuality and completeness. Since therefore the divine *being* is most actual and most complete: therefore it is most composite.

5. Likewise, the properties of the divine *being* are unity and truth and goodness: either therefore truth *is the same* as substance, or *not*. If *altogether the same*: therefore truth is no more a property of substance than the reverse, which is absurd; if *not altogether the same*: therefore it adds something: therefore there is some composition.

6. Likewise, either truth and goodness *are the same*, or *not*. If *the same*: therefore the vestige of goodness is the vestige of truth, which is false; but if in some way they *differ*: therefore that in which they are is in some way composite. — *If you say* that they differ *by account*; it is then asked what underlies that account.

7. Likewise, acts are diversified by their objects[^p69-8]; but the soul is turned to God under the account of the *true* by knowledge, and under the account of the *good* by love: if therefore those are formal objects, then these acts are formally different; it seems etc.

8. Likewise, in the divine *being* there is power, wisdom and will; either therefore by these three I say *something more* than by one of them, or *not*. If *not*: therefore whoever says that God has *power* only takes nothing away from God, which is false; if *something more*, and that whole is in God: therefore there is composition too.

9. Likewise, either power is *knowledge*, or *not*. If *not*: therefore in the divine *being* there are diverse things; if *so*: therefore *to know* is *to be able*. But God *knows* evils: therefore he *is able to do* evils; but this is absurd: it remains therefore that it is something else: therefore it seems that it is composite.

10. Likewise, the divine will is restrictive[^p69-9] of the power; for God does not do all the things which he knows and is

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able to do, but only those which he wills; but nothing is restrictive of its own self: therefore power and wisdom and will are one thing and another: therefore the divine nature is composite.

11. Likewise, nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less; but the divine *being* is participated according to more and less both by wayfarers and by the Blessed, who participate in it and see it in itself: therefore it is impossible that it be altogether simple.

12. Likewise, nothing altogether simple has a multiform operation, because "the same thing, remaining the same, is always born to do the same[^p70-1]"; and again, a multiform action either *is the agent itself*, and so it is not simple; or *not*, and so it is still not simple; but God has a multiform operation, namely *to create* and *to govern* and *to reward*: therefore etc. — *If you say* that they differ *by account of the effects*; *on the contrary*: the action is not from the effect, but rather the reverse: therefore it is diversified rather according to the diversity of the actions than according to the variety of the effects.

13. Likewise, nothing altogether simple exercises at once operations altogether disparate and infinite, because the simple, to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly[^p70-2], and to an infinite action no power less than infinite suffices; but God at once creates the soul of one and justifies the soul of another, which are disparate and infinite actions: therefore etc.

14. Likewise, nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation; but in the divine *being* there is a plurality of ideal accounts, because "by one account man was made, and by another the horse[^p70-3]": therefore the divine *being* is not most simple. — *If you say* that the plurality of the ideas is a plurality of respects; *on the contrary*: the likeness of things is attended to not according to respect, but according to form: if therefore the ideas are called likenesses in the divine mind, and nothing that is the same and according to the same has a likeness to diverse things; it is necessary therefore that there be composition in the divine art and wisdom.

**CONCLUSION.**

*The divine being is most simple.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the divine *being* is most simple. — For the evidence of this, two things must be looked at[^p70-4], namely the perfection of the divine conditions and the modes of our considerations.

If we consider the modes of the divine conditions, the divine *being*, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. For by the very fact that it is first, all things flow from it, and by the very fact that they flow from it, they run back and are led back to it as to their last end; and from this it has that it is *alpha* and *omega*, *the first* and *the last*, *the beginning* and *the end*[^p70-5]. Since therefore these things, which seem most distant, converge into what is in every way one; it is necessary that the divine *being* itself be most perfect, as a kind of intelligible circle; it is necessary also that it be most simple.

For in three ways something falls short of the highest simplicity: either because it is *composed out of others*, or because it is *composed with another*, or because it is *composable in aptitude*. But the divine *being*, from the fact that it is *first*, is not *composed out of others*, for it has nothing prior before itself; from the fact that it is *most perfect*, it is not *composed with another*, for the perfect does not come to the constituting of a third; from the fact, moreover, that it is *last*, the rest are ordered to it as to a term that brings rest: and so it is itself most absolute, and through this it lacks not only *actual* composition but also *possible*; and thus to be most simple belongs[^p70-6] to God *truly and properly*, for it is not possible to find these three in anything else. — It belongs to him also perfectly, from this threefold condition. For because it is *most perfect*, it has all the conditions of nobility; because it is *last* and best, on account of which all things are, it has all those conditions in the highest degree; because it is *first*, in which there is no diversity, it is necessary that they all be one in it, and thus most simple by the exclusion of all composition and the inclusion of all perfection. There are therefore in God all the conditions of nobility, namely power and wisdom and will, goodness, truth and unity, being, living and understanding and the rest of the like, truly, perfectly and in the highest degree under their proper and perfect account; yet they are so one that they introduce no composition nor lessen anything of the simplicity. — Which he does not see clearly, unless he likewise understands concerning the divine *being* the highest simplicity together with the highest *immensity*; and how this can be grasped will be able to be searched out in what follows[^p70-7], but for now it must be supposed as certain and indubitable, so that we may rightly understand the divine simplicity according to the requirement of the divine conditions.

We must also see the diverse *modes of our considerations*. — For since to a consideration three things necessarily converge, namely the *one understanding*, the *thing understood*, and the *medium* or *account of understanding*; some mode can be attributed in three ways to our understanding: either so that it puts that mode *about the thing*, and then it is true if it is found in that thing, as when it understands spiritual things

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spiritually; or so that it puts that mode *about itself*, as when it understands abstractly things that are joined, and yet it is not lying, because, as the Philosopher says[^p71-1], "there is no lie in abstracting"; or when it puts it about the *account* by which it understands, as when it understands in many ways what is one by many. — It must be known therefore that our understanding resolves every understanding of a thing completely into the understanding of its *quo est* ("that by which it is") and its *quod est* ("that which is"), and when it understands a *composite* thing, then it puts that resolution *about itself* and *about the thing*; but when it understands a thing altogether *simple*, then it puts it not *about the thing*, but *about itself*, because otherwise it cannot understand. Hence our understanding, when it understands God, altogether understands that in him there is every simplicity and no composition, no concretion, yet it understands by way of *quo est* and *quod est*; nor yet is it false, because it does not put that mode *about the thing*, nor is it empty, because in truth something corresponds on God's side, though not something diverse. For truly there is in God essence and supposit, yet they are one; truly will and power, yet they are not many, but are known through many. — And hence it is that "he is more truly than he is understood, and is more truly understood than he is spoken," as Augustine says[^p71-2]. For this reason every understanding falls short in understanding the divine *being*, and yet nonetheless the faithful understanding concerning it understands nothing but *one*, since it understands the *one* multiformly, the *abstract* concretely, the *simple* complexly, the *immense* finitely, the *eternal* temporally, because, as has been said, it attributes those modes not to the intelligible itself, but to itself understanding, or to the account of understanding. The true understanding therefore confesses, by the proper lumen[^tr-lumen] of reason, that the divine *being* is altogether most simple. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary, that the divine *being* supremely differs from created *being*; it must be said that this is true; but as to what is further inferred: *therefore it differs by several differences*; it can be said that this does not follow, because the first genera[^p71-3] supremely differ, and yet they differ by themselves. Differences too that immediately divide the genus itself differ by themselves, and yet are maximally distant from themselves. — And *if you object* that the more things agree in more respects, the more they are alike: therefore the more things differ in more respects, the more they are different; it can be said that the divine *being* differs from created *being* by several differences, which indeed posit plurality and a real difference on the side of the creature, yet not on the side of God, because the things that are in the creature by multiformity and real difference are found far more perfectly in God by a most simple identity, as is evident from the things which have already been said and will be said below.

2. To that which is objected, that *being* altogether abstracted from a supposit is more simple than concrete *being*; it must be said that a supposit is twofold: one which *adds* something over the nature, the other which *does not add*. Of the first supposit, which *adds* something over the nature, contracting and distinguishing it, it holds true; but in this way we do not posit a supposit to be in the divine, because there there is no distinction by any *addition* made about the nature, but by the *origin* of one person from another; hence there is no concretion there according to *real inherence*, but only according to *our understanding*. — And *if it be objected* that either something corresponds on the side of the thing to that understanding, or nothing; the answer is already evident, that *something does correspond*. For there truly is in the divine a nature and truly a supposit, that is *deity* and *what has the deity*; hence although the understanding understands this by way of a certain difference, it is not on that account false, because it puts that mode *about itself* or *about the account of understanding*, and not *about the thing* which it understands; or if it be posited, there is posited some real difference between the supposit and the nature, and it is such that it introduces no composition, as will better appear in the following question[^p71-4].

3. To that which is objected, that *whatever* belongs to nobility in the creature is to be attributed to the Creator; it must be said that there is a nobility *simply*, and there is a nobility *in a certain respect*. But that which in the creature says nobility *simply* is properly and truly to be attributed to the creating essence; but what says nobility with a diminution, that does not befit being attributed to God[^p71-5]. When therefore it is said that greater composition in the creature makes for the perfection of nobility, as is evident in man; it must be said that this is a diminished nobility, which comes from the aggregation of many things, because what a thing cannot have in itself through one it has through many; and therefore such nobility is not to be attributed to the divine *being*, which indeed is most noble at the term of a perfect nobility.

4. To that which is objected, that in ordered forms the form which stands by addition is more actual; it must be said that there is an actuality *in a genus*, and there is an actuality *outside a genus*. But actuality *in a genus* is an actuality mixed with potency, which

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potency is preserved in the nature of the genus and is brought to act by the superaddition of a distinguishing and specifying difference; and of this actuality the premised proposition holds true. — But there is besides this an actuality *outside a genus*, which has nothing of potency mixed in, and such is pure act; and therefore there is no positing there of one thing added to another, as act is added to a pre-lying potency; and such actuality is posited in God: and therefore it does not follow that any addition or composition is posited[^p72-1].

To that which is objected, that the highest good stands by addition to the good; it must be said that it stands by addition on the side of the *understanding*, because in the understanding of the highest good the understanding of the *good* is enclosed; but it does not stand by addition on the side of the *thing*: both because created and uncreated good do not communicate in any common nature; and also because the highest good is of a greater simplicity than is the common intention itself which is signified by the name *good*; and also because the highest good exceeds every created good by a disproportionate excess. Hence when *good* is said of created and uncreated good, this is only by a certain analogy, because every created goodness flows from the uncreated goodness as from a first cause; hence that one is posterior and through this falls short of the highest simplicity; but that other, as first, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. Hence just as the condition of simplicity added over *being*, as when I say *simple being*, does not posit any composition about it; so neither does *highestness* about the *good*[^p72-2].

5. To that which is objected, that the properties of the divine *being* are unity, truth, goodness; it must be said that truth is called a property of the divine *being* because, so far as it is of itself, it says a mode of being; but because in the divine *being* there is no difference between *being* and *being able*[^p72-3], therefore there is no difference between *being* and *being thus*, because it cannot be thus and otherwise. And therefore, because there *being* and *the mode of being* are the same, therefore there is no composition there; but because *the mode of being* is a property of being itself, and not the reverse: hence it is that *unity*, *truth* and *goodness* are said to be properties of the divine essence; but *essence* cannot be called a property of *truth* or of *goodness* the other way round, because it does not name a mode of being, as those do.

6. To that which is objected, that either truth and goodness are the same in God, or not; it must be said that, so far as it is on the side of the *principal thing signified*, or of the thing understood through these names, they say the same about the divine being, because it is not by one thing that God is good and by another that he is true, but by the very same thing by which he is true he is good. But so far as it is on the side of the *account of understanding*, according to which the understanding[^p72-4] ascends from creatures to the understanding of the Creator; thus there is a difference: because, since uncreated truth and goodness are understood through the created, and these in creatures have some difference; therefore those are said in some way to be distinguished on the side of the accounts of understanding, though they are the same on the side of the thing; nor yet is there falsity or error in the understanding, because these are truly and most perfectly in God, though they are not really diversified among themselves, as in created *being*. And this is clear enough if what was said at the beginning of the solution about the manifold mode of our consideration is understood.

7. To that which is objected, that acts are diversified by their objects; the answer is already evident: because, although those are *the same* in reality in God, they are yet said to be *diversified* according to the *account of understanding* on our side. Hence just as one and another representative property corresponds to them in the vestige of the representing creature, because goodness and truth are not the same in created nature; so one and another power corresponds to it in the apprehending image, in the intellective and the affective, because both in the vestige[^p72-5] and in the image there are some things by way of diversity, corresponding nevertheless to some things in God which have an identity in every way according to reality.

8. To the other thing which is objected, that either power and wisdom and will say more than any one of them, or nothing; it must be said that *explicitly* they say something more, but *implicitly* one of them is enclosed in the other; for there cannot be the highest power where there is not will and wisdom; and therefore, if one is attributed to God apart from the other, it is attributed diminishedly; not because they are really different, but because by the very fact that they are posited as separated by an impossibility, they are posited also as diversified by an impossibility; and therefore, just as they cannot be diversified, so they cannot be separated.

9. To that which is objected, that either power is knowledge, or not; it must be said that there are two ways of speaking of power and knowledge: either according to the *principal thing signified*, or according to the *connotation*. They are therefore the same according to *the thing* and the principal signification, but they differ according to *connotation*; for it is not the same for something to be *knowable* to God and *possible*, just as *to be known* and *to be made* are not the same. For *the possible* names something as it is in the account of what emanates or can emanate; but *the knowable*, as in the account of what is present to the understanding of the knower; and since in God there is not one thing by which he is powerful and another by which he is knowing, because by his very self both belong to him: therefore, although these are diversified by *connotation*, they are yet the same according to *the thing*.

10. To that which is objected, that the will is restrictive of the power; it must be said that there are three ways of speaking of power and will: either as regards

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*affection*[^p73-1], or as regards *effect*, or as regards *respect*. In the *first* way they have identity and equality, because whatever God wills he can will, or whatever he can he wills to be able. In the *last* way they have inequality, because power is said with respect to possible things, and will with respect to willed things, and possible things are more than willed things. But in the *middle* way they have equality, namely as regards *effect*, because, although the power extends to more things than the will, yet since God does nothing except what he wills, the will and the power are said to be equal as regards *effect*: and therefore the will is said to be *restrictive of the power*, not by reason of that *which* they are, but by reason of that *to which* they are compared.

11. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less; it must be said that something is said to be participated in two ways, namely according to *form*, as a genus is participated by its species[^p73-2]; or according to *influence*, as a cause is participated by its effects. In the first way the proposition holds true; but in this way the divine *being* is not said to be participated according to more and less, but only in the second way; and this does not posit a diversity in the participated thing itself, but in that through which that participation comes about, namely in some created gift.

12. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple has a multiform operation; it must be said that operation is said both of the *work working* and of the *work worked*, that is, of the active act and of the effect produced. In the first way, therefore, God's operation is the same as God himself, and therefore it is not multiplied by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of the effect produced on the side of the creature. In the first way, therefore, the proposition holds true, but not in the second: because the more simple a thing is, the more powerful, and through this the more it is a principle of multiform effects[^p73-3].

13. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple turns itself at once to disparate and infinite operations; it must be said that a thing happens to be simple in two ways: in one way, in which simplicity *excludes immensity*; in another way, in which it *includes* it. Of the first the aforesaid proposition holds true, but of the second not at all, for the reason that the infinite — by the fact that the infinite divine *being* is infinitely infinite — can turn itself at once to all things, however many and of whatever sort, without restriction, since it admits absolutely no limitation.

14. To that which is objected last, that nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation; it must be said that there is a multiformity according to the *account of informing* and according to the *account of expressing*. In the first way multiformity belongs to that which has within itself the natures of diverse forms; and thus it cannot stand together with the highest simplicity. In the second way multiformity belongs to that which has in itself the ideas of many forms, and in this way it stands together with the highest simplicity. For just as the most simple, by its highest actuality, has the highest power, by which it can produce all things distinctly and fully; so also the highest truth, by which it can represent all things eternally, as appeared better above in the question on the eternal accounts[^p73-4].

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la: Cap. 6. n. 13: Te simplicius quidquam non reperitur. — Dictio *simplex in termino* est secundum Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Principiis, c. ult.; et significat *superlativum* (simplicissimus). — De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. seq.

en: C. 6, n. 13: "Nothing more simple than you is found." — The expression *simple in the ultimate term* is from Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles*, last chapter; and it signifies the *superlative* (most simple). — On this question compare I *Sentences*, d. 8, p. II, q. 1 and following.

la: Cap. 3. n. 4: Solus simpliciter es... et aliud beate vivere.

en: C. 3, n. 4: "You alone simply are... and another to live blessedly."

en: Compare above, p. 12, note 9, and p. 47, note 5.

la: Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 1. c. 8. et tr. 8. c. 4. seqq.; Algazel., I. Philos. tr. 2. c. *de Esse possibile et esse debitum*: Si pendet [*esse*], vocamus illud possibile; si vero non pendeat, vocamus debitum per se, quod est necessarium per se; de quo *duodecim* dicenda sunt: primum quod non est accidens... quod non est corpus; et hoc duobus modis: uno, quod omne corpus divisibile est secundum quantitatem in partes: igitur totalitas eius pendet ex partibus eius... et idcirco non potest concedi, *necesse esse* componi ex partibus (ed. an. 1506 fol. 27).

en: Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. 1, c. 8, and tr. 8, c. 4 ff.; Algazel, *Philosophy* I, tr. 2, the chapter *On possible being and due being*: "If [being] depends, we call it possible; but if it does not depend, we call it due of itself, which is necessary of itself; concerning which *twelve* things are to be said: first, that it is not an accident... that it is not a body; and this in two ways: first, that every body is divisible according to quantity into parts: therefore its totality depends on its parts... and for that reason it cannot be granted that *necessary being* is composed of parts" (ed. of the year 1506, fol. 27).

la: Propos. 17.

en: Proposition 17.

la: Secundum August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. n. 2, et Boeth., in lib. *Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint* etc., ac de Trin. c. 2. — De probatione *minoris* vide August., VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. — Inferius pro *esset compositio aliqua* A B *essent aliqua composita* [componentia ?]

en: According to Augustine, *City of God* XI, c. 10, n. 2, and Boethius, in the book *How substances are good in that they are* etc., and *On the Trinity*, c. 2. — On the proof of the *minor* see Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII, c. 1, n. 1 ff. — Below, in place of *esset compositio aliqua*, A B have *essent aliqua composita* [*componentia*?]

la: Boeth., III de Differentiis topic.: Posito antecedenti, comitari quod subsequitur; perempto consequenti, perimi quod antecedit.

en: Boethius, *On Topical Differences* III: "The antecedent being posited, what follows accompanies it; the consequent being destroyed, what precedes it is destroyed."

la: Quaest. 2. a. 1. — De *maiori* vide supra pag. 63, nota 5.

en: Question 2, art. 1. — On the *major* see above, p. 63, note 5.

la: Monolog. c. 16: Sed palam est, quia quodlibet bonum summa natura sit, summe illud est. Illa igitur est summa essentia, summa vita etc.

en: *Monologion*, c. 16: "But it is plain that, whatever good the highest nature is, it is that in the highest degree. That therefore is the highest essence, the highest life," etc.

la: Pro *concretum*, quod praebet G, substituit B *est*, et *in* pro *cum*.

en: In place of *concretum*, which G offers, B substitutes *est*, and *in* for *cum*.

la: Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 15. — Inferius pro *perfectissimus* G *perfectissima*.

en: Compare Anselm, *Monologion*, c. 15. — Below, in place of *perfectissimus*, G has *perfectissima*.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.); cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3.

en: According to Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 33 (c. 4); compare tom. II, p. 561, note 3.

la: D H *arctatio divinae*.

en: D H have *arctatio divinae*.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.); cfr. supra pag. 61, nota 2.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 56 (c. 10); compare above, p. 61, note 2.

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 311, nota 1.

en: See tom. III, p. 311, note 1.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 46. n. 2. Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. arg. 1. ad oppos. — De *similitudine* vide supra pag. 9, nota 1. definitionem ex Boethio allatam.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 46, n. 2. See above, the *Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 3, arg. 1 on the opposite side. — On *likeness* see above, p. 9, note 1, the definition adduced from Boethius.

la: Ita A B G, sed E *intendi* alii *interveniri*.

en: So A B G, but E has *intendi*, others *interveniri*.

la: Apoc. 1, 8. Verba *primus et novissimus* habentur ibid. v. 17. — Superius pro *eo ipso, quo* G ter *eo ipso, quod*.

en: Revelation 1:8. The words *the first and the last* are found in the same place, v. 17. — Above, in place of *eo ipso, quo*, G has three times *eo ipso, quod*.

la: A B G *competit*. Inferius pro *Quia enim est* A *Quia enim per se*.

en: A B G have *competit*. Below, in place of *Quia enim est*, A has *Quia enim per se*.

la: Quaest. 4. a. 1. — Superius pro *perfecta* A *vera*.

en: Question 4, art. 1. — Above, in place of *perfecta*, A has *vera*.

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 18. (c. 2.). — De seq. distinctione *quo est* et *quod est* cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 4; d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 27. p. I. q. 3.

en: *Physics* II, text 18 (c. 2). — On the following distinction of *quo est* and *quod est* compare I *Sentences*, d. 19, p. II, q. 4; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 27, p. I, q. 3.

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7: Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur, et verius est, quam cogitatur. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. dub. 2. et d. 34. q. 2. in corp.

en: *On the Trinity* VII, c. 4, n. 7: "For God is more truly thought than he is spoken, and he more truly is than he is thought." Compare I *Sentences*, d. 23, doubt 2, and d. 34, q. 2, in the body.

la: Scil. decem praedicamenta: substantia, quantitas etc. « Neque enim, ut ait Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. *de Specie*, est commune unum genus omnium *ens*, nec omnia eiusdem generis sunt... sed posita sint... prima decem genera, quasi prima decem principia. Et si omnia quis *entia* vocet, aequivoce, inquit, [Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et VII. text. 15. sive IV. c. 12. et VI. c. 4.] nuncupabit ». — Superius ex A E G posuimus *ultra*, alii *ultimo*.

en: That is, the ten categories: substance, quantity, etc. "For neither, as Porphyry says in *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species*, is *being* one common genus of all things, nor are all things of the same genus... but let there be posited... ten first genera, as it were ten first principles. And if anyone should call them all *beings*, he will name them, he says, equivocally [Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 17, and VII, text 15, or IV, c. 12, and VI, c. 4]." — Above, following A E G, we have printed *ultra*, others *ultimo*.

la: Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et d. 34. q. 1. — D H *aut si ponitur, aliqua... et naturam, talis est* etc.

en: Compare also I *Sentences*, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1, and d. 34, q. 1. — D H have *aut si ponitur, aliqua... et naturam, talis est* etc.

la: Vide Anselm., Monolog. c. 15. — De seqq. cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 8.

en: See Anselm, *Monologion*, c. 15. — On what follows compare II *Sentences*, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 8.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4, et Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).

en: Compare I *Sentences*, d. 8, p. II, q. 4, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 22. q. 3. ad 1. — Ipsa *obiecto* supra tantum implicite invenitur. — Superius posuimus *unde posterior* pro *non posterior*, quod codd. perperam exhibent.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 22, q. 3, ad 1. — The objection itself is found above only implicitly. — Above, we have printed *unde posterior* for *non posterior*, which the codices wrongly exhibit.

la: Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): *Posse* enim ab ipso *esse* nihil differt in perpetuis. — De ipsa solut. cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. pro parte negat. — Circa finem solut. voci *essentia* H praemittit *divina*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 4): "For in everlasting things *being able* differs in nothing from *being* itself." — On this solution compare I *Sentences*, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, on the negative side. — Towards the end of the solution H prefixes *divina* to the word *essentia*.

la: A B G H *intelligens*.

en: A B G H have *intelligens*.

la: G addit *creaturae*.

en: G adds *creaturae*.

la: A B E G H *effectum*; insuper codd. erronee omittunt unum divisionis membrum, scil. vel *affectum*, vel *effectum*. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. in fine, ubi eadem distinctio habetur: Dicendum enim, quod est loqui de his [voluntate, potentia et sapientia] quantum ad *affectum* sive *actum* et quantum ad *effectum* et quantum ad *obiectum*. Si quantum ad *actum*; sic est ibi omnimoda aequalitas etc. Cfr. etiam supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. in corp. et ad 11.

en: A B E G H have *effectum*; moreover the codices erroneously omit one member of the division, namely either *affectum* or *effectum*. Compare I *Sentences*, d. 45, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, where the same distinction is found: "For it must be said that there is a speaking of these [will, power and wisdom] as regards *affection* or *act*, and as regards *effect*, and as regards *object*. If as regards *act*, then there is in them equality in every way," etc. Compare also above, the *Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 1, in the body and ad 11.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1: Terminus autem eius quod est *participare*, est suscipere participati rationem; manifestum igitur, quoniam species quidem participant genera, genera autem non; nam species suscipit generis rationem, genus autem speciei non.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 1: "But the definition of *to participate* is to receive the account of what is participated; it is clear therefore that species do indeed participate genera, but genera do not participate species; for the species receives the account of the genus, but the genus does not receive that of the species."

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 1; II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. — Lib. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis vis unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. — A *effectivum multiforme*. Superius post *Dei* A G addunt *in se*, E *in se ipsa*.

en: See I *Sentences*, d. 43, q. 3, ad 1; II *Sentences*, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. — *Book of Causes*, proposition 17: "Every united force is more infinite than a multiplied power." — A has *effectivum multiforme*. Above, after *Dei*, A G add *in se*, E *in se ipsa*.

la: Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seq.

en: The *Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ*, q. 2 and following.

en: Translator’s note: *lumen* stands untranslated and *lux* is rendered "light", a distinction Bonaventure keeps and English does not have: *lux* is light at its source, *lumen* the light given off and had. The article has just granted that our understanding cannot think the divine being at all except under the modes of *quo est* and *quod est*; the lumen of reason is then what it has been given of its own, by which it can still confess the truth even while falling short of it. "By the light of reason" is an English commonplace and would pass as one, where the Latin names a definite thing the understanding has received. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the Internet Archive djvu OCR of *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, tomus V (`doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`), **raw lines 19462–20250**, against the 450 dpi plate (`raw/vision/vol5/p-0{68..73}.png`, PDF pages 144–149, offset `pdf = printed + 76`). **Every heading, italic subtitle, footnote anchor, marginale and apparatus entry was read off the plate**; the raw carries no footnote numerals in Vol V, so the whole register is a plate read. Fresh literal English translation.

**Structure.** `QUAESTIO III.` stands **full measure on p. 68**, below the close of Quaestio II, with its italic subtitle *Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas* — **both unanchored**, the frozen heading rule holding for the sixth heading running; then a **two-column opener** (*Consequenter quaeritur…* in the left column, the two *praeambula* in the right), also unanchored; then `ARTICULUS I.` full measure with its own italic subtitle, likewise unanchored. Then: a one-sentence opener (*Circa primum sic proceditur…*); **ten arguments** that the divine being is most simple, under the single marginale `Fundamenta.`; a **`Contra`** series of **fourteen arguments** under the single marginale `[A]d oppositum.`; **`CONCLUSIO`** with its italic subtitle, printed **in-column**; a **`Respondeo`** in **two declared members** (*perfectionem conditionum divinarum et modos considerationum nostrarum*), the first taken from the divine conditions and the second from the modes of our understanding; and **fourteen numbered replies plus one unnumbered**, answering the `Contra` series. **The first ten arguments get no replies** — the *Respondeo* closes by conceding them outright (*Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt*).

### ⭐ THE INDEX SPAN 68–73 IS RIGHT, AND IT WAS MEASURED BEFORE THE PLATES WERE PULLED

`q2-a2` found the index span short by a leaf and left the standing order: **fix the END on the plate before extracting plates.** That was done here first — p. 73 alone was extracted and read before pp. 68–72 were pulled — and the index is right this time: **the article runs to p. 73**, whose replies 11–14 fill the leaf to about three-fifths before `ARTICULUS II.` stands full measure on the same leaf. ⚠ **Being right is not the same as being known to be right**, and the order that makes the difference costs one page extraction.

### ⭐ BOUNDARY 5 (p. 73) MEASURED: THE LEAF FORWARDS, AND THE REGISTER SPLITS 4/2

p. 73 carries **six** apparatus entries. **nn. 1–4 are this chunk's**: n. 1 anchors at the leaf's very first word, reply 10's *…quantum ad af-* | *fectum*¹ (read at 3×, the anchor and the `Notandum.` marginale on the same line); n. 2 answers *a speciebus*² in reply 11; n. 3 *effectuum multiformium*³ in reply 12; n. 4 *de rationibus aeternis*⁴, the article's last word. **nn. 5–6 forward to `bon-qmt-q3-a2`** — n. 5 (*Quod praeter formam sive naturam includit suppositum*) answers Art. II's argument 1 on *natura nullum habens suppositum*, and n. 6 (Aristotle, *Metaph.* V) answers argument 2's *idem diverso*. ⭐ **n. 2 runs over the gutter** into the right footer block (*…genera autem* | *non; nam species suscipit…*), so that runover belongs to this chunk's ledger line.

The incoming boundary at p. 68 was measured by `q2-a2` and taken over unchanged: **nn. 2–5 inherited, n. 1 left behind**, and n. 5 (Avicenna/Algazel) crosses the gutter into the right block — a second gutter-crossing runover for this chunk.

### ⭐⭐ THE FREE CONTROLS AGAIN, AND THIS SPAN IS UNUSUALLY DENSE IN THEM

Five of this chunk's notes are back-references into pages we have already built and deployed, and **every one was opened rather than believed**. All five land, and three of them land on the anchor's own proposition:

| note | reference | target | what it settles |
|---|---|---|---|
| p. 68 n. 4 | *Cfr. supra pag. 12, nota 9. et pag. 47, nota 5.* | `bon-qsc-q3`, `bon-qmt-q1-a1` | ⭐⭐ p. 12 n. 9 IS the Aristotle *II. de Caelo* note reading *Prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis et simplex composito* — **argument 3's own premiss, word for word** (*simplex prius composito*) |
| p. 69 n. 4 | *Quaest. 2. a. 1.* | `bon-qmt-q2-a1` | ⭐⭐ its `title_la` is *Utrum divinum esse sit summe unum*, and the anchor is argument 10's *sed divinum esse summe est unum, sicut fuit in praecedentibus ostensum*. **The reference names the very article that showed it** |
| p. 70 n. 1 | *cfr. supra pag. 61, nota 2* | `bon-qmt-q2-a1` | p. 61 n. 2 gives the same Aristotle citation (*II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.)*) in full, quoting *Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere* — **the digits `56` and `(c. 10.)` are corroborated by our own deployed page** |
| p. 70 n. 3 | *vide supra pag. 9, nota 1* | `bon-qsc-q2` | the Boethius definition of *similitudo*, which is what argument 14 turns on |
| p. 73 n. 4 | *Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seq.* | `bon-qsc-q2` | *Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines rerum* — the *rationes aeternae* the article's last sentence points back to |

⭐ **And a sixth reference is FORWARD, into a chunk this work has not built yet: p. 70 n. 7's `Quaest. 4. a. 1.`** A header grep over the raw band gives Quaestio IV as *Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate*, article 1 *Utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum* — and the anchor is the *Respondeo*'s promise that *summa simplicitas cum summa immensitate* will be searched out *in consequentibus*. **It lands.** That is a twenty-seventh instance of the internal `q. N. a. N.` cross-reference class on which this work's chunking was settled, and the first one this work has been able to check against a target it does not yet hold — checked against the raw's own heading, not against the index.

### ⚠⚠ AN INK SMEAR ON p. 71, AND IT IS A THIRD CLASS — NEITHER OF THE TWO RULED AT THE GATE

The shakedown gate ratified a two-part rule for lost letters: flanking letters at full strength = the forme never carried the type, **reproduce and never fill**; flanking letters lighter than their own line = this copy failed to take set type, **restore in square brackets where determinate**. **p. 71 is neither.** A heavy black stroke lies *across* two lines of the left footer block — over the citation chain of n. 1 and over *verius est, quam cogitatur* in n. 2 — and the raw independently returns garbage at exactly those two places (`-«SmdiT^tei^~^. \S.^ji\. (i^;ji.S^`, `et v«*«b «p( , quam (»gi«»*«F`). **The type is present under the smear, not absent from the page**, so nothing is restored in brackets and nothing is reproduced as a gap: the letters are read through the ink where they can be, and where they cannot, **the reading is taken from the target, not from the type.**

⭐⭐ **Three readings on that line were decided by opening what the note cites, and the decisive one overturns the raw:**

- **`d. 23`, not the raw's `d. 33`.** The note is on *the following distinction of* quo est *and* quod est. **I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3 is `Utrum nomen essentiae in divinis convenienter adhibeatur; insuper quaeritur de differentia nominum essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona`** — the *quo est/quod est* question exactly, and it carries the phrase **nine** times, more than any other candidate. d. 33 offers nothing of the kind. ⚠ The glyph under the smear reads `23` rather than `22` on its own, but it is the target that makes it certain.
- **`d. 27. p. I. q. 3`, where the final digit is blotted out entirely.** Of d. 27 p. I's four questions, **`q. 3` (*Utrum proprietates possint abstrahi a personis divinis*) is the only one that contains *quo est* at all** — five occurrences against zero in q. 1, q. 2 and q. 4. **The digit was recovered from the target's text, not from the plate.**
- **`d. 19. p. II. q. 4`**, where the `4` is crossed but legible, and d. 19 p. II q. 4 carries *quo est et quod est* as a pair more often than its siblings.

⚠ **What the smear is NOT: it is not the failing impression of `q2-a2`, and treating it as one would have put brackets around letters that are on the page.** The diagnostic that separates them is the same one the gate froze — **look at the neighbours** — but read the other way: here the neighbouring letters are *darker* than their line, not lighter, because ink has been added, not lost.

### ⚠⚠ THE SCAN CLIPS THE GUTTER-SIDE MARGINALIA ON EVERY LEAF OF THIS SPAN

Quaracchi sets a marginal gloss outside each column: outside the left column in the wide outer margin, and outside the right column in the narrow one. **On this span the narrow one is cut by the edge of the scanned image.** On the recto leaves (69, 71, 73) it is the *left* glosses that lose their first letter — `[A]d oppositum.`, `[A]pplicatio.`, `[C]orollarium.` — a one-letter loss, determinate. **On p. 70 the loss is severe**: eight right-hand glosses lose their line-ends, and three of them lose more than a letter.

⭐ **The `bon-brev-p7-c7` test governs, and it is applied strictly: restore only what is determinate from matter printed on the same page.** So `Confirma[tio].`, `Corollari[um].`, `Secundo [de] modis nos[tra]rum consi[de]rationum.`, `Tria in [no]stris consi[de]rationibus.` and `Mod[us tri]pliciter [in]tellectui tribuitur.` are restored — each is the standing form of a gloss this work uses elsewhere, or is a word-for-word summary of the sentence it stands against (the last three answer *Oportet etiam videre diversos modos nostrarum considerationum*, *ad considerationem necessario concurrant tria*, and *aliquis modus potest tripliciter attribui nostro intellectui*, all within four lines of the gloss). `Triplex co[m]positio n[on] est in D[eo].` is restored on the same test — the paragraph it glosses denies all three compositions of God in three consecutive clauses — and the `n` of *non* is half-visible at the line end. ⛔ **But `Sed sim[pli]citas ve[re…]` and `Et simp[lici]tas perfec[te…]` are NOT completed.** Their line-ends are gone and nothing on the page fixes them; the body sentences beside them (*esse simplicissimum convenit Deo vere et proprie*; *Competit etiam perfecte ex hac triplici conditione*) make a guess easy and that is exactly why it is refused. **A defect in the photograph is not a defect in Quaracchi, but neither is it a licence to write Quaracchi's line for him.**

### ⚠ THE REPLY THAT HAS NO NUMBER, AND THE NOTE THAT EXPLAINS IT

Between reply 4 and reply 5 on p. 72 stands a full reply — *Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summum bonum se habet ex additione ad bonum* — **with no number before it**, so that fourteen `Contra` arguments are answered by fourteen numbered replies plus this one. Plate and raw agree that no numeral was set. ⭐⭐ **Quaracchi says why, in the note anchored at that very reply's last word:** p. 72 n. 2 reads *Ipsa* obiecto *supra tantum implicite invenitur* — **the objection it answers is only implicit in the arguments above**, and so it is answered without being counted. ⚠ *obiecto* stands as printed where *obiectio* is what the sentence wants; plate at 5.5× and raw agree on the reading, and it is not emended.

### ⭐ A NEAR-MISS ANCHOR, THE SECOND ATTESTATION OF THE CLASS

On p. 71, *Actualitas·* *autem in genere* carries a mark after the noun which the raw also picks up (`Actualitas '`), and which would make a sixth anchor on a five-note leaf. **At 3.2× it sits on the baseline, not raised** — a speck, or a comma whose body failed — and the register has no seat for it: all five of p. 71's entries are already paired with body anchors. ⛔ **A mark is not an anchor until the register has a seat for it.** `q2-a2` met the same thing on p. 66 (a clipped comma after *nomen trinitatis*); this is its second attestation, and counting anchors and register entries both ways on every leaf is what catches it. A stray mark also stands above *trinitas* in p. 68's italic subtitle and is not an anchor for the same reason.

### Digit and letter resolution — raw versus plate

Beyond the three settled from the targets above: p. 69 n. 8 raw `text. 33. (c. i.)` → **(c. 4.)** (the disputed glyph has a diagonal and a closed apex; `(c. 4.)` also appears cleanly on p. 72 n. 3 for the same author) · p. 71 n. 2 raw `c. ii n. 7` → **c. 4. n. 7** · p. 71 n. 4 raw `d. 33. a. 1. q. 2.` → **d. 25. a. 1. q. 2.** — ⭐ read plainly at 2.6× and confirmed by the target, since **I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2 is *Utrum recte a Boethio definita sit persona, quod sit rationalis naturae individua substantia***, which is the supposit/nature difference the note is glossing, and `d. 34. q. 1` in the same breath is *Utrum in divinis res naturae addat supra naturam* — the same doctrine from the other side. `q2-a2` had already cited d. 25 a. 1 q. 2 twice for this exact doctrine · p. 68 n. 5 raw `tp. 2.` → **tr. 2.** · p. 71 n. 3 raw `et VI. c. i.` → **et VI. c. 4.** · p. 70 n. 2 raw `nota I.` → **nota 1.** · p. 73 n. 3 raw `vis multiplicata` → **virtus multiplicata** and raw `E in se ipso` → **E *in se ipsa***.

⚠ **One place where the raw beat a first plate read.** p. 69 n. 2's bracketed editorial conjecture was read as `[componenda ?]` from a whole-page view and is **`[componentia ?]`** at 2.2×, which is what the raw gave. ⛔ **The rule the Hexaemeron gate paid for holds: an apparatus entry is never transcribed from a whole-page read.**

### ⚠ SMALL PRINTING DEFECTS RECORDED AS PRINTED

1. **p. 69 n. 3 prints `Boeth., III de Differentiis topic.` without the abbreviating point after `III`**, where n. 2 four lines above prints `XI. de Civ. Dei` with one. Plate at 2.2× and raw agree — two witnesses, so it is the print. ⭐ **And our own deployed corpus supplies the control**: `bon-qsc-q2`'s p. 9 n. 1 cites *Boeth. III. de Differentiis topic.* **with** the point, so the omission is an accident of this leaf and not house usage.
2. **p. 72 n. 1 prints `q. 4` without a following point** (`d. 8. p. II. q. 4 , et Aristot.`), alone among the span's citation strings, and carries a stray mark between `8.` and `p.`
3. **p. 72's nn. 4 and 5 are set side by side on a single line** — two short entries sharing one line of the register rather than each taking its own. The leaf therefore shows four register lines for five entries; ⚠ **counting printed lines instead of numerals would have made p. 72 a four-note page.**

### Marginalia, in body order

**p. 68** — `Fundamenta.`
**p. 69** — `[A]d oppositum.`
**p. 70** — `Conclusio.` · `Duo pensanda.` · `Primo de modis divinarum conditionum.` · `Confirma[tio].` · `Triplex co[m]positio n[on] est in D[eo].` · `Sed sim[pli]citas ve[re…]` · `Et simp[lici]tas perfec[te…]` · `Corollari[um].` · `Secundo [de] modis nos[tra]rum consi[de]rationum.` · `Tria in [no]stris consi[de]rationibus.` · `Mod[us tri]pliciter [in]tellectui tribuitur.`
**p. 71** — `[A]pplicatio.` · `Distinctio.` · `[C]orollarium.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Notandum.` · `Duplex suppositum.` · `Notandum.` · `Nobilitas duplex.` · `Actualitas duplex.`
**p. 72** — `Additio duplex.` · `Notandum.` · `Quid veritas.` · `Distinctio.` · `Notandu[m].` · `Distinctio.` · `Quid possibile et scibile.` · `Distinctio.`
**p. 73** — `Notandum.` · `Duplex participatio.` · `Operatio sumitur dupliciter.`

Thirty-two in all; square brackets mark what the scan's edge cut, per the paragraph above.

### Translation choices

- ***intellectus* → "understanding" at every occurrence, with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English.** The work's frozen register makes the ratified narrow exception unreachable (*intellectus agens* / *possibilis* occur nowhere in its 71 printed pages), so a bare "intellect" here would be a defect by construction. This article is the densest test of the rule so far — the second half of the *Respondeo* is about nothing else — and *intelligens* / *res intellecta* / *intelligibile* go to "the one understanding" / "the thing understood" / "the intelligible" accordingly.
- ***ratio* takes "account" throughout this article, and that is a decision, not a default.** The *Respondeo* turns on *ratio intelligendi* as the third thing that must converge in a consideration alongside the knower and the thing known, and replies 6, 7 and 9 all reuse it; *rationes ideales* (argument 14, reply 14) and *principale significatum* versus *connotatum* (reply 9) belong to the same chain. Rendering *ratio intelligendi* "reason" would put the faculty back where the article has just been at pains to distinguish it from the mode.
- ***quo est* / *quod est* keep their Latin with the English in parentheses at the first occurrence** in the *Respondeo*, per the frozen table, and the Latin alone thereafter.
- ***arctativa* → "restrictive"** and *arctatio* → "restriction", held across argument 10 and reply 10, where the whole reply is about the sense in which the will restricts the power.
- ***vestigium* → "vestige"** against *imago* → "image", held in argument 6 and reply 7, where the pair carries the argument.
- ***opus operans* / *opus operatum* → "the work working" / "the work worked"** in reply 12, kept literal rather than resolved into "action" and "product": the reply's point is that one Latin word covers both.
- ***summitas* → "highestness"** in the unnumbered reply, an ugly word kept because the reply's move is exactly that *summum* adds to *bonum* the way *simplex* adds to *ens* — a condition, not a part.
- ***lumen* → "lumen" (ruling 2) at the chunk's one site — REPAIRED AT THE WORK-CLOSE GATE (2026-09-15).** The *Respondeo*'s *Fatetur igitur intellectus verus proprio **lumine** rationis* was first rendered "by the proper **light** of reason" and this list did not record it; ruling 2 holds *lumen* → "lumen" in body prose (the only exemption is Ps. 35:10's received wording), so the English now reads "by the proper **lumen** of reason". *lux* does not occur in the chunk. See `manual-review/vol5-mysterio-trinitatis-workclose-gate.md`.

### ⚠ FIVE OF THE SIX PAGE BREAKS FALL MID-WORD

`Mi|nor` (68→69), `po|test` (69→70), `spiritua|liter` (70→71), `po|tentia` (71→72), `af|fectum` (72→73) — only the 68→69 boundary of the *heading* falls at white space. **The `<!-- page N -->` markers are set at the word boundary immediately before the split word, so the split word is carried whole into the new page**, and both languages are marked at the same place. ⚠ The alternative — splitting the word across the marker — parses but puts a fragment either side of a comment, and a later reader cannot tell a typo from a page break.

### Apparatus: page-split map and hand-offs

| page | entries | this chunk |
|---|---|---|
| 68 | 5 | **nn. 2–5 only** (INHERITED; n. 5 runs over the gutter) |
| 69 | 9 | all nine |
| 70 | 7 | all seven |
| 71 | 5 | all five |
| 72 | 5 | all five |
| 73 | 6 | **nn. 1–4 only** (n. 2 runs over the gutter) |

**34 entries. Zero `[?]` flags.** Forwarded to `bon-qmt-q3-a2`: **p. 73 nn. 5–6**, both answering Articulus II's opening arguments, with the split taken by body anchor and not by block position.

**Gutters, measured on every leaf** (`gutter-profile.py`, band midpoints): 68 **1342** · 69 **1119** · 70 **1431** · 71 **1139** · 72 **1431** · 73 **1162**. ⚠ **`colcrop.py`'s default was wrong on three of the six**, and p. 71's was wrong by 25 px on a **4 px** run — the printed centre rule inked at peak 358 on that leaf and truncated the blank band outright, the exact failure the frozen rule names. ⚠⚠ **p. 73 needed the region treatment**: profiled over the whole body window its band collapsed to 5 px, because `ARTICULUS II.` stands full measure across the middle of the leaf; profiled above and below the heading separately it gives 1161 and 1163. **A full-measure heading inside the body window is as destructive as one at the head of a page.**