title: Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum fides sit circa verum creatum et increatum, an circa increatum tantum tanquam obiectum proprium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum fides sit circa verum creatum et increatum, an circa increatum tantum tanquam circa obiectum proprium. Et quod solum sit circa verum increatum, videtur:

1. *Primo* per hoc, quod fides est virtus theologica. Omnis enim virtus theologica habet idem pro obiecto et fine: si ergo finis virtutum[^p512-1] non est quid creatum, sed increatum, videtur etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per hoc, quod[^p512-2] est virtus una: quia unica virtus unum debet habere obiectum: si ergo fides virtus una est, et creatum et increatum sunt diversa omnino; igitur si fides habet esse circa Verum increatum, non habet esse circa verum creatum sicut circa obiectum.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per hoc, quod fides est virtus evacuanda per obiecti sui praesentiam et apertam notitiam; sed sola visio Veri increati est illa, quae virtutem fidei evacuat — fides enim non evacuatur in vias[^p512-3] — ergo videtur, quod fides solum sit in Verum increatum tanquam in obiectum.

4. Item, fides est virtus, qua assentitur ipsi credito propter se et super omnia; sed nulli vero est propter se et super omnia assentiendum, nisi quod est summum Verum et Verum increatum: ergo solummodo circa illud consistit fidei obiectum.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem articuli a Richardo datam[^p512-4], qua dicit, quod «articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo, arctans nos ad credendum»: ergo si articulus est fidei obiectum, videtur, quod fides solum sit circa verum increatum et circa Deum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Circa veritatem in Symbolo contentam[^p512-5] consistit fides tanquam circa obiectum proprium; sed in Symbolo non solum sunt articuli spectantes ad Deitatem, immo etiam spectantes ad humanitatem: ergo si humanitas est quid creatum, fides non solum consistit circa Veritatem increatam, verum etiam circa creatam.

2. Item, tantae amplitudinis est fides, sicut et caritas, vel maioris; sed caritas non tantummodo diligit Bonum increatum, sed etiam creatum, quia non tantummodo diligit Deum, sed etiam proximum[^p512-6]: ergo fides non tantum est in Verum increatum sicut in obiectum, verum etiam in verum creatum.

3. Item, nullum verum futurum est verum increatum, quia Verum increatum est verum aeternum; sed fides nostra est circa verum futurum, quia credimus «carnis resurrectionem[^p512-7]», quae nec est nec fuit, sed futura est: ergo videtur, quod fides non tantum sit circa Verum increatum, sed etiam circa creatum.

4. Item, si quis pertinaciter assereret, esse falsum quod sacra Scriptura dicit esse verum, esset haereticus: ergo videtur, quod obiectum fidei extendatur ad omnia quae in sacra Scriptura scribuntur; sed in sacra Scriptura multo plura scribuntur de temporalibus quam de aeternis, de creatis quam de increatis, sicut quod Abraham genuit Isaac[^p512-8], et con-

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similia: ergo videtur, quod obiectum fidei magis consistat in vero creato quam in increato.

5. Item, illuminatio fidei sequitur, vel concomitatur illuminationem prophetiae; sed prophetia maxime et praecipue consistit circa verum creatum, cum sit praenuntiatio futurorum[^p513-1]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et ipsa fides.

### Conclusio.

> Fidei obiectum proprie dictum sive formale, quod habet rationem motivi, est Verum increatum; obiectum vero communiter dictum est verum tum increatum, cui assentitur propter se, tum creatum, cui assentitur propter aliud et quod habet rationem materialis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod obiectum alicuius habitus cognitivi dupliciter habet determinari: aut communiter, aut proprie, sive per se et per accidens. Illud autem vocatur obiectum commune, quod habet[^p513-2] communem acceptionem; et obiectum per accidens, quod quidem habet rationem materialis; illud autem dicitur obiectum proprie et per se, quod quidem habet rationem motivi[^p513-3].

Secundum hanc duplicem acceptionem dupliciter contingit loqui de obiecto fidei. Nam uno modo potest dici obiectum fidei, circa quod ipsa fides versatur, tanquam circa illud quod credit esse verum, sive illi assentiat propter se, sive propter aliud. Et hoc modo non tantummodo est circa Verum increatum, verum etiam circa verum creatum, quia fides non tantum credit ipsi divinae Veritati in se, sed etiam in his quae sibi ab ea dictantur, quae sunt multa vera creata. — Si autem loquamur de obiecto fidei secundum propriam acceptionem, prout dicitur obiectum, quod habet rationem motivi; sic obiectum fidei est Verum increatum. — Et sicut contingit intelligere in visu, quod lucidum dupliciter movet visum, vel prout est absolutum, vel prout est terrenae materiae incorporatum[^p513-4]; sic ipsa divina Veritas dupliciter movet ipsum intellectum per fidem illuminatum: vel per se, sicut in articulis spectantibus ad ipsum Deum secundum Divinitatem, vel ut est unita creaturae, sicut in illis articulis respicientibus ipsum Deum in sua humanitate assumta, vel in operatione ab ipso creata, sicut in creatione, reparatione et glorificatione. — Concedendum igitur est, quod obiectum fidei proprium, secundum quod habet rationem motivi, est Verum increatum; et quia hoc probant rationes ad primam partem inductae, ideo concedendae sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:**
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod quidam articuli respiciunt humanitatem, sicut quidam Divinitatem; iam patet responsio, quia illi articuli, qui sunt de humanitate et circa humanitatem, enuntiantur de divina persona, circa quam consistit Veritas increata, et ex illa parte habent rationem movendi[^p513-5]. Nam ex illa parte, qua consistunt circa veritatem creatam, habent solum rationem materialis. Unde sicut una est persona in duabus naturis, creata videlicet et increata; sic una est Veritas movens, quae tenet rationem obiecti, sive in articulis, qui respiciunt Divinitatem, sive in his qui respiciunt humanitatem, quae quidem est Veritas increata.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad tot se extendit fides, ad quot se extendit caritas; dicendum, quod etsi caritas videatur esse circa Bonum increatum et circa bonum creatum tanquam circa obiectum proprium, tamen obiectum eius proprium, sicut infra[^p513-6] manifestabitur, non est nisi circa Bonum increatum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est de vero futuro; dicendum, quod resurrectio carnis futura non est obiectum fidei proprium, nisi in quantum comparatur ad divinam virtutem et iustitiam, quae corpora resuscitabit, ut retributio fiat secundum merita; et sic ratione Veri increati implicati[^p513-7] habet rationem obiecti; quod quidem Verum increatum, quantum est de se, abstrahit a ratione praeteriti et futuri, licet praeteritio et futuritio notetur circa eius effectum, qui, quantum est de se, habet solum rationem materialis in comparatione ad fidei assensum, secundum quod in praecedentibus fuit tactum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haereticus iudicaretur qui pertinaciter negaret quae in sacra Scriptura dicuntur; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, teneant rationem obiecti proprii et motivi respectu ipsius fidei; sed hoc est, quia consequuntur ad eius obiectum proprium. Quia enim sacra Scriptura edita est ab ipsa Veritate increata et a Spiritu sancto[^p513-8]; qui contradiceret sacrae Scripturae contradiceret ei

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cui fides assentit propter se, videlicet ipsi summae Veritati. Et ideo ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides circa verum creatum habeat versari sicut circa obiectum proprium.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illuminatione prophetica, dicendum, quod prophetia non habet pro principali obiecto et motivo ea quae propheta praenuntiat, sed solum habet pro obiecto materiali, circa quod ipsa prophetia versatur. Unde Propheta non assentit ei quod praenuntiat, propter se, sed propter Veritatem ipsum illuminantem et erudientem; et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit circa vera creata, nisi tanquam circa obiecta materialia. — Posset tamen dici, quod non est simile de fide et prophetia, quia fides in suo obiecto, cui assentit, requirit aliquid, quod habeat rationem motivi; sed prophetia nihil tale requirit in prophetato, sed totam rationem suae cognitionis sumit ab inspirante. Ideo non sequitur, quodsi prophetia est de aliquo, quod de illo debeat esse fides sicut de obiecto.

english:
### Question II. *Whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with uncreated truth alone as its proper object.*

Secondly it is asked whether faith is concerned with created and uncreated truth, or with the uncreated alone as its proper object. And that it is concerned solely with uncreated truth, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, through this, that faith is a theological virtue. For every theological virtue has the same thing for its object and its end: if therefore the end of the virtues[^p512-1] is not something created, but uncreated, it seems [to follow] etc.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that[^p512-2] it is one virtue: because a single virtue ought to have one object: if therefore faith is one virtue, and the created and the uncreated are altogether diverse; therefore if faith has being concerned with the uncreated Truth, it does not have being concerned with created truth as with [its] object.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through this, that faith is a virtue to be done away with through the presence of its object and open knowledge; but the vision of the uncreated True alone is that which does away with the virtue of faith — for faith is not done away with for [those] on the way[^p512-3] — therefore it seems that faith is solely concerned with the uncreated Truth as with [its] object.

4. Likewise, faith is a virtue by which assent is given to the very thing believed for its own sake and above all things; but to no truth is assent to be given for its own sake and above all things except that which is the highest True and the uncreated True: therefore the object of faith consists in that alone.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through the definition of the article given by Richard[^p512-4], by which he says that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, constraining us to believe": therefore if the article is the object of faith, it seems that faith is concerned solely with uncreated truth and with God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Faith consists in the truth contained in the Symbol[^p512-5] as in its proper object; but in the Symbol there are not only articles pertaining to the Deity, but indeed also pertaining to the humanity: therefore if the humanity is something created, faith does not consist solely in the uncreated Truth, but also in created [truth].

2. Likewise, faith is of as great a breadth as charity, or greater; but charity loves not only the uncreated Good, but also the created, because it loves not only God, but also the neighbor[^p512-6]: therefore faith is not only in the uncreated Truth as in [its] object, but also in created truth.

3. Likewise, no future truth is uncreated truth, because the uncreated True is eternal truth; but our faith is concerned with future truth, because we believe "the resurrection of the flesh[^p512-7]," which neither is nor was, but is to come: therefore it seems that faith is not only concerned with the uncreated Truth, but also with the created.

4. Likewise, if someone pertinaciously were to assert that what sacred Scripture says to be true is false, he would be a heretic: therefore it seems that the object of faith extends to all things which are written in sacred Scripture; but in sacred Scripture many more things are written about temporal than about eternal matters, about created than about uncreated, such as that Abraham begot Isaac[^p512-8], and the

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like: therefore it seems that the object of faith consists more in created than in uncreated truth.

5. Likewise, the illumination of faith follows, or accompanies, the illumination of prophecy; but prophecy consists chiefly and principally about created truth, since it is the foretelling of things to come[^p513-1]: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] of faith itself.

### Conclusion.

> The object of faith properly so called, or formal, which has the character of a motive, is the uncreated True; but the object commonly so called is truth both uncreated, to which assent is given for its own sake, and created, to which assent is given for the sake of another and which has the character of the material.

**I respond:** It must be said that the object of any cognitive habit has to be determined in two ways: either commonly, or properly, that is, *per se* and *per accidens*. Now that is called the common object which has[^p513-2] a common acceptation; and the object *per accidens* [is that] which indeed has the character of the material; but that is called the object properly and *per se* which indeed has the character of a motive[^p513-3].

According to this twofold acceptation it happens that one speaks of the object of faith in two ways. For in one way that can be called the object of faith about which faith itself is occupied, as about that which it believes to be true, whether it assents to it for its own sake or for the sake of another. And in this way it is concerned not only with the uncreated Truth, but also with created truth, because faith does not only believe the divine Truth itself in itself, but also in those things which are dictated to it by it, which are many created truths. — But if we speak of the object of faith according to the proper acceptation, inasmuch as that is called the object which has the character of a motive; thus the object of faith is the uncreated Truth. — And just as it happens to be understood in sight that the luminous moves sight in two ways, either as it is absolute, or as it is incorporated into earthly matter[^p513-4]; so the divine Truth itself moves in two ways the very intellect illumined through faith: either *per se*, as in the articles pertaining to God himself according to the Divinity, or as it is united to a creature, as in those articles regarding God himself in his assumed humanity, or in an operation created by him, as in creation, reparation, and glorification. — It must therefore be granted that the proper object of faith, according as it has the character of a motive, is the uncreated Truth; and because the reasonings adduced for the first part prove this, therefore they are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the opposite part:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that certain articles regard the humanity, as certain regard the Divinity; the response is now plain, because those articles which are about the humanity and concerning the humanity are predicated of the divine person, about which the uncreated Truth consists, and from that side they have the character of moving[^p513-5]. For from that side by which they consist about created truth, they have only the character of the material. Hence just as there is one person in two natures, namely created and uncreated; so there is one moving Truth, which holds the character of object, whether in the articles which regard the Divinity, or in those which regard the humanity, which indeed is the uncreated Truth.

2. To that which is objected, that faith extends to as many things as charity extends to; it must be said that although charity may seem to be concerned with the uncreated Good and with the created good as with its proper object, nevertheless its proper object, as will be shown below[^p513-6], is nothing but the uncreated Good.

3. To that which is objected, that faith is about the future true; it must be said that the future resurrection of the flesh is not the proper object of faith, except inasmuch as it is compared to the divine power and justice, which will raise up the bodies, so that retribution may be made according to merits; and thus by reason of the uncreated True implicated[^p513-7] it has the character of object; which uncreated True indeed, so far as concerns itself, abstracts from the character of past and future, although pastness and futureness are noted about its effect, which, so far as concerns itself, has only the character of the material in comparison to the assent of faith, according as was touched upon in the foregoing.

4. To that which is objected, that one would be judged a heretic who pertinaciously denied what is said in sacred Scripture; it must be said that this is not because all things which are contained in sacred Scripture hold the character of proper object and motive with respect to faith itself; but this is because they follow upon its proper object. For since sacred Scripture was set forth by the uncreated Truth itself and by the Holy Spirit[^p513-8]; he who would contradict sacred Scripture would contradict him

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to whom faith assents for his own sake, namely the highest Truth itself. And therefore from this it cannot be concluded that faith has to be occupied about created truth as about its proper object.

5. To that which is objected concerning prophetic illumination, it must be said that prophecy does not have for its principal object and motive those things which the prophet foretells, but has them only for the material object, about which prophecy itself is occupied. Hence the Prophet does not assent to that which he foretells for its own sake, but for the sake of the Truth illumining and instructing him; and from this it cannot be concluded that faith is concerned with created truths, except as with material objects. — It could nevertheless be said that the case is not alike for faith and prophecy, because faith in its object, to which it assents, requires something that has the character of a motive; but prophecy requires nothing of the kind in the thing prophesied, but takes the whole ground of its cognition from the one inspiring it. Therefore it does not follow that, if prophecy is about something, that there must be faith about it as about an object.

la: Scil. theologicarum. — Paulo ante pro *idem* Vat. non apte *Deum*, edd. 1, 2 et cod. V *fidem*.

en: That is, of the theological [virtues]. — Shortly before, for *idem* the Vatican [edition] inaptly [reads] *Deum*; editions 1, 2 and codex V [read] *fidem*.

la: Supple: fides. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. — Subinde pro *unum* edd. et nonnulli codd. *unicum*.

en: Supply: faith. Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3. — Thereupon, for *unum* the editions and several codices [read] *unicum*.

la: Vide infra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. — Cod. bb *non evacuatur nisi in ea*, plures codd. *non evacuatur in ea*. Paulo ante pro *virtutem fidei* edd. nec non pauci codd. *veritatem fidei*; perperam.

en: See below d. 31, a. 2, q. 1. — Codex bb [reads] *non evacuatur nisi in ea* ["is not done away with except in it"], several codices *non evacuatur in ea* ["is not done away with in it"]. Shortly before, for *virtutem fidei* ["the virtue of faith"] the editions and not a few codices [read] *veritatem fidei* ["the truth of faith"]; wrongly.

la: De qua fusius infra a. 3. q. 1. — Subinde pro *qua dicit* codd. A Z *quae dicit* [cod. A *dixit*].

en: Concerning which [definition] more fully below a. 3, q. 1. — Thereupon, for *qua dicit* codices A Z [read] *quae dicit* [codex A *dixit*].

la: Ex codd. A K L N P Q (aa a secunda manu) bb supplevimus *contentam*.

en: From codices A K L N P Q (aa by a second hand) bb we have supplied *contentam* ["contained"].

la: Vide infra d. 28. q. 6.

en: See below d. 28, q. 6.

la: Symbol. Apostolorum.

en: The Apostles' Symbol [Creed].

en: Genesis 21:3; Matthew 1:2.

la: Cassiodor., Praefat. in Psalter. c. 1: «Prophetia est aspiratio divina, quae eventus rerum aut per facta aut per dicta quorundam immobili veritate pronuntiat». Gregor., I. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 1. n. 1: Cum ideo prophetia dicta sit, quod futura praedicat, quando de praeterito vel praesenti loquitur, rationem sui nominis amittit etc.

en: Cassiodorus, *Preface on the Psalter* c. 1: "Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things, either through the deeds or through the words of certain persons, with unmovable truth." Gregory, [Book] I of the *Homilies on Ezekiel*, homily 1, n. 1: Since prophecy is so called because it foretells things to come, when it speaks of the past or the present, it loses the ground of its name, etc.

la: Exceptis codd. A U, edd. et codd. *secundum* pro *quod habet*; superius pro *et per* cod. aa *aut per*, cod. bb *sive per*. — De *absolutum* edd. *abstractum*.

en: Excepting codices A U, the editions and codices [read] *secundum* for *quod habet*; above, for *et per* codex aa [reads] *aut per*, codex bb *sive per*. — On *absolutum* the editions [read] *abstractum*.

la: Ita codd., edd. *motivi*.

en: Thus the codices; the editions [read] *motivi*.

la: Scil. in coloribus. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2: Sicut lux incorporata est principium coloris in ipso corpore terminato, qui quidem color est accidens et passibilis qualitas et sensu percipitur; sic etiam lux in corpore luminoso est principium cuiusdam fulgoris, qui ad modum coloris est accidens.

en: That is, in colors. *Sentences* Book II, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2: Just as light incorporated is the principle of color in the bounded body itself, which color indeed is an accident and a passible quality and is perceived by the senses; so also light in a luminous body is the principle of a certain radiance, which after the manner of color is an accident.

en: Distinction 27, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Edd. *implicari*.

en: The editions [read] *implicari*.

la: Vide supra pag. 505, nota 7. De propositione praecedenti cfr. infra a. 3. q. 1, d. 23. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See above p. 505, note 7. On the preceding proposition cf. below a. 3, q. 1, [and] d. 23, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 479, nota 8.

en: Cf. above p. 479, note 8.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Observandus est modus loquendi hic a S. Bonav. usurpatus. Obiectum proprium fidei significat id quod vulgo dicitur obiectum formale; sed hoc iterum sumitur dupliciter, scilicet vel ut habet rationem motivi et est «obiectum proprie et per se» (obiectum formale quo), vel ut id, circa quod fides versatur assentiendo ei per se. Quod distinctius Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 2.) sic exprimit: «Obiectum per se (iterum) dicitur dupliciter: vel formaliter, id est illud, ad quod actus terminatur primo et per se, vel materialiter, ad quod terminatur per se, sed non primo». — Vera autem creata semper habent rationem obiecti materialis (ad I.), et eadem, quatenus ut conclusiones consequuntur ad obiectum primum et respectu articulorum fidei vel antecedunt, vel comitantur vel sequuntur, sunt obiectum per accidens. Similiter hic S. Thom. (hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.) distinguit triplex alicuius potentiae obiectum: formale, materiale, accidentale, ut S. Bonav. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. (ubi et de obiecto fidei per accidens); qui etiam eodem modo (ibi ad 3.) solvit 1. arg. ad oppos. — De hac (2.) quaestione praeter citatos locos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 6. — S. Thom., S. III. q. 1. a. 1; de Verit. q. 14. a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

**II.** In seq. (3.) quaestione de opinionibus in corp. memoratis sic loquitur Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 3.): «Quidam, ut cancellarius Parisiensis, dixerunt, quod res, et non enuntiabilia, sunt articuli, de quibus est fides; quia res arctat semper et per se ex natura propria ad credendum, enuntiabilia per accidens ex divulgatione. — Alii vero, ut magister Altissiodorensis [Autissiod.], quod enuntiabilia determinata, et non res, sunt articuli, et quamvis variata sint enuntiabilia, non tamen articuli, quia tria enuntiabilia secundum tres differentias temporum non sunt nisi unus articulus, sicut tres voces unum nomen: albus, alba, album. — Alii dicunt melius, quod res non sunt articuli nisi materialiter, sed enuntiabilia indeterminata, quae se habent communiter ad quamlibet temporis differentiam, ut Christum incarnari aut incarnandum fuisse; enuntiabilia vero determinata non sunt articuli nisi per accidens, quia credere sub hac vel illa differentia accidit saluti... Est ergo fides simpliciter de vero complexo; sed tamen complexio duplex est: quaedam indeterminata, ut Christum incarnari, quaedam determinata, ut Christum incarnatum esse. Fides ergo per se est de vero complexo primo modo, sed per accidens de vero complexo secundo modo». — Idem sentit S. Bonav., et etiam S. Thom., qui in Comment. de patronis primae opinionis dicit, quod «propriam vocem ignoraverunt», sed in Summa mitius de his iudicat et distinguens dicit, quod ex parte ipsius rei creditae obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, sed ex parte credentis aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Consentiunt B. Albert. et Richard. a Med. — De hac (3.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The manner of speaking here employed by St. Bonaventure is to be observed. The proper object of faith signifies that which is commonly called the formal object; but this in turn is taken in two ways, namely either as it has the character of a motive and is "the object properly and *per se*" (the formal object *quo*), or as that about which faith is occupied by assenting to it *per se*. Which Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 2) expresses more distinctly thus: "The object *per se* (again) is said in two ways: either formally, that is, that at which the act is terminated first and *per se*, or materially, at which it is terminated *per se* but not first." — Now created truths always have the character of material object (to I), and the same, inasmuch as, as conclusions, they follow upon the first object and, with respect to the articles of faith, either precede, or accompany, or follow [them], are object *per accidens*. Similarly here St. Thomas (here a. 1, quaestiuncula 1) distinguishes a threefold object of any power: formal, material, accidental, as St. Bonaventure above d. 23, a. 1, q. 3 (where also concerning the object of faith *per accidens*); who also in the same manner (there, to 3) solves the first argument to the opposite. — On this (second) question, besides the cited places: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 68, m. 7, a. 6. — St. Thomas, *Summa* III, q. 1, a. 1; *On Truth* q. 14, a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

**II.** On the following (third) question, concerning the opinions recalled in the body [of the text], Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 3) speaks thus: "Some, like the chancellor of Paris, said that things, and not enunciables, are the articles about which faith is concerned; because a thing always and *per se* by its proper nature constrains to belief, [whereas] enunciables [do so] *per accidens* by [their] divulgation. — Others, however, like Master William of Auxerre [Autissiodorensis], [say] that determinate enunciables, and not things, are the articles, and although the enunciables be varied, yet not the articles, because three enunciables according to the three differences of times are not but one article, just as three utterances [are] one name: *albus, alba, album*. — Others say better, that things are not articles except materially, but indeterminate enunciables, which stand commonly toward any difference of time, as that Christ is incarnated or was to be incarnated; but determinate enunciables are not articles except *per accidens*, because to believe under this or that difference happens to salvation... Faith therefore is simply about the complex true; but nevertheless the complexity is twofold: a certain indeterminate, as that Christ is incarnated, [and] a certain determinate, as that Christ has been incarnated. Faith therefore *per se* is about the complex true in the first way, but *per accidens* about the complex true in the second way." — St. Bonaventure thinks the same, and also St. Thomas, who in the Commentary says of the patrons of the first opinion that "they were ignorant of the proper term," but in the *Summa* judges more mildly concerning these and, distinguishing, says that on the side of the believed thing itself the object of faith is something incomplex, but on the side of the believer something complex by way of an enunciable. Blessed Albert and Richard of Mediavilla agree. — On this (third) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 5. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; *Summa* loc. cit. a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 514 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum fides sit circa complexum, an circa incomplexum.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum fides sit circa complexum, an circa incomplexum. Et quod sit circa complexum, videtur:

1. «Credere enim, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p514-2], est cogitare cum assensione»; sed assensus rationis non est supra incomplexum, sed supra complexum: videtur ergo, quod fides sit circa complexum, sicut circa proprium obiectum[^p514-1].

2. Item, fides credit aliquid, quia verum, et respuit, quia falsum; sed verum et falsum sunt circa complexionem[^p514-3]: ergo videtur, quod et habitus fidei ipsum complexum sive enuntiabile respiciat ut obiectum.

3. Item, fides est media inter opinionem et scientiam, secundum quod vult Hugo[^p514-4]; sed tam opinio quam scientia est circa complexum: ergo cum medium suscipiat naturam extremorum, videtur similiter, quod et fides.

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4. Item, fides est opposita errori; sed nullus errat nisi ex hoc, quod attribuit aliquid alicui, quod non est attribuendum, vel removet quod non est removendum; hoc autem non fit nisi in complexione: ergo omnis error circa complexionem consistit. Si igitur «opposita nata sunt consistere circa idem[^p515-1]», videtur similiter, quod et fides verum complexum habeat pro obiecto.

5. Item, si ipsum verum incomplexum est obiectum fidei, cum ergo Iudaei credulitatem habeant de incarnatione, Iudaei fidem haberent incarnationis; quod est manifeste falsum, immo errant circa articulum illum; similiter illi qui crederent resurrectionem iam factam, haberent fidem de resurrectione, quos tamen circa resurrectionem constat errare: restat igitur, quod aliquid incomplexum non habet esse ipsius fidei obiectum; et est complexum vel incomplexum: ergo complexum.

**Sed contra:** 1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo[^p515-2]: *Omnes eundem potum spiritualem biberunt*; Glossa Augustini: «Tempora sunt mutata, sed tamen non est fides variata»: si igitur non est fides variata, nec obiectum fidei: cum ergo enuntiabilia, quae creduntur, variata sunt, quia illi credebant, Christum esse passurum, nos, passum esse; illi, incarnandum, nos, incarnatum esse: restat igitur, quod fides non est circa enuntiabile sive circa complexum tanquam circa obiectum.

2. Item, obiectum fidei est Verum increatum, sicut prius[^p515-3] fuit ostensum — unde Richardus de sancto Victore dicit, quod «articulus est veritas de Deo» — si ergo Deus est simplicissimus, et in simplici nulla cadit complexio vel compositio; videtur, quod obiectum fidei non sit verum complexum, sed incomplexum.

3. Item, de eodem et circa idem est fides, circa quod est visio futura; sed visio est circa verum incomplexum et per modum incomplexionis[^p515-4] — erit enim visio simplex intuitus summae lucis — ergo videtur, quod fides similiter consistat circa verum incomplexum per modum incomplexi.

4. Item, spes et caritas sunt circa res incomplexas et per modum incomplexionis, quia spes exspectat beatitudinem, et caritas amat Deum: ergo cum virtutes theologicae idem habeant pro obiecto secundum rem, videtur, quod et ipsa fides circa verum incomplexum consistat.

5. Item, si fides consistat circa verum complexum; cum tempore passionis paucissimi scirent, Christum pati, et in tempore incarnationis paucissimi scirent, Christum incarnari, paucissimi habuissent fidem; Cornelius etiam fidem non habuisset, qui nesciebat, Christum esse incarnatum nec passum, et tamen de illo legitur, quod eleemosynae eius placuerunt Deo — sine fide autem, ut dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo[^p515-5], impossibile est placere Deo — si igitur ista inconvenientia essent, inconveniens est ponere, quod fides consistat circa complexionem.

### Conclusio.

> Fides proprie consistit circa verum complexum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi diversimode senserunt[^p515-6].

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Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod fides consistit circa incomplexum, sicut circa proprium obiectum; et isti dixerunt, quod articuli fidei non sunt enuntiabilia, sed res, utpote incarnatio, passio et resurrectio; et ista quidem omni tempore sunt eadem, sicut et ipsa fides. Quod autem actus fidei transit super ipsum credibile sicut super complexum, hoc est propter defectum intellectus, qui non potest totum simplici aspectu intueri, sed primo hoc intuetur et postea illud, componens unum alteri.

Sed quoniam ipse assensus fidei est proprie super complexionem; et ad perfectionem fidei non tantum oportet cogitare de incarnatione, sed etiam oportet credere, incarnationem iam fuisse: ideo dixerunt alii, quod articuli sunt enuntiabilia, et quod fides consistit circa complexum, maxime cum fides quantum ad aliquos articulos simul respiciat increatum et creatum, et de nullo creato possit esse, nisi secundum quod componitur ipsi increato, secundum quod prius[^p516-1] habitum est: si ergo intellectus illud non capit nisi per modum complexionis, rationabilius videtur illud ponere et dicere, quod fides sit circa verum complexum sive sub ratione complexi. Et quoniam errans circa verum complexum quantum ad differentiam temporis simpliciter iudicatur haereticus, sicut si aliquis crederet resurrectionem iam factam, vel incarnationem futuram; ideo non solum dixerunt, fidem esse circa verum complexum[^p516-2], sed etiam circa verum complexum sub determinata differentia temporis. Et si tu obiicias eis de mutatione fidei propter mutationem istorum enuntiabilium; respondent secundum Nominales, quod enuntiabilia non sunt mutata, quia *te esse cursurum*, *te currere*, *te cucurrisse*, in diversis temporibus prolata, idem significant, et unum est enuntiabile, quia una est res, quam significant, et unum est tempus, pro quo proferuntur; et ideo unum sunt secundum rem et veritatem, quamvis videantur vocaliter esse diversa. — Aliter etiam respondent. Esto quod ista enuntiabilia sint diversa, quia tamen una est Veritas, cui fides assentit principaliter, et ratione cuius ista enuntiabilia credit, quae quidem non mutatur secundum diversitatem temporis, licet ipsa enuntiabilia diversificentur; non propter hoc fides mutatur et diversificatur, immo in diversis temporibus fides non mutata consistit.

Sed quia positio illa Nominalium, quae dicebat, enuntiabilia diversorum temporum esse unum, communiter non approbatur, immo falsa est, sicut in primo libro[^p516-3] fuit ostensum; similiter nec alius modus dicendi sufficit, quod ad immutabilitatem fidei sufficiat immutabilitas rationis credendi — si enim articuli sunt enuntiabilia et dicuntur immutabiles propter rationem credendi immutabilem, pari ratione omnes dicerentur unus articulus propter unicam rationem credendi, quae est in eis — ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod cum fidei habitus faciat mentem assentire credibili sive credito; et assensus animi[^p516-4] non feratur supra incomplexum, sed supra complexum: ponere oportet, quod ipsum obiectum fidei, secundum quod supra illud fertur fides, habet rationem complexi. Et quia dupliciter contingit, fidem ferri in obiectum suum, scilicet aut implicite, aut explicite; ideo secundum duplicem modum dicitur complexum esse obiectum fidei, sive fides consistere circa complexum. Nam fides quantum ad suam substantiam respicit complexum sive enuntiabile, non concernendo determinatam temporis differentiam, immo aliquod dictum, quod est commune et indifferens ad omne tempus, sicut Christum fuisse passurum. Fides autem explicita respicit complexum sub differentia temporis determinata, sicut nunc oportet credere, incarnationem fuisse, et resurrectionem futuram esse. Sicut ergo explicatio accidit fidei nec mutat essentiam fidei[^p516-5]; sic et variatio temporis determinati non variat fidem, ut sit alia et alia secundum speciem. — Et hic quidem modus dicendi satis est probabilis. Hunc igitur sustinendo dicere possumus, quod fides proprie consistit circa verum complexum. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de enuntiabilium mutatione, iam patet responsio: quia enuntiabile, quod non concernit determinatam temporis differentiam, in diversis temporibus non mutatur, et hoc est, circa quod habet fides consistere, secundum quod fides; sed illa enuntiabilia solum variantur, quae concernunt determinatam temporis differentiam, et circa hoc consistit fides, secundum quod explicita. Et ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit alia et alia, sed[^p516-6] quod fidei explicatio sit variata in diversis temporibus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides est circa Verum increatum, circa quod nulla est complexio; dicendum, quod sicut in primo libro[^p516-7] dictum fuit, quamvis Deus sit simplicissimus, tamen circa ipsum vere contingit enuntiare hoc de hoc per modum complexionis, pro eo quod illam complexionem non ponit intellectus circa rem, sed circa se ipsum intelligentem; nec tamen errat, quia non potest simplicitatem divini esse nisi sub tali compositione et collatione capere. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est in fide. — Praeterea, fides non tantum est de Vero increato in se, sed etiam prout comparatur ad veritatem creatam, sicut dictum est supra[^p516-8]; et illa comparatio sub quadam complexione est, et propterea illa ratio non cogit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de eodem est fides in via et visio in patria; dicendum, quod unum et idem potest apprehendi per modum incomplexi et per modum complexi, sicut patet in apprehensione sensus et intellectus. Sensus enim, dum apprehendit rem albam, apprehendit per modum cuiusdam incomplexionis, quia non novit sensus exterior componere nec dividere[^p516-9]; sed intellectus, dum illud idem apprehendit, quod sensus apprehendebat, sub modo complexionis accipit, praedicans hoc de hoc, componens hoc illi et dicens, hoc esse album; et

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ita complexum et incomplexum non faciunt diversitatem a parte rei comprehensae, sed a parte modi comprehendendi, quia unum et idem potest apprehendi sub modo complexionis et incomplexionis[^p517-1]. Et propterea non sequitur, quod si visio est de eodem, de quo est fides, et visio non est sub ratione complexionis, ergo et fides; immo est ibi *figura dictionis*, vel etiam *accidens*, quia proceditur ab unitate rei ad unitatem modi. Et si tu quaeras, quare fides non assentit obiecto suo per modum incomplexi, sicut visio; satis plana est responsio: quia visio patriae uno et simplici aspectu faciet videri et cognosci multa propter perfectionem gloriae[^p517-2]; non sic autem est de cognitione secundum statum viae, quem quidem statum respicit ipsa fides.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de spe et caritate, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia proprie intellectus est negotiari circa complexum, sed affectus est negotiari circa ipsam rem; et quia res in se ipsa habet rationem incomplexionis, sed prout est in intellectu, habet rationem complexionis[^p517-3]: hinc est, quod quamvis virtutes respicientes affectum sint circa obiectum suum praeter rationem complexionis, non tamen propter hoc fides[^p517-4], quae est regula intellectus. — Nec valet, quod si idem est obiectum virtutum theologicarum, propter hoc, in quantum est fidei, careat complexione, sicut in quantum est aliarum. Complexum enim et incomplexum non dicunt variationem a parte rei, sed solum a parte modi, sicut prius visum est; et quamvis virtutes theologicae habeant idem obiectum secundum rem et substantiam, habent tamen differens secundum rationem et modum.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Cornelio, iam patet responsio: quia Cornelius habebat fidem implicitam, et ideo non credebat incarnationem vel passionem[^p517-5] sub differentia temporis determinata; et propterea non errabat, sed explicatio fidei sibi deerat, ad quam faciendam misit Dominus Ecclesiae architectum[^p517-6].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether faith is concerned with the complex or with the incomplex.*

Thirdly it is asked whether faith is concerned with the complex, or with the incomplex. And that it is concerned with the complex seems [to be the case]:

1. «To believe, as Augustine says[^p514-2], is to think with assent»; but the assent of reason is not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it seems therefore that faith is concerned with the complex, as with its proper object[^p514-1].

2. Likewise, faith believes something because [it is] true, and rejects [something] because [it is] false; but the true and the false are concerned with complexity[^p514-3]: therefore it seems that the habit of faith also regards the complex itself, or the enunciable, as its object.

3. Likewise, faith is a mean between opinion and knowledge, as Hugh holds[^p514-4]; but both opinion and knowledge are concerned with the complex: therefore, since a mean takes on the nature of the extremes, it seems likewise [to be the case] that faith too [is].

4. Likewise, faith is opposed to error; but no one errs except from this, that he attributes something to something which ought not to be attributed, or removes what ought not to be removed; but this happens only in complexity: therefore every error consists in complexity. If therefore «opposites are by nature apt to be concerned with the same thing[^p515-1]», it seems likewise that faith too has the true complex for its object.

5. Likewise, if the true incomplex itself is the object of faith, then since the Jews have a credulity concerning the incarnation, the Jews would have faith of the incarnation; which is manifestly false — indeed they err concerning that article; similarly those who would believe the resurrection to have already taken place would have faith of the resurrection, who nevertheless are agreed to err concerning the resurrection: it remains therefore that something incomplex is not the object of faith itself; and it is [either] complex or incomplex: therefore complex.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that [text] of First Corinthians, chapter ten[^p515-2]: *They all drank the same spiritual drink*; the Gloss of Augustine: «The times are changed, but yet faith is not varied»: if therefore faith is not varied, neither [is] the object of faith: since therefore the enunciables which are believed are varied — because they believed that Christ was to suffer, [whereas] we [believe] that He has suffered; they [believed He] was to be incarnate, [whereas] we [believe He] has been incarnate: it remains therefore that faith is not concerned with the enunciable or with the complex as with its object.

2. Likewise, the object of faith is the uncreated Truth, as was shown before[^p515-3] — whence Richard of Saint Victor says that «an article is a truth about God» — if therefore God is most simple, and in the simple no complexity or composition falls; it seems that the object of faith is not the true complex, but the incomplex.

3. Likewise, faith is concerned with the same thing, and about the same thing, with which the future vision [is concerned]; but vision is concerned with the true incomplex and by way of incomplexity[^p515-4] — for vision will be a simple gaze upon the highest light — therefore it seems that faith likewise consists about the true incomplex by way of the incomplex.

4. Likewise, hope and charity are concerned with incomplex things and by way of incomplexity, because hope awaits beatitude, and charity loves God: therefore, since the theological virtues have the same thing for their object as to the reality, it seems that faith too consists about the true incomplex.

5. Likewise, if faith consists about the true complex; then since at the time of the passion very few knew that Christ was suffering, and at the time of the incarnation very few knew that Christ was being incarnate, very few would have had faith; Cornelius too would not have had faith, who did not know that Christ was incarnate nor [that He had] suffered, and yet it is read of him that his alms pleased God — but without faith, as is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven[^p515-5], it is impossible to please God — if therefore these incongruities should follow, it is unfitting to hold that faith consists about complexity.

### Conclusion.

> Faith properly consists about the true complex.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this question different [authors] have held different views[^p515-6].

For some wished to say that faith consists about the incomplex, as about its proper object; and these said that the articles of faith are not enunciables, but realities, such as the incarnation, the passion, and the resurrection; and these indeed are the same at every time, just as faith itself [is]. But that the act of faith passes over upon the very believable as upon the complex — this is on account of a defect of the intellect, which cannot behold the whole by a simple gaze, but first beholds this and afterward that, composing one with the other.

But since the assent of faith itself is properly upon complexity; and for the perfection of faith it is necessary not only to think about the incarnation, but also necessary to believe that the incarnation has already taken place: therefore others said that the articles are enunciables, and that faith consists about the complex, especially since faith, as regards certain articles, regards the uncreated and the created together, and can be of no created thing except insofar as it is composed with the uncreated itself, as was held before[^p516-1]: if therefore the intellect does not grasp it except by way of complexity, it seems more reasonable to hold and to say that faith is concerned with the true complex, or under the formal character of the complex. And since one who errs concerning the true complex as regards the difference of time is simply judged a heretic — as if someone were to believe the resurrection to have already taken place, or the incarnation to be future — therefore they said not only that faith is concerned with the true complex[^p516-2], but also concerned with the true complex under a determinate difference of time. And if you object to them concerning the change of faith on account of the change of these enunciables; they answer, following the Nominalists, that the enunciables are not changed, because *that you will run*, *that you run*, *that you have run*, uttered at different times, signify the same, and are one enunciable, because there is one reality which they signify, and one time for which they are uttered; and therefore they are one as to reality and truth, although they seem to be diverse in vocal expression. — Otherwise too they answer. Granted that these enunciables are diverse, yet because there is one Truth, to which faith principally assents, and by reason of which it believes these enunciables, [a Truth] which indeed is not changed according to the diversity of time, although the enunciables themselves are diversified; on account of this faith is not changed and diversified, but rather at different times faith consists unchanged.

But because that position of the Nominalists, which said that the enunciables of different times are one, is not commonly approved — indeed is false, as was shown in the first book[^p516-3]; likewise neither does that other mode of speaking suffice, that for the immutability of faith the immutability of the formal ground of believing should suffice — for if the articles are enunciables and are called immutable on account of the immutable formal ground of believing, by parity of reasoning all would be called one article on account of the single formal ground of believing which is in them — therefore there is a third mode of speaking, that since the habit of faith makes the mind assent to the believable or believed; and the assent of the mind[^p516-4] is borne not upon the incomplex, but upon the complex: it must be held that the very object of faith, insofar as faith is borne upon it, has the formal character of the complex. And because it happens in two ways that faith is borne into its object, namely either implicitly or explicitly; therefore according to the twofold mode the complex is said to be the object of faith, or faith [is said] to consist about the complex. For faith, as regards its substance, regards the complex or the enunciable, not concerning a determinate difference of time, but rather some statement which is common and indifferent to every time, as that Christ was to suffer. But explicit faith regards the complex under a determinate difference of time, as it is now necessary to believe that the incarnation has taken place, and that the resurrection is to come. As therefore explication is accidental to faith and does not change the essence of faith[^p516-5]; so too the variation of the determinate time does not vary faith, so that it should be one and another according to species. — And this mode of speaking is sufficiently probable. Therefore, maintaining it, we can say that faith properly consists about the true complex. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is first objected, concerning the change of enunciables, the response is now clear: because an enunciable which does not concern a determinate difference of time is not changed at different times, and this is that about which faith has to consist, insofar as [it is] faith; but only those enunciables are varied which concern a determinate difference of time, and about this faith consists, insofar as [it is] explicit. And from this it cannot be concluded that faith is one and another, but[^p516-6] that the explication of faith is varied at different times.

2. To that which is objected, that faith is concerned with the uncreated Truth, about which there is no complexity; it must be said that, as was said in the first book[^p516-7], although God is most simple, nevertheless concerning Him it truly happens that one enunciates this of this by way of complexity, for the reason that the intellect does not place that complexity upon the reality, but upon itself in understanding; nor yet does it err, because it cannot grasp the simplicity of the divine being except under such composition and collation. And in this way it is to be understood in faith. — Moreover, faith is not only about the uncreated Truth in itself, but also as it is compared to created truth, as was said above[^p516-8]; and that comparison is under a certain complexity, and therefore that reason does not compel.

3. To that which is objected, that faith in the way and vision in the fatherland are of the same thing; it must be said that one and the same thing can be apprehended by way of the incomplex and by way of the complex, as is clear in the apprehension of sense and intellect. For sense, when it apprehends a white thing, apprehends by way of a certain incomplexity, because the exterior sense does not know how to compose or divide[^p516-9]; but the intellect, when it apprehends that same thing which sense was apprehending, takes it under the mode of complexity, predicating this of this, composing this with that and saying that this is white; and

so the complex and the incomplex do not make a diversity on the part of the thing comprehended, but on the part of the mode of comprehending, because one and the same thing can be apprehended under the mode of complexity and of incomplexity[^p517-1]. And therefore it does not follow that, if vision is of the same thing of which faith is, and vision is not under the formal character of complexity, therefore neither [is] faith; rather there is here a *figure of speech*, or even an *accident*, because one proceeds from the unity of the thing to the unity of the mode. And if you ask why faith does not assent to its object by way of the incomplex, as vision [does]; the response is plain enough: because the vision of the fatherland will, by one and a simple gaze, cause many things to be seen and known, on account of the perfection of glory[^p517-2]; but it is not so concerning cognition according to the state of the way, which state faith itself regards.

4. To that which is objected concerning hope and charity, it must be said that it is not similar: because properly it belongs to the intellect to be occupied about the complex, but to the affection to be occupied about the reality itself; and because the reality in itself has the character of incomplexity, but as it is in the intellect, has the character of complexity[^p517-3]: hence it is that, although the virtues which regard the affection are concerned with their object apart from the character of complexity, yet not so faith[^p517-4], which is the rule of the intellect. — Nor does it hold, that if the object of the theological virtues is the same, on account of this, insofar as it is [the object] of faith, it should lack complexity, just as [it does] insofar as it is [the object] of the others. For the complex and the incomplex do not state a variation on the part of the thing, but only on the part of the mode, as was seen before; and although the theological virtues have the same object as to reality and substance, they nevertheless have a differing [object] according to formal character and mode.

5. To that which is objected concerning Cornelius, the response is now clear: because Cornelius had implicit faith, and therefore did not believe the incarnation or the passion[^p517-5] under a determinate difference of time; and therefore he did not err, but the explication of faith was lacking to him, for the making of which the Lord sent the architect of the Church[^p517-6].

---

la: Cod. U subdit *Deo*.

en: Codex U adds *Deo* ["to God"].

la: *De Praedest. Sanct.* c. 2. n. 5. — Minorem explicat Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 7. a. 5. (ubi idem arg.) sic: *Sed cogitare est conferre unum alteri, consentire (assentire?) vero sententiam super illud inferre; et hoc non fit super incomplexum.* — Pro *supra* nonnulli codd., ut G K Y aa, substituunt *circa*.

en: Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 2, n. 5. — Alexander of Hales explains the minor [premise], *Summa*, p. III, q. 68, m. 7, a. 5 (where the same argument [occurs]), thus: *But to think is to confer one thing with another, while to consent (assent?) is to bring sentence to bear upon it; and this does not happen upon the incomplex.* — For *supra* ["upon"] several codices, such as G K Y aa, substitute *circa* ["concerning"].

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. seqq.; III. de Anima, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.), et VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.). — Pro *complexionem* edd. *complexum*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 1 ff.; *On the Soul* III, text 21 ff. (c. 6); and *Metaphysics* VI, text 8 (V, c. 4). — For *complexionem* ["complexity"] the editions [read] *complexum* ["the complex"].

la: *Libr.* I. *de Sacram.* p. X. c. 2. Eius verba, quibus Richard. quoque a S. Vict. utitur, Declarat. ad Bernard. (circa finem), vide supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos. Ibid. etiam videsis de ratione (ex Aristot. sumta), quae hic in fulcimentum conclus. adducitur. — De minori cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 26. (c. 33.). — In conclus. pro *suscipiat* codd. A K Z bb *sapiat*.

en: [Hugh of St. Victor,] book I *On the Sacraments*, p. X, c. 2. His words, which Richard of St. Victor also uses, *Declaration to Bernard* (near the end), see above d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 1 *ad oppositum*. There too you may see concerning the reasoning (taken from Aristotle) which is here adduced in support of the conclusion. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* I, c. 26 (c. 33). — In the conclusion, for *suscipiat* ["takes on"] codices A K Z bb [read] *sapiat* ["savors of"].

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de *Oppositis*, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). De praecedentibus cfr. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 21. seqq. (VIII. c. 10.). — Pro *consistere* codd. A K *fieri*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter on *Opposites*, and *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7). On the preceding [points] cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 21 ff. (VIII, c. 10). — For *consistere* ["to be concerned with"] codices A K [read] *fieri* ["to come to be"].

la: Vers. 4. — Glossa August. invenitur in Enarrat. Ps. 50, 14. n. 17. et in Ioan. Evang. tr. 45. n. 9. — Paulo inferius post *enuntiabilia* cod. U adiicit *fidei*.

en: Verse 4. — The Gloss of Augustine is found in the *Commentary on Psalm 50*, 14, n. 17, and in [the tractates] on the Gospel of John, tr. 45, n. 9. — A little below, after *enuntiabilia* ["enunciables"] codex U adds *fidei* ["of faith"].

la: Quaest. praeced. — De definitione *articuli* vide infra a. 3. q. 1. — Pro *Richardus* cod. aa *Hugo*.

en: The preceding question. — On the definition of *article* see below a. 3, q. 1. — For *Richardus* codex aa [reads] *Hugo*.

la: Cod. A K V bb *est*. In fine arg. pro *incomplexi* cod. Z *incomplexionis*.

en: Codices A K V bb [read] *est* ["is"]. At the end of the argument, for *incomplexi* ["of the incomplex"] codex Z [reads] *incomplexionis* ["of incomplexity"].

la: Vers. 6. — De Cornelio vide Act. 10, 31. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *qui nesciebat... nec passum* cod. aa *quia nesciebat... et passum*.

en: Verse 6. — On Cornelius see Acts 10, 31 ff. — A little above, for *qui nesciebat... nec passum* ["who did not know... nor [that He had] suffered"] codex aa [reads] *quia nesciebat... et passum* ["because he did not know... and [that He had] suffered"].

la: De quo Praepositivus, S. p. III. q. de articulis fidei, tradit haec: *Quidam respondent, quod non sunt articuli fidei, ut Christum esse natum... Alii respondent, quod totum hoc est articulus fidei: Christum esse natum, vel nasci, vel nasciturum esse... Alii dicunt, quod nomina non sunt articuli, sed eventus sunt articuli, ut nativitas, passio... Alii dicunt, quod haec sunt articuli fidei, scilicet credere nativitatem, credere passionem, credere unitatem essentiae, credere trinitatem personarum, et his similia. Contra quos sic: credere est motus mentis, quo quis movetur ad credendum; alius est motus mentis istius, alius illius... ergo alius est articulus istius et alius articulus illius... Item secundum istos non est concedendum: iste credit articulos fidei; quia credere passionem est articulus fidei, et iste credit credere passionem; hoc nihil est dicere. Concedunt, quod nemo credit articulos fidei, sed ea quae subsunt articulis, ut nativitatem, passionem... Sunt alii qui fere idem dicunt; dicunt enim, quod fides est de nativitate, fides de passione, fides de Trinitate, fides de unitate et similia sunt articuli fidei. Translatum est enim hoc nomen articulus ab articulis digitorum; sicut enim articuli digitorum sunt quaedam distinctiones digitorum, ita fides de passione, fides de resurrectione quaedam particulae fidei sunt... Penultimae viae, ut diximus, magis consentimus etc.* — Pro *senserunt* codd. A K *sentiunt*, ex quibus codd. nec non ex cod. bb (H a secunda manu) non ita multo post supplevimus *sicut ante et ipsa fides*.

en: Concerning which Praepositinus, *Summa*, p. III, the question on the articles of faith, hands down this: *Some answer that there are not articles of faith, such as that Christ was born... Others answer that this whole is an article of faith: that Christ was born, or is being born, or is to be born... Others say that the names are not articles, but events are the articles, such as the nativity, the passion... Others say that these are articles of faith, namely to believe the nativity, to believe the passion, to believe the unity of essence, to believe the trinity of persons, and the like. Against whom thus: to believe is a motion of the mind, by which one is moved to believing; the motion of the mind of this [object] is one, of that [object] another... therefore the article of this is one and the article of that another... Again, according to these it is not to be granted: this man believes the articles of faith; because to believe the passion is an article of faith, and this man believes to believe the passion; this is to say nothing. They grant that no one believes the articles of faith, but the things which underlie the articles, such as the nativity, the passion... There are others who say almost the same; for they say that faith concerning the nativity, faith concerning the passion, faith concerning the Trinity, faith concerning the unity, and the like, are the articles of faith. For this name "article" is transferred from the articulations [joints] of the fingers; for just as the joints of the fingers are certain distinctions of the fingers, so faith concerning the passion, faith concerning the resurrection, are certain particles of faith... With the penultimate way, as we have said, we more agree, etc.* — For *senserunt* ["have held"] codices A K [read] *sentiunt* ["hold"], from which codices, and also from codex bb (H by a second hand), not long after we have supplied *sicut ante et ipsa fides* ["just as before, faith itself also"].

la: Quaest. praeced. — Pro *componitur* cod. Z *comparatur*. Inferius pro *videtur illud* cod. A *videtur idem*.

en: The preceding question. — For *componitur* ["is composed"] codex Z [reads] *comparatur* ["is compared"]. Below, for *videtur illud* codex A [reads] *videtur idem*.

la: Non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 perperam (quia contra mentem huius opinionis) *incomplexum*.

en: Not a few codices, and also editions 1, 2, wrongly (because against the mind of this opinion) [read] *incomplexum* ["the incomplex"].

la: Dist. 41. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Mox pro *immutabilitatem* codd. G (H a secunda manu) L (bb a prima manu) *immutationem*.

en: [First book,] d. 41, a. 2, q. 2, in the body [of the article]. — Soon, for *immutabilitatem* ["immutability"] codices G (H by a second hand) L (bb by a first hand) [read] *immutationem* ["non-change"].

la: Vat. omittit *animi*, pro quo edd. 1, 2 *cum*. Inferius post *duplicem* codd. A K addunt *istum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *animi* ["of the mind"], for which editions 1, 2 [read] *cum* ["since"]. Below, after *duplicem* ["twofold"] codices A K add *istum* ["that"].

la: Vide infra d. 25. a. 2. q. 1.

en: See below d. 25, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Edd. 1, 2 et complures codd. *secundum*.

en: Editions 1, 2 and several codices [read] *secundum* ["according"].

la: Dist. 27. p. 1. q. 3; d. 34. q. 1. in corp.; d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *nulla est* cod. V *nulla consistit*, et paulo inferius idem cod. V post *circa rem* adiicit *intellectam*.

en: [First book,] d. 27, p. 1, q. 3; d. 34, q. 1, in the body; d. 41, a. 2, q. 1. — A little above, for *nulla est* ["there is no"] codex V [reads] *nulla consistit* ["none consists"], and a little below the same codex V, after *circa rem* ["upon the reality"], adds *intellectam* ["understood"].

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Nec etiam super se reflectere (I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. ad 4.). Aliter autem se habet sensus communis, de quo vide supra d. 14. a. 3. q. 2. ad 5.

en: Nor even to reflect upon itself (First [book of the] *Sentences*, d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4). The common sense, however, stands otherwise, concerning which see above d. 14, a. 3, q. 2, ad 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 152. seqq. et III. text. 21. seqq. (III. c. 3. et 6.) — De fallacia *figurae dictionis* et *accidentis* vide supra pag. 151, nota 3. et pag. 179, nota 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 152 ff. and III, text 21 ff. (III, c. 3 and 6). — On the fallacy of *figure of speech* and of *accident* see above p. 151, note 3, and p. 179, note 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad fundam. 6.

en: Cf. above d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, *ad fundamentum* 6.

la: Vide Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.), ubi etiam actuum intellectus et voluntatis diversitas inter se respectu obiecti in eo reponitur, quod *bonum* et *malum* sint in *rebus*, *verum* autem et *falsum* in *anima*. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 562, nota 10. — Superius pro *complexum* cod. G *complexionem*.

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, text 8 (V, c. 4), where too the diversity of the acts of intellect and will among themselves with respect to the object is placed in this, that *good* and *evil* are in *things*, but *true* and *false* in the *soul*. Cf. tome I, p. 562, note 10. — Above, for *complexum* codex G [reads] *complexionem*.

la: Cod. A supplet *est*; sensus completus huius propos. est: *non tamen propter hoc etiam fides est circa obiectum incomplexum.* — Proxime post pro *quae est* edd. *quia est*. Aliquanto inferius pro *variationem* codd. A K *varietatem*.

en: Codex A supplies *est* ["is"]; the complete sense of this proposition is: *yet not on account of this is faith also concerned with the incomplex object.* — Immediately after, for *quae est* the editions [read] *quia est*. Somewhat below, for *variationem* ["a variation"] codices A K [read] *varietatem* ["a variety"].

la: Pro *passionem* edd. cum bene multis codd. *resurrectionem*, cod. bb *passionem vel resurrectionem*.

en: For *passionem* ["the passion"] the editions, with very many codices, [read] *resurrectionem* ["the resurrection"]; codex bb [reads] *passionem vel resurrectionem* ["the passion or the resurrection"].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{514,515,516,517}-{L,R}-*.png`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 35747–35938); Vol III PDF-priority inversion applied to the cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Solutio bands on pp.515–516. pdf = printed + 22 (printed 514–517 = PDF 536–539). Fresh literal English translation. Template = `vol3/bon-sent-III-d24-a1-q2.md`.

**Page span: pp.514–517** (q3 turned out to span FOUR pages, not the 3 the prior hand-off projected — its Solutio oppositorum ad 3/4/5 spill onto p.517, where the new ARTICULUS II begins in the left column while q3's solutio finishes in the right column). QUAESTIO III header + opener begin at the FOOT of **p.514-R** (the q2 scholion I–II fills p.514 above it). Body: p.514 = header + opener + *Fundamenta* args 1–3; p.515 = args 4–5 + *Sed contra* 1–5 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (opinions 1–2); p.516 = Respondeo (the rejected Nominalist mode, then the third / accepted mode with conclusiones 1–4) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–3 (ad 3 breaks at *…componens hoc illi et dicens, hoc esse album; et* / foot); p.517 = ad 3 completes + ad 4 + ad 5 (ending *…misit Dominus Ecclesiae architectum*), then ARTICULUS II opens (next chunk).

**Apparatus 25 entries**, NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart: **p.514 ×4** (`[^p514-1..4]`; n.1 = *Deo* variant on arg.1's *obiectum*, n.2 = *Augustinus²* in arg.1 [*De Praedest. Sanct.* + Alex. Hal. on the minor], n.3 = *complexionem³* in arg.2 [Aristot.], n.4 = *Hugo⁴* in arg.3 [Hugh *de Sacram.*]) + **p.515 ×6** (`[^p515-1..6]`; n.1 = *idem¹* in arg.4 [Aristot. *Oppositis*], n.2 = *decimo²* in contra-1 [Gloss of Augustine], n.3 = *prius³* in contra-2 [definition of *article*], n.4 = *incomplexionis⁴* in contra-3, n.5 = *undecimo⁵* in contra-5 [Cornelius / Acts 10], n.6 = *senserunt⁶* opening the Respondeo [the long Praepositinus note on what an "article" is]) + **p.516 ×9** (`[^p516-1..9]`; nn.1–4 in the Respondeo [componitur¹ / complexum² / libro³ / animi⁴], nn.5–9 in Solutio ad 1–3 [essentiam fidei⁵ / sed⁶ in ad 1 / libro⁷ in ad 2 / supra⁸ in ad 2-*Praeterea* / dividere⁹ in ad 3]) + **p.517 ×6** (`[^p517-1..6]`; n.1 = *incomplexionis¹* in ad 3 [*figura dictionis*/*accidens* fallacies], n.2 = *gloriae²* in ad 3, n.3 = *complexionis³* in ad 4 [Aristot. *Metaph.* bonum/malum in rebus, verum/falsum in anima], n.4 = *fides⁴* in ad 4 [Cod. A supplet *est*], n.5 = *passionem⁵* in ad 5, n.6 = *architectum⁶* closing ad 5).

**NO scholion of its own.** Verified on the PDF: after q3's ad 5 (*…misit Dominus Ecclesiae architectum*) the text runs straight into ARTICULUS II — no SCHOLION header. Decisive confirmation: p.517 footnote **6** reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question") — i.e. q3 is glossed by q2's scholion, whose section II already previews the *complexum/incomplexum* opinions of q.3. Hence `has_scholion: false`.

**Footers IN (picked up):** the p.514 footer band that q2 forwarded — q2 placed NO `[^p514-N]` (its scholion is inline-referenced), so all of p.514's NOTAE (nn.1–4, glossing q3's *complexum*/Augustinus/Hugo args) are q3's — plus all of p.515, p.516, and p.517 nn.1–6. **Footers OUT (forwarded to d24-a2-q1):** p.517's nn.7–10 (Vers. 29 / Vers. 1 / Codd. *pati*–*passum* / Cod. V *sed constat*) belong to ARTICULUS II's QUAESTIO I args (Apostles saw Christ; the Blessed Virgin's experiential knowledge), not q3.

**Seam CLEAN both ends:** opens raw 35747/35750 (QUAESTIO III header + *Tertio quaeritur…circa complexum, an circa incomplexum*, continuous after q2's scholion II close raw 35744 *…Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.*); closes raw 35938 (*…misit Dominus Ecclesiae architectum*) immediately before the ARTICULUS II opener raw 35939 (*AKTICULUS II — De obiecto fidei in comparatione ad nostram cognitionem*).

**No [?] flags** — 450 dpi legible throughout; the long Praepositinus note (p.515 n.6) and the Aristotelian cross-references collated against the PDF bands. (Running heads in this span are OCR digit-mangled — "518"/"316"/"!J17" for the page numbers, and `DIST. XXIll.` for `DIST. XXIV.` — trusted via the +22 offset and running-head text, never the OCR'd digits, per the Vol III convention.)

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0