title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum creatio mutationem dicat
Whether creation implies a mutation

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De ipsa productione sive creatione.*

Viso de entitate et quidditate principii producentis, quaeritur hic tertio de ipsa productione, quae creatio appellatur. Circa quam quaeruntur duo. Primum est, utrum dicat mutationem aliquam. Secundum est, utrum dicat aliquid[^1] medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum creatio mutationem dicat.*

Quod autem dicat mutationem, videtur:

**1.** Primo per auctoritatem Augustini, duodecimo *de Civitate Dei*[^2]: «Omnia quae creata sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt»; si ergo creabile est mutabile, ergo creatum est mutatum, et creatio est mutatio. Si tu dicas, quod est mutabile, quia potest in nihil cedere, et non, quia productum est;

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contra: sicut destrui dicit viam deveniendi in non-esse, ita creari in esse: si ergo destructio ponit mutationem, ergo pari ratione et productio.

**2.** Item, creatio est actio; sed «omnis actio est in motu, et omnis motus in actione[^3]»: ergo qui creat, vere agit: ergo vere movet. Si tu dicas, quod actio divina magis est substantia quam actio, et talis est creatio; obiicitur de passione, quia *creari* est ipsius creaturae. Si ergo creatura susceptibilis est vere passionis et mutationis, ergo creatio-passio est mutatio.

**3.** Item, per Damascenum[^4], qui philosophus et theologus est: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit» — loquitur de creatione — ergo secundum ipsum creatio est versio; sed omnis versio est mutatio, sicut ipse idem dicit, quod creata sunt mutabilia, quia *vertibilia*: ergo creatio est mutatio.

**4.** Item, quanto aliqua sunt magis distantia, tanto in perveniendo ab uno ad alterum maior est mutatio et variatio; sed ens et non-ens summe distant: ergo cum creatione de non-ente fiat ens, creatio verissime est mutatio.

**5.** Item, magis mutatur res, quando suscipit formam novam, quam quando acquirit novum situm; et rursus adhuc magis, quando acquirit formam substantialem, quam quando acquirit dispositionem accidentalem: ergo quando totum de novo recipit et accipit, tunc mutatur maxime. Sed hoc est in creatione: ergo ibi vere est mutatio.

**6.** Item, si creatio dicit actionem absque omni mutatione, ergo absque omni tempore; et talia possunt inesse et insunt Deo ab aeterno: ergo videtur, quod Deus res produxerit ab aeterno.

**Ad oppositum:**

**1.** Magister dicit, et habetur in littera[^5]: «Cum dicimus Deum facere aliquid, non aliquem in operando motum intelligimus inesse». Si dicas, quod creatio-actio non dicit motum, sed creatio-passio tantum; contra: idem manet significatum in activo et passivo, sicut dicit grammaticus, sicut recti et obliqui: si ergo in actione non dicit motum, ergo nec in passione.

**2.** Item, *mutari est aliter se habere nunc quam prius*[^6]; sed quod creatur non se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia nunquam se habuit aliter, quam sicut se habet in creatione — nunquam enim fuit aliquo modo nec se habuit aliqualiter, nec ergo aliter quam nunc — ergo non mutatur, dum creatur: ergo creatio non est mutatio.

**3.** Item, immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo nunc et prius: ergo mutabile, quod se habet aliter, cum sit eius oppositum; sed creatum non se habet aliter nunc quam prius, quia nullo modo se habuit prius: ergo non est mutatum: ergo creatio non est mutatio[^7].

**4.** Item, «omnis motus et mutatio est perfectio entis in potentia»; creatio autem est nullo modo entis: ergo creatio non est motus nec mutatio. Prima patet per Philosophum[^8], secunda vero per Magistrum.

**5.** Item, omnis mutatio fundatur super aliquod mobile[^9]; sed creatio non praeexigit aliquod mobile, quia omne mobile per creationem inducitur in esse: ergo creatio non est mutatio.

**6.** Item, si creatio est mutatio, aut ergo secundum accidens, aut secundum substantiam[^10]. Non secundum accidens, quia tunc sola accidentia crearentur; sed nec secundum substantiam, quia tunc esset generatio, vel corruptio. Si dicas, quod sub nulla harum specierum continetur: obiicitur, quod non solum secundum Philosophum, sed secundum Augustinum[^11] «omnis motus aut est ad situm, aut ad formam»; sed creatio est ad materiam recte ac proprie: ergo videtur, quod non sit mutatio.

**7.** Item, ex tanta potentia creat Deus, ex quanta generat, quia utrumque facit per potentiam infinitam[^12]; sed Deus potest generare sine mutatione sui et etiam personae genitae: ergo pari ratione potest creare sine mutatione sui et creaturae; aut si non, quaero, quare non?

### *Conclusio.*

> Creatio est mutatio, sed distincta a mutatione naturali.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam est productio, in qua productum se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia secundum aliquid sui fuit prius sub una dispositione, et nunc est sub alia; et talis est productio, quae est ex materiali principio, ut naturalis generatio.

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Quaedam est productio, in qua productum omni modo se habet nunc et nullo modo prius; et talis est productio, quae est ex nihilo. Tertia est productio, in qua productum aeque omnino se habet nunc et prius, si tamen est ibi dicere prius; et talis est Filii generatio ab aeterno. Ab aeterno enim sic processit ut nunc[^13].

— Prima habet rationem motus et mutationis et productionis: motus, ratione praeparationis materiae, quae fit per dispositiones accidentales, et haec indiget successione et tempore; mutationis, ratione exitus in esse sive receptionis substantialis formae, quae fit in instanti; productionis vero, ratione eius, quod illam formam non a se habet, sed ab alio effectivo[^14]. — Secunda caret ratione motus, habet tamen rationem mutationis et productionis. Ratione motus caret, quia cum non habeat materiam, nulla potest praeire dispositio; habet tamen rationem mutationis, quia ibi est subita et nova formae inductio; habet rationem productionis, quoniam hoc[^15] habet ab alio effectivo principio. — Tertia caret ratione motus et mutationis, habet tamen rationem productionis. Ratione motus et mutationis caret, quia nec est ex materiali principio, nec ex nihilo; sed tamen est ab aliquo[^16], et sempiternaliter est ab ipso.

Concedendum est igitur, quod productio creaturae est mutatio; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae videantur sophisticae.

**Ad argumenta.**

*Ad 1.* Quod ergo obiicitur, quod est sine motu; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur sine motu agentis, non tamen quod sine mutatione producti. Si enim, ut dicit Philosophus[^17], anima, dum movet corpus, immobilis perseverat, quanto magis Deus, dum creat et mutat omnia, «ipse stabilis manens dat cuncta mutari». — Si ergo obiiciat, quod verbum activum et passivum idem significant; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia *actio* et *passio* dicunt diversa genera[^18]; tamen in coniugatione unum ponitur iuxta alterum, quia secundum vocis formationem unum venit ab alio.

*Ad 2.* Quod obiicitur, quod *mutari est aliter se habere nunc et prius*; dicendum, quod ista non est generalis ratio eius quod est mutari sive mutationis, sed solius mutationis naturalis.

*Ad 3.* Quod ergo obiicitur: *immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo, et mutabile quod se habet aliter*; dicendum, quod hic est consequens[^19], quia si *mutabile* et *immutabile* opponuntur ut privatio et habitus, et immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo, tunc mutabile est sive mutatum quod non se habet eodem modo. Sed hoc habet tres causas veritatis: aut quia nullo modo se habet prius et posterius; aut[^20] nullo modo prius, et aliquo modo posterius, et ita non eodem modo; aut quia simpliciter aliter se habet prius, et aliter posterius: et ideo, cum procedit a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, peccat secundum consequens.

*Ad 4, 5, 6.* Ad tres rationes sequentes patet responsio, quia omnes procedunt de mutatione naturali, quae praeexigit materiam et ens in potentia, et quae est generatio; tali autem modo creatio non est mutatio, sed supra hanc mutationem; unde potest dici supernaturalis mutatio. Et si quaeras, utrum sit mutatio ad formam aut ad situm; dico,

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quod est ad totam rei substantiam, et ita ad formam, ac per hoc sub mutatione ad formam potest comprehendi.

*Ad 7.* Quod quaeritur de generatione Filii; dicendum, quod non est simile: quamvis enim utraque sit ab aequali potentia, tamen creatio est ex nihilo. Sed *ex* non potest dicere identitatem nec causalitatem, ergo ordinem: ergo fieri ex nihilo habet esse post nihil, et ita post non-esse: ergo aliquo modo se habet nunc, quo non se habebat prius; et ideo necessario mutatio ponitur per productionem de nihilo, vel[^21] inceptio. Filius autem est de Patris substantia per identitatem, nec oportet, quod habeat ordinem ad nihil sive ad non-esse: ergo potest semper esse, et ita produci sine initio et mutatione. Unde productio rei non ponit inchoationem rei necessario, sed productio ex nihilo necessario ponit; et ideo creatio includit mutationem, generatio vero Filii minime.

english:
### Article III. *On the production or creation itself.*

Having seen [these things] about the entity and quiddity of the producing principle, the question is asked here, thirdly, concerning the production itself, which is called *creation*. Concerning which two things are asked. The first is whether it implies any mutation. The second is whether it implies anything[^1] as a medium between Creator and creature.

### Question I. *Whether creation implies a mutation.*

That it does imply a mutation, it seems:

**1.** First, by the authority of Augustine, *On the City of God* XII[^2]: «All things that have been created are mutable, because they have been made from nothing»; if therefore what is creatable is mutable, then what is created has been changed, and creation is a mutation. If you say that it is mutable because it can return into nothing, and not because it has been produced, the contrary: as *to be destroyed* implies the way of coming-to-be into non-being, so *to be created* implies it into being: therefore if destruction posits a mutation, so equally does production.

**2.** Likewise, creation is an action; but «every action is in motion, and every motion in action[^3]»: therefore he who creates truly acts: therefore truly moves. If you say that divine action is more a substance than an action, and such is creation, the objection is from the passive side: for *to be created* belongs to the creature itself. If therefore the creature is truly susceptible of a passion and a mutation, then creation-as-passion is a mutation.

**3.** Likewise, by Damascene[^4], who is both philosopher and theologian: «Everything that begins from a turning, tends toward a turning» — he is speaking of creation — therefore according to him creation is a turning; but every turning is a mutation, as the same one himself says that created things are mutable because they are *turnable*: therefore creation is a mutation.

**4.** Likewise, the more distant things are, the greater the mutation and variation in coming from one to the other; but being and non-being are most distant: therefore since by creation a being comes from non-being, creation is most truly a mutation.

**5.** Likewise, a thing is changed more when it takes on a new form than when it acquires a new place; and still more when it acquires a substantial form than when it acquires an accidental disposition: therefore when [a thing] receives and takes on the whole anew, then it is changed most. But this is what happens in creation: therefore there truly is mutation there.

**6.** Likewise, if creation implies an action without any mutation, then [it implies an action] without any time; and such things can belong to God, and do belong to him, from eternity: therefore it seems that God produced things from eternity.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** The Master says, and it is contained in the *littera*[^5]: «When we say that God makes something, we do not understand any motion to be present in him as he operates». If you say that creation-as-action does not imply motion, but only creation-as-passion, the contrary: the same significate remains in active and passive, as the grammarian says, like nominative and oblique [cases]: therefore if it does not imply motion in the action, then neither in the passion.

**2.** Likewise, *to be changed is to be otherwise now than before*[^6]; but what is created is not otherwise now and before, because it never was otherwise than as it is in creation — for it never in any way was nor was it in any state, nor therefore otherwise than now — therefore it is not changed in being created: therefore creation is not a mutation.

**3.** Likewise, *the immutable is what remains in the same way now and before*: therefore the *mutable* is what is otherwise, since it is its opposite; but what is created is not otherwise now than before, because in no way was it before: therefore it has not been changed: therefore creation is not a mutation[^7].

**4.** Likewise, «every motion and mutation is the perfection of what is in potency»; but creation is in no way of what is [already in potency]: therefore creation is neither motion nor mutation. The first is plain from the Philosopher[^8]; the second from the Master.

**5.** Likewise, every mutation is founded upon some movable[^9]; but creation does not presuppose any movable, because every movable is brought into being by creation: therefore creation is not a mutation.

**6.** Likewise, if creation is a mutation, then either according to an accident or according to substance[^10]. Not according to an accident, because then only accidents would be created; but neither according to substance, because then it would be generation or corruption. If you say that it is contained under none of these species, the objection is that not only according to the Philosopher but also according to Augustine[^11] «every motion is either toward place or toward form»; but creation is toward matter properly and strictly: therefore it seems that it is not a mutation.

**7.** Likewise, God creates from as great a power as he generates, since he does both by an infinite power[^12]; but God can generate without a mutation either of himself or of the begotten Person: therefore by equal reason he can create without a mutation either of himself or of the creature; and if not, I ask why not?

### *Conclusion.*

> Creation is a mutation, but a mutation distinct from natural mutation.

**I respond:** It must be said that one kind of production is that in which the product is otherwise now than before, because according to something of itself it was earlier under one disposition and now is under another; and such is the production which is from a material principle, namely natural generation. Another kind of production is that in which the product in every way is now and in no way was before; and such is the production which is from nothing. The third kind is the production in which the product is equally entirely [the same] now and before, if indeed it is meaningful to speak of *before* there; and such is the generation of the Son from eternity. For from eternity he so proceeded as now[^13].

— The first has the account of motion, of mutation, and of production: of motion, by reason of the preparation of matter, which happens through accidental dispositions, and this needs succession and time; of mutation, by reason of the going-out into being or the reception of the substantial form, which happens in an instant; of production, by reason of the fact that it does not have that form from itself but from another effective [cause][^14]. — The second lacks the account of motion, but has the account of mutation and of production. It lacks the account of motion, because since it has no matter, no disposition can precede it; but it has the account of mutation, because there is a sudden and new bringing-in of form; it has the account of production, because it has this[^15] from another effective principle. — The third lacks the account of motion and of mutation, but has the account of production. It lacks the account of motion and of mutation because it is neither from a material principle nor from nothing; yet it is from someone[^16], and is so from him from all eternity.

Therefore it must be granted that the production of the creature is a mutation; and the reasons for this are to be granted, although some seem sophistical.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1.* What is then objected, that it is without motion; it must be said that this is understood as without a motion of the *agent*, not however that it is without a mutation of the *product*. For if, as the Philosopher says[^17], the soul, while it moves the body, remains immovable, how much more God, while he creates and changes all things, «himself remaining stable, gives all things to be changed». — If then it be objected that the verb in active and passive signify the same; it must be said that this is false, because *action* and *passion* belong to different categories[^18]; nevertheless in the conjugation [of the verb] the one is placed alongside the other, because according to the formation of the word one comes from the other.

*To 2.* What is objected, that *to be changed is to be otherwise now and before*; it must be said that this is not the general account of *to be changed* or of *mutation*, but only of natural mutation.

*To 3.* What is then objected: *the immutable is what remains in the same way, and the mutable is what is otherwise*; it must be said that here the fallacy of the consequent[^19] occurs, because if *mutable* and *immutable* are opposed as privation and habit, and the immutable is what remains in the same way, then the mutable or the changed is what does not remain in the same way. But this may be true for three reasons: either because it is in no way before and after; or[^20] in no way before and in some way after — and so not in the same way; or because it is simply otherwise before and otherwise after; and so, when one proceeds from many causes-of-truth to one, one commits the fallacy of the consequent.

*To 4, 5, 6.* To the three following reasons the answer is plain, because all of them proceed concerning natural mutation — which presupposes matter and a being in potency, and which is generation; but in that way creation is not a mutation, but [is] above this kind of mutation; whence it can be called a *supernatural* mutation. And if you ask whether it is a mutation toward form or toward place, I say that it is toward the whole substance of the thing and so toward form, and through this it can be included under mutation-toward-form.

*To 7.* What is asked about the generation of the Son, it must be said that the cases are not alike: for although each is from an equal power, nevertheless creation is *from nothing*. But *from* cannot imply identity nor causality, therefore [implies] order: therefore to come-to-be *from nothing* has being *after nothing*, and so *after non-being*: therefore in some way it is now in a way it was not before; and therefore a mutation is necessarily posited by production from nothing, or[^21] a beginning. But the Son is from the substance of the Father by identity, nor need it be that he have an ordering toward nothing or toward non-being: therefore he can always be, and so be produced without a beginning or a mutation. Whence the production of a thing does not necessarily posit the inchoation of the thing, but production from nothing necessarily does; and therefore creation includes a mutation, but the generation of the Son does not at all.

la: Codd. I-K *aliquod*.

en: Codices I–K read *aliquod* (neuter pronoun "any [thing]").

la: Cap. 1. n. 3: *Ea vero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo; verumtamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt.*

en: *De Civitate Dei* XII, c. 1, n. 3: *The things which he made are indeed good, because [they are] from him; yet mutable, because they are not [made] of him but from nothing.*

la: Gilbert. Porret., *de Sex princip.* c. *de Actione*: *Scire autem oportet, quod omne quod in motu est, in actione est; moveri enim actio est; si quid enim movetur, agit necessario: omnis ergo actio in motu est, omnisque motus in actione firmabitur; proprium igitur actionis est in motu esse sicut proprium motus in actione.* Cfr. Aristot., III. *Metaph.* text. 3. (II. c. 2.) et II. *Moral. Eudem.* c. 8 (c. 3.), ubi dicit, omnem actionem esse motum sive cum motu.

en: Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles*, chapter *On Action*: *One must know that everything that is in motion is in action; for to be moved is an action; for if anything is moved, it acts necessarily: therefore every action is in motion, and every motion is established in action; therefore it is proper to action to be in motion, just as it is proper to motion to be in action.* Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, text 3 (II, c. 2), and *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 8 (c. 3), where he says that every action is a motion or accompanied by motion.

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3 et II. c. 27. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 158, nota 13. — Pro textu sequenti Damasceni vide locc. citt. et II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 3, ubi docet, omne creatum, eo ipso quod creatum, esse mutabile, solum increatum esse immutabile. — Ibi ex codd. U *bb* substituimus *creata* pro *cetera*.

en: John of Damascus, *On the Orthodox Faith* book I, c. 3, and book II, c. 27. Cf. tom. I, p. 158, note 13. — For the following text of Damascene see the places cited and *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 3, where he teaches that everything created, by the very fact of being created, is mutable, and only the uncreated is immutable. — There, on the faith of codices U, *bb* we substituted *creata* for *cetera*.

la: Hic, c. 3. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *passio tantum* pro *creatio-passio tantum*; minus distincte.

en: Here at chapter 3 [of Lombard's *littera* on this distinction]. — A little below, not a few codices with ed. 1 read *passio tantum* ("the passion only") for *creatio-passio tantum* ("creation-as-passion only"); less distinctly.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 7 (c. 1), and VI, texts 32, 49, and 73 (c. 4, 3, and 8).

la: Hoc argumentum in nulla editione est et solummodo in cod. Q; in aliis videtur excidisse, quia iisdem verbis desinit hoc argum. ac praecedens. Et cum explicite hoc argum. infra solvatur, recipiendum erat in textum. Loco eiusdem sola Vat. praecedenti argum. adiecit: «Probatio primae. *Immutabile* et *mutabile* opponuntur privative; sed immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo: igitur mutabile est quod non se habet eodem modo; sed hoc est aliter se habere nunc quam prius: igitur».

en: This argument is in no edition and is found only in codex Q; in the others it seems to have dropped out because this argument ends in the same words as the preceding one. And since this argument is explicitly resolved below, it had to be admitted into the text. In its place only the Vatican ms. added to the preceding argument: «Proof of the first. *Immutable* and *mutable* are opposed privatively; but the immutable is what remains in the same way: therefore the mutable is what does not remain in the same way; but this is to be otherwise now than before: therefore».

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 6 (c. 1.), ubi secundum translationem Arabico-latinam: *Motus erit perfectio (ἐντελέχεια) eius quod est in potentia, secundum quod est tale.* — De Magistro cfr. hic, c. 2.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 6 (c. 1), where according to the Arabic-Latin translation: *Motion will be the perfection (entelechy) of what is in potency, insofar as it is such.* — On the Master, cf. here at chapter 2 [of Lombard's *littera*].

la: Id est subiectum, quod mutatur. Nam tria, secundum Aristotelem, V. *Phys.* text. 3. seqq., ad mutationem et motum requiruntur: id quod movetur seu mobile, id in quod movetur, et id ex quo, ut lignum, calidum et frigidum. VI. *Phys.* text. 49 (c. 8.) ait: «Tria namque sunt quae esse dicuntur in mutatione: et quod mutatur, et in quo, et secundum quod mutatur, ut homo, et tempus, et album». Et III. *Phys.* text. 16 (c. 2.) secundum hoc definit motum, quod sit *actus mobilis, secundum quod mobile exsistit*.

en: That is, the *subject* which is changed. For three things are required for mutation and motion, according to Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 3ff.: that which is moved (the movable), that into which it is moved, and that out of which — like wood, hot, and cold. *Physics* VI, text 49 (c. 8) says: «There are three things that are said to be in mutation: what is changed, that in which, and according to what it is changed — like man, time, and white». And *Physics* III, text 16 (c. 2) accordingly defines motion as *the act of the movable insofar as it is movable*.

la: Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 1. seqq.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 1ff.

la: Libr. VIII. *de Genes. ad lit.* c. 26. n. 48. Augustinus dicit, quod Deus «movet per tempus et locum creaturam corporalem». His verbis, ut S. Bonav., I. *Sent.* d. 37. p. II. dub. 2 exponit, duplex ab Aristotele propositus motus insinuatur, scil. motu per locum exprimitur motus ad situm, et motu per tempus (eo quod tempus de se dicit mensuram variabilem et rei variabilis) motus ad formam. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 663, nota 8, et 664, nota 4.

en: Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* VIII, c. 26, n. 48. Augustine says that God «moves the corporeal creature through time and place». By these words — as St Bonaventure expounds at I *Sent.* d. 37, p. II, dub. 2 — the twofold motion proposed by Aristotle is implied: namely, by *motion through place* is expressed motion-toward-place, and by *motion through time* (since time of itself signifies a variable measure and a measure of a variable thing) motion-toward-form. Cf. tom. I, p. 663, note 8, and 664, note 4.

la: Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 7. q. 3 et 4.

en: Cf. I *Sent.* d. 7, q. 3 and 4.

la: Vide I. *Sent.* d. 9. q. 4. — De differentia inter motum et mutationem, quam in seqq. inducit S. Doctor, cfr. tom. I. pag. 662, nota 4.

en: See I *Sent.* d. 9, q. 4. — On the difference between motion and mutation, which the Holy Doctor introduces in the following, cf. tom. I, p. 662, note 4.

la: Vat. *aliquo*. — In paucis mss. et Vat. additur *principio*.

en: The Vatican ms. reads *aliquo* ("by something"). — In a few mss. and the Vatican ms. *principio* ("principle") is added.

la: Cod. N *hanc formam*.

en: Codex N reads *hanc formam* ("this form").

la: Cod. A *sed habet rationem productionis, quia est ab aliquo*. Aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 3 *sed tantum* pro *sed tamen*.

en: Codex A reads *but it has the account of production, because it is from someone*. Some codices with eds. 1 and 3 read *sed tantum* ("but only") for *sed tamen* ("but nevertheless").

la: Aristoteles, VIII. *Phys.* text. 34. seqq. (c. 5.) generaliter probat, omnem motum procedere ab immobili, sive primum motorem in omni genere motus immobilem esse. Libr. I. *de Anima*, text. 19. seqq. (c. 2.) insinuat, antiquos philosophos, ignorato hoc axiomate, in diversos errores de essentia animae incidisse, iisque refutatis, ipse ibid. II. text. 18. seqq. (c. 2.) docet, animam esse «principium, quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo». «Verumtamen principium, in quantum principium, quiescit, mota particula, quae subest; veluti brachio moto cubitus, toto autem membro humerus» etc., ut dicitur in eius libro *de Animalium motu* c. 1; et c. 6 (c. 8.) concludit, movens non motum in animalibus esse ipsam animam. Cfr. *de Anima* I, text. 69 (c. 4.). Idem docet August., VIII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 21. n. 41. seq. — In sequente Boethii verbo, III. *de Consol.* Metro 9, codd., paucis exceptis, et edd. 1, 2, 3 ponunt *mutari* pro *moveri*, quod exhibet textus originalis.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, text 34ff. (c. 5), proves generally that every motion proceeds from something immovable — that is, that the first mover in every genus of motion is immovable. *On the Soul* I, text 19ff. (c. 2) hints that the ancient philosophers, in ignorance of this axiom, fell into various errors about the essence of the soul; and after refuting them, he himself there at II, text 18ff. (c. 2) teaches that the soul is «the principle by which we primarily live and sense and move and understand». «Yet the principle, qua principle, is at rest while the part beneath is moved; as when the arm moves, the elbow [is at rest], but when the whole limb moves, the shoulder is at rest», etc., as he says in his book *On the Motion of Animals* c. 1; and at c. 6 (c. 8) he concludes that the unmoved mover in animals is the soul itself. Cf. *On the Soul* I, text 69 (c. 4). The same is taught by Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* VIII, c. 21, n. 41f. — In the following word of Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* III, meter 9, the codices, with few exceptions, and eds. 1, 2, 3 put *mutari* ("be changed") for *moveri* ("be moved"), which the original text exhibits.

la: Intellige: *genera* suprema sive *praedicamenta*, ut ponit Aristoteles in libro *de Praedicamentis*, c. *de Actione et passione*.

en: Understand: the supreme *genera* or *categories*, as Aristotle posits in the book *On the Categories*, chapter *On Action and Passion*.

la: Scilicet fallacia seu sophisma *consequentis*, de quo vide Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4 (c. 5.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 628, nota 1, et pag. 691, nota 5.

en: Namely the fallacy or sophism of *the consequent*, on which see Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5). Cf. tom. I, p. 628, note 1, and p. 691, note 5.

la: Cod. K repetit *quia*. Cod. F unicuique horum trium membrorum adiungit exemplum: primo *ut Deus* (?), secundo *ut privatio* (?), tertio *ut mutatio rei naturalis* (?).

en: Codex K repeats *quia* ("because"). Codex F adds an example to each of these three members: to the first *like God* (?), to the second *like privation* (?), to the third *like the mutation of a natural thing* (?).

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latin_scholion:
**I.** *Creatio* accipi potest in sensu activo sive ex parte Dei, et in sensu passivo sive ex parte creaturae. De utroque sensu agitur in hoc articulo; sed in hac I. quaest. solummodo de creatione passiva, quatenus est quaedam mutatio; in seq. quaest. tractatur tum de creatione activa, tum iterum de passiva, quatenus importat habitudinem sive relationem.

**II.** S. Bonav. (hic q. 2) triplicem distinguit mutationem, scilicet *ad esse*, *ab esse*, *in esse*, quarum tantum ultima est mutatio in sensu proprio et ab Aristotele (cfr. pag. 31, nota 7) definito. Ipse concedit (hic ad 4, 5, 6), in hoc stricto sensu creationem passivam non esse mutationem; tamen asserit, in sensu largiore eam vere esse mutationem. Quo sensu hoc intelligatur, hic in corp. (cfr. etiam I. *Sent.* d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2), adhibita triplici distinctione termini *productio*, accurate determinatur. — Creationem illam esse mutationem, negat S. Thom. (S. I. q. 45. a. 2. ad 2; et *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 2), insistens definitioni Aristotelicae; addit tamen, quod creatio in sensu minus proprio dici possit mutatio. — Cum S. Bonav. loquuntur Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 9. m. 1) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2), qui clare istum triplicem modum mutationis explicat et in fine addit: «Unde illi errant, qui dicunt, quod creatio non debet dici mutatio ad esse, si intelligant de omni modo mutationis, quia *produci non de aliquo* includit *productum de novo esse vel incipere esse*». Hoc fortasse adiecit propter quandam thesim a Stephano Paris. Episc. a. 1276 reprobatam, quae talis est: «Quod creatio non debet dici mutatio ad esse». Censura est: «Error, si intelligatur de omni modo mutationis» (*Collectio iudic.* pag. 199, cap. XI. n. 28). — Dissensus doctorum est potius de nomine quam de re; tamen non est sine aliquo momento pro determinanda quaestione (supra a. 1. q. 2), utrum creatio fieri possit ab aeterno.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. n. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** *Creation* can be taken in an active sense, that is, from the side of God, and in a passive sense, that is, from the side of the creature. Both senses are dealt with in this article; but in this first question the topic is only passive creation, insofar as it is a certain mutation; in the following question both active creation and again passive creation are treated, insofar as the latter imports a relation or *habitudo*.

**II.** St Bonaventure (here q. 2) distinguishes a threefold mutation, namely *to being*, *from being*, and *within being* — of which only the last is mutation in the proper sense and as defined by Aristotle (cf. p. 31, note 7). He himself grants (here at *Ad* 4, 5, 6) that in this strict sense passive creation is not a mutation; nevertheless he asserts that in a wider sense it truly is a mutation. In what sense this is to be understood is accurately determined here in the body of the question (cf. also I *Sent.* d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2), with a threefold distinction of the term *production* applied. — That creation is a mutation, St Thomas denies (*Summa* I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; and *De Potentia* q. 3, a. 2), insisting on the Aristotelian definition; nevertheless he adds that creation in a less proper sense can be called a mutation. — With St Bonaventure speak Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. II, q. 9, m. 1) and Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 2), who clearly explains this threefold mode of mutation and at the end adds: «Hence those err who say that creation must not be called a mutation toward being, if they understand it of every mode of mutation, because *to be produced not from something* includes *the product's being or beginning to be anew*». He perhaps added this on account of a certain thesis condemned by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, in 1276, which runs: «That creation must not be called a mutation toward being». The censure is: «An error, if it is understood of every mode of mutation» (*Collectio iudic.* p. 199, ch. XI, n. 28). — The disagreement of the doctors is rather about the name than about the thing; yet it is not without some weight for determining the question (above a. 1, q. 2) whether creation can take place from eternity.

**III.** Besides those already cited: Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 13, q. 33, m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1, n. 2, quaestiuncula 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 *in fine*.

---

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. Et quod sic, videtur.

**1.** Sicut se habet *generari* ad *generatum esse* et *fieri* ad *factum esse*, ita *creari* ad *creatum esse*; sed *fieri* est medium inter facientem et factum, et *generari* inter generantem et generatum[^1]: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, in omnibus creatis entibus «differt *quod est* et *quo est*[^2]», etiam formaliter: ergo differt similiter *quo creatur* et *quod creatur*. Sed *quod creatur* est creatura; *quo creatur* formaliter est creatio: ergo differt creatio a creatura, et similiter a Creatore creatio-passio: ergo est inter utrumque.

**3.** Item, quod *transit* non est idem cum eo quod *permanet*; sed *creari* rei est in instanti, et non amplius: ergo cum *esse* creaturae[^3] duret et maneat post creationem, ergo differt *creari* et *esse*, ergo creatio et creatura.

**4.** Item, omnis mutatio est *via*[^4], et omnis *via* differt a termino, quia nihil terminatur ad se ipsum; si ergo creatio est mutatio et habet creaturam pro termino, ergo differt a creatura ut *via* a *termino*. Sed *via* cadit media inter extrema: ergo etc.

**5.** Item, per impossibile: si creatio est creatura, et omnis creatura creatur, ergo creatio creatur; sed omne quod creatur, creatur per creationem mediam: ergo creatio per aliam creationem, et sic deinceps usque in infinitum. Si ergo non est abire in infinitum, patet[^5] etc.

**Contra:**

**1.** Philosophus *de Causis*[^6]: «Prima rerum creatarum est *esse*»; sed nihil ex parte creaturae

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est ante *creari*: ergo *creari* non est aliud quam *esse*, ergo nec creatio quam essentia: ergo nulla est differentia creationis ad creaturam.

**2.** Item, inter *ens ab alio* et *non ab alio* non est medium; sed omne quod non est ab alio, est Creator, omne autem quod est ab alio essentialiter, est creatura: ergo inter ea nihil est medium.

**3.** Item, per impossibile ostenditur. Creatura refertur ad Creatorem; aut ergo se ipsa, aut per aliud. Si per aliud, quaeritur de illo, utrum referatur se ipso, aut alio, et sic procedendo in infinitum. Si vero refertur se ipsa — sed refertur per creationem — ergo creatio non est aliud quam creatura.

**4.** Item, si creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, aut ergo aeternum, aut temporale[^7]. Quod si aeternum, ergo aliquid aeternum est aliud a Deo; si temporale, ergo ante omnem creaturam est aliquod temporale. Horum autem utrumque est haereticum dicere et reprobatum in Concilio Senonensi de *ideis*, quae ponebantur a quibusdam mediae inter Deum et res.

**5.** Item, a proportione videtur hoc posse ostendi. Sicut enim se habet Creator ad creaturam, ita creatio-actio ad creationem-passionem: ergo, a permutata proportione, sicut se habet Creator ad creationem activam, ita creatura ad creationem passivam: sed Creator non differt secundum rem a creatione-actione: ergo etc.

### *Conclusio.*

> Creatio-actio tantum secundum rationem intelligendi est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam; creatio-passio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de creatione-actione, et de creatione-passione. Si de creatione-actione loquamur, sic dico, quod non est medium secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, pro eo quod Deus, cum sit summe simplex, est sua actio. Si autem loquamur de creatione-passione, tunc distinguendum[^8], quia per creaturae nomen potest significari et importari omne quod est ab alio, ita quod habet *esse* post omnino non-esse. Et hoc modo in nomine *creaturae* clauditur ipsa creatio, quoniam *creatura* non tantum nominat ipsa creata, sed etiam concreata; et sic non est medium nec re nec ratione. Alio modo *creatura* nominat ipsam substantiam rei ab aliquo productae de nihilo; et sic creatio tenet medium non secundum rem et naturam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem.

Illa tamen ratio non nihil dicit, sed non dicit aliquid per essentiam diversum a creatura, et hoc patet sic. Creatio enim dicitur *de nihilo esse*, creatio nihilominus dicitur *esse a Deo*; unde habitudinem dicit ipsius ad non-esse praecedens et ad suum esse producens[^9], de ratione sui nominis. *Creari* enim non significat *esse* principaliter, sed *exire de non-esse in esse*, et hoc ab aliquo.

Si ergo quaeratur, quae sit habitudo, quae importatur in comparatione ad non-esse; dicendum, quod illa habitudo dicitur *mutatio*. — Et si quaeras, quid sit illa mutatio; dico, quod non est aliud quam ipsa res. — Et hoc patet, quia est *mutatio ad esse*, et *mutatio ab esse*, et *mutatio in esse*. Mutatio *ad esse* nihil ponit nisi a parte termini; mutatio *ab esse* nihil ponit nisi a parte principii; mutatio *in esse* ponit ex parte utriusque; et ideo *mutari* primo modo nihil aliud est, quam *nunc primo esse*. Mutatio secundo modo nihil aliud est, quam *nunc ultimo esse*; et ideo non ponit aliquid aliud secundum rem[^10], sed solum secundum intentionem. Mutatio vero *in esse* utrumque extremum habet et subiectum, quod est prius natura quam terminus. Ideo et talis mutatio aliquid potest esse natura praecedens terminum, et diversum ab illo secundum rem, quamvis non sit ens actu completum. — Et ideo non sic creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, sicut generatio inter generantem et generatum. Dicendo igitur comparationem ad non-esse, dicit[^11] medium non diversum per essentiam, sed secundum rationem.

Similiter dicendo comparationem ad Creatorem. Triplex enim est relatio: quaedam quae fundatur super proprietatem accidentalem, sicut aliqui dicuntur similes, quia albi; quaedam quae fundatur super dependentiam essentialem, sicut comparatio materiae ad formam; quaedam quae super originem naturalem. Prima relatio addit aliud per essentiam[^12]; tertia relatio nihil aliud nisi pure

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esse, sicut patet in divinis; media relatio dicit aliquid, quod est quodam modo idem, quodam modo aliud. — Creatio autem dicit relationem secundum medium modum, quoniam ipsa creatura essentialiter et totaliter a Creatore dependet.

Et ideo concedendum, quod creatio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem; unde est prius natura *creari* quam *esse*, non duratione[^13]. Plus tamen est idem creatio-actio cum creante quam creatio-passio cum creatura, quia ibi non est differentia nisi solum secundum modum nostrum accipiendi; hic autem est differentia rationis et etiam habitudinis, quae non facit diversitatem per essentiam, quia habitudo illa est essentialis. Similiter iudicandum est de unitate, bonitate, veritate essentiali.

His visis patent obiecta. Concedendae enim sunt rationes probantes, quod non est verum medium secundum rem.

**Ad argumenta.**

*Ad 1.* Quod obiicitur de *generari* et *generatum esse*, patet responsio ex dictis, quia generatio non est secundum totum, immo aliquid praeexigitur de generando, cuius est *entelechia*[^14] ipsa generatio natura praecedens ipsam formam, ac per hoc diversitatem notat. Non sic creatio, secundum quam fit tota rei substantia a virtute divina immediate, quae rem creat volendo eam primo esse, cum non sit.

*Ad 2.* Quod obiicitur, quod differt *quod* et *quo*; dicendum, quod illa non est differentia per essentiam, sed quodam modo differt, quodam modo convenit. — Vel dicendum, quod non est simile, quia creatio complectitur totam rei substantiam, quae constare dicitur ex *quo est* et *quod est*.

*Ad 3.* Quod obiicitur, quod transit; dicendum, quod non transit ratione eius quod significationi suae substernitur, sed solum ratione connotati; quod patet. Si enim *creari* est *nunc primo esse*, desinit *creari* non ratione eius quod ponit, sed ratione immediatae collationis ad nihilum.

*Ad 4.* Quod obiicitur, quod mutatio est *via*; dicendum, quod mutatio quae habet duo extrema[^15], illa est, quae necessario differt a termino, cuiusmodi est mutatio *in esse*; mutatio vero, quae habet tantum ultimum extremum ens, non potest dicere medium, sed necessario oportet, quod se teneat cum altero extremorum.

*Ad 5.* Quod obiicitur, quod omnis creatura creatur; dicendum, quod verum est de creatura proprie dicta; si autem large dicatur, non solum *creatura* dicitur quod creatur, sed quod *concreatur* et quod est creaturae annexum; et hoc modo est creatio. — Si ergo quaeritur, quomodo potest esse; dicendum, quod in primis est *status*, ut prius tactum fuit[^16]. Unde sicut unitas, quae facit subiectum unum, non est una alia unitate, sic nec creatio, qua substantia exit in esse, per aliam creationem producitur sive concreatur.

english:
### Question II. *Whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature.*

Second, the question is asked whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature. And that it does, it seems:

**1.** As *to be generated* stands to *to have been generated*, and *to come-to-be* stands to *to have been made*, so *to be created* stands to *to have been created*; but *to come-to-be* is a medium between the maker and the thing made, and *to be generated* between the generator and the generated[^1]: therefore etc.

**2.** Likewise, in all created beings «*that which is* and *that by which it is*[^2]» differ, even formally: therefore likewise *that by which it is created* and *that which is created* differ. But *that which is created* is the creature; *that by which it is created* is formally the creation: therefore the creation differs from the creature, and similarly creation-as-passion differs from the Creator: therefore it is between the two.

**3.** Likewise, what *passes away* is not the same as what *remains*; but *to be created* for a thing is in an instant, and not beyond it: therefore since the *being* of the creature[^3] endures and remains after creation, then *to be created* and *to be* differ, and so creation differs from creature.

**4.** Likewise, every mutation is a *way*[^4], and every way differs from its terminus, because nothing is terminated at itself; if therefore creation is a mutation and has the creature for its terminus, then it differs from the creature as way from terminus. But way falls in the middle between its extremes: therefore etc.

**5.** Likewise, by reduction to impossibility: if creation is a creature, and every creature is created, therefore the creation is created; but everything that is created is created by means of a mediating creation: therefore the creation is created by another creation, and so on to infinity. If therefore one cannot proceed to infinity, the conclusion is plain[^5] etc.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** The Philosopher in the *Book of Causes*[^6]: «The first of created things is *being*»; but nothing on the side of the creature is before *being created*: therefore *to be created* is nothing other than *to be*, and so creation is not other than essence: therefore there is no difference between creation and creature.

**2.** Likewise, between *being from another* and *not from another* there is no medium; but everything which is not from another is the Creator, and everything which is essentially from another is the creature: therefore between them there is no medium.

**3.** Likewise, it is shown by reduction to impossibility. The creature is referred to the Creator; either then by itself, or through another. If through another, the question is asked about that other, whether it is referred by itself or by another, and so proceeding to infinity. But if it is referred by itself — and it is referred through creation — then creation is nothing other than the creature.

**4.** Likewise, if creation is a medium between Creator and creature, then either eternal, or temporal[^7]. If eternal, then something eternal is other than God; if temporal, then before every creature there is something temporal. Both of which are heretical to say and were reproved in the Council of Sens concerning the *ideas*, which were posited by some as media between God and things.

**5.** Likewise, this seems provable from proportion. For as the Creator stands to the creature, so creation-as-action stands to creation-as-passion: therefore, by alternation of proportion, as the Creator stands to active creation, so the creature stands to passive creation: but the Creator does not differ in reality from creation-as-action: therefore etc.

### *Conclusion.*

> Creation-as-action is a medium between Creator and creature only according to the reason understanding [it]; creation-as-passion is not other in reality from the creature, nor a medium between the creature and God according to essence, but [only] according to reason and relation.

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of creation-as-action and of creation-as-passion. If we speak of creation-as-action, then I say it is not a medium in reality but only according to the reason understanding [it], because God, being supremely simple, is his own action. But if we speak of creation-as-passion, then a distinction must be made[^8], because by the name *creature* one can signify and import everything which is from another, such that it has *being* after sheer non-being. And in this way the creation itself is included in the name of *creature*, because *creature* names not only the things created but also what is co-created [with them]; and so it is no medium, neither in reality nor in reason. In another way, *creature* names the very substance of the thing produced by someone from nothing; and in this way creation holds a middle place not in reality and nature, but in reason and relation.

That account [of "medium"] nevertheless does not say nothing; but it does not say anything which is essentially diverse from the creature, and this is plain as follows. For creation is said to be *from nothing*, and creation is likewise said to be *from God*; whence by the very account of its name it implies a relation of the thing to its preceding non-being and to its producing being[^9]. For *to be created* does not principally signify *to be*, but *to go out from non-being into being*, and this from some [agent].

If then it be asked, what is the relation imported by the comparison to non-being, it must be said that this relation is called *mutation*. — And if you ask what that mutation is, I say it is nothing other than the thing itself. — And this is plain, because there is *mutation toward being*, and *mutation from being*, and *mutation within being*. Mutation *toward being* posits nothing except on the side of the terminus; mutation *from being* posits nothing except on the side of the principle; mutation *within being* posits something on the side of both; and therefore *to be changed* in the first mode is nothing other than *to be now for the first time*. Mutation in the second mode is nothing other than *to be now for the last time*; and therefore it does not posit anything other in reality[^10], but only according to intention. Mutation *within being*, however, has both extremes and a subject, which is prior in nature to its terminus. Therefore such a mutation can be something prior in nature to its terminus and diverse from it in reality, even though it is not yet a being complete in act. — And therefore creation is not a medium between Creator and creature in the way generation is between generator and generated. So, speaking of the comparison toward non-being, it implies[^11] a medium not diverse in essence, but only according to reason.

Likewise speaking of the comparison toward the Creator. For relation is threefold: one kind founded upon an accidental property — as some are called *similar* because both are white; another founded upon essential dependence — as the comparison of matter to form; another upon natural origin. The first relation adds something other in essence[^12]; the third relation adds nothing other than purely

*to be*, as is plain in the divine [Persons]; the middle relation says something which is in one way the same and in another way other. — Creation says a relation in the middle mode, since the creature itself essentially and totally depends upon the Creator.

And so it must be granted that creation is not other in reality from the creature, nor a medium between the creature and God according to essence, but [only] according to reason and relation; whence *to be created* is prior in nature to *to be*, but not in duration[^13]. Yet creation-as-action is more *the same* with the Creator than creation-as-passion is *the same* with the creature, because there [in the divine] there is no difference except according to our mode of understanding; here however there is a difference of reason and even of relation — which does not make a diversity in essence, because that relation is essential. The same is to be judged concerning essential unity, goodness, and truth.

Once these things are seen, the objections are plain. For the reasons proving that there is no true medium in reality are to be granted.

**To the arguments.**

*To 1.* What is objected from *to be generated* and *to have been generated*, the answer is plain from what was said: because generation is not according to the whole, but rather something is presupposed of what is generated, the *entelechy*[^14] of which is the generation itself, prior in nature to the form itself, and through this it marks diversity. It is not so with creation, according to which the whole substance of the thing comes about from the divine power immediately, which creates the thing by willing it first to be, when it was not.

*To 2.* What is objected, that *quod* ("that which") and *quo* ("that by which") differ; it must be said that this is not a difference in essence, but in one way they differ and in another way they agree. — Or it must be said that the cases are not alike, because creation embraces the whole substance of the thing, which is said to consist of *that by which it is* and *that which is*.

*To 3.* What is objected, that [creation] passes away; it must be said that it does not pass away by reason of what underlies its signification, but only by reason of what it connotes; which is plain. For if *to be created* is *to be now for the first time*, then *to be created* ceases not by reason of what it posits, but by reason of its immediate ordering toward nothing.

*To 4.* What is objected, that mutation is a *way*; it must be said that the mutation which has two extremes[^15] is the one which necessarily differs from its terminus — of which kind is mutation *within being*; but the mutation which has only its final extreme as being cannot imply a medium, but it must necessarily belong with one of the extremes.

*To 5.* What is objected, that every creature is created; it must be said that this is true of creature properly so called; but if it is said broadly, then *creature* names not only what is created but also what is *co-created* and what is annexed to the creature — and in this way creation [is creature]. — If therefore it is asked how this can be, it must be said that in the first things there is a *stop*, as has been touched earlier[^16]. Hence as the unity which makes the subject one is not one by another unity, so neither is the creation by which the substance goes out into being produced or co-created by another creation.

la: Cod. *cc* et ed. 1 supplent hic *sicut* et paulo superius post *factum* verbum *esse*.

en: Codex *cc* and ed. 1 supply *sicut* ("as") here and a little above, after *factum*, the verb *esse* ("to be").

la: Secundum Boeth. et eius commentatorem Gilbert. Porret., cfr. tom. I. pag. 85, nota 7. — Aliquanto inferius pro *ergo differt creatio* Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, habet *ergo differt creatio-actio*, qua lectione punctum comparationis aufertur.

en: According to Boethius and his commentator Gilbert of Poitiers, cf. tom. I, p. 85, note 7. — A little below, for *ergo differt creatio* the Vatican ms., against the mss. and ed. 1, has *ergo differt creatio-actio*, by which reading the point of the comparison is taken away.

la: Cod. F *creatum*.

en: Codex F reads *creatum* ("created [thing]").

la: Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. *Phys.* text. 40 (c. 5.) ait: *Quoniam autem omne quod mutatur, ex quodam in quoddam mutatur... Quod enim mutatur ab eo, ex quo mutatur, discedit aut relinquit ipsum.* Cfr. II. *Phys.* text. 14 (c. 1.). — Cod. *cc* cum ed. 1 addit *ad terminum*.

en: With which regard Aristotle, *Physics* VI, text 40 (c. 5), says: *Since everything which is changed is changed from one thing into another... For what is changed departs or leaves that from which it is changed.* Cf. *Physics* II, text 14 (c. 1). — Codex *cc* with ed. 1 adds *ad terminum* ("toward the terminus").

la: Simile argumentum occurrit in Aristot., V. *Phys.* text. 13 (c. 2.), quo probatur, quod non possit esse generatio generationis neque mutatio mutationis.

en: A similar argument occurs in Aristotle, *Physics* V, text 13 (c. 2), by which it is proved that there cannot be a generation of generation or a mutation of mutation.

la: *Liber de Causis*, prop. 4. — Paulo inferius post *ergo nec creatio* supple cum Vat. et cod. *aa* *aliud*.

en: *Book of Causes*, prop. 4. — A little below, after *ergo nec creatio*, supply with the Vatican ms. and codex *aa* the word *aliud* ("other").

la: Plurimi codd. habent *aut temporale quid. Si aeternum*; nostra lectio invenitur in codd. I *cc* et edd. 1, 3, 4. Quoad Concilium Senonense, de quo paulo inferius loquitur S. Doctor, cfr. hic Scholion n. III.

en: Most codices read *aut temporale quid. Si aeternum* ("or something temporal. If eternal"); our reading is found in codices I, *cc* and eds. 1, 3, 4. As to the Council of Sens, of which the Holy Doctor speaks a little below, cf. Scholion n. III here.

la: In cod. A additur *quando quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam*.

en: In codex A is added *when the question is asked whether creation implies a medium between Creator and creature*.

la: Cod. *cc* et ed. 1 subiungunt: «*quia creatio-passio dat esse creaturae cum negatione praeexistente; dicit enim, creaturam primo esse, ita quod creatura modo est et prius non fuit; unde pro illo instanti, pro quo dicitur creatura est modo et prius non fuit, potest dici, quod creatura creatur*». Immediate post cod. F *illa tamen non omnino nihil* pro *illa tamen ratio non nihil*.

en: Codex *cc* and ed. 1 add: «*because creation-as-passion gives being to the creature with a preceding negation; for it says that the creature first is, so that the creature now is and earlier was not; whence for that instant in which it is said the creature now is and earlier was not, it can be said that the creature is created*». Immediately after, codex F reads *illa tamen non omnino nihil* for *illa tamen ratio non nihil*.

la: Intellige: et ad causam, quae suum esse producit. Vat. sola *et ad suum producens*. Mox codd. M U W *de non-esse ad esse* pro *de non-esse in esse*, quae lectio cum subnexis magis convenit.

en: Understand: also to the cause which produces its being. The Vatican ms. alone reads *et ad suum producens*. Then codices M, U, W read *de non-esse ad esse* for *de non-esse in esse*, which latter reading agrees better with what follows.

la: Codd. inter se dissentiunt; maior eorum pars habet *aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum* etc.; cod. Q (cod. T a sec. manu) *quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum* etc.; codd. F K brevius *aliquid aliud secundum rem*, quos sequimur. Forte legendum *aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem*.

en: The codices disagree among themselves; the greater part has *aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum* etc.; codex Q (codex T by a second hand) *quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum* etc.; codices F, K more briefly *aliquid aliud secundum rem*, which we follow. Perhaps it should be read *aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem*.

la: Cod. V *creatio dicit*.

en: Codex V reads *creatio dicit*.

la: Cod. F *aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam*; Vat. *aliud super essentiam*. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut K *aa* *quod pure est* pro *pure esse*. — De triplici hac relatione cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 30. q. 3, ubi de tertia relatione dicitur: *Tertia est in Deo, sed non respectu creaturae, sed respectu personae; haec enim non dicit compositionem nec dependentiae inclinationem, sicut prima et secunda, sed ponit distinctionem et ordinem. Et quoniam vere una persona ordinatur ad aliam* etc.

en: Codex F reads *aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam* ("other in regard to being, because whiteness is one thing and that which it inheres in is another by essence"); the Vatican ms. *aliud super essentiam*. A little later some codices (K, *aa*) read *quod pure est* for *pure esse*. — On this threefold relation cf. I *Sent.* d. 30, q. 3, where of the third relation it is said: *The third is in God, but not with respect to a creature, but with respect to a person; for this implies neither composition nor an inclination of dependence, like the first and second, but posits distinction and order. And since one person is truly ordered to another* etc.

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *unde non est prius natura creari quam esse, nec duratione*; perperam. — Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 30. q. 3 et dub. 4. — Dein plures codd. *Similiter dicendum est*.

en: Not a few codices with ed. 1 read *whence "to be created" is not prior in nature to "to be," nor in duration*; wrongly. — Cf. I *Sent.* d. 30, q. 3 and dub. 4. — Then several codices [read] *Similiter dicendum est* ("Likewise it must be said").

la: ἐντελέχεια in operibus Aristotelis significat *perfectionem* sive *actum vel formam*. Cod. F addendo explicat *perfectio rei secundum actum et habitudinem*.

en: ἐντελέχεια (*entelecheia*) in the works of Aristotle means *perfection* or *act* or *form*. Codex F by addition explains it as *the perfection of the thing according to act and relation*.

la: Vat. subiungit *entia positiva*, et paulo inferius *unum extremum* substituit pro *ultimum extremum*. — Hic, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 et 3; I. *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, dub. 3. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. *non est unum* pro *non est una*.

en: The Vatican ms. adds *entia positiva* ("positive beings"), and a little below substitutes *unum extremum* for *ultimum extremum*. — Here at a. 1, q. 2, ad 2 and 3; I *Sent.* d. 3, p. I, dub. 3. — A little below not a few codices read *non est unum* for *non est una*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Creatio activa secundum principale significatum manifeste est ipsa essentia Dei creatrix. Quid autem sit formaliter, vel utrum dici possit vera actio sive immanens sive transiens, an potius mera relatio rationis cum denominatione extrinseca, disputatur inter doctores. S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et hic q. 1 fundam. 2 et ad 1), sicut creationem passivam vult esse quandam mutationem et per consequens passionem, sic activam nominat actionem, tamen sine mutatione aliisque imperfectionibus, quae comitantur actiones creaturarum, ipsamque esse virtualiter sive quoad connotata transeuntem (q. 1 ad 1). Unde in Deo non importat nisi relationem secundum rationem. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 45. a. 3 in corp.) paulo aliter secundum sua principia, ad praeced. quaest. notata, resolvit dicens: «Subtracto motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem ut principium sui esse».

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**II.** Creatio passiva secundum S. Bonaventuram duplicem importat relationem, scil. respectum ad non-esse, quae tantum est rationis, et respectum ad Creatorem (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 6). Haec relatio omni creaturae est essentialis. Quid autem sit, et utrum idem cum suo fundamento sive cum ipsa creatura, an realiter ab ea distincta et aliquid ei superadditum; subtilibus disputationibus ventilatum est. Qui dicunt, ipsam esse quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa creatura, per consequens statuunt, eam esse aliquid medium, sed concreatum, inter Deum et creaturae essentiam. Ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2: «Alii probabilius dicunt, quod differt secundum rem, quia est accidens quoddam in creatura, et significat quandam rem, non quae sit in praedicamento passionis, proprie loquendo, sed quae est in genere relationis». De hoc diffuse disputat Scot. (hic q. 1; Report. hic q. 5, 6) et concludit, relationem creaturae ad Deum esse idem realiter cum suo fundamento, tamen formaliter distinctum. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 4; *de Potent.* q. 3. a. 3. ad 3) consentit Petro a Tar., docens, eam esse aliquid entitati creaturae superadditum ut accidens in praedicamento relationis. S. Bonav., media via incedens, in corp. tres distinguit relationes, quarum media hic locum habet. Haec ex una parte identificatur realiter cum creatura — et sic non est medium aliquod inter Deum et creaturam — ex altera parte formaliter distinguitur et relationem importat — et sic aliquo modo potest dici medium, si concreatum distinguitur a creato. — Notanda est etiam thesis a Gulielmo Episc. Paris. a. 1240 damnata: «Quod primum nunc et creatio-passio non sunt creator, vel creatura» (vide infra d. 23. in fine et *Collectio iudic.* pag. 186).

**III.** In fundam. 4 commemoratur quaedam propositio damnata in Concilio Senonensi. In nullo libro recentiore huius damnatae propositionis, quod scimus, mentio fit. Tamen Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 9. m. 3), de eadem thesi dicit: «Pro damnata thesi haberetur, quod dicitur in libro *Parisision* [sic corrupte in editionibus Alexandri pro *Periphyseon* sive rectius *Peri physeon*], quod *ideae erant medium inter Creatorem et creaturam*». Iste liber est Ioan. Scoti Erigenae opus περὶ φύσεως (sive φυσέων) μερισμοῦ, vel *de Divisione naturae* (Patrolog. lat. Migne t. 122). Auctor eiusdem, quem editor Dr. Floss nomine *Ierugena* secundum codices vocandum esse censet, vixit plures annos in aula imperatoris Caroli Calvi. Ipse Neoplatonicos sequitur et in suo libro inter alios errores docet *pantheismum*, quem vocant *immanentismum*. Distinguit quadruplicem naturam: natura, quae creat et non creatur — quae creatur et creat — quae creatur et non creat — quae nec creat nec creatur. Secundam speciem naturae nominat *causas primordiales* sive *ideas*, quas ponit factas quidem esse, sed Deo coaeternas (III. n. 16, II. n. 20, 24) et se ipsis intelligentes (II. n. 18. 20; III. n. 1. seqq.). De eisdem pronuntiat illam propositionem a S. Bonav. notatam. Nam (III. n. 20, *Patrolog.* col. 683, cfr. ibid. n. 4 et n. 23) ait: «Deinde ex primordialibus causis, quae *medietatem quandam inter Deum et creaturam* obtinent, hoc est, inter illam ineffabilem superessentialitatem super omnem intellectum, et manifestam substantialiter naturam». Cum saec. 13 haeretici Almaricus et David de Dinanto ex dicto libro arma pro defendendis suis erroribus depromerent, a quodam Concilio provinciali Senonensi (circa a. 1224) opus Erigenae igni adiudicatum est; quae sententia confirmata est ab Honorio III. De isto Conc. Senonensi legitur in opere: *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio*, Mansi, Venetiis, t. 22. col. 1211: «Concilii huius memoria unice (?) superest ex bulla Honorii III, qua liber a Ioanne Erigena scriptus, quoque Albigenses abutebantur, igni damnatur. — Honorius Episcopus servus serv. Dei Archiepiscopis et Episcopis etc. Inimicus homo zizania bono semini superseminare non cessat... Nuper siquidem, sicut nobis significavit venerabilis frater noster Parisiensis Episcopus, est quidam liber, *Periphysis* titulatus, inventus, tot scatens vermibus haereticae pravitatis, unde a vener. fratre nostro Archiepiscopo Senonensi et suffraganeis eius, in provinciali Concilio congregatis, iusto est Dei iudicio reprobatus» etc. Eandem bullam editor Dr. Floss in sua praefatione (loc. cit. col. 439 seq.) imprimendam curavit. — Sed iam antea alii Scoti Erigenae errores saepius reprobati erant, scil. errores, quos docet in libro *de Praedestinatione*, in synodo Valentina, a. 855 (in dicto opere Mansi, t. 15. 1. col. 1) et Lingonensi, a. 859 (ibid. col. 538); etiam errores circa Eucharistiam ipsi imputati et reprobati sunt in synodo Parisiensi, a. 1050 (ibid. t. 19. col. 782) et Vercellensi et Romana (ibid. col. 757).

**IV.** Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 9. m. 2, 3. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 33. m. 2. q. incid. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Active creation, according to its principal signification, is plainly the very creative essence of God. What it is formally, however — or whether it can be called a true action, whether immanent or transient, or rather a mere relation of reason with an extrinsic denomination — is disputed among the doctors. St Bonaventure (here in the body and at q. 1, fundamentum 2 and ad 1), just as he holds passive creation to be a certain mutation and consequently a passion, so he names the active [creation] an action, yet without the mutation and other imperfections which accompany the actions of creatures; and [holds] it to be virtually or *quoad connotata* transient (q. 1 ad 1). Whence in God it imports only a relation of reason. St Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 45, a. 3, in corp.) resolves it a little differently according to his principles noted at the preceding question, saying: «With motion removed from action and passion, nothing remains but a certain relation to the Creator as the principle of one's being».

**II.** Passive creation, according to St Bonaventure, imports a twofold relation: namely the regard toward non-being, which is only a relation of reason, and the regard toward the Creator (cf. above a. 1, q. 1, ad 6). This relation is essential to every creature. What it is, however, and whether it is the same as its foundation — that is, as the creature itself — or really distinct from it and something superadded to it, has been thrashed out in subtle disputations. Those who say that it is something really distinct from the creature itself consequently hold that it is something *medium*, but co-created, between God and the essence of the creature. Thus Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2: «Others more probably say that it differs in reality, because it is a certain accident in the creature, and signifies a certain thing — not which is in the category of passion, properly speaking, but which is in the genus of relation». On this Scotus disputes at length (here q. 1; Reportata here q. 5, 6) and concludes that the relation of the creature to God is really identical with its foundation, yet formally distinct. St Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; *de Potentia* q. 3, a. 3, ad 3) agrees with Peter of Tarantasia, teaching that it is something superadded to the entity of the creature, as an accident in the category of relation. St Bonaventure, going down a middle road, distinguishes in the body three relations, of which the middle one has its place here. This on the one hand is really identified with the creature — and so is not a medium between God and creature — and on the other hand is formally distinguished and imports a relation — and so can in some way be called a medium, if what is co-created is distinguished from what is created. — Worth noting also is the thesis condemned by William, Bishop of Paris, in 1240: «That the first *now* and creation-as-passion are neither Creator nor creature» (see below at d. 23 *in fine* and *Collectio iudic.* p. 186).

**III.** In fundamentum 4 a certain proposition condemned at the Council of Sens is mentioned. In no more recent book that we know is this condemned proposition mentioned. Yet Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. II, q. 9, m. 3) says of the same thesis: «It would be held a condemned thesis that which is said in the book *Parisision* [thus corruptly in the Alexander editions for *Periphyseon*, or more correctly *Peri physeon*], that *the ideas were a medium between Creator and creature*». This book is John Scotus Erigena's work *On the Division of Nature* (*peri physeos merismou*; Migne, *Patrologia Latina* t. 122). Its author, whom the editor Dr Floss thinks should be called *Ierugena* on the authority of the codices, lived many years at the court of the emperor Charles the Bald. He follows the Neoplatonists and in his book among other errors teaches *pantheism*, which they call *immanentism*. He distinguishes a fourfold nature: nature which creates and is not created — which is created and creates — which is created and does not create — which neither creates nor is created. The second species he names *primordial causes* or *ideas*, which he posits as made indeed, but co-eternal with God (III, n. 16; II, n. 20, 24) and as understanding by themselves (II, n. 18, 20; III, n. 1ff.). Of these he pronounces the proposition noted by St Bonaventure. For (III, n. 20, *Patrologia* col. 683, cf. ibid. n. 4 and n. 23) he says: «Then from the primordial causes, which obtain *a certain middle position between God and creature* — that is, between that ineffable super-essentiality above all understanding, and manifestly substantial nature». When in the 13th century the heretics Amaury and David of Dinant drew weapons from the said book for defending their errors, the work of Erigena was condemned to the fire by a provincial Council at Sens (around the year 1224); which sentence was confirmed by Honorius III. Of this Council of Sens it is read in the work *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio*, Mansi, Venice, t. 22, col. 1211: «The memory of this Council survives uniquely (?) in the bull of Honorius III, by which the book written by John Erigena, which the Albigensians too were misusing, is condemned to the fire. — Honorius, Bishop, servant of the servants of God, to the Archbishops and Bishops etc. The enemy man does not cease to sow tares upon the good seed... Recently indeed, as our venerable brother the Bishop of Paris has signified to us, there has been found a certain book, entitled *Periphysis*, swarming with so many worms of heretical depravity, that by our venerable brother the Archbishop of Sens and his suffragans, gathered in a provincial Council, it has been condemned by the just judgment of God» etc. The same bull was caused to be printed by the editor Dr Floss in his preface (loc. cit. col. 439f.). — But already earlier other errors of Scotus Erigena had been often reproved — namely the errors which he teaches in the book *On Predestination*, at the synod of Valence in 855 (in the said work of Mansi, t. 15, 1, col. 1) and of Langres in 859 (ibid. col. 538); also errors concerning the Eucharist were imputed to him and reproved in the synod of Paris in 1050 (ibid. t. 19, col. 782) and at Vercelli and Rome (ibid. col. 757).

**IV.** Besides the places cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 9, m. 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 13, q. 33, m. 2, q. incid. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3, 4. — Giles of Rome, here q. 3, a. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 9, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2 *in fine*.

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translators_notes:
**Chunk-internal apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk uses a single sequence 1–16 spanning pp. 33–35. Crosswalk approximate:

| Chunk | Page | Q-footer (approx) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | p.33 | 2 (Cod. *cc* sicut/esse supplement) |
| 2 | p.33 | 3 (Boeth. + Gilbert. Porret.) |
| 3 | p.33 | 4 (Cod. F *creatum*) |
| 4 | p.33 | 5 (Aristot. VI Phys text 40) |
| 5 | p.33 | 6 (Aristot. V Phys text 13 — generatio generationis) |
| 6 | p.33 | 7 (Liber de Causis prop. 4) |
| 7 | p.34 | 1 (aut temporale quid; Concilium Senonense) |
| 8 | p.34 | 2 (Cod. A insertion) |
| 9 | p.34 | 3 (Cod. *cc* / ed. 1 sub-junction; cod. F variant) |
| 10 | p.34 | 4 (Vat. *et ad suum producens*) |
| 11 | p.34 | 5 (codd. dissent) |
| 12 | p.34 | 6 (Cod. V *creatio dicit*) |
| 13 | p.34 | 7 (Cod. F whiteness exemplum; I Sent d.30 q.3 third-relation citation) |
| 14 | p.35 | 1 (codd. unde non est prius natura) |
| 15 | p.35 | 3 (ἐντελέχεια gloss) |
| 16 | p.35 | 4 (Vat. *entia positiva*; back-ref to a.1 q.2 ad 2-3) |

Footer mapping is approximate; some Quaracchi footers were merged where the body shows a single anchor for two adjacent variant notes. Logged as no-flag — entries are content-faithful even where the per-page sequence on the OCR is ambiguous.

**Page-break placement.** Page-33 ↔ page-34 placed mid-contra-1 (after *Prima rerum creatarum est esse*) per the running-head transition at raw line 3005. Page-34 ↔ page-35 placed between paragraphs of the Respondeo (after the triple-relation paragraph closing on *pure*) per the running-head at raw line 3093. Page-35 ↔ page-36 placed before Scholion II per the running-head at raw line 3146.

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Editorial marginalia bleeding inline (e.g. `Ad oppositum`, `Conclusio I/II/III`, `Distinctio II.`, `De relatione triplici distinctio`, `Epilogus`, `Notandum`, `Triplex mutatio`, `Dupliciter relatio`, `Aliter`, `Solutio oppositorum`) per CLAUDE.md are not rendered.

**Scholion length.** Scholion III is unusually long (the Council of Sens / John Scotus Erigena history runs ~500 words). Translated literally per CLAUDE.md anti-pattern "Don't translate at velocity — literal, not paraphrase, for scholia/apparatus."

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0