title: Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus
Whether the Son of God is predestined

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Filius Dei est praedestinatus. Secundo quaeritur de hac: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo. Tertio vero quaeritur de hac: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus. Et quod sic, videtur.

(*Ad oppositum.*) 1. Haec conceditur: Filius Dei est homo; sed omnis homo aut est praescitus, aut praedestinatus[^1]; sed Filius Dei non est homo praescitus: ergo praedestinatus.

2. Item, exceptis vocabulis importantibus unionem, necesse est, esse idiomatum communicationem[^2]; sed vocabulum praedestinationis unionem non importat, quantum est de se: ergo cum ille homo sit praedestinatus, et ille homo sit Filius Dei, necessario sequitur, quod Filius Dei sit praedestinatus.

3. Item, magis repugnat temporale aeterno, quam aeternum aeterno; sed esse praedestinatum dicit quid aeternum[^3]; sed esse conceptum et natum quid temporale; sed haec conceditur: Filius Dei est natus de Virgine: ergo et haec: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

4. Item, nulli non convenit alicui nisi ex tempore, pro eo quod effectum dicit temporalem[^4]; sed simpliciter conceditur: Filius Dei est in carnem missus: ergo multo magis ista concedi debet: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

5. Item, praedestinatio non est aliud quam praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro[^5]; sed Filio Dei Christo collata fuit gratia et gloria in tempore et praevisa sibi conferri ab aeterno; sed cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum: ergo necesse est Filium Dei concedere esse praedestinatum.

6. Item, haec est vera: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, secundum quod homo; sed ista determinatio homo non diminuit aliquid circa subiectum: ergo, ipsa subtracta, licet inferre, Filium Dei simpliciter esse praedestinatum. Cum ergo «ad verum non sequatur nisi verum[^6]», videtur, quod locutio praedicta, scilicet Filius Dei est praedestinatus, tanquam vera sit concedenda.

(*Fundamenta.*) Sed contra: 1. Origenes[^7]: «Praedestinatur qui nondum est; haec verba dicuntur propter illos qui in Unigenitum Dei impietatem loquuntur. Putant enim, eum inter illos connumerandum esse, qui, antequam fierent, praedestinati sunt, ut essent»: ergo impium est dicere, Filium Dei esse praedestinatum.

2. Item, super illud ad Romanos octavo[^8]: *Quos praedestinavit, hos et vocavit;* Glossa: «Praedestinavit non existentes, vocavit ante aversos»: si ergo praedestinatio est non existentis, et Filius Dei semper existit, nunquam videtur praedestinatus esse.

3. Item, praedestinatio de ratione nominis dicit antecessionem praedestinantis ad praedestinatum[^9]; sed Filium Dei nihil antecedit, cum sit aeternus: ergo nullo modo convenit ei inter praedestinatos connumerari.

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4. Item, nullus semetipsum praedestinavit[^1b] — sicut enim alius est qui creatur, alius est qui creat; sic et qui praedestinat, et qui praedestinatur — sed omnes, quotquot praedestinantur, a Filio Dei praedestinantur: ergo nullatenus est concedendum: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

### Conclusio

> Locutio: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, non admittitur a theologis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis haec sit concedenda: Christus est praedestinatus, pro eo quod Christus nominat hypostasim in duabus naturis; et haec: Christus est praedestinatus, in quantum homo, ratione determinationis adiunctae; (*Conclusio.*) haec tamen communiter non recipitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus. — Et ratio huius est propter repugnantiam intellectuum, (*Triplex ratio.*) quae quidem invenitur inter subiectum et praedicatum.

Reperitur autem ibi triplex repugnantia. Nam vocabulum praedestinationis circa praedestinatum (*Tria in praedestinatione.*) tria importat, videlicet habitudinem effectuum[^2b] respectu causae, acceptationem per donum gratiae, et inchoationem quantum ad esse naturae. Et primum intellectum habet, quia descendit a verbo passivo; secundum vero intellectum habet, quia descendit ab actu dicente ordinationem ad finem[^3b]; tertium intellectum habet, quia componitur a praepositione dicente antecessionem, sicut ab hac praepositione prae. — Econtra Filius Dei dicit illam (*Triplex repugnantia.*) personam ut causam, non ut effectum. Dicit etiam illam personam, prout competit illi filiatio per naturam, non per gratiae donum. Dicit etiam illam personam ut aeternam, non ut habentem initium. Et sic expresse est repugnantia intellectuum inter (*Corollarium.*) subiectum et praedicatum. — Et potest ista repugnantia reduci ad triplex genus oppositionis, videlicet contradictionis, contrarietatis et relationis[^4b]. Et propter hanc triplicem repugnantiam non admittunt magistri praedictam locutionem. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

(*Solutio oppositorum.*) 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod haec conceditur: Filius Dei est homo; dicendum, quod non est ibi repugnantia intellectuum, immo potius consonantia. Homo enim nominat naturam habilem ad unionem, non sic autem hoc praedicatum praedestinatum[^5b]. Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod si Filius Dei est homo, quod propter hoc sit praescitus, vel praedestinatus, nisi addatur ei: secundum quod homo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod communicatio idiomatum est in omnibus, exceptis nominibus unionem importantibus; dicendum, quod non solum (*Notandum.*) sunt illa excipienda nomina, sed etiam vocabula illa, ex quibus consurgit intellectuum repugnantia; et tale est vocabulum praedestinationis et consimilia, sicut melius manifestabitur infra distinctione undecima[^6b], ubi quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Filius Dei est creatura.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod magis repugnat temporale aeterno, quam aeternum aeterno; dicendum, quod verum est de eo quod est pure aeternum; de eo autem, quod est sic aeternum, quod de suo primario intellectu dicit et nominat[^7b] aliquid temporale, non habet veritatem, maxime quando sic importat illud temporale, quod directe habet oppositionem ad aeternum, sicut est hoc participium praedestinatus.

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de missione, quod quamvis sit temporale, conceditur[^8b] Filius Dei esse missus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, (*Notandum.*) etsi mitti dicat quid temporale, tamen illud temporale non dicitur poni circa divinam personam, sed circa aliquid creatum; circa vero divinam personam ponit solam emanationem. Sed praedestinatio circa ipsum praedestinatum triplicem ponit intellectum, qui repugnat personae aeternae; et ideo, quamvis sane possit concedi: Filius Dei est missus; non sane potest concedi: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filio Dei praeparata fuit gratia in praesenti et gloria in futuro; dicendum, quod etsi Christo praeparata fuit gratia[^9b] ratione humanae naturae, non tamen ratione divinae. Et ideo sicut prima locutio negatur, qua dicitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, nisi addatur determinatio, secundum quam et ratione cuius attendatur ipsa praedestinatio; sic neganda est alia locutio, in qua ponitur praedestinationis definitio, nisi addatur haec determinatio: secundum quod homo.

6. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod haec determinatio: secundum quod homo, non diminuit; dicendum, quod quamvis non diminuat de ratione praedestinationis; facit tamen, quod praedestinatio rem suam ponat circa hypostasim Christi ratione humanae naturae, non ratione divinae; et sic tollit repugnantiam intellectuum. Cum autem simpliciter infertur et dicitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus; cum Filius Dei denominet personam Christi secundum

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divinam naturam tantum, est ibi repugnantia intellectuum. Et ideo non tenet ille processus, non quia ibi est paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter, sed quia ibi est paralogismus secundum accidens[^1c]. Quod enim convenit Christo ratione humanae naturae est extraneum ratione divinae.

english:
### Article II. *On the locutions expressing the predestination of the union.*

Next, with regard to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the locutions expressing the predestination of the union. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined. Second, inquiry is made concerning this: the Son of God is predestined to be man. Third, inquiry is made concerning this: the man is predestined to be the Son of God.

### Question I. *Whether the Son of God is predestined.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the Son of God is predestined. And that he is, seems [to be the case].

(*To the contrary side.*) 1. This is conceded: the Son of God is man; but every man is either foreknown, or predestined[^1]; but the Son of God is not a foreknown man: therefore predestined.

2. Likewise, excepting the words importing the union, there must be a communication of idioms[^2]; but the word "predestination" does not import the union, so far as it is of itself: therefore, since that man is predestined, and that man is the Son of God, it necessarily follows that the Son of God is predestined.

3. Likewise, the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; but to be predestined says something eternal[^3]; but to be conceived and born [says] something temporal; but this is conceded: the Son of God was born of the Virgin: therefore this also: the Son of God is predestined.

4. Likewise, nothing belongs to anyone except from time, in that it says a temporal effect[^4]; but it is conceded without qualification: the Son of God was sent into the flesh: therefore much more must this be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

5. Likewise, predestination is nothing other than the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future[^5]; but to the Son of God, Christ, grace and glory were conferred in time and foreseen from eternity to be conferred upon him; but to whatever the definition belongs, the thing defined [also belongs]: therefore one must necessarily concede that the Son of God is predestined.

6. Likewise, this is true: the Son of God is predestined, insofar as he is man; but that qualification "man" does not diminish anything with respect to the subject: therefore, it being removed, it is permissible to infer that the Son of God is predestined without qualification. Since therefore "from the true nothing but the true follows[^6]," it seems that the aforesaid locution, namely "the Son of God is predestined," is to be conceded as true.

(*Fundamental arguments.*) On the contrary: 1. Origen[^7]: "He is predestined who does not yet exist; these words are said on account of those who speak impiety against the Only-begotten of God. For they think that he is to be numbered among those who, before they came to be, were predestined to be": therefore it is impious to say that the Son of God is predestined.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Romans 8[^8]: *Whom he predestined, them he also called;* the Gloss: "He predestined those not existing, he called them before they had turned away": if therefore predestination is of the non-existent, and the Son of God always exists, he never seems to be predestined.

3. Likewise, predestination by the meaning of the name says a precedence of the one predestining over the one predestined[^9]; but nothing precedes the Son of God, since he is eternal: therefore in no way does it befit him to be numbered among the predestined.

4. Likewise, no one predestined himself[^1b] — for just as one is who is created, another who creates; so also one who predestines, and another who is predestined — but all, however many are predestined, are predestined by the Son of God: therefore it is in no way to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

### Conclusion

> The locution "the Son of God is predestined" is not admitted by the theologians.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although this is to be conceded: "Christ is predestined," in that "Christ" names the hypostasis in two natures; and this: "Christ is predestined, insofar as he is man," by reason of the adjoined qualification; (*Conclusion.*) nevertheless this is commonly not received: "the Son of God is predestined." — And the reason for this is on account of the repugnance of the intelligible contents, (*Threefold reason.*) which is indeed found between the subject and the predicate.

Now a threefold repugnance is found there. For the word "predestination," with regard to the one predestined, (*Three things in predestination.*) imports three things, namely a relation of effects[^2b] with respect to a cause, an acceptation through the gift of grace, and an inchoation as regards the being of [the] nature. And it has the first intelligible content because it descends from a passive verb; it has the second intelligible content because it descends from an act expressing an ordering to an end[^3b]; it has the third intelligible content because it is compounded from a preposition expressing precedence, namely from this preposition "pre-." — On the contrary, "the Son of God" signifies that (*Threefold repugnance.*) person as cause, not as effect. It also signifies that person inasmuch as sonship belongs to him by nature, not by the gift of grace. It also signifies that person as eternal, not as having a beginning. And thus there is expressly a repugnance of the intelligible contents between (*Corollary.*) subject and predicate. — And this repugnance can be reduced to the threefold genus of opposition, namely of contradiction, of contrariety, and of relation[^4b]. And on account of this threefold repugnance the masters do not admit the aforesaid locution. — Hence the reasonings which are on this side are to be conceded.

(*Solution of the opposing arguments.*) 1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that this is conceded: "the Son of God is man"; it must be said that there is not there a repugnance of the intelligible contents, but rather a consonance. For "man" names a nature apt for the union, but not so this predicate "predestined"[^5b]. And therefore it does not follow from this, that if the Son of God is man, that on account of this he is foreknown or predestined, unless there be added to him: insofar as he is man.

2. To that which is objected, that the communication of idioms is in all [terms], excepting the names importing the union; it must be said that not only (*Note.*) are those names to be excepted, but also those words from which a repugnance of intelligible contents arises; and such is the word "predestination" and the like, as will be better made clear below in the eleventh distinction[^6b], where it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is a creature.

3. To that which is objected, that the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; it must be said that this is true of that which is purely eternal; but of that which is so eternal that of its primary intelligible content it expresses and names[^7b] something temporal, it does not hold true, especially when it so imports that temporal [thing] which has a direct opposition to the eternal, as is this participle "predestined."

4. To that which is objected concerning the mission, that although it is temporal, it is conceded[^8b] that the Son of God was sent; it must be said that it is not alike, because, (*Note.*) although "to be sent" expresses something temporal, nevertheless that temporal [thing] is not said to be placed about the divine person, but about something created; whereas about the divine person it places only an emanation. But predestination places about the very one predestined a threefold intelligible content, which is repugnant to the eternal person; and therefore, although it may soundly be conceded "the Son of God was sent," it cannot soundly be conceded "the Son of God is predestined."

5. To that which is objected, that for the Son of God grace was prepared in the present and glory in the future; it must be said that, although for Christ grace was prepared[^9b] by reason of the human nature, nevertheless not by reason of the divine. And therefore, just as the first locution is denied, by which it is said "the Son of God is predestined," unless a qualification be added, according to which and by reason of which the predestination itself is regarded; so the other locution is to be denied, in which the definition of predestination is placed, unless this qualification be added: insofar as he is man.

6. To that which is objected, that this qualification "insofar as he is man" does not diminish; it must be said that, although it does not diminish [anything] of the meaning of predestination, it nevertheless brings it about that predestination places its reality about the hypostasis of Christ by reason of the human nature, not by reason of the divine; and thus it removes the repugnance of the intelligible contents. But when it is inferred and said without qualification "the Son of God is predestined," since "the Son of God" denominates the person of Christ according to

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the divine nature only, there is there a repugnance of the intelligible contents. And therefore that reasoning does not hold, not because there is there a paralogism of the qualified and the unqualified, but because there is there a paralogism of accident[^1c]. For what belongs to Christ by reason of the human nature is foreign [to him] by reason of the divine.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL.

en: Cf. I Sent., text of the Master, d. 40.

la: Vide supra a. I. q. 3. in fine.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 3, near the end.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro *sed esse conceptum et natum quid* etc. codd. AELNTXYaa *sed omne conceptum est natum quid* etc. Pro *sed esse* cod. K *et esse*, edd. *esse* tantum.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. — Thereupon, for *sed esse conceptum et natum quid* etc., codices AELNTXYaa read *sed omne conceptum est natum quid* etc. For *sed esse*, cod. K reads *et esse*, the editions *esse* only.

la: De quo vide I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 2. — Deinde post *sed* edd. inserunt *ista*.

en: On which see I Sent., d. 15, p. 1, q. 2. — Then, after *sed*, the editions insert *ista*.

la: De hac definitione cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL. c. 2. et hic c. 2. in fine. — Paulo inferius post *definitio* edd. cum paucis codd. repetunt *convenit*. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. seq., et Boeth., II. et III. de Differentiis topic.

en: On this definition cf. I Sent., text of the Master, d. 40, c. 2, and here c. 2, near the end. — A little below, after *definitio*, the editions with a few codices repeat *convenit*. Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 1 ff., and Boethius, *On Topical Differences* II and III.

la: Aristot., II. Prior. c. 2: «Ex veris ergo non est falsum syllogizare». I. Poster. c. 25. (c. 32.): *Vera autem* [conclusio] *ex veris.*

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, c. 2: "From true [premises], therefore, one cannot syllogize a falsehood." *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 25 (c. 32): *And a true* [conclusion follows] *from true [premises].*

la: Libr. I. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. n. 5, ubi illa verba: *Qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei* etc. (1, 4.) enucleans ait: *Quamvis enim in Latinis exemplaribus praedestinatus soleat inveniri, tamen secundum quod interpretationis veritas habet, destinatus scriptum est, non praedestinatus. Destinatur enim ille qui est, praedestinatur vero ille qui nondum est, sicut hi, de quibus dicit Apostolus: Quos autem praescivit, illos et praedestinavit* (Rom. 8, 30.). *Praesciri ergo et praedestinari possunt illi qui nondum sunt; ille autem, qui est et semper est, non praedestinatur, sed destinatur. Haec dicta sint a nobis propter eos qui in unigenitum Filium Dei impietatem loquuntur et ignorantes differentiam destinati et praedestinati, putant eum inter eos qui, cum ante non fuerint, praedestinati sunt ut essent, numerandum* (ed. Migne).

en: Book I, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, n. 5, where, expounding those words *Who was predestined Son of God* etc. (1:4), he says: *For although in the Latin exemplars "predestined" is wont to be found, nevertheless, according to what the truth of the interpretation holds, "destined" is written, not "predestined." For he is destined who is, but he is predestined who does not yet exist, like those of whom the Apostle says: But whom he foreknew, them he also predestined* (Rom. 8:30). *Therefore those can be foreknown and predestined who do not yet exist; but he who is and always is, is not predestined, but destined. Let these things be said by us on account of those who speak impiety against the only-begotten Son of God and, ignorant of the difference between "destined" and "predestined," think that he is to be numbered among those who, since they did not before exist, were predestined to be* (Migne's edition).

la: Vers. 30. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum, sumta est ex August., Serm. 158. (alias 16. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 1. n. 1: *Praedestinavit, antequam essemus; vocavit, cum aversi essemus.* Cfr. ibid. c. 3. n. 3. seq. — Pro *ante aversos* codd. AEFSHKNTXZ (aa a secunda manu) bb *adversos*, cod. U *adversarios*.

en: Verse 30. — The Gloss, which is interlinear and is found in [Nicholas of] Lyra, is taken from Augustine, *Sermon* 158 (otherwise 16, *On the Words of the Apostle*), c. 1, n. 1: *He predestined [us] before we were; he called [us] when we had turned away.* Cf. ibid. c. 3, n. 3 ff. — For *ante aversos* codices AEFSHKNTXZ (aa by a second hand) bb read *adversos*, cod. U *adversarios*.

la: Codd. GKZbb *praedestinat.*

en: Codices GKZbb read *praedestinat.*

la: Cod. Z *effectus.* Paulo ante pro *praedestinationis* edd. *praedestinatus.*

en: Cod. Z reads *effectus.* A little before, for *praedestinationis* the editions read *praedestinatus.*

la: Codd. FGHILUZaabb *in finem.* Immediate ante pro *ab actu dicente* edd. 1, 2 *a verbo dicente.*

en: Codices FGHILUZaabb read *in finem.* Immediately before, for *ab actu dicente* the editions 1, 2 read *a verbo dicente.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Opposites.*

la: Cod. bb *praedestinatus.*

en: Cod. bb reads *praedestinatus.*

en: Article 2, q. 1.

la: Codd. EFHLNXZaa *connominat,* codd. IY *connotat.*

en: Codices EFHLNXZaa read *connominat,* codices IY *connotat.*

la: Edd. hic ante *conceditur* et in fine arg. inter *non* et *sane potest* interserunt *tamen.* In medio arg. pro *solam emanationem* codd. AGIKLNTUZaabb *solum emanationem* [codd. IL (T a prima manu) Yaa et edd. 1, 2 *emanabilitatem*].

en: Here the editions insert *tamen* before *conceditur* and, at the end of the argument, between *non* and *sane potest.* In the middle of the argument, for *solam emanationem* codices AGIKLNTUZaabb read *solum emanationem* [codices IL (T by a first hand), Yaa, and editions 1, 2 read *emanabilitatem*].

la: Cod. U addit *in praesenti et gloria in futuro.*

en: Cod. U adds *in the present and glory in the future.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. *de Fallaciis,* fallaciam *secundum quid ad simpliciter* describens ait: «*Dictum secundum quid* appellatur hic determinatio diminuens de ratione vel de *esse* eius cui adiungitur, ut, cum dico: homo mortuus, ibi mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis... Fit autem haec fallacia tot modis, quot modis contingit alicui addere determinationem diminuentem; et ponuntur quinque modi» etc. Describens autem fallaciam *secundum accidens* dicit: *Accidens,* ut hic sumitur, idem est quod extraneum in parte idem et in parte diversum etc. Cfr. supra pag. 175, nota 7. — Pro *sed quia ibi est* codd. AHILNTUXaa *sed est ibi.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5). Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, tract *On Fallacies*, describing the fallacy *of the qualified leading to the unqualified*, says: "*A statement made in a qualified sense* is here called a determination that diminishes from the formal account or from the *being* of that to which it is joined, as when I say 'a dead man,' there 'dead' diminishes from the formal account of man... Now this fallacy occurs in as many ways as it happens that one adds to something a diminishing determination; and five ways are set down," etc. But describing the fallacy *of accident* he says: *Accident*, as it is taken here, is the same as what is extraneous, in part the same and in part diverse, etc. Cf. above p. 175, note 7. — For *sed quia ibi est* codices AHILNTUXaa read *sed est ibi.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tribus huius articuli quaestionibus iterum de proprietate trium locutionum agitur, non de ipsa praedestinatione Christi in se considerata. De praedestinatione in genere cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. 41; de praedestinatione Christi infra d. 11. a. 1. — Praesupponendum est, ad rationem praedestinationis proprie dictam tria requiri, scilicet quod praedestinatio praecedat praedestinatum; quod res praedestinata concedatur per gratiam; quod eadem aliquando reapse concedatur. Hinc iam patet, primam locutionem (q. I.) esse falsam; aliae duae cum quibusdam restrictionibus communiter conceduntur, contrarium tamen docente Durando. De aliis similibus locutionibus vide infra d. 10. a. 1. et 11. a. 2.

**II.** De his tribus quaestionibus et locutionibus, mutato tantum interdum ordine, tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 3. m. 1–4. — Scot., hic q. 3; Report. hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2; S. III. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2, infra d. 10. a. 4–7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1–4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1–3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the three questions of this article, again it is the propriety of the three locutions that is treated, not the predestination of Christ considered in itself. On predestination in general, cf. I Sent. d. 40, 41; on the predestination of Christ, below d. 11, a. 1. — It must be presupposed that, for the properly-so-called meaning of predestination, three things are required, namely that predestination precede the one predestined; that the predestined reality be conferred through grace; that the same be at some time actually conferred. Hence it is now clear that the first locution (q. I) is false; the other two, with certain restrictions, are commonly conceded, Durand, however, teaching the contrary. On other similar locutions see below d. 10, a. 1, and 11, a. 2.

**II.** On these three questions and locutions — with only the order sometimes changed — treat: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 3, m. 1–4. — Scotus, here q. 3; *Reportata* here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, 2; *Summa* III, q. 24, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2, below d. 10, a. 4–7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1–4. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1–3. — Durand, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 177–179 (PDF pp. 199–201; offset pdf = printed + 22), read Left column top→bottom then Right, cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 12746–12901), which is clean here with no cascade-shatter. English is a fresh literal translation. The short ARTICULUS II opener (*Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum… Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria*, raw 12746) is folded into q1 per the locked chunking convention. Apparatus built continuously from the PDF footers page by page.

**Alignment.** VERIFIED. q1 opener = *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus* — concerns *whether the Son of God is predestined*. This is q1, NOT q2 (*Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo*, QUAESTIO II at raw 12902) or q3 (*homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei*, raw 13012).

**Page-split map.**
- p. 177 (PDF 199): ART. II opener + q1 header + opener + affirmative (*Ad oppositum*) args 1–6 + *Sed contra* (*Fundamenta*) args 1–3. Running head `DIST. VII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` Footer notes 1–9 (`[^1]`–`[^9]`).
- p. 178 (PDF 200): *Sed contra* arg. 4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (triple repugnantia of the predestination-locution) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–6 (ad 6 runs to the foot, broken at *secundum*). Footer notes 1–9 (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`).
- p. 179 (PDF 201): Solutio ad 6 tail (the *paralogismus secundum accidens* close) + SCHOLION I–II. Running head `DIST. VII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` (q2 prints in the right column). q1 owns the single p. 179 footer note 1 (`[^1c]`); q2's footers (notes 2+) begin in the q2 column.

**Apparatus count: 19 entries.** p. 177 notes 1–9 (`[^1]`–`[^9]`) + p. 178 notes 1–9 (`[^1b]`–`[^9b]`) + p. 179 note 1 (`[^1c]`).

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: **TRUE.** A standalone SCHOLION (§§ I–II) prints at q1's tail on p. 179 (spanning the column boundary into the q2 column), carrying **no footnote markers** (cross-references only). §I states the article-scope (the propriety of the three locutions, not Christ's predestination in itself) and explicitly judges *primam locutionem (q. I.) esse falsam* — i.e. it is q1's own scholion. §II is the parallel-commentator source-list covering all three quaestiones of the article (Alex. Hal., Scotus, S. Thom., Albert, etc.) — so q2 and q3 are forward-covered for commentator lists and will likely be **has_scholion: FALSE** with a redirect to this scholion.

**Footer hand-off.**
- RECEIVED: NONE. d7-a1-q3 forwarded no footer (its p. 175 n. 9–10 + p. 176 n. 1–9 were exhausted there); ART. II opens its own footer sequence fresh on p. 177.
- FORWARDED to d7-a2-q2: NONE. q1's p. 177 n. 1–9 + p. 178 n. 1–9 + p. 179 n. 1 are fully exhausted. q2 opens its own footer sequence on p. 179 (q2's first markers — *naturae* / *termini* etc. — key p. 179 footer notes 2+ which print in the q2 column and belong to QUAESTIO II).

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 179 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum haec sit vera: Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse homo.*

Secundo quaeritur de hac: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo. Et quod sit vera, videtur:

1. *Primo* per Magistrum in littera[^2], qui dicit, eam secundum quamlibet trium opinionum esse concedendam. (*Fundamenta.*)

2. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Tantum repugnat vel amplius Filio Dei fieri[^3], quantum praedestinari; sed haec conceditur: Filius Dei est factus homo: ergo et haec: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo.

3. *Item*, prophetia illa, qua dicitur Isaiae septimo[^4]: *Ecce Virgo concipiet,* dicitur esse prophetia praedestinationis: ergo quod Verbum caro fieret, sicut ex tempore fuit prophetatum et impletum, ita et ab aeterno praedestinatum: ergo sicut ex tempore factus est homo, ita et ab aeterno praedestinatus est esse homo.

4. *Item*, Filius Dei est homo aut per gratiam, aut per naturam; non per naturam: ergo per gratiam; sed omnis gratia, quaecumque datur alicui ex tempore, praeordinata fuit et praeparata ab aeterno; sed hoc non est aliud quam praedestinari[^5]: ergo videtur, quod haec: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo, est concedenda.

**Sed contra:** (*Ad oppositum.*)
1. Praedestinatio est respectu gratiae et gloriae, non respectu naturae[^6]; sed *esse hominem* dicit praedicatum naturale, non donum gratuitum: ergo respectu illius nullus debet dici praedestinatus.

2. *Item*, necessario sequitur: iste praedestinatus est habere gratiam et gloriam, ergo est praedestinatus, ergo similiter sequitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo, ergo est praedestinatus; sed haec est neganda: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, sicut ostensum est supra[^7]: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, praedestinatio dicit antecessionem non solum respectu termini[^8], sed etiam respectu praedestinati; sed quamvis divina praevisio praecesserit humanam naturam, non tamen praecessit divinam personam: igitur sive dicatur absolute, sive respectu humanae naturae, negandum est, Filium Dei praedestinatum esse: ergo falsa est praedicta locutio, scilicet: Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse homo.

4. *Item*, quicumque praedestinatur[^9], ad aliquod donum gratuitum praeparatur; sed Filius Dei cum factus est homo, nulla fuit facta gratia illi personae Filii Dei, sed solummodo generi humano: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo Filio Dei competat ista praedestinatio.

<!-- page 180 -->

### Conclusio.

> Locutio: Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse homo, admitti potest, licet in uno sensu falsa sit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum hoc participium *praedestinatus* dicat *antecessionem,* tripliciter potest eam importare: vel respectu *subiecti,* vel respectu *praedicati,* vel respectu *totius copulati.* (*Tripliciter importat antecessionem.*) Si autem importet antecessionem respectu *subiecti,* tunc est sensus: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo, id est, Filius Dei ante praevisus est esse homo, quam esset Filius Dei; et hoc modo falsa est praedicta locutio. (*Conclusio 1.*) — Si autem importet antecessionem respectu *praedicati;* tunc est sensus: Filius Dei praevisus[^1b] est esse homo, id est, cognitus vel praevisus fuit esse homo, non antequam Filius Dei esset, sed antequam esset homo. — Si autem importet antecessionem respectu *totius dicti;* tunc est sensus: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo, id est, praedestinatum est, ut Filius Dei sit homo.

Sic igitur potest esse triplex sensus praedictae locutionis; et unus quidem falsus est, duo autem sequentes sunt veri; et quantum ad istos duos sensus subsequentes recipitur praedicta locutio ab omnibus opinionibus, ut Magister dicit in littera[^2b]. (*Conclusio 2.*) Et ideo secundum hunc sensum concedendum est, ipsam esse veram.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:** (*Solutio oppositorum.*)
*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod praedestinatio est respectu gloriae et gratiae, non respectu naturae; dicendum, quod cum vocabulum *praedestinationis* per se profertur, claudit in se intellectum gratiae et gloriae, ut puta cum dicitur aliquis esse *simpliciter* praedestinatus. Cum autem additur ei *determinatio exterior,* solum retinet intellectum principalis significati, videlicet praeordinationis sive praevisionis. (*Notandum.*) Unde cum dicitur: iste est praedestinatus habere gratiam et gloriam, *praedestinatus* tantum valet ibi quantum *praevisus.* Et est simile, cum dicitur: cede; per se tantum valet quantum: locum da; sed cum dicitur: cede locum, *cede* habet solum intellectum alterius. Et ideo, cum dicitur: Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse homo, *praedestinatus* solum importat praevisionem vel ordinationem; et ideo importat solum generalem significationem. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi *esse hominem* de Filio Dei praedicet esse naturale, concernit tamen gratiam unionis; et ideo tale praedicatum non exit extra rationem praedestinationis. (*Aliter.*)

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi est praedestinatus esse homo, quod est praedestinatus; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, cum *praedestinatus* ponitur inter subiectum et praedicatum, potest dicere antecessionem tam respectu unius quam respectu alterius; sed cum *per se* praedicatur[^3b], dicit antecessionem respectu *subiecti.* Et ideo non sequitur: est praedestinatus esse homo, ergo est praedestinatus; sicut non sequitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, secundum quod homo, ergo est praedestinatus. Nec est simile de aliis, qui praedestinantur ad gratiam et gloriam, quia in eis praedestinatio non tantummodo dicit antecessionem respectu eius, *ad quod* praedestinantur, sed etiam respectu eorum, *qui* praedestinantur; non sic autem est in proposito.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud autem quod tertio obiicitur, quod *praedestinatio* dicit antecessionem respectu praedestinati; dicendum, quod verum est, quando *simpliciter* et per se de aliquo dicitur; sed quando *in comparatione* dicitur ad praedicatum aliquod, tunc potest dicere antecessionem respectu illius praedicati. Et hoc modo dicit in proposito; et ideo non cogit illa obiectio[^4b].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod quicumque praedestinatus est, ei fit aliqua gratia; dicendum, quod *praedestinatio* respectu eius importat gratiae collationem, respectu cuius importat *antecessionem.* Cum autem dicitur: Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse homo, non conceditur, secundum quod praedestinatio importat antecessionem respectu *subiecti,* sed solum secundum quod importat[^5b] respectu *praedicati.* Et ideo non notatur, quod aliqua gratia fiat ipsi Filio Dei, sed filio hominis; et hoc quidem verum est, et ideo illa obiectio et ceterae praecedentes non currunt nisi secundum illum sensum, secundum quem praedicta locutio non recipitur[^6b].

---

english:
<!-- page 179 -->

### Question II. *Whether this is true: the Son of God is predestined to be man.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning this proposition: the Son of God is predestined to be man. And that it is true is shown:

1. *First*, by the Master in the text[^2], who says that it is to be conceded according to each of the three opinions. (*Foundations.*)

2. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. It is as much repugnant, or more, for the Son of God *to be made*[^3] [man] as to be predestined; but this is conceded: the Son of God was made man: therefore this too: the Son of God is predestined to be man.

3. *Likewise*, that prophecy by which it is said in Isaiah, chapter seven[^4]: *Behold, a Virgin shall conceive,* is said to be a prophecy of predestination: therefore that the Word should become flesh, just as it was prophesied and fulfilled in time, so also was it predestined from eternity: therefore, just as he was made man in time, so also from eternity he was predestined to be man.

4. *Likewise*, the Son of God is man either by grace or by nature; not by nature: therefore by grace; but every grace, whatsoever is given to anyone in time, was preordained and prepared from eternity; but this is nothing other than to be predestined[^5]: therefore it seems that this proposition — the Son of God is predestined to be man — is to be conceded.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*)
1. Predestination is in respect of grace and glory, not in respect of nature[^6]; but *to be man* states a natural predicate, not a gratuitous gift: therefore in respect of that no one ought to be called predestined.

2. *Likewise*, it follows necessarily: this one is predestined to have grace and glory, therefore he is predestined; therefore likewise it follows: the Son of God is predestined to be man, therefore he is predestined; but this is to be denied: the Son of God is predestined, as was shown above[^7]: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, predestination states a precedence not only in respect of the terminus[^8], but also in respect of the one predestined; but although the divine foreknowledge preceded the human nature, nevertheless it did not precede the divine person: therefore whether it be said absolutely, or in respect of the human nature, it must be denied that the Son of God is predestined: therefore the aforesaid expression is false, namely: the Son of God is predestined to be man.

4. *Likewise*, whoever is predestined[^9] is prepared for some gratuitous gift; but when the Son of God was made man, no grace was made for that person of the Son of God, but only for the human race: therefore it seems that this predestination in no way befits the Son of God.

<!-- page 180 -->

### Conclusion.

> The expression "the Son of God is predestined to be man" can be admitted, although in one sense it is false.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since this participle *predestined* states a *precedence,* it can convey it in three ways: either in respect of the *subject,* or in respect of the *predicate,* or in respect of the *whole compound.* (*It conveys precedence in three ways.*) But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *subject,* then the sense is: the Son of God is predestined to be man, that is, the Son of God was foreseen to be man before he was the Son of God; and in this way the aforesaid expression is false. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *predicate,* then the sense is: the Son of God was foreseen[^1b] to be man, that is, he was known or foreseen to be man, not before the Son of God existed, but before he was man. — But if it conveys precedence in respect of the *whole statement,* then the sense is: the Son of God is predestined to be man, that is, it was predestined that the Son of God should be man.

Thus, therefore, there can be a threefold sense of the aforesaid expression; and one indeed is false, but the two following are true; and as regards those two subsequent senses the aforesaid expression is received by all the opinions, as the Master says in the text[^2b]. (*Conclusion 2.*) And therefore according to this sense it must be conceded that it is true.

**To the arguments to the contrary:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)
*To 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that predestination is in respect of glory and grace, not in respect of nature; it must be said that when the word *predestination* is uttered by itself, it includes within itself the understanding of grace and glory, as for instance when someone is said to be *simply* predestined. But when an *external determination* is added to it, it retains only the understanding of the principal signification, namely of preordination or foreknowledge. (*Note.*) Hence when it is said: this one is predestined to have grace and glory, *predestined* there has only the force of *foreseen.* And it is similar, when it is said: "yield"; by itself it has only the force of "give place"; but when it is said "yield place," *yield* has only the understanding of the other [word]. And therefore, when it is said: the Son of God is predestined to be man, *predestined* conveys only foreknowledge or ordination; and therefore it conveys only the general signification. — It could, however, be said that, although *to be man* predicates of the Son of God something natural, it nevertheless concerns the grace of the union; and therefore such a predicate does not pass outside the account of predestination. (*Otherwise.*)

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that if he is predestined to be man, then he is predestined; it must be said that it does not follow, because, when *predestined* is placed between the subject and the predicate, it can state precedence in respect of the one as much as of the other; but when it is predicated *per se*[^3b], it states precedence in respect of the *subject.* And therefore it does not follow: he is predestined to be man, therefore he is predestined; just as it does not follow: the Son of God is predestined, insofar as he is man, therefore he is predestined. Nor is it similar in the case of others, who are predestined to grace and glory, because in them predestination states a precedence not only in respect of that *to which* they are predestined, but also in respect of those *who* are predestined; but it is not so in the case at hand.

*To 3.* But to that which is objected thirdly, that *predestination* states precedence in respect of the one predestined; it must be said that this is true when it is said of something *simply* and per se; but when it is said *in comparison* to some predicate, then it can state precedence in respect of that predicate. And in this way it speaks in the case at hand; and therefore that objection does not compel[^4b].

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that to whoever is predestined some grace is made; it must be said that *predestination* in respect of him conveys the conferral of grace, in respect of which it conveys *precedence.* But when it is said: the Son of God is predestined to be man, it is not conceded insofar as predestination conveys precedence in respect of the *subject,* but only insofar as it conveys [precedence][^5b] in respect of the *predicate.* And therefore it is not denoted that any grace is made to the Son of God himself, but to the son of man; and this indeed is true, and therefore that objection and the others preceding hold only according to that sense by which the aforesaid expression is not received[^6b].

---

la: Elicitur ex iis quae Magister hic c. I. seqq. et infra d. X. c. I. 3. proponit.

en: Drawn from what the Master sets forth here in chapter I and following, and below in distinction X, chapters I and 3.

la: Pro *fieri* edd. *hominem fieri.*

en: For *fieri* (to be made) the editions read *hominem fieri* (to be made man).

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Praedestinatio namque definiri solet: praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro. Cfr. supra pag. 177, nota 5.

en: For predestination is wont to be defined as: the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future. Cf. above, page 177, note 5.

la: Cfr. nota praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding note.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Pro *termini* cod. U *naturae.*

en: For *termini* (of the terminus) codex U reads *naturae* (of the nature).

la: Cod. N *praedestinatus.* In fine arg. pro *ista* codd. ti (K a secunda manu) Z bb *ipsa.*

en: Codex N reads *praedestinatus.* At the end of the argument, for *ista* codices ti (K by a second hand) Z bb read *ipsa.*

la: In cod. bb verbum *praevisus* a secunda manu bene transformatum est in *praedestinatus.* Paulo superius pro *quam esset* codd. NT *quam esse.*

en: In codex bb the word *praevisus* (foreseen) has been well transformed by a second hand into *praedestinatus* (predestined). A little above, for *quam esset* codices NT read *quam esse.*

la: Hic c. I. seqq., sententialiter. — Paulo superius pro *et unus quidem* cod. H *primus quidem.*

en: Here, chapter I and following, in substance. — A little above, for *et unus quidem* codex H reads *primus quidem.*

la: Ut in huius obiectionis consequente: est praedestinatus. — Mox ante *est praedestinatus esse homo* edd. supplent *Filius Dei.* Circa finem solut. pro *ad quod praedestinantur* codd. et edd. exhibent *ad quod praedestinatur;* sed perperam, ut ex contextu apparet.

en: As in the consequent of this objection: he is predestined. — Just before *est praedestinatus esse homo* the editions supply *Filius Dei.* Near the end of the solution, for *ad quod praedestinantur* the codices and editions exhibit *ad quod praedestinatur;* but wrongly, as is clear from the context.

la: Cod. G *ratio.*

en: Codex G reads *ratio.*

la: Edd. et nonnulli codd. hic repetunt *antecessionem.* Incipiente solutione, pro *quicumque praedestinatus est* codd. G Z bb *quicumque praedestinatur.*

en: The editions and some codices here repeat *antecessionem* (precedence). At the beginning of the solution, for *quicumque praedestinatus est* codices G Z bb read *quicumque praedestinatur.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 179–180 = PDF 201–202; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{179,180}-{L,R}-*.png`, read Left column top→bottom then Right) and cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 12902–13011). OCR here was clean enough for the body; the PDF resolved the column-bled marginal labels and the footer apparatus. Fresh literal English.

**Alignment VERIFIED.** Opener *Secundo quaeritur de hac: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo. Et quod sit vera, videtur* — this is q2 (*whether "the Son of God is predestined to be man" is true / to be conceded*), NOT q1 (*Utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus*) nor q3 (*homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei*). q3 opens at raw 13012.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 179 (PDF 201): the running head reads `DIST. VII. ART. II. QUAEST. II. — 179`. The top of the page is the **tail of q1** (the *paralogismus secundum accidens* close) + q1's standalone SCHOLION §I–II — those belong to `bon-sent-III-d7-a2-q1`, NOT here. This chunk begins lower on the page (left column) with the QUAESTIO II header, the opener, the four affirmative (*Fundamenta*) arguments, and the four *Sed contra* (*Ad oppositum*) arguments (printing in the right column). Footer notes 2–9 (note 1 is q1's).
- p. 180 (PDF 202): left-page footer `180 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (*Tripliciter importat antecessionem*; *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*) + Solutio oppositorum ad 1–4 (marginal labels *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Aliter*). The Solutio runs to the foot of the right column, ending *...non recipitur.* Footer notes 1–6 (suffixed `b`). The `181` running head printed after the p.180 footer is the page-break separator before q3 (no q2 body on p.181).

**Footer hand-off to d7-a2-q3.** NONE forwarded. q2 closes cleanly at the foot of p. 180 (last note = p.180 note 6, *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem*); q3 opens fresh on **p. 181** (the running head printed at the tail of the p.180 footer block in the OCR) with its own footer sequence. No shared-footer split at the q2→q3 seam.

**Footer hand-off received.** NONE. q1's scholion was markerless and q1 owned the single p. 179 footer note 1; q2 opened its own p. 179 footer sequence at note 2.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. No distinct q2 scholion prints. The article-level SCHOLION §I–II (printed at q1's tail on p. 179) forward-covers q2 (and q3); p. 180 footer note 6 explicitly redirects: *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem* (rendered in `[^6b]`).

**Marginal labels** rendered inline in parentheses per convention, not as anchors: *Fundamenta*, *Ad oppositum*, *Tripliciter importat antecessionem*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Aliter*.

**`[?]` flags.** None. Body and apparatus fully resolved from the PDF column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 181 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.*

Tertio quaeritur de hac: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, utrum sit concedenda. Et quod sic, videtur.

(*Fundamenta.*)

1. Ad Romanos primo[^1]: *Qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei in virtute*; sed hoc dicitur aut de filio hominis, aut de Filio Dei; sed non de Filio Dei: ergo de filio hominis.

2. Item, in Glossa[^2]: «Praedestinatus est Iesus, ut qui futurus erat in carne filius David, esset in virtute Filius Dei»; sed Iesus nominat illum hominem: ergo homo ille est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei.

3. Item, quanto maior est gratia, tanto maior secundum illam debet attendi praedestinatio; sed gratia unionis, per quam homo ille factus est Dei Filius, maxima fuit[^3], quae simul in se continuit gratiam et gloriam: si ergo homo praevisus est Filius Dei esse per gratiam illam, videtur, quod praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.

4. Item, praedestinatio non attribuitur Filio Dei propter antecessionem, quae quidem non convenit Filio Dei, secundum quod *Deus*[^4]; sed talis antecessio bene competit homini, secundum quod *homo*: ergo recte videtur, quod competat sibi praedestinatio. Ergo si non tantum datur illi homini gratia, per quam sit beatus, sed etiam, per quam sit Filius Dei; videtur, quod haec sit concedenda: homo est praedestinatus, ut sit Filius Dei.

**Sed contra:** (*Ad oppositum.*)

1. Si homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, et Filius Dei est homo[^5], ergo Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei; sed haec est falsa: ergo et illa, ex qua sequitur. Sequitur autem ex hac: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei: ergo etc.

2. Item, praedestinatio non est nisi personae: ergo si homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aliqua persona est praedestinata esse Filius Dei; aut igitur persona creata, aut persona increata; sed non persona creata, quia talem non est reperire in Christo: ergo persona increata. Sed personae increatae non convenit praedestinari[^6]: ergo videtur, quod non debeat recipi praedictus sermo, iste scilicet: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei.

3. Item, quicumque praedestinatur, antecedit illud, ad quod praedestinatur, tempore, aut natura; sed homo nec tempore nec natura antecedit Filium Dei: ergo videtur, quod sermo praedictus non debeat concedi.

4. Item, cum dicitur: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aut hoc intelligitur, secundum quod homo, aut secundum quod Deus; non secundum quod Deus, hoc constat: ergo intelligitur, secundum quod homo. Sed quicumque est hunc praedestinatus, ab aeterno fuit praedestinatus: ergo secundum quod homo, fuit ab aeterno praedestinatus esse Filius Dei. Sed iste terminus homo supponit verbo de praeterito[^7]: ergo supponit pro praeterito: ergo si aliquis ab aeterno fuit praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, ab aeterno aliquis fuit homo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo et primum.

### Conclusio

> **(Conclusio.)** Ab omnibus recipitur locutio: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista locutio distingui habet per eum modum, per quem distincta fuit prius[^8] posita, ex eo videlicet, quod hoc participium praedestinatus potest dicere antecessionem respectu subiecti, vel respectu praedicati, vel respectu totius copulati. (*Distinctio.*) Si dicat antecessionem respectu subiecti, vera est locutio, et est sensus: homo, antequam esset homo[^9], praevisus est esse Filius Dei. (*Conclusio 1.*) — Si autem notet antecessionem respectu praedicati, falsa est locutio. Est enim sensus: homo praevisus est esse Filius Dei, antequam Filius Dei esset. (*Conclusio 2.*) — Si autem notet antecessionem respectu totius copulati, vera est. Est enim sensus: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, id est praedestinatum est, ut homo sit Filius Dei. Et iste sensus ab omnibus opinionibus recipitur[^10]; et ideo secundum communem locutionem concedi potest praedictus sermo. (*Conclusio generalis.*) — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:** (*Solutio oppositorum.*)

<!-- page 182 -->

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quodsi homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, quod tunc Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, sicut praedictum est[^1b], quantum ad vocabulum praedestinandi non est communicatio idiomatum, immo est sophisma secundum accidens in praedicto processu. Non enim sequitur: divina praevisio praecedit Christum, secundum quod est filius Virginis, ergo secundum quod est Filius Dei.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatio est respectu personae; dicendum, quod si est ratione personae[^2b], non est ratione personalitatis, sed alicuius naturae. (*Notandum.*) Et ideo non oportet ad hoc, quod sermo habeat veritatem, praedestinationem antecedere personam simpliciter, sed sufficit, si antecedat eam ratione alicuius naturae. Et ideo, cum dicitur: homo est praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, non intelligitur, quod illa persona sit praedestinata nisi ratione humanae naturae. — Cum vero dicitur, quod persona aeterna non est praedestinata; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod est aeterna; potest tamen ei convenire ratione naturae temporaliter assumtae[^3b].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatus antecedit illud, ad quod praedestinatur; dicendum, quod verum est; et illud non habet instantiam, quando praedestinatio accipitur proprie respectu gratiae et gloriae; in proposito autem nomen praedestinationis extenditur ad standum pro praevisione ratione determinationis adiunctae, secundum quod (*Notandum.*) in praecedenti problemate visum est. — Posset tamen dici, quod praedictum verbum intelligendum est, quando vocabulum praedestinationis dicit antecessionem non solum respectu subiecti, sed etiam respectu praedicati; sic autem non est in proposito. (*Alia solutio.*) Oportet etiam intelligere de re, ad quam quis praedestinatur non simpliciter[^4b], sed in comparatione ad ipsum quod praedestinatur. Non enim oportet, quod ille qui praedestinatur, sit ante gratiam vel gloriam simpliciter, sed solum secundum quod est in eo; et sic non habet instantiam in proposito. Nam si Filius Dei praecedat hominem, tamen non prius inest homini, quam homo sit; immo per naturam prius est humanitas, quam uniretur personae Verbi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum homo sit praedestinatus esse Filius Dei, aut secundum quod est Deus, aut secundum quod est homo; dico, quod secundum quod homo; et sic fuit ab aeterno. (*Notandum.*) Nec valet: ergo supponit pro praeterito. Hoc enim intelligitur de verbo praeteriti temporis, quod non habet vim ampliandi ad futurum. In his enim, quae habent vim ampliandi ad futura, pro eo quod claudunt in se actum de futuro, praedicta regula non habet locum[^5b]. Et sic est in proposito, quia praedestinatio connotat praescientiam alicuius futuri; et ideo non oportet, istum terminum homo respectu talis praedicati supponere pro praeteritis. — Alia est etiam ratio, quare ampliat ad omne tempus: quia (*Alia ratio.*) praedestinatio non ponit rem suam in praedestinato, sed in praedestinante, sicut laus non in laudato, sed in laudante. Et ideo, sicut laus non tantum est de praesenti, sed etiam de praeterito et futuro; ita et praedestinatio praeterita potest esse de eo quod est futurum. Et ista clarescunt melius per ea quae in primo libro[^6b] dicta sunt.

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: man is predestined to be the Son of God.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning this: man is predestined to be the Son of God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so seems to be the case.

(*Foundations.*)

1. Romans 1[^1]: *Who was predestined the Son of God in power*; but this is said either of the son of man, or of the Son of God; but not of the Son of God: therefore of the son of man.

2. Likewise, in the Gloss[^2]: «Jesus was predestined, that he who was to be in the flesh the son of David, might be in power the Son of God»; but "Jesus" names that man: therefore that man is predestined to be the Son of God.

3. Likewise, the greater the grace, the greater the predestination that ought to be reckoned according to it; but the grace of the union, through which that man was made the Son of God, was the greatest[^3], which contained in itself at once grace and glory: if therefore the man was foreseen to be the Son of God through that grace, it seems that he was predestined to be the Son of God.

4. Likewise, predestination is not attributed to the Son of God on account of antecedence, which indeed does not befit the Son of God, insofar as he is *God*[^4]; but such antecedence does well befit the man, insofar as he is *man*: therefore it rightly seems that predestination befits him. Therefore if not only is grace given to that man, by which he is blessed, but also that by which he is the Son of God; it seems that this is to be conceded: man is predestined, that he may be the Son of God.

**On the contrary:** (*To the opposite.*)

1. If man is predestined to be the Son of God, and the Son of God is man[^5], therefore the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; but this is false: therefore also that from which it follows. But it follows from this: man is predestined to be the Son of God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, predestination is only of a person: therefore if man is predestined to be the Son of God, some person is predestined to be the Son of God; either therefore a created person, or an uncreated person; but not a created person, because such a one is not to be found in Christ: therefore an uncreated person. But to be predestined does not befit an uncreated person[^6]: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be received, namely this: man is predestined to be the Son of God.

3. Likewise, whoever is predestined precedes that to which he is predestined, in time or in nature; but man precedes the Son of God neither in time nor in nature: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement ought not to be conceded.

4. Likewise, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, either this is understood insofar as he is man, or insofar as he is God; not insofar as he is God, this is established: therefore it is understood insofar as he is man. But whoever is predestined to this, was predestined from eternity: therefore insofar as he is man, he was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God. But this term "man" supposits for the verb in the past[^7]: therefore it supposits for the past: therefore if anyone was from eternity predestined to be the Son of God, from eternity someone was a man; but this is false: therefore also the first.

### Conclusion

> **(Conclusion.)** The locution "man is predestined to be the Son of God" is received by all.

**I respond:** It must be said that this locution has to be distinguished by the same mode by which the one set down earlier[^8] was distinguished, namely from the fact that this participle "predestined" can express antecedence with respect to the subject, or with respect to the predicate, or with respect to the whole copulated whole. (*Distinction.*) If it expresses antecedence with respect to the subject, the locution is true, and the sense is: man, before he was man[^9], was foreseen to be the Son of God. (*Conclusion 1.*) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the predicate, the locution is false. For the sense is: man was foreseen to be the Son of God, before the Son of God existed. (*Conclusion 2.*) — But if it notes antecedence with respect to the whole copulated whole, it is true. For the sense is: man is predestined to be the Son of God, that is, it is predestined that man be the Son of God. And this sense is received by all opinions[^10]; and therefore according to common usage the aforesaid statement can be conceded. (*General conclusion.*) — And the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments on the negative side:** (*Solution of the opposing arguments.*)

*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that if man is predestined to be the Son of God, then the Son of God is predestined to be the Son of God; it must be said that it does not follow, because, as has been said[^1b], with respect to the word "predestining" there is no communication of idioms, rather there is a sophism of accident in the aforesaid process. For it does not follow: the divine foreknowledge precedes Christ, insofar as he is the son of the Virgin, therefore insofar as he is the Son of God.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that predestination is with respect to a person; it must be said that if it is by reason of the person[^2b], it is not by reason of the personality, but of some nature. (*Note.*) And therefore it is not necessary, in order that the statement have truth, that predestination precede the person absolutely, but it suffices if it precede it by reason of some nature. And therefore, when it is said: man is predestined to be the Son of God, it is not understood that that person is predestined except by reason of the human nature. — But when it is said that the eternal person is not predestined; it must be said that this is true, insofar as it is eternal; yet it can befit it by reason of the nature temporally assumed[^3b].

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that the predestined precedes that to which it is predestined; it must be said that this is true; and that has no force against the case, when predestination is taken properly with respect to grace and glory; but in the present case the name of predestination is extended to stand for foreknowledge by reason of an adjoined determination, according as (*Note.*) was seen in the preceding problem. — Yet it could be said that the aforesaid statement is to be understood, when the word "predestination" expresses antecedence not only with respect to the subject, but also with respect to the predicate; but it is not so in the present case. (*Another solution.*) It is also necessary to understand concerning the thing to which one is predestined not absolutely[^4b], but in comparison to the very thing which is predestined. For it is not necessary that he who is predestined be before grace or glory absolutely, but only insofar as it is in him; and thus it has no force against the case. For if the Son of God precedes the man, nevertheless he is not present in the man before the man exists; rather by nature the humanity is prior to its being united to the person of the Word.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, whether man is predestined to be the Son of God, either insofar as he is God, or insofar as he is man; I say that it is insofar as he is man; and thus it was from eternity. (*Note.*) Nor does it hold: therefore it supposits for the past. For this is understood of a verb of past tense, which does not have the power of amplifying to the future. For in those things which have the power of amplifying to future things, because they enclose in themselves an act concerning the future, the aforesaid rule does not hold[^5b]. And so it is in the present case, because predestination connotes the foreknowledge of something future; and therefore it is not necessary that this term "man," with respect to such a predicate, supposit for past things. — There is also another reason why it amplifies to every time: because (*Another reason.*) predestination does not place its reality in the predestined, but in the one predestining, just as praise is not in the one praised, but in the one praising. And therefore, just as praise is not only of the present, but also of the past and future; so too past predestination can be of that which is future. And these things become clearer through what was said in the first book[^6b].

---

la: Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius post *sed non de Filio Dei* cod. O adiicit *ut patet in Glossa ibidem*, quae Glossa affertur in arg. seq.

en: Verse 4. — A little below, after *but not of the Son of God*, codex O adds *as is clear in the Gloss there*, which Gloss is adduced in the following argument.

la: Glossa (in Rom. 1, 4.) hic allata est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum; sumta est ex August., de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 15. n. 31, ubi pro *in carne* legitur *secundum carnem*. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine.

en: The Gloss (on Rom. 1:4) here adduced is the ordinary one and is found in Strabo and Lyra; it is taken from Augustine, *On the Predestination of the Saints* c. 15, n. 31, where for *in the flesh* is read *according to the flesh*. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2, at the end.

la: Ut ait August., cuius dictum habes supra pag. 29, nota 1. *Maior* efficitur ex definitione praedestinationis, supra pag. 179, nota 5 allata.

en: As Augustine says, whose statement you have above on page 29, note 1. The "greater" is made out from the definition of predestination, adduced above on page 179, note 5.

la: Vide supra q. 1. seq. — Paulo inferius pro *quod competat* plurimi codd. (quorum tamen aliqui a secunda antiqui amanuensis manu emendati sunt) et edd. 1, 2 perperam *quod non competat*.

en: See above, the following q. 1. — A little below, for *that it befits* very many codices (some of which, however, have been corrected by the second hand of an old scribe) and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] *that it does not befit*.

la: In edd. desiderantur verba *et Filius Dei est homo*.

en: In the editions the words *and the Son of God is man* are wanting.

la: Cod. U *praedestinatio*.

en: Codex U [reads] *predestination*.

la: Scil. illi: *fuit praedestinatus*. De hoc modo loquendi cfr. infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 2. arg. ult. — Pro *supponit* cod. T *supponitur*. Vat. post *supponit* inserit *pro*.

en: Namely for it: *was predestined*. On this manner of speaking cf. below d. 11, a. 2, q. 2, last argument. — For *supposits* codex T [reads] *is supposited*. The Vatican edition after *supposits* inserts *for*.

la: In quaest. praeced.

en: In the preceding question.

la: Id est, antequam esset productus.

en: That is, before he was produced.

la: De quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq.

en: Concerning which see here the text of the Master, c. 1 and following.

la: Supra q. 1. ad 2. — De sophismate *secundum accidens* vide supra pag. 179, nota 1.

en: Above, q. 1, to the second. — On the sophism *of accident* see above on page 179, note 1.

la: Edd. *quod etsi sit ratione personae, non tamen est* etc.

en: The editions [read] *that although it is by reason of the person, nevertheless it is not* etc.

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. X. c. 1. in fine et c. 3.

en: Cf. below the text of the Master, d. 10, c. 1, at the end, and c. 3.

la: Verba *non simpliciter*, quae ab edd. et plurimis codd. absunt, restituimus ex codd. A (K a secunda manu) U Z bb; cod. F insufficienter non habet nisi *simpliciter*. Aliquanto inferius pro *Nam si* edd. substituerunt *Nam etsi*.

en: The words *not absolutely*, which are absent from the editions and most codices, we have restored from codices A (K by a second hand) U Z bb; codex F insufficiently has only *absolutely*. A little below, for *For if* the editions have substituted *For although*.

la: *Ampliatio* est extensio termini communis, v. gr. hominis, a minore suppositione ad maiorem. Efficitur etiam adhibito *verbo*, ut in hac propositione: homo praedestinatur i. e. homo, qui erat, qui est, et qui futurus est, praedestinatur. — Paulo superius pro *ad futurum* codd. K N X *ad futura*.

en: *Amplification* is the extension of a common term, e.g. "man," from a lesser supposition to a greater. It is also effected by employing a *verb*, as in this proposition: "man is predestined," i.e. the man who was, who is, and who will be, is predestined. — A little above, for *to the future* codices K N X [read] *to future things*.

la: Dist. 40. — De eo quod laus non sit in laudato, cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 5, ubi agens de honore (τιμή) dicit: «Magis enim in iis qui honorem exhibent, quam qui eo afficiuntur, consistit». Vide etiam tom. II. pag. 631, nota 3. — Vide scholion ad 1. q. huius art.

en: Distinction 40. — On the point that praise is not in the one praised, cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, c. 5, where, treating of honor (τιμή), he says: «For it consists more in those who show honor than in those who are affected by it». See also vol. II, page 631, note 3. — See the scholion to question 1 of this article.

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