title: Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo
Whether every punishment is from God

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Ad Romanos duodecimo[^1]: *Mihi vindictam, et ego retribuam*: ergo vindicta proprie competit ipsi Deo; sed omnis punitio vindicta quaedam est: ergo omnis poena et punitio est a Deo.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^2]: « Omnis poena, si peccati poena est, iusta est et supplicium nominatur »; sed omne quod iustum est, a Deo est: ergo omnis poena a Deo est.

3. Item, ad Romanos primo[^3]: *Tradidit illos Deus in passiones ignominiae*; Glossa paulo ante: « Deserit Deus non apponendo gratiam, vel appositam subtrahendo ». Si igitur nulla poena magis caret ratione boni et pulcri, quam subtractio gratiae et passio ignominiae; et huiusmodi poenae sunt a Deo, sicut patet ex textu et ex Glossa: ergo et omnis poena.

4. Item, nulla poena est acerbior quam poena infernalis, nulla poena habet plus de ratione privationis et defectus quam poena mortis; sed utraque istarum est a Deo: ergo et omnis alia poena.

5. Item, subtractio gratiae directe opponitur collationi gratiae; sed gratiam dare hoc maxime placet divinae bonitati: ergo inter omnes poenas minime est haec poena a Deo auctore. Sed haec est a Deo auctore: ergo et omnis alia. Probatio minoris: In subtractione gratiae est gratiae annihilatio et quaedam Dei de habitaculo cordis expulsio; sed operatio annihilationis soli Deo est possibilis, sicut dicit Hugo[^4], cum sit infinita distantia inter extrema; et praeterea, nihil potest Deum eiicere: ergo videtur, quod talis subtractio gratiae non possit esse nisi a Deo tanquam ab auctore.

6. Item, omne illud, quod ordinat inordinatum et restituit honorem Deo sublatum, est a summo Ordinatore et honoris proprii Zelatore; sed omnis poena, secundum quod huiusmodi, est ordinativa culpae — in omni etiam punitione honor redditur Deo, cui subtractus est per culpam — ergo omnis poena, secundum id quod est, procedit a divina iustitia[^5].

**Sed contra:**

1. Excaecatio est quaedam poena[^6]; sed excaecatio non est a Deo, sed ex propria malitia, sicut dicitur Sapientiae secundo: *Excaecavit illos malitia eorum*: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem excaecatio non sit a Deo, apparet tam ex textu quam ex verbis Augustini, qui dicit super illud Ioannis primo: *Lux in tenebris lucet*, ibi dicit, quod « quomodo caeco praesens est lux corporalis, et ipse non est praesens lumini »; sic intelligendum est in luce spirituali, et hoc ipse textus innuit.

2. Item, amissio sive exspoliatio gratuitorum est quaedam poena; sed haec non est a Deo, immo potius a diabolo, secundum quod dicitur, Lucae decimo[^7], de homine descendente a Ierusalem in Iericho, qui a latronibus fuit vulneratus et spoliatus: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem exspoliatio gratuitorum non sit a Deo, apparet per hoc quod dicit Anselmus, quod « homo non habet gratiam, non quia Deus non dat, sed quia ipse non recipit ».

3. Item, imaginis deformatio est quaedam poena; sed Deus imaginem suam nullo modo deformat, immo indignatur contra deformantem: ergo non omnis poena est a Deo. Quod autem imaginis deformatio non sit a Deo, apparet, quoniam imaginem Dei deformare est contumeliam Deo inferre; sed Deus nunquam facit sibi contumeliam: ergo nunquam deformat imaginem suam.

4. Item, nullus purus defectus est a Deo; aliqua poena est purus defectus: ergo aliqua poena non est a Deo. Maior per se manifesta est, quia defectus non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem;

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sed Deus nullius est causa deficiens[^8]. Minor probatur, quia ignorantia nihil aliud est quam spiritualis tenebra: ergo est privatio pura; et ignorantia est poena: ergo etc.

5. Item, nullum vitium est a Deo; aliqua poena est vitium, utpote malitia et concupiscentia: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo. Maior et minor per se manifestae sunt.

6. Item, nullum peccatum est a Deo; sed aliquod peccatum est poena, sicut ostensum est supra[^9], et manifeste apparet in illa deformitate, quae remanet in anima post culpam perpetratam: ergo aliqua poena est, quae non est a Deo.

### Conclusio.

> Omnis poena, quatenus tenet rationem poenae, est a Deo, non tamen id quod dicitur poena, a Deo est, si importat defectum simpliciter, vel aliquam positionem cum deordinatione.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod poena de sui generali acceptione dicit nocumentum ordinatum[^10]. Nocumentum autem comparationem habet et ad ipsum nocivum, et ad illud quod patitur nocumentum, et ad illud, secundum cuius privationem nocumentum illud attenditur. Et secundum istam triplicem comparationem nomen poenae habet triplicem acceptionem. Unde dicitur poena aliquando *actio* rei laedentis, secundum quod adustio ignis infernalis dicitur esse poena reproborum. Dicitur etiam poena *passio* rei laesae sive punitae, secundum quod dicitur: afflictio reproborum est eorum poena aeterna. Dicitur etiam *defectus* alicuius boni, in quem incurritur ex illa passione, sicut defectus quietis, salutis et pacis est poena reproborum.

Quocumque autem istorum modorum dicatur poena, sive actio, sive passio, sive defectus, semper nomen poenae, ut sic est, impositum est ab ordine; et quod dicit nominat ut ordinatum. Et quoniam omne ordinatum, ut tale est, procedit a Deo, a quo est omnis ordo; quocumque modo dicatur poena, et quidquid dicitur poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est, quoniam omne ordinatum a Deo est. A Deo enim habet, quod sit ordinatum, et Deo placet omnis ordo, et idem est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente[^11].

Si autem loquamur de poena secundum illud quod subest huic ordini, a quo imponitur nomen poenae; tunc dicendum est, quod si poena dicatur defectus sive carentia alicuius boni, sic dicendum est, quod talis defectus a Deo non est; non enim habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, nec poena, quae talem defectum nominat, est a Deo. — Si autem poena dicatur ipsa passio rei punitae, quae est via ad defectum alicuius boni, tunc distinguendum est: quia quaedam est passio, quae est ordinata simpliciter[^12]; quaedam vero, quae, quamvis sit ordinata secundum quid, est tamen deordinata simpliciter; quaedam vero medio modo se habens. Passio illa, quae est ordinata simpliciter, illa est passio, quae est pure poenalis, sicut passio famis et sitis, et talis passio a Deo est; unde fames et sitis a Deo dicitur esse. — Passio vero, quae est deordinata simpliciter, sed ordinata secundum quid, est illa quae est culpabilis, sicut est deformatio imaginis et corruptio habilitatis ad bonum; et talis non est concedenda esse a Deo. — Passio vero media est illa, quae est passio vitiosa, utpote illa quae est ex rebellione carnis ad spiritum, quae quodam modo ordinata est ad culpam praecedentem, quodam modo deordinata est, quia est inclinativa ad culpam sequentem; et haec non conceditur esse a Deo. Et Magister dixit supra distinctione trigesima secunda[^13], quod « fomes et concupiscentia non habent Deum auctorem, sed diabolum aut hominem ». — Et sicut distinctum est de poena, prout dicitur passio rei punitae, sic distinguendum est de poena, prout dicitur actio rei punitivae.

Ex praedictis igitur patet, quod etsi omnis poena sit a Deo, in quantum tenet rationem poenae, non omne tamen, quod dicitur poena, a Deo est; immo quaedam est a Deo, quaedam non. Illa est a Deo, quae dicit positionem aliquam, ita quod non nominat deordinationem; et haec est simpliciter poena. Illa vero non est concedenda esse a Deo, quae nominat simpliciter defectum, vel quae nominat positionem aliquam cum deordinatione. Unde nec conceditur a Deo esse excaecatio nec obduratio nec imaginis deformatio nec gratiae subtractio sive exspoliatio nec error nec ignorantia nec concupiscentia nec his consimilia; omnia enim haec vel dicunt defectum, vel deordinationem aliquam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod non omnis poena est a Deo.

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis vindicta est a Deo, et similiter ad sequens, quo dicitur, quod omnis poena iusta est; dicendum, quod illae

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duae rationes non concludunt, nisi quod poena sit a Deo sub ratione poenae; sic enim aliquid dicit, quod respicit ordinem, qui attenditur secundum ultionem divinae iustitiae. De eo autem, quod subest, non oportet illud intelligi, quod sit a Deo; nam « crimina criminibus vindicantur », secundum quod Sancti dicunt, et supra[^14] ostensum fuit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio ignominiae et subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo, neutrum a Deo esse conceditur nisi permissive, secundum quod Deus dicitur obdurare, quia, ipso gratiam non apponente, homo obduratur; sicut etiam Deus dicitur tradere in desideria cordis. Unde Glossa dicit ibidem[^15]: « Tradere est permittere, et non incitare, sed dimittere; praecedentibus quippe culparum causis, iure et merito deseruntur a Deo »; et per hoc, quod deseruntur, desideriis traduntur. Similiter, quod dicitur Deus gratiam subtrahere, hoc non est, quod auferat datam, sed quia, homine se avertente, Deus eam non continuat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de poena mortis et aeternae damnationis, dicendum, quod utraque a Deo est; utraque enim positionem aliquam vel dispositionem[^16] nominat sine deordinatione aliqua. — Et si obiiciat, quod poena infernalis est acerbissima; dicendum, quod acerbitas non impedit, quin poena sit a Deo, sed potius deordinatio et defectus. — Et si obiiciat, quod mors dicit defectum; dico, quod mors non tantum dicit defectum, immo dicit passionem et progressum ab esse in non-esse, qui quidem est per animae et corporis separationem, ubi est ergo dolor et afflictio. Et licet defectus consequatur ad illam passionem, mors tamen non nominat purum defectum, sed potius passionem et transitum illum; et ideo conceditur mors esse a Deo, quamvis non concedatur de aliis poenis, quarum nomina imponuntur ab ipso defectu.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod subtractio gratiae est a Deo; dicendum, quod falsum est, proprie loquendo, nisi dicatur permissive, ut dictum est. — Quod vero obiicitur[^17], quod ibi est annihilatio et Dei expulsio; dicendum, quod Deum expelli non est aliud quam gratiam Dei repelli. Gratiam autem Dei repelli non est aliud quam gratiam corrumpi, pro eo quod ipsa, cum sit accidens, non habet salvari, nisi in substantia rationali. Gratia autem corrumpitur et annihilatur non per actionem contrarii agentis, sed propter defectum in se ipsa. *Deficit* autem in se ipsa propter hoc, quod subiectum deficit sibi. Anima enim non est nata esse subiectum gratiae nisi per conversionem sui ad Deum; et ideo, cum se a Deo avertit, iam gratia gratum faciens in ea non potest salvari, et ideo in se ipsa deficit. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod nihil potest gratiam annihilare et Deum de habitaculo suo eiicere; dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit, ac si talis annihilatio vel eiectio fieret per *virtutem alicuius agentis*. Hoc autem non fit, immo fit propter ineptitudinem suscipientis, sicut visum est[^18].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne ordinatum, et quod reddit honorem Deo, est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est in quantum tale. Sed cum assumit[^19], quod omnis poena est huiusmodi; verum est in quantum poena; et tunc conclusio vera est, videlicet, quod omnis poena, in quantum poena, a Deo est. Sed si ex hoc arguatur ulterius, quod omne illud, quod dicitur poena, est a Deo, utpote culpa vel vitium vel defectus, fiet sophisma secundum accidens[^20], quia quaedam sunt, quae Deo attribuere potius sonat in contumeliam quam in gloriam. — Et propterea si alicubi unquam inveniatur, quod concupiscentia vel ignorantia vel cetera similia a Deo sint, exponenda sunt verba, vel quod[^21] dicta sunt esse a Deo, quia sunt permissive, vel quia dicuntur esse a Deo, in quantum sunt poenae, vel dicuntur esse a Deo, secundum quod concernunt aliquod ens, non secundum illud, a quo primo et principaliter imponuntur[^22].

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english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether every punishment is from God.*

Secondly it is asked, whether every punishment is from God. And that it is, it seems.

*To the opposite.*

1. Romans, twelfth [chapter][^1]: *Vengeance is mine, and I will repay*: therefore vengeance properly belongs to God himself; but every punishing is a certain vengeance: therefore every penalty and punishment is from God.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text[^2]: « Every punishment, if it is the punishment of sin, is just and is called a chastisement »; but everything that is just is from God: therefore every punishment is from God.

3. Likewise, Romans, first [chapter][^3]: *God delivered them up to passions of ignominy*; the Gloss a little before: « God deserts [them] by not bestowing grace, or by withdrawing grace once bestowed ». If therefore no punishment lacks the character of the good and the beautiful more than the withdrawal of grace and the passion of ignominy; and punishments of this kind are from God, as is clear from the text and from the Gloss: therefore [so is] every punishment.

4. Likewise, no punishment is more bitter than the punishment of hell, no punishment has more of the character of privation and defect than the punishment of death; but each of these is from God: therefore [so is] every other punishment.

5. Likewise, the withdrawal of grace is directly opposed to the bestowal of grace; but to give grace pleases the divine goodness most of all: therefore among all punishments this punishment is least from God as author. But this is from God as author: therefore [so is] every other. Proof of the minor: In the withdrawal of grace there is the annihilation of grace and a certain expulsion of God from the dwelling of the heart; but the operation of annihilation is possible to God alone, as Hugh says[^4], since there is an infinite distance between the extremes; and besides, nothing can cast out God: therefore it seems that such a withdrawal of grace cannot be except from God as from author.

6. Likewise, everything which orders the disordered and restores to God the honor taken away, is from the supreme Orderer and Zealot of his own honor; but every punishment, insofar as it is of this kind, is ordering of guilt — in every punishment too honor is rendered to God, of whom [it] was withdrawn through guilt — therefore every punishment, according to that which it is, proceeds from divine justice[^5].

**On the contrary:**

1. Blinding is a certain punishment[^6]; but blinding is not from God, but from one's own malice, as is said in Wisdom, second [chapter]: *Their own malice blinded them*: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that blinding is not from God is apparent both from the text and from the words of Augustine, who says, upon that place of John, first [chapter]: *The light shines in the darkness*, there he says, that « as bodily light is present to a blind man, and he himself is not present to the light »; so it is to be understood in regard to spiritual light, and the text itself suggests this.

2. Likewise, the loss or despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is a certain punishment; but this is not from God, but rather from the devil, according to what is said, in Luke, tenth [chapter][^7], of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who by robbers was wounded and despoiled: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is not from God is apparent through what Anselm says, that « the human does not have grace, not because God does not give [it], but because he himself does not receive [it] ».

3. Likewise, the deformation of the image is a certain punishment; but God in no way deforms his image, but rather is indignant against the one deforming [it]: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the deformation of the image is not from God is apparent, because to deform the image of God is to inflict an affront upon God; but God never does an affront to himself: therefore he never deforms his image.

4. Likewise, no pure defect is from God; some punishment is a pure defect: therefore some punishment is not from God. The major is manifest of itself, because a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one;

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but God is the deficient cause of nothing[^8]. The minor is proven, because ignorance is nothing other than spiritual darkness: therefore it is pure privation; and ignorance is a punishment: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, no vice is from God; some punishment is a vice, such as malice and concupiscence: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God. The major and minor are manifest of themselves.

6. Likewise, no sin is from God; but some sin is a punishment, as has been shown above[^9], and it is manifestly apparent in that deformity which remains in the soul after guilt has been perpetrated: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God.

### Conclusion.

> Every punishment, insofar as it holds the character of punishment, is from God; yet that which is called punishment is not from God, if it imports a defect simply, or some position with disorder.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that punishment, in its general acceptation, states an *ordered harm*[^10]. But harm has a relation both to the harmful thing itself, and to that which suffers the harm, and to that according to whose privation that harm is regarded. And according to this threefold relation the name of punishment has a threefold acceptation. Whence punishment is sometimes called the *action* of the thing inflicting harm, according to which the burning of the infernal fire is said to be the punishment of the reprobate. Punishment is also called the *passion* of the thing harmed or punished, according to which it is said: the affliction of the reprobate is their eternal punishment. It is also called the *defect* of some good, into which one falls from that passion, as the defect of rest, of health, and of peace is the punishment of the reprobate.

But in whichever of these modes punishment is called, whether action, or passion, or defect, the name of punishment, as it is so, is always imposed from order; and what it states it names as ordered. And since everything ordered, as such, proceeds from God, from whom is all order; in whatever mode punishment is called, and whatever is called punishment, insofar as it is punishment, is from God, because everything ordered is from God. For from God it has, that it is ordered, and to God all order is pleasing, and it is the same to come about with God as author and with God willing [it][^11].

But if we speak of punishment according to that which underlies this order, from which the name of punishment is imposed; then it must be said that if punishment is called the defect or lack of some good, thus it must be said that such a defect is not from God; for it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, nor is the punishment, which names such a defect, from God. — But if punishment is called the very passion of the thing punished, which is the way to the defect of some good, then it must be distinguished: because there is a certain passion which is *ordered simply*[^12]; another, indeed, which, although it be ordered in a certain respect, is nevertheless disordered simply; and another holding in a middle mode. That passion which is ordered simply, that is the passion which is purely penal, such as the passion of hunger and thirst, and such a passion is from God; whence hunger and thirst are said to be from God. — But the passion which is disordered simply, but ordered in a certain respect, is that which is culpable, such as is the deformation of the image and the corruption of the aptitude for the good; and such is not to be granted to be from God. — But the middle passion is that which is the vicious passion, such as that which is from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which in a certain mode is ordered to a preceding guilt, in a certain mode is disordered, because it is inclining toward a following guilt; and this is not granted to be from God. And the Master said above, in the thirty-second distinction[^13], that « the tinder [of sin] and concupiscence do not have God as author, but the devil or the human ». — And just as it has been distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the passion of the thing punished, so it must be distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the action of the punishing thing.

From the foregoing therefore it is clear that, although every punishment is from God insofar as it holds the character of punishment, yet not everything which is called punishment is from God; rather a certain [punishment] is from God, a certain [punishment] not. That is from God which states some position, in such a way that it does not name disorder; and this is simply punishment. But that is not to be granted to be from God which names simply a defect, or which names some position with disorder. Whence neither is it granted to be from God that there be blinding, nor hardening, nor deformation of the image, nor withdrawal of grace or despoiling, nor error, nor ignorance, nor concupiscence, nor things like these; for all these either state a defect, or some disorder. — The reasons showing that not every punishment is from God are therefore to be granted.

1. 2. To that which is objected, that every vengeance is from God, and likewise to the following, by which it is said that every punishment is just; it must be said that those

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two reasons conclude only that punishment is from God under the character of punishment; for thus it states something which regards the order which is regarded according to the avenging of divine justice. But concerning that which underlies [it], it is not necessary to understand it to be from God; for « crimes are avenged by crimes », according to what the Saints say, and as was shown above[^14].

3. To that which is objected, that the passion of ignominy and the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that, properly speaking, neither is granted to be from God except permissively, according to which God is said to harden, because, with him not bestowing grace, the human is hardened; just as also God is said to deliver up into the desires of the heart. Whence the Gloss says in the same place[^15]: « To deliver up is to permit, and not to incite, but to let go; for, with the causes of guilt going before, they are by right and merit deserted by God »; and through this, that they are deserted, they are delivered up to [their] desires. Likewise, that God is said to withdraw grace, this is not that he takes away what was given, but because, with the human turning himself away, God does not continue it.

4. To that which is objected concerning the punishment of death and of eternal damnation, it must be said that each is from God; for each names some position or disposition[^16] without any disorder. — And if one object, that the punishment of hell is most bitter; it must be said that bitterness does not prevent the punishment from being from God, but rather disorder and defect do. — And if one object, that death states a defect; I say that death does not only state a defect, but rather states a passion and a passage from being into non-being, which indeed is through the separation of soul and body, where therefore there is pain and affliction. And although a defect follows upon that passion, death nevertheless does not name a pure defect, but rather that passion and passage; and therefore death is granted to be from God, although it not be granted concerning the other punishments, whose names are imposed from the defect itself.

5. To that which is objected, that the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that it is false, properly speaking, unless it be called [so] permissively, as has been said. — But to that which is objected[^17], that there is in it annihilation and the expulsion of God; it must be said that for God to be expelled is nothing other than for the grace of God to be repelled. But for the grace of God to be repelled is nothing other than for grace to be corrupted, for the reason that it, since it is an accident, cannot be preserved except in a rational substance. But grace is corrupted and annihilated not through the action of a contrary agent, but on account of a defect in itself. And it *fails* in itself for this reason, that the subject fails it. For the soul is not born to be the subject of grace except through its conversion to God; and therefore, when it turns itself away from God, now sanctifying grace cannot be preserved in it, and so it fails in itself. — To that therefore which is objected, that nothing can annihilate grace and cast God out of his dwelling; it must be said that that argument proceeds as if such annihilation or ejection were brought about through *the power of some agent*. But this does not come about; rather it comes about on account of the unfitness of the recipient, as has been seen[^18].

6. To that which is objected, that everything ordered, and what renders honor to God, is from God; it must be said that it is true insofar as [it is] such. But when it assumes[^19] that every punishment is of this kind; it is true insofar as [it is] punishment; and then the conclusion is true, namely, that every punishment, insofar as [it is] punishment, is from God. But if from this it be argued further, that everything which is called punishment is from God, such as guilt or vice or defect, there will be a fallacy of accident[^20], because there are certain things which to attribute to God sounds rather to [his] reproach than to [his] glory. — And therefore if anywhere it ever be found that concupiscence or ignorance or the rest of such things are from God, the words are to be expounded, either [in the sense] that[^21] they are said to be from God because they are [so] permissively, or because they are said to be from God insofar as they are punishments, or [because] they are said to be from God according as they concern some being, not according to that from which they are first and principally imposed[^22].

---

la: Vers. 19. Vulgata: *Mihi vindicta, ego*.

en: Verse 19. The Vulgate: *Mihi vindicta, ego* ("Vengeance is mine, I [will repay]").

la: Hic c. 2. et 5.

en: Here c. 2 and 5.

la: Vers. 26. — Glossa allegata pertinet ad v. 24. et habetur apud Petr. Lombardum. Cfr. etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Verse 26. — The Gloss adduced pertains to v. 24 and is found in Peter Lombard. Cfr. also here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Libr. 1. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 37. Vide supra pag. 729, nota 6.

en: Book 1. *On the Sacraments*, p. VI. c. 37. See above p. 729, note 6.

la: Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 13-15.

en: Cfr. Anselm, I. *Why God [Became] Man*, c. 13-15.

la: Vers. 21. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 5. Verba Augustini vide supra pag. 123, nota 6. — Aliquanto inferius post *Lux in tenebris lucet* Vat. omittit *ibi dicit*, quae verba re vera superflua sunt, nisi forte verba *qui dicit*, quae immediate habentur post *Augustini*, aut expunguntur, quod in cod. W factum est, aut potius commutantur in *quae dicit*.

en: Verse 21. — The following text is at the place cited, v. 5. For the words of Augustine see above p. 123, note 6. — A little below, after *Lux in tenebris lucet* ("The light shines in the darkness"), the Vatican [edition] omits *ibi dicit*, which words are in truth superfluous, unless perhaps the words *qui dicit*, which are had immediately after *Augustini*, are either expunged, which was done in cod. W, or rather changed into *quae dicit*.

la: Vers. 30. Cfr. supra pag. 506, nota 3. et pag. 700, nota 1. — Dictum Anselmi habetur in Dialog. de Casu diaboli, c. 2. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 247, nota 1. et tom. I. pag. 720, nota 6. — Vat. hic textum valde mutilavit. Omissis enim ultima huius arg. parte inde a verbis *Quod autem exspoliatus*, nec non prima parte arg. sequentis usque ad verba *Quod autem imaginis*, haec duo argg. in unum perperam confudit.

en: Verse 30. Cfr. above p. 506, note 3, and p. 700, note 1. — The saying of Anselm is found in the *Dialogue on the Fall of the Devil*, c. 2 seq. Cfr. above p. 247, note 1, and tom. I. p. 720, note 6. — The Vatican [edition] here greatly mutilated the text. For, omitting the last part of this argument from the words *Quod autem exspoliatus* ("But that the despoiling..."), as well as the first part of the following argument up to the words *Quod autem imaginis* ("But that... of the image"), it wrongly confused these two arguments into one.

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8. Idem in Enarrat. in Ps. 34. serm. I. n. 9. ignorantiam vocat *tenebram*. — In initio arg. post *Item* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 interserit *si*, et deinde sola post *defectus est a Deo* interiicit *et*.

en: Cfr. Augustine, XII. *On the City of God*, c. 8. The same, in *Enarration on Ps.* 34, serm. I. n. 9, calls ignorance *tenebram* ("darkness"). — At the beginning of the argument, after *Item*, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 inserts *si*, and then alone, after *defectus est a Deo*, interjects *et*.

la: Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 27. n. 2: *Poena dicta, quod puniat*. — Mox pro *nocivum* codd. K M T V bb ee etc. *nocumentum*.

en: Isidore, V. *Etymologies*, c. 27. n. 2: *Poena* ("punishment") *is so called, because it punishes* (*puniat*). — Presently for *nocivum* codd. K M T V bb ee etc. [read] *nocumentum*.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 3: *Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur*. — Paulo superius post *poena, a Deo est* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 incongrue addit *et*; at mox sola *et* ante *Deo placet* et ante *idem est* hanc particulam omittit; deinde post *idem est* subiicit *enim*.

en: Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 3: *But when it is said [to be] with him as author, it is said [to be] with him willing [it]*. — A little above, after *poena, a Deo est*, the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 incongruously adds *et*; but presently it alone omits this particle *et* before *Deo placet* and before *idem est*; then after *idem est* it adds *enim*.

la: In multis codd., ut B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., et in edd. 3, 4 deest *simpliciter*.

en: In many codices, such as B C E F H K O R S T W Y etc., and in edd. 3, 4, *simpliciter* is lacking.

la: Cap. 3. — In Vat., edd. 3, 4 et in aliquibus codd. desiderantur verba, quae mox sequuntur: *sicut distinctum est...* usque ad *rei punitae* inclusive.

en: Cap. 3. — In the Vatican [edition], edd. 3, 4, and in some codices, the words which follow presently are lacking: *sicut distinctum est...* ("just as it has been distinguished...") up to *rei punitae* inclusively.

la: Art. I. q. 1. Verbum August. vide hic lit. Magist. c. 3.

en: Art. I. q. 1. For the word of Augustine see here the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Super Rom. 1, 24; vide Petr. Lombard. in hunc locum. — Versus finem solutionis ante *datam* Vat. repetit *gratiam*.

en: On Rom. 1, 24; see Peter Lombard on this place. — Toward the end of the solution, before *datam*, the Vatican [edition] repeats *gratiam*.

la: Codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee et alii cum ed. 1 *in positionem*. Particula *vel*, quae voci *dispositionem* praecedit, deest in codd. K (a secunda manu) T ee; codd. H Y bb pro ea substituerunt *et*.

en: Codd. K (by a second hand) T ee and others, with ed. 1, [read] *in positionem*. The particle *vel*, which precedes the word *dispositionem*, is lacking in codd. K (by a second hand) T ee; codd. H Y bb substituted *et* for it.

la: Cod. V et ed. 1 *Ad illud vero quod obiicitur*.

en: Cod. V and ed. 1 [read] *Ad illud vero quod obiicitur* ("But to that which is objected").

la: Cfr. supra d. 26. q. 5. praesertim ad 5. — Paulo superius pro *eiectio* edd. praeter 1 cum pluribus codd. *abiectio*.

en: Cfr. above d. 26. q. 5, especially ad 5. — A little above, for *eiectio* the editions except 1, with several codices, [read] *abiectio*.

la: Sive aliis verbis: cum *in minori* dicit. — Paulo ante post *dicendum, quod* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt *hoc*.

en: Or in other words: when it says it *in the minor*. — A little before, after *dicendum, quod*, the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 add *hoc*.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5, et infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. in fine. — Mox pro *attribuere* Vat. *attributa*, edd. 3, 4 *attribuere possunt*, cod. ee *attribui possunt*. Subinde pro *sonat* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. *sonant*.

en: See tom. I. p. 58, note 5, and below d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. at the end. — Presently for *attribuere* the Vatican [edition reads] *attributa*, edd. 3, 4 *attribuere possunt*, cod. ee *attribui possunt*. Thereupon for *sonat* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 and several codices [read] *sonant*.

la: Cod. F *quia*.

en: Cod. F [reads] *quia*.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 59454–59618), with the videtur args, the Sed-contra args, the Conclusio, the Respondeo (threefold distinction of *poena* as *actio* / *passio* / *defectus*, and the triple-passio analysis), the epilogue, and the Ad-obiecta replies, plus all page-footers, verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 854–856, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 876–878). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands. The cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Solutio + replies were re-set from the PDF (Vol II PDF-priority inversion); the videtur/Sed-contra running prose follows the OCR base with footnote-marker spacing.

**Alignment (coordinator-verified, PASSED).** This chunk = ARTICULUS III, QUAESTIO II only. Opener `Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis poena sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.` (raw 59457–59458, p. 854 L-col, with marginal *Ad oppositum*) matches ART III topic (2) `Utrum omnis poena sit a Deo` verbatim (cf. the folded ART III opener held at a3-q1: *Secundo … utrum omnis poena sit ab ipso*). This is the LAST quaestio of d.36; the chunk ENDS at `…a quo primo et principaliter imponuntur[^22].` (raw 59618, p. 856 R-col), immediately before the full-width `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header (raw 59619, bottom of p. 856).

**Reply numbering (verbatim).** The printed Ad-obiecta replies are numbered `1. 2.` (joint reply to the first two objections), `3.`, `4.`, `5.`, `6.` — preserved as printed. (The OCR garbles `5.` as `0.` at raw 59616; the PDF p. 856 L-col confirms `5.`) Likewise the Sed-contra arg 5 is OCR-garbled `0.` at raw 59513; PDF p. 855 L-col confirms `5.`

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 854–856.
- p. 854 (running head, OCR digit-mangled `854`/`SENTENTIARUM LIB. II`): q1 SCHOLION tail (L/R-col top, belongs to a3-q1) then full-width QUAESTIO II header; q2 videtur args 1–6 (L-col) + Sed contra 1–4 partial (R-col). Footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7] (received whole from a3-q1; no q1 footer on p. 854). Markers: [^1] arg 1 *Romanos duodecimo* (Vers.19); [^2] arg 2 *in littera* (Hic c.2 et 5); [^3] arg 3 *Romanos primo* (Vers.26, Glossa); [^4] arg 5 *Hugo* (de Sacram.); [^5] arg 6 *divina iustitia* (Anselm, Cur Deus homo); [^6] s.c.1 *Excaecatio … poena* (Vers.21, Lux in tenebris); [^7] s.c.2 *Lucae decimo* (Vers.30, Anselm de Casu diaboli + Vat. mutilation note).
- p. 855 (running head `DIST. XXXVI. ART. III. QUAEST. II. 855`): Sed contra 4 tail + 5 + 6 (L-col); CONCLUSIO; RESPONDEO + the threefold/triple-passio analysis + epilogue (L-col→R-col); Solutio oppositorum opens (reply 1.2) at R-col bottom. Footers 1–6 → [^8]–[^13]: [^8] s.c.4 *causa deficiens* (Civ. Dei XII c.8); [^9] s.c.6 *ostensum supra* (Art.1 q.1 + d.33); [^10] Respondeo *nocumentum ordinatum* (Isidor.); [^11] *Deo volente* (August. 83 Qq.); [^12] *ordinata simpliciter* (deest simpliciter); [^13] *trigesima secunda* (Cap.3 + Vat. omission).
- p. 856 (running head, OCR digit-mangled `836`/`SENTENTIARUM LIB. II`): Solutio oppositorum replies 1.2 tail, 3, 4, 5, 6 (L-col→R-col); then full-width DUBIA header + Dub. I body opens at the foot of L-col/foot of R-col. Footers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 → [^14]–[^22]: [^14] reply-1.2 *supra ostensum fuit* (Art.1 q.1); [^15] reply-3 *Glossa ibidem* (Super Rom. 1,24); [^16] reply-4 *positionem … vel dispositionem* (codd. var.); [^17] reply-5 *Quod vero obiicitur* (Cod.V); [^18] reply-5 *sicut visum est* (Cfr. d.26 q.5); [^19] reply-6 *cum assumit* (Sive aliis verbis); [^20] reply-6 *sophisma secundum accidens* (tom.I p.58 + d.37); [^21] reply-6 *vel quod* (Cod.F quia); [^22] reply-6 *principaliter imponuntur* (Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.). **p.856 footers 4 (`Edd. … omittunt ergo`) and 11 (`Vide supra pag. 592, nota 3`) belong to the DUBIA body that opens at the foot of p. 856 → forwarded to d36-dubia.**

**Hand-off received.** From d36-a3-q1: the entire p.854 footer block (7 footers) was forwarded here — a3-q1 claimed no p.854 footer (its body on p.854 was only the SCHOLION, which carries no markers). All 7 serve this q2's videtur/Sed-contra args and are rendered [^1]–[^7].

**Hand-off forwarded to d36-dubia.** The DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI opens at the foot of p. 856 (raw 59619), below/beside this q2's reply 6. Two p.856 footer notes belong to the Dub. I body, not to q2: footer **4** (`Edd. cum aliquot codd., ut F bb, omittunt ergo.`, anchored at Dub.I `ergo non est voluntaria causa`) and footer **11** (`Vide supra pag. 592, nota 3. — Subinde post talis autem est cod. Y subiicit sola.`). These are forwarded to d36-dubia as its opening apparatus.

**Scholion disposition (Override §5).** NONE here. `has_scholion: false`. The article-level scholion (item I treats *both* questions, flagging the threefold-punishment distinction as belonging to this q. 2; item II is headed *De utraque quaestione*) is held at a3-q1. This is the expected pattern, confirmed by footer [^22] (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) which explicitly points q2's reader back to q1's scholion.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 854–856 read top→bottom against the PDF. The p.854/855 seam (inside Sed contra arg 4, `…sed deficientem; | sed Deus nullius est causa deficiens` — continuous) and the p.855/856 seam (inside the joint reply 1.2, `…dicendum, quod illae | duae rationes non concludunt` — continuous) are grammatically continuous; no mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.854 footer block is fully accounted (all 7 → q2); the shared p.856 footer block is split by body anchor (q2 = 1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10; Dub.I = 4,11).

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 36, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXXVI)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXVI)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 856 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

**Dub. I.** In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur in primo capitulo, quod *peccatum est causa peccati.* Sed contra: aut peccatum est causa peccati *voluntaria*, aut *necessaria.* Non *voluntaria*, quia nihil voluntarie operatur, nisi quod cognoscit et appetit[^1]; talis autem est rationalis creatura, non culpa: ergo non est voluntaria causa. Item, non est causa *necessaria*,

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quia qui peccavit uno peccato, non est necesse, quod peccet altero[^2]: ergo non videtur, quod aliquo modo sit causa. — Item, si peccatum est causa peccati, aut ratione alicuius *boni substrati*, aut ratione *defectus.* Non ratione *boni substrati*, quia tunc magis deberet dici bonum esse causa mali, quam peccatum causa peccati. Non ratione *defectus*, quia quod nihil est nullius est causa; intentio enim causalitatis in solis entibus reperitur.

Propter quod est quaestio, quod peccatum sit *causa peccati*, et ratione *cuius* peccatum sit causa peccati.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum in peccato duo sint, videlicet *conversio* et *aversio*, ratione utriusque peccatum habet ad aliud peccatum disponere, et per hoc peccatum aliud dicitur causare. Ratione quidem *aversionis*, quia in hoc, quod a Deo avertit, elongat a bono, et per hoc homo efficitur impotens ad resistendum malo. Ratione *conversionis*, sicut actus unius virtutis disponit ad actum alterius[^3], utpote actus nutritivae ad generativam, sic una culpa habet disponere ad aliam, utpote gula ad luxuriam. Est igitur peccatum causa peccati, id est dispositio trahens sive inclinans ad aliud peccatum, tam ratione *aversionis* quam ratione *conversionis.* Sed ratione *aversionis*, in qua communicant omnia peccata, quodlibet est causa cuiuslibet; ratione vero *conversionis*, in qua distinguuntur, non *quodlibet* est causa *cuiuslibet*, sed peccatum *unius* generis disponit ad peccatum generis *proximi*, utpote spirituale ad spirituale, ut superbia ad invidiam, et carnale ad carnale, sicut gula ad luxuriam.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non est causa voluntaria nec necessaria; dicendum, quod peccatum non est *sufficiens* causa peccati; sed causa dicitur in hoc, quod trahit voluntatem, ut committat aliam[^4] culpam, et ita reducitur ad causam *voluntariam.*

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit causa ratione *positionis*, vel *defectus*; dico, quod ratione utriusque, sicut visum est[^5]. Conversio enim inordinata disponit ad aliam conversionem inordinatam. Ex conversione enim inordinata augetur in nobis concupiscentia et pronitas ad malum, et dum augetur pronitas et concupiscentia, quasi quoddam pondus ponitur in anima. «Quod enim est pondus in corporibus, hoc est amor in spiritibus[^6]». Et ideo bene dicit Gregorius, quod «peccatum, quod per poenitentiam non diluitur, mox pondere suo ad aliud trahit». Et ita nec defectus per se facit, nec bonum per se, sed unum cum alio. — Illud tamen argumentum non valet: quia *defectus non potest esse causa alicuius, ergo non potest esse causa peccati.* Causare enim peccatum non est causare aliquid, sed potius deficere. Unde est ibi sophisma *secundum quid* et *simpliciter*[^7].

**Dub. II.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Illico, ut peccat homo, fit in homine corruptio, quae tamen fit Deo auctore.* Sed contra hoc est, quia illa boni corruptio, sive *active* dicatur sive *passive*, est imaginis Dei deformatio. Deformatio autem imaginis Deo displicet; et nihil quod Deo displicet, est a Deo — «idem enim est fieri Deo auctore et Deo volente[^8]» — ergo talis corruptio non est a Deo. — Item, eadem sunt principia actionis et passionis: ergo si corruptio-actio non est a Deo, videtur similiter, quod nec corruptio-passio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod illud verbum non est dictum secundum opinionem Magistri, sed secundum opinionem aliorum, sicut patet ex ipsa serie litterae[^9]. Sed quia tamen illud idem videtur Magister dixisse in ultimo capitulo praecedentis distinctionis; aliter respondendum est, quod in illa corruptione et est considerare *defectum* et *deordinationem*; est nihilominus ibi considerare *passionem* et *ordinem* ad praecedentem actionem; et quantum ad haec duo ultima, corruptio ista tenet rationem *poenae*, et quantum ad hoc dicitur esse a Deo, videlicet in quantum poena. *Simpliciter* autem loquendo, ut dicatur corruptio *modi, speciei et ordinis* esse a Deo sive *deformatio imaginis*, non admittitur; sicut rationes ostendunt, propter hoc quod talis corruptio et *defectum* dicit et etiam *deordinationem*, quae est culpa, sicut supra[^10] est ostensum. Et est talis corruptio poena non *inflicta* nec *contracta*, sed *acta*; et ideo quodam modo tenet rationem culpae, sicut ostensum fuit in praecedenti distinctione[^11]. Et quantum ad hoc non intelligitur illud quod in littera dicitur. — Et per hoc patent ea quae in littera obiiciuntur.

**Dub. III.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si quis dicat, ea quae peccata sunt, essentialiter poenas esse, in nullo praeiudicium fit veritati.* Et postea subiungit,

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quod *huiusmodi punitiones iustae sunt et a Deo sunt, nec tamen*[^12] *peccata a Deo sunt.* Videtur enim esse implicatio contradictionis. Primo enim dicit, unum et idem, *essentialiter* loquendo, est poena et culpa; et post dicit, quod idem ipsum et *est a Deo* et *non est a Deo.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum est ad hoc, quod illud et consimilia intelligenda sunt *cum reduplicatione*, ut quando dicitur, quod aliquod peccatum est poena peccati, et quod poena illa est a Deo; hoc intelligitur, secundum quod poena, hoc est secundum rationem ordinationis. Et hoc innuit Magister in littera[^13], cum dicit, quod non *in quantum peccata sunt*, poenae sunt, nec *in quantum peccata sunt*, a Deo sunt, quasi dicat: cum in idem concurrant ratio *deordinationis* et *ordinationis* per relationem[^14] ad diversa, ordinatio est a Deo, deordinatio vero minime.

**Dub. IV.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *sunt quaedam necessitate facta improbanda.* Contrarium huius videtur dicere Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus[^15]. Dicit enim, quod illud solum est peccatum, a quo «liberum est abstinere».

Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod, sicut Magister determinat infra[^16], quaedam necessitas est ad venialia peccata, saltem in universali. Illa autem ratio et verbum, quod ibidem sequitur, intelligitur de peccato actuali mortali. Qualiter autem necessitas sit ad venialia, hoc habebit quaestionem infra suo loco, ubi Magister inquirit, distinctione quadragesima prima.

**Dub. V.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Addunt quoque, quosdam actus non tantum essentia, sed etiam genere esse bonos, ut reficere esurientem.* Quaeritur enim: pro quanto dicitur[^17] *bonum in genere*? Si quia dicit bonum absque circumstantia aliqua superaddita, tunc videtur, quod reficere indigentem non sit bonum in genere, quia est ibi circumstantia debita in eo qui reficitur. Si tu dicas, quod *bonum in genere* dicitur, quia commune est et universale: tunc videtur, quod similiter deberet dici *bonum in specie*, cum generale dicatur respectu speciei.

Est igitur quaestio, pro quanto dicatur aliquid esse *bonum in genere.* Quaestio est etiam de sufficientia ipsius divisionis per tria membra; videtur enim esse insufficiens, quia non tantum est *bonum in genere* et *bonum ex intentione et causa*, sed etiam *bonum gratiae* et *bonum gloriae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister dividit hic bonum non quocumque modo, sed bonum, prout est in actu. Bonum autem huiusmodi habet considerari *in se* sive *secundum se*; et sic est *bonum naturae.* Habet iterum considerari secundum *comparationem* ad materiam debitam; et sic dicitur *bonum in genere.* Habet iterum considerari secundum alia tria genera causarum, videlicet in comparatione ad *efficiens* et *formam* et *finem*; et sic est *bonum perfectum.*

Et sic patet sufficientia, quia omnis actus aut comparatur ad suum principium *efficiens* solum; aut comparatur ad suum principium *efficiens*, prout respicit debitum obiectum; aut comparatur ad suum principium *efficiens*, prout respicit debitum obiectum et finem congruum. Bonum autem, secundum quod respicit materiam debitam, dicitur esse *bonum in genere*, pro eo quod, sicut genus dicit esse in potentia ad esse completum, quae completur per adventum *differentiarum*[^18], sic in actu transeunte super materiam debitam quodam modo inchoatur bonum *moris*; illud autem bonum *moris* specificatur et completur per adventum circumstantiarum, unde potest fieri et bene et male. Similiter intelligendum est de malo in genere. — Quamvis autem bonum et malum possint differenter fieri et bene et male; nihilominus tamen bonum, quantum est de se, dicit inchoationem boni, et malum similiter mali; et ideo nomen boni tenet, quia in ipso salvatur ratio generis. Unde *bonum naturae* respectu *boni moris* est quasi in potentia *materiali*, quae est potentia passiva; *bonum* autem *in genere* aliquo modo est *bonum moris* ex hoc, quod transit supra materiam debitam: et ideo assimilatur potentiae generis, quae est aliquo modo activa. Genus enim est forma, ut dicit Philosophus[^19], licet per comparationem ad differentias in definitione, sit sicut materia.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam bonum ex circumstantia contineri potest sub *bono perfecto*, vel sub *bono in genere.* Si enim est indutum omnibus bonis circumstantiis, continetur sub *bono perfecto.* Si autem deficit in aliqua circumstantia,

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reducitur ad *bonum in genere.* Sub *bono* autem *perfecto* comprehenditur actus *gratuitus* et *gloriosus.*

Possent autem plura quaeri de hac materia, sed alibi magis habent locum quam hic[^20].

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which is said in the first chapter, that *sin is the cause of sin.* But on the contrary: sin is the cause of sin either as a *voluntary* cause, or as a *necessary* one. Not as *voluntary*, because nothing acts voluntarily except what it knows and desires[^1]; but such is the rational creature, not fault: therefore it is not a voluntary cause. Likewise, it is not a *necessary* cause,

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because he who has sinned by one sin, it is not necessary that he sin by another[^2]: therefore it does not seem that in any way it is a cause. — Likewise, if sin is the cause of sin, [it is so] either by reason of some *underlying good*, or by reason of *defect.* Not by reason of an *underlying good*, because then good ought rather to be called the cause of evil, than sin the cause of sin. Not by reason of *defect*, because what is nothing is the cause of nothing; for the intention of causality is found only in beings.

On account of which there is the question, whether sin be the *cause of sin*, and by reason of *what* sin is the cause of sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since in sin there are two things, namely *conversion* and *aversion*, by reason of each sin has it to dispose toward another sin, and through this one sin is said to cause another. By reason of *aversion*, indeed, because in this, that it turns away from God, it withdraws from good, and through this man is rendered powerless to resist evil. By reason of *conversion*, just as the act of one virtue disposes toward the act of another[^3], as the act of the nutritive [power disposes] toward the generative, so one fault has it to dispose toward another, as gluttony toward lust. Sin is therefore the cause of sin, that is, a disposition drawing or inclining toward another sin, both by reason of *aversion* and by reason of *conversion.* But by reason of *aversion*, in which all sins communicate, any is the cause of any; whereas by reason of *conversion*, in which they are distinguished, not *any* is the cause of *any*, but a sin of *one* genus disposes toward a sin of the *nearest* genus, as the spiritual toward the spiritual, as pride toward envy, and the carnal toward the carnal, as gluttony toward lust.

To that, then, which is objected, that it is neither a voluntary nor a necessary cause; it must be said that sin is not the *sufficient* cause of sin; but it is called a cause in this, that it draws the will to commit another[^4] fault, and thus it is reduced to a *voluntary* cause.

To that which is asked, whether it be a cause by reason of *position* or of *defect*; I say that [it is so] by reason of each, as has been seen[^5]. For inordinate conversion disposes toward another inordinate conversion. For from inordinate conversion concupiscence and the proneness to evil are increased in us, and while proneness and concupiscence are increased, a kind of weight is, as it were, placed in the soul. «For what weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits[^6]». And therefore Gregory well says that «the sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another». And thus neither does defect of itself effect [it], nor good of itself, but the one together with the other. — Yet that argument is not valid: namely, *defect cannot be the cause of anything, therefore it cannot be the cause of sin.* For to cause sin is not to cause something, but rather to be deficient. Hence there is here a sophism *in a certain respect* and *simply*[^7].

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *As soon as man sins, there arises in man a corruption, which nonetheless arises with God as author.* But against this is that this corruption of good, whether it be called *active* or *passive*, is a deformation of the image of God. But the deformation of the image displeases God; and nothing which displeases God is from God — «for it is the same to come to be with God as author and with God willing it[^8]» — therefore such a corruption is not from God. — Likewise, the principles of action and of passion are the same: therefore if the corruption-action is not from God, it seems likewise that neither [is] the corruption-passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that that word is not said according to the opinion of the Master, but according to the opinion of others, as is plain from the very course of the text[^9]. But because nevertheless the Master seems to have said the same thing in the last chapter of the preceding distinction; it must be answered otherwise, that in that corruption there is both to consider a *defect* and a *deordination*; there is nonetheless there to consider a *passion* and an *order* to the preceding action; and as to these two last, that corruption holds the formal character of *punishment*, and as to this it is said to be from God, namely insofar as it is punishment. But *simply* speaking, so that the corruption of *measure, species, and order* be said to be from God, or the *deformation of the image*, it is not admitted; as the reasons show, on account of this, that such a corruption both bespeaks a *defect* and also a *deordination*, which is fault, as was shown above[^10]. And such a corruption is a punishment not *inflicted* nor *contracted*, but *enacted*; and therefore in a certain manner it holds the formal character of fault, as was shown in the preceding distinction[^11]. And as to this, that which is said in the text is not understood [thus]. — And by this are made plain those things which are objected in the text.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *If anyone should say that those things which are sins are essentially punishments, in no way is prejudice done to the truth.* And afterward he subjoins,

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that *such chastisements are just and are from God, nor nevertheless*[^12] *are sins from God.* For it seems to be an implication of contradiction. For first he says that one and the same thing, speaking *essentially*, is punishment and fault; and afterward he says that the same very thing both *is from God* and *is not from God.*

**I respond:** It must be said to this, that this and like statements are to be understood *with reduplication*, as when it is said that some sin is the punishment of sin, and that that punishment is from God; this is understood according as it is punishment, that is, according to the formal character of ordination. And the Master intimates this in the text[^13], when he says that not *insofar as they are sins* are they punishments, nor *insofar as they are sins* are they from God, as if to say: since in the same thing there concur the account of *deordination* and of *ordination* through a relation[^14] to diverse things, the ordination is from God, but the deordination by no means.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *there are certain things to be reproved which are done by necessity.* The contrary of this Augustine seems to say in the book *On the Two Souls*[^15]. For he says that that alone is sin from which «it is free to abstain».

And it must be said to this, that, as the Master determines below[^16], there is a certain necessity for venial sins, at least in general. But that account and word which there follows is understood of actual mortal sin. But in what manner there is necessity for venial sins, this will have its question below in its own place, where the Master inquires, in the forty-first distinction.

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *They add also that certain acts are good not only in essence, but also in genus, as to refresh one who is hungry.* For it is asked: for how much is a thing called[^17] *good in genus*? If because he calls it good without any added circumstance, then it seems that to refresh one in need is not good in genus, because there is there a due circumstance in him who is refreshed. If you say that it is called *good in genus* because it is common and universal: then it seems that likewise it ought to be called *good in species*, since the general is said with respect to the species.

There is therefore a question, for how much something is said to be *good in genus.* There is also a question concerning the sufficiency of that division itself by three members; for it seems to be insufficient, because there is not only *good in genus* and *good from intention and cause*, but also *good of grace* and *good of glory.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here divides good not in any way whatever, but good insofar as it is in act. But good of this kind has to be considered *in itself* or *according to itself*; and thus it is the *good of nature.* It has again to be considered according to *comparison* to a due matter; and thus it is called *good in genus.* It has again to be considered according to the other three genera of causes, namely in comparison to the *efficient* and the *form* and the *end*; and thus it is *perfect good.*

And thus the sufficiency is plain, because every act either is compared to its *efficient* principle alone; or is compared to its *efficient* principle, insofar as it regards a due object; or is compared to its *efficient* principle, insofar as it regards a due object and a fitting end. But good, according as it regards a due matter, is said to be *good in genus*, for the reason that, just as genus bespeaks being in potency to a complete being, which is completed by the advent of *differences*[^18], so in an act passing over upon a due matter the good of *conduct* is in a certain manner begun; but that good of *conduct* is specified and completed by the advent of circumstances, whence it can be done both well and ill. Likewise is it to be understood of evil in genus. — But although good and evil can be done differently both well and ill; nevertheless good, as regards itself, bespeaks the inchoation of good, and evil likewise of evil; and therefore it holds the name of good, because in it the account of genus is preserved. Hence the *good of nature* with respect to the *good of conduct* is as it were in *material* potency, which is passive potency; but *good in genus* is in some manner the *good of conduct*, from this, that it passes over upon a due matter: and therefore it is likened to the potency of genus, which is in some manner active. For genus is form, as the Philosopher says[^19], although by comparison to the differences in the definition it is as matter.

And by this the answer to the objections is plain. For good from circumstance can be contained under *perfect good*, or under *good in genus.* For if it is clothed in all good circumstances, it is contained under *perfect good.* But if it is deficient in some circumstance,

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it is reduced to *good in genus.* But under *perfect good* is comprehended the *gratuitous* and *glorious* act.

But more could be asked concerning this matter, but elsewhere they have place more than here[^20].

---

la: Vide supra pag. 592, nota 3. — Subinde post *talis autem est* cod. V subiicit *sola.*

en: See above, p. 592, note 3. — Soon after, following *talis autem est* codex V subjoins *sola.*

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd., ut F bb, omittunt *ergo.*

en: The editions with several codices, such as F, bb, omit *ergo.*

la: Cod. T hic repetit *virtutis.*

en: Codex T here repeats *virtutis.*

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, paulo superius post *sed* omissa voce *causa*, hic loco *aliam* exhibent *aliquando.*

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, a little above, the word *causa* being omitted after *sed*, here in place of *aliam* present *aliquando.*

la: Cfr. etiam supra d. 35. a. 1. q. 1, praesertim ad 2.

en: Cf. also above, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, especially ad 2.

la: Secundum Augustinum. Vide supra pag. 76, nota 6. — Verbum Gregorii exhibetur XXV. Moral. c. 9. n. 22. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3. — Pro *spiritibus* Vat. *spiritualibus.*

en: According to Augustine. See above, p. 76, note 6. — The word of Gregory is given in the *Morals*, Bk. XXV, c. 9, n. 22. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1 and 3. — For *spiritibus* the Vatican edition [reads] *spiritualibus.*

la: De quo vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — De hoc dubio tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 9; S. Thom., hic a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

en: Concerning which see Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, Bk. I, c. 4 (c. 5). — On this doubt treat Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 94, m. 9; St. Thomas, here, a. 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 1; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 1.

la: August., 83 Qq. q. 3. Vide supra pag. 855, nota 4.

en: Augustine, *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 3. See above, p. 855, note 4.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

en: Article 3, q. 2.

la: Art. 1. q. 2, praecipue in solut. ad 4. — Cfr. Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Article 1, q. 2, especially in the solution ad 4. — Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: In littera Magistri additur *in quantum.*

en: In the text of the Master is added *in quantum.*

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4.

la: Codd. C F H I O R S T V W Z ce et edd. 2, 3, 4 *assertionem*, codd. X Y bb *comparationem*, ed. 1 *assumptionem*; in cod. T legitur: *per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa.* — Huius dubii solutio habetur etiam apud S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.

en: Codices C, F, H, I, O, R, S, T, V, W, Z, ce, and editions 2, 3, 4 [read] *assertionem*; codices X, Y, bb *comparationem*; edition 1 *assumptionem*; in codex T is read: *per assertionem, per assertionem ad diversa.* — The solution of this doubt is also had in St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 3.

en: Chapter 11, n. 15.

la: Dist. XLI. in fine. Vide ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. 1. De eadem re Magister iam locutus est in praecedente d. c. 6. — Mox edd. praeter 1 cum codd. O R ee et aliis: *ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali.*

en: Distinction XLI, at the end. See there the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1. The Master has already spoken of the same matter in the preceding distinction, c. 6. — Soon after, the editions except 1, with codices O, R, ee, and others: *ad peccata venialia, peccata saltem in universali.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, adiiciunt *esse.* Subinde pro *Si quia dicit* Vat. *Si dicitur quia.*

en: The editions, except 1, add *esse.* Soon after, for *Si quia dicit* the Vatican edition [reads] *Si dicitur quia.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.). — Paulo ante pro *genus dicit* Vat. *genus dicitur.* Subinde pro *in potentia* plures codd. *in potentiam*, alii *impotentiam.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12). — A little before, for *genus dicit* the Vatican edition [reads] *genus dicitur.* Soon after, for *in potentia* several codices [read] *in potentiam*, others *impotentiam.*

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. ult.; VII. Metaph. text. 43. et VIII. text. 6. (VI. c. 12. et VII. c. 2.). Averroes hos locos exponens docet, definitiones continere genera et differentias; genera esse formas universales, differentias autem formas proprias, genera determinantes.

en: *Physics*, Bk. II, last text; *Metaphysics*, Bk. VII, text 43, and Bk. VIII, text 6 (VI, c. 12, and VII, c. 2). Averroes, expounding these places, teaches that definitions contain genera and differences; that the genera are universal forms, but the differences proper forms, determining the genera.

la: Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro *habent locum* cod. cc et ed. 1 *habet locum.* In praecedentibus multi codd., ut F K T V Y bb ce etc., ter *sub bono perfecte* pro *sub bono perfecto*, sed contra contextum. — De hoc dubio scripserunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 96. per totam; B. Albert., hic a. 6. seq.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.

en: Cf. below, d. 41, a. 1, q. 1. — For *habent locum* codex cc and edition 1 [read] *habet locum.* In the preceding [text] many codices, such as F, K, T, V, Y, bb, ce, etc., three times [read] *sub bono perfecte* for *sub bono perfecto*, but against the context. — On this doubt have written Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 96, throughout; B. Albert, here, a. 6 ff.; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 3.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 856–859 = PDF 878–881, offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw 59619–59788). English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus drawn from the printed-page footers.

**Verified DUB count = 5 (I–V).** Read column-by-column at 450 dpi: the OCR's 5-dubium count was confirmed (no hidden column-interleave inflation, unlike d.34-dubia 2→4 and d.35-dubia 3→6). Topics: **Dub. I** — whether/how sin is the *cause* of sin (by *conversio*/*aversio*; not a sufficient cause); **Dub. II** — whether the corruption arising when man sins is from God (only *qua* punishment, not *qua* deformation of the image); **Dub. III** — the apparent contradiction in calling the same thing essentially punishment-and-fault yet both from God and not from God (resolved *cum reduplicatione*); **Dub. IV** — whether things done by necessity are reprovable (vs. Augustine, *de Duabus Animabus*); **Dub. V** — for how much something is called *bonum in genere*, and the sufficiency of the threefold division of good. This unit **CLOSES DISTINCTIO XXXVI** (9 units now Tier 2). The body ends mid-top of p.859 immediately before `DISTINCTIO XXXVII.`

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- p.859 (Dub. V closing two sentences): footer 1 → [^20].

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**[?] flags:** none. All five dubia bodies and all twenty apparatus entries read cleanly from the 450 dpi column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37

title_alt: Distinction XXXVII — The Text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVII.

#### Cap. I.

#### *Quod aliqui putant, malos actus nullo modo esse a Deo.*

Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter de peccato et de actu sentientes; asserunt enim, voluntatem malam et actum malum peccata esse et nulla ratione bona, nec secundum aliquam rationem ex Deo auctore esse, quia sine Deo fiunt. Sine eo namque, ut ait Evangelista, *factum est nihil,* id est peccatum, quod dicitur esse nihil, non quia non sit actio, vel voluntas mala, quae aliquid est, sed quia a vero esse separat homines et ad malum trahit, et sic ad *non-esse* deducit. « Qui enim a summi boni participatione recedunt, quod solum vere ac proprie *est,* merito *non esse* dicuntur[^1] ». Ideoque Augustinus dicit super Ioannem[^2], « peccatum nihil esse, nihilque fieri homines, cum peccant ». Hac igitur ratione astruunt, peccatum nihil esse, quia a *vero esse* hominem elongat; voluntatemque malam atque actionem, sive locutionem malam peccatum esse dicunt, quia praevaricatio et inobedientia haec sunt et contra legem Dei fiunt; quae tamen *sunt,* sed ab homine, vel a diabolo, non a Deo. Nullatenus enim haec a Deo esse dicunt, sive in quantum sunt, sive alio modo.

Illa quoque Augustini verba, quibus dicit[^3] omne quod est, in quantum est, bonum esse et Deum habere auctorem, de *natura* sive de *substantiis* tantum accipienda fore tradunt. *Substantiae* vero nomine atque *naturae* dicunt significari substantias ipsas, et ea quae naturaliter habent, scilicet, quae concreata sunt eis, sicut anima naturaliter habet intellectum et ingenium et voluntatem et huiusmodi; quod ex verbis Augustini praemissis colligitur, ubi *bonum*[^4] hominem appellat *bonam naturam,* et malum hominem *malam naturam.* — Secundum hanc ergo assertionem vel acceptionem mali actus non sunt naturae vel substantiae, nec etiam boni actus; quod utique videtur Augustinus innuere in libro primo Retractationum[^5], distinguens inter *substantias* sive naturas, et bonas *actiones* sive malas. Aperiens enim, quomodo intelligendum sit quiddam in libro de Vera Religione ab eo traditum, ait: « Hoc de *substantiis* atque naturis dictum est. Inde enim disputabatur, non de bonis *actionibus* atque peccatis ». — Aperte hic videtur dividere inter *naturas* sive substantias, et *actiones* sive peccata. Ideoque asserunt praefati doctores, actiones interiores vel exteriores non esse naturas vel substantias, quae, si malae sunt, peccata sunt neque a Deo sunt. Quod vero mali *actus* non sint *naturae,* Augustinus videtur notare in prima responsione contra Pelagianos[^6], ita dicens: « Opera diaboli, quae *vitia* dicuntur, *actus* sunt, non *res* ». Idem in quarta responsione: « Omne malum *natura* non est, sed *actus, accidens* alicui ex defectu boni. Quam ob rem quod *natura* non est Deus non fecit, quia natura est omne quod fecit ». Item: « Omne quod natura bonum est, Deus ex nihilo fecit, non diabolus ».

Ex quo colligitur, res aliquas esse, quae a Deo non sunt, eisque homines mali sunt. Quod nihilominus et ipsi concedunt, innitentes verbis Augustini superius positis, qui in Enchiridio[^7], determinans illa verba Prophetae: *Vae! his qui dicunt bonum malum,* dicit, « de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus hoc esse intelligendum ». Sunt ergo aliquae res, quibus homines mali sunt. Id autem, quo homo fit deterior, a Deo non est, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^8], « Deo auctore non fit homo deterior ». Non est igitur Deus auctor rerum, quibus homo deterior fit; at sunt aliquae res, ut dictum est, quibus homines mali fiunt: sunt igitur aliquae res, quae a Deo non sunt, quia peccata ipsae sunt. Ideoque Scriptura in pluribus contestatur locis[^9], Deum non esse auctorem malorum, id est eorum, quae peccata sunt.

#### Cap. II.

#### *Ex quo sensu dictum sit: Deus non est auctor mali.*

In hoc autem verbo superiorum sententiae recte opponitur, qui dicunt, Deum non esse auctorem eorum, quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, sed in quantum sunt; et in quantum mala sunt, dicunt, ea nihil esse. Quid igitur mirum, si Deus dicitur non esse auctor eorum, in quantum nihil sunt, cum nihil nullus auctor existere queat? Ideoque, cum dicitur Deus esse auctor omnium quae sunt, *bonorum* isti subintelligi volunt. *Bona* autem illa esse dicunt, quae *naturaliter* sunt; ea vero naturaliter esse dicunt, non solum quae substantiae sunt, vel concreata[^10] substantiis, qualiter supra acceperunt, sed et omnia quae naturam non privant bono. Et ita secundum eosdem multiplex in Scripturis fit intelligentia, ubi de natura sive substantia, vel de his quae naturaliter sunt, sermo occurrit. Sed super illum locum Psalmi: *Non est substantia,* ita Augustinus[^11] de *substantia* disseruit, ut praemissae sententiae videatur consentire, dicens: « *Substantia* intelligitur illud quod sumus, quidquid sumus, homo, pecus, terra, sol; omnia ista *substantiae* sunt, eo ipso quo sunt. Naturae ipsae substantiae dicuntur; nam quod nulla est substantia nihil omnino est: substantia ergo est *aliquid esse* ». « Deus fecit hominem substantiam, sed per iniquitatem lapsus est homo a substantia, in qua factus est; iniquitas quippe ipsa non est substantia. Non enim iniquitas est natura, quam formavit Deus, sed iniquitas est perversio, quam fecit homo ». « Naturae omnes per ipsum factae sunt; iniquitas per ipsum facta non est, quia iniquitas non est substantia. In illo hymno trium puerorum universa creatura laudans Deum commemoratur. Laudant enim omnia Deum, sed quae fecit Deus. Laudat ibi serpens Deum, sed non avaritia. Omnia reptilia ibi nominata sunt, sed non aliqua vitia. Vitia enim ex nobis et ex nostra voluntate habemus, et vitia non sunt substantia ». — Intendant diligenter his verbis praemissarum assertores sententiarum, et percipere poterunt rationem et causam dictorum, ubi Scriptura de *natura* vel *substantia* mentionem facit. — Illarum vero sententiarum iudicium prudentis lectoris, cui utriusque sententiae

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notitiam plenarie dedimus, arbitrio relinquimus, ad ea quae adhuc nobis supersunt tractanda festinantes.

Cum igitur in hoc omnes consentiant catholici tractatores, scilicet quod Deus non est auctor malorum; cavendum est tamen, ne *malorum* nomine *poenas,* sicut *peccata,* generaliter includas. Poenarum enim Deus auctor est, sicut ipse per Prophetam[^12] ait: *Non est malum in civitate, quod Dominus non fecerit.* Item alibi ex persona sua ait: *Ego sum Deus, creans malum et faciens bonum.* — Ecce hic dicitur creasse et fecisse malum; sed *mali* nomine poena intelligitur, non peccatum; sicut e converso, cum dicitur Deus non esse auctor malorum, nomine *mali* peccata intelliguntur. Ideoque Augustinus, qui dixerat in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^13], quod Deus auctor mali non sit, in primo libro Retractationum, quomodo id intelligendum sit, aperit dicens: « Videndum est, ne male intelligatur quod dixi: Deus auctor mali non est, qui et omnium quae sunt auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona sunt; et ne hinc putetur, non ab illo esse poenam malorum, quae utique malum est his qui puniuntur. Sed hoc ita dixi, sicut dictum est: *Deus mortem non fecit,* cum alibi scriptum sit: *Mors et vita a Domino est.* Malorum ergo poena, quae a Deo est, malum est quidem malis, sed in bonis Dei operibus est, quoniam iustum est, ut mali puniantur; et utique bonum est omne quod iustum est ». — Sic ergo dicitur Deus non fecisse mortem, quia non fecit illud, pro quo mors infligitur, id est peccatum. Audisti, lector, causam dictorum, ex qua sana intelligentia firmatur[^14], cum dicitur: *Deus non est auctor mali,* et: *Deus mortem non fecit.*

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVII.

#### Chapter I.

#### *That certain men hold that evil acts are in no way from God.*

But there are also very many others, who think far otherwise concerning sin and concerning the act; for they assert that the evil will and the evil act are sins and in no respect good, nor are from God as author according to any account, because they come to be without God. For without Him, as the Evangelist says, *was made nothing,* that is, sin, which is said to be nothing, not because it is not an action, or an evil will, which is something, but because it separates men from true being and draws them toward evil, and thus leads them to *non-being.* "For those who recede from participation in the highest good, which alone truly and properly *is,* are deservedly said *not to be*[^1]." And therefore Augustine says, on John[^2], that "sin is nothing, and that men become nothing when they sin." By this reasoning, therefore, they maintain that sin is nothing, because it estranges man from *true being;* and they say that the evil will and the action, or evil speech, is sin, because these are transgression and disobedience and come to be against the law of God; which nevertheless *are,* but from man, or from the devil, not from God. For in no way do they say that these are from God, whether insofar as they are, or in any other way.

Those words also of Augustine, by which he says[^3] that everything that is, insofar as it is, is good and has God as author, they hand down as to be taken only of *nature* or of *substances.* And by the name of *substance* and of *nature* they say that there are signified the substances themselves, and the things which they have naturally, namely those which are con-created with them, as the soul naturally has intellect and natural disposition and will and the like; which is gathered from the words of Augustine premised above, where he calls a *good*[^4] man a *good nature,* and an evil man an *evil nature.* — According to this assertion, therefore, or acceptation, evil acts are not natures or substances, nor are good acts either; which indeed Augustine seems to suggest in the first book of Retractations[^5], distinguishing between *substances* or natures, and good *actions* or evil ones. For in disclosing how a certain thing handed down by him in the book On True Religion is to be understood, he says: "This was said of *substances* and natures. For it was being disputed thence, not of good *actions* and sins." — Here he plainly seems to divide between *natures* or substances, and *actions* or sins. And therefore the aforesaid doctors assert that actions interior or exterior are not natures or substances, which, if they are evil, are sins and are not from God. But that evil *acts* are not *natures,* Augustine seems to note in the first response against the Pelagians[^6], saying thus: "The works of the devil, which are called *vices,* are *acts,* not *things.*" The same one in the fourth response: "Every evil is not *nature,* but an *act, accidental* to something from a defect of good. Wherefore what is not *nature* God did not make, because nature is everything that He made." Likewise: "Everything that is by nature good, God made out of nothing, not the devil."

From which it is gathered that there are certain things which are not from God, and by which men are evil. Which nevertheless they themselves also concede, relying on the words of Augustine set down above, who in the Enchiridion[^7], in determining those words of the Prophet, *Woe to those who call good evil,* says that "this is to be understood of the very things by which men are evil, not of the men." There are, therefore, certain things by which men are evil. But that by which a man becomes worse is not from God, because, as Augustine says in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^8], "with God as author a man does not become worse." God, therefore, is not the author of the things by which a man becomes worse; but there are certain things, as has been said, by which men become evil: there are, therefore, certain things which are not from God, because they themselves are sins. And therefore Scripture testifies in many places[^9] that God is not the author of evils, that is, of those things which are sins.

#### Chapter II.

#### *In what sense it is said: God is not the author of evil.*

But to this saying of the opinion of the foregoing there are rightly opposed those who say that God is not the author of the things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, but insofar as they are; and insofar as they are evil, they say that they are nothing. What wonder, therefore, if God is said not to be the author of them, insofar as they are nothing, since no one can exist as the author of nothing? And therefore, when God is said to be the author of all things which are, these men wish *good things* to be understood. And they say that those things are *good* which *naturally* are; but those things they say to be naturally, not only those which are substances, or con-created[^10] with substances, in the way they took it above, but also all things which do not deprive nature of good. And so according to the same men there comes to be a manifold understanding in the Scriptures, where there occurs speech concerning nature or substance, or concerning those things which naturally are. But on that passage of the Psalm: *There is no substance,* Augustine[^11] thus discoursed concerning *substance,* so that he seems to consent to the aforesaid opinion, saying: "*Substance* is understood to be that which we are, whatever we are, man, beast, earth, sun; all these are *substances,* by the very fact that they are. The natures themselves are called substances; for what is no substance is nothing at all: substance therefore is *to be something.*" "God made man a substance, but through iniquity man fell away from the substance in which he was made; for iniquity itself is not a substance. For iniquity is not a nature, which God formed, but iniquity is a perversion, which man made." "All natures were made through Him; iniquity was not made through Him, because iniquity is not a substance. In that hymn of the three boys every creature praising God is commemorated. For all things praise God, but the things which God made. The serpent there praises God, but not avarice. All creeping things are there named, but not any vices. For vices we have from ourselves and from our own will, and vices are not a substance." — Let the asserters of the aforesaid opinions attend diligently to these words, and they will be able to perceive the reason and the cause of the things said, where Scripture makes mention of *nature* or *substance.* — But the judgment of those opinions we leave to the discretion of the prudent reader, to whom

<!-- page 860 -->

we have fully given the knowledge of each opinion, hastening on to those things which still remain to us to be treated.

Since, therefore, in this all the catholic treaters agree, namely that God is not the author of evils; yet it must be guarded against, lest under the name of *evils* you generally include *penalties,* as you do *sins.* For of penalties God is the author, as He Himself says through the Prophet[^12]: *There is no evil in the city, which the Lord has not done.* Likewise elsewhere He says in His own person: *I am God, creating evil and making good.* — Behold, here He is said to have created and made evil; but by the name of *evil* a penalty is understood, not sin; just as, conversely, when God is said not to be the author of evils, by the name of *evil* sins are understood. And therefore Augustine, who had said in the book of the Eighty-three Questions[^13] that God is not the author of evil, in the first book of Retractations discloses how this is to be understood, saying: "It must be seen that what I said be not ill understood: God is not the author of evil, who is also the author of all things which are, because insofar as they are, so far they are good; and lest from this it be thought that the penalty of the wicked is not from Him, which assuredly is an evil to those who are punished. But I said this thus, as it is said: *God did not make death,* although it is written elsewhere: *Death and life are from the Lord.* The penalty therefore of the wicked, which is from God, is indeed an evil to the evil, but it is among the good works of God, since it is just that the evil be punished; and assuredly everything that is just is good." — Thus, therefore, God is said not to have made death, because He did not make that on account of which death is inflicted, that is, sin. You have heard, reader, the cause of the things said, from which a sound understanding is confirmed[^14], when it is said: *God is not the author of evil,* and: *God did not make death.*

---

la: Gregor., XIV. Moral. c. 18. 22. Superius respicitur Ioann. 1, 3.

en: Gregory, Morals XIV, c. 18, 22. Above, reference is made to John 1, 3.

la: Tract. I. n. 13.

en: Tractate I, n. 13.

la: Vide d. XXXV. c. 3.

en: See Distinction XXXV, c. 3.

la: Dist. XXXIV. c. 4. Immediate post solummodo codd. omittunt hic *bonum,* et iterum *bonam.*

en: Distinction XXXIV, c. 4. Immediately after, only the codices here omit *good,* and again *good [nature].*

la: Cap. 13. n. 8, ubi agitur de loco ex libro de Vera Relig. c. 41. n. 78.

en: Chapter 13, n. 8, where the passage from the book On True Religion, c. 41, n. 78, is treated.

la: Libr. I. Hypognost. c. 5. n. 7. Seq. locus ibid. IV. c. 1. n. 1; tertius ibid. paulo superius.

en: Hypognosticon, Book I, c. 5, n. 7. The following passage is ibid. IV, c. 1, n. 1; the third ibid. a little above.

la: Cap. 19. n. 6, ubi respicitur Isai. 5, 20. Vide d. XXXIV. c. 5.

en: Chapter 19, n. 6, where reference is made to Isaiah 5, 20. See Distinction XXXIV, c. 5.

la: Quaest. 3.

en: Question 3.

en: Cf. Deuteronomy 32, 4; Isaiah 33, 9.

la: Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 *concreta.*

en: The codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 read *concreated.*

la: Enarrat. serm. 1. n. 5. super Ps. 68, 3, ubi etiam seqq. loci. Hymnus trium puerorum est Dan. 3, 24. seqq.

en: Commentary, sermon 1, n. 5, on Psalm 68, 3, where also the following passages occur. The hymn of the three boys is Daniel 3, 24 ff.

la: Amos 3, 6; seq. locus Isai. 45, 6. 7. Vulgata: *Ego Dominus, et non est alter, formans lucem et creans tenebras, faciens pacem et creans malum.*

en: Amos 3, 6; the following passage is Isaiah 45, 6, 7. The Vulgate: *I am the Lord, and there is none other, forming the light and creating the darkness, making peace and creating evil.*

la: Quaest. 21; alius locus est I. Retract. c. 26. Duo loci Scripturae sunt Sap. 1, 13, et Eccli. 11, 14.

en: Question 21; the other passage is Retractations I, c. 26. The two scriptural passages are Wisdom 1, 13, and Ecclesiasticus 11, 14.

la: Ed. 1 *formatur.*

en: Edition 1 reads *is formed.* ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 859–860 = PDF 881–882, offset `pdf = printed + 22`) authoritative wherever the two-column IA djvu OCR (raw 59789–59903) was cascade-fragmented, reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXXVII (on the opinion that evil will and evil act are sins, in no way from God; and the sense in which it is said that God is not the author of evil — evil under the name of sin, as distinct from penalty/death, of which God is author). The littera opens with the `DISTINCTIO XXXVII.` header at the top of the p.859 L-col (after the close of the d.36 COMMENTARIUS at the top of the prior L-col), and closes mid-page on p.860 with "…et: *Deus mortem non fecit.*", immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII.` (raw 59904, OCR `DISTmCTIONEM`) / `Utrum actio malitiae substrata sit a Deo` / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`, which is the `d37-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (2), order verified at 450 dpi.** Cap. I *Quod aliqui putant, malos actus nullo modo esse a Deo*; Cap. II *Ex quo sensu dictum sit: Deus non est auctor mali*. Both present and in printed reading order (L-column-then-R-column per page). There is no closing Epilogus. The editorial margin labels (*Opinio alia de actione mala*, *Gregorius*, *Augustinus*, *Confirmant opinionem suam*, *Dubium 1/2/3/4*, *Inde concludunt*, *Opponitur isti opinioni*, *Removetur dubitatio quaedam*, *Commonitio*) are Quaracchi cross-reference marginalia, not Lombard's text, and are omitted per the Vol II littera convention.

**Page-split map.** Reading order is Left column top→bottom, then Right column top→bottom, per printed page. **p.859:** L-col = DISTINCTIO XXXVII header + Cap. I title + Cap. I body (*Sunt autem et alii plurimi… libro primo Retractationum, distinguens inter substan-*); R-col = Cap. I tail (*-tias sive naturas… Deum non esse auctorem malorum, id est eorum, quae peccata sunt*) + Cap. II title + Cap. II opener (*In hoc autem verbo superiorum sententiae… cum nihil nullus auctor existere queat? Ideoque, cum dicitur Deus esse auctor omnium quae sunt, bonorum isti subintelligi*). **p.860:** L-col = Cap. II continued (*volunt. Bona autem illa esse dicunt… Illarum vero sententiarum iudicium prudentis lectoris, cui utriusque sententiae*) [the COMMENTARIUS / divisio body also begins lower on this L-col — NOT claimed here]; R-col = Cap. II tail (*notitiam plenarie dedimus… et: Deus mortem non fecit*), then the COMMENTARIUS header / divisio body begins (NOT claimed here). Body seams across page/column breaks all grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified): 859 L→R (Cap. I "…distinguens inter substan‖tias sive naturas"); 859 R→860 L (Cap. II "…bonorum isti subintelligi ‖ volunt. Bona autem illa esse dicunt"); 860 L→R (Cap. II "…cui utriusque sententiae ‖ notitiam plenarie dedimus").

**Apparatus split map (14 printed NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footer entries → 14 sequential markers; footer numbering restarts per printed page, so body superscripts and footer numbers both reset 1 at each page top). p.859** (9 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers — L-col band f1–f2 below the "NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM" header + R-col band f3–f9; body-marker order 1→9): f1→[^1] (Gregor. XIV Moral. c.18.22, Ioann. 1,3) at Cap. I *merito non esse dicuntur*; f2→[^2] (Tract. I. n.13) at Cap. I *super Ioannem*; f3→[^3] (Vide d. XXXV. c.3) at Cap. I *quibus dicit*; f4→[^4] (Dist. XXXIV. c.4, codd. omittunt bonum/bonam) at Cap. I *ubi bonum hominem appellat*; f5→[^5] (Cap. 13 n.8, de Vera Relig. c.41 n.78) at Cap. I *in libro primo Retractationum*; f6→[^6] (Libr. I. Hypognost. c.5 n.7) at Cap. I *in prima responsione contra Pelagianos*; f7→[^7] (Cap. 19 n.6, Isai. 5,20; d. XXXIV c.5) at Cap. I *qui in Enchiridio*; f8→[^8] (Quaest. 3) at Cap. I *in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum*; f9→[^9] (Cfr. Deut. 32,4; Isai. 33,9) at Cap. I *contestatur locis*. The first L-col footer block (unheaded, *Cfr. infra d. 41 a.1 q.1 — Pro habent locum…*) belongs to the d.36 COMMENTARIUS notes (NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM continued), NOT to this littera, and is claimed by `d36-divisio`. **p.860** (5 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers — L-col band f1–f3 + R-col band f4–f5; body-marker order 1→5): f1→[^10] (Codd. et edd. 1,2,3,7,8 *concreta*) at Cap. II *vel concreata substantiis*; f2→[^11] (Enarrat. serm.1 n.5 super Ps.68,3; Hymnus trium puerorum Dan.3,24) at Cap. II *ita Augustinus de substantia disseruit*; f3→[^12] (Amos 3,6; Isai. 45,6.7 Vulgata) at Cap. II *ipse per Prophetam ait*; f4→[^13] (Quaest. 21; I. Retract. c.26; Sap. 1,13; Eccli. 11,14) at Cap. II *in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum*; f5→[^14] (Ed. 1 *formatur*) at Cap. II *sana intelligentia firmatur*. The p.860 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM block (`¹ Dist. XXXV. c.1. seqq.`) belongs to `d37-divisio`, not this littera. Total = 9 + 5 = 14 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers → 14 sequential markers ([^1]–[^14]); one-to-one, no folded or duplicated entries.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: nothing — DISTINCTIO XXXVII opens fresh at the top of the p.859 L-col with its own NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footer block; `d36-dubia` (the last d.36 unit) closed cleanly and the d.36 COMMENTARIUS/divisio ended at the top of the p.859 L-col, forwarding nothing to this littera. FORWARDED: nothing to `d37-divisio` — the littera closes mid-page on p.860 R-col before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII.` (raw 59904). The p.860 COMMENTARIUS body (title *Utrum actio malitiae substrata sit a Deo*, lemma *Sunt autem et alii plurimi, longe aliter de peccato etc.*, DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) and its NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM footer (`Dist. XXXV. c.1`) all belong to `d37-divisio`. NOTE: every p.859 and p.860 NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footer anchors within this littera's Cap. I–II body, so all 14 are claimed here; no littera footer carries over to the divisio, and no divisio footer is owed back.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. actionibiis→actionibus, fiunt/flunt→fiunt, Nullatenus retained, Pelagianos retained, Enchiridio retained, conci'eata→concreata, perversio retained, avaritia retained, infligitur retained). The OCR running-head digits (859/860) are clean; offset pdf=printed+22 confirmed against running-head text (`DISTINCTIO XXXVII. 859`, `860 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`).