title: Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 373 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus in omni oratione sua fuerit exauditus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud quod dicitur Ioannis undecimo[^p373-1]: *Ego autem sciebam, quoniam semper audis me*; sed illud audire non est aliud quam exaudire: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^p373-2]: *Desiderium animae eius tribuisti ei, et voluntate labiorum eius non fraudasti eum*; Glossa: « *Voluntate labiorum*, id est verborum eius, hoc est per verba prolata, non fraudasti eum; quidquid enim dixit, factum est »: ergo etc.

3. Item, Christus magis dignus est exaudiri quam membra eius, petentia in nomine eius; sed Ioannis decimo quarto[^p373-3] dicitur: *Quidquid petieritis Patrem in nomine meo, dabit vobis*: ergo multo fortius, quidquid ipse petiit, obtinuit.

4. Item, voluntas Christi fuit divinae voluntati conformis, ergo nihil desideravit et petiit, nisi quod Deus voluit; sed omne quod Deus voluit, fecit[^p373-4] et facit: ergo omne quod Christus petiit, impetravit.

5. Item, quod Christus petiit, petiit pie, perseveranter et ad salutem, nec habuit in aliquo remorsum conscientiae; sed quicumque petit sic, impetrat quod petit[^p373-5]: ergo omne quod Christus petiit, obtinuit.

**Sed contra:**
1. In Psalmo[^p373-6] dicitur de Christo: *Deus meus, clamabo per diem, et non exaudies*: ergo non exaudivit ipsum in eo quod clamavit: non ergo exaudivit ipsum in omni eo, quod petiit.

2. Item, in littera[^p373-7] dicitur: « Christus clamans non exauditur ad salutem corporalem; bonum quidem petiit, scilicet ut non moreretur; sed melius erat, ut moreretur »: ergo Christus non fuit in omni eo, quod petiit, exauditus.

3. Item, Christus petiit et oravit, ut calix transiret ab eo[^p373-8]; sed calix non transiit ab eo: ergo non in omni eo, quod petiit, fuit exauditus.

4. Item, Christus oravit pro suis crucifixoribus[^p373-9]; nec tamen omnes salvati fuerunt: ergo non fuit exauditus in omnibus.

5. Item, Christus oravit pro discipulis suis, ut servarentur a malo, secundum quod dicitur Ioannis decimo septimo[^p373-10]: *Non tantum pro eis, sed etiam pro eis qui credituri sunt* etc.; sed non omnes fuerunt servati a malo: ergo non in omnibus quae petiit, exauditus fuit.

### Conclusio.

> Christus exauditus fuit in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate rationis sive absoluta, non vero in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate pietatis vel carnis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum oratio sit petitio procedens ex voluntate et desiderio[^p373-11]; secundum quod voluntas humana fuit in Christo secundum triplicem differentiam, sic et oratio. Nam quaedam oratio fuit exprimens sive procedens a voluntate rationis, quaedam a voluntate pietatis, quaedam a voluntate carnis. — Oratio procedens a voluntate rationis procedebat a voluntate, quae quidem requirebat exaudiri; et talis oratio in omnibus est exaudita, tum propter hoc, quod ista voluntas erat per omnia conformis voluntati divinae; tum etiam, quia adeo petebat digne et sancte, quod in omnibus erat exaudienda pro sua reverentia[^p373-12] et dignitate. — Oratio autem procedens a voluntate pietatis et voluntate carnis non fuit in Christo exaudita per omnia, tum quia hac voluntate non conformabatur Deo in omni volito, sicut habitum est prius[^p373-13]; tum etiam, quia illa petitio plus ordinabatur ad nostram instru<!-- page 374 -->ctionem quam ad divinam exauditionem. Magis enim petebat hac voluntate, ut nos erudiret, quam ut Deum ad suam petitionem inclinaret.

Ex his patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad rationes ad utramque partem. Concedendum est enim, quod Christus exauditus fuit in omni petitione, qua petiit[^p374-1], ut exaudiretur, hoc est in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate rationis sive voluntate absoluta. Unde rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, verum concludunt. Concedendum est nihilominus, quod non in omni eo, quod petiit voluntate carnis vel pietatis, fuit exauditus, sicut rationes ad secundam partem inductae ostendunt. Non enim petebat, ut exaudiretur, sed ut nos erudiremur; sicut petiit, calicem a se transferri, et suis crucifixoribus condonari, unum[^p374-2] ex voluntate carnis ad ostensionem naturae assumtae, alterum ex voluntate pietatis ad ostensionem benignitatis et misericordiae.

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de auctoritate Psalmi, dicendum, quod hoc dicitur de capite ratione membrorum, sicut Glossa ibidem[^p374-3] exponit; et multa consimilia reperiri consueverunt in Scriptura.

*Ad 3. 4. 5.* Ad tres rationes sequentes patet responsio per iam dicta, quia non ferunt instantiam pro quacumque oratione Christi, sed pro ea solum, quae procedebat ex voluntate carnis vel pietatis, sicut patet aspicienti.

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ in all his prayer was heard.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ in all his prayer was heard. And that he was, it seems:

1. From what is said in John, chapter eleven[^p373-1]: *But I knew that thou hearest me always*; but that hearing is nothing other than being heard: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, upon that of the Psalm[^p373-2]: *Thou hast given him his soul's desire, and hast not defrauded him of the will of his lips*; the Gloss: « *Of the will of his lips*, that is, of his words, that is, through words uttered, thou hast not defrauded him; for whatever he said was done »: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Christ is more worthy to be heard than his members, who ask in his name; but in John, chapter fourteen[^p373-3], it is said: *Whatsoever you shall ask the Father in my name, he will give you*: therefore much more strongly, whatever he himself asked, he obtained.

4. Likewise, Christ's will was conformed to the divine will, therefore he desired and asked nothing except what God willed; but everything that God willed, he did[^p373-4] and does: therefore everything that Christ asked, he obtained.

5. Likewise, what Christ asked, he asked piously, perseveringly, and unto salvation, nor did he have in anything a remorse of conscience; but whoever asks thus, obtains what he asks[^p373-5]: therefore everything that Christ asked, he obtained.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the Psalm[^p373-6] it is said of Christ: *My God, I shall cry by day, and thou wilt not hear*: therefore he did not hear him in that which he cried out: therefore he did not hear him in everything that he asked.

2. Likewise, in the text[^p373-7] it is said: « Christ crying out is not heard unto bodily salvation; he asked indeed a good thing, namely that he might not die; but it was better that he should die »: therefore Christ was not heard in everything that he asked.

3. Likewise, Christ asked and prayed that the cup might pass from him[^p373-8]; but the cup did not pass from him: therefore he was not heard in everything that he asked.

4. Likewise, Christ prayed for those who crucified him[^p373-9]; yet not all were saved: therefore he was not heard in all things.

5. Likewise, Christ prayed for his disciples, that they might be kept from evil, according to what is said in John, chapter seventeen[^p373-10]: *Not for them only, but for them also who through their word shall believe* etc.; but not all were kept from evil: therefore he was not heard in all the things that he asked.

### Conclusion.

> Christ was heard in everything that he asked by the will of reason, or absolute will, but not in everything that he asked by the will of piety or of the flesh.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since prayer is a petition proceeding from will and desire[^p373-11], according as the human will was in Christ under a threefold difference, so too was prayer. For one prayer was expressing or proceeding from the will of reason, another from the will of piety, another from the will of the flesh. — The prayer proceeding from the will of reason proceeded from a will which indeed required to be heard; and such prayer is heard in all things, both because that will was in all respects conformed to the divine will, and also because he asked so worthily and holily that in all things it had to be heard on account of his reverence[^p373-12] and dignity. — But the prayer proceeding from the will of piety and the will of the flesh was not heard in Christ through all things, both because by this will he was not conformed to God in every thing willed, as was held before[^p373-13]; and also because that petition was ordered more to our instruction than to the divine hearing. For by this will he asked more that he might instruct us than that he might incline God to his petition.

From these things the response to the proposed question and to the reasons on either side is clear. For it must be granted that Christ was heard in every petition by which he asked[^p374-1] to be heard, that is, in everything that he asked by the will of reason or absolute will. Hence the reasons which are adduced for the first part conclude truly. It must nonetheless be granted that he was not heard in everything that he asked by the will of the flesh or of piety, as the reasons adduced for the second part show. For he did not ask that he might be heard, but that we might be instructed; as he asked that the cup be removed from him, and that his crucifiers be forgiven, the one[^p374-2] from the will of the flesh for the showing of the assumed nature, the other from the will of piety for the showing of kindness and mercy.

*To 1 and 2.* As to what is objected from the authority of the Psalm, it must be said that this is said of the head by reason of the members, as the Gloss in the same place[^p374-3] explains; and many similar things are wont to be found in Scripture.

*To 3, 4, 5.* To the three following reasons the response is clear from what has already been said, because they do not bring an instance against any prayer whatever of Christ, but only against that which proceeded from the will of the flesh or of piety, as is clear to one who looks.

la: Vers. 42.

en: Verse 42.

la: Psalm. 20, 3. — Glossa, quae apud Petr. Lombard. nec non apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis, est secundum Cassiodorum.

en: Psalm 20:3. — The Gloss, which in Peter Lombard and likewise in Lyranus is given as interlinear, is according to Cassiodorus.

la: Vers. 13. — In fine arg. pro *obtinuit* cod. K *impetravit*.

en: Verse 13. — At the end of the argument, for *obtinuit* codex K [reads] *impetravit*.

la: Psalm. 134, 6: Omnia quaecumque voluit Dominus fecit etc.

en: Psalm 134:6: All whatsoever the Lord willed he did, etc.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 104, nota 9, et Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 5. c. 5. q. 3. — Post *Item* codd. F bb (aa a secunda manu) omittunt *quod*, et subinde edd. 1, 2 cum codd. F aa et non paucis aliis supprimunt semel *petiit*. In fine arg. pro *obtinuit* codd. A (K primitus) X substituunt *impetravit*.

en: Cf. above p. 104, note 9, and William of Auxerre, Summa p. III. tr. 5. c. 5. q. 3. — After *Item* codices F bb (aa by a second hand) omit *quod*, and accordingly editions 1, 2 together with codex F aa and not a few others suppress *petiit* once. At the end of the argument, for *obtinuit* codices A (K originally) X substitute *impetravit*.

en: Psalm 21:3.

la: Hic c. 2. in fine.

en: Here, chapter 2, at the end.

la: Matth. 26, 39. — In minori plurimi codd. omittunt *ab eo*.

en: Matthew 26:39. — In the lesser [text] very many codices omit *ab eo* [from him].

la: Vers. 20. — Vat. cum paucis codd. post *Non tantum pro eis* supplet *rogo*, quod et in Vulgata habetur.

en: Verse 20. — The Vatican edition, with a few codices, after *Non tantum pro eis* supplies *rogo* [I pray], which is also found in the Vulgate.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 371, nota 6. — De triplici voluntate vide supra a. 1. q. 3. in corp. — Cod. F *ex voluntatis desiderio*.

en: Cf. above p. 371, note 6. — On the threefold will see above a. 1. q. 3. in the body. — Codex F [reads] *ex voluntatis desiderio*.

la: Hebr. 5, 7. — Pro *exaudienda*, quae scriptura est codd. A F (N U a secunda manu) X bb, alii codd. et edd. *exaudita*.

en: Hebrews 5:7. — For *exaudienda*, which is the reading of codices A F (N U by a second hand) X bb, other codices and editions [read] *exaudita*.

la: Art. 1. q. 3. — De secunda ratione vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine et c. 3. in fine. — Mox pro *ordinabatur*, quam lectionem ex codd. A K M (N a secunda manu) O U bb restituimus, alii codd. nec non edd. *ordinatur*.

en: Article 1, q. 3. — On the second reason see here the text of the Master, c. 2 at the end and c. 3 at the end. — Presently for *ordinabatur*, which reading we have restored from codices A K M (N by a second hand) O U bb, other codices and also the editions [read] *ordinatur*.

la: Non pauci codd. *quam petiit*; cod. A *in omni quod petiit*.

en: Not a few codices [read] *quam petiit*; codex A [reads] *in omni quod petiit*.

la: Pro *unum* cod. S *unde hoc fuit*.

en: For *unum* codex S [reads] *unde hoc fuit*.

la: His verbis a Petro Lombardo relatis: Dixit enim: *Pacem meam relinquo vobis* (Ioan. 14, 27.); et factum est. Verbum quoque eius impletum est, fugando daemones, sanando infirmos; praedicatio eius quoque recepta est.

en: In these words reported by Peter Lombard: For he said: *My peace I leave with you* (John 14:27); and it was done. His word too was fulfilled, by driving out demons, by healing the sick; his preaching too was received.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Omnes concorditer docent, hanc quaestionem cum distinctione esse solvendam, quod scilicet, si consideratur materia petita, non omnis oratio Christi fuit exaudita, quia nec ipsa voluntatis intentio hanc exauditionem volebat; sed si loquimur de fine intento, sine dubio omnis eius oratio fuit exaudita. — Quoad solutionem 3. obiecti, scilicet quoad petitionem de translatione calicis, variae sunt expositiones. Opinio Hilarii refertur hic dub. 4; aliorum Sanctorum verba vide apud S. Thom. (S. III. q. 21. a. 4. ad 1.). De hac (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 16. m. 2. — Scot., Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 4; S. art. cit. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4.

**II.** Eandem solutionem sequentis (3.) quaestionis aliis verbis exhibet S. Thom. in Comment. (loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3.), scilicet quod illa oratio non fuerit a sensualitate ut principio eliciente actum orationis, sed ut obiecto movente rationem ad proponendum. Cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. I. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 7. — S. Thom., Sum. loc. cit. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** All teach concordantly that this question is to be resolved with a distinction, namely that, if the matter asked is considered, not every prayer of Christ was heard, because not even the intention of the will itself willed this hearing; but if we speak of the end intended, without doubt every prayer of his was heard. — As to the solution of the third objection, namely as to the petition concerning the removal of the cup, there are various expositions. The opinion of Hilary is reported here in doubt 4; the words of the other Saints see in St. Thomas (Summa III. q. 21. a. 4. ad 1.). On this (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 16. m. 2. — Scotus, Reportatio here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. little-question 4; Summa, the cited article. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 4.

**II.** The same solution of the following (3rd) question St. Thomas presents in other words in the Commentary (cited place, little-question 3.), namely that that prayer was not from sensuality as the principle eliciting the act of prayer, but as an object moving reason to propose [it]. Cf. Alexander of Hales, cited place m. I. — Scotus, cited place n. 7. — St. Thomas, Summa cited place a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, cited place a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, cited place q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.373–374 (PDF pp.395–396; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 26041–26128). Running head *DIST. XVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.* / page number 373 confirmed on the page itself.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.373** (full): question opener, the five *quod sic* fundamenta, the five *Sed contra* arguments, the Conclusio, and the Respondeo down through *…ad nostram instru-*. Footer block = 13 numbered notes (`[^p373-1]`–`[^p373-13]`), split L-column notes 1–6 / R-column notes 7–13. Marginal labels on the page: *Fundamenta.* (at fund. 1), *Ad oppositum.* (at Sed contra), *Triplex oratio in Christo* and *Conclusio 1. / Conclusio 2.* (in the Respondeo).
- **p.374** (top portion, q2's share): the tail of the Respondeo (*-ctionem… inclinaret*), the *Ex his patet responsio* paragraph, the replies *Ad 1. 2.* and *Ad 3. 4. 5.* (marginal label *Solutio oppositorum.*), and the SCHOLION I–II. q2 carries p.374 footer notes **1, 2, 3** only (`[^p374-1]`–`[^p374-3]`), anchored at *qua petiit¹*, *unum²*, *Glossa ibidem³*.

**Hand-off picked up:** NONE. Per the d17-a2-q1 hand-off, the seam at raw 26041 / p.373 is clean — p.372's footer block was fully consumed by a2-q1's body + scholion, and q2 opens fresh on a new printed page (p.373) with its own per-page footer sequence.

**Hand-off forwarded to d17-a2-q3:** **QUAESTIO III** (*Utrum oratio, qua Christus oravit in passione, ut calix transferretur a se, fuerit a ratione, an a sensualitate*) begins on **p.374**, after q2's scholion, at **raw line 26129** (QUAESTIO III header at raw 26129; running text *Tertio quaeritur…*). The seam falls **mid-page on p.374**: p.374's footer block (numbered notes 1–10) is **SHARED** — q2 took notes **1, 2, 3**; **notes 4–10 migrate to q3** (note 4 = Matth. 26,39; note 5 = *Hic c. 2.* / *nec obtinuit* variant; note 6 = Matth. 26,39; note 7 = *Cod. F addit et quod debet velle*; note 8 = *appetere* / variants; note 9 = Damasc., *De Fide orth.* c. 24; note 10 = *In libro de Spiritu et anima* c. 50). q3 also has marginal label *Argg. pro 1. parte.* and *Pro 2. parte.*

**[?] flags:** NONE — pp.373–374 fully legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, fuerit sensualitatis, aut rationis

title_alt: Whether that prayer by which he prayed in the passion was of the sensuality or of the reason

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum oratio, qua Christus oravit in passione, ut calix transferretur, fuerit a ratione, an a sensualitate.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum illa oratio, qua oravit in passione, ut calix transferretur a se[^p374-4], fuerit a ratione, an a sensualitate. Et quod a sensualitate, videtur:

*Argg. pro 1. parte.*

1. Auctoritate Magistri in littera[^p374-5]: «Secundum affectum sensualitatis Christus mori noluit, nec obtinuit quod secundum istum affectum petiit»: ergo videtur, quod petitio illa ex voluntate sensualitatis processerit.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex ordine verborum, cum dicit: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu*[^p374-6]; aut hoc dicit ratione voluntatis sensualitatis, aut rationis. Quantum ad voluntatem rationis non dicit, quia illa erat per omnia divinae voluntati conformis: ergo hoc dicit quantum ad voluntatem sensualitatis: ex illa ergo voluntate procedebat postulatio orationis propositae.

3. Item, nullus sapiens petit vel orat contrarium eius quod vult[^p374-7]; sed ratio volebat mori: ergo petitio de evasione mortis non erat petitio rationis; et erat rationis, vel sensualitatis: ergo sensualitatis.

4. Item, peccatum est alicui petere quod est peccatum appetere[^p374-8]; sed appetere non mori peccatum esset ipsi voluntati rationali: ergo si illud petivisset, peccasset. Sed non peccavit: ergo non petiit: ergo petitio illa fuit a voluntate sensuali.

**Sed contra:**

*Pro 2. parte.*

1. Oratio sic definitur[^p374-9]: «Oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum»; sed sensualitatis non est ascendere in Deum: ergo sensualitatis non est orare: ergo praedicta oratio non potuit esse sensualitatis.

2. Item, alio modo definitur oratio[^p374-10]: «Oratio est pius mentis affectus in Deum directus»; sed
<!-- page 375 -->
sensualitas non habet ferri in Deum: ergo quantum ad actum sensualitatis non consistit usus orationis.

3. Item, solius rationis est conferre[^p375-1]; sed praedicta oratio fuit cum collatione quadam, sicut patet, cum dicitur: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu*: ergo non processit a sensualitate, sed a ratione.

4. Item, solius rationis est futura praecognoscere[^p375-2]; sed oratio illa, qua petebatur calix futurus transferri, erat ex futurorum praecognitione: ergo non erat sensualitatis, sed rationis.

### Conclusio.

> Christi oratio in horto ad Patrem quoad materiam fuit sensualitatis, sed quoad formam fuit rationis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de praedicta oratione est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad materiam, aut quantum ad formam. Si loquamur de ipsa quantum ad materiam; cum materia orationis respiciat desiderium petentis, talis petitio fuit petitio sensualitatis[^p375-3], cuius desiderium erat ad non moriendum. Si autem loquamur de praedicta oratione quantum ad formam; sic, cum forma petitionis respiciat discretionem proponentis, et talis modus proponendi sit ad discretionem rationis, concedendum est, quod talis oratio fuerit voluntatis rationalis.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta; ad quaestionem propositam, quia non est simpliciter concedendum, quod talis oratio fuerit simpliciter rationis, vel simpliciter sensualitatis, sed quodam modo huius, quodam modo illius: sensualitatis quantum ad materiam, sed rationis quantum ad formam; item, sensualitatis ut moventis, sed rationis ut proponentis; item, sensualitatis ut pro quo, sed rationis ut a quo. Unde bene et recte consuevit dici, quod ratio fuerit advocatus sensualitatis[^p375-4]. — Secundum hoc dissolvi possunt rationes ad utramque partem, quoniam procedunt his duabus viis, sicut patet aspicienti.

*Quaest. incidens.* Sed tunc restat quaestio: cum ratio sciret, sensualitatem in hac petitione nec exaudiendam nec[^p375-5] dignam exaudiri, utpote quia petebat contrarium divini propositi; quomodo hanc petitionem proposuit et pro ea allegavit? — Et dicendum est ad hoc, quod *Ratio triplex.* ratio triplex[^p375-6] fuit. Prima, ad manifestationem veritatis naturae assumtae, quae naturaliter refutabat passionem; et in hoc erudivit nostram fidem. — Secunda vero, ad confirmandam nostram imbecillitatem, ut non diffidamus, si passionum pericula exhorremus; et in hoc erexit nostram spem. — Tertio, ut ostenderet, voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati esse per omnia subiiciendam, quod ostendit in conditione apposita, *non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu*; et in hoc ordinavit in nobis caritatem[^p375-7], quae affectum nostrum divinae voluntati per omnia conatur subiicere. Unde magis oravit pro nobis in illa oratione, quam oraret pro se. — *Notabilis observatio.* Et attendendum est, quod ratio[^p375-8] in petitione illa servavit formam prudentis et fidelis advocati, qui desiderium sensualitatis proponit, servata tamen forma iuris. Dictat enim ius divinum, quod omnis appetitus debet esse Deo subiectus. — Et per hoc patet determinatio obiectorum, patet etiam praedictae orationis finis et utilitas[^p375-9].

---

english:
<!-- page 374 -->

### Question III. *Whether the prayer by which Christ prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed, was from the reason or from the sensuality.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether that prayer by which he prayed in the passion, that the cup be removed from him[^p374-4], was from the reason or from the sensuality. And that it was from the sensuality seems so:

*Arguments for the first part.*

1. By the authority of the Master in the text[^p374-5]: «According to the affect of the sensuality Christ did not wish to die, nor did he obtain what he asked according to that affect»: therefore it seems that that petition proceeded from the will of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown from the order of the words, when he says: *Not as I will, but as thou wilt*[^p374-6]; either he says this by reason of the sensual will, or of the will of reason. As to the will of reason he does not say it, because that was in all things conformed to the divine will: therefore he says this as to the will of the sensuality: from that will, therefore, proceeded the request of the prayer proposed.

3. Likewise, no wise man asks or prays for the contrary of what he wills[^p374-7]; but reason willed to die: therefore the petition about escaping death was not a petition of reason; and it was either of reason or of the sensuality: therefore of the sensuality.

4. Likewise, it is a sin for someone to ask what it is a sin to desire[^p374-8]; but to desire not to die would be a sin for the rational will itself: therefore if he had asked that, he would have sinned. But he did not sin: therefore he did not ask: therefore that petition was from the sensual will.

**On the contrary:**

*For the second part.*

1. Prayer is defined thus[^p374-9]: «Prayer is the ascent of the intellect into God»; but it does not belong to the sensuality to ascend into God: therefore it does not belong to the sensuality to pray: therefore the aforesaid prayer could not be of the sensuality.

2. Likewise, prayer is defined in another way[^p374-10]: «Prayer is a pious affect of the mind directed into God»; but
<!-- page 375 -->
the sensuality cannot be borne into God: therefore as to the act of the sensuality the use of prayer does not consist.

3. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to deliberate[^p375-1]; but the aforesaid prayer was with a certain deliberation, as is clear, when it is said: *Not as I will, but as thou wilt*: therefore it did not proceed from the sensuality, but from the reason.

4. Likewise, it belongs to reason alone to foreknow future things[^p375-2]; but that prayer, by which it was asked that the coming cup be removed, was from a foreknowledge of future things: therefore it was not of the sensuality, but of the reason.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's prayer in the garden to the Father, as to its matter, was of the sensuality, but as to its form was of the reason.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid prayer is to be spoken of in two ways: either as to its matter, or as to its form. If we speak of it as to its matter; since the matter of prayer regards the desire of the one petitioning, such a petition was a petition of the sensuality[^p375-3], whose desire was for not dying. But if we speak of the aforesaid prayer as to its form; thus, since the form of the petition regards the discretion of the one proposing, and such a manner of proposing belongs to the discretion of the reason, it must be granted that such a prayer was of the rational will.

And by this is clear the response to the proposed question and also to the objections; to the proposed question, because it is not to be granted absolutely that such a prayer was absolutely of the reason, or absolutely of the sensuality, but in one manner of this, in another manner of that: of the sensuality as to its matter, but of the reason as to its form; likewise, of the sensuality as moving, but of the reason as proposing; likewise, of the sensuality as that-for-which, but of the reason as that-from-which. Hence it has rightly and well been wont to be said that reason was the advocate of the sensuality[^p375-4]. — According to this, the reasons on either side can be resolved, since they proceed by these two ways, as is clear to one looking [at it].

*Incidental question.* But then a question remains: since reason knew that the sensuality in this petition was neither to be heard nor[^p375-5] worthy to be heard, inasmuch as it asked the contrary of the divine plan; how did it propose this petition and plead for it? — And it must be said to this that *A threefold reason.* the reason was threefold[^p375-6]. The first, for the manifestation of the truth of the assumed nature, which naturally refused the passion; and in this he instructed our faith. — But the second, for the confirming of our weakness, that we should not despair if we shrink from the perils of sufferings; and in this he raised up our hope. — Thirdly, that he might show that our will is to be subjected in all things to the divine will, which he showed in the condition added, *not as I will, but as thou wilt*; and in this he ordered charity in us[^p375-7], which strives to subject our affect in all things to the divine will. Hence he prayed more for us in that prayer than he would pray for himself. — *A noteworthy observation.* And it must be noted that the reason[^p375-8] in that petition kept the form of a prudent and faithful advocate, who proposes the desire of the sensuality, yet keeping the form of the law. For the divine law dictates that every appetite ought to be subject to God. — And by this is clear the determination of the objections, and also clear is the end and usefulness of the aforesaid prayer[^p375-9].

---

en: Matthew 26:39.

la: Hic c. 2. — Pro *nec obtinuit* non pauci codd., discrepantes cum verbis Magistri, *nec optavit.* Deinde pro *ex voluntate sensualitatis* cod. W *ex sensualitate.*

en: Here, c. 2. — For *nor did he obtain* not a few codices, departing from the words of the Master, [read] *nor did he wish.* Then for *from the will of the sensuality* codex W [reads] *from the sensuality.*

la: Cod. F addit *et quod debet velle.*

en: Codex F adds *and what he ought to will.*

la: Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *appetere.* In fine arg. pro *sensuali* codd. GIZ *sensibili*, codd. L aa *sensualitatis.*

en: Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *to desire.* At the end of the argument, for *sensual* codices GIZ [read] *sensible*, codices L aa [read] *of the sensuality.*

la: A Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24. Cfr. supra pag. 201, nota 7.

en: From [John] Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 24. Cf. above, p. 201, note 7.

la: In libro de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 50: *Devotio est pius et humilis affectus in Deum*: humilis ex conscientia infirmitatis propriae, pius ex consideratione divinae clementiae. *Oratio est mentis devotio* i. e. conversio in Deum per pium et humilem affectum. — In fine arg. pro *orationis* plurimi codd. vitiose *rationis.*

en: In the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 50: *Devotion is a pious and humble affect toward God*: humble from the consciousness of one's own weakness, pious from the consideration of the divine clemency. *Prayer is a devotion of the mind*, that is, a turning into God through a pious and humble affect. — At the end of the argument, for *of prayer* very many codices faultily [read] *of reason.*

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57. (c. 11.): *Deliberativa autem in rationalibus* [est]; utrum enim aget hoc, an hoc, iam rationis est opus, et necesse est mensurare; maius enim persequitur.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 57 (c. 11): *But the deliberative [faculty] is in rational beings*; for whether he shall do this or that, that is now the work of reason, and it is necessary to measure; for he pursues the greater.

la: Ut insinuat Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 10.), et de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1.

en: As Aristotle suggests, *On the Soul* III, text 53 (c. 10), and *On Memory and Recollection* c. 1.

la: Codd. N U subiungunt *tantummodo*, pauci codd. et edd. addunt *tantum.* Paulo inferius pro *ad discretionem* edd. cum nonnullis codd. *a discretione.*

en: Codices N U add *only*, a few codices and editions add *only.* A little below, for *to the discretion* the editions with some codices [read] *from the discretion.*

la: Guliel. Antissiodor., S. p. III. tr. 1. c. 6. q. 3: «Dicimus, quod illa petitio fuit *rationis* et fuit etiam *sensualitatis*, sed aliter et aliter. *Rationis* fuit tanquam illa [illam?] proponens; *sensualitatis* fuit, quia vice sensualitatis proposita fuit a ratione. *Ratio* enim inclinata a sensualitate ad hoc proposuit illam tanquam *advocatus* sensualitatis». Et inferius, «Haec dictio: *si possibile est*, non est de petitione, in quantum proponitur pro *sensualitate*, sed est addita ab ipsa *ratione*; *ratio* enim ex parte una illud proponit, sicut *advocatus* multa proponit quandoque, quae nescit ille cuius est advocatus».

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa*, part III, tr. 1, c. 6, q. 3: «We say that that petition was *of reason* and was also *of the sensuality*, but in one way and another. *Of reason* it was as proposing it; *of the sensuality* it was, because in place of the sensuality it was proposed by reason. For *reason*, inclined by the sensuality, proposed it for this [purpose] as the *advocate* of the sensuality». And below, «This phrase, *if it be possible*, is not part of the petition insofar as it is proposed for the *sensuality*, but is added by *reason* itself; for *reason* on the one part proposes it, just as an *advocate* sometimes proposes many things which the one whose advocate he is does not know».

la: Cod. K inserit *esse*, cod. A *esset* (!).

en: Codex K inserts *to be*, codex A [reads] *would be* (!).

la: De hac triplici ratione vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. et supra d. XV. c. 1.

en: On this threefold reason see here the text of the Master, c. 2, and above, d. XV, c. 1.

la: Respicitur illud Cant. 2, 4: *Ordinavit in me caritatem.* — Paulo ante pro *Tertio* cod. K *Tertia vero.*

en: Reference is made to that of Canticles 2:4: *He ordered charity in me.* — A little before, for *Thirdly* codex K [reads] *But the third.*

la: Ita recte codd. A K bb, in aliis et edd. *oratio*; paulo inferius pro *qui* plurimi codd. *quae.*

en: Thus rightly codices A K bb; in others and the editions [read] *prayer*; a little below, for *who* very many codices [read] *which.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp.374–375 = pdf 396–397; offset pdf = printed + 22), per the VOL II OVERRIDE applied to Vol III. The IA djvu OCR (raw span 26129→26205) cascade-merged the two-column body and embedded a stray running-head digit ("378"), which the eyes-on PDF read corrected: q3 occupies **only pp.374–375** (running head on p.375 reads "DIST. XVII. DUBIA" because the DUBIA section begins at the foot of p.375 L column). Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus drawn from the printed page footers.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.374** (lower portion, q3's share): QUAESTIO III header + title; the *Tertio quaeritur* statement; *Argg. pro 1. parte* arguments 1–4; the *Sed contra* opening (*Pro 2. parte*) arguments 1–2 (arg 2 breaks mid-sentence at *sed* and continues on p.375). Footer notes **4–10** (`[^p374-4]`–`[^p374-10]`), anchored at *calix transferretur a se⁴*, *in littera⁵*, *sed sicut tu⁶*, *eius quod vult⁷*, *petere⁸*, *definitur⁹*, *definitur oratio¹⁰*.
- **p.375** (upper portion, q3's share): completion of *Sed contra* arg 2 (*sensualitas non habet ferri…*); arguments 3–4; CONCLUSIO; Respondeo; the *Quaest. incidens* / *Ratio triplex* / *Notabilis observatio* block, ending at *finis et utilitas⁹*. Then the DUBIA begins. Footer notes **1–9** (`[^p375-1]`–`[^p375-9]`), anchored at *conferre¹*, *praecognoscere²*, *petitio sensualitatis³*, *advocatus sensualitatis⁴*, *nec⁵* (incidental question), *ratio triplex⁶*, *caritatem⁷*, *ratio⁸*, *utilitas⁹*.

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up (from a2-q2 seam):* p.374 footer notes **4–10**. q2 carried p.374 notes **1–3** (`qua petiit¹`, `unum²`, `Glossa ibidem³`); this q3 picks up notes 4–10 as above. Seam verified clean against q2's chunk (its `[^p374-1..3]` defs).
- *Forwarded (to d.17 DUBIA — `bon-sent-III-d17-dubia`):* the DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI begins at **raw line 26206** (DUB. I at raw 26209), at the foot of **p.375 L column**, immediately after q3's *...finis et utilitas.* **Migrating footer:** p.375 footer note **10** belongs to the dubia, not to q3 — `10 Libr. l. c. 22. n. 1. Nomen istius fuit Cleombrotus; a Cicerone, I. Tuscul. Disput. c. 34, cognomine appellatur Ambraciota.` (anchored at *de Civitate Dei¹⁰* in Dub. I). So the dubia chunk inherits p.375 note 10 plus p.376+ footers. **Expected DUB count:** the d.17 dubia chunk runs raw 26206→26303 (DISTINCTIO XVIII at raw 26304); a single Dub. heading (DUB. I) is visible at raw 26209 — expect the dubia chunk to verify against the printed page count (≥1 DUB.) forward to p.376+.

**Scholion.** None for this quaestio. ART. II's scholion sits at the foot of p.372 (carried by q1) and a q2 scholion (I–II) sits at the top of p.374 (carried by q2); q3 has no separate SCHOLION header — its closing *Notabilis observatio* is part of the body (Respondeo), not a scholion. `has_scholion: false` set accordingly.

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands were fully legible for both pages.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XVII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XVII)

source_text:
<!-- page 375 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: *Reliquit affectum infirmitatis, quo nemo vult mori, qui adeo naturalis est* etc. Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia multi occidunt semetipsos — sicut patet in desperatis — et desiderant mori: non ergo verum est quod dicit. — Item, Augustinus narrat de quodam in libro de Civitate Dei[^p375-10], quod « lecto Platonis libro, ubi de immortalitate animae disputavit, se praecipitem dedit de muro, ut de hac vita migraret ad eam quam credidit meliorem ». Ex hoc ipso videtur, quod aliqui sunt, qui mori desiderant.

*Respondeo:* Dicendum, quod est affectus naturalis, et est affectus deliberativus. Affectu naturali
<!-- page 376 -->
nemo vult mori, immo omnis homo refugit mortem. Affectu autem deliberativo potest quis appetere mortem et effugere vitam, non quia haec sit mors, et illa sit vita[^p376-1], sed ratione alicuius, quod est annexum, vel existimatur esse annexum; sicut desperati et vehementer in vita confusi propter confusionem annexam refugiunt vitam; sic est etiam de aliis incommodis. Per hunc modum etiam aliqui appetunt mortem, qui post mortem credunt quiescere et gaudere, sicut est in illis, de quibus opponit, in quibus non fertur instantia contra verbum Augustini[^p376-2]. Augustinus enim loquitur *per se,* loquitur etiam de appetitu *naturali,* non *deliberativo.*

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *pius mentis affectus appetit dissolvi et esse cum Christo,* quia contrarium videtur, secundae ad Corinthios quinto[^p376-3]: *Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri.* Si tu dicas, quod voluntate *naturali,* sive *sensualitatis* nolebat exspoliari, sed voluntate *rationis* sive deliberativa cupiebat dissolvi; obiicitur contra hoc per hoc quod dicitur ad Philippenses primo[^p376-4]: *Permanere autem in carne necessarium est propter vos;* sed Apostolus voluntate *deliberativa* id magis appetebat et volebat, quod erat fratribus magis necessarium: ergo illa voluntate videtur quod non appeteret dissolvi, aut simul appetebat duo contraria[^p376-5].

*Respondeo:* Dicendum, quod in carne nostra est duo reperire, videlicet ipsam *naturam* et *infirmitatem* aggravantem animam, secundum quod dicit Augustinus decimo tertio de Civitate Dei[^p376-6], quod corpus aggravat animam, non quia corpus, sed quia corruptibile. Cum ergo dicitur: *Nolumus exspoliari* etc., hoc dicitur quantum ad ipsam carnis naturam, de qua dicitur ad Ephesios quinto[^p376-7]: *Nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit.* Quantum autem ad *infirmitatem* aggravantem dicitur: *Cupio dissolvi* etc. Et sic nulla est ibi contrarietas.

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, quomodo petebat simul dissolvi et permanere in carne; dicendum, quod est voluntas *absoluta* et voluntas *con-*
<!-- page 376 R -->
*ditionalis;* et nihil impedit duo opposita velle, ita quod unum velit voluntate *conditionali,* alterum voluntate *absoluta.* Volebat igitur Apostolus in carne permanere propter utilitatem fratrum voluntate *absoluta,* volebat nihilominus dissolvi et esse cum Christo, sed hoc non *absolute,* sed quantum *in se* erat; et sic nulla erat repugnantia, erat tamen quaedam mentis angustia ex hoc duplici desiderio; propter quod dicit: *Coarctor ex duobus: desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo.*

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Ambrosii: *Ut homo dubitat, ut homo locutus est.* Videtur enim esse falsum: quia Christus habuit scientiam omnium futurorum sub certitudine: ergo videtur, quod de nullo potuerit dubitare. — Item, in quemcumque cadit dubitatio, cadere potest ignorantia et error; sed nullum istorum potuit in Christo cadere: ergo videtur, quod non potuerit dubitare.

*Respondeo:* Dicendum, quod *dubitatio* proprie dicit indifferentiam iudicii rationis respectu utriusque partis contradictionis, ita quod neutrum praeeligat alteri; et hoc modo accipiendo dubitationem, in Christo non fuit dubitatio. Alio modo dicitur *dubitatio* indifferentia quaedam partis sensibilis ad sequendum affectum naturae inclinantem, vel rationem imperantem; et talis dubitatio potuit esse in Christo; et de hac intelligit Ambrosius, de alia vero currit obiectio.

### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Hilarii: *Non sibi tristis fuit, nec sibi orat transire calicem, sed discipulis.* Videtur enim hoc esse falsum per ipsam orationis seriem. Ait enim: *Transeat a me calix iste;* si petit, calicem transire a se: ergo videtur, quod pro se oravit. — Item, sic petebat, sicut volebat; sed Christus sentiebat, aliquid se velle, quod non vellet Pater, sicut ipse dicebat: *Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu:* si ergo aliqua voluntate sua ca-
<!-- page 377 -->
licem passionis fugiebat, videtur, quod cum petiit, calicem transire a se, *pro se* oraverit.

*Respondeo:* Dicendum, quod orare pro aliquo contingit dupliciter: aut secundum *formam* orationis, aut secundum *intentionem* orantis. Secundum *formam* orationis Christus orabat *pro se,* id est pro voluntate sua sensuali[^p377-1]; secundum autem *intentionem* orantis in illa petitione Christus non *pro se* oravit, sed magis *pro nobis.* Non enim credidit, se
<!-- page 377 R -->
in petitione illa aliquid obtenturum pro se, nec ratio voluisset obtinere sibi liberationem a passione, sed potius oravit ob triplicem nostram utilitatem, sicut in praecedentibus[^p377-2] factum est. Hilarius ergo loquitur isto secundo modo; unde sermones sui, qui ponuntur in littera, referendi sunt ad principalem intentionem Christi; omnes autem obiectiones currunt secundum viam priorem.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about this which is said: *He left behind the affection of weakness, by which no one wishes to die, which is so very natural,* etc. For this seems false, since many kill themselves — as is evident in the despairing — and desire to die: therefore what he says is not true. — Likewise, Augustine relates in the book *On the City of God*[^p375-10] of a certain man who, "having read Plato's book in which he discoursed on the immortality of the soul, threw himself headlong from a wall, that he might pass from this life to that which he believed better." From this very thing it seems that there are some who desire to die.

*I respond:* It must be said that there is a natural affection, and there is a deliberative affection. By the natural affection
no one wishes to die; rather, every man flees death. But by the deliberative affection one can desire death and flee life, not because the one is death and the other is life[^p376-1], but by reason of something that is annexed, or is reckoned to be annexed; just as the despairing and those who are vehemently confounded in life, on account of the confusion annexed to it, flee life; and so it is also with other troubles. In this manner too some desire death who believe that after death they will rest and rejoice, as is the case with those of whom he raises the objection, against whom the instance is not brought to bear against Augustine's word[^p376-2]. For Augustine speaks *of itself,* and he speaks also of the *natural* appetite, not the *deliberative.*

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *the pious affection of the mind desires to be dissolved and to be with Christ,* since the contrary seems [true], in the second [letter] to the Corinthians, the fifth [chapter][^p376-3]: *We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed over.* If you say that by the *natural* will, or [the will] of *sensuality,* he did not wish to be unclothed, but by the will of *reason* or the deliberative [will] he desired to be dissolved; against this it is objected by what is said to the Philippians, the first [chapter][^p376-4]: *But to remain in the flesh is necessary for your sake;* but the Apostle by the *deliberative* will rather desired and willed that which was more necessary for the brethren: therefore by that will it seems that he would not desire to be dissolved, or that he desired two contraries at once[^p376-5].

*I respond:* It must be said that in our flesh there are two things to be found, namely the *nature* itself and the *weakness* burdening the soul, according to what Augustine says in the thirteenth [book] *On the City of God*[^p376-6], that the body burdens the soul, not because it is body, but because it is corruptible. When therefore it is said: *We do not wish to be unclothed,* etc., this is said with regard to the very nature of the flesh, of which it is said to the Ephesians, the fifth [chapter][^p376-7]: *No one ever hated his own flesh.* But with regard to the *weakness* that burdens, it is said: *I desire to be dissolved,* etc. And thus there is no contrariety there.

But as to that which is asked, how he desired at once to be dissolved and to remain in the flesh; it must be said that there is an *absolute* will and a *con-*
ditional will; and nothing prevents one from willing two opposites, so that one wills one of them by the *conditional* will, the other by the *absolute* will. Therefore the Apostle willed to remain in the flesh for the benefit of the brethren by the *absolute* will, and he willed nonetheless to be dissolved and to be with Christ, but this not *absolutely,* but insofar as it lay *in himself;* and thus there was no repugnance, yet there was a certain anguish of mind arising from this twofold desire; on account of which he says: *I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.*

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that word of Ambrose: *As a man he doubts, as a man he spoke.* For this seems to be false: because Christ had the knowledge of all future things under certainty: therefore it seems that he could doubt about nothing. — Likewise, into whomever doubt falls, ignorance and error can fall; but none of these could fall in Christ: therefore it seems that he could not doubt.

*I respond:* It must be said that *doubt* properly bespeaks an indifference of the judgment of reason with respect to each side of the contradiction, so that it prefers neither to the other; and taking doubt in this way, in Christ there was no doubt. In another way *doubt* is said [to be] a certain indifference of the sensible part toward following the affection of nature that inclines, or the reason that commands; and such a doubt could be in Christ; and of this Ambrose understands [it], but concerning the other the objection runs [its course].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that word of Hilary: *He was not sad for himself, nor does he pray for himself that the cup pass, but for the disciples.* For this seems to be false by the very tenor of the prayer. For he says: *Let this cup pass from me;* if he asks that the cup pass from him: therefore it seems that he prayed for himself. — Likewise, he asked just as he willed; but Christ perceived that he willed something which the Father did not will, as he himself said: *Not as I will, but as thou [wilt]:* if therefore by some will of his own he
fled the cup of the passion, it seems that, when he asked the cup to pass from him, he prayed *for himself.*

*I respond:* It must be said that to pray for someone happens in two ways: either according to the *form* of the prayer, or according to the *intention* of the one praying. According to the *form* of the prayer Christ was praying *for himself,* that is, for his sensual will[^p377-1]; but according to the *intention* of the one praying, in that petition Christ did not pray *for himself,* but rather *for us.* For he did not believe that he
would obtain anything for himself in that petition, nor would reason have willed to obtain deliverance from the passion for itself, but rather he prayed for our threefold benefit[^p377-2], as has been done in the preceding [matters]. Hilary therefore speaks in that second way; whence his discourses, which are set down in the text, are to be referred to the principal intention of Christ; but all the objections run their course according to the prior way.

---

la: Libr. l. c. 22. n. 1. Nomen istius fuit Cleombrotus; a Cicerone, I. Tuscul. Disput. c. 34, cognomine appellatur Ambraciota.

en: Book l[oc. cit.], c. 22, n. 1. The name of this man was Cleombrotus; by Cicero, in the first [book of the] *Tusculan Disputations*, c. 34, he is surnamed Ambraciota.

la: Sententia est: potest quis mortem appetere, non in quantum mors est, et vitam effugere, non in quantum est vita. — Pro *non quia haec* edd. *non quia illa.* Mox pro *existimatur* codd. A F L aa *existimant,* codd. G H I N T V *aestimant.*

en: The sense is: one can desire death, not insofar as it is death, and flee life, not insofar as it is life. — For *not because the one* (*non quia haec*) the editions [read] *not because the other* (*non quia illa*). Presently, for *is reckoned* (*existimatur*) codices A F L aa [read] *they reckon* (*existimant*), codices G H I N T V [read] *they estimate* (*aestimant*).

la: Scil. contra ipsa verba dubii, quae ex August. sumta sunt. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 6.

en: Namely, against the very words of the doubt, which are taken from Augustine. — Cf. on this doubt Blessed Albert, here a. 6.

la: Vers. 4. — Mox ante *voluntate naturali* edd. cum aliquot codd. inserunt *ex.*

en: Verse 4. — Presently, before *by the natural will* (*voluntate naturali*) the editions, with some codices, insert *ex.*

la: Vers. 24. In hoc loco non pauci codd. perperam *propter nos.*

en: Verse 24. In this place not a few codices wrongly [read] *for our sake* (*propter nos*).

la: Quod est impossibile. Cfr. Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.).

en: Which is impossible. Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 4 (c. 14).

la: Cap. 16 n. 1, ubi arguit contra philosophos, qui animae separationem a corpore non putant esse poenalem: Unde illud est quod de Scripturis nostris in superiori libro commemoravimus: *Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam* (Sap. 9, 15.). Addendo utique *corruptibile* non qualicumque corpore, sed quale factum est ex peccato, consequente vindicta, animam perhibuit aggravari. Quod etiamsi non addidisset, nihil aliud intelligere deberemus.

en: Chapter 16, n. 1, where he argues against the philosophers who do not think the separation of the soul from the body is penal: "Whence that is which we recalled from our Scriptures in the preceding book: *For the corruptible body burdens the soul* (Wisdom 9, 15). For by adding *corruptible* he declared that the soul is burdened not by any body whatever, but by such a body as has been made [so] from sin, with vindication following. And even if he had not added [it], we ought to understand nothing else."

la: Vers. 29. — Codd. *Eph. ultimo.* — Simili modo explicatur ab August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 6. n. 16. et Serm. 344. n. 3. (alias seq. 31. ex Sirmond.) de Amore Dei et amore saeculi.

en: Verse 29. — Codices [read] *Ephesians, last [chapter].* — It is explained in a similar manner by Augustine, *Letter* 140 (otherwise 120), c. 6, n. 16, and *Sermon* 344, n. 3 (otherwise the following 31, from Sirmond), *On the Love of God and the Love of the World.*

la: Pauci codd. *sensibili,* quod etiam in aliis legi potest, cum propter nimiam abbreviaturam scriptura vocis dubia sit. Post pauca pro *in illa petitione Christus non pro se* edd. *nulla petitione Christus pro se.* Voculam *non,* quam multi codd. omittunt, ex codd. F M N O V restituimus.

en: A few codices [read] *sensible* (*sensibili*), which can also be read in others, since on account of the excessive abbreviation the writing of the word is doubtful. Shortly after, for *in that petition Christ not for himself* (*in illa petitione Christus non pro se*) the editions [read] *in no petition Christ for himself* (*nulla petitione Christus pro se*). The little word *non* (*not*), which many codices omit, we have restored from codices F M N O V.

la: Hic a. 2. q. 3. in fine corp. — Mox edd. omittunt *secundo,* et subinde post *sermones sui* codd. A K M O addunt *omnes.* — De hoc dubio vide B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. ad 5; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

en: Here a. 2, q. 3, at the end of the body [of the article]. — Presently the editions omit *second* (*secundo*), and thereupon after *his discourses* (*sermones sui*) codices A K M O add *all* (*omnes*). — On this doubt see Blessed Albert, here a. 9; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, sub-question 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3, ad 5; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{375,376,377}-{L,R}-*`), printed pp. 375–377 (PDF 397–399, offset pdf = printed + 22). English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus rendered directly from the printed page footers, page by page, with per-page numbering preserved in the slug prefixes.

**Dubia count.** Four dubia (DUB. I–IV) — the full DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI block of Distinctio XVII. **This promotion completes Distinctio XVII.**

**Page-split map.**
- **p.375** (foot of L col + foot of R col): DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI header; DUB. I opening (*In parte ista…*) through *Affectu naturali.* Apparatus: only **note 10** (Cleombrotus / Cicero, *Tusc.*) anchors here, at *de Civitate Dei¹⁰* in DUB. I — **picked up from the q3 seam** (q3 carried p.375 notes 1–9; note 10 belongs to the DUBIA).
- **p.376** (L col → R col): DUB. I tail (*nemo vult mori… non deliberativo*); DUB. II in full; DUB. III in full; DUB. IV opening through *…sicut tu: si ergo aliqua voluntate sua ca-*. Apparatus: p.376 notes **1–7** (page-restarted numbering).
- **p.377** (L col top → R col top): DUB. IV tail (*licem passionis fugiebat… secundum viam priorem.*). Apparatus: p.377 notes **1–2**. (The *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* / *Codd. nostri praetereundum* block at the foot of p.377 L belongs to **DISTINCTIO XVIII**, not here.)

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* p.375 footer **note 10** (Cleombrotus), forwarded from d17-a2-q3.
- *Forwarded:* none. **Distinctio XVII is COMPLETE on this promotion.** DISTINCTIO XVIII proper (Cap. I / Cap. II — *Si Christus meruit sibi et nobis…*) begins at **raw line 26319**, immediately after this chunk's closing *…secundum viam priorem.* (raw ~26317). The "DISTINCTIO XVIII." string at raw ~26304 is the page-top running head of p.377 (DUB. IV text flows around it); it is **not** the semantic seam. Seam confirmed clean: DUB. IV's Respondeo concludes grammatically before DISTINCTIO XVIII's Cap. I opens. Offset reminder for d.18: **pdf = printed + 22.** (Note: d.20 is the next Vol III decade-polish gate — NOT yet reached.)

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands were fully legible throughout.


title: Dist. 18

title_alt: Distinctio XVIII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XVIII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XVIII.

### Cap. I. *Si Christus meruit sibi et nobis, et quid sibi et quid nobis.*

De merito etiam Christi praetermittendum[^p377-1] non est, de quo quidam dicere solent, quod non *sibi*, sed *membris* tantum meruerit. Meruit quidem *membris* redemptionem a diabolo, a peccato, a poena et regni reserationem, ut, amota *ignea romphea*, libere pateret introitus; sed et *sibi* meruit impassibilitatis et immortalitatis gloriam, sicut ait Apostolus[^p377-2]: *Christus factus est pro nobis obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum et dedit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen.* Aperte dicit Apostolus, Christum propterea exaltatum per impassibilitatis gloriam, quia est humiliatus per passionis obedientiam; humilitas ergo passionis meritum fuit exaltationis, et exaltatio praemium humilitatis. Unde Augustinus[^p377-3], exponens praemissum capitulum, ait: «Ut Christus resurrectione clarificaretur, prius humiliatus est passione; humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium. Sed hoc totum factum est in forma servi; in forma enim Dei semper fuit et erit claritas». Item Ambrosius, idem capitulum tractans, ait: «Quid et quantum humilitas mereatur, hic ostenditur». — His testimoniis evidens fit, quod Christus per humilitatem et obedientiam passionis meruit clarificationem corporis, nec id solum, sed etiam impassibilitatem animae. Anima enim ipsius ante mortem erat passibilis, sicut caro mortalis; sed post mortem merito humilitatis et anima impassibilis facta est, et caro immortalis. Utrum autem anima facta sit impassibilis, quando caro facta est immortalis, scilicet ipso resurrectionis momento, de auctoritate nobis certum non est; sed vel mox post carnis separationem anima impassibilitate donata est, aut in resurrectione, quando *caro refloruit*[^p377-4].

### Cap. II. *Quod a conceptu meruit Christus sibi idem, quod per passionem.*

Nec solum hoc meruit Christus, quando Patri obediens crucem subiit, sed etiam ab ipsa conceptione, ex quo homo factus est, per caritatem et iustitiam et alias virtutes, in quarum plenitudine fuit secundum hominem conditus, sibi tantum meruit, quantum post per martyrii tolerantiam. Tanta enim plenitudo spiritualium charismatum in eo fuit, quod in eis proficere non potuit; et ideo melior ipsius anima fieri non potuit, quam ab initio suae conditionis exstitit, quia proficere in meritis non valuit. Unde Gregorius[^p377-5] ait: «Non habuit omnino Christus iuxta animae meritum, quo potuisset proficere; in membris autem, quae nos sumus, quotidie proficit». — Non ergo plus meruit sibi per crucis patibulum, quam a conceptione meruit per gratiam virtutum. Non igitur profecit secundum animae meritum quantum ad *virtutem meriti*; profecit tamen quantum ad *numerum meritorum*. Plura enim habuit merita in passione quam in conceptione; sed maioris virtutis non exstiterunt in merendo plura, quam ante fuerant pauciora. Meruit ergo a conceptione non modo gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis corporis, sed etiam impassibilitatem animae. Per quid? Per obedientiam et voluntatem perfectam, quam non tunc primo habuit nec maiorem, cum pati coepit et mori. Obediens enim perfecte[^p377-6] et bonus exstitit secundum hominem, ex quo fuit homo. — Habuit igitur anima illa aliquod bonum in se post mortem, quod non habuit ante. Num igitur *melior* vel *beatior* fuit quam ante? Absit, quod *melior* fuerit, quia non sanctior, non gratia cumulatior; nec etiam *beatior* fuit in Dei contemplatione, in quo praecipue beatitudo consistit. Potest tamen dici in hoc fuisse *beatior*, quia ab omni

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miseria immunis; ex quo nequit inferri *simpliciter*, quod beatior fuerit.

### Cap. III. *De eo quod scriptum est: Donavit illi nomen, quod est supra omne nomen.*

Nec tantum gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis meruit, sed etiam donari sibi *nomen, quod est super omne nomen*, scilicet honorificentiam, quod vocatur Deus. Hoc tamen nomen ante mortem habuit. Habuit enim hoc nomen *Dei*, in quantum *Deus* est, ab aeterno per naturam; in quantum vero *homo* factus est, habuit ex tempore per gratiam. Verumtamen Augustinus[^p378-1] dicit, «homini donatum esse illud nomen, non *Deo*, quia illud nomen habuit, cum in forma Dei tantum erat; sed cum dicitur: *Propter quod illum exaltavit et donavit illi nomen, quod est super omne nomen*, satis apparet, propter *quid* exaltaverit, id est propter obedientiam, et in qua *forma* exaltatus sit. In qua enim *forma* crucifixus est, in ea exaltatus est, et in ea donatum est ei nomen, ut cum ipsa *forma servi* nominetur unigenitus Filius Dei: hoc illi donatum est ut *homini*, quod iam habebat idem ipse *Deus*». Hoc igitur per gratiam accepit, ut ipse ens homo vel subsistens in forma servi, id est in anima et carne, nominetur et sit Deus. — Sed numquid hoc meruit? Supra[^p378-2] enim dictum est, quia hoc tantum bonum homo ille non meruit; quomodo ergo hic dicitur: *Propter obedientiam donatum est ei hoc nomen*? Secundum tropum illum in Scriptura creberrimum hoc accipiendum est, quo dicitur res fieri, «quando innotescit[^p378-3]». Post resurrectionem vero quod ante erat in evidenti positum est, ut scirent homines et daemones. *Manifestationem* ergo illius nominis donavit ei Deus post resurrectionem, sed illam meruit per obedientiam passionis, qui, eo quod obedivit patiendo, exaltatus est resurgendo, et per hoc manifestatum est *nomen*. Hoc eodem tropo usus est etiam Dominus post resurrectionem dicens[^p378-4]: *Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra*, non quod tunc primo acceperit, sed quam ante habebat, tunc manifestata est potestas. Ceterum Ambrosius[^p378-5] dicit, nomen illud donatum esse Deo, non homini, et videtur secundum verborum superficiem oppositus Augustino; sed intelligentia non obviat, licet diversum sapiat. Nam Ambrosius de naturali donatione id dictum intelligit, qua aeternaliter Pater generando dedit Filio nomen, quod est super omne nomen, scilicet esse Deum per naturam, quia genuit ab aeterno Filium plenum et sibi aequalem Deum; quod tamen nomen Apostolus propter passionis obedientiam Christo donatum dicit; sed praemisso locutionis modo accipiendum est.

### Cap. IV. *Si Christus sine omni merito habere valuit quod merito obtinuit.*

Si vero quaeritur, utrum Christus illam immortalitatis et impassibilitatis gloriam et nominis Dei manifestationem sine omni merito habere potuerit; sane dici potest, quia humanam naturam ita *gloriosam* suscipere potuit, sicut in resurrectione exstitit, nomenque suum etiam aliter hominibus manifestare potuit; sed homo *passibilis* esse non potuit, sicut fuit, et ad illam gloriam *sine merito* pervenire. Potuit quidem pervenire ad illam sine *merito passionis*, quia potuit, consumta mortalitate, immortalitatis gloria vestiri, sed non sine *merito iustitiae et caritatis aliarumque virtutum*. Non enim Christus homo esse potuit, in quo *plenitudo virtutum et gratiae* non fuerit; nec virtutes ei inesse potuerunt, cilicio mortalitatis induto, quin per eas mereretur. Habens igitur has virtutes secundum hominem passibilem ac mortalem, non potuit non mereri gloriam immortalitatis; non igitur potuit, factus mortalis, *sine merito* gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis ac manifestationem Dei nominis consequi. Potuit tamen haec[^p378-6] assequi sine *merito passionis*, quia per passionem nil sibi meruit, quod non ante per virtutes meruerit.

### Cap. V. *De causa passionis et mortis Christi.*

Ad quid ergo voluit pati et mori, si ei virtutes ad merendum illa sufficiebant? *Pro te, non pro se.* Quomodo pro me? Ut ipsius passio et mors tibi esset forma et causa: forma virtutis et humilitatis, causa gloriae et libertatis; forma Deo usque ad mortem obediendi, et causa tuae liberationis ac beatitudinis. Meruit enim nobis per mortis ac passionis tolerantiam, quod per praecedentia non meruerat, scilicet aditum paradisi et redemptionem a peccato, a poena, a diabolo; et per mortem eius haec nos adepti sumus, scilicet redemptionem et filiorum gloriae adoptionem. Ipse enim moriendo factus est hostia nostrae liberationis. — Sed quomodo per mortem nos a diabolo et a peccato redemit et aditum gloriae aperuit? Decreverat Deus in mysterio, ut ait Ambrosius[^p378-7], propter primum peccatum non intromitti hominem in paradisum, id est, ad Dei contemplationem non admitti, nisi in uno homine tanta existeret humilitas, quae omnibus suis proficere posset, sicut in primo homine tanta fuit superbia, quae omnibus suis nocuit. Non est autem inventus inter homines aliquis, qui id posset implere, nisi *leo de tribu Iuda, qui aperuit librum et solvit signacula*, implendo in se *omnem iustitiam*, id est consummatissimam hu-

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militatem, qua maior esse non potest. Nam omnes alii homines debitores erant, et vix unicuique sua virtus sufficiebat et humilitas. Nullus ergo eorum hostiam poterat offerre sufficientem nostrae reconciliationi. Sed Christus homo sufficiens et perfecta fuit hostia, qui multo amplius est humiliatus, amaritudinem mortis gustando, quam ille Adam superbiit, per esum ligni vetiti noxia delectatione perfruendo. Si igitur illius superbia omnium exstitit ruina, ipsum de paradiso mittens foras aliisque occludens ianuam; multo magis Christi humilitas, qua mortem gustavit, ingressum regni caelestis omnibus suis, impleto Dei decreto, aperire valuit atque decreti delere chirographum. Ut enim ait Ambrosius[^p379-1]: «Tantum fuit peccatum nostrum, ut salvari non possemus, nisi unigenitus Dei Filius pro nobis moreretur, debitoribus mortis, sed sic dignos nos fecit testamenti et promissae hereditatis». Quod non ita est intelligendum, quasi non alio *modo* salvare nos potuerit quam per mortem suam, sed quod[^p379-2] per aliam *hostiam* non potuit nobis aperiri regni aditus et fieri salus nisi per mortem Unigeniti, cuius tanta fuit, ut dictum est, humilitas et patientia, ut eius merito pateret credentibus in eum aditus regni. Magna ergo in morte Unigeniti praestita sunt nobis, ut liceat nobis redire in patriam, sicut olim in morte summi Pontificis his qui ad civitatem refugii confugerant, secure licebat[^p379-3] ad propria remeare. — Ecce, aliquatenus ostensum est, qualiter per Christi mortem aditus regni sit nobis paratus.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XVIII.

### Chap. I. *Whether Christ merited for himself and for us, and what for himself and what for us.*

Concerning the merit of Christ also nothing must be passed over[^p377-1], about which some are wont to say that he merited not for *himself*, but only for his *members*. He did indeed merit for his *members* redemption from the devil, from sin, from punishment, and the opening of the kingdom, so that, the *fiery sword* being removed, entrance might lie freely open; but he also merited for *himself* the glory of impassibility and immortality, as the Apostle says[^p377-2]: *Christ was made for us obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which cause God also exalted him, and gave him a name which is above every name.* The Apostle clearly says that Christ was on this account exalted through the glory of impassibility, because he was humbled through the obedience of the passion; therefore the humility of the passion was the merit of exaltation, and the exaltation the reward of humility. Hence Augustine[^p377-3], expounding the foresaid chapter, says: «That Christ might be glorified in the resurrection, he was first humbled in the passion; humility is the merit of brightness, brightness is the reward of humility. But all this was done in the form of a servant; for in the form of God there always was and will be brightness». Likewise Ambrose, treating the same chapter, says: «What and how much humility merits, is here shown». — From these testimonies it becomes evident, that Christ through the humility and obedience of the passion merited the glorification of his body, and not that alone, but also the impassibility of his soul. For his soul before death was passible, as his flesh was mortal; but after death, by the merit of humility, both the soul was made impassible, and the flesh immortal. But whether the soul was made impassible when the flesh was made immortal, namely at the very moment of the resurrection, is not certain to us from authority; but either soon after the separation of the flesh the soul was endowed with impassibility, or in the resurrection, when *the flesh flowered again*[^p377-4].

### Chap. II. *That from conception Christ merited for himself the same thing which [he merited] through the passion.*

Nor did Christ merit this only when, obedient to the Father, he underwent the cross, but also from the very conception, from when he was made man, through charity and justice and the other virtues, in the fullness of which he was established according to his humanity, he merited for himself as much as afterward through the endurance of martyrdom. For so great a fullness of spiritual graces was in him, that he could not advance in them; and therefore his soul could not be made better than it was from the beginning of its formation, because it could not advance in merits. Hence Gregory[^p377-5] says: «Christ did not at all have, according to the merit of the soul, anything whereby he could have advanced; but in his members, which we are, he advances daily». — Therefore he merited for himself no more through the gibbet of the cross than he had merited from conception through the grace of the virtues. He did not therefore advance according to the merit of the soul as to the *power of merit*; yet he advanced as to the *number of merits*. For he had more merits in the passion than in the conception; but they were not, in meriting, more of greater power than they had earlier been fewer. Therefore from conception he merited not only the glory of impassibility and immortality of the body, but also the impassibility of the soul. By what? By obedience and a perfect will, which he did not then first have, nor a greater one, when he began to suffer and to die. For he was obedient perfectly[^p377-6] and good according to his humanity, from when he was man. — That soul therefore had some good in itself after death, which it did not have before. Was it then *better* or *more blessed* than before? Far be it that it was *better*, because [it was] not holier, not more heaped with grace; nor was it even *more blessed* in the contemplation of God, in which beatitude chiefly consists. It can nevertheless be said to have been *more blessed* in this, that [it was] from all

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misery immune; from which it cannot be inferred *absolutely* that it was more blessed.

### Chap. III. *On that which is written: He gave him a name which is above every name.*

He merited not only the glory of impassibility and immortality, but also that there be given to him a *name, which is above every name*, namely the honor whereby he is called God. Yet he had this name before death. For he had this name of *God*, inasmuch as he is *God*, from eternity by nature; but inasmuch as he was made *man*, he had it from time by grace. Nevertheless Augustine[^p378-1] says, «that name was given to the man, not to *God*, because he had that name when he was only in the form of God; but when it is said: *For which cause he exalted him and gave him a name, which is above every name*, it is sufficiently apparent for *what* he exalted him, that is, on account of obedience, and in what *form* he was exalted. For in whatever *form* he was crucified, in that he was exalted, and in that a name was given to him, so that with the very *form of a servant* the only-begotten Son of God might be named: this was given to him as to a *man*, which he himself the same *God* already had». This therefore he received through grace, that he himself, being a man or subsisting in the form of a servant, that is, in soul and flesh, should be named and be God. — But did he merit this? For above[^p378-2] it was said, that that man did not merit so great a good; how then is it here said: *On account of obedience this name was given to him*? This is to be understood according to that trope most frequent in Scripture, by which a thing is said to be done, «when it becomes known[^p378-3]». But after the resurrection, what was before was set in evidence, so that men and demons might know. Therefore God gave to him the *manifestation* of that name after the resurrection, but he merited it through the obedience of the passion, who, because he obeyed by suffering, was exalted by rising again, and through this the *name* was manifested. The Lord himself also used this same trope after the resurrection, saying[^p378-4]: *All power is given to me in heaven and in earth*, not that he then first received it, but the power which he had before was then manifested. Moreover Ambrose[^p378-5] says that that name was given to God, not to man, and he seems, according to the surface of the words, opposed to Augustine; but the understanding is not contrary, although it has a different sense. For Ambrose understands it said of the natural giving, by which the Father, eternally begetting, gave to the Son a name which is above every name, namely to be God by nature, because he begot from eternity the Son full and equal to himself, [as] God; which name nevertheless the Apostle says was given to Christ on account of the obedience of the passion; but it is to be understood according to the manner of speaking premised.

### Chap. IV. *Whether Christ could have had without any merit that which he obtained by merit.*

But if it is asked whether Christ could have had that glory of immortality and impassibility and the manifestation of the name of God without any merit; it can soundly be said, that he could have taken up human nature so *glorious* as it was in the resurrection, and could also have manifested his name to men in another way; but he could not be a *passible* man, as he was, and arrive at that glory *without merit*. He could indeed arrive at it without the *merit of the passion*, because he could, mortality being consumed, be clothed with the glory of immortality, but not without the *merit of justice and charity and the other virtues*. For Christ could not be a man in whom there was not the *fullness of virtues and grace*; nor could the virtues be in him, clad in the hair-shirt of mortality, without his meriting by them. Having therefore these virtues according to his passible and mortal humanity, he could not but merit the glory of immortality; therefore he could not, having been made mortal, attain *without merit* the glory of impassibility and immortality and the manifestation of the name of God. Yet he could attain these[^p378-6] without the *merit of the passion*, because through the passion he merited for himself nothing which he had not already merited before through the virtues.

### Chap. V. *On the cause of the passion and death of Christ.*

For what then did he will to suffer and to die, if the virtues sufficed him for meriting those things? *For you, not for himself.* How for me? That his passion and death might be for you a form and a cause: a form of virtue and humility, a cause of glory and freedom; a form of obeying God unto death, and a cause of your liberation and beatitude. For he merited for us, through the endurance of death and passion, what he had not merited through the preceding things, namely the entrance of paradise and redemption from sin, from punishment, from the devil; and through his death we have obtained these things, namely redemption and the adoption of the glory of sons. For he, by dying, was made the victim of our liberation. — But how, through death, did he redeem us from the devil and from sin and open the entrance of glory? God had decreed in mystery, as Ambrose says[^p378-7], that on account of the first sin man should not be brought into paradise, that is, should not be admitted to the contemplation of God, unless in one man there should exist so great a humility, which could profit all his own, just as in the first man there was so great a pride, which harmed all his own. But there was found among men no one who could fulfill this, except the *lion of the tribe of Judah, who opened the book and loosed the seals*, by fulfilling in himself *all justice*, that is, the most consummate hu-

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mility, than which there can be none greater. For all other men were debtors, and his own virtue and humility scarcely sufficed for any one of them. Therefore none of them could offer a victim sufficient for our reconciliation. But Christ, the man, was a sufficient and perfect victim, who was much more humbled, by tasting the bitterness of death, than that Adam was proud, by enjoying with harmful delight the eating of the forbidden tree. If therefore his pride was the ruin of all, casting himself out of paradise and shutting the gate against the others; much more was the humility of Christ, by which he tasted death, able, the decree of God being fulfilled, to open the entrance of the heavenly kingdom to all his own, and to blot out the bond of the decree. For as Ambrose says[^p379-1]: «So great was our sin, that we could not be saved, unless the only-begotten Son of God should die for us, who were debtors of death, but thus he made us worthy of the testament and of the promised inheritance». Which is not to be so understood, as though he could not save us in another *way* than through his death, but that[^p379-2] through another *victim* the entrance of the kingdom could not be opened to us and salvation come to pass except through the death of the Only-begotten, whose humility and patience were so great, as has been said, that by his merit the entrance of the kingdom might lie open to those believing in him. Great things therefore were furnished to us in the death of the Only-begotten, that it might be permitted us to return into our fatherland, just as formerly, at the death of the high priest, it was permitted with safety[^p379-3] to those who had fled to the city of refuge to return to their own. — Behold, it has been in some measure shown how, through the death of Christ, the entrance of the kingdom is prepared for us.

---

la: Codd. nostri *praetereundum*. — Cfr. de hac distinctione Hugo de S. Vict., *Sum. Sent.* tr. I. c. 18. — Infra pro *reserationem* edd. 1, 8 male *resurrectionem*, et pro *libere* ponunt *liber*. — De *ignea romphea* cfr. Gen. 3, 24.

en: Our codices [read] *praetereundum*. — Compare, on this distinction, Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. I, c. 18. — Below, for *reserationem* editions 1, 8 wrongly [read] *resurrectionem*, and for *libere* they put *liber*. — On the *fiery sword* compare Gen. 3:24.

la: Phil. 2, 8. 9. — Superius post *gloriam* edd. 1, 8 adiiciunt *secundum carnem*.

en: Philippians 2:8–9. — Above, after *gloriam*, editions 1, 8 add *secundum carnem*.

la: *Tract.* 104. in Evang. Ioan. (17, 1.) n. 3. Sequens locus est super *Epist. ad Phil.* 2, 9. (inter opera Ambrosii).

en: *Tractate* 104 on the Gospel of John (17:1), n. 3. The following passage is on the *Letter to the Philippians* 2:9 (among the works of Ambrose).

en: Psalm 27:7.

la: Libr. I. *Homil. in Ezech.* hom. 6. n. 8; est etiam in Glossa super Exod. 25, 31, ut insinuant cod. E et ed. 1.

en: Book I, *Homilies on Ezekiel*, hom. 6, n. 8; it is also in the Gloss on Exodus 25:31, as codex E and edition 1 suggest.

la: Vat. cum pluribus edd. *perfectus*, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 3, 7, 8.

en: The Vatican edition with most editions [reads] *perfectus*, the codices and editions 1, 3, 7, 8 opposing.

la: Libr. I. *contr. Maximin.* c. 5, et II. c. 2, sed verba inde extracta verbotenus leguntur in Glossa ad Phil. 2, 9. — Paulo inferius P. Nicolai in sua editione proprio marte verba *nominetur unigenitus* mutavit in *nominatur, intelligatur unigenitus*. Sed Magister suam sententiam paulo inferius satis explicat.

en: Book I, *Against Maximinus*, c. 5, and Book II, c. 2, but the words drawn thence are read word for word in the Gloss on Phil. 2:9. — A little below, P. Nicolai in his edition, on his own initiative, changed the words *nominetur unigenitus* into *nominatur, intelligatur unigenitus*. But the Master explains his meaning sufficiently a little below.

la: Dist. VII. c. 2. fere in fine.

en: Distinction VII, c. 2, nearly at the end.

la: Ita Hugo a S. Vict., *Quaestion. in Epist. ad Phil.* q. 9, unde Magister etiam sequentem propositionem sumsit. — Paulo inferius post *ante erat* cod. B addit *in obscuro*, ed. 6 *obscurum*.

en: So Hugh of St. Victor, *Questions on the Letter to the Philippians* q. 9, whence the Master also took the following proposition. — A little below, after *ante erat*, codex B adds *in obscuro*, edition 6 *obscurum*.

en: Matthew 28:18.

la: Loc. supra cit.

en: The place cited above.

la: Ita codd. A B D E et ed. 6; in aliis *hoc*. Post *per virtutes* edd. 1, 8 addunt *sibi*.

en: So codices A B D E and edition 6; in the others *hoc*. After *per virtutes* editions 1, 8 add *sibi*.

la: *Comment. in Epist. Rom.* 5, 14. (inter opera Ambrosii), secundum sensum. In quo loco post *omnibus suis* pro *proficere* cod. B *sufficere*. Ibi respiciuntur loci Scripturae Apoc. 5, 5; Matth. 3, 15; Gen. 3, 6; denique Coloss. 2, 14.

en: *Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* 5:14 (among the works of Ambrose), according to the sense. In which place, after *omnibus suis*, for *proficere* codex B [reads] *sufficere*. There the Scripture passages Apoc. 5:5; Matt. 3:15; Gen. 3:6; finally Coloss. 2:14 are referred to.

la: In Glossa ad Hebr. 9, 15. apud Lyranum, sumta ex Alcuino (ibid.), qui, paucis mutatis, eam sumsit ex S. Chrysostomo (ad eundem locum). Ambrosius autem (in Ps. 47. n. 17.) tantum dicit: «Ut sanguine suo mundum lavaret, cuius peccatum nullo alio modo potuisset aboleri».

en: In the Gloss on Hebrews 9:15 in Lyra, taken from Alcuin (ibid.), who, with a few changes, took it from St. Chrysostom (on the same place). But Ambrose (on Psalm 47, n. 17) says only: «That he might wash the world with his blood, whose sin could by no other means have been abolished».

la: Ita codd. A B C E et edd. 1, 8; in aliis *quia*.

en: So codices A B C E and editions 1, 8; in the others *quia*.

la: Deest in pluribus codd. et edd., refragantibus codd. D E et edd. 1, 8. — Hic respicitur Iosue 20, 6.

en: It is lacking in most codices and editions, the codices D E and editions 1, 8 opposing. — Here Joshua 20:6 is referred to.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{377,378,379}-{L,R}-*.png` (read L-column then R-column, body bands then footer bands), per the Vol II/III override (PDF authoritative over the cascade-shattered IA djvu OCR). Raw span 26316→26458 in `raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`. English is a fresh literal translation. This chunk is the **Littera Magistri** (Lombard's text) for Distinctio XVIII — Cap. I–V — distinct from the Bonaventure COMMENTARIUS that follows.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart):**
- p.377 (Cap. I–II): 6 notes `[^p377-1..6]`. Note 1 = *Codd. nostri praetereundum* + Hugo de S. Vict. cross-ref + Gen. 3,24 *ignea romphea*; note 4 = Psal. 27,7 (*caro refloruit*); note 6 = *perfectus*/*perfecte* cod. variant. (The two L-column footnotes above the *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* heading — *Pauci codd. sensibili…* and *Hic a. 2…* — belong to the d.17 commentary that occupies the top of p.377, NOT to this littera.)
- p.378 (Cap. III–V): 7 notes `[^p378-1..7]`. Note 1 = *contr. Maximin.* + P. Nicolai conjecture; note 4 = Matth. 28,18; note 7 = *Comment. in Rom.* 5,14 with Apoc./Matt./Gen./Coloss. cross-refs.
- p.379 (Cap. V end): 3 notes `[^p379-1..3]`. Note 1 = Glossa ad Hebr. 9,15 / Alcuin / Chrysostom / Ambrose; note 3 (*Deest in pluribus codd.* + Iosue 20,6) sits in the R-column footer band but belongs to this littera. The R-column *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* block (notes 1–2) belongs to the COMMENTARIUS, not the littera.

**Page-split (body):** Cap. II runs across the p.377→p.378 break (closing "…quia ab omni / miseria immunis"); Cap. V runs across the p.378→p.379 break (closing "…consummatissimam hu- / militatem").

**Hand-offs picked up:** NONE. The d.17→d.18 seam is clean — d.17-dubia's DUB. IV Respondeo concludes grammatically (*…secundum viam priorem.*) before Cap. I opens; the "DISTINCTIO XVIII" string at the top of p.377 is the page-top running head, not the seam.

**Hand-off forwarded → d18-divisio:** The **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII / DIVISIO TEXTUS** begins at **raw line 26462** (printed p.379 R-column, immediately after this littera's closing *…nobis paratus.* at raw 26458). The littera carries NO commentary footer downstream: p.379's R-column *NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM* block (notes 1–2) plus the "Deest…"/Iosue note belong to the commentary apparatus and are NOT this littera's (except note 3, which is the littera's and is captured here). The d18-divisio chunk picks up the p.379 commentary opener + its own apparatus.

**[?] flags:** NONE — all three pages legible at 450 dpi.


title: Dist. 18, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius et divisio textus distinctionis XVIII

title_alt: Commentary and division of the text of Distinction XVIII

source_text:
<!-- page 379 -->

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

*De usu voluntatis Christi, qui consistit in exercitio merendi.*

*De merito Christi etiam praetermittendum non est etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de voluntate Christi. In hac parte agit de usu voluntatis, qui consistit in exercitio merendi. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas partes. In quarum prima agit de merito Christi in se. Secundo vero agit de ipso ad nostram utilitatem ordinato, ibi : *Ad quid ergo voluit pati et mori* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in quatuor partes secundum quatuor quaestiones, quas determinat. In prima determinat Magister, cui meruerit principaliter, ostendens, quod aliquid meruit sibi. In secunda vero determinat, quando mereri incepit, ostendens, quod ab instanti conceptionis, ibi : *Nec solum hoc meruit* etc. In tertia vero determinat, quid meruerit, ostendens, quod non tantum gloriam impassibilitatis, sed etiam exaltationem nominis, ibi : *Nec tantum gloriam impassibilitatis* etc. In quarta vero determinat, qua necessitate meruerit[^p379-1], ibi : *Si vero quaeritur, utrum Christus* etc.

Secunda vero pars principalis dividitur in duas partes. In quarum prima proponit efficaciam meriti Christi respectu nostri. In secunda vero multiplici auctoritate confirmat, ibi : *Sed quomodo per mortem nos a diabolo redemit* etc. Subdivisiones[^p379-2] partim manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis, in qua agitur de merito Christi, incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

Primo quaeritur de ipsius merito quantum ad usum sive exercitium.

Secundo vero quantum ad praemium sive fructum.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum aliquid meruerit post conceptionem.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquid meruerit in passione.

english:
<!-- page 379 -->

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII.

*On the use of Christ's will, which consists in the exercise of meriting.*

*"Concerning the merit of Christ also it must not be passed over," etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of the will of Christ. In this part he treats of the use of the will, which consists in the exercise of meriting. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he treats of the merit of Christ in himself. Secondly he treats of it as ordered to our benefit, there: *"To what end, then, did he will to suffer and die,"* etc.

The first part is divided into four parts according to the four questions which he determines. In the first the Master determines for whom he merited principally, showing that he merited something for himself. In the second he determines when he began to merit, showing that it was from the instant of conception, there: *"Nor did he merit this alone,"* etc. In the third he determines what he merited, showing that it was not only the glory of impassibility, but also the exaltation of the name, there: *"Nor only the glory of impassibility,"* etc. In the fourth he determines by what necessity he merited[^p379-1], there: *"But if it is asked whether Christ,"* etc.

The second principal part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he sets forth the efficacy of Christ's merit with respect to us. In the second he confirms it by manifold authority, there: *"But how did he redeem us from the devil by his death,"* etc. The subdivisions[^p379-2] are partly evident in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, in which there is treatment of the merit of Christ, a question arises here concerning two things.

First, there is inquiry concerning his merit as to its use or exercise.

Secondly, as to the reward or fruit.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First, it is asked whether Christ merited from the instant of conception.

Secondly, it is asked whether he merited anything after the conception.

Thirdly, it is asked whether he merited anything in the passion.

la: Cod. O *In quarta ostendit, quando et qualiter meruerit.*

en: Codex O: *"In the fourth he shows when and how he merited."*

la: Codd. A K adiiciunt *autem.*

en: Codices A and K add *autem* ("however").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed p. 379 (PDF p. 401; offset pdf = printed + 22), bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p379-{L,R}-*`. Running-head text confirms p. 379. The COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM occupy the lower R-column of p. 379, immediately after the close of the d18-littera. Raw OCR span 26462→26507.

**Page-split map.** Single printed page (p. 379). The chunk ends just before the `380 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` page break; ART. I QUAESTIO I (the next chunk, d18-a1-q1) begins on p. 380 (raw 26508).

**Question counts (verified against TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + each ARTICULUS/QUAESTIO opener in raw):**
- **ART. I** (*De merito quoad usum sive exercitium*) = **3 questions** (matches "Circa primum quaeruntur tria"):
  1. *Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis* (raw 26512)
  2. *Utrum Christus meruerit aliquid post conceptionem* (raw 26691)
  3. *Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione* (raw 26873)
- **ART. II** (*De merito Christi quoad fructum vel praemium*) = **3 questions** ("circa hoc quaeruntur tria"):
  1. *Utrum Christus sibi meruerit Dei fruitionem sive praemium substantiale* (raw 27004)
  2. *Utrum Christus meruerit sui corporis glorificationem* (raw 27153)
  3. *Utrum Christus meruerit nobis ianuae apertionem* (raw 27299)

This matches the skeleton set (a1-q1/q2/q3 + a2-q1/q2/q3), all 6 titles confirmed. No mismatch.

**DUBIA — MISSING CHUNK FLAG.** Distinction XVIII **does** have a DUBIA block: `DIST. XVIII. DUBIA.` at raw 27530 (printed page after p. 379, between ART. II q3 and DISTINCTIO XIX at raw 27636/27669). The d.18 skeleton set has **no** d18-dubia chunk. **A `bon-sent-III-d18-dubia.md` chunk must be created** to cover this block (raw ~27530→27635); it is currently unaccounted for.

**Hand-offs picked up (from d18-littera).** The p.379 R-column **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** block (notes 1–2) was forwarded to this chunk and is captured here as `[^p379-1]` and `[^p379-2]`. The other p.379 footers (left-col Glossa-ad-Hebr. note 1 + *Ita codd. ABCE* note 2, and right-col *Deest in pluribus codd.* / Iosue 20,6 note 3) are the LITTERA's own page-379 apparatus and remain in d18-littera — not duplicated here.

**Hand-off forwarded (to d18-a1-q1).** ART. I QUAESTIO I (*Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis*) begins at **raw 26508**, printed p. 380. The divisio carries no footer onward (its only apparatus, the NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, is fully consumed here). The a1-q1 chunk picks up p.380's own footer sequence fresh.

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands are fully legible.