title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Articulus I. *De merito quoad usum sive exercitium.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ieremiae trigesimo primo[^p380-1]: *Novum faciet Dominus super terram, mulier circumdabit virum*, ergo Christus fuit vir ab instanti conceptionis; sed constat, quod non fuerit vir quantum ad aetatem: ergo fuit vir quantum ad animi vigorem: habuit igitur quantum ad animam virtutem et operationem viri perfecti. Sed haec consistit in merendo: ergo Christus meruit a suae conceptionis primordio.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Gregorii et Magistri in littera[^p380-2]: «Non solum meruit Christus, quando Patri obediens crucem subiit, sed ab ipsa conceptione, ex quo homo factus est». Et hoc ipsum potest elici ab auctoritate Gregorii consequente.

3. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis suae fuit beatus; sed beatitudo est habitus in actu[^p380-3]: ergo a primo instanti conceptionis suae habuit actum gloriosum. Sed qua ratione per gloriam habuit actum gloriosum, eadem ratione per gratiam habuit actum virtuosum: ergo videtur, quod a primordio suae conceptionis Christus meruit.

4. Item, lux propter suam nobilitatem et actualitatem[^p380-4] in eodem instanti incipit esse et lucere: ergo si anima Christi multo nobilior et potentior et deiformior est, videtur, quod in instanti eodem, in quo incepit esse, coepit habere operationem sibi debitam. Sed talis est operatio meritoria: ergo etc.

5. Item, sicut animae nostrae se habent ad demeritum, ita anima Christi se habet ad meritum; sed animae nostrae in ipso instanti infusionis habent reatum culpae originalis[^p380-5]: ergo anima Christi ab ipso instanti conceptionis et infusionis habuit meritum virtutis.

**Sed contra:**
1. «Prius est esse quam agere[^p380-6]»: in oppositum si ergo *mereri* est *agere*, anima Christi prius habuit esse completum, quam habuerit meriti usum: ergo non meruit a primordio conceptionis.

2. Item, omne quod exit ab otio in actum, prius quiescit, quam agat[^p380-7], et omne tale prius est, quam operetur; sed anima Christi incepit mereri: ergo de non operante facta est operans: ergo in merendo exivit ab otio in actum: ergo prius quievit: ergo non meruit ab instanti conceptionis.

3. Item, meritum est a voluntate deliberativa, in quantum deliberativa est; sed ubi est deliberatio, ibi est collatio[^p380-8]; ubi autem haec est, ibi est temporis successio: ergo non videtur, quod meritum Christi potuerit esse a suae conceptionis principio.

4. Item, Angelus non peccavit in primo instanti suae creationis; et tamen ita cito usum liberi arbitrii habuit, sicut aliqua anima rationalis, cum creatus esset in cognitionis perfectione[^p380-9]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nec anima Christi ab instanti conceptionis mereri potuerit.

5. Item, omne illud, quod anima Christi habuit a primordio conceptionis suae, habuit ab alio; sed meritum ortum habuit a libero arbitrio gratia informato: ergo non videtur, quod usum meriti habuit ab ipso conceptionis primordio.

> **Conclusio.** Christus certo meruit ab instanti suae conceptionis, si loquamur de habitu, et probabiliter etiam quoad actum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ad perfectionem meriti duo concurrunt, videlicet ipse habitus gratuitus et ipsius

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habitus actus vel usus[^p381-1]. Si ergo loquamur de merito quantum ad *habitum*, qui reddit habentem dignum praemio, sic, absque dubio concedendum est, quod a principio suae conceptionis Christus meruit, quia omni bono et praemio dignus fuit propter plenitudinem gratiae, quam Deus animae suae contulit et infudit[^p381-2]. Et ab hoc non discordat aliquis doctor catholicus. — Si autem fiat sermo de merito quantum ad virtutis *actum* sive usum, in quo proprie attenditur completa ratio merendi, sic est duplex modus dicendi: unus, quod Christus meruit statim post principium conceptionis, non autem in ipso primo instanti. Et ratio huius est, quia operatio debet sequi *esse* substantiae; ideo necesse fuit, animam Christi prius esse quam agere, praecipue eo actionis genere, quod spectat ad usum voluntatis deliberativae; talis autem est actus meritorius. Et ideo si dicatur alicubi, Christum a primordio suae conceptionis meruisse; dicunt verum esse, secundum quod *a* dicit ordinem ad principium *extra* sumtum, non *intra*[^p381-3].

Est et alius modus dicendi, quod Christus quantum ad virtutis *usum* et actum meruit in ipso conceptionis primordio; hoc enim datum est ei per gratiam perfectissimam, ut in primo instanti, in quo incepit esse, non tantum haberet habitus virtutum, sed etiam actum, unde simul coepit esse et usum comprehensionis habere; et anima Christi in eodem instanti habuit creari et infundi, et gratia informari et exire in actum meriti, qui quidem consistit in motu bonae voluntatis.

Uterque tamen istorum modorum satis est rationabilis, sed primus facilior est et communior et secundum ipsum plana ad obiecta responsio. — Nam quod dicitur Christus ab instanti conceptionis suae fuisse vir, et quod dicitur ab instanti conceptionis suae meruisse; hoc dicitur quantum ad *habitum*; et hoc innuit ipsum verbum Gregorii[^p381-4], cum dicit: «Non sibi plus Christus meruit per crucis patibulum, quam ab ipsa conceptione per gratiam virtutum». Notabile est, quod dicit «per virtutum gratiam», non per virtutum usum. Habuit enim gratiam a principio, ita quod in ipso principio; usum vero habuit a principio, ita quod post principium. — Et si tu obiicias de beatitudine et de luce[^p381-5], qui hoc tenent generaliter respondent, quod in omni creatura esse praecedit operari tam in corporali quam in spirituali, tam in actu naturae quam in actu gratiae, tam etiam in actu gratiae quam in actu gloriae. — Nec obstat illud quod obiicitur[^p381-6] de merito animae. Anima enim habet originale peccatum in sua infusione per modum habitus, non autem quantum ad actum. — Et sic secundum istam viam patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.

Si quis autem velit aliam viam tenere, videlicet quod Christus in primo instanti suae creationis[^p381-7] habuit usum liberi arbitrii propter excellentissimum gratiae donum et quantum ad actum *viatoris* et quantum ad actum *comprehensoris*; satis faciliter poterit ad obiecta in contrarium responderi.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod prius est *esse* quam *agere*; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, si intelligatur de prioritate quantum ad ordinem *naturae*. Si autem intelligatur de prioritate quantum ad *durationem*, non habet veritatem, secundum quod expresse dicit Augustinus octavo super Genesim ad litteram[^p381-8], ubi dicit, quod in luce corporali *esse* non praecedit *agere*; et in Angelis, de quibus dicit, quod in primo instanti suae conditionis eas res cognoverunt, quae simul cum eis in *esse* prodierunt. Et in sexto de Trinitate[^p381-9] dicit, quod «si ignis esset aeternus, splendor ab igne egrediens esset aeternus». Et ideo satis rationabiliter potest dici, quod illud non habet veritatem de ordine durationis, sed de ordine naturae.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod sub-

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stantia, quae incipit agere, exit ab otio in actum; dicendum, quod illud non habet generaliter veritatem, nisi intelligatur de operatione, sine qua substantia operans potest esse; de alia autem non habet veritatem, pro eo quod creatura simul incipit esse et operari; nec incipit operari, quia exit ab otio in actum, sed quia exit a *non esse* in *esse*[^p382-1]. Hoc modo potest intelligi in Christo quantum ad *actum gratiae* et *virtutis*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum est a voluntate deliberativa; dicendum, quod quamvis secundum *processum naturae* deliberatio indigeat successione et tempore; tamen secundum *plenitudinem gratiae* et *gloriae* possibile est ipsi animae in instanti discernere, quod alias non posset facere «sine continuo et tempore[^p382-2]». Et sic per *deiformitatem gloriae* intellectus potest simul plura intelligere, quamvis per *naturam* non intelligatur nisi unum solum simul et semel. Et quia anima Christi erat in plenitudine gratiae et gloriae; hinc est, quod non indigebat mora temporis ad discernendum, quid eligendum, quid fugiendum, quid amandum, quid odiendum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelo, dicendum, quod non est simile; non enim sic poterat simul et semel cognoscere plura, secundum quod anima Christi cum plenitudine gratiae. Praeterea, *peccatum* dicit motum deordinatum et contrarium naturali rectitudini, sed *meritum* dicit naturalis rectitudinis complementum; et licet non decuerit, aliquam substantiam creari cum actu contrario rectitudini naturali, decuit tamen creari in actu et cum actu consonante ipsi naturae et eam complente, maxime illam, in qua Deus a primordio suae conditionis plenissime habitavit, sicut fuit anima Christi[^p382-3].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod inest a primordio conditionis inest aliunde; dicendum, quod si illud intelligatur praecise, ita quod anima Christi se habeat solummodo per modum suscipientis et nullo modo cooperantis, non habet[^p382-4] veritatem. Potuit enim ipsi animae dari, ut cooperaretur Deo statim, cum fuit, et ita quod aliquid haberet in se, quod non tantum esset aliunde, verum etiam a se; et sic potuit esse in actu virtutis et exercitio meriti.

Si quis igitur velit sustinere hunc modum dicendi, non videtur multum deviare a probabilitate rationis nec etiam a pietate fidei, quae, quanto plus potest, ipsi Christo gratiae et honoris attribuit.

english:
### Article I. *On merit with respect to its use or exercise.*
### Question I. *Whether Christ merited from the instant of conception.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether Christ merited from the instant of conception. And that he did, it seems.

1. Jeremiah thirty-one[^p380-1]: *The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth, a woman shall compass a man*, therefore Christ was a man from the instant of conception; but it is agreed that he was not a man with respect to age: therefore he was a man with respect to vigor of soul: he had therefore, with respect to the soul, the virtue and operation of a perfect man. But this consists in meriting: therefore Christ merited from the beginning of his conception.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] from the authority of Gregory and of the Master in the text[^p380-2]: «Christ did not only merit when, obedient to the Father, he underwent the cross, but from the very conception, from when he was made man». And this same thing can be drawn from the consequent authority of Gregory.

3. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed; but blessedness is a habit in act[^p380-3]: therefore from the first instant of his conception he had a glorious act. But by the same reason by which through glory he had a glorious act, by the same reason through grace he had a virtuous act: therefore it seems that from the beginning of his conception Christ merited.

4. Likewise, light, on account of its nobility and actuality[^p380-4], in the same instant begins to be and to shine: therefore if the soul of Christ is much more noble and more powerful and more deiform, it seems that in the same instant in which it began to be, it began to have the operation due to it. But such is meritorious operation: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, just as our souls stand with respect to demerit, so the soul of Christ stands with respect to merit; but our souls in the very instant of infusion have the guilt of original fault[^p380-5]: therefore the soul of Christ from the very instant of conception and infusion had the merit of virtue.

**On the contrary:**
1. «Being is prior to acting[^p380-6]»: to the opposite — if therefore *to merit* is *to act*, the soul of Christ first had complete being before it had the use of merit: therefore it did not merit from the beginning of conception.

2. Likewise, everything that passes from rest into act, first rests before it acts[^p380-7], and everything of this kind is prior before it operates; but the soul of Christ began to merit: therefore from non-operating it was made operating: therefore in meriting it passed from rest into act: therefore it first rested: therefore it did not merit from the instant of conception.

3. Likewise, merit is from the deliberative will insofar as it is deliberative; but where there is deliberation, there is comparison[^p380-8]; and where this is, there is succession of time: therefore it does not seem that the merit of Christ could be from the principle of his conception.

4. Likewise, the Angel did not sin in the first instant of his creation; and yet he had the use of free choice as quickly as any rational soul, since he was created in the perfection of cognition[^p380-9]: therefore by equal reason it seems that neither could the soul of Christ merit from the instant of conception.

5. Likewise, everything that the soul of Christ had from the beginning of its conception, it had from another; but merit took its origin from free choice informed by grace: therefore it does not seem that it had the use of merit from the very beginning of conception.

> **Conclusion.** Christ certainly merited from the instant of his conception, if we speak of the habit, and probably also with respect to act.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that two things concur for the perfection of merit, namely the gratuitous habit itself and the

act or use of that habit[^p381-1]. If therefore we speak of merit with respect to the *habit*, which renders its possessor worthy of reward, thus, without doubt it must be conceded that from the principle of his conception Christ merited, because he was worthy of every good and reward on account of the fullness of grace which God conferred and infused into his soul[^p381-2]. And no catholic doctor disagrees with this. — But if the discourse is about merit with respect to the *act* or use of virtue, in which the complete account of meriting is properly considered, thus there is a twofold manner of speaking: one, that Christ merited immediately after the principle of conception, but not in the very first instant. And the reason for this is that operation must follow the *being* of substance; therefore it was necessary that the soul of Christ be prior to acting, especially in that genus of action which pertains to the use of the deliberative will; but such is the meritorious act. And therefore if it is said anywhere that Christ merited from the beginning of his conception; they say it is true, according as *from* denotes an order to a principle taken *outside*, not *within*[^p381-3].

There is also another manner of speaking, that Christ with respect to the *use* and act of virtue merited in the very beginning of conception; for this was given to him through most perfect grace, that in the first instant in which he began to be, he might have not only the habits of the virtues, but also the act, whence he simultaneously began to be and to have the use of comprehension; and the soul of Christ in the same instant had to be created and infused, and to be informed by grace and to pass into the act of merit, which indeed consists in the motion of the good will.

Each of these manners, however, is sufficiently reasonable, but the first is easier and more common, and according to it the response to the objections is plain. — For as to what is said, that Christ from the instant of his conception was a man, and that he is said to have merited from the instant of his conception; this is said with respect to the *habit*; and this the very word of Gregory[^p381-4] suggests, when he says: «Christ did not merit more for himself through the gibbet of the cross than from the very conception through the grace of the virtues». It is notable that he says «through the grace of the virtues», not through the use of the virtues. For he had grace from the principle, so that in the very principle; but he had use from the principle, so that after the principle. — And if you object concerning blessedness and concerning light[^p381-5], those who hold this generally respond that in every creature being precedes operating, both in the corporeal and in the spiritual, both in the act of nature and in the act of grace, and even in the act of grace as much as in the act of glory. — Nor does that which is objected[^p381-6] about the merit of the soul stand in the way. For the soul has original sin in its infusion by way of habit, but not with respect to act. — And thus according to this way the response to all the objections is clear.

But if anyone should wish to hold another way, namely that Christ in the first instant of his creation[^p381-7] had the use of free choice on account of the most excellent gift of grace, both with respect to the act of the *wayfarer* and with respect to the act of the *comprehensor*; he will be able quite easily to respond to the objections to the contrary.

1. For to that which is first objected, that *being* is prior to *acting*; it must be said that that holds true if it is understood of priority with respect to the order of *nature*. But if it is understood of priority with respect to *duration*, it does not hold true, according as Augustine expressly says in the eighth book *On Genesis according to the Letter*[^p381-8], where he says that in corporeal light *being* does not precede *acting*; and concerning the Angels, of whom he says that in the first instant of their condition they knew those things which came forth into *being* together with them. And in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^p381-9] he says that «if fire were eternal, the splendor going forth from the fire would be eternal». And therefore it can be said quite reasonably that that does not hold true of the order of duration, but of the order of nature.

2. But to that which is objected, that a sub-

stance which begins to act passes from rest into act; it must be said that that does not hold true generally, unless it is understood of an operation without which the operating substance can be; but of another [operation] it does not hold true, for the reason that a creature simultaneously begins to be and to operate; nor does it begin to operate because it passes from rest into act, but because it passes from *non-being* into *being*[^p382-1]. In this way it can be understood in Christ with respect to the *act of grace* and *of virtue*.

3. To that which is objected, that merit is from the deliberative will; it must be said that although according to the *process of nature* deliberation needs succession and time; nevertheless according to the *fullness of grace* and *of glory* it is possible for the soul itself to discern in an instant, which otherwise it could not do «without continuum and time[^p382-2]». And thus through the *deiformity of glory* the intellect can understand many things at once, although through *nature* it understands only one thing at one time and once. And because the soul of Christ was in the fullness of grace and glory; hence it is that it did not need a delay of time to discern what was to be chosen, what to be fled, what to be loved, what to be hated.

4. To that which is objected about the Angel, it must be said that it is not similar; for it could not so know many things at one time and once, as could the soul of Christ with the fullness of grace. Moreover, *sin* denotes a disordered motion contrary to natural rectitude, but *merit* denotes the complement of natural rectitude; and although it was not fitting that any substance be created with an act contrary to natural rectitude, it was nevertheless fitting that it be created in act and with an act consonant with the nature itself and completing it, especially that one in which God from the beginning of its condition most fully dwelt, as was the soul of Christ[^p382-3].

5. To that which is objected, that what is present from the beginning of condition is present from elsewhere; it must be said that if that is understood precisely, so that the soul of Christ stands solely by way of receiving and in no way of cooperating, it does not hold[^p382-4] true. For it could be given to the soul itself that it cooperate with God immediately, when it was, and so that it have something in itself which was not only from elsewhere, but also from itself; and thus it could be in the act of virtue and the exercise of merit.

If therefore anyone wishes to maintain this manner of speaking, he does not seem to deviate much from the probability of reason nor even from the piety of faith, which, as much as it can, attributes grace and honor to Christ himself.

la: Vers. 22. Argumentum, quod ex hoc loco deducitur, est secundum Hieron. in hunc loc. et Bernard., Homil. 2. super *Missus est*, n. 9; de quo cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 3. in corp. et p. II. a. 3. q. I. ad 2. — Pro *ergo Christus fuit* edd. *videtur ergo, quod Christus fuerit*. Paulo inferius pro *sed haec consistit* cod. bb *sed haec consistunt*.

en: Verse 22. The argument deduced from this passage is according to Jerome on this passage and Bernard, Homily 2 on *Missus est*, n. 9; concerning which cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 3 in the body and p. II, a. 3, q. I, ad 2. — For *therefore Christ was* the editions [read] *it seems therefore that Christ was*. A little below, for *but this consists* codex bb [reads] *but these consist*.

la: Hic c. 2, ubi et verba Gregorii afferuntur.

en: Here c. 2, where also the words of Gregory are adduced.

la: Vide supra pag. 310, nota 2.

en: See above p. 310, note 2.

la: Pro *actualitatem* codd. F I T X bb et alii partim *actuitatem*, partim *activitatem*, codd. G L aa et edd. 1, 2 *acuitatem*, Vat. *actualitatem sive activitatem*. Paulo inferius pro *in instanti* codd. E H T *ab instanti*.

en: For *actuality* codices F I T X bb and others [read] partly *actuity*, partly *activity*, codices G L aa and editions 1, 2 *acuity*, the Vatican [edition] *actuality or activity*. A little below, for *in the instant* codices E H T [read] *from the instant*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2. — Subinde pro *ab ipso* edd. *a primo*.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 30, a. I, q. 2. — Thereupon for *from the very* the editions [read] *from the first*.

la: Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.): *Semper etenim ex eo quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente... movens autem actu iam est.* Cfr. III. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.) et tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7. Hilar., XI. de Trin. n. 19. ait: *Meruisse aliquid posterius est, quam esse qui possit mereri. Mereri enim eius est, qui sibi ipsi meriti acquirendi auctor existat.* — Mox pro *quam habuerit* edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. *quam habuit*.

en: Aristotle, IX *Metaphysics* text 13 (VIII c. 8): *For always, from that which is in potency, there comes to be a being in act from an existing being in act... but the mover is already in act.* Cf. III *Physics* text 17 (c. 2) and tome I p. 84, note 7. Hilary, XI *On the Trinity* n. 19 says: *To have merited something is posterior to being one who can merit. For to merit belongs to him who is the author for himself of acquiring merit.* — Presently for *than it had* editions 1, 2 with many codices [read] *than it had* [habuit].

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 4.): *Neque faber a materia [ferri patitur], sed ab illo haec; faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.*

en: Aristotle, II *On the Soul* text 45 (c. 4): *Nor does the smith suffer from the matter [of the iron], but this [matter does] from him; but the smith is changed only into act out of rest.*

la: Vide supra pag. 375, nota I. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 330, nota 9.

en: See above p. 375, note I. — Concerning the major [premise] cf. above p. 330, note 9.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 90: *Meritum boni consistit penes liberum arbitrium occasionaliter, penes virtutem formaliter, penes motum virtutis essentialiter, penes gratiam efficaciter, penes opus instrumentaliter. Libertas enim arbitrii occasio est meriti; penes enim liberum arbitrium est velle vel nolle; nec ipsum est efficiens causa, sed ad hoc faciens, non sufficiens. Virtus vero est causa formalis meriti, ex qua tanquam ex forma procedit motus, quo meremur. Ipse autem motus essentialiter meritum est, quia penes ipsum motum proprie consistit meritum. Gratia vero efficit, quod ipse motus est meritum; sine gratia enim nullus motus vel opus erit meritum; et ita penes gratiam consistit meritum efficaciter. Opus exterius est quasi causa instrumentalis meriti, et ita penes ipsum opus consistit ipsum meritum instrumentaliter.*

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 90: *The merit of the good consists in free choice occasionally, in virtue formally, in the motion of virtue essentially, in grace efficaciously, in the work instrumentally. For the liberty of choice is the occasion of merit; for it belongs to free choice to will or not to will; nor is it itself an efficient cause, but a contributing cause to this, not a sufficient one. Virtue, however, is the formal cause of merit, from which, as from a form, proceeds the motion by which we merit. But the motion itself is essentially merit, because merit properly consists in the motion itself. Grace, however, brings it about that the motion itself is merit; for without grace no motion or work will be merit; and so merit consists in grace efficaciously. The exterior work is as it were the instrumental cause of merit, and so merit itself consists in the work itself instrumentally.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 13. a. I. q. 1. et 3.

en: Cf. above d. 13, a. I, q. 1 and 3.

la: Ita Alex. Hal., cuius verba vide hic in scholio. — Paulo superius post *secundum quod* in Vat. desideratur praepositio *a*, pro qua edd. 1, 2, substituerunt *anima*. Aliquanto inferius pro *habitus virtutum* edd. nec non aliquot codd. exhibent *habitum virtutum*, et proxime post pro *actum* cod. O *actus*.

en: Thus Alex. Hal., whose words see here in the scholion. — A little above, after *according as* the preposition *from* [a] is lacking in the Vatican [edition], in place of which editions 1, 2 substituted *soul* [anima]. Somewhat below, for *habits of the virtues* the editions and also some codices exhibit *habit of the virtues*, and immediately after, for *act* codex O [reads] *acts*.

la: Vel potius Magistri (hic c. 2.), ex Gregorii verbis hoc inferentis, ut Guliel. Estius in III. Sent. d. 18. § 1. observat dicens: *Ex quo [Gregorii verbo] recte infert Magister, Christum non plus meruisse per crucis patibulum, quam a conceptione meruit per gratiam virtutum. Quamvis enim profecerit quantum ad numerum meritorum, prout successu temporis opera alia aliis et quidem maiora accedebant, non tamen proficiebat quantum ad virtutem meriti. Aequalitas enim gratiae aequalitatem meriti omnibus eius operibus conciliabat.*

en: Or rather of the Master (here c. 2.), inferring this from the words of Gregory, as Guliel. Estius in III Sent. d. 18, § 1 observes, saying: *From which [word of Gregory] the Master rightly infers that Christ did not merit more through the gibbet of the cross than he merited from the conception through the grace of the virtues. For although he advanced with respect to the number of merits, inasmuch as with the succession of time some works were added to others and indeed greater ones, he nevertheless did not advance with respect to the virtue of the merit. For the equality of grace reconciled equality of merit to all his works.*

la: Vide fundam. 3. et 4. — Mox pro *operari* cod. O *operationem*.

en: See fundament 3 and 4. — Presently for *to operate* codex O [reads] *operation*.

la: In fundam. 5. — Pro *de merito* cod. C conformiter ad fundam. allegat *de demerito*.

en: In fundament 5. — For *concerning merit* codex C, conformably to the fundament, alleges *concerning demerit*.

la: Pro *creationis* edd. *conceptionis*, et paulo inferius *respondere* pro *responderi*.

en: For *creation* the editions [read] *conception*, and a little below *respondere* for *responderi*.

la: Cap. 12. n. 26. August. verba videsis tom. I. pag. 186, nota 9. Edd. cum multis codd. allegant lib. 3, ubi c. 4. n. 10, c. 18. n. 36. et c. 23. n. 46. altera Augustini sententia hic allata invenitur, scil. de Angelorum cognitione, de qua cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3. q. I. et d. 13. a. 1. q. I. — De prioritate naturae et durationis vide supra pag. 94, nota 4. — Paulo inferius pro *quae simul* codd. G H L T V Y aa contra mentem argumenti et sententiam Augustini *non simul*.

en: Chapter 12, n. 26. The words of Augustine see in tome I p. 186, note 9. The editions with many codices allege book 3, where in c. 4, n. 10, c. 18, n. 36, and c. 23, n. 46 the other opinion of Augustine here adduced is found, namely concerning the cognition of the Angels, concerning which cf. also II Sent. d. 4, a. 3, q. I, and d. 13, a. 1, q. I. — Concerning the priority of nature and of duration see above p. 94, note 4. — A little below, for *which together* codices G H L T V Y aa [read], against the mind of the argument and the opinion of Augustine, *not together*.

la: Cap. I. n. I. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 115, nota 4.

en: Chapter I, n. I. Cf. tome II p. 115, note 4.

la: Exempla vide in solut. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro *de alia autem* non pauci codd. perperam *de illa autem*.

en: See the examples in the solution to 1. — A little before, for *but of another* not a few codices wrongly [read] *but of that*.

la: Aristot., de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1. docet, quod propter dependentiam intellectus nostri in cognoscendo a phantasmatibus, quae respiciunt sensibilia singularia, «non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore, quae non in tempore sunt». — De propos. seq. cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 1, et q. 2. fundam. 1. et in fine corp. (resp. ad fundam. 6.). — Subinde pro *Et sic* non pauci codd. *Et sicut*, codd. A I *Sicut*, cod. D *Et sicut patet*. Paulo superius pro *processum naturae deliberatio indigeat* cod. A *processum naturae deliberantem* [deliberativae?] *indigeat ratio*.

en: Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminiscence* c. 1, teaches that on account of the dependence of our intellect in knowing upon phantasms, which regard singular sensibles, «it does not happen that one understands anything without continuum nor without time, [things] which are not in time». — Concerning the following proposition cf. above d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, and q. 2 fundament 1 and at the end of the body (response to fundament 6.). — Thereupon for *And thus* [Et sic] not a few codices [read] *And as* [Et sicut], codices A I *As* [Sicut], codex D *And as is clear*. A little above, for *the process of nature, deliberation needs* codex A [reads] *the process of nature deliberating* [deliberative?] *reason needs*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 3. et 4.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, fundament 3 and 4.

la: Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *habuit*.

en: Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *it had* [habuit]. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In tota hac distinctione multa supponuntur, quae a theologis de merito eiusdemque speciebus et conditionibus solent tractari, et quae etiam a S. Bonav. in 1. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. I; II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. et 3. (vide ibi scholion), d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1-3, et III. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. q. 1-3. iam explicata, vel saltem tacta sunt. Specialim autem supponitur, quod omnes conditiones ad merendum requisitae sufficienter fuerint in Christo, et quod de facto meruerit: de quo in seq. quaestione nonnulla dicuntur.

**II.** Quoad primum instans temporis, in quo incepit actus merendi in Christo, Alex. Hal. (3. p. III. q. 16. m. 2. § I.) cum B. Alberto et, ut refert Dionys. Carth., Uldarico aliisque antiquis docet primum modum hic in corp. relatum his verbis: «Est principium extra sumtum, vel intra sumtum. Si dicatur principium intra sumtum, non est dicere, quod a principio conceptionis meruerit, quia tunc principium illud dicit illud instans, quo producebatur in esse per Spiritum S. Si vero initium vel principium dicatur extra sumtum, tunc est dicere, quod Christus meruit a principio conceptionis, quia statim, postquam conceptus est, habuit plenum usum liberi arbitrii» etc. Ratio, cui idem innititur, est 1. arg. ad oppos., quod S. Bonav., saltem quoad Christum, non approbat (ad 1-5), sed tantum quoad *demeritum* Angelorum, ut docetur hic ad 4. et etiam II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. 2. Durand. (hic q. 2.) sententiam Alexandri censet esse probabilem, immo idem, ulterius progressus, dubitat, anne hoc meritum inceperit posterius et post nativitatem ex utero, contradicentibus omnibus antiquis Scholasticis. — S. Bonav. tamen etiam oppositam opinionem iudicat esse *probabilem* et obiecta contra eam bene solvit; insuper ostendit, in quo sensu, scilicet loquendo de merito quoad *habitum*, secunda opinio sit *certo* vera (in principio corp.).

**III.** Praeter laudatos: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica (in Oxon. n. 41. seqq.). — S. Thom., hic a. 3; 3. III. q. 34. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In this whole distinction many things are presupposed which theologians are accustomed to treat concerning merit and its species and conditions, and which also have already been explained, or at least touched upon, by St. Bonav. in I Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. I; II Sent. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2 and 3 (see the scholion there), d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1-3, and III Sent. d. 4, a. 2, q. 1-3. But it is specially presupposed that all the conditions required for meriting were sufficiently in Christ, and that he in fact merited: concerning which some things are said in the following question.

**II.** As to the first instant of time in which the act of meriting began in Christ, Alex. Hal. (3. p. III. q. 16. m. 2. § I.) with B. Albert and, as Dionys. Carth. reports, Uldaricus and other ancients teaches the first manner here related in the body in these words: «There is a principle taken outside, or a principle taken within. If the principle is said to be taken within, one cannot say that he merited from the principle of conception, because then that principle denotes that instant in which he was produced into being by the Holy Spirit. But if the beginning or principle is said to be taken outside, then one can say that Christ merited from the principle of conception, because immediately after he was conceived, he had the full use of free choice» etc. The reason on which the same [author] relies is the 1st argument to the opposite, which St. Bonav., at least as regards Christ, does not approve (ad 1-5), but only as regards the *demerit* of the Angels, as is taught here ad 4 and also II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. 2. Durand. (here q. 2.) judges the opinion of Alexander to be probable; indeed the same [author], advancing further, doubts whether this merit may have begun later and after birth from the womb, all the ancient Scholastics contradicting. — St. Bonav. nevertheless also judges the opposite opinion to be *probable* and solves well the objections against it; moreover he shows in what sense, namely speaking of merit with respect to the *habit*, the second opinion is *certainly* true (at the beginning of the body).

**III.** Besides those cited: Scot., in both Writings here q. unica (in the Oxon. n. 41 ff.). — S. Thom., here a. 3; 3. III. q. 34, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. I. — Richard. a Med., here a. I, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp. 380–382 (PDF pp. 402–404; offset pdf = printed + 22), per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override. Fresh literal English translation. Apparatus transcribed page-by-page from the PDF footers (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each page): p.380 = 9 entries (1–9), p.381 = 9 entries (1–9; only those marked in this chunk's body, 2–9, are rendered — see page-split map), p.382 = 4 entries (1–4).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.380** (raw 26508–26573): ARTICULUS I + QUAESTIO I openers, fundamenta 1–5, sed contra 1–5, CONCLUSIO, opening of Respondeo. Footnotes 1–9 all marked and rendered. (Body markers: fund.1 `[^p380-1]`, fund.2 `[^p380-2]`, fund.3 `[^p380-3]`, fund.4 `[^p380-4]`, fund.5 `[^p380-5]`; sed contra 1 `[^p380-6]`, 2 `[^p380-7]`, 3 `[^p380-8]`, 4 `[^p380-9]`.)
- **p.381** (raw 26573–26641): continuation of Respondeo (the two opinions + Si quis autem velit + replies 1). The page footer carries footnotes 1–9, all marked and rendered. **Footnote 1** (`Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 90…`, the long Alan-of-Lille gloss on *meritum*) anchors to the body word `usus` at the head of p.381 (`habitus actus vel usus¹`), continuing p.380's Respondeo — marker `[^p381-1]`. Footnotes 2–9 are `[^p381-2]`…`[^p381-9]`.
- **p.382** (raw 26641–26690): replies 2–5 (the splice `substantia, quae incipit agere…` continues reply 2 from p.381's `quod sub-`), close of the Respondeo (`Si quis igitur…`), and SCHOLION I–III. Footnotes 1–4 marked and rendered. **Footnote 5 of p.382** (`Vers. 8. — Seq. Script. loc. ibid. v. 9.`) belongs to QUAESTIO II's opener (`Ad Philippenses secundo`), which begins lower on p.382 — it stays with d18-a1-q2, not duplicated here.

**Hand-offs picked up:** NONE. Per the d18-divisio hand-off, the divisio's NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM apparatus was fully consumed; a1-q1 picks up p.380's footer sequence fresh, which it does (p.380 fn 1–9 all original to this chunk).

**Hand-off forwarded (to d18-a1-q2):** QUAESTIO II (*Utrum Christus meruerit aliquid post conceptionem*) begins at **raw 26691**, printed **p.382** (lower portion). The shared printed **p.382** footer's **footnote 5** (`Vers. 8.` on *Ad Philippenses secundo*) is q2's, NOT captured here — d18-a1-q2 must pick it up along with the rest of p.382's q2-side footers (5+). q1's share of p.382 = footnotes 1–4 (captured above).

**Scholion status:** The SCHOLION (I–III) sits on printed p.382 and **forward-covers the whole distinction / article**: §I states the merit-conditions are presupposed and that more is said *in the following question* (q2); §II treats the merit-instant debate (Alexander/Albert/Durand) shared across the article; §III lists parallel-author citations (Scotus, Thomas, Albert, etc.) for the article. It is rendered in full here (this is q1's page); subsequent quaestiones of this article carry no fresh scholion of their own and may note `pro quaest. praec.`.

**[?] flags:** NONE — the 450 dpi column bands were fully legible for body, scholion, and all three pages' footers.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 382 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum Christus meruerit aliquid post conceptionem.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus aliquid meruerit post conceptionem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^p382-5]: *Humiliavit semetipsum usque ad mortem; et post: Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum* etc. Sed humilitas non est causa exaltationis nisi per modum meriti: si ergo

<!-- page 383 -->

hoc fuit post conceptionem, ergo Christus post conceptionem aliquid meruit.

2. Item, Augustinus[^p383-1], tractans illud verbum praemissum: « Humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium »: si ergo humiliatio in Christo subsecuta fuit ipsam conceptionem, necessario etiam sequitur, quod meruerit, postquam conceptus fuerit.

3. Item, in libro de Regulis fidei[^p383-2] mereri ita definitur: « Mereri apud Deum dicitur qui nulla necessitate compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet »; sed hoc fecit Christus post suam conceptionem: ergo apud Deum meruit.

4. Item, opera Christi fuerunt multo nobiliora, quam sunt merita aliorum Sanctorum: si ergo opera aliorum Sanctorum sunt digna retributione, videtur, quod multo fortius opera Christi: ergo videtur, quod Christus apud Deum meruerit.

5. Item, si non meruit apud Deum, postquam conceptus fuit: ergo videtur, quod frustra Deo servivit et quod frustra fecit[^p383-3], quidquid fecit post conceptionem. Si ergo hoc est impium dicere, necesse est, Christum post conceptionem aliquid meruisse.

**Sed contra:** 1. Mereri est facere opus de genere laudabilium; sed potentia determinata ad unum tantum non habet laudem in actu illius, sicut patet in omnibus potentiis naturalibus[^p383-4]; sed liberum arbitrium Christi ab ipsa conceptione determinatum fuit ad bonum: ergo non potuit exire in opus de genere laudabilium, ergo nec in opus meritorium.

2. Item, mereri est facere[^p383-5] opus remuneratione dignum; sed liberum arbitrium, iam existens in statu remunerationis, iam non facit opus ulteriori remuneratione dignum, sicut patet in Beatis; sed tale fuit liberum arbitrium Christi, cum esset in statu comprehensoris: ergo videtur, quod post conceptionem suam nihil omnino mereri potuerit.

3. Item, quicumque[^p383-6] meretur, proficit in bonis animae, scilicet in gratia et gloria; sed Christus non potuit proficere supra id quod accepit a conceptione: ergo non videtur, quod post conceptionem mereri potuerit.

4. Item, quicumque meretur aliquid, de non-suo facit suum per opus et obsequium, et de eo quod est sibi indebitum, facit debitum; sed Christus non potuit facere de indebito debitum, vel de non-suo suum — omnia enim sua erant per gratiam conceptionis, sicut ipse testatur: *Omnia tua mea sunt*[^p383-7] — ergo non videtur, quod post conceptionem aliquid meruerit.

5. Item, quod eodem modo se habet nunc et prius natum est consimiles operationes efficere[^p383-8]; sed liberum arbitrium in Christo eodem modo se habet post conceptionem et post resurrectionem, et gratia similiter, et haec duo sunt principia merendi: si igitur post resurrectionem non meruit, ergo nec post conceptionem. Si tu dicas, quod aliter et aliter se habet, quantum est ex parte carnis; hoc non solvit, quia meritum non respicit statum carnis, sed statum caritatis: ergo si Christus post conceptionem habuit caritatem patriae aeque nobilem et perfectam, sicut modo habet, nec est eius caritas variata; si modo non habet usum merendi, videtur, quod nec tunc habuerit.

### Conclusio.

> Christus post conceptionem actu meruit, nobis quidem meruit gratiae infusionem, gratiae provectionem et bonorum operum multiplicationem; sibi autem id quod iam sibi debebatur, fecit debitum alio modo.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod mereri contingit tripliciter: uno modo *simpliciter abusive*, alio modo *partim proprie et partim improprie*, tertio modo *simpliciter proprie*. — *Simpliciter abusive* mereri dicitur qui facit aliquod opus de genere bonorum, tamen facit illud malo modo, id est mala intentione, sicut ille qui dat eleemosynam cum murmure; talia enim opera aliquando remunerantur a Deo ex immensa sua largitate, sicut innuitur de Nabuchodonosor in Ieremia[^p383-9]. — Ille vero meretur *partim proprie, partim abusive*, qui facit opus de genere bonorum et bona intentione, verumtamen non ex caritate; sicut aliquis peccator facit opera de genere bonorum et propter Deum, in quibus de congruo se disponit ad gratiam. — Ille vero meretur *simpliciter proprie*, qui facit bonum opus et bona intentione et ex caritate. Et primum quidem meritum dicitur meritum *interpretativum*[^p383-10]; secundum dicitur meritum *congrui*; tertium dicitur meritum *condigni*.

<!-- page 384 -->

Cum igitur quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit, non quaeritur de primo et secundo modo, sed quaeritur de tertio. Ad hoc igitur respondendum, quod mereri ex condigno tribus modis contingit. Uno modo *mereri* est ex *indebito* facere *debitum*, sicut meretur quis in gratiae infusione et motu liberi arbitrii. Alio modo *mereri* est de *debito* facere *magis debitum*, sicut contingit de profectu in profectum, de virtute in virtutem. Tertio modo *mereri* est de *debito uno modo* facere *debitum alio modo*, ut de debito per *habitum* facere debitum per *usum*, et de debito per *alium* actum facere debitum per *unum* aeque bonum.

Omnibus his modis Christus meruit *nobis*. Meruit enim *nobis* gratiae *infusionem*, meruit et gratiae *provectionem*[^p384-1], meruit et *bonorum operum multiplicationem*. *Sibi* autem non meruit nisi tertio modo tantum post conceptionem. Ipse enim non potuit facere sibi de indebito debitum, cum omni bono esset dignus. Non potuit facere de debito magis debitum, cum omni gratia ab ipsa conceptione esset plenus[^p384-2], sed quod erat debitum *uno modo* fecit debitum *pluribus modis*; et ita meruit secundum tertium modum dicendi meritum solum, non propter imperfectionem a parte meriti, sed propter perfectionem a parte merentis. Et hoc est quod dicitur in littera[^p384-3]: « Non profecit Christus secundum *meritum quantum ad virtutem meriti*, profecit tamen quantum ad *numerum meritorum*. Plura enim habuit merita in passione quam in conceptione ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, Christum post conceptionem usum et exercitium meriti habuisse.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia determinata ad unum non facit opus de genere laudabilium; dicendum, quod determinatio potentiae ad unum potest esse dupliciter, videlicet per *necessitatem naturae* et per *confirmationem gratiae*. Si sit per *necessitatem naturae*, tunc tollit arbitrii libertatem, ac per hoc tollit dignitatem meriti. Si autem sit determinatio per *confirmationem gratiae*, cum talis confirmatio simul stet cum libera voluntate, sic non tollit ab ipso opere bonitatem moris, cum sit voluntarium, ac per hoc nec qualitatem meriti. In Christo autem fuit liberum arbitrium determinatum ad unum non per *necessitatem naturae*, sed per *confirmationem gratiae*[^p384-4].

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens munus gloriae non facit opus remunerabile; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando aliquis est simpliciter in statu *patriae*; cum autem non tantum est in statu *comprehensoris*, verum etiam in statu *viatoris*, tunc opus eius esse potest remunerabile propter statum *viae*; et sic est reperire in Christo secundum divinam dispensationem. Nam sicut anima Christi propter coniunctionem sui cum Divinitate habet statum *patriae*, sic propter coniunctionem sui cum carne habet statum *viae* et miseriae pro illo tempore. Et ideo, sicut potuit esse in statu *viatoris* simul et *comprehensoris*, sic habuit gloriam ad comprehendendum et gratiam ad merendum. — Et est simile de Angelis, in quibus ponimus vim administrativam et contemplativam, secundum quarum unam merentur, et secundum alteram fruuntur et praemiantur[^p384-5].

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quicumque meretur, merendo proficit; dicendum, quod proficere est duobus modis: vel *incremento*[^p384-6] *habitus*, vel in *multitudine actuum*; vel per alia verba: est proficere quantum ad virtutem merendi et quantum ad numerum meritorum. Primo modo accipiendo profectum, non competit tertio modo dicendi meritum, secundum quem tertium modum dicitur meruisse Christus. Alio modo accipiendo profectum, competit sibi, sicut patet per supra habitam distinctionem.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mereri est facere de indebito debitum; dicendum, quod illud verum est quantum ad aliquem modum merendi, sed non quantum ad omnes, sicut prius dictum est; et ideo non habet locum in proposito.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium eodem modo se habet nunc et prius; dicendum, quod verum est per comparationem ad *superius*, scilicet ad Deum; non tamen est verum per comparationem ad *inferius*, scilicet ad carnem passibilem, ex cuius coniunctione tam liberum arbitrium quam gratia ipsum perficiens habet pertinere ad statum viae. Unde non valet illud quod obiicit de carne, quod non est principium merendi; hoc enim verum est, per se loquendo, facit tamen ad meritum, dum facit ad statum meriti, sicut patet in coniunctione animae ad carnem et eius separatione[^p384-7]. Anima enim nostra statim, dum a carne separatur, amplius non habet merendi vel demerendi statum.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether Christ merited anything after his conception.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ merited anything after his conception. And that he did, it seems thus.

1. To the Philippians, chapter two[^p382-5]: *He humbled himself unto death; and afterward: Wherefore God also hath exalted him* etc. But humility is not a cause of exaltation except by way of merit: if therefore

this came about after the conception, therefore Christ after his conception merited something.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^p383-1], treating the aforesaid word: « The humility of brightness is the merit, the brightness of humility is the reward »: if therefore humiliation in Christ followed his conception itself, it necessarily also follows that he merited after he had been conceived.

3. Likewise, in the book *On the Rules of Faith*[^p383-2] meriting is defined thus: « He is said to merit before God who, compelled by no necessity, does that which he ought to do »; but Christ did this after his conception: therefore he merited before God.

4. Likewise, Christ's works were far nobler than are the merits of the other Saints: if therefore the works of the other Saints are worthy of recompense, it seems that much more are Christ's works: therefore it seems that Christ merited before God.

5. Likewise, if he did not merit before God after he had been conceived: therefore it seems that he served God in vain and that he did in vain[^p383-3] whatever he did after his conception. If therefore it is impious to say this, it is necessary that Christ merited something after his conception.

**On the contrary:** 1. To merit is to do a work of the kind that is praiseworthy; but a power determined to one thing only has no praise in the act of it, as is plain in all natural powers[^p383-4]; but the free choice of Christ was from his very conception determined to the good: therefore it could not go forth into a work of the praiseworthy kind, therefore neither into a meritorious work.

2. Likewise, to merit is to do[^p383-5] a work worthy of recompense; but free choice, already existing in the state of recompense, no longer does a work worthy of further recompense, as is plain in the Blessed; but such was the free choice of Christ, since he was in the state of a comprehensor: therefore it seems that after his conception he could merit nothing at all.

3. Likewise, whoever[^p383-6] merits advances in the goods of the soul, namely in grace and glory; but Christ could not advance beyond what he received from the conception: therefore it does not seem that he could merit after his conception.

4. Likewise, whoever merits anything makes his own out of what is not his own through work and service, and out of what is not owed to him makes what is owed; but Christ could not make out of the not-owed the owed, or out of the not-his-own his own — for all things were his own through the grace of the conception, as he himself testifies: *All thine are mine*[^p383-7] — therefore it does not seem that he merited anything after his conception.

5. Likewise, that which is in the same condition now and before is apt to produce like operations[^p383-8]; but free choice in Christ is in the same condition after his conception and after his resurrection, and grace likewise, and these two are the principles of meriting: if therefore after the resurrection he did not merit, therefore neither after the conception. If you say that it is in one condition and another, as far as concerns the flesh; this does not solve it, because merit does not regard the state of the flesh, but the state of charity: therefore if Christ after his conception had the charity of the homeland as noble and perfect as he now has, nor is his charity varied; if he now does not have the use of meriting, it seems that neither then did he have it.

### Conclusion.

> Christ after his conception merited in act: for us indeed he merited the infusion of grace, the advancement of grace, and the multiplication of good works; but for himself, what was already owed to him he made owed in another manner.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that meriting comes about in three ways: in one way *simply improperly*, in another way *partly properly and partly improperly*, in a third way *simply properly*. — He is said to merit *simply improperly* who does some work of the good kind, yet does it in a bad manner, that is with a bad intention, like one who gives alms with grumbling; for such works are sometimes recompensed by God out of his immense bounty, as is intimated of Nabuchodonosor in Jeremiah[^p383-9]. — But he merits *partly properly, partly improperly* who does a work of the good kind and with good intention, yet not out of charity; as some sinner does works of the good kind and for God's sake, in which he disposes himself by congruity for grace. — But he merits *simply properly* who does a good work and with good intention and out of charity. And the first kind of merit is called *interpretative*[^p383-10] merit; the second is called merit of *congruity*; the third is called merit of *condignity*.

Therefore when it is asked whether Christ merited, the question is not about the first and second mode, but about the third. To this then it must be answered that meriting by condignity comes about in three ways. In one way *to merit* is from the *not-owed* to make the *owed*, as one merits in the infusion of grace and the motion of free choice. In another way *to merit* is out of the *owed* to make *more owed*, as happens in advancing from progress to progress, from virtue to virtue. In a third way *to merit* is out of the *owed in one manner* to make it *owed in another manner*, as out of the owed by *habit* to make it owed by *use*, and out of the owed by *another* act to make it owed by *one* equally good.

In all these ways Christ merited *for us*. For he merited *for us* the *infusion* of grace, and he merited the *advancement*[^p384-1] of grace, and he merited the *multiplication of good works*. But *for himself* he merited only in the third way after his conception. For he could not make for himself the owed out of the not-owed, since he was worthy of every good. He could not make of the owed the more-owed, since he was full[^p384-2] of every grace from the very conception, but what was owed *in one manner* he made owed *in several manners*; and so he merited only according to the third manner of speaking of merit, not on account of imperfection on the part of the merit, but on account of perfection on the part of the one meriting. And this is what is said in the text[^p384-3]: « Christ did not advance according to *merit as regards the virtue of the merit*, yet he advanced as regards the *number of merits*. For he had more merits in his passion than in his conception ». — Therefore the reasonings must be granted which show that Christ after his conception had the use and exercise of merit.

*To 1.* As to the objection that a power determined to one thing does not do a work of the praiseworthy kind; it must be said that the determination of a power to one thing can be in two ways, namely by *necessity of nature* and by *confirmation of grace*. If it is by *necessity of nature*, then it takes away the liberty of choice, and thereby takes away the dignity of merit. But if the determination is by *confirmation of grace*, since such confirmation stands together with a free will, then it does not take away from the work itself the goodness of morals, since it is voluntary, and thereby neither the quality of merit. In Christ, however, the free choice was determined to one thing not by *necessity of nature*, but by *confirmation of grace*[^p384-4].

*To 2.* As to the objection that one having the gift of glory does not do a remunerable work; it must be said that this is true when someone is simply in the state of the *homeland*; but when he is not only in the state of a *comprehensor*, but also in the state of a *wayfarer*, then his work can be remunerable on account of the state of *the way*; and so it is to be found in Christ according to the divine dispensation. For just as the soul of Christ, on account of its conjunction with the Divinity, has the state of the *homeland*, so on account of its conjunction with the flesh it has the state of *the way* and of misery for that time. And therefore, just as he could be in the state of a *wayfarer* and a *comprehensor* at once, so he had glory for comprehending and grace for meriting. — And there is a likeness in the case of the Angels, in whom we posit an administrative and a contemplative power, according to one of which they merit, and according to the other they enjoy and are rewarded[^p384-5].

*To 3.* As to the objection that whoever merits advances by meriting; it must be said that to advance is in two ways: either by the *increase*[^p384-6] of a *habit*, or in the *multitude of acts*; or in other words: to advance is as regards the virtue of meriting and as regards the number of merits. Taking advancement in the first way, it does not belong to the third manner of speaking of merit, according to which third manner Christ is said to have merited. Taking advancement in the other way, it belongs to him, as is plain through the distinction set forth above.

*To 4.* As to the objection that to merit is to make of the not-owed the owed; it must be said that this is true as regards some mode of meriting, but not as regards all, as was said before; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand.

*To 5.* As to the objection that free choice is in the same condition now and before; it must be said that this is true by comparison to what is *above*, namely to God; yet it is not true by comparison to what is *below*, namely to the passible flesh, from whose conjunction both the free choice and the grace perfecting it belong to the state of the way. Hence the objection about the flesh, that it is not a principle of meriting, does not hold; for this is true, speaking per se, yet it contributes to merit, while it contributes to the state of merit, as is plain in the conjunction of the soul to the flesh and in their separation[^p384-7]. For our soul, as soon as it is separated from the flesh, no longer has the state of meriting or demeriting.

---

en: Verse 8. — The following Scripture passage [is] from the same place, verse 9.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 104. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Post *praemissum* Vat. supplet *ait*.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, treatise 104, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — After *praemissum* the Vatican edition supplies *ait*.

la: Sive de Articulis cathol. fidei, lib. II. in explicat. theorematis sive propos. 8, ubi textus origin. pro *Mereri* exhibet *Bene mereri* et deinde *compulsus libens facit Deo quod debet* pro *compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet*. Cfr. ibid. theorema 16.

en: Or *On the Articles of the Catholic Faith*, book II, in the explanation of theorem or proposition 8, where the original text for *Mereri* gives *Bene mereri* and then *compulsus libens facit Deo quod debet* for *compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet*. Cf. ibid. theorem 16.

la: Bene multi codd. *fecerit*. Mox pro *Christum* edd. incongrue *Deum*, cod. bb *ipsum*.

en: Many codices well [read] *fecerit*. Presently, for *Christum* the editions incongruously [read] *Deum*, codex bb *ipsum*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. — Pro *laudem* cod. K *laudari*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 5. — For *laudem* codex K [reads] *laudari*.

la: Ita codd. A H K Q; in aliis deest *facere*.

en: Thus codices A H K Q; in the others *facere* is lacking.

la: Pro *quicumque*, quod et in solut. habetur nec non in codd. A K bb, cod. Z *quisquis*, alii codd. et edd. *quidquid*. Post pauca pro *a conceptione* edd. *in conceptione*.

en: For *quicumque*, which is also held in the solution as well as in codices A K bb, codex Z [reads] *quisquis*, other codices and editions *quidquid*. A little after, for *a conceptione* the editions [read] *in conceptione*.

la: Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.): Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere. — In fine arg. pro *habuerit* multi codd. *habuit*.

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 56 (c. 10): For the same thing and that which is in the same condition is always apt to do the same. — At the end of the argument, for *habuerit* many codices [read] *habuit*.

la: Cap. 27, 6. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, exempli causa proponit quod in vita B. Ioannis eleemosynarii de quodam milite, Petro nomine, narratur, qui scilicet « iratus pane, quo proiecerat pauperem, meruit in iudicio Domini, ad quod raptus fuit, prolongationem vitae in poenitentiam ».

en: Chapter 27, 6 ff. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1, proposes by way of example what is related in the life of Blessed John the Almsgiver about a certain soldier, Peter by name, who indeed « angered by the bread which he had thrown at a poor man, merited in the judgment of the Lord, to which he was rapt, a prolongation of life unto penance ».

la: Quam appellationem Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 1, sic explicat: « Quia Deus retribuit ei maius, quam faciat [peccator]; et ideo interpretatur Deus remunerando, ac si ille meruisset ». — De merito congrui et condigni vide supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro *et secundo modo* cod. U *nec de secundo modo*.

en: Which appellation Alexander of Hales, *Summa* part III, q. 17, m. 1, explains thus: « Because God repays him more than [the sinner] does; and therefore God interprets [it] by remunerating, as if he had merited ». — On the merit of congruity and condignity see above d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — A little below, for *et secundo modo* codex U [reads] *nec de secundo modo*.

la: Edd. cum paucis codd. *promotionem*.

en: The editions with a few codices [read] *promotionem*.

la: Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul., in exponenda regula 106. ait: Cum mereri sit de non-debito facere debitum, Christo autem a tempore incarnationis deberetur quidquid postea est consecutus, ipse de indebito debitum non fecit et ita sibi non meruit. Aeque enim dignus fuit ab incarnatione omnibus his etc.

en: Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, in expounding rule 106, says: Since to merit is to make of the not-owed the owed, but to Christ from the time of the incarnation was owed whatever he afterward attained, he himself did not make the owed out of the not-owed and so did not merit for himself. For he was equally worthy from the incarnation of all these things, etc.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro *confirmationem* (primo loco) codd. G H L T V aa *consummationem*; cod. K in hac solut. constanter exhibet vocem *conformationis*. Post *sit determinatio* edd. male adiiciunt *meriti*.

en: Cf. II *Sentences*, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — Somewhat above, for *confirmationem* (in the first place) codices G H L T V aa [read] *consummationem*; codex K in this solution consistently exhibits the word *conformationis*. After *sit determinatio* the editions wrongly add *meriti*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 11. a. 2. q. 2.

en: See II *Sentences*, d. 11, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Pro *incremento* edd. et nonnulli codd. substituunt *in merito*, et paulo inferius post *tertium modum* subiiciunt *tantummodo*.

en: For *incremento* the editions and some codices substitute *in merito*, and a little below, after *tertium modum*, they add *tantummodo*.

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. *separationem*; perperam.

en: The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] *separationem*; wrongly. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.382–384 (PDF 404–406; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw span 26691→26872). The PDF column-band read is authoritative per the Vol II/III override; the OCR served only as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The body opens at the bottom of p.382-L with the **QUAESTIO II** header and argument 1, which finishes on p.383.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.382** (lower portion): QUAESTIO II header + title + opener (*Secundo quaeritur…*) + fundamentum 1 (*Ad Philippenses secundo… Sed humilitas non est causa exaltationis nisi per modum meriti: si ergo —*). Footer: **fn 5 only** (this q's share; q1 held fn 1–4 of the shared p.382 footer).
- **p.383**: fundamenta 2–5; **Sed contra** 1–5; CONCLUSIO; RESPONDEO (the triple distinction of *abusive / partim proprie / simpliciter proprie*). Footers fn 1–10.
- **p.384**: RESPONDEO continues (the three modes of merit by condignity; *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Confirmatur*); replies *Ad 1–Ad 5*; the chunk closes with *Ad 5* (*…amplius non habet merendi vel demerendi statum.*). Footers fn 1–7.

**Hand-offs.**
- **Picked up (from d18-a1-q1):** the shared printed **p.382 footnote 5** (`Vers. 8. — Seq. Script. loc. ibid. v. 9.`, on *Ad Philippenses secundo*) — q1 captured p.382 fn 1–4; fn 5 is q2's, rendered here as `[^p382-5]`.
- **Forwarded (to d18-a1-q3):** **ART. I QUAESTIO III** (*Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione*) begins at **raw 26873**, printed **p.385** (PDF 407). The **SCHOLION (I–III)** printed at the top of **p.385** under the running head `DIST. XVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` is **q3's** (it discusses the article's solutions broadly but is printed before q3's body) — it does NOT migrate back to q2. q3 opens with no footer carry-over from q2 (p.384's footers fn 1–7 are all q2's; p.385's footer numbering restarts for q3). Offset reminder: **pdf = printed + 22**.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. q2 carries no scholion of its own: q1's Scholion I–III (printed on p.382 under the QUAEST. I/II region) forward-covers the whole article, and the next printed scholion (p.385) belongs to q3.

**[?] flags.** None — the 450 dpi bands were fully legible across pp.382–384.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 385 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per textum Apostoli[^p385-1]: *Humiliavit semetipsum usque ad mortem, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum* etc.; quod verbum tractans Magister dicit: « Aperte dicit Apostolus, propterea Christum exaltatum per impassibilitatis gloriam, quia est humiliatus per passionis obedientiam »: ergo meruit in passione.

2. Item, Augustinus[^p385-2], exponens verbum praedictum: « Ut Christus clarificaretur resurrectione, prius humiliatus est passione »: ergo videtur, quod per meritum passionis pervenerit ad gloriam resurrectionis.

3. Item, nihil est magis meritorium quam opus patientiae, propter quod dicitur Iacobi primo[^p385-3]: *Patientia opus perfectum habet;* sed patientia consistit in tolerantia passionis: ergo videtur, quod Christus in passione multum meruerit.

4. Item, nihil est satisfactorium, nisi quod est meritorium; sed passio Christi fuit satisfactoria, sicut dicunt Sancti[^p385-4]: ergo fuit meritoria: ergo Christus meruit patiendo.

5. Item, omnis qui patitur, aut passionem promeruit, aut per passionem meretur, alioquin pateretur sine iustitia, pateretur etiam frustra[^p385-5]; sed Christus non meruit passionem, quia immunis fuit a culpa omni: meruit ergo per passionem, alioquin passus esset iniuste et frustra, quod esset magnae impietatis et insaniae.

**Sed contra:** 1. « Passionibus, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p385-6], nec laudamur nec vituperamur »; sed per omne, per quod meremur, laudamur: ergo passionibus non meremur: ergo Christus patiendo non meruit.

2. Item, « passio est effectus et illatio actionis[^p385-7] »; sed qualis est causa, talis est effectus: si ergo actio passionem inferens non fuerit meritoria, videtur, quod nec ipsa passio meritoria fuerit: ergo Christus in passione non meruit.

3. Item, nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est voluntarium; nihil autem est voluntarium, nisi quod est a principio intrinseco, sicut patet per definitionem voluntarii, quam ponit Philosophus in Ethicis[^p385-8]: « Voluntarium est cuius principium est in ipso »; sed passio Christi fuit ab extra, sicut patet: ergo non fuit meritoria.

<!-- page 386 -->

4. Item, nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est secundum naturam; sed « passio est motus contra naturam », sicut dicit Damascenus[^p386-1]: ergo impossibile est passione mereri: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne meritum ortum habet ab aliqua virtute; omnis autem virtus consistit in ratione, ut *ratio* est[^p386-2]: ergo omne meritum consistit circa rationem, ut ratio est. Sed passio Christi solummodo fuit circa sensualitatem et circa rationem per modum *naturae:* ergo non videtur, quod Christus in passione aliquid meruisset.

### Conclusio.

> Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione. Non enim passus fuit frustra, sed ex rationabili causa; nec passus fuit propter demeritum culpae, sed propter amorem veritatis et iustitiae.

Et propterea notandum, quod in passione est duo considerare, videlicet passionis *causam* et passionis *sustinentiam.* Passionis *causa* est a violentia agentis, sed passionis *sustinentia* est a voluntate patientis. Quantum ad primum passio non est *meritoria* nec *demeritoria*, quia est ab extra[^p386-3]; quantum ad secundum potest esse *meritoria* et *demeritoria:* *meritoria* autem, si quis eam perferat ex voluntate bona; *demeritoria* autem, si quis eam sustineat impatienter et ex voluntate iniqua. Quoniam igitur Christus passionem pertulit non tantum ex voluntate bona, immo etiam ex voluntate optima; hinc est, quod passio eius fuit meritoria, non solum sicut passiones Sanctorum, sed inter omnia merita tenuit principatum[^p386-4]. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod passionibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod sunt *purae* passiones; prout autem coniuncta est eis voluntas bona, vel mala, sic habent sortiri rationem meriti et demeriti, laudis et vituperii. Et sic fuit in passione Christi, qui *oblatus est, quoniam ipse voluit,* et libenter et patienter passionem sustinuit, quoniam *pro transgressoribus exoravit*[^p386-5].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio est effectus actionis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad efficaciam in genere *naturae*, potest tamen nihilominus esse effectus voluntatis internae[^p386-6] quantum ad voluntatis complacentiam, et per hoc habet poni in genere *moris.* Et quoniam voluntas passionem acceptans fuit bona, quamvis voluntas passionem inferens fuerit mala; et hinc est, quod quamvis actio displiceret, passio tamen grata fuit: ideo non sequitur, quod si actio fuit demeritoria, quod propter hoc passio. Actio enim non erat causa passionis in genere *moris.*

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio fuit involuntaria; dicendum, quod quamvis hoc sit verum quantum ad *violentiam*, quae est ab extra; non tamen est verum quantum ad *sustinentiam*, quae est ab intra. Et ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod nullo modo passio Christi esset meritoria; non enim tantum erat ab *extra*, sed etiam quodam modo erat ab *intra* per complacentiam et sustinentiam[^p386-7].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio est contra naturam; dicendum, quod *esse contra naturam* est dupliciter[^p386-8]: aut quia est contra naturale dictamen *rationis*, aut quia est contra naturalem appetitum *salutis.* Primo modo accipiendo *naturale*, sic illud quod est contra naturam, est vitium, nisi forte sit *supra* naturam, sicut est in assensu fidei. Secundo modo accipiendo *naturale*, sic illud quod est contra naturam, potest esse meritorium, quamvis sit poenale; et hoc modo accipit Damascenus, cum dicit, quod « passio est contra naturam ».

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne meritum consistit circa actum rationis; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed aliquid consistere[^p386-9] circa actum rationis contingit tripliciter: vel per modum *elicientis*, vel per modum *imperantis*, vel per modum *acceptantis.* Quamvis autem passio Christi non esset in ratione per modum *elicientis*, vel per modum *imperantis*, erat tamen per modum *acceptantis;* et hoc dabat ipsi passioni rationem meriti, dat etiam passionibus nostris ratione consimili. — Et per haec quae dicta sunt, potest dissolvi illa quaestio, qua quaeritur, utrum passionibus contingat mereri, vel demereri.

english:
### Question III. *Whether Christ merited anything in the passion.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether Christ merited anything in the passion. And that he did, it seems:

1. *First*, by the text of the Apostle[^p385-1]: *He humbled himself even unto death, on account of which God also exalted him* etc.; treating which word the Master says: « The Apostle plainly says that Christ was exalted through the glory of impassibility for this reason, because he was humbled through the obedience of the passion »: therefore he merited in the passion.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^p385-2], expounding the aforesaid word: « That Christ might be glorified in the resurrection, he was first humbled in the passion »: therefore it seems that through the merit of the passion he attained to the glory of the resurrection.

3. Likewise, nothing is more meritorious than the work of patience, on account of which it is said in James, chapter one[^p385-3]: *Patience has a perfect work;* but patience consists in the endurance of suffering: therefore it seems that Christ merited much in the passion.

4. Likewise, nothing is satisfactory unless it is meritorious; but the passion of Christ was satisfactory, as the Saints say[^p385-4]: therefore it was meritorious: therefore Christ merited by suffering.

5. Likewise, everyone who suffers either has earned the suffering [as punishment] or merits through the suffering, otherwise he would suffer without justice, and would also suffer in vain[^p385-5]; but Christ did not earn the suffering, because he was free from all fault: therefore he merited through the suffering, otherwise he would have suffered unjustly and in vain, which would be of great impiety and insanity.

**On the contrary:** 1. « By sufferings, as the Philosopher says[^p385-6], we are neither praised nor blamed »; but by everything through which we merit, we are praised: therefore by sufferings we do not merit: therefore Christ by suffering did not merit.

2. Likewise, « suffering is the effect and the consequence of an action[^p385-7] »; but as the cause is, so is the effect: if therefore the action inflicting the suffering was not meritorious, it seems that the suffering itself was not meritorious either: therefore Christ in the passion did not merit.

3. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary; but nothing is voluntary unless it is from an intrinsic principle, as is clear from the definition of the voluntary which the Philosopher gives in the *Ethics*[^p385-8]: « The voluntary is that whose principle is in [the agent] himself »; but the passion of Christ was from without, as is clear: therefore it was not meritorious.

4. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is according to nature; but « suffering is a motion against nature », as Damascene says[^p386-1]: therefore it is impossible to merit by suffering: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, all merit takes its origin from some virtue; but all virtue consists in reason, as *reason* is[^p386-2]: therefore all merit consists about reason, as reason is. But the passion of Christ was only about sensuality and about reason in the manner of *nature:* therefore it does not seem that Christ merited anything in the passion.

### Conclusion.

> Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion. For he did not suffer in vain, but from a reasonable cause; nor did he suffer on account of the demerit of fault, but for the love of truth and justice.

And therefore it is to be noted that in the passion there are two things to consider, namely the *cause* of the suffering and the *endurance* of the suffering. The *cause* of the suffering is from the violence of the agent, but the *endurance* of the suffering is from the will of the one suffering. As regards the first, the suffering is neither *meritorious* nor *demeritorious*, because it is from without[^p386-3]; as regards the second, it can be *meritorious* and *demeritorious:* *meritorious*, if one endures it from a good will; *demeritorious*, if one bears it impatiently and from a wicked will. Since therefore Christ bore the passion not only from a good will, but indeed from a most excellent will; hence it is that his passion was meritorious, not only as the sufferings of the Saints, but it held the chief place among all merits[^p386-4]. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that by sufferings we are neither praised nor blamed; it must be said that this is true insofar as they are *pure* sufferings; but inasmuch as a good or evil will is joined to them, thus they come to take on the character of merit and demerit, of praise and blame. And so it was in the passion of Christ, who *was offered because he himself willed it*, and willingly and patiently endured the passion, since *he prayed for the transgressors*[^p386-5].

2. To that which is objected, that suffering is the effect of an action; it must be said that this is true as regards efficacy in the genus of *nature*, yet it can nonetheless be an effect of the internal will[^p386-6] as regards the will's complacency, and through this it comes to be placed in the genus of *morals.* And since the will accepting the passion was good, although the will inflicting the passion was evil; and hence it is that, although the action was displeasing, the passion nevertheless was pleasing: therefore it does not follow that, if the action was demeritorious, the passion was so on that account. For the action was not the cause of the passion in the genus of *morals.*

3. To that which is objected, that the passion was involuntary; it must be said that, although this is true as regards the *violence* which is from without; nevertheless it is not true as regards the *endurance*, which is from within. And therefore that argument does not conclude that the passion of Christ was in no way meritorious; for it was not only from *without*, but also in a certain way from *within* through complacency and endurance[^p386-7].

4. To that which is objected, that suffering is against nature; it must be said that *to be against nature* is twofold[^p386-8]: either because it is against the natural dictate of *reason*, or because it is against the natural appetite for *well-being.* Taking *natural* in the first way, that which is against nature is a vice, unless perhaps it be *above* nature, as is the case in the assent of faith. Taking *natural* in the second way, that which is against nature can be meritorious, although it be penal; and it is in this way that Damascene takes it when he says that « suffering is against nature ».

5. To that which is objected, that all merit consists about the act of reason; it must be said that this is true. But for something to consist[^p386-9] about the act of reason happens in a threefold way: either in the manner of one *eliciting*, or in the manner of one *commanding*, or in the manner of one *accepting.* Now although the passion of Christ was not in reason in the manner of one *eliciting*, or in the manner of one *commanding*, it was nevertheless [there] in the manner of one *accepting;* and this gave to the passion itself the character of merit, and gives it also to our sufferings by a like account. — And by these things which have been said, that question can be resolved which asks whether it can happen that one merit, or demerit, by sufferings.

la: Philip. 2, 8. seq. — Verba Magistri habentur hic in lit. c. 1.

en: Phil. 2:8 ff. — The words of the Master are found here in the text, c. 1.

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 104. n. 3. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Post *praedictum* Vat. adiicit *inquit.*

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tractate 104, n. 3. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — After *praedictum* the Vatican edition adds *inquit.*

la: Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius pro *passionis* edd. *passionum.*

en: Verse 4. — A little below, for *passionis* the editions read *passionum.*

la: Cfr. infra d. XIX. lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq., et ibid. Comment. a. 1. per totum nec non d. 20. q. 5.

en: Cf. below d. XIX, text of the Master, c. 1 ff., and there the Commentary, a. 1, throughout, as also d. 20, q. 5.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 5.

en: *Ethics*, Book II, c. 5.

la: Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Princip. de Passione. — De minori cfr. Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.), et II. Phys. text. 38. (c. 3.), ubi docet, causam et effectum debere esse proportionata.

en: Gilbert of Poitiers, *On the Six Principles*, on Passion. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, *Posterior [Analytics]* II, c. 17 (c. 14), and *Physics* II, text 38 (c. 3), where he teaches that the cause and the effect must be proportionate.

la: Libr. III. c. 1. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 3. — Pro *voluntarii* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *voluntatis.*

en: [*Ethics*] Book III, c. 1. Cf. tom. II, p. 592, note 3. — For *voluntarii* many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *voluntatis.*

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith*, Book II, c. 22.

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13: *Virtus enim non tam secundum rectam rationem, quam cum recta ratione habitus est.* — De minori vide supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* VI, c. 13: *For virtue is a habit not so much according to right reason as with right reason.* — On the minor [premise] see above d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Sive violenta; *violentum* enim, voluntario contrarium, ab Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. definitur « cuius principium extrinsecus est, nihilque ad id confert ille qui cogitur ».

en: Or violent; for *the violent*, contrary to the voluntary, is defined by Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 1, as « that whose principle is from without, and to which he who is compelled contributes nothing ».

la: Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. above d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.

la: Isai. 53, 7. 12. Pro *exoravit* Vulgata *rogavit*, edd. cum aliquot codd. *oravit.*

en: Isa. 53:7, 12. For *exoravit* the Vulgate [reads] *rogavit*, the editions with several codices *oravit.*

la: Edd. *voluntatis in genere moris*, incongrue propter subnexa. Mox pro *et per hoc* codd. E N T *et pro hoc*, codd. V bb *et secundum hoc.*

en: The editions [read] *voluntatis in genere moris*, incongruously on account of what follows. Soon, for *et per hoc* codices E N T [read] *et pro hoc*, codices V bb *et secundum hoc.*

la: Ita codd. A G T; in aliis *sufferentiam*, quod vocabulum non ita bene exprimit virtutem constantiae in passione sufferenda, unde auctor etiam alibi passim utitur voce *sustinentia.* Post *quodam modo* codd. L aa supplent *passio.*

en: So codices A G T; in others *sufferentiam*, which word does not so well express the virtue of constancy in enduring suffering, whence the author also elsewhere commonly uses the word *sustinentia.* After *quodam modo* codices L aa supply *passio.*

la: Cod. O *existere*, edd. *esse.* Mox pro *elicientis* cod. Z bis *efficientis.*

en: Codex O [reads] *existere*, the editions *esse.* Soon, for *elicientis* codex Z [reads] twice *efficientis.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum secundum actionem *divinae* naturae non possit esse quaestio de merito, hic praesupponitur, in Christo fuisse etiam actionem *humanam*, vel potius *divino-humanam*, de qua in Concilio Lateranensi, an. 649 sub Martino I. celebrato (can. 15.), docetur: « Si quis secundum scelerosos haereticos *deivirilem* operationem, quam Graeci dicunt θεανδρικήν, unam operationem insipienter suscipit, non autem duplicem esse confitetur secundum Ss. Patres, hoc est divinam et humanam; aut ipsam deivirilis, quae posita est, novam vocabuli dictionem *unius* esse designativam, sed non *utriusque* mirificae et gloriosae unitionis demonstrativam, condemnatus sit ». Haec autem actio humana in Christo dicitur etiam *divina*, non quia divina sit per *essentiam*, sed per *participationem*, et hoc triplici ratione: primo propter associationem aliquam in una *persona agente;* secundo propter associationem in *modo agendi*, quia perfectius operabatur ceteris operantibus propter unionem, sicut sensualitas in homine perfectius quam in brutis; tertio propter associationem in *uno effectu*, seu opere operato, ut in uno et eodem miraculo, in quo Divinitas operabatur *interius*, sicut leprosum sanando, humanitas *exterius*, sicut leprosum tangendo » (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 19. a. 2; Bonav., supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. 2.).

**II.** Distinctio triplicis *meriti ex condigno* sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 1, qui ibi quinque species meriti in genere distinguit. — Notandum, quod in solutione ad 1. 5. tantum quaestio, in qua solvenda posteriores theologi multum laboraverunt, scilicet quomodo in Christo fuerit sufficiens *libertas* ad merendum (cfr. hic a. 2. q. 2. et supra d. 12. a. 2. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. q. 1.). — Item in solut. ad 2. docetur, quod Christus singularissimo modo fuerit in statu *viae*, extra quem non potest esse meritum (cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. q. 1.), et quod non ratione gloriae et amoris huic statui annexi meruerit (cfr. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 5. et ad 2.), sed ratione amoris, quem habuit ut viator ex gratia infusa. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. et S. Thom. aliique multi. Scotus autem cum nonnullis vult, Christum etiam per amorem beatificum meruisse. — Denique observandum est, quod in corp. satis clare docetur, Christum nobis etiam *applicationem* sui meriti respectu primae infusionis gratiae sanctificantis meruisse, quod plures antiqui theologi negarunt (cfr. Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4, et Suarez in III. p. tom. disp. 41. sect. 2.).

**III.** Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. III. q. 19. a. 3. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2, q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Since with respect to the action of the *divine* nature there can be no question of merit, it is here presupposed that there was in Christ also a *human* action, or rather a *divine-human* one, concerning which it is taught in the Lateran Council, held in the year 649 under Martin I (canon 15): « If anyone, following the wicked heretics, foolishly admits one *deivirile* operation — which the Greeks call θεανδρικήν — but does not confess that there are two according to the holy Fathers, that is, a divine and a human one; or if [he holds] that the very word "deivirile," which has been laid down, is a new coinage of speech indicating *one* operation, but not demonstrating the marvelous and glorious union of *both* — let him be condemned ». Now this human action in Christ is also called *divine*, not because it is divine by *essence*, but by *participation*, and this in a threefold way: first, on account of a certain association in one *acting person;* secondly, on account of an association in the *manner of acting*, because it operated more perfectly than other operating things by reason of the union, just as sensuality [operates] more perfectly in man than in brutes; thirdly, on account of an association in *one effect*, or work performed, as in one and the same miracle, in which the Divinity operated *interiorly*, as in healing the leper, [and] the humanity *exteriorly*, as in touching the leper » (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa* III, q. 19, a. 2; Bonaventure, above d. 17, a. 1, qq. 1–2).

**II.** The distinction of the threefold *merit of condignity* is taken from Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. 17, m. 1, who there distinguishes five species of merit in general. — It is to be noted that in the solution to [arguments] 1 and 5 [is touched] only the question — in the solving of which the later theologians labored much — namely, how there was in Christ sufficient *freedom* for meriting (cf. here a. 2, q. 2, and above d. 12, a. 2, q. 2; *II Sent.* d. 7, p. I, a. , q. 1). — Likewise in the solution to [argument] 2 it is taught that Christ was in a most singular way in the state of *the wayfarer*, outside of which there can be no merit (cf. *II Sent.* d. 7, p. I, q. 1), and that he merited not by reason of the glory and love annexed to this state (cf. a. 2, q. 1, fundam. 5 and ad 2), but by reason of the love which he had as a wayfarer from infused grace. Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas and many others agree. Scotus, however, with some, holds that Christ merited also through beatific love. — Finally it is to be observed that in the body [of the question] it is taught clearly enough that Christ merited for us also the *application* of his merit with respect to the first infusion of sanctifying grace, which many of the ancient theologians denied (cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 4, and Suarez, *in III. p.*, tom., disp. 41, sect. 2).

**III.** Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; *Summa* III, q. 19, aa. 3, 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p385..386-{L,R}-*`), per the VOL II OVERRIDE applied to Vol III (column-band PDF authoritative). English is a fresh literal translation. Raw OCR (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` ~26873→26977) used only for cross-check; it cascade-shattered the Respondeo/footers and (critically) bled in p.387's ARTICULUS II scholion — see boundary note below.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.385** (PDF 407): SCHOLION I–III (top, both columns; q3's own) + Quaestio III heading + opener + args 1–5 + Sed contra args 1–3. Footers fn 1–8 (`[^p385-1..8]`).
- **p.386** (PDF 408): Sed contra args 4–5 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo + replies 1–5. Body ends at "...utrum passionibus contingat mereri, vel demereri." Footers fn 1–9 (`[^p386-1..9]`).
- **Apparatus total: 17 entries** (p.385: 8; p.386: 9).

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true`. The q3 scholion (I–III) is printed at the TOP of p.385 under running head `DIST. XVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. III.`, BEFORE q3's body (Quaracchi convention) — verified on the 450 dpi crop. ⚠ The auto-chunk skeleton (line_end 26992) had wrongly absorbed the SCHOLION printed on p.387 ("Manifestum est, quod passio..." under running head `DIST. XVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`) — that scholion belongs to **a2-q1**, NOT to q3, and has been EXCLUDED here. It must be picked up when a2-q1 is built.

**Hand-offs picked up:** NONE. p.385's footer numbering restarts fresh; no footer carried over from q2 (p.384 fn 1–7 were all q2's, per the q2 hand-off).

**Hand-off forwarded → d18-a2-q1:** ART. II opens at **raw 27004**, printed **p.387** (PDF 409). There is a short ARTICULUS II opener fold (`Consequenter quaeritur de merito Christi quantum ad fructum sive quantum ad praemium. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria...` with the three-question listing) — per the locked chunking convention, fold this ARTICULUS II opener + tractatio listing into **a2-q1**, no standalone divisio chunk. **MIGRATING FOOTER/SCHOLION:** the SCHOLION printed at the top of **p.387** under running head `DIST. XVIII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` ("Manifestum est, quod passio in se considerata..." with entries I, II, III) is **a2-q1's scholion** — translate it there (`has_scholion: true` for a2-q1). p.387's own footer sequence restarts for a2-q1; no footer carries forward from q3 (p.386 fn 1–9 are all q3's).

**[?] flags:** NONE — all of pp.385–386 was legible at 450 dpi.