title: Dist. 37, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVII — De praeceptorum Decalogi distinctione in comparatione ad scripturam tabularum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVII — On the distinction of the precepts of the Decalogue in comparison with the writing of the tablets

source_text:
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## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII.
### *De praeceptorum Decalogi distinctione in comparatione ad scripturam tabularum.*

*Sed iam distributio Decalogi etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

Pars ista, in qua Magister agit de vita gratiae, quam suscepimus per Christum et in qua vivimus secundum Christum, divisa fuit[^1] in partes duas. Id quarum prima determinat Magister de habitibus gratuitis, in quibus consistit spiritualis vitae complementum; in secunda vero de praeceptis Decalogi, in quibus consistit spiritualis vitae exercitium. Prima parte terminata, hic incipit secunda. — Dividitur autem pars ista in partes tres. In quarum prima determinat de distinctione praeceptorum in comparatione ad scripturam tabularum. In secunda vero determinat de eadem respectu obliquitatum eisdem oppositarum, ubi agit de mendacio et periurio[^2], infra distinctione trigesima octava: *Sciendum est, tria esse mendaciorum genera etc.* In tertia vero agit de eisdem praeceptis comparando Legem ad Evangelium, infra distinctione quadragesima: *Sextum praeceptum est: Non desiderabis etc.*

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, dividitur in partes duas. In quarum prima[^3] exsequitur de praeceptis primae tabulae. In secunda vero de praeceptis secundae, ibi: *In secunda vero tabula septem erant mandata etc.*

Prima pars habet tres partes, secundum quod tria sunt mandata primae tabulae, de quibus exsequitur. In prima agit de primo. In secunda de secundo, ibi: *Secundum praeceptum est etc.* In tertia de tertio, ibi: *Memento, ut diem Sabbati sanctifices etc.*

Secunda vero pars dividitur in quinque partes, secundum quod quinque sunt mandata, de quibus exsequitur breviter. Subdivisiones[^4] autem illarum partium satis manifestae sunt in littera.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis incidit hic quaestio de mandatis Decalogi in generali. Circa hoc autem duo generaliter possunt quaeri.

Primum est de ipsorum mandatorum obligatione.

Secundum vero est de distinctione et ordine.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum verba Decalogi debuerint esse obligatoria.

*Secundo*, utrum obligent ad opera bona in genere tantum[^5], an etiam ad opera formata.

*Tertio*, utrum obligatio illorum mandatorum procedat secundum legem naturae, an secundum legem scriptam.

english:
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## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVII.
### *On the distinction of the precepts of the Decalogue in comparison with the writing of the tablets.*

*But now the distribution of the Decalogue, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry gives the Latin apparatus note (**La.**) followed by an English rendering (**En.**).

This part, in which the Master treats of the life of grace, which we have received through Christ and in which we live according to Christ, was divided[^1] into two parts. Of these, in the first the Master determines concerning the gratuitous habits, in which consists the completion of the spiritual life; but in the second, concerning the precepts of the Decalogue, in which consists the exercise of the spiritual life. The first part being finished, here the second begins. — But this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these he determines concerning the distinction of the precepts in comparison with the writing of the tablets. But in the second he determines concerning the same with respect to the obliquities opposed to them, where he treats of lying and perjury[^2], below in the thirty-eighth distinction: *It must be known that there are three kinds of lies, etc.* But in the third he treats of the same precepts by comparing the Law to the Gospel, below in the fortieth distinction: *The sixth precept is: Thou shalt not covet, etc.*

The first part, which contains the present distinction, is divided into two parts. In the first of these[^3] he treats of the precepts of the first tablet. But in the second, of the precepts of the second, there: *But in the second tablet there were seven commandments, etc.*

The first part has three parts, according as there are three commandments of the first tablet, of which he treats. In the first he treats of the first. In the second, of the second, there: *The second precept is, etc.* In the third, of the third, there: *Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day, etc.*

But the second part is divided into five parts, according as there are five commandments, of which he treats briefly. But the subdivisions[^4] of those parts are sufficiently manifest in the text.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part there here arises a question concerning the commandments of the Decalogue in general. And concerning this, two things can be asked in a general way.

The first is concerning the obligation of the commandments themselves.

But the second is concerning their distinction and order.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether the words of the Decalogue ought to have been obligatory.

*Second*, whether they oblige to good works in general only[^5], or also to formed works.

*Third*, whether the obligation of those commandments proceeds according to the law of nature, or according to the written law.

la: Vide supra d. 23. divis. textus.

en: See above, d. 23, division of the text.

la: In cod. K sic pergitur: *de primo, dist. 58: Sciendum... genera. De secundo, videlicet de periurio, infra dist. 59: Nunc de periurio etc.* — Paulo superius pro *de eadem* multi codd. *de eisdem.*

en: In codex K it proceeds thus: *of the first, dist. 58: It must be known... kinds. Of the second, namely concerning perjury, below dist. 59: Now concerning perjury, etc.* — A little above, for *de eadem* ("of the same," fem.) many codices read *de eisdem* ("of the same," neut. pl.).

la: Edd. addunt *praemisso numero praeceptorum et distinctione respectu tabularum.*

en: The editions add: *the number of the precepts and their distinction with respect to the tablets having been premised.*

la: Codd. G I L T V aa *Signationes.*

en: Codices G I L T V aa read *Signationes* ("markings").

la: Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt *tantum.* Subinde pro *legem scriptam* edd. *legem scripturae.* Idem pluries occurrit infra in ipsa quaest.

en: Nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2 omit *tantum* ("only"). Thereupon, for *legem scriptam* ("the written law") the editions read *legem scripturae* ("the law of Scripture"). The same occurs several times below in the question itself.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed **p.812** (PDF 834; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw `bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt` 56349–56389). Running head `812 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` confirmed (raw 56347). Vol III two-column; PDF-priority inversion applies, but p.812's COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO/TRACTATIO band is clean in OCR and the PDF read confirmed it 1:1.

**Page-split map.** The divisio occupies the **top of p.812 only** (single page): `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVII` header (raw 56349) → DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 56354) → TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw 56374) → bounded forward at `ARTICULUS I.` (raw 56383) / `QUAESTIO I.` (raw 56387), whose body (`Circa primum sic proceditur…`, raw 56390) is **a1-q1**. The ARTICULUS I opener + the QUAESTIO I header/title fold into a1-q1 per the divisio-chunk convention (ART. I has no standalone *Consequenter quaeruntur* opener — its three questions are pre-stated here in the TRACTATIO under "Circa primum quaeruntur tria").

**Apparatus = shared p.812 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band, per-page restart.** The page's footer band has 6 notes (L-col nn.1–3, R-col nn.4–6). This chunk claims **nn.1–5 → [^1]–[^5]** (the markers `divisa fuit ¹`, `periurio ²`, `prima ³`, `Subdivisiones ⁴`, `in genere tantum ⁵`, all in the DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO text). **n.6** (*Vers. 14. — Minor fundatur in dicto Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1…*) keys to the a1-q1 body marker `ad Romanos septimo ⁶` and **FORWARDS to a1-q1** — do NOT carry it here. Marker pairing 5/5. NOTHING picked up from d37-littera (the littera's NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM band closed fully on p.811; this is a fresh NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band opening on p.812).

**`has_scholion: false`** — no SCHOLION header in the divisio range (grep-verified raw 56349–56389).

**No `[?]` flags** — p.812 legible at 450 dpi.

---

### ⭐ VERBATIM TRACTATIO ARTICLE + QUESTION FRAMING (for a1/a2 alignment checks)

d.37 has **TWO articuli**. The general frame (in this divisio's TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM) states: *"Circa hoc autem duo generaliter possunt quaeri. Primum est de ipsorum mandatorum obligatione. Secundum vero est de distinctione et ordine."* → **ART. I = obligation**, **ART. II = distinction & order**.

**ARTICULUS I — *De mandatorum Decalogi obligatione.*** Framing (TRACTATIO): *"Circa primum quaeruntur tria."* → **3 questions** (pre-stated here in the TRACTATIO):
> 1. *Primo quaeritur, utrum verba Decalogi debuerint esse obligatoria.* → **a1-q1** (`QUAESTIO I.` header: *Utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria.*)
> 2. *Secundo, utrum obligent ad opera bona in genere tantum, an etiam ad opera formata.* → **a1-q2**
> 3. *Tertio, utrum obligatio illorum mandatorum procedat secundum legem naturae, an secundum legem scriptam.* → **a1-q3**

Raw header positions confirmed: ART. I QUAESTIO I (raw 56387), QUAESTIO II (56562), QUAESTIO III (56769).

**ARTICULUS II — *De mandatis Decalogi quoad distinctionem et ordinem.*** This article has its OWN opener (raw 56964–56970), verbatim:
> *"Consequenter quaeritur de mandatis Decalogi quantum ad ordinem et distinctionem. Et circa hoc tria possunt quaeri.*
> *Primo quaeritur de ipsorum mandatorum numero et sufficientia, utrum sint decem.*
> *Secundo quaeritur de ordine ipsorum ad invicem.*
> *Tertio vero quaeritur de numero et ordine in comparatione ad tabularum distinctionem."*

→ **ART. II = 3 questions**:
> 1. **a2-q1** (`QUAESTIO I.`, raw 56974): *Utrum mandata Decalogi debeant esse tantum decem, an plura, an pauciora.* (number & sufficiency)
> 2. **a2-q2** (`QUAESTIO II.`, OCR'd `QUAESTIO H.`, raw 57245): *De ordine mandatorum Decalogi ad invicem.* (order among themselves)
> 3. **a2-q3** (`QUAESTIO III.`, raw 57394): *De numero et ordine mandatorum quoad tabularum distinctionem.* (number & order vs the tablets)

Raw header positions confirmed: ART. II (raw 56964); QUAESTIO I (56974), QUAESTIO II (57245), QUAESTIO III (57394).

### ⭐ a2-q2 RESOLUTION — MISSING SKELETON CREATED

ART. II genuinely has **THREE questions** (q1·q2·q3), per both the verbatim ART. II opener *"circa hoc tria possunt quaeri"* and the three confirmed `QUAESTIO I/II/III` raw headers under ART. II. The on-disk slate was missing `a2-q2`: the auto-chunker had dumped the ART. II QUAESTIO I **and** QUAESTIO II text into the single `a2-q1` skeleton (its range 56974–57393 spans both q1's body AND q2's *De ordine* header+body), then started a2-q3 at QUAESTIO III (57394). So **a2-q2 was dropped by the chunker, NOT genuinely absent.** A reconstructed `vol3/bon-sent-III-d37-a2-q2.md` skeleton has been scaffolded (quaestio:2, type:quaestio, placeholder body, `transcription_status: "auto-chunked 2026-06-13 (reconstructed missing skeleton)"`, line range 57245–57393). When a2-q1 is later re-bounded at QUAESTIO II (raw 57245), it must hand off the q2 *De ordine* material to this new file.

**Resolved d.37 slate:** littera(✅) · divisio(✅ this) · a1-q1 · a1-q2 · a1-q3 · a2-q1 · **a2-q2 (scaffolded)** · a2-q3 · dubia.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

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### Articulus I. *De mandatorum Decalogi obligatione.*

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicitur ad Romanos septimo[^1]: *Peccatum, occasione accepta per mandatum, operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam*; sed Deus nihil debet imponere, quod faciat ad augmentum concupiscentiae: ergo non debuit hominem per mandata obligare.

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2. Item, super illud primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^2]: *Virtus peccati lex*; Glossa: « Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem »: si ergo Deus nihil debet nobis imponere, quod faciat ad cupiditatis augmentum, sed potius ad diminutionem; videtur, quod per mandata nullo modo debuit nos obligare.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit super Genesim ad litteram[^3]: « Meliores iudicavit homines, qui ei liberaliter deservirent »; sed debitum obligationis repugnat libertati obsequii: si ergo Deus a principio hominem reliquit *in manu consilii sui*, dando ei libertatem arbitrii; videtur, quod nullo modo debuerit addere obligationem praecepti.

4. Item, liberalius dat aliquod donum qui dat sine onere, quam qui cum oneris impositione: si ergo obligatio praeceptorum magnum onus est, et Deus est liberalissimus; videtur, quod gratiam et gloriam debuit dare[^4] homini, ita quod ipsum non obligaret ad aliquod mandatum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Decet *Conditorem* cunctis operibus suis legem certam et limitem praefigere, ultra quam non debeant progredi; sicut patet, quia omnes creaturae reguntur secundum leges sibi a Creatore impositas[^5]: si ergo hoc est dignitatis in creatura, videtur, quod decens et conveniens fuit, homini legem imponi, extra quam non liceret homini progredi. Hoc autem fit per mandata obligatoria: ergo talia mandata fuerunt homini danda.

2. Item, decet *rectorem* in subditis servare debitum ordinem[^6]: si ergo homo per libertatem suae voluntatis poterat inordinari, opportunum et convenientissimum fuit, ipsum ad rectum ordinem astringi. Hoc autem fit per obligationem mandatorum Decalogi: decens igitur fuit, talia mandata homini dari.

3. Item, decens est, *dominum* a servo suo obsequium exigere[^7]; sed tunc dominus a servo suo obsequium exigit, quando leges et praecepta eidem imponit: si ergo decens fuit, quod Deus ab homine tanquam a servo exigeret talia obsequia, decens fuit, ut ei imponeret mandata obligatoria.

4. Item, decens est, iustum *iudicem* secundum merita retribuere[^8]; sed meritum et demeritum non habet locum, ubi nulla cadit obligatio legis: si ergo conveniens fuit Deo hominem, cui contulerat liberum arbitrium, secundum iustitiam iudicare, decens etiam fuit, ut regulam iustitiae eidem praefigeret. Sed hoc fit secundum mandatorum impositionem: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Decalogus debuit dari per modum praecepti, tum quia decebat divinam aequitatem et maiestatem, tum quia nobis expediebat ad gloriam nostram augendam et pacem conservandam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio verba Decalogi debuerunt dari per modum praecepti, ita quod in eis homo non solum instrueretur, verum etiam obligaretur. — Et ratio huius est: tum quia Deum decebat, tum quia nobis expediebat.

*Deum* utique decebat, quia in his verbis Decalogi consistit regula iustitiae, secundum quod dictat lumen rationis rectae[^9]. Et quoniam Deus tanquam iustus debet esse aemulator rectitudinis et iustitiae et in subditis et in se ipso; hinc est, quod homini leges iustitiae imposuit, ad quas ipsum obligavit, ut nullo modo liceret, ipsum eas impune praetergredi. Verba igitur Decalogi per modum obligationis debuerunt dari, quia sic decebat divinam aequitatem. — Nec tantum decebat aequitatem, immo etiam maiestatem. Sicut enim decet summam Maiestatem a creatura rationali omni reverentia coli, sic etiam decet, quod rationalis creatura ad manifestationem illius summae Maiestatis per obedientiam famuletur[^10]. Et propterea decuit ipsum imponere homini leges et mandata obligatoria.

Non solum autem *Deum* decebat, sed etiam *nobis* expediebat, tum propter gloriam nostram augendam, tum propter pacem conservandam.

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Propter *gloriam* utique *augendam*, quia gloriosius est homini obtinere beatitudinem per merita quam sine meritis[^11]. Et quoniam, cum aliquid redditur ex meritis, quodam modo homo, qui meretur, obligat sibi retribuentem; et magis decet, hominem obligari Deo, quam Deum homini: hinc est, quod ad opera, per quae contingebat mereri, debuit homo per praecepta *obligari*, ut, dum obligatus obediret, in merito proficeret et ad maiorem cumulum gloriae perveniret. — Alia ratio est propter *pacem conservandam*, quae « tantum bonum est, sicut dicit Augustinus[^12], ut cuncta pacem appetant »; pax autem servari non potest, ubi homo usurpat sibi quod est alienum: ideo, ut pax servaretur inter homines, debuit Deus mandata homini tradere, in quibus obligaretur, ne quod est alienum usurparet, sed redderet Deo et proximo quod eis deberet, ne aliter iniuriam faciendo pacem frangeret, et frangendo pacem ipse in se pacem amitteret[^13]. — Sic ergo decuit, verba Decalogi tradi per modum obligationis et praecepti, tum quia decens erat ex parte *Dei*, tum quia expediens erat ex parte *nostri*. Et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, possunt concedi.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium ex auctoritate Apostoli, quod mandatum intendit concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, sed valde *per accidens* et *occasionaliter*. Ex hoc enim, quod per Legem erat peccati cognitio, tamen[^14] per ipsam non erat gratiae collatio, concupiscentia nitente in vetitum, et homine scienter perpetrante peccatum; ex hoc occasionaliter fiebat et ipsius concupiscentiae intensio et peccati aggravatio. Sed hoc non erat de principali intentione ferentis mandata nec de ipsorum mandatorum obligatione. Nam Dominus sic tribuit mandata obligatoria, quod semper fuit promptus tribuere gratiam adiutricem ad illa implenda. Unde quod per mandatorum obligationem augeretur concupiscentia, hoc non erat ex ipsis mandatis, sed potius ex negligentia et culpa hominis; Dominus autem propter negligentiam hominis non debuit dimittere, quin diligentiam circa salutem hominis exerceret[^15].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem; dicendum, quod Glossa non dicit illud simpliciter, sed addit hanc conditionem: « nisi diffundat Spiritus caritatem[^16] ». Unde quamvis per se Lex non esset utilis nisi ad cognitionem, tamen cum gratia ipsa mandatorum obligatio multum conferebat ad salutem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obligatio repugnat libertati; potest responderi, quod obligatio ad bonum non repugnat libertati *simpliciter*, sed repugnat libertati *peccandi*. « Posse autem peccare nec est libertas nec pars libertatis[^17] »; et ideo, dum obligatio mandati repugnabat libertati male faciendi, libertatem non minuebat, sed potius augebat. — Aliter etiam potest responderi, quod est obligatio, quae aufert *potestatem*, et est obligatio, quae aufert *impunitatem*. Prima obligatio, quae potestatem aufert, minuit libertatem; secunda vero, quae potestatem non aufert, sed tollit impunitatem, libertatem arbitrii salvat et superaddit iustitiae aequitatem. Hoc autem secundo modo mandata Dei sunt obligatoria; et propterea in nullo libertati arbitrii derogabant, quin potius divinam iustitiam commendabant.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris liberalitatis[^18] est dare aliquid sine merito quam cum meritis; dicendum, quod etsi maioris liberalitatis sit ex parte *dantis*, non tamen est tantae gloriae et excellentiae ex parte *suscipientis*. Et quoniam Dominus in conferendo praemium non tantum attendit suae liberalitatis manifestationem, immo etiam gloriae nostrae promotionem; hinc est, quod maluit nobis dare aeternam beatitudinem per impletionem mandatorum et meritum obedientiae, quam nullo merito praecedente. — Praeterea, merita nostra in nullo derogant divinae liberalitati, immo potius eam manifestant, tum quia ipse bonorum nostrorum non eget[^19], tum quia omnia merita nostra procedunt ex munere gratiae suae. Et propterea dicit Apostolus ad Romanos sexto: *Gratia Dei vita aeterna*.

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english:
### Article I. *On the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue.*

Concerning the first point three things are asked.

### Question I. *Whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether God ought to have imposed obligatory commandments on man. And that he ought not, it seems:

1. First, through what is said in Romans 7[^1]: *Sin, taking occasion through the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence*; but God ought to impose nothing that makes for the increase of concupiscence: therefore he ought not to have obligated man through commandments.

2. Likewise, on that text of 1 Corinthians 15[^2]: *The strength of sin is the law*; the Gloss: « The law, by forbidding, increases the desire for sin »: if therefore God ought to impose nothing on us that makes for the increase of desire, but rather for its diminution; it seems that he ought in no way to have obligated us through commandments.

3. Likewise, Augustine says on Genesis literally[^3]: « He judged those men better who served him freely »; but the debt of obligation is repugnant to the freedom of service: if therefore God from the beginning left man *in the hand of his own counsel*, giving him freedom of choice; it seems that he ought in no way to have added the obligation of a precept.

4. Likewise, he who gives some gift without a burden gives more liberally than he who gives with the imposition of a burden: if therefore the obligation of precepts is a great burden, and God is most liberal; it seems that he ought to have given grace and glory[^4] to man in such a way that he would not obligate him to any commandment.

**On the contrary:**

1. It befits the *Maker* to set for all his works a fixed law and limit, beyond which they ought not to advance; as is plain, since all creatures are governed according to the laws imposed on them by their Creator[^5]: if therefore this belongs to the dignity of a creature, it seems that it was fitting and suitable that a law be imposed on man, beyond which it would not be permitted to man to advance. But this is done through obligatory commandments: therefore such commandments were to be given to man.

2. Likewise, it befits a *ruler* to preserve due order among his subjects[^6]: if therefore man through the freedom of his will could become disordered, it was opportune and most suitable that he be bound to right order. But this is done through the obligation of the commandments of the Decalogue: it was therefore fitting that such commandments be given to man.

3. Likewise, it is fitting that a *lord* exact service from his servant[^7]; but a lord exacts service from his servant when he imposes laws and precepts on him: if therefore it was fitting that God should exact such service from man as from a servant, it was fitting that he impose obligatory commandments on him.

4. Likewise, it is fitting that a just *judge* repay according to merits[^8]; but merit and demerit have no place where no obligation of law falls: if therefore it was suitable for God to judge man, on whom he had conferred free choice, according to justice, it was also fitting that he set before him a rule of justice. But this is done by the imposition of commandments: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> The Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, both because it befitted the divine equity and majesty, and because it was expedient for us, for the increasing of our glory and the preserving of peace.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the words of the Decalogue had to be given by way of precept, in such a way that in them man should not only be instructed but also be obligated. — And the reason for this is: both because it befitted God, and because it was expedient for us.

It befitted *God* indeed, because in these words of the Decalogue consists the rule of justice, according as the light of right reason dictates[^9]. And since God, as just, ought to be a zealous defender of rectitude and justice both in his subjects and in himself; hence it is that he imposed on man the laws of justice, to which he obligated him, so that it would in no way be permitted for him to transgress them with impunity. The words of the Decalogue, therefore, had to be given by way of obligation, because thus it befitted the divine equity. — Nor did it befit equity only, but rather majesty also. For just as it befits the supreme Majesty to be worshipped with all reverence by the rational creature, so too it befits that the rational creature should, for the manifestation of that supreme Majesty, do service through obedience[^10]. And therefore it was fitting that he impose on man laws and obligatory commandments.

Now not only did it befit *God*, but it was also expedient for *us*, both for the increasing of our glory and for the preserving of peace.

For the *increasing of glory* indeed, because it is more glorious for man to obtain beatitude through merits than without merits[^11]. And since, when something is repaid out of merits, in a certain way the man who merits obligates the one repaying him to himself; and it is more fitting that man be obligated to God than God to man: hence it is that with regard to the works through which it befell him to merit, man had to be *obligated* through precepts, so that, while obligated he obeyed, he might advance in merit and arrive at a greater accumulation of glory. — Another reason is for the *preserving of peace*, which « is so great a good, as Augustine says[^12], that all things desire peace »; but peace cannot be preserved where man usurps for himself what is another's: therefore, that peace might be preserved among men, God had to hand over commandments to man, in which he might be obligated not to usurp what is another's, but to render to God and to neighbor what was owed to them, lest otherwise, by doing injury, he break the peace, and by breaking the peace himself lose peace within himself[^13]. — Thus therefore it was fitting that the words of the Decalogue be handed over by way of obligation and precept, both because it was fitting on the part of *God*, and because it was expedient on the part of *us*. And the reasons that show this can be granted.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the authority of the Apostle, that the commandment intends concupiscence; it must be said that this holds true, but very much *per accidens* and *occasionally*. For from this, that through the Law there was knowledge of sin, yet[^14] through it there was no conferral of grace, with concupiscence striving toward the forbidden, and man knowingly perpetrating sin; from this there occasionally came about both the intensifying of concupiscence itself and the aggravation of sin. But this was not part of the principal intention of the one bearing the commandments, nor of the obligation of the commandments themselves. For the Lord so bestowed obligatory commandments that he was always ready to bestow helping grace for fulfilling them. Hence that concupiscence was increased through the obligation of the commandments, this was not from the commandments themselves, but rather from the negligence and fault of man; but the Lord, on account of man's negligence, ought not to have refrained from exercising diligence concerning man's salvation[^15].

2. To that which is objected, that the Law by forbidding increases the desire for sin; it must be said that the Gloss does not say this absolutely, but adds this condition: « unless the Spirit pour out charity[^16] ». Hence although the Law of itself was not useful except for knowledge, nevertheless with grace the very obligation of the commandments contributed much to salvation.

3. To that which is objected, that obligation is repugnant to freedom; it can be answered that obligation to the good is not repugnant to freedom *absolutely*, but is repugnant to the freedom *of sinning*. « But to be able to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom[^17] »; and therefore, since the obligation of the commandment was repugnant to the freedom of acting wrongly, it did not diminish freedom, but rather increased it. — In another way too it can be answered, that there is an obligation that takes away *power*, and there is an obligation that takes away *impunity*. The first obligation, which takes away power, diminishes freedom; but the second, which does not take away power but removes impunity, preserves freedom of choice and adds to it the equity of justice. Now in this second way the commandments of God are obligatory; and therefore they in no way derogated from freedom of choice, but rather commended the divine justice.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater liberality[^18] to give something without merit than with merits; it must be said that although it is of greater liberality on the part of the *giver*, nevertheless it is not of such great glory and excellence on the part of the *receiver*. And since the Lord, in conferring a reward, attends not only to the manifestation of his liberality, but rather also to the promotion of our glory; hence it is that he preferred to give us eternal beatitude through the fulfillment of the commandments and the merit of obedience, rather than with no merit preceding. — Moreover, our merits in no way derogate from the divine liberality, but rather manifest it, both because he himself has no need of our goods[^19], and because all our merits proceed from the gift of his grace. And therefore the Apostle says in Romans 6: *The grace of God is life eternal*.

la: Vers. 14. — *Minor* fundatur in dicto Aristot., II. Ethic. c. I, quod legislator intendit per leges *bonos* reddere cives.

en: Verse 14. — The *minor* premise is founded on the saying of Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 1, that the legislator intends through laws to render the citizens *good*.

la: Vers. 56. — Glossa refertur a Petr. Lombardo et a Lyrano ut *ordinaria*; sumta est ex August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 6. n. 14: Quoniam Lex prohibendo auget peccati cupiditatem, nisi diffundat Spiritus caritatem etc. Cfr. XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 5.

en: Verse 56. — The Gloss is reported by Peter Lombard and by Lyra as *the ordinary [gloss]*; it is taken from Augustine, *On the Perfection of Man's Righteousness*, c. 6, n. 14: Since the Law by forbidding increases the desire for sin, unless the Spirit pour out charity, etc. Cf. *City of God* XIII, c. 5.

la: Haec sententia colligi posset ex iis quae lib. XI. c. 7. n. 9. seqq. proponit in solvenda quaestione, cur homo non sit talis creatus, qui nollet unquam peccare; sed si verba attendantur, invenitur in lib. de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27. Vide supra pag. 265, nota 7. Inferius respicitur Eccli. 15, 14.

en: This sentence could be gathered from what he sets forth in book XI, c. 7, n. 9ff. in resolving the question why man was not so created that he would never will to sin; but if the words are attended to, it is found in the book *On True Religion*, c. 14, n. 27. See above p. 265, note 7. Below, Ecclesiasticus 15:14 is referred to.

la: Psalm. 83, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.

en: Psalm 83:12: The Lord will give grace and glory.

la: Secundum August., IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17, n. 32. Cfr. Iob 28, 26. et 38, 11, et Aristot., de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.), ubi dicit, hoc Deum esse in mundo, « quod in navi gubernator est, quod in curru agitator, quod in choro praecentor, quod denique lex in civitate et dux in exercitu »; et subinde ostendit, caelum, plantas, bestias regi Dei auspiciis et obtemperare divinis legibus. — Pro *secundum leges* cod. Z *per leges*. Inferius edd. *fuerit* pro *fuit*.

en: According to Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* IX, c. 17, n. 32. Cf. Job 28:26 and 38:11, and Aristotle, *On the World*, c. 7 (c. 6), where he says that God is to the world « what the helmsman is in a ship, what the driver is in a chariot, what the precentor is in a choir, what finally law is in a city and the commander in an army »; and thereupon he shows that the heavens, plants, and beasts are governed under God's auspices and obey the divine laws. — For *secundum leges* codex Z reads *per leges*. Below the editions read *fuerit* for *fuit*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 9; August., de Quantit. animae, c. 36. n. 80, ubi, postquam ostendit, Deum universa condita regere iuxta legem inviolabilem, et homini datum fuisse liberum arbitrium, subiungit: Nec tamen ita liberum arbitrium animae datum est, ut quodlibet eo moliens ullam partem divini ordinis legisque perturbet. Datum est enim a sapientissimo atque invictissimo totius creaturae Domino. — Codd. G Z aa *rectum ordinem*. In fine arg. pro *dari* cod. Z *imponi*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X, c. 9; Augustine, *On the Greatness of the Soul*, c. 36, n. 80, where, after showing that God governs all created things according to an inviolable law, and that free choice was given to man, he adds: Nevertheless free choice was not given to the soul in such a way that whoever attempts anything by it should disturb any part of the divine order and law. For it was given by the most wise and most invincible Lord of all creation. — Codices G Z aa read *rectum ordinem*. At the end of the argument, for *dari* codex Z reads *imponi*.

la: Boeth., de Trin. c. 5, dominium definit: Potestas quaedam, qua servus coercetur. — Inferius pro *imponit* edd. *tribuit*.

en: Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 5, defines lordship: A certain power by which a servant is constrained. — Below, for *imponit* the editions read *tribuit*.

la: Vide August., I. de Ordine, c. 7. n. 19. — Finem arg. Vat. sic exhibet: ergo decens fuit, obligatoria mandata homini imponi.

en: See Augustine, *On Order* I, c. 7, n. 19. — The Vatican edition presents the end of the argument thus: therefore it was fitting that obligatory commandments be imposed on man.

la: Cfr. infra q. 3. — Mox respicitur Exod. 34, 14; Deut. 4, 24. et 5, 9, ubi Deus nominatur *aemulator*.

en: Cf. below, q. 3. — Presently Exodus 34:14; Deuteronomy 4:24 and 5:9 are referred to, where God is named *the jealous one*.

la: August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 12, loquens de praecepto, quod Deus dedit Adam, ait: Oportebat autem, ut homo, sub Domino Deo positus, aliunde prohiberetur, ut ei promerendi Dominum suum virtus esset ipsa obedientia, quam possum verissime dicere solam esse virtutem omni creaturae rationali agenti sub Dei potestate... Non esset ergo, unde se homo dominium habere cogitaret atque sentiret, nisi aliquid ei iuberetur.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* VIII, c. 11, n. 12, speaking of the precept which God gave to Adam, says: But it was fitting that man, placed under the Lord God, should be prohibited from something else, so that the virtue of meriting his Lord might be obedience itself, which I can most truly say is the only virtue for every rational creature acting under God's power... There would be, then, no source from which man might think and feel that he has a lord, unless something were commanded to him.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 387, nota 4. — De seq. proposit. vide August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 16. n. 45.

en: Cf. above p. 387, note 4. — On the following proposition see Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 16, n. 45.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. et 12. n. 1. — Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *cetera* pro *cuncta*. Cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 1. Paulo inferius pro *usurpat sibi* cod. A *usurpat aliquid*, et pro *servaretur* cod. Z *conservaretur*. Subinde pro *ne aliter* Vat. *ne alteri*.

en: *City of God* XIX, c. 11 and 12, n. 1. — Very many codices and editions 1, 2 read *cetera* for *cuncta*. Cf. above p. 680, note 1. A little below, for *usurpat sibi* codex A reads *usurpat aliquid*, and for *servaretur* codex Z reads *conservaretur*. Thereupon for *ne aliter* the Vatican edition reads *ne alteri*.

la: August., Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 4. n. 15: Si autem praecepta non essent, non utique esset, ubi se homo certius inspiceret et videret, unde averteretur, quo conaretur, quare gratularetur, quid precaretur. Magna est ergo utilitas praeceptorum, si libero arbitrio tantum detur, ut gratia Dei amplius honoretur.

en: Augustine, *Letter* 167 (otherwise 29), c. 4, n. 15: But if there were no precepts, there would surely be nothing in which a man might more surely examine himself and see from what he should turn away, toward what he should strive, for what he should give thanks, what he should pray for. Great therefore is the usefulness of the precepts, provided it be granted to free choice only so far that the grace of God may be the more honored.

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd. *cum*. Paulo inferius pro *nitente* cod. A *intense nitente*, edd. 1, 2 *intendit*, dein pro *homine scienter perpetrante peccatum* non pauci codd. *hominem scienter perpetrare*, edd. 1, 2 melius *hominem scienter fecit perpetrare*.

en: The editions with some codices read *cum*. A little below, for *nitente* codex A reads *intense nitente*, editions 1, 2 *intendit*; then for *homine scienter perpetrante peccatum* not a few codices read *hominem scienter perpetrare*, editions 1, 2 better *hominem scienter fecit perpetrare*.

la: Haec solutio consonat cum illa expositione, quam facit August. in Expos. quarundam proposit. ex Epist. ad Rom. proposit. 37. seqq., et I. de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplic. q. I. n. I. seqq.

en: This solution accords with that exposition which Augustine makes in his *Exposition of Certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans*, proposition 37ff., and in book I *Of Various Questions to Simplician*, q. I, n. I, ff.

la: Vide supra pag. 813, nota I. — Infra post *cognitionem* Vat. addit *peccati*.

en: See above p. 813, note 1. — Below, after *cognitionem* the Vatican edition adds *peccati*.

la: Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. I. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 613, nota 9.

en: Anselm, *Dialogue on Free Choice*, c. 1. Cf. vol. II, p. 613, note 9.

la: Cod. Z *perfectionis*; multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 hic et paulo inferius perperam *libertatis*.

en: Codex Z reads *perfectionis*; many codices and editions 1, 2 here and a little below wrongly read *libertatis*.

la: Respicitur Ps. 15, 2: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Seq. textus Scripturae est Rom. 6, 23. — August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 24: Ille quippe nostra servitute non indiget, nos vero dominatione illius indigemus, ut operetur et custodiat nos; et ideo verus solus est Dominus, quia non illi ad suam, sed ad nostram utilitatem salutemque servimus. Nam si nobis indigeret, eo ipso non verus Dominus esset, cum per nos eius adiuvaretur necessitas, sub qua et ipse serviret. Merito ille in Psalmo: Dixi, inquit, Domino: Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges etc.

en: Psalm 15:2 is referred to: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods. The following text of Scripture is Romans 6:23. — Augustine, *On Genesis Literally* VIII, c. 11, n. 24: For he indeed has no need of our servitude, but we have need of his lordship, that he may work and guard us; and therefore he alone is the true Lord, because we serve not for his own benefit but for our benefit and salvation. For if he had need of us, by that very fact he would not be the true Lord, since through us his necessity would be aided, under which he himself too would be a servant. Rightly does he say in the Psalm: I said to the Lord: Thou art my God, for thou hast no need of my goods, etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Licet haec quaestio specialiter agat de opportuna promulgatione Decalogi, allata tamen principia et solutiones obiectorum serviunt ad praecipua Antinomistarum sophismata solvenda, simulque eadem militant contra errores novatorum saeculi XVI, qui negabant, Christum ut *Legislatorem* leges evangelicas tulisse, eoque progrediebantur, ut libertatem christianam (qua liberi sumus a servitute peccati, a lege Moysaica, a spiritu timoris) detorquerent ad exemptionem Christianorum ab obligatione Decalogi. Eadem auctoris doctrina valet etiam contra Kantii figmentum, quo humanae rationi *autonomiam* ipsique formaliter inhaerentem auctoritatem legiferam vindicare impio et vano conatu nititur.

Eandem quaestionem, sed sumtam sensu universaliori, ut totam legem Moysaicam complectatur, solvunt Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 28. m. I, et Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Alii antiqui auctores rem tangunt passim in tractatu de legibus; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 98. a. I, q. 99, praesertim a. 2. ad 2, et q. 100. a. 7. — Quoad solutionem ad 3. cfr. ibid. q. 93. a. 6. ad I.

Generaliter observamus, S. Bonaventuram in quaestionibus et dubiis huius distinctionis breviter exhibere substantiam diffusae disputationis, quam de Decalogo instituit Alex. Hal. (Sum. p. III. q. 19–38.) et de aliis praeceptis legis Mosaicae (ibid. q. 46. 49. 54. 55.); qui etiam de lege aeterna (ibid. q. 26.), de lege naturali (q. 27.), de lege evangelica (q. 56–60) copiose tractat.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Although this question deals specially with the opportune promulgation of the Decalogue, nevertheless the principles brought forward and the solutions of the objections serve for resolving the chief sophisms of the Antinomians, and the same at once contend against the errors of the innovators of the sixteenth century, who denied that Christ as *Legislator* bore the evangelical laws, and went so far as to twist Christian liberty (by which we are free from the servitude of sin, from the Mosaic law, from the spirit of fear) into an exemption of Christians from the obligation of the Decalogue. The same doctrine of the author avails also against the fiction of Kant, by which he strives with impious and vain effort to claim *autonomy* for human reason and a law-giving authority formally inhering in it.

The same question, but taken in a more universal sense, so as to embrace the whole Mosaic law, is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Sum. p. III, q. 28, m. I, and by Peter of Tarentaise, here q. I, a. I. — Other ancient authors touch upon the matter here and there in the treatise on laws; cf. St. Thomas, S. I-II, q. 98, a. I, q. 99, especially a. 2, ad 2, and q. 100, a. 7. — As to the solution to objection 3, cf. ibid. q. 93, a. 6, ad I.

We observe in general that St. Bonaventure, in the questions and doubts of this distinction, briefly sets forth the substance of the diffuse disputation that Alexander of Hales conducts concerning the Decalogue (Sum. p. III, q. 19–38) and concerning the other precepts of the Mosaic law (ibid. q. 46, 49, 54, 55); he also treats copiously of the eternal law (ibid. q. 26), of the natural law (q. 27), and of the evangelical law (q. 56–60).

---

translators_notes:
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**ART. I opener folded in.** Per the Vol III convention (and the d37-divisio hand-off), the short **ARTICULUS I** opener — *De mandatorum Decalogi obligatione* / *Circa primum quaeruntur tria* (raw 56383) — folds into this q1 along with the `QUAESTIO I.` header/title. The divisio (commit `27e31ac`) held only COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

**Alignment check — PASS.** TRACTATIO **Primo** *utrum verba Decalogi debuerint esse obligatoria* ↔ `QUAESTIO I.` *Utrum Deus debuerit homini imponere mandata obligatoria* (raw 56387) maps 1:1. Bound forward at `QUAESTIO II.` raw 56562 (= a1-q2, *opera in genere/formata*). No misalignment.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum praecepta Decalogi obligent ad opera formata.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum praecepta Decalogi obligent ad opera formata. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Deuteronomii decimo sexto[^1]: *Iuste quod iustum est exsequeris*. Ex hoc verbo colligitur, quod Legislator non solum praecipiebat iustitiam in facto, sed etiam iustitiam in modo; opus autem, quod est iustum in facto et modo, est opus formatum: ergo per mandata Legis obligatur homo ad opera formata.

2. Item, Matthaei decimo nono[^2]: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata*: observatio igitur mandatorum Decalogi introducit ad vitam; sed nemo introducitur ad vitam per aliqua opera, nisi fiant ex caritate, et talia sunt opera formata: cum ergo per Legem obligemur ad praecepta Decalogi observanda, videtur, quod per eandem obligemur ad opera formata.

3. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in fine distinctionis praecedentis[^3], quod omnia praecepta Decalogi reducuntur ad duo praecepta; sed illa praecepta nemo implet nisi ex caritate — sicut patet de praecepto, quo praecipitur: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo* etc. — videtur ergo similiter, quod omnia mandata Decalogi teneamur implere ex caritate: ergo per Legem obligamur ad opera formata.

4. Item, ad opera mandatorum obligamur secundum intentionem praecipientis; sed intentio praecipientis fuit dare illa mandata, ut per illa ei serviamus et serviendo placeamus[^4]; hoc autem non fit nisi per opera caritate et gratia informata: ergo etc.

5. Item, informatio et deformatio sunt opposita, praeceptio et prohibitio sunt opposita; et « si oppositum de opposito, et propositum de proposito[^5] »; cum ergo deformatio operum sit in prohibitione, eorundem informatio erit in praecepto.

**Sed contra:** 1. Dicit Hieronymus[^6], quod « anathema sit qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile »: cum ergo praecepta illa obligent tam iustos quam peccatores, et in potestate peccatoris non sit informare opera sua, cum illud habeat fieri per caritatem et gratiam; videtur, quod ad hoc nemo obligetur per divina mandata.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in Glossa super illud Psalmi[^7]: *Declina a malo et fac bonum*: « Declinare a malo semper vitat poenam, quamvis non semper promereatur palmam »; sed quotiescumque declinat homo a malo ex caritate, promeretur palmam: ergo non semper tenetur homo ex caritate a malo declinare. Sed declinando a malo, observantur praecepta negativa: ergo non videtur, quod obligent ad opera formata.

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3. Item, aliquis filius, habens parentes et existens in peccato mortali, honorat eos ex naturali pietate, cum se offert locus et tempus et opportunitas; constat, quod iste non peccat parentes honorando, nec committendo nec omittendo: ergo mandatum illud, quo Dominus praecepit[^8]: *Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam*; non obligabat ad hoc, quod opus illud ex caritate impenderetur: pari ratione nec alia mandata.

4. Item, opera formata non sunt nisi per gratiam; sed nemo scit, utrum gratiam Spiritus sancti habeat[^9]: ergo nemo scit, utrum eius opera sint formata, vel informata. Sed nemo obligatur ad id quod non potest scire: ergo mandata Decalogi ad opera formata non obligant.

5. Item, quicumque obligatur ad aliquid, obligatur per consequens ad id quod est illi inseparabiliter annexum[^10]; sed opera non possunt formari ab aliquo, nisi habeatur gratia: ergo quicumque obligatur ad opera formata, obligatur ad habendam gratiam. Cum ergo habere gratiam respiciat omne tempus indifferenter, tam tempus dormitionis quam tempus vigiliae; videtur, quod homo omittat in quolibet instanti et in quolibet tempore, ac per hoc in uno die peccabit infinities. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, restat, quod mandata Decalogi ad opera formata non habeant obligare.

### Conclusio.

> Praecepta Decalogi non obligant ad opus proprie formatum obligatione absoluta, si loquimur de quolibet opere singillatim; tamen de eis in unum collectis hoc concedi potest, et etiam loquendo de obligatione conditionali.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est triplex modus dicendi.

Quibusdam enim visum est, quod mandata Decalogi obligant ad opera formata, obligatione tamen praecepti *affirmativi*, non praecepti *negativi*. Obligatio enim praecepti negativi est *semper* et *ad semper*; obligatio vero praecepti *affirmativi*, quamvis sit *semper*, non tamen *ad semper*, sed pro loco et tempore. Propter quod dixerunt, quod mandata Decalogi obligant hominem ad opera formata pro eo tempore, quo habet caritatem et gratiam; tunc enim potestatem habet exeundi in opera meritoria et tenetur bene uti gratia accepta.

Alius autem modus dicendi est, quod mandata Decalogi non obligant nisi ad opera bona in genere[^11]. Opera enim formata sunt supra nostram potestatem et supra cognitionis certitudinem; et propterea ad talia opera non debemus obligari per mandata Decalogi, sed solum ad opera bona in genere. Cuius signum est, quia, si aliquis existens in caritate honoret parentes ex naturali pietate, huiusmodi opere absolvitur a mandati obligatione.

Sed quoniam primus modus dicendi videtur excedere, in hoc videlicet, quod ponit, hominem[^12] obligari ad id, de quo non potest habere certitudinem; secundus vero modus dicendi videtur nimis parum dicere, in hoc videlicet, quod ponit, hominem per mandata Decalogi solummodo obligari ad ea quae potest quis implere existens in statu peccati, cum observatio mandatorum Dei sit via deveniendi ad statum gratiae[^13] et iustitiae: ideo est adhuc tertius dicendi modus, qui quasi medium tenet inter utrumque, et ad quaestionem propositam respondet per distinctionem hoc modo. Cum quaeritur, utrum mandata Decalogi obligent ad opera formata; respondendum est, quod opera formata possunt dici dupliciter: uno modo per *exclusionem* deformitatis peccati, alio modo per *positionem* dignitatis meriti. Si primo modo accipiantur opera formata; sic utique ad opera formata obligant; obligant enim ad vitandum omnia peccata mortalia. — Si autem dicantur alio modo opera formata; sic accipiuntur proprie, et tunc distinguendum est in ipsa obligatione: est enim obligatio *absoluta* et obligatio *conditionalis*. Obligatio absoluta est, qua quis simpliciter ad aliquid faciendum obligatur, ita quod, si illud non faciat, incurrit omissionis reatum; obligatio vero conditionalis est, qua quis obligatur ad aliquid faciendum, si vult pervenire ad praemium. Et haec obligatio in eo qui omittit, non inducit omissionis peccatum, sed ponit implicitae conditionis defectum.

Si igitur loquamur de obligatione *conditionali*; mandata Decalogi obligant ad opera formata. Si quis enim vult ad vitam ingredi, necesse est ex caritate servare mandata, quae quidem caritas est meriti principium[^14]. — Si autem loquamur de obligatione *absoluta*; tunc distinguendum est in ipsis mandatis, quod dupliciter contingit de eis loqui: aut de eis *in unum collectis*, prout habent reduci ad duo mandata caritatis, aut de quolibet *per se singillatim*[^15]. Si de eis collectis in unum; cum in eis contineatur regula iustitiae secundum ordinem ad Deum et ad proximum, per quam excluditur omne peccatum; sic concedi potest, quod obligant ad aliquod opus formatum vel *in se*, si homo habet unde possit in illud exire, vel *in dispositione* sive praeparatione

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ad illud[^16]. Tenetur enim homo sic mandata Decalogi implere, ut per ipsorum impletionem praeparet locum ipsi gratiae; qua obtenta, exeat, cum locus et tempus est, in opera meritoria, adimplendo duo caritatis praecepta. — Si autem loquamur de quolibet *singillatim* et *per se*; sic accipiendo proprie opus formatum, hoc est opus meritorium, et loquendo de obligatione *absoluta*, mandata Decalogi non obligant ad opera formata, sicut rationes ostendunt, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur, et propterea concedendae sunt[^17].

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod Legislator praecipit non solummodo facere opus iustum, sed etiam iuste; dicendum, quod modus iustitiae *quidam* est, qui facit opus Deo placitum et meritorium: et hic proprie reddit opus formatum. Alius autem est modus iustitiae, qui excludit circa actum viri iusti deordinationem intentionis, quae facit animum iniustum, et praeposterationem operis[^18]; et hic modus est in praecepto, non primus. Ab hoc autem modo non dicitur opus formatum, nisi accipiendo *large*, sicut prius tactum est in respondendo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo: *Si vis ad vitam ingredi* etc; patet responsio per iam dicta: quia ex verbo illo non potest colligi, quod homo obligetur ad opera meritoria facienda nisi obligatione *conditionali*, videlicet si vult ingredi ad vitam. Si autem de obligatione *conditionali* ad *absolutam* velit procedere; non valet ratio, immo est ibi sophisma *secundum quid et simpliciter*[^19].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia mandata reducuntur ad duo praecepta caritatis; similiter patet responsio: quia praecepta duo caritatis non implentur in quocumque mandato *singillatim* accepto, sed ex quodam *plenario* intellectu et perfectione, consurgente ex omnium mandatorum aggregatione et integra observatione. Et hoc modo verum est, quod mandata obligant[^20] ad opus formatum *in se*, vel *in sua dispositione*. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ad hoc obliget quodlibet mandatum per se. Sicut enim non sequitur, *decem homines trahunt navem, ergo quilibet per se trahit*; quia plus possunt decem quam unus; sic et in proposito suo modo est intelligendum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenemur observare mandata secundum intentionem praecipientis; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de obligatione *conditionali*, si volumus ingredi ad vitam. — Posset tamen et aliter dici, quod intentio Legislatoris non solummodo fuit ad hoc, ut homo perveniret ad gloriam, sed[^21] ut vitaret poenam; mandata autem, si observentur, quantum ad opera extra gratiam facta sufficiunt ad vitandum poenam; et propterea non sequitur, quod per mandata obligetur quis absolute ad opera meritoria.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod deformatio est in prohibitione, ergo informatio[^22] in praecepto; dicendum, quod secundum quod informatio *proprie* accipitur, ratio non valet, pro eo quod *informatio* et *deformatio* non sunt opposita immediate, immo inter opus meritorium et opus peccati cadit medium bonum *in genere* et bonum *ex circumstantia*[^23]. Cum autem dicitur, quod si aliquid est in prohibitione, eius oppositum est in praecepto; hoc intelligitur de oppositis *immediatis*, sicut *furari* est prohibitum, et *non furari* est in praecepto; et propterea consequentia illa non habet locum in proposito.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works.*

Secondly it is asked whether the precepts of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Deuteronomy 16[^1]: *Thou shalt justly pursue what is just*. From this word it is gathered that the Lawgiver commanded not only justice in the deed, but also justice in the manner; but a work that is just in deed and in manner is a formed work: therefore through the commandments of the Law man is obligated to formed works.

2. Likewise, Matthew 19[^2]: *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments*: the observance therefore of the commandments of the Decalogue leads to life; but no one is led to life through any works unless they be done out of charity, and such are formed works: since therefore through the Law we are obligated to observe the precepts of the Decalogue, it seems that through the same we are obligated to formed works.

3. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found at the end of the preceding distinction[^3], that all the precepts of the Decalogue are reduced to two precepts; but those precepts no one fulfills except out of charity — as is plain of the precept by which it is commanded: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart*, etc. — it seems therefore likewise that we are bound to fulfill all the commandments of the Decalogue out of charity: therefore through the Law we are obligated to formed works.

4. Likewise, we are obligated to the works of the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; but the intention of the one commanding was to give those commandments so that through them we might serve him and by serving please him[^4]; but this is not done except through works informed by charity and grace: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, information and deformation are opposites, command and prohibition are opposites; and « if the opposite [is said] of the opposite, then the proposite [is said] of the proposite[^5] »; since therefore the deformation of works is in the prohibition, the information of the same will be in the command.

**On the contrary:** 1. Jerome says[^6] that « let him be anathema who says that God commanded what is impossible »: since therefore those precepts obligate the just as well as sinners, and it is not in the power of the sinner to inform his works, since that must come about through charity and grace; it seems that to this no one is obligated by the divine commandments.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the Gloss on that text of the Psalm[^7]: *Turn away from evil and do good*: « To turn away from evil always avoids punishment, although it does not always earn the palm »; but as often as a man turns away from evil out of charity, he earns the palm: therefore a man is not always bound to turn away from evil out of charity. But by turning away from evil, the negative precepts are observed: therefore it does not seem that they obligate to formed works.

3. Likewise, a certain son, having parents and existing in mortal sin, honors them out of natural piety, when place and time and opportunity present themselves; it is established that this man does not sin in honoring his parents, neither by commission nor by omission: therefore that commandment by which the Lord commanded[^8]: *Honor thy father and thy mother*; did not obligate to this, that the work be rendered out of charity: by parity of reasoning, neither do the other commandments.

4. Likewise, formed works are not [done] except through grace; but no one knows whether he has the grace of the Holy Spirit[^9]: therefore no one knows whether his works are formed or unformed. But no one is obligated to that which he cannot know: therefore the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

5. Likewise, whoever is obligated to something is obligated consequently to that which is inseparably annexed to it[^10]; but works cannot be formed by anyone unless grace be had: therefore whoever is obligated to formed works is obligated to have grace. Since therefore having grace regards every time indifferently, the time of sleeping as well as the time of waking; it seems that man omits at every instant and at every time, and through this in one day he will sin infinitely. But if this is manifestly false, it remains that the precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works.

### Conclusion.

> The precepts of the Decalogue do not obligate to a properly formed work by an absolute obligation, if we speak of any single work taken singly; nevertheless of them collected into one this can be granted, and also speaking of conditional obligation.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that here there are three modes of speaking.

For to some it has seemed that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works, yet by the obligation of an *affirmative* precept, not of a *negative* precept. For the obligation of a negative precept is *always* and *unto always*; but the obligation of an *affirmative* precept, although it is *always*, is nevertheless not *unto always*, but according to place and time. On account of which they said that the commandments of the Decalogue obligate man to formed works for that time in which he has charity and grace; for then he has the power to go forth into meritorious works and is bound to make good use of the grace received.

But there is another mode of speaking, that the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate except to works good in their kind[^11]. For formed works are above our power and above the certitude of cognition; and therefore we ought not to be obligated to such works through the commandments of the Decalogue, but only to works good in their kind. The sign of this is that, if someone existing in charity honors his parents out of natural piety, by such a work he is absolved from the obligation of the commandment.

But since the first mode of speaking seems to go too far, in this namely, that it posits man[^12] to be obligated to that of which he cannot have certitude; while the second mode of speaking seems to say too little, in this namely, that it posits man to be obligated through the commandments of the Decalogue only to those things which one can fulfill while existing in the state of sin, whereas the observance of the commandments of God is the way of arriving at the state of grace[^13] and justice: therefore there is yet a third mode of speaking, which holds as it were a middle between the two, and answers the proposed question by a distinction in this manner. When it is asked whether the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works; it must be answered that formed works can be spoken of in two ways: in one way by the *exclusion* of the deformity of sin, in another way by the *positing* of the dignity of merit. If formed works are taken in the first way; then they certainly obligate to formed works; for they obligate to the avoiding of all mortal sins. — But if formed works are spoken of in the other way; then they are taken properly, and then a distinction must be made in the obligation itself: for there is *absolute* obligation and *conditional* obligation. Absolute obligation is that by which one is simply obligated to do something, in such a way that, if he does not do it, he incurs the guilt of omission; but conditional obligation is that by which one is obligated to do something, if he wishes to attain a reward. And this obligation, in him who omits it, does not induce the sin of omission, but posits the defect of an implicit condition.

If therefore we speak of *conditional* obligation; the commandments of the Decalogue obligate to formed works. For if anyone wishes to enter into life, it is necessary to keep the commandments out of charity, which charity indeed is the principle of merit[^14]. — But if we speak of *absolute* obligation; then a distinction must be made in the commandments themselves, since it happens to speak of them in two ways: either of them *collected into one*, inasmuch as they are reducible to the two commandments of charity, or of each one *by itself singly*[^15]. If of them collected into one; since in them is contained the rule of justice according to the order toward God and toward neighbor, by which all sin is excluded; then it can be granted that they obligate to some formed work either *in itself*, if a man has the means by which he can go forth into it, or *in disposition* or preparation

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toward it[^16]. For man is bound so to fulfill the commandments of the Decalogue that through their fulfillment he prepares a place for grace itself; which once obtained, he may go forth, when there is place and time, into meritorious works, by fulfilling the two precepts of charity. — But if we speak of each one *singly* and *by itself*; then taking a formed work properly, that is, a meritorious work, and speaking of *absolute* obligation, the commandments of the Decalogue do not obligate to formed works, as the reasons show that are brought forward for the second part, and therefore they are to be granted[^17].

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that the Lawgiver commands not only to do a just work, but also to do it justly; it must be said that there is a *certain* mode of justice, which makes the work pleasing to God and meritorious: and this properly renders the work formed. But there is another mode of justice, which excludes around the act of the just man the disorder of intention, which makes the soul unjust, and the perverse ordering of the work[^18]; and this mode is in the precept, not the first. But from this mode the work is not called formed, except by taking it *broadly*, as was touched upon before in responding.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Lord in Matthew: *If thou wilt enter into life*, etc; the response is plain through what has already been said: because from that word it cannot be gathered that man is obligated to do meritorious works except by *conditional* obligation, namely if he wishes to enter into life. But if one wishes to proceed from *conditional* obligation to *absolute*; the reasoning does not hold, rather there is here a sophism *secundum quid et simpliciter*[^19].

3. To that which is objected, that all the commandments are reduced to the two precepts of charity; the response is likewise plain: because the two precepts of charity are not fulfilled in each commandment taken *singly*, but out of a certain *full* understanding and perfection, arising from the aggregation and entire observance of all the commandments. And in this way it is true that the commandments obligate[^20] to a formed work *in itself*, or *in its disposition*. But from this it does not follow that any single commandment by itself obligates to this. For just as it does not follow, *ten men draw a ship, therefore each one by himself draws it*; because ten can do more than one; so too in the matter at hand it must be understood in its own way.

4. To that which is objected, that we are bound to observe the commandments according to the intention of the one commanding; it must be said that this is true of *conditional* obligation, if we wish to enter into life. — Yet it could also be said otherwise, that the intention of the Lawgiver was not only to this, that man should arrive at glory, but[^21] that he should avoid punishment; but the commandments, if they be observed, as far as concerns works done outside of grace, suffice for avoiding punishment; and therefore it does not follow that through the commandments one is obligated absolutely to meritorious works.

5. To that which is objected last, that deformation is in the prohibition, therefore information[^22] in the command; it must be said that according as information is taken *properly*, the reasoning does not hold, for the reason that *information* and *deformation* are not opposites immediately, but rather between a meritorious work and a work of sin there falls a middle, namely the good *in genus* and the good *from circumstance*[^23]. But when it is said that if something is in the prohibition, its opposite is in the command; this is understood of *immediate* opposites, as *to steal* is prohibited, and *not to steal* is in the command; and therefore that consequence does not have place in the matter at hand.

la: Vers. 20, ubi Vulgata *persequeris* pro *exsequeris*.

en: Verse 20, where the Vulgate has *persequeris* (thou shalt persecute) for *exsequeris* (thou shalt pursue).

la: Vers. 17. — *Minor*, in qua pro *nisi fiant* cod. 1. *nisi fuerint*, probatur ex illo I. Cor. 13, 1. seqq.: *Si linguis hominum loquar* etc.

en: Verse 17. — The *minor* premise, in which for *nisi fiant* (unless they be done) codex 1 reads *nisi fuerint* (unless they be), is proved from 1 Corinthians 13:1ff.: *If I should speak with the tongues of men*, etc.

la: Lat. Magistri, c. 3. — Seq. testimonium Scripturae est Deut. 6, 5.

en: The Master's text [Lombard], c. 3. — The following testimony of Scripture is Deuteronomy 6:5.

la: Cfr. Ioan. 15, 14: *Vos amici mei estis* etc.

en: Cf. John 15:14: *You are my friends*, etc.

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 808, nota 1, ubi pro *de proposito* et *de opposito* textus origin. et etiam codd. A bb *in proposito* et *in opposito*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* IV, c. 4. Cf. above p. 808, note 1, where for *de proposito* and *de opposito* the original text and also codices A bb read *in proposito* and *in opposito*.

la: Symboli Explic. ad Damasum (inter opera Hieronymi); cfr. tom. I. pag. 846, nota 2.

en: The Exposition of the Creed to Damasus (among the works of Jerome); cf. vol. I, p. 846, note 2.

la: Psalm. 33, 15. Glossa, quae apud Strabum, Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum ut *ordinaria* habetur, est secundum Cassiodorum dicentem: *In illo culpam refugimus, in isto palmam pietatis acquirimus*. Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. Regul. regula 74: *... vitare poenam, facere meretur coronam*. Verba autem prorsus eadem sunt apud Magistrum, II. Sent. d. 24. c. 1. in fine. — Inferius pro *ergo non semper* Vat. *at non semper*.

en: Psalm 33:15. The Gloss, which is found in Strabo, Peter Lombard, and Lyra as the *ordinary [gloss]*, is according to Cassiodorus, who says: *In the former we flee from fault, in the latter we acquire the palm of piety*. Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 74: *... to avoid punishment; to do [good] merits a crown*. But the words are precisely the same in the Master, II Sent., d. 24, c. 1, at the end. — Below, for *ergo non semper* the Vatican edition reads *at non semper*.

la: Deut. 5, 16. Vide II. Sent. d. 28. a. 1. q. 3. arg. 4. ad oppos. — Cod. K legit: *cum se offert loci et temporis opportunitas... nec omittendo illud, quod Dominus... matrem tuam: ergo illud praeceptum non obligabat* etc. Pro *obligabat* et *impenderetur* edd. *obligat* et *impendatur*.

en: Deuteronomy 5:16. See II Sent., d. 28, a. 1, q. 3, arg. 4, ad opposita. — Codex K reads: *when the opportunity of place and time presents itself... nor by omitting that which the Lord... thy mother: therefore that precept did not obligate*, etc. For *obligabat* and *impenderetur* the editions read *obligat* and *impendatur*.

la: Eccle. 9, 1: *Nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit.*

en: Ecclesiastes 9:1: *Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.*

la: Simile habetur in Regul. Iur. in sexto 39: *Cum quid prohibetur, prohibentur omnia, quae sequuntur ex illo.* — Aliquanto inferius pro *respiciat* edd. *inspiciat*. Circa finem arg. pro *in uno* cod. Y *in quolibet*, et codd. H L *peccaret* pro *peccabit*.

en: The like is found in the *Rules of Law in the Sixth* [Book of Decretals], 39: *When anything is prohibited, all things that follow from it are prohibited.* — Somewhat below, for *respiciat* the editions read *inspiciat*. Near the end of the argument, for *in uno* codex Y reads *in quolibet*, and codices H L *peccaret* for *peccabit*.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5. Cfr. etiam ibid. d. 28. a. 1. q. 3. — Mox pro *supra nostram potestatem* edd. 1, 2 *supra naturam, potestatem*.

en: See II Sent., d. 36, dub. 5. Cf. also ibid. d. 28, a. 1, q. 3. — Presently, for *supra nostram potestatem* editions 1, 2 read *supra naturam, potestatem*.

la: Cod. F addit *per mandata*.

en: Codex F adds *per mandata* (through the commandments).

la: Cod. Z *gloriae*, edd. *gratiae, gloriae*.

en: Codex Z reads *gloriae* (of glory); the editions *gratiae, gloriae* (of grace, of glory).

la: Cod. A *per se et singillatim*. Paulo inferius pro *in eis* codd. A K Z aa bb *ibi*.

en: Codex A reads *per se et singillatim* (by itself and singly). A little below, for *in eis* codices A K Z aa bb read *ibi*.

la: Vat. pro *ad illud* substituit *si non habet, unde possit in illud exire*. Subinde pro *locus et tempus est* cod. K *se offerant locus et tempus*.

en: The Vatican edition for *ad illud* substitutes *if he does not have whence he can go forth into it*. Thereupon for *locus et tempus est* codex K reads *se offerant locus et tempus* (place and time present themselves).

la: In Vat. desideratur *et propterea concedendae sunt*. Mox post *in contrarium* cod. A subiungit *de auctoritate*.

en: In the Vatican edition *et propterea concedendae sunt* is wanting. Presently, after *in contrarium* codex A adds *de auctoritate*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Edd. *quae* [Vat. *qui*] *facit animum iustum et praeparationem* [Vat. addit *sive dispositionem*] *operis*.

en: Cf. II Sent., d. 40, a. 1, q. 1ff. — The editions read *quae* [Vat. *qui*] *facit animum iustum et praeparationem* [the Vatican adds *sive dispositionem*] *operis*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 258, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 258, note 2.

la: Cod. A *obligent*.

en: Codex A reads *obligent*.

la: Edd. *sed etiam*. Mox pro *mandata autem* cod. Q *mandata enim*; et immediate post cod. A *observantur* pro *observentur*.

en: The editions read *sed etiam* (but also). Presently, for *mandata autem* codex Q reads *mandata enim*; and immediately after, codex A *observantur* for *observentur*.

la: Cod. G supplet *est*.

en: Codex G supplies *est*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 36. q. 1. ad 6, et II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5, nec non d. 41. a. 1. q. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. above, d. 36, q. 1, ad 6, and II Sent., d. 36, dub. 5, and also d. 41, a. 1, q. 1ff.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem S. Thom. aliique hac formula exprimunt: « Utrum in adimpletione mandatorum modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto ». — Opera formata ea sunt, quae fiunt non tantum in statu gratiae, sed etiam ex motivo caritatis; immo, ut dicitur in corp., proprie opera dicuntur formata, quatenus fiunt ex caritate. — Respectu primae informationis non est dubium, quod quilibet rationis compos obligatur esse habitualiter in statu gratiae, sive quod obligatur « ad exclusionem deformitatis peccati », ut auctor noster dicit (in corp.). Licet autem habitus gratiae et habitus caritatis sint inseparabiliter connexi (unde etiam actus caritatis supponit, saltem ordinarie, statum gratiae); tamen nullus habitus operativus est semper in actu. Dubitari igitur potest, utrum, quando aliquod praeceptum impletur, actualis influxus caritatis actum illum debeat comitari. Eodem sensu intelligitur etiam quaestio proposita.

**II.** Principia ad hanc quaestionem solvendam necessaria auctor noster iam exhibuit I. Sent. d. 18. a. 2. q. 1, II. Sent. d. 41. n. 1. q. 3. cum scholio, nec non supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 6. — S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 36. a. 6.) refert quatuor de hac re opiniones, quarum prima, tertia et quarta etiam a S. Bonav. hic afferuntur; secunda vero non differt a prima nisi in hoc, quod eandem statuat obligationem etiam pro non habente caritatem, quam prima adesse vult pro habente eam. S. Thom. in Comment. eandem praefert viam mediam, quam sequitur S. Bonav. Sed in Summa (1. 2. q. 100. a. 10.) ad eandem fere conclusionem alia via procedit. Docet enim, quod actus caritatis praeceptus sit lege speciali et quidem *affirmativa*, ita ut in aliis praeceptis non includatur. Cum igitur in quarto praecepto affirmativo imponitur, ut parentes honorentur, eodem non praescribitur, ut hoc fiat *ex caritate Dei*. Cum autem duo affirmativa praecepta possint diversis temporibus ad actum obligare, bene fieri potest, quod aliquis implens quartum praeceptum sine modo caritatis non peccet. Haec sententia communiter nunc approbatur; Dionys. autem Carth. primam opinionem esse veriorem iudicavit.

De hac quaestione praeter S. Thomam alii Lombardi commentatores tractant in III. Sent. dist. 36: B. Albert., ibi a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., ibi a. 6. — Richard. a Med., ibi q. 6, ubi lectorem remittit ad I. Sent. d. 48. a. 2. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., ibi q. 3.

**III.** Seq. (3.) quaestio de *obligatione* mandatorum Decalogi satis solvitur in generaliore quaestione S. Thomae (S. I. II. q. 100. a. 1.): « Utrum omnia praecepta *moralia veteris Legis* pertineant ad legem naturae », et in altera quaestione (ibi a. 3.): « Utrum omnia praecepta moralia veteris Legis reducantur ad decem praecepta Decalogi ». Eandem autem rem sic proponit Alex. Hal. (Sum. p. III. q. 29. m. 1. a. 1.): *An radix vel origo (Decalogi)... in lege naturae radicetur*. S. Thom. ad primam suam quaestionem respondet, « quod omnia praecepta moralia pertineant ad legem naturae, sed *diversimode* », ut ibi fusius explicatur. Alii commentatores principia hic posita tangunt in quaestione de dispensatione circa praecepta Decalogi. In utraque autem quaestione solvenda Scot. (hic q. unica n. 2. seqq.) non convenit, saltem in modo loquendi, cum S. Thoma (loc. cit. a. 8: *Utrum praecepta Decalogi sint dispensabilia*). S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4.) docet cum S. Bernardo et Scoto, quod Deus in praeceptis *secundae* tabulae possit dispensare, non in praeceptis *primae* tabulae. Circa doctrinam S. Thom. in *Summa* cfr. scholion ad cit. locum I. Sent. d. 47.

Rationes in resp. allatae pro opportunitate legis scriptae confirmantur a S. Thoma (hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 99. a. 2. ad 2.). — Inter posteriores theologos agitata est alia quaestio, cum hac connexa, utrum Decalogus obliget Christianos non solum vi legis naturae et evangelicae, sed etiam vi promulgationis per Moysen factae. Responsio negativa est communior, cui favent etiam verba S. Thomae S. I. II. q. 98. a. 5.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question St. Thomas and others express by this formula: « Whether in the fulfillment of the commandments the mode of charity falls under the precept ». — Formed works are those which are done not only in the state of grace, but also from the motive of charity; indeed, as is said in the body, works are properly called formed inasmuch as they are done out of charity. — With respect to the first information there is no doubt that anyone possessed of reason is obligated to be habitually in the state of grace, or that he is obligated « to the exclusion of the deformity of sin », as our author says (in the body). But although the habit of grace and the habit of charity are inseparably connected (whence too the act of charity presupposes, at least ordinarily, the state of grace); nevertheless no operative habit is always in act. It can therefore be doubted whether, when some precept is fulfilled, the actual influx of charity must accompany that act. In the same sense the proposed question is also understood.

**II.** The principles necessary for solving this question our author has already set forth in I Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, II Sent., d. 41, n. 1, q. 3 with the scholion, and also above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 6. — St. Thomas (III Sent., d. 36, a. 6) reports four opinions on this matter, of which the first, third, and fourth are also brought forward here by St. Bonaventure; but the second differs from the first only in this, that it establishes the same obligation even for one not having charity, which the first holds to be present for one having it. St. Thomas in his Commentary prefers the same middle way which St. Bonaventure follows. But in the Summa (I-II, q. 100, a. 10) he proceeds to nearly the same conclusion by another way. For he teaches that the act of charity is commanded by a special law and indeed an *affirmative* one, so that it is not included in the other precepts. Since therefore in the fourth affirmative precept it is imposed that parents be honored, by the same it is not prescribed that this be done *out of charity for God*. And since two affirmative precepts can obligate to an act at different times, it can well happen that someone fulfilling the fourth precept without the mode of charity does not sin. This opinion is now commonly approved; but Dionysius the Carthusian judged the first opinion to be the truer.

On this question, besides St. Thomas, the other commentators on Lombard treat it in III Sent., dist. 36: Blessed Albert, there a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, there a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, there q. 6, where he refers the reader to I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, there q. 3.

**III.** The following (third) question, on the *obligation* of the commandments of the Decalogue, is sufficiently resolved in the more general question of St. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 100, a. 1): « Whether all the *moral precepts of the Old Law* pertain to the law of nature », and in another question (ibid. a. 3): « Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reduced to the ten precepts of the Decalogue ». Now Alexander of Hales proposes the same matter thus (Sum. p. III, q. 29, m. 1, a. 1): *Whether the root or origin (of the Decalogue)... is rooted in the law of nature*. St. Thomas answers his first question, « that all the moral precepts pertain to the law of nature, but *in diverse ways* », as is there more fully explained. Other commentators touch upon the principles here set forth in the question concerning dispensation regarding the precepts of the Decalogue. But in solving both questions Scotus (here, q. unica, n. 2ff.) does not agree, at least in manner of speaking, with St. Thomas (loc. cit. a. 8: *Whether the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable*). St. Bonaventure (I Sent., d. 47, q. 4) teaches with St. Bernard and Scotus that God can dispense in the precepts of the *second* table, not in the precepts of the *first* table. Concerning the doctrine of St. Thomas in the *Summa*, cf. the scholion to the cited place, I Sent., d. 47.

The reasons brought forward in the response for the opportuneness of the written law are confirmed by St. Thomas (here a. 1; S. I-II, q. 99, a. 2, ad 2). — Among later theologians another question, connected with this one, has been agitated: whether the Decalogue binds Christians not only by force of the law of nature and of the Gospel, but also by force of the promulgation made through Moses. The negative response is the more common one, which the words of St. Thomas also favor, S. I-II, q. 98, a. 5.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p81{5,6,7,8}-{L,R}-*.png`); raw OCR range 56562–56768 (`bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`), bounded forward by `QUAESTIO III.` raw 56769 (= a1-q3). Vol III two-column + PDF-priority inversion. Offset pdf = printed + 22 → printed pp.815–818 = PDF 837–840. Running heads: p.815 head OCR's the numeral as *813* (visibly garbled — actual is 815, confirmed by position between p.814 and p.816 and the trusted running-head TEXT); p.816 = `816 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.817 = `DIST. XXXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 817`; p.818 = `818 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`.

**Alignment check — PASS.** TRACTATIO **Secundo** *utrum obligent ad opera bona in genere tantum, an etiam ad opera formata* ↔ `QUAESTIO II.` opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum praecepta Decalogi obligent ad opera formata. Et quod sic, videtur* (raw 56567) maps 1:1. No misalignment.

**Body structure.** args 1–5 (Deut.16 *iuste quod iustum exsequeris* / Matth.19 *Si vis ad vitam ingredi serva mandata* / Aug. *omnia reducuntur ad duo* / *intentio praecipientis ut serviamus et placeamus* / informatio-deformatio opposita) + Sed contra 1–5 (Hieron. *anathema qui dicit Deum praecepisse impossibile* / Glossa *Declina a malo* declinare-vitat-poenam-non-semper-palmam / *Honora patrem* ex-naturali-pietate non-peccat / *nemo scit utrum gratiam habeat* / quicumque-obligatur-ad-inseparabiliter-annexum → peccabit-infinities) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (**triplex modus dicendi**: opinio 1 [affirmativi-non-negativi, semper-non-ad-semper] / opinio 2 [solum opera bona in genere] / opinio 3 = *medium* = Bonaventure: opera formata *dupliciter* — per exclusionem deformitatis [→ Conclusio 1, sic obligant] vs per positionem dignitatis meriti [→ distinguenda obligatio]; **obligatio absoluta** [reatus omissionis] vs **obligatio conditionalis** [defectus implicitae conditionis, si vult praemium] → Conclusio 2 [conditionalis: obligant] + Conclusio 3 [absoluta: *in unum collecta* obligant ad opus formatum in se/in dispositione, NON quodlibet singillatim — *decem homines trahunt navem* simile]) + Solutio ad 1–5 (modus-iustitiae quidam/alius; sophisma *secundum quid et simpliciter*; plenario-intellectu-aggregatione; intentio-Legislatoris vitare-poenam; informatio/deformatio non opposita immediate, medium bonum in genere/ex circumstantia, *furari/non furari*).

**Page-split map (apparatus, 23 entries, NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, per-page restart, renumbered continuous):**
- **p.815** footer nn.1–7 → **[^1]–[^7]**. nn.1–5 (*exsequeris* / *nisi fiant* (1Cor.13) / *Lat. Magistri c.3* (Deut.6:5) / *Ioan.15:14* / *Aristot. IV. Topic.*) were **PICKED UP from d37-a1-q1's hand-off** (they sit in the p.815 L-col footer band but key to the QUAESTIO II body, not q1). nn.6–7 (*Symboli Explic. ad Damasum* / *Psalm.33:15 Glossa+Cassiodorus+Alan ab Insulis reg.74*) sit in the p.815 R-col footer band — also QUAESTIO II's (SC-1 *Hieronymus*, SC-2 *Psalmi Declina a malo*).
- **p.816** footer nn.1–8 → **[^8]–[^15]** (OWN band: *Deut.5:16 Honora* / *Eccle.9:1* / *Regul.Iur.in-sexto-39* / *II.Sent.d.36.dub.5 supra-potestatem* / *Cod.F per-mandata* / *Cod.Z gloriae* / *supra d.27.a.2.q.1+d.36.q.6* / *Cod.A per-se-et-singillatim*).
- **p.817** footer nn.1–8 → **[^16]–[^23]** (*Vat. si-non-habet-unde-exire* / *In-Vat-desideratur* / *II.Sent.d.40.a.1.q.1* / *supra pag.258 nota 2* / *Cod.A obligent* / *sed etiam* / *Cod.G supplet est* / *supra d.36.q.1.ad6 + II.Sent.d.36.dub.5*).

Marker pairing 23/23 in both Latin and English bodies.

**Scholion (`has_scholion: true`).** OWN scholion §I–§III (OCR'd `SOHOLIOK`, header on p.817 bottom L-col; body-then-scholion LAST per parser rule). **§I** = S.Thom. formula *Utrum in adimpletione mandatorum modus caritatis cadat sub praecepto* + opera-formata definition (*fiunt ex caritate*) + habitual-grace / first-information discussion (habitus gratiae & caritatis inseparable, but no operative habit always in act). **§II** = principia cross-refs (I Sent. d.18 a.2 q.1; II Sent. d.41 n.1 q.3; supra d.27 a.2 q.6); S.Thom. III Sent. d.36 a.6 four opinions (1/3/4 = Bonaventure's; 2 ≈ 1); Summa I-II q.100 a.10 (actus caritatis lege speciali affirmativa); fourth-precept *honora parentes* not *ex caritate Dei* example; Dionys. Carth. prefers opinion 1; other III Sent. d.36 commentators (B.Albert / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. → I Sent. d.48 a.2 q.2 / Dionys. Carth.). **§III** = the following (a1-q3) *obligatio* question resolved via S.Thom. S. I-II q.100 a.1+a.3 + Alex. Hal. Sum. p.III q.29; dispensatio (Scot. q.unica; S.Thom. a.8; S.Bonav. I Sent. d.47 q.4 — second-table dispensable, first not); whether the Decalogue binds Christians *vi promulgationis per Moysen* (negative = communior, S.Thom. S. I-II q.98 a.5). **The scholion carries NO own numbered footnote markers** (its citations are inline); §II–§III span pp.817 (R-col) → 818 (L-col top → R-col top). §III is a forward-looking note on a1-q3's question but the §III prose belongs to this q2 scholion block.

**Footer hand-offs.** PICKED UP: p.815 nn.1–5 from a1-q1 (commit `e0460b6`), plus p.815 R-col nn.6–7 which are also q2's. FORWARDED: **NOTHING to a1-q3.** The p.818 footer band (nn.1–3: *Boeth. de Divisione* / *Naturale enim secundum Aristot. Problem.* / *Hilar. Tract. in Ps.118*) keys to the QUAESTIO III body args (*commune omnes¹* / *secundum legem naturae²* / *lege Evangelii³*), which open lower on p.818 (raw 56769) — those belong to a1-q3, NOT to this chunk. q2's scholion text spills onto p.818 but carries no footnotes of its own there.

**`[?]` flags:** none — pp.815–818 legible at 450 dpi.