title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum proprietas sit persona
Whether property is a person

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus.
#### *De diversis comparationibus proprietatis.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum proprietas sit persona.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur de comparatione proprietatis ad personam. Et quaeritur, utrum proprietas sit persona. Et quod non, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Ubicumque est vere determinans et determinatum secundum rem, ibi determinans differt a determinato — nam si non differt, non est determinans vere, sed totum est determinatum — sed persona in divinis est vere determinatum, et proprietas vere determinans, quia proprietas vere et non secundum modum dicendi solum distinguit personam: ergo proprietas differt a persona. Sed differentia non praedicatur de se in abstractione[^1]: ergo nec proprietas de persona, vel e converso.

2. Item, ubicumque est vere abstractum et concretum, ibi differt quod abstrahitur ab eo, a quo abstrahitur[^2]; sed proprietas significatur in concretione ad personam, cum dicitur Pater, et in abstractione, cum dicitur paternitas, et non tantum est differentia in modo loquendi, quia aliquid dicitur de Patre, quod non de paternitate: ergo vere differt paternitas a persona. Sed quod vere differt ab alio non praedicatur de eo in abstractione: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubicumque est absolutum et respectivum, absolutum non est ipse respectus, quantumcumque se ipso referatur — unde quamvis materia se ipsa referatur ad formam, tamen non est ipse respectus ad formam — ergo cum in divinis persona vere sit substantia absoluta, relatio sit verus respectus, quantumcumque se ipsa referatur persona, non est verus respectus sive ipse respectus, nec e converso: ergo proprietas non est ipsa persona.

Ex his tribus suppositionibus arguebat Porretanus, quod persona non est proprietas nec e converso. Et quia omne quod est in persona, est persona propter summam simplicitatem, arguebat ulterius, quod proprietates non sunt in personis, sed assistunt.

4. Et quod ista positio sit conveniens, videtur auctoritate Boethii *de Trinitate*[^3]. Dicit enim, quod «relatio non in eo quod est *esse* consistit, sed in *comparatione*».

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia omne quod advenit alicui et recedit sine sui mutatione, non praedicat aliquid, quod sit in illo, sed solum[^4] assistens; sed relatio est huiusmodi, ut patet in dextro et sinistro: ergo etc. Cum ergo proprietates sint relationes, non sunt personae nec in personis, sed assistunt.

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**Contra:**

1. «Omne simplicissimum est id quod habet, excepto eo, ad quod relative dicitur». Haec est Augustini undecimo *de Civitate Dei*[^5] et per se nota est; sed divina persona est simplicissima, aliter non esset Deus, et non dicitur relative ad proprietatem: ergo est proprietas.

2. Item, omne perfectissimum est omne illud a quo perficitur et denominatur — haec per se nota est, quia aliter denominans et perficiens esset perfectius eo; et Augustinus istam proponit quinto *de Trinitate*[^6] dicens quod, quia ipse Deus est maximus, ideo est sua magnitudo — sed persona divina est perfectissimum quid et denominatur sua proprietate: ergo persona est sua proprietas, et Pater est paternitas.

3. Item, omne simpliciter primum est quidquid habet, excepto eo quod est ex illo[^7] — nam si habet aliquid quod non sit ab ipso, vel quod non sit ipsum illud, illud est aeque primum ut ipsum: ergo ipsum non erit simpliciter primum — sed Pater habet paternitatem, et paternitas non est ab ipso, et ipse est simpliciter primus: ergo Pater est paternitas, eadem ratione Filius est filiatio, et Spiritus sanctus processio.

Ex his concluditur, quod proprietates non sunt tantum personae, sed etiam in personis.

4. Et quod istud verum sit, videtur auctoritate Hieronymi in libro *de Expositione fidei catholicae ad Damasum*[^8]: «Tres, inquit, personas expressas sub proprietatibus distinguimus».

5. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Quia omne quod est, aut est ens per se et in se, aut in alio[^9]. Proprietates igitur aut sunt per se entes, et ita substantiae; aut in alio. Si in alio, non nisi in personis, quia proprietas non est nisi in eo cuius est proprietas. Si per se, ergo proprietas est substantia: aut ergo creata, aut increata, aut media. Sed non creata, nec media — illud constat — restat ergo, quod increata: ergo sunt personae.

### Conclusio.

> *Proprietas est persona et in persona, tamen proprietas et persona differunt secundum modum se habendi.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de comparatione proprietatis ad personam triplex fuit opinio.

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Prima positio fuit, quod proprietates non sunt personae nec in personis, sed assistunt personis, sicut relationes. Et ratio, quae movit istos, fuit personarum pluralitas et divina simplicitas. Quia enim personae plures sunt, plures habent proprietates, quae vere differentes sunt[^10]. Et quia differentes sunt, si essent in persona, auferrent ei simplicitatem. Quae cum non possit auferri a divinis, posuerunt, proprietates esse assistentes personis, non esse personas. Et huic videtur consonare natura relationis, quae non videtur esse in substantia[^11] nec praedicare aliquid in subiecto[^12], sed dicere respectum ad aliud. Et haec positio, etsi rationabilis aliquo modo fuit, tamen stare non potest, quia ponebat, relationes in divinis nec Deum esse nec creaturam. Unde etsi in principio sui modicum contineret errorem, ducebat tamen ad magnum[^13]; et ideo retractata fuit in Concilio Rhemensi, et magister Gilbertus Porretanus ore proprio retractavit.

Ideo fuit secunda opinio[^14], multum differens ab ista, videlicet, quod proprietates omnino sunt personae nec differunt nisi solummodo in modo loquendi, et tantum sunt tres proprietates, sicut sunt tres personae. Et ista positio fundata est similiter super divinam simplicitatem. Quia enim personae sunt simplicissimae, se ipsis distinguuntur, et ipsae sunt suae proprietates nec habent alias differentes re, sed solo modo loquendi. Et ista positio fuit magistri Praepositivi, et magis est probabilis quam praecedens. Attamen ipsa improbata est supra, distinctione vigesima sexta[^15], quia una persona plures habet relationes, quae sunt verae relationes; et plures personae habent unam proprietatem et una persona alio et alio modo se habet ad Filium et ad Spiritum sanctum, etiam secundum rem. Ex quo necessario sequitur, quod realiter aliquo modo differt proprietas a persona, et non solum in modo loquendi, sicut dicebat magister Praepositivus.

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Et propter hoc intelligendum, quod utraque praedictarum positionum aliquid veri dixit et in aliquo defecit. Nam prima, quae dicebat, quod proprietates aliquo modo differunt a personis, verum dixit; sed in hoc male, quod dixit *simpliciter* differre. Sequens, quae dixit, quod proprietates sunt personae, verum dixit; sed in hoc excessit, quod dixit, quod *nullo modo* differunt a personis.

Ideo ex his duabus positionibus conflatur[^16] una vera et communis positio, quam tenent modo magistri communiter, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis, tamen aliquo modo differunt a personis. — Et quod ista positio sit conveniens, patet, si quis inspiciat naturam proprietatum. Dictum enim est supra[^17], cum quaerebatur, quid esset proprietas in divinis, quod erat *relatio*. Dictum est etiam, quod relatio ratione comparationis, quam habet ad subiectum, transit in substantiam in divinis; et ideo de subiecto suo omnino vere praedicatur, ut Pater est paternitas. Ratione vero comparationis, quam habet ad obiectum, manet verissime in divinis et habet quodam modo differentiam a persona; nec facit secundum hoc compositionem, sed distinctionem respectu cuius est. Compositio enim attenditur per comparationem proprietatis ad subiectum, distinctio respectu obiecti. Et ex hoc patet, quod proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam[^18] sive modum essendi, differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Et patet ex dictis responsio ad primum argumentum. Quia enim aliquantulam habent differentiam proprietates a persona penes modum se habendi, ideo proprietas vere determinat et distinguit; hoc tamen non tollit praedicationem[^19], quia modus ille non addit aliam essentiam.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur* secundo de abstractione, dicendum, quod non est abstractio secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi et loquendi: quia abstractio respicit subiectum *in quo*, et secundum illum respectum transit[^20]; quia tamen manet in comparatione ad terminum, hinc est, quod relatio non tantummodo loquendi differt, nec tamen oportet, quod sit ibi vera abstractio.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur* tertio, quod absolutum non dicitur de respectivo; dicendum, quod verum est in creatura, quia respectus ipse verus aut est alius per essentiam, aut in comparatione ad aliud[^21]: per essentiam, ut materia et forma, quorum neutrum est in divinis: unde respectus in creaturis ponit dependentiam, et ideo privat summam simplicitatem, et ideo non praedicatur in creaturis. Omne enim simplicissimum est independens omnino[^22]. In divinis autem relationes dicunt respectum sine dependentia; et ideo non privant summam simplicitatem, et ideo dicuntur de hypostasibus.

4. *Ad illud quod obiicitur* postmodum, quod omnes relationes sunt assistentes; dicendum, quod *esse in comparatione* dicuntur a Boethio, non quia non sint in re, sed quia, cum sint in re, non sunt in ea absolute, sed in comparatione ad alterum; quo quidem mutato et corrupto, contingit relationem pariter corrumpi et desinere propter hoc, quod non est in subiecto absolute, sed ad alterum; nihilominus tamen est in subiecto.

5. Ex hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur. Nam illud non habet veritatem nisi in ente absoluto, non respectivo. Et illud[^23] trahitur ex ratione et verbis Boethii: ex ratione, quia quando dico, hoc esse ordinatum ad aliquid, non *nihil* dico de illo, de quo dicitur, et quando de aliquo, quod non habet ordinem, fit habens ordinem, quia non erat illud ad quod ordinaretur — et ideo ordo erat in potentia in hoc, non ratione sui, sed ratione eius ad quod est — quantum est ex parte sui, erat in actu; et ideo, nulla mutatione facta in ipso, sed in obiecto, introducitur in esse et desinit. Et hoc patet ex verbis Boethii, quia Boethius non negat *simpliciter*, quod relatio non in eo quod est esse consistit, sed *non totaliter* consistit. Unde dicit[^24]: «Non potest praedicatio relativa quidquam rei, de qua dicitur, per se addere, vel minuere, vel mutare, quae non *tota* in eo quod est esse consistit». Ex hoc innuit, quod aliquo modo consistit; et ideo nec in creaturis nec in Deo est verum dicere, quod relatio non sit in aliquo; sed verum est dicere, quod non *tota* est in aliquo absolute.

english:
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### Article Unique.
#### *On the various comparisons of property.*

### Question I.
#### *Whether property is a person.*

So as to the first, it is asked concerning the comparison of property to person. And it is asked, whether property is a person. And that it is not, is shown in this way.

1. Wherever there is truly a determining and a determined according to the thing, there the determining differs from the determined — for if it does not differ, it is not truly determining, but the whole is determined — but the person in the divine is truly the determined, and the property truly the determining, since the property truly, and not according to a mode of speaking only, distinguishes the person: therefore the property differs from the person. But a difference is not predicated of itself in the abstract[^1]: therefore neither is the property [predicated] of the person, or vice versa.

2. Likewise, wherever there is truly an abstract and a concrete, there what is abstracted differs from that from which it is abstracted[^2]; but property is signified in concretion to the person, when "Father" is said, and in abstraction, when "paternity" is said, and there is not only a difference in the mode of speaking, since something is said of the Father which is not said of paternity: therefore paternity truly differs from the person. But what truly differs from another is not predicated of it in the abstract: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, wherever there is an absolute and a relative, the absolute is not the very respect, however much it be referred by itself — whence although matter is referred by itself to form, nevertheless it is not the very respect to form — therefore since in the divine the person is truly absolute substance, the relation is true respect, however much the person be referred by itself, [the person] is not true respect or the very respect, nor the converse: therefore the property is not the person itself.

From these three suppositions Porretanus argued that the person is not the property nor vice versa. And since whatever is in the person is the person on account of supreme simplicity, he argued further, that the properties are not in the persons, but stand alongside.

4. And that this position is fitting, appears from the authority of Boethius, *On the Trinity*[^3]. For he says that "relation does not consist in that which is *to be*, but in *comparison*."

5. Likewise, this same point is shown by reason, since whatever comes to something and recedes without its own change does not predicate something which is in it, but only[^4] something standing alongside; but relation is of this kind, as is clear in right and left: therefore etc. Therefore since the properties are relations, they are not persons nor in the persons, but stand alongside.

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**On the contrary:**

1. "Everything most simple is that which it has, except for that to which it is said relatively." This is from Augustine, *On the City of God* XI[^5], and it is *per se* known; but the divine person is most simple, otherwise it would not be God, and it is not said relatively to the property: therefore it is the property.

2. Likewise, every most perfect [thing] is everything by which it is perfected and denominated — this is *per se* known, since otherwise the denominator and perfecter would be more perfect than it; and Augustine sets this forth in [book] five *of the Trinity*[^6], saying that, since God himself is the greatest, therefore he is his own greatness — but the divine person is something most perfect and is denominated by his own property: therefore the person is his own property, and the Father is paternity.

3. Likewise, every simply first [thing] is whatever it has, except for that which is from it[^7] — for if it has anything which is not from itself, or which is not it itself, that thing is equally first as it [is]: therefore it itself will not be simply first — but the Father has paternity, and paternity is not from him, and he is simply first: therefore the Father is paternity, by the same reason the Son is filiation, and the Holy Spirit procession.

From these it is concluded that the properties are not only persons, but also in the persons.

4. And that this is true, appears from the authority of Jerome in the book *On the Exposition of the Catholic Faith to Damasus*[^8]: "We distinguish three persons," he says, "expressed under properties."

5. Likewise, this appears by reason. Since whatever is, either is a being *per se* and in itself, or in another[^9]. The properties therefore either are *per se* beings, and so substances; or [are] in another. If in another, only in the persons, since a property is only in that of which it is the property. If *per se*, then property is substance: either then created, or uncreated, or middle. But not created, nor middle — that is established — therefore there remains, that [it is] uncreated: therefore they are persons.

### Conclusion.

> *Property is a person and in a person; nevertheless property and person differ according to the mode of having themselves.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that concerning the comparison of property to person there has been a threefold opinion.

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The first position was, that the properties are not persons nor in the persons, but stand alongside the persons, like relations. And the reason which moved them was the plurality of persons and the divine simplicity. For since the persons are several, they have several properties, which are truly different[^10]. And since they are different, if they were in the person, they would take from it simplicity. Since this cannot be taken from the divine [persons], they posited that the properties are standing-alongside [assistant] to the persons, are not persons. And to this the nature of relation seems to consort, which does not seem to be in substance[^11] nor to predicate something in a subject[^12], but to express a respect to another. And this position, although it was reasonable in some way, nevertheless cannot stand, because it posited that relations in the divine are neither God nor creature. Whence even though in its beginning it contained little error, nevertheless it led to a great one[^13]; and therefore it was retracted at the Council of Reims, and master Gilbert Porretanus retracted it with his own mouth.

Therefore there was a second opinion[^14], much differing from this, namely, that the properties are altogether persons and do not differ except only in the mode of speaking, and there are only three properties, just as there are three persons. And this position is founded likewise upon the divine simplicity. For since the persons are most simple, they are distinguished by themselves, and they are themselves their own properties and do not have others differing in reality, but only in the mode of speaking. And this position was that of master Praepositivus, and is more probable than the preceding. Nevertheless it itself was disproved above, in the twenty-sixth distinction[^15], because one person has several relations, which are true relations; and several persons have one property, and one person has himself in one and another way to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, even according to the thing. From which it necessarily follows that really in some way property differs from person, and not only in the mode of speaking, as master Praepositivus said.

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And on this account it must be understood that each of the foregoing positions said something true and failed in something. For the first, which said that the properties differ in some way from the persons, said truly; but in this badly, that it said they differed *simply*. The next, which said that the properties are persons, said truly; but in this it went too far, that it said that they differ *in no way* from the persons.

Therefore from these two positions there is welded together[^16] one true and common position, which the masters now hold commonly, that the properties are persons and in the persons, yet differ in some way from the persons. — And that this position is fitting is clear, if one inspects the nature of the properties. For it was said above[^17], when it was asked, what property in the divine was, that it was *relation*. It was also said, that relation, by reason of the comparison which it has to the subject, passes over into substance in the divine; and therefore it is most truly predicated of its subject, as the Father is paternity. But by reason of the comparison which it has to the object, it remains most truly in the divine and has in some way a difference from the person; nor on this account does it make a composition, but a distinction with respect to that of which it is. For composition is taken according to the comparison of the property to the subject, distinction with respect to the object. And from this it is clear, that property is person and in person, since it is the same by essence[^18] or by mode of being, but differs as to the mode of having-itself. — The reasons therefore must be conceded, that the properties are persons and in the persons.

**To the arguments:**

1. And from what has been said the response to the first argument is clear. For since the properties have some little difference from the person according to the mode of having-themselves, therefore the property truly determines and distinguishes; this however does not take away the predication[^19], since that mode does not add another essence.

2. *To that which is objected* secondly, concerning abstraction, it must be said that there is not abstraction according to the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding and of speaking: since abstraction regards the subject *in which*, and according to that respect [the relation] passes over[^20]; since however it remains in comparison to the term, hence it is, that relation does not differ only in speaking, and yet it is not necessary that there be there a true abstraction.

3. *To that which is objected* thirdly, that the absolute is not said of the relative; it must be said, that this is true in the creature, since the very true respect either is another by essence, or in comparison to another[^21]: by essence, as matter and form, of which neither is in the divine: whence respect in creatures posits dependence, and therefore takes away supreme simplicity, and therefore is not predicated in creatures. For everything most simple is altogether independent[^22]. But in the divine relations express a respect without dependence; and therefore they do not take away supreme simplicity, and therefore they are said of the hypostases.

4. *To that which is objected* afterward, that all relations are standing-alongside; it must be said, that they are said by Boethius *to be in comparison*, not because they are not in the thing, but because, since they are in the thing, they are not in it absolutely, but in comparison to another; with this changed and corrupted, the relation likewise comes to be corrupted and to cease, on account of this, that it is not in the subject absolutely, but to another; nonetheless it is in the subject.

5. From this is clear the response to that which is objected. For that does not have truth except in absolute being, not relative. And that[^23] is drawn from the reasoning and the words of Boethius: from the reasoning, since when I say, this is to be ordered to something, I do not say *nothing* of that of which it is said, and when, of something which does not have an order, [the case] becomes one having an order, since that to which it would be ordered did not yet exist — and therefore the order was in potency in this, not by reason of itself, but by reason of that to which it is — as far as it [depended] on its own side, it was in act; and therefore, with no change made in itself, but in the object, it is brought into being and ceases. And this is clear from the words of Boethius, since Boethius does not deny *simply* that relation does not consist in that which is to be, but [says it does] not *wholly* consist [therein]. Whence he says[^24]: "A relative predication cannot of itself add anything to the thing of which it is said, or diminish, or change, [a thing] which does not *wholly* consist in that which is to be." From this he hints that it does in some way consist [there]; and therefore neither in creatures nor in God is it true to say that the relation is not in something; but it is true to say that it is not *wholly* in something absolutely.

la: Sic non dicitur: *rationale est rationalitas*. Hoc argumentum Gilb. Porret. insinuatur hic in *lit. Magistri*, c. 1. circa medium.

en: Thus it is not said: *the rational is rationality*. This argument of Gilb. Porret. is hinted at here in the *text of the Master*, c. 1, near the middle.

la: De quo vide supra d. 27. p. 1. q. 3. — Vide supra d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. 3. ad I. — Mox post *absoluta* codd. IXbb cum ed. 1 subiiciunt *et*. Aliquanto inferius cod. T omittit verba *verus respectus sive*.

en: Concerning which see above d. 27, p. 1, q. 3. — See above d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. 3, *ad* 1. — Soon after *absoluta*, codices IXbb with edition 1 add *et*. Somewhat below, codex T omits the words *verus respectus sive*.

la: Cap. 5: «Quae tota non in eo quod est ei [esse], sed in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere». Ibid. insinuatur et proxime sequens argumentum, de quo vide supra pag. 433, nota 3. Cfr. etiam Comment. Gilb. Porret. in hunc locum. — Sola Vat. in hoc textu perperam omittit *non*.

en: Chapter 5: "[a relation] which entirely [consists] not in that which is for it [to be], but in that which is in some way to have itself in comparison." There also is hinted the next following argument, on which see above p. 433, n. 3. Cf. also the Commentary of Gilb. Porret. on this place. — The Vatican [edition] alone in this text wrongly omits *non*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc addit *est*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds *est*.

la: Cap. 10. n. 1: *Ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet, hoc est, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur*. — In cod. post *Haec est* additur *regula*.

en: Chapter 10, n. 1: "It is called simple for this reason, that what it has, this it is, except that each person is said relatively to another." — In a codex, after *Haec est* is added *regula*.

la: Cap. 10. n. 11: *Deus autem, quia non ea magnitudine magnus est, quae non est quod est ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit Deus, cum magnus est — alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam Deus, Deo autem non est aliquid maius ea — igitur magnitudine magnus est, qua ipse est eadem magnitudo*. Cfr. et VI. c. 7. n. 8. seq. — Mox post *quod* ex codd. M Z I W X bb restituimus coniunctionem *quia*, quae in Vat. desideratur. Codd. I X bb omittunt *ipse* ante *Deus*. Paulo superius pro *aliter denominans* multi codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *tunc denominans*. Deinde post *eo* cod. I (L in marg.) addit: *ad minus secundum quid; et si secundum quid: ergo simpliciter, maxime in simplicissimo, ubi non est quid et quid*. In fine argumenti voci *paternitas* cod. I praemittit *sua*.

en: Chapter 10, n. 11: "But God, since he is not great by that greatness which is not what he himself is, as if God were a participant of it when he is great — otherwise that greatness will be greater than God, but to God there is nothing greater than it — therefore he is great by that greatness by which he himself is the same greatness." Cf. also VI, c. 7, n. 8 ff. — Soon after *quod*, from codices M Z I W X bb we have restored the conjunction *quia*, which is missing in the Vatican [edition]. Codices I X bb omit *ipse* before *Deus*. A little earlier, in place of *aliter denominans*, many codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] *tunc denominans*. Then after *eo*, codex I (with L in the margin) adds: *at least in some respect; and if in some respect: therefore simply, especially in what is most simple, where there is not "what" and "what."* At the end of the argument, before the word *paternitas*, codex I prefixes *sua*.

la: Codd. I M bb cum ed. 1 *ab illo*.

en: Codices I M bb with edition 1 [read] *ab illo*.

la: Vide supra d. XXV. c. 3. — Pro *ad Damasum* codd. et edd., except. 4 et 5, *ad Philippum*.

en: See above d. XXV, c. 3. — In place of *ad Damasum*, the codices and editions, except 4 and 5, [read] *ad Philippum*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 116, nota 6. — Mox pro *substantiae* Vat. cum paucis codd. *substantia*.

en: Cf. above p. 116, n. 6. — Soon, in place of *substantiae*, the Vatican [edition] with a few codices [reads] *substantia*.

la: In cod. bb et ed. 1 hic additur *vere*.

en: In codex bb and edition 1, here is added *vere*.

la: [No separate footnote in OCR — apparatus marker keyed by position; serves as crossover anchor for the *substantia* / *substantiae* variant noted at fn-9 and the *subiecto* variant at fn-12.]

la: Codd. E F I M X aa bb *subiecto*.

en: Codices E F I M X aa bb [read] *subiecto*.

la: Aristot., I. *de Caelo et Mundo*, text. 33. (c. 5.): «Quapropter quod in principio modicum est, in fine fit perquam magnum», quam sententiam Averroes in suo Commentario in hunc locum sic exprimit: «minimus error in principiis vel in principio rei est magnus in ultimo». Haec Averrois verba postea apud Scholasticos frequentissima erant. — Paulo ante pro *contineret* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. et ed. 1 *continet*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the World* I, text 33 (c. 5): "Wherefore what is small at the beginning, in the end becomes exceedingly great"; which sentiment Averroes in his Commentary on this place expresses thus: "the smallest error at the beginnings, or at the beginning of the matter, is great at the end." These words of Averroes were afterwards most frequent among the Scholastics. — A little earlier, in place of *contineret*, the Vatican [edition] with some codices and edition 1 [reads] *continet*.

la: Codd. I Y et ed. 1 *positio*. Paulo inferius ante vocem *tantum* cod. T repetit *quod*.

en: Codices I Y and edition 1 [read] *positio*. A little below, before the word *tantum*, codex T repeats *quod*.

la: Quaest. 1–3. — Post *Attamen* in initio huius propos. cod. I et ed. 1 subiiciunt *et*.

en: Questions 1–3. — After *Attamen* at the beginning of this proposition, codex I and edition 1 add *et*.

la: Cod. bb *conficitur*.

en: Codex bb [reads] *conficitur*.

en: Distinction 26, q. 2.

la: Codd. T X voci *modum* praemittunt *secundum*. Paulo post voci *rationes* cod. R bene adiungit *ostendentes*.

en: Codices T X prefix to the word *modum* the word *secundum*. A little after, to the word *rationes*, codex R rightly adds *ostendentes*.

la: Scil. qua proprietas praedicatur de persona et e converso.

en: Namely, [the predication] by which the property is predicated of the person and vice versa.

la: Supple cum Vat. *in substantiam*. In fine solutionis ante *vera* Vat. cum paucis codd. omittit *ibi*.

en: Supply with the Vatican [edition] *in substantiam* ("into substance"). At the end of the solution, before *vera*, the Vatican [edition] with a few codices omits *ibi*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 169, nota 1.

en: Cf. above p. 169, n. 1.

la: Simul audi *relationes*. — Immediate post pro *in comparatione* plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 perperam *in relatione*; cod. T sic: *quod non esse relationes dicuntur, non quia* etc.

en: At the same time understand *relationes*. — Immediately after, in place of *in comparatione*, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 wrongly [read] *in relatione*; codex T thus: *that they are said not to be relations, not because* etc.

la: Cod. T *hoc*, cod. L *idem*, alii codd. falso *ideo*. Paulo superius post *absoluto* cod. T et nonnulli alii inserunt *et*.

en: Codex T [reads] *hoc*, codex L *idem*, other codices wrongly *ideo*. A little earlier, after *absoluto*, codex T and several others insert *et*.

la: Libr. *de Trin.* c. 5. — In loco citato Vat. *quae* mutavit in *quia*, renitentibus tum codd., tum ed. 1, tum etiam textu originali. — Pro *in hoc non* codd. M P Q X *et hoc non*, codd. *nec hoc*, cod. T brevius sic: *in hoc, tamen ratione sui erat in actu, et ideo* etc.

en: Book *On the Trinity*, c. 5. — In the place cited, the Vatican [edition] changed *quae* into *quia*, against both the codices, edition 1, and even the original text. — In place of *in hoc non*, codices M P Q X [read] *et hoc non*, codices [read] *nec hoc*, codex T more briefly thus: *in this, yet by reason of itself it was in act, and therefore* etc.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod sint proprietates in divinis, iam supra (d. 26. q. 1.) probatum est, et simul aliquid dictum est de natura earum et de duabus extremis falsisque opinionibus Gilberti Porretani et Praepositivi. In hac quaestione natura proprietatum accuratius determinatur. — Gilbertus, Episcopus Pictaviensis († 1154), in philosophia immoderato realismo addictus, ex sententia Boethii (in 1. *ad opposit.*), quod *relatio habeat tantum esse in comparatione*, id est in ordine ad terminum, inferre voluit, relationes non esse personas, nec reduci per identitatem ad essentiam; item, ipsas non esse nec in personis nec in essentia (scilicet denominative, et secundum nostrum modum intelligendi quasi per informationem), sed eas esse tantum *assistentes*, utpote respectus ad aliud. Ut ipsius sententia melius intelligatur, haec ex B. Alberto (S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 52.) transcribimus: *Distinguunt (Porretani) inter subsistens, existens, insistens et assistens. Subsistens dicunt esse quod sibi ad esse sufficit et alio non indiget; sic est divina essentia. Existens autem dicunt esse quod alio quodam ut causa indiget, ex quo sit, sicut causatum et creatum. Insistens autem dicunt esse quod ad aliud fluit ut ad subiectum, in quo insit. Assistens vero dicunt quod non inest, sed per habitudinem alicuius extrinseci dicit respectum unius ad alterum, sicut relativa, quorum esse est ad aliud. Et tales respectus dicunt esse in his nominibus dominus et creator.* — Argumenta pro hac sententia principalia habes hic 1–3. ad oppos. Hunc errorem confixit Concilium Rhemense, an. 1148 ab Eugenio III. celebratum, his verbis: «Credimus et confitemur, solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum S. aeternum esse, nec aliquas omnino res, sive relationes, sive proprietates, sive singularitates vel unitates dicantur, vel alia huiusmodi adesse Deo, quae sint ab aeterno et non sint Deus». — *Praepositivus* e contrario ex eodem principio divinae simplicitatis intulit aliam extremam opinionem, scilicet proprietates esse quidem personas, sed non esse in personis, cum non differant a personis nisi modo dicendi. Hic error refutatur argg. 3. 5. in fundam. et in corp. — Media igitur et vera sententia statuit, tum quod proprietates sunt personae per identitatem, tum quod sunt in personis propter quandam distinctionem, ab intellectu nostro necessario et saltem cum fundamento ex parte rei faciendam. De natura huius distinctionis doctores in modo loquendi differunt, de quo vide supra d. 26. q. 1. *Scholion*, et hic solut. ad 1.

**II.** Quoad solut. ad 2. cfr. supra d. 27. p. I. q. 3, ubi negatur, quod in proprietatibus sit vera abstractio. Optima hic et ibi ad 3. additur ratio huius assertionis, scil. quod abstractio respicit subiectum, in quo est relatio; et sub hoc respectu relatio (ut *in quo*) transit in substantiam et identificatur cum ipsa. Relatio vero ut *ad* (sive quoad respectum ad terminum) manet quidem et distinctio relativa inter personas est realis, sed hoc non est ratione *abstractionis*. Nihil enim in divinis abstrahitur, quod realiter differt, nihilque realiter differt, quod abstrahitur. — Obiect. 3, quod nullatenus relatio praedicari possit de essentia divina, non exiguam difficultatem continet, quam Seraphicus solvit ex hoc principio, quod relationis conceptus, a creaturis ad Deum a nobis translatus, purificari debeat ab omnibus quas habet in creatis imperfectionibus, et ab omnibus quae repugnant simplicitati divinae. Paulo aliter, sed in eodem sensu, S. Thom. (S. I. q. 28. a. 2. ad 3.) eandem difficultatem solvit. — Solut. ad 4. bene explicat definitionem relationis a Boethio factam; cfr. S. Thom. loc. cit. a. 3.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 1. a. 1, m. 5. a. 1. et 6. § 1. — Scot., hic quaest. unica; *Report.* hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 40. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 39. m. 2. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. n. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 56. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — de Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic quaest. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That there are properties in the divine has already been proved above (d. 26, q. 1), and at the same time something was said of their nature and of the two extreme and false opinions of Gilbert Porretanus and of Praepositivus. In this question the nature of the properties is more accurately determined. — Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers († 1154), in philosophy addicted to immoderate realism, from the opinion of Boethius (in 1, *ad opposit.*), that *relation has being only in comparison*, that is, in order to a term, wished to infer that relations are not persons, nor reduced by identity to the essence; likewise, that they themselves are neither in the persons nor in the essence (namely denominatively, and according to our mode of understanding as if by informing), but that they are only *standing-alongside*, as respects to another. So that his opinion may be better understood, we transcribe these [words] from B. Albert (*S.* p. I, tr. 13, q. 52): *They (the Porretans) distinguish among subsisting, existing, insisting and assisting [i.e. standing-alongside]. They say a subsisting [thing] is what suffices to itself for being and does not need another; thus is the divine essence. An existing [thing] they say is what needs some other as a cause, from which it is, like the caused and created. An insisting [thing] they say is what flows toward another as toward a subject, in which it inheres. But a standing-alongside [thing] they say is what does not inhere, but through the relation of something extrinsic expresses the respect of one to another, like relatives, whose being is to another. And such respects they say are [found] in these names "lord" and "creator."* — The principal arguments for this opinion you have here at 1–3, *ad oppositum*. This error was transfixed by the Council of Reims, in 1148, celebrated by Eugene III, with these words: "We believe and confess that only God the Father and Son and Holy Spirit is eternal, and that no things at all, whether they be called relations, or properties, or singularities or unities, or other things of this sort, are present to God which are from eternity and are not God." — *Praepositivus*, on the other hand, from the same principle of the divine simplicity, drew another extreme opinion, namely that the properties indeed are persons, but are not in the persons, since they do not differ from the persons except in mode of speaking. This error is refuted by arguments 3 and 5 in the *fundamenta* and in the body. — The middle and true opinion, then, establishes both that the properties are persons by identity, and that they are in the persons on account of a certain distinction, to be made by our intellect necessarily and at least with foundation on the side of the thing. Concerning the nature of this distinction the doctors differ in mode of speaking, on which see above d. 26, q. 1, *Scholion*, and here in the solution to [argument] 1.

**II.** As to the solution to [argument] 2, cf. above d. 27, p. I, q. 3, where it is denied that in the properties there is a true abstraction. Best [there], here and there at *ad* 3, the reason for this assertion is added, namely that abstraction regards the subject in which the relation is; and under this respect the relation (as *in which*) passes over into substance and is identified with it. But the relation as *to* (or as regards the respect to the term) indeed remains, and the relative distinction among the persons is real, but this is not by reason of *abstraction*. For nothing is abstracted in the divine which really differs, nor does anything really differ which is abstracted. — Objection 3, that relation can in no way be predicated of the divine essence, contains no small difficulty, which the Seraphic Doctor solves from this principle, that the concept of relation, transferred by us from creatures to God, must be purified from all the imperfections it has in created things, and from all that is repugnant to the divine simplicity. A little otherwise, but in the same sense, St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 28, a. 2, *ad* 3) solves the same difficulty. — The solution to [argument] 4 well explains the definition of relation given by Boethius; cf. St. Thom. *loc. cit.* a. 3.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 1, m. 5, a. 1 and 6, § 1. — Scot., here unique question; *Report.* here q. 3. — St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 2; *S.* I, q. 40, a. 1. — B. Albert., here a. 2; *S.* p. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 2, a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, n. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1, 2. — Ægid. R., here 1, *princ.* q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 56, q. 1. — Durand., on this and the following question here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following question here q. 1. — de Biel, on this and the following question here, unique question.

---

translators_notes: [Notes pending]


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum proprietas sit essentia
Whether property is essence

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum proprietas sit essentia.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione proprietatis ad essentiam, et quaeritur, utrum proprietas sit essentia. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Ecclesia cantat[^1]: «In personis adoretur proprietas»; sed nihil est adorandum latria nisi divina essentia: ergo etc. Unde Bernardus[^2]: «Illam proprietatem, quae Deus non est, non mihi adorabilem credo».

2. Item, essentia est in persona, similiter[^3] et proprietas: aut ergo sunt ibi per differentiam, aut per indifferentiam. Si per differentiam: ergo persona est composita, quod est inconveniens. Si per indifferentiam omnimodam: ergo proprietas est essentia, et essentia est proprietas.

3. Item, proprietas aut est aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo aut persona non distinguitur, aut distinctio personae nihil est. Si aliquid est: sed omne quod est aliquid est essentia vel creata, vel increata; sed proprietas non est essentia creata, hoc manifestum est: ergo increata.

4. Item, omne quod est, aut est Deus, aut melius Deo aut minus bonum aut maius: proprietas ergo aut est Deus, aut melius aut minus aut maius. Sed maius non potest esse, quia Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest[^4]. Minus non potest esse, quia tunc Pater esset minor, quam sit ipse: ergo est Deus.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus dicit et habetur supra, distinctione decima octava[^5]: «Non eo est Deus quo Pater, sed deitate est Deus, paternitate est Pater»: ergo deitas non est paternitas, immo aliud et aliud.

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2. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Haec est conceptio animi per se vera[^6], quod non est idem principium distinguendi et uniendi, formaliter loquendo; sed essentia est ratio uniendi, proprietas autem ratio distinguendi: ergo essentia et proprietas non sunt idem.

3. Item, nulla proprietas proprie praedicatur de aliqua essentia sive substantia, nisi sit in illa: ergo si proprietates dicuntur de divina essentia, ergo sunt in illa. Sed proprietas ponit rem suam circa subiectum, in quo est: ergo cum rei proprietas sit respectus, et ad respectum sequatur distinctio, de necessitate proprietates ponunt distinctionem circa divinam essentiam, si sunt in illa. Sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, si essentia est proprietas, aut ergo per se, aut per accidens: si per se, ergo cuicumque inest essentia, et paternitas; sed hoc est falsum: ergo si est vera, est vera per accidens. Ergo cum in divinis non sit ponere accidens, nec per accidens patet etc.

5. Item, si proprietas est divina essentia, cum divina essentia vel substantia sit creatrix et creet[^7], ergo proprietas creat; quod non conceditur. Quaeritur igitur, quare conceditur, quod paternitas sit essentia, et quod etiam sit adoranda, non tamen, quod sit creatrix vel sapiens.

### Conclusio.

> *Licet essentia et proprietas habeant diversum modum se habendi, quia essentia dicit absolutum, proprietas vero respectum ad terminum; tamen essentia est proprietas, et e converso.*

**Respondeo:** Sicut Magister tangit in littera[^8], aliquorum positio fuit et imponitur Pictaviensi, quod proprietas nec sit essentia nec in essentia, sed solum assistens. — Sed ista positio manifeste improbata est, quia necesse est, quod sit divina essentia, si est aliquid.

Propter hoc ad intelligentiam obiectorum intelligendum, sicut praenotatum est[^9], quod relatio ratione comparationis ad subiectum transit in substantiam, et ideo proprietas est divina substantia; ratione vero comparationis ad terminum sive obiectum remanet; et quantum ad hoc est distinctiva[^10] et differt ab essentia, non quia dicat aliam essentiam, sed alium modum se habendi, qui per comparationem ad essentiam vel personam dicit modum, nihil addens; in comparatione vero ad correlativum vere dicit rem[^11] et distinctionem: et ideo non est vanitas in ratione intelligendi nec compositio in re, sed vera distinctio. Et quoniam iste respectus non dicit aliud quam essentiam, ipsi comparatus, similiter nec aliud quam personam: ideo vere est essentia et persona. — Sed quia ulterius respectus ille non est essentiae ad aliud, sed personae ad personam; ideo respectus et relationes, proprie loquendo, sunt in personis, non in essentia: quia personae secundum eos referuntur et distinguuntur, in essentia autem non, quia[^12] nec refertur nec distinguitur. Sunt tamen in essentia divina, loquendo communiter et improprie, ut dicatur in divina essentia esse omne quod est divina essentia, vel omne quod est in essentia vel persona.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod ablativus facit rationem dicendi vel denominandi; unde et alietas, per ablativum significata, attenditur solum quantum ad modum, non quantum ad essentiam, ut patet.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud similiter quod obiicitur, quod non idem est principium distinguendi et uniendi; patet responsio, quia proprietas distinguit in eo, quod differens non essentia, sed modo; qui modus non dicit compositionem, quia transit in substantiam; nec dicit solum intellectum, quia res est et manet respectu obiecti.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non praedicatur de substantia, nisi[^13] quod est in substantia; di-

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cendum, quod non praedicatur de substantia ut de subiecto, nec per inhaerentiam sed solum de persona sic praedicatur. Unde de essentia praedicatur, quia essentia et proprietas sunt unum in persona, non quia unum sit in alio.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum praedicetur per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod *per se*, quia per personam; non per accidens, quia persona non est aliud ab essentia. Quoniam igitur res divinae superexcedunt res inferiores, sic et praedicatio praedicationem.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod si essentia creat, et proprietas; dicendum est ad hoc, quod quamvis proprietas sit essentia, tamen essentia non supponit proprietatem, nec e converso. Unde non sequitur, quod illud quod convenit essentiae, conveniat personae, vel e converso; aliqua tamen conveniunt et proprietati, aliqua non.

**Ad quaestionem incidentem.** Unde notandum, quod quaedam dicuntur de divina essentia in se, ut puta illa quae dicuntur in oppositione ad creaturam, ut immensa, increata et huiusmodi; et haec dicuntur de proprietatibus. Aliqua dicuntur de divina essentia ut in personis, ut esse communicabilem, et esse in tribus unam; talia conveniunt essentiae, ut habet rationem formae, et in hoc differt ratio essentiae et proprietatis; et talia non dicuntur de proprietatibus. Rursus aliqua dicuntur de essentia ut esse principium actionis, ut esse potentem, sapientem, volentem, ut creare; et talia non dicuntur de proprietatibus. Unde notandum, quod adiectiva essentialia, quae essentiam in se respiciunt ut diversam a creatura, dicuntur de proprietatibus; quae autem de ipsa formaliter, sive ut est forma, vel ut est principium, non dicuntur. Et sic patent omnia quaesita.

english:
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### Question II.
#### *Whether property is essence.*

Second, inquiry is made concerning the comparison of property to essence, and it is asked whether property is essence. And that it is so seems to be shown:

1. Because the Church sings[^1]: «Let property be adored in the persons»; but nothing is to be adored with latria except the divine essence: therefore etc. Whence Bernard[^2]: «That property, which is not God, I do not believe to be adorable to me».

2. Likewise, essence is in the person, and similarly[^3] property: therefore either they are there by difference, or by indifference. If by difference: then the person is composite, which is unfitting. If by indifference of every kind: then property is essence, and essence is property.

3. Likewise, property is either something or nothing. If nothing: then either the person is not distinguished, or the distinction of the person is nothing. If it is something: but everything that is something is essence, either created or uncreated; but property is not created essence — this is manifest: therefore uncreated.

4. Likewise, everything that is, either is God, or is better than God, or is less good, or is greater: therefore property either is God, or is better, or less, or greater. But it cannot be greater, because God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived[^4]. Nor can it be less, because then the Father would be less than himself: therefore it is God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine says, and it is held above in distinction eighteen[^5]: «It is not by that by which he is Father that he is God, but by deity he is God, by paternity he is Father»: therefore deity is not paternity, but rather one thing and another.

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2. Likewise, this seems by reason. This is a conception of the mind true through itself[^6], that the principle of distinguishing and of uniting is not the same, formally speaking; but essence is the ground of uniting, while property is the ground of distinguishing: therefore essence and property are not the same.

3. Likewise, no property is properly predicated of any essence or substance unless it is in it: therefore if properties are said of the divine essence, then they are in it. But property places its thing about the subject in which it is: therefore since the property of a thing is a relation, and from a relation distinction follows, of necessity properties place a distinction about the divine essence, if they are in it. But this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if essence is property, then it is so either *per se* or *per accidens*: if *per se*, then to whatever essence belongs, paternity also belongs; but this is false: therefore if it is true, it is true *per accidens*. Therefore since in the divine there is no place for the accidental, neither can it be *per accidens*: this is plain etc.

5. Likewise, if property is the divine essence, since the divine essence or substance is creator and creates[^7], then property creates; which is not conceded. It is asked, therefore, why it is conceded that paternity is essence, and that it is also to be adored, yet not that it is creator or wise.

### Conclusion.

> *Although essence and property have a different mode of being-toward, because essence states the absolute, but property a relation to a term; nevertheless essence is property, and conversely.*

**I respond:** As the Master touches in the text[^8], the position of certain ones was — and is imputed to the Poitevin — that property is neither essence nor in essence, but only assistant. — But this position has been manifestly disproved, because it is necessary that it be the divine essence, if it is anything.

For this reason, for the understanding of the objections, it must be understood, as has been noted before[^9], that relation by reason of comparison to its subject passes into substance, and therefore property is divine substance; but by reason of comparison to its term or object it remains; and as to this it is distinctive[^10] and differs from essence, not because it states another essence, but another mode of being-toward, which by comparison to essence or person states a mode adding nothing; whereas in comparison to the correlative it truly states a thing[^11] and a distinction: and therefore there is no vanity in the account of understanding nor composition in the thing, but a true distinction. And since this relation states nothing other than essence, when compared to it, and likewise nothing other than person: therefore it truly is essence and person. — But because furthermore that relation is not of essence to another, but of person to person; therefore relations and references, properly speaking, are in the persons, not in the essence: because the persons according to them are referred and distinguished, but the essence is not, because[^12] it is neither referred nor distinguished. Yet they are in the divine essence, speaking commonly and improperly, so that it is said that whatever is divine essence, or whatever is in essence or person, is in the divine essence.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that by one thing he is God, by another he is Father; it must be said that the ablative makes the manner of speaking or denominating; whence also the otherness signified by the ablative is regarded only as to mode, not as to essence, as is plain.

*To 2.* Likewise to that which is objected, that the principle of distinguishing and of uniting is not the same; the response is plain, because property distinguishes in this — that what differs does so not by essence, but by mode; which mode does not state composition, because it passes into substance; nor does it state only an intellectual concept, because it is a thing and remains in respect to the object.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that nothing is predicated of substance unless[^13] it is in substance; it must be

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said that it is not predicated of substance as of a subject, nor by inherence, but only of the person it is so predicated. Whence it is predicated of the essence, because essence and property are one in the person, not because the one is in the other.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, whether it is predicated *per se* or *per accidens*; it must be said *per se*, because through the person; not *per accidens*, because the person is not other than the essence. Therefore, since divine things exceed inferior things, so also predication exceeds predication.

*To 5.* To that which is finally objected, that if essence creates, so also property; it must be said to this that, although property is essence, yet essence does not suppose property, nor conversely. Whence it does not follow that what belongs to the essence belongs to the person, or conversely; yet some things belong also to the property, others not.

**To the incidental question.** Whence it must be noted that some things are said of the divine essence in itself, namely those which are said in opposition to the creature, such as *immense*, *uncreated*, and the like; and these are said of the properties. Some things are said of the divine essence as in the persons, such as to be communicable, and to be one in three; such things belong to the essence as it has the relation of form, and in this differ the account of essence and the account of property; and such things are not said of the properties. Again, some things are said of the essence as being the principle of action, such as to be powerful, wise, willing, to create; and such things are not said of the properties. Whence it must be noted that essential adjectives which regard the essence in itself as diverse from the creature are said of the properties; but those which regard it formally, either as it is form, or as it is principle, are not said. And thus all the things asked are made plain.

la: In Praefatione de Ss. Trinitate, cuius auctor esse perhibetur aut Pelagius papa, aut S. Ambrosius.

en: In the Preface of the Most Holy Trinity, whose author is reputed to be either Pope Pelagius or St. Ambrose.

la: Libr. V. de Consid. c. 7. n. 15: *Si quartam divinitatem adiicere placet; interim ego hanc, quae Deus non est, persuasi*.

en: *Book V On Consideration*, c. 7, n. 15: «If it pleases [anyone] to add a fourth divinity; meanwhile I am persuaded that this one, which is not God, [is not adorable to me]».

la: In plurimis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 desideratur *similiter*.

en: In very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 the word *similiter* (similarly) is missing.

la: Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10.

en: Boethius, *On the Consolation [of Philosophy]*, book III, prose 10. [The phrase "than which nothing greater can be conceived" is in fact Anselmian; the Quaracchi editors evidently cite Boethius for the underlying axiom of the supreme good.]

la: In Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. et supra d. 6. dub. 2, et d. 19, lit. II. q. 2. ad 1.

en: In the Master [Lombard], c. 3. Cf. also above d. 6, dub. 2, and d. 19, *littera* II, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Pro *per se vera* codd. L *quia per se nota*. Paulo inferius pro *autem* Vat. cum paucis mss. et ed. 1 *est*. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 13.

en: For *per se vera* (true through itself) codices L read *quia per se nota* (because known through itself). A little below, for *autem* (but) the Vatican edition with a few manuscripts and the first edition reads *est* (is). Cf. Anselm, *Monologion*, c. 13.

la: Cap. 1. — Pictaviensis, qui subinde commemoratur, non est ille Petrus Pictaviensis, qui Cancellarius fuit Universitatis Parisiensis scripsitque «Quinque libros Sententiarum» (†1205), sed est Gilb. Porretanus, Episcopus quondam Pictaviensis. — Aliquanto inferius verbis *divina essentia* cod. T praefigit *in*.

en: Chapter 1. — The Poitevin who is repeatedly mentioned is not that Peter of Poitiers who was Chancellor of the University of Paris and wrote the *Five Books of Sentences* (†1205), but rather Gilbert Porreta, formerly Bishop of Poitiers. — Somewhat below, before the words *divina essentia* (divine essence) codex T prefixes *in*.

la: Sic codd. G H K R T V X Y π et alii, Vat. *distincta*. Paulo inferius pro *qui* codd. bb *quia*, et dein post *personam* Vat. interiicit *solum*.

en: Thus read codices G H K R T V X Y π and others; the Vatican edition reads *distincta* (distinct). A little below, for *qui* (which) codices bb read *quia* (because), and then after *personam* (person) the Vatican edition interjects *solum* (only).

la: Quaest. praeced., et d. 26. q. 2. — Paulo post pro *divina substantia* cod. bb *divina essentia*.

en: The preceding question, and d. 26, q. 2. — A little after, for *divina substantia* (divine substance) codex bb reads *divina essentia* (divine essence).

la: Intellige: aliquid, sive entitatem relativam, quae, dum nihilo opponitur, *res* vocatur.

en: Understand: something, that is, a relative entity, which, when it is opposed to nothing, is called *a thing*.

la: Vat., omissis vocibus *non, quia nec*, *non* particula in ante *essentia*, sic: *essentia autem nec refertur* etc. Nostra lectio est communis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Paulo superius post *secundum eos* cod. T adiicit *tantum*. Pro *Sunt tamen in essentia divina* codd. G H K P Q S T V et alii *sed tamen in divina essentia*. In fine corp. ante *essentia* cod. T omittit *in*.

en: The Vatican edition, omitting the words *non, quia nec* and the particle *non* before *in essentia*, reads thus: *but the essence is not referred* etc. Our reading is the common one of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. A little above, after *secundum eos* (according to them) codex T adds *tantum* (only). For *Sunt tamen in essentia divina* (yet they are in the divine essence) codices G H K P Q S T V and others read *sed tamen in divina essentia* (but yet in the divine essence). At the end of the body, before *essentia*, codex T omits *in*.

la: Codd. aa bb clarius: *quia proprietas non distinguit in eo quod differunt in essentia*. Cod. M post *differens* inserit *est*.

en: Codices aa, bb more clearly: «because property does not distinguish in that they differ in essence». Codex M after *differens* inserts *est* (is).

la: Postulante contextu, ex cod. Z restituimus *nisi*. Plures codd. ut X V aa bb cc pro *nisi quod* minus bene exhibent *quod non*. Mox post *dicendum, quod* supple: *proprietas*. Dein pro *ut de subiecto* non pauci codd. perperam *vel de subiecto*, cod. L *ut substantia*.

en: As the context demands, we have restored *nisi* (unless) from codex Z. Several codices, such as X V aa bb cc, less well read *quod non* (what does not) instead of *nisi quod*. Soon after *dicendum, quod* supply *proprietas* (property). Then for *ut de subiecto* (as of a subject) not a few codices wrongly read *vel de subiecto* (or of a subject); codex L reads *ut substantia* (as substance).

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione docetur, quomodo se habeant proprietates ad essentiam. Difficultates principales in praecedenti quaest. et supra d. 26. q. 1. explicatae sunt. Conclusiones ipsae duobus corollariis magis determinantur, scil. quomodo proprietates sint in personis et in essentia.

**II.** Sensus solutionis ad 1. est: licet ablativus importet habitudinem in ratione causae formalis, quae secundum rem non est in Deo, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi ponenda est; et hoc sufficit, ut dicatur: *non eo* (id est non ea ratione sive formalitate) *est Deus, qua est Pater*. Sed Gilbertus, distinguens paternitatem realiter a deitate, falso intellexit ista verba in hoc sensu: *quantum ad id quod est Pater, non est Deus* (cfr. hic dub. 1.). — De praedicatione per inhaerentiam in solut. ad 3. cfr. quaest. seq., et infra d. 34. q. 2. — Solut. ad 4. eruitur ex hoc principio, quod, cum res divinae in infinitum excedant intellectum creatum, interdum etiam regulae logicae deficiunt, ut haec regula, quod omnis praedicatio sit vel per se, vel per accidens. Nam utrumque negatur quoad propositionem *essentia est proprietas*. Quoad praedicationem per se hoc intelligendum videtur de tali praedicatione in sensu stricto, cum S. Thomas (S. 1. q. 39. a. 6. ad. 2.) in casu simili istam praedicationem admittat. — Plura attentione digna leguntur in solut. ad 5. — Duae quaestiones huc spectantes a S. Bonaventura explicite non tractantur, quae inter Scholasticos, praesertim Thomistas et Scotistas disputabantur, scilicet, utrum relatio includatur in ratione essentiae, et vice versa, quod negat Scotus cum multis aliis. Alia est, utrum relationes praecise sumtae dicant perfectionem, quod iterum Scotus negat. Interpretes S. Bonaventurae ipsum ad utramque partem trahere volunt. Probabilius nobis videtur, ipsum saltem in secunda quaestione favere potius Scoto, ut vult Barth. de Barberiis, tom. I. disp. 13. q. 3.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 39. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 5. 6; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 39. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 55. q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In this question is taught how properties stand toward the essence. The principal difficulties have been explained in the preceding question and above at d. 26, q. 1. The conclusions themselves are further determined by two corollaries, namely how properties are in the persons and in the essence.

**II.** The sense of the solution to the first [objection] is: although the ablative imports a relation in the manner of a formal cause — which according to the thing is not in God — nevertheless according to the manner of understanding it must be posited; and this suffices for it to be said: *not by that by which* (that is, not by that account or formality) *he is God, by which he is Father*. But Gilbert, distinguishing paternity really from deity, falsely understood these words in this sense: *as to that which is Father, he is not God* (cf. here dub. 1). — On the predication by inherence in the solution to the third [objection], cf. the following question, and below d. 34, q. 2. — The solution to the fourth [objection] is drawn from this principle: that since divine things exceed the created intellect to infinity, sometimes even the rules of logic fail, as this rule, that every predication is either *per se* or *per accidens*. For both are denied of the proposition *essence is property*. As regards predication *per se*, this seems to be understood of such predication in a strict sense, since St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 39, a. 6, ad 2) in a similar case admits this predication. — Many things worth attention are read in the solution to the fifth. — Two questions bearing on this matter are not explicitly treated by St. Bonaventure, which were disputed among the Scholastics, especially the Thomists and Scotists, namely whether relation is included in the account of essence, and conversely, which Scotus with many others denies. The other is whether relations precisely taken state perfection, which again Scotus denies. Interpreters of St. Bonaventure wish to draw him to either side. It seems to us more probable that he himself, at least in the second question, favors rather Scotus, as Bartholomew of Barberiis maintains, vol. I, disp. 13, q. 3.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* pt. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica; *Report.* here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 1. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3. 5. 6; *S.* pt. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. 2. — Giles of Rome, here I principle, q. 2. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *S.* a. 55, q. 5.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III.
#### *Utrum notio de notione praedicetur.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Tertio quaeritur de comparatione unius notionis ad aliam. Et quaeritur, utrum una notio sive proprietas unius personae praedicetur de alia[^1]. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Syllogismo expositorio.* De necessitate enim sequitur, ut dicitur in arte *Priorum*[^2], hoc *A* est *B*; hoc *A* est *C* eodem demonstrato: ergo *C* est *B*; et fundatur iste syllogismus super illud principium per

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se notum: *quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem*. Fiat ergo talis syllogismus: Pater est paternitas; Pater est innascibilitas: ergo paternitas est innascibilitas. Si tu dicas, quod accidens[^3] peccat contra istam consequentiam et contra illud principium, ut patet hic: Petrus est individuum; Petrus est homo: ergo homo est individuum; contra hoc obiicitur, quia ubi est accidens, ibi est et accidentalis praedicatio; sed cum dicitur: Pater est paternitas, Pater est innascibilitas, non est accidentalis praedicatio, quia est in abstractione: ergo non est ibi accidens. — Item bene sequitur concretive: Pater generat; Pater est innascibilis: ergo innascibilis generat; et tamen magis importatur sic[^4] praedicatio per modum accidentis: ergo multo fortius sequitur in abstracto: ergo haec est vera: paternitas est innascibilitas.

2. Item, hoc ostenditur a minori sic: maior est unio[^5] proprietatum in una persona sive in supposito incommunicabili quam proprietatum in una natura communi; sed tanta est unio proprietatum in una natura communi, quod una est alia, ut bonitas est sapientia: ergo multo fortius in persona una proprietas praedicatur de alia.

3. Item, maior est unio proprietatum in una persona quam proprietatis et essentiae in persona — quia ibi unio quantum ad rem est aequalis, et quantum ad modum magis convenit proprietas cum proprietate, quam proprietas cum natura sive essentia — sed tanta est unio essentiae et proprietatis in persona, quod una de alia praedicatur, ut paternitas est[^6] deitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, maior est unio proprietatum[^7] in una persona quam duarum naturarum in eadem persona — sed propter convenientiam naturarum in una persona Christi est communicatio idiomatum, quia Deus est homo, et homo Deus: ergo pari ratione propter convenientiam proprietatum in una hypostasi una de alia praedicatur.

**Contra:**

1. Sicut se habet persona ad personam, ita notio ad notionem; sed una persona non praedicatur de alia persona: ergo nec una notio de alia notione.

2. Item, quod praedicatur de aliquo in abstractione non facit numerum cum illo[^8]: ergo si notio de notione praedicatur, non sunt plures notiones, sed una.

3. Item, si notio praedicatur de notione, spiratio est generatio, cum haec sit vera: Pater spirat Spiritum sanctum, et spirare est generare: ergo et haec similiter erit vera: Pater generat Spiritum sanctum.

### Conclusio.

> *Duae notiones unius personae in concreto de se invicem praedicari possunt, non vero in abstracto.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est praedicatio per identitatem et praedicatio per inhaerentiam. Praedicatio per inhaerentiam est in concretione, et hoc est[^9] ratione suppositi, ut *album est musicum*. Praedicatio vero per identitatem est in abstractione et ratione formae, non suppositi, ut *iustitia est bonitas*.

Dico ergo, quod notio ad notionem dupliciter potest comparari: vel in concretione, vel in abstractione. Si in concretione, sic una praedicatur de alia, ut *generans est spirans*, et *Pater est innascibilis*, et hoc, quia conveniunt in supposito. Si autem in abstractione, quia tunc notio pure importat ipsum respectum, et in una eademque persona sunt diversi respectus sine sui compositione, et hoc secundum diversas comparationes; sic una de alia non praedicatur.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de syllogismo*; dicendum, quod contra illum syllogismum peccat accidens, sicut patet in exemplo prius posito; unde non valet forma syllogismi. Similiter illud principium[^10] intelligendum est secundum idem. Non enim sequitur, quod si aliqua duo sunt similia uni, quod sint similia inter se, nisi sint similia secundum idem. Similiter oportet etiam in relationibus ad hoc, quod sit identitas unius ad aliam, quod non tantum in eodem[^11] et secundum idem, verum etiam sint ad idem.

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Quoniam igitur relationes diversae in eadem persona non sunt ad idem sive ad eundem, ideo non sequitur, quod si conveniant in supposito, quod propter hoc conveniant inter se. Et sic patet, quod nec syllogismus nec principium convenit.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod non est ibi accidens; dicendum, quod fallacia accidentis non solum attenditur quantum ad praedicatum accidentale, sed etiam attenditur quantum ad principii[^12] variationem, ita quod in una sola acceptione conveniat, in alia sit extraneum; sic est in proposito. Nam Pater secundum aliam comparationem est innascibilitas, secundum aliam est paternitas; ita quod paternitas nullo modo dicit comparationem ad prius[^13], nec positive, nec privative, quantum est de sua ratione: et ideo patet etc.

3. *Ad illud quod obiicitur* per similitudinem unionis duorum in tertio; dicendum, quod praedicatio per identitatem potest esse tripliciter: aut ita quod essentia comparetur ad essentiam, aut essentia ad proprietatem, aut proprietas ad proprietatem. Quando igitur est praedicatio per identitatem per comparationem essentiae ad essentiam, notatur identitas essentialis, ut cum dicitur, *magnitudo est bonitas*. Quando iterum per comparationem essentiae ad proprietatem, similiter notatur identitas essentialis. Quando vero est comparatio proprietatis ad proprietatem, quia proprietas non importat nisi rationem et relationem sive respectum, tunc notatur identitas rationis. Et hinc est, quod una proprietas essentialis praedicatur de altera, et proprietas de essentia, quia uniformis modus praedicandi est in his ad se invicem et ad illud in quo conveniunt, quia per identitatem essentiae. Sed non sic est, cum proprietas praedicatur de proprietate. Nam cum proprietas praedicatur de persona, notatur convenientia in substantia et essentia et supposito[^14]. Cum autem praedicatur de alia proprietate, notatur convenientia in ratione et respectu. Et ideo non est simile, immo est ibi accidens: conveniunt in substantia, ergo in respectu.

4. *Ad ultimum* de convenientia naturarum in una persona patet responsio, quia non est communicatio idiomatum in abstractione, sed in concretione, quia *deitas non est humanitas*, sed *Deus est homo*: similiter in proposito est. Ideo patent omnia[^15].

english:
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### Question III. *Whether one notion is predicated of another notion.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the comparison of one notion to another. And it is asked, whether one notion or property of one person is predicated of another[^1]. And that it is so, it appears:

1. *By an expository syllogism.* For of necessity it follows, as is said in the *Prior [Analytics]*[^2]: this *A* is *B*; this *A* is *C*, the same [middle] being demonstrated: therefore *C* is *B*; and this syllogism is founded upon that self-evident principle:

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*whatsoever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another*. Let, then, such a syllogism be made: the Father is paternity; the Father is unbegottenness: therefore paternity is unbegottenness. If you say that "accident"[^3] sins against this consequence and against that principle, as appears here: Peter is an individual; Peter is a man: therefore man is an individual; against this it is objected that, where there is an accident, there also is accidental predication; but when it is said: "the Father is paternity, the Father is unbegottenness," there is not accidental predication, since it is in the abstract: therefore there is no accident there. — Likewise, it follows well concretively: the Father generates; the Father is unbegotten: therefore the unbegotten generates; and yet thus[^4] the predication is more imported by way of an accident: therefore much more strongly does it follow in the abstract: therefore this is true: paternity is unbegottenness.

2. Likewise, this is shown *a minori* thus: greater is the union[^5] of properties in one person or in an incommunicable supposit than [the union] of properties in one common nature; but so great is the union of properties in one common nature that one is the other, as goodness is wisdom: therefore much more strongly in [one] person is one property predicated of another.

3. Likewise, greater is the union of properties in one person than [the union] of property and essence in a person — since there the union as to the thing is equal, and as to the mode property agrees more with property than property with nature or essence — but so great is the union of essence and property in a person that the one is predicated of the other, as paternity is[^6] deity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, greater is the union of properties[^7] in one person than [the union] of two natures in the same person — but on account of the agreement of the natures in the one person of Christ there is the communication of idioms, since God is man and man is God: therefore by parity of reason, on account of the agreement of properties in one hypostasis, the one is predicated of the other.

**On the contrary:**

1. As person is to person, so is notion to notion; but one person is not predicated of another person: therefore neither is one notion of another notion.

2. Likewise, what is predicated of something in the abstract does not make a number with it[^8]: therefore if notion is predicated of notion, there are not several notions, but one.

3. Likewise, if notion is predicated of notion, [then] spiration is generation, since this is true: "the Father spirates the Holy Spirit," and "to spirate is to generate": therefore this likewise will be true: "the Father generates the Holy Spirit."

### Conclusion.

> *Two notions of one person can be predicated of one another in the concrete, but not in the abstract.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is predication by identity and predication by inherence. Predication by inherence is in concretion, and this is[^9] by reason of the supposit, as *the white [thing] is musical*. But predication by identity is in abstraction and by reason of the form, not of the supposit, as *justice is goodness*.

I say therefore that notion to notion can be compared in two ways: either in concretion, or in abstraction. If in concretion, thus the one is predicated of the other, as *the one generating is the one spirating*, and *the Father is unbegotten*, and this, because they agree in the supposit. But if in abstraction — since then the notion purely imports the relation itself, and in one and the same person there are diverse relations without composition of themselves, and this according to diverse comparisons — thus the one is not predicated of the other.

**To the arguments:**

1. *To that, then, which is objected concerning the syllogism*; it must be said that against that syllogism the [fallacy of] accident is at play, as is clear in the example previously set down; whence the form of the syllogism does not hold. Likewise that principle[^10] must be understood according to "the same." For it does not follow that, if any two things are like one [thing], they are like one another, unless they are like according to the same [respect]. Likewise it is also required, in relations, for there to be identity of one to another, that not only [the things] be in the same [supposit][^11] and according to the same, but also that they be ordered to the same.

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Since therefore diverse relations in the same person are not [ordered] to the same nor to the same [term], therefore it does not follow that, if they agree in the supposit, on this account they should agree among themselves. And thus it is plain that neither the syllogism nor the principle applies.

2. *To that which is objected*, that there is no accident there; it must be said that the fallacy of accident is not only attended to as regards an accidental predicate, but is also attended to as regards a variation of the [middle] principle[^12], such that it agrees in one acceptance only, [but] in another is foreign [to the matter]; so it is in the case proposed. For the Father, according to one comparison, is unbegottenness; according to another is paternity; so that paternity in no way expresses comparison to a prior[^13], neither positively nor privatively, so far as concerns its own nature: and so it is plain etc.

3. *To that which is objected* through the likeness of the union of two [things] in a third; it must be said that predication by identity can be threefold: either [taking it] thus, that essence is compared to essence, or essence to property, or property to property. When, then, there is predication by identity through the comparison of essence to essence, an essential identity is noted, as when it is said, *magnitude is goodness*. When again through the comparison of essence to property, likewise an essential identity is noted. But when there is comparison of property to property, since property imports nothing but a relation [*ratio*] and relation [*relatio*] or respect, then an identity of *ratio* is noted. And hence it is that one essential property is predicated of another, and property of essence, since the mode of predicating is uniform in these toward one another and toward that in which they agree, since by identity of essence. But it is not so, when property is predicated of property. For when property is predicated of person, an agreement is noted in substance and essence and supposit[^14]. But when it is predicated of another property, an agreement is noted in *ratio* and respect. And therefore it is not similar; rather, there is an accident there: they agree in substance, therefore in respect.

4. *To the last*, concerning the agreement of natures in one person, the response is plain, since the communication of idioms is not in the abstract but in the concrete, since *deity is not humanity*, but *God is man*: likewise it is in the case proposed. Thus all things are plain[^15].

la: Sive includit in sua formali significatione. Ut enim Alex. Hal., *S.* I. q. 36. m. 5. in fine ait: «Illud dicitur supponi supposito, quod est in intentione eius in rectitudine, ut supposito *homine* supponitur *animal*, et supposito *Petro* supponitur *homo*: essentia autem in ratione personae non est secundum rectitudinem, sed oblique. Similiter, supposita notione non supponitur persona. Vel si coarctetur intentio suppositi, illud dicitur supponi altero supposito, quando quod attribuitur uni attribuitur alteri; ideo dixerunt antiqui, quod licet persona essentia esset, quia tamen persona generat, essentia non, supposita persona non supponitur essentia; ergo non sequitur: persona gignit; ergo essentia [non] gignit: et hoc, quia non est: ergo persona non est essentia; sed quod altera ratio intelligentiae [est] in hoc nomine *persona* et in hoc nomine *essentia*». — *Intellige*: notione eiusdem personae, v. g. paternitas de innascibilitate.

en: Or it includes [it] in its formal signification. For as Alex. Hal., *S.* I, q. 36, m. 5, says at the end: «That is said to be supposited under a supposit, which is in [the supposit's] intention in the rectitude [of supposition], as under the supposit *man* there is supposited *animal*, and under the supposit *Peter* there is supposited *man*; but essence in the formal character of the person is not [supposited] according to the rectitude [of supposition], but obliquely. Similarly, when a notion is supposited, person is not supposited [under it]. Or, if the intention of the supposit is constrained, that is said to be supposited under another supposit when what is attributed to one is attributed to the other; therefore the ancients said that, although a person is essence, since nevertheless the person generates, [but] the essence does not, when person is supposited essence is not supposited [under it]; therefore it does not follow: a person begets; therefore essence [does not] beget: and this, because it is not [the case]: therefore a person is not essence; but [it is] that there is another formal character of intelligibility in this name *person* and in this name *essence*». — *Understand*: of a notion of the same person, e.g. paternity of unbegottenness.

la: Aristot., I. *Prior.* c. 6. tertiae syllogisticae figurae modos utiles duplici modo probat: per deductionem ad impossibile, et per expositionem (Ἔκθεσις). Probatio per expositionem est illa, in qua, ut B. Albert. ait in *Comment.* super hunc locum (tract. 2. c. 11), aliquid sensibile sumitur, de quo utraque extremitas universaliter vel particulariter praedicatur; sive, ut Scotus ait, I. *Prior.* q. 11: «Syllogismus expositorius est ille, cuius medium est terminus discretus (singularis)». Vocatur *expositorius*, quia rem, quam concludit, ipsis sensibus exponit sive manifestat. — De principio, in quo iste syllogismus innititur, vide supra pag. 546, nota 2.

en: Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* I, c. 6, proves the useful modes of the third syllogistic figure in two ways: by reduction *ad impossibile*, and by *exposition* (Ἔκθεσις). Proof by exposition is that in which, as B. Albert says in his *Commentary* on this place (tract. 2, c. 11), something sensible is taken, of which each extreme is predicated universally or particularly; or, as Scotus says, I *Prior.* q. 11: «An expository syllogism is one whose middle is a discrete (singular) term». It is called *expository* because it sets forth or makes manifest, to the senses themselves, the thing which it concludes. — On the principle on which this syllogism is grounded, see above p. 546, note 2.

la: Id est *fallacia accidentis*.

en: That is, *the fallacy of accident*.

la: Codd. L T *hic*; multi codd. perperam *sicut*. Mox pro *sequitur* codd. I aa bb *sequeretur*.

en: Codices L and T [read] *hic* ("here"); many codices wrongly [read] *sicut* ("just as"). Soon, for *sequitur* ("it follows"), codices I, aa, bb [read] *sequeretur* ("it would follow").

la: Cod. W *unitas*.

en: Codex W [reads] *unitas* ("unity").

la: Aliqui codd., ut H V Y, cum ed. 1 *et* pro *est*.

en: Some codices, as H, V, Y, with edition 1 [read] *et* in place of *est*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. et ed. 1 *proprietatis*; minus recte. Voci *unio* codd. B E I X aa bb praemittunt *unitas vel*. Mox post *convenientiam* in cod. bb repetitur *duarum*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with several codices and edition 1, [reads] *proprietatis* ("of property"); less correctly. To the word *unio* codices B, E, I, X, aa, bb prefix *unitas vel* ("unity or"). Soon after *convenientiam*, in codex bb, *duarum* ("of two") is repeated.

la: Quia per abstractionem tollitur ratio compositionis, v. g. subiectum, in quo plura inter se diversa possent uniri.

en: Because by abstraction the formal character of composition is removed, e.g. the subject in which several things diverse among themselves could be united.

la: Multi codd. hic repetunt *in*, at minus congrue.

en: Many codices here repeat *in*, but less fittingly.

la: *Intellige*: identitatis, in obiectione allatum.

en: *Understand*: [the principle] of identity, the one brought forward in the objection.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *non tantum eadem sint et sint secundum* etc.; vetustioribus codd. cum ed. 1 nostram lectionem exhibentibus, eo tamen discrimine interposito, quod non pauci ex illis, ut A C F H K L R S T U V, pro *in eodem* substituunt *in eadem*, scil. *persona*. — Cfr. Scot., I. *Prior.* q. 11, ubi quaestio: utrum syllogismus expositorius teneat gratia formae, resolvitur hoc modo: quod syllogismus expositorius tenet gratia formae in omnibus terminis, dum tamen praemissae regulentur debite per *dici de omni vel de nullo*, ita quod terminus discretus distribuatur mediantibus istis dictionibus (i. e. ita quod terminus discretus sive singularis accipiatur secundum idem in praemissis).

en: The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, [reads] *non tantum eadem sint et sint secundum* etc.; the older codices with edition 1 exhibit our reading, with this distinction interposed, however, that not a few of them, as A, C, F, H, K, L, R, S, T, U, V, in place of *in eodem* substitute *in eadem*, namely *persona*. — Cf. Scot., I *Prior.* q. 11, where the question, whether an expository syllogism holds by virtue of the form, is resolved in this way: that an expository syllogism holds by virtue of the form in all terms, provided that the premises be duly regulated by the *dici de omni vel de nullo*, so that the discrete term is distributed by means of those expressions (i.e. so that the discrete or singular term is taken according to the same in the premises).

la: Vat. perperam *praedicati* contra codd. et alias sex edd.

en: The Vatican [edition] wrongly [reads] *praedicati* ("of the predicate") against the codices and the other six editions.

la: Codd. L sic prosequuntur: *innascibilitas privat comparationem ad prius, paternitas vero nullo modo* etc.

en: Codices L continue thus: *unbegottenness denies comparison to a prior, but paternity in no way* etc.

la: Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *in supposito*; alii, ut C L R U bb, *et in supposito*. Paulo superius, post *notatur*, cod. V inserit *identitas vel*.

en: Many codices, with editions 2 and 3, [read] *in supposito* ("in the supposit"); others, as C, L, R, U, bb, [read] *et in supposito* ("and in the supposit"). A little earlier, after *notatur*, codex V inserts *identitas vel* ("identity or").

la: Pro *omnia* aliqui codd. *obiecta*; codd. B X *omnia obiecta*.

en: In place of *omnia* ("all things"), some codices [read] *obiecta* ("the objections"); codices B, X [read] *omnia obiecta* ("all the objections").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio est de notionibus in eadem persona, v. g. de paternitate et spiratione activa in Patre. Cum enim attributa divina virtualiter inter se distincta praedicentur de se invicem et proprietas de essentia, videtur, quod etiam proprietates eiusdem personae de se praedicari possint (quae ratio solvitur ad 2. 3.). Sed responsio negativa est communis. Schola autem S. Thomae non admittit hic nisi distinctionem virtualem; Scotus adhibet distinctionem suam formalem, S. Bonaventura illam distinctionem attributionis, de qua supra d. 26. q. 1. locuti sumus.

**II.** De diversis speciebus praedicationis vide supra d. 30. q. 1. *Scholion*. — De differentia inter praedicationem per identitatem et aliam per inhaerentiam sive denominationem (quae a Scoto vocatur *formalis*) plura vide d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, d. 31. q. 2, et III. *Sent.* d. 8. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. Praedicatio per identitatem fit inter terminos abstractos, vel saltem cum uno abstracto, non ratione suppositi, sed formae, ut *sapientia est bonitas*, *essentia est Pater*. Haec proprie non valet in creatis (d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.), sed veraciter adhibetur in divinis (d. 31. q. 2.), sive haec sint idem secundum substantiam, at diversum secundum rationem intelligendi (ut *bonitas est sapientia*), sive sint idem secundum substantiam, diversum secundum modum se habendi vel non se habendi, ut *persona et substantia* (ibid. ad 5.). Tamen praedicatio per identitatem minus servat proprietatem praedicationis quam altera (III. *Sent.* d. 3. dub. 4.). Praedicatio denominativa fit in forma concreta et ratione suppositi. Haec (ut dicitur III. *Sent.* d. 6. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4.) «potest esse quatuor modis: per modum inhaerentiae sive per modum accidentis, ut cum dicitur: *iste est albus*; per modum transmutationis, ut cum dicitur: *Petrus est dealbatus*; per modum possessionis, ut cum dicitur: *asinus Socratis*; per modum unionis, ut cum dicitur *ferrum ignitum*, id est igni unitum, et *corpus animatum*, id est animae unitum». — Vocabulum *denominativum* sumtum est ex Aristotele (*De praedicam.* c. 1.), qui distinguit ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, παρώνυμα (denominativa).

**III.** Conveniunt auctores in conclusione. Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. *S.* p. 1. q. 68. m. 5. a. 4. 5. et 6. § 6. — Scot., *Report.* hic q. 3. ad 3. — S. Thom., I. *Sent.* d. 27. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3; *S.* I. q. 32. a. 3. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 7. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 75. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 26. q. 1. (breviter quaestio tangitur).

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The question is concerning the notions in the same person, e.g. concerning paternity and active spiration in the Father. For since the divine attributes, virtually distinct among themselves, are predicated of one another, and property [is predicated] of essence, it appears that the properties of the same person also can be predicated of one another (which reasoning is resolved in [the responses] to 2 and 3). But the negative response is the common [one]. Now the school of St. Thomas does not here admit any [distinction] but a virtual one; Scotus employs his formal [distinction]; St. Bonaventure [employs] that distinction of attribution of which we spoke above at d. 26, q. 1.

**II.** On the diverse species of predication see above d. 30, q. 1, *Scholion*. — On the difference between predication by identity and the other, by inherence or denomination (which is called *formal* by Scotus), see further d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; d. 31, q. 2; and III *Sent.* d. 8, a. 1, q. 3 in the body. Predication by identity is made between abstract terms, or at least with one abstract [term], not by reason of the supposit but of the form, as *wisdom is goodness*, *essence is the Father*. This properly does not hold in created things (d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2), but is truly employed in divine matters (d. 31, q. 2), whether these be the same according to substance, but diverse according to the manner of understanding (as *goodness is wisdom*), or be the same according to substance, [but] diverse according to the mode of comporting itself or not comporting itself, as *person and substance* (ibid. ad 5). Yet predication by identity preserves the proper character of predication less than the other does (III *Sent.* d. 3, dub. 4). Denominative predication is made in concrete form and by reason of the supposit. This (as is said in III *Sent.* d. 6, a. 1, q. 3, ad 4) "can be in four modes: by way of inherence or by way of an accident, as when it is said, *this [thing] is white*; by way of transmutation, as when it is said, *Peter has been whitened*; by way of possession, as when it is said, *the donkey of Socrates*; by way of union, as when it is said *iron set on fire*, that is, united to fire, and *animated body*, that is, united to a soul." — The term *denominative* is taken from Aristotle (*Categories* c. 1), who distinguishes ὁμώνυμα, συνώνυμα, παρώνυμα (*denominativa*).

**III.** The authors agree on the conclusion. Alex. Hal., on this and the following question, *S.* p. 1, q. 68, m. 5, a. 4, 5, and 6, § 6. — Scot., *Report.* here q. 3, ad 3. — St. Thom., I *Sent.* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; *S.* I, q. 32, a. 3, ad 3. — B. Albert., here a. 4, 7. — Petr. a Tar., on this and the following question, here q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Richard a Med., on this and the following question, here a. 3, q. 1, 2. — Henr. Gand., *S.* a. 75, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 26, q. 1 (the question is touched on briefly).

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translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 (J4 Class D/E repair):** Health scan flagged `defs=12 la=13 en=13` — old `[^5]` appeared twice in the body. Page-verified against `raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-576.png`, `p-577.png`, `p-578.png` (pdf = printed − 410). Diagnosis: two cascading merge bugs, both on this printed spread, not a benign shared-note case:

1. **p.577, old `[^5]`:** the printed page's local footer notes 3, 4, and 5 (`Cod. W unitas.` / `Aliqui codd., ut H V Y, cum ed. 1 et pro est.` / `Vat. cum pluribus codd. et ed. 1 proprietatis...repetitur duarum.`) had been concatenated into a single entry and pinned to two different body words. Footer 3 belongs at *unio* (¶2, "maior est unio³ proprietatum..."); footer 4 belongs at *est* before *deitas* (¶3, "paternitas est⁴ deitas") — this marker was **missing from the body entirely** in both languages before this fix; footer 5 belongs at the second *proprietatum* (¶4), which was already correctly anchored. Split into three defs and added the missing ¶3 anchor.
2. **p.578, old `[^10]`:** same pattern — local footer notes 1 (`Vat. perperam praedicati contra codd. et alias sex edd.`, at *principii*, Ad 2) and 2 (`Codd. L sic prosequuntur:...`, at *ad prius*, Ad 2) had been concatenated into one entry anchored only at *ad prius*; the *principii* anchor was missing in both languages. Split into two defs and added the missing anchor. This one didn't trip the anchor-count health check (it was under-anchored, not duplicated) but was caught during the required page-verification of the same spread.

Net effect: apparatus expanded from 12 to 15 entries (defs 5–12 renumbered/split to 5–15); two new marker tokens added (`[^6]` at ¶3 "est" and `[^12]` at Ad-2 "principii", both languages); no Latin or English wording changed, only marker placement and def numbering/splitting. All def content is verbatim from the pre-existing (merged) entries — nothing was newly transcribed from the page image beyond marker placement.

No backtick-blockquote false-positive pattern found in this chunk (§2 of J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md) — the intro blockquote at the top of `## Latin` has no `[^N]`-style example ranges.