title: Dist. 40, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. X*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc verbo, quod ponitur, scilicet *praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribus*. Quaeritur ergo, quid intelligatur per bona salutaria. Si tu dicas, quod gratia et gloria: ergo, sicut homo dicitur praedestinatus, ita gratia debet dici praedestinata.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedestinatio est praeordinatio. In ordinatione autem tria concurrunt, *quid* ordinatur, et *per quid*, et *ad quid*. Primum est homo, secundum est gratia, tertium est gloria. Et quoniam ille solus dicendus est praedestinatus, qui praedestinatione ordinatur, ideo patet, quod gratia et gloria non debet[^1] dici praedestinata, sed homo solum, qui praedestinatur ad salutem.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Et de hominibus salvandis*. Videtur enim insufficienter dicere: quia cum praedestinatio sit praeparatio gratiae et gloriae[^2], ergo non tantum est hominum, sed etiam Angelorum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedestinatio uno modo dicit praeparationem boni[^3], et sic convenit hominibus et Angelis et etiam Christo: alio modo dicit praeparationem boni et liberationem a malo, et sic dicitur praedestinatio *propositum miserendi*, et sic proprie est hominum, et sic accipit Magister hic[^4].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *praedestinatio sine praescientia esse non potest*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia praescientia est malorum, unde praesciti dicuntur mali; sed praedestinatio bonorum: ergo potest esse praedestinatio sine praescientia, sicut e converso[^5]. Si dicas mihi, quod praedestinatio est speciale, sed praescientia est commune et speciale: tunc quaero, quare magis praescientia approprietur reprobationi quam praedestinationi.

Ad hoc est unus modus respondendi, quod quia praedestinatio addit, ideo habuit nomen proprium; reprobatio vero non, ideo retinuit nomen commune. — Sed quomodo habet illud veritatem, cum reprobatio sit praescientia poenae, cuius Deus est causa[^6]?

Et propterea est dicendum, quod non tantum addit, quod ita distrahat[^7]. Nam praedestinatio dat intelligere *beneplacitum*, quod trahit ipsam in genus *scientiae practicae* simpliciter, eo quod beneplacitum est simpliciter et absolute respectu totius connotati. Sed non sic est de reprobatione, quia voluntas non est respectu mali culpae, et respectu poenae est *consequens*, non *antecedens*, et quasi tracta[^8]. Et propter hoc, quia minus distrahit a ratione *scientiae*, retinuit sibi nomen *praescientiae*.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de ista responsione Magistri: *Quibus respondemus, ex ea ratione dictum esse* etc.

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Videtur enim, quod non solvat propter suam distinctionem ad quaestionem de augmento, quoniam demonstrato aliquo damnando, verum est dicere: *istum posse salvari*, ergo potest esse praedestinatus: ergo plures possunt esse praedestinati, quam sunt: ergo potest numerus praedestinatorum augeri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister in hac prima responsione principaliter respondet ad quaestionem primam, utrum praedestinatum sit possibile damnari; et bene, scilicet *per compositionem et divisionem*[^9]. Et per istam solutionem patet aliquo modo responsio ad illud de augmento, sed non plene; ideo annectit solutionem sequentem, quae est explicatio huius, in qua dicitur, quod aliquis non potest *incipere esse praedestinatus*, quamvis possit *esse praedestinatus*, quia hoc est dicere, quod ab aeterno potuit. Et quoniam augmentum dicit maiorem numerum quam prius cum praesuppositione prioris et nova additione, ideo patet, quod ex sui ratione distinctionem et successionem dicit in partibus. Unde si aliquis, statim cum est, esset ita magnus, quantus futurus est, non diceretur augeri, sed tamen potuisset esse maior; ita in proposito intelligendum. — Vel aliter solvi potest per *compositionem et divisionem*, sicut Magister solvit; possunt enim plures esse, quam sint: ergo potest numerus augeri.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, *quod intelligentia conditionis implicitae veritatem facit in dicto et impossibilitatem in vero*[^10], quomodo sit illud intelligibile. Si enim idem non est causa oppositorum, et conditio implicita facit veritatem, quomodo facit impossibilitatem?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister vult dicere, quod illud est falsum, demonstrato aliquo: *istum damnari* vel *salvari*, est impossibile; sed si addatur et implicetur conditio praedestinationis, facit veritatem in dicto et impossibilitatem in vero, id est, facit illud dictum cum modo impossibilitatis esse verum, utpote si dicatur: *istum damnari et esse praedestinatum simul*, est impossibile, sive: *istum salvari et non esse praedestinatum*, est impossibile. — Vel aliter potest dici, quod dictum falsum alicuius conditionis implicatione fit verum[^11]: ut demonstrato reprobo, *istum salvari* est falsum; adde conditionem praedestinationis, et fiet verum: *istum salvari, si est praedestinatus*, est verum. Item, eodem demonstrato, *istum damnari* est verum; adde conditionem praedestinationis, et fiet impossibile: *istum damnari, si est praedestinatus*, est impossibile, coniunctim intelligendo[^12].

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ex quo aliquid factum est vel dictum, non concedunt, quod illud possit non esse* etc. Videtur enim falsum: quia Christus dixit, Petrum peccaturum[^13]: ergo postquam dixit, fuit necessarium dixisse, et necessario sequitur: si Christus dixit, hoc erit, quia da oppositum, et tunc sequetur, Christum esse mentitum, quod est impossibile: ergo videtur, cum antecedens sit necessarium, quod necessarium fuit, Petrum negare.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in dictione Christi duo sunt, scilicet *verbi prolatio* et *assertio*. Et verbi prolatio simpliciter est praeterita et necessaria, et ex illa non sequitur consequens. Non enim sequitur: Christus hoc dixit, ergo erit; protulit enim hoc verbum: *Ero similis vobis mendax*[^14]. Est iterum *assertio*, et illa sequitur illustrationem divinae praescientiae. Sicut ergo divina praescientia est certa et infallibilis, cui non potest subesse falsum, et tamen aspicit futurum et connotat circa ipsum veritatem[^15], et ideo non est necessarium, Deum praescisse quod praescivit, quamvis sit certum et infallibile: ita intelligendum de Christi assertione, quod certitudinem habet et infallibilitatem a divina praescientia; sed tamen non est necessarium, Christum hoc asseruisse; et ideo, si ponatur, hoc non contingere, ponitur, et Christum non asseruisse. Et sic patet illud et consimilia. In assertione enim Christi duo sunt, scilicet *actus mentis*[^16], et *relatio* ad futurum contingens sive ordinatio. Et quamvis unum sit necessarium, reliquum est contingens.

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sicut praedestinationis effectus illa gratia est, qua in praesenti iustificamur* etc. Ex hoc ostenditur, quod praedestinatio sit causa gratiae. Quaeritur ergo: in quo genere causae? Cum enim sit scientia, videtur dicere causam exemplarem. Et iterum, hoc non videtur sufficere, quia exemplar non necessario infert exemplatum, sed praescientia ponit. Et iterum, si est causa, aut universalis, aut particularis[^17]: non universalis, quia tunc indigeret alia particulari adiuvante; non particularis, quia tunc determinata esset ad unum effectum tantum. Et iterum, aut necessaria, aut contingens: non necessaria, quoniam per voluntatem operatur; non contingens, quoniam haec est fallibilis et incerta.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedestinatio est causa gratiae, sicut dicit[^18], et tota causa, sed non causa salutis, ut excludatur cooperans et disponens. *Adiutores enim Christi sumus*[^19], et nullus salvatur invitus. — Quod ergo quaeritur, in quo genere causae sit; dicendum, quod praedestinatio claudit in se scientiam et beneplacitum voluntatis et dispositionem voluntatis, per quam placuit Deo nos salvare, quae est summa bonitas manifestanda. Ratione primi dicit causam in genere *formae*[^20], ratione secundi in genere *efficientis*, ratione tertii in genere *finis*.

Quod quaeritur, utrum *necessaria*, vel *contingens*; *universalis*, vel *particularis*; dicendum, quod de omnibus istis modis causandi habet quod est perfectionis, non quod est imperfectionis. Nam de proprietate[^21] universalis habet extensionem ad multa; de proprietate particularis sufficientiam ad singula; de proprietate causae necessariae immutabilitatem; de proprietate contingentis habet arbitrii libertatem, quia potest facere et non facere. Conditiones autem imperfectionis non habet, quia nec habet insufficientiam, sicut causa universalis; nec limitationem, sicut causa particularis; nec inevitabilitatem, sicut causa necessaria; nec vertibilitatem, sicut causa contingens[^22].

#### DUB. VIII.

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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *praedestinationis effectus est gratiae appositio*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia causa et effectus sunt correlativa; cum ergo relativa simul sint natura[^23], quandocumque est praedestinatio, est gratiae appositio: ergo nullus est praedestinatus, nisi qui habet gratiam. Sed contra hoc est, quia praedestinatio est non entium, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^24].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedestinatio non semper est causa in actu, sed in habitu; et ideo non oportet, quod respondeat effectus in actu, sed in habitu.

Unde ex hoc patet quod quaeri consuevit, utrum praedestinatio aliquid ponat in praedestinato; dicendum enim, quod non necessario ponit aliquid de praesenti sive actu[^25], quoniam multi sunt praedestinati, qui non sunt mali, et multi, qui mali sunt; sed ponit aliquid secundum *habitum* sive de futuro, ratione cuius homo potest gaudere, scilicet quia *nomen eius scriptum est in caelo*[^26]. Et cum illud positum erit, magnum bonum erit; et illud erit ratio persistendi in bono et perveniendi ad magnum et summum bonum; et ideo hoc bonum habituale praeponendum est gratiae, quae est secundum *praesentem iustitiam*[^27].

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this term that is set down, namely *predestination is of saving goods*. It is asked therefore what is to be understood by *saving goods*. If you say, grace and glory: then, just as a man is called *predestined*, so grace ought to be called *predestined*.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is *preordering*. Now in ordering three things concur: *what* is ordered, and *by what*, and *to what*. The first is the man, the second is grace, the third is glory. And since only that one is to be called *predestined* who is ordered by predestination, it is therefore plain that grace and glory ought not[^1] be called *predestined*, but only the man, who is predestined to salvation.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *And concerning men to be saved*. For he seems to speak insufficiently: because, since predestination is the preparation of grace and of glory[^2], it is therefore not only of men, but also of Angels.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination in one mode states the preparation of a good[^3], and in this way it suits men and Angels and even Christ; in another mode it states the preparation of a good and the freeing from an evil, and in this way predestination is called *the purpose of having mercy*, and in this way it is properly of men, and in this way the Master here takes it[^4].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge*. For he seems to speak ill, because foreknowledge is of evils, whence the foreknown are called evil; but predestination [is] of goods: therefore predestination can exist without foreknowledge, just as conversely [foreknowledge can exist without predestination][^5]. If you say to me, that predestination is special, but foreknowledge is both common and special: then I ask, why foreknowledge is more appropriated to reprobation than to predestination.

To this there is one mode of responding, that because predestination *adds* [something], it therefore had a proper name; reprobation, however, [does] not, [and] therefore it retained the common name. — But how does that hold true, since reprobation is the foreknowledge of punishment, of which God is the cause[^6]?

And therefore it must be said that it does not [merely] add as much as that it [should] thus draw aside[^7]. For predestination gives one to understand *good-pleasure*, which draws it into the genus of *practical knowledge* simply, in that the good-pleasure is simple and absolute with respect to the whole connoted [term]. But it is not so concerning reprobation, because the will is not [directed] to the evil of fault, and with respect to punishment is *consequent*, not *antecedent*, and as it were drawn [along][^8]. And on this account, because it draws aside less from the account of *knowledge*, it retained for itself the name of *foreknowledge*.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master: *To which we reply, it has been said by that account* etc.

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For it seems that he does not solve [it] by his distinction with respect to the question concerning increase, since once someone to be damned has been demonstrated, it is true to say: *this man can be saved*, therefore he can be predestined: therefore more can be predestined than there are: therefore the number of the predestined can be increased.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master in this first response principally responds to the first question, whether it is possible for one predestined to be damned; and well, namely *by composition and division*[^9]. And by this solution the response to that [question] concerning increase appears in some way, but not fully; therefore he annexes the following solution, which is an explication of this [one], in which it is said that someone cannot *begin to be predestined*, although he can *be predestined*, because this is to say, that from eternity he could [be]. And since increase states a greater number than before with the presupposition of the prior and a new addition, it is therefore plain that from its own account it states distinction and succession in [its] parts. Hence if someone, the very moment he is, were as great as he is going to be, he would not be said to be increased, although he could have been greater; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. — Or otherwise it can be solved by *composition and division*, just as the Master solves [it]; for there can be more than there are: therefore the number can be increased.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, *that the understanding of the implied condition makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true*[^10], how that is intelligible. For if the same is not the cause of opposites, and the implied condition makes truth, how does it make impossibility?

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master wishes to say that this is false, when someone has been demonstrated: *for this man to be damned* or *to be saved* is impossible; but if the condition of predestination is added and implied, it makes truth in the saying and impossibility in the [thing-as-]true, that is, it makes that saying with a mode of impossibility be true, as if it should be said: *for this man to be damned and to be predestined at once*, is impossible; or: *for this man to be saved and not to be predestined*, is impossible. — Or otherwise it can be said that a false saying about someone, by the implication of a condition, becomes true[^11]: as, with a reprobate having been demonstrated, *for this man to be saved* is false; add the condition of predestination, and it will become true: *for this man to be saved, if he is predestined*, is true. Likewise, with the same having been demonstrated, *for this man to be damned* is true; add the condition of predestination, and it will become impossible: *for this man to be damned, if he is predestined*, is impossible, taking [it] in a conjoined sense[^12].

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Once something has been done or said, they do not concede that it can not be* etc. For it seems false: because Christ said that Peter would sin[^13]: therefore after he said [it], it was necessary that he had said [it], and it follows necessarily: if Christ said [it], this will be; because grant the opposite, and then it will follow that Christ has lied, which is impossible: therefore it seems, since the antecedent is necessary, that it was necessary that Peter [should] deny [him].

**I respond:** It must be said that in Christ's saying there are two things, namely the *uttering of the word* and the *assertion*. And the uttering of the word is simply past and necessary, and from it the consequent does not follow. For it does not follow: Christ said this, therefore it will be; for he uttered this word: *I shall be like to you a liar*[^14]. There is again the *assertion*, and that follows the illumination of divine foreknowledge. Therefore just as divine foreknowledge is certain and infallible, beneath which falsehood cannot lie, and yet looks at the future and connotes around it truth[^15], and therefore it is not necessary that God foreknew what he foreknew, although it is certain and infallible: so it is to be understood concerning Christ's assertion, that it has its certitude and infallibility from divine foreknowledge; but yet it is not necessary that Christ asserted this; and therefore, if it is posited that this not happen, it is also posited that Christ did not assert [it]. And so this and similar [cases] are clear. For in Christ's assertion there are two [things], namely the *act of mind*[^16], and the *relation* to the contingent future, or the ordering. And although one is necessary, the other is contingent.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Just as the effect of predestination is that grace by which we are justified in the present* etc. From this it is shown that predestination is the cause of grace. It is asked therefore: in what genus of cause? For since it is knowledge, it would seem to state an exemplary cause. And again, this does not seem to suffice, because an exemplar does not necessarily entail what is exemplified, but foreknowledge does posit [it]. And again, if it is a cause, [it is] either universal or particular[^17]: not universal, because then it would need another particular [cause] helping; not particular, because then it would be determined to one effect only. And again, [it is] either necessary or contingent: not necessary, since it operates through the will; not contingent, since this [latter] is fallible and uncertain.

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is the cause of grace, as he says[^18], and the whole cause; but not the cause of salvation, that the cooperating and disposing [causes] may be excluded. For *we are helpers of Christ*[^19], and no one is saved unwillingly. — As for the question, in what genus of cause it is; it must be said that predestination encloses in itself knowledge and the good-pleasure of the will and the disposition of the will, by which it pleased God to save us, which is the highest goodness to be manifested. By reason of the first it states a cause in the genus of *form*[^20], by reason of the second in the genus of *efficient* [cause], by reason of the third in the genus of *end*.

As for the question, whether *necessary* or *contingent*, *universal* or *particular*; it must be said that of all these modes of causing it has what is of perfection, not what is of imperfection. For from the property[^21] of the universal it has extension to many; from the property of the particular, sufficiency for individuals; from the property of the necessary cause, immutability; from the property of the contingent it has freedom of choice, because it can act and not act. But it does not have the conditions of imperfection, because it neither has insufficiency, like a universal cause; nor limitation, like a particular cause; nor inevitability, like a necessary cause; nor vertibility, like a contingent cause[^22].

#### DOUBT VIII.

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Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace*. For he seems to speak ill, because cause and effect are correlative; therefore since relatives are simultaneous in nature[^23], whenever there is predestination there is the bestowal of grace: therefore no one is predestined except one who has grace. But against this is [the fact] that predestination is of non-existents, as Augustine says in the book *On Faith to Peter*[^24].

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination is not always a cause in act, but in habit; and therefore it is not necessary that the effect respond in act, but in habit.

Hence from this it is plain [as to] what was wont to be asked, whether predestination posits something in the predestined; for it must be said that it does not necessarily posit something of the present or in act[^25], since many are predestined who are not evil, and many [are] who are evil; but it does posit something according to *habit*, or as to the future, by reason of which a man can rejoice, namely because *his name is written in heaven*[^26]. And when that has been laid down, it will be a great good; and that will be a reason for persisting in the good and arriving at the great and highest good; and therefore this habitual good is to be set before grace, which is according to *present justice*[^27].

---

la: Ed. 1 *debent*. — Plura de hoc dubio habentur supra a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *debent* (they ought). — More on this doubt is found above, art. 1, q. 1. Cf. also Peter of Tarentaise and Richard [of Mediavilla], here at the text.

la: Vel, ut accuratius dicamus: cum praedestinatio sit praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: Or, to say it more accurately: since predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cod. Y hic interponit: *secundum quod dicitur praedestinatio in praesenti.*

en: Cod. Y interpolates here: *insofar as predestination is called [predestination] in the present.*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., hic q. 2; Richard., hic a. 1. q. 3; Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 28, m. 2, a. 4; Bl. Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, here q. 2; Richard [of Mediavilla], here a. 1, q. 3; Giles of Rome, here lib. 1, principal q. 2.

la: Aliis verbis: *reprobi vocantur praesciti*: si ergo praesciti non sunt praedestinati, videtur, quod praescientia non contineatur in praedestinatione.

en: In other words: *the reprobate are called the foreknown*: if therefore the foreknown are not predestined, it seems that foreknowledge is not contained in predestination.

la: Sensus est: non solum praedestinatio aliquid addit ad praescientiam, verum etiam reprobatio, nempe poenam, quae reprobis a Deo infligitur.

en: The sense is: not only does predestination add something to foreknowledge, but reprobation [does] also, namely the punishment which is inflicted by God on the reprobate.

la: Hoc sibi vult: reprobatio superaddit quidem aliquid praescientiae, sed non tantum, quantum superaddit praedestinatio, quae praescientiam a genere scientiae distrahit in aliud genus, scil. voluntatis.

en: What he means is this: reprobation does indeed superadd something to foreknowledge, but not so much as predestination superadds, which draws foreknowledge from the genus of knowledge into another genus, namely [that] of will.

la: Quid S. Doctor his verbis dicere velit, vide infra d. 46. q. 2, praesertim ad ult. — Vat. minus recte: *non est respectu mali culpae, sed respectu poenae. Est et consequens etc.* — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 29. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 10; S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1.

en: What the holy Doctor wishes to say by these words, see below, d. 46, q. 2, especially at the last [reply]. — The Vatican edition less correctly [reads]: *it is not [directed] to the evil of fault, but to punishment. It is also a consequent etc.* — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 29, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 10; St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 1.

la: Sive ut nunc dici solet: *per distinctionem in sensu composito et in sensu diviso.*

en: Or, as it is now usually said: *by distinction in the composed sense and in the divided sense.*

la: Codd. W X *sunt*. — Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 3, et m. 4. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 11. seqq.

en: Codices W and X [read] *sunt*. — Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 28, m. 2, a. 3, and m. 4, a. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 11 and following.

la: Vat. *implicite verum sit.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads]: *let it implicitly be true.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Eadem huius dubii solutio invenitur apud B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — The same solution of this doubt is found in Bl. Albert, here a. 13; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard [of Mediavilla], here at the text.

la: Matth. 26, 34. — Mox post *fuit* codd. A X intericiunt *certum.*

en: Matthew 26:34. — Soon after *fuit* codd. A and X interpolate *certum* (certain).

la: Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *sequitur.*

en: The Vatican edition with some codices [reads] *sequitur* (follows).

la: Cod. Y adiungit *contingentem*. Paulo inferius post *assertione* cod. T *quae* pro *quod*.

en: Cod. Y adds *contingentem* (contingent). A little below, after *assertione* cod. T [reads] *quae* for *quod*.

la: Causa particularis est, quae unam tantum speciem effectus producit, v. g. ignis ignem; causa universalis vero est, quae varias effectuum species producit, v. g. sol, cuius influxu, concurrentibus aliis causis particularibus, diversi producuntur effectus. Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 32. et 38. (c. 3.).

en: A particular cause is one which produces only one species of effect, e.g. fire [produces] fire; a universal cause indeed is one which produces various species of effects, e.g. the sun, by whose influx, with other particular causes concurring, diverse effects are produced. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 32 and 38 (c. 3).

la: Intellige: Magister. — Subinde post *sed non* supple cum cod. Y *tota.*

en: Understand: the Master. — Then after *sed non* supply with cod. Y *tota* (whole).

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 3, 9: *Dei enim sumus adiutores.*

en: 1 Corinthians 3:9: *For we are God's helpers.*

la: Sive formalis extrinsecae i. e. exemplaris. Cfr. supra pag. 73, nota 7. — Paulo superius post *summa bonitas* Vat. omittit *manifestanda.*

en: Or of extrinsic formal [cause], i.e. exemplary. Cf. above, p. 73, note 7. — A little earlier, after *summa bonitas* the Vatican edition omits *manifestanda* (to be manifested).

la: Cod. O subiicit *causae.*

en: Cod. O adds *causae* (of cause).

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 21; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 28, m. 4, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 21; Peter of Tarentaise, here at the text.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Relatione*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, chapter *On Relation*.

la: Cap. 34, secundum sensum; nam docetur, homines praedestinatos a Deo praedestinatos esse ante omnia saecula et ante constitutionem mundi. Clarius sententia haec proferlur in Serm. 26. c. 4. n. 4. Cfr. supra d. 36. lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Chapter 34, according to the sense; for it is taught that men predestined by God were predestined before all ages and before the foundation of the world. This view is more clearly set forth in Sermon 26, c. 4, n. 4. Cf. above, d. 36, text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Sola Vat. voci *actu* praemittit *mali.*

en: The Vatican edition alone places *mali* (of evil) before the word *actu*.

la: Luc. 10, 20: *Gaudete autem, quod nomina vestra scripta sunt in caelis.* — Proxime post pro *magnum bonum*, quae lectio est codd. M T aa bb (ee a secunda manu), Vat. tantummodo *magnum.*

en: Luke 10:20: *But rejoice, that your names are written in heaven.* — Just after, for *magnum bonum*, which is the reading of codd. M, T, aa, bb (ee from a second hand), the Vatican edition has only *magnum*.

la: De hoc dubio nec non de quaestione in eo tractata, utrum praedestinatio ponat aliquid in praedestinato, cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 1, et m. 4. a. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et S. I. q. 23. a. 2; Richard., hic a. 1. q. 1. et circa lit.

en: On this doubt, and on the question treated in it, whether predestination posits something in the predestined, cf. above, a. 1, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 28, m. 2, a. 1, and m. 4, a. 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and *Summa* I, q. 23, a. 2; Richard [of Mediavilla], here a. 1, q. 1, and at the text.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 41

title_alt: Distinction XLI — The Master's Sentences

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XLI.

### Cap. I. *Utrum aliquod sit meritum obdurationis vel misericordiae.*

Si autem quaerimus meritum obdurationis et misericordiae, obdurationis meritum invenimus, misericordiae autem meritum non invenimus, quia nullum est misericordiae meritum, ne gratia evacuetur, si non gratis donatur[^1], sed meritis redditur. Miseretur itaque secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur. « Unde datur intelligi, ut sicut reprobatio Dei est nolle misereri, ita obduratio Dei sit non misereri, ut non ab illo irrogetur aliquid, quo sit homo deterior, sed tantum quo sit melior non erogetur »[^2]. Ex his aperte ostenditur, quid misericordiam, quid obdurationem intellexerit Apostolus[^3], et quia misericordia nullum advocat meritum, obduratio vero non est sine merito, sed habet nolle misereri. Et misericordiae verbo hic accipitur praedestinatio, et praecipue praedestinationis effectus, obdurationis vero non ipsa Dei aeterna reprobatio, quia eius nullum est meritum, sed gratiae privatio sive subtractio, quae quodam modo est reprobationis effectus. Accipitur tamen aliquando reprobatio pro obduratione, sicut et praedestinatio pro suo effectu, qui est gratia apposita[^4]. Gratia enim, quae apponitur, effectus est praedestinationis. — Cum igitur gratiae, quae apponitur homini ad iustificationem, nulla sint merita; multo minus et ipsius praedestinationis, qua ab aeterno elegit Deus quos voluit, aliqua possunt existere merita, ita nec reprobationis, qua ab aeterno quosdam praescivit futuros malos et damnandos: sicut elegit Iacob, et Esau[^5] reprobavit, quod non fuit pro meritis eorum, quae tunc haberent, quia nulla habebant, quoniam nec ipsi existebant; nec propter futura merita quae praevideret, vel illum elegit, vel illum reprobavit.

### Cap. II. *De variis super hoc carnalium opinionibus.*

Opinati sunt tamen quidam, Deum ideo elegisse Iacob, quia talem futurum praescivit, qui in eum crederet et ei serviret. Quod aliquando Augustinus se sensisse dicit in libro *Retractationum*[^6], ubi aperte ostendit, quod si propter futura merita electus esset, iam non ex gratia esset electio. Non ergo ideo electus est a Deo, quia talis futurus erat, sed ex electione talis est factus, ita dicens: «Disputans, quid elegerit Deus in nondum nato, cui dixit serviturum esse maiorem, et quid in eodem maiore similiter nondum nato reprobaverit, ad hoc perduxi ratiocinationem, ut dicerem: Non ergo elegit Deus opera cuiusquam in praescientia, quae ipse daturus est, sed fidem elegit in praescientia, et quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui Spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando etiam aeternam vitam consequeretur». — Ecce hic aperte dicit, non propter opera eum elegisse, sed propter fidem qua eum praescivit[^7] crediturum. Sed quia et in fide meritum est, sicut et in operibus, hoc retractavit dicens[^8]: « Nondum diligentius quaesiveram nec adhuc inveneram, qualis sit electio gratiae, de qua dicit Apostolus: *Reliquiae per electionem gratiae salvae fient*; quae utique non est gratia, si ex meritis procedit, ut iam quod datur non secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum reddatur potius meritis, quam donetur. Proinde quod continuo dixi: Dicit enim idem Apostolus[^9]: *Idem Deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus*. Nusquam autem dictum est: *Deus credit omnia in omnibus*. Ac deinde subiunxi: Quod ergo credimus, nostrum est; quod vero bonum operamur, illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum sanctum. Profecto non dicerem, si iam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter Dei munera reperiri, quae dantur in eodem spiritu.

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Utrumque ergo nostrum est propter arbitrium voluntatis, et utrumque datum est per spiritum fidei et caritatis. — Et quod paulo post dixi: Nostrum enim est credere et velle, illius autem dare credentibus et volentibus facultatem bene operandi per Spiritum sanctum, per quem *caritas diffunditur in cordibus nostris*[^10], verum est quidem, sed eadem regula et utrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et utrumque nostrum, quia non fit, nisi volentibus nobis ». Ergo et meritum fidei de misericordia Dei venit. Non ergo propter fidem vel aliqua merita elegit Deus aliquos ab aeterno vel apposuit gratiam iustificationis[^11] in tempore, sed gratuita bonitate sua elegit, ut boni essent. Unde Augustinus in libro *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*[^12]: « Non quia futuros nos tales esse praescivit, ideo elegit, sed ut essemus tales per ipsam electionem gratiae suae, qua *gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo*».

His tamen adversari videtur, quod dicit Augustinus[^13] super Malachiam prophetam, ubi scriptum est: *Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui*: « Cui[^14] vult, inquit, miseretur, et quem vult indurat. Sed haec voluntas Dei iniusta esse non potest. Venit enim de occultissimis meritis, quia et ipsi peccatores cum propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerunt, non tamen nulla[^15] inter eos est diversitas. Praecedit ergo aliquid in peccatoribus, quo, quamvis nondum sint iustificati, digni efficiantur iustificatione. Et item praecedit in aliis peccatoribus, quo digni sunt obtusione». — Ecce hic videtur Augustinus dicere, quod et ipsa Dei voluntas, qua alios ex meritis eligit, alios reprobat, non[^16] proveniat, sed occultissimis, id est, quod pro meritis alios voluerit eligere, alios reprobare, et quod pro meritis aliis apponitur gratia iustificationis, aliis non, unde obtunduntur. Sed quid intelligere voluerit, ignoratur, nisi forte hoc dicatur intellexisse, quod supra diximus eum retractasse. Nam ibidem etiam quaedam[^17] alia continue subdit, quae in libro *Retractationum* aperte retractat; quod utrumque legenti patebit. Unde verisimile est, in praemissis etiam hoc retractasse.

Quidam tamen ex eo sensu accipiunt fore dictum, non quia aliquis praedestinetur pro meritis vel iustificationis gratiam mereatur, sed quia aliqui non adeo mali sunt, ut mereantur sibi gratiam non impertiri. Nullus enim Dei gratiam mereri potest, per quam iustificatur; potest tamen mereri, ut non apponatur, ut penitus abiiciatur. Et quidem aliqui in tantum profundum iniquitatis devenerunt, ut hoc mereantur, ut hoc digni sint; alii vero ita vivunt, ut, etsi non mereantur gratiam iustificationis, non tamen mereantur omnino repelli et gratiam sibi subtrahi. Ideoque dixit, in quibusdam peccatoribus praecedere quo digni sint iustificatione, et in aliis quo digni sint obtusione. — Sed hoc frivolum est.

« Multi vero de isto profundo quaerentes reddere rationem, atque secundum coniecturas cordis sui inscrutabilem altitudinem iudiciorum Dei cogitare conantes, in fabulas vanitatis abierunt dicentes, quod animae sursum in caelo peccant et secundum sua peccata ad corpora pro meritis diriguntur, et dignis sibi quasi carceribus includuntur. Ierunt hi tales post cogitationes suas, et volentes disputare de Dei profundo, versi sunt in profundum, dicentes, animas in caelo ante conversatas et ibi aliquid boni vel mali egisse et pro meritis ad corpora terrena detrusas esse. Hoc autem respuit catholica fides propter evidentem Apostoli sententiam, qua ait[^18]: *Cum nondum nati essent, aut aliquid boni vel mali egissent*[^19]» etc. Melior est ergo fidelis ignorantia quam temeraria scientia. « Elegit ergo quos voluit gratuita misericordia, non quia fideles futuri erant, sed ut fideles essent, eisque gratiam dedit, non quia fideles erant, sed ut fierent. Ait enim Apostolus[^20]: *Misericordiam consecutus sum, ut fidelis essem*; non ait, quia fidelis eram. Datur quidem et fideli, sed data est etiam prius, ut esset fidelis». Ita etiam reprobavit quos voluit, non propter merita futura, quae praevideret, veritate tamen rectissima et a nostris sensibus remota[^21].

Sed quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur elegisse quosdam, ut boni fierent et fideles, ita etiam concedi debeat, reprobasse quosdam, ut mali essent et infideles et obdurare, ut peccent; quod nullatenus concedi oportet. Non enim reprobatio ita est causa mali, sicut praedestinatio est causa boni; neque obduratio ita facit hominem malum, quemadmodum misericordia facit bonum.

### Cap. III. *An ea quae semel scit Deus vel praescit, semper sciat et praesciat, et semper scierit et praescierit.*

Praeterea considerari oportet, utrum ea omnia quae semel scit vel praescit Deus, semper sciat et scierit, ac praesciat et praescierit; an olim scierit vel praescierit quod modo non scit vel praescit. — De praescientia primo respondemus dicentes, multa eum praescisse, quae modo non praescit. Cum enim eius praescientia non sit nisi de futuris, ex quo illa quae futura erant, praesentia fiunt vel praetereunt, sub Dei praescientia esse desinunt, sub scientia vero semper sunt.

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Praescivit ergo Deus omnia ab aeterno, quae futura erant, neque praescire desinit, nisi cum futura esse desinunt. Neque cum praescire desinit aliqua, quae ante praesciebat, minus ea noscit, quam ante cognoscebat. Non enim dicitur ex defectu scientiae eius, quod aliqua praescierit aliquando, quae modo non praesciat, sed ex ratione verbi quod est praescientia. Praescire enim est ante scire, quam fiat aliquid. Ideoque non potest dici Deus praescire, nisi quae futura sunt.

De scientia autem aliter dicimus. Scit enim Deus semper omnia quae aliquando scit. Omnem enim scientiam, quam aliquando habet, semper habuit et habet et habebit. — Ad hoc autem opponitur ita: olim scivit, hunc hominem nasciturum, qui natus est, modo non scit, eum nasciturum: scivit ergo aliquid, quod modo non scit. Item scivit mundum esse creandum, modo non scit, eum esse creandum: aliquid ergo scivit, quod modo non scit; et alia huiusmodi infinita induci possent. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod idem de nativitate huius hominis et mundi creatione nunc etiam scit, quod sciebat, antequam fierent, licet tunc et nunc hanc scientiam eius diversis exprimi verbis oporteat. Nam quod tunc futurum erat, nunc praeteritum est; ideoque verba commutanda sunt ad ipsum designandum; sicut diversis temporibus loquentes eandem diem modo per hoc adverbium *cras* designamus, dum adhuc futura est, modo per *hodie*, dum praesens est, modo per *heri*, dum praeterita est. Itaque antequam crearetur mundus, sciebat Deus hunc creandum, postquam creatus est, scit eum creatum. Nec est hoc scire diversa, sed omnino idem de mundi creatione; sicut antiqui patres crediderunt, Christum nasciturum et moriturum, nos autem credimus, eum iam natum et mortuum; nec tamen diversa credimus nos et illi, sed eadem. « Tempora enim, ut ait Augustinus[^22], variata sunt; et ideo verba sunt mutata, non fides ». Indubitanter igitur teneamus, Deum semper omnia scire, quae aliquando scit.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XLI.

### Chap. I. *Whether there is any merit of hardening or of mercy.*

If however we inquire about the merit of hardening and of mercy, we find a merit of hardening, but we do not find a merit of mercy, because there is no merit of mercy, lest grace be made void if it is not freely given[^1] but rendered for merits. He has mercy therefore according to grace, which is given freely; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered for merits. « Hence it is given to understand that, just as God's reprobation is *not to will to have mercy*, so God's hardening is *not to have mercy*, in such a way that nothing is inflicted by him by which a man might be made worse, but only that by which he might be made better is not bestowed »[^2]. From these things it is plainly shown what the Apostle[^3] understood by mercy and what by hardening, and that mercy invokes no merit, but hardening is not without merit, but has [as its merit] the *not willing to have mercy*. And by the word *mercy* here is taken predestination, and especially the effect of predestination; but by *hardening* is taken not God's eternal reprobation itself, since of that there is no merit, but the privation or subtraction of grace, which in a certain manner is the effect of reprobation. Yet sometimes reprobation is taken for hardening, just as predestination is taken for its own effect, which is grace applied[^4]. For the grace which is applied is the effect of predestination. — Since therefore for the grace which is applied to a man unto justification there are no merits; much less also for predestination itself, by which from eternity God chose those whom he willed, can any merits exist; nor for reprobation, by which from eternity he foreknew certain ones as future evil men and as those to be damned: just as he chose Jacob, and reprobated Esau[^5], which was not on account of their merits which they then might have had, because they had none, since they did not yet exist; nor on account of future merits which he might foresee, did he either choose this one, or reprobate that one.

### Chap. II. *On the various opinions of carnal men on this matter.*

Yet certain ones have held the opinion that God therefore chose Jacob because he foreknew him as such a future man as would believe in him and serve him. Which Augustine says he himself sometimes held, in [his] book *Retractationes*[^6], where he plainly shows that, if [Jacob] had been chosen on account of future merits, then the election would no longer be from grace. Therefore he is not chosen by God because he was going to be such, but he was made such by election, [Augustine] thus saying: «Disputing what God chose in the not-yet-born one, to whom he said that the elder would serve [the younger], and what in the same elder, likewise not yet born, he reprobated, I carried the reasoning to this point, that I said: Therefore God did not choose the works of anyone in foreknowledge, [works] which he himself was to give, but he chose faith in foreknowledge; and whom he foreknew as one going to believe in him, that one he chose, to whom he would give the Holy Spirit, that by performing good works he might also obtain eternal life». — Behold, here he plainly says that he did not choose him on account of works, but on account of the faith by which he foreknew[^7] him as one going to believe. But because there is merit also in faith, just as in works, he retracted this, saying[^8]: « I had not yet more diligently inquired, nor had I yet found out, of what sort is the *election of grace*, of which the Apostle says: *The remnants shall be saved by the election of grace*; which is not at all grace, if it proceeds from merits, so that now what is given is rendered not according to grace but according to debt — rather to merits than bestowed [as a gift]. Accordingly, what I went on to say: For the same Apostle says[^9]: *The same God who works all things in all*. But it is nowhere said: *God believes all things in all*. And then I subjoined: What therefore we believe is ours; but the fact that we work good is His, who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe. Surely I would not say [this], if I knew already, that faith itself also is found among the gifts of God, which are given in the same Spirit.

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Therefore each is ours through the choice of the will, and each has been given through the spirit of faith and charity. — And what I said a little after: For ours it is to believe and to will, but His to give to those believing and willing the capacity of working well through the Holy Spirit, through whom *charity is poured out in our hearts*[^10], is indeed true, but the same rule [applies] and each is His, because He himself prepares the will, and each is ours, because [it] does not come about unless we are willing ». Therefore even the merit of faith comes from God's mercy. Therefore not on account of faith nor on account of any merits did God choose certain ones from eternity, nor [did he] apply the grace of justification[^11] in time, but by his gratuitous goodness he chose [them], that they might be good. Whence Augustine in [his] book *On the Predestination of the Saints*[^12]: « Not because he foreknew us as going to be such, did he therefore choose [us], but [he chose us] that we might be such, through that very election of his grace by which *he has made us pleasing in his beloved Son*».

To these things, however, seems to be opposed what Augustine[^13] says on the prophet Malachi, where it is written: *Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated*: « *On whom*[^14] *he wills*, he says, *he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens*. But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, since even the sinners themselves, although on account of the general [original] sin they have made one mass, yet there is not no[^15] diversity among them. Something therefore precedes in [some] sinners, by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification. And likewise something precedes in other sinners, by which they are worthy of being made dull». — Behold, here Augustine seems to say that even God's very will, by which he elects some from merits and reprobates others, does not[^16] arise [from open merits], but from most hidden ones — that is, [he means] that on account of [hidden] merits he willed to elect some, [and] to reprobate others, and that on account of [hidden] merits to some the grace of justification is applied, to others not, whence they are made dull. But what he wished to understand is unknown, unless perchance he be said to have understood this, which we said above that he retracted. For there too he goes on at once to subjoin certain[^17] other things which in [his] book *Retractationes* he plainly retracts; both of which will be plain to the reader. Whence it is likely that in the foregoing he retracted this also.

Yet certain ones take it in this sense, that what was said was [meant] not that anyone is predestined on account of merits or merits the grace of justification, but that some are not so evil as to merit that grace not be imparted to them. For no one can merit God's grace, by which he is justified; but he can yet merit that it not be applied, that it be utterly cast away. And indeed some have come into so great a depth of iniquity that they merit this, that they are worthy of this; but others so live that, even if they do not merit the grace of justification, yet they do not merit to be altogether driven away and to have grace withdrawn from them. And therefore he said that in certain sinners something precedes by which they are worthy of justification, and in others by which they are worthy of being made dull. — But this is frivolous.

« But many, seeking to render a reason of this depth, and striving according to the conjectures of their own heart to think out the inscrutable height of God's judgments, have departed into fables of vanity, saying that the souls aloft in heaven sin and according to their sins are directed to bodies for [their] merits, and are enclosed in worthy [bodies] as in prisons. These such men have gone after their own thoughts, and willing to dispute about God's depth, have been turned into the depth, saying that souls have lived in heaven before [embodiment] and there have done some good or evil and on account of [their] merits have been thrust down into earthly bodies. But the catholic faith refuses this, on account of the plain saying of the Apostle, by which he says[^18]: *When they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil*[^19]» etc. Better therefore is faithful ignorance than rash knowledge. « He chose therefore those whom he willed by gratuitous mercy, not because they were going to be faithful, but that they might be faithful; and he gave them grace, not because they were faithful, but that they might become [so]. For the Apostle says[^20]: *I have obtained mercy, that I might be faithful*; he does not say, *because I was faithful*. It is given indeed also to one [already] faithful, but it has also been given previously, that he might be faithful». So also he reprobated those whom he willed, not on account of future merits which he might foresee, yet by a most upright truth and one remote from our senses[^21].

But it is asked whether, just as he is said to have chosen some so that they might become good and faithful, so also it must be conceded that he reprobated some so that they might be evil and unfaithful, and to harden [them] so that they might sin; which it in no way behooves to concede. For reprobation is not the cause of evil in the way predestination is the cause of good; nor does hardening make a man evil in the way mercy makes [him] good.

### Chap. III. *Whether those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and foreknows, and always has known and foreknown.*

Furthermore it must be considered whether all those things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and has known, and foreknows and has foreknown; or whether he once knew or foreknew what he does not now know or foreknow. — Concerning foreknowledge, we first respond by saying that he has foreknown many things which he does not now foreknow. For since his foreknowledge is only of future things, from the moment those things which were future become present or pass by, they cease to be under God's foreknowledge, but they are always under [his] knowledge.

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Therefore God foreknew all things from eternity that were future, nor does he cease to foreknow, unless when [things] cease to be future. Nor when he ceases to foreknow certain things, which he previously foreknew, does he know them less than he was knowing them before. For it is not said from a defect of his knowledge that he sometimes foreknew certain things, which he does not now foreknow, but from the meaning of the word, which is *foreknowledge*. For to foreknow is to know before something comes to be. And therefore God cannot be said to foreknow except those things which are future.

But concerning [his] knowledge we say otherwise. For God always knows all those things which he ever knows. For every knowledge which he ever has, he always has had and has and will have. — To this, however, it is objected thus: he once knew that this man would be born, who is [now] born; he does not now know that he is going to be born: therefore he knew something which he does not now know. Likewise he knew that the world was to be created; he does not now know that it is to be created: therefore he knew something which he does not now know; and other infinite things of this sort could be adduced. — But to this we say that he now knows the same about the birth of this man and the creation of the world as he was knowing before they came to be, although then and now this knowledge of his must be expressed by different words. For what was then future is now past; and therefore the words must be exchanged to designate the same thing: just as, speaking at different times, we designate the same day now by the adverb *tomorrow*, while it is still future; now by *today*, while it is present; now by *yesterday*, while it is past. So before the world was created, God was knowing that it was to be created; after it has been created, he knows it as created. Nor is this to know diverse things, but altogether the same thing concerning the creation of the world: just as the ancient fathers believed that Christ was going to be born and to die, but we believe that he is now born and dead; nor yet do we and they believe diverse things, but the same things. « For times, as Augustine says[^22], have been varied; and therefore the words have been changed, not the faith ». Without doubt therefore let us hold that God always knows all things which he ever knows.

---

la: Vat. et plures edd. cum cod. C *donetur... reddatur*.

en: The Vatican edition and several editions with codex C [read] *donetur... reddatur*.

la: August., l. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 13.

en: Augustine, book *to Simplician*, q. 2, n. 13.

la: Rom. 9, 18: *Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat*. — Paulo inferius codd. BD et ed. 1 addunt *semper* et legunt: *non est semper sine merito*. Immediate post praeter Vat. aliae edd. omittunt verba *sed habet nolle misereri*.

en: Romans 9:18: *Therefore on whom he wills, he has mercy, and whom he wills, he hardens*. — A little below, codices BD and edition 1 add *semper* and read *non est semper sine merito*. Immediately after, except the Vatican edition, the other editions omit the words *sed habet nolle misereri*.

la: Cod. A *gratiae appositio*.

en: Codex A [reads] *gratiae appositio*.

la: Respicitur ad Malach. I, 2. 3: *Nonne frater erat Esau Iacob, dicit Dominus, et dilexi Iacob, Esau autem odio habui*. Cfr. Rom. 9, 13.

en: Reference is made to Malachi 1:2–3: *Was not Esau brother to Jacob, says the Lord, and I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated*. Cf. Romans 9:13.

la: Libr. I. c. 23. n. 2. 3. Retractatio refertur ad ea quae ipse dixerat in *Exposit. Epist. ad Romanos*, c. 60. Cfr. I. ad Simplician. q. 2. n. 8, et *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 3. n. 7. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum edd. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 *ea tali electione talis* pro *ex electione talis*.

en: Book I, c. 23, nn. 2–3. The retractation refers to what he himself had said in the *Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans*, c. 60. Cf. [book] I *to Simplician*, q. 2, n. 8, and *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 3, n. 7. — A little below, the Vatican edition with editions 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 [reads] *ea tali electione talis* in place of *ex electione talis*.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, *praemittit*, refragantibus codd.

en: The Vatican edition and the other editions, except [edition] 1, [read] *praemittit*, against the codices.

la: Loc. cit. — Locus s. Scripturae est Rom. 11, 5. Ed. August. infra habet: *quae utique non est gratia, si eam merita ulla praecedant, ne iam*. Vat.: *quae utique non ex gratia, si eam merita praecedant*. Textum nostrum exhibent edd. 1, 6, 8, cui aliae editiones et nostri codd. consentiunt, nisi quod aliquae edd. habent *et ex gratia*, aliae *ex gratia* pro *ex gratia*.

en: At the place cited. — The passage of holy Scripture is Romans 11:5. The Augustinian edition below has: *quae utique non est gratia, si eam merita ulla praecedant, ne iam*. The Vatican edition: *quae utique non ex gratia, si eam merita praecedant*. Our text is shown by editions 1, 6, 8, with which the other editions and our codices agree, except that some editions have *et ex gratia*, others *ex gratia* in place of *ex gratia*.

en: 1 Corinthians 12:6.

en: Romans 5:5.

la: Sola Vat. *sancti*.

en: The Vatican edition alone [reads] *sancti*.

la: Cap. 19. n. 38. — Locus s. Scripturae est Ephes. I, 6.

en: Chapter 19, n. 38. — The passage of holy Scripture is Ephesians 1:6.

la: Libr. 83 *Quaest.* q. 68. n. 4. — Loci s. Scripturae sunt Malach. I, 2. 3, et Rom. 9, 18. Vulgata et Augustin. *Cuius vult* pro *Cui vult*. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 8, pluribus omissis, exhibent: *Augustinus lib. 83 Quaestionum: Cui vult*.

en: [Augustine,] book of 83 *Questions*, q. 68, n. 4. — The Scriptural passages are Malachi 1:2–3 and Romans 9:18. The Vulgate and Augustine [read] *Cuius vult* in place of *Cui vult*. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6, 8, with many things omitted, exhibit: *Augustinus lib. 83 Quaestionum: Cui vult*.

la: Ita codd., edd. 1, 6 et originale. Vat. cum pluribus edd. *fecerunt: tamen nonnulla inter eos*.

en: Thus the codices, editions 1, 6, and the original. The Vatican edition with several editions [reads] *fecerunt: tamen nonnulla inter eos*.

la: Codd. et ed. 1 *veniat*.

en: The codices and edition 1 [read] *veniat*.

la: Libr. I. c. 26. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 1, 6 omittunt *etiam* ante *quaedam alia*.

en: Book I, c. 26. — A little before, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 6 omit *etiam* before *quaedam alia*.

la: Rom. 9, 11. 12. Apostolus prosequitur sic: *ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est ei: Quia maior serviet minori*.

en: Romans 9:11–12. The Apostle continues thus: *that according to election the purpose of God might stand, not from works, but from him who calls it was said to her: For the elder shall serve the younger*.

la: Quae praecedunt sumta sunt ex August., Serm. 169. c. 5. n. 6, sed nonnullis transpositis vel mutatis.

en: What precedes is taken from Augustine, Sermon 169, c. 5, n. 6, but with several [things] transposed or changed.

la: I. Cor. 7, 25. — Quoad sensum hae propositiones sumtae sunt ex August., 1. *Retract.* c. 23. n. 1, et *de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 3. n. 7.

en: 1 Corinthians 7:25. — As to the sense, these propositions are taken from Augustine, [book] 1 *Retractationes*, c. 23, n. 1, and *On the Predestination of the Saints*, c. 3, n. 7.

la: Libr. I. *de Diversis Quaest. ad Simplician.* q. 2. n. 16, paucis mutatis.

en: Book I, *On Various Questions to Simplician*, q. 2, n. 16, with a few [things] changed.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 minus congrue *scit*, sed refragantibus omnibus codd.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 less fittingly [read] *scit*, but against all the codices.

la: *In Ioan.* tract. 99. n. 1, secundum sensum. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 omittunt *iam* ante *natum et mortuum*.

en: *On John*, tractate 99, n. 1, according to the sense. — A little before, the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 omit *iam* before *natum et mortuum*. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above. Page 727 footer note 1 (`Val. et aliae edd., excepta I, dici possunt …`) anchors in the immediately-following `bon-sent-I-d41-p1-divisio` chunk, not here.]

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 41, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLI. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLI. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 727 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLI.

#### *De causalitate passiva sive de causa meritoria praedestinationis et reprobationis.*

> *Si autem quaerimus obdurationis meritum et misericordiae etc.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de causalitate activa praedestinationis et reprobationis. In hac parte inquirit de causalitate passiva, utrum scilicet praedestinatio et reprobatio habeant in nobis causam meritoriam; et hoc quidem principaliter intendit in hac distinctione, quae duas habet partes. In prima Magister investigat principale propositum; in secunda movet quandam quaestionem, quae ex praecedentibus habet ortum, scilicet utrum Deus desinat aliquid scire vel praescire. Ex cuius manifestatione patefacit divinae scientiae interminabilitatem, ibi: *Praeterea considerari oportet.*

Prima pars quatuor habet partes. In prima Magister determinat veritatem ostendens, quod reprobatio habet causam meritoriam quantum ad connotatum, quod est obduratio; non sic praedestinatio quantum ad connotatum, quod est gratificatio. In secunda vero Magister removet quandam opinionem, quae posset hominem ducere in errorem, ibi: *Opinati sunt tamen quidam.* In tertia removet eius defensionem, ibi: *His tamen videtur adversari* etc. In quarta removet praesumptuosam in hac quaestione inquisitionem ostendens, aliquos volentes reddere rationem de hoc profundo divinae praedestinationis lapsos esse in profundum erroris, ibi: *Multi vero de isto profundo quaerentes reddere rationem* etc.

*Praeterea considerari oportet, utrum ea omnia quae semel scit etc.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua determinat Magister quaestionem, utrum Deus desinat aliquid scire vel praescire; et similiter est quaestio, utrum desinat aliquem praedestinare; et haec pars habet duas. In prima determinat de praescientia, quod contingit desinere aliquid praescire. In <!-- page 728 -->secunda vero determinat de scientia, ibi: *De scientia autem aliter dicimus,* ubi dicit, quod Deus nihil desinit scire; et in utraque parte primo movet quaestionem, secundo determinat.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis[^1] distinctionis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de praedestinationis causalitate.

Secundo de divinae scientiae sempiternitate sive interminabilitate.

Quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum praedestinatio vel reprobatio in nobis habeant causam meritoriam.

Secundo, utrum habeant in Deo rationem motivam.

---

english:
<!-- page 727 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XLI.

#### *On the passive causality, or on the meritorious cause of predestination and reprobation.*

> *"If however we ask after the merit of hardening and of mercy, etc."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the active causality of predestination and reprobation. In this part he inquires concerning the passive causality, namely whether predestination and reprobation have in us a meritorious cause; and this indeed is what he principally intends in this distinction, which has two parts. In the first the Master investigates the principal proposition; in the second he raises a certain question which arises from what precedes, namely whether God ceases to know or foreknow anything. Through the unfolding of which he manifests the unboundedness of the divine knowledge, there: *"Furthermore it must be considered."*

The first part has four parts. In the first the Master determines the truth by showing that reprobation has a meritorious cause as to its connoted [object], which is hardening; not so predestination as to its connoted [object], which is justification by grace. In the second the Master removes a certain opinion which could lead a man into error, there: *"Yet some have held."* In the third he removes its defense, there: *"To these things, however, it seems to be opposed,"* etc. In the fourth he removes a presumptuous inquiry into this question, showing that certain men, wishing to render a reason concerning this depth of the divine predestination, have fallen into the depth of error, there: *"But many, seeking concerning this depth to render a reason,"* etc.

*"Furthermore it must be considered whether all those things which he once knows, etc."* This is the second part, in which the Master determines the question whether God ceases to know or foreknow anything; and there is likewise the question whether he ceases to predestine anyone; and this part has two [parts]. In the first he determines concerning foreknowledge, that it can happen that something cease to be foreknown. In <!-- page 728 -->the second he determines concerning knowledge, there: *"But concerning knowledge we say otherwise,"* where he says that God ceases to know nothing; and in each part he first raises the question, second determines [it].

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present[^1] distinction, two [matters] are principally asked.

First, [the question] is asked concerning the causality of predestination.

Second, concerning the eternity or unboundedness of the divine knowledge.

As to the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether predestination or reprobation have in us a meritorious cause.

Second, whether they have in God a motive ground.

---

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta I, *dici possunt,* contradicentibus codd., quorum tamen codd. A B D *possunt* pro *possent*. — De parte falsa, cfr. Comment. hic a. 2. q. 2. — De eadem re loquitur Magister etiam infra d. XLIV. c. 2.

en: The Vatican edition and the other editions, except [edition] I, [read] *"dici possunt"* ("they can be said"), with the codices contradicting [them], of which however codices A, B, D have *possunt* in place of *possent.* — On the false [part], cf. the Commentary here, art. 2, q. 2. — The Master speaks of the same matter also below at d. XLIV, c. 2. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above. Footer note 2 on printed p. 727 (`In Ioan. tract. … secundum sensum. — Paulo ante Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 omittunt *iam* ante *natum et mortuum*`) anchors in the d.41-littera body (which discusses *Christum nasciturum et morituruin … iam natum et mortuum*), not in this divisio chunk.]