title: Coll. 6

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### COLLATIO VI.
#### *De prima visione tractatio tertia, quae est de prima virtutum causa exemplari, de virtutibus exemplaribus et de cardinalibus inde fluentibus.*

### Summarium

*Introductio; repetitio, 1. — Errores philosophorum circa Deum ut causam exemplarem; doctrina Aristotelis in hoc deficit, 2. — Error triplex inde exortus, 3. — Item, triplex caecitas: circa aeternitatem mundi, unitatem intellectus et defectum retributionis post mortem, 4. 5. — De his erroribus adhuc pullulantibus, 6. — Pars I. De virtutibus exemplaribus in luce aeterna et cardinalibus inde ortis. In Deo sunt exemplaria non tantum rerum, sed etiam virtutum, 7. — De quatuor virtutibus exemplaribus in Deo, quae sunt celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis, 8. — Probantur per Scripturam, 9. — Ex his fluunt consimiles proprietates, scilicet virtutes cardinales, 10. — Virtutes cardinales habent nomen ob tres rationes, 11. — De prima ratione, 12. — De secunda et de quatuor integrantibus virtutibus secundum actus cardinalium, 13. — De tertia ratione; comparatio maioris mundi et minoris, 14. — De definitione et partibus singularum virtutum cardinalium, 15. — Ortus et praestantia earundem, 16. — Ipsae configurantur quatuor aliis divisionibus; primo, lucis quatuor influentiis, 17. — Secundo, elementorum quatuor proprietatibus, 18. — Tertio, causarum quatuor efficaciis; quarto, vitae quatuor salubritatibus, 19. — Ipsae fluunt a luce aeterna; reducunt in Deum, qui est vera beatitudo; tres gradus et effectus ipsarum; doctrina Salomonis, 20. — Pars II. Confirmatio per doctrinam Plotini relatam a Macrobio. De sententia, quod non sint sapientes et beati nisi philosophi, et quomodo haec distribuit exercitia virtutum, 21. — Aliter Plotinus, ponens quatuor genera quaternarum virtutum, 22. — Primo, de virtutibus politicis, quomodo exerceantur cardinales, 23. — Secundo, de virtutibus purgatoriis, 24. — Tertio, de virtutibus animi iam purgati, 25. — Quarto, de virtutibus exemplaribus, 26.*

1. *Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris*[^p360-1] etc. Propter primam visionem *intelligentiae per naturam inditae* sumtum est verbum illud: *Vidit Deus lucem*, id est videre fecit. De hoc supra in duabus collationibus dictum est[^p360-2], et per considerationem *scientialem*, pro eo quod radiat lux ut veritas *rerum*, ut veritas *vocum*, ut veritas *morum*. Et fuerunt distinctae novem partes doctrinae, quarum tres principales sunt radii, et sunt ex dictamine lucis aeternae, secundum Augustinum[^p360-3]. — Item, quod *vidit*, id est, videre fecit per contemplationem *sapientialem*, illuminando animam *in se* tanquam in speculo, *in Intelligentia* tanquam in medio delativo, *in luce increata* tanquam in obiecto fontano, secundum illas sex conditiones, quas imprimit menti; et secundum has consurgit anima in illam lucem *ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo*, ut dictum est[^p360-4]. Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset *principium* et *finis* et *ratio exemplaris*.

2. *Divisit* tamen Deus *lucem a tenebris*, ut, sicut dictum est[^p360-5] de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sunt? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium *principium*, omnium *finem*, in *medio* tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse *exemplaria rerum*; quorum princeps videtur fuisse Aristoteles, qui et in principio *Metaphysicae* et in fine[^p360-6] et in multis aliis locis exsecratur ideas Platonis. Unde dicit, quod Deus solum novit se et non indiget notitia alicuius alterius rei et movet ut *desideratum* et *amatum*. Ex hoc ponunt, quod *nihil*, vel

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*nullum particulare* cognoscat. Unde illas ideas praecipuus impugnat Aristoteles et in *Ethicis*[^p361-1], ubi dicit, quod summum bonum non potest esse *idea*. Et nihil valent rationes suae, et commentator solvit eas.

3. Ex isto errore sequitur alius error, scilicet quod Deus non habet *praescientiam* nec *providentiam*, ex quo non habet rationes rerum in se, per quas cognoscat. — Dicunt etiam[^p361-2], quod nulla veritas de futuro est nisi veritas necessariorum; et veritas contingentium non est veritas. — Et ex hoc sequitur, quod omnia fiant *a casu*, vel *necessitate fatali*. Et quia impossibile est fieri *a casu*; ideo inducunt necessitatem fatalem Arabes, scilicet quod illae substantiae moventes orbem sunt causae omnium necessariae. — Ex hoc sequitur *veritas occultata*, scilicet *dispositionis mundialium* secundum poenas et gloriam. Si enim illae substantiae movent non errantes, nihil ponitur de inferno, nec quod sit daemon; nec Aristoteles unquam posuit daemonem nec beatitudinem post hanc vitam, ut videtur. Iste est ergo triplex error, scilicet occultatio *exemplaritatis, divinae providentiae, dispositionis mundanae*.

4. Ex quibus sequitur triplex caecitas vel caligo, scilicet de *aeternitate mundi*, ut videtur dicere Aristoteles secundum omnes doctores Graecos, ut Gregorium Nyssenum, Gregorium Nazianzenum, Damascenum, Basilium[^p361-3], et commentatores omnium Arabum, qui dicunt, quod Aristoteles hoc sensit, et verba sua sonare videntur. Nunquam invenies, quod ipse dicat, quod mundus habuit principium vel initium; immo redarguit[^p361-4] Platonem, qui solus videtur posuisse, tempus incepisse. Et istud repugnat lumini veritatis.

Ex isto sequitur alia caecitas de *unitate intellectus*, quia, si ponitur mundus aeternus, necessario aliquod istorum sequitur: vel quod animae sunt *infinitae*, cum homines fuerint infiniti; vel quod anima est *corruptibilis*; vel quod est *transitio de corpore in corpus*; vel quod *intellectus sit unus in omnibus*, qui error attribuitur Aristoteli secundum Commentatorem[^p361-5].

Ex his duobus sequitur, quod post hanc vitam non est *felicitas* nec *poena*.

5. Hi ergo ceciderunt in errores nec fuerunt divisi a tenebris; et isti sunt pessimi errores. Nec adhuc clausi sunt clave putei abyssalis[^p361-6]. Hae sunt tenebrae Aegypti; licet enim magna lux videretur in eis ex praecedentibus scientiis, tamen omnis exstinguitur per errores praedictos. Et alii videntes, quod tantus fuit Aristoteles in aliis et ita dixit veritatem, credere non possunt, quin in istis dixerit verum.

6. Dico ergo, quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo primo occurrunt animae *exemplaria virtutum*. « Absurdum enim est, ut dicit Plotinus[^p361-7], quod exemplaria aliarum rerum sint in Deo, et non exemplaria virtutum ».

7. Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes *exemplares* sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet *celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis*; de quibus Philo, « disertissimus Iudaeorum », loquens ut philosophus. — Sapientiae septimo[^p361-8]: *Vapor est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; et ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit*; ecce *celsitudo puritatis*. — *Candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius.* Et infra: *Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stella-*

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*rum, luci comparata invenitur prior*; ecce *pulcritudo claritatis*. Ubi enim est *speculum* et *imago* et *candor*, necessario est *repraesentatio* et *pulcritudo*. « Pulcritudo nihil aliud est quam aequalitas numerosa[^p362-1] »; ibi autem sunt rationes numerosae ad unum reductae. Et quia est speciosissima, ideo *attingit ubique propter suam munditiam*.

8. Ex quo sequitur, quod sit *fortissima*; ideo dicitur[^p362-2]: *Sapientiam non vincit malitia. Attingit a fine usque in finem fortiter*; ecce *fortitudo virtutis*: attingit a summo vel supremo usque ad infimum, ab intrinseco usque ad extrinsecum, a primo usque ad ultimum, quia ubique est centrum suae potentiae: ideo virtus eius est infinita.

9. Et ex hoc habet *rectitudinem diffusionis*; ecce *iustitia*; et ideo dicit[^p362-3]: *Disponit omnia suaviter.* — Et quia loquitur ut philosophus et ut *amator sapientiae*; ideo dicit: *Hanc amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea et quaesivi sponsam mihi eam assumere et amator factus sum formae illius*; non solum propter se, sed quia ab illa in me consequenter fiunt consimiles proprietates. Unde statim post sequitur: *Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus.*

10. Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in *cognitivam*, in *affectivam*, in *operativam*. Ex *celsitudine puritatis* imprimitur *sinceritas temperantiae*; ex *pulcritudine claritatis serenitas prudentiae*; ex *fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae*; ex *rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae*. — Hae sunt quatuor virtutes *exemplares*[^p362-4], de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi.

11. *Cardinales* dicuntur tripliciter: vel quia per ipsas est *ingressus* ad acquirendum omnes virtutes; vel quia sunt *principales*, in quibus integratur omnis virtus; vel quia *omnis ratio vitae humanae* habet dirigi et regulari per eas in quatuor *cardinibus* mundi minoris, ad similitudinem mundi maioris, quantum ad activam et contemplativam.

12. Philosophus[^p362-5] dicit, quod « virtus est medium duarum extremitatum, secundum quod sapiens determinabit »; est enim in medietate consistens. Virtus enim secundum Augustinum, in libro *de Moribus*, non est aliud quam *modus*. Hunc *modum* prudentia invenit, ut in omnibus non excedas, sed circa centrum consistas. Unde prudentia *auriga* est virtutum[^p362-6]. Unde *dicit prudentia*: ego inveni modum; et *temperantia custodit* et dicit: et hoc volebam ego; *iustitia distribuit*, ut non tantum velit sibi, sed et alteri; et quia postmodum multiplices adversitates eveniunt, *fortitudo defendit*, ne perdatur modus.

13. Item, secundo dicuntur *cardinales*, quia secundum actus accipiuntur *integrantes* virtutes, qui sunt quatuor: *modificare* per appositionem circumstantiarum, *rectificare* — est enim recta ratio ducens in finem, coaequans legibus[^p362-7] — *ordinare, stabilire*. Ab hoc dicitur *virtus*, quia est robur mentis ad bonum faciendum et malum evitandum. Temperantia *modificat*, prudentia *rectificat*, iustitia *ordinat*, fortitudo *stabilit*. Et omnes se circumincedunt. Oportet enim, quod temperantia sit *prudens*, iustitia *fortis*; item, quod prudentia sit *sobria, iusta* et *fortis* etc. Gregorius[^p362-8]: Quomodo potest esse fortis, nisi sit prudens? Temerarius est enim qui aggreditur quod super vires est; et ideo virtutes sunt connexae.

14. Item, tertio modo dicuntur *cardinales*, quia *omnis vita hominis* his quatuor cardinibus gubernatur; sicut sol habet quatuor aspectus ad quatuor partes mundi, scilicet orientem, meridiem, aquilonem, occidentem, in quibus habet quatuor proprietates. A sole autem omnis vita: in oriente purificat, in meridie illuminat, in aquilone stabilit, in occidente conciliat. Sic *Sol iustitiae* in oriente mentis

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ponit *sinceritatem temperantiae*, in meridie *claritatem prudentiae*, in aquilone *stabilitatem constantiae*, in occidente *suavitatem iustitiae*. — Et hoc modo in Apocalypsi Ioannes describit quatuor latera civitatis secundum quatuor virtutes cardinales[^p363-1]; et ordinabantur etiam tribus iuxta tabernaculum.

15. *Temperantia*, quae est ab oriente, sic describitur a Tullio[^p363-2]: « Temperantia est rationis in libidinem aliosque animi motus non rectos firma et moderata dominatio ». Partes eius sunt *sobrietas* in gustu, *castitas* in tactu, *modestia* in ceteris sensibus; quam modestiam vocant theologi *disciplinam*.

16. *Serenitas prudentiae* est a meridie, quae sic describitur[^p363-3]: « Prudentia est bonorum et malorum scientia et utrorumque discretio, cuius partes sunt *memoria, intelligentia, providentia* ». Prudentia enim est de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris.

17. *Fortitudo* ab aquilone, quae sic describitur: « Fortitudo est aggressio periculorum vel susceptio et eorundem constans et laboriosa perpessio ». Cuius partes sunt *fiducia, patientia, perseverantia*: fiducia in *aggrediendo*, patientia in *sustinendo*, perseverantia in *perseverando*.

18. Item, in occidente *suavitas iustitiae*, quae est in exhibitione pietatis — volunt enim leges, poenas mitigari; unde finis iustitiae non est severitas, sed benignitas — quae sic describitur: « Iustitia est habitus, communi utilitate servata, suam unicuique tribuens dignitatem ». Partes eius secundum Tullium sunt ex *lege*, a *natura*, ex *consuetudine*; secundum nos una ordinat ad *superiores*, alia ad *inferiores*, tertia ad *pares*.

19. Hoc totum est per regulam rationis; et sicut sol transiens per duodecim signa[^p363-4] dat vitam, sic sol sapientialis, in nostrae mentis hemisphaerio radians et transiens, per has duodecim partes virtutum ordinat vitam nostram; et quantumcumque homo habeat alias scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam; sicut, quantumcumque habeas stellas, nisi habeas solem in duodecim signis, non habebis diem.

20. Hae sunt tantae *nobilitatis*, quod dispositio mundi his correspondet. Virtutes enim configurantur quatuor *lucis influentiis*, quatuor *elementorum proprietatibus*, quatuor *causarum efficaciis*, quatuor *vitae salubritatibus*. — Primo, quatuor lucis principalibus influentiis: lux *purgat, illuminat, perficit* et *stabilit*; *temperantia* purgat, *prudentia* illuminat, *iustitia* conciliat, *fortitudo* roborat.

21. Item, quatuor elementorum proprietatibus: in *terra* est ariditas adornata, in *aqua* perspicuitas cum intensione lucis, in *aëre* subtilitas cum mulcebritate, in *igne* virtuositas in actione. Prima est *temperantia*, quae aridum reddit, et tamen ornat et vestit floribus. *Prudentia* respondet aquae perspicuitati, quae quasi incorporata est luci. *Iustitia* respondet aëris mulcebritati; aer enim ascendit et descendit, ad dexteram et sinistram movetur. *Fortitudo* respondet vigori ignis; unde ille loquens de fortitudine dicit[^p363-5]: *Fortis est ut mors dilectio; dura sicut infernus aemulatio; lampades eius lampades ignis atque flammarum.*

22. Item, quatuor causarum efficaciis: *efficiens, forma, finis* et *materia* integrant rem[^p363-6]. *Fortitudo* debetur efficienti, *prudentia* formae; *iustitia* fini; *temperantia* materiae, ne defluat.

23. Item, quatuor vitae salubritatibus: subtilitati spirituum, *temperantia*; vivacitati sensuum, *prudentia*; robori virium, *fortitudo*; coaequationi qualitatum, *iustitia*[^p363-7].

24. Hae virtutes fluunt a luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit. Et haec est beatitudo. Unde primo sunt *politicae*, secundo *purgatoriae*, tertio *animi iam purgati*. *Politicae* sunt in actione, *purgatoriae* in contemplatione, *animi iam purgati* in lucis visione.

25. Et de his agit Salomon, ut dicit Origenes[^p363-8], de *politicis* in Proverbiis, de *purgatoriis* in Ecclesiaste, de *animi iam purgati* in Cantico canticorum.

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Et in notitiam istarum venerunt nobiles philosophi. Unde Macrobius[^p364-1], narrans sententiam Plotini, dicit sic: « Qui aestimant nullis nisi philosophantibus inesse virtutes, nullos praeter philosophos beatos esse pronuntiant. Agnitionem enim rerum divinarum *sapientiam* proprie vocantes, eos tantummodo dicunt esse sapientes, qui superna acie mentis requirunt et quaerendi sagaci diligentia comprehendunt, et quantum vivendi perspicuitas praestat, imitantur, et in hoc solo dicunt esse exercitia virtutum ».

26. « Quarum sic officia dispensant: *prudentiae* esse mundum istum et omnia, quae in mundo sunt, divinorum contemplatione despicere omnemque animi cognitionem in sola divina dirigere; *temperantiae*, omnia relinquere, in quantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; *fortitudinis*, non terreri animam a corpore quodam modo ductu philosophiae recedentem nec altitudinem perfectae ad superna ascensionis horrere; *iustitiae*, ad unam sibi huius propositi consentire viam uniuscuiusque virtutis obsequium. Atque ita fit, ut secundum hoc tam rigidae definitionis abruptum rerum publicarum rectores beati esse, vel omnino esse non possint ».

27. « Sed Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, in libro *de Virtutibus*[^p364-2] gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primae *politicae* vocantur, secundae *purgatoriae*, tertiae *animi iam purgati*, quartae *exemplares* ».

28. « Et sunt *politicae* hominis, quia sociale animal est. His boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbes tuentur; his parentes venerantur, liberos amant, proximos diligunt; his civium salutem gubernant; his socios circumspecta providentia protegunt, iusta liberalitate devinciunt, hisque « sui memores alios fecere merendo[^p364-3] » ».

29. « Et est politicae *prudentiae* ad rationis normam quae cogitat, quaecumque agit, universa dirigere, ac nihil praeter rectum velle vel facere, humanisque actibus tanquam divinis arbitris providere. Prudentiae insunt *ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio*. — *Fortitudinis* est animum supra periculi metum agere, nihilque nisi turpia timere, tolerare fortiter vel adversa, vel prospera. Fortitudo praestat *magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem*. — *Temperantiae* est nihil appetere poenitendum, in nullo legem moderationis excedere, sub iugum rationis cupiditatem domare. Temperantiam sequuntur *modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderamen* vel[^p364-4] *moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia*. — *Iustitiae* est servare unicuique quod suum est; et de iustitia veniunt *innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas*. His virtutibus vir bonus primum sui atque inde reipublicae rector efficitur, iuste ac provide gubernans humana, divina non deserens ».

30. « *Secundae*, quas *purgatorias* vocant, hominis sunt, qui divini capax est, solumque animum eius expediunt, qui decrevit se a corporis contagione purgare et quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserere divinis. Hae sunt otiosorum, qui a rerum publicarum actibus se sequestrant. Harum quid singulae velint, superius[^p364-5] expressimus, cum de virtutibus philosophantium diceremus, quas solas quidam aestimaverunt esse virtutes ».

31. « *Tertiae* sunt *purgati iam defaecatique animi* et ab omni mundi huius aspergine presse pureque detersi. Illic *prudentiae* est divina non quasi in electione praeferre, sed sola nosse et haec tanquam nihil sit aliud, intueri; *temperantiae*, terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; *fortitudinis*, passiones ignorare, non vincere, ut nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil; *iustitiae*, ita cum superna et divina mente sociari, ut servet perpetuum cum ea foedus imitando ».

32. « *Quartae* sunt *exemplares*, quae in ipsa divina mente consistunt, quam diximus *νοῦν*[^p364-6] vocari, a quarum exemplo reliquae omnes per ordinem defluunt. Nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis virtutum ideas esse in mente divina credendum est. Illic *prudentia* est ipsa mens divina; *temperantia*, quod in se perpetua intentione conversa est; *fortitudo*, quod semper idem est nec aliquando mutatur; *iustitia*, quod perenni lege a sempiterna operis sui continuatione non flectitur. — Haec sunt quaternarum quatuor genera virtutum, quae praeter cetera maximam in passionibus habent differentiam sui ». Hucusque Plotinus.

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english:
### COLLATION VI.
#### *On the first vision, the third treatment, which is on the first exemplary cause of the virtues, on the exemplary virtues, and on the cardinal virtues flowing from them.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; recapitulation, 1. — The errors of the philosophers concerning God as exemplary cause; the teaching of Aristotle is defective in this, 2. — A threefold error arising thence, 3. — Likewise, a threefold blindness: concerning the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect, and the lack of retribution after death, 4. 5. — On these errors, still burgeoning, 6. — Part I. On the exemplary virtues in the eternal light and the cardinal virtues arising thence. In God there are exemplars not only of things, but also of virtues, 7. — On the four exemplary virtues in God, which are the loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion, 8. — They are proved from Scripture, 9. — From these flow like properties, namely the cardinal virtues, 10. — The cardinal virtues have their name for three reasons, 11. — On the first reason, 12. — On the second, and on the four integrating virtues according to the acts of the cardinal virtues, 13. — On the third reason; a comparison of the greater world and the lesser, 14. — On the definition and the parts of each of the cardinal virtues, 15. — Their origin and excellence, 16. — They are configured to four other divisions; first, to the four influences of light, 17. — Second, to the four properties of the elements, 18. — Third, to the four efficacies of the causes; fourth, to the four wholesomenesses of life, 19. — They flow from the eternal light; they lead back to God, who is true beatitude; their three steps and effects; the teaching of Solomon, 20. — Part II. A confirmation from the teaching of Plotinus reported by Macrobius. On the opinion that none are wise and blessed but philosophers, and how he distributes the exercises of the virtues, 21. — Otherwise Plotinus, positing four kinds of fourfold virtues, 22. — First, on the political virtues, how the cardinal virtues are exercised in them, 23. — Second, on the purgatorial virtues, 24. — Third, on the virtues of the soul already purged, 25. — Fourth, on the exemplary virtues, 26.*

1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*[^p360-1], etc. For the sake of the first vision, that *of the understanding implanted by nature*, that word was taken up: *God saw the light*, that is, he made it to be seen. Of this it has been said above in two collations[^p360-2], and by way of the *scientific* consideration, in that the light shines as the truth *of things*, as the truth *of words*, as the truth *of morals*. And nine parts of doctrine were distinguished, of which three are the principal rays, and they are from the dictate of the eternal light, according to Augustine[^p360-3]. — Likewise, that *he saw*, that is, he made to be seen by the *sapiential* contemplation, illuminating the soul *in itself* as in a mirror, *in an Intelligence* as in a conveying medium, *in the uncreated light* as in the fontal object, according to those six conditions which it imprints upon the mind; and according to these the soul rises up into that light *by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding*, as has been said[^p360-4]. And to this the philosophers came, and their nobles and the ancients, namely that it should be *principle* and *end* and *exemplary ground*.

2. Yet God *divided the light from the darkness*, so that, as has been said[^p360-5] of the Angels, so it may be said of the philosophers. But whence did some follow the darkness? From this: that although all of them saw the first cause as the *principle* of all and the *end* of all, in the *medium* they nevertheless diverged. For some denied that in it there are the *exemplars of things*; of whom the chief seems to have been Aristotle, who both at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and at the end[^p360-6] and in many other places execrates the ideas of Plato. Hence he says that God knows only himself and has no need of the knowledge of any other thing, and moves as the *desired* and the *beloved*. From this they lay down that he knows *nothing*, or

*no particular thing*. Hence Aristotle chiefly attacks those ideas, and in the *Ethics*[^p361-1], where he says that the highest good cannot be an *idea*. And his arguments are worth nothing, and the commentator resolves them.

3. From this error there follows another error, namely that God has no *foreknowledge* nor *providence*, since he has not the grounds of things in himself, through which he might know them. — They say also[^p361-2] that there is no truth about the future save the truth of necessary things; and that the truth of contingent things is not truth. — And from this it follows that all things come about *by chance*, or *by fatal necessity*. And because it is impossible for things to come about *by chance*, therefore the Arabs bring in a fatal necessity, namely that those substances moving the sphere are the necessary causes of all things. — From this there follows a *hidden truth*, namely that of the *disposition of the things of the world* according to punishments and glory. For if those substances move without erring, nothing is laid down about hell, nor that there is a demon; nor did Aristotle ever posit a demon, nor beatitude after this life, as it seems. This, then, is the threefold error: the hiding of *exemplarity*, of *divine providence*, of *the world's disposition*.

4. From these there follows a threefold blindness or gloom: namely concerning the *eternity of the world*, which Aristotle seems to assert according to all the Greek doctors — as Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, the Damascene, Basil[^p361-3] — and the commentators of all the Arabs, who say that Aristotle held this, and his words seem to sound so. You will never find that he himself says that the world had a beginning or a starting-point; rather he refutes[^p361-4] Plato, who alone seems to have laid down that time began. And this is repugnant to the light of truth.

From this there follows another blindness, concerning the *unity of the intellect*: because, if the world is laid down as eternal, one of these necessarily follows: either that souls are *infinite*, since men will have been infinite; or that the soul is *corruptible*; or that there is a *passage from body to body*; or that *the intellect is one in all*, which error is attributed to Aristotle according to the Commentator[^p361-5].

From these two it follows that after this life there is neither *happiness* nor *punishment*.

5. These men, then, fell into errors and were not divided from the darkness; and these are the worst errors. Nor are they yet shut up with the key of the bottomless pit[^p361-6]. These are the darknesses of Egypt; for although a great light seemed to be in them from the preceding sciences, yet the whole of it is extinguished by the aforesaid errors. And others, seeing that Aristotle was so great in other matters and so spoke the truth, cannot believe that he did not speak truly in these.

6. I say therefore that that eternal light is the exemplar of all things, and that a mind raised up, like the mind of the other noble philosophers of old, arrives at this. In it, then, there occur first to the soul the *exemplars of the virtues*. « For it is absurd, as Plotinus says[^p361-7], that the exemplars of other things should be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues ».

7. There appear, therefore, first in the eternal light the *exemplary* virtues, or the exemplars of the virtues, namely the *loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion*; of which Philo, « the most eloquent of the Jews », speaks as a philosopher. — Wisdom, chapter seven[^p361-8]: *For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the brightness of the almighty God; and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her*; behold the *loftiness of purity*. — *For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness.* And below: *For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars; being compared with the light, she is found before it*; behold the *beauty of brightness*. For where there is a *mirror* and an *image* and *brightness*, there is necessarily *representation* and *beauty*. « Beauty is nothing else than numerous equality[^p362-1] »; and there the numbered grounds are led back to one. And because she is most comely, therefore *she reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity*.

8. From which it follows that she is *most strong*; therefore it is said[^p362-2]: *Malice overcometh not wisdom. She reacheth from end to end mightily*; behold the *fortitude of power*: she reaches from the summit or the supreme down to the lowest, from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from the first to the last, because everywhere is the centre of her power: therefore her power is infinite.

9. And from this she has the *rectitude of diffusion*; behold *justice*; and therefore it says[^p362-3]: *She ordereth all things sweetly.* — And because he speaks as a philosopher and as a *lover of wisdom*, therefore he says: *Her have I loved and have sought her out from my youth, and have desired to take her for my spouse, and I became a lover of her beauty*; not only for her own sake, but because from her like properties consequently come to be in me. Hence immediately after there follows: *For she teacheth sobriety and prudence and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men.*

10. These are imprinted on the soul through that exemplary light and descend into the *cognitive*, into the *affective*, into the *operative* power. From the *loftiness of purity* is imprinted the *sincerity of temperance*; from the *beauty of brightness*, the *serenity of prudence*; from the *fortitude of power*, the *stability of constancy*; from the *rectitude of diffusion*, the *sweetness of justice*. — These are the four *exemplary*[^p362-4] virtues, of which the whole of sacred Scripture treats; and Aristotle perceived nothing of them, but the ancient and noble philosophers did.

11. They are called *cardinal* in three ways: either because through them there is an *entrance* for acquiring all the virtues; or because they are the *principal* ones, in which every virtue is integrated; or because *the whole ordering of human life* has to be directed and regulated by them in the four *hinges* of the lesser world, after the likeness of the greater world, as regards the active and the contemplative life.

12. The Philosopher[^p362-5] says that « virtue is the mean of two extremes, according as the wise man shall determine »; for it consists in a mean. For virtue, according to Augustine in the book *On Morals*, is nothing other than *measure*. This *measure* prudence finds out, so that in all things you may not exceed, but may hold to the centre. Hence prudence is the *charioteer* of the virtues[^p362-6]. Hence *prudence says*: I have found the measure; and *temperance keeps* it and says: and this is what I wanted; *justice distributes* it, so that a man may will it not only for himself but also for another; and because afterwards manifold adversities befall, *fortitude defends* it, lest the measure be lost.

13. Likewise, secondly they are called *cardinal*, because according to their acts the *integrating* virtues are taken, which are four: *to modify*, by the addition of the circumstances; *to rectify* — for it is right reason leading to the end, making equal with the laws[^p362-7] — *to order, to stabilize*. From this it is called *virtue*, because it is the strength of the mind for doing good and avoiding evil. Temperance *modifies*, prudence *rectifies*, justice *orders*, fortitude *stabilizes*. And they all mutually interpenetrate one another. For it is needful that temperance be *prudent*, justice *brave*; likewise that prudence be *sober, just* and *brave*, etc. Gregory[^p362-8]: How can a man be brave, unless he be prudent? For he is rash who attempts what is beyond his strength; and therefore the virtues are connected.

14. Likewise, in a third way they are called *cardinal*, because *the whole life of man* is governed by these four hinges; as the sun has four aspects toward the four parts of the world, namely east, south, north, west, in which it has four properties. And from the sun comes all life: in the east it purifies, in the south it illuminates, in the north it stabilizes, in the west it reconciles. So the *Sun of justice* in the east of the mind sets the *sincerity of temperance*, in the south the *brightness of prudence*, in the north the *stability of constancy*, in the west the *sweetness of justice*. — And in this manner John in the Apocalypse describes the four sides of the city according to the four cardinal virtues[^p363-1]; and the tribes too were ordered beside the tabernacle.

15. *Temperance*, which is from the east, is thus described by Tullius[^p363-2]: « Temperance is reason's firm and moderate dominion over lust and the other unruly motions of the soul ». Its parts are *sobriety* in taste, *chastity* in touch, *modesty* in the remaining senses; which modesty the theologians call *discipline*.

16. The *serenity of prudence* is from the south, which is thus described[^p363-3]: « Prudence is the knowledge of good and evil things and the discernment of both, whose parts are *memory, understanding, foresight* ». For prudence is of present, past and future things.

17. *Fortitude* is from the north, which is thus described: « Fortitude is the undertaking of dangers, or the taking of them up, and the constant and laborious endurance of the same ». Its parts are *confidence, patience, perseverance*: confidence in *undertaking*, patience in *sustaining*, perseverance in *persevering*.

18. Likewise, in the west is the *sweetness of justice*, which lies in the showing of piety — for the laws will have punishments mitigated; whence the end of justice is not severity, but benignity — and it is thus described: « Justice is a habit which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth ». Its parts, according to Tullius, are from *law*, from *nature*, from *custom*; according to us, one orders us to *superiors*, another to *inferiors*, a third to *equals*.

19. All this is by the rule of reason; and as the sun, passing through the twelve signs[^p363-4], gives life, so the sun of wisdom, shining and passing through the hemisphere of our mind, orders our life through these twelve parts of the virtues; and however many other sciences a man may have, unless he have the virtues, he has not life — just as, however many stars you may have, unless you have the sun in the twelve signs, you will not have day.

20. These are of such *nobility* that the disposition of the world corresponds to them. For the virtues are configured to the four *influences of light*, the four *properties of the elements*, the four *efficacies of the causes*, the four *wholesomenesses of life*. — First, to the four principal influences of light: light *purges, illuminates, perfects* and *stabilizes*; *temperance* purges, *prudence* illuminates, *justice* reconciles, *fortitude* strengthens.

21. Likewise, to the four properties of the elements: in *earth* there is dryness adorned, in *water* transparency with an intensity of light, in *air* subtlety with softness, in *fire* forcefulness in acting. The first is *temperance*, which makes dry, and yet adorns and clothes with flowers. *Prudence* answers to the transparency of water, which is as it were incorporated into light. *Justice* answers to the softness of air; for air ascends and descends, and is moved to right and left. *Fortitude* answers to the vigour of fire; whence he who speaks of fortitude says[^p363-5]: *Love is strong as death; jealousy is hard as hell; the lamps thereof are lamps of fire and flames.*

22. Likewise, to the four efficacies of the causes: the *efficient*, the *form*, the *end* and the *matter* make up a thing[^p363-6]. *Fortitude* is owed to the efficient, *prudence* to the form, *justice* to the end, *temperance* to the matter, lest it flow away.

23. Likewise, to the four wholesomenesses of life: to the subtlety of the spirits, *temperance*; to the vivacity of the senses, *prudence*; to the strength of the powers, *fortitude*; to the equalizing of the qualities, *justice*[^p363-7].

24. These virtues flow from the eternal light into the hemisphere of our mind and lead the soul back to its origin, as a perpendicular or direct ray returns by the same way by which it came. And this is beatitude. Hence first they are *political*, second *purgatorial*, third *of the soul already purged*. The *political* are in action, the *purgatorial* in contemplation, those *of the soul already purged* in the vision of light.

25. And of these Solomon treats, as Origen says[^p363-8]: of the *political* in Proverbs, of the *purgatorial* in Ecclesiastes, of those *of the soul already purged* in the Canticle of Canticles.

And the noble philosophers came to a knowledge of these. Hence Macrobius[^p364-1], reporting the opinion of Plotinus, speaks thus: « Those who judge that the virtues are in none but philosophers pronounce that none but philosophers are blessed. For calling the recognition of divine things properly *wisdom*, they say that those alone are wise who seek them with the mind's higher edge and grasp them by a sagacious diligence in seeking, and imitate them so far as clarity of living allows, and they say that in this alone lie the exercises of the virtues ».

26. « The offices of these they distribute thus: it belongs to *prudence* to despise this world and all that is in the world by the contemplation of divine things, and to direct the whole knowledge of the soul upon the divine alone; to *temperance*, to leave behind, so far as nature suffers, all that the body's use requires; to *fortitude*, that the soul be not terrified as it withdraws in a manner from the body under philosophy's leading, nor shrink from the height of the perfect ascent to things above; to *justice*, that the obedience of each virtue consent to the one way of this purpose. And so it comes about that, by the abruptness of so rigid a definition, the rulers of commonwealths cannot be blessed, or even be at all ».

27. « But Plotinus, chief with Plato among the professors of philosophy, in the book *On the Virtues*[^p364-2] sets out in order their degrees, composed by a true and natural principle of division. There are four, he says, kinds of fourfold virtues. Of these the first are called *political*, the second *purgatorial*, the third those *of the soul already purged*, the fourth *exemplary* ».

28. « And the *political* are of man, because he is a social animal. By these good men take counsel for the commonwealth, guard cities; by these they venerate parents, love their children, cherish their neighbours; by these they govern the safety of the citizens; by these they protect their allies with circumspect providence, bind them by a just liberality, and by these « they have made others mindful of them by deserving well[^p364-3] » ».

29. « And it belongs to political *prudence* to direct all that it thinks and whatever it does to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing but what is right, and to provide for human acts as though for divine arbiters. To prudence belong *reason, intellect, circumspection, foresight, docility, caution*. — It belongs to *fortitude* to carry the mind above the fear of danger, and to fear nothing but base things, and to bear bravely either adversity or prosperity. Fortitude furnishes *magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, tolerance, firmness*. — It belongs to *temperance* to desire nothing that must be repented of, to exceed in nothing the law of moderation, to tame cupidity under the yoke of reason. Temperance is followed by *modesty, shamefastness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, restraint* or[^p364-4] *moderation, frugality, sobriety, purity*. — It belongs to *justice* to preserve for each what is his own; and from justice come *innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity*. By these virtues a good man is made first the ruler of himself and thence of the commonwealth, governing human affairs justly and providently, and not deserting the divine ».

30. « The *second*, which they call *purgatorial*, are of the man who is capable of the divine, and they set free only the soul of him who has resolved to purge himself of the body's contagion and, by a certain flight from human things, to engage himself with the divine alone. These belong to men at leisure, who sequester themselves from the acts of public affairs. What each of these means we have set out above[^p364-5], when we spoke of the virtues of those who philosophize, which certain men have reckoned to be the only virtues ».

31. « The *third* are those of the *soul already purged and cleansed*, and closely and purely wiped clean of every besprinkling of this world. There it belongs to *prudence* not to prefer divine things as though by a choice, but to know them alone and to gaze on them as though nothing else existed; to *temperance*, not to repress earthly cupidities but to forget them utterly; to *fortitude*, to be ignorant of the passions, not to conquer them, so that it may not know how to be angry, and may desire nothing; to *justice*, so to be joined with the supernal and divine mind that it may keep a perpetual covenant with it by imitation ».

32. « The *fourth* are the *exemplary*, which consist in the divine mind itself, which we have said is called *νοῦν*[^p364-6], from whose exemplar all the rest flow down in order. For if it must be believed that the ideas of other things are in the divine mind, much more those of the virtues. There *prudence* is the divine mind itself; *temperance*, that it is turned upon itself by a perpetual intention; *fortitude*, that it is always the same and is never changed; *justice*, that by a perennial law it is not bent from the sempiternal continuation of its own work. — These are the four kinds of fourfold virtues, which beyond all the rest have the greatest difference among themselves in respect of the passions ». Thus far Plotinus.

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la: Collat. 4. et 5.

en: Collations 4 and 5.

la: Vide supra pag. 349, nota 7.

en: See above, p. 349, note 7.

la: Collat. praeced.

en: The preceding collation.

la: Ab Augustino, XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 19. et 33. Cfr. etiam supra collat. 1. n. 17.

en: By Augustine, XI *On the City of God*, c. 19 and 33. Cf. also above, collation 1, n. 17.

la: Libr. I. text. 25. seqq. (c. 9.) et XIII. c. 4. seqq. (XII. c. 4. seqq.) Cfr. ibid. VII. text. 44. seqq. (VI. c. 13. seqq.). Sententia, quae mox ex Aristotele de causa prima affertur, scil. quod solum novit se etc., insinuatur XII. Metaph. text. 51. et 35. seqq. (XI. c. 9. et 7.).

en: Book I, text 25 ff. (c. 9), and XIII, c. 4 ff. (XII, c. 4 ff.). Cf. ibid. VII, text 44 ff. (VI, c. 13 ff.). The opinion which is presently adduced from Aristotle concerning the first cause, namely that he knows only himself, etc., is hinted at in XII *Metaphysics*, text 51 and 35 ff. (XI, c. 9 and 7).

la: Libr. I. c. 6. — Per *commentatorem* (pro Ethica) non intelligitur Averroes, qui hoc nomine insignitur. Iourdain indicat in libro suo: Recherches critiques etc. (pag. 180), commentatorem ethicae Aristot. nomine Eustrathium (archiep. de Nicaea) una cum Aspasio et Michaele Ephesino. Quia illius commentarium prae manibus non habemus, quaestionem resolvere non potuimus, utrum hic a S. Bonaventura nominetur, an non? — Conferri de ipsa re potest Franc. Piccolomini, *Universa Philosophia de moribus*, Venetiis, 1583, gradus IV. c. 18, seqq., ubi agit de differentia inter Aristotelem et Platonem quoad has virtutes, et gradus IX. c. 22. seqq. (de idea boni).

en: Book I, c. 6. — By the *commentator* (on the *Ethics*) Averroes is not meant, who is distinguished by that name. Jourdain indicates in his book *Recherches critiques*, etc. (p. 180), that the commentator on Aristotle's *Ethics* was named Eustrathius (archbishop of Nicaea), together with Aspasius and Michael of Ephesus. Since we do not have his commentary at hand, we could not resolve the question whether he is the one named here by St. Bonaventure or not. — On the matter itself, Franc. Piccolomini may be consulted, *Universa Philosophia de moribus*, Venice, 1583, grade IV, c. 18 ff., where he treats of the difference between Aristotle and Plato as regards these virtues, and grade IX, c. 22 ff. (on the idea of the good).

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 7. (c. 9.). — De praecedente errore cfr. Averroes, Epitom. in libros metaph. tr. 4. in fine; de seq. (fatalismo) vide S. Thom., III. contra Gent. c. 87, ubi recitat opinionem Avicennae.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I *On Interpretation*, c. 7 (c. 9). — On the preceding error cf. Averroes, *Epitome on the books of the Metaphysics*, tr. 4, at the end; on the following one (fatalism) see St. Thomas, III *Against the Gentiles*, c. 87, where he recites the opinion of Avicenna.

la: Non invenimus in libris praedictorum Patrum, quod ipsi hunc errorem *explicite* Aristoteli attribuerint. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. 33. circa finem ait: Aristotelis praeparcam et angustis finibus circumscriptam providentiam et artificium... confuta. Orat. 35, ubi de materia prima dicit, « quae haud dubie ex non ente procreata est, utcumque eam nonnulli aeternam esse confingant ». Gregor. Nyssen., de Vita Moysis, quosdam errores philosophorum recensens dicit: « Creatorem ipsum [Deum] fatentur, sed et materia ad creandum indiguisse ipsum volunt ». Basil., in Hexaëm. serm. 1. n. 7: Et quia complures eorum, qui mundum ab aeterno una cum Deo existere opinati sunt, ab ipso factum esse nequaquam concesserunt etc. Damasc. in libro de Haeresibus recenset errores Platonicorum, Stoicorum et Epicureorum (n. 6-8.); II. de Fide orthod. c. 1. seq. docet, Deum solum principio carere ipsumque omnia creasse. Cfr. Ambros., I. Hexaëm. c. 1. n. 3: Ipsumque mundum semper fuisse et fore, Aristoteles usurpat dicere. — Verba Commentatoris (i. e. Averrois) vide supra pag. 351, nota 4. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 2. seq.

en: We have not found in the books of the aforesaid Fathers that they *explicitly* attributed this error to Aristotle. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 33, near the end, says: Refute the providence and craftsmanship of Aristotle, over-sparing and circumscribed within narrow bounds. Oration 35, where he says of prime matter that « it was without doubt procreated out of non-being, however much some feign it to be eternal ». Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Life of Moses*, reviewing certain errors of the philosophers, says: « They confess the Creator himself [God], but they will have it that he needed matter also in order to create ». Basil, *on the Hexaëmeron*, sermon 1, n. 7: And because many of those who supposed the world to exist from eternity together with God by no means conceded that it was made by him, etc. The Damascene in the book *On Heresies* reviews the errors of the Platonists, the Stoics and the Epicureans (nn. 6–8); II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 1 f., teaches that God alone lacks a beginning and that he created all things. Cf. Ambrose, I *Hexaëmeron*, c. 1, n. 3: Aristotle presumes to say that the world itself always was and will be. — For the words of the Commentator (i.e. Averroes) see above, p. 351, note 4. Cf. II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 f., and dubium 2 f.

la: Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 10. (c. 1.). Cfr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 109. (c. 10.).

en: Book VIII of the *Physics*, text 10 (c. 1). Cf. I *On the Heavens and the World*, text 109 (c. 10).

la: Scil. Averroem in III. de Anima, text. 5. 17. seqq. et 36. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 22, nota 1. — Pro *transitio* A D E *transformatio*.

en: Namely Averroes, on III *On the Soul*, text 5, 17 ff., and 36. Cf. tom. II, p. 22, note 1. — For *passage* A D E have *transformation*.

la: Apoc. 9, 1. seqq.: Et data est ei [Angelo quinto] clavis putei abyssi. Et aperuit puteum abyssi, et ascendit fumus putei etc. — Immediate post respicitur Exod. 10, 22. seq.

en: Apoc. 9:1 ff.: And there was given to him [the fifth Angel] the key of the bottomless pit. And he opened the bottomless pit, and the smoke of the pit arose, etc. — Immediately after, Exod. 10:22 f. is had in view.

la: Vide infra n. 32, ubi secundum Macrobium verba Plotini exhibentur.

en: See below, n. 32, where the words of Plotinus are set out according to Macrobius.

la: Vers. 25. Ibid. v. 26. et 29. habentur duo seqq. loci. — Hieron. in praefatione sui libri de Nominibus Hebraicis ait: « Philo, vir disertissimus Iudaeorum ». Opera ipsius recenset Hieron. in libro de Viris illustribus, c. 11. Cfr. ex eius operibus I. Allegor. Legis et de Profugis.

en: V. 25. Ibid., vv. 26 and 29, are the two following passages. — Jerome, in the preface to his book *On Hebrew Names*, says: « Philo, the most eloquent man of the Jews ». Jerome reviews his works in the book *On Illustrious Men*, c. 11. Cf. among his works I *Allegories of the Law* and *On Fugitives*.

la: Secundum August.; cfr. supra pag. 301, nota 1. — Pro *repraesentatio et pulcritudo* B *esse pulcritudinem*; adiunximus *et pulcritudo*, quod in codd. et Vat. excidit.

en: According to Augustine; cf. above, p. 301, note 1. — For *representation and beauty* B has *to be beauty*; we have added *and beauty*, which dropped out in the codices and in the Vatican edition.

la: Sap. 7, 30. et 8, 1. — Inferius respicitur Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. regul. regul. 7: Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam (cfr. supra pag. 310, nota 3.).

en: Wisd. 7:30 and 8:1. — Below, Alan of Lille is had in view, *Theological Rules*, rule 7: God is an intelligible sphere, whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference nowhere (cf. above, p. 310, note 3).

la: Sap. 8, 1. Ibid. v. 2. et 7. sunt duo seqq. loci.

en: Wisd. 8:1. Ibid., vv. 2 and 7, are the two following passages.

la: Codd. et Vat. *cardinales*, sed contra contextum, cum Aristoteles non *cardinales*, sed *exemplares* ut platonicas ideas reiicere videatur (cfr. supra n. 2.). August., IV. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 17: Verum tu in hac causa, etsi ad scholam Pythagorae provoces vel Platonis, ubi eruditissimi atque doctissimi viri, multo excellentiore ceteris philosophia nobilitati, veras virtutes non esse dicebant, nisi quae menti quodam modo imprimuntur a forma illius aeternae immutabilisque substantiae, quod est Deus etc.

en: The codices and the Vatican edition have *cardinal*, but against the context, since Aristotle seems to reject not the *cardinal* virtues but the *exemplary* ones, as Platonic ideas (cf. above, n. 2). Augustine, IV *Against Julian the Pelagian*, c. 3, n. 17: But you in this cause, even if you appeal to the school of Pythagoras or of Plato, where the most learned and erudite men, ennobled by a philosophy far more excellent than the rest, used to say that there are no true virtues save those which are in some manner imprinted on the mind by the form of that eternal and immutable substance, which is God, etc.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 6. — Sententia Augustini insinuatur in I. de Moribus Eccles. cathol. c. 19. n. 35, ubi docet, quod ex quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus eruendus sit *modus vivendi*. In libro de Beata Vita, n. 33, dicit, quod sapientia « nihil est aliud quam modus animi, hoc est, quo sese animus librat, ut neque excurrat in nimium, neque infra quam plenum est coarctetur. Excurrit autem in luxurias, dominationes, superbias... Coarctatur autem sordibus, timore » etc. (Posuimus *in libro de Moribus*, pro quo codd. vel *in libro de Moralibus*, vel *in libro de Modo*).

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 6. — Augustine's opinion is hinted at in I *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, c. 19, n. 35, where he teaches that the *measure of living* is to be drawn out of the four cardinal virtues. In the book *On the Happy Life*, n. 33, he says that wisdom « is nothing other than the measure of the soul, that is, that by which the soul poises itself, so that it neither runs out into excess nor is contracted below what is full. Now it runs out into wanton excesses, dominations, prides… but it is contracted by sordidness, by fear », etc. (We have set *in the book On Morals*, for which the codices have either *in the book On Moral Matters* or *in the book On Measure*).

la: Secundum Bernard., I. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 9. et 11, ut dicitur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. (vide ibid. notam 3.). Bernard., loc. cit., seqq. insinuat.

en: According to Bernard, I *On Consideration*, c. 8, nn. 9 and 11, as is said in III *Sentences*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body (see note 3 there). Bernard, loc. cit., hints at what follows.

la: Respicitur definitio virtutis sumta ex August., I. Soliloq. c. 6. n. 13: Virtus est vel recta vel perfecta ratio perveniens ad finem suum. Cfr. liber de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.) c. 3. et 20.

en: The definition of virtue taken from Augustine is had in view, I *Soliloquies*, c. 6, n. 13: Virtue is reason either right or perfect, arriving at its own end. Cf. the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among Augustine's works), c. 3 and 20.

la: Sententiam hanc, si *verba* attendantur, Gregor. exprimit I. Moral. c. 32. n. 45, ubi agens de donis Spiritus S. (quae ab ipso *virtutes* nominantur) dicit: « Valde *fortitudo* destruitur, nisi per *consilium* fulciatur; quia, quo plus se posse conspicit, eo virtus sine rationis moderamine deterius in praeceps ruit ». Idem docet II. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 7. n. 7. Cfr. ibid. hom. 10. n. 18. et lib. I. homil. 3. n. 8: Quid enim prodesse potest prudentia, si fortitudo desit? Scire etenim cuiquam quod non potest facere poena magis quam virtus est. — De connexione virtutum vide III. Sent. d. 36, q. 3.

en: This opinion, if the *words* are attended to, Gregory expresses in I *Morals*, c. 32, n. 45, where, treating of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (which he himself names *virtues*), he says: « *Fortitude* is greatly destroyed unless it be supported by *counsel*; because, the more it sees itself able to do, the worse does strength without the moderation of reason rush headlong ». He teaches the same in II *Homilies on Ezechiel*, homily 7, n. 7. Cf. ibid., homily 10, n. 18, and book I, homily 3, n. 8: For what can prudence profit, if fortitude be lacking? For to know what one cannot do is a punishment rather than a virtue. — On the connection of the virtues see III *Sentences*, d. 36, q. 3.

la: Cap. 21, 16: Et civitas in quadro posita est, et longitudo eius tanta est, quanta et latitudo etc. In quem locum Glossa *ordinaria* apud Strabum: Vel quatuor latera sunt quatuor principales virtutes, quarum una non debet aliam excedere. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 802, nota 1, in qua pro hac Glossa allegavimus Gregorium, qui etiam I. Homil. in Ezech. homil. 3. n. 8. ait: Possumus etiam per quatuor partes principales [orientem, occidentem etc.] quatuor virtutes accipere, ex quibus reliquae virtutes oriuntur etc. — Immediate post respicitur Num. 2, 3. seqq.

en: C. 21:16: And the city lieth in a foursquare, and the length thereof is as great as the breadth, etc. On which passage the *ordinary* Gloss in Strabo: Or the four sides are the four principal virtues, of which one ought not to exceed another. Cf. tom. III, p. 802, note 1, in which for this Gloss we cited Gregory, who also says in I *Homilies on Ezechiel*, homily 3, n. 8: We can also take, by the four principal quarters [east, west, etc.], the four virtues, from which the remaining virtues arise, etc. — Immediately after, Num. 2:3 ff. is had in view.

la: Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 54. Deinde adiungit: Partes eius sunt continentia, clementia, modestia.

en: Book II of the *Rhetoric*, c. 54. Then he adds: Its parts are continence, clemency, modesty.

la: Loc. cit.: Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque [in nota adiecta exhibetur ut lectio vulgaris *et utrarumque*] scientia. Partes eius: memoria etc. Ibid.: « Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio. Eius partes: magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia ». Definitioni iustitiae inferius positae additur ibid.: Eius initium est ab *natura* profectum; deinde quaedam in *consuetudinem* ex utilitatis ratione venerunt; postea res a natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit.

en: Loc. cit.: Prudence is the knowledge of things good and bad and neither [in an added note the common reading *and of both* is set out]. Its parts: memory, etc. Ibid.: « Fortitude is the considered undertaking of dangers and the endurance of labours. Its parts: magnificence, confidence, patience, perseverance ». To the definition of justice set down below there is added ibid.: Its beginning proceeded from *nature*; then certain things passed into *custom* by reason of utility; afterwards the fear of the laws and religion sanctioned what had proceeded from nature and been approved by custom.

la: Vide supra pag. 221, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 221, note 5.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3.) et V. Metaph. text. 2. seq. (IV. c. 2.). — Mox post *efficienti* B prosequitur: *severitas* [ita et A, D E G *serenitas*] *prudentiae formae; rectitudo iustitiae fini, stabilitas temperantiae materiae.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, II *Physics*, text 28 (c. 3), and V *Metaphysics*, text 2 f. (IV, c. 2). — Presently after *to the efficient* B continues: *severity* [so also A; D E G *serenity*] *of prudence to the form; the rectitude of justice to the end, the stability of temperance to the matter.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 17. a. 2. q. 3, ubi distinguitur aequalitas miscibilium in mixto *a pondere* et *a iustitia*.

en: See II *Sentences*, d. 17, a. 2, q. 3, where the equality of the miscible elements in a compound is distinguished *by weight* and *by justice*.

la: In Prologo in Canticum canticorum, ubi, allata scientiarum distinctione in tres partes, scil. ethicam, physicam et theoricen (quam appellat *inspectivam*, i. e. qua supergressi visibilia de divinis aliquid et caelestibus contemplamur), notat, quod hanc divisionem sapientes Graecorum sumserunt a Salomone, utpote qui aetate et tempore longe ante ipsos prior eam per Dei spiritum didicerat. Subinde ait: Salomon ergo tres istas [disciplinas]... distinguere ab invicem ac secernere volens, tribus eas libellis edidit... Primo ergo in *Proverbiis* moralem docuit locum, succinctis, ut decuit, brevibusque sententiis vitae instituta componens. Secundam vero, quae naturalis appellatur, comprehendit in *Ecclesiaste*, in quo multa de rebus naturalibus disserens et inania ac vana ab utilibus necessariisque secernens, relinquendam vanitatem monet et utilia rectaque sectanda. Inspectivum quoque locum in hoc libello tradidit, qui habetur in manibus, id est in *Cantico canticorum*, in quo amorem caelestium divinorumque desiderium incutit animae sub specie sponsae ac sponsi, caritatis et amoris viis perveniendum docens ad consortium Dei.

en: In the Prologue on the Canticle of Canticles, where, having brought forward the division of the sciences into three parts — namely ethics, physics and theoric (which he calls *inspective*, that is, that by which, having passed beyond visible things, we contemplate something of divine and heavenly things) — he notes that the wise men of the Greeks took this division from Solomon, inasmuch as he had learned it before them, long prior in age and time, through the Spirit of God. Then he says: Solomon, therefore, wishing to distinguish and separate these three [disciplines] from one another, published them in three little books… First, then, in *Proverbs* he taught the moral part, composing, as was fitting, the institutes of life in terse and brief sentences. The second, which is called natural, he comprehended in *Ecclesiastes*, in which, discoursing much about natural things and separating the empty and vain from the useful and necessary, he warns that vanity is to be left behind and useful and right things pursued. The inspective part too he handed down in this little book which is in our hands, that is, in the *Canticle of Canticles*, in which he strikes into the soul the love of heavenly things and the desire of divine ones under the figure of bride and bridegroom, teaching that one must come to fellowship with God by the ways of charity and love.

la: Libr. I. in Somnium Scipionis, c. 8.

en: Book I *On the Dream of Scipio*, c. 8.

la: Enneadae primae libro II. de virtutibus (ed. Basileae 1580, pag. 13, n. 3. seqq.; secundum hanc ed. opera Plotini continentur 54 libris, in sex enneades distributis).

en: In the second book of the first Ennead, *On the Virtues* (ed. Basel 1580, p. 13, n. 3 ff.; according to this edition the works of Plotinus are contained in 54 books, distributed into six Enneads).

la: Virgil., VI. Aeneid. v. 664: Quique sui memores etc. — Mox contra textum originalem codd. prosequuntur: *Et est politici prudentia ad rationis* etc.

en: Virgil, VI *Aeneid*, v. 664: And they who by deserving made others mindful of them, etc. — Presently, against the original text, the codices continue: *And it is of the political man's prudence to the norm of reason*, etc.

la: In originali omittitur *moderamen vel*.

en: In the original *restraint or* is omitted.

la: Scilicet n. 25. 26.

en: Namely nn. 25 and 26.

la: Vox Graeca νοῦν.

en: The Greek word νοῦν. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin set from the IA djvu OCR of Tomus V (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`,
raw L62017–L62763) and checked page by page against the 450 dpi bands; **the whole apparatus is
read off the footer bands.** English translated literally and in parallel. Printed pp. 360–364,
PDF 436–440 (offset +76). Plate scouting banked and committed ahead of writing at
`manual-review/hex-c6-plate-scouting.md`.

**Span — a leaf edge at both ends.** Collatio VI opens at the **head of p. 360** (display
heading, two-line subtitle, Summarium to ~50 % of the leaf, body from ~54 %) and closes at the
foot of **p. 364** on *…Hucusque Plotinus.*; **`COLLATIO VII.` opens at the head of p. 365**,
verified on the band. **The third leaf-edge boundary in this work** (335 | 336, 359 | 360,
364 | 365). **Nothing inherited, nothing forwarded.**

**✅ `COLLATIO VI.` CARRIES NO APPARATUS ANCHOR.** Five openings read; only `COLLATIO I.` has one.

**★★★ THE SUMMARIUM'S PARAGRAPH REFERENCES RUN THREE SHORT FROM ITS ENTRY 16 TO THE END — AND
THE BODY HAS 32 NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS WHERE THE SUMMARIUM'S LAST REFERENCE IS 26.** This is the
third and by far the largest Summarium disagreement in the work (c2's unsummarised ¶ 34, c3's
five properties against six), and it is systematic rather than a slip:

| Summarium says | the body actually has |
|---|---|
| *De definitione et partibus singularum virtutum cardinalium*, **15** | ¶¶ **15–18** — one entry folded over four paragraphs |
| *Ortus et praestantia earundem*, **16** | ¶ **19** |
| *primo, lucis quatuor influentiis*, **17** | ¶ **20** |
| *Secundo, elementorum*, **18** | ¶ **21** |
| *Tertio, causarum … quarto, vitae salubritatibus*, **19** | ¶¶ **22–23** |
| *Ipsae fluunt … doctrina Salomonis*, **20** | ¶¶ **24–25** |
| *Pars II … Macrobio*, **21** | ¶ **26** |
| *Aliter Plotinus*, **22** | ¶ **27** |
| *Primo, de virtutibus politicis*, **23** | ¶¶ **28–29** |
| *Secundo, de purgatoriis*, **24** | ¶ **30** |
| *Tertio, de animi iam purgati*, **25** | ¶ **31** |
| *Quarto, de virtutibus exemplaribus*, **26** | ¶ **32** |

The content matches item for item; only the numbers are wrong, and they go wrong at exactly the
point where the editors folded ¶¶ 15–18 into one entry and then went on counting entries instead
of paragraphs. **Transcribed exactly as printed in both languages — Quaracchi is never silently
emended — and every reference is verified here so no later chunk has to re-derive it.**
⚠ **Consequence for the frozen rule:** the free mechanical check is the *body's* run of numbers,
never the Summarium's. Here the body runs **1..32 with no gaps**, identical in both languages.

**Gutters.** 360 = **1373** · 361 = **1173** · 362 = **1405** · 363 = **1167** · 364 = **1392**,
all taken from the direct band profile with the centre-rule island located. ★ p. 360 is a
**collatio-opening leaf** and its whole-page default came off a **38 px** run — the predicted
failure, since heading, subtitle and Summarium all cross the gutter. Profiled over the body rows
alone (.55–.77) it is a clean 60 px band and returns the same 1373. **The narrow run was the
trigger to look, and looking confirmed it; that is the rule working, not failing.**

**Registers, block split and anchor split — stated separately.**

| page | notes | block L / R | anchors L / R | relation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 360 | 6 | 5 / 1 | 3 / 3 | left overruns by two |
| 361 | 8 | 3 / 5 | 4 / 4 | left underruns by one |
| 362 | 8 | 5 / 3 | 4 / 4 | left overruns by one |
| 363 | 8 | 3 / 5 | 4 / 4 | left underruns by one |
| 364 | 6 | **0 / 6** | 3 / 3 | see below |

**36 entries owned.**

**★★ A FOOTER BLOCK CAN CARRY NO NUMBERED NOTE AT ALL — p. 364's left block is nothing but an
incoming runover.** p. 363 n. 8 (Origen's prologue on the Canticle, the longest note in the
chunk) breaks at the foot of p. 363's right block and continues **unnumbered** at the head of
p. 364's LEFT block — *docuit locum, succinctis, ut decuit, brevibusque sententiis…* — filling
it entirely, so that **all six of p. 364's own notes print in the right block** while three of
their anchors stand in the left column. This is the extreme case of the standing rule: block
extent says nothing about column, and here the block says nothing at all. **New shape in Vol V.**

**Runovers: four.** Three gutter-crossing (361 n. 3 · 362 n. 5 · 363 n. 3) and **one
page-crossing** (363 n. 8 → 364). **Checked negative: pp. 360, 361, 362 and 363 each open their
left block numbered ¹**; p. 364 does not. Nothing runs off p. 364 — n. 6 (*Vox Graeca νοῦν*)
closes complete and `COLLATIO VII.` opens on the next leaf.

**★ A DIGIT SETTLED BY A TARGET THAT DOES NOT EXIST.** p. 361 n. 3 ends `Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1.
p. I. **a. 1.** q. 1. seq. et dub. 2. seq.`; the raw gives `a. 4. q. 1.` The plate shows a serif
`1`, and the corpus settles it twice: **`II Sent. d. 1 p. I` has only three articles**, so `a. 4`
cannot be cited, and `bon-sent-II-d1-p1-a1-q2` is *Utrum mundus productus sit ab aeterno, an ex
tempore* — the exact question the note supports. ★ Also corrected against the raw: **¶ 22's
paragraph number** (the raw prints `24`, the plate `22`, and the body's own run requires 22).

**Page-break map.** 360 | 361 at ¶ 2 (*…quod nihil, vel* | *nullum particulare cognoscat*) ·
361 | 362 at ¶ 7, mid-word inside a Wisdom quotation (*…super omnem dispositionem stella-* |
*rum, luci comparata*) · 362 | 363 at ¶ 14 (*…Sic Sol iustitiae in oriente mentis* | *ponit
sinceritatem temperantiae*) · 363 | 364 at ¶ 25 (*…in Cantico canticorum.* | *Et in notitiam
istarum venerunt*, a fresh sentence inside the same unnumbered paragraph). **All four joints
read against the band; nothing dropped.**

**Paragraph map.** 360 = ¶¶ 1–2 · 361 = ¶¶ 2–7 · 362 = ¶¶ 7–14 · 363 = ¶¶ 14–25 ·
364 = ¶¶ 25–32.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body, transcribed here in body order):
*p. 360* — Introductio. · Repetitio. · Divisio lucis a tenebris. · Circa causam exemplarem
defecit Aristoteles.
*p. 361* — Errores inde sequentes. · Caecitas circa aeternitatem mundi. · Circa unitatem
intellectus. · Circa vitam aeternam. · De his erroribus in genere. · In Deo exemplar omnium. ·
Praecipue virtutum. · Virtutes 4 exemplares in Deo. · Celsitudo puritatis. · Pulcritudo
claritatis.
*p. 362* — Fortitudo virtutis. · Rectitudo diffusionis. · Notandum. · Inde oriuntur virtutes
cardinales. · Triplex ratio huius nominis. · Ratio 1. · Ratio 2. · Actus quatuor. · Ratio 3.
*p. 363* — Latera quatuor civitatis. · Temperantiae partes tres. · Item, prudentiae. · Item,
fortitudinis. · Item, iustitiae. · Notandum. · Simile. · Virtutes 12. · Hae respondent
quadrupliciter dispositioni mundi. · Primo, lucis influentiis 4. · Secundo, elementis 4. ·
Causis 4. · Vitae salubritatibus 4. · Reducunt in finem. · Tres gradus. · Docentur in Scriptura.
*p. 364* — Verba Macrobii de sententia aliquorum. · Definitiones sec. istos. · Melius Plotinus. ·
Divisio virtutum. · Primo, de politicis virtutibus. · De quatuor in specie. · Secundo, de
purgatoriis. · Tertio, de virtutibus animi iam purgati. · De exemplaribus.

**Register (additions; the c1–c5 freezes stand).**
- **★★ ALL THREE SENSES OF *medium* STAND INSIDE THIS ONE CHUNK, and each keeps the rendering
  its own freeze gave it.** ¶ 1's *in medio delativo* → **"in a conveying medium"** (c5) · ¶ 2's
  *in medio tamen diversificati sunt* → **"in the medium they nevertheless diverged"**, the c1
  sense of the *medium* between principle and end, which is the whole subject of the collatio ·
  ¶ 12's *medium duarum extremitatum* → **"the mean of two extremes"**, the ethical sense, under
  the exception recorded at c5. **The exception is reused, not widened.**
- **★ *caligo* → "gloom" HERE, against the Itinerarium c5 freeze ("darkness"), and deliberately:**
  in this work *tenebrae* is the Genesis word and has taken "darkness" in every chunk since c1
  (*divisit lucem a tenebris*). ¶ 4 sets *caecitas vel caligo* together, so the two need
  different English. Governing text wins over the earlier work's freeze; recorded so it is not
  re-decided.
- The four exemplary virtues, kept as a fixed formula wherever they recur (¶¶ 7, 8, 9, 10):
  *celsitudo puritatis · pulcritudo claritatis · fortitudo virtutis · rectitudo diffusionis* →
  "the loftiness of purity · the beauty of brightness · the fortitude of power · the rectitude of
  diffusion". ⚠ ***virtus* takes "virtue" throughout this collatio** — it is the collatio's
  subject — **except inside *fortitudo virtutis***, where the sense is God's power and "the
  fortitude of virtue" would say nothing.
- Their four impressions: *sinceritas temperantiae · serenitas prudentiae · stabilitas
  constantiae · suavitas iustitiae* → "the sincerity of temperance · the serenity of prudence ·
  the stability of constancy · the sweetness of justice".
- *modus* → **"measure"** (Augustine's *modus animi*; "mode" would lose the poise the note's
  *librat* describes) · *auriga* → "charioteer" · *integrantes virtutes* → "integrating virtues"
  · *modificare · rectificare · ordinare · stabilire* → "to modify · to rectify · to order · to
  stabilize" · *circumincedunt* → **"mutually interpenetrate one another"** (the Itinerarium c3
  freeze) · *cardines* → "hinges" (so that *cardinales* → "cardinal" keeps its etymology visible
  where ¶ 14 makes the point).
- *aequalitas numerosa* → **"numerous equality"**, following `bon-itin-c2`, where the same
  Augustinian definition was first rendered.
- *exemplaritas* → "exemplarity" · *virtutes purgatoriae* → "purgatorial virtues" ·
  *animi iam purgati* → "of the soul already purged" · *defaecatus* → "cleansed" ·
  *inspectiva* → "inspective" (Origen's *theorice*, the apparatus glossing it).
- **The Greek is not normalised:** ¶ 32 prints *quam diximus **νοῦν** vocari* with the accusative,
  and n. 6 is nothing but *Vox Graeca νοῦν*. Kept as printed, exactly as the Itinerarium
  scholion's τοῦ was.

**Census/ledger.** One line appended to `manual-review/vol5-runover-ledger.tsv` for `bon-hex-c6`:
three gutter-crossing runovers and one page-crossing.

**Hand-off to `bon-hex-c7`.** **Nothing is forwarded.** `COLLATIO VII.` opens at the head of
**p. 365**; its subtitle reads *De prima visione tractatio quarta, quae est de triplici defectu
virtutum in philosophis, secundo, de fide sanante, rectificante, ordinante*, and its Summarium
runs well down the leaf — **so expect the collatio-opening gutter failure on p. 365 and profile
below the Summarium.** ⚠ Its span is unknown: fix the far end from the next real `COLLATIO VIII.`
header on the band, never from a running head.