title: Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1

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## ARTICULUS II.
### *Utrum originale transfundatur mediante carne.*

Consequenter circa secundum principale, quo scilicet quaerebatur, utrum originale transfundatur mediante carne, procedendum est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum anima possit infici a carne.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc sit ex voluntate aliqua et appetitu animae.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum talis infectio fiat ex propagatione, vel libidine.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum anima possit infici a carne.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima inficiatur a carne. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per auctoritatem Apostoli ad Romanos septimo[^1]: *Scio, quod non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum*; ibi Glossa: « Corruptio per conditionem offensionis manet in corpore, robur tenens divinae sententiae datae in Adam, cuius consortio anima maculatur peccato ». Ex hoc expresse colligitur, quod caro inficit spiritum.

2. *Item*, Augustinus *de Verbis Apostoli*[^2]: « Vitium concupiscentiae est, quod anima pertraxit ex carne ».

3. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Peccatum originale inest homini ex hoc, quod traducitur ex primo parente, in quo omnes posteri dicuntur peccasse; sed non dicitur filius nasci ex patre nisi solummodo ratione carnis, quam ex eo trahit[^3]: ergo si anima efficitur peccatrix, hoc est a corruptione carnis.

4. *Item*, nulla proprietas traducitur ab uno in alterum, nisi mediante aliqua substantia deferente, quae sit communis utrique[^4]; sed nulla substantia est communis patri et proli nisi sola carnis substantia: ergo impossibile est, peccatum patris in animam filii descendere, nisi mediante carne.

5. *Item*, mala dispositio, existens in corpore, potest inducere oblivionem in memoriam et dementiam in intelligentiam: ergo pari ratione in voluntatem potest inducere concupiscentiam; sed concupiscentia in anima est peccatum originale, sicut ostensum fuit supra[^5]: ergo caro potest facere animam peccatricem.

6. *Item*, anima iuncta carni passibili efficitur passibilis et dolens: ergo pari ratione, coniuncta carni infectae et lascivae maculatur et efficitur concupiscens: si ergo concupiscentia peccatum est, patet etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*, capitulo septimo[^6]: « Non est magis culpa in semine, quam sit in sputo, vel sanguine, si quis mala voluntate exspuit, aut ex sanguine suo aliquid emittit »:
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ergo si nihil potest dare alii quod non habet, videtur, quod caro non possit animam inficere.

2. *Item*, Augustinus in sexto *Musicae*[^7]: « Omne agens praestantius est patiente, et efficiens materia »; sed anima praestantior est carne: ergo nullo modo caro potest in animam agere, ergo nec ipsam inficere.

3. *Item*, sicut vult Philosophus[^8] « necesse est, agens et patiens in materia communicare »; sed caro et anima non communicant in materia: ergo caro non potest agere in animam, ergo nec ipsam corrumpere.

4. *Item*, multo spiritualior est anima quam radius; sed radius ex coniunctione sui ad corpora immunda non habet infici: ergo nec anima ex coniunctione ad carnem infectam potest infici[^9].

5. *Item*, nulla corruptio maior est in effectu, quam sit in causa; sed corruptio, quae est in carne, non est corruptio culpabilis, « quia culpa, ut dicit Anselmus[^10], est in sola voluntate »: si ergo minima culpa peior est quam quantacumque poena et plus habet de ratione mali, sicut Augustinus in *Sermone de Innocentibus* dicit; igitur ex poenali infectione carnis impossibile est culpam in anima generari.

6. *Item*, corruptio, quae est in carne, aut est poena, aut culpa. Non culpa; hoc constat. Si poena: ergo iusta est; sed nihil iustum est causa iniusti secundum quod huiusmodi: ergo corruptio, quae est in carne, cum sit poena, non poterit esse principium inficiendi animam culpa.

### Conclusio.

> *Anima contrahit peccatum originale mediante carne.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio, sicut dicunt Sancti, et tenent doctores, quod[^11] anima contrahit peccatum originale mediante carne. — Quomodo autem hoc possit intelligi, nituntur ad hoc diversi diversimode.

Quidam enim dicunt, quod ex hoc ipso, quod anima unitur carni mortali et passibili, quam non potest regere, efficitur concupiscens; et sic contrahit maculam originalis culpae, quia ipsa concupiscentia sive necessitas concupiscentiae reddit animam perversam. Et quoniam caro mortalis habet propagari ex carne mortali, et mortalitas fuit in carne primi parentis propter peccatum inobedientiae; hinc est, quod originale peccatum dicitur in nos transire a primo parente. Et hoc ex ipsius Hugonis verbis extrahunt, qui dicit in septima parte, prima distinctione libri sui[^12], ubi ait sic: « Quia caro mortalitate percussa est, ipsa sui languoris infirmitate dissoluta, extra mensuram primae dispositionis desideria sua extendit ». « Quia ergo caro humana a parentibus cum mortalitate seminatur, in eo ipso quod seminata subiacet mortalitati, vivificata postmodum, carnalis concupiscentiae subiecta invenitur necessitati; unde ipsa mortalitatis infirmitas causa est, quam sequitur[^13] concupiscens necessitas ». Hucusque verba Hugonis, quae videntur illud dicere quod prius dictum est. — Sed quoniam in Christo fuit mortalitatis infirmitas, nec tamen fuit in eo concupiscentia vel originalis culpa; non videtur istud plene satisfacere, nec totam causam, quare caro inficit animam, assignare. Esto enim, quod aliquod corpus a fomite purificaretur, remanente tamen mortalitate, sicut fuit in beata Virgine; si anima tali corpori iungeretur, non videtur, quod contraheret originale, licet illud corpus sit passibile et mortale.

Et ideo alii aliter dicere voluerunt, quod cum peccatum originale non sit positio vel aliqua essentia, sed potius privatio et iustitiae carentia; non contrahit illud anima a carne, ita quod caro aliquid in animam agat vel influat, sed quia praebet ipsi animae obstaculum, ratione cuius anima debita iustitia privatur, et privata illa iustitia impetu concupiscentiae deorsum fertur, cum non habeat retinaculum; et ita concupiscentia sequitur ex debitae iustitiae carentia, et sic debitae iustitiae carentia praecedit ipsam concupiscentiam per naturam. Praebet autem caro ipsi animae obstaculum vel offendiculum, ut non habeat illam iustitiam, ex hoc quod propagata est a primo parente. Unde ex coniunctione animae ad talem carnem ille qui nascitur, dicitur esse filius Adae; et quia Adam offendit Deum non tantum pro se, sed etiam in[^14] tota sua posteritate: hinc est, quod anima hoc ipso, quod tali carni coniungitur et spectat ad genus Adae, indigna efficitur, ut Deus sibi iustitiam apponat; et cum illam debeat habere et non habeat, culpabilis est et rea, et per consequens efficitur concupiscens et vana, sicut manus paralytica ex dissolutione virtutis regitivae efficitur
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tremulosa. Et illud videtur trahi ex verbis Anselmi *de Conceptu virginali*, capitulo quinto[^15], ubi ait: « Non est iniustitia talis res, qua inficiatur et corrumpatur anima, velut corpus veneno, et quae faciat aliquid, sicut videtur, quando malitiosus homo mala facit opera. Nam quemadmodum, cum indomita fera, ruptis vinculis, discurrendo saevit, et navis, si gubernator, dimisso gubernaculo, dimittit eam ventis et motibus maris, vagatur et invehitur in quaelibet pericula, dicimus, quod hoc facit absentia catenae aut gubernaculi, non quod absentia horum aliquid sit: sic cum malus saevit, clamamus, quia operatur iniustitia, non quod ipsa sit ulla essentia ». Et iterum, infra capitulo vigesimo tertio: « Spoliavit persona naturam bono iustitiae in Adam, et natura, egens facta, omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et iniustas facit. Hoc modo transit peccatum personale Adae in omnes, qui de illo personaliter[^16] propagantur ». Ex his verbis videtur colligi posse intellectus, qui prius dictus est. — Sed tamen adhuc illud non videtur plene intellectui satisfacere, quia, esto quod anima illa, quae creatur in corpore, extra corpus crearetur, et nihil ultra sibi daretur, quam datur, cum corpori infunditur; non diceretur habere originale peccatum, immo pura esset et innocens; igitur oportet intelligere, quod aliquo modo corruptio redundet in animam ex carne.

Et propter hoc est tertius modus intelligendi, quod in carne Adae propter peccatum duplex fuit corruptio. Una scilicet purae poenalitatis; et ex hac anima, cum coniungitur corpori, contrahit passibilitatem. Alia vero fuit corruptio vitiositatis sive foeditatis, per quam caro est spiritui rebellis; et ex hac anima contrahit culpam originalem, quoniam talis vitiositas quasi medium tenet inter culpam et poenam. Et hoc est quod Magister dicit in littera[^17], et quod sonant sacrae Scripturae verba, quod ex fervore coitus parentum et concupiscentia libidinosa contrahit caro foeditatem quandam, cum concipitur, quae est causa originalis peccati, et recte vitium sive corruptio carnis appellari potest.

Ad intelligendum autem, quomodo anima possit infici corruptione culpabili ex tali foeditate, haec tria supponenda sunt tanquam manifesta: quorum unum est, quod foeditas carnis potest facere carnem rebellem spiritui; quod patuit in Adam, qui post peccatum sensit carnis suae rebellionem[^18]. Secundum est illud, quod anima, unita carni, propter coniunctionem ipsius ad carnem vel trahit eam sursum, vel ab ipsa trahitur deorsum, propter vinculum, quod est ipsius carnis ad animam[^19]. Tertium est illud, quod anima propria virtute non potest regere carnem rebellem, nisi iuvetur per divinam gratiam, secundum quod Apostolus[^20] exclamat: *Infelix ego homo* etc. — Ex his igitur tribus suppositionibus necessario sequitur, quodsi anima tali carni unitur, quod ab ipsa trahitur *deorsum* et per concupiscentiam *incurvatur*. Sed *animam incurvari* non est aliud, quam *eam perverti*[^21]; perversitas autem in substantia rationali, quae est capax iustitiae, non est aliud quam iniustitia et culpa. Ex hoc igitur clarum est, quod foeditas, quae est in carne, potest animam sibi unitam facere peccatricem. Et quia ista foeditas a primo parente habet traduci in omnes posteros genitos secundum legem propagationis; hinc est, quod mediante carne ad omnes transfundit originale.

Hoc autem melius explanatur per evidentiam exemplorum. Videmus[^22] enim, quod caro de se non dolet, nec est in ea passio doloris ante adventum animae, quamvis in ea possit esse incisio. Ponatur igitur, animam uniri carni incisae et laesae, statim, cum ei unitur, habet dolorem; et dicimus, dolorem aggenerari in anima, non incisionem. Si igitur carnis incisio potest facere animam dolentem, quare non similiter carnis quaedam foedatio et resolutio faciat animam lascivam et concupiscentem, quamdiu habitet in carne? — *Item*, esto quod aliquod corpus esset ad rationis usum ineptum, sicut est corpus in ea dispositione, quam habet phreneticus et furiosus; in tali corpore nec dicitur esse furia nec ignorantia, sed quaedam dispositio mala. Si tamen anima tali corpori infunderetur, statim efficeretur ignorans et furiosa, quamdiu esset in carne illa[^23]. Quare non similiter possumus intelligere et in concupiscentia? — *Rursus*, esto quod aliquod membrum formaretur ad motum et regimen animae ineptum et inhabile, utpote in ea complexione, quam habet membrum paralyticum; statim, cum virtus motiva uniretur illi membro, diceretur, ibi esse morbus paralysis, et esset virtutis dissolutio et per consequens tremulatio. Virtutis autem dissolutio non esset quantum ad corruptionem ipsius virtutis motivae in se, sed quantum ad ineptitudinem organi, quod debet regi ab illa virtute. — Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod
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in corpore ante adventum animae non est actualiter morbus culpae; sed iuncta anima, quae debet ipsum corpus regere, propter carnis ineptitudinem caret anima rectitudine virtutis regitivae, et illa carens, tremulosa efficitur per actum concupiscentiae. — Et sic patet, quod valde est verisimile, quod originale possit contrahi in anima ex carne.

Ad dissolutionem autem obiectorum praenotandum est, quod tripliciter dicitur aliquid agere in alterum: uno modo per *praedominantiam*, sicut contrarium agit in suum contrarium; alio modo per *influentiam*, sicut corpus superius[^24] agit in haec inferiora; tertio modo per *colligantiam*, sicut quando duo ita sunt unita, quod unum trahit ad se alterum et communicat alteri proprietates suas. Cum ergo dicimus, *carnem inficere animam*, hoc intelligitur quantum ad tertium modum agendi, scilicet propter *colligantiam*, quam habet ad animam, propter quam, dum deorsum tendit, eam secum trahit; ut enim dicit Gregorius[^25], quod « qui labenti innititur, necesse est, ut cum labente labatur ». His visis, patent ea quae obiecta sunt.

1. Ad illud enim quod dicit Anselmus, quod peccatum non est in semine; dicendum, quod hoc dicit quantum ad existentiam actualem ipsius peccati, quod quidem est deformitas aspiciens ipsam voluntatem sicut subiectum proprium; non autem vult negare, quin ibi sit *causa* peccati, immo asserit, sicut patet ex verbis suis sequentibus[^26].

2. Ad illud Augustini, quod omne agens praestantius est patiente; dicendum, quod intelligit de agente per *influentiam*; per hunc autem modum in originalis contractione non dicimus carnem agere in animam, sicut praedictum est.

3. Ad illud Philosophi, quod agens et patiens debent communicare in materia; dicendum, quod ipse intelligit de actione, qua contrarium agit in contrarium per *praedominantiam*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multo spiritualior est anima quam radius; dicendum, quod etsi[^27] spiritualior, tamen magis est alligata carni, quam radius aeri sive corpori illuminato; ideo magis contrahit eius proprietates, sive *passibilitatis* sive *foeditatis*, quam radius contrahat proprietates illuminabilis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est maior corruptio in effectu quam in causa; dicendum, quod illud dupliciter fallit. Primo, quando aliquid non se habet in ratione perfectae causalitatis, sed solum ratione instrumenti et deferentis. Nam si velimus comparare corruptionem animae parvuli ad primam causam, videlicet animam Adae, reperiretur in Adam aeque magna vel maior. — Deficit etiam ex hoc, quod magnitudo corruptionis intenditur frequenter ex nobilitate et dignitate corruptibilis, quia tanto maius est vitium, et corruptio peior, quanto natura praestantior, sicut Augustinus[^28] dicit; et hinc est, quod quando anima corrumpitur a carne, maior est in ea corruptio, quam in carne fuerit; et hoc est ratione nobilitatis subiecti.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod poena non est causa culpae; dicendum, quod verum est de illo quod est pure poena. Talis autem corruptio vitiosa in Adam subsecuta est ex culpa, quia ex hoc, quod peccavit, caro eius dissoluta est, non solum dissolutione ordinante[^29] ad mortem, sed etiam faciente rebellionem, et faciente concupiscere quod non licet; et ideo, quia talis vitiositas et a culpa est et ad culpam, potest quodam modo causare peccatum in anima. Hoc autem non facit aliquid ipsi animae impartiendo, sed potius rebellando, et ideo subtrahendo[^30]. — Et hoc modo intellexit Magister, animam infici a carne, et traxit hoc ex verbis Augustini; et his verbis consonant verba Anselmi. Non enim vult Anselmus dicere, quod carentia debitae iustitiae praecedat necessitatem concupiscendi, cum e contrario sit ordine naturali; eo enim ipso anima privatur illa iustitia, quo necessitatem concupiscendi habet ex carne coniuncta; sed hoc intelligit quantum ad actum concupiscendi. Similiter verba Hugonis non[^31] intelligenda sunt, quod caro inficiat animam solum ratione passibilitatis, sed etiam ratione adiunctae foeditatis et vitiositatis, quam in semine esse manifestat ipsa corruptio, quae sentitur in actu generativae virtutis[^32], et in membris illis residet principaliter, quamvis omnia alia ita sint passibilia, sicut illa.
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## Article II.
### *Whether original [sin] is transmitted by means of the flesh.*

Next we must proceed to the second principal [question], namely that in which it was asked whether original [sin] is transmitted by means of the flesh. And concerning this three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether the soul can be infected by the flesh.

Second it is asked whether this comes about from some will and appetite of the soul.

Third it is asked whether such infection comes about from propagation, or from lust.

### Question I.
### *Whether the soul can be infected by the flesh.*

Concerning the first we proceed thus, and it is asked whether the soul is infected by the flesh. And that it is, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Apostle to the Romans, chapter seven[^1]: *I know that there does not dwell in me, that is in my flesh, anything good*; there the Gloss [says]: "Corruption, by the condition of the offense, remains in the body, retaining the force of the divine sentence given in Adam, by whose fellowship the soul is stained with sin." From this it is expressly gathered that the flesh infects the spirit.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine *On the Words of the Apostle*[^2]: "The vice of concupiscence is that which the soul has drawn out of the flesh."

3. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to follow] *by reason*. Original sin is in man from the fact that it is transmitted from the first parent, in whom all his descendants are said to have sinned; but a son is not said to be born of a father except only by reason of the flesh, which he draws from him[^3]: therefore if the soul becomes a sinner, this is from the corruption of the flesh.

4. *Likewise*, no property is transmitted from one to another except by means of some conveying substance which is common to both[^4]; but no substance is common to father and offspring except the substance of the flesh alone: therefore it is impossible that the sin of the father descend into the soul of the son, except by means of the flesh.

5. *Likewise*, a bad disposition existing in the body can induce forgetfulness in the memory and dementia in the understanding: therefore by parity of reasoning it can induce concupiscence in the will; but concupiscence in the soul is original sin, as was shown above[^5]: therefore the flesh can make the soul a sinner.

6. *Likewise*, the soul joined to passible flesh becomes passible and suffering: therefore by parity of reasoning, joined to infected and lascivious flesh it is stained and becomes concupiscent: if then concupiscence is sin, the point is clear, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Anselm *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter seven[^6]: "There is no more fault in the seed than there is in spittle or blood, if someone with an evil will spits, or emits something from his blood":
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therefore, if nothing can give to another what it does not have, it seems that the flesh cannot infect the soul.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine in the sixth [book] of *Music*[^7]: "Every agent is more excellent than what it acts upon, and the efficient [more excellent] than the matter"; but the soul is more excellent than the flesh: therefore in no way can the flesh act upon the soul, therefore neither can it infect it.

3. *Likewise*, as the Philosopher holds[^8], "it is necessary that the agent and the patient share in matter"; but the flesh and the soul do not share in matter: therefore the flesh cannot act upon the soul, therefore neither can it corrupt it.

4. *Likewise*, the soul is much more spiritual than a ray [of light]; but a ray, from its conjunction to unclean bodies, is not infected: therefore neither is the soul, from its conjunction to infected flesh, able to be infected[^9].

5. *Likewise*, no corruption is greater in the effect than it is in the cause; but the corruption which is in the flesh is not a culpable corruption, "since fault, as Anselm says[^10], is in the will alone": if then the least fault is worse than any punishment whatsoever and has more of the character of evil, as Augustine says in the *Sermon on the Innocents*; therefore from the penal infection of the flesh it is impossible for fault to be generated in the soul.

6. *Likewise*, the corruption which is in the flesh is either punishment or fault. Not fault; this is established. If punishment: then it is just; but nothing just is the cause of the unjust insofar as it is such: therefore the corruption which is in the flesh, since it is punishment, cannot be the principle of infecting the soul with fault.

### Conclusion.

> *The soul contracts original sin by means of the flesh.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt, as the Saints say and the doctors hold, that[^11] the soul contracts original sin by means of the flesh. — But as to how this may be understood, various [authors] strive [to explain it] in various ways.

For some say that from this very fact, that the soul is united to mortal and passible flesh which it cannot govern, it becomes concupiscent; and so it contracts the stain of original fault, because the concupiscence itself, or the necessity of concupiscence, renders the soul perverse. And since mortal flesh is propagated from mortal flesh, and mortality was in the flesh of the first parent on account of the sin of disobedience; hence it is that original sin is said to pass into us from the first parent. And this they draw from the very words of Hugh, who says in the seventh part, first distinction of his book[^12], where he speaks thus: "Because the flesh has been struck with mortality, dissolved by the very infirmity of its languor, it extends its desires beyond the measure of the first disposition." "Because, therefore, human flesh is sown by the parents with mortality, in this very fact that, sown, it lies subject to mortality, afterward being vivified, it is found subjected to the necessity of carnal concupiscence; whence the very infirmity of mortality is the cause which the concupiscent necessity follows[^13]." Thus far the words of Hugh, which seem to say that which was said before. — But since in Christ there was the infirmity of mortality, and yet there was not in him concupiscence or original fault; this does not seem to satisfy fully, nor to assign the whole cause why the flesh infects the soul. For suppose that some body were purified from the fomes, mortality nevertheless remaining, as was the case in the Blessed Virgin; if a soul were joined to such a body, it does not seem that it would contract original [sin], although that body be passible and mortal.

And therefore others wished to say otherwise, that since original sin is not a positive thing or some essence, but rather a privation and a lack of justice; the soul does not contract it from the flesh in such a way that the flesh acts upon or influences the soul in some way, but because it offers an obstacle to the soul itself, by reason of which the soul is deprived of its due justice, and, deprived of that justice, is borne downward by the impulse of concupiscence, since it has no restraint; and thus concupiscence follows from the lack of due justice, and thus the lack of due justice precedes the concupiscence itself by nature. Now the flesh offers to the soul itself an obstacle or stumbling-block, so that it does not have that justice, from the fact that it has been propagated from the first parent. Hence from the conjunction of the soul to such flesh the one who is born is called a son of Adam; and because Adam offended God not only for himself, but also in[^14] his whole posterity: hence it is that the soul, by this very fact, that it is joined to such flesh and belongs to the race of Adam, becomes unworthy that God should bestow justice upon it; and since it ought to have it and does not have it, it is culpable and guilty, and consequently becomes concupiscent and vain, just as a paralytic hand, from the dissolution of the governing power, becomes
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trembling. And this seems to be drawn from the words of Anselm *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter five[^15], where he says: "Such a thing is not injustice, by which the soul is infected and corrupted, as a body by poison, and which does something, as it seems, when a malicious man does evil works. For just as, when an untamed beast, its bonds broken, rages running about, and a ship, if the helmsman, having let go the rudder, abandons it to the winds and motions of the sea, wanders and is borne into any perils whatever, we say that absence of the chain or rudder does this, not that the absence of these is something: so when the evil man rages, we cry out that injustice is at work, not that it is itself any essence." And again, below, chapter twenty-three: "The person despoiled the nature of the good of justice in Adam, and the nature, made destitute, makes all the persons whom it procreates from itself sinners and unjust by the same destitution. In this way the personal sin of Adam passes into all who are personally[^16] propagated from him." From these words it seems that the understanding which was stated before can be gathered. — But nevertheless this still does not seem to satisfy the understanding fully, because, suppose that that soul which is created in the body were created outside the body, and nothing more were given to it than is given when it is infused into the body; it would not be said to have original sin, but rather would be pure and innocent; therefore one must understand that in some way the corruption redounds into the soul from the flesh.

And on account of this there is a third mode of understanding, that in the flesh of Adam, on account of sin, there was a twofold corruption. One, namely, of pure penality; and from this the soul, when it is joined to the body, contracts passibility. But the other was a corruption of viciousness or foulness, through which the flesh is rebellious to the spirit; and from this the soul contracts original fault, since such viciousness holds, as it were, a middle [position] between fault and punishment. And this is what the Master says in the text[^17], and what the words of Sacred Scripture sound forth, that from the fervor of the coitus of the parents and from libidinous concupiscence the flesh contracts a certain foulness when it is conceived, which is the cause of original sin, and can rightly be called the vice or corruption of the flesh.

Now in order to understand how the soul can be infected with a culpable corruption from such foulness, these three [things] must be supposed as manifest: of which one is that the foulness of the flesh can make the flesh rebellious to the spirit; which was evident in Adam, who after sin felt the rebellion of his flesh[^18]. The second is that the soul, united to the flesh, on account of its conjunction to the flesh, either draws it upward, or is drawn downward by it, on account of the bond which the flesh has to the soul[^19]. The third is that the soul cannot by its own power govern the rebellious flesh, unless it is helped by divine grace, according to which the Apostle[^20] cries out: *Unhappy man that I am*, etc. — From these three suppositions, therefore, it necessarily follows that if the soul is united to such flesh, [it follows] that it is drawn *downward* by it and is *bent* by concupiscence. But for *the soul to be bent* is nothing other than *for it to be perverted*[^21]; and perversity in a rational substance, which is capable of justice, is nothing other than injustice and fault. From this, therefore, it is clear that the foulness which is in the flesh can make the soul united to it a sinner. And because this foulness is transmitted from the first parent into all his descendants begotten according to the law of propagation; hence it is that by means of the flesh it transmits original [sin] to all.

But this is better explained through the evidence of examples. For we see[^22] that the flesh of itself does not suffer, nor is there in it a passion of pain before the coming of the soul, although there can be a cut in it. Suppose then that the soul is united to cut and wounded flesh: immediately, when it is united to it, it has pain; and we say that the pain is generated in the soul, not the cut. If then a cut of the flesh can make the soul suffer, why does not likewise a certain foulness and dissolution of the flesh make the soul lascivious and concupiscent, as long as it dwells in the flesh? — *Likewise*, suppose that some body were unfit for the use of reason, as is a body in that disposition which the frenzied and the furious have; in such a body there is said to be neither fury nor ignorance, but a certain bad disposition. If, however, a soul were infused into such a body, it would immediately become ignorant and furious, as long as it were in that flesh[^23]. Why can we not understand it likewise also in the case of concupiscence? — *Again*, suppose that some member were formed unfit and unsuited for the motion and governance of the soul, namely in that complexion which a paralytic member has; immediately, when the motive power were united to that member, it would be said that the disease of paralysis is there, and there would be a dissolution of the power and consequently trembling. But the dissolution of the power would not be with respect to the corruption of the motive power itself in itself, but with respect to the unfitness of the organ, which ought to be governed by that power. — So also in the matter at hand it must be understood that
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in the body, before the coming of the soul, there is not actually the disease of fault; but once the soul is joined, which ought to govern the body itself, on account of the unfitness of the flesh the soul lacks the rectitude of the governing power, and, lacking that, it becomes trembling through the act of concupiscence. — And so it is clear that it is highly probable that original [sin] can be contracted in the soul from the flesh.

Now for the dissolution of the objections it must be noted beforehand that something is said to act upon another in three ways: in one way by *predominance*, as a contrary acts upon its contrary; in another way by *influence*, as a higher body[^24] acts upon these lower [things]; in a third way by *binding-together*, as when two [things] are so united that one draws the other to itself and communicates its properties to the other. When therefore we say that *the flesh infects the soul*, this is understood with respect to the third mode of acting, namely on account of the *binding-together* which it has to the soul, on account of which, while it tends downward, it draws [the soul] along with it; for as Gregory says[^25], that "he who leans on one who is falling, must needs fall with the one falling." These things seen, those things which were objected are clear.

1. To that which Anselm says, that sin is not in the seed; it must be said that he says this with respect to the actual existence of the sin itself, which indeed is a deformity regarding the will itself as its proper subject; but he does not wish to deny that there is there the *cause* of sin, rather he asserts it, as is clear from his subsequent words[^26].

2. To that of Augustine, that every agent is more excellent than what it acts upon; it must be said that he understands it of an agent acting by *influence*; but in this mode, in the contraction of original [sin], we do not say that the flesh acts upon the soul, as was said before.

3. To that of the Philosopher, that agent and patient must share in matter; it must be said that he understands it of the action by which a contrary acts upon a contrary by *predominance*.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul is much more spiritual than a ray; it must be said that, although[^27] it is more spiritual, nevertheless it is more bound to the flesh than a ray is to the air or to an illuminated body; therefore it contracts its properties, whether of *passibility* or of *foulness*, more than a ray contracts the properties of the illuminable [body].

5. To that which is objected, that there is not greater corruption in the effect than in the cause; it must be said that this fails in two ways. First, when something is not related in the character of a perfect causality, but only in the character of an instrument and conveyor. For if we wished to compare the corruption of the soul of an infant to the first cause, namely the soul of Adam, [a corruption] equally great or greater would be found in Adam. — It also fails on this account, that the magnitude of the corruption is frequently intensified by the nobility and dignity of the corruptible, since the vice is so much the greater, and the corruption the worse, the more excellent the nature, as Augustine[^28] says; and hence it is that, when the soul is corrupted by the flesh, the corruption is greater in it than it was in the flesh; and this is by reason of the nobility of the subject.

6. To that which is objected, that punishment is not the cause of fault; it must be said that this is true of that which is purely punishment. But such a vicious corruption in Adam followed from fault, because from the fact that he sinned, his flesh was dissolved, not only by a dissolution ordaining[^29] [him] to death, but also by one causing rebellion and causing [him] to desire what is not licit; and therefore, because such viciousness is both from fault and toward fault, it can in a certain way cause sin in the soul. But it does this not by imparting something to the soul itself, but rather by rebelling, and therefore by withdrawing[^30]. — And in this way the Master understood the soul to be infected by the flesh, and he drew this from the words of Augustine; and with these words the words of Anselm agree. For Anselm does not wish to say that the lack of due justice precedes the necessity of concupiscence, since on the contrary it is so in the natural order; for by this very fact the soul is deprived of that justice, by which it has the necessity of concupiscence from the conjoined flesh; but he understands this with respect to the act of concupiscence. Likewise the words of Hugh are not[^31] to be understood [to mean] that the flesh infects the soul only by reason of passibility, but also by reason of the adjoined foulness and viciousness, which the very corruption — which is felt in the act of the generative power[^32], and resides principally in those members — manifests to be in the seed, although all the other [members] are just as passible as those.
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la: Vers. 18: *Scio enim, quia non* etc. — Glossam, quae sumta est ex Commentario, Ambrosio tributo, super hunc locum, exhibent Strabus et Lyranus sub v. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: Verse 18: *For I know that there does not* etc. — The Gloss, which is taken from the Commentary attributed to Ambrose on this passage, Strabo and Lyranus give under v. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: In hoc textu, de quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5, Vat. *pertraxit* mutavit in *contraxit*, ut habet Magister; sed infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1, ipsa Vat. et omnes codd. et edd. habent *pertrahit*. Codd. I bb pro *ex carne* substituunt *a carne*.

en: In this text, on which see here the text of the Master, c. 5, the Vatican edition changed *pertraxit* (drew out) into *contraxit* (contracted), as the Master has it; but below, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, fundamentum 1, the Vatican edition itself and all the codices and editions have *pertrahit*. Codices I, bb substitute *a carne* (from the flesh) for *ex carne* (out of the flesh).

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3.

la: Vide supra pag. 26, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 26, note 5.

la: Dist. 30. a. 2. q. 1. — De prima huius arg. propositione, in qua Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 pro *in corpore* substituerunt *in carne*, vide supra d. 25. p. II. q. 6.

en: Dist. 30, a. 2, q. 1. — Concerning the first proposition of this argument, in which the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 substituted *in carne* (in the flesh) for *in corpore* (in the body), see above, d. 25, p. II, q. 6.

la: Textus originalis hic: *Non tamen magis est in semine culpa, quam est in sputo... aut de sanguine suo aliquid emittit.* — Ratio in conclusione addita, scil. *si nihil potest dare* etc., insinuatur ab Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.).

en: The original text here: *Yet there is no more fault in the seed than there is in spittle... or [if] he emits something of his blood.* — The reason added in the conclusion, namely *if nothing can give* etc., is intimated by Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* II, c. 3 (c. 22).

la: Cap. 5. n. 8, ubi animam corpore meliorem esse docens ait: *Sed perabsurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquo modo animam subdere. Nunquam enim anima est corpore deterior, et omnis materia fabricatore deterior* etc. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.) dicit: *Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia.*

en: Chapter 5, n. 8, where, teaching that the soul is better than the body, he says: *But it is utterly absurd that the soul should in any way be subjected as matter to the body which is its maker. For the soul is never inferior to the body, and all matter is inferior to its maker* etc. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 19 (c. 5), says: *For the agent is always more honorable than the patient, and the principle [more honorable] than the matter.*

la: Libr. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 53, (c. 7.). Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 52. (c. 3. circa finem).

en: *On Generation and Corruption*, Book I, text 53 (c. 7). Cf. *On the Soul* I, text 52 (c. 3, near the end).

la: Codd. K T W Y bb ee et alii *inficiari*.

en: Codices K, T, W, Y, bb, ee and others [read] *inficiari* (to be infected).

la: *De Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc.* c. 3. — Testimonium Augustini, quod mox respicitur, habetur in Serm. 220. (in Appendice; alias 10. de Sanctis) n. 3, ubi distinguitur inter *malum pati* et *malum esse*, et illud huic praeferendum esse docetur. Cfr. Serm. 294. (alias 14. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 6. n. 6. et Serm. 95. n. 5.

en: *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin*, c. 3. — The testimony of Augustine, which is referred to shortly after, is found in Sermon 220 (in the Appendix; otherwise 10, On the Saints), n. 3, where a distinction is made between *to suffer evil* and *to be evil*, and the former is taught to be preferred to the latter. Cf. Sermon 294 (otherwise 14, On the Words of the Apostle) c. 6, n. 6, and Sermon 95, n. 5.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit *quod*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, omits *quod* (that).

la: Scil. *de Sacram.* c. 31. Ultima huius loci propositio in textu originali sic sonat: *quia ipsa mortalitatis infirmitas causa est, quam consequitur concupiscendi necessitas.*

en: Namely, *On the Sacraments*, c. 31. The last proposition of this passage in the original text runs thus: *because the very infirmity of mortality is the cause which the necessity of being concupiscent follows.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, *et ita sequitur concupiscentiam.*

en: The editions, except for 1, [read] *and so it follows concupiscence.*

la: Cod. F et ed. 1 *pro*.

en: Codex F and edition 1 [read] *pro* (for).

la: Circa medium loci ex Anselmo allati textus originalis inter verba *et navis* interiicit *cum*, et deinde aliquanto inferius post *aliquid sit* non pauca addens prosequitur sic: *aut quidquam faciat; sed quoniam si adessent, facerent, ne saeviret fera, aut periret navis, ita cum malus homo saevit et in quaelibet animae suae pericula, quae sunt mala opera, impellitur, clamamus, quia haec operatur iniustitia* etc. — Edd. cum pluribus codd. perperam *iniustitiam* pro *iniustitia*.

en: Around the middle of the passage cited from Anselm, the original text inserts *cum* between the words *et navis* (and a ship), and then somewhat further down, after *aliquid sit* (it is something), adding not a few [words] continues thus: *or does anything; but since, if they were present, they would cause the beast not to rage, or the ship not to perish, so when an evil man rages and is driven into any perils whatever of his soul, which are evil works, we cry out that injustice does these things* etc. — The editions with several codices wrongly [read] *iniustitiam* for *iniustitia*.

la: Textus originalis *naturaliter*. Post *personale Adae* cod. I sic prosequitur: *quia omnes de illo personaliter propagamur.*

en: The original text [reads] *naturaliter* (naturally). After *personale Adae* (Adam's personal [sin]) codex I continues thus: *because we are all propagated from him personally.*

la: Hic c. 4. seq. Verba sacrae Scripturae, quae hic respiciuntur, insinuantur ibid. — De praecedenti propositione et S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. ad 4. cfr. hic dub. 1.

en: Here, c. 4 following. The words of Sacred Scripture which are referred to here are intimated in the same place. — Concerning the preceding proposition and St. Thomas, [see] here, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; cf. here, dubium 1.

la: Cfr. Gen. 3, 7.

en: Cf. Genesis 3, 7.

la: Quare Sap. 9, 15. dicitur: *Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam* etc.

en: Wherefore Wisdom 9, 15 says: *For the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul* etc.

en: Romans 7, 24.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 124, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 124, note 3.

la: Plures codd., ut H I V Z, cum edd. 2, 3 *Videtur*.

en: Several codices, such as H, I, V, Z, with editions 2, 3, [read] *Videtur* (it seems).

la: Vide supra d. 25. p. II. q. 6.

en: See above, d. 25, p. II, q. 6.

la: Nempe corpora caelestia. Cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius post *suum contrarium* cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt: *ut calidum in frigidum, et humidum in siccum*, quae duo secundum Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 8. (c. 2.), sunt primae activae et passivae contrarietates elementorum.

en: Namely, the celestial bodies. Cf. above, d. 2, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 14, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, after *suum contrarium* (its contrary), codex cc and edition 1 add: *as the hot into the cold, and the moist into the dry*, which two, according to Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II, text 8 (c. 2), are the first active and passive contrarieties of the elements.

la: Haec sententia habetur in Richard. a S. Vict., *de Gradibus caritatis*, c. 4.

en: This sentence is found in Richard of St. Victor, *On the Degrees of Charity*, c. 4.

la: Loc. cit. cap. 7: *Non enim sputum aut sanguis, sed mala voluntas arguitur. Patet igitur, quomodo et in infantibus non statim ab ipsa conceptione sit peccatum, et vera sint quae de divina Scriptura opposui. Quippe non est in illis peccatum, quia non habent (sine qua non inest peccatum) voluntatem; et tamen dicitur inesse, quoniam in semine trahunt peccandi (cum homines iam erunt) necessitatem.*

en: Loc. cit., chapter 7: *For it is not the spittle or the blood, but the evil will that is convicted. It is clear, therefore, how even in infants there is not sin immediately from the very conception, and how the things I objected from divine Scripture are true. For there is no sin in them, because they do not have (the will, without which sin is not present); and yet it is said to be present, since in the seed they draw the necessity of sinning (when they shall now be men).*

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 supplet *anima sit*, et in fine solut. sola subiungit *vel illuminati*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3, 4, supplies *anima sit* (the soul is), and at the end of the solution alone adds *vel illuminati* (or of the illuminated).

la: In Ioan. Evang. tr. 110. n. 7; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. de Natura boni, c. 3. seqq. de Quantit. animae, c. 34.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tract 110, n. 7; *On the City of God* XII, c. 1; *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 3 ff.; *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 34.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. *ordinationis*, codd. T bb ee et alii cum ed. 1 *ordinantis*, cod. A concordat cum nostra lectione.

en: The editions, except for 1, with several codices [read] *ordinationis*; codices T, bb, ee and others, with edition 1, [read] *ordinantis*; codex A agrees with our reading.

la: Hic c. 3. seqq. — Paulo superius *et ideo subtrahendo* revocavimus ex codd. I W Y Z cc ee et edd. 1, 2 pro *et Deo subtrahendo*, quam lectionem Vat. sibi adoptavit, cod. Q (a secunda manu) *et aliquid subtrahendo*. Paulo inferius post *et his verbis* edd., excepta 1, repetunt *Augustini*.

en: Here, c. 3 following. — A little above, *et ideo subtrahendo* (and therefore by withdrawing) we have restored from codices I, W, Y, Z, cc, ee and editions 1, 2, in place of *et Deo subtrahendo* (and by withdrawing from God), which reading the Vatican edition adopted for itself; codex Q (by a second hand) [reads] *et aliquid subtrahendo* (and by withdrawing something). A little below, after *et his verbis* (and with these words) the editions, except for 1, repeat *Augustini* (of Augustine).

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 hic omittit particulam *non* eamque mox praefigit vocabulo *solum*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 2, 3, 4, here omits the particle *non* (not) and prefixes it shortly after to the word *solum* (only).

la: Consentit S. Thom. (de Malo, q. 4. a. 6. ad 16.): *Libido actualis, quae est in coitu, est signum concupiscentiae habitualis, quae materialiter se habet in originali peccato.*

en: St. Thomas agrees (*On Evil*, q. 4, a. 6, ad 16): *The actual lust which is in coitus is a sign of habitual concupiscence, which is related materially in original sin.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Secundum doctrinam S. Anselmi, hic in corp. relatam, persona (in Adam peccante) infecit naturam, natura autem vitiata inficit personam in posteris eius. Infectio autem naturae cum ipsa natura non transit ad animam et personam posterorum nisi per actum generationis (S. Thom., de Malo, q. 4. a. 6. ad 10.). Hinc sequitur, quod « peccatum originale habet processum a carne ad animam » (idem, S. I. II. q. 83. a. 3. ad 2.). — Huic autem obstare videntur plures difficultates gravissimae, quarum prima est, quod caro proprie *agere in animam* non potest. Ad hanc difficultatem solvendam S. Bonav. utitur triplice distinctione circa modum agendi in alterum, et asserit, hoc fieri « propter *colligantiam* » (in fine corp. et infra q. 2.). Consentit S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. a. 2. ad 5.) dicens: « Anima non inficitur per infectionem corporis, quasi corpore agente in animam, sed per quandam *collimitationem* unius ad alterum ». — Alia difficultas est, quod cum nec *caro* nec *semen* subiectum esse possit peccati, non apparet, quomodo *efficere* possint, ut peccatum *formaliter* sit in anima. Et *peccatum* intelligitur hic non tam sub ratione *culpae* (quae a stipite humani generis actualiter commissa, *moraliter* tantum transit ad eiusdem membra), quam sub ratione *corruptionis et vitiositatis* sive pravae concupiscentiae, quam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.) declarat esse « necessitatem habendi interdum pronitatem ad aliquam inordinatam motionem, quando poterit exire in actum ». Ad hanc autem difficultatem enodandam S. Bonav. cum aliis Scholasticis concedit, peccatum non esse in carne *formaliter* (hic ante finem corp. et ad 1.), sed tantum *materialiter et virtualiter* (S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 4; de Malo, q. 4. a. 3, a. 3. ad 1.), et quidem eo sensu, quod et caro et actus generationis non habeant rationem *causae principalis*, sed tantum « *instrumenti et deferentis* » (hic ad 5; cfr. S. Thom., de Malo, q. 4. a. 3; S. I. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Immo vitiositas illa generantis per se solam non vitiaret animam generati, nisi cum natura deferret peccatum et pravitatem ipsius Adae, cuius sunt quasi instrumenta posteri eius in propaganda natura. Unde nunc accidit contrarium eius quod evenisset, si Adam stetisset. Tunc enim generantes per actum in se sanctum et virtute Spiritus S. fecundatum potuissent in generatos deferre ab ipso capite et stipite generis humani cum natura totam iustitiam originalem. — Quomodo autem id quod tantum materialiter et virtualiter est in carne, possit transire ad animam, ut sit in ea formaliter, tribus exemplis aptis Seraphicus illustrat. — Hanc eiusdem doctrinam dilucide Petr. a Tar. sic contrahit (hic q. 2. a. 1.): « Qualis caro facta est in Adam, talis ab eo traducitur... Ideo anima prolis infusa huiusmodi carni duplicem corruptionem contrahit: unam vitiositatis, alteram passibilitatis. Quia vero unumquodque est in recipiente per modum recipientis et non per modum agentis, ideo utraque corruptio aliter recipitur in anima, quam sit in carne, sicut color aliter recipitur in oculo, quam sit in pariete. Corruptio enim passibilitatis in carne est sine sensu doloris, in anima vero cum sensu doloris; similiter corruptio vitiositatis in carne est sine reatu culpae, in anima vero cum reatu culpae » (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. ad 2. 4.). — Ex textu S. Bonaventurae et aliis locis Scholasticorum patet, quod illi antiqui propagationem ipsius corruptionis, quam vocant concupiscentiam, accipiebant secundum analogiam, qua quaedam mala pure physica a parentibus transfunduntur in filios (cfr. S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3. et 4.). — Plura hic dicta explicantur duabus quaestionibus, quae sequuntur. S. Thom., cum doceat, ex defectu gratiae sanctificantis oriri concupiscentiam, et illum defectum natura huic praecedere, fere convenit cum opinione secunda, in textu recensita, quae revera secundum viam S. Bonaventurae non perfecte satisfacit. Tamen S. Thom. in suis scriptis fere omnia in hoc articulo dicta approbat. Non raro autem idem alio etiam utitur exemplo ad istam traductionem explicandam, scilicet « sicut a voluntate animi per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale [v. g. homicidium] ad membra corporis... quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate » (S. I. II. q. 81. a. 3. 1; cfr. de Malo, q. 4. a. 1.). Hoc autem exemplum aptissimum est, praesertim ut explicetur, quomodo culpa cum privatione gratiae sanctificantis possit in omnes transfundi.

**II.** Praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 4. — Scot., hic q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 3. partic. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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english_scholion:
**I.** According to the doctrine of St. Anselm, related here in the body [of the article], the person (in Adam sinning) infected the nature, but the vitiated nature infects the person in his descendants. Now the infection of the nature, together with the nature itself, does not pass to the soul and person of the descendants except through the act of generation (St. Thomas, *On Evil*, q. 4, a. 6, ad 10). Hence it follows that "original sin has its passage from the flesh to the soul" (the same, *Summa* I-II, q. 83, a. 3, ad 2). — But against this several very grave difficulties seem to stand, of which the first is that the flesh cannot properly *act upon the soul*. To solve this difficulty St. Bonaventure uses a threefold distinction concerning the mode of acting upon another, and asserts that this comes about "on account of *binding-together*" (at the end of the body and below, q. 2). St. Thomas agrees (II Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5), saying: "The soul is not infected by the infection of the body, as though the body were acting upon the soul, but by a certain *co-limitation* of the one to the other." — Another difficulty is that, since neither *flesh* nor *seed* can be the subject of sin, it does not appear how they can *effect* that sin should be *formally* in the soul. And *sin* is understood here not so much under the character of *fault* (which, actually committed by the stock of the human race, passes only *morally* to its members), as under the character of *corruption and viciousness*, or of depraved concupiscence, which Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1) declares to be "the necessity of having at times a proneness to some disordered motion, whenever it can issue into act." To unravel this difficulty St. Bonaventure with the other Scholastics concedes that sin is not in the flesh *formally* (here, before the end of the body, and ad 1), but only *materially and virtually* (St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 4; *On Evil*, q. 4, a. 3, a. 3, ad 1), and indeed in this sense, that neither the flesh nor the act of generation has the character of a *principal cause*, but only of "an *instrument and conveyor*" (here, ad 5; cf. St. Thomas, *On Evil*, q. 4, a. 3; *Summa* I-II, q. 83, a. 1). Indeed, that viciousness of the begetter by itself alone would not vitiate the soul of the begotten, unless the nature conveyed the sin and depravity of Adam himself, of whom his descendants are, as it were, the instruments in propagating the nature. Hence now the contrary happens of what would have happened if Adam had stood. For then the begetters, through an act holy in itself and fecundated by the power of the Holy Spirit, could have conveyed to those begotten, from the very head and stock of the human race, together with the nature the whole original justice. — But how that which is only materially and virtually in the flesh can pass to the soul, so that it is formally in it, the Seraphic [Doctor] illustrates with three apt examples. — This same doctrine Peter of Tarentaise summarizes clearly thus (here, q. 2, a. 1): "Such as the flesh was made in Adam, such is it transmitted from him... Therefore the soul of the offspring, infused into flesh of this kind, contracts a twofold corruption: one of viciousness, the other of passibility. But since each thing is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not according to the mode of the agent, therefore each corruption is received in the soul otherwise than it is in the flesh, just as color is received in the eye otherwise than it is in the wall. For the corruption of passibility in the flesh is without the sensation of pain, but in the soul with the sensation of pain; likewise the corruption of viciousness in the flesh is without the guilt of fault, but in the soul with the guilt of fault" (cf. St. Thomas, here, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, 4). — From the text of St. Bonaventure and from other places of the Scholastics it is clear that those ancients understood the propagation of the corruption itself, which they call concupiscence, according to an analogy by which certain purely physical evils are transmitted from parents into children (cf. St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3 and 4). — Many things said here are explained in the two questions that follow. St. Thomas, since he teaches that concupiscence arises from the defect of sanctifying grace, and that the defect precedes the latter by nature, agrees almost with the second opinion, recounted in the text, which in truth, according to the way of St. Bonaventure, does not satisfy perfectly. Nevertheless St. Thomas in his writings approves almost everything said in this article. Not rarely, however, does the same [doctor] use yet another example to explain this transmission, namely "just as from the will of the mind through the motion of the members actual sin [e.g. homicide] is transmitted to the members of the body... which are born to be moved by the will" (*Summa* I-II, q. 81, a. 3, 1; cf. *On Evil*, q. 4, a. 1). And this example is most apt, especially that it may be explained how fault, together with the privation of sanctifying grace, can be transmitted into all.

**II.** Besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 106, m. 4. — Scotus, here, q. unica. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 1; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 3, partic. 1. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1. — Biel, here, q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` raw lines 52079–52386), with the cascade-shattered Respondeo and Consectarium regions re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{747–751}-{L,R}-{0–2}.png`; pdf = printed + 22). ARTICULUS II opener + TRACTATIO (3 items) folded into this q1 per Vol II Override §5.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum originale contrahatur in anima ex carne ex aliquo appetitu et voluntate animae

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 751 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum peccatum originale contrahatur in anima ex carne ex aliquo appetitu et voluntate animae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum originale contrahatur in anima ex carne ex aliquo appetitu et voluntate animae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per rationem Augustini, quam facit in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^1], ostendens, quod nullus potest ab alio fieri deterior, sed si fit deterior, hoc erit a se ipso. Ait enim sic: Si fit deterior, aut ergo a superiori, aut a pari, aut ab inferiori. Ab inferiori non potest; a pari non, quia ei non praevalet; a superiori non, quia ille aut esset bonus, aut malus. Si bonus: ergo nunquam faceret ipsum deteriorem. Si malus: ergo iam inferior est et deterior. Similiter arguitur in proposito; et ex hoc sequitur, quod anima non possit fieri mala, nisi cooperante voluntate propria.

2. *Item*, omne peccatum ab aliqua voluntate est; sola enim voluntas est peccati principium[^2]: ergo originale peccatum, quod est in parvulo, aut est a voluntate propria, aut a voluntate aliena. Si a voluntate aliena, utpote Adae, cum in Adam non fuerimus nisi *secundum quid*, non esset originale peccatum in homine nisi *secundum quid*: ergo propter ipsum non deberemus aeternaliter visione Dei privari. Quodsi hoc falsum est, non ergo solum fuit a voluntate aliena. Restat igitur, quod contrahatur a voluntate propria.

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3. *Item*, superius non patitur ab inferiori nisi merito culpae, vel nisi ei se subiiciat mera voluntate; sed anima, cum unitur carni, ante unionem non habet culpam: ergo si inficitur a carne, hoc non est absque voluntaria subiectione ipsius animae.

4. *Item*, si Angelus intraret corpus infectum, non diceretur ex hoc contrahere originale: si igitur anima contrahit, hoc non est nisi propter aliquem appetitum, quem habet ad carnem.

5. *Item*, si anima innocens poneretur in igne infernali, nunquam arderet: ergo si non est magis activa caro quam ignis; si inficitur a carne, hoc non est nisi propter affectionem ipsius animae ad carnem: et si hoc verum est, originalis culpa contrahitur mediante appetitu animae et voluntate.

**Sed contra:**

1. Peccatum, quod contrahitur a voluntate animae, est peccatum *actuale*: ergo peccatum, quod parvuli contrahunt, non deberet dici peccatum *originale*, sed peccatum *actuale*.

2. *Item*, si peccatum originale esset a voluntate ipsius animae, ergo puniendum esset poena *actuali*: si ergo non punitur poena *actuali*, sed poena *damni*, sicut infra[^3] videbitur; ergo non videtur, quod a voluntate animae causetur.

3. *Item*, natura et voluntas sunt principia disparata, ita quod effectus, qui sunt a natura et qui sunt a proposito, sunt alii et alii[^4]: si ergo originale peccatum eo ipso dicitur originale, quia est a natura, ergo non est a voluntate propria.

4. *Item*, peccatum, quod est a propria voluntate, est per proprium actum commissum; nullum autem peccatum per proprium actum commissum sine proprio actu dimittitur: ergo si originale contraheretur ex animae voluntate, nunquam in parvulis per baptismum deleretur. Quodsi hoc est contra fidem, restat, quod peccatum originale non contrahitur per animae voluntatem.

5. *Item*, si contrahitur per voluntatem, aut per naturalem, aut per deliberativam[^5]. Non per deliberativam, quia in ipso instanti creationis unitur anima carni. Non per naturalem, quia naturalis voluntas semper est recta et sic movetur, secundum quod eam instituit auctor Deus: ergo nullo modo potest esse peccati principium: redit igitur idem quod prius.

### Conclusio

> Peccatum originale non contrahitur ab anima mediante appetitu deliberativo, sed mediante appetitu naturali, quem habet anima ad corpus, non quidem ut causa efficiente, sed ut causa sine qua non.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum originale contrahatur ex voluntate vel appetitu animae, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi. Contingit enim hoc taliter intelligere, quod spectat ad haeresis perversitatem; et taliter, ut spectet ad rationis probabilitatem; et tertio etiam modo, ut spectet ad fidei veritatem.

Cum enim duplex sit in anima appetitus, videlicet naturalis et deliberativus; si sic intelligatur, quod anima prius deliberet de carnis infectione, et ei coniungatur voluntarie et ex deliberatione, et ex hoc contrahat culpam originalem; sic intelligere haereticum est, pro eo quod doctores catholici[^6] dicunt, quod «anima creando infunditur et infundendo creatur». Et Apostolus ad Romanos nono[^7] de Iacob et Esau loquens dicit: *Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent* etc.

Est et alius in anima appetitus naturalis, et per hunc appetitum dupliciter potest intelligi contrahi originale. Uno modo, ut sic intelligatur contrahi ex carnis corruptione et appetitu animae, quod corruptio carnis est[^8] sicut materialis; sed naturalis appetitus animae ad corpus, qui est ad ipsam unionem et unionem antecedit natura, quamvis non antecedat tempore, se habeat in ratione efficientis eo modo, quo est dicere, peccatum habere causam efficientem; et sic dicatur contrahi originale peccatum a carne infecta mediante appetitu, per quem anima carni alligatur et quodam modo ei condescendit, ac per hoc ei se subiicit et subiiciendo pervertitur. Nec tamen ex hoc dicetur culpa illa esse acta, sed contracta[^9], nec personalis, sed naturalis, quia ille appetitus est appetitus naturalis; non tamen causat peccatum per se, sed cum corruptione carnis adiuncta, quae a primo parente propagatur. — Hoc etsi probabiliter esse dictum videatur, videtur tamen in hoc a veritate deviare, quod principalem causam contractionis originalis ponit ex parte animae, cum Sancti et doctores dicant, originale peccatum principaliter traduci a primo parente, a quo non propagamur nisi secundum carnem[^10].

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Alio modo potest intelligi, peccatum originale contrahi ab anima per naturalem appetitum ipsius animae ad carnem, ita ut principalis ratio ponatur ex parte carnis, et appetitus ille naturalis sit causa *sine qua non*; et hoc quidem habet veritatem, et necesse est ponere. Nunquam enim caro posset animam inficere, nisi anima haberet naturalem colligantiam ad ipsam. Naturalis autem colligantia non est nisi per appetitum ipsius animae ad corpus, per quem anima adeo alligatur carni, ut, sicut dictum fuit supra[^11], nisi virtutem habeat, per quam carnem regat, necesse habet deorsum ferri cum carne, ac per hoc captivari in servitute peccati. — Et propter hoc simpliciter concedendum est, peccatum originale esse contractum, et nullo modo debet dici actum. Et hoc ipsum nomen indicat, quod dicitur peccatum *originale*, non *actuale*, dicitur *naturale*, non *voluntarium*. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad secundam partem inducuntur.

**Ad obiecta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non potest homo fieri malus ab alio; dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de alio agente, quod quidem est ita aliud, quod non est naturaliter alligatum ei quod debet fieri deterius. Sic autem non est in proposito; nam caro naturalem habet colligantiam cum spiritu per naturalem appetitum unius ad alterum.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum originale aut est a voluntate propria, aut a voluntate aliena; dicendum, quod a voluntate aliena. — Ad illud vero quod subiungit, quod non fuimus nisi *secundum quid* in ipso Adam; dicendum, quod verum est, quia fuimus[^12] in potentia *causali*; sed quemadmodum *secundum quid* reductum est ad *simpliciter* per operationem naturae — nam cum prius essemus in *potentia*, nunc sumus entes in *actu* — sic et originale peccatum prolis, quod erat *secundum quid* ante ipsius prolis generationem, in ipsa prolis propagatione ex[^13] unione animae ad corpus incipit esse peccatum *simpliciter*; nec requiritur ibi actualis vel nova deliberatio, sed sufficit ipsa propagatio et animae ad carnem coniunctio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod superius non patitur ab inferiori etc.: dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his, inter quae non est naturalis colligantia; et ideo non habet locum in proposito, cum naturalis colligantia sit animae ad carnem, sicut dictum est supra[^14]. — Posset tamen dici, quod Adam aliquo modo meruit; sed hoc melius patebit, cum agetur, qualiter salvatur divina iustitia in unione animae ad carnem.

*Ad 4, 5.* Ad duas ultimas rationes iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Nam si Angelus poneretur in carne infecta, et anima innocens poneretur in flamma; nec ille inficeretur, nec ista pateretur. Sed hoc non esset propter defectum appetitus deliberativi, sed propter hoc, quod non esset ibi appetitus, nec colligantia naturalis, et sine hac non potest anima a[^15] carne infici, sicut prius dictum est, quamvis haec non sit causa principalis. Consimilis enim appetitus naturalis salvaretur in anima ad carnem, si homo stetisset; et tamen anima nullam culpam contraheret.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether original sin is contracted in the soul from the flesh through some appetite and will of the soul.*

Secondly it is asked whether original sin is contracted in the soul from the flesh through some appetite and will of the soul. And that it is so, seems [to follow]:

1. *First*, by the argument of Augustine, which he makes in the book *Of Eighty-Three Questions*[^1], showing that no one can be made worse by another, but if he is made worse, this will be from himself. For he says thus: If he is made worse, then [it is] either from a superior, or from an equal, or from an inferior. From an inferior it cannot be; from an equal not, because it does not prevail over it; from a superior not, because that one would be either good or evil. If good: then it would never make it worse. If evil: then it is already inferior and worse. The same is argued in the matter at hand; and from this it follows that the soul cannot be made evil except with its own will cooperating.

2. *Likewise*, every sin is from some will; for the will alone is the principle of sin[^2]: therefore original sin, which is in an infant, is either from its own will, or from another's will. If from another's will, namely Adam's, then since we were in Adam only *in a certain respect*, original sin would not be in man except *in a certain respect*: therefore on account of it we ought not to be eternally deprived of the vision of God. But if this is false, then it was not solely from another's will. It remains, therefore, that it is contracted from one's own will.

3. *Likewise*, a superior does not suffer from an inferior except by the desert of fault, or unless it subjects itself to it by mere will; but the soul, when it is united to the flesh, before the union has no fault: therefore if it is infected by the flesh, this is not without a voluntary subjection of the soul itself.

4. *Likewise*, if an angel were to enter an infected body, it would not be said on this account to contract original sin: if therefore the soul contracts it, this is only on account of some appetite which it has toward the flesh.

5. *Likewise*, if an innocent soul were placed in the infernal fire, it would never burn: therefore if the flesh is no more active than fire; [then] if it is infected by the flesh, this is only on account of the affection of the soul itself toward the flesh: and if this is true, original fault is contracted by means of the appetite and will of the soul.

**On the contrary:**

1. The sin which is contracted by the will of the soul is *actual* sin: therefore the sin which infants contract ought not to be called *original* sin, but *actual* sin.

2. *Likewise*, if original sin were from the will of the soul itself, then it would have to be punished with the punishment of *sense*: if therefore it is not punished with the punishment of *sense*, but with the punishment of *loss*, as will be seen below[^3]; then it does not seem that it is caused by the will of the soul.

3. *Likewise*, nature and will are disparate principles, so that the effects which are from nature and those which are from purpose are diverse[^4]: if therefore original sin is for that very reason called original, because it is from nature, then it is not from one's own will.

4. *Likewise*, the sin which is from one's own will is committed through one's own act; but no sin committed through one's own act is remitted without one's own act: therefore if original [sin] were contracted from the will of the soul, it would never be destroyed in infants through baptism. But if this is contrary to faith, it remains that original sin is not contracted through the will of the soul.

5. *Likewise*, if it is contracted through the will, [it is] either through the natural [will], or through the deliberative [will][^5]. Not through the deliberative, because in the very instant of creation the soul is united to the flesh. Not through the natural, because the natural will is always right and is so moved according as God the author instituted it: therefore in no way can it be the principle of sin: it returns, therefore, to the same as before.

### Conclusio

> Original sin is not contracted by the soul by means of the deliberative appetite, but by means of the natural appetite which the soul has toward the body, not indeed as an efficient cause, but as a cause without which not.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether original sin is contracted from the will or appetite of the soul, this can be understood in three ways. For it happens that one understands this in such a way as pertains to the perversity of heresy; and in such a way as pertains to the probability of reason; and in a third way also, as pertains to the truth of faith.

For since there is a twofold appetite in the soul, namely the natural and the deliberative; if it be understood thus, that the soul first deliberates about the infection of the flesh, and is joined to it voluntarily and from deliberation, and from this contracts original fault; to understand it so is heretical, for the reason that the Catholic doctors[^6] say that «the soul is infused by being created and created by being infused». And the Apostle, speaking to the Romans, in the ninth chapter[^7], of Jacob and Esau, says: *Before they had done anything good or evil* etc.

There is also another appetite in the soul, the natural one, and through this appetite it can be understood in two ways that original sin is contracted. In one way, so that it be understood to be contracted from the corruption of the flesh and the appetite of the soul, [so] that the corruption of the flesh is[^8] as it were material; but the natural appetite of the soul toward the body, which is [ordered] to the union itself and precedes the union in nature, although it does not precede it in time, stands in the character of an efficient [cause] in that manner in which one says that sin has an efficient cause; and thus original sin is said to be contracted from the infected flesh by means of the appetite, through which the soul is bound to the flesh and in a certain way condescends to it, and through this subjects itself to it and by subjecting itself is perverted. Nor yet on this account will that fault be said to be enacted, but contracted[^9], nor personal, but natural, because that appetite is a natural appetite; yet it does not cause sin of itself, but with the corruption of the flesh joined to it, which is propagated from the first parent. — Although this seems to be said with probability, nevertheless it seems to deviate from the truth in this, that it places the principal cause of the contraction of original [sin] on the side of the soul, whereas the Saints and doctors say that original sin is principally derived from the first parent, from whom we are not propagated except according to the flesh[^10].

In another way it can be understood that original sin is contracted by the soul through the natural appetite of the soul itself toward the flesh, so that the principal ground is placed on the side of the flesh, and that natural appetite is the cause *without which not*; and this indeed holds the truth, and it is necessary to posit it. For the flesh could never infect the soul, unless the soul had a natural connection to it. But the natural connection is only through the appetite of the soul itself toward the body, through which the soul is so bound to the flesh that, as was said above[^11], unless it have the virtue by which it may govern the flesh, it necessarily is borne downward with the flesh, and through this is taken captive in the servitude of sin. — And on account of this it is to be conceded without qualification that original sin is contracted, and in no way ought it to be called enacted. And this very name indicates it, that it is called *original*, not *actual*, sin; it is called *natural*, not *voluntary*. — Hence the arguments which are adduced for the second part are to be conceded.

**To the objections:**

*To 1.* But to that which is objected, that man cannot be made evil by another; it must be said that Augustine there speaks of another agent which is so other that it is not naturally bound to that which is to be made worse. But it is not so in the matter at hand; for the flesh has a natural connection with the spirit through the natural appetite of the one toward the other.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that original sin is either from one's own will or from another's will; it must be said that [it is] from another's will. — But to that which it adds, that we were in Adam himself only *in a certain respect*; it must be said that this is true, because we were[^12] in *causal* potency; but just as *in a certain respect* is reduced to *without qualification* through the operation of nature — for whereas before we were in *potency*, now we are beings in *act* — so also the original sin of the offspring, which was *in a certain respect* before the generation of the offspring itself, in the very propagation of the offspring begins, from[^13] the union of the soul to the body, to be sin *without qualification*; nor is there required there an actual or new deliberation, but the propagation itself and the conjunction of the soul to the flesh suffices.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a superior does not suffer from an inferior etc.: it must be said that this holds true in those things between which there is no natural connection; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand, since there is a natural connection of the soul to the flesh, as was said above[^14]. — It could nevertheless be said that Adam in some way merited [it]; but this will appear better when it is treated how divine justice is preserved in the union of the soul to the flesh.

*To 4, 5.* To the last two arguments the response is already clear from what has been said. For if an angel were placed in infected flesh, and an innocent soul were placed in the flame; neither would the former be infected, nor would the latter suffer. But this would not be on account of the defect of the deliberative appetite, but on account of this, that there would not be there an appetite, nor a natural connection, and without this the soul cannot be infected by[^15] the flesh, as was said before, although this is not the principal cause. For a like natural appetite would be preserved in the soul toward the flesh, if man had stood [in innocence]; and yet the soul would contract no fault.

---

la: Quaest. 3. seq. Verba: *Si fit deterior* etc. sententialiter tantum exhibent testimonium Augustini. Cfr. etiam 1. de Lib. Arb. c. 10. n. 20. seqq.; III. c. 1. n. 2. et c. 14. n. 39. seq., ubi et maior tertii arg. insinuatur.

en: Question 3, following. The words *If he is made worse* etc. give the testimony of Augustine only as to its sense. Cf. also *On Free Will* I, c. 10, n. 20 ff.; III, c. 1, n. 2, and c. 14, n. 39 f., where also the major of the third argument is implied.

la: Ut ostendit August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 2. et Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 3., qui iam in praecedenti quaest. arg. 5. ad opposit. allegatus est.

en: As Augustine shows, *On Free Will* III, c. 1, n. 2, and Anselm, *On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin*, c. 3, who was already cited in the preceding question, argument 5 to the contrary.

en: Distinction 33, a. 3, q. 1, following.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 688, nota 4. et tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 688, note 4, and tome I, p. 714, note 3.

la: De hac divisione vide supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

en: On this division see above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Ita Innocentius III. in Commentario in septem Psalmos poenitent., Ps. 50. Cfr. de Ecclesiasticis Dogmat. (inter opera August.) c. 14. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Thus Innocent III in the *Commentary on the Seven Penitential Psalms*, Ps. 50. Cf. *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas* (among the works of Augustine) c. 14, and above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Cod. N *sit* (addita etiam, sed superflue, paulo ante voci *animae* particula *ita*); lectio vere bona, quippe cum in subnexis etiam modus coniunctivus recurrat, scil. *se habeat* et *dicatur*, ubi Vat. et edd. 3, 4 solae exhibent modum indicativum, scil. *se habet* et *dicitur*.

en: Codex N [reads] *sit* (with the particle *ita* also added, but superfluously, a little before the word *animae*); a truly good reading, since indeed in what follows the subjunctive mood also recurs, namely *se habeat* and *dicatur*, where the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 alone exhibit the indicative mood, namely *se habet* and *dicitur*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 191, nota 2. et infra d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp. — Superius post *subiiciendo* edd., excepta 1, addunt *se*.

en: Cf. above, p. 191, note 2, and below, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, argument 2 to the contrary. — Above, after *subiiciendo* (by subjecting), the editions, except for 1, add *se* (itself).

la: Vide quaest. praeced. et seq. et infra d. 33. a. 2. q. 1, ubi in peccato originali tria distinguntur.

en: See the preceding and following questions and below, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, where three things are distinguished in original sin.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo superius pro *per quem* codd. F K W bb ee cum ed. 1 *per quam*. Paulo inferius pro *in servitute peccati* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et plures codd. *in servitutem peccati*, quibus verbis alluditur ad illud Rom. 7, 23: *Video autem aliam legem in membris meis... et captivantem me in lege peccati* etc.

en: The preceding question. — A little above, in place of *per quem* (through which) codices F, K, W, bb, ee with edition 1 [read] *per quam*. A little below, in place of *in servitute peccati* (in the servitude of sin) the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 and several codices [read] *in servitutem peccati* (into the servitude of sin), by which words there is an allusion to that [text] of Rom. 7, 23: *But I see another law in my members... and captivating me in the law of sin* etc.

la: Cod. V bene addit *in eo*.

en: Codex V rightly adds *in eo* (in him).

la: Cod. aa *et*. Voculae *ex* in cod. C praemittitur *vel*, in cod. R *et*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *et* (and). To the little word *ex* (from) in codex C there is prefixed *vel* (or), in codex R *et* (and).

la: Hic in corp. et supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — De propos. q. vide infra d. 32. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — In fine solutionis cod. pro *unione* substituit *coniunctione*.

en: Here in the body and above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, following. — On the proposed question see below, d. 32, a. 3, q. 1, following. — At the end of the solution a codex substitutes *coniunctione* (conjunction) for *unione* (union).

la: Codd. H I V cum edd. 2, 3 *in*. Paulo inferius pro *tamen* codd. A F *cum*.

en: Codices H, I, V with editions 2, 3 [read] *in*. A little below, in place of *tamen* (yet) codices A, F [read] *cum* (with).

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` raw lines 52387–52522). The cascade-shattered Respondeo (triple-distinction: haeresis / two natural-appetite senses) and the Ad-obiecta region were re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{751,752,753}-{L,R}-{0–2}.png`; pdf = printed + 22, i.e. PDF pp. 773–775). Read column-by-column (L then R), body bands then footer bands.

**Page-split / footer map.** q2 spans printed pp. 751–753 (running heads: p.751 `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`; p.752 plain `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; p.753 `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` — the p.753 running head is set for the question that *opens* lower on that page; the p.753 body above the QUAESTIO III header is still q2's Respondeo + Ad obiecta).
- **p. 751** (bottom block, below the a2-q1 scholion: QUAESTIO II header + title + opener + fundamenta 1–2): printed footers 1–2 → apparatus [^1]–[^2]. *These are the footers RECEIVED from a2-q1 (see hand-offs).*
- **p. 752** (fundamenta 3–5 + Sed contra 1–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo opening through the first natural-appetite sense): printed footers 1–7 → apparatus [^3]–[^9].
- **p. 753** (Respondeo "Alio modo" + "Et propter hoc" + Ad obiecta 1–5): printed footers 1–6 → apparatus [^10]–[^15]. Printed footer **7** on p.753 (`Cap. 2. n. 16, ubi pro ad parvulos…`) glosses the QUAESTIO III opener and is FORWARDED to a2-q3.

**Footer count.** 2 + 7 + 6 = 15 printed footer entries belonging to q2; 15 apparatus entries; all 15 markers paired in the Latin and English bodies. (p.753 footer 7 belongs to q3, not counted here.)

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q1: the entire p.751 footer block (footers 1–2 → [^1]–[^2]); a2-q1's scholion occupies the top of p.751 and the QUAESTIO II body opens at the bottom of p.751 with a fresh per-page footer sequence, so q2 owns all p.751 footers. FORWARDED to a2-q3: p.753 printed footer 7 (`Cap. 2. n. 16, ubi pro ad parvulos textus orig. habet parvulos. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.`), which glosses the q3 opener's *de Fide ad Petrum* citation.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. The SCHOLION printed on p.753 (sections I and II, "Hac et sequente huius articuli quaest. multa illustrantur…") covers BOTH q2 and q3 of this article and physically follows q2's Ad obiecta but precedes the QUAESTIO III header; per Vol II Override §5 this article-level scholion is carried by the LAST question of the article (a2-q3), which it caps. q2 forward-references it. No scholion footnotes (citations inline).

**Cascade-dropout check.** Verified against 450 dpi column bands. The OCR cascade-fragmented the Respondeo right column of p.752 (the "Est et alius… per hunc appetitum dupliciter" splice and the marginal glosses *Triplici intelligitur / Duplex appetitus / Interpretatio*) — re-set from PDF; no body text lost at the splice. q2/q3 boundary (raw 52522→52523) confirmed clean: q2 ends with the Ad-4-5 reply "et tamen anima nullam culpam contraheret"; the SCHOLION and then QUAESTIO III header follow on p.753.

**[?] flags.** None. All damaged regions resolved from the 450 dpi PDF column bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0