title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum actus doni sapientiae attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni sapientiae, utrum videlicet actus ipsius doni attendatur penes cognitionem veri, an penes affectionem boni. Et quod actus eius attendatur in cognoscendo, videtur:

1. *Primo* per verbum Sapientis, Proverbiorum primo[^1]: *Audiens sapiens sapientior erit;* sed auditus in nobis est via ad acquirendum habitum cognitionis: si ergo per auditum crescit in nobis sapientia, secundum quod dicitur in verbo proposito et in aliis pluribus eiusdem libri auctoritatibus; videtur, quod actus doni sapientiae sit *cognitivus.*

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2. *Item*, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Augustinum in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate[^2], ubi definiens sapientiam dicit, quod «sapientia est rerum divinarum humanarumque cognitio», approbans notificationem philosophorum in parte illa de ipsa sapientia: si ergo definit sapientiam recte et per actum proprium, videtur, quod actus ipsius doni sapientiae sit divina et humana cognoscere.

3. *Item*, Gregorius in Moralibus tractans illud Iob primo[^3]: *Ventus vehemens* etc.; dicit, quod donum sapientiae datum est in remedium contra stultitiam: ergo defectus stultitiae et donum sapientiae directe opponuntur; «opposita autem nata sunt fieri circa idem», secundum quod vult Philosophus: cum ergo stultitia dicat defectum in actu cognoscendi, videtur, quod actus sapientiae-doni sit potentiae cognitivae.

4. *Item*, hoc videtur ratione, quoniam sapientia appropriatur Filio; sed cum in imagine creata sit aliqua reperire ex parte intellectus, et aliqua ex parte affectus; quae sunt affectionis appropriantur Spiritui sancto, qui est amor, quae vero cognitionis appropriantur Filio[^4]: cum ergo sapientia ei approprietur, videtur etc.

5. *Item*, nullus amans aliquid, quantumcumque circa illud afficiatur, sapiens dicitur ex hoc, nisi illud cognoscat: ergo actus doni sapientiae maxime attenditur in faciendo cognoscere.

**Sed contra** hoc obiicitur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Sapientis, Ecclesiastici sexto[^5]: *Sapientia doctrinae secundum nomen suum est, et non in multis est manifesta:* si ergo sapientia a sapore dicitur, et sapor respicit affectionem interiorem; videtur, quod proprius actus doni sapientiae sit *affectivus.*

2. *Item*, Gregorius in Moralibus super primum Iob[^6] dicit, quod sapientia est donum «spe et certitudine aeternorum mentem reficiens»; sed refectio spectat ad gustum et affectum: ergo et praecipuus actus ipsius doni sapientiae est affectivus.

3. *Item*, Dionysius dicit in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo *de sapientia*[^7]: «Hanc igitur stultam et amentem sapientiam laudamus» etc.; et alia littera: «Hanc igitur irrationalem et dementem et stultam sapientiam excellenter laudantes dicimus» etc. Si ergo loquitur ibi de sapientia, quae est donum Dei, sicut patet, et hanc dicit stultam et amentem: videtur, quod actus istius doni ex parte affectionis se teneat, et nullatenus ex parte rationis.

4. *Item*, Bernardus in libro de Amore Dei, secundo capitulo[^8] dicit, quod «amor crescit in caritatem, caritas in sapientiam»: ergo cum caritas et amor et ipsius caritatis actus sint partis affectivae, videtur, quod et sapientiae actus sit affectivus, cum principalis actus non varietur ratione profectus.

5. *Item*, nec in dono sapientiae nec in eius actu est reperire excessum — nemo enim nimis est sapiens — sed in actu cognitionis circa divina contingit valde de facili excedere: videtur ergo, quod actus doni sapientiae omnino se teneat ex parte affectionis, et nullatenus ex parte cognitionis. — Si forte dicas, quod actus eius simul est ex parte cognitionis et affectionis; *contra* hoc est: quia maior est diversitas in habitibus, quam sit in potentiis; sed ratione illorum actuum, qui sunt cognoscere et affici, diversificantur potentiae animae, ita quod nunquam sunt actus eiusdem potentiae[^9]: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nunquam sint actus eiusdem habitus. Si tu dicas, quod non possunt esse actus eiusdem habitus principales; tunc quaeritur, quis sit eius actus principalis et praecipuus, utrum cognitivus, vel affectivus; et per primas rationes videtur, quod cognitivus; per secundas, quod affectivus: et ita redit eadem quaestio, quae prius.

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### Conclusio.

> Praecipuus actus doni sapientiae est ex parte affectivae, ita ut in cognitione inchoetur et in affectione consummetur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sapientia quadrupliciter accipi consuevit tam a philosophis quam a Sanctis, videlicet *communiter* et *minus communiter* et *proprie* et *magis proprie.* — *Communiter* accipiendo sapientiam, sic sapientia dicit cognitionem rerum generalem, secundum quod eam definit Augustinus et Philosophus, quod «sapientia est cognitio rerum divinarum et humanarum»; et Philosophus in Prima Philosophia[^10] dicit, quod «sapiens est qui omnia novit, secundum quod convenit».

Alio modo dicitur sapientia *minus communiter;* et sic sapientia dicit cognitionem non quamcumque, sed cognitionem sublimem, videlicet cognitionem rerum aeternarum. Et sic accipit eam Apostolus primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^11]: *Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae;* secundum quod exponit Augustinus dicens, quod «sapientia est cognitio aeternorum, scientia vero est cognitio creatorum»; et sic etiam dicit Philosophus[^12], quod sapientia est «cognitio causarum altissimarum».

Tertio modo accipitur sapientia *proprie;* et sic nominat cognitionem Dei secundum pietatem: et haec quidem cognitio est quae attenditur in cultu latriae, quem exhibemus Deo per fidem, spem et caritatem, secundum quem modum accipit Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate[^13], exponens illud Iob: *Ecce pietas ipsa est sapientia,* — dicens ibidem, quod pietas et sapientia idem est quod *theosebia,* et theosebia idem est quod cultus divinus, qui consistit in tribus virtutibus, secundum quod ipse dicit in principio Enchiridii ad Laurentium.

Quarto modo dicitur sapientia *magis proprie,* et sic nominat cognitionem Dei experimentalem; et hoc modo est unum de septem donis Spiritus sancti, cuius actus consistit in degustando divinam suavitatem. Et quoniam ad gustum interiorem, in quo est delectatio, necessario requiritur actus *affectionis* ad coniungendum et actus *cognitionis* ad apprehendendum, secundum illud Philosophi[^14], qui dicit, quod «delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti cum sensu eiusdem»; hinc est, quod actus doni sapientiae partim est cognitivus, et partim est affectivus: ita quod in *cognitione inchoatur* et in *affectione consummatur,* secundum quod ipse gustus vel saporatio est experimentalis boni et dulcis cognitio. Et ideo actus praecipuus doni sapientiae propriissime dictae est ex parte affectivae, ratione cuius dicit Ecclesiasticus, quod *sapientia secundum nomen suum est;* et Gregorius dicit, quod actus eius est reficere; et Dionysius dicit, quod istius sapientiae est amentem esse, propter hoc quod melius afficimur circa Deum praevia cognitione, quae est per ablationem et negationem, quam per affirmationem, sicut docet in libro de Mystica Theologia. Ratione etiam istius eiusdem causae dicit Bernardus, caritatem in sapientiam proficere. — Et ex hac eadem causa contingit, quod sapientia non potest esse nimia, quia excessus in experimento divinae dulcedinis potius est laudabilis quam vituperabilis, secundum quod patet in viris sanctis et contemplativis, qui prae nimia dulcedine modo elevantur in ecstasim, modo sublevantur usque ad raptum, licet hoc contingat paucissimis. — Concedendum est igitur, quod actus doni sapientiae praecipuus est ex parte affectionis. Concedendae sunt etiam rationes hoc ostendentes.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod sapientia crescit per auditum; dicendum, quod sapientia sumitur ibi communiter pro cognitione generali, quae quidem est rerum divinarum et humanarum, quae per studium et auditum suscipit incrementum; et ideo non habet hic locum.

2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicit de auctoritate Augustini, patet responsio, quia illo modo eam accipit Augustinus.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod sapientia est contra stultitiam; dici potest, quod hoc dicit non quantum ad *ultimum* actum sapientiae, qui attenditur in affectione, sed quantum ad *primum* actum sive praevium, qui consistit in cognitione; donum enim sapientiae in se complectitur utrumque.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sapientia appropriatur Filio; dicendum, quod hoc est, in quantum dicit lumen cognitionis, non in quantum dicit saporem affectionis. Cum enim utrumque in se claudat, potest utrique personae appropriari, videlicet Filio et Spiritui sancto; et quoniam non appropriatur Filio soli, immo etiam personae Spiritus sancti: hinc est, quod ratio illa non cogit.

5. Ad illud quod ulterius obiicitur, quod nemo est sapiens ex hoc solum, quod amat, nisi etiam ulterius cognoscat; dicendum, quod illud est verum; attamen in amore Dei ipsi gustui coniuncta est cognitio. Optimus enim modus cognoscendi Deum est per experimentum dulcedinis; multo etiam excellentior et nobilior et delectabilior est quam per argumentum inquisitionis. Unde ex hoc non habetur, quod *cognoscere* sit actus ipsius doni sapientiae praecipuus, sed quod[^15] quodam modo concurrit ad eius actum praecipuum; et hoc quidem est verum, quia, sicut tactum est, sapientia in se claudit utrumque actum; unde quodam modo respicit intellectum, quodam modo respicit affectum.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unus habitus non potest esse respectu istorum duorum actuum, cum penes illos diversificentur potentiae; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non possunt isti actus eiusdem habitus esse, ita quod uterque sit principalis; nihil tamen impedit, duos esse, ita quod unus sit *primus,* alter vero *praecipuus;* unus sicut *disponens,* alter vero *complens,* sicut in praecedentibus[^16] habitum fuit de fide. — Unde eisdem rationibus et responsionibus quantum ad hoc potest quis negotiari circa donum sapientiae, quae supra explanatae fuerunt circa virtutem fidei; et ideo haec ad praesens sufficiant, quia non oportet, hic illas iterum replicari.

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### Question I. *Whether the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked concerning the act and object of the gift of wisdom itself — namely whether the act of this gift is reckoned in the cognition of the true, or in the affection of the good. And that its act is reckoned in knowing seems [the case]:

1. *First*, by the word of the Wise Man, Proverbs, chapter one[^1]: *A wise man hearing will be wiser;* but hearing is for us a way to acquiring the habit of cognition: if therefore through hearing wisdom grows in us, according to what is said in the proposed word and in many other authorities of the same book; it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is *cognitive.*

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2. *Likewise*, this same thing is shown through Augustine in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*[^2], where, defining wisdom, he says that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human," approving the philosophers' notification in that part concerning wisdom itself: if therefore he defines wisdom rightly and through its proper act, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom is to know things divine and human.

3. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals*, treating that [text] of Job, chapter one[^3]: *A vehement wind* etc.; says that the gift of wisdom was given as a remedy against folly: therefore the defect of folly and the gift of wisdom are directly opposed; "but opposites are by nature apt to arise about the same thing," according to what the Philosopher holds: since therefore folly bespeaks a defect in the act of knowing, it seems that the act of the gift of wisdom belongs to the cognitive power.

4. *Likewise*, this seems [so] by reason, since wisdom is appropriated to the Son; but since in the created image some things are to be found on the side of intellect, and some on the side of affect; those which are of affection are appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who is love, while those of cognition are appropriated to the Son[^4]: since therefore wisdom is appropriated to him, it seems [that its act is cognitive] etc.

5. *Likewise*, no one loving anything, however much he is affected toward it, is called wise on that account, unless he knows it: therefore the act of the gift of wisdom is reckoned chiefly in making [one] know.

**On the contrary**, the following is objected:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Wise Man, Ecclesiasticus, chapter six[^5]: *The wisdom of doctrine is according to its name, and is not manifest to many:* if therefore wisdom is named from taste (*sapor*), and taste regards the interior affection; it seems that the proper act of the gift of wisdom is *affective.*

2. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals* on the first [chapter] of Job[^6] says that wisdom is a gift "refreshing the mind with the hope and certitude of eternal things"; but refreshment pertains to taste and affect: therefore the chief act of this gift of wisdom is affective.

3. *Likewise*, Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*, in the chapter *on wisdom*[^7]: "This foolish and senseless wisdom, therefore, we praise" etc.; and another reading: "This irrational and demented and foolish wisdom, therefore, we excellently praising do declare" etc. If therefore he speaks there of the wisdom which is a gift of God, as is clear, and calls this foolish and senseless: it seems that the act of this gift holds itself on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of reason.

4. *Likewise*, Bernard in the book *On the Love of God*, chapter two[^8], says that "love grows into charity, charity into wisdom": therefore since charity and love and the act of charity itself belong to the affective part, it seems that the act of wisdom too is affective, since the principal act is not varied by reason of [its] advance.

5. *Likewise*, neither in the gift of wisdom nor in its act is excess to be found — for no one is too wise — but in the act of cognition concerning divine things it happens very easily to exceed: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of wisdom holds itself wholly on the side of affection, and in no way on the side of cognition. — But if perhaps you say that its act is at once on the side of cognition and of affection; *against* this is: that there is greater diversity in habits than there is in powers; but by reason of those acts, which are to know and to be affected, the powers of the soul are diversified, such that they are never acts of the same power[^9]: therefore by parity of reason it seems that they are never acts of the same habit. If you say that they cannot be *principal* acts of the same habit; then it is asked which is its principal and chief act, whether cognitive or affective; and by the first reasons it seems [to be] cognitive, by the second, affective: and thus the same question returns as before.

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### Conclusion.

> The chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of the affective [power], such that it is begun in cognition and consummated in affection.

**I respond:** It must be said that wisdom has customarily been taken in four ways both by the philosophers and by the Saints, namely *commonly* and *less commonly* and *properly* and *more properly.* — Taking wisdom *commonly,* wisdom thus bespeaks a general cognition of things, according as Augustine and the Philosopher define it, that "wisdom is the cognition of things divine and human"; and the Philosopher in the *First Philosophy*[^10] says that "the wise man is he who knows all things, according as is fitting."

In another way wisdom is called [such] *less commonly;* and thus wisdom bespeaks not just any cognition, but a sublime cognition, namely the cognition of eternal things. And thus the Apostle takes it in the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter twelve[^11]: *To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge;* according as Augustine expounds it, saying that "wisdom is the cognition of eternal things, but knowledge is the cognition of created things"; and thus too the Philosopher says[^12] that wisdom is "the cognition of the highest causes."

In the third way wisdom is taken *properly;* and thus it names the cognition of God according to piety: and this cognition indeed is the one reckoned in the worship of latria, which we render to God through faith, hope, and charity, according to which mode Augustine takes it in the fourteenth [book] *On the Trinity*[^13], expounding that [text] of Job: *Behold, piety itself is wisdom,* — saying in the same place that piety and wisdom are the same as *theosebia,* and theosebia is the same as divine worship, which consists in the three virtues, according to what he himself says at the beginning of the *Enchiridion* to Laurentius.

In the fourth way wisdom is called [such] *more properly,* and thus it names the experiential cognition of God; and in this way it is one of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, whose act consists in tasting the divine sweetness. And since for the interior taste, in which there is delight, there is necessarily required an act of *affection* for conjoining and an act of *cognition* for apprehending, according to that [saying] of the Philosopher[^14], who says that "delight is the conjunction of the suitable with the suitable with the sense of the same"; hence it is that the act of the gift of wisdom is partly cognitive and partly affective: such that it is *begun in cognition* and *consummated in affection,* according as the taste or savoring itself is an experiential cognition of the good and the sweet. And therefore the chief act of the gift of wisdom, most properly so called, is on the side of the affective [power], by reason of which Ecclesiasticus says that *wisdom is according to its name;* and Gregory says that its act is to refresh; and Dionysius says that it belongs to this wisdom to be senseless, on account of this, that we are better affected toward God by a prior cognition which is through removal and negation than by affirmation, as he teaches in the book *On Mystical Theology.* By reason also of this same cause Bernard says that charity advances into wisdom. — And from this same cause it happens that wisdom cannot be excessive, because excess in the experience of divine sweetness is rather laudable than blameworthy, according as is clear in holy and contemplative men, who from too much sweetness are now raised into ecstasy, now lifted up even to rapture, though this happens to very few. — It must therefore be conceded that the chief act of the gift of wisdom is on the side of affection. The reasons showing this are also to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that wisdom grows through hearing; it must be said that wisdom is there taken commonly for the general cognition which is indeed of things divine and human, which receives increase through study and hearing; and therefore it has no place here.

2. To that likewise which objects from the authority of Augustine, the response is clear, because Augustine takes it in that way.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Gregory, that wisdom is against folly; it can be said that he says this not as to the *ultimate* act of wisdom, which is reckoned in affection, but as to the *first* or prior act, which consists in cognition; for the gift of wisdom embraces both in itself.

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4. To that which is objected, that wisdom is appropriated to the Son; it must be said that this is so insofar as it bespeaks the light of cognition, not insofar as it bespeaks the savor of affection. For since it encloses both in itself, it can be appropriated to either person, namely to the Son and to the Holy Spirit; and since it is not appropriated to the Son alone, but rather also to the person of the Holy Spirit: hence it is that that reasoning is not compelling.

5. To that which is further objected, that no one is wise from this alone, that he loves, unless he also further knows; it must be said that this is true; yet in the love of God cognition is conjoined to the taste itself. For the best mode of knowing God is through the experience of sweetness; it is also far more excellent and nobler and more delightful than through the argument of inquiry. Hence from this it is not had that *to know* is the chief act of the gift of wisdom, but that[^15] in a certain way it concurs toward its chief act; and this indeed is true, because, as has been touched on, wisdom encloses both acts in itself; whence in a certain way it regards the intellect, in a certain way it regards the affect.

To that which is objected last, that one habit cannot be with respect to those two acts, since the powers are diversified by reason of them; it must be said that it is true that these acts cannot be of the same habit such that each is principal; nevertheless nothing prevents there being two, such that one is the *first,* the other the *chief;* one as *disposing,* the other as *completing,* as in the foregoing[^16] it was held concerning faith. — Whence by the same reasons and responses one can, as to this, treat of the gift of wisdom as those were explained above concerning the virtue of faith; and therefore let these things suffice for the present, since it is not necessary to repeat them here again.

la: Vers. 5. Cfr. ibid. 4, 10. seq.; 8, 33; 12, 15; 19, 20; 23, 19. — De *minori* cfr. Aristot., de Sensu et sens. c. 1, et supra d. 24. dub. 2. — Paulo ante cod. U verbo *cognoscendo* adiungit *verum.*

en: Verse 5. Cf. ibid. 4:10 f.; 8:33; 12:15; 19:20; 23:19. — On the *minor* [premise] cf. Aristotle, *On Sense and Sensibles* c. 1, and above d. 24, dub. 2. — A little before, codex U adds to the word *cognoscendo* the word *verum.*

la: Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. XIII. c. 19. n. 24; 1. contra Academicos, c. 6. n. 16, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 25. (c. 11.), et XI. Metaph. c. 6. (X. 7.), ubi eadem definitio sententialiter tantum profertur. Ad verbum autem habetur apud Ciceron., V. Tuscul. Disp. c. 3, et II. de Offic. c. 2; apud Clem. Alex., I. Strom. c. 5; apud Orig., III. contra Cels. n. 72. — Paulo inferius pro *definit sapientiam* cod. U *definitur sapientia.*

en: Chapter 1, n. 3. Cf. XIII c. 19 n. 24; *Against the Academics* I c. 6 n. 16, and here the letter of the Master, c. 1. Cf. also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I c. 25 (c. 11), and *Metaphysics* XI c. 6 (X. 7), where the same definition is given only as to sense. Word for word, however, it is found in Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* V c. 3, and *On Duties* II c. 2; in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* I c. 5; in Origen, *Against Celsus* III n. 72. — A little below, for *definit sapientiam* codex U reads *definitur sapientia.*

la: Vers. 19. — De Gregorii sententia (II. Moral. c. 49. n. 77.) cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 8, et de sententia Philosophi supra pag. 515, nota 1.

en: Verse 19. — On Gregory's sentence (*Morals* II c. 49 n. 77) cf. above p. 736, note 8, and on the sentence of the Philosopher above p. 515, note 1.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3, et d. 34. q. 3. ac dub. 7.

en: See I *Sent.* d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 34, q. 3, and dub. 7.

la: Vers. 23. — In testimonio allato Vulgata pro *suum* exhibet *eius* et omittit *in.* — Isidor., X. Etymolog. n. 240: *Sapiens* dictus a *sapore,* quia, sicut gustus aptus est ad discretionem saporis ciborum, sic sapiens ad dignoscentiam rerum atque causarum, quod unumquodque dignoscat atque sensu veritatem discernat. Cui contrarius est *insipiens,* quod sit *sine sapore* nec alicuius discretionis vel sensus. Cfr. supra pag. 612, nota 3. — Pro *affectionem* cod. Z *affectum,* et in fine arg. pro *affectionis* codd. A K *affectus,* cod. bb *affectionis.*

en: Verse 23. — In the testimony adduced the Vulgate reads *eius* for *suum* and omits *in.* — Isidore, *Etymologies* X n. 240: One is called *sapiens* ("wise") from *sapor* ("taste"), because, just as taste is fit for discerning the savor of foods, so the wise man is fit for discerning things and causes, so that he may distinguish each thing and discern the truth by sense. To whom the *insipiens* ("foolish") is contrary, who is *without taste* (*sine sapore*) and without any discernment or sense. Cf. above p. 612, note 3. — For *affectionem* codex Z [reads] *affectum,* and at the end of the argument for *affectionis* codices A K [read] *affectus,* codex bb *affectionis.*

la: Vers. 4. — Gregor., I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44.

en: Verse 4. — Gregory, *Morals* I c. 32 n. 44.

la: Paragr. 1. Abbas Vercell. locum e Dionysio allegatum sic reddit: «Aeternam sapientiam irrationabilem et amentem et stultam excedenter laudantes dicimus, quod ipsa est causa omnis mentis et rationis et omnis sapientiae» etc. Scotus Erigena sic: «Hanc igitur irrationalem et mente carentem et stultam sapientiam supereminenter laudantes dicimus, quia totius est animi et rationis et totius sapientiae et intellectus causa» etc. Dionysius illam sententiam dixit relate ad illud 1. Cor. 1, 25: *Quod stultum est Dei sapientius est hominibus.* — In alia littera (versione) adducta pro *laudantes dicimus* (ὑμνοῦντες λέγομεν) codd. et edd. vitiose *intuentes dicunt.* — In fine arg. cod. Z *ex parte cognitionis vel rationis.*

en: Paragraph 1. The Abbot of Vercelli renders the passage cited from Dionysius thus: "We, surpassingly praising the eternal wisdom as irrational and senseless and foolish, declare that it is the cause of all mind and reason and of all wisdom," etc. Scotus Eriugena thus: "This wisdom, therefore, as irrational and lacking mind and foolish, supereminently praising, we declare, because it is the cause of all soul and reason and of all wisdom and understanding," etc. Dionysius spoke that sentence in relation to that [text of] 1 Cor. 1:25: *That which is foolish of God is wiser than men.* — In another reading (version) adduced, for *laudantes dicimus* (ὑμνοῦντες λέγομεν) the codices and editions corruptly [have] *intuentes dicunt.* — At the end of the argument codex Z [reads] *on the side of cognition or reason.*

la: Num. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 596, nota 7. — Paulo inferius codd. A H L aa omittunt *et* ante *ipsius caritatis.*

en: Number 3. Cf. above p. 596, note 7. — A little below codices A H L aa omit *et* before *ipsius caritatis.*

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et I. in corp. Paulo ante pro *quia* maior cod. U *quod maior.* In fine arg. cod. U definitiones sapientiae adiungit, quae infra in corp. occurrunt, simulque notat, sapientiam quadrupliciter sumi posse.

en: Cf. II *Sent.* d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and 1, in the body. A little before, for *quia maior* codex U [reads] *quod maior.* At the end of the argument codex U adds definitions of wisdom which occur below in the body, and at the same time notes that wisdom can be taken in four ways.

la: Libr. I. Metaph. c. 2.

en: *Metaphysics* I c. 2.

la: Vers. 8. — Expositio August. plenius habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Pro *cognitio creatorum* cod. A *cognitio creaturarum.*

en: Verse 8. — Augustine's exposition is found more fully here in the letter of the Master, c. 1. — For *cognitio creatorum* codex A [reads] *cognitio creaturarum.*

la: Libr. I. Metaph. c. 1. seqq. et III. text. 3. (II. c. 2.). Idem dicit VI. Ethic. c. 7, sapientiam esse «scientiam rerum praestantissimarum».

en: *Metaphysics* I c. 1 ff. and III text. 3 (II c. 2). The same he says in *Ethics* VI c. 7, that wisdom is "the knowledge of the most excellent things."

la: Cap. 1. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 216, nota 4. — Pro *de Trinitate,* quam lectionem ex Guliel. Mara, hic q. 1, in textum recepimus, codd. et edd. exhibent *de Civitate Dei;* perperam, siquidem ibi nihil de Iob legitur; rectius lectorem delegassent ad Lib. X. c. 1. n. 3. istius libri Augustiniani, de quo vide supra pag. 213, nota 9. — Testimonium e libro Iob allatum habetur ibi 28, 28. Pro *Ecce pietas,* quae lectio est septuaginta interpretum, Vulgata *Ecce timor Domini.* — Locus ex August. Enchiridio mox citatus habetur ibi c. 2. seq. n. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 215, nota 4.

en: Chapter 1, n. 1. Cf. above p. 216, note 4. — For *de Trinitate,* which reading we have received into the text from William of Mara, here q. 1, the codices and editions exhibit *de Civitate Dei;* wrongly, since nothing of Job is read there; they would more rightly have referred the reader to Book X c. 1 n. 3 of that Augustinian work, on which see above p. 213, note 9. — The testimony adduced from the book of Job is found there 28:28. For *Ecce pietas,* which is the reading of the seventy interpreters, the Vulgate [has] *Ecce timor Domini.* — The passage from Augustine's *Enchiridion* just cited is found there c. 2 f., n. 1. Cf. above p. 215, note 4.

la: Praeter locc. tom. I. pag. 38, nota 1. citt.; cfr. II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 3.) et III. text. 29. (c. 7.). — Pro *qui dicit* edd. *quo dicit,* cod. A *quod dicit.*

en: Besides the places cited in vol. I p. 38, note 1; cf. *On the Soul* II text. 20 (c. 3) and III text. 29 (c. 7). — For *qui dicit* the editions [read] *quo dicit,* codex A *quod dicit.*

la: August., XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12: *Dilectio quoque ubi nulla est, quis ullam dicat esse sapientiam?* Cfr. liber de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. Aristot., X. Ethic. c. 7. ait: *Iucundissima autem ex virtutis operationibus ea procul dubio est, quae secundum sapientiam sit; philosophia* [i. e. amor sapientiae vel etiam ipsa sapientia] *ergo mirabiles habere et puritate et nobilitate voluptates videtur.* — Paulo superius pro *consummatur* cod. F *terminatur,* et pro *saporatio* cod. A *sapor.*

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* XV c. 7 n. 12: *Where there is no love at all, who would say there is any wisdom?* Cf. the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* c. 11. Aristotle, *Ethics* X c. 7, says: *Of the operations of virtue the most pleasant beyond doubt is that which is according to wisdom; philosophy* [i. e. the love of wisdom, or even wisdom itself] *therefore is seen to have wondrous pleasures both in purity and in nobility.* — A little above, for *consummatur* codex F [reads] *terminatur,* and for *saporatio* codex A *sapor.*

la: Dist. 23. a. 1. q. 2. circa finem. Cfr. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. — Pro *alter vero* cod. A *alter sicut.*

en: Distinction 23, a. 1, q. 2, near the end. Cf. d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6. — For *alter vero* codex A [reads] *alter sicut.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Eandem distinctionem quadruplicem *sapientiae* repetit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.), qui deinde (quaestiunc. 3.) in conclusione generaliter cum nostro auctore convenit; sed addit: «Sapientia amorem importat ut causam disponentem proximam, sed cognitionem essentialiter, cognitionem, dico, non tantum speculativam, sed practicam; unde duplicem habet effectum consequentem, scilicet *illuminationem* et *delectationem*». Hoc dicitur ad mentem S. Thomae, qui (S. II. II. q. 45. a. 2.) docet: «Sapientia, quae est donum, causam quidem habet in voluntate, scilicet caritatem, sed essentiam habet in intellectu» (cfr. ibid. q. 8. a. 6, et Comment. hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3.). Similiter loquitur Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Paulo aliter S. Bonav. (cfr. hic dub. 1.), qui negat (in corp. et ad 3.), quod cognoscere sit actus sapientiae praecipuus; cui doctrinae favet B. Albert. (hic a. 1.). — Cfr. praeter laudatos: Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

**II.** De *scientia* (q. seq.) atque de differentia inter *sapientiam, intellectum* et *scientiam;* cfr. etiam infra q. 3. Cum Magister (hic c. 1.) secundum Augustinum scientiae assignet quatuor actus (cfr. hic dub. 2. 3.), orta est quaestio, quis eorum sit principalis. Etiam in hac quaestione S. Thom. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 9. a. 3.) aliqualenus recedit a nostro auctore. Nam in Summa resolvit, quod «donum scientiae primo quidem et principaliter respicit *speculationem,* in quantum scilicet homo scit, quid fide tenere debeat; secundario autem se extendit etiam ad *operationem,* secundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agendis». — Quod autem *praecipuus* actus huius doni sit dirigere circa *actionem,* cum S. Bonav. tenent etiam B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 8.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question 1) repeats the same fourfold distinction of *wisdom,* who then (sub-question 3) in his conclusion agrees generally with our author; but he adds: "Wisdom imports love as a proximate disposing cause, but cognition essentially — cognition, I say, not only speculative but practical; whence it has a twofold consequent effect, namely *illumination* and *delight.*" This is said according to the mind of St. Thomas, who (S. II. II. q. 45, a. 2) teaches: "Wisdom, which is a gift, has indeed its cause in the will, namely charity, but its essence in the intellect" (cf. ibid. q. 8, a. 6, and Commentary here q. 2, a. 1, sub-question 3). Richard speaks similarly (here a. 2, q. 1). A little differently St. Bonaventure (cf. here dub. 1), who denies (in the body and in reply to 3) that to know is the chief act of wisdom; to which doctrine Bl. Albert is favorable (here a. 1). — Cf., besides those cited: Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

**II.** On *knowledge* (the following question) and on the difference among *wisdom, understanding,* and *knowledge;* cf. also below q. 3. Since the Master (here c. 1), following Augustine, assigns four acts to knowledge (cf. here dub. 2, 3), the question arose which of them is principal. In this question too St. Thomas (here a. 3, sub-question 2; S. II. II. q. 9, a. 3) somewhat recedes from our author. For in the *Summa* he resolves that "the gift of knowledge first indeed and principally regards *speculation,* insofar namely as a man knows what he must hold by faith; but secondarily it extends itself also to *operation,* according as through the knowledge of things to be believed, and of those things which follow upon things to be believed, we are directed in things to be done." — But that the *chief* act of this gift is to direct concerning *action,* together with St. Bonaventure hold also Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 4; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 3, sub-question 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 8.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum actus praecipuus doni scientiae consistat in actione, vel in speculatione.*

Secundo quaeritur de actu et obiecto doni scientiae, et est quaestio, utrum actus praecipuus doni scientiae consistat in actione, vel in consideratione[^1].

Et quod consistat in actione, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Augustini, duodecimo de Trinitate, quae habetur in littera[^4]; distinguens enim inter *sapientiam* et *scientiam,* dicit, quod sapientia spectat ad contemplationem, et scientia ad actionem.

2. Item, secundum Philosophum[^5], «scire quod non est coniunctum operationi, parum aut nihil prodest ad virtutem»: si ergo scientia, quae est Spiritus sancti donum, multum prodest ad meritum, videtur, quod actus eius circa agenda praecipue sit constitutus.

3. Item, fides sine operibus mortua est[^6], ergo pari ratione et scientia; sed ipsa scientia, quae est donum Spiritus sancti, non est mortua, sed gratuita: ergo videtur, quod actus eius praecipuus consistat circa agenda.

4. Item, donum scientiae comparatur ad pietatem, sicut dirigens ad exsequens; sed pietatis, secundum quod dicit Gregorius in Moralibus[^7], est opera misericordiae exhibere: ergo actus scientiae est circa talia opera dirigere: ergo actus eius consistit in agendis.

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5. Item, actus doni scientiae, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera[^8], «est conversari *in medio nationis pravae et perversae*»; sed bona conversatio respicit actiones exteriores: ergo actus doni scientiae circa agenda versatur praecipue.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate[^9]: «Huic scientiae tribuo non quidquid humanae curiositatis et vanitatis est, sed quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur et roboratur»: si ergo actus doni scientiae est ad generandum fidem, videtur, quod magis sit circa fidem quam circa mores.

2. Item, in eodem libro dicitur, et Magister dicit in littera[^10], quod cognitio divinitatis in Christo spectat ad *sapientiam,* cognitio vero humanitatis in eodem spectat ad *scientiam;* sed cognitio humanitatis Christi non est cognitio operativa, sed potius contemplativa: si ergo haec est doni scientiae, videtur etc.

3. Item, in agendis sufficienter dirigimur per virtutem prudentiae[^11]: aut ergo donum scientiae superfluit, aut eius actus praecipuus non ad hoc, sed ad aliud ordinatur.

4. Item, intelligentia Scripturae spectat ad donum scientiae, secundum quod Augustinus innuit in libro de Doctrina christiana[^12], ubi ostendit, quod per pietatem et mititatem pervenitur ad intelligentiam sacrae Scripturae: si ergo huiusmodi intelligentia non consistit in actione, sed in speculatione; videtur, quod actus eius magis consistat in contemplatione quam in actione.

Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum unius habitus unus sit actus, quomodo doni scientiae habent tam diversi actus assignari? Innuit enim Magister in littera[^13], quod actus doni scientiae est fidem nutrire et defendere; et ulterius, quod eiusdem actus est conversari *in medio nationis pravae et perversae;* et postremo, quod actus eius est Christum cognoscere.

### Conclusio.

> Doni scientiae praecipuus actus est dirigere circa actionem, sed ex consequenti etiam nosse ea quae sunt fidei, et humanitatem Christi.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod scientiae quadruplex est differentia[^14]. Quaedam est, quae consistit in intellectu *pure speculativo;* et haec est fundata super principia rationis[^15], et haec est scientia acquisita de quacumque creatura, sicut scientia humanae philosophiae. — Quaedam autem est, quae consistit in intellectu *inclinato ab affectu*[^16]; et haec est fundata super principia fidei, quae quidem sunt articuli, et nihilominus acquisita; et haec est scientia sacrae Scripturae, quam nullus habere potest, nisi saltem habeat fidem informem. — Quaedam autem est, quae consistit in intellectu sive ratione, in quantum *inclinat affectum ad operationem;* et haec fundata est super principia iuris naturalis, quae ordinatur ad rectitudinem et honestatem vitae; et huiusmodi est scientia prudentiae-virtutis. — Quaedam autem scientia est, quae consistit in intellectu, secundum quod est *inclinatus* et *inclinans: inclinatus,* inquam, a fide, et *inclinans* ad bonam operationem: et haec fundatur super principia fidei et habet ortum a dono gratiae; et talis est scientia, quae est donum Spiritus sancti.

Et ex hoc patet, quis sit actus proprius huius doni. Est enim actus eius *dirigere ad agenda* secundum praeexigentiam regulae ipsius fidei, cuius est dirigere ad opera misericordiae, ut non tantum bona pro bonis reddat, secundum quod dictat lex naturae, sed etiam bona pro malis, secundum quod dictat lex gratiae[^17], ad exemplar ipsius Iesu Christi, in quo fuit gratiae abundantia. Et ideo ad ipsam scientiam non solummodo pertinet *dirigere in agendis;* sed etiam ex consequenti pertinet *nosse ea quae sunt fidei* tanquam fundamentum suae directionis; et ulterius *nosse humanitatem Christi* tanquam exemplar sui regiminis; ita quod hic triplex actus convenit ei secundum triplicem respectum: unus videlicet respectu *obiecti motivi,* alter vero respectu sui *fundamenti,* et tertius est[^18] *exemplaris excitativi.* Et quia principalis actus accipitur ex parte *obiecti;* hinc est, quod praecipuus actus doni scientiae est *dirigere circa actionem,* secundum quod dicit Augustinus, et ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae; et ideo sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ipsius scientiae est fidem gignere et roborare; dicendum, quod iste non est actus eius *principalis,* sed *ad principalem ordinatus* ea ratione, qua directio doni scientiae in agendis sequitur et fundatur super principia ipsius fidei[^19].

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ipsius doni scientiae est humanitatem et gratiam Christi nosse; iam patet responsio: quia nec hic est actus ipsius scientiae principalis, sed qui ad principalem habet ordinari; sicut cognitio exempli utilis est ad evidentiorem cognitionem rei, quae secundum exemplar illud debet fieri.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per prudentiam sufficienter dirigitur homo in agendis; iam patet responsio: quia prudentia dirigit secundum principia iuris naturalis ad ea quae *honesta* sunt; sed scientia-donum dirigit per principia fidei et iuris divini ad ea quae sunt *sancta*[^20]; unde et quodam modo altior est actus ipsius doni scientiae quam virtutis prudentiae, et super principia magis elevata fundari habet; et propter hoc, habita virtute prudentiae, non superfluit donum scientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligentia Scripturarum spectat ad donum scientiae; dicendum, quod sicut prius tactum fuit de cognitione eorum quae sunt fidei, quod non *principaliter* spectant ad donum ipsius scientiae, sed quodam modo *antecedenter* et quasi *praesuppositive*; sic etiam intelligendum est de intelligentia sacrae Scripturae.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de diversitate actuum, iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt: quoniam unus est eius actus principalis, duo vero annexi; et simul cum hoc patet, quid sit obiectum ipsius doni scientiae, et quomodo etiam differat a virtute prudentiae et ab habitu cuiuslibet alterius scientiae[^21].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in speculation.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of knowledge, and the question is whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in consideration[^1].

And that it consists in action seems [so]:

1. *First,* by the authority of Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity,* which is had in the [Master's] text[^4]; for distinguishing between *wisdom* and *knowledge,* he says that wisdom regards contemplation, and knowledge action.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher[^5], "to know what is not conjoined to operation profits little or nothing toward virtue": if therefore knowledge, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, profits much toward merit, it seems that its act is chiefly constituted concerning things to be done.

3. Likewise, faith without works is dead[^6], therefore by parity of reasoning so too is knowledge; but knowledge itself, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is not dead, but gratuitous: therefore it seems that its chief act consists concerning things to be done.

4. Likewise, the gift of knowledge is compared to piety as the directing to the executing; but it belongs to piety, according as Gregory says in the *Morals*[^7], to exhibit works of mercy: therefore the act of knowledge is to direct concerning such works: therefore its act consists in things to be done.

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5. Likewise, the act of the gift of knowledge, according as the Master says in the [his] text[^8], "is to converse *in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation*"; but good conversation regards exterior actions: therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is occupied chiefly concerning things to be done.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the fourteenth book of *On the Trinity*[^9]: "To this knowledge I attribute not whatever is of human curiosity and vanity, but that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, and strengthened": if therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is for generating faith, it seems that it is concerned rather with faith than with morals.

2. Likewise, in the same book it is said, and the Master says in his text[^10], that the cognition of the divinity in Christ regards *wisdom,* but the cognition of [his] humanity in the same regards *knowledge;* but the cognition of Christ's humanity is not an operative cognition, but rather a contemplative one: if therefore this belongs to the gift of knowledge, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, in things to be done we are sufficiently directed by the virtue of prudence[^11]: therefore either the gift of knowledge is superfluous, or its chief act is not ordered to this but to something else.

4. Likewise, the understanding of Scripture regards the gift of knowledge, according as Augustine intimates in the book *On Christian Doctrine*[^12], where he shows that through piety and meekness one comes to the understanding of sacred Scripture: if therefore such understanding consists not in action but in speculation; it seems that its act consists rather in contemplation than in action.

Likewise, according to this it is asked: since of one habit there is one act, how can acts so diverse be assigned to the gift of knowledge? For the Master intimates in his text[^13] that the act of the gift of knowledge is to nourish and defend faith; and further, that of the same [gift] the act is to converse *in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation;* and lastly, that its act is to know Christ.

### Conclusion.

> The chief act of the gift of knowledge is to direct concerning action, but consequently also to know the things which are of faith, and the humanity of Christ.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a fourfold difference of knowledge[^14]. There is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the *purely speculative* intellect; and this is founded upon the principles of reason[^15], and this is the knowledge acquired about any creature whatsoever, as the knowledge of human philosophy. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect *inclined by affect*[^16]; and this is founded upon the principles of faith, which indeed are the articles, and is nonetheless acquired; and this is the knowledge of sacred Scripture, which no one can have unless he have at least unformed faith. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect or reason, insofar as it *inclines the affect to operation;* and this is founded upon the principles of natural law, which is ordered to the rectitude and honesty of life; and of this kind is the knowledge of prudence-as-virtue. — But there is a certain knowledge which consists in the intellect, according as it is *inclined* and *inclining: inclined,* I say, by faith, and *inclining* to good operation: and this is founded upon the principles of faith and has its origin from the gift of grace; and such is the knowledge which is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

And from this it is clear what is the proper act of this gift. For its act is *to direct toward things to be done* according to the prerequisite of the rule of faith itself, whose [office] is to direct toward works of mercy, so that one render not only good for good, according as the law of nature dictates, but also good for evil, according as the law of grace dictates[^17], after the exemplar of Jesus Christ himself, in whom was the abundance of grace. And therefore to this knowledge it pertains not only *to direct in things to be done;* but also consequently it pertains *to know the things which are of faith* as the foundation of its direction; and further *to know the humanity of Christ* as the exemplar of its governance; so that here a threefold act belongs to it according to a threefold respect: one namely with respect to the *motive object,* another with respect to its *foundation,* and the third is[^18] with respect to the *exciting exemplar.* And because the principal act is taken on the side of the *object,* hence it is that the chief act of the gift of knowledge is *to direct concerning action,* according as Augustine says, and as the reasons adduced for this show; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to knowledge to beget and strengthen faith; it must be said that this is not its *principal* act, but one *ordered to the principal* for this reason, that the direction of the gift of knowledge in things to be done follows upon and is founded upon the principles of faith itself[^19].

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2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the gift of knowledge to know the humanity and grace of Christ; the response is already clear: because neither is this the principal act of knowledge, but one that has to be ordered to the principal; just as the cognition of an example is useful for the more evident cognition of the thing which ought to be done according to that exemplar.

3. To that which is objected, that man is sufficiently directed in things to be done by prudence; the response is already clear: because prudence directs according to the principles of natural law toward those things which are *honorable;* but knowledge-as-gift directs through the principles of faith and divine law toward those things which are *holy*[^20]; whence the act of the gift of knowledge is in a certain way higher than that of the virtue of prudence, and has to be founded upon more elevated principles; and on account of this, when the virtue of prudence is had, the gift of knowledge is not superfluous.

4. To that which is objected, that the understanding of the Scriptures regards the gift of knowledge; it must be said that just as it was touched on before concerning the cognition of the things which are of faith, that they do not *principally* regard the gift of knowledge itself, but in a certain way *antecedently* and as it were *presuppositively;* so too it must be understood concerning the understanding of sacred Scripture.

To that which is lastly asked concerning the diversity of acts, the response is already clear through the things which have been said: since one is its principal act, but two are annexed; and together with this it is clear what is the object of the gift of knowledge, and how also it differs from the virtue of prudence and from the habit of any other knowledge whatsoever[^21].

---

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 15. p. II. q. 2. et d. 27. p. II. q. 3. in corp. — *In plurimis codd. et in edd. 1, 2 deest* quid. *Paulo ante pro* non habetur *cod. aa* non sequitur, *edd.* non sequitur et habetur; *edd. etiam superius omittunt* per *ante* experimentum.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3; d. 15, p. II, q. 2, and d. 27, p. II, q. 3, in the body. — In very many codices and in editions 1, 2 *quid* is wanting. A little before, for *non habetur* codex aa [reads] *non sequitur,* editions [read] *non sequitur et habetur;* the editions also above omit *per* before *experimentum.* [This note combines the printed p.775 nn.1 and 2, which together gloss the opener; rendered as one entry on the single body anchor at the opener.]

la: Hic c. 1; codd. non bene citant XIV. de Trin.

en: Here c. 1; the codices wrongly cite *On the Trinity* book XIV.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 1: *Ad virtutes autem cognitio parum vel nihil valet; reliqua* [*eligere et immutabiliter agere*] *non parum, sed multum ac totum conferunt.*

en: *Ethics* book II, c. 1: "But toward the virtues cognition avails little or nothing; the rest [to choose and to act immutably] confer not a little, but much and the whole."

en: James 2:20 and 26.

la: Libr. I. c. 32. n. 44. — De maiori cfr. supra d. 31. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (tertia via).

en: [*Morals*] book I, c. 32, n. 44. — On the greater [point] cf. above d. 31, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way).

la: Hic c. 1. Respicitur Phil. 2, 13. — Subinde pro *actiones* cod. A *operationes.*

en: Here c. 1. Reference is to Philippians 2:13. — Thereupon for *actiones* codex A [reads] *operationes.*

la: Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In testimonio allato Vat. post *nutritur* inserit *defenditur,* quod et in textu origin. invenitur. — Mox pro *ad generandum* codd. A I L N T *ad aggenerandum,* codd. O bb *ad roborandam.*

en: [*On the Trinity* book XIV] c. 1, n. 3. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1. — In the testimony adduced the Vatican [edition] inserts *defenditur* after *nutritur,* which is also found in the original text. — Presently for *ad generandum* codices A I L N T [read] *ad aggenerandum,* codices O bb [read] *ad roborandam.*

la: Hic c. 1; attamen locus ibi cit. non invenitur in XIV. de Trin., sed in XIII. c. 19. n. 24.

en: Here c. 1; yet the passage cited there is not found in *On the Trinity* book XIV, but in book XIII, c. 19, n. 24.

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 5. dicit, quod «prudentia habitus sit vera cum ratione activus circa ea quae et bona et mala homini sunt».

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* book VI, c. 5, says that "prudence is a habit truly active with reason concerning those things which are both good and evil for man."

la: Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9: *Deinde mitescere opus est pietate, neque contradicere divinae Scripturae, sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra percutit, sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere meliusque praecipere possimus; sed cogitare potius et credere, id esse melius et verius quod ibi scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id quod nos per nosmetipsos sapere possumus.*

en: [*On Christian Doctrine*] book II, c. 7, n. 9: "Then it is necessary to grow gentle by piety, and not to contradict divine Scripture — whether understood, if it strikes some of our vices, or not understood, as though we could be wiser and prescribe better; but rather to think and believe that what is written there is better and truer, even if it lies hidden, than what we are able to know by ourselves."

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here c. 1.

la: Vide Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3.

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* book VI, c. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq., nec non pag. 491, nota 6.

en: Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f., and also p. 491, note 6.

la: Cfr. Matth. 5, 39. seqq., et Rom. 12, 17. seqq.

en: Cf. Matthew 5:39 ff., and Romans 12:17 ff.

la: Codd. A Z *respectu.* Superius pro *suae directionis* cod. A *summae directionis.*

en: Codices A Z [read] *respectu.* Above, for *suae directionis* codex A [reads] *summae directionis.*

la: Vide infra dub. 2. — Pro *ea ratione* cod. R *ea ordinatione rationis.*

en: See below dubium 2. — For *ea ratione* codex R [reads] *ea ordinatione rationis.*

la: Sap. 10, 10: *Dedit illi scientiam sanctorum.* — Paulo superius pro *secundum* codd. B O *per.*

en: Wisdom 10:10: "He gave him the knowledge of the holy ones." — A little above, for *secundum* codices B O [read] *per.*

la: Permulti codd. *praesuppositione.* In codd. A bb sic legitur: *sed quodam modo ad affectum* [cod. bb addit *antecedunt*] *et quasi cognitionem praesupponunt.*

en: Very many codices [read] *praesuppositione.* In codices A bb it reads thus: *but in a certain way they presuppose toward the affect* [codex bb adds *antecedunt*] *and as it were the cognition.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.775–777 (PDF 797–799; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p77{5,6,7}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 53831–53947. Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied. Offset pdf = printed + 22. Running heads verified: p.775 recto `DIST. XXXV. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II.` (OCR-mangled `…ICUS QUAEST. II. 775`); p.776 verso `776 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III`; p.777 recto `DIST. XXXV. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III.` (this recto head names the *next* question, QUAESTIO III, which begins lower in p.777's L-col — q2 closes above it).

**Alignment check — PASS (1:1).** TRACTATIO **Secundo** = *quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni **scientiae*** → a1-q2. The opener reads *Secundo quaeritur de actu et obiecto doni scientiae, et est quaestio, utrum actus praecipuus doni scientiae consistat in actione, vel in consideratione* — q2 = **scientia**, confirmed against the divisio's six-question listing. No q-swap.

**Page-split / apparatus map (19 markers over 21 printed footer notes, per-page restart).**
- **p.775** (foot of L-col through R-col): question opener + args 1–4 + start of arg 4 footer. Notes by body anchor: opener (n.1 *Cfr. I. Sent. d.10…* + n.2 the *deest quid* variant, combined) → **[^1]**; arg 1 *in littera⁴* (n.4 *Hic c.1; codd. XIV de Trin*) → **[^4]**; arg 2 *Philosophum⁵* (n.5 *Libr. II. Ethic. c.1*) → **[^5]**; arg 3 *fides sine operibus mortua est⁶* (n.6 *Iac. 2,20 et 26*) → **[^6]**; arg 4 *Gregorius in Moralibus⁷* (n.7 *Libr. I. c.32 n.44*) → **[^7]**. **p.775 n.3** (*Dist. 23. a.1. q.2.… alter vero* variant) was claimed by **a1-q1 as its [^16]** (q1's final reply *in praecedentibus*); NOT re-claimed here.
- **p.776** (nn.1–11 → [^8]–[^18], 11 notes): arg 5 *in littera¹* (n.1 *Hic c.1. Phil 2,13*) → [^8]; Sed contra 1 *de Trin.²* (n.2 *Cap.1 n.3*) → [^9]; SC 2 *in littera³* (n.3 *Hic c.1… XIII c.19*) → [^10]; SC 3 *prudentiae⁴* (n.4 *Aristot. VI Ethic c.5*) → [^11]; SC 4 *de Doctrina christiana⁵* (n.5 *Libr. II c.7 n.9*) → [^12]; iuxta-hoc *in littera⁶* (n.6 *Hic c.1*) → [^13]; Respondeo *quadruplex differentia⁷* (n.7 *Vide Aristot. VI Ethic c.3*) → [^14]; *principia rationis⁷* (n.8 *Cfr supra d.23*) → [^15]; *inclinato ab affectu⁸* (n.9 *Matth 5,39*) → [^16]; *lex gratiae⁹* (n.10 *Codd A Z respectu*) → [^17]; Respondeo *tertius est¹⁰* / Solutio 1 *principia fidei¹¹* (n.11 *Vide infra dub.2*) → [^18].
- **p.777** (nn.1–4 → [^19]–[^21], 4 notes; printed n.3 has no separate body anchor and is folded): reply 3 *sancta¹* (n.1 *Sap. 10,10*) → [^19]; reply 4 *praesuppositive²* (n.2 *Permulti codd. praesuppositione…*) → [^20]; printed n.3 (*Codd. … quod,* the *quid sit obiectum* variant) folded into [^20]'s entry context; final reply *alterius scientiae⁴* (n.4 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) → **[^21]** = the scholion-redirect marker. **p.777 nn.5 ff.** (*Hic c.2;* *Sive Epist. 9…*) open QUAESTIO III's band — **FORWARDED to a1-q3.** The `S. Bonav. — Tom. III.` line at p.777-L foot is a gathering signature, not a note.

> **Note on marker numbering.** 19 body markers are used: 1, 4–21** (the slots 2, 3 are deliberately empty — printed p.775 n.2 was folded into 1 as a combined opener-gloss, and p.775 n.3 was claimed by a1-q1 as its 16). The numbering is kept aligned to the printed p.775 footer sequence (n.1→1, n.4→4, n.5→5, n.6→6, n.7→7) so the gap is legible against the source; p.776 nn.1–11 then continue as 8–17 (note 14 also covers p.776 n.7, the Aristotle *Ethics* VI.3 reference for the fourfold *scientia*), and p.777 nn.1–4 as 19–21 with 18 = p.776 n.11. Marker pairing verified 19/19 equal in Latin and English bodies.

**Scholion disposition — `has_scholion: false`, REDIRECT.** q2's range (raw 53831–53947) has NO own `SCHOLION.` header — the SCHOLION at raw 53812 closes **a1-q1**, and the SCHOLION at raw 54124 opens within **a1-q3**'s matter. Per the a1-q1 hand-off, **a1-q1's article-master scholion §II is exactly this question's dossier** (*De scientia, q. seq.* + the Magister's fourfold *scientia* acts + S. Thom. S. II. II. q. 9 a. 3 *speculatio/operatio* + Bl. Albert / Petr. a Tar. / Richard concurring with S. Bonav. on *actio* as the chief act). The final footer note [^21] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms the redirect in the source itself. → **see the scholion to a1-q1, §II.**

**Footer hand-offs.** PICKED UP from a1-q1: the p.775 *scientia* footer band (printed nn.1, 2, 4–7), claimed by body anchor (q1's nn.2–3 = de Trin XV / Dist.23 were interleaved among them and stayed with q1). FORWARDED to a1-q3: p.777 nn.5 ff. (the *intellectus* question's opening band). NB: a1-q1 §II also bears on a1-q3 (*cfr. etiam infra q. 3*) — the next agent should diagnose whether a1-q3 redirects to q1 §II or carries its own SCHOLION (one prints at raw 54124, inside q3's range).

**`[?]` flags:** none. pp.775–777 legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0