title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum homini dari potuerit liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod homini dari potuerit adiutorium sive liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam, hoc est absque gratia superaddita:

1. *Primo a simili.* Contingit enim reperire lucem corporalem, quam impossibile est per naturam in se obnubilari, sicut lucem empyrei, vel lucem solis. Si ergo lux spiritualis multo permanentior est quam corporalis, videtur, quod anima humana potuit fieri in perfectione tanti luminis per naturam, quod nullo modo posset obscurari, nec per ignorantiam nec per culpam.

2. Item, contingit reperire aliquam substantiam corporalem intransmutabilem quantum ad *substantiam* et quantum ad *proprietates*, sicut est corpus ultimum, scilicet empyreum; et hoc non habet solum per gratiam, sed etiam per naturam[^1]. Ergo pari ratione possibile est, substantiam spiritualem per naturam in tanta stabilitate fieri, quod nullo modo valeat permutari a *rectitudine naturali*; si enim hoc reperitur in substantia corporali, multo fortius reperiri potest in substantia digniori.

3. Item, gratia est perfectio naturae, et perfectio conformatur suo perfectibili: si ergo gratia confirmationis omnino reddit naturam impossibilem ad peccandum, videtur, quod anima humana naturaliter capax sit talis stabilitatis et invertibilitatis.

*Si tu dicas*, quod non est capax talis invertibilitatis, nisi mediante gratia; *obiicitur contra hoc*, quod talis vertibilitas ad malum aut *est essentialis* ipsi naturae, aut *non*. Si *est essentialis*: ergo videtur, quod per gratiam non possit auferri. Si *non* est essentialis: ergo videtur, quod sine tali vertibilitate ad malum possit natura rationalis fieri, salva sua natura et nulla superaddita gratia. — Propter hoc est quaestio, cum tam *liberum arbitrium* hominis quam *gratia* sit quid creatum, sicut patebit infra[^2]: utquid dari potest gratiae inflexibilitas ad malum, et non potest dari *creaturae rationali*? Videtur enim ratione consimili, quodsi potest dari uni, quod possit dari alteri.

4. Item, licet omnis creatura per se vertibilis sit in natura, aliquae tamen tales creantur a sua origine, quod impossibile est eas corrumpi: et hoc habent sine aliquo addito naturalibus, sicut patet in substantiis simplicibus. Unde Angeli et animae per naturam sunt immortales: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod aliquae animae possint creari per naturam ad malum inflexibiles: videtur ergo fuisse possibile, tale adiutorium a Deo conferri, per quod naturaliter ad malum non posset inflecti[^3].

**Sed contra:** 1. Ista duo sunt convertibilia, sicut vult Damascenus[^4] et etiam Augustinus, videlicet *esse creabile* et *esse vertibile*. Sic ergo in omni creatura necesse est, esse aliquam vertibilitatem; sed in substantia spirituali non est vertibilitas secundum substantiam: ergo necesse est, quod sit secundum electionem: ergo impossibile est, substantiam creatam habere liberum arbitrium per naturam inflexibile.

2. Item, non est per naturam magis arctatus affectus quam intellectus; sed intellectus, eo ipso quod intellectus est, per naturam suam est natus omnia intelligere[^5]: ergo pari ratione affectus per naturam suam est potens hoc vel illud appetere, ergo ab uno oppositorum in alterum transire: ergo omnis affectus creatus, quantum est de natura sua, non solum bonum *simpliciter*, sed etiam *apparens*, non solum bonum *concessum*, sed etiam *prohibitum* potest velle et praeeligere: ergo etc.

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3. Item, liberum arbitrium creatum, hoc ipso quod *liberum* est, dominatur actui suo[^6]; hoc ipso quod *creatum* est, factum est debens aliquid suo Creatori, videlicet honorem: ergo si dominatur suo actui, potest non reddere quod debet; sed hoc est peccatum: ergo necessarium est, liberum arbitrium, quantum est de sua natura, fieri flexibile ad peccatum.

4. Item, si liberum arbitrium per naturam suam esset inflexibile ad malum, ergo stare in bono et facere bonum esset ei *naturale*: ergo omne opus egrediens a libero arbitrio esset in genere *operis naturalis*, et nullum esset in genere *moris*: ergo, si hoc verum est[^7], nullum esset meritorium, nullum etiam esset laudabile, per nullum etiam opus, quod faceret, esset liberum arbitrium ad gloriam ordinabile. Sed hoc est contra naturalem liberi arbitrii institutionem: ergo impossibile est, alicui creaturae dari liberum arbitrium per naturam inflexibile.

### Conclusio.

> Et ex parte *initialis principii* et ex parte *finalis termini* repugnat, ullam rationalem creaturam per naturam habere liberum arbitrium inflexibile ad malum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod impossibile fuit, hominem vel aliquam creaturam rationalem per naturam habere liberum arbitrium inflexibile ad malum. Hoc enim repugnat naturae ipsius creaturae rationalis et a parte *principii initialis* et a parte *termini finalis*; et hoc patet sic.

Si enim liberum arbitrium creaturae rationalis fieret naturaliter ad malum inflexibile, aut hoc esset propter ipsius *arctationem ad bonum*, aut propter ipsius *determinationem*. Si propter *arctationem*, ut sic faceret bonum, sicut lapis tendit deorsum; iam certe liberum arbitrium nec esset liberum, nec opus eius esset laude dignum; et ita ineptum esset *ad finem*, propter quem est factum, videlicet ad laudis et gloriae praemium assequendum. — Si autem inflexibile esset ad malum propter *determinationem*, quia sic potens esset per propriam naturam in bonum, ut non posset deficere in malo, sicut est de libero arbitrio divino, quod ad sola bona determinatum est; iam tale liberum arbitrium careret vanitate per naturam suam: ergo iam non esset creatura nec productum ex nihilo, cum omnis *creatura vanitati subiecta sit*[^8]; et ita hoc esset contra naturam *principii initialis*, quantum ad hoc quod dicimus, creaturam rationalem ex nihilo esse productam. — Repugnante igitur natura rationalis creaturae et ex parte *initialis principii* et ex parte *finalis termini*, impossibile fuit, hominem, vel aliam quamcumque creaturam rationalem liberum arbitrium habere per naturam ad malum inflexibile. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud quod *primo* obiicitur de luce corporali, dicendum, quod non est simile, tum propter hoc, quod fons lucis corporalis reperiri potest in genere creaturae, fons autem lucis spiritualis non reperitur in genere creaturae, sed est ipse Creator, iuxta illud, Ecclesiastici primo[^9]: *Fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis*; tum etiam, quia lux corporalis respectu actus lucendi habet arctationem, adeo ut lucere eius non sit laudabile, sed pure naturale. Non sic est de rectitudine et operatione rationalis creaturae, sive voluntatis deliberativae.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliqua substantia corporalis per naturam est immutabilis etc.; iam patet responsio per hoc, quod non valet sive non decet, creaturam spiritualem sic esse arctatam ad opus suum, sicut corporalem; sive etiam, quia non tenet summum in genere spiritus, sicut aliqua creatura corporalis tenet summum in genere corporum. — Verumtamen dici posset, quod omne corpus mutabile est aliquo genere mutationis, sicut vult Augustinus[^10], sive quia ipsum mutatur in se, sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso; et hoc ultimo modo mutatio posset esse in empyreo.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de gratia confirmante, dicendum, quod gratia dicitur esse perfectio naturae non solum, quia adiuvat, sed etiam, quia defectum eius excludit. Unde in omni natura creaturae rationalis est aliquis defectus naturalis, qui per gratiam habet excludi, quantumcumque illa natura sit in genere creaturae perfecta[^11]. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi aliquid convenit alicui per gratiam, quod conveniat per naturam. Et si obiiciatur, quod Deus potuit dare naturae, quod dedit gratiae; dicendum, quod natura non fuit nata suscipere. Sicut enim alia est natura operis moralis, alia operis naturalis, nec proprietas operis moralis potest convenire operi naturali, nisi naturale desineret esse naturale — non enim potest laus et vituperium, quae est proprietas operis moralis, secundum quod huiusmodi, competere operi naturali, in quantum tale — sic et in proposito intelligendum est se habere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de immortalitate, iam patet responsio per praedicta. Quod enim naturaliter est immortale ex hoc non est laudabile, vel vituperabile; et ita, si liberum arbitrium inflexibile creatum esset, nec laudis nec vituperii capax esset.

english:
### Article I. *On the help conferred upon man, by which he might be able to resist.*
### Question I. *Whether free choice unbendable by nature could be given to man.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there could be given to man a help, that is, a free choice unbendable by nature, that is, apart from superadded grace:

1. *First, from a similitude.* For it happens that one finds a corporeal light which it is impossible by nature to be darkened in itself, such as the light of the empyrean, or the light of the sun. If therefore spiritual light is far more permanent than corporeal, it seems that the human soul could have been made in the perfection of so great a light by nature, such that it could in no way be obscured, neither through ignorance nor through fault.

2. Likewise, it happens that one finds some corporeal substance unchangeable as to its *substance* and as to its *properties*, such as the outermost body, namely the empyrean; and this it has not only through grace, but also through nature[^1]. Therefore by parity of reasoning it is possible that a spiritual substance be made by nature in such great stability that it can in no way be turned away from *natural rectitude*; for if this is found in a corporeal substance, much more strongly can it be found in a more dignified substance.

3. Likewise, grace is the perfection of nature, and a perfection is conformed to its perfectible subject: if therefore the grace of confirmation renders nature wholly incapable of sinning, it seems that the human soul is naturally capable of such stability and unbendableness.

*If you say* that it is not capable of such unbendableness except by the mediation of grace; *it is objected against this* that such bendability toward evil is either *essential* to the nature itself, or *not*. If it *is essential*: then it seems that it cannot be removed through grace. If it is *not* essential: then it seems that without such bendability toward evil the rational nature could be made, its own nature preserved and with no superadded grace. — On this account there is a question, since both the *free choice* of man and *grace* are something created, as will be made clear below[^2]: why can unbendableness toward evil be given to grace, and yet cannot be given to the *rational creature*? For it seems by a like reasoning that if it can be given to one, it can be given to the other.

4. Likewise, although every creature is in itself bendable in its nature, yet some are so created from their origin that it is impossible for them to be corrupted: and this they have without anything added to their natural endowments, as is clear in the case of simple substances. Hence the Angels and souls are by nature immortal: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that some souls can be created by nature unbendable toward evil: it seems therefore to have been possible for such a help to be conferred by God, by which one could not be bent toward evil by nature[^3].

**On the contrary:** 1. These two are convertible, as Damascene[^4] and also Augustine hold, namely *to be creatable* and *to be bendable*. So therefore in every creature there must be some bendability; but in a spiritual substance there is no bendability according to substance: therefore there must be bendability according to choice: therefore it is impossible for a created substance to have free choice unbendable by nature.

2. Likewise, the affective power is not by nature more constrained than the intellect; but the intellect, by the very fact that it is intellect, is by its own nature born to understand all things[^5]: therefore by parity of reasoning the affective power is by its own nature able to desire this or that, and therefore to pass from one of two opposites into the other: therefore every created affective power, as far as concerns its own nature, can will and prefer not only the good *simply*, but also the *apparent* good, not only the good that is *permitted*, but also that which is *forbidden*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, created free choice, by the very fact that it is *free*, is master of its own act[^6]; by the very fact that it is *created*, it has been made to owe something to its Creator, namely honor: therefore if it is master of its own act, it can fail to render what it owes; but this is sin: therefore it is necessary that free choice, as far as concerns its own nature, be made bendable toward sin.

4. Likewise, if free choice were by its own nature unbendable toward evil, then to stand in the good and to do good would be *natural* to it: therefore every work proceeding from free choice would be in the genus of a *natural work*, and none would be in the genus of *moral conduct*: therefore, if this is true[^7], none would be meritorious, none would be praiseworthy, and free choice would be ordainable to glory through no work that it might do. But this is contrary to the natural institution of free choice: therefore it is impossible for free choice unbendable by nature to be given to any creature.

### Conclusio.

> Both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term* it is repugnant that any rational creature should have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil.

**I respond:** It must be said that it was impossible for man or any rational creature to have, by nature, free choice unbendable toward evil. For this is repugnant to the nature of the rational creature itself both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term*; and this is clear thus.

For if the free choice of the rational creature were to become naturally unbendable toward evil, this would be either on account of its *constraint toward the good*, or on account of its *determination*. If on account of *constraint*, so that it would do good as a stone tends downward; then surely free choice would neither be free, nor would its work be worthy of praise; and thus it would be unsuited *to the end* for which it was made, namely to the attaining of the reward of praise and glory. — But if it were unbendable toward evil on account of *determination*, because it would be so capable through its own nature with regard to the good that it could not fall into evil, as is the case with the divine free choice, which is determined to goods alone; then such free choice would lack mutability by its own nature: therefore it would no longer be a creature nor produced from nothing, since every *creature is subject to vanity*[^8]; and thus this would be contrary to the nature of the *initial principle*, as to that which we say, that the rational creature was produced from nothing. — Since therefore the nature of the rational creature is repugnant both on the side of the *initial principle* and on the side of the *final term*, it was impossible for man, or any other rational creature, to have free choice unbendable toward evil by nature. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected *first* concerning corporeal light, it must be said that it is not similar, both on account of the fact that the source of corporeal light can be found within the genus of creature, whereas the source of spiritual light is not found within the genus of creature, but is the Creator himself, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter one[^9]: *The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high*; and also because corporeal light has a constraint with respect to the act of shining, so much so that its shining is not praiseworthy, but purely natural. It is not so with the rectitude and operation of the rational creature, that is, of the deliberative will.

2. To that which is objected, that some corporeal substance is by nature unchangeable, etc.; the response is now clear from this, that it is not fitting or proper that a spiritual creature be so constrained to its work as a corporeal one; or also because it does not hold the highest place in the genus of spirit, as some corporeal creature holds the highest place in the genus of bodies. — Nevertheless it could be said that every body is changeable by some kind of change, as Augustine holds[^10], either because it is changed in itself, or because some things are changed within it; and in this last way change could be in the empyrean.

3. To that which is objected concerning confirming grace, it must be said that grace is said to be the perfection of nature not only because it aids, but also because it excludes a defect of it. Hence in every nature of a rational creature there is some natural defect which is to be excluded through grace, however perfect that nature may be within the genus of creature[^11]. And therefore it does not follow that, if something belongs to a thing through grace, it belongs to it through nature. And if it is objected that God could have given to nature what he gave to grace; it must be said that nature was not born to receive it. For just as the nature of a moral work is one thing, and that of a natural work another, nor can a property of a moral work belong to a natural work unless the natural ceased to be natural — for praise and blame, which is a property of a moral work as such, cannot belong to a natural work as such — so too in the matter at hand it is to be understood to be the case.

4. To that which is objected concerning immortality, the response is now clear from what has been said. For that which is naturally immortal is on that account neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy; and thus, if free choice unbendable were created, it would be capable neither of praise nor of blame.

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — In principio arg. Vat. *reperiri* pro *reperire*.

en: Cf. above d. 2, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — At the beginning of the argument the Vatican edition reads *reperiri* for *reperire*.

la: Dist. 26. q. 2. — Paulo post edd. 3, 4 et Vat. voci *gratiae* praefigunt *ipsi*.

en: Dist. 26, q. 2. — A little later editions 3 and 4 and the Vatican edition prefix *ipsi* to the word *gratiae*.

la: Vat. *in naturam*, codd. F Y *in nihil*. Circa finem arg. pro *a Deo* codd. W Z substituunt *Adam*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *in naturam*, codices F Y *in nihil*. Near the end of the argument, for *a Deo* codices W Z substitute *Adam*.

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — August., de Natura boni, c. 1; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3.

en: Book I, *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 3, and Book II, c. 27. — Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 1; Book XII, *On the City of God*, c. 1, n. 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 4. seqq. (c. 4.). De seq. prop. vide supra pag. 183, nota 7. — Paulo inferius desunt in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 verba *non solum bonum simpliciter, sed etiam apparens*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 4 ff. (c. 4). On the following proposition see above page 183, note 7. — A little below, the words *non solum bonum simpliciter, sed etiam apparens* are lacking in the Vatican edition and in editions 3, 4.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 5. — Mox plures codd. omittunt *factum*, alii *debens*; Vat. etiam omittit *factum* et dein pro *est debens* substituit *debet*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* III, c. 5. — Soon after, several codices omit *factum*, others *debens*; the Vatican edition also omits *factum* and then for *est debens* substitutes *debet*.

la: Codd. F Y *esset*. In ultima huius arg. conclus. auctoritate codd. cc et ed. 1 commutavimus *dare*, quod Vat. cum aliis codd. exhibet, in *dari*. — Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 8.

en: Codices F Y read *esset*. In the final conclusion of this argument, on the authority of codices cc and edition 1, we have changed *dare*, which the Vatican edition with the other codices exhibits, into *dari*. — Cf. above page 113, note 8.

la: Rom. 8, 20: *Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est.* — Paulo inferius multi codd. cum primis edd. post *quantum ad* omittunt *hoc*, pro quo Vat. *id* contra codd. H Y (T W a sec. manu).

en: Rom. 8:20: *For the creature was made subject to vanity.* — A little below, many codices with the first editions omit *hoc* after *quantum ad*, for which the Vatican edition reads *id* against codices H Y (T W by a second hand).

la: Eccli. 1, 5: *Fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis.* — Vers. B. In fine solut. pro *deliberativae* plures codd., inter quos C L M R S T aa, *deliberatione*.

en: Ecclus. 1:5: *The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high.* — Version B. At the end of the solution, for *deliberativae* several codices, among them C L M R S T aa, read *deliberatione*.

la: Libr. III. de Trin. c. 10. n. 21; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 19. et VIII. c. 20. n. 39. seqq. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 31, nota 9. — Edd. 1, 4 cum Vat. *sicut universaliter vult Augustinus*. Paulo inferius pro *sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso* (i. e. extrinsece) aliqui codd., ut C H R T ee, *sive quia aliqua mutatio est in ipso*.

en: Book III, *On the Trinity*, c. 10, n. 21; Book VII, *On Genesis according to the Letter*, c. 12, n. 19, and Book VIII, c. 20, n. 39 ff. Cf. also above page 31, note 9. — Editions 1, 4 with the Vatican edition read *sicut universaliter vult Augustinus*. A little below, for *sive quia aliqua mutantur in ipso* (i.e. extrinsically) some codices, such as C H R T ee, read *sive quia aliqua mutatio est in ipso*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio, utrum possibile sit, quod creatura secundum conditionem naturae sit impeccabilis, connexa est cum ea quae quoad impeccabilitatem supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. agit de congruentia facti. Utraque quaestio, praesertim autem haec, convenit cum iis quae leguntur in Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. et (de hac) § 3. (cfr. supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. schol.). — Conclusio communiter tenetur; sed Durand. (II. Sent. d. 23. q. 1.) respondet cum distinctione sic: « Nulla creatura intellectualis potest esse impeccabilis per naturam quoad eligibilia, quae deducuntur ex principiis legis supernaturalis fidei, vel disciplinae, licet possit esse impeccabilis quoad solum dictamen rationis naturalis, nisi haec deducerentur ex altiore principio, ut dictum est ». — Scot. (in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 23. q. unica) in conclusione quidem convenit, sed quia ipse, si agitur de possibilitate, Deo plus tribuere solet quam alii doctores, etiam hic argumenta rationis non sufficere putat, et de rationibus Alexandri et S. Bonaventurae dicit (ibid. n. 5.), quod non concludunt, quibus adiicit duas alias tanquam probabiles. Tamen affirmat (ibid. n. 7.), se tenere dictam conclusionem magis propter auctoritates.

**II.** Commentatores Lombardi de hac quaest. tractant II. Sent. d. 23, et quidem quaest. 1. Quibus adde S. Thom., S. 1. q. 63. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 108. seq.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question, whether it is possible that a creature according to the condition of its nature be impeccable, is connected with that which, regarding impeccability, above in d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, treats of the fittingness of the fact. Each question, but especially this one, agrees with what is read in Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, and (concerning this) § 3 (cf. above d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, scholion). — The conclusion is commonly held; but Durandus (II Sent., d. 23, q. 1) responds with a distinction thus: « No intellectual creature can be impeccable by nature as to the eligible things which are deduced from the principles of the supernatural law of faith, or of discipline, although it can be impeccable as to the mere dictate of natural reason, unless these were deduced from a higher principle, as has been said ». — Scotus (in both his works on II Sent., d. 23, q. unica) does indeed agree in the conclusion, but because he, when it is a matter of possibility, is wont to attribute more to God than do other doctors, here too he thinks the arguments of reason insufficient, and concerning the reasons of Alexander and St. Bonaventure he says (ibid. n. 5) that they are not conclusive, to which he adds two others as probable. Yet he affirms (ibid. n. 7) that he holds the said conclusion rather on account of the authorities.

**II.** The commentators on Lombard treat of this question in II Sent., d. 23, and indeed in question 1. To these add St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 63, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 108 seq.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p554-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p555-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split_x=1850) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines ~38847–38986). English is a fresh literal translation. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (printed 554/555 = PDF 576/577).

**Structure.** Per Override §5 the short ARTICULUS I opener *De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere* is folded into this q1 chunk as the article heading. q1 = *Utrum homini dari potuerit liberum arbitrium inflexibile per naturam* (opener *Circa primum sic proceditur*). Verified the q1 body (raw 38854) aligns with the TRACTATIO sub-question *Primo… utrum dari potuerit homini… adiutorium, quod esset naturaliter inflexibile*. Closes at the SCHOLION (raw 38986), immediately before QUAESTIO II (raw 38987). `has_scholion: true` — Scholion I (Durandus/Scotus on impeccability) + II (commentators roll, S. Thom.).

**Page-split map.** p.554 holds the q1 opener + args 1–4 + Sed contra args 1–2 (footers ¹–⁵). p.555 holds Sed contra args 3–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (Conclusio 1 + 2) + replies 1–4 + SCHOLION (footers ¹–⁶). Renumbered continuously [^1]–[^11].

**Apparatus split.** 11 entries. p.554 footers 1–5 → [^1]–[^5]; p.555 footers 1–6 → [^6]–[^11]. p.555 footer 4 (*Vers. B* + *deliberativae* variant) folded with the Eccli. 1,5 scripture citation into [^9] at the *Verbum Dei in excelsis* anchor (the *deliberativae* clause closes that same reply 1 paragraph).

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**Side-glosses** trimmed as Quaracchi marginalia (not body text): *Ad oppositum*, *Quaestio incidens*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*, *Ratio a parte termini finalis*, *Ratio a parte principii initialis*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Aliter*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem*.

**[?] flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De adiutorio homini collato, per quod posset resistere.*
### Quaestio II. *Utrum homini datum fuerit naturale adiutorium, per quod posset absque gratia tentationi resistere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum datum fuerit homini naturale adiutorium, per quod posset absque omni gratia tentationi resistere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. « Liberum arbitrium, ut dicit Anselmus[^1], est potestas servandi rectitudinem propter se »; sed liberum arbitrium est potentia naturalis: ergo per naturalem potentiam absque addita gratia homo poterat servare rectitudinem sive iustitiam. Sed servando rectitudinem, tentationi non consentiret, immo resisteret et superaret: ergo etc. — Servatur enim — qui enim rectus est, obliquus esse non potest, quamdiu vult esse rectus — sed « nihil tam est in voluntate nostra quam ipsa voluntas[^4] », nihil facilius homini recto quam velle rectitudinem: si ergo liberum arbitrium hominis, quantum est de sua conditione primaria, rectum erat; absque omni gratia superaddita rectitudinem servare poterat, et sic adversario resistere et tentationem superare.

2. Item, ponatur homo in puris naturalibus; aut igitur posset resistere diabolo suadenti, aut non. Si non; et nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest[^2]: ergo si consentiret tentationi diabolicae, non peccaret; quod est impossibile. Si sic: ergo per naturale adiutorium sine gratia superaddita superare poterat adversarium.

3. Item, natura nulli dat esse, quin etiam det ei aliquam potentiam permanendi, cum non deficiat in necessariis[^3]; unde sicut aliquid naturaliter propagatur, sic etiam in naturali virtute in esse conservatur. Si ergo liberum arbitrium homini datum per naturam propriam innocens erat et immune a culpa: ergo per naturam propriam absque omni gratia permanere poterat in sua innocentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, rectitudo voluntatis solo actu voluntatis servatur.

**Sed contra:**
1. Augustinus *de Vera Innocentia*[^5]: « Humana natura, etsi in illa integritate, in qua condita est, permaneret, nullo tamen modo se ipsam, Creatore non adiuvante, servaret »: ergo quantumcumque homo haberet liberum arbitrium, ad hoc, ut permaneret, necessarium ei erat gratiae divinae suffragium.

2. Item, si tunc poterat de potentia naturae tentationi resistere; et naturalia sunt eadem in nobis et in ipso: ergo tentationi resistere esset nobis per naturam possibile: ergo frustra frequentaremus dominicam orationem, petentes: *Et ne nos inducas in tentationem*[^6]. Quod si absurdum est dicere, patet etc.

<!-- page 557 -->
3. Item, si virtute propria posset homo absque omni gratia tentationi resistere, potuisset etiam victoriam de inimico obtinere; sed victoriae respondet corona: ergo absque omni gratia potuisset mereri et pervenire ad gloriam; quod si evidenter falsum est, restat etc.

4. Item, tentationi resistere hoc est opus de se laudabile; sed faciens opus laudabile non potest non proficere: ergo si virtute propria habuit, unde posset stare, virtute propria habuit, unde posset proficere; quod est contra Magistrum in littera[^7], qui dicit, quod habuit unde posset stare, sed non habuit unde posset proficere.

### Conclusio

> Primus homo per naturale adiutorium cum continuatione divinae influentiae poterat tentationi resistere sine novae gratiae appositione.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquem posse resistere virtute propria tentationi diabolicae absque omni gratia, intelligi potest dupliciter: aut ita, quod excludatur *continuatio divinae influentiae*, aut ita, quod excludatur *appositio novae gratiae*. Primum simpliciter est impossibile; nunquam enim liberum arbitrium malae suggestioni resisteret, nisi Deus suae bonitatis influentia continua in bono conservaret. Secundo modo veritatem habet pro statu innocentiae. Sicut enim dicit Magister in littera[^8], magna erat in primo homine « liberi arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptione immunitas atque naturalium potentiarum animae sinceritas et vivacitas », et per hoc poterat evitare et repellere suggestionem diabolicam; nec indigebat, ad hoc apponi sibi novam gratiam, cum respectu huius nulla esset in eo difficultas, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^9], et rationes ostendunt, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

**Ad obiecta:**
1. Ad illud ergo Augustini *de Vera Innocentia*, iam patet responsio. Dicit enim[^10], quod nulla creatura rationalis potest sine divino adiutorio conservari, non quia ad resistendum peccato sit ei necessaria gratia, quamdiu est in innocentia, sed quia, in quocumque statu est, necessaria est sibi divinae bonitatis influentia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem sunt naturalia in nobis et in primo homine; dicendum, quod etsi eadem sunt[^11] secundum substantiam, tamen infirmata sunt et vulnerata et deteriorata; et ideo non sequitur, quod tantum *posse* habeant, quantum habuerunt, quando natura erat instituta.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tentationi resistere, hoc est victoriam obtinere; dicendum, quod plus est adversarium *superare* quam eidem *resistere*. Ad hoc enim quod aliquis adversarium *superet*, opportunum est[^12], quod oppositum assequatur, ad quod adversarius pertrahere intendebat; hoc autem solum est, quando homo non tantum resistit adversario *voluntarie*, verum etiam *meritorie*. Tunc enim recte vincitur diabolus, quando ex vexatione tentationis, per quam intendebat *incurvare ad demeritum*, homo *proficit ad meritum*. Hoc autem liberum arbitrium facere non potest nisi per gratiae adiutorium, quamvis per se posset refugere peccatum. Si enim absque gratia peccatum refugeret, meritorium sibi non esset, et tamen tentationi resisteret[^13].

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia Magister non loquitur de quocumque profectu, sed de profectu in merito, in quo non semper proficit homo, cum facit opus bonum bonitate morali, nisi adsit gratia Spiritus sancti, sicut melius infra[^14] patebit.

english:
### Article I. *On the aid bestowed on man, by which he could resist.*
### Question II. *Whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without grace.*

Secondly it is asked whether man was given a natural aid by which he could resist temptation without any grace. And that he could, it seems.

1. « Free choice, as Anselm says[^1], is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake »; but free choice is a natural power: therefore by a natural power, without added grace, man was able to preserve rectitude or justice. But by preserving rectitude he would not consent to temptation, but rather would resist it and overcome it: therefore etc. — For it is preserved — for whoever is upright cannot be crooked, so long as he wills to be upright — but « nothing is so much in our will as the will itself[^4] », nothing is easier for an upright man than to will rectitude: if therefore the free choice of man, as far as concerns its primary condition, was upright; without any superadded grace it was able to preserve rectitude, and thus to resist the adversary and overcome temptation.

2. Likewise, let man be posited in his purely natural state; then either he could resist the devil who urges him, or he could not. If he could not; and no one sins in that which he cannot avoid[^2]: therefore if he consented to the devil's temptation, he would not sin; which is impossible. If he could: therefore by a natural aid, without superadded grace, he was able to overcome the adversary.

3. Likewise, nature gives being to nothing without also giving it some power of enduring, since it does not fail in necessities[^3]; whence just as something is naturally propagated, so too it is preserved in being by a natural power. If therefore the free choice given to man by his own nature was innocent and immune from fault: therefore by his own nature, without any grace, he was able to endure in his innocence: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the rectitude of the will is preserved by the act of the will alone.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine, *On the Innocence of Human Nature*[^5]: « Human nature, even if it had remained in that integrity in which it was created, would yet in no way have preserved itself, the Creator not aiding it »: therefore however much man had free choice, in order that he might endure, the help of divine grace was necessary to him.

2. Likewise, if then he was able by the power of nature to resist temptation; and the natural endowments are the same in us and in him: therefore to resist temptation would be possible for us by nature: therefore in vain would we frequently say the Lord's Prayer, asking: *And lead us not into temptation*[^6]. But if it is absurd to say this, it is clear etc.

3. Likewise, if by his own power man could resist temptation without any grace, he could also have obtained victory over the enemy; but to victory corresponds the crown: therefore without any grace he could have merited and arrived at glory; but since this is plainly false, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, to resist temptation is a work praiseworthy in itself; but one who does a praiseworthy work cannot fail to make progress: therefore if by his own power he had that whereby he could stand, by his own power he had that whereby he could make progress; which is against the Master in the text[^7], who says that he had that whereby he could stand, but did not have that whereby he could make progress.

### Conclusion

> The first man, by a natural aid together with the continuation of the divine influence, was able to resist temptation without the addition of new grace.

**I respond:** It must be said that for someone to be able by his own power to resist the devil's temptation without any grace can be understood in two ways: either so that the *continuation of the divine influence* is excluded, or so that the *addition of new grace* is excluded. The first is simply impossible; for free choice would never resist an evil suggestion unless God by the continual influence of his goodness preserved it in the good. In the second way it holds true for the state of innocence. For as the Master says in the text[^8], there was in the first man a great « immunity of free choice from every stain and corruption, and a soundness and liveliness of the natural powers of the soul », and by this he was able to avoid and repel the devil's suggestion; nor did he need new grace to be added to him for this, since with respect to this there was no difficulty in him, as the Master says in the text[^9], and the reasons show, which are brought forward for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the objections:**
1. To that text of Augustine *On the Innocence of Human Nature*, the response is now clear. For he says[^10] that no rational creature can be preserved without divine aid, not because grace is necessary for it to resist sin, so long as it is in innocence, but because, in whatever state it is, the influence of the divine goodness is necessary to it.

2. To that which is objected, that the natural endowments are the same in us and in the first man; it must be said that although they are the same[^11] according to substance, yet they are weakened and wounded and made worse; and therefore it does not follow that they have as much *power* as they had, when nature was first established.

3. To that which is objected, that to resist temptation is to obtain victory; it must be said that to *overcome* the adversary is more than to *resist* him. For in order that someone *overcome* the adversary, it is fitting[^12] that he attain the opposite of that to which the adversary intended to draw him; but this comes about only when man not only resists the adversary *voluntarily*, but also *meritoriously*. For then is the devil rightly conquered, when from the vexation of temptation, by which he intended to *bend man toward demerit*, man *advances toward merit*. But this free choice cannot do except through the aid of grace, although by itself it could flee sin. For if without grace it fled sin, it would not be meritorious for it, and yet it would resist temptation[^13].

4. And by this the response to what follows is clear, namely that the Master does not speak of any progress whatever, but of progress in merit, in which man does not always make progress when he does a good work with moral goodness, unless the grace of the Holy Spirit be present, as will appear better below[^14].

la: Dialog. de Lib. Arb. c. 3.

en: Anselm, *Dialogue on Free Choice*, c. 3.

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50: *Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest?*

en: Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 18, n. 50: « For who sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? »

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.): *Natura neque facit frustra quidquam neque deficit in necessariis.* — Vat. et edd. 3, 4 infra ante *naturali* omittunt *in*.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 45 (c. 9): « Nature neither does anything in vain nor fails in necessities. » — The Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 below, before *naturali*, omit *in*.

la: August., I. Retract. c. 22. n. 4. et III. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 7. — De maiori cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de Veritate, c. 12.

en: Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 22, n. 4, and *On Free Choice of the Will* III, c. 3, n. 7. — On the major premise cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 12.

la: Sub hoc titulo hic citatur illa collectio 390 sententiarum, quas Prosper Aquitanus ex diversis Augustini operibus excerpsit. Sententia, quae hic affertur, est sent. 308. et sumta est ex August., Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 11. n. 37; habetur etiam in can. 19. concilii Arausicani. In textu originali pro *etsi* exstat *etiamsi*, deinde omittitur *tamen* et post *Creatore* subiungitur *suo*.

en: Under this title there is here cited that collection of 390 sentences which Prosper of Aquitaine excerpted from various works of Augustine. The sentence here adduced is sentence 308 and is taken from Augustine, *Letter* 186 to Paulinus, c. 11, n. 37; it is also found in canon 19 of the Council of Orange. In the original text, for *etsi* there stands *etiamsi*, then *tamen* is omitted, and after *Creatore* there is added *suo*.

la: Matth. 6, 13; Luc. 11, 4. — Paulo superius pro *esset nobis* fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. *esset a nobis*, non bene.

en: Matthew 6:13; Luke 11:4. — A little above, for *esset nobis*, nearly all the codices with the first editions read *esset a nobis*, not well.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, c. 1.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

la: Hic c. 1; d. XXV. c. 6; d. XXXIII. c. 3.

en: Here, c. 1; d. XXV, c. 6; d. XXXIII, c. 3.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *Dicit enim*. Paulo inferius post *gratia* cod. F non perverse adiungit *nova*; cod. 1 hunc locum sic mutavit: *non quia ad resistendum peccato appositio novae gratiae sit ei necessaria*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 omit *Dicit enim*. A little below, after *gratia*, codex F not improperly adds *nova*; codex 1 altered this passage thus: *not because the addition of new grace is necessary to it for resisting sin*.

la: Vat. *sint*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *sint*.

la: Primae edd. cum aliquibus codd. *optimum est*, Vat. *oportet*. Subinde post *assequatur* in codd. DF altera manus inseruit *eius*.

en: The first editions, with some codices, read *optimum est*; the Vatican edition, *oportet*. Then, after *assequatur*, in codices D and F a second hand inserted *eius*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et infra d. 28. a. 1. q. 2, ubi hoc diffusius explicatur.

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1, and below d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, where this is explained more at length.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) cum aliis ita ponit quaestionem: « Utrum per liberum arbitrium *sine gratia gratum faciente* potuissent primi parentes malo resistere », et in responsione manifeste declarat, affirmativam solutionem intelligendam esse de libero arbitrio in statu *iustitiae originalis*, id est coniuncto cum dono supernaturali, quod nunc communiter appellatur *donum integritatis*. Idem addit: « Non credo tamen, quod per *pura naturalia* potuissent resistere omni motui vitioso ». In eodem sensu intelligendum esse S. Bonaventuram, satis apparet ex verbis in corp. positis, attento modo loquendi illa aetate usitato (cfr. infra d. 28. a. 1. q. 2. 3.). Eodem fere modo ac S. Bonav. loquitur S. Thom. in Commentar. (hic q. 1. a. 4.), sed clare se ipsum explicat S. l. II. q. 109. a. 8; cfr. S. c. Gent. III. c. 160. — Etiam <!-- page 558 -->Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 91. m. 1. a. 2.) sententiam S. Bonaventurae sic explanat: « Nota, quod primus homo *duplicem* habuit gratiam in primo statu, hoc est, antequam habuerit gratiam *gratum facientem* [secundum opinionem, eundem non fuisse statim in gratia habituali creatum], scil. *gratis datam* (communiter dicta gratia eo modo, quo dictum est) et gratiam *superinfusam*, quae erat continua influentia virtutis a causa prima ». Hanc autem gratiam *gratis datam* idem paulo superius sic determinavit, quod « comprehendit quidquid est additum naturalibus, quae sunt de constitutione generali rerum, et quod est *additum* libero arbitrio, disponens et faciens ad eius rectitudinem ». — Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. a. 3. § 2.), B. Albert. (hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 90. m. 3.), Petr. a Tar. (loc. cit. q. 1.), Richard. a Med. (loc. cit. q. 2.) insuper quaerunt, utrum primus homo in illo statu proficere potuerit per liberum arbitrium. Negative respondent, qui negant, eum statim gratia sanctificante ornatum fuisse; quod qui affirmant etiam illud concedunt.

**II.** Praeter citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. loc. cit. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 21. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 1), with others, frames the question thus: « Whether by free choice *without sanctifying grace* the first parents could have resisted evil », and in his reply he plainly declares that the affirmative solution is to be understood of free choice in the state of *original justice*, that is, joined with the supernatural gift which is now commonly called the *gift of integrity*. He likewise adds: « I do not however think that by *pure natural endowments* they could have resisted every vicious movement ». That St. Bonaventure is to be understood in the same sense appears sufficiently from the words set down in the body, attending to the manner of speaking customary in that age (cf. below d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, 3). In almost the same way as St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas speaks in his Commentary (here q. 1, a. 4), but he explains himself clearly in S. I-II, q. 109, a. 8; cf. S. c. Gent. III, c. 160. — Alexander of Hales too (S. p. II, q. 91, m. 1, a. 2) explains St. Bonaventure's view thus: « Note that the first man had a *twofold* grace in his first state, that is, before he had *sanctifying* grace [according to the opinion that he was not created at once in habitual grace], namely *freely given* grace (commonly called grace in the manner that has been stated) and *superinfused* grace, which was the continual influence of power from the first cause ». And this *freely given* grace the same author a little above so determined, that it « comprises whatever is added to the natural endowments, which belong to the general constitution of things, and that which is *added* to free choice, disposing and making it toward its rectitude ». — Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. a. 3, § 2), B. Albert (here a. 2; S. p. II, tr. 14, q. 90, m. 3), Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit. q. 1), Richard of Middleton (loc. cit. q. 2) further ask whether the first man could have made progress in that state through free choice. Those answer negatively who deny that he was at once adorned with sanctifying grace; while those who affirm this also concede the former.

**II.** Besides those cited: B. Albert, here a. 1; S. loc. cit. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 21. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p556-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p557-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; SCHOLION tail on p.558), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines ~38987–39101. English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus transcribed from the raw OCR footer blocks page by page.

**Alignment confirmed:** Pars I ART I sub-question 2 = *Secundo quaeritur, utrum datum fuerit ei adiutorium, per quod posset absque auxilio gratiae tentationi resistere* (per the d24-p1-divisio TRACTATIO). Body opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum datum fuerit homini naturale adiutorium…* matches. This is the LAST quaestio of Pars I ART I; ARTICULUS II (*De divisione potentiarum animae*) follows immediately (raw 39102).

**Page-split map:**
- p.556 (PDF 578): q2 title + arguments 1–3 (*videtur*), Sed contra 1–2 begin. Footers ¹–⁶ → [^1]–[^6].
- p.557 (PDF 579): Sed contra 3–4, CONCLUSIO, RESPONDEO, replies 1–4, SCHOLION I begins. Footers ¹–⁸ → [^7]–[^14].
- p.558 (PDF 580): SCHOLION I tail (*runt, utrum primus homo…*) + SCHOLION II (commentator roll). No new footnote markers in the body on p.558.

**Hand-offs:** RECEIVED — none (a1-q1 closed clean on p.555/556 with its own SCHOLION; all p.555 footers anchored in a1-q1). FORWARDED — none (q2's footers begin and end within pp.556–558; the q2 SCHOLION fully closes before ARTICULUS II, and the next chunk a2-q1 opens fresh on p.558).

**has_scholion:** true — q2 has its own SCHOLION I (Richard of Middleton / Thomas / Alexander of Hales on the *gratia gratum faciens* vs *donum integritatis* reading) + SCHOLION II (commentator roll: Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Denis the Carthusian).

**Running-head note:** the printed running head on p.557 reads "DIST. XXIV. P. I. ART. I. QUAEST. I." — the QUAEST. number is a printed/OCR carry-over from the prior page; the body content is unambiguously QUAESTIO II.

**[?] flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0