title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium, ut non possit cum alio contrahere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium, ut non possit cum alio contrahere matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia «unusquisque potest abrenuntiare iuri suo»[^1]; sed de iure uniuscuiusque est, quod possit in aliam personam matrimonialiter consentire; huic autem iuri homo renuntiat, cum alii per consensum se obligat: si ergo qui consentit in invitum suo iuri renuntiat, patet etc.

2. Item, potestas proprii corporis transfertur per consensum animi, qui praeest ei; sed unusquisque sibi praeest: ergo cum consentit in aliquam, potestatem sui corporis ei tribuit: ergo iam non potest dare eam alii.

3. Item, iste consentit in invitam et renitentem, et postmodum illa consentit; constat, quod cum illa consentit, matrimonium ratum existit: ergo si mulier virum sibi obligat non ex hoc, quod ipsa consentit — quia consensus unius personae alteram non obligat — ergo hoc est propter priorem consensum, quem ille prius emiserat: ergo prius obligatus erat.

4. Item, efficacius et intensius consentit qui non solum favet consentienti, sed etiam consentit et aliam personam ad consentiendum compellit; sed primus modus consentiendi facit matrimonium et obligationem inducit: ergo multo fortius secundus.

5. Item, caritas est vinculum perfectionis, sicut dicitur ad Colossenses tertio[^2]; hoc autem vinculum, quamvis sit perfectum, tamen potest esse unius ad alterum, ita quod non sit mutuum, ita pari ratione et vinculum carnale: ergo et matrimonium: ergo videtur, quod aliquis possit esse iunctus matrimonialiter alicui, si in aliquam consentit, aut e converso, etiam si altera dissentit.

**Contra:**

1. Matrimonium est maris et feminae coniunctio[^3]; omnis autem talis coniunctio est aequiparantiae relatio; sed omnis talis requirit convenientiam inter extrema, quia ad minus est inter duos — unde si alter duorum desinat esse similis, non est similitudo — ergo a simili in matrimonio, si alter dissentiat, non est matrimonium nec sponsalia: constat ergo, quod nulla est ibi obligatio nec aliquod praeiudicium.

2. Item, ubi est matrimonialis obligatio, est vir et uxor; sed uxor dicitur respectu viri, sicut pater respectu filii, et e converso: ergo sicut sequitur: iste non est filius huius, ergo iste non est pater huius; ita bene sequitur: ista non est obligata isti ut uxor, ergo iste non est obligatus isti ut vir; nec alio modo: ergo etc.

3. Item, consensus, qui transfert corporis potestatem in alteram, est consensus, qui dicit: accipio te in meam; sed nullus potest accipere aliquam in suam, nisi quae facit se suam[^4]: ergo absque consensu mulieris nullus est consensus viri.

4. Item, quantumcumque vendam tibi aliquid, non fit contractus nec adstrictio[^5], nisi tu emas: ergo pari ratione nunquam transfertur potestas viri in mulierem, nisi mulier consentiat: si ergo ipsa est coacta, non videtur ibi esse obligatio aliqua.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Consentiens in renitentem et in dissensu perseverantem non facit sibi praeiudicium ad consentiendum in aliam personam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaerere, utrum consentienti in renitentem fiat praeiudicium, est quaerere, utrum matrimoniale vinculum claudicet, ut ex parte sit solidum et ex parte contritum[^6]; et hoc est quaerere, utrum aliquis sit vir, cuius non est uxor, et aliqua sit uxor, quae non habet virum. Et haec in se ipsa quaestio solvitur, pro eo quod in ea opposita implicantur propter naturam matrimonialis vinculi, quod est relativum et mutuum, quod significat ipsa comparatio et relatio uxoris ad virum. Dico igitur, quod quia matrimonium non potest esse claudum quantum ad vinculum, quod si mulier invita est et in dissensu perseverat tam signo quam corde, nullum est matrimonium; nec
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unus acquirit potestatem aliquam in alterum, pro eo quod in altero extremo defuit consensus. Unde primus non se habet per modum efficientis, sed disponentis; et ideo, si secundus adveniat, tunc perficit matrimonium, pro eo quod iam habet consensum mutuum, qui est eius principium completum[^7]; et ex tunc vir obligatur, et ei praeiudicium ad consentiendum in personam aliam generatur.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest renuntiare iuri suo; dicendum, quod huic iuri non renuntiat nisi per votum, aut matrimonium; et quoniam in tali consensu non est votum nec matrimonium, et nemo est qui accipiat illud ius: ideo ille consensus nullum potest per se praeiudicium generare.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas transfertur per consensum animi; dicendum, quod in translatione potestatis huius duo sunt, scilicet donatio et acceptio. Quantum ad donationem attinet, hoc est consensus proprii; quantum ad receptionem, hoc est consensus alieni; et quia ille non est ibi, ideo non est translatio.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, si illa consentiat; dicendum, quod tunc incepit obligari, non ratione consensus alieni tantum, sed ratione sui, qui praecesserat in actu et erat in habitu — qui etsi non obligaret, quia non erat qui acciperet —, ideo, alieno consensu adveniente[^8], ille consensus habet vim obligandi quamvis prius non haberet. — Posset tamen dici, quod in tali casu consensus viri renovari debet vel verbo, vel signo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod efficacius consentit; dicendum, quod si iste non obligetur, hoc non est propter defectum intentionis, quia non sit sufficienter intensus, sed quia non est mutuus.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de vinculo caritatis, dicendum, quod caritas, prout est vinculum, quod facit unum corpus spirituale, nunquam est, quin sit in utroque extremorum, alioquin non facit unum; et in matrimonio fiunt unum sponsus et sponsa, et significatur coniunctio Dei et animae, quae nunquam claudicat: ideo nullus est consensus quantum ad vim Sacramenti, si libertatem habet in una persona et coactionem in alia[^9].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether he who consents to one who refuses him generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another.*

Secondly it is asked, whether he who consents to one who refuses generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another. And that it is so, is seen:

1. Because "each one can renounce his own right"[^1]; but it is of each one's right that he can consent matrimonially to another person; but a man renounces this right when he obliges himself to another by consent: therefore if one who consents renounces his own right in favor of an unwilling party, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, the power over one's own body is transferred by the consent of the mind, which has authority over it; but each one has authority over himself: therefore when he consents to some woman, he bestows on her the power over his own body: therefore he can no longer give it to another.

3. Likewise, this man consents to an unwilling and resisting woman, and afterward she consents; it is agreed that when she consents, the marriage stands ratified: therefore if the woman obliges herself to the man not from the fact that she herself consents — since the consent of one person does not oblige another — then this is on account of the prior consent which he had already given: therefore he was obliged beforehand.

4. Likewise, he consents more effectively and intensely who not only favors the one consenting, but also himself consents and compels another person to consent; but the first manner of consenting makes marriage and induces an obligation: therefore much more so does the second.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of perfection, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians[^2]; but this bond, although it is perfect, can nevertheless be from one toward the other, such that it is not mutual; by the same reasoning, so too the carnal bond: therefore also marriage: therefore it seems that someone can be joined matrimonially to another, if he consents with regard to her, or conversely, even if the other party dissents.

**Contra:**

1. Marriage is the conjunction of a man and a woman[^3]; but every such conjunction is a relation of equalization; but every such [relation] requires a correspondence between the extremes, since likeness is at least between two — hence if one of the two ceases to be like [the other], there is no likeness — therefore by a like argument in marriage, if one party dissents, there is no marriage nor betrothal: it stands, therefore, that there is no obligation there, nor any prejudice.

2. Likewise, where there is a matrimonial obligation, there are husband and wife; but a wife is so called in relation to a husband, just as a father in relation to a son, and conversely: therefore just as it follows: this one is not the son of this man, therefore this man is not the father of this one; so it likewise follows well: this woman is not obliged to this man as a wife, therefore this man is not obliged to this woman as a husband; nor in any other way: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the consent which transfers the power of the body to another is the consent which says: I take you as mine; but no one can take another as his own, unless she makes herself his own[^4]: therefore without the woman's consent there is no consent of the man.

4. Likewise, however much I may sell you something, no contract or binding arises[^5], unless you buy it: therefore by the same reasoning the man's power is never transferred into the woman, unless the woman consents: if therefore she herself is coerced, there does not seem to be any obligation there.

### CONCLUSIO.

> One who consents to a resisting party, and who perseveres in dissent, does not create for himself a prejudice against consenting to another person.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that to ask whether a prejudice arises for one who consents to a resisting party is to ask whether the matrimonial bond limps, such that it is whole on one side and broken on the other[^6]; and this is to ask whether someone is a husband whose wife he is not, and some woman is a wife who has no husband. And this question is resolved in itself, for the reason that opposites are implied in it, on account of the nature of the matrimonial bond, which is relative and mutual — which very comparison and relation of wife to husband signifies. I say, therefore, that since marriage cannot be lame with respect to the bond, if the woman is unwilling and perseveres in dissent both in sign and in heart, there is no marriage at all; nor does the one party acquire any power over the other, for the reason that consent was lacking on the other extreme. Hence the first party does not stand in the manner of an efficient [cause], but of one disposing; and therefore, if the second should come along, then it perfects the marriage, for the reason that it now has mutual consent, which is its completed principle[^7]; and from then the man is obliged, and a prejudice is generated for him against consenting to another person.

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that he can renounce his own right: it must be said that he does not renounce this right except by vow or by marriage; and since in such a consent there is neither vow nor marriage, and there is no one to receive that right: therefore that consent cannot of itself generate any prejudice.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that power is transferred by the consent of the mind: it must be said that in this transfer of power there are two things, namely giving and receiving. As far as the giving is concerned, this is the consent of one's own; as far as the receiving is concerned, this is the consent of another; and since the other is not present there, therefore there is no transfer.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, if she should consent: it must be said that then he began to be obliged, not by reason of the other's consent alone, but by reason of his own, which had preceded in act and was present in habit — which, even if it did not oblige, was because there was no one to receive it — therefore, when the other's consent arrives[^8], that [prior] consent has the force of obliging, although before it did not have it. — It could, however, be said that in such a case the man's consent ought to be renewed either by word or by sign.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that he consents more effectively: it must be said that if this man is not obliged, this is not on account of a defect of intention, as though it were not sufficiently intense, but because it is not mutual.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning the bond of charity: it must be said that charity, insofar as it is the bond which makes one spiritual body, is never such that it fails to be in both extremes, otherwise it would not make one; and in marriage husband and wife become one, and the conjunction of God and the soul is signified, which never limps: therefore there is no consent as regards the force of the Sacrament, if one person has liberty and the other coercion[^9].

---

la: Cfr. supra pag. 567, nota 4. — Inferius pro *in aliam* cod. aa *in unamquamque*, plures codd. *in aliquam*.

en: Cf. above, p. 567, note 4. — Below, for "into another [woman]" codex aa [reads] "into each one," several codices "into some [woman]."

la: Vers. 14: *Caritatem habete, quod est vinculum perfectionis.* — Cod. Y *vinculum spirituale et perfectionis*, Vat. mox post *perfectum* addit *et spirituale*. In fine arg. fide cod. K (1 a secunda manu) supplevimus *etiam si*.

en: Verse 14: "Have charity, which is the bond of perfection." — Codex Y [reads] "the spiritual bond, and of perfection"; the Vatican edition adds "and spiritual" soon after "perfect." At the end of the argument, on the authority of codex K (by a second hand), we have supplied "even if."

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 1. — De relatione aequiparantiae cfr. supra pag. 492, nota 2.

en: Cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 1. — On the relation of equalization, cf. above, p. 492, note 2.

la: Vat. *nisi qui facit suam*.

en: The Vatican edition reads "unless he who makes her his own" [masculine, rather than the feminine].

la: Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *venditio*, cod. L *distractio*, plures codd. vel *districtio* vel *distinctio*.

en: Codex K (by a second hand) [reads] "sale" [*venditio*], codex L "disposal" [*distractio*], several codices either "constraint" [*districtio*] or "distinction" [*distinctio*].

la: Cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *confractum*.

en: Codex K (by a second hand) [reads] "broken" [*confractum*].

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Planius codd. E L Y *tamen*.

en: More clearly, codices E, L, Y [add] "however" [*tamen*].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from `raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` (IA djvu OCR, lines 75731–75854) cross-checked eyes-on against the 300 dpi PDF page images `raw/vision/vol4/p-701.png` and `p-702.png` (offset `pdf = printed + 20`; PDF pp. 721–722), per the VOL II OVERRIDE (the raw OCR here is heavily column-bled/interleaved and effectively unreadable in running order — every sentence of the body and all footer apparatus were re-set from the clean PDF page reads rather than the OCR text). No column-band crops were needed: at 300 dpi the full printed page renders legibly in one image and was read column-by-column, top to bottom.

**Boundary verification.** `QUAESTIO II.` opens at raw L75731 immediately after Q1's closing scholion-note apparatus block (page 701 running head "DIST. XXIX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II."); `QUAESTIO III.` opens at raw L75855 ("Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit ad matrimonium compelli per praeceptum patris"), confirming `line_end: 75854` is correct and the "Secundo quaeritur..." opener aligns to this Q2 chunk (no q-swap). This chunk spans printed pp. 701 (in full, following Q1's tail apparatus) through the top third of p. 702 (Respondeo continuation + Ad 1–5), where `QUAESTIO III.` begins mid-page.

**Page-701/702 footer note-series and cross-chunk split.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page. P. 701's footer carries **6 notes (1–6)**, all belonging to this chunk's body (markers on *iuri suo*, *Colossenses tertio*, *coniunctio*, *facit se suam*, *adstrictio*, *contritum*) → rendered here as [^1]–[^6]. P. 702's footer restarts at 1 and carries **7 notes**; this chunk claims only **notes 1–2** (*principium completum* → [^7]; the *ideo* variant-reading note → [^8]) since its body ends before `QUAESTIO III.` begins. **P. 702 footer notes 3–7 belong to Q3**, not this chunk — note 3 ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") explicitly back-references this Q2's Conclusio/Respondeo from Q3's own apparatus; notes 4–7 (Genesis 24:6/28:1 Chanaan citation, Colossians 3:20 citation, and two decretal cross-references) belong entirely to Q3's body arguments. **Hand-off to `d29-a1-q3`:** confirm your chunk's footer apparatus starts at p. 702 note 3, not note 1 — notes 1–2 are claimed here.

**Marginalia trimmed** (editorial Quaracchi side-glosses, not Bonaventure's text, per corpus convention): *Notandum.* (beside the Respondeo opening on p. 701/702), *Corollarium.* (beside "primus non se habet per modum efficientis" on p. 702), *Solutio oppositorum.* (beside "Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur" on p. 702).

**has_scholion: false** — this quaestio has no `SCHOLION` section in the raw range; the Respondeo/Ad-argumenta close the quaestio directly before `QUAESTIO III.` begins. (Q3's own apparatus note 3 redirects would-be scholion-seekers back to this quaestio's Conclusio/Respondeo, confirming no separate scholion was omitted.)

**[?] flags:** none. The OCR's severe column-interleaving on this raw range made line-by-line OCR correction impractical; the full re-set from the clean 300 dpi PDF page images resolved every reading without ambiguity. No hand-off was received from `d29-a1-q1` (its `## Notes` was still `[Notes pending]` at the time of this promotion).

**✓ Cross-chunk apparatus gap RESOLVED (2026-07-10, d.21–d.30 decade-polish gate, Pass 1):** p.702 footer note 3 ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") was initially handed off to `d29-a1-q3`, while q3 believed it belonged to q2 — so it was rendered in neither chunk. Resolved via 450dpi PDF eyes-on (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p702-{L,R}-0.png`): the superscript ³ anchor is visible in the printed body at the very end of **this chunk's own Ad-5 reply** ("...si libertatem habet in una persona et coactionem in alia³"), matching this chunk's existing English translation exactly ("...if one person has liberty and the other coercion"). It belongs to q2, not q3. Inserted as [^9] in both Latin and English bodies and in the Apparatus block; count updated 8→9.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum aliquis possit ad matrimonium compelli per praeceptum patris.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit ad matrimonium compelli per praeceptum patris; et voco hic compulsionem, ut obedire teneatur. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia dicitur Genesis vigesimo octavo[^1], Isaac vocavit filium suum Iacob praecepitque ei dicens: *Ne accipias uxorem* etc.; constat quod Isaac non praecepit, nisi quod potuit et debuit: ergo potest hoc pater filio praecipere.

2. Item, ad Colossenses tertio[^2]: *Filii, obedite parentibus vestris per omnia*: ergo in omnibus quae non sunt contra salutem, tenetur patri filius obedire; unde Glossa: «Placet Deo, si per omnia obeditis, ita tamen si in Domino obeditis»: si ergo matrimonium non est contra salutem, patet etc.

3. Item, sicut se habet pater spiritualis respectu matrimonii spiritualis, ita pater carnalis respectu carnalis; sed dominus Papa potest praecipere alicui sub poena excommunicationis, quod episcopatum accipiat: ergo pater carnalis, quod filius cum muliere, cum qua vult, contrahat.

4. Item, stultus est qui iurat et se obligat pro alio, qui non est ei obligatus, ut si iurarem pro extraneo, quod ipse ad sanctum Dionysium iret: si ergo parentes iurant pro filiis, ergo videtur, quod filiis suis possint praecipere, ut iuramenta sua debeant implere[^3].

5. Item, si aliquis contrahat sponsalia cum aliqua, nondum est matrimonium contractum; tamen per ecclesiasticum praeceptum compellitur ad contrahendum[^4]: si ergo potest compelli ab episcopo, pari ratione videtur, quod possit compelli a patre suo.

**Contra:**
1. In eo, in quo pares sumus, unus non tenetur obedire mandato alterius; sed quantum ad ius matrimonii omnes sunt pares: ergo non videtur, quod pater possit filio imperare.

2. Item, patre imperante matrimonium, filius sine peccato potest castitatem vovere: ergo non tenetur patri obedire.

3. Item, si filius vult religionem intrare, non tenetur patri determinanti religionem obedire, immo in quamcumque potest sine peccato intrare, quia tale votum est spontaneum: si ergo matrimonium debet esse liberum, patet etc.

4. Item, nemo potest me compellere ad perpetuam servitutem; sed vir, eo quod contrahit cum uxore, dat ei sui corporis perpetuam potestatem: ergo non videtur, quod in hoc teneatur quis alicui obedire.
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5. Item, si teneretur obedire, tunc sponsalia per parentes contracta absque consensu filiorum nubentium essent stabilia; sed hoc est contra iura canonica et civilia[^5]: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Contractus matrimonii debet esse liber nec ordinarie subiicitur praecepto parentum obligatorio.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut ostendunt rationes ultimae, matrimonii contractus debet esse liber omnino, tum ratione *significationis*, tum etiam ratione *talis et tantae obligationis*, quae in illo contractu consistit; et ideo non est praecipiendum a parentibus filio praecepto obligatorio, quod contrahat; quia potest continere, si vult, et iterum, si vult, contrahere. — Adhuc, per praeceptum non potest pater ad contrahendum cum hac, vel cum illa eum obligare, nisi caritas, vel rationabilis causa eum liget, vel promissio ipsius voluntaria. Rationabilis autem causa ligat, quando pater habet inimicitias et non potest evadere, nisi filius cum consanguinea inimici contrahat; vel[^6] quando pater prohibet filio, ne contrahat cum muliere mala. Ob promissionem voluntariam, ut quando ipsemet se obligat contrahendo sponsalia, praeiudicium sibi generat in hoc, quod inchoat matrimonium; unde tenetur ad consummandum et ad hoc compelli potest per mandatum ecclesiasticum.

*Ad primum et ad ultimum.* Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum in contrarium et ad ultimum. Nam Isaac rationabiliter praecepit illud quod Iacob alias tenebatur facere, tum propter malitiam mulierum, tum etiam, quia semen Chanaan de terra illa erat disperdendum; et illud clare insinuatur in textu[^7], et clarius in quodam libello, qui dicitur Testamentum Patriarcharum.

*Ad secundum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia respectu patris, dicendum, quod illa distributio intelligitur solum quantum ad ea quae sunt de paterna honorificatione, et quantum ad ea quae spectant ad regimen familiae. Si autem quantum ad alia intelligatur, consilium est, non praeceptum; et hoc innuit Glossa, quae dicit: *Placet Deo* etc.

*Ad tertium.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de matrimonio spirituali, respondent aliqui, quod Papa non potest praecipere, quia consensus debet esse liber; sed post susceptionem potest praecipere administrationem. — Sed tamen istud non videtur securum dicere, cum tota die videamus fieri contrarium. Et ideo dicunt alii, quod simpliciter potest praecipere; nec est simile de patre carnali, quia pater spiritualis potestatis plenitudinem super filios suos habet amplius quam pater carnalis. Et praeterea, non est tanta servitus et tam indivisibilis copula in matrimonio spirituali, sicut in carnali; et hoc patet, quia Papa potest deponere et absolvere ab episcopatu[^8]. Tertius modus dicendi est, quod ubi rationalis causa est, scilicet necessitas vel communis utilitas, potest praecipi, et tunc ille tenetur obedire; et quoniam semper praesumendum est, quod tantus pater ex causa rationabili moveatur, nisi expresse appareat contrarium; credendum est, quod subditus obedire tenetur. Quodsi sciret se insufficientem et indignum, et videret, sibi imminere periculum animae; credendum est, quod non teneretur obedire. Haec enim obedientia modicum aut nihil de suo debet habere, maxime temporibus modernis. Quidquid tamen sit, non est simile de isto matrimonio et de illo, ratione iam visa.

*Ad quartum et quintum.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de iuramento pro altero, dicendum, quod, sicut infra[^9] patebit, nullius est roboris, sed cuiusdam solatii et solemnitatis, quando parentes iurant pro parvulis: nec obligantur ad aliud, nisi quod bona fide ad hoc laborabunt, quod matrimonium compleatur. — Ultimum patet, quia talis sibi praeiudicium generavit ex propria obligatione[^10].

---

english:
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### Article, the Only One.
### Question III. *Whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept.*

Third it is asked, whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept; and I call this "compulsion" here in the sense that he is bound to obey. And it seems that he can, thus:

1. Because it is said in Genesis 28[^1], Isaac called his son Jacob and commanded him, saying: *Do not take a wife* etc.; it is agreed that Isaac did not command anything except what he was able and bound to command: therefore a father can enjoin this upon his son.

2. Likewise, to the Colossians 3[^2]: *Children, obey your parents in all things*: therefore in all things that are not contrary to salvation, a son is bound to obey his father; whence the Gloss: "It is pleasing to God, if you obey in all things, provided, however, that you obey in the Lord": if therefore marriage is not contrary to salvation, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, as a spiritual father stands with respect to spiritual marriage, so a carnal father stands with respect to carnal marriage; but the lord Pope can command someone, under pain of excommunication, to accept a bishopric: therefore a carnal father [can command] that his son marry the woman he wishes.

4. Likewise, he is a fool who swears and binds himself on behalf of another who is not obligated to him — as if I should swear on behalf of a stranger that he himself would go to Saint Denis: if therefore parents swear on behalf of their children, it seems, therefore, that they can enjoin upon their children that they must fulfill their oaths[^3].

5. Likewise, if someone contracts a betrothal with a woman, marriage is not yet contracted; nevertheless by ecclesiastical precept he is compelled to contract [marriage][^4]: if therefore he can be compelled by a bishop, it seems by the same reasoning that he can be compelled by his own father.

**On the contrary:**
1. In that in which we are equals, one is not bound to obey the command of another; but as to the right of marriage, all are equals: therefore it does not seem that a father can command his son [in this].

2. Likewise, with a father commanding marriage, a son can vow chastity without sin: therefore he is not bound to obey his father.

3. Likewise, if a son wishes to enter religious life, he is not bound to obey his father determining a religious order for him — indeed he can enter whichever order he wishes without sin, because such a vow is spontaneous: if therefore marriage ought to be free, it is clear, etc.

4. Likewise, no one can compel me to perpetual servitude; but a husband, by the fact that he contracts with a wife, gives her perpetual power over his body: therefore it does not seem that anyone is bound in this matter to obey another.
<!-- page 703 -->
5. Likewise, if one were bound to obey, then betrothals contracted by parents without the consent of the children who are to marry would be binding; but this is contrary to the canon and civil laws[^5]: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The contract of marriage ought to be free, and is not ordinarily subject to a binding precept of parents.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the last-mentioned arguments show, the contract of marriage ought to be entirely free, both by reason of its *signification*, and also by reason of *the kind and greatness of the obligation* that consists in that contract; and therefore it is not to be enjoined upon a son by parents through a binding precept that he contract [marriage]; for he can remain continent, if he wishes, and again, if he wishes, contract [marriage]. — Further, by precept a father cannot bind his son to contract with this woman or with that one, unless charity, or a reasonable cause, binds him, or his own voluntary promise. A reasonable cause, moreover, binds when the father has enmities and cannot escape them except by his son contracting with a kinswoman of the enemy; or[^6] when the father forbids his son to contract with an evil woman. On account of a voluntary promise — as when he himself binds himself by contracting a betrothal — he generates a prejudice against himself in this, that he begins a marriage; whence he is bound to consummate it, and can be compelled to this by ecclesiastical mandate.

*To the first and to the last.* And by this the answer to the first of the contrary arguments and to the last is clear. For Isaac reasonably commanded that which Jacob was in any case bound to do, both on account of the wickedness of the women, and also because the seed of Canaan was to be destroyed from that land; and this is clearly suggested in the text[^7], and more clearly in a certain little book which is called the Testament of the Patriarchs.

*To the second.* To that which is objected concerning obedience owed to a father, it must be said that that distribution ["in all things"] is understood only as regards those things that pertain to paternal honor, and as regards those things that pertain to the governance of the household. But if it is understood as regards other things, it is counsel, not precept; and this the Gloss suggests, which says: *It is pleasing to God*, etc.

*To the third.* To that which is objected concerning spiritual marriage, some reply that the Pope cannot command it, because consent must be free; but after its reception he can command its administration. — Yet this does not seem safe to say, since we see the contrary happen every day. And therefore others say that he can simply command it; nor is the case the same as with a carnal father, because the spiritual father has a fullness of power over his [spiritual] sons greater than a carnal father has. And moreover, there is not so great a servitude, nor so indivisible a bond, in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage; and this is clear, because the Pope can depose [a bishop] and absolve him from his bishopric[^8]. A third way of speaking is that where there is a rational cause — namely necessity or the common good — it can be commanded, and then the subject is bound to obey; and since it must always be presumed that so great a father is moved by a reasonable cause, unless the contrary expressly appears, it must be believed that the subject is bound to obey. But if he knew himself to be unfit and unworthy, and saw that danger to his soul threatened him, it must be believed that he would not be bound to obey. For this obedience ought to have little or nothing of one's own [interest] in it, especially in modern times. Whatever the case may be, however, it is not the same with this marriage as with that [spiritual bond], for the reason already seen.

*To the fourth and fifth.* To that which is objected concerning an oath sworn on another's behalf, it must be said that, as will be clear below[^9], it has no binding force, but is a matter of a certain comfort and solemnity, when parents swear on behalf of their small children: nor are they bound to anything else except that they will labor in good faith toward this, that the marriage be completed. — The last point is clear, because such a person generated a prejudice against himself by his own obligation[^10].

---

la: Vers. 6: *Non accipias uxorem de filiabus Chanaan*. Cfr. ibid. v. 1: *Noli accipere coniugem de genere Chanaan*.

en: Verse 6: "Do not take a wife from the daughters of Canaan." Cf. ibid. v. 1: "Do not take a wife from the race of Canaan."

la: Vers. 20. Vulgata omittit *vestris*. Cfr. Eph. 6, 1: *Filii, obedite parentibus vestris in Domino*. Ex Comment. Hieron. in hunc loc. sumta videtur Glossa (quam Petr. Lombard. et Lyranus ut interlinearem in Col. 3, 20 exhibent), in qua pro *in Domino* codd. et edd. *Domino*. — Superius post *salutem* cod. aa supplet *animae*.

en: Verse 20. The Vulgate omits "your." Cf. Eph. 6:1: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord." From Jerome's Commentary on this passage the Gloss seems to be drawn (which Peter Lombard and Lyra present as an interlinear gloss on Col. 3:20), in which, for "in the Lord," the manuscripts and editions have "the Lord." — Above, after "salutem" ["safety"], codex aa supplies "of the soul."

la: Cfr. C. *Tua nos requisivit* (1.), X. de Desponsatione impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).

en: Cf. the chapter *Tua nos requisivit* (1), Decretals, *On the Betrothal of Minors* (Bk. IV, tit. 2).

la: Vide C. *Ex litteris Silvani* (10.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).

en: See the chapter *Ex litteris Silvani* (10), Decretals, *On Betrothals and Marriage* (Bk. IV, tit. 1).

la: Cfr. supra q. 1, et Glossa in C. *Tua nos requisivit* (1.), in nota penultima allegatum, ubi etiam loci ex iure civili proponuntur, secundum quos distinguendum videtur inter *filios* et *filias* (quae solum in casu, quo pater elegerit turpem vel moribus indignum, contradicendi ius habere dicuntur). Vide hic lit. Magistri, in fine.

en: Cf. above, q. 1, and the Gloss on the chapter *Tua nos requisivit* (1), cited in the note before last, where passages from civil law are also brought forward, according to which a distinction seems to be drawn between *sons* and *daughters* (who are said to have the right to object only in the case where the father has chosen for them someone base or unworthy in character). See here the Master's text, at the end.

la: In cod. A secunda manus hic addidit *caritas* et paulo inferius *sicut Isaac* post *mala*. Edd. pro *vel* substituunt *ut caritas vero obligat*. Inferius post *voluntariam* Vat. addit *ligatur*.

en: In codex A a second hand added here "charity" and, a little below, "as Isaac" after "evil." The editions substitute for "or": "or charity indeed obligates." Below, after "voluntary," the Vatican [manuscript] adds "is bound."

la: Gen. 28, 4. — Seq. libellus habetur apud Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. II. col. 1037, sub hoc titulo: «Testamenta duodecim Patriarcharum, filiorum Iacob ad filios suos», interprete Roberto Lincolniensi episcopo [Robert. Grosseteste]. Duplex haec ratio tangitur c. 2. n. 6. et c. 4. n. 11. — Edd. *Testimonium Patriarcharum*.

en: Gen. 28:4. — The following little book is found in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. II, col. 1037, under this title: "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the sons of Jacob, to their sons," translated by Robert, bishop of Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste]. This twofold reasoning is touched on in ch. 2, n. 6, and ch. 4, n. 11. — The editions [read]: "Testimony of the Patriarchs."

la: Cfr. C. *Inter corporalia* (2.), X. de Translat. episcopi (lib. I. tit. 7.).

en: Cf. the chapter *Inter corporalia* (2), Decretals, *On the Translation of a Bishop* (Bk. I, tit. 7).

en: See the scholion to the first question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Re-set 2026-07-10 from raw OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 75855–76020) cross-checked against 450 dpi PDF column bands (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol4 --pages 702-704 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol4 {702,703} 1880`), per the VOL II/IV PDF-priority-inversion override (CLAUDE.md). **Offset correction:** `--pages` for `extract-pages.py` takes **printed** page numbers, not PDF page numbers — the tool applies the `pdf = printed + 20` offset internally. An initial mis-extraction at `--pages 722-724` (treating printed+20 as the input) pulled the wrong physical pages (confirmed by content mismatch — that crop showed unrelated d.31-region text on delectatio/coitu, not d.29's matrimonial-compulsion material); the crops were deleted and re-extracted correctly at `--pages 702-704`, which the tool internally maps to PDF pp. 722–724 as expected.

**Page span:** printed pp. 702–703 only (not 704). Raw line 76016 ("704 SENTENTIARUAI LIB. IV.") is the running head at the very top of printed p.704, and raw line 76021 ("DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI", OCR-garbled) is the start of the next chunk, `bon-sent-IV-d29-dubia.md` — confirmed against the PDF that p.704 opens directly with the "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI" title + "DUB. I." and carries no q3 body text. `line_end` set to 76020 (last raw line before the DUBIA heading).

**Cross-chunk footer split (p.702, shared with q2):** printed p.702's footer carries **7** Quaracchi footnotes total. Notes 1–3 (Cfr. supra d.27 a.2 q.1 / Planius codd. ELY tamen / Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.) belong to **q2** (anchored at q2's closing "...coactionem in alia³" — q2 is still an unpromoted skeleton as of this session, so q2's own apparatus is **not yet built**; flagging here so the next q2 promotion session picks up p.702 notes 1–3). Notes 4–7 belong to **this chunk** (q3), rendered as [^1]–[^4].

**`[?]` flags:** none — both pages read cleanly at 450 dpi against the OCR baseline; no illegible glyphs.

**Structural note on the reply numbering:** the Respondeo answers the five *videtur-quod-sic* (Fundamentum) arguments, not the Contra arguments (the Conclusio sides with the Contra position that marriage must stay free). Reply 1 covers Fundamentum-1 (Isaac/Genesis) *and* Fundamentum-5 (episcopal-compulsion analogy) together via "ad primum ... et ad ultimum"; reply 2 covers Fundamentum-2 (Colossians); reply 3 covers Fundamentum-3 (papal/episcopal-precept analogy); the final unlabeled reply covers Fundamentum-4 and -5 jointly ("Ad illud... de iuramento... — Ultimum patet"). Rendered with descriptive `*Ad ...*` labels rather than renumbering, to stay literal to the Quaracchi text's own (non-strictly-sequential) numbering.

**Marginalia omitted:** per CLAUDE.md OCR-cleanup convention, marginal keyword glosses visible in the PDF (*Ad oppositum*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Opinio 1*, *Opinio 2*, *Opinio 3 cum restrictione*, *Non probatur*) are editorial sidebar labels, not Bonaventure's running text — trimmed, not rendered as headers.

**Scholion:** `has_scholion: false`. [^10] (the chunk's final footnote) reads "Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest." ("See the scholion to the first question of this article") — i.e., this quaestio's scholion material lives with q1, not here. Checked q1's currently-chunked raw range (lines 75513–75730): **no SCHOLION heading found there either** — flagging for the future q1 promotion session to locate the actual scholion (it may sit just past q1's current skeleton boundary, since q1/q2 are unpromoted and their chunk boundaries haven't been re-verified against raw/PDF yet).

**Hand-off forwarded to `bon-sent-IV-d29-dubia`:** none needed — the page-703/704 boundary is a clean chunk break (no split footer, no mid-sentence splice); q3 ends with its own footnote 6 ([^10] here) fully resolved on p.703, and p.704 opens fresh with the DUBIA title.

**Hand-off forwarded to `bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q2` (when promoted):** p.702 footer notes 1–3 belong to q2 (see cross-chunk footer split above).

**✓ Cross-chunk apparatus gap RESOLVED (2026-07-10, d.21–d.30 decade-polish gate, Pass 1):** p.702 footer note 3 ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") does NOT belong to this chunk. Resolved via 450dpi PDF eyes-on: the superscript ³ anchor sits at the end of `d29-a1-q2`'s own Ad-5 reply ("...coactionem in alia³"), not anywhere in this chunk's body. Inserted into `d29-a1-q2.md` as its [^9]. This chunk's apparatus (starting at note 4, rendered here as [^1]) is correct as-is.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XXIX)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XXIX)

source_text:
<!-- page 704 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur *de situ huius partis.* Videtur enim male hic situari; si enim coactio est impedimentum matrimonii, ergo in illo capitulo deberet determinari, ubi agitur de impedimentis matrimonii[^1].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia Magister agit hic de matrimonio a parte causae *efficientis;* et causa efficiens est consensus, non quilibet, sed plenus, et plenitudo consensus deficit secundum modos praedictos: ideo hic agit de *coactione* et *errore,* infra vero agit de personarum legitimitate. Et quia illa multis modis potest privari, et per consequens matrimonium impediri; ideo inferius agit de multis impedimentis. Et haec est ratio, quare tractatus ille ab hoc separatur, quia ratio impediendi venit ex alio genere causae.

### Dub. II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Nequaquam eam invitam ac renitentem cogas eius coniugio copulari* etc. Ponatur, quod aliqua consentiat in aliquem per nuntium et ante adventum nuntii poeniteat et nolit consentire, utrum sit compellanda. Et quod sic, videtur: quia, si potestatem suam commisit procuratori, tunc ita ratum est quod procurator facit, sicut si ipsa[^2] faceret: ergo si procurator et nuntius consentiat, quantumcumque postmodum reclamet; videtur, quod stet matrimonium. — Sed contra: ponatur, quod statim, ex quo poenitet, antequam nuntius perveniat, cum alio contrahat; constat, quod matrimonium est, cum adhuc alii non sit alligata: ergo aliud matrimonium non stat. — Item, non fit matrimonium nisi per mutuum consensum; consensus autem mutuus nullus est, nisi simul sit actu, vel habitu: ergo si poenitet, antequam tunc consentiat, patet etc.

Quaeritur ergo, utrum matrimonium possit contrahi inter absentes.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si aliquis consentit in absentem per procuratorem, potest fieri matrimonium, non solum sponsalia contrahi, dum tamen constet, utrumque consentire; sicut impraesentiarum[^3] potest unus alteri consensum exprimere per interpositam personam.

Quod autem quaeritur, utrum, ipsa poenitente, matrimonium contrahatur; dicendum, quod re vera, si non ante poeniteat, quam ille consentiat, res est salva. Et si poenitet in corde et reclamat in signo in conspectu testium, per quos possit probari, utpote negando, vel matrimonium cum alio contrahendo; re vera non est matrimonium, nec in conspectu Dei nec in conspectu Ecclesiae, quia consensus non simul concurrunt, maxime si fecit quod in se fuit, ut revocatio voluntatis eius ad nuntium perveniret. Et hoc patet, quia, si statim, ex quo poenitet, cum alio contraheret, matrimonium esset.

Quod obiicitur, quod dedit alteri suam potestatem; dicendum, quod semper intelligitur potestatem ad hunc actum dare, consensu in ipsa remanente, qui est de essentia matrimonii interius in facie Dei et exterius in facie Ecclesiae[^4].

### Dub. III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *inviti et coacti coniuncti sunt* etc. Videtur enim dicere, quod si non reclamat, quod est matrimonium. **Contra:** illud potest esse ex negligentia; sed negligentia non supplet locum consensus: ergo non videtur, quod sit matrimonium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum faciem Ecclesiae consensus praesumtus matrimonium facit, quando scilicet probabiliter praesumitur quod consensus ille sit maritalis. Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: primo modo, quando consentit *ore;* secundo vero, quando, etsi non consentit ore, tamen voluntarie consentit *in carnale opus,* petendo vel reddendo quod exigitur; tertio modo, quando reclamare potest et habet locum et tempus et *non reclamat,* consentire praesumitur, et ideo amplius non auditur; immo in facie Ecclesiae pro matrimonio habetur, non propter negligentiam, sed propter consensum, qui creditur inclinatus et voluntarius simpliciter, quamvis in principio fuerit coactus[^5].

english:
### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked *concerning the placement of this part.* For it seems to be badly placed here; for if coercion is an impediment of marriage, then it ought to be determined in that chapter where the impediments of marriage are treated[^1].

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the Master here treats of marriage on the side of the *efficient* cause; and the efficient cause is consent, not just any consent, but full consent, and the fullness of consent is lacking according to the aforesaid modes: therefore he here treats of *coercion* and *error,* while below he treats of the legitimacy of persons. And because that [legitimacy] can be lacking in many ways, and consequently marriage impeded; therefore further below he treats of many impediments. And this is the reason why that treatise is separated from this one, because the ground of impeding comes from another kind of cause.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *By no means force her, unwilling and resisting, to be joined in her marriage* etc. Suppose that some woman consents to someone through a messenger, and before the messenger's arrival she repents and does not wish to consent — is she to be compelled? And it seems that she is: because, if she committed her power to a proxy, then what the proxy does is as ratified as if she[^2] had done it herself: therefore if the proxy and the messenger consent, however much she afterward protests, it seems that the marriage stands. — But on the contrary: suppose that, as soon as she repents, before the messenger arrives, she contracts with another; it is settled that there is a marriage, since she is not yet bound to the other: therefore the other marriage does not stand. — Likewise, marriage is not made except through mutual consent; but mutual consent is none, unless it is simultaneous either in act or in habit: therefore if she repents before he then consents, it is clear, etc.

It is asked, therefore, whether marriage can be contracted between absent parties.

**I respond:** It must be said that if someone consents to an absent party through a proxy, marriage can be made — not only betrothal contracted — provided it be established that both consent; just as in the present[^3] one person can express consent to another through an interposed person.

As for what is asked, whether, she repenting, the marriage is contracted: it must be said that in truth, if she does not repent before he consents, the matter is safe. And if she repents in her heart and protests by a sign in the sight of witnesses, by whom it can be proved — for instance by denying, or by contracting marriage with another — in truth there is no marriage, neither in the sight of God nor in the sight of the Church, because the two consents do not concur simultaneously, especially if she did what was in her power, so that the revocation of her will might reach the messenger. And this is clear, because, if as soon as she repents she were to contract with another, there would be a marriage.

As for the objection, that she gave her power to another: it must be said that it is always understood that she gives the power for this act, the consent remaining in herself, which consent is of the essence of marriage — inwardly in the sight of God and outwardly in the sight of the Church[^4].

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says that *unwilling and coerced persons are joined* etc. For he seems to say by this that, if she does not protest, there is a marriage. **On the contrary:** that could be from negligence; but negligence does not supply the place of consent: therefore it does not seem that there is a marriage.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the face of the Church, presumed consent makes a marriage, namely when it is probably presumed that the consent is marital. But this can happen in three ways: in the first way, when one consents *by word;* second, when, although one does not consent by word, one nevertheless consents willingly *to the carnal act,* by seeking or rendering what is required; in the third way, when one is able to protest and has the place and the time and *does not protest,* one is presumed to consent, and therefore is not heard afterward; rather, in the sight of the Church it is held for a marriage, not on account of negligence, but on account of consent, which is believed to be inclined and voluntary simply, although at the beginning it was coerced[^5].

la: Infra d. XXXIV. seqq.

en: Below, d. XXXIV and following.

la: Cod. C *propria,* edd. *Papa.*

en: Codex C reads *propria* ("her own"), the editions *Papa* [an apparent misreading, retained as the editions' variant].

la: Codd. II *aa in praesentia.*

en: Two codices read *in praesentia* ("in the present") [for *impraesentiarum*].

la: Solutio nititur C. *Procurator* (9.), de Procuratoribus in Sexto (lib. I. tit. 19.). Cfr. ibid. Glossa, sicut et in C. *Nec illud otiosum* (8.), C. 30. q. 5. — De ipso dubio vide S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., IV. Sent. d. 27. a. 4. q. 3.

en: The solution rests on the canon *Procurator* (9.), *On Proctors,* in the Sext (bk. I, tit. 19). Cf. there the Gloss, as also on the canon *Nec illud otiosum* (8.), C. 30, q. 5. — On this doubt itself see St. Thomas, here on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, *IV Sentences,* d. 27, a. 4, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1. ad 3. et 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. et circa lit.

en: Cf. above, d. 28, q. 1, ad 3 and 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 3 and on the text.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** The entire Dubia section for Distinctio XXIX occupies a single printed page (704 = PDF 724), running from the centered `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header down to the close of Dub. III, at which point the page turns directly to `DISTINCTIO XXX.` (printed p. 705). Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 76021–76106), cross-checked against the PDF column bands (`vol4-p704-{L,R}-0/1/2` at split_x=1880) per the Vol IV two-column PDF-priority inversion — the OCR on this page is only mildly damaged (diagonal fragmentation, not full cascade-shatter), so OCR and PDF agree closely; the PDF was used to resolve every OCR garble (`Duo. U.`→`Dub. II`, `DUD. Ili.`→`Dub. III`, `RESPONDDO`→`Respondeo`, etc.) and to confirm footnote-marker placement. English is a fresh literal translation.

**This is the LAST chunk of Distinctio XXIX** — the next content on the page (raw line 76107 and the running-head repeat at 76112) is the start of `DISTINCTIO XXX.` and belongs to the d.30 chunks, not here.

**Dubia count: 3** (verified against the raw range — only `Dub. I`, `Dub. II`, `Dub. III` occur; no `Dub. IV`).
- **Dub. I** — Why is this Dubia section (on coercion/error as consent-defects) placed here rather than among the impediments of marriage below? Answer: the Master treats marriage here from the side of the *efficient cause* (full consent, undermined by coercion/error), reserving personal *legitimacy* defects for the impediments treatise below (d. 34 ff.) — different genus of cause.
- **Dub. II** — Can marriage be contracted between absentes (via proxy/messenger), and what if the principal repents before the messenger arrives or before the other's consent is expressed? Answer: marriage by proxy is valid like betrothal-by-proxy, provided mutual consent is established; if she repents (in heart, provably signaled) before his consent arrives, the earlier "consent" never matured into marriage — consent is retained by the principal even when power to express it is delegated, since consent (not the proxy's act) is of marriage's essence both before God and before the Church.
- **Dub. III** — Does non-protest alone (absent true consent) make a marriage, given the Master's "unwilling and coerced persons are joined"? Answer: the Church presumes marital consent in three cases — express verbal consent, voluntary consent to the marital act itself, or failure to protest when one could and should have — the third resting not on negligence but on a probable, simply-voluntary consent, even if the union began under coercion.

**Apparatus:** 5 entries, all on this single page — footers 1–3 anchor in Dub. I/II's argument and Respondeo bodies (`impedimentis matrimonii¹`, `sicut si ipsa² faceret`, `impraesentiarum³`); footer 4 closes Dub. II's Respondeo (`facie Ecclesiae⁴`); footer 5 closes Dub. III and the whole distinction (`fuerit coactus⁵`). No footer carries over from the preceding q3 chunk — the page's top margin begins directly with the centered DUBIA header, and q3's own apparatus is entirely self-contained on the prior page(s).

**Hand-offs:** None received — `bon-sent-IV-d29-a1-q3.md` is itself still an unpromoted skeleton (`transcription_status: "auto-chunked 2026-06-16"`) with no `## Notes` hand-off to pick up. No hand-off is forwarded either, since this chunk's content is bounded cleanly by the page break into Distinctio XXX.

**[?] flags:** none. The page's OCR damage was fully resolved against the PDF; footnote 2's `edd. Papa` reading is a genuine (surprising) textual variant recorded verbatim in the apparatus, not an unresolved garble — flagged here only as a note-worthy oddity, not an ambiguity requiring `[?]`.


title: Dist. 30

title_alt: Distinctio XXX — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXX — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
<!-- page 705 -->

DISTINCTIO XXX.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; here they are renumbered continuously across pp. 705–706.

### Cap. I. *De errore, qui evacuat consensum.*

Nec solum coactio impedit vel excludit consensum, sed etiam error. «Non autem omnis error consensum impedit. Est enim error alius *personae*, alius *fortunae*, alius *conditionis*, alius *qualitatis*: error *personae*, quando hic putatur esse ille homo, et est alius; error *fortunae*, quando putatur esse dives qui pauper est, vel e converso; error *conditionis*, quando putatur esse liber qui servus est; error *qualitatis*, quando putatur esse bonus qui malus est. — Error *fortunae* et *qualitatis* coniugii consensum non excludit. Error vero *conditionis* coniugalem consensum evacuat, de qua conditione postmodum tractabimus. Error quoque *personae* consensum coniugalem non admittit, ut si quis feminam nobilem in coniugium petat, et pro ea alia ignobilis tradatur ei; non est inter eos coniugium, quia non consensit vir in istam, sed in aliam; ut si quis promitteret mihi, se venditurum aurum, et pro auro offerret mihi aurichalcum, et ita me deciperet; nunquid dicerer consensisse in aurichalcum? Nunquam volui emere aurichalcum, nec ergo in illud consensi, quia consensus non nisi voluntatis est. Sicut ergo error *materiae* excludit consensum, ita et in coniugio error *personae*. — Sed obiicitur de Iacob[^1], qui pro Rachel septem annis servierat, et supposita est ei Lia; nunquid error personae exclusit coniugium, cum non in eam, sed in Rachel consenserit? Sed quod ibi factum est in mysterio gestum non improbe traditur; ibi tamen, etsi non praecessit, secutus est consensus; nec ex illo concubitu, qui consensum praecessit, fornicarii iudicantur, cum ille maritali affectu eam cognoverit, et illa uxorio affectu debitum persolverit, putans, lege primogeniturarum et paternis imperiis se illi iure copulatam. Excusatur etiam, quia Dei consilio in mysterio ita actum est. Hodie etiam excusaretur ille cui inscio uxoris soror, lectulum eius ingressa, se subiiceret; quae cum sine spe coniugii perpetuo manere censeatur, ille tamen, qui cognovit eam per ignorantiam, excusatur. Quod per simile probatur: si enim diabolus, transfigurans se in angelum lucis[^2], credatur bonus, non est error periculosus. Quod autem vir ille in illam mulierem non consenserit, ex simili ostenditur: si quis haereticus nomine Augustini vel Ambrosii alicui Catholico se offerret eumque ad suae fidei imitationem vocaret; si ille assentiret, in cuius sententiam fidei diceretur consensisse? Non in haereticorum sectam, sed in integritatem fidei, quam ille haereticus se mentiebatur habere. — Error *fortunae* consensum non excludit — quae enim nubit pauperi putans, illum esse divitem, non potest renuntiare priori conditioni, quamvis erraverit — nec error *qualitatis*, ut si quis ducat uxorem meretricem, corruptam, quam putat esse castam, vel virginem, non potest eam dimittere[^3]».

### Cap. II. *De coniugio Mariae et Ioseph.*

Praemissis aliquid addendum est de modo illius consensus, qui inter Mariam et Ioseph intercessit. Sane credi potest, non solum Mariam, sed etiam Ioseph apud se disposuisse virginitatem servare, nisi Deus aliter iuberet; eosque sic consensisse in coniugalem societatem, ut uterque de altero, revelante Spiritu sancto, intelligeret, quod virginitatem servare vellet, nisi Deus aliter inspiraret; sed illam voluntatem verbis non expresserant, postea vero expresserunt et in virginitate permanserunt. Consensit ergo Maria in maritalem societatem, sed non in carnalem copulam, nisi de eadem specialiter Deus praeciperet, cuius etiam consilio in maritalem consensit copulam, quia virginitatem servare volebat: et ideo non aliter consensisset in coniugalem societatem, nisi familiare Dei consilium habuisset. De qua Augustinus[^4] sic ait: «Beata Maria proposuit, se servaturam votum virginitatis in corde, sed ipsum votum non expressit in ore. Subiecit se divinae dispositioni, proposuit, se perseveraturam virginem, nisi Deus aliter ei revelaret. Committens ergo virginitatem suam divinae dispositioni, consensit in carnalem copulam, non illam appetendo, sed divinae inspirationi in utroque obediendo; postea vero simul cum viro labiis expressit, et uterque in virginitate permansit». Inter quos, ut ait Augustinus[^5], perfectum fuit coniugium, perfectum quidem non in significatione, sed in sanctitate. Sanctiora enim sunt coniugia pari voto continentium. Unde Augustinus: «Quod Deo pari consensu voveratis, ambo perseveranter reddere debuistis, a quo proposito si lapsus est ille, tu saltem persevera». «Non quia pariter temperabatis a commixtione carnali, ideo maritus tuus esse destiterat, immo vero tanto sanctius coniuges manebatis, quanto sanctiora concorditer placita servabatis». Perfectum igitur fuit Mariae et Ioseph coniugium in sanctitate; perfectum etiam fuit secundum triplex bonum coniugii, fidem scilicet, prolem et Sacramentum. «Omne enim nuptiarum bonum, ut ait Augustinus[^6], impletum est in illis parentibus Christi, *fidem*, *prolem*, *Sacramentum*:
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*prolem* cognoscimus ipsum Dominum; *fidem*, quia nullum adulterium; *Sacramentum*, quia nullum divortium». «Solus ibi nuptialis concubitus non fuit, quia in carne peccati fieri non poterat sine pudenda concupiscentia carnis, quae accidit ex peccato; sine qua concipi voluit qui sine peccato futurus erat». Et licet non intercesserit coniugalis concubitus, coniuges tamen vere fuerunt *mente*, non *carne*, sicut et parentes; quamvis Ambrosius[^7] dicat, perfectum fieri coniugium per carnalem copulam. «In omni, inquit, matrimonio coniunctio intelligitur spiritualis, quam confirmat et perficit coniunctorum commixtio corporalis». Sed intelligendum est, coniugium perfici commixtione corporali non quantum ad veritatem, vel sanctitatem coniugii, sed quantum ad significationem, quia perfectius unionem Christi et Ecclesiae tunc figurat.

### Cap. III. *De finali causa coniugii.*

Exposito, quae sit *efficiens causa* matrimonii, consequens est ostendere, *ob quam causam* soleat vel debeat contrahi matrimonium. «Est igitur *finalis causa* contrahendi matrimonii principalis procreatio prolis; propter hoc enim instituit Deus coniugium inter primos parentes, quibus dixit: *Crescite et multiplicamini*[^8] etc. Secunda est post peccatum Adae vitatio fornicationis; unde Apostolus: *Propter fornicationem unusquisque habeat uxorem suam, et unaquaeque habeat virum suum*. Sunt et aliae causae honestae, ut inimicorum reconciliatio et pacis redintegratio. Sunt etiam et aliae minus honestae causae, propter quas aliquando contrahitur, ut viri mulierisque pulcritudo, quae animos amore inflammatos saepe impellit inire coniugium, ut valeant suum explere desiderium; quaestus quoque et divitiarum possessio frequenter est causa coniugii et alia multa, quae cuique diligentiam adhibenti facile est discernere. Nec est assentiendum illis qui dicunt, non esse coniugium, quod propter has causas minus honestas contrahitur. Constat enim ex praemissis, coniugium fieri ex communi consensu, verbis de praesenti expresso, quamvis amor ad hoc attraxerit. Cuius rei documentum praestat Iacob, qui Rachel decoram facie et venusto aspectu amavit eamque diligens ait[^9]: *Serviam tibi pro Rachel septem annis*. In Deuteronomio etiam legitur: *Si videris in medio captivorum mulierem pulcram et adamaveris eam voluerisque uxorem habere, introduces eam in domum tuam*» etc.

### Cap. IV. *Quod malus finis non contaminat Sacramentum.*

Et licet fine non bono contrahatur coniugium, quando species contrahentis movet animum, coniugium tamen bonum est, quia vita mala, vel intentio perversa alicuius Sacramentum non contaminat. — Habuit autem coniugium Mariae et Ioseph alias causas speciales, scilicet ut «Virgo solatio viri sustentaretur, et ut diabolo partus celaretur, ut Ioseph esset testis castitatis, defendens eam ab infamia suspicionis, ne ut adultera damnaretur[^10]».

---

english:
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DISTINCTION XXX.

### Chap. I. *On the error which nullifies consent.*

Not only coercion impedes or excludes consent, but also error. «Now not every error impedes consent. For error is of one kind regarding *person*, of another regarding *fortune*, of another regarding *condition*, of another regarding *quality*: error of *person*, when this man is thought to be that man, and is another; error of *fortune*, when a man is thought to be rich who is poor, or the reverse; error of *condition*, when one is thought to be free who is a slave; error of *quality*, when one is thought to be good who is wicked. — Error of *fortune* and of *quality* does not exclude the consent of marriage. But error of *condition* nullifies the marital consent, of which condition we shall treat afterward. Error of *person*, too, does not admit marital consent, as when someone seeks a noble woman in marriage, and another, ignoble, is given to him in her place; there is no marriage between them, because the man did not consent to this woman, but to another; as if someone should promise me that he would sell me gold, and for the gold should offer me brass, and thus deceive me; would I be said to have consented to the brass? I never wished to buy brass, and therefore I did not consent to it, because consent belongs only to the will. Just as, then, error of *matter* excludes consent, so too in marriage does error of *person*. — But an objection is raised concerning Jacob[^1], who had served seven years for Rachel, and Leah was substituted for him; did error of person, then, exclude marriage, since he consented not to her but to Rachel? But what was done there was done in a mystery, and is not related as blameworthy; there, however, even though it did not precede, consent followed; nor from that intercourse, which preceded the consent, are they judged fornicators, since he had known her with marital affection and she had rendered the debt with the affection of a wife, thinking, by the law of the firstborn and by her father's command, that she was rightly joined to him. He is excused also because it was so done by God's counsel in mystery. Today, too, that man would be excused to whom, unknown to him, his wife's sister, having entered his bed, gave herself; who, since she is judged to remain forever without hope of marriage, [is excused] though he who knew her did so through ignorance. Which is proved by a like case: for if a devil, transforming himself into an angel of light[^2], is believed to be good, this is not a dangerous error. But that the man did not consent to that woman is shown by a like case: if some heretic, under the name of Augustine or Ambrose, should offer himself to some Catholic and call him to the imitation of his faith; and if that man should assent, to whose profession of faith would he be said to have consented? Not to the sect of heretics, but to the integrity of the faith which that heretic falsely claimed to hold. — Error of *fortune* does not exclude consent — for a woman who marries a poor man thinking him rich cannot renounce the prior condition, although she erred — nor does error of *quality*, as when someone takes as wife a prostitute, corrupted, whom he thinks chaste, or a virgin, he cannot dismiss her[^3]».

### Chap. II. *On the marriage of Mary and Joseph.*

To what has been said something must be added concerning the manner of that consent which passed between Mary and Joseph. It may indeed be believed that not only Mary but Joseph too had resolved within himself to preserve virginity, unless God should otherwise command; and that both so consented to the marital society that each, by the Holy Spirit revealing it, understood of the other that he or she wished to preserve virginity, unless God should otherwise inspire; but they had not expressed that will in words, but afterward expressed it and remained in virginity. Mary, therefore, consented to the marital society, but not to carnal union, unless God should specifically so command for that very purpose, by whose counsel also she consented to the marital union, because she wished to preserve her virginity: and therefore she would not otherwise have consented to the marital society, unless she had had God's intimate counsel. Of whom Augustine[^4] speaks thus: «Blessed Mary resolved that she would keep the vow of virginity in her heart, but she did not express that very vow with her lips. She submitted herself to the divine disposition; she resolved that she would persevere a virgin, unless God should otherwise reveal it to her. Entrusting, then, her virginity to the divine disposition, she consented to carnal union, not seeking it for itself, but obeying the divine inspiration in both matters; afterward, together with her husband, she expressed it with her lips, and each remained in virginity». Between them, as Augustine[^5] says, the marriage was perfect, perfect indeed not in signification, but in holiness. For marriages of those joined in an equal vow are holier. Whence Augustine: «What you had vowed to God by equal consent, you both ought to render perseveringly; and if he has fallen from that resolve, do you at least persevere». «Not because you both equally abstained from carnal intercourse did your husband therefore cease to be your husband; rather, the more you kept your resolves in holy concord, the more holily you both remained spouses». Perfect, therefore, was the marriage of Mary and Joseph in holiness; it was also perfect according to the threefold good of marriage, namely fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. «For every good of marriage, as Augustine[^6] says, was fulfilled in those parents of Christ: *fidelity*, *offspring*, *sacrament*:
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*offspring*, for we recognize the Lord himself as the offspring; *fidelity*, because there was no adultery; *sacrament*, because there was no divorce». «There alone the nuptial intercourse did not take place, because it could not occur in sinful flesh without the shameful concupiscence of the flesh, which arises from sin; without which he who was to be without sin willed to be conceived». And although conjugal intercourse did not take place between them, they were nonetheless truly spouses *in mind*, not *in flesh*, just as were their own parents; although Ambrose[^7] says that marriage is made perfect through carnal union. «In every marriage, he says, a spiritual union is understood, which the bodily commingling of those joined confirms and perfects». But it must be understood that marriage is perfected by bodily commingling not as regards its truth or holiness, but as regards its signification, because it then more perfectly figures the union of Christ and the Church.

### Chap. III. *On the final cause of marriage.*

Having explained what the *efficient cause* of marriage is, it follows to show *for what cause* marriage is accustomed or ought to be contracted. «The *final cause*, then, of contracting marriage is principally the procreation of offspring; for on this account God instituted marriage between our first parents, to whom he said: *Increase and multiply*[^8], etc. The second cause, after Adam's sin, is the avoidance of fornication; whence the Apostle: *Because of fornication let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband*. There are also other honorable causes, such as the reconciliation of enemies and the restoration of peace. There are also other less honorable causes, on account of which marriage is sometimes contracted, such as the beauty of the man and the woman, which often, kindling their hearts with love, impels them to enter marriage so that they may fulfill their desire; gain also and the possession of riches is frequently the cause of marriage, and many other things which anyone applying diligence can easily discern. Nor is one to agree with those who say that a marriage contracted for these less honorable causes is not a marriage at all. For it is established from what has been said that marriage comes about from common consent expressed in words of the present, even though love may have drawn one to it. Of this matter Jacob furnishes a proof, who loved Rachel for her beautiful face and comely appearance, and loving her said[^9]: *I will serve you seven years for Rachel*. In Deuteronomy also it is read: *If you see among the captives a beautiful woman, and desire her, and wish to have her as wife, you shall bring her into your house*», etc.

### Chap. IV. *That an evil end does not contaminate the sacrament.*

And although marriage may be contracted for an end that is not good, when the appearance of the one contracting moves the mind, the marriage is nonetheless good, because the evil life or perverse intention of anyone does not contaminate the sacrament. — Now the marriage of Mary and Joseph had other special causes, namely that «the Virgin might be sustained by the comfort of her husband, and that her childbearing might be hidden from the devil, and that Joseph might be a witness to her chastity, defending her from the infamy of suspicion, lest she be condemned as an adulteress[^10]».

---

la: Gen. 29, 24. — Inferius pro *excusatur* codd. ABE et ed. 1 *excusantur*.

en: Gen. 29:24. — Below, for *excusatur* ["is excused"], codd. ABE and ed. 1 read *excusantur* ["are excused"].

la: Epist. II. Cor. 11, 14. — Infra pro *ducat uxorem* codd. ABC, ed. 1 et Gratian. *ducat in uxorem*.

en: 2 Cor. 11:14. — Below, for *ducat uxorem* ["should take a wife"], codd. ABC, ed. 1, and Gratian read *ducat in uxorem*.

la: Hoc I. cap., nonnullis omissis, quasi verbotenus est apud Gratian., in C. 29. q. 1. — De seq. cap. cfr. supra d. 28. c. 3.

en: This first chapter, with a few things omitted, is found almost verbatim in Gratian, C. 29, q. 1. — On the following chapter, cf. above, d. 28, c. 3.

la: Can. *Beata Maria* (3.), C. 27. q. 2.

en: Canon *Beata Maria* (3), C. 27, q. 2.

la: Libr. I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 11. n. 12; verbotenus apud Gratian. super C. *Institutum est* (39.), ibid. Seq. locus eiusd. est Epist. 262. (alias 199.) ad Ecdiciam n. 3; C. *Quod Deo* (1.), C. 33. q. 5. Tertius ibid. n. 4, et cit. can. § 1. — In 2. loco edd., excepta I, pro *consensu* habent *voto et consensu*, refragante etiam originali et canone.

en: Book I, *On Marriage and Concupiscence* c. 11, n. 12; found verbatim in Gratian on canon *Institutum est* (39), ibid. The following passage is from the same author's Letter 262 (otherwise 199) to Ecdicia, n. 3; canon *Quod Deo* (1), C. 33, q. 5. The third [citation] is ibid., n. 4, and the canon cited, § 1. — In the second place, the editions, except I, read *voto et consensu* ["by vow and consent"] for *consensu* ["by consent"], the original and the canon likewise disagreeing.

la: Loc. cit. c. 11. n. 13; C. *Omne itaque* (10.), C. 27. q. 2. Seq. locus ibid. c. 12. n. 13; can. cit.

en: Loc. cit., c. 11, n. 13; canon *Omne itaque* (10), C. 27, q. 2. The following passage ibid., c. 12, n. 13; canon cited.

la: Non est Ambrosii; vide C. *In omni matrimonio* (36.), ibid. hoc cap., omissis paucis, sumtum est ex Hug., Sum. Sent. tr. 7. c. 1.

en: It is not Ambrose's; see canon *In omni matrimonio* (36), ibid. This chapter, with a few things omitted, is taken from Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 7, c. 1.

la: Gen. 1, 28, deinde I. Cor. 7, 2.

la: Gen. 29, 17. 18, deinde Deut. 21, 12, ubi Vulgata et Hugo *in numero captivorum* pro *in medio captivorum*. — Totum hoc cap., omissis paucis, sumtum est ex Hug., Sum. Sent. tr. 7. c. 1.

en: Gen. 29:17–18, then Deut. 21:12, where the Vulgate and Hugh read *in numero captivorum* ["among the number of captives"] for *in medio captivorum* ["in the midst of the captives"]. — The whole of this chapter, with a few things omitted, is taken from Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 7, c. 1.

la: Glossa in Matth. 1, 18, apud Lyranum.

en: Gloss on Matt. 1:18, in Lyra. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 76112–76238), cross-checked column-by-column against the PDF at 400 dpi (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{705,706}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, split x≈1880) per the Vol IV PDF-priority-inversion override. The raw OCR for this chunk is heavily cascade-fragmented (diagonal one-token-per-line shattering plus two-column bleed — worse than most Vol IV chunks), so nearly every line of running prose was re-set from the PDF bands rather than lightly corrected from OCR. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (confirmed again here: printed 705 → PDF 725).

**Boundary verification.** `DISTINCTIO XXX.` heading at raw line 76112 (page-top duplicate at 76107 is the running head of the facing verso). The littera ends at raw line 76238 ("...ne ut adultera damnaretur\*»."), immediately before the next chunk's heading, OCR-garbled as `COMMENTAEIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX.` at line 76239 (correct reading: `COMMENTARIUS`). That garble is why the auto-chunker's regex (which looks for `COMMENTARIUS`) failed to see this exact boundary automatically, but line_end 76238 in the pre-existing skeleton was already correct.

**Chapter list (Lombard's divisions).** Cap. I *De errore, qui evacuat consensum*; Cap. II *De coniugio Mariae et Ioseph*; Cap. III *De finali causa coniugii*; Cap. IV *Quod malus finis non contaminat Sacramentum*. Single pars (no pars label in the id).

**Page-split map.** p.705 holds the DISTINCTIO XXX heading, all of Cap. I, and Cap. II up to "...impletum est in illis parentibus Christi, fidem, prolem, Sacramentum:" (sentence completes on p.706). p.706 holds the remainder of Cap. II, all of Cap. III, and all of Cap. IV, ending "...ne ut adultera damnaretur»" — immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX` (= the d30-divisio chunk, excluded from this file).

**Footer-ownership / apparatus renumbering.** Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously here as [^1]–[^10].
- p.705 footer carries Quaracchi's own 1–6, rendered as [^1]–[^6]: (1) Gen. 29:24 note on *excusatur*; (2) 2 Cor. 11:14 note on *ducat uxorem*; (3) sourcing note for Cap. I (Gratian C.29 q.1); (4) canon *Beata Maria*; (5) the long Augustine *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* / Epist. 262 citation (covers three successive Augustine quotations in the body: "perfectum fuit coniugium," the "Unde Augustinus: Quod Deo pari consensu" quote, and back to "impletum est," per the note's own "Tertius ibid. n.4" cross-reference — hence only two superscript markers, [^5] and [^6], are needed in the body for a three-quote span).
- p.706 footer carries Quaracchi's own 1–4, rendered as [^7]–[^10]: (1) correction of the "Ambrosius" attribution + sourcing note that Cap. II is drawn from Hugh's *Summa Sententiarum* tr.7 c.1 (this note wraps from the left footer column into the right column, ending "...tr. 7. c. 1." immediately before note 4 begins on the same line); (2) Gen. 1:28 / 1 Cor. 7:2; (3) Gen. 29 / Deut. 21 textual variant, continuing "— Totum hoc cap...sumtum est ex Hug." (a second, separate note that Cap. III likewise draws from Hugh, tr.7 c.1 — this "Totum" clause overflows the left footer column and continues at the top of the right footer column, ahead of note 4, which is a column-overflow pattern distinct from note 1's same-line wrap; resolved with high confidence from the physical column layout, not flagged as `[?]`); (4) Glossa on Matt. 1:18. Immediately below note 4, the page footer begins a new, separate section headed `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` with its own note "1. Vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 2." — this belongs to the **d30-divisio** chunk's apparatus (keyed to the Commentarius' DIVISIO TEXTUS discussion of "aliquid dicit voluntatis"), not to this littera, and is EXCLUDED here per the cross-chunk footer-split convention.

**[?] flags.** None outstanding. The one genuine ambiguity encountered (whether the "Totum hoc cap...ex Hug." clause continues footnote [^7] or footnote [^9]) was resolved via the physical column-overflow layout of the p.706 footer (see above) rather than left unresolved.


title: Dist. 30, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
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### Commentarius in Distinctionem XXX.
### *De consensu, qui deficit a parte rationis.*

> *Nec solum coactio impedit vel excludit consensum* etc.

### Divisio textus.

Supra egit Magister de consensu, qui deficit a parte voluntatis. Hic secundo agit de consensu, qui deficit a parte rationis. Et quoniam ex hac parte potest dupliciter deficere: aut propter errorem in ratione, aut propter obliquitatem in intentione, quae aliquid dicit rationis, aliquid dicit voluntatis[^1]; ideo primo determinat de consensu, qui fit cum errore. Secundo vero determinat de consensu, qui fit mala intentione, et per oppositum bona, ibi: *Exposito, quae sit causa efficiens matrimonii.*

Prima pars habet duas. Primo enim determinat in varios errores, qui incidunt circa consensum. Secundo vero determinat, qualiter consensus Mariae et Ioseph fuerit rectus et sanctus, ibi: *Praemissis aliquid addendum est de modo illius consensus* etc.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis tria quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de consensu illo, qui est cum errore. Secundo quaeritur de consensu beatae Virginis Mariae. Tertio, de consensu illo, qui est ex libidine.

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### Articulus unicus.
### *De consensu, qui deficit a parte rationis.*

---

english:
### Commentary on Distinction XXX.
### *On consent that is lacking on the part of reason.*

> *Not only does coercion impede or exclude consent,* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above, the Master treated of consent that is lacking on the part of the will. Here, second, he treats of consent that is lacking on the part of reason. And since it can fail in a twofold way from this side: either on account of an error in reasoning, or on account of an obliquity in intention — which pertains partly to reason, partly to the will[^1] — therefore he first determines concerning the consent that occurs with error. Second, he determines concerning the consent that comes about through an evil intention, and, by contrast, a good one, at the point: *"Having explained what is the efficient cause of marriage."*

The first part has two [subparts]. In the first he determines the various errors that occur regarding consent. In the second he determines in what manner the consent of Mary and Joseph was upright and holy, at the point: *"To what has been premised something must be added concerning the manner of that consent,"* etc.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, three things are asked.

First, it is asked concerning that consent which occurs with error. Second, it is asked concerning the consent of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Third, concerning that consent which arises from lust.

### The sole article.
### *On consent that is lacking on the part of reason.*

---

la: Notae ad Commentarium. Vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 2.

en: Notes on the Commentary. See II Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 2.

translators_notes:
**Provenance (2026-07-10):** Re-set Tier 2 from raw IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 76239–76287) cross-checked against 300 dpi full-page and column-band PDF crops of printed pp. 706–707 (pdf pp. 726–727, `tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol4 --pages 706-708 --dpi 300` + `colcrop.py vol4 {706,707} 1880`). The auto-chunked skeleton's `line_start`/`line_end` (76248–76283) captured only the DIVISIO TEXTUS + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM body and dropped the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXX.` heading + subtitle + epigraph (raw lines 76239–76247) and the `ARTICULUS UNICUS` heading that opens page 707 (raw lines 76284–76287) — both folded into this chunk per the d29-divisio precedent, since they belong to neither `d30-littera` (which ends cleanly at 76238, the line immediately before `COMMENTARIUS`) nor `d30-a1-q1` (which begins cleanly at 76288, `QUAESTIO 1.`).

**Reading order (two-column page, verified against full-width 300 dpi crop, not the `colcrop` half-page bands alone):** the DIVISIO TEXTUS paragraph is continuous prose split across the column rule — the left column ends mid-sentence (*"...qui fit mala"*) and the right column continues it (*"intentione, et per oppositum bona..."*). Read left column top-to-bottom in full, then right column top-to-bottom, as a single flowing paragraph (confirmed against `raw/vision/vol4/p-706.png` full-width crop, not just the L/R `colcrop` bands, which on their own could be misread as two independent parallel columns).

**Apparatus scope — hand-off to `d30-littera` (forward):** printed p. 706's footer holds two separate numbered sequences: the ongoing Littera apparatus (1–4: `Non est Ambrosii...`, `Gen. 1, 28...`, `Gen. 29, 17.18...`, `Glossa in Matth. 1, 18...`) and a restarted `NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM` sequence (1: `Vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 2.`) for the Commentary section proper. Only the latter anchors to this chunk (the `[^1]` on *voluntatis* in Divisio Textus). The four Littera-apparatus entries anchor to markers in the Cap. III/IV littera text at the top of p. 706 (`quamvis Ambrosius¹ dicat...`, `unusquisque habeat uxorem suam²`, `Iacob, qui Rachel... septem annis³` / the Deut. 21:12 captive-woman citation, and `ne ut adultera damnaretur⁴`) — all within `d30-littera.md`'s existing `line_start`/`line_end` (76112–76238), which is still an unpromoted skeleton as of this session (`d30-littera.md`'s `## Notes` reads "[Notes pending]" — no hand-off was waiting for this session). Flagging forward: when `d30-littera` is promoted, its apparatus should include these four entries verbatim from p. 706's footer.

**No `[?]` flags.** Both columns of pp. 706–707 read cleanly against the OCR after silent correction of standard letter-substitution garbles (`Siipra→Supra`, `qiii→qui`, `deficil→deficit`, `inlenlione→intentione`, `liabet→habet`, `deteriTiinat→determinat`, `loseph→Ioseph`, `recttis→rectus`, `Terlio→Tertio`); no genuinely ambiguous readings remained after the PDF cross-check.

**Chunking boundary confirmed:** `QUAESTIO 1.` and its title (`Utrum consensus erroneus faciat matrimonium`) begin at raw line 76288, matching `bon-sent-IV-d30-a1-q1.md`'s existing `line_start: 76288` — no overlap, no gap.