title: Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 1007 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum potestas praesidendi sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae, vel secundum punitionem culpae. Et quod primo modo, videtur:

1. Genesis primo[^1]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit* etc. Si tu dicas, quod habuit praelationem respectu bestiarum, sed non respectu hominum; per hoc non evadetur, quia primae ad Corinthios undecimo[^2]: *Caput mulieris vir*: si ergo caput praesidet corpori et debet regere corpus, ergo videtur, quod secundum institutionem naturae sit potestas dominandi in humano genere.

2. Item, in Angelis, qui sunt perfecti in natura et in gloria, non tantummodo est ordo et gradus secundum excellentiam naturalium, sed etiam secundum praesidentiam officiorum[^3]: ergo videtur, quod dominium non repugnet, sed consonet institutioni naturae humanae, sicut et angelicae.

3. Item, potestas dominandi est proprietas dignitatis et nobilitatis[^4]; sed si aliquid dignitatis competit naturae lapsae, multo magis competit naturae institutae: ergo videtur, quod magis pertinebat ad statum naturae institutae potestas dominandi quam ad statum naturae lapsae.

4. Item, omne illud, quod est ad conservationem ordinis naturalis, pertinet ad institutionem naturae; sed potestas praesidendi pertinet ad conservationem ordinis naturalis: ergo potestas praesidendi inest homini a Deo secundum institutionem naturae. Maior manifesta est. Minor probatur per illud quod dicit Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei[^5]: «Poenalis servitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari iubet et perturbari vetat»; sed ad idem ordinatur potestas dominandi et poenalis servitus: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Gregorius[^6]: «Omnes homines natura aequales fecit, sed pro variis meritis alios aliis occulta Dei dispensatio, sed iusta praeponit»: ergo videtur, quod subiectio et praelatio non sit in homine secundum institutionem naturae.

2. Item, Augustinus, decimo nono de Civitate Dei[^7]: «Rationalem hominem, ad imaginem Dei factum, dominari noluit Deus nisi irrationalibus»: ergo si potestas praesidendi et dominandi est in uno homine respectu alterius, videtur etc.

3. Item, ratione hoc ipsum videtur. Libertas homini inest a natura; sed potestas dominandi est libertatis impeditiva: ergo non videtur, quod sit a natura. Quod autem libertas et a natura sit et a po
<!-- page 1008 -->
testate praesidendi habeat impediri, manifestatur, quia libertas sic habet definiri[^8]: «Libertas est naturalis potestas, qua licet homini facere quod vult».

4. Item, homo secundum suam primam conditionem factus est ad Dei imaginem[^9]; sed in quantum est imago Dei, natus est immediate ferri in Deum: ergo si solus Deus eo maior est, ergo secundum naturam nihil est supra hominem nisi Deus: ergo nullum dominium in homine est secundum naturae institutionem nisi solum dominium divinum.

5. Item, non est dominus sine servo, ergo nec dominium sine servitute; sed «servitus est introducta propter peccatum», sicut in pluribus locis[^10] dicit Augustinus: ergo videtur, quod potestas dominandi in homine sit secundum conditionem culpae, non secundum institutionem naturae.

6. Item, in glorificatione hominum «vitia detrahentur, et natura servabitur», secundum quod in libro de Civitate Dei[^11] vult Augustinus; sed in statu gloriae non manebit dominium praelationis et subiectio servitutis: ergo non videntur haec esse in natura humana, secundum quod instituta, sed solum secundum quod lapsa et vitiata.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Potestas dominandi, quatenus dicit potestatem coercendi subditos, inest homini solum secundum statum naturae lapsae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod potestas dominandi vel praesidendi dicitur tripliciter, scilicet largissime et communiter et proprie. Largissime dominandi potestas dicitur respectu omnis rei, qua homo potest ad libitum et votum suum uti; et hoc modo dicitur homo esse dominus possessionum suarum, sive mobilium, sive immobilium. Alio modo potestas dominandi sive praesidendi dicit excellentiam potestatis in imperando ei qui est capax rationis et praecepti. Tertio modo potestas dominandi dicitur potestas coercendi subditos[^12]; et haec potestas dicit quandam arctationem libertatis; et talis potestas dominandi proprie dicitur *dominium*, cui respondet *servitus*.

Primo modo potestas dominandi communis est omni statui, videlicet statui naturae institutae et naturae lapsae et naturae glorificatae; et excellentiori modo fuit in statu naturae institutae, quam sit in statu naturae lapsae. — Secundo modo competit statui viae, sive pro statu naturae institutae, sive pro statu naturae lapsae. Si enim homo stetisset, et vir posset imperare uxori, et pater potuisset imperare filio. Et hoc reperitur etiam in Angelis, quamdiu *sunt administratorii spiritus*[^13], quia ex illa parte aliquo modo sunt in statu viae. Haec tamen praesidentia non manebit in gloria, sicut in praecedentibus[^14] ostensum fuit. — Tertio vero modo potestas dominandi in homine est solum secundum statum naturae lapsae; inest enim ei secundum culpae punitionem, non secundum naturae institutionem, et hoc, quia servitus sibi correspondens, secundum quod dicunt Sancti, est poena peccati. — Et quia isto modo loquimur hic de potestate dominandi, ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod talis potestas non inest homini secundum primariam suam[^15] conditionem sive secundum statum naturae institutae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium ex textu Genesis et ex prima Corinthiorum, iam patet responsio; procedunt enim de potestate praesidendi accepta primo et secundo modo, non tertio. Nam etsi mulier sit viro quodam modo inferior ratione infirmioris sexus, nihilominus, quia non est creata, ut esset ei in adiutorium ut famula, sed ut socia; hinc est, quod quamvis dicatur caput eius, non tamen dicitur dominus, quia ipsa non est ancilla ipsius. Et ideo supra dixit Magister distinctione decima octava[^16], quod mulier ad aequalitatem fuit condita; ideo fuit formata de latere, non de pedibus, vel de capite, ut viri videretur esse socia, non domina, vel ancilla.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praelatio est in Angelis: iam patet responsio, quia, quamvis unus praesideat alteri et imperet alteri et auctoritatem habeat super alterum imperandi ei aliquid, quod pertinet ad officium ministerii, tamen unus Angelus non dicitur servus alterius Angeli; et ideo ex hoc non concluditur, quod potestas dominandi, secundum quod ei correspondet servitus, sit in homine secundum conditionem naturae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominium est proprietas dignitatis; dicendum, quod etsi sit pro
<!-- page 1009 -->
prietas *dignitatis* in eo qui praesidet, *indignitatem* tamen dicit in eo qui subest; et ideo naturaliter potest convenire homini respectu alterius creaturae inferioris, respectu tamen alterius hominis non convenit naturaliter, sed quodam modo praeternaturaliter, videlicet in punitionem peccati; sicut enim dicit Ambrosius[^17]: «Servitus introducta fuit per peccatum ebrietatis».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dominium et servitus facit ad conservationem ordinis naturalis; dicendum, quod est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum *omnem* statum; et est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum statum *suae conditionis*; et est ordo, qui respicit naturam secundum statum *suae corruptionis*. Et secundum hoc quaedam sunt de dictamine naturae *simpliciter*; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum *naturae institutae*; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum *naturae lapsae*[^18]. Deum esse honorandum, dictat natura secundum *omnem* statum; omnia esse communia, dictat secundum statum naturae institutae; aliquid esse proprium, dictat secundum *statum naturae lapsae* ad removendas contentiones et lites[^19]. Sic omnes homines esse servos Dei, dictat natura secundum omnem statum; hominem vero adaequari homini, dictat secundum statum suae primae conditionis; hominem autem homini subiici et hominem homini famulari, dictat secundum statum corruptionis, ut mali compescantur, et boni defendantur. Nisi enim essent huiusmodi dominia coercentia malos, propter corruptionem, quae est in natura, unus alterum opprimeret, et communiter homines vivere non possent. Non sic autem esset, si homo permansisset in statu innocentiae; quilibet enim in gradu et statu suo maneret. Et sic patet, quod illa ratio non concludit, quod servitus vel dominium respiciat naturam institutam, sed solum, quod respicit naturam lapsam, ubi ordo habet perturbari et potest per dominium conservari.

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin. And that it is in the first way, it seems:

1. Genesis 1[^1]: *Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him preside* etc. If you should say that he had preeminence with respect to the beasts, but not with respect to men; by this the difficulty is not escaped, because in 1 Corinthians 11[^2]: *The head of the woman is the man*: if therefore the head presides over the body and ought to govern the body, then it seems that according to the institution of nature there is a power of ruling in the human race.

2. Likewise, in the Angels, who are perfect in nature and in glory, there is not only order and grade according to the excellence of natural endowments, but also according to the presidency of offices[^3]: therefore it seems that lordship is not repugnant to, but consonant with, the institution of human nature, as also of angelic nature.

3. Likewise, the power of ruling is a property of dignity and nobility[^4]; but if anything of dignity belongs to fallen nature, much more does it belong to instituted nature: therefore it seems that the power of ruling pertained more to the state of instituted nature than to the state of fallen nature.

4. Likewise, everything that is for the conservation of the natural order pertains to the institution of nature; but the power of presiding pertains to the conservation of the natural order: therefore the power of presiding is in man from God according to the institution of nature. The major is manifest. The minor is proved by what Augustine says in the nineteenth book *On the City of God*[^5]: "Penal servitude is so ordained by that law which commands the natural order to be conserved and forbids it to be disturbed"; but the power of ruling and penal servitude are ordained to the same end: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Gregory[^6]: "He made all men equal by nature, but for their various merits the hidden, yet just, dispensation of God sets some over others": therefore it seems that subjection and preeminence are not in man according to the institution of nature.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the nineteenth book *On the City of God*[^7]: "God did not will that rational man, made to the image of God, should have lordship over any but the irrational creatures": therefore if the power of presiding and ruling is in one man with respect to another, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, by reason this same thing seems true. Liberty is in man from nature; but the power of ruling is an impediment to liberty: therefore it does not seem that it is from nature. And that liberty both is from nature and is liable to be impeded by the power of presiding, is manifested, because liberty is to be defined thus[^8]: "Liberty is the natural power by which it is permitted to a man to do what he wills."

4. Likewise, man according to his first condition was made to the image of God[^9]; but inasmuch as he is the image of God, he is born to be borne immediately into God: therefore if God alone is greater than he, then according to nature nothing is above man except God: therefore there is no lordship in man according to the institution of nature except only the divine lordship.

5. Likewise, there is no master without a servant, therefore neither lordship without servitude; but "servitude was introduced on account of sin," as Augustine says in many places[^10]: therefore it seems that the power of ruling in man is according to the condition of sin, not according to the institution of nature.

6. Likewise, in the glorification of men "the vices will be taken away, and nature will be preserved," according to what Augustine holds in the book *On the City of God*[^11]; but in the state of glory the lordship of preeminence and the subjection of servitude will not remain: therefore these do not seem to be in human nature according as it is instituted, but only according as it is fallen and vitiated.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The power of ruling, insofar as it means the power of coercing subjects, is in man only according to the state of fallen nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the power of ruling or of presiding is spoken of in three ways, namely, most broadly, commonly, and properly. Most broadly, the power of ruling is spoken of with respect to every thing which a man can use according to his pleasure and wish; and in this way a man is said to be the master of his possessions, whether movable or immovable. In another way the power of ruling or of presiding signifies an excellence of power in commanding one who is capable of reason and precept. In a third way the power of ruling is said to be the power of coercing subjects[^12]; and this power signifies a certain constraining of liberty; and such power of ruling is properly called *lordship*, to which *servitude* corresponds.

In the first way the power of ruling is common to every state, namely to the state of instituted nature and of fallen nature and of glorified nature; and it was in a more excellent way in the state of instituted nature than it is in the state of fallen nature. — In the second way it belongs to the state of the wayfarer, whether for the state of instituted nature or for the state of fallen nature. For if man had stood firm, the husband could have commanded the wife, and the father could have commanded the son. And this is found also in the Angels, as long as they are *ministering spirits*[^13], because on that side they are in some way in the state of the wayfarer. Yet this presidency will not remain in glory, as was shown in the preceding[^14]. — But in the third way the power of ruling in man is only according to the state of fallen nature; for it belongs to him according to the punishment of sin, not according to the institution of nature, and this because the servitude corresponding to it, according to what the Saints say, is a penalty of sin. — And because it is in this way that we here speak of the power of ruling, therefore those reasons are to be conceded which show that such a power is not in man according to his primary[^15] condition or according to the state of instituted nature.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the text of Genesis and from First Corinthians, the response is already clear; for they proceed about the power of presiding taken in the first and second way, not the third. For although the woman is in a certain way inferior to the man by reason of the weaker sex, nevertheless, because she was not created to be to him as a maidservant for assistance, but as a companion; hence it is that, although she is called his head, yet he is not called her master, because she is not his handmaid. And therefore the Master said above, in the eighteenth distinction[^16], that the woman was created for equality; and so she was formed from the side, not from the feet, nor from the head, that she might seem to be the man's companion, not his mistress, nor his handmaid.

2. To that which is objected, that preeminence is in the Angels: the response is already clear, because, although one presides over another and commands another and has authority over another to command him something which pertains to the office of ministry, nevertheless one Angel is not called the servant of another Angel; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the power of ruling, according as servitude corresponds to it, is in man according to the condition of nature.

3. To that which is objected, that lordship is a property of dignity; it must be said that although it is a property of *dignity* in him who presides, yet it signifies *unworthiness* in him who is subject; and therefore it can naturally belong to a man with respect to another, inferior creature, but with respect to another man it does not belong naturally, but in a certain way preternaturally, namely as a punishment of sin; for as Ambrose says[^17]: "Servitude was introduced through the sin of drunkenness."

4. To that which is objected, that lordship and servitude conduce to the conservation of the natural order; it must be said that there is an order which regards nature according to *every* state; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of *its own condition*; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of *its own corruption*. And accordingly some things are of the dictate of nature *simply*; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of *instituted nature*; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of *fallen nature*[^18]. That God is to be honored, nature dictates according to *every* state; that all things be in common, it dictates according to the state of instituted nature; that something be private property, it dictates according to *the state of fallen nature*, to remove contentions and disputes[^19]. Thus that all men are servants of God, nature dictates according to every state; but that man be made equal to man, it dictates according to the state of his first condition; but that man be subjected to man and that man serve man, it dictates according to the state of corruption, so that the wicked may be checked and the good defended. For unless there were such lordships coercing the wicked, on account of the corruption which is in nature, one would oppress another, and men could not commonly live together. But it would not be so, if man had remained in the state of innocence; for each one would remain in his own grade and state. And thus it is clear that that reason does not conclude that servitude or lordship regards instituted nature, but only that it regards fallen nature, where the order is liable to be disturbed and can be conserved through lordship.

---

la: Vers. 26.

en: Verse 26.

la: Vers. 3. — Pro *evadetur* cod. F substituit *evades*.

en: Verse 3. — For *evadetur* codex F substitutes *evades*.

la: Ut supra d. 9. per totam ostensum est. — Mox pro *non* cod. T habet *nec*.

en: As was shown throughout above in distinction 9. — Presently, for *non* codex T has *nec*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Polit. c. 4. et 12. (c. 11. seq.). — Subinde pro *aliquid* codd. L O *aliquis status*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Politics* III, c. 4 and 12 (c. 11 ff.). — Thereupon, for *aliquid* codices L O read *aliquis status*.

en: Chapter 15.

la: Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22: *Omnes homines natura aequales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis dispensatio occulta postponit. Ipsa autem diversitas, quae accessit ex vitio, recte est divinis iudiciis ordinata, ut, quia omnis homo iter vitae aeque non graditur, alter ab altero regatur.* Cfr. ibid. XXVI. c. 26. n. 46. — In fine arg. pro *institutionem naturae* codd. C F K R S T ee *constitutionem naturae*.

en: *Morals* book XXI, c. 15, n. 22: "He begot all men equal by nature, but, the order of merits varying, the hidden dispensation sets some after others. But that very diversity, which came in from vice, is rightly ordained by the divine judgments, so that, because not every man treads the path of life equally, one may be governed by another." Cf. ibid. XXVI, c. 26, n. 46. — At the end of the argument, for *institutionem naturae* codices C F K R S T ee read *constitutionem naturae*.

la: Cap. 15. — Paulo inferius in cod. T desunt verba *et dominandi*.

en: Chapter 15. — A little below, in codex T the words *et dominandi* are wanting.

la: Iustiniani, I. Institut. iur. civ. c. 3. § Et libertas: *Et libertas quidem (ex qua etiam liberi vocantur) est naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure prohibetur.* — In definitione allata post *quod vult* supplendum esse videtur *quod* loc. cit. sequitur. — Loc. cit. § seq. de servitute dicitur: «Servitus autem est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subiicitur». Sententiam Aristot. de hac re vide in eius I. Polit. c. 3. seq. (c. 2.).

en: Justinian, *Institutes of Civil Law* I, c. 3, § "And liberty": "And liberty indeed (from which men are also called free) is the natural faculty of doing what each one pleases, unless something is prohibited by force or by law." — In the definition cited, after *quod vult* there seems to be supplied *quod*, which follows in the place cited. — In the place cited, in the following §, concerning servitude it is said: "But servitude is an institution of the law of nations, by which one is, against nature, subjected to another's lordship." For Aristotle's opinion on this matter see his *Politics* I, c. 3 ff. (c. 2).

la: Gen. 1, 26. — De minori cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., et de prima conclusione vide supra pag. 45, nota 5.

en: Genesis 1:26. — On the minor cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, and on the first conclusion see above page 45, note 5.

la: Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15; XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 37. n. 50; I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 153. — Sententia propos. *maioris* ab August., V. de Trin. c. 16. n. 17. sic exprimitur: *Sicut autem non potest esse servus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet servum.*

en: *On the City of God* book XIX, c. 15; *On Genesis to the Letter* XI, c. 37, n. 50; *Questions on the Pentateuch* I, q. 153. — The proposition of the *major* is thus expressed by Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 16, n. 17: "But just as there cannot be a servant who has no master, so neither a master who has no servant."

la: Libr. XXII. c. 17. Cfr. ibid. c. 19. n. 2. — Paulo ante pro *hominum* Vat. et ed. 1 *hominis*, edd. 2, 3 *homini*.

en: Book XXII, c. 17. Cf. ibid. c. 19, n. 2. — A little before, for *hominum* the Vatican edition and ed. 1 read *hominis*, edd. 2, 3 *homini*.

la: Secundum Boeth., cuius verba videsis supra pag. 69, nota 10. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 12, ubi ad dominationem tria requiri docetur: superioritas sive excellentia gradus, possessio bonorum et immutabilis firmitas i. e. potestas continendi et coercendi. — Paulo superius post *potestas dominandi* Vat. adiicit *sive praesidendi*.

en: According to Boethius, whose words you may see above on page 69, note 10. Cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 12, where it is taught that three things are required for lordship: superiority or excellence of grade, possession of goods, and unchangeable firmness, i.e. the power of restraining and coercing. — A little above, after *potestas dominandi* the Vatican edition adds *sive praesidendi*.

la: Hebr. 1, 14. — Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 37. n. 50, et I. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 153: *Est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut serviant feminae viris... quia et illic haec iustitia est, ut infirmior ratio serviat fortiori.*

en: Hebrews 1:14. — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* XI, c. 37, n. 50, and *Questions on the Pentateuch* I, q. 153: "There is also a natural order in men, that women should serve their husbands... because there too this is justice, that the weaker reason should serve the stronger."

la: Dist. 9. q. 6. — Cfr. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 16.

en: Distinction 9, q. 6. — Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 16.

la: Cod. T *sui*.

en: Codex T reads *sui*.

la: Cap. 2. Cfr. ibid. Comment. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Chapter 2. Cf. ibid. the Commentary, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Libr. de Elia et ieiunio, c. 5. n. 11: *Non esset hodie servitus, si ebrietas non fuisset.*

en: Book *On Elijah and Fasting*, c. 5, n. 11: "There would be no servitude today, if drunkenness had not existed."

la: In hac ultima propositione codd. et primae edd. non modice discrepant a nostra lectione, quae est etiam Vaticanae. Plerique enim codd. cum primis edd. omittunt verba *naturae institutae; quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum statum naturae lapsae*, terminantes propositionem verbis *secundum statum*; cod. W loco verborum istorum omissorum posuit *istum vel illum* et dein prosequitur *Nam Deum esse* etc.; denique cod. H textum sic formavit (post *simpliciter*): *quaedam de dictamine naturae secundum omnem statum, ut Deum esse* etc.

en: In this last proposition the codices and the first editions differ not a little from our reading, which is also that of the Vatican edition. For most of the codices, together with the first editions, omit the words *naturae institutae; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of fallen nature*, ending the proposition with the words *according to the state*; codex W in place of these omitted words put *this or that* and then continues *For that God is* etc.; finally codex H formed the text thus (after *simply*): *some of the dictate of nature according to every state, that God is* etc.

la: Cfr. Iac. 4, 1. seq. Cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi Platonis doctrina de communitate bonorum impugnatur.

en: Cf. James 4:1 ff. Cf. also Aristotle, *Politics* II, c. 3 (c. 2), where Plato's doctrine on the community of goods is attacked.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops of printed pp.1007–1009 (PDF 1029–1031, offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 69937–70067). Running heads confirmed via crops: p.1007 `DIST. XLIV. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 1007`; p.1008 `1008 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; p.1009 `DIST. XLIV. ART. III. QUAEST. I. 1009`. Body layout: q2 opener (`Secundo quaeritur…`) + fund. 1–3 in p.1007 L-col; fund. 4 + Sed contra 1–3 in p.1007 R-col (the R-col *top* holds the tail of a2-q1's SCHOLION, NOT q2 — the hand-off's "q2 starts R-col" referred to that scholion seam; q2's own opener is L-col). Respondeo + Conclusiones span p.1008; replies 1–4 span p.1008 R-col → p.1009.

**No scholion** — a2-q1's Scholion II (`Quod attinet sequentem quaest.…`) covers this question; `has_scholion: false`.

**Apparatus page-split map (19 entries, per-page footer restart):**
- **p.1007** L-col footers 1–6 + R-col footer 7 = `[^1]`–`[^7]` (**PICKED UP per hand-off — a2-q1 consumed NONE of the p.1007 footers; q1's body ended in the SCHOLION carrying only the lettered "a" source-note**). The p.1007 R-col footer 6 (`Libr. XXI. Moral.`, Gregory) tail runs into the R-col bottom; footer 7 = the `Cap. 15. — Paulo inferius in cod. T desunt verba et dominandi` note on Sed-contra-2.
- **p.1008** footers 1–9 = `[^8]`–`[^16]` (L-col 1–3 = `[^8]`–`[^10]`; R-col 4–9 = `[^11]`–`[^16]`).
- **p.1009** L-col footers 1–3 = `[^17]`–`[^19]` (reply-3 Ambrose note + reply-4 variant note + reply-4 Iac./Aristot. note). **p.1009 R-col footers 4–9 belong to ARTICULUS III / a3-q1** — forwarded, NOT claimed here.

**Hand-offs forwarded → d44-a3-q1:** see resume.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR + crops clean; every reading confirmed line-by-line against the column bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 44, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 1009 -->

### Articulus III. *De necessitate subiacendi potentiae praesidendi.*

Consequenter quaeritur de necessitate subiacendi potentiae[^1] praesidendi[^2]. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Christiani teneantur subiacere tyrannis in aliquibus.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum religiosi teneantur subiacere praelatis suis in omnibus.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Christiani teneantur subesse tyrannis sive potestati saeculari in aliquibus.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christiani teneantur subesse tyrannis sive potestati saeculari in aliquibus. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. *Primae Petri* secundo[^3]: *Servi, subditi estote in omni timore dominis, non tantum bonis et modestis, sed etiam discolis.*

2. Item, *ad Romanos* decimo tertio[^4]: *Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit*; et post: *Reddite omnibus debita, cui tributum tributum, cui vectigal vectigal.* Et si tu dicas, quod haec est admonitio propter scandalum vitandum; contra: paulo ante[^5]: *Necessitate subditi estote, non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam.*

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quam Apostolus facit ibidem[^6]. *Non est*, inquit, *potestas nisi a Deo; sed quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt*: ergo omnis potestas ordinata est ordinatione divina: *itaque qui resistit potestati Dei ordinationi resistit; sed qui resistit ordinationi Dei damnationem sibi acquirit*: ergo etc.

<!-- page 1010 -->
4. Item, servire homini non est culpa nec malum, immo meritorium[^7]: ergo videtur, quod ab illa servitute non absolvatur per baptismum: ergo sicut non-Christiani servi sunt aliorum, ita, etiamsi Christiani fiant, servire tenentur.

5. Item, ad hoc ipsum sunt multae auctoritates, quae possunt sumi quasi ab omnibus Epistolis[^8] beati Pauli, in quibus monet servos subiacere dominis suis.

**Sed contra:** 1. *Matthaei* decimo septimo[^9]: *Reges terrae a quibus accipiunt censum? a filiis, an ab alienis?* et post infra: *Ergo liberi sunt filii*; et Glossa ibi: «*Liberi sunt filii regni in omni regno, multo magis liberi sunt filii illius regni, sub quo sunt omnia regna in quolibet regno terreno*»: si ergo boni Christiani sunt filii regni illius, videtur, quod sub nullius regis terreni potestate sint astricti: ergo non tenentur ei subesse in aliquo tributo.

2. Item, *Iacobi* primo[^10]: *Qui autem prospexerit in lege perfectae libertatis*; Glossa exponit, quod «*lex perfectae libertatis est lex Evangelica*»: ergo si perfecta libertas liberat ab omni servitute, videtur, quod omnis qui inhaeret legi Evangelii, absolutus sit ab omni servitute regis terreni.

3. Item, caritas omnia membra Christi facit unum et omnia facit communia; unde *primae ad Corinthios* tertio[^11]: *Omnia vestra sunt, sive mors, sive vita* etc. Omnia facit unum, quia dicit Apostolus et ad Ephesios et ad Colossenses: *Omnes unum sumus in Christo, nec est distinctio servi et liberi*: ergo si caritas reducit omnia membra ad aequalitatem et communitatem, videtur igitur, quod in habentibus caritatem non sit aliqua obligatio servitutis.

4. Item, maius est vinculum legis divinae, quam sit vinculum constitutionis humanae; sed lex Evangelica absolvit ab onere servitutis legalis, quae quidem a Deo per Moysen lata fuerat[^12]: ergo multo fortius absolvit ab onere humanae servitutis et legis civilis.

5. Item, Anselmus in libro: *Cur Deus homo*, capitulo quinto[^13]: «*Per se redimere voluit, ut in pristinam redigeret libertatem, et sibi homo subiectus esset, non homini*»: si ergo *empti sumus pretio magno*, videlicet *sanguine agni incontaminati et immaculati*; videtur, quod ipsius solius servi simus: ergo non videtur, quod vir christianus, qui renatus est in Christo, astrictus sit alicui servituti terreni imperii.

### Conclusio

> Christiani terrenis dominis sunt obligati, non tamen in omnibus, sed solum in his quae non sunt contra Deum, et quae secundum rectam consuetudinem rationabiliter statuta sunt.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum servitus opponatur libertati, secundum quod triplex dicitur esse libertas, videlicet a coactione et a culpa et a miseria[^14]; sic servitus potest dici tripliciter, quae attenditur in libertatis arctatione. Secundum enim arctationem libertatis a culpa attenditur servitus peccati, de qua *Ioannis* octavo[^15]: *Qui facit peccatum servus est peccati*; et *ad Romanos* sexto: *Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore.* — Secundum vero arctationem libertatis a miseria attenditur servitus poenae et mortis, de qua dicitur *ad Romanos* sexto[^16]: *Christus resurgens a mortuis iam non moritur, mors illi ultra non dominabitur.* — Secundum autem arctationem libertatis a coactione attenditur servitus conditionis, de qua dicitur *primae ad Corinthios* septimo[^17]: *Servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae; sed et si potes liber fieri, magis utere.* Haec autem servitus attenditur in coarctatione libertatis a coactione, non quantum ad interiorem motum voluntatis, quae cogi non potest, sed quantum ad exteriorem[^18]. Unde et servitus introducta fuit in hoc, quod unus alterum vicit et servituti suae addixit, ut non liceat facere contrarium eius quod ipse mandaverit.

Cum igitur triplex sit servitus, una habet ortum ab altera; nam non esset servitus poenae, nisi praecessisset servitus culpae; nec servitus conditionis subsequeretur, nisi illa duplex praecederet. Cum ergo aliquis regeneratur in Christo et efficitur Christianus, liberatur a servitute peccati; sed tamen non sic liberatur, quin etiam possibilitatem et facilitatem et pronitatem habeat redeundi in idem genus servitutis; et hinc est, quod propter eius promotionem et humiliationem relinquit Dominus eidem[^19] servitutem mortis et conditionis. Unde ita moriuntur Christiani, sicut et alii; et propter pronitatem ad malum et concupiscentias militantes in membris, ex quibus consurgunt bella et lites[^20], ita indigent regi terreno principe, sicut et aliae gentes — et ideo non solum secundum humanam institutionem, sed etiam secundum divinam dispensationem inter Christianos sunt reges et principes, domini et servi — et secundum distinctionem potestatis ei subiiciuntur et tenentur secundum plus et minus. Et hoc ipse Dominus dicit *Matthaei* vigesimo secundo[^21]: *Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et quae sunt Dei Deo.* Et Apostolus *primae ad Timotheum* ultimo hoc docet et contrarium praedicantes condemnat. Ait enim sic: *Quicumque sunt sub iugo servitutis, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen Domini et doctrina blasphemetur. Si quis autem aliter docet et non acquiescit sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Iesu Christi, superbus est, nihil sciens* etc. Et hoc ipsum probat *ad Romanos* decimo tertio[^22], et in pluribus aliis locis docet et mandat. — Et ideo concedendum est, quod Christiani sunt terrenis dominis obligati, non tamen in omnibus, sed in his solum, quae non sunt contra Deum; nec in his omnibus, sed in his quae secundum rectam consuetudinem rationabiliter statuta sunt, sicut tributa et vectigalia et consimilia. — Unde auctoritates et rationes, quae hoc probant, concedendae sunt.

<!-- page 1011 -->
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de textu et Glossa, decimo septimo Matthaei, dicendum, quod textus intelligit de Christo, quod Christus non tenebatur reddere tributum, et de his qui sunt eius imitatores perfecti, utpote de Apostolis, pro eo quod naturaliter erant liberi et omnia bona temporalia dimiserant[^23]; et ideo censum vel tributum ab eis reges terrae accipere non debebant. In aliis autem Christianis, vel qui sunt servilis conditionis, vel qui abundant temporalibus bonis, illa auctoritas non habet intelligi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex Evangelica est lex perfectae libertatis; dicendum, quod ideo dicitur lex perfectae libertatis, quia liberat a servitute praevaricationis, sive etiam a servitute Legis, dum in ea datur spiritus caritatis, qui est spiritus libertatis secundum id quod dicit Apostolus *ad Romanos* octavo[^24]: *Non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum*; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod homo, qui est sub lege Evangelii, sit liberatus a servitute terreni dominii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas omnia unit et communia facit; dicendum, quod hoc verum est per quandam *participationem*, sed non est verum per *dominii auctoritatem*[^25]. Omnes etiam unit, sed hoc est secundum *affectionem*, non secundum *gradus et dignitatis indistinctionem*; nam in corpore Christi magna est membrorum distinctio, quamvis quantum ad conformitatem affectionum magna sit unio[^26].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod absolvit lex Evangelica ab onere legis Moysaicae, ergo multo fortius a lege humana; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lex ista legem illam implet et evacuat, tanquam veritas figuram[^27]. Non sic autem est de lege institutionis humanae, quae multum adiuvat ad observantiam legis divinae. Unde et Apostolus mandat rogari pro principibus, *primae ad Timotheum* secundo[^28]: *ut quietam et tranquillam vitam sub eis agamus.*

<!-- page 1012 -->
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus ideo per se redimere voluit, ut in pristinam libertatem redigeret; dicendum, quod ibi notatur effectus plenus redemptionis factae per Christum. Sed tamen illum effectum non plene assequimur in praesenti, quousque *creatura ingemiscit et parturit, donec liberetur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei*[^29]. Unde hic inchoatur libertas a *culpa*, sed ibi consummabitur libertas a *miseria* et ab omni potestate humana. Unde non sequitur, quod si sumus empti a Christo, quod propter hoc non simus servi alterius, quia dominium Christi bene compatitur secum dominium hominis, in his maxime, qui nihil iubent contra Deum; sed non compatitur secum dominium diaboli vel peccati, secundum illud *Matthaei* sexto[^30]: *Non potestis duobus dominis servire.* Ideo quamvis redemptione Christi eruamur a servitute mortalis peccati, non tamen eruimur a servitute conditionis, vel mortis.

english:
### Article III. *On the necessity of being subject to the power that presides.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the necessity of being subject to the power[^1] that presides[^2]. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether Christians are bound to be subject to tyrants in some things.

Second it is asked, whether religious are bound to be subject to their prelates in all things.

### Question I. *Whether Christians are bound to be subject to tyrants or to the secular power in some things.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christians are bound to be subject to tyrants or to the secular power in some things. And that they are, it seems.

1. *First Peter*, chapter two[^3]: *Servants, be subject in all fear to your masters, not only to the good and the gentle, but also to the froward.*

2. Likewise, *to the Romans*, chapter thirteen[^4]: *Let every soul be subject to the higher powers*; and afterwards: *Render to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom.* And if you say that this is an admonition for the sake of avoiding scandal; on the contrary, a little before[^5]: *Be subject of necessity, not only because of wrath, but also for conscience' sake.*

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the reason which the Apostle makes in the same place[^6]. *There is no power*, he says, *but from God; but the things that are from God are ordained*: therefore every power is ordained by divine ordination: *and so he who resists the power resists the ordinance of God; but he who resists the ordinance of God acquires damnation to himself*: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to serve a man is neither fault nor evil, nay rather it is meritorious[^7]: therefore it seems that one is not absolved from that servitude through baptism: therefore just as non-Christians are servants of others, so too, even if they become Christians, they are bound to serve.

5. Likewise, to this same effect there are many authorities, which may be drawn as it were from all the Epistles[^8] of blessed Paul, in which he admonishes servants to be subject to their masters.

**On the contrary:** 1. *Matthew*, chapter seventeen[^9]: *Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute? of their own children, or of strangers?* and afterwards below: *Then the children are free*; and the Gloss there: «*The children of the kingdom are free in every kingdom; much more are the children of that kingdom free, under which are all kingdoms in any earthly kingdom whatever*»: if therefore good Christians are children of that kingdom, it seems that they are bound under the power of no earthly king: therefore they are not bound to be subject to him in any tribute.

2. Likewise, *James*, chapter one[^10]: *But he who has looked into the law of perfect liberty*; the Gloss explains that «*the law of perfect liberty is the law of the Gospel*»: therefore if perfect liberty frees from all servitude, it seems that everyone who cleaves to the law of the Gospel is absolved from all servitude to an earthly king.

3. Likewise, charity makes all the members of Christ one and makes all things common; whence *first to the Corinthians*, chapter three[^11]: *All things are yours, whether death, or life* etc. It makes all things one, because the Apostle says both to the Ephesians and to the Colossians: *We are all one in Christ, nor is there distinction of servant and free*: therefore if charity reduces all members to equality and community, it seems then that in those who have charity there is no obligation of servitude.

4. Likewise, the bond of the divine law is greater than the bond of human constitution; but the law of the Gospel absolves from the burden of legal servitude, which indeed had been laid down by God through Moses[^12]: therefore much more strongly does it absolve from the burden of human servitude and of the civil law.

5. Likewise, Anselm in the book *Why God Became Man*, chapter five[^13]: «*He willed to redeem by himself, that he might restore [man] to his pristine liberty, and that man might be subject to himself, not to a man*»: if therefore *we are bought with a great price*, namely *with the blood of a lamb unspotted and undefiled*; it seems that we are servants of him alone: therefore it does not seem that a Christian man, who is reborn in Christ, is bound to any servitude of an earthly empire.

### Conclusion

> Christians are obligated to earthly masters, yet not in all things, but only in those which are not against God, and which according to right custom have been reasonably established.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since servitude is opposed to liberty, according as liberty is said to be threefold, namely from coercion and from fault and from misery[^14]; so servitude can be spoken of in three ways, which is considered in the restriction of liberty. For according to the restriction of liberty from fault there is considered the servitude of sin, of which *John*, chapter eight[^15]: *He who commits sin is the servant of sin*; and *to the Romans*, chapter six: *Let not sin reign in your mortal body.* — But according to the restriction of liberty from misery there is considered the servitude of punishment and of death, of which it is said *to the Romans*, chapter six[^16]: *Christ rising from the dead dies now no more, death shall no more have dominion over him.* — But according to the restriction of liberty from coercion there is considered the servitude of condition, of which it is said *first to the Corinthians*, chapter seven[^17]: *Were you called as a servant? care not for it; but if you can be made free, use it rather.* And this servitude is considered in the restriction of liberty from coercion, not as to the interior motion of the will, which cannot be coerced, but as to the exterior[^18]. Whence servitude too was introduced in this, that one conquered another and bound him to his own servitude, so that it is not permitted to do the contrary of what he himself has commanded.

Since therefore servitude is threefold, one takes its origin from another; for there would be no servitude of punishment, unless the servitude of fault had preceded; nor would the servitude of condition follow, unless that twofold one preceded. When therefore someone is regenerated in Christ and becomes a Christian, he is freed from the servitude of sin; but yet he is not so freed that he does not also have the possibility and the facility and the proneness of returning to the same kind of servitude; and hence it is that, on account of his advancement and humiliation, the Lord leaves to him[^19] the servitude of death and of condition. Whence Christians die just as others do; and on account of the proneness to evil and the concupiscences warring in their members, from which arise wars and strifes[^20], they need an earthly ruling prince, just as do other peoples — and therefore not only according to human institution, but also according to divine dispensation among Christians there are kings and princes, masters and servants — and according to the distinction of power they are subjected to him and bound according to more and less. And this the Lord himself says, *Matthew*, chapter twenty-two[^21]: *Render the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God.* And the Apostle in *first to Timothy*, the last [chapter], teaches this and condemns those who preach the contrary. For he says thus: *Whoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them count their masters worthy of all honor, lest the name of the Lord and the doctrine be blasphemed. But if anyone teaches otherwise and does not acquiesce in the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ, he is proud, knowing nothing* etc. And this same thing he proves *to the Romans*, chapter thirteen[^22], and in many other places he teaches and commands. — And therefore it must be granted that Christians are obligated to earthly masters, yet not in all things, but in those alone which are not against God; nor in all these, but in those which according to right custom have been reasonably established, such as tributes and customs and the like. — Whence the authorities and reasons which prove this are to be granted.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first concerning the text and the Gloss, the seventeenth of Matthew, it must be said that the text is to be understood of Christ, that Christ was not bound to render tribute, and of those who are his perfect imitators, such as the Apostles, for the reason that they were naturally free and had given up all temporal goods[^23]; and therefore the kings of the earth ought not to receive census or tribute from them. But in other Christians, either those who are of servile condition, or those who abound in temporal goods, that authority is not to be understood.

2. To that which is objected, that the law of the Gospel is the law of perfect liberty; it must be said that it is therefore called the law of perfect liberty, because it frees from the servitude of transgression, or even from the servitude of the Law, since in it is given the spirit of charity, which is the spirit of liberty according to what the Apostle says *to the Romans*, chapter eight[^24]: *You have not received the spirit of servitude again in fear, but the spirit of the adoption of sons*; and therefore from this it does not follow that a man who is under the law of the Gospel is freed from the servitude of earthly dominion.

3. To that which is objected, that charity unites all and makes [all things] common; it must be said that this is true through a certain *participation*, but it is not true through *the authority of dominion*[^25]. It also unites all, but this is according to *affection*, not according to *an indistinction of grade and dignity*; for in the body of Christ there is a great distinction of members, although as to the conformity of affections there is a great union[^26].

4. To that which is objected, that the law of the Gospel absolves from the burden of the Mosaic law, therefore much more strongly from human law; it must be said that it is not the same, because this law fulfills and empties that one, as truth does a figure[^27]. But it is not so with the law of human institution, which greatly helps toward the observance of the divine law. Whence the Apostle too commands that prayer be made for princes, *first to Timothy*, chapter two[^28]: *that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life under them.*

5. To that which is objected, that Christ therefore willed to redeem by himself, that he might restore [man] to his pristine liberty; it must be said that there is noted the full effect of the redemption made by Christ. But yet we do not fully attain that effect in the present, so long as *the creature groans and travails, until it be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God*[^29]. Whence here liberty from *fault* is begun, but there liberty from *misery* and from all human power will be consummated. Whence it does not follow that, if we are bought by Christ, on account of this we are not servants of another, because the dominion of Christ is well compatible with the dominion of a man, especially in those who command nothing against God; but it is not compatible with the dominion of the devil or of sin, according to that of *Matthew*, chapter six[^30]: *You cannot serve two masters.* Therefore although by the redemption of Christ we are rescued from the servitude of mortal sin, we are not yet rescued from the servitude of condition, or of death.

la: August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15: *Nullus autem natura, in qua prius Deus hominem condidit, servus est hominis aut peccati. Verum et poenalis servitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari iubet, perturbari vetat; quia si contra eam legem non esset factum, nihil esset poenali servitute coercendum.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 15: *But no one is by nature — in which God first created man — a servant of man or of sin. Moreover the penal servitude too is ordained by that law which bids the natural order be preserved and forbids it to be disturbed; for if nothing had been done against that law, there would be nothing to be coerced by penal servitude.* — See the scholion to the preceding question. (This note belongs by anchor to the close of the preceding question, a2-q2; it is rendered here as the lead of the inherited p.1009 R-col footer block — see Notes.)

la: Vat. *praesidenti*. Codd. H T W et alii nec non ed. 1 omittunt paulo inferius *in aliquibus*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *praesidenti*. Codices H, T, W and others, as well as ed. 1, omit a little below *in aliquibus*.

la: Vers. 18.

la: Vers. 1. — Seq. loc. Script. est ibid. v. 7.

en: Verse 1. — The following scriptural passage is in the same place, v. 7. (Romans 13:1, 7.)

la: Loc. cit. v. 5.

en: Loc. cit., v. 5. (Romans 13:5.)

la: Rom. 13, 1. seq. Ita fere legitur in pluribus antiquis edd. Vulgatae; nunc autem: *quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.* — Paulo inferius pro *itaque* edd. (excepta 1, quae habet *sed*) substituunt *ita quod*.

en: Romans 13:1 ff. So it is read in nearly the same way in many old editions of the Vulgate; but now: *but the things that are, are ordained by God.* — A little below, for *itaque* the editions (except ed. 1, which has *sed*) substitute *ita quod*.

en: Cf. James 4:1 ff. Cf. also Aristotle, *Politics* II, c. 3 (c. 2), where Plato's doctrine concerning the community of goods is impugned.

en: Ephesians 6:5; Colossians 3:22; Titus 2:9.

la: Vers. 24. In Vulg. ante *censum* habetur *tributum vel*. — Seq. loc. Script. est ibid. v. 25. — Glossa, in qua Vat. et nonnulli codd. pro *illius regni* substituunt *illius regis*, est ordinaria et habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. Mox pro *nullius regis* codd. B bb exhibent *nullius regni*, ut Vat., omissa vocula *sub*, quae vocula etiam in ceteris edd. desideratur, cum edd. 3, 4 pro *potestate* ponit *potestati*.

en: Verse 24. In the Vulgate before *census* stands *tribute or*. — The following scriptural passage is in the same place, v. 25. — The Gloss, in which the Vatican edition and several codices for *of that kingdom* substitute *of that king*, is the ordinary Gloss and is found in Strabus and Lyranus. Shortly, for *of no king* codices B and bb give *of no kingdom*, as the Vatican edition, the word *under* being omitted, which word is also lacking in the other editions, while editions 3, 4 for *power* (abl.) put *power* (dat.).

la: Vers. 25. Vulgata et Vat. cum paucis codd. *perspexerit* pro *prospexerit*, et pro *in lege perfectae libertatis* Vulgata *in legem perfectam libertatis*. Glossa est ordinaria apud Lyranum.

en: Verse 25. The Vulgate and the Vatican edition, with a few codices, read *perspexerit* for *prospexerit*, and for *into the law of perfect liberty* the Vulgate has *into the perfect law of liberty*. The Gloss is the ordinary one in Lyranus.

la: Vers. 22. — Ex Epist. ad Ephes. huc pertinent 2, 14. seqq. et 4, 4. seqq., ex Epist. ad Coloss. verba illa omnibus nota (3, 11.): «*Ubi non est Gentilis et Iudaeus... servus et liber, sed omnia et in omnibus Christus*». Similiter Apostolus loquitur Gal. 3, 28: *Non est Iudaeus neque Graecus, non est servus neque liber... Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Iesu.*

en: Verse 22. — From the Epistle to the Ephesians there belong here 2:14 ff. and 4:4 ff.; from the Epistle to the Colossians those words known to all (3:11): «*Where there is not Gentile and Jew... servant and free, but Christ is all and in all*». Similarly the Apostle speaks in Galatians 3:28: *There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither servant nor free... for you are all one in Christ Jesus.*

la: Cfr. Act. 15, 5. seqq.

en: Cf. Acts 15:5 ff.

la: Liber. I. c. 5: *An non intelligis, quia quaecumque alia persona [praeter personam divinam] hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius servus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod si esset, nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non peccasset; cum ipse, qui non nisi Dei servus et aequalis Angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius qui Deus non esset, et cuius Angeli servi non essent.* — *Minor* huius arg. sumta est ex 1. Cor. 6, 20. et 1. Petr. 1, 19, ubi Vulgata pro *sanguine agni incontaminati et immaculati* habet *sanguine quasi agni immaculati Christi et incontaminati.*

en: Book I, c. 5: *Do you not understand that whatever other person [besides the divine person] should redeem man from eternal death, the same man would rightly be judged that person's servant? And if that were so, he would in no way be restored to that dignity which he was to have had if he had not sinned; since he who was to be the servant of God alone and equal to the good angels in all things, would be the servant of one who was not God, and whose servants the angels were not.* — The *minor* of this argument is taken from 1 Corinthians 6:20 and 1 Peter 1:19, where the Vulgate, for *with the blood of a lamb unspotted and undefiled*, has *with the blood, as it were, of an unspotted and undefiled lamb, [namely] Christ.*

la: August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13: *Et utique felicius servitur homini quam libidini, cum saevissimo dominatu vastet corda mortalium, ut alias omittam, libido ipsa dominandi. Hominibus autem illo pacis ordine, quo aliis alii subiecti sunt, sicut prodest humilitas servientibus, ita nocet superbia dominantibus.* — Paulo inferius post *absolvatur* cod. O supplet *quis*.

en: Augustine, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 13: *And surely it is happier to serve a man than lust, since lust itself — to omit other matters — lays waste the hearts of mortals with most savage dominion, the very lust of domination. But for men, by that order of peace by which some are subjected to others, just as humility profits those who serve, so pride harms those who dominate.* — A little below, after *absolvatur* codex O supplies *quis*.

la: Vers. 34. — Seq. loc. Script. est Rom. 6, 12.

en: Verse 34 (John 8:34). — The following scriptural passage is Romans 6:12.

la: Vers. 9. Vulgata: *ex mortuis*.

en: Verse 9 (Romans 6:9). The Vulgate: *from the dead*.

la: Vers. 21. — Pro *primae ad Corinthios* codd. et primae edd. perperam exhibent *ad Romanos*.

en: Verse 21 (1 Corinthians 7:21). — For *first to the Corinthians* the codices and the first editions wrongly give *to the Romans*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. p. II. q. 4. seq. — Unde servitus originem duxit (de quo in seqq. sermo est), inde et in lingua Latina nomen *servi* derivatum esse vult August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15: *Origo autem vocabuli servorum in Latina lingua inde creditur ducta, quod hi qui iure belli possent occidi, a victoribus cum servabantur, servi fiebant, a servando appellati.* — Paulo post pro *addixit* codd. C F K O S et edd. 1, 2 *adduxit*.

en: Cf. above d. 23, p. II, q. 4 f. — Whence servitude took its origin (of which there is discourse in what follows), thence also in the Latin tongue the name *servus* is derived, as Augustine holds, *On the City of God* XIX, c. 15: *But the origin of the word for servants in the Latin tongue is believed to be drawn from this, that those who by the law of war could have been killed, when they were preserved by the victors, became servants (servi), being so named from being preserved (servando).* — Shortly after, for *addixit* codices C F K O S and editions 1, 2 read *adduxit*.

la: Pro *eidem* codd. B C I K R S (T a prima manu) V ee *idem*, codd. D M W *hominem*, cod. L *eundem*, cod. O (P a secunda manu) *eum*. Codd. E F Q (T a secunda manu) bb et edd. 1, 2, omissa voce *eidem*, pro *servitutem* substituunt (cum cod. P) *sub servitute*, codd. I L W exhibent *in servitute*. Paulo ante pro *relinquit* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 habet *reliquit*, et paulo inferius post *et conditionis* codd. D W addunt *servilis, ut et mori necesse habeat et dominio possit arceri.*

en: For *to him (eidem)* codices B C I K R S (T by a first hand) V ee read *idem*, codices D M W *the man*, codex L *the same (eundem)*, codex O (P by a second hand) *him*. Codices E F Q (T by a second hand) bb and editions 1, 2, omitting the word *eidem*, for *servitude* substitute (with codex P) *under servitude*, while codices I L W give *in servitude*. A little before, for *leaves (relinquit)* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 has *left (reliquit)*, and a little below after *and of condition* codices D W add *servile, so that he must both die of necessity and can be restrained by dominion.*

la: Epist. Iac. 4, 1: *Unde bella et lites in vobis? Nonne hinc? ex concupiscentiis vestris, quae militant in membris vestris?*

en: Epistle of James 4:1: *Whence are wars and strifes among you? Are they not hence? from your concupiscences, which war in your members?*

la: Vers. 21. — Seq. verbum Apostoli habetur loc. cit. v. 1, 3. seq. Vulgata post *Iesu Christi* addit *et ei quae secundum pietatem est doctrinae.*

en: Verse 21 (Matthew 22:21). — The following word of the Apostle is found in the place cited, v. 1, 3 ff. The Vulgate, after *Jesus Christ*, adds *and to that doctrine which is according to godliness.*

la: Vers. 1. — De aliis Script. locis lectorem remittimus ad notam 2, pag. 1010.

en: Verse 1 (Romans 13:1). — For the other scriptural passages we refer the reader to note 2, p. 1010.

la: Matth. 19, 27: *Ecce nos reliquimus omnia.* Cfr. Ambros., IX. Expos. in Luc. n. 35, ubi ait: *Cur dedit [Christus] censum? Non de suo dedit, sed reddit mundo quod erat mundi. Et tu, si vis non esse obnoxius Caesari, noli habere quae mundi sunt; sed si habes divitias, obnoxius es Caesari. Si vis nihil regi debere terreno, relinque omnia tua et sequere Christum.* — Paulo superius pro *tenebatur* cod. T substituit *tenetur*, et in fine arg. non habet locum nec *intelligi* pro *non habet intelligi*.

en: Matthew 19:27: *Behold we have left all things.* Cf. Ambrose, *Exposition on Luke* IX, n. 35, where he says: *Why did [Christ] pay the census? He did not pay from what was his own, but renders to the world what was the world's. And you, if you wish not to be liable to Caesar, do not have the things that are the world's; but if you have riches, you are liable to Caesar. If you wish to owe nothing to an earthly king, leave all that is yours and follow Christ.* — A little above, for *was bound (tenebatur)* codex T substitutes *is bound (tenetur)*, and at the end of the argument it has no place for *intelligi* in place of *non habet intelligi*.

la: Vers. 15. Cfr. supra pag. 680, nota 2. — Edd. paulo inferius omittunt *homo*.

en: Verse 15 (Romans 8:15). Cf. above p. 680, note 2. — The editions a little below omit *man (homo)*.

la: Cfr. Rom. 12, 4. seqq. et 1. Cor. 12, 12. seqq.

en: Cf. Romans 12:4 ff. and 1 Corinthians 12:12 ff.

en: Cf. Matthew 5:17; John 1:17; 1 Corinthians 10:11.

la: Vers. 2.

en: Verse 2 (1 Timothy 2:2).

la: Rom. 8, 21. 22: *Quia et ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei. Scimus enim, quod omnis creatura ingemiscit et parturit usque adhuc.*

en: Romans 8:21–22: *Because the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that every creature groans and travails even until now.*

la: Vers. 24.

en: Verse 24 (Matthew 6:24).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Principia supra (a. 2. q. 1.) exposita hic specialiter applicantur ad potestatem saecularem; simul autem sana et catholica doctrina de libertate et auctoritate concinne exponitur. Nemo est, qui nesciat, infinitos fere et sibi oppositos errores circa hanc doctrinam a saeculis mundum obruisse, vel sub praetextu falsae libertatis, vel per usurpationem nimiamque amplificationem potestatis saecularis, qua derogatur legitimae libertati Ecclesiae et iuribus familiae et etiam singularium personarum. Inter alia plura haec tria magni momenti principia inter catholicos omnino constant. — 1. Ipsum ius legitimum potestatis tum spiritualis tum saecularis non dependet praecise a dignitate vel indignitate personae in praelatione constitutae. Contraria opinio Wicleffi (et Hussii) damnata est a Martino V. et Concil. Constantiensi, scilicet eiusdem prop. 15: «Nullus est dominus civilis, nullus est praelatus, nullus est episcopus, dum est in peccato mortali». Item communiter tenetur, quod «distinctio fidelium et infidelium, secundum se considerata, non tollit dominium et praelationem infidelium supra fideles» (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 10. a. 10; cfr. ibid. q. 12. a. 2, et Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2.). — Alius etiam error cuiusdam Fr. Dionysii Sulecbat O. Min. (qui retractavit) damnatus est ab Urbano V. 1368, scilicet prop.: Haec benedicta, immo superbenedicta lex amoris omnem aufert proprietatem et dominium». — (Censura) falsa, erronea, haeretica (D'Argentré *Collectio iudiciorum* t. I. pag. 382 seqq.). — 2. Quoad *modum acquirendi dominium* potest esse iniustitia, quae impedit ius legitimae potestatis (cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1.); unde obedire usurpatoribus *per se* non est debitum, nisi forte postea ab ipsis per sanationem acquisitum sit ius legitimae possessionis. — 3. Quoad *usum potestatis* iura qualiscumque potestatis, a Deo communicatae, sunt determinatis *limitibus circumscripta*; et si usus potestatis terminos istos irrationabiliter egreditur, iniustus est et abusus nec est a Deo. In tantum autem subditus tenetur obedire, in quantum potestas praecipientis est *a Deo*, non autem, in quantum non est *a Deo*; immo in his quae sunt contra Deum, tenetur non obedire iniusto homini, sed Deo (Act. 4, 19.). — De obedientia erga Summum Pontificem S. Bonav. egregie tractat in quaest. quadam inedita: *Utrum omnes Christiani teneantur obedire uni.*

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 104. a. 3. 6, et I. II. q. 96. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The principles set forth above (a. 2, q. 1) are here applied specially to the secular power; and at the same time the sound and catholic doctrine concerning liberty and authority is fittingly set forth. There is no one who does not know that almost infinite and mutually opposed errors have for ages overwhelmed the world concerning this doctrine, either under the pretext of false liberty, or through the usurpation and excessive amplification of the secular power, whereby the legitimate liberty of the Church and the rights of the family and even of individual persons are infringed. Among many other things, these three principles of great moment are altogether settled among catholics. — 1. The legitimate right itself of power, whether spiritual or secular, does not depend precisely on the worthiness or unworthiness of the person constituted in prelacy. The contrary opinion of Wycliffe (and Hus) was condemned by Martin V and the Council of Constance, namely its proposition 15: «No one is a civil lord, no one is a prelate, no one is a bishop, while he is in mortal sin». Likewise it is commonly held that «the distinction of the faithful and the unfaithful, considered in itself, does not take away the dominion and prelacy of the unfaithful over the faithful» (S. Thom., S. II–II, q. 10, a. 10; cf. ibid. q. 12, a. 2, and Aegidius R., here q. 2, a. 2). — Another error too, of a certain Fr. Dionysius Sulecbat, O. Min. (who retracted it), was condemned by Urban V in 1368, namely the proposition: «This blessed, nay super-blessed law of love takes away all property and dominion». — (Censure) false, erroneous, heretical (D'Argentré, *Collection of Judgments*, vol. I, p. 382 ff.). — 2. As to the *manner of acquiring dominion* there can be an injustice which impedes the right of legitimate power (cf. above a. 2, q. 1); whence to obey usurpers is *of itself* not a duty, unless perhaps afterwards the right of legitimate possession is acquired from them through ratification. — 3. As to the *use of power*, the rights of any power whatever, communicated by God, are circumscribed by determinate *limits*; and if the use of power irrationally exceeds those bounds, it is unjust and an abuse and is not from God. But the subject is bound to obey in so far as the power of the one commanding is *from God*, but not in so far as it is not *from God*; nay, in those things which are against God, he is bound not to obey the unjust man, but God (Acts 4, 19). — Concerning obedience toward the Supreme Pontiff St. Bonaventure treats admirably in a certain unpublished question: *Whether all Christians are bound to obey one.*

**II.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1–2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. II–II, q. 104, a. 3, 6, and I–II, q. 96, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Aegidius R., loc. cit. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{1009-1012}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion; the IA djvu OCR for this region was cascade-fragmented across the two columns. Printed pp.1009–1012 (PDF 1031–1034); offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Running heads confirmed via crops: p.1009 `DIST. XLIV. ART. III. QUAEST. I. 1009`; p.1010 `1010 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; p.1011 `DIST. XLIV. ART. III. QUAEST. I. 1011`; p.1012 `1012 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`

**ARTICULUS III opener** (*De necessitate subiacendi potentiae praesidendi*) is folded into this a3-q1 per the Vol II chunking convention (no standalone a3-divisio chunk). The opener sits in the L-col bottom / R-col of p.1009, immediately after a2-q2's Respondeo tail.

**Apparatus = 27 entries, per-page footer restart:**
- **p.1009 R-col footers 4–9 PICKED UP** from the shared page (a2-q2 consumed p.1009 L-col footers 1–3 = its `[^17]`–`[^19]`): footer 4 = `[^1]` (August. de Civ.Dei XIX c.15 *Nullus autem natura…* + `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`); footer 5 = `[^2]` (Vat. *praesidenti*); footer 6 = `[^3]` (1 Pet. 2:18); footer 7 = `[^4]` (Rom. 13:1, 7); footer 8 = `[^5]` (Rom. 13:5); footer 9 = `[^6]` (Rom. 13:1 ff. Vulgate variant).
- **p.1010 footers 1–11** = `[^7]`–`[^17]` (single full-width footer block; L-col 1–5, R-col 6–11).
- **p.1011 footers 1–10** = `[^18]`–`[^27]` (L-col 1–3, R-col 4–10).
- **p.1012 L-col footers 1–3** = `[^28]`–`[^30]` (ADDED 2026-06-01 decade polish): a3-q1's reply 4 tail + reply 5 print at the **top of p.1012 L-col** (the page break falls inside reply 4 at *ad Timotheum se-/cundo*). Their three superscripts anchor in a3-q1's body, not a3-q2's: footer 1 = `Vers. 2` → reply 4 *ad Timotheum secundo* (1 Tim 2:2, `[^28]`); footer 2 = `Rom. 8, 21. 22 Quia et ipsa creatura…` → reply 5 *filiorum Dei* (`[^29]`); footer 3 = `Vers. 24` → reply 5 *Matthaei sexto: Non potestis duobus dominis servire* (Matt 6:24, `[^30]`). Confirmed 600 dpi p.1012 L-0 (body) + L-2 (footer band). **p.1012 footers 4–8** (footer 4 `Vers. 2. seq. Super cathedram` / footer 5 `Luc. 10, 16` / footer 6 *praelatis a Deo institutis* variant / footer 7 Coloss. 3:20 / footer 8 Benedict Rule c.68) annotate a3-q2's body and are claimed there as its `[^1]`–`[^5]`. The a3-q1 SCHOLION (carried on p.1012, below reply 5) bears no numbered footnotes — only the parenthetical source-references rendered inline in Scholion I–II.

**Cross-chunk anchor note (`[^1]` / p.1009 footer 4) — confirmed 2026-06-01 decade polish (600 dpi p.1009 R-0 + R-2).** The 600 dpi read confirms footer **⁴** (`August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15: Nullus autem natura… — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) prints its superscript on the word ***conservari***, the LAST word of **a2-q2**'s Ad-4 reply (`…ubi ordo habet perturbari et potest per dominium conservari⁴.`), immediately before the `ARTICULUS III` header. So footer 4's true body home is a2-q2's tail, not a3-q1. a2-q2 (which closes at its own `[^19]`) explicitly **forwarded** this footer to a3-q1 (its Notes: "p.1009 R-col footers 4–9 belong to ARTICULUS III / a3-q1 — forwarded, NOT claimed here"), and a3-q1 picked it up as the lead `[^1]` of the inherited p.1009 R-col block, anchored to the ARTICULUS III opener's *potentiae* / *the power*. The marker `[^1]` is present and paired in both the Latin and English bodies of this chunk (at *potentiae* / *the power*); its def is the de Civ. Dei XIX c.15 note. The arrangement is deliberate and marker-clean: the note lives in exactly one chunk (here), is paired, and the cross-chunk provenance (true anchor = a2-q2's *conservari*) is documented on both sides. No duplicate created; a2-q2 does not also carry this note. Vol II ends at d.44, so the d.50 polish gate does not apply.

**Scholion** held here (Scholion I–II). Scholion I is the article-level doctrinal note (three catholic principles + the Wycliffe/Hus/Constance and Urban V condemnations); Scholion II is the parallel-reference list (Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Durand., Dionys. Carth.). The references in Scholion II (`S. Thom. hic q. 2`, etc.) span the whole article; a3-q2 has no scholion of its own (`has_scholion: false` on that chunk).

**HAND-OFF TO d44-a3-q2 (forwarded):** `QUAESTIO II. Utrum religiosi teneantur praelatis suis obedire in omnibus, quae non sunt contra Deum.` (`Secundo quaeritur, utrum religiosi teneantur praelatis suis obedire in omnibus, quae non sunt contra Deum. Et quod sic, videtur`) begins at raw line **~70286**, on printed **p.1012** (PDF 1034), in the **R-col lower half** immediately after this q1's SCHOLION block (Scholion II `…Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.`). Seam grammatically clean. **CORRECTED 2026-06-01 (decade polish):** the original hand-off here claimed a3-q2 has no scholion and that the whole p.1012 footer block is a3-q2's. Both are wrong. (a) a3-q2 DOES have its own scholion (printed on p.1014), and that chunk now carries `has_scholion: true`. (b) p.1012 **footers 1–3** (`Vers. 2` 1 Tim 2:2 / `Rom. 8, 21. 22` / `Vers. 24` Matt 6:24) annotate **a3-q1's** reply 4/5 tail printed at the top of p.1012 L-col, and are claimed here as `[^28]`–`[^30]`. a3-q2's first footer is p.1012 **footer 4** (`Vers. 2. seq.` Matth. 23 *Super cathedram*, = a3-q2 `[^1]`); a3-q2's p.1012 footers run 4–8 = its `[^1]`–`[^5]` (footer 5 = `Luc. 10, 16`, footer 6 = *praelatis a Deo institutis* variant, footer 7 = Coloss. 3:20, footer 8 = Benedict Rule c.68). Then fresh p.1013+ sequences. q2 fund.: 1 (Matth. 23 *Super cathedram Moysi sederunt Scribae et Pharisaei; quae dicunt vobis facite*); 2 (Coloss. 3 *Filii, obedite parentibus vestris per omnia*); 3 (Benedictus in regula c. 68). Offset `pdf = printed + 22`; OCR running-head digits mangled — confirm printed_pages via low-dpi render. **d.44 is the LAST distinction of Vol II** — when d.44 completes (a3-q2 + dubia remain), Vol II is DONE (update landing/About copy per MEMORY.md `update-about-copy-after-vol2`). d.50 polish gate does NOT apply. No `[?]` flags in this chunk (OCR/PDF clean; every reading confirmed line-by-line against column-band crops).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0