title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum distinctio Angelorum sit a natura, an a gratia.*

Secundo quaeritur, quae sit distinctionis ordinum principalis causa, utrum scilicet sit a natura, vel a gratia. Et quod a natura, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.* 1. Per illud quod dicit Magister in littera[^1]: «Superiores sunt qui natura sunt magis subtiles et intelligentia amplius perspicaces»: ergo si ordo attenditur secundum *sub-* et *supra*, videtur, quod ordo Angelorum sit a natura.

2. Item, supra distinctione tertia[^2]: «In exordio suae conditionis alii superiores, alii inferiores Dei sapientia constituti sunt»; sed quod habuerant ab exordio suae conditionis est eis naturale: ergo distinctio ordinum est in eis a natura.

3. Item, quaecumque Deus facit a primaria conditione, facit in modo, specie et ordine, ita quod ista sunt naturalia unicuique[^3]: ergo nobilissimam creaturam, scilicet angelicam, a principio suae conditionis debuit facere in perfecto modo, specie et ordine. Si ergo hoc est a natura, quod est eis ab initio inditum, patet etc.

4. Item, gratiae gratum facientis est unire et assimilare: si ergo quod est principium uniendi non est principium ordinis distinguendi, videtur, quod distinctio ordinum non sit a gratia; et est a gratia, vel a natura: ergo etc.

*Fundamenta.* **Contra** hoc obiicitur: 1. Per definitionem ordinis, quam Magister ponit in littera[^4]: «Ordo est multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere gratiae similantur»: ergo videtur, quod absque munere gratiae in Angelis non sit ordo.

2. Item, supremus omnium ordinum est ordo Seraphim; sed ordo Seraphim est ab eminentia dilectionis et caritatis: ergo primus et praecipuus ordo est a gratia. Si ergo omnes alii ex illo pendent, videtur, quod nullus ordo in Angelis sit sine dono gratiae.

3. Item, Throni dicuntur, sicut dicit Gregorius[^5], quia «tanta divinitatis gratia replentur, ut in eis sedeat Deus»: si ergo Deus non dicitur sedere nec inhabitare nisi per gratiam gratum facientem, ergo ordo Thronorum non est nisi a gratia: ergo pari ratione videtur de aliis.

4. Item, Deus non praefert hominem homini propter naturalia, sed propter merita[^6]: ergo si distinctio ordinum est secundum divinam acceptionem, non est secundum naturalia, sed secundum gratuita.

### Conclusio

> Angelicorum ordinum distinctio principaliter est a gratia, a natura tantum ut a dispositione praeambula.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut patet ex definitione ordinis supra posita[^7], *Conclusio.* ordo et est a natura et est a gratia; sed a natura tanquam a praeambula dispositione, a gratia tanquam a completiva perfectione. Hoc dico de illis ordinibus, secundum quos attenditur distinctio hierarchiarum in supremis spiritibus, sicut manifeste apparet ex officio et actione et nominatione ipsorum ordinum, inter quos praecipuus ordo est ordo Seraphim, qui denominatur ab ardore dilectionis, quae non est in Angelis consummata et perfecta nisi per gratiam. Et ideo concedo, quod ordinum principalis distinctio non potest esse a natura.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de duplici auctoritate Magistri, quod per naturam alii aliis sunt superiores; dicendum, quod hoc non concludit, quod ordines sint a natura sicut a causa completiva; quia non quaelibet superioritas et inferioritas facit ordinem completum, sed ea solum, in qua consistit rerum ordinabilium complementum quantum ad officium et statum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus et species et ordo est a natura; dicendum, quod aequivocatio est in *ordine*; ipse[^8] enim loquitur ibi de ordine, quo creatura dicitur ordinata per comparationem ipsius ad *finem*; ordo vero Angelorum attenditur secundum praecellentiam ipsorum ordinabilium *inter se*, et haec completa non est inter Angelos natura consimiles nisi per dona gratuita, capacitatem naturae complentia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia unit, ergo ordines non distinguit, sive perficit: dicendum, quod est loqui de gratia quantum ad *habitum* et quantum ad *usum* et quantum ad *statum*. Etsi gratia gratum faciens *uniat* et conformet quantum ad *habitum*, quia omnes habitus gratuiti sunt in omnibus;

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distinguit tamen quantum ad *usum* et ordinat quantum ad *statum*, pro eo quod usus diversificatur in diversis, et status unius in gratia est excellentior statu alterius. Et hoc est quod facit in habentibus consimilem gratiam, ordinem et gradum. Et hoc modo esse in Angelis est intelligendum[^9].

---

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### Question II. *Whether the distinction of the Angels is from nature or from grace.*

Secondly it is asked what is the principal cause of the distinction of the orders — namely, whether it is from nature or from grace. And that it is from nature seems [to be the case]:

*To the opposite.* 1. Through that which the Master says in the text[^1]: «The superior [Angels] are those who are by nature more subtle and in intelligence more perspicacious»: therefore, if order is attended to according to *below* and *above*, it seems that the order of the Angels is from nature.

2. Likewise, above, in distinction three[^2]: «At the outset of their condition some were established superior, others inferior, by the wisdom of God»; but what they had had from the outset of their condition is natural to them: therefore the distinction of the orders is in them from nature.

3. Likewise, whatever God makes from the primary [act of] founding, He makes in measure, species, and order, so that these are natural to each thing[^3]: therefore the noblest creature, namely the angelic, He ought to have made — from the beginning of its condition — in a perfect measure, species, and order. If, therefore, that which was implanted in them from the beginning is from nature, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it belongs to sanctifying grace to unite and to assimilate: if, therefore, that which is the principle of uniting is not the principle of distinguishing order, it seems that the distinction of the orders is not from grace; and it is [either] from grace or from nature: therefore etc.

*Foundations.* **Against** this it is objected: 1. Through the definition of order which the Master sets down in the text[^4]: «An order is a multitude of celestial spirits who are likened to one another by some gift of grace»: therefore it seems that without a gift of grace there is no order in the Angels.

2. Likewise, the supreme of all the orders is the order of the Seraphim; but the order of the Seraphim is from the eminence of love and charity: therefore the first and chief order is from grace. If, therefore, all the others depend on it, it seems that no order in the Angels is without a gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the Thrones are [so] called, as Gregory says[^5], because «they are filled with so great a grace of divinity that God sits in them»: if, therefore, God is not said to sit or to indwell except through sanctifying grace, then the order of the Thrones is only from grace: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning the others.

4. Likewise, God does not prefer one man to another on account of natural [endowments], but on account of merits[^6]: therefore, if the distinction of the orders is according to divine acceptance, it is not according to natural [endowments], but according to gratuitous [gifts].

### Conclusion

> The distinction of the angelic orders is principally from grace, [and] from nature only as from a preambular disposition.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is clear from the definition of order set down above[^7], *Conclusion.* an order is both from nature and from grace; but from nature as from a preambular disposition, [and] from grace as from a completive perfection. This I say of those orders according to which the distinction of the hierarchies is attended to in the supreme spirits, as manifestly appears from the office and action and nomination of those orders — among which the chief order is the order of the Seraphim, which is named from the ardor of love, [a love] which is not consummated and perfected in the Angels except through grace. And therefore I concede that the principal distinction of the orders cannot be from nature.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].* 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the twofold authority of the Master — that by nature some are superior to others — it must be said that this does not conclude that the orders are from nature as from a completive cause; because not every superiority and inferiority makes a complete order, but only that [superiority and inferiority] in which consists the completion of orderable things as to office and status.

3. To that which is objected — that measure and species and order are from nature — it must be said that there is an equivocation in [the word] *order*; for he[^8] [the objector] is speaking there of the order by which a creature is said to be ordered by its relation to [its] *end*; but the order of the Angels is attended to according to the precellence of the orderable things themselves *among one another* — and this [precellence] is not complete among Angels alike in nature except through gratuitous gifts, which complete the capacity of nature.

4. To that which is objected — that grace unites, therefore it does not distinguish, or perfect, the orders — it must be said that one may speak of grace as to *habit* and as to *use* and as to *status*. Even if sanctifying grace *unites* and conforms as to *habit* — since all gratuitous habits are in all [the Angels];

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it nevertheless distinguishes as to *use* and orders as to *status*, inasmuch as use is diversified in diverse [subjects], and the status of one [Angel] in grace is more excellent than the status of another. And this is what it effects in those having a like grace, order, and grade. And it is to be understood that it is in this manner in the Angels[^9].

---

la: Hic c. 4.

en: Here, c. 4 [of the Master's text — Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 9, c. 4].

la: Cap. 2. lit. Magistri.

en: Chapter 2 of the text of the Master.

la: Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 7; de Natura boni, c. 3. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* IV, c. 3, n. 7; *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 3. See also here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Hic c. 2. — Nonnulli codd. ut F T V *assimilantur* pro *similantur*.

en: Here, c. 2. — Some codices, such as F, T, V, [read] *assimilantur* (*are assimilated*) for *similantur* (*are likened*).

la: In Evang. hom. 34. n. 10. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

en: [Gregory,] *Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 34, n. 10. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.

la: Cfr. Deut. 10, 17. seq.; Act. 10, 34; Eph. 6, 9. — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum primis edd. *acceptationem* pro *acceptionem*.

en: Cf. Deuteronomy 10:17 f.; Acts 10:34; Ephesians 6:9. — A little below, several codices, with the first editions, [read] *acceptationem* for *acceptionem* (*acceptance*).

la: In praenotatis ad hanc distinctionem, circa medium. Cfr. et lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Paulo inferius post *Hoc dico* in cod. aa additur *secundum quod* (quid?).

en: In the prefatory notes to this distinction, near the middle. Cf. also the text of the Master, c. 2. — A little below, after *Hoc dico*, codex aa adds *secundum quod* — [the editors query:] *quid?* (*what?*).

la: Intellige: obiiciens. — Paulo inferius plures codd. *istius* pro *ipsius*.

en: Understand: the objector. — A little below, several codices [read] *istius* for *ipsius*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question [the SCHOLION of `d9-a1-q1`, whose n. III opens *Sequentem quaestionem...*]. ---

translators_notes:
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- **DISTINCTION 9 NOW 4/11.** Next chunk: `d9-a1-q3` *Utrum secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium dentur a Deo maiora dona gratuita* (raw 17535+, opens p.245).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium dentur a Deo maiora dona gratuita.*

Tertio quaeritur de ipsis ordinibus quantum ad dispositionem praeambulam; et cum haec sit naturalium capacitas et praecellentia, est quaestio, utrum secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium dentur a Deo maiora dona gratuita. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Ad oppositum.* 1. Per illud quod dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^1]: *Dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem*; constans est, quod loquitur ibi de dato superaddito naturae: ergo si secundum virtutem naturae dedit, videtur, quod secundum meliora naturalia sint et maiora gratuita.

2. Item, Magister supra distinctione tertia[^2]: «Qui natura magis subtiles et sapientia plus perspicaces creati sunt, hi maioribus gratiae muneribus praediti sunt»; et hoc ipsum dicit in littera: ergo videtur, quod maior gratia detur secundum maiora naturalia.

3. Item, ad hoc videtur esse ratio: materiae dispositae ad formam, secundum quod dignius et melius disponitur, Deus nobiliorem dat formam[^3]: ergo cum naturalia sint sicut dispositiones quaedam ad gratuita, quanto quis habet meliora naturalia, tanto Deus dabit ei maiora dona gratuita.

4. Item, ratio, quare Deus non dat homini gratiam, est, quia homo non accipit[^4]: ergo cum ipse sit semper promptus et paratus dona sua liberalissime infundere, et liberalitas eius superexcedat omnem capacitatem, videtur, quod de capacitate naturae nihil dimittat vacuum, quando quis plene se convertit ad eum. Et si hoc, restat, quod qui maiora habet naturalia, cum maioris gratiae sit capax, maiorem etiam habebit gratiam. Et hoc videtur sonare verbum Platonis[^5] dicentis, quod «dedit unicuique beatitudinis, quantum capax erat».

5. Item, sicut gratia est dispositio ad gloriam, ita bona natura est dispositio ad gratiam; sed Deus ei qui habet ampliorem gratiam, ampliorem dat gloriam: ergo ei qui habet meliora naturalia, dat maiora gratuita. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia gratia meretur gloriam, non sic natura gratiam; obiicitur[^6] tunc, quia qualiscumque sit comparatio dispositionis, hoc tamen verum est, quia gloria perfecte complet naturam, ita quod nullus in ea remanet appetitus incompletus. Si ergo gloria implet naturae capacitatem, aut natura magis capax magis habebit de gloria, aut non erit glorificata: si ergo secundum maiorem capacitatem naturae est maioritas gloriae, et quantitas gloriae correspondet quantitati gratiae, ergo secundum maiorem capacitatem naturalium attendetur maioritas gratiae.

6. Item, finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem; sed natura facta est propter gloriam, non e converso: si ergo Deus praesciens et praedestinans facit animam ad hoc, quod eam glorificet, tantam dabit ei naturalium capacitatem, quantam scit se ei daturum gloriam; aut si ultra tribuat, faciet aliquid frustra. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod capacitas naturae et quantitas gloriae commetiantur[^7]: ergo redit idem quod prius.

*Fundamenta.* **Contra:** 1. Ecclesiastici primo[^8]: *Secundum datum suum praebet illam diligentibus se*: ergo videtur, quod distributio sapientiae et gratiae non pensatur ex parte suscipientis, sed ex parte Dei conferentis.

2. Item, possibile est, eum qui meliora habet naturalia, nihil habere de gratia et omni tempore vitae suae carere gratia, eum vero, qui habet minora naturalia, abundare in gratia: quod si hoc est verum, ergo non est dispensatio gratiae secundum mensuram naturalium.

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3. Item, Deus dat gratiam homini, secundum quod se praeparat: ergo si habens minora naturalia frequenter se melius praeparat quam habens maiora, ergo videtur, quod maiora suscipiat dona gratuita, quamvis minora habeat naturalia.

4. Item, qui meliora habet naturalia frequenter remanet in statu imperfectionis, qui vero minora, frequenter assumit statum perfectionis sive religionis: ergo si maior est gratia in perfectis, patet etc.

5. Item, gratia in nobis nullam potentiam ita principaliter respicit sicut arbitrii libertatem[^9]; sed libertas arbitrii aequaliter est in omnibus: si ergo maior est gratia in uno quam in alio, non est a natura, sed magis a distributione divina.

6. Item, distributio gratiae Dei procedit ex visceribus pietatis et misericordiae[^10]; sed misericordiae est magis compati ei qui magis miser est, ceteris paribus, et qui magis indiget. Si ergo ille qui habet minora naturalia, magis indiget sustentari a gratia, quam qui habet meliora: ergo ubi nulla merita vel demerita praecedunt, Deus ei qui minora habet naturalia, debet dare maiorem gratiam: ergo distributio gratiae non est praecise secundum maiorem capacitatem naturae, sed secundum beneplacitum pietatis divinae.

### Conclusio

> Maior naturalium capacitas respectu gratiae dandae non habet nec efficaciam causalitatis, nec dispositionem necessitatis, sed tantum aliquatenus et fallibiliter dispositionem congruitatis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod gratiam dare secundum maiorem[^11] *Distinctio.* capacitatem naturalium potest intelligi tripliciter: *Conclusio 1.* aut ita, quod hoc quod est *secundum* dicat *efficaciam causalitatis*, et sic secundum omnes est falsum, quia naturalia non sunt causa gratiae; *Conclusio 2.* aut ita, quod dicat *dispositionem congruitatis*, et sic, ubi non est obstaculum, secundum omnes est verum, quia natura bona de congruo disponit ad gratiam; *Conclusio 3.* aut ita, quod dicat *dispositionem necessitatis*, et sic secundum communem opinionem est falsum et a doctoribus reprobatum. — *Alia opinio.* Tamen secundum aliquorum opinionem aliquando positum est tanquam verum.

*Ratio huius opinionis.* Ratio autem huius positionis fuit ista. Ipsi enim ponebant, quod gratia non erat aliud quam Deus; et quod caritas non esset aliud quam Spiritus sanctus[^12]; et quod intensio gratiae vel caritatis non erat nisi secundum maiorem depurationem animae et remissionem concupiscentiae, quae obsistit, ne anima possit perfecte Deo uniri; et ideo, concupiscentia omnino extincta, anima tantum unitur Deo, quantum eius potest elevari natura, et tantam dicitur habere gratiam. Et ideo ponebant, quod finaliter anima, quae meliora habebat naturalia, maiorem haberet gratiam. — *Falsum est fundam.* Sed huius positionis fundamentum improbatum est in primo libro, distinctione decima septima[^13] et amplius improbabitur infra distinctione vigesima sexta. *Item positio ipsa.* Ipsa autem positio de se improbabilis est et contra bonos mores esse videtur, dum tantum tribuit ei qui parum laborat et parum Deo servit, quantum ei qui magis, immo plus, si maiora habeat naturalia et perseverat in gratia; quod omnino absurdum est et per rationes praecedentes improbatum. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. *Ad 6. fundam.* Ultima tamen ratio non cogit, quia in distributione gratiarum nec capacitas naturae nec eius indigentia principaliter pensatur, sed divinae praedestinationis dispositio et mensura, secundum quam partitur Deus *mensuram fidei*, sicut dicit Apostolus[^14], secundum quod in sua praedestinatione mensus est ei.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod *dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem*; dicendum, quod *secundum* dicit ibi solummodo causam disponentem de congruo. Et iterum, *virtus* ibi vocatur conatus cordis, qui non solum dicit capacitatem, sed etiam actualem praeparationem; et ideo auctoritas illa non cogit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Magistri, similiter dicendum, quod ibi dicit dispositionem de congruo, et magis congruam dispositionem dicit circa Angelos quam circa homines, de quibus loquitur Magister. *Non valet quod homines.* Boni enim[^15], qui ad Deum conversi sunt, secundum hoc plus se praeparaverunt, secundum quod meliora naturalia habuerunt, quia quilibet movebatur in Deum secundum totum cordis conatum, cum non haberet retardativum. Non sic autem est in hominibus; et ideo illa auctoritas exponi debet, ampliari non debet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materiae melius dispositae imprimit Deus nobiliorem formam; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia materia disponitur ad formam naturalem dispositione, quae est necessitas; *Notandum.* sed maior capacitas naturalium non disponit ad maiorem gratiam dispositione necessitatis, sed solum congruitatis. Et quia dispositio congruitatis multis modis potest impediri, sive per oppositum, sive per maiorem congruitatem, quae potest ex aliquo accidente supervenire in alio; ideo illa ratio non concludit.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo non habet gratiam, quia non accipit; dicendum, *Notandum.* quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod «ideo *habeat* gratiam, quia *accipit*», sicut dicit Anselmus[^16], quia in privativis et contradictorie oppositis non tenet consequentia *in ipso*, sed *e contrario*; et ideo sicut non conceditur, quod maiorem habeat gratiam, quia accipit, sic non est concedendum, quod maiorem habeat gratiam ex *maiori capacitate*.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura disponit ad gratiam; dicendum, sicut dicebatur, quod non est simile, quia natura non sic meretur gratiam, sicut gratia gloriam. Ad illud vero quod subiungit, quod gloria perficit totam capacitatem naturae; dicendum, quod *Notandum.* sicut *forma* perficit capacitatem materiae non simpliciter, sed prout exigit dispositio superinducta; sic *gloria* perficit naturam non simpliciter, sed secundum quod exigebat gratia, quae prius libero arbitrio data erat. Cum autem sic perficitur, sufficienter perfecta est, quia rectitudo iustitiae limitat appetitum naturae, ut non ultra appetat, quam gratia promeruit, maxime cum plene sufficiat quod Deus sibi retribuit.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod capacitas naturae ordinatur ad gloriam finaliter; dicendum, quod sic ordinatur a Deo, ut tamen praesupponatur dispositio ex parte voluntatis nostrae[^17]. Unde sicut homo, qui capax erat beatitudinis et propter beatitudinem factus, per deordinationem voluntatis deputatur aeternis suppliciis et perdit gloriam; sic homo, qui maioris beatitudinis capax erat, quia non ex totis viribus suis se disponit ad gratiam, minorem assequitur gloriam, quam assequatur alius minoris capacitatis, qui magis se disponit ad gratiam. — Nec sequitur, quod aliquid sit ibi frustra, quia ex hoc ostendit Deus, quantum possit gratia super naturam. Verumtamen hoc in bonis Angelis non habet instantiam; cum enim ex totis viribus suis se disposuerint ad gratiam, secundum quod habuerunt meliora naturalia, data sunt eis maiora gratuita.

english:
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### Question III. *Whether according to a greater capacity of natural endowments greater gratuitous gifts are given by God.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the orders themselves as to the preambular disposition; and since this [disposition] is the capacity and precellence of natural endowments, the question is whether, according to a greater capacity of natural endowments, greater gratuitous gifts are given by God. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:

*To the opposite.* 1. Through that which is said in Matthew twenty-five[^1]: *He gave to each according to his own ability* (*virtus*); it is settled that He there speaks of a gift superadded to nature: therefore, if He gave according to the ability of nature, it seems that according to better natural endowments there are also greater gratuitous gifts.

2. Likewise, the Master above, in distinction three[^2]: «Those who were created by nature more subtle and in wisdom more perspicacious, these were endowed with greater gifts of grace»; and he says this very thing in the text: therefore it seems that greater grace is given according to greater natural endowments.

3. Likewise, there seems to be a reason for this: to matter disposed to a form, according as it is more worthily and better disposed, God gives a nobler form[^3]: therefore, since natural endowments are like certain dispositions to gratuitous [gifts], the more one has better natural endowments, the more God will give him greater gratuitous gifts.

4. Likewise, the reason why God does not give grace to a man is that the man does not receive[^4]: therefore, since He Himself is always prompt and ready most liberally to pour in His gifts, and His liberality exceeds all capacity, it seems that He leaves nothing of the capacity of nature empty, when one fully converts himself to Him. And if this [is so], it remains that he who has greater natural endowments, since he is capable of greater grace, will also have greater grace. And this seems to echo the word of Plato[^5], saying that «He gave to each as much of beatitude as he was capable of».

5. Likewise, just as grace is a disposition to glory, so a good nature is a disposition to grace; but God gives to him who has fuller grace fuller glory: therefore to him who has better natural endowments He gives greater gratuitous [gifts]. If you say that it is not similar, because grace merits glory, [whereas] nature does not thus [merit] grace — it is then objected[^6] that, whatever be the comparison of the disposition, this nevertheless is true: that glory perfectly completes nature, so that no incomplete appetite remains in it. If, therefore, glory fills the capacity of nature, either a nature more capable will have more of glory, or it will not be glorified: if, therefore, according to a greater capacity of nature there is a greater magnitude of glory, and the quantity of glory corresponds to the quantity of grace, then according to a greater capacity of natural endowments a greater magnitude of grace will be attended to.

6. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are for the end; but nature was made for the sake of glory, not conversely: if, therefore, God, foreknowing and predestining, makes a soul for this — that He may glorify it — He will give it as much capacity of natural endowments as He knows He will give it of glory; or if He bestows beyond [that], He will do something in vain. But if this is false, it remains that the capacity of nature and the quantity of glory are commensurate[^7]: therefore the same returns as before.

*Foundations.* **On the contrary:** 1. Ecclesiasticus, chapter one[^8]: *According to His gift He bestows it on those who love Him*: therefore it seems that the distribution of wisdom and grace is not weighed on the side of the one receiving, but on the side of God conferring.

2. Likewise, it is possible that he who has better natural endowments should have nothing of grace and for the whole time of his life lack grace, while he who has lesser natural endowments should abound in grace: but if this is true, then the dispensation of grace is not according to the measure of natural endowments.

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3. Likewise, God gives grace to a man according as he prepares himself: therefore, if one having lesser natural endowments frequently prepares himself better than one having greater, then it seems that he receives greater gratuitous gifts, although he has lesser natural endowments.

4. Likewise, he who has better natural endowments frequently remains in a state of imperfection, while he who has lesser frequently assumes the state of perfection, or of religious life: therefore, if grace is greater in the perfect, it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, grace in us regards no power so principally as the freedom of choice[^9]; but the freedom of choice is equally in all: if, therefore, grace is greater in one than in another, it is not from nature, but rather from the divine distribution.

6. Likewise, the distribution of God's grace proceeds from the bowels of [His] mercy and pity[^10]; but it belongs to mercy to have more compassion on him who is more wretched — other things being equal — and who is more in need. If, therefore, he who has lesser natural endowments is more in need of being sustained by grace than he who has better: then, where no merits or demerits precede, God ought to give greater grace to him who has lesser natural endowments: therefore the distribution of grace is not precisely according to the greater capacity of nature, but according to the good pleasure of the divine pity.

### Conclusion

> A greater capacity of natural endowments, with respect to the grace to be given, has neither the efficacy of causality nor the disposition of necessity, but only — in some measure and fallibly — the disposition of congruity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to give grace according to a greater[^11] *Distinction.* capacity of natural endowments can be understood in three ways: *Conclusion 1.* either thus, that the [word] *according-to* states an *efficacy of causality* — and so, according to all, it is false, since natural endowments are not the cause of grace; *Conclusion 2.* or thus, that it states a *disposition of congruity* — and so, where there is no obstacle, according to all it is true, since a good nature congruently disposes to grace; *Conclusion 3.* or thus, that it states a *disposition of necessity* — and so, according to the common opinion, it is false and reproved by the doctors. — *Another opinion.* Yet according to the opinion of some it was at one time posited as true.

*The reason of this opinion.* Now the reason of this position was this. For they posited that grace was nothing other than God; and that charity was nothing other than the Holy Spirit[^12]; and that the intensification of grace or charity was nothing but [a function of] the greater purification of the soul and the remission of concupiscence, which stands in the way lest the soul be able to be perfectly united to God; and therefore, concupiscence being entirely extinguished, the soul is united to God as much as its nature can be elevated, and it is said to have that much grace. And therefore they posited that, finally, the soul which had better natural endowments would have greater grace. — *The foundation is false.* But the foundation of this position was disproved in the first book, distinction seventeen[^13], and will be further disproved below in distinction twenty-six. *Likewise the position itself.* And the position itself is in itself improbable and seems to be against good morals, since it grants as much to him who labors little and serves God little as to him who [serves] more — indeed, more, if he has greater natural endowments and perseveres in grace; which is altogether absurd and disproved by the preceding reasons. — And therefore the arguments which show this are to be conceded. *To the 6th foundation.* The last argument, however, does not compel, because in the distribution of graces neither the capacity of nature nor its need is principally weighed, but the disposition and measure of the divine predestination, according to which God apportions *the measure of faith*, as the Apostle says[^14], according as in His predestination He has measured it out to him.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].* 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary — that *He gave to each according to his own ability* — it must be said that *according-to* there states only a disposing cause of congruity. And again, *ability* (*virtus*) is there called the effort of the heart, which states not only capacity but also actual preparation; and therefore that authority does not compel.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, it must likewise be said that he there speaks of a disposition of congruity, and he speaks of a more congruent disposition concerning the Angels than concerning men, of whom the Master is speaking. *It does not hold for men.* For the good [Angels][^15], who were converted to God, prepared themselves the more according as they had the better natural endowments, since each one was moved into God according to the whole effort of [his] heart, having nothing to retard him. But it is not so in men; and therefore that authority ought to be expounded, [and] ought not to be extended.

3. To that which is objected — that God imprints a nobler form on better-disposed matter — it must be said that it is not similar, because matter is disposed to a natural form by a disposition which is a necessity; *Note.* but a greater capacity of natural endowments does not dispose to a greater grace by a disposition of necessity, but only of congruity. And because a disposition of congruity can be impeded in many ways — whether by something opposed, or by a greater congruity which can supervene in another from some accident — therefore that argument does not conclude.

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4. To that which is objected — that man does not have grace because he does not receive — it must be said *Note.* that this is true; but from this it does not follow that «he therefore *has* grace because he *receives*», as Anselm says[^16], because in privatives and contradictorily opposed [terms] the consequence does not hold *in the thing itself*, but *conversely*; and therefore, just as it is not conceded that he has greater grace because he receives, so it is not to be conceded that he has greater grace from a *greater capacity*.

5. To that which is objected — that nature disposes to grace — it must be said, as was said, that it is not similar, because nature does not merit grace in the way that grace [merits] glory. But to that which is added — that glory perfects the whole capacity of nature — it must be said that *Note.* just as a *form* perfects the capacity of matter not absolutely, but as the superinduced disposition requires, so *glory* perfects nature not absolutely, but according as the grace required [it] which had earlier been given to free choice. And when it is thus perfected, it is sufficiently perfected, because the rectitude of justice limits the appetite of nature, so that it does not desire beyond what grace has merited — especially since what God renders to it fully suffices.

6. To that which is objected last — that the capacity of nature is ordered to glory finally — it must be said that it is so ordered by God, yet so that a disposition on the side of our will is presupposed[^17]. Hence, just as a man who was capable of beatitude and made for the sake of beatitude is, through the disordering of [his] will, assigned to eternal punishments and loses glory; so a man who was capable of greater beatitude, because he does not dispose himself to grace with all his powers, attains a lesser glory than another of lesser capacity attains who disposes himself more to grace. — Nor does it follow that anything is there in vain, because by this God shows how much grace can [do] above nature. Nevertheless this has no instance in the good Angels; for since they disposed themselves to grace with all their powers, according as they had better natural endowments, greater gratuitous [gifts] were given to them.

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13 [Matthew 25:15].

la: Cap. 2. — Verba paulo inferius posita *et hoc ipsum* [cod. aa *hoc idem*] *dicit in littera* respiciunt praesentem distinctionem, c. 4.

en: Chapter 2. — The words placed a little below, *et hoc ipsum dicit in littera* (*and he says this very thing in the text*) [codex aa: *hoc idem*], regard the present distinction, c. 4.

la: Sub quo respectu Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.) ait: *Actus activorum sunt in patiente praedisposito.* Cfr. II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. — Vat., interpunctione mutata: *esse ratio materiae dispositae ad formam; secundum enim quod dignius* etc.

en: In which respect Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 24 (c. 2), says: *The acts of active things are in a predisposed patient.* Cf. *On the Generation of Animals* II, c. 3. — The Vatican edition, with the punctuation altered: *esse ratio materiae dispositae ad formam; secundum enim quod dignius* etc.

la: Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 2. seqq.

en: Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 2 ff.

la: Prout refertur a Chalcidio in suo Comment. super Timaeum (ed. Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, Lipsiae, 1876 pag. 26.): «Optimus erat [rerum Conditor]; ab optimo porro invidia longe relegata est [cfr. tom. 1. pag. 784, nota 3.]. Itaque consequenter cuncta sui similia, prout cuiusque natura capax beatitudinis esse poterat, effici voluit». De hoc Commentario notatu digna sunt quae sequuntur. Inter opera Honorii Augustodunensis (1090–1120), ed. Migne (Patrol. Lat. tom. 172.) recensetur «Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis, auctore, ut videtur Honorio Augustodunensi». In hoc Commentario legitur: *Est igitur ignoratus* [Timaeus Platonis] *a Latinis usque ad tempus Osii papae* [Osii, Cordubensis ecclesiae in Hispania episcopi], *qui cum sciret, in eo multa utilia nec fidei contraria contineri, rogavit Chalcidium, archidiaconum suum, in utraque lingua peritum, ut de Graeco in Latinum illum transferret. Cuius auctoritati obediens, primas partes illius transtulit.* — Cod. Q post *quod* subiungit *Deus*.

en: As it is reported by Chalcidius in his Commentary on the *Timaeus* (ed. Dr. Ioh. Wrobel, Leipzig, 1876, p. 26): «He [the Founder of things] was best; and from the best, moreover, envy is far removed. Therefore, consequently, He willed all things to be made like Himself, according as the nature of each was capable of beatitude». — Concerning this Commentary the following is worthy of note. Among the works of Honorius of Autun (1090–1120), in the Migne edition (*Patrologia Latina*, vol. 172), is listed a «Commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato, the author being, as it seems, Honorius of Autun». In this Commentary one reads: *The* Timaeus *of Plato was therefore unknown to the Latins until the time of Pope Osius* [Osius, bishop of the church of Córdoba in Spain], *who, since he knew that many useful things, and nothing contrary to the faith, were contained in it, asked Chalcidius, his archdeacon, skilled in both languages, to translate it from Greek into Latin. Obedient to his authority, he translated the first parts of it.* — Codex Q, after *quod*, adds *Deus*.

la: Non pauci codd. *ostenditur*.

en: Not a few codices [read] *ostenditur* (*it is shown*) [for *obiicitur*].

la: Vat. *secum commensurantur*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *secum commensurantur* (*are commensurate with one another*).

la: Vers. 10, in quo textu Vulgata praebuit *pro* praebet. — Dein multi codd. *distinctio* pro *distributio*; indebite.

en: Verse 10 [Ecclesiasticus 1:10], in which text the Vulgate read *praebuit* (*bestowed*) for *praebet* (*bestows*). — Then many codices [read] *distinctio* for *distributio*; improperly.

la: Cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3. et de seq. prop. d. 25. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. below, d. 26, q. 3, and on the following proposition, d. 25, p. II, a. 1, q. 1.

la: In cod. T additur *et minorem*.

en: In codex T there is added *et minorem* (*and lesser*).

la: Huius sententiae erat Magister Sententiarum, libro I. d. XVII. c. 1. seqq., ubi etiam c. 8. de augmentatione gratiae agitur. — Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 *quod caritas non est aliud* pro *quod caritas non esset aliud*.

en: Of this opinion was the Master of the Sentences, in Book I, d. 17, c. 1 ff., where in c. 8 the augmentation of grace is also treated. — Some codices, with edition 1, [read] *quod caritas non est aliud* for *quod caritas non esset aliud*.

la: Parte I. q. 1. et p. II. q. 1. seq. — Infra d. 26. q. 2.

en: Part I, q. 1, and p. II, q. 1 f. — Below, d. 26, q. 2.

en: Romans 12:3.

la: Supple cum Vat. *Angeli*.

en: Supply, with the Vatican edition, *Angeli* (*the Angels*).

la: De Casu diaboli, c. 3, ubi hoc ostenditur tali exemplo: *Si ego porrigo tibi aliquid, et tu accipis, non ideo do, quia accipis, sed ideo accipis, quia do, et est datio causa acceptionis.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 2. ad 6. — Ratio addita sumta est ex Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 8.), ubi docet quod in contradictorie oppositis valet consequentia *e converso*; respectu tamen privativorum, si *per se* sumuntur, oppositum valet: «Verumtamen non in privationibus [consequentia] *e converso*, sed contra se ipsa [in ipso] consequentiam necessarium est semper fieri, veluti visum sequi sensum, caecitatem autem insensibilitatem; opponitur enim sensus insensibilitati, ut habitus et privatio». Verba igitur S. Bonav. ita intelligenda. In privativis, quae se habent per modum contradictionis, v. g. habere gratiam et non habere gratiam [bonum et non bonum, ut ait Aristoteles], non tenet consequentia *in ipso*, sed *e contrario*. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 822, nota 1.

en: *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 3, where this is shown by such an example: *If I hold out something to you, and you receive it, I do not therefore give because you receive, but you therefore receive because I give, and the giving is the cause of the receiving.* Cf. I *Sentences*, d. 40, a. 4, q. 2, ad 6. — The added reasoning is taken from Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 8), where he teaches that in contradictorily opposed [terms] the consequence holds *conversely*; yet with respect to privatives, if they are taken *of themselves*, the opposite holds: «Nevertheless, not in privations [is the consequence valid] *conversely*, but it is necessary that the consequence always be made against the thing itself [in the thing itself], as sight follows sense [and] blindness follows insensibility; for sense is opposed to insensibility as habit and privation». The words of St. Bonaventure are therefore to be understood thus: in privatives which stand by way of contradiction — e.g. to have grace and not to have grace [good and not-good, as Aristotle says] — the consequence does not hold *in the thing itself*, but *conversely*. Cf. vol. I, p. 822, note 1.

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *naturae*; plures propter abbreviationem sunt dubiae lectionis. Paulo inferius multi codd. *propter beatitudinem perfectus* pro *et propter beatitudinem factus*.

en: Not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *naturae* (*of nature*); many, on account of the abbreviation, are of doubtful reading. A little below, many codices [read] *propter beatitudinem perfectus* (*perfected for the sake of beatitude*) for *et propter beatitudinem factus* (*and made for the sake of beatitude*). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Communis doctrina tenet, respectu hominum in statu naturae lapsae minime subsistere legem, quod gratia semper secundum maiorem vel minorem naturae capacitatem a Deo donetur (cfr. hic q. 9; S. Thom., S. I. q. 108. a. 4.); sed respectu Angelorum communiter docetur, Deum, gratis gratuita sua dona distribuentem, dictam legem sibi statuisse, non autem in eo sensu, quod gratiam dederit proprie intuitu naturae, quasi gratia sit debita vel naturae in se, vel meritis naturae viribus acquisitis. — Notabilis est solut. ad 4.

**II.** Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 62. a. 6. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 62. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 4. q. 2. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The common doctrine holds that, with respect to men in the state of fallen nature, the law by no means subsists that grace is always given by God according to the greater or lesser capacity of nature (cf. here, q. 9; St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 108, a. 4); but with respect to the Angels it is commonly taught that God, freely distributing His gratuitous gifts, set this said law for Himself — yet not in the sense that He gave grace properly with regard to nature, as though grace were owed either to nature in itself or to merits acquired by the powers of nature. — The solution to [argument] 4 is notable.

**II.** Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 62, a. 6. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I, q. 62, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, *Sentences* II, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, *Sentences* II, d. 4, q. 2, at the end.

---

translators_notes:
- s67 (2026-05-21): built from auto-chunked skeleton (raw 17535–17696) to Tier 2 — Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR base over 450 dpi PDF column-band crops of printed pp.245–247 (PDF 267–269), fresh literal English, 17-entry apparatus, 2-paragraph SCHOLION (I–II).
- Structure: 6 *videtur* arguments (marginal *Ad oppositum* — pro grace following greater natural capacity) + 6 *Contra* / *Fundamenta* arguments + CONCLUSIO (greater natural capacity has *neither efficacy of causality nor disposition of necessity, but only fallibly the disposition of congruity*) + Respondeo (the locked threefold *Distinctio* — *efficacia causalitatis* false / *dispositio congruitatis* true / *dispositio necessitatis* false — followed by the rejected *Alia opinio* identifying grace with God / charity with the Holy Spirit, disproved at I Sent. d.17 and below d.26) + Solutio oppositorum 1–6.
- Apparatus 17 entries spanning three pages, footer numbering restarting per page: p.245 footer ²–⁹ = [^1]–[^8] (p.245 footer ¹ belongs to the prior chunk `d9-a1-q2`); p.246 footer ¹–⁷ = [^9]–[^15]; p.247 footer ¹–² = [^16]–[^17]. The skeleton apparatus-audit (~25) overcounts per Lesson 9; true count 17. [^16] (Anselm *de Casu diaboli* + Aristotle *Topics* on privative opposition) is the densest entry — it wraps from the left footer column of p.247 to the right.
- Incoming cross-chunk boundary from `d9-a1-q2` CLEAN: q2's body crossed onto p.245 and took p.245 footer ¹ (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*); q3 opens p.245 with QUAESTIO III and takes p.245 footer ²+. Outgoing: q3 ends mid-p.247 (Solutio 6 `data sunt eis maiora gratuita`); SCHOLION I–II follow; then QUAESTIO IV opens on p.247 — **d9-a1-q4 takes p.247 footer ³+** (q4's first marker is ⁵ at `a digniori debet fieri denominatio`; p.247 footer ³, ⁴ belong to q4's arg. 1).
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Ad oppositum.*, *Fundamenta.*, *Distinctio.*, *Conclusio 1.* / *Conclusio 2.* / *Conclusio 3.*, *Alia opinio.*, *Ratio huius opinionis.*, *Falsum est fundam.*, *Item positio ipsa.*, *Ad 6. fundam.*, *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Non valet quod homines.*, *Notandum.* (×3 — Solutio 3, 4, 5).
- SCHOLION I closes `Notabilis est solut. ad 4`: IA OCR rendered the numeral `l`; the 450 dpi PDF shows `4` — read as 4 per the established pattern that the IA djvu OCR mis-renders `4` as `i`/`l` (cf. q1 [^6], q2 [^1], both cross-confirmed as 4).
- OCR garbles cleaned silently against the 450 dpi crops: capacitatem / praecellentia / glorificet / commetiantur / misericordiae / depurationem / concupiscentia / praedestinationis / retardativum / superinducta, etc. No `[?]` flags.
- **DISTINCTION 9 NOW 5/11.** Next chunk: `d9-a1-q4` *A quo ordo Angelorum denominetur* (raw 17697+, opens p.247).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt:
A quo ordo Angelorum denominetur
From what each order of Angels is named

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *A quo ordo Angelorum denominetur.*

Quarto quaeritur de ordinum nominatione; super quod dicit Gregorius[^1], quod «unusquisque ordo ab eo denominatur, quod plenius accepit in munere». Obiicitur autem contra hoc:

1. Quia quod non contingit cognoscere non contingit nominare[^2]; sed angelici spiritus sunt nobis ignoti, ergo sunt innominabiles. Si tu dicas, quod ipsi se nobis notificant, dum revelant; tunc ex hoc sequitur, quod uno solo nomine debeant nominari. Sic enim nominamus, sicut cognoscimus: ergo si per revelationem cognoscimus, omnes debemus nominare et dicere revelatores: ergo non est ibi ponere nominum distinctiones.

2. Item, «a digniori debet fieri denominatio»[^3]; sed caritas est excellentissimum donum, quod est in Angelis: ergo omnes debent denominari a caritate, ergo omnes debent dici Seraphim.

3. Item, «omnia dona sunt omnibus communia», sicut dicit Gregorius et Magister in littera[^4]; sed denominatio angelicorum ordinum fit a donis gratuitis: ergo omnia nomina eorum debent esse communia, quemadmodum et dona.

4. Item, si unusquisque ordo denominatur ab eo quod plenius accepit in munere; et supremus ordo omnia dona gratiarum plenius accepit quam ordines inferiores: ergo debet denominari ab omnibus donis: ergo habebit nomina omnium ordinum, sicut dona.

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5. Item, si dicitur ordo denominari ab eo quod plenius accepit in munere, aut excessus plenitudinis notatur respectu aliorum ordinum, aut respectu aliorum donorum. Si respectu aliorum ordinum, cum ordo inferior in nullo dono aliquem superiorum ordinum excellat, a nullo debet denominari. Si vero dicitur respectu aliorum donorum, tunc aut dona Angelorum erunt inaequalia, aut a nullo fiet denominatio. Sed dona gratiarum in eodem sunt aequalia, sicut infra patebit in tertio[^5]: ergo a nullo donorum potest denominari inferior ordo.

6. Item, in imagine reformata dilectio adaequatur cognitioni: ergo si ordo Cherubim denominatur a plenitudine scientiae, erit in eo similiter plenitudo dilectionis gratuitae: ergo nomen Cherubim et Seraphim eidem ordini Angelorum debet attribui et non aliis.

7. Item, cum ordo Cherubim denominatur a plenitudine scientiae, aut denominatur a plenitudine scientiae respectu inferiorum, aut respectu superiorum. Non respectu inferiorum, quia talis cognitio in eis non est nobilissima: denominatur ergo a cognitione respectu superiorum. Sed haec cognitio est sapientia: ergo denominatur a plenitudine sapientiae. Sed sapientia est excellentissimum omnium donorum: ergo Cherubim denominatur ab excellentissimo dono: ergo videtur, quod sit ordo supremus, vel quod dignior ordo non denominetur a digniori nomine.

8. Item, cum Angeli habeant quaedam nomina, quae sunt eis propria, quaedam, quae sunt communia, quaedam, quae sunt propria et possunt esse communia; quaeritur, quae sit istorum nominum ratio et differentia.

### Conclusio

> Angelorum denominatio quoad nomina singulis ordinibus propria sumta est a donis gratiarum secundum diversos status et gradus, in quibus distinguuntur et ordinantur.

**Respondeo:** Ad horum intelligentiam est notandum, *Nominari possunt tripliciter.* quod Angeli nominari possunt per ea quae sunt eis naturalia, nominari etiam possunt per ea quae sunt eis gratuita, nominari etiam possunt per aliqua, quae quodam modo sunt eis naturalia, quodam modo gratuita. — *Secundum naturalia.* Si denominantur per ea quae sunt eis naturalia, cum eorum natura non innotescat nobis in singulari, sed in communi, sic habent nominari nominibus communibus, sumtis a natura et forma communi; et hoc dupliciter: vel a communi remoto, et sic dicuntur caelestes essentiae; vel a communi propinquo, et sic dicuntur caelestes spiritus. — *Secundum gratuita.* Si autem denominentur secundum dona gratuita, sic, quia in ipsis differenter habent statum et gradum, et ita distinctionem, sic per illa[^6] habent ordines nominari nominibus propriis; propriis inquam sive respectu daemonum, sive respectu aliorum ordinum, sicut dicuntur Seraphim et Throni. — *Secundum utraque.* Si autem fiat denominatio ab his quae possunt esse naturalia, uno modo accipiendo, et alio modo accipiendo, gratuita; sic nomina possunt esse communia et propria[^7]: communia inquam bonis et malis, et propria bonis, sicut principatus et potestates, quae si dicantur a naturali proprietate, conveniunt daemonibus, si vero a dono gratuito, conveniunt sanctis Spiritibus; vel communia omnibus ordinibus, propria vero aliquibus, sicut Angeli et Virtutes. Si enim dicantur a naturalibus donis, utpote a limpiditate scientiae et fortitudine[^8] potentiae; sic, quia haec duo sunt in omnibus, omnes possunt dici Angeli, scilicet habiles ad revelandum; omnes etiam Virtutes, id est fortes ad operandum. Si autem dicantur a dono gratiae, secundum quod sunt ad haec officia specialiter deputati, scilicet ad mysteria revelanda et miracula facienda; sic sunt quorundam ordinum nomina propria. — *Conclusio.* Ex his igitur colligitur, quod denominatio Angelorum quantum ad nomina propria singulis ordinibus sumta est a donis gratiarum secundum diversos status et gradus, in quibus distinguuntur et ordinantur, sicut praedictum est[^9].

In modo autem accipiendi nomina ista, tria sunt consideranda. *Tria consideranda.* Primum quidem, quod unum donum dignius est altero, sicut caritas dicitur esse donum excellens inter alia. Secundum vero est, quod ordo superior in omnibus donis excellit inferiores. Tertium vero est, quod denominatio debet fieri a digniori. — Secundum hoc igitur, cum novem sint status, in quibus ordines angelici habeant disponi secundum differentem gratuitorum praecellentiam, ordo supremus vindicat sibi nomen a dignissimo dono et statu; ordo sequens a dono et statu magis accedente ad summum, et haec est plenitudo scientiae; et sic de aliis descendendo usque ad infimum. Unde in denominatione consideratur duplex excessus: et doni ad donum, et ordinis ad ordinem[^10]. Et istud vult dicere Gregorius, quod «unus<!-- page 249 -->quisque ordo eius rei censetur nomine, quam plenius accepit in munere», plenius, inquam, respectu inferiorum, nisi donum illud sit tantae dignitatis et excellentiae, quod ab ipso debeat denominari aliquis ordinum superiorum; sicut patet, quia ordo Cherubim plenius accepit caritatem quam aliquis inferiorum ordinum, ab ipsa tamen non denominatur, quia, cum sit donum praecellentissimum, excellentissimo ordini appropriatur. — His visis, facile est respondere ad obiecta.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod non sint noti; dicendum, quod verum est de cognitione, quae est per acquisitionem; sed non est verum de cognitione, quae est per revelationem, qualiter cognovit beatus Paulus et beatus Ioannes Evangelista; et ideo ipsi potuerunt denominare et alios erudire, sicut Paulus erudivit Dionysium[^11]. *Notandum.* Omnium tamen Angelorum nomina sumta sunt de sacra Scriptura, sicut Seraphim de Isaiae sexto[^12], Cherubim de Psalmis et de aliis locis Scripturae, Throni de Danielis septimo[^13]; Dominationes, Principatus, Potestates, Virtutes ex diversis locis Epistolarum Pauli, Angeli et Archangeli tam ex novi quam ex veteris Testamenti diversis locis. Quoniam igitur sacra Scriptura fuit divinitus inspirata, non humanitus adinventa, impositio nominum Angelorum potius fuit ex Dei revelatione quam ex humana investigatione.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod denominatio debet fieri a digniori; dicendum, quod non solum hoc attendendum est, quod denominatio rei fiat a digniori, sed etiam, quod nomen, quod pluribus convenit, attribuatur digniori; et ideo, quamvis omnes ordines a dono caritatis et ardoris denominari possent, quia tamen donum illud in supremo ordine praecellit, solus ille ordo ab eo debet denominari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia dona omnibus sunt communia; dicendum, quod sicut supra tactum fuit[^14], etsi sit in donis communitas quantum ad habitum, est tamen distinctio quantum ad statum. Denominatio autem non solum respicit substantiam habitus, sed etiam praecellentiam status.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ordo debet denominari ab eo munere, quod plenius accepit; dicendum, quod hoc non intelligendum est de omni eo quod plenius accepit, sed de eo quod plenius accepit et est in ipso dignissimum, maxime si ille sit ordo dignissimus; et si ordo sit immediate sequens illum, debet denominari ab eo quod immediate sequitur praecellentissimum donum; et sic consequenter descendendo usque ad infimum. Et sic patet responsio ad hoc et ad sequens, quoniam supremus a supremo debuit denominari, quia illud dignissimum est et plenissime accepit. Infimus vero ab infimo dono, quia, cum in omnibus excedatur ab aliis, nomen sumtum a dono ultimo sibi debuit relinqui, non quia illud plenius aliis possideret, sed quia alii denominati sunt ab eo quod plenius possidebant. Ex hoc consequenter factum est, ut infimus ordo denominaretur ab infimo dono. — Et si obiicitur, quod unum donum non est excellentius alio, quia dona sunt aequalia; dicendum, quod etsi sint aequalia intensive, nihilominus tamen est in eis praerogativa alicuius excellentiae, sicut caritas dicitur ab Apostolo[^15] maior esse fide et spe.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi maior est cognitio, maior est dilectio; dicendum, quod verum est, ad minus in gloria. Unde sicut in Seraphim est maior plenitudo dilectionis, est[^16] amplior plenitudo cognitionis; nec Cherubim dicuntur, quia sit in eis amplior plenitudo cognitionis simpliciter, sed respectu inferiorum ordinum.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae est excellentissimum; dicendum, quod sapientia, secundum quod est donum excellentissimum, est dicta a sapore, non a sapere, et ita includit caritatem[^17]; sed sapientia sive scientia, a qua denominantur Cherubim, nominat Dei cognitionem, quae etsi sit nobilissima cognitio et ordinata ad affectionem et ideo possit dici sapientia, non tamen est ita nobilis, ut dilectio, a qua est sapor. Et ideo in illa ratione in nomine sapientiae fit aequivocatio.

8. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, iam patet responsio ex praedictis.

english:
<!-- page 247 -->

### Question IV. *From what each order of Angels is named.*

Fourthly it is asked concerning the naming of the orders; on which Gregory[^1] says that «each order is named from that which it received more fully as a gift». But it is objected against this:

1. Because that which it does not happen [for us] to know it does not happen [for us] to name[^2]; but the angelic spirits are unknown to us, therefore they are unnameable. If you say that they make themselves known to us when they reveal [things], then from this it follows that they ought to be named by one single name. For we name in the way that we know: therefore, if we know [them] through revelation, we ought all to name [them] and call them revealers: therefore there is no place there for distinctions of names.

2. Likewise, «a naming ought to be made from the worthier»[^3]; but charity is the most excellent gift that is in the Angels: therefore all ought to be named from charity, therefore all ought to be called Seraphim.

3. Likewise, «all gifts are common to all», as Gregory and the Master say in the text[^4]; but the naming of the angelic orders is made from the gratuitous gifts: therefore all their names ought to be common, just as the gifts also [are].

4. Likewise, if each order is named from that which it received more fully as a gift; and the supreme order received all the gifts of graces more fully than the inferior orders: therefore it ought to be named from all the gifts: therefore it will have the names of all the orders, just as [it has] the gifts.

<!-- page 248 -->

5. Likewise, if an order is said to be named from that which it received more fully as a gift, either the excess of fullness is noted with respect to the other orders, or with respect to the other gifts. If with respect to the other orders, since an inferior order excels none of the superior orders in any gift, it ought to be named from none. But if it is said [to be] with respect to the other gifts, then either the gifts of the Angels will be unequal, or a naming will be made from none. But the gifts of graces in the same [angel] are equal, as will be made clear below in [Book] three[^5]: therefore an inferior order can be named from none of the gifts.

6. Likewise, in the reformed image love is made equal to knowledge: therefore, if the order of the Cherubim is named from the fullness of knowledge, there will be in it likewise a fullness of gratuitous love: therefore the name Cherubim and Seraphim ought to be attributed to the same order of Angels and not to others.

7. Likewise, since the order of the Cherubim is named from the fullness of knowledge, either it is named from the fullness of knowledge with respect to the inferior [orders], or with respect to the superior [orders]. Not with respect to the inferior, because such knowledge in them is not the noblest: therefore it is named from knowledge with respect to the superior. But this knowledge is wisdom: therefore it is named from the fullness of wisdom. But wisdom is the most excellent of all the gifts: therefore the Cherubim are named from the most excellent gift: therefore it seems that it is the supreme order, or that the worthier order is not named from the worthier name.

8. Likewise, since the Angels have certain names which are proper to them, certain which are common, certain which are proper and can be common; it is asked what is the account and difference of these names.

### Conclusion

> The naming of the Angels, as to the names proper to the individual orders, is taken from the gifts of graces according to the diverse states and grades in which they are distinguished and ordered.

**I respond:** For the understanding of these things it must be noted *They can be named in three ways.* that the Angels can be named through those things which are natural to them, can also be named through those things which are gratuitous to them, [and] can also be named through certain things which are in one way natural to them, in another way gratuitous. — *According to natural [endowments].* If they are named through those things which are natural to them, since their nature does not become known to us in particular, but in common, they thus have to be named by common names taken from a common nature and form; and this in two ways: either from the remote common [character], and so they are called heavenly essences; or from the proximate common [character], and so they are called heavenly spirits. — *According to gratuitous [gifts].* But if they are named according to the gratuitous gifts, then, since in these they have a state and grade differently, and thus a distinction, the orders in this way have to be named through them[^6] by proper names; proper, I say, whether with respect to the demons or with respect to the other orders, as they are called Seraphim and Thrones. — *According to both.* But if the naming is made from those things which can be — taken in one way — natural, and — taken in another way — gratuitous; then the names can be common and proper[^7]: common, I say, to the good and the wicked, and proper to the good, like Principalities and Powers, which, if they are named from a natural property, belong to the demons, but if from a gratuitous gift, belong to the holy Spirits; or [they can be] common to all the orders, but proper to certain ones, like Angels and Virtues. For if they are named from the natural gifts — namely, from the clarity of knowledge and the fortitude[^8] of power — then, since these two are in all, all can be called Angels, that is, fit for revealing; all also Virtues, that is, strong for working. But if they are named from the gift of grace, according as they are specially deputed to these offices — namely, to revealing mysteries and working miracles — then they are the proper names of certain orders. — *Conclusion.* From these things, therefore, it is gathered that the naming of the Angels, as to the names proper to the individual orders, is taken from the gifts of graces according to the diverse states and grades in which they are distinguished and ordered, as has been said[^9].

But in the manner of taking these names, three things are to be considered. *Three things to be considered.* The first indeed, that one gift is worthier than another, as charity is said to be a gift excellent among the others. The second is that a superior order excels the inferior ones in all the gifts. The third is that a naming ought to be made from the worthier. — According to this, therefore, since there are nine states in which the angelic orders have to be arranged according to a differing precellence of the gratuitous [gifts], the supreme order claims for itself a name from the worthiest gift and state; the following order from a gift and state more closely approaching the highest, and this is the fullness of knowledge; and so concerning the others, descending down to the lowest. Hence in the naming a twofold excess is considered: both of gift over gift, and of order over order[^10]. And this is what Gregory means [when he says] that «each<!-- page 249 -->order is reckoned by the name of that thing which it received more fully as a gift», more fully, I say, with respect to the inferior [orders], unless that gift be of such dignity and excellence that one of the superior orders ought to be named from it; as is clear, since the order of the Cherubim received charity more fully than any of the inferior orders, yet is not named from it, because, since it is a most precellent gift, it is appropriated to the most excellent order. — These things having been seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].* 1. To that, then, which is objected — that they are not known — it must be said that this is true of the knowledge which is through acquisition; but it is not true of the knowledge which is through revelation, in which manner blessed Paul and blessed John the Evangelist knew [them]; and therefore they were able to name [them] and to instruct others, as Paul instructed Dionysius[^11]. *Note.* Nevertheless the names of all the Angels are taken from sacred Scripture, as Seraphim from Isaiah six[^12], Cherubim from the Psalms and from other places of Scripture, Thrones from Daniel seven[^13]; Dominations, Principalities, Powers, Virtues from diverse places of the Epistles of Paul, Angels and Archangels from diverse places both of the New and of the Old Testament. Since, therefore, sacred Scripture was divinely inspired, not humanly devised, the imposition of the names of the Angels was rather from the revelation of God than from human investigation.

2. To that which is objected — that a naming ought to be made from the worthier — it must be said that not only must this be attended to, that the naming of a thing be made from the worthier, but also that a name which befits several should be attributed to the worthier; and therefore, although all the orders could be named from the gift of charity and ardor, yet because that gift precels in the supreme order, that order alone ought to be named from it.

3. To that which is objected — that all gifts are common to all — it must be said that, as was touched on above[^14], although there is in the gifts a commonness as to the habit, there is nevertheless a distinction as to the state. But the naming regards not only the substance of the habit, but also the precellence of the state.

4. 5. To that which is objected — that an order ought to be named from the gift which it received more fully — it must be said that this is not to be understood of everything which it received more fully, but of that which it received more fully and is the worthiest thing in it, especially if that be the worthiest order; and if an order be that which immediately follows it, it ought to be named from that which immediately follows the most precellent gift; and so consequently descending down to the lowest. And thus the response to this and to the following [objection] is clear, since the supreme [order] had to be named from the supreme, because that is the worthiest and it received [it] most fully. But the lowest [had to be named] from the lowest gift, because, since it is exceeded by the others in all [things], the name taken from the last gift had to be left to it — not because it possessed that more fully than the others, but because the others were named from that which they possessed more fully. From this it consequently came about that the lowest order was named from the lowest gift. — And if it is objected that one gift is not more excellent than another, because the gifts are equal; it must be said that, even if they are equal intensively, there is nevertheless in them a prerogative of some excellence, as charity is said by the Apostle[^15] to be greater than faith and hope.

6. To that which is objected — that where knowledge is greater, love is greater — it must be said that this is true, at least in glory. Hence, just as in the Seraphim there is a greater fullness of love, [so] there is[^16] a fuller fullness of knowledge; nor are they called Cherubim because there is in them a fuller fullness of knowledge absolutely, but with respect to the inferior orders.

7. To that which is objected — that the gift of wisdom is the most excellent — it must be said that wisdom, according as it is the most excellent gift, is named from *sapor* (taste, savor), not from *sapere* (to be wise), and thus includes charity[^17]; but the wisdom or knowledge from which the Cherubim are named denotes the knowledge of God, which, although it is the noblest knowledge and ordered to affection and therefore can be called wisdom, is nevertheless not so noble as the love from which is the savor. And therefore in that argument an equivocation is made in the name of wisdom.

8. To that which is asked last, the response is now clear from the foregoing.

la: In Evang. hom. 34. n. 14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. seq.

en: [Gregory,] *Homilies on the Gospels*, hom. 34, n. 14. See here the text of the Master, c. 3 f.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 22. q. 1.

en: Cf. I *Sentences*, d. 22, q. 1.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 49. (c. 4.). Vide tom. I. pag. 14, nota 7.

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 49 (c. 4). See vol. I, p. 14, note 7.

la: Hic c. 3.

en: Here, c. 3 [of the text of the Master].

la: Dist. 36. a. 1. q. 5. — Paulo superius post *tunc* cod. aa prosequitur *cum dona Angelorum sint aequalia, a nullo fiet denominatio* etc.

en: [III *Sentences*,] dist. 36, a. 1, q. 5. — A little above, after *tunc* (*then*), codex aa continues *cum dona Angelorum sint aequalia, a nullo fiet denominatio* (*since the gifts of the Angels are equal, a naming will be made from none*) etc.

la: Vat. *per illam*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *per illam* (*through it* [fem. sing.]).

la: Plures codd. ut H T W bb ee post *possunt esse* addunt *et*; cod. A verbo *gratuita* praemittit *possunt esse*. Paulo inferius Vat. post primum *conveniunt* adiicit *etiam* et post secundum subiungit *solum*.

en: Several codices, such as H T W bb ee, after *possunt esse* (*can be*) add *et* (*and*); codex A prefixes *possunt esse* to the word *gratuita*. A little below, the Vatican edition, after the first *conveniunt* (*they belong*), adds *etiam* (*also*), and after the second appends *solum* (*only*).

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 2 *formatione*.

en: Very many codices, with edition 2, [read] *formatione* (*by the formation*) [for *fortitudine*].

la: Hic et q. 2. et in Praenotatis ad hanc distinctionem.

en: Here, and [in] q. 2, and in the Prefatory Notes to this distinction.

la: Quod in cod. Q (a secunda manu in marg.) ita explicatur: *Unde denominantur a donis secundum gradum excellentiae ipsorum ordinum, ut excellenti primo gradu detur donum excellentiae primae, et excellenti secundo gradu donum excellentiae secundae, et sic de aliis gradatim descendendo usque ad infimum.*

en: Which in codex Q (by a second hand in the margin) is explained thus: *Hence they are named from the gifts according to the grade of excellence of the orders themselves, so that to [the order] excelling in the first grade is given the gift of the first excellence, and to [the order] excelling in the second grade the gift of the second excellence, and so concerning the others, gradually descending down to the lowest.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 241, nota 5. — Immediate post cod. aa *Omnia* pro *Omnium*.

en: Cf. above, p. 241, note 5. — Immediately after, codex aa [reads] *Omnia* for *Omnium*.

la: Vers. 2. et 6. — Cherubim nominantur in Ps. 17, 11; 79, 2; 98, 1; Gen. 3, 24; Isai. 37, 16; Ezech. 10, 1.

en: [Isaiah 6,] verses 2 and 6. — The Cherubim are named in Psalms 17:11; 79:2; 98:1; Genesis 3:24; Isaiah 37:16; Ezekiel 10:1.

la: Vers. 9. — De seqq. nominibus *Dominationes* etc. cfr. Rom. 8, 38; I. Cor. 15, 24; Eph. 1, 21; 3, 10; Col. 1, 16; 2, 10; I. Tim. 3, 16.

en: [Daniel 7,] verse 9. — Concerning the following names, *Dominations* etc., cf. Romans 8:38; I Corinthians 15:24; Ephesians 1:21; 3:10; Colossians 1:16; 2:10; I Timothy 3:16.

la: Quaest. 2. ad 4.

en: [Above,] question 2, ad 4.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13.

en: [The Apostle,] Epistle I to the Corinthians 13:13.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *ita est*; supple: *in eis*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *ita est* (*it is so*); supply: *in eis* (*in them*).

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et supra pag. 129, nota 2.

en: Cf. III *Sentences*, d. 35, a. 1, q. 1, and above, p. 129, note 2. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio quaestionis nititur hoc principio, quod omnis denominatio est a forma completiva et digniore, nisi haec forma in maiore gradu competat superiori. In hoc enim casu nomen dignioris formae superiori reservatur; inferior autem nominatur ab alia forma. Exemplum affert Petr. a Tar. (hic q. unica, a. 3.): «Sicut homo non denominatur a sensitiva potentia, quia habet nobiliorem, nec ab intellectiva, quia habet eam incomplete [Angeli autem completius], sed a ratione».

**II.** S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 108. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 80. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of the question rests on this principle, that every naming is from the completive and worthier form, unless this form belongs in a greater grade to the superior [thing]. For in this case the name of the worthier form is reserved to the superior; but the inferior is named from another form. Peter of Tarentaise (here, the single question, a. 3) offers an example: «Just as a man is not named from the sensitive power, because he has a nobler [one], nor from the intellective, because he has it incompletely [whereas the Angels {have it} more completely], but from reason».

**II.** St. Thomas, here, the single question, a. 4; *Summa* I, q. 108, a. 5; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 80. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 1, dub. lat. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 3. — Biel, here, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
- s68 (2026-05-21): built from auto-chunked skeleton (raw 17697–17874) to Tier 2 — Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR base over 450 dpi PDF column-band crops of printed pp.247–249 (PDF 269–271), fresh literal English, 17-entry apparatus, 2-paragraph SCHOLION (I–II).
- **Page-range correction:** the task packet listed printed pp.247–250, but eyes-on PDF column bands show q4's body (Respondeo, Solutio 1–8, SCHOLION I–II) closes on **p.249**; **p.250 holds only QUAESTIO V** (`Utrum ad singulos ordines Angelorum fiat assumtio salvandorum`, `Quinto quaeritur de ordinum reparatione…`). Frontmatter `printed_pages`/`pdf_pages` corrected to [247,248,249]/[269,270,271] — no q4 text or footnote lies on p.250; all p.250 footers belong to q5.
- Structure: opening (Gregorius *unusquisque ordo ab eo denominatur quod plenius accepit in munere*) + 8 *Obiicitur* objections + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (the threefold *Nominari possunt tripliciter* — *secundum naturalia* / *secundum gratuita* / *secundum utraque* — then the *Tria consideranda*) + Solutio oppositorum 1, 2, 3, 4.5 (combined reply), 6, 7, 8 + SCHOLION I–II.
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- OCR garbles cleaned silently against the 450 dpi crops: *innominabiles* / *notificant* / *revelatores* / *excellentissimum* / *inaequalia* / *adaequatur* / *praecellentissimum* / *appropriatur* / *adinventa* / *aequivocatio* / *limpiditate*, the cascade-shattered Respondeo opener (`Nominari possunt tripliciter` marginal spliced inline as `piciier.`/`possunt Lri-`), and the diagonally fragmented p.248 footers. The OCR's `a dignori` (obj. 2) corrected to `a digniori` against the PDF; `«omnia dona sunt omnibus communia»` (obj. 3) restored from the PDF where OCR ran `oinnia`/`commu- nia`. No genuinely ambiguous readings.
- **No [?] flags raised.**
- **DISTINCTION 9 NOW 6/11.** Next chunk: `d9-a1-q5` *Utrum ad singulos ordines Angelorum fiat assumtio salvandorum* (raw 17875+, opens p.250).