site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 1, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: Whether the Sacraments are effective of grace

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *De Sacramentorum efficacia.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae effectiva. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia ista assignatur differentia Sacramentorum novae legis ad Sacramenta veteris legis, quod haec efficiunt, illa solum figurant[^1]; sed quod efficit est causa efficiens: ergo Sacramenta novae legis sunt gratiae effectiva.

2. Item, Hugo[^2] dicit, « quod Sacramenta novae legis infusa sibi primum benedictione sanctificant »; et alibi dicit, quod sunt « ex sanctificatione sanctificantia »; sed non sanctificatur anima nisi per gratiam: ergo efficiunt ipsam gratiam in anima.

3. Item, Magister in definitione Sacramenti in littera[^3] dicit, quod « Sacramentum est quod similitudinem gerit et causa existit »; sed non *formalis* neque *finalis* neque *materialis*, ut supra monstratum est: ergo *a divisione* est causa *efficiens*.

4. Item, idem *ratione* videtur, quia signum institutum humana institutione potest in nobis aggenerare spiritualem cognitionem et affectionem, sicut circulus ante domum aggenerat cognitionem in anima transeuntis, quod ibi sit vinum; et patibulum et signa belli aggenerant timorem: ergo si divina institutio multo potentior est quam humana, et Sacramenta sunt signa secundum divinam institutionem[^4]; possunt in nobis aggenerare multo nobiliorem effectum: ergo possunt efficere gratiam.

5. Item, « opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem[^5] »; unde nihil est susceptibile culpae, nisi sit susceptibile gratiae, et e converso: cum ergo caro, quae est quid corporale, possit adeo vitiari, ut efficiat et generet culpam in anima, quae sibi unitur; ergo Sacramentum corporale poterit sanctificari adeo, quod transfundat gratiam: nihil ergo prohibet, quod efficiat in anima gratiam spiritualem.

6. Item, sicut in generatione carnis est generans et generatus et ulterius quo mediante fit generatio; ita in spirituali regeneratione est regenerans Christus, regeneratus homo, et illud quo mediante fit regeneratio, scilicet Sacramentum: ergo sicut semen, quod erat medium in generatione carnali, defert culpam, eadem ratione Sacramentum defert gratiam, quae facit filium[^6]; sed non defert essentialiter: ergo defert causaliter. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia facilius est male facere sive vitiare quam bene facere; hoc nihil est: quia nunquam Adam fuit potentior ad malum vel eius culpa, quin Christus sit potentior ad bonum et eius passio[^7]; sed Adam sua culpa potuit vitiare omnem carnem: ergo Christus sua passione potuit adeo sanctificare Sacramenta, ut ipsa sanctificata animas sanctificarent et gratiam darent.

7. Item, dicit Anselmus *de Conceptu virginali*[^8], quod « si Adam stetisset, transfunderet iustitiam originalem »; sed hoc non potest esse nisi mediante carne corporali: ergo multo magis Christus potest mediante corporali Sacramento transfundere iustitiam gratuitam.

**Contra:**
1. Omnis causa *efficiens* est nobilior suo effectu, et nullum corporale nobilius est aliquo spirituali: cum igitur gratia sit spiritualis, Sacramentum corporale, ut dicit Hugo[^9]; nullum Sacramentum est causa efficiens ipsius gratiae.

2. Item, Magister in littera[^10] dicit, quod « non est gratia *ab illis*, sed *per illa* »: ergo videtur, quod non sint sicut canales, non sicut fons: ergo non sunt causa efficiens gratiae, sicut nec canales aquae.

3. Item, Hugo[^11] dicit, quod « gratia non est *ex ipsis* Sacramentis, sed *in ipsis* »; sed constat, quod *in ipsis* dicit causam efficientem, sicut patet ibi: ergo etc.

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4. Item, super illud Psalmi[^12]: *Benedicam Dominum, qui tribuit mihi intellectum*; Glossa dicit: « Deus per semetipsum irradiat pias mentes »: ergo cum illa irradiatio fiat per lumen gratiae, constat, quod gratia est a Deo immediate: non ergo a Sacramentis.

5. Item, « virtus est, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur[^13] »: si ergo non operatur in nobis virtutem per subiectam creaturam, per consequens nec gratiam.

6. Item, ordo debet servari in agentibus: ergo Deus per minus nobile non debet influere in magis nobile; sed anima nobilior est Sacramento: ergo Deus non influit per Sacramentum gratiam in animam: ergo gratia a solo Deo est *effective*. Si igitur Sacramentum est gratiae causa, hoc est solum *dispositive*.

*Quaeritur ergo, utrum Sacramentum sit causa* disponens *ad gratiam. Quod sic, videtur:*

1. Quia si Sacramenta novae legis essent solum causa *sine qua non*, tunc ergo in ratione causandi non differrent a Sacramentis legis veteris et essent in onus[^14]; sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

2. Item, tam Hugo[^15] quam Magister in littera quam etiam alii dicunt, quod Deus per Sacramenta regenerat animam: ergo Sacramentum est medium actionis divinae in animam; sed omne medium agendi aut est *deferens virtutem*, aut *disponens*; sed Sacramentum non *defert*: ergo *disponit*.

3. Item, « Sacramenta sunt medicinae spirituales[^16] »; sed medicina corporalis disponit ad sanitatem corporalem: ergo medicina spiritualis disponit ad sanitatem spiritualem.

4. Item, si nihil disponerent nec cooperarentur ad sanitatem animae, aeque bene sine his posset fieri salus, sicut cum eis: ergo imposita nobis in nova lege potius dicenda sunt onera quam medicamina, et lex nova lex oneris, non suavitatis[^17].

**Sed contra:**
1. Dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit, non solum natura, sed etiam tempore[^18]; sed simul est Sacramenti perceptio et gratiae infusio tempore: ergo Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam.

2. Item, gratia ex nihilo et subito creatur[^19], ergo nullo indiget disponente ad hoc, ut sit: ergo Sacramenta non disponunt ad gratiam. — *Si dicas*, quod non disponunt ad hoc, quod gratia sit, sed ad hoc, quod insit ipsi animae, unde habilitant ipsam animam disponendo ad gratiae susceptionem; *contra*: *esse* gratiae est suum *inesse*, cum sit accidens[^20]: ergo si non habet dispositionem ad hoc, quod *sit*, nec ad hoc, quod *insit*.

3. Item, si Sacramenta disponunt animam et habilitant, ergo influunt in ipsam; sed nullum corporale influit in aliquod spirituale[^21]: ergo Sacramenta, cum sint corporalia, non influunt in animam: ergo non habilitant ipsam nec *disponunt*.

*Si dicas* forte, quod in ipsis Sacramentis est aliqua *virtus spiritualis*, per quam influunt in animam; quaeritur ergo ratione huius, utrum in Sacramentis sit aliqua virtus, per quam influant in ipsam animam. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia illa virtus aut est *substantia*, aut *accidens*. Si *substantia*, aut Deus, aut Angelus, aut anima; nullum horum esse[^22], certum est, quia si illa virtus est de Sacramento, tunc Deus est de Sacramento. Si *accidens*, sed nullum accidens *spirituale* est in subiecto *corporali*: ergo aut illa virtus est *corporalis*, et sic non influet; aut si est *spiritualis*, non est in Sacramento.

2. Item, illa virtus est *bonum*, constat; aut ergo est bonum *magnum*, aut *mediocre*, aut *parvum*, sicut dividit Augustinus[^23]. Non de *maioribus*, quia tunc esset gratia; nec virtus gratuita, quae est in sola anima; non *mediocre*, quia talia sunt potentiae animae: ergo est bonum *infimum*. Sed hoc est bonum *corporale*: ergo illa virtus non est *spiritualis* et non influit in animam.

3. Item, nullum *corporale* recipitur in *spirituali corporaliter*, sed solum *spiritualiter*[^24]: ergo similiter nullum *spirituale* recipitur in corpore *spiritualiter*, sed *corporaliter*: ergo illa virtus, cum sit in Sacramentis, est ibi *corporaliter*, et ita non est potens influere in animam: ergo frustra est ibi.

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4. Item, « omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum recipientis et non recepti », sicut dicit Boethius[^25]: ergo illa virtus recipitur in Sacramento corporali per modum corporis: ergo etc. — *Si dicas*, quod verum est, loquendo naturaliter; sed illa virtus est ibi mirabiliter, et supra naturam; *contra*: quantumcumque sit ibi supra[^26] naturam et qualitercumque, tamen est ignobilior ipsa anima; non ergo influit in ipsam: ergo si non ponitur ob aliud, manifestum est etc.

**Contra:**
1. Beda[^27] dicit, quod « Dominus contactu mundissimae carnis suae dedit vim regenerativam aquis »: ergo aliqua vis collata est ipsis aquis; sed haec non potuit esse nisi creata, quia collata est creaturae, et cum esset ad regenerandum, non potuit esse nisi spiritualis, quia operis spiritualis virtus est spiritualis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in tertia distinctione[^28]: « Quae est virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat »? Ergo aliqua virtus est in Sacramento, qua abluitur cor: ergo spiritualis.

3. Item, videmus, quod opera divinae *iustitiae* fiunt ministerio creaturae corporalis, quae habet a Deo vim aliquam, per quam possit agere in animam — alioquin non posset — sicut patet in igne purgatorio[^29]: ergo in operibus *misericordiae*, quae fiunt per Sacramenta, erit, quod Sacramenta habeant aliquam virtutem a Deo sibi collatam, per quam agant in animam.

4. Item, videmus, quod si aliquis contritus accedat ad baptismum, etsi non conferatur ei gratia, quia iam habet eam, tamen confertur ei remissio omnis poenae, quam non habebat prius[^30]: ergo baptismus supra collationem gratiae addit remissionem poenae: ergo aliqua virtus est in baptismo praeter virtutem gratiae; eadem ratione in aliis Sacramentis novae legis.

5. Item, si nulla esset virtus ibi, tunc ergo rediret inconveniens saepe dictum, quod non differrent a Sacramentis veteris legis.

### Conclusio

> Probabilis est opinio, cum suis rationibus primo posita, quod Sacramenta respectu gratiae gratum facientis sint causa *sine qua non*, respectu vero characteris et ornatus sint causa efficiens, respectu denique efficaciae gratiae et sanationis potentiarum sint causa disponens. Probabilis etiam est alia opinio, quae negat, ipsis Sacramentis datam esse virtutem efficientem per modum qualitatis absolutae, non relativae.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui volunt dicere, quod in Sacramentis[^31] est aliqua *virtus creata*, per quam influunt in animam et habent rationem causandi differenter. Dicunt enim, quod in Sacramentis datur *gratia gratum faciens*; datur etiam in eis *gratia gratis data*, sicut est character et ornatus animae; datur etiam *debilitatio fomitis* sive expeditio potentiarum, haec est efficacia gratiae. Dicunt ergo, quod respectu *gratiae gratum facientis* sunt sicut causa *sine qua non*; respectu *characteristicationis*[^32] et ornatus sint sicut causa *efficiens*; respectu illius virtutis, respectu scilicet *debilitationis fomitis* sive roboris potentiarum, sunt causa *disponens*. — Et hoc manifestum est. Nam sicut videmus, quod in purgatione per ignem purgatorium est ipsa *anima* purgabilis, habens reatum vel maculam venialem; est[^33] *gratia* intra animam, quia sine ipsa non fieret purgatio; est rursus *virtus ignis*: sic in Sacramento est *anima* habens defectum et debilitatem potentiarum; est iterum *gratia* in anima intus operans; est iterum *virtus Sacramenti exterior*; et his concurrentibus roborantur et sanantur potentiae, et gratia fit efficacior in sua operatione mediante virtute Sacramenti. Sic ergo dicunt, quod Sacramentum est causa gratiae ut *sine qua non*, scilicet *gratum facientis*; est causa *characteris* et ornatus *efficiens*; est causa *efficaciae*[^34] gratiae et sanationis potentiarum ut *disponens*; et hoc per virtutem, quae est in ipso Sacramento, spiritualem et a Deo collatam sibi. — His visis, manifesta est secundum hos responsio ad obiecta.

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*Solutio oppositorum quaestionis principalis.*
1, 2. Ad illud enim quod quaeritur primo, utrum sint causa *efficiens* gratiae gratum facientis; dicunt, quod non. Quod ergo obiicitur de differentia horum Sacramentorum et illorum[^35]; dicunt, quod differentia attenditur ratione *characteristicationis* et ornatus et *efficaciae gratiae*. Et sic respondent ad illud Hugonis, quod de illa sanctificatione intelligitur.

3. Similiter dicunt de eo quod dicit Magister, quod sit[^36] causa; tamen si intelligatur quantum ad gratiam gratum facientem, dicunt, quod est causa *sine qua non*. — *Aliter* etiam dicunt, quod potest dici, quod sit causa *disponens* vel ad hoc, quod *insit*, vel ad hoc, quod *efficax* sit, et hoc ratione operis *operati*; non sic autem erat in illis Sacramentis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod signum ex humana institutione generat cognitionem et affectionem spiritualem; dicunt, quod hoc est solum *dispositive*[^37] sive occasionaliter, non *effective*; immo ipsa anima conferendo in semetipsa cognitionem generat et affectionem; sicut patet exemplo manifesto, quod alii vident patibulum et timent, alii non; tamen per hoc non potest ostendi, quod Sacramentum sit causa *efficiens gratiae*.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de transfusione culpae mediante carne, dicunt, quod sicut *gratia* non est in aliquo corporali, sic nec *culpa*. Sed tamen *vitiositas* in carne habere potest rationem efficiendi *culpam* in anima; non sic *virtus Sacramenti gratiam*. Et causa huius est, quia *gratia* est effectus nobilior omni virtute corporali et fit ex nihilo, et hoc[^38] est solius Dei; sed effectus *culpae* dicit ignobilitatem et imperfectionem et defectum. Ideo omnia argumenta illa non valent, quae fiunt per similitudinem gratiae ad culpam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus potentior est in bonum; dicunt, quod verum est; nec tamen sequitur ex hoc, quodsi Adam transmittit culpam mediante carne, quod Christus transmittat gratiam mediante Sacramento. Nam istud esset inordinatio; *praeterea*, sicut creatura non potest recipere potestatem creandi, sic nec dandi gratiam[^39].

7. Ad illud Anselmi dicunt, quod non intelligitur, quod transfunderet iustitiam carne mediante, sed quod omnes posteri haberent illam iustitiam a Deo, quia non esset impedimentum ex parte carnis.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum Sacramentum sit causa *disponens*; dicunt, quod sic, sicut tactum fuit[^40]; quia disponit ad *efficaciam gratiae*, remittendo fomitem, qui impedit operationem gratiae; vel, sicut tactum fuit[^41], disponit ad hoc, quod *gratia insit* animae, quamvis non disponat ad hoc, quod *sit*. Et hoc est dicere, quod gratia comparatur ad *causam efficientem*, comparatur ad *substantiam suscipientem*. Sacramentum autem non disponit a parte *agentis*, qui est Deus, sed a parte *suscipientis*, quod est anima.

2. Et sic patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia est ex nihilo; dicunt enim, quod Sacramentum non disponit ad gratiam ratione eius *ex quo*, sed ratione eius *in quod recipitur*[^42].

*Ad argumenta pro parte negativa primae quaestionis lateralis.*
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dispositio praecedit illud, ad quod disponit; dicunt, quod non semper praecedit *tempore*, sicut patet in dispositione, quae est *necessitas* sive in dispositione ultima[^43]; sic Sacramentum digne susceptum disponit dispositione ultima, quae simul est *tempore* cum gratia, sed *natura* prior, sicut ex parte illius.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si disponit, influit; dicunt, quod *influit*. — Quod ergo obiicitur[^44], quod nullum corporale influit in spirituale; dicunt, quod in Sacramento est aliqua *virtus spiritualis*, per quam influit in animam. Tamen illa ratio non valet secundum eos, quia in anima mundanda est considerare ipsam *substantiam* et ipsam *maculam*, a qua mundatur; et licet secundum *substantiam* sit superior omni corpore, tamen ratione *maculae* vel defectus est inferior.

*Ad argumenta pro parte negativa secundae quaestionis lateralis.*
Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit in Sacramentis ponere virtutem creatam; dicunt, quod sic.
1. Quod ergo quaeritur, utrum substantia, aut[^45] accidens; dicunt, quod *accidens*. — Quod iterum quaeritur, utrum accidens *corporale*, aut *spirituale*; dicunt, quod *spirituale*. — Quod obiicitur postea, quod accidens spirituale non est in subiecto corporali; dicunt, quod verum est naturaliter, sed ipsum Sacramentum habet illam virtutem supra naturam secundum ordinem divinae misericordiae, sicut

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virtus est in igne purgatorio secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae supra naturam ignis. Et quod amplius est ex parte hac, quia Sacramentum non est subiectum naturale sive secundum naturam; et ideo non est mirum, si habeat virtutem supra naturam.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit bonum maximum etc.; dicunt, quod virtus illa ponenda est inter bona *mediocria*, quia est infra gratiam et supra corpus. — *Si obiicias*, quod tale bonum est animae potentiae; dicunt, quod Augustinus non excludit propter hoc, quin alia sint; sed illud dicit exemplando vel arctando bonum ad subiectum humanum[^46]. — *Si vero obiicias*, quod non aget vel influet in potentias animae, cum sit *mediocre*, et influxus sit a superiori; dicunt, quod non influit in potentias ratione potentiarum, sed ratione ipsarum deficientium per culpam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de receptione substantiae spiritualis; dicunt, quod non est simile: quia, si substantia *spiritualis* reciperet corporale corporaliter, tunc derogaretur ipsi substantiae nec perficeretur in ipsa receptione; sed si aliquod *materiale*[^47] recipiat spirituale spiritualiter, non derogaretur ei in aliquo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne quod recipitur, est in recipiente per modum recipientis; dicunt, quod hoc verum est de receptione *naturali*; sed haec est *supra naturam*. *Praeterea*, ipsum Sacramentum, secundum quod huiusmodi, est medicina spiritualis; et ideo debet habere virtutem spiritualem. In naturalibus autem[^48] maxime consideratur *materia*, sed in divinis maxime et principaliter consideratur *finis*; ideo, quia in Sacramentis non consideratur ratio *materiae*, sed *finis*, conveniens fuit secundum ipsos virtutem spiritualem in eis ponere.

Ad aliud[^49] secundum eos iam responsum est, quia nobilior est virtus ista, minus nobilis anima lapsa, non ratione substantiae, sed ratione lapsus. — Et patent hoc modo cetera obiecta secundum hanc opinionem. Et haec opinio est magnorum[^50].

*Opinio 2 cum conclusione.*
Est etiam aliorum magnorum circa hoc opinio dicentium, quod in Sacramentis non sit *causalitas* neque *virtus* aliqua, nec *effectiva* nec *dispositiva* ad gratiam, quae sit *qualitas* vel proprietas aliqua *absoluta*, sed *per quandam assistentiam*. Sacramento enim dicunt assistere divinam virtutem, quae est causa gratiae, et fidem et devotionem suscipientis[^51], quae disponit ad gratiam. — Et adducunt simile: quoniam ad verbum Elisaei, Naaman se lavante, astitit virtus divina *effectiva* sanitatis et devotio et obedientia Naaman *dispositiva*; nulla tamen causalitas fuit nec in verbo Elisaei nec in aqua Iordanis[^52]. Si ergo Dominus ita instituisset, ut ad verbum Elisaei non solum ipse Naaman, sed ceteri accedentes curarentur, et hoc ex quadam pactione, ita quod semper assisteret vis divina; aqua illa diceretur curare et sanare lepram et esse causa curationis et habere virtutem curandi. Sic in Sacramentis dicunt quod ad prolationes verbi assistit virtus divina aquis et infundit gratiam et regenerat, dum homo subiicit se per fidei professionem et obedientiam. Dicunt ergo, quod Sacramenta dicuntur *habere virtutem* et dicuntur *causa* et dicuntur *efficere* secundum communem modum loquendi propter assistentiam divinae virtutis.

Et *si tu quaeras*, utrum habeant virtutem aliquam *creatam* super[^53] increatam; respondent, quod praeter virtutem increatam est dicere aliquam virtutem habere Sacramentum, sed *extenso nomine virtutis*. Si enim *virtus* dicat aliquam qualitatem vel naturam sive essentiam advenientem Sacramento, sicut virtus *proprie* dicitur, sic secundum eos non est dicendum, quod habeat *virtutem*[^54]; sed *extenditur* nomen virtutis ad *aliquam ordinationem*, ut quando aliquid habet efficacem ordinationem ad aliquid, dicitur habere virtutem respectu illius. — *Et* ponunt hoc exemplum: rex statuit, ut qui habent tale signum, habeant centum libras[^55]. Post istam institutionem signum illud non habet aliquam proprietatem *absolutam*, quam non haberet prius; *ad aliquid* tamen est *ordinatum*, ad quod non erat prius; et quia habet *efficacem ordinationem*, dicitur *habere virtutem*, ut faciat aliquem habere centum marcas; et dicitur illud signum valere centum marcas, et tamen nihil plus habet de bonitate nunc quam prius. — *Si ergo quaeras*, quid sit illa virtus in illo signo; dicetur, quod non est aliquid *absolutum*, sed *ad aliquid*[^56]. — Sic dicunt, quod Sacramenta sunt talia signa a Deo instituta, ut qui ea susceperit debito modo habeat tantum de gratia vel habeat gratiam ad hunc actum; illa, inquam, *ordina-*

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*tio* est in ipso Sacramento, spiritualem et a Deo collatam sibi[^57]. Et rationes illius disponunt hominem, ut habeat gratiam, quia efficaciter ordinat ad habendam et suscipiendam gratiam.

*Pactio divina.* Rursus dicunt, quod ex tali pactione Dominus astrinxit se quodam modo ad dandum gratiam suscipienti Sacramentum; astringit enim quodam modo Deum ad conferendum, et ideo[^58] dicitur *habere virtutem* ad efficiendum et etiam disponendum. Et sicut extenditur *nomen virtutis*, ita *verbum efficiendi*, vel *disponendi*, quia nec efficit nec disponit *influendo*, sed *efficaciter ordinando*. Et sicut haec extenduntur, ita et *nomen causae*, quia non dicitur causa, secundum quod est *principium operandi*, sed secundum quod est *ratio ordinandi*.

*Ratio consentit.* Huic positioni *pietas fidei non repugnat*, et *ratio consentit*[^59]. — *Consentit* namque *ratio*, quia valde difficile est intelligere, *qualiter* illa virtus detur sicut *qualitas absoluta*; difficilius, *quando* detur; difficile etiam est intelligere, *cui* detur, verbo scilicet, an elemento, quae sunt duo nihil unum facientia; difficile etiam est scire, *quamdiu* duret; difficile vel est similiter valde intelligere, *quomodo* influat; difficile etiam, *cuius naturae* sit in seipsa; et multa talia. Alii vero[^60] positioni satis faciliter ratio concordat.

*Fides non repugnat.* *Pietas* etiam *fidei non repugnat*. Cavendum est enim, ne, dum nimis damus corporalibus signis ad laudem, subtrahamus honorem gratiae curanti et animae suscipienti. — Haec autem opinio non nimis dat neque subtrahit aliquid honoris debiti. Sicut igitur litterae regiae anulo regis sigillatae magnae sunt dignitatis et virtutis et valoris et magna dicuntur et[^61] posse et facere, tamen in eis nulla virtus est *absoluta*, sed sola *ordinatio* per assistentiam virtutis regiae — quod patet, quia, mortuo rege, non plus curatur de litteris suis quam de aliis, tamen nihil absolutum amiserunt — sic intelligendum in Sacramentis, et sic loquuntur Sanctorum auctoritates secundum communem usum.

*Quaestio incidens solvitur.* Et rationes ad oppositum patent. — *Et si tu quaeras*; super quid fundatur relatio, et quomodo advenit sine donatione proprietatis? dicendum, quod in *institutionibus signorum*; ut quando nummus fit arrha, nihil datur de novo ipsi nummo[^62].

*Iudicium auctoris.* Utraque harum positionum satis videtur probabilis, haec tamen mihi videtur ad sustinendum facilior; nescio tamen, quae sit verior, quia cum loquimur de his quae sunt miraculi, non multum adhaerendum est rationi. Concedimus igitur, quod Sacramenta novae legis sunt *causa* et *efficiunt* et *disponunt*, extenso nomine, ut dictum est, et hoc securum est dicere; utrum autem plus habeant, nec volo affirmare nec negare. Et secundum hanc ultimam viam omnia quaesita patent.

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### Question IV. *On the efficacy of the Sacraments.*

Fourth, it is asked whether the Sacraments are effective of grace. And that they are, it seems:

1. Because this difference is assigned between the Sacraments of the new law and the Sacraments of the old law, that the former produce an effect, the latter only prefigure[^1]; but what produces an effect is an efficient cause: therefore the Sacraments of the new law are effective of grace.

2. Likewise, Hugh[^2] says, "that the Sacraments of the new law, the blessing being first infused into them, sanctify"; and elsewhere he says that they are "sanctifying from sanctification"; but the soul is not sanctified except through grace: therefore they produce grace itself in the soul.

3. Likewise, the Master in the definition of a Sacrament in the text[^3] says that "a Sacrament is that which bears a likeness and exists as a cause"; but not as a *formal* nor *final* nor *material* cause, as was shown above: therefore *by division* it is an *efficient* cause.

4. Likewise, the same seems so by *reasoning*, because a sign instituted by human institution can engender in us spiritual cognition and affection, as a hoop before a house engenders cognition in the soul of a passer-by that there is wine there; and the gibbet and the signs of war engender fear: therefore if divine institution is much more powerful than human, and the Sacraments are signs according to divine institution[^4]; they can engender in us a much nobler effect: therefore they can produce grace.

5. Likewise, "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing[^5]"; whence nothing is susceptible of fault unless it is susceptible of grace, and conversely: since therefore the flesh, which is something corporeal, can be so vitiated as to produce and generate fault in the soul to which it is united; therefore a corporeal Sacrament will be able to be so sanctified as to transmit grace: nothing therefore prevents it from producing in the soul spiritual grace.

6. Likewise, just as in the generation of flesh there is a begetter and one begotten and further that by means of which the generation takes place; so in spiritual regeneration there is the regenerator, Christ, the regenerated man, and that by means of which the regeneration takes place, namely the Sacrament: therefore just as the seed, which was the means in carnal generation, transmits fault, by the same reasoning the Sacrament transmits grace, which makes [one] a son[^6]; but it does not transmit it essentially: therefore it transmits it causally. If you say that it is not similar, because it is easier to do ill or to vitiate than to do well; this is nothing: for Adam was never more powerful for evil, or his fault, than Christ is more powerful for good, and His passion[^7]; but Adam by his fault was able to vitiate all flesh: therefore Christ by His passion was able so to sanctify the Sacraments that they, being sanctified, should sanctify souls and give grace.

7. Likewise, Anselm says in *On the Virginal Conception*[^8] that "if Adam had stood, he would have transmitted original righteousness"; but this could not be except by means of corporeal flesh: therefore much more can Christ, by means of a corporeal Sacrament, transmit gratuitous righteousness.

**On the contrary:**
1. Every *efficient* cause is nobler than its effect, and nothing corporeal is nobler than anything spiritual: since therefore grace is spiritual, [and] the Sacrament corporeal, as Hugh says[^9]; no Sacrament is an efficient cause of grace itself.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text[^10] says that "grace is not *from them*, but *through them*": therefore it seems that they are not as channels, [but] not as a fount: therefore they are not an efficient cause of grace, just as channels are not [the efficient cause] of water.

3. Likewise, Hugh[^11] says that "grace is not *from* the Sacraments themselves, but *in* them"; but it is established that *in them* signifies the efficient cause, as is plain there: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, upon that [verse] of the Psalm[^12]: *I will bless the Lord, who has given me understanding*; the Gloss says: "God through Himself irradiates pious minds": therefore since that irradiation takes place through the light of grace, it is established that grace is from God immediately: therefore not from the Sacraments.

5. Likewise, "virtue is that which God works in us without us[^13]": if therefore He does not work virtue in us through a subjected creature, consequently neither [does He work] grace.

6. Likewise, order ought to be observed among agents: therefore God ought not to flow into a more noble thing through a less noble one; but the soul is nobler than the Sacrament: therefore God does not flow grace into the soul through the Sacrament: therefore grace is from God alone *effectively*. If therefore the Sacrament is a cause of grace, this is only *dispositively*.

*It is asked therefore whether the Sacrament is a cause* disposing *to grace. That it is, it seems:*

1. Because if the Sacraments of the new law were only a cause *without which not*, then they would not differ in the manner of causing from the Sacraments of the old law, and they would be a burden[^14]; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, both Hugh[^15] and the Master in the text, and also others, say that God regenerates the soul through the Sacraments: therefore the Sacrament is a means of the divine action upon the soul; but every means of acting either *transmits virtue* or *disposes*; but the Sacrament does not *transmit*: therefore it *disposes*.

3. Likewise, "the Sacraments are spiritual medicines[^16]"; but corporeal medicine disposes to corporeal health: therefore spiritual medicine disposes to spiritual health.

4. Likewise, if they disposed nothing nor cooperated toward the health of the soul, salvation could come about equally well without them as with them: therefore what is imposed on us in the new law would rather have to be called burdens than medicines, and the new law a law of burden, not of sweetness[^17].

**But on the contrary:**
1. A disposition precedes that to which it disposes, not only by nature, but also in time[^18]; but the reception of the Sacrament and the infusion of grace are simultaneous in time: therefore the Sacrament does not dispose to grace.

2. Likewise, grace is created out of nothing and suddenly[^19], therefore it needs nothing disposing toward this, that it should be: therefore the Sacraments do not dispose to grace. — *If you say* that they do not dispose to this, that grace should *be*, but to this, that it should *be in* the soul itself, whence they make the soul itself fit by disposing it to the reception of grace; *on the contrary*: the *being* of grace is its *being-in*, since it is an accident[^20]: therefore if it has no disposition toward this, that it should *be*, neither [has it any] toward this, that it should *be in*.

3. Likewise, if the Sacraments dispose and make fit the soul, then they flow into it; but no corporeal thing flows into any spiritual thing[^21]: therefore the Sacraments, since they are corporeal, do not flow into the soul: therefore they do not make it fit nor *dispose* it.

*If you say* perhaps that in the Sacraments themselves there is some *spiritual virtue*, through which they flow into the soul; it is asked therefore by reason of this whether in the Sacraments there is some virtue through which they flow into the soul itself. And that there is not, it seems:

1. Because that virtue is either a *substance* or an *accident*. If a *substance*, then either God, or an Angel, or the soul; that it is none of these[^22] is certain, because if that virtue is of the Sacrament, then God is of the Sacrament. If an *accident*, but no *spiritual* accident is in a *corporeal* subject: therefore either that virtue is *corporeal*, and so will not flow [into the soul]; or if it is *spiritual*, it is not in the Sacrament.

2. Likewise, that virtue is a *good*, this is established; therefore it is either a *great* good, or a *middling* one, or a *small* one, as Augustine divides[^23]. Not among the *greater* [goods], because then it would be grace; nor a gratuitous virtue, which is in the soul alone; not *middling*, because such are the powers of the soul: therefore it is the *lowest* good. But this is a *corporeal* good: therefore that virtue is not *spiritual* and does not flow into the soul.

3. Likewise, no *corporeal* thing is received in a *spiritual* one *corporeally*, but only *spiritually*[^24]: therefore likewise no *spiritual* thing is received in a body *spiritually*, but *corporeally*: therefore that virtue, since it is in the Sacraments, is there *corporeally*, and so is not able to flow into the soul: therefore it is there in vain.

4. Likewise, "everything that is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received," as Boethius says[^25]: therefore that virtue is received in the corporeal Sacrament according to the mode of a body: therefore etc. — *If you say* that this is true, speaking naturally; but that virtue is there miraculously, and above nature; *on the contrary*: however much it be there above[^26] nature and in whatever manner, still it is more ignoble than the soul itself; therefore it does not flow into it: therefore if it is not posited for some other reason, it is manifest etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Bede[^27] says that "the Lord by the contact of His most pure flesh gave a regenerative power to the waters": therefore some power was conferred upon the waters themselves; but this could not be except created, because it was conferred upon a creature, and since it was for regenerating, it could not be except spiritual, because the virtue of a spiritual work is spiritual: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the third distinction[^28]: "What is the virtue of the water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" Therefore there is some virtue in the Sacrament by which the heart is cleansed: therefore a spiritual one.

3. Likewise, we see that the works of divine *justice* are done by the ministry of a corporeal creature, which has from God some power through which it can act upon the soul — otherwise it could not — as is plain in the fire of purgatory[^29]: therefore in the works of *mercy*, which are done through the Sacraments, it will be the case that the Sacraments have some virtue conferred upon them by God, through which they act upon the soul.

4. Likewise, we see that if someone contrite approaches baptism, even though grace is not conferred on him, because he already has it, nevertheless the remission of all punishment is conferred on him, which he did not have before[^30]: therefore baptism adds, over and above the conferral of grace, the remission of punishment: therefore there is some virtue in baptism besides the virtue of grace; by the same reasoning in the other Sacraments of the new law.

5. Likewise, if there were no virtue there, then the unfitting [consequence] often mentioned would return, that they would not differ from the Sacraments of the old law.

### Conclusion

> Probable is the opinion, with its reasons, first set down, that the Sacraments, with respect to grace that makes [one] pleasing, are a cause *without which not*; but with respect to the character and adornment, are an efficient cause; and finally, with respect to the efficacy of grace and the healing of the powers, are a disposing cause. Probable too is the other opinion, which denies that there was given to the Sacraments themselves an efficient virtue after the manner of an absolute, not a relative, quality.

**I respond:** Some wish to say that in the Sacraments[^31] there is some *created virtue* through which they flow into the soul and have an account of causing differently. For they say that in the Sacraments is given *grace that makes [one] pleasing*; there is also given in them *grace freely given*, as is the character and adornment of the soul; there is also given a *weakening of the tinder* [of sin] or an expediting of the powers, [and] this is the efficacy of grace. They say therefore that with respect to *grace that makes pleasing* they are as a cause *without which not*; with respect to the *characterization*[^32] and adornment they are as an *efficient* cause; with respect to that virtue, namely with respect to the *weakening of the tinder* or the strengthening of the powers, they are a *disposing* cause. — And this is manifest. For just as we see that in the purgation by the fire of purgatory there is the *soul* itself, purgeable, having guilt or a venial stain; there is[^33] *grace* within the soul, because without it the purgation would not take place; there is again the *virtue of the fire*: so in the Sacrament there is the *soul* having the defect and weakness of the powers; there is again *grace* working within the soul; there is again the *exterior virtue of the Sacrament*; and with these concurring the powers are strengthened and healed, and grace becomes more efficacious in its operation by means of the virtue of the Sacrament. Thus therefore they say that the Sacrament is a cause of grace as *without which not*, namely of [grace] *making pleasing*; is an *efficient* cause of the character and adornment; is a cause of the *efficacy*[^34] of grace and of the healing of the powers as *disposing*; and this through the virtue which is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God. — These things seen, the response to the objections is manifest according to these [thinkers].

*Solution of the opposing [arguments] of the principal question.*
1, 2. For to that which is asked first, whether they are an *efficient* cause of grace that makes pleasing; they say, no. To that, then, which is objected concerning the difference between these Sacraments and those[^35]; they say that the difference is regarded by reason of the *characterization* and adornment and of the *efficacy of grace*. And thus they respond to that of Hugh, that it is understood of that sanctification.

3. Similarly they speak of that which the Master says, that it is[^36] a cause; nevertheless, if it be understood as to grace that makes pleasing, they say that it is a cause *without which not*. — *Otherwise* too they say that it can be said to be a *disposing* cause, either toward this, that [grace] *be in*, or toward this, that it be *efficacious*, and this by reason of the work *worked*; but it was not so in those [old] Sacraments.

4. To that which is objected, that a sign from human institution generates spiritual cognition and affection; they say that this is only *dispositively*[^37] or occasionally, not *effectively*; rather the soul itself, by conferring within itself, generates the cognition and affection; as is plain by a manifest example, that some see the gibbet and fear, others do not; nevertheless by this it cannot be shown that the Sacrament is an *efficient cause of grace*.

5. To that which is objected concerning the transmission of fault by means of the flesh, they say that just as *grace* is not in anything corporeal, so neither is *fault*. But nevertheless *viciousness* in the flesh can have an account of producing *fault* in the soul; not so [does] the *virtue of the Sacrament* [have an account of producing] *grace*. And the cause of this is that *grace* is an effect nobler than every corporeal virtue and is made out of nothing, and this[^38] belongs to God alone; but the effect of *fault* bespeaks ignobility and imperfection and defect. Therefore all those arguments which are made through the likeness of grace to fault are not valid.

6. To that which is objected, that Christ is more powerful for good; they say that it is true; nor however does it follow from this that, if Adam transmits fault by means of the flesh, Christ should transmit grace by means of the Sacrament. For this would be a disorder; *furthermore*, just as a creature cannot receive the power of creating, so neither [can it receive the power] of giving grace[^39].

7. To that of Anselm they say that it is not understood that he would transmit righteousness by means of the flesh, but that all his posterity would have that righteousness from God, because there would be no impediment on the part of the flesh.

To that which is asked, whether the Sacrament is a *disposing* cause; they say that it is, as was touched upon[^40]; because it disposes to the *efficacy of grace*, by remitting the tinder which impedes the operation of grace; or, as was touched upon[^41], it disposes to this, that *grace be in* the soul, although it does not dispose to this, that it *be*. And this is to say that grace is compared to the *efficient cause*, [and] is compared to the *receiving substance*. But the Sacrament does not dispose on the part of the *agent*, who is God, but on the part of the *receiver*, which is the soul.

2. And thus the response is plain to that which is objected, that grace is from nothing; for they say that the Sacrament does not dispose to grace by reason of that *out of which* [it is made], but by reason of that *in which it is received*[^42].

*To the arguments for the negative part of the first lateral question.*
1. To that which is objected, that a disposition precedes that to which it disposes; they say that it does not always precede *in time*, as is plain in the disposition which is a *necessity* or in the ultimate disposition[^43]; thus the Sacrament worthily received disposes by the ultimate disposition, which is simultaneous *in time* with grace, but prior *in nature*, as on the part of the latter.

3. To that which is objected, that if it disposes, it flows in; they say that it *does flow in*. — To that, then, which is objected[^44], that no corporeal thing flows into a spiritual one; they say that in the Sacrament there is some *spiritual virtue* through which it flows into the soul. Nevertheless that argument is not valid according to them, because in the soul to be cleansed one must consider the *substance* itself and the *stain* itself, from which it is cleansed; and although according to *substance* it is superior to every body, nevertheless by reason of the *stain* or defect it is inferior.

*To the arguments for the negative part of the second lateral question.*
To that which is asked, whether one is to posit in the Sacraments a created virtue; they say that one is.
1. To that, then, which is asked, whether a substance or[^45] an accident; they say, an *accident*. — To that which is again asked, whether a *corporeal* accident or a *spiritual* one; they say, a *spiritual* one. — To that which is objected afterward, that a spiritual accident is not in a corporeal subject; they say that this is true naturally, but the Sacrament itself has that virtue above nature according to the order of the divine mercy, just as

virtue is in the fire of purgatory above the nature of the fire according to the order of the divine justice. And what is more, on this account, because the Sacrament is not a natural subject or one according to nature; and therefore it is no wonder if it has a virtue above nature.

2. To that which is asked, whether it is a greatest good etc.; they say that that virtue is to be placed among *middling* goods, because it is below grace and above body. — *If you object* that such a good belongs to the soul's power; they say that Augustine does not exclude, on this account, that there be others; but he says that by way of example or by restricting the good to the human subject[^46]. — *But if you object* that it will not act or flow into the powers of the soul, since it is *middling*, and the influx is from a superior; they say that it does not flow into the powers by reason of the powers, but by reason of them as deficient through fault.

3. To that which is objected concerning the reception of a spiritual substance; they say that it is not similar: because, if a *spiritual* substance were to receive a corporeal thing corporeally, then a derogation would be done to that substance, nor would it be perfected in the reception; but if some *material*[^47] thing receives a spiritual one spiritually, no derogation would be done to it in anything.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver; they say that this is true of *natural* reception; but this is *above nature*. *Furthermore*, the Sacrament itself, as such, is a spiritual medicine; and therefore it ought to have a spiritual virtue. But in natural things[^48] *matter* is chiefly considered, whereas in divine things *the end* is chiefly and principally considered; therefore, because in the Sacraments the account of *matter* is not considered, but [that of] *the end*, it was fitting according to them to posit a spiritual virtue in them.

To the other [argument][^49] it has, according to them, already been responded, that that virtue is nobler [and] the fallen soul less noble, not by reason of substance, but by reason of the fall. — And in this way the other objections are plain according to this opinion. And this opinion is [the opinion] of great [thinkers][^50].

*Opinion 2, with its conclusion.*
There is also the opinion of other great [thinkers] about this, who say that in the Sacraments there is no *causality* nor any *virtue*, neither *effective* nor *dispositive* toward grace, which is a *quality* or some *absolute* property, but [that it is] *by a certain assistance*. For they say that the divine virtue, which is the cause of grace, assists the Sacrament, and [also] the faith and devotion of the receiver[^51], which disposes to grace. — And they adduce a similitude: that at the word of Elisha, with Naaman washing himself, the divine virtue stood by as *effective* of health, and Naaman's devotion and obedience as *dispositive*; yet there was no causality either in the word of Elisha or in the water of the Jordan[^52]. If therefore the Lord had so instituted that at the word of Elisha not only Naaman himself, but [all] others approaching should be cured, and this from a certain pact, such that the divine power should always stand by; that water would be said to cure and heal leprosy and to be the cause of the cure and to have the virtue of curing. So in the Sacraments they say that at the pronouncing of the word the divine virtue stands by the waters and infuses grace and regenerates, while a man subjects himself by the profession of faith and obedience. They say therefore that the Sacraments are said to *have virtue* and are said [to be] a *cause* and are said to *effect* according to the common mode of speaking, on account of the assistance of the divine virtue.

And *if you ask* whether they have any *created* virtue over and above[^53] the uncreated one; they answer that, besides the uncreated virtue, one may say that the Sacrament has some virtue, but *by an extended sense of the name of virtue*. For if *virtue* signifies some quality or nature or essence supervening upon the Sacrament, as virtue is *properly* said, then according to them it is not to be said that it has *virtue*[^54]; but the name of virtue *is extended* to *some ordination*, so that when something has an efficacious ordination toward something, it is said to have virtue with respect to it. — *And* they put this example: a king ordains that those who have such a token shall have a hundred pounds[^55]. After this institution that token does not have any *absolute* property which it would not have had before; yet *toward something* it is *ordained*, toward which it was not before; and because it has an *efficacious ordination*, it is said to *have virtue*, so as to make someone have a hundred marks; and that token is said to be worth a hundred marks, and yet it has nothing more of goodness now than before. — *If therefore you ask* what that virtue in that token is; it will be said that it is not something *absolute*, but *toward something*[^56]. — Thus they say that the Sacraments are such tokens instituted by God, that whoever shall have received them in the due manner has such-and-such of grace or has grace for this act; that *ordina-*

*tion*, I say, is in the Sacrament itself, spiritual and conferred upon it by God[^57]. And the reasons of it dispose the man so that he may have grace, because it efficaciously ordains toward having and receiving grace.

*The divine pact.* Again they say that, from such a pact, the Lord bound Himself in a certain manner to giving grace to the one receiving the Sacrament; for it binds God in a certain manner to conferring, and therefore[^58] it is said to *have virtue* for effecting and also for disposing. And just as the *name of virtue* is extended, so [is] the *word "to effect,"* or *"to dispose,"* because it neither effects nor disposes by *flowing in*, but by *efficaciously ordaining*. And just as these are extended, so also [is] the *name of cause*, because it is not called a cause insofar as it is a *principle of operating*, but insofar as it is an *account of ordaining*.

*Reason consents.* To this position *the piety of faith is not repugnant*, and *reason consents*[^59]. — For *reason consents*, because it is very difficult to understand *how* that virtue is given as an *absolute quality*; more difficult, *when* it is given; difficult also to understand *to what* it is given, namely to the word or to the element, which are two things making no one [thing]; difficult also to know *how long* it lasts; difficult likewise it is very [much] to understand *how* it flows in; difficult also, *of what nature* it is in itself; and many such things. But to the other[^60] position reason agrees quite easily.

*Faith is not repugnant.* The *piety* too *of faith is not repugnant*. For care must be taken lest, while we give too much to corporeal signs for [their] praise, we subtract honor from the grace that cures and from the soul that receives. — But this opinion neither gives too much nor subtracts anything of due honor. Just as, therefore, royal letters sealed with the king's ring are of great dignity and virtue and value, and are said to be able to do great things and to do them[^61], yet in them there is no *absolute* virtue, but only an *ordination* through the assistance of the royal virtue — which is plain, because, the king being dead, his letters are cared for no more than others, yet they have lost nothing absolute — so it is to be understood in the Sacraments, and so the authorities of the Saints speak according to common usage.

*An incidental question solved.* And the reasons to the opposite are plain. — *And if you ask* upon what the relation is founded, and how it comes about without the donation of a property? it must be said, [it is founded] in the *institutions of signs*; as when a coin becomes an earnest-pledge, nothing is given anew to the coin itself[^62].

*The author's judgment.* Each of these positions seems probable enough; this one, however, seems to me easier to maintain; yet I do not know which is truer, because when we speak of things that belong to the miraculous, we must not adhere too much to reason. We grant therefore that the Sacraments of the new law are a *cause* and *effect* and *dispose*, by an extended sense [of the names], as has been said, and this it is safe to say; but whether they have more, I will neither affirm nor deny. And according to this last way all the questions are plain.

---

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: Cf. the text of the Master here, c. 6.

la: Libr. I de Sacram. p. XI c. 5; vide etiam supra q. 3 ad 5. — Seq. eius sententia, in qua pro *ex sanctificatione* cod. Z *ex benedictione*, habetur ibid. c. 2. Cfr. p. IX c. 2.

en: *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. XI, c. 5; see also above, q. 3, ad 5. — His following sentence, in which for *from sanctification* cod. Z [reads] *from blessing*, is found ibid. c. 2. Cf. pt. IX, c. 2.

la: Hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. — De *minori* vide supra q. 3. — In conclusione pro *a divisione* (Vat. addit *sufficienti*) codd. M O planius *per locum a divisione*, quem describit Aristot., II Rhetor. c. 30. (c. 23.): Alius locus *a divisione*: ut, si omnes qui iniuriam faciunt, trium rerum aliqua impelluntur, vel hac, vel ista, vel illa; et duabus rebus impelli nullo modo potuit, de tertia vero necesse ipsi adversarii insimulant. Cfr. Boeth., II de Different. topic.

en: The text of the Master here, c. 4. — On the *minor* [premise] see above, q. 3. — In the conclusion, for *by division* (the Vatican edition adds *sufficient*) codd. M O more plainly [read] *by the topic from division*, which Aristotle describes, *Rhetoric* II, c. 30 (c. 23): Another topic [is] *from division*: as, if all who do injury are impelled by some one of three things, either by this, or that, or the other; and they could in no way be impelled by two things, then the adversaries necessarily charge [them] with the third. Cf. Boethius, *On Topical Differences*, bk. II.

la: De quo vide supra q. 2. — Inferius post *aggenerare* cod. Z prosequitur *sive efficere aliquem nobiliorem* etc.

en: On which see above, q. 2. — Lower down, after *to engender*, cod. Z continues *or to effect any nobler [thing]* etc.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Oppositis*, et II Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). — Quod anima possit infici a carne, ostensum est II Sent. d. 31 a. 2 q. 1 seqq., ubi etiam de seq. arg. — In fine arg. pro *quod efficiunt* (permulti codd. et edd. incongrue *efficiant*) codd. F H aa *quin efficiat*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Opposites*, and *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7). — That the soul can be infected by the flesh was shown in *Sentences* II, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 ff., where [there is] also [a treatment] of the following argument. — At the end of the argument, for *that they effect* (very many codd. and edd. incongruously [read] *that they may effect*) codd. F H aa [read] *but rather that it effects*.

la: Cod. K supplet *Deo*, Vat. *spiritualem et adoptionis*.

en: Cod. K supplies *to God*, the Vatican edition [reads] *spiritual and of adoption*.

la: Respicitur Rom. 5, 6 seqq. — Aristot., VII Topic. c. 3. (c. 4.): Quemadmodum in aliis corrumpere quam facere facilius, sic et in his destruere quam construere. Cfr. II Ethic. c. 6, et Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 4 §31. — Pro *quin Christus* codd. AE (la secunda manu) K L V aa bb cc *quam Christus*.

en: Romans 5, 6 ff. is referred to. — Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 3 (c. 4): Just as in other things it is easier to corrupt than to make, so too in these [it is easier] to destroy than to construct. Cf. *Ethics* II, c. 6, and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, c. 4, §31. — For *than that Christ* codd. AE (la, by a second hand) K L V aa bb cc [read] *than Christ*.

la: Cap. 10 et 24. (Cfr. tom. II pag. 784, nota 3.). Vide etiam I [libro] Cur Deus homo, c. 18. — Pro *stetisset* cod. Z *non peccasset*. — Inferius pro *potest transfundere* codd. A K N W Y aa *transfundit*.

en: Chs. 10 and 24 (cf. tom. II, p. 784, note 3). See also bk. I of *Why God [became] Man*, c. 18. — For *had stood* cod. Z [reads] *had not sinned*. — Lower down, for *can transmit* codd. A K N W Y aa [read] *transmits*.

la: Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 2. Vide supra pag. 13, nota 2. — De *maiori* cfr. August., VI de Musica c. 5 n. 8, et 83 Qq. q. 2; Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 6 c. 3: Causa dignior est causato.

en: *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 2. See above, p. 13, note 2. — On the *major* [premise] cf. Augustine, *On Music* VI, c. 5, n. 8, and *83 Questions*, q. 2; Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. 6, c. 3: The cause is worthier than the caused.

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, c. 5.

la: Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 4. Vide supra pag. 17, nota 4. — Inferius edd. omittunt *ibi*.

en: *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 4. See above, p. 17, note 4. — Lower down the edd. omit *there*.

la: Psalm. 15, 7; sed Glossa Augustini refertur a Strabo et Lyrano in Ps. 118, 73: *Da mihi intellectum*. Verba August. vide tom. III pag. 895, nota 1. Cfr. etiam 83 Qq. q. 53 n. 2.

en: Psalm 15, 7; but the Gloss of Augustine is reported by Strabo and [Nicholas of] Lyra on Ps. 118, 73: *Give me understanding*. For Augustine's words see tom. III, p. 895, note 1. Cf. also *83 Questions*, q. 53, n. 2.

la: De hac ex August. delibata definitione virtutis vide II Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII c. 5. — Codd. F H (V a secunda manu) post *virtus est* addunt *qualitas*, cod. I (a secunda manu) *bona qualitas mentis, ut ait Augustinus*.

en: On this definition of virtue drawn from Augustine see *Sentences* II, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 5. — Codd. F H (V by a second hand) after *virtue is* add *a quality*, cod. I (by a second hand) *a good quality of the mind, as Augustine says*.

la: Cfr. II Sent. d. 26 q. 3 seq. — Pro *et subito* cod. N *in subiecto*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* II, d. 26, q. 3 ff. — For *and suddenly* cod. N [reads] *in the subject*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4, et III Sent. d. 40 q. 3.

en: See the text of the Master here, c. 4, and *Sentences* III, d. 40, q. 3.

la: Libr. I de Sacram. p. IX c. 2, et II p. VI c. 2. — Hic lit. Magistri c. 4, et infra d. III c. 9. Vide etiam August., I de Peccator. mer. et remiss. etc. c. 31 n. 60 seqq., et II c. 27 n. 43.

en: *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 2, and bk. II, pt. VI, c. 2. — The text of the Master here, c. 4, and below, d. III, c. 9. See also Augustine, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc., bk. I, c. 31, n. 60 ff., and bk. II, c. 27, n. 43.

la: Hugo a S. Vict., I de Sacram. p. IX c. 5.

en: Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments*, bk. I, pt. IX, c. 5.

la: Respicitur Matth. 11, 30: Iugum enim meum suave est etc. — Cod. A *quam suavitatis*, qui cod. etiam cum pluribus aliis ante *oneris* omittit *lex*.

en: Matthew 11, 30 is referred to: For my yoke is sweet etc. — Cod. A [reads] *than of sweetness*, which cod., together with several others, also omits *law* before *of burden*.

la: Vide tom. II pag. 682, nota 3.

en: See tom. II, p. 682, note 3.

la: Aristot., VII Metaph. text. 2. (VI c. 1.) docet, quod *accidens* nominat non tam *ens* quam *ens entis*, quoniam subiectum ei naturaliter determinatum est. — Pro *dispositionem* codd. A K aa *disponere*.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1), teaches that *accident* names not so much a *being* as a *being of a being*, since its subject is naturally determined for it. — For *disposition* codd. A K aa [read] *to dispose*.

la: August., VI de Musica c. 5 n. 8, et XII de Gen. ad lit. c. 20 n. 42: Neque enim [corpus] habet eam vim, ut formet aliquid spiritale.

en: Augustine, *On Music* VI, c. 5, n. 8, and *On Genesis to the Letter* XII, c. 20, n. 42: For [the body] does not have such a power as to form anything spiritual.

la: Ex codd. M O supplevimus *esse*, pro quo non pauci alii codd. *est*; cod. L omittit *esse certum*. Aliquanto superius post *aliqua virtus* codd. V Z addunt *spiritualis*.

en: From codd. M O we have supplied *to be*, for which not a few other codd. [read] *is*; cod. L omits *to be certain*. Somewhat above, after *some virtue*, codd. V Z add *spiritual*.

la: Libr. II de Lib. Arb. c. 19 n. 50. Vide II Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII c. 3. — Pro *dividit* codd. B C D I V et cod. 4 *dicit*. In fine arg. pro *et non* cod. G *et sic non*, cod. H *ergo non*.

en: *On Free Choice*, bk. II, c. 19, n. 50. See *Sentences* II, text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 3. — For *divides* codd. B C D I V and cod. 4 [read] *says*. At the end of the argument, for *and not* cod. G [reads] *and thus not*, cod. H *therefore not*.

la: Vide Aristot., II de Anima text. 121. (c. 12.) et III text. 37 seqq. (c. 8.). — Cod. S prosequitur *a permutata proportione* [cfr. tom. III pag. 684, nota 3.], *ergo similiter* etc. Inferius post *sed* cod. bb addit *solum*.

en: See Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 121 (c. 12), and III, text 37 ff. (c. 8). — Cod. S continues *by an inverted proportion* [cf. tom. III, p. 684, note 3], *therefore likewise* etc. Lower down, after *but*, cod. bb adds *only*.

la: Libr. V de Consol. prosa 4, ubi agens de *cognitione* dicit: «Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem». Si *verba* istius axiomatis attendantur, inveniuntur in Libro de Causis, proposit. 10; cfr. ibid. proposit. 20 seqq.

en: *On Consolation* [of Philosophy], bk. V, prose 4, where, treating of *cognition*, he says: "For everything that is known is comprehended not according to its own power, but rather according to the faculty of the knowers." If the *words* of that axiom be attended to, they are found in the *Book of Causes*, proposition 10; cf. ibid. proposition 20 ff.

la: Edd. *contra*. Inferius pro *ergo si non* cod. N *ergo quia non*.

en: The edd. [read] *on the contrary*. Lower down, for *therefore if not* cod. N [reads] *therefore because not*.

la: Libr. I in Luc. 3, 21. Cfr. lib. I in Matth. 3, 13 et in Marc. 1, 9, nec non Homil. 11 in festo Epiphaniae (alias in Octava Epiphan.). Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. III c. 5. — In fine arg. non pauci codd. omittunt *est*.

en: [Bede,] bk. I on Luke 3, 21. Cf. bk. I on Matthew 3, 13, and on Mark 1, 9, as also Homily 11 on the feast of the Epiphany (alias on the Octave of the Epiphany). See below, text of the Master, d. III, c. 5. — At the end of the argument, not a few codd. omit *is*.

la: Lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. aa cum textu originali et Magistro: *Unde est haec tanta virtus aquae* etc. Circa finem arg. pro *abluitur cor*, quod exhibent codd. V aa et [edd.] 1, codd. H K *quae abluit cor*, alii *qua abluit cor*.

en: Text of the Master, c. 1. — Cod. aa, with the original text and the Master: *Whence is this so great virtue of the water* etc. Toward the end of the argument, for *the heart is cleansed*, which codd. V aa and [edd.] 1 exhibit, codd. H K [read] *which cleanses the heart*, others *by which it cleanses the heart*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 20 p. I q. 1 seqq. et d. 44 p. II a. 3. — 2. — Inferius post *erit* cod. B addit *ita*, cod. G *similiter*.

en: Cf. below, d. 20, pt. I, q. 1 ff., and d. 44, pt. II, a. 3. — 2. — Lower down, after *it will be*, cod. B adds *thus*, cod. G *likewise*.

la: Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. IV c. 5, et Comment. ibid. l. a. 1. q. 2.

en: See below, text of the Master, d. IV, c. 5, and the Commentary ibid., a. 1, q. 2.

la: Ed. 1 falso addit *veteris legis*, Vat. *novae legis*. Pro *abluunt* codd. F G *voluerunt*.

en: Ed. 1 falsely adds *of the old law*, the Vatican edition *of the new law*. For *they cleanse* codd. F G [read] *they willed*.

la: Vat. *characterificationis vel characteris*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *of the charactering, or of the character*.

la: Codd. F H Z (V a secunda manu) *est etiam*. Aliquanto inferius pro *primo est iterum* cod. N *est etiam*; subinde ex codd. A G H K N Y (V a secunda manu) *intus operans* substituimus pro *virtus operans*.

en: Codd. F H Z (V by a second hand) [read] *is also*. Somewhat lower down, for *first there is again* cod. N [reads] *is also*; thereupon, from codd. A G H K N Y (V by a second hand), we have substituted *working within* for *working virtue*.

la: Codd. F H (bb a secunda manu) *de differentia novorum Sacramentorum et veterum*. In fine solut. codd. A E F G I K L V, posito *sic* pro *Et sic*, substituunt *intelligit* pro *intelligitur*.

en: Codd. F H (bb by a second hand) [read] *concerning the difference of the new Sacraments and the old*. At the end of the solution, codd. A E F G I K L V, putting *thus* for *And thus*, substitute *he understands* for *it is understood*.

la: Simul audi cum codd. F H (I bb a secunda manu) *Sacramentum*, edd. habent *sint*. Circa finem solut. post *operis operati* in codd. G Y Z et ed. 1 additur *quod* (ed. 1 *et*) *habet virtutem a passione Christi*, et subinde cod. Z *in illis primis* pro *in illis*.

en: Read at the same time with codd. F H (I bb by a second hand) *Sacrament*; the edd. have *they are*. Toward the end of the solution, after *of the work worked*, in codd. G Y Z and ed. 1 is added *which* (ed. 1 *and*) *has virtue from the passion of Christ*, and thereupon cod. Z [reads] *in those first ones* for *in those*.

la: Codd. V Z *sola dispositione*.

en: Codd. V Z [read] *by disposition alone*.

la: Scilicet *creare ex nihilo*. — Codd. F G H L *et haec*. Inferius pro *fiunt* cod. I *sunt*.

en: Namely *to create out of nothing*. — Codd. F G H L [read] *and these*. Lower down, for *are done* cod. I [reads] *are*.

la: Cfr. I Sent. d. 14 a. 2 q. 2. — Pro *creatura* cod. Z *Sacramentum*.

en: Cf. *Sentences* I, d. 14, a. 2, q. 2. — For *a creature* cod. Z [reads] *a Sacrament*.

la: In corp. quaest. principalis. — Superius pro *quaeritur* multi codd. et ed. 1 *obiicitur*.

en: In the body of the principal question. — Above, for *it is asked* many codd. and ed. 1 [read] *it is objected*.

la: Quaest. principal. ad 3. — Edd. prosequuntur *quia disponit*. Inferius pro *suscipientem. Sacramentum autem non*, quod habet cod. H, cod. V *suscipientem, sed Sacramentum non*, alii et edd. *suscipientem Sacramentum; non autem*. Post pauca pro *qui est Deus* edd. *quod est Deus*.

en: The principal question, ad 3. — The edd. continue *because it disposes*. Lower down, for *the receiver. But the Sacrament does not*, which cod. H has, cod. V [reads] *the receiver, but the Sacrament does not*, others and the edd. *the receiving Sacrament; but not*. After a little, for *who is God* the edd. [read] *which is God*.

la: Codd. D E I R S T U V W et ed. 1 *quod recipitur (recipit?)*, cod. A *quo recipitur*, cod. B *quo recipit*, Vat. melius *in quo recipitur*.

en: Codd. D E I R S T U V W and ed. 1 [read] *which is received (receives?)*, cod. A *by which it is received*, cod. B *by which it receives*, the Vatican edition better *in which it is received*.

la: Haec dispositio habetur v. g. respectu combustionis ligni in calore concomitante formam ignis introducti; cfr. tom. II pag. 471, nota 2. — Ex parte illa, intelligi: suscipientis.

en: This disposition is found e.g. with respect to the combustion of wood in the heat accompanying the form of the fire introduced; cf. tom. II, p. 471, note 2. — *On the part of the latter*, understand: of the receiver.

la: Cod. Z *dicitur*, codd. A E G K L V W aa bb *dicit*, codd. F I *dicunt*. Mox pro *quod nullum corporale* plures codd. *quod corporale non*. Circa finem solut. pro *omni corpore* cod. Z *omni corporali*.

en: Cod. Z [reads] *it is said*, codd. A E G K L V W aa bb *he says*, codd. F I *they say*. Soon, for *that no corporeal thing* several codd. [read] *that a corporeal thing does not*. Toward the end of the solution, for *every body* cod. Z [reads] *every corporeal thing*.

la: Cod. Z supplet *sit*.

en: Cod. Z supplies *it be*.

la: Vide II Sent. d. 26 q. 3 ad 5. — Vat. *suppositum humanum*. Superius pro *animae potentiae* Vat. *animae potentia*. Subinde pro *exemplando* cod. H *exemplificando*. Post pauca pro *obiiciat* substituimus ex codd. E P Q *obiicias*.

en: See *Sentences* II, d. 26, q. 3, ad 5. — The Vatican edition [reads] *human supposit*. Above, for *the soul's power* [dative] the Vatican edition [reads] *the soul's power* [nominative]. Thereupon, for *by way of example* cod. H [reads] *by exemplifying*. After a little, for *he objects* we have substituted, from codd. E P Q, *you object*.

la: Cod. L *aliquod corporale*.

en: Cod. L [reads] *some corporeal [thing]*.

la: Pro *autem*, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, codd. F H I *enim*, codd. S T legunt *nam in naturalibus*.

en: For *but*, which not a few codd. omit, codd. F H I [read] *for*, codd. S T read *for in natural things*.

la: In cod. M suppletur *quod virtus ista est ignobilior anima*.

en: In cod. M is supplied *that this virtue is more ignoble than the soul*.

la: Edd. hic et paulo inferius addunt *Magistrorum*.

en: The edd., here and a little lower down, add *of the Masters*.

la: Cod. F H Z (I V a secunda manu) subiungunt *similiter esse dicunt* (cod. V *dicuntur*). Mox pro *disponit* edd. cum pluribus codd. *disponunt*.

en: Codd. F H Z (I V by a second hand) subjoin *they say [it] to be likewise* (cod. V *are said*). Soon, for *disposes* the edd., with several codd., [read] *dispose*.

la: Libr. IV Reg. 5, 14.

en: [The] Fourth [book] of Kings 5, 14.

la: Codd. R S T *praeter*.

en: Codd. R S T [read] *besides*.

la: Vat. addit *proprie*. Ed. 1 prosequitur *sed quod extenditur nomen* etc. Subinde cod. F *ob aliquam* pro *ad aliquam*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *properly*. Ed. 1 continues *but that the name is extended* etc. Thereupon cod. F [reads] *because of some* for *toward some*.

la: Codd. K N aa *marcas*, quae lectio convenit cum subiexis, ubi fide codd. bis substituimus *marcas* pro *libras*, quod habent edd. Paulo ante pro *hic exemplum* ex codd. F G H I L posuimus *hoc exemplum*.

en: Codd. K N aa [read] *marks*, which reading agrees with what follows, where on the faith of the codd. we have twice substituted *marks* for *pounds*, which the edd. have. A little before, for *this example* [masc.] we have put, from codd. F G H I L, *this example* [neut.].

la: Sive relatio. — Cod. Z *non est ibi quid* pro *non est aliquid*.

en: Or a relation. — Cod. Z [reads] *there is not there anything* for *it is not something*.

la: Ex codd. F G H V (I bb a secunda manu) supplevimus *ideo*, pro quo cod. Z *iam*. Paulo superius pro *suscipienti* cod. G *suscipientibus*. Aliquanto inferius pro *Et sicut extenditur* codd. H R cc (K a secunda manu) *Et ideo sicut extenditur*, cod. Z *Et sicut hic extenditur*, qui etiam subinde pro *extenduntur* substituit *extenditur virtus*.

en: From codd. F G H V (I bb by a second hand) we have supplied *therefore*, for which cod. Z [reads] *now*. A little above, for *to the one receiving* cod. G [reads] *to the ones receiving*. Somewhat lower down, for *And as it is extended* codd. H R cc (K by a second hand) [read] *And therefore as it is extended*, cod. Z *And as it is here extended*, which [cod.] also thereupon substitutes *the virtue is extended* for *they are extended*.

la: Codd. *pietas fidei consentit, et ratio non repugnat*, quae lectio subnexis non congruit.

en: [Some] codd. [read] *the piety of faith consents, and reason is not repugnant*, which reading does not agree with what follows.

la: Ed. 1 *et huic*, Vat. *et ideo huic*. Paulo superius pro *nihil* cod. X *nihilominus*, cod. Z *hic*. Aliquanto inferius pro *honorem gratiae curanti et animae* permulti codd. et ed. 1 *hominem gratiae et a se* (codd. I W *ad se*).

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *and to this*, the Vatican edition *and therefore to this*. A little above, for *nothing* cod. X [reads] *nonetheless*, cod. Z *here*. Somewhat lower down, for *honor from the grace that cures and from the soul* very many codd. and ed. 1 [read] *the man of grace and from himself* (codd. I W *to himself*).

la: Codd. A E L M V W aa bb *eo*, mox post *posse* codd. F H S T U omittunt *et*.

en: Codd. A E L M V W aa bb [read] *it*; soon, after *to be able*, codd. F H S T U omit *and*.

la: August. V de Trin. c. 16 n. 17: Nummus autem, cum dicitur *pretium*, relative dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coepit pretium; neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua sunt similia etc. Cfr. infra d. 3 p. II a. 1 q. 2 in fine, et I Sent. d. 30 dub. 3. — In praecedentibus exhibemus lectionem codd., quam, licet sit brevissima, genuinam tamen esse iudicamus. Post *in institutionibus signorum* supplendum est *fundatur*, cod. G vero supplet *non datur aliquid novum*, edd. glossando habent: *super ipsis signis* (ed. 1 *super eo*) *fundatur relatio; et hoc modo advenit sine proprietatis donatione*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, c. 16, n. 17: A coin, however, when it is called a *price*, is said relatively, nor yet is it changed when it began to be a price; nor [is it changed] when it is called a pledge, and if there are any like cases etc. Cf. below, d. 3, pt. II, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, and *Sentences* I, d. 30, dub. 3. — In the preceding [text] we exhibit the reading of the codd., which, although it is very brief, we nevertheless judge to be genuine. After *in the institutions of signs* one must supply *it is founded*; cod. G, however, supplies *nothing new is given*; the edd., by glossing, have: *upon the signs themselves* (ed. 1 *upon it*) *the relation is founded; and in this way it comes about without the donation of a property*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.19–24 (PDF pp.39–44; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 2605–3206) as the base for clean *videtur/Contra* prose and footnote-marker spacing. This chunk is **Distinction I, Part I, Articulus Unicus, Quaestio IV** — *De Sacramentorum efficacia* (whether the Sacraments are effective of grace). The two-column IA OCR is cascade-shattered through the Respondeo, the whole *Solutio oppositorum*, the two opinion-reports, and every footer, so the PDF column-band read is authoritative for those regions per the override; the OCR supplied marker spacing and the clean argument prose of the opening *Fundamenta* and *Contra*.

**Opener alignment verified.** Raw L2605 `Quarto quaeritur, utrum Sacramenta sint gratiae effectiva. Et quod sic, videtur` follows `QUAESTIO IV. / De Sacramentorum efficacia` (raw L2602 ff.; confirmed eyes-on against the p.19 L-0 band, which prints `De Sacramentorum efficacia`) and matches `title_la`. No q-swap. The opener is keyed to the *fourth* question of the article (efficacy/effective causation), distinct from q3's *containing power* (*continentia*). The internal structure is unusually large: after the 7 *Fundamenta* and 6 *Contra* of the principal question, Bonaventure embeds **two "lateral" sub-questions** (utrum sit causa *disponens*; utrum sit in eis *aliqua virtus*), each with its own affirmative args + *Sed contra*, then a Conclusio, a long Respondeo reporting **Opinion 1** (created relative virtue: *sine qua non* / efficient / disposing), an extended *Solutio oppositorum* answering the principal + both lateral questions, then **Opinion 2** (no absolute virtue, only an *ordinatio* by divine pact/assistance — the Naaman-Jordan and royal-token similes), and the author's own judgment leaning to Opinion 2.

**Page-split map (running heads verified eyes-on):**
- **p.19** (running head "DIST. I. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV. — 19"): QUAESTIO IV heading + *De Sacramentorum efficacia* subtitle (L col); *Fundamenta* args 1–5 (L), args 6–7 + *Contra* 1–3 (R). Footer note-series **1–11** → [^1]–[^11] (L footer nn.1–5; R footer nn.5-tail through 11). Notes: lit. Magistri c.6 / Hugh de Sacram. p.XI c.5 / Magister c.4 + Aristot. Rhetor. *a divisione* / supra q.2 / Aristot. Praedicam.+Topic. + II Sent. d.31 / cod. K *Deo* / Rom. 5 + Aristot. Topic. VII + Dionys. / Anselm *Cur Deus homo* + *Conceptu virg.* / Hugh p.IX c.2 + Avicenna / lit. Magistri c.5 / Hugh p.IX c.4.
- **p.20** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 20", verso): *Contra* args 4–6 (L), then the FIRST lateral question (*utrum sit causa disponens*) — affirmative args 1–4 + *Sed contra* 1 (L); *Sed contra* 2–3 + the SECOND lateral question (*utrum sit aliqua virtus*) negative args 1–3 (R). Footer note-series **1–13** → [^12]–[^24] (L footer nn.1–8; R footer nn.9–13). Notes: Ps.15/118 Gloss / def. virtutis + II Sent. d.27 / lit. Magistri c.4 + III Sent. d.40 / Hugh p.IX c.2 + August. / Hugh p.IX c.5 / Matth.11:30 *suave iugum* / tom.II p.682 / II Sent. d.26 *et subito* / Aristot. Metaph. *accidens* / August. de Musica+Gen. ad lit. / supply *esse* / II Lib.Arb. + II Sent. d.27 / Aristot. de Anima.
- **p.21** (running head "DIST. I. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV. — 21"): the lateral-q2 *Contra* args 1–5 (L); the CONCLUSIO blockquote, the RESPONDEO (Opinion 1: triple conclusion + purgatory-fire explication), and the opening of the *Solutio oppositorum* (replies 1–2 to the principal question) (R). Footer note-series **1–10** → [^25]–[^34] (L footer nn.1–4; R footer nn.4-tail through 10). Notes: Boeth. de Consol. V + Liber de Causis / edd. *contra* / Beda in Luc. / lit. Magistri c.1 + var. *abluitur cor* / infra d.20+d.44 / infra lit. Magistri d.IV / cod. var. *veteris/novae legis* / Vat. *characterificationis* / cod. var. *intus operans* / edd. *efficientiae*.
- **p.22** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 22", verso): the *Solutio* continued — replies 3–7 to the principal question (L); reply to lateral q1 (*Resp. ad 1. quaest. lateralem*), then replies to lateral q1's negative args (1, 3), then the opening of the reply to lateral q2 (*Resp. ad 2. quaest. lateralem*: args 1) (R). Footer note-series **1–11** → [^35]–[^45] (L footer nn.1–6; R footer nn.7–11). Notes: cod. *de differentia* / cod. *Sacramentum/sint* + *virtutem a passione Christi* / cod. *sola dispositione* / *creare ex nihilo* / I Sent. d.14 / *quaeritur/obiicitur* / quaest. principal. ad 3 / cod. *in quo recipitur* / combustio ligni tom.II p.471 / cod. *dicit/dicunt* / cod. supplet *sit*.
- **p.23** (running head "DIST. I. P. I. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. IV. — 23"): the reply to lateral q2 continued — args 2–4 + *Ad aliud* (L), closing Opinion 1 (*haec opinio est magnorum*); then **Opinion 2** opens (no absolute virtue, only assistance), the Naaman-Jordan simile, and the incidental question on created-over-uncreated virtue with the royal-token (*rex statuit*) example (R). Footer note-series **1–11** → [^46]–[^56] (L footer nn.1–6; R footer nn.6-tail through 11). Notes: II Sent. d.26 + Vat. *suppositum* / cod. L *aliquod corporale* / cod. *enim/nam* / cod. M *ignobilior anima* / edd. *Magistrorum* / cod. *similiter esse dicunt* / IV Reg. 5:14 (Naaman) / cod. *praeter* / Vat. *proprie* / cod. *marcas/libras* + *hoc exemplum* / *sive relatio*.
- **p.24** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 24", verso): Opinion 2 concluded — the *ordinatio*/*pactio divina* exposition (L + top of R), *ratio consentit* / *fides non repugnat* (the difficulties of an absolute quality), the royal-letters simile, the incidental question on the foundation of the relation, and the **author's judgment** (*Iudicium auctoris*) leaning to Opinion 2 (*haec mihi videtur ad sustinendum facilior*); q4 ends mid-R-column at *...omnia quaesita patent* (raw L3203). **QUAESTIO V then opens on the same printed page** (R col, raw L3208) and belongs to the next chunk. Footer note-series for this page runs **1–10**, but **only nn.1–6 belong to q4** → [^57]–[^62] (L footer nn.1–5; R footer nn.5-tail through 6). **p.24 footer nn.7–10 belong to Quaestio V** (Hugh de Sacram., *De differentia*, etc.) and are NOT claimed here. Notes: supply *ideo* + var. *Et sicut extenditur* / cod. *pietas...consentit* var. / Ed.1 *et huic* + var. *honorem gratiae* / cod. *eo* + omit *et* / August. de Trin. V *nummus/pretium* + supply *fundatur* / **Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.** (the printed apparatus itself redirects q4's last note to q3's scholion — see below).

**Apparatus count = 62** (p.19: 11; p.20: 13; p.21: 10; p.22: 11; p.23: 11; p.24: 6), all keyed to body markers in both languages. The per-page footer-restart series are merged into one consecutive [^1]–[^62] run for this file.

**Scholion: ABSENT — `has_scholion: false`.** Per q3's forwarded hand-off, q4 carries **no scholion of its own**: q3's article-master SCHOLION (§I–§IV, printed on p.18) explicitly covers "the third and fourth questions" (it opens *Ad 3. et 4. quaestionem praenotanda sunt verba Eugenii IV.*) and §III–§IV survey the very physical-vs-moral / created-virtue-vs-assistance efficacy controversy (Scotus, Durandus, Henry of Ghent) that q4 debates as Opinion 1 vs Opinion 2. This is independently **confirmed by the printed apparatus itself**: q4's final footnote on p.24 (n.6, here [^62]) reads in full *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"). No scholion has been invented or duplicated here. The scholion lives in `bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-a1-q3`.

**Hand-off picked up from `bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-a1-q3`:** q3's Notes forwarded that (a) QUAESTIO IV opens at raw L2605 after the p.19 running head, (b) q3's body ends cleanly on p.17 and its SCHOLION fills all of p.18, so there is **no mid-page body splice at the q3/q4 seam** and q4 begins fresh on p.19, (c) q4 carries **no scholion of its own** and is `has_scholion: false` with a redirect to the q3 scholion, and (d) q4 starts a fresh per-page footer band on p.19 (q3 claimed no p.19 apparatus). All four honored: q4 opens at the top of p.19 with the QUAESTIO IV heading; p.19 notes 1–11 are rendered here as [^1]–[^11]; `has_scholion: false` with the redirect ([^62] + this Notes block); the q3/q4 seam is grammatically clean. No p.16/17/18 footers re-claimed (those were q3's).

**Cross-chunk hand-off forwarded to `bon-sent-IV-d1-p1-a1-q5`:** QUAESTIO V (*De differentia inter Sacramenta vetera et nova*) opens at raw L3208 on printed **p.24** (R column), immediately after q4's body ends at *...Et secundum hanc ultimam viam omnia quaesita patent* (raw L3203, R col of p.24). There **is** therefore a mid-page boundary at the q4/q5 seam — both quaestiones share printed p.24 — but **no mid-page body splice**: q4's last sentence closes grammatically (*...omnia quaesita patent*) before the QUAESTIO V heading begins a new question. **Footer split on shared p.24:** p.24's per-page footer series runs nn.1–10; **q4 claims nn.1–6** (rendered here [^57]–[^62]); **q5 must claim p.24 footer nn.7–10** (Hugh, *Libr. I p. VIII c.12* on *De differentia*; the *ex quo homo* / *currere medicina cum morbo* notes). q5 should pick these up as the start of its own p.24 footer band; do not re-read q4's nn.1–6. q5's body then continues onto pp.25–27 (the q3 hand-off noted a "...QUAEST. V. — 27" running head). Verify q5's own article position before treating any missing scholion as an error (the q3 art.-master scholion's scope is "the 3rd and 4th questions" only).

**[?] flags:** none. All formulae, codex sigla (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, aa, bb, cc), conciliar/patristic citations (Hugh of St. Victor *de Sacramentis*, the Master/Lombard, Anselm *Cur Deus homo* and *de Conceptu virginali*, Bede on Luke, Augustine *de Trinitate*/*de Musica*/*de Libero Arbitrio*/*de Genesi ad litteram*/*83 Quaestiones*, Boethius *de Consolatione* and *de Differentiis topicis*, Aristotle *Rhetoric*/*Topics*/*Categories*/*Metaphysics*/*de Anima*/*Ethics*, Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*, Avicenna *Metaphysics*, the *Liber de Causis*, the Naaman narrative of IV Reg. 5:14) resolved cleanly against the PDF column bands. Running heads confirm the quaestio number by text on the recto pages ("...QUAEST. IV. — 19/21/23"); the +20 offset confirms the verso pages ("SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 20/22/24"). The OCR garbled the page digits and a few glyphs ("UNIGUS"/"UNICLIS" for UNICUS; "Qiiarto" for Quarto; "efftcacia" for efficacia) — all resolved against the PDF.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0