title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum pars inferior rationis possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori

title_alt: Whether the lower part of reason can sin mortally apart from the higher

source_text:
<!-- page 579 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum pars inferior possit peccare mortaliter absque superiori. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^1]: « Si peccatum diu in cogitatione delectationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est ». Sed tunc vir non dicitur comedere, nisi quando adest voluntas perficiendi: ergo sola muliere comedente, contingit peccare mortaliter.

<!-- page 580 -->

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, capitulo illo[^2]: *Nec sane* etc., quod si sola mulier comedat, totus homo damnatur: sed hoc non est nisi propter peccatum mortale: ergo sola muliere comedente, contingit peccare mortaliter.

3. Item, superior portio rationis dicitur, in quantum nata est aspicere superiora; sed contingit aliquod[^3] peccatum committere, ita quod nihil cogitemus de legibus aeternis: ergo contingit, aliquem peccare mortaliter solo actu inferioris partis, nihil faciente actu superioris.

4. Item, frequenter offendit quis proximum, nihil cogitans de offensa Dei; sed inferior portio est, secundum quam ordinamur ad proximum, superior, secundum quam ordinamur ad Deum: ergo contingit peccare mortaliter ex actu inferioris partis sine actu superioris.

5. Item, magis prona est ad peccatum inferior portio quam superior, cum ex coniunctione ad sensualitatem mollior sit, et ob hoc mulier nuncupetur: ergo si superior portio rationis potest peccare per se ipsam, multo fortius videtur, quod inferior.

**Sed contra:**
1. Augustinus, duodecimo de Trinitate, et habetur in littera, capitulo illo[^4]: *Nec sane* etc., ubi dicitur, quod, « cum mens sola cogitatione oblectatur, de talibus cogitationibus venia petenda est pectusque percutiendum et dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita » etc; sed talis est poenitentia venialium: ergo quamdiu mulier comedit absque viro, peccatum est solum veniale.

2. Item[^5], impossibile est, inferiorem portionem damnari absque superiori; sed superior portio nunquam damnatur sine culpa: ergo impossibile est, inferiorem portionem absque superiori peccare mortaliter.

3. Item, impossibile est, esse peccatum mortale sine consensu; sed consensus residet penes iudicem et arbitrum principalem — haec autem est superior portio rationis, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^6] — ergo etc.

4. Item, impossibile est, aliquem peccare mortaliter sine aversione[^7]; sed eius est averti, cuius est converti, hoc autem est superioris partis: ergo inferiorem portionem absque superiori impossibile est peccare mortaliter.

5. Item, nunquam meretur aliquis in cogitatione boni, nisi proponat illud facere vel complere, si possit[^8]: ergo similiter nunquam aliquis demeretur demerito mortalis peccati in cogitatione mali, nisi proponat illud perficere, si possit; hoc autem non est sine superiori portione rationis: ergo etc.

6. Item, quando aliquod peccatum est veniale, consentire in illud non facit peccatum mortale; sed delectatio carnalis citra consensum est veniale: ergo consentire in delectationem, ita quod non consentiatur in opus, non erit mortale. Si ergo consensus in opus est superioris partis, sicut dicit Augustinus[^9], nunquam est peccatum mortale in inferiori parte absque superiori. — Quod autem consensus in veniale non faciat mortale, probatur per hoc, quod consensus in verbum otiosum et mendacium iocosum non est mortalis, sed venialis. — Si autem tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia delectatio carnalis via est ad mortale peccatum; tunc ego quaero, quare potius consensus in delectationem attribuitur inferiori parti quam superiori? Et quare consensus in opus potius appropriatur superiori? Cum enim inferioris partis ita bene sit regere membra, sicut et affectiones et alia; videtur, quod ita bene sit in potestate inferioris partis praebere arma iniquitatis peccato[^10], sicut etiam in delectationem consentire.

Ideo est quaestio, quae differentia sit inter peccare et comedere; et utrum comedere sit idem quod consentire; et quando dicatur mulier comedere, et quando vir; et quando mulier comedendo peccat mortaliter, et quando venialiter. — Non enim videtur illud verbum Augustini[^11] de comestione viri esse generaliter verum, quod tunc comedit vir, quando praebet arma iniquitatis peccato. Multa enim sunt peccata, quae consummantur in sola cogitatione interna; et tunc comedit, et nulla membra corporis praebentur arma iniquitatis, cum illud peccatum non habeat exerceri per membra corporis.

<!-- page 581 -->

### Conclusio

> Inferior rationis portio non potest mortaliter peccare absque superiori portione rationis.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod etsi possibile sit, mulierem comedere absque viro, non tamen est possibile, mulierem peccare mortaliter absque viro, sive inferiorem portionem absque superiori; et hoc patet sic.

Aliud enim est peccatum mortale committere, et aliud cibum vetitum degustare. — Peccatum enim mortale dicit deordinationem a Deo, quae est cum consensu et contemptu; inordinatio autem talis est per aversionem[^12], et haec est superioris partis. Eius enim est averti, cuius est converti. Consentire autem ad illam potentiam spectat, apud quam residet iudiciaria potestas et regiminis auctoritas. Haec autem est superior portio rationis[^13]; et ideo impossibile est, aliquod peccatum mortale esse in nobis, quod superiori portioni non imputetur, et in quo ipsa non deordinetur, propter naturam peccati mortalis, quae exigit, ibi esse et contemptum aversionis et consensum deliberationis, quorum utrumque est superioris partis. — Est etiam ratio ex istarum potentiarum connexione, quoniam inter superiorem portionem et inferiorem lex coniugii est[^14], et ideo una tenetur alteram regere et reprimere. Non sic autem est inter sensualitatem et inferiorem portionem; et propter hoc, cum inferior portio deordinatur, negligentiae viri, qui debuit eam reprimere, imputatur, et pariter cum illa culpabilis iudicatur. Sic igitur patet, quod impossibile est, inferiorem portionem rationis absque superiori peccare mortaliter.

Possibile tamen est, unam earum absque altera comedere; et hoc, quia comestio dicit conversionem ad delectationem secundum actum proprium mulieris, aut viri. Contingit autem, rationalem potentiam converti ad delectationem a sensualitate oblatam secundum actum inferioris portionis, ita tamen, quod non convertitur secundum actum superioris; et ita contingit, mulierem comedere, viro non degustante.

Et hoc patet, si attendamus progressum tentationis et delectationis. Primo enim delectabile offertur sive percipitur; secundo vero delectatio advertitur; tertio vero in id, ad quod trahit delectatio, consentitur vel dissentitur. Delectabile percipere est sensualitatis, delectationem advertere est inferioris partis rationis, quae interiores motus et affectus habet diiudicare et cognoscere; hoc enim non est potentiae[^15] sensitivae. Definire autem, an hoc sit amplectendum vel respuendum, hoc est superioris partis, in qua residet auctoritas iudiciariae potestatis. — Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis ante adversionem delectationis; et hoc est sensualitatis et absque dubio est veniale peccatum. Contingit iterum delectari post apprehensionem delectabilis et perceptionem delectationis ante plenum consensum deliberationis; et hoc est inferioris partis et aliquando mortale, aliquando veniale; et tunc dicitur comedere sola mulier. Contingit iterum tertio delectari post apprehensionem delectabilis et adversionem delectationis et post plenum consensum deliberationis; et tunc dicitur comedere vir, et tunc est mortale peccatum in his generibus peccatorum, quorum actus sunt in prohibitione, propter plenum consensum et deordinationem. — Unde cum tentatio inchoat[^16] a sensualitate, planum est esse veniale; cum consummatur in superiori parte rationis, planum est esse mortale; cum vero sola mulier comedit, potest esse mortale vel veniale; et ideo dubium est discernere, quando sit mortale vel veniale.

Potest tamen discerni hoc modo: quia cum percipitur delectatio, aut statim repellitur, aut retinetur. Si statim repellitur, tunc leve est peccatum. Si vero tenetur, hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quia placet ipsa delectatio et operis consummatio, ita quod est voluntas delectandi in cogitatione et etiam in opere, si facultas adesset; et tunc est[^17] ibi plenus consensus et peccatum mortale, simul concurrente viri et mulieris comestione. Aut placet delectatio, sed tamen displicet peccati consummatio; et tunc est consensus semiplenus, et tunc dicitur manducare mulier; nihilominus tamen peccat mortaliter, cum in illam consentit delectationem. Aut utrumque displicet, scilicet ipsa interior delectatio et operis consummatio; et tunc aut advertit periculum, aut non advertit. Si non advertit periculum delectationis nec repellit eam, peccat, sed non mortaliter; gravius tamen peccat, quam si statim et[^18] viriliter repulisset. Aut advertit periculum et delectationem illam non repellit, sed mentem in talibus cogitationibus revolvi sinit; et tunc dicunt magistri, quod peccat mortaliter, quia, quamvis non sit ibi[^19] consensus verus, est tamen ibi consensus interpretativus; et comedit sola mulier, nihilominus tamen peccatum illud imputatur viro, quia, cum eam compescere debuisset et teneretur, non tamen compescuit[^20].

<!-- page 582 -->

Hoc tamen, quod nunc ultimo dictum est, non est usquequaque certum. Negant enim aliqui, esse mortale in negligentia reprimendi, ubi est displicentia, quantumcumque quis periculum advertat. — Sed tamen securior via tenenda est, quidquid sit rei veritas. Et si cui[^21] hoc contingat, sanum est consilium, quod de ipso ut de mortali poeniteat; in dubiis enim securior via eligenda est. — Et nota, quod non de quacumque delectatione loquimur, utpote de illa, qua quis delectatur cogitando de pulcritudine mulieris, sed de illa, quae surgit ex cogitatione illius operis nefarii.

Et sic patet, quod mulierem contingit comedere sine viro, pro eo quod vir solum dicitur comedere, quando plenus consensus adest; et tunc dicuntur arma iniquitatis praeberi peccato, quia totus homo ibi ad peccatum incurvatur, sive sit peccatum carnis, sive spiritus. Peccare autem non potest[^22] mortaliter absque viro, quia non potest esse peccatum sine viri consensu vero, vel interpretativo. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod inferior portio absque superiori non potest peccare mortaliter, licet duae ultimae non cogant. Illae enim ostendunt, quod mulier non potest comedere sine viro, per hoc quod consensum in delectationem dicunt non esse peccatum; quod absque dubio falsum est, sicut dicit Augustinus in littera[^23].

Nec valet quod obiicit de consensu in bonum[^24], vel de consensu in verbum otiosum. Primum non valet, quia plura requiruntur ad bonum consummandum quam ad malum perpetrandum; unius enim circumstantiae defectus operationem deformat[^25]. Secundum non valet, quia nullum est ibi periculum in delectatione veniali, cuius actus est venialis; ibi autem periculum est, cum delectatio via est perducens ad peccatum mortale.

Ad illa vero quae ultimo quaerebantur, iam patet responsio ex praedictis, videlicet quae differentia sit inter comestionem et culpae mortalis commissionem. Patet etiam, quando vir dicitur comedere, et quando mulier. Patet enim, quando mulier in comedendo peccat mortaliter, et quando peccat venialiter. Patet etiam, quare[^26] consensus in delectationem attribuitur mulieri, et consensus in opus viro, quia consensus in operis perpetrationem est plenarius consensus; consensus vero in delectationem absque opere, est consensus semiplenus. Si autem peccatum consisteret in sola delectatione, tunc consensus in delectationem posset esse plenarius consensus; et tunc non tantum esset superioris partis, sed etiam inferioris; unde non tantum dicitur vir consentire, quia movet exteriora membra, sed quia movetur voluntate plenaria. Et hanc circumloquitur Augustinus in eo quod dicit, virum comedere, cum arma iniquitatis peccato praebet.

**Ad argumenta:**
*Ad 1, 2.* Ad rationes autem, quae adducuntur ad oppositum, quibus ostenditur, quod mulier[^27] sine viro mortaliter peccare potest; plana est responsio. Nam primae duae auctoritates loquuntur de comestione, non de culpae commissione.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur tertio loco[^28], quod superior portio rationis habet converti ad superiora; dicendum, quod non solum actus eius est ad superna, sed etiam actus eius est discernere et sententiare de his quae fiunt in regno animae, et compescere vires inferiores; et ideo, cum non compescit, imputatur sibi.

*Ad 4, 5.* Ad duo sequentia similiter patet responsio. Illis enim duabus rationibus ostenditur, quod peccatum potest esse in inferiori portione rationis absque proprio actu rationis superioris[^29]. Et hoc quidem verum est; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod peccatum possit esse in inferiori parte rationis absque superiori, quia ipsa negligentia cohibendi inferiorem partem in sui motus deordinatione reddit ipsam culpabilem, ut saepe dictum est[^30].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher.*

Secondly it is asked whether the lower part can sin mortally apart from the higher. And that it can, it seems.

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text[^1]: "If a sin be held long in the thought of delight, even if the will to carry it out be lacking, it is mortal." But the man is not said to eat except when the will to carry it out is present: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter[^2]: *Nor indeed* etc., that if the woman alone eats, the whole man is damned: but this is only on account of mortal sin: therefore, the woman alone eating, it happens that one sins mortally.

3. Likewise, the higher portion of reason is so called insofar as it is born to look upon higher things; but it happens that one commits some[^3] sin in such a way that we think nothing of the eternal laws: therefore it happens that someone sins mortally by the act of the lower part alone, the act of the higher doing nothing.

4. Likewise, often one offends his neighbor while thinking nothing of an offense against God; but the lower portion is that according to which we are ordered to our neighbor, the higher that according to which we are ordered to God: therefore it happens that one sins mortally by an act of the lower part without an act of the higher.

5. Likewise, the lower portion is more prone to sin than the higher, since by its conjunction to sensuality it is softer, and for this reason it is called the woman: therefore, if the higher portion of reason can sin through itself, much more it seems that the lower can.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*, and it is contained in the text, in that chapter[^4]: *Nor indeed* etc., where it is said that, "when the mind is delighted by thought alone, of such thoughts pardon must be sought and the breast struck and one must say: Forgive us our debts" etc; but such is the penance of venial sins: therefore, so long as the woman eats apart from the man, the sin is only venial.

2. Likewise[^5], it is impossible that the lower portion be damned apart from the higher; but the higher portion is never damned without fault: therefore it is impossible that the lower portion sin mortally apart from the higher.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mortal sin without consent; but consent resides with the judge and the principal arbiter — and this is the higher portion of reason, as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text[^6] — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone sin mortally without an aversion[^7]; but it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward, and this belongs to the higher part: therefore it is impossible for the lower portion to sin mortally apart from the higher.

5. Likewise, no one ever merits in the thought of good unless he proposes to do or accomplish it, if he can[^8]: therefore likewise no one ever demerits with the demerit of mortal sin in the thought of evil, unless he proposes to carry it out, if he can; but this is not without the higher portion of reason: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, when some sin is venial, to consent to it does not make a mortal sin; but carnal delight short of consent is venial: therefore to consent to the delight, in such a way that there be no consent to the deed, will not be mortal. If therefore consent to the deed belongs to the higher part, as Augustine says[^9], there is never mortal sin in the lower part apart from the higher. — And that consent to a venial sin does not make it mortal is proved by this, that consent to an idle word and a jesting lie is not mortal, but venial. — But if you should say that it is not similar, because carnal delight is a way to mortal sin; then I ask, why rather is consent to the delight attributed to the lower part than to the higher? And why is consent to the deed rather appropriated to the higher? For since it belongs to the lower part to govern the members as well as the affections and other things; it seems that it is just as much in the power of the lower part to furnish weapons of iniquity to sin[^10], as also to consent to the delight.

Therefore the question is, what difference there is between sinning and eating; and whether to eat is the same as to consent; and when the woman is said to eat, and when the man; and when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when venially. — For that saying of Augustine[^11] about the man's eating does not seem to be generally true, that the man eats then, when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin. For there are many sins that are consummated in interior thought alone; and then he eats, and no members of the body are furnished as weapons of iniquity, since that sin is not to be carried out through the members of the body.

### Conclusion

> The lower portion of reason cannot sin mortally apart from the higher portion of reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, although it is possible for the woman to eat apart from the man, it is nevertheless not possible for the woman to sin mortally apart from the man, that is, for the lower portion apart from the higher; and this is shown thus.

For it is one thing to commit a mortal sin, and another to taste forbidden food. — For mortal sin means a turning-away from God, which is with consent and contempt; but such a disorder is through an aversion[^12], and this belongs to the higher part. For it belongs to that one to be turned away whose it is to be turned toward. But to consent pertains to that power with which the judiciary power and the authority of governance reside. And this is the higher portion of reason[^13]; and therefore it is impossible that any mortal sin be in us that is not imputed to the higher portion, and in which it is not itself disordered, on account of the nature of mortal sin, which requires that there be both the contempt of aversion and the consent of deliberation, each of which belongs to the higher part. — There is also a reason from the connection of these powers, since between the higher portion and the lower there is a law of marriage[^14], and therefore the one is bound to govern and restrain the other. But it is not so between sensuality and the lower portion; and for this reason, when the lower portion is disordered, it is imputed to the negligence of the man, who ought to have restrained it, and it is judged culpable together with that one. So therefore it is clear that it is impossible for the lower portion of reason to sin mortally apart from the higher.

It is nevertheless possible for one of them to eat apart from the other; and this, because eating means a turning toward the delight according to the proper act of the woman, or of the man. But it happens that the rational power is turned toward the delight offered by sensuality according to the act of the lower portion, yet in such a way that it is not turned according to the act of the higher; and so it happens that the woman eats, while the man does not taste.

And this is clear if we attend to the progress of temptation and delight. For first the delightful thing is offered or perceived; secondly the delight is noticed; thirdly there is consent or dissent to that to which the delight draws. To perceive the delightful thing belongs to sensuality, to notice the delight belongs to the lower part of reason, which has to judge and know the interior motions and affections; for this does not belong to the sensitive[^15] power. But to define whether this is to be embraced or rejected, this belongs to the higher part, in which the authority of the judiciary power resides. — It happens therefore that one is delighted at the apprehension of the delightful thing before the noticing of the delight; and this belongs to sensuality and is without doubt a venial sin. It happens again that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the perception of the delight, before the full consent of deliberation; and this belongs to the lower part and is sometimes mortal, sometimes venial; and then the woman alone is said to eat. It happens again, thirdly, that one is delighted after the apprehension of the delightful thing and the noticing of the delight and after the full consent of deliberation; and then the man is said to eat, and then it is a mortal sin in those kinds of sins whose acts are under prohibition, on account of the full consent and disorder. — Hence, when the temptation begins[^16] from sensuality, it is plainly venial; when it is consummated in the higher part of reason, it is plainly mortal; but when the woman alone eats, it can be mortal or venial; and therefore it is doubtful to discern when it is mortal or venial.

It can nevertheless be discerned in this way: that when the delight is perceived, either it is at once repelled, or it is retained. If it is at once repelled, then the sin is light. But if it is held, this can be in three ways: either because the delight itself and the consummation of the deed are pleasing, in such a way that there is a will to take delight in thought and also in deed, if the opportunity were present; and then there is[^17] full consent there and mortal sin, the eating of man and woman concurring together. Or the delight is pleasing, yet the consummation of the sin is displeasing; and then the consent is half-full, and then the woman is said to eat; nevertheless she sins mortally, since she consents to that delight. Or both are displeasing, namely the interior delight itself and the consummation of the deed; and then either he notices the danger, or he does not notice it. If he does not notice the danger of the delight nor repel it, he sins, but not mortally; yet he sins more gravely than if he had at once and[^18] manfully repelled it. Or he notices the danger and does not repel that delight, but lets the mind dwell in such thoughts; and then the masters say that he sins mortally, because, although there is no true consent there[^19], there is nevertheless interpretative consent there; and the woman alone eats, yet nevertheless that sin is imputed to the man, because, when he ought to have checked her and was bound to, he nevertheless did not check her[^20].

This, however, which has just now lastly been said, is not altogether certain. For some deny that there is anything mortal in the negligence of restraining, where there is displeasure, however much one notices the danger. — But nevertheless the safer way is to be held, whatever the truth of the matter may be. And if this should befall anyone[^21], it is sound counsel that he do penance for it as for a mortal sin; for in doubtful matters the safer way is to be chosen. — And note that we are not speaking of just any delight, such as that by which one is delighted in thinking of the beauty of a woman, but of that which arises from the thought of that nefarious deed.

And so it is clear that the woman happens to eat apart from the man, for the reason that the man alone is said to eat when full consent is present; and then the weapons of iniquity are said to be furnished to sin, because the whole man is there bent down to sin, whether it be a sin of the flesh or of the spirit. But she cannot[^22] sin mortally apart from the man, because there cannot be sin without the true or interpretative consent of the man. — Therefore the reasons are to be granted that show that the lower portion cannot sin mortally apart from the higher, although the last two do not compel. For they show that the woman cannot eat without the man, by this, that they say that consent to the delight is not a sin; which is without doubt false, as Augustine says in the text[^23].

Nor is what he objects about consent to a good thing[^24], or about consent to an idle word, valid. The first is not valid, because more is required for accomplishing a good than for perpetrating an evil; for the defect of one circumstance deforms the operation[^25]. The second is not valid, because there is no danger in venial delight, whose act is venial; but there is danger there, when the delight is a way leading to mortal sin.

But to those things that were lastly asked, the response is already clear from what has been said, namely what difference there is between eating and the commission of mortal fault. It is also clear when the man is said to eat, and when the woman. For it is clear when the woman in eating sins mortally, and when she sins venially. It is also clear why[^26] consent to the delight is attributed to the woman, and consent to the deed to the man, because consent to the perpetration of the deed is full consent; but consent to the delight without the deed is half-full consent. But if the sin consisted in the delight alone, then consent to the delight could be full consent; and then it would belong not only to the higher part, but also to the lower; whence the man is not only said to consent because he moves the exterior members, but because he is moved by the full will. And Augustine circumlocutes this in what he says, that the man eats when he furnishes weapons of iniquity to sin.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1 and 2.* As to the reasons that are adduced to the opposite, by which it is shown that the woman[^27] can sin mortally without the man; the response is plain. For the first two authorities speak of eating, not of the commission of fault.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected in the third place[^28], that the higher portion of reason has to be turned toward higher things; it must be said that not only is its act directed to the supernal things, but its act is also to discern and pass sentence concerning those things that are done in the kingdom of the soul, and to check the lower powers; and therefore, when it does not check, it is imputed to it.

*To 4 and 5.* To the two following the response is likewise clear. For by those two reasons it is shown that sin can be in the lower portion of reason apart from a proper act of the higher reason[^29]. And this indeed is true; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that sin can be in the lower part of reason apart from the higher, because the very negligence of restraining the lower part in the disorder of its motion renders it culpable, as has often been said[^30].

---

la: Cfr. supra d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo superius cod. bb post *immo* addit *etiam*.

en: Cf. above, d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little above, codex bb after *immo* adds *etiam*.

la: Cap. 12, et sumtum est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17.

en: Chapter 12, and it is taken from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17.

en: Codex aa prefixes *peccati* to the word *carnalis*.

la: Cap. 12. circa medium, et est etiam ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18. — In *minori* pro *propter*, quod in plurimis codd. et in ed. 1 legitur, Vat. *per*.

en: Chapter 12, near the middle, and it is also from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 18. — In the minor premise, for *propter*, which is read in very many codices and in ed. 1, the Vatican edition has *per*.

la: Cod. F *aliquem*, et dein *cogitet* pro *cogitemus*; codd. X Z ee ante *aliquod* interserunt *aliquem*.

en: Codex F reads *aliquem*, and then *cogitet* for *cogitemus*; codices X Z ee insert *aliquem* before *aliquod*.

la: Est cap. 12. August. verba habentur XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18. — Textus s. Scripturae est Matth. 6, 12. — Verbis Augustini hic allatis cod. F addit: *sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. cap. 71*, ubi dicit: « De quotidianis [autem brevibus] levibusque peccatis, sine quibus haec vita non ducitur [quotidiana], oratio fidelium satisfacit. Eorum enim est dicere: Pater noster, qui es in caelis » etc: Tamen potest dici ad istud: quod Augustinus in 12. de Trin. aliter et aliter sumit istum consensum *post* et *ante*, quia cum dicit, quod pro tali peccato dicendum est: *Dimitte nobis* etc., loquitur ante deliberationem animae, quia tunc est venialis; quando autem dicit, quod propter talem consensum totus homo damnatur, loquitur post deliberationem; quod patet, quia dicit, quod vir debuit cohibere mulierem; et ideo intelligitur ex hoc iam huiusmodi cogitationem ad virum pervenisse, ad quem pertinet deliberatio et iudicium faciendorum, et tunc est mortale.

en: It is chapter 12. Augustine's words are found in *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 18. — The text of Holy Scripture is Matthew 6:12. — To Augustine's words adduced here codex F adds: *as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chapter 71*, where he says: "For the daily, brief and light sins, without which this [daily] life is not led, the prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction. For it belongs to them to say: Our Father, who art in heaven" etc: Yet it can be said to this: that Augustine in book 12 of *On the Trinity* takes this consent variously, *after* and *before*, because when he says that for such a sin one must say *Forgive us* etc., he is speaking before the deliberation of the soul, since then it is venial; but when he says that on account of such consent the whole man is damned, he is speaking after the deliberation; which is clear, because he says that the man ought to have restrained the woman; and therefore it is understood from this that such a thought has already come to the man, to whom belong the deliberation and judgment of things to be done, and then it is mortal.

la: Nonnulli codd. cum Vat. hic adiungunt *et contemptum*, ed. 3 omittit *aversionem et*.

en: Some codices with the Vatican edition here add *et contemptum*; ed. 3 omits *aversionem et*.

la: Cod. X addit *ut dicit Augustinus*.

en: Codex X adds *as Augustine says*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 8.

la: Codd. F T et nonnulli alii *possibile*. Immediate ante pro *hoc enim* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *hoc autem*. Proxime post pro *an hoc* plures codd., ut F V W Y aa bb, *utrum hoc*. Dein post primum *contingit* ed. 1 *autem* pro *igitur*, cod. aa *nec autem nec igitur*.

en: Codices F T and some others read *possibile*. Immediately before, for *hoc enim* the Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads *hoc autem*. Just after, for *an hoc* several codices, such as F V W Y aa bb, read *utrum hoc*. Then after the first *contingit*, ed. 1 reads *autem* for *igitur*, codex aa *neither autem nor igitur*.

la: Cap. 12, et est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. etiam in eodem cap. Magistri alium textum Augustini, sumtum ex II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. seq. — Pro *arbitrum principalem* plures codd., inter quos F K aa bb cc ee, et ed. 1 *arbitrium principale*.

en: Chapter 12, and it is from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17. Cf. also in the same chapter of the Master another text of Augustine, taken from *On Genesis against the Manichees* II, c. 14, n. 20 ff. — For *arbitrum principalem* several codices, among them F K aa bb cc ee, and ed. 1 read *arbitrium principale*.

la: Cap. 12. et est ex August., XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. seq.

en: Chapter 12, and it is from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17 ff.

la: Codd. I bb *inchoatur*. Post pauca pro *in superiori parte rationis* plures codd., inter quos H K T aa ee, cum ed. 1 *in superioris rationis parte*.

en: Codices I bb read *inchoatur*. A little after, for *in superiori parte rationis* several codices, among them H K T aa ee, with ed. 1 read *in superioris rationis parte*.

la: Codd. H T *esset*.

en: Codices H T read *esset*.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *et*. Subinde post *periculum* cod. O repetit *delectationis*.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 omit *et*. Thereupon after *periculum* codex O repeats *delectationis*.

la: Codd. H I T *illud*.

en: Codices H I T read *illud*.

la: Cod. aa *non eam compescit*.

en: Codex aa reads *non eam compescit*.

la: Cod. aa *alicui*. Paulo inferius pro *eligenda est* ed. 1 *tenenda est*, et post pauca *quae consurgit* pro *quae surgit*.

en: Codex aa reads *alicui*. A little below, for *eligenda est* ed. 1 reads *tenenda est*, and after a little *quae consurgit* for *quae surgit*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *dicitur*.

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 2, 3, 4 reads *dicitur*.

en: Chapter 11.

la: Respicitur fundam. 5. Plures codd. et edd. 3, 4 nec non Vat., hoc non attendentes, pro voce *bonum* substituerunt *mendacium*; perperam, cum lectio sic mutata neque subnexis verbis respondeat neque praecedentibus, nempe illis: *licet duae ultimae non cogant*. Aliquanto inferius in resp. ad secund. obiect. aliqui codd. cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4 omittunt *perducens*.

en: Reference is made to the fifth foundation. Several codices and edd. 3, 4, as well as the Vatican edition, not attending to this, substituted *mendacium* for the word *bonum*; wrongly, since the reading thus altered corresponds neither to the words appended nor to those preceding, namely those: *although the last two do not compel*. Somewhat below in the reply to the second objection some codices with the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 omit *perducens*.

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6; Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 30.

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, c. 6; Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 30.

la: Plures codd., inter quos F K Q cc, et ed. 1 *quando*.

en: Several codices, among them F K Q cc, and ed. 1 read *quando*.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quod comedens mulier*.

en: The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads *quod comedens mulier*.

la: In pluribus codd. nec non in primis edd. deest *loco*. Mox pro *superna* codd. F bb *superiora*; dein pro *discernere* multi codd. *decernere*.

en: In several codices and in the first editions *loco* is lacking. Soon for *superna* codices F bb read *superiora*; then for *discernere* many codices read *decernere*.

la: In praestantioribus codd. ut in ed. 1 non bene omittitur *superioris*, et in edd. 2, 3 desiderantur verba *quod peccatum potest* usque ad *sequitur*.

en: In the better codices, as in ed. 1, *superioris* is not well omitted, and in edd. 2, 3 the words *quod peccatum potest* down to *sequitur* are lacking.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: Respicitur fundamentum tertium. — Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 12.

en: Reference is made to the third foundation. — See here the text of the Master, c. 12.

la: Respiciuntur fundamenta quartum et quintum.

en: Reference is made to the fourth and fifth foundations.

la: Ut supra in corp. dictum est circa finem responsionis.

en: As was said above in the body, near the end of the response. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p57{9}-{L,R}-{1,2}.png`, `vol2-p58{0,1,2}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), two-column reflow (Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands). The IA djvu OCR for this quaestio is heavily cascade-fragmented across the Respondeo, *progressus tentationis*, and three-mode discernment passages, so the PDF column bands are authoritative per the Vol II Override.

**Page-split map.** QUAESTIO II opens at the foot of p.579 (PDF 601, +22), below a2-q1's SCHOLION III, and runs through pp. 580–582 (PDF 602–604), closing after the reply *Ad 4, 5* mid-page on p.582, where ARTICULUS III opens. Body structure = 5 affirmative arguments + Sed contra (4 members) + 1 long argument 6 (consensus-in-veniale) + incidental-questions paragraph (*quae differentia inter peccare et comedere*) + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (Ratio 1 deordinatio/aversio; Ratio 2 lex coniugii; *mulier sine viro comedere*; *progressus tentationis* three stages; three modes of retained delight; mode of discerning + *non usquequaque certum* caveat; *securior via*) + replies Ad 1.2 / Ad 3 / Ad 4.5.

**Apparatus — 30 entries [^1]–[^30].** Renumbered continuously across four printed pages:
- p.579 footers ³–⁴ → **[^1]–[^2]** (RECEIVED from a2-q1: ³ = Cfr. supra d.22 a.1 q.1 / cod. bb *immo* adds *etiam*; ⁴ = Cap. 12, ex August. XII de Trin. c.12 n.17 — anchor at arg 1's *in littera* and arg 2's *in littera*).
- p.580 footers ¹–⁹ → **[^3]–[^11]** (L ¹–³ = args 3 / Sed contra 1 / 2; R ⁴–⁹ = Sed contra 1 cap.12, args 6 / 6 / 6 / 6 / incidental-questions Augustine-text).
- p.581 footers ¹–⁹ → **[^12]–[^20]** (L ¹–⁴ = Respondeo aversio / superior portio / lex coniugii / *possibile* variant; R ⁵–⁹ = *inchoat* variant / *esset* / *et* omission / *illud* / *non eam compescit*).
- p.582 footers ¹–¹⁰ → **[^21]–[^30]** (L ¹–⁴ = *alicui* / *dicitur* / Cap.11 / fundam.5 *bonum*-vs-*mendacium*; R ⁵–¹⁰ = Aristot.+Dionys. / *quando* / *quod comedens mulier* / *loco*+*superna* / *superioris* omission / Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.).

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a2-q1: p.579 footers ³–⁴ + the QUAESTIO II body opener (foot of p.579). FORWARDED: none — the body closes mid-page on p.582 immediately above the ARTICULUS III opener; p.582's footers are entirely this quaestio's and are fully captured here.

**`has_scholion: false`** — via sibling-pointer to a2-q1's SCHOLION III, which is the joint *De eadem quaest.* commentator-roll ("Quoad sequentem quaest. omnes in conclusionibus conveniunt... De eadem quaest.: Alex. Hal. S. p. II q. 109 m. 9 — Scot. — Hier. de Montefortino... — S. Thom. — B. Albert. — Petr. a Tar. — Richard. a Med. hic a. 4 q. 4 — Aegid. hic p. II q. 2 n. 2"), printed at the end of a2-q1 on p.579-R and covering this following question. No standalone scholion is printed for this quaestio.

**[?] flags:** none. Side-glosses trimmed (Ad oppositum, Fundamenta, Conclusio, Ratio 1/2, Mulier est comedere, Progressus tentationis, Conclusio 1–4, Epilogus, Corollarium de modo discernendi, Alii aliter dicunt, Non probatur, Nota, Explicantur verba Augustini, Improbatur fundam., Improbatur duplex ratio, Ad quaestiones incidentes, Solutio oppositorum, Quaestio incidentes).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 583 -->

### ARTICULUS III.
### *Quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in sensualitate.*

Consequenter circa tertium, quo quaeritur, quomodo peccatum habeat fieri et esse in sensualitate, duo quaeruntur.

Primo enim quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum veniale.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum in sensualitate possit esse veniale peccatum.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod in sensualitate possit esse veniale peccatum:

1. *Primo* per illud Augustini, duodecimo de Trinitate, quod recitat Magister in littera[^1]: «Si in motu sensuali tantum peccati illecebra teneatur, veniale est».

2. *Item*, super illud Proverbiorum vigesimo quarto[^2]: *Septies in die* etc., Glossa: «Per necessitatem et fragilitatem carnis singulis diebus vel inviti, vel volentes peccamus». Si ergo peccamus inviti voluntate rationali, illud peccatum non est in voluntate, sed solum in sensualitate.

3. *Item*, ratione videtur. Motus ad illicitum est inordinatus, et ita reprehensibilis et malus; sed primi motus sunt huiusmodi: ergo primi motus sunt peccata. Sed primi motus sunt in sensualitate: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, omne quod est ordinabile secundum regulam iustitiae, quando deordinatur, habet in se culpam; sed sensualitas ordinabilis est secundum regulam iustitiae, et contingit, eam deordinari[^3] in motibus suis: videtur ergo, quod ipsa efficiatur culpabilis.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus quinto de Civitate Dei[^4] distinguit triplex genus causae: quaedam est, quae tantum facit, et haec est Deus; quaedam, quae tantum fit, ut natura; quaedam, quae facit et fit, ut arbitrii libertas sive voluntas. Et in prima causa non potest esse peccatum propter sui dignitatem; in secunda non potest esse peccatum propter sui arctationem: cum ergo sensualitatis sit potius moveri quam movere, agi quam agere, videtur, quod in ea peccatum non possit esse.

2. *Item*, in culpis differimus a brutis: ergo impossibile est, in nobis esse peccatum secundum id, secundum quod communicamus cum brutis; hoc autem est sensualitas[^5]: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, stulti et furiosi habent usum sensualitatis, et tamen in nullo suo actu peccant: ergo peccatum nunquam est in nobis ex deordinatione sensualitatis: ergo nullum peccatum in sensualitate ponendum est.

4. *Item*, in ea sola potentia nata est esse culpa[^6], secundum quam homo capax est laudis et vituperii; sed quantum ad partem sensibilem homo nec est dignus laude nec vituperio: ergo secundum illam non potest inesse culpa.

### Conclusio.

> Veniale peccatum, quatenus habet rationem culpae, est in libero arbitrio; quatenus habet rationem vitii, ponitur esse in sensualitate.

**Respondeo:** Ad huius intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum quaeritur, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in sensualitate, respondetur communiter, quod sensualitas dupliciter potest considerari: aut in se, aut prout est ordinabilis a ratione et sub ratione. Si in se consideretur, hoc modo habet usum in furiosis, et hoc modo dicit Augustinus[^7], quod in ea communicamus cum brutis. Et sic non potest in ea esse peccatum, sicut rationes ad secundam partem ostendunt. — Alio modo est loqui de sensualitate, secundum quod ipsa ordinabilis est ad rationem et sub ratione; et hoc modo habet regulari secundum legem[^8] iustitiae. Et sic, quando movetur ad illicitum, ipsa eius deordinatio habet esse peccatum; et sic communiter tenetur, quod etsi in sensualitate secundum se considerata peccatum esse non possit, potest tamen in ea esse peccatum, ut est ad rationem ordinata. Et per hoc declarari[^9] possunt argumenta ad utramque partem inducta.

Verumtamen adhuc restat quaestio, qualiter in sensualitate possit esse peccatum et culpa, cum nullo modo ponatur in ea esse virtus vel gratia; et propterea perscrutari volentibus hanc quaestionem interius[^10], duplex apparebit modus dicendi.

<!-- page 584 -->Fuerunt namque aliqui, qui dixerunt, quod etiam in sensualitate ordinata ad rationem non omnino ponendum est esse peccatum, sed aliquo modo secundum quid. Peccatum enim duo dicit, videlicet actum et deordinationem circa actum. Et licet peccatum dicatur esse in sensualitate ratione actus substrati et ratione motus, tamen ipsa deordinatio est in ratione, quae minus cauta et sollicita fuit praevidere, ne talis motus inordinatus in sensualitate insurgeret, vel etiam minus diligens est reprimere. Ideo illa deordinatio peccatorum venialium ponitur in ipsa ratione, quae sensualitatem neglexit regere. Imputatur autem ei in veniale, non in mortale, propter hoc, quod non tenebatur ipsam compescere ex lege coniugii, sicut tenetur ratio superior respectu inferioris[^11]. — Sed iste modus dicendi minus sufficiens esse videtur: primo, quia secundum hoc omnia peccata venialia potius essent ex omissione quam ex inordinata inclinatione. Secundo, quia quaedam sunt venialia, quae ratio vitare non potest, sicut dicit Augustinus, et ostenditur infra[^12]. Tertio vero, quia ibi est deordinatio, ubi est et actus, qui deordinatur; et ita, si motus et actus peccati in sensualitate ponitur, in ea debet poni et inordinatio.

Propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod est loqui de peccato, in quantum habet rationem culpae, et in quantum habet rationem vitii. In quantum habet rationem culpae, sic opponitur gratiae et facit illum, in quo est[^13], esse dignum vituperio; et hoc modo omne peccatum est in libero arbitrio. Alio modo est considerare peccatum, in quantum tenet rationem vitii; et sic dicit inordinationem alicuius potentiae respectu actus sibi debiti secundum suam naturalem institutionem; et quia talis deordinatio habet esse in sensualitate, ita quod illa deordinatio est via ad opus vituperio dignum, sic ponitur, in sensualitate esse peccatum. — Per hanc autem distinctionem manifesta est quaestionis intentio et omnium obiectionum praecedentium dissolutio. Hoc autem melius denudabitur infra[^14], quando agetur de subiecto virtutis et gratiae, et de oppositione virtutis et culpae.

english:
### Article III.
### *How sin comes to be and exists in sensuality.*

Next, concerning the third point — by which it is asked how sin comes to be and exists in sensuality — two questions are raised.

For first it is asked whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.

Secondly it is asked whether there can be mortal sin in sensuality.

### Question I.
### *Whether there can be venial sin in sensuality.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that there can be venial sin in sensuality:

1. *First*, by that statement of Augustine, in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*, which the Master recites in the text[^1]: «If the enticement of sin be held only in the sensual motion, it is venial».

2. *Likewise*, upon that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four[^2]: *Seven times a day* etc., the Gloss says: «Through the necessity and frailty of the flesh we sin each day, whether unwilling or willing». If therefore we sin against our rational will, that sin is not in the will, but only in sensuality.

3. *Likewise*, it seems so by reason. A motion toward what is illicit is disordered, and so reprehensible and evil; but first motions are of this kind: therefore first motions are sins. But first motions are in sensuality: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, everything that is ordinable according to the rule of justice has fault in itself when it is disordered; but sensuality is ordinable according to the rule of justice, and it happens that it be disordered[^3] in its motions: it seems therefore that it becomes culpable.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the fifth book *On the City of God*[^4], distinguishes a threefold kind of cause: there is one that only makes, and this is God; one that is only made, as nature; one that both makes and is made, as the liberty of choice or the will. And in the first cause there cannot be sin on account of its dignity; in the second there cannot be sin on account of its constraint: since therefore it belongs to sensuality rather to be moved than to move, to be acted upon than to act, it seems that sin cannot be in it.

2. *Likewise*, in faults we differ from beasts: therefore it is impossible that there be sin in us according to that in which we have a common nature with beasts; but this is sensuality[^5]: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, the foolish and the frenzied have the use of sensuality, and yet in none of their acts do they sin: therefore sin is never in us from the disorder of sensuality: therefore no sin is to be placed in sensuality.

4. *Likewise*, fault is born to be only in that power[^6] according to which a man is capable of praise and blame; but as regards the sensible part a man is worthy neither of praise nor of blame: therefore according to it fault cannot be present.

### Conclusion.

> Venial sin, insofar as it has the character of fault, is in free choice; insofar as it has the character of vice, it is placed in sensuality.

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that, when it is asked whether venial sin can be in sensuality, the common reply is that sensuality can be considered in two ways: either in itself, or as it is ordinable by reason and under reason. If it be considered in itself, in this mode it has its use in the frenzied, and in this mode Augustine says[^7] that in it we have a common nature with beasts. And so there cannot be sin in it, as the reasons for the second part show. — In another way one speaks of sensuality according as it is ordinable to reason and under reason; and in this mode it can be regulated according to the law[^8] of justice. And so, when it is moved toward what is illicit, its very disorder comes to be a sin; and so it is commonly held that, although in sensuality considered in itself sin cannot be, nevertheless sin can be in it as it is ordered to reason. And by this the arguments adduced for either part can be made clear[^9].

Nevertheless there still remains the question how there can be sin and fault in sensuality, since in no way is virtue or grace placed in it; and therefore, to those willing to examine this question more inwardly[^10], a twofold mode of speaking will appear.

<!-- page 584 -->For there were some who said that even in sensuality ordered to reason sin is not altogether to be placed, but in some way according to something. For sin states two things, namely the act and the disorder concerning the act. And although sin is said to be in sensuality by reason of the underlying act and by reason of the motion, nevertheless the disorder itself is in reason, which was less cautious and careful to foresee, lest such a disordered motion should arise in sensuality, or which is also less diligent in repressing it. Therefore that disorder of venial sins is placed in reason itself, which neglected to govern sensuality. But it is imputed to it as venial, not as mortal, on this account: that it was not bound to restrain it by the law of marriage, as the superior reason is bound with respect to the inferior[^11]. — But this mode of speaking seems to be less sufficient: first, because according to it all venial sins would be rather from omission than from disordered inclination. Secondly, because there are certain venial sins which reason cannot avoid, as Augustine says, and as is shown below[^12]. And thirdly, because disorder is there where there is also an act that is disordered; and so, if the motion and act of sin be placed in sensuality, the disorder too ought to be placed in it.

Therefore there is another mode of speaking, namely to speak of sin insofar as it has the character of fault, and insofar as it has the character of vice. Insofar as it has the character of fault, it is thus opposed to grace and makes the one in whom it is[^13] worthy of blame; and in this mode every sin is in free choice. In another way sin is to be considered insofar as it holds the character of vice; and thus it states the disorder of some power with respect to the act due to it according to its natural institution; and because such a disorder has its being in sensuality, so that that disorder is the way to a work worthy of blame, so it is placed that sin is in sensuality. — And by this distinction the intention of the question and the resolution of all the preceding objections is made manifest. But this will be better laid bare below[^14], when treatment is made of the subject of virtue and grace, and of the opposition of virtue and fault.

la: Cap. 9. Verba August. exstant XII. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17.

en: Chapter 9. The words of Augustine occur in *On the Trinity* XII, c. 12, n. 17.

la: Vers. 16: *Septies enim cadet iustus et resurget.* Glossam vide apud Lyranum; convenit cum verbis Rabani in hunc locum. Apud Lyranum in Glossa post *volentes* adiectum est *frequenter.* — Dein in conclus. edd., excepta I, post *secundum voluntate* repetunt *rationali.*

en: Verse 16: *For seven times shall the just man fall and rise again.* See the Gloss in Lyra; it agrees with the words of Rabanus on this passage. In Lyra's Gloss, after *willing* the word *frequently* is added. — Then in the conclusion the editions, except I, after *according to the will* repeat *rational.*

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *ordinari*, lectio aperte incongrua.

en: Several codices with the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read *ordinari* ("to be ordered"), a reading plainly incongruous.

la: Cap. 9. n. 4; *Causa itaque rerum, quae facit nec fit, Deus est. Aliae vero causae et faciunt et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes creati spiritus, maxime rationales. Corporales autem causae, quae magis fiunt quam faciunt* etc.

en: Chapter 9, n. 4; *The cause of things, therefore, which makes and is not made, is God. But the other causes both make and are made, as are all created spirits, especially the rational ones. But corporeal causes, which are made rather than make* etc.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. 8. et 13. — Paulo superius codd. DHT aa omittunt *secundum id*; in Vat. et edd. 2, 3 propositio legitur sic: *esse peccatum secundum illud quod communicamus* etc.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, 8 and 13. — A little above, codices DHT aa omit *according to that*; in the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3 the proposition reads thus: *that there is sin according to that in which we have a common nature* etc.

la: Cod. X hic non bene addit *in qua potest esse eius oppositum, scilicet gratia.* Deinde pro *capax est laudis et vituperii* codd. cum primis edd. *capax est laude et vituperio.* Demum in fine arg. pro *inesse culpa* nonnulli codd. cum edd. *esse culpa.*

en: Codex X here not well adds *in which its opposite can be, namely grace.* Then for *capable of praise and blame* the codices with the first editions read *capable of praise and blame* (in the ablative). Finally at the end of the argument, for *fault be present* some codices with the editions read *be fault.*

la: Libr. XII. de Trin. c. 1. 3. et 12. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. 8. et 13. — Paulo inferius pro *ad secundam partem* codd. cum edd. I, 2 *ad primam partem*; perperam.

en: Book XII *On the Trinity* c. 1, 3 and 12. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4, 8 and 13. — A little below, for *for the second part* the codices with editions I, 2 read *for the first part*; wrongly.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. et edd. 3, 4 *regulam.* Subinde pro *ad illicitum* cod. T *ad aliquem illicitum actum*, et immediate post pro *ipsa eius deordinatio* codd. A M *in ipsa eius deordinatione*, et pro *habet* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *potest.*

en: The Vatican edition with one codex or another and editions 3, 4 read *the rule.* Thereupon for *toward what is illicit* codex T reads *toward some illicit act*, and immediately after, for *its very disorder* codices A M read *in its very disorder*, and for *has* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *can.*

la: Multi codd. *declinari*, plures alii cum edd. 2, 3 *determinari*, cod. aa sic: *et per hoc responderi potest ad argumenta* etc.

en: Many codices read *declinari*, several others with editions 2, 3 *determinari*, codex aa thus: *and through this a reply can be made to the arguments* etc.

la: Edd. 2, 3 et Vat. *ulterius.*

en: Editions 2, 3 and the Vatican edition read *further.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. seqq. — Vat., in principio huius propos. pro *autem* substituto *enim*, mox ante *tenebatur* cum nonnullis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittit *non*, qua vocula omissa, vis argumenti frangitur. Deinde eadem Vat. loco *respectu inferioris* ponit *inferiorem.*

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7 ff. — The Vatican edition, at the beginning of this proposition substituting *enim* ("for") for *autem* ("but"), then before *was bound* with some codices and editions 2, 3, 4 omits *not*; with this little word omitted, the force of the argument is broken. Then the same Vatican edition, in place of *with respect to the inferior*, puts *the inferior.*

la: Dist. 41. a. 2. q. I, ubi etiam, et quidem in corp. quaest. nec non in argg. ad opp., dictum Augustini, quod hic respicitur, et habetur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51. seqq., affertur et explicatur.

en: Distinction 41, a. 2, q. I, where also — and indeed in the body of the question as well as in the arguments to the contrary — the saying of Augustine, which is referred to here, and is found in *On Free Choice* III, c. 18, n. 51 ff., is adduced and explained.

la: Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 supprimunt *in quo est.*

en: Not a few codices with editions 1, 2, 3 suppress *in whom it is.*

la: Dist. 26. q. 3, d. 31. a. I. q. 2, d. 32. a. 2. q. I, d. 41. a. 2. q. 2. — *Denudabitur* idem est ac *manifestabitur*; cfr. de hoc Forcellini, Lexicon etc. Pro *denudabitur* edd. *determinabitur.*

en: Distinction 26, q. 3; d. 31, a. I, q. 2; d. 32, a. 2, q. I; d. 41, a. 2, q. 2. — *Denudabitur* ("will be laid bare") is the same as *manifestabitur* ("will be made manifest"); cf. on this Forcellini, *Lexicon* etc. For *denudabitur* the editions read *determinabitur* ("will be determined").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Primam opinionem S. Thom. absolute approbat, quam tenet etiam S. Bonav., sed cum distinctione, quam saepius Magister (cfr. infra d. XXXI. c. 6.), secutus Augustinum, facit inter culpam et vitium. Hanc distinctionem ipse S. Bonav. etiam alibi adhibet et explicat his verbis: «Nam peccatum dicit culpam, vitium dicit culpae sequelam» (III. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. I. ad I, cfr. ibid. ad 3.). Et iterum (infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2.): «Peccatum de sua ratione duo dicit: dicit enim deordinationem sive privationem ordinis circa actum alicuius potentiae; dicit nihilominus illam deordinationem ut dignam vituperatione et punitione. Et quantum ad primum peccatum tenet rationem vitii aliquo modo corrumpentis; quantum ad secundum tenet rationem culpae et demeriti». — Quibus modis peccatum referri possit ad voluntatem et esse voluntarium, explicatur infra d. 41. a. 2. q. I. — Satis ad mentem S. Doctoris, sed aliis verbis, Richard. a Med. (II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. q. 3.) quatuor terminos, quorum frequenter unus accipitur pro alio, ita explicat: «Vitium est carentia habitualis dispositionis convenientis naturae rei... Peccatum vero est actus, vel carentia rectitudinis in actu, ex eo quod declinat a regula sua; unde in naturalibus monstra dicuntur peccata, eo quod declinant a recta regula naturae; similiter in artificialibus dicitur peccatum in effectu, cum declinat ab artis regula; in moralibus est peccatum in actu, cum declinat a regula rationis rectae. — Culpa autem est in actu non recto, in quantum est in voluntatis potestate. — Demeritum autem est culpa in comparatione ad retributionem. Et sic vides, quod omne demeritum est culpa, et omnis culpa est peccatum, et omne peccatum est vitium; sed non convertitur». — Idem (hic a. 4. q. I.) ad ipsam quaestionem respondet: «Ego autem dico, quod inordinatio sensualitatis potest esse sine omni culpa, si voluntas non est causa illius inordinationis nec omittendo nec committendo, nec antecedenter nec concomitanter. Quandoque autem est culpa venialis materialiter in sensualitate, formaliter autem nunquam, sed in voluntate, et hoc est, quando insurgit inordinatio in sensualitate per negligentiam voluntatis... Semper tamen inordinatio sensualitatis in nobis vitium est et peccatum, secundum quod peccatum distinguitur contra culpam et demeritum». — Fere in eodem sensu videtur intelligendus S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 74. a. 3. ad 3.), qui dicit: «Talis motus sensualitatis rationem praeveniens est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam imperfectum in genere peccati». Aegid. etiam R. (hic p. II. q. I. a. 2.) vult, «quod primi motus, qui pertinent ad sensualitatem et oriuntur ex rebellione carnis, non solum sunt poenae peccati, sed etiam sunt peccatum». Uterque autem excipit motus pure naturales, qui sunt sine imaginatione.

**II.** De hac et seq. quaestione simul tractant praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 68. m. 4. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 3. 4. — S. Thom., praeter locum cit. hic q. 3. a. 2, et de seq. q.; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 92. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4. a. I.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** S. Thomas absolutely approves the first opinion, which S. Bonaventure also holds, but with the distinction that the Master often (cf. below, d. XXXI, c. 6) makes, following Augustine, between fault and vice. S. Bonaventure himself also employs and explains this distinction elsewhere in these words: «For sin states fault, vice states the sequel of fault» (III. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. I. ad 1, cf. ibid. ad 3). And again (below, d. 41. a. 2. q. 2): «Sin of its very nature states two things: for it states the disorder or privation of order concerning the act of some power; it states nonetheless that disorder as worthy of blame and punishment. And as to the first, sin holds the character of a vice in some way corrupting; as to the second, it holds the character of fault and demerit». — In what modes sin can be referred to the will and be voluntary is explained below, d. 41. a. 2. q. I. — Quite in accord with the mind of the holy Doctor, but in other words, Richard of Mediavilla (II. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. q. 3) explains four terms, of which frequently one is taken for another, thus: «Vice is the lack of a habitual disposition befitting the nature of the thing... But sin is an act, or a lack of rectitude in an act, from the fact that it deviates from its rule; whence in natural things monsters are called sins, because they deviate from the right rule of nature; likewise in artificial things a sin is said to be in the effect, when it deviates from the rule of art; in moral matters there is sin in the act, when it deviates from the rule of right reason. — But fault is in an act not right, insofar as it is in the power of the will. — And demerit is fault in comparison to retribution. And thus you see that every demerit is fault, and every fault is sin, and every sin is vice; but it does not convert». — The same author (here, a. 4. q. I) replies to the question itself: «But I say that the disorder of sensuality can be without any fault, if the will is not the cause of that disorder either by omitting or by committing, neither antecedently nor concomitantly. But sometimes there is venial fault materially in sensuality, formally however never, but in the will, and this is when disorder arises in sensuality through the negligence of the will... Yet always the disorder of sensuality in us is vice and sin, according as sin is distinguished against fault and demerit». — In nearly the same sense S. Thomas seems to be understood (S. I. II. q. 74. a. 3. ad 3), who says: «Such a motion of sensuality preceding reason is venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin». Giles of Rome also (here, p. II. q. I. a. 2) holds «that first motions, which pertain to sensuality and arise from the rebellion of the flesh, are not only penalties of sin, but are also sin». But each excepts the purely natural motions, which are without imagination.

**II.** On this and the following question there treat together, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 68. m. 4. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 74. a. 3. 4. — S. Thomas, besides the place cited, here q. 3. a. 2, and on the following q.; S. loc. cit. a. 4. — B. Albert, on this and the following q. here a. 9; S. p. II. tr. 15. q. 92. m. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following q. here q. 4. a. I.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p58{3,4}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), two-column reflow (Left top→bottom, then Right), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines ~40784–40951). Offset pdf = printed + 22 (pp. 583–584 → PDF 605–606). Running heads `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. III. QUAEST. I.` confirm pars/articulus/quaestio; printed page numbers `583`/`o84` (= 584) OCR-mangled.
- **Structure:** ARTICULUS III opener (*Consequenter circa tertium… duo quaeruntur*, raw 40789) + TRACTATIO 2-question listing folded into this q1 per Override §5. QUAESTIO I = 4 arguments (pro) + Contra (3 members — OCR/print number the contrary 1–3, but the fourth pro-style objection *in ea sola potentia…* sits in the right column under the Contra block; rendered here as Contra members 1–4 following the printed sequence) + CONCLUSIO (blockquote) + Respondeo (sensualitas *in se* vs *ordinabilis sub ratione*; then the *Verumtamen adhuc restat quaestio* excursus with two *modi dicendi*: the first opinion rejected on three grounds, the second opinion = culpa vs vitium distinction) + SCHOLION I–II.
- **Page-split map:** p.583 = ART III opener + TRACTATIO + QUAESTIO I header + args 1–4 + Contra 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opening (through *…volentibus hanc quaestionem interius*). p.584 = excursus (two modi dicendi) + closing + SCHOLION I–II. Boundary falls mid-Respondeo on p.583→584 (marked `<!-- page 584 -->`); opening sentence on p.584 (*Fuerunt namque aliqui…*) is grammatically continuous with p.583 tail.
- **Apparatus (14 entries [^1]–[^14]):** p.583 footers ¹–⁹ → [^1]–[^9] (L col ¹–⁵: arg1/arg2/arg4-deordinari/Contra1/Contra2; R col ⁶–⁹: arg4-culpa/Respondeo-Augustinus/Respondeo-legem/Respondeo-declarari). p.584 footers ¹–⁵ → [^10]–[^14] (¹ interius; ² respectu inferioris; ³ ostenditur infra; ⁴ in quo est; ⁵ denudabitur infra).
- **Hand-offs:** RECEIVED none — a2-q2 closed clean mid-p.582 and captured all 10 of p.582's footers (the footer block at raw ~40793–40805, markers ¹–⁴ + *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, belongs to a2-q2's p.582, not here). FORWARDED to a3-q2: none — this chunk's body closes after SCHOLION II on p.584; QUAESTIO II (*Utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale peccatum*) opens fresh at raw 40952 on p.585 with its own footer set.
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I (S. Thom./S. Bonav./Richard. a Med./Aegid. R. on the culpa-vitium-peccatum-demeritum distinction and the two opinions) + SCHOLION II (commentator-roll *de hac et seq. quaestione* covering this q1 and the following q2).
- **`[?]` flags:** none.
- Side-glosses trimmed from body (marginalia, not Bonaventure's text): *Argg. pro parte affirmativa*, *Pro parte negativa*, *Conclusio*, *Responsio communis cum distinctione*, *Restat difficultas*, *Solutio aliorum*, *Non sufficit ob 3 rationes*, *Solutio auctoris cum distinctione*, *Conclusio 1/2*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 24, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 585 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale peccatum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum mortale. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sicut primus motus habet esse in parte sensibili, ita etiam et actus, in quo est consummatio peccati: ergo sicut ponitur in sensualitate esse peccatum veniale propter primum motum, ita ponendum est esse mortale propter actum consummatum.

2. Item, in eodem, in quo est *dispositio*, natus est esse *habitus*; sed veniale *disponit* ad mortale: ergo cum veniale possit esse in sensualitate, ut ostensum est[^1], videtur etc.

3. Item, iustitiae originali opponitur culpa mortalis; sed illa originalis iustitia non tantum fuit in Adam secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum partem sensibilem, quia totus ordinatus erat: ergo videtur, quod mortalis culpa in sensualitate esse possit, cum opposita nata sint fieri circa idem[^2].

4. Item, sicut superior portio rationis se habet ad bonum, ita sensualitas declinat ad malum; sed in superiori portione rationis potest esse veniale peccatum ex surreptione, sicut supra[^3] ostensum est: ergo econtra ex pleno consensu et peccati perpetratione mortale peccatum descendere poterit usque ad sensualitatem, ut, sicut sensualitas communicat veniale peccatum superiori, ita superior pars communicet mortale peccatum sensualitati.

**Sed contra:**
1. Completivum mortalis peccati in quantum huiusmodi est aversio a Deo; sed solius rationis est a Deo averti, cum eius solius sit ad Deum converti: ergo ex sola ratione potest peccatum[^4] esse peccatum mortale.

2. Item, solus consensus facit mortale peccatum; sed consensus est solius partis rationalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, culpa mortalis et gratia mutuo se expellunt, ergo habent esse circa idem[^5]; sed gratia gratum faciens, cum in ea attendatur imago similitudinis, non habet esse nisi in ratione: ergo nec culpa mortalis.

4. Item, si culpa mortalis esset in sensualitate, hoc non esset, nisi quia per ipsam perpetratur: ergo quando aliquis perpetrat homicidium per gladium et manum, peccatum homicidii erit in gladio[^6] et manu; quod si falsum est dicere, absurdum est etiam dicere, peccatum mortale esse in sensualitate.

> **Conclusio.** Peccatum mortale, nec quatenus dicit culpam, nec quatenus dicit vitium, ponendum est in sensualitate.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod mortale peccatum, nec in quantum culpa nec in quantum vitium, ponendum est esse in sensualitate. — Et ratio huius est, quia aliter vitiat peccatum mortale quam peccatum veniale. Peccatum enim mortale vitiat et deordinat deordinatione *perfecta*, ut ita dicam, quae quidem consistit in aversione a Deo et eius contemptu et deliberationis consensu. Haec autem solius rationis sunt; et ideo mortale peccatum in sola ratione consistit. Deordinatio autem venialis non est deordinatio consummata, sed *inchoata*; et quia deordinatio inchoari habet in potentia inferiori et consummari in superiori: hinc est, quod veniale peccatum, in quantum vitium est, in sensualitate reperitur. Non enim directe opponitur habitui virtutis, sicut vitium mortalis peccati, sed solum ex quadam inclinatione et comparatione ad terminum, ad quem disponit. Vitiositas autem et deordinatio mortalis simpliciter excludit habitum virtutis; et propterea omne peccatum mortale in *ratione* ponitur, et nullum in *sensualitate*. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo, quod actus peccati est in sensualitate, sicut primus motus[^7]; dicendum, quod etsi contingat utrumque in sensualitate reperiri, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam primus motus in sensualitate reperitur, ita quod ibi sumit originem, et potius est sensualitatis rationem excitantis quam a ratione excitatae et motae. Actus autem mortalis peccati sic reperitur in sensualitate, quod originem sumit ab imperio rationis, et est sensualitatis potius motae quam moventis. Et quoniam deordinatio et vitiositas ibi ponitur esse peccatum, ubi sumunt originem et ubi est in *ratione* actionis, non in *ratione* passionis[^8]; hinc est, quod ex primo motu existente in sensualitate ponitur ibi esse peccatum veniale; ex actu vero peccati per sensualitatem perpetrato non ponitur in ea esse peccatum mortale.

<!-- page 586 -->

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dispositio et habitus in eadem potentia habent fieri; dicendum est, quod verum est de illa dispositione, quae est eiusdem naturae cum habitu, et de qua transitur[^9] in habitum, sicut scientia-dispositio fit scientia-habitus. De illa autem dispositione, quae est alterius generis et disponit solum per quandam ordinationem, veritatem non habet. Actus enim unius potentiae potest esse dispositio ad eliciendum actum alterius potentiae, sicut cognitio ad affectionem. Et sic in proposito habet esse; ideo non valet.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de iustitia originali, dicendum, quod de originali iustitia dupliciter contingit loqui: aut in quantum dicit *habitum* quendam *regulantem* naturam in statu innocentiae, aut in quantum dicit omnium virium *rectificationem* plenariam. Primo modo originalis iustitia habet esse in *sola ratione*; et sic opponitur ei culpa. Secundo modo non solum habet esse in *ratione*, sed etiam in *viribus inferioribus*; et sic non solum habet auferri per *culpam*, sed etiam per *poenam*, sive per aliquid, quod aliquo modo habet rationem poenae, aliquo modo rationem culpae; et tale est veniale peccatum[^10].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet sensualitas ad illicitum, sic se habet ratio ad bonum; dicendum, quod illa comparatio non valet, propterea quod plus potest virtus superior quam inferior; ideo, etsi superior potentia possit induere[^11] actum et dispositionem inferioris et negotiari circa eius obiectum, non tamen sequitur, quod possit esse e converso[^12].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality.*

Secondly it is asked whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality. And that it can, seems [to follow].

1. Just as the first movement has being in the sensible part, so too the act in which the consummation of the sin consists: therefore, just as venial sin is held to be in the sensuality on account of the first movement, so mortal [sin] must be held to be [there] on account of the consummated act.

2. Likewise, in that in which there is a *disposition*, there is apt to be a *habit*; but the venial *disposes* toward the mortal: therefore, since the venial can be in the sensuality, as has been shown[^1], it seems so, etc.

3. Likewise, mortal fault is opposed to original justice; but that original justice was in Adam not only according to reason, but also according to the sensible part, since the whole [man] was ordered: therefore it seems that mortal fault can be in the sensuality, since opposites are apt to come to be about the same thing[^2].

4. Likewise, just as the higher portion of reason is related to the good, so the sensuality declines toward evil; but in the higher portion of reason there can be venial sin by surreptition, as was shown above[^3]: therefore, conversely, from full consent and the perpetration of the sin, mortal sin will be able to descend even to the sensuality, so that, just as the sensuality communicates venial sin to the higher [part], so the higher part may communicate mortal sin to the sensuality.

**On the contrary:**
1. What completes mortal sin as such is aversion from God; but it belongs to reason alone to be turned away from God, since to it alone belongs being turned to God: therefore from reason alone can a sin[^4] be a mortal sin.

2. Likewise, consent alone makes mortal sin; but consent belongs to the rational part alone: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, mortal fault and grace mutually expel each other, therefore they have being about the same thing[^5]; but sanctifying grace, since in it is regarded the image of likeness, has being only in reason: therefore neither [does] mortal fault.

4. Likewise, if mortal fault were in the sensuality, this would not be except because it is perpetrated through it: therefore when someone perpetrates a homicide through the sword and the hand, the sin of homicide will be in the sword[^6] and the hand; and if it is false to say this, it is also absurd to say that mortal sin is in the sensuality.

> **Conclusion.** Mortal sin, neither inasmuch as it names a fault, nor inasmuch as it names a vice, is to be placed in the sensuality.

**I respond:** It must be said that mortal sin, neither inasmuch as it is a fault nor inasmuch as it is a vice, is to be placed in the sensuality. — And the reason for this is that mortal sin vitiates otherwise than venial sin does. For mortal sin vitiates and disorders with a *perfect* disorder, so to speak, which indeed consists in aversion from God and contempt of him and the consent of deliberation. But these belong to reason alone; and therefore mortal sin consists in reason alone. But the venial disorder is not a consummated disorder, but an *inchoate* one; and because disorder is apt to be begun in the lower power and consummated in the higher: hence it is that venial sin, inasmuch as it is a vice, is found in the sensuality. For it is not directly opposed to the habit of virtue, as is the vice of mortal sin, but only by a certain inclination and relation to the term toward which it disposes. But the viciousness and disorder of the mortal [sin] simply excludes the habit of virtue; and therefore every mortal sin is placed in *reason*, and none in the *sensuality*. — And the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that the act of sin is in the sensuality, just as the first movement[^7]; it must be said that, although it happens that both are found in the sensuality, yet [it is] in one way and another. For the first movement is found in the sensuality in such a way that it takes its origin there, and it is rather of the sensuality as exciting reason than as excited and moved by reason. But the act of mortal sin is found in the sensuality in such a way that it takes its origin from the command of reason, and is of the sensuality rather as moved than as moving. And since disorder and viciousness is held to be a sin there where they take their origin and where it is in the *account* of action, not in the *account* of passion[^8]; hence it is that from the first movement existing in the sensuality, venial sin is held to be there; but from the act of sin perpetrated through the sensuality, mortal sin is not held to be in it.

2. To that which is objected, that disposition and habit are apt to come to be in the same power; it must be said that this is true of that disposition which is of the same nature as the habit, and from which there is a passing over[^9] into the habit, just as the disposition-of-knowledge becomes the habit-of-knowledge. But of that disposition which is of another genus and disposes only by a certain ordering, it does not hold true. For the act of one power can be a disposition for eliciting the act of another power, just as cognition [is a disposition] for affection. And so it holds in the proposed [case]; therefore it is not valid.

3. To that which is objected concerning original justice, it must be said that of original justice it happens that one speaks in two ways: either inasmuch as it names a certain *habit regulating* nature in the state of innocence, or inasmuch as it names a full *rectification* of all the powers. In the first way original justice has being in *reason alone*; and thus fault is opposed to it. In the second way it has being not only in *reason*, but also in the *lower powers*; and thus it is taken away not only by *fault*, but also by *punishment*, or by something which in some way has the character of punishment, in some way the character of fault; and such is venial sin[^10].

4. To that which is objected, that as the sensuality is related to the illicit, so reason is related to the good; it must be said that that comparison is not valid, because the higher power can do more than the lower; therefore, although the higher power can put on[^11] the act and disposition of the lower and busy itself about its object, it does not, however, follow that it can [be so] conversely[^12].

---

la: Quaest. praeced. — De *dispositione* et *habitu* cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Qualitate.

en: The preceding question. — On *disposition* and *habit* cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories*, the chapter on Quality.

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 181, nota 3.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom see above, p. 181, note 3.

en: Here, article 1, question 2.

la: In pluribus codd., ut F R aa, et in edd. deest *peccatum*.

en: In several codices, such as F R aa, and in the editions, *peccatum* ["sin"] is lacking.

la: Vide hic arg. 3. ad opp. — Post *se expellunt* Vat. adiungit *ut opposita*.

en: See here argument 3 to the contrary. — After *se expellunt* ["expel each other"] the Vatican edition adds *ut opposita* ["as opposites"].

la: Codd. F K X Y Z bb ee etc. cum ed. 1 *cultello*.

en: Codices F K X Y Z bb ee etc., with edition 1, [read] *cultello* ["with the knife"].

la: Cod. F hic addit *in sensualitate reperitur*.

en: Codex F here adds *in sensualitate reperitur* ["is found in the sensuality"].

en: Cf. below, distinction 35, article 1, question 2, and distinction 41, article 2, question 2.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *transit*. Paulo ante pro *eiusdem … luae* cod. aa *eiusdem generis*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 3 and 4, [reads] *transit* ["passes over"]. A little before, in place of *eiusdem … luae*, codex aa [reads] *eiusdem generis* ["of the same genus"].

la: De quo plura invenies infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Concerning which you will find more below, distinction 41, article 2, question 1, in the body [of the response].

la: Cod. aa *inducere*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *inducere* ["to bring in"].

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 585–586 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p585-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol2-p586-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), two-column reflow (Vol II PDF-priority inversion). Cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines ~40950–41032. Offset pdf = printed + 22 (PDF pp. 607–608). Running head verified: `DIST. XXIV. P. II. ART. III. QUAEST. II.` / `585` (p.585), `586` / `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` (p.586).

**Alignment confirmed.** Body opener *Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum mortale* (raw 40950) = ARTICULUS III TRACTATIO sub-question 2 (*Secundo quaeritur, utrum in sensualitate possit esse mortale*). LAST quaestio of d.24 Pars II ARTICULUS III. Structure = 4 arguments (pro) + Sed contra (1–4) + CONCLUSIO (blockquote) + Respondeo (mortal sin disorders with a *perfect* disorder = aversion/contempt/deliberate consent, all of reason alone; venial = *inchoate* disorder, begun in lower power, so veniale as *vitium* is found in sensuality; mortal in reason alone) + replies Ad 1–4. No scholion in this q's range.

**Page-split map.** Body: p.585 (args 1–4, Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo, reply Ad 1) + p.586 (replies Ad 2, Ad 3, Ad 4; body closes at *…possit esse e converso* on p.586-R, immediately above `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI`). Apparatus: **p.585 footers ¹–⁸ → [^1]–[^8]; p.586 footers ¹–⁴ → [^9]–[^12].** 12 entries total.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none — q2 opens fresh on p.585 with its own footer set (a3-q1 closed after SCHOLION II on p.584). FORWARDED to **p2-dubia**: p.586 footers ⁵+ (⁵ *non mutat genus peccati: ergo*; ⁶ supplent *peccatum*; ⁷ *vitiorum*; ⁸ Particulam *et* …; ⁹ Vat. *inducia*; ¹⁰ Epist. I. Ioan. 2,27 unctio …) — these attach to the Dub. I body, which begins at raw 41032 (`DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` → `Dub. I`) on p.586-L/R, the start of the p2-dubia chunk.

**`has_scholion: false`** via sibling-pointer to a3-q1 SCHOLION II (joint commentator-roll *de hac et seq. quaestione* explicitly covering this following q2). Footnote [^12] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is the Quaracchi editors' own pointer to that same a3-q1 scholion.

**[?] flags:** none. Side-glosses trimmed (Ad oppositum / Idcirco enim / Solutio oppositorum / Conclusio / Ratio / Notandum).