title: Dist. 4

title_alt: Distinctio IV — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction IV — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO IV.

### *Utrum Deus Pater se Deum genuerit.*

Hic oritur quaestio satis necessaria. Constat enim et irrefragabiliter verum est, quod Deus Pater genuit Filium. Ideo quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Deus genuit Deum. Si enim Deus genuit Deum, videtur quod aut se Deum, aut alium[^1] genuerit. Si vero alium Deum genuit, non est tantum unus Deus; si autem se ipsum Deum genuit, aliqua res se ipsam genuit.

Ad quod respondentes dicimus, sane et[^2] catholice concedi, quod unus unum genuit, et quod Deus Deum genuit, quia Deus Pater Deum Filium genuit. In Symbolo quoque scriptum est: « Lumen de Lumine, Deum verum de Deo vero ». Quod vero additur: ergo genuit se Deum vel alium Deum, neutrum concedendum esse dicimus. Quod alium Deum non genuit[^3], manifestum est, quia unus tantum Deus est. Quod autem se ipsum non genuit, ostendit Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate[^4] dicens: « Qui putant eius potentiae esse Deum, ut se ipsum ipse genuerit, eo plus errant, quod non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec spiritualis neque corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit »; et ideo non est credendum vel dicendum, quod Deus genuit se.

Sed adhuc opponunt garruli ratiocinatores dicentes: si Deus Pater genuit Deum, aut genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, aut Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Si genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater: ergo Deus est qui non est Deus Pater: non ergo unus tantum Deus est. Si vero genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater: ergo genuit se ipsum.

Ad quod respondemus determinantes istam[^5] propositionem, quam sic proponunt: si Deus Pater genuit Deum, aut Deum, qui est Deus Pater, aut Deum, qui non est Deus Pater. Hoc enim sane et prave intelligi potest; et ideo respondendum est ita: Deus Pater genuit Deum, qui est ipse Pater, hoc dicimus esse falsum; et concedimus alteram[^6], scilicet genuit Deum, qui non est Pater; nec tamen genuit alterum Deum, nec ille qui genitus est, alius Deus est quam Pater, sed unus Deus cum Patre. Si vero additur: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, hic[^7] distinguimus, quia dupliciter potest intelligi: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, scilicet Deum Filium, qui Filius non est Pater, qui Deus est; hic sensus verus est. Si vero intelligatur sic: genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, id est, qui non est Deus, qui Pater est; hic sensus falsus est. Unus enim et idem Deus est Pater et[^8] Filius et Spiritus sanctus; et e converso Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unus est Deus.

### Cap. II.

### *Utrum Trinitas de uno Deo praedicetur[^9] sicut unus Deus de tribus personis.*

Quidam tamen veritatis adversarii concedunt, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum sive tres personas esse unum Deum, unam substantiam, sed[^10] nolunt concedere, unum Deum sive unam substantiam esse tres personas, dicentes, substantiam divinam praedicari de tribus personis, non tres personas de substantia divina. Fides autem catholica tenet ac praedicat, et tres personas esse unum Deum, unam substantiam sive essentiam sive naturam divinam, et unum Deum sive essentiam divinam esse tres personas. Unde Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate[^11] ita ait: « Recte ipse Deus Trinitas intelligitur, beatus et solus potens ». Ecce, quam expresse dixit ipse Deus Trinitas, ut ostenderet, et ipsum Deum esse Trinitatem et Trinitatem ipsum Deum. Item in eodem: « In verbis, inquit, illis Apostoli, quibus de adventu Christi agens dicit[^12]: Quem ostendet beatus et solus potens, Rex regum et Dominus dominantium, qui solus habet immortalitatem etc., nec Pater proprie nominatus est nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed beatus et solus potens, id est unus et solus Deus verus, qui est ipsa Trinitas ». Ecce et hic aperte dicit, unum solum verum Deum esse ipsam Trinitatem; et si unus Deus Trinitas est, ergo unus Deus est tres personae. Item in libro quinto de Trinitate[^13]: « Non tres deos, sed unum Deum dicimus esse ipsam praestantissimam Trinitatem ». Item in libro, qui dicitur Enchyridion ad Laurentium, capitulo nono: « Satis est christiano, rerum creatarum causam visibilium sive invisibilium non nisi bonitatem credere Creatoris, qui est Deus unus et verus, nullamque esse naturam, quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso, eumque esse Trinitatem, Patrem scilicet et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ». Item Augustinus in sermone de Fide[^14]: « Credimus, unum Deum unam esse divini nominis

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Trinitatem ». Idem in sexto libro de Trinitate[^15]: « Dicimus, Deum solum esse ipsam Trinitatem ». Ecce, his et aliis pluribus auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur, dicendum esse et credendum, quod unus Deus est Trinitas, et una substantia tres personae; sicut e converso Trinitas dicitur esse unus Deus, et tres personae dicuntur esse una substantia.

Nunc ad praemissam quaestionem revertamur, ubi quaerebatur, an Deus Pater genuerit se Deum, an alium Deum. Ad quod dicimus, neutrum fore concedendum. Dicit tamen Augustinus in Epistola ad Maximum[^16], quod Deus Pater se alterum genuit, his verbis: « Pater, ut haberet Filium de se ipso, non minuit se ipsum, sed ita genuit de se alterum se, ut totus maneret in se et esset in Filio tantus, quantus et solus ». Quod ita intelligi potest, id est, de se alterum a se genuit, non utique alterum Deum, sed alteram personam; vel genuit se alterum, id est, genuit alterum, qui hoc est quod ipse. Nam etsi alius sit Pater quam Filius, non est tamen aliud quam Filius, sed unum.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION IV.

### *Whether God the Father begot Himself as God.*

Here arises a question sufficiently necessary. For it is settled and irrefragably true that God the Father begot the Son. Therefore it is asked whether it should be conceded that God begot God. For if God begot God, it seems that He begot either Himself as God or another[^1]. But if He begot another God, then there is not only one God; whereas if He begot Himself as God, then some thing begot itself.

In response to this we say that it is soundly and[^2] catholically conceded that one begot one, and that God begot God, because God the Father begot God the Son. In the Symbol it is also written: « Light from Light, true God from true God ». But as to what is added: therefore He begot Himself as God, or another God — neither, we say, is to be conceded. That He did not beget another God[^3] is manifest, because there is only one God. That He did not beget Himself, however, Augustine shows in the first book *On the Trinity*[^4], saying: « Those who think that it belongs to God's power that He should beget Himself, err the more, in that not only is God not so, but neither any spiritual nor corporeal creature. For there is no thing which begets itself, that it may be »; and therefore it is not to be believed or said that God begot Himself.

But still the garrulous reasoners object, saying: if God the Father begot God, He either begot God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. If He begot God who is not God the Father: therefore there is a God who is not God the Father: therefore there is not only one God. But if He begot God who is God the Father: therefore He begot Himself.

To which we respond by determining this[^5] proposition, which they thus propound: if God the Father begot God, He begot either God who is God the Father, or God who is not God the Father. For this can be understood soundly and perversely; and therefore it must be answered thus: that God the Father begot God who is the Father Himself — this we say to be false; and we concede the other[^6], namely, that He begot God who is not the Father; nor however did He beget another God, nor is He who was begotten another God than the Father, but one God with the Father. But if it is added: He begot God who is not God the Father, here[^7] we distinguish, because this can be understood in two ways: He begot God who is not God the Father, namely, God the Son, who as Son is not the Father, who is God; this sense is true. But if it is so understood: He begot God who is not God the Father, that is, who is not God who is the Father — this sense is false. For one and the same God is Father and[^8] Son and Holy Spirit; and conversely, Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God.

### Cap. II.

### *Whether the Trinity is predicated of the one God[^9] just as the one God is predicated of the three persons.*

Yet certain adversaries of the truth concede that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the three persons, are one God, one substance, but[^10] are unwilling to concede that the one God or the one substance is three persons, saying that the divine substance is predicated of the three persons, but not the three persons of the divine substance. The catholic faith, however, holds and preaches both that the three persons are one God, one substance or essence or divine nature, and that the one God or divine essence is three persons. Whence Augustine in the first book *On the Trinity*[^11] thus says: « Rightly is God Himself understood as the Trinity, blessed and alone powerful ». Behold, how expressly he said God Himself is the Trinity, in order to show both that God Himself is the Trinity and that the Trinity is God Himself. Likewise in the same: « In those words, he says, of the Apostle, by which, treating of the coming of Christ, he says[^12]: Whom the blessed and only powerful, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone has immortality, will show forth etc., neither was the Father properly named nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but the blessed and only powerful, that is, the one and only true God, who is the Trinity itself ». Behold, here too he openly says that the one only true God is the Trinity itself; and if the one God is the Trinity, therefore the one God is three persons. Likewise in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^13]: « We say not three gods, but one God to be that most excellent Trinity itself ». Likewise in the book called *Enchiridion to Laurentius*, chapter nine: « It is enough for the Christian to believe the cause of created things, visible or invisible, to be nothing but the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and true God, and that there is no nature which is not either Himself, or from Him, and that He is the Trinity, namely the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit ». Likewise Augustine in the sermon *On Faith*[^14]: « We believe that one God is one

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Trinity of the divine name ». The same in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^15]: « We say that God alone is the Trinity itself ». Behold, by these and many other authorities it is evidently shown that it must be said and believed that one God is the Trinity, and one substance is three persons; just as conversely the Trinity is said to be one God, and the three persons are said to be one substance.

Now let us return to the foregoing question, where it was asked whether God the Father begot Himself as God, or another God. To which we say that neither is to be conceded. Yet Augustine says in the *Letter to Maximus*[^16] that God the Father begot Himself as another, in these words: « The Father, that He might have a Son from Himself, did not diminish Himself, but so begot from Himself another self, that He remained whole in Himself and was in the Son as great as, and alone ». This can be understood thus, that is, He begot from Himself another from Himself — not indeed another God, but another person; or He begot Himself as another, that is, He begot another, who is the same as He Himself. For although the Father is other than the Son, yet He is not another thing than the Son, but one.

---

la: Vat. hic addit *Deum*.

en: The Vatican edition here adds *Deum* ("God").

la: Vat. male omittit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition wrongly omits *et* ("and").

la: Solummodo codd. B C D E *genuerit*, quod ponendum videretur, nisi paulo infra iidem codd. posuissent *genuit*.

en: Only codd. B C D E read *genuerit* ("had begotten"), which would seem to be the correct reading, except that a little below the same codices have placed *genuit* ("begot").

la: Cap. 1, n. 1, ubi pro *putant* et *errant* legitur in singulari *putat* etc., et codd. B C pro *eius potentiae* male legunt *eiusdem potentiae*.

en: Chapter 1, no. 1, where for *putant* ("they think") and *errant* ("they err") it is read in the singular *putat* etc., and codd. B C for *eius potentiae* ("of His power") wrongly read *eiusdem potentiae* ("of the same power").

la: Omnes codd. *illam*.

en: All codd. read *illam* ("that").

la: Sola Vat. male *alterum*.

en: Only the Vatican edition wrongly reads *alterum* ("the other [masc.]").

en: Editions 2, 3, 7, 8 read *hoc* ("this").

la: Codd. B C omittunt hic et mox post *Pater* particulam *et*.

en: Codd. B C omit here, and likewise after *Pater* below, the particle *et* ("and").

la: Codd. D E et edd. omnes, exceptis 1, 8, adiiciunt *tamen*.

en: Codd. D E and all editions, except 1 and 8, add *tamen* ("nevertheless").

la: Vat. et ed. 4 addunt *et*; mox codd. C D *unam essentiam* pro *sive essentiam*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 4 add *et* ("and"); shortly after, codd. C D read *unam essentiam* ("one essence") for *sive essentiam* ("or essence").

la: Cap. 6. n. 10, ubi et proximus locus, sed nonnullis omissis et mutatis.

en: Chapter 6, no. 10, where also the next passage is found, but with some things omitted and changed.

la: I. Tim. 6, 15. *Quem suis temporibus ostendet beatus* etc. Apud Augustinum: *Quem temporibus propriis ostendet Pater beatus* etc. Perperam mss. D E cum edd. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *ostendit* loco *ostendet*.

en: 1 Tim. 6:15. *Whom in his times the blessed [one] shall show* etc. In Augustine: *Whom the blessed Father shall show forth in His own times* etc. Wrongly the manuscripts D E together with editions 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 [read] *ostendit* ("shows") in place of *ostendet* ("shall show").

la: Cap. 8, n. 9. Proximi loci citatio in omnibus mss. et edd., demptis Vat. et ed. 4, ita fertur: *Item in libro de Fide ad Petrum in expositione Symboli*; at perperam, cum verba subsequentia non in eo, sed in *Enchyridion* legantur.

en: Chapter 8, no. 9. The citation of the next passage in all manuscripts and editions, except the Vatican and edition 4, is given thus: *Likewise in the book On Faith to Peter, in the exposition of the Symbol*; but wrongly, since the subsequent words are not read in that work, but in the *Enchiridion*.

la: Serm. 233. de Fide cathol., n. 1, sed paulo aliter, nempe: *Credimus in unum Deum... Hunc unum Deum et hanc unam esse divini nominis Trinitatem*.

en: Sermon 233, *On the Catholic Faith*, no. 1, but somewhat differently, namely: *We believe in one God... [we believe] this one God and this one [to be] the Trinity of the divine name*.

la: Cap. 7, n. 9. — Immediate ante Vat. et edd. 1, 2 habent *item* pro *idem*; mox post *Ecce* Vat. et ed. 4 addunt *et*. Deinde codd. A B C D et edd. 1, 8 *concedendum* pro *credendum*, sed non bene nec congrue ad duo testimonia Augustini, qui loquitur tum de interiore fide (*Credimus*), tum de confessione fidei (*Dicimus*).

en: Chapter 7, no. 9. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 2 have *item* ("likewise") for *idem* ("the same"); shortly after *Ecce*, the Vatican and edition 4 add *et* ("and"). Then codd. A B C D and editions 1, 8 [read] *concedendum* ("to be conceded") for *credendum* ("to be believed"), but not well nor congruously with the two testimonies of Augustine, who speaks both of interior faith (*We believe*) and of the confession of faith (*We say*).

la: Epistola 170. ad Maximum medicum, n. 5. — Paulo infra in explicatione verborum Augustini Vat. male omittit *a* post *de se alterum*.

en: Letter 170 to Maximus the physician, no. 5. — A little below in the explanation of Augustine's words, the Vatican edition wrongly omits *a* ("from") after *de se alterum* ("another from Himself").


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 4, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem IV — Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction IV — Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Divisio Textus.

In praecedenti distinctione probavit Magister Trinitatem et Unitatem per similitudines congruas et rationes. In praesenti distinctione ponitur secunda pars, in qua solvit incidentes dubitationes. Et incidit dubitatio ex hoc, quod in divinis est trinitas et unitas, et ita aliquid distinguens et distinctum, aliquid indistinctum, ut termini substantiales. Incidit ergo dubitatio ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad terminum substantialem. Habet autem haec pars duas. In prima movet dubitationem ex comparatione proprietatis distinguentis ad substantiam vel essentiam; in secunda ad eius potentiam, infra distinctione sexta: *Praeterea quaeri solet*.

Item prima pars habet duas, quia substantia potest significari in concretione, ut per hoc nomen *Deus*, vel in abstractione, ut per hoc nomen *essentia*. Primo ergo movet quaestionem ex comparatione generationis ad hoc nomen *Deus*, secundo, ad hoc nomen *essentia*, infra distinctione quinta: *Post haec quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit etc.*

Haec autem distinctio habet quatuor particulas et hoc secundum quatuor, quae ibi tanguntur. In prima, supposito quod haec sit vera: *Deus genuit Deum*, quaeritur de hac: *Genuit se vel alium*, ad[^1] quam solvit interimendo. In secunda quaerit de hac: *Genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, vel qui non est Deus Pater*, et ad hoc solvit distinguendo ex parte praedicati, et hoc ibi: *Sed adhuc opponunt*. In tertia quaerit de hac: *Deus est Trinitas*, et probat multis auctoritatibus, quod est vera, et hoc occasione praedictorum, ibi: *Quidam tamen veritatis adversarii*. In quarta ad suum propositum redit, scilicet ad primo quaesitum; ad primum videlicet[^2] addens primae solutioni, quod quamvis non sit concedendum: *Genuit se, vel alium divisim*, tamen potest concedi coniunctim, ibi: *Nunc ad praemissam quaestionem*.

### Tractatio Quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae tangit Magister in praesenti distinctione, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum haec locutio sit concedenda in divinis: *Deus genuit Deum*.

Secundo, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc locutionem: *Deus genuit alium Deum*, vel *Deus est alius a Deo*.

Tertio quaeritur de consignificatione[^3] huius nominis *Deus*, utrum videlicet grammatice possimus dicere plures deos.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur de suppositione istius nominis *Deus*, utrum supponat pro persona vel pro essentia.

---

english:
### Division of the Text.

In the preceding distinction the Master proved the Trinity and Unity by congruous likenesses and reasons. In the present distinction the second part is set down, in which he resolves incidental doubts. And a doubt arises from this, that in divine matters there is trinity and unity, and thus something distinguishing and distinct, and something indistinct, as the substantial terms. Therefore a doubt arises from the comparison of the distinguishing property to the substantial term. Now this part has two [sections]. In the first he raises a doubt from the comparison of the distinguishing property to the substance or essence; in the second, to its power, below in the sixth distinction: *Furthermore it is wont to be asked*.

Likewise the first part has two [sections], because substance can be signified in the concrete, as by this name *God*, or in the abstract, as by this name *essence*. First, therefore, he raises a question from the comparison of generation to this name *God*; secondly, to this name *essence*, below in the fifth distinction: *After these things it is asked, whether it is to be granted etc.*

Now this distinction has four particles, and this according to the four [points] which are touched on there. In the first, supposing that this is true: *God begot God*, it is asked concerning this: *He begot himself or another*, to[^1] which he resolves by ruling out. In the second he inquires concerning this: *He begot God, who is God the Father, or who is not God the Father*, and to this he resolves by distinguishing on the side of the predicate, and this in the place: *But still they object*. In the third he inquires concerning this: *God is Trinity*, and he proves by many authorities that it is true, and this on the occasion of the foregoing, in the place: *Yet certain adversaries of the truth*. In the fourth he returns to his own proposition, namely to what was first asked; to the first, that is to say[^2], adding to the first solution, that although it is not to be granted: *He begot himself, or another, dividedly*, nevertheless it can be granted conjointly, in the place: *Now to the foregoing question*.

### Treatment of the Questions.

For an understanding of those things which the Master touches upon in the present distinction, four [questions] are asked.

First, whether this locution is to be granted in divine matters: *God begot God*.

Second, whether the unity of essence admits this locution: *God begot another God*, or *God is another from God*.

Third, it is asked concerning the consignification[^3] of this name *God*, namely whether grammatically we can say several gods.

Fourth and last, it is asked concerning the supposition of this name *God*, whether it supposits for a person or for the essence.

---

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *ad*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, omits *ad*.

la: Codd. et ed. 1 contra Vat. addunt *ad primum videlicet*.

en: The codices and ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, add *ad primum videlicet* ("to the first, that is to say").

la: Auctoritate plurimorum mss. ut A F G K T etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *consignificatione* pro *significatione* et *Deus* loco *Dii* ac mox *istius* pro *illius*.

en: On the authority of many manuscripts (such as A F G K T etc.) and of ed. 1, we have substituted *consignificatione* for *significatione*, and *Deus* in place of *Dii*, and presently *istius* for *illius*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus.
### Quaestio I. *Utrum haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda.*

Circa primum, quod haec locutio: Deus genuit Deum, sit concedenda,

1. Videtur per hoc quod dicitur in Symbolo: *Deum de Deo*; sed hoc non est nisi per generationem[^1]: ergo Deus generatur de Deo: ergo ista locutio est concedenda: Deus genuit Deum.

2. Item, generatio est respectu similis in natura, unde « homo generat hominem[^2] »; unde si in divinis est generatio, producitur similis in natura: ergo cum Pater sit Deus, non generat nisi Deum: ergo haec est vera: Deus generat Deum.

3. Item, quidquid habet Filius, aut habet a se, aut ab alio; sed habet deitatem, et non a se, quia sic esset ingenitus: ergo habet ab alio; sed non habet nisi per generationem, et[^3] non habet deitatem nisi ab habente deitatem, et habens deitatem est Deus: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Hoc nomen Deus significat essentiam sive substantiam, cum sit terminus substantialis[^4]; sed haec non conceditur, immo est falsa: essentia generat essentiam: ergo similiter et ista: Deus genuit Deum.

2. Item, hoc nomen Deus aut supponit pro omni persona, aut determinate pro aliqua. Si determinate pro aliqua: ergo restringitur eius significatio[^5] ab aliquo, nec est dare, quod ab alio nisi ab hoc verbo genuit vel generat. Sed regula est, quod terminus, positus in praedicato, non restringit terminum a parte subiecti ratione significationis: ergo stat pro omni persona. Non ergo videtur locutio vera, secundum quod accipitur pro persona Filii: ergo etc.

3. Item, iste terminus Deus, quantum est de se, aeque bene supponit pro Filio, sicut[^6] pro Patre: ergo cum Filii sit non generare, sicut et Patris est generare, si haec est vera: Deus generat, pro Patre, eadem ratione et haec: Deus non generat, pro Filio; si ergo haec non conceditur, nec prima.

4. Item, contradictorie opposita sunt vera de quolibet sub disiunctione, quia de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio[^7]: ergo si Deus genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Pater, aut Deum qui non est Pater. Si Deum qui est Pater, ergo genitus est generans; si Deum qui non est Pater; sed quod implicatur contingit simpliciter inferri, ut si dicatur: homo qui non currit, disputat: ergo homo non currit: ergo similiter, si genuit Deum qui non est Pater, Deus non est Pater; sed si non est Pater, non generat: ergo etc.[^8]

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> **Conclusio.** Recte dicitur: Deum genuisse Deum, quod quatuor regulis probatur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, salva essentiae unitate, recipitur tam a magistris quam a Sanctis. Ad cuius intelligentiam quatuor regulae sunt notandae.

*Prima* est, quod nomen abstractum imponitur formae et a forma, ut albedo imponitur ipsi albedini[^9] et a forma albedinis; nomen vero concretum imponitur a forma, sed non formae, sed supposito: ut album imponitur a forma albedinis, sed non formae, sed supposito, ut alicui rei albae, homini vel cygno.

*Secunda* regula est, quod terminus habens multitudinem suppositorum, sine distributione acceptus, stat pro illo, pro quo reddit locutionem veram, ut cum dicitur: homo currit, vera est locutio pro currente, si aliquis sit currens.

*Tertia* regula est, quod termino habenti formam non multiplicabilem non differt praeponere et postponere negationem. Unde non differt dicere: Petrus non currit, et, non Petrus currit.

*Quarta* regula est ista, quod relativum refert antecedens sub eodem modo supponendi, sub quo antecedens praecessit ipsum relativum, nisi faciat relationem simplicem[^10].

1. Ex prima regula patet responsio ad primum. Cum enim iste terminus Deus sit concretus, etsi[^11] imponatur a forma essentiali, scilicet deitate, tamen imponitur personae sive supposito, sicut album imponitur ab albedine rei albae; et ideo supponit et reddit locutionem veram pro persona, non pro forma. Hoc autem nomen essentia vel deitas est abstractum, et ideo imponitur formae et a forma, sicut albedo, et ideo essentiam significat et supponit. Et ideo haec est falsa: essentia generat essentiam, quia generatio non est formae, sed suppositi[^12]; sed haec est vera: Deus genuit Deum, pro persona.

2. Ex secunda regula patet responsio ad secundum. Quamvis enim significatio termini non arctetur, tamen pro illo stat, pro quo est locutio vera, ut homo currit, pro Petro vel Ioanne, si pro illo, est locutio vera; nec tamen ad illum restringitur. Et hoc patet, quia si addatur distributio, confundet[^13] illum terminum pro omnibus; sed si esset restrictus, non confunderet nisi pro illis, ad quos se extenderet restrictio. Unde aliud est terminum restringi ad unum, aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro uno.

3. Ex tertia regula patet solutio[^14] ad tertium. Licet enim haec sit vera pro Patre: Deus generat Deum, tamen haec: Deus non generat Deum, non est vera pro Filio. Cum enim iste terminus Deus dicat formam immultiplicabilem, non differt ei praeponere negationem et postponere; et ideo cum negatio praeposita[^15] omnino a subiecto removeat praedicatum, sic et negatio postposita removet totaliter praedicatum ab hoc termino Deus, cum dicitur: Deus non generat, quia removet a quolibet supposito. Et ideo alium modum habet supponendi in affirmativa quam in negativa, quia in affirmativa erat locutio vera pro Patre; in negativa vero non potest esse veritas, quia negatio removet totaliter praedicatum illud.

4. Ex quarta regula patet quartum. Cum enim relativum omnino habeat suppositionem antecedentis, et iste terminus Deus[^16] in praedicato supponat pro Deo genito, relativum refert pro illo. Et ita sensus est: Deus genuit Deum, qui Deus genitus est Pater, vel non est Pater; et haec est vera pro negativa, nec licet inferre: ergo Deus non est Pater; quia mutatur suppositio, immo est ibi figura dictionis[^17].

english:
### Sole Article.
### Question I. *Whether this expression should be conceded: God begot God.*

Concerning the first [point], that this expression — God begot God — should be conceded:

1. It seems so, by what is said in the Creed: *God from God*; but this is only by generation[^1]: therefore God is generated from God: therefore this expression should be conceded: God begot God.

2. Likewise, generation is with respect to a like in nature, whence "man generates man[^2]"; whence if in divine matters there is generation, a like in nature is produced: therefore, since the Father is God, He generates only God: therefore this is true: God generates God.

3. Likewise, whatever the Son has, He has either from Himself or from another; but He has the deity, and not from Himself, since [if so] He would be unbegotten: therefore He has it from another; but He has it only through generation, and[^3] He has the deity only from one having the deity, and the one having the deity is God: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The name *God* signifies essence or substance, since it is a substantial term[^4]; but this is not conceded, rather it is false: the essence generates the essence: therefore likewise this also: God begot God.

2. Likewise, the name *God* either supposits for every person, or determinately for some [one]. If determinately for some [one]: then its signification[^5] is restricted by something, and there is no other [source] from which [it could be restricted] except from this verb *begot* or *generates*. But the rule is that a term placed in the predicate does not restrict a term on the side of the subject by reason of its signification: therefore it stands for every person. Therefore the expression does not seem true insofar as it is taken for the person of the Son: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this term *God*, so far as it is in itself, supposits equally well for the Son as[^6] for the Father: therefore, since it belongs to the Son not to generate, just as it belongs to the Father to generate, if this is true: God generates, for the Father, then by the same reasoning this also: God does not generate, for the Son; if therefore the latter is not conceded, neither [should] the first [be conceded].

4. Likewise, contradictorily opposed [statements] are true of anything under disjunction, since of anything [there is] either affirmation or negation[^7]: therefore if God begot God, [He begot] either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then the begotten is the begetter; if God who is not the Father — but what is implied may simply be inferred, as if it be said: "the man who is not running, is disputing": therefore the man is not running: so likewise, if He begot God who is not the Father, [then] God is not the Father; but if He is not the Father, He does not generate: therefore etc.[^8]

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> **Conclusion.** It is rightly said: God to have begotten God, which is proved by four rules.

**I respond:** It must be said that the foregoing expression, the unity of the essence being preserved, is received both by the masters and by the saints. For the understanding of which, four rules are to be noted.

*The first* is that an abstract noun is imposed on the form and from the form, as *whiteness* is imposed on whiteness itself[^9] and from the form of whiteness; but a concrete noun is imposed from the form, but not on the form, but on the supposit: as *white* is imposed from the form of whiteness, but not on the form, but on the supposit, namely on some white thing, on a man or a swan.

*The second* rule is that a term having a multitude of supposits, taken without distribution, stands for that for which it renders the expression true, as when it is said: "man runs," the expression is true for the runner, if there be someone running.

*The third* rule is that for a term having a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after. Whence it makes no difference to say: "Peter is not running," and "not Peter is running."

*The fourth* rule is this: that the relative refers the antecedent under the same mode of suppositing under which the antecedent preceded the relative itself, unless it makes a simple relation[^10].

1. From the first rule, the response to the first [argument] is clear. For since this term *God* is concrete, although[^11] it is imposed from the essential form, namely the deity, nevertheless it is imposed on the person or supposit, just as *white* is imposed from whiteness on a white thing; and therefore it supposits and renders the expression true for a person, not for a form. But this name *essence* or *deity* is abstract, and therefore is imposed on the form and from the form, like *whiteness*, and therefore it signifies and supposits the essence. And therefore this is false: the essence generates the essence, because generation is not of a form, but of a supposit[^12]; but this is true: God begot God, [taken] for a person.

2. From the second rule, the response to the second [argument] is clear. For although the signification of the term is not narrowed, nevertheless it stands for that for which the expression is true, as "man runs" [stands] for Peter or for John, if for him the expression is true; and yet it is not [thereby] restricted to him. And this is clear, because if distribution be added, it will confound[^13] that term [to stand] for all; but if it were restricted, it would not confound except for those to whom the restriction would extend. Whence it is one thing for a term to be restricted to one, and another thing to render the expression true for one.

3. From the third rule, the solution[^14] to the third is clear. For although this is true for the Father: God generates God, nevertheless this: God does not generate God, is not true for the Son. For since this term *God* names a non-multipliable form, it makes no difference to place the negation before or after it; and therefore, since the negation placed before[^15] altogether removes the predicate from the subject, so also the negation placed after totally removes the predicate from this term *God*, when it is said: God does not generate, because it removes [the predicate] from any supposit. And therefore it has another mode of suppositing in the affirmative than in the negative, because in the affirmative the expression was true for the Father; in the negative, however, there cannot be truth, because the negation totally removes that predicate.

4. From the fourth rule, the fourth is clear. For since the relative entirely has the supposition of the antecedent, and this term *God*[^16] in the predicate supposits for God begotten, the relative refers for that. And so the sense is: God begot God, who [God] begotten is the Father, or is not the Father; and this is true for the negative [reading], nor is it permitted to infer: therefore God is not the Father; because the supposition is changed, indeed there is here a *figure of speech*[^17].

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *generationem* loco *gignitionem*.

en: From the manuscripts and the first edition we have placed *generationem* in place of *gignitionem*.

la: Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 28. (VI. 8.): *In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur... homo namque hominem generat.* Cfr. II. *de Anima*, text. 34. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 28 (VI, 8): "For in some cases it is even manifest that the generator is such as that which is generated... for man generates man." Cf. *De Anima* II, text 34 (c. 4).

la: Multi codd. ut AFGIKT etc. cum sex primis edd. *sed* loco *et*. Cod. R hanc propositionem ita exhibet: *per generationem vel ab habente deitatem, sed habens*.

en: Many codices, such as AFGIKT etc., together with the first six editions, [read] *sed* in place of *et*. Codex R presents this proposition thus: *through generation, or from one having the deity, but the one having*.

la: De significatione et suppositione huius nominis *Deus*, in quibus haec et seqq. obiectiones fundantur, vide infra q. 4. — In fine argumenti plures codd. ut AFGIKT etc. cum ed. 1 *generat* pro *genuit*.

en: On the signification and supposition of this name *God*, on which this and the following objections are founded, see below q. 4. — At the end of the argument, several codices, such as AFGIKT etc., together with ed. 1, [read] *generat* in place of *genuit*.

la: Codd. DHO (T *fl* in marg.) *suppositio*, quod et infra in responsione ad hanc obiectionem fere omnes codd. et sex primae edd. habent pro *significatio*; cod. l *significatio vel suppositio*. Sed vide regulam paulo infra ex Petr. Hisp. allatam. Mox multi codd. et ed. 1 *non* loco *nec*; cod. R *sed non*. Dein post *significationis* cod. X addit *sed consignificationis*, quod concordat cum regulae istius explicatione proposita a Petro Hispano, *Summula*, tract. de Restrictione: *Nihil positum a parte praedicati potest restringere terminum communem positum a parte subiecti quoad principalem eius significationem, ut homo est albus... Dico autem, quoad principalem eius significationem, quia praedicatum restringit subiectum quoad consignificationem, quae est genus v. g. masculinum.*

en: Codices DHO (T with *fl* in the margin) [read] *suppositio*, which both here and below in the reply to this objection nearly all codices and the first six editions have in place of *significatio*; codex l [reads] *significatio vel suppositio*. But see the rule a little below, drawn from Peter of Spain. Next many codices and ed. 1 [read] *non* in place of *nec*; codex R [reads] *sed non*. Then after *significationis* codex X adds *sed consignificationis*, which agrees with the explanation of that rule proposed by Peter of Spain, *Summula*, tract on Restriction: "Nothing placed on the side of the predicate can restrict a common term placed on the side of the subject as to its principal signification, as 'man is white'... I say, however, as to its principal signification, because the predicate restricts the subject as to consignification, which is gender, e.g. masculine."

la: Aliqui codd. ut TZ cum ed. 1 addunt *et*. Paulo infra post *sicut* codd. HY omittunt *et*. Mox cod. Y *ergo si haec est vera pro Patre, sic illa erit vera pro Filio, scilicet Deus non generat; si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, nec prima*. Codd. aa bb circa finem argumenti: *sed haec non conceditur, ergo nec prima*; ed. 1 *nec prima debet concedi*; cod. Z *si ergo haec non conceditur pro Filio, pariter nec illa conceditur pro Patre*. — Plures codd. ut ACFILMRSU ff hoc tertium argumentum omittunt, sed indebite, sicut patet ex responsione infra posita; cod. O vero illud praecedenti argumento circa finem post *omni persona* interserit sub hac forma: *Item, si haec est vera: Deus generat Deum, pro persona Patris, multo fortius haec erit vera: Deus non generat Deum, pro persona Filii et Spiritus sancti; ergo a destructione consequentis, si haec nullo modo est concedenda, nec ista. Non ergo etc.* Eadem fere verba exhibet cod. Z in fine huius tertii argumenti.

en: Some codices, such as TZ, together with ed. 1, add *et*. A little below, after *sicut*, codices HY omit *et*. Next codex Y [reads]: "therefore if this is true for the Father, so that will be true for the Son, namely 'God does not generate'; if then this is not conceded for the Son, neither [is] the first." Codices aa, bb, near the end of the argument: "but this is not conceded, therefore neither [is] the first"; ed. 1: "neither ought the first to be conceded"; codex Z: "if therefore this is not conceded for the Son, equally neither is that conceded for the Father." — Several codices, such as ACFILMRSU ff, omit this third argument, but improperly, as is clear from the reply set forth below; codex O, however, inserts it into the preceding argument near the end after *omni persona* in this form: "Likewise, if this is true: God generates God, for the person of the Father, much more strongly will this be true: God does not generate God, for the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit; therefore, by destruction of the consequent, if the latter is in no way to be conceded, neither [is] the former. Therefore not, etc." Codex Z presents nearly the same words at the end of this third argument.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Periherm.* c. 6. et II. c. 3, ubi agit de affirmatione, negatione et contradictione; et VI. *Topic.* c. 3. circa medium (c. 6.), ubi dicit: *Nam de omni aut affirmatio, aut negatio vera est*; et tandem IV. *Metaph.* text. 15. (III. 4.): *De omni affirmatio, aut negatio*. Ultimum textum et II. *Periherm.* c. 3. videntur codd. cum ed. 1 respexisse, omittendo *vera est*, quod Vat. adiungit. Paulo infra in Vat. desiderantur verba *Si Deum* usque ad *sed quod*, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habentur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On Interpretation* I, c. 6 and II, c. 3, where he treats of affirmation, negation, and contradiction; and *Topics* VI, c. 3, near the middle (c. 6), where he says: "For of everything, either affirmation or negation is true"; and finally *Metaphysics* IV, text 15 (III, 4): "Of everything, either affirmation or negation." The codices, together with ed. 1, seem to have looked to this last text and to *On Interpretation* II, c. 3, by omitting *vera est*, which the Vatican [edition] adds. A little below, in the Vatican [edition] the words *Si Deum* through *sed quod* are missing, which nevertheless are had in the manuscripts and in ed. 1.

la: Cod. O hic addit novum argumentum: *Item, si Deus generat Deum, Deus est genitus a Deo: ergo Deus est distinctus a Deo; ergo sunt duo dii.*

en: Codex O here adds a new argument: "Likewise, if God generates God, God is begotten from God: therefore God is distinct from God; therefore there are two gods."

la: Plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt *ipsi albedini et*, sed male, uti ex contextu patet.

en: Very many codices, together with the first six editions, omit *ipsi albedini et*, but wrongly, as is clear from the context.

la: Praedictarum regularum prima insinuatur ab Aristot., VII. *Metaph.* text. 21. et 27. ac IX. *Metaph.* text. 12. (VI. c. 6. 8. et VIII. c. 7.); secunda habetur in Petri Hisp. *Summula*, tract. de Suppos. et Distrib.; tertia in opusculo, quod etiam Petro Hisp. attribuitur, scil. *Parvorum Logicalium*, tract. de Negat. et Affirm. c. 1; quarta in eiusdem *Summula*, tract. de Relativis.

en: Of the foregoing rules, the first is hinted at by Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 21 and 27, and *Metaphysics* IX, text 12 (VI, cc. 6, 8, and VIII, c. 7); the second is found in Peter of Spain's *Summula*, tract on Supposition and Distribution; the third in a little work also attributed to Peter of Spain, namely the *Parvorum Logicalium*, tract on Negation and Affirmation, c. 1; the fourth in the same author's *Summula*, tract on Relatives.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *etsi* loco *et*. Mox cod. X post *deitate* habet *non tamen imponitur formae, sed personae*.

en: From very many manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *etsi* in place of *et*. Next codex X, after *deitate*, has: "yet it is not imposed on the form, but on the person."

la: Ex illo generali principio: *Actiones sunt suppositorum.*

en: From that general principle: "Actions are of supposits."

la: Id est, *facit supponere*. — Paulo ante Cod. R *subiectum* pro *illum*.

en: That is, *it makes [the term] supposit*. — A little before, codex R [reads] *subiectum* in place of *illum*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus *responsio* in *solutio* et paulo post *non multiplicabilem* in *immultiplicabilem*.

en: From older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have changed *responsio* into *solutio*, and a little after *non multiplicabilem* into *immultiplicabilem*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *totaliter et*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older codices and ed. 1, adds *totaliter et*.

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 *Deus*. Paulo ante cod. K. modo negativo *relativum non habet suppositionem aliam a suo antecedente*.

en: From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *Deus*. A little before, codex K [reads], in the negative mode: "*the relative does not have a supposition other than from its own antecedent*."

la: Cod. K. addit *hic*: *Deus genitus non est Pater; ergo Deus non est Pater*.

en: Codex K adds *hic* ["here"]: "God begotten is not the Father; therefore God is not the Father."

latin_scholion:
**I.** In gratiam lectorum, qui in antiqua logica minus sunt exercitati, iuvat hic ponere explicationem aliquorum terminorum, quae in hac quaestione et alibi in hoc opere saepe occurrunt. Sumtae sunt hae et aliae multae alibi in notis positae explicationes magna ex parte ex Summulis Petri Hispani, quae tempore S. Bonaventurae in manibus scholarium erant. Postquam Petrus multa de rebus philosophicis et medicina scripsit, a. 1275 electus est in Summum Pontificem et assumsit nomen Ioannis XXI. Mortuus est 16. Maii 1277. Plura videri possunt in quovis libro de logica scholastica tractante.

1. Aliud est *significatio*, aliud *suppositio* alicuius termini. Significatio est repraesentatio rei per vocem et convenit omnibus vocabulis tam substantivis quam reliquis, sive in propositione, sive extra propositionem.

Suppositio, ut vult Petrus Hisp., tract. de suppositione, «est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo», intellige, de quo

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vel de quibus huiusmodi terminus in aliqua propositione verificatur. Sic terminus *homo* potest supponere vel pro homine in communi, ut in propositione: homo est species; vel pro suis inferioribus sub hac specie comprehensis, v. g. homo currit. Suppositionum alia est *communis*, alia *discreta*; illa fit per terminum communem, ut homo est mortalis; haec per terminum discretum (concretum), ut Socrates, vel per communem, sed determinatum per pronomen demonstrativum, ut iste *homo*. Aliae divisiones suppositionis apud S. Bonav. occurrentes sunt: suppositio *simplex* et *personalis*. Illa est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum terminum communem, ut cum dicitur: homo est species; animal est genus. Tunc terminus *homo* supponit pro homine in communi, et non pro quolibet inferiore; unde non licet facere descensum, uti dicunt, sic arguendo: homo est species: ergo aliquis homo est species. *Personalis* vero suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro suis inferioribus, ut cum dicitur: homo currit; hic iste terminus *homo* supponit pro suis inferioribus. — Personalium suppositionum alia est *determinata*, alia est *confusa*. *Determinata* est acceptio termini communis indefinite sumti, vel cum signo particulari, ut homo currit, vel aliquis homo currit; et dicitur determinata, quia licet in utraque istarum propositionum ille terminus *homo* supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente, propositio est vera; et quia aliud est supponere et aliud locutionem veram vel falsam esse pro aliquo, igitur in praedictis iste terminus *homo* supponit pro omni homine currente et non currente, licet reddat locutionem veram pro uno solo currente... *Confusa* suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus, mediante signo universali, ut cum dicitur: omnis homo est animal; quia supponit terminus *homo* pro quolibet suo supposito. Ita Petrus Hisp.; alii quoad confusam et determinatam suppositionem rem paulo aliter explicant.

2. *Distributio* est acceptio termini communis pro suis significatis, sive est multiplicatio termini communis virtute alicuius signi universalis, v. g. in propositione: omnis homo currit, terminus *homo* distribuitur (sive confunditur) pro omnibus hominibus virtute illius vocabuli *omnis*, quod *signum distributivum* appellatur.

3. *Restrictio* est coarctatio termini communis a maiore suppositione sive extensione ad minorem; sic homo *albus* non significat omnes homines, sed partem eorum.

4. *Reddere locutionem veram* significat, quod in propositione, in qua subiectum supponit pro pluribus disiunctive, sensus redditur verus per hoc, quod in uno saltem supposito verificatur; v. g. propositio: homo currit, redditur vera, currente uno qualicumque. Unde reddere locutionem veram differt a restrictione termini ad unum, ut bene dicit S. Bonav., hic ad 2.

**II.** His suppositis, quatuor regulae logicales in corp. positae earumque applicatio in solutione obiectorum facile intelliguntur. Sic verba (ad 2.): «quia si addatur distributio, confundet illum terminum pro omnibus», hunc sensum habent; si additur signum *omnis* termino *homo*, tunc *confundet* i. e. distribuet illum terminum, ita ut verificetur de omnibus hominibus; si vero terminus *homo* restringitur per *albus*, tunc non «confunderet nisi pro albis hominibus». — Pro intelligentia applicationis quartae regulae est notandum, quod est duplex relatio pronominis relativi ad suum nomen, scil. relatio *simplex* vel *personalis*. Per relationem simplicem pronomen relativum (*qui, quae, quod*) non refertur ad idem numero antecedens sive ad idem suppositum, bene vero per relationem personalem. Exemplum: «Mulier damnavit, quae salvavit;» hic relativum *quae* habet relationem simplicem, non personalem, quia alia mulierum persona damnavit, nempe Eva, alia salvavit, scil. Ss. Virgo Maria. Unde S. Doctor recte concludit, quod in illata obiectione est figura dictionis i. e. fallacia figurae dictionis, quia terminus sumitur sub diversa suppositione. De hoc plura vide dub. 3. huius dist., Alex. Hal., p. 1. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 4. Richard. a Med., hic q. 4.

**III.** Contra applicationem tertiae regulae ad Deum moverunt subtilem difficultatem Durand. (hic q. 2.), Aureol., Brulifer (hoc loco) aliique posteriores Scholastici. Negant enim, quod Deus sit proprie terminus singularis, cum aliquo modo sit etiam terminus communis, quod etiam S. Bonav. (infra q. 4.) concedit. Inde concludunt, propositionem: Deus non generat Deum, posse concedi. Probatiores vero theologi, ut S. Thomas (S. I. q. 39. a. 4. ad 3.), Richard. (hic q. 1.) aliique cum nostro Seraphico (hic ad 3.) locutionem hanc recte improbant. Cfr. Caietanus ad loc. S. Thomae cit.

**IV.** Quoad quaestionis solutionem omnes antiqui conveniunt. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 9. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 30. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. 4. — Scot., hic q. 1. ad 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7; de hac et seqq. qq., S. p. I. tr. 43. q. 51. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. et 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., de hac et seq. q. hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. qq., S. a. 54. q. 3. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the benefit of readers who are less practiced in the old logic, it is helpful here to set forth an explanation of certain terms which often occur in this question and elsewhere in this work. These and many other explanations placed elsewhere in the notes are taken for the most part from the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain, which were in the hands of scholars in the time of St. Bonaventure. After Peter had written much on philosophical matters and on medicine, in 1275 he was elected Supreme Pontiff and took the name John XXI. He died on May 16, 1277. More may be seen in any book treating of scholastic logic.

1. *Signification* is one thing, *supposition* of any term another. Signification is the representation of a thing by means of an utterance, and it belongs to all words, both substantives and the rest, whether in a proposition or outside a proposition.

Supposition, as Peter of Spain holds, in the tract on supposition, "is the taking of a substantive term for something" — understand, of which

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or of which things [in the plural] such a term is verified in some proposition. Thus the term *man* can supposit either for man in common, as in the proposition: "man is a species"; or for its inferiors comprehended under this species, e.g. "man runs." Of suppositions, one is *common*, another *discrete*; the former is made by a common term, as "man is mortal"; the latter by a discrete (concrete) term, as "Socrates," or by a common [term], but determined by a demonstrative pronoun, as "this *man*." Other divisions of supposition occurring in St. Bonaventure are: *simple* and *personal* supposition. The former is the taking of a common term for the universal thing signified through the common term itself, as when it is said: "man is a species; animal is a genus." Then the term *man* supposits for man in common, and not for any inferior; whence it is not permitted to make a descent, as they say, by arguing thus: "man is a species: therefore some man is a species." But *personal* supposition is the taking of a common term for its inferiors, as when it is said: "man runs"; here this term *man* supposits for its inferiors. — Of personal suppositions one is *determinate*, another *confused*. *Determinate* is the taking of a common term taken indefinitely, or with a particular sign, as "man runs," or "some man runs"; and it is called determinate because, although in each of these propositions that term *man* supposits for every man, both running and not running, nevertheless with one man alone running, the proposition is true; and because to supposit is one thing and another to be a true or false expression for some [supposit], therefore in the foregoing this term *man* supposits for every man running and not running, although it renders the expression true for one alone running... *Confused* supposition is the taking of a common term for several, by means of a universal sign, as when it is said: "every man is an animal"; because the term *man* supposits for any of its supposits. So Peter of Spain; others explain confused and determinate supposition somewhat differently.

2. *Distribution* is the taking of a common term for its significates, or it is the multiplication of a common term by virtue of some universal sign, e.g. in the proposition: "every man runs," the term *man* is distributed (or confounded) for all men by virtue of that word *every*, which is called a *distributive sign*.

3. *Restriction* is the contraction of a common term from a greater supposition or extension to a lesser; thus *white* man does not signify all men, but a part of them.

4. *To render the expression true* signifies that in a proposition, in which the subject supposits for several disjunctively, the sense is rendered true by the fact that it is verified in at least one supposit; e.g. the proposition: "man runs" is rendered true with any one whatsoever running. Whence to render the expression true differs from restricting the term to one, as St. Bonaventure rightly says, here at [reply] 2.

**II.** These things presupposed, the four logical rules placed in the body and their application in the solution of the objections are easily understood. Thus the words (at 2): "because if distribution be added, it will confound that term for all" have this sense: if the sign *every* is added to the term *man*, then it will *confound*, i.e. distribute that term, so that it is verified of all men; but if the term *man* is restricted by *white*, then it would "not confound except for white men." — For the understanding of the application of the fourth rule, it is to be noted that there is a twofold relation of the relative pronoun to its noun, namely *simple* or *personal* relation. By a simple relation the relative pronoun (*qui, quae, quod*) is not referred to numerically the same antecedent or to the same supposit, but rather [is so referred] by personal relation. Example: "The woman damned, who saved" — here the relative *quae* has a simple, not personal, relation, because a different person of the women damned, namely Eve, [and] another saved, namely the Most Holy Virgin Mary. Whence the holy Doctor rightly concludes that in the inferred objection there is a *figure of speech* — that is, the fallacy of a figure of speech — because the term is taken under a different supposition. Concerning this, see further dub. 3 of this distinction; Alex. of Hales, p. 1, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4.

**III.** Against the application of the third rule to God, Durandus (here q. 2), Aureolus, Brulifer (in this place), and other later Scholastics raised a subtle difficulty. For they deny that *God* is properly a singular term, since in some way it is also a common term, which St. Bonaventure too (below, q. 4) concedes. Hence they conclude that the proposition: "God does not generate God" can be conceded. But the more approved theologians, such as St. Thomas (*S.* I, q. 39, a. 4, ad 3), Richard (here q. 1), and others, with our Seraphic [Doctor] (here ad 3), rightly disapprove this expression. Cf. Cajetan on the cited passage of St. Thomas.

**IV.** As to the solution of the question, all the ancients agree. Cf. St. Bonav., below d. 9 q. 1. — Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. I, q. 30, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. 4. — Scotus, here q. 1, ad 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. 2; *S.* I, q. 39, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6. 7; on this and the following questions, *S.* p. I, tr. 43, q. 51. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 4 and 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, on this and the following question, here 2. princ. q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following questions, *S.* a. 54, q. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Biel, on this and the following question, here q. 4.

---


title: Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum admitti possit haec locutio: Deus generat alium Deum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum unitas essentiae admittat hanc: *Deus generat alium Deum.* Et quod non, videtur.

1. Anselmus *de Processione Spiritus sancti*[^1]: « Cum dicimus *Deum de Deo*, non intelligimus alium Deum, sed eundem de se ipso ».

2. Item, si genuit alium Deum; sed ubi est unus et alius, ibi sunt duo: ergo si genuit alium, sunt duo dii.

3. Item, *alius* dicit alietatem in generali: ergo cum generale specificetur per adiunctum, hoc nomen *Deus* specificat ipsum; sed si specificat, specificat ratione formae: ergo notatur alietas in forma: ergo non est admittenda talis locutio, cum non sit ibi alietas in forma.

**Sed contra:**

1. Generatio importat distinctionem[^2]; sed distinctio alietatem aliquam: ergo et generatio; ergo si haec est vera: *Deus genuit Deum*, et haec per consequens: *Deus distinguitur a Deo*, vel *genuit alium Deum*. Si dicas, quod non sequatur, quia generare importat distinctionem ut modum, sed distingui vel esse alium ut rem; contra: ad

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consequentiam ut modum sequitur consecutio ut res; unde si haec est vera: *si homo est, animal est*[^3], ad hominem sequitur animal. Et praeterea, constat quod distinctio generationis non tantum est a parte intelligentis, verum etiam a parte rei: ergo illi distinctioni ut exercitae respondet distinctio realis.

2. Item, affirmativa est falsa: *Deus genitus est Deus generans*; ergo negativa est vera: *Deus genitus non est Deus generans*. Sed sicut affirmativa significat identitatem, ita negativa diversitatem: ergo sicut Deum generantem et genitum contingit ad invicem comparari mediante negatione, ita mediante alietate: ergo haec est vera: *Deus genuit alium Deum*.

3. Item, Pater sive Deus genuit alium; haec est vera, constat: ergo aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum; sed non alium non Deum: ergo etc.

4. Item, *alius* est terminus masculini generis; sed terminus masculini generis[^4] stat pro persona in partitivis terminis: ergo *alius* dicit alietatem personalem; sed haec est vera: *Deus genuit Deum alium in persona*; ergo simpliciter est vera haec: *Deus genuit alium Deum*.

### Conclusio.

> In stricto verborum sensu falsa est locutio: *Deus genuit alium Deum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec consuevit distingui: *Deus genuit alium Deum*, quia *alius* potest teneri *adiective*; et sic ponit alietatem circa formam istius termini *Deus*, et sic locutio est falsa; potest etiam teneri *substantive*, ut[^5] substantivetur; et tunc est appositiva constructio, sicut *animal homo*, et est sensus hoc modo: *Deus genuit alium Deum*, id est, *genuit alium qui est Deus*; et in hoc sensu est locutio vera.

Sed licet ista distinctio in locutionibus theologicis propter quendam proprium modum loquendi locum habeat, tamen quantum esset de virtute[^6] sermonis, non esset distinguenda; quia adiectivum adiunctum substantivo, ut *homo albus*, non dicitur substantivari, nec appositiva constructio dicitur ibi esse, maxime cum illa sit minus communis respectu magis communis[^7]. Unde cum hoc nomen *alius* sit adiectivum habens substantivum coniunctum, in praedicta locutione ponit alietatem circa ipsum ratione suppositi et formae.

Et propterea, si velimus artificialiter[^8] procedere, iudicanda est talis locutio falsa. Propter hoc ad intelligentiam dictae locutionis notanda est regula communis: non habet locum distinctio, ubi non est ex diversis causis unio, verbi gratia, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in hoc nomine *Deus*, non ex diversis causis sive ratione diversorum, sed ratione unius deitatis sive essentiae. Unio ex diversis causis est, ut in homine uniuntur Petrus et Ioannes ratione diversarum humanitatum, quia alia est humanitas Petri, et alia Ioannis.

Et iuxta hanc regulam ab oppositis[^9] est alia regula accipienda: non habet locum omnimoda[^10] unio, ubi est simul cum unione distinctio, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus uniuntur in una deitate sive essentia, sed distinctionem habent ratione pluralitatis personarum.

Secundum hoc est attendendum, quod in divinis quaedam vocabula important distinctionem solum, quaedam omnimodam unionem, quaedam medio modo. Quoniam igitur Deus generans et Deus genitus, etsi sint personaliter distincti, tamen in deitate uniuntur ex eadem causa, quia una deitate: ideo non recipiuntur[^11] nomina importantia simpliciter distinctionem. Ideo haec non admittitur: *Deus distinguitur a Deo*, similiter: *Deus genuit alium Deum.* Item, ratione distinctionis non recipiuntur vocabula omnimodam importantia unionem in supposito et forma: unde haec non recipitur: *Deus genuit se.* Sed illa quae medio modo se habent, recipiuntur, quale est hoc verbum *generat*, quia dicit distinctionem in persona cum[^12] unitate essentiae. Similiter haec conceditur: *Pater generat alterum se.* Unde Augustinus *ad Maximinum*[^13]: « Pater genuit alterum se »; et similiter *super Ioannem*: « Pater mittens Filium misit alterum se ». Et ex hoc est, quod non sequitur ad verbum simpliciter distinctionem; et sic patet primum.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de negatione, bene concedo, quod est alietas; sed tamen non sequitur, quod possit dici alietas in essentia sive forma deitatis. Unde non sequitur: *genitus est alius a generante*, ergo[^14] *alius Deus*, quia mutatur suppositio huius termini *Deus*.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: *aut alium Deum, aut alium non Deum*; dico, quod non sufficienter dividit; quia non est contradictio, nisi accipiatur negatio respectu totius. In hac enim: *genuit alium Deum*, duo dicuntur, scilicet quod *Deus genuit Deum*, et quod *alium in deitate*: et ideo ad hoc, quod sumatur contradictio, necesse est, quod feratur supra totum. Unde sicut non valet, demonstrato monacho nigro, qui est albus per naturam: *iste aut est albus monachus, aut albus non monachus*, quia utraque falsa; similiter intelligendum est in proposito. Nec valet: *est Deus et est alius: ergo est Deus alius*, immo est ibi accidens, sicut hic: *est bonus et est citharoedus: ergo est bonus citharoedus*.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod *alius*, quamvis sit masculini generis, tamen quia ponit rem circa substantivum, ab illo trahit suppositionem; et ideo non tenetur personaliter, nisi secundum quod substantivatur, sicut et hoc nomen *unus*; unde sicut si dicatur *unus Deus*, *unus* dicit unitatem substantialem, ita si dicatur *alius Deus*, *alius* dicit alietatem substantialem. Et ratio huius venit non tantum, quia adiectivum, sed quia generale, quod specificatur per adiunctum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether this expression can be admitted: God generates another God.*

Secondly it is asked whether the unity of the essence admits this: *God generates another God.* And that it does not, seems [to be the case].

1. Anselm, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*[^1]: "When we say *God from God*, we do not understand another God, but the same one from himself."

2. Likewise, if he generated another God; but where there is one and another, there are two: therefore if he generated another, there are two gods.

3. Likewise, *alius* (another) signifies otherness in general: therefore since the general is specified through what is adjoined, this name *Deus* (God) specifies it; but if it specifies, it specifies by reason of the form: therefore otherness is marked in the form: therefore such an expression is not to be admitted, since there is no otherness there in the form.

**On the contrary:**

1. Generation imports distinction[^2]; but distinction [imports] some otherness: therefore so does generation; therefore if this is true: *God generated God*, then this consequently: *God is distinguished from God*, or *he generated another God*. If you say that it does not follow, because to generate imports distinction as a mode, but to be distinguished or to be another as a thing; on the contrary: upon

a consequence as a mode follows a consecution as a thing; whence if this is true: *if a man exists, an animal exists*[^3], upon "man" follows "animal." And besides, it is established that the distinction of generation is not only on the side of the one understanding, but truly also on the side of the thing: therefore to that distinction as exercised there corresponds a real distinction.

2. Likewise, the affirmative is false: *God generated is God generating*; therefore the negative is true: *God generated is not God generating.* But just as the affirmative signifies identity, so the negative [signifies] diversity: therefore just as God generating and [God] generated happen to be compared with one another by means of negation, so by means of otherness: therefore this is true: *God generated another God.*

3. Likewise, the Father or God generated another; this is true, it is established: therefore either another God, or another non-God; but not another non-God: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *alius* is a term of masculine gender; but a term of masculine gender[^4] stands for a person in partitive terms: therefore *alius* signifies personal otherness; but this is true: *God generated another God in person*; therefore this is simply true: *God generated another God.*

### Conclusion.

> In the strict sense of the words the expression is false: *God generated another God.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this is customarily distinguished: *God generated another God*, because *alius* can be taken *adjectivally*; and thus it places otherness around the form of this term *Deus*, and so the expression is false; it can also be taken *substantivally*, so that[^5] it be substantivized; and then it is an appositive construction, as in *animal homo* (animal-man), and the sense is in this way: *God generated another God*, that is, *he generated another who is God*; and in this sense the expression is true.

But although this distinction has place in theological expressions on account of a certain proper mode of speaking, nevertheless as far as concerns the strict force[^6] of the discourse, it should not be distinguished; because an adjective adjoined to a substantive, as *homo albus* (white man), is not said to be substantivized, nor is an appositive construction said to be there, especially since that [appositive construction] is less common with respect to the more common[^7]. Whence since this name *alius* is an adjective having a substantive joined [to it], in the aforesaid expression it places otherness around it by reason of the supposit and of the form.

And therefore, if we wish to proceed artificially[^8] [i.e., strictly by the rules of the arts], such an expression must be judged false. On account of this, for the understanding of the said expression, a common rule must be noted: distinction has no place where there is not union from diverse causes — for example, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in this name *Deus*, not from diverse causes or by reason of diverse [things], but by reason of one deity or essence. Union from diverse causes is, as in [the case of] man, Peter and John are united by reason of diverse humanities, because Peter's humanity is one, and John's another.

And alongside this rule, from opposites[^9], another rule must be received: complete[^10] union has no place where there is, together with union, distinction, as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are united in one deity or essence, but they have distinction by reason of the plurality of persons.

According to this it must be attended to, that in divine matters certain words import distinction only, certain ones complete union, certain ones a middle mode. Therefore, since God generating and God generated, although they are personally distinct, nevertheless in the deity are united from the same cause, because by one deity: therefore names importing distinction simply are not received[^11]. Therefore this is not admitted: *God is distinguished from God*, similarly: *God generated another God.* Likewise, by reason of distinction words importing complete union in supposit and form are not received: whence this is not received: *God generated himself.* But those which hold themselves in a middle mode are received, of which sort is this verb *generates*, because it states distinction in person with[^12] unity of essence. Similarly this is conceded: *the Father generates another self.* Whence Augustine, *to Maximinus*[^13]: "The Father generated another self"; and similarly on John: "The Father, sending the Son, sent another self." And from this it is, that there does not follow upon the word [taken] simply [a] distinction; and so the first [argument] is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly concerning negation, I well concede that there is otherness; but nevertheless it does not follow that otherness can be said in essence or in the form of deity. Whence it does not follow: *the generated is other than the one generating*, therefore[^14] *another God*, because the supposition of this term *Deus* is changed.

3. To that which is objected thirdly: *either another God, or another non-God*; I say that it does not divide sufficiently; because there is no contradiction unless the negation is taken with respect to the whole. For in this [proposition]: *he generated another God*, two things are said, namely that *God generated God*, and that *another in deity*: and therefore for this, that a contradiction be taken, it is necessary that it be borne over the whole. Whence just as it does not hold, when a black-clad monk who is white by nature has been pointed out: *he is either a white monk, or a white non-monk*, since both are false; similarly it must be understood in the proposed [case]. Nor does it hold: *he is God and he is another: therefore he is another God*, rather there is an accident there, just as here: *he is good and he is a citharist: therefore he is a good citharist*.

4. To that which is objected last, it must be said, that *alius*, although it is of masculine gender, nevertheless because it places the thing around a substantive, draws its supposition from it; and therefore is not taken personally, except insofar as it is substantivized, just as also this name *unus* (one); whence just as if one were to say *unus Deus* (one God), *unus* signifies substantial unity, so if one were to say *alius Deus*, *alius* signifies substantial otherness. And the reason for this comes not only because [*alius*] is an adjective, but because [it is] general, which is specified through what is adjoined.

la: Anselmus, *de Processione Spiritus sancti* c. 24: « Nam cum dicimus *Deum de Deo*, *Filium de Patre*, non alium intelligimus Deum de Deo alio, sed eundem ipsum Deum de eodem ipso Deo ». — Codd. cum Vat. falso ponunt *in Proslogio*.

en: Anselm, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* c. 24: "For when we say *God from God*, *Son from Father*, we do not understand another God from another God, but the same God himself from the same God himself." — The codices, with the Vatican edition, falsely place [it] *in the Proslogion*.

la: Nam ut ait Aristot., II. *de Anima*, text. 47 (c. 4.): *Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum.* — De propositione minore Aristot., XIV. *Metaph.* c. 3 (XIII. c. 1.): *Alterum (contrarium est) eidem, et aliud ipsi (αὐτῷ).* — In hac propositione minore Vat. *et* loco *sed*, obstantibus mss. et ed. I.

en: For as Aristotle says, II *On the Soul*, text 47 (c. 4): *Nothing generates its very self.* — Concerning the minor proposition, Aristotle, XIV *Metaphysics* c. 3 (XIII c. 1): *The other (is contrary) to the same, and "another" to it itself (αὐτῷ).* — In this minor proposition the Vatican edition [reads] *et* in place of *sed*, against the mss. and ed. I.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *etiam*; cod. 1 autem addit *similiter haec est vera*. Cod. O post *homo est* addit *ergo*. — Plura de hac consequentia vide apud Boeth., *de Syllogismo hypothetico*.

en: On the authority of the mss. and ed. 1 we have here struck out the added *etiam*; cod. 1, however, adds *similiter haec est vera*. Cod. O after *homo est* adds *ergo*. — For more on this consequence see Boethius, *On the Hypothetical Syllogism*.

la: Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, minus bene *qui* loco *sed terminus masculini generis*; et circa finem argumenti similiter *loco simpliciter*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older mss. and ed. 1, less well [reads] *qui* in place of *sed terminus masculini generis*; and near the end of the argument similarly [reads] *loco* in place of *simpliciter*.

la: Ed. 1 *sic ut*. Cod. R *et si substantivetur tunc*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *sic ut*. Cod. R [reads] *et si substantivetur tunc*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut R cc *veritate*, et paulo infra plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. *iunctum* pro *adiunctum*.

en: Some codices, as R cc, [read] *veritate*, and a little below most codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, [read] *iunctum* in place of *adiunctum*.

la: Sensus est: maxime cum appositiva constructio fiat coniunctione termini minus communis cum magis communi.

en: The sense is: especially since an appositive construction comes about by the conjunction of a less common term with a more common [one].

la: Hoc est, stricte secundum regulas artium, scilicet grammaticae et logicae.

en: That is, strictly according to the rules of the arts, namely of grammar and of logic.

la: Vat. praeter fidem codd. et ed. 1 *opposito*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the codices and of ed. 1, [reads] *opposito*.

la: Codd. cum primis sex edd. omittunt *omnimoda*, quod a Vat. termino *distinctio* praefigitur.

en: The codices, with the first six editions, omit *omnimoda*, which by the Vatican edition is prefixed to the term *distinctio*.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *recipiuntur* loco *recipiunt*. Paulo infra multi codd. omittunt *similiter*.

en: On the faith of the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted *recipiuntur* in place of *recipiunt*. A little below, many codices omit *similiter*.

la: Cod. X *distinctionem personarum in*.

en: Cod. X [reads] *distinctionem personarum in*.

la: Vide in lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine; et *super Ioannem*, c. 3. Tract. 14. n. 11: *Pater mittens Filium se alterum misit.*

en: See in the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 2 at the end; and *on John*, c. 3, Tract. 14, n. 11: *The Father sending the Son sent himself another.*

la: Codd. MX addunt *est*.

en: Codices MX add *est*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Distinctionem in principio responsionis positam, quod *alius* hic possit teneri vel adiective vel substantive (nempe ut appositio), S. Doctor improbat, cum sit regula grammaticorum, quod adiectivum, si immediate sibi coniunctum habet substantivum, non potest accipi ut substantivum sive ut appositio. Si autem *alius* est adiectivum, tunc valet regula logicae, quod *alius*, quando immediate ad suum subiectivum ponitur, importat alietatem circa suum substantivum tum ratione suppositi, tum ratione formae. Consequenter in casu nostro hic terminus importaret diversitatem in Deitate.

**II.** In conclusione et solutione obiectorum principales doctores conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 50. m. 3. a. 2. § 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic a. 3, S. I. q. 31. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The distinction placed at the beginning of the response, that *alius* here can be taken either adjectivally or substantivally (namely as apposition), the holy Doctor disapproves, since it is a rule of grammarians that an adjective, if it has a substantive immediately joined to it, cannot be taken as a substantive or as apposition. If, however, *alius* is an adjective, then the rule of logic holds, that *alius*, when it is placed immediately to its subject [substantive], imports otherness around its substantive both by reason of the supposit and by reason of the form. Consequently, in our case this term would import diversity in the Deity.

**II.** In the conclusion and solution of the objections the principal doctors agree. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 50, m. 3, a. 2, § 2. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here a. 3, *Summa* I, q. 31, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

---

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title: Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III

*Utrum congrue iuxta regulas grammaticae dici possit: plures dii.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen *Deus* grammatice significet pluralem numerum, sive utrum congrue possit dici: *plures dii*. Et quod sic, videtur:

**1.** Quia secundum Philosophum[^1] intellectus sunt idem apud omnes, quamvis voces sint diversae; sed modi significandi consequuntur modos intelligendi: ergo cum apud Hebraeos congrue dicatur *Heloim*, quod aequipollet ei quod est *dii*, ergo et apud nos.

**2.** Item, sicut vult Philosophus[^2], verum supponit congruum; unde «*Catonis est*, vel *non est*, nec verum nec falsum significat»; sed haec vera est: *non sunt plures dii*: ergo congrua: ergo et haec congrua: *plures sunt dii*, quia negatio non removet incongruitatem.

**3.** Item, sicut Deus convenit uni soli, ita principium[^3] creaturarum uni soli; sed quamvis falso dicantur plura principia, tamen dicuntur congrue: ergo pari ratione possumus dicere: *plures dii*.

**4.** Item, hoc nomen *phoenix* non habet nisi unicum suppositum[^4]; tamen congrue dicitur: *plures phoenices*. Si tu dicas, quod suppositum plurificatur per successionem temporis; obiicio tibi de hoc nomine *sol*, quod nullo tempore plurificatur; et tamen congrue dicitur: *plures soles*: ergo et *plures dii*.

**Contra:**

**1.** Omne nomen, quod habet plurale, est nomen appellativum; propria enim nomina non plurificantur, non enim dicitur: *plures Petri* vel *Ioannes*[^5]; sed hoc nomen *Deus* non est nomen appellativum, quia non significat formam multiplicabilem: ergo etc.

**2.** Item, hoc nomen *Deus* est proprie[^6] proprium divinae naturae; sed nullum tale multiplicatur: ergo etc.

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> **Conclusio.** Nomen *Deus*, proprie loquendo, non habet plurale.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hoc nomen *Deus* dicitur tripliciter, scilicet *nuncupative*, *adoptive* et *naturaliter*. Primis duobus modis plurificatur; unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios octavo: *Si quidem sunt dii multi, et domini multi*; sed tertio modo non, quia sic hoc nomen *Deus* significat divinam naturam cum conditionibus, quarum collectiones impossibile est in alio reperire; et ideo sicut nomen proprium non habet plurale, secundum artem loquendo, sic nec hoc nomen *Deus*.

**1.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod apud Hebraeos habet plurale quod est *Heloim*; dicendum, quod modi significandi non tantum sequuntur[^7] diversos modos intelligendi generales, sed etiam modos exprimendi. Et quoniam ipsi habent articulos et modos exprimendi diversos, quos nos non habemus, ideo illi possunt habere, sed nos non.

**2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verum supponit congruum; dicendum, quod duplex est incongruitas: una est ex discohaerentia accidentium[^8], ut *Catonis est*; alia ex discohaerentia intellectuum, ut cum dicitur: *plures Petri*. Prima incongruitas tollit veritatem et falsitatem; secunda vero incongruitas habet falsitatem coniunctam: et ideo, quia per negationem removetur falsitas, et Sancti malunt loqui vere, quam proprietatem sermonis servare et loqui minus vere, ideo negant *plures deos*. Posset[^9] tamen dici, quod quamvis haec vox *dii* non sit vox significativa secundum artem et impositionem, tamen est vox significativa ex accommodatione usus, ut *olli* pro *illi*: et ideo generat falsum intellectum affirmativa, et negativa verum, quamvis non grammatice.

**3. 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principium uni soli convenit, similiter et *phoenix*; dicendum, quod convenire uni soli est tripliciter. Aut enim est, quia imponitur nomen a forma immultiplicabili, ut in propriis nominibus; et sic tollit pluralitatem re et consignificatione. Aut imponitur a forma, quae nata est communicari, quamvis non communicetur propter determinationem, ut cum[^10] dicitur: *principium creaturarum*. Aut propter defectum materiae, ut *phoenix*; et tale tollit pluralitatem secundum rem, non secundum consignificationem, quia potest consignificari talis forma, ut potest multiplicari per supposita.

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### Question III

*Whether it can be said congruously according to the rules of grammar: several gods.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether this name *God* grammatically signifies the plural number, or whether it can be said congruously: *several gods*. And that it can, seems thus:

**1.** Because according to the Philosopher[^1] understandings are the same among all, although vocal expressions are diverse; but the modes of signifying follow the modes of understanding: therefore since among the Hebrews it is congruously said *Heloim*, which is equivalent to that which is *gods*, therefore also among us.

**2.** Likewise, as the Philosopher will have it[^2], the true presupposes the congruous; whence "*Cato's is*, or *is not*, signifies neither true nor false"; but this is true: *there are not several gods*: therefore congruous: therefore also this is congruous: *there are several gods*, because negation does not remove incongruity.

**3.** Likewise, just as *God* belongs to one alone, so *principle*[^3] of creatures belongs to one alone; but although several principles are said falsely, nevertheless they are said congruously: therefore by parity of reasoning we can say: *several gods*.

**4.** Likewise, this name *phoenix* has only a single supposit[^4]; nevertheless it is congruously said: *several phoenixes*. If you should say that the supposit is multiplied through succession of time, I object to you concerning this name *sun*, which is at no time multiplied; and nevertheless it is congruously said: *several suns*: therefore also *several gods*.

**On the contrary:**

**1.** Every name which has a plural is an appellative name; for proper names are not pluralized, for one does not say: *several Peters* or *Johns*[^5]; but this name *God* is not an appellative name, because it does not signify a multipliable form: therefore etc.

**2.** Likewise, this name *God* is properly[^6] proper to the divine nature; but no such [name] is multiplied: therefore etc.

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> **Conclusion.** The name *God*, properly speaking, does not have a plural.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that this name *God* is said in three ways, namely *nuncupatively*, *adoptively* and *naturally*. In the first two modes it is pluralized; whence the Apostle in First Corinthians, chapter eight: *If indeed there are many gods, and many lords*; but in the third mode not, because thus this name *God* signifies the divine nature together with conditions whose collection is impossible to find in another; and therefore, just as a proper name does not have a plural, speaking according to art, so neither does this name *God*.

**1.** Therefore to that which is objected, that among the Hebrews there is a plural which is *Heloim*; it must be said that the modes of signifying do not follow[^7] only the diverse general modes of understanding, but also the modes of expressing. And because they themselves have articles and diverse modes of expressing, which we do not have, therefore they can have [it], but we cannot.

**2.** To that which is objected, that the true presupposes the congruous; it must be said that incongruity is twofold: one is from disharmony of accidents[^8], as *Cato's is*; the other from disharmony of understandings, as when it is said: *several Peters*. The first incongruity takes away truth and falsity; but the second incongruity has falsity conjoined: and therefore, because through negation falsity is removed, and the Saints prefer to speak truly than to preserve the propriety of speech and speak less truly, therefore they deny *several gods*. It could[^9] nevertheless be said, that although this utterance *gods* is not a significative utterance according to art and imposition, it is nevertheless a significative utterance from the accommodation of usage, as *olli* for *illi*: and therefore the affirmative generates a false understanding, and the negative a true [understanding], although not grammatically.

**3. 4.** To that which is objected, that *principle* belongs to one alone, and likewise *phoenix*; it must be said that to belong to one alone is in three ways. For either it is because the name is imposed from an unmultipliable form, as in proper names; and thus it removes plurality in reality and in cosignification. Or it is imposed from a form which is suited by nature to be communicated, although it is not communicated because of determination, as when[^10] it is said: *principle of creatures*. Or on account of a defect of matter, as *phoenix*; and such [a name] removes plurality according to the thing, not according to cosignification, because such a form can be cosignified, as it can be multiplied through supposits.

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la: Libr. I. Periherm. c. 1: *Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem sunt, ita nec voces omnibus eaedem: quorum tamen haec signa primo sunt, ea omnibus sunt eaedem passiones animae.*

en: Book I of *On Interpretation*, c. 1: *And just as letters are not the same for all, so neither are vocal expressions the same for all: but those of which these [vocal expressions] are primarily signs, are the same affections of the soul for all.*

la: Libr. I. Periherm. c. 2, iuxta translationem Boethii: «*Nomen vero semper, ut Catonis est, vel non est; nondum enim aliquid verum dicit aut falsum*»; in quo textu ceterae translationes *Philonis* pro *Catonis* ponunt. Ad quem locum auctor libri *Auctoritatum Aristot.* etc. (a. 1500) addit: «*Ex quo communiter trahitur, quod verum et falsum praesupponunt congruum*». Incongruitas huius dictionis consistit in discohaerentia accidentium, ut infra in solutione dicitur; deest enim subiectum genitivi.

en: Book I of *On Interpretation*, c. 2, according to Boethius's translation: "*A noun, however, always — as in 'Cato's is' or 'is not' — does not yet say anything true or false*"; in which text the other translations put *Philo's* for *Cato's*. To which passage the author of the book of *Aristotelian Authorities* etc. (a. 1500) adds: "*From which it is commonly drawn that the true and the false presuppose the congruous*." The incongruity of this expression consists in the disharmony of accidents, as is said below in the solution; for the subject of the genitive is lacking.

la: Cod. S addit *omnium*. Codd. cum ed. 1 in fine argumenti *deos* loco *dii*.

en: Codex S adds *of all*. The codices with edition 1 at the end of the argument [read] *deos* in place of *dii*.

la: S. Doctor loquitur secundum antiquam opinionem fabulosam, quod haec avis in uno solo individuo existat, ex cuius cineribus resurgat alius. Idem exemplum adducit Boeth., I. de Categoriis Aristot. c. de Denominativis.

en: The holy Doctor speaks according to the ancient fabulous opinion, that this bird exists in one sole individual, from whose ashes another arises. Boethius adduces the same example in Book I of [his commentary on] Aristotle's *Categories*, chapter on Denominatives.

la: Cfr. Priscian., II. Grammat. c. 5.

en: Cf. Priscian, *Grammar* II, c. 5.

la: Postulantibus mss. et edd. 1, addidimus *proprie*. Paulo infra aliqui codd. ut H ff post *multiplicatur* adiiciunt *vel plurificatur*; ed. 1 *nec plurificatur*.

en: With the manuscripts and edition 1 demanding it, we have added *proprie*. A little below, some codices such as H ff after *multiplicatur* add *vel plurificatur*; edition 1 [reads] *nec plurificatur*.

la: Ex plurimis mss. ut A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. substituimus *sequuntur* loco *requirunt*; alii codd. ut I U ff cum ed. 1 *consequuntur*. Lectio mss. certe praeferenda lectioni Vat. Paulo infra Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. et ed. 1 *quoniam ergo* pro *Et quoniam*. Demum circa finem argumenti, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. *dicere* loco *habere*; in lectione mss. supple: *plurale*.

en: From very many manuscripts such as A C F G H M N R S T V X Y Z etc. we have substituted *sequuntur* (follow) in place of *requirunt* (require); other codices such as I U ff with edition 1 [read] *consequuntur* (follow upon). The reading of the manuscripts is certainly to be preferred to the Vatican reading. A little below, the Vatican against many codices such as A C G H I K S T V W Y etc. and edition 1 [reads] *quoniam ergo* in place of *Et quoniam*. Finally, near the end of the argument, with the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, the Vatican places *dicere* (to say) in place of *habere* (to have); in the reading of the manuscripts supply: *plurale*.

la: Priscian., XVII. Grammat. c. 1. (de Constructione): *Nam si incongrua (ratio contextus) sit, soloecismum faciet, quasi elementis orationis inconcinne coeuntibus, quomodo inconcinnitas litterarum vel syllabarum vel eis accidentium in singulis dictionibus facit barbarismum.* — Vat. sola *adiacentium* loco *accidentium*, quae et paulo supra contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 habet *praesupponit* pro *supponit*.

en: Priscian, *Grammar* XVII, c. 1 (*On Construction*): *For if (the order of the context) be incongruous, it will make a solecism, as it were by the elements of speech coming together inelegantly, just as the inelegance of letters or of syllables or of what is accidental to them in single words makes a barbarism.* — The Vatican alone [reads] *adiacentium* (of adjacent things) in place of *accidentium* (of accidental things), which [Vatican] also a little above, against nearly all codices and edition 1, has *praesupponit* (presupposes) for *supponit* (presupposes/posits).

la: Vat. *potest*, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Circa finem huius responsionis aliqui codd. ut A C L O R S V Y *ex intellectu* pro *intellectum*.

en: The Vatican [reads] *potest* (it can), but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against [it]. Near the end of this response, some codices such as A C L O R S V Y [read] *ex intellectu* (out of understanding) in place of *intellectum* (understanding).

la: Supplevimus ex mss. et primis sex edd. *cum*. In fine responsionis antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 *significari* pro *consignificari*.

en: We have supplied *cum* (when) from the manuscripts and the first six editions. At the end of the response, the more ancient codices with edition 1 [read] *significari* (to be signified) in place of *consignificari* (to be cosignified).