title: Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum in daemonibus sit malae voluntatis continuatio.*

Supposito, quod in voluntate daemonum non sit possibilis rectificatio, quaeritur secundo, utrum sit in eis malae voluntatis continuatio. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Secundae ad Corinthios sexto[^1]: *Quae conventio Christi ad Belial?* Glossa: « Sicut Christus omnia bene facit, ita diabolus omnia male »; sed semper facit aliquid, quia est substantia spiritualis, non lassata in operando: ergo etc.

2. Item, primae Ioannis tertio[^2]: *Diabolus ab initio peccat;* Glossa: « Ab initio suae creationis incipiens, peccat continue usque in praesens ».

3. Item, Augustinus, *de Fide ad Petrum*[^3], loquens de daemonibus dicit: « Nec mala possunt voluntate carere nec poena ». *Si tu dicas,* quod loquitur de habitu, non de actu; *obiicitur,* quod de actu, per Hieronymum[^4], qui dicit, quod « diabolus adhuc idem sibi arrogat, quod prius praesumserat ».

4. Item, hoc videtur *ratione.* Diabolus est obstinatus; sed obstinatio est confirmatio in priori malo: ergo diaboli voluntas est confirmata in malo, quod commisit, ergo ab illo non potest recedere: ergo etc.

5. Item, Angeli confirmati in bono, continue habent bonam voluntatem habitu et actu, et eandem, quam habuerunt in sui glorificatione: ergo ab *oppositis* similiter videtur de daemonibus, cum sint obstinati in malo, sicut illi confirmati in bono.

6. Item, si[^5] posset ab actu malae voluntatis desistere, posset aliquo modo se ad gratiam praeparare, quia dimittere actum peccati est praeparare se ad gratiam; sed ipse nullo modo hoc potest, sicut supra[^6] probatum est: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Iacobi secundo[^7]: *Daemones credunt et contremiscunt;* sed credere et timere non sunt actus malae voluntatis: ergo videtur, quod aliquando moventur sine obliquitate, et ita aliqua est interpolatio.

2. Item, si contremiscunt, et timor retrahit a malo actu, ergo videtur, quod aliquando desistant.

3. Item, secundae Petri secundo[^8]: *Daemones non portant adversus se execrabile iudicium;* Glossa: « Magnitudine poenarum territi, a iudicio praesumtionis desistunt »: ergo videtur, quod cessaverit in eis praesumendi perversitas, saltem quantum ad actum.

4. Item, daemones naturaliter diligunt Deum, unde dicit Augustinus[^9], quod « nullius conscientia potest Deum odisse »; et si non diceret, videtur verum, quia « vitium non delet extrema naturae vestigia ». Si igitur diligere Deum est naturale, ergo adhuc sunt habiles et apti ad hunc actum. Esto ergo, quod exeant in actum, cum non moveantur simul pluribus motibus; tunc, ut videtur, cessant ab actu malae voluntatis.

5. Item, diabolus, tentans hunc hominem, potest desistere ab actu exteriori, ita quod nihil mali exterius nec illi nec alii faciat; sed plus sumus domini actuum interiorum quam exteriorum: ergo potest desistere, ut nihil actu male velit.

6. Item, videtur, quod voluntas prima superbiendi in eo desierit, quia cessante causa cessat
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effectus; sed ratio, quae movit diabolum ad appetendam divinam celsitudinem, fuit pulcritudo et strenuitas naturalium et praeexcellentia respectu omnium — ideo speravit posse obtinere et appetiit — sed modo non habet in se istam celsitudinem: ergo, ut videtur, nec illam voluntatem: ergo videtur in eo variata affectio.

7. Item, differt *dilectio* et *appetitus,* quia *dilectio* est boni, sed *appetitus* est boni ut unibilis, quia homo appetit bonum sibi, et bonum sibi non est nisi unibile sibi; sed diabolus bene videt, quod non potest ad Dei celsitudinem pervenire, quia revelata est ei sua damnatio, et ut dicit Augustinus *de Mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae*[^10], « ad suae damnationis cumulum desperavit ».

### Conclusio

> *Daemon non tantum quoad malae voluntatis deformitatem et pronitatem continuitatem habet, sed etiam semper omnem actum deformat et depravat, et ita continuo peccat.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod loqui contingit de mala voluntate tripliciter, scilicet quantum ad *deformitatem,* quantum ad *pronitatem* et quantum ad *actualitatem.* — Quantum ad *deformitatem* est in mala voluntate diabolus continue, ita quod nulla intervenit variatio per deformitatis desitionem sive minorationem, quia ita adhaesit macula peccati voluntati diaboli, ut nullo modo possit ab illa separari. — Quantum ad *pronitatem* est continuatio eiusdem, ita tamen, quod intervenit variatio quantum ad modum inclinandi. Diabolus enim ad id ipsum, quod primo appetiit, etiam nunc pronitatem habet, sed differenti modo quam prius. Prius enim appetiit cum proposito obtinendi, unde dixit: *Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem*[^11] etc.; nunc appetit quantum in se est, sicut ambitiosus, qui sperat obtinere episcopatum, et si non obtineat, non recedit ambitio, sed modus ambiendi variatur; sic et in diabolo est. — Quantum vero ad *actualitatem* est continuatio in actu peccandi, sed tamen intervenit variatio quantum ad genus, quia non peccat continue peccato unius generis, cum non moveatur simul motibus diversis. Modo enim peccat superbia, modo invidia, modo aliis modis; tamen voluntas eius nunquam requiescit, quia nunquam lassatur, cum sit incorruptibilis. Et cum in ea regnet perversitas, semper omnem actum, quem elicit, deformat et depravat, et ita continue peccat. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod credunt et contremiscunt; dicendum, quod[^12] actus iudicatur bonus dupliciter: aut *ex se,* ut puta, quando est actus virtutis elicientis ipsum, ut abstinere a voluptatibus, et consimiles; aut *ex adiuncto,* sicut ire ad sanctum Iacobum. Sic actus dicitur malus dupliciter: aut quia *directe* elicitur a vitio, ut velle praeesse; aut quia vitium deformans *concomitatur,* ut dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam vel cum murmure et impatientia. Et hoc modo deformat diabolus actum credendi, quia cum murmure et impatientia et displicentia illius quod credit, movetur in actum illum; et ita credendo peccat, non quia credit, sed quia non eo modo credere debet, quo credit. Similiter iudicandum est, si diabolus Deo obediat.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de timore, dico, quod verum est, quod timent; sed tamen timor ita exilis est, et voluntas peccandi adeo est improba, quod propter hoc non cessat[^13], sicut in latrone, qui licet timeat furcas, tamen propter appetitum furandi non cessat a furto; et in ipso timore peccat, quia displicet ei Dei iustitia, quam formidat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod a iudicio praesumtionis desistunt; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, quamvis non audeant appetere quod primo ausi sunt, tamen improba voluntate non desistunt appetere; et si viam possent invenire, per quam crederent attingere, absque dubio idem praesumerent. Unde quamvis iudicium sit variatum propter poenarum intuitum; tamen appetitus non est avulsus nec malum desiderium, immo regnat actu.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de motu naturali, respondent quidam, quod natura, etsi non sit exstincta, est tamen adeo consopita et liberi arbitrii malitia superata, quod in actum suum non potest exire. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod, sicut libera voluntas deformabat actum credendi, ita etiam deformat actum naturalem, cum ei adiungitur. Exemplum huius est hoc. Licet avarus naturaliter appetat beatitudinem, tanta est perversitas iudicii in eo et voluntatis, ut non dicat esse beatitudinem nisi in divitiis; et ita nunquam exit in appetitum beatitudinis, nisi ut est in divitiis; et ita appetendo illam beatitudinem peccat, quia motum illum, quem natura inchoat incitando, voluntas consummat deformando. Sic intelligendum, quod diabolus naturaliter diligit Deum ut conservatorem, sed voluntas diaboli illam dilectionem refert ad propriam utilitatem; ideo peccat, quia, etsi Deum diligat, tamen propter se diligit. Bene igitur concedo, quod exit in actum naturalem, sed nunquam in pure naturalem.
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest desistere ab actu exteriori; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum diabolus non obdormiat, semper in eo vigent interiores virtutes, et ita semper sunt in actu, velit nolit, sicut in homine vigilante. Sed opus ad alterum subest omnino libero arbitrio, ideo potest cessare ab hoc et ab omni[^14]; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc vel ab illo secundum diversas conversiones, sed nunquam ab omni. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod magis sumus domini actuum interiorum; si intelligatur quantum ad cohibitionem propriam, manifeste falsum est; si quantum ad cohibitionem alienam, verum est, quia aliquis potest me cohibere ab actu exteriori et compellere: non sic est de interiori.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non videtur modo superbire, quia cessavit causa; dicendum, quod est causa *inducens,* sed tamen non *efficiens* nec *conservans;* et hac cessante, non cessat effectus, sicut patet manifeste; et talis fuit in diabolo pulcritudo. Est alia *efficiens* et *conservans;* et talis fuit voluntas diaboli obliqua et aversa[^15], et haec semper est in diabolo, ideo semper est in eo superbia; et quamvis non assurgat ad illud obtinendum, tamen adhuc assurgit ad illud quod potest, et amplius quam potest, quia ad dominium hominum, et maxime Sanctorum.

7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod appetitus est rei unibilis; dicendum, quod appetitus *absolutus* et *deliberatus* est rei unibilis et possibilis; et iste est appetitus cum eligentia. Sed appetitus *velleitatis,* qui est impossibilium, non est rei unibilis secundum veritatem, sed rei, quae desideratur, sicut aliquis appetit esse velox sicut hirundo et similia[^16]. Diabolus autem quod prius appetiit, eo modo quo appetiit, voluntate *eligentiae* non appetit, sed solum quantum est ex se. — Si tamen aliquis contendat, quod appetit; fatendum est, quod iudicium eius est perversum sive aestimatio, saltem intellectus practici, quo iudicat, se ad illud[^17] posse pervenire, quamvis iudicium speculationis dictet contrarium.

english:
### Question II. *Whether in demons there is a continuation of evil will*

Granted that in the will of demons there is no possible rectification, it is asked, secondly, whether in them there is a continuation of evil will. And that there is, seems [to be the case].

1. 2 Corinthians 6[^1]: *What concord hath Christ with Belial?* The Gloss: "As Christ does all things well, so the devil does all things evilly"; but he always does something, because he is a spiritual substance, not wearied in operating: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, 1 John 3[^2]: *The devil sinneth from the beginning;* the Gloss: "Beginning from the very beginning of his creation, he sins continually right up to the present."

3. Likewise, Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter*[^3], speaking of demons, says: "They can neither be without evil will nor without punishment." *If you say* that he is speaking of habit, not of act; it is *objected* that [he speaks] of act, through Jerome[^4], who says that "the devil still arrogates to himself the same thing that he had presumed before."

4. Likewise, this seems [so] *by reason.* The devil is obstinate; but obstinacy is confirmation in a prior evil: therefore the devil's will is confirmed in the evil that he committed, therefore he cannot withdraw from it: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the angels confirmed in good continually have a good will in habit and in act, and the same [will] that they had in their glorification: therefore from the *opposites* it likewise seems [so] concerning the demons, since they are obstinate in evil, as those [angels are] confirmed in good.

6. Likewise, if[^5] he could desist from the act of evil will, he could in some way prepare himself for grace, because to lay aside the act of sin is to prepare oneself for grace; but he can in no way do this, as was proved above[^6]: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. James 2[^7]: *The demons believe and tremble;* but to believe and to fear are not acts of evil will: therefore it seems that they are sometimes moved without obliquity, and so there is some interruption.

2. Likewise, if they tremble, and fear draws [them] back from an evil act, then it seems that they sometimes desist.

3. Likewise, 2 Peter 2[^8]: *The demons do not bring against themselves an execrable judgment;* the Gloss: "Terrified by the magnitude of the punishments, they desist from the judgment of presumption": therefore it seems that the perversity of presuming has ceased in them, at least as to act.

4. Likewise, demons naturally love God, whence Augustine says[^9] that "no one's conscience can hate God"; and even if he did not say [it], it seems true, because "vice does not destroy the last traces of nature." If, therefore, to love God is natural, then they are still capable and apt for this act. Grant, then, that they go forth into act, since they are not moved by several motions at once; then, as it seems, they cease from the act of evil will.

5. Likewise, the devil, tempting this man, can desist from the exterior act, such that he does nothing evil exteriorly either to him or to another; but we are more masters of interior acts than of exterior ones: therefore he can desist, so as to will nothing evil in act.

6. Likewise, it seems that the first will of being proud in him has ceased, because, the cause ceasing, the
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effect ceases; but the reason that moved the devil to desire the divine sublimity was the beauty and vigor of his natural endowments and his pre-eminence in relation to all — and so he hoped to be able to obtain [it] and desired [it] — but now he does not have that sublimity in himself: therefore, as it seems, neither [does he have] that will: therefore it seems that the affection in him has been changed.

7. Likewise, *love* (*dilectio*) and *appetite* (*appetitus*) differ, because *love* is of the good, but *appetite* is of the good as unitable, since a man desires the good for himself, and the good for himself is nothing but what is unitable to himself; but the devil sees well that he cannot attain to God's sublimity, because his damnation has been revealed to him, and as Augustine says *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*[^10], "he despaired, to the heaping up of his damnation."

### Conclusion

> *The demon not only has continuity as to the deformity and the proneness of evil will, but also always deforms and depraves every act, and so sins continually.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of evil will in three ways, namely as to *deformity,* as to *proneness,* and as to *actuality.* — As to *deformity,* the devil is continually in evil will, such that no variation intervenes by a ceasing or a lessening of the deformity, because the stain of sin has so adhered to the devil's will that it can in no way be separated from it. — As to *proneness,* there is a continuation of the same, yet in such a way that a variation intervenes as to the mode of inclining. For the devil even now has a proneness to the very thing that he first desired, but in a different mode than before. For before, he desired with the purpose of obtaining, whence he said: *I will set my seat to the north*[^11] etc.; now he desires as far as in him lies, like an ambitious man who hopes to obtain a bishopric, and if he does not obtain it, the ambition does not depart, but the mode of being ambitious is varied; so it is also in the devil. — But as to *actuality,* there is a continuation in the act of sinning, yet a variation intervenes as to kind, because he does not sin continually with a sin of one kind, since he is not moved by diverse motions at once. For now he sins by pride, now by envy, now in other modes; yet his will never rests, because it is never wearied, since it is incorruptible. And since perversity reigns in it, it always deforms and depraves every act that it elicits, and so sins continually. — And the reasons brought forward for this [conclusion] are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that they believe and tremble; it must be said that[^12] an act is judged good in two ways: either *of itself,* as for instance when it is the act of a virtue eliciting it, such as abstaining from pleasures, and the like; or *from something adjoined,* as to go to St. James [of Compostela]. So too an act is called evil in two ways: either because it is *directly* elicited from a vice, as to will to be in command; or because a deforming vice *accompanies* [it], as to give alms for the sake of vainglory or with murmuring and impatience. And in this mode the devil deforms the act of believing, because with murmuring and impatience and displeasure at that which he believes, he is moved into that act; and so in believing he sins, not because he believes, but because he ought not to believe in the mode in which he believes. The like is to be judged if the devil obeys God.

2. To that which is objected concerning fear, I say that it is true that they fear; but nevertheless the fear is so slight, and the will of sinning is so wicked, that on account of this he does not cease[^13], as in the case of a thief who, although he fears the gallows, nevertheless on account of the appetite for stealing does not cease from theft; and in that very fear he sins, because the justice of God, which he dreads, displeases him.

3. To that which is objected, that they desist from the judgment of presumption; it must be said that, as has been said, although they do not dare to desire what they first dared, nevertheless by a wicked will they do not desist from desiring; and if they could find a way by which they believed they might attain [it], without doubt they would presume the same. Whence, although the judgment is varied on account of the consideration of the punishments, nevertheless the appetite is not torn away nor [is] the evil desire, but rather it reigns in act.

4. To that which is objected concerning the natural motion, some respond that nature, even if it is not extinguished, is nevertheless so lulled to sleep and overcome by the malice of free choice that it cannot go forth into its own act. — Yet it can be said otherwise: that, just as the free will deformed the act of believing, so too it deforms the natural act when it is joined to it. An example of this is the following. Although the miser naturally desires beatitude, so great is the perversity of judgment in him and of will, that he says beatitude to be nothing except in riches; and so he never goes forth into the appetite of beatitude except as it is in riches; and so in desiring that beatitude he sins, because the motion that nature begins by inciting, the will consummates by deforming. So it is to be understood that the devil naturally loves God as preserver, but the devil's will refers that love to his own utility; therefore he sins, because, although he loves God, nevertheless he loves [Him] for his own sake. I therefore grant well that he goes forth into a natural act, but never into a purely natural one.
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5. To that which is objected, that he can desist from the exterior act; it must be said that it is not the same, because, since the devil does not fall asleep, the interior powers are always vigorous in him, and so they are always in act, whether he will or not, as in a waking man. But work directed to another is wholly subject to free choice, and therefore he can cease from this and from all[^14]; in the interior [act] he can cease from this or from that according to diverse turnings, but never from all. — As for what is said, then, that we are more masters of interior acts; if it is understood as to restraint by oneself, it is manifestly false; if as to restraint by another, it is true, because someone can restrain me from an exterior act and compel [me]: it is not so concerning the interior.

6. To that which is objected, that he does not seem now to be proud, because the cause has ceased; it must be said that there is a cause that *induces,* but yet does not *effect* nor *preserve;* and when this ceases, the effect does not cease, as is plainly evident; and such was the beauty in the devil. There is another [cause] that *effects* and *preserves;* and such was the devil's will, oblique and turned away[^15], and this is always in the devil, therefore pride is always in him; and although he does not rise up to obtain that [sublimity], nevertheless he still rises up to that which he can, and more than he can, because [he rises up] to dominion over men, and especially over the saints.

7. To that which is objected last, that appetite is of a unitable thing; it must be said that *absolute* and *deliberate* appetite is of a unitable and possible thing; and this is appetite with choice. But the appetite of *velleity,* which is of impossible things, is not of a unitable thing according to truth, but of a thing that is desired, as someone desires to be swift like a swallow and the like[^16]. But the devil, by a will of *choice,* does not desire what he first desired, in the mode in which he desired it, but only as far as in him lies. — If, however, someone contends that he does desire [it]; it must be admitted that his judgment, or estimation, is perverse, at least [that] of the practical intellect, by which he judges that he can attain to that[^17], although the judgment of speculation dictates the contrary.

la: Vers. 15. — Glossa invenitur apud Petrum Lombardum in hunc locum. Cfr. etiam Hieronym. in Ps. 33, 15.

en: Verse 15. — The Gloss is found in Peter Lombard on this passage. Cf. also Jerome on Ps. 33, 15.

la: Vers. 8. — Glossa interlinearis apud Lyranum in hunc locum.

en: Verse 8. — The interlinear Gloss in [Nicholas of] Lyra on this passage.

la: Cfr. Comment. in Iob. 24, 17, ubi dicit: Divinitatem quoque sibi per superbiam arrogando, quam praesumtione animi sui tentavit invadere, velut fur inventus est... Hic iam in peccatorum suorum tenebris constitutus, vultum malae conscientiae suae obduratione operuit, poenitentiam non acturus; et idcirco divino lumine privatus studet, atque observat, ut ea quae tenebris et caligine sunt digna, committat. Unde in his operibus vitam agens, fodiet sibi domos habitationum in inferis cum illis suis ministris, cum quibus se adversus Deum et creatorem erigere tentavit. — Liber hic non est S. Hieronymi.

en: Cf. the Commentary on Job 24, 17, where he says: "Arrogating to himself even the divine nature by pride, which he attempted to invade by the presumption of his own mind, he was found out like a thief... Now, established in the darkness of his own sins, he covered the face of his evil conscience with hardening, not about to do penance; and therefore, deprived of the divine light, he strives and watches to commit those things that are worthy of darkness and gloom. Whence, leading his life in these works, he will dig for himself dwelling-houses in hell with those ministers of his, with whom he attempted to rise up against God and the Creator." — This book is not St. Jerome's.

la: Supple cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) *diabolus.*

en: Supply, with codex Q (by a second hand), *diabolus.*

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Vers. 19.

en: Verse 19.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossam refert Strabus loc. cit.

en: Verse 11. — Strabo reports the Gloss in the place cited.

la: Libr. II. de Serm. Domini, c. 14. n. 48. Vide supra d. 5. dub. 1. — Sequens textus est August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. n. 2: Nullum quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae deleat etiam extrema vestigia.

en: Book II of *On the Lord's Sermon [on the Mount]*, ch. 14, n. 48. See above, d. 5, dub. 1. — The following text is Augustine, *City of God* XIX, ch. 12, n. 2: "For no vice is so contrary to nature that it destroys even the last traces of nature."

la: Libr. I. c. 2: Praeterea quoque ad cumulum diabolici peccati illud accidit, quod statim postquam peccavit, foveam desperationis incurrit.

en: Book I, ch. 2: "Moreover, this too belongs to the heap of the devil's sin, that immediately after he sinned, he fell into the pit of despair."

la: Isai. 14, 13. Cfr. supra pag. 137, nota 5.

en: Isaiah 14, 13. Cf. above, p. 137, note 5.

la: In cod. I (cod. bb a secunda manu) propter subnexa non male additur *sicut.*

en: In codex I (codex bb by a second hand), on account of what follows, *sicut* is not badly added.

la: Supple: a malo actu. — Vat. paulo ante *timet* pro *timent.* Circa finem solutionis cod. T *ita ipso timore* pro *in ipso timore.*

en: Supply: *a malo actu* (from the evil act). — The Vatican edition, a little before, [reads] *timet* for *timent.* Near the end of the solution codex T [reads] *ita ipso timore* for *in ipso timore.*

la: Vat. cum nonnullis mss. omittit *et ab omni; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc;* quibus omissis propositio redditur falsa. In his verbis, contextu postulante, ante *interiori* supplevimus particulam *in,* quae in codd. et ed. 1 desideratur et facile excidere potuit.

en: The Vatican edition with several manuscripts omits *et ab omni; in interiori potest cessare ab hoc;* with these omitted the proposition is rendered false. In these words, as the context requires, before *interiori* we have supplied the particle *in,* which is wanting in the manuscripts and the first edition and could easily have fallen out.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *perversa.*

en: Codex cc and the first edition [read] *perversa.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 159, nota 3. et scholion ad eandem quaest.

en: Cf. above, p. 159, note 3, and the scholion to the same question.

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 *idem;* cod. A *illud idem.*

en: Several manuscripts with the first edition [read] *idem;* codex A [reads] *illud idem.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio est de actibus voluntatis deliberatis in daemonibus, non de naturalibus, qui certe in se sunt boni, ut procedunt a natura bona. Alii doctores proponunt quaestionem hanc sub terminis magis restrictis, v. g. utrum omnes actus daemonis sint mali. — Supponit S. Doctor, voluntatem creatam posse sine gratia facere aliquod opus naturaliter honestum et de se ordinabile in finem ultimum (cfr. infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.); item, actum in genere bonum posse fieri moraliter malum, quando pravitate finis vel alicuius circumstantiae maculetur (cfr. infra d. 36. d. 5.).

Si quaeritur de facto, communiter affirmatur, omnes actus daemonum non naturales esse malos, licet actum ex genere bonum facere possint, sed non nisi mala voluntate. Etiam Scot. hoc censet esse probabile. Cum autem quaeritur, utrum impossibile sit, eosdem aliquos actus moraliter bonos, at non meritorios elicere posse, Scot. (hic q. unica, n. 22. seqq., Report. hic q. 3.), variis circa bonum usus distinctionibus, asseruit, hanc impossibilitatem non posse probari. — Licet autem damnatus semper faciat male, tamen, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.), non « semper demerebitur, proprie loquendo de demerito, secundum quod demeritum dicitur culpa, pro qua secundum decretum divini iudicii infligi debet a iudice peccati poena; quia pro malo actu liberi arbitrii post iudicium non infligetur sibi a Deo poena. Nec tamen remanebit ille actus impunitus, quia ille actus erit ipsi diabolo et culpa et punitio, ita quod erit diabolo poena acta, non inflicta. Sed usque ad iudicium malus actus liberi arbitrii est diabolo et culpa et demeritum, quia pro quolibet malo actu liberi arbitrii indigetur sibi poena a iudice; in quo [iudicio] recipiet totius poenae sibi infligendae a iudice complementum ». Quod sit pro illo statu intermedio aliquod demeritum et augmentum poenae accidentalis, approbant Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 102. m. 1. et m. 3. a. 9.) et S. Bonav., ut iam supra d. 6. a. 2. q. 4. 2. observatum est, et magis patebit ex quaestione sequenti. Ipse S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) ex parte consentit dicens: « Culpa dicitur crescere non quantum ad intensionem malitiae, sed quantum ad multiplicitatem actus. Poena etiam essentialis non crescit, sed accidentalis ».

**II.** De *intensione* malitiae explicite agitur in seq. quaest. Neminem inter antiquos invenimus, qui data opera de hoc disputet, nisi Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. m. 3. a. 9. et q. 101. m. 10.), B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 3. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1.) et Dionys. Carth., qui (hic q. 2.) aliqua verba ex S. Bonav. transcribit. — Opinionem in corp. primo loco positam sequitur S. Thom. in Comment., ut ex verbis modo relatis patet; quae sententia non penitus placet nostro Doctori, qui etiam aliam distinctionem adhibet. — De vi administrativa in Angelis cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

**III.** De hac 2. quaest. praeter citatos in praeced. scholio: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 102. m. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The question is about the deliberate acts of will in demons, not about the natural ones, which certainly are good in themselves, as they proceed from a good nature. Other doctors propose this question under more restricted terms, e.g. whether all the acts of a demon are evil. — The Holy Doctor supposes that a created will can, without grace, do some work naturally honorable and of itself orderable to the ultimate end (cf. below, d. 28, a. 2, q. 3); likewise, that an act generically good can be made morally evil when it is stained by the depravity of the end or of some circumstance (cf. below, d. 36, d. 5).

If it is asked as to fact, it is commonly affirmed that all the non-natural acts of demons are evil, although they can do an act generically good, but not except with an evil will. Scotus too judges this to be probable. But when it is asked whether it is impossible that they could elicit some of these same acts morally good, but not meritorious, Scotus (here q. unica, n. 22 ff., *Reportata* here q. 3), using various distinctions concerning the good, asserted that this impossibility cannot be proved. — Although the damned [one] always does evil, nevertheless, as Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 2, q. 2), he does not "always demerit, speaking properly of demerit, according as demerit is called fault, for which, by the decree of the divine judgment, a punishment for sin ought to be inflicted by the judge; because for an evil act of free choice after the judgment no punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor yet will that act remain unpunished, because that act will be to the devil himself both fault and punishment, such that there will be for the devil a punishment enacted, not inflicted. But until the judgment an evil act of free choice is to the devil both fault and demerit, because for any evil act of free choice a punishment is owed to him by the judge; in which [judgment] he will receive the completion of the whole punishment to be inflicted on him by the judge." That there is for that intermediate state some demerit and an increase of accidental punishment, Alexander of Hales approves (S. p. II, q. 102, m. 1 and m. 3, a. 9) and St. Bonaventure, as was already observed above, d. 6, a. 2, q. 4, [obj.] 2, and will be more evident from the following question. St. Thomas himself in the Commentary (here q. 1, a. 2) in part agrees, saying: "Fault is said to grow not as to the intensity of malice, but as to the multiplicity of the act. The essential punishment too does not grow, but the accidental [one does]."

**II.** Of the *intensity* of malice it is treated explicitly in the following question. We find no one among the ancients who treats of this on purpose, except Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 3, a. 9, and q. 101, m. 10), B. Albert (S. p. II, tr. 3, q. 23, m. 1, a. 1), and Dionysius the Carthusian, who (here q. 2) transcribes some words from St. Bonaventure. — The opinion set down in the first place in the body [of the article] St. Thomas follows in the Commentary, as is evident from the words just related; which opinion does not entirely please our Doctor, who also employs another distinction. — Concerning the administrative power in angels, cf. below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.

**III.** On this 2nd question, besides those cited in the preceding scholion: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. q. 102, m. 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 180 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum mala voluntas in daemonibus intendatur.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in daemonibus sit malae voluntatis intensio. Et quod sic:

1. Isidorus *de Summo Bono*[^1]: « Diabolus non per hoc contentus est, quod Deo aequalem se existimans cecidit, sed etiam superiorem se Deo dicit »: ergo videtur crevisse superbia.
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2. Item, *ratione* videtur. Quia mala facimus, mali sumus[^2]: ergo quanto plura mala facimus, tanto peiores sumus: sed diabolus plura mala fecit post lapsum: ergo peior est nunc, quam quando cecidit: ergo crevit in eo voluntatis deordinatio.

3. Item, diabolo debetur maior poena nunc, quam quando cecidit — hoc non est dubium — sed praemium in bonis non augetur, nisi crescat bona voluntas: ergo nec in malis supplicium, nisi crescat mala voluntas: ergo etc.

4. Item, malum est « privatio modi, speciei et ordinis[^3] »; sed ista non possunt totaliter ab aliquo removeri, alioquin cederet in non-ens, quia dicit Augustinus, quod « ubi haec nulla sunt, nullum bonum est »: ergo si non sunt omnino ablata, possunt adhuc diminui. Sed diminuuntur per peccatum: cum ergo diabolus peccet, tanto magis diminuuntur, quanto magis peccat; sed quanto magis diminuuntur, tanto peior est voluntas: ergo etc.

5. Item, qui procurat homicidium corporale homicida est, et quanto plura procurat homicidia, tanto peior in eo est voluntas: ergo pari ratione, immo fortiori, qui mortem spiritualem procurat homicida est, et qui plurium mortem procurat peior est; sed diabolus post mortem primi hominis dicitur fuisse *homicida ab initio*[^4], quia procuravit eius lapsum, sed processu temporis procuravit mortem plurium: ergo in malitia crevit. *Si tu dicas,* quod crevit mala voluntas in comparatione ad hominem, non in comparatione ad Deum; *ostenditur,* quod ista responsio nulla est, *primo,* quia diabolus inordinate movetur in Deum, sicut in hominem. Si ergo multiplicando et iterando peccatum in hominem intenditur, et crescit in eo malitia; pari ratione, cum odit et blasphemat Deum, quod nullo modo potest bene fieri[^5]. *Praeterea,* non est peccatum, in quo non contemnatur et offendatur Deus, et in quo peccans non avertatur a Deo: ergo in omni peccato crescit mala voluntas in comparatione ad Deum.

**Contra:** 1. « *Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem*[^6] »; sed daemones non possunt proficere: ergo non possunt magis deficere sive peiores esse.

2. Item, hoc videtur *per simile in hominibus damnatis,* quia diabolus et homo mortuus sive damnatus sunt in consimili statu, sicut dicit Damascenus[^7], quod « hoc est hominibus mors, quod Angelis casus »; sed post mortem mala voluntas in homine non crescit: ergo nec in daemone post casum.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur *per simile in bonis Angelis.* Similis enim est status bonorum in bono, et malorum in malo; sed in bonis non potest crescere bona voluntas: ergo nec in malis mala.

4. Item, Angelus simplex est et nullum habet retardativum[^8]: ergo in prima conversione tantum se convertit, quod non potest amplius converti: ergo similiter tantum se avertit, quod non potest amplius: ergo etc.

5. Item, in nullo crescit mala voluntas, in quo non crescit demeritum; sed demeritum non crescit in eo, quia non potest evitare peccatum: ergo si necesse est, diabolum male velle, impossibile est, malam voluntatem in eo crescere.

6. Item, diabolus et daemones sunt redditi omnino impossibiles ad gratiam in primo lapsu, nec possunt magis impossibiles esse; sed quando[^9] crescit mala voluntas, fit maior elongatio a gratia: si ergo non possunt magis elongari, sicut caecus non potest plus caecari: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> *Daemonis voluntas mala semper intenditur quoad vim administrativam.*

**Respondeo:** Triplex est hic modus dicendi.

Quidam enim senserunt, quod sicut in Angelis bonis voluntas bona crevit in prima conversione usque ad terminum, ita quod amplius in se non potest crescere, sed solum in effectibus bonis, quos efficiunt circa homines; similiter in angelis malis dicere voluerunt, quod in prima aversione aversa est voluntas eorum in termino, ita quod tantum fuit depravata voluntas malorum, quod amplius nec depravatur nec crescit, sed solum in *effectibus,* quando plura mala ex aequali voluntate semper facit. Et quia supplicium non tantum respicit intensionem voluntatis, sed etiam *actum* exteriorem, ideo gravius punitur diabolus ex malis, quae committit. Rationem autem huius positionis assignant simplicitatem et spiritualitatem angelicam, quae nullum habet retardativum; et ideo totaliter et in termino in prima conversione se convertit; homo autem non sic.

Aliorum positio est ista, quod in malis angelis, simpliciter loquendo, *crescit* malitia et malae voluntatis deordinatio. Sicut enim patet ex problemate praecedenti, diabolus continue peccat et novas malitias quotidie excogitat. Et quoniam, quia mala facimus, mali sumus, et quodlibet malum adimit de habilitate voluntatis, quia aliter non esset malum: ideo semper habilitas minuitur, et voluntas magis et magis deordinatur. Nec est simile de bonis, quia bonum opus non ita apponit ad bonitatem gratiae vel voluntatis, sicut peccatum quodlibet adimit.
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Sed quia durum videtur dicere, quod diaboli malitia non intendatur, cum dicatur in Psalmo[^10]: *Superbia eorum, qui te oderunt, ascendit semper,* et exponitur de daemonibus; et iterum irrationabile videtur, quod ita crescat in diabolo malitia sicut in pure viatore, cum iam sit in statu damnationis et necessitatem habeat ad aliqua mala; ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod in diabolo crescat malitia voluntatis quantum ad *vim administrativam,* qua convertitur ad hominem, sed non quantum ad *vim contemplativam,* qua est simpliciter et necessario aversus a Deo.

Ratio autem huius positionis est ista. Ad crementum enim voluntatis malae sive demeriti non sufficit *inordinata affectio,* quia haec est in damnatis et erit in sempiternum, sed requiritur ultra *tempus* meriti et *status* merendi vel demerendi. Diabolus autem est in statu demerendi quantum ad *vim administrativam,* non quantum ad *contemplativam;* et ideo crescit et demeritum et peccatum quantum ad *vim administrativam,* non quantum ad *contemplativam.* — Ratio autem huius patet, si revocentur ad memoriam praedicta in solutione praecedentis primi problematis, ubi tactum est de praefixione temporis ad merendum ipsi Angelo. Dictum est enim, quod[^11] Angelus spiritualis et incorruptibilis et propinquus ad gloriam est conditus; ideo est ei tempus breve praefixum, homini vero terminus longus. Sed quia Deus sic condidit universum, ut maior et potentior minorem adiuvet; ideo non tantum Angelo dedit vim contemplativam, qua mereretur et ad Deum converteretur, sed etiam administrativam, qua homini suffragaretur. Quia ergo vis contemplativa erat ipsius Angeli in se, quantum ad illam praefixum est spatium merendi usque ad primam conversionem vel aversionem. Sed quia administrativa respectum habet ad hominem, ideo praefixum est Angelis spatium merendi, usquequo[^12] homines assumerentur totaliter ad gloriam. Mansit ergo quantum ad vim istam status merendi vel demerendi, et manet usque ad diem iudicii. — Sed quoniam meritum et demeritum non est in vi administrativa nisi per vim contemplativam, et in bonis contemplativa ita est conversa ad bonum, quod non potest averti; ideo administrativa non habet nisi locum *merendi*[^13]. Econtra, quia in malis ita est aversa contemplativa, quod non potest converti, ideo quantum ad administrativam non habet nisi locum et spatium *demerendi.* Et in hoc patet, quod divinum decretum manet iustum et inviolatum, quia tempus, quod a conditione praefixerat, non debuit auferre nec bonis nec malis. Et illis[^14] quidem diligentibus Deum spatium illud conversum est in bonum, impiis autem et peccatoribus angelis conversum est in malum. Et ideo patet, quo modo crescit mala voluntas in malis, scilicet quantum ad vim administrativam solum. — Nec est omnino simile in bonis et malis, quia voluntas in bonis propter influentiam perfectam statim pervenit ad terminum; et ideo, quamvis plura bona faciant, tamen voluntas bona propter hoc non intenditur. Sed in malis non est ita, quia corruptio venit ab ipsis; et non potuerunt ita se inficere, quin adhuc magis, quamdiu durat tempus. Unde et crescit in eis *macula*[^15] et etiam appetitus nocendi et dominandi hominibus; non sic in Angelis bonis.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod mala voluntas in daemonibus intendatur et crescat, tamen quantum ad vim administrativam, sive in comparatione ad hominem.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod inordinate movetur in Deum; dicendum, quod sicut in damnatis[^16] inordinatus motus voluntatis conversus est in poenam et imputatur in supplicium, non in demeritum; sic in angelis malis in poenam est conversus ille inordinatus motus.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in omni peccato contemnitur Deus; dicendum, quod non est peccatum, quin adsit vis contemplativa, et quin sit in Deum aliquo modo[^17]; sed tamen distinguuntur haec ad invicem quantum ad principalitatem actuum. Dicitur enim aliquod peccatum esse in Deum, aliquod in proximum; aliquod quantum ad vim administrativam, aliquod quantum ad vim contemplativam; et secundum quod distinguuntur, sic loquimur.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem; dicendum, quod illud habet instantiam in accidentibus inseparabilibus, sive sit inseparabile per naturam, sive per *acquisitionem.* Quia ergo in Angelis bonis est gratia inseparabiliter, ideo impossibile est, quod insit culpa. Econtra intelligendum est in malis angelis. Accidens enim inseparabile aut est *naturale,* aut *quasi in naturam conversum;* et in his quae naturaliter insunt, habet illud verbum instantiam etiam secundum Philosophum[^18].
<!-- page 183 -->
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de statu hominis mortui, iam patet, quod non est simile, quia simpliciter exiit statum meriti, Angelus non.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelis bonis, quod non augetur in eis bona voluntas; patet, quod non est simile, quia voluntas bona non ita est ab *opere*[^19], ut malitia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de simplicitate Angeli, dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter: *primo,* quia voluntas deliberativa, cum sit libera, non movetur secundum totum suum posse, quamvis nullum habeat retardativum; et illud manifestum est, quia Angelus magis diligit unum quam alium, et magis odit unum quam alium; sed hoc non esset, si totaliter moveretur in quemlibet. Et ideo ratio non valet. *Praeterea,* alius defectus est ibi, quia, esto quod quantum posset, se converteret prima vice, adhuc posset *magis*[^20], quoniam *posse peccare* est *posse deficere* et *posse moveri inordinate;* et quamvis non possit intensius moveri quantum ad motum, potest tamen magis deordinari, quia semper crescere potest pronitas et inclinatio ad malum. Et ita patet illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest evitare; dicendum, quod falsum est. Quamvis enim malitiam voluntatis non possit immutare, potest tamen cessare a nocumento, quod homini facit. Et *praeterea*[^21], ipse induxit se in hanc necessitatem et non poenitet, et ideo non excusatur; nullus enim excusatur per necessitatem inductam, nisi poeniteat de inductione.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus est omnino impossibilis ad gratiam; dicendum, quod non crescit mala voluntas quantum ad impossibilitatem suscipiendi gratiam, quia hoc est aequaliter in omnibus damnatis; sed quantum ad indignitatem; et diabolus est indignus et potest esse magis indignus, secundum quod magis offendit et abutitur bonis naturalibus sibi *datis*[^22].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether evil will is intensified in demons*

Thirdly it is asked whether in demons there is an intensification of evil will. And that there is:

1. Isidore, *On the Highest Good*[^1]: "The devil is not content with this, that, esteeming himself equal to God, he fell, but he also calls himself superior to God": therefore it seems that his pride has grown.
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2. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason.* Because we do evils, we are evil[^2]: therefore the more evils we do, the worse we are: but the devil has done more evils after his fall: therefore he is worse now than when he fell: therefore the disorder of his will has grown in him.

3. Likewise, a greater punishment is owed to the devil now than when he fell — this is not in doubt — but the reward in the good [angels] is not increased unless the good will grows: therefore neither [is] the punishment in the evil [ones] unless the evil will grows: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, evil is "the privation of mode, species, and order[^3]"; but these cannot be totally removed from anything, otherwise it would pass into non-being, because Augustine says that "where these are nothing, there is no good": therefore if they are not wholly taken away, they can still be diminished. But they are diminished by sin: since therefore the devil sins, they are diminished the more, the more he sins; but the more they are diminished, the worse the will is: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, he who procures a bodily homicide is a homicide, and the more homicides he procures, the worse the will is in him: therefore by parity of reasoning, indeed by a stronger one, he who procures spiritual death is a homicide, and he who procures the death of more [people] is worse; but the devil after the death of the first man is said to have been *a homicide from the beginning*[^4], because he procured his fall, but in the process of time he procured the death of many: therefore he has grown in malice. *If you say* that the evil will grew in comparison to man, not in comparison to God; *it is shown* that this response is null, *first,* because the devil is moved inordinately against God, as against man. If therefore by multiplying and repeating sin against man it is intensified, and malice grows in him; by parity of reasoning, when he hates and blasphemes God, which can in no way be done well[^5]. *Furthermore,* there is no sin in which God is not despised and offended, and in which the one sinning is not turned away from God: therefore in every sin the evil will grows in comparison to God.

**On the contrary:** 1. "*Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing*[^6]"; but demons cannot make progress: therefore they cannot fail more, or be worse.

2. Likewise, this seems [so] *by a likeness in damned men,* because the devil and a dead or damned man are in a like state, as Damascene says[^7], that "this is to men as death, what to angels [is] the fall"; but after death the evil will does not grow in a man: therefore neither [does it grow] in a demon after the fall.

3. Likewise, this is shown *by a likeness in the good angels.* For the state of the good [angels] in good is like [that] of the evil [ones] in evil; but in the good [ones] the good will cannot grow: therefore neither [can] the evil [will grow] in the evil [ones].

4. Likewise, an angel is simple and has nothing retarding[^8]: therefore in the first conversion he converts himself so [completely] that he cannot be converted further: therefore likewise he turns himself away so [completely] that he cannot [do so] further: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, evil will does not grow in anyone in whom demerit does not grow; but demerit does not grow in him, because he cannot avoid sin: therefore if it is necessary that the devil will evilly, it is impossible that evil will should grow in him.

6. Likewise, the devil and the demons have been rendered wholly incapable of grace in the first fall, nor can they be more incapable; but when[^9] the evil will grows, a greater removal from grace comes about: if therefore they cannot be removed further, as a blind man cannot be made more blind: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The demon's evil will is always intensified as to the administrative power.*

**I respond:** There is here a threefold manner of speaking.

For some held that, just as in the good angels the good will grew in the first conversion up to its term, such that it can no longer grow in itself, but only in the good effects which they bring about regarding men; so likewise concerning the evil angels they wished to say that in the first aversion their will was turned away at its term, such that the will of the evil [ones] was so depraved that it is no longer depraved nor grows, but only in *effects,* when from an equal will it always does more evils. And because punishment regards not only the intensity of the will but also the exterior *act,* therefore the devil is more grievously punished from the evils which he commits. As the ground of this position they assign the simplicity and spirituality of the angel, which has nothing retarding; and therefore wholly and at its term he converts himself in the first conversion; man, however, [does] not so.

The position of others is this: that in the evil angels, speaking simply, malice and the disorder of evil will *grows.* For as is evident from the preceding problem, the devil sins continually and daily devises new malices. And since, because we do evils, we are evil, and every evil takes away from the aptitude of the will, because otherwise it would not be evil: therefore the aptitude is always lessened, and the will is more and more disordered. Nor is it the same with the good [angels], because a good work does not so add to the goodness of grace or of will as every sin takes away.
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But since it seems harsh to say that the devil's malice is not intensified, since it is said in the Psalm[^10]: *The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually,* and it is expounded of demons; and again it seems unreasonable that malice should grow in the devil just as in a pure wayfarer, since he is already in the state of damnation and has a necessity to certain evils; therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that in the devil malice of will grows as to the *administrative power,* by which he is turned toward man, but not as to the *contemplative power,* by which he is simply and necessarily turned away from God.

The ground of this position is this. For the increase of evil will or of demerit an *inordinate affection* does not suffice, because this is in the damned and will be forever, but there is further required the *time* of merit and the *state* of meriting or demeriting. But the devil is in the state of demeriting as to the *administrative power,* not as to the *contemplative;* and therefore both demerit and sin grow as to the *administrative power,* not as to the *contemplative.* — The ground of this is evident if there be recalled to memory the things said before in the solution of the preceding first problem, where mention was made of the prefixing of a time for meriting to the angel himself. For it was said that[^11] an angel was constituted spiritual and incorruptible and near to glory; therefore a short time was prefixed for him, but for man a long term. But since God so founded the universe that the greater and more powerful should help the lesser; therefore He gave to the angel not only the contemplative power, by which he might merit and be turned to God, but also the administrative, by which he might assist man. Since therefore the contemplative power was the angel's own in himself, as to it a span of meriting was prefixed up to the first conversion or aversion. But since the administrative has a regard to man, there was prefixed to the angels a span of meriting, until[^12] men should be wholly assumed into glory. There remained therefore, as to that power, the state of meriting or demeriting, and it remains until the day of judgment. — But since merit and demerit are not in the administrative power except through the contemplative power, and in the good [angels] the contemplative is so turned to good that it cannot be turned away; therefore the administrative has only a place of *meriting*[^13]. On the contrary, since in the evil [ones] the contemplative is so turned away that it cannot be converted, therefore as to the administrative it has only a place and span of *demeriting.* And in this it is evident that the divine decree remains just and inviolate, because the time which it had prefixed from [their] founding ought not to be taken away either from the good or from the evil. And for those[^14] indeed who love God that span was turned into good, but for the impious and sinful angels it was turned into evil. And therefore it is evident in what manner the evil will grows in the evil [ones], namely as to the administrative power alone. — Nor is it altogether the same in the good and the evil, because the will in the good [angels], on account of the perfect influence, immediately arrives at its term; and therefore, although they do more goods, yet the good will is not on this account intensified. But in the evil [ones] it is not so, because the corruption comes from themselves; and they could not so infect themselves but that [they do so] still more, as long as the time lasts. Whence both the *stain*[^15] grows in them and also the appetite of harming and of dominating men; not so in the good angels.

The reasons proving that the evil will in demons is intensified and grows are therefore to be granted, yet as to the administrative power, or in comparison to man.

To that, then, which is objected, that he is moved inordinately against God; it must be said that, just as in the damned[^16] the inordinate motion of the will is turned into punishment and is imputed to chastisement, not to demerit; so in the evil angels that inordinate motion is turned into punishment.

To that which is objected, that in every sin God is despised; it must be said that there is no sin but that the contemplative power is present, and but that it is against God in some way[^17]; but yet these are distinguished from one another as to the principality of the acts. For some sin is said to be against God, some against the neighbor; some as to the administrative power, some as to the contemplative power; and according as they are distinguished, so we speak.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that opposites are by nature produced about the same thing; it must be said that this has an instance [i.e. a counterexample] in inseparable accidents, whether it be inseparable by nature or by *acquisition.* Since therefore in the good angels grace is [present] inseparably, therefore it is impossible that fault be present. The contrary is to be understood in the evil angels. For an inseparable accident is either *natural* or *quasi-converted into nature;* and in those things which are present naturally, that maxim has an instance even according to the Philosopher[^18].
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2. To that which is objected concerning the state of a dead man, it is now evident that it is not the same, because he simply went out of the state of merit, an angel [does] not.

3. To that which is objected concerning the good angels, that the good will is not increased in them; it is evident that it is not the same, because the good will is not so from the *work*[^19] as malice [is].

4. To that which is objected concerning the simplicity of the angel, it must be said that that argument fails in two ways: *first,* because the deliberative will, since it is free, is not moved according to its whole power, although it has nothing retarding; and this is manifest, because an angel loves one more than another, and hates one more than another; but this would not be so if it were moved wholly into [each and] every one. And therefore the argument is not valid. *Furthermore,* there is another defect there, because, granted that he turned himself in the first time as much as he could, he could still [do so] *more*[^20], since *to be able to sin* is *to be able to fail* and *to be able to be moved inordinately;* and although he cannot be moved more intensely as to the motion, he can nevertheless be more disordered, because proneness and inclination to evil can always grow. And so that [point] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that he cannot avoid [sin]; it must be said that it is false. For although he cannot change the malice of the will, he can nevertheless cease from the harm which he does to man. And *furthermore*[^21], he led himself into this necessity and does not repent, and therefore he is not excused; for no one is excused by an induced necessity, unless he repent of the inducing [of it].

6. To that which is objected, that the devil is wholly incapable of grace; it must be said that the evil will does not grow as to the incapacity of receiving grace, because this is equally [so] in all the damned; but [it grows] as to unworthiness; and the devil is unworthy and can be more unworthy, according as he more offends and abuses the natural goods given to *him*[^22].

---

la: Libr. I. c. 10. n. 8, ubi textus originalis *Diabolus non solum hoc contentus, quod* etc.

en: Book I, ch. 10, n. 8, where the original text [reads] *Diabolus non solum hoc contentus, quod* (The devil not only content with this, that) etc.

la: Econtra respectu bonorum; nam quia boni sumus, bona facimus. Cfr. infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4; d. 44. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et tom. I. pag. 469, nota 3.

en: The contrary as regards the good; for because we are good, we do good. Cf. below, d. 40, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4; d. 44, a. 1, q. 2, ad 3, and tom. I, p. 469, note 3.

la: August., de Natura boni, c. 4. Ibid. c. 6. 9. et 13. habetur etiam sequens textus.

en: Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good,* ch. 4. The following text is also found ibid., ch. 6, 9, and 13.

la: In Vat. perperam omittitur *bene.*

en: In the Vatican edition *bene* is wrongly omitted.

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 30, nota 6.

en: Aristotle, *Categories,* the chapter on Opposites, and *Topics* II, ch. 3 (ch. 7). Cf. tom. I, p. 30, note 6.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 4.

en: Book II of *On the Orthodox Faith,* ch. 4.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut F bb *retardamentum;* idem recurrit et in corp. quaest. et in solutione obiectorum.

en: Several manuscripts, such as F bb, [read] *retardamentum;* the same recurs both in the body of the question and in the solution of the objections.

la: Ed. 1 cum Vat. et cod. cc *quanto.*

en: The first edition with the Vatican edition and codex cc [read] *quanto.*

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 *quia;* cod. W (Q a secunda manu) *quod quia.*

en: Not a few manuscripts with the first edition [read] *quia;* codex W (Q by a second hand) [reads] *quod quia.*

la: Codd. T cc et ed. 1 *quousque.* Vat. hic et paulo superius post *merendi* addit *et demerendi.*

en: Codices T cc and the first edition [read] *quousque.* The Vatican edition here and a little above adds *et demerendi* after *merendi.*

la: Codd. V cc et ed. 1 *locum et spatium merendi.*

en: Codices V cc and the first edition [read] *locum et spatium merendi.*

la: Codd. bb cc et ed. 1 *iustis.*

en: Codices bb cc and the first edition [read] *iustis.*

la: Ed. 1 cum cod. cc et Vat. *malitia.*

en: The first edition with codex cc and the Vatican edition [read] *malitia.*

la: Intellige cum codd. U aa *in hominibus damnatis.*

en: Understand, with codices U aa, *in hominibus damnatis* (in damned men).

la: Ergo secundum S. Doctorem non est peccatum philosophicum, quod scil. sit contra rationem et non contra Deum.

en: Therefore according to the Holy Doctor there is no philosophical sin, that is, [one] which would be against reason and not against God.

la: Libr. de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. Libr. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): « Rursum, si positum est accidens, cui est aliquid contrarium, considerandum, si et contrarii susceptivum, quod accidentis est; nam idem contrariorum susceptivum ». Quae verba B. Albert., in hunc locum, ita exponit: « Considerandum... si illud contrarium potentia insit eidem subiecto, vel non; si enim inest accidens contrarium accidenti eidem, potest inesse, quia idem est susceptibile contrariorum, nisi alterum insit natura » etc. Colligi etiam potest ex I. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3.), ubi Aristot. accidens distinguit in separabile et in inseparabile.

en: The book of the *Categories,* the chapter on Opposites. *Topics* II, ch. 3 (ch. 7): "Again, if an accident is posited to which there is something contrary, it must be considered whether the receptacle of the contrary is also that which is of the accident; for the same [thing] is the receptacle of contraries." Which words B. Albert, on this passage, expounds thus: "It must be considered... whether that contrary be potentially present in the same subject, or not; for if an accident contrary to an accident is present in the same [subject], it can be present, because the same [thing] is receptive of contraries, unless the other be present by nature," etc. It can also be gathered from *Physics* I, text 28 (ch. 3), where Aristotle distinguishes an accident into separable and inseparable.

la: Cod. B *opere nostro;* Vat. *operatione.*

en: Codex B [reads] *opere nostro;* the Vatican edition [reads] *operatione.*

la: Vat. *posset se convertere prima vice, adhuc posset magis peccare.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *posset se convertere prima vice, adhuc posset magis peccare.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 cum Vat. *propterea.*

en: Codex cc and the first edition with the Vatican edition [read] *propterea.*

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **ARTICULUS I, QUAESTIO III** of the COMMENTARIUS on Distinction VII, **Pars I** (*De obstinationis malignitate quoad malos spiritus*) — *Utrum mala voluntas in daemonibus intendatur* (whether evil will, granted its continuation, is also *intensified* in demons). This is the *intensio malitiae* question that the committed `bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q2` SCHOLION II explicitly flags as *De intensione malitiae explicite agitur in seq. quaest.* Structure: a *Tertio quaeritur* opener + 6 *Fundamenta* (Isidore *de Summo Bono* / *ratione* "quia mala facimus, mali sumus" / greater-punishment-implies-greater-will / evil = privatio modi-speciei-ordinis diminished by sin / the *homicida ab initio* argument with its long *Si tu dicas… ostenditur* replicatio in three *rationes*) + **Contra** in 6 membra (Aristotle's *opposita circa idem* / the dead-man simile via Damascene / the good-angels simile / angelic simplicity = no *retardativum* / no demerit-growth / already-maximal incapacity-for-grace) + *Conclusio* (blockquote: intensified *quoad vim administrativam*) + a **triplex-modus Respondeo** (opinio 1: no growth in itself, only in effects; opinio 2: simple growth of malice; opinio 3 *et media* [the accepted *Conclusio*]: growth *quantum ad vim administrativam* but not *quantum ad vim contemplativam*, grounded on the *praefixio temporis* / *status demerendi* analysis + the *Differentia in bonis et malis*) + the two replies to the *Si tu dicas* replicatio (*Ad rationem 1 / Ad rationem 2*) + a 6-member numbered **Solutio oppositorum** (the *opposita-in-accidentibus-inseparabilibus* answer via Aristotle/Albert; the dead-man; the good-angels; the *Notandum* twofold-defect answer on angelic simplicity; the cannot-avoid answer; the incapacity vs *indignitas* distinction).
- **NO own scholion (`has_scholion: false`).** Confirmed by the **terminal cross-ref note** — p.183 footer note ⁴ (this chunk's [^22], anchoring the last reply's *sibi datis*) reads `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` — the sibling-scholion pattern (as `d5-a2-q2`, where the preceding q's Scholion I covered the following q): a1-q2's SCHOLION I–III already treats this *intensio* question's doctors (Scholion II: *De intensione malitiae explicite agitur in seq. quaest.*; Scholion III: *De hac 2. quaest.…*). Read on the p.183 crops, not assumed.
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- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.180 ⁵ → [^1]; p.181 ¹–⁸ → [^2]–[^9] (L-footer ¹–⁴: *mali sumus*/*ordinis*/*homicida ab initio*/*bene fieri*; R-footer ⁵–⁸: *circa idem*/*Damascenus*/*retardativum*/*quando*); p.182 ¹–⁹ → [^10]–[^18] (L-footer ¹–⁴: *Psalmo*/*quod Angelus*/*usquequo*/*locum merendi*; R-footer ⁵–⁹: *illis*/*macula*/*damnatis*/*aliquo modo*/*Philosophum* — note ⁹ the long Aristotle-*Categories*/B.Albert/*Physics* runover); p.183 ¹–⁴ → [^19]–[^22] (*opere*/*posset magis*/*praeterea*/the *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-scholion cross-ref).
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0