title: Dist. 21, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Distinctio XXI — Capitula VI–VIII Magistri, Commentarius, Divisio textus, Tractatio quaestionum

title_alt: Distinction XXI — Chapters VI–VIII of the Master, Commentary, Division of the Text, Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
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### Cap. VI.
### *De duplici tentationis specie.*

«Porro sciendum est, duas esse species tentationis, *interiorem* scilicet et *exteriorem*. Exterior tentatio est, quando nobis extrinsecus malum visibiliter suggeritur verbo, vel signo aliquo, ut ille cui fit, ad consensum peccati declinet; et talis tentatio tantum fit ab adversario. *Interior* vero tentatio est, quando invisibiliter[^1] malum nobis intrinsecus suggeritur; et haec tentatio aliquando fit ab *hoste*, aliquando a *carne*. Nam et diabolus invisibiliter mala suggerit, et ex carnis corruptione suboritur motus illicitus et titillatio prava; ideoque tentatio, quae est ex *carne*, non fit sine peccato; quae autem est ab *hoste*, nisi ei consentiatur, non habet peccatum, sed est materia exercendae virtutis. Tentatio autem *carnis* interior difficilius vincitur, quia interius oppugnans de nostro contra nos roboratur».

### Cap. VII.
### *Quare peccatum hominis, et non angeli, remediabile sit.*

«Homo igitur, qui sola *exteriori* tentatione pulsatus cecidit, tanto gravius plectendus erat, quanto leviori impulsu fuerat prostratus. Et tamen quia aliquam, licet modicam, cadendi occasionem habuit, idcirco per Dei gratiam iuvari potuit ad veniam, ut qui per alium cecideral per alium erigeretur. Qui ergo incitatorem habuit ad malum, non iniuste reparatorem habuit ad bonum. Diabolus vero, quia sine alicuius tentatione peccavit, per alium, ut surgeret, iuvari non debuit nec per se potuit, et ideo irremediabile peccatum eius exstitit. Peccatum vero hominis, sicut per alium habuit initium, ita per alium non incongrue habuit remedium[^2]».

Praeterea angelica natura, quoniam non tota perierat, sed ex parte perstiterat, non est redempta; humana vero tota perierat, et ideo ne penitus perderetur, ex parte est redempta, ut inde ruina suppleretur angelica. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^3]: «Placuit universitatis Creatori et Moderatori, ut, quoniam non tota multitudo Angelorum Deum deserendo perierat, ea quae perierat, in perpetua perditione remaneret; quae autem cum Deo, illa deserente, perstiterat, de sua certissime cognita semper felicitate gauderet. At vero creatura rationalis, quae in hominibus erat, quoniam peccatis atque suppliciis tota perierat, ex parte poterat reparari, unde angelicae societati suppleretur, quod ruina illa minuerat. Hoc enim promissum est Sanctis, quod erunt aequales *Angelis Dei*[^4]».

### Cap. VIII.
### *Quod non soli viro praeceptum fuit datum.*

Illud etiam notandum est, quod non soli viro praeceptum videtur esse datum, cum ipsa mulier testetur, sibi etiam esse mandatum, dicens: *Praecepit nobis Deus* etc. Supra tamen legitur, ante factam mulierem Deum dixisse viro: *De ligno scientiae boni et mali ne comedas*. Non dixit: *ne comedatis*. Forte quia facturus erat mulierem[^5], sic praecepit, ut per virum ad mulierem perveniret mandatum; quia mulier, quae subiecta viro fuit, non nisi mediante viro divinum debuit accipere praeceptum. Unde Apostolus: *Si quid discere mulieres voluerint, domi viros suos interrogent.*

*Si quaeritur:* quomodo loqui potuerunt vel loquentem intelligere, qui non didicerant inter loquentes crescendo vel magisterio? «dicimus, quia Deus eos tales fecerat, qui possent loqui et discere ab aliis, si essent[^6]».

### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.
### *De primorum parentum tentatione facta a diabolo.*

> *Videns autem diabolus hominem* etc.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Terminata prima parte principali huius totalis libri, in qua agit Magister de hominis conditione, sequitur secunda pars principalis, in qua agit de lapsu. Et quoniam lapsus hominis est per peccatum, et peccatum hominis est triplex — quoddam, in quo persona corrumpit naturam, et hoc fuit peccatum primi hominis; quoddam, in quo natura corrumpit personam, et hoc est originale; quoddam vero, in quo persona corrumpit se ipsam, et hoc est actuale — ideo pars ista habet tres partes. In prima determinat
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Magister de peccato primorum parentum. In secunda vero determinat de peccato originali, quod ab illo fuit causatum[^7], infra distinctione trigesima: *In superioribus insinuatum est* etc. In tertia vero de peccato actuali, infra distinctione trigesima quarta: *Post praedicta de peccato actuali* etc.

Prima pars, in qua determinat de peccato primorum parentum, habet duas. In prima determinat modum[^8] transgrediendi. In secunda vero, ut ostendatur hominis culpa, ostendit, quod homo habuit potentiam resistendi. Sive in prima determinat de culpa, per quam cecidit; in secunda de potentia, per quam stare potuit, infra distinctione vigesima quarta: *Nunc diligenter investigari oportet* etc.

Et quoniam culpa sive peccatum Adae comparationem habet ad diabolum tentantem et ad hominem cadentem et ad Deum permittentem, ideo prima pars habet tres partes. In prima determinat de diaboli tentatione. In secunda vero determinat hominis transgressione, infra distinctione vigesima secunda: *Hic videtur diligenter investigandum* etc. In tertia vero determinat de Dei permissione, infra distinctione vigesima tertia: *Praeterea solet quaeri* etc.

Prima pars continet praesentem distinctionem et potest dividi in tres partes. In prima Magister determinat, qualiter[^9] primi parentes fuerunt tentati. In secunda vero determinat generaliter modos tentandi, ibi: *Porro sciendum est, duas esse species tentationis*. In tertia vero[^10] concludit propter tentationem praeambulam remissibilitatem humani peccati, ibi: *Homo igitur, qui sola exteriori tentatione* etc. Duabus ultimis partibus remanentibus indivisis, prima pars habet tres partes. In prima determinat de tentatione primi hominis quantum ad motivum, scilicet primo capitulo. In secunda vero quantum ad instrumentum, ibi: *Sed quia per violentiam* etc. In tertia vero quantum ad progressum, ibi: *Tentatio vero hoc modo facta est*. — Et sic in parte ista tria determinantur, scilicet modus primae tentationis in speciali; modi etiam cuiuslibet tentationis in generali; postremo vero qualitas et quantitas peccati humani, ibi: *Homo igitur, qui sola exteriori tentatione* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis circa tria incidit hic quaestio.

Primo quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum.

Secundo quaeritur de diversitate tentationum.

Tertio vero incidit hic quaestio circa quantitatem et qualitatem peccati, quod ex illa tentatione est secutum.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum quantum ad motivum.

Secundo, quantum ad instrumentum.

Tertio, quantum ad ordinem et progressum.

---

english:
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### Chap. VI.
### *On the twofold species of temptation.*

“Further, it must be known that there are two species of temptation, namely *interior* and *exterior*. Exterior temptation is when evil is suggested to us from outside, visibly, by a word or by some sign, so that the one to whom it happens may incline to consent to sin; and such temptation occurs only from the adversary. *Interior* temptation, however, is when evil is suggested to us inwardly, invisibly[^1]; and this temptation sometimes occurs from the *enemy*, sometimes from the *flesh*. For the devil suggests evils invisibly, and from the corruption of the flesh there arises illicit motion and depraved titillation; therefore the temptation which is from the *flesh* does not occur without sin, whereas that which is from the *enemy*, unless one consents to it, has no sin, but is matter for exercising virtue. The interior temptation of the *flesh*, however, is more difficult to overcome, because what assails from within is strengthened against us out of what is our own.”

### Chap. VII.
### *Why the sin of man — and not that of the angel — is remediable.*

“Man therefore, who fell when struck only by *exterior* temptation, deserved to be punished the more gravely, the lighter the impulse by which he had been prostrated. And yet, because he had some occasion for falling — modest though it was — he could on that account be helped by the grace of God to pardon, so that he who had fallen through another might be raised up through another. He, then, who had an inciter to evil, not unjustly had a repairer to good. The devil, however, because he sinned without anyone’s tempting him, neither ought to be helped by another in order to rise nor could he by himself, and therefore his sin remained irremediable. The sin of man, however, just as it had its beginning through another, so not incongruously had its remedy through another[^2].”

Furthermore the angelic nature, because not the whole of it had perished, but had partly remained, was not redeemed; whereas human nature had wholly perished, and therefore, lest it should perish utterly, it has been partly redeemed, so that thereby the angelic ruin might be supplied. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^3]: “It pleased the Creator and Governor of the universe that, since not the whole multitude of the angels had perished by deserting God, that part which had perished should remain in perpetual perdition; whereas that part which, while the other deserted, had stood firm with God, should rejoice forever in its felicity, known to it with full certainty. But the rational creature which was in human beings, since it had wholly perished through sins and punishments, could be partly repaired, so that what that ruin had diminished might be supplied to the angelic society. For this is promised to the saints, that they shall be equal to the *angels of God*[^4].”

### Chap. VIII.
### *That the precept was not given to the man alone.*

It must also be noted that the precept appears not to have been given to the man alone, since the woman herself testifies that it was commanded to her too, saying: *God has commanded us* etc. Yet above it is read that, before the woman was made, God said to the man: *Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat*. He did not say: *you shall not eat* (plural). Perhaps because He was about to make the woman[^5], He gave the precept thus, so that the command might come to the woman by way of the man; for the woman, who was subject to the man, was to receive the divine precept only through the man’s mediation. Whence the Apostle: *If women wish to learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home.*

*If it is asked:* how could they speak, or understand the one speaking, who had not learned among speakers by growing up or by instruction? — “we say that God had made them such that they could speak and learn from others, if there were others[^6].”

### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI.
### *On the temptation of our first parents wrought by the devil.*

> *Now the devil, seeing the man,* etc.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

The first principal part of this whole book having been brought to a close — that in which the Master treats of the constitution of man — there follows the second principal part, in which he treats of the Fall. And since man’s fall is through sin, and the sin of man is threefold — one in which the person corrupts the nature, and this was the sin of the first man; another in which the nature corrupts the person, and this is original sin; another in which the person corrupts itself, and this is actual sin — therefore this part has three sections. In the first he determines
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about the sin of the first parents (i.e. the Master does). In the second he determines about original sin, which was caused by that first sin[^7], below at distinction thirty: *In superioribus insinuatum est* etc. In the third about actual sin, below at distinction thirty-four: *Post praedicta de peccato actuali* etc.

The first section, in which he determines about the sin of the first parents, has two parts. In the first he determines the mode[^8] of transgressing. In the second, however, in order that man’s fault may be made plain, he shows that man had the power to resist. — Or rather: in the first he determines the fault by which he fell; in the second the power by which he could have stood firm, below at distinction twenty-four: *Nunc diligenter investigari oportet* etc.

And since the fault or sin of Adam has a relation to the devil who tempted, to the man who fell, and to God who permitted, therefore the first section has three parts. In the first he determines about the devil’s temptation. In the second he determines about man’s transgression, below at distinction twenty-two: *Hic videtur diligenter investigandum* etc. In the third he determines about God’s permission, below at distinction twenty-three: *Praeterea solet quaeri* etc.

The first part contains the present distinction and can be divided into three sections. In the first the Master determines in what way[^9] the first parents were tempted. In the second he determines generally the modes of tempting, at the place: *Further, it must be known that there are two species of temptation*. In the third[^10] he concludes, on account of the preceding temptation, the remissibility of the human sin, at: *Therefore man, who being struck by exterior temptation alone* etc. The last two sections remaining undivided, the first section has three parts. In the first he determines about the temptation of the first man as to the *motive*, namely in the first chapter. In the second as to the *instrument*, at: *But because by violence* etc. In the third as to the *progress*, at: *The temptation, however, was made in this manner*. — And thus in this section three things are determined: the mode of the first temptation in particular; the modes of every temptation in general; and finally the quality and quantity of human sin, at: *Therefore man, who being struck by exterior temptation alone* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this section a question arises here on three heads.

First it is asked about the temptation of the first parents.

Second it is asked about the diversity of temptations.

Third a question arises here about the quantity and quality of the sin which followed from that temptation.

About the first three things are asked.

First it is asked about the temptation of the first parents as to the *motive*.

Second, as to the *instrument*.

Third, as to the *order and progress*.

---

la: Cod. Erl. hic recte annotat: *In Hugone* (loc. cit. c. 9) *non est* invisibiliter; *unde aliter intendit Hugo distinguere, scil. quod tentatio exterior est, quando nobis extrinsecus malum sive visibiliter sive invisibiliter faciendum suggeritur; interior, quando ex motu pravae delectationis interior animus ad peccandum sollicitatur. Magister vero aliter distinguit, ut patet.*

en: Codex Erl. correctly notes here: *In Hugh* (loc. cit. c. 9) *the word* invisibiliter *is not present; whence Hugh intends a different distinction, namely that exterior temptation is when evil to be done is suggested to us from outside, whether visibly or invisibly; interior temptation, when from the motion of a depraved delight the inward mind is solicited to sin. The Master, however, distinguishes differently, as is clear.*

la: Verba: *Qui ergo incitatorem* etc., usque ad finem cap. sumta sunt ex Gregor., IV. *Moral.* c. 3. n. 8, sententialiter.

en: The words: *Qui ergo incitatorem* etc., down to the end of the chapter, are taken sense-for-sense from Gregory, *Moralia* IV, c. 3, n. 8.

la: Cap. 29. n. 9, nonnullis in fine mutatis; in quo textu circa finem pro *poterat reparari* codd. A E et ed. 6 *meruit reparari*, codd. B C *debuit reparari*, cod. D *valuit reparari*.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 29, n. 9, with some things altered at the end; in which text, near the end, in place of *poterat reparari* (“could be repaired”) codices A E and edition 6 read *meruit reparari* (“deserved to be repaired”), codices B C *debuit reparari* (“ought to have been repaired”), codex D *valuit reparari* (“was able to be repaired”).

en: Matthew 22:30.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 addit *de viro*. Locus Script. deinde est I. Cor. 14, 35.

en: The Vatican edition, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, adds *de viro* (“out of the man”). The scriptural locus that follows is 1 Corinthians 14:35.

la: August., VIII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 16. n. 33. Quae praecedunt habentur ibid. c. 17. n. 36.

en: Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 16, n. 33. What precedes is found at the same place, c. 17, n. 36.

la: Cod. K *traductum*.

en: Codex K reads *traductum* (“transmitted”).

la: Cod. W *de modo*. Mox cod. F *ut ostendat nominis pam* pro *ut ostendatur hominis culpa*.

en: Codex W reads *de modo* (“concerning the mode”). Soon after, codex F reads *ut ostendat nominis pam* in place of *ut ostendatur hominis culpa* (“so that man’s fault may be shown”).

la: Vat. *quare*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *quare* (“why”).

la: Cod. aa addit *quasi*.

en: Codex aa adds *quasi* (“as it were”). ---

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 492 -->

### Articulus I. *De tentatione primorum parentum.*
### Quaestio I. *Quid moverit principaliter diabolum ad tentandum hominem.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, quid moverit principaliter diabolum ad tentandum hominem. Et quod invidia, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*
1. *Primo* per illud quod dicitur Sapientiae secundo[^1]: *Invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum*; introitus autem mortis fuit per tentationem et seductionem hominis: ergo ad tentandum hominem invidia diabolum commovit.

2. *Item*, Gregorius in *Moralibus*[^2]: «In paradiso diabolus invidens homini superbiae vulnus inflixit»: ergo cum vulnus inflixerit per tentationem, tentatio fuit ex invidia.

3. *Item*, diabolus tentando hominem factus est homicida, secundum quod dicitur Ioannis octavo[^3]: *Ille homicida erat ab initio*; sed homicidium procedit ex odio, odium autem procedit ex invidia: ergo *a primo*, tentatio hominis, in qua diabolus fuit homicida, processit ex invidia.

4. *Item*, qui desiderat casum alterius sine suo fructu, non movetur ex amore commoditatis propriae, sed ex odio felicitatis alienae; sed diabolus casum hominis desiderabat absque suo fructu, sicut constat: ergo movebatur odio felicitatis humanae ad tentandum hominem. Sed tale odium non est aliud quam invidia[^4]: ergo etc.

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*Ad oppositum.*
**Sed contra:** 1. Omnis invidia est respectu paris, vel superioris, secundum quod dicit Gregorius[^5] super illud Iob: *Parvulum occidit invidia*, superioris, inquam, saltem secundum reputationem: sed diabolus non reputabat hominem superiorem sibi: ergo videtur, quod ei non invidebat: ergo si ipsum tentabat, hoc non erat ex invidia.

2. *Item*, invidia est respectu boni, quod aliquo modo potest acquiri; sed diabolus non poterat pervenire ad aeternam beatitudinem, quia lapsus erat irreparabiliter[^6]: ergo videtur, quod propter illius acquisitionem non invidebat homini.

3. *Item*, invidia est respectu boni, quod desideratur; nullus enim invidet alicui de aliquo, nisi cum illud amat et cupit; sed diabolus non cupiebat mandatis Dei obedire nec ad supernam patriam ascendere nec amicus Dei esse, propter sui desperationem: ergo videtur, quod hoc in homine non invideret: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, invidia non est nisi respectu eius quod est natum diminuere bonum proprium[^7]; sed beatitudinis acquisitio nullius bonum potest diminuere: ergo non est aliquid, quod ab aliquo invideri possit: ergo videtur, quod si diabolus aliquo appetitu hominem cadere fecit, ex invidia motus non fuit.

> **Conclusio.** Diabolus ex superbia quidem, sed immediate ex invidia motus est ad hominem tentandum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut praetactum fuit[^8], ista duo peccata sunt, quae maxime possident mentem diaboli, *superbia* et *invidia*. Unde, sicut habitum fuit supra, et Augustinus dicit, ex his duobus, qui prius erat lucifer, diabolus factus est: et sunt quasi haec duo inseparabilia, ita quod unum concomitatur ad alterum[^9]. *Superbus* enim amat excellentiam, et ita nullum vult habere parem, ac per hoc statim appetit excellentiam singulariter possidere; et ideo statim vel actu, vel habitu invidet, cum nolit, bonum consimile bono, quod appetit, ab alio communicari. — Mens igitur diaboli, ab his duobus vitiis possessa, videlicet *superbia* et *invidia*, videns hominem in statu, in quo poterat cadere sub diabolica potestate et in quo poterat ascendere ad supernam felicitatem[^10], ex qua ipse ceciderat — et ex superbia motus est et ex invidia ad ipsum tentandum. Ex *superbia* namque, ut ipsum sibi subiiceret; ex *invidia* vero, ut ipsum a superna felicitate impediret. Et *superbia* fuit sicut movens[^11] primum, *invidia* vero sicut movens proximum et immediatum. — Esto enim, quod non posset dominium super hominem acquirere, adhuc studuisset ipsum a paradisi gaudiis impedire; et ideo Scriptura dicit, et eius expositores, diabolum ad tentandum hominem ex invidia motum esse. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu superioris, vel paris; dicendum, quod non solum est respectu superioris eius qui est superior, sed etiam eius qui *potest esse*. Quamvis autem diabolus in statu illo non reputaret hominem superiorem se; invidebat tamen, ne merito obedientiae sublimaretur ad statum gloriae, in quo statu ipsum superiorem se non dubitaret. — *Aliter* potest etiam dici, quod tunc reputabat ipsum superiorem se in hoc, quod poterat pervenire ad illam gloriam, ad quam diabolus ascendere non poterat.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu boni, quod potest acquiri; respondendum est *per interemptionem*[^12], quia non solum invidet aliquis illud quod potest obtinere, sed etiam illud quod *natus est habere*, quamvis non possit, sicut truncatus et caecus invidet aliis visum et progressum. Licet autem diabolus non posset ad beatitudinem pervenire, tamen habebat ad hoc naturalem aptitudinem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod invidia est respectu boni desiderati; dicendum, quod invidia non tantum venit ex desiderio alicuius boni privati, immo ex odio boni alieni[^13]. — *Alia solutio.* Quia tamen desiderium boni proprii videtur esse principium omnis peccati, ideo potest aliter dici, quod invidia non solummodo est respectu eius boni, quod desideratur, sed etiam respectu eius boni, cuius obtentu minuitur bonum desideratum, vel aestimatur minus. Et quoniam diabolus desiderat singulariter efferri, ideo ex exaltatione hominis aestimabat suum bonum impediri; et ideo invidebat et ex invidia oppugnabat.

<!-- page 494 -->

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum, quia, etsi hominis glorificatio et exaltatio secundum veritatem alicuius bonum non diminueret, tamen secundum aestimationem falsam credi potuit, esse alicuius boni diminutivum, et ex illa aestimatione oriri invidia. Affectiones enim non tantum oriuntur ex iudiciis certis, sed etiam ex suspicionibus[^14] et aestimationibus falsis.

english:
### Article I. *On the temptation of our first parents.*
### Question I. *What principally moved the devil to tempt man.*

Concerning the first point, the procedure is thus and it is asked what principally moved the devil to tempt man. And that it was envy, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*
1. *First*, from what is said in Wisdom 2[^1]: *By the envy of the devil, death entered the world*; but the entrance of death was through the temptation and seduction of man: therefore envy moved the devil to tempt man.

2. *Likewise*, Gregory in the *Morals*[^2]: "In paradise the devil, envying man, inflicted the wound of pride": therefore, since he inflicted the wound through temptation, the temptation was from envy.

3. *Likewise*, the devil by tempting man became a homicide, according to what is said in John 8[^3]: *He was a homicide from the beginning*; but homicide proceeds from hatred, and hatred proceeds from envy: therefore *from the first*, the temptation of man, in which the devil was a homicide, proceeded from envy.

4. *Likewise*, one who desires the fall of another without his own profit is not moved by love of his own advantage, but by hatred of another's happiness; but the devil desired man's fall without his own profit, as is plain: therefore he was moved by hatred of human happiness to tempt man. But such hatred is nothing other than envy[^4]: therefore etc.

*Ad oppositum.*
**On the contrary:** 1. All envy is with respect to an equal or superior, according to what Gregory says[^5] on that text of Job: *Envy slays the little one*, "a superior," I say, at least according to reputation: but the devil did not reckon man superior to himself: therefore it seems that he did not envy him: therefore if he tempted him, this was not from envy.

2. *Likewise*, envy is with respect to a good which in some way can be acquired; but the devil could not attain eternal beatitude, since he had fallen irreparably[^6]: therefore it seems that on account of acquiring it he did not envy man.

3. *Likewise*, envy is with respect to a good which is desired; for no one envies another concerning anything unless he loves and longs for it; but the devil did not long to obey God's commands nor to ascend to the supernal fatherland nor to be a friend of God, on account of his despair: therefore it seems that he would not envy this in man: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, envy is only with respect to that which is naturally fitted to diminish one's own good[^7]; but the acquisition of beatitude can diminish no one's good: therefore there is nothing which can be envied by anyone: therefore it seems that if the devil by some appetite made man fall, he was not moved by envy.

> **Conclusion.** The devil was moved indeed from pride, but immediately from envy, to tempt man.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been touched upon[^8], these are the two sins which most possess the mind of the devil, *pride* and *envy*. Hence, as has been held above, and as Augustine says, from these two, he who before was Lucifer became the devil: and these are, as it were, two inseparable things, so that one accompanies the other[^9]. For the *proud man* loves excellence, and so wills to have no equal, and on account of this he immediately desires to possess excellence in singular fashion; and therefore he immediately, either in act or in habit, envies, when he is unwilling that a good similar to the good which he desires be shared by another. — The mind of the devil, therefore, possessed by these two vices, namely *pride* and *envy*, seeing man in a state in which he could fall under diabolical power and in which he could ascend to the supernal happiness[^10] from which he himself had fallen — was moved both from pride and from envy to tempt him. For from *pride*, that he might subject him to himself; from *envy*, that he might impede him from supernal happiness. And *pride* was as the first mover[^11], but *envy* as the proximate and immediate mover. — For granted that he could not acquire dominion over man, still he would have striven to impede him from the joys of paradise; and therefore Scripture says, and its expositors, that the devil was moved from envy to tempt man. — And the arguments showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*
1. To that, then, which is first objected, that envy is with respect to a superior or equal; it must be said that it is not only with respect to one who is superior in being superior, but also with respect to one who *can be*. For although the devil in that state did not reckon man superior to himself; he nevertheless envied him, lest by the merit of obedience he be raised to the state of glory, in which state he would not doubt him to be superior to himself. — *Otherwise* it can also be said that he then reckoned him superior to himself in this, that he could attain that glory to which the devil could not ascend.

2. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a good which can be acquired; it must be answered *by way of qualification*[^12], because someone envies not only that which he can obtain, but also that which he *is naturally fitted to have*, although he cannot, just as a mutilated and blind man envies sight and walking in others. Now although the devil could not attain to beatitude, nevertheless he had a natural aptitude for it.

3. To that which is objected, that envy is with respect to a desired good; it must be said that envy comes not only from the desire of some private good, but rather from hatred of another's good[^13]. — *Another solution.* Yet since the desire of one's own good seems to be the principle of every sin, it can therefore be said otherwise that envy is not only with respect to that good which is desired, but also with respect to that good by whose attainment the desired good is diminished, or is reckoned less. And since the devil desires to be singularly exalted, therefore from the exaltation of man he reckoned his own good to be impeded; and so he envied and from envy fought against him.

4. And by this is plain the response to the last argument, because, although the glorification and exaltation of man would not according to the truth diminish anyone's good, nevertheless according to false estimation it could be believed to be diminutive of someone's good, and from that estimation envy could arise. For affections arise not only from certain judgments, but also from suspicions[^14] and false estimations.

la: Vers. 24.

en: Verse 24.

la: Libr. XXXI. c. 1. n. 1: *In paradiso sano homini diabolus invidens superbiae* etc. — In fine argumenti Vat. perperam *invidia* pro *ex invidia*.

en: Book XXXI c. 1 n. 1: *In paradise the devil, envying healthy man, [inflicted] the [wound] of pride*, etc. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition wrongly reads *invidia* for *ex invidia*.

la: Vers. 44. — Paulo superius verbo *tentando* multi codd. et ed. 1 praefigunt *in*. Paulo inferius post *a primo* cod. F adiicit *ad ultimum*.

en: Verse 44. — A little above, to the word *tentando* many codices and ed. 1 prefix *in*. A little below, after *a primo*, cod. F adds *ad ultimum*.

la: August., XI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 14. n. 18. *invidiam* definit *odium felicitatis alienae*. Cfr. Aristot., II. *Rhetor.* c. 13. (c. 10.), ubi et principia tanguntur, quae in seqq. argg. proponuntur.

en: Augustine, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* XI c. 14 n. 18, defines *envy* as *hatred of another's happiness*. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II c. 13 (c. 10), where the principles which are proposed in the following arguments are also touched upon.

la: Libr. V. *Moral.* c. 46. n. 84. super Iob 5, 2: *Invidere enim non possumus nisi eis, quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus.*

en: Book V of the *Morals* c. 46 n. 84, on Job 5:2: *For we cannot envy except those whom we reckon better than ourselves in some respect.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Vat. *irrecuperabiliter*.

en: Cf. above d. 7 p. I a. 1 q. 1. — The Vatican edition reads *irrecuperabiliter*.

la: Cfr. Gregor., V. *Moral.* c. 46. n. 86.

en: Cf. Gregory, *Morals* V c. 46 n. 86.

la: Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1, ubi et dictum Augustini occurrit, quod mox memoratur et habetur in eius libro *de Sancta Virginitate*, c. 31. n. 31. Cfr. etiam XI. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 14. n. 18, et c. 16. n. 21.

en: Dist. 5 a. 1 q. 1, where also occurs that saying of Augustine which is presently mentioned and is found in his book *On Holy Virginity* c. 31 n. 31. Cf. also XI *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 14 n. 18, and c. 16 n. 21.

la: Vat. *concomitatur alterum*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *concomitatur alterum*.

la: Codd. cc et ed. 1 *civitatem*.

en: Codices cc and ed. 1 read *civitatem* ("city") [for *felicitatem*].

la: Cod. T *ee movens ipsum*.

en: Cod. T reads *ee movens ipsum*.

la: Cfr. tom. 1. pag. 87, nota 4.

en: Cf. Volume 1, p. 87, note 4.

la: Quare invidia a Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 14. definitur: *tristitia de alienis bonis*. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. *minui* pro *minus*.

en: Hence envy is defined by Damascene, II *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 14, as: *sadness over the goods of others*. — A little below, the Vatican edition reads *minui* for *minus*.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. *suspicationibus*.

en: The editions, excepting ed. 1, with many codices read *suspicationibus*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quid sit *tentatio*, explicatur infra a. 2. q. I. et diffusius ab Alexandro Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 1; cfr. etiam S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et S. I. q. 114. a. 2; II. II. q. 97. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. — De variis speciebus tentationis vide egregiam doctrinam hic dub. 3. positam. — De causis, quare permittatur tentatio, vide infra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3.

**II.** *De ipsa quaestione*: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 114. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 1. partic. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. refert tantum verba S. Bonaventurae. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** What *temptation* is, is explained below a. 2 q. 1, and more diffusely by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II q. 101 m. 1; cf. also St. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 1 and *Summa* I q. 114 a. 2; II–II q. 97 a. 1; Blessed Albert, here aa. 1, 2. — On the various species of temptation, see the excellent doctrine set forth here, dub. 3. — On the causes why temptation is permitted, see below d. 23 a. 1 qq. 1, 2, 3.

**II.** *On the question itself*: Alexander of Hales, *loc. cit.* m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1 ad 1; *Summa* I q. 114 a. 2. — Blessed Albert, *Summa* p. II tr. 14 q. 86 m. 1 partic. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1 dub. lat. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2, reports only the words of St. Bonaventure. — Biel, here *quaestio unica* at the end.

---

translators_notes:
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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 494 -->

### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum tentatio per serpentem fuerit conveniens.*

Secundo quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum quantum ad instrumentum medium. Et dicitur in Genesis tertio[^1], quod diabolus tentavit hominem per serpentem. Et quod iste modus non fuerit conveniens, ostenditur primo sic.

***Ad oppositum.***

1. Quanto tentatio est occultior, tanto est ad decipiendum efficacior: si ergo diabolus, quanta maiori calliditate poterat, hominem decipere conabatur, videtur, quod ipsum debuisset tentare spirituali tentatione absque alicuius corporis assumtione.

2. Item, tanto tentatio est efficacior, quanto tentans est in suggerendo affabilior; sed actus locutionis proprie debetur humanae effigiei[^2]: ergo videtur, quod diabolus ad tentandum magis debuit assumere effigiem hominis quam bruti animalis, cum brutum animal sua locutione potius esset ad terrorem quam ad persuasionem.

3. Item, quanto tentans magis simulat et induit speciem sanctitatis, tanto magis praevalet in tentando[^3]; sed multa sunt animalia, quae magis in suis proprietatibus sanctitatem praetendunt quam serpens, sicut columba et agnus: ergo videtur, quod illa magis debuerit assumere diabolus ad tentandum.

4. Item, instrumentum sive organum debet conformari exercitio per ipsum facto[^4]; sed tentatio erat ad decipiendum: ergo diabolus debuit assumere animal maxime dolosum et callidum. Sed plus est de dolositate in vulpe quam in serpente: ergo magis debuit assumere vulpem quam serpentem.

***Nota.*** Ad oppositum sunt rationes; sed quoniam verum concludunt, possunt claudi in responsione.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Quod homo tentaretur a diabolo sub specie animalis bruti, et quidem serpentis, congruum esse, tripliciter insinuatur.

***Notandum.*** **Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod modus ille tentandi non tantum fuit ex *diabolica electione*, sicut dicit Augustinus[^5], sed etiam ex *divina permissione*. Non enim licuit diabolo tentare omni modo, quo vellet et posset, sed eo modo, quo Dominus permitteret. Concessit autem divina Sapientia, quae omnia ordinat et gubernat, et permisit[^6], quod diabolus tentaret hominem in effigie *animalis bruti*, et non cuiuscumque, sed *serpentis*; sic enim exigebat congruentia ordinis. ***Conclusio bimembris.***

***Congruitas triplex prob. conclusionis.*** Quod enim homo tentaretur a diabolo in effigie *bruti animalis*, congruum erat tum respectu *operis*, tum respectu *finis intenti*, tum etiam respectu *divini iudicii*. Respectu *operis*, quia homo natus est inclinari ad bonum ut *nunc*[^7], maxime ex parte sensibili et brutali; et ideo congruum erat, ipsum tentari in effigie animalis bruti. — Respectu *finis intenti* similiter congruum erat, quia ad hoc ordinabatur tentatio, ut homo efficeretur similis animali bruto, cum, contempto bono incommutabili, adhaereret bono commutabili et ibi quiesceret[^8]; et ideo ad hoc insinuandum in specie animalis bruti debuit tentari. — Respectu *divini iudicii* etiam congruum fuit, quoniam Dominus iustus et fidelis non permittit hominem tentari ultra, quam possit[^9]. Et ideo sic patitur diabolum in tentatione latere, ut nihilominus possit ab homine deprehendi: et ideo non passus est, quod diabolus hominem tentaret omnino in specie consimili, et per hoc non in specie vel effigie humana, sed potius brutali. — Triplex ergo congruentia ordinis exigebat, ut homo a diabolo in brutali effigie tentaretur.

***Conclusione pro 2.*** Hac etiam[^10] triplici congruentia exigente, permissus est homo tentari a diabolo non in quolibet animali bruto, sed in serpente. Primum ratione *operis*. Quia enim tentatio fiebat per suggestionis ingressum, quae intrat ad cor ad modum serpentis et ibi virus peccati diffundit, ex quo homo habet spiritualiter mori; ideo, ut exterior effigies operi responderet interiori, congruum fuit, hominem a diabolo tentari in effigie serpentis, cuius est serpere et venenum diffundere et diffundendo hominem interimere[^11]. — Respectu etiam *finis intenti* congruum erat. Quia enim intendebat diabolus faciem hominis et caput et superiorem mentem convertere deorsum et totum prosternere, et sic prosternendo ad malum finem deducere, proponendo sibi praemium aliquod delectabile: ideo permissus est tentare in serpente, qui secundum totum suum corpus habet terrae in suo incessu adhaerere[^12]. — Congruum etiam erat respectu *divini iudicii*. Quia enim ex illa tentatione divino iudicio inter tentatum et tentatorem debebat inimicitia exoriri[^13]; ideo tentatio hominis in serpente debuit fieri, quem post lapsum maxime exhorret, et qui maxime sua calliditate insidiatur hominem laedere. — Et sic patet multiplex congruentia, quare diabolus permissus est hominem tentare in effigie serpentina.

***Solutio oppositorum.*** 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod tentatio tanto est efficacior, quanto occultior; dicendum, quod etsi diabolus se manifestaret exterioribus sensibus in effigie serpentis, nihilominus tamen in illa manifestatione plus se occultabat, quam manifestabat. Unde mulier non credidit, eum qui loquebatur in serpente, esse adversarium, sed etiam potius bonum consiliarium[^14]: et ideo ita occulta erat illa tentatio, sicut si diabolus loqueretur ad cor interius. — ***Alia solutio.*** Aliter potest responderi, quod iusto iudicio Dei non est permissus tentare interius, quia non habebat posse ingredi interius, nisi homo praeberet sibi aditum; et ideo tentavit ab exteriori per sensum, et voce sensibili magis quam voce spirituali; non enim debebat aliter permitti.

<!-- page 495 -->

2. Ad illud de maiori affabilitate iam patet responsio. Verum est enim, quod si fuisset in effigie humana, affabilior fuisset; sed divina providentia non debuit hoc permittere, sed cautelam diaboli debuit temperare; et ideo concessum est sibi corpus serpentis, quod tamen habebat faciem virginis, sicut dicit Beda[^15], et reliquum corpus erat serpentis[^16], ut sic ex una parte posset latere, ex altera deprehendi.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amicabilitate, iam patet responsio: quia sic debuit permitti ostendi *effigies amicitiae*, ut posset deprehendi *veritas inimicitiae*. Nam tentator, qui effigiem amicitiae praetendebat, secundum veritatem inimicus erat. Ideo huic operi animal maxime competebat, quod haberet aspectum humanum, corpus vero *eius* animalis, quod natum est homini esse maxime inimicum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de calliditate, dicendum, quod etsi sint aliqua animalia callidiora et prudentiora, tamen in nocendo et insidiando homini serpens est animal callidissimum. Et quia calliditas tentantis erat ad hominem offendendum, hinc est, quod inter cetera animalia magis permissus est tentare per serpentem.

### SCHOLION.

**I.** Hanc et sequentem quaest. alii Scholastici plerumque una quaestione absolvunt, tractando speciatim de sequente. De hac autem (2.) explicite tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 103. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 2. — Petr. de Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3.

**II.** De sequente (3.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 7 et 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 165. a. 2. — B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english:
### Question II.
### *Whether the temptation through a serpent was fitting.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the temptation of the first parents with respect to the intermediate instrument. And it is said in Genesis chapter three[^1] that the devil tempted man through a serpent. And that this manner was not fitting is shown first as follows.

***For the opposite.***

1. The more hidden a temptation is, the more efficacious it is for deceiving: if therefore the devil was attempting to deceive man with the greatest cunning he could, it seems that he ought to have tempted him by a spiritual temptation without the assumption of any body.

2. Likewise, a temptation is the more efficacious, the more affable the tempter is in suggesting; but the act of speech belongs properly to the human form[^2]: therefore it seems that the devil, in order to tempt, ought rather to have assumed the form of a man than of a brute animal, since a brute animal by its speech would be more for terror than for persuasion.

3. Likewise, the more the tempter simulates and puts on the appearance of holiness, the more he prevails in tempting[^3]; but there are many animals which in their properties pretend to holiness more than the serpent, such as the dove and the lamb: therefore it seems that the devil ought to have assumed those rather for tempting.

4. Likewise, the instrument or organ ought to be conformed to the exercise carried out through it[^4]; but the temptation was for deceiving: therefore the devil ought to have assumed an animal most crafty and cunning. But there is more cunning in the fox than in the serpent: therefore he ought rather to have assumed a fox than a serpent.

***Note.*** For the opposite side there are reasons; but since they conclude what is true, they can be closed within the response.

### Conclusion.

> That man should be tempted by the devil under the species of a brute animal, and indeed of a serpent, is shown to be fitting in a threefold way.

***Notandum.*** **I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that that manner of tempting was not only from *diabolical choice*, as Augustine says[^5], but also from *divine permission*. For it was not permitted to the devil to tempt in every manner he wished and could, but only in that manner which the Lord would permit. Now divine Wisdom, which orders and governs all things, conceded and permitted[^6] that the devil should tempt man in the form of a *brute animal*, and not of just any one, but of a *serpent*; for the fittingness of order so required. ***Two-membered conclusion.***

***Threefold fittingness, proof of conclusion.*** For that man should be tempted by the devil in the form of a *brute animal* was fitting both with respect to the *deed*, with respect to the *intended end*, and also with respect to the *divine judgment*. With respect to the *deed*, because man is born to be inclined to the good *as it now is*[^7], chiefly on the sensible and brutal side; and therefore it was fitting that he be tempted in the form of a brute animal. — With respect to the *intended end* it was likewise fitting, because the temptation was ordered to this, that man might be made like a brute animal, when, with the unchangeable good despised, he would cling to the changeable good and there rest[^8]; and therefore for the insinuating of this he had to be tempted in the species of a brute animal. — With respect to the *divine judgment* also it was fitting, because the Lord, just and faithful, does not permit man to be tempted beyond what he is able[^9]. And therefore he so allows the devil to lie hidden in the temptation that nonetheless he can be detected by man: and therefore he did not allow that the devil should tempt man altogether in a like species, and through this not in human species or form, but rather in a brutal one. — Therefore the threefold fittingness of order required that man be tempted by the devil in a brutal form.

***For the second conclusion.*** This same[^10] threefold fittingness requiring, man was permitted to be tempted by the devil not in just any brute animal, but in the serpent. First by reason of the *deed*. For since the temptation came about through the entry of suggestion, which enters into the heart after the manner of a serpent and there spreads the poison of sin, from which man comes to die spiritually; therefore, so that the exterior form might correspond to the interior deed, it was fitting that man be tempted by the devil in the form of a serpent, whose nature it is to creep and to spread venom and by spreading it to kill man[^11]. — With respect also to the *intended end* it was fitting. For since the devil intended to turn the face and head and higher mind of man downward and to prostrate the whole, and so by prostrating to lead him to an evil end, proposing to him some delectable reward: therefore he was permitted to tempt in the serpent, which through its whole body has to cleave to the earth in its going[^12]. — It was fitting also with respect to the *divine judgment*. For since from that temptation by divine judgment an enmity was to arise between the tempted and the tempter[^13]; therefore the temptation of man had to come about in the serpent, which after the fall he most abhors, and which most by its cunning lies in wait to harm man. — And thus the manifold fittingness is plain why the devil was permitted to tempt man in serpentine form.

***Solution of the opposed.*** 1. To that therefore which is first objected, that a temptation is the more efficacious the more hidden it is; it must be said that, although the devil manifested himself to the exterior senses in the form of a serpent, nevertheless in that manifestation he was hiding himself more than manifesting himself. Whence the woman did not believe that he who was speaking in the serpent was an adversary, but rather a good counselor[^14]: and therefore that temptation was as hidden as if the devil were speaking to the inner heart. — ***Another solution.*** It can be answered otherwise: that by the just judgment of God he was not permitted to tempt interiorly, because he had no power to enter within, unless man should give him an opening; and therefore he tempted from outside through the senses, and by a sensible voice rather than by a spiritual voice; for he was not to be permitted otherwise.

2. To that concerning the greater affability the response is now plain. It is true indeed that if he had been in human form, he would have been more affable; but divine providence ought not to have permitted this, but rather to have tempered the wariness of the devil; and therefore there was conceded to him the body of a serpent, which however had the face of a virgin, as Bede says[^15], and the rest of the body was that of a serpent[^16], so that on one side he might lie hidden, on the other be detected.

3. To that which is objected concerning friendliness, the response is now plain: because the *appearance of friendship* had to be permitted to be shown thus, so that the *truth of enmity* might be detected. For the tempter, who pretended the appearance of friendship, was in truth an enemy. Therefore for this work an animal was most suited which had a human aspect but the body of *that* animal which is born to be most an enemy to man.

4. To that which is objected last concerning cunning, it must be said that, although there are some animals more cunning and prudent, nevertheless in harming and lying in wait against man the serpent is the most cunning animal. And because the cunning of the tempter was for offending man, hence it is that among other animals he was rather permitted to tempt through the serpent.

### Scholion.

**I.** This and the following question other Scholastics generally resolve in one question, treating specifically of the following. But of this (2.) explicitly there treat Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 103. m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; *Summa* p. II. tr. 14. q. 86. m. 2. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. dub. lat. 3.

**II.** Of the following (3.) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 7 and 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; *Summa* II. II. q. 165. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, loc. cit. m. 1. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. and dub. lat. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4.

---

la: Vers. 1. seqq.

en: Verses 1 ff. [Gen. 3, 1 ff.].

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Histor. animal. c. 9; V. de Generat. animal. c. 7; I. Politic. c. 2. (c. 1.) et Problem. sect. 11. n. 1, ubi dicit, soli homini locutionem competere sive loquelam.

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Historia animalium* c. 9; V *De generatione animalium* c. 7; I *Politica* c. 2 (c. 1) and *Problemata* sect. 11 n. 1, where he says that speech or speaking belongs to man alone.

la: Cod. aa *tanto magis praebet in tentando suggestionem.* Paulo inferius post *magis* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit *in*.

en: Codex aa reads *tanto magis praebet in tentando suggestionem* ["the more he supplies suggestion in tempting"]. A little below, after *magis*, the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 omits *in*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Part. animal. c. 6; II. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 4.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *De partibus animalium* c. 6; II *De anima*, text 38 (c. 4).

la: Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. Vide hic in lit. Magistri c. 4.

en: Book XI *De Genesi ad litteram* c. 3 n. 5. See here in the *Littera Magistri* c. 4.

la: Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *permittit*. Paulo inferius pro *ordinis* plures codd. *ordinationis*.

en: The Vatican edition with one or two codices reads *permittit*. A little below, for *ordinis* several codices read *ordinationis*.

la: B. Albert., I. Ethic. tr. 3. c. 3: *Bonum per accidens et ut nunc est resonantia boni simpliciter et semper, et ob id tantum movet appetitum.* Cfr. supra pag. 123, nota 2, ubi similis exhibetur divisio boni, scil. in bonum *absolutum* et bonum *alicui*.

en: Bl. Albert, I *Ethica* tr. 3 c. 3: "Good by accident and as it now is is a resonance of the good simply and always, and on that account only does it move the appetite." Cf. above p. 123, note 2, where a similar division of the good is exhibited, namely into *absolute* good and good *to someone*.

la: Psalm. 48, 13: *Homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus et similis factus est illis.*

en: Psalm 48, 13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to the senseless beasts, and is become like to them."

la: Epist. I. Cor. 10, 13: *Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis* etc.

en: 1 Corinthians 10, 13: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able" etc.

la: Codd. T ee *Et hac*; plures alii cum ed. 1 omittunt *etiam*.

en: Codices T and ee read *Et hac*; several others with edition 1 omit *etiam*.

la: Haec ratio insinuatur a Gregorio, V. Moral. c. 34. n. 58. — Paulo inferius cod. aa *id est superiorem* pro *et superiorem*.

en: This reason is insinuated by Gregory, V *Moralia* c. 34 n. 58. — A little below codex aa reads *id est superiorem* for *et superiorem*.

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16. seqq.; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et Isidor., Comment. in Gen. c. 4.

en: Cf. Augustine, XII *De Trinitate* c. 11 n. 16 ff.; XIV *De civitate Dei* c. 11 n. 2; and Isidore, *Commentary on Genesis* c. 4.

la: Gen. 3, 15: *Inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem* etc. — Pro *tentatio hominis* multi codd. et edd. 1. 2 *tentatio animalis*.

en: Genesis 3, 15: "I will put enmities between thee and the woman" etc. — For *tentatio hominis* many codices and editions 1 and 2 read *tentatio animalis*.

la: Qq. veteris et novi Testam. (inter opera August.) q. 31: *Admiscens enim se [diabolus] serpenti egit per illum quasi per organum, ut nec mulier occulti diaboli intelligeret dolum, sciens, prudentem esse serpentem.* — Paulo inferius Vat. *daemon* pro *Dei*.

en: *Questions of the Old and New Testament* (among the works of Augustine) q. 31: "For mixing himself in with the serpent [the devil] acted through it as through an instrument, so that not even the woman might understand the deceit of the hidden devil, knowing the serpent to be prudent." — A little below the Vatican edition reads *daemon* for *Dei*.

la: Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. seq. — De hac et seqq. solutionibus cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, II *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* c. 14 n. 20 f. — On this and the following solutions cf. here the *Littera Magistri* c. 2 ff.

la: Teste Petro Comestore (de quo cfr. supra pag. 380, nota 4.) in sua *Historia scholastica*, c. 21. hist. libri Genesis. — Mox pro *ut sic* non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *et sic*.

en: On the testimony of Peter Comestor (on whom cf. above p. 380, note 4) in his *Historia scholastica*, c. 21 of the history of the book of Genesis. — Soon, for *ut sic*, not a few codices with editions 1 and 2 read *et sic*.

translators_notes:
- **Source provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi column-band PDF read of pp. 494–495 (PDF pp. 516–517, Vol II offset +22) per Vol II Override step 1; raw OCR cross-checked at lines 34711–34835. English freshly translated literally, paragraph-for-paragraph.
- **Page-split map (16 apparatus entries, no `[?]` flags):** p.494 L-2 ²–⁶ = [^1]–[^5] (Gen 3 Vers. 1 + Aristot. *Hist. animal.* IV / *Gen. animal.* V / *Polit.* I / *Problem.* sect. 11; cod. aa *tanto magis* + Vat. omits *in*; Aristot. *Part. animal.* IV / *de Anima* II; Aug. XI *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 3 n. 5 + Magistri c. 4); p.494 R-2 ⁷–⁹ = [^6]–[^8] (Vat. *permittit* + *ordinis*/*ordinationis* variant; Albert *Ethic.* I tr. 3 c. 3 *bonum ut nunc* + cross-ref pag. 123 nota 2; Psalm 48:13 *iumentis insipientibus*); p.495 L-2 ¹–⁵ = [^9]–[^13] (1 Cor 10:13 *Fidelis Deus*; codd. T ee *Et hac* + ed. 1 omits *etiam*; Greg. V *Moral.* c. 34 n. 58 + cod. aa *id est superiorem*; Aug. XII *de Trin.* c. 11 n. 16 + XIV *de Civ. Dei* c. 11 n. 2 + Isidor. *Comment. in Gen.* c. 4; Gen 3:15 *Inimicitias ponam* + multi codd. *tentatio animalis*); p.495 R-2 ⁶–⁸ = [^14]–[^16] (Qq. vet. et nov. Testam. q. 31 *Admiscens enim se diabolus serpenti* + Vat. *daemon*/*Dei*; Aug. II *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 14 n. 20 + Magistri c. 2; Petr. Comestor *Hist. schol.* c. 21 + ed. 1, 2 *et sic*).
- **`has_scholion: true`** — two-part SCHOLION on p. 495 R-mid jointly framing q2 commentators (I) and q3 commentators (II). Per Vol II Override step 5, the next quaestio (`d21-a1-q3`) will be `has_scholion: false` with sibling-pointer to SCHOLION II here.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:** received **none** from d21-a1-q1 (q1 closed cleanly with [^14] on p.494 L-2 ¹ *suspicationibus*; q2 starts fresh from p.494 L-2 ² *Vers. 1 seqq.* = Gen 3, anchoring the opener's *Genesis tertio*). Forward hand-off to d21-a1-q3: **none** — QUAESTIO III opens on p. 495 R-bottom / p. 496 L-top at raw 34837 with its own fresh apparatus block (p. 496 L-2 lit. Magistri c. 4 + Vat. variants for *Et dicit Scriptura et Magister*).
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 16 anchors crisp at 450 dpi.


title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 496 -->

### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum ordo et progressus tentationis in primis parentibus fuerit conveniens.*

Tertio quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum quantum ad ordinem et progressum. Et dicit Scriptura et Magister in littera[^1], quod tentatio incepit a muliere, et per mulierem pervenit ad virum. Et videtur, quod hic modus progrediendi competat astutiae diaboli, et quod etiam debeat a Deo permitti.

***Fundamenta.***

1. Ordo enim destructionis contrarius est ordini constructionis, quae enim sunt ultima in componendo sunt priora in resolvendo[^2]; sed mulier fuit ultimo facta et formata: ergo videtur, quod via deformationis et corruptionis a muliere debuit habere exortum; ergo tentator debuit eam prius aggredi.

2. Item, tentatio exterior debet conformari interiori; sed in tentatione interiori peccatum ascendit a sensualitate ad superiorem partem mediante inferiori portione rationis: si ergo superior portio est vir, et inferior est mulier; sicut tentatio interior procedit ad virum mediante muliere, sic et tentatio exterior[^3].

3. Item, cautus pugnator citius aggreditur ad bellandum[^4] illum, quem potest expugnare facilius: si ergo mulier facilius poterat expugnari quam vir, videtur, quod progressus tentationis pervenire debuit ad virum mediante muliere.

4. Item, facilius est alicui expugnare fortem inimicum per domesticum quam etiam per se ipsum; sed vir erat fortis et spirituali mente praeditus: ergo non videtur, quod diabolus ausus fuerit eum tentare per se ipsum, sed per suum domesticum: ergo mediante muliere tentatio pervenit ad virum[^5].

***Ad oppositum.*** Sed contra:

1. Peccatum non est in carne, sed in Dei imagine[^6]; sed mulier et vir aequaliter sunt ad imaginem Dei, quia in anima non est distinctio sexus: ergo videtur, quod tentatio non magis debuit inchoari a sexu muliebri quam a virili.

2. Item, mulier nullam habebat pronitatem ad peccatum, sicut nec vir, et ita erat recta, sicut vir, nec caro eius aliquo modo animam incurvabat[^7]: ergo videtur, quod ita difficile erat mulierem sicut virum deiicere: nulla ergo ratio videtur esse, ob quam tentatio diaboli magis inciperet a muliere.

3. Item, vituperabilius est vinci a muliere quam a viro, et gloriosius est vincere virum quam mulierem: si ergo diabolus maxime refugit vituperium et avidissime quaerit gloriam, videtur, quod magis tentationem a viro quam a muliere inchoaverit.

4. Item, natura audacium est libenter fortibus occurrere[^8]; sed diabolus est audacissimus et procacissimus et maxime praesumens de suis viribus: ergo videtur, quod dedignatus fuerit primo aggredi muliebrem sexum: non ergo videtur probabile, quod prius tentaverit mulierem quam virum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Propter duplicem rationem diaboli tentatio a muliere inchoavit.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Scriptura et Magister dicit in littera, non est dubitandum, quin tentatio diaboli a muliere inchoaverit et per eam pervenerit ad virum. — Ratio autem huius sumitur ex parte *sapientiae Dei*, et ex parte *astutiae diaboli*.

***Ratio quae est ex pte. Dei.*** Ex parte *sapientiae Dei*. Dominus enim tali ordine permisit diabolum tentare, tum propter *viri exercitationem*, tum ne *mulier haberet excusationem*, tum etiam propter *nostram eruditionem*. — Propter *viri exercitationem*, quia ipse adeo fortis erat et spirituali mente praeditus, quod non solum poterat resistere tentationi serpentis, sed etiam suggestioni mulieris; et ideo fortiori tentatione permissus est tentari. — Propter *mulieris* vero *removendam excusationem* primo debuit ab ipsa tentatio incipere. Nam si vir primo peccasset, cum *vir sit caput mulieris*[^9] et dominetur ei, non esset multum mirandum, si mulier ei consentiret; immo magnum haberet excusationis colorem. — Propter *nostram eruditionem* etiam hoc permissum est. In illo enim modo tentandi sensibili cognoscimus nos modum et progressum tentationis invisibilis; et sicut ille a serpente venit ad virum mediante muliere, sic iste a sensualitate pervenit ad superiorem portionem rationis mediante inferiori.

<!-- page 497 -->

***Ratio 2, item triplex.*** Ex parte similiter *astutiae diaboli* potest sumi ratio. Diabolus enim attendebat, mulierem esse *minoris sapientiae* et *debilioris constantiae* et *importunioris adhaerentiae*. Quia minoris sapientiae erat, facilior erat ad seducendum; et ideo diabolus seductor per eam voluit sibi facere transitum ac viam. Quia debilioris constantiae, facilior erat ad pervertendum: et ideo diabolus expugnator aggressus est hominis civitatem ex ea parte, ex qua erat aditus minus munitus. Quia vero importunioris erat adhaerentiae, cogitavit diabolus, quod si ipsa primo vinceretur, non quiesceret, quousque perverteret virum. Unde dicitur Ecclesiastis septimo de muliere, quod *laqueus est venatorum*, et *sagena cor eius*, *vincula sunt manus illius*. Propterea diabolus, astutus impulsor[^10], incepit a sexu femineo.

***Conclusio 2.*** Et sic patet, quod sicut dicit Scriptura, per omnem modum congruum fuit, tentationem incipi a muliere, tum quia hoc diaboli astutia expetebat, tum quia hoc divina providentia disponebat. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

***Solutio oppositorum.*** 1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod quantum ad imaginem non est sexuum differentia; dicendum, quod licet in viro et muliere reperiatur imago aeque expresse, quantum est de natura ipsius animae; quia tamen anima, quamdiu est in corpore, complexionem corporis imitatur, ex ratione debilitatis complexionis[^11] et sexus contrahit anima quandam effeminationem; et propterea, quantum est ex parte naturae, nisi adsit fortitudo maioris gratiae, facilius incurvatur ad malum sexus femineus. Et propterea illud non cogit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicit, quod mulier nullam habuit ad hoc pronitatem; dicendum, quod verum est: non tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod haberet aequalem stabilitatem. Quamvis enim non haberet curvationem in affectu nec deceptionem in aspectu, facilius tamen poterat in hoc incidere quam vir, in quo et natura erat fortior, et gratia creditur fuisse abundantior.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vituperabile est vinci a muliere etc.; dicendum, quod verum est; verumtamen gloriosius est mulierem luctando superare, quam cum viro luctando succumbere. Et quia diabolus, si incepisset a viro, timebat, ne viriliter sibi resisteret, ideo maiori cautela studuit gloriam adipisci.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod audaces libentius aggrediuntur fortes; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi est audacia sine astutia; diabolus autem non tantum est audax et procax, immo etiam est astutus et fallax: et ideo in tentando non aggressus est viam difficiliorem, sed potius efficaciorem. Praeterea, non permittebatur sibi totam suam exercere potentiam; cum enim non vincat nisi volentem, est debilis in pugnando[^12]; et ideo non a fortiori, sed a debiliori suam inchoavit tentationem[^13].

---

english:
### Question III.
### *Whether the order and progress of the temptation in the first parents was fitting.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the temptation of the first parents with respect to the order and progress. And Scripture and the Master in the *Littera*[^1] say that the temptation began from the woman, and through the woman came to the man. And it seems that this manner of proceeding suits the cunning of the devil, and also that it ought to have been permitted by God.

***Fundamenta.***

1. For the order of destruction is contrary to the order of construction, since the things that are last in composing are first in resolving[^2]; but the woman was formed and made last: therefore it seems that the way of deformation and corruption had to have its rising from the woman; therefore the tempter ought to have approached her first.

2. Likewise, exterior temptation ought to be conformed to the interior; but in interior temptation sin ascends from the sensuality to the higher part by means of the lower portion of reason: if therefore the higher portion is the man, and the lower the woman; just as the interior temptation proceeds to the man by means of the woman, so also the exterior temptation[^3].

3. Likewise, the cautious warrior more readily approaches to fight[^4] him whom he can vanquish more easily: if therefore the woman could be vanquished more easily than the man, it seems that the progress of the temptation ought to have arrived at the man by means of the woman.

4. Likewise, it is easier for someone to vanquish a strong enemy through one of his household than through himself; but the man was strong and endowed with a spiritual mind: therefore it does not seem that the devil dared to tempt him through himself, but through one of his household: therefore through the woman the temptation came to the man[^5].

***For the opposite.*** On the contrary:

1. Sin is not in the flesh, but in the image of God[^6]; but woman and man are equally to the image of God, because in the soul there is no distinction of sex: therefore it seems that the temptation ought not to have begun more from the female sex than from the male.

2. Likewise, the woman had no proneness to sin, just as neither did the man, and she was as upright as the man, nor did her flesh in any way bend the soul downward[^7]: therefore it seems that it was as difficult to throw down the woman as the man: therefore there seems to be no reason on account of which the devil's temptation should begin rather from the woman.

3. Likewise, it is more shameful to be conquered by a woman than by a man, and more glorious to conquer a man than a woman: if therefore the devil most flees shame and most eagerly seeks glory, it seems that he would rather have begun the temptation from the man than from the woman.

4. Likewise, the nature of the daring is to gladly meet the strong[^8]; but the devil is most daring and most insolent and most presuming on his own powers: therefore it seems that he would have disdained to attack the female sex first: therefore it does not seem probable that he tempted the woman before the man.

### Conclusion.

> On account of a twofold reason the devil's temptation began from the woman.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Scripture says and the Master says in the *Littera*, it is not to be doubted that the temptation of the devil began from the woman and through her came to the man. — Now the reason of this is taken on the part of *the wisdom of God*, and on the part of *the cunning of the devil*.

***Reason which is from the part of God.*** On the part of *the wisdom of God*. For the Lord permitted the devil to tempt in such an order, both for *the man's exercising*, and lest *the woman should have an excuse*, and also for *our instruction*. — For the *man's exercising*, because he was so strong and endowed with a spiritual mind that he could not only resist the temptation of the serpent, but even the suggestion of the woman; and therefore he was permitted to be tempted by a stronger temptation. — For *removing the woman's excuse* the temptation had to begin from her first. For if the man had first sinned, since *the man is the head of the woman*[^9] and rules over her, it would not have been much to wonder at if the woman had consented to him; rather, she would have had a great color of excuse. — For *our instruction* also this was permitted. For in that sensible manner of tempting we recognize the manner and progress of invisible temptation; and just as that one came from the serpent to the man by means of the woman, so this comes from the sensuality to the higher portion of reason by means of the lower.

***Reason 2, likewise threefold.*** On the part of *the cunning of the devil* a reason can be similarly taken. For the devil was considering that the woman was of *lesser wisdom* and *weaker constancy* and *more importunate adherence*. Because she was of lesser wisdom, she was easier to seduce; and therefore the devil as seducer wished to make for himself through her a passage and way. Because she was of weaker constancy, she was easier to pervert: and therefore the devil as conqueror approached the city of man on that side on which the entrance was less fortified. Because moreover she was of more importunate adherence, the devil reckoned that if she were first conquered, she would not be at rest until she had perverted the man. Hence it is said in Ecclesiastes seven of the woman, that *she is a snare of hunters*, and *her heart a net*, *her hands are bands*. Therefore the devil, the cunning impeller[^10], began from the female sex.

***Conclusion 2.*** And thus it is plain that, as Scripture says, in every manner it was fitting that the temptation should begin from the woman, both because the cunning of the devil sought this, and because divine providence was disposing this. Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

***Solution of the opposed.*** 1. To that which is first objected in opposition, that as to the image there is no difference of the sexes; it must be said that, although in the man and in the woman the image is found equally express, as far as concerns the nature of the soul itself; yet because the soul, so long as it is in the body, imitates the complexion of the body, by reason of the weakness of complexion[^11] and of sex the soul contracts a certain effeminacy; and therefore, as far as is on the part of nature, unless the strength of greater grace be present, the female sex is more easily bent toward evil. And therefore that does not constrain.

2. To that which objects, that the woman had no proneness to this; it must be said that this is true: nevertheless from this it does not follow that she had equal stability. For although she had no curvature in affection nor deception in sight, yet she could more easily fall into this than the man, in whom both nature was stronger and grace is believed to have been more abundant.

3. To that which is objected, that it is shameful to be conquered by a woman etc.; it must be said that this is true; yet it is more glorious to overcome a woman in wrestling than to succumb wrestling with a man. And because the devil, if he had begun from the man, was afraid lest he should resist him manfully, therefore with greater caution he strove to obtain glory.

4. To that which is objected, that the daring more willingly attack the strong; it must be said that that is true where there is daring without cunning; but the devil is not only daring and insolent, but is also cunning and deceitful: and therefore in tempting he did not attack the more difficult way, but rather the more efficacious. Besides, he was not permitted to exercise all his power; for since he does not conquer except the willing, he is *weak in fighting*[^12]; and therefore not from the stronger, but from the weaker he began his temptation[^13].

---

la: Hic c. 1. et 5.

en: Here c. 1 and 5 [of the *Littera Magistri* of Dist. XXI].

la: Et, ut dicit Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 3, *quod extremum est in resolutione, in generatione esse primum videtur.* — Paulo inferius pro *exortum* Vat. *exordium.*

en: And, as Aristotle says, III *Ethics* c. 3, "what is last in resolution is seen to be first in generation." — A little below, for *exortum* the Vatican edition reads *exordium*.

la: Cfr. August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 21; XII. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16. seq.; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2. Vide infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. et p. II. per totam.

en: Cf. Augustine, II *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* c. 14 n. 21; XII *De Trinitate* c. 11 n. 16 f.; XIV *De civitate Dei* c. 11 n. 2. See below d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 2 and p. II throughout.

la: Satis multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *ad bellum*, Vat. *in bello*. Nostram lectionem habent codd. F Q T ee.

en: Quite a few codices with editions 1 and 2 read *ad bellum*, the Vatican edition *in bello*. Codices F Q T and ee have our reading.

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58. seq.

en: Cf. Augustine, XI *De Genesi ad litteram* c. 42 n. 58 f.

la: Haec est lectio plurium codd. ut IP aa ee et ed. 1. Alii codd. inter *sed* et *in Dei* inepte interiiciunt *etiam*; in Vat. legitur: *Peccatum non tantum est in carne, sed etiam in Dei imagine, scilicet anima*; sed quoad rem cfr. d. 24. p. II. per totam. — De minori vide supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 2.

en: This is the reading of several codices, namely IP, aa, ee, and edition 1. Other codices ineptly insert *etiam* between *sed* and *in Dei*; in the Vatican edition it reads: "Sin is not only in the flesh, but also in the image of God, namely the soul"; but as to the matter cf. d. 24 p. II throughout. — On the minor premise see above d. 16 a. 2 q. 2.

la: Alluditur ad Eccle. 7, 30. ubi dicitur: *quod fecerit Deus hominem rectum.* Cfr. supra pag. 124, nota 3.

en: Allusion is made to Ecclesiastes 7, 30, where it is said: "that God made man upright." Cf. above p. 124, note 3.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 7.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III *Ethics* c. 7.

la: Eph. 5, 23: *Quoniam vir caput est mulieris.* Cfr. I. Cor. 11, 3.

en: Ephesians 5, 23: "For the husband is the head of the wife." Cf. 1 Corinthians 11, 3.

la: Vers. 27. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Mox pro *impulsor* codd. T ee *impugnator*.

en: Verse 27 [Eccle. 7, 27: *Et inveni amariorem morte mulierem, quae laqueus venatorum est, et sagena cor eius, vincula sunt manus illius*]. — Cf. here the *Littera Magistri*, c. 1. — Soon, for *impulsor*, codices T and ee read *impugnator*.

la: Plures codd., inter quos F K T Y, *compositionis*.

en: Several codices, among them F, K, T, and Y, read *compositionis*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 170, nota 2.

en: Cf. above p. 170, note 2.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question [i.e., q. 2 SCHOLION II on p. 495 R-mid, which jointly covers q. 2 and q. 3 commentators].

translators_notes:
- **Source provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi column-band PDF read of pp. 496–497 (PDF pp. 518–519, Vol II offset +22) per Vol II Override step 1; raw OCR cross-checked at lines 34836–34934. English freshly translated literally, paragraph-for-paragraph.
- **Page-split map (13 apparatus entries, no `[?]` flags):** p.496 L-2 ¹–⁵ = [^1]–[^5] (Hic c. 1 et 5 *Littera Magistri* pointer + Aristot. III *Ethic.* c. 3 *quod extremum est in resolutione* + Vat. *exordium*/*exortum* variant; Aug. II *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 14 + XII *de Trin.* + XIV *de Civ. Dei* + d. 24 cross-refs; codd. *ad bellum*/*in bello*/*ad bellandum* variants F Q T ee; Aug. XI *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 42); p.496 R-2 ⁶–⁹ = [^6]–[^9] (codd. IP aa ee ed.1 vs Vat. *etiam* interpolation for *Peccatum non est in carne, sed in Dei imagine* + d. 24 p. II + d. 16 a. 2 q. 2; Eccle. 7, 30 *fecerit Deus hominem rectum* + p. 124 nota 3; Aristot. III *Ethic.* c. 7; Eph. 5, 23 *vir caput mulieris* + 1 Cor. 11, 3); p.497 L-2 ¹–⁴ = [^10]–[^13] (Eccle. 7, 27 *laqueus venatorum* + codd. T ee *impugnator*/*impulsor* variant + lit. Magistri c. 1; codd. F K T Y *compositionis*/*complexionis* variant; p. 170 nota 2 cross-ref on *debilis in pugnando*; *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-pointer to q. 2 SCHOLION II commentator-roll).
- **`has_scholion: false`** — sibling-pointer to q. 2 SCHOLION II on p. 495 R-mid (commentator-roll for q. 3: Alex. Hal., S. Thom., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Dionys. Carth.) captured in q. 2's chunk and pointed to here via apparatus [^13]. Per Vol II Override step 5, no-scholion is normal when sibling's scholion declares joint coverage; the printed footer ⁴ on p. 497 L-2 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is Quaracchi's explicit confirmation of the sibling-pointer convention.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:** received **none** from d21-a1-q2 (q2 closed cleanly with [^16] on p.495 R-2 ⁸ *et sic*/*ut sic*; q3 starts fresh on p.496 L-1 top with its own apparatus block opening at [^1] = *Hic c. 1. et 5.*). Forward hand-off to **`d21-a2-q1` (currently MISSING from auto-chunker output — see anomaly note below)**: **none** — ARTICULUS II opener at raw 34935 on p.497 R-1 mid-page carries its own fresh apparatus block (footers ⁵–⁸ on p.497 L-2: *Hic c. 6* + *Dist. 8 p. II praesertim q. 1* + Jas 1, 14 + B. Albert. Cassiodorus roll).
- **Auto-chunker anomaly verdict — `d21-a2-q1` MISSING, NOT MERGED INTO q3:** verified by reading raw line 34935 (`ARTICULUS II.`) directly after q3's body close at line 34934 (`debiliori suam inchoavit tentationem`). The QUAESTIO III opener at line 34836 is correctly aligned (*Tertio quaeritur de tentatione primorum parentum quantum ad ordinem et progressum*), and q3's Solutio ad 4 ends cleanly with the sibling-pointer footer ⁴. ARTICULUS II opener (raw 34935 *Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de modis tentationis in generali*) + QUAESTIO I (raw 35047 *Utrum carnis sit tentare*) live in raw lines 34935–35081 with NO chunk file emitted by the auto-chunker. **a2-q1 needs a fresh chunk file created (not re-split)** before promotion. Flagged for the next session via `next-session-resume.md`.
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 13 anchors crisp at 450 dpi across pp. 496–497.