title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum in divinis ponenda sit processio per modum liberalitatis

title_alt: Whether a procession by way of liberality is to be posited in God

source_text:
### Quaestio I. *Utrum in divinis ponenda sit persona procedens per modum liberalitatis.*

Circa primum, quod sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum liberalitatis, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Perfectior est dilectio mutua quam reflexa[^1], et perfectior adhuc mutua communicata quam non communicata, quia talis, scilicet[^2] non communicata, videtur sapere amorem libidinosum: ergo si in Deo est summa dilectio et summa delectatio et beatitudo, non est ibi persona, quae mutuo non ametur, sed cui amor mutuus communicetur[^3]; sed communicatio amoris mutui est per liberalitatem: ergo etc.

2. Item, in his inferioribus duplex invenitur modus procedendi[^4] nobilis, scilicet per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis: primo modo emanat Filius a Patre, secundo modo donum a datore; sed omne quod nobilitatis est in creatura, est attribuendum Deo: ergo etc.

3. Item, in Deo est ponere naturam et voluntatem, et sicut naturam perficit fecunditas, ita voluntatem summa liberalitas; sed natura perfecta fecunditate, producit persona aliam personam: ergo pari ratione, voluntate perfecta liberalitate, producit persona[^5] aliam personam: et sic etc.

4. Item, omnes creaturae a Deo procedunt per cognitionem, et voluntatem; sed ante creaturarum productionem ponere fuit in divinis emanationem Verbi ab aeterno, in quo Pater omnia fienda disposuit[^6]: ergo pari ratione necesse fuit emanare personam, in qua omnia vellet et donaret; sed talis procedit per modum liberalitatis: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Non est similis modus procedendi sive exeundi[^7] in creaturis respectu Dei et in personis; nam creaturae sunt extrinsecus, personae vero in essentia unum; sed exitus creaturarum a Deo est per modum liberalitatis: ergo non est ponere personam hoc modo procedere.

2. Item, exiens per modum voluntatis ab aliquo non assimilatur in substantia producenti, nec aequatur, nec necessario producitur; sed persona, si procedit in divinis, est in substantia similis et in potestate aequalis nec potens se aliter habere: ergo etc.

3. Item, in his inferioribus non tantum sunt ista principia nobilia, scilicet natura et voluntas, verum etiam ratio sive operans per artem[^8]: ergo si ponuntur duae personae his duobus modis procedentes, debet poni tertia, quae tertio modo procedat; sed illa non ponitur[^9]: ergo nec per modum voluntatis ponetur aliqua pari ratione.

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4. Item, quanto pluribus communicatur dilectio, tanto perfectior, quia omne bonum in commune deductum pulcrius elucescit: ergo non solum est ponere tertiam personam, cui amor communicetur secundae[^10], sed etiam quartam, cui amor communicetur tertiae; et sic in infinitum; sed hoc est impossibile in divinis, ut ostensum est supra[^11]: ergo est stare in prima persona producente: ergo non est persona procedens per modum liberalitatis.

### Conclusio.

> In divinis per modum liberalitatis procedit tertia persona, quae dicitur Donum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut probatum est[^12], in divinis est ponere tertiam personam procedentem per modum liberalitatis, quae dicitur Donum. Et ratio huius est perfectio dilectionis, perfectio emanationis et perfectio voluntatis, qua existente[^13] liberalissima, non potest non producere personam; sicut natura, existente fecundissima, non potest non producere personam; et haec est ratio propria huius emanationis.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod creaturae emanant per modum liberalitatis; dicendum, quod per modum liberalitatis emanare est dupliciter: aut sicut volitum, aut sicut ratio volendi, sive aut sicut donatum[^14], aut sicut ratio donandi. Primo modo emanant creaturae, quae sunt extra; secundo modo emanat tertia in Trinitate persona, quia ratio volendi et donandi est intrinseca perfectissimae voluntati.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas non est[^15] principium assimilans nec necessario emanans; dicendum, quod voluntas sive liberalitas dupliciter est principium: uno modo distinctum in natura, et sic non assimilat in substantia; alio modo concomitante[^16] natura, et sic in substantia assimilat. Quoniam igitur persona sic procedit per modum liberalitatis, ut tamen concomitetur natura: ideo similis in substantia, quamvis ipse modus procedendi non sit per modum similis; et sic patet illud.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quare non procedit aliqua persona per modum rationis; dicendum, quod omnis modus procedendi nobilis ad istos duos reducitur: quia omne agens aut agit naturaliter, aut per voluntatem: — agens enim per violentiam, aut per fortunam est agens imperfectum, et modus producendi minus nobilis[^17] — unde ratio non distinguitur contra naturam et voluntatem quantum ad modum agendi: et ideo non est persona tali modo procedens.

Sed tamen hoc non videtur plene solvere, quia nos distinguimus in his creaturis egressum per modum *liberalitatis* ab egressu per modum *artis*. Et[^18] propterea dicendum, quod processus per modum liberalitatis est dupliciter, aut sicut ratio liberalitatis sive ipsa liberalitas, aut sicut *liberaliter factum*; similiter et in arte, aut sicut ipsa ars sive ratio artificiandi, aut sicut *artificiatum*; et primo modo potest cadere in divina persona, secundo modo non. Et primo modo procedit Filius, qui est «Verbum et ars plena omnium rationum viventium»[^19]. Sed iste modus emanandi non distinguitur a modo emanandi per modum naturae, quia emanat ut omnino similis et per modum similitudinis perfectae. Alius autem modus non potest esse[^20], quia duas personas necesse est communicare in eadem natura, et quia necesse est, quod omnis modus emanandi, qui est in divinis, sit per modum naturae principaliter, vel illa concomitante[^21]. Unde cum processus per modum *voluntatis* possit esse intrinsecus, sicut procedit amor ab amante: per modum vero artis semper est extrinsecus, inquantum huiusmodi: ideo impossibile est, quod cadat in Deo respectu personae, sed cadit solum respectu creaturae.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur: si est ponere tertiam personam ob communicationem, pari ratione et quartam: dicendum, quod omnis ratio et natura[^22] concordat, quod non fiat per plures quod potest sufficientissime fieri per unum; alioquin est ibi superfluum[^23]. Si ergo mutua dilectio non potest esse minus quam ad unum, et communicatio illius mutuae non minus quam ad unum, et in uno est mutua dilectio, et in altero mutuae dilectionis communicatio perfectissime, cum uterque[^24] accipiat totum infinite; patet quod non est ultra procedere, sed ibi est stare. Unde ipsa eadem ratio, quae ponit personarum pluralitatem, aufert infinitatem et ponit trinitatem.

english:
### Question I. *Whether a person proceeding by way of liberality is to be posited in God.*

Concerning the first point, that it is necessary to posit a person proceeding by way of liberality, is shown in this way.

1. A mutual love is more perfect than a reflexive one[^1], and a mutual love communicated is even more perfect than one not communicated, because such a love — namely[^2] one not communicated — seems to savor of a libidinous love: therefore if in God there is the highest love and the highest delight and beatitude, there is not there a person who is not loved mutually, but [a person] to whom mutual love is communicated[^3]; but the communication of mutual love is by liberality: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in things below us a twofold noble manner of proceeding[^4] is found, namely by way of nature and by way of will: in the first manner the Son emanates from the Father, in the second manner a gift [emanates] from a giver; but everything which is of nobility in a creature is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in God one must posit nature and will, and just as fecundity perfects nature, so the highest liberality perfects will; but nature, perfected by fecundity, produces — a person produces another person: therefore by parallel reasoning, when will is perfected by liberality, a person produces[^5] another person: and so etc.

4. Likewise, all creatures proceed from God by knowledge and will; but before the production of creatures one had to posit in God an emanation of the Word from eternity, in which the Father disposed all things to be done[^6]: therefore by parallel reasoning it was necessary that a person emanate, in whom He would will and give all things; but such a person proceeds by way of liberality: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The manner of proceeding or going forth[^7] in creatures with respect to God and in [the divine] persons is not similar; for creatures are extrinsic, but the persons are one in essence; but the going forth of creatures from God is by way of liberality: therefore one is not to posit a person to proceed in this manner.

2. Likewise, what goes forth by way of will from something is not assimilated to the producer in substance, nor equated [with it], nor produced necessarily; but a person, if it proceeds in God, is similar in substance and equal in power and not able to be otherwise: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in things below us not only are these noble principles found — namely nature and will — but also reason or that which works through art[^8]: therefore if two persons are posited as proceeding by these two manners, a third must be posited which proceeds by the third manner; but that [third one] is not posited[^9]: therefore neither will any [person] be posited by way of will by parallel reasoning.

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4. Likewise, the more love is communicated to many, the more perfect it is, because every good when brought into common possession shines forth more beautifully: therefore one is not only to posit a third person, to whom love is communicated by the second[^10], but also a fourth, to whom love is communicated by the third; and so on to infinity; but this is impossible in God, as has been shown above[^11]: therefore one must stop at the first producing person: therefore there is no person proceeding by way of liberality.

### Conclusion.

> In God by way of liberality there proceeds a third person, who is called the Gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been proved[^12], in God one must posit a third person proceeding by way of liberality, who is called the Gift. And the reason for this is the perfection of love, the perfection of emanation, and the perfection of will, which, since it exists[^13] as most liberal, cannot but produce a person; just as nature, since it exists as most fecund, cannot but produce a person; and this is the proper reason of this emanation.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that creatures emanate by way of liberality; it must be said that to emanate by way of liberality is twofold: either as something willed, or as the ground of willing — that is, either as something given[^14], or as the ground of giving. In the first manner creatures emanate, which are outside; in the second manner the third person in the Trinity emanates, because the ground of willing and of giving is intrinsic to a most perfect will.

2. To that which is objected, that the will is not[^15] an assimilating principle nor one necessarily emanating; it must be said that the will or liberality is a principle in two ways: in one way as distinct in nature, and so it does not assimilate in substance; in another way as concomitant with[^16] nature, and so it assimilates in substance. Since therefore a person so proceeds by way of liberality that nature nevertheless accompanies [it]: therefore [the person is] similar in substance, although the manner of proceeding itself is not by way of one similar; and so this is clear.

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3. To that which is objected, why some person does not proceed by way of reason; it must be said that every noble manner of proceeding is reduced to those two: because every agent either acts naturally, or by will: — for an agent [acting] by violence or by chance is an imperfect agent, and the manner of producing less noble[^17] — whence reason is not distinguished against nature and will as to the manner of acting: and therefore there is no person proceeding by such a manner.

But yet this does not seem fully to resolve [the question], because we distinguish in these creatures a going forth by way of *liberality* from a going forth by way of *art*. And[^18] therefore it must be said that the procession by way of liberality is twofold, either as the ground of liberality or liberality itself, or as *that done liberally*; likewise also in art, either as art itself or the ground of crafting, or as *that crafted*; and in the first manner it can fall upon a divine person, in the second manner not. And in the first manner the Son proceeds, who is "the Word and art full of all living reasons"[^19]. But this manner of emanating is not distinguished from the manner of emanating by way of nature, because he emanates as wholly similar and by way of perfect likeness. But another manner cannot be[^20], because two persons must communicate in the same nature, and because it is necessary that every manner of emanating which is in God be principally by way of nature, or with that [nature] concomitant[^21]. Whence since the procession by way of *will* can be intrinsic, just as love proceeds from the lover: but by way of art [the procession] is always extrinsic, inasmuch as it is of this kind: therefore it is impossible that it fall in God with respect to a person, but it falls only with respect to a creature.

4. To that which is objected last: if a third person is to be posited because of communication, then by parallel reasoning also a fourth: it must be said that every reason and nature[^22] agrees that what can be done most sufficiently by one should not be done by many; otherwise there is something superfluous[^23]. If therefore mutual love cannot be of fewer than to one, and the communication of that mutual [love] not of fewer than to one, and in one there is mutual love, and in another the communication of mutual love most perfectly, since each[^24] receives the whole infinitely; it is clear that there is no further proceeding, but there [we are] to stop. Whence the very same reason which posits the plurality of persons removes infinity and posits trinity.

la: Hoc est, quae ad ipsum diligentem reflectitur, sive qua aliquis diligit naturam propriam, dum dilectio mutua in alterum tendit, quae esse potest vel communicata vel non communicata (privata), prout aliqui ita mutuo se diligunt, quod etiam velint vel dilectum diligi ab aliis aliosque diligere, vel non. Vide Scot., III. Sent. d. 28. et Aristot., II. Magn. Moral. c. 17. (c. 13.). — Mox post *adhuc mutua* cod. M addit *et*.

en: That is, [a love] which is reflected back upon the lover himself, or by which someone loves his own nature, whereas a mutual love tends toward another, which can be either communicated or not communicated (private), inasmuch as some so mutually love each other that they also wish either the beloved to be loved by others and themselves to love others, or not. See Scotus, *III Sent.* d. 28. and Aristotle, *II Magna Moralia* c. 17. (c. 13.). — Soon after *adhuc mutua* codex M adds *et*.

en: Codex A and the first edition add *scilicet*.

la: Vat., reluctantibus vetustioribus mss., repetit hic *summa*. Mox maiorem mss. partem ut aCDGKLORSUVWXYZ secuti, pro *nec cui amor mutuus non communicetur* substituimus *sed cui amor mutuus communicetur*, quo sententia Doctoris distinctior exprimitur, si supples post *sed*: *est persona* scil. Spiritus S. Vide infra q. 3, et a. 2. q. 2. Alii codd. ponunt loco *sed* vel *et* ut codd. FHPQT, vel ut cod. ff *sive*, vel ut cod. cc *sed et*, ed. 1 *autem id est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older manuscripts, repeats here *summa*. Then, following the larger part of the manuscripts (aCDGKLORSUVWXYZ), in place of *nec cui amor mutuus non communicetur* we have substituted *sed cui amor mutuus communicetur*, by which the Doctor's meaning is more clearly expressed, if one supplies after *sed*: *est persona*, namely the Holy Spirit. See below q. 3, and a. 2. q. 2. Other codices put in place of *sed* either *et* (codd. FHPQT), or *sive* (cod. ff), or *sed et* (cod. cc); the first edition: *autem id est*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc, antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 renitentibus, *producendi*, sed minus cohaerenter cum subnexis. Mox cod. T *procedit* loco *emanat*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc, against the older manuscripts and the first edition, *producendi* [is read], but less coherently with what follows. Then codex T has *procedit* in place of *emanat*.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus non apte omissum *persona*.

en: On the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition we have restored *persona*, which had been inappropriately omitted.

la: August., Enarrat. in Psalm. 61. n. 18. seq. Vide infra d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — Paulo ante cod. O *necesse fuit ponere* pro *ponere fuit*.

en: Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 61. n. 18 ff. See below d. 27. p. II. q. 2. — A little before, codex O reads *necesse fuit ponere* in place of *ponere fuit*.

la: Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. cum cod. cc solummodo ponit *producendi* omisso *sive exeundi*. Mox codd. aa bb post *liberalitatis* addunt *vel voluntatis* et cod. Y in fine argumenti ponit *procedentem* loco *procedere*.

en: Thus nearly all the codices with the first edition, while the Vatican edition with codex cc puts only *producendi*, omitting *sive exeundi*. Then codices aa bb after *liberalitatis* add *vel voluntatis*, and codex Y at the end of the argument puts *procedentem* in place of *procedere*.

la: Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. et XII. text. 13. (VIII. c. 5. et XI. c. 3.).

en: See Aristotle, *IX Metaph.* text. 10. and *XII* text. 13. (VIII. c. 5. and XI. c. 3.).

la: Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *ponitur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against very many manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] *ponitur*.

la: Ed. 1 *primae et secundae*.

en: The first edition: *primae et secundae*.

la: Dist. 7. q. 2. fundam. penult., et d. 2. q. 3.

en: Distinction 7. q. 2. penultimate fundamentum, and d. 2. q. 3.

la: Hic in fundam. et d. 2. q. 4.

en: Here in the fundamenta and d. 2. q. 4.

la: Cod. U *quia voluntate existente*.

en: Codex U: *quia voluntate existente*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *datum*, sed contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1, qui et omisso primo *aut* pro secundo ponunt *sive*; at grammatice non ita bene.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *datum*, but against the older codices and the first edition, which, with the first *aut* omitted, put *sive* for the second; but grammatically not so well.

la: Multi codd. ut ABDISTWZ etc. cum ed. 1 *habet*, sed cum subnexis minus cohaerenter.

en: Many codices (e.g. ABDISTWZ) with the first edition [read] *habet*, but less coherently with what follows.

la: Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut RXY et ed. 1, qui loco *cum communicante* legunt *concomitante*, dum alii ut CLOTU habent *comitante*, alii ut FGHI etc. *communicante*. Hac de re vide supra d. 6. q. 2. et 3. Eadem lectionum diversitas reperitur paulo infra respectu verbi *concomitetur*, ubi Vat. etiam particulam *tamen* omittit.

en: We prefer the reading of several manuscripts (e.g. RXY) and the first edition, which in place of *cum communicante* read *concomitante*, while others (e.g. CLOTU) have *comitante*, and others (e.g. FGHI etc.) *communicante*. On this matter see above d. 6. q. 2. and 3. The same diversity of readings is found a little below with respect to the word *concomitetur*, where the Vatican edition also omits the particle *tamen*.

la: De agente per violentiam vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. et II. Magn. Moral. c. 8. et 9. (c. 7. et 8.). — De agente per fortunam cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 13. (XI. c. 3.). et II. Phys. text. 39. et seqq. (c. 4–6.).

en: On an agent [acting] by violence see Aristotle, *III Ethics* c. 1. and *II Magna Moralia* c. 8. and 9. (c. 7. and 8.). — On an agent [acting] by chance cf. *XII Metaph.* text. 13. (XI. c. 3.) and *II Physics* text. 39. ff. (c. 4–6.).

la: Supplevimus ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 particulam *Et*.

en: We have supplied the particle *Et* from very many manuscripts and the first edition.

la: August., VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11. — Paulo infra cod. A *consimilis* loco *similis*.

en: Augustine, *VI De Trinitate* c. 10. n. 11. — A little below, codex A reads *consimilis* in place of *similis*.

la: Supple cum ed. 1: *in divinis*.

en: Supply with the first edition: *in divinis*.

la: Eodem modo, quo paulo superius, etiam hic lectionum occurrit varietas: Vat. cum pluribus codd. *communicante*, alii ut GTU *comitante*, alii ut HIIO XV aa bb ff cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem nostram.

en: In the same way as a little above, here too a variety of readings occurs: the Vatican edition with several codices [reads] *communicante*, others (e.g. GTU) *comitante*, others (e.g. HIIO XV aa bb ff) with the first edition exhibit our reading.

la: Vide Aristot. et Averroem, I. Phys. text. 50. et 36. (c. 6.), et VIII. Topic. c. 1. (c. 9. circa finem), ubi respectu syllogismi dicitur: *Est autem quoddam et idem ad syllogismos peccatum, quando ostenditur per longiora, quod contingit per breviora.* — In hac propositione Vat. *esset* pro *est*. Paulo ante in cod. M post *natura* satis bene additur *in hoc*.

en: See Aristotle and Averroes, *I Physics* text. 50. and 36. (c. 6.), and *VIII Topics* c. 1. (c. 9. near the end), where with respect to the syllogism it is said: *There is moreover a certain identical fault with regard to syllogisms, when it is shown by longer means what could occur by shorter ones.* — In this proposition the Vatican edition has *esset* for *est*. A little before, in codex M after *natura* there is rather aptly added *in hoc*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. perperam *sic*.

en: The Vatican edition with several codices wrongly [reads] *sic*.

la: Plurium mss. ut AFGHIKRU Y etc. et ed. 1 auctoritate pro *utrumque* substituimus *uterque*, quo sensus redditur clarior.

en: On the authority of very many manuscripts (e.g. AFGHIKRU Y etc.) and the first edition we have substituted *uterque* for *utrumque*, by which the sense is rendered clearer.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Spiritus sanctus habet nomen Doni, et quidem Doni, in quo omnia donantur (cfr. infra d. 18. per totam). Quidquid autem donatur, datur per modum liberalitatis. Quo sensu Seraphicus hic accipiat hanc locutionem, explicatione indigere videtur. Liberalitas praeter specialem virtutem moralem implicito etiam importat rationem liberalis seu voluntatis, ut declaratur in solut. ad 3. Cum igitur duplex sit modus emanandi in Deo, scil. per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis, et processio Spiritus sancti sit per modum voluntatis, illa intrinseca perfectio divinae voluntatis, quae se diffundit et exprimit in processione Spiritus sancti, ut Doni omnium donorum, a Sancto vocatur liberalitas. Insuper notandum, quod voluntas in Deo potest accipi vel quatenus secundum nostrum modum intelligendi distinguitur ut potentia contra naturam, vel quatenus concomitatur ipsam naturam eamque communicat in ratione obiecti summe amabilis. In primo sensu voluntas est principium fecundum in productione rerum creatarum, non vero in productione Spiritus sancti; in secundo vero sensu est principium Spiritus sancti. Unde patet quod dicit ad 1. 2; intelligitur etiam quod supra d. 6. q. 2. dictum est de differentia inter productionem Filii et Spiritus sancti. Filius enim procedit a Patre per modum naturae, concomitante voluntate; et quia per modum naturae procedit, procedit ut omnino similis Patri et perfecta ipsius imago (cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.). Spiritus sanctus vero producitur per modum voluntatis, concomitante natura, similis quidem, immo idem omnino in natura, tamen sic, quod vi processionis ratio imaginis completius sit in Filio.

**II.** Argumentum ultimum in fundam., quod ab emanatione creaturarum deducitur, approbatur etiam ab Alex. Hal., S. Thom. (hic in Comment.), Richard. aliisque, sed ab Aegid. (hic) immerito impugnatur, de quo videsis Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1. circa med.).

**III.** De ipsa quaestione Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 1. qui, ut dicit hic Dionys. Carth., «de his plenissime scribit, immo quod iam ex multis doctoribus est inductum, ipse pene totum solus in scripto suo expressit, multaque alia, quae aliorum nullus conscripsisse videtur». — Scot., hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. seq. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 13. a. 1; de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., de hac quaest. et seq. hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 2. concl. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The Holy Spirit has the name of Gift, and indeed of the Gift in which all things are given (cf. below d. 18. throughout). But whatever is given is given by way of liberality. In what sense the Seraphic Doctor here takes this expression seems to need explanation. Liberality, besides the special moral virtue, also implicitly imports the character of liberty — that is, of will — as is declared in the solution to the third [objection]. Since therefore the manner of emanating in God is twofold, namely by way of nature and by way of will, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, that intrinsic perfection of the divine will, which diffuses itself and is expressed in the procession of the Holy Spirit, as the Gift of all gifts, is by the Saint called liberality. Moreover it is to be noted that the will in God can be taken either insofar as, according to our manner of understanding, it is distinguished as a power against nature, or insofar as it accompanies nature itself and communicates it in the character of a supremely lovable object. In the first sense the will is a fecund principle in the production of created things, but not in the production of the Holy Spirit; but in the second sense it is the principle of the Holy Spirit. Whence what he says to 1 [and] 2 is clear; and what was said above d. 6. q. 2. about the difference between the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is also understood. For the Son proceeds from the Father by way of nature, with will accompanying; and because he proceeds by way of nature, he proceeds as wholly similar to the Father and his perfect image (cf. below d. 31. a. 1. q. 2.). But the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will, with nature accompanying — similar indeed, nay wholly the same in nature, yet so that by force of the procession the character of image is more completely in the Son.

**II.** The last argument in the foundations, which is drawn from the emanation of creatures, is also approved by Alex. of Hales, S. Thomas (here in his Commentary), Richard, and others, but is undeservedly attacked by Aegidius (here), concerning which see Dionys. Carth. (here q. 1. about the middle).

**III.** On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 43. m. 1. who, as Dionys. Carth. says here, "writes most fully on these matters; nay rather, what has now been adduced from many doctors he has nearly all alone expressed in his writing, and many other things which none of the others seems to have written down". — Scotus, here q. unic. — S. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1. seq. — B. Albert, *I Sent.* d. 13. a. 1; on this and the following questions *Summa* p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this question and the next, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 61. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 2. concl. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
### *Utrum in divinis ponenda sit persona procedens per modum amoris sive caritatis.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit necesse ponere personam procedentem per modum amoris sive caritatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

**Fundamenta.**

1. Non est[^1] perfecta cognitio sine dilectione, ergo nec perfectum verbum sine amore: ergo nec perfecta emanatio verbi sine emanatione amoris: ergo necesse est ponere emanationem per modum amoris: ergo etc.

2. Item, amor est donum, in quo omnia[^2] alia dona donantur; nihil enim proprie donatur nisi ex amore: si ergo persona procedit per modum liberalitatis, cum ipsa procedat non per aliud, sed per se; ergo per modum amoris sive caritatis.

3. Item, omnis et summa perfectio pluralitatis est in unitate, ergo et distinctionis in unione; sed inter omnes uniones, quae sunt inter distantes, summa et iucundissima est unio caritatis; si ergo est ibi distinctio, est unio; et si unio, est caritatis emanatio.

4. Item, Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens et habitans, facit nos similes illi summae Trinitati, sicut dicit Dominus, Ioannis decimo septimo[^3]: «Ut sint unum, sicut et nos»; sed Spiritus sanctus, in nobis existens, producit primo amorem caritatis, ad Romanos quinto[^4]: «Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris etc.». Ergo necesse est, in illa summa Trinitate reperiri per prius emanationem caritatis.

**Sed contra:**

**Ad oppositum.**

1. Personae divinae sunt hypostases perfectae, ut Pater et Filius; nullus autem amor dicit hypostasim, sed eius proprietatem sive habitum: ergo nulla persona in divinis procedit per modum amoris.

2. Item, amor est eius in quo requiescit affectus: ergo semper accipitur ut in alium tendens; sed omnis persona est in se perfecte ens et distincta: ergo nulla persona procedit per modum amoris.

3. Item, non ob aliud ponitur in divinis emanatio per modum amoris, nisi quia Pater amat Filium: cum ergo Filius amet Spiritum sanctum, pari ratione erit ponere ulteriorem personam emanantem per modum amoris, et[^5] sic in infinitum; et hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, cum in natura intellectuali ex parte potentiae motivae sit accipere irascibilem, quae respicit honorem, sicut concupiscibilem, quae respicit amorem[^6], quaestio est, quare in divinis non accipitur persona secundum actum irascibilis, sicut secundum actum concupiscibilis?

5. Item, cum sint aliae affectiones in anima, ut gaudium, spes et huiusmodi, quare solum per modum amoris procedit persona in divinis? Si tu dicas, quod amor non tenet rationem affectionis, tunc obiicio, quia sicut amor divinus[^7] non est affectio, ita nec gaudium.

6. Item, cum sint alii habitus in anima importantes complementum, cuiusmodi sunt scilicet dona Spiritus sancti, ut intelligentia[^8] et sapientia; quare magis procedit persona per modum amoris, quam per modum alterius habitus? quod si non alius, nec iste debet poni, ut videtur.

### Conclusio.

> Spiritus sanctus per modum amoris procedit, quia procedit per modum voluntatis et liberalitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut probatum est supra[^9], necesse est aliquam personam in divinis procedere per modum liberalitatis, et illam dicimus Spiritum sanctum. Hanc autem necesse est procedere per modum amoris; quia, si ponatur in divinis emanatio[^10] per modum voluntatis, necesse est, quod inter omnes sit prima et nobilissima. Emanatio autem per modum amoris est huiusmodi, quod patet, si respiciamus in anima. Affectio enim amoris est prima inter omnes affectiones et radix omnium aliarum, sicut ostendit Augustinus in pluribus locis, maxime in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^11]. Et ista affectio nobilissima est inter omnes, quoniam plus

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tenet de ratione liberalitatis. Unde hoc est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur, et in quo consistunt omnes deliciae substantiae intellectualis. Unde nihil in creaturis est considerare ita deliciosum, sicut amorem mutuum; et sine amore nullae sunt deliciae[^12]. Propter hoc dicit Philosophus[^13], quod amicitia aut est beatitudo, aut non sine beatitudine. Si ergo emanatio est per modum liberalitatis in divinis, necesse fuit esse[^14] primam et summam; et sic necesse fuit esse per modum amoris.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod amor nominat habitum, non substantiam; dicendum, quod loqui de amore est ratione eius quod nominat, et sic non dicit substantiam; vel ratione eius circa quod ponitur; et quia ponitur in Deo, in quo nullum accidens, sed totum[^15] substantia est, ideo non dicit habitum vel proprietatem, sed magis substantiam; et cum dicat egressum, dicit hypostasim sive personam. Simile dicendum est de Verbo[^16].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor caritatis semper in alium tendit, et ita procedit in alium et non stat in se; dicendum, quod procedere in alium est dupliciter: aut quia aliud respicit ut obiectum, aut quia in aliud tendit et recipitur. Primo modo bene convenit personae in divinis, quia bene convenit habere respectum ad aliam personam; unde Spiritus sanctus est amor, quo Pater amat Filium. Si autem dicatur tendere secundo modo, sic non habet locum in proposito, quia, quando ego amo alium, amor non exit a me, ita ut recipiatur in alio, sed tantum a voluntate procedit, et quia est accidens, ideo non recedit, sed in voluntate subsistit. In divinis vero, quia hypostasis est, ideo in se subsistit.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similiter Filius amans Spiritum sanctum produceret aliam personam; dicendum, quod hoc non tantum facit, quod Pater et Filius producant aliam personam, quia[^17] est amor, quo se amant, sed etiam, quia in eis voluntas est fecundissima. Ratio huius dicetur infra[^18], et illa non est in Spiritu sancto. Nihilominus tamen potest dici, quod status est in primo amore. Nam primo amore producto, cum ille se ipso amet[^19] et ametur, non oportet, alium amorem produci sive aliam personam per modum amoris.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare non est emanatio quantum ad actum irascibilis? quidam respondent, quod haec vis non habet locum in substantia pure spirituali; tamen supposito, quod sit in substantia intellectuali, adhuc actus eius non competit productioni personae, tum quia naturaliter sequitur actum concupiscibilis; «ira enim est vindex laesae concupiscentiae», ut dicit Damascenus[^20]; tum etiam, quia actus eius consistit aut respectu superioris, et hoc non potest esse ubi nihil est superius; aut respectu inferioris, et hoc similiter non, quia nulla est inferioritas ibi; respectu paris similiter non potest esse in Deo, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia et victoriosa repulsione[^21]; in personis autem divinis summam unionem et convenientiam esse necesse est. Et si tu obiicias, quod non omnis actus irascibilis est respectu disconvenientis, quod patet in spe, et quia in Beatis habebit irascibilis actum; dicendum, quod vel consistit respectu disconvenientis vincendi, vel respectu ardui aggrediendi, et ita vel gradum vel disconvenientiam dicit; sed neutrum potest esse in divinis personis.

5, 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de aliis affectibus et habitibus, iam patet responsio. Quia amor est affectus intimus et primus et nobilissimus, quia origo omnium aliorum, ideo complectitur in se totam nobilitatem emanationis per modum liberalitatis: ideo nulla persona debuit emanare per modum alterius habitus, cum talis modus non sit principalis.

english:
### Question II.
### *Whether a person proceeding by way of love or charity is to be posited in God.*

Second, the question is whether in God it is necessary to posit a person proceeding by way of love or charity. And that it is so, seems to follow.

**Foundations.**

1. There is no[^1] perfect knowledge without love, therefore no perfect word without love either; therefore no perfect emanation of the word without an emanation of love; therefore it is necessary to posit an emanation by way of love: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, love is the gift in which all[^2] other gifts are given; for nothing is properly given except out of love: if therefore a person proceeds by way of liberality, since that person proceeds not through another but through itself, therefore [it proceeds] by way of love or charity.

3. Likewise, every and the highest perfection of plurality is in unity, therefore also that of distinction is in union; but among all the unions which exist between distinct things, the highest and most delightful is the union of charity; if therefore there is distinction there, there is union; and if union, there is an emanation of charity.

4. Likewise, the Holy Spirit, existing and dwelling in us, makes us like that highest Trinity, as the Lord says, in John seventeen[^3]: «That they may be one, as we also [are]»; but the Holy Spirit, existing in us, produces first the love of charity, to the Romans five[^4]: «The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts etc.». Therefore it is necessary that in that highest Trinity an emanation of charity be found first.

**On the contrary:**

**To the opposite.**

1. The divine persons are perfect hypostases, as the Father and the Son; but no love expresses a hypostasis, but rather its property or habit: therefore no person in God proceeds by way of love.

2. Likewise, love belongs to that in which the affection comes to rest: therefore it is always taken as tending toward another; but every person is in itself perfectly a being and distinct: therefore no person proceeds by way of love.

3. Likewise, an emanation by way of love is posited in God for no other reason than that the Father loves the Son: since therefore the Son loves the Holy Spirit, by the same reasoning a further person emanating by way of love will have to be posited, and[^5] so on to infinity; and this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, since in intellectual nature, on the side of the motive power, one must admit the irascible, which has regard to honor, just as the concupiscible, which has regard to love[^6], the question arises, why in God is a person not taken according to the act of the irascible, as according to the act of the concupiscible?

5. Likewise, since there are other affections in the soul, such as joy, hope, and the like, why is it only by way of love that a person proceeds in God? If you say that love does not have the character of an affection, then I object, because just as divine love[^7] is not an affection, neither is joy.

6. Likewise, since there are other habits in the soul carrying completion, of which kind namely are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as understanding[^8] and wisdom; why does a person proceed by way of love rather than by way of some other habit? but if not another, neither ought this one to be posited, so it seems.

### Conclusion.

> The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love, because it proceeds by way of will and liberality.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been proved above[^9], it is necessary that some person in God proceed by way of liberality, and that one we call the Holy Spirit. But this person must necessarily proceed by way of love; because, if there is posited in God an emanation[^10] by way of will, it is necessary that among all [emanations] it be the first and most noble. Now an emanation by way of love is of this kind, which is clear if we look at the soul. For the affection of love is the first among all affections and the root of all the others, as Augustine shows in many places, especially in the fourteenth [book] *On the City of God*[^11]. And this affection is the most noble among all, because it

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holds more of the character of liberality. Hence this is the gift in which all other gifts are given, and in which consist all the delights of the intellectual substance. Hence nothing in creatures is to be considered so delightful as mutual love; and without love there are no delights[^12]. On account of this the Philosopher says[^13] that friendship either is beatitude, or is not without beatitude. If therefore the emanation is by way of liberality in God, it had to be[^14] the first and highest; and thus it had to be by way of love.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected, that love names a habit, not a substance; it must be said that to speak of love is either by reason of what it names, and thus it does not signify a substance; or by reason of that about which it is set; and because it is set in God, in whom there is no accident, but everything[^15] is substance, therefore it does not signify a habit or property, but rather a substance; and since it expresses an issuing-forth, it signifies a hypostasis or person. The like must be said of the Word[^16].

2. To that which is objected, that the love of charity always tends toward another, and so proceeds into another and does not remain in itself; it must be said that to proceed into another is twofold: either because it has regard to another as object, or because it tends into another and is received [there]. In the first way it well befits a person in God, since it well befits [a person] to have regard to another person; hence the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son. But if it be said to tend in the second way, that has no place in the present case; because, when I love another, love does not go out from me so as to be received in the other, but proceeds only from the will, and because it is an accident, therefore it does not depart but subsists in the will. But in God, because it is a hypostasis, it therefore subsists in itself.

3. To that which is objected, that likewise the Son loving the Holy Spirit would produce another person; it must be said that this is not the sole [reason] which brings it about that the Father and the Son produce another person, namely that[^17] there is love by which they love one another, but also that in them the will is most fecund. The reason for this will be stated below[^18], and that [reason] is not in the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless it can be said that there is a stop in the first love. For, the first love having been produced, since it by its very self loves[^19] and is loved, there is no need that another love be produced or another person by way of love.

4. To that which is asked, why there is not an emanation as regards the act of the irascible: some answer that this power has no place in a purely spiritual substance; nevertheless, supposing it to be in an intellectual substance, still its act does not befit the production of a person: both because it naturally follows the act of the concupiscible — «for anger is the avenger of injured desire», as Damascene says[^20] — and also because its act consists either with respect to a superior, and this cannot be where there is nothing superior; or with respect to an inferior, and this likewise not, because there is no inferiority there; with respect to an equal it likewise cannot be in God, because thus it is with a certain disagreement and victorious repulsion[^21]; whereas in the divine persons the highest union and agreement must necessarily exist. And if you object that not every act of the irascible is with respect to something disagreeable, which is clear in hope, and because in the Blessed the irascible will have its act; it must be said that either it consists with respect to a disagreeable thing to be conquered, or with respect to something arduous to be undertaken, and thus it expresses either a degree or a disagreement; but neither can be in the divine persons.

5, 6. To that which is objected concerning other affections and habits, the response is already clear. Because love is the inmost and first and most noble affection, since it is the origin of all the others, therefore it embraces in itself the whole nobility of emanation by way of liberality: therefore no person had to emanate by way of another habit, since such a way is not the principal one.

la: Mss. et ed. 1 *postulantibus*, expunximus hic a Vat. additum *enim*. Mox post *cognitio* eod. W addit *boni*. — Cfr. de hoc argumento August., IX. de Trin. c. 10. n. 15. ubi et ait: *Verbum est... cum amore notitia.*

en: The manuscripts and edition 1 [read] *postulantibus*; we have here expunged *enim*, added from the Vatican [edition]. Then after *cognitio* the same codex W adds *boni*. — Cf. on this argument Augustine, *On the Trinity* IX, c. 10, n. 15, where he also says: *The word is... knowledge together with love.*

la: Ex multis mss. et ed. 1. adiecimus *omnia*. — Plura de hac propositione vide infra d. 18. q. 1.

en: From many manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *omnia*. — On this proposition see further below, d. 18, q. 1.

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Vers. 5. — Mox cod. U *communicationem* loco *emanationem*.

en: Verse 5. — Then codex U [reads] *communicationem* in place of *emanationem*.

la: Ed. 1 *sed* pro *et*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *sed* for *et*.

la: Praestituimus lectionem distinctiorem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 pro lectione Vat. et cod. cc sic *concupiscibilis amorem*. Haec motivae potentiae divisio, a Scholasticis recepta, occurrit in Nemesii Episc. Emeseni libro *de Natura hominis* c. 16. et seqq.; ac in Gregorii Nysseni libro *de Anima et resurrectione*, et in Epistola eiusdem canonica ad S. Letoium; ac Ioan. Damasc., II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 22, ubi et passiones seu affectiones animae enumerantur. Vide et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 41. et 53. (c. 9. seq.); *de Motu animal.* c. 3. (c. 6.); II. *Ethic.* c. 5, et I. *Magn. Moral.* c. 8. (c. 7. et 8.).

en: We have preferred the more distinct reading of the older manuscripts and edition 1 over the reading of the Vatican [edition] and codex cc, which reads thus: *concupiscibilis amorem*. This division of the motive power, received by the Scholastics, occurs in Nemesius bishop of Emesa, *On the Nature of Man*, c. 16 and following; and in Gregory of Nyssa's book *On the Soul and Resurrection*, and in his canonical letter to St. Letoius; and in John Damascene, II. *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 22, where also the passions or affections of the soul are enumerated. See also Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 41 and 53 (c. 9 sq.); *On the Motion of Animals* c. 3 (c. 6); II. *Ethics* c. 5, and I. *Greater Morals* c. 8 (c. 7 and 8).

la: Codd. V Y *in divinis*.

en: Codices V Y [read] *in divinis*.

la: Ed. 1 *intellectus*. Paulo infra post *si non* codd. T V addunt *est*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *intellectus*. A little below, after *si non*, codices T V add *est*.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding Question.

la: Codd. R T et ed. 1 *processio*.

en: Codices R T and edition 1 [read] *processio*.

la: Cap. 7-9. Mss. et omnes edd. falso citant XIV: *de Trin*. — Paulo ante ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ostendit* loco *dicit*. Mox post *Unde* cod. Y *haec* pro *hoc*.

en: Cap. 7-9. The manuscripts and all editions wrongly cite XIV: *On the Trinity*. — A little before, from very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *ostendit* in place of *dicit*. Then after *Unde* codex Y [reads] *haec* for *hoc*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Libr. IX. *Ethic.* c. 9, ubi conversa probatur, quod scil. beatitudo non sit sine amicitia. — In seqq. locis probatur amicitiam coniunctam esse iucunditati: VIII. *Ethic.* c. 1; II. *Magn. Moral.* c. 12. (c. 11.) et VII. *Moral. Eudem.* c. 2. seqq. ac I. *Rhet.* c. *de Iucundis*.

en: Book IX of the *Ethics*, c. 9, where the converse is proved, namely that beatitude is not without friendship. — In the following passages it is proved that friendship is conjoined with delight: VIII. *Ethics* c. 1; II. *Greater Morals* c. 12 (c. 11) and VII. *Eudemian Morals* c. 2 sqq., and I. *Rhetoric*, chapter *On Things Delightful*.

la: Cod. O *necesse est eam esse*. Mox, consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, post *fuit* adiecimus *esse*.

en: Codex O [reads] *necesse est eam esse*. Then, with the manuscripts and edition 1 agreeing, after *fuit* we have added *esse*.

la: Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 non ita bene *tota*. Vat. hic contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 repetit *in Deo*.

en: Very many codices with edition 1, not so well, [read] *tota*. The Vatican [edition] here, against the older codices and edition 1, repeats *in Deo*.

la: In Vat. hic additur *quamvis enim verbum in nobis sit accidens, est tamen substantia in Deo*, sed obest auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.

en: In the Vatican [edition] there is here added *for although the word in us is an accident, nevertheless in God it is a substance*, but the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 stands against it.

la: Supple: *haec persona*. Praeferimus hanc lectionem, in qua et convenit maior pars codd. ut I L O R S T U W X Y etc., dum Vat. hic *quae* loco *quia*, et mox *quia* pro *quo* habet; ceteri autem codd. vel consentiunt lectioni Vat. totaliter, vel tantum partialiter; sic cod. K cum ed. 1 *quae est amor, quo*.

en: Supply: *this person*. We prefer this reading, in which also the greater part of the codices agree, such as I L O R S T U W X Y etc., whereas the Vatican [edition] here has *quae* in place of *quia*, and then *quia* for *quo*; the other codices either agree with the Vatican reading totally, or only partially; thus codex K with edition 1 [reads] *quae est amor, quo*.

la: Dist. 11. q. 2. et d. 13. q. 3. — Mox post *status* plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 fide substituimus *est* pro *sit*.

en: Distinction 11, q. 2 and d. 13, q. 3. — Then after *status* on the faith of very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *est* for *sit*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc addit *alium*, quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Mox multi codd. ut A C F G H I K L R S U V W X Y etc. *illum* loco *alium*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds *alium*, which is missing in the older manuscripts and edition 1. Then many codices, such as A C F G H I K L R S U V W X Y etc., [read] *illum* in place of *alium*.

la: Libr. II. *de Fide orthod.* c. 16: *Est porro ira rationis satelles, vindex cupiditatis.*

en: Book II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 16: *Anger, moreover, is the attendant of reason, the avenger of desire.*

la: Vat. praecedentia exhibet ita: *nulla est inferioritas in persona producta respectu Patris, non similiter potest esse in Deo respectu disconvenientis, quia sic est cum quadam disconvenientia in victoriosa repulsione*, quae lectio interpolata et distorta castigatur auctoritate mss., qui quoad lectionis substantiam omnes inter se consentiunt et cum ed. 1.

en: The Vatican [edition] presents the preceding thus: *there is no inferiority in the produced person with respect to the Father; it cannot likewise be in God with respect to something disagreeable, because thus it is with a certain disagreement in victorious repulsion*; this interpolated and distorted reading is corrected on the authority of the manuscripts, which as regards the substance of the reading all agree among themselves and with edition 1.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Amor seu caritas in divinis accipitur tripliciter: *essentialiter*, et sic est illa complacentia, qua quaelibet persona diligit se et duas alias personas; *notionaliter*, et sic est ipsa spiratio activa sive concordia in spirando, qua Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum; *personaliter*, et sic est ipsa persona procedens i. e. Spiritus sanctus (cfr. infra a. 2. q. 1.). Et notandum, quod Spiritus sanctus non procedit ut id quod datur per amorem, sed ut amor datus sive productus.

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**II.** Quaestio in solut. ad 4. tacta, utrum vis irascibilis habeat locum in substantia spirituali, resolvitur quoad Deum a S. Bonaventura (I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 10.) cum sententia communi sic: «Vis irascibilis et ira non recipitur in Deo nisi transsumtive». Quoad Angelos et appetitum rationalem animae humanae Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) affirmat, in appetitu rationali distinguendam esse vim irascibilem et concupiscibilem; sed ipsius argumenta a Scot. (III. Sent. d. 26. q. unic.) impugnantur. Etiam S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 59. a. 4.) illam distinctionem Henr. Gand. non admittit, nec Richardus (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.); etiam Petr. a Tar. (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 7.) hanc negativam sententiam reputat probabiliorem. Propriam suam sententiam Scot. explicat alibi (III. Sent. d. 34. q. unic.), admittendo aliquam distinctionem ex parte obiecti, cui consentiunt S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2, et d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.) et Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 29. m. 3.).

**III.** Ipsa quaestio non ab omnibus antiquis explicite tractatur. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unic., et infra d. 32. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 37. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Love or charity in God is taken in three ways: *essentially*, and thus it is that complacency by which any person loves itself and the two other persons; *notionally*, and thus it is the active spiration itself or the concord in spirating, by which the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit; *personally*, and thus it is the proceeding person itself, i.e., the Holy Spirit (cf. below a. 2. q. 1.). And it is to be noted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as that which is given through love, but as love given or produced.

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**II.** The question touched in the solution to [argument] 4, whether the irascible power has place in a spiritual substance, is resolved as regards God by St. Bonaventure (I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 10.) with the common opinion thus: «The irascible power and anger are not received in God except by transumption». As regards Angels and the rational appetite of the human soul, Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 8. q. 15.) affirms that in the rational appetite the irascible and concupiscible powers are to be distinguished; but his arguments are impugned by Scotus (III. Sent. d. 26. q. unic.). St. Thomas (S. 1. q. 59. a. 4.) likewise does not admit that distinction of Henry of Ghent, nor does Richard (II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.); Peter of Tarentaise also (III. Sent. d. 26. a. 7.) considers this negative opinion the more probable. Scotus explains his own opinion elsewhere (III. Sent. d. 34. q. unic.), admitting some distinction on the side of the object, in which St. Bonaventure concurs (II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2, and d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 33. a. 1. q. 3.), as does Alexander of Hales (S. p. II. q. 29. m. 3.).

**III.** The question itself is not explicitly treated by all the ancients. Cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 43. m. 3. a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unic., and below d. 32. q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 37. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 61. q. 5.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Whether a third person proceeding by way of mutual charity is to be posited in God

source_text:
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### Quaestio III

*Utrum in divinis ponenda sit tertia persona procedens per modum mutuae caritatis.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit necesse ponere tertiam personam procedentem per modum mutuae caritatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ioannis decimo septimo[^1]: «Ut sint unum, sicut et nos»: Dominus orat et petit discipulis unitatem, non naturae, sed dilectionis per conformitatem ad illam summam unitatem; sed membra Christi uniuntur per amorem mutuum: ergo in divinis est exemplar huius: sic etc.[^2]

2. Item, Hieronymus super Psalmum decimum septimum[^3]: «Spiritus sanctus est amor, quem habet Pater in Filium, et Filius in Patrem»: ergo est amor mutuus.

3. Item, ratione ostenditur hoc ipsum, quia perfectior est dilectio, quando est mutua, quia si non est mutua, ex altera parte claudicat; sed in illa dilectione est summa perfectio et nulla claudicatio: ergo etc.

4. Item, qui non amat vicissim amantem se recte et liberaliter aut est iniquus, aut ingratus: cum ergo in divinis nulla sit iniquitas, nulla ingratitudo, necesse est ibi esse amorem mutuum.

**Contra:**

1. Si est amor mutuus, ergo Filii in Patrem et Patris in Filium: ergo Pater aliquid recipit a Filio; quod absurdum est.

2. Item, qui amat amantem facit quod debet, quia hoc est debitum, quod rependendum est; ergo si est in divinis amor mutuus, ergo est debitus: ergo non est liberalissimus, quod absurdum est.

3. Item, nullus amor mutuus est amor unicus; haec per se nota est; ergo si Spiritus sanctus est amor mutuus, unicus non est amor.

4. Item, si amor est mutuus, ergo est amor Patris ad Filium; sed iste, ut dicit Richardus[^4], est amor gratuitus, similiter erit Filii ad Patrem; et iste, ut ipse dicit, est amor debitus: ergo si tertia persona procedit per modum amoris gratuiti et debiti, ergo est amor ex utroque permixtus: ergo non amor purus. Et iterum, cum iste amor sit Filius, videtur quod Filius sit Spiritus sanctus, quia, ut dicit Richardus[^5], in Filio est amor ex utroque permixtus.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Tertia persona procedit per modum mutuae caritatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum amor perfectionem delectationis[^6] et unionis et rectitudinis habeat ex mutualitate, aut non est personam ponere in divinis procedere per modum amoris, aut, si procedit, procedit per modum mutuae caritatis.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod tunc Filius aliquid dat Patri; dicendum, quod ex hoc, quod amans per amorem tendit in amatum, nihil dat ei; alioquin nos daremus aliquid Deo, cum ipsum amamus.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor mutuus est debitus; dicendum, quod debitus est, quia rectus; sed tamen amor non considerat debitum. Unde quantumcumque debeatur, dum tamen debitum non attendatur, non minuitur ratio liberalitatis, immo ostenditur ratio rectitudinis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: si mutuus, non unicus[^7]; dicendum, quod verum est in amantibus, quorum affectus sunt diversi; non sic est in Deo.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est amor purus; dicendum, quod ex utraque parte liberalis est, et ideo omnino purus. Et quod[^8] dicit Richardus, quod est amor debitus et gratuitus; dicendum, quod istae conditiones non dicunt modum amandi circa amorem, sed dicunt modum emanandi sive originis circa personas.

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english:
### Question III

*Whether in God a third person is to be posited proceeding by way of mutual charity.*

Thirdly it is asked whether it is necessary to posit a third person proceeding by way of mutual charity. And that it is so, it seems.

1. John 17[^1]: «That they may be one, even as we are»: the Lord prays and asks for the disciples a unity, not of nature, but of love through conformity to that highest unity; but the members of Christ are united by mutual love: therefore in God there is an exemplar of this: and so on.[^2]

2. Likewise, Jerome on Psalm 17[^3]: «The Holy Spirit is the love which the Father has toward the Son, and the Son toward the Father»: therefore it is a mutual love.

3. Likewise, this same point is shown by reason, because love is more perfect when it is mutual, since if it is not mutual, it limps on the other side; but in that love is the highest perfection and no limping: therefore, and so on.

4. Likewise, he who does not love in return one who loves him rightly and liberally is either unjust or ungrateful: since therefore in God there is no injustice and no ingratitude, it is necessary that there be mutual love.

**On the contrary:**

1. If there is mutual love, therefore [it is] of the Son toward the Father and of the Father toward the Son: therefore the Father receives something from the Son; which is absurd.

2. Likewise, he who loves one who loves him does what is owed, because this is a debt which is to be repaid; therefore if in God there is mutual love, therefore it is owed: therefore it is not most liberal, which is absurd.

3. Likewise, no mutual love is a unique love; this is self-evident; therefore if the Holy Spirit is mutual love, He is not a unique love.

4. Likewise, if the love is mutual, therefore it is the love of the Father toward the Son; but this love, as Richard says[^4], is gratuitous love; likewise will there be [love] of the Son toward the Father; and this, as he himself says, is owed love: therefore if the third person proceeds by way of gratuitous and owed love, therefore it is a love mixed from both: therefore not pure love. And again, since this love is the Son, it seems that the Son is the Holy Spirit, because, as Richard says[^5], in the Son there is a love mixed from both.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The third person proceeds by way of mutual charity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since love has the perfection of delight[^6] and of union and of rectitude from mutuality, either one is not to posit a person in God to proceed by way of love, or, if one does proceed, it proceeds by way of mutual charity.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To what is objected to the contrary, that then the Son gives something to the Father; it must be said that from the fact that the lover by love tends toward the beloved, he gives nothing to him; otherwise we would be giving something to God when we love Him.

*To 2.* To what is objected, that mutual love is owed; it must be said that it is owed because it is right; yet love does not consider what is owed. Hence however much may be owed, so long as the debt is not attended to, the character of liberality is not diminished; rather, the character of rectitude is shown.

*To 3.* To what is objected: if mutual, not unique[^7]; it must be said that this is true among lovers whose affections are diverse; it is not so in God.

*To 4.* To what is objected, that it is not pure love; it must be said that from each side it is liberal, and therefore wholly pure. And as to what[^8] Richard says, that it is owed and gratuitous love; it must be said that these conditions do not state the mode of loving with respect to the love itself, but state the mode of emanation or of origin with respect to the persons.

la: Vers. 22.

en: Verse 22.

la: Pauci codd. ut HIPQ; et sic patet etc.

en: A few codices, such as HIPQ: *and so it is clear, etc.*

la: Vide lit. Magistri, c. 2. post medium.

en: See the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 2, after the middle.

la: Libr. V. *de Trin.* c. 17. et seqq. — Mox post *iste* Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 additur *ergo*, et paulo infra contra multos codd. ut A G K T Z etc. et ed. 1 habetur *ille* loco *iste*.

en: [Richard of St. Victor], Book V, *On the Trinity*, c. 17 and following. — Shortly after *iste*, the Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *ergo*; and a little further on, against many codices such as A, G, K, T, Z, etc., and ed. 1, it has *ille* in place of *iste*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Richardus*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *Richardus*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut A F K U Z cum ed. 1 *dilectionis*.

en: Several codices, such as A, F, K, U, Z, together with ed. 1, [read] *dilectionis* [love].

la: Cod. X *obiicitur: nullus amor mutuus est unicus*.

en: Codex X [reads]: *it is objected: no mutual love is unique*.

la: Vat. loco *quod* habet *cum*, deinde omittit *Richardus*, refragantibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1, sicuti et paulo infra ponit perperam *emanandi* pro *amandi*.

en: The Vatican edition, in place of *quod*, has *cum*, then omits *Richardus*, against the older manuscripts and ed. 1; likewise a little further on it wrongly puts *emanandi* for *amandi*.

latin_scholion:
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**I.** In solut. ad 4. verba locum Richardi a S. Victore exponentia: «Non dicunt modum amandi circa amorem etc.» hunc sensum habent: Pater habet amorem gratuitum, quia non est ab alio, Filius amorem permixtum, quia a Patre procedit et cum ipso producit Spiritum sanctum, cui attribuitur amor debitus, quia non producit personam, sed ipse producitur. Cum vero amor in tribus personis sit idem et purissimus, locutio Richardi sumenda est non in sensu proprio, sed metaphorico; unde Scholastici posteriores eam non probabant. Cfr. Brulifer ad hunc locum S. Bonaventurae.

**II.** Quoad conclusionem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 5. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1, et d. 32. q. 1. ad 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. n. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 61. q. 4, et a. 54. q. 6. n. 47. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 12. q. 2. nota 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the solution to [argument] 4, the words expounding the passage of Richard of St. Victor — «They do not state the mode of loving with respect to the love, etc.» — have this sense: the Father has gratuitous love, because He is not from another; the Son has mixed love, because He proceeds from the Father and together with Him produces the Holy Spirit, to whom is attributed owed love, because He does not produce a person, but is Himself produced. But since love in the three persons is the same and most pure, Richard's expression must be taken not in a proper sense, but in a metaphorical one; whence the later Scholastics did not approve it. Cf. Brulefer (Stephanus Brulefer, †1499) on this passage of St. Bonaventure.

**II.** As to the conclusion, cf. Alex. of Hales, *Summa*, p. I, q. 43, m. 5. — Scotus, I *Sent.* d. 12, q. 1, and d. 32, q. 1, ad 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, n. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 61, q. 4, and a. 54, q. 6, n. 47. — Biel, I *Sent.* d. 12, q. 2, nota 3.

---


title: Dist. 10, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De proprietate Spiritus sancti.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum amor sive caritas sit proprium Spiritus sancti.*

Circa primum, quod caritas sit proprium Spiritus sancti, sic ostenditur.

1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate[^1]: «Sicut in illa Trinitate non solus Spiritus sanctus est spiritus, tamen proprie dicitur Spiritus sanctus; ita, quamvis Pater sit caritas et Filius caritas, tamen proprie caritas dicitur illa persona, sicut proprie dicitur Spiritus sanctus».

2. Item, hoc idem ostenditur per eundem super primam Canonicam Ioannis[^2], ubi intendit proprietatem Spiritus sancti invenire, et ad hoc perducit sermonem, quod Spiritus sanctus est caritas.

3. Item, ratione ostenditur illud idem: quia[^3] illud est proprie proprium personae, quod dicit modum emanandi ipsius; sed amor est huiusmodi, ut probatum est[^4]: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut verbum se habet ad Filium, ita amor ad Spiritum sanctum; sed verbum est proprium Filii: ergo et amor proprium Spiritus sancti.

**Contra:**

1. Augustinus in decimo quinto de Trinitate[^5]: «Pater est caritas, et Filius est caritas, et Spiritus sanctus est caritas, et simul omnes una caritas»: ergo caritas non dicitur proprie de Spiritu sancto.

2. Item, amor non procedit aliter quam amando: ergo cum amor de necessitate insit amanti, et Pater et Filius amando producant Spiritum sanctum, impossibile videtur, quod ei conveniat proprie. Aut ergo Spiritus sanctus non est persona, aut non est amor proprie sive[^6] non procedit per modum amoris.

3. Item, sicut se habet sapientia ad Filium, ita amor ad Spiritum sanctum; sed sapientia non est Filii proprium, immo appropriatum solum: ergo et[^7] amor similiter Spiritus sancti: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne[^8] quod dicitur proprie, importat aliquam relationem: ergo si amor proprie dicitur, importat relationem. Quaero: ad quid? aut ad amantem, aut ad amatum[^9]. Si ad amantem, ergo amans non est amor; similiter si ad amatum, tunc ergo Spiritus sanctus aut non amaret aut non amaretur; hoc autem est inconveniens.

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> **Conclusio.** *Caritas, personaliter accepta, est proprium Spiritus sancti; essentialiter accepta dicit complacentiam; notionaliter vero concordiam in spirando.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dilectio in divinis potest accipi et accipitur necessario essentialiter, notionaliter et personaliter: essentialiter, quia quilibet diligit se[^10]; notionaliter vero, quia Pater et Filius concordant in spirando Spiritum sanctum, quae concordia amor sive dilectio est; personaliter vero, quia ille qui producitur per modum perfectae liberalitatis, non potest esse nisi amor sive dilectio.

Unde essentialiter dictum dicit complacentiam, notionaliter vero concordiam in spirando, personaliter vero processum in[^11] illa concordia.

Huius autem[^12] exemplum potest poni in amore creato, quo sponsus et sponsa se diligunt. Nam diligunt se amore sociali ad convivendum; diligunt se ulterius amore coniugali ad prolem procreandam, et illa[^13], si produceretur ex sola concordiae voluntate, amor esset; nunc vero est amatus, nisi dicatur amor per emphaticum loquendi modum. In divinis vero vere et proprie amor est, habens rationem amoris et hypostasis: amoris propter hoc, quia ex voluntate liberalissima primo procedit per modum perfectae liberalitatis; hypostasis, quia cum distinguatur a producente et non possit distingui essentialiter, distinguitur personaliter; non sic autem est in amore creato.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ex hoc patet illud quod obiicitur primo et secundo, cum dicitur, quod[^14] est proprietas amantium sive producentium; quia accipitur notionaliter; nam prout ab eis procedit, non potest esse proprietas, sed persona distincta. Unde non omnino est similis processus amoris creati et amoris increati[^15], quia hic est proprietas, ibi hypostasis et substantia.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia, dicendum, quod non est simile; quia sapientia non dicit respectum ad alium, et ideo semper de se dicitur ad se et est essentiale, nisi approprietur; sed amor respectum dicit ad eos, qui amore nectuntur. Unde sicut verbum est proprium Filii, non appropriatum[^16], quia connotat respectum ad dicentem; sic etiam amor sive caritas non tantum est appropriatum, verum etiam proprium Spiritus sancti. Et sicut procedit Filius a Patre per modum verbi, ita Spiritus sanctus per modum amoris. Et ex hoc est, sicut melius patebit infra[^17], quod haec admittitur: Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto; non autem, quod Pater sit sapiens sapientia genita.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur: ad quid dicit respectum? dicendum, quod ad amantes, secundum quod hoc quod est amantes tenetur notionaliter, sicut praetactum est[^18]. Uno enim modo diligere se idem est quod concordiler spirare; hoc modo Spiritus sanctus non est amans, quia non spirat. Ipse autem obiicit de essentiali[^19], qui non dicit egressum ab amante, sed solum dicit complacentiam voluntatis, qua quilibet amat et amatur.

english:
### Article II. *On the property of the Holy Spirit.*
### Question I. *Whether love or charity is proper to the Holy Spirit.*

Concerning the first, that charity is proper to the Holy Spirit, it is shown thus.

1. Augustine, in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^1]: "Just as in that Trinity not only the Holy Spirit is spirit, yet he is properly called the Holy Spirit; so, although the Father is charity and the Son is charity, yet that person is properly called charity, just as he is properly called the Holy Spirit."

2. Likewise, the same is shown by the same [Augustine] on the First Canonical [Epistle] of John[^2], where he intends to find the property of the Holy Spirit, and brings the discourse to this point, that the Holy Spirit is charity.

3. Likewise, the same is shown by reason: since[^3] that is properly proper to a person which states its mode of emanating; but love is of this sort, as has been proved[^4]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, as the word stands to the Son, so love to the Holy Spirit; but the word is proper to the Son: therefore love also is proper to the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[^5]: "The Father is charity, and the Son is charity, and the Holy Spirit is charity, and all together are one charity": therefore charity is not properly said of the Holy Spirit.

2. Likewise, love does not proceed otherwise than by loving: therefore, since love by necessity is in the lover, and the Father and the Son by loving produce the Holy Spirit, it seems impossible that it should belong to him properly. Either, then, the Holy Spirit is not a person, or he is not love properly, or[^6] he does not proceed by the mode of love.

3. Likewise, as wisdom stands to the Son, so love to the Holy Spirit; but wisdom is not proper to the Son, but only appropriated: therefore also[^7] love similarly to the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything[^8] that is said properly imports some relation: therefore if love is said properly, it imports a relation. I ask: to what? Either to the lover, or to the beloved[^9]. If to the lover, then the lover is not love; likewise if to the beloved, then the Holy Spirit either would not love or would not be loved; but this is unfitting.

> **Conclusion.** *Charity, taken personally, is proper to the Holy Spirit; taken essentially, it states complacency; but notionally, concord in spirating.*

**I respond:** It must be said that love in the divine [reality] can be and necessarily is taken essentially, notionally, and personally: essentially, because each one loves himself[^10]; notionally, however, because the Father and the Son agree in spirating the Holy Spirit, which concord is love or affection; but personally, because he who is produced by the mode of perfect liberality cannot be other than love or affection.

Hence, said essentially, it states complacency; notionally, concord in spirating; but personally, the procession in[^11] that concord.

An example of this[^12] can be set in created love, by which a husband and wife love each other. For they love each other with social love for living together; they love each other further with conjugal love for the procreation of offspring, and that [offspring][^13], if it were produced from the will of concord alone, would be love; but now it is one beloved, unless it be called love by an emphatic mode of speaking. In the divine, however, it is truly and properly love, having the character of love and of hypostasis: of love on account of this, that from the most liberal will it first proceeds by the mode of perfect liberality; of hypostasis, because, since it is distinguished from the producer and cannot be distinguished essentially, it is distinguished personally; but it is not so in created love.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* From this is clear what is objected in the first and second, when it is said, that[^14] it is the property of lovers or producers; for it is taken notionally; for as it proceeds from them, it cannot be a property, but a distinct person. Whence the procession of created love and of uncreated love[^15] is not altogether similar, because here it is a property, there a hypostasis and substance.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning wisdom, it must be said that it is not similar; for wisdom does not state a relation to another, and therefore is always said of itself in reference to itself and is essential, unless it be appropriated; but love states a relation to those who are joined by love. Whence, just as the word is proper to the Son, not appropriated[^16], because it connotes a relation to the speaker; so also love or charity is not only appropriated, but indeed proper to the Holy Spirit. And as the Son proceeds from the Father by the mode of word, so the Holy Spirit by the mode of love. And from this it is, as will better appear below[^17], that this is admitted: the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit; but not that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last: to what does it state a relation? It must be said that to the lovers, according as "lovers" is taken notionally, as was already touched on[^18]. For in one mode "to love themselves" is the same as "to spirate concordantly"; in this mode the Holy Spirit is not a lover, because he does not spirate. But he [the objector] objects from the essential[^19], which does not state an egress from the lover, but only states the complacency of will by which each one loves and is loved.

la: August., *de Trin.* l. XV, c. 19, n. 37: *Sicut non solus est in illa Trinitate vel spiritus vel sanctus... et tamen iste non frustra proprie dicitur Spiritus sanctus.* Et ibid. c. 17, n. 31: *Ita Spiritus sanctus proprie nuncupatur vocabulo caritatis, cum sit universaliter caritas et Pater et Filius.* — Paulo ante fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ostenditur* loco *ostendit*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* bk. XV, c. 19, n. 37: "As it is not only in that Trinity that one is spirit or holy... and yet this one is not in vain properly called the Holy Spirit." And ibid. c. 17, n. 31: "Thus the Holy Spirit is properly designated by the word of charity, since universally both the Father and the Son are charity." — A little before, on the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *ostenditur* (is shown) in place of *ostendit* (he shows).

la: August., *Tractat. [in I Ioan.]* VII, n. 6. Vide et XV *de Trin.* c. 17-20. — Paulo ante Val. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit *primam*, et ed. 1 loco *idem* habet *ipsum*. Mox aliqui codd. ut GKTWY cum ed. 3 *producit* loco *perducit*.

en: Augustine, *Tractate [on the First Epistle of John]* VII, n. 6. See also XV *On the Trinity*, c. 17-20. — A little before, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, omits *primam* (first), and ed. 1 in place of *idem* (the same) has *ipsum* (it). Soon after, some codices such as GKTWY together with ed. 3 read *producit* (produces) in place of *perducit* (brings to).

la: Ope plurium mss. ut KTZH et ed. 1 posuimus *quia* pro *quod*.

en: By the aid of several manuscripts such as KTZH and ed. 1 we have put *quia* (since) for *quod* (that).

en: Here, article 1, question 2.

la: August., *de Trin.* l. XV, cap. 17, n. 28: *Et caritas et Pater dicitur et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et simul omnes una caritas.* In quo textu ed. 1 post *omnes* addit *tres*.

en: Augustine, *On the Trinity* bk. XV, c. 17, n. 28: "Both the Father is called charity and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and all together are one charity." In which text ed. 1 after *omnes* (all) adds *tres* (three).

la: Aliqui codd. ut V X Z bb falso *aut* loco *sive*.

en: Some codices such as V X Z bb falsely [read] *aut* (or) in place of *sive* (or).

la: Supplevimus hic *et*; mox substituimus genitivum *Spiritus sancti* pro dativo, ope mss. et ed. 1.

en: We have supplied here *et* (and); soon we substitute the genitive *Spiritus sancti* (of the Holy Spirit) for the dative, by aid of the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Posuit *omne* iuxta antiquiores mss. et ed. 1, contra Vat. *omne illud*, *illud* additum a Vat.

en: We have put *omne* (every) according to the older manuscripts and ed. 1, against the Vatican edition's *omne illud* (every thing), *illud* (that) being added by the Vatican edition.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desunt verba *Quaero* etc., quae in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc the words *Quaero* (I ask) etc. are lacking, which are contained in the other manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Cod. 0 addit XV. c. 47. *de Trin.*

en: Codex 0 adds: XV, c. 47, *On the Trinity*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut Hl aa bb *ex*. Mox post *concordia* cod. H adiungit: *primo modo est commune tribus, secundo modo est in Patre et Filio, tertio autem modo est proprium Spiritus sancti*.

en: Some codices such as Hl aa bb [read] *ex* (from). Soon after *concordia* (concord) codex H adds: "in the first mode it is common to the three, in the second mode it is in the Father and the Son, but in the third mode it is proper to the Holy Spirit."

la: Cod. I addit *processus*.

en: Codex I adds *processus* (procession).

la: Plurimi codd. incongrue *ille*. Mox post *esset* cod. W adiungit *et ratio amandi*; dein cod. Y *non est amor* pro *amatus*, quod per modum substantivi intelligas. Paulo post *per emphaticum loquendi modum* intellige: emphasim, illam scil. grammaticalem figuram, quae ad maiorem expressionem intimandam adhibetur, v. g. quando abstractum adhibetur pro concreto, cum dicitur: *rogo excellentiam tuam*.

en: Very many codices incongruously [read] *ille* (he). Soon after *esset* (would be) codex W adds *et ratio amandi* (and the ground of loving); then codex Y [reads] *non est amor* (is not love) for *amatus* (beloved), which understand in the manner of a substantive. Shortly after, by *per emphaticum loquendi modum* (by an emphatic mode of speaking) understand: emphasis, namely that grammatical figure which is employed to convey greater expression, e.g., when an abstract is employed for a concrete, as when it is said: "I beg your excellency."

la: Subaudi: *amor*. — Paulo infra post *quia* in codd. additur *amor ibi*.

en: Supply: *amor* (love). — A little below, after *quia* (because) in the codices is added *amor ibi* (love there).

la: Nonnulli codd. ut AFRTX cum ed. 1, omissa post *creati* particula *et*, ponunt *amori increato* loco *amoris increati*. Mox particula *hic* refertur ad amorem creatum, et *ibi* ad amorem increatum.

en: Some codices such as AFRTX together with ed. 1, the particle *et* (and) being omitted after *creati* (created), put *amori increato* (to uncreated love) in place of *amoris increati* (of uncreated love). Soon the particle *hic* (here) refers to created love, and *ibi* (there) to uncreated love.

la: Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *et non appropriatur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *et non appropriatur* (and is not appropriated).

la: Dist. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Paulo ante ed. 1 *sequitur* loco *est*, quae et mox post *haec* addit *bene*.

en: Distinction 32, article 1, question 1, and article 2, question 1. — A little before, ed. 1 [reads] *sequitur* (follows) in place of *est* (is), and soon after *haec* (this) it adds *bene* (well).

la: Hic, in corp. et ad 1. — Paulo supra Vat. *sed loco secundum quod*, at perperam et contra mss. cum sex primis edd., quorum tamen aliqui ut OZ *secundum hoc quod amantes*. Mox plures codd. ut AISTVWXY *diligunt* pro *diligere*.

en: Here, in the body and in the reply to 1. — A little above, the Vatican edition [reads] *sed* in place of *secundum quod* (according as), but wrongly and against the manuscripts together with the first six editions, of which however some such as OZ [read] *secundum hoc quod amantes* (according to this that they are lovers). Soon several codices such as AISTVWXY [read] *diligunt* (they love) for *diligere* (to love).

la: Supple cum cod. 1 *amore*. Vat. *quod* pro *qui*, sed minus clare et contra plurimos codd. cum ed. 1; aliqui codd. ut HXY cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *quia*.

en: Supply with codex 1 *amore* (by love). The Vatican edition [reads] *quod* (which/that) for *qui* (who), but less clearly and against very many codices together with ed. 1; some codices such as HXY together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *quia* (because).

latin_scholion:
Doctrina huius quaestionis est sententia communis: Alex., S. p. I. q. 13. m. 3. a. 1, et q. 67. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., q. unic., et d. 32. q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 27. q. 2; S. 1. q. 37. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38. q. 2. n. 8. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
The doctrine of this question is the common opinion: Alex., *Summa* p. I. q. 13. m. 3. a. 1, and q. 67. m. 3. a. 3. — Scotus, q. unic., and d. 32. q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* d. 27. q. 2; *Summa* I. q. 37. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here I. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 38. q. 2. n. 8. — Denys the Carthusian, on this and the following, here q. 1.

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