site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 756 -->

### Articulus unicus.
#### *De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.*

### Quaestio IV.
#### *Utrum possibile simpliciter dicatur secundum causas superiores, an inferiores.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–28 across the four printed pages (756, 757, 758, 759).

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum *possibile simpliciter* dicatur aliquid secundum causas superiores, vel secundum causas inferiores, hoc est secundum potentiam divinam, an secundum potentiam creatam. Et quod secundum potentiam creatam sive secundum causas inferiores, videtur.

1. Ab eodem enim est in rebus *potestas*[^1], a quo est necessitas et contingentia simpliciter; sed necessitas et contingentia attenditur in rebus non tantum secundum causas superiores, immo secundum inferiores causas proximas et particulares: ergo et potestas.

2. Item, sicut aliquis dicitur *potens* a potestate activa, ita dicitur *possibile* a potestate passiva: sed potestas passiva primo est in eo, in quo primo est potentia ad *fieri*, et per illud in aliis[^2]: ergo cum hoc sit principium materiale et causa creata, *possibile simpliciter* dicitur secundum causas inferiores.

3. Item, si *possibile simpliciter* diceretur secundum causas superiores tantum, tunc, cum *apud Deum non sit impossibile omne verbum*[^3], nihil iudicandum esset impossibile.

4. Item, si secundum causas superiores, tunc cum Deus possit facere, quod caecus recipiat visum, possibile est caecum videre; sed si possibile esset videre, posset videre, et si posset, haberet potentiam visivam: sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. *Possibile* dicitur denominative a potentia; ergo *possibile simpliciter* a potentia simpliciter[^4]; sed potentia, quae summe et simpliciter est potentia, est potentia divina, quae dicitur secundum causas superiores: ergo *possibile simpliciter* dicitur secundum causas superiores.

2. Item, mundum creari et animam antichristi creari vel esse, et consimilia, simpliciter dicuntur possibilia; et sunt possibilia solum secundum causas superiores: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur, quia si aliquid sequitur ad aliquid[^6], si antecedens est possibile, et consequens; sed demonstrato aliquo impossibili, ut truncum fieri ex vitulo, sequitur: *Deum facere hoc, est possibile*: ergo hoc, scilicet truncum fieri ex vitulo, est possibile simpliciter[^5].

4. Item, omne verum est possibile, et omne quod erat verum, potest esse verum, et omne quod potest esse verum, est simpliciter possibile; et est possibile solum secundum causas superiores: ergo etc.[^7]

### Conclusio.

> *Simpliciter possibile aliquando dicitur praescindendo a suis causis, aliquando dicitur secundum causas et inferiores et superiores in comparatione ad potentiam activam, ad quam refertur, aliquando etiam ad passivam, dummodo non sit potentia obedientialis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc fuerunt diversi modi dicendi.

Quidam enim dixerunt quod secundum utrasque causas accipitur *possibile simpliciter*; et fundant se super illud primae ad Corinthios primo[^8]: *Stultam Deus fecit sapientiam* etc., Glossa: «Stultam fecit possibile declarando quod ipsa impossibile iudicat», quia *possibile* dicit commune ad utramque. — <!-- page 757 -->Tamen illud non videtur convenienter posse stare, quia[^9] non admittitur, quod possibile sit simpliciter de caeco fieri videntem, immo dicitur impossibile: ergo simul esset possibile et impossibile, quod est inconveniens. Tamen illud est possibile secundum causas superiores. Et fundamentum positionis eorum non est conveniens, quia Glossa non dicit tantum *declarando*, sed etiam dicit *faciendo* possibile: ergo prius non erat possibile. Et iterum dicit: *stulta facta est*, quia sapientia mundana iudicabat ita impossibile, quod nulli esset possibile, et Deus declaravit sibi possibile esse.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod secundum quod descendunt scientiae, ita et nomina scientiarum: et ita in naturali philosophia iudicandum est *possibile simpliciter* secundum causas inferiores, sed in theologia secundum causas superiores. — Tamen adhuc non videtur conveniens esse positio, quia ipse Anselmus[^10], et theologus, dicit, quod impossibile est, de trunco fieri vitulum, et quod impossibilia simpliciter Deo sunt possibilia.

Propter hoc aliter dicendum, quod *possibile simpliciter* potest dicere ordinem *substantiae*[^11] ad illud respectu cuius est, ordinem, inquam, qui est, vel qui futurus est, sive potentiam praesentem, vel futuram. Si dicat futuram, tunc est sensus: *possibile est hominem currere*, hoc est habere potentiam ad currendum. Si dicat potentiam praesentem, tunc est sensus: *possibile est hominem currere*, id est, homo habet potentiam ad currendum; et iste duplex modus dicendi accipitur a Philosopho[^12], qui istam exponit dupliciter: «Omne B contingit esse A, id est omne quod est B, vel omne quod potest esse B, contingit esse A».

Prout autem dicit potentiam de futuro, sic potest accipi *possibile* secundum quascumque causas, sive superiores sive inferiores. Et hoc patet, quia nihil aliud dicitur tunc, nisi quod habebit potentiam ad hoc: et a quocumque habeat, sive a Deo sive ab Angelo sive a se, verum est, quod potentiam habebit. Et sic dicendum, quod possibile est istum videre, demonstrato caeco illuminando, et virginem parere, et cetera talia, quia talibus dari potest potentia.

Alio autem modo hoc quod est *possibile* dicit *actualiter potentiam in re*, quae significatur ad alterum ordinari: et sic generalis est regula, quod si conclusio in re, cui attribuitur *possibile simpliciter*[^13], est potentia simpliciter, tunc dicitur *possibile simpliciter*; si autem potentia secundum quid, tunc dicitur *possibile secundum quid*. Cum enim *possibile* dicat ordinem potentiae ad actum sive alicuius ad aliquid mediante potentia; ideo ratio dicendi in ipso possibili sumitur a *potentia*.

*Nomen* autem *potentiae* dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de potentia *activa*, quae est principium *transmutandi aliud*, et de potentia *passiva*, quae est principium *transmutandi ab alio*[^14]. Et potentia activa reperitur et in Deo et in creatura, et utraque est potentia simpliciter completa respectu sui actus. Nam potentia activa, eo ipso quod activa, dicit ordinationem completam ad actum, quantum est de se. Potentia vero passiva reperitur solum in creatura. Et haec quidem potentia potest esse actui propinqua, et ab actu remota; ideo potentia passiva dicitur *simpliciter*, et *secundum quid*. Quaedam enim potentia est nata reduci ad actum a potentia inferiori cooperante superiori, ut quando est cum dispositione propinqua, ut potentia, quae est in ligno ad *ignitionem*[^15]. Quaedam est nata reduci a potentia superiori aliquo modo consonante inferiori, ut potentia impii ad iustificationem, et utraque dicitur *propinqua*. Quaedam ita distat ab actu, quod si reducatur, non potest nisi a potentia superiori reduci, et hoc quidem omnino deficiente vel nullo modo consonante potentia activa inferiori, ut puta quod ex mortuo possit fieri vivus, et ex trunco fieri vitulus[^28], et haec est potentia *secundum quid*.

<!-- page 758 -->Ex quo patet, quod *potentia passiva simpliciter* attenditur secundum causas superiores et inferiores. Et quia secundum quod dicit potentiam respectu obedientialem[?], potestas passiva, quae sumitur per relationem ad agens transmutans, potestas activa, secundum quod actum respicit, secundum quod refertur ad recipiens, sive secundum quod respicit actum elicitum, [?] in eo quod ex parte recipientis: dicitur etiam, quod illud, quod respicit causam moventem; sive de hoc[?] *causa transitur*. Et de hoc *vagiendo* respicit eam, dicitur *de futuro*; non dicit aliquid in eo[?], nisi quod habebit potentiam, si dicat de praesenti, vel de futuro, sic potest accipi possibile secundum quascumque causas, sive superiores sive inferiores, deficiente potentia activa[?] vel non consonante, est potentia *vocata*[?] *potentia obedientiae*. Vel de hac, quae[?] sic est quod erat costa, posset, immo posset[?], unde fieri posset, scilicet potentia[?]. *Possibile* igitur, quod dicitur a potentia, non dicitur univoce nec dicitur omnino aequivoce, sed *analogice*, sicut sanum: et ideo eius acceptio determinatur per adiunctum.

Potest ergo hoc quod est possibile dicere ordinem substantiae ad agere; et hinc dicit potentiam *activam*, et haec determinatur per adiunctum. Nam si dicat ordinem substantiae increatae ad actum, dicit potentiam activam increatam, ut *illuminare caecum*. Si autem dicat ordinem substantiae creatae[^16], dicit potentiam activam creatam, ut si dicatur: *possibile est antichristum currere*, vel *caecum possibile est videre*, significatur potentia in caeco; ideo falsa est simpliciter.

Potest iterum[^17] dicere ordinem alicuius ad *fieri*, et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in comparatione ad aliquid *ex quo*, aut sine comparatione. Si in comparatione ad aliquid *ex quo*, ut cum dicitur, *possibile est ex aere fieri ignem*, tunc importat potentiam passivam secundum rem. Et si sit[^18] potentia passiva simpliciter, ut illa quae est secundum causas superiores et inferiores[^19], dicitur *possibile simpliciter*. Si autem sit potentia passiva reducibilis solum secundum causas superiores, est solum *possibile secundum quid*; ut si dicatur: *ex trunco possibile est fieri vitulum*, negandum[^20] est simpliciter, nisi addatur determinatio contrahens, ut si dicatur *possibile potentia obedientiae* vel *possibile Deo*. — Si autem dicat ordinem alicuius ad *fieri* sine comparatione ad principium *ex quo*, tunc importat potentiam passivam secundum modum, sed activam secundum rem; ut si dicatur: *possibile est, animam antichristi creari*, vel *possibile est, vitulum fieri*, hoc est dicere, *aliquis potest facere*; et ideo sine determinatione est *possibile* sive secundum causas superiores, sive secundum causas inferiores, quia ratione potentiae activae utrobique salvatur simpliciter.

Potest etiam tertio hoc quod est *possibile* dicere ordinem vel comparationem *nullius* ad esse, ut cum dicitur: *hoc potest esse quodcumque demonstrato*; et sic nec potentiam activam nec potentiam passivam dicit determinate, nec secundum causas superiores nec secundum causas inferiores, unde simpliciter dicitur quocumque[^21] horum modorum sit.

Solum ergo in uno casu *possibile secundum quid* dicitur secundum causas superiores, videlicet cum dicit potentiam passivam secundum modum et rem, ut cum dicitur: *ex caeco potest fieri videns*, et *ex trunco potest fieri vitulus*, et *ex asino possibile est fieri hominem*.

Ex his patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem: nam obiecta ad primam partem procedunt de *possibili passivo*, et talia non sunt vera, nisi sint reducibilia per potentiam *non obedientialem* sive ad superiorem causam ratione complementi vel ad inferiorem.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, ad oppositum, quod possibile dicitur denominative a potentia; dicendum, quod possibile potest dici denominative a potentia activa vel passiva; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur[^22] *possibile simpliciter*, secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc, quod est mundum creari; dicendum, quod quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa; et ideo dicitur simpliciter secundum causas superiores.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sequitur: *si Deus potest facere, quod res potest fieri*; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod *potest* dicit eandem potentiam per modum passionis, et hoc dicit[^23], cum simpliciter dicitur. Si autem vere dicat potentiam passivam, non sequitur, quia variatur hoc quod est *possibile*, ut patet, si dicatur: *Deus potest facere de caeco videntem: ergo caecus potest esse videns*, vel *ex caeco potest fieri videns*. Prius enim dicebat potentiam activam simpliciter et postmodum passivam; et ideo non sequitur. Ergo quando dicitur: *si antecedens est possibile, et consequens*, intelligendum est eadem possibilitate.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud ergo quod ultimo obiicitur, quod *omne verum potest esse verum, antequam sit*: dicendum, quod verum est, et demonstrato caeco fieri videns, hoc dictum[^24] esse verum, est possibile, quia possibile accipitur ibi respectu veri; et dictum esse possibile, quando dicit ordinem ad esse vel ad esse verum, dicit potentiam communiter ad activam et passivam, superiorem et inferiorem. Sed tunc non sequitur de re: ergo iste potest videre; quia[^25] dicit potentiam activam creatam, scilicet potentiam visivam. Nec sequitur: ergo de caeco poterit fieri videns, secundum quod *potest* ponit potentiam actu in isto; quia dicit potentiam passivam dispositam, immo est ibi fallacia consequentis; quia cum *possibile* accipiatur in sua generalitate, habet tres causas veritatis: aut quia in caeco est potestas ad videndum, aut potestas ad recipiendum, aut quia in alio est potestas ad dandum[^26]; ratione huius dictum est *possibile*, et fiet aliquando verum, sicut patet; et ita patent cetera obiecta.

english:
<!-- page 756 -->

### Article unique.
#### *On power in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question IV.
#### *Whether something is said to be possible without qualification according to higher causes, or to lower.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether *something possible without qualification* (*possibile simpliciter*) is said [to be such] according to higher causes, or according to lower causes — that is, according to divine power or according to created power. And that [it is said to be such] according to created power, or according to lower causes, [thus] appears.

1. For from the same [source] is *power* (*potestas*) in things[^1], from which is necessity and contingency without qualification; but necessity and contingency are observed in things not only according to higher causes, but rather according to lower, proximate, and particular causes: therefore [so is] *power* (*potestas*) also.

2. Likewise, just as a thing is called *able-to-act* (*potens*) from *active power*, so it is called *possible* from *passive power*: but passive power is first in that in which there is first *potency to coming-to-be* (*potentia ad fieri*), and [is in others] through that[^2]: therefore since this [potency] is a material principle and a created cause, *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to lower causes.

3. Likewise, if *possibile simpliciter* were said [to be such] according to higher causes only, then, since *with God no word is impossible*[^3], nothing would be judged to be impossible.

4. Likewise, if [it is said to be such] according to higher causes, then since God can make a blind man receive sight, it is possible for the blind to see; but if it were possible to see, [he] could see, and if he could, he would have a visual power: but this is false: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Possibile* is said denominatively from *potentia*; therefore *possibile simpliciter* [is said] from *potentia simpliciter*[^4]; but the power which is supremely and without qualification power is the divine power, which is said [to be] according to higher causes: therefore *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to higher causes.

2. Likewise, *that the world be created*, and *that the soul of antichrist be created or be*, and like things, are said to be possible without qualification; and they are possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is shown thus: because if something follows upon something[^6], if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent; but, having demonstrated some impossible [thing], such as *that a tree-stump come to be from a calf*, it follows: *that God do this is possible*: therefore this, namely *that a tree-stump come to be from a calf*, is possible without qualification[^5].

4. Likewise, every true [thing] is possible, and every [thing] which was true can be true, and every [thing] which can be true is possible without qualification; and it is possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.[^7]

### Conclusion.

> ***Simpliciter possibile* is sometimes said by prescinding from its causes, sometimes is said according to causes both lower and higher in comparison to *active power*, to which it is referred, sometimes also to *passive [power]*, provided that it is not [merely] *obediential power*.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there have been different ways of speaking on this point.

For *some* said that *possibile simpliciter* is taken according to both [kinds of] causes; and they ground themselves on that [text] of the *First [letter] to the Corinthians*, chapter one[^8]: *God hath made foolish the wisdom* etc., Gloss: «He hath made foolish the possible *by declaring* that [that wisdom] itself judges [it] impossible», because *possibile* signifies what is common to both. — <!-- page 757 -->However, this does not seem to be able to stand suitably, since[^9] it is not granted that it be possible *without qualification* that of a blind man there come to be a seeing man, but rather it is said to be impossible: therefore it would be simultaneously possible and impossible, which is incongruous. Yet this is possible according to higher causes. And the foundation of their position is not suitable, since the Gloss does not only say *by declaring*, but also says [it] *by making* possible: therefore beforehand it was not possible. And again it says: *foolish has it been made*, because worldly wisdom was judging [as] so impossible that it was possible to none, and God declared it to be possible to himself.

And therefore there is another position, that as the sciences descend, so also [do] the names of the sciences: and so in natural philosophy *possibile simpliciter* is to be judged according to lower causes, but in theology according to higher causes. — Yet still the position does not appear to be suitable, since *Anselm* himself[^10], and as a theologian, says that *it is impossible* that of a tree-stump there come to be a calf, and that *things impossible without qualification are possible to God*.

For this reason it must be said *otherwise* that *possibile simpliciter* can signify the order of a *substance*[^11] toward that with respect to which it is — an order, I say, which either is or is to be, that is, a power present or future. If it signify [a power] future, then the sense is: *it is possible for a man to run* — that is, *to have* power to run. If it signify a power present, then the sense is: *it is possible for a man to run* — that is, *the man has* power to run; and this twofold way of speaking is taken from the Philosopher[^12], who expounds it in a twofold way: «Every B happens to be A, that is, every [thing] that is B, or every [thing] that can be B, happens to be A».

Now insofar as it signifies a power *of the future*, in this way *possibile* can be taken according to any causes whatsoever, whether higher or lower. And this is plain, because nothing else is then said except that [the thing] *will have* power to this: and from whomever it have it, whether from God or from an Angel or from itself, it is true that it will have the power. And so it must be said that it is possible that this man see, having designated a blind man being illuminated, and that a virgin give birth, and other such things, since to such [things] power can be given.

In *another* mode, that which is *possibile* signifies *actually* a power in the thing, which [power] is signified to be ordered to another: and so the general rule is, that if the conclusion in the thing to which *possibile simpliciter* is attributed[^13] is power without qualification, then it is said *possibile simpliciter*; but if [it is] a power [only] *in a certain respect* (*secundum quid*), then it is said *possibile secundum quid*. For since *possibile* signifies the order of power to act, or of something to something else by means of a power; therefore the ground of [its] being said in the *possibile* itself is taken from the *power*.

Now the *name of power* is said in two ways, namely of *active power*, which is the principle of *transmuting another*, and of *passive power*, which is the principle of *being transmuted by another*[^14]. And active power is found both in God and in a creature, and either is power *simpliciter complete* with respect to its own act. For active power, by the very fact that it is active, signifies a complete ordering to act, as far as is from itself. But passive power is found only in a creature. And this power can be *proximate to act*, and *remote from act*; therefore passive power is said [to be such] *simpliciter*, and *secundum quid*. For a certain power is born to be reduced to act from a lower power *cooperating with a higher* — as when it is in a *proximate disposition*, such as the power that is in wood toward *ignition*[^15]. A certain [power] is born to be reduced from a higher power, [the lower power] being in some way consonant [with the higher], such as the power of an unrighteous man unto justification; and either is said [to be] *proximate*. A certain [power] is so distant from act that, if it be reduced, it can be reduced only by a higher power, and this indeed with the lower active power wholly failing or in no way consonant — such as that of the dead there be made a living [thing], and of a tree-stump a calf[^28]: and this is power *secundum quid*.

<!-- page 758 -->From which it is plain that *passive power simpliciter* is observed according to higher and lower causes. And because insofar as it signifies a power having the character of obediential [potency] [?], passive power, which is taken by relation to a transmuting agent, [and] active power, insofar as it regards the act, insofar as it is referred to the recipient, or insofar as it regards the act elicited, [?] inasmuch as on the part of the recipient: it is also said that that which regards the moving cause; or [thus]: a cause is transferred [?]. And of this [power], moving outward, regards it [?]; it is said *of the future*; it does not signify anything in it [?], except that it will have power, if it signify [a power] of the present, or of the future, thus *possibile* can be taken according to whatever causes, whether higher or lower; the active power failing or not being consonant, it is a power *called*[?] *the power of obedience*. Or of this [power], which[?] thus is, [as] of what was the rib, would be able [to be], indeed it would be able, whence it could come to be, namely [obediential] power [?]. *Possibile* therefore, that which is said from a power, is not said univocally nor is it said wholly equivocally, but *analogically*, like *sanum* (*healthy*): and therefore the acceptation of it is determined by what is adjoined.

> *Editorial note:* the preceding paragraph (in the Latin column) is the page-top of p. 758 and is heavily garbled in the OCR underlay. The five `[?]` flags mark spots where the OCR strings have collapsed multiple columns or marginal scholia into the running text and the 600 dpi PDF render is also worn in the inner gutter; the resolution is logged in `manual-review/d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.md`.

[*Reset to clean reading from here:*]

Therefore that which is *possibile* can signify the order of *substance to acting*; and from this it signifies *active* power, and this is determined by what is adjoined. For if it signify the order of an uncreated substance to act, it signifies an uncreated active power, as *to illuminate the blind man*. If however it signify the order of a created substance[^16], it signifies a created active power, as if it is said: *it is possible for antichrist to run*, or *it is possible for the blind man to see* — a power in the blind man is signified; therefore [the second] is false without qualification.

Again[^17] it can signify the order of something to *coming-to-be* (*fieri*), and this can be twofold: either in comparison to some [terminus] *from which*, or without [such] comparison. If in comparison to something *from which* — as when it is said *it is possible for fire to come to be from air* — then it imports passive power according to the thing. And if it be[^18] passive power *simpliciter*, such as that which is according to higher and lower causes[^19], it is said *possibile simpliciter*. But if it be passive power reducible only according to higher causes, it is only *possibile secundum quid*; as if it is said: *of a tree-stump it is possible that a calf come to be*, it must be denied[^20] without qualification, unless there be added a contracting determination, as if it is said *possible by the power of obedience*, or *possible to God*. — But if it signify the order of something to *coming-to-be* without comparison to a principle *from which*, then it imports passive power according to mode, but active [power] according to the thing; as if it is said: *it is possible that the soul of antichrist be created*, or *it is possible that a calf come to be*, this is to say *someone can make [it]*; and therefore without [further] determination it is *possibile*, whether according to higher causes or according to lower causes, since by reason of the active power [the sense] is preserved on either side without qualification.

It can also, thirdly, signify the order or comparison of *nothing* to being, as when it is said: *this can be whatsoever has been designated*; and in this mode it signifies determinately neither active power nor passive power, neither according to higher causes nor according to lower causes; whence simpliciter is said whichever[^21] of these modes it be.

Only therefore in *one* case is *possibile secundum quid* said [to be such] according to higher causes, namely when it signifies passive power according to mode and thing, as when it is said: *of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man*, and *of a tree-stump there can come to be a calf*, and *of an ass it is possible that a man come to be*.

From these things all the objections to either side are plain: for the objections to the first part proceed from *passive possibile*, and such [things] are not true unless they are reducible through a *non-obediential* power, either to a higher cause by reason of completion, or to a lower [cause].

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the opposite [side], that *possibile* is said denominatively from *potentia*; it must be said that *possibile* can be said denominatively from active or passive power; and because in God there is properly active power, therefore[^22] *possibile simpliciter* is said [to be such] according to that from which it is denominated, not according to that from passive [power].

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning this, that *the world is created*; it must be said that, although it signifies power *by mode of passion*, nevertheless according to the thing it signifies nothing but active power, since before the creation of the world there is nothing except active power; and therefore it is said *simpliciter* according to higher causes.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it follows: *if God can make [it], that the thing can come to be*; it must be said that it is true insofar as *potest* signifies the same power *by mode of passion*, and this it signifies[^23] when it is said *simpliciter*. But if it truly signify *passive* power, it does not follow, because that which is *possibile* is varied, as is plain, if it is said: *God can make of a blind man a seeing man*: therefore *the blind man can be a seeing man*, or *of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man*. For at first it was signifying active power *simpliciter* and afterwards passive [power]; and therefore it does not follow. Therefore when it is said: *if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent*, it is to be understood with the same possibility.

*To 4.* To that therefore which is objected last, that *every true [thing] can be true, before it is*: it must be said that it is true, and, having designated a blind man becoming seeing, [that] this saying[^24] be true is possible, since *possibile* is taken there with respect to the true; and *[the thing] said to be possible*, when it signifies an order toward being or toward being true, signifies power in common with respect to both active and passive, higher and lower. But then it does not follow regarding the thing: therefore this man can see; since[^25] it signifies a created active power, namely a visual power. Nor does it follow: therefore of the blind man there will be able to come to be a seeing man, insofar as *potest* posits a power *in act* in that [man]; since it signifies a passive power *disposed*, indeed there is here a fallacy of the consequent; since when *possibile* is taken in its generality, it has three grounds of truth: either because in the blind man there is power to see, or [the] power to receive, or because in another there is power to give[^26]; by reason of this it has been said *possibile*, and it will some time become true, as is plain; and so the other objections are plain.

la: *Terminus* potestas *accipi potest etiam in sensu passivo. Sic eum nonnumquam accipiendam esse intelliges, si antiquiores Aristotelis versiones inspicias, in quibus v. g. V.* Metaph. *text. 17. (IV. c. 12.) vox* potestas *occurrit pro δύναμις; Graeca autem vox δύναμις ab Aristotele in sensu activo et passivo adhibetur. Vat. hic et in seqq. corpore eius pro* potestas *substituit* possibilitas. *— Ratio, cur ab eodem sit in rebus* potestas*, a quo est necessitas et contingentia simpliciter, ex eo peti potest, quod necessarium opponitur impossibili, et possibile confunditur cum contingente, de quo vide supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. De propos. minori argumenti vide supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. et 2.*

en: The term *potestas* can also be accepted in a passive sense. You will understand that it must sometimes be so taken if you inspect the older versions of Aristotle, in which e.g. *Metaphysics* V, text 17 (IV, c. 12), the word *potestas* occurs for δύναμις; but the Greek word δύναμις is used by Aristotle in both active and passive sense. The Vatican [edition] here and in what follows in his body [text], in place of *potestas* substitutes *possibilitas*. — The reason why from the same [source] in things is *power* from which is necessity and contingency without qualification can be sought from this, that the necessary is opposed to the impossible, and the possible is conflated with the contingent — concerning which see above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, *fundam.* On the minor proposition of the argument see above d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, et 2.

la: *Supple cum codd. P Q* aliquid. *— Mox pro* in quo primo *codd. R V* in quo prima. *— De ratione conclusioni intexta (*cum hoc sit principium materiale etc.*) cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 3. fundamenta.*

en: Supply with codices P, Q, *aliquid*. — Soon after, in place of *in quo primo*, codices R, V [read] *in quo prima*. — On the ground woven into the conclusion (*cum hoc sit principium materiale etc.*), cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 3, *fundamenta*.

la: *Nam quod est simpliciter tale sive primum in aliquo genere, est causa et mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis, ut* Aristot. Metaph. *text. 4. seqq. (I. brevior IX.)*

en: For that which is *simpliciter* such, or first in some genus, is the cause and measure of all things that are of that genus, as Aristotle, *Metaphysics* text 4 ff. (I, briefer IX).

la: *Propositio minor, paulo latius et diffusius expressa, sonaret sic:* sed demonstrato aliquo impossibili secundum causas inferiores, ut truncum fieri ex vitulo, nihilominus dici debet Deum hoc facere posse, sive hoc esse adhuc possibile.

en: The minor proposition, expressed a little more broadly and diffusely, would run thus: *but on the demonstration of something impossible according to lower causes, such as that a tree-stump come to be from a calf, nevertheless it must be said that God can do this, or that this is still possible*.

la: *De propos. maiori huius argum., cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 1. In hac propos. maiori pro* antecedens est possibile *codd. AFGHJVWX cc* antecedens est impossibile; *prave, ut evidens est.*

en: On the major proposition of this argument, cf. above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, *fundam.* 1. In this major proposition, in place of *antecedens est possibile*, codices A, F, G, H, J, V, W, X, cc [read] *antecedens est impossibile*; corruptly, as is evident.

la: *Sensus est: quod erat verum in praeterito potest esse verum in futuro, v. g. caecus aliquis potuit videre, ergo alter caecus poterit videre. — Pro* erat *sola Vat.* erit.

en: The sense is: that which was true in the past can be true in the future, e.g. some blind man was able to see, therefore another blind man will be able to see. — In place of *erat*, the Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *erit*.

la: *Vers. 20. — Verba Glossae, quae hic citantur, neque in Walfridi neque in Lyrani collectione Gloss. inveniuntur; attamen apud Lyranum habentur haec: «*Quae (sapientia huius mundi) impossibile iudicat quod in naturis rerum non videt*», et apud Ambrosium in expos. loc. cit. haec: «*Quod enim (sapientia huius saeculi) impossibile iudicabat, possibile declaratum est, Deum incuriosum existimans*». S. Doctor ista verba, citata sub nomine Glossae, fortasse sumsit ex Petri Lombardi* Collectaneis*, in quibus revera verba citata occurrunt (in Epist. I. ad Cor.), additis tantum post* declarando *verbis* et faciendo*, quae verba et cod. B in marg. exhibet, et quae etiam S. Doctor ipse paulo inferius affert, ubi ait:* quia Glossa non dicit tantummodo declarando, sed etiam dicit faciendo possibile. *— In citatione Glossae Vat. falso* ipse *pro* ipsa.

en: [1 Cor. 1,] verse 20. — The words of the Gloss which are here cited are not found either in Walfrid's or in Lyranus's collection of the Gloss; yet in Lyranus these are had: «*[The wisdom of this world] judges that impossible which it does not see in the natures of things*», and in Ambrose's exposition of the cited passage these: «*For what [the wisdom of this age] was judging [to be] impossible has been declared possible, [the wisdom] reckoning God to be careless [of human affairs]*». The Holy Doctor perhaps took these words, cited under the name of the Gloss, from Peter Lombard's *Collectanea*, in which the cited words indeed occur (on the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*), with only the words *et faciendo* added after *declarando* — which words codex B exhibits in the margin, and which the Holy Doctor himself also brings forward a little below, where he says: *because the Gloss does not say only by declaring, but also says by making possible*. — In the citation of the Gloss the Vatican [edition reads] erroneously *ipse* for *ipsa*.

la: *Pro* quia*, quod fide codd. IPQT et ed. I posuimus, alii codd. cum edd. 2, 3 incongrue* quod; *Vat. melius* nam, *et dein* admittatur. *Aliquanto inferius eadem Vat.* nam *pro* Tamen.

en: In place of *quia*, which we have set on the testimony of codices IPQT and edition 1, other codices with editions 2, 3 incongruously [read] *quod*; the Vatican [edition reads] better *nam*, and then *admittatur*. A little below, the same Vatican [reads] *nam* in place of *Tamen*.

la: *Libr. II.* Cur Deus homo*, c. 18: «*Omnis quippe necessitas et impossibilitas, eius [Dei] subiacet voluntati*». De exemplo allato cfr. supra pag. 751. nota 2. — Post* Anselmus *Vat. interiicit* et Philosophus.

en: Book II *Cur Deus homo*, c. 18: «*For every necessity and impossibility lies under his [God's] will*». On the example brought forward cf. above p. 751, note 2. — After *Anselmus* the Vatican [edition] inserts *et Philosophus* («and the Philosopher»).

la: *Pro* substantiae *Vat. cum cod. cc perperam* potentiae. *— [Quaracchi p. 757 footer entry 4:] Nostrae lectioni suffragantur tum vetustiores codd. et ed. 1, tum ipsa verba Bonav., quae aliquanto inferius in corpore huius conclusionis habentur:* Potest ergo hoc quod est possibile dicere ordinem substantiae ad agere etc. *— Mox post* sive *cod. X repetit* potest dicere.

en: In place of *substantiae* the Vatican, with codex cc, [reads] corruptly *potentiae*. — [Quaracchi p. 757 footer entry 4:] To our reading speak in favor both the more ancient codices and edition 1, and the very words of Bonaventure himself, which a little below in the body of this conclusion are had: *Therefore that which is possible can signify the order of substance to acting etc.* — Soon after *sive*, codex X repeats *potest dicere*.

la: *Libr. I.* Prior. *c. 12:* Quoniam autem contingere hoc huic inesse dupliciter est accipere: aut enim cui inest hoc, aut cui contingit ipsum inesse; nam* de quo B, A contingere, *horum alterum significat: aut* de quo dicitur B, *aut* de quo contingit dici *etc. — Pro* potest esse B *in codd. I V legitur* contingit esse B.

en: Book I *Prior [Analytics]*, c. 12: *That this happens to be in this is to be taken in two ways: either [as that] in which this is, or [as that] in which it happens to be; for «B happens [to be predicated] of A» signifies one of these: either «of what B is said», or «of what it happens to be said»* etc. — In place of *potest esse B*, in codices I, V one reads *contingit esse B*.

la: *Ed. I omittit* simpliciter*, quae lectio praeferenda videtur. — Paulo superius pro* quae significatur *sola Vat. substituit* quo signatur*, et paulo inferius post* sive alicuius *eadem Vat. cum cod. cc perperam subiicit* sive. *Deinde particulae* ideo *plurimi codd. cum sex primis edd. praefigunt* et.

en: Edition 1 omits *simpliciter*, which reading appears preferable. — A little above, in place of *quae significatur*, the Vatican alone substitutes *quo signatur*, and a little below after *sive alicuius* the same Vatican with codex cc corruptly adds *sive*. Then to the particle *ideo* very many codices with the first six editions prefix *et*.

la: *Definitio potentiae tam activae quam passivae hic exhibita insinuatur ab Aristot., V.* Metaph. *text. 17, et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12, et VIII. c. 1.). Gerundium* transmutandi *primo loco vim activam, secundo loco passivam habet.*

en: The definition of power, both active and passive, here set forth is suggested by Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 17, and IX, text 2 (IV, c. 12, and VIII, c. 1). The gerund *transmutandi* in the first place has an active force, in the second place a passive force.

la: *Pro* ignitionem *Vat. cum cod. cc* combustionem*, et paulo post pro* ut potentia impii *substituit* ut puta impii.

en: In place of *ignitionem* the Vatican with codex cc [reads] *combustionem*, and a little after, in place of *ut potentia impii*, substitutes *ut puta impii*.

la: *Supple cum Vat.* ad actum. *— Paulo post pro* antichristum currere *codd. IT perperam* esse antichristum.

en: Supply with the Vatican, *ad actum*. — A little after, in place of *antichristum currere*, codices I, T corruptly [read] *esse antichristum*.

la: *Post* iterum *cod. M et ed. I bene interiiciunt* possibile.

en: After *iterum*, codex M and edition 1 rightly insert *possibile*.

la: *In non paucis codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 perperam omittitur* dicitur*, pro quo cod. R* est.

en: In not a few codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 *dicitur* is corruptly omitted, in place of which codex R [reads] *est*.

la: *Sive, ut supra dictum fuit, quae est nata reduci ad actum a potentia inferiori, cooperante superiori. — Paulo superius pro* Et si sit *plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 falso* Et sic fit.

en: Or, as has been said above, [the power] which is born to be reduced to act from a lower power, the higher [power] cooperating. — A little above, in place of *Et si sit*, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 falsely [read] *Et sic fit*.

la: *Sola Vat., mutata interpunctione, verbo* negandum *praemittit* et ideo. *Pro* trunco *aliqui codd. ut V Z cum ed. 1* sl trunco. [?]

en: The Vatican alone, having changed the punctuation, prefixes *et ideo* to the word *negandum*. In place of *trunco*, some codices such as V, Z, with edition 1 [read] *sl trunco* (so the apparatus; reading uncertain, possibly *sub trunco* or *si trunco*). [?]

la: *Multi codd. cum ed. I* quicumque.

en: Many codices with edition 1 [read] *quicumque*.

la: *Supplevimus* dicit *ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.*

en: We have supplied *dicit* from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.

la: *Supple: possibile. — Pro* quia *cod. R* et*, ut evidens; pro* ratione *ed. I* ratio.

en: Supply: *possibile*. — In place of *quia*, codex R [reads] *et*, as is evident; in place of *ratione*, edition 1 [reads] *ratio*.

la: *[Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 1.] Vat. suo marte, at non male adiungit* iste potest videre. *Paulo inferius pro* et dictum esse possibile *eadem Vat.* et dictum est quod possibile*, codd. cc ff* et dictum est possibile*, codd. MRVXZ (T a secunda manu)* et sic dictum esse possibile*, ed. I* et siunt dictum est, esse possibile.

en: [Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 1.] The Vatican, on its own initiative, but not badly, adds *iste potest videre*. A little below, in place of *et dictum esse possibile*, the same Vatican [reads] *et dictum est quod possibile*, codices cc, ff *et dictum est possibile*, codices M, R, V, X, Z (T from a second hand) *et sic dictum esse possibile*, edition 1 *et siunt dictum est, esse possibile*.

la: *[Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 2.] Intellige:* iste homo potest. *— Subinde pro* activam *Vat. cod. cc* passivam. *Mox pro* poterit *cod. V et ed. I* potest.

en: [Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 2.] Understand: *this man can [see]*. — Soon after, in place of *activam*, the Vatican (and) codex cc [read] *passivam*. Soon after, in place of *poterit*, codex V and edition 1 [read] *potest*.

la: *[Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 3.] Scilicet quia in alio est potestas ad dandum.*

en: [Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 3.] Namely, because *in another there is power to give*.

la: *[Quaracchi p. 758 footer entry 1.] Libr. IX.* de Gen. ad lit. *c. 16. et 17. n. 30. et 31.*

en: [Quaracchi p. 758 footer entry 1.] Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book IX, c. 16 and 17, nn. 30 and 31. ---

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Antiqua est distinctio inter *possibile simpliciter* et *possibile secundum quid*. *Possibile* autem non tantum absolute in se consideratur, quatenus secundum regulas logicae concipiatur ut *non impossibile*, sed etiam in ordine ad aliud, ut ipsius causam; et sic dicit ordinem ad aliquam potentiam sive activam sive passivam. Manifestum est, unum idemque in comparatione ad unam causam posse esse ipsi possibile, in comparatione ad aliam vero huic impossibile. Hinc orta est distinctio inter *possibile simpliciter* et *possibile secundum quid*, nec non quaestio, secundum quam rationem sive comparationem ad aliquam potentiam, creatam vel increatam, aliquid dicatur *possibile simpliciter*, vel *possibile secundum quid*. Et videbatur illa aetate solutio difficilis. Sed S. Thom. hanc intricatam quaestionem in sua *Summa* potius praecidit, cum *possibile simpliciter* accipit in sensu absoluto. Dicit enim ibi (I. q. 25. a. 3. ad 4.): «*Possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas superiores neque secundum causas inferiores, sed secundum se ipsum. Possibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam, nominatur possibile secundum proximam causam*» etc. — Quaestio autem sub forma ab antiquis proposita potius spectat ad *modum dicendi*.

Antissiodorensis (ut legitur apud Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.) tres refert opiniones. *Prima* est, quod solum illud est simpliciter possibile, quod fieri potest secundum causas inferiores; *secunda*, quod omne et solum illud, quod est possibile Deo; *tertia*, quod nec tantum secundum causas superiores, nec tantum secundum inferiores, sed interdum secundum causas inferiores, interdum secundum superiores iuxta diversa adiuncta. Ipse autem Antissiodorensis praefert secundam opinionem, cui videtur etiam B. Albert. favere. Alex Hal. (S. p. I. q. 21. m. 5. a. 1.), recensitis his tribus opinionibus, addit et approbat eam quae hic secundo loco ponitur. S. Bonav. tertiam opinionem ab Antissiodorensi relatam subtilissime et adhibitis multis distinctionibus late explicat et quid veri unaquaeque trium opinionum contineat, accurate determinat. Ut doctrina ipsius satis intricata percipiatur, attendendum est ad illud principium (in corp. ante medium positum): «*Possibile dicit ordinem potentiae ad actum sive alicuius ad aliquid mediante potentia; ideo ratio dicendi in ipso possibili sumitur a potentia*». Hanc autem potentiam auctor sub variis distinctionibus considerat, quarum principales sunt haec: primo, potentia est vel *futura* et ideo indeterminata, vel *praesens* et determinata. Iuxta hanc distinctionem respondetur ad quaestionem per conclusiones generales. Potentia praesens iterum distinguitur in potentiam *activam* et *passivam*, cum aliis subdistinctionibus et conclusionibus, ut patet in littera. Inde concluditur, quod *possibile* non semper dicatur univoce, sed etiam *analogice*, et quod eius «*acceptio determinetur per adiunctum*». Per hoc enim exprimitur vel ordo ad agere, vel ad fieri, vel ad esse. In hac secunda parte responsionis principia et distinctiones in prima parte posita applicantur et magis determinantur.

**II.** S. Thomas in *Comment.* hic q. 2. a. 3. convenit in pluribus distinctionibus et conclusionibus cum S. Bonav. — Alii paulo aliter resolvunt, quin appareat aliqua notabilis differentia nisi in modo loquendi.

Praeter auctores citatos: Scot., I. Sent. d. 43. q. unica, et Report. ibid. q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 9; *S.* p. 1, tr. 19. q. 78. m. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
<!-- page 759 -->

**I.** Ancient is the distinction between *possibile simpliciter* and *possibile secundum quid*. Now *possibile* is considered not only absolutely in itself, insofar as it is conceived according to the rules of logic as *non-impossible*, but also in order to another, as to its cause; and thus it signifies an order to some power, whether active or passive. It is manifest that one and the same [thing] can in comparison to one cause be possible for it, but in comparison to another impossible for this [thing]. Hence arose the distinction between *possibile simpliciter* and *possibile secundum quid*, and also the question, according to what ground or comparison to some power, created or uncreated, something is called *possibile simpliciter*, or *possibile secundum quid*. And the solution seemed difficult in that age. But St. Thomas in his *Summa* rather cut short this intricate question, when he takes *possibile simpliciter* in an absolute sense. For he says there (I, q. 25, a. 3, ad 4): «*The absolute possible is said [to be such] neither according to higher causes nor according to lower causes, but according to itself. But the possible which is said [to be such] according to some power is called possible according to the proximate cause*» etc. — Now the question under the form proposed by the ancients rather pertains to the *manner of speaking*.

The *Antissiodorensis* (as is read in Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 3) reports three opinions. The *first* is, that only that is simpliciter possible which can come to be according to lower causes; the *second*, that [the simpliciter possible is] each and only that which is possible to God; the *third*, that [it is] neither only according to higher causes, nor only according to lower, but sometimes according to lower causes, sometimes according to higher according to the diverse adjuncts. The Antissiodorensis himself prefers the second opinion, to which B. Albert also seems to incline. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 21, m. 5, a. 1), after reviewing these three opinions, adds and approves that which here is placed in the second place. St. Bonaventure most subtly, and by the employment of many distinctions, expounds at length the third opinion related from the Antissiodorensis, and accurately determines what of truth each of the three opinions contains. That his doctrine, which is rather intricate, may be sufficiently grasped, one must attend to that principle (placed in the body before the middle): «*Possibile signifies the order of power to act, or of something to something [else] through the mediation of a power; therefore the ground of [its] being said in the possibile itself is taken from the power*». Now this power the author considers under various distinctions, of which the principal ones are these: first, a power is either *future* and therefore indeterminate, or *present* and determinate. According to this distinction the response to the question is given through general conclusions. The present power is again distinguished into *active* and *passive* power, with other subdistinctions and conclusions, as is plain in the text. Hence it is concluded that *possibile* is not always said univocally, but also *analogically*, and that its «*acceptation is determined by what is adjoined*». For through this is expressed either the order to *acting*, or to *coming-to-be*, or to *being*. In this second part of the response the principles and distinctions posited in the first part are applied and more determined.

**II.** St. Thomas in his *Commentary* here, q. 2, a. 3, agrees in many distinctions and conclusions with St. Bonaventure. — Others resolve [it] a little differently, without any notable difference appearing except in *the mode of speaking*.

Besides the authors cited: Scotus, *I Sent.* d. 43, q. unica, and *Report.* ibid. q. unica. — B. Albert, here a. 9; *S.* p. 1, tr. 19, q. 78, m. 1. 2. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 7. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2, *princ.* q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**J4 Class D/E mixed-case disposition (2026-07-17)**, per `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §4 footnote. Handoff diagnosis was: defs=27, la=30, en=30, with three tangled issues. All three investigated against PDF; two resolved, one partially resolved with a documented refusal on the wording-level root cause.

1. **Latin `la` extras at labels `1` and `28` — NOT a real defect (§2 backtick-blockquote false positive, confirmed).** The `## Latin` intro blockquote at line 37 reads: "...this chunk renumbers them sequentially `` `[^1]` ``–`` `[^28]` `` across the four printed pages." The health-scan regex does not respect backtick code-spans, so it double-counts these two explanatory example numbers as real body anchors. Both `[^1]` and `[^28]` are otherwise correctly anchored exactly once each in the real body (matching their `## Apparatus` defs). **Left unchanged** per §2/§6 instructions — this is the same corpus-wide notation-convention issue already confirmed in `IV-d21-p1-littera`/`III-d33-dubia`; do not fix locally, report to Wilson for a corpus-wide decision. This is why `la` still shows 29 (not 27) after this session's fixes — the residual +2 is entirely this false positive, not a new/missed defect.

2. **Latin + English `26` duplicate — RESOLVED (genuine duplicate anchor, removed).** Both bodies had `[^24][^25][^26]` stacked immediately after "iste potest videre" / "*this man can see*" in the Ad-4 reply, **and** a second, separate `[^26]` later at "potestas ad dandum" / "power to give". Def `[^26]` ("*Quaracchi p. 759 footer entry 3.* Scilicet quia in alio est potestas ad dandum" / "Namely, because in another there is power to give") content-matches **only** the second occurrence — confirmed against the printed page 759 image (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-759.png`, extracted at 400 dpi, `pdf = printed − 410`): the printed footer note 3 reads "Scilicet quia in alio est potestas ad dandum," which is the *dandum* clause verbatim, not the "iste potest videre" clause. Removed the stray `[^26]` from the first stack in both Latin and English, leaving `[^24][^25]` there and the single `[^26]` at its correctly-matched location. No wording changed, marker tokens only.

3. **English-only `[^?]` stray at "...higher and lower causes [^?]." — RESOLVED (phantom, removed).** Same pattern as the `I-d1-a1-q3` J4-Class-C precedent (see that chunk's `## Notes`, 2026-07-17 disposition): a caret-`[^?]` placeholder with no Latin-body counterpart at all (the Latin at this spot reads plainly "...causas superiores et inferiores." with no marker, caret or otherwise). Verified against the printed page 758 image (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-758.png`, 400 dpi): the printed sentence "Ex quo patet, quod potentia passiva simpliciter attenditur secundum causas superiores et inferiores." carries **no superscript numeral anywhere on that line** — confirming the printed page is well-set at this point (the OCR-collapse garble documented in `manual-review/d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.md` for this same paragraph is confined to the sentences that follow, not this opening sentence). Removed the `[^?]` token from the English body only (no Latin change needed, since Latin never had it).

4. **English-only Scholion `[^24]` — RESOLVED (erroneous duplicate insertion, removed).** Scholion I's citation "St. Thomas ... (I, q. 25, a. 3, ad 4)[^24]:" carried a spurious re-use of label `24`, which is the same def already correctly bound to the Ad-4 body occurrence (§2 above). The parallel Latin Scholion sentence — "Dicit enim ibi (I. q. 25. a. 3. ad 4.):" — has **no marker at all** at this position, and the printed page 759 Scholion column (same 400 dpi image) shows no superscript near "ad 4.)" either. Removed the `[^24]` token from the English Scholion; the Latin was already correct and untouched.

5. **RESOLVED (2026-07-17, wording-level fix) — missing clause restored, `[^24]`/`[^25]` repositioned to their true printed spots.** The prior flag (below, preserved for record) was verified against 400 dpi renders of printed pp. 758–759 (`raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-758.png`, `p-759.png`; `pdf = printed − 410`, both fully legible — the p.758 top-of-page garble previously logged in `manual-review/d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.md` affects the OCR text layer at that spot, not the print image itself) and cross-checked against the raw IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol1_pt2_raw.txt`, lines 33696–33707) — both sources agree verbatim, so both were used, with the PDF image as primary read and OCR as confirming cross-check per CLAUDE.md. The true printed Ad-4 reply reads, immediately after "et demonstrato caeco fieri videns,": "hoc dictum¹ esse verum, est possibile, quia possibile accipitur ibi respectu veri; et dictum esse possibile, quando dicit ordinem ad esse vel ad esse verum, dicit potentiam communiter ad activam et passivam, superiorem et inferiorem. Sed tunc non sequitur de re: ergo iste potest videre; quia² dicit potentiam activam creatam, scilicet potentiam visivam." The chunk's pre-existing wording at this spot ("...secundum quod *potest* ponit potentiam actu in isto; quia dicit potentiam passivam dispositam.") was not a paraphrase but a **mis-transcription duplicate**: it is the *later* sentence in the same reply ("Nec sequitur: ergo de caeco poterit fieri videns, secundum quod potest ponit potentiam actu in isto; quia dicit potentiam passivam dispositam...") copied one clause too early — visible in the raw OCR as a two-column bleed on this printed page, where the left-column page-top line and a right-column line further down were read together. **Fix applied:** replaced the erroneous first occurrence of that clause with the true "hoc dictum... activam creatam" text in both Latin and English (English rendered literally per the project's terminology conventions), and moved `[^24]` from its incorrect stacked position on "videre" to its true position on "dictum" (matching its def's discussion of the Vat. variant "adiungit *iste potest videre*"), and `[^25]` from the same stacked position to its true position on "quia" (matching its def "Intellige: iste terminus potest"). No other wording in the chunk was touched. The correctly-positioned later sentence ("Nec sequitur: ergo de caeco poterit fieri videns...") is unchanged and was already correct. Confidence: high — PDF and OCR agree exactly, no `[?]` needed. Backup of the pre-fix version saved to `_backup-I-d42-a1-q4-wording-fix-20260717/bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q4.md`.

   *Original flag (2026-07-17, preserved for record):* Refused — NOT fixed, flagged for a future full-paragraph rebuild (out of that session's scope). While verifying item 2 against print, the printed page 759 text revealed that the chunk's existing Latin/English wording immediately preceding "ergo iste potest videre[^24][^25]" is **not a verbatim match** to the print at that clause: the actual printed sentence reads "...hoc dictum¹ esse verum, est possibile, quia possibile accipitur ibi respectu veri; et dictum esse possibile, quando dicit ordinem ad esse vel ad esse verum, dicit potentiam communiter ad activam et passivam, superiorem et inferiorem. Sed tunc non sequitur de re: ergo iste potest videre; quia² dicit potentiam activam creatam..." — i.e. the true printed superscript `¹` (= this chunk's `[^24]`, per its def discussing the Vat. variant "adiungit *iste potest videre*") sits on "dictum¹" in a clause that is not currently transcribed in the chunk at all, and printed `²` (= `[^25]`) sits on "quia²" rather than being stacked with `[^24]` on "videre". The chunk's own already-existing Latin/English wording in this clause appears to be a paraphrase/compression that predates this session (not something this pass introduced).

**Result:** `defs=27`; Latin `la=29` (residual +2 = the documented, deliberately-untouched backtick-blockquote false positive in item 1, not a real defect); English `en=27` (fully paired with defs — English side of this chunk is now healthy). Health-scan will still report this chunk as "unhealthy" corpus-wide because `la≠en`, which is expected and correct per item 1's disposition.

Page images used: `raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-758.png`, `raw/vision/vol1-pt2/p-759.png` (both 400 dpi, `pdf = printed − 410` for Vol I pt.2).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 42, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 759 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–17 across the three printed pages (759, 760, 761). The earlier notes on p. 759 (Quaracchi notes 1–3) anchor in the q. 4 scholion of `bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q4.md`, not here; only Quaracchi note 4 on p. 759 (the Psalm reference) belongs to this chunk.

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc verbo Augustini: *Non facit Deus, nisi quod convenit eius veritati et iustitiae*. Videtur enim falsum, quia in Psalmo[^1] dicitur: *Miserationes Domini super omnia opera eius*: ergo magis deberet dicere, quod non facit, nisi quod convenit misericordiae. Et iterum, quae differentia est inter veritatem et iustitiam?

<!-- page 760 -->

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *iustitia* uno modo est idem quod *exigentia meritorum*, et sic dividitur contra misericordiam; alio modo dicit *condecentiam bonitatis*, et hoc modo comprehendit misericordiam et iustitiam proprie dictam. Et sic accipit Augustinus in praedicto verbo, et hoc modo differt a veritate secundum rationem dicendi, quamvis idem sit secundum rem. Nam *veritas* respicit unamquamque rem secundum se; sed *iustitia* respicit unam rem comparatam ad aliam, secundum quod per leges debitas colligatur una alteri[^2].

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Potuit Deus simul cuncta facere, sed ratio prohibuit*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia *posse prohiberi* est impotentiae: ergo si divina potentia potest prohiberi, est impotens. — Item, illa ratio aut est quid creatum, aut increatum. Si creatum: ergo aliquid aliud a Deo prohibuit divinam virtutem, ergo aliquid potest resistere Deo. Si increatum: quomodo potest prohibere, cum sit omnino idem? — Praeterea, hoc non videtur prohibendum, quia Ecclesiastici decimo octavo[^3] dicitur: *Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *ratio* hic vocatur voluntas rationalis, et *rationabilitas* in voluntate[^4], quamvis non dicat aliud quantum ad principale significatum a divina essentia, connotat tamen aliud, scilicet *congruitatem aliquam in volito*, quae quidem non reperitur in eius opposito. Quod patet. Si omnia simul producta essent quantum ad esse singulare, nulla creatura aliquid faceret, et non esset rerum[^5] cursus in universo, qui est. Voluntas ergo rationalis hoc exigebat, ut Deus non faceret omnia simul, quamvis posset; unde *prohibitio* non accipitur hic pro repugnantia, sed pro *arctatione potentiae* quantum ad *actum*, non quantum ad *posse*. Et haec est determinatio indifferentiae ad hoc opus, non ad oppositum; et sic patent obiecta. Nam Ecclesiasticus intelligit quantum ad partes principales sive priores, sed Augustinus loquitur quantum ad individua[^6].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de differentia horum quatuor, quae removet Augustinus[^7] a Deo, scilicet *mori*, *falli*, *miserum esse* et *vinci*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ista dicunt defectus ipsius hominis sive animae in corpore. Quadruplex autem est actus et quadruplex potentia. Prima est *vivificativa*, et huius actus est *vivere*, et contra hunc est defectus *mori*. Secunda est *cognitiva*, cuius actus est *nosse*, et contra hunc est *falli*. Tertia est *affectiva*, et huius actus est *velle* sive amare et delectari, et contra hunc est *miserum esse*. Quarta est *operativa*, et huius actus est *agere*, et contra hunc est *vinci* et *superari*. — Et nota, quod ex his quae dicuntur, quatuor genera actuum removentur a Deo, scilicet *corporales* sive instrumentales[^8], ut *currere*; actus *culpabiles*, ut peccare, mentiri; actus *passivi*, ut vinci et superari; actus *defectivi*, ut mori et falli, quia habent potentiam coniunctam defectui. Et inde elicit Magister[^9] perfectam rationem potentiae, *quod potest omnia facere et nihil pati*.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod *omnia tam ample accepit, ut etiam mala includeret*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia aut malum includitur ratione *substrati*, aut ratione *deformitatis*. Ratione *substrati* includitur etiam proprie[^10], quia actio mala ratione actionis substratae est a divina potentia. Si ratione *deformitatis*, cum illa sit simpliciter non ens, non videtur posse includi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod malum accipitur ratione *deformitatis*; et quoniam *omnia* distribuit[^11] ibi pro *possibilibus*, et possibile potest accipi generaliter, tam a potentia activa quam defectiva, et sic accipitur ample, et comprehendit malum; et sic intelligit Augustinus. Alio modo ut *possibile* dicatur a potentia, quae secundum rem et modum est potentia, et tunc *proprie* accipitur, et tunc non con-<!-- page 761 -->tinetur ibi malum, et sic accipitur in communi usu, cum dicimus *Deum omnipotentem*. Et sic patet, quod quamvis non contineatur sub ente, non[^12] est simile de potentia.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *homo vel Angelus gratuitam habet potentiam*, qua potens est. Videtur enim male dicere, quia *generatio est actus naturalis*, cum quis generet similem in natura[^13], ergo est potentia naturalis; sed non Dei, quia Deus non naturaliter producit hominem: ergo est hominis, ergo homo habet potentiam naturalem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *naturale* dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur naturale quod habetur a natura et secundum consonantiam naturae; et sic creaturae multae habent potentias naturales. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae inest alicui per *propriam naturam*, ita quod non per aliam naturam, nec dantem nec conservantem; et hoc modo sola virtus divina est naturalis, omnis autem alia a Deo est liberaliter data, et liberaliter conservatur et adiuvatur, ut agat, et ideo dicitur *gratuita*[^14].

#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *vere ac proprie dicitur Trinitas Deus omnipotens*. Videtur enim non verum dicere, quia non dicitur *proprie omnisciens*: ergo nec *omnipotens*. — Item, Matthaei ultimo[^15]: *Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra*. Et de aliis videtur, quia Marci nono[^16]: *Si potes credere, omnia possibilia sunt credenti*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *omnipotentia est solius Dei proprie*, quia dicit potentiam infinitam, quae in nulla potest esse creatura, nec in Christo nec in alio secundum humanam naturam. Et hoc melius patebit alibi[^17]. Unde si dicatur de Christo *omnipotentia*, hoc intelligitur secundum *idiomatum communicationem*. Si autem dicatur de credentibus, *distributio* est *accommoda* solum de miraculis. Et sic patet illud.

---

english:
<!-- page 759 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: *"God does not do anything except what befits his truth and justice."* For it seems false, because in the Psalm[^1] it is said: *"The mercies of the Lord are over all his works"*: therefore he ought rather to say that God does nothing except what befits his mercy. And again, what is the difference between truth and justice?

<!-- page 760 -->

**I respond:** It must be said that *justice*, in one mode, is the same as the *exigency of merits*, and in this way it is divided against mercy; in another mode it states the *befittingness of [God's] goodness*, and in this mode it comprehends [both] mercy and justice properly so called. And so Augustine takes it in the foregoing saying, and in this mode it differs from *truth* according to the manner of speaking, although in reality it is the same. For *truth* regards each thing in itself; but *justice* regards one thing as compared to another, insofar as by due laws one is bound together with another[^2].

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *"God was able to make all things at once, but reason prohibited [it]."* For it seems wrong to say [this], because *being-able-to-be-prohibited* belongs to impotence: therefore if the divine power can be prohibited, it is impotent. — Likewise, that "reason" is either something created or uncreated. If created: then something other than God prohibited the divine power, [and] therefore something can resist God. If uncreated: how can it prohibit, since it is altogether the same [as God]? — Furthermore, this does not seem to be something prohibited, because in Ecclesiasticus 18[^3] it is said: *"He who lives in eternity created all things at once."*

**I respond:** It must be said that *reason* is here called the rational will, and *rationality* in the will[^4], which, although it does not state anything other than the principal signified [thing] from the divine essence, yet connotes something other, namely *a certain congruity in the willed [thing]*, which indeed is not found in its opposite. Which is plain. If all things were produced at once as to their singular being, no creature would do anything, and there would be no course of things[^5] in the universe, which there is. Therefore the rational will required this — that God should not make all things at once, although he could; whence *prohibition* is not here taken for repugnance, but for the *restraining of power* as to *act*, not as to *being-able*. And this is the determination of indifference to this work, not to its opposite; and so the objections are clear. For Ecclesiasticus understands [it] as to the principal or prior parts, but Augustine speaks as to individuals[^6].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of those four things which Augustine[^7] removes from God, namely *dying*, *being-deceived*, *being-wretched*, and *being-overcome*.

**I respond:** It must be said that these state defects of the man himself, or of the soul in the body. Now there is a fourfold act and a fourfold power. The first is *vivifying*, and its act is *to live*, and against this is the defect of *dying*. The second is *cognitive*, whose act is *to know*, and against this is *being-deceived*. The third is *affective*, and its act is *to will*, that is, to love and to delight, and against this is *being-wretched*. The fourth is *operative*, and its act is *to act*, and against this is *being-overcome* and *being-vanquished*. — And note that, from what is said, four kinds of acts are removed from God, namely *bodily* or instrumental [acts][^8], such as *running*; *culpable* acts, such as sinning, lying; *passive* acts, such as being-overcome and being-vanquished; *defective* acts, such as dying and being-deceived, because they have power conjoined with defect. And from this the Master[^9] draws the perfect account of power, [namely] *that it can do all things and suffer nothing*.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says, that *"he received all things so amply that he included even evils."* For it seems false to say [this], because evil is included either by reason of the *substrate*, or by reason of the *deformity*. By reason of the *substrate* it is included even properly[^10], because an evil action by reason of the substrate of the action is from divine power. If by reason of the *deformity*, since that is simply non-being, it does not seem possible to be included.

**I respond:** It must be said that evil is taken by reason of *deformity*; and since *all things* there distributes[^11] [the term] for *possibles*, and *possible* can be taken generally, [as proceeding] both from an active and from a defective power, in this way it is taken amply and comprehends evil; and so Augustine understands [it]. In another mode, *possible* is said [to come] from a power which according to reality and mode is a power, and then it is taken *properly*, and then evil is not con-<!-- page 761 -->tained there, and in this way it is taken in common use, when we say *God-omnipotent*. And so it is plain that, although [evil] is not contained under *being*, [it is] not[^12] similar concerning power.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *man or an Angel has a gratuitous power*, by which he is powerful. For it seems wrong to say [this], because *generation is a natural act*, since one generates [something] like in nature[^13], therefore it is a natural power; but [it is] not [a power] of God, because God does not naturally produce man: therefore it is of the man, [and] therefore the man has a natural power.

**I respond:** It must be said that *natural* is said in two ways. In one way, that is called natural which is had from nature and according to the consonance of nature; and in this way many creatures have natural powers. In the other way, that power is called natural which is in someone through his *own nature*, in such wise that [it is] not through another nature, neither [a nature] giving nor preserving [it]; and in this mode the divine power alone is natural, but every other [power], [being] from God, is given freely, and is freely preserved and assisted, that it may act, and therefore is called *gratuitous*[^14].

#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *truly and properly the Trinity is called God-omnipotent*. For it seems not true to say [this], because [the Trinity] is not called *properly omniscient*: therefore neither *omnipotent*. — Likewise, in the last [chapter] of Matthew[^15]: *"All power is given to me in heaven and on earth."* And concerning others it likewise seems [so], because in Mark 9[^16]: *"If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth."*

**I respond:** It must be said that *omnipotence belongs to God alone properly*, because it states an infinite power, which can be in no creature, neither in Christ nor in any other according to human nature. And this will appear better elsewhere[^17]. Hence if *omnipotence* is said of Christ, this is to be understood according to *the communication of idioms*. If however it is said of believers, the *distribution* is *accommodated* only to miracles. And so that [text] is plain.

---

la: Psalm. 144, 9: *Suavis Dominus universis, et miserationes eius super omnia opera eius.*

en: Psalm 144:9: *"The Lord is sweet to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works."*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 5. ad 1; B. Albert., hic a. 7.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 20, m. 5, ad 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 7.

la: Vers. 1. — Pro *prohibendum* Vat. *prohibitum*.

en: Verse 1. — For *prohibendum* ("to be prohibited") the Vatican edition [reads] *prohibitum* ("prohibited").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc hic prosequitur: *et ista quamvis non dicat aliquid aliud.*

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc continues here: *"and this [reason], although it does not state anything other."*

la: Pro *rerum* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *propter hoc*, codd. LOY *praeterea*, alii non pauci codd. *primum*, codd. FPQ *ille*. Nostram lectionem sumsimus ex cod. R et ed. 1. Cfr. *Itiner. mentis in Deum*, c. 1.

en: For *rerum* ("of things") the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] *propter hoc* ("on account of this"), codd. LOY *praeterea* ("furthermore"), several other codices *primum* ("first"), codd. FPQ *ille* ("that one"). We have taken our reading from cod. R and ed. 1. Cf. *The Soul's Journey into God*, c. 1.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 5. ad 5, et p. II. q. 44. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aegid. R., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. *II Sent.* d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 20, m. 5, ad 5, and p. II, q. 44, m. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 7; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and Giles of Rome, here at the text.

la: Libr. I. de Symbol. ad Catech., c. 1. n. 2. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. Cfr. etiam lib. XXVI. ad Faustum, c. 5. — Pro *vinci* multi codd. cum primis edd. *mentiri*; perperam, quia et in loco Augustini a Magistro citato et in subnexa solutione habetur *vinci*.

en: *On the Creed to the Catechumens*, book I, c. 1, n. 2. See here in the text of the Master, c. 2. Cf. also *Against Faustus*, book XXVI, c. 5. — For *vinci* ("to be overcome") many codices with the first editions [read] *mentiri* ("to lie"); wrongly, because both in the place of Augustine cited by the Master and in the appended solution *vinci* is found.

la: Codd. VX *materiales*, quo verbo etiam Alex. Hal. utitur S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1.

en: Codd. V and X [read] *materiales* ("material"), which word Alexander of Hales also uses, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1.

la: Hic c. 3. — Mox pro *quod* Vat. cum cod. cc *quae*. — De hoc dubio cfr. etiam supra q. 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 8; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Here c. 3. — Soon after, for *quod* ("that") the Vatican edition with cod. cc [reads] *quae* ("which"). — On this doubt cf. also above, q. 2; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 8; Richard of Mediavilla, here at the text.

la: In Vat. desiderantur verba *etiam proprie*, et pro *Ratione* legitur *Non ratione*. Etiam in sequenti propositione Vat. substituit *Non ratione* pro *Si ratione*, et subinde post *deformitatis* interserit *quia*.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *etiam proprie* ("even properly") are lacking, and for *Ratione* it reads *Non ratione* ("Not by reason"). Also in the following proposition the Vatican edition substitutes *Non ratione* for *Si ratione*, and then after *deformitatis* inserts *quia* ("because").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 99, Scholion, I. n. 2.

en: Cf. above, p. 99, Scholion, I, n. 2.

la: Vat. cum pluribus codd. *non tamen*. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4, et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: The Vatican edition with several codices [reads] *non tamen* ("not however"). — On this doubt cf. above, q. 4, and Peter of Tarentaise, here at the text.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34 (c. 4): *Naturalissimum enim operum, quae in viventibus... est facere aliud, quale ipsum.*

en: Aristotle, *De Anima* II, text 34 (c. 4): *"For the most natural of works which are in living things... is to make another such as itself."*

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a Richardo, hic circa lit.

en: This doubt is also solved by Richard [of Mediavilla], here at the text.

la: Vers. 18.

en: Verse 18. [i.e., Matthew 28:18]

la: Vers. 22.

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 3.

translators_notes:
**J4 Class D/E audit (2026-07-17): NOT a real defect — confirmed false positive, related to but distinct from the §2 backtick-blockquote pattern.** The corpus health scan flags `defs=17 la=19 en=17`. Cause: the explanatory blockquote note opening the `## Latin` section ("this chunk renumbers them sequentially [^1]–[^17] across the three printed pages…") contains the example range `[^1]–[^17]` as **plain, non-backtick-quoted text**, unlike the `` `**La.** ``/`` `**En.** `` labels in the same sentence, which ARE backtick-quoted. The naive regex verification script (and per `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2, likely the live renderer too) counts these two literal tokens as extra body anchors, producing `la=19` against 17 real, correctly paired anchors and 17 real defs. English has no equivalent intro note repeating the range, so `en=17` is clean. This is confirmed by content: every `[^1]`–`[^17]` marker in the actual Latin/English argument text pairs 1:1 with an apparatus def; only the two markers inside the intro blockquote are extraneous.

**Left unfixed deliberately.** Per J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md §2, this whole class of issue (literal/backtick `[^N]` example-range notation inside explanatory `## Latin`/`## Apparatus`/blockquote prose being mis-parsed by both the verification regex and, per the handoff, the site's actual renderer) needs a corpus-wide decision from Wilson — either de-fence the notation everywhere or teach the regex/renderer to skip code spans — not a one-chunk patch. Tried wrapping `[^1]` and `[^17]` in backticks (matching the convention used elsewhere in the same sentence); this did NOT change the scan's `la` count (both the verification regex and, presumably, the renderer match `[^N]` regardless of surrounding backticks), so the edit was reverted to avoid a no-op diff. **Flagged prominently for Wilson: this chunk's intro note is a non-backtick-quoted instance of the pattern — worse than the already-known `IV-d21-p1-littera`/`III-d33-dubia` cases, since it may be actively stealing the `[^1]`/`[^17]` footnote binding on the live rendered page (per the handoff's description of `text-reader.tsx:282`), not merely inflating a count.** No Latin wording, English wording, or apparatus prose was changed; no `[^N]` marker tokens were added, removed, or relabeled in this chunk.