title: Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum haec tria bona sint de necessitate matrimonii.*

Tertio quaeritur de necessitate horum trium bonorum, utrum scilicet sint de necessitate Sacramenti. Et quod bonum *Sacramenti* sit de necessitate,

*Argg. pro parte affirmativa.*

1. Dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^1]: «Sacramentum ita inseparabiliter coniugio haeret, ut sine illo esse non videatur».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: bonum Sacramenti est ratione inseparabilitatis; sed inseparabilitas[^2] semper inest ut necessitas: aut ergo bonum Sacramenti non est bonum, aut necessario inest.

Item, quod bonum *prolis* de necessitate consequatur matrimonium, videtur:

3. Quia dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^3], quod «qui venena sterilitatis procuraverint non sunt coniuges».

4. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia ad hoc institutum fuit matrimonium, scilicet ad crescendum et multiplicandum[^4]: ergo frustra est, si hoc fine caret; sed non potest esse omnino frustra, cum sit Sacramentum: ergo etc.

Item, quod bonum *fidei* sit de necessitate Sacramenti, videtur:

5. Quia dicit Augustinus[^5], quod si quis consentiat in aliquam, ut postmodum aliam accipiat, non est Sacramentum; sed hoc est propter defectum fidei: ergo etc.

6. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia licet ex causa fornicationis matrimonium dividere[^6]; sed non liceret, nisi fides esset de substantia: ergo etc.

**Contra:** *(Pro parte negativa.)*

1. Quod *Sacramentum* non sit de substantia matrimonii, videtur: quia si aliquis contrahat cum aliqua per verba *de praesenti*, est matrimonium contractum, et tamen, illo transeunte ad religionem, ista potest nubere[^7]: ergo non erat ibi vinculum inseparabile.

2. Item, quod nec *fides*, videtur: quia matrimonium potest esse inter perpetuo continentes, et potest esse inter incontinentes, quia neuter cum alio vel alia potest contrahere: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod *proles* non sit de necessitate, videtur: quia matrimonium est inter steriles, sicut patet; sed hic non est bonum prolis.

Quaeritur ergo: quid est quod dicit Augustinus[^8], quod «non sunt coniuges»? Si enim prius consenserunt, fuit matrimonium ratum; si post coierunt, fuit consummatum; sed hoc nullo casu, nullo peccato rumpitur.

> **Conclusio.** Bonum *Sacramenti* est de necessitate matrimonii; alia duo, scilicet *fides* et *proles*, quodam modo sunt de esse Sacramenti, et quodam modo tantum de bene esse.

**Respondeo:** Sicut tangit Magister in littera[^9] et accipit ab Augustino, cum sint tria bona matrimonii, scilicet *fides*, *proles* et *Sacramentum*, unum, scilicet *Sacramentum*, est de *necessitate* matrimonii. Sacramentum enim venit ex mutua obligatione et divina institutione et significatione illius unionis; et ideo, quia ista sunt de necessitate matrimonii, per consequens et Sacramentum. — Sed alia duo bona quodam modo sunt de *esse*, quodam modo de *bene esse*. Si enim loquamur quantum ad *matrimonii usum*, sic sunt de *bene esse*[^10], quoniam usus matrimonii absque his esse potest, sicut tota die est; et non solum est *absque his*, sed etiam *cum suis*

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*oppositis*. Unde sterilitatis et aborsus procuratio et fidei fractio non dissolvunt matrimoniale vinculum contractum.

Si autem loquamur quantum ad *matrimonii contractum*, qui est per matrimonialem consensum; sic potest esse contractus *absque his duobus bonis*, ut puta in sterilibus et in continentibus, sed tamen[^11] non est *contra haec*. Tunc autem est consensus *contra haec*, quando sub *tali pacto consentitur*, ut prolis sterilitas procuretur, vel uxor alii prostituatur; tunc enim non est consensus vel pactio *matrimonii*, sed potius *adulterii*, cum directe repugnet institutioni matrimonii. Sed *carentia* sive absentia horum duorum non repugnat: quia *fides* venit ex recto matrimonii usu; et quia possunt homines abuti ipso, ideo potest deesse fides. Similiter *proles* venit ex fructu ventris; et quia steriles possunt esse vel natura, vel arte: ideo matrimonium hoc bono potest carere.

*(Ad 1.)* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Sacramenti bonum non est in matrimonio *ante* carnalem copulam; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia est inter coniuges insolubile vinculum nec solvitur nisi per mortem *spiritualem*, sicut *post* consummationem per mortem *corporalem*[^12]. Verum est tamen, quod non est ibi Sacramentum secundum *completam* et plenariam rationem.

*(Ad arg. 5, pro parte affirm.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides sit[^13] de necessitate, quia qui sic consentit, ut tamen aliam ducere possit post, non contrahit; dicendum, quod hoc non est tantum propter defectum *fidei*, sed etiam propter defectum *Sacramenti*, quia non vult isti coniungi perpetuo, et quia in pactione introducitur conditio contraria bono *fidei*; nec propter infidelitatem solvitur matrimonii Sacramentum, sed solvitur obligatio ad reddendum debitum[^14].

*(Item ad arg. 4.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur de bono prolis, quod propter hoc institutum est; dicendum, quod non tantum propter hoc, sed etiam in *remedium* et in *signum*; et ideo, quamvis non sit ibi hoc bonum, possunt tamen esse alia bona. Si autem homo stetisset, tunc semper fuisset hoc bonum, quia tantum fuisset in *officium*; et hoc bonum non deesset, quia nulla esset sterilitatis poena[^15].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether these three goods are of the necessity of marriage.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the necessity of these three goods, namely whether they are of the necessity of the Sacrament. And that the good of the *Sacrament* is of necessity [is shown]:

*Arguments for the affirmative side.*

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text[^1]: "The Sacrament cleaves so inseparably to the marriage bond that it seems not to be without it."

2. Likewise, it appears by reason: the good of the Sacrament consists in the account of inseparability; but inseparability[^2] is always present as a necessity: therefore either the good of the Sacrament is not a good, or it is present necessarily.

Likewise, that the good of *offspring* follows of necessity upon marriage appears thus:

3. Because Augustine says, and it is contained in the text[^3], that "those who have procured the poisons of sterility are not spouses."

4. Likewise, it appears by reason: because marriage was instituted for this, namely for increasing and multiplying[^4]: therefore it is in vain if it lacks this end; but it cannot be altogether in vain, since it is a Sacrament: therefore etc.

Likewise, that the good of *faith* is of the necessity of the Sacrament appears thus:

5. Because Augustine says[^5] that if someone should consent to one woman so that afterwards he may take another, it is not a Sacrament; but this is on account of a defect of faith: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it appears by reason: because it is permitted to divide a marriage for the cause of fornication[^6]; but it would not be permitted unless faith belonged to the substance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** *(For the negative side.)*

1. That the *Sacrament* is not of the substance of marriage appears thus: because if someone contracts with a woman through words *of the present*, the marriage is contracted, and yet, when he passes over to religion, she is able to marry[^7]: therefore there was not there an inseparable bond.

2. Likewise, that neither is *faith* [of the substance] appears thus: because marriage can exist between those perpetually continent, and can exist between the incontinent, since neither can contract with another man or woman: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that *offspring* is not of necessity appears thus: because marriage exists among the sterile, as is evident; but here there is no good of offspring.

It is asked therefore: what is it that Augustine says[^8], that "they are not spouses"? For if they first consented, the marriage was ratified; if afterwards they came together, it was consummated; but this is broken in no case, by no sin.

> **Conclusion.** The good of the *Sacrament* is of the necessity of marriage; the other two, namely *faith* and *offspring*, are in a certain manner of the being of the Sacrament, and in a certain manner only of its well-being.

**I respond:** As the Master touches upon in the text[^9] and takes from Augustine, since there are three goods of marriage, namely *faith*, *offspring*, and *the Sacrament*, one, namely *the Sacrament*, is of the *necessity* of marriage. For the Sacrament comes from the mutual obligation and the divine institution and the signification of that union; and therefore, since these are of the necessity of marriage, consequently the Sacrament also is. — But the other two goods are in a certain manner of the *being*, and in a certain manner of the *well-being*. For if we speak with respect to the *use of marriage*, thus they are of the *well-being*[^10], since the use of marriage can exist without them, as is the case all the time; and it not only exists *without them*, but even *with their*

*opposites*. Hence the procuring of sterility and abortion and the breaking of faith do not dissolve the contracted marriage bond.

But if we speak with respect to the *contract of marriage*, which is through the matrimonial consent; thus the contract can exist *without these two goods*, as for instance among the sterile and among the continent, yet nevertheless[^11] it is not *against these things*. But then the consent is *against these things* when it is consented to under such a pact that the sterility of offspring be procured, or the wife be prostituted to another; for then it is not a consent or pact of *marriage*, but rather of *adultery*, since it directly conflicts with the institution of marriage. But the *lack* or absence of these two does not conflict: because *faith* comes from the right use of marriage; and since men can abuse it, therefore faith can be absent. Likewise *offspring* comes from the fruit of the womb; and since the sterile can be so either by nature or by art: therefore marriage can lack this good.

*(To 1.)* To that, then, which is objected, that the good of the Sacrament is not in marriage *before* carnal union; it must be said that this is false, because there is between the spouses an indissoluble bond, and it is not dissolved except by *spiritual* death, just as *after* consummation by *bodily* death[^12]. Yet it is true that the Sacrament is not there according to its *complete* and full account.

*(To argument 5, for the affirmative side.)* To that which is objected, that faith is[^13] of necessity, because he who consents in such a way that he may nevertheless marry another afterwards does not contract; it must be said that this is not only on account of a defect of *faith*, but also on account of a defect of the *Sacrament*, because he does not will to be joined to this woman perpetually, and because in the pact a condition contrary to the good of *faith* is introduced; nor is the Sacrament of marriage dissolved on account of infidelity, but the obligation of rendering the debt is dissolved[^14].

*(Likewise to argument 4.)* To that which is objected concerning the good of offspring, that marriage was instituted for its sake; it must be said that it was not only for its sake, but also for a *remedy* and for a *sign*; and therefore, although this good is not there, the other goods can nevertheless be present. But if man had stood [in innocence], then this good would always have been present, because it would have been only for [an] *office*; and this good would not be lacking, because there would be no penalty of sterility[^15].

---

la: Hic c. 2. Verba potius sunt Hug. a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 8, quibus sententiam August., I. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 10. n. 11. seq. (hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2. relatam), complectitur.

en: Here, c. 2. The words are rather those of Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments* II, p. XI, c. 8, in which he embraces the opinion of Augustine, *On Marriage and Concupiscence* I, c. 10, n. 11 and following (related here in the Master's text, c. 2).

la: Codd. L Y addunt *quae inest*, codd. N aa *quae ibi est*, edd. pro *ratione* ponunt *ratio*, deinde legunt: *quae rei semper inest, est necessitas*, codd. M O R T U X *inseparabilitas semper est necessitas* (codd. M O *est ut necessitas*). Pro *ut necessitas* pauci codd. perperam *non necessitas*. Inferius pro *necessario* cod. W *semper*.

en: Codices L and Y add *quae inest* ("which is present"), codices N and aa *quae ibi est* ("which is there"); the editions put *ratio* for *ratione*, then read *quae rei semper inest, est necessitas* ("that which is always present in a thing is a necessity"); codices M O R T U X read *inseparabilitas semper est necessitas* ("inseparability is always a necessity") (codices M O *est ut necessitas* ["is as a necessity"]). For *ut necessitas* a few codices wrongly [read] *non necessitas*. Below, for *necessario*, codex W [reads] *semper*.

la: Hic c. 3.

en: Here, c. 3.

la: Respicitur Gen. 1, 28.

en: Reference is to Gen. 1:28.

la: De Bono coniugali, c. 5. n. 5, hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, allegatus.

en: *On the Good of Marriage*, c. 5, n. 5, cited here in the Master's text, c. 2.

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 6. seqq., et Comment. a. 3. q. 2.

en: See above, the Master's text, d. XXVII, c. 6 and following, and the Commentary, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Supra arg. 3. pro parte affirm. — Inferius pro *peccato* [*veneficii*] edd. *pacto*.

en: Above, argument 3 for the affirmative side. — Below, for *peccato* [i.e. *veneficii*, "poisoning"], the editions [read] *pacto*.

la: Hic c. 1. et 2.

en: Here, c. 1 and 2.

la: Vat. *si tamen*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *si tamen* ("if nevertheless").

la: Vide supra d. 27. a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Post *spiritualem* Vat. addit *vel civilem*.

en: See above, d. 27, a. 3, q. 1 and following. — After *spiritualem*, the Vatican edition adds *vel civilem* ("or civil").

la: Edd. perperam *non sit*.

en: The editions wrongly [read] *non sit* ("is not").

la: Vat. hic addit: *Ad illud quod dicit Augustinus, quod qui venena procuraverant etc.; dicendum, quod hoc non dicit, quia per hoc solvatur matrimonii vinculum, sed quia Sacramenti amittatur meritum, et grave incurrant peccatum. Unde non sunt coniuges*, supple, *veri et fideles*. (Cfr. tamen corp. quaest.)

en: The Vatican edition here adds: "To that which Augustine says, that those who have procured poisons etc.; it must be said that he does not say this because through it the bond of marriage is dissolved, but because the merit of the Sacrament is lost, and they incur grave sin. Hence they are not spouses" — supply: "true and faithful ones." (Cf. nevertheless the body of the question.)

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the vol4 PDF colour bands for printed pp. 720–721 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{720,721}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; R columns regenerated at split_x=1780 because the default 1880 clipped the right column's first letters). The raw IA djvu OCR (L77564–L77694) served only as a spacing/marker reference; the two-column cascade-shattered footers and Respondeo were read from the bands per the VOL II OVERRIDE. `has_scholion: false` — the Article I scholion lives in a1-q1 (footnote [^15] here explicitly points to it: "Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.").

**Page span verified.** Running heads confirmed: p.720 "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." with "QUAESTIO III." and title band "Utrum haec tria bona sint de necessitate matrimonii"; the "Tertio quaeritur de necessitate horum trium bonorum" opener aligns correctly (no q-swap). p.721 running head "DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. I." — Article II begins lower on p.721, so the running head names the article that opens on the page, not this chunk. My q3 body ends at "nulla esset sterilitatis poena[^15]" (p.721, upper right column); everything below (ARTICULUS II / QUAESTIO I "Utrum coitus propter prolem possit esse...") is a2-q1.

**Apparatus count: 15.** Per-page split — p.720: [^1]–[^10] (physically numbered footers 3–12). p.721: [^11]–[^15] (physically numbered footers 1–5). Footnote [^14] (p.721 footer 4) is a long Vatican-variant note that wraps across the column gap; its tail ("...non sunt coniuges, supple, veri et fideles. (Cfr. tamen corp. quaest.)") was read from the right-column footer band.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- To **a1-q2** (pp. 719–720): p.720 footers physically numbered **1** ("Edd. cum paucis codd. vindicat.") and **2** ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."), plus the unnumbered variant note opening the p.720 footer block ("stanti, cod. bb instituiae, cod. A statui... et statui naturae corruptae") — these are anchored in q2's body (its tail "...vindicavit¹... Et sic patent obiecta²." occupies the top of both columns of p.720). Not claimed here.
- To **a2-q1** (begins p.721): p.721 footers physically numbered **6** ("Hic c. 5."), **7** ("Vers. 2. — Seq. locus est Matth. 19, 4. seqq..."), and **8** ("Vers. 17. Cfr. ibid. 9, 1.") — anchored in the Art II q1 body ("betur in littera⁶", "secundo Ioannis⁷", "Genesis octavo⁸"). Not claimed here.

**[?] flags.**
- [^8] (p.720 footer 10): the Quaracchi note reads "Inferius pro *peccato* [*veneficii*] edd. *pacto*." The bracketed *[veneficii]* is the editors' own gloss on the variant; English rendered interpretively. Low-confidence on the exact editorial intent, but the Latin is transcribed verbatim from the band.
- Minor: mid-Respondeo marginal numerals on p.721 (small "3." / "4." beside "sic potest esse contractus" and "tunc enim non est consensus") are editorial navigation marginalia and were not rendered inline; the three explicit printed reply-labels (*Ad 1*, *Ad arg. 5 pro parte affirm.*, *Item ad arg. 4*) are preserved as bracketed italic labels.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Qualiter bona matrimonii excusent coitum.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de excusatione actus coniugalis per bona matrimonii. Et cum contingat coire cum uxore causa concupiscentiae implendae, causa fornicationis vitandae et causa prolis procreandae; circa hoc secundum haec tria tria quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum coitus propter prolem possit esse sine omni culpa.

*Secundo* quaeritur, utrum coitus propter fornicationem vitandam possit esse sine omni peccato veniali.

*Tertio*, utrum coire cum uxore causa concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper peccatum mortale.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum coitus propter prolem possit esse sine omni culpa.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod possit esse sine omni culpa.

1. Augustinus dicit *de Bono coniugali*, et habetur in littera[^1]: «Coniugalis concubitus generandae prolis gratia non habet culpam».

2. Item, ratione videtur: matrimonium est sanctum et bonum; quod patet, quia a Deo est institutum et confirmatum per praesentiam suam ad nuptias, *secundo Ioannis*[^2], et approbatum per responsionem suam, Matthaei decimo nono; sed re sancta potest homo sancte uti et sine peccato: ergo cum hoc sit maxime causa prolis, patet etc.

3. Item, omne quod Deus praecipit, potest fieri sine peccato; sed Deus praecepit prolem procreare, *Genesis octavo*[^3], post lapsum: ergo possibile est hoc facere sine peccato.

4. Item, nulla potentia est mala de se, ergo omni potentia bene possumus uti; sed potentia ge<!-- page 722 -->nerandi est potentia nobis data: ergo possumus ea bene uti. Sed *bene uti sive melius* non est aliter quam ad id, ad quod est et secundum quod ad illud est; hoc autem est, cum cognoscit uxorem propter prolem: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Omnis delectatio immoderata est peccatum, quia, ubi est defectus modi, est malum culpae[^4]; sed in coitu est delectatio immoderata, etiam quando coit quis causa prolis procreandae: ergo est ibi peccatum.

2. Item, omnis delectatio, in qua pervertitur rectus ordo, est peccatum; sed in coitu coniugali est delectatio, in qua anima absorbetur a carne, etiam cum coit propter hoc: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis actus, in quo rationabiliter homo erubescit, est peccatum, vel foeditatem habet — ut purgare ventrem: attamen non ita rationabiliter de hoc erubescit quis, quia non debet homo erubescere de *poena*, sed de *culpa* — sed in coitu coniugali ratione vel amore prolis erubescit et nullo modo coram aliis faceret: ergo est peccatum.

4. Item, omnis actus, in quo regnat libido, est peccatum; sed in actu coniugali pro generanda prole regnat libido, quia dicit Augustinus[^5], quod «peccatum non transmittit ad posteros propagatio, sed libido»: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis actus, qui est necessario ordinatus ad culpam, est peccatum; sed hoc est in coitu ratione prolis, quia contrahit peccatum proles: ergo in actu coniugali semper est peccatum.

6. Item, ubicumque est actus coniugalis, necesse est, praecedere motus in carne; sed primi motus sunt peccata, saltem venialia: ergo semper coitus propter prolem est peccatum veniale.

7. Item, si matrimonium excusat coitum propter prolis bonum, aut excusat a peccato, quod *est*, aut a peccato, quod *non est*. Non a peccato, quod non est nec fuit[^6]! Si a peccato, quod *est*: ergo aliquid est ibi peccatum.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, pro quanto dicatur matrimonium *excusare coitum*, cum omnis ordinatio, quae cum uxore habetur, possit etiam haberi cum alia muliere, et ita sit libido et pruritus et carnalis actus in cognoscendo uxorem, sicut etiam aliam mulierem, vel pene.

> **Conclusio.** Actus coniugii excusatur per Sacramentum, et quidem ab omni culpa, quando fit prolis generandae gratia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt dicentes, quod in actu generativae non est culpa nisi per excessum, sicut in actu nutritivae. — Alii erraverunt dicentes, semper esse peccatum et nullo modo excusari, immo propter peccatum matrimonium vitiari, non vitium excusari; malum enim iunctum bono ipsum vitiat, non e converso bonum malum excusat. — Et primi quidem non intellexerunt *morbum*, quomodo scilicet infecta est vis generativa. Secundi vero non intellexerunt, Sacramentum esse *remedium* et *medicamentum*, quod non vitiatur a morbo, sed econtra morbum sedat[^7]. — Et ideo qui recte credunt, videntes *morbum* et *remedium*, dicunt, actum coniugii per Sacramentum excusari tanquam *morbum* per *remedium*.

Si quis autem velit rationem *morbi* et *remedii* intueri, potest patere sic. *Primum* quidem omnis actus, in quo regnat pruritus libidinis adeo, quod absorbetur ratio, et homo efficitur totus caro, est actus deordinatus et actus, in quo, quantum est de se, pervertitur regnum animae et ordinatio[^8], quae est in viribus animae; secundum quam ordinationem attenditur iustitia quaedam, quae non tantum est in ordinatione *ad alterum*, sed in ordinatione virium animae *ad se*. Sed hoc est in actu coniugali, sicut experimento patet, et Sancti dicunt, maxime Augustinus et Origenes, et in Glossa tangitur, primae ad Corinthios sexto[^9]: *Qui fornicatur in corpus suum peccat*; Glossa: «Hic proprie servit anima corpori in tantum, ut ipso momento et experimento huius flagitii nihil cogitare homini liceat aut intendere, quia mentem captivam subdit ipsa submersio et absorbitio libidinis». — In huius autem deordinationis arbitrium plurimum facit *erubescentia* naturae, quae mendax esse non potest; erubescit autem motum illorum membrorum et actum tanto plus, quanto est melius ordinata. Et sic patet, quod actus ille de se est *morbidus*, quia sine tanta deordinatione exerceri non potest, sicut in ea<!-- page 723 -->dem Glossa tangitur. — Ecce igitur, qualiter possumus videre *morbum*.

*Remedium* autem intueri sic possumus. Quidam enim est actus, qui dicit deordinationem *mentis ad Deum*, ut idololatrare et periurare; quidam est, qui dicit deordinationem *creaturae ad creaturam*, sive unius ad alterum, sive eiusdem ad se. Primus est malus et morbidus *secundum se* et nullo modo potest fieri bene, nec divino mandato nec aliter. Secundus vero, quia non habet essentialem deordinationem, potest per divinum imperium ordinari, utpote cum Deus praecipit occidere hominem, cum etiam praecipit rem alienam accipere, cum etiam inspirat se ipsum occidere, sicut Samson, in quem irruit Spiritus Domini, Iudicum decimo quarto[^10]; per hunc modum ordinavit coitum Osee cum muliere, quae non erat sua uxor, scilicet per Dei mandatum. Sed quoniam actus iste coniugalis non omnibus debebat praecipi; providit divina dispositio illam deordinationem ordinare non per *mandatum*, sed per aliquod *statutum*, et per statutum, quod esset signum illius coniunctionis, quae erat ordinata ad concupiscentiae remedium, et ita per Sacramentum matrimonii, quod quia habet rationem *medicinae*, potius excusat, quam vitietur; sicut, cum Dominus praecepit Hebraeis, ut vasa Aegyptiorum asportarent[^11], *asportatio* non facit praeceptum malum, sed potius econtra *praeceptum*, quod est potentius et superius, fecit asportationem bonam et meritoriam, quae alias esset culpabilis et mala. — Sancti igitur et omnes Catholici dicunt, coitum per Sacramentum matrimonii excusari a culpa mortali, maxime quando gratia prolis fit.

Sed de *modo* excusandi est duplex opinio: quia quidam voluerunt dicere, quod excusatur a culpa mortali, sed non a veniali, quia mortale fit ibi veniale. Alii dixerunt, et hoc videtur sentire Augustinus[^12], quod cum Deus perfectum det remedium contra morbum, quod quando gratia prolis coitur, potest esse sine omni culpa; et hoc est magis consonum rationi et pietati fidei. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, si tamen haec intentio duret a principio usque in finem, ut non deflectatur ad aliud mens; quod tamen est valde difficile[^13].

**Ad obiecta:**

*1. 2. 3. 4.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est ibi immoderatio, deordinatio, erubescentia et libido; dicendum, quod haec quatuor possunt esse circa actum *rationis*, aut *sensualitatis*[^14]. Si circa actum *rationis*, semper faciunt culpam, quia faciunt malum secundum se. Si autem sunt circa actum *sensualitatis*, existente ordinatione circa actum rationis; tunc ista cedunt in poenam; et sic est in proposito. Nam per virtutem Sacramenti ratio ordinatur, ut moderate velit et ordinate et honeste; nec de illo actu erubescit homo, quia vult filios procreare, nec improba voluntate appetit, sed casta. Sed nisi interveniret remedium matrimonii, tunc esset inordinatio non solum in *sensualitate*, sed etiam in *ratione*; et sic semper esset peccatum. Unde istis quatuor mediis ostendi potest, quod actus generativae est peccatum, nisi excusetur.

*5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est causa peccati; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia actus ille secundum se non est causa nisi *prolis*, sed ratione primae transgressionis prolem generari non contingit sine culpa sua, non *generantis*, quia non propter culpam generantis, sed propter culpam primi parentis nascitur proles peccatrix.

*6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de primis motibus, potest dici, quod antecedunt actum coniugalem nec semper sunt peccata, ut puta quando surgunt ex cogitatione ordinata, utpote si Abraham cogitaret cognoscere uxorem, ut acciperet prolem; et tunc, si caro moveretur, non peccaret[^15].

*7.* Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur: a quo peccato excusat? dicendum, quod a peccato, non quod *est*, sed quod alias *esset*, nisi matrimonium interveniret. — Unde differenti modo est remedium Sacramentum matrimonii et alia Sacramenta. Hoc enim est in *remedium*, quia facit vitare peccatum, quod incurreretur; alia vero *liberant* a peccato, in quod iam quis est lapsus; pro tanto autem praestat remedium, quia actus de se inordinatus ordinatur per divinum statutum[^16].

english:
### Article II. *In what way the goods of marriage excuse intercourse.*

Consequently, as regards the second article, inquiry is made concerning the excusing of the conjugal act through the goods of marriage. And since it may happen that one has intercourse with one's wife for the sake of fulfilling concupiscence, for the sake of avoiding fornication, and for the sake of procreating offspring; concerning this, according to these three, three [questions] are asked.

*First* it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.

*Second* it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication can be without all venial sin.

*Third*, whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.

### Question I. *Whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it can be without all fault.

1. Augustine says, in *On the Good of Marriage*, and it is contained in the text[^1]: «Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generating offspring does not have fault».

2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: marriage is holy and good; which is evident, because it is instituted by God and confirmed by his presence at the wedding, in the second [chapter] *of John*[^2], and approved by his answer, in the nineteenth [chapter] of Matthew; but a holy thing a man can use in a holy manner and without sin: therefore since this is chiefly for the sake of offspring, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that God commands can be done without sin; but God commanded to procreate offspring, in the eighth [chapter] *of Genesis*[^3], after the fall: therefore it is possible to do this without sin.

4. Likewise, no power is evil of itself, therefore we can use every power well; but the power of gene<!-- page 722 -->rating is a power given to us: therefore we can use it well. But *to use well, that is, better,* is nothing other than [to use it] toward that for which it is and according as it is [ordered] to it; and this is [the case] when a man knows his wife for the sake of offspring: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every immoderate pleasure is a sin, because, where there is a defect of measure, there is the evil of fault[^4]; but in intercourse there is immoderate pleasure, even when one has intercourse for the sake of procreating offspring: therefore there is sin there.

2. Likewise, every pleasure in which right order is perverted is a sin; but in conjugal intercourse there is pleasure in which the soul is absorbed by the flesh, even when one has intercourse for the sake of this: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every act at which a man reasonably blushes is a sin, or has foulness — as to purge the belly: yet a man does not so reasonably blush at this, because a man ought not to blush at the *penalty*, but at the *fault* — but in conjugal intercourse, by reason or love of offspring, one blushes and would by no means do it before others: therefore it is a sin.

4. Likewise, every act in which lust reigns is a sin; but in the conjugal act, for the generating of offspring, lust reigns, because Augustine says[^5] that «propagation does not transmit sin to posterity, but lust [does]»: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every act that is necessarily ordered to fault is a sin; but this is [the case] in intercourse by reason of offspring, because the offspring contracts sin: therefore in the conjugal act there is always sin.

6. Likewise, wherever there is a conjugal act, it is necessary that movements in the flesh precede; but the first movements are sins, at least venial: therefore intercourse for the sake of offspring is always a venial sin.

7. Likewise, if marriage excuses intercourse for the sake of the good of offspring, either it excuses from a sin that *is* [real], or from a sin that *is not*. Not from a sin that is not, nor was[^6]! If from a sin that *is* [real]: therefore there is some sin there.

Alongside this it is asked, in what measure marriage is said *to excuse intercourse*, since every ordering that is had with one's wife could also be had with another woman, and thus there would be lust and titillation and a carnal act in knowing one's wife, just as [with] another woman, or even [more].

> **Conclusion.** The conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament, and indeed from all fault, when it is done for the sake of generating offspring.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this some have erred, saying that in the act of the generative [power] there is no fault except through excess, as in the act of the nutritive [power]. — Others have erred, saying that it is always a sin and can in no way be excused, but rather that on account of the sin the marriage is vitiated, not the vice excused; for evil joined to good vitiates it, and not conversely does good excuse the evil. — And the first indeed did not understand the *disease*, namely, in what way the generative power is infected. But the second did not understand that the Sacrament is a *remedy* and a *medicine*, which is not vitiated by the disease, but on the contrary calms the disease[^7]. — And therefore those who rightly believe, seeing the *disease* and the *remedy*, say that the conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament as a *disease* [is healed] through a *remedy*.

But if anyone wishes to consider the account of the *disease* and the *remedy*, it can be made clear thus. *First* indeed, every act in which the itching of lust so reigns that reason is absorbed, and man is made wholly flesh, is a disordered act, and an act in which, so far as depends on itself, the reign of the soul and the ordering[^8] which is in the powers of the soul is perverted; according to which ordering a certain justice is regarded, which is not only in the ordering *toward another*, but in the ordering of the powers of the soul *toward itself*. But this is [the case] in the conjugal act, as is evident by experience, and the Saints say, especially Augustine and Origen, and it is touched upon in the Gloss, on the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter six[^9]: *He who fornicates sins against his own body*; the Gloss: «Here the soul properly serves the body to such a degree that at the very moment and experience of this disgrace it is not permitted to a man to think or intend anything, because the submersion and absorption of lust itself subjects the mind as a captive». — And in the judgment of this disorder the *blushing* of nature contributes very much, [nature] which cannot be a liar; and it blushes at the movement of those members and at the act so much the more, the better ordered it is. And thus it is evident that that act is of itself *diseased*, because it cannot be exercised without such great disorder, as is touched upon in the same<!-- page 723 --> Gloss. — Behold, therefore, in what way we can see the *disease*.

The *remedy*, however, we can consider thus. For there is a certain act which bespeaks a disorder *of the mind toward God*, as to commit idolatry and to perjure; there is a certain [act] which bespeaks a disorder *of creature toward creature*, whether of one toward another, or of the same toward itself. The first is evil and diseased *in itself* and can in no way be done well, neither by divine command nor otherwise. But the second, because it does not have an essential disorder, can be ordered by divine authority, as when God commands to kill a man, when also he commands to take another's property, when also he inspires [one] to kill himself, as Samson, upon whom the Spirit of the Lord rushed, in the fourteenth [chapter] of Judges[^10]; in this manner he ordered the intercourse of Hosea with the woman who was not his wife, namely by God's command. But since this conjugal act ought not to be commanded to all, the divine disposition provided to order that disorder not by a *command*, but by a certain *statute*, and by a statute that would be a sign of that union which was ordained for the remedy of concupiscence, and thus through the Sacrament of marriage, which, because it has the character of a *medicine*, rather excuses than is vitiated; just as, when the Lord commanded the Hebrews to carry off the vessels of the Egyptians[^11], the *carrying-off* does not make the command evil, but rather, on the contrary, the *command*, which is more powerful and higher, made the carrying-off good and meritorious, which otherwise would be culpable and evil. — The Saints, therefore, and all Catholics say that intercourse is excused from mortal fault through the Sacrament of marriage, especially when it is done for the sake of offspring.

But concerning the *manner* of excusing there is a twofold opinion: for some wished to say that it is excused from mortal fault, but not from venial, because the mortal there becomes venial. Others said, and this Augustine seems to hold[^12], that since God gives a perfect remedy against the disease, [then] when intercourse is had for the sake of offspring, it can be without all fault; and this is more consonant with reason and with the piety of faith. — And the reasons for this are to be granted, provided however that this intention endure from beginning to end, so that the mind be not deflected toward something else; which however is very difficult[^13].

**To the objections:**

*1. 2. 3. 4.* To that, therefore, which is objected, that there is there immoderation, disorder, blushing, and lust; it must be said that these four can be about the act of *reason*, or of *sensuality*[^14]. If about the act of *reason*, they always cause fault, because they cause evil in itself. But if they are about the act of *sensuality*, an ordering existing about the act of reason; then these pass into penalty; and so it is in the case at hand. For through the power of the Sacrament reason is ordered, so that it may will moderately and in an ordered and honorable way; nor does a man blush at that act, because he wishes to procreate children, nor does he seek [it] with a wicked will, but a chaste one. But unless the remedy of marriage intervened, then there would be disorder not only in *sensuality*, but also in *reason*; and so it would always be a sin. Hence by these four means it can be shown that the act of the generative [power] is a sin, unless it be excused.

*5.* To that which is objected, that it is the cause of sin; it must be said that it is false, because that act of itself is not the cause of anything but *offspring*, but by reason of the first transgression offspring cannot be generated without its own fault — not [the fault] of the one *generating*, because it is not on account of the fault of the one generating, but on account of the fault of the first parent that sinful offspring is born.

*6.* To that which is objected concerning the first movements, it can be said that they precede the conjugal act and are not always sins, as for instance when they arise from an ordered thought, as if Abraham should think of knowing his wife in order to obtain offspring; and then, if the flesh were moved, he would not sin[^15].

*7.* To that which is asked last: from what sin does it excuse? it must be said that [it excuses] from a sin, not one that *is* [real], but one that would otherwise *be*, unless marriage intervened. — Hence in a different manner the Sacrament of marriage is a remedy and [so are] the other Sacraments. For this one is unto a *remedy*, because it makes [one] avoid a sin that would be incurred; but the others *free* [one] from a sin into which one has already fallen; and it furnishes a remedy in this measure, because an act of itself disordered is ordered through a divine statute[^16].

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, ch. 5.

la: Vers. 2. — Seq. locus est Matth. 19, 4. seqq. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 5. — In fine arg. post *prolis* codd. E R T bb addunt *procreandae*.

en: Verse 2. — The following passage is Matthew 19, 4. and following. Cf. above the text of the Master, d. XXVI. c. 5. — At the end of the argument, after *offspring* codices E R T bb add *to be procreated*.

la: Vers. 17. Cfr. ibid. 9, 1.

en: Verse 17. Cf. the same [book], 9, 1.

la: August., *de Natura boni* etc. c. 4. ait, quod malum «nihil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis naturalis».

en: Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good* etc. c. 4. says that evil «is nothing other than the corruption either of measure, or of form, or of natural order».

la: Potius Fulgentius, *de Fide ad Petrum* (inter opera August.), c. 2. n. 16, ubi textus originalis *in parvulos* pro *in posteros*. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. — In maiori ex codd. I L Y substituimus *actus* pro *coitus*.

en: Rather Fulgentius, *On the Faith, to Peter* (among the works of Augustine), c. 2. n. 16, where the original text has *unto little ones* for *unto posterity*. Cf. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 2. q. 3. — In the major premise, on the authority of codices I L Y, we have substituted *act* for *intercourse*.

la: Pro *nec fuit* cod. K (I a secunda manu) *hoc planum est*. Inferius pro *et ita sit libido* multi codd. et edd. *et ita fit libido*.

en: For *nor was* codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] *this is plain*. Below, for *and so there would be lust* many codices and editions [read] *and so there comes to be lust*.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 2-4. — Cod. F *sanat*, codd. R T *fugat*.

en: Cf. above a. 1. q. 1. ad 2-4. — Codex F [reads] *heals*, codices R T *puts to flight*.

la: Edd. *inordinatio*. Pro *regnum* codd. aa bb *regimen*.

en: The editions [read] *disorder*. For *reign* codices aa bb [read] *rule*.

la: Vers. 18. — Glossa, quam exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc. (in Lyrano cfr. Glossa *interlinearis* et *ordinaria*), sumta est ex August., Serm. 162. (alias Fragment. 3.) de verbis Apostoli I. Cor. 6, 18. n. 2. — Cfr. Origen., Homil. 6. in Num. n. 3. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 3. in fine. — Inferius pro *arbitrium* (i. e. testimonium, secundum Forcellini Lexicon) edd. *argumentum*.

en: Verse 18. — The Gloss, which Peter Lombard sets forth on this passage (in Lyra cf. the *interlinear* and *ordinary* Gloss), is taken from Augustine, Serm. 162. (otherwise Fragment 3.) on the words of the Apostle, I Cor. 6, 18. n. 2. — Cf. Origen, Homily 6. on Numbers n. 3. See below the text of the Master, d. XXXII. c. 3. at the end. — Below, for *judgment* (i. e. testimony, according to Forcellini's Lexicon) the editions [read] *argument*.

la: Vers. 6. et 19: *Irruit itaque in eum Spiritus Domini.* Codd. allegant c. 16, in quo de morte Samsonis. — Osee 1, 2.

en: Verses 6. and 19: *And the Spirit of the Lord rushed upon him.* The codices allege c. 16, in which [it treats] of the death of Samson. — Hosea 1, 2.

la: Exod. 3, 21. seq.; 11, 2. seq. et 12, 35. seq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4. — Pro *vitietur* edd. *vitiet*. Cfr. infra dub. 5.

en: Exodus 3, 21. and following; 11, 2. and following, and 12, 35. and following. Cf. I. Sent. d. 47. q. 4. — For *is vitiated* the editions [read] *vitiates*. Cf. below dub. 5.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seqq.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5. and following.

la: Cfr. August., *de Bono coniugali*, c. 13. n. 15.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*, c. 13. n. 15.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. per totam.

en: Cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. II. throughout.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4.

en: See II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4.

en: Cf. above d. 26. a. 2. q. 2. and q. 3. ad 4. on the negative side. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Cum S. Bonav. duos errores sibi extreme oppositos reprobet, viam sibi sternit ad communem illius aetatis doctrinam stabiliendam. Secundus igitur error, qui usum matrimonii generaliter non esse sine peccato asseruit, a Manichaeis secundum pessima eorum principia pessime traditus est (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.); habuit tamen etiam inter Catholicos, alia principia adhibentes et sententiam mitigantes, suos defensores (cfr. Estius, IV. Sent. d. 31. § 6.). Primum autem errorem, qui actum nutritivae potentiae et generativae parem esse quoad corruptionem iudicat, eadem ac S. Bonav. ratione improbat S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. I. ad I; Suppl. q. 49. a. I. ad I.) scilicet «quia vis generativa, per quam originale traducitur, est infecta et corrupta; nutritiva autem, per quam non traducitur, est corrupta et non infecta» etc. Hanc formulam antiquis magistris commu<!-- page 724 -->nem speciali quaestione confirmat S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 3; et quo sensu intelligatur, vide ibi in scholio. Idem docet S. Thom. S. I. II. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 23. a. 6. Haec Augustini doctrina fundamentum est assertionis iam tactae, quod actus generativae non possit fieri absque peccato, «nisi excusetur per bona coniugii» (Petr. Lombard., II. Sent. d. XXXI. c. 4, et hic c. 5.); quod disertis verbis docet etiam S. Thom. locis primo citt. — Haec antiqua doctrina praedictae erroneae Catholicorum quorundam opinioni ansam praebuit; unde Guliel. Antissiod. et Alex. Hal. in eadem confutanda multam operam conferunt. — Cum iisdem principiis cohaerere videtur etiam antiquorum Patrum et Scholasticorum de usu matrimonii doctrina paulo severior, quam ea est, quae nunc passim docetur, ut ad seq. quaestionem continuo dicitur.

De 1. quaestione praeter S. Thom.: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 35. m. 8. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 1. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1, et supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Quoad 2. conclusionem quaestionis 2. observandum est, quod nostra aetate plerique moralistae a peccato etiam veniali excusant usum matrimonii, quando fit tantum ob periculum incontinentiae etiam in se ipso vitandum, ita ut praeter tres intentiones prorsus excusantes, quas concedit S. Bonav., ipsi adiiciant hanc quartam. Eandem sententiam etiam S. Alphonsus (Theolog. moralis, libr. VI. tr. 6. c. 1. n. 882, c. 2. n. 924) probabiliorem esse censet et argg. S. Thomae evertere nititur. Quaestio praecipue versatur de usu matrimonii tempore praegnationis, et secluso periculo abortus et officio debiti reddendi. — Attamen conclusio S. Bonaventurae usque ad saec. XVI. vel XVII, exceptis paucis doctoribus, in scholis communiter tenebatur, saltem ut probabilior et securior. Hanc tenent Magister (hic c. 5. seqq. et in seq. dist. c. 1.); et fere omnes eius commentatores, non excluso Estio (IV. d. 31. § 7. 8.), hanc sententiam verbis plus minusve explicitis approbant tanquam sententiam multorum Patrum, praesertim Augustini, Fulgentii, Hieronymi, Chrysostomi, Gregorii, Bedae etc.; quorum testimonia collegit Estius (loc. cit.). Porro ita docent Hug. a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. 11. c. 7. 9; Sum. Sent. tr. 7. c. 3; Guliel. Parisien., de Matrim. c. 3. seqq.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 1; p. III. q. 35. m. 8. (sed in utroque loco non satis distincte); S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2, et Suppl. q. 49. a. 5; B. Albert. (de tempore praegnationis), hic a. 22, cfr. a. 21.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, et a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2, ubi etiam aliam opinionem cum suis argumentis affert, sed illam, quam communem appellat, praefert; Scot., supra d. 26. n. 20, sed non satis clare; Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica, et plurimi canonistae illius aetatis cum S. Raymundo de Pennafort. Hinc non est mirandum, quod plurimi alii ex schola S. Thomae et Scoti eandem doctrinam vel simpliciter, vel saltem ut magis probabilem profiteantur, ut S. Antoninus (Sum. p. III. tit. 1. c. 20.) et ex recentioribus Gotti et Scotista Henno. Fuerunt tamen ante S. Bonaventuram aliqui canonistae et theologi, qui favebant mitiori sententiae. Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. p. IV. tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2.) generatim dicit, uti matrimonio vitandae incontinentiae causa nullum peccatum esse; sed postea hanc restrictionem addit: «Si aliquis vir sanctus cognoscit ex caritate uxorem suam, et nullo modo placet ei delectatio, quae ibi est, immo odiosa sit ei; tunc ille concubitus est sine omni peccato; sed hoc raro contingit»; et ante dixerat, hoc esse cum peccato veniale, «si ex caritate vir sanctus cognoscit uxorem suam, et aliquantum placet ei delectatio, quae ibi est». Durand. autem (hic q. 4. n. 6.) opinionem illa aetate communem disertis verbis dubiam esse dicit. Etiam Capreolus (hic a. 3.) favet recentiori opinioni, sed cum quadam distinctione a Paludano accepta et, ut videtur, parum apta, quod scilicet non semper careat omni peccato, sed solummodo tunc, quando non possit per alia media vitari periculum incontinentiae meliori modo, et «ita quod voluptas in nullo movet, sed solum amore vitandae fornicationis». Pro mitiore sententia citatur etiam Caietanus cum fere omnibus recentioribus. — Utraque sententia libere potest defendi, omnesque debent approbare verba Catechismi Romani (de Matrim. n. 33): «Duo illa maxima docendi sunt fideles: primum quidem, non voluptatis aut libidinis causa matrimonio operam dandam esse, sed eo utendum esse intra illos fines, qui a Domino... praescripti sunt. Meminisse etiam convenit, quod Apostolus hortatur (I. Cor. 7, 29.): Qui habent uxores tanquam non habentes sint» etc. Et cum tot horrendis peccatis mortalibus sanctitas matrimonii passim profanetur, non facile quis negabit, in materia tam lubrica venialia saepe committi, cum contra alia praecepta quotidie etiam a bonis non raro venialiter peccetur. Ipsi perfecti Christiani non possunt ordinarie omnia peccata venialia vitare (Concil. Trident. Sess. VI. can. 23.); sed imperfecti continuo in multa incidunt venialia, ut cum non paucis antiquis docet S. Bonav. (supra d. 17. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.), inter alia dicens: «Strepitus vitiorum et peccatorum venialium semper insonant auribus cordis nostri».

**III.** In 3. quaestione opinionem 1. recte improbant S. Bonav. aliique communiter ut nimis duram, immo falsam; etiam conclusiones eiusdem sunt certae, et secunda confirmatur reprobatione prop. 9. ab Innocentio XI. damnatae: «Opus coniugii ob solam voluptatem exercitum omni penitus caret culpa ac defectu veniali»; ubi similia in prop. 8. de actu comedendi et bibendi dicuntur.

De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Suppl. q. 49. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 25. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Since St. Bonaventure reproves two errors extremely opposed to each other, he prepares for himself the way to establish the common doctrine of that age. The second error, therefore, which asserted that the use of marriage is generally not without sin, was handed down by the Manichees, according to their most wicked principles, most wickedly (cf. above a. 1. q. 1.); yet it had, even among Catholics who employed other principles and mitigated the opinion, its defenders (cf. Estius, IV. Sent. d. 31. § 6.). But the first error, which judges the act of the nutritive power and [that] of the generative to be equal as regards corruption, St. Thomas reproves by the same reasoning as St. Bonaventure (here q. 1. a. 1. ad 1; Suppl. q. 49. a. 1. ad 1.), namely «because the generative power, through which original [sin] is transmitted, is infected and corrupt; but the nutritive, through which it is not transmitted, is corrupt and not infected» etc. This formula, common to the ancient masters, St. Bonaventure confirms<!-- page 724 --> by a special question, II. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 3; and in what sense it is to be understood, see there in the scholion. The same is taught by St. Thomas, Summa I. II. q. 83. a. 4; de Verit. q. 23. a. 6. This doctrine of Augustine is the foundation of the assertion already touched upon, that the act of the generative [power] cannot be done without sin, «unless it be excused through the goods of marriage» (Peter Lombard, II. Sent. d. XXXI. c. 4, and here c. 5.); which St. Thomas also teaches in express words (in the places first cited). — This ancient doctrine gave occasion to the opinion of certain of the aforesaid erring Catholics; whence William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales expend much labor in refuting it. — With the same principles there seems to cohere also the doctrine of the ancient Fathers and Scholastics concerning the use of marriage, somewhat more severe than that which is now commonly taught, as will be said continuously at the following question.

On the first question, besides St. Thomas: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 35. m. 8. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 1. seqq. — B. Albert, here a. 21. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 1, and above d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. unica.

**II.** As regards the second conclusion of the second question, it must be observed that in our age most moralists excuse the use of marriage even from venial sin, when it is done only on account of the danger of incontinence to be avoided even in oneself, so that, besides the three intentions entirely excusing which St. Bonaventure grants, they themselves add this fourth. The same opinion St. Alphonsus also (Moral Theology, book VI. tr. 6. c. 1. n. 882, c. 2. n. 924) judges to be more probable, and strives to overthrow the arguments of St. Thomas. The question is chiefly concerned with the use of marriage in the time of pregnancy, the danger of abortion being set aside and [also] the duty of rendering the debt. — Nevertheless the conclusion of St. Bonaventure, until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, with a few doctors excepted, was commonly held in the schools, at least as more probable and safer. This the Master holds (here c. 5. seqq. and in the following distinction c. 1.); and nearly all his commentators, Estius not excepted (IV. d. 31. § 7. 8.), approve this opinion in words more or less explicit as the opinion of many Fathers, especially Augustine, Fulgentius, Jerome, Chrysostom, Gregory, Bede, etc.; whose testimonies Estius collected (loc. cit.). Furthermore, thus teach Hugh of St. Victor, II. On the Sacraments p. 11. c. 7. 9; the Summa Sententiarum tr. 7. c. 3; William of Paris, On Marriage c. 3. seqq.; Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 149. m. 1; p. III. q. 35. m. 8. (but in both places not distinctly enough); St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2, and Suppl. q. 49. a. 5; B. Albert (on the time of pregnancy), here a. 22, cf. a. 21.; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, and a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2, where he also brings forward another opinion with its arguments, but prefers the one which he calls common; Scotus, above d. 26. n. 20, but not clearly enough; Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica, and very many canonists of that age with St. Raymond of Peñafort. Hence it is not surprising that very many others of the school of St. Thomas and Scotus profess the same doctrine either simply, or at least as more probable, as St. Antoninus (Sum. p. III. tit. 1. c. 20.) and among more recent [writers] Gotti and the Scotist Henno. There were, however, before St. Bonaventure some canonists and theologians who favored the milder opinion. William of Auxerre (Sum. p. IV. tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2.) says generally that to use marriage for the sake of avoiding incontinence is no sin; but afterward he adds this restriction: «If some holy man knows his wife out of charity, and the pleasure which is there in no way pleases him, but rather is odious to him; then that intercourse is without all sin; but this rarely happens»; and he had said before that this is [attended] with venial sin, «if out of charity a holy man knows his wife, and the pleasure which is there pleases him somewhat». But Durandus (here q. 4. n. 6.) says in express words that the opinion common in that age is doubtful. Capreolus also (here a. 3.) favors the more recent opinion, but with a certain distinction taken from Paludanus and, as it seems, not very apt, namely that it is not always free from all sin, but only then, when the danger of incontinence cannot be avoided by other means in a better way, and «so that pleasure moves in nothing, but only the love of avoiding fornication». For the milder opinion Cajetan too is cited, with nearly all the more recent [writers]. — Either opinion can be freely defended, and all ought to approve the words of the Roman Catechism (on Marriage n. 33): «Two things, those greatest, are to be taught to the faithful: first indeed, that pains are not to be spent on marriage for the sake of pleasure or lust, but it is to be used within those limits which have been prescribed by the Lord... It is also fitting to remember that the Apostle exhorts (I Cor. 7, 29.): Let those who have wives be as though not having [them]» etc. And since, with so many horrible mortal sins, the holiness of marriage is commonly profaned, no one will easily deny that in a matter so slippery venial [sins] are often committed, since against other precepts too there is daily, not rarely, venial sin even by the good. The perfect Christians themselves cannot ordinarily avoid all venial sins (Council of Trent, Sess. VI. can. 23.); but the imperfect continually fall into many venial [sins], as St. Bonaventure teaches with not a few of the ancients (above d. 17. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.), saying among other things: «The din of vices and of venial sins always sounds in the ears of our heart».

**III.** In the third question the first opinion is rightly reproved by St. Bonaventure and others commonly as too harsh, indeed false; also the conclusions of the same are certain, and the second is confirmed by the reprobation of proposition 9 condemned by Innocent XI: «The work of marriage exercised for pleasure alone is entirely without any fault or venial defect»; where similar things are said in proposition 8 concerning the act of eating and drinking.

On the third question: St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 3; Suppl. q. 49. a. 6. — B. Albert, here a. 25. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
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license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 724 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum coitus coniugalis causa fornicationis vitandae possit esse sine omni peccato veniali.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum coitus coniugalis causa fornicationis vitandae possit esse sine omni peccato veniali. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Ita dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^1]: «Hoc, quod coniugati, victi concupiscentia, utuntur invicem ultra necessitatem procreandi liberos, ponam in his, pro quibus quotidie dicimus: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra*».

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios septimo[^2]: *Iterum revertimini in id ipsum, ne tentet vos satanas propter incontinentiam; hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium*; sed si meritorium esset et sine peccato sic uxorem cognoscere posset, non tantum deberet indulgeri, verum etiam praecipi.

<!-- page 725 -->

3. Item, Gregorius[^3] dicit, quod vir, qui cognovit uxorem, non debet ecclesiam ingredi, nisi lavetur; et post dicit, hanc constitutionem non extendi ad eos qui uxores solo amore prolis cognoscunt: ergo aliqua culpa amplior est in his qui cognoscunt causa fornicationis vitandae; sed non nisi venialis: ergo etc.

4. Item, qui cognoscit ad vitandam fornicationem, aut *impellitur* a carne, aut *non*. Si *non impellitur*: ergo utitur remedio, cum non indiget: ergo aliqua inordinatio est ibi, ergo veniale. Si *impellitur*; sed impulsus talis non est sine peccato[^4]: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Augustinus[^5]: «Infirmitas carnis excipitur per bonum matrimonii, ne cadat in foveam peccati»; sed cum coit causa fornicationis vitandae, infirmitas carnis movet: ergo etc.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia qui utitur aliquo ad illud, ad quod est, potest hoc facere sine peccato; sed coniugium est propter fornicationem vitandam[^6]: ergo etc.

3. Item, maius bonum est continentia quam proles: ergo magis licitum et debitum est amare continentiam quam prolem; sed qui coit amore prolis procreandae potest sine peccato[^7]: ergo qui amore continentiae servandae similiter.

4. Item, qui coit amore continentiae servandae in altero non peccat, ut cum vir reddit debitum uxori, ne in fornicationem labatur: ergo si non magis debet esse sollicitus de aliena continentia quam de sua, patet etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Usus matrimonii ad vitandam incontinentiam in altero excusatur ab omni culpa, sed ad vitandam eandem in se est peccatum veniale.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod qui coit causa fornicationis vitandae, aut hoc est *in se*, aut *in altero*. Si *in altero*, ut reddat debitum, hoc est purae iustitiae, hoc est fidei et est de bonis matrimonii; recte ideo omnino a culpa excusatur. — Qui vero coit causa fornicationis vitandae *in se*, in hoc semper peccat *venialiter*: quia aut pulsatur a carne, aut si non pulsatur, ex quo non vult procreare prolem nec compellitur debitum reddere, aliqua superfluitas est ibi, et ideo peccat. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod licet homini bibere, ne sitiat, sic etiam sine peccato coire, ne fornicari appetat; non est simile: quia hic est motus naturae et necessitatis[^8], in coitu vero non; et hoc dicit Magister in sequenti distinctione in primo capitulo: «Reddere debitum coniugale nullius est criminis, exigere autem ultra generandi necessitatem culpae est venialis».

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum quod *foveam peccati* vocat peccatum mortale.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad hoc est; dico, quod ad hoc est *secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium*[^9]; et ideo veniale peccatum, et in hoc ordinatur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod continentia maius bonum est; dico, quod continentiam servare contingit sine hoc, sed non prolem procreare.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod continentia servanda est in altero sine culpa; dico, quod non est locus *a minori*, sed *a maiori*[^10], quia ibi est actus iustitiae, ratione cuius tenetur et excusatur, non ratione amoris continentiae[^11].

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english:
### Question II. *Whether conjugal intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication can be without all venial sin.*

Secondly it is asked whether conjugal intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication can be without all venial sin. And that it cannot, is shown thus:

1. So says Augustine, and it is contained in the text[^1]: "This, that married persons, overcome by concupiscence, make use of one another beyond the necessity of procreating children — this I shall place among those things for which we daily say: *Forgive us our debts*."

2. Likewise, in the first [Letter] to the Corinthians, the seventh [chapter][^2]: *Return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of [your] incontinence; but this I say by way of indulgence, not by way of command*; but if it were meritorious and one could thus without sin know his wife, it ought not only to be indulged, but even commanded.

3. Likewise, Gregory[^3] says that a man who has known his wife ought not to enter the church unless he is washed; and afterwards he says that this ordinance is not extended to those who know their wives out of love of offspring alone: therefore some greater fault is in those who know [their wives] for the sake of avoiding fornication; but only a venial one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, one who knows [his wife] in order to avoid fornication is either *driven* by the flesh, or *not*. If he is *not driven*: then he uses a remedy when he does not need it: therefore there is some disorder there, therefore [it is] venial. If he is *driven*; but such an impulse is not without sin[^4]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine[^5]: "The weakness of the flesh is excepted through the good of marriage, lest it fall into the pit of sin"; but when one has intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication, the weakness of the flesh moves [him]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because one who uses something for that for which it exists can do this without sin; but marriage exists for the sake of avoiding fornication[^6]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, continence is a greater good than offspring: therefore it is more permitted and more of a duty to love continence than offspring; but one who has intercourse out of love of procreating offspring can [do so] without sin[^7]: therefore likewise one who [does so] out of love of preserving continence.

4. Likewise, one who has intercourse out of love of preserving continence in another does not sin, as when a husband renders the debt to his wife lest she fall into fornication: therefore if he ought not to be more solicitous about another's continence than about his own, it is evident, etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The use of marriage for the sake of avoiding incontinence in another is excused from all fault, but for the sake of avoiding the same in oneself it is a venial sin.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one who has intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication does so either *in himself* or *in another*. If *in another*, so as to render the debt, this belongs to pure justice, this belongs to fidelity and is among the goods of marriage; rightly therefore he is entirely excused from fault. — But one who has intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication *in himself*, in this always sins *venially*: because either he is impelled by the flesh, or, if he is not impelled, since he does not wish to procreate offspring nor is he compelled to render the debt, there is some excess there, and therefore he sins. And *if you object* that it is permitted for a man to drink lest he thirst, so too [it is permitted] to have intercourse without sin lest he crave to fornicate; it is not similar: because here there is a movement of nature and of necessity[^8], but in intercourse there is not; and this the Master says in the following distinction, in the first chapter: "To render the conjugal debt is no crime, but to demand [it] beyond the necessity of begetting is a venial fault."

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning Augustine, it must be said that by *the pit of sin* he means mortal sin.

2. To that which is objected, that it exists for this; I say that it exists for this *by way of indulgence, not by way of command*[^9]; and therefore [it is] a venial sin, and in this it is ordered.

3. To that which is objected, that continence is a greater good; I say that preserving continence can happen without this, but not procreating offspring.

4. To that which is objected, that continence to be preserved is in another without fault; I say that there is no argument *from the lesser*, but *from the greater*[^10], because there is an act of justice, by reason of which one is bound and excused, not by reason of love of continence[^11].

---

la: Hic c. 5; his verbis, Hug. a S. Vict., *Sum. Sent.* tr. 7, c. 3, ut ipse dicit, sententiam Augustini *de Bono nuptiarum* exhibet. Cfr. Petr. Lombard. in I. Cor. 7, 1. Respicitur in ipsa Matth. 6, 12. — Plures codd. omittunt *Augustinus*.

en: Here c. 5; in these words Hugh of St. Victor, *Summa Sententiarum* tr. 7, c. 3, as he himself says, sets forth the opinion of Augustine's *On the Good of Marriage*. Cf. Peter Lombard on 1 Cor. 7, 1. Reference is made in it to Matt. 6:12. — Several codices omit *Augustinus*.

la: Vers. 5, seq. Post *incontinentiam* Vulgata addit *vestram*. — Inferius edd. cum paucis codd. omittunt *et ac deberet*, legentes: *meritorium esset sine peccato sic uxorem cognoscere, posset non tantum indulgeri* etc.

en: Verse 5f. After *incontinentiam* the Vulgate adds *vestram*. — Below, the editions with a few codices omit *et ac deberet*, reading: *meritorium esset sine peccato sic uxorem cognoscere, posset non tantum indulgeri*, etc.

la: Registr. epist. XI. indict. 4. epist. 64. ad Augustin. Anglor. episc. (resp. ad 10. interrog.). Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. — Non pauci codd. et ed. 1 hoc arg. cum praecedente coniungunt, substituto *Ideo* pro *Item*. Post *dicit* edd. addunt *super Osee*.

en: Register of letters, bk. XI, indiction 4, letter 64, to Augustine bishop of the English (reply to the 10th inquiry). See here the text of the Master, c. 8. — Not a few codices and ed. 1 join this argument with the preceding, substituting *Ideo* for *Item*. After *dicit* the editions add *super Osee*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 21. dub. 4.

en: Cf. 2 Sent. d. 21, dub. 4.

la: Libr. I. *de Nuptiis et concupisc.* c. 16. n. 18, exponens illud I. Cor. 7, 2: *Propter fornicationem* etc., ait: *Ac sic infirmitas incontinentiae, ne cadat in ruinam flagitiorum, excipiatur honestate nuptiarum*. Cfr. *de Bono coniugali*, c. 6. n. 6.

en: Bk. I *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, c. 16, n. 18, expounding that text of 1 Cor. 7:2, *Propter fornicationem* etc., he says: *And thus the weakness of incontinence, lest it fall into the ruin of shameful deeds, is excepted by the honorableness of marriage.* Cf. *On the Good of Marriage*, c. 6, n. 6.

la: Vide I. Cor. 7, 2.

en: See 1 Cor. 7:2.

la: Ut ostensum est quaest. praeced. — In fine arg. cum cod. Z supplevimus *similiter*.

en: As was shown in the preceding question. — At the end of the argument we have supplied *similiter* together with codex Z.

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. legunt: *motus naturae, in coitu vero non, nec* [nonnulli codd. omittunt *nec*] *etiam necessitatis; et hoc* etc.

en: The editions with several codices read: *motus naturae, in coitu vero non, nec* [some codices omit *nec*] *etiam necessitatis; et hoc*, etc.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 7, 6. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: [First] Epistle to the Corinthians 7:6. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 6.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 835, note 5.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the vol4 450 dpi PDF column bands (`colcrop.py vol4 {724,725}`), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw L78001–78086). Per the VOL II/IV override the column-band PDF is authoritative for the cascade-shattered two-column body; OCR served only for clean-prose base and footnote-marker spacing. Read left-column top→bottom then right-column for each page; reflowed column-by-column.

**Page-span correction (report-worthy).** The frontmatter previously listed `printed_pages: [723, 724, 725]`. Verified against the running heads and page numbers on the bands: **p. 723 is entirely a2-q1** (q1 body + the start of the Article II SCHOLION + q1's replies; recto running head `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`, page number 723 confirmed). The Article II scholion continues to fill **both columns of p. 724** (recto running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.`), and only at the **bottom of p. 724** do the `QUAESTIO II.` header, its full-width title, and the opening (opener + fund. 1 in the left column, fund. 2 in the right column) begin. The body runs on through **p. 725**. Frontmatter corrected to `printed_pages: [724, 725]` / `pdf_pages: [744, 745]`. `line_start`/`line_end` kept as given.

**Running-head bleed confirmed.** p. 725's recto running head reads `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` (page number 725 confirmed) even though this q2 CONCLUSIO/Respondeo/replies still run there — because q3 (`Tertio quaeritur…`) opens on the lower half of p. 725 (raw L78087, belongs to a2-q3). Not a misalignment. The opener alignment ("Secundo quaeritur, utrum coitus coniugalis causa…") is correct against raw L78003ff.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false` — the Article II scholion (covering all Art II questions) lives in a2-q1. Footnote [^11] (`Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`) explicitly points back to it. No scholion rendered here.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *p. 724 footers:* the page's numbered footer sequence has only two entries (nn. 1–2), both anchored in this question's opener (fund. 1 "in littera" and fund. 2 "ad Corinthios septimo") — claimed here as [^1]–[^2]. The scholion filling p. 724 carries its references inline, not as numbered footers, so nothing of a2-q1's is claimed here.
- *p. 725 footers:* nn. 1–9 all anchor in this question's body (fund. 3–4, contra 1–3, Respondeo, replies 2 and 4) — claimed as [^3]–[^11]. **Footer n. 10** (`Hic c. 5.`) anchors in q3's opener (`…et habetur in littera¹⁰`) and is **handed off to a2-q3**; not claimed here.

**[?] flags.**
- **RESOLVED (600 dpi, p. 724)** — d.31–d.40 decade polish gate, Pass 1 (2026-07-13). Latin body, fund. 1, Augustine quotation. Read at 600 dpi from `raw/vision/vol4/p-hires-724-r600-0744.png`, right-hand column below the `QUAESTIO II.` heading (crops `(2500, 5150)–(4900, 5750)` and `(2600, 5680)–(4900, 5820)`). The printed text sets the line-break as `…utuntur | invicem ultra necessitatem procreandi liberos, po-` / `nam in his, pro quibus quotidie dicimus: Dimitte | nobis debita nostra ».` The hyphenated fragment is therefore simply the **column-break hyphenation of the single word *ponam*** (1 sg. fut. of *pono*), not a dropped clause and not damage. Nothing is missing from the citation. This matches the received Augustine text (*De bono coniugali* c. 10 n. 11 / Lombard's *littera*): *«Hoc, quod coniugati, victi concupiscentia, utuntur invicem ultra necessitatem procreandi liberos, ponam in his, pro quibus quotidie dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra.»* Both the Latin and English bodies were corrected accordingly (Latin now reads `…procreandi liberos, ponam in his…`; English renders it "…beyond the necessity of procreating children — this I shall place among those things for which we daily say…"), and both `[?]` markers were deleted. Apparatus marker positions and counts unchanged ([^1] still anchors at `in littera`).


title: Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum coire cum uxore ratione concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper peccatum mortale.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum coire cum uxore ratione concupiscentiae satiandae sit semper mortale peccatum. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera[^1]: «Coniugalis concubitus gratia concupiscentiae satiandae, sed tamen cum coniuge, propter tori fidem venialem habet culpam».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: quia delectari in coitu coniugali ratione boni matrimonii non est peccatum: ergo nec *velle delectari*, quia, si actus bonus, et voluntas actus bona: ergo videtur etc.

3. Item, qui delectatur in cibo non propter Deum, sed propter ipsum cibum, quia boni saporis est, non peccat mortaliter: ergo pari ratione, cum delectatio coniugalis non sit mortalis, si vult delectari, non peccat mortaliter.

<!-- page 726 -->

**Contra:** 1. Dicit auctoritas, et habetur in littera[^2]: «Vehemens amator uxoris est adulter»; sed qui amat uxorem propter hoc, ut delectetur in ipsa, est vehemens amator: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hieronymus[^3]: «Voluptates, quae de meretricum amplexibus capiuntur, in uxore damnandae sunt».

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia velle coire sive appetere sola delectatione est peccatum etiam ante consensum: ergo cum progreditur in consensum et actum, cum *comedat vir*[^4], tunc, cum comedere viro fiat mortale, erit mortale.

4. Item, qui cognoscit propter hoc, ut delectetur, fruitur creatura, quia ibi ponit finem suae quietis; sed «summa perversitas est frui utendis[^5]»: ergo etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Cognoscere uxorem concupiscentiae satiandae causa est veniale, mortale autem, si fiat ita, ut ponatur ibi finis ultimus.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, quod qui *finaliter* cognoscit uxorem, ut habeat illam miseram delectationem, quae dicitur esse in coitu, peccat *semper mortaliter*, quando illam ponit tanquam finem principalem, sicut si aliquis propter vanam gloriam[^6] praedicaret; qui autem cognoscit aliqua *alia causa principali*, sed tamen quasi a latere placet ei delectatio, quae est ibi, sicut est de aliquo, qui finaliter praedicat propter Deum, sed tamen quasi a latere placet ei delectatio laudis; dicunt, quod peccat *venialiter*. Ad hoc enim, quod coniugalis coitus sit sine omni peccato, necesse est, quod illa delectatio non placeat, immo displiceat rationi. Tanta enim est, ut auferat usum rationis et spiritum prophetiae secundum illud tempus[^7]; et ideo non potest tunc referri in Deum, et ideo ea non potest quis bene uti *volendo*, sed *nolendo*; non sic est de aliis delectationibus, quarum sensus possunt a ratione actu referri in Deum. Unde secundum hos aliud est delectationem *quaerere*, aliud est *oblatam acceptare*, aliud eam *tolerare*. Primum est peccati *mortalis*, secundum est *venialis*, tertium est *perfectionis*. — Et haec positio, licet probabilis videatur, tamen *nimis dura* est; licet enim viris cum uxoribus iocari et etiam delectari, et veniale est, ita tamen, quod faciant[^8] affectu maritali; nec oportet omnem delectationem referre in Deum, peccant tamen venialiter. Nec semper *frui creatura* est mortale, nisi ita ponat ibi finem, quod etiam faceret, si *contra Deum esset*; tunc enim ponit finem ultimum ibi. Unde non est simile de praedicatione, quae est opus privilegiatum.

Et propter hoc est alia opinio, quod qui cognoscit uxorem propter *delectationem finalem*, aut movetur in delectationem tanto impetu, ut cognoscat uxorem sicut meretricem; et hoc tunc est, quando eam cognosceret, si non esset uxor; et tunc peccat mortaliter, quia tunc ponit ibi finem ultimum, et tunc vere et proprie fruitur et nimis vehementer amat. — Si autem in ea vult delectari, quia uxor, et nullo modo eam cognosceret, si uxor non esset, tunc non est *omnimoda* inordinatio; et tunc est peccatum veniale, quia excusatur per bonum matrimonii, ut non sit mortale.

In hoc casu dicunt locutum fuisse Augustinum. — Tamen illa ratio non valet: *delectari* non est malum: ergo nec *velle*. Quamvis enim *laudari* non sit malum, tamen *velle laudari* malum est. — Et secundum has duas vias procedunt rationes ad partes oppositas. Illae enim, quae probant, quod sit mortale libidinis ardore et creaturae fruitione, procedunt, secundum quod coitus fit secundum impetum voluptatis. Rationes vero ad *oppositum* procedunt, secundum quod habetur respectus ad matrimonii Sacramentum, quia cognoscit eam, quia uxor, nec aliter delectaretur in ea, nisi esset matrimonialiter coniuncta[^9].

---

english:
### Question III. *Whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin. And that it is not, is shown thus.

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text[^1]: "Conjugal intercourse for the sake of satisfying concupiscence, yet with one's spouse, on account of fidelity to the marriage-bed has a venial fault."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [true] *by reason*: because to take delight in conjugal intercourse for the sake of the good of marriage is not a sin: therefore neither is it [a sin] *to will to take delight*, because, if the act is good, the will of the act is also good: therefore it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, one who takes delight in food not for the sake of God, but for the sake of the food itself, because it is of good flavor, does not sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning, since conjugal delight is not mortal, if one wills to take delight, one does not sin mortally.

**On the contrary:** 1. An authority says, and it is contained in the text[^2]: "A vehement lover of his wife is an adulterer"; but one who loves his wife on account of this, that he may take delight in her, is a vehement lover: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome[^3]: "The pleasures which are seized from the embraces of harlots are to be condemned in a wife."

3. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason*: because to will to have intercourse or to seek it by delight alone is a sin even before consent: therefore when it advances into consent and act, since *a man may eat*[^4], then, since to eat becomes mortal for the man, it will be mortal.

4. Likewise, one who has knowledge [of his wife] on account of this, that he may take delight, enjoys a creature, because he places therein the end of his rest; but "it is the highest perversity to enjoy the things to be used[^5]": therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *To know one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is venial, but mortal if it is done in such a way that the ultimate end is placed therein.*

**I respond:** It must be said that some say that one who *finally* knows his wife in order to have that wretched delight which is said to be in intercourse, sins *always mortally*, when he places it as the principal end, just as if someone were to preach for the sake of vainglory[^6]; but one who has knowledge [of his wife] for some *other principal cause*, yet as it were incidentally the delight which is therein pleases him, as is [the case] with someone who finally preaches for the sake of God, yet as it were incidentally the delight of praise pleases him; they say that he sins *venially*. For, in order that conjugal intercourse may be without any sin, it is necessary that that delight not please [him], but rather displease his reason. For it is so great that it takes away the use of reason and the spirit of prophecy for that time[^7]; and therefore it cannot then be referred to God, and therefore of it one cannot make good use *by willing* [it], but [only] *by not willing* [it]; it is not so with the other delights, whose objects of sense can be actually referred to God by reason. Whence according to these [thinkers] it is one thing to *seek* delight, another to *accept it when offered*, another to *tolerate* it. The first belongs to *mortal* sin, the second to *venial*, the third to *perfection*. — And this position, although it may seem probable, nevertheless is *too harsh*; for it is permitted to men to sport with their wives and even to take delight, and it is venial, provided nonetheless that they do so[^8] with marital affection; nor is it necessary to refer every delight to God, yet they sin venially. Nor is *enjoying a creature* always mortal, unless one places therein an end in such a way that he would do it even *if it were against God*; for then he places the ultimate end therein. Whence it is not similar with preaching, which is a privileged work.

And on account of this there is another opinion, that one who knows his wife for the sake of *final delight*, either is moved into delight with such great impetus that he knows his wife as [he would] a harlot; and this is then [the case], when he would know her [even] if she were not his wife; and then he sins mortally, because he then places therein the ultimate end, and then he truly and properly enjoys [her] and loves [her] too vehemently. — But if he wills to take delight in her because [she is his] wife, and would in no way know her if she were not his wife, then there is not *complete* disorder; and then it is a venial sin, because it is excused through the good of marriage, so that it is not mortal.

In this case they say that Augustine spoke. — Nevertheless that reasoning does not hold: *to take delight* is not evil: therefore neither is it [evil] *to will* [it]. For although *to be praised* is not evil, nevertheless *to will to be praised* is evil. — And according to these two ways the arguments proceed to the opposite sides. For those [arguments] which prove that it is mortal by the ardor of lust and by the enjoyment of a creature, proceed insofar as intercourse is done according to the impetus of pleasure. But the arguments [proceeding] to the *opposite* proceed insofar as regard is had to the Sacrament of marriage, because he knows her because [she is his] wife, nor would he take delight in her otherwise, unless she were joined [to him] in marriage[^9].

---

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, c. 5.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: De hac Augustini locutione figurativa, in qua respicitur illud Gen. 2, 6, vide II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq. — Mox edd. omittunt *viro fiat mortale*.

en: On this figurative expression of Augustine, in which reference is made to that [text] of Gen. 2:6, see 2 Sent., text of the Master, d. XXIV, c. 6ff. — Presently the editions omit *viro fiat mortale*.

la: Secundum August., 83 Qq. q. 30. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 34, nota 5.

en: According to Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 30. For the words see vol. I, p. 34, note 5.

la: Cod. Y addit *finaliter*.

en: Codex Y adds *finaliter*.

la: Guliel. Antissiod., IV. *Sum.* tr. 9. c. 4. q. 2, pro hoc adducit Origen. (*Homil.* 6. in Num. n. 3.) infra in lit. Magistri d. XXXII. c. 3. allegatum. Cfr. supra q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius pro *acceptare* plures codd. *accipere*.

en: William of Auxerre, *Summa* bk. IV, tr. 9, c. 4, q. 2, adduces for this Origen (*Homily* 6 on Numbers, n. 3), cited below in the text of the Master, d. XXXII, c. 3. Cf. above, q. 1. — Somewhat further below, for *acceptare* several codices [read] *accipere*.

la: Cod. aa *fiat*, multi codd. *faciat* et paulo inferius *peccat*, incongrue.

en: Codex aa [reads] *fiat*, many codices *faciat*, and a little below *peccat*, incongruously.

en: See the scholion on the first question of this article. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the vol4 450 dpi PDF column bands (`colcrop.py vol4 725` at split 1880; `colcrop.py vol4 726` at split 2120 for the full left column and split 1700 for the full right column — the default split truncated both), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw L78087–78228). Per the VOL II/IV override the column-band PDF is authoritative for the cascade-shattered two-column body; OCR served only for clean-prose base and footnote-marker spacing. Read each page left column top→bottom then right column; reflowed column-by-column.

**Page span verified.** q3 opens on the **lower-left of p. 725** (the recto running head at the top of p. 725 reads `DIST. XXXI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` — a forward-bleed head, because q2's Conclusio/Respondeo/replies still occupy the top of p. 725's two columns; q3's own `QUAESTIO III.` header + full-width title sit lower in the left column, opener + fund. 1 in the left column, fund. 2–3 in the right column). The body then runs through **p. 726** (verso running head `SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.`, page number 726 confirmed), ending with the Respondeo at `…matrimonialiter coniuncta⁸` immediately before the full-width `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` header. Frontmatter `printed_pages: [725, 726]` / `pdf_pages: [745, 746]` confirmed correct; `line_start`/`line_end` kept as given.

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: false` — the Article II scholion (covering all Art II questions) lives in a2-q1. Footnote [^9] (`Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.`) explicitly points back to it. No scholion rendered here.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* p. 725 footer **n. 10** (`Hic c. 5.`), anchored in q3's opener at fund. 1 (`…et habetur in littera¹⁰`), was handed forward by a2-q2 and is claimed here as **[^1]**. a2-q2 kept p. 725's nn. 1–9.
- *p. 726 footers:* the page's numbered sequence nn. 1–8 all anchor in this question's body (Contra 1–3, fund. 4, and the Respondeo/replies) — claimed here as **[^2]–[^9]**.
- *Forwarded:* the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` block opens at the very bottom of p. 726 (`male dicere, quia per matrimonium non generatur…`), but its footer notes fall on p. 727 (p. 726 carries no Dubia-anchored footers). **Nothing of p. 726's footers is handed to the dubia chunk**; the dubia's footer sequence begins fresh on p. 727.

**[?] flags.** None. Both column bands read cleanly at 450 dpi after the wider re-crops; footer nn. 3–4 (p. 726), whose right halves were clipped in the default crop, were completed from the split-1700 right-column band (`figurativa, in qua respicitur illud Gen. 2, 6 … d. XXIV. c. 6. seqq.`; `Verba vide tom. I.`).