title: Dist. 25, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 6

title_alt: Penes quam istarum potentiarum principalius nobis insit liberi arbitrii facultas, utrum penes rationem an penes voluntatem

title_alt: In which of these powers freedom of choice principally resides, whether in reason or in will

source_text:
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### Quaestio VI. *Utrum liberi arbitrii facultas insit principalius rationi, an voluntati.*

Sexto et ultimo est quaestio, cum liberum arbitrium sit habitus[^1] sive facultas residens penes rationem et voluntatem coniunctim; penes quam istarum potentiarum principalius nobis insit. Et quod principalius insit penes rationem, videtur:

**Ad oppositum.**

1. *Primo* per ipsam nominationem, qua dicitur esse *liberum arbitrium*. Si enim adiectivum ponit rem suam circa suum substantivum, et principalius dicitur aliquid de aliquo, quod dicitur secundum abstractionem, quam quod dicitur secundum concretionem[^2]; et habitus ille nominatur *arbitrium liberum*, non *libertas arbitraria*, arbitrium vero se tenet ex parte rationis: videtur ergo etc.

2. *Item*, Philosophus[^3] dicit, quod « ratio nata est regere irascibilem et concupiscibilem »; sed voluntas consistit in illis duabus viribus, scilicet concupiscibili et irascibili: ergo ratio nata est regere voluntatem; sed liberum arbitrium est magis regens quam rectum: ergo magis se tenet ex parte rationis quam voluntatis. Si tu dicas, quod Philosophus intelligit de irascibili et concupiscibili brutali, non de illa, in qua consistit voluntas; contra hoc est ipsa littera. Dicitur enim, quod liberum arbitrium « est liberum de voluntate iudicium »[^4]: si ergo iudicantis est regere iudicatum, patet etc.

3. *Item*, facto ultimo iudicio rationis, semper voluntas movetur secundum illud: ergo si hoc praeit tanquam iudicans, et illud sequitur tanquam iudicatum, cum libertas magis resideat penes illud quod praeit et imperat, quam penes illud quod sequitur et obedit: videtur, quod liberum arbitrium plus se tenet ex parte rationis quam voluntatis.

4. *Item*, liberum arbitrium eo ipso liberum est, quo potest se ipsum restringere et reprimere; sed repressio actus voliti non est nisi per iudicium rationis, quia, nisi examen rationis interveniat, semper voluntas sequitur impetum affectionis: ergo libertas magis est penes rationem quam voluntatem[^5].

**Sed contra:**

1. Liberum arbitrium eo ipso dicitur liberum, quia immune est a coactione[^6]: ergo penes illud maxime est liberum arbitrium, quod magis elongatur a natura coactionis; et talis potentia est ipsa voluntas, non ratio; in multis enim contingit rationem cogi, non sic voluntatem: ergo etc.

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2. *Item*, liberum arbitrium est illud quod est in nobis maxime[^7] imperativum; sed magis est imperativa in nobis voluntas quam ratio, quidquid enim ratio dictet, semper illud fiet, quod voluntas praeoptat: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, liberum arbitrium est illud, ex quo principaliter consistit in nobis meritum, vel demeritum[^8]; sed meritum, vel demeritum principaliter consistit penes voluntatem: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, liberum arbitrium est in nobis potentissimum, sicut dicit Bernardus[^9], et plures auctoritates hoc sonant; sed « nihil adeo est in potestate nostra, sicut est voluntas et actus volendi »: ergo videtur, quod maxime penes voluntatem residet in nobis libertas.

### Conclusio.

> Liberum arbitrium inchoatur in ratione et consummatur in voluntate; ideo libertas arbitrii principaliter consistit in voluntate.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum liberum arbitrium sit facultas sive dominium, ex qua dicitur potentia facilis, non solum ad movendum alia, sed etiam ad movendum se ipsam; sicut ratio movendi se inchoatur in ratione et consummatur in voluntate[^10], sic et arbitrii libertas residet penes rationem et voluntatem, ita quod in una illarum potentiarum inchoatur et in alia consummatur. — Ideo autem dico, motum inchoari in ratione, quia non movetur appetitus nisi praeambulo cogitatu; nequaquam enim amare possumus quod non cognoscimus[^11]; et ideo ad hoc, quod motus fiat, praeit cognitio disponens, et subsequitur voluntas perficiens. Quantumcumque enim praecedat cogitatus, nunquam motus sequitur, nisi ipsum imperet voluntatis affectio. — Et sicut voluntas non habet moveri ad obiectum, amplectendo vel refugiendo illud, nisi praeambulo cogitatu, sic etiam non habet approbare vel respuere, sive elicere[^12] et refrenare actum proprium, nisi rationis actus praecedat, qui dictet, ipsum esse bonum vel malum, perficiendum vel refrenandum. Ex tali enim actu praeambulo voluntas in actu suo incipit complacere vel displicere. — Et sic patet, quod libertas arbitrii sive facultas, quae dicitur liberum arbitrium, in ratione inchoatur et in voluntate consummatur. Et quoniam penes illud principaliter residet, penes quod consummatur, ideo principaliter libertas arbitrii et dominium in voluntate consistit. — Et iterum, quia illud, in quo res inchoatur, se habet per modum materialis; illud, in quo consummatur, se habet per modum formalis; et adiectivum respectu substantivi se habet per modum informantis: ideo in nominatione illius potestatis nomen respondens rationi significatur substantive; nomen vero respondens voluntati significatur adiective; et propterea magis vocatur ista facultas *liberum arbitrium* quam *arbitraria libertas*.

**Ad obiecta in contrarium:**

1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur secundo, quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem; dicendum, quod sive[^13] vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sive de potentia appetitiva rationali, utramque habet regere ratio per modum disponentis et consulentis, quantum est de se. Quod autem regat per modum imperantis, hoc non est nisi mediante voluntate, quae dat ei auctoritatem. Voluntas autem non dicit aliam potentiam per essentiam a concupiscibili et irascibili[^14], sed nominat ipsum appetitum ut ratiocinatum sive rationi coniunctum, et sic eius regere est et imperare. Concupiscibilis autem et irascibilis eandem potentiam affectivam nominant, in quantum tamen habet regi; et ita dicuntur inferiores, non quantum ad naturam potentiae, sed quantum ad officium. Et hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium secundum rem comprehendit istas tres potentias, videlicet rationalem, irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Quinque Responsionibus*: « Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota ». Hinc est etiam, quod cum ceterae virtutes non indocte ponantur in libero arbitrio, non huic obviat illud quod consuevit dici, quod tres virtutes theologicae sunt in rationali et concupiscibili et irascibili. Voluntas enim, ut iam dictum est, non nominat aliam potentiam secundum essentiam et naturam ab irascibili et concupiscibili, licet alio modo nominet.

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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ratio iudicat et voluntas sequitur; dicendum, quod duplex est iudicium rationis: quoddam est in solo dictamine, et hoc est rationis secundum se; aliud est iudicium definitivum, ut fiat vel non fiat, et illud nunquam est sine voluntate[^15]. Quantumcumque enim ratio deliberet, in eam partem terminatur definitivum iudicium, quam praeoptat voluntas. Et ideo, cum dicitur, quod voluntas sequitur iudicium, si intelligatur de iudicio, quod consistit in solo dictamine, non est semper verum, quod ad illud sequatur voluntas necessario. Si autem intelligatur de iudicio definitivo, ex hoc non sequitur, quod voluntas sequatur principaliter actum alienum; immo potius actum alienum trahit ad proprium.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod refrenatio est mediante actu rationis; dicendum, quod verum est, quod actus rationis requiritur, sed nunquam[^16] ab illo principaliter est refrenatio. Quantumcumque enim ratio dictet actum voluntatis esse malum, nunquam voluntas se retrahit, nisi velit; et ideo, sicut possibilitas scribendi principalius dicitur esse in manu quam in oculo, licet ad eam concurrat et vis oculi et vis manus, sic intelligendum est in proposito.

**Epilogus.** Ex praedictis igitur patet, quid sit liberum arbitrium secundum rem, et qualiter se habeat ad rationem et voluntatem. Si enim omnia, quae praedeterminata sunt, insimul conferantur in unum, puto satis posse quietari intellectum; si quis autem in aliquo praedictorum quiescere velit, reliqua non pertractans, non ita evidenter innotescet ei, quae sit liberi arbitrii quidditas et essentia.

english:
### Question VI. *Whether the faculty of free choice resides principally in reason or in will.*

Sixth and last is the question: since free choice is a habit[^1] or faculty residing in reason and will conjointly, in which of these powers it principally resides in us. And that it resides principally in reason is shown:

**On the opposite side.**

1. *First*, by the very naming whereby it is called *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice"). For if an adjective sets its [own] reality about its substantive, and something is more principally said of something which is said by abstraction than what is said by concretion[^2]; and that habit is named *arbitrium liberum* ("free judgment"), not *libertas arbitraria* ("arbitrary freedom"), and *arbitrium* ("judgment") holds on the side of reason: therefore it seems, etc.

2. *Likewise*, the Philosopher[^3] says that "reason is born to rule the irascible and the concupiscible"; but will consists in those two powers, namely the concupiscible and the irascible: therefore reason is born to rule the will; but free choice is more a ruling than a ruled [thing]: therefore it holds rather on the side of reason than of will. If you say that the Philosopher understands [this] of the brute irascible and concupiscible, not of that in which will consists; against this is the letter [of the text] itself. For it is said that free choice "is a free judgment concerning the will"[^4]: if therefore it belongs to the one judging to rule the thing judged, it is plain, etc.

3. *Likewise*, when the last judgment of reason has been made, the will is always moved according to it: therefore if this goes before as the one judging, and that follows as the thing judged, since freedom resides rather in that which goes before and commands than in that which follows and obeys: it seems that free choice holds rather on the side of reason than of will.

4. *Likewise*, free choice is free by the very fact that it can restrain and repress itself; but the repression of a willed act is only through the judgment of reason, since, unless the examination of reason intervenes, the will always follows the impulse of affection: therefore freedom is rather in reason than in will[^5].

**On the contrary:**

1. Free choice is called free by the very fact that it is immune from coercion[^6]: therefore free choice is most of all in that which is more removed from the nature of coercion; and such a power is will itself, not reason; for in many cases reason happens to be coerced, but not so the will: therefore, etc.

2. *Likewise*, free choice is that which is most of all[^7] commanding in us; but the will is more commanding in us than reason, for whatever reason may dictate, that will always be done which the will prefers: therefore, etc.

3. *Likewise*, free choice is that from which merit or demerit[^8] principally consists in us; but merit or demerit consists principally in the will: therefore, etc.

4. *Likewise*, free choice is the most powerful [thing] in us, as Bernard says[^9], and many authorities sound this; but "nothing is so much in our power as the will and the act of willing": therefore it seems that freedom resides in us most of all in the will.

### Conclusion.

> Free choice is begun in reason and is completed in will; therefore the freedom of choice consists principally in will.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since free choice is a faculty or dominion, from which it is called a power apt not only for moving other things, but also for moving itself; just as the way of moving oneself is begun in reason and completed in will[^10], so too the freedom of choice resides in reason and will, in such a way that it is begun in one of those powers and completed in the other. — Now I say that the motion is begun in reason, because the appetite is not moved except by a preceding cogitation; for we can in no way love what we do not know[^11]; and therefore, in order that the motion come about, a disposing cognition goes before, and a perfecting will follows after. For however much cogitation precede, motion never follows unless the affection of will command it. — And just as the will cannot be moved to an object, embracing or fleeing it, except by a preceding cogitation, so likewise it cannot approve or reject, or elicit[^12] and restrain its own act, unless an act of reason precede, which dictates it to be good or bad, to be carried out or to be restrained. For from such a preceding act the will, in its own act, begins to be pleased or displeased. — And thus it is plain that the freedom of choice, or the faculty which is called free choice, is begun in reason and completed in will. And since it principally resides in that in which it is completed, therefore the freedom and dominion of choice consists principally in will. — And again, since that in which a thing is begun stands after the manner of the material; that in which it is completed stands after the manner of the formal; and the adjective with respect to the substantive stands after the manner of that which informs: therefore in the naming of that power the name corresponding to reason is signified substantively; but the name corresponding to will is signified adjectivally; and on this account this faculty is called rather *liberum arbitrium* ("free choice") than *arbitraria libertas* ("arbitrary freedom").

**To the objections on the contrary:**

1. And by this the reply to the first objection on the contrary is plain.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that reason rules the irascible and the concupiscible; it must be said that whether[^13] the irascible and concupiscible power be understood of the brute appetite, or of the rational appetitive power, reason has to rule each after the manner of one disposing and counseling, as far as is in its own power. But that it rules after the manner of one commanding, this is only by the mediation of the will, which gives it authority. Now the will does not name a power other in essence from the concupiscible and irascible[^14], but names the appetite itself as reasoned-upon or joined to reason, and thus its ruling is also a commanding. But the concupiscible and irascible name the same affective power, insofar however as it has to be ruled; and so they are called inferior, not as to the nature of the power, but as to office. And hence it is that free choice in reality comprehends those three powers, namely the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as Augustine says *On the Five Responses*: "When we speak of free choice, we are not speaking of a part of the soul, but of the whole." Hence it is also that, since the other virtues are not unlearnedly placed in free choice, that does not stand against this which is wont to be said, that the three theological virtues are in the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. For the will, as has now been said, does not name a power other in essence and nature from the irascible and concupiscible, although it names [it] in another way.

3. To that which is objected, that reason judges and the will follows; it must be said that the judgment of reason is twofold: one is in mere dictate, and this is of reason in itself; the other is the definitive judgment, that [a thing] be done or not be done, and that is never without the will[^15]. For however much reason deliberate, the definitive judgment is terminated to that side which the will prefers. And therefore, when it is said that the will follows the judgment, if it be understood of the judgment which consists in mere dictate, it is not always true that the will necessarily follows it. But if it be understood of the definitive judgment, from this it does not follow that the will principally follows another's act; but rather it draws another's act to its own.

4. To that which is objected lastly, that the restraint is by the mediation of an act of reason; it must be said that it is true that an act of reason is required, but the restraint is never principally from it[^16]. For however much reason dictate the act of will to be bad, the will never withdraws itself unless it wills [to]; and therefore, just as the possibility of writing is said to be more principally in the hand than in the eye, although both the power of the eye and the power of the hand concur to it, so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

**Epilogue.** From what has been said, therefore, it is plain what free choice is in reality, and how it is related to reason and will. For if all the things which have been predetermined be conferred together into one, I think the intellect can be sufficiently set at rest; but if anyone should wish to rest in any one of the aforesaid, not treating through the rest, it will not become so evidently known to him what is the quiddity and essence of free choice.

la: Edd. cum non paucis codd. *habitualis*, nostram lectionem defendunt codd. A (a secunda manu) D E F I K M N P Y aa.

en: The editions, with not a few codices, [read] *habitualis* ("habitual"); our reading is defended by codices A (by a second hand) D E F I K M N P Y aa.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 472, nota 6.

en: Cf. above, p. 472, note 6.

la: Libr. V. Topic. c. 1: *Rationalis proprium [est] principare ad concupiscibile et irascibile, eo quod illud quidem imperat, haec autem parent.* Libr. I. Ethic. c. ult. et III. c. ult. Aristot. docet, partem concupiscibilem debere obedire et imperio rationis obtemperare; et ibid. X. c. 7, intellectum esse id, « quod sane secundum naturam videtur principatum obtinere et praesidere notionemque habere de honestis et divinis rebus ». — Libr. I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.) ait: *Nam animus quidem in corpus dominicum [herile] habet imperium; mens vero in appetitum civile et regium; in quibus clarum est secundum naturam et utilitatem imperari ab animo corpori, et ab ea parte, quae habet rationem, ei parti, quae subiacet perturbationi.* Cfr. etiam II. Moral. Eudem. c. 2. (c. 1.). — Paulo inferius post *voluntatem* Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 addunt *et rationem*.

en: Book V, *Topics*, c. 1: "It is proper to the rational [part] to have rule over the concupiscible and irascible, because the one commands, while the others obey." In Book I, *Ethics*, last chapter, and Book III, last chapter, Aristotle teaches that the concupiscible part ought to obey and submit to the command of reason; and ibid., Book X, c. 7, that the intellect is that "which indeed, according to nature, seems to obtain the principate and to preside, and to have the notion of honorable and divine things." — Book I, *Politics*, c. 3 (c. 2), says: "For the soul indeed has over the body a despotic [lordly] rule; but the mind over the appetite a civil and royal [rule]; in which it is clear that, according to nature and utility, the body is ruled by the soul, and the part subject to disturbance by that part which has reason." Cf. also II, *Eudemian Ethics*, c. 2 (c. 1). — A little below, after *voluntatem* ("will"), the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 add *et rationem* ("and reason").

la: Magistri, hic c. 1, ubi haec Boethii definitio affertur, de qua cfr. etiam supra pag. 393, nota 3.

en: Of the Master, here c. 1, where this definition of Boethius is adduced, concerning which cf. also above, p. 393, note 3.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *quam penes voluntatem*. In initio arg. idem cod. cc cum eadem ed. 1 substituit *quod potest* pro *quo potest*. Paulo inferius post *repressio actus* cod. O substituit *voluntatis* pro *voliti*.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *quam penes voluntatem* ("than in the will"). At the beginning of the argument the same codex cc, with the same edition 1, substitutes *quod potest* for *quo potest*. A little below, after *repressio actus*, codex O substitutes *voluntatis* ("of the will") for *voliti* ("of the willed [act]").

la: Cfr. infra p. II. huius dist. q. 1. et 3. seq.

en: Cf. below, p. II of this distinction, q. 1 and 3 following.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 omittunt *maxime*. In fine arg. pro *praeoptat* codd. A X *praecipit*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 omit *maxime* ("most of all"). At the end of the argument, for *praeoptat* ("prefers") codices A X [read] *praecipit* ("enjoins").

la: Cod. aa addit *sicut dicit Augustinus*; cfr. August., de Lib. Arb. quasi per totum.

en: Codex aa adds *sicut dicit Augustinus* ("as Augustine says"); cf. Augustine, *On Free Choice*, throughout, as it were.

la: In libro de Libr. Arb., ex quo iam supra pag. 113, nota 6. verba, quae hic respiciuntur, attulimus. Cfr. etiam dictum August., in nota memorata allatum, nec non Richard. a S. Vict., de Statu interioris hominis, tract. 1. c. 3, ubi ad dignitatem liberi arbitrii monstrandam imprimis praedicatur, quod neque a Deo neque ab ulla creatura possit cogi. — Verba propos. minoris sunt Augustini et inveniuntur I. Retract. c. 9. n. 3. et c. 22. n. 4; l. de Lib. Arb. c. 12. n. 26, et III. c. 3. n. 7.

en: In the book *On Free Choice*, from which we have already adduced above, p. 113, note 6, the words which are here referred to. Cf. also the saying of Augustine adduced in the note mentioned, as well as Richard of St. Victor, *On the State of the Interior Man*, tract. 1, c. 3, where, to show the dignity of free choice, it is above all proclaimed that it can be coerced neither by God nor by any creature. — The words of the minor premise are Augustine's and are found in I, *Retractations*, c. 9, n. 3, and c. 22, n. 4; book *On Free Choice*, c. 12, n. 26, and III, c. 3, n. 7.

la: Sicut supra q. 3. expositum est. — Paulo superius pro *dicitur* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *redditur*, et codd. F T W aa ee nec non plures alii omittunt *alia* post *ad movendum* scil. se ad obiectum, sicut infra dicitur.

en: As was expounded above, q. 3. — A little above, for *dicitur* ("is called") the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] *redditur* ("is rendered"), and codices F T W aa ee as well as several others omit *alia* ("other things") after *ad movendum* ("for moving"), namely [for moving] itself to the object, as is said below.

la: Cfr. August., X. de Trin. c. 1. seqq. — Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *nisi cognoscamus*. Post *nunquam* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 subiicit *tamen*, et dein pro *amplectendo* substituit *acceptando*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, X, c. 1 sqq. — The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 [reads] *nisi cognoscamus* ("unless we know"). After *nunquam* ("never") the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 adds *tamen* ("yet"), and then for *amplectendo* ("embracing") substitutes *acceptando* ("accepting").

la: Edd., excepta 1, *eligere*.

en: The editions, except 1, [read] *eligere* ("to choose").

la: Multi codd. non bene *si*, codd. H R V Z cum edd. 2, 3 *etsi*; in cod. Y legitur *quod si vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis non intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sed de potentia* etc.

en: Many codices, not well, [read] *si* ("if"); codices H R V Z with editions 2, 3 [read] *etsi* ("even if"); in codex Y is read *quod si vis irascibilis et concupiscibilis non intelligatur de appetitu brutali, sed de potentia* ("for if the irascible and concupiscible power be understood not of the brute appetite, but of the power"), etc.

la: Cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in fine corp. et q. 3.

en: Cf. above, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, at the end of the body, and q. 3.

la: Et hoc communiter vocatur *practicum*, illud *speculativum*. — Post *aliud est* Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 superflue adiiciunt *secundum*. Paulo inferius pro *terminatur* eadem Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *determinat*.

en: And this is commonly called *practical*, the other *speculative*. — After *aliud est* ("the other is") the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 superfluously add *secundum* ("second"). A little below, for *terminatur* ("is terminated") the same Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [reads] *determinat* ("determines").

la: Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt *tamen*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 add *tamen* ("yet").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Praepositivus extremam de hac re opinionem profert in sua inedita *Summa* (p. II.). Nam ad quaestionem, utrum liberum arbitrium sit *ratio*, an *facultas rationis et voluntatis*; respondet: « Ad hoc, ut nobis videtur, dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium sit *ratio*, licet magistris nostris aliter visum fuerit ». Idem ad obiectionem, quod rationis non sit *velle*; respondet: « Concedendum esse, quod rationis est *velle*; sed aliter *voluntatis* est velle, et aliter *rationis*. Voluntatis enim est velle, quia motus ille surgit ex voluntate tanquam ex radice; rationis autem dicitur velle, quia ratio impellit voluntatem ad hoc ». — E contrario S. Bonav. hic tenet, quod liberum arbitrium *inchoatur* in ratione et in voluntate *consummatur*, et alibi (III. d. 33. a. I. q. 3. in corp.) vult, quod liberum arbitrium « dicitur *voluntas*, secundum quod coniuncta est rationi ». Quod approbant S. Thom., Scot., Richardus aliique, immo hi dicunt, quod est in *sola voluntate*, formaliter loquendo; quem eundem modum loquendi, in fine corp. etiam S. Bonav. satis approbat, cum rationem per modum *materialis*, voluntatem per modum *formalis* se habere dicat. Ex quo iterum patet, S. Doctorem parum vel nihil in re distare a posterioribus magistris, licet ipse (supra q. 1. et passim) libertatem ponat in quodam *habitu* sive *facultate* utriusque potentiae cfr. etiam III. d. 23. a. I. q. 2.

**II.** In determinanda accuratius relatione, quam *ratio* habet ad libertatem, Scotus saltem verbis non concordat cum S. Thoma (de Verit. q. 24. a. 2. in corp.), qui ait: « Unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta »; et alibi (S. I. II. q. 17. a. 1. ad 2.): « *Radix* libertatis est *voluntas* sicut subiectum, sed sicut *causa* est *ratio* » (cfr. hic q. 1. a 2; S. I. q. 83. a. 1; I. II. q. 9. a. 1.). Unde in schola S. Thomae communiter docetur, indifferentiam iudicii circa aliquod obiectum aut aliquem actum esse radicem libertatis. — Sed Scotus (hic q. unica, n. 22. seqq. et *Report.* hic q. unica) negat, primam radicem libertatis nostrae esse indifferentiam iudicii, scilicet *effective*, concedit autem, esse radicem *dispositive*, cum eam consideret tanquam puram et simplicem *conditionem sine qua non* (*Report.* ibid. n. 13.). Hinc affirmat, quod « nihil creatum aliud a voluntate est causa *totalis* actus volendi in voluntate » (ibid. n. 20; cfr. *Sum. Hier. de Montefortino*, t. II. q. 83. a. 1.). Non autem negat, quod obiectum cognitum sit causa *partialis* volitionis, et quod aliquo modo intellectus moveat voluntatem, praesertim quoad *specificationem* actus, sicut etiam voluntas movet intellectum quoad *exercitium* actus. — Henr. Gand. (*Quodl.* I. q. 26.), a quo tamen Scot. (locis citt.) in multis discedit, censet: « Dicendum absolute, quod bono et meliori proposito, potest eligere minus bonum voluntas ». Quoad sententiam S. Bonav. cfr. hic solut. ad 3. 4. Videtur autem, quod praedicta solutio Scoti cohaereat cum opinione, quod voluntas sit potentia simpliciter nobilior quam intellectus, quam sententiam diffuse defendunt Scot. (IV. *Sent.* d. 49. q. 4. quaest. lateral.), nec non Richard. (II. *Sent.* d. 24. a. 1. q. 5.). Consentiunt iisdem Alex. in tractatu de oratione, S. p. IV. q. 26. m. 3. a. 5. § 2. quaest. incid. (secund. ed. Venet. et Colon.; in ed. Koberg. q. 92. m. 2.); B. Albert. (I. *Sent.* d. 1. a. 12.); Henr. Gand. (*Quodl.* I. q. 14.) aliique. Aliter de hoc sentit S. Thom. (S. I. q. 82. a. 3; de Verit. q. 22. a. 11.), cum doceat, quod « secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate », quae tantum « secundum quid et per comparationem ad alterum invenitur interdum altior intellectu ». Quod attinet S. Bonaventuram, in favorem sententiae primae afferri potest, quod ipse supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. in solut. ad 3, non reprobat propositionem in dicto arg. prolatam, quod « voluntas est nobilissimum, quod est in anima ». Idem insinuare videntur verba ibid. in corp. dicta, quod « qualitas, in qua principaliter assimilatur Deo, est in voluntate ». Hanc (6.) quaestionem alii antiqui Scholastici tangunt in praecedentibus quaest., sed explicite non tractant.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Praepositinus brings forward the extreme opinion on this matter in his unedited *Summa* (p. II.). For to the question whether free choice is *reason*, or *a faculty of reason and will*, he responds: "To this, as it seems to us, it must be said that free choice is *reason*, although it seemed otherwise to our masters." Likewise, to the objection that to *will* does not belong to reason, he responds: "It must be conceded that to *will* belongs to reason; but it belongs to *will* to will in one way, and to *reason* in another. For it belongs to will to will because that motion arises from will as from a root; but reason is said to will because reason impels the will to this." — On the contrary, St. Bonaventure here holds that free choice is *begun* in reason and *completed* in will, and elsewhere (III, d. 33, a. 1, q. 3, in the body) he holds that free choice "is called *will*, inasmuch as it is joined to reason." This St. Thomas, Scotus, Richard, and others approve; indeed, these say that it is in *will alone*, speaking formally; which same manner of speaking St. Bonaventure too, at the end of the body, sufficiently approves, when he says that reason stands after the manner of the *material*, will after the manner of the *formal*. From which it is again plain that the Holy Doctor differs little or nothing in fact from the later masters, although he himself (above, q. 1, and throughout) places freedom in a certain *habit* or *faculty* of both powers — cf. also III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2.

**II.** In determining more accurately the relation which *reason* has to freedom, Scotus, at least in words, does not agree with St. Thomas (de Verit., q. 24, a. 2, in the body), who says: "Whence the root of all freedom is established in reason"; and elsewhere (S. I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2): "The *root* of freedom is *will* as subject, but as *cause* it is *reason*" (cf. here q. 1, a. 2; S. I, q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 9, a. 1). Whence in the school of St. Thomas it is commonly taught that the indifference of judgment concerning some object or some act is the root of freedom. — But Scotus (here, q. unica, n. 22 sqq., and *Report.* here, q. unica) denies that the first root of our freedom is the indifference of judgment, namely *effectively*, but concedes that it is the root *dispositively*, since he considers it as a pure and simple *condition without which not* (*Report.* ibid., n. 13). Hence he affirms that "nothing created other than the will is the *total* cause of the act of willing in the will" (ibid., n. 20; cf. *Sum. Hier. de Montefortino*, t. II, q. 83, a. 1). But he does not deny that the known object is a *partial* cause of volition, and that in some way the intellect moves the will, especially as to the *specification* of the act, just as the will too moves the intellect as to the *exercise* of the act. — Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* I, q. 26), from whom however Scotus (at the cited places) departs in many things, holds: "It must be said absolutely that, with a good and better resolve, the will can choose the lesser good." As to the opinion of St. Bonaventure, cf. here the solution ad 3, 4. Now it seems that the aforesaid solution of Scotus coheres with the opinion that the will is a power simply nobler than the intellect, which opinion Scotus diffusely defends (IV *Sent.*, d. 49, q. 4, lateral quaest.), as also Richard (II *Sent.*, d. 24, a. 1, q. 5). The same is agreed to by Alexander in the treatise on prayer, S. p. IV, q. 26, m. 3, a. 5, § 2, incidental quaest. (according to the Venice and Cologne edd.; in the Koberger ed., q. 92, m. 2); Bl. Albert (I *Sent.*, d. 1, a. 12); Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* I, q. 14), and others. St. Thomas thinks otherwise about this (S. I, q. 82, a. 3; de Verit., q. 22, a. 11), since he teaches that "in itself and simply the intellect is higher and nobler than the will," which is found "only in a certain respect and by comparison to something else sometimes higher than the intellect." As regards St. Bonaventure, in favor of the first opinion it can be adduced that he himself, above, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, in the solution ad 3, does not reprove the proposition put forward in the said argument, that "the will is the noblest thing that is in the soul." The same the words said in the body there seem to insinuate, that "the quality in which [the soul] is principally assimilated to God is in the will." This (sixth) question other ancient Scholastics touch upon in the preceding questions, but do not treat explicitly.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 604–606 = PDF 626–628; raw OCR lines 42281–42448), per the Vol II PDF-priority inversion. English is a fresh literal translation. Apparatus walked from the raw OCR footers page by page and confirmed against the PDF column bands.
- **Page-split map:**
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  - p.605 (raw 42330–42394): Sed contra arg 2–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo + replies ad 1–2. Footnote markers ⁶–¹⁴. p.605 footers 1–9 → [^6]–[^14].
  - p.606 (raw 42395–42413): replies ad 3–4 + Epilogus, then Scholion (I–II), then DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM (raw 42449). Footnote markers ¹⁵–¹⁶. p.606 footers 1–2 → [^15]–[^16]; p.606 footer 3 (Topicorum, Cap. 5) belongs to d25-p1-dubia DUB. I, NOT to this quaestio.
- **Hand-offs:**
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  - FORWARDED to `d25-p1-dubia`: nothing of q6's; but the DUBIA's own footers begin on p.606 (footer 3: *Cap. 5. (c. 11.) Topicorum*, and footer 2 *Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt tamen* belongs to DUB. I... see below).
- **⚠ p.606 footer disambiguation:** p.606 has 3 footers. Footer 1 (*Et hoc communiter vocatur practicum*) = reply ad 3 → [^15]. Footer 2 (*Vat. et edd. 3, 4 addunt tamen*) = reply ad 4 *nunquam tamen* → [^16]. Footer 3 (*Cap. 5. (c. 11.)* Aristotle Topics) belongs to DUB. I's *Philosophus in sexto Topicorum³* anchor → goes to `d25-p1-dubia`. (The DUBIA region also carries its own footer numbered ² in the raw for *addunt tamen* — that is DUB. I internal numbering, distinct from q6's reply-4 footer; both happen to read *addunt tamen*. Confirmed by column position at 450 dpi: q6's reply-4 footer is in the left footer band of the body region; DUB. I's footers begin below the DUBIA header.)
- **has_scholion = true:** SCHOLION I–II (Praepositinus's contrary opinion; the ratio-vs-voluntas debate among Scotus/Aquinas/Henry of Ghent). This is the closing commentator-roll for Pars I ARTICULUS UNICUS.
- **No `[?]` flags.** OCR was clean (no cascade-shatter in the Respondeo/Conclusio/Scholion); all readings confirmed against the 450 dpi column bands.
- **Boundary:** this is the LAST quaestio of Pars I ARTICULUS UNICUS. DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (Pars I dubia) begins at raw 42449 (printed p.606, "In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod philosophi, definientes liberum arbitrium, dixerunt, esse liberum de voluntate iudicium").


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De libero arbitrio in comparatione.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit aeque in omnibus, in quibus reperitur.*

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, cum supra habitum sit de libero arbitrio in se, quaeritur hic de ipso in comparatione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

Primo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad subiectum.

Secundo quaeritur de ipso in comparatione ad actum.

Tertio vero quaeritur in comparatione ad obiectum.

Quarto, in comparatione ad aliquod aliud agens creatum.

Quinto, in comparatione ad movens primum, scilicet Deum.

Sexto et ultimo, in comparatione ad corpus coniunctum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de libero arbitrio per comparationem ad subiectum, utrum in omnibus, in quibus est, sit aequaliter, aut secundum magis et minus. Et quod sit in omnibus aequaliter, videtur:

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1. *Primo* per Bernardum in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^1]: « Manet libertas voluntatis tam plena in bonis quam in malis, sed in bonis ordinatior, tam integra quoque suo modo in creatura quam in Creatore ».

2. *Item*, in eodem[^2]: « Libertas arbitrii cunctis pariter ratione utentibus competit, nec magis est in bonis quam in malis ». Et iterum subiungit, quod « nec augetur gratia nec minuitur culpa ».

3. *Item*, liberum arbitrium eo ipso dicitur *liberum*, quo est a coactione immune; sed omne liberum arbitrium est ab omni coactione immune: ergo si libertas arbitrii in quolibet universaliter privat coactionem, et in omnimoda privatione non est *magis* et *minus* reperire[^3]; arbitrii libertas in omnibus, in quibus est, est aequaliter.

4. *Item*, *magis* et *minus* est per permixtionem unius ad aliud[^4]; sed libertas arbitrii nullo modo potest permisceri in aliquo servituti sibi contrariae, quae quidem est servitus coactionis: ergo non videtur, quod possit secundum *magis* et *minus* participari: ergo aequaliter est in omnibus, in quibus invenitur.

**Sed contra:**
1. Liberum arbitrium « est potestas servandi rectitudinem », sicut dicit Anselmus[^5]; sed maior est potestas servandi rectitudinem in bonis quam in malis, in confirmatis quam in non confirmatis: ergo liberum arbitrium contingit secundum *magis* et *minus* participari.

2. *Item*, libertas arbitrii est quaedam nobilis dignitas in anima rationali; sed in nulla proprietate dignitatis creatura potest[^6] aequari Creatori: ergo impossibile est, libertatem arbitrii in Creatore et creatura aequaliter reperiri.

3. *Item*, libertas arbitrii est facultas, quae fundatur super rationem et voluntatem[^7]; sed vis cognitiva multo perfectius reperitur in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura plus quam in alia, similiter et vis appetitiva: ergo pari ratione et illa facultas, ex qua potentia rationis et potentia voluntatis liberae esse dicuntur.

4. *Item*, liberius est illud, in quo nullum cadit genus servitutis, quam in quo potest aliquod genus servitutis cadere: cum igitur aliqua sint, quae nullo modo possunt subiici nec peccato nec miseriae, quaedam vero, quae eis subiecta sunt et serviunt; videtur ergo, quod ab his et illis liberum arbitrium non participetur aequaliter[^8].

> **Conclusio.** Liberum arbitrium quoad immunitatem a coactione aequaliter est in omnibus, in quibus reperitur; quoad excellentiae dignitatem praestantius est in Creatore, sed aequaliter in creaturis relatis ad invicem; quoad facultatem iustitiae servandae etiam in creaturis est inaequaliter.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium sit aequaliter in omnibus, non est quaestio de ipso, secundum quod dicitur liberum ea libertate, quae est a *miseria*, vel a *culpa*; hoc enim modo planum est, quod liberius est in uno quam in alio; sed est quaestio de libero arbitrio, secundum quod dicitur libertas a *coactione*[^9]; sic enim videntur auctoritates Sanctorum sibi invicem repugnare.

Et propterea ad contrarietatem, quae videtur, de medio dirimendam, intelligendum est, quod liberum arbitrium sive libertas arbitrii et dicit comparationem ad illud *a quo*, et ad illud *ad quod*. Per comparationem ad illud *a quo* dicitur privative sive negative; dicitur enim liberum a coactione, pro eo quod est ab omni coactione immune. Per comparationem ad illud *ad quod* dicitur positive, quoniam[^10] libertas arbitrii est quaedam facultas sive potestas servandi rectitudinem. Haec autem facultas, prout privationi coactionis coniuncta est, habet quandam dignitatem; dignitatis enim est et potestatis non posse cogi. Et sic in liberi arbitrii intellectu tria clauduntur, videlicet a coactione immunitas, excellentiae dignitas et potestas sive facultas.

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*Quantum* ad *primum*, liberum arbitrium in omnibus, in quibus est, aequaliter se habet, sicut dicunt auctoritates Bernardi, et ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae, pro eo quod in omni, in quo ponitur, simpliciter et universaliter omnem excludit *coactionem*. Propterea dicit Bernardus, quod ita plena est arbitrii libertas in creatura suo modo, sicut in Creatore; quod etsi non possit intelligi veraciter esse dictum de aliquo, quod dicitur per *positionem*, potest tamen intelligi de eo quod dicitur per omnimodam *privationem*.

*Quantum* autem ad *secundum*, videlicet quantum ad excellentiae dignitatem, est inaequaliter in comparatione creaturarum ad Creatorem, sed aequaliter in comparatione creaturarum ad invicem. Dignitas enim liberi arbitrii increati superexcellit dignitatem omnis liberi arbitrii creati[^11], quia illa est dignitas summa, et omnis dignitas creata est dignitas infra illam et propter illam; et sic inaequalitas est in libertate arbitrii quantum ad dignitatem, prout consideratur in creaturis et Creatore. — Prout autem consideratur in creaturis relatis ad invicem, sic habet in eis reperiri aequaliter, pro eo quod omne liberum arbitrium immediate est sub Deo constitutum, et quodlibet est suarum operationum post Deum primum principium. Attenditur enim secundum rationalis creaturae *supremum*, quo solus Deus superior est, sicut vult Augustinus[^12].

*Quantum* autem ad *tertium*, videlicet quantum ad facultatem aut ad servandae iustitiae potestatem; sic inaequalitas reperitur non solum in creaturis et Creatore, sed etiam in creaturis comparatis ad invicem. Una enim creatura multo potentior est altera in rectitudine servanda, sicut beata quam misera; et hoc est, quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^13]: « Libertas arbitrii alia est a se, quae nec est facta nec ab alio accepta, quae est solius Dei. Alia est a Deo facta et accepta, quae est Angelorum et hominum. Facta autem sive accepta, alia est habens rectitudinem, quam servet, alia carens; habens, alia tenet separabiliter, alia inseparabiliter; carens autem, alia caret recuperabiliter, alia irrecuperabiliter ». Ex hac divisione Anselmi apparent gradus libertatis non solum in creaturis respectu Creatoris, sed etiam in creaturis ad invicem relatis. Sumitur enim haec divisio libertatis secundum id quod est in ea positionis; et hoc modo contingit, eam secundum plus et minus in habentibus liberum arbitrium reperiri. Et sic procedunt rationes prius adductae.

**Ad argumenta.** Patet igitur ex praedictis responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet nihilominus responsio ad obiecta, quia rationes, quae probant aequalitatem, arguunt de libero arbitrio penes id quod dicit privationem; rationes vero ad oppositum penes id quod dicit positionem; et ideo utraeque concedendae sunt, quia diversis viis verum concludunt.

english:
### Article (Sole). *On free choice in comparison.*
### Question I. *Whether free choice is equally in all in which it is found.*

For the understanding of this part, since above free choice has been treated in itself, here inquiry is made concerning it in comparison. And concerning this six questions are asked.

First, inquiry is made concerning free choice in comparison to the *subject*.

Second, inquiry is made concerning it in comparison to the *act*.

Third, in comparison to the *object*.

Fourth, in comparison to *some other created agent*.

Fifth, in comparison to the *first mover*, namely God.

Sixth and last, in comparison to the *conjoined body*.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and inquiry is made concerning free choice by comparison to the subject, whether it is equally in all in which it is, or according to more and less. And that it is equally in all, it seems:

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1. *First*, through Bernard in the book *On Free Choice*[^1]: "The liberty of the will remains as full in the good as in the wicked, but in the good more ordered, just as also whole in its own way in the creature as in the Creator."

2. *Likewise*, in the same work[^2]: "The liberty of choice belongs alike to all who use reason, nor is it greater in the good than in the wicked." And he again adds that "neither is grace increased nor fault diminished."

3. *Likewise*, free choice is called *free* by the very fact that it is immune from coercion; but every free choice is immune from all coercion: therefore if the liberty of choice in anything universally excludes coercion, and in a total privation there is no *more* and *less* to be found[^3]; the liberty of choice is equally in all in which it is.

4. *Likewise*, *more* and *less* arise through the intermixing of one thing with another[^4]; but the liberty of choice can in no way be intermixed in anything with a servitude contrary to it, which is indeed the servitude of coercion: therefore it does not seem that it can be participated according to *more* and *less*: therefore it is equally in all in which it is found.

**On the contrary:**
1. Free choice "is the power of preserving rectitude," as Anselm says[^5]; but the power of preserving rectitude is greater in the good than in the wicked, in the confirmed than in the unconfirmed: therefore free choice happens to be participated according to *more* and *less*.

2. *Likewise*, the liberty of choice is a certain noble dignity in the rational soul; but in no property of dignity can the creature[^6] be equal to the Creator: therefore it is impossible that the liberty of choice be found equally in the Creator and the creature.

3. *Likewise*, the liberty of choice is a faculty which is founded upon reason and will[^7]; but the cognitive power is found much more perfectly in God than in the creature, and in one creature more than in another, and likewise the appetitive power: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is that faculty, from which the power of reason and the power of will are said to be free.

4. *Likewise*, that is freer in which no kind of servitude falls than that in which some kind of servitude can fall: since therefore there are some things which can in no way be subjected either to sin or to misery, and certain others which are subjected to them and serve them; it seems therefore that free choice is not participated equally by these and by those[^8].

> **Conclusion.** Free choice, as to immunity from coercion, is equally in all in which it is found; as to the dignity of excellence it is more eminent in the Creator, but equal in creatures related to one another; as to the faculty of preserving justice, even in creatures it is unequal.

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that when it is asked whether free choice is equally in all, the question is not concerning it according as it is called free by that liberty which is from *misery* or from *fault*; for in this way it is plain that it is freer in one than in another; but the question is concerning free choice according as it is called liberty from *coercion*[^9]; for in this way the authorities of the Saints seem to be at odds with one another.

And therefore, to settle the contrariety that appears, it must be understood that free choice or the liberty of choice both expresses a comparison to that *from which* and to that *to which*. By comparison to that *from which* it is named privatively or negatively; for it is called free from coercion, inasmuch as it is immune from all coercion. By comparison to that *to which* it is named positively, since[^10] the liberty of choice is a certain faculty or power of preserving rectitude. Now this faculty, inasmuch as it is joined to the privation of coercion, has a certain dignity; for it belongs to dignity and to power not to be able to be coerced. And so in the notion of free choice three things are enclosed, namely immunity from coercion, the dignity of excellence, and the power or faculty.

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As to the *first*, free choice is held equally in all in which it is, as the authorities of Bernard say, and as the reasons adduced to this effect show, inasmuch as in everything in which it is placed it simply and universally excludes *coercion*. Therefore Bernard says that the liberty of choice is as full in the creature in its own way as in the Creator; which, although it cannot be truly understood to be said of anything that is named by *position*, can nevertheless be understood of that which is named by total *privation*.

But as to the *second*, namely as to the dignity of excellence, it is unequal in the comparison of creatures to the Creator, but equal in the comparison of creatures to one another. For the dignity of uncreated free choice supereminently surpasses the dignity of all created free choice[^11], because the former is the supreme dignity, and every created dignity is a dignity beneath it and on account of it; and so there is inequality in the liberty of choice as to dignity, insofar as it is considered in creatures and in the Creator. — But insofar as it is considered in creatures related to one another, thus it is to be found in them equally, inasmuch as every free choice is immediately constituted under God, and each is, after God, the first principle of its own operations. For it is regarded according to the *supreme* element of the rational creature, above which God alone is superior, as Augustine holds[^12].

But as to the *third*, namely as to the faculty or to the power of preserving justice; thus inequality is found not only in creatures and the Creator, but also in creatures compared to one another. For one creature is much more powerful than another in preserving rectitude, as the blessed than the wretched; and this is what Anselm says in the book *On Free Choice*[^13]: "The liberty of choice is one kind that is from itself, which is neither made nor received from another, which belongs to God alone. Another is made and received from God, which belongs to the angels and to men. But of that which is made or received, one kind has rectitude which it preserves, another lacks it; of that which has it, one holds it separably, another inseparably; of that which lacks it, one lacks it recoverably, another irrecoverably." From this division of Anselm there appear degrees of liberty not only in creatures with respect to the Creator, but also in creatures related to one another. For this division of liberty is taken according to what is of position in it; and in this way it happens that it is found according to more and less in those having free choice. And thus the reasons previously adduced proceed.

**To the arguments.** It is therefore clear from what has been said what the response is to the question proposed; the response to the objections is likewise no less clear, because the reasons that prove equality argue concerning free choice as regards what it expresses of privation; the reasons to the opposite, as regards what it expresses of position; and therefore both are to be granted, because by diverse ways they conclude what is true.

la: Cap. 4. n. 9: *Manet ergo libertas voluntatis, ubi etiam fit captivitas mentis, tam plena quidem in malis quam in bonis, sed... tam integra quoque pro suo modo etc.*

en: Bernard, *On Grace and Free Choice*, c. 4, n. 9: "There remains therefore the liberty of the will, even where there occurs captivity of the mind, indeed as full in the wicked as in the good, but... whole also in its own way, etc."

la: Cap. 5. n. 13: *Libertas... utentibus convenit, non minor, quantum in se est, in malis quam in bonis.* — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 9. n. 28. et sic sonat in originali: *Nam etsi habuerit initium, nescit tamen occasum, nec de iustitia vel gloria capit augmentum, nec de peccato sive miseria detrimentum.* Et c. 4. n. 9. dicit Bernardus: *Nec peccato nec miseria amittitur vel minuitur.*

en: Ibid. c. 5, n. 13: "Liberty... befits those who use [reason], no less, so far as in itself it is, in the wicked than in the good." — The following text is ibid. c. 9, n. 28, and in the original it runs thus: "For although it had a beginning, it nevertheless knows no setting, nor does it take increase from justice or glory, nor diminution from sin or misery." And at c. 4, n. 9, Bernard says: "It is lost or diminished neither by sin nor by misery."

la: Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 3, ubi ex Aristot. monstratur, quod in privatione nulla est differentia. — Vat. ultimam huius propos. partem sic exhibet: *et omnimodam privationem non est magis et minus reperiri in toto quam in altero; arbitrii libertas in omnibus etc.* Particulam *in* ante *omnimoda* nostri codd. omittunt, sed habent *reperire* et vel *omnimoda privatione* vel *omnimodam privationem*; insuper plurimi codd. in fine arg. supprimunt unum ex duobus *est* ante *aequaliter*. Nostra lectio exhibet correctionem factam in cod. bb a manu antiqua.

en: Cf. above p. 111, note 3, where from Aristotle it is shown that in a privation there is no difference. — The Vatican edition presents the last part of this proposition thus: "and a total privation cannot be found more and less in the whole than in another; the liberty of choice in all, etc." Our codices omit the particle *in* before *omnimoda*, but they have *reperire* and either *omnimoda privatione* or *omnimodam privationem*; moreover most codices at the end of the argument suppress one of the two *est* before *aequaliter*. Our reading presents a correction made in codex bb by an ancient hand.

la: Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.): *Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora, magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius.* — Cod. cc et ed. 1 *Item, secundum magis et minus est permixtionem fieri unius ad aliud.*

en: Aristotle, *Topics* III, c. 4 (c. 5): "And those things that are less mixed with their contraries are more such; as the whiter is less mixed with black." — Codex cc and edition 1 read: "Likewise, according to more and less there comes to be an intermixing of one thing with another."

la: *Dialogus de lib. arb.* c. 3. et 13.

en: Anselm, *Dialogue on Free Choice*, c. 3 and 13.

la: Cod. T *sed in nulla dignitate creatura proprie potest.* Versus finem arg. Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *minus aeque* sic legunt: *arbitrii inter creaturam et Creatorem etc.* — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 607, nota 2.

en: Codex T reads "but in no dignity can the creature properly." Toward the end of the argument the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4 read *minus aeque* ("less equally") thus: "of choice between the creature and the Creator, etc." — On the major premise cf. above p. 607, note 2.

la: Vide lit. Magistri, dist. praeced. c. 3. Paulo inferius Vat. *multo perfectior* pro *multo perfectius.*

en: See the text of the Master, preceding distinction, c. 3. A little below the Vatican edition reads *multo perfectior* for *multo perfectius.*

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. seqq.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3 and following.

la: De hac triplici libertate, a Bernardo sic divisa et nominata, scil. *a miseria, a culpa, a coactione*, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. et infra dub. 2.

en: On this threefold liberty, thus divided and named by Bernard, namely *from misery, from fault, from coercion*, cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8, and below dub. 2.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *pro eo quod*. Paulo inferius pro *dignitatis enim est et potestatis* codd. T V aa *dignitas enim est potestatis*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *pro eo quod* ("inasmuch as"). A little below, for *dignitatis enim est et potestatis* ("for it belongs to dignity and to power") codices T V aa read *dignitas enim est potestatis* ("for dignity is of power").

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *superexcellit omnem dignitatem liberi arbitrii creati.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 reads *superexcellit omnem dignitatem liberi arbitrii creati* ("supereminently surpasses every dignity of created free choice").

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, d. 8. p. II. q. 2. et d. 10. a. 2. q. 1, ubi haec Augustini sententia fusius exponitur.

en: Cf. above d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2; d. 8, p. II, q. 2; and d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, where this opinion of Augustine is more fully expounded.

la: Cap. 14. In textu originali post *inseparabiliter* pro hac duplici libertate in exemplum subiiciuntur Angeli ante et post confirmationem, et homines ante mortem, et electi post mortem.

en: Anselm, *On Free Choice*, c. 14. In the original text, after *inseparabiliter* there are subjoined as an example of this twofold liberty the angels before and after confirmation, and men before death, and the elect after death.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In solvenda hac quaestione, quae praedictis doctrinis non parum luminis affert, antiqui satis conveniunt. Petr. a Tar. etiam in verbis sequitur S. Bonaventuram. Tota haec doctrina fundata est in definitione liberi arbitrii, quam ex S. Augustino hausit S. Anselmus, et quae hic in fine responsionis magis determinatur, scil. quod sit *potestas servandi rectitudinem propter ipsam rectitudinem* (cfr. supra p. I. dub. 2. et in p. II. q. 3. et dub. 2. 3.). Secundum istam explicationem S. Anselmi libertas in creaturis praesupponit *rectitudinem acceptam* a Deo, et est potestas propria electione servandi, prosequendi et exsequendi rectitudinem acceptam. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 72. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. unic. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** Sequens (2.) quaest. in corp. et ad 4. explicat duo genera *necessarii* et *voluntarii* et in specie, quomodo etiam circa obiectum *necessarium* possit esse actus contingens. Quod confirmat S. Thom., de Malo, q. 6. a. unic. in corp. ante finem, ubi inter alia, postquam docuit, quod homo ex necessitate appetit beatitudinem in communi, hoc addit: « Dico autem ex necessitate quantum ad *determinationem* actus, quia non potest velle oppositum, non autem quantum ad *exercitium* actus, quia potest aliquis non velle nunc cogitare de beatitudine, quia etiam ipsi actus intellectus et voluntatis particulares sunt ». — Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 9. 10.) non tantum quoad beatitudinem in communi, nec non in particulari, si obscure ostenditur, sed etiam quoad dilectionem Dei in patria vult, actum esse liberum, non quidem libertate *contrarietatis*, sed *contradictionis* (exercitii), scilicet quia in sensu diviso et potentia remota possit ab actu cessare. Etiam S. Bonav. eundem actum vocat *liberum*, cum distinguat duplicem libertatem, ut supra p. I. q. 1. in scholio notatum est. De hac (2.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 6. a. 2. — S. Thom., (quoad partem quaestionis), hic q. unica a. 3; S. I. II. q. 13. a. 3, q. 17. a. 3. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 97. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In solving this question, which sheds no little light upon the foregoing doctrines, the ancients are in fair agreement. Peter of Tarentaise even in his words follows St. Bonaventure. This whole doctrine is founded on the definition of free choice, which St. Anselm drew from St. Augustine, and which here at the end of the response is more fully determined, namely that it is the *power of preserving rectitude for the sake of rectitude itself* (cf. above p. I, dub. 2, and in p. II, q. 3 and dub. 2, 3). According to this explanation of St. Anselm, liberty in creatures presupposes the *rectitude received* from God, and is the power of preserving, pursuing, and carrying out by its own choice the rectitude received. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 72, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. unic. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 5. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, on this and the following questions here, q. unica.

**II.** The following (2nd) question, in the body and in the reply to the fourth, explains the two genera of the *necessary* and the *voluntary*, and in particular how even concerning a *necessary* object there can be a contingent act. This St. Thomas confirms, *On Evil*, q. 6, a. unic. in the body before the end, where among other things, after he has taught that man by necessity desires beatitude in general, he adds this: "But I say by necessity as to the *determination* of the act, because he cannot will the opposite, but not as to the *exercise* of the act, because someone can will not to think now about beatitude, since even the very acts of intellect and will are particular." — Scotus (IV Sent. d. 49, q. 9, 10) holds that the act is free not only as to beatitude in general, and indeed in particular, if it is shown obscurely, but even as to the love of God in the fatherland — free not indeed by liberty of *contrariety*, but of *contradiction* (of exercise), namely because in the divided sense and in remote potency it could cease from the act. St. Bonaventure too calls the same act *free*, since he distinguishes a twofold liberty, as was noted above in p. I, q. 1, in the scholion. On this (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 6, a. 2. — St. Thomas (as to part of the question), here q. unica a. 3; Summa I-II, q. 13, a. 3, q. 17, a. 3, 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2; Summa p. II, tr. 13, q. 97, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 4. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (printed pp. 609–611 = pdf pp. 631–633; raw lines 42603–42800). The IA djvu OCR is two-column cascade-shattered through the Conclusio, Respondeo, and Scholion (diagonal one-token-per-line fragmentation + cross-column bleed), so the PDF column bands are authoritative here per the Vol II Override. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Structure.** Per Override §5 the Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS opener (TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM, the six-question list: ad subiectum / ad actum / ad obiectum / ad aliquod aliud agens creatum / ad movens primum scilicet Deum / ad corpus coniunctum) folds into this q1. QUAESTIO I = *ad subiectum*. Alignment verified against raw 42603–42660: opener "Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de libero arbitrio per comparationem ad subiectum, utrum in omnibus, in quibus est, sit aequaliter"; QUAESTIO II (*ad actum*) begins at raw ~42801 (next chunk).

**Page-split map.**
- p.609 (bottom): TRACTATIO 6-question list + QUAESTIO I title + opener + opening words of arg. 1. No q1 footers on p.609 (its footers 1–2 belong to d25-p1-dubia [^24]–[^25]; footers 3–6 belong to d25-p2-divisio [^1]–[^4]).
- p.610: args 1–4 + Sed contra 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + start of Respondeo. Footers 1–10 → [^1]–[^10].
- p.611: rest of Respondeo (Quantum ad primum/secundum/tertium) + Ad argumenta + SCHOLION I–II. Footers 1–3 → [^11]–[^13].

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: none — d25-p2-divisio closed cleanly before QUAESTIO I and forwarded nothing; q1 opens fresh with its own p.610/611 footers (p.609 carried no q1-anchored footers). FORWARDED: none — q1 closes cleanly with SCHOLION II on p.611; QUAESTIO II opens fresh on p.611/612 (raw ~42801) with its own footer sequence.

**has_scholion = true** — SCHOLION I (commentator-roll for q1, the Anselm/Augustine definition of *potestas servandi rectitudinem*) + SCHOLION II (forward-pointer to q2 on the *necessary*/*voluntary* genera, with Scotus/Aquinas).

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (`proceditnr`→*proceditur*, `quaeritnr`→*quaeritur*, `Bernardnm`→*Bernardum*, `crealura`→*creatura*, `permixlionem`→*permixtionem*, `liJDerius`→*liberius*, `superexcelht`→*superexcellit*, `snb Deo`→*sub Deo*, `recupera-biliter`→*recuperabiliter*, `SCHOLIOK`→*SCHOLION*, `salis`→*satis*, `iuniinis`→*luminis*, `polestas`→*potestas*, `expjicationem`→*explicationem*, `praesupponit`→*praesupponit*, `neci^ssarii`→*necessarii*). Marginal editorial labels (*Praenotandum*, *Duplex comparatio*, *Tria in liberi arbitrio*, *Conclusio 1–4*, *Ad argumenta*, *Argg. pro parte affirmativa/negativa*) trimmed as gloss.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum liberum arbitrium sit actuum contingentium et necessariorum, an contingentium tantum.*

Secundo quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad actum, et quaeritur, utrum sit actuum contingentium et necessariorum, an contingentium tantum.

Et quod sit contingentium tantum, videtur:

1. Per Magistrum in secundo[^1] capitulo huius distinctionis, ubi ait sic: « Hoc autem sciendum, quod liberum arbitrium non refertur ad praesens, vel ad praeteritum, sed ad futura contingentia ».

2. Item, liberum arbitrium est respectu eorum actuum, qui sunt a nobis, et eorum, de quibus consiliamur. Si ergo non consiliamur de necessariis et impossibilibus, sed de contingentibus, et ea quae sunt in nobis, possumus facere et non facere; videtur, quod soli actus contingentes ad liberum arbitrium habeant pertinere[^2].

3. Item, liberum arbitrium est potestas rationalis; sed potestas rationalis est indifferens ad faciendum et non faciendum[^3]; et nihil, quod exit a potentia indifferenter se habente ad hoc et ad eius oppositum, est necessarium, sed contingens: ergo etc.

4. Item, necessarium et voluntarium ex opposito dividuntur[^4]: ergo si actus liberi arbitrii esset necessarius, non esset voluntarius: si ergo omnis actus liberi arbitrii est voluntarius, videtur, quod nullus sit necessarius.

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in Enchiridio[^5]: « Erit homo sic, ut velle male non possit, nec tamen ideo carebit libero arbitrio ». Et paulo post: « Neque aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda non est, qua beati sic esse volumus, ut esse miseri non solum nolimus, sed nequaquam prorsus velle possimus ». Ex hoc expresse colligitur, quod liberum arbitrium est respectu actus necessarii et immutabilis.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium est in Deo et Angelis et hominibus beatis; sed Deus est immutabilis per naturam, Angelus vero et homo beatus per gloriam: ergo in ipsis liberum arbitrium necessario et immutabiliter in suum actum exit: ergo non solum est respectu actus contingentis, verum etiam necessarii.

3. Item, non est meritum sine actu liberi arbitrii; sed iste qui fecit bonum, vult se fecisse, et hoc ipso meretur: si igitur hunc fecisse bonum, demonstrato illo qui fecit, est necessarium, liberum arbitrium est respectu actus necessarii, etiam secundum statum meriti.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium est potestas non alligata, eo ipso quod liberum est[^6]: si igitur potentia intellectiva, eo ipso quod non est alligata, potest cognoscere necessaria et contingentia: ergo cum voluntas vel arbitrii libertas ad nihil astringatur, videtur, quod erit respectu actuum necessariorum et contingentium simul.

### Conclusio

> Actus liberi arbitrii, ut liberi, non solum potest esse circa necessarium, sed etiam esse necessarius in se; actus eius, ut deliberantis, semper est contingens, licet possit esse circa necessarium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium dupliciter potest considerari: aut secundum quod liberum, aut secundum quod deliberans. — Si loquamur de ipso, secundum quod liberum, sic concedo, quod potest esse non solum respectu contingentis, sed etiam necessarii, sicut patet in Deo et in Christo et in Angelis et in hominibus beatis. Cum enim duplex sit necessitas, videlicet coactionis et immutabilitatis, necessitas coactionis repugnat libertati arbitrii, necessitas vero immutabilitatis non, pro eo quod arbitrium dicitur liberum, non quia sic velit hoc, ut possit velle eius oppositum, sed quia omne quod vult, appetit ad sui ipsius imperium, quia sic vult aliquid, ut velit, se velle illud; et ideo in actu volendi se ipsum movet et sibi dominatur, et pro tanto dicitur *liberum*, quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud[^7].

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Si autem loquamur de libero arbitrio, secundum quod deliberans, utrum hoc fiat, vel non fiat; sic actus eius, de quo deliberat, est *contingens*; nullus enim deliberat de necessario et impossibili; actus tamen ille potest esse circa necessarium, vel circa contingens. In libero enim arbitrio est considerare actum volendi et ipsum volitum. Et in quantum liberum arbitrium est *deliberans*, necesse est, quod contingentia[^8] sit circa *utrumque* istorum, vel circa *alterum*: circa *utrumque*, ut cum quis deliberat, utrum velit intrare religionem, vel diligere inimicum; circa *alterum*, ut cum quis deliberat, utrum debeat sibi placere, vel displicere malum, quod fecit; vel utrum debeat consentire, vel dissentire appetitui naturaliter inserto, utpote appetitui beatitudinis. Sic igitur actus liberi arbitrii *deliberantis*, quamvis possit esse *circa necessarium*, semper est *contingens*; actus vero liberi arbitrii, ut *liberum* est, non solum potest esse *circa necessarium*, sed[^9] etiam *necessarius in se*.

**Ad argumenta:** Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae ostendunt, quod liberum arbitrium potest esse respectu actus *necessarii*, concludunt de libero arbitrio, secundum quod *liberum*, sicut manifeste apparet pertractanti. Auctoritates vero et rationes ad oppositum intelliguntur de libero arbitrio, secundum quod *deliberans* et consilians; aliter non cogunt.

*Ad 1, 2.* Nam quod primo obiicitur de verbo Magistri[^10], planum est, quod intelligit de libero arbitrio secundum statum viatoris, sicut ipse Magister in littera[^11] se ipsum exponit. — Similiter quod secundo obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium est eorum, de quibus consiliamur; hoc enim verum est de libero arbitrio, secundum quod tenet rationem *deliberantis*.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationalis potestas est ad opposita; dicendum, quod illud non est verum de omni potestate rationali, sicut iam in sequenti problemate melius patebit[^12]; sed hoc est verum de rationali potestate secundum statum mutabilitatis et vertibilitatis, secundum quem statum intelligitur verbum Philosophi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod necessarium et voluntarium ex opposito dividuntur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod necessarium dictum est a necessitate coactionis; secundum autem quod necessarium dictum est a necessitate immutabilitatis[^13], non dividitur contra voluntarium, nisi voluntarium dicatur a voluntate *deliberante* et consiliante. Et hoc modo bene concedo, quod voluntarium est contingens, et hoc non obviat, sed potius consonat ei quod prius dictum est[^14].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether free choice concerns acts that are contingent and necessary, or only contingent ones.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning free choice in comparison to its act, and it is asked whether it concerns acts that are contingent and necessary, or only contingent ones.

And that it concerns only contingent ones, it seems:

1. Through the Master in the second[^1] chapter of this distinction, where he speaks thus: "But this must be known, that free choice is not referred to the present, nor to the past, but to future contingent things."

2. Likewise, free choice concerns those acts which are from us, and those about which we deliberate. If therefore we do not deliberate about necessary and impossible things, but about contingent ones, and the things which are in our power we can do and not do; it seems that only contingent acts can pertain to free choice[^2].

3. Likewise, free choice is a rational power; but a rational power is indifferent to doing and not doing[^3]; and nothing which proceeds from a power indifferently disposed toward this and toward its opposite is necessary, but contingent: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the necessary and the voluntary are divided by opposition[^4]: therefore if the act of free choice were necessary, it would not be voluntary: if then every act of free choice is voluntary, it seems that none is necessary.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^5]: "Man will be such that he cannot will evil, nor on that account will he be deprived of free choice." And a little later: "Nor is it the case that there is no will, or that it should not be called free, by which we will to be blessed in such a way that we not only do not will to be wretched, but cannot will it at all." From this it is expressly gathered that free choice concerns a necessary and immutable act.

2. Likewise, free choice is in God and the Angels and the blessed; but God is immutable by nature, while the Angel and the blessed man are immutable by glory: therefore in them free choice goes out into its act necessarily and immutably: therefore it concerns not only a contingent act, but also a necessary one.

3. Likewise, there is no merit without an act of free choice; but he who has done good wills himself to have done it, and by this very fact merits: if therefore this man's having done good, the one who did it having been pointed out, is necessary, free choice concerns a necessary act, even according to the state of merit.

4. Likewise, free choice is a power that is not bound, by the very fact that it is free[^6]: if therefore the intellective power, by the very fact that it is not bound, can know necessary and contingent things: therefore since the will, or the liberty of choice, is constrained to nothing, it seems that it will concern necessary and contingent acts together.

### Conclusion

> The act of free choice, as free, can not only be about something necessary, but even be necessary in itself; its act, as deliberating, is always contingent, although it can be about something necessary.

**I respond:** It must be said that free choice can be considered in two ways: either as it is free, or as it is deliberating. — If we speak of it as it is free, then I concede that it can concern not only the contingent, but also the necessary, as is clear in God and in Christ and in the Angels and in the blessed. For since necessity is twofold, namely of coercion and of immutability, the necessity of coercion is repugnant to the liberty of choice, but the necessity of immutability is not, for the reason that choice is called free, not because it so wills this that it could will its opposite, but because everything that it wills, it desires under its own command, since it so wills something that it wills to will it; and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and is master of itself, and to that extent it is called *free*, although it is immutably ordered to that thing[^7].

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But if we speak of free choice as it is deliberating, whether this be done or not be done; then its act, about which it deliberates, is *contingent*; for no one deliberates about the necessary and the impossible; yet that act can be about something necessary, or about something contingent. For in free choice there is the act of willing and the thing willed itself to consider. And insofar as free choice is *deliberating*, it is necessary that the contingency[^8] be about *each* of these, or about *one*: about *each*, as when one deliberates whether he wills to enter religious life, or to love an enemy; about *one*, as when one deliberates whether he ought to take pleasure in, or be displeased by, an evil which he has done; or whether he ought to consent to, or dissent from, an appetite naturally implanted, such as the appetite for beatitude. Thus therefore the act of free choice as *deliberating*, although it can be *about something necessary*, is always *contingent*; but the act of free choice, as it is *free*, can not only be *about something necessary*, but[^9] even *necessary in itself*.

**To the arguments:** And by this the answer to the question proposed is clear, and the answer to the objections is also clear. For the reasons which show that free choice can concern a *necessary* act conclude about free choice as it is *free*, as is manifestly apparent to one who examines them. But the authorities and reasons to the contrary are understood of free choice as it is *deliberating* and taking counsel; otherwise they do not compel.

*To 1 and 2.* For as to what is objected first, concerning the word of the Master[^10], it is plain that he understands it of free choice according to the state of the wayfarer, as the Master himself expounds himself in the text[^11]. — Similarly, as to what is objected secondly, that free choice concerns the things about which we deliberate; this indeed is true of free choice insofar as it holds the character of *deliberating*.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that a rational power is for opposites; it must be said that this is not true of every rational power, as will become clearer in the following problem[^12]; but it is true of a rational power according to the state of mutability and changeableness, according to which state the word of the Philosopher is understood.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that the necessary and the voluntary are divided by opposition; it must be said that this is true according as the necessary is said from the necessity of coercion; but according as the necessary is said from the necessity of immutability[^13], it is not divided against the voluntary, unless the voluntary be said from a will *deliberating* and taking counsel. And in this way I readily concede that the voluntary is contingent, and this is not opposed but rather consonant with what was said before[^14].

---

la: Sic codd. et edd.; in nostra ed. verba citt., divisione capit. emendata, habentur in cap. primo.

en: Thus the codices and editions; in our edition the cited words, the division of chapters having been emended, are found in chapter one.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 3; Nemesius, de Natura hominis, c. 34. et 39; Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 25. seqq.; Boeth., III. Maior. Comment. in librum Aristotelis de Interpret. ed. secunda. — Dictio *quae sunt in nobis* (Graece τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) delibata est ex modo memoratis auctoribus Graecis et nihil aliud significat quam: quae sunt in nostra potestate. Cfr. supra pag. 565, nota 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 3; Nemesius, *On the Nature of Man*, cc. 34 and 39; Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 25 ff.; Boethius, *Greater Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*, second edition. — The phrase *which are in our power* (in Greek τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is drawn from the Greek authors just mentioned and signifies nothing other than: the things that are in our power. Cf. above, p. 565, note 1.

la: Sive, ut Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.) ait, rationalis potestas est ad opposita; quod dictum Aristotelis in solut. huius obiect. explicatur.

en: Or, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* IX, texts 3 and 10 (VIII, cc. 2 and 5), a rational power is for opposites; which saying of Aristotle is explained in the solution of this objection.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Magn. moral. c. 14. seq. et II. Moral. Eudem. c. 8. seq. (c. 7. seq.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Magna Moralia* I, c. 14 f. and *Eudemian Ethics* II, c. 8 f. (c. 7 f.).

la: Cap. 105. n. 28. — Seq. textus est ibid., qui in originali sic sonat: *Neque enim culpanda est voluntas, aut voluntas non est etc.* — Codd. H T *Aut voluntas non est libera, aut libera etc.*

en: Chapter 105, n. 28. — The following text is in the same place, which in the original runs thus: *For neither is the will to be blamed, or there is no will, etc.* — Codices H, T: *Either the will is not free, or it is free, etc.*

la: Vide supra p. I. huius dist. q. I. in corp. et q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius Vat. omittit *et contingentia*. In fine arg. pro *simul* cod. cc et ed. 1 *similiter*.

en: See above, Part I of this distinction, q. I in the body and q. 3 in the body. — A little below, the Vatican edition omits *and contingent things*. At the end of the argument, for *together* codex cc and edition 1 read *similarly*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — Paulo inferius post *nullus enim* cod. O subiicit *deliberans*.

en: Cf. above, d. 7, Part I, a. 2, q. 3, to the first. — A little below, after *for no one* codex O adds *deliberating*.

la: Codd. E K *contingens*.

en: Codices E, K: *contingent*.

la: Vide supra pag. 612, nota 3. — Immediate post *non* codd., inter quos K T W Y aa bb cc ee, cum ed. 1 substituunt *et* pro *sed*.

en: See above, p. 612, note 3. — Immediately after *not*, the codices, among which K, T, W, Y, aa, bb, cc, ee, together with edition 1, substitute *and* for *but*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 8. seq. et dist. praeced. c. 3.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 8 f., and the preceding distinction, c. 3.

la: Hic c. 1. seqq.

en: Here at c. 1 ff.

la: Cfr. etiam supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3, ubi hoc dictum Aristotelis simili modo explanatum est.

en: Cf. also above, d. 7, Part I, a. 2, q. 1, to the third, where this saying of Aristotle is explained in a similar manner.

la: Codd. F K T W et alii cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *mutabilitatis*; perperam.

en: Codices F, K, T, W and others, together with editions 2, 3, 4, read *of mutability*; wrongly.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — Paulo superius post *et hoc* cod. Y bene repetit *modo*.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. — A little above, after *and this* codex Y rightly repeats *manner*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 612–613 (Vol II PDF-priority inversion per CLAUDE.md Override; raw OCR lines 42801–42902 of `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). The two-column djvu OCR cascade-fragmented the Conclusio/Respondeo and footer blocks, so the body was rebuilt from the PDF crops; clean running prose (args + Sed contra) cross-checked against OCR.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 612: Quaestio II title + opener + args 1–4 + Sed contra 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo (first half, ending "...ordinetur ad illud[^7]"). Footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7].
- p. 613: Respondeo second half (the *deliberans* case) + Ad argumenta (the general reply + *Ad 1,2*, *Ad 3*, *Ad 4*). Footers 1–7 → [^8]–[^14]. The body breaks mid-Respondeo at "...considerare / actum volendi" across the 612→613 seam (grammatically continuous, verified at 450 dpi).

**Footer ownership at the 613 seam.** p. 613 carries 9 footers; footers 1–7 belong to Quaestio II ([^8]–[^14] here). p. 613 footers 8 (August., III. de Lib. Arb.) and 9 (Anselm, *additum* / *separatum*) belong to QUAESTIO III's Sed contra (Anselmus de Libero Arbitrio), which opens lower on p. 613 R-col — they are forwarded to a1-q3, NOT consumed here.

**Hand-offs.** NONE received (a1-q1 closed clean and consumed p. 611 footers 1–3 in its scholion; Quaestio II opens fresh on p. 612). FORWARDED to a1-q3: p. 613 footers 8–9 (the QUAESTIO III Anselmus/Augustine Sed-contra footers).

**Scholion.** has_scholion = FALSE. Per the Override §5 pro-quaest.-seq. convention, the Pars II ARTICULUS UNICUS commentator-roll sits with a1-q1's SCHOLION (which forward-points to the *necessarii*/*voluntarii* genera treated here); footer [^14] ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") explicitly redirects to it.

**[?] flags.** None. All footer→marker assignments verified against the 450 dpi column bands. Body-order vs printed-page-footer-order mapping (p.613): [^8]=footer 1 (*contingens* variant); [^9]=footer 7 (*et*/*sed* variant at "...sed etiam necessarius in se"); [^10]=footer 6 ("verbo Magistri"); [^11]=footer 2 ("in littera"); [^12]=footer 3 ("patebit"); [^13]=footer 4 ("immutabilitatis"); [^14]=footer 5 ("dictum est"). The renumbering reflects that p.613's footer block is laid out in page-column order, not body-anchor order.