title: Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum caritas possit diminui
Whether charity can be diminished

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.

#### *Utrum caritas possit diminui.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum caritas possit diminui. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per naturam sui oppositi sic: sicut dicit Augustinus[^1]: «Venenum caritatis est cupiditas»; unde et dicit[^2], quod «ubi magna cupiditas, ibi parva caritas», et in libro *Confessionum*[^3]: «Minus te amat, qui tecum aliquid amat, quod non propter te amat». Si ergo contingit cupiditatem non tantum remitti, sed etiam augeri, per contrarium contingit caritatem diminui.

2. Item, veniale est malum; sed non est malum, nisi quod adimit aliquid de bono[^4]: ergo veniale adimit aliquid. Sed naturalis habilitas est multo maioris inhaerentiae quam caritas: ergo cum veniale adimat de bonitate naturali, ergo et de caritate, ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam sui subiecti; quia sicut hominem contingit proficere, ita et[^5] retrocedere; sed per profectum liberi arbitrii contingit in nobis caritatem augeri, dum ascenditur ad perfectionem: ergo cum contingat eisdem gradibus redire ad imperfectionem, contingit caritatem diminui.

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4. Item, omne illud quod sui dehabilitatione[^6] in termino est causa corruptionis, per sui dehabilitationem citra terminum est causa diminutionis: sed liberum arbitrium dehabilitatum per aversionem est causa corruptionis caritatis: ergo dehabilitatio eius sub Deo est causa diminutionis[^7].

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam ipsius caritatis sic: «opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»[^8]; sed augmentum et diminutio sunt opposita: ergo si contingit caritatem augeri, contingit et diminui.

6. Item, quod potest salvari in esse[^9] sine coniunctione sui ad aliquid, potest illud ab illo post coniunctionem separari; sed caritas ante additionem habet esse sine additamento: ergo potest[^10] separari: et si hoc, ergo et diminui: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Caritas est forma simplex et uniformis per totum; ergo quod adimit de caritate, qua ratione adimit unam partem, adimit[^11] et totum: et si hoc, ergo nunquam diminuitur.

2. Item, magnitudo caritatis est secundum magnitudinem divinae influentiae, ergo diminutio eius est per diminutionem influentiae; sed Deus non subtrahit influentiam suam nisi offensus, et non offenditur nisi per aversionem ab ipso et contemptum: ergo non diminuitur caritas nisi per peccatum mortale; sed hoc non est aliud quam caritatem tolli: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne[^12] quod diminuit alterum, est illi oppositum; sed veniale vel cupiditas sive concupiscentia citra Deum non opponitur caritati, immo est omnino illi contingens: ergo non diminuitur.

4. Item, quod diminuit alterum habet posse super[^13] illud; sed veniale non habet posse super caritatem, quia plus diligit caritas Deum, quam cupiditas centum marcas auri et argenti[^14]: ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile hoc modo: si veniale diminuit caritatem, ergo aliquid diminuit ab ipsa: si ergo caritas non est infinitae magnitudinis, ergo veniale aliquoties iteratum totam adimit caritatem, quod falsum est.

6. Item, si diminuit caritatem secundum substantiam, ergo minuit praemium substantiale ei debitum: sed praemium substantiale est bonum aeternum: ergo veniale aliquid aufert de bono aeterno; sed ablatio boni aeterni vel simpliciter vel secundum partem est poena aeterna: ergo veniale meretur poenam aeternam, quod est contra communem opinionem. Si ergo veniale non minuit unum, nec aliud.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Caritas, licet tollatur per peccatum mortale, tamen per peccatum veniale non minuitur secundum substantiam, sed tantum secundum fervorem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex opinio est, fundata super duplicem opinionem praecedentem de modo augmentandi caritatem[^15]. Quidam enim dicunt, caritatem augeri per impermixtionem; et cum impermixtio maior sit secundum maiorem liberi arbitrii habilitationem et secundum concupiscentiae diminutionem, et e contrario permixtio per dehabilitationem liberi arbitrii et[^16] augmentationem concupiscentiae: dicunt per consequens, eam diminui, secundum quod augetur cupiditas vel concupiscentia et dehabilitatur liberum arbitrium; et hoc est per veniale peccatum. Sed quoniam veniale peccatum, manens veniale, nunquam toties iteratur, quod concupiscentiam augeat[^17], ita quod aliquid diligat supra Deum: ideo caritas per venialia potest minui, sed non tolli; tollitur autem per mortale, quod auget concupiscentiam supra Deum.

Sed haec opinio, ut supra probatum est[^18], non habet stabile fundamentum, quoniam substantiale augmentum caritatis non venit a libero arbitrio nec a concupiscentia[^19], ideo nec diminutio.

Et propter hoc ponitur alia opinio probabilior, quod caritas non minuitur substantialiter; et haec opinio fundatur super hoc, quod augmentum caritatis fieri habet per additionem[^20] vel incrementum maioris influentiae. Quo supposito dicendum, quod caritas secundum substantiam non minuitur, sed augetur.

Et ratio huius sumitur a parte oppositi sive agentis. Nam caritas non habet oppositum nisi mortale peccatum; per illud autem non minuitur, sed

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tollitur; concupiscentia autem sive cupiditas et veniale peccatum opponuntur caritati secundum fervorem solum, quia simul stant et substantialiter sunt sese incontingentia[^21].

**Ad 1, 2.** Et ideo solvendum ad duo prima, quod illud Augustini de cupiditate et minori amore, similiter[^22] illud de veniali diminutione locum habet solum quantum ad fervorem caritatis; et sic patent duo prima.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare caritas non minuitur a parte ipsius subiecti, quod est liberum arbitrium secundum conversionem ad Deum. Liberum autem[^23] arbitrium ad augmentum caritatis se disponit per habilitatem, similiter ad diminutionem per dehabilitatem citra mortale. Sed haec dispositio est de congruo, non de condigno; et quoniam Deus est pronior ad miserendum quam ad condemnandum, et ad donandum quam ad subtrahendum[^24]: hinc est, quod caritatem tribuit, cum se liberum arbitrium disponit de congruo, sed non subtrahit, nisi quando necessario se disponit ad subtractionem gratiae. Hoc autem solum est per aversionem, et tunc totum tollit. Et hinc est, quod caritas nunquam minuitur, sed augetur, quia solum de congruo potest se praeparare subiectum ad diminutionem.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut homo proficit, ita descendit[^25] frequenter; dicendum, quod non sic diminuitur per descensum substantialiter caritas, sicut augetur per ascensum.

**Ad 4.** Quod etiam[^26] obiicit, quod liberum arbitrium potest totum privare per dehabilitationem etc.; dicendum, quod istud falsum est, quia forma substantialis omnino privatur per dispositionem ad oppositum in termino, non tamen minuitur per dispositionem citra[^27] terminum. Praeterea, illud habet locum, quando dispositio in termino et citra terminum sunt eiusdem generis; non sic autem est in proposito, quia una est mortale peccatum, alia veniale.

Sumitur etiam ratio, quare[^28] non potest minui a parte naturae suae. Ipsa enim est influentia secundum divinam acceptationem; sed quod Deus acceptet[^29], hoc est ab ipso et ita, quod magis et magis acceptet, et ita de sui natura potest augeri; quod autem minus acceptet, hoc non est ex se: ergo oportet quod veniat a nobis: ergo caritas de se habet augeri, minui vero non habet nisi a nobis, ut supra ostensum est[^30]. Per nos autem non potest minui, et ideo caritati solum debetur augmentum naturaliter.

**Ad 5.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod opposita nata sunt etc., dicendum, quod verum est, nisi alterum insit per naturam.

**Ad 6.** Ad illud quod obiicitur: potest esse sine additione, ergo separari; dicendum, quod istud verum est, si esset aliquid separans; sed nihil est quod separet.

english:
### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether charity can be diminished.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether charity can be diminished. And that it can, it seems:

1. Through the nature of its opposite, thus: as Augustine says[^1]: "The poison of charity is cupidity"; whence he also says[^2], that "where there is great cupidity, there is little charity," and in the book of the *Confessions*[^3]: "He loves you less who loves anything together with you, that he does not love on account of you." If therefore it happens that cupidity is not only remitted but also augmented, by the contrary it happens that charity is diminished.

2. Likewise, the venial [sin] is an evil; but nothing is an evil, except what takes away something from a good[^4]: therefore the venial takes away something. But natural aptitude is of much greater inherence than charity: therefore since the venial takes away from natural goodness, therefore it takes also from charity, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of its subject; because just as it happens that a human being makes progress, so also[^5] retreats; but through the progress of free choice it happens that in us charity is augmented, while there is ascent toward perfection: therefore since it happens by the same steps to return to imperfection, it happens that charity is diminished.

4. Likewise, every thing which by its disabling[^6] at the term is the cause of corruption, by its disabling on this side of the term is the cause of diminution: but free choice disabled through aversion is the cause of corruption of charity: therefore its disabling under God is the cause of diminution[^7].

5. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of charity itself, thus: "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"[^8]; but augmentation and diminution are opposites: therefore if it happens that charity is augmented, it happens also that it is diminished.

6. Likewise, what can be preserved in being[^9] without the conjunction of itself to something can, after conjunction, be separated from it; but charity, before addition, has being without an additional element: therefore it can be[^10] separated: and if so, then also diminished: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Charity is a simple form and uniform throughout; therefore what takes away from charity, by the same reason by which it takes away one part, takes away[^11] also the whole: and if so, therefore it is never diminished.

2. Likewise, the magnitude of charity is according to the magnitude of the divine influence, therefore its diminution is through the diminution of the influence; but God does not withdraw his influence except when offended, and he is not offended except through aversion from him and contempt: therefore charity is not diminished except through mortal sin; but this is nothing other than for charity to be removed: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything[^12] which diminishes another is opposite to it; but the venial [sin] or cupidity or concupiscence on this side of God is not opposed to charity, but rather is altogether contingent to it: therefore it is not diminished.

4. Likewise, what diminishes another has power over[^13] it; but the venial does not have power over charity, because charity loves God more than cupidity loves a hundred marks of gold and silver[^14]: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through impossibility in this way: if the venial diminishes charity, then it diminishes something from it: if therefore charity is not of infinite magnitude, then the venial, repeated several times, takes away the whole charity, which is false.

6. Likewise, if it diminishes charity according to substance, then it diminishes the substantial reward owed to it: but the substantial reward is the eternal good: therefore the venial takes away something from the eternal good; but the taking away of the eternal good either simply or in part is the eternal punishment: therefore the venial merits eternal punishment, which is against the common opinion. If therefore the venial does not diminish the one, neither [does it diminish] the other.

### CONCLUSION.

> Charity, although it is removed through mortal sin, nevertheless through venial sin is not diminished according to substance, but only according to fervor.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion, founded on the twofold preceding opinion concerning the mode of augmenting charity[^15]. For some say that charity is augmented through unmixedness; and since the unmixedness is greater according to the greater enabling of free choice and according to the diminution of concupiscence, and conversely the mixedness [is greater] through the disabling of free choice and[^16] the augmentation of concupiscence: they say consequently that it is diminished, according as cupidity or concupiscence is augmented and free choice is disabled; and this is through venial sin. But since venial sin, remaining venial, is never repeated so many times as to augment[^17] concupiscence so that one loves something above God: therefore charity through venial [sins] can be diminished, but not removed; it is removed however through the mortal [sin], which augments concupiscence above God.

But this opinion, as has been proven above[^18], does not have a stable foundation, since the substantial augmentation of charity does not come from free choice nor from concupiscence[^19], therefore neither does the diminution.

And on account of this another more probable opinion is set down, namely that charity is not diminished substantially; and this opinion is founded on this, that the augmentation of charity has to come about through addition[^20] or increase of greater influence. Granted which, it must be said that charity according to substance is not diminished, but augmented.

And the reason for this is taken from the side of the opposite or of the agent. For charity has no opposite except mortal sin; through that, however, it is not diminished but

removed; concupiscence, however, or cupidity, and venial sin are opposed to charity according to fervor only, because they stand together and substantially are mutually non-contingent[^21].

**To 1 and 2.** And so it is to be resolved as to the first two, that that [saying] of Augustine concerning cupidity and lesser love, likewise[^22] that concerning venial diminution, has place only as to the fervor of charity; and thus the first two are clear.

There is also taken a reason why charity is not diminished from the side of its subject, which is free choice according to conversion to God. Free choice, however[^23], disposes itself for the augmentation of charity through enabling, likewise for diminution through disabling on this side of the mortal. But this disposition is of congruity, not of condignity; and since God is more inclined to mercy than to condemnation, and to giving than to withdrawing[^24]: hence it is that he confers charity, when free choice disposes itself by congruity, but he does not withdraw, except when [free choice] necessarily disposes itself for the withdrawal of grace. This, however, is only through aversion, and then he removes the whole. And hence it is, that charity is never diminished, but augmented, because [the will] can prepare the subject for diminution only by congruity.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that just as a human being makes progress, so also descends[^25] frequently; it must be said, that charity is not diminished by descent substantially in the same way as it is augmented by ascent.

**To 4.** What [the objector] also[^26] objects, that free choice can wholly deprive [of charity] through disabling, etc.; it must be said, that this is false, because a substantial form is wholly deprived through disposition to the opposite at the term, but is not however diminished through disposition on this side of[^27] the term. Furthermore, that has place when the disposition at the term and on this side of the term are of the same genus; but it is not so in the case proposed, because one is mortal sin, the other venial.

There is also taken a reason why[^28] [charity] cannot be diminished from the side of its own nature. For [charity] itself is an influence according to divine acceptation; but that God should accept[^29], this is from him, and so, that he should accept more and more, and so by its own nature [charity] can be augmented; but that he should accept less, this is not from itself: therefore it must come from us: therefore charity from itself is to be augmented, but it has no diminution except from us, as has been shown above[^30]. By us, however, it cannot be diminished, and therefore to charity only augmentation is owed naturally.

**To 5.** To that therefore which is objected, that opposites are by nature [produced] etc., it must be said, that it is true, unless one of them is in [the subject] by nature.

**To 6.** To that which is objected: it can be without addition, therefore [it can be] separated; it must be said, that this is true, if there were something separating; but there is nothing which separates.

la: Libr. 83. Qq. q. 36. n. 1. «Caritatis autem venenum est spes adipiscendorum aut retinendorum temporalium». Quae spes ab ipso paulo post nominatur cupiditas.

en: *Book of 83 Questions*, q. 36, n. 1. "But the poison of charity is the hope of obtaining or retaining temporal things." Which hope is by him a little later named cupidity.

la: Ibid. et *Enchirid.* c. 121. n. 32; vide supra q. praeced. corp. quaest. — Vat. post *unde* contra plurimos mss. et quinque primas edd. omittit *et*.

en: Ibid. and *Enchiridion* c. 121, n. 32; see above in the body of the preceding question. — The Vatican edition, after *unde*, against most manuscripts and the first five editions, omits *et*.

la: August., *Enchir.* c. 12. n. 4: *Nocet autem (malum), adimit igitur bonum.* — Paulo ante cod. Z incongrue *quia* loco *quod*.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 12, n. 4: "But [evil] harms; therefore it takes away a good." — A little before, codex Z incongruously [reads] *quia* in place of *quod*.

la: Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *et*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the resistance of most manuscripts and edition 1, omits *et*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut XZ *per sui dehabilitationem*.

en: Some codices such as XZ [read] *per sui dehabilitationem*.

la: Supple cum cod. F *caritatis*.

en: Supply with codex F *caritatis*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de Oppositis et 11. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 7.). — Paulo ante plures codd. ut ASTWZ omittunt *caritatis*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on Opposites, and *Topics* XI, c. 3 (c. 7). — A little before, several codices such as ASTWZ omit *caritatis*.

la: Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus *in esse*. Mox cod. V *aliud* loco *aliquid*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and of the first six editions we have added *in esse*. Soon after, codex V [reads] *aliud* in place of *aliquid*.

la: Unus alterque cod. ut V H' cum ed. 1 addunt *ab illo*.

en: One or two codices such as V, H' with edition 1 add *ab illo*.

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *adimit*.

en: In most manuscripts and edition 1 *adimit* is missing.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 addit *illud*. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 habent *opponuntur* loco *opponitur*, sed non cohaerenter cum subnexis.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices and edition 1, adds *illud*. A little later, most codices with edition 1 have *opponuntur* in place of *opponitur*, but not coherently with what follows.

la: Multi codd. hic et paulo infra *supra*.

en: Many codices, here and a little below, [read] *supra*.

la: Fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 exhibent hanc abbreviationem: *c. m. a. ar.*; cod. O integre lectionem in textum receptam praebet, dum cod. V (H et cc ab altera manu) ponit *aurum et argentum*; Vat. vero *creaturam*.

en: Almost all codices with edition 1 give this abbreviation: *c. m. a. ar.*; codex O presents in full the reading received into the text, while codex V (H and cc by a second hand) puts *aurum et argentum*; the Vatican edition, however, [reads] *creaturam*.

la: Vide. q. praeced.

en: See the preceding question.

la: Cod. Z addit *per*.

en: Codex Z adds *per*.

la: Cod. V *concupiscentia augeatur*. Paulo post plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *minui* loco *diminui*, et dein cod. X *quia* pro *quod*.

en: Codex V [reads] *concupiscentia augeatur*. A little later, most codices with edition 1 [read] *minui* in place of *diminui*, and then codex X [reads] *quia* for *quod*.

la: In corp. praeced. n. [?]

en: In the body of the preceding [question], n. [?]

la: Intellige iuxta praedicta: non venit a liberi arbitrii habitatione in bono nec a concupiscentiae diminutione. Mendum Vat., quae post *arbitrio* ponit *ideo* et mox *ideo nec* omittit, correximus ex mss. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6.

en: Understand according to what has been said above: it does not come from the dwelling of free choice in the good, nor from the diminution of concupiscence. The error of the Vatican edition, which after *arbitrio* puts *ideo* and soon after omits *ideo nec*, we have corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 4, 5, 6.

la: Aliqui codd. ut ILO cum ed. 1 *superadditionem*, quae lectio corroboratur lectione mutila plurium codd. ponentium *super* loco *per*. Mox ed. 1 *sive* pro *vel*.

en: Some codices such as ILO with edition 1 [read] *superadditionem*, which reading is corroborated by the mutilated reading of several codices putting *super* in place of *per*. Soon after, edition 1 [reads] *sive* for *vel*.

la: Licet lectio Vat. et aliquorum mss., in qua ponitur *contingentia* loco *incontingentia*, possit aliquo sub respectu explicari, praeferimus tamen lectionem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1, quia ipsa veritati et praedictis magis consonat. — Paulo ante cod. Z *tantum* loco *solum*.

en: Although the reading of the Vatican edition and of some manuscripts, in which *contingentia* is put in place of *incontingentia*, can be explained under some respect, nevertheless we prefer the reading of most manuscripts and of edition 1, because it agrees more with the truth and with what has been said above. — A little before, codex Z [reads] *tantum* in place of *solum*.

la: Fide antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum *ad*. Mox codd. Y bb bene *venialii* pro *veniali*.

en: On the testimony of the older codices and edition 1 we have struck out *ad*, here wrongly added. Soon after, codices Y, bb rightly [read] *venialii* for *veniali*.

la: Plures codd. ut A T V Y omittunt *autem*; cod. X *quia liberum arbitrium*; cod. Z vero, mutata interpunctione, *Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium*, quod non respondet subnexis. Mox cod. W *habilitationem* pro *habilitatem*, sicut et paulo infra *dehabilitationem* loco *dehabilitatem*.

en: Several codices such as A, T, V, Y omit *autem*; codex X [reads] *quia liberum arbitrium*; codex Z, however, with the punctuation changed, [reads] *Secundum enim conversionem ad Deum liberum arbitrium*, which does not correspond to what follows. Soon after, codex W [reads] *habilitationem* in place of *habilitatem*, just as a little below also *dehabilitationem* in place of *dehabilitatem*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *abstrahendum* et mox *abstrahit* pro *subtrahit*, deinde nomini *subtractionem* praemittit *abstractionem vel*, sed obstat usus loquendi, sicut et auctoritas antiquiorum mss. cum ed. 1. Mox cod. W *non ad gratiam* pro *gratiae*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *abstrahendum* and soon after *abstrahit* for *subtrahit*, then prefixes to the noun *subtractionem* the words *abstractionem vel*, but the usage of speech opposes [this], as does the authority of the older manuscripts together with edition 1. Soon after, codex W [reads] *non ad gratiam* in place of *gratiae*.

la: Ex mss. et quinque primis edd. pro *retrocedit* substituimus *descendit*, quod subnexis conformius est.

en: From the manuscripts and the first five editions, in place of *retrocedit* we have substituted *descendit*, which is more conformable to what follows.

la: Vat. cum nonnullis codd. *autem*, et *obiicitur* pro *obiicit*.

en: The Vatican edition with several codices [reads] *autem*, and *obiicitur* for *obiicit*.

la: Multi codd. ut ABCDFGIPQSUWZ *modo*, sed non bene nec cohaerenter cum subnexis. Quid sit *dispositio in termino* et *citra terminum*, satis apparet ex his verbis S. Thomae (IV. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. solutio ad quaestiunc. 2.): «Expulsio formae dicit terminum motus illius, qui est ad corruptionem ordinatus; et introductio formae dicit similiter terminum motus illius, qui praecedit generationem; quia tam generatio quam corruptio sunt termini motus. Omne autem quod movetur, quando est in termino motus, disponitur secundum illud, ad quod motus ordinatur; et ideo cum motus corruptionis tendat in non esse, generationis vero ad esse, quando forma introducitur, *factum est*; quando autem expellitur, *non est*».

en: Many codices such as ABCDFGIPQSUWZ [read] *modo*, but not well, nor coherently with what follows. What *disposition at the term* and *on this side of the term* is, sufficiently appears from these words of St. Thomas (*IV Sent.* d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, solution to the second little question): "The expulsion of a form expresses the term of that motion which is ordered to corruption; and the introduction of a form expresses likewise the term of that motion which precedes generation; because both generation and corruption are termini of motion. But everything which is moved, when it is at the term of motion, is disposed according to that to which the motion is ordered; and so, since the motion of corruption tends to non-being, but [the motion] of generation to being, when the form is introduced, *it has been made*; when, however, it is expelled, *it is not*."

la: Supple: *caritas*.

en: Supply: *caritas*.

la: Plures codd. ut AFGHITY bb cum ed. 1 hanc propositionem ita exhibent *secundum quod Deus acceptat*, cui codd. VX praefigunt *id est*; cod. T vero mox post *hoc* addit *autem*. Paulo infra antiquiorum mss. et edd. 1, 3 fide substituimus *sui* pro *sua*.

en: Several codices such as AFGHITY, bb with edition 1 give this proposition thus: *secundum quod Deus acceptat*, to which codices VX prefix *id est*; codex T, however, soon after *hoc* adds *autem*. A little below, on the testimony of older manuscripts and editions 1, 3 we have substituted *sui* for *sua*.

la: Hic, in corp. quaest. — Mox ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *solum*, pro quo cod. Z habet *soli* et quod Vat. cum cod. cc male omittit.

en: Here, in the body of the question. — Soon after, by the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *solum*, in place of which codex Z has *soli* and which the Vatican edition with codex cc wrongly omits.

latin_scholion:
Ex antiquis Antissiodorensis et etiam, quod mirum est, Dionys. Carth. affirmarunt, caritatem secundum habitum minui posse, quod nunc communissime negatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 108. m. 8. § 3. — Scot., Report. hic q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 5.; S. II. II. q. 24. a. 10. — Gulielmus Par., de Virtut. c. 11. ante med. — B. Albert., hic n. 10. — Petr. Tar., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. q. 23. — Durand., hic q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 9. — Biel, hic q. 4.

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english_scholion:
From among the ancients, [William of] Auxerre and even — what is remarkable — Dionysius the Carthusian affirmed that charity according to habit can be diminished, which is now most commonly denied. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 108, m. 8, § 3. — Scotus, *Reportata* here q. 7. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 5; *Summa* II–II, q. 24, a. 10. — William of Paris, *De Virtutibus* c. 11, before the middle. — Bl. Albert, here n. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here 2nd princ., q. unica. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* q. 23. — Durandus, here q. 10. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 9. — Biel, here q. 4.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO IV.

#### *Utrum caritas terminum habeat in augmento.*

Quarto quaeritur et ultimo de augmento caritatis quantum ad terminum, et quaeritur, utrum habeat statum vel terminum, ultra quem non possit augeri. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Omne quod est in aliquo, non excedit capacitatem eius in quo est; sed caritas est in anima: ergo non excedit animae capacitatem. Sed capacitas animae est finita, quia omnis potentia finita habet capacitatem finitam: ergo et caritas.

2. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur secundum quantitatem virtutis; sed quantitas virtutis similis est quantitati molis et perfectior; sed in quantitate molis in augmentando[^1] est status, unde Philosophus: «Omnium natura constantium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti»: ergo similiter et in quantitate virtutis.

3. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur per ascensum ad quantitatem perfectam[^2], ergo quod semper augetur nunquam venit ad perfectum, «perfectum autem est, cui non est possibilis additio[^3]»; sed caritatem, cum sit opus Dei, contingit perfici, Dei enim perfecta sunt opera[^4]: ergo etc.

4. Item, augmentum caritatis attenditur secundum approximationem ad finem, nam quanto caritas maior, tanto fini proximior[^5]; ergo aut nunquam pervenit ad finem, aut si sic, necesse est stare, quia alias esset frustra: ergo etc.

**Contra:**
1. Quod non sit status, ostenditur a parte virtutis augmentantis. Tantum enim extenditur augmentum, quantum virtus augmentativa; sed virtus augmentans caritatem est virtus divina, quae non habet terminum nec[^6] statum: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur[^7] a parte suscipientis. Sicut enim se habet transparens ad lumen corporale, sic capacitas animae ad lumen gratiae sive caritatis; sed aer nunquam tantum recipit de lumine, quin adhuc possit plus recipere: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc videtur posse ostendi a parte augmentabilis, quod est caritas, quia ipsa est aeque in actu vel amplius quam[^8] ignis materialis; sed ignis materialis ratione suae actualitatis augetur in infinitum, si adsit combustibile, sicut dicit Philosophus[^9]: ergo similiter caritas de se.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte obiecti caritatis, quod est summum bonum non habens mensuram: ergo si mensura caritatis debet attendi per[^10] magnitudinem obiecti, et illud caret modo et mensura, ergo et caritas: et si hoc, ergo non habet statum nec terminum.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Caritas habet terminum in augmento, quod colligitur ex parte tum virtutis agentis, tum potentiae suscipientis, tum formae perficientis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod status est in augmento caritatis secundum omnem modum, secundum quem contingit esse statum et perfectionem in motu augmenti.

Augmentum enim, sicut patet in corporalibus, habet statum a tribus: videlicet a virtute agente et potentia suscipiente et forma perficiente. Sic[^11] est in homine, cuius augmentum stat, quando virtus caloris et carnis secundum speciem non potest amplius convertere, quam deperdatur; quando potentia humidi radicalis non potest plus extendi[^12]; quando

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corpus perfectum est, secundum quod congruit perfectioni animae.

Sic dicendum, quod caritas stat a parte virtutis agentis; sed huiusmodi status potest esse dupliciter[^13]. Nam illa virtus aut est operans naturaliter, aut a proposito; si naturaliter, tunc stat, quando non potest amplius; si a proposito, tunc stat, quando non disponit amplius; et hoc modo stat caritatis augmentum, cum deventum est ad mensuram, quam mensus est Deus homini secundum distributionem suae sapientiae. Et ideo, quamvis[^14] virtus augmentans sit infinita, tamen operatur secundum dispositionem sapientiae limitantis effectus varios, secundum quod sibi placet. Non enim operatur secundum omnimodam possibilitatem.

Stat etiam a parte suscipientis, quia sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^15]: *Dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem.* Et huiusmodi status potest intelligi tripliciter: aut secundum actum, cum amplius non procedit, et sic stat in viris perfectis, qui non assurgunt ad maiora; aut secundum aptitudinem, et sic stat in beatis, qui amplius non possunt se disponere et tantum habent, quantum se disposuerunt, unde status est in eis; aut secundum possibilitatem suscipientis, et sic statum habet in Christo[^16], et credo etiam, quod in beata Virgine, et aliqui dicunt, quod in Angelis; utrum in aliquibus aliis, nescio. Scio tamen de Christo, quod[^17] tantum habet de gloria, quantum potest recipere creatura unita, et credo hoc ipsum de Matre dulcissima.

Stat etiam a parte augmentabilis, cum pervenit[^18] ad quantitatem perfectam. Sed notandum, quod quantitas virtutis perfecta est dupliciter: vel simpliciter, vel in genere. Simpliciter perfecta est in summo et simplicissimo, ut in Deo; in genere vero in omnibus, qui[^19] pertingunt ad actum completum, ad quem sunt, et hoc est diligere Deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota virtute[^20]. Primo modo non est status, sed secundo solum.

**Ad 1.** Ad illud quod obiicitur primo de infinitate virtutis agentis, dicendum, quod illa ratio teneret, si virtus caritatem augmentans ageret naturaliter et secundum impetum sive secundum totum suum posse; nunc autem agit sapienter et ita ponit unicuique limitem, ipsa in se non limitata.

**Ad 2.** Ad illud quod obiicitur per simile in aere, quod suscipientis potentia est ad infinitum; dicendum, quod lumen augeri in aere hoc est dupliciter: vel per ipsius *clarificationem*, vel per *luminum aggregationem*. Primo modo credo quod statum[^21] habeat; adeo enim posset aer illuminari, quod si etiam superveniret aliud lumen, non magis claresceret. Alio modo potest augeri lumen in aere per *luminum aggregationem*; et sic, quia lumina diversorum luminarium sunt in eodem puncto aeris, non se coangustant[^22] nec se expellunt, sicut multae species in uno medio; et ita nunquam sunt tot species, quin plures possint esse; similiter de luminibus. Sed tunc non est simile de caritate, quoniam, sicut prius tactum est[^23], in una anima una tantum est caritas; non sic est de lumine, quod egreditur a diversis luminaribus.

**Ad 3.** Ad illud quod obiicitur a parte augmentabilis, quod ignis in infinitum est augmentabilis; dicendum, quod calor potest augeri dupliciter: vel *intensive*, et sic statum habet et summum; vel *extensive*[^24], ut sit in pluribus, et sic non habet statum a parte sua, sed a parte combustibilis, quod finitum est. Similiter dico, quod caritas potest augeri *intensive*, ut magis diligat, et sic habet statum, sicut ignis; alio modo *extensive*, ut a parte dilectorum, et sic non habet statum ex parte sua, quia nunquam tot diligit, quin adhuc nata sit diligere plures.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur a parte obiecti[^25], dicendum, quod obiectum nihil ad hoc facit, quia obiectum semper est idem non mutatum et est infinitum; et ideo nunquam ei caritas commensuratur nec ad eius mensuram[^26] recipit augmentum nec decrementum.

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english:
### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether charity has a term in its augmentation.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked concerning the augmentation of charity with respect to its term, and it is asked whether it has a state or term, beyond which it cannot be augmented. And that it has [such a term] is shown in this way.

1. Everything which is in something does not exceed the capacity of that in which it is; but charity is in the soul: therefore it does not exceed the capacity of the soul. But the capacity of the soul is finite, since every finite power has a finite capacity: therefore so also is charity.

2. Likewise, the augmentation of charity is regarded according to the quantity of power; but the quantity of power is similar to the quantity of mass and more perfect; but in the quantity of mass, in being augmented[^1], there is a state, whence the Philosopher: "Of all things constituted by nature, there is a term and a measure of magnitude and of augmentation": therefore likewise also in the quantity of power.

3. Likewise, the augmentation of charity is regarded by ascent to a perfect quantity[^2]; therefore what is always being augmented never comes to the perfect, "but the perfect is that to which no addition is possible[^3]"; but charity, since it is the work of God, comes to be perfected, for the works of God are perfect[^4]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the augmentation of charity is regarded according to approximation to its end, for the greater the charity, the closer to its end[^5]; therefore either it never arrives at its end, or if it does, it is necessary that it stop, since otherwise it would be in vain: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. That there is no state is shown from the side of the augmenting power. For the augmentation extends as far as the augmentative power; but the power augmenting charity is the divine power, which has neither term nor[^6] state: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this same is shown[^7] from the side of the recipient. For as the transparent stands to corporeal light, so the capacity of the soul to the light of grace or of charity; but air never receives so much of light, but that it can still receive more: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this seems to be demonstrable from the side of the augmentable, which is charity, since it is equally in act, or more, than[^8] material fire; but material fire, by reason of its actuality, is augmented infinitely, if there is fuel, as the Philosopher says[^9]: therefore likewise charity from itself.

4. Likewise, this same is shown from the side of the object of charity, which is the highest good not having any measure: therefore if the measure of charity ought to be regarded by[^10] the magnitude of the object, and that lacks mode and measure, therefore so also charity: and if so, therefore it has neither state nor term.

### CONCLUSION.

> Charity has a term in its augmentation, which is gathered from the side both of the agent power, and of the receiving potency, and of the perfecting form.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a state in the augmentation of charity according to every mode by which a state and perfection in the motion of augmentation can occur.

For augmentation, as is evident in bodily things, has a state from three [things]: namely from the agent power, the receiving potency, and the perfecting form. So[^11] it is in a human being, whose augmentation stops, when the power of heat and of flesh according to species can no longer convert more than is lost; when the potency of the radical moisture cannot be extended further[^12]; when

the body is perfected, according as is congruent with the perfection of the soul.

So it must be said that charity stops from the side of the agent power; but a state of this kind can be in two ways[^13]. For that power either acts naturally, or by purpose; if *naturally*, then it stops, when it can [act] no further; if *by purpose*, then it stops, when it disposes [it] no further; and in this mode the augmentation of charity stops, when it has come to the measure which God has measured out to a human being according to the distribution of his wisdom. And therefore, although[^14] the augmenting power is infinite, nevertheless it operates according to the disposition of [his] wisdom, which limits the various effects, according as is pleasing to it. For it does not operate according to its every-modal possibility.

It stops also from the side of the recipient, since, as is said in the twenty-fifth of Matthew[^15]: *He gave to each according to his proper power.* And a state of this kind can be understood in three ways: either according to act, when it does not proceed further, and so it stops in perfect men, who do not rise up to greater [things]; or according to aptitude, and so it stops in the blessed, who can no longer dispose themselves and have as much as they have disposed themselves [to have], whence the state is in them; or according to the possibility of the recipient, and so it has a state in Christ[^16], and I believe also that [it has a state] in the Blessed Virgin, and some say that [it has it] in the Angels; whether [it has it] in any others, I do not know. I know nevertheless concerning Christ, that[^17] he has as much of glory as the united creature can receive, and I believe the same of the most sweet Mother.

It stops also from the side of the augmentable, when it has arrived[^18] at the perfect quantity. But it must be noted, that the perfect quantity of power is in two ways: either *simply*, or *in a kind*. *Simply* perfect [it is] in the highest and most simple, as in God; *in a kind*, however, in all those who[^19] attain to the complete act for which they are, and this is to love God with one's whole heart and with one's whole soul and with one's whole power[^20]. In the first mode there is no state, but [there is] in the second only.

**To 1.** To that which is objected first concerning the infinity of the agent power, it must be said that that argument would hold, if the power augmenting charity were to act naturally and according to impulse or according to its whole power; now however it acts wisely and so sets a limit for each one, [while] itself in itself not limited.

**To 2.** To that which is objected by a likeness in air, that the potency of the recipient is to the infinite; it must be said that for light to be augmented in air is in two ways: either through its *clarification*, or through the *aggregation of lights*. In the first mode I believe that it has a state[^21]; for so much could the air be illuminated, that even if another light were to supervene, it would not become more clear. In the other mode, light can be augmented in air through the *aggregation of lights*; and so, since the lights of diverse luminaries are in the same point of air, they do not crowd[^22] each other nor expel each other, as do many species in one medium; and so there are never so many species, but that more can be; likewise concerning lights. But then [the case] is not similar concerning charity, since, as was touched on before[^23], in one soul there is only one charity; not so is it concerning light, which proceeds from diverse luminaries.

**To 3.** To that which is objected from the side of the augmentable, that fire is augmentable infinitely; it must be said that heat can be augmented in two ways: either *intensively*, and thus it has a state and a maximum; or *extensively*[^24], that it be in many [things], and thus it does not have a state from its own side, but from the side of the fuel, which is finite. Likewise I say that charity can be augmented *intensively*, that it love more, and thus it has a state, like fire; in another mode *extensively*, that is, from the side of those loved, and thus it does not have a state from its own side, since it never loves so many but that it is naturally apt to love more.

**To 4.** To that which is objected from the side of the object[^25], it must be said that the object does nothing toward this, since the object is always the same not changed and is infinite; and therefore charity is never commensurated to it nor receives augmentation or decrement to its measure[^26].

la: Libr. II. *de Anima* text. 41. (c. 4.). — Paulo ante cod. S cum ed. 1 *augmento* pro *augmentando*. Mox post *similiter* ex multis mss. ut AGHITWX etc. et ed. 1 substituimus *et* loco *est*.

en: Book II *On the Soul* text. 41 (c. 4). — A little before, codex S with edition 1 [reads] *augmento* in place of *augmentando*. Soon after, after *similiter*, from many manuscripts such as AGHITWX etc. and edition 1 we have substituted *et* in place of *est*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *accessionem ad caritatem perfectam*; multi codd. ut A C F G I L P Q R S T U W etc. cum edd. 3, 6 *qualitatem* loco *quantitatem*, sed in se minus bene et contra ea quae in corp. quaestionis circa finem habentur. Codd. aa bb *et perfectionem* pro *perfectam*; aliqui codd. ut K X cum edd. 2, 3 *ascensionem* loco *ascensum*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *accessionem ad caritatem perfectam*; many codices such as A C F G I L P Q R S T U W etc. with editions 3, 6 [read] *qualitatem* in place of *quantitatem*, but in itself less well and against what is had in the body of the question near the end. Codices aa bb [read] *et perfectionem* in place of *perfectam*; some codices such as K X with editions 2, 3 [read] *ascensionem* in place of *ascensum*.

la: Aristot.; vide supra q. 2. ad 3. — Mox ed. 1 cum aliquibus mss. expresso et bene *contingit* loco *convenit*.

en: Aristotle; see above q. 2, [reply] to 3. — Soon after, edition 1 with some manuscripts expressly and rightly [reads] *contingit* in place of *convenit*.

en: Deuteronomy 32:4.

la: Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 21. (IV. c. 16.): *Etenim secundum quod habent finem, perfecta dicuntur.* — Mox ex aliquibus mss. ut MT YZ adiecimus primum *aut*.

en: Under this respect Aristotle says, V. *Metaph.* text. 21 (IV. c. 16): *For according as they have an end, they are called perfect.* — Soon after, from some manuscripts such as MT, YZ we have added the first *aut*.

la: Substituimus ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *nec* loco *et*.

en: We have substituted, by the help of older manuscripts and edition 1, *nec* in place of *et*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *videtur*, sed ceteris mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, [reads] *videtur*, but with the rest of the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting.

la: Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *quam* loco *sicut*.

en: On the testimony of most manuscripts and edition 1 we have placed *quam* in place of *sicut*.

la: Libr. II. *de Anima* text. 41. (c. 4.): *Ignis enim augmentum in infinitum est, quousque fuerit combustibile.*

en: Book II *On the Soul* text. 41 (c. 4): *For the augmentation of fire is to infinity, as long as there is fuel.*

la: Ed. 1 *secundum*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *secundum*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut K V cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *sicut*; cod. Z *et sic*. Mox cod. K post *stat* addit *a tribus scilicet*.

en: Some codices such as K, V, cc with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] *sicut*; codex Z [reads] *et sic*. Soon after, codex K, after *stat*, adds *a tribus scilicet*.

la: Quid sit *humidum radicale* secundum opinionem illius aetatis explicat Scotus, 1. *Phys.* q. 10. n. 23: «Unde nota secundo, quod duplex est humidum, radicale scilicet et cibale. Radicale non est in aliqua parte corporis determinata, sed est sparsum per totum corpus estque tota illa materia corporea, in qua introducitur anima in initio generationis, in qua anima fovetur et radicatur, cuius virtute postea reliqua efficiuntur in corpore. Et hoc humido durante, durat vita et consumto, consumitur, et recedit anima. Humidum cibale seu nutrimentale est quod fit ex cibo per conversionem eius in substantiam aliti, ad reparandum quod deperditur ex humido radicali per actionem caloris naturalis. Nam licet calor naturalis praecipue resideat in corde, quod est omnium membrorum calidissimum, ab eo tamen derivatur in ceteras partes corporis estque sparsus per totum corpus et immersus humido radicali, in quibus actione sua consumitur, atque adeo, ne consumatur, necesse est, quod continue reparetur per intus susceptionem extrinseci alimenti» etc. — Paulo ante cod. K cum ed. 1 *amplius* loco *plus*. Paulo infra cod. M *operationi* pro *perfectioni*.

en: What *radical moisture* is according to the opinion of that age, Scotus explains, *Physics* I, q. 10, n. 23: "Hence note secondly, that moisture is twofold, namely radical and nutritive. The radical is not in any determinate part of the body, but is dispersed through the whole body and is the whole of that bodily matter, in which the soul is introduced at the beginning of generation, in which the soul is cherished and rooted, by whose power afterwards the rest are produced in the body. And while this moisture endures, life endures, and when it is consumed, life is consumed, and the soul departs. Nutritive or alimentary moisture is that which is made from food by its conversion into the substance of the one nourished, for the repair of what is lost from the radical moisture by the action of natural heat. For although natural heat resides chiefly in the heart, which is the warmest of all the members, yet from it it is derived into the other parts of the body and is dispersed through the whole body and immersed in the radical moisture, in which by its action it is consumed; and so much so that, lest it be consumed, it is necessary that it be continually repaired by the inner reception of extrinsic nourishment," etc. — A little before, codex K with edition 1 [reads] *amplius* in place of *plus*. A little below, codex M [reads] *operationi* in place of *perfectioni*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut X V *duplex*. Paulo ante ed. 1 *huius* loco *huiusmodi*. De proxime sequenti divisione virtutis operantis cfr. Aristot., I. *Magn. Moral.* c. 16. (17.), ubi de προαίρεσι, quod in antiquioribus translationibus nomine *propositum* vel *delectus* exhibebatur.

en: Some codices such as X, V [read] *duplex*. A little before, edition 1 [reads] *huius* in place of *huiusmodi*. Concerning the immediately following division of the operating power, cf. Aristotle, I. *Magna Moralia* c. 16 (17), where concerning *proairesis*, which in the older translations was rendered by the name *propositum* or *delectus*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *licet*. Paulo ante cod. C *daturus* loco *mensus*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *licet*. A little before, codex C [reads] *daturus* in place of *mensus*.

la: Vers. 15.

en: Verse 15.

la: Plura vide infra d. 44. dub. 3, ubi et de B. V. Maria, et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3.

en: See more below at d. 44, dub. 3, where also concerning the Bl. Virgin Mary, and *III Sent.* d. 13, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quod* loco *quia*. Paulo infra post *dulcissima* in cod. H additur *plena gratia, quae Deum genuit et hominem*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *quod* in place of *quia*. A little below, after *dulcissima*, in codex H is added *plena gratia, quae Deum genuit et hominem* ("full of grace, who bore God and man").

la: Cod. Y *pervenerit*, qui et mox *duplex* ponit loco *dupliciter*.

en: Codex Y [reads] *pervenerit*, which also soon after puts *duplex* in place of *dupliciter*.

la: Antiqui codd. cum ed. 1 *quae* loco *qui*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut HMPQV cum ed. 1 post *vero* addunt *est*, pauci vero ut VX *ut*.

en: Old codices with edition 1 [read] *quae* in place of *qui*. A little before, some codices such as HMPQV with edition 1 add *est* after *vero*, while a few such as VX [add] *ut*.

en: Matthew 22:37, and Mark 12:30.

la: Codd. aa bb adiungunt *illuminari*.

en: Codices aa, bb add *illuminari*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *angustant*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *angustant*.

la: Supra q. 2. ad 4. — Mox cod. I *nec* pro *non*, et cod. Y *ut* loco *quod*.

en: Above q. 2, [reply] to 4. — Soon after, codex I [reads] *nec* in place of *non*, and codex Y [reads] *ut* in place of *quod*.

la: Vat. addit *id est*, cod. cc *et*, sed antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt quamlibet particulam. Paulo ante in cod. S post *habet* additur *a parte*, in qua additione decidit certe sua.

en: The Vatican edition adds *id est*, codex cc [adds] *et*, but the older codices with edition 1 omit any particle whatever. A little before, in codex S, after *habet* is added *a parte*, in which addition his [position] certainly falls away.

la: Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum *caritatis*.

en: On the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged *caritatis* added here by the Vatican edition.

la: Cod. T *nec ad illud mensuratur nec*; aliqui codd. ut A S V X cum ed. 1 perperam post *mensuram* adiiciunt *nec*.

en: Codex T [reads] *nec ad illud mensuratur nec*; some codices such as A, S, V, X with edition 1 wrongly add *nec* after *mensuram*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Hanc quaestionem alibi tractat S. Thomas, scil. III. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. a. 2. n. 1, altius in *Sum.* II. II. q. 24. a. 7., ubi inter alios Caietanus ad locum docet, eius verba in iis posse intelligi de gratia seu caritate aliud in superlativo gradu. Quod autem definitum est a Clemente V. in Concilio Viennensi (Clementinarum, cap. *Ad nostrum*, lib. V. tit. 3. n. 11. 12.) sententiam communem docere de Christo, animam eius habuisse summum gradum gratiae secundum quantitatem intensivam etc., satis ostendit, non dissentire eum a S. Bonav., qui (hic dub. 1.) de Christo idem profitetur cum communi meliorum Scholasticorum sententia, cui Durand. ubique pauci contradicunt.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 3. a. 8. 6. — Scot., in utroque scripto III. Sent. d. 13. q. 1. 2. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 17. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. (qui expresse sententiam S. Bonaventurae dicit esse «planiorem atque communiorem»). — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 22. — Durand., hic q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 8.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question St. Thomas treats elsewhere, namely *III Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, n. 1, more deeply in the *Summa* II–II, q. 24, a. 7, where among others Cajetan at the place teaches that his words can be understood concerning grace or charity in another, superlative, degree. Now what was defined by Clement V in the Council of Vienne (*Clementines*, ch. *Ad nostrum*, bk. V, tit. 3, nn. 11–12) — that the common opinion teaches concerning Christ, that his soul had the highest degree of grace according to intensive quantity, etc. — sufficiently shows that he does not dissent from St. Bonaventure, who (here, dub. 1) professes the same concerning Christ, with the common opinion of the better Scholastics, against which Durandus and a few others everywhere contradict.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 21, m. 3, a. 8, 6. — Scotus, in both writings on *III Sent.* d. 13, qq. 1, 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, *I Sent.* d. 17, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 4 (who expressly says the opinion of St. Bonaventure to be "plainer and more common"). — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1st princ., q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 5, q. 22. — Durandus, here q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 8. — Biel, here q. 8.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de ista consequentia: *Qui diligit proximum, consequens est, ut ipsam dilectionem diligat.* Videtur enim ista consequentia non valere. Quamvis enim possibile sit, dilectionem diligi, non tamen est necesse, quod aliquis diligat eam; multa enim frequenter amamus, quae nollemus amare.

Item dubitatur de ista consequentia: *Qui diligit dilectionem, consequens est, ut Deum diligat;* quia, aut intelligit de increata, aut[^1] creata. Si de creata, nihil valet: diligit quid creatum, ergo increatum; si de increata, tunc in nullo concordat cum priori sententia, quia dilectio, qua diligimus[^2] proximum, est dilectio creata.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod utraque consequentia bona est in proposito. Quidam enim est amor, in quo non est quietatio nec delectatio nec complacentia, ut puta ille qui est ex pronitate corruptionis, cui ratio obsistit. Quidam vero est amor, qui est cum delectatione, complacentia et quietatione; et in tali amore non est tantum acceptatio rei amatae, immo[^3] etiam ipsius amoris; et talis amor est caritas, et ideo sequitur: qui amat proximum amat dilectionem, id est, acceptat.

Sed quoniam bene sequitur: qui acceptat aliquid ex se, multo magis acceptat illud, in quo invenitur ratio acceptationis;[^4] si dilectio, eo ipso quo dilectio, acceptatur, maior dilectio magis acceptatur. Cum ergo dilectio nostra sit dilectio exemplata, et dilectio divina sit[^5] exemplar omnis rectae dilectionis, et in illa est prima et summa ratio omnis acceptationis: hinc est, quod sequitur, quod qui diligit dilectionem diligit Deum. Unde Augustinus[^6] arguit ex hac suppositione, quod ipsa caritas sive dilectio proximi est dilectio cum acceptatione; et ex hoc tenet prima consequentia;[^7] et ex alia suppositione, quod prima ratio acceptationis est in dilectione exemplante, non exemplata; et ex hoc patet secunda.[^8]

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ecce iam potes notiorem Deum habere quam fratrem.* Videtur enim falsum, quia primae ad Timotheum ultimo[^9] dicitur de Deo, quod *lucem habitat inaccessibilem*. Praeterea, de fratre novit, quid est, de Deo vero non novit, quid est, sed, si est; ipse autem[^10] non loquitur quantum ad cognitionem, si est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid magis certitudinaliter cognosci est dupliciter, quia certitudo cognitionis est secundum praesentiam; aliquid autem praesentius est dupliciter: aut quantum ad rationem cognoscibilis, aut quantum ad substantiam.[^11] Quantum ad substantiam Deus est praesentior cuilibet rei quam aliqua alia res; quantum autem ad rationem cognoscendi hoc est dupliciter: aut a parte cognoscibilis, sicut sol est praesens caeco, et tamen caecus est absens lumini; sic Deus est praesentior quam frater; si autem a parte cognoscentis, sic praesentior est frater, quia praesens est oculis carnis,[^12] quorum cognitio viget secundum statum praesentem.

Aliter potest dici, quod praesentius est aliquid dupliciter in ratione cognoscibilis: vel secundum effectum, vel secundum se. Secundum se notior est frater, secundum *effectum* notior est Deus. Quia effectus divinus, qui est dilectio, intrat ipsam animam et ei est praesens et magis cognoscitur quam frater.[^13]

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo canonicae Ioannis quarto, quod est in littera: *Qui diligit, manet in lumine.* Videtur enim improprie dictum, quia lumen

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respicit cognitionem, sicut calor affectionem: ergo magis deberet dicere: *manet in calore*, quam *manet in lumine*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod luminis est manifestare. Manifestare autem aliquid alicui est dupliciter: aut sicut viam cognoscendorum, aut sicut viam agendorum. Primum est per scientiam, et contra illud lumen opponitur tenebra ignorantiae simplicis; secundum est per gratiam, unde: *Unctio docebit vos de omnibus*;[^14] et contra illud est tenebra malitiae sive peccati; et de hoc lumine et de his tenebris loquitur beatus Ioannes, quod patet in textu, et Ecclesiastici undecimo[^15]: *Error et tenebrae peccatoribus concreata sunt.* Et quoniam caritas semper est cum gratia, aliae virtutes non, ideo dicit: *Qui amat, manet in lumine*, per appropriationem.[^16]

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *in divinis donis nihil maius est caritate*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia sapientiae donum ponitur excellentissimum inter omnia dona, vel si idem est caritas et sapientia, caritas non retinet praerogativam inter dona. Item quaeritur de consequentia: si caritas est praecipuum inter dona Dei, et nullum maius est quam Spiritus sanctus: ergo Spiritus sanctus est caritas. Aut ergo[^17] loquitur de caritate creata, aut increata; si de increata, tunc ergo probat idem per idem; si de creata, tunc nulla videtur consequentia, quia non valet, quod si creata est caritas maior inter dona creata, quod sit Spiritus sanctus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedicta auctoritas Augustini potest intelligi de caritate creata et increata; et pro utraque habet veritatem. Si de increata, certum est; si de creata, maximum est inter dona, quia plus habet in se de ratione bonitatis sive de ipsa bonitate, quam aliquod donum,[^18] loquendo praecise. Quaedam enim dona sunt, quae sunt sine caritate; et hoc quidem certum est, quod minora sunt. Quaedam praesupponunt caritatem, sicut[^19] donum sapientiae. Caritas enim est, quae dat sensum gustui, ut sapiant ei bona aeterna. Unde sapientia superaddit quandam ulteriorem habilitatem,[^20] quae comparata ad caritatem minus bonum est, sed prout claudit caritatem, maius bonum est ratione eius quod praesupponit. Et ita patet, quod caritas, praecise loquendo, est excellentissimum donum; sapientia vero, praesupponendo sive implicando donum caritatis, dicitur excellentissimum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de consequentia, dicendum, quod utroque modo bona est. Si enim intelligatur de caritate increata, si[^21] ipsa est donum primum et praecipuum, et Spiritus sanctus est huiusmodi: oportet quod ipsa sit Spiritus sanctus, quia quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit.[^22] Si autem de caritate creata; tunc consequentia Augustini intelligenda est a parte nominis sic: si caritas creata est maximum[^23] inter dona creata, et Spiritus sanctus est maximum donorum: ergo melius nominatur nomine doni excellentissimi quam alio. Consequens ergo est, ut Spiritus sanctus sit caritas, sed non creata, immo illa quae Deus est.[^24]

### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non utique sic dictum est, quod Dei substantia est nostra patientia.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum, non est ipse Deus, nisi intelligamus quo diligimus exemplariter vel causaliter: ergo cum simile sit de patientia, videtur quod Augustinus male destruit[^25] illud simile. Item, cum Deus faciat nos diligentes, sicut patientes, quare non dicitur Deus caritas nostra, sicut patientia nostra?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus est caritas et essentialiter et causaliter: essentialiter, quia in se amor est; causaliter, quia in nobis amorem efficit. Sed Deus non est patientia essentialiter, sed solum causaliter; et ideo Scriptura istum diversum modum innuens[^26] dicit, Deum esse patientiam nostram, et Deum esse caritatem sine additione. Ratio autem huius est, quia[^27] quidam habitus dicunt incompletionem, sicut patientia, spes et huiusmodi, qui non cadunt in Deo per essentiam, sed per causam, quia huiusmodi sunt a Deo. Quidam autem sunt habitus di-

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centes complementum, et huiusmodi[^28] sunt in Deo essentialiter, sicut caritas et sapientia et huiusmodi. Notandum autem, quod Augustinus vult dicere, quod Deus est caritas essentialiter, sed ipse non vult dicere, quod sit caritas nostra essentialiter, sed causaliter et exemplariter. Nec ita est patientia nostra exemplariter.[^29] Quamvis enim omnes virtutes habeant exemplar cognoscitivum in Deo et omnes habeant exemplar secundum similitudinem longinquam, tamen quaedam virtutes non habent sibi correspondens in Deo per omnia, sicut patientia, quae duo dicit, scilicet passionem et superferri passionibus. Quantum ad primum, non habet in Deo correspondens, sed quantum ad secundum solum. Caritas autem habet amorem in Deo sibi per omnia correspondentem, et[^30] amorem non tantum essentialem, sed etiam personalem: et ideo dicunt auctoritates,[^31] quod Spiritus sanctus est caritas, qua diligimus Deum; et ablativus *qua* dicit habitudinem non tantum causae efficientis, sed etiam formalis, non perficientis, sed exemplantis.[^32]

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *solum donum caritatis dividit inter filios regni et filios perditionis*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut loquitur de divisione quantum ad cognitionem, aut quantum ad veritatem. Si quantum ad veritatem, hoc falsum est, quia non solum in caritate, sed etiam in fide gratuita et spe differunt; si quantum ad cognitionem, tunc minime dividit, quia nescitur, quis hoc donum habeat.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnia dona virtutum possunt esse informia praeter caritatem. Et quoniam possunt esse informia, possunt esse in iustis et peccatoribus, et ideo in illis nunquam separantur ab invicem. Sed caritas nunquam potest esse informis nec esse cum peccato, quia actus eius est diligere Deum[^33] propter se et super omnia, qui removetur per omne peccatum. Ideo dicit Augustinus,[^34] quod sola caritas distinguit, loquendo de distinctione in universali.

Quod obiicitur de fide gratuita sive formata, concedo, quod distinguit; sed tamen hoc non habet, quia fides, sed quia gratuita; et ita ex hoc, quod caritati coniuncta;[^35] et sic patet illud.

### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Dominus dicit, Ioannis decimo quinto[^36]: *Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat* etc.: ergo si hoc est maximum opus caritatis, impossibile est, quod fiat sine caritate.

**Respondeo:** Aliqui dicunt, quod Apostolus dicit per impossibile; posito enim adhuc,[^37] quod aliquis hanc poenam pateretur sine caritate pro Christo, adhuc non prodesset sibi. Credo tamen, quod aliqui[^38] ex industria naturalium et aliqua gratia gratis data possent sustinere pro fide Christi mortem etiam sine caritate, sicut[^39] haereticus sustinet per errorem. Et quod dicit Dominus, quod illud est summae caritatis, hoc dicit quantum ad signum et exteriorem ostensionem; signa tamen sunt fallibilia, et ideo non necessario oportet, quod si aliquis mortem sustinet pro Christo sive pro eius fide,[^40] habeat caritatem. Credo tamen, quod si aliquis pro Christo sustineret mortem, qui non magnum haberet obicem, quod disponeret se ad gratiae susceptionem, ita quod daretur sibi caritas.

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt about this consequence: *He who loves the neighbor, it consequently follows that he loves the love itself.* For this consequence appears not to hold. For although it is possible that love be loved, yet it is not necessary that someone love it; for many things we frequently love which we would not wish to love.

Likewise there is doubt about this consequence: *He who loves love, it consequently follows that he loves God;* because [the proposition] is taken either of uncreated [love] or[^1] of created. If of created, it has no force: he loves something created, therefore something uncreated; if of uncreated, then it accords in nothing with the prior statement, because the love by which we love[^2] the neighbor is a created love.

**I respond:** It must be said that both consequences are good in the matter proposed. For there is a certain love in which there is no rest nor delight nor complacence — such, for instance, as that which is from the proneness of corruption, to which reason resists. But there is another love which is with delight, complacence and rest; and in such love there is acceptance not only of the thing loved, but rather[^3] also of the love itself; and such love is charity, and therefore it follows: he who loves the neighbor loves the love, that is, accepts [it].

But since it well follows: he who accepts something from itself, much more accepts that in which is found the ground of acceptance;[^4] if love, by the very fact that it is love, is accepted, a greater love is more accepted. Since therefore our love is an exemplated love, and the divine love is[^5] the exemplar of every right love, and in it is the first and supreme ground of all acceptance: hence it is that it follows that he who loves love loves God. Whence Augustine[^6] argues from this supposition, that charity itself or the love of the neighbor is love with acceptance; and from this the first consequence holds;[^7] and from another supposition, that the first ground of acceptance is in exemplating love, not in exemplated love; and from this the second is clear.[^8]

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Behold, you can already have God more known than your brother.* For it appears false, because in the last [chapter] of First Timothy[^9] it is said of God, that *he dwells in inaccessible light*. Furthermore, of one's brother one knows *what he is*; but of God one does not know *what he is*, but only *whether he is*; he himself, however,[^10] does not speak as to the cognition *whether he is*.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to be known more certainly is twofold, since the certitude of cognition is according to presence; but something is more present in two ways: either with respect to the ground of being knowable, or with respect to substance.[^11] With respect to substance, God is more present to any thing whatever than any other thing is; with respect to the ground of knowing, however, this is twofold: either on the side of the knowable, as the sun is present to the blind man, and yet the blind man is absent from the light; thus God is more present than the brother; but if on the side of the knower, thus the brother is more present, because he is present to the eyes of the flesh,[^12] whose cognition flourishes according to the present state.

It can be said otherwise, that something is more present in two ways in the ground of being knowable: either according to effect, or according to itself. According to itself the brother is more known; according to *effect* God is more known. For the divine effect, which is love, enters the soul itself and is present to it and is more known than the brother.[^13]

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that word of the canonical [Letter] of John, chapter four, which is in the text: *He who loves abides in light.* For it appears improperly said, because light

regards cognition, as heat [regards] affection: therefore he ought rather to say *abides in heat* than *abides in light*.

**I respond:** It must be said that it belongs to light to manifest. But to manifest something to someone is twofold: either as the way of things to be known, or as the way of things to be done. The first is by knowledge, and against this light is opposed the darkness of simple ignorance; the second is by grace, whence: *The unction shall teach you concerning all things*;[^14] and against this is the darkness of malice or sin; and of this light and of these darknesses speaks the blessed John, as is plain in the text, and Ecclesiasticus eleven[^15]: *Error and darkness are created together with sinners.* And since charity is always with grace, but other virtues not, therefore he says: *He who loves, abides in light*, by appropriation.[^16]

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *in the divine gifts nothing is greater than charity*. For it appears to say falsely, because the gift of wisdom is set down as most excellent among all the gifts; or, if charity and wisdom are the same, charity does not retain a prerogative among the gifts. Likewise it is asked of the consequence: if charity is the chief among the gifts of God, and nothing is greater than the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is charity. Either therefore[^17] he speaks of created charity, or of uncreated; if of uncreated, then he proves the same by the same; if of created, then no consequence appears, because it does not hold, that if a created charity is the greater among created gifts, then it is the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid authority of Augustine can be understood of charity created and uncreated; and for both it has truth. If of uncreated, it is certain; if of created, it is the greatest among the gifts, because it has more in itself of the ground of goodness, or of goodness itself, than any [other] gift,[^18] speaking precisely. For there are certain gifts which are without charity; and this indeed is certain, that they are lesser. There are certain ones which presuppose charity, such as[^19] the gift of wisdom. For charity it is that gives sense to taste, that eternal goods may have savor for it. Whence wisdom superadds a certain further capability,[^20] which compared to charity is a lesser good, but inasmuch as it includes charity, it is a greater good by reason of that which it presupposes. And so it is plain, that charity, precisely speaking, is the most excellent gift; but wisdom, presupposing or implicating the gift of charity, is called the most excellent.

To that which is objected concerning the consequence, it must be said, that in either way it is good. For if it is understood of uncreated charity, if[^21] it is the first and chief gift, and the Holy Spirit is of this kind: it is necessary that it be the Holy Spirit, because what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone.[^22] But if of created charity; then the consequence of Augustine is to be understood from the side of the name thus: if created charity is the greatest[^23] among created gifts, and the Holy Spirit is the greatest of gifts: therefore he is better named by the name of the most excellent gift than by another. Consequently, then, the Holy Spirit is charity, but not created, but rather that [charity] which is God.[^24]

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *It was not at all said in this manner, that the substance of God is our patience.* For it appears to speak ill, because the charity by which we love God is not God himself, unless we understand by which we love exemplarily or causally: therefore, since it is similar concerning patience, it appears that Augustine wrongly destroys[^25] that similarity. Likewise, since God makes us loving, just as he makes us patient, why is God not called our charity, just as our patience?

**I respond:** It must be said that God is charity both essentially and causally: essentially, because in himself he is love; causally, because he effects love in us. But God is not patience essentially, but only causally; and therefore Scripture, hinting at this diverse mode,[^26] says God to be our patience, and God to be charity without addition. The reason for this is that[^27] certain habits state incompletion, like patience, hope, and the like, which do not fall in God by essence, but by cause, because such things are from God. But there are certain habits

stating completion, and such[^28] are in God essentially, like charity and wisdom and such. Yet it must be noted that Augustine wishes to say that God is charity essentially, but he does not wish to say that he is our charity essentially, but causally and exemplarily. Nor is he our patience in this way exemplarily.[^29] For although all virtues have a cognoscitive exemplar in God and all have an exemplar according to a remote likeness, yet certain virtues do not have something corresponding to them in God in every respect, as patience, which states two things, namely passion and the bearing-up-over passions. With respect to the first, it has no correspondent in God; but only with respect to the second. But charity has love in God corresponding to it in every respect, and[^30] love not only essential, but also personal: and therefore the authorities say,[^31] that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God; and the ablative *qua* states a relation not only of efficient, but also of formal cause, not perfecting but exemplating.[^32]

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the gift of charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition*. For it appears to speak ill, because either he speaks of division with respect to cognition, or with respect to truth. If with respect to truth, this is false, because they differ not only in charity, but also in gratuitous faith and hope; if with respect to cognition, then it does not divide at all, because it is not known who has this gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that all gifts of the virtues can be unformed except charity. And since they can be unformed, they can be in the just and in sinners, and therefore in them they are never separated from one another. But charity can never be unformed nor be with sin, because its act is to love God[^33] for his own sake and above all things, which act is removed by every sin. Therefore Augustine says,[^34] that charity alone distinguishes, speaking of distinction in the universal.

To that which is objected concerning gratuitous or formed faith, I concede that it distinguishes; but yet this it has not because [it is] faith, but because [it is] gratuitous; and so from this, that it is joined to charity;[^35] and so that is plain.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *If I shall have delivered my body so that I burn* etc. For it appears to speak ill, because the Lord says, John fifteen[^36]: *Greater love than this no one has, that he lay down his soul* etc.: therefore if this is the greatest work of charity, it is impossible that it be done without charity.

**I respond:** Some say, that the Apostle speaks by an impossibility; for granting still,[^37] that someone should suffer this penalty without charity for Christ, still it would not profit him. Yet I believe, that some[^38] by an industry of natural [powers] and some grace gratuitously given could sustain death for the faith of Christ even without charity, just as[^39] the heretic sustains [it] through error. And as to what the Lord says, that this is of the highest charity, he says this with respect to sign and exterior showing; yet signs are fallible, and therefore it is not necessary, that if someone sustains death for Christ or for his faith,[^40] he have charity. Yet I believe, that if someone should sustain death for Christ, who did not have a great obstacle, that he would dispose himself to the reception of grace, so that charity would be given to him.

---

la: Aliqui codd. ut HK aa ee ff cum ed. 1 repetunt hic *de*.

en: Some codices, such as HK, aa, ee, ff, with edition 1, here repeat *de*.

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *diligimus* loco *diligit*. Paulo ante cod. O, posito *consequentia*, loco *sententia*, addit *immo aequivocatur dilectio*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have placed *diligimus* in place of *diligit*. A little before, codex O, having placed *consequentia* in place of *sententia*, adds *immo aequivocatur dilectio*.

la: Cod. dd *sed* pro *immo*.

en: Codex dd [reads] *sed* for *immo*.

la: Sequimur nonnullos codd. ut FGHKT ponendo *acceptationis* loco *dilectionis*, quorum lectio toto contextus processu confirmatur. Mox aliqui mss. ut VZ comparativo *maior* praemittunt particulam *et*, ac dein post *magis* multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *certe* supplendum *acceptatur*.

en: We follow some codices such as FGHKT in placing *acceptationis* in place of *dilectionis*, whose reading is confirmed by the whole course of the context. Soon some manuscripts such as VZ prefix the particle *et* to the comparative *maior*, and then after *magis* many codices with edition 1 omit *acceptatur*, which is certainly to be supplied.

la: Lectio Vat., in qua habetur *ut* loco *ut*, castigatur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, ex quibus etiam paulo infra post *hinc* supplevimus *est quod*. Aliqui codd. ut AGHIKT etc. cum ed. 1 voci *hinc* praefigunt particulam *et*.

en: The reading of the Vatican [edition], in which there is *ut* in place of *ut*, is corrected with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6; from these also a little below, after *hinc*, we have supplied *est quod*. Some codices such as AGHIKT etc., with edition 1, prefix the particle *et* to the word *hinc*.

la: Lib. VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est.

en: Book VIII *On the Trinity*, c. 8, n. 12, from which the text of this doubt is taken.

la: Scil., quod qui diligit proximum, diligat ipsam dilectionem. — Plurimis codd. consentientibus, substituimus *et ex hoc* pro *et ex hac*.

en: Namely, that he who loves the neighbor loves the love itself. — Most codices agreeing, we substitute *et ex hoc* for *et ex hac*.

la: Nempe: quod qui diligit dilectionem, diligat Deum. — Ed. 1 *ex hac* loco *ex hoc*. — Plura de hac re vide supra q. 2. et apud B. Albert., hic a. 3. — S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic expos. lit.

en: Namely: that he who loves love, loves God. — Edition 1 [reads] *ex hac* in place of *ex hoc*. — More on this matter see above q. 2, and in B. Albert, here a. 3. — St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the *expositio litterae*.

la: Vers. 16, ubi Vulg. *inhabitat* loco *habitat*.

en: [1 Tim. 6,] verse 16, where the Vulgate [reads] *inhabitat* in place of *habitat*.

la: Nonnulli codd. ut AIVX cum ed. 1 omittunt minus bene *autem*; cod. Y addit *Magister*.

en: Some codices such as AIVX with edition 1 omit, less well, *autem*; codex Y adds *Magister*.

la: Vat. et cod. cc in hac propositione contra multos mss. et ed. 1 *praesens* loco *praesentius*, ac mox contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1, omisso primo *aut*, ponunt *cognoscendi* loco *cognoscibilis*, quod transferunt post *substantiam*. Pro *rationem cognoscibilis* magis placeret *rationem cognoscendi*, si faverent codd.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc, in this proposition against many manuscripts and edition 1, [read] *praesens* in place of *praesentius*; and soon, against most codices and edition 1, with the first *aut* omitted, they put *cognoscendi* in place of *cognoscibilis*, which they transfer after *substantiam*. In place of *rationem cognoscibilis*, *rationem cognoscendi* would please more, if the codices favored [it].

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *carnis* pro *carneis*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *carnis* for *carneis*.

la: De duplici modo, quo Deus intellectui nostro praesens est, vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — In solutione huius dubii conveniunt B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.

en: On the twofold mode in which God is present to our intellect, see above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — In the solution of this doubt B. Albert, here a. 4, agrees. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3.

la: I. Ioan. 2, 27, ubi Vulgata: *Unctio eius docet vos de omnibus.* — Vat. contra mss. post *unde* addit *per Ioannem*.

en: I John 2, 27, where the Vulgate [reads]: *His unction teaches you concerning all things*. — The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts, after *unde* adds *per Ioannem*.

la: Vers. 16.

en: Verse 16.

la: Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic in expos. textus.

en: Cf. B. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the *expositio textus*.

la: Ed. 1 *enim* loco *ergo*, quae et mox post *aut* repetit *de caritate*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *enim* in place of *ergo*, which also soon after *aut* repeats *de caritate*.

la: Ed. 1 *donorum*, cod. dd autem addit *aliud*. Mox pauci codd. ut VZ omittunt *quae sunt*.

en: Edition 1 [reads] *donorum*; codex dd, however, adds *aliud*. Soon a few codices such as VZ omit *quae sunt*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *velut*. Ed. 1 post *sicut* adiungit *est*.

en: The Vatican [edition], beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *velut*. Edition 1 after *sicut* adds *est*.

la: Exhibemus lectionem fere omnium mss. ponendo *habilitatem* pro *virtutem quae habilitat*; ed. 1 *habititationem*. Paulo infra ex multis codd. ut AGHIK TW etc. et ed. 1 pro *minus bona* substituimus *minus bonum*, quod et in se distinctius et cum subnexis magis correspondens.

en: We give the reading of nearly all the manuscripts in placing *habilitatem* for *virtutem quae habilitat*; edition 1 [reads] *habititationem*. A little below, from many codices such as AGHIK, TW etc., and edition 1, in place of *minus bona* we substitute *minus bonum*, which is both more distinct in itself and more corresponding to what follows.

la: Vat. *sic* loco *si*, et mox post *huiusmodi* addit *ergo*, bene, quia agitur tantum de consequentia ostendenda. Obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1 et quidem.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *sic* in place of *si*, and soon after *huiusmodi* adds *ergo*, rightly, because the consequence alone is being shown. Yet the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 stands against [it], and indeed.

la: Aristot., V. Top. c. 3. (c. 5.).

en: Aristotle, *Topics* V, c. 3 (c. 5).

la: Aliqui codd. ut IT addunt *donum*.

en: Some codices such as IT add *donum*.

la: Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., Richard., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. B. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, Richard, here *circa litteram*.

la: Cod. J *destruat*.

en: Codex J [reads] *destruat*.

la: Mendum Vat. *inveniens* loco *innuens* correximus ope mss. — Textus S. Scripturae de isto diverso modo vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: The error of the Vatican [edition], *inveniens* in place of *innuens*, we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts. — For the texts of Holy Scripture concerning this diverse mode, see here in the Master's text, c. 3.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quia*, loco *quod*, et paulo infra *qui* pro *quae*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we substitute *quia* for *quod*, and a little below *qui* for *quae*.

la: In cod. I additur *habitus*.

en: In codex I is added *habitus*.

la: In Vat. haec propositio: *Nec ita est patientia nostra exemplariter* perperam deest, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur.

en: In the Vatican [edition] this proposition: *Nor is our patience [so] exemplarily*, is wrongly absent, which yet is found in the manuscripts and edition 1.

la: Cod. V *per* loco *et*.

en: Codex V [reads] *per* in place of *et*.

la: Quas videsis in lit. Magistri, hic c. 14.

en: Which you may see in the Master's text, here c. 14.

la: Duplex siquidem tunc distinguebatur causa formalis, scil. intrinseca seu informans (perficiens), et extrinseca seu exemplaris. — De hoc dubio vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 8 et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

en: A twofold formal cause was then distinguished, namely the intrinsic or informing (perfecting), and the extrinsic or exemplary. — On this doubt see also B. Albert, here a. 8, and Peter of Tarentaise, here *circa litteram*.

la: Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus male omissum *Deum*. Mox relativum *qui* referas ad *actum*. — Plura de eo, quod caritas non possit esse informis, vide III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.

en: On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have added *Deum*, which had been wrongly omitted. Soon refer the relative *qui* to *actum*. — More on this, that charity cannot be unformed, see III *Sent.* d. 27, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 18. n. 32, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est.

en: Book XV *On the Trinity*, c. 18, n. 32, from which the text of this doubt is taken.

la: In ed. 1 additur *huius*. Idem dubium solutum invenies apud B. Albert., hic a. 9.

en: In edition 1 is added *huius*. The same doubt resolved you will find in B. Albert, here a. 9.

la: Vers. 13.

en: Verse 13.

la: Vat. perperam, et antiquioribus mss. cum edd. 1, 6 refragantibus, *ad hoc*. Dein edd. 2, 3 *habens* pro *hanc*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] wrongly, with the older manuscripts and editions 1 and 6 contradicting, *ad hoc*. Then editions 2 and 3 [read] *habens* for *hanc*.

la: Ex pluribus codd. ut TX et ed. 1 adiecimus *aliqui*. Cod. Z *aliquis*, et paulo post *posset* loco *possent*; cod. V absque *aliqui* habet *posset*.

en: From many codices such as TX and edition 1 we have added *aliqui*. Codex Z [reads] *aliquis*, and a little after *posset* in place of *possent*; codex V, without *aliqui*, has *posset*.

la: Cod. bb addit particulam *et*. Mox cod. M pro *errore*, et cod. ee cum ed. 1 *propter errorem* loco *per errorem*.

en: Codex bb adds the particle *et*. Soon codex M [reads, in place of] *errore*, and codex ee with edition 1 [reads] *propter errorem* in place of *per errorem*.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus mss. hic repetit *quod*, in maiore parte codd. et ed. 1 tamen deest.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts here repeats *quod*; in the greater part of the codices and edition 1, however, it is absent.


title: Dist. 17, Part 2, Dubia

source_text:
<!-- page 318 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod *Christo non ad mensuram datus est Spiritus.* Videtur enim falsum, quia omne finitum habet mensuram: ergo si Christo datus est Spiritus non ad mensuram, Christo datus est Spiritus infinitus. Sed contra hoc est, quod omnia creata sunt finitae capacitatis.

**Respondeo:** Hoc infra melius patebit[^1]; nunc tantummodo sufficiat, quod hoc vel est dictum propter gratiam unionis, quae fecit, quod omnia quae Dei sunt, sint illius hominis; vel propter gratiam capitis, quia in Christo est gratia ad omnes actus non arctata, sicut in capite vigent omnes sensus. Unde illa determinatio non privat finitatem, sed privat determinationem ad aliquem actum sive speciale donum[^2].

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod *caritas est animi nostri rectissima affectio.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia nullus habitus est affectio; caritas est virtus et ita habitus: ergo non est affectio.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod affectio dicitur quadrupliciter: uno modo ipsa vis affectiva; alio modo dicitur affectio passio vis affectivae, ut gaudium et dolor et huiusmodi; tertio modo dicitur actus potentiae affectivae[^3]; quarto modo dicitur habitus affectivus, sicut intellectus uno modo dicitur habitus principiorum, qui[^4] est regula intellectus: et hoc modo accipitur, cum dicitur, quod caritas est affectio; et similiter accipit Bernardus[^5], cum dicit, quod virtus est affectio ordinata.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *caritas intus operatur alios actus atque motus, mediantibus aliis virtutibus.* Videtur enim dicere contra illud quod dicitur ad Galatas quinto[^6]: *Fides per dilectionem operatur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis illud possit sustineri, quod caritas operatur mediantibus aliis virtutibus tanquam ministris, et aliae nihilominus per caritatem adiuvantem et dirigentem; tamen solutio Magistri, quam hic facit, non valet, quia Magister petit principium in solvendo. Supponit enim in solutione oppositum eius quod probatur. Cum enim Spiritus sanctus non efficiat in nobis opera aliarum virtutum sine habitibus mediis, quomodo efficit in nobis opus dilectionis? Si tu dicas, quod ipse dilectio est, similiter possum dicere, quod Filius est Sapientia et Verbum, ergo pari ratione sine habitu medio debet illuminare intellectum. Et propter hoc Magistri opinio non est ita[^7] probabilis nec quantum ad rationes nec quantum ad auctoritates. Quod patet, si attendantur praedictae solutiones. In omnibus enim solutionibus Magister petit quod est in principio[^8].

<!-- page 319 -->

### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Spiritus sanctus non dividitur.* Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia Numerorum undecimo[^9] dicitur, quod Dominus dixit Moysi: *Auferam de spiritu tuo* etc. Item, primae Ioannis quarto[^10]: *De Spiritu suo dedit nobis;* si dedit de Spiritu, videtur, quod vel totum dedit, vel divisit in partes.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus est in semetipso simplex et ideo in se indivisus; sed in effectibus est multiplex, et ideo quantum ad effectum dividitur, quia non datur singulis ad omnia. Et hinc est — quia plenius datus est Moysi quam aliis — quod ideo dicit: *Auferam de spiritu tuo;* et quia non ad omnia datur nobis, ideo dicit beatus Ioannes: *De Spiritu suo dedit nobis.*

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there fall doubts concerning the *littera*, and first about what he says, that *to Christ the Spirit was given not by measure.* For it appears false, because every finite [thing] has a measure: therefore, if to Christ the Spirit was given not by measure, to Christ an infinite Spirit was given. But against this is, that all created things are of finite capacity.

**I respond:** This will appear better below[^1]; for now let it suffice that this is said either on account of the grace of union, which made it that all things which are God's are that man's; or on account of the grace of [Christ as] head, because in Christ there is grace for all acts unconfined, just as in the head all the senses flourish. Whence that determination [i.e., the qualification "not by measure"] does not take away finitude, but takes away the determination to some [single] act or special gift[^2].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that *charity is the most upright affection of our soul.* For it appears to speak ill, because no habit is an affection; charity is a virtue and thus a habit: therefore it is not an affection.

**I respond:** It must be said that *affection* is said in four ways: in one way, the affective power itself; in another way, an *affection* is called the passion of the affective power, as joy and grief and the like; in a third way, it is called the act of the affective potency[^3]; in a fourth way, it is called an affective habit, just as *intellect* in one way is called the habit of principles, which[^4] is the rule of intellect: and in this way it is taken when it is said that charity is an affection; and similarly Bernard[^5] takes it when he says that *virtue is an ordered affection.*

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what the Master says, that *charity inwardly works the other acts and motions, by the mediation of the other virtues.* For it appears to say [something] contrary to that which is said in Galatians five[^6]: *Faith works through love.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, although it can be maintained that charity works by the mediation of the other virtues as by ministers, and the others, no less, [work] through charity helping and directing; nevertheless the solution of the Master, which he makes here, does not hold, because the Master begs the question in solving. For he supposes in the solution the opposite of what is being proved. For since the Holy Spirit does not effect in us the works of the other virtues without intermediate habits, how does he effect in us the work of love? If you say that he himself is love, similarly I can say that the Son is Wisdom and the Word, therefore by parity of reasoning he ought, without an intermediate habit, to illuminate the intellect. And on account of this the Master's opinion is not as[^7] probable, neither as to reasons nor as to authorities. Which is plain, if the aforesaid solutions are attended to. For in all the solutions the Master begs that which is at the beginning [i.e., the question itself][^8].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Holy Spirit is not divided.* For it appears to say [something] false, because in Numbers eleven[^9] it is said that the Lord said to Moses: *I will take from your spirit* etc. Likewise, in First John, four[^10]: *Of his Spirit he has given to us;* if he gave of [his] Spirit, it appears that either he gave the whole, or divided [it] into parts.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Holy Spirit is in himself simple and therefore in himself undivided; but in his effects he is manifold, and therefore with respect to effect he is divided, because he is not given to single [persons] for all things. And hence it is — because he was more fully given to Moses than to others — that he therefore says: *I will take from your spirit;* and because he is not given to us for all things, therefore the blessed John says: *Of his Spirit he has given to us.*

---

la: Libr. III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. — Mox ex mss. adiecimus *nunc*, cui cod. Y addit *hoc*.

en: Book III *Sentences*, d. 13, a. 1. — Soon, from the manuscripts, we have added *nunc*, to which codex Y adds *hoc*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *bonum*, sed contra alios codd. et edd. 1, 3.

en: The Vatican [edition], with codex cc, [reads] *bonum*, but against the other codices and editions 1 and 3.

la: Cod. M *ante affectivus*.

en: Codex M [reads] *ante affectivus*.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. ponunt *et* loco *qui*, alii omittunt *qui*; alii ut HTVY cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam.

en: Many codices, with the Vatican [edition], place *et* in place of *qui*; others omit *qui*; others, such as HTVY with edition 1, exhibit the reading received into the text.

la: *De Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 6. n. 17: *Ut nihil aliud sint virtutes nisi ordinatae affectiones.*

en: *On Grace and Free Choice*, c. 6, n. 17: *That the virtues are nothing other than ordered affections.*

la: Vers. 6, ubi Vulgata: *Fides, quae per caritatem operatur.* — Paulo ante in textu Magistri plures codd. ut AGIKT etc. omittunt *mediantibus*.

en: Verse 6, where the Vulgate [reads]: *Faith, which works through charity.* — A little before, in the Master's text, many codices such as AGIKT etc. omit *mediantibus*.

la: Cod. X omittit *ita*, qui et paulo ante cum uno alterove cod. ut V habet *ideo* loco *propter hoc*. Mox aliqui codd. ut ST post *secundum nec* omittunt minus bene *quantum ad*.

en: Codex X omits *ita*, which [codex] also a little before, with one or another codex such as V, has *ideo* in place of *propter hoc*. Soon some codices such as ST, after *secundum nec*, omit, less well, *quantum ad*.

la: Ultimam propositionem *In omnibus* etc. supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. — Solutiones Magistri vide hic in lit. c. 6, et hic p. I. q. 1.

en: The last proposition *In omnibus* etc. we have supplied from the older manuscripts and edition 1. — For the Master's solutions see here in the text [of Lombard] c. 6, and here p. I, q. 1.

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.