title: Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II.
### *De morbo concupiscentiae.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo principali, scilicet de morbo concupiscentiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, in quo sit concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto.

Secundo quaeritur, a quo sit tanquam a principio effectivo.

### Quaestio I.
### *Utrum concupiscentia sit in anima, vel in carne ut in subiecto.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, in quo sit concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto, videlicet, utrum sit in anima, vel in carne. Et quod in carne, videtur:

**Ad oppositum.**

1. Ad Romanos septimo[^1] dicit Apostolus: *Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae;* Glossa: *Video aliam legem*, id est « fomitem peccati, qui regnat » in membris meis, « ut in oculo ad concupiscendum, in manu ad operandum »: ergo concupiscentia est in oculo.

2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore[^2]: « Vitium originis humanae duplici corruptione inficit naturam: ignorantia mentem, et concupiscentia carnem ». Si igitur ignorantia est in mente tanquam in subiecto, videtur, quod et concupiscentia sit in carne tanquam in subiecto.

3. Item, sicut se habet lex mentis ad mentem, ita se habet lex carnis ad carnem; sed lex mentis est in mente tanquam in subiecto: ergo pari ratione et lex carnis est in carne tanquam in subiecto. Sed lex carnis est concupiscentia, sicut saepe dicitur ad Romanos septimo[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, concupiscentia carnis non est in anima, nisi quamdiu anima est unita carni: si ergo proprietas salvari habet in proprio subiecto, videtur, quod concupiscentia ipsa non sit in anima, quae separabilis est a carne, immo in carne ipsa.

5. Item, cuius est actus, eius est et habitus; sed carnis est concupiscere, sicut dicitur ad Galatas quinto[^4]: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum:* ergo concupiscentia est a carne.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus *de Verbis Apostoli*[^5]: « Vitium concupiscentiae est, quod anima pertrahit ex carne »; sed illud quod anima pertrahit, proprie est in anima: ergo concupiscentiae vitium est in ipsa sicut in subiecto.

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2. Item, Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6]: « Concupiscentia est turpis affectio, qua anima inferiora sectatur, quae magis proprie cupiditas dicitur »; sed affectio habet esse in anima tanquam in subiecto: ergo etc.

3. Item, illius solius est concupiscere, cuius est cognoscere: ergo in illo solo est concupiscentia, in quo est cognitio; sed cognitio est in anima tanquam in subiecto: ergo et concupiscentia.

4. Item, in illo solo est concupiscentia tanquam in subiecto, in quo potest esse culpa: sed tale non est caro, sed anima: ergo etc.

5. Item, anima recedente a carne, non plus concupiscit caro quam lapis; anima vero praeter carnem concupiscere potest et desiderare, sicut et dolere: ergo videtur proprie, quod concupiscentia esse habeat in anima ut in subiecto proprio.

### Conclusio.

> Concupiscentia est in carne causaliter, in ratione formaliter, in sensualitate utroque modo et proprie in coniuncto.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod concupiscentia dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo dicitur concupiscentia omne desiderium nimis intensum et immoderatum, sive sit respectu boni interioris, sive exterioris sive inferioris. Et hoc modo accipitur ad Romanos septimo[^7] ubi dicitur in Glossa: « Bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omnia mala prohibet ». Et sic concupiscentia habet esse in vi animae appetitiva, sive dicatur vis appetitiva brutalis, sive dicatur vis appetitiva rationalis. — Alio modo sumitur concupiscentia pro appetitu delectabilis secundum tactum; et sic accipitur Ecclesiastici nono[^8]: *Propter speciem mulieris multi perierunt, et ex hoc concupiscentia quasi ignis exardescit.* Haec autem concupiscentia dicitur esse in carne et in sensualitate et in rationali parte. Sed in carne est causaliter, in rationali vero parte est formaliter, in sensualitate vero utroque modo, videlicet causaliter et formaliter. — Ideo dico, quod in rationali parte et in sensualitate est formaliter, quoniam actus, qui est concupiscere, sicut vult Augustinus[^9] est proprie ipsius animae. Ideo vero causaliter dicitur esse in carne, quia caro infecta, iuncta animae, ex sua infectione reddit eam concupiscentem. Unde si quis vellet proprie subiectum concupiscentiae carnalis assignare, nec tantum diceret carnem, nec tantum diceret animam, sed ipsum coniunctum, ut, sicut sentire est actus coniuncti, sic etiam actus coniuncti est delectari carnaliter et concupiscere.

Propter quod nota, quod caro dupliciter sumitur in Scriptura. Aliquando dicitur caro homo exterior, carnalis et sensualis; et sic comprehendit carnem cum potentia animae sensitiva[^10]; et hoc modo proprie est subiectum carnalis concupiscentiae. Alio modo dicitur caro pars hominis constitutiva; et hoc modo non est concedendum, quod concupiscentia sit in carne, nisi dicatur in ea esse sicut in causa. — Rationes igitur ostendentes, quod concupiscentia magis proprie est in anima quam in carne, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de verbo Apostoli: *Video aliam legem in membris meis* etc.; dicendum, quod membrum non tantum vocatur ibi caro exterior, sed etiam accipitur ibi pro carne et virtute appetitiva.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hugone, responderi potest similiter, quod carnem accipit pro homine carnali; aut[^11] si caro dicatur ipsum corpus, tunc intelligit de praedicatione causali, ut concupiscentia dicatur carnem inficere, id est carnis foeditas vel corruptio, ex qua concupiscentia ipsa oritur.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de lege carnis, dicendum, quod caro accipitur ibi pro homine carnali et exteriori; et similiter in ultima auctoritate, qua dicitur: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum.*

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod in anima separata non est concupiscentia carnalis; dicendum, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod caro sit proprium subiectum concupiscentiae, sed ex hoc bene sequitur, quod concupiscentia non inest animae, nisi ut carni unitae.

5. Ad ultimum iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Cum enim dicitur: *Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum*, caro ibi, secundum quod Glossa[^12] exponit, dicitur homo carnalis sive sensualitas carnis.

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english:
### Article II.
### *On the disease of concupiscence.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the second principal [point], namely concerning the disease of concupiscence. And about this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, in what concupiscence is as in a subject.

Secondly it is asked, from what it is as from an effective principle.

### Question I.
### *Whether concupiscence is in the soul, or in the flesh as in a subject.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, in what concupiscence is as in a subject, namely, whether it is in the soul, or in the flesh. And that it is in the flesh, it seems:

**To the opposite.**

1. To the Romans, seventh [chapter][^1], the Apostle says: *I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind;* the Gloss: *I see another law*, that is, « the tinder of sin, which reigns » in my members, « as in the eye for concupiscing, in the hand for operating »: therefore concupiscence is in the eye.

2. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor[^2]: « The vice of human origin infects nature by a twofold corruption: ignorance [infects] the mind, and concupiscence the flesh ». If therefore ignorance is in the mind as in a subject, it seems that concupiscence too is in the flesh as in a subject.

3. Likewise, as the law of the mind is related to the mind, so the law of the flesh is related to the flesh; but the law of the mind is in the mind as in a subject: therefore by parity of reasoning the law of the flesh too is in the flesh as in a subject. But the law of the flesh is concupiscence, as is often said to the Romans, seventh [chapter][^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the concupiscence of the flesh is not in the soul, except as long as the soul is united to the flesh: if therefore a property is to be preserved in its proper subject, it seems that concupiscence itself is not in the soul, which is separable from the flesh, but rather in the flesh itself.

5. Likewise, of whatever the act is, of it is also the habit; but concupiscing belongs to the flesh, as is said to the Galatians, fifth [chapter][^4]: *The flesh concupisces against the spirit:* therefore concupiscence is from the flesh.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Words of the Apostle*[^5]: « The vice of concupiscence is that which the soul draws from the flesh »; but that which the soul draws is properly in the soul: therefore the vice of concupiscence is in it [the soul] as in a subject.

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2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Eighty-Three Questions*[^6]: « Concupiscence is a base affection, by which the soul pursues lower things, which is more properly called cupidity »; but an affection has its being in the soul as in a subject: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to concupisce belongs to that alone to which knowing belongs: therefore concupiscence is in that alone in which knowledge is; but knowledge is in the soul as in a subject: therefore concupiscence too.

4. Likewise, concupiscence is as in a subject in that alone in which there can be guilt: but such is not the flesh, but the soul: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, when the soul withdraws from the flesh, the flesh concupisces no more than a stone; but the soul apart from the flesh can concupisce and desire, just as also grieve: therefore it seems properly that concupiscence has its being in the soul as in its proper subject.

### Conclusion.

> Concupiscence is in the flesh causally, in the reason formally, in the sensuality in both ways, and properly in the conjoined [whole].

**I respond:** It must be said that concupiscence is taken in two ways. In one way concupiscence is called every too-intense and immoderate desire, whether it be with respect to an interior, or exterior, or lower good. And in this way it is taken to the Romans, seventh [chapter][^7], where it is said in the Gloss: « Good is the law, which, while it prohibits concupiscence, prohibits all evils ». And so concupiscence has its being in the appetitive power of the soul, whether it be called the brute appetitive power, or be called the rational appetitive power. — In another way concupiscence is taken for the appetite of the delectable according to touch; and so it is taken in Ecclesiasticus, ninth [chapter][^8]: *On account of the beauty of a woman many have perished, and from this concupiscence is kindled like a fire.* But this concupiscence is said to be in the flesh and in the sensuality and in the rational part. But in the flesh it is causally, in the rational part it is formally, in the sensuality in both ways, namely causally and formally. — Therefore I say that in the rational part and in the sensuality it is formally, since the act, which is to concupisce, as Augustine holds[^9], properly belongs to the soul itself. But it is said to be causally in the flesh, because the infected flesh, joined to the soul, by its own infection renders it concupiscent. Whence if one wished properly to assign the subject of carnal concupiscence, he would say neither only the flesh, nor only the soul, but the conjoined [whole] itself, so that, just as to sense is the act of the conjoined, so also the act of the conjoined is to be delighted carnally and to concupisce.

On account of which note that flesh is taken in two ways in Scripture. Sometimes flesh is called the exterior, carnal, and sensual human; and thus it comprehends the flesh with the sensitive power of the soul[^10]; and in this way it is properly the subject of carnal concupiscence. In another way flesh is called the constitutive part of the human; and in this way it is not to be conceded that concupiscence is in the flesh, unless it be said to be in it as in a cause. — Therefore the reasons showing that concupiscence is more properly in the soul than in the flesh are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is objected concerning the word of the Apostle: *I see another law in my members* etc.; it must be said that a member is there called not only the exterior flesh, but is also taken there for the flesh together with the appetitive power.

2. To that which is objected concerning Hugh, it can be answered similarly, that he takes the flesh for the carnal human; or[^11] if the flesh is called the body itself, then he understands it of causal predication, so that concupiscence is said to infect the flesh, that is, [it is] the foulness or corruption of the flesh, from which concupiscence itself arises.

3. To that which is objected concerning the law of the flesh, it must be said that the flesh is there taken for the carnal and exterior human; and similarly in the last authority, in which it is said: *The flesh concupisces against the spirit.*

4. To that which is objected, that in the separated soul there is no carnal concupiscence; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the flesh is the proper subject of concupiscence, but from this it well follows that concupiscence is not in the soul, except as united to the flesh.

5. To the last [argument] the response is already plain from those things which have been said. For when it is said: *The flesh concupisces against the spirit*, flesh there, according as the Gloss[^12] expounds, is called the carnal human or the sensuality of the flesh.

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la: Vers. 23. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, habetur apud Lyranum. — In fine argumenti pro *in oculo* cod. aa legit *in carne*.

en: Verse 23. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is found in Lyranus. — At the end of the argument, for *in oculo* ("in the eye") codex aa reads *in carne* ("in the flesh").

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 26.

en: Book I. *On the Sacraments* p. VII. c. 26.

la: Vers. 5. seqq.

en: Verse 5 and following.

la: Vers. 17. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., de Somno et vigilia, c. 1, ubi illa sententia: *Cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus.*

en: Verse 17. — On the major [premise] cfr. Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, c. 1, where [is] that statement: *For of whatever the potency is, of it is also the act.*

la: Vide supra d. XXXI. lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: See above d. XXXI. text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Quaest. 33. n. 1: *Est enim et turpis [amor scil., quem paulo ante motum vocat], quo animus se ipso inferiora* etc.

en: Question 33. n. 1: *For there is also a base [love, namely, which a little before he calls a motion], by which the mind [pursues] things lower than itself* etc.

la: Vers. 7. — Textum Glossae integrum videsis supra pag. 721, nota 2.

en: Verse 7. — You may see the full text of the Gloss above p. 721, note 2.

la: Vers. 9, in quo textu pro *speciem mulieris* plurimi codd. *concupiscentiam mulieris*.

en: Verse 9, in which text for *speciem mulieris* ("the beauty of a woman") very many codices [read] *concupiscentiam mulieris* ("the concupiscence of a woman").

la: Libr. X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 20. seq., ubi etiam de relatione inter carnem et spiritum (animam) agitur. Cfr. et XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2.

en: Book X. *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 12. n. 20 seq., where also the relation between the flesh and the spirit (the soul) is treated. Cfr. also XIV. *On the City of God*, c. 15. n. 2.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 14. et 64. (c. 1. et 4.). — De duplici significatione, quam s. Scriptura tribuit termino *carnis*, cfr. August., I. Retract. c. 17. et II. c. 3; Epist. 205. (alias 146.); XI. Contra Faustum, c. 7. et XXIV. c. 2. Vide etiam supra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq. et ibid. in Comment. — Vat. *sensitivae*.

en: Cfr. Aristotle, I. *On the Soul*, text 14 and 64 (c. 1 and 4). — On the twofold signification which Holy Scripture attributes to the term *carnis* ("of flesh"), cfr. Augustine, I. *Retractations* c. 17 and II. c. 3; *Letter* 205 (otherwise 146); XI. *Against Faustus*, c. 7 and XXIV. c. 2. See also above d. XXIV. text of the Master, c. 4 seqq. and in the same place in the Commentary. — The Vatican [edition reads] *sensitivae*.

la: Codd. H K T aa et alii cum edd. 2, 3 perperam *ut*, Vat. cum ed. 1 *vel*.

en: Codd. H K T aa and others, with edd. 2, 3, wrongly [read] *ut*, the Vatican [edition] with ed. 1 [reads] *vel*.

la: Scil. super hunc loc., Gal. 5, 17. Verba Glossae, quae delibata est ex August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 20, haec sunt: *Caro enim nihil nisi per animam concupiscit, sed concupiscere dicitur, cum anima carnali concupiscentia spiritui reluctatur.* Cfr. etiam apud Lyranum Glossam super v. seq. (18.), quae sumta est ex August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. n. 2. et docet, nomine carnis hominem ipsum intelligi iuxta illum dicendi modum, quo totum significetur a parte.

en: Namely on this place, Gal. 5, 17. The words of the Gloss, which is excerpted from Augustine, X. *On Genesis to the Letter* c. 12. n. 20, are these: *For the flesh concupisces nothing except through the soul, but it is said to concupisce, when the soul by carnal concupiscence struggles against the spirit.* Cfr. also in Lyranus the Gloss on the following verse (18.), which is taken from Augustine, XIV. *On the City of God*, c. 2. n. 2, and teaches that by the name of flesh the human himself is understood, according to that manner of speaking by which the whole is signified by a part.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In utraque huius articuli quaestione solvenda Scholastici conveniunt.

De 1. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 30. a. 1. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.

**II.** Quoad 2. quaestionem Petr. a Tar. (loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2.) doctrinam S. Bonaventurae sic concise contrahit: « Concupiscentia dupliciter potest considerari: vel in comparatione ad malum, a quo est, et sic habet rationem poenae; vel in comparatione ad malum, ad quod est. Primo modo dupliciter etiam potest considerari; vel in comparatione ad causam meritoriam, sic est a nobis; vel ad causam ordinantem, sic est ex Deo. Secundo item modo dupliciter potest considerari; vel in quantum nominat appetitum, sic aliquid est, et a Deo; vel in quantum nominat excessum appetitus, sic non est a Deo, quia magis est privatio quam positio [cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1.]... Sciendum vero, quod poena duplex est: quaedam enim consistit in positione, scilicet in actione contrarii affligentis, et haec simpliciter a Deo est efficiente et movente; quaedam in privatione, scilicet in remotione alicuius perfectionis, et haec non est a Deo simpliciter (quia, quantum est in se, paratus est omnem perfectionem influere), sed secundum quid, in quantum propter dispositionem contrariam suscipientis voluntarie cessat influere. Talis autem poena est concupiscentia ». — De distinctione duplicis poenae, hic a Petro et a S. Thoma (loc. cit.) adhibita, quam S. Bonav. in hac quaestione tantum insinuat, cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2, ubi etiam tertia species poenae distinguitur.

**III.** De 2. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. loc. cit. a. 4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit. — B. Albert., loc. cit. m. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In solving both questions of this article the Scholastics agree.

On the 1st question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 3. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I. II. q. 30. a. 1. — B. Albert, *Summa* p. II. tr. 17. q. 108. m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1. a. 4. little-question 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 2.

**II.** As to the 2nd question Petrus a Tarantasia (in the cited place, little-question 2.) concisely contracts the doctrine of S. Bonaventure thus: « Concupiscence can be considered in two ways: either in comparison to the evil from which it is, and thus it has the character of punishment; or in comparison to the evil to which it [tends]. In the first way it can also be considered in two ways: either in comparison to the meritorious cause, thus it is from us; or to the ordaining cause, thus it is from God. In the second way likewise it can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it names appetite, thus it is something, and from God; or insofar as it names the excess of appetite, thus it is not from God, because it is more a privation than a position [cfr. St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1.]... But it is to be known that punishment is twofold: for one [kind] consists in position, namely in the action of an afflicting contrary, and this is simply from God as efficient and moving [cause]; another [kind] in privation, namely in the removal of some perfection, and this is not from God simply (because, as far as it is in itself, He is ready to pour in every perfection), but in a certain respect, insofar as on account of the contrary disposition of the recipient He voluntarily ceases to pour [it] in. But such a punishment is concupiscence ». — On the distinction of the twofold punishment, here employed by Petrus and by St. Thomas (in the cited place), which S. Bonav. in this question only insinuates, cfr. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2, where also a third species of punishment is distinguished.

**III.** On the 2nd question: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* in the cited place a. 4. — St. Thomas, here in the cited place. — B. Albert, in the cited place m. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 53313–53452), with the two-column cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Ad-obiecta replies, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 765–767, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 787–789). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

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**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 765–767 (running heads: p.765 top `DIST. XXXII. ART. II. QUAEST. I.`; p.766 verso `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`; p.767 `DIST. XXXII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.` — p.767's running head already names QUAEST. II because q2 opens below the SCHOLION on that page).
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt:
Utrum concupiscentia sit a Deo
Whether concupiscence is from God

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
### *Utrum concupiscentia sit a Deo.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, a quo sit ipsa concupiscentia tanquam a principio. Et est quaestio, utrum sit a Deo. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Ad Romanos sexto[^1]: *Vetus homo noster crucifixus est;* Glossa: « Vetus homo est fomes, qui ex nobis est, non ex Deo ».

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *Quinque Responsionum*[^2]: « Credite, malum ex diabolo, non bonum ex Deo esse libidinem »; sed libido et concupiscentia idem sunt: ergo etc.

3. Item, « Dei Filius assumsit omne quod in nostra natura plantavit »[^3]; sed concupiscentiam non assumsit: ergo concupiscentia non est in nobis a Deo.

4. Item, omne quod est a Deo, est bonum et de se ad bonum ordinatum; sed concupiscentia malum est et ad malum ordinata, cum eius usus, scilicet actus concupiscendi, sit malus: ergo videtur, quod concupiscentia non sit a Deo.

5. Item, fomes[^4], in quantum huiusmodi, est causa originalis in prole, et ita est causa originalis necessaria et determinata, quod non attenditur ibi libertas voluntatis; sed quod est causa alicuius rei, necessario et determinate ordinatae ad malum, est causa mali. Si ergo fomes esset a Deo, tunc sequeretur, quod peccatum originale esset a Deo. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat, quod et primum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Augustinus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^5]: « Omnis poena peccati iusta est et supplicium nominatur »; sed concupiscentia, quae remanet post baptismum, poena est: ergo iusta est. Sed omne quod iustum est, a Deo est: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis poena aut est *acta*, aut *inflicta*, aut *contracta*[^6]; sed fomes non est poena *acta*, quia est in parvulis, qui nihil boni vel mali egerunt. Non est poena *contracta*, quia fuit in Adam, qui non processit ex alio parente. Restat igitur, quod est poena *inflicta*. Sed omnis talis poena est a divina iustitia: ergo etc.

3. Item, concupiscentia dicit amoris intensionem, amoris autem intensio dicit positionem; sed omne quod dicit aliquam positionem, est ab illo, a quo procedit omne ens[^7]: ergo etc.

4. Item, eius est auferre dominium, cuius est et dare: si ergo Deus dedit dominium homini vel spiritui rationali super vires inferiores; videtur, quod illius solius fuit auferre. Sed auferre dominium non est aliud quam infligere deordinationem concupiscentiae in sensualitate, ob quam *caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*[^8].

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Si ergo illud dominium a Deo est ablatum, videtur, quod concupiscentiae vitium ab ipso sit inflictum.

5. Item, quod bestiae homini non obtemperent, hoc est ex divina dispositione, secundum quam sapienter omnia reguntur: ergo pari ratione, quod vires inferiores non obediant superiori, hoc est ex ultione divina. Et quod istud verum sit, multae auctoritates Sanctorum[^9] videntur dicere, quae innuunt, quod ideo rebellio est homini inflicta, quia homo fuit rebellis Deo; haec autem rebellio nihil aliud est quam concupiscentiae vitium.

### Conclusio.

> Concupiscentia, prout dicit poenam ad culpam ordinatam et appetitum substratum, est a Deo, non vero, prout est proprie concupiscentia sive prout dicit appetitus excessum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de ipsa concupiscentia: aut secundum quod est poena, aut secundum id quod est concupiscentia[^10]. Si loquamur de ipsa, secundum quod est poena, sic dicit ordinem ad culpam; et hoc modo habet causam promerentem et causam ordinantem. Meretur enim homo habere talem rebellionem ex sua culpa et inobedientia; Deus vero hoc malum ad aliud praeexistens ordinat ex sua iustitia. — Alio modo est loqui de concupiscentia, secundum id quod est; et sic concupiscentia duo dicit. Dicit enim appetitum, dicit nihilominus in actu appetitus excessum. Appetitus, inquam, ille substratus bonus est et a Deo est. Excessus autem ille in appetendo, etsi videatur esse positio, plus tamen est *privatio*, nec habet causam *efficientem*, sed *deficientem*. Et ideo, quia Deus nullius est causa *deficiens*, hoc modo non ponitur esse a Deo, sed potius a libero arbitrio per culpam deficientem, et a diabolo instigante.

Quod autem concupiscentia ratione excessus *privationem* dicat, quamvis videatur dicere *positionem*, hoc planum est. Hoc enim est concupiscentia respectu virtutis appetitivae, quod est paralysis respectu motivae. Et quemadmodum membrum paralyticum tremulat et movetur velocissime; et hoc non venit ex virtutis augmento, sed potius ex virtutis decremento, nec ex virtutis fortificatione, sed potius ex dissolutione: sic et in concupiscentia intelligendum est, quod appetitus in amore rei temporalis exardescit, nec potest se ipsum continere, immo in continuo motu et concupiscentiae iteratione consistit: hoc, inquam, intelligendum est provenire ex defectu *retinaculi*, sicut moventur ferae, ruptis vinculis, et naves, destructis gubernaculis[^11]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod concupiscentia non sit a Deo, prout concludunt de concupiscentia, secundum id quod est.

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1. Ad illud vero Augustini, qui dicit, quod omnis poena iusta est; dicendum, quod intelligit de poena sub ratione poenae; sic enim iusta est ratione iustae ordinationis ad praecedentem culpam. — Posset tamen dici, quod intelligit de poena, quae *pure* poena est, hoc est, quae ita poena est, quod nec est culpa, nec de se ordinata ad culpam. Concupiscentia vero, aut culpa est, aut ordinata ad culpam; et ideo non habet locum hic auctoritas illa[^12].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis poena aut est acta, aut inflicta, aut contracta; dicendum, quod concupiscentia in Adam fuit *acta*, pro eo quod peccando se ipsum privavit originali iustitia et induxit in se concupiscentiam. In nobis vero est poena *contracta*, pro eo quod a parentibus contrahimus carnem infectam, quae facit, concupiscentiam esse in anima sibi unita.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis positio a Deo est, et concupiscentia dicit positionem etc.; dicendum, quod sicut claudicatio et tremulatio positionem dicit quandam, quia ponit actum et virtutem progressivam; dicit etiam nihilominus defectum et privationem — claudicatio enim defectum in crure ponit[^13], tremulatio vero defectum in virtute movente sive ineptitudinem circa mobile — sic et in proposito intelligendum est esse, ut prius explanatum est. Et ratione eius quod est ibi positionis, absque dubio a Deo est; ratione vero eius quod est ibi defectus et privationis, non est quaerenda causa *efficiens*, sed *deficiens*.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *Dei*[^14] est auferre dominium, cuius est dare; dicendum, quod ipse, cui datum est dominium, ex mala custodia potest amittere. Et sic intelligendum est, hominem perdidisse dominium illud, quod habebat ratio super vires inferiores; et hoc, non quia sit ei ablatum violenter, sed quia, cum esset in sua potestate tale dominium in se conservare, ex propria incuria et negligentia *noluit*[^15] et amisit; sicut homo, dum peccat, a semetipso fugat gratiam divinam, et Deus dicitur auferre, quia iusto suo iudicio ultra non apponit, dum homo reddit se ipsum indignum ad donum Dei percipiendum.

5. Et per hoc etiam posset responderi ad sequens obiectum de amissione dominii bestiarum. — Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod non est simile, quia quod bestia non obtemperat homini, hoc non ponit culpam, nec in bestia, quae non subiacet, nec in homine, qui non praesidet; secus tamen est in sensualitate et ratione. Cum enim sensualitas rationi repugnet movendo et inclinando ad illicitum, ipsa talis repugnantia est ei culpa; et ideo proprie non debet dici talis rebellio esse a Deo, nec Deum inflixisse concupiscentiam. Et si aliquae tales auctoritates inveniantur, intelligendae sunt et exponendae, ut loquantur de concupiscentia, secundum quod est *poena*. Et sic patent obiecta[^16].

---

english:
### Question II.
### *Whether concupiscence is from God.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, from what concupiscence itself is as from a principle. And the question is, whether it is from God. And that it is not, it seems:

1. To the Romans, sixth [chapter][^1]: *Our old man is crucified;* the Gloss: « The old man is the tinder, which is from us, not from God ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *Of Five Responses*[^2]: « Believe that lust is an evil from the devil, not a good from God »; but lust and concupiscence are the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « The Son of God assumed everything that He planted in our nature »[^3]; but He did not assume concupiscence: therefore concupiscence is not in us from God.

4. Likewise, everything that is from God is good and of itself ordained to the good; but concupiscence is an evil and ordained to evil, since its use, namely the act of concupiscing, is evil: therefore it seems that concupiscence is not from God.

5. Likewise, the tinder[^4], insofar as [it is] of this kind, is an original cause in the offspring, and so it is an original cause [so] necessary and determinate that there is no consideration there of freedom of the will; but that which is the cause of some thing necessarily and determinately ordained to evil, is the cause of evil. If therefore the tinder were from God, then it would follow that original sin were from God. But if this is false, it remains that the first [is false] also.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On Free Choice*[^5]: « Every punishment of sin is just and is named a chastisement »; but concupiscence, which remains after baptism, is a punishment: therefore it is just. But everything that is just is from God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every punishment is either *acted*, or *inflicted*, or *contracted*[^6]; but the tinder is not an *acted* punishment, because it is in little children, who have done nothing of good or evil. It is not a *contracted* punishment, because it was in Adam, who did not proceed from another parent. It remains therefore that it is an *inflicted* punishment. But every such punishment is from divine justice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, concupiscence states an intensification of love, but the intensification of love states a position; but everything that states some position is from Him from whom proceeds every being[^7]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to take away dominion belongs to him whose it is also to give: if therefore God gave dominion to the human or to the rational spirit over the lower powers; it seems that it was His alone to take it away. But to take away dominion is nothing other than to inflict the disorder of concupiscence in the sensuality, on account of which *the flesh concupisces against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*[^8].

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If therefore that dominion is taken away by God, it seems that the vice of concupiscence is inflicted by Him.

5. Likewise, that the beasts do not obey the human, this is from the divine disposition, according to which all things are wisely governed: therefore by parity of reasoning, that the lower powers do not obey the higher, this is from divine vengeance. And that this is true, many authorities of the Saints[^9] seem to say, who intimate that rebellion is therefore inflicted on the human, because the human was rebellious to God; but this rebellion is nothing other than the vice of concupiscence.

### Conclusion.

> Concupiscence, insofar as it states a punishment ordained to guilt and an underlying appetite, is from God; but not insofar as it is properly concupiscence, or insofar as it states the excess of appetite.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of concupiscence itself: either according as it is a punishment, or according to that which concupiscence is[^10]. If we speak of it according as it is a punishment, thus it states an order to guilt; and in this way it has a meriting cause and an ordaining cause. For the human merits to have such a rebellion from his own guilt and disobedience; but God ordains this evil from His justice to another, pre-existing [end]. — In another way one speaks of concupiscence according to that which it is; and thus concupiscence states two things. For it states an appetite, it states nonetheless an excess in the act of appetite. The appetite, I say, that underlying one, is good and is from God. But that excess in appetition, even though it may seem to be a position, is nevertheless more a *privation*, and has no *efficient* cause, but a *deficient* one. And therefore, because God is the *deficient* cause of nothing, in this way it is not held to be from God, but rather from free choice deficient through guilt, and from the instigating devil.

But that concupiscence by reason of excess states a *privation*, although it may seem to state a *position*, this is plain. For concupiscence is, with respect to the appetitive power, what paralysis is with respect to the motive [power]. And just as a paralyzed member trembles and moves very swiftly; and this comes not from an increase of strength, but rather from a decrease of strength, nor from a strengthening of strength, but rather from its dissolution: so also in concupiscence it must be understood that the appetite blazes up in the love of a temporal thing, nor can it contain itself, but rather consists in continual motion and in the repetition of concupiscence: this, I say, must be understood to come about from a defect of the *restraint*, just as wild beasts are moved when their chains are broken, and ships when their rudders are destroyed[^11]. — Therefore the reasons showing that concupiscence is not from God are to be granted, insofar as they conclude concerning concupiscence according to that which it is.

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1. But to that [argument] of Augustine, who says that every punishment is just; it must be said that he understands it of punishment under the character of punishment; for thus it is just by reason of the just ordination to the preceding guilt. — It could nevertheless be said that he understands it of a punishment which is *purely* a punishment, that is, which is so a punishment that it is neither guilt, nor of itself ordained to guilt. But concupiscence is either guilt, or ordained to guilt; and therefore that authority has no place here[^12].

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is either acted, or inflicted, or contracted; it must be said that concupiscence in Adam was *acted*, for the reason that by sinning he deprived himself of original justice and induced concupiscence into himself. But in us it is a *contracted* punishment, for the reason that from our parents we contract infected flesh, which makes concupiscence to be in the soul united to it.

3. To that which is objected, that every position is from God, and concupiscence states a position etc.; it must be said that just as limping and trembling state a certain position, because they posit an act and a progressive power; they also state nonetheless a defect and a privation — for limping posits a defect in the leg[^13], but trembling a defect in the moving power or an ineptitude regarding the movable — so also in the case at hand it must be understood to be, as was explained before. And by reason of that which is there of position, without doubt it is from God; but by reason of that which is there of defect and privation, no *efficient* cause is to be sought, but a *deficient* one.

4. To that which is objected, that to take away dominion belongs to *God*[^14], whose it is to give; it must be said that he to whom dominion is given can lose it through bad custody. And thus it must be understood that the human lost that dominion which his reason had over the lower powers; and this, not because it was taken away from him violently, but because, although it was in his power to conserve such dominion in himself, by his own carelessness and negligence he *was unwilling*[^15] [to do so] and lost it; just as a human, while he sins, drives away the divine grace from himself, and God is said to take it away, because by His just judgment He no longer applies [it], while the human renders himself unworthy to receive the gift of God.

5. And by this also one could respond to the following objection concerning the loss of dominion over the beasts. — It can nevertheless be said also otherwise, that it is not similar, because that a beast does not obey the human, this posits no guilt, neither in the beast, which is not subject, nor in the human, who does not preside; nevertheless it is otherwise in the sensuality and the reason. For since the sensuality fights against the reason by moving and inclining to the illicit, this very fighting is a guilt for it; and therefore such a rebellion ought not properly to be said to be from God, nor [that] God inflicted concupiscence. And if any such authorities are found, they are to be understood and expounded so that they speak of concupiscence according as it is a *punishment*. And thus the objections are clear[^16].

---

la: Vers. 6. — Glossa est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum.

en: Verse 6. — The Gloss is interlinear and is found in Lyranus.

la: Sive Hypogn. IV. c. 4. In textu August. sume *malum* ut praedicatum, scil. libidinem esse aliquod malum. — In eodem post *ex diabolo* codd. Q W aa ee et ed. 3 *bonum ex Deo esse, non libidinem.* Vat. omittit *bonum*; cod. aa post *bonum* subiicit *vero.*

en: Or *Hypognosticon* IV. c. 4. In the text of Augustine take *malum* ("evil") as predicate, namely that lust is some evil. — In the same place, after *ex diabolo* ("from the devil") codd. Q W aa ee and ed. 3 [read] *bonum ex Deo esse, non libidinem* ("that it is a good from God, not lust"). The Vatican [edition] omits *bonum* ("good"); cod. aa after *bonum* adds *vero.*

la: Ut Damascenus ait III. de Fide orthod. c. 6.

en: As Damascene says, III. *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 6.

la: Sive concupiscentia. Cfr. supra d. XXX. lit. Magistri, c. 8. In definiendo *fomite* Scholastici communiter sequebantur Augustinum, secundum quem concupiscentia sive fomes est quidam morbidus affectus, qui commovet ad desiderium illicitum.

en: Or concupiscence. Cfr. above d. XXX. text of the Master, c. 8. In defining the *tinder* the Scholastics commonly followed Augustine, according to whom concupiscence or the tinder is a certain morbid affection, which stirs up to illicit desire.

la: Libr. III. c. 18. n. 51. Verba vide supra pag. 432, nota 4.

en: Book III. c. 18. n. 51. See the words above p. 432, note 4.

la: Praepositivus, S. p. II. in quaest., utrum peccatum iusta poena sit, ait: *Dicimus igitur, quod est poena contracta et poena acta et poena illata. Et poena contracta dupliciter: poena quae dicitur vitium mentis, alia infirmitas corporis vel mentis.* — Vide infra d. 35. a. I. q. 2. ad 4, ubi etiam docetur, quod in poena acta sit et ratio culpae et ratio poenae.

en: Praepositivus, *Summa* p. II. in the question whether sin is a just punishment, says: *We say therefore that there is a contracted punishment and an acted punishment and an inflicted punishment. And a contracted punishment in two ways: a punishment which is called a vice of the mind, another an infirmity of the body or of the mind.* — See below d. 35. a. I. q. 2. ad 4, where it is also taught that in an acted punishment there is both the character of guilt and the character of punishment.

la: Cfr. infra d. 37. a. I. et 2.

en: Cfr. below d. 37. a. I. and 2.

la: Gal. 5, 17. — Paulo superius pro *fuit auferre* codd. F T *sit auferre.*

en: Gal. 5, 17. — A little above, for *fuit auferre* codd. F T [read] *sit auferre.*

la: Augustinus, XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 13; II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 22. n. 36; Gregor., XXVI. Moral. c. 17. n. 28.

en: Augustine, XIII. *On the City of God*, c. 13; II. *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc. c. 22. n. 36; Gregory, XXVI. *Morals* c. 17. n. 28.

la: Augustinus, XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 24. n. 1: *In originali malo duo sunt, peccatum atque supplicium... quorum unum de nostra venit audacia, id est peccatum, alterum de iudicio Dei, id est supplicium.* — De seqq. cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 37. n. 2. q. 1.

en: Augustine, XXII. *On the City of God*, c. 24. n. 1: *In the original evil there are two things, sin and chastisement... of which the one comes from our boldness, that is, sin, the other from the judgment of God, that is, chastisement.* — On what follows cfr. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1 seq. and d. 37. n. 2. q. 1.

la: Alluditur ad verba Anselmi, quae habentur supra pag. 749, nota 1.

en: It alludes to the words of Anselm, which are found above p. 749, note 1.

la: Vide August., I. Retract. c. 13. n. 2, et infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.

en: See Augustine, I. *Retractations* c. 13. n. 2, and below d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. ad 2.

la: Cfr. August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 2. n. 4.

en: Cfr. Augustine, *On the Perfection of Human Justice*, c. 2. n. 4.

la: Edd. cum nonnullis codd. *eius.*

en: The editions, with some codices, [read] *eius.*

la: Plures codd., ut X Y aa bb ee etc., verbo *noluit* praemittunt *custodire.* Mox ante *Deus* primae edd. cum plurimis codd. omittunt *et*, pro quo cod. aa substituit *quia.*

en: Several codices, as X Y aa bb ee etc., prefix *custodire* ("to guard") to the word *noluit* ("he was unwilling"). Then before *Deus* ("God") the first editions, with very many codices, omit *et* ("and"), in place of which cod. aa substitutes *quia* ("because").

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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**Hand-off forwarded to d32-a3-q1.** ARTICULUS III (*De aequitate divini iudicii in infusione et punitione animae*, "Consequenter quaeritur de tertio… Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus illam maculam…", raw ~53577, p.769) begins immediately after this q2's closing "Et sic patent obiecta." The p.769 footers 2+ (Intellige: animae; Cap. 12. n. 17 Peccati reum; Cfr. supra pag. 113 nota 8; "S. Bonav. — Tom. II" signature) belong to a3-q1, not here — only p.769 footer 1 is claimed by q2.

**Scholion disposition / has_scholion = false.** This quaestio has NO scholion section. The ARTICULUS II scholion is **article-level**, covering BOTH q1 and q2, and is already held in full in the committed **a2-q1** chunk (item I "De 1. quaest.", item II "Quoad 2. quaestionem", item III "De 2. quaest."). Per Override §5, a quaestio with no scholion is normal when the sibling's scholion is article-level; q2's closing footnote [^16] ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.") explicitly points the reader back to that scholion. `has_scholion: false`.

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 767–769 read top→bottom; the p.767/768 seam (inside Sed contra 4: "…ob quam *caro concupiscit ad-*" on p.767 R bottom → "*versus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem*" on p.768 L top — clean mid-quotation continuation), the p.768 intra-page L→R reflow inside the Respondeo, and the p.768/769 seam (inside the Respondeo "Concedendae sunt igitur rationes…" → reply 1 "Ad illud vero Augustini") are grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. All footer blocks (p.767: 7; p.768: 8; p.769: footer 1 only) are accounted for.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus III.
### *De aequitate divini iudicii in infusione et punitione animae.*

Consequenter quaeritur de tertio, videlicet de aequitate divinae iustitiae, secundum quam animam tali carni infundit, ex qua contrahit reatum aeternae damnationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus illam maculam, quam anima contrahit, de iustitia debeat sibi imputare.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni sociare.

### Quaestio I.
### *Utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus ipsi imputare.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illam maculam, quam anima contrahit ex carne, debeat Deus sibi[^1] imputare. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro *de Duabus Animabus contra Manichaeos*[^2]: « Reum teneri quemquam, quia non facit quod facere non potest, summae iniquitatis et insaniae est ». Si igitur anima parvuli in suo ortu habere non potest iustitiam, videtur, quod nullo modo sit ei originalis macula imputanda.

2. Item, sicut gloria respicit meritum, sic etiam poena respicit demeritum; sed meritum proprie consistit circa actum, ergo et demeritum: ergo nihil imputandum est alicui pro demerito, quod non sit ex actu proprio.

3. Item, in eo quod inest alicui naturaliter, nec est laudandus quis nec vituperandus[^3]; sed talis culpa inest parvulo ex naturali coniunctione animae et carnis: igitur pro illa nec est parvulus laudandus nec vituperandus: igitur macula illa, quam contrahit, non debet sibi imputari ad poenam.

4. Item, pronior est Deus ad miserendum, quam sit homo; sed homo alium habet excusatum ex impossibilitate, nec punit eum qui non est rationis capax: si ergo talis conditio reperitur in parvulo, videtur, quod nihil quod sit in ipso, debeat ei imputari a Domino.

**Sed contra:**

1. Actuale peccatum reddit hominem indignum, propter hoc quod est ibi privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse; sed originale peccatum in hoc communicat cum actuali, quia in eo est privatio alicuius boni, quod deberet inesse, utpote originalis iustitiae: ergo originale peccatum facit eum in quo est, dignum esse poena. Sed omne tale est a iusto iudice imputandum: ergo etc.

2. Item, originale, sicut prius[^4] probatum est, malum culpae est; sed culpa deordinat universum, nisi subsequatur poena, in qua ordinetur, secundum quod vult Augustinus: ergo si divina iustitia non debet dimittere aliquid inordinatum in universo, debet igitur punire originale peccatum in quocumque reperiatur, sive in parvulo, sive in adulto.

3. Item, iustum est, quod Deus ab omni anima exigat honorem sibi debitum: cum igitur pulcritudo imaginis in creatura rationali spectet ad honorem Dei, Deus a quacumque creatura rationali exigit illam pulcritudinem. Sed qui iuste exigit aliquid ab aliquo, si caret illo, recte imputat ei ad poenam: si ergo quicumque habet originale peccatum, caret illa pulcritudine, quam anima deberet habere; ergo omni tali debet imputari ad poenam a summa iustitia[^5].

4. Item, sicut secundus Adam fuit exemplum obediendi, sic primus Adam fuit exemplum praevaricandi, sicut Apostolus[^6] innuit: ergo sicut habens imaginem secundi Adae est dignus gloria, sic habens imaginem primi est dignus poena. Sed omnis qui regeneratur in baptismo Christi, hoc ipso quod habet imaginem Christi, videlicet gratiam baptismalem, reputatur a Deo dignus gloria aeterna, quamvis nihil

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boni vel mali fecerit: ergo per oppositum, omnis qui generatur ab Adam, cum hoc ipso gerat imaginem eius, debet a divina iustitia reputari indignus gloria et reus poena.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Divinam sapientiam, potentiam et iustitiam decet imputare animae culpam, quam contraxit ex carne.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio Deus imputat originale peccatum ipsis parvulis in demeritum, quia in reatum poenae, saltem poenae damni. Hoc autem exigit divinae *potentiae altitudo* et *sapientiae pulcritudo* et *iustitiae rectitudo*.

*Altitudo divinae potentiae* hoc exigit, ob quam Deus semper debet quaerere gloriam suam et honorem; et ideo, si anima rationalis honorem Deo non reddit, cum in se non habeat decus imaginis divinae, per quod Deus honorari habet; necesse est, quod Deus dedecus culpae recompenset in decorem iustitiae[^7]. — *Pulcritudo* etiam *sapientiae* hoc requirit, quia non patitur aliquid turpe vel inordinatum reperiri intra universum. Et quoniam omne peccatum, sive sit actuale, sive contractum, est « privatio modi, speciei et ordinis[^8] »; necesse est, quod inordinationem naturae recompenset Deus per ordinem poenae, ut sic pulcritudo universi ex nulla parte remaneat deturpata. — *Rectitudo* etiam *divinae iustitiae* hoc requirit, quia Deus id a creatura exigit, quod ei dedit. Quoniam igitur Deus humanam naturam in primo homine instam fecerat, voluntatis iustitiam non solum a primo parente, sed etiam ab omnibus posteris, in quibus natura illa reperitur, debet exigere. In quocumque igitur est illius iustitiae carentia, merito sibi imputatur a divina iustitia. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro *de Conceptu virginali*, capitulo vigesimo octavo[^9]: « Dicendum est, quod aliter Deus erga infantes debeat agere, et aliter homo. Nam homo non debet exigere a natura quod sibi non dedit et quod sibi non debetur; nec iuste redarguit homo hominem cum culpa nasci, sine qua ipse non exstitit, et de qua non nisi per alium sanatur. Deus vero recte exigit a natura quod ipse dedit, et quod sibi iuste debetur ». Sic ergo patet, quod decet Deum culpam imputare animae, quam contraxit ex carne. Hoc enim exigit tam potentia, quam sapientia, quam etiam iustitia. Ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de verbis Augustini in libro *de Duabus Animabus*[^10], dicendum est, quod ratio ista dupliciter deficit. Primo quidem, quia ex malo intellectu auctoritatis procedit. Augustinus enim loquitur de impossibilitate, quae inest simpliciter homini ex natura, non de ea, in quam homo intrusus est per voluntatem et culpam, sicut supra distinctione vigesima octava positum fuit exemplum de servo eunte ad nundinas. Haec autem impossibilitas servandi rectitudinem iustitiae non fuit indita homini ex conditione naturae, sed potius intrusa fuit ex voluntaria transgressione Adae. — Secundo etiam deficit in assumtione[^11], pro eo quod Deus non imputat parvulo peccatum originale ex hoc, quod non *facit* quod facere non potest, sed ex hoc, quod non *habet* quod habere debet. Et hoc bene imputatur homini, secundum illud Lucae[^12]: *Omni habenti dabitur, et abundabit; non habenti vero* etc. Et Apostolus dicit, quod *ignorans ignorabitur*. Et eiectus fuit[^13] homo a nuptiis non solum propter enormitatem actualis praevaricationis, sed etiam propter carentiam vestis nuptialis, qua quia caret homo in originali conceptus, nisi vestiatur in baptismate, non permittitur aulam superni regis intrare, exigente hoc illius supernae aulae dignitate.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod demeritum respicit actum; dicendum, quod sicut parvuli habentes gratiam digni sunt vita aeterna, pro eo quod illam gratiam habent[^14] per Sacramenta Christi, qui eis vitam aeternam sua gratia et passione promeruit, ita quod alia est gratia in parvulis quam in Christo: sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quod maculam peccati contrahit anima ex sua generatione in ipsa propagatione, et hoc ab ipso Adam, qui ex actu suo naturam humanam foedavit. Et ideo *in ipso Adam* dicimur peccasse et demeruisse, et *per eius inobedientiam peccatores constituti esse*[^15]. Alia tamen est in nobis culpa, quam fuerit in ipso: habet tamen haec *rationem demeriti* ab illa, ex qua processit. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus *de Conceptu*

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*virginali*, capitulo vigesimo septimo[^16]: « Originale peccatum aliud intelligere nequeo in parvulis, nisi ipsam factam per inobedientiam Adae *iustitiae debitae nuditatem*, per quam omnes sunt *filii irae*, quoniam et naturam accusat spontanea quam fecit iustitiae desertio; nec personas excusat impotentia recuperandi, quam comitatur beatitudinis nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni iustitiae rectitudine, ita sint absque omni beatitudine ».

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non est aliquis laudandus vel vituperandus pro eo quod ei naturaliter inest; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de *natura instituta*, nec est laudandus nec vituperandus, nec apud Deum nec apud homines, quia ipse Deus naturam instituit nec debet culpare quod fecit. Si vero intelligatur de eo quod naturaliter inest secundum *statum naturae lapsae*; sic dico, quod non est homo apud *homines* vituperandus, sicut dicit Anselmus, et habitum est in responsione, quia homines quantum ad talia pares sunt; nec debet homo quod non dedit ab homine exigere. Apud vero *Deum*, qui aliter naturam instituit, vituperandus est, quia in se non habet quod Deus iuste ab ipso exigit[^17]. Illud igitur verbum Philosophi, quod dicit, quod pro naturalibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur, aut est intelligendum de naturalibus quantum ad naturae institutionem, aut si de aliis intelligatur, hoc intelligitur quantum ad iudicium humanum, non quantum ad iudicium divinum.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod pronior est Deus ad miserendum quam homo; dicendum, quod verum est, pro eo quod plenam misericordiam praestat ei cui sibi placuerit misereri; nihilominus tamen districtissime iudicat, sicut ex illo verbo colligitur in Matthaei duodecimo[^18]: *De omni verbo otioso reddent homines rationem in die iudicii.* Unde multa sunt peccata, quae apud homines tolerantur et non puniuntur, utpote sunt spiritualia et interiora, de quibus oportebit in die iudicii nos reddere rationem. Misericordia enim viam iustitiae non praecludit.

english:
### Article III.
### *On the equity of the divine judgment in the infusion and the punishment of the soul.*

There is asked, consequently, concerning the third [point], namely concerning the equity of divine justice, according to which it infuses the soul into such flesh, from which it contracts the liability of eternal damnation. And concerning this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God ought, out of justice, to impute to it that stain which the soul contracts.

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to associate the soul with such flesh.

### Question I.
### *Whether God ought to impute to the soul that stain which it contracts from the flesh.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether God ought to impute to it[^1] that stain which the soul contracts from the flesh. And that [He ought] not, it seems.

1. Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls against the Manichees*[^2]: « That anyone be held guilty because he does not do what he cannot do, is [a mark] of the highest iniquity and insanity ». If therefore the soul of a little child cannot at its origin have justice, it seems that the original stain ought in no way to be imputed to it.

2. Likewise, just as glory regards merit, so also punishment regards demerit; but merit properly consists in respect of an act, therefore also demerit: therefore nothing is to be imputed to anyone for a demerit which is not from his own act.

3. Likewise, in that which is in someone naturally, one is neither to be praised nor blamed[^3]; but such a guilt is in the little child from the natural conjunction of soul and flesh: therefore for it the little child is neither to be praised nor blamed: therefore that stain which it contracts ought not to be imputed to it unto punishment.

4. Likewise, God is more inclined to mercy than is the human; but a human holds another excused on account of impossibility, nor does he punish him who is not capable of reason: if therefore such a condition is found in a little child, it seems that nothing which is in it ought to be imputed to it by the Lord.

**On the contrary:**

1. Actual sin renders a human unworthy, because there is therein a privation of some good which ought to be present; but original sin shares in this with actual [sin], because in it there is a privation of some good which ought to be present, namely of original justice: therefore original sin makes him in whom it is worthy of punishment. But everything such is to be imputed by a just judge: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the original [sin], as was proven before[^4], is an evil of guilt; but guilt disorders the universe, unless punishment follows, in which it may be ordered, according to what Augustine holds: therefore if divine justice ought not to leave anything disordered in the universe, it ought therefore to punish original sin in whomever it is found, whether in a little child or in an adult.

3. Likewise, it is just that God should exact from every soul the honor owed to Him: since therefore the beauty of the image in a rational creature pertains to the honor of God, God exacts that beauty from every rational creature. But he who justly exacts something from someone, if he lacks it, rightly imputes it to him unto punishment: if therefore whoever has original sin lacks that beauty which the soul ought to have; therefore to everyone such it ought to be imputed unto punishment by the highest justice[^5].

4. Likewise, just as the second Adam was an example of obeying, so the first Adam was an example of transgressing, as the Apostle[^6] intimates: therefore just as one having the image of the second Adam is worthy of glory, so one having the image of the first is worthy of punishment. But everyone who is regenerated in the baptism of Christ, by this very fact that he has the image of Christ, namely baptismal grace, is reputed by God worthy of eternal glory, although he has done nothing

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of good or evil: therefore by the opposite, everyone who is generated from Adam, since by this very fact he bears his image, ought to be reputed by divine justice unworthy of glory and liable to punishment.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** It befits the divine wisdom, power, and justice to impute to the soul the guilt which it has contracted from the flesh.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt God imputes original sin to the little children themselves unto demerit, because unto the liability of punishment, at least the punishment of loss. And this the *loftiness of the divine power* and the *beauty of the wisdom* and the *rectitude of the justice* demand.

The *loftiness of the divine power* demands this, on account of which God ought always to seek His own glory and honor; and therefore, if the rational soul does not render honor to God, since it does not have in itself the comeliness of the divine image, through which God is to be honored; it is necessary that God recompense the disgrace of guilt in the comeliness of justice[^7]. — The *beauty* also *of the wisdom* requires this, because it does not suffer anything base or disordered to be found within the universe. And since every sin, whether it be actual or contracted, is « a privation of mode, species, and order[^8] »; it is necessary that God recompense the disorder of nature through the order of punishment, so that thus the beauty of the universe may remain disfigured in no part. — The *rectitude* also *of the divine justice* requires this, because God exacts from the creature that which He gave it. Since therefore God had made human nature upright in the first human, He ought to exact the justice of the will not only from the first parent, but also from all the posterity in whom that nature is found. In whomever therefore there is a lack of that justice, it is deservedly imputed to him by divine justice. And this is what Anselm says in the book *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter twenty-eight[^9]: « It must be said that God ought to act otherwise toward infants, and the human otherwise. For the human ought not to exact from nature what he did not give it and what is not owed to it; nor does a human justly reproach a human for being born with a guilt, without which he himself did not exist, and from which he is healed only through another. But God rightly exacts from nature what He Himself gave, and what is justly owed to Him ». Thus therefore it is plain that it befits God to impute to the soul the guilt which it contracted from the flesh. For this both power, and wisdom, and also justice demand. Therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary concerning the words of Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls*[^10], it must be said that that reasoning is deficient in two ways. First indeed, because it proceeds from a bad understanding of the authority. For Augustine speaks of an impossibility which is in the human simply from nature, not of that into which the human has been thrust through will and guilt, as above, in the twenty-eighth distinction, the example was set forth of the servant going to the market. But this impossibility of preserving the rectitude of justice was not implanted in the human from the condition of nature, but rather was thrust in from the voluntary transgression of Adam. — Second, it is also deficient in the assumption [of the minor premise][^11], inasmuch as God does not impute to the little child original sin from this, that it does not *do* what it cannot do, but from this, that it does not *have* what it ought to have. And this is well imputed to the human, according to that [text] of Luke[^12]: *To everyone who has it shall be given, and he shall abound; but from him who has not* etc. And the Apostle says that *he who is ignorant shall be ignored*. And the human was cast out[^13] from the wedding not only on account of the enormity of the actual transgression, but also on account of the lack of the wedding garment, which because the human lacks in the original conception, unless he be clothed in baptism, he is not permitted to enter the hall of the heavenly king, the dignity of that heavenly hall demanding this.

2. But to that which is objected, that demerit regards an act; it must be said that, just as little children having grace are worthy of eternal life, because they have that grace[^14] through the Sacraments of Christ, who merited eternal life for them by His grace and passion, so that the grace in the little children is other than [that] in Christ: so also in the [present] matter it must be understood that the soul contracts the stain of sin from its generation in the very propagation, and this from Adam himself, who by his own act befouled human nature. And therefore *in Adam himself* we are said to have sinned and demerited, and *through his disobedience to have been constituted sinners*[^15]. Yet the guilt in us is other than it was in him; nevertheless this has the *character of demerit* from that [guilt] from which it proceeded. And this is what Anselm says *On the Virginal*

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*Conception*, chapter twenty-seven[^16]: « Original sin I can understand to be nothing else in little children except that *nakedness of the owed justice* made through the disobedience of Adam, through which all are *children of wrath*, since the spontaneous desertion of justice which it made accuses also nature; nor does the impotence of recovering excuse persons, which the nakedness of beatitude accompanies, so that, just as they are without all rectitude of justice, so they are without all beatitude ».

3. But to that which is objected, that no one is to be praised or blamed for that which is in him naturally; it must be said that if it be understood of *instituted nature*, one is neither to be praised nor blamed, neither before God nor before humans, because God Himself instituted nature and ought not to blame what He made. But if it be understood of that which is in him naturally according to the *state of fallen nature*; thus I say that the human is not to be blamed before *humans*, as Anselm says, and as was held in the [above] response, because humans as regards such things are equal; nor ought a human to exact from a human what he did not give. But before *God*, who instituted nature otherwise, he is to be blamed, because he does not have in himself what God justly exacts from him[^17]. Therefore that word of the Philosopher, who says that for natural things we are neither praised nor blamed, is either to be understood of natural things as regards the institution of nature, or, if it be understood of other [things], this is understood as regards human judgment, not as regards divine judgment.

4. To that which is objected last, that God is more inclined to mercy than the human; it must be said that it is true, inasmuch as He bestows full mercy on him whom it shall please Him to pity; nevertheless He judges most strictly, as is gathered from that word in the twelfth [chapter] of Matthew[^18]: *Of every idle word humans shall render an account in the day of judgment.* Hence there are many sins which among humans are tolerated and not punished, such as are spiritual and interior, of which it will behoove us to render an account in the day of judgment. For mercy does not preclude the way of justice.

la: Intellige: animae.

en: Understand: to the soul.

la: Cap. 12. n. 17: *Peccati reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est et insaniae.*

en: Chapter 12, n. 17: « That anyone be held guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, is [a mark] of the highest iniquity and insanity ».

la: Cfr. supra pag. 113, nota 8.

en: Cf. above p. 113, note 8.

la: Dist. 30. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Sententia Augustini, quae mox memoratur, habetur III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. et c. 13. n. 41. nec non de Natura boni, c. 7. seqq. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. q. 6. — Circa finem arg. cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *igitur.*

en: Dist. 30, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — The opinion of Augustine, which is recalled shortly after, is found in *On Free Choice* III, c. 9, n. 26, and c. 13, n. 41, and also in *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 7 and following. — Cf. I Sent., d. 46, q. 6. — Toward the end of the argument codex cc and edition 1 omit *igitur* (therefore).

la: Cfr. Anselm., I. *Cur Deus homo*, c. 13. seqq.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Why God [Became] Man*, bk. I, c. 13 and following.

en: Romans 5:14 and 19.

la: Hic S. Doctori illa verba August., III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 15. n. 44. ante oculos versata esse videntur: *Nullo autem temporis intervallo ista* [peccatum et poena peccati] *dividuntur... ne vel puncto temporis universalis pulcritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati dedecus sine decore vindictae.*

en: Here those words of Augustine, *On Free Choice* III, c. 15, n. 44, seem to have been before the eyes of the holy Doctor: « But by no interval of time are these [the sin and the punishment of the sin] divided... lest the universal beauty be marred even for a point of time, so that there be in it the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of vengeance ».

la: Secundum August., *de Natura boni*, c. 4. Cfr. infra d. 33. a. 2.

en: According to Augustine, *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 4. Cf. below, d. 33, a. 2.

la: In testimonio ex Anselmo allato textus originalis pro *debeat agere* exhibet *exigit quid debeant agere*, deinde pro *sibi non dedit* lectionem *ipse non dedit*, tum *nascitur* pro *exstitit* et circa finem post *ipse dedit* adiungit *ei.*

en: In the testimony adduced from Anselm the original text exhibits, for *debeat agere* (ought to act), *exigit quid debeant agere* (exacts what they ought to do), then for *sibi non dedit* (did not give it) the reading *ipse non dedit* (he himself did not give), then *nascitur* (is born) for *exstitit* (existed), and toward the end after *ipse dedit* (He Himself gave) it adds *ei* (to it).

la: Dub. 3. Augustinus obiectionem hic factam ipse solvit I. *Retract.* c. 15. n. 6, ubi ait: *Cur ergo parvuli tenentur rei? Respondetur, quia ex eius origine tenentur, qui non fecit quod facere potuit, divinum scilicet servare mandatum.* Cfr. etiam supra d. XXVIII. lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: Dub. 3. Augustine himself solves the objection here made in *Retractations* I, c. 15, n. 6, where he says: « Why then are little children held guilty? It is answered, because they are held [guilty] from his origin who did not do what he could do, namely to keep the divine command ». Cf. also above, d. 28, the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Sive in minori, quae habetur in I. arg., scilicet: *Si igitur anima parvuli* etc.

en: Or in the minor [premise], which is found in the 1st argument, namely: « If therefore the soul of a little child » etc.

la: Cap. 19, 26, ubi Vulgata pro *non habenti vero* legit *ab eo autem qui non habet.* — Seq. textus est I. Cor. 14, 38: *Si autem ignorat, ignorabitur.*

en: Chapter 19:26, where the Vulgate, for *non habenti vero* (but from him who has not), reads *ab eo autem qui non habet* (but from him who has not). — The following text is 1 Cor. 14:38: « But if he is ignorant, he shall be ignored ».

la: Edd. adiiciunt *Matthaei 7.* (perperam pro 22. 12. seqq.); edd. 3, 4 interserunt *Matthaei 7. Glossa*; Vat. inter verba *Et eiectus* interiicit *Glossa in Matthaeo.*

en: The editions add *Matthew 7* (wrongly, for 22:12 and following); editions 3 and 4 insert *Matthew 7, the Gloss*; the Vatican [edition] interjects between the words *Et eiectus* (And [he] cast out) *the Gloss on Matthew.*

la: Cum codd. F O (T a secunda manu) adiecimus *habent*, quod in Vat. desideratur. In cod. aa secunda, sed antiqua manus textum sic transformavit: *gratiam per sacramenta Christus eis* etc.

en: With codices F O (T by a second hand) we have added *habent* (they have), which is wanting in the Vatican [edition]. In codex aa a second, but ancient hand transformed the text thus: *the grace through the sacraments Christ to them* etc.

la: Textus originalis sic sonat: *Hoc peccatum, quod* originale *dico, aliud intelligere nequeo in* eisdem infantibus, *nisi ipsam, quam supra posui, factam... quam fecit in Adam* iustitiae desertio. *Nec personas excusat, ut dictum est, recuperandi impotentia, quam comitatur beatitudinis* quoque *nuditas, ut, sicut sunt sine omni* iustitia, *ita sint* etc.

en: The original text runs thus: « This sin, which I call original, I can understand to be nothing else in those same infants, except that very [nakedness], which I set down above, made... which the desertion of justice made in Adam. Nor does the impotence of recovering excuse persons, as has been said, which the nakedness also of beatitude accompanies, so that, just as they are without all justice, so they are » etc.

la: Cfr. August., I. *Retract.* c. 15. n. 6. seq. — Dictum Philosophi iam supra notavimus pag. 113, nota 8.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Retractations* I, c. 15, n. 6 and following. — We have already noted the saying of the Philosopher above, p. 113, note 8.

la: Vers. 36: *Dico autem vobis, quoniam omne verbum otiosum, quod locuti fuerint homines, reddent rationem de eo in die iudicii.*

en: Verse 36: « But I say to you, that for every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account for it in the day of judgment. » ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime cohaerent. In 1. quaest. peccatum originale consideratur sub ratione *culpae*, quae a capite seu stipite generis humani per moralem quandam imputationem transit in animas posterorum. In 2. quaest. vero agitur de hoc, quod Deus cum infecta carne uniat animam ab ipso creatam. Exceptis Petro a Tar. et Richardo a Med., alii Commentores una quaestione comprehendunt utrumque problema, tractantes vel primum (ut S. Thom. et Richardus) vel secundum. Plerumque autem iidem tantum unum alterumve argumentum ponunt ex pluribus a nostro Doctore allatis.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 4. in solut. obiector. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1, a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The two questions of this article are intimately connected. In the 1st question original sin is considered under the character of *guilt*, which passes from the head or stock of the human race by a certain moral imputation into the souls of the posterity. But in the 2nd question there is treated this, that God unites with the infected flesh a soul created by Him. With the exception of Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, the other Commentators comprehend both problems in one question, treating either the first (as St. Thomas and Richard) or the second. But for the most part these same [authors] set down only one or the other argument out of the many adduced by our Doctor.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 106, m. 4, in the solution of the objectors. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1, 2, 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1, a. 4, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (pp. 769–771, pdf 791–793) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53577–53746); literal English; full apparatus from the printed-page footers.

**Boundary.** This chunk holds the **ARTICULUS III opener** (*De aequitate divini iudicii in infusione et punitione animae*) folded into q1 per the Vol II chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk). It begins at raw ~53577 (`ARTICULUS in.` opener) and ends immediately before **QUAESTIO II** (*Utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere*, header raw ~53747). The article-level SCHOLION (raw ~53737) is the last thing in this chunk.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 769 (q1 opener + 4 arguments + 4 sed-contra): footers 2–7 → [^1]–[^6]. (p.769 footer 1 *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* was held by a2-q2 as its [^16] *obiecta* reference.)
- p. 770 (end of sed-contra 4, Conclusio, Respondeo, replies 1–2): footers 1–9 → [^7]–[^15].
- p. 771 (replies 2 cont., 3, 4, Scholion): footers 1–3 → [^16]–[^18]. Footer 3 (`Vers. 36`, Matthew 12:36 *De omni verbo otioso*) anchors **q1 reply 4** ("in Matthaei duodecimo") and is held here as [^18] — restored 2026-05-30 after the initial promotion wrongly forwarded it to a3-q2 (a3-q2 correctly declined it; the citation lives in this q1). The remaining p.771 right-column footers (4–5: the *animam infusam* textual variant; Vat. *vexaret*) belong to **QUAESTIO II** and are held in a3-q2.

**Hand-off received** (from a2-q2): the ARTICULUS III opener + p.769 footers 2+ anchored here. a2-q2 retained p.769 footer 1.

**Hand-off forwarded** (to d32-a3-q2): the QUAESTIO II body begins on p.771 right column; the p.771 right-column footers 4–5 (the *animam infusam* / *eam* manuscript variant; Vat./cod. AI/cod. F variant on *vexaret*) belong to q2. (Footer 3, Matthew 12:36, was initially mis-forwarded here but actually anchors q1 reply 4 — held in this chunk as [^18], corrected 2026-05-30.)

**Scholion scope.** The two-paragraph SCHOLION (I–II) is **article-level**, explicitly covering both q1 and q2 ("Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime cohaerent. In 1. quaest.... In 2. quaest. vero..."). It is held here in q1; **a3-q2 has has_scholion: false**.

**[?] flags.** None. One silent OCR correction noted: the running-head digit-mangling on p.771 (`DIST. XXXll. ART. 111. QUAEST. II.`) is a page-top running head over the QUAESTIO II column, not a header in this chunk's body.