title: Dist. 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum Christus habuerit cum aliis hominibus communem speciem.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus habuerit cum aliis communem speciem. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Ad Philippenses secundo[^1]: *In similitudinem hominum factus*: si ergo communitas speciei attenditur secundum assimilationem in forma humanitatis, videtur, quod Christus in forma specifica conveniat cum aliis hominibus.

2. Item, genitus est eiusdem speciei cum generante in generatione univoca[^2]; sed Christus genitus fuit ex beata Virgine: ergo est eiusdem speciei cum ea.

3. Item, anima rationalis, unita carni, constituit hominem eiusdem speciei communis; sed in Christo fuit anima rationalis unita carni[^3]: ergo Christus habuit speciem communem cum aliis.

4. Item, in Christi incarnatione natura humana exaltata est et reparata[^4]; sed hoc non esset, si Christus non haberet cum aliis hominibus speciem communem: ergo etc.

*Ad oppositum.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Ioannes Damascenus, et habetur in littera[^5]: « In Domino Iesu Christo non est communem speciem accipere ».

2. Item, Magister in littera[^6]: « *Natura* non sic accipitur in Christo, sicut cum dicitur: una est natura omnium hominum »; sed cum dicitur: una est natura omnium hominum, dicitur esse una unitate speciei: ergo non videtur, quod in Christo sit accipere unam naturam, cum qua cum aliis communicat tanquam in specie specifica.

3. Item, « species, ut dicit Boethius[^7], dicit totum esse individuorum »; sed humanitas non dicit totum esse Christi: ergo Christus non continetur sub homine tanquam individuum sub propria specie.

4. Item, forma specifica accipitur ab eo quod nobilissimum et perfectissimum est in re[^8]; sed nobilissimum et perfectissimum in Christo non est natura creata, sed increata; sed penes naturam increatam non est accipere speciem communem cum aliis hominibus: ergo nullo modo.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Christus ratione humanae naturae habuit communem speciem cum aliis hominibus, non autem ratione utriusque naturae, scilicet divinae et humanae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *species* dicit formam, et non quamcumque, sed formam totius, hoc est formam complectentem totum esse. *(Quid species.)* Iuxta quod dicit Boethius, quod « species est totum esse individuorum »: et Avicenna[^9] et alii etiam philosophi in hoc concordant. Forma ergo specifica communis dupliciter potest intelligi: aut secundum *praedicationem*, aut secundum *constitutionem*. *(Duplex sensus.)* Secundum praedicationem homo dicit formam communem Petro et Paulo; secundum constitutionem homo dicit formam, quae simul respicit animam et corpus, et quae resultat ex coniunctione animae cum corpore. Anima enim et corpus concurrunt ad unam essentiam constituendam. Et hinc est, quod constitutus ex anima et corpore habet unam[^10] formam specificam, communem sibi et aliis sic constitutis per praedicationem; communem nihilominus partibus constituentibus per quandam *informationem* et completionem.

Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum in Domino Iesu Christo sit communem speciem accipere; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ratione *naturae assumtae*, aut ratione *utriusque*, humanae scilicet et divinae. *(Applicatio et distinctio.)* Si ratione humanae naturae, sic est communem speciem accipere Christi ad alios homines: quia, sicut in aliis hominibus ex coniunctione animae ad carnem per modum perficientis et informantis resultat forma humanitatis, sic et in Christo[^11]. *(Conclusio 1.)* Et ideo isto modo est accipere in eo communem speciem, tam per praedicationem quam etiam per constitutionem. — Si autem loquamur de Christo ratione divinae naturae et humanae, sic in Domino *(Conclusio 2.)*

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Iesu Christo non est accipere communem speciem, quia divina natura non unitur humanae ad unius essentiae constitutionem; ideo ex coniunctione divinitatis ad humanitatem in Christo nulla resultat forma communis vel universalis, in qua possit aliis assimilari. Et ideo Damascenus dicit, subiungens in eadem auctoritate[^12], quod « in Christo non est communem speciem accipere, quia nec factus est nec aliquando fiet alius »; subaudiendum est: qui communicet cum eo in forma una ex hoc, quod dicitur Christus. Aliter enim sua ratio non valeret, quia, esto quod esset unus solus homo, sicut est unus solus sol, adhuc esset in eo communem speciem accipere[^13]. *(Epilogus.)* — Uno igitur modo est in Christo speciem communem accipere, et alio modo non; quia, cum sit in eo triplex substantia, ex coniunctione duarum, videlicet animae et carnis, resultat una forma specifica, in qua cum aliis hominibus communicat. — Et sic procedunt rationes, quae inducuntur ad primam partem.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)*

*Ad 1, 2.* Ex coniunctione vero divinitatis ad naturam creatam nulla omnino forma[^14] resultat; et quantum ad hoc intelligitur verbum Damasceni et Magistri, qui dicunt, quod non est una natura Christi, sicut omnium hominum.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod species dicit totum esse individuorum; dicendum, quod verum est eatenus, qua est individuum contentum sub illa specie. Christus autem est individuum contentum sub specie humana ratione naturae creatae, non ratione naturae increatae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod species specifica accipitur penes illud quod nobilissimum est et perfectissimum in re; dicendum, quod verum est, loquendo de illis, secundum quae res habet esse in genere; Christus autem secundum divinam naturam non ponitur in aliquo genere, sed solum ratione naturae creatae[^15]. Sic igitur concedendum est, quod Christus assumsit veram carnem et veram animam, et haec unita, prout concurrunt in unius speciei specialissimae veritatem.

english:
### Question III. *Whether Christ had a common species with other men.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ had a common species with others. And it seems that he did.

*Foundations.*

1. To the Philippians, chapter two[^1]: *Made in the likeness of men*: if, therefore, the commonness of species is regarded according to a likeness in the form of humanity, it seems that Christ agrees in specific form with other men.

2. Likewise, the one begotten is of the same species as the one begetting in a univocal generation[^2]; but Christ was begotten of the blessed Virgin: therefore he is of the same species as she.

3. Likewise, a rational soul, united to flesh, constitutes a man of the same common species; but in Christ there was a rational soul united to flesh[^3]: therefore Christ had a common species with others.

4. Likewise, in Christ's incarnation human nature was exalted and repaired[^4]; but this would not be so if Christ did not have a common species with other men: therefore, etc.

*To the contrary.*

**On the contrary:** 1. John Damascene, and it is found in the text [of the Master][^5]: « In the Lord Jesus Christ there is no taking of a common species ».

2. Likewise, the Master in the text[^6]: « *Nature* is not taken in Christ as when it is said: there is one nature of all men »; but when it is said: there is one nature of all men, it is said to be one by a unity of species: therefore it does not seem that in Christ one is to take a single nature, with which he has in common with others as in a specific species.

3. Likewise, « species, as Boethius says[^7], states the whole being of individuals »; but humanity does not state the whole being of Christ: therefore Christ is not contained under man as an individual under its proper species.

4. Likewise, specific form is taken from that which is noblest and most perfect in the thing[^8]; but the noblest and most perfect in Christ is not the created nature, but the uncreated; but in respect of the uncreated nature there is no taking of a common species with other men: therefore in no way [does he have it].

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Christ, by reason of his human nature, had a common species with other men, but not by reason of both natures, namely the divine and the human.

**I respond:** It must be said that *species* states a form, and not just any form, but the form of the whole, that is, a form embracing the whole being. *(What species is.)* According to which Boethius says that « species is the whole being of individuals »: and Avicenna[^9] and other philosophers also agree in this. Therefore common specific form can be understood in two ways: either according to *predication*, or according to *constitution*. *(Twofold sense.)* According to predication, "man" states a form common to Peter and Paul; according to constitution, "man" states a form which regards at once soul and body, and which results from the conjunction of soul with body. For soul and body come together to constitute one essence. And hence it is that what is constituted of soul and body has one[^10] specific form, common to itself and to others so constituted by predication; common nonetheless to the constituting parts by a certain *informing* and completion.

When, therefore, it is asked whether in the Lord Jesus Christ there is a taking of a common species; this can be understood in two ways: either by reason of the *assumed nature*, or by reason of *both* [natures], namely the human and the divine. *(Application and distinction.)* If by reason of the human nature, then there is a taking of a common species of Christ with respect to other men: because, just as in other men from the conjunction of soul to flesh by way of perfecting and informing there results the form of humanity, so also in Christ[^11]. *(Conclusion 1.)* And therefore in this way one is to take in him a common species, both by predication and also by constitution. — But if we speak of Christ by reason of the divine nature and the human, then in the Lord *(Conclusion 2.)*

Jesus Christ there is no taking of a common species, because the divine nature is not united to the human for the constitution of one essence; therefore from the conjunction of divinity to humanity in Christ there results no common or universal form, in which he could be likened to others. And therefore Damascene says, adding in the same authority[^12], that « in Christ there is no taking of a common species, because he has neither been made nor will ever be made another »; it must be understood: one that would share with him in one form from the fact that he is called Christ. For otherwise his reasoning would not hold, since, granted that there were but one single man, just as there is one single sun, there would still be in him a taking of a common species[^13]. *(Epilogue.)* — In one way, therefore, there is in Christ a taking of a common species, and in another way not; because, since there is in him a threefold substance, from the conjunction of two, namely soul and flesh, there results one specific form, in which he has [something] in common with other men. — And thus proceed the arguments which are brought to the first part.

*(Solution of the contrary arguments.)*

*To 1 and 2.* From the conjunction of divinity to created nature there results no form whatever[^14]; and as regards this the saying of Damascene and the Master is to be understood, who say that there is not one nature of Christ, as [there is one nature] of all men.

*To 3.* As for that which is objected, that species states the whole being of individuals; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is an individual contained under that species. But Christ is an individual contained under the human species by reason of the created nature, not by reason of the uncreated nature.

*To 4.* As for that which is objected last, that specific form is taken in respect of that which is noblest and most perfect in the thing; it must be said that this is true, speaking of those things according to which a thing has being in a genus; but Christ, according to his divine nature, is not placed in any genus, but only by reason of the created nature[^15]. Thus, therefore, it must be conceded that Christ assumed true flesh and a true soul, and these united, inasmuch as they come together into the truth of one most special species.

la: Vers. 7. Supra edd. *aliis hominibus* contra codd.

en: Verse 7. Above, the editions read *to other men*, against the codices.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 479, nota 1. — Mox post *ex beata Virgine* codd. M O subiiciunt *generatione univoca*.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 479, note 1. — Soon after *of the blessed Virgin* codices M O add *by univocal generation*.

la: Ut ostensum est quaest. praeced.

en: As was shown in the preceding question.

la: Cfr. Eph. 2, 5. seq.; II. Petr. 1, 4.

la: Hic c. I.

en: Here, chapter I.

la: Hic c. I. In auctoritate adducta codd. EG (K a prima manu) pro *una est natura* substituunt *una esse natura,* quae lectio etiam in textu origin. Magistri habetur. Mox in minori codd. A K L T V aa bb eandem lectionem exhibent pro *una est natura*.

en: Here, chapter I. In the authority adduced, codices EG (K by a first hand) substitute *to be one nature* for *there is one nature,* which reading is also found in the original text of the Master. Soon after, in the minor [premise], codices A K L T V aa bb present the same reading in place of *there is one nature*.

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. c. *de Specie* et in libro *de Divisione*. Ipsa Boethii verba vide tom. II. pag. 108, nota 6. et pag. 441, nota 8.

en: Book III of the *Commentary on Porphyry*, chapter *On Species*, and in the book *On Division*. For Boethius's own words see vol. II, p. 108, note 6, and p. 441, note 8.

la: Sub hoc respectu differentia specifica etiam *ultima* vocari potest, quippe cum secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), sumatur a forma et in sua unitate totam substantiam comprehendat et speciem definiti. Cfr. X. Ethic. c. 6. et 7.

en: Under this respect the specific difference can also be called *ultimate*, since according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12), it is taken from the form and in its unity comprehends the whole substance and the species of the defined thing. Cf. *Ethics* X, cc. 6 and 7.

la: Libr. I. Logic. c. *de Specie,* et V. Metaph. c. 3. seqq. Cfr. Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. *de Specie,* ubi Aristotelica de hac re doctrina proponitur exponiturque. — In subnexis respicitur nota divisio universalis in universale *logicum* (in praedicando) et universale *metaphysicum* (in essendo). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 441, nota 3.

en: *Logic* I, chapter *On Species,* and *Metaphysics* V, c. 3 ff. Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* chapter *On Species,* where the Aristotelian doctrine on this matter is set forth and expounded. — In what follows reference is made to the well-known division of the universal into the *logical* universal (in predicating) and the *metaphysical* universal (in being). Cf. vol. II, p. 441, note 3.

la: Pro *unam* edd. *humanam*.

en: For *one* the editions read *human*.

la: Cfr. infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius pro *ex hoc, quod* codd. L aa cc *et hoc est quod*, cod. dd *et ex hoc est quod*, codd. A N T U X *et ex hoc quod*, cod. F *id est in hoc ex hoc quod*.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — A little below, for *from this, that* codices L aa cc read *and this is what*, codex dd *and from this is what*, codices A N T U X *and from this what*, codex F *that is, in this from this what*.

la: Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.): Quaecumque in alio contingunt, velut si alter fiat talis, patet, quod erit sol; communis ergo ratio. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 357, nota 2.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 55 (VI, c. 15): Whatever things occur in another, as if another should become such, it is plain that there will be [but one] sun; therefore the account is common. Cf. vol. II, p. 357, note 2.

la: Cod. K *forma communis*.

en: Codex K reads *common form*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. — Circa initium solut. Vat. pro *species* (i. e. forma) *specifica* substituit *species specialissima*. Secundum Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Specie,* homo respectu generis generalissimi, quod est *substantia,* species vocatur specialissima; membra intermedia, scil. corpus (substantia corporea) et animal (corpus animatum), respectu habito ad superiora, dicuntur species, respectu habito ad inferiora, genera. — In fine solut. pro *veritatem* codd. A K L T U aa bb exhibent *unitatem;* Vat. voci *veritatem* adiicit *et unitatem*.

en: Cf. I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 4. — Near the beginning of the solution, for *specific species* (i.e. form) the Vatican edition substitutes *most special species*. According to Porphyry, *On the Predicables,* chapter *On Species,* man, in respect of the most general genus, which is *substance,* is called the most special species; the intermediate members, namely body (corporeal substance) and animal (animated body), with regard had to the higher [members] are called species, and with regard had to the lower [members], genera. — At the end of the solution, for *truth* codices A K L T U aa bb present *unity;* the Vatican edition adds to the word *truth* the words *and unity*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio militat contra errorem paucorum, qui sustinebant, Verbum assumsisse quidem animam et corpus, sed non ita, quod ex eorum coniunctione aliquod totum sive species communis (humanitas) resultaret, cum animam assumserit per se et carnem per se, non animam coniunctam carni. Hoc errore et veritati humanae naturae in Christo et dignitati corporis ipsius omnino derogatur. Plura vide hic in lit. Magistri c. I (ubi Damasceni verba afferuntur, quae huic quaestioni occasionem dedisse videntur) et infra d. 5. a. 2. q. 5.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. i. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; S. III. q. 5. a. 3. ad 3, q. 6. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. I. quaest. lat. 2. — Alii auctores rem breviter tangunt locis citt. in praecedenti scholio.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question contends against the error of a few who maintained that the Word indeed assumed a soul and a body, but not in such a way that from their conjunction any whole or common species (humanity) resulted, since he assumed the soul by itself and the flesh by itself, not the soul joined to the flesh. By this error both the truth of the human nature in Christ and the dignity of his body are entirely disparaged. See more here in the text of the Master, chapter I (where the words of Damascene are adduced, which seem to have given occasion to this question) and below, d. 5, a. 2, q. 5.

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. III, q. i, m. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 3, little-question 3; *Summa* III, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, q. 6, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Giles of Rome, here q. I, a. I, quaest. lat. 2. — Other authors touch on the matter briefly in the places cited in the preceding scholion.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p048-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`, `vol3-p049-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`) per the Vol II/III PDF-priority override; OCR (raw lines 3928–4025) used as base for clean prose and for footnote-marker spacing. Marginal labels (*Fundamenta, Ad oppositum, Quid species, Duplex sensus, Applicatio et distinctio, Conclusio 1/2, Epilogus, Solutio oppositorum*) rendered inline in parentheses/italics, NOT as footnote anchors.

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**`[?]` flags:** none.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a soul

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De natura assumta quoad medii necessitatem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de natura assumta quantum ad medii necessitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum caro assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante spiritu humano.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum[^1] assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante habitu gratuito.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum tota humana natura assumta fuerit mediante Spiritu sancto.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum corpus unitum fuerit Verbo mediante spiritu humano sive anima.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum corpus unitum fuerit Verbo mediante spiritu humano sive anima. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Damasceni, quam Magister inducit in littera[^2]: « Unitum est carni Verbum Dei per medium intellectum ».

2. *Item*, Gregorius[^3]: « Carnem deitas mediante anima suscepit ».

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3. *Item*, Augustinus hoc ipsum ad Volusianum[^4]: « Animam rationalem et per ipsam corpus humanum aptavit sibi ».

4. *Item*, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*. Extrema multum distantia non uniuntur nisi per medium aliquod; sed corporeum creatum et corruptibile, et increatum incorporeum et incorruptibile sunt maxime distantia: ergo uniuntur per aliquod medium, quod quidem sit creatum et incorporeum. Sed talis est spiritus rationalis[^5]: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, maioris dignitatis est esse unitum divinitati quam esse glorificatum; sed corpus non est habile ad glorificationem nisi mediante anima[^6]: ergo nec ad unionem.

6. *Item*, circumscripta anima, corpus humanum minus est nobile, quam sit brutalis spiritus, quia substantia spiritualis dignior est corporali; sed animal brutum non habet congruentiam ad unionem[^7] ergo nec corpus humanum per se ipsum. Si ergo congruentiam habet, hoc est mediante spiritu vel intellectu.

**Sed contra:** 1. Deus est intimus omni creaturae, tam corporali quam spirituali[^8]: ergo nihil cadit medium inter ipsum et creaturam: si ergo unit sibi corpus humanum, videtur, quod non uniat sibi mediante spiritu.

2. *Item*, magis unitur medium cuilibet extremorum quam extrema ad invicem: ergo si divinitas unitur carni mediante anima, ergo magis unitur divinitas animae quam carni, et caro magis unitur animae quam Deo. Sed hoc est falsum, quia anima uniebatur carni separabiliter, divinitas inseparabiliter[^9], et ita illa caro erat Dei, sicut anima Dei: ergo relinquitur idem quod prius.

3. *Item*, soluto medio solvuntur extrema: ergo si Deus unitur carni mediante anima, facta separatione a carne, fit separatio a divinitate. Sed hoc est falsum, quia in morte anima a carne recessit; Deus autem carnem, quam assumsit, nunquam dimisit[^10]: ergo videtur, quod anima mediante carnem non assumserit.

4. *Item*, Deus non organizavit nec formavit carnem illam mediante anima[^11]: ergo si eadem virtute assumsit, qua formavit, et ita immediate assumsit, sicut immediate fecit; non videtur, quod assumserit mediante spiritu rationali.

### Conclusio

> Verbum fuit unitum carni mediante creato spiritu, non quasi anima sit medium colligantiae, sed tantum ut est medium congruentiae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum caro assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante spiritu humano; hoc dupliciter potest intelligi, secundum quod ad coniunctionem aliquorum potest concurrere medium secundum duplicem rationem. Est enim medium *colligantiae*, et est medium *congruentiae*. Medium *colligantiae* est per quod extrema ligantur ad invicem, sicut duo corpora ad invicem coniunguntur, interveniente glutino. Medium vero *congruentiae* dicitur ratione cuius congruum est, aliqua duo extrema perduci ad aliquam unionem, sicut mulier nobilis mediante nobilitate congruentiam habet, ut sit sponsa regis; cum tamen rex sibi unitur, magis unitur sicut *coniugi* quam sicut *nobili*.

Si ergo intelligitur de medio *colligantiae*, tunc quaeritur: utrum Verbum unitur carni mediante spiritu creato? Respondendum est, quod non[^12], pro eo quod immediate et inseparabiliter Verbum unitur tam carni quam animae; et ideo non cadit ibi anima medium quasi glutinum vel vinculum inter corpus et Deum. — Si autem intelligatur de medio *congruentiae*, sic absque dubio concedendum est, quod caro unitur ipsi[^13] Verbo mediante spiritu creato. Non enim erat congruum, quod Dei Verbum, quod est vita, acciperet corpus nisi vivificatum; nec conveniebat, eum qui est Spiritus immortalis, uniri corpori, nisi vivificato spiritu immortali, unde illud corpus esset idoneum ad incorruptionem. Et hoc est quod dicitur in littera[^14], quod « incommutabilis et invisibilis Veritas per *spiritum* animam, et per *animam* corpus, totum hominem, sine sui contagione susciperet ». Et accipitur *spiritus* pro superiori portione animae, sicut dicit Magister, quae maiorem convenientiam habet cum Deo; *anima* vero pro inferiori parte animae, secundum quam vivificat corpus. Et per haec duo nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam illud corpus congruum esse ad unionem, quod quidem habet per *animam* vivificari et per *spiritum* ad perpetuitatem et incorruptionem ordinari. — Et quia rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, pro

<!-- page 51 -->

cedunt secundum medium congruentiae, ideo sunt concedendae.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Deus est intimus creaturae corporali, ergo non unitur spiritu mediante; dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de medio *distantiae* vel *colligantiae*, quod quidem non est ibi reperire; non autem obviat medio *congruentiae*. Quamvis enim sit intimus per modum essendi potentialiter, essentialiter, praesentialiter in omni creatura[^15]; non tamen congruum est, ut quamlibet assumat in unitatem personae, sicut supra visum est, sed eam solam, quae est ad eius imaginem, vel quae cum sua imagine habet compositionem.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non magis unitur Deus animae quam carni, immo aeque immediate utrique unitur; dicendum, quod verum est de immediatione, secundum quam privat medium faciens *distare*; sed non est verum de immediatione, quae[^16] privat medium faciens *congruere*; quia plus congruit unioni substantia rationalis, quae est ad eius imaginem, quam substantia corporalis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod soluto medio solvuntur extrema; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem de medio *congruentiae*; sicut patet, cum aliquis accipit in[^17] uxorem aliquam ratione pulcritudinis, non tamen ab ea separatur, pulcritudine recedente; sic et in proposito intelligendum est. — Praeterea, anima non recedebat a corpore simpliciter, sed solum ad tempus; et corpus illud ex prima coniunctione sui ad animam dispositionem ad incorruptionem habebat; et ideo propter separationem ipsius animae congruitatem ad unionem non amittebat; et ideo, quamvis anima separaretur a carne, non[^18] oportebat, divinitatem a carne separari.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non formavit carnem illam mediante anima; dicendum, quod etsi teneat hoc de medio per modum *causae*[^19], non tenet tamen de medio per modum *congruentiae*. Quamvis enim anima non fuerit causa corporis *effectiva*, tamen ex communicatione corporis cum anima potuit esse aliqua *congruentia* ad unionem cum divina natura.

english:
### Article III. *On the assumed nature with respect to the necessity of a medium.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the assumed nature as regards the necessity of a medium. And about this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit.

Secondly it is asked, whether [the soul][^1] was assumed by the Word through the medium of a gratuitous habit.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the Holy Spirit.

### Question I. *Whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul.*

Concerning the first the inquiry proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether the body was united to the Word through the medium of a human spirit, or soul. And that it was so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Damascene, which the Master adduces in the text[^2]: « United to the flesh is the Word of God through the medium of the intellect ».

2. *Likewise*, Gregory[^3]: « The deity took up the flesh through the medium of the soul ».

3. *Likewise*, Augustine [says] this same thing to Volusianus[^4]: « He fitted to himself a rational soul, and through it a human body ».

4. *Likewise*, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. Things greatly distant from one another are not united except through some medium; but the created and corruptible corporeal, and the uncreated, incorporeal, and incorruptible, are maximally distant: therefore they are united through some medium, which indeed is created and incorporeal. But such is the rational spirit[^5]: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, it is of greater dignity to be united to the divinity than to be glorified; but the body is not fit for glorification except through the medium of a soul[^6]: therefore neither for the union.

6. *Likewise*, with the soul set aside, the human body is less noble than the brute spirit is, since a spiritual substance is more worthy than a corporeal one; but a brute animal does not have a fittingness for the union[^7] — therefore neither does the human body of itself. If therefore it has a fittingness, this is through the medium of a spirit or intellect.

**On the contrary:** 1. God is most inward to every creature, both corporeal and spiritual[^8]: therefore nothing falls as a medium between him and the creature: if therefore he unites a human body to himself, it seems that he does not unite it to himself through the medium of a spirit.

2. *Likewise*, a medium is more united to each of the extremes than the extremes are to one another: therefore if the divinity is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then the divinity is more united to the soul than to the flesh, and the flesh is more united to the soul than to God. But this is false, since the soul was united to the flesh separably, the divinity inseparably[^9], and so that flesh was God's, just as the soul was God's: therefore the same [conclusion] remains as before.

3. *Likewise*, when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved: therefore if God is united to the flesh through the medium of the soul, then, the separation from the flesh having been made, a separation from the divinity comes about. But this is false, since in death the soul withdrew from the flesh; God, however, never relinquished the flesh which he had assumed[^10]: therefore it seems that he did not assume the flesh through the medium of the soul.

4. *Likewise*, God did not organize nor form that flesh through the medium of the soul[^11]: therefore if he assumed it by the same power by which he formed it, and thus assumed it immediately, just as he made it immediately; it does not seem that he assumed it through the medium of a rational spirit.

### Conclusio

> The Word was united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit, not as though the soul were a medium of binding-together, but only inasmuch as it is a medium of fittingness.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, when it is asked whether the flesh was assumed by the Word through the medium of a human spirit, this can be understood in two ways, according as a medium can concur for the joining of certain things under a twofold account. For there is a medium of *binding-together* (*colligantiae*), and there is a medium of *fittingness* (*congruentiae*). A medium of *binding-together* is that through which the extremes are bound to one another, just as two bodies are joined to one another, with glue intervening. But a medium of *fittingness* is so called by reason of which it is fitting that two extremes be brought to some union, just as a noble woman through her nobility has the fittingness to be the bride of a king; yet when the king unites her to himself, he is united [to her] more as a *spouse* than as a *noblewoman*.

If, therefore, it is understood concerning the medium of *binding-together*, then it is asked: is the Word united to the flesh through the medium of a created spirit? It must be answered that no[^12], on the ground that the Word is immediately and inseparably united both to the flesh and to the soul; and therefore the soul does not there fall as a medium, like glue or a bond between the body and God. — But if it is understood concerning the medium of *fittingness*, then without doubt it must be conceded that the flesh is united to the Word himself[^13] through the medium of a created spirit. For it was not fitting that the Word of God, who is life, should take up a body unless one quickened [with life]; nor was it suitable that he who is an immortal Spirit should be united to a body, unless one quickened by an immortal spirit, whence that body would be apt for incorruption. And this is what is said in the text[^14], that « the immutable and invisible Truth took up, without any defilement of himself, through the *spirit* the soul, and through the *soul* the body, the whole man ». And *spirit* is taken for the higher portion of the soul, as the Master says, which has the greater agreement with God; but *soul* [is taken] for the lower part of the soul, according to which it quickens the body. And by these two things nothing else is given to be understood than that that body is fitting for the union, which indeed it has by being quickened through the *soul* and by being ordered to perpetuity and incorruption through the *spirit*. — And since the reasons which are adduced for the first part proceed

according to the medium of fittingness, therefore they are to be conceded.

*Ad 1.* To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that God is most inward to the corporeal creature, therefore he is not united through the medium of a spirit; it must be said that that reason proceeds concerning a medium of *distance* or of *binding-together*, which indeed is not to be found here; but it is not opposed to the medium of *fittingness*. For although he is most inward by the mode of being potentially, essentially, and presentially in every creature[^15]; nevertheless it is not fitting that he should assume any one whatever into the unity of person, as was seen above, but only that one which is to his image, or which has a composition with his image.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that God is not more united to the soul than to the flesh, but rather is equally immediately united to each; it must be said that this is true of the immediacy according to which it excludes a medium causing *distance*; but it is not true of the immediacy which[^16] excludes a medium causing *fittingness*; since a rational substance, which is to his image, is more fitting for the union than a corporeal substance.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that when the medium is dissolved the extremes are dissolved; it must be said that this does not hold true of a medium of *fittingness*; as is clear, when someone takes a woman in[^17] marriage by reason of her beauty, he is nevertheless not separated from her when the beauty fades; and so it is to be understood in the present matter. — Moreover, the soul did not withdraw from the body absolutely, but only for a time; and that body, from its first conjunction to the soul, had a disposition toward incorruption; and therefore on account of the separation of the soul it did not lose its fittingness for the union; and therefore, although the soul was separated from the flesh, it was not[^18] necessary that the divinity be separated from the flesh.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that God did not form that flesh through the medium of the soul; it must be said that, even if this holds of a medium by the mode of a *cause*[^19], it nevertheless does not hold of a medium by the mode of *fittingness*. For although the soul was not the effective cause of the body, nevertheless from the communication of the body with the soul there could be some *fittingness* for the union with the divine nature.

la: Supple cum codd. P Q *anima*.

en: Supply, with codices P Q, the word *soul* [so that the second question reads « whether the *soul* was assumed »].

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 2.

la: Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 23. n. 42.

en: [Gregory,] *Moralia*, Book XXXI, c. 23, n. 42.

la: Epist. 137. (alias 3.) c. 2. n. 8: Ipsa [magnitudo virtutis divinae] sibi animam rationalem et per eandem etiam corpus humanum totumque omnino hominem in melius mutandum, nullo modo in deterius mutata, coaptavit. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2, ubi alia Augustini verba afferuntur. — Post *animam rationalem* cod. Z inserit *Deitas*.

en: [Augustine,] *Letter* 137 (otherwise 3), c. 2, n. 8: « That [greatness of the divine power], itself in no way changed for the worse, fitted to itself a rational soul, and through the same also a human body and the whole man altogether, to be changed for the better ». Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2, where other words of Augustine are adduced. — After *rational soul* codex Z inserts *the Deity*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine, nec non liber de Unione corporis et animae (inter opera Hug. a S. Vict.).

en: Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2 at the end, as well as the book *On the Union of Body and Soul* (among the works of Hugh of St. Victor).

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. a. 1. princip. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. Book IV of the *Sentences*, d. 49, p. II, a. 1, principal a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. — De ratione addita *maiori* cfr. tom. II. pag. 214, nota 3. — Pro *animal brutum* codd. G H Z bb *animal brutale*.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1. — On the reason added to the major [premise] cf. vol. II, p. 214, note 3. — For *brute animal* (*animal brutum*) codices G H Z bb [read] *animal brutale*.

la: Deus est intimus omni creaturae… Ut probatum est I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — In fine arg. pro *spiritu* cod. aa *anima*.

en: [That] God is most inward to every creature… As was proved in Book I of the *Sentences*, d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and Book II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2. — At the end of the argument, for *spirit* codex aa [reads] *soul*.

la: Vide infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 3.

en: See below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Ut ostendetur infra d. 21. a. 1. q. 2.

en: As will be shown below, d. 21, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. — Subinde post *ergo si* cod. K subiicit *Deus*.

en: Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. — Thereafter, after *therefore if* codex K subjoins *God*.

la: In edd. deest *non*. Paulo ante pro *unitur carni* codd. K P Q *uniatur carni*.

en: In the editions *no* is lacking. A little before, for *is united to the flesh* codices K P Q [read] *let it be united to the flesh*.

la: Pro *ipsi* Vat. *Christi*. Paulo inferius pro *quod est vita* (Ioan. 1, 4.) plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *qui est vita*. Post pauca pro *esset idoneum* cod. P *erat idoneum*, codd. M O *est idoneum*.

en: For *to him* (*ipsi*) the Vatican [edition reads] *of Christ*. A little below, for *which is life* (John 1:4) very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *who is life*. Shortly after, for *would be apt* (*esset idoneum*) codex P [reads] *was apt* (*erat idoneum*), codices M O *is apt* (*est idoneum*).

la: Hic c. 2. In fine testimonii pro *susciperet* cod. H *assumsit*, quod verbum et in textu originali habetur; cod. N *suscepit*, cod. K *susceperit*, edd. *susceperat*.

en: Here [in the Master's text], c. 2. At the end of the testimony, for *should take up* (*susciperet*) codex H [reads] *assumed* (*assumsit*), which word is also found in the original text; codex N *took up* (*suscepit*), codex K *would have taken up* (*susceperit*), the editions *had taken up* (*susceperat*).

la: Art. 1. q. 1. — De praedicto triplici modo existendi in creatura cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *obviat medio* codd. M O *obviat ratione medii*, Vat. *obviat de medio*; et mox pro *per modum essendi* codd. G L Z aa et edd. 1, 2 *per medium essendi*, perperam.

en: Article 1, q. 1. — On the aforesaid threefold mode of existing in a creature cf. Book I of the *Sentences*, d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for *is opposed to the medium* codices M O [read] *is opposed by reason of the medium*, the Vatican [edition] *is opposed concerning the medium*; and shortly after, for *by the mode of being* codices G L Z aa and editions 1, 2 [read] *through the medium of being*, wrongly.

la: Cod. aa *secundum quam*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *according to which* (*secundum quam*).

la: In codd. H K Z bb deest *in*.

en: In codices H K Z bb *in* is lacking.

la: Edd. *non tamen*.

en: The editions [read] *not, however* (*non tamen*).

la: Edd. 1, 2 *quodsi dicat hoc de medio per modum causae, non tenet; tenet tamen etc.*, cui lectioni favet cod. H, in quo legitur *quod non tenet... per modum causae, tenet tamen etc.* Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. Pro *quod etsi* plurimi codd. *quod si*.

en: Editions 1, 2 [read] *but if it says this of a medium by the mode of a cause, it does not hold; it holds, however, etc.*, which reading codex H favors, in which is read *that it does not hold... by the mode of a cause, it holds, however, etc.* Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2. For *that even if* (*quod etsi*) very many codices [read] *that if* (*quod si*).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Doctrina Ss. Patrum a Magistro (hic c. 2.) relata, quod Filius Dei assumsit carnem et animam, sed carnem mediante anima et animam mediante spiritu, explicatione indiget, in qua Scholastici principales satis concordant, licet non eisdem verbis et distinctionibus omnes utantur. Cum hac quaestione intime connectitur et fere coincidit quaestio de ordine assumtionis respectu totius assumti ad partes, et partium inter se. — Duo autem omnino constant, scilicet Verbo immediate unita esse et corpus et animam, nec non simul secundum ordinem temporis fuisse formationem et assumtionem tam corporis quam animae. — Disputant autem posteriores Scholastici de hac speciali quaestione, utrum totum compositum humanum sit assumtum mediantibus partibus, vel vice versa partes mediante toto, et quid secundum ordinem naturae, non temporis, sit prius. S. Thom. (S. III. q. 6. a. 5.) utitur hic distinctione inter ordinem *intentionis* (ex parte agentis) et *operationis* (exsecutionis, ex parte materiae), et simpliciter dicendum esse resolvit, « quod Verbum Dei assumsit partes humanae naturae mediante toto. Sicut enim assumsit corpus propter ordinem, quem habet ad animam rationalem; ita assumsit corpus et animam propter ordinem, quem habent ad humanam naturam ». Sed praecise quoad ordinem *exsecutionis* idem docet: « Ex parte vero materiae est primum illud, quod primum existit in transmutatione materiae ». Contra hanc ultimam propositionem arguitur a Scoto eiusque schola. Scotus (hic q. 2. n. 5. seqq.) etiam utitur hic alia distinctione, scilicet inter medium *quod* et medium *quo*, et concedit, quod anima est medium *quo*, sed non *quod*, assumtionis totius naturae, atque diffuse disputat de quaestione, quomodo *totum* ut ens aliud sit distinctum a partibus simul sumtis; in qua quaestione determinanda ipsi Scotistae non penitus consentiunt.

**II.** S. Bonav. agit tantum de duplici quaestione, utrum assumta sit caro mediante anima, et (in fine corp.), utrum anima mediante spiritu, quae ulterior quaestio a S. Thoma aliisque pluribus alia distincta quaestione resolvitur. — Distinctio illa, quam facit S. Bonav. inter medium *colligantiae* (quod in solut. ad 6. et quaest. seq. vocatur « per modum causae », scilicet effectivae) et medium *congruentiae*, a S. Thoma in Comment. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) exprimitur verbis medium *necessitatis* et medium *congruentiae*. Ab eodem hic tres aliae non inutiles distinctiones adiiciuntur. In Summa autem theol. (III. q. 6. a. 1.) distinguitur ordo *naturae* secundum gradum *dignitatis* et rationem *causalitatis* (scilicet congruentiae), et conceditur, utroque modo sane dici posse, carnem assumtam esse mediante anima.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1, dub. lat. 1. et a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The teaching of the Holy Fathers reported by the Master (here c. 2), namely that the Son of God assumed flesh and soul, but the flesh through the medium of the soul and the soul through the medium of the spirit, needs explanation, in which the principal Scholastics sufficiently agree, although they do not all use the same words and distinctions. Intimately connected with this question, and nearly coinciding with it, is the question concerning the order of the assumption with respect to the whole assumed in relation to the parts, and of the parts among themselves. — But two things are altogether settled, namely that both the body and the soul were immediately united to the Word, and that the formation and the assumption of both the body and the soul took place at the same time according to the order of time. — But the later Scholastics dispute about this special question, whether the whole human composite was assumed through the mediation of the parts, or vice versa the parts through the mediation of the whole, and what, according to the order of nature, not of time, is prior. St. Thomas (Summa III, q. 6, a. 5) uses here the distinction between the order of *intention* (on the part of the agent) and of *operation* (of execution, on the part of the matter), and resolves that it must simply be said « that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature through the medium of the whole. For just as he assumed the body on account of the order which it has to the rational soul, so he assumed the body and the soul on account of the order which they have to human nature ». But precisely as to the order of *execution* he teaches the same: « On the part of the matter, however, that is first which first exists in the transmutation of the matter ». Against this last proposition Scotus and his school argue. Scotus (here q. 2, n. 5 ff.) also uses here another distinction, namely between the medium *which* (*quod*) and the medium *by which* (*quo*), and concedes that the soul is the medium *by which*, but not the medium *which*, of the assumption of the whole nature, and discusses at length the question how the *whole* as another being is distinct from the parts taken together; in determining which question the Scotists themselves do not entirely agree.

**II.** St. Bonaventure treats only of the twofold question, whether the flesh was assumed through the medium of the soul, and (at the end of the body) whether the soul [was assumed] through the medium of the spirit, which latter question is resolved by St. Thomas and many others under another distinct question. — That distinction which St. Bonaventure makes between a medium of *binding-together* (which in the reply to objection 6 and in the following question is called « by the mode of a cause », namely an effective one) and a medium of *fittingness*, is expressed by St. Thomas in his Commentary (here q. 2, a. 1) by the words medium of *necessity* and medium of *fittingness*. By the same author three other not useless distinctions are here added. But in the Summa theol. (III, q. 6, a. 1) the order of *nature* is distinguished according to the degree of *dignity* and the account of *causality* (namely of fittingness), and it is conceded that in either way it can soundly be said that the flesh was assumed through the medium of the soul.

**III.** Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 4, m. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 9, 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1, lat. dub. 1, and a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here the sole question.

---

translators_notes:
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- **Incoming hand-off (from d2-a2-q3, commit b2e0979).** q3 consumed p.49 footers 1–4 only (the last spanning into the R-col `Secundum Porphyr…` block). This chunk INHERITS **p.49 footers 5–7** as `[^1]`–`[^3]`: f.5 `Supple cum codd. P Q anima.` → anchors `utrum⁵` in the ART. III TRACTATIO q2 line (codd. P Q supply *anima* so it reads « utrum anima assumta fuerit »); f.6 `Hic c. 2.` → anchors `in littera⁶` (Damascene/Master); f.7 `Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 23. n. 42.` → anchors `Gregorius⁷`. Anchors verified on the p.49 R-col band.
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- **Forward hand-off to d2-a3-q2.** QUAESTIO II (`Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima fuerit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito`; subtitle *Utrum anima Christi assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito*) begins **raw 4200/4204**, head of **printed p.52** (PDF 74). q1 fully consumes p.51 (scholion §III ends `…Biel, hic q. unica.` then the `52 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` running head at raw 4197); q2 opens a FRESH per-page footer sequence at the column top of p.52 — **no shared-page footer carries forward**. q2 must verify its OWN scholion on the PDF.
- **Alignment result: PASS.** ART. III TRACTATIO q1 = `Primo quaeritur, utrum caro assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante spiritu humano.` (raw 4033); q1 body opener = `Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum corpus unitum fuerit Verbo mediante spiritu humano sive anima.` (raw 4039). No q-swap.
- **Scholion disposition: held in q1 (`has_scholion: true`), §I–III.** The SCHOLION prints on p.51 after q1's reply *Ad 4* (`…ad unionem cum divina natura.`) — ART. III holds its scholion in q1. §I = dogmatic note on the order/mode of assumption (Word immediately united to both body and soul; later-Scholastic dispute over whole-through-parts vs. parts-through-whole; S. Thom. vs. Scotus on medium *quod*/*quo*). §II = comparison of S. Bonav.'s *colligantiae*/*congruentiae* medium-distinction with S. Thom.'s *necessitatis*/*congruentiae*; the scholion §II expressly forward-covers q2 (« utrum anima mediante spiritu », treated by S. Thomas under a distinct question) — q2 may therefore carry no scholion of its own (verify). §III = parallel-treatments list (Alex. Hal. / Albert / Petr. a Tar. / Richard. a Med. / Giles of Rome / Durandus / Dionys. Carth. / Biel).
- **Boundary lock.** Scholion §III ends grammatically complete at `…Biel, hic q. unica.` (p.51 R-col, raw ~4168); `52 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` head (raw 4197) then `QUAESTIO II.` (raw 4200) follow on p.52 — NOT included. q1 tail + q2 opener continuous (no cascade-merge splice).
- **`[?]` flags:** none.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the soul was assumed by the Word through the medium of some gratuitous habit

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum anima Christi assumta fuerit a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima fuerit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate[^1]: « In rebus per tempus ortis summa gratia est, quod Deus in unitatem personae, nullis praecedentibus meritis, homini copulatur »: ergo videtur, quod Dei Filius uniatur animae mediante aliqua gratia sive dono gratuito.

2. Item, Augustinus[^2]: « Quidquid convenit Filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam »: ergo videtur, quod unio Verbi et animae fiat mediante aliquo dono gratiae.

3. Item, perfectius est Deus, cum est cum aliquo, per unionem quam per inhabitationem; sed si Deus in nullo habitat nisi mediante aliquo dono gratuito[^3], ergo non videtur, quod animam assumat, nisi mediante aliquo habitu vel gratia disponente.

4. Item, plus est, animam uniri Verbo quam frui Deo; sed anima Christi non fruitur Deo, nisi mediante aliquo habitu gloriae, per quam fit deiformis[^4]: ergo videtur, quod nec uniatur ipsi Verbo, nisi mediante aliquo habitu gratiae, cuius deiformitas superexcellat deiformitatem gloriae.

5. Item, unio est relatio; sed nulla *relatio* introducitur in *esse* nisi per introductionem alicuius *absoluti*, quia « in *ad aliquid* non est motus per se[^5] »: si ergo Deus assumit aliquam animam, quam prius non assumsit, cum hoc non sit secundum mutationem *sui*, quia est immutabilis, nec secundum mutationem *animae* de *non-esse* in *esse*, quia haec mutatio est creatio; restat ergo, quod hoc erit mediante infusione alicuius gratiae nobilissimae.

6. Item, uniri divinae naturae in unitatem personae, hoc excedit omnem naturam creatam; sed cum creatura aliqua ordinatur ad aliquod, quod est supra naturam suam, indiget habitu adiuvante et elevante: ergo videtur, quod anima uniatur divinae naturae aliquo habitu gratiae mediante.

*Fundamenta.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Omnis gratia, quantum est de se, aequaliter respicit tres personas, cum sit totius Trinitatis effectus: ergo si habitus gratuitus faceret uniri personae Filii Dei, eadem ratione et personae Patris et Spiritus sancti; sed constat, quod persona Patris et Spiritus sancti non sunt unitae illi animae in unitatem personae[^6]: ergo illa unio non fuit alicuius gratiae.

2. Item, omnis habitus gratuitus dicit quid creatum; sed omne creatum est in infinitum Deo inferius: ergo per nihil creatum efficitur homo Deus. Sed per unionem factum est, ut homo esset Deus[^7]: ergo non videtur, quod illa unio fieret aliquo habitu gratuito.

3. Item, si illa unio fieret aliquo habitu gratuito, cum corpus non sit illius gratiae susceptibile, ergo corpus non esset unibile; sed corpus est unibile et unitum: ergo non videtur, quod unio fiat animae ad Deum per habitum medium.

4. Item, intelligamus, quod Deus assumeret unam animam gloriosam et ipsam deponeret; planum est, quod anima illa et ante unionem et in unione et post unionem non haberet nisi habitum gloriae: si ergo habitus ille communis est creaturae unitae et non unitae, videtur ergo, quod unio divinitatis ad animam non fiat aliquo habitu gloriae mediante. Nec alium habitum supra hunc est dare: ergo non videtur, quod anima uniatur Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.

### Conclusio

> Anima Christi non fuit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, cooperante per modum causae.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum anima uniatur ipsi Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: *(Duplex sensus.)* aut quod ille habitus in illa unione teneat rationem congruentiae, vel rationem causae. Si ita, quod teneat rationem *congruentiae*, sic concedi potest, quod *(Conclusio 1.)* anima unitur ipsi Verbo mediante habitu creato[^8], quia non decet ipsam Verbo uniri, nisi assimiletur habitu perfectae deiformitatis. Unde anima Christi
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non tantum fuit grata in instanti unionis, sed etiam glorificata super omnes animas beatas, quia non decet animam Dei[^9] carere deiformitate.

Si autem intelligatur unio illa fieri mediante habitu gratuito, ita quod ille habitus respectu unionis teneat rationem *causae*, sic veritatem non habet; *(Conclusio 2. Ratio 1.)* quoniam illa unio, quae est per habitum infusum, sicut est unio amoris et cognitionis, communiter[^10] respicit tres personas; unio autem illa respicit unam solam. — *(Ratio 2.)* Rursus, unio illa facit, hominem esse *conformem* Deo et *ad Deum*, quia gratia est influentia a Deo exiens et ad Deum reducens[^11]; sed haec unio facit, hominem esse *Deum*; et ideo nullus habitus creatus potest hoc efficere, nec per collationem alicuius boni creati fit, ut homo sit Deus, sed per hoc, quod ipsa persona Verbi se ipsam facit humanae naturae hypostasim et suppositum. *(Notandum.)* Hoc autem non facit secundum mutationem factam *in se*, sed secundum mutationem factam *in natura assumta*. Illa autem mutatio in natura assumta fuit in ipsius naturae formatione, ita quod careret personali distinctione[^12] in genere proprio et inniteretur personae divinae. — *(Quare vocetur gratia.)* Sed quia hoc totum Deus gratuita bonitate facit, ideo maxima gratia dicitur esse in unione divinae naturae ad humanam; non quia illa unio perficiatur vel compleatur per aliquam influentiam creatam, sed quia fit per gratuitam Dei bonitatem, *(Nota.)* *simul coexistente* influentia doni gratuiti ad *congruitatem*, non ad *causalitatem*.

Unde rationes, quae ostendunt, quod non fiat unio illa mediante aliquo habitu gratuito, sunt concedendae; quoniam ea via procedunt[^13], secundum quod dicitur aliquid fieri per habitum gratuitum cooperantem per modum causae; sicut homo iustificatur mediante gratia informante et meretur mediante caritate movente et regulante.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)* 1. 2. Ad duas igitur auctoritates Augustini adductas de gratia unionis dicendum, quod large accipitur ibi gratia, non pro habitu animam informante, sed pro eo quod gratis accipitur et superexcellit terminum[^14] naturae; et sic potest dici, factam magnam gratiam corpori, dum assumtum fuit a persona Verbi. Et ita ex hoc non sequitur, quod unio illa Verbi ad animam fiat mediante aliquo habitu gratuito.

3. 4. Ad illas duas rationes de inhabitatione et fruitione dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam *(Notandum.)* inhabitatio Dei in anima et *fruitio* ipsa ponit aliquem *actum*, qui fit ab[^15] anima, respectu cuius gratia infusa est *causa*, et ad quem *habilitatur* anima mediante gratia, et in quem *exit*, cum a gratia est adiuta et regulata. Non sic autem est de *unione*; quoniam natura humana unitur divinae absque actu suo et solum se habet ibi per modum *passivi*, et non *activi*; et ideo non sic indiget per habitum adiuvantem et regulantem dispositione, quae quidem sit *principium* illius unionis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio non introducitur nisi per aliquam mutationem, factam in aliquo absoluto; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quemadmodum duae lineae possunt intelligi uniri in puncto et continuari, ita tamen, quod non sit mutatio in altera linearum nisi per hoc, quod amittit discretionem unitatis; sic intelligendum est, quod si Deus assumeret aliquod individuum hominis in *esse* constitutum et *gratia* informatum, solum amitteret personalem discretionem per unionem cum ipso Verbo in unitate personae. In assumtione autem illius naturae, quam Filius Dei assumsit de Virgine, *simul* fuit formatio et unio; et ideo nunquam fuit in illo homine quantum ad humanam naturam personalis discretio; hoc enim faciebat unio ipsius cum Verbo[^16]. Et propterea non sequitur ex hoc, quod unio in unitate personae fieri habeat mediante aliquo habitu gratuito. Assumtio enim proprie respicit illam naturam, quamvis *congrue* non habeat fieri absque gratia.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod uniri divinae naturae superexcellit[^17] gradum creaturae; dicendum, quod verum est; et ideo concedendum est, quod talis unio ex gratia fit; sed tamen non sequitur ex hoc, quod fiat per donum gratiae creatae, quia omne donum creatum est hac unione inferius.

*(Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter.)* Unde si quaeratur, utrum gratia unionis dicat quid creatum, aut increatum; dicendum, quod gratia unionis tripliciter potest accipi. Potest enim gratia unionis dici illud, per quod efficitur anima *gratis congrua* ad unionem; et sic dicit donum gratiae creatae, per quod anima habuit excellenter deiformitatem. Alio modo dicitur gratia unionis gratia *effectiva* unionis; et sic dicit donum gratiae increatae. Tertio modo potest dici *gratia unionis* ipsa *unio gratuita*, sive gratis facta; et sic ex parte divinae naturae dicit quid *increatum*, ex parte humanae naturae dicit quid *creatum*, non absolutum, sed relatum; et sic patet totum.

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english:
### Question II. *Whether the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word through the medium of some gratuitous habit.*

Second it is asked, whether the soul was assumed by the Word through the medium of some gratuitous habit. And that it was, it seems.

*To the opposite.*

1. Augustine, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity[^1]: « Among things that arise through time, the highest grace is that God is joined to man into the unity of the person, with no preceding merits »: therefore it seems that the Son of God is united to the soul through the medium of some grace or gratuitous gift.

2. Likewise, Augustine[^2]: « Whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace »: therefore it seems that the union of the Word and the soul comes about through the medium of some gift of grace.

3. Likewise, God is more perfectly with something through union than through indwelling; but if God dwells in nothing except through the medium of some gratuitous gift[^3], then it does not seem that He assumes the soul except through the medium of some habit or disposing grace.

4. Likewise, it is more for the soul to be united to the Word than to enjoy God; but the soul of Christ does not enjoy God except through the medium of some habit of glory, by which it is made deiform[^4]: therefore it seems that neither is it united to the Word itself except through the medium of some habit of grace, whose deiformity surpasses the deiformity of glory.

5. Likewise, union is a relation; but no *relation* is introduced into *being* except through the introduction of something *absolute*, because « in the *in-relation-to-something* there is no motion per se[^5] »: if therefore God assumes some soul which He did not previously assume, since this is not according to a change *of Himself*, because He is immutable, nor according to a change *of the soul* from *non-being* into *being*, because this change is creation; it remains therefore that this will be through the medium of the infusion of some most noble grace.

6. Likewise, to be united to the divine nature into the unity of the person exceeds every created nature; but when some creature is ordered to something which is above its own nature, it needs an aiding and elevating habit: therefore it seems that the soul is united to the divine nature through the medium of some habit of grace.

*Foundations.*

**Sed contra:** 1. Every grace, so far as it pertains to itself, regards the three persons equally, since it is an effect of the whole Trinity: therefore if a gratuitous habit caused union with the person of the Son of God, by the same account it would do so with the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit as well; but it is settled that the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit are not united to that soul into the unity of the person[^6]: therefore that union was not of any grace.

2. Likewise, every gratuitous habit signifies something created; but everything created is infinitely inferior to God: therefore man is made God by nothing created. But by the union it came about that man was God[^7]: therefore it does not seem that that union came about by any gratuitous habit.

3. Likewise, if that union came about by some gratuitous habit, then since the body is not receptive of that grace, the body would not be unitable; but the body is unitable and united: therefore it does not seem that the union of the soul to God comes about through an intermediary habit.

4. Likewise, let us suppose that God should assume one glorious soul and lay it aside; it is plain that that soul, both before the union and in the union and after the union, would have nothing but the habit of glory: if therefore that habit is common to the creature both united and not united, it seems then that the union of the divinity to the soul does not come about through the medium of any habit of glory. Nor is there any other habit above this to be granted: therefore it does not seem that the soul is united to the Word through the medium of any gratuitous habit.

### Conclusio

> The soul of Christ was not assumed by the Word through the medium of any gratuitous habit cooperating after the manner of a cause.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that when it is asked whether the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of some gratuitous habit, this can be understood in two ways: *(Twofold sense.)* either that that habit holds in that union the account of *congruity*, or the account of *cause*. If it be so that it holds the account of *congruity*, then it can be conceded that *(Conclusion 1.)* the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of a created habit[^8], because it is not fitting that it be united to the Word unless it be made like Him by a habit of perfect deiformity. Hence the soul of Christ
was not only graced in the instant of union, but also glorified above all blessed souls, because it is not fitting that the soul of God[^9] lack deiformity.

But if that union is understood to come about through the medium of a gratuitous habit, in such a way that that habit holds with respect to the union the account of *cause*, then it does not hold true; *(Conclusion 2. Reason 1.)* because that union which is through an infused habit, as is the union of love and of knowledge, regards in common[^10] the three persons; but that union regards one alone. — *(Reason 2.)* Again, that union makes man to be *conformed* to God and *toward God*, because grace is an influence going forth from God and leading back to God[^11]; but this union makes man to be *God*; and therefore no created habit can effect this, nor does it come about by the conferral of some created good that man be God, but by this, that the very person of the Word makes itself the hypostasis and supposit of the human nature. *(Note.)* This, however, it does not do according to a change made *in itself*, but according to a change made *in the assumed nature*. But that change in the assumed nature consisted in the formation of the nature itself, in such a way that it lacked personal distinction[^12] in its proper genus and rested upon the divine person. — *(Why it is called grace.)* But because God does all this by gratuitous goodness, therefore the highest grace is said to be in the union of the divine nature to the human; not because that union is perfected or completed by any created influence, but because it comes about by the gratuitous goodness of God, *(Note.)* *with the influence* of the gratuitous gift *coexisting* toward *congruity*, not toward *causality*.

Hence the reasons which show that that union does not come about through the medium of any gratuitous habit are to be conceded; because they proceed[^13] along that way according to which something is said to come about through a gratuitous habit cooperating after the manner of a cause; just as man is justified through the medium of informing grace and merits through the medium of charity moving and ruling.

*(Solution of the opposing arguments.)* 1. 2. To the two authorities of Augustine adduced concerning the grace of union, it must be said that grace is there taken broadly, not for a habit informing the soul, but for that which is received gratis and surpasses the terminus[^14] of nature; and thus it can be said that a great grace was done to the body when it was assumed by the person of the Word. And so from this it does not follow that that union of the Word to the soul comes about through the medium of any gratuitous habit.

3. 4. To those two reasons concerning indwelling and enjoyment, it must be said that it is not similar, because *(Note.)* the indwelling of God in the soul and *enjoyment* itself posit some *act* which is done by[^15] the soul, with respect to which the infused grace is a *cause*, and toward which the soul is *enabled* through the medium of grace, and into which it *goes out* when it is aided and ruled by grace. But it is not so concerning *union*; because the human nature is united to the divine without any act of its own and holds itself there only after the manner of a *passive* thing, and not of an *active* one; and therefore it does not in this way need, through an aiding and ruling habit, a disposition which would be the *principle* of that union.

5. To that which is objected, that a relation is not introduced except through some change made in something absolute; it must be said that this is true; but just as two lines can be understood to be united at a point and continued, yet in such a way that there is no change in either of the lines except by this, that it loses the distinctness of unity; so it must be understood that if God should assume some individual of man already constituted in *being* and informed by *grace*, it would lose only its personal distinctness through the union with the Word itself in the unity of the person. But in the assumption of that nature which the Son of God assumed of the Virgin, the formation and the union were *simultaneous*; and therefore there never was in that man, as regards the human nature, a personal distinctness; for this the union itself with the Word brought about[^16]. And therefore it does not follow from this that the union in the unity of the person must come about through the medium of any gratuitous habit. For assumption properly regards that nature, although *congruously* it ought not to come about without grace.

6. To that which is objected last, that to be united to the divine nature surpasses[^17] the rank of a creature; it must be said that this is true; and therefore it must be conceded that such a union comes about from grace; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it comes about through a created gift of grace, because every created gift is inferior to this union.

*(The grace of union is said in three ways.)* Hence if it be asked whether the grace of union signifies something created or uncreated; it must be said that the grace of union can be taken in three ways. For the grace of union can be called that by which the soul is made *gratuitously congruous* for the union; and thus it signifies a created gift of grace, by which the soul had deiformity excellently. In another way the grace of union is called the grace *effective* of the union; and thus it signifies an uncreated gift of grace. In a third way the *grace of union* can be called the very *gratuitous union*, or that which is done gratis; and thus on the part of the divine nature it signifies something *uncreated*, on the part of the human nature it signifies something *created*, not absolute, but relative; and thus the whole is clear.

la: Cap. 49. n. 24. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro *in unitatem* exhibet *in unitate* et omittit verba *nullis praecedentibus meritis*, quae tamen sunt in Enchirid. c. 40. n. 12, ubi simile testimonium affertur.

en: Ch. 49, n. 24. In the testimony adduced the original text reads *in unitate* for *in unitatem* and omits the words *nullis praecedentibus meritis*, which nevertheless are in the Enchiridion, c. 40, n. 12, where a similar testimony is brought forward.

la: Enchirid. c. 35-41. n. 10-13, sententialiter. Hugo a S. Vict. hoc dictum tribuit Ambrosio, sed nec ibi verbotenus invenitur. — Post verba Augustini codd. M O minorem supplent sic: *sed esse Deum vel Dei Filium convenit Verbo per naturam.*

en: Enchiridion, c. 35-41, n. 10-13, in substance. Hugh of St. Victor attributes this saying to Ambrose, but it is not found there verbatim either. — After the words of Augustine, codices M O supply the minor premise thus: *but to be God or the Son of God belongs to the Word by nature.*

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 17, p. 1, q. 1, and II Sent. d. 26, q. 2.

la: De quo vide infra d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro *per quam* codd. A G H K T bb *per quem.*

en: Concerning which see below, d. 14, a. 1, q. 1. — For *per quam* codices A G H K T bb read *per quem.*

la: Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.). Cuius verbi explicationem vide tom. II. pag. 831, nota 7. — Post *introductionem* edd. 1, 2 addunt *vel mediationem*, Vat. *vel mutationem.* Paulo inferius pro *secundum mutationem sui, quia* [cod. U *Deus*] *est immutabilis* codd. T V W X et edd. 1, 2 *secundum unionem sui, quia est inunibilis.*

en: Aristotle, Physics V, text 10 (c. 2). For the explanation of this phrase see tom. II, p. 831, note 7. — After *introductionem* editions 1, 2 add *vel mediationem*, the Vatican *vel mutationem.* A little below, for *secundum mutationem sui, quia* [cod. U *Deus*] *est immutabilis*, codices T V W X and editions 1, 2 read *secundum unionem sui, quia est inunibilis.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius post *faceret* cod. U (T a secunda manu) subiicit *animam*, cod. K *humanam naturam.*

en: Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 3. — A little higher up, after *faceret*, cod. U (T by a second hand) subjoins *animam*, cod. K *humanam naturam.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 7. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Pro *creato* Vat. *gratuito.*

en: For *creato* the Vatican reads *gratuito.*

la: Cod. K *quia non decebat animam Christi.*

en: Cod. K reads *because it was not fitting for the soul of Christ.*

la: Pro *communiter*, quod ex codd. F K P Q Z bb in textum recepimus, alii codd. nec non edd. *convenienter.*

en: For *communiter*, which we have received into the text from codices F K P Q Z bb, the other codices as well as the editions read *convenienter.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro *collationem* cod. A *collectionem.*

en: Cf. above, p. 20, note 1. — A little below, for *collationem* cod. A reads *collectionem.*

la: Codd. G H K L (Z a prima manu) aa bb *discretione.* Paulo inferius pro *ad humanam* codd. V X *ad humanitatem.*

en: Codices G H K L (Z by a first hand) aa bb read *discretione.* A little below, for *ad humanam* codices V X read *ad humanitatem.*

la: Id est, iure negant, assumtionem fuisse mediante habitu gratuito.

en: That is, they rightly deny that the assumption came about through the medium of a gratuitous habit.

la: Cod. V *donum.*

en: Cod. V reads *donum.*

la: Vat. *in.* Paulo inferius pro *quoniam* codd. A M O *qua.* In fine solut. pro *quae quidem* edd. 1, 2 cum codd. K Q L' V X bb *qui quidem*, et immediate ante pro *dispositione* cod. Q (U a secunda manu) *disponi.*

en: The Vatican reads *in.* A little below, for *quoniam* codices A M O read *qua.* At the end of the solution, for *quae quidem* editions 1, 2 with codices K Q L' V X bb read *qui quidem*, and immediately before, for *dispositione* cod. Q (U by a second hand) reads *disponi.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seq. — Circa finem solut. pro *illam naturam* Vat. *ipsam naturam.*

en: Cf. below, d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 and following. — Near the end of the solution, for *illam naturam* the Vatican reads *ipsam naturam.*

la: Codd. G K Z *superexcedit.*

en: Codices G K Z read *superexcedit.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** Si nomine gratiae intelligitur *grata Dei voluntas*, manifestum est, incarnationem factam esse « per gratuitam Dei voluntatem » (hic in corp.), non tanquam per *medium*, sed tanquam per *causam efficientem*. Sed proposita quaestio solummodo procedit de « habitu gratuito », id est de gratia habituali. — Quod gratia habitualis sit *dispositio necessaria* ad unionem hypostaticam, et quod per consequens sit medium necessarium assumtionis, cum aliis docuit Alex. Hal. (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.); unde idem hanc gratiam appellat *gratiam unionis*. Dicit enim: « Non est possibile creaturae humanae, quod ipsa per donum conditionis naturae elevetur et disponatur ad divinam unionem; et ideo *necessaria est ei gratia*, quae elevet ad hoc et disponat ipsam; quam nos appellamus gratiam unionis ». Haec sententia, secundum proprietatem verborum et ordinem *exsecutionis* intellecta, a posterioribus doctoribus communiter reprobatur, et ab ipso S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et ad 3. 4.) solide refutatur, scilicet si intelligitur, quod ille habitus teneat rationem *causae*, sive *necessariae dispositionis* (cfr. ultima verba in solut. ad 3. 4.). — Attamen auctor noster addit, quod si intelligitur secundum rationem *congruentiae*, « concedi potest, quod anima unitur ipsi Verbo mediante habitu creato ». — Scot. (hic q. 2. n. 12. seqq.) cum Durando (hic q. 3.) ne hoc quidem concedendum esse vult, quod gratia in illa unione fuerit *medium congruitatis*. Argumenta autem ipsius supponunt, ut etiam Lychetus ibi in Comment. (n. 1.) explicat, praedicta verba S. Bonaventurae ita intelligenda esse, ut secundum *ordinem naturae* prius fuerit natura humana non unita, secundo gratia ipsi infusa, tertio assumtio naturae gratia ornatae. Eodem fere modo etiam plurimi posteriores theologi hunc locum S. Doctoris intelligunt et variis argumentis improbant.

Opinamur autem cum Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 2. q. 5.), hanc interpretationem esse omnino alienam a mente et a verbis Seraphici, qui nullatenus dicit, gratiam secundum ordinem naturae praecessisse unioni tanquam dispositionem congruam. Etiamsi supponamus, eum locutum esse de ordine *exsecutionis*, non *intentionis*, tamen tacet de ordine *prioritatis*, quem haec dispositio congrua ad unionem habeat secundum ordinem naturae, dum tantum dicit (circa finem corp.): « Simul coexistente influentia doni gratuiti ad congruitatem, non ad causalitatem »; quibus verbis generatim praecedentem causalitatem, etiam ratione congruae dispositionis, excludit. Item, in solut. ad 3. 4. docet, quod « natura humana unitur divinae absque actu suo et solum se habet ibi per modum passivi, et non activi »; sed constat, quod gratia habitualis datur in ordine ad actum. — Hinc ipsa verba huius quaestionis insinuant, mentem Seraphici bene interpretatum esse Richardum a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 3.), qui cum Petro a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.) et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 5.) approbat propositionem: animam Christi fuisse assumtam mediante gratia tanquam medio congruitatis, sed eam explicans de ordine intentionis addit: « Non ut (gratia) actualiter existens in ea in re, sed ut existens in ea secundum propositum Dei, seu in eius praeordinatione ». Sic intellecta, verba Seraphici (hic et infra d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.) nullam habent difficultatem. In ordine autem exsecutionis gratia habitualis communiter potius concipitur ut effectus unionis hypostaticae quam ut dispositio.

**II.** Praeter citatos auctores: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 6. a. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.

**III.** Sequens (3.) quaestio sic solvitur, ut Spiritus S. non dicatur medium unionis nisi ut causa effectiva, quae licet communis sit tribus Trinitatis personis, tamen Spiritui S. appropriatur. De eadem speciatim hic tractantes non invenimus nisi S. Thomam, hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** If by the name of grace is understood the *gracious will of God*, it is manifest that the incarnation was done « by the gratuitous will of God » (here in the body), not as if through a *medium*, but as through an *efficient cause*. But the question proposed proceeds only concerning a « gratuitous habit », that is, concerning habitual grace. — That habitual grace is a *necessary disposition* for the hypostatic union, and that consequently it is a necessary medium of the assumption, was taught, among others, by Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 1.); whence he too calls this grace the *grace of union*. For he says: « It is not possible for human creation that it be elevated and disposed to the divine union through the gift of the condition of its nature; and therefore *grace is necessary for it*, which may elevate it to this and dispose it; which we call the grace of union ». This opinion, understood according to the propriety of the words and the order of *execution*, is commonly rejected by later doctors, and is solidly refuted by S. Bonaventure himself (here in the body and in the reply to 3 and 4), namely if it is understood that that habit holds the account of *cause*, or of a *necessary disposition* (cf. the last words in the solution to 3 and 4). — Yet our author adds that, if it is understood according to the account of *congruity*, « it can be conceded that the soul is united to the Word itself through the medium of a created habit ». — Scotus (here q. 2. n. 12. and following), with Durandus (here q. 3.), holds that not even this is to be conceded, that grace in that union was a *medium of congruity*. But his arguments suppose, as Lychetus too in his Commentary (n. 1.) explains, that the aforesaid words of S. Bonaventure are to be understood thus, that according to the *order of nature* the human nature was first not united, secondly grace was infused into it, thirdly the assumption of the nature adorned with grace took place. In nearly the same way also very many later theologians understand this passage of the holy Doctor and disprove it with various arguments.

But we are of the opinion, with Bartholomew de Barberiis (Cursus theolog. p. III. disp. 2. q. 5.), that this interpretation is wholly foreign to the mind and to the words of the Seraphic Doctor, who in no way says that grace, according to the order of nature, preceded the union as a congruous disposition. Even if we suppose that he spoke of the order of *execution*, not of *intention*, nevertheless he is silent about the order of *priority* which this congruous disposition may have toward the union according to the order of nature, since he only says (near the end of the body): « With the influence of the gratuitous gift coexisting toward congruity, not toward causality »; by which words he generally excludes preceding causality, even by reason of a congruous disposition. Likewise, in the solution to 3 and 4 he teaches that « the human nature is united to the divine without any act of its own and holds itself there only after the manner of a passive thing, and not of an active one »; but it is settled that habitual grace is given in order to an act. — Hence the very words of this question suggest that Richard of Middleton (here a. 2. q. 3.) well interpreted the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, who with Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2. a. 2.) and Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 5.) approves the proposition: that the soul of Christ was assumed through the medium of grace as a medium of congruity, but, explaining it of the order of intention, adds: « Not as (grace) actually existing in it in reality, but as existing in it according to the purpose of God, or in His preordination ». Understood thus, the words of the Seraphic Doctor (here and below, d. 4. a. 2. q. 3.) have no difficulty. But in the order of execution habitual grace is commonly conceived rather as an effect of the hypostatic union than as a disposition.

**II.** Besides the authors cited: S. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2; S. III. q. 6. a. 6. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2. a. 3.

**III.** The following (3rd) question is solved in such a way that the Holy Spirit is not called a medium of the union except as an effective cause, which, although it is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is nevertheless appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Treating expressly of the same, we have not found anyone here except S. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2. little-question 2.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 52–54 (PDF 74–76; offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 4204–4367 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). Per the Vol II/III override, the PDF column-band read is authoritative for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, replies, scholion, and footers; OCR is the base only for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Literal English throughout.
- **Alignment (PASS):** opener = `Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima fuerit assumta a Verbo mediante aliquo habitu gratuito` = ART. III TRACTATIO q2. No q-swap.
- **Page-split map:** q2 spans printed pp. 52–54. p.52 (running head `52 SENTENTIARUM` L / `…ARUM LIB. III.` R): QUAESTIO II title + opener + fundamenta 1–6 + Sed contra 1–4 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo opening (down to `Unde anima Christi`). p.53 (running heads `DIST. II. ART. III. QUAEST. II.` L / `QUAEST. II. 53` R): Respondeo continuation + replies Ad 1.2 / 3.4 / 5 / 6 + the threefold *gratia unionis* distinction, ending `…et sic patet totum.` p.54 (running head `54 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.`): SCHOLION §I–III prints here, after q2's replies and before QUAESTIO III.
- **Per-page footer split (17 entries, continuous slugs `[^1]`–`[^17]`):** **NO inherited footer** — q1 fully consumed p.51; q2 opens at the head of p.52 with a fresh per-page sequence (as the q1 hand-off predicted). **p.52 footers 1–8 = `[^1]`–`[^8]`** (L-col 1–4 on fundamenta: ¹Aug. de Trin. c.49 + Enchirid. variant / ²Enchirid. + Hugo→Ambrose / ³I+II Sent / ⁴infra d.14 + per quam/per quem; R-col 5–8 on fundamenta 5–6: ⁵Aristot. V Phys + tom.II p.831 + introductionem/mutationem variants / ⁶supra d.1 + animam/humanam naturam / ⁷infra d.7 / ⁸creato→gratuito Vat.). **p.53 footers 1–9 = `[^9]`–`[^17]`** (L-col 1–5 on Respondeo: ⁹Cod. K *quia non decebat animam Christi* [anchors `animam Dei` at p.53 top] / ¹⁰communiter codd. variant / ¹¹supra p.20 + collationem/collectionem / ¹²discretione codd. variant + ad humanam/ad humanitatem / ¹³iure negant gloss; R-col 6–9: ¹⁴Cod. V donum / ¹⁵Vat. in + quae quidem variants + dispositione/disponi / ¹⁶infra d.3 p.II + Vat. ipsam naturam / ¹⁷Codd. G K Z superexcedit). All 17 carry real body anchors in both languages.
- **SCHOLION (`has_scholion: true`) — VERIFIED on PDF p.54:** a distinct `SCHOLION` header prints after q2's body and before QUAESTIO III. This CONTRADICTS the q1 hand-off prediction (which expected q2 might carry no scholion under a `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` footer). q2 has its OWN scholion: **§I** = long dogmatic note (Alex. Hal.'s grace-of-union/necessary-disposition reading rejected; Scotus + Durandus deny even *medium congruitatis*; Lychetus's order-of-nature reading; Barth. de Barberiis defends the Seraphic mind; Richard of Middleton + Peter of Tarentaise + Dionys. Carth. read it of the order of intention). **§II** = parallel-treatments list (S. Thom. / Giles of Rome). **§III** = forward-cover note for q3 (Spirit appropriated as effective cause; only S. Thomas found treating it; this is the d2-a3-q3 hand-off). The scholion carries no numbered apparatus footnotes of its own.
- **Out-of-chunk footers OMITTED (with note):** p.54's footers 1–3 (Damascenus / Dionysius / I Sent. d.10) anchor QUAESTIO III's fundamenta (`Tertio quaeritur, utrum Verbum sit unitum…`), NOT q2's scholion. They belong to d2-a3-q3 and are not rendered here.
- **Marginal labels** (*Ad oppositum, Fundamenta, Duplex sensus, Conclusio 1/2, Ratio 1/2, Notandum, Quare vocetur gratia, Nota, Solutio oppositorum, Gratia unionis dicitur tripliciter*) are Quaracchi's editorial side-glosses; rendered inline in parentheses/italics, NOT as footnote anchors.
- **`[?]` flags:** NONE. All 17 apparatus entries verified on the 450 dpi column bands; marker pairing confirmed 17 La = 17 En = 17 defs, 0 anchorless / 0 defless. (The IA djvu OCR cascade re-emitted a duplicate of footer ¹⁵'s `Vat. in.` opener at the foot of the raw range; it is an OCR artifact, not a real footer, and is not rendered.)
- **Boundary lock / forward hand-off → d2-a3-q3:** q2's scholion §III ends grammatically complete at `…hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.` (p.54 R-col). `QUAESTIO III.` (raw 4368) / `Tertio quaeritur, utrum Verbum sit unitum humanae naturae mediante Spiritu sancto` (raw 4371) begin d2-a3-q3 on p.54 L-col bottom — NOT included. q2 tail + q3 opener continuous (no cascade-merge splice).