site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 7, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas.*

Deinde quaeritur, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur.

1. Augustinus ad Orosium[^p109-7]: « Pater nec necessitate nec voluntate genuit Filium »; sed quod repugnat generationi repugnat trinitati; necessitas est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

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2. Item, nobilius est agens, quod dominatur actioni suae, quam quod non dominatur[^p110-1]; sed in Trinitate non potest esse productio nisi nobilissimo modo; quod autem necessario producit suae actioni non potest dominari: ergo nec in divinis potest necessario produci.

3. Item, nobilior est communicatio, quae est ex benignitate, quam quae est ex necessitate: aut ergo in divinis non est communicatio aliqua ipsius naturae, aut non est ex necessitate[^p110-2]; sed non potest esse trinitas sine communicatione: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne necessarium est absolutum; quod enim habet respectum ad aliquid a se distinctum non potest omnino esse necessarium, et hoc vult Avicenna[^p110-3]; sed trinitatem esse sine respectu et relatione est impossibile: ergo similiter impossibile est, quod stet cum necessitate.

5. Item, nihil, quod est ab alio, potest esse necessarium in summo; quia *esse* eius[^p110-4] et *manere* non habet nisi aliunde, et ita non est necessarium in se; sed trinitas non potest esse, quin aliqua persona sit ibi non a se: ergo non stat cum summa necessitate.

6. Item, nihil est summe verum, quod potest cogitari non esse[^p110-5]: ergo similiter nihil est summe necessarium, quod potest credi non esse; *necessarium* enim praesupponit *verum;* sed trinitas absque dubio potest cogitari non esse: ergo etc.

7. Item, quod repugnat evidentiae repugnat certitudini, et quod repugnat certitudini repugnat necessitati[^p110-6]; sed trinitas in unitate repugnat evidentiae, quia hoc nullo modo videtur intelligibile: ergo repugnat necessitati summae.

8. Item, nihil omnino necessarium est perfecte laudabile[^p110-7]: ergo si persona Patris necessario producit personam Filii et Spiritus sancti, non est laudabilis in aliquo praedictorum; sed nihil est in Deo laudabilius: ergo nulla laus debetur Deo. Sed hoc est impium dicere: ergo etc.

9. Item, nihil est omnino necessarium, quod est simpliciter voluntarium; productio personarum in divinis est simpliciter per voluntatem: non ergo per necessitatem. *Maior* probatur, quia necessaria naturaliter insunt, et contra voluntatem natura habet dividi. *Minor* probatur: quia illud est maxime delectabile, acceptabile et iucundum: ergo maxime voluntarium.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Omne necessarium immutabile, et e converso; sed trinitas stat cum summa immutabilitate, sicut patet de proximo[^p110-8]: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne, quod est summe unum, est omnino necessarium, et e converso; sed simul stant trinitas et summa unitas[^p110-9]: ergo etc.

3. Item, maioris colligantiae est productio personae unius ab alia quam splendoris et lucis; sed haec sunt necessaria: ergo etc.

4. Item, Omnipotenti summum *posse* abesse est impossibile, et adesse est necessarium; sed summum *posse* est in productione personarum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis actus, qui habet Deum pro principio et termino, est undique necessarius; sed productio personae a persona est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne, quod est indifferens a summo necessario, est omnino necessarium; sed trinitas tota est divina essentia: ergo etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Divinum esse necessarium et liberalissimum stat simul cum trinitate personarum.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod et divinum *esse* est *necessarium*, et nihilominus *liberalissimum;* et ipsa beata Trinitas stat simul cum *necessitate* et *voluntate*, si accipiantur secundum modum convenientem. Sicut enim tactum est[^p110-10] de necessitate, non omnis *necessitas* competit divino *esse* nec etiam Trinitati beatae, sed *immutabilitatis* et *independentiae;* simimiliter neque omnis *modus volendi*. Est enim voluntas *accedens*, id est de novo adveniens; et haec non est in Deo, nec respectu *sui* nec respectu *creati*, propter Dei immutabilitatem et necessitatem. Est iterum voluntas *antecedens;* et haec est in Deo, sed non respectu *sui*, sed respectu *creati*, quod antecedit natura et aeternitate. Est tertio voluntas *concomitans et acceptans;* et haec est in Deo respectu *sui* et respectu *creati;* approbat enim et acceptat voluntas divina omne bonum, sive *creatum* sive *increatum*, sive *contingens* sive *necessarium*.

Tripliciter ergo dicta *necessitate* et *voluntate*, tertius modus utriusque competit Trinitati summae,

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scilicet *voluntas acceptans* et *necessitas immutabilitatis: voluntas*, inquam, *acceptans* propter summam caritatem in producente et summam bonitatem in producto, quae duo necessario claudunt in se voluntatem complacentiae; *necessitas* vero *incommutabilitatis* est propter *indifferentiam essentiae* et *independentiam personae*. Quia enim in tribus personis est *essentia* omnino indifferens, ideo una quidditas sive entitas, una veritas, ac per hoc una necessitas. Cum enim prima persona sit a se ipsa, omnino est necessaria, ac per hoc secunda et tertia. — *Rursus*, quia in tribus personis indifferens est essentia, relatio distinctiva trinitatis non dicit respectum ad aliquid *extra;* et ideo nulla est ibi *dependentia unius personae* ad alteram, aequaliter ergo sunt fixae et per se stantes; et ideo si una est necessaria, et omnes. — Stant igitur simul haec tria, sicut ostensum est iam, scilicet *trinitas*, *necessitas* et *voluntas;* nec est in eis aliqua repugnantia, sed summa consonantia, sicut simul consonant summa *unitas*, *veritas* et *bonitas*.

Summa enim *unitas* est, quae est in pluribus indivisa, et haec ponit *trinitatem;* summa *veritas*, quae est infallibilis et certissima, et haec ponit *necessitatem;* summa *bonitas*, quae est amabilis et amativa, et haec ponit *voluntatem*. Summa igitur *unitas*, *veritas* et *bonitas* necessario exigit, quod simul stent *trinitas*, *necessitas* et *voluntas*. — Quoniam igitur in Deo trino simul est *necessitas* cum voluntate, et *voluntas* cum necessitate; hinc est, quod ipsum est summe *bonum per essentiam*. Quia in eo est summa *iucunditas* per voluntatem et summa *securitas* per necessitatem et summa *felicitas* per utrumque; hinc etiam est, quod ipsum est summe *beatificativum per influentiam:* quia *affectus* noster non quiescit nisi in summe amabili vacando[^p111-1], et *intellectus* non nisi in summe infallibili et certo; ac per hoc in eo solo beatificari possumus, quod simul est *necessarium* et *voluntarium*, quod solum natum est sapidissime amari, certissime cognosci et securissime possideri. — Quoniam igitur beatissima Trinitas non tantum est *beata*, verum etiam *beatificativa;* hinc est, quod ipsa necessitati nobilissimae summe consonat et in nullo repugnat; similiter et voluntati liberalissimae. — Unde et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Augustini et Hilarii[^p111-2], dicendum, quod utraque illarum auctoritatum intelligitur de necessitate quantum ad primum et secundum modum, non quantum ad tertium, sicut ex praedictis apparet.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilius est agens, quod dominatur actioni suae; dicendum, quod illud est verum de actione, quae se habet per differentiam ab agente; de ea actione autem, quae propter summam simplicitatem omnino est indifferens ab agente, nec habet nec habere potest praedicta propositio veritatem; nihil enim potest dominari sibi. Quoniam ergo productio in divinis personis est per simplicitatem summam, in qua non potest differre *producens* et *productio* sua secundum differentiam realem; ideo in huiusmodi nullum locum habet allegatio propositionis praedictae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nobilior est communicatio, quae est ex benignitate quam ex necessitate; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa *necessitate*, quae benignitatem excludit; talis autem non est necessitas, quae ponitur in divinis; intelligitur etiam de *communicatione*, quae est doni per essentiam differentis; talis autem non est in emanatione[^p111-3] divinarum personarum: et ideo illa ratio non concludit, pro eo quod in se ipsa duplicem includit defectum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne necessarium est absolutum; dicendum, quod *absolutio perfecta* non excludit relationem intrinsecam, pro eo quod illa, cum sit ad indifferens per essentiam, nullam dependentiam ponit, ac per hoc nec repugnat necessitati; et talis relatio est in divinis personis. Sed si excludit relationem, hoc est per respectum ad *extra* et ad *rem essentialiter differentem*. Unde licet Deus per aliqua nomina significetur ut habens respectum ad res, ille respectus ex parte *Dei* non ponitur nisi secundum *rationem intelligendi*, cui *verus* respondet respectus ex parte *entis creati*[^p111-4]; et de hoc respectu ratio praemissa procedit.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil, quod est ab alio, potest esse necessarium in summo; dicendum quod illud veritatem habet, quando est ab alio essentialiter differente, et aliud habet *esse*, quam quod[^p111-5] sit ipsum *esse* dantis; tunc enim non potest habere plenam rationem necessitatis, pro eo quod pendet ab alio *esse* et alia natura essentialiter differente. Non sic autem est de divinis personis, quia persona producta non differt per essentiam a

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producente nec habet aliud *esse*. Unde cum unum habeat *esse* et eandem essentiam et unius essentialiter veritatem; hinc est, quod nullam ex hoc sortitur dependentiam, sed omnino eandem habet is qui producitur cum eo qui producit permanendi firmam necessitatem et necessariam firmitatem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est summe necessarium, quod potest cogitari non esse; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet, cum illud necessarium apparet, ut est, non autem quando latet. Unde licet beatissima Trinitas nunc et credi et cogitari possit non esse, quia nondum nobis apparet, sicut est; cum tamen apparuerit, sicut est[^p112-1], tunc nullatenus cogitari poterit non esse. Quod ergo nunc vel creditur vel cogitatur non esse; hoc est non propter defectum suae certitudinis et veritatis in se ipso, cum sit ens semper et ubique et summe; sed propter defectum luminis ex parte nostra.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod repugnat evidentiae repugnat certitudini; dicendum, quod est *certitudo* ex parte *rei* et ex parte *nostra;* similiter et *evidentia*. Cum ergo dicitur: quod repugnat evidentiae et certitudini repugnat necessitati; hoc verum de certitudine et evidentia ex parte *rei*, non autem est verum de certitudine et evidentia ex parte *nostra*, quia, sicut prius tactum est, idem potest esse et in se certissimum et nobis occultum. — *Praeterea*, quamvis trinitas videatur certitudini repugnare, plurimum tamen consonat, quia Pater Verbo suo se declarat, Pater etiam et Filius se nobis per Spiritum sanctum certissime manifestant[^p112-2]. Unde quamvis ratio *phantastica* fugiat trinitatis intellectum, ratio tamen *illustrata* videt, quod sola trinitas ut trinitas est plenissima ratio *cognoscendi* omne verum, per quam fit, ut omne verum cognitum *memoriter* teneatur, retentum memoriter intelligatur clarius, et intellectum placeat et ametur.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino necessarium est perfecte laudabile; dicendum, quod duplex est laus: una, in qua *laudato* accrescit aliquid honoris et dignitatis, et ista laus attenditur secundum progressum a statu imperfecto ad perfectum; et haec proprie competit viatoribus, qui cum *possint transgredi et non transgrediuntur*, merito laudantur divinitus et etiam praemiantur[^p112-3]. Est et alia laus, qua *ipsum bonum*, quia bonum, dicitur commendabile; et haec magis competit bono *per essentiam* quam *per participationem*, ac per hoc magis bono incommutabili quam variabili, et necessario quam contingenti; et hac laude laudatur Deus Pater in productione Filii, et Pater et Filius in productione Spiritus sancti in mutua dilectione sui et diffusione omnis boni respectu cuiuscumque creati.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil simpliciter voluntarium est omnino necessarium, plana est responsio ex his quae praetacta sunt in principali solutione; et ideo in his diutius non est morandum.

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english:
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.

1. Augustine to Orosius[^p109-7]: « The Father begot the Son neither by necessity nor by will »; but what is repugnant to generation is repugnant to trinity; necessity is of this kind: therefore etc.

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2. Likewise, an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler than one which has not[^p110-1]; but in the Trinity there can be no production except in the noblest mode; but what produces necessarily cannot have dominion over its action: therefore neither can there be necessary production in divine things.

3. Likewise, a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one which is from necessity: either, then, there is in divine things no communication of the nature itself, or it is not from necessity[^p110-2]; but there cannot be trinity without communication: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything necessary is absolute; for what has a respect to something distinct from itself cannot be altogether necessary, and this is what Avicenna means[^p110-3]; but it is impossible for trinity to be without respect and relation: therefore likewise it is impossible that it stand with necessity.

5. Likewise, nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree; because it has its *being*[^p110-4] and its *remaining* only from elsewhere, and so it is not necessary in itself; but there cannot be trinity without some person there being not from itself: therefore it does not stand with supreme necessity.

6. Likewise, nothing is supremely true which can be thought not to be[^p110-5]: therefore likewise nothing is supremely necessary which can be believed not to be; for the *necessary* presupposes the *true;* but trinity can without doubt be thought not to be: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, and what is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity[^p110-6]; but trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence, because it seems in no way intelligible: therefore it is repugnant to supreme necessity.

8. Likewise, nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy[^p110-7]: therefore if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he is not praiseworthy in any of the aforesaid; but nothing in God is more praiseworthy: therefore no praise is owed to God. But it is impious to say this: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, nothing is altogether necessary which is simply voluntary; the production of the persons in divine things is simply through will: therefore not through necessity. The *major* is proved, because necessary things are present by nature, and nature is divided against will. The *minor* is proved: because that is supremely delightful, acceptable and pleasing: therefore supremely voluntary.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Everything necessary is immutable, and conversely; but trinity stands with supreme immutability, as is clear from what immediately precedes[^p110-8]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything which is supremely one is altogether necessary, and conversely; but trinity and supreme unity stand together[^p110-9]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the production of one person from another is of a greater binding-together than that of splendour and light; but these are necessary: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, for the Omnipotent, that the highest *being able* be absent is impossible, and that it be present is necessary; but the highest *being able* is in the production of the persons: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every act which has God for its principle and term is necessary on every side; but the production of a person from a person is of this kind: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything which is indifferent from the supremely necessary is altogether necessary; but the whole trinity is the divine essence: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being, necessary and most liberal, stands together with the trinity of persons.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine *being* is both *necessary* and nonetheless *most liberal;* and the blessed Trinity itself stands together with *necessity* and with *will*, if they are taken according to the fitting mode. For just as was touched on[^p110-10] concerning necessity, not every *necessity* belongs to the divine *being*, nor yet to the blessed Trinity, but that of *immutability* and *independence;* similarly, neither does every *mode of willing*. For there is a will that is *accedent*, that is, supervening anew; and this is not in God, neither with respect to *himself* nor with respect to the *created*, on account of God's immutability and necessity. There is again a will that is *antecedent;* and this is in God, not with respect to *himself*, but with respect to the *created*, which it precedes in nature and in eternity. There is, thirdly, a will that is *concomitant and accepting;* and this is in God with respect to *himself* and with respect to the *created;* for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether *created* or *uncreated*, whether *contingent* or *necessary*.

Necessity and will being therefore spoken of in three ways, the third mode of each belongs to the supreme Trinity,

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namely *accepting will* and *the necessity of immutability: will*, I say, *accepting*, on account of the supreme charity in the one producing and the supreme goodness in the one produced, which two necessarily enclose in themselves the will of complacency; and *the necessity* of *unchangeableness* on account of the *indifference of the essence* and the *independence of the person*. For because in the three persons the *essence* is altogether indifferent, therefore there is one quiddity or entity, one truth, and on this account one necessity. For since the first person is from itself, it is altogether necessary, and on this account the second and the third. — *Again*, because in the three persons the essence is indifferent, the relation distinctive of the trinity does not signify a respect to anything *outside;* and therefore there is there no *dependence of one person* on another; equally, therefore, they are fixed and standing through themselves; and therefore if one is necessary, so are all. — These three therefore stand together, as has now been shown, namely *trinity*, *necessity* and *will;* nor is there in them any repugnance, but a supreme consonance, just as supreme *unity*, *truth* and *goodness* are consonant together.

For supreme *unity* is that which is undivided in many, and this posits *trinity;* supreme *truth*, which is infallible and most certain, and this posits *necessity;* supreme *goodness*, which is lovable and loving, and this posits *will*. Supreme *unity*, *truth* and *goodness* therefore necessarily require that *trinity*, *necessity* and *will* stand together. — Since, then, in the triune God there is *necessity* together with will, and *will* together with necessity, hence it is that he is the supreme *good by essence*. Because in him is supreme *delight* through will and supreme *security* through necessity and supreme *felicity* through both, hence also it is that he is supremely *beatifying by influence:* because our *affection* does not rest except by keeping leisure[^tr-vacare] in the supremely lovable[^p111-1], and the *understanding* not except in the supremely infallible and certain; and on this account we can be beatified in that alone which is at once *necessary* and *voluntary*, which alone is apt by nature to be loved most savourily, known most certainly and possessed most securely. — Since, then, the most blessed Trinity is not only *blessed* but also *beatifying*, hence it is that it is supremely consonant with the noblest necessity and in nothing repugnant to it; and likewise with the most liberal will. — Whence also the reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

1. To what is first objected to the contrary from the authority of Augustine and of Hilary[^p111-2], it must be said that each of those authorities is understood of necessity as to the first and second mode, not as to the third, as is clear from what has been said.

2. To the objection that an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler, it must be said that this is true of an action which stands by way of difference from the agent; but of that action which, on account of supreme simplicity, is altogether indifferent from the agent, the aforesaid proposition neither has nor can have truth; for nothing can have dominion over itself. Since, then, production in the divine persons is through supreme simplicity, in which the *producer* and his *production* cannot differ by a real difference, therefore in things of this kind the allegation of the aforesaid proposition has no place.

3. To the objection that a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one from necessity, it must be said that this is true of that *necessity* which excludes benignity; but such is not the necessity which is posited in divine things; it is understood also of a *communication* which is of a gift differing in essence; but such is not in the emanation[^p111-3] of the divine persons: and therefore that reason does not conclude, since in itself it includes a twofold defect.

4. To the objection that everything necessary is absolute, it must be said that *perfect absoluteness* does not exclude intrinsic relation, since that relation, being to what is indifferent in essence, posits no dependence, and on this account is not repugnant to necessity; and such relation is in the divine persons. But if it excludes relation, this is by respect to what is *outside* and to *a thing essentially differing*. Whence, although God is signified by certain names as having a respect to things, that respect is not posited on the part of *God* except according to *the reason of understanding*, to which there answers a *true* respect on the part of *the created being*[^p111-4]; and of this respect the premised reason proceeds.

5. To the objection that nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree, it must be said that this has truth when it is from another essentially differing, and has a *being* other than[^p111-5] the very *being* of the giver; for then it cannot have the full reason of necessity, since it depends on another *being* and another nature essentially differing. But it is not so with the divine persons, because the person produced does not differ in essence from the

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producer, nor has it another *being*. Whence, since they have one *being* and the same essence and the truth of one thing essentially, hence it is that it acquires from this no dependence, but the one who is produced has altogether the same firm necessity of remaining, and necessary firmness, with the one who produces.

6. To the objection that nothing is supremely necessary which can be thought not to be, it must be said that this has truth when that necessary thing appears as it is, but not when it lies hidden. Whence, although the most blessed Trinity can now be both believed and thought not to be, because it does not yet appear to us as it is, yet when it shall have appeared as it is[^p112-1], then it will in no way be able to be thought not to be. That it is now either believed or thought not to be, therefore, is not on account of a defect of its certitude and truth in itself, since it is being always and everywhere and supremely, but on account of a defect of lumen[^tr-lumen] on our part.

7. To the objection that what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, it must be said that there is *certitude* on the part of *the thing* and on *our* part; and similarly *evidence*. When, therefore, it is said: what is repugnant to evidence and certitude is repugnant to necessity, this is true of certitude and evidence on the part of *the thing*, but it is not true of certitude and evidence on *our* part, because, as was touched on before, the same thing can be both most certain in itself and hidden to us. — *Moreover*, although trinity seems to be repugnant to certitude, yet it is very greatly consonant with it, because the Father declares himself by his Word, and the Father and the Son manifest themselves to us most certainly through the Holy Spirit[^p112-2]. Whence, although *phantastic* reason flees the understanding of the trinity, yet *illumined* reason sees that trinity alone, as trinity, is the fullest reason of *knowing* every truth, through which it comes about that every truth known is held *in memory*, that what is retained in memory is understood more clearly, and that what is understood pleases and is loved.

8. To the objection that nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy, it must be said that praise is twofold: one, in which something of honour and dignity accrues to *the one praised*, and this praise is reckoned according to progress from an imperfect state to a perfect one; and this belongs properly to wayfarers, who, since *they could transgress and do not transgress*, are deservedly praised by God and also rewarded[^p112-3]. There is also another praise, by which *the good itself*, because it is good, is called commendable; and this belongs more to a good *by essence* than to one *by participation*, and on this account more to an unchangeable good than to a variable one, and to a necessary than to a contingent; and with this praise God the Father is praised in the production of the Son, and the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, in their mutual love of each other and the diffusion of every good with respect to whatever is created.

9. To the objection that nothing simply voluntary is altogether necessary, the answer is plain from what was touched on beforehand in the principal solution; and therefore there is no need to dwell on these things longer.

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la: Sive Quaest. 65 dialog. (inter opera August.) q. 7. — Eadem quaestio solvitur I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. et 2.

en: Or the *Dialogue of Sixty-five Questions* (among the works of Augustine), q. 7. — The same question is solved in I *Sentences*, d. 6, q. 1 and 2.

la: Vide quaest. praeced. solut. ad 5. — Nemesius, episc. Emesenus in libro de Natura hominis, c. 41. ait: Si autem [quis] sit dominus actionum, omnino *liberam* habebit agendi voluntatem. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2.

en: See the preceding question, reply to 5. — Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, in the book *On the Nature of Man*, c. 41, says: But if [someone] is lord of his actions, he will have an altogether *free* will of acting. Compare tome II, p. 592, note 2.

la: Hilar. III. de Trin. n. 3. docet, Patrem Filio impertivisse « omne, quod Deus est per *caritatem* ».

en: Hilary, III *On the Trinity*, n. 3, teaches that the Father imparted to the Son « all that God is, through *charity* ».

la: Metaph. tr. 1. c. 7. et tr. 8. c. 4. seq. — *Minorem* docet Boeth. de Trin. c. 6. his verbis: Substantia continet unitatem, *relatio* multiplicat trinitatem.

en: *Metaphysics*, tr. 1, c. 7, and tr. 8, c. 4 ff. — Boethius, *On the Trinity*, c. 6, teaches the *minor* in these words: Substance contains the unity, *relation* multiplies the trinity.

la: Congruentius *suum*.

en: *Suum* ("its own") would be more fitting.

la: Vide supra q. 1. a. 1. — Quod *necessarium* supponat *verum*, explicatur infra in corp., in quantum scil. *verum* idem est ac *ens*.

en: See above, q. 1, a. 1. — That the *necessary* supposes the *true* is explained below in the body [of the article], inasmuch, namely, as the *true* is the same as *being*.

la: Certitudo siquidem est determinatio ad unum, sicut e contrario dubitatio respicit plura. « Quandocumque enim, ut ait Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.), ad *utraque* ratiocinantibus nobis similiter videntur omnia secundum utrumque fieri, dubitabimus, utrum agamus ».

en: For certitude is determination to one, just as, on the contrary, doubt regards many. « For whenever, as Aristotle says, VI *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 6), as we reason on *both* sides, everything seems to us to come about alike according to each, we shall doubt which we are to do ».

la: Aristot., II. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.): Vituperantur autem laudanturque non quae a necessitate vel natura vel fortuna insunt, sed quorum ipsi causa sumus. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Post *laudabilius* supple: quam istae productiones.

en: Aristotle, II *Eudemian Ethics*, c. 7 (c. 6): Now those things are blamed and praised which are present not from necessity or nature or fortune, but of which we ourselves are the cause. Compare tome II, p. 113, note 8. — After *laudabilius* ("more praiseworthy") supply: than these productions.

la: Supra q. 6. a. 2.

en: Above, q. 6, a. 2.

la: Ut ostensum est supra q. 2. a. 2.

en: As was shown above, q. 2, a. 2.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: August., XXII. de Civ. Dei. c. 30. n. 5: Ibi [in aeterna felicitate] vacabimus et videbimus; videbimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. — D potius legi deberet *vetando*. Fortasse originale habuit *amabili et amativo*, ut supra, cum quoad *intellectum* repetat eadem adiectiva.

en: Augustine, XXII *The City of God*, c. 30, n. 5: There [in eternal felicity] we shall keep leisure and we shall see; we shall see and we shall love, we shall love and we shall praise. Behold what shall be in the end without end. — D should rather be read *vetando* ("forbidding"). Perhaps the original had *amabili et amativo* ("lovable and loving"), as above, since with regard to the *understanding* it repeats the same adjectives.

la: Superius in obiectionibus desideratur arg. ex auctoritate *Hilarii*, quod suppleri potest ex I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. arg. 2. ad oppos., ubi S. Bonav. refert: Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis [η. 58. XXV.]: « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »: ergo non fuit ibi necessitas naturalis; nec necessitas alia, ut videtur: ergo etc.

en: Above, among the objections, the argument from the authority of *Hilary* is lacking, which can be supplied from I *Sentences*, d. 6, q. 1, arg. 2 to the opposite, where St. Bonaventure reports: Likewise, Hilary in the book *On the Synods* [n. 58, XXV]: « Not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son »: therefore there was there no natural necessity; nor any other necessity, as it seems: therefore etc.

la: Cod. D perperam *enumeratione*.

en: Codex D wrongly has *enumeratione* ("enumeration").

la: Cfr. supra q. 3. a. 1. et a. 2. ad 16. — Superius post *pro eo quod illa* D incongrue omittit *cum*.

en: Compare above, q. 3, a. 1, and a. 2, reply to 16. — Above, after *pro eo quod illa* ("since that"), D unfittingly omits *cum* ("being").

la: Cum cod. hic corruptus appareat, supplevimus *quam* ante *quod*, et superius pro *essentialiter et differenter* substituimus *essentialiter differente*, sicut paulo inferius idem habet.

en: Since the codex appears corrupt here, we have supplied *quam* ("than") before *quod*, and above, for *essentialiter et differenter* ("essentially and differently"), we have substituted *essentialiter differente* ("essentially differing"), as the same codex has a little below.

la: Respicitur I. Ioan. 3, 2: Scimus, quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus; quoniam videbimus eum, sicuti est. — De seqq. cfr. supra q. 1. a. 1.

en: The reference is to I John 3:2: We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; because we shall see him as he is. — On what follows, compare above, q. 1, a. 1.

la: Cfr. Ioan. 16, 13. seqq. et 17, 1. seqq. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 4. in corp. Superius pag. 19, nota 7., teste Augustino, Plato posuit, quod in Deo « inveniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi ».

en: Compare John 16:13 ff. and 17:1 ff. See also I *Sentences*, d. 15, p. I, q. 4, in the body. Above, p. 19, note 7, on the witness of Augustine, Plato held that in God « there is found both the cause of subsisting and the reason of understanding and the order of living ».

la: Eccli. 31, 9. seqq.: Quis est hic et laudabimus eum?... Qui probatus est in illo et perfectus est erit illi gloria aeterna; qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus etc. — August. Enarrat. in Ps. 134, 3: *Laudate Dominum, quia bonus Dominus*, n. 3. ait: Breviter uno verbo explicata est laus Domini Dei nostri: *Bonus Dominus*. Sed bonus, non ut sunt bona quae fecit... Omnia enim bona ipse fecit, ipse est bonus, quem nemo fecit. Ille bono suo bonus est, non aliunde participato bono; ille se ipso bono bonus est, non adhaerendo alteri bono etc. — Inferius supplevimus *incommutabili*, pro quo in ipso codice existit lacuna; subinde substituimus *quam variabili* pro *et variabili*.

en: Ecclesiasticus 31:9 ff.: Who is he, and we will praise him?... He that hath been tried thereby and made perfect shall have glory everlasting; he that could have transgressed and hath not transgressed, etc. — Augustine, *Expositions on the Psalms*, on Ps. 134:3, *Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good*, n. 3, says: Briefly, in one word, the praise of the Lord our God has been set forth: *The Lord is good*. But good, not as the good things are good which he made... For he himself made all good things, he himself is good, whom no one made. He is good by his own good, not by a good participated from elsewhere; he is good by himself as good, not by adhering to another good, etc. — Below we have supplied *incommutabili* ("unchangeable"), for which there is a gap in the codex itself; next we have substituted *quam variabili* ("than a variable one") for *et variabili* ("and a variable one").

en: Translator’s note: this is the one clause in these questions where both Latin families stand in a single breath — *non quiescit nisi … vacando* — so the English has to keep them apart: *quies* takes "rest", *vacare* takes "leisure", here "by keeping leisure". The point is that our affection comes to rest not by ceasing but by being wholly free for what is supremely lovable, and one English word for both would reduce the clause to saying that it rests by resting. The word itself is not textually secure: Quaracchi prints *vacando*, but its own note on this passage holds that the sole witness should rather be read *vetando*, and suspects that the original ran differently again. The English renders the text as printed, and the standing rule holds whichever way the reading falls — no *vaca-* word is rendered "rest" in this translation.

en: Translator’s note: *lumen* is left as it stands throughout this translation, against *lux* rendered "light", because Bonaventure uses the two for things English covers with one word: *lux* is light at its source, *lumen* the light given off and received. That distinction is the whole of this reply. The failing is not in the divine truth, which is certain and true in itself, but at the receiving end — *defectus luminis ex parte nostra*. "A defect of light" would leave a reader unable to tell which end is deficient, which is exactly what the reply is settling.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`, raw lines **L25571–L25999**), with every heading, subtitle, apparatus anchor position, marginale and digit checked against the 450 dpi plates (`raw/vision/vol5/p-109..112.png`). Body raw usable on all four leaves (p. 111's right column and p. 112's head are the noisiest — *iitraf|iie*, *(|uod oi)iicitur*, *nMlominus* — every word re-read on the plate); footers usable, digits corrected below. Fresh literal English translation. **Four printed pages, 109–112; 19 apparatus entries; zero `[?]` flags.**

**Structure.** The chunk opens on **p. 109**, three-fifths down the leaf, below `bon-qmt-q7-a1`'s close: **`ARTICULUS II.`** full measure, its italic subtitle *Utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas*, the opener *Deinde quaeritur…* and **argument 1** (*Augustinus ad Orosium*⁷) — re-read here on a full-width crop at 0.75× and the heading and subtitle at 1.4×, not adopted from the hand-off. **Neither the heading nor the subtitle nor the opener is anchored.** Then: **nine arguments** that trinity and supreme necessity are incompossible (marginale `Ad oppositum.`); a **`Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ:` series of six** (marginale `Fundamenta.`), letter-spaced small caps, in-column; **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column; a *Respondeo* that answers Art. I's threefold *necessity* with a **threefold will** — *accedens* (not in God), *antecedens* (in God toward the created), *concomitans et acceptans* (in God toward himself and the created) — and pairs the third mode of each (*voluntas acceptans* / *necessitas immutabilitatis*), then **three *rationes*** (marginalia `Ratio 1.`, `Ratio 2.`, `Ratio 3. de unitate, veritate, bonitate.`) and a **`Corollarium.`** on beatitude; and **nine replies for nine arguments, none combined**, which answer the **OPENING** series. The chunk closes on **p. 112**, half-way down, *…in his diutius non est morandum.*, above `QUAESTIO VIII.`

### ⭐⭐ BOUNDARY 14 (p. 112): IT FORWARDS, SPLIT 3/2 — AND THE INDEX'S `111` WAS WRONG BY A LEAF

**p. 112 was extracted ALONE and read before pp. 110–111 were pulled**, per the standing order. The raw predicted a shared leaf (numeral 112 at L25925, `QUAESTIO VIII.` at L26000) and **the plate confirms it**: replies 5 (its tail, *…producente nec habet aliud esse*) through 9 fill both columns to about half the leaf; **`QUAESTIO VIII.`** then stands full measure with its subtitle *Utrum possit simul stare trinitas cum summa primitate*, the opener *Ultimo quaeritur…* and **arguments 1–3**. The register holds **five** entries: **nn. 1–3 are this chunk's** (reply 6 *sicut est*¹, reply 7 *manifestant*², reply 8 *praemiantur*³); **nn. 4–5** anchor at Q. VIII's argument 1 *quod neutra esset prima*⁴ and argument 2 *causam primam*⁵ and **forward to `bon-qmt-q8`**. ⭐ **Five marks, five seats — so Quaestio VIII's opener is UNANCHORED** (the register's arithmetic is the proof, the `q4-a1` p. 78 instrument; `q8` should re-read it at full width). **Eight quaestio openers in the work, two anchored (pp. 59, 106).** ⚠ **p. 112 n. 4 carries `q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 6.` — a Ruling 5 site, but it is `q8`'s, not this chunk's.**

▶ **Fourteen boundaries, TWELVE shapes: 5/1 · LEAF EDGE · 2/8 · 1/4 · 4/2 · 4/0 · 1/6 · 3/2 · LEAF EDGE · 5/0 · 3/1 · 4/4 · 6/1 · 3/2** — **12 forwarding / 2 leaf edges.** (3/2 now occurs twice, at pp. 87 and 112; the ratio still carries no rule.) ⛔ **The index line `q7-a2 109–111` is wrong at its end by one leaf** — the `q2-a2` / `q6-a2` mechanism (the index's last page is the page on which the NEXT unit's heading falls, and Q. VIII's heading is on 112). The raw band was exact a fifth time: L25571 → L25999 ends at the article's last word. ★ The standing order paid an **eleventh** time.

### ⭐⭐⭐ THE *VACATIO*/*QUIES* DECIDING SITE RESTS ON A READING QUARACCHI ITSELF DOUBTS

The site the pilot banked as **the sole deciding site** — p. 111, *affectus noster non **quiescit** nisi in summe amabili **vacando***¹ — **is fully legible on the plate and prints exactly that.** But its note (p. 111 n. 1), read in full on the plate for the first time, is an editorial *argument about the word itself*: after quoting Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XXII.30.5, ***Ibi vacabimus et videbimus…***, Quaracchi writes ***D potius legi deberet vetando. Fortasse originale habuit amabili et amativo, ut supra, cum quoad intellectum repetat eadem adiectiva.*** That is: **the one witness (D) should rather be read *vetando*; the printed *vacando* is the editors' reading, propped by the Augustine; and they suspect the original was *amabili et amativo***, since the parallel clause for the understanding (*in summe infallibili et certo*) repeats the adjectives of *summa veritas… infallibilis et certissima* just above, and *summa bonitas* was *amabilis et amativa*. ⚠ **So the gerund may not be Bonaventure's at all** — and D is the only witness (from p. 104 n. 4 on).

**What was done, and what is handed on.** The deployed `bon-praec-c4` pair was **applied, not re-decided**: *quiescit* → **"rest"** (ruled at `q5-a2`), *vacando* → **"keeping leisure"**, and the Augustine in the note *vacabimus* → **"we shall keep leisure"** (against the familiar English "we shall rest and see", which would collapse the pair in the very note that justifies the word). ⭐ **The English keeps the two families apart in the one clause where they meet** — *does not rest except by keeping leisure in the supremely lovable* — **so the pair survives the test it was saved for.** ⛔ **But the test is weak**: a distinction confirmed at a site whose word the editors think may be a misreading of *vetando* or a corruption of *amativo* does not carry the weight the pilot put on it. **For the work-close gate / Wilson: is `bon-praec-c4`'s *vacatio* → "leisure" now RATIFIED on this evidence, or does it stay open with the note that the only site in two works where both families meet is textually insecure?** The rendering here is reversible in one line either way. ✅ **RATIFIED at the work-close gate (Wilson, 2026-09-15): *vacatio*/*vacare* → "leisure" / "to keep leisure", held apart from *quies* → "rest", is now the rule — no text edit was needed, the rendering stands as built.**

### ⭐ THE TEXT RESTS ON CODEX D ALONE, AND QUARACCHI'S HAND SHOWS NOTE BY NOTE

As at `q6-a2` and `q7-a1`, every variant note names D or *cod.* in the singular: p. 110 n. 4 (*Congruentius suum* — *eius* kept, a better word proposed); p. 111 n. 1 (*vacando*, above); n. 2 (**a whole objection missing** — reply 1 answers *de auctoritate Augustini et Hilarii*, but only the Augustine stands among the arguments; Quaracchi supplies the Hilary *de Synodis* text from I *Sent.* d. 6 q. 1 in the note, **not in the body**, and the body is left as printed); n. 3 (D *enumeratione* for *emanatione*); n. 4 (D omits *cum*; supplied); n. 5 (**two conjectures in one sentence** — *quam* supplied, *essentialiter differente* for *essentialiter et differenter*); p. 112 n. 3 (**a lacuna filled** — *incommutabili* supplied, and *quam variabili* for *et variabili*). ⚠ **Four of reply 5's and reply 8's key words are Quaracchi's, not D's.**

### ⭐ PRINTING ANOMALIES — A DITTOGRAPHY, A GREEK SORT, THE REST SPECKS

- ⭐ **p. 110 *Respondeo*: `simi-` | `militer`** — the compositor repeated *mi* across the line-break (the raw independently: `stmi-militer`). A printed dittography, the `q1-a1` "as printed" class: **transcribed *simimiliter***, English "similarly". Not emended.
- ⭐ **p. 111 n. 2 `[η. 58. XXV.]`** — the abbreviation for *numero* is set with a **Greek η** (an *n* whose right stem descends, read at 4×; the raw `[r|.`). **An identifiable wrong sort → transcribed as printed** (the `q6-a1` `p. J.` rule); English "n.". The digit **58** (raw `38`) is fixed by the **target**: `bon-sent-I-d6-a1-q1` n. 5 prints *Num. 58. XXV* for the same Hilary. ⚠ Its neighbour `bon-sent-I-d6-a1-q2` n. 2 gives the adjacent anathema as *n. 88. XXIV* — probably a 5→8 in the deployed Vol I, **noted for the Vol I polish, not edited here**.
- **p. 112 n. 2 `nota 7.,`** — point and comma both, as printed. **p. 111 n. 1 `de Civ. Dei. c. 30.`** — a point after *Dei*, as printed. **Reply 5 `dicendum quod`** without its comma (every other reply has one) and **reply 7 `hoc verum de certitudine`** without *est* (supplied two lines later, *non autem est verum*) — as printed.
- **Specks and stray marks, not transcribed:** p. 110 arg. 9 *necessarià* (a speck over the *a*), *con`tra*, Respondeo *sui-,* (a hairline after *sui*); p. 111 *non˘ dicit*, *aequaliter‿ergo*, *—. Unde* (a point after the dash), *cum ˈsit*, *potest,*; p. 112 *certitudini ;*, *et ˙ etiam*, *in qua˛ laudato*.

### ⭐⭐ THE TARGETS BEAT THE GLYPH

Every citation naming a place we hold was opened; **every one lands on its note's subject**:

- ⭐ **p. 109 n. 7 `I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. et 2.`** → `bon-sent-I-d6-a1-q1` *Utrum generatio Filii sit secundum rationem necessitatis* and `-q2` *…secundum rationem voluntatis* — **this article's own question, in the Sentences.** The same note's **`Quaest. 65 dialog.`** (raw `63`) is the pseudo-Augustinian *Dialogus quaestionum LXV* (Orosius' questions), whose q. 7 is the *nec voluntate nec necessitate* text — fixed externally.
- ⭐ **p. 111 n. 2 `I. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. arg. 2.`** → `bon-sent-I-d6-a1-q1` argument 2, *Item, Hilarius in libro de Synodis: « Non naturali necessitate ductus Pater genuit Filium »* — **word for word what the note quotes**, and its n. 5 fixes `58. XXV`.
- **p. 110 n. 1 `tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2`** → `bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q1` n. 2, Aristotle's free man *qui sui ipsius… gratia est* (the target `q7-a1` already opened for the same citation). **p. 110 n. 7 `tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8`** → `bon-sent-II-d3-p2-a1-q1` (pp. 112–114), whose apparatus carries **the same Eudemian *Vituperantur autem laudanturque…*** (that chunk still uses sequential labels; the entry is its note 10). `113` also read on the type at 3×.
- **p. 112 n. 2 `I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 4.`** → `bon-sent-I-d15-p1-a1-q4` *Utrum missio, active accepta, sit totius Trinitatis* — reply 7's *Pater Verbo suo se declarat… per Spiritum sanctum… manifestant*. **`pag. 19, nota 7`** → `bon-qsc-q4` p. 19 n. 7, *Secundum August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4, Plato posuit, quod in Deo « inveniatur et causa subsistendi et ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi »* — **the same quotation**.
- **Internal:** p. 110 n. 1 / n. 10 *quaest. praeced.* → `q7-a1` (reply 5's *causae facientes*; the *Respondeo*'s threefold necessity); n. 5 `q. 1. a. 1.` → *Utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile* (argument 6's *cogitari non esse*); n. 8 `q. 6. a. 2.` → *Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa immutabilitas* (Contra 1's *summa immutabilitate… de proximo*); n. 9 `q. 2. a. 2.` → *Utrum unitas naturae possit simul stare cum trinitate personarum* (Contra 2's *summa unitas*); p. 111 n. 4 `q. 3. a. 1. et a. 2. ad 16.` (raw `J6`) → `bon-qmt-q3-a2` reply 16, *prius est absolutum quam respectivum… omnis distinctio includit aliquem respectum* — reply 4's *absolutio*/*relatio* exactly; p. 112 n. 1 `q. 1. a. 1.`
- **Scripture fixed by the Vulgate wording:** p. 112 n. 1 **I Ioan. 3, 2** (*videbimus eum, sicuti est* = reply 6's *apparuerit, sicut est*); n. 3 **Eccli. 31, 9** (*Quis est hic, et laudabimus eum?… qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus* = reply 8's *possint transgredi et non transgrediuntur*); **Ps. 134, 3** (*Laudate Dominum, quia bonus Dominus*); n. 2 **Ioan. 16, 13** / **17, 1**.
- **Digits on the type against same-line controls:** p. 110 n. 1 **`c. 41.`** (raw `i1`; at 5× a closed-bowl 4 then a flagged bare 1 — Nemesius' chapter on why we were made free); n. 3 **`tr. 1. c. 7. et tr. 8. c. 4.`** (at 3×, the flagged `1` four words from the closed-bowl `4`; Avicenna *Metaph.* I.7 is that *necesse esse* is not relative); p. 111 n. 1 **`n. 5`** (raw `n. 3`; *De civ. Dei* XXII.30.5 is the *vacabimus et videbimus* section, the book's last).

### ▶ GUTTERS — THE DEFAULT WAS WRONG ON BOTH FULL LEAVES

109 **1162** for Article II's REGION *(rows 0.705–0.775, too thin for window consensus; band 1131–1194, 64 px, rule 1160–1164 peak 75 — the same value `q7-a1` measured for Art. I's region above, arrived at independently)* · 110 **1387** *(default **1363 on a 16 px run**, 24 px out; band 1356–1418, 63 px, rule island 1383–1388 peak 718; skew screen: 1 px drift)* · 111 **1194** *(default **1161 on a 2 px run**, flagged WEAK, 33 px out; body rows 0.08–0.62 give twenty-four windows spread 5 px at 1191–1196 on 53–63 px; band 1169–1222, rule 1190–1194 peak 299; the skew screen's 192 px "drift" was one slice landing on the footer gap, as the tool warns)* · 112 **1380** for Article II's REGION *(rows 0.05–0.50; twenty windows at 1377–1382 on 49–62 px; whole-leaf default 1407 on 16 px, the Q. VIII stack crossing the gutter)*.

### ▶ RUNOVERS AND THE INCOMING REGISTERS

**Two gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** The head of every incoming register (pp. 110–112) was read before its first numeral:

- **p. 110** opens numbered and indented at n. 1 — **nothing runs over from p. 109**; the right block opens numbered at n. 6 (n. 5 ends in the left block, *…est ac ens.*).
- **p. 111 n. 2** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *dis [η. 58. XXV.]: « Non naturali…*.
- **p. 112 n. 3** runs over the gutter; the right block opens flush left *quae fecit… Omnia enim bona ipse fecit…*, and nn. 4–5 (`q8`'s) follow it in the right block.
- p. 109's inherited n. 7 stands in the right block below n. 6 and crosses nothing.

Ledger line: `bon-qmt-q7-a2	p.111 n.2:gutter,p.112 n.3:gutter`.

### ▶ MARGINALIA, IN BODY ORDER

**p. 109** — `Ad oppositum.` (printed `Ad opposi-` / `tum.`)
**p. 110** — `Fundamenta.` · `Conclusio 1.` · `Triplex modus volendi.` · `Conclusio 2.`
**p. 111** — `Ratio 1.` · `Ratio 2.` · `Ratio 3. de unitate, veritate, bonitate.` · `Corollarium.` · `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Duplex actio.` · `Distinctio duplex.` · `Notandum.` · `Notandum.`
**p. 112** — `Duplex certitudo.` · `Alia ratio.` · `Duplex ratio.` · `Duplex laus.`

**Eighteen in all, none clipped.** The gutter-side margin was checked on every leaf that carries a gutter-side gloss — p. 110's four (right, verso), p. 111's five on the left (recto, read on a **full-image-width strip** from x = 0 at 0.8×: *Ratio 3. de unitate, ve-ritate, boni-tate.* complete with clean paper before the edge), p. 112's `Duplex ratio.` / `Duplex laus.` — all complete. ⭐ **The solution-heavy split is total an eleventh time**: the fifteen arguments of the two series carry **two** glosses, one at the head of each; the *Conclusio*, *Respondeo* and nine replies carry **sixteen**. ⚠ `Conclusio 1.` / `Conclusio 2.` stand in the *Respondeo*, not at the `Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ` heading.

### ⚠ SMALLER THINGS

**The replies answer the OPENING series, checked, not assumed.** The *Respondeo* closes *Unde et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae* — the side just argued, the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ` — and reply 2 quotes argument 2 (*nobilius est agens, quod dominatur actioni suae*), reply 9 argument 9. **The reverse of `q7-a1` inside one quaestio, as in Quaestiones IV, V and VI** — and the marginalia follow the side (`Ad oppositum.` on the opening series, `Fundamenta.` on the `Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ`), **swapped from `q7-a1`**. · **Nine replies for nine arguments, but reply 1 answers TWO authorities** (Augustine and Hilary) where the objection gives one — Quaracchi's n. 2, above; the body is not supplemented. · **`Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.`** in-column, its italic sentence centred in the right column, *esse* set roman inside the italic; the heading line follows the frozen flat-italic markup. · **The subtitle and the opener agree** (*utrum stent simul trinitas et summa necessitas*), and both agree with `q7-a1`'s second *praeambulum* — which was Quaracchi's own supplement (*deficiens in D, a nobis pro more auctoris suppleta*, p. 106 n. 5).

### ▶ THE DIGIT-MULTISET SCREEN, AND THE TEST IT STANDS IN FOR

**Both languages carry the same four `<!-- page N -->` markers, 109–112, in the same order**, each at a word boundary — p. 110's at a paragraph boundary (before argument 2), p. 111's mid-sentence after *Trinitati summae,* (before *scilicet* / *namely*), p. 112's before *producente* / *producer* (the page breaking *produ-* | *cente*). **19 anchors in each language, in the same order, each defined once.** The English carries no digit the Latin lacks: no spelled-out chapter number occurs in the body.

### Translation choices

- ⭐⭐ ***vacando* → "by keeping leisure"; *quiescit* → "rest"** — the `bon-praec-c4` / `q5-a2` pair applied at the one site where both families meet; ***vacabimus* (Augustine, n. 1) → "we shall keep leisure"**. See the section above: applied here, the site textually insecure — ✅ **RATIFIED by Wilson at the work-close gate, 2026-09-15.**
- ⭐ **Ruling 2 exercised on BOTH sides, for the first time since `q1-a2`:** *lux* once (Contra 3, *splendoris et lucis* → "splendour and light"), ***lumen* once** (reply 6, *propter defectum **luminis** ex parte nostra* → "a defect of **lumen** on our part") — transliterated per the ruling. *illustrata* (reply 7, *ratio illustrata*) → "illumined", the verb family, not ruled.
- ***intellect-* → "understanding" with ZERO bare "intellect"**: *intellectus non nisi in summe infallibili* → "the understanding"; *fugiat trinitatis **intellectum*** → "flees the understanding of the trinity"; *intellectum placeat et ametur* → "what is understood pleases and is loved"; *rationem intelligendi* → "the reason of understanding"; *ratio intelligendi* (n. 2 of p. 112) → "the reason of understanding". *intelligentia* absent. `contuit-` absent.
- **Ruling 5 is NOT reached in this chunk** — no `fundam.` in any of its 19 entries. **p. 112 n. 4's `fundam. 6.` is `q8`'s**, and `q8` must quote its rendering.
- **The threefold will**, kept literal and parallel to Art. I's threefold necessity: *voluntas accedens* / *antecedens* / *concomitans et acceptans* → "a will that is accedent" / "antecedent" / "concomitant and accepting"; *de novo adveniens* → "supervening anew"; *voluntas complacentiae* → "the will of complacency"; *modus volendi* → "mode of willing".
- ***liberalissimum* → "most liberal"** (the *liberalitas* of `q7-a1`'s reply 9, "liberality"), not "most free", so the *liber*/*liberalis* distinction survives. ***necessitas incommutabilitatis* → "necessity of unchangeableness"** against ***immutabilitatis* → "immutability"** — two Latin words, two English. ***colligantia* → "binding-together"**; ***undique* → "on every side"**.
- ***beatificativum per influentiam* → "beatifying by influence"**; ***sapidissime* → "most savourily"** (the *sapor*/*sapientia* root kept); ***ratio phantastica* / *illustrata* → "phantastic reason" / "illumined reason"** — technical, not "fanciful".
- ***absolutio perfecta* → "perfect absoluteness"** (*absolutum* → "absolute"); ***indifferens ab* → "indifferent from"** (the `q7-a1` rendering).
- ***viatores* → "wayfarers"**; ***laudantur divinitus* → "are praised by God"**.
- The Ecclesiasticus in p. 112 n. 3 is rendered in the Douay register the corpus uses for scripture quoted inside apparatus (*hath*).

### Ledger

**19 entries** (p. 109 n. 7 of seven · p. 110 all ten · p. 111 all five · p. 112 nn. 1–3 of five). **Zero `[?]` flags. Two gutter runovers, zero page-crossing.** What this chunk inherits from `bon-qmt-q7-a1` is **p. 109 n. 7** (position re-derived: argument 1's *Orosium*, left column of the Art. II region) and **`ARTICULUS II.`, its subtitle, the opener and argument 1 on p. 109** (re-read at full width). What it forwards to `bon-qmt-q8` is **p. 112 nn. 4–5** (n. 4 at Q. VIII's argument 1 *prima*, left column; n. 5 at argument 2 *primam*, right column; n. 4 carries a Ruling 5 site) and **`QUAESTIO VIII.`, its subtitle, the opener (unanchored by count) and arguments 1–3 on p. 112**. **QUAESTIO VII IS COMPLETE.**

### ⚠ CITATIONS — 9 RECORDS, ZERO DANGLING, AND TWO INBOUND LINES CHANGE

`build-citations.py` returns **9 records from this chunk: 6 crossref (5 chunk, 1 page-multi) · 3 scripture verse (tier A); ZERO dangling, ZERO unresolvable, ZERO ambiguous.** Corpus QA stays at **202**. Named for the work-close gate, none edited here:

- ⭐ **INBOUND, and a free external control:** `bon-brev-prol` p. 202 n. 3's **`supra pag. 111, nota 1`** — *Verbis videbimus, amabimus… exprimitur sententia August. supra pag. 111, nota 1. allata* — now resolves to this chunk, **and it is right**: p. 111 n. 1 is that very Augustine, *De civ. Dei* XXII.30.5. Quaracchi's Breviloquium editors quote the sentence **from *videbimus* on, without *vacabimus*** — worth knowing at the *vacatio* ruling, though it decides nothing.
- ⚠ **INBOUND, degraded not broken:** `bon-itin-c5` p. 309 n. 2's `supra pag. 109, nota 5` resolved at `chunk` level to `q7-a1` until this chunk shared p. 109; it now reads `page-multi` (`q7-a1` + `q7-a2`). The right target is still among the two; p. 109 n. 5 is `q7-a1`'s.
- **Under-captured, not wrong:** p. 109 n. 7's `q. 1. et 2.` yields a record for `q1` only; p. 112 n. 2's `et 17, 1.` (John) and p. 112 n. 3's `Enarrat. in Ps. 134, 3` yield none (the second is the commentary-title shape the resolver deliberately skips). Internal `q. N. a. M.` references (six here) produce no record — true of every chunk in the work.
- **p. 110 n. 1's `tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2`** is `page-multi` (`bon-sent-II-d25-p1-a1-q1` + `-divisio`), as at `q7-a1`.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0