title: Dist. 44, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the fire of hell afflicts the spirit

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum ignis inferni affligat spiritum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ille ignis sit afflictivus spirituum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^p931-1]: *Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius;* sed daemones vel angeli sunt substantiae incorporales, et ille ignis non est eis paratus nisi ad poenam et afflictionem: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius in quarto Dialogorum[^p931-2]: «Si diabolus eiusque angeli, cum sint incorporei, corporeo igne sunt cruciandi, quid mirum, si et animae, antequam recipiant corpora, possint igne corporeo cruciari»? quasi dicat: non est mirum.

3. Item, hoc videtur *ratione* sumta *a causis superioribus*: quia divina iustitia rectissime ordinat omnia in poena, secundum quod sapientia ordinat in natura: si ergo peccatum est dispositio vilissima, ergo spiritus infectus peccato ad hoc, quod debite ordinetur, debet ordinari sub infima creatura. Si ergo infima creatura est substantia corporalis, ordinatio vero peccantium est in poenis: ergo debet

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substantia spiritualis a corpore puniri vel affligi[^p932-1]. Si ergo omne quod congruum est, possibile est; et quod est possibile et congruum ponendum est circa opus divinum: ergo ponendum est, spiritum affligi per ignem corporeum.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur per causas inferiores. Anima existens in corpore patitur, corpore non patiente, ergo est passibilis de sua natura; sed eadem est natura animae in corpore et extra corpus: ergo anima extra corpus est passibilis. *Probatio maioris* manifesta est in dormientibus, qui in somnis gravissime patiuntur, corporibus nihil patientibus[^p932-2]. — Ex hoc igitur arguo ulterius sic: anima extra corpus est passibilis; sed omne quod patitur, patitur ab aliquo, quod habet repugnantiam per qualitatem activam et repugnantem[^p932-3]; spiritualia autem non sunt huiusmodi, sed corporalia: ergo si patitur, patitur a corpore. — Quod autem spiritualia non habeant contrarietatem agentem et patientem, expresse apparet per *exemplum*, quia albedo et nigredo in anima non contrariantur. Apparet etiam per *rationem*, quia quae abstrahuntur ab *esse* materiali abstrahuntur per consequens a contrarietate et mutua actione et passione[^p932-4].

**Ad oppositum** arguitur primo a parte *agentis*, secundo a parte *patientis*[^p932-5]. A parte *agentis* sic:

1. «Omne agens, quod agit in aliquid, agit per contrarietatem et contactum»; sed ignis ad animam nec *contactus* potest esse, nec est *contrarietas* aliqua: ergo nec potest esse actio aliqua. Primum manifestum est per Philosophum[^p932-6], secundum in se manifestum est.

2. Item, «omne agens, quod agit in aliquid, generat similitudinem suam in passo[^p932-7]»; unde calidum non agit in aliquid, nisi illud calefaciat; sed impossibile est, animam esse calidam: ergo impossibile est, quod ignis agat in animam. *Si tu dicas* ad hoc, quod talis actio non est *per naturam*, sed supra naturam, et ignis non agit per virtutem innatam, sed per virtutem desuper sibi datam; *obiicitur contra hoc* de illa virtute: quia illa virtus aut est *corporalis*, aut *spiritualis*. Si *corporalis*, adhuc est inferior anima: ergo non agit in ipsam[^p932-8]; si *spiritualis*; sed omnis virtus spiritualis debet fundari in substantia spirituali: ergo non debet talis virtus *esse* in igne nec debet *dari* igni.

3. Item, illa virtus aut est igne *nobilior*, aut *inferior*. Si igne *inferior*: ergo non agit in animam, sicut nec ignis agebat; si *superior*: ergo cum virtus non debeat esse nobilior substantia, videtur, quod igni non debeat dari. *Quodsi tu dicas*, quod hoc verum est *per naturam*; *quaeritur tunc*: ut quid haec virtus magis datur substantiae ignis quam alicui alii, cum aeque bene possit dari lapidi, sicut igni?

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *patientis*:

4. Sicut ostendit Augustinus in sexto Musicae[^p932-9], impossibile est, magis nobile pati a minus nobili, quia «omne agens praestantius est passo»; sed substantia spiritualis nobilior est corporali: ergo ab ipsa non patitur. *Si tu dicas mihi*, quod per peccatum facta est inferior; *contra hoc* est quod dicit Augustinus in tertio de Libero Arbitrio[^p932-10], quod «substantia spiritualis, quantumcumque peccat, nobilior est nobilissimo corpore».

5. Item, aeque magna distantia est peccati ad ignem, sicut et animae ad ignem; et ita spirituale est peccatum, sicut et anima: ergo si aequaliter distat[^p932-11], nunquam per peccatum anima fit actioni proximior vel habilior: ergo si ab igne non patitur per naturam, nec etiam per culpam.

Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte *passionis*.

6. Nihil affligitur proprie, nisi in ipsum cadat dolor; sed in spiritu separato non cadit dolor: ergo non potest affligi: ergo ab igne non patitur. *Probatio minoris*: «Dolor, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p932-12],

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est sensus divisionis partium cum vi»; sed spiritus separatus caret partibus, caret divisione, caret sensu: ergo caret dolore.

Item, hoc ostenditur a parte *actionis*.

7. Omne puniens laedit[^p933-1], omne quod laedit, adimit; sed a spiritu incorporali nihil potest adimi per corpus: ergo non potest laedi, ergo nec affligi: ergo ab igne non patitur.

### Conclusio

> Ignis inferni affligit etiam spiritus, eos alligando et perceptionem immutando, repugnante cum horrore voluntate.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa praedictam quaestionem triplex fuit via.

Aliqui enim philosophorum negaverunt *simpliciter*, spiritum incorporeum posse cruciari, attendentes ad eius incorruptibilitatem, pro eo quod senserunt, omne incorruptibile[^p933-2] esse impassibile. — Sed iste est error manifestus. Si enim dolor necessario generatur ex *amore cum privatione amati*, sicut aliquis dolet de morte patris, et ex *odio cum praesentia rei displicentis*, sicut aliquis dolet de exaltatione inimici; cum nihil prohibeat in sensum spiritualem cadere *amorem* et alias duas conditiones, nihil prohibet cadere *dolorem*. — Amplius, si «contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem[^p933-3]», et spiritus incorporeus potest *gaudere*; quare etiam et non *dolere*, cum naturaliter in mente eius possint affectiones quatuor alternari?

Et ideo aliorum philosophorum modernorum positio fuit, quod substantia spiritualis dolere potest et pati, non per *actionem* alicuius, sed potius per *privationem*. Posuerunt enim et intellexerunt, quod anima desiderat summum Bonum, quo potest privari propter mala merita in hac vita, et ideo ex eius carentia generatur in ea maxima tristitia; et hanc poenam dixerunt esse post hanc vitam, et non aliam, sicut non est aliud gaudium spiritibus nisi in contemplatione summi Boni. — Et ista positio fuit Algazelis[^p933-4], quae licet veritati magis appropinquaverit, quam praedicta, nihilominus tamen deficit. Si enim originali peccato, ubi est pura privatio iustitiae, debetur poena damni et carentia beatitudinis aeternae; actuali peccato, quod quidem non tantum consistit in privatione, immo etiam in deordinata delectatione, non tantum debetur aeternae beatitudinis carentia, immo etiam poena aliqua afflictiva. — *[margo: Conclusio.]* Et ideo dicit fides christiana, quod spiritus separati cruciantur non tantum per summi Boni absentiam, sed etiam per afflictivi praesentiam. Ad quod credendum sufficit auctoritas Veritatis, Matthaei vigesimo quinto[^p933-5]: *Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum* etc.

*[margo: Modus huius afflictionis. Opinio 1.]* Sed intelligentia magis requirit, quomodo istud possit ratione persuaderi. Et ideo huius rei intelligentiam quidam conati sunt dare aspiciendo ad ordinem divinae iustitiae, sicut in opponendo[^p933-6] tactum est. Cum enim duplex sit ordo, scilicet *naturae* et *divinae iustitiae*, primus *conditionis*, secundus *retributionis*; et anima secundum naturam sit superior igne, merito tamen peccati efficitur inferior corpore: ideo divina iustitia et animam subiicit igni merito peccati et ignem superponit animae, faciendo ipsum instrumentum divinae iustitiae. — Et per hoc volunt omnia obiecta solvere, quia omnia sumuntur secundum ordinem *naturae*, aspiciendo ad animae dignitatem et ignis naturalem virtutem; haec autem actio competit igni per virtutem sibi datam, per quam est divinae iustitiae instrumentum et passio competit animae propter peccati demeritum. —

*[margo: Non satisfacit.]* Sed ista positio adhuc non satisfacit intellectui. Non enim quaerimus hic, quid divina iustitia *possit*, sed qualiter hoc quod facit, *naturae consonum sit*[^p933-7]. — Amplius, si ignis agit per virtutem sibi datam, quare magis deputatur huic actioni quam terra? Et videtur, quod terra magis, quia peccator, cum sit infimus, debet subiici infimae creaturae; terra autem est infimum omnium elementorum et faex: ergo si qualitas ignis naturalis nihil facit ad agendum in animam, sed solum virtus[^p933-8] superaddita; si terrae daretur, aeque bene ageret, et ordo divinae iustitiae ibi clarius appareret.

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*[margo: Opinio 2.]* Et ideo alii sumere volunt rationem ex parte *naturae ipsius animae*, quem modum sumere possumus ab Augustino in duodecimo super Genesim[^p934-1], ubi ostendit, quod anima pati potest, corpore non patiente, etiam acerbissimas passiones, sicut et ibi probat per exempla in somnis et in quadam aegritudine et in vexationibus. Si ergo anima secum trahit affectiones et imagines corporales et per illas et in illis pati poterat in corpore praeter corpus, etiam ad ignis absentiam; multo magis, cum separata erit, pati poterit in illis et per illas, praesente igne infernali; quia, quamvis ibi non sit passio *corporalis*, est tamen ibi passio *animalis* sive *spiritualis*, quae vera passio est et vera afflictio, ac per hoc vera punitio. — *[margo: Non sufficit.]* Sed nec istud fideli animae sufficit, pro eo quod credimus, spiritus angelicos, qui carent imaginibus et affectionibus ex corpore tractis, igne corporeo cruciari. — Credimus *etiam*, quod poena illa infernalis sit per veram *ignis actionem*, non per phantasticam imaginationem. — *Amplius*, si substantia spiritualis certa[^p934-2] est, quod ab igne laedi non potest; ergo imaginatio ignis non generat in ea terrorem nec passionem, nisi aliud occurrat quam ipsius animae natura vel dispositio ex corpore contracta.

Et ideo, cum non possit sufficiens ratio sumi ex parte *divinae iustitiae*, quae rationem nostram quietet, nec ex parte *solius animae*, quae fidei concordet; *[margo: Conclusio 1.]* ideo sumi potest ratio aspiciendo ad *utrumque* per hunc modum. «Dolor enim, sicut patet per Augustinum decimo quarto de Civitate Dei[^p934-3] est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt». Ad hoc ergo, quod dolor generetur in anima ab aliquo, *[margo: Requisita 4.]* duo concurrunt ex parte *animae*, scilicet *perceptio* ex parte cognitionis et *detestatio* ex parte affectionis. Similiter duo requiruntur ex parte *agentis*: unum est, quod immutet animae perceptionem; aliud est, quod violenter et inseparabiliter *adhaereat contra repugnantiam voluntatis*. — *[margo: Determinantur.]* Ex his quatuor duo sunt secundum ordinem *naturae*, et alia duo secundum ordinem *divinae iustitiae*. Quod enim ignis immutet cognitionem[^p934-4] animae, et anima percipiat actionem et calorem ignis; hoc est de potentia naturali utriusque; et hoc patet sic. *[margo: Explicatur.]* Cum enim ignis agit in compositum ex anima et corpore, ibi duplex est passio: una *naturalis*, et haec est *calefactio corporis*; alia *animalis*, et haec est *immutatio sensus*. Prima passio est vera passio, quia est ab igne ut vere agente; secunda passio est ab anima se ipsam movente et ab igne occasionem praebente, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in sexto Musicae[^p934-5]. Sicut ergo, postquam separatur anima, corpus potest pati ab igne passione naturali, quia potest calefieri et inflammari, et hoc per naturalem potentiam utriusque; sic spiritus pati potest passione *animali* et ab igne praesenti *immutari* naturali potentia ignis et animae.

Duo igitur sunt ibi per ordinem *naturae*, alia duo per ordinem *divinae iustitiae*. Quod enim ignis animae indissolubiliter *alligetur*, et anima in eo recludatur ut in carcere, *divinae iustitiae* est, ad quam spectat malefactorem in carcere recludere[^p934-6]. Quod iterum *anima refugiat* ignis calorem, qui per naturam nocere non potest, et trepidet *timore, ubi timor non est*[^p934-7], hoc *divinae iustitiae* est, quae facit trepidare peccatores, immittendo terrorem et horrorem eius rei, qua per naturam sunt superiores. Et quamvis sit illud *divinae iustitiae*, hoc non est *contra ordinem naturae*, sive spiritum *trepidare* quod trepidandum non est, sive spiritum *alligari* corpori. — Et hoc est quod innuit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei[^p934-8], quod sicut anima in hominis conditione iungitur corpori ut dans ei vitam, quamvis illud sit spirituale, et hoc corporale, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit ad corpus *amorem*; sic ligatur igni ut accipiens ab eo *poenam*, et ex illa coniunctione vehementer concipit *horrorem* ac per hoc et *dolorem*, qui verus est, et ex vero igne corporali et ex vera applicatione corporalis ignis ad spiritum causatur secundum quatuor praehabitas conditiones. — His visis, satis facile est ad obiecta respondere.

1. 2. 3. Quod enim obiicitur de *actione*, quod est per contrarietatem et contactum; istud intelligitur de *actione naturali*, cui respondet *passio naturalis*; et hoc est ad generandam speciem consimilem in passo secundum naturam; hic autem est passio *animalis*, qua quidem generatur similitudo spiritualis in passo. Unde Gregorius in quarto Dialogorum[^p934-9] dicit, quod animae in eo ardent, quod ardorem vident; non tamen intendit dicere, quod visio sit tota causa ardoris, sed perceptio ignis

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praesentis cum horrore generat dolorem, quia non est cognitio speculationis tantum, sed potius experientiae. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens et etiam ad alias rationes, quia non oportet ibi poni, *virtutem creatam dari igni*, per quam agat in animam.

4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ex parte *patientis*, quod anima nobilior est corpore; dicendum, quod sicut nunc ignis dicitur agere in animam *coniunctam carni* et ibi generare dolorem, non quia ignis *omnino* sit faciens, sed quia per causationem ignis anima habet necessariam occasionem agendi in se et patiendi a se, cum ipsa sit se ipsam movens, sicut dicit Augustinus in sexto Musicae[^p935-1]; sic intelligendum est in anima *separata*; sed quod fit hic mediante corpore, ibi fit immediate. Unde nec in coniuncta nec in separata agit *vere efficiendo*, sed *occasionem praebendo*, et tamen vere dicitur *affligere* et vere *punire*, sicut vere dicitur *immutare*, quamvis anima speciem potius in se faciat, quam a corpore aliquo fiat in ea. — Nec obstat istud quod obiicitur de *peccato*: quia peccatum non sic disponit spiritum ad passionem, ut faciat ipsum vere materialem respectu ignis, cum sit superior per naturam; sed meretur apud divinam iustitiam, ut, salva natura animae, Deus ipsam igni *alliget* et alligando incarceret[^p935-2], incarcerando horrorem sui carceris immittat, ac per hoc ipsa anima ad praesentiam carceris vero dolore et moestitia se affligat.

*[margo: Notandum.]* 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *dolore*, quod est *divisio partium*; dicendum, quod illa non est *definitio generalis*, sed solummodo doloris, qui est animae ex carne; sed illa quam assignat Augustinus, «dolor est *dissensus ab his rebus*» etc. Ut enim ostendit Augustinus in vigesimo primo de Civitate Dei[^p935-3], dolor potius venit ex *impedimento operationis animae* quam ex *corporis sectione*, sicut patet in paralyticis, in quibus est partium sectio sine afflictione, quia anima in illis non habet operationem, quae ibi impediatur; et quoniam potentiae animae, quae sunt eius partes, quodam modo possunt in suis operationibus inquietari et impediri occasione accepta; hinc est, quod spiritus dolere potest et affligi.

*[margo: Notandum.]* 7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod *puniens laedit et quod laedit adimit*; dicendum, quod sicut in *ademptione peccati* adimitur aliquid de substantia vel potentia animae, non solum de habilitate ad gratiam et iustitiam[^p935-4]; sic per ignem punitivum adimitur illa *habilitas*, secundum quam anima est habilis ad gloriae et beatitudinis laetitiam; nec semper nova adimitur, sed illa ademptio est afflictionis continuatio, sicut supra[^p935-5] dictum est de ademptione, quae fit in corpore. — Et haec dicta sufficiant.

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### Question II. *Whether the fire of hell afflicts the spirit.*

Secondly it is asked whether that fire is afflictive of spirits. And that it is, it seems.

1. Matthew, chapter twenty-five[^p931-1]: *Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels;* but demons and angels are incorporeal substances, and that fire was prepared for them only for punishment and affliction: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues[^p931-2]: «If the devil and his angels, though they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by a corporeal fire, what wonder is it if souls too, before they receive their bodies, can be tortured by a corporeal fire»? as if he were to say: it is no wonder.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a *reason* drawn *from higher causes*: because divine justice most rightly orders all things in punishment, just as wisdom orders [them] in nature: if therefore sin is the vilest disposition, then a spirit infected with sin, in order that it be duly ordered, ought to be ordered beneath the lowest creature. If therefore the lowest creature is a corporeal substance, and the ordering of sinners is [placed] among punishments: therefore

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a spiritual substance ought to be punished or afflicted by a body[^p932-1]. If therefore everything that is fitting is possible; and what is possible and fitting ought to be posited concerning the divine work: therefore it must be posited that a spirit is afflicted through a corporeal fire.

4. Likewise, this is shown through lower causes. A soul existing in the body suffers while the body does not suffer, therefore it is passible of its own nature; but the nature of the soul is the same in the body and outside the body: therefore the soul outside the body is passible. *The proof of the major* is manifest in sleepers, who in dreams suffer most grievously while their bodies suffer nothing[^p932-2]. — From this therefore I argue further thus: the soul outside the body is passible; but everything that suffers, suffers from something that has a repugnance through an active and repugnant quality[^p932-3]; but spiritual things are not of this kind, but corporeal things are: therefore if it suffers, it suffers from a body. — But that spiritual things do not have an acting and suffering contrariety appears expressly through an *example*, because whiteness and blackness in the soul are not contrary. It also appears through *reason*, because things that are abstracted from material *being* are consequently abstracted from contrariety and from mutual action and passion[^p932-4].

**To the opposite** it is argued first on the part of the *agent*, secondly on the part of the *patient*[^p932-5]. On the part of the *agent* thus:

1. «Every agent that acts upon something acts through contrariety and contact»; but between fire and the soul there can be neither *contact*, nor is there any *contrariety*: therefore there can be no action either. The first is manifest through the Philosopher[^p932-6], the second is manifest in itself.

2. Likewise, «every agent that acts upon something generates its own likeness in the patient[^p932-7]»; whence the hot does not act upon anything unless it makes it hot; but it is impossible that the soul be hot: therefore it is impossible that fire act upon the soul. *If you say* to this that such an action is not *by nature*, but above nature, and that the fire does not act by an innate power, but by a power given to it from above; *it is objected against this* concerning that power: because that power is either *corporeal* or *spiritual*. If *corporeal*, it is still inferior to the soul: therefore it does not act upon it[^p932-8]; if *spiritual*; but every spiritual power ought to be founded in a spiritual substance: therefore such a power ought not to *be* in fire nor ought it to be *given* to fire.

3. Likewise, that power is either *nobler* than the fire or *inferior*. If *inferior* to the fire: then it does not act upon the soul, just as neither did the fire; if *superior*: then, since a power ought not to be nobler than [its] substance, it seems that it ought not to be given to fire. *But if you say* that this is true *by nature*; *then it is asked*: why is this power given to the substance of fire rather than to some other, since it could equally well be given to a stone as to fire?

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the *patient*:

4. As Augustine shows in the sixth [book] of the *Music*[^p932-9], it is impossible for the more noble to suffer from the less noble, because «every agent is more excellent than the patient»; but a spiritual substance is nobler than a corporeal one: therefore it does not suffer from it. *If you say to me* that through sin it has been made inferior; *against this* is what Augustine says in the third [book] of *On Free Will*[^p932-10], that «a spiritual substance, however much it sins, is nobler than the noblest body».

5. Likewise, the distance of sin from fire is as great as that of the soul from fire; and sin is spiritual, just as the soul is: therefore, if it is equally distant[^p932-11], never through sin does the soul become nearer or more apt to being acted upon: therefore, if it does not suffer from fire by nature, neither does it [suffer] by fault.

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the *passion*.

6. Nothing is properly afflicted unless pain fall upon it; but upon a separated spirit pain does not fall: therefore it cannot be afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire. *The proof of the minor*: «Pain, as the Philosopher says[^p932-12],

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is the sense of the division of parts by force»; but a separated spirit lacks parts, lacks division, lacks sense: therefore it lacks pain.

Likewise, this is shown on the part of the *action*.

7. Everything that punishes harms[^p933-1], everything that harms takes away; but from an incorporeal spirit nothing can be taken away through a body: therefore it cannot be harmed, therefore neither afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire.

### Conclusion

> The fire of hell afflicts spirits also, by binding them and altering their perception, the will resisting with horror.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that concerning the aforesaid question there were three ways.

For some of the philosophers denied *absolutely* that an incorporeal spirit can be tormented, attending to its incorruptibility, on the ground that they held that everything incorruptible[^p933-2] is impassible. — But that is a manifest error. For if pain is necessarily generated from *love together with the privation of the loved thing*, as when someone grieves over the death of a father, and from *hatred together with the presence of a displeasing thing*, as when someone grieves over the exaltation of an enemy; since nothing prevents *love* and the other two conditions from falling into the spiritual sense, nothing prevents *pain* from falling [into it]. — Furthermore, if «contraries are naturally apt to come to be about the same thing[^p933-3]», and an incorporeal spirit can *rejoice*; why then can it not also *grieve*, since naturally in its mind the four affections can alternate?

And therefore the position of other modern philosophers was that a spiritual substance can grieve and suffer, not through the *action* of anything, but rather through *privation*. For they posited and held that the soul desires the highest Good, of which it can be deprived on account of evil merits in this life, and therefore from the lack of it the greatest sadness is generated in it; and this punishment they said to be after this life, and no other, just as there is no other joy for spirits except in the contemplation of the highest Good. — And this was the position of Algazel[^p933-4], which, although it came nearer to the truth than the aforesaid, nonetheless still falls short. For if to original sin, where there is pure privation of justice, there is owed the punishment of loss and the lack of eternal beatitude; to actual sin, which indeed consists not only in privation but also in disordered delight, there is owed not only the lack of eternal beatitude, but also some afflictive punishment. — *[margin: Conclusion.]* And therefore the Christian faith says that separated spirits are tormented not only through the absence of the highest Good, but also through the presence of an afflictive [thing]. For believing which the authority of Truth suffices, Matthew, chapter twenty-five[^p933-5]: *Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire* etc.

*[margin: The mode of this affliction. Opinion 1.]* But understanding requires further how this can be shown by reason. And therefore some have tried to give the understanding of this matter by looking to the order of divine justice, as was touched upon in the opposing arguments[^p933-6]. For since order is twofold, namely of *nature* and of *divine justice*, the first of *creation*, the second of *retribution*; and the soul according to nature is superior to fire, yet by the merit of sin it becomes inferior to the body: therefore divine justice both subjects the soul to fire by the merit of sin and sets fire over the soul, making it the instrument of divine justice. — And by this they wish to solve all the objections, because all are taken according to the order of *nature*, looking to the dignity of the soul and the natural power of fire; but this action belongs to fire through a power given to it, through which it is the instrument of divine justice, and the passion belongs to the soul on account of the demerit of sin. —

*[margin: It does not satisfy.]* But this position still does not satisfy the intellect. For we are not asking here what divine justice *can* do, but how this which it does is *consonant with nature*[^p933-7]. — Furthermore, if the fire acts through a power given to it, why is it assigned to this action rather than earth? And it seems that earth [rather], because the sinner, since he is the lowest, ought to be subjected to the lowest creature; but earth is the lowest of all the elements and their dregs: therefore if the natural quality of fire does nothing toward acting upon the soul, but only the superadded power[^p933-8]; if it were given to earth, it would act equally well, and the order of divine justice would there appear more clearly.

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*[margin: Opinion 2.]* And therefore others wish to draw the reason on the part of *the nature of the soul itself*, which mode we can draw from Augustine in the twelfth [book] *On Genesis*[^p934-1], where he shows that the soul can suffer, while the body does not suffer, even the most bitter passions, as he there also proves by examples in dreams and in a certain sickness and in vexations. If therefore the soul draws with it corporeal affections and images, and through them and in them was able to suffer in the body apart from the body, even at the absence of fire; much more, when it is separated, will it be able to suffer in them and through them, with the infernal fire present; because, although there be no *corporeal* passion there, there is nonetheless an *animal* or *spiritual* passion there, which is a true passion and a true affliction, and through this a true punishment. — *[margin: It does not suffice.]* But this too does not suffice for a soul faithful [to belief], because we believe that the angelic spirits, which lack images and affections drawn from a body, are tormented by a corporeal fire. — We believe *also* that that infernal punishment is through a true *action of fire*, not through a fantastical imagination. — *Furthermore*, if a spiritual substance is certain[^p934-2] that it cannot be harmed by fire; then the imagination of fire does not generate in it terror or passion, unless something else occur than the nature of the soul itself or a disposition contracted from a body.

And therefore, since a sufficient reason cannot be drawn on the part of *divine justice*, which would quiet our reason, nor on the part of *the soul alone*, which would accord with faith; *[margin: Conclusion 1.]* therefore a reason can be drawn by looking to *both* in this manner. «For pain, as is clear through Augustine in the fourteenth [book] of the *City of God*[^p934-3], is a dissent from those things which happen to us against our will». For this then, that pain be generated in the soul by something, *[margin: The four requisites.]* two things concur on the part of the *soul*, namely *perception* on the part of cognition and *detestation* on the part of affection. Likewise two things are required on the part of the *agent*: one is that it alter the perception of the soul; the other is that it adhere violently and inseparably *against the resistance of the will*. — *[margin: They are determined.]* Of these four, two are according to the order of *nature*, and the other two according to the order of *divine justice*. For that the fire alter the cognition[^p934-4] of the soul, and that the soul perceive the action and heat of the fire; this belongs to the natural power of both; and this is clear thus. *[margin: It is explained.]* For when fire acts upon the composite of soul and body, there is a twofold passion there: one *natural*, and this is the *heating of the body*; the other *animal*, and this is the *alteration of sense*. The first passion is a true passion, because it is from the fire as truly acting; the second passion is from the soul moving itself and from the fire offering the occasion, according to what Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the *Music*[^p934-5]. As therefore, after the soul is separated, the body can suffer from fire by a natural passion, because it can be heated and set aflame, and this through the natural power of both; so the spirit can suffer by an *animal* passion and be *altered* by the fire present through the natural power of the fire and of the soul.

Two things therefore are there through the order of *nature*, two others through the order of *divine justice*. For that the fire be indissolubly *bound* to the soul, and the soul be enclosed in it as in a prison, belongs to *divine justice*, to which it pertains to enclose a malefactor in prison[^p934-6]. That again *the soul shrink from* the heat of the fire, which by nature cannot harm it, and *tremble with fear where there is no fear*[^p934-7], this belongs to *divine justice*, which makes sinners tremble by sending in the terror and horror of that thing over which by nature they are superior. And although that be [a matter] of *divine justice*, this is not *against the order of nature*, whether it be the spirit *trembling* at what is not to be trembled at, or the spirit *being bound* to a body. — And this is what Augustine intimates in the twenty-first [book] of the *City of God*[^p934-8], that just as the soul in the condition of man is joined to a body as giving it life, although the former is spiritual and the latter corporeal, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives *love* toward the body; so it is bound to the fire as receiving from it *punishment*, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives *horror* and through this also *pain*, which is true, and is caused both from the true corporeal fire and from the true application of the corporeal fire to the spirit according to the four aforesaid conditions. — These things seen, it is quite easy to reply to the objections.

1. 2. 3. As for what is objected concerning *action*, that it is through contrariety and contact; this is understood of *natural action*, to which corresponds a *natural passion*; and this is toward generating a like species in the patient according to nature; but here it is an *animal* passion, by which indeed a spiritual likeness is generated in the patient. Whence Gregory in the fourth [book] of the Dialogues[^p934-9] says that souls burn in that they see the burning; yet he does not intend to say that the vision is the whole cause of the burning, but the perception of the fire

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present, together with horror, generates pain, because it is not a cognition of speculation only, but rather of experience. — And through this the reply is clear to the following [objection] and also to the other reasons, because there is no need to posit there that *a created power be given to the fire*, through which it might act upon the soul.

4. 5. To that which is objected on the part of the *patient*, that the soul is nobler than the body; it must be said that just as now the fire is said to act upon the soul *joined to flesh* and there to generate pain, not because the fire is *wholly* the doer, but because through the causation of the fire the soul has the necessary occasion of acting upon itself and suffering from itself, since it is what moves itself, as Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the *Music*[^p935-1]; so it must be understood in the *separated* soul; but what here happens by the mediation of the body, there happens immediately. Whence neither in the joined [soul] nor in the separated one does it act *by truly effecting*, but *by offering an occasion*, and yet it is truly said to *afflict* and truly to *punish*, just as it is truly said to *alter*, although the soul rather makes the species in itself than that it be made in it by any body. — Nor does this stand in the way which is objected concerning *sin*: because sin does not so dispose the spirit to passion that it makes it truly material with respect to fire, since it is superior by nature; but it earns before divine justice that, the nature of the soul being preserved, God *bind* it to the fire and by binding imprison it[^p935-2], and by imprisoning send in the horror of its prison, and through this the soul itself, at the presence of the prison, afflict itself with true pain and sadness.

*[margin: To be noted.]* 6. To that which is objected concerning *pain*, that it is the *division of parts*; it must be said that that is not the *general definition*, but only of the pain which belongs to the soul from the flesh; but the one that Augustine assigns [is]: «pain is a *dissent from those things*» etc. For as Augustine shows in the twenty-first [book] of the *City of God*[^p935-3], pain comes rather from the *impediment of the soul's operation* than from the *cutting of the body*, as is clear in paralytics, in whom there is a cutting of the parts without affliction, because the soul in them has no operation which would there be impeded; and since the powers of the soul, which are its parts, can in a certain way be disturbed and impeded in their operations by an occasion taken; hence it is that the spirit can grieve and be afflicted.

*[margin: To be noted.]* 7. To that which is objected last, that *what punishes harms and what harms takes away*; it must be said that just as in the *taking away of sin* something is taken away from the substance or power of the soul, not only from the aptitude for grace and justice[^p935-4]; so through the punitive fire that *aptitude* is taken away, according to which the soul is apt for the joy of glory and beatitude; nor is a new [thing] always being taken away, but that taking away is the continuation of the affliction, as was said above[^p935-5] concerning the taking away which occurs in the body. — And let these things said suffice.

---

la: Vers. 41: *Discedite a me maledicti* etc.

en: Verse 41: *Depart from me, you cursed* etc.

la: Cap. 29. Finem exhibet textus originalis sic: *possint corporea sentire tormenta.*

en: Chapter 29. The original text gives the ending thus: *[souls] can feel corporeal torments.*

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. seq.: *Cui [affectioni peccati] propterea poenalis adhibetur, ut ordinet eam, ubi talem esse non turpe sit et decori universitatis congruere cogat, ut peccati dedecus emendet poena peccati. Hinc fit, ut peccans creatura superior a creaturis inferioribus puniatur; quia illae tam sunt infimae, ut ornari etiam a turpibus animis possint atque ita decori universitatis congruere.*

en: Augustine, *On Free Will* III, c. 9, n. 26 f.: *To it [the disposition of sin] a penal [order] is applied for this reason, that it may order it, where it may compel [it] not to be shameful to be such and to be fitting to the beauty of the universe, so that the punishment of sin may mend the disgrace of sin. Hence it comes about that a sinning superior creature is punished by inferior creatures; because they are so lowly that they can be adorned even by base souls and thus be fitting to the beauty of the universe.*

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 32. n. 61.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* XII, c. 32, n. 61.

la: Vide Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 50. seqq. (c. 7.).

en: See Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 50 ff. (c. 7).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 121; III. text. 6. et 37. seqq. (II. c. 12; III. c. 4. et 8.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 121; III, text 6 and 37 ff. (II, c. 12; III, c. 4 and 8).

la: In cod. bb secunda manus bene supplevit: *tertio a parte passionis, quarto a parte actionis.*

en: In codex bb a second hand rightly supplied: *thirdly on the part of the passion, fourthly on the part of the action.*

la: Lib. I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 43. et 50. seqq. (c. 7.), IX. Metaph. text. 10. (VIII. c. 5.).

en: Book I of *On Generation and Corruption*, text 43 and 50 ff. (c. 7); *Metaphysics* IX, text 10 (VIII, c. 5).

la: Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 51. (c. 7.): *Ideo et rationabile iam, ignem calefacere, et frigidum infrigidare, et omnino activum assimilare sibi ipsi patiens.* De minori cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. (c. 4.).

en: Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, text 51 (c. 7): *And so it is now reasonable that fire heats, and the cold cools, and in general that the active assimilates the patient to itself.* On the minor cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 6 (c. 4).

la: Vide supra pag. 20, nota 10. — Voci *adhuc* nonnulli codd. praemittunt *ergo.*

en: See above, p. 20, note 10. — To the word *adhuc* some codices prefix *ergo.*

la: Cap. 5. n. 8, ubi ostendit, perabsurdum esse, quod anima fabricatori corpori sit subiecta materies; *«nunquam enim anima est corpore deterior, et omnis materia fabricatore deterior».* — Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 19. (c. 5.): *Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia.* Cfr. tom. II. pag. 748, nota 1.

en: Chapter 5, n. 8, where he shows that it is utterly absurd that the soul be a subject matter to the body that fashions [it]; *«for the soul is never worse than the body, and every matter is worse than what fashions it».* — Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 19 (c. 5): *For the agent is always more honorable than the patient, and the principle than the matter.* Cf. tom. II, p. 748, note 1.

la: Cap. 5. n. 12: *Quamvis enim anima nostra peccatis tabefacta sit, sublimior est tamen et melior, quam si in hanc lucem visibilem verteretur. Et vides profecto, de huius lucis eminentia quantum laudent animae Deum, etiam corporis sensibus deditae.* Cfr. ibid. n. 16, et IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9. Codd. et ed. 1 allegant librum *secundum*, ubi c. 17. n. 46. et c. 18. n. 48. generatim praestantia animae prae corpore asseritur. — Pro *peccat* codd. G L aa *peccatrix.*

en: Chapter 5, n. 12: *For although our soul is wasted by sins, it is nevertheless more sublime and better than if it were turned into this visible light. And you see indeed, from the eminence of this light, how much souls praise God, even those given over to the bodily senses.* Cf. ibid. n. 16, and *City of God* IX, c. 9. The codices and ed. 1 cite the *second* book, where at c. 17, n. 46 and c. 18, n. 48 the general pre-eminence of the soul over the body is asserted. — For *peccat* codices G L aa [read] *peccatrix.*

la: Supple hic *peccatum*, et mox cum codd. E L bb *ignis* post *actioni* (Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. sive VIII. c. 5. requirit ad actionem et passionem, ut activum et passivum *approximentur*). — Edd. *distant.*

en: Supply here *sin*, and shortly, with codices E L bb, *of fire* after *to action* (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 10, or VIII, c. 5, requires for action and passion that the active and passive *be brought near*). — The editions [read] *they are distant.*

la: Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.). Cfr. tom. II. pag. 482, nota 3. — Pro *minoris* Vat. *maioris*, quae etiam cum ed. 1 superius pro *in spiritu separato* substituit *in spiritum separatum.*

en: *Topics* Book VI, c. 3 (c. 6). Cf. tom. II, p. 482, note 3. — For *of the minor* the Vatican [edition reads] *of the major*, which also, together with ed. 1, above substitutes for *in a separated spirit* [the reading] *into a separated spirit.*

la: In libro de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 19. n. 35. dicitur: *Poena enim proprie dicitur laesio, quae punit et vindicat quod quisque commisit.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.

en: In the book *On True and False Penitence* (among the works of Augustine), c. 19, n. 35, it is said: *For punishment is properly called a harm which punishes and avenges what each one has committed.* Cf. II Sent., d. 41, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.

la: Nonnulli codd. *incorporale*, Vat. *incorruptibile vel incorporale.* Inferius pro *necessario* cod. L *manifeste.*

en: Some codices [read] *incorporeal*, the Vatican [edition] *incorruptible or incorporeal.* Below, for *necessarily* codex L [reads] *manifestly.*

la: Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 19, nota 5. allegatum. De quatuor affectionibus (gaudium, dolor, spes et timor) vide tom. III. pag. 555, nota 7. et pag. 556, nota 5, nec non August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. n. 2. — Mox pro *incorporeus*, quod praebent codd. F G O Q U aa, alii codd. et edd. *corporeus.*

en: According to Aristotle, cited above p. 19, note 5. On the four affections (joy, pain, hope and fear) see tom. III, p. 555, note 7, and p. 556, note 5, as well as Augustine, *City of God* XXI, c. 3, n. 2. — Shortly, for *incorporeal*, which codices F G O Q U aa give, the other codices and editions [read] *corporeal.*

la: Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 9, hanc opinionem referens ait: *Unde Algazel, V. libro Physicorum, c. 5, dicit de anima, quae in corpore fuit amatrix corporalium voluptatum, quod illa dispositio propter usum imprimitur in ea et inhaeret vehementer desiderium eius ad illam; postea vero, per mortem, instrumento rei desideratae amisso, remanet desiderium eius et amor; et hic est cruciatus ineffabilis.* Cfr. Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 9. c. 7, ubi docet: *Animae vero malae vident etiam poenam, quam imaginaverant in hoc mundo, et affliguntur ea; forma enim imaginata non est debilior sensibili, sed est maior impressione et claritate, sicut videmus in somnis* etc.

en: Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 9, reporting this opinion, says: *Whence Algazel, in the fifth book of the Physics, c. 5, says of a soul which in the body was a lover of corporeal pleasures, that that disposition is impressed in it through use, and its desire toward that [pleasure] clings vehemently; but afterwards, through death, the instrument of the desired thing being lost, its desire and love remain; and this is an ineffable torment.* Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* tr. 9, c. 7, where he teaches: *But evil souls see also the punishment which they had imagined in this world, and are afflicted by it; for the imagined form is not weaker than the sensible one, but is greater in impression and clarity, as we see in dreams* etc.

la: Vers. 41. — Inferius pro *requirit* cod. A *requiritur.*

en: Verse 41. — Below, for *requires* codex A [reads] *is required.*

la: Scilicet fundam. 3. — Aliquanto inferius pro *merito tamen* edd. cum aliquot codd. *merito causae.*

en: Namely, fundamentum 3. — Somewhat below, for *yet by merit* the editions, with some codices, [read] *by the merit of the cause.*

la: Simile habetur apud August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2. — Inferius pro *terra* edd. bis (secundo loco etiam multi codd.) *terrae*, quae lectio, ut sit congrua, requirit, quod pro *actioni* cum cod. F substituatur *actio.*

en: A similar [statement] is found in Augustine, *On Genesis to the Letter* II, c. 1, n. 2. — Below, for *earth* the editions twice (in the second place also many codices) [read] *to earth*, which reading, to be congruous, requires that for *to the action* one substitute, with codex F, *action.*

la: Ita cod. aa, in aliis et edd. male *videtur.* Mox pro *volunt* codd. L Y *tentaverunt.*

en: So codex aa; in the others and in the editions, wrongly, *it seems.* Shortly, for *they wish* codices L Y [read] *they attempted.*

en: Chapter 32, n. 61.

la: Cod. U *creata*, cod. L *separata*, codd. W Y *separata*; ceteri codd. et edd. *certa.*

en: Codex U [reads] *created*, codex L *separated*, codices W Y *separated*; the rest of the codices and the editions [read] *certain.*

la: Cap. 15. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 383, nota 6.

en: Chapter 15, n. 2. Cf. above, p. 383, note 6.

la: Cod. K *perceptionem sive cognitionem.*

en: Codex K [reads] *perception or cognition.*

la: Cap. 5. n. 9. et 12. — Superius pro *vera passio* codd. HU *naturae passio*, edd. *a natura, quia est passio vera.* Inferius pro *quia potest calefieri* cod. Z *et ab igne praesenti immutari.*

en: Chapter 5, n. 9 and 12. — Above, for *a true passion* codices H U [read] *a passion of nature*, the editions *from nature, because it is a true passion.* Below, for *because it can be heated* codex Z [reads] *and be altered by the fire present.*

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6, verba August.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 6, the words of Augustine.

la: Psalm. 52, 6: *Trepidaverunt timore, ubi non erat timor.* — Superius post *per naturam* cod. F supplet *ei.*

en: Psalm 52:6: *They trembled with fear, where there was no fear.* — Above, after *by nature* codex F supplies *to it.*

la: Cap. 10. n. 1, ubi docet, spiritus corporeis ignibus cruciari *«miris et ineffabilibus modis adhaerendo, accipientes ex ignibus poenam, non dantes ignibus vitam. Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus et animalia fiunt, omnino mirus est nec comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est».* — In hac sententia inferius pro *sic ligatur* edd. *sic spiritus ligatus.* Eaedem edd. superius post *hoc* supplent *tamen*, et pro *quod trepidandum* substituunt *ubi trepidandum.*

en: Chapter 10, n. 1, where he teaches that spirits are tormented by corporeal fires *«by clinging in wondrous and ineffable ways, receiving punishment from the fires, not giving life to the fires. For that other mode too, by which spirits cling to bodies and animals come to be, is altogether wondrous and cannot be comprehended by man—and this is man himself».* — In this passage, below, for *is bound thus* the editions [read] *thus is a spirit bound.* The same editions above, after *this*, supply *nevertheless*, and for *what is to be trembled at* substitute *where it is to be trembled at.*

la: Cap. 29. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. — Superius voci *istud* cod. S praemittit *dicendum quod.*

en: Chapter 29. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. — Above, to the word *this* codex S prefixes *it must be said that.*

la: Cap. 5. n. 9. et 12. — Superius pro *generare* non pauci codd. *aggenerare*, et pro *causationem* codd. E F G M N O Y *actionem*, multi alii cum ed. 1 *curationem*, Vat. *approximationem vel causationem.*

en: Chapter 5, n. 9 and 12. — Above, for *to generate* not a few codices [read] *to generate in addition*, and for *causation* codices E F G M N O Y [read] *action*, many others, with ed. 1, *procurement*, the Vatican [edition] *approximation or causation.*

la: Ita cod. E, in aliis et edd. *incarceretur.* Superius pro *a corpore* Vat. *in corpore.*

en: So codex E; in the others and in the editions [it reads] *be imprisoned.* Above, for *by the body* the Vatican [edition reads] *in the body.*

la: Cap. 3. n. 2. Cfr. ibid. XIV. c. 15. n. 2, ubi etiam praenotata definitio doloris occurrit. Clarius tamen quae hic exhibentur proponit August. in VI. Musicae, c. 5. n. 9. seqq. — In fine solut. verbis *occasione accepta* cod. Y interserit *ab extrinseco.*

en: Chapter 3, n. 2. Cf. ibid. XIV, c. 15, n. 2, where also the aforementioned definition of pain occurs. More clearly, however, Augustine sets out what is here presented in the *Music* VI, c. 5, n. 9 ff. — At the end of the solution, to the words *by an occasion taken* codex Y inserts *from without.*

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 3. — De laesione poenae cfr. August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 2.

en: See II Sent., d. 35, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 3. — On the harm of punishment cf. Augustine, *City of God* XIX, c. 13, n. 2.

la: Quaest. praeced. ad 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: The preceding question, [reply] to 2. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw L99059–99496) collated line-by-line against the p.931–935 two-column PDF bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p93{1..5}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), reading each page Left column then Right, body bands then footer bands. Fresh literal English throughout.
- **Page span corrected** from the skeleton's 931–934 to **931–935**: the Respondeo replies (4–7) overflow onto the top of p.935 above the `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.` banner. `line_end` extended 99450 → **99496**; `printed_pages`/`pdf_pages` extended accordingly. Chunk stops at "*Et haec dicta sufficiant.*" (end of reply 7, right column of p.935); the DUBIA banner and Dub. I. belong to the separate `p2-dubia` chunk and are **not** swallowed here.
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- **Apparatus = 36 entries**, page-qualified and restarting each printed page: p.931 (2: notes 1–2), p.932 (12: notes 1–12, spanning both columns), p.933 (8: notes 1–8; note 4 bridges the left→right footer columns), p.934 (9: notes 1–9), p.935 (5: notes 1–5 only — the reply-anchored footers; p.935 notes 6–8 are anchored in the Dubia and belong to the `p2-dubia` chunk).
- **Marginal glosses** (Quaracchi side-keywords) rendered inline as `*[margo: …]*`: Conclusio; Modus huius afflictionis / Opinio 1; Non satisfacit; Opinio 2; Non sufficit; Conclusio 1; Requisita 4; Determinantur; Explicatur; Notandum (×2 on p.935). A few partially-cropped keyword fragments in the p.934 right-column margin (near the "1. 2. 3." reply) were not fully legible and were left out.
- **Resolved OCR garbles:** p.933 footer note 4 "*moriom*" → **mortem** ("*postea vero, per mortem, instrumento rei desideratae amisso*") — confirmed by sense (ablative absolute). p.932 note 6 "*text. iS.*" → **43**; note 3 "*•50*" → **50**.
- **`[?]` flags (minor, carried to next-session-resume):**
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  - p.934 note 2 (`p934-2`): the codex-siglum tail ("*codd. W Y separata … certa*") is cropped at the band's right edge; reconstructed as "*codd. W Y separata; ceteri codd. et edd. certa*" — the lemma *certa* is secure, the intervening sigla phrasing is a best fit.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 44, Part 1, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Pars I)
Doubts on the Master's text (Part I)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 917 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *resurgentibus non eadem assignatur statura, sed aetas.* Videtur enim male dicere: quia duplex est quantitas, scilicet *temporis* et *extensionis*[^p917-3]; sed qui habuerunt diversam quantitatem molis in diversa resurgent: ergo qui diversam habuerunt aetatem in diversa resurgent. — Item, impossibile est, quod est praeteritum non esse praeteritum[^p917-4]: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis, qui habuit annos centum, non habuerit centum: ergo impossibile est, quod habeat solum triginta duos annos. Sed in hac aetate resurrexit Christus: ergo impossibile est senibus in hac aetate resurgere. — Item, si resurgentibus computatur aetas, aut ergo ab instanti *nativitatis*, aut *resurrectionis*. Si ab instanti *nativitatis*, tunc erunt plus quam centum anni, immo quam mille in aliquibus; si ab instanti *resurrectionis*, tunc non habebit[^p917-5] aliquis unam horam, nedum quod triginta annos. — Item, Dominus nulli detrahet de quantitate *molis*, sed addet his qui minus habent: ergo pari ratione de *aetate*, cum *senectus sit venerabilis*[^p917-6].

Ad haec omnia respondendum, quod aetas resurgentium dupliciter potest intelligi: aut per comparationem ad *principium durationis*, sicut assignatur nobis nunc secundum computationem ab initio nostri *esse*; et sic non computatur aetas in resurgentibus, quia transierunt omnem aetatem et extra statum talem sunt. Alio modo aetas attenditur secundum *dispositionem et valitudinem corporis*; et sic accipitur aetas iuvenilis. Omnes enim tales et tanti resurgent in corpore, quales fuissent in aetate iuvenili; et ita *aetas* non nominat *durationem*, sed *corporis dispositionem*. Si enim Deus modo crearet hominem in eo habitu et statu, quem habet vir in trigesimo anno; tunc diceretur creare[^p917-7] in aetate virili, non ratione computationis temporis, sed habitudinis corporis. Et per haec patent obiecta.

#### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Ut significaret perfectionem virium.* Videtur enim male dicere; quoniam, si femina non est vir, nec quantum ad sexum nec quantum ad virium perfectionem, quia sexus femineus attestatur infirmitati; ergo videtur, quod mulier non resurgat aliquo modo. — Item, sicut dicit Philosophus[^p917-8], «femina est vir occasionatus»: ergo si occasiones non resurgunt in natura quantum ad electos, nec feminae resurgent. — Item, in resurrectione erunt sicut *Angeli Dei*[^p917-9], et hoc erit, quia corpus conformabitur animae; sed in Angelis non est distinctio sexus nec in animabus: ergo etc. — Item, sexus distinctio est propter generationem; sed ibi non erit generatio: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus vigesimo secundo *de Civitate Dei*[^p917-10], aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod sexus femineus non resurget propter praedictam auctoritatem Apostoli: *Donec occurramus omnes in virum perfectum*; sed sicut ipse dicit, ibi dicitur vir non a *sexu*, sed a *virtute*, non corporis, sed mentis, per quem modum <!-- page 918 --> mulier facta vir est, secundum quem modum dicitur in Psalmo[^p918-1]: *Beatus vir, qui non abiit in consilio* etc.; quod intelligi etiam potest de muliere. Et ideo auctoritas ista non negat resurrectionem mulierum; sed manifesta ratio confirmat. Quoniam enim sexus femineus est naturalis et a Deo formatus, qui formavit virilem — quod patet, quia sine ipso non esset perfectio speciei — et in corporibus nostris «natura servabitur, et vitia detrahentur[^p918-2]»: sicut viri resurgent cum sexu virili, non propter generationem, sed propter perfectionem et decorem quantum ad electos, sic feminae in sexu femineo; quia tunc a membris illis dedecus et inhonestas per omnia auferetur, et quod excitavit ad libidinem, excitabit ad Dei laudem.

Quod ergo primo obiicitur, quod dicit defectum virium; dicendum, quod hoc est solum secundum statum praesentem, ibi autem relinquetur sexus et tolletur infirmitas.

Quod obiicitur, quod femina est vir occasionatus; dicendum, quod est loqui de naturae *intentione universali*, et sic femina est de intentione naturae, quae intendit salvare speciem[^p918-3]; et est loqui de *intentione naturae singularis*, quae desiderat rem facere, quanto meliorem et perfectiorem potest, et quod non faciat, hoc est praeter intentionem propter aliquam occasionem incidentem. Et hoc modo est hic, quia natura de semine[^p918-4] faceret virum, si posset; sed quia vel est defectus in virtute et caliditate, vel etiam est debilis coagulatio in semine, vel non directe recipitur in matrice; hinc est, quod mulier generatur et dicitur *vir occasionatus*. Tamen quia istam occasionem necesse est evenire, nec sine ea potest natura salvari in *esse*; ideo natura, quae intendit salvari, utrumque sexum intendit. Et sic patet illud.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod erunt sicut *Angeli*; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo, sed quantum ad hoc, quod erunt immunes ab operibus carnis[^p918-5].

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non erit generatio; dicendum, quod sicut erit vis generativa non ad usum generandi, sed ad perfectionem hominis; sic etiam erunt membra genitalia ad perfectionem corporis[^p918-6].

#### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *non est fas dicere, quod in resurrectione accedat corpori magnitudo.* Videtur enim falsum, quia nanus nec habuit nec habiturus fuit sufficientem magnitudinem in hac vita: ergo nani[^p918-7] boni, quorum corpora sunt deformia, sic erunt in caelesti patria. — Item, qui caret manibus nunquam erat habiturus manus: ergo resurget sine manibus: ergo potest fieri additio membrorum officialium, quia non resurget sine manibus. Quodsi hoc, multo fortius videtur a parte membrorum consimilium, sicut maioris staturae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod statim, ex quo corpus humanum generatum est, statutum est, quantum debet esse *mole*, licet nos non percipiamus; quia iam est ibi totum *ratione*[^p918-8]; esse autem ratione hoc est esse in *quantitate virtutis*, quae distinguitur contra *quantitatem molis*; et hoc est esse secundum potentiam *virtutis augmentativae*. Quantum ergo natura potest istum augmentare, qui nunc parvulus est, tantus debet esse *ratione*, et tantus erit *mole*, nisi impediatur per occasionem. — Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod *quantitas rationis* in aliquo potest *deficere* a statu competente speciei, vel *superabundare*, vel *sufficere*. Quod *sufficiat*, hoc est de integritate naturae; tunc autem dicitur *sufficere*, quando potest tantum corpus producere, quantum competit humanae naturae, quae determinatos habet terminos, sive in parvitate, sive in magnitudine[^p918-9]; inter quos statura Christi tenere medium creditur tanquam perfectissima. Et quamdiu ab illa statura non receditur, ita quod deformitas generetur, dicitur virtus augmentativa sive quantitas rationis *sufficiens*, et resurget unusquisque secundum staturam illi quantitati competentem. — Si vero *receditur* adeo, ita quod deformitas generetur sive in superfluo, sive in diminuto; dicendum, quod tunc *quantitas rationis* fuit *occasionata*, et non <!-- page 919 --> fuit perfecta, sed vitiata; et ideo oportet tunc detrahi, vel addi, non ad *naturae mutationem*, sed potius ad *vitiositatis ablationem*.

Et sic totum patet, quia Augustinus[^p919-1] loquitur, salva integritate et perfectione naturae. Unde generaliter intelligere dat, quod quantum ad *quantitatem rationis* nec fiet additio nec subtractio, nisi etiam fuerit vitii deformatio. Quantum ad *quantitatem molis* fiet *additio* in his, in quibus non fuit perducta ad *quantitatem rationis*; nec oportet, quod Dominus adducat materiam aliunde ad perficiendum, sed possibile est, quod de illo uno totum extrahat; sicut creditur, quod quinque panes sine appositione inter quinque millia hominum multiplicavit per virtutem infinitam[^p919-2]. — Potest tamen esse, quod aliunde addat, et fortasse in illis panibus fecit, et utrumque miraculum fuit. Aliud tamen probabilius videtur.

#### Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de isto exemplo Augustini: *Sed quemadmodum, si statua cuiuslibet solubilis metalli* etc. Videtur enim istud exemplum non valere: quia aliud est artificiatum et aliud statua illa, quae primo fuit fusa, et illa quae post fusa fuit: ergo videtur, si Deus sic reparat, quod alius fuit homo post quam ante.

Ad hoc volunt aliqui dicere, quod exemplum Augustini perfecte conforme est quantum ad *modum* et *identitatem* reparationis et reparati: quantum ad *modum*, quia non oportet singula ad sua loca redire; quantum ad *identitatem*, quoniam, sicut in statua materia subiecta est eadem semel et iterum fusa, sed forma artificialis[^p919-3] est alia; sic in corpore resurrectionis eadem est materia, sed forma carnis et accidentia generata sunt alia; sed tamen homo non est alius, quia forma ultimo completiva et primaria materia secundum substantiam est una et eadem. Unde si statua haberet animam, ipsa diceret: *ego sum renovata*, quia haberet eandem *materiam* et eandem *formam ultimam*, quamvis non haberet intermedias. Sic et in proposito dicunt se habere, quod formae *intermediae* iteratae sunt aliae; attamen homo idem est, maxime ratione *formae*, quia tota ratio personalitatis venit ex parte animae.

Sed tamen istud non sufficit, pro eo quod resurrectio dicitur esse *corporum* humanorum magis proprie quam *coniunctorum*[^p919-4]. Si ergo resurrectio debet esse eiusdem, necesse est, quod corpus humanum sit *idem*; sed nunquam est idem corpus, nisi sit eadem *caro*: ergo oportet, quod *caro*, quae est forma *intermedia*, sit eadem; pari ratione et de aliis formis intermediis; et si oportet, quod *caro* sit eadem, oportet, quod *partes officiales*, ut manus et pes, sint eaedem. — Amplius, Iob decimo nono[^p919-5] expresse dicitur: *In carne mea videbo Deum, Salvatorem meum*: ergo eadem erit caro. Non ergo rectum videtur exemplum Augustini.

Et ideo dicendum ad hoc, quod opera Dei solum non inveniunt perfectam similitudinem in operibus nostris, maxime istud, cum sit *supra naturam* iterare eandem formam numero[^p919-6]; ideo non est intelligendum, istud exemplum adduci quantum ad hoc, sed solum quantum ad hoc, quod sicut artifex creatus reparat de materia eiusdem statuae statuam *consimilem*, ita quod non oportet, partes ad eadem loca redire; sic Deus reparat de materia corporis tui corpus, quod non tantum *simile*, sed *idem* est in substantia; nec oportet, singula ad singula membra redire, ubi est superexcrescentia, quae generaret indecentiam, quia quantum ad hoc loquitur Augustinus, ut patet in littera[^p919-7].

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says, that *to those rising again the same stature is not assigned, but age.* For it seems to be badly said: because quantity is twofold, namely *of time* and *of extension*[^p917-3]; but those who had a different quantity of mass will rise again in different [quantities]: therefore those who had a different age will rise again in different [ages]. — Likewise, it is impossible that what is past should not be past[^p917-4]: therefore it is impossible that someone who had a hundred years should not have had a hundred: therefore it is impossible that he should have only thirty-two years. But Christ rose again at this age: therefore it is impossible for the aged to rise again at this age. — Likewise, if age is reckoned for those rising again, then either from the instant of *birth* or of *resurrection*. If from the instant of *birth*, then there will be more than a hundred years, indeed more than a thousand in some; if from the instant of *resurrection*, then no one will have[^p917-5] even one hour, much less thirty years. — Likewise, the Lord will take away nothing from anyone's quantity of *mass*, but will add to those who have less: therefore by parity of reasoning concerning *age*, since *old age is venerable*[^p917-6].

To all these it must be responded that the age of those rising again can be understood in two ways: either by comparison to the *beginning of duration*, as it is assigned to us now according to the reckoning from the beginning of our *being*; and in this way age is not reckoned in those rising again, because they have passed through every age and are outside such a state. In another way age is regarded according to the *disposition and health of the body*; and in this way youthful age is taken. For all such and so great will rise again in a body such as they would have been at the youthful age; and thus *age* does not name *duration*, but *the disposition of the body*. For if God were now to create a man in that condition and state which a man has in his thirtieth year, then he would be said to create[^p917-7] at a virile age, not by reason of the reckoning of time, but of the condition of the body. And by these things the objections are made clear.

#### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *That it might signify the perfection of powers.* For it seems to be badly said; since, if a woman is not a man, neither as to sex nor as to the perfection of powers, because the female sex bears witness to weakness; therefore it seems that a woman does not rise again in any way. — Likewise, as the Philosopher says[^p917-8], «a woman is a misbegotten man»: therefore if misbegotten things do not rise again in nature as regards the elect, neither will women rise again. — Likewise, in the resurrection they will be as the *Angels of God*[^p917-9], and this will be because the body will be conformed to the soul; but in the Angels there is no distinction of sex, nor in souls: therefore etc. — Likewise, the distinction of sex is for the sake of generation; but there there will be no generation: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says in the twenty-second [book] *of the City of God*[^p917-10], some wished to say that the female sex will not rise again on account of the aforesaid authority of the Apostle: *Until we all meet into a perfect man*; but as he himself says, there "man" is said not from *sex*, but from *virtue*, not of the body, but of the mind, in which manner <!-- page 918 --> a woman is made a man, in which manner it is said in the Psalm[^p918-1]: *Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel* etc.; which can also be understood of a woman. And therefore that authority does not deny the resurrection of women; rather manifest reason confirms it. For since the female sex is natural and formed by God, who formed the male — which is clear, because without it there would not be the perfection of the species — and in our bodies «nature will be preserved, and the defects will be taken away[^p918-2]»: just as men will rise again with the male sex, not for the sake of generation, but for the sake of perfection and beauty as regards the elect, so [will] women in the female sex; because then from those members all disgrace and dishonor will be entirely removed, and what excited to lust will excite to the praise of God.

To what is therefore first objected, that he states a defect of powers; it must be said that this is only according to the present state, but there sex will be retained and weakness will be removed.

To what is objected, that a woman is a misbegotten man; it must be said that there is a speaking about the *universal intention of nature*, and thus a woman is [part] of the intention of nature, which intends to preserve the species[^p918-3]; and there is a speaking about the *intention of the singular nature*, which desires to make a thing as much better and more perfect as it can, and that it does not do so, this is beside the intention on account of some occurring occasion. And in this way it is here, because nature would make a man from the seed[^p918-4], if it could; but because either there is a defect in the power and heat, or also there is a weak coagulation in the seed, or it is not directly received in the womb; hence it is that a woman is generated and is called a *misbegotten man*. Yet because it is necessary for this occasion to occur, nor can nature be preserved in *being* without it; therefore nature, which intends to be preserved, intends both sexes. And thus that is clear.

To that which is objected, that they will be as *Angels*; it must be said that there is not an entire likeness, but as to this, that they will be immune from the works of the flesh[^p918-5].

To that which is objected, that there will be no generation; it must be said that just as there will be a generative power not for the use of generating, but for the perfection of the man; so also the genital members will be for the perfection of the body[^p918-6].

#### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is not right to say that in the resurrection magnitude accrues to the body.* For it seems false, because a dwarf neither had nor was going to have sufficient magnitude in this life: therefore good dwarfs[^p918-7], whose bodies are deformed, will be thus in the heavenly fatherland. — Likewise, he who lacks hands was never going to have hands: therefore he will rise again without hands: therefore an addition of functional members can be made, because he will not rise again without hands. But if this, it seems much more strongly [so] on the part of uniform members, as of greater stature.

I respond: It must be said that immediately, from when the human body was generated, it was determined how much it ought to be in *mass*, although we do not perceive it; because the whole is already there in its formal principle (*ratione*)[^p918-8]; but to be in the formal principle is to be in the *quantity of power*, which is distinguished against the *quantity of mass*; and this is to be according to the potency of the *augmentative power*. Therefore as much as nature can augment this one, who is now a little child, so much he ought to be in his *formal principle*, and so much he will be in *mass*, unless he is impeded by an occasion. — According to this it must be understood that the *quantity of the formal principle* in something can *fall short* of the state befitting the species, or *superabound*, or *suffice*. That it *suffice*, this is of the integrity of nature; and then it is said to *suffice*, when it can produce as much body as befits human nature, which has determinate limits, whether in smallness or in magnitude[^p918-9]; among which the stature of Christ is believed to hold the middle as most perfect. And as long as one does not depart from that stature, such that deformity is generated, the augmentative power or *quantity of the formal principle* is called *sufficient*, and each one will rise again according to the stature befitting that quantity. — But if one *departs* so far, such that deformity is generated either in excess or in defect; it must be said that then the *quantity of the formal principle* was *occasioned*, and was not <!-- page 919 --> perfect, but vitiated; and therefore it must then be diminished or added to, not for a *change of nature*, but rather for the *removal of the defect*.

And thus the whole is clear, because Augustine[^p919-1] speaks with the integrity and perfection of nature preserved. Hence he gives generally to understand that, as regards the *quantity of the formal principle*, there will be neither addition nor subtraction, unless there has also been a deformity of defect. As regards the *quantity of mass*, there will be *addition* in those in whom it was not brought to the *quantity of the formal principle*; nor is it necessary that the Lord bring matter from elsewhere for perfecting [it], but it is possible that from that one [body] he draw out the whole; just as it is believed that he multiplied five loaves without any adding among five thousand men by infinite power[^p919-2]. — Yet it can be that he adds from elsewhere, and perhaps he did so in those loaves, and each was a miracle. Yet another [view] seems more probable.

#### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about that example of Augustine: *But just as, if a statue of any meltable metal* etc. For it seems that this example is not valid: because the artifact is one thing and that statue which was first cast is another, and [another] that which was cast afterward: therefore it seems, if God restores in this way, that the man afterward was other than before.

To this some wish to say that the example of Augustine is perfectly conformable as regards the *mode* and the *identity* of the restoration and of the thing restored: as to the *mode*, because it is not necessary that the individual [parts] return to their own places; as to the *identity*, because, just as in the statue the underlying matter is the same, cast once and again, but the artificial form[^p919-3] is other; so in the body of the resurrection the matter is the same, but the form of the flesh and the generated accidents are other; but nevertheless the man is not other, because the ultimately completive form and the primary matter are, according to substance, one and the same. Hence if the statue had a soul, it would say: *I am renewed*, because it would have the same *matter* and the same *ultimate form*, although it would not have the intermediate [ones]. Thus also in the case at hand they say it holds, that the *intermediate* forms repeated are other; yet the man is the same, especially by reason of the *form*, because the whole account of personhood comes from the side of the soul.

But nevertheless this does not suffice, for the reason that the resurrection is said to be of *human bodies* more properly than of *composites*[^p919-4]. If therefore the resurrection ought to be of the same [thing], it is necessary that the human body be the *same*; but a body is never the same, unless the *flesh* be the same: therefore it must be that the *flesh*, which is an *intermediate* form, be the same; by parity of reasoning also concerning the other intermediate forms; and if it must be that the *flesh* be the same, it must be that the *functional parts*, such as hand and foot, be the same. — Further, in Job the nineteenth[^p919-5] it is expressly said: *In my flesh I shall see God, my Saviour*: therefore the flesh will be the same. Therefore the example of Augustine does not seem correct.

And therefore it must be said to this, that the works of God alone do not find a perfect likeness in our works, especially this one, since it is *above nature* to repeat numerically the same form[^p919-6]; therefore it must not be understood that this example is adduced as regards this [point], but only as regards this, that just as a created artificer restores from the matter of the same statue a *similar* statue, in such a way that it is not necessary that the parts return to the same places; so God restores from the matter of your body a body which is not only *like*, but *the same* in substance; nor is it necessary that the individual [parts] return to the individual members, where there is a superabundance which would generate unseemliness, because as regards this Augustine speaks, as is clear in the text[^p919-7].

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la: Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto. — Codd. R S T bb addunt *sive molis*. — De *minori* cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Categories*, the chapter *On Quantity*. — Codices R S T bb add *or of mass*. — On *the lesser* cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3. — De aetate Christi resurgentis cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: See Book I of the Sentences, d. 42, q. 3. — On the age of the rising Christ cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

la: Ex codd. R S T bb supplevimus *aliquis*. Subinde pro *nedum quod* edd. *qui ante habuit*.

en: From codices R S T bb we have supplied *aliquis* [anyone]. Then for *nedum quod* the editions [read] *qui ante habuit*.

la: Sap. 4, 8: *Senectus enim venerabilis est* etc.

en: Wisdom 4:8: *For venerable old age is* etc.

la: Edd., pro *Si... modo crearet* posito *sic... tunc crearet*, omittunt *quem habet... creare* (cod. U *creari*). — Idem dub. solvitur a S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. et circa lit., et a Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 8.

en: The editions, having put *thus... then he would create* for *If... were now to create*, omit *which... to create* (codex U *creari*). — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, little-question 1 and concerning the text, and by Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 8.

la: Libr. II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. Vide tom. II. pag. 483, nota 5.

en: Book II *On the Generation of Animals*, c. 3. See volume II, p. 483, note 5.

la: Matth. 22, 30: *In resurrectione enim neque nubent neque nubentur, sed erunt* etc.

en: Matthew 22:30: *For in the resurrection they will neither marry nor be given in marriage, but will be* etc.

la: Cap. 17. (ubi etiam rationes ponuntur pro resurrectione sexus feminei, quae inferius tanguntur) et c. 18, in quo exponit verba Apostoli Eph. 4, 13: *Donec occurramus omnes in unitatem fidei et agnitionis Filii Dei in virum perfectum* etc.

en: Chapter 17 (where also reasons are set down for the resurrection of the female sex, which are touched upon below) and c. 18, in which he expounds the words of the Apostle, Eph. 4:13: *Until we all meet into the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, into a perfect man* etc.

la: Psalm. 1, 1. (August. loc. cit. allegat Ps. 111, 1: *Beatus vir, qui timet Dominum*; utique ibi sunt et feminae, quae timent Dominum). — Pro *vir est* cod. L *dicitur vir*. Inferius pro *sed* edd. *sicut*, quae etiam subinde omittunt *naturalis et*, quod codd. F H P R S T praebent, et pro quo alii codd. substituunt *virilis et*, cod. O *sicut virilis et*. Post pauca pro *virilem* plures codd. *mulierem*.

en: Psalm 1:1. (Augustine in the passage cited adduces Ps. 111:1: *Blessed is the man who fears the Lord*; assuredly there too are also women, who fear the Lord.) — For *vir est* [is a man] codex L [reads] *dicitur vir* [is called a man]. Below, for *sed* [but] the editions [read] *sicut* [just as], which also thereupon omit *naturalis et* [natural and], which codices F H P R S T provide, and for which other codices substitute *virilis et* [virile and], codex O *sicut virilis et*. A little after, for *virilem* [male] several codices [read] *mulierem* [woman].

la: August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. seq. (c. 4.), et II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 39. (c. 10.), ubi etiam illud: *In omnibus quod melius est, desiderare naturam semper.* Cfr. de hac solut. II. Sent. d. 20. q. 6. ad 1.

en: Cf. Aristotle, Book II *On the Soul*, text 34 f. (c. 4), and Book II *On Generation and Corruption*, text 39 (c. 10), where also this: *In all things nature always desires what is better.* Cf. on this solution Book II of the Sentences, d. 20, q. 6, ad 1.

la: Cod. U *de se*, edd. cum pluribus codd. *de femina*. Verba *est hic, quia* supplevimus ex cod. F, pro quibus alii codd. *vel quia hic*, *vel quia haec*, *vel quia*.

en: Codex U *de se*, the editions with several codices *de femina* [about a woman]. The words *est hic, quia* we have supplied from codex F, for which other codices [read] *vel quia hic*, *vel quia haec*, *vel quia*.

la: Cfr. August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17.

en: Cf. Augustine, Book XXII *of the City of God*, c. 17.

la: Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 10.

en: The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, little-question 3; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 10.

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd. *varii*.

en: The editions with some codices [read] *varii* [various].

la: August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 14: *Hunc perfectionis modum sic habent omnes, ut cum illo concipiantur atque nascantur; sed habent in ratione, non in mole, sicut ipsa iam membra omnia sunt latenter in semine* etc. — De quantitate *molis* et *virtutis* cfr. supra pag. 399, nota 4. — Superius pro *statutum est* codd. vel *statim scitur*, vel *statim scit* (codd. F O addunt *natura*), vel *statim scimus*, cod. B *statim tantum est ratione sui virtute*, et pro *quantum... mole* codd. R S T U X bb *quantae... molis*.

en: Augustine, Book XXII *of the City of God*, c. 14: *All have this measure of perfection in such a way that they are conceived and born with it; but they have it in the formal principle, not in mass, just as the members themselves are already all latently in the seed* etc. — On the quantity of *mass* and of *power* cf. above p. 399, note 4. — Above, for *statutum est* the codices [read] either *statim scitur*, or *statim scit* (codices F O add *natura*), or *statim scimus*, codex B *statim tantum est ratione sui virtute*, and for *quantum... mole* codices R S T U X bb [read] *quantae... molis*.

la: Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 41. (c. 4.): *Natura autem constantium omnium terminus est et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti.* — Aliquanto inferius pro *secundum staturam*, quod exhibent codd. E Z, alii codd. et edd. *secundum statum*.

en: Aristotle, Book II *On the Soul*, text 41 (c. 4): *But for all constant things there is a limit and formal principle of magnitude and of growth.* — Somewhat below, for *secundum staturam* [according to stature], which codices E Z exhibit, other codices and the editions [read] *secundum statum* [according to state].

la: In textu huius dubii. — Superius edd., pro *adeo* posito *ab ea*, subinde omittunt *fuit occasionata, et* (cfr. dub. praeced., ubi eodem sensu dicitur femina vir *occasionatus*).

en: In the text of this doubt. — Above, the editions, having put *ab ea* for *adeo*, thereupon omit *fuit occasionata, et* (cf. the preceding doubt, where in the same sense a woman is called a *misbegotten man*).

la: Matth. 14, 15. seqq. et Ioan. 6, 9. seqq. — Ex cod. F substituimus *inter* pro *in*. Superius pro *perducta* multi codd. *producta*. — Idem dub. solvitur a S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Matthew 14:15 ff. and John 6:9 ff. — From codex F we have substituted *inter* for *in*. Above, for *perducta* many codices [read] *producta*. — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here concerning the text.

la: Ita codd. R S T bb, cod. O *artificii*, in aliis et edd. *artificis*. Infra pro *renovata* Vat. *revocata*.

en: Thus codices R S T bb, codex O *artificii*, in others and the editions *artificis*. Below, for *renovata* the Vatican [edition reads] *revocata*.

la: Cod. aa addit *et hoc est, quia corpus solum resurgit proprie*.

en: Codex aa adds *and this is, because the body alone properly rises again*.

la: Vers. 26. Vulgata omittit *Salvatorem*.

en: Verse 26. The Vulgate omits *Salvatorem* [my Saviour].

la: Cfr. supra d. 43. a. 1. q. 4. et 5.

en: Cf. above, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4 and 5.

la: Hic c. 2. — Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 11; […]

en: Here c. 2. — Cf. above a. 2, q. 2; Blessed Albert, here a. 11; […]

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (raw L97560–L97795) collated against the p.917–919 two-column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{917,918,919}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), read Left column top→bottom then Right column. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (917→937, 918→938, 919→939), confirmed against running heads "DIST. XLIV. P. I. DUBIA." / "917", "918" / "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV.", and "DIST. XLIV. P. II. DIVISIO TEXTUS." / "919". Fresh literal English. No scholion (dubia have none). This is the *Dubia circa litteram Magistri* for Pars I of d.44 (*De aetate et statura resurgentium*).

**Verified dubia count = 4** (DUB. I, DUB. II, DUB. III, DUB. IV). Counted top-to-bottom off the bands, Left column then Right column: p.917-L holds the banner + DUB. I heading and body opening (through "...secundum dispositionem et valitudinem corporis"); p.917-R continues DUB. I's Respondeo and opens DUB. II; p.918-L continues DUB. II's Respondeo; p.918-R closes DUB. II and opens DUB. III; p.919-L top completes DUB. III's Respondeo ("...fuit perfecta, sed vitiata... Aliud tamen probabilius videtur.") then holds the DUB. IV heading and objection; p.919-R holds DUB. IV's Respondeo, ending "...ut patet in littera." immediately before the Pars II COMMENTARIUS (raw L97796). The raw OCR surfaced only DUB. I/II/III/IV headings; no DUB. V exists — confirmed by eyes-on band read. Each dubium has its objections then a single `Respondeo`.

**Seam with prior chunk (p1-a3-q2).** The preceding quaestio's Respondeo replies 4–5 occupy the top of BOTH columns of p.917, above the DUBIA banner; they are NOT part of this chunk. Consequently p.917 footers **1** (marker ¹ at "in ordine", reply 4) and **2** (marker ² at "torqueri", reply 5) belong to that quaestio and are excluded here. This chunk claims p.917 footers **3–10** (anchored in the DUBIA bodies), all p.918 footers **1–9**, and all p.919 footers **1–7** (p.919 notes 1–2 in DUB. III's tail: Left column; notes 3–7 in DUB. IV: 3 in the *aliqui dicere* section, Left→Right column, 4–7 in the Right column). Apparatus total = 24 entries (8 + 9 + 7).

**End boundary.** DUB. III's Respondeo, cut mid-clause at the p.918/919 seam ("...fuit occasionata, et non …"), was completed from the p.919-L top band; the page break is marked inline `<!-- page 919 -->` between "et non" and "fuit perfecta". DUB. IV closes cleanly on p.919-R at "...ut patet in littera[^p919-7]", immediately before the Pars II COMMENTARIUS (raw L97796) — no open sentence remains.

**[?] flag — [^p919-7].** Quaracchi footer note 7 of p.919 (anchor at "ut patet in littera") continues past the foot of p.919 onto the next page (Pars II region): the p.919 band ends "...B. Albert., hic a. 11;" with a dangling semicolon. Rendered here with a trailing "[…]"; the continuation (p.920 footer) was not read, being outside this Pars I chunk. Flag parked for the decade-polish pass.

**Editorial marginalia omitted.** Quaracchi prints side-captions in the outer margins — "Notandum." (×3), "Error aliquorum.", "Duplex intentio naturae.", and partial "Dis[tinctio]…" / "…sufficiens" / "Item sic…" glosses beside DUB. III. These are editorial navigation labels, not Bonaventure's text, and are trimmed from the running body per corpus convention.

**Minor readings.** `valitudinem` (p.917-L, so printed; not normalized to *valetudinem*). `Ps. 111, 1` in [^p918-1] = Ps. 111(112):1 (OCR "111" = CXI), distinct from the lemma Ps. 1:1. Footnote [^p918-8] cod. sigla "F O" and "B" read off the p.918-R band (raw OCR garbled these to "F" and "h").

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 44, Part 2, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Pars II)
Doubts on the Master's text (Part II)

source_text:
<!-- page 935 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

#### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo super hoc quod dicit: *Illud investigari oportet, utrum monstra resurgant.* Quaeritur de monstris et de gigantibus, utrum resurgant. Et quod sic, videtur, quia nihil debet deperire[^p935-6] humanae naturae. — Item, quomodo poterunt evenire huiusmodi moles tam magnae de corporibus hominum, cum nati fuerint ex Adam?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod monstra non resurgent, pro eo quod non est ibi naturae veritas, sed potius error; unde si sunt magnitudinis giganteae in via, in patria non erunt.

*Si vero quaeras:* unde habuerunt ortum? dicendum, quod, sicut narrat Iosephus[^p935-7], daemones incubi, assumtis corporibus, generant, et daemon ostendit mulieri, cum qua concubuit, figuram talem hominis maximi; et ideo tum propter seminis multiplicationem, tum propter virtutem animalem generatus fuit homo mirae magnitudinis, et ille postmodum alios generat. — *Si quaeras:* quomodo daemon generare potest, cum solus «homo generet hominem[^p935-8]»? ad hoc potest responderi, quod daemon, prius assumta
<!-- page 936 -->
effigie mulieris, se ipsum subiicit viro et ipsum semen susceptum transfundit et conservat, sicut novit per aliqua remedia, ne calor et spiritus evanescant. — Sed hoc totum magis est coniecturae quam rationis rectae[^p936-1].

#### Dub. II.

Item de hoc quod dicit, quod *absit, ut illum bimembrem, quem nuper* etc.; quaeritur, quando aliquis est in parte bimembris, in parte habet membra unita[^p936-2], utrum debeat resurgere unus, vel duo, quia, qua ratione debet resurgere unicus, videtur, quod duo, et e converso. — Item, similis casus est, quando est hermaphroditus et natus in utroque sexu; quaeritur, in quo debeat resurgere, quia qua ratione resurget in uno, et in altero: ergo vel resurget in neutro, vel in utroque.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de monstro, quod in parte habet duo membra, in parte unum, in parte distincta, in parte unita, distinguendum est: quia aut habet distinctionem in membris *principalibus* et unionem in *non principalibus,* aut e converso. Si habet distinctionem in membris *principalibus,* sunt ibi duae animae, et tunc resurgent duo corpora; si autem habet unitatem in *illis,* distinctionem in *aliis,* resurget unum corpus.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de hermaphrodito, dicendum, quod secundum naturam impossibile est, quod sit omnino indifferens, sicut dicunt medici[^p936-3], quamvis discerni non possit; et ideo debet resurgere in eo sexu, qui dominatur per naturam.

Si vero quaeratur de monstro, quod partim est homo, partim bestia; dicendum, quod si partes principales sunt hominis, si vixit, habuit animam humanam, et ideo ordinatum est ad resurrectionem, et resurget homo secundum totum[^p936-4].

---

english:
<!-- page 935 -->

### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first upon this which he says: *It must be investigated whether monsters rise again.* The question concerns monsters and giants, whether they rise again. And that they do, it seems, because nothing ought to perish[^p935-6] of human nature. — Likewise, how could masses so great arise from the bodies of men, since they were born from Adam?

**I respond:** It must be said that monsters will not rise again, for the reason that there is no truth of nature there, but rather error; hence, if they are of gigantic size on the way, in the fatherland they will not be so.

*But if you ask:* whence did they have their origin? it must be said that, as Josephus[^p935-7] relates, incubus demons, having assumed bodies, generate; and the demon shows to the woman with whom he has lain such a figure of a very great man; and therefore, both on account of the multiplication of the seed and on account of the animal power, a man of wondrous size was generated, and he afterwards generates others. — *If you ask:* how can a demon generate, since only «man generates man[^p935-8]»? to this it can be answered that the demon, having first assumed
<!-- page 936 -->
the effigy of a woman, subjects himself to a man and transfers and preserves the seed received, as he knows how by certain remedies, lest the heat and spirit evaporate. — But all this is a matter of conjecture rather than of right reasoning[^p936-1].

#### Doubt II.

Likewise concerning this which he says, that *far be it, that the two-membered one, whom recently* etc.; it is asked, when someone is in part two-membered, [and] in part has members united[^p936-2], whether he ought to rise as one, or as two — since, by the reasoning by which he ought to rise as a single one, it seems [he should rise as] two, and conversely. — Likewise, a similar case is when there is a hermaphrodite, born in both sexes; it is asked, in which he ought to rise, since by the reasoning by which he would rise in the one, [he would rise] also in the other: therefore either he will rise in neither, or in both.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning the monster which in part has two members, in part one, in part distinct, in part united, a distinction must be made: for either it has distinction in the *principal* members and union in the *non-principal* ones, or conversely. If it has distinction in the *principal* members, there are two souls there, and then two bodies will rise; but if it has unity in *those,* [and] distinction in *the others,* one body will rise.

To that which is asked concerning the hermaphrodite, it must be said that according to nature it is impossible that it be wholly indifferent, as the physicians say[^p936-3], although it cannot be discerned; and therefore it ought to rise in that sex which dominates by nature.

But if it be asked concerning the monster which is partly man, partly beast; it must be said that if the principal parts are those of a man, if it lived, it had a human soul, and therefore it is ordained to the resurrection, and the man will rise according to the whole[^p936-4].

---

la: Cod. S. addit *de veritate.* Inferius pro *poterunt* codd. E I K *potuerunt.*

en: Codex S adds *de veritate* ("of the truth"). Below, for *poterunt* codices E I K read *potuerunt.*

la: Libr. I. de Antiq. Iud. c. 5. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 219, nota 4.

en: Book I *On the Antiquities of the Jews,* c. 5. Cf. vol. II, p. 219, note 4.

la: Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. (VI. c. 7.). — Inferius pro *aliqua remedia* cod. B *aliqua media,* cod. C *aliqua animalia* (plures codd. *amicitia,* cod. O *sacrificia,* cod. M *alia*), codd. I K *aliquam vim,* codd. N aa *aliquas astutias.* Cfr. II. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 3. q. 1, ubi hac de re agens S. Bonav. ait: *Quadam sagacitate ipsum [semen] in sua virtute custodiunt* etc.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, text 22 (VI, c. 7). — Below, for *aliqua remedia* ("certain remedies") codex B [reads] *aliqua media,* codex C *aliqua animalia* (several codices *amicitia,* codex O *sacrificia,* codex M *alia*), codices I K *aliquam vim,* codices N aa *aliquas astutias.* Cf. II Sent., d. 8, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, where, treating of this matter, St. Bonaventure says: *By a certain shrewdness they preserve the [seed] itself in its own power,* etc.

la: Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 44; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The same doubt is resolved by Blessed Albert, here a. 44; Richard of Middleton, here on the text.

la: Ita recte cod. F, in aliis et edd. *divisa;* infra pro *videtur, quod* cod. U *ea ratione et.*

en: So rightly codex F; in the others and the editions, *divisa;* below, for *videtur, quod* codex U [reads] *ea ratione et.*

la: Cfr. Avicenna, III. Canon. Fen 20. tr. I. c. 43.

en: Cf. Avicenna, *Canon* III, Fen 20, tr. I, c. 43.

la: Vide de hoc dubio S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: See on this doubt St. Thomas, here on the text.

translators_notes:
**Verified dubia count = 2 (Dub. I, Dub. II).** Counted top-to-bottom, Left column then Right column, on the p.935–936 bands: p.935-L opens with the banner *DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI* and *Dub. I* (which continues across p.935-R and onto p.936-L top, ending "...rationis rectae¹"); p.936-L then carries *Dub. II* (objection) whose Respondeo continues onto p.936-R, ending "...resurget homo secundum totum⁴", immediately after which *DISTINCTIO XLV* begins. No hidden third dubium surfaced (unlike Pars I, which concealed a Dub. IV); the OCR had likewise surfaced only Dub. II in this cascade-merged region, so the bands were decisive.

**Seam (start):** the top of p.935 above the banner (both columns: "praesentis cum horrore generat dolorem... — Et haec dicta sufficiant.") is the overflow tail of the preceding chunk (a. 3, q. 2, *De poena damnatorum*) and is NOT part of this chunk. This chunk begins at the *DUBIA* banner. Accordingly, p.935 footers nn. 1–5 (Musicae VI; incarceretur; de Civ. Dei XXI/XIV; II Sent. d. 35; Quaest. praeced. ad 2) belong to a. 3 q. 2, not here; only the p.935 dubia footers nn. 6, 7, 8 are claimed.

**Seam (end):** stopped before *DISTINCTIO XLV* (raw L99733). The *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* block at the foot of p.936-R (nn. 1–2, "In Evang. Ioan. tr. 49..." etc.) belongs to Lombard's text of d.45 and is excluded.

**Apparatus:** 7 entries total — p.935 nn. 6–8; p.936 nn. 1–4. Page-qualified labels preserve the printed per-page numbering (Quaracchi restarts each page).

**Editorial marginalia omitted** per the trim rule: the Quaracchi side-glosses *Notandum,* *Ad quaest. incid. secundum Iosephum,* *Alia quaestio solvitur,* and *Distinguendum* (visible in the margins of p.935-R, p.936-L, p.936-R) are editorial labels, not Bonaventure's text, and are not rendered in the body.

**No `[?]` flags.** One resolved glyph ambiguity worth noting: the footnote marker after "homo generet hominem" prints small and reads like "6" on the band, but it is note **8** (the Aristotle *Metaph.* VII reference), confirmed by the matching footer content; rendered [^p935-8] with confidence.