title: Dist. 47, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the letter of the Master

source_text:
<!-- page 847 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially 1–12 across the apparatus block that falls on the printed page bearing DUB. I–V (848).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de illo verbo Augustini: *Ad eorum damnationem, quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam*. Videtur enim improprie loqui, quia supra quadragesima distinctione dicitur, quod praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribus. Item, Damascenus: «*Non ad puniendum plasmavit nos Deus*»: ergo male dicit. — Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum Deus sit summe iustus, sicut summe misericors: quare magis dicitur proprium Dei misereri, quam condemnare sive punire.

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Damascenus distinguit voluntatem Dei in antecedentem et consequentem. Potest igitur praeparatio esse quantum ad utramque; et sic est praeparatio bonorum, et hoc modo est praeparatio simpliciter et praedestinatio proprie dicta. Alio modo praeparatio accipitur large, secundum quamcumque voluntatem; et sic est malorum et est praedestinatio large. Magister autem et Damascenus supra acceperunt proprie, sed Augustinus accipit communiter; et sic patet contrarii solutio.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de opere misericordiae, dicendum, quod magis est proprium Dei misereri, quia ad opus misericordiae non requiritur nisi Dei benignitas; sed ad hoc, quod severitatem iustitiae faciat, praesupponitur nostra iniquitas; et ideo illud magis appropriatur ipsi Deo quam hoc.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *mala fiunt praeter Dei voluntatem, sed non praeter permissionem*. Videtur enim male loqui, quia cum permissio sit signum voluntatis divinae, si fiunt praeter voluntatem, ergo etiam praeter permissionem[^1]. Item, quaeritur, quae differentia est inter fieri praeter voluntatem et contra; et videtur quod nulla, quia Matthaei duodecimo[^2]: *Qui non est mecum, contra me est*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod fieri praeter voluntatem hoc est, quia voluntas Dei nec est in *hoc fieri*, nec in eius oppositum; et ita praeter voluntatem fit quod nec fit secundum voluntatem nec contra, et inter haec medium est. Dominus autem in Matthaeo intelligit de praeceptis, quae qui negligit inimicus Dei efficitur. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod permissio est signum voluntatis beneplaciti; dicendum, quod non est signum, quod Deus velit illud quod permittitur, sed quod velit illud quod ex eo elicitur. Et sic patet illud[^3].

#### DUB. III.

Item, quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Sed non praeter eius permissionem, quae ipse non est*. Secundum hoc videtur, quod permissio non sit Deus. Contra: Deus est sua actio: ergo Deus est sua permissio, cum permissio sit actio Dei. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum ratione connotati; tunc obiicitur, quod voluntas Dei similiter aliquid connotat circa volitum.

**Respondeo:** Dici potest, quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum, qui dicunt, nomina sex generum non praedicare aliquid de Deo vel in Deo, sed a Deo. Sed haec opinio supra[^4] improbata est. — Et ideo potest dici, quod Magister loquitur de permissione ratione sui connotati, quod importat ratione sui nominis. Et si tu obiicias de voluntate, quod connotat; dicendum, quod verum[^5] est ex adiuncto, sed non est ita de principali significatione nominis.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Neque ideo praecepit omnibus bona pro eo, quod vellet ab omnibus bona, quae praecepit fieri*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia praeceptum Dei est signum voluntatis Dei, sicut praeceptum nostrum est signum voluntatis nostrae; sed rectus homo nunquam praecipit aliquid alicui, nisi quod vult fieri[^6]: ergo multo fortius nec ipse Deus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus et Magister sequens Augustinum, quando de voluntate beneplaciti loquuntur, semper accipiunt pro voluntate, qua Deus absolute vult aliquid evenire; et de hac non est dubium illud quod dicit. Sed ulterius magistri secundum Damascenum distinguunt voluntatem antecedentem[^7] sive quantum in se est, et huius signum est praeceptum; et de hac non loquitur Augustinus nec Magister.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *praecepit et in nova et in veteri Lege, quae ab eis quibus praecepit, fieri noluit*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia praeceptum est signum divinae voluntatis: ergo si praecipiebat quod nolebat, videtur quod illos decipiebat, quibus praecipiebat. Item, videtur falsum dicere, quod noluit immolationem Isaac, quia Abraham volebat[^8]: ergo voluntatem suam divinae non conformabat: ergo non merebatur, ut videtur. Item, quare Abraham paravit se ad obediendum, non autem curatus in Evangelio[^9]?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quaedam praecepit[^10] Dominus ad faciendum, ut praecepta moralia, quaedam ad probandum, id est probatum ostendendum, quaedam ad erudiendum; et horum duorum exempla tanguntur in littera[^11]. In praecepto igitur Abrahae significatur, non quod Deus velit immolationem, sed quod vult Abraham velle; et ideo, cum voluit, se sibi[^12] conformavit. In praecepto vero, quod fecit curato, significavit, se velle contemptum laudis; et ideo Abraham laudandus est in voluntate obedientiae, et curatus in hoc, quod non tacuit.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS ON THE LETTER OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: *Unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment*. For this seems to speak improperly, since above at the fortieth distinction it is said that predestination is concerning saving goods. Likewise, Damascene: «*Not for punishing did God fashion us*»: therefore he speaks ill. — Alongside this it is asked, since God is most just, just as he is most merciful: why is it rather said to be proper to God to be merciful, than to condemn or to punish.

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**I respond:** It must be said that Damascene distinguishes the will of God into antecedent and consequent. Therefore the preparation can be as to either; and so there is a preparation of goods, and in this mode there is preparation properly and predestination strictly so called. In another mode preparation is taken broadly, according to any will whatever; and so there is [a preparation] of evils, and there is predestination broadly. The Master, however, and Damascene above took it properly, but Augustine takes it commonly; and so the solution of the contrary [argument] is plain.

To that which is asked concerning the work of mercy, it must be said that it is rather proper to God to be merciful, because the work of mercy requires nothing but God's kindness; but for this — that he should exercise the severity of justice — our iniquity is presupposed; and therefore the former is more appropriated to God himself than the latter.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that *evils come about beside the will of God, but not beside his permission*. For this seems ill said, because, since permission is a sign of the divine will, if they come about beside the will, then also beside the permission[^1]. Likewise, it is asked what the difference is between coming about *beside* the will and *against* it; and it seems there is none, because in Matthew chapter twelve[^2]: *He who is not with me is against me*.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to come about beside the will* is this: that the will of God is neither in *this coming about*, nor in its opposite; and so it comes about beside the will, since it comes about neither according to the will nor against, and there is a middle between these. The Lord, however, in Matthew, understands [it] concerning the precepts, which whoever neglects becomes an enemy of God. — As for what is objected, that permission is a sign of the will of good pleasure: it must be said that it is not a sign that God wills that which is permitted, but that he wills that which is elicited from it. And so that is plain[^3].

#### Doubt III.

Likewise, it is asked concerning what he says: *But not beside his permission, which he himself is not*. According to this it seems that permission is not God. On the contrary: God is his own action: therefore God is his own permission, since permission is an action of God. If you say, this is said by reason of what is connoted; then it is objected that the will of God likewise connotes something with respect to the thing willed.

**I respond:** It can be said that the Master speaks according to the opinion of those who say that the names of the six genera do not predicate anything of God or in God, but from God. But this opinion has been disproved above[^4]. — And therefore it can be said that the Master speaks of permission by reason of what it itself connotes, which it imports by reason of its own name. And if you object concerning the will, that it connotes [something]: it must be said that this is true[^5] from an adjunct, but it is not so concerning the principal signification of the name.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Nor did he therefore command good things to all on the ground that he willed from all the good things which he commanded to be done*. For this seems false to say, since God's precept is a sign of God's will, just as our precept is a sign of our will; but an upright man never commands anything to anyone except what he wills to be done[^6]: therefore much more so does not God himself.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine, and the Master following Augustine, when they speak of the will of good pleasure, always take it for that will by which God absolutely wills something to come about; and concerning this [will] there is no doubt as to what he says. But further, the masters, following Damascene, distinguish the antecedent will[^7] — or [the will] as it is in itself — and the sign of this is the precept; and concerning this Augustine does not speak, nor does the Master.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *he commanded both in the new and in the old Law things which he did not will to be done by those to whom he commanded them*. For this seems ill said, because a precept is a sign of the divine will: therefore if he was commanding what he did not will, it seems that he was deceiving those to whom he was commanding [it]. Likewise, it seems false to say that he did not will the immolation of Isaac, since Abraham was willing it[^8]: therefore he was not conforming his will to the divine: therefore he was not meriting, as it seems. Likewise, why did Abraham prepare himself to obey, but not the man cured in the Gospel[^9]?

**I respond:** It must be said that some things the Lord commanded[^10] for doing — like the moral precepts; some for proving — that is, for showing what is proved; some for instructing; and examples of two of these are touched on in the text[^11]. In the precept to Abraham, therefore, it is signified, not that God wills the immolation, but that he wills Abraham to will it; and therefore, when he willed [it], he conformed himself to him[^12]. But in the precept which he made to the cured man, he signified that he wills contempt of praise; and therefore Abraham is to be praised in the will of obedience, and the cured man in this, that he did not keep silent.

---

la: In plurimis mss. et ed. I, ordine inverso, legitur: *si fiunt praeter permissionem, ergo et praeter voluntatem*; vitiose.

en: In very many manuscripts and ed. I the reverse order is read: *if they come about beside permission, therefore also beside the will*; faultily.

la: Vers. 30.

en: Verse 30.

la: Cfr. supra q. 2. et 3.

en: Cf. above q. 2 and 3.

la: Dist. 35. dub. 4, ubi haec opinio pluribus verbis explicatur. — Paulo inferius loco *ratione sui connotati* cod. T cum pluribus aliis et ed. I *ratione connotati*, et dein post *connotati* cod. V adiungit *scilicet mali*.

en: Dist. 35, dub. 4, where this opinion is explained at greater length. — A little below, in place of *ratione sui connotati*, cod. T with very many others and ed. I have *ratione connotati*, and then after *connotati* cod. V adds *scilicet mali* ("namely, of evil").

la: Cod. V *quod hoc verum*. — Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a S. Thoma, Petro a Tar. et Richardo a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Cod. V has *quod hoc verum*. — This doubt is also resolved by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the letter.

la: Codd. cum ed. I incongrue *facere*. Paulo ante pro *rectus* cod. V *iustus*.

en: The codices with ed. I have, incongruously, *facere* ("to make/do"). A little before, in place of *rectus*, cod. V has *iustus* ("just").

la: Vat. sic; sed ulterius Ioannes Damascenus distinguit voluntatem etiam in antecedentem. Eadem Vat. paulo ante *et de hoc* pro *et de hac*. — Cfr. supra q. 1, nec non Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: The Vatican [reads] thus; but further on, John Damascene distinguishes the will also into antecedent. The same Vatican [edition] a little before has *et de hoc* for *et de hac*. — Cf. above q. 1, as well as Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the letter.

la: Gen. 22, 2. seqq.

en: Genesis 22:2 ff.

la: Marc. 1, 40, ubi narratur, leprosum, qui a Domino mundatus fuerat, se sanatum esse praedicasse et diffamasse, neglecto Domini vetito.

en: Mark 1:40, where it is narrated that the leper, who had been cleansed by the Lord, proclaimed and made known abroad that he had been healed, neglecting the Lord's prohibition.

la: Non pauci codd. cum ed. I *praecipit*.

en: Not a few codices, with ed. I, have *praecipit* ("commands" [present]).

la: Cap. 3, scil. exemplum quod praebuit Abraham, et illud quod praebuit ille leprosus mundatus. — Pro *tanguntur* codd. V W *ponuntur*.

en: Chap. 3, namely, the example which Abraham furnished, and that which the cleansed leper furnished. — In place of *tanguntur*, codd. V W have *ponuntur*.

la: Pro *sibi* Vat. *illi*. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra q. 4; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 37. m. 1; B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 80, m. 2, a. 1; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., nec non Durand., hic q. 3.

en: In place of *sibi*, the Vatican has *illi*. — On this doubt cf. above q. 4; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 37, m. 1; Bl. Albert, *Summa* p. I, tr. 20, q. 80, m. 2, a. 1; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Mediavilla, here in their commentary on the letter; as well as Durandus, here q. 3. ---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 J4 Class D/E health-scan false positive (confirmed, not fixed):** the health scan
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same false-positive pattern documented in `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §2 (cf.
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 48

title_alt:
Distinctio XLVIII. — Littera Magistri
Distinction XLVIII — The Master's Text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 849 -->

### DISTINCTIO XLVIII.

### Cap. I.

#### *Quod homo aliquando bona voluntate aliud vult quam Deus, et mala idem quod Deus.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Sciendum quoque est, quod aliquando mala est voluntas hominis idem volentis, quod Deus vult fieri; et aliquando bona est voluntas hominis aliud volentis quam Deus. Ut enim bona sit hominis voluntas, oportet attendere, quid congruat ei velle et quo fine. Tantum enim interest inter voluntatem Dei et voluntatem hominis, ut in quibusdam aliud congruat Deo velle, aliud homini. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^1]: « Aliquando, inquit, bona voluntate homo vult aliquid, quod Deus non vult bona multo amplius multoque certius voluntate — nam illius mala voluntas esse nunquam potest — tanquam si bonus filius patrem velit vivere, quem Deus bona voluntate vult mori. Et rursus fieri potest, ut hoc velit homo voluntate mala, quod Deus vult bona, velut si malus filius velit mori patrem, velit etiam hoc Deus. Nempe ille vult quod non vult Deus, iste vero id vult quod vult et Deus; et tamen bonae Dei voluntati pietas illius potius consonat, quamvis aliud volentis, quam huius idem volentis impietas. Multum enim interest, quid velle homini, quid[^2] Deo congruat, et ad quem finem suam quisque referat voluntatem, ut approbetur vel improbetur ». Potest enim velle bonum, quod non congruit ei velle, et potest velle bonum, quod congruit, sed non refert ad finem rectum; et ideo non est bona voluntas.

### Cap. II.

#### *Quod Dei voluntas per malas hominum voluntates impletur[^3].*

Illud quoque non est praetermittendum, quod aliquando Dei voluntas bona per malam hominis voluntatem impletur, ut in crucifixione Christi factum est, quem Deus bona voluntate mori voluit; Iudaei vero impia voluntate eum crucifixerunt. Et volebant Iudaei mala voluntate quiddam, quod Deus bona voluntate volebat, scilicet ut Christus pateretur et moreretur; sed volebant et aliquid aliud, quod Deus non volebat, scilicet occidere Christum, quod fuit mala actio et peccatum. Actum quippe Iudaeorum non voluit Deus, passionem vero Christi voluit, sicut et in Psalmo[^4] Christus ad Patrem ait: *Tu cognovisti sessionem meam*, « id est, voluisti et approbasti passionem meam »; tibi enim placuit. Voluit itaque tota Trinitas, ut Christus pateretur, nec tamen voluit, ut Iudaei occiderent: quia voluit poenam Christi, sed non voluit culpam Iudaeorum, nec tamen noluit; si enim noluisset, nec fuisset[^5].

Sed ad hoc opponitur sic: si voluit Deus, ut Christus pateretur, voluit utique, ut pateretur a Iudaeis, vel non. Si voluit, ut non pateretur a Iudaeis, cum passus sit, factum est itaque, quod voluit Deus non fieri. Si autem voluit, eum pati a Iudaeis, ergo voluit, eum occidi a Iudaeis: voluit itaque, ut Iudaei occiderent eum. — Ad quod respondentes dicimus, simpliciter concedendum esse, quod Deus voluit, Christum pati et mori, quia eius passio bonum fuit et causa nostrae salutis. Cum autem dicitur: volebat, eum pati vel occidi a Iudaeis; hic distinguendum est. Si enim intelligitur sic: volebat, eum sustinere passionem sive crucifixionem a Iudaeis illatam, verus est sensus; si vero intelligitur sic: volebat, ut Iudaei occiderent eum, falsum est. Non enim volebat Deus actionem Iudaeorum, quae mala erat, sed volebat passionem bonam; et haec voluntas per malas Iudaeorum voluntates impleta est. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^6]: « Deus quasdam voluntates suas utique bonas implet per malorum hominum voluntates malas, sicut per malevolos Iudaeos bona voluntate Patris Christus pro nobis occisus est; quod tantum bonum fuit, ut Apostolus Petrus, quando id fieri nolebat, satanas ab ipso, qui occisus est, diceretur ». — Ecce manifeste habes, magnum bonum fuisse, quod Christus occisus est; et hoc bonum quia Petrus nolebat, ideo redargutus est.

### Cap. III.

#### *Utrum placuerit viris sanctis, quod Christus pateretur et moreretur.*

Ex quo solvitur quaestio, qua quaeri solet, utrum viris sanctis placere debuerit, quod Christus pateretur vel occideretur. Debuit enim eis placere intuitu nostrae redemptionis, sed non intuitu ipsius[^7] cruciatus. Voluerunt ergo ac vehementer cupierunt, Christum mori propter liberationem hominis et impletionem <!-- page 850 --> divinae voluntatis; sed non voluerunt delectatione[^8] ipsius afflictionis. De eodem ergo laetabantur et tristabantur, sed ob aliud gaudebant et propter aliud dolebant. Volebant igitur, Christum mori pro hominis redemptione, et tamen de morte ipsius diversis de causis corda eorum varie movebantur.

### Cap. IV.

#### *Utrum passiones Sanctorum debeamus velle.*

Si vero quaeritur, utrum eodem modo sentiendum sit de passionibus et martyriis Sanctorum; dicimus, aliquam esse differentiam inter passionem capitis et membrorum. Christi namque passio causa est nostrae salutis, quod non est passio alicuius Sancti. Nullius enim passione redempti sumus nisi Christi. Profuerunt quidem non modo eis qui passi sunt, verum etiam aliis fidelibus ipsorum passiones; verumtamen nostra redemptio non sunt: hoc enim illius sola passio potuit, qui Deus est et homo. Illius ergo passionem credentium piae mentes voluerunt et optaverunt fieri, sicut futuram[^9] credebant; passiones vero Sanctorum possumus velle et nolle, et utrumque bona voluntate, si rectos nobis proponamus fines. Cui enim placuit Pauli passio eo fine, quia praemium eius per hoc auctum et paratum cernebat, bonam videtur habuisse voluntatem, quae voluntati eius congruebat, qua *cupiebat dissolvi et esse cum Christo*[^10]. Qui autem voluit, eum declinare passionem et effugere manus iniquorum, compassione pietatis, et ille habuit bonam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^11]: « Bonae apparebant voluntates piorum fidelium, qui nolebant, Apostolum Paulum Ierusalem pergere, ne ibi pateretur mala, quae Agabus propheta praedixerat. Et tamen hoc illum Deus pati volebat pro annuntianda fide Christi, exercens martyrem Christi; neque ipse bonam voluntatem suam implevit per Christianorum voluntates bonas, sed per Iudaeorum malas; et ad eum potius pertinebant qui nolebant quod volebat, quam illi per quos volentes factum est quod volebat, quia id ipsum mala voluntate fecerunt, quod Deus bona voluntate voluit[^12] ». Ita et in passione Christi factum est. Quod enim Deus voluit, hoc idem Iudas, Iudaeus et diabolus, sed illi mala voluntate, Deus vero bona voluntate, scilicet ut Christus moreretur. Verumtamen illi actum voluerunt, quem Deus non voluit.

Explicit liber primus[^13]; incipit secundus.

---

english:
<!-- page 849 -->

### DISTINCTION XLVIII.

### Chapter I.

#### *That a man sometimes with a good will wills something other than [what] God [wills], and with an evil will the same [thing] which God [wills].*

It must also be known that sometimes the will of a man is evil while willing the same thing which God wills to be done; and sometimes the will of a man is good while willing something other than [what] God [wills]. For in order that the will of a man may be good, one must attend to what is fitting for him to will, and to what end. For there is so great a difference between the will of God and the will of a man, that in certain matters it is fitting for God to will one thing, [and] for a man another. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^1]: « Sometimes, he says, a man with a good will wills something which God does not will with a will much more amply and much more certainly good — for his [God's] will can never be evil — as if a good son wills his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die. And again it can happen that a man wills with an evil will that which God wills with a good [will], as if an evil son wills his father to die, [and] God also wills this. Indeed the one wills what God does not will, the other wills that which God also wills; and yet the piety of the former, although willing something other [than God], harmonizes more with God's good will than the impiety of the latter, willing the same [as God]. For it makes much difference what it is fitting for a man to will, what[^2] for God, and to what end each refers his will, so that it may be approved or disapproved ». For [a man] can will a good which it is not fitting for him to will, and he can will a good which is fitting, but not refer [it] to the right end; and therefore [his] will is not good.

### Chapter II.

#### *That the will of God is fulfilled through the evil wills of men[^3].*

That also is not to be passed over, that sometimes the good will of God is fulfilled through the evil will of a man, as was done in the crucifixion of Christ, whom God with a good will willed to die; the Jews however with impious will crucified him. And the Jews with an evil will willed a certain thing which God with a good will was willing, namely that Christ should suffer and die; but they also willed something else, which God was not willing, namely to kill Christ, which was an evil action and a sin. The deed of the Jews indeed God did not will; but the passion of Christ he did will, just as also in the Psalm[^4] Christ says to the Father: *Thou hast known my sitting* — « that is, thou hast willed and approved my passion »; for it pleased thee. The whole Trinity therefore willed that Christ should suffer, yet did not will that the Jews should kill [him]: because [God] willed the punishment of Christ, but did not will the guilt of the Jews, nor yet was he unwilling [it]; for if he had been unwilling [it], it would not have come to pass[^5].

But against this it is objected thus: if God willed that Christ should suffer, he willed either that he should suffer at the hands of the Jews, or not. If he willed that he should not suffer at the hands of the Jews — since he did suffer — then it has come to pass which God willed not to be done. But if he willed him to suffer at the hands of the Jews, then he willed him to be killed by the Jews: he therefore willed that the Jews should kill him. — Responding to which we say that it must simply be conceded that God willed Christ to suffer and to die, because his passion was a good and the cause of our salvation. But when it is said: he willed him to suffer or to be killed by the Jews; here a distinction must be made. For if it is understood thus: he willed him to undergo the passion or crucifixion inflicted by the Jews, the sense is true; but if it is understood thus: he willed that the Jews should kill him, it is false. For God was not willing the action of the Jews, which was evil, but he was willing the good passion; and this will was fulfilled through the evil wills of the Jews. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^6]: « God indeed fulfills certain of his own good wills through the evil wills of evil men, just as through the malevolent Jews, with the good will of the Father, Christ was killed for us; which was so great a good, that the Apostle Peter, when he was unwilling that it should happen, was called Satan by him who was killed ». — Behold, plainly thou hast it that it was a great good that Christ was killed; and because Peter was unwilling [for] this good, therefore he was rebuked.

### Chapter III.

#### *Whether it pleased holy men that Christ should suffer and die.*

From which is resolved the question which is wont to be asked, whether it ought to have pleased holy men that Christ should suffer or be killed. For it ought to have pleased them with a view to our redemption, but not with a view to his[^7] torment. They therefore willed and vehemently desired Christ to die for the deliverance of man and the fulfillment <!-- page 850 --> of the divine will; but they did not [will it] with delight[^8] in his affliction itself. Concerning the same thing therefore they rejoiced and were saddened, but on account of one thing they rejoiced, and on account of another they grieved. They willed therefore that Christ should die for the redemption of man, and yet concerning his death their hearts were variously moved by diverse causes.

### Chapter IV.

#### *Whether we ought to will the passions of the Saints.*

But if it be asked whether the same is to be thought concerning the passions and martyrdoms of the Saints; we say that there is some difference between the passion of the head and [that] of the members. For the passion of Christ is the cause of our salvation, which is not [true of] the passion of any Saint. For we are redeemed by the passion of no one save Christ. Their passions indeed profited not only those who suffered, but also other faithful; nevertheless they are not our redemption: for this his passion alone could [do], who is God and man. The pious minds therefore of believers willed and desired his passion to come to pass, just as they believed [it] was to come[^9]; but the passions of the Saints we can will and not will, and both with a good will, if we set before ourselves right ends. For he to whom Paul's passion was pleasing on this account, that he discerned his reward to be thereby increased and prepared, seems to have had a good will, which harmonized with [Paul's] own will, by which he *was desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ*[^10]. But he who willed [him] to decline the passion and to escape the hands of the wicked, out of the compassion of piety, he also had a good will. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*[^11]: « The wills of pious faithful appeared good, who were unwilling that the Apostle Paul should go to Jerusalem, lest he should there suffer the evils which the prophet Agabus had foretold. And yet God was willing him to suffer this for the proclaiming of the faith of Christ, training [him as] a martyr of Christ; nor did [God] himself fulfill his good will through the good wills of Christians, but through the evil [wills] of the Jews; and those rather pertained to him who were unwilling [for] what he was willing, than those by whose willing was done that which he was willing, because they did the very same thing with an evil will which God with a good will willed[^12] ». So also it was done in the passion of Christ. For that which God willed, this same thing [willed] Judas, the Jew, and the devil, but they with an evil will, [and] God with a good will, namely that Christ should die. Nevertheless they willed the deed which God did not will.

Here ends the first book[^13]; the second begins.

---

la: Cap. 101. n. 26. — Vat. cum pluribus edd. omittit *inquit*.

en: *Enchiridion*, c. 101, n. 26. — The Vatican edition with most others omits *inquit* ("he says").

la: Vat. cum paucis edd. addit *velle*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few others adds *velle* ("to will").

la: In cod. E et ed. 1 hic incipit d. XLVIII.

en: In codex E and edition 1 distinction XLVIII begins here.

la: Psalm. 138, 2, et August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. n. 1. — Etiam ea quae praecedunt secundum sensum collecta sunt ex August., Enchirid. c. 101. n. 26.

en: Psalm 138, 2, and Augustine, *Commentary on this Psalm*, n. 1. — Also the things which precede have been gathered according to the sense from Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 101, n. 26.

la: Cod. D *nec fecisset*, A B *non fuisset*.

en: Codex D [reads] *nec fecisset* ("nor would he have done [it]"); A, B [read] *non fuisset* ("it would not have been").

la: Cap. 101. n. 26. — In fine respicitur Matth. 16, 23.

en: *Enchiridion*, c. 101, n. 26. — At the end reference is made to Matthew 16, 23.

la: Codd. *eius*.

en: The codices [read] *eius* ("his") [in place of *ipsius*].

la: Cod. D *dolorem*, C *dilectione*, E *dilectionem*.

en: Codex D [reads] *dolorem* ("grief"), C *dilectione* ("with love"), E *dilectionem* ("love").

la: Ita codd., Vat. cum aliis edd. *futuram*.

en: Thus the codices; the Vatican edition with other editions [reads] *futuram* ("to be").

la: Phil. 1, 23. — Immediate ante Vat. et ed. 4 *quia* pro *qua*.

en: Philippians 1, 23. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition and edition 4 [read] *quia* in place of *qua*.

la: Loc. cit. — Respicitur illud factum, quod narratur Act. 21, 10. seqq.

en: Loc. cit. — Reference is made to that event which is recounted in Acts 21, 10 and following.

la: Ita codd. et edd., excepta Vat., quae cum originali sic habet: *quia id ipsum quidem, sed ipse per eos bona, illi autem mala voluntate fecerunt*. — Immediate post Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 omittendo *Iudas* habent *Iudaei*, aliae omittunt *Iudaeus*.

en: Thus the codices and editions, except the Vatican, which with the original has it thus: *quia id ipsum quidem, sed ipse per eos bona, illi autem mala voluntate fecerunt* ("because [they did] this same thing indeed, but he through them [did it] with a good will, [and] they with an evil will"). — Immediately after, the Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9, by omitting *Iudas*, have *Iudaei*; the others omit *Iudaeus*.

la: Ita cod. B; codd. A C E: *Hic finitur primus liber de mysterio Trinitatis; incipit liber secundus de rerum creatione et formatione corporalium et aliis pluribus* (deest in A) *eis pertinentibus*. In cod. D et in edd. haec rubrica paulo aliter exhibetur.

en: Thus codex B; codices A, C, E [read]: *Here ends the first book on the mystery of the Trinity; here begins the second book on the creation of things and the formation of bodily [creatures] and on many other matters* (lacking in A) *pertaining to them*. In codex D and in the editions this rubric is displayed somewhat differently.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 48, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVIII. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XLVIII. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 850 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XLVIII.

#### *De conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad voluntatem divinam.*

> *Sciendum quoque est, quod aliquando mala est voluntas hominis* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Haec est tertia pars, in qua agit Magister de conformatione voluntatis nostrae ad voluntatem divinam. Et dividitur haec pars in quatuor partes.

In *prima* Magister ostendit, quod ad conformitatem voluntatis nostrae et divinae non sufficit conformitas in volito. In *secunda* ostendit, quod non sufficit conformitas in operatione sive in opere operato, ibi: *Illud quoque non est praetermittendum.* In *tertia* Magister solvit ex hoc quandam quaestionem a latere, utrum scilicet Sancti debeant passionem Christi velle, ibi: *Ex quo solvitur quaestio, quae quaeri solet.* In *quarta* vero et ultima Magister movet quaestionem iuxta hanc et determinat, ibi: *Si vero quaeritur, utrum eodem modo sentiendum sit*; ubi ostendit, quod dissimiliter iudicandum est de passionibus Sanctorum et ipsius Christi.

<!-- page 851 -->

### DIST. XLVIII. ART. I. QUAEST. I.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quaeritur de conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad voluntatem Dei. Et circa hoc duo principaliter quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur de ipsa conformitate quantum ad quidditatem.

*Secundo* quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad tentionem[^1].

Circa primum articulum duo quaeruntur.

*Primo* quaeritur, utrum possibile sit voluntatem nostram conformari voluntati divinae.

*Secundo*, utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat voluntatem nostram iustam.

---

english:
<!-- page 850 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XLVIII.

#### *On the conformity of our will to the divine will.*

> *"It must also be known that the will of man is sometimes evil,"* etc.

### Division of the text.

This is the third part, in which the Master treats of the conformity of our will to the divine will. And this part is divided into four parts.

In the *first* the Master shows that, for the conformity of our will to the divine will, conformity in the thing willed does not suffice. In the *second* he shows that conformity in operation, or in the work performed, does not suffice, there: *"That also is not to be passed over."* In the *third* the Master, on the basis of this, solves a certain question from the side, namely whether the Saints ought to will the Passion of Christ, there: *"From which is resolved the question that is wont to be asked."* In the *fourth* and last the Master raises a question alongside this and determines it, there: *"But if it is asked whether it ought to be felt in the same way"*; where he shows that judgment must be made differently concerning the sufferings of the Saints and those of Christ Himself.

<!-- page 851 -->

### Dist. XLVIII. Art. I. Quaest. I.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction, inquiry is made concerning the conformity of our will to the will of God. And concerning this, two things are principally asked.

*First*, inquiry is made concerning the conformity itself with respect to its quiddity.

*Second*, inquiry is made concerning it with respect to its holding-fast[^1].

Concerning the first article two questions are asked.

*First*, it is asked whether it is possible for our will to be conformed to the divine will.

*Second*, whether the conformity of our will to the divine will makes our will just.

---

la: *Id est obligationis.*

en: That is, of obligation.


title: Dist. 48, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum possibile sit voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati conformari

source_text:
<!-- page 851 -->

### Articulus Unicus. *De conformitate voluntatis nostrae ad divinam.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum possibile sit, voluntatem nostram divinae voluntati conformari.*

Quod autem non sit possibile, nostram voluntatem conformari divinae, ostenditur sic.

1. *Isaiae* quinquagesimo quinto[^1]: *Sicut exaltantur caeli a terra, ita exaltatae sunt viae meae a viis vestris, et cogitationes meae a cogitationibus vestris*. Sed sicut est in viis et cogitationibus, sic et in voluntatibus: ergo si caelum et terra non habent conformitatem, immo difformitatem, videtur similiter, quod nec voluntas nostra et voluntas divina. Si dicas, quod auctoritas intelligitur et loquitur de malis; contra: super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Exultate iusti*, Glossa: « Quantum distat Deus ab homine, tantum distat voluntas Dei a voluntate hominis »: ergo etc.

2. Item, infinite distantium nulla est conformitas[^3]; sed Deus et homo distant in infinitum, cum unum sit finitum et aliud infinitum: ergo nulla est conformitas voluntatum.

3. Item, si voluntas nostra conformatur divinae, aut ergo se ipsa, aut in tertio. Si in tertio: ergo divina voluntas et humana conveniunt in aliquo communi; et si hoc, ergo habent aliquid simplicius se[^4]; quod est inconveniens, maxime in divina voluntate. Restat ergo, quod si est conformis, quod se ipsa conformetur: ergo voluntas est ipsa conformitas. Sed conformitas non potest esse difformis: ergo voluntas nostra non potest discordare a divina, quod est manifeste falsum.

4. Item, si voluntas nostra est conformis divinae, aut hoc convenit essentialiter, aut per participationem. Si essentialiter, redit idem quod prius[^5]; si per participationem, quaero de illo, per cuius participationem voluntas est conformis, utrum sit conforme. Si non, non potest conformare; si sic, tunc aut essentialiter, aut participative: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel stare in aliquo creato, quod sit conforme Deo per essentiam, vel voluntas conformatur Deo per increatum. Sed non est abire in infinitum, nec est ponere, quod Deus sit conformitas voluntatis humanae ad Deum: ergo aliquod creatum essentialiter est conforme. Sed quod essen-

<!-- page 852 -->

tialiter est conforme alicui, essentialiter convenit cum illo, et quod essentialiter convenit, est eiusdem essentiae: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Primae ad *Corinthios* sexto[^6]: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est*; sed non est unus spiritus per unitatem naturae: ergo est unus per conformitatem voluntatis.

2. Item, *Matthaei* duodecimo[^7]: *Omnis qui facit voluntatem Patris mei, qui est in caelis, ille meus frater et soror* etc.; sed non est verum, quod sit frater per propinquitatem sanguinis: ergo est frater per conformitatem voluntatis et dilectionis.

3. Item, quascumque voluntates contingit velle idem et velle opposita, contingit conformari et difformari sive contrariari; sed voluntas divina et humana sunt huiusmodi: hoc patet[^8], ergo etc.

4. Item, quascumque voluntates contingit ad invicem ordinari per perfectam praesidentiam et obedientiam, contingit ad invicem conformari; sed voluntatem humanam contingit divinae per omnia subiacere et obedire[^9]: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas humana potest conformari voluntati divinae per similem habitudinem ad actum, ad obiectum et ad finem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliquid conformari alicui contingit dupliciter: aut quantum ad similitudinem, aut quantum ad habitudinem.

Quantum ad similitudinem contingit tripliciter: aut quando aliqua duo participant tertium, in quo assimilantur, ut cygnus et nix in[^10] albedine; aut cum aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum est similitudo alterius, ut species coloris sive idolum assimilatur colori sive conformatur; aut quando aliquid participat similitudinem, ut speculum vel oculus assimilatur vel conformatur corpori obiecto.

Primo modo non est possibile, aliquam creaturam Deo conformari. Secundo modo aliqua creatura Deo conformatur, ut puta gratia, quae dicitur similitudo Dei, vel gloria, quae est deiformitas. Tertio modo assimilatur et conformatur anima, quae habet gratiam et gloriam. De hac conformitate nihil ad praesens.

Alio modo contingit conformari aliquid alicui secundum consimilem[^11] habitudinem sive comparationem, quae potest dici proportio, cum est rerum eiusdem generis, et proportionalitas, cum est rerum diversorum generum sive non communicantium, ut fiat vis in verbo[^12]. Large tamen loquendo utraque potest dici proportio; et haec nihil ponit commune, quia est per comparationem duorum ad duo, et potest esse et est inter summe distantia.

Et secundum hanc potest voluntas nostra conformari divinae, videlicet per similem habitudinem ad actum, ut sicut Deus quod vult vult liberaliter et caritative, ita et homo; et per similem comparationem ad obiectum, ut quod vult Deus, velit homo; et eodem fine, quo vult Deus, velit homo. Hoc totum possibile est esse, et totum possibile est non esse; et ideo possibile est, voluntatem nostram divinae conformari et difformari. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distat Deus ab homine, et humana voluntas a divina in infinitum; iam patet responsio: quia hoc non impedit conformitatem comparationis, licet impediat conformitatem aequalitatis et univocationis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum se ipsa vel in tertio conformetur; dicendum, quod non se ipsa[^13], nisi loquamur de conformitate longinqua, quae attenditur in imagine. Si autem loquamur de conformitate propinqua, quae consistit in similitudine, sic non se ipsa conformatur, sed mediante gratia, quae non est tanquam tertium ab utroque participatum, sed est sicut similitudo unius et proprietas alterius. Unde gratia est similitudo essentialiter; non tamen oportet, quod essentialiter conveniant[^14] in tertio, quia similitudo se ipsa convenit cum eo cuius est similitudo; et sic patent ambo obiecta.

<!-- page 853 -->

Similiter si loquamur de conformitate quantum ad habitudinem, dicemus, quod voluntas non se ipsa conformatur, sed per comparationem ad alterum, quod tamen neque est de essentia divinae voluntatis, nec humanae, nec tanquam tertium participatum ab utroque. Et sic patet illud.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum conformetur per essentiam, aut per participationem; dicendum, quod nec sic nec sic, sed conformatur per proportionem sive per consimilem habitudinem. Et sic patet illud.

english:
### Article Unique. *On the conformity of our will to the divine.*
### Question I. *Whether it is possible for our will to be conformed to the divine will.*

That it is not possible for our will to be conformed to the divine is shown as follows.

1. *Isaiah* fifty-five[^1]: *As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts*. But as it is in ways and thoughts, so also in wills: therefore if heaven and earth have no conformity, but rather difformity, it seems likewise that neither do our will and the divine will. If you say that the authority is to be understood and speaks of the wicked; on the contrary: on that text of the Psalm[^2], *Rejoice, ye just*, the Gloss: « As far as God is distant from man, so far is the will of God distant from the will of man »: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, of things infinitely distant there is no conformity[^3]; but God and man are distant infinitely, since the one is finite and the other infinite: therefore there is no conformity of wills.

3. Likewise, if our will is conformed to the divine, then either by itself or in a third. If in a third: then the divine will and the human agree in something common; and if so, then they have something simpler than themselves[^4]; which is unfitting, especially in the divine will. It remains, therefore, that if it is conformed, it is conformed by itself: therefore the will is conformity itself. But conformity cannot be difform: therefore our will cannot disagree from the divine, which is manifestly false.

4. Likewise, if our will is conformed to the divine, either this belongs to it essentially or by participation. If essentially, the same returns as before[^5]; if by participation, I ask concerning that, by the participation of which the will is conformed, whether it is itself conformed. If not, it cannot conform [anything]; if yes, then either essentially or participatively: therefore either there will be an infinite regress, or one must stop at some created thing which is conformed to God by essence, or the will is conformed to God by something uncreated. But there is no infinite regress, nor can it be posited that God is the conformity of the human will to God: therefore some created thing is essentially conformed. But what is essentially conformed to something essentially agrees with it, and what essentially agrees is of the same essence: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. First to the *Corinthians*, sixth[^6]: *He who cleaves to God is one spirit*; but he is not one spirit through unity of nature: therefore he is one through conformity of will.

2. Likewise, *Matthew* twelve[^7]: *Everyone who does the will of my Father who is in heaven, he is my brother and sister*, etc.; but it is not true that he is a brother through nearness of blood: therefore he is a brother through conformity of will and love.

3. Likewise, whatever wills can will the same thing and will opposite things can be conformed and difformed or made contrary; but the divine and human wills are of this kind: this is plain[^8], therefore etc.

4. Likewise, whatever wills can be ordered to one another through perfect rulership and obedience can be conformed to one another; but the human will can in all things be subject and obey the divine[^9]: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The human will can be conformed to the divine will by a similar relation to act, to object, and to end.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that one thing can be conformed to another in two ways: either as to likeness, or as to relation.

As to likeness it can happen in three ways: either when two things participate in a third, in which they are made alike, as a swan and snow in[^10] whiteness; or when two things are so related that one is the likeness of the other, as the species of a color or an image (*idolum*) is made like, or conformed, to the color; or when something participates in the likeness, as a mirror or an eye is made like or conformed to the body that is its object.

In the first way it is not possible for any creature to be conformed to God. In the second way some creature is conformed to God, as for example grace, which is called the likeness of God, or glory, which is deiformity. In the third way the soul which has grace and glory is made like and conformed [to God]. Of this conformity, nothing at present.

In another way something can be conformed to another according to a like[^11] relation or comparison, which can be called *proportion*, when it is of things of the same genus, and *proportionality*, when it is of things of diverse genera, or of things not having communication, that emphasis may be put on the word[^12]. But, broadly speaking, both can be called proportion; and this posits nothing common, because it is by the comparison of two things to two, and it can be and is between things most distant.

And it is according to this [latter] that our will can be conformed to the divine, namely, by a like relation to act, so that, as God wills what he wills liberally and charitably, so also does man; and by a like comparison to object, so that what God wills, man may will; and by the same end by which God wills, man wills. All this is possible to be, and all is possible not to be; and therefore it is possible for our will to be conformed to and difformed from the divine. — And the reasons brought for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected, that God is distant from man, and the human will from the divine, infinitely; the response is now plain: because this does not impede the conformity of comparison, although it impedes the conformity of equality and univocation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, whether it is conformed by itself or in a third; it must be said that not by itself[^13], unless we speak of remote conformity, which is observed in the image. But if we speak of proximate conformity, which consists in likeness, then it is not conformed by itself, but by the mediation of grace, which is not as a third participated by both, but is as the likeness of the one and the property of the other. Whence grace is essentially a likeness; nor yet is it necessary that they agree essentially[^14] in a third, because likeness agrees by itself with that of which it is the likeness; and so both objections are clear.

Likewise, if we speak of conformity as to relation, we shall say that the will is not conformed by itself, but by comparison to another, which yet is not of the essence of the divine will, nor of the human, nor as a third participated by both. And so that is plain.

*To 4.* To that which is asked last, whether it is conformed by essence or by participation; it must be said, that neither thus nor thus, but it is conformed by proportion or by a like relation. And so that is plain.

la: *Vers.* 9. — Paulo inferius pro *difformitatem* Vat. cum pluribus mss. incongrue *deformitatem*; ed. 1 omittit *immo difformitatem*.

en: *Verse* 9. — A little further down, for *difformitatem* the Vatican edition with several mss. incongruously reads *deformitatem*; ed. 1 omits *immo difformitatem*.

la: Psalm. 32, 1. — Glossa cit. sumta est ex August., *Enarrat. in dictum Psalm.* n. 2.

en: Psalm 32:1. — The Gloss cited is taken from Augustine, *Enarration on the said Psalm*, n. 2.

la: Ratio est, quia conformitas est secundum aliquam convenientiam et approximationem. Cfr. Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 24. seqq. (c. 4.). Quoad propos. minorem respiciendum est illud Aristot., I. *de Caelo et mundo*, text. 52. et 64. (c. 6. et 7.): *Finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio (ratio)*.

en: The reason is that conformity is according to some agreement and approximation. Cf. Aristotle, VII *Physics* text 24 ff. (c. 4). As to the minor proposition, one must consider that of Aristotle, I *On the Heavens and the World*, text 52 and 64 (c. 6 and 7): *Of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion (ratio)*.

la: Nempe illud commune, in quo conveniunt. Cfr. Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 20. (c. 24.), ubi universale (commune) particularibus simplicius esse docetur. — Paulo post pro *difformis* Vat. cum cod. cc *difformitas*.

en: Namely, that common thing in which they agree. Cf. Aristotle, I *Posterior [Analytics]* c. 20 (c. 24), where the universal (common) is taught to be simpler than the particulars. — A little later, for *difformis* the Vatican edition with cod. cc has *difformitas*.

la: Scilicet, quod nostra voluntas non possit discordare a voluntate divina; quod manifeste falsum est, ut in arg. praeced. dicebatur. — Paulo inferius post *utrum sit conforme* Vat. addit *vel non*. Dein pro *aut participative* cod. T cum pluribus aliis codd. *aut participatione*. In ultima argumenti propositione Vat. et cod. cc post *secundum convenit* repetunt *cum illo*.

en: Namely, that our will could not disagree from the divine will; which is manifestly false, as was said in the preceding argument. — A little further down, after *utrum sit conforme*, the Vatican edition adds *vel non*. Then, for *aut participative*, cod. T with several other codices [reads] *aut participatione*. In the last proposition of the argument, the Vatican edition and cod. cc, after *secundum convenit*, repeat *cum illo*.

la: *Vers.* 17. Vulgata: *Qui autem adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est*.

en: *Verse* 17. Vulgate: *But he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit*.

la: *Vers.* 50. Vulgata: *Quicumque enim fecerit voluntatem... in caelis, ipse meus frater* etc.

en: *Verse* 50. Vulgate: *For whoever shall do the will... in heaven, he is my brother*, etc.

la: Cfr. August., *Enarrat.* 2. in Psalm. 31. n. 26.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Enarration* 2 on Psalm 31, n. 26.

la: Cfr. August., *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 44, 7. sub n. 17, et VIII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 23. n. 44.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 44:7, under n. 17, and VIII *On Genesis to the Letter*, c. 23, n. 44.

la: Cum Vat. retinuimus *in*, etsi haec particula in plurimis codd. desideratur. Cod. X, qui etiam omittit *in*, pro *albedine* exhibet *albedinem*, referens hanc vocem ad verbum *participant*, quam lectionem sequitur Marra in suo Commentario anecdoto. Exemplum in secundo disiunctionis membro allatum: *ut species coloris sive idolum assimilatur colori sive conformatur*, in codd. diversimode mutilatum exhibetur. Plures codd. sic referunt: *ut species coloris sive conformatur*; cod. V, insuper omissis vocibus *sive conformatur*, legit sic: *ut species coloris*; cod. R: *ut species coloris sibi conformatur*; cod. F clarius: *ut species coloris ipsi colori conformatur*; ed. 1 et Vat. denique: *ut species coloris sive idolum assimilatur sive conformatur lovi*. Nostra lectio nititur auctoritate codd. H K M T V et edd. 2, 3. Quid sit *idolum* vide supra pag. 663, nota 5. In tertio disiunctionis membro post *similitudinem* codd. F M P Q adiiciunt *alterius*.

en: With the Vatican edition we have retained *in*, although this particle is lacking in very many codices. Cod. X, which also omits *in*, for *albedine* reads *albedinem*, referring this word to the verb *participant*; Marra in his unpublished Commentary follows this reading. The example brought forward in the second member of the disjunction — *as the species of a color or an image is made like or conformed to the color* — is variously mutilated in the codices. Several codices report thus: *ut species coloris sive conformatur*; cod. V, omitting moreover the words *sive conformatur*, reads: *ut species coloris*; cod. R: *ut species coloris sibi conformatur*; cod. F more clearly: *ut species coloris ipsi colori conformatur*; ed. 1 and the Vatican, finally: *ut species coloris sive idolum assimilatur sive conformatur lovi* [to Jove]. Our reading rests on the authority of codd. H K M T V and edd. 2, 3. What an *idolum* is, see above p. 663, note 5. In the third member of the disjunction, after *similitudinem*, codd. F M P Q add *alterius*.

la: Plures codd. ut H M P Q cum ed. 1 *consimilem*, quam vocem codd. P Q etiam paulo superius ante *habitudinem* adhibent pro *similem*.

en: Several codices, such as H M P Q with ed. 1, [read] *consimilem*, which word codd. P Q also use a little earlier, before *habitudinem*, in place of *similem*.

la: Boeth., II. *de Arithmetica*, c. 40: *Proportionalitas est duarum vel plurium proportionum similis habitudo, etiamsi non eisdem quantitatibus et differentiis constitutae sint. Differentia vero est inter numeros quantitas. Proportio est duorum terminorum ad se invicem quaedam habitudo et quasi quodammodo continentia*. — Pro *proportionalitas* Vat. cum paucis codd. *proportionabilitas*. Paulo inferius eadem Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *et est*.

en: Boethius, II *On Arithmetic*, c. 40: *Proportionality is a like relation of two or more proportions, even if they are not constituted of the same quantities and differences. Difference, however, is a quantity between numbers. Proportion is a certain relation of two terms to one another, and as it were a certain containing*. — For *proportionalitas* the Vatican edition with a few codices reads *proportionabilitas*. A little further down, the same Vatican edition with cod. cc omits *et est*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc hic et paulo ante *in se ipsa*.

en: The Vatican edition with cod. cc, here and a little earlier, [reads] *in se ipsa*.

la: Plures codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 *conveniat*; perperam. Paulo superius pro *sed est sicut* plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *sed etiam sicut*.

en: Several codices with the Vatican edition and ed. 1 [read] *conveniat*; wrongly. A little higher up, for *sed est sicut*, several codices with edd. 2, 3 [read] *sed etiam sicut*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supra (d. 31. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.) triplex distinguitur conformitas: in natura, in voluntate, in operatione sive in actibus voluntatis. Quaestio est de conformitate in actibus liberis sive in volendo et nolendo, et quidem non secundum entitatem naturalem, sed moralem. — Attendendum est ad multiplices distinctiones in corpore positas. Duo membra primae et principalis divisionis (conformitas secundum similitudinem et habitudinem) non indigent explicatione. Tria membra primae subdivisionis fundantur in triplici similitudine, quae esse potest vel in una forma eiusdem speciei (v. g. in albedine), vel in imitatione et repraesentatione (ut in statua), vel in ratione exemplaritatis. Hoc tertium membrum differt a secundo, quia in secundo ipsa statua conformis est originali, sed in tertio membro iuxta exempla adhibita nec oculus nec speculum est aliquid conforme, sed potius continet per participationem exemplar. — Secunda subdivisio coincidit cum communi distinctione analogiae in analogiam attributionis (proportionis) et proportionalitatis. De analogia attributionis vide supra d. 45. q. 5, ubi *sanum* tripliciter distinguitur; de analogia proportionalitatis agitur supra d. 1. a. 3. q. I. ad 1. et in Scholio, et d. 7. q. 4. in Scholio. — Docet autem S. Bonav., conformitatem voluntatis attendi tantum secundum habitudinem et per comparationem ad alterum. Tamen quatenus voluntas informatur gratia, est etiam conformitas secundum similitudinem, ut docetur in solut. ad 3. — Conformitas habitudinis secundum actum et secundum finem vulgo vocatur conformitas in *modo volendi*, conformitas autem secundum obiectum dicitur conformitas in *volito*.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 41. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. 1. tr. 20. q. 80. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Above (d. 31, p. II, a. 2, q. 2) a threefold conformity is distinguished: in nature, in will, and in operation, or in the acts of the will. The question is about conformity in free acts, that is, in willing and not-willing, and indeed not according to natural entity, but moral. — One must attend to the manifold distinctions set forth in the body. The two members of the first and principal division (conformity according to likeness and according to relation) need no explanation. The three members of the first subdivision are founded on a threefold likeness, which can be either in one form of the same species (e.g., in whiteness), or in imitation and representation (as in a statue), or in the character of exemplarity. This third member differs from the second, because in the second the statue itself is conformed to the original, but in the third, according to the examples adduced, neither eye nor mirror is anything conformed, but rather contains the exemplar by participation. — The second subdivision coincides with the common distinction of analogy into analogy of attribution (proportion) and of proportionality. On the analogy of attribution, see above d. 45, q. 5, where "sound" (*sanum*) is threefold distinguished; on the analogy of proportionality, [see] above d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1, and in the Scholion, and d. 7, q. 4, in the Scholion. — St. Bonaventure teaches that conformity of will is observed only according to relation and by comparison to another. Yet inasmuch as the will is informed by grace, there is also a conformity according to likeness, as is taught in the solution ad 3. — Conformity of relation according to act and according to end is commonly called conformity in the *mode of willing*, while conformity according to object is called conformity in the *thing willed*.

**II.** *Authors:* Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 41, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I-II, q. 19, a. 9–10. — B. Albert, here a. 1; on this and the following questions, *Summa* p. 1, tr. 20, q. 80, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.*, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

---


title: Dist. 48, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia super illud Psalmi[^1]: *Rectos decet collaudatio*, Glossa: « Recti sunt qui dirigunt cor suum secundum voluntatem Dei, quae recta est ».

2. Item, secundae ad *Corinthios* sexto[^2]: *Quae participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras?* quasi dicat: nulla. Si ergo divina voluntas iustitia est et lux, si humana voluntas sit iniqua, non potest esse conformis: ergo si est conformis, necesse est esse iustam.

3. Item, conformari regulae iustitiae nihil aliud est quam iustificari[^3]; sed voluntas divina est regula iustitiae, quia non potest obliquari ad aliquod iniquum: ergo conformari voluntati divinae est iustificari.

4. Item, intellectus noster non potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur verus: ergo nec affectus noster potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur iustus; sicut enim veritas est rectitudo intellectus, sic iustitia est rectitudo affectus[^4].

**Contra:**

1. Magister[^5] dicit, et est verbum Augustini, quod « voluntas Dei bona per hominum malas voluntates impletur »; sed unus effectus non procedit ab una causa per aliam, nisi illae causae ad invicem conformentur: ergo contingit malam voluntatem divinae conformari.

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2. Item, conformitas voluntatum consistit in volendo et nolendo idem; sed impius potest velle et nolle quod Deus vult et non vult, ut ponit exemplum Augustinus[^6] de pravo filio, qui vult patrem mori, quod et Deus vult: ergo conformitas non facit voluntatem iustam.

3. Item, quamvis voluntas Dei sit beata, tamen voluntas illi conformis non propter hoc est beata: ergo pari ratione, quamvis sit iusta, non propter hoc voluntas conformis est iusta.

4. Item, si conformitas facit voluntatem iustam, cum velit hominem, qui patitur iniuriam, vindicare, si ille qui patitur iniuriam, vult se vindicare, iuste vult: ergo iustum est exigere vindictam. Si tu dicas, quod Deus vult hominem vindicare, sed non vult, quod homo vindicet se; hoc non solvit, quia saltem tunc liceret homini appetere, quod Deus ipsum vindicaret.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam et secundum actum et secundum volitum facit eam iustam; non autem sola conformitas in volito.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam attenditur secundum proportionem, sicut dictum est[^7]. Duplex est autem proportio voluntatis, scilicet ad actum et ad volitum. Similis proportio ad actum consistit in hoc quod, sicut Deus quod vult vult ex caritate et liberaliter sive iuste et recto fine, sic et homo velit. Similis proportio ad obiectum[^8] est, ut quod vult Deus, etiam homo velit.

Potest igitur conformitas attendi secundum hanc duplicem similitudinem[^9] et comparationem; et sic est sufficiens et facit voluntatem iustam. Potest iterum attendi solum secundum alteram, ut puta secundum volitum; et sic est deficiens, cum careat simili habitudine, et hoc non sufficit ad iustitiam.

De prima conformitate procedunt primae rationes, de secunda secundae.

3. Ad illud tamen quod tertio obiicitur, quod conformitas non facit beatam animam, ergo nec iustam; dicendum, quod beatitudo dicit iustitiam consummatam. Unde plus requiritur ad hoc, ut voluntas fiat beata, quam ut fiat iusta; et ideo non sequitur, quod si non facit beatam, quod non faciat iustam. Tamen, sicut conformitas sufficiens, quae est in volito et ratione volendi, facit voluntatem iustam, sic conformitas superexcellens facit eam beatam. Illa autem est superexcellens, quando in omnibus divinae conformatur et ex nulla parte est difformis, nec in aliquo, saltem in modico[^10].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, iam patet responsio; quia appetens vindictam non conformat se Deo in modo sive in ratione volendi. Deus enim tanquam iustus iudex vult hoc zelo iustitiae; qui autem appetit ultionem sui sive suae iniuriae ut plurimum vult libidine vindictae. Si autem aliquis appetat solum zelo iustitiae, sicut Deus, et ex caritate, tunc dicerem, eum habere voluntatem iustam.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the conformity of our will to the divine makes it just.*

Secondly it is asked whether the conformity of our will to the divine makes it just. And that it does, seems [to be the case]:

1. Because on that text of the Psalm[^1], *Praise becomes the upright*, the Gloss [says]: « The upright are those who direct their heart according to the will of God, which is upright ».

2. Likewise, in the second [letter] to the *Corinthians*, sixth[^2]: *What participation has justice with iniquity? or what fellowship has light with darkness?* — as if to say: none. If, therefore, the divine will is justice and light, [and] if the human will be iniquitous, it cannot be conformed [to it]: therefore if it is conformed, it must necessarily be just.

3. Likewise, to be conformed to the rule of justice is nothing other than to be justified[^3]; but the divine will is the rule of justice, because it cannot be deflected toward anything iniquitous: therefore to be conformed to the divine will is to be justified.

4. Likewise, our intellect cannot be conformed to the divine without being made true: therefore neither can our affection be conformed to the divine without being made just; for as truth is the rectitude of the intellect, so justice is the rectitude of the affection[^4].

**On the contrary:**

1. The Master[^5] says, and it is a saying of Augustine, that « the good will of God is fulfilled through the evil wills of men »; but one effect does not proceed from one cause through another, unless those causes are conformed to one another: therefore it happens that an evil will is conformed to the divine.

2. Likewise, conformity of wills consists in willing and not-willing the same thing; but the impious man can will and not-will what God wills and does not will, as Augustine[^6] sets forth in the example of the wicked son, who wishes his father to die, which God also wills: therefore conformity does not make the will just.

3. Likewise, although the will of God is blessed, nevertheless the will conformed to it is not on that account blessed: therefore, by like reasoning, although [the divine will] is just, the conformed will is not on that account just.

4. Likewise, if conformity makes the will just, since [God] wills that the man who suffers injury be avenged, [then] if the one who suffers injury wills to avenge himself, he wills justly: therefore it is just to exact vengeance. If you say that God wills the man to be avenged, but does not will that the man avenge himself; this does not solve [the difficulty], because at least it would then be permitted to the man to desire that God avenge him.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The conformity of our will to the divine both according to act and according to the thing willed makes it just; but not the sole conformity in the thing willed.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the conformity of our will to the divine is observed according to proportion, as has been said[^7]. There is, however, a twofold proportion of the will, namely to the act and to the thing willed. The like proportion to the act consists in this: that, as God wills what he wills out of charity and liberally, or justly and with a right end, so also man wills. The like proportion to the object[^8] is that what God wills, man also wills.

Conformity can therefore be observed according to this twofold likeness[^9] and comparison; and so it is sufficient and makes the will just. It can again be observed only according to one [of these], for example, according to the thing willed; and so it is deficient, since it lacks the like relation, and this does not suffice for justice.

From the first conformity proceed the first reasons; from the second, the second.

3. As for that which is objected in the third place, that conformity does not make the soul blessed, therefore neither just; it must be said that beatitude bespeaks consummate justice. Hence more is required for the will to be made blessed than to be made just; and therefore it does not follow that if it does not make [the will] blessed, it does not make it just. Yet, just as sufficient conformity, which is in the thing willed and in the manner of willing, makes the will just, so super-excelling conformity makes it blessed. That [conformity] is super-excelling when it is conformed to the divine in all things and is from no part difform, nor in anything, even in a little[^10].

4. As for that which is objected last, the response is now plain; because the one desiring vengeance does not conform himself to God in the manner or in the manner of willing. For God, as a just judge, wills this with zeal for justice; but he who desires the avenging of himself, or of his own injury, for the most part wills [it] with the lust of vengeance. But if anyone desires [it] only with zeal for justice, as God [does], and out of charity, then I should say that he has a just will.

la: Psalm. 32, 1. — Glossa, quae mox affertur, deprompta est ex August., *Enarrat.* 2. in dictum Psalm. n. 2.

en: Psalm 32:1. — The Gloss, which is presently brought forward, is taken from Augustine, *Enarration* 2 on the said Psalm, n. 2.

la: *Vers.* 14. Vulgata: *Quae enim participatio... societas luci ad tenebras?* — Paulo post pro *si humana* Vat. *et humana*.

en: *Verse* 14. Vulgate: *For what participation... fellowship has light with darkness?* — A little later, for *si humana* the Vatican edition [reads] *et humana*.

la: Cfr. de hoc argumento August., *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 93, 15. sub n. 18. seq.

en: Cf. on this argument Augustine, *Enarration on Psalm* 93:15, under n. 18 ff.

la: Cfr. Anselm., *Dialog. de veritate*, c. 12, ubi iustitia definitur « rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata »; et *Dialog. de lib. arb.* c. 8, ubi S. Doctor ait: « nulla autem est iusta voluntas, nisi quae vult quod Deus vult eam velle »; nec non libr. *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 1. c. 6, ubi sic legitur: *Sed quoniam iustitiam, qua iustus est aliquis, constat esse rectitudinem voluntatis, quam dixi; quae rectitudo tunc tantum est in aliquo, cum ipse vult quod Deus vult eum velle*.

en: Cf. Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 12, where justice is defined as « the rectitude of will preserved for its own sake »; and *Dialogue on Free Will*, c. 8, where the holy Doctor says: « no will is just, except that which wills what God wills it to will »; and likewise his book *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will*, q. 1, c. 6, where the following is read: *But since it is agreed that the justice by which someone is just is the rectitude of the will of which I have spoken, [and] that this rectitude is then only in someone when he himself wills what God wills him to will*.

la: Hic c. 2, ubi et verbum Augustini, mox citatum, invenitur. *Enchirid.* c. 101. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Here c. 2, where the saying of Augustine, presently cited, is also found. *Enchiridion* c. 101, n. 26. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1.

la: *Enchirid.* c. 101. n. 26. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., IX. *Ethic.* c. 6, ubi de concordia amicorum agitur; nec non Cicero, *de Amicitia*, c. 6, de quo vide infra a. 2. q. 2. arg. 3.

en: *Enchiridion* c. 101, n. 26. See here the text of the Master [Lombard], c. 1. — On the major proposition, cf. Aristotle, IX *Ethics* c. 6, where concord of friends is treated; and likewise Cicero, *On Friendship*, c. 6, on which see below a. 2, q. 2, arg. 3.

la: *Quaest. praeced.*

en: [In] the preceding question.

la: Pro *obiectum* Vat. *volitum*; cod. R voci *obiectum* adiungit et *volitum*.

en: For *obiectum* the Vatican edition [reads] *volitum*; cod. R adds *volitum* to the word *obiectum*.

la: Plures codd. ut H K V X (M T in marg.) et ed. 1 *habitudinem*.

en: Several codices, such as H K V X (M T in the margin) and ed. 1, [read] *habitudinem*.

la: Cfr. August., *de Beata Vita*, n. 17-36, et XIII. *de Trin.* c. 6-9.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Happy Life*, n. 17-36, and XIII *On the Trinity*, c. 6-9.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Pro maiori elucidatione servire possunt verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. 1. q. 41. m. 2.): « Conformatio potest attendi secundum quatuor genera causarum, scil. quod Deus vult, in volendo ut vult, in volendo quod scimus ipsum velle, in volendo ad quid vult. Prima est conformitas materialis, secunda formalis, tertia est in ratione causae efficientis, quarta in ratione finis. Dicendum ergo, quod si ista quatuor concurrunt, est conformitas perfecta sive conformatio. Sufficiens autem conformitas attenditur in duobus, ut scil. velit homo sicut vult Deus, et propter quid vult. Imperfecta vero conformatio, cum homo vult quod vult [Deus], vel quod scit Deum velle ». — Eandem distinctionem secundum quatuor genera causarum adhibet S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 41. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., S. I. II, q. 19. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** For the greater elucidation, the words of Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. 1, q. 41, m. 2) may serve: « Conformation can be observed according to the four kinds of causes, namely: what God wills, in willing as he wills, in willing what we know him to will, in willing to what end he wills. The first is material conformity, the second formal, the third [is] in the character of efficient cause, the fourth in the character of [final] end. It must therefore be said that if these four concur, there is perfect conformity or conformation. Sufficient conformity, however, is observed in two [of them], namely, that man wills as God wills, and on account of what he wills. But imperfect conformation [is] when man wills what [God] wills, or what he knows God to will ». — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, employs the same distinction according to the four kinds of causes.

**II.** *Authors:* Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 41, m. 2. — Scotus, in both *Scripta*, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, *Summa* I-II, q. 19, a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.*, q. 2.

---


title: Dist. 48, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 855 -->

### Articulus II. *De obligatione conformandi voluntatem nostram divinae.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum teneamur voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae conformare in ratione volendi.*

Quod autem teneamur in ratione volendi, videtur.

1. Quia tenemur, quod facimus, facere iuste. Unde *Deuteronomii* decimo sexto[^1]: *Iuste quod iustum est exsequeris*; sed non fit iuste, nisi quod homo facit secundum conformitatem voluntatis quantum ad rationem volendi, ut velit ex caritate: ergo etc.

2. Item, tenemur diligere Deum ex toto corde, quia hoc praecipitur *Deuteronomii* sexto[^2], et Dominus idem iterat *Matthaei* vigesimo secundo; sed hoc non potest fieri nisi ex caritate: ergo tenemur ad conformitatem in ratione sive in forma volendi.

3. Item, tenemur Deo veraciter obedire; sed veraciter non obedit Deo, nisi qui facit ea voluntate, quam acceptat Deus. Haec autem est voluntas informata caritate: ergo etc.

4. Item, « propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis[^3] »; sed propter conformitatem voluntatis in ratione volendi obligamur ad conformitatem voluntatis in volito, quia finis praecepti est caritas, ut dicit Apostolus primae ad *Timotheum* primo[^4]: ergo multo fortius obligamur ad conformitatem in ratione volendi, ut quod volumus velimus ex caritate.

**Contra:**

1. Deus vult et praecepit parentes honorari[^5]; esto quod opportunitas se offerat, et aliquis honoret patrem ex naturali pietate, non ex caritate, constat quod non peccat; et non conformat voluntatem suam nisi in volito: ergo non tenetur ad rationem volendi.

2. Item, si tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram divinae in ratione volendi, sicut in volito, ergo quotiescumque volumus aliquid non ex caritate, deficit illud ad quod tenemur: ergo peccamus in omni[^6] actu: nullus ergo actus est indifferens.

3. Item, si tenemur conformare in ratione volendi, cum ergo vir peccator habeat voluntatem a Deo continue in hoc deficientem, quia non habet caritatem: ergo continue in omni instanti peccat.

4. Item, nullus potest conformare voluntatem suam divinae in ratione volendi, nisi habeat caritatem; sed non est in nostra potestate habere caritatem[^7]: ergo homo tenetur ad impossibile. Si dicas, quod potest facere, quo facto habebit caritatem, quia potest se disponere ad caritatem; obiicitur de obstinato, et de eo qui actualiter est in peccato: dum peccat et est in actu illo, non potest se conformare: ergo non tenetur. Quodsi non tenetur, et alii tenentur, reportat commodum de malitia; quodsi hoc non est conveniens, nulli ergo tenentur.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Voluntas nostra tenetur conformari voluntati divinae in ratione volendi et quidem, quatenus est praeceptum negativum, semper et pro semper, quatenus vero est affirmativum, non pro semper, sed pro loco et tempore.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod tenemur conformare voluntatem nostram voluntati divinae in ratione

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volendi, ut si velimus aliquid, velimus ex caritate[^9]; et hoc patet, quia tenemur eum diligere ex caritate.

Attendendum autem, quod haec est obligatio per modum praecepti affirmativi. Differt enim obligatio praecepti *affirmativi* et *negativi*[^10]; nam negativum obligat semper et ad semper; affirmativum autem tantum obligat semper, sed non ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore; et sicut non obligat ad semper, ita nec ad omnem actum voluntatis, nec ad omne praeceptum, sed tunc solum, quando tenemur exire in actum caritatis.

Unde notandum, quod sic tenemur ad hoc, quod numquam ad contrarium, sicut velle, quod Deus vult, ex libidine[^11]. Ad hoc etiam tenemur pro loco et tempore, si habemus caritatem; si autem non habemus, non ad hoc tenemur, sed ad aequivalens, quia tenemur facere quod in nobis est, ut habeamus; et ad hoc similiter[^12] pro loco et tempore obligamur. Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta.

**Ad argumenta:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Quod enim obiicitur, quod aliquis sine peccato honorat parentes etiam ex naturali pietate; dicendum, quod verum est; et ex hoc sequitur, quod non in omni actu tenetur conformare[^13], non tamen sequitur, quod non teneatur. Et per hoc patet sequens, quod obiicit de generalitate actuum. Patet etiam aliud quod obiicit de generalitate temporis.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod non est in potestate nostra habere caritatem; dicendum, quod in potestate habentium caritatem est, et in potestate non habentium, non propinqua, sed dispositiva. Potest enim quilibet facere, quo facto habeat caritatem; et ideo, si non faciat, imputatur sibi, nec excusatur per impossibilitatem, quia non est impossibilitas, ubi succurrit aliunde potestas, et non deficit, nisi propter nostram negligentiam[^14].

Ad illud quod obiicitur de obstinato, dicendum, quod nullus est adeo obstinatus, qui non possit facere quod in se est, et qui non possit redire ad cor[^15]; et ideo tenetur sicut et alii, licet non pro quolibet instanti, sed pro loco et tempore.

Si autem tu quaeras, quid sit locus et tempus; melius docet unctio[^16] quam ars; tamen quando Dominus visitat eum interiori allocutione vel exteriori praedicatione vel aliquo tali, in quo est opportunitas redeundi ad cor, si tunc negligat, incidit in contemptum et omissionis peccatum.

english:
### Article II. *On the obligation of conforming our will to the divine.*
### Question I. *Whether we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the manner of willing.*

That we are bound [to conform it] in the manner of willing, is shown.

1. Because we are bound to do justly what we do. Hence *Deuteronomy* sixteen[^1]: *Thou shalt justly pursue what is just*; but it is not done justly except as man acts according to a conformity of will as to the manner of willing, namely, that he will from charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, we are bound to love God with our whole heart, since this is commanded in *Deuteronomy* six[^2], and the Lord repeats the same in *Matthew* twenty-two; but this cannot be done except from charity: therefore we are bound to conformity in the manner, that is, in the form, of willing.

3. Likewise, we are bound truly to obey God; but no one truly obeys God except he who acts with the will that God accepts. But this is the will informed by charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, "that on account of which a thing [is so], is itself more so"[^3]; but on account of the conformity of will in the manner of willing we are obliged to conformity of will in the thing willed, since the end of the precept is charity, as the Apostle says in the first to *Timothy*, chapter one[^4]: therefore much more strongly are we obliged to conformity in the manner of willing, so that what we will, we may will from charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. God wills and commands parents to be honored[^5]; granted that opportunity offers itself, and someone honors his father out of natural piety, not out of charity, it is clear that he does not sin; and yet he conforms his will only in the thing willed: therefore he is not bound to the manner of willing.

2. Likewise, if we are bound to conform our will to the divine in the manner of willing as well as in the thing willed, then whenever we will anything not out of charity, that to which we are bound is lacking: therefore we sin in every[^6] act: therefore no act is indifferent.

3. Likewise, if we are bound to conform in the manner of willing, since a sinful man has a will continually deficient from God in this respect — because he does not have charity — therefore he sins continually in every instant.

4. Likewise, no one can conform his will to the divine in the manner of willing unless he have charity; but to have charity is not in our power[^7]: therefore man is bound to the impossible. If you say that he can do that which, once done, he will have charity, because he can dispose himself to charity; the objection is raised concerning the obstinate man, and concerning him who is actually in sin: while he sins and is in that act, he cannot conform himself: therefore he is not bound. And if he is not bound, while others are bound, he reaps an advantage from his malice; and if this is not fitting, then no one is bound.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** Our will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the manner of willing — and indeed, insofar as it is a negative precept, always and for always; but insofar as it is affirmative, not for always, but for [the proper] place and time.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that we are bound to conform our will to the divine will in the manner of willing, so that, if we will anything, we will it from charity[^9]; and this is plain, because we are bound to love him from charity.

But it must be observed that this is an obligation by way of an *affirmative* precept. For the obligation of an *affirmative* and of a *negative* precept differs[^10]; for the negative obliges always and for always; but the affirmative only obliges always, but not for always, but rather according to place and time; and just as it does not oblige for always, so neither does it oblige to every act of the will, nor to every precept, but only when we are bound to issue forth in an act of charity.

Whence it is to be noted that we are so bound to this, that never to the contrary — as it would be to will what God wills out of lust[^11]. To this also we are bound according to place and time, if we have charity; but if we do not have it, we are not bound to this, but to the equivalent, since we are bound to do what is in us, in order that we may have it; and to this likewise[^12] we are obliged according to place and time. From these things the response to the objections is plain.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* What is objected, that someone honors his parents without sin even from natural piety; it must be said that this is true; and from this it follows that he is not bound to conform[^13] in every act — yet it does not follow that he is not bound. And through this the next objection, which urges the generality of acts, is also clear. Likewise the other objection, which urges the generality of time, is clear.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last, that it is not in our power to have charity; it must be said that it is in the power of those who have charity, and in the power of those who do not have it — not in proximate, but in dispositive power. For anyone can do that which, once done, he will have charity; and therefore, if he does not do it, it is imputed to him, nor is he excused by impossibility, since there is no impossibility where power is supplied from elsewhere, and it does not fail except through our own negligence[^14].

To that which is objected concerning the obstinate man, it must be said that no one is so obstinate that he cannot do what is in himself, and who cannot return to the heart[^15]; and therefore he is bound just as others are, although not for every instant, but for [the proper] place and time.

If, however, you ask what the place and time are; unction[^16] teaches this better than art does; nevertheless, when the Lord visits him by interior address, or by exterior preaching, or by some such thing in which there is opportunity for returning to the heart, if he then neglects it, he falls into contempt and into the sin of omission.

la: *Vers.* 20, ubi Vulgata *persequeris* pro *exsequeris*.

en: *Verse* 20, where the Vulgate has *persequeris* in place of *exsequeris*.

la: *Vers.* 3: *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde et ex tota anima tua, et ex tota fortitudine tua*. Alter locus, qui ex *Matthaeo* allegatur, est ibid. 22, 37.

en: *Verse* 3: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength*. The other place, alleged from *Matthew*, is at ibid. 22:37.

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2.

en: Aristotle, I *Posterior [Analytics]*, c. 2.

en: *Verse* 5.

la: *Deut.* 5, 16. — Mox pro *et aliqui* cod. cc et ed. 1 *quod aliquis*.

en: *Deuteronomy* 5:16. — Just after, for *et aliqui*, cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] *quod aliquis*.

la: Vat. post *in omni* non incongrue interiicit *tati*; cod. post *actu* adiicit *vel meremur*.

en: The Vatican edition, after *in omni*, not incongruously inserts *tati*; the codex, after *actu*, adds *vel meremur*.

la: Nam ipsa caritas non est ex nobis, sed ex Deo per Spiritum sanctum, qui diffundit ipsam in cordibus nostris (Rom. 5, 5.). Cfr. August., *de Gratia et lib. arb.* c. 18. n. 37. seq. — Paulo inferius post *potest facere* Vat. absque auctoritate codd. adiungit *quod in se est*.

en: For charity itself is not from us, but from God through the Holy Spirit, who pours it forth in our hearts (Rom. 5:5). Cf. Augustine, *On Grace and Free Will*, c. 18, n. 37 ff. — A little further down, after *potest facere*, the Vatican edition, without the authority of the codices, adds *quod in se est*.

la: Pro *ut si velimus aliquid, velimus ex caritate* plures codd. cum ed. 1 et Vat. *ut scilicet velimus ex caritate*, quam lectionem correximus ex codd. R T Z aa, suffragantibus aliqua ex parte etiam codd. A S, qui etiam pro *scilicet*, quod in Vat. legitur, exhibent *si*, etsi deinde post primum *velimus* omittunt *aliquid, velimus*.

en: For *ut si velimus aliquid, velimus ex caritate*, several codices with ed. 1 and the Vatican edition [read] *ut scilicet velimus ex caritate*, which reading we have corrected from codd. R T Z aa, with some partial support also from codd. A S, which likewise, for *scilicet* as the Vatican reads, give *si*, although then, after the first *velimus*, they omit *aliquid, velimus*.

la: Vat. *negativi*, scil. *obligatio*, et deinde, eadem constructionis ratione ducta, *affirmativi* pro *affirmativum*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *negativi*, namely *obligatio*, and then, drawn by the same syntactic logic, *affirmativi* in place of *affirmativum*.

la: Sensus est: ad hoc, scil. ut, si velimus aliquid, velimus ex caritate, tenemur ita, ut numquam nobis liceat aliquid velle contrario voluntatis actu, id est male sive libidinose. — Pro *ex libidine* Vat. *ex liberalitate*, cod. V et ed. 1 *ex caritate*. Cod. K verbis *ex libidine* praemittit *non*, cod. Z *non velle*. Paulo ante pro *sicut velle* cod. *scilicet velle*.

en: The sense is: to this, namely that, if we will anything, we will it from charity, we are bound in such a way that it is never lawful for us to will anything with a contrary act of the will, that is, badly or out of lust. — For *ex libidine* the Vatican edition [reads] *ex liberalitate*, cod. V and ed. 1 *ex caritate*. Cod. K prefixes *non* to the words *ex libidine*; cod. Z [reads] *non velle*. A little earlier, for *sicut velle*, the codex [reads] *scilicet velle*.

la: Pro *similiter* ed. 1 *simpliciter*.

en: For *similiter*, ed. 1 [reads] *simpliciter*.

la: Intellige: *voluntatem suam divinae in ratione volendi*.

en: Understand: *one's own will to the divine [will] in the manner of willing*.

la: Sola Vat. hic adiicit *propinqua*, et paulo inferius post *quilibet facere* adiungit *aliquid*.

en: The Vatican edition alone here adds *propinqua* ["proximate"], and a little further down, after *quilibet facere*, adds *aliquid*.

la: Respicitur illud *Isai.* 46, 8: *Redite praevaricatores ad cor*. — Paulo ante pro *qui non possit facere* Vat. *quod non potest facere*.

en: Reference is made to that of *Isaiah* 46:8: *Return, ye transgressors, to the heart*. — A little earlier, for *qui non possit facere*, the Vatican edition has *quod non potest facere*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 720, nota 5. Cfr. etiam Anselm., *de Casu diaboli*, c. 3. seqq., *Dialog. de lib. arb.* c. 3. seqq., et *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 3. — *Epist. I. Ioan.* 2, 20: *Sed vos unctionem habetis a Sancto et nostis omnia*. Et ibid. v. 27: *Et vos unctionem, quam accepistis ab eo, maneat in vobis. Et non necesse habetis, ut aliquis doceat vos; sed sicut unctio eius docet vos de omnibus et verum est, et non est mendacium. Et sicut docuit vos, manete in eo*.

en: Cf. above p. 720, note 5. Cf. also Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, c. 3 ff.; *Dialogue on Free Will*, c. 3 ff.; and *On the Harmony of God's Foreknowledge with Free Will*, q. 3. — *First Epistle of John* 2:20: *But you have an unction from the Holy One, and know all things*. And ibid., v. 27: *And as for you, let the unction, which you have received from him, abide in you. And you have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie. And as it hath taught you, abide in him*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod omnes teneantur semper et pro semper se divinae voluntati conformare, loquendo de conformitate in habitu, omnino constat. Quaestio autem haec est de conformatione in actu. — Quod praeceptum negativum obligat semper et ad semper (pro semper), cum Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 41. m. 3.) communissime docetur. Sed restat quaestio quoad praeceptum *affirmativum*; in qua quaestione implicatur celebris controversia, quae et quoties sit obligatio ad actum caritatis eliciendum. Iansenistae et nonnulli rigidioris ethices patroni inter catholicos nimis urgebant dictam obligationem. De hoc cfr. S. Bonav., III. *Sent.* d. 27. a. 2. q. 5. 6.

**II.** S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, 3; S. I. II. q. 19. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2, q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That all are bound always and for always to conform themselves to the divine will, speaking of conformity in habit, is entirely settled. But this question concerns conformity in act. — That a negative precept obliges always and for always (*pro semper*) is most commonly taught, following Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. 1, q. 41, m. 3). But there remains a question regarding the *affirmative* precept; and in this question is involved the celebrated controversy as to what the obligation is to elicit an act of charity, and how often. The Jansenists and certain patrons of stricter ethics among Catholics urged this obligation too far. On this, cf. St. Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 2, q. 5–6.

**II.** *Authors:* St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2–3; *Summa* I-II, q. 19, a. 10. — B. Albert, here a. 2, 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2; q. 2, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 *princ.*, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 2.

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