title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa.*

Secundo quaeritur de connexione donorum, et est quaestio, utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo*, quia, sicut habitus virtutum sunt gratuiti et procedunt ex munere divinae largitatis, sic et habitus donorum: cum ergo propter unitatem gratiae informantis et munificentiam largitatis dispensantis ponatur connexio in virtutibus gratuitis[^1], eadem ratione videtur, quod ponenda est et in donis.

2. Item, sicut una virtus alteri adminiculatur et eam adiuvat in actu suo, sic unum donum se habet respectu alterius: ergo qua ratione una virtus indiget altera et non potest ab ea separari, eadem ratione videtur necessarium esse, unum donum connecti alteri[^2].

3. Item, quicumque habet caritatem, habet unde possit delectari et gustare, quoniam *suavis est Dominus*[^3]; sed donum sapientiae consistit in gustu illius summae dulcedinis: igitur quicumque habet caritatem, habet donum sapientiae. Sed donum sapientiae est supremum inter omnia dona et praesupponit omnia dona inferiora: ergo quicumque habet caritatem, habet omnia Spiritus sancti dona: ergo videtur, quod dona sint connexa.

4. Item, aliquis homo existens in gratia ex ipso primo munere gratiae sine alterius doni appositione potest pervenire ad salutem: ergo videtur, quod possit in usu donorum et gratiae semetipsum exercere; sed hoc non esset, nisi dona essent connexa: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**
1. Primae ad Corinthios duodecimo[^4] dicit Apostolus: *Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii datur sermo scientiae*; ubi diversitatem donorum dicit distribui secundum diversitatem personarum: ergo non videtur, quod necessario oporteat, omnia dona in una et eadem anima esse connexa.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Sermone Domini in monte*[^5] ponit gradus inter dona, ita quod ab uno paulative fit processus ad alterum; sed hoc

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non esset, si omnia infunderentur aequaliter et simul: ergo non videtur, quod dona Spiritus sancti invicem connectantur.

3. Item, Gregorius in *Moralibus*[^6] dicit, quod «minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat»; ergo donum sapientiae potest haberi sine dono intellectus.

4. Item, supra habitum fuit distinctione proxima[^7], et est verbum Augustini, *de Trinitate* decimo quarto, quod «dono scientiae non pollent plures fideles, quamvis polleant ipsa fide»: ergo videtur, quod donum scientiae non necessario concomitetur infusionem gratiae.

5. Item, habitus donorum secundum suam generalitatem dantur ad expediendum[^8]: ergo si dona essent necessario connexa, videtur, quod uno dono habito, sanarentur omnia symptomata, et expeditus esset homo ad omnia opera meritoria; quod manifeste esse falsum, deprehendit ipsa experientia.

6. Item, dona ut plurimum ordinant ad ea quae sunt *supererogationis*, sicut patet in dono consilii et fortitudinis[^9]; ea autem, quae supererogationis sunt, non concomitantur inseparabiliter ea quae sunt *necessitatis*: ergo videtur, quod inter ipsa dona gratuita non sit connexio necessaria.

> **Conclusio.** Dona Spiritus sancti respectu originis habent connexionem, non autem ita respectu usus et perfectionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de habitibus donorum gratuitorum est loqui dupliciter, videlicet quantum ad ipsorum originem et quantum ad usum consequentem. Si loquamur de ipsis quantum ad ipsorum originem; cum origo omnium habituum gratuitorum consistat quasi materialiter in natura et completive et formaliter in gratia[^10]; quando Spiritus sancti gratia infunditur, ita sufficienter datur, quod omnes habitus gratuiti ex ipsa possunt oriri, si nos velimus susceptae gratiae cooperari, non solum habitus virtutum, sed etiam habitus donorum et beatitudinum. Ideo quantum ad *originem* indubitanter verum est, dona Spiritus sancti habere connexionem.

Aliter est loqui de ipsis habitibus donorum quantum ad *usum*, secundum quem modum isti habitus reddunt potentiam facilem et expeditam ad proprios actus, qui non tantum sunt *necessitatis* et *sufficientiae*, sed etiam cuiusdam *supererogationis* et *excellentiae*; et quantum ad hoc non est necessarium in his esse connexionem, immo vix, aut nunquam usus istorum habituum reperitur perfectus in aliquo, sicut innuit Gregorius super illud Iob[^11]: *Nunquid coniungere poteris micantes stellas Pleiadas?* dicens, quod usus Spiritus septiformis in solo Christo fuit perfecte. — Usus enim donorum ponit hominem in statu *perfectionis*, sed origo non necessario ponit in statu *perfectionis*, sed in statu *inchoationis*. Unde sicut puer parvulus, sicut dicit Augustinus[^12], habet in *ratione* quidquid postmodum habiturus est in *mole*, licet magnitudinem molis nondum habeat in actu; sic concedi potest, quod habitus donorum non necessario connectuntur quantum ad usum et ipsorum *esse completum*, secundum quod potentias facilitant et ad actus excellentes expediunt. Tamen[^13] in infusione gratiae habentur *radicaliter* et virtualiter et implicite, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

Attamen illud quod obiicit de similitudine virtutum et donorum, non valet. Habitus enim virtutum, pro eo quod *necessitatis* sunt, etiam quantum ad suos usus in his qui libero arbitrio iam utuntur, simpliciter habent ad invicem connecti, non solum ratione suae originis, sed etiam ratione usus consequentis. Nemo enim potest esse in gratia, nisi credat, speret et amet: et sic de aliis virtutibus. Non sic autem est de usibus donorum et beatitudinum, sine quibus plures salvantur. Multi enim sunt, qui fideliter credunt, et tamen illud quod credunt, nunquam intellectu comprehendunt[^14]. Similiter est de usu ipsarum beatitudinum. Et ideo, si aliquo modo sit connexio in habitibus beatitudinum et donorum, non tamen tanta est, quanta est in ha-

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bitibus virtutum. Est tamen ibi aliqua, sicut illae rationes ostendunt.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**
1. Ad illa vero quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, satis facilis est responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Nam quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Apostoli, quod *alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae*[^15] etc.; procedit de donis gratiae gratis datae, non autem de donis gratiae gratum facientis; vel certe, si intelligit de ipsis donis, hoc dicit quantum ad usum, non quantum ad ipsorum habituum radicem sive principium.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, similiter patet responsio. Augustinus enim assignat gradus inter dona quantum ad eorum usus, quia non potest quis assuefieri in usu doni superioris, nisi primo assuefiat in usu doni inferioris, qui[^16] non est tantae sublimitatis.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Gregorii, quod minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat; similiter respondendum est, hoc Gregorium intellexisse de usu doni intellectus; quo neglecto, si quis se protendat ad usum doni sapientiae, non ita proficit, sicut proficeret, si ordinato gradu procederet[^17].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, habita in distinctione praemissa, dicendum, quod Augustinus intelligit de usu doni *scientiae*; et hoc manifestum est ex ipsa auctoritate. Dicit enim, quod multi pollent fide, qui non pollent scientia. Nemo enim pollet in aliquo habitu, nisi habeat ipsum in sua *completione*, per quam facile sit, ipsum habitum manifestari in opere[^18].

*Ad 5. 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dona expediunt, et quod similiter ordinant ad ea quae sunt supererogationis et excellentiae; respondendum, sicut prius tactum est, quod hoc intelligitur de donis, quando habentur in *usu*, non solum in *munere*[^19], sive quando habentur quantum ad assuefactionem et facilitatem in opere, non quando habentur quantum ad *causalitatem* in sua origine: uno modo habentur in ipsius gratiae infusione, alio modo habentur per bonorum operum et orationum sive precum multiplicationem, secundum illud quod dicitur in Glossa, Matthaei sexto[^20]: «Quia per haec *dona* nos ab imis ad summa consurgimus, septem *beatitudines*, quae per eadem dona quaeruntur, de imis gradatim ad summa perveniunt. In *precibus* ergo est, ut impetremus *dona*, in donis, ut operemur *mandata*, de operatione *beatitudines* consequuntur». Haec autem intelligenda sunt quantum ad *usum*, sicut prius fuit explanatum[^21].

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english:
### Question II. *Whether the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected.*

Secondly there is asked about the connection of the gifts, and the question is whether the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, because, just as the habits of the virtues are gratuitous and proceed from the gift of the divine bounty, so also are the habits of the gifts: since therefore, on account of the unity of the informing grace and the munificence of the dispensing bounty, a connection is posited in the gratuitous virtues[^1], by the same reasoning it seems that one must be posited in the gifts as well.

2. Likewise, just as one virtue supports another and aids it in its act, so one gift is disposed with respect to another: therefore by the reasoning by which one virtue needs another and cannot be separated from it, by the same reasoning it seems necessary that one gift be connected to another[^2].

3. Likewise, whoever has charity has whereby he can take delight and taste, since *the Lord is sweet*[^3]; but the gift of wisdom consists in the tasting of that highest sweetness: therefore whoever has charity has the gift of wisdom. But the gift of wisdom is the supreme among all the gifts and presupposes all the lower gifts: therefore whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the gifts are connected.

4. Likewise, a man existing in grace can, from the first gift of grace itself, without the addition of another gift, attain to salvation: therefore it seems that he can exercise himself in the use of the gifts and of grace; but this would not be, unless the gifts were connected: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. In the first to the Corinthians, the twelfth chapter[^4], the Apostle says: *To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge*; where he says that the diversity of the gifts is distributed according to the diversity of persons: therefore it does not seem that it must necessarily be the case that all the gifts are connected in one and the same soul.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*[^5] posits degrees among the gifts, such that there is a gradual progression from one to another; but this

would not be the case if all were infused equally and at once: therefore it does not seem that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are mutually connected.

3. Likewise, Gregory in the *Morals*[^6] says that «wisdom is the less, if it lacks understanding»; therefore the gift of wisdom can be had without the gift of understanding.

4. Likewise, it was held above in the preceding distinction[^7]—and it is a saying of Augustine, *On the Trinity*, book fourteen—that «many of the faithful are not strong in the gift of knowledge, though they are strong in faith itself»: therefore it seems that the gift of knowledge does not necessarily accompany the infusion of grace.

5. Likewise, the habits of the gifts, according to their generality, are given for expediting[^8]: therefore if the gifts were necessarily connected, it seems that, with one gift had, all the symptoms would be healed, and a man would be expedited unto all meritorious works; which experience itself plainly detects to be false.

6. Likewise, the gifts for the most part order one toward those things that are of *supererogation*, as is plain in the gift of counsel and of fortitude[^9]; but those things that are of supererogation do not inseparably accompany those that are of *necessity*: therefore it seems that among the gratuitous gifts there is no necessary connection.

> **Conclusion.** The gifts of the Holy Spirit, with respect to their origin, have a connection; but not so with respect to their use and perfection.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of the habits of the gratuitous gifts, namely with respect to their origin and with respect to the use that follows. If we speak of them with respect to their origin; since the origin of all the gratuitous habits consists as it were materially in nature and completively and formally in grace[^10]; when the grace of the Holy Spirit is infused, it is given so sufficiently that all the gratuitous habits can arise from it, if we are willing to cooperate with the grace received, not only the habits of the virtues but also the habits of the gifts and of the beatitudes. Therefore with respect to *origin* it is undoubtedly true that the gifts of the Holy Spirit have a connection.

It is otherwise to speak of these habits of the gifts with respect to *use*, according to which mode these habits render the power facile and expedited unto their proper acts, which are not only of *necessity* and *sufficiency*, but also of a certain *supererogation* and *excellence*; and as to this it is not necessary that there be a connection among them, nay rather the use of these habits is scarcely, or never, found perfect in anyone, as Gregory intimates upon that text of Job[^11]: *Canst thou join together the shining stars the Pleiades?* saying that the use of the sevenfold Spirit was perfectly in Christ alone. — For the use of the gifts sets a man in the state of *perfection*, but the origin does not necessarily set him in the state of *perfection*, but in the state of *inchoation*. Hence, just as a little child, as Augustine says[^12], has in *reason* whatever he is afterward going to have in *bulk*, although he does not yet have the magnitude of the bulk in act; so it can be granted that the habits of the gifts are not necessarily connected with respect to use and their *complete being*, according as they make the powers facile and expedite them unto excellent acts. Yet[^13] in the infusion of grace they are had *radically* and virtually and implicitly, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

Nevertheless, that which is objected about the likeness of the virtues and the gifts does not hold. For the habits of the virtues, for this reason that they are of *necessity*, even as to their uses in those who already make use of free will, are simply held to be connected to one another, not only by reason of their origin, but also by reason of the use that follows. For no one can be in grace unless he believe, hope, and love: and so of the other virtues. But it is not so of the uses of the gifts and of the beatitudes, without which many are saved. For there are many who faithfully believe, and yet what they believe they never comprehend with the understanding[^14]. Likewise it is concerning the use of the beatitudes themselves. And therefore, if in some way there is a connection in the habits of the beatitudes and of the gifts, yet it is not so great as is the one in the ha-

bits of the virtues. Yet there is some connection there, as those reasons show.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**
1. To those things, indeed, which are objected on the contrary, the response is easy enough through the things that have been said. For as to what is first objected from the authority of the Apostle, that *to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom*[^15] etc.; it proceeds concerning the gifts of grace gratuitously given, not concerning the gifts of grace making-pleasing; or certainly, if he understands it of the gifts themselves, he says this with respect to use, not with respect to the root or principle of the habits themselves.

*To the 2nd.* To what is objected from the authority of Augustine, likewise the response is plain. For Augustine assigns degrees among the gifts with respect to their uses, because one cannot become habituated in the use of a higher gift unless he is first habituated in the use of a lower gift, which[^16] is not of such great sublimity.

*To the 3rd.* To what is objected from the authority of Gregory, that wisdom is the less if it lacks understanding; likewise it must be responded that Gregory understood this concerning the use of the gift of understanding; which being neglected, if one stretches himself toward the use of the gift of wisdom, he does not so profit as he would profit if he proceeded by the ordered degree[^17].

*To the 4th.* To what is objected from the authority of Augustine, had in the preceding distinction, it must be said that Augustine understands it concerning the use of the gift of *knowledge*; and this is manifest from the authority itself. For he says that many are strong in faith who are not strong in knowledge. For no one is strong in any habit unless he have it in its *completion*, through which it is easy for that habit to be manifested in work[^18].

*To the 5th and 6th.* To what is objected, that the gifts expedite, and that likewise they order one toward those things that are of supererogation and excellence; it must be responded, as was touched on before, that this is understood concerning the gifts when they are had in *use*, not only in *endowment*[^19], or when they are had with respect to becoming habituated and to facility in work, not when they are had with respect to *causality* in their origin: in one way they are had in the very infusion of grace, in another way they are had through the multiplication of good works and prayers or supplications, according to what is said in the Gloss on the sixth of Matthew[^20]: «Since through these *gifts* we rise up from the lowest to the highest, the seven *beatitudes*, which are sought through these same gifts, come gradually from the lowest to the highest. It is in *prayers*, therefore, that we obtain the *gifts*; in the gifts, that we may work the *commandments*; from the working the *beatitudes* follow». But these things are to be understood with respect to *use*, as was explained before[^21].

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la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Gregor., I. *Moral.* c. 32. n. 45: *Valde enim singula quaelibet virtus* [intellige: donum] *destituitur, si non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur. Minor quippe est sapientia, si intellectu careat; et valde inutilis intellectus est, si ex sapientia non subsistat* etc.

en: Gregory, *Morals* bk. I, c. 32, n. 45: «For each single virtue [understand: gift] is greatly impoverished if one virtue does not support another virtue. For wisdom is the less if it lacks understanding; and understanding is very useless if it does not subsist from wisdom», etc.

la: Psalm. 33, 9. — De seqq. cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. et d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. — Pro *quoniam suavis* codd. Z bb (K a secunda manu) *quam suavis*.

en: Psalm 33:9. — On what follows cf. above, d. 35, q. 1, and d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. — For *quoniam suavis* (since [the Lord] is sweet) codices Z, bb (and K by a second hand) read *quam suavis* (how sweet).

la: Vers. 8. — Paulo post pro *dicit distribui* edd. *distribuit*. Deinde Vat. omittit *necessario*.

en: [I Cor. 12,] verse 8. — A little later, for *dicit distribui* (he says are distributed) the editions read *distribuit* (he distributes). Then the Vatican edition omits *necessario* (necessarily).

la: Libr. I. c. 3. n. 10. Cfr. Serm. 347. (alias 17. de Sanctis) c. 2. n. 2. seq., et II. de Doctr. christ. c. 7. n. 9. seqq.

en: Book I, c. 3, n. 10. Cf. *Sermon* 347 (otherwise 17, *On the Saints*), c. 2, n. 2 f., and *On Christian Doctrine* II, c. 7, n. 9 ff.

la: Lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 1. — In fine arg. cod. K *communicetur infusione gratiae*.

en: The text of the Master, d. XXXV, c. 1. — At the end of the argument codex K reads *communicetur infusione gratiae* (let it be communicated by the infusion of grace).

la: Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1, ubi etiam sermo est de symptomatibus.

en: Cf. above, d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, where there is also discussion of the symptoms.

la: Vide supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia et quarta).

en: See above, d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third and fourth way).

la: Cfr. supra d. 33. q. 5. — Alanus ab Insulis, *Theolog. Regul.* regul. 88: *Omnes virtutes simul et similiter dantur homini a creatione, ut sint per naturam* [datur scilicet homini, ut sibi exponitur, potentia, qua naturaliter aptus sit ad hoc vel illud faciendum, e. g. ad ratiocinandum vel intelligendum]; ex recreatione vero infunduntur homini, ut sint virtutes per gratiam, pariter quidem habitu, sed dispariter usu.

en: Cf. above, d. 33, q. 5. — Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 88: «All the virtues are given to man at once and alike from creation, that they may be his by nature» [that is, there is given to man, as it is expounded there, the power by which he is naturally apt for doing this or that, e.g. for reasoning or for understanding]; but from re-creation they are infused into man, that they may be virtues by grace—equally indeed in habit, but unequally in use.

la: Cap. 38, 31, ubi Vulgata *valebis* pro *poteris*. — Gregorius, XXIX. *Moral.* c. 31. n. 74. sic ait: *Redemptor autem noster in carne veniens Pleiades iunxit, quia operationes septiformis Spiritus simul in se et coniunctas et manentes habuit*... Nullus vero hominum operationes sancti Spiritus simul omnes habuit, nisi solus Mediator Dei et hominum etc.

en: [Job] c. 38:31, where the Vulgate has *valebis* for *poteris* (canst thou). — Gregory, *Morals* XXIX, c. 31, n. 74, speaks thus: «But our Redeemer, coming in the flesh, joined the Pleiades, because he had the operations of the sevenfold Spirit at once joined and abiding in himself»... But no man among men had all the operations of the Holy Spirit at once, save only the Mediator of God and men, etc.

la: Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 14. — Pro *habet in ratione*, quemadmodum et in textu origin. legitur, Vat. *habet in virtute*; cod. K voci *ratione* adiungit *seminali*.

en: *On the City of God*, bk. XXII, c. 14. — For *habet in ratione* (has in reason), as is also read in the original text, the Vatican edition has *habet in virtute* (has in power); codex K adds to the word *ratione* the word *seminali* (seminal).

la: Vat., superius post *quod* inserto *licet*, hic post *expediunt* sic prosequitur: *connectuntur tamen quantum ad eorum principium et originem, cum in infusione gratiae habeantur radicaliter* etc. Paulo ante pro *facilitant* cod. P *habilitant*.

en: The Vatican edition, having above inserted *licet* after *quod*, here continues thus after *expediunt*: «they are nevertheless connected with respect to their principle and origin, since in the infusion of grace they are had radically», etc. A little before, for *facilitant* (make facile) codex P reads *habilitant* (make able).

la: Bernard., *Serm. in Cantic.* serm. 18. n. 1. duplicem distinguens operationem Spiritus s., unam videlicet, qua intus per virtutes solidat ad salutem, alteram, qua foris muneribus [gratis datis] nos ornat, aut illos nobis, vel nostros aliis. Verbi gratia, fides, spes, caritas nobis propter nos dantur; absque his quippe salvi esse non possumus. Porro scientiae seu sapientiae sermo, gratia curationis, prophetia similiaque, quibus carere cum integritate etiam salutis propriae possumus, proximorum procul dubio in salutem expendenda donantur.

en: Bernard, *Sermons on the Song of Songs*, serm. 18, n. 1, distinguishing a twofold operation of the Holy Spirit, namely one by which inwardly through the virtues he makes solid unto salvation, the other by which outwardly with gifts [gratuitously given] he adorns us, or them for us, or ours for others. For example, faith, hope, charity are given to us for our own sake; for without these we cannot be saved. But the word of knowledge or of wisdom, the grace of healing, prophecy and the like, which we can lack with the integrity even of our own salvation, are given without doubt to be expended for the salvation of our neighbors.

la: Permulti codd. *scientiae*.

en: Very many codices read *scientiae* (of knowledge).

la: Vat. *quia*, et paulo ante pro *nisi primo* codd. K Z *nisi prius*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *quia* (because), and a little before, for *nisi primo* (unless first) codices K, Z read *nisi prius* (unless beforehand).

la: Cfr. Gregor., II. *Homil. in Ezech.* homil. 7. n. 7, ex quo nonnulla iam allata sunt supra pag. 748, nota 6.

en: Cf. Gregory, *Homilies on Ezekiel* II, homily 7, n. 7, from which some things have already been adduced above, p. 748, note 6.

la: Secundum August., de Bono coniugali, c. 21. n. 25, habitus est «quo aliquid agitur, cum opus est; cum autem non agitur, potest agi, sed non opus est». Averroes, III. de Anima, text. 18, de habitu intellectus dicit: *Haec enim est definitio huius habitus, scilicet ut habens habitum intelligat per ipsum illud quod est sibi proprium ex se, et quando voluerit, absque eo quod indigeat in hoc aliquo extrinseco*. — Pro *opere* cod. A *operatione*. Superius pro *scientiae* plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 falso *sapientiae*.

en: According to Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*, c. 21, n. 25, a habit is «that by which something is done when there is need; but when it is not done, it can be done, though there is no need». Averroes, *On the Soul* III, text 18, says of the habit of the intellect: «For this is the definition of this habit, namely that the one having the habit understands through it that which is proper to him of himself, and when he wills, without his needing in this anything extrinsic». — For *opere* (work) codex A reads *operatione* (operation). Above, for *scientiae* (of knowledge) very many codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly read *sapientiae* (of wisdom).

la: Respicitur Hilarii locutio, de qua vide I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. ibid. d. 15. p. II. q. 1. seqq.

en: A locution of Hilary is being looked back to, on which see I Sent., d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 3. Cf. ibid., d. 15, p. II, q. 1 ff.

la: Vers. 9. — In Glossa allegata, de qua cfr. supra pag. 739, nota 2, edd. cum aliquot codd. pro *septem beatitudines*, uti et in textu origin. legitur, substituerunt *unde beatitudines*; cfr. scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: [Matth. 6,] verse 9. — In the Gloss cited, on which cf. above, p. 739, note 2, the editions together with several codices, in place of *septem beatitudines* (seven beatitudes), as is also read in the original text, substituted *unde beatitudines* (whence the beatitudes); cf. the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.794–796 (PDF 816–818; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines **55144–55271**, bounded forward by `QUAESTIO III.` (= a1-q3, *de connexione virtutum politicis*) at raw 55272. **Alignment PASS 1:1**: the `QUAESTIO II.` opener *Secundo quaeritur de connexione donorum… utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa* matches the d.36 TRACTATIO item 2 (*Secundo, de connexione donorum*). q2 = **connexio donorum**.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum connexio sit in virtutibus politicis, ut necesse sit, una habita, omnes haberi.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit connexio in virtutibus politicis, ita quod, una habita, necesse sit, omnes haberi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate philosophica. Dicit enim Seneca[^1]: « Omne quod bene fit, fit iuste, fortiter et temperate »; sed opus cuiuslibet virtutis bene fit: ergo necesse est, quod fiat iuste et fortiter et temperate: igitur ad quodlibet opus virtutis concurrunt quatuor virtutes. Sed hoc non posset esse, nisi essent connexae: ergo etc.

2. Item, Hieronymus ad Pammachium[^2]: « Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici ita sibi esse connexas et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit omnibus careat, et qui unam habuerit omnes habeat »: videtur ergo auctoritate philosophorum, virtutes politicas esse connexas.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate *Sanctorum* et primo auctoritate Augustini, in libro *de Quantitate animae*[^3]. Definiens enim virtutem dicit, quod « virtus est aequalitas vitae undique rationi consentiens »; sed vita non consonat undique rationi nisi per virtutum universitatem: ergo ad hoc quod habeat aliquis unam virtutem meram, necesse est, quod habeat ceteras.

4. Item, Bernardus, in primo *ad Eugenium*[^4]: « Advertere etiam est suavissimum quendam concen-
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tum complexumque virtutum, atque alteram pendere ex altera, sicut vides, fortitudinis matrem esse prudentiam, et non fortitudinem, sed temeritatem esse quemlibet ausum, quem non parturivit prudentia ». Et paulo post: « Iustitia quaerit, prudentia invenit, vindicat fortitudo, temperantia possidet »: ergo si haec requiruntur ad actum cuiuslibet virtutis, videtur, quod omnes virtutes necessario concurrant ad unum actum.

5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*: quia, sicut se habet castitas ad esse castum, sic se habet virtus ad esse virtuosum; sed quicumque habet castitatem, est castus[^5]: ergo quicumque habet virtutem, est virtuosus. Sed nullus est virtuosus, qui habet vitium: ergo si aliquis habet virtutem, nullum habet vitium. Sed vitia non expelluntur nisi per virtutes sibi oppositas: ergo qui habet unam virtutem habet ceteras.

6. Item, cuiuslibet virtutis est discernere, quid eligendum, et tenere medium et recte tendere in finem et negotiari circa arduum et difficile; sed primum est prudentiae, secundum temperantiae, tertium iustitiae, quartum fortitudinis[^6]: ergo videtur, quod ad quemlibet actum virtuosum concurrant necessario istae quatuor virtutes. Hoc autem non esset, nisi haberent connexionem ad invicem: ergo videtur, quod virtutes politicae sint connexae.

**Sed contra** hoc est:

1. auctoritas Augustini ad Hieronymum[^7]. Dicit enim, quod « non est divina sententia, qua dicitur, quod qui habet unam habet omnes; sed hominibus hoc visum est studiosis et ingeniosis »; sed si hoc esset verum, esset divina sententia, quia omne verum a prima Veritate procedit: ergo cum hoc intelligatur de virtutibus politicis, virtutes politicae non sunt connexae.

2. Item, secundum Philosophum[^8] habitus virtutum politicarum et consuetudinalium sunt ex actibus: sed actus non sunt connexi — contingit enim, hominem exercitari in actu unius virtutis, ita quod non exerceatur in actu alterius — videtur ergo, quod non omnes virtutes necessario connectantur.

3. Item, sicut scientiae habentur per acquisitionem, ita virtutes politicae; et sicut una virtus alteri adminiculatur, sic est in habitu unius scientiae respectu alterius; sed scientiae, quae sunt per acquisitionem, non habentur simul, sed una prius et altera posterius, et una potest haberi sine altera: ergo una virtus politica non videtur esse necessario alteri connexa.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per experimentum sensibile: quia multi pollent in virtute prudentiae, qui tamen non habent largitatem, aut virtutem patientiae; multi etiam iustitiam ad proximum servant, qui tamen in se ipsis non habent continentiam; et tamen illa faciunt per virtutes politicas: videtur ergo, quod inter huiusmodi virtutes non sit connexio necessario[^9].

> **Conclusio.** Simpliciter loquendo, virtutes politicae non habent connexionem; habent tamen secundum statum perfectionis et secundum quasdam conditiones communes.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in ista quaestione controversia fuit inter ipsos philosophos, secundum quod innuit Augustinus[^10] et Hieronymus. — *Opinio 1.* « Nam quidam philosophorum, qui Stoici dicebantur, dixerunt, virtutes necessario esse connexas, ut qui una caruerit ceteris careat ». De quorum positione videtur fuisse Seneca[^11]. Ait enim sic: « Si unam de Corinthiis tuis dimiseris, poteris dicere, supellectilem tuam tibi salvam. Si autem unam de virtutibus amiseris, nullam te habiturum, necesse est ut confitearis ». — *Opinio 2.* Aliorum positio fuit, quod una potest haberi sine altera, sicut aliquis potest habere castitatem, ita quod non habeat iustitiam.

*Ratio 1. secundum Stoicos.* Ratio autem huius diversitatis ex hoc fuit, quia Stoici ponebant, quod virtus non esset in aliquo nisi in sapiente, pro eo quod regimen totius vitae hominis secundum regulam moris pendet a rectitudine rationis. Sapientem autem dixerunt, secundum quod dicit Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^12], in quo nulla cadit perturbatio. Ille enim secundum eos sapiens dicebatur, qui omnibus passionibus animae dominatur. —

*Ratio 2.* Praeter hoc etiam ponebant, quod cum virtus sit
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circa medium[^13], et medium sit uno modo et indivisibile, nemo habet virtutem, nisi habeat eam in summo et perfecte. Perfecte autem virtus non habetur, ubi regnat aliquod vitium, et ubi aliae virtutes desunt. — Et propter istas duas rationes dixerunt Stoici, virtutes politicas esse connexas, videlicet quia non possidentur nisi a sapiente, cui non dominatur vitium, et sunt circa medium indivisibile, a quo per quodlibet vitium fit recessus.

*Duplex error reprobatur.* In huius autem positionis suae fundamento nimis excesserunt quantum ad utrumque praedictorum, tum ex hoc, quod non ponebant sapientiam in proficientibus, sed solum in *perfectis*; tum etiam, quia dixerunt, non referre quantum ad amissionem virtutis parum vel multum a medio punctali recedere. Et ideo reprehendit eos Augustinus, ad Hieronymum[^14] dicens sic: « Mihi videntur Stoici esse falsi, qui *proficientem* hominem in sapientia nolunt habere omnino sapientiam, sed tunc solum, cum est *perfectus*. Dicunt enim, quod sicut nihil interest ad praefocandum hominem, utrum aquam stadiis multis habeat supra se, vel uno palmo; sic est de illis qui sunt in gurgite erroris, ad sapientiam ». Et satis rationabiliter reprehendit eos Augustinus, propter *Corollarium.* hoc quod viam salutis in *bono* valde arctant, dum dicunt, in solis perfectis esse virtutem et sapientiam; et in *malitia* valde dilatant, dum dicunt, quod non refert, utrum quis magis, vel minus a medio virtutis recedat.

*Opinio his contraria probatur.* Et propterea aliorum philosophorum positio magis fuit rationabilis, qui posuerunt, sapientiam non solum esse in perfectis, sed etiam in illis qui *proficiunt*. Posuerunt etiam, *medium* virtutis *latitudinem* habere, secundum quod latitudinem habet medium sanitatis[^15]. Quoniam ergo secundum politicam vitam virtutes paulative acquiruntur in his qui proficiunt ad sapientiam; ideo posuerunt, quod una virtus potest haberi in perfectione maiori et minori secundum diversa tempora; una etiam potest separari ab altera. Et istorum sententia secundum dicta Augustini magis est approbanda.

*Conclusio generalis.* Respondendum est igitur ad quaestionem propositam, quod simpliciter loquendo, videlicet quantum ad omne tempus et quantum ad ipsos habitus virtutum, non est connexio inter virtutes[^16] politicas, licet aliqua inter eas possit connexio reperiri ratione *status* alicuius determinati et quarundam *conditionum communium*. — *Distinctio.* Propter quod notandum est, quod contingit loqui de huiusmodi virtutibus politicis quantum ad *propria* et quantum ad *appropriata*. *Conclusio 2.* Si quantum ad *appropriata*; sic est in eis connexio, quia illae quatuor conditiones prius habitae, quae sunt *discernere* et *medium tenere* et huiusmodi, singillatim his quatuor virtutibus appropriantur, et tamen simul ad quamlibet virtutem requiruntur[^17]. — *Subdistinctio.* Si vero loquamur quantum ad *propria*, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut *simpliciter* aut *secundum statum perfectionis*. *Conclusio 3.* Si *secundum statum perfectionis*; sic est adhuc necessaria in eis connexio, quia una virtus nunquam perfecte habetur, nisi ceterae habeantur. Et quantum ad hoc bene dicebant Stoici, licet non usquequaque super verum fundati essent[^18]. — *Conclusio 4.* Si *simpliciter* sive secundum *omnem statum*; sic non est necessarium, connexionem esse in huiusmodi virtutibus, cum sint ab acquisitione; sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae, et ideo sunt concedendae.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Senecae, quod *omne quod bene fit etc.*; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de ipsis virtutibus, quantum ad *appropriata*, non quantum ad *propria*. Nam si quantum ad *propria* velimus loqui, actus illarum virtutum diversi sunt nec negotiantur circa idem, sed circa diversa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Stoicorum, quam introducit Hieronymus; iam patet responsio: quia Stoicis in parte ista non est usquequaque credendum. *Praeterea*, Stoici, sicut prius tactum est, semper loquebantur de virtutibus secundum *culmen perfectionis*, et quantum ad illum statum verum dicebant, quia connexio est in virtutibus non propter ipsius virtutis *essentiam*, sed propter *perfectionem superadditam*, quam una virtus non tribuit, nisi sit aliis associata.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, quod *virtus est aequalitas vitae etc.*; dicendum, quod per illud adverbium *undique* non fit *Notandum.* distributio pro omnibus, quae spectant ad rectitudinem *totius vitae*, sed pro his quae spectant ad rectitudinem *actus* ipsius virtutis[^19]; possibile est autem, aliquem rectificari in actu unius virtutis, secundum
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quod exigit virtus civilis, ita tamen quod non habet rectificationem in actu alterius virtutis, sicut potest manifeste per exempla videri.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Bernardi, iam patet responsio: quia Bernardus loquitur de ipsis virtutibus quantum ad *appropriata*, non quantum ad *propria*. Et *praeterea*, loquitur de virtutibus cardinalibus, non in quantum sunt *politicae*, sed in quantum sunt *gratuitae* et per infusionem magis quam per acquisitionem. Et sic concedi potest, quod sunt connexae[^20]; sed hoc non facit ad quaestionem propositam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod castitas denominat aliquem castum: ergo similiter virtus virtuosum; *Notandum.* dicendum, quod non est simile: quia nomina desinentia in *osum* significant *plenitudinem*. Unde plus dicitur, cum dico, istum esse *virtuosum*, quam cum dico, ipsum *habere virtutem*. Unde et Philosophus[^21] dicit, « quod a virtute non denominatur aliquis *virtuosus*, sed magis *studiosus* »; *castus* autem non plus importat quam *habens castitatem*. Et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de illis quatuor conditionibus, secundum quas virtutes distinguuntur, quod in singulis reperiuntur; iam patet responsio. Illud enim intelligendum est per *appropriationem*, non per *proprietatem*, sicut praedictum est.

english:
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### Question III. *Whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had.*

Thirdly it is asked whether there is a connection among the political virtues, such that, one being had, all must be had. And that there is, it seems:

1. *First*, by philosophical authority. For Seneca says[^1]: « Everything that is done well is done justly, bravely, and temperately »; but the work of any virtue is done well: therefore it is necessary that it be done justly and bravely and temperately: therefore to any work of virtue four virtues concur. But this could not be, unless they were connected: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome to Pammachius[^2]: « The Stoics describe the four virtues as so connected and mutually cohering, that whoever does not have one lacks them all, and whoever has one has them all »: therefore it seems, by the authority of the philosophers, that the political virtues are connected.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by the authority of the *Saints*, and first by the authority of Augustine, in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul*[^3]. For in defining virtue he says that « virtue is an equality of life consenting on every side to reason »; but life does not accord on every side with reason except through the totality of the virtues: therefore, in order that someone have one virtue purely, it is necessary that he have the rest.

4. Likewise, Bernard, in the first book *to Eugenius*[^4]: « It is also most delightful to observe a certain harmony and interweaving
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of the virtues, and that one depends on another, as you see that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that whatever boldness prudence has not given birth to is not fortitude but rashness ». And a little after: « Justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude avenges, temperance possesses »: therefore if these are required for the act of any virtue, it seems that all the virtues necessarily concur in one act.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] *by reason*: for as chastity is related to being chaste, so virtue is related to being virtuous; but whoever has chastity is chaste[^5]: therefore whoever has virtue is virtuous. But no one is virtuous who has a vice: therefore if someone has virtue, he has no vice. But vices are not expelled except by the virtues opposed to them: therefore he who has one virtue has the rest.

6. Likewise, it belongs to any virtue to discern what is to be chosen, and to hold the mean, and to tend rightly toward the end, and to deal with what is arduous and difficult; but the first belongs to prudence, the second to temperance, the third to justice, the fourth to fortitude[^6]: therefore it seems that to any virtuous act these four virtues necessarily concur. But this would not be, unless they had a connection with one another: therefore it seems that the political virtues are connected.

**On the contrary:**

1. the authority of Augustine to Jerome[^7]. For he says that « it is not a divine pronouncement by which it is said that he who has one has all; but this has seemed so to men who are studious and ingenious »; but if this were true, it would be a divine pronouncement, because every truth proceeds from the first Truth: therefore, since this is understood of the political virtues, the political virtues are not connected.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher[^8] the habits of the political and customary virtues come from acts: but acts are not connected — for it happens that a man is exercised in the act of one virtue in such a way that he is not exercised in the act of another — therefore it seems that not all the virtues are necessarily connected.

3. Likewise, just as the sciences are had by acquisition, so are the political virtues; and as one virtue assists another, so it is in the habit of one science with respect to another; but the sciences that are by acquisition are not had at once, but one earlier and another later, and one can be had without another: therefore one political virtue does not seem to be necessarily connected to another.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [shown] by sensible experience: for many are strong in the virtue of prudence who nevertheless do not have generosity or the virtue of patience; many also keep justice toward their neighbor who nevertheless do not have continence in themselves; and yet they do those things through the political virtues: therefore it seems that among virtues of this kind there is no necessary connection[^9].

> **Conclusion.** Simply speaking, the political virtues do not have a connection; they do, however, according to the state of perfection and according to certain common conditions.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this question there was a controversy among the philosophers themselves, as Augustine[^10] and Jerome indicate. — *Opinion 1.* « For certain of the philosophers, who were called Stoics, said that the virtues are necessarily connected, such that he who lacks one lacks the rest ». Of whose position Seneca seems to have been[^11]. For he speaks thus: « If you let go one of your Corinthian vessels, you can say that your furnishing is safe for you. But if you lose one of the virtues, you must confess that you will have none ». — *Opinion 2.* The position of others was that one can be had without another, just as someone can have chastity in such a way that he does not have justice.

*Reasoning 1, according to the Stoics.* Now the reason for this diversity was this, that the Stoics held that virtue was not in anyone except in the wise man, because the governance of a man's whole life according to the rule of conduct depends on the rectitude of reason. And they called wise, as Augustine says *On the City of God*[^12], the one into whom no disturbance falls. For according to them he was called wise who masters all the passions of the soul. —

*Reasoning 2.* Besides this they also held that since virtue is
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about the mean[^13], and the mean is in one way and indivisible, no one has virtue unless he has it in the highest degree and perfectly. But virtue is not had perfectly where some vice reigns, and where the other virtues are lacking. — And on account of these two reasons the Stoics said that the political virtues are connected, namely because they are not possessed except by the wise man, over whom no vice has dominion, and they are about the indivisible mean, from which by any vice there is a falling away.

*A twofold error is rebutted.* But in the foundation of this position of theirs they went too far as to each of the aforesaid points, both because they did not place wisdom in those who are progressing, but only in the *perfect*; and also because they said that, as to the loss of virtue, it makes no difference whether one falls away from the precise mean a little or much. And therefore Augustine rebukes them, to Jerome[^14], speaking thus: « The Stoics seem to me to be in error, who do not wish a man *progressing* in wisdom to have wisdom at all, but only then, when he is *perfect*. For they say that just as it makes no difference for drowning a man whether he has water many furlongs above him or one palm; so it is with those who are in the gulf of error, with respect to wisdom ». And quite reasonably does Augustine rebuke them, because of *Corollary.* this — that they greatly narrow the way of salvation in what is *good*, when they say that virtue and wisdom are in the perfect alone; and greatly widen it in *malice*, when they say that it makes no difference whether one falls away more or less from the mean of virtue.

*The opinion contrary to this is approved.* And therefore the position of the other philosophers was more reasonable, who held that wisdom is not only in the perfect, but also in those who are *progressing*. They also held that the *mean* of virtue has a *latitude*, just as the mean of health has a latitude[^15]. Since therefore, according to the political life, the virtues are acquired little by little in those who are progressing toward wisdom; therefore they held that one virtue can be had in a greater and a lesser perfection according to different times; and one can also be separated from another. And the opinion of these is, according to the sayings of Augustine, the more to be approved.

*General conclusion.* It must therefore be answered to the proposed question that, simply speaking — namely as to all time and as to the very habits of the virtues — there is no connection among the political virtues[^16], although some connection can be found among them by reason of some determinate *state* and of certain *common conditions*. — *A distinction.* On account of which it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of virtues of this kind, the political ones, as to their *proper [features]* and as to their *appropriated [features]*. *Conclusion 2.* If as to the *appropriated*; then there is a connection in them, because those four conditions previously mentioned, which are *to discern* and *to hold the mean* and the like, are appropriated singly to these four virtues, and yet are required together for any virtue[^17]. — *A subdistinction.* But if we speak as to the *proper*, this can be in two ways: either *simply* or *according to the state of perfection*. *Conclusion 3.* If *according to the state of perfection*; then there is still a necessary connection in them, because one virtue is never had perfectly unless the rest are had. And as to this the Stoics spoke well, although they were not founded throughout upon the truth[^18]. — *Conclusion 4.* If *simply*, or according to *every state*; then it is not necessary that there be a connection in virtues of this kind, since they are from acquisition; as the arguments brought forward for this part show, and therefore they are to be granted.

*The solution of the opposing arguments.* 1. Therefore to that which is objected to the contrary from the authority of Seneca, that *everything that is done well etc.*; it must be said that this is understood of the virtues themselves as to their *appropriated [features]*, not as to their *proper [features]*. For if we wish to speak as to the *proper*, the acts of those virtues are diverse and do not deal with the same thing, but with diverse things.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Stoics, which Jerome introduces; the response is already clear: because the Stoics are not to be believed throughout in this matter. *Moreover*, the Stoics, as was touched on before, always spoke of the virtues according to the *summit of perfection*, and as to that state they spoke truly, because the connection is in the virtues not because of the *essence* of the virtue itself, but because of the *superadded perfection*, which one virtue does not confer unless it is associated with the others.

3. To that which is objected from the authority of Augustine, that *virtue is an equality of life etc.*; it must be said that by that adverb *on every side* there is not made a *Note.* distribution for everything that pertains to the rectitude of the *whole life*, but for those things that pertain to the rectitude of the *act* of the virtue itself[^19]; but it is possible that someone be rectified in the act of one virtue, according to
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what the civil virtue requires, in such a way nevertheless that he does not have rectification in the act of another virtue, as can be manifestly seen through examples.

4. To that which is objected from the authority of Bernard, the response is already clear: because Bernard speaks of the virtues themselves as to their *appropriated [features]*, not as to their *proper [features]*. And *moreover*, he speaks of the cardinal virtues, not insofar as they are *political*, but insofar as they are *gratuitous* and by infusion rather than by acquisition. And thus it can be granted that they are connected[^20]; but this does not bear on the proposed question.

5. To that which is objected, that chastity denominates someone chaste: therefore similarly virtue [denominates someone] virtuous; *Note.* it must be said that it is not alike: because names ending in *-osus* signify *fullness*. Hence more is said when I say that someone is *virtuous* than when I say that he *has virtue*. Hence the Philosopher also says[^21] « that from virtue someone is not denominated *virtuous*, but rather *zealous* »; whereas *chaste* imports no more than *having chastity*. And therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is objected concerning those four conditions, according to which the virtues are distinguished, that they are found in each one; the response is already clear. For that must be understood by *appropriation*, not by *property*, as was said before.

la: Sententia allata (non quidem ad verbum) habetur in *Epist.* 66. (alias 67.) n. 7. seqq., ubi Seneca ostendere nititur, omnia bona esse paria propter virtutem, quae per se *una* est, nec maior nec minor. Cfr. *Epist.* 67. (alias 68.) n. 12. — De *minori* cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. *(p.796, n.8.)*

en: The cited statement (though not word for word) is found in *Letter* 66 (alias 67), n. 7 sqq., where Seneca strives to show that all goods are equal on account of virtue, which is in itself *one*, neither greater nor lesser. Cf. *Letter* 67 (alias 68), n. 12. — On the *lesser* cf. above p. 470, note 8. *(p.796, n.8.)*

la: *Epist.* 66. (alias 26.) n. 3. — Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 13: Simul enim cum prudentia, quae una est, omnes existent. — In conclus. edd. omittunt *auctoritate philosophorum*. *(p.796, n.9.)*

en: *Letter* 66 (alias 26), n. 3. — Aristotle, VI *Ethics* c. 13: For together with prudence, which is one, all [the virtues] will exist at once. — In the conclusion the editions omit *by the authority of the philosophers*. *(p.796, n.9.)*

la: Cap. 16. n. 27. — In edd. desiderantur verba *auctoritate Sanctorum et primo*. *(p.796, n.10.)*

en: Chapter 16, n. 27. — In the editions the words *by the authority of the Saints, and first* are wanting. *(p.796, n.10.)*

la: Sive *de Considerat.* c. 8. n. 9. In loco allegato pro *concentum* codd. et edd., textum origin. nihil spectantes, perperam substituerunt *conceptum*. Seq. testimonium habetur ibid. n. 11. *(p.796, n.11.)*

en: Or *On Consideration* c. 8. n. 9. In the place cited, for *harmony* (*concentum*) the codices and editions, having no regard for the original text, wrongly substituted *conception* (*conceptum*). The following testimony is found ibid. n. 11. *(p.796, n.11.)*

la: August., *83 Qq.* q. 23: Omne castum castitate castum est. *(p.797, n.1.)*

en: Augustine, *83 Questions* q. 23: Everything chaste is chaste by chastity. *(p.797, n.1.)*

en: Cf. above d. 33. q. 2., argument 5 to the opposite. *(p.797, n.2.)*

la: *Epist.* 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 10, ubi textus origin. post *hoc visum est* sic prosequitur: *multum quidem ingeniosis, studiosis, sed tamen hominibus*. — Idem in Prolog. lib. *de Doctr. christ.* n. 8. ait: Omne verum ab illo est qui ait: *Ego sum Veritas* (Ioan. 14, 6.). *(p.797, n.3.)*

en: *Letter* 167 (alias 29) c. 3. n. 10, where the original text after *this has seemed so* continues thus: *to the very ingenious and studious indeed, but nonetheless to men*. — The same author in the Prologue of the book *On Christian Doctrine*, n. 8, says: Every truth is from him who says: *I am the Truth* (John 14, 6.). *(p.797, n.3.)*

la: Libr. II. *Ethic.* c. 1. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 721, nota 6. et 7. — Mox pro *consuetudinalium*, cod. S *cardinalium*, edd. *consimilium*. Circa finem arg. cod. A post *virtutes* subdit *politicae*. *(p.797, n.4.)*

en: Book II *Ethics* c. 1 sq. Cf. above p. 721, notes 6 and 7. — Shortly, for *customary* cod. S [reads] *cardinal*, the editions *similar*. Near the end of the argument cod. A adds after *virtues* the word *political*. *(p.797, n.4.)*

la: Sic et Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 13. fere argumentatur proferens, « quod idem ad omnes [virtutes] aptissimus minime sit, atque ideirco alias iam, alias nondum acquisierit ». — Edd. *necessaria*. *(p.797, n.5.)*

en: So too Aristotle, VI *Ethics* c. 13, argues nearly thus, putting it forward « that the same man is by no means most apt for all [the virtues], and therefore has acquired some already, others not yet ». — The editions [read] *necessary* (fem.). *(p.797, n.5.)*

la: *Epist.* 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 4. Verba Hieronymi habes supra arg. 2. ad oppos. *(p.797, n.6.)*

en: *Letter* 167 (alias 29) c. 2. n. 4. You have the words of Jerome above, in argument 2 to the opposite. *(p.797, n.6.)*

la: Potius Cicero, II. *Tusc. Disp.* c. 14: Ecquid scis igitur, si quid de Corinthiis [vasibus] tuis amiseris, posse habere te reliquam supellectilem salvam; virtutem autem si unam amiseris (etsi amitti non potest virtus); sed si unam confessus fueris te non habere, nullam te esse habiturum? — Pro *Corinthiis* multi codd. atque edd. 1, 2 *turmis*, reliqui codd. *turribus*, Vat. *cortinis*. Superius pro *positione* cod. A *opinione*, et inferius *opinio* pro *positio*. *(p.797, n.7.)*

en: Rather Cicero, II *Tusculan Disputations* c. 14: Do you not know, then, that if you lose any of your Corinthian [vessels], you can have the rest of your furnishing safe; but if you lose one virtue (although virtue cannot be lost); but if you confess that you do not have one, that you will have none? — For *Corinthian* many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *of squadrons* (*turmis*), the remaining codices *of towers* (*turribus*), the Vatican [edition] *of curtains* (*cortinis*). Above, for *position* cod. A [reads] *opinion*, and below *opinion* for *position*. *(p.797, n.7.)*

la: Libr. XIV. c. 8. n. 1. et 3. Cfr. Cicer., III. *Tusc. Disp.* c. 1. seqq. et IV. per totum. Cfr. etiam Senecae, *Epist.* 66. (alias 67.), et supra pag. 338, nota 7. — Subinde pro *in quo* edd. *in quem*, et paulo post *dominabatur* pro *dominatur*. *(p.797, n.8.)*

en: Book XIV c. 8. nn. 1 and 3. Cf. Cicero, III *Tusculan Disputations* c. 1 sqq. and IV throughout. Cf. also Seneca, *Letter* 66 (alias 67), and above p. 338, note 7. — Thereupon for *in whom* the editions [read] *into whom*, and a little after *was master* for *masters*. *(p.797, n.8.)*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 6. in fine. Seneca, *Epist.* 66. (alias 67.) n. 11: Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. — Mox pro *indivisibile* edd. *indivisibili*, et paulo inferius *Perfecta* pro *Perfecte*. *(p.798, n.1.)*

en: Cf. above p. 474, note 6, at the end. Seneca, *Letter* 66 (alias 67) n. 11: For right reason is one and simple. — Shortly, for *indivisible* the editions [read] *by the indivisible*, and a little lower *Perfect* (fem.) for *perfectly*. *(p.798, n.1.)*

la: *Epist.* 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 12. In isto testimonio post *cum est perfectus* text. origin. plura addit et dein post *uno palmo* sic pergit: sic illos qui tendunt ad sapientiam, proficere quidem dicunt, tanquam ab imo gurgitis surgentes in aerem; sed nisi totam stultitiam velut opprimentem aquam proficiendo velut emergendo evaserint, non habere virtutem nec esse sapientes; ubi autem evaserint, mox habere totam etc. — Paulo superius pro *in perfectis* cod. aa *in provectis*. *(p.798, n.2.)*

en: *Letter* 167 (alias 29) c. 3. n. 12. In this testimony the original text adds more after *when he is perfect* and then after *one palm* continues thus: thus those who tend toward wisdom they say indeed progress, as if rising from the bottom of a gulf into the air; but unless by progressing they have, as it were by emerging, escaped all folly like the oppressing water, they do not have virtue nor are they wise; but when they have escaped, they soon have it whole etc. — A little above, for *in the perfect* cod. aa [reads] *in the advanced*. *(p.798, n.2.)*

la: Aristot., X. *Ethic.* c. 3. dicit, quod « sanitas, quae, cum definita sit, admittit tamen, ut esse magis ac minus possit ». Cfr. ibid. II. c. 6. et 9. — Cod. K voci *sanitatis* praefigit *virtutis*. In edd. legitur *secundum quod latitudo habet medium summitatis*. Subinde pro *politicam vitam* edd. *politicam veritatem*. *(p.798, n.3.)*

en: Aristotle, X *Ethics* c. 3 says that « health, which, although it is determinate, nevertheless admits of being able to be more and less ». Cf. ibid. II. c. 6 and 9. — Cod. K prefixes to the word *of health* [the word] *of virtue*. In the editions it reads *according to which the latitude has a mean of the summit*. Thereupon for *political life* the editions [read] *political truth*. *(p.798, n.3.)*

la: Cod. F *omnes virtutes*. Mox pro *possit*, quod habent codd. AUZ, in aliis *posset*. *(p.798, n.4.)*

en: Cod. F [reads] *all the virtues*. Shortly, for *can be* (*possit*), which codices AUZ have, in others *could be* (*posset*). *(p.798, n.4.)*

la: Etiam Aristot., VI. *Ethic.* c. 13. ait: Hoc siquidem [separatas esse virtutes] in naturalibus virtutibus licet; in iis vero, quibus *absolute bonus* vocatur quispiam, non licet; simul enim cum prudentia, quae una est, omnes existent. — Proxime post pro *Si* edd. *Sed*. *(p.798, n.6.)*

en: Aristotle too, VI *Ethics* c. 13, says: This indeed [that the virtues be separate] is permissible in the natural virtues; but in those by which someone is called *good without qualification*, it is not permissible; for together with prudence, which is one, all [the virtues] will exist at once. — Immediately after, for *If* the editions [read] *But*. *(p.798, n.6.)*

la: Vide supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 2. — Subinde pro *autem* edd. *enim*. In fine solut. cod. A voci *exempla* adtexit *fidei*. *(p.798, n.7.)*

en: See above d. 33. q. 2., to [argument] 2. — Thereupon for *however* (*autem*) the editions [read] *for* (*enim*). At the end of the solution cod. A appends to the word *examples* [the word] *of faith*. *(p.798, n.7.)*

en: Cf. above a. 1. q. 1. (in this distinction). *(p.799, n.1.)*

la: De Praedicam. c. de Quali, ubi de denominatione agens dicit, quod in plurimis haec denominatio fit, e. g. grammaticus a grammatica; in aliquibus vero fieri nequit, « eo quod non sunt posita qualitati nomina »; « aliquando autem et posito nomine non dicitur denominative quod secundum eam [qualitatem] quale dicitur, ut a virtute studiosus [σπουδαῖος]; eo enim ipso quod virtutem habeat, studiosus dicitur, sed non denominatione a virtute; non autem in pluribus hoc tale est ». — *(p.799, n.2.)*

en: *On the Categories*, the chapter *On Quality*, where, treating of denomination, he says that in most cases this denomination occurs — e.g. "grammarian" from "grammar"; but in some it cannot occur, « because names have not been imposed for the quality »; « but sometimes, even with a name imposed, that which is said to be of-a-certain-quality according to it [the quality] is not said denominatively, as the studious man [*spoudaios*] from virtue; for by the very fact that he has virtue, he is called studious, but not by denomination from virtue; but in most cases it is not so ». — *(p.799, n.2.)*

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione, circa quam Magister (hic c. 2.) duplicem refert opinionem, Scot. (hic q. unica n. 1–10.) disputat contra sententiam Henrici Gand. (Quodl. 5. q. 17.) et S. Thomae, quibus in re principali assentit S. Bonav. Scot. autem tenet, virtutes morales *acquisitas*, etiam in genere suo *perfectas*, non necessario esse connexas (cfr. de hac opinione Scoti Commentator et Hier. de Montefortino, tom. II. pag. 209 seqq.). Idem (ibid. n. 11. seqq.) reiicit etiam illam rationem communiter pro opinione opposita allatam, quod virtutes perfectae connexae sint in *prudentia*, secundum quam rationem etiam Durand. (hic q. 3.) virtutes morales *perfectas* vult esse connexas, non autem per essentialem dependentiam. Opinioni Scoti assentiunt Nominales (cfr. Biel, hic q. unica). — Sed Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Dionys. Carth. concordant cum Ss. Bonaventura et Thoma. — B. Albert. (hic a. 1.) sine distinctione asserit, has virtutes connexionem non habere. — In hac quaestione a multis in medium profertur auctoritas S. Hieronymi supra pag. 789, nota 3. citata.
Praeter laudatos: S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 65. a. 1; Q. disp. de Virtut. cardin. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

**II.** In sequenti (4.) quaestione solvenda et ratione principali omnes conveniunt. Idem dicendum de falso principio hic reprobato, quod omnia peccata sint paria; de quo cfr. hic dub. 2; II. Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, d. 33. dub. 2; S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 73. a. 2.
De ipsa quaestione: Scot., II. Sent. d. 28. n. 6. — S. Thom., hic a. 5; S. I. II. q. 73. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In this question — concerning which the Master (here c. 2.) reports a twofold opinion — Scotus (here, the single question, nn. 1–10.) disputes against the view of Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 5. q. 17.) and of St. Thomas, with whom in the principal matter St. Bonaventure agrees. Scotus, however, holds that *acquired* moral virtues, even when *perfect* in their own kind, are not necessarily connected (cf. on this opinion of Scotus his Commentator and Hieronymus de Montefortino, vol. II, p. 209 sqq.). The same author (ibid. n. 11. sqq.) also rejects that argument commonly brought forward for the opposing opinion, namely that perfect virtues are connected in *prudence*, according to which reasoning Durandus too (here q. 3.) holds that perfect moral virtues are connected, but not by an essential dependence. To the opinion of Scotus the Nominalists assent (cf. Biel, here, the single question). — But Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and Dionysius the Carthusian agree with Saints Bonaventure and Thomas. — Blessed Albert (here a. 1.) asserts without distinction that these virtues do not have a connection. — In this question the authority of St. Jerome, cited above on p. 789, note 3, is brought forward by many.
Besides those named: St. Thomas, here a. 1; S. I. II. q. 65. a. 1; Disputed Question on the Cardinal Virtues a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.

**II.** In the following (4th) question, which is to be resolved, all agree also in the principal reasoning. The same must be said of the false principle here rebutted, that all sins are equal; on which cf. here dub. 2; II Sent. d. 42. a. 2. q. 1, d. 33. dub. 2; St. Thomas, S. I. II. q. 73. a. 2.
On this question itself: Scotus, II Sent. d. 28. n. 6. — St. Thomas, here a. 5; S. I. II. q. 73. a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 796–799 (PDF 818–821; offset pdf = printed + 22) per the Vol III two-column / PDF-priority-inversion discipline; cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 55272–55482, bounded forward by `QUAESTIO IV.` at raw 55485). The Respondeo and Solutio columns on pp.798–799 were cascade-shattered in the OCR (column-bleed and one-token-per-line fragmentation) and were re-set from the PDF bands; the *argumenta* and Sed-contra prose on pp.796–797 were clean enough to base on the OCR with PDF confirmation.

**Page-split map (printed → content).**
- **p.796 (R-col, lower):** QUAESTIO III header + title; opener; args 1–4 (arg 4 breaks mid-Bernard-quote at the page foot). Footers (R-col) nn.8–11 → **[^1]–[^4]** (the p.796 L-col footers nn.1–6 and R-col n.7 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* are **q2's**, NOT re-claimed — see hand-off).
- **p.797:** arg 4-tail, args 5–6, Sed contra 1–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo (Opinio 1/2, Ratio 1). Footers nn.1–8 → **[^5]–[^12]**: n.1 *83 Qq.* (arg 5 *castus*) → [^5]; n.2 *d.33 q.2* (arg 6 *fortitudinis*) → [^6]; n.3 *Epist.167 c.3* (Sed contra 1) → [^7]; n.4 *Libr.II Ethic.* (Sed contra 2) → [^8]; n.5 *Aristot. VI Ethic.* (Sed contra 4 *necessario*) → [^9]; n.6 *Epist.167 c.2 Verba Hieronymi* (Respondeo *Augustinus*) → [^10]; n.7 *Cicero/Seneca-Corinthiis* (Respondeo *Seneca*) → [^11]; n.8 *de Civ. Dei* (Respondeo *de Civitate Dei*) → [^12].
- **p.798:** Respondeo cont. (Ratio 2, Duplex-error, Corollarium, Opinio-contraria, Conclusio generalis + Distinctio/Conclusio 2/Subdistinctio/Conclusio 3/Conclusio 4) + Solutio replies 1–3 (reply 3 breaks at page foot). Footers nn.1–7 → **[^13]–[^19]**.
- **p.799:** Solutio replies 3-tail, 4, 5, 6 + SCHOLION §I–II. Footers nn.1–2 → **[^20]–[^21]**.

Total apparatus: **21 markers** (`[^1]`–`[^21]`), all paired in both bodies.

**Alignment.** PASS 1:1. q3 opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit connexio in virtutibus politicis, ita quod, una habita, necesse sit, omnes haberi* = TRACTATIO **Tertio** *de connexione virtutum politicarum* (d.36 six-question listing). q3 = **virtutes politicae** (the connection of the political / cardinal-as-acquired virtues). No q-swap.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. q3 carries its OWN article-style scholion §I–II, placed LAST in both language blocks (the OCR rendered the header `SCHOLIOK`, which is why a `SCHOLION.`-period grep missed it — it is present at raw 55465, on printed p.799). **§I** = the present q3 (the Scotus-vs-Henry-Gand./Thomas dispute over whether *acquired* moral virtues are necessarily connected; S. Bonaventure with Thomas; Durandus's prudence-connection variant; Nominalists with Scotus; Albert; the Hieronymus authority of p.789). **§II FORWARDS to a1-q4** (`In sequenti (4.) quaestione solvenda…` — connexio vitiorum / the *omnia peccata paria* false principle, with the *De ipsa quaestione* doxography). So a1-q4 will likely have `has_scholion: false` with a redirect to this §II.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from a1-q2:* NOTHING. q2's NOTAE band closed at p.796 R-col n.7 ([^21] in q2). q3 opened its own fresh band on p.796 R-col, claiming the p.796 R-col footers nn.8–11 ([^1]–[^4]).
- *Forwarded to a1-q4:* NOTHING. q3's NOTAE band closes fully on p.799 (n.2 = [^21]). QUAESTIO IV opens lower on p.799 (raw 55485, *Utrum sit connexio in vitiis et peccatis*) with its own fresh per-page footer band. **Scholion §II forwards to q4** (the *connexio vitiorum* / *omnia peccata paria* dossier).

**`[?]` flags.** NONE. Printed pp.796–799 fully legible at 450 dpi; the cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio columns were resolved from the PDF bands without ambiguity.

**[^20]/[^21] note.** p.799's two q3 footers (n.1 anchoring reply 4 *connexae¹*; n.2 anchoring reply 5 *Philosophus²*) sit physically above the SCHOLION block at the page top; p.799's footnote column restarts once for the whole page, so these are **p.799 nn.1–2** and the *following* chunk q4 begins at p.799 n.3. n.1 = `Cfr. supra a.1 q.1` (cross-ref). **[^21] CORRECTED (PASS 3b, 2026-06-14):** the *Philosophus* note on reply 5 (*a virtute non denominatur aliquis virtuosus, sed magis studiosus*) is the *De Praedicam.* (Categories) *de Quali* denomination passage — read eyes-on from p.799 L-col footer n.2 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p799-FOOTL.png`). It had been truncated to a wrong "Aristot., I. *Ethic.*" cite; the full Quaracchi note text (La+En) is now restored. (This is the note q4 had erroneously double-claimed as its own leading [^2]; that duplicate has been removed from q4 — see q4 PASS-3b note.) Backup `_backup-d36-a1-q3-pre-pass3b-20260614/`.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0