title: Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum nomina numeralia in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicantur.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina praedicta dicantur[^1] secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Boethius et Augustinus[^2]: « Quantitas in substantiam transit »; sed numerus quantitatem dicit, ergo transit in substantiam: ergo dictiones numerales secundum substantiam dicuntur.

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2. Item, omne nomen, quod dicitur ad se, dicitur secundum substantiam[^3]; sed *duo* et *tres* est nomen, quod dicitur ad se, non ad aliud: ergo dicuntur secundum substantiam.

3. Item, cum dicitur: *Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres*[^4], hoc quod est *tres* aut dicitur notionaliter, aut essentialiter; non notionaliter, quia nulla est notio, quae communiter dicatur de tribus: ergo dicitur essentialiter.

4. Item, notiones sunt quinque; sed si[^5] termini numerales important pluralitatem notionum, ergo erit quinarius in divinis: ergo non tres, sed quinque sunt. Sed hoc falsum: ergo non dicuntur notionaliter, ergo dicuntur essentialiter sive substantialiter.

**Contra:**

1. Omne nomen pertinens ad substantiam non dicitur pluraliter, sed[^6] singulariter; sed *tres* tantum dicitur pluraliter: ergo nullo modo dicitur secundum substantiam, ergo dicitur secundum relationem.

2. Item, omne nomen substantiale praedicatur de qualibet persona; sed *tres* de nulla persona praedicatur: ergo etc.

3. Item, si hoc nomen *tres* secundum substantiam dicitur, ergo licet ei[^7] addere terminum substantialem: ergo possumus dicere *tres deos* vel *tres substantias*, quorum utrumque est contra fidem.

> **Conclusio.** *Nomina numeralia in divinis dicuntur secundum relationem et important [ipsas notiones].*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod huiusmodi termini numerales in Deo nihil aliud dicant quam hoc nomen *personae* pluraliter. Unde si dicatur: *personae sunt tres*, idem subiicitur et praedicatur. Et ratio et modus intelligendi hic est: quia si ponerentur formae esse ab aeterno, sicut imponitur Platoni quod posuit[^8], tunc plures essent et in aliquo certo numero. Sed numerus ille non esset proprietas nec passio consequens, sed ipsae formae numerales[^9]. Et per hunc modum dicere *tres* in divinis non est dicere nisi ipsas personas.

Sed illud non oportet dicere, quoniam si idem esset omnino, tunc videretur esse nugatio, si dicerentur tres personae, una persona; et videretur nihil[^10] plus dici, cum dicitur: *tres sunt personae*, quam: *personae sunt personae*.

Et propter hoc alius modus dicendi est, quod huiusmodi termini numerales dicuntur secundum relationem et important ipsas[^11] notiones. Et hoc patet, quia in divinis important distinctionem; distinctio autem est a proprietatibus: unde *tres* importat proprietatem trium personarum in concretione. Notio autem, in quantum convenit soli, dicit[^12] proprietatem; in quantum vero ab alio distinguit, dicit relationem: unde dicuntur personae *tres* proprietatibus suis distinctae. Et si tu quaeras, quid dicitur, quando dicitur: *tres notiones*; dicendum, quod se ipsis distinguuntur proprietates, ideo non dicit nisi notiones ipsas.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quantitas transit in substantiam; dicendum, quod numerus in creaturis est quantitas, sed in Deo dicit relationem; et hoc patet sic. Distinctio in creaturis est per alicuius proprietatis vel qualitatis appositionem, et ita per additionem; ubi autem additio, ibi limitatio; ubi limitatio, ibi unius ab alio divisio, et ubi haec sunt, ibi aggregatio diversorum et mensuratio. Et quia quantitatis est mensurare, ad distinctionem in inferioribus sequitur numerus et est modus essendi consequens materiam cum forma. In divinis autem est distinctio solum[^13] per originem, non per additionem alicuius, et ideo nulla additio, nulla limitatio; et ubi hoc non est, nec mensuratio, et ideo nec quantitas. Sed ubi origo, ibi habitudo et relatio; et ideo in divinis numerus non dicit quantitatem, sed magis relationem. Et quoniam relatio non transit in substantiam, ideo nec termini numerales.

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*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicuntur ad se; dicendum, quod nomen dici ad aliud[^14], hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel intra vel extra, vel implicite vel explicite. Et illud nomen substantialiter dicitur, quod non dicitur ad aliud, nec intra nec extra, nec implicite nec explicite. Sed terminus numeralis dicit relationem ad aliud intra, quia importat distinctionem numeratorum et implicat relationem.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla notio dicitur de tribus; dicendum, quod verum est: nulla notio determinata; sed commune ad notiones secundum rationem dicitur de tribus, ut hoc nomen *relatus* et hoc nomen *distinctus* et nomina consimilia.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notiones sunt quinque; dicendum, quod *tres* non quascumque notiones importat, sed solum personales[^15]. Illa enim notio, quae facit personam esse personam et ab omnibus distinctam, illa dicitur unitas personae, in quantum dat esse distinctum; et illa notio est una unius, sicut una est unitas unius; et illae sunt tantum tres. Et ideo cum tantum[^16] sint tres unitates in tribus personis, hinc est, quod personae solummodo *tres* dicuntur.

english:
### Question II. *Whether numeral names in divine matters are said according to substance or according to relation.*

Secondly, it is asked whether the aforesaid names are said[^1] according to substance, or according to relation. And that [they are said] according to substance is shown.

1. As Boethius and Augustine say[^2]: « Quantity passes over into substance »; but number expresses quantity, therefore it passes over into substance: therefore numeral terms are said according to substance.

2. Likewise, every name which is said *of itself* [*ad se*] is said according to substance[^3]; but *two* and *three* is a name said *of itself*, not *of another*: therefore they are said according to substance.

3. Likewise, when it is said: *The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three*[^4], that which is *three* is said either notionally or essentially; not notionally, since there is no notion which is said in common of the three: therefore it is said essentially.

4. Likewise, the notions are five; but if[^5] the numeral terms import a plurality of notions, then there will be a fivefold [number] in divine matters: therefore not three, but five there are. But this is false: therefore they are not said notionally; therefore they are said essentially or substantially.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every name pertaining to substance is not said in the plural, but[^6] in the singular; but *three* is said only in the plural: therefore in no way is it said according to substance, therefore it is said according to relation.

2. Likewise, every substantial name is predicated of any [given] person; but *three* is predicated of no [single] person: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if this name *three* is said according to substance, then it is permitted to it[^7] to add a substantial term: therefore we can say *three gods* or *three substances*, each of which is against the faith.

> **Conclusion.** *Numeral names in divine matters are said according to relation and import [the notions themselves].*

**I respond:** It must be said that some wished to say that numeral terms of this kind in God express nothing other than this name *person* in the plural. Whence if it is said: *the persons are three*, the same thing is subject and predicate. And the reason and mode of understanding here is this: that, if forms were posited to be from eternity, as is imputed to Plato that he held[^8], then there would be many [forms] and in some certain number. But that number would not be a property nor a passion consequent [on form], but the very numeral forms themselves[^9]. And in this way, to say *three* in divine matters is nothing other than to say the persons themselves.

But that need not be said, since if it were entirely the same, then it would seem to be a triviality, if it were said: *three persons, one person*; and it would seem that nothing[^10] more is being said, when it is said: *three are persons*, than: *persons are persons*.

And on account of this another mode of speaking is, that numeral terms of this kind are said according to relation and import the notions themselves[^11]. And this is plain, because in divine matters they import distinction; but distinction is from properties: whence *three* imports the property of three persons in concretion. But a notion, insofar as it belongs to one alone, expresses[^12] property; insofar, however, as it distinguishes [it] from another, it expresses relation: whence the persons are called *three* as distinguished by their properties. And if you ask, what is being said when it is said: *three notions*; it must be said that the properties are distinguished by themselves, therefore it expresses nothing but the notions themselves.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that quantity passes over into substance; it must be said that number in creatures is quantity, but in God expresses relation; and this is plain thus. Distinction in creatures is through the apposition of some property or quality, and so through addition; but where addition, there limitation; where limitation, there division of one from another, and where these are, there aggregation of diverse things and measurement. And because measuring belongs to quantity, on distinction in lower [things] there follows number, and it is a mode of being consequent upon matter together with form. But in divine matters distinction is only[^13] through origin, not through addition of anything, and therefore there is no addition, no limitation; and where this is not, there is also no measurement, and therefore no quantity either. But where origin is, there is relation and disposition; and therefore in divine matters number does not express quantity, but rather relation. And since relation does not pass over into substance, therefore neither do the numeral terms.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that they are said *of themselves*; it must be said that for a name to be said *of another*[^14], this can be in two ways: either *within* or *outside*, [and either] implicitly or explicitly. And that name is said substantially which is not said *of another*, neither within nor outside, neither implicitly nor explicitly. But a numeral term expresses relation *to another within*, since it imports a distinction of [things] numbered and implies relation.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that no notion is said of the three; it must be said that this is true: no determinate notion; but a [name] common to the notions according to its account is said of the three, like this name *related* and this name *distinct* and similar names.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the notions are five; it must be said that *three* does not import any [and every] notion whatsoever, but only the personal [notions][^15]. For that notion which makes a person to be a person and distinct from all [others], it is called the unity of the person, insofar as it gives distinct being; and that notion is one of one, just as the unity of one is one; and these are only three. And therefore since[^16] there are only three unities in the three persons, hence it is that the persons are called only *three*.

la: Auctoritate vetustiorum codd. et ed. I posuimus *dicantur*.

en: On the authority of the older codices and ed. I we have placed *dicantur* ("they are said").

la: Boeth., Libr. de Trin. c. 1. — August., V. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2, et passim.

en: Boethius, *Book on the Trinity*, c. 1. — Augustine, V *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 2, and *passim*.

la: Vide supra d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: See above d. XXII, *Littera Magistri*, c. 1.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, refragantibus aliis codd. et ed. I, male omittit *tres*. Mox plures codd. ut F G H I M W X *sed* pro *hoc*, at incongrue.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, the other codices and ed. I resisting, wrongly omits *tres*. Soon afterwards several codices such as F G H I M W X [read] *sed* in place of *hoc*, but unsuitably.

la: Vat. sola omittit *si*, et paulo infra post *erit* adiicit *numerus*, et *est* ante *falsum*.

en: The Vatican alone omits *si*, and a little below after *erit* it adds *numerus*, and *est* before *falsum*.

la: Plures codd. ut A C R S Y Z cum ed. 1, omissa particula *non*, pro *sed* ponunt *et*, quae lectio explicari forte posset verbis Alani de Insulis, citatis supra pag. 423, nota 2: sed lectio in textum recepta concordat cum praedictis in d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 4. et dub. 2. circa lit., et exhibet generalem regulam.

en: Several codices such as A C R S Y Z with ed. 1, with the particle *non* omitted, in place of *sed* place *et*, which reading could perhaps be explained by the words of Alan of Lille cited above on p. 423, note 2: but the reading received into the text concords with what was set forth in d. XXII, *Littera Magistri*, c. 4 and dub. 2 *circa litteram*, and exhibits the general rule.

la: Vat. cum pluribus mss. omittit *ei*, quod tamen ab aliis codd. et ed. I exhibetur. Mox cod. X *inconveniens*, et cod. Y *falsum* pro *contra fidem*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with several mss. omits *ei*, which however is exhibited by the other codices and ed. I. Soon, cod. X [reads] *inconveniens* ("unfitting"), and cod. Y *falsum* ("false") in place of *contra fidem* ("against the faith").

la: Cfr. Timaeus, circa init. (ed. Basil. an. 1578, tom. III. pag. 28 seq.), et Parmenides, circa init. (ibid. pag. 132), ac de Anima mundi, in princ. (ibid. pag. 93). — Aristot., passim, praesertim VII. Metaph. text. 56. seqq., et XIII. c. 4. et 5. (VI. c. 16, et XII. c. 4. et 5.).

en: Cf. *Timaeus*, near the beginning (Basel ed., year 1578, tom. III, p. 28 ff.), and *Parmenides*, near the beginning (ibid. p. 132), and *On the Soul of the World*, at the start (ibid. p. 93). — Aristotle, *passim*, especially VII *Metaph.*, text 56 ff., and XIII, c. 4 and 5 (VI, c. 16, and XII, c. 4 and 5).

la: Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. perperam *numeratae*. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc *tres* pro *ipsas*, sed praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1; ceteri codd. legunt *ipsas tres*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the mss. and the first six editions, wrongly [reads] *numeratae*. Soon, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] *tres* in place of *ipsas*, but contrary to the faith of very many mss. and ed. 1; the other codices read *ipsas tres*.

la: Fide fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 substituimus hic *nihil* pro *non*, et paulo ante ex mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *dicerentur* loco *diceretur*. Plures codd. ut T X verbo *videretur* praemittunt *iterum*, et mox post *quam* codd. H K V X Z aa bb addunt *si diceretur*. Aliqui mss. ut A S V cum ed. 1 *et* pro *quam*.

en: On the faith of nearly all the mss. and ed. 1 we have here substituted *nihil* ("nothing") in place of *non* ("not"), and a little before, from the mss. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, *dicerentur* in place of *diceretur*. Several codices such as T X prepose *iterum* ("again") to the verb *videretur*, and soon after *quam* codices H K V X Z aa bb add *si diceretur*. Some mss. such as A S V with ed. 1 [read] *et* in place of *quam*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *ipsas*, quod in aliis mss. et ed. 1 exstat.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc *ipsas* is missing, which is present in the other mss. and ed. 1.

la: Explicationem huius vide infra in resp. ad 4. — Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit *esse* tum ante *proprietas*, tum ante *unitas*. Mox Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, *tribus* pro *suis*, et *quaeris* loco *quaeras*.

en: For the explanation of this see below in the response *ad 4*. — The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc preposes *esse* both before *proprietas* and before *unitas*. Soon, the Vatican, with the older mss. and ed. 1 resisting, [reads] *tribus* in place of *suis*, and *quaeris* in place of *quaeras*.

la: In Vat. et solo cod. cc minus bene omittitur *solum*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A G H S T V Y bb post *et ubi* ponunt *haec* pro *hoc*. — Plura vide supra pag. 362, q. 4.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and only in cod. cc *solum* is less suitably omitted. A little below, several codices such as A G H S T V Y bb after *et ubi* place *haec* in place of *hoc*. — See more above on p. 362, q. 4.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. I hic supplevimus *hoc*, et mox post *dupliciter* substituimus *vel* pro *uno modo*, ac circa finem responsionis post *relationem* posuimus *ad aliud* loco *ad aliquid*.

en: From the older mss. and ed. I we have here supplied *hoc*, and soon after *dupliciter* we have substituted *vel* in place of *uno modo*, and toward the end of the response, after *relationem*, we have placed *ad aliud* in place of *ad aliquid*.

la: Cod. aa *non quamcumque notionem importat, sed solum personalem*; cod. T *vere quamcumque relationem vel notionem importat*. Mox post *facit* fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *illam*.

en: Cod. aa [reads] *non quamcumque notionem importat, sed solum personalem* ("does not import any [and every] notion whatsoever, but only the personal"); cod. T [reads] *vere quamcumque relationem vel notionem importat*. Soon after *facit*, on the faith of the older mss. and ed. 1, we have expunged *illam*.

la: In Vat. et solo cod. cc indebite omittitur *tantum*. Paulo ante cod. Y post *unitas unius* addit *in tribus personis*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and only in cod. cc *tantum* is wrongly omitted. A little before, cod. Y after *unitas unius* adds *in tribus personis* ("in three persons").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quod nomina numeralia in Deo tantum secundum relationem dicantur, est doctrina certissima et communissima; sed controversia est de hoc, quid ista nomina in divinis importent; et de hac re in responsione agitur. Prima opinio ibi posita, quam S. Doctor reprobat, concedit quidem, haec nomina dici secundum relationem, sed ita, ut nihil aliud significet locutio: *sunt tres personae*, nisi hoc: *sunt personae*. Huius opinionis defensores timuisse videntur, ne, si diceretur, nomina numeralia importare aliquid distinctum ab ipsis personis divinis, inciderent in errorem Platoni impositum, quasi numerorum sint formae aeternae subsistentes. — Hic notandum, S. Bonav. favere mitiori explicationi idearum Platonicarum, quam etiam habet S. Augustinus libro 83 *Quaest.* q. 46. n. 2. Putat enim S. Augustinus, Platonem docuisse, ideas esse separatas a rebus, at subsistentes non in se, sed in mente Creatoris. Aristoteles vero vult, Platonem docuisse, ideas per se esse subsistentes. De vera sententia Platonis controversia nec nostris temporibus est composita.

Notiones seu proprietates personales se ipsis distingui, constans est doctrina Seraphici (hic in corp., supra d. 13. q. 2. 3. Schol., infra d. 26. q. 1. et 3.).

**II.** Communis sententia aliorum doctorum concordat cum Seraphico in conclusione. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. I. — B. Albert, hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** That numeral names in God are said only according to relation is a most certain and most common doctrine; but the controversy is about this, what these names import in divine matters; and on this matter [the question] is treated in the response. The first opinion there set forth, which the holy Doctor rejects, concedes indeed that these names are said according to relation, but in such a way that the locution: *there are three persons* signifies nothing else than this: *there are persons*. The defenders of this opinion seem to have feared lest, if it were said that numeral names import something distinct from the divine persons themselves, they should fall into the error imputed to Plato, as though numbers were eternally subsisting forms. — Here it is to be noted that St. Bonaventure favors the milder explanation of the Platonic ideas, which St. Augustine also holds in book 83 *Quaest.*, q. 46, n. 2. For St. Augustine thinks that Plato taught that the ideas are separate from things, but subsisting not in themselves, but in the mind of the Creator. Aristotle, however, will have it that Plato taught the ideas to be subsisting *per se*. The controversy about Plato's true judgement is not even in our times settled.

That the personal notions or properties are distinguished by themselves is the constant doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] (here in the body, above d. 13, q. 2, 3, Scholion; below d. 26, q. 1 and 3).

**II.** The common judgement of the other doctors concords with the Seraphic [Doctor] in the conclusion. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 31, a. I. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.* q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS III. *De nomine trinus et trinitas.*

Tertio loco est quaestio principalis de tertia differentia[^1] nominum numeralium, sicut est hoc nomen *trinus* et *trinitas*. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum huiusmodi nomina important unitatem.

Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, cuiusmodi sit illa unitas, quam important.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomina, quae significant simul unum et numerum, importent unitatem.*

Quod autem importent unitatem, videtur:

1. Primo per etymologiam: trinitas enim dicitur quasi trium unitas[^2], similiter et trinus.

2. Item, hoc videtur, quia in divinis recipitur hoc nomen *trinitas*, sed non hoc nomen *ternarius*; sed haec duo eandem pluralitatem important: ergo hoc[^3] non est ratione pluralitatis: ergo hoc nomen *trinitas* ultra pluralitatem aliquid importat, et non nisi unitatem: ergo etc.

3. Item, in divinis recipitur hoc nomen *trinus*, sed non recipitur hoc nomen *triplex* — non enim dicitur Deus triplex, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^4], sed fides communiter dicit Deum trinum — ergo aliquid dicit ultra hoc, quod est triplex; sed non pluralitatem: ergo unitatem.

4. Item, Magister dixit supra, distinctione vigesima secunda[^5], quod hoc nomen *trinitas* est nomen collectivum; sed nomen collectivum non tantum importat pluralitatem, sed etiam unitatem: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Ex tribus personis nihil unum fit; sed ex pluribus unitatibus creatis aliquid unum[^6] resultat: ergo numerus, in creaturis dictus, potius debet importare unitatem quam in divinis. Sed cum dicitur in creaturis binarius vel ternarius, ita importat numerum, quod non unitatem: ergo nec hoc nomen *trinitas* debet in divinis importare.

2. Item, si *trinus* et *trinitas* important pluralitatem et unitatem; cum nullum nomen sic distinctum et indistinctum[^7] habeat pluralitatem distinctionis et unitatem indistinctionis, de nullo nomine in divinis poterit dici.

3. Item, si unitatem importat[^8]: ergo cum idem non debeat sibi copulari, male et nugatorie dicitur in hymno Confessorum in fine:

> *Qui supra caeli residens cacumen*
> *Totius mundi machinam gubernat,*
> *Trinus et unus*[^9].

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> **Conclusio.** *Nomen* trinus *vel* trinitas *importat cum pluralitate personarum etiam unitatem essentiae, non autem collectivam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quia in divinis singulari modo est numerus, scilicet ex distinctione suppositorum cum unitate formae, speciali modo[^10] debuit exprimi nomine, quod simul dicit pluralitatem et unitatem. — Quia ergo huiusmodi nomina important pluralitatem et unitatem, ideo sunt similia nominibus collectivis. Sed quia unitas collectivorum est unitas aggregationis, quae consequitur pluralitatem; hic autem est unitas formae, quae non est pluralitatem consequens: ideo non est collectivum tale nomen. Et ideo dicit Magister, quod est *quasi* collectivum.

*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet primum in contrarium. Concedendum ergo, quod importat pluralitatem et unitatem.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nullum nomen simul importat[^11] pluralitatem et unitatem; dicendum, quod hoc verum est ratione formae; sed cum sit unum in forma, potest habere pluralitatem suppositorum: et hoc non est inconveniens vel impossibile.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de nugatione, dicendum, quod, sicut hoc verbum *cede* habet intellectum huius verbi *dandi* et *loci*, sed cum dicitur, *cede locum*, cadit ab intellectu alterius: similiter in proposito, et similiter intelligendum in relativis, cum dicitur: *filii pater*.

english:
### ARTICLE III. *On the name "threefold" and "trinity."*

In the third place is the principal question concerning the third difference[^1] of numeral names, as is this name *threefold* (*trinus*) and *trinity* (*trinitas*). And on this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether names of this sort import unity.

Second, granted that they do, it is asked of what sort is that unity which they import.

### Question I. *Whether the names which signify one and number together import unity.*

That they do import unity, however, is shown:

1. First, through etymology: for *trinitas* is so called as it were a unity of three[^2], and likewise *trinus*.

2. Likewise, this is plain, since in divine matters this name *trinitas* is received, but not this name *ternarius*; but these two import the same plurality: therefore this[^3] is not by reason of plurality: therefore this name *trinitas* imports something beyond plurality, and nothing other than unity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in divine matters this name *trinus* is received, but this name *triplex* is not received — for God is not called *triplex*, as the Master says in the *littera*[^4], but the faith commonly calls God *trinus* — therefore it says something beyond what *triplex* says; but not plurality: therefore unity.

4. Likewise, the Master said above, in the twenty-second distinction[^5], that this name *trinitas* is a collective name; but a collective name does not only import plurality, but also unity: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. From three persons nothing one comes to be; but from many created unities something one[^6] results: therefore number, said in creatures, ought rather to import unity than [it does] in divine matters. But when in creatures it is said *binary* or *ternary*, it so imports number that [it does] not [import] unity: therefore neither ought this name *trinitas* to import [unity] in divine matters.

2. Likewise, if *trinus* and *trinitas* import plurality and unity; since no name so distinct and indistinct[^7] has plurality of distinction and unity of indistinction, it can be said of no name in divine matters.

3. Likewise, if it imports unity[^8]: therefore since the same thing ought not to be coupled with itself, it is badly and pointlessly said in the hymn of Confessors at the end:

> *He who, residing above the summit of heaven,*
> *Governs the machine of the whole world,*
> *Threefold and one*[^9].

> **Conclusion.** *The name* trinus *or* trinitas *imports, together with plurality of persons, also unity of essence, but not collective [unity].*

**I respond:** It must be said that, because in divine matters number is in a singular way, namely from distinction of supposits with unity of form, in a special way[^10] it had to be expressed by a name which says plurality and unity together. — Since therefore names of this sort import plurality and unity, they are accordingly similar to collective names. But since the unity of collective [things] is a unity of aggregation, which follows upon plurality; here, however, it is a unity of form, which is not a consequence of plurality: therefore such a name is not collective. And therefore the Master says that it is *quasi* collective ("as it were collective").

*To 1.* And from this what was said first on the contrary side is plain. Therefore it must be conceded that it imports plurality and unity.

*To 2.* To that, then, which is objected, that no name imports[^11] plurality and unity together; it must be said that this is true by reason of form; but since it is one in form, it can have plurality of supposits: and this is not unfitting or impossible.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning pointlessness, it must be said that, just as this word *cede* ("yield") has the meaning of the verb *to give* and of *place*, but when it is said *cede locum* ("yield place"), it falls away from the meaning of the other [word]: similarly in the [present] proposition, and similarly is it to be understood in relatives, when it is said: *filii pater* ("the sons' father").

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *Tertio principaliter quaeritur de differentia*, et mox cum cod. cc post *trinus* habet *vel* pro *et*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *Tertio principaliter quaeritur de differentia* ("Thirdly is principally asked concerning the difference"), and soon after, with cod. cc, after *trinus* it has *vel* ("or") in place of *et* ("and").

la: Isidor., VII. *Etymolog.* c. 4: *Trinitas appellatur, quod fiat totum unum ex quibusdam tribus, quasi triunitas.*

en: Isidore, VII *Etymologies* c. 4: *"Trinity" is so called because the whole one is made out of certain three [things], as it were a "tri-unity."*

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic supplevimus *hoc*, et mox post *dupliciter* substituimus *vel* pro *uno modo*, ac circa finem responsionis post *relationem* posuimus *ad aliud* loco *ad aliquid*.

en: From the older mss. and ed. 1 we have here supplied *hoc* ("this"), and soon after *dupliciter* we have substituted *vel* ("or") in place of *uno modo* ("in one way"), and toward the end of the response, after *relationem* we have placed *ad aliud* ("to another") in place of *ad aliquid* ("to something").

la: Dist. XIX. c. 12. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *dicitur multipliciter* pro *dicit Magister*.

en: Distinction XIX, c. 12. — The Vatican [edition], against many codices and ed. 1, [reads] *dicitur multipliciter* ("is said in many ways") in place of *dicit Magister* ("the Master says").

la: Cap. 3. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit *distinctione 22, quod hoc nomen*; et mox post *nomen* inserit *quasi*, quod quidem ab ipso Magistro exhibetur; sed attendendum, quod hic omittitur, quia in corp. sensus explicatur.

en: Chapter 3. — The Vatican [edition], against the testimony of the mss. and ed. 1, omits *distinctione 22, quod hoc nomen* ("in distinction 22, that this name"); and soon after *nomen* it inserts *quasi* ("as it were"), which indeed is given by the Master himself; but it must be noted that here it is omitted, since in the body the sense is explained.

la: Lectio Vat. et cod. cc *fit* sive pro *unum* nimis vaga est et contradicit ceteris codd. et ed. 1. Paulo infra Vat. *trinarius* pro *ternarius*.

en: The reading of the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc, *fit* or in place of *unum*, is too vague and contradicts the other codices and ed. 1. A little below, the Vatican [edition reads] *trinarius* in place of *ternarius*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, hic nimis arcte *ergo hoc nomen Trinitatis si recipiatur in divinis, hoc etc.*, et paulo ante *reputatur* pro *recipitur*, ac *trinarius* loco *ternarius*. [?]

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, with other mss. and ed. 1 resisting, here too tightly [reads] *ergo hoc nomen Trinitatis si recipiatur in divinis, hoc etc.*, and a little before *reputatur* in place of *recipitur*, and *trinarius* in place of *ternarius*. [?]

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. addit *nec*, pro quo in ed. 1 legitur *nullam*. Paulo ante pro *sic* Vat. *sit*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the older codices, adds *nec* ("nor"), in place of which ed. 1 reads *nullam* ("none"). A little before, in place of *sic* ("thus") the Vatican [edition reads] *sit* ("let it be").

la: Invenitur sic in Breviario gothico secundum S. Isidorum in officio unius Confessoris praecipui, non Pontificis.

en: It is found thus in the Gothic Breviary according to St. Isidore, in the office of one principal Confessor, not a Pontiff.

la: In Vat. minus bene et contra mss. et ed. 1 deest *modo*. Paulo ante cod. R *in* pro *ex*.

en: In the Vatican [edition], less well and against the mss. and ed. 1, *modo* ("in the manner") is missing. A little before, cod. R [reads] *in* in place of *ex*.

la: Cod. T cum ed. 1 habet *qui*, et dein post *quod* cum pluribus aliis codd. ut A I Y omittit *hoc*. Dein cod. R *potest habere ratione suppositorum pluralitatem* loco *potest habere pluralitatem suppositorum*.

en: Cod. T with ed. 1 has *qui*, and then after *quod*, with several other codices such as A I Y, omits *hoc*. Then cod. R [reads] *potest habere ratione suppositorum pluralitatem* in place of *potest habere pluralitatem suppositorum*.

latin_scholion:
Ceteri antiqui magistri hanc et sequentem quaestionem simul tractant et in eadem solutione conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. 2. — Scot., Report., hic q. unic. circa fin. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 48. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 75. q. 4. n. 16. et seq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
The other ancient masters treat this and the following question together, and agree in the same solution. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 66, m. 1, 2. — Scotus, *Reportata*, here q. unic. near the end. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 31, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8; *Summa* p. I, tr. 10, q. 48, m. 1, 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. *princ.* q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 75, q. 4, n. 16 et seq. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5.

---

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 24, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the unity which the names 'trinity' and 'three' import is the unity of the essence or of the supposit

source_text:
<!-- page 430 -->

### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum unitas, quam important nomina trinitas et trinus, sit unitas essentiae, an suppositi.*

Secundo quaeritur, cuiusmodi sit illa unitas, quam importat hoc nomen *trinitas* vel *trinus*, utrum videlicet suppositi, an essentiae. Et quod essentiae, videtur:

1. Quia hoc quod est *trinitas* dicitur de omnibus simul et[^1] in singulari; sed hoc solum convenit termino importanti unitatem substantialem: ergo etc.

2. Item, nulla unitas est trium nisi essentia vel essentialis[^2]; sed *trinitas* est trium unitas: ergo hoc nomen *trinitas* dicit unitatem essentialem; pari ratione et hoc nomen *trinus*.

3. Item, nec hoc nomen *trinitas* nec hoc nomen *trinus* dicitur de persona: ergo non importat unitatem personalem. Non enim[^3] conceditur: *persona est trina*, vel *persona est trinitas*.

**Contra:**

1. Huiusmodi nomina important simul pluralitatem et unitatem; sed sola unitas personae est plurificabilis, non essentiae: ergo important[^4] unitatem personae.

2. Item, unitas essentiae praedicatur de Patre; sed neque hoc nomen *trinus*, neque hoc nomen *trinitas* praedicatur de Patre: ergo etc.

3. Item, unitas essentiae praedicatur de essentia; sed haec nequaquam dicitur: *essentia divina est trina*, nec: *trinitas est trina*[^5]: ergo non dicit unitatem essentialem.

Quaeritur ergo, quam unitatem important, et utrum nomina ista secundum substantiam dicantur, an secundum relationem. Et cum dicantur de omnibus simul in singulari, videntur dici secundum substantiam; cum iterum non dicantur de aliquo singillatim, non videntur dici secundum substantiam.

> **Conclusio.** *Unitas, quam important termini trinitas et trinus, non est unitas personalis, sed essentialis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum[^6], quod ad hoc consuevit assignari duplex etymologia. Uno modo *trinitas* dicitur *unitas ter*; et sic nomen numerale cadit in eo ut complementum, et sic dicitur secundum relationem, sicut termini numerales; et unitas, quam importat, est unitas personalis, non essentialis, quia illa plurificatur. Alia etymologia est: *trinitas est unitas trium*[^7]; et tunc unitas non numeratur, sed significatur ut communicabilis a tribus; et quoniam haec unitas est essentialis, ideo importat unitatem essentialem.

Et haec quidem etymologia ultima[^8] absque dubio habet veritatem; sed prima non videtur habere veritatem. Nam cum eandem significationem habeat *trinus* et *trinitas*, si illa est etymologia: *unitas ter*[^9], tunc *trinus* diceretur *unus ter*. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, scilicet *ter unus*, cum tamen dicatur *trinus*.

Propter hoc dicendum, quod huiusmodi nomina important unitatem formalem sive essentiae cum pluralitate suppositorum; et ideo habent quodam modo naturam termini substantialis in hoc, quod dicuntur de tribus singulariter, et termini numeralis in hoc, quod de nullo dicuntur per se.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sola unitas personae est plurificabilis; dicendum, quod *trinitas* non importat pluralitatem circa unitatem in recto, sed solum in obliquo, quod sit trium vel tribus; et hoc est essentiae.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas essentiae praedicatur de Patre; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non ratione hac, quia plures in eo conveniunt — sicut *animal* praedicatur de homine, non tamen ea ratione, qua diversae species in eo conveniunt[^10] — et quia *trinitas* importat illam unitatem ut in pluribus, ideo etc.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non dicitur *essentia trina*, neque *trinitas trina*[^11]; dicendum, quod hoc nomen *trinus* importat unitatem ut in concretione, et ita ut inhaerentem pluribus. Et ideo de eo solo dicitur, quod importat unitatem ut in concretione,

<!-- page 431 -->

ut hoc nomen *Deus*, quod quidem supponit personas. Et quia tale est hoc nomen *Deus*, ideo conceditur: *Deus est trinus*, non: *deitas est trina*: quia *deitas* non supponit personam; similiter nec hoc *trinitas*; et sic patent omnia.

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether the unity which the names "trinity" and "three" import is the unity of the essence, or of the supposit.*

Secondly it is asked, of what kind that unity is which this name *trinity* or *three* imports — namely, whether of supposit, or of essence. And that [it is] of essence is shown:

1. Because that which is *trinity* is said of all [the persons] together and[^1] in the singular; but this belongs only to a term importing substantial unity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no unity is "of three" except essence or essential[^2]; but *trinity* is the unity of three: therefore this name *trinity* expresses essential unity; by parity of reason, also this name *three*.

3. Likewise, neither this name *trinity* nor this name *three* is said of a person: therefore it does not import personal unity. For it is not[^3] conceded: *the person is three*, or *the person is trinity*.

**On the contrary:**

1. Names of this sort import simultaneously plurality and unity; but the unity of the person alone is what can be pluralized, not [the unity] of the essence: therefore they import[^4] the unity of the person.

2. Likewise, the unity of the essence is predicated of the Father; but neither this name *three*, nor this name *trinity*, is predicated of the Father: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the unity of the essence is predicated of the essence; but this is by no means said: *the divine essence is three*, nor: *trinity is three*[^5]: therefore it does not express essential unity.

It is asked, therefore, what unity they import, and whether these names are said according to substance, or according to relation. And since they are said of all [the persons] together in the singular, they seem to be said according to substance; since again they are not said of any one singly, they do not seem to be said according to substance.

> **Conclusion.** *The unity which the terms "trinity" and "three" import is not personal unity, but essential.*

**I respond:** It must be said[^6] that for this purpose a twofold etymology is wont to be assigned. In one way *trinity* is called *unity thrice*; and thus the numeral name falls in it as a complement, and it is so said according to relation, like numeral terms; and the unity which it imports is personal unity, not essential, since the latter is pluralized. The other etymology is: *trinity is the unity of three*[^7]; and then the unity is not numbered, but is signified as communicable from the three; and since this unity is essential, therefore it imports essential unity.

And this last[^8] etymology indeed without doubt has truth; but the first does not seem to have truth. For since *three* and *trinity* have the same signification, if that is the etymology: *unity thrice*[^9], then *three* would be called *one thrice*. But this cannot be said of God, namely *thrice one*, although he is nevertheless called *three*.

On account of this it must be said that names of this sort import formal unity, or unity of essence, together with plurality of supposits; and therefore they have in some way the nature of a substantial term in this, that they are said of three in the singular, and the nature of a numeral term in this, that they are said of no one [supposit] *per se*.

**To the arguments on the opposite side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that the unity of the person alone can be pluralized; it must be said that *trinity* does not import plurality with regard to unity in the direct [case], but only in the oblique, [namely] that it be of three or to three; and this is [the case] of the essence.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the unity of the essence is predicated of the Father; it must be said that this is true, but not on this ground — that several [persons] come together in him — just as *animal* is predicated of man, yet not on the ground on which diverse species come together in him[^10] — and since *trinity* imports that unity as in several [supposits], therefore etc.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is not said *the essence [is] three*, nor *trinity [is] three*[^11]; it must be said that this name *three* imports unity as in concretion, and so as inhering in several. And therefore of it alone is it said that it imports unity as in concretion,

as [does] this name *God*, which indeed stands for the persons. And because this name *God* is such, therefore it is conceded: *God is three*, [but] not: *the deity is three*: because *deity* does not stand for a person; likewise neither does this *trinity*; and so all things are plain.

la: In Vat. et solo cod. cc deest *et*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc, *et* ("and") is missing.

la: Sola Vat. hic repetit *unitas*.

en: The Vatican [edition] alone here repeats *unitas* ("unity").

la: Vat. et unus vel alter codex addunt *haec*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and one or another codex add *haec* ("these").

la: Vat. mendose *importat*.

en: The Vatican [edition] erroneously [reads] *importat* ("[it] imports") [in the singular].

la: Verba *nec trinitas est trina* ex codd. P Q adiecimus, praesertim eo, quod infra in solutione huius obiectionis occurrunt. Mox codd. W Y *essentiae* pro *essentialem*.

en: We have added the words *nec trinitas est trina* ("nor: trinity is three") from codd. P Q, especially because they recur below in the solution to this objection. Soon afterwards, codd. W Y [read] *essentiae* in place of *essentialem*.

la: Vat. cum solo cod. cc praemittit *Ad praedictorum intelligentiam*. Mox Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 *convenit* pro *consuevit*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with only cod. cc prefixes *Ad praedictorum intelligentiam* ("For the understanding of the things said before"). Soon afterwards, the Vatican [edition], without the authority of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *convenit* ("it agrees") in place of *consuevit* ("it is wont").

la: Ita S. Isidor., VII. Etymolog. c. 4. Vide pag. 428, nota 8. — Paulo infra post *communicabilis*, postulantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, supplevimus praepositionem *a*, quae saepe a S. Doctore cum verbo *communicabilis* coniungitur.

en: Thus St. Isidore, VII *Etymologies* c. 4. See above p. 428, note 8. — A little below, after *communicabilis*, with the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3 demanding it, we have supplied the preposition *a* ("from"), which is often joined by the holy Doctor with the word *communicabilis* ("communicable").

la: A Vat. et solo cod. cc omittitur *ultima*.

en: By the Vatican [edition] and only cod. cc, *ultima* ("last") is omitted.

la: In Vat. et in aliquot codd. verbis *unitas ter* praemittitur *trinitas*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and in some codices, *trinitas* is prefixed to the words *unitas ter*.

la: Paritas in hoc est: sicut de homine non praedicatur *animal*, quatenus sub se comprehendit alias diversas species animalium, scil. rationale et irrationale, quasi in homine diversae animalium species convenirent, sed quia homo est una species animalium: sic de Patre non praedicatur unitas essentiae, quatenus est in aliis personis, quasi in Patre plures personae convenirent, sed quia est una personarum, quibus unica divina essentia convenit. — Vat. paulo superius contra fere omnes codd. et sex primas edd. *qua* loco *quia*, ac dein post *plures* in cum aliquibus codd. et ed. 1 perperam *ea* pro *eo*. Proxime infra Vat., fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 dissidentibus, omittit *tamen*, et mendose exhibet *diversa specie* pro *diversae species*.

en: The parity in this is: just as *animal* is not predicated of man insofar as it comprehends under itself other diverse species of animals, namely rational and irrational, as if in man diverse species of animals came together, but because man is one species of animals — so the unity of the essence is not predicated of the Father insofar as it is in the other persons, as if in the Father several persons came together, but because he is one of the persons to whom the one divine essence belongs. — The Vatican [edition], a little above, against nearly all the codices and the first six editions, [reads] *qua* in place of *quia*, and then after *plures in* with some codices and ed. 1 erroneously [reads] *ea* in place of *eo*. Just below, the Vatican [edition], with nearly all the mss. and ed. 1 dissenting, omits *tamen* ("nevertheless"), and erroneously exhibits *diversa specie* in place of *diversae species*.

la: Codd. VZ omittunt *neque trinitas trina*.

en: Codd. VZ omit *neque trinitas trina* ("nor: trinity is three").

latin_scholion:
In solut. ad 3. S. Doctor refugit[?] locutionem *deitas est trina*. Tamen in hymno: « Sacris solemniis iuncta sint gaudia » (Officium in festo Corp. Christi), cuius auctor fertur esse S. Thomas, legitur: « Te trinitas unaque poscimus ». Dici potest, quod hic abstracti [ponitur] pro concreto. Auctores vide in quaest. praeced.

---

english_scholion:
In the solution to [objection] 3, the holy Doctor shrinks from[?] the locution *deitas est trina* ("the deity is three"). Yet in the hymn « Sacris solemniis iuncta sint gaudia » (Office on the feast of *Corpus Christi*), whose author is reputed to be St. Thomas, one reads: « Te trinitas unaque poscimus » ("Thee, both Trinity and one, we beseech"). It can be said that here the abstract [stands] for the concrete. For the [other] authors see in the preceding question.

---


title: Dist. 25

title_alt:
Distinctio XXV littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XXV

source_text:
<!-- page 432 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXV.

#### Cap. I. *Quid significetur hoc nomine persona in plurali numero, scilicet[^1] cum dicitur personae.*

Praeterea considerandum est, cum hoc nomen *persona*, ut praedictum est, secundum substantiam dicatur, quae sit intelligentia dicti, cum pluraliter profertur: tres personae, vel: duae personae, et cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia est persona Filii, alia est persona Spiritus sancti. Si enim in his locutionibus *personae* vocabulum essentiae intelligentiam facit, plures essentias confiteri videmur, et ita plures deos. Si vero essentiae significationem ibi non tenet, alia est huius nominis ratio, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, vel Filius est persona; et alia, cum dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae; et cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, et huiusmodi.

«Persona enim, ut supra[^2] ait Augustinus, *ad se* dicitur, et idem est Deo esse personam quod esse, sicut idem est ei esse quod Deum esse». Unde manifeste colligitur, quod essentiam divinam praedicamus, dicentes: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, id est divina essentia; et omnino unum et idem significatur nomine *personae*, id est essentia divina, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, quod significatur nomine *Dei*, cum dicitur: Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus. Ita etiam idem significatur, cum dicitur: Deus est Deus, et Deus est persona; utroque enim nomine essentia divina intelligitur, quia utrumque secundum substantiam dicitur.

Cum vero dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae, quid nomine *personae* significamus? An essentiam? Hoc enim videtur, si supra posita verba Augustini diligenter scrutemur. Supra enim dixit, quod «ideo tres personas dicimus, quia id quod persona est commune est tribus»[^3]. Et item: «quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo tres personae dicuntur». Videtur ergo, eandem tenere significationem hoc nomen *persona*, cum dicitur: tres personae, quam habet, cum dicitur: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona; quia, ut ostendit Augustinus, hoc dicitur — id est tres personae — propter illud, quia id quod persona est commune est eis. Id ergo quod commune est eis, id est Patri et Filio et Spiritui sancto, videtur significari nomine *personae*, cum dicitur tres personae.

Aliter etiam potest[^4] ostendi, quod ibi nomine *personae* significetur essentia, cum dicitur tres personae. Ut enim supra dixit Augustinus, ea necessitate diximus tres personas, ut responderemus quaerentibus, quid tres, vel quid tria. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tres vel quid tria, convenienter respondetur, cum dicitur: tres personae. At cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid tria, per quid de essentia quaeritur. Non enim invenitur, quid illi tres sint, nisi essentia. Si ergo quaestioni recte respondemus, oportet ut respondendo essentiam significemus; alioquin non ostendimus, quid tres sint. Si vero respondentes essentiam significamus, ipsam essentiam *personae* nomine intelligimus, cum dicitur: tres personae.

Quibusdam videtur, quod nomine *personae* significetur essentia, cum dicitur tres personae, propterea quia Augustinus dicit, ideo dici tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod est persona, ut sit talis intelligentia: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres personae, id est, sunt tres id habentes commune, quod est persona, id est, tres sunt, quorum quisque est persona, id est essentia. Sed quomodo iuxta hanc intelligentiam dicetur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii? Et hoc etiam ita volunt intelligere, scilicet alius est Pater, et alius est Filius, id tamen commune habentes quod est persona. Et hoc confirmant auctoritate Augustini, qui in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^5] ait: «Tres personas eiusdem essentiae, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus. Tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona»[^6]. Hac auctoritate et praemissis conantur asserere in praedictis locutionibus, nomen *personae* essentiam significare.

Sed quid respondebunt ad id quod ipse Augustinus in libro *de Fide ad Petrum*[^7] dicit, «scilicet, quod alius est Pater in persona sive personaliter, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus»? Quomodo enim alius personaliter Pater, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus, si in esse personam omnino conveniunt, id est, si persona essentiae tantum intelligentiam facit? Ideo nobis videtur aliter hoc posse dici congruentius iuxta catholicorum Doctorum auctoritates.

#### Cap. II. *De triplici acceptione huius nominis persona in Trinitate.*

Sciendum est igitur, quod hoc nomen *persona* multiplicem intelligentiam facit, non unam tantum. Et ut Hilarius ait in libro quarto *de Trinitate*[^8]: «Intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi, quia non sermoni res, sed rei sermo subiectus est». Discernentes ergo dicendi causas huius nominis, scilicet *personae*, significationem distinguimus dicentes, quod hoc nomen, scilicet *persona*, proprie secundum substantiam dicitur et essentiam significat, sicut supra[^9] ostendit Augustinus, cum dicitur: Deus est persona, Pater est persona. Quadam tamen necessitate, ut supra dixit Augustinus, translatum est hoc nomen, ut pluraliter diceretur tres personae, cum quaereretur, quid tres, vel quid tria; ubi non significat essentiam, id est naturam divinam, quae communis est tribus personis, sed subsistentias, vel hypostases secundum Graecos. Graeci quippe, ut supra[^10] dixit Augustinus, aliter accipiunt substantiam, id est *hypostasim*, aliter nos. Nos enim substantiam dicimus essentiam sive naturam. Personas autem dicimus, sicut illi dicunt, substantias, id est hypostases. Si[^11] ergo nos ita accipimus personas, ut illi accipiunt substantias vel hypostases; at illi aliter accipiunt hypostases, quam nos substantiam: aliter ergo nos accipimus personas quam substantiam. Cum ergo dicimus: tres personas, non ibi *personae* nomine essentiam significamus. Quid ergo dicimus? Dicimus, quia tres personae sunt, id est tres subsistentiae[^12], scilicet tres entes; pro quo Graeci dicunt: tres hypostases.

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Et hic sensus adiuvatur ex verbis Augustini praemissis, si interius intelligantur. Quia enim Pater est persona, id est essentia, et Filius persona, et Spiritus sanctus persona; ideo dicuntur tres personae, id est tres subsistentiae[^13], tres entes. Non enim possent dici tres subsistentiae vel entes, nisi singulus eorum esset persona, id est essentia. Quia ergo eis commune est id quod est persona, id est essentia; ideo recte dicuntur tres personae, id est subsistentiae vel subsistentes, ut, sicut essentia, quae est eis communis, vere ac proprie est, ita illi tres vere ac proprie subsistentiae vel entes intelligantur. Ideoque Augustinus[^14], causas dictorum discernens, dicit, tres personas esse unam essentiam vel eiusdem essentiae, non ex eadem essentia, ne aliud intelligatur ibi esse persona, aliud essentia. Tres enim personae, id est subsistentiae, una sunt essentia et unius essentiae, non autem sunt una persona vel unius personae, licet *persona* secundum substantiam aliquando dicatur. Nam si hoc diceretur, confusio fieret in personis.

Ad hoc autem, quod illi dicunt: cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid[^15] tria, de essentia quaeritur, quia non invenitur, quid illi tres sint nisi essentia — per hoc volentes nos inducere, ut nomine *personae* essentiam intelligamus, cum respondemus: tres personas — ita dicimus: indubitabiliter verum est, quia non invenitur unum aliquid, quod illi tres sint nisi essentia. Unum enim sunt illi tres, id est essentia divina. Unde Veritas ait[^16]: *Ego et Pater unum sumus*. Verumtamen, cum quaeritur, quid tres, vel quid tria, non de essentia quaeritur, nec ibi *quid* ad essentiam refertur; sed cum fides catholica tres esse profiteretur, sicut Ioannes in Epistola canonica[^17] ait: *Tres sunt, qui testimonium perhibent in caelo*, quaerebatur, quid illi tres essent, id est, an essent tres res, et quae tres res, et quo nomine illae tres res significarentur. Et ideo loquendi necessitate inventum est ad respondendum hoc nomen *persona*, et dictum est: tres personae.

Non autem te moveat quod diximus tres res. Non enim hoc dicentes diversarum rerum numerum ponimus in Trinitate, sed ita tres res dicimus, ut easdem esse unam quandam summam rem confiteamur. Unde Augustinus in primo libro *de Doctrina christiana*[^18] sic ait: «Res, quibus fruendum est, nos beatos faciunt». «Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Eademque Trinitas una quaedam summa res est communisque fruentibus ea, si tamen res, et non rerum omnium causa sit, si tamen et causa[^19]. Non enim facile potest inveniri nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, nisi quod melius dicitur: Trinitas haec unus Deus». Sicut ergo tres res dicuntur, et hae sunt una res, ita tres subsistentiae[^20] dicuntur, et hae sunt una substantia. — Ecce ostensum est, quae sit intelligentia huius nominis *persona*, cum dicimus: tres personas.

#### Cap. III. *Ex quo sensu dicatur: alia persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti; sive alius in persona Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus.*

Nunc inspiciamus, utrum secundum eandem rationem et causam dicatur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus sancti. Quod utique sane intelligi potest, ut sit sensus talis: alia est subsistentia vel hypostasis Patris, alia subsistentia Filii, alia subsistentia Spiritus sancti; et alia subsistentia Pater, alia Filius, alia Spiritus sanctus.

Deinde quaeritur, utrum secundum eandem rationem accipiatur, cum dicitur: alius est in persona Pater, alius in persona Filius, alius in persona Spiritus sanctus; sive alius personaliter Pater, alius personaliter Filius, alius personaliter Spiritus sanctus.

Ad quod dicimus, quia etsi possit eodem modo accipi, congruentius tamen ex ratione dicti alia variatur intelligentia, ut hic *personae* nomine proprietas personae intelligatur, ut sit sensus talis: alius est in persona vel personaliter Pater, id est, proprietate sua Pater alius est quam Filius, et Filius proprietate sua alius quam Pater; paternali enim proprietate distinguitur hypostasis Patris ab hypostasi Filii, et hypostasis Filii filiali proprietate discernitur a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque distinguitur processibili proprietate.

Hoc etiam modo sane potest accipi *persona* in praemissis locutionibus, cum dicitur: alia est persona Patris, alia Filii[^21], id est, alia est proprietas, qua Pater est Pater, alia qua Filius est Filius, alia qua Spiritus sanctus est Spiritus sanctus. Ita etiam nomine *personae* quidam proprietates intelligere volunt, cum dicuntur tres personae; sed melius est, ut subsistentias vel hypostases intelligamus, cum dicimus tres personas.

Ex praedictis colligitur, quod nomen *personae* in Trinitate triplicem tenet rationem. Est enim ubi facit intelligentiam essentiae, et est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis, et est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis. Quod autem secundum substantiam dicatur et essentiam aliquando significet, supra[^22] ex dictis Augustini aperte ostendimus. Quod vero pro hypostasi atque proprietate accipiatur, ex auctoritatibus Sanctorum ostendi

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oportet, ne coniecturis nostris aliquid ausi dicere videamur. De hoc Hieronymus in *expositione fidei catholicae ad Damasum*[^23] ita ait: «Non est prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus, nihilque quod inferius superiusve dici possit, sed tota deitas sui perfectione aequalis est, ut exceptis vocabulis, quae proprietatem indicant personarum, quidquid de una persona dicitur, de tribus dignissime possit intelligi. Atque ut confutantes Arium, unam eandemque Trinitatis dicimus esse substantiam, et unum in tribus personis fatemur Deum; ita impietatem Sabellii declinantes, tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus, non ipsum sibi Patrem, ipsum sibi Filium, ipsum sibi Spiritum sanctum esse dicentes, sed aliam Patris, aliam Filii, aliam Spiritus sancti esse personam. Non enim nomina tantummodo, sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas, vel, ut Graeci exprimunt, hypostases, id est subsistentias confitemur. Nec Pater Filii vel Spiritus sancti personam aliquando excludit; nec Filius vel Spiritus sanctus Patris nomen personamque recipit, sed Pater semper Pater, et Filius semper Filius, et Spiritus sanctus semper Spiritus sanctus. Itaque substantia unum sunt, sed personis ac nominibus distinguuntur». Ecce hic aperte dicit Hieronymus, proprietates esse personas, et personas esse subsistentias. Unde manifestum fit quod diximus, scilicet *personae* nomine significari et hypostasim et proprietatem. — Ioannes etiam Damascenus[^24] personas dicit esse hypostases, et eas dicit *entes*, ita inquiens: «In deitate unam naturam confitemur et tres hypostases secundum veritatem entes, id est personas».

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english:
### DISTINCTION XXV.

#### Cap. I. *What is signified by this name "person" in the plural number, namely[^1] when one says "persons".*

Furthermore it must be considered, since this name *person*, as has been said before, is said according to substance, what is the understanding of the saying when it is uttered in the plural: three persons, or two persons, and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another. For if in these locutions the term *person* makes the understanding of the essence, we would seem to confess several essences, and so several gods. But if it does not there hold the signification of essence, the meaning of this name is different, when it is said: the Father is a person, or the Son is a person; and another, when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons; and when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, and the like.

"For *person*, as Augustine says above[^2], is said *to itself*, and it is the same for God to be a person as to be, just as it is the same for Him to be as to be God." From which it is plainly gathered that we predicate the divine essence when we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, divine essence; and altogether one and the same is signified by the name *person*, that is, the divine essence, when it is said: the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, as is signified by the name *God*, when it is said: the Father is God, the Son is God. So also the same is signified, when it is said: God is God, and God is a person; for by both names the divine essence is understood, since both are said according to substance.

But when it is said: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, what do we signify by the name *person*? The essence? For this seems so, if we diligently scrutinize the words of Augustine set forth above. For he said above that "we therefore say three persons, because that which *person* is is common to the three"[^3]. And likewise: "since the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons". It seems therefore that this name *person*, when it is said: three persons, holds the same signification which it has when it is said: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person; since, as Augustine shows, this — that is, three persons — is said on account of this, that that which *person* is is common to them. Therefore that which is common to them, that is, to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, seems to be signified by the name *person*, when one says three persons.

In another way also it can[^4] be shown that there by the name *person* the essence is signified, when one says three persons. For as Augustine said above, by that necessity we said three persons, that we might answer those inquiring, *what three*, or *what three things*. When therefore it is asked, *what three* or *what three things*, it is fittingly answered when one says: three persons. But when it is asked, *what three*, or *what three things*, by *what* one inquires about the essence. For nothing is found *what* those three are, except essence. If therefore we rightly answer the question, it is necessary that in answering we should signify the essence; otherwise we do not show what the three are. But if in answering we signify the essence, we understand the essence itself by the name *person*, when one says: three persons.

To some it seems that by the name *person* the essence is signified when one says three persons, on this account, because Augustine says it is therefore said three persons, since that which *person* is is common to them, so that the understanding may be such: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, that is, they are three having that in common which is *person*, that is, they are three of whom each is a person, that is, an essence. But how, according to this understanding, will it be said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another? And this also they wish to understand thus, namely the Father is one and the Son another, having yet that in common which is *person*. And they confirm this by the authority of Augustine, who in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^5] says: "We say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence. But we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as if there were something else there which is essence, and something else which is person"[^6]. By this authority and the foregoing they attempt to assert that in the aforesaid locutions the name *person* signifies the essence.

But what shall they answer to that which Augustine himself in the book *On the Faith to Peter*[^7] says, "namely, that the Father is one in person or personally, the Son is personally another, the Holy Spirit is personally another"? For how is the Father personally one, the Son personally another, the Holy Spirit personally another, if in being a person they wholly agree, that is, if *person* makes the understanding of the essence only? Therefore it seems to us that this can be said otherwise more fittingly according to the authorities of the catholic Doctors.

#### Cap. II. *On the threefold acceptance of this name "person" in the Trinity.*

It must be known therefore that this name *person* makes a manifold understanding, not one only. And as Hilary says in the fourth book *On the Trinity*[^8]: "The understanding of what is said is to be drawn from the causes of speaking, since the matter is not subject to the speech, but the speech to the matter". Distinguishing therefore the causes of speaking of this name, namely *person*, we distinguish the signification, saying that this name, namely *person*, properly is said according to substance and signifies the essence, just as Augustine showed above[^9], when one says: God is a person, the Father is a person. Yet by a certain necessity, as Augustine said above, this name has been transferred so that it might be said in the plural three persons, when it was asked, *what three*, or *what three things*; where it does not signify the essence, that is, the divine nature, which is common to the three persons, but the subsistences, or hypostases according to the Greeks. For the Greeks, as Augustine said above[^10], understand *substance*, that is *hypostasis*, otherwise than we do. For we call *substance* the essence or nature. But we call persons, as they call substances, that is hypostases. If[^11] therefore we so understand persons as they understand substances or hypostases — yet they understand hypostases otherwise than we do substance — therefore we understand persons otherwise than substance. When therefore we say: three persons, we do not there signify the essence by the name *person*. What therefore do we say? We say that there are three persons, that is three subsistences[^12], namely three beings; for which the Greeks say: three hypostases.

And this sense is supported by the words of Augustine cited above, if they are understood inwardly. For since the Father is a person, that is, an essence, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person; therefore they are called three persons, that is, three subsistences[^13], three beings. For they could not be called three subsistences or beings, unless each of them were a person, that is, an essence. Since therefore that which is *person*, that is, essence, is common to them; therefore they are rightly called three persons, that is, subsistences or subsisting [things], so that, just as the essence which is common to them truly and properly *is*, so those three may be understood truly and properly as subsistences or beings. And therefore Augustine[^14], distinguishing the causes of what is said, says that the three persons are one essence or of the same essence, not out of the same essence, lest something else there be understood to be person, and something else essence. For the three persons, that is, the subsistences, are one essence and of one essence, but they are not one person nor of one person, although *person* is sometimes said according to substance. For if this were said, confusion would arise in the persons.

But to that which they say: when it is asked, *what three*, or *what*[^15] *three things*, the question is about the essence, since it is not found *what* those three are except essence — by which they wish to lead us to understand by the name *person* the essence, when we answer: three persons — we say thus: it is undoubtedly true that no one thing is found which those three are except essence. For those three are one, that is, the divine essence. Whence the Truth says[^16]: *I and the Father are one*. Yet, when it is asked, *what three* or *what three things*, the question is not about the essence, nor is *what* there referred to the essence; but since the catholic faith was professing them to be three, as John in his canonical Epistle[^17] says: *There are three who give testimony in heaven*, it was being asked what those three were, that is, whether they were three things, and what three things, and by what name those three things were to be signified. And therefore by the necessity of speaking the name *person* was found for answering, and it was said: three persons.

But let it not move you that we have said *three things*. For we, in saying this, do not place a number of diverse things in the Trinity, but we say *three things* in such a way that we confess them to be one certain supreme thing. Whence Augustine in the first book *On Christian Doctrine*[^18] thus says: "The things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed". "The things therefore which are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. And the same Trinity is one certain supreme thing common to those who enjoy it, if nevertheless it is a thing, and not the cause of all things, if nevertheless even a cause[^19]. For a name cannot easily be found which would befit so great an excellence, except that it is better said: this Trinity is one God". Just therefore as three things are said, and these are one thing, so three subsistences[^20] are said, and these are one substance. — Behold, it has been shown what is the understanding of this name *person*, when we say: three persons.

#### Cap. III. *In what sense it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another; or, the Father is one in person, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.*

Now let us inspect whether it is said according to the same reason and cause: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. Which can certainly be soundly understood, so that the sense be such: the subsistence or hypostasis of the Father is one, the subsistence of the Son another, the subsistence of the Holy Spirit another; and the Father is one subsistence, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another.

Then it is asked whether it is taken according to the same reason, when it is said: the Father is one in person, the Son another in person, the Holy Spirit another in person; or, the Father is one personally, the Son another personally, the Holy Spirit another personally.

To which we say that, although it can be taken in the same way, more fittingly however from the meaning of the saying the understanding is varied, so that here by the name *person* the property of the person is understood, so that the sense is such: the Father is one in person or personally, that is, by His own property the Father is other than the Son, and the Son by His own property other than the Father; for by the paternal property the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Son, and the hypostasis of the Son by the filial property is discerned from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is distinguished from both by the processional property.

In this way also *person* can be soundly taken in the foregoing locutions, when it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another[^21], that is, the property by which the Father is Father is one, another that by which the Son is Son, another that by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit. So also some wish to understand by the name *person* the properties, when three persons are spoken of; but it is better that we should understand subsistences or hypostases, when we say three persons.

From the foregoing it is gathered that the name *person* in the Trinity holds a threefold meaning. For there is [a place] where it makes the understanding of essence, and there is where it makes the understanding of hypostasis, and there is where it makes the understanding of property. That however it is said according to substance and sometimes signifies the essence, we have plainly shown above[^22] from the sayings of Augustine. But that it is taken for hypostasis and property, must be shown from the authorities of the Saints, lest we should seem to dare to say something by our own conjectures. Concerning this Hieronymus in his *exposition of the catholic faith to Damasus*[^23] thus says: "There is in the Trinity absolutely no degree, and nothing which can be called inferior or superior, but the whole deity is equal in its perfection, so that, the words excepted which indicate the property of the persons, whatever is said of one person can most worthily be understood of the three. And as, in confuting Arius, we say that the substance of the Trinity is one and the same, and we confess one God in three persons; so, declining the impiety of Sabellius, we distinguish the three persons expressed under [their] property, not saying that the same is to Himself the Father, the same to Himself the Son, the same to Himself the Holy Spirit, but that the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names, that is the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, hypostases, that is subsistences. Nor does the Father ever exclude the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; nor does the Son or the Holy Spirit receive the name and person of the Father, but the Father is always Father, and the Son always Son, and the Holy Spirit always Holy Spirit. Therefore in substance they are one, but they are distinguished by persons and names". Behold, here Hieronymus plainly says that the properties are persons, and the persons are subsistences. Whence what we have said becomes manifest, namely that by the name *person* both the hypostasis and the property are signified. — Ioannes Damascenus[^24] also says that the persons are hypostases, and calls them *beings*, thus saying: "In the Deity we confess one nature and three hypostases truly being, that is, persons".

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la: In Vat. et solo cod. *gc* deest *scilicet*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex *gc* alone *scilicet* ("namely") is missing.

la: Vide supra d. I. a. 1. q. 2. et dub. 9. Mox particula *et* minus bene abest a plurimis codd. et sex primis edd.

en: See above, distinction I, article 1, question 2, and dubium 9. Soon afterward the particle *et* ("and") is, less appropriately, absent from very many codices and the first six editions.

la: Dist. XXIII. c. 2. Loci isti indicati sunt pag. 402, nota 1. et 2. — Codd. A D et ed. I non bene addunt *id est*.

en: Distinction XXIII, chapter 2. These passages are indicated on p. 402, note 1 and 2. — Codices A, D and edition 1 incorrectly add *id est* ("that is").

la: Dist. XXIII. c. 1. et 2, ubi loci Augustini citati sunt. — Paulo ante Vat. et aliae edd., excepta I, contra codd. *videtur posse* pro *potest*. — In sequentibus plurimae edd. habent *dicimus* pro *dicemus*, et *ostendemus* pro *ostendimus*.

en: Distinction XXIII, chapters 1 and 2, where the passages of Augustine are cited. — A little before, the Vatican edition and other editions, except 1, against the codices, read *videtur posse* ("seems to be able") in place of *potest* ("can"). — In what follows very many editions have *dicimus* in place of *dicemus*, and *ostendemus* in place of *ostendimus*.

la: Libr. VII. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 7.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, chapter 4, n. 7.

la: Cap. 6. n. 11. — In fine textus post *persona* Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, addit *est* contra codd. et originale.

en: Chapter 6, n. 11. — At the end of the text after *persona* the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, adds *est* ("is") against the codices and the original.

la: Cap. I. n. 3.

en: Chapter 1, n. 3.

en: Number 14.

la: Hic c. I, et d. XXIII. c. I. 3; et sequens locus ibid. c. 2.

en: Here, chapter 1, and at distinction XXIII, c. 1, n. 3; and the following passage at the same place, c. 2.

la: Vide d. XXIII. c. 2. — Paulo ante codd. C D E pro *subsistentias* habent *substantias*, quae lectio non est falsa, dummodo *substantiae* intelligantur ut *substantiae* primae sive ut hypostases apud Graecos, quemadmodum in loco mox sequente.

en: See distinction XXIII, c. 2. — A little before, codices C, D, E in place of *subsistentias* ("subsistences") have *substantias* ("substances"), which reading is not false, provided that *substantiae* are understood as primary substances or as hypostases among the Greeks, as in the place immediately following.

la: Vat. et ed. 8 perperam *Sic*. Mox Vat. et ed. 2 *et illi* pro *at illi*.

en: The Vatican edition and edition 8 wrongly read *Sic*. Soon afterward the Vatican edition and edition 2 read *et illi* ("and they") in place of *at illi* ("but they").

la: Vat. et edd. I, 2, 3, 8, 9 *substantiae*; codd. ABDE *subsistentiae*, cod. C *subsistentes*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 read *substantiae* ("substances"); codices ABDE read *subsistentiae* ("subsistences"); codex C reads *subsistentes* ("subsisting").

la: Cod. C et ed. 8 hic et infra saepius *substantiae* pro *subsistentiae*; codd. C E et ed. 8 addunt *vel* ante *tres entes*.

en: Codex C and edition 8 here and below several times read *substantiae* in place of *subsistentiae*; codices C, E and edition 8 add *vel* ("or") before *tres entes* ("three beings").

la: Lib. VII. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 11; vide cap. praecedens.

en: Book VII *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, n. 11; see the preceding chapter.

la: Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 9 omittunt *quid*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 1, 6, 9 omit *quid* ("what").

la: I. Ioan. 5, 7. Vulgata: *Quoniam tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in caelo*. Etiam cod. C cum Vulgata legit *dant* pro *perhibent*. Cfr. supra pag. 49, nota 3. — Infra Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta I, transponit verba *ad respondendum* post *persona*.

en: 1 John 5:7. The Vulgate reads: *For there are three who give testimony in heaven*. Also codex C with the Vulgate reads *dant* in place of *perhibent* ("give testimony"). Cf. above p. 49, note 3. — Below, the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, transposes the words *ad respondendum* ("for answering") after *persona*.

la: Cap. 3. n. 3. Sequens locus est ibid. c. 5. n. 5. — Supra, ante *haec* in Vat. cum edd. 1, 6 *dicimus* pro *diximus*.

en: Chapter 3, n. 3. The following passage is at the same place, c. 5, n. 5. — Above, before *haec* the Vatican edition with editions 1, 6 reads *dicimus* in place of *diximus* ("we have said").

la: Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 6, omittit *si tamen et causa* contra originale et codd.

en: The Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 6, omits *si tamen et causa* ("if nevertheless even a cause") against the original and the codices.

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 7, 8 et cod. C *substantiae*, et mox solummodo Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta I, *essentia* pro *substantia*.

en: The Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 7, 8 and codex C reads *substantiae*, and soon afterward the Vatican edition alone with the other editions, except 1, reads *essentia* in place of *substantia*.

la: Solummodo cod. A et edd. 1, 6 addunt *alia Spiritus sancti*; sed haec verba ex praecedentibus facile suppleri possunt.

en: Codex A alone and editions 1, 6 add *alia Spiritus sancti* ("of the Holy Spirit another"); but these words can easily be supplied from what precedes.

la: Hic c. I, et d. XXIII. c. I.

en: Here, chapter 1, and distinction XXIII, c. 1.

la: Codd. omnes et edd. I, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9: *ad Alipium et Augustinum, Episcopos*. Sed inter opera S. Hieronymi liber inscribitur: *ad Damasum*. — In hoc textu, contra editionem Hieronymi, codd. A B C et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis edd. ponit *divinitas* loco *deitas*. Deinde contra originale codd. A B C E et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis edd. addit *essentiam vel* ante *substantiam*, et postea ante *impietatem* adiicit *etiam*.

en: All the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 [read]: *ad Alipium et Augustinum, Episcopos* ("to Alypius and Augustine, Bishops"). But among the works of St. Jerome the book is inscribed: *ad Damasum* ("to Damasus"). — In this text, against the edition of Jerome, codices A, B, C and edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions puts *divinitas* in place of *deitas*. Then against the original, codices A, B, C, E and edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions adds *essentiam vel* before *substantiam*, and afterward before *impietatem* adds *etiam* ("also").

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthodoxa*, c. 5, ubi sic ait: *Unam in divinitate naturam confitemur, tres autem personas vere existentes dicimus*.

en: Book III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 5, where he thus says: *We confess in the divinity one nature, but we say that there are three persons truly existing.*


title: Dist. 25, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Divisio textus distinctionis XXV
Division of the text of Distinction XXV

source_text:
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### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit[^1] Magister, quid significetur per terminum numeralem, cum dicimus, *tres personas*; hic secundo subdit, quid significetur per hunc terminum *persona*. Et dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima quaerit et opponit; in secunda solvit, ibi: *Quibusdam videtur, quod nomine personae*.

Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima movet dubitationem; in secunda opponit per auctoritatem Augustini ostendens, quod dicitur secundum substantiam, ibi: *Persona enim, ut supra ait Augustinus*; tertio opponit per rationem, tertio capitulo[^2] ibi: *Aliter etiam potest ostendi, quod nomine personae*: ubi monstrat illud idem.

*Quibusdam videtur, quod nomine personae*. Haec est secunda pars, in qua solvit; et dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima solvit secundum opinionem aliorum, qui dicunt, quod persona accipitur secundum essentiam, tamen relatam ad suppositum. In secunda solvit secundum opinionem suam per distinctionem ibi: *Sciendum est igitur, quod hoc nomen* persona *multiplicem intelligentiam facit*. Et haec pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte ostendit, quomodo accipitur hoc nomen *persona* in plurali; in secunda, quomodo accipitur in singulari, cum dicitur: *alius est Pater, alius Filius in persona*[^3], ibi: *Nunc inspiciamus, utrum secundum eandem rationem*. — Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima ponit distinctionem, per quam solvit; in secunda confirmat per auctoritatem Augustini, ibi: *Et hic sensus adiuvatur ex verbis* etc.; in tertia ad obiectionem respondet, ibi: *Ad hoc autem quod illi dicunt*. — Similiter sequens pars habet tres partes. In

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prima determinat, quomodo accipitur *persona*, cum dicitur: *alia est persona Patris*; secundo, quomodo accipitur, cum dicitur: *alius est Pater in persona*; tertio hoc confirmat auctoritatibus. Primum facit ibi: *Nunc inspiciamus* etc.; secundum ibi: *Deinde quaeritur, utrum secundum eandem rationem*; tertium, ibi: *Quod autem secundum substantiam dicatur*.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de quidditate huius nominis *persona*.

Secundo quaeritur de communitate eiusdem.

Quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de persona, quid sit secundum rem.

Secundo, quid sit secundum definitionem.

---

english:
### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master showed[^1] what is signified by a numeral term, when we say *three persons*; here, secondly, he adds what is signified by this term *person*. And this part is divided into two. In the first he inquires and raises objections; in the second he resolves, there: *To certain ones it seems, that by the name of person*.

The first part has three parts. In the first he raises a doubt; in the second he objects by the authority of Augustine, showing that it is said according to substance, there: *For person, as Augustine says above*; thirdly he objects by reason, in the third chapter[^2] there: *It can also otherwise be shown, that by the name of person*: where he shows the same thing.

*To certain ones it seems, that by the name of person*. This is the second part, in which he resolves; and this part is divided into two. In the first he resolves according to the opinion of others, who say that *person* is taken according to essence, yet related to a supposit. In the second he resolves according to his own opinion by a distinction, there: *It must therefore be known, that this name* person *makes a manifold understanding*. And this part is divided into two. In the first part he shows how this name *person* is taken in the plural; in the second, how it is taken in the singular, when it is said: *the Father is one, the Son another, in person*[^3], there: *Now let us look, whether according to the same account*. — The first part has three parts. In the first he sets down the distinction by which he resolves; in the second he confirms by the authority of Augustine, there: *And this sense is supported by the words* etc.; in the third he responds to an objection, there: *To this, however, that those say*. — Likewise the following part has three parts. In

the first he determines how *person* is taken, when it is said: *one is the person of the Father*; secondly, how it is taken, when it is said: *the Father is one in person*; thirdly, he confirms this by authorities. The first he does there: *Now let us look* etc.; the second there: *Then it is asked, whether according to the same account*; the third, there: *That, however, it is said according to substance*.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part, two questions are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the quiddity of this name *person*.

Secondly it is asked concerning the community of the same.

As to the first, two questions are asked.

First it is asked concerning the person, what it is according to the thing.

Secondly, what it is according to the definition.

---

la: Vat., repugnantibus codd. et ed. 1, *respondet*, et paulo infra *dicitur* pro *dicimus*. Dein post *hic*, quod quidem in non paucis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur, omittit *secundo*, quod in omnibus fere codd. et ed. 1 exstat.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and edition 1, reads *respondet* ("responds"), and a little below *dicitur* ("it is said") in place of *dicimus* ("we say"). Then after *hic* ("here"), which indeed is wanting in not a few codices and in edition 1, it omits *secundo* ("secondly"), which in nearly all codices and in edition 1 stands.

la: Vat. omittit *tertio capitulo*, quae voces in multis codd. ut I P T V etc. habentur, aliis codd. ut A Q S V X Z loco earum exhibentibus *quarto capitulo*; in nostra editione Magistri est *capitulo primo*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *tertio capitulo* ("in the third chapter"), which words are found in many codices such as I, P, T, V, etc., other codices such as A, Q, S, V, X, Z exhibiting in their place *quarto capitulo* ("in the fourth chapter"); in our edition of the Master it is *capitulo primo* ("in the first chapter").

la: Voces *in persona*, a Vat. suppressas, restituimus auctoritate plurimorum mss. ut A B D F G H K P Q T Y Z etc. et ed. 1.

en: The words *in persona* ("in person"), suppressed by the Vatican edition, we have restored on the authority of very many manuscripts, such as A, B, D, F, G, H, K, P, Q, T, Y, Z, etc., and of edition 1.