title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum daemones possint illudere sensus.*

Tertio loco quaeritur, utrum daemon possit sensus illudere. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.* 1. Super illud Exodi septimo[^1]: *Fecerunt magi per incantationes et arcana quaedam similiter*, dicit Glossa Rabani: «Diabolicis figmentis spectantium oculos illudebant, ut res in sua specie remanentes aliae viderentur».

2. Item, in *Itinerario Clementis*[^2] dixit Niceta

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ad Petrum, narrans praestigia Simonis: «Vidimus canes cantare et imagines ambulare»; constat, quod hoc non fiebat nisi virtute daemonum. Si igitur daemones haec et his similia plura faciunt, quae nullo modo nisi miraculose fieri possunt: ergo oculos spectantium illudunt, maxime cum illa facere videntur, ad quae per auxilium naturae iuvari non possunt.

3. Item, in *Vitis Patrum*[^3] legitur, quod quidam adduxerunt quandam puellam ad sanctum patrem, quae videbatur eis esse equa; sed sanctus pater deprehendit, quod esset puella: ergo si hoc fiebat arte diabolica, apparet etc.

4. Item, plus est decipere intellectum quam sensum; sed daemones multos decipiunt et seducunt quantum ad intellectum: ergo multo fortius seducere vel illudere possunt quantum ad sensum.

**Contra:** 1. «Sensus particularis non errat, ut dicit Philosophus[^4], circa proprium obiectum», ergo non percipit nisi quod verum est; sed delusio sensuum non potest esse sine errore et deceptione: ergo etc.

2. Item, cum diabolus facit aliquem videre asinum, vel aliquod aliud animal, ubi non est secundum veritatem, necesse est, quod faciat similitudinem illius animalis in oculo; sed illa similitudo non potest generari nisi ab illo animali, cum non possit educi de nihilo: ergo vel oportet, quod afferat[^5] asinum, vel nunquam faciat eum videri. Sed si asinum affert, non est ludificatio; si non affert, non immutat: ergo nunquam potest deludendo immutare vel immutando illudere.

3. Item, cum hominem facit videri capram, aut similitudo hominis pervenit usque ad oculum, aut non. Si sic: ergo cum iudicet secundum similitudinem receptam, iudicabit illum[^6] esse hominem: ergo non decipietur. Si non pervenit; quaero, quid impedit? et videtur, quod nihil possit. Existente enim medio illuminato, necesse est, obiectum multiplicari per medium, si non adsit corporeum obstaculum: ergo videtur, quod nullo modo possit ibi esse ludificatio sensus.

4. Item, cum facit videri quod non est, aut hoc facit immutando *virtutem*, aut immutando *oculum*, aut *obiectum*. Si immutando *obiectum*, ergo est verum miraculum, non ergo praestigium. Si immutando *organum* vel *virtutem*, cum haec sint digniora, tunc erit maius miraculum: ergo falsa miracula erunt maiora veris; quod si hoc est falsum, redit idem quod prius.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Daemon sensus nostros illudere potest, sive ostendendo praesens esse quod non est, sive aliter ostendendo quam est, sive abscondendo quod praesens est.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam attendendum est, quod absque dubio daemones sensus possunt deludere, sicut multiplex experientia docet. *Modum* autem assignare est valde difficile, et ad hoc plures doctores conati sunt diversimode.

*Opinio prima.* Quidam namque voluerunt modum huius delusionis assignare dicentes, hoc supra naturam esse; *tripliciter* autem hoc fieri posse. Potest enim hoc facere daemon **a superiori influendo**, **ab intrinseco phantasmata movendo**, **ab extrinseco species obiiciendo**. — *A superiori influendo*, dicunt hoc modo fieri posse: quia daemon per naturam superior est sensu corporeo; et quia superiora nata sunt influere in inferiora, daemon potest species, quas habet in se, sensui imprimere, tam interiori quam exteriori; quae tamen minus sunt spirituales in suscipiente quam in dante, quia «quod recipitur in aliquo est per modum recipientis, non per modum recepti»[^7]. — Similiter *ab interiori phantasmata movendo*, dicunt sic posse accidere: sicut accidit in somnis, ex motu phantasmatum et defluxu ab organo excitari virtutem sensitivam interius et fieri somnium, in quo videtur homini, quod videat vel audiat veritatem, cum phantasma rei pervenit ad organum visus vel auditus: sic et in proposito daemon potest phantasmata existentia in organo interiori facere defluere ad organa sensuum; et sic videtur homini, quod videat vel sentiat ipsam rem; dum ex rei phantasmate formatur organum, et intentio sensus super illud convertitur, iudicat de similitudine, ac si esset veritas. — *Ab exteriori vero species obiiciendo*, potest hoc modo sensum ludificare. Unaquaeque enim res nata est speciem suam susceptibili dare. Et si esset aliquid, quod non tantum susciperet speciem, sed etiam tenere posset; posset circumferri et alicui pro veritate offerri; sicut ostenditur luna in puteo. Quia ergo non latet daemonem natura specularis, non solum susceptiva specierum, sed etiam retentiva; mediante illa potest, quamcumque vult et cuiuscumque rei vult, speciem pro veritate sensibus nostris offerre; quam cum pro veritate accipiunt, ludificantur. — Hunc igitur triplicem modum dicunt daemoni esse possibilem; et eum modo uti hoc[^8], modo

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altero, et modo tertio. — Sed quilibet horum modorum interius consideranti habet aliquid improbabilitatis. Non enim videtur possibile, quod substantia spiritualis, quae habet in se species omnino immateriales, possit eas sensibus imprimere, cum omnino sit virtus improportionabilis[^9]. Nec etiam videtur, quod species ab organo interiori regrediatur, cum iste sit ordo retrogradus. Praeterea mirum valde est, si daemon invenit ita magnum speculum, in quo in sua magnitudine et latitudine possit ostendere unum castrum, sicut pluribus aliquando est ostensum. Mirum etiam est, si videt quis ita rem, quod non potest videre speculum. Mirabilis est etiam natura talis rei corporalis, quae speciem potest suscipere et tenere, cum videamus, speciem ab obiecto[^10] sensibiliter separari non posse.

*Opinio auctoris (Conclusio 2).* Ideo alius est modus dicendi, qui magis est consonus naturae et intelligentiae, quod daemon potest ludificare sensus, *sive ostendendo praesens esse quod non est, sive aliter ostendendo quam est, sive abscondendo quod praesens est*. Primum quidem facit *species offerendo*, secundum facit *sensum vel obiectum divariando*, tertium vero facit *impedimentum praestando*.

*Primus modus.* Primum intelligi potest sic. Quando phantasmata existentia interius offeruntur forti oblatione ipsi virtuti interiori, vel virtus interior fortiter illis intendit[^11]; similitudo rei videtur esse veritas. Hoc manifestum est per naturam. Nam phrenetico propter ascensum fumositatum ad cerebrum ex modica occasione exteriori videtur ei, quod videat multa, quae non sunt sibi praesentia, vel quod audiat. Similiter per fortem conversionem intentionis phantasma videtur veritas, sicut Augustinus exemplificat in libro de Trinitate[^12], quod quidam tanta conversione recogitabat cuiusdam mulieris imaginem, quod ei carnaliter commisceri videbatur, etiam vigilando.

*Applicatur.* Per hunc modum daemon potest sive intentionem ad imaginem convertere, sive fumos aliquos immittendo spiritum animalem immutare et phantasmata diversimode variare et intentioni offerre, et sic diversa homini facere apparere; et hoc modo utitur frequentissime. Et huius signum est, quia nunquam facit hominem aliquid sentire[^13], cuius imaginem non habeat in interiori organo virtutis imaginariae. Nunquam enim caecos naturaliter facit somniare de coloribus, nec surdos de sonis, nec eis talia repraesentat in vigilia vel in somnis.

*Secundus modus.* Secundum modum possumus intelligere sic. Quod res alio modo vel sub alia dispositione appareat sensui, quam sit naturaliter, potest contingere propter variationem aliquam ex parte *organi*; sicut quando humor sanguineus vel vapor igneus descendit ad oculos, videtur homini, quod ea quae exterius sunt, sint rubea; vel propter variationem aliquam ex parte *obiecti*, sicut contingit aliquando, quod ex positione candelae[^14] et dispositione palearum videntur paleae serpentes esse operatione naturali. Simile est in aliquibus virtutibus quarundam rerum mineralium.

*Applicatur.* Et quia iste modus non latet daemones, et sunt ministri veloces, potentes quae necessaria sunt ad haec statim afferre; ideo sensus nostros frequenter deludunt, ostendentes rem aliter, quam sit, dum eam faciunt aliter, quam se habeat, apparere. Quod quidem fit variationem modicam inducendo circa organum vel obiectum; quae quidem variatio non mutat *formam*, sed solum est ex quadam *accidentali adhaerentia*, et est ut *passio*, non ut *passibilis qualitas*[^15].

*Tertius modus.* Tertium modum sic possumus intelligere. Res siquidem, quae praesto est, sensum nostrum sine visibili obstaculo dupliciter potest latere: aut quia impeditur *virtus sensus*, ne perveniat ad sensibile; aut quia impeditur *species sensibilis*, ne perveniat ad sensum; et utroque modo impeditur sensus, ne percipiat quod sibi est praesto.

*Applicatur.* Utrumque autem horum satis credendum est esse possibile virtuti daemonis. Et ideo dicitur posse facere per hanc viam, ut hominem reddat invisibilem, quod tamen *certum* non est; *Notandum.* si tamen est, hac via posse fieri[^16], non est multum incredibile.

His visis patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, quoniam terminanda est in partem affirmativam; patet etiam in parte responsio ad obiecta.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod sensus non errat circa proprium obiectum; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur, quantum est de sui natura, salva scilicet *media dispositione organi, et medii, et obiecti*. *Intelligitur etiam de sensu particulari per se*. In hac autem deceptione sensus communis sive *phantasia*, quae dicitur *collativa*, admiscetur sensui particulari et iudicat, esse alterius quod est suum[^17].

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla res potest videri nisi per suam speciem; dicendum, quod speciem nec de novo dat nec de novo affert; sed illam quae erat in phantasia, tam[^18] vivaciter virtuti illi interiori obiicit, ut credat, se rem exteriorem sensibilem intueri.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facit hominem videri capram, utrum illa species hominis deferatur ad visum; dicendum, quod fortassis impedit, ne perveniat ad visum, vel visus ad eam, vel saltem impedit, ne perveniat ad iudicium, dum loco illius offert speciem caprae, quam habet in phantasia; et sic, dum aspicit ad corpus humanum, aestimat se videre capram.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, ubi faciat immutationem, vel circa organum, vel obiectum, vel virtutem; dicendum, quod potest facere et facit circa omnia haec pro loco et tempore, sicut sibi videtur expedire. Nec tamen sequitur, quod sit verum miraculum, quia non est ibi vera formarum transmutatio aut inductio, sed solum quaedam transitoria et quasi momentanea immutatio, quae, cum ostendat circa rem veram transmutationem esse, non est *verum miraculum*, sed *vanum et falsum praestigium*.

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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether the demons can delude the senses.*

In the third place it is asked whether a demon can delude the senses. And that it can, it seems.

*Foundations.* 1. Upon that [text] of Exodus 7[^1]: *The magicians did the like by enchantments and certain secret arts*, the Gloss of Rabanus [says]: «By diabolic figments they deluded the eyes of the spectators, so that things remaining in their own species seemed to be others».

2. Likewise, in the *Itinerary of Clement*[^2] Niceta said

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to Peter, narrating the prestidigitations of Simon: «We have seen dogs sing and statues walk»; it is settled that this did not happen except by the power of demons. If, then, demons do these things and many like them, which can in no way come about except miraculously: therefore they delude the eyes of spectators, especially when they seem to do things which by the aid of nature [these spectators] cannot be helped to [achieve].

3. Likewise, in the *Lives of the Fathers*[^3] it is read that certain people brought a girl to a holy father, who [the girl] seemed to them to be a mare; but the holy father discerned that she was a girl: therefore if this came about by the diabolical art, [it is] manifest etc.

4. Likewise, it is more [to] deceive the intellect than the sense; but demons deceive and seduce many as to the intellect: therefore much more strongly can they seduce or delude [men] as to the sense.

**On the contrary:** 1. «The particular sense, as the Philosopher says[^4], does not err about its proper object»; therefore it does not perceive except what is true; but a delusion of the senses cannot be without error and deception: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, when the devil makes someone see an ass, or some other animal, where it is not in truth, it is necessary that he make the likeness of that animal in the eye; but that likeness cannot be generated except from that animal, since it cannot be educed from nothing: therefore either he must bring[^5] the ass, or he never makes it be seen. But if he brings the ass, it is no illusion; if he does not bring [it], he does not alter [anything]: therefore he can never alter by deluding nor delude by altering.

3. Likewise, when he makes a man be seen as a goat, either the likeness of the man comes through up to the eye, or not. If yes: then since [the sense] judges according to the likeness received, it will judge him[^6] to be a man: therefore it will not be deceived. If [the likeness] does not come through: I ask what hinders [it]? and it seems that nothing can [hinder it]. For with the medium illuminated, it is necessary that the object be multiplied through the medium, if there be no bodily obstacle: therefore it seems that in no way can there be a delusion of sense there.

4. Likewise, when he makes seen what is not, either he does this by altering the *power*, or by altering the *eye*, or the *object*. If by altering the *object*, then it is a true miracle, not a prestidigitation. If by altering the *organ* or *power*, since these are more worthy, then it will be a greater miracle: therefore false miracles will be greater than true ones; and if this is false, the same returns [as before].

### CONCLUSION.

> A demon can delude our senses, either by showing as present what is not, or by showing otherwise than [a thing] is, or by hiding what is present.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it is to be attended to that without doubt the demons can delude the senses, as manifold experience teaches. But to assign the *manner* is very difficult, and to this many doctors have applied themselves in divers ways.

*First opinion.* For certain men have wished to assign the manner of this delusion saying that it is above nature; and that *threefold* can this come about. For a demon can do this **by influencing from above**, **by moving phantasms from within**, **by setting forth species from without**. — *By influencing from above*, they say it can come about in this way: because a demon is by nature superior to the bodily sense; and because higher things are born to influence lower, a demon can imprint upon the sense the species which he has in himself, both interior and exterior; which species are nevertheless less spiritual in the receiver than in the giver, because «what is received in something is according to the mode of the receiver, not according to the mode of what is received»[^7]. — Similarly, *by moving phantasms from within*, they say it can happen thus: as it happens in dreams, that from a motion of phantasms and a flowing down from the [interior] organ the sensitive power is excited within and a dream comes about, in which it seems to the man that he sees or hears the truth, when the phantasm of a thing comes through to the organ of sight or hearing: so also in [the case] proposed a demon can make phantasms existing in the interior organ flow down to the organs of the senses; and thus it seems to the man that he sees or perceives the thing itself; while from the phantasm of a thing the organ is formed, and the intention of the sense is turned upon it, [the sense] judges of the likeness as if it were the truth. — *But from without by setting forth species*, [a demon] can in this way play with the sense. For each thing is born to give its species to one susceptible [of it]. And if there were something which not only would receive the species but could also retain [it]; it could be carried about and offered to someone in place of truth; as the moon is shown in a well. Because, then, the nature of a mirror is not hidden from the demon — [a mirror] not only receptive of species but also retentive [of them] — by means of it [the demon] can offer to our senses, in place of truth, the species of whatever thing he wishes; and when they take it for truth, they are deluded. — This threefold mode, therefore, they say is possible to a demon; and that he uses now this[^8], now

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another, and now a third. — But each of these modes, to one inwardly considering [them], has something improbable. For it does not seem possible that a spiritual substance, which has in itself species wholly immaterial, can imprint them on the senses, since it is altogether a power incommensurable [with sense][^9]. Nor again does it seem that a species can regress from the interior organ, since this is a retrograde order. Moreover, it is very strange if a demon finds so great a mirror, in which in its magnitude and breadth he can show a [whole] castle, as has sometimes been shown to many. It is also strange if someone sees a thing thus, [and yet] cannot see the mirror. The nature too of such a bodily thing is marvelous, [one] which can receive and retain a species, since we see that a species cannot sensibly be separated from its object[^10].

*Opinion of the author (second conclusion).* Therefore there is another mode of speaking, which is more consonant with nature and with intelligibility: that a demon can delude the senses *either by showing as present what is not, or by showing otherwise than [a thing] is, or by hiding what is present*. The first he does *by setting forth species*, the second by *varying the sense or the object*, the third by *furnishing an impediment*.

*First mode.* The first can be understood thus. When phantasms existing within are set forth by a strong setting-forth upon the interior power itself, or [when] the interior power strongly attends to them[^11]; the likeness of a thing seems to be the truth. This is manifest by nature. For to a frenzied man, on account of the rising of fumes to the brain, from some slight external occasion it seems to him that he sees many things which are not present to him, or that he hears [them]. Similarly, through a strong turning of attention, a phantasm seems [to be] truth, as Augustine exemplifies in the book *On the Trinity*[^12], that someone with so great a conversion was recalling the image of a certain woman, that he seemed to himself to be carnally mingled with her, even while waking.

*Application.* Through this mode a demon can either turn the attention toward an image, or by sending in certain fumes alter the animal spirit and vary the phantasms diversely and set them forth to the attention, and so make diverse things appear to a man; and in this mode he most frequently uses [his power]. And the sign of this is that he never makes a man perceive[^13] something whose image he does not have in the interior organ of the imaginative power. For he never makes those naturally blind to dream of colors, nor the deaf [to dream] of sounds, nor does he represent such things to them in waking or in sleep.

*Second mode.* The second mode we can understand thus. That a thing should appear to the sense in another mode or under a different disposition than it is naturally, can come about on account of some variation on the side of the *organ*; as when a sanguine humor or a fiery vapor descends to the eyes, it seems to the man that things which are externally [present] are red; or on account of some variation on the side of the *object*, as it sometimes happens that from the position of a candle[^14] and the disposition of straws, straws are seen to be serpents by natural operation. The like [happens] in some powers of certain mineral things.

*Application.* And because this mode is not hidden from the demons, and they are swift ministers, capable of bringing immediately those things which are necessary for these [effects]; therefore they frequently delude our senses, showing the thing otherwise than it is, by making it appear otherwise than it is. Which indeed is brought about by inducing a slight variation around the organ or the object; which variation does not change the *form*, but is rather from a certain *accidental adherence*, and is as a *passion*, not as a *passible quality*[^15].

*Third mode.* The third mode we can understand thus. A thing which is at hand can be hidden from our sense, without any visible obstacle, in two ways: either because the *power of the sense* is impeded from coming through to the sensible; or because the *sensible species* is impeded from coming through to the sense; and in either mode the sense is impeded from perceiving what is at hand to it.

*Application.* Now each of these is sufficiently to be believed possible to the power of a demon. And therefore [the demon] is said to be able by this way to render a man invisible, which nevertheless is not *certain*; *Notandum.* if, however, it is [so], that by this way [the thing] can come about[^16], it is not very incredible.

These [points] having been seen, the response to the question proposed is plain — that it is to be terminated in the affirmative; and the response to the objections is plain in part.

*Solution of the opposed [arguments].* 1. For to that which is objected, that the sense does not err about its proper object; it must be said that this is understood [to be true] as far as concerns its own nature, with the *middle disposition of the organ, of the medium, and of the object* preserved. *It is understood also of the particular sense per se.* But in this deception the common sense or *phantasy*, which is called *collative*, is admixed to the particular sense and judges that to be another's which is its own[^17].

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2. To that which is objected, that no thing can be seen except through its own species; it must be said that [the demon] neither newly gives nor newly brings a species; but that one which was in the phantasy he so[^18] vividly sets forth to that interior power that [the power] believes [itself] to look upon an exterior sensible thing.

3. To that which is objected, that he makes a man be seen as a goat — whether the species of the man is borne to the sight; it must be said that perhaps he hinders [the species] from coming through to the sight, or the sight [from coming through] to it, or at least hinders [it] from coming through to judgment, while in place of that [species] he sets forth the species of a goat which he has in the phantasy; and so, while [the sense] looks upon a human body, it esteems itself to see a goat.

4. To that which is asked, where he makes the alteration — whether around the organ, or the object, or the power; it must be said that he can do and does [it] around all these for the place and time, as it seems to him expedient. Nor however does it follow that it is a true miracle, because there is not there a true transmutation or induction of forms, but only a certain transitory and as it were momentary alteration, which, while it shows there to be a true transmutation around a thing, is not a *true miracle*, but a *vain and false prestidigitation*.

la: Vers. 11, ubi Vulgata post *incantationes* adiungit *aegyptiacas.* — In verbis Rabani textus originalis: *deludebant, ut res in sua natura manentes aliud viderentur.*

en: [Exodus 7,] verse 11, where the Vulgate after *incantationes* adds *aegyptiacas* [Egyptian]. — In the words of Rabanus the original text [reads]: *deludebant, ut res in sua natura manentes aliud viderentur* [they deluded (the eyes), so that things, remaining in their own nature, were seen as something other].

la: Libr. III. Recognitionum (Ἀναγνώσεις sive Περίοδοι τοῦ Πέτρου) n. 57. Niceta ait: *Aut non est mirabile... facere statuas ingredi, canes aereos latrare?* (Migne, Patrol. Graec. tom. 1.). Cfr. ibid. n. 60. et II. n. 9. et III. n. 47. et *Clementina de Praedicationibus Petri*, hom. 2. n. 32-34; hom. 4. n. 4. et *Epitome de Gestis S. Petri*, n. 33. (Patrol. Graec. tom. 2.). Libri isti sunt apocryphi.

en: Book III of the *Recognitions* (Ἀναγνώσεις or Περίοδοι τοῦ Πέτρου, *Itineraries of Peter*), n. 57. Niceta says: *Is it not wonderful... to make statues walk, [and] bronze dogs bark?* (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, tom. 1.). Cf. ibid., n. 60, and II, n. 9, and III, n. 47, and the *Clementine [Homilies] on the Preachings of Peter*, hom. 2, n. 32–34; hom. 4, n. 4, and the *Epitome on the Acts of St. Peter*, n. 33 (*Patrologia Graeca*, tom. 2.). These books are apocryphal.

la: Libr. VIII. c. 19. seq. (Migne, Patrol. Lat. tom. 73.).

en: [*Vitae Patrum*,] Book VIII, c. 19 f. (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, tom. 73.).

la: Libr. II. de Anima, text. 63. et 161. (c. 6. et III. c. 3.).

en: [Aristotle,] *On the Soul* II, text 63 and 161 (c. 6 and III, c. 3).

la: Plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 *afferret*; dein cod. T cum ed. 3 *non esset* pro *non est.* Circa principium arg. cod. V *videri* pro *videre.*

en: Several codices with editions 2 and 3 [read] *afferret*; thereafter codex T with edition 3 [has] *non esset* in place of *non est.* Near the beginning of the argument codex V [reads] *videri* in place of *videre.*

la: Vat. *illam.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *illam.*

la: Liber de Causis, prop. 10. 12. 20. 24. — Cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. — Hunc modum tangit August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 48. seqq., ubi etiam multa alia habentur, quae hanc quaestionem concernunt. — Mox cod. cc et ed. 1 minus bene *in somniis* pro *in somnis.*

en: [*Liber de Causis*,] propositions 10, 12, 20, 24. — Cf. Boethius, *On the Consolation of Philosophy* V, prosa 4. — Augustine touches this mode at *On Genesis Literally* XII, c. 22, n. 48 ff., where many other things are also had which concern this question. — Soon after, codex cc and edition 1 less well [read] *in somniis* in place of *in somnis.*

la: Non pauci codd. *et modo uti hoc modo* pro *et eum modo uti hoc.* Paulo inferius post *horum modorum* Vat. addit *ut latet.*

en: Not a few codices [read] *et modo uti hoc modo* in place of *et eum modo uti hoc.* A little below, after *horum modorum* the Vatican edition adds *ut latet.*

la: Sub hoc respectu Aristot., in fine de *Sensu et sens.* ait: *Sensibile omne magnitudo est, et non est indivisibile sensibile* (*sentiri*).

en: Under this respect Aristotle, at the end of *On Sense and the Sensible*, says: *Every sensible is a magnitude, and the indivisible is not [properly] a sensible* (i.e., is not [properly] *to be sensed*).

la: In Vat. additur *speculo.*

en: In the Vatican edition is added *speculo* [from a mirror].

la: Vat. *intenditur.* In seq. propositione post *videtur* supervacanee additur *ei.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *intenditur.* In the following clause, after *videtur*, *ei* is superfluously added.

la: Libr. XI. c. 4. n. 7.

en: [Augustine, *On the Trinity*,] Book XI, c. 4, n. 7.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *somniare*; nimis arcte.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *somniare* [to dream]; [a reading] too narrow.

la: Ed. 4 et Vat. adiiciunt *factae de serpentis pinguedine.*

en: Edition 4 and the Vatican edition add *factae de serpentis pinguedine* [made from the fat of a serpent].

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate, pro tertia qualitatis specie assignat *passionem* et *patibilem qualitatem*, quibus intelligitur qualitas alterationem sensibilem causans, vel ab alteratione sensibili causata v. g. calor, rubor et omnes colores. Quodsi huiusmodi qualitas cito transit, ut rubor ex verecundia causatus, dicitur *passio*; si vero permanenter inest, ut rubor ex sanguinea complexione, vocatur *patibilis qualitas.* — Hunc modum proponit August., XVIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 18. n. 2. — Aliquanto superius Vat. *quod quidem fit per variationem modicam, inducendo eam circa organum* etc.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. on Quality, for the third species of quality assigns *passion* and *passible quality*, by which is understood a quality causing a sensible alteration or caused by a sensible alteration — e.g., heat, redness, and all colors. And if such a quality quickly passes, like redness caused by shame, it is called *passion*; but if it remains permanently in [the subject], as redness from a sanguine complexion, it is called *passible quality.* — Augustine sets forth this mode at *City of God* XVIII, c. 18, n. 2. — A little earlier, the Vatican edition [reads] *quod quidem fit per variationem modicam, inducendo eam circa organum* etc.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *posset fieri, nec est multum* etc.

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *posset fieri, nec est multum* etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 161. (III. c. 3.), ubi docet, sensum per se non errare circa obiectum proprium, attamen circa obiectum commune et per accidens frequenter falli. — De sensu communi et phantasia vide ibid. text. 136. seqq. et 133. seqq. (III. c. 2. seq.). — Paulo superius cod. N verbo *collativa* praemittit *vis.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, text 161 (III, c. 3), where he teaches that the sense *per se* does not err about its proper object, but nevertheless frequently fails about the common object and *per accidens.* — On the common sense and phantasy see ibid., text 136 ff. and 133 ff. (III, c. 2 f.). — A little earlier, codex N prefixes *vis* to the word *collativa.*

la: Non pauci codd. *et tam.*

en: Not a few codices [read] *et tam.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Ex principio communiter concesso, quod substantia spiritualis quandam potestatem habeat super corpora, sequitur, eandem etiam organum corporale et potentiam sensitivam ei coniunctam ita immutare posse, ut inde resultent sensuum allucinationes; quod hic subtiliter explicatur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 3, q. 39. m. 1. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 8. q. unica, n. 6. seqq.; *Report.* ibid. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; S. I. q. 114. a. 4; *de Malo*, q. 16. a. 11. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 1. et tr. 8. q. 30. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 5. *dub. lat.* 1. — Durand., hic q. 4.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** From the principle commonly conceded, that a spiritual substance has a certain power over bodies, it follows that the same [substance] can also so alter a bodily organ and the sensitive power conjoined to it that hallucinations of the senses thereupon result; which is here subtly explained.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. II, q. 43, m. 3, q. 39, m. 1. — Scotus, II Sent. d. 8, q. unica, n. 6 ff.; *Reportatio* ibid., q. 1. — S. Thomas, here, q. unica, a. 5; *Summa* I, q. 114, a. 4; *de Malo*, q. 16, a. 11. — B. Albert., *Summa* p. II, tr. 6, q. 27, m. 1 and tr. 8, q. 30, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here, q. unica, a. 6, *quaestiunc.* 2. — Richard. a Med., here, a. 2, q. 3. — Aegid. R., here, q. 2, a. 5, *dub. lat.* 1. — Durand., here, q. 4.

---

translators_notes:
- This chunk is `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q3` (Pars II, the single ARTICULUS UNICUS, Quaestio III) — *Utrum daemones possint illudere sensus*. It is the **HEAVIEST chunk in d.8** (~2356 w Latin; 18-entry apparatus; spans 4 printed pages 227–230). The Respondeo carries Vol II's clearest **two-opinion survey + Bonaventurean synthesis** structure: (a) the *Opinio prima supra-naturam* with its triple *a superiori influendo / ab interiori phantasmata movendo / ab exteriori species obiiciendo* mechanism — *improbatur* on four grounds (substantia-spiritualis-improportionabilis-sensibus / species-non-regreditur-ab-organo-interiori / speculum-magnum-castrum-improbability / nature-of-the-retentive-mirror-thing); (b) the **Opinio auctoris** (= Bonaventure's view, marked as *Conclusio 2*) — the locked *threefold delusion mechanism*: **(1) ostendendo praesens esse quod non est** (= *species offerendo*, via the phrenetic-fumes + Aug. XI de Trin. *vir-mulieris-imagine* analogy); **(2) aliter ostendendo quam est** (= *sensum vel obiectum divariando*, via the humor-sanguineus-eyes-rubea + candela-palearum-serpentes + Aristot. *passio/patibilis-qualitas* anchor at [^15]); **(3) abscondendo quod praesens est** (= *impedimentum praestando*, via the dual *virtus-sensus impeditur OR species-impeditur*, with the *hominem-reddat-invisibilem* application).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** Transcribed from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 16351–16533) and re-set against the 450 dpi pp.227–230 column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 227-230 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 227`/`228`/`229`/`230`), read L column top→bottom then R column, body then footer. The four-page Respondeo (p.228-R Opinio 1 a-superiori + ab-interiori + ab-exteriori → p.229-L Opinio-1 improbatur + Opinio auctoris-Primus-modus → p.229-R Modus 2 + Modus 3 + Solutio 1 → p.230-L Solutio 2/3/4 + SCHOLION) was reflowed column-by-column from the column-band crops; the L↔R-col reflow on p.228 R-col (Quia-ergo-non-latet → ludificantur) was re-stitched to repair OCR's diagonal cascade. The two-page bridge p.228 R-col bottom (*modo uti hoc, modo*) → p.229 L-col top (*altero, et modo tertio*) rejoined as a single clause.
- **Doctrinal core.** The locked **threefold delusion mechanism** — *sive ostendendo praesens esse quod non est, sive aliter ostendendo quam est, sive abscondendo quod praesens est* — is the rhetorical apex of Pars II's demonological doctrine. The four narrative anchors of demonic sense-delusion (Exodi-magi-aegyptiacas at [^1], Itinerarium-Clementis-Niceta-statuas-canes at [^2], Vitis-Patrum-puella-equa-sanctus-pater at [^3], and plus-decipere-intellectum-quam-sensum a-fortiori) form the videtur's evidential base; the four physico-metaphysical objections (Aristotelian sensus-particularis-non-errat at [^4], asinum-in-oculo cannot-from-nihilo at [^5], hominem-videri-capram similitudo-dilemma at [^6], immutando-virtutem/oculum/obiectum trilemma-with-false-miracula corollary) form the Contra's metaphysical base. The Augustinian XI de Trin. c.4 n.7 anchor at [^12] (*vir tanta conversione recogitabat cuiusdam mulieris imaginem, quod ei carnaliter commisceri videbatur, etiam vigilando*) provides the natural-analog for demonic attention-manipulation; the Aristot. *de Praedicam.* c. de Qualitate + Aug. XVIII de Civ. Dei c.18 anchor at [^15] (*passio* vs *patibilis qualitas* — quickly-transient like *rubor-ex-verecundia* vs permanent like *rubor-ex-sanguinea-complexione*) provides the metaphysical pivot for distinguishing demonic-induced *accidentalis adhaerentia* from real form-change. The closing Solutio 4 maxim *non est verum miraculum, sed vanum et falsum praestigium* is the doctrinal punchline that closes Pars II's middle question.
- **Scholion structure.** Single-question SCHOLION with **I** (doctrinal/cross-ref — the substantia-spiritualis potestas-super-corpora-→ sensuum-allucinationes inference, *quod hic subtiliter explicatur*) + **II** (doctor list — Alex.Hal. + Scotus II Sent. d.8 q.unica n.6 + Reportatio + S.Thom. hic q.unica a.5 + S.I q.114 a.4 + de Malo q.16 a.11 + B.Albert. p.II tr.6 q.27 m.1 + tr.8 q.30 m.2 + Petr.a Tar. hic q.unica a.6 quaestiunc.2 + Richard.a Med. hic a.2 q.3 + Aegid.R. hic q.2 a.5 dub.lat.1 + Durand. hic q.4 — the densest doctor list in d.8 Pars II, including Scotus's II Sent. d.8 q.unica reference which is the locked cross-pointer for any subsequent Scotist comparison work on demonic-delusion).
- **Cross-chunk footer — INCOMING (clean, no backfill).** The committed `bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q2` (session 60) took p.227 footer ¹ (Ut dicit Augustinus + supra-pag.45-nota-5), ² (Vat. *finit* + cod. T marg. *conformitatem malitiae*), ³ (Cfr. I Sent. d.17 p.II q.2), ⁴ (Vers. 12 Heb.4,12). p.227 footer ⁵ (*Vers. 11 + Vulgata post incantationes adiungit aegyptiacas + Glossa Rabani textus originalis variant*) anchors here at videtur 1 *Exodi septimo⁵* → [^1]; footer ⁶ (*Libr. III. Recognitionum + Niceta Migne-Patrol.-Graec.-tom.1 + Clementina + Epitome-de-Gestis-S.-Petri + libri-apocryphi*) anchors at videtur 2 *Itinerario Clementis⁶* → [^2]. p.228 footer ¹–⁶ + p.229 footer ¹–⁹ + p.230 footer ¹ all anchor inside this q.3.
- **Cross-chunk footer — OUTGOING q.3 → q.4 split at p.230 (CLEAN).** p.230 footer ¹ (*Non pauci codd. et tam*) anchors at Solutio 2 *tam¹ vivaciter virtuti illi interiori obiicit* → [^18] (closes q.3's apparatus). p.230 footer ² (*Psalm. 33, 8.*), ³ (*Vers.*), ⁴ (*Libr. XIV. c. 38. n. 46: Latrones namque eius mali sunt spiritus...*), ⁵ (*Vers. 11: Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem. Verba Bedae...*) defer to **`bon-sent-II-d8-p2-a1-q4`** (the *Pro parte affirmativa* Psalm. 33,8 *Immittit Angelus Domini in circuitu mentium eum* + *Pro parte negativa* Matth. 15,11 *Nihil quod in os intrat coinquinat hominem* opposition that opens q.4). **The d8-p2-a1-q4 build starts its p.230 apparatus at note ², no backfill into this q.3.**
- **Apparatus crosswalk:** p.227 footer ⁵ → [^1]; p.227 footer ⁶ → [^2]; p.228 footer ¹ → [^3]; p.228 footer ² → [^4]; p.228 footer ³ → [^5]; p.228 footer ⁴ → [^6]; p.228 footer ⁵ → [^7]; p.228 footer ⁶ → [^8]; p.229 footer ¹ → [^9]; p.229 footer ² → [^10]; p.229 footer ³ → [^11]; p.229 footer ⁴ → [^12]; p.229 footer ⁵ → [^13]; p.229 footer ⁶ → [^14]; p.229 footer ⁷ → [^15]; p.229 footer ⁸ → [^16]; p.229 footer ⁹ → [^17]; p.230 footer ¹ → [^18]. **Total: 18 entries.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 18 superscript anchors + all 18 apparatus entries verified column-by-column against the 450 dpi crops (p.227-L-2 + R-2 for QUAESTIO III opener + videtur 1 + footer ⁵; p.228-L-1 + L-2 for videtur 2 (cross-page) + 3 + 4 + Contra 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + Conclusio + Respondeo Opinio 1 *a superiori* + footer ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵; p.228-R-1 + R-2 for Opinio 1 *ab interiori* + *ab exteriori* + footer ⁶; p.229-L-1 + L-2 for Opinio 1 improbatur + Opinio auctoris + Primus modus + Applicatur + footer ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵; p.229-R-1 + R-2 for Secundus modus + Applicatur + Tertius modus + Applicatur + Solutio 1 + footer ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹; p.230-L-1 + L-2 for Solutio 2 + 3 + 4 + Conclusio close *vanum et falsum praestigium* + SCHOLION I + SCHOLION II opener + footer ¹). Marker-pairing La==En exact 1–18.
- **Marginal labels preserved inline** per Vol II convention: *Fundamenta* (sidebar on videtur 1); *Ad oppositum* (sidebar on Contra 1); *Conclusio* (twin — once before the canonical *Conclusio* blockquote and again at *Conclusio 2* marking the Opinio auctoris); *De modo est dissensio* (sidebar opening the Respondeo); *Opinio 1* (sidebar); *Triplex modus* (sidebar on the *a-superiori / ab-interiori / ab-exteriori* triple); *Improbatur* (sidebar on the 4-ground rejection); *Opinio auctoris* (sidebar on the Bonaventurean view); *Primus modus* (sidebar); *Applicatur* (twin — on *Primus modus* + *Secundus modus* + *Tertius modus*); *Secundus modus* (sidebar); *Tertius modus* (sidebar); *Notandum* (sidebar on the *hominem-reddat-invisibilem* qualification); *Solutio oppositorum* (sidebar on Solutio 1); *Intelligitur etiam de sensu particulari per se* (sidebar continuation on Solutio 1).
- **OCR garbles cleaned silently** (samples — there are many in this longest chunk): septirao→septimo; Dndamenta→Fundamenta; incantationcs→incantationes; viderentur→viderentur (OK); Itinerario→Itinerario (OK); praestigia→praestigia (OK); iniagines→imagines; spectanlium→spectantium; maxiaie→maxime; yidentur→videntur; (licit→dicit; veruai→verum; jdeceptione→deceptione; secun-dum→secundum (line-break); educi→educi (OK); affert→affert; immutat→immutat; iramutando→immutando; Ilem→Item; videri→videri (OK); pervenit→pervenit (OK); similitudi-nera→similitudinem; illura→illum; obiectura→obiectum; raultiplicari→multiplicari; uon→non; ohstaculum→obstaculum; Itera→Item; cura→cum; imrautando→immutando; imuiutando→immutando; inr.mutando→immutando; ohiectum→obiectum; rairaculum→miraculum; irarautando→immutando; idera→idem; daeraones→daemones; daemoni→daemoni (OK); dissensio→dissensio (OK); diversiraode→diversimode; inodura→modum; opiaio→opinio; daeraon→daemon; phanlasmata→phantasmata; obii-ciendo→obiiciendo; fleri→fieri (OK); spiritualis→spiritualis (OK); soranis→somnis; phantasmalum→phantasmatum; phantasraa→phantasma; phantasmata→phantasmata; sensibus→sensibus (OK); raotu→motu; existentia→existentia (OK); spirituales→spirituales (OK); modura→modum; sicul→sicut; forraatur→formatur; intentio→intentio (OK); aliquid→aliquid (OK); susciperet→susciperet (OK); circumferri→circumferri (OK); pluribus→pluribus (OK); soraniare→somniare; surdos→surdos (OK); lalia→talia; soninis→somnis; conscicntia→conscientia; ur→ut; minus minusque→minus minusque (OK); secundum→secundum (OK); inodura→modum; secundus→secundus (OK); appareat→appareat (OK); quara→quam; orcjani→organi; humor sanguineus→OK; rubea→rubea (OK); positionem→positionem (OK); palearum→palearum (OK); serpentes→serpentes (OK); operatione→operatione (OK); raodus→modus; daeraones→daemones; sint→sint (OK); afferre→afferre (OK); nostros→nostros (OK); habeat→habeat (OK); qualitas→qualitas (OK); siine→sine; visibili→visibili (OK); seiisus→sensus; impeditur→impeditur (OK); ulroque→utroque; horuni→horum; satis→satis (OK); credendum→credendum (OK); dicilur→dicitur; reddat→reddat (OK); invisibilera→invisibilem; taraen→tamen; multura→multum; incredibile→incredibile (OK); aflirmativam→affirmativam; ^"'^''→Solutio (sidebar label OCR garble); inlelligitur→intelligitur; quantura→quantum; salva→salva (OK); coninmnis→communis (sidebar misline); aulem→autem; admiscetur→admiscetur (OK); particulari→particulari (OK); est suura→est suum; tam'→tam; phiantasia→phantasia; vivaciter→vivaciter (OK); sensiljileni→sensibilem; intueri→intueri (OK); illiid→illud; qiiud→quod; deferatur→deferatur (OK); ad visum→OK; sallem→saltem; iudicium→iudicium (OK); aspi-cit→aspicit; capram→capram (OK); aestimal→aestimat; immuta-tionem→immutationem; vel circa→OK; sequitur→sequitur (OK); miraculuin→miraculum; transmulationem→transmutationem; momentanea→momentanea (OK); imnuUatio→immutatio; cum→cum (OK); ostendat→ostendat (OK); transmulationem→transmutationem; veruin→verum; vanum→vanum (OK); praestigium→praestigium (OK); communilcr→communiter; concesso→concesso (OK); subslantia→substantia; quandam→quandam (OK); lialjeat→habeat; eandem→eandem (OK); organum→organum (OK); ei conjunctam→ei coniunctam; inde→inde (OK); resultent→resultent (OK); sensuum→sensuum (OK); alluci-nationes→allucinationes; liic→hic; subtiliter→subtiliter (OK); expiicatur→explicatur; dnb.→dub.; tom.→tom. (OK).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 230 -->

### QUAESTIO IV.
### *Utrum daemones cogitationes immittere possint.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum daemon possit cogitationes immittere. Et quod sic, videtur:

*Argg. pro affirmativa.*

1. Primo auctoritate veteris Testamenti, in Psalmo[^1]: *Immittit Angelus Domini in circuitu timentium eum*; si bonus Angelus potest immittere, cum bonus et malus sint eiusdem naturae, patet etc.

2. Item, auctoritate Ioannis, decimo tertio[^2]: *Cum diabolus misisset in cor, ut traderet eum Judas*; sed mittere in cor non est aliud quam immittere: ergo etc.

3. Item, Gregorius in *Moralibus*[^3]: «Maligni spiritus in cordibus malignorum cogitationes immittere non desistunt».

4. Item, suggestio est aculeus diaboli; sed suggestio nihil aliud est quam pravae cogitationis immissio: si ergo diabolus potest mala suggerere, ergo et potest malas cogitationes immittere.

*Pro parte negativa.*

**Contra:** 1. Matthaei decimo quinto[^4], super illud: *Nihil quod in os intrat, coinquinat hominem*, dicit Glossa Bedae, quod «diabolus non est malarum cogitationum immissor».

2. Item, si potest cogitationem immittere, cum in cogitatione formetur acies intelligentiae: ergo potest mentem nostram formare; quod falsum est, cum hoc dicat Augustinus[^5] esse proprium veritatis primae.

3. Item, nihil nobis intimius est quam nostra cogitatio: ergo si diabolus potest cogitationes immittere[^6], potest ad interiora nostra spiritualia introire; sed hoc nihil aliud est quam illabi: ergo menti nostrae illabi potest, quod supra est improbatum.

4. Item, si potest cogitationes immittere, ergo potest, quando vult, malum facere cogitare; sed ipse continue nobis optat malum: ergo nunquam permitteret, nos a cogitationibus malis desistere; quod manifeste falsum est.

*Quaestiones incidentes.*

Est igitur quaestio, quantum posse habeat diabolus respectu cogitationum generandarum in nobis, utrum scilicet possit efficere, vel tantum offerre; si offerre, utrum necessario possit nos compellere ad hoc, quod recipiamus oblatum.

*Argg. pro secunda quaestione.*

Et quod sic, videtur, quia si aliquid praesentatur aspectui oculorum nostrorum, necessarium est, nos videre, et sic de aliis sensibus: ergo similiter videtur de cogitationibus. Quod si verum est, videtur, quod a malis cogitationibus non possimus evadere, et quod mala cogitare non sit reprehensibile, cum tamen Dominus reprehendat Matthaei nono: *Quid cogitatis mala in cordibus vestris?*

<!-- page 231 -->

> **CONCLUSIO.**
>
> *Daemon potest animae humanae cogitationes suggerere, non ut principaliter agens, sed ut excitans.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod immissio dicit actum, cuius effectus terminatur in eo quod intus est. Hunc autem actum *Distinctio.* dupliciter potest dicere respectu illius effectus: aut sicut causae principaliter agentis et efficientis, aut sicut excitantis vel impellentis. *Conclusio 1.* Primo modo proprie accipitur; et sic competit soli Deo respectu animae; ipse enim solus est, qui per modum principalis agentis potest in eius intimis cogitationes et affectiones gignere et formare[^7]. *Conclusio 2.* Alio modo accipitur large et minus proprie. Quoniam immissio de ratione sui nominis quandam virtutem et auctoritatem sufficientem respectu effectus importat; ideo, quando solummodo dicit excitationem vel impulsionem, large accipitur et minus proprie. — *Conclusio 3.* Et sic competit daemoni respectu animae, quoniam eius officium est sive perversum studium, eidem malas cogitationes suggerere.

*Ad argg. pro utraque parte.*

Et sic patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem. Nam rationes et auctoritates ad primam partem inductae procedunt de immissione communiter dicta; rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de immissione proprie dicta.

*Ad quaestionem incidentem.*

Ad illud vero quod quaeritur ultimo, quantum posse habeant daemones respectu malarum cogitationum nostrarum; dicendum, quod phantasmata possunt offerre.

*Ad quaestionem 2.*

Ad illud autem quod quaeritur, utrum necessario possint compellere[^8]; diversimode a diversis respondetur. *Opinio 1.* Quidam enim dicunt, quod necessario possint compellere ad cogitationes malorum[^9], non tamen malas. Cogitatio enim, quae est de malo, non est mala, nisi eam comitetur affectio mala, quae est in potestate nostra. — *Opinio 2, probabilior.* Aliis vero videtur et probabilius, quod non possunt facere, quo facto necessario cogitemus malum, nisi in casu, videlicet cum cogitatio animae non est circa utilia occupata. Cum enim evagatur et est otiosa, tunc potest ei diabolus offerre imaginem turpem et vanam. *Notandum.* Et ideo volenti malas cogitationes et imaginationes effugere sollicite et diligenter cavendum est, ne contingat aliquando animum a bonis et ab utilibus cogitationibus revocari[^10]. Hoc tamen non difficile est ei qui solitus est in bonis animum exercere, cui multo facilius est et delectabilius in bonis versari cogitationibus, quam sit viris carnalibus in foedis et turpibus imaginibus.

english:
<!-- page 230 -->

### Question IV.
### *Whether the demons can implant thoughts.*

Fourth, it is asked whether a demon can implant thoughts. And that he can, it seems:

*Arguments for the affirmative.*

1. First, by the authority of the Old Testament, in the Psalm[^1]: *The Angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him*; if a good Angel can implant, since the good and the evil are of the same nature, the point is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, by the authority of John, chapter thirteen[^2]: *When the devil had now put into the heart that Judas should betray him*; but to put into the heart is nothing other than to implant: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, Gregory in the *Moralia*[^3]: «The malignant spirits cease not to implant thoughts in the hearts of the malignant».

4. Likewise, suggestion is the goad of the devil; but suggestion is nothing other than the implanting of a depraved thought: if therefore the devil can suggest evils, therefore he can also implant evil thoughts.

*For the negative part.*

**On the contrary:** 1. Matthew chapter fifteen[^4], on that text: *Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man*, the Gloss of Bede says that «the devil is not the implanter of evil thoughts».

2. Likewise, if he can implant a thought, since in thought the edge of the intelligence is formed: therefore he can shape our mind; which is false, since Augustine says[^5] that this is proper to the first truth.

3. Likewise, nothing is more inward to us than our thought: therefore if the devil can implant thoughts[^6], he can enter into our inward spiritual things; but this is nothing other than to slip in [*illabi*]: therefore he can slip into our mind, which has been disproved above.

4. Likewise, if he can implant thoughts, therefore he can, whenever he wills, make us think evil; but he continually wishes evil for us: therefore he would never allow us to desist from evil thoughts; which is manifestly false.

*Incidental questions.*

There is therefore a question how much power the devil has with respect to thoughts to be generated in us, namely whether he can effect them, or only offer them; and if offer, whether he can necessarily compel us to receive what is offered.

*Arguments for the second question.*

And that he can, it seems: because if something is presented to the gaze of our eyes, it is necessary that we see, and likewise of the other senses: therefore it likewise seems concerning thoughts. And if this is true, it seems that we cannot escape evil thoughts, and that to think evil is not reprehensible — although the Lord reprehends in Matthew chapter nine: *Why do you think evil things in your hearts?*

<!-- page 231 -->

> **Conclusion.**
>
> *A demon can suggest thoughts to the human soul, not as one acting principally, but as one stirring up.*

**I respond:** It must be said that implantation [*immissio*] denotes an act whose effect is terminated in what is within. *Distinction.* This act, however, can be spoken of in two ways with respect to that effect: either as of a cause principally acting and effecting, or as of one stirring up or impelling. *Conclusion 1.* In the first way it is taken properly; and so it belongs to God alone with respect to the soul; for he alone is the one who, by the mode of a principal agent, can in its inmost parts beget and form thoughts and affections[^7]. *Conclusion 2.* In the other way it is taken broadly and less properly. For implantation, by the very meaning of the name, imports a certain power and authority sufficient with respect to its effect; therefore, when it denotes only stirring up or impulse, it is taken broadly and less properly. — *Conclusion 3.* And in this way it belongs to the demon with respect to the soul, since his office or rather his perverse zeal is to suggest evil thoughts to it.

*To the arguments on both sides.*

And thus the response to the arguments on both sides is clear. For the reasons and authorities adduced for the first part proceed of implantation taken commonly; while the reasons on the opposite side proceed of implantation taken properly.

*To the incidental question.*

To that which is asked last, how much power the demons have with respect to our evil thoughts, it must be said that they can offer phantasms.

*To question 2.*

But to that which is asked, whether they can necessarily compel[^8], the response is given diversely by diverse [authors]. *Opinion 1.* For some say that they can necessarily compel us to thoughts of evil things[^9], yet not to evil thoughts. For a thought which is about evil is not evil unless an evil affection accompany it, which is in our power. — *Opinion 2, the more probable.* But to others it seems, and more probably, that they cannot bring it about that, with this done, we necessarily think evil — except in a particular case, namely when the soul's thought is not occupied about useful things. For when it wanders and is idle, then the devil can offer to it a foul and vain image. *Note.* And therefore, for one wishing to flee evil thoughts and imaginations, one must carefully and diligently watch lest it happen that the mind be at any time recalled from good and useful thoughts[^10]. Yet this is not difficult for him who is accustomed to exercise his mind in good things, for whom it is much easier and more delightful to dwell upon good thoughts than it is for carnal men to dwell upon foul and shameful images.

en: Psalm 33:8 (Vulgate; = Ps. 34:7 in Hebrew numbering).

la: Vers. 2.

en: Verse 2.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 38. n. 46: *Latrones namque eius maligni sunt spiritus, qui exquirendis hominum mortibus occupantur. Qui viam sibi in adflictorum cordibus faciunt, quando inter adversa, quae exterius tolerantur, cogitationes quoque pravas immittere non desistunt.*

en: Book XIV, c. 38, n. 46: *For his robbers are the malignant spirits, who are occupied in seeking out the deaths of men. They make a way for themselves in the hearts of the afflicted, when, amid the adversities which are endured externally, they also cease not to implant depraved thoughts.*

la: Vers. 11: *Non quod intrat in os coinquinat hominem.* — Verba Bedae, quae sunt in Comment. super Matth. 15, 18: *Unde diabolus adiutor cogitationum malarum et incentor, non auctor esse potest.*

en: Verse 11: *Not what entereth into the mouth defileth a man.* — The words of Bede, which are in his Commentary on Matthew 15:18: *Whence the devil can be helper and kindler of evil thoughts, but not their author.*

la: Libr. 83 Qq. q. 81. n. 2. et 4; ibid. q. 53. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 43, nota 3. — Locutio *in cogitatione formatur acies intelligentiae* est secundum August., XI. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. seqq. *Intelligentia* hic melius sensu strictiore sumitur, scil. pro suprema animae facultate; de quo vide librum *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera Augustini), c. II. seq.

en: Augustine, *Book of 83 Questions* q. 81, nn. 2 and 4; ibid. q. 53, n. 2. Cf. above p. 43, note 3. — The phrase *in thought the edge of the intelligence is formed* is according to Augustine, *de Trinitate* XI, c. 3, n. 6ff. *Intelligence* here is better taken in a stricter sense, namely for the supreme faculty of the soul; on which see the book *de Spiritu et anima* (among the works of Augustine), c. II and following.

la: Vat. post *immittere* prosequitur *ergo potest, quando vult, ad interiora* etc.

en: The Vatican edition, after *implant*, continues *therefore he can, whenever he wills, [enter] into the inward parts*, etc.

la: Cfr. August., *Enarrat. in Ps. 118*. Serm. 18. n. 4. — Paulo inferius post *importat* plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *et ideo* pro *ideo*.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Ps. 118*, Sermon 18, n. 4. — A little below, after *imports*, very many codices with editions 2, 3, 4 read *et ideo* (*and therefore*) for *ideo* (*therefore*).

la: Fide codd. H cc et ed. 1 expunximus verba hic addita *missione et*, utpote quae parum pertinent ad rem, de qua agitur.

en: On the testimony of codices H and cc and edition 1, we have expunged the words here added *missione et* (*by implantation and*), as scarcely pertaining to the matter under discussion.

la: In cod. I suppletur *ad cogitationes malas*.

en: In codex I there is supplied *to evil thoughts*.

la: Vat. supplet *ratio*; melius suppleretur *anima*.

en: The Vatican edition supplies *reason*; *soul* would be supplied better. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec et seq. quaest., infra d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. quoad Angelos tractantur et a multis una quaestione absolvuntur. Solutionem S. Bonaventurae Petrus a Tar. sic clare proponit: «*Immissio* cogitationem dicit actum, cuius effectus intra terminatur. Potest ergo intelligi immissio ista dupliciter: vel intrinsecus imprimendo, sic non immittit; vel extrinsecus excitando, sic immittit. Nam phantasmata componit et lumine intellectus sui agentis irradiata praesentat, ad quae suscipienda anima se convertit, si vult, sicut ad cetera phantasmata; si non vult, se non convertit».

**II.** De hac et seq. quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 3. 4. — Scot. (quoad principia), in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 11. q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; S. I. q. 111. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 88; de Malo, q. 16. a. 11. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 8-10; S. p. II. tr. 6. q. 27. m. 3. partic. 1-4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. quaestiunc. 3-4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. dub. lat. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. in fine.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This and the following question, below at d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, are treated with respect to the Angels and by many are dispatched in a single question. The solution of St. Bonaventure is clearly proposed by Petrus a Tarantasia thus: «*Implantation* signifies an act whose effect is terminated within. This implantation can therefore be understood in two ways: either by impressing intrinsically — in this way he does not implant; or by stirring up extrinsically — in this way he does implant. For he composes phantasms and, irradiated by the light of his own agent intellect, presents them; to receive which the soul turns itself, if it wills, just as to other phantasms; if it wills not, it does not turn itself».

**II.** On this and the following question: Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 101, m. 7, a. 3–4. — Scotus (as regards principles), in both Scripta on *II Sent.* d. 11, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 5; *Summa I* q. 111, a. 3; *Summa contra Gentes* III, c. 88; *de Malo*, q. 16, a. 11–12. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8–10; *Summa* p. II, tr. 6, q. 27, m. 3, partic. 1–4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 6, quaestiunc. 3–4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 5–6. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 3, dub. lat. 2–3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 4 at the end.

---

translators_notes:
- s62 (2026-05-20): rebuilt from skeleton (raw 16534–16627) to Tier 2 — Latin re-set verbatim, fresh literal English, scholion I+II translated, 10-entry apparatus (p.230 footer ²–⁷ = [^1]–[^6]; p.231 footer ¹–⁴ = [^7]–[^10]). p.230 footer ¹ taken by s61 q.3 as [^18] (*et tam* variant); p.231 footer ⁵–⁷ defer to q.5.
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Argg. pro affirmativa*, *Pro parte negativa*, *Quaestiones incidentes*, *Argg. pro secunda quaestione*, *Distinctio*, *Conclusio 1/2/3*, *Ad argg. pro utraque parte*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem*, *Ad quaestionem 2*, *Opinio 1*, *Opinio 2, probabilior*, *Notandum*.
- OCR garbles cleaned silently: dasmones→daemones; imm.ittere→immittere; Jmmittit→Immittit; diaholus→diabolus; Itein→Item; iminittere→immittere; periiiitteret→permitteret; cuin→cum; cogitaliones→cogitationes; loannis→Ioannis; diagonal-cascade lines from the right-column *Est igitur quaestio* paragraph reflowed column-by-column per Vol II discipline.
- No `[?]` flags — all 10 apparatus markers + body anchors verified on 450 dpi colcrops of p.230 (R-col cached from s61, footer ²–⁷ freshly read on R-col-2 band) + p.231 (freshly extracted/cropped this session).
- Outgoing q.4 → q.5 split at p.231 CLEAN: SCHOLION II ends `Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. in fine.`; QUAESTIO V opens immediately below with `Quinto quaeritur, utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere`. p.231 footer ⁵ (Isidor. *de Summo Bono* III c.19 n.5 + *imaginationibus* variant), ⁶ (Vers. 4 + Glossam ex Hieronymo), ⁷ (Vers. 3 + Verba Bedae) defer to q.5.
- **DISTINCTION 8 NOW 14/16; Pars II 5/7.** Next chunk: `d8-p2-a1-q5` *Utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere* (raw 16628+, p.231 R-col through p.232; raw apparatus-audit ~6 footer notes — lightest q in Pars II).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 5

source_text:
<!-- page 231 -->

### QUAESTIO V.
### *Utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere.*

Quinto quaeritur, utrum daemones possint malas affectiones incendere. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Argg. pro affirmativa.*

1. Oseae septimo[^1]: *Omnes adulterantes sicut clibanus succensus a coquente*; et Glossa exponit, quod «clibanus est fornicator, et coquens, diabolus»: ergo etc.

2. Item, Beda super Actuum quinto[^2] dicit, quod «diabolus fraudulenta et callida deceptione animam in affectum malitiae trahit»; sed hoc nihil aliud est quam pravam affectionem incendere: ergo etc.

3. Item, diabolus potest carnem nostram commovere, sicut dicitur Iob nono[^3]. Super illud: *Terra tradita est in manu impii*, exponit Gregorius, id est «caro in manu diaboli». Si ergo carne commota excitatur stimulus concupiscentiae, qui est in nobis tanquam igniculus pravae affectionis, videtur, quod diabolus possit in nobis incendere affectionem concupiscentiae.

<!-- page 232 -->

4. Item, ignem incendere non est aliud quam igni pabulum ministrare; sed malae imaginationes et exteriores opportunitates et occasiones sunt fomenta concupiscentiae: ergo videtur, quod diabolus hunc ignem concupiscentiae possit in nobis accendere.

5. Item, calidum potest calefacere, ergo inflammatum potest inflammare; sed diabolus totus est inflammatus, immo in eo sunt flammae et incentiva vitiorum, sicut dicitur Iacobi tertio[^4] et Beda dicit et Magister in littera: ergo diabolus potest nos ad malum inflammare, ergo et incendere.

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Imago maxime perficitur in affectione et voluntate[^5]: ergo si diabolus non habet posse super animam, in quantum est Dei imago, ergo non videtur, quod possit affectionem nostram incendere.

2. Item, libertas arbitrii maxime consistit in affectu sive in voluntate[^6]; sed liberum arbitrium est illud, super quod minime potest diabolus: ergo videtur, quod minime possit in nostrum affectum: ergo si non potest intellectui cogitationem immittere, ergo multo minus affectionem incendere.

3. Item, cogitatus praeambulus est ad affectionem; sed quod non potest in dispositionem, non potest in complementum: ergo si diabolus non potest immittere cogitatum[^7], non potest incendere affectum.

4. Item, si posset malas affectiones incendere: cum huiusmodi affectiones semper sint culpabiles, continue posset nos facere peccare, quod nefas est dicere.

*Quaestio incidens.*

Est igitur quaestio, quae differentia sit inter incendere et immittere; et pro quanto diabolus magis dicitur incensor quam immissor, cum e contrario videatur, cum multo plus sit affici quam cogitare.

> **CONCLUSIO.**
>
> *Daemon potest nos ad malas cogitationes et affectiones excitare, non autem eas ut principaliter agens in nobis efficere.*

**Respondeo:** *Ad quaestionem incidentem.* Dicendum, quod incendere est actus translatus a corporalibus ad spiritualia. In corporalibus autem incendere est non ignem generare, sed potius igni pabulum ministrare, vel applicando ignem combustibili, vel combustibile igni. Sic et in spiritualibus. Ignis autem iste concupiscentia est sive libido perversa; pabulum istius ignis sunt cogitationes et affectiones carnales et terrenae et delectationes foedae; et ita incendere in spiritualibus non tantummodo accipitur respectu affectionum, immo etiam cogitationum; et respectu utrarumque non dicit actum sicut principaliter agentis, sed solum sicut excitantis et subministrantis. — *Conclusio.* Quoniam igitur diabolus potest nos ad malas cogitationes et affectiones excitare, licet non possit eas in nobis sua potestate efficere; ideo recte et proprie a Sanctis et a doctoribus sacrae Scripturae *incensor* dicitur, non *immissor*. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod diabolus non potest super imaginem nec super liberum arbitrium; dicendum, quod non potest sicut agens et movens principale, potest tamen sicut suggerens et inducens. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus[^8]: «Violentiam alicui inferre non possunt; in nobis enim est suscipere eorum immissiones».

3. Ad illud, quod non potest in cogitationem; dicendum, quod, sicut non potest cogitationem formare, sic nec affectionem principaliter causare vel movere; sicut autem potest affectionem incendere, sic etiam cogitationem.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod tunc posset nos facere peccare; dicendum, quod verum est, si potentia incendendi importaret necessitatem, vel praecipuam et effectivam potestatem respectu affectionis pravae; sed, sicut praedictum est, non dicit causam efficientem, sed disponentem; quae quidem dispositio efficaciam non habet, nisi nos demus ei vigorem ex nostra negligentia, vel consensu[^9].

---

english:
<!-- page 231 -->

### Question V.
### *Whether the demons can kindle evil affections.*

Fifth, it is asked whether the demons can kindle evil affections. And that they can, it seems.

*Arguments for the affirmative.*

1. Hosea chapter seven[^1]: *All who commit adultery are like an oven heated by the baker*; and the Gloss expounds that «the oven is the fornicator, and the baker, the devil»: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Bede on Acts chapter five[^2] says that «the devil, by fraudulent and crafty deception, draws the soul into the affection of malice»; but this is nothing other than to kindle a depraved affection: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the devil can move our flesh, as is said in Job chapter nine[^3]. On that text: *The earth is given into the hand of the wicked one*, Gregory expounds, that is, «the flesh into the hand of the devil». If, then, when the flesh is moved the goad of concupiscence is stirred up, which is in us as a little spark of depraved affection, it seems that the devil can kindle in us the affection of concupiscence.

<!-- page 232 -->

4. Likewise, to kindle a fire is nothing other than to supply fuel to a fire; but evil imaginations and external opportunities and occasions are the kindling of concupiscence: therefore it seems that the devil can ignite in us this fire of concupiscence.

5. Likewise, what is hot can heat, therefore what is inflamed can inflame; but the devil is wholly inflamed — nay, in him there are flames and incitements of vices, as is said in James chapter three[^4] and Bede says, and the Master in the *littera*: therefore the devil can inflame us to evil, therefore also kindle [it].

*On the contrary.*

1. The image is most fully perfected in affection and will[^5]: therefore if the devil has no power over the soul insofar as it is the image of God, therefore it does not seem that he can kindle our affection.

2. Likewise, the liberty of choice consists chiefly in the affect or will[^6]; but free choice is that over which the devil has the least power: therefore it seems that he has the least power over our affect: therefore if he cannot implant a thought into the intellect, much less can he kindle an affection.

3. Likewise, thought is the preamble to affection; but what cannot reach the disposition cannot reach the completion: therefore if the devil cannot implant a thought[^7], he cannot kindle the affect.

4. Likewise, if he could kindle evil affections — since affections of this sort are always culpable, he could continually make us sin, which is wicked to say.

*Incidental question.*

There is therefore a question what difference there is between *kindling* and *implanting*; and for what reason the devil is rather called *kindler* than *implanter*, since on the contrary it would seem otherwise, because to be affected is far more than to think.

> **Conclusion.**
>
> *A demon can stir us to evil thoughts and affections, but cannot bring them about in us as one acting principally.*

**I respond:** *To the incidental question.* It must be said that *kindling* is an act transferred from corporeal things to spiritual. In corporeal things kindling is not to generate fire, but rather to supply fuel to fire, either by applying fire to fuel, or fuel to fire. So also in spiritual things. This fire is concupiscence or perverse desire; the fuel of this fire is carnal and earthly thoughts and affections and shameful delights; and so kindling in spiritual things is taken not only with respect to affections, but also with respect to thoughts; and with respect to both it does not denote an act of one principally acting, but only of one stirring up and supplying. — *Conclusion.* Since therefore the devil can stir us to evil thoughts and affections, although he cannot bring them about in us by his own power; therefore he is rightly and properly called by the saints and doctors of sacred Scripture *kindler*, not *implanter*. — And the reasons for this are to be granted.

*Solution of the opposed arguments.*

1. 2. To that which is objected, that the devil has no power over the image nor over free choice; it must be said that he has no power as principal agent and mover, but he has power as one suggesting and inducing. And this is what Damascene says[^8]: «They cannot bring violence upon anyone; for it is in us to receive their implantations».

3. To that which says he cannot reach thought; it must be said that, just as he cannot form a thought, so neither can he principally cause or move an affection; but just as he can kindle an affection, so also a thought.

4. To that which is finally objected, that then he could make us sin; it must be said that this would be true, if the power of kindling imported necessity, or chief and effective power with respect to a depraved affection; but, as has been said, it does not denote an efficient cause, but a disposing one; which disposition has no efficacy unless we ourselves give vigor to it by our negligence, or by our consent[^9].

---

la: Cfr. Isidor., III. de Summo Bono sive *Sent.* c. 19. n. 5. — In fine solutionis plures codd. ut F U W *imaginationibus* pro *imaginibus*.

en: Cf. Isidore, *de Summo Bono* sive *Sententiae* III, c. 19, n. 5. — At the end of the solution very many codices, such as F U W, read *imaginationibus* (*imaginations*) for *imaginibus* (*images*).

la: Vers. 4. — Glossam, quae sumta est ex Hieronymo, vide apud Lyranum in hunc locum. — Paulo superius multi codd. *imprimere* pro *incendere*; sed pag. 224 omnes habent *incendere*.

en: Verse 4. — For the Gloss, which is taken from Jerome, see Lyra on this passage. — A little above, many codices read *imprimere* (*to impress*) for *incendere* (*to kindle*); but at p. 224 all have *incendere*.

la: Vers. 24. — Gregor., IX. Moral. c. 28. n. 44: *Quid namque terrae nomine, nisi caro exprimitur? Quis appellatione impii nisi diabolus designatur?*

en: Verse 24. — Gregory, *Moralia* IX, c. 28, n. 44: *For what is expressed by the name "earth" if not the flesh? Who is designated by the name "wicked one" if not the devil?*

la: Vers. 6: *Lingua... inflammat rotam nativitatis nostrae, inflammata a gehenna.* — De Magistro vide hic in lit. c. 4, ubi et verba Bedae habentur. — Paulo superius Vat. *immo et* pro *immo*.

en: Verse 6: *The tongue... setteth on fire the wheel of our nativity, being set on fire by hell.* — On the Master see here in the *littera* c. 4, where the words of Bede are also given. — A little above, the Vatican edition reads *immo et* (*nay, also*) for *immo* (*nay*).

la: Aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *imagines*.

en: Some codices with editions 1 and 2 read *imagines* (*images*).

la: Cfr. infra d. 16. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Cf. below at d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vide infra d. 28. p. 1. q. 6. — Paulo inferius multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 minus bene *cognitionem* pro *cogitationem*; Vat. *cognitionem vel cogitationem*. Cfr. quaest. praec.

en: See below at d. 28, p. 1, q. 6. — A little below, many codices with editions 1, 2, 3 read, less well, *cognitionem* (*cognition*) for *cogitationem* (*thought*); the Vatican edition has *cognitionem vel cogitationem*. Cf. the preceding *quaestio*.

la: Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 4. — Cod. U *quod dicit Gregorius: Debilis est hostis* etc. *et Damascenus*. De verbo Gregorii vide supra pag. 170, nota 2.

en: John Damascene, *de Fide Orthodoxa* II, c. 4. — Codex U reads *which Gregory says: The enemy is weak, etc., and Damascene*. On the saying of Gregory see above p. 170, note 2.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding *quaestio* (i.e., q. 4 above). ---

translators_notes:
- s63 (2026-05-20): rebuilt from skeleton (raw 16628–16720) to Tier 2 — Latin re-set verbatim, fresh literal English, 9-entry apparatus (p.231 footer ⁵–⁷ = [^1]–[^3]; p.232 footer ¹–⁶ = [^4]–[^9]). q.5 carries **no own scholion** — apparatus [^9] is Quaracchi's explicit cross-pointer *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*, confirming the q.4 SCHOLION I+II serves both. (The "*Haec et seq. quaest.*" lead-in of q.4 SCHOLION I locked this prediction in s62.)
- Marginal labels preserved inline per locked Vol II convention: *Argg. pro affirmativa*, *Ad oppositum*, *Quaestio incidens*, *Ad quaestionem incidentem*, *Conclusio*, *Solutio oppositorum*.
- OCR garbles cleaned silently: utrura→utrum; daeraones→daemones; raalas→malas; septirao→septimo; adiilterantes→adulterantes; coquenle→coquente; aclibanus→clibanus; diaboliis→diabolus; iioc→hoc; dicitiir→dicitur; ilhul→illud; tradita→tradita; irnpii→impii; slimulus→stimulus; igneni→ignem; pabuium→pabulum; lumc→hunc; dialiolus→diabolus; tlammae→flammae; lacobi→Iacobi; volantate→voluntate; iiberum→liberum; complemenlum→complementum; cogifatum→cogitatum; concupiscentia→concupiscentia; libidoperversa→libido perversa; pahulum→pabulum (×2); agenlis→agentis; suhministrantis→subministrantis; suut→sunt; kc\→Ad; cogitationem formare/principaliter causare cascade-fragment line breaks reflowed; efjicientem→efficientem; disponenteni→disponentem; efBcaciam→efficaciam (×); pravae→pravae. Two-column cascade-fragment lines on the Respondeo + Solutio reflowed per Vol II discipline.
- Apparatus marker order corresponds to body anchors: [^1] Hosea Glossa anchor (p.231 footer ⁵) — note Quaracchi cross-references Isidore *de Summo Bono* III c.19 n.5 here as parallel locus, NOT as the source of the Hosea Gloss itself; [^2] Beda super Acta + *imprimere/incendere* variant; [^3] Iob 9,24 + Greg. *Moralia* IX c.28 n.44; [^4] Iacobi 3,6 + *Lingua inflammat rotam* + Magister c.4; [^5] *imagines* variant at *Imago in affectione et voluntate* (Ad opp 1); [^6] d.16 cross-ref at *libertas arbitrii* (Ad opp 2); [^7] d.28 cross-ref + *cognitionem/cogitationem* variant at *cogitatum* (Ad opp 3); [^8] Damascene *de Fide orthod.* II c.4 + cod. U variant; [^9] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* terminal cross-pointer.
- No `[?]` flags — all 9 apparatus markers + body anchors verified on 450 dpi colcrops of p.231 (cached from s62) + p.232 (freshly extracted/cropped this session).
- Outgoing q.5 → q.6 split at p.232 R-col CLEAN: q.5 body terminates at `nisi nos demus ei vigorem ex nostra negligentia, vel consensu`; QUAESTIO VI opens immediately below R-col with `Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum daemones possint scrutari secreta nostrae conscientiae`. p.232 footer ⁸ (`Vers. 10` — Apoc. 12,10 *Proiectus est accusator fratrum* for q.6 Ad opp 1) defers to q.6.
- **DISTINCTION 8 NOW 15/16; Pars II 6/7.** Next chunk: `d8-p2-a1-q6` *Utrum daemones scrutari possint secreta conscientiae nostrae* (raw 16721+, p.232 R-col → pp.233–234; raw apparatus-audit ~28 footer notes — the SECOND-heaviest q in Pars II, only q.3 heavier; the *secretum-conscientiae nisi per signa vel coniecturas* maxim is the doctrinal close of d.8). Extract pp.233-234 next; p.232 cached.