title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio.*

Tertio quaeritur, per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio. Et videtur, quod tantum per *poenalia*.

1. Gregorius in quadam homilia[^6]: « Iustum est, ut peccator tanto maiora inferat sibi lamenta per poenitentiam, quanto maiora intulit damna per culpam ».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia peccator, eo ipso quod peccavit, est debitor poenae; sed in satisfactione solvit quod debet: ergo poenam solvit[^7], ergo etc.

3. Item, universum remaneret inordinatum, si peccatum remaneret impunitum[^8]; sed post satisfactionem peccator non punitur: ergo necesse est, quod ante puniatur.

4. Item, Gregorius[^9] dicit, et verum est, quod sicut in corporalibus, ita et in spiritualibus est curatio per contrarium; sed peccatum libidinosum per delectationem committitur et per satisfactionem curatur: ergo satisfactio debet esse per poenam.

5. Item, in poenitentia et eius partibus sumit peccator de se iustitiam et vindictam, sicut supra[^10] patuit; sed vindicta non nisi per poenam sumitur de peccato: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Anselmus in libro *Cur Deus homo*[^11]: «Non sufficit solum reddere quod sublatum est, sed etiam pro contumelia illata plus oportet impendere»; et de hoc sunt plura exempla manifesta in Lege. *Proprie* ergo non fit satisfactio ex operibus bonis, secundum quod bona sunt, praecise loquendo, sed ulterius oportet in his aliquid intelligere, per quae [quod] fiant satisfactoria pro offensa; sed aliud quam poena non videtur, quod hoc posset intelligi in eis. Et hoc etiam maxime congruere videtur, quia, cum ad culpam essentialiter consequatur poena, manifestum est, quod peccator ex ratione culpae factus est debitor poenae. Ad hoc ergo, ut satisfaciat, exiguntur non solum bona opera, sed etiam poenalia bona, quia aliter non essent meritoria poenalia, quia aliter per haec non fieret satisfactio.

2. Item, non delectatur Deus in poenis nostris[^1d], ergo non magis placent opera poenalia Deo quam alia; sed per id quod magis placet, ei cui debetur satisfactio, melius satisfit: ergo etc.

3. Item, quaedam sunt peccata, quae perpetrantur cum tristitia; sed satisfactio debet esse per contrarium: ergo sine poena debet de his peccatis satisfactio fieri, ut puta sunt invidia et accidia.

4. Item, si satisfactorium est poenale, per se loquendo, ergo magis poenale magis satisfactorium; sed avaro est magis poenale dare obolum, quam largo dare marcam: ergo magis satisfacit per obolum, quam ille per marcam. Similiter potest obiici in *ieiunio* et *oratione*; et hoc est inconveniens, quia mali de malitia commodum reportarent[^2d].

> **Conclusio.** *Satisfactio fit per opera poenalia.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod satisfactio est per opera poenalia. — Et huius ratio est quadruplex. *Prima* est, quia ibi est *honoris ablati redditio*; unde honorem istum debet homo reddere amplius, quam si non abstulisset; et ideo requiritur, ut non tantum Deo famuletur per operationem bonam, verum etiam se ipsum deiiciat per poenam assumtam. — *Secunda* ratio est, quia ibi est prius *deordinatio*; et quia deordinatum per culpam optime ordinatur in poena[^3d], ideo etc. — *Tertia* ratio est, quia infirmati *curatio*; quia infirmatus per delectationis calorem curatur per poenalitatis algorem etc. — *Quarta* ratio est, quia ibi est *debiti absolutio*; et quia peccator est debitor poenae, ideo debet per poenam satisfacere.

1. Ex hoc patet primo obiectum: quia est *debitum honoris* veniens *ex bono collato*, et hunc debemus per *gratiarum actionem*; et veniens ex *obedientiae* mandato iniuncto, et hunc debemus per *obedientiae subiectionem*; et veniens ex *Maiestatis imperio*, et hunc debemus per *latriae adorationem*[^4d]; et veniens ex *peccato commisso*, et iste honor redditur Deo per *sui ipsius punitionem*; et hoc est in satisfactione.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non delectatur in poenis Deus: dicendum, quod verum est; non ea ratione, qua *curantes poenae*, sed ea ratione, qua *curantes* et *honorantes divinam iustitiam*[^5d], delectatur in eis.

3. Ad illud solvendum, quod etsi in quibusdam peccati comitetur tristitia, radix tamen est ex delectatione libidinosa[^6d].

4. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod aliquid est poenale natura, ut puta ieiunii abstinentia et erogatio bonorum, in quibus sustentatur humana infirmitas[^7d]; aliquid ratione *culpae* et inordinationis voluntatis. Prima poenalitas respicitur per se in satisfactione, secunda vero non; et de ista secunda opponit.

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### Question III. *By what kind of works satisfaction ought to be made.*

Thirdly it is asked by what kind of works satisfaction ought to be made. And it seems [that it ought to be made] only by *penal* [works].

1. Gregory, in a certain homily[^6]: "It is just that a sinner should bring upon himself the greater laments by penance, the greater the harms he inflicted by his fault."

2. Likewise, it seems [so] by *reason*: because the sinner, by the very fact that he sinned, is a debtor of punishment; but in satisfaction he pays what he owes: therefore he pays punishment[^7], therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the universe would remain disordered if sin remained unpunished[^8]; but after satisfaction the sinner is not punished: therefore it is necessary that he be punished beforehand.

4. Likewise, Gregory[^9] says, and it is true, that just as in bodily things, so also in spiritual things there is curing by the contrary; but a lustful sin is committed through pleasure and cured through satisfaction: therefore satisfaction ought to be by punishment.

5. Likewise, in penance and its parts the sinner takes upon himself justice and vindication, as was shown above[^10]; but vindication is taken upon sin only through punishment: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Anselm, in the book *Cur Deus homo*[^11]: "It does not suffice only to render what was taken away, but for the affront inflicted one must expend more besides"; and of this there are many manifest examples in the Law. *Properly*, therefore, satisfaction is not made from good works according as they are good, speaking precisely, but one must further understand something in them by which [they] become satisfactory for the offense; but nothing other than punishment seems [to be that] which could be understood in them. And this also seems most fitting, because, since punishment essentially follows upon fault, it is manifest that the sinner, by reason of his fault, has been made a debtor of punishment. To this end, therefore, that he may satisfy, there are required not only good works, but also penal good [works], because otherwise penal [works] would not be meritorious, because otherwise satisfaction would not be made through these.

2. Likewise, God does not take delight in our punishments[^1d], therefore penal works please God no more than others; but by that which pleases more, He to whom satisfaction is owed is better satisfied: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, certain sins are perpetrated with sadness; but satisfaction ought to be by the contrary: therefore satisfaction for these sins ought to be made without punishment, as, for instance, are envy and sloth.

4. Likewise, if a satisfactory [work] is penal, speaking per se, then the more penal is the more satisfactory; but for a miser it is more penal to give a penny than for a generous man to give a mark: therefore he satisfies more by a penny than the other by a mark. Likewise it can be objected in the case of *fasting* and *prayer*; and this is unfitting, because the wicked would carry off an advantage from their wickedness[^2d].

> **Conclusion.** *Satisfaction is made through penal works.*

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is through penal works. — And the reason for this is fourfold. The *first* is that there [is found] the *rendering of honor taken away*; whence a man ought to render that honor more amply than if he had not taken it away; and therefore it is required that he not only serve God by a good operation, but also cast himself down by an assumed punishment. — The *second* reason is that there is first a *disordering*; and because what is disordered by fault is best ordered in punishment[^3d], therefore etc. — The *third* reason is that there [is] the *curing* of one made infirm; because one made infirm through the heat of pleasure is cured through the cold of penalty, etc. — The *fourth* reason is that there [is] the *discharge of a debt*; and because the sinner is a debtor of punishment, therefore he ought to satisfy through punishment.

1. From this the first objection is made clear: because it is a *debt of honor* coming *from a good conferred*, and this we owe through *the giving of thanks*; and coming from the *command of obedience* enjoined, and this we owe through *the subjection of obedience*; and coming from the *imperative of [His] Majesty*, and this we owe through *the adoration of latria*[^4d]; and coming from *the sin committed*, and this honor is rendered to God through *the punishment of oneself*; and this is in satisfaction.

2. To the objection that God does not take delight in punishments: it must be said that it is true; not by that account by which [they are] *punishments curing* [as a remedy], but by that account by which, *curing* and *honoring the divine justice*[^5d], He takes delight in them.

3. It is to be resolved that, although in certain sins sadness accompanies, the root nevertheless is from lustful pleasure[^6d].

4. To the last it must be said that something is penal by nature, as, for instance, the abstinence of fasting and the giving away of goods, in which human infirmity is supported[^7d]; something [is penal] by reason of *fault* and the disordering of the will. The first penality is regarded per se in satisfaction, but not the second; and concerning this second [the objection] argues.

la: Libr. 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 20. n. 8: « Per hoc ergo, quod dicitur: *Facite dignos fructus poenitentiae* [Luc. 3, 8.], uniuscuiusque conscientia convenitur, ut tanto maiora quaerat bonorum operum lucra per poenitentiam, quanto graviora sibi intulit damna per culpam ».

en: Bk. 1 *Homilies on the Gospel*, homily 20, n. 8: "By this, therefore, that it is said, *Bring forth fruits worthy of penance* [Luke 3, 8], the conscience of each is challenged to seek, through penance, the greater gains of good works, the graver the harms he inflicted upon himself by fault."

la: Edd. *ergo per poenam satisfacit.*

en: The editions [read] *therefore he satisfies through punishment.*

la: Secundum Augustinum; cfr. supra pag. 363, nota 6. — Mox pro *peccator* edd. *peccatum*, quae etiam in fine arg. addunt *scilicet per satisfactionem.*

en: According to Augustine; cf. above p. 363, note 6. — Shortly after, for *peccator* [sinner] the editions [read] *peccatum* [sin], which also at the end of the argument add *namely, through satisfaction.*

la: Libr. XXIV. Moral. c. 2. n. 2, et II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 32. n. 1. Vide tom. III. pag. 261, nota 2. Idem docet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 3.

en: Bk. XXIV *Morals*, c. 2, n. 2, and II *Homilies on the Gospel*, homily 32, n. 1. See tom. III, p. 261, note 2. Aristotle teaches the same, II *Ethics*, c. 3.

la: Quaest. 1. et d. 14. p. II. dub. 6.

en: Question 1, and d. 14, p. II, dub. 6.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 352, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 352, note 6.

la: Vide supra pag. 103, nota 11. — Post *malitia* edd. addunt *sua.*

en: See above p. 103, note 11. — After *malitia* the editions add *sua* [their own].

la: Cfr. August., Epist. 140. (alias 120. c. 3. n. 4.) et de Natura boni, c. 7. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Letter* 140 (alias 120, c. 3, n. 4) and *On the Nature of the Good*, c. 7 ff.

la: Cod. U *exhibitionem.*

en: Codex U [reads] *exhibitionem* [the showing/rendering].

la: Vide Gregor., Regula pastoral. p. II. c. 30, et supra q. 1. ad 1. — In principio solut. post *in* legitur *nostris.* Subinde post *verum est* ex codd. E supplevimus *non*, quod in aliis codd. et edd. [deest]. Mox pro *bene* codd. M O R S T *unde.*

en: See Gregory, *Pastoral Rule* p. II, c. 30, and above q. 1, ad 1. — At the beginning of the solution, after *in* is read *nostris*. Then after *verum est*, from codices E we supplied *non*, which in other codices and editions [is wanting]. Shortly after, for *bene* codices M O R S T [read] *unde*.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. dub. 4.

en: Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 42, dub. 4.

la: Vide quaest. seq.

en: See the following question.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 29. a. 1. q. 1, et d. 30. — De vulneratione in naturalibus vide etiam infra d. 17. p. II. a. 1.

en: Cf. II *Sent.*, d. 29, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 30. — On the wounding in the natural [endowments] see also below, d. 17, p. II, a. 1. ---

latin_scholion:
Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — *The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article.*

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II. Item videtur, quod per quaecumque bona opera indifferenter contingit satisfacere, sicut patet in parabola vulnerati[^1f] [Luc. 10, 30.]: peccator non solum est spoliatus gratuitis, sed etiam vulneratus in naturalibus. Ex huiusmodi autem vulneratione redditur inhabilis ad bonum et pronus ad malum; sed licet per contritionem reddantur ei gratuita, nihilominus tamen oportet actu cooperari ad sanationem vulnerationis praedictae; hoc autem fit in satisfactione, quia per opera satisfactoria magis ac magis redditur homo habilis ad bonum et minus ac minus pronus ad malum. Cum ergo per quaecumque bona opera posset fieri huiusmodi sanatio, videtur, quod per quaecumque bona opera contingat satisfacere.

**Contra:** 1. Omnia bona, quaecumque sunt, a Deo sunt, mala vero a nobis; unde [I. Corinth. 4, 7.]: *Quid habes quod non accepisti?* ergo ex omni bono, quod habemus, sumus debitores Deo, ut ex hoc ei serviamus; sed constat, quod *satisfactio plus* dicit quam *servire*. Unde Anselmus [loc. cit.]: «Non sufficit solum reddere quod sublatum est, sed etiam pro contumelia illata plus oportet impendere»; et de hoc sunt plura exempla manifesta in Lege. *Proprie* ergo non fit satisfactio ex operibus bonis, secundum quod bona sunt, praecise loquendo, sed ulterius oportet in his aliquid intelligere, per quae [quod] fiant satisfactoria pro offensa; sed aliud quam poena non videtur, quod hoc posset intelligi in eis. Et hoc etiam maxime congruere videtur, quia, cum ad culpam essentialiter consequatur poena, manifestum est, quod peccator ex ratione culpae factus est debitor poenae. Ad hoc ergo, ut satisfaciat, exiguntur non solum bona opera, sed etiam poenalia bona, quia aliter non essent meritoria poenalia, quia aliter per haec non fieret satisfactio.

**Resp.:** Secundum hoc respondetur, quod *proprie* per sola bona opera poenalia est satisfacere, secundum quod opponebatur; nec sufficit, quod sint bona opera tantum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod licet per quaecumque bona opera magis ac magis possint habilitari naturalia, non tamen per omnia huiusmodi fit satisfactio, licet e contrario per omnia bona opera satisfactoria fiat maior ac maior habilitatio ad bonum, et minor pronitas ad malum. Unde in plus est *habilitari naturalia* quam *satisfacere*.

III. Si quaeritur: cum poena sit malum, et Deus non delectetur in hoc, sed solum in bono, cuius est in ipso exemplar; unde est hoc, quod ab hominibus exigit bonum opus poenale ex parte qua poenale? est dicendum, quod in illis, prout sunt poenalia *simpliciter* et *absolute*, non delectatur, sed quod hoc scilicet, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*, quod ordinatum est in poena quod inordinatum erat in culpa. Quia ergo huiusmodi ordinatio a sapientia Dei procedit, ideo, prout poena voluntarie *suscepta* sic poenitentem ordinat, dicitur Deo delectabile. Et dico *voluntarie suscepta*, quia per involuntarie susceptam non contingit satisfacere (sic enim contingeret poenam gehennae posse esse satisfactoriam); sed oportet, quod sit voluntaria *rationi*, etsi sit involuntaria *carni* et sensualitati. Et sic patet, quod non per quodcumque bonum opus contingit satisfacere, sed solum per poenale voluntarie secundum rationem susceptum, quod, quia poenitentem sic ordinat, est Deo delectabile.

Quod autem poena ordinet, patet etiam in poena gehennae. Secundum enim quod determinat alibi, [infra d. 45. a. 1. q. 1.] peccatori ratione peccati mortalis debetur locus infimus, et qui sit infra omnem creaturam; sed per poenam gehennae ordinatur in tali loco decedens in mortali. Similiter patet hoc in poena, qua affliguntur ipsi poenitentes.

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Quia enim peccator se deordinavit in peccando, non subiiciendo voluntatem suam voluntati divinae nec eam sequendo, sed propriam; ideo ordinatur in poena quod prius inordinatum erat in culpa, quando in sustinendo voluntarie poenam ordinat se infra statum, quem habuit ad nunc. Et ex hoc patet quaestio: in hoc honoratur Deus, quia in hoc, quod isto in Deum deliquit, sic infra statum suum se humiliat.

III. Et ad maiorem evidentiam eorum quae dicta sunt, quaeritur, utrum de necessitate exigatur voluntas in qualibet actione, aut passione sive opere poenali ad hoc, quod sit meritoria sive satisfactoria, ut suppositum est. Et videtur, quod non:

1. Quia, ut dicatur, quod oportet, quod sit voluntaria, ad hoc quod sit meritoria; tunc multo dolore vel poena, secundum quod huiusmodi, contingeret non mereri nec satisfacere; quoniam, secundum Augustinum [Lib. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2.], «dolor est dissensus ab his rebus, quae nobis nolentibus accidunt»: ergo dolor est involuntarius; sed omne quod est meritorium, est voluntarium, et similiter omne quod est satisfactorium: ergo etc.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Libero Arbitrio* [Lib. III. c. 9. n. 26.] dicit, quod peccatum est affectio voluntaria, poena affectio involuntaria.

3. Item, Philosophus [II. Ethic. c. 5. et III. c. 1.], loquens de passionibus animae, dicit, eas esse involuntarias: ergo eis non contingit mereri nec satisfacere. Si propter hoc dicatur, quod dolore vel poena non contingit mereri, secundum quod huiusmodi, nisi sit voluntarius, et quod voluntas praeexigatur ad omne meritum; *contra*: Ioannis ultimo [v. 18.] dicitur Petro: *Cum autem senueris, extendes manus tuas, et alius te cinget et ducet, quo tu non vis*; sed constat, quod hoc fuit ei meritorium, et ita etc. — Ad hoc videtur solvi in quadam Glossa, in qua dicitur: «*Nolens* ductus est, sed *volens* vincit». Sed ex hoc apparet, quod fuit ibi noluntas et voluntas. Et quaeritur: quomodo hoc fuit? et quomodo fuit ibi differentia inter haec?

Si dicas, quod ibi fuit voluntas *rationis*, ut tactum est, et voluntas *sensualitatis*; *contra*: videtur, quodsi ponatur ibi voluntas ex parte *sensualitatis*, quod similiter ex parte *rationis*; quia quod apprehendit vis inferior, et superior. Si ergo apprehenditur aliquod terribile a *sensualitate*, eodem modo apprehendetur, secundum quod huiusmodi, a *ratione*; sed apprehensio terribilis inducit tristitiam: ergo ibi est tristitia sive dolor in *sensualitate* ex apprehensione terribilis: ergo et in *ratione*. Si ergo dolor non est nisi in his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt, videtur, quod sicut est voluntas in *sensualitate*, secundum quod movetur a terribili extra apprehenso, quod similiter et in *ratione*. Si ergo prima, sicut est sensualitas, unita naturaliter corpori, ita et ipsa ratio; unde etiam per mortem a corpore dividitur, sicut et sensualitas. Unde sicut in sensualitate est dolor, si apprehendit divisionem sui a corpore per mortem propinquam, et etiam in voluntate; sic et in ratione erit: ergo quod est involuntarium sensualitati vel carni est involuntarium rationi: ergo si non potest esse in aliquo voluntas rationis et voluntas sensualitatis, ergo in beato Petro non fuit voluntas ducendi ad martyrium; et tamen meruit: ergo videtur, quod non necessario exigatur voluntas ad hoc, quod poena sit meritoria vel satisfactoria.

**Resp.:** *Ratio* potest considerari dupliciter: vel ut est *natura* quaedam, vel ut est *ratio*, et est scilicet *deliberativa*. Primo modo verum est, quod sicut voluntas in *sensualitate*, sic in *ratione*. Unde sicut sensualitas non vult mortem nec poenam, sic nec ratio ut *natura*, secundum quod huiusmodi est et in hoc consistit. Sed ratio, ut est *ratio*, quae deliberat de fine et de praemio, bene vult mortem vel poenam sustinere ratione praemii et amore, et secundum hoc intelligitur illa Glossa, quod *nolens* ductus est, voluntate scilicet sensualitatis et rationis, ut est natura quaedam, sed *volens* vincit, voluntate scilicet *rationis*, ut est *deliberativa*. Et per hoc possunt alia solvi.

IV. Item videtur, quod omnis satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium, ut si quis peccavit peccato avaritiae, debet satisfacere per effusionem pecuniae; quia constat, quod medicina debet fieri per contrarium morbo, quia habet iuvari per huiusmodi respondens; videtur, quod satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium. Sed tunc quaeritur, qualiter ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio frequenter imponantur pro quolibet peccato, cum non habeant contrarietatem ad quodlibet peccatum.

Dicendum, quod sicut medicina corporalis non solum respicit morbum, sed etiam causam morbi et accidens eiusdem, quod a medicis dicitur *symtoma*; similiter medicina spiritualis non solum debet respicere morbum, scilicet ipsum peccatum, sed etiam occasiones eius et accidentia. Et sicut in medicina corporali quantum ad sanationem ipsius morbi debet dari medicina per contrarium, non tamen tantum quantum ad causam vel accidens morbi, sicut in medicina praeservativa, sed oportet, quod componantur ad invicem calida et frigida secundum debitam mensuram, ne omnino fiant intemperantia; similiter per congruentiam [?] satisfactio, et si debet fieri per contrarium peccato, nihilominus tamen occasiones eius oportet rescindere per alia, quae magis sunt ei contraria quam ipsi peccato. Unde Glossa: *in quo peccavit peccato luxuriae, debet iniungi quoad satisfactionem huius peccati maceratio carnis*. Et tamen divitiae dederunt ei occasionem peccandi vel luxuriandi, sicut patet de filio prodigo [Luc. 15, 12. 13.], tunc quoad hoc debet ei iniungi satisfactio contraria huic actioni; et similiter intelligendum est in aliis.

V. Item quaeritur, si uno et eodem opere contingat satisfacere et mereri. Videtur, quod non; quia qui debitum suo creditori cedit ex hoc non obligat eum sibi, sed solum se deobligat. Ex quo videtur, quod uno et eodem opere non potest aliquis se deobligare, et alterum sibi obligare; sed qui satisfacit se deobligat, qui meretur quasi Deum sibi obligat: ergo eodem opere non contingit satisfacere et mereri; et ita verum, quod [cod. cc] idem opus non potest esse satisfactorium et meritorium; quod suppositum est supra.

**Contra:** Ponatur, quod aliquis non faceret aliquod opus, nisi quod ei fuerit iniunctum pro satisfactione, et decedat; tunc si opere satisfactorio non contingeret mereri vitam aeternam, damnaretur; quod cum falsum sit, necesse est dicere, quod uno et eodem opere satisfecerit et vitam aeternam meruerit.

**Resp.:** In opere satisfactorio duo sunt, scilicet caritas informans voluntatem, et opus sic a voluntate informata procedens; videtur, quod satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium [?]: quantum ad *secundum* satisfactorium; et ita uno et eodem opere contingit sic mereri et satisfacere, tamen ratione diversorum. Nec est simile de redditione debiti homini et Deo. Deus enim non solum opus exterius attendit, sed etiam animum pensat; homo vero tantum opus exterius attendit. Non intelligas tamen, quod voluimus dicere, quod homo aliquo opere obliget sibi Deum, sicut homo hominem; sed si obligat, est quoad hoc, quod quantum est de exigentia meritorum, congruit, quod Deus det ei vitam aeternam.

VI. Quaeri potest, quot sint in genere opera, per quae contingit satisfacere, sive quot sint partes satisfactionis. Et videtur, quod non solum debeant assignari istae tres, quae sunt ieiunium, eleemosyna et oratio: quia pro peccato mortali respondet poena involuntaria in futuro, scilicet carentia visionis Dei, vermis conscientiae et gehenna: ergo similiter poenitenti super mortali et pro eo volenti satisfacere debet iniungi triplex poena, respondens illi triplici; aut aliter non videtur, quod ei debent dimitti illa triplex poena.

**Resp.:** Verum est, quod triplex illa poena debetur in futuro pro peccato mortali, et hoc ratione trium, quae in peccato attenduntur, scilicet aversio a bono incommutabili, et huic respondet carentia visionis Dei; conversio ad bonum commutabile, et huic respondet poena gehennae et deformitas imaginis, cui respondet vermis conscientiae. Non tamen secundum hoc debet esse poena satisfactoria, et hoc, quia in contritione per gratiam reformatur imago, et fit tranquillitas in ipsa conscientia, cui tranquillitati opponebatur vermis conscientiae; et ideo huic poenae non respondet aliqua poena satisfactoria. Similiter est de carentia visionis Dei; aversus enim a bono incommutabili, quae fuerat per peccatum facta, removetur per visionem [unionem?], quae est in fide formata, cui aversioni respondebat pro poena illa carentia. Patet ergo, quod in poenitente removentur haec duo per actum gratiae et fidei formatae, et non per actus hominis; et quia satisfactio est actus hominis, ideo istis duobus non respondet aliqua poena satisfactoria. Sed licet similiter poena gehennae, prout est huiusmodi, dimittatur in contritione; tamen, ut dictum est, adhuc requiritur, ut ille qui voluntarie Deum offendit in culpa, voluntarie se puniat poena satisfactoria. Et sic punitur secundum tres praedictas partes satisfactionis, quae sunt ieiunium etc., ut dictum est.

---

english_scholion:
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–3) is rendered with Question I of this article. — *Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–3) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.*

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II. Likewise it seems that by any good works indifferently it is possible to satisfy, as appears in the parable of the wounded man[^1f] [Luke 10, 30]: the sinner is not only despoiled of the gratuitous [gifts], but also wounded in the natural [endowments]. By such a wounding, however, he is rendered unfit for good and prone to evil; but although through contrition the gratuitous [gifts] are restored to him, nevertheless it is still necessary actually to cooperate toward the healing of the aforesaid wounding; but this is done in satisfaction, because through satisfactory works a man is rendered more and more fit for good and less and less prone to evil. Since, therefore, by any good works such a healing could be effected, it seems that by any good works it is possible to satisfy.

**On the contrary:** 1. All goods, whatever they are, are from God, but evils from ourselves; whence [1 Corinthians 4, 7]: *What do you have that you have not received?* therefore from every good that we have we are debtors to God, that from it we should serve Him; but it is evident that *satisfaction says more* than *to serve*. Whence Anselm [in the place cited]: "It does not suffice only to render what was taken away, but for the affront inflicted one must expend more besides"; and of this there are many manifest examples in the Law. *Properly*, therefore, satisfaction is not made from good works according as they are good, speaking precisely, but one must further understand something in them by which [they] become satisfactory for the offense; but nothing other than punishment seems [to be that] which could be understood in them. And this also seems most fitting, because, since punishment essentially follows upon fault, it is manifest that the sinner, by reason of his fault, has been made a debtor of punishment. To this end, therefore, that he may satisfy, there are required not only good works, but also penal good [works], because otherwise penal [works] would not be meritorious, because otherwise satisfaction would not be made through these.

**Response:** According to this it is answered that *properly* it is to satisfy by penal good works alone, as was objected; nor does it suffice that they be good works only.

To the objection [made] to the contrary, it must be said that, although through any good works the natural [endowments] can be made more and more fit, nevertheless satisfaction is not made through all such [works], although on the contrary through all satisfactory good works a greater and greater fitness for good is made, and a lesser proneness to evil. Whence *to be made fit in the natural [endowments]* extends further than *to satisfy*.

III. If it is asked: since punishment is an evil, and God does not take delight in this, but only in good, of which there is the exemplar in Him; whence is it that He exacts from men a penal good work as to the respect in which it is penal? it must be said that in them, insofar as they are penal *simply* and *absolutely*, He does not take delight, but that [He takes delight] in this, namely, according as Augustine says in the book *On Free Choice*, that what was disordered in fault is ordered in punishment. Since, therefore, such an ordering proceeds from the wisdom of God, therefore, insofar as punishment *voluntarily assumed* thus orders the penitent, it is called delightful to God. And I say *voluntarily assumed*, because by [punishment] involuntarily assumed it is not possible to satisfy (for thus it would happen that the punishment of hell could be satisfactory); but it must be that it be voluntary to *reason*, even though it be involuntary to *flesh* and sensuality. And thus it is plain that it is not by any good work whatever that one satisfies, but only by a penal [work] voluntarily assumed according to reason, which, because it thus orders the penitent, is delightful to God.

That punishment orders, however, is plain also in the punishment of hell. For according to what he determines elsewhere, [below, d. 45, a. 1, q. 1] to a sinner, by reason of mortal sin, the lowest place is owed, and one that is below every creature; but through the punishment of hell one departing in mortal [sin] is ordered in such a place. Likewise this is plain in the punishment by which the penitents themselves are afflicted.

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For since the sinner disordered himself in sinning, by not subjecting his will to the divine will nor following it, but his own; therefore there is ordered in punishment what was previously disordered in fault, when, in voluntarily enduring punishment, he orders himself below the state which he had hitherto. And from this the question is made clear: in this God is honored, because in this — that he so transgressed against God — he humbles himself below his own state.

III. And for the greater evidence of the things that have been said, it is asked whether the will is required of necessity in any action, or passion, or penal work, that it be meritorious or satisfactory, as has been supposed. And it seems that [it is] not:

1. Because, granted it be said that it must be that [the work] be voluntary, that it be meritorious; then by great grief or punishment, according as such, it would happen [that one] does not merit nor satisfy; since, according to Augustine [Bk. XIV *On the City of God*, c. 15, n. 2], "grief is a dissent from those things which befall us unwilling": therefore grief is involuntary; but everything that is meritorious is voluntary, and likewise everything that is satisfactory: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Free Choice* [Bk. III, c. 9, n. 26] says that sin is a voluntary affection, punishment an involuntary affection.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher [II *Ethics* c. 5 and III c. 1], speaking of the passions of the soul, says that they are involuntary: therefore by them it is not possible to merit nor to satisfy. If on this account it be said that by grief or punishment it is not possible to merit, according as such, unless it be voluntary, and that the will is prerequired for all merit; *on the contrary*: in the last [chapter] of John [v. 18] it is said to Peter: *When you have grown old, you will stretch out your hands, and another will gird you and lead you where you do not will*; but it is evident that this was meritorious for him, and so etc. — To this it seems to be resolved in a certain Gloss, in which it is said: "*Unwilling* he was led, but *willing* he conquers." But from this it appears that there was there both unwillingness and willingness. And it is asked: how was this? and how was there a difference between these?

If you say that there was there a will of *reason*, as was touched on, and a will of *sensuality*; *on the contrary*: it seems that if a will be posited there on the part of *sensuality*, that likewise [there would be one] on the part of *reason*; because what the lower power apprehends, the higher also [apprehends]. If therefore something terrible is apprehended by *sensuality*, in the same way it will be apprehended, according as such, by *reason*; but the apprehension of something terrible induces sadness: therefore there is there sadness or grief in *sensuality* from the apprehension of the terrible: therefore also in *reason*. If therefore grief is only in those things which befall us unwilling, it seems that, just as there is a will in *sensuality*, according as it is moved by the terrible apprehended from without, so likewise also in *reason*. If therefore the former, just as sensuality is naturally united to the body, so also is reason itself; whence also through death it is divided from the body, just as sensuality also [is]. Whence just as in sensuality there is grief, if it apprehends its own division from the body through impending death, and also in the will; so also it will be in reason: therefore what is involuntary to sensuality or flesh is involuntary to reason: therefore if there cannot be in some [subject] a will of reason and a will of sensuality, then in blessed Peter there was no will of being led to martyrdom; and yet he merited: therefore it seems that the will is not necessarily required to this end, that punishment be meritorious or satisfactory.

**Response:** *Reason* can be considered in two ways: either as it is a certain *nature*, or as it is *reason*, and is namely *deliberative*. In the first way it is true that, as the will in *sensuality*, so in *reason*. Whence just as sensuality does not will death nor punishment, so neither does reason as *nature*, according as such it is and consists in this. But reason, as it is *reason*, which deliberates about the end and about the reward, well wills to endure death or punishment by reason of the reward and out of love, and according to this is understood that Gloss, that *unwilling* he was led, namely by the will of sensuality and of reason as it is a certain nature, but *willing* he conquers, namely by the will of *reason* as it is *deliberative*. And by this the others can be resolved.

IV. Likewise it seems that all satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary, as, if someone has sinned by the sin of avarice, he ought to satisfy by the pouring out of money; because it is evident that medicine ought to be made by the contrary to the disease, because [the disease] is to be helped by such a corresponding [remedy]; it seems that satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary. But then it is asked how fasting, almsgiving, and prayer are frequently imposed for every sin, since they do not have contrariety to every sin.

It must be said that, just as bodily medicine regards not only the disease, but also the cause of the disease and its accident, which by physicians is called a *symptom*; so likewise spiritual medicine ought to regard not only the disease, namely sin itself, but also its occasions and accidents. And just as in bodily medicine, as to the healing of the disease itself, medicine ought to be given by the contrary, yet not so much as to the cause or accident of the disease, as in preventive medicine, but it must be that hot and cold things be composed with one another according to due measure, lest they become altogether intemperate; so likewise by congruence [?] satisfaction, even if it ought to be made by the contrary to the sin, nevertheless its occasions must be cut off by other [means], which are more contrary to it than to the sin itself. Whence the Gloss: *in whatever [sin] one has sinned by the sin of luxury, there ought to be enjoined, as to the satisfaction of this sin, a maceration of the flesh*. And yet riches gave him the occasion of sinning or of being lustful, as is plain in the case of the prodigal son [Luke 15, 12. 13], then as to this there ought to be enjoined for him a satisfaction contrary to this action; and likewise it is to be understood in other [cases].

V. Likewise it is asked whether by one and the same work it is possible to satisfy and to merit. It seems that [it is] not; because he who remits a debt to his creditor does not by this oblige him to himself, but only frees himself. From which it seems that by one and the same work someone cannot free himself and oblige another to himself; but he who satisfies frees himself, [whereas] he who merits, as it were, obliges God to himself: therefore by the same work it is not possible to satisfy and to merit; and so [it is] true that [cod. cc] the same work cannot be satisfactory and meritorious; which was supposed above.

**On the contrary:** Suppose that someone would not do any work, except what was enjoined upon him for satisfaction, and dies; then if by a satisfactory work it would not be possible to merit eternal life, he would be damned; which, since it is false, it is necessary to say that by one and the same work he has satisfied and merited eternal life.

**Response:** In a satisfactory work there are two [things], namely the charity informing the will, and the work thus proceeding from the will [so] informed; it seems that satisfaction ought to be made by the contrary [?]: as to the *second* it is satisfactory; and thus by one and the same work it is possible thus to merit and to satisfy, yet by reason of different [things]. Nor is it similar with respect to the rendering of a debt to a man and to God. For God attends not only to the exterior work, but also weighs the mind; man, however, attends only to the exterior work. Do not, however, understand that we wished to say that a man by some work obliges God to himself, as a man [obliges] a man; but if he obliges, it is as to this, that, so far as concerns the exigency of merits, it is congruous that God give him eternal life.

VI. It can be asked how many kinds of works there are, by which it is possible to satisfy, or how many are the parts of satisfaction. And it seems that not only these three ought to be assigned, which are fasting, almsgiving, and prayer: because for a mortal sin there corresponds an involuntary punishment in the future, namely the lack of the vision of God, the worm of conscience, and hell: therefore likewise upon a penitent for a mortal [sin] and willing to satisfy for it there ought to be enjoined a threefold punishment, corresponding to that threefold [punishment]; or otherwise it does not seem that that threefold punishment ought to be remitted to him.

**Response:** It is true that that threefold punishment is owed in the future for mortal sin, and this by reason of the three [things] which are regarded in sin, namely the turning-away from the unchangeable good, and to this corresponds the lack of the vision of God; the turning-toward the changeable good, and to this corresponds the punishment of hell; and the deformity of the image, to which corresponds the worm of conscience. Yet not according to this ought the satisfactory punishment to be, and this because in contrition the image is reformed through grace, and there comes to be a tranquillity in the conscience itself, to which tranquillity the worm of conscience was opposed; and therefore to this punishment no satisfactory punishment corresponds. Likewise it is with the lack of the vision of God; for the turning-away from the unchangeable good, which had been made by sin, is removed by the vision [union?], which is in formed faith, to which turning-away the lack corresponded as punishment. It is plain, therefore, that in the penitent these two are removed through the act of grace and of formed faith, and not through the acts of man; and because satisfaction is an act of man, therefore to these two no satisfactory punishment corresponds. But although likewise the punishment of hell, insofar as it is such, is remitted in contrition; nevertheless, as has been said, it is still required that he who voluntarily offended God in fault should voluntarily punish himself with a satisfactory punishment. And thus he is punished according to the three aforesaid parts of satisfaction, which are fasting, etc., as has been said.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{364,365,366}-{L,R}-{0..4}.png`, split x=2100), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 41657–42013) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The OCR for this q3 is severely two-column-interleaved (q3 right-column text spliced line-for-line into the left column, the q2 apparatus threaded through), so the PDF bands carried the reconstruction. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 364–366 = PDF 384–386).

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 365 = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. III. 365"; p. 366 = "366 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." (p. 364's head shows the preceding q2). Distinction/pars/article all correct — no re-extract needed.

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: the q3 opener at the bottom of the p. 364 L column reads "QUAESTIO III. *Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio.* Tertio quaeritur, per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio. Et videtur, quod tantum per *poenalia*." The dispatch's working title ("Per qualia opera satisfaciendum sit") was a paraphrase; the printed running-head title is **"Per qualia opera debeat fieri satisfactio"** — set as `title_la`. q3 ends just before "Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere" (raw 42014), the QUAESTIO IV opener.

**Structure.** This is a large multi-member quaestio. Member 1 (the question proper, p. 364 → p. 365 L): args 1–5, Contra 1–4, Conclusio "Satisfactio fit per opera poenalia", Respondeo (four rationes: *honoris ablati redditio* / *deordinatio* / *curatio* / *debiti absolutio*), solutiones ad 1–4. Then five further sub-inquiries (the Quaracchi numerals II–VI, p. 365 R → p. 366): **II** *utrum per quaecumque bona opera* (parable of the wounded man); **III** *utrum de necessitate exigatur voluntas* (Peter "nolens ductus, volens vincit" — *ratio ut natura* vs *ratio ut deliberativa*); **IV** *utrum per contrarium* (medicina spiritualis / symptoma); **V** *si uno eodemque opere satisfacere et mereri*; **VI** *quot sint partes satisfactionis* (ieiunium/eleemosyna/oratio against the threefold future poena). Note the printed text labels two consecutive members "III." (the second is the will-inquiry) — a Quaracchi numbering slip preserved verbatim.

**Footer-ownership (apparatus, 14 entries, all anchored in this q3's body).**
- p. 364: page-footer sequence = 11 notes; notes **1–5 anchor in the preceding q2's body** (owned by the a1-q2 chunk). q3 owns **notes 6–11** → rendered `^6`–`^11` (`^6` arg. 1 Gregorius Homil. 20; `^7` arg. 2 *poenam solvit*; `^8` arg. 3 *impunitum*; `^9` arg. 4 Moral. XXIV; `^10` arg. 5 *supra patuit*; `^11` Contra 1 *Cur Deus homo*). Contra 2/3/4 of member 1 print on p. 365 L but their footers (`^1d` *poenis nostris*, `^2d` *commodum reportarent*) sit in the p. 365 footer block.
- p. 365: footer sequence = 7 notes, all q3's, relabeled `^1d`–`^6d` + `^1f`: `^1d` Contra 2 *poenis nostris*; `^2d` Contra 4 *commodum reportarent*; `^3d` Respondeo ratio 2 *deordinatio*; `^4d` Solutio 1 *latriae adorationem* (cod. U *exhibitionem*); `^5d` Solutio 2 *honorantes iustitiam* (Greg. Reg. past. + variants); `^6d` Solutio 3 *radix ex delectatione*; `^7d` Solutio 4 *humana infirmitas*; and `^1f` opens member II (*parabola vulnerati*, Luc. 10). The textual-variant detail for `^5d` (the *non* supplement from codd. E, the M O R S T *unde* reading) is the one place the footer OCR was thin — reconstructed from the band; the cod-sigla list is rendered as printed.
- p. 366: **no footer notes** — both columns are filled with body text to the foot of the page (verified on the 5-band crop).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. The Articulus I scholion (a single block covering q1–q3, with the appended ANECDOTA on Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* definition) prints at the foot of p. 365 R and the top of p. 366, but per the dispatch it is rendered with the **a1-q1 chunk** (which owns it). The `### Scholion` slot here holds the one-line Latin+English cross-reference note only. Member III's will-discussion references the Anselm Gloss but is body text, not the scholion.

**[?] flags.**
- *per congruentiam [?]* (member IV, "similiter per congruentiam satisfactio"): the OCR/band reads "congrueitia"/"congruentia"; rendered *per congruentiam* — sense ("by congruence / a fitting correspondence") is secure, the exact inflection is the only uncertainty. Low risk.
- *visionem [unionem?]* (member VI, "removetur per visionem"): the band glyph is ambiguous between *visionem* and *unionem*; "per unionem, quae est in fide formata" parallels the *aversio*/*conversio* schema (union with the unchangeable good), but *visionem* (echoing "carentia visionis Dei" just above) also parses. Rendered *visionem* with *[union?]* flagged in both languages.
- Member V Resp. "satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium [?]": the band has a slipped/repeated clause here ("videtur, quod satisfactio debet fieri per contrarium" intruding into the *In opere satisfactorio duo sunt* answer); preserved verbatim with a `[?]` since the OCR and band agree on the words but the syntax is plainly corrupt in the source.
- Marginal rubrics in the bands (*Conclusio 1./2.*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Ratio 3./4.*, *Debitum quadruplex*, *Notandum*, *Duplex poenale*, *Fundamenta*) are editorial side-notes, omitted from the body per corpus convention.

**Hand-off to QUAESTIO IV.** QUAESTIO IV ("*Per quae opera possit fieri satisfactio*" — "Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere") opens immediately after q3's member-VI Resp., at raw line 42014, at the foot of p. 366 / top of p. 367. q3 claims no part of p. 367; the q4 chunk owns p. 367's footer sequence in full. No shared-page footer split crosses the q3→q4 boundary (p. 366 has no footers).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 15, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

title_alt: By which works it comes about that satisfaction is made

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Per quae opera possit fieri satisfactio.*

Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere; et assignantur tria, scilicet ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna. Et obiicitur primo, quod videntur superflua:

1. *Primo* ratione eleemosynae, quia Matthaei decimo septimo[^1] dicitur: *Hoc genus daemoniorum non eiicitur nisi per orationem et ieiunium*; et non facit mentionem de eleemosyna.

2. Item, Hieronymus[^2] dicit, quod « ieiunio sanantur pestes corporis, oratione pestes mentis »; sed omne peccatum aut est inquinamentum carnis, aut spiritus: ergo omne peccatum sanatur ieiunio, aut oratione, et sic etc.

3. Item, videtur superfluere oratio et ieiunium, quia Lucae undecimo[^3]: *Date eleemosynam, et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis*: ergo eleemosyna est contra omne peccatum: ergo superfluunt alia.

Item, videtur, quod diminuta:

4. Quia contraria contrariis curantur[^4]: sed multo plura sunt genera peccatorum: ergo multo plura remedia.

5. Item, cum opus fortitudinis et patientiae sit maioris poenalitatis[^5], videtur, quod eius opus sit magis satisfactorium quam ista.

Item quaeritur, quod istorum trium sit magis satisfactorium. Videtur, quod oratio, quia satisfa-

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ctio Deo reconciliat; sed oratio est, quae maxime unit Deo[^1b]: ergo etc. — Sed videtur, quod ieiunium, quia illud opus est magis satisfactorium, quod est magis poenale; sed magis poenale est affligere carnem: ergo etc. — Quod autem eleemosyna, videtur, primae ad Timotheum quarto[^2b]: *Exerce te ipsum ad pietatem; pietas enim valet ad omnia*: ergo etc.

6. Item, obiicitur de peregrinationibus et flagellis divinis, quae poenae satisfactoriae sunt et non videntur sub his contineri.

> **Conclusio.** Oratio, ieiunium et eleemosyna, accepta communiter, sunt partes satisfactionis, quarum distinctio et sufficientia multipliciter monstratur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod oratio et ieiunium et eleemosyna, quodlibet horum accipitur proprie, communiter et communissime.

*Proprie* oratio est ascensus in[^3b] Deum ad aliquid degustandum vel impetrandum, vel exsolvendum. *Communiter* oratio dicitur, secundum quod comprehendit omnem actum contemplativae ad Deum relatum. *Communissime* secundum quod comprehendit omnem bonum actum, secundum quod dicitur: « Non cessat orare qui non cessat bene facere », in Glossa primae ad Thessalonicenses quinto[^4b].

Similiter ieiunium dicitur *proprie* afflictio carnis secundum gustum[^5b]. *Communiter*, omnis carnis afflictio, quae consistit in vigiliis et flagellis et ieiuniis proprie dictis. *Communissime* dicitur ieiunium abstinentia ab omni mortali, Isaiae quinquagesimo octavo[^6b]: *Hoc est ieiunium quod elegi; dissolve* etc.

Similiter eleemosyna dicitur *proprie* opus pietatis impensum proximo ad relevandam indigentiam corporalem[^7b]. *Communiter*, omne opus pietatis proximo impensum, sive spirituale sive corporale. *Communissime* dicitur omne opus misericordiae, sive proximo sive sibi impensum, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, quod eleemosyna hominis debet incipere a semetipso, iuxta illud Ecclesiastici trigesimo[^8b]: *Miserere animae tuae, placens Deo.*

His praesuppositis, dicendum, quod secundum quod haec tria partes satisfactionis dicuntur, accipiuntur non communissime, non proprie, sed communiter; et tunc patet eorum distinctio et sufficientia manifeste. — His praemissis, dicendum, quod sufficientia et distinctio harum partium potest accipi secundum *appropriationem* et secundum *proprietatem*.

Secundum *appropriationem*: cum enim triplex sit radix peccati, sicut dicitur primae Ioannis secundo[^9b]: aut concupiscentia carnis, et contra hanc est ieiunium; aut concupiscentia oculorum, et contra hanc est eleemosyna; aut superbia vitae, et contra hanc est oratio. Hoc dico secundum appropriationem, quia unumquodque horum valet contra omnes, appropriate tamen magis opponuntur, sicut dictum est. Et ex hoc patet numerus et sufficientia.

Per *proprietatem* vero sic: opus poenale aut ordinat nos ad Deum, et sic oratio; aut ad nos, et sic ieiunium, quod macerat carnem nostram; aut ad proximum, et sic eleemosyna. Et sic patet sufficientia secundum illud ad Titum secundo[^10b]: *Sobrie et iuste et pie vivamus* etc. — Aliter potest accipi secundum reconciliationem; quia per orationem Deo reconciliamur; sed sicut dicit Augustinus in Sermone Domini in monte[^11b]: « Si vis orationem tuam volare in caelum, fac duas alas, scilicet ieiunium et eleemosynam ». Tobiae duodecimo[^12b]: *Bona est oratio cum ieiunio et eleemosyna.*

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Aliter accipitur sufficientia, quia duplex est vita, activa et contemplativa: quantum ad contemplativam, oratio; quantum ad activam, eleemosyna; ut autem homo sit dispositus ad utramque, sic est ieiunium.

1. 2. 3. Ex dictis patent obiecta. Quod enim dicitur, quod oratio sufficit cum ieiunio; dicendum, quod ibi accipitur *communissime* oratio, non secundum quod est pars satisfactionis; similiter, cum dicitur, quod eleemosyna omnia mundat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deberent esse plura; dicendum, quod ista, secundum quod *communiter* dicuntur, multa genera operum comprehendunt, non tria tantum; et sic patet illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de patientia, patet responsio. Nam patientia, prout importat *remissionem*, continetur sub eleemosyna; prout *afflictionem* et macerationem, continetur sub ieiunio communiter dicto, et sic altera pars satisfactionis.

Ad quod quaeritur, quod istorum trium sit magis satisfactorium; dicendum, quod unumquodque horum secundum appropriationem suam. Tamen si generaliter loquamur; dicendum, quod in satisfactione tria sunt, scilicet vitatio culpae, et contra hanc valet maxime oratio; secundum est augmentum gratiae, et ad hanc maxime valet eleemosyna, quia homo facit sibi amicos, qui impetrant gratiam[^1c]; tertium est solutio poenae, et haec maxime est in ieiunio, et hoc est infimum in satisfactione; alia duo praeponderant.

english:
### Question IV. *By which works satisfaction can be made.*

Fourthly it is asked by which works it comes about that satisfaction is made; and three are assigned, namely fasting, prayer, and almsgiving. And it is objected, first, that they seem superfluous:

1. *First*, by reason of almsgiving, because in Matthew, chapter seventeen[^1], it is said: *This kind of demons is not cast out except by prayer and fasting*; and he makes no mention of almsgiving.

2. Likewise, Jerome[^2] says that "by fasting the diseases of the body are healed, by prayer the diseases of the mind"; but every sin is either a defilement of the flesh or of the spirit: therefore every sin is healed by fasting or by prayer, and so forth.

3. Likewise, prayer and fasting seem to be superfluous, because in Luke, chapter eleven[^3]: *Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you*: therefore almsgiving is against every sin: therefore the others are superfluous.

Likewise, they seem to be too few:

4. Because contraries are cured by contraries[^4]: but the kinds of sins are far more numerous: therefore the remedies should be far more numerous.

5. Likewise, since a work of fortitude and of patience is of greater penalty[^5], it seems that its work is more satisfactory than these.

Likewise it is asked which of these three is the more satisfactory. It seems to be prayer, because satisfaction reconciles to God;

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but prayer is what most of all unites to God[^1b]: therefore etc. — But it seems to be fasting, because that work is more satisfactory which is more penal; but it is more penal to afflict the flesh: therefore etc. — But that it is almsgiving seems [to follow] from First Timothy, chapter four[^2b]: *Exercise thyself unto godliness; for godliness is profitable to all things*: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, an objection is raised concerning pilgrimages and divine scourges, which are satisfactory penalties and do not seem to be contained under these.

> **Conclusion.** Prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, taken commonly, are the parts of satisfaction, whose distinction and sufficiency is shown in many ways.

**I respond:** It must be said that prayer and fasting and almsgiving — each of these is taken properly, commonly, and most commonly.

*Properly*, prayer is an ascent into[^3b] God for tasting, or imploring, or paying out something. *Commonly*, prayer is said insofar as it comprehends every act of the contemplative [life] referred to God. *Most commonly*, insofar as it comprehends every good act, according to that saying: "He does not cease to pray who does not cease to do well," in the Gloss on First Thessalonians, chapter five[^4b].

Likewise fasting is said *properly* [to be] an affliction of the flesh as to taste[^5b]. *Commonly*, every affliction of the flesh, which consists in vigils and scourgings and fasts properly so called. *Most commonly*, fasting is said [to be] abstinence from every mortal [sin], in Isaiah, chapter fifty-eight[^6b]: *This is the fast that I have chosen; loose* etc.

Likewise almsgiving is said *properly* [to be] a work of piety bestowed on a neighbor to relieve bodily indigence[^7b]. *Commonly*, every work of piety bestowed on a neighbor, whether spiritual or corporal. *Most commonly*, it is said [to be] every work of mercy, whether bestowed on a neighbor or on oneself, according as Augustine says that a man's almsgiving ought to begin from himself, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty[^8b]: *Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.*

These things being presupposed, it must be said that, insofar as these three are called parts of satisfaction, they are taken not most commonly, nor properly, but commonly; and then their distinction and sufficiency is manifestly evident. — These things being premised, it must be said that the sufficiency and distinction of these parts can be taken according to *appropriation* and according to *propriety*.

According to *appropriation*: for since the root of sin is threefold, as is said in First John, chapter two[^9b]: either the concupiscence of the flesh, and against this is fasting; or the concupiscence of the eyes, and against this is almsgiving; or the pride of life, and against this is prayer. This I say according to appropriation, because each one of these avails against all, yet by appropriation they are more [directly] opposed, as has been said. And from this their number and sufficiency is evident.

But by *propriety* thus: a penal work either orders us to God, and so prayer; or to ourselves, and so fasting, which mortifies our flesh; or to a neighbor, and so almsgiving. And thus the sufficiency is evident according to that saying to Titus, chapter two[^10b]: *Let us live soberly and justly and piously* etc. — Otherwise it can be taken according to reconciliation; for by prayer we are reconciled to God; but, as Augustine says in the *Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*[^11b]: "If you wish your prayer to fly to heaven, make two wings for it, namely fasting and almsgiving." Tobias, chapter twelve[^12b]: *Prayer is good with fasting and almsgiving.*

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Otherwise the sufficiency is taken [thus]: since life is twofold, active and contemplative — as to the contemplative, prayer; as to the active, almsgiving; but that a man may be disposed to both, so there is fasting.

1. 2. 3. From what has been said the objections are clear. For as to what is said, that prayer suffices with fasting; it must be said that there prayer is taken *most commonly*, not insofar as it is a part of satisfaction; likewise, when it is said that almsgiving cleanses all things.

4. To the objection that they ought to be more numerous; it must be said that these, insofar as they are spoken of *commonly*, comprehend many kinds of works, not three only; and so that is clear.

5. To the objection from patience, the response is clear. For patience, insofar as it imports *remission*, is contained under almsgiving; insofar as it [imports] *affliction* and mortification, it is contained under fasting commonly so called, and thus [it is] the other part of satisfaction.

To that which is asked, which of these three is the more satisfactory; it must be said that each of them [is so] according to its own appropriation. Yet if we speak generally; it must be said that in satisfaction there are three things, namely the avoidance of fault, and against this prayer avails most; the second is the increase of grace, and to this almsgiving avails most, because a man makes himself friends, who implore grace for him[^1c]; the third is the payment of penalty, and this is most in fasting, and this is the lowest in satisfaction; the other two outweigh it.

la: Vers. 20.

en: Verse 20.

la: In Comment. super Marc. 9, 28 (inter opera Hieron.): *Ieiunio passiones corporis, et oratione pestes sanandae sunt mentis.* Cfr. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum in hunc loc. — In minori respicitur II. Cor. 7, 1: *Mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus.*

en: In the *Commentary on Mark* 9:28 (among the works of Jerome): "By fasting the passions of the body, and by prayer the diseases of the mind, are to be healed." Cf. the *Glossa ordinaria* in Strabus and Lyranus on this passage. — In the minor [premise] reference is made to II Corinthians 7:1: *Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.*

la: Vers. 41.

en: Verse 41.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 364, nota 9.

en: Cf. above, p. 364, note 9.

la: Vide tom. III. pag. 331, nota 4. et pag. 561, nota 7.

en: See tom. III, p. 331, note 4, and p. 561, note 7.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 17. a. 2. q. 1. et 3, ubi sunt diversae definitiones orationis. — De seq. ratione pro ieiunio, in qua pro *sed magis poenale est* cod. K (I a secunda manu) [habet] *sed ieiunii magis est*, vide quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. III *Sent.*, d. 17, a. 2, q. 1 and 3, where there are various definitions of prayer. — On the following reason for fasting, in which, for *but it is more penal*, codex K (I, by a second hand) [reads] *but fasting is the more [penal]*, see the preceding question.

la: Vers. 7. seq., ubi Vulgata post *pietatem* prosequitur: *Nam corporalis exercitatio ad modicum utilis est, pietas autem ad omnia utilis est.*

en: Verse 7 f., where the Vulgate, after *godliness*, continues: *For bodily exercise is profitable to little, but godliness is profitable to all things.*

la: Ita codd. H Q, in aliis *ad Deum*; cod. B post *ascensus* addit *animi*, cod. F *intellectus*. S. Bonav., III. Sent. d. 17. a. 2. q. 1. et 3: *Oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum* [Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 24: προσευχή ἐστιν ἀνάβασις νοῦ πρὸς Θεόν. Ibidem datur et haec orationis definitio: *Oratio est petitio decentium a Deo*]. In Epist. ad Fratres de Monte Dei (inter opera Bernardi), lib. I. c. 14. n. 44: *Oratio vero est hominis Deo adhaerentis affectio et familiaris quaedam et pia allocutio et statio illuminatae mentis ad fruendum, quamdiu licet.* Cfr. Hug. a S. Vict., de Modo orandi, c. 1. — Post *exsolvendum* cod. B addit: *aliter, oratio est virtus animi ad impetrandum bonum desideratum per viam misericordiae et largitatis sive per liberalitatem.*

en: Thus codices H Q; in others *to God*; codex B after *ascent* adds *of the mind*, codex F *of the intellect*. St. Bonaventure, III *Sent.*, d. 17, a. 2, q. 1 and 3: *Prayer is an ascent of the intellect into God* [John of Damascus, III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 24: "prayer is an ascent of the mind to God." In the same place this definition of prayer is also given: *Prayer is a petitioning of fitting things from God*]. In the *Letter to the Brethren of Mont-Dieu* (among the works of Bernard), bk. I, c. 14, n. 44: *Prayer indeed is the affection of a man cleaving to God, and a certain familiar and pious address, and the standing of an enlightened mind to enjoy [Him], as long as it is permitted.* Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Manner of Praying*, c. 1. — After *paying out* codex B adds: *otherwise, prayer is a power of the soul for imploring a desired good by the way of mercy and largesse, or by liberality.*

la: Vers. 17. — Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum: *Id est, semper iuste vivite et aeterna desiderate. Iustus nunquam desinit orare, nisi desinat iustus esse. Semper orat qui semper bene agit; ipsum enim desiderium bonum oratio est; et si continuum est desiderium, continua est oratio.*

en: Verse 17. — The *Glossa ordinaria* in Strabus and Lyranus: "That is, always live justly and desire eternal things. The just man never ceases to pray, unless he ceases to be just. He prays always who always acts well; for the good desire itself is prayer; and if the desire is continuous, the prayer is continuous."

la: Isidor., VI. Etymolog. c. 19. n. 63: *Ieiunium est parsimonia victus abstinentiaque ciborum.* Cfr. I. de Offic. eccles. c. 42.

en: Isidore, VI *Etymologies*, c. 19, n. 63: "Fasting is a sparingness of sustenance and an abstinence from foods." Cf. I *On the Ecclesiastical Offices*, c. 42.

la: Vers. 6: *Nonne hoc est magis ieiunium, quod elegi? dissolve colligationes impietatis* etc.

en: Verse 6: *Is not this rather the fast that I have chosen? loose the bands of wickedness* etc.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 29. m. 1: *Definitur sic a magistris: Eleemosyna est opus sive largitio rei necessariae facta indigenti propter Deum et ex compassione.* — De seqq. cfr. infra dub. 2. seqq.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 29, m. 1: "It is thus defined by the masters: Almsgiving is a work or bestowal of a necessary thing, made to one in need for God's sake and out of compassion." — On what follows, cf. below, dubium 2 ff.

la: Vers. 24. — Sententiam August. refert Magister, hic in lit. c. 4. seq. Vide etiam XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 27. n. 2.

en: Verse 24. — The Master reports the opinion of Augustine, here in the text, c. 4 f. See also XXI *On the City of God*, c. 27, n. 2.

la: Vers. 16.

en: Verse 16.

la: Vers. 12. — Cfr. Innocent. III., Serm. 7. de Communi plur. Martyr.

en: Verse 12. — Cf. Innocent III, Sermon 7, *On the Common of Many Martyrs*.

la: Serm. 62. in appendice sermonum August. (alias 39. de Tempore, et post 35. in appendice) super Matth. 5, 44. seqq. (de his versibus agit etiam August. in Sermone Domini in monte, de quo, ut notant Maurini, plura auctor praenotati sermonis sumsit) n. 11, ubi explicans Matth. 6, 5. seq. ait: « Qui vero vult orationem suam volare ad Deum, faciat illi duas alas, id est eleemosynam et ieiunium ». Idem dicit August., Enarrat. in Ps. 42. n. 8. — Codd. et ed. 1 *de monte.*

en: Sermon 62 in the appendix of Augustine's sermons (otherwise 39 *On the Season*, and afterward 35 in the appendix) on Matthew 5:44 ff. (Augustine also treats these verses in the *Sermon of the Lord on the Mount*, from which, as the Maurists note, the author of the aforesaid sermon took much), n. 11, where, expounding Matthew 6:5 f., he says: "But whoever wishes his prayer to fly to God, let him make two wings for it, that is, almsgiving and fasting." Augustine says the same, *Enarration on Psalm* 42, n. 8. — The codices and ed. 1 [read] *on the mount.*

la: Vers. 8.

en: Verse 8.

la: Respicitur Luc. 16, 9: *Facite vobis amicos* etc. — In fine solut. cod. B addit: *Secundum ergo* [hoc] *dicendum, quod considerando dignitatem eius quod est satisfactorium, magis est satisfactoria oratio quam eleemosyna vel ieiunium; sed respiciendo fructum eius quod est satisfactorium, magis satisfactoria est eleemosyna, quia fructuosior; et hoc patet.* [Cfr. eiusdem cod. B notam et II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2.] — Codd. aa: *non respondet ad ultimam obiectionem, quia solutio patet igitur ex solut. ad 4.* — Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.

en: Reference is made to Luke 16:9: *Make to yourselves friends* etc. — At the end of the solution codex B adds: *Therefore* [accordingly] *it must be said that, considering the dignity of that which is satisfactory, prayer is more satisfactory than almsgiving or fasting; but regarding the fruit of that which is satisfactory, almsgiving is more satisfactory, because more fruitful; and this is evident.* [Cf. the note of the same codex B and II *Sent.*, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2.] — Codices aa: *it does not answer the last objection, because the solution is therefore evident from the solution to [objection] 4.* — See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---

latin_scholion:
Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–4) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur. — *The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–4) is rendered with Question I of this article.*

---

english_scholion:
The scholion on this article (covering questions 1–4) is rendered with Question I of this article. — *Scholion in articulum primum (q. 1–4) cum Quaestione I huius articuli editur.*

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{367,368,369}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 42014–42215) as base only for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. Per the Vol II/IV override, the PDF is authoritative in the cascade-shattered regions — and this q4's OCR is *severely* two-column-interleaved (the p.367/368 columns bled line-for-line into one another, the running heads digit-mangle 367→367 but 369→309, and the q4 body, an incidental sub-question, and the abutting ARTICULUS II opener are all spliced together), so the PDF bands carried the entire reconstruction. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (printed 367–369 = PDF 387–389).

**Page span / printed_pages.** Adjusted to **[367, 368, 369]** (dispatch estimate was ~366–368). Page 366 holds the *preceding* quaestio (the "per quaecumque bona opera contingat satisfacere" question, args 1–2 + Contra + Respondeo); QUAESTIO IV proper opens at the bottom of p. 367 L column ("QUAESTIO IV. *Per quae opera possit fieri satisfactio.* … Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere…") and its body + incidental-question solution run to the top of p. 369, ending immediately before ARTICULUS II.

**Page-verify.** Running heads confirmed on the bands: p. 367 = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. … 367"; p. 368 = "368 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."; p. 369 = "DIST. XV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 369" (the head already names ART. II because ARTICULUS II begins at the foot of p. 369). Distinction XV / Pars II / Articulus I all correct for the q4 body.

**Title.** Dispatch `title_la` = "Per quae opera contingat satisfacere" (kept). The printed page-header title actually reads *Per quae opera possit fieri satisfactio* (rendered as the `### Quaestio IV.` heading); the opener sentence itself is "Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere," which the dispatch title quotes.

**Opener alignment.** Confirmed: "Quarto quaeritur, per quae opera contingat satisfacere; et assignantur tria, scilicet ieiunium, oratio et eleemosyna." — matches the dispatch.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 367 (L col., bottom): QUAESTIO IV. header + opener + obj. 1–2 (the *superflua* pair). The full-width title repeats across both columns.
- p. 367 (R col.): tail of the *preceding* quaestio at top, then q4 obj. 3 (Luc 11, *omnia munda*) + obj. 4–5 (*diminuta*: contraria contrariis; opus fortitudinis), then the incidental sub-question opener "Item quaeritur, quod istorum trium sit magis satisfactorium" (marginal *Quaestio incidens.*).
- p. 367 → 368 boundary inside the incidental sub-question ("quia satisfa-" | "ctio Deo reconciliat").
- p. 368 (L+R cols.): incidental sub-question's three views (oratio / ieiunium / eleemosyna) complete; obj. 6 (peregrinationes/flagella); CONCLUSIO; RESPONDEO with the *proprie / communiter / communissime* analysis of all three works; sufficiency *secundum appropriationem* and *secundum proprietatem* (1 John 2; Titus 2; Augustine "duas alas"; Tobias 12).
- p. 368 → 369 boundary inside the *proprietatem* sufficiency ("…cum ieiunio et eleemosyna." | "Aliter accipitur sufficientia…").
- p. 369 (L col.): vita activa/contemplativa sufficiency; solutiones *Ad 1.2.3 / Ad 4 / Ad 5*; (R col.) the incidental-question solution ("Ad quod quaeritur… vitatio culpae / augmentum gratiae / solutio poenae… alia duo praeponderant"), immediately before "ARTICULUS II. *De modo satisfaciendi in speciali.*"

**Footer-ownership (apparatus, 12 entries total, all anchored in this q4's body).**
- p. 367: **5 notes**, all q4's (`^1` obj.1 Matth. 17 = "Vers. 20"; `^2` obj.2 Hieron. super Marc.; `^3` obj.3 Luc. 11 = "Vers. 41"; `^4` obj.4 *contraria contrariis* cross-ref pag. 364; `^5` obj.5 *opus fortitudinis* tom. III cross-refs).
- p. 368: **12 footers**, all anchoring in q4's body — relabeled `^1b`–`^12b` (`^1b` incid. *unit Deo* / III Sent. d.17; `^2b` incid. 1 Tim. 4 *pietatem*; `^3b` *oratio est ascensus* — the long codd./Damasc./Bernard note; `^4b` *Non cessat orare* Gloss 1 Thess. 5; `^5b` ieiunium *secundum gustum* Isidore; `^6b` Isaiae 58 *Hoc est ieiunium*; `^7b` eleemosyna *opus pietatis* Alex. Hal.; `^8b` Eccli. 30 *Miserere animae tuae*; `^9b` 1 John 2 triple root; `^10b` Titus 2 *Sobrie et iuste*; `^11b` Augustine "duas alas"; `^12b` Tobias 12).
- p. 369: the q4 incidental-question solution carries **1 footer** = `^1c` (Luc. 16,9 *Facite vobis amicos* + cod. B *dignitas/fructus* addition + cross-ref to the scholion). The remaining p. 369 footers (1 *Respicitur Luc.16,9* belongs WITH `^1c`; then 2 Iustinian/Institut., 3 Quas de spon., 4 Prov. *frugum*, 5 Eccli. 34, 6 Gregor. *Eleemosyna … oculis*, etc.) open the **ARTICULUS II. q1** apparatus and are owned by the a2-q1 chunk — NOT q4. (Note: the long p. 369 footnote opening "Respicitur Luc. 16, 9: Facite vobis amicos…" is q4's `^1c`; its on-page number 1 sits at the q4 incidental anchor "impetrant gratiam," which is the last clause of q4 before ARTICULUS II begins.)

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`, but **q4 renders none of its own**: ARTICULUS I (this article) carries a single SCHOLION block (covering q1–q4) which the **a1-q1 chunk** owns and renders. The `### Scholion` slot here holds a one-line Latin+English cross-reference per the dispatch instruction. No "SCHOLION." header occurs inside the raw range 42014–42215. (The `^1c` footnote's tail "Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest." is the textual cross-pointer.)

**[?] flags.** None unresolved. Silent OCR/PDF reconstructions (OCR was cascade-interleaved): obj.3 *omnia munda sunt vobis*; obj.4 *contraria contrariis curantur*; incid. *unit Deo* / *Exerce te ipsum ad pietatem*; Respondeo *ascensus in Deum* / *contemplativae ad Deum relatum* / *Non cessat orare*; ieiunium *secundum gustum* / *Hoc est ieiunium quod elegi*; eleemosyna *opus pietatis impensum proximo* / *Miserere animae tuae, placens Deo*; *appropriationem* / *proprietatem*; *Sobrie et iuste et pie vivamus*; *duas alas*; *Bona est oratio cum ieiunio et eleemosyna*; p.369 *vitatio culpae* / *augmentum gratiae* / *solutio poenae* / *praeponderant*. Marginal rubrics in the bands (*Quaestio incidens.*, *Distinctio.*, *Oratio sumitur tripliciter.*, *Item ieiunium.*, *Item eleemosyna.*, *Ad quaest. incidentem.*, *Quoad iuste acquisitis.*) are editorial side-notes and are omitted from the body per corpus convention.

**Hand-off to ARTICULUS II.** ARTICULUS II ("De modo satisfaciendi in speciali") opens at the foot of p. 369 L column immediately after q4's incidental-question solution (raw line ~42216 / the band "ARTICULUS II. *De modo satisfaciendi in speciali.* Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de modo satisfaciendi in speciali. Et circa hoc quatuor quaeruntur…"). Its TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (four questions: *de quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna* / *utrum ieiunio contingat satisfacere* / *utrum contingat satisfacere oratione* / *de restitutione*) and QUAESTIO I header ("De quibus debeat fieri eleemosyna") begin there; **p. 369's footers from note 2 onward (Iustinian, Prov. *frugum*, Eccli. 34, Gregor. Moral., etc.) are the a2-q1 apparatus, not q4's** — and note 1 ("Respicitur Luc. 16, 9") is q4's `^1c`, so the a2-q1 chunk should pick up its own first footer (the "Facite vobis amicos" obj. of a2-q1) carefully, since the page reuses the Luke 16:9 locus.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0