title: Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum scientia sit clavis
Whether knowledge is a key

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *De clave scientiae specialiter.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur specialiter de clave, quae dicitur scientia. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum scientia sit clavis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit alia clavis quam potentia.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum scientia sit clavis.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod scientia sit clavis. Primo sic.

1. Super illud Matthaei decimo sexto[^1]: *Tibi dabo claves*; Glossa[^2]: « Clavis dicitur scientia et potentia, qua debet dignos recipere et indignos repellere »: ergo scientia est clavis.

2. Item, in quodam sermone de Apostolis Petro et Paulo[^3] dicitur: « Petrus accepit clavem potentiae, Paulus clavem scientiae »: ergo scientia est clavis.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne illud quod directe repugnat errori, scientia est, vel de genere scientiae; sed clavis aliqua est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

*Probatio minoris.* Hieronymus super illud[^4]: *Tibi dabo claves* etc.: « Sciat prudens lector, hoc esse de futuro promissum, quia, si statim datae essent, nunquam in eo error pravae confessionis locum habuisset »; ergo aliqua clavium excludit errorem.

4. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in littera, distinctione praecedenti[^5]: « Qui vult peccata confiteri, ut inveniat gratiam, quaerat sacerdotem, qui sciat ligare et solvere, ne, cum negligens circa se exstiterit, negligatur »: ergo necessarium est absolventi habere scientiam: ergo si illud quod tenet rationem ad aperiendum, est clavis; videtur, quod scientia clavis sit.

**Sed contra:**
1. Super illud[^6]: *Tibi dabo claves* etc.; Glossa: « Praesentis iudicii potestatem »: ergo videtur, quod utraque clavis est potestas, non ergo scientia.

2. Item, claves dantur in ordine et consequuntur praecise ordinem[^7]; sed multi habent ordinem,
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qui non habent scientiam, et e converso: ergo scientia non est clavis.

3. Item, clavis semel habita nunquam amittitur, sicut nec ordo; sed scientia habita potest amitti: ergo scientia non est clavis.

4. Item, si scientia est clavis, aut scientia *innata*, aut *acquisita*, aut *infusa*. Si *innata*; ergo claves sunt a natura. Si scientia *acquisita*; ergo claves sunt per acquisitionem, non per gratiam. Si *infusa*; sed multi sunt, qui nihil noverunt per infusionem propter suam nequitiam[^8][^10]: ergo mali non habent claves. Si tu dicas, quod infunditur scientia, quae est gratis data, sicut Salomoni; contrarium videmus aperte, quia omnes fere ita sunt simplices et idiotae post susceptionem sacerdotii, ut ante.

> **Conclusio.**
> Scientia non est clavis, secundum quod dicit habitum, sed secundum quod dicit auctoritatem sive officium discernendi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio antiquorum.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod scientia est clavis, prout scientia nominat habitum sciendi discernere. Sed non est clavis *principalis* nec *per se*, sed prout iuncta est *auctoritati* solvendi et ligandi; et haec clavis non est de *esse* ordinis, sed de *bene esse*, ita quod, si aliquis recipit *ordinem* de facto, non habens scientiam, factum est; sed *exsecutionem* iurisdictionis in absolvendo non recipit sine periculo animae, eo quod altera clavium caret. Et hi dixerunt, quod quidam habeant scientiam *clavium*, ut illi qui habent scientiam acquisitam; quidam *claviculam*, ut illi qui carent acquisita, tamen per naturalem industriam noscunt quod ars docet et Scriptura; quidam vero *nullam*, ut qui carent utraque. Et videtur fuisse opinio Magistri[^9][^11] — Sed non videtur hoc bene posse sustineri — licet aliquam habeat probabilitatem — cum dicamus, has claves ordinem consequi et ita dari sicut ordinem, et ita durare, sicut ordo durat.

Et ideo est secunda opinio, quod scientia non est clavis, secundum quod dicit habitum; sed in quantum dicit auctoritatem sive officium discernendi; hoc autem officium sive haec auctoritas est consequens ordinem inseparabiliter; et haec clavis est essentialiter. — Et haec fuit Praepositivi[^12], et hanc tenent communiter doctores, hoc addentes, quod scientia-habitus est sicut dispositio faciens ad *bene esse* vel etiam sicut dispositio *materialis*, sine qua altera clavis exire non potest in actum. Sicut enim vis visiva non est humidum crystallinum[^13], tamen illud exigit ad suam operationem; sic ipsa *auctoritas* discernendi requirit habitum scientiae; et quanto melius habetur scientia, tanto meliori modo habetur clavis. Et ideo maluerunt Sancti hanc clavem vocare hoc nomine quam alio. — Ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem.

1. 2. Nam primae auctoritates, quae dicunt scientiam clavem, intelliguntur de scientia, prout dicit *auctoritatem discernendi*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Hieronymo, dicendum, quod non intelligit tantum quantum ad esse nec etiam solum quantum ad bene esse, sed etiam ulterius quantum ad *perfectum esse*; sicut fuerunt[^14] in Apostolis, qui post adventum Spiritus sancti non fuerunt decepti nec a veritate abducti.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, quod solus sciens potest utiliter ligare; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia habitus scientiae sit clavis, sed quia dispositio est ad clavem, sicut dictum est.

Quae autem ad oppositum inducuntur, concedenda sunt, quoniam verum concludunt, scilicet scientiam, ut dicit *habitum*, non esse clavem.

english:
### Article III. *On the key of knowledge specifically.*

Next, with respect to the third article, inquiry is made specifically concerning the key which is called knowledge. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether knowledge is a key. Second it is asked whether it is a key other than power.

### Question I. *Whether knowledge is a key.*

Concerning the first point it is shown that knowledge is a key. First thus.

1. On that text of Matthew, chapter sixteen[^1]: *To thee I will give the keys*; the Gloss[^2]: « The key is called knowledge and power, by which one ought to receive the worthy and repel the unworthy »: therefore knowledge is a key.

2. Likewise, in a certain sermon on the Apostles Peter and Paul[^3] it is said: « Peter received the key of power, Paul the key of knowledge »: therefore knowledge is a key.

3. Likewise, by reason it seems so: for everything that directly opposes error is knowledge, or of the genus of knowledge; but some key is of this kind: therefore etc.

*Proof of the minor.* Jerome on that text[^4]: *To thee I will give the keys* etc.: « Let the prudent reader know that this was promised concerning the future, because, if they had been given at once, no error of perverse confession would ever have had place in him »; therefore some one of the keys excludes error.

4. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the text, in the preceding distinction[^5]: « Let him who wishes to confess his sins, that he may find grace, seek a priest who knows how to bind and to loose, lest, when he has been negligent about himself, he be neglected »: therefore it is necessary for the one absolving to have knowledge: therefore if that which holds the account for opening is a key, it seems that knowledge is a key.

**On the contrary:**
1. On that text[^6]: *To thee I will give the keys* etc.; the Gloss: « The power of present judgment »: therefore it seems that each key is a power, therefore not knowledge.

2. Likewise, the keys are given in ordination and follow precisely upon ordination[^7]; but many have ordination
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who do not have knowledge, and conversely: therefore knowledge is not a key.

3. Likewise, a key once had is never lost, just as neither is ordination; but knowledge once had can be lost: therefore knowledge is not a key.

4. Likewise, if knowledge is a key, either knowledge is *innate*, or *acquired*, or *infused*. If *innate*; then the keys are from nature. If knowledge is *acquired*; then the keys are by acquisition, not by grace. If *infused*; but there are many who have come to know nothing by infusion on account of their wickedness[^8][^10]: therefore the wicked do not have the keys. If you say that knowledge is infused which is freely given, as to Solomon; we see the contrary plainly, because almost all are as simple and ignorant after receiving the priesthood as before.

> **Conclusion.**
> Knowledge is not a key insofar as it denotes a habit, but insofar as it denotes the authority or office of discerning.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion of the ancients.

For some said that knowledge is a key, insofar as knowledge names the habit of knowing how to discern. But it is not a key *principally* nor *of itself*, but insofar as it is joined to the *authority* of loosing and binding; and this key is not of the *being* of ordination, but of its *well-being*, so that, if someone in fact receives *ordination* without having knowledge, it has been done; but he does not receive the *exercise* of jurisdiction in absolving without peril to the soul, because he lacks one of the keys. And these said that some have the knowledge of *keys*, as those who have acquired knowledge; some a *little key*, as those who lack acquired knowledge yet by natural industry know what art and Scripture teach; some none at all, as those who lack both. And this seems to have been the opinion of the Master[^9][^11] — But this does not seem able to be well sustained — although it has some probability — since we say that these keys follow ordination and are thus given just as ordination is, and so endure as ordination endures.

And therefore there is a second opinion, that knowledge is not a key insofar as it denotes a habit; but insofar as it denotes the authority or office of discerning; and this office or this authority follows ordination inseparably; and this is a key essentially. — And this was the opinion of Praepositivus[^12], and the doctors commonly hold it, adding this, that knowledge-as-habit is like a disposition making for *well-being*, or even like a *material* disposition, without which the other key cannot pass into act. For just as the power of sight is not the crystalline humor[^13], yet requires it for its operation; so the very *authority* of discerning requires the habit of knowledge; and the better knowledge is had, the better the manner in which the key is had. And therefore the Saints preferred to call this key by this name rather than by another. — From these things the objections to each side are evident.

1. 2. For the first authorities, which call knowledge a key, are understood of knowledge insofar as it denotes the *authority of discerning*.

3. To that which is objected from Jerome, it must be said that he does not understand it only with respect to being, nor even only with respect to well-being, but further also with respect to *perfect being*; as it was[^14] in the Apostles, who after the coming of the Holy Spirit were not deceived nor led away from the truth.

4. To that which is objected from Augustine, that only one who knows can usefully bind; it must be said that this is not because the habit of knowledge is a key, but because it is a disposition toward the key, as has been said.

But the things adduced for the opposite are to be conceded, since they conclude what is true, namely that knowledge, insofar as it denotes a *habit*, is not a key.

la: Matth. 16, 19. Hieron. in v. 23. ait: *Aedificabo*, inquit, *super te Ecclesiam meam* etc, et: *Dabo tibi claves regni caelorum*; omnia de futuro, quae si statim dedisset ei, nunquam in eo pravae opinionis [alias: confessionis] error invenisset locum.

en: Matthew 16, 19. Jerome on verse 23 says: *I will build*, he says, *my Church upon thee* etc., and: *I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven*; all in the future, which, if he had given to him at once, no error of perverse opinion [otherwise: confession] would ever have found place in him.

la: Vers. 19. — Glossa ordinaria apud Lyranum est ex Beda (in hunc loc.) dicente: *Et tibi dabo claves regni caelorum*, id est discernendi *scientiam potentiamque*, qua dignos debeas in regnum recipere et indignos secludere.

en: Verse 19. — The Ordinary Gloss in Lyra is from Bede (on this passage), saying: *And to thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven*, that is, the *knowledge and power* of discerning, by which thou shouldst receive the worthy into the kingdom and shut out the unworthy.

la: Serm. 202. in appendice serm. Augustini (alias 27. de Sanctis et post 79. in appendice) n. 1.

en: Sermon 202 in the appendix of Augustine's sermons (otherwise 27 *On the Saints* and after 79 in the appendix), n. 1.

la: Psalm. 84, 11. Vide supra d. 15. p. I. q. 1.

en: Psalm 84, 11. See above, d. 15, p. I, q. 1.

en: Distinction 46, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Cfr. supra d. 17. p. III. a. I. q. 2. ad 5. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Cf. above, d. 17, p. III, a. I, q. 2, ad 5. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Matth. 16, 19. Hieron. in v. 23.

en: Matthew 16, 19. Jerome on verse 23.

la: Matth. 16, 19. — Glossa est interlinearis apud Lyranum.

en: Matthew 16, 19. — The Gloss is the interlinear one in Lyra.

la: Ut ostenditur infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. Ibid. q. 2. insinuatur maior seq. arg.

en: As is shown below, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1. In the same place, q. 2, the major of the following argument is intimated.

la: Sap. 1, 4: *Quoniam in malevolam animam non introibit sapientia* etc. — Post pauca respicitur III. Reg. 3, 11. seq. (de Salomone).

en: Wisdom 1, 4: *For wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul* etc. — A little after, reference is made to 3 Kings 3, 11 ff. (concerning Solomon).

la: Infra d. XIX. c. 1. — Superius pro *scientiam clavium* codd. FGIK *scientiam clavem*.

en: Below, d. XIX, c. 1. — Above, for *the knowledge of keys* the codices FGIK [read] *the knowledge a key*.

la: Sum. p. IV. q. *Quae sint claves sacerdotis*, ubi ait Magister, dicit in sententiis, quod non omnes sacerdotes habent illam clavem [scientiae]; sed potest dici, quod omnes habent, nisi sit aliquis omnino amens. Nullus enim est, qui in aliquo non sciat discernere inter peccata, licet non sciat discernere inter omnia; sed quod minus scit a sciente debet quis discere... Alii dicunt, quod tantum una est clavis, scil. potestas ligandi et solvendi; sed propter duos usus duae dicuntur. Sed hoc de auctoritate non habent; unde eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua probatur. Alii dicunt, quod duae sunt claves, officium discernendi est una, officium ligandi alia; secundum quos et omnes sacerdotes et soli habent duas claves; et hoc satis probabile est.

en: *Summa*, p. IV, q. *What the keys of the priest are*, where the Master says, he says in the *Sentences*, that not all priests have that key [of knowledge]; but it can be said that all have it, unless someone be wholly out of his mind. For there is no one who does not in some respect know how to discern among sins, although he may not know how to discern among them all; but what one knows less, he ought to learn from one who knows... Others say that there is only one key, namely the power of binding and loosing; but on account of two uses they are called two. But this they do not hold on authority; whence it is despised with the same ease with which it is proved. Others say that there are two keys, the office of discerning being one, the office of binding the other; according to whom both all priests and they alone have two keys; and this is sufficiently probable.

la: Membrano seu tunicae, quae dicitur *specularis* (pellucida), inclusum.

en: Enclosed in the membrane or tunic which is called *specular* (transparent).

la: Codd. H aa *fuit*.

en: Codices H aa [read] *fuit*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Antiqui doctores communiter distinguunt *duas* claves, quae secundum S. Thomam (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 1.) non distinguuntur in *auctoritatis essentia*, sed ex comparatione ad diversos actus. Sed Scot. (hic d. 18. q. unica n. 10.) tenet, esse « simpliciter *duas*, ita quod simpliciter verum est, illud verbum Christi: *Tibi dabo claves* etc, et possent de potentia Dei absoluta separari ab invicem »; « una tamen sunt unitate *ordinis* ». Idem etiam in dubio ponit doctrinam Angelici, quod istae claves sint idem cum *charactere* sacerdotali, qui, cum sit unus in se, se extendat ad diversos actus; de quo agitur infra d. 19. a. 2.

**II.** Quoad 1. quaestionem opinio Magistri, quae primo loco ponitur, communiter a posterioribus Scholasticis improbatur. — Circa 2. quaestionem dicit S. Doctor: « Sunt duae claves »;
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sed addit: « Tamen, quia ex his constat una plena auctoritas, ideo in uno ordine dantur et unum respiciunt »; quae verba nec S. Thomae nec Scoto contradicunt.

De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. d. 20. m. 3. 4. — Scot., loc. cit. n. 7. seqq. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. 3; Suppl. q. 17. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. i. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The ancient doctors commonly distinguish *two* keys, which according to St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2, ad 1) are not distinguished in the *essence of authority*, but by comparison to diverse acts. But Scotus (here d. 18, q. unica, n. 10) holds that they are « simply *two*, so that that word of Christ is simply true: *To thee I will give the keys* etc., and they could by God's absolute power be separated from one another »; « yet they are one with a unity of *ordination* ». He also in a doubt sets down the teaching of the Angelic Doctor, that these keys are the same as the priestly *character*, which, since it is one in itself, extends to diverse acts; concerning which it is treated below in d. 19, a. 2.

**II.** As to the first question, the opinion of the Master, which is set down in the first place, is commonly disapproved by the later Scholastics. — Concerning the second question the Holy Doctor says: « There are two keys »;
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but he adds: « Yet, because from these there results one full authority, therefore they are given in one ordination and regard one thing »; which words contradict neither St. Thomas nor Scotus.

On both questions: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, d. 20, m. 3, 4. — Scotus, loc. cit., n. 7 ff. — St. Thomas, loc. cit., quaestiuncula 2, 3; Suppl. q. 17, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3, i. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{478,479,480}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (Vol IV two-column, VOL II OVERRIDE: PDF authoritative in cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio/footer regions), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 53317–53508. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (pp. 478–480 → PDF 498–500). Running heads verified: p.478 "478 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV", p.479 "DIST. XVIII. P. I. ART. III. QUAEST. I. 479", p.480 "480 / SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV".
- **Article opener folded in:** the short Art. III opener ("Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum... Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo... Secundo...") is rendered at the head of this q1 per the locked chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk). Opener alignment verified: Primo = q1 (utrum scientia sit clavis), Secundo = q2 (utrum sit alia clavis quam potentia).
- **Scholion ownership:** the Articulus III SCHOLION (points I–II) covers BOTH q1 and q2. Point I treats the general two-keys question; Point II explicitly addresses "Quoad 1. quaestionem" (this q1) AND "Circa 2. quaestionem" (q2), plus the "De utraque quaestione" reference list. It is rendered IN FULL here (the article's lead question). **Hand-off to q2:** q2 should NOT render its own scholion — it is covered here (cf. CLAUDE.md "no scholion is normal if the article's q1 scholion covers the sibling").
- **Marginal labels** in the PDF (printed in the gutter margins) confirmed and not transcribed into body text: "Ad oppositum" (beside Sed contra block, p.478), "Non probatur." / "Opinio 2. et conclusio." / "Corollarium." / "Solutio oppositorum." / "Ad fundam." (p.479) — these are Quaracchi editorial side-notes, not Bonaventure's text.
- **Page-footer split:** p.478 footers 1–9 and p.479 footers 1–5 all belong to this q1 (renumbered [^1]–[^14] for parser uniqueness). p.480's top is the tail of this scholion (the "De utraque quaestione" list); p.480's footer notes belong to q2, NOT this chunk — **hand-off to q2: p.480 footers are q2's.**
- **[?] flags:** none. OCR + PDF agree throughout; ambiguous marginal-label glyphs resolved against PDF bands.
- **J4 Class B — orphaned apparatus anchors placed (2026-07-17):** defs [^10]–[^14] (p.479's own footer sequence 1–5) had no body anchor in either language. Confirmed against PDF page bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p479-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (450 dpi) — read the printed superscript numerals ¹–⁵ directly and matched each to its footer text, then to the corresponding lemma. All five placed, mirrored in both Latin and English:
  - [^10] (Sap. 1,4 / Solomon) → Latin *nequitiam*, English "wickedness" (stacked with existing [^8] on the same word — Sed contra 4).
  - [^11] (cross-ref d. XIX + *scientiam clavium* variant note) → Latin *Magistri* (in "opinio Magistri"), English "Master" (stacked with existing [^9] — Respondeo, first opinion).
  - [^12] (Magister's *Summa* quote on priests' keys) → Latin *Praepositivi*, English "Praepositivus" (Respondeo, second opinion).
  - [^13] (membrane *specularis* gloss on the crystalline humor) → Latin *crystallinum*, English "crystalline humor" (Respondeo, vis-visiva analogy).
  - [^14] (codd. H aa read *fuit*) → Latin *fuerunt* (first occurrence), English "was" (Ad 3, "sicut fuerunt in Apostolis" / "as it was in the Apostles").
  All five confirmed by direct visual match of printed superscript position AND footer content (not by position/order alone — printed order on the page is 1,2,3,4,5 = [^10]–[^14] in sequence, verified independently for each). No notes refused.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 18, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

title_alt: Utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potestas solvendi et ligandi

title_alt: Whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing and binding

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 480 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potestas solvendi.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potentia solvendi. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Domini, Matthaei decimo sexto[^1]: *Tibi dabo claves regni caelorum:* si ergo Dominus vere et proprie est locutus, non ergo tantum clavem, verum etiam claves dedit: ergo plures sunt claves. Sed non nisi potentia et scientia: ergo etc.

2. Item, «habitus et potentiae per actus dignoscuntur[^2]», ergo pari ratione et instrumenta; sed scientia est ad discernendum, sive nominet auctoritatem sive habitum, potentia vero ligandi et solvendi est ad alterum actum: ergo etc.

3. Item, quae habent opposita diversa ipsa sunt diversa; sed scientia opponitur errori, ut dicit Hieronymus, et habetur in praecedenti problemate[^3]; potentia autem solvendi opponitur difficultati: ergo etc.

4. Item, quae respiciunt diversas animae vires diversa sunt, loquendo de his quae superadduntur potentiis, pro eo quod accidentia et proprietates per subiecta propria distinguuntur[^4]; scientia autem ad intellectum, et potentia ad affectum refertur: ergo videtur, quod sint duae.

**Contra:**

1. Clavis vel est ordo sacerdotalis, vel proprietas inseparabiliter annexa, sicut infra[^5] videbitur; sed ordo ille est unus: ergo et clavis ad illum ordinem spectans est una.

2. Item, claves sunt directae ad regnum caelorum aperiendum et ad obstaculum removendum[^6]; sed regnum illud non est nisi unum, et ostium, quod sacerdos aperit, non est nisi unum, scilicet debitum aeternae poenae: ergo videtur, quod una tantum debeat esse clavis scientia et potentia.

3. Item, aut potentia ligandi et solvendi aperit per se solam, aut iuncta auctoritati discernendi; constat, quod non per se solam, sicut prius[^7] visum est, et hoc patet, quia nulli competit de aliquo decernere, de quo non competit discernere: si ergo actus aperiendi non competit ei nisi cum scientia, et clavis ab actu aperiendi denominatur; ergo ambae sunt una clavis.

4. Item, si claves istae distinguuntur, aut penes id, a quo sunt, aut in quo, aut ad quod. Si penes id, a quo, ut scientia a Filio, et potentia a Patre[^8]; contra hoc est numerus et ordo: numerus, quia cum tres sint personae, tres deberent esse claves; ordo, quia, cum Pater secundum originem praeintelligatur, potestas solvendi praeiret scientiam; quod est inconveniens. — Si penes id, in quo sunt; cum ergo triplex sit in nobis potentia, secundum quam consistit imago, triplex deberet esse clavis: una in memoria, alia in intelligentia, tertia in voluntate; vel si non est in istis, sed in viribus, cum tres sint vires, in quibus sunt tres virtutes[^9], deberent tunc igitur esse tres claves, una in rationali, alia in concupiscibili et tertia in irascibili. — Si autem distinguuntur penes id, ad quod; sed illud est unum, scilicet aperire regnum: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod sunt ad solvendum et ligandum, et ita ad duo; contra: ad virtutem requiritur scire et velle et perseveranter operari[^10]; sed scire et velle virtutem non plurificant, immo sunt in una virtute: ergo pari ratione discernere et solvere.

### Conclusio.

> In auctoritate sacerdotibus commissa duae sunt claves, scilicet potestas discernendi causam et sententiandi, concurrentes in unam plenam auctoritatem et in uno ordine datae.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod distinctio clavium praedictarum di-
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versimode sumitur a diversis. — Quidam enim distinctionem harum clavium sumunt penes id, a quo sunt et ad quod finaliter reducunt[^11]. Dicunt enim, quod sicut in Angelis est hierarchia descendens a hierarchia supercaelesti et ad illam ascendens et rediens; sic est in militante Ecclesia. In Angelis autem hierarchia, sicut dicit Dionysius[^12], est ordo, scientia et actio, id est potestas ordinata scientia et actione, ita quod potestas respondet Patri, et haec apparet in Thronis; scientia Filio, et haec apparet in Cherubim; et actio sive opus Spiritui sancto, et haec apparet in Seraphim. Per hunc modum est intelligere in hierarchia ecclesiastica; quae maxime consistit penes Sacramentum ordinis, in quo confertur potestas ordinata scientia et actione; et hanc dicunt potestatem clavium, quae complectitur actum discernendi et solvendi: ita quod potestas respondeat Patri, et scientia Filio, et opus Spiritui sancto. Et secundum hos sunt in sacerdote tres potestates: una principalis et prima, quae est ipse ordo ut potestas conficiendi; secunda est potestas discernendi, et tertia absolvendi; ut sic appareat perfectissima pulcritudo in ordine ecclesiastico secundum repraesentationem illius superioris perfectissimae Trinitatis. — Si autem tu quaeras ab his: quare potestas conficiendi non est clavis? respondent tibi, quia non est ad alterum, sicut illae duae, sicut videbitur infra[^13]. — Et haec quidem positio satis probabilis videtur esse.

Alii sumunt rationem distinguendi penes id, in quo sunt et contra quod sunt. Dicunt enim, quod hae duae claves respiciunt *intellectum* et *affectum* removendo duplex malum nobis inflictum, scilicet errorem per scientiam et difficultatem per potentiam. — Sed iste modus minus probabilis est quam primus, tum quia secundum rectam viam distinctionem clavium non inquirit, tum quia, etsi scientia sit in intellectu, tamen auctoritas discernendi in eadem potentia est, ut videtur aperte, cum auctoritate solvendi sive sententiandi. Non autem recte sumit rationem distinctionis: claves enim non dantur sacerdoti, ut sint in remedium sibi, sed ut sint directae[^14] in remedium aliis. In hoc tamen concordat cum prima, quod duae sunt claves secundum completam distinctionem.

Tertius modus distinguendi claves est penes id, ad quod immediate sunt. In foro autem poenitentiali duo sunt, quemadmodum in foro iudiciali. In illo enim sunt isti duo actus, scilicet discernere causam, et postmodum sententiare; et isti sunt actus diversi, et ad hoc, quod plene committatur alicui auctoritas, necesse est, utrumque committi, alioquin plenam non habet auctoritatem; est tamen duplex auctoritas concurrens in unam plenam, quod patet, quia eam contingit dividi. Committit enim aliquando Dominus Papa aliquibus, ut causam discutiant et instructam ante prolationem sententiae ad ipsum remittant; et hi habent auctoritatem discernendi, non sententiandi. Per hunc modum in auctoritate sacerdotibus commissa est sentiendum, quod cum sufficiens sit eis collata potestas arbitrandi inter peccatorem et Deum, quod utramque habent auctoritatem; et cum utraque harum sit ordinata ad aperiendum caelum, utraque dicitur clavis, et sunt duae claves; tamen, quia ex his constat una plena auctoritas, ideo in uno ordine dantur et unum respiciunt. — Et sic patet, quod sunt plures claves.

1. Et patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium de ordinis unitate. — Posset tamen dici quod prima et unica potestas *essentialis* ordini sacerdotali est potestas conficiendi.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt ad unum dicendum, quod ad illud unum duplex actus necessario requiritur, scilicet discretio culpae et solutio poenae, et in his duobus duplex clavis consistit; non ergo penes finem ultimum, sed penes immediatum habent distinctionem[^15].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de apertione, dicendum secundum antiquos, quod ad eandem seram aperiendam in corporalibus videmus duplicem clavem: unam, quae aperit viam et dicitur anticlavis, et aliam, quae directe aperit, et haec dicitur principalis clavis. Sic in spiritualibus scientia est sicut anticlavis, quae dirigit iudicium, et potestas solvendi principalis clavis.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur: penes quid distinguuntur? dicendum quod penes illud ad quod immediate sunt, scilicet discernere de culpa et solvere a poena, non penes hos actus solvere et ligare. Et si tu obiicias, quod scientia et operatio non faciunt duas virtutes; dicendum, quod scientia est duplex: una per modum praxis et experientiae, et haec est in qualibet virtute et est eis essentialis; alia vero est per modum cuiusdam directionis — sicut prudentia, quae, ut dicit Bernardus, «est auriga virtutum», et fides etiam est directiva theologicarum — et sic distinguitur ab his quae circa opus consistunt. Sic intelligendum est in proposito. — Et si tu quaeras a me: quare non sunt tot potestates, quot sunt vitia, a quibus solvunt? dicendum, quod ab omnibus illis solvunt secundum unam rationem et unum actum et modum consimilem; et ideo non oportet sic multiplicari.

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this matter, whether knowledge is a key other than the power of loosing. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of the Lord, Matthew the sixteenth[^1]: *I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven:* if therefore the Lord spoke truly and properly, then he gave not only a key, but indeed keys: therefore there are several keys. But [these are] nothing other than power and knowledge: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, "habits and potencies are known through their acts[^2]," therefore by parity of reasoning instruments [are known] also; but knowledge is for discerning, whether it names an authority or a habit, while the power of binding and loosing is for the other act: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, things that have diverse opposites are themselves diverse; but knowledge is opposed to error, as Jerome says, and it is found in the preceding problem[^3]; while the power of loosing is opposed to difficulty: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, things that regard diverse powers of the soul are diverse, speaking of those things which are superadded to the powers, on account of the fact that accidents and properties are distinguished through their proper subjects[^4]; but knowledge is referred to the intellect, and power to the affect: therefore it seems that there are two.

**On the contrary:**

1. A key is either the priestly order, or a property inseparably annexed [to it], as will be seen below[^5]; but that order is one: therefore also the key pertaining to that order is one.

2. Likewise, the keys are directed to opening the kingdom of heaven and to removing the obstacle[^6]; but that kingdom is nothing but one, and the door, which the priest opens, is nothing but one, namely the debt of eternal punishment: therefore it seems that there ought to be only one key, [namely] knowledge and power.

3. Likewise, either the power of binding and loosing opens by itself alone, or joined to the authority of discerning; it is established that [it does] not [open] by itself alone, as was seen before[^7], and this is plain, because it belongs to no one to determine concerning anything about which it does not belong [to him] to discern: if therefore the act of opening does not belong to it except with knowledge, and a key is named from the act of opening; therefore both are one key.

4. Likewise, if these keys are distinguished, [it is] either with respect to that from which they are, or [that] in which, or [that] to which. If with respect to that from which, as knowledge from the Son, and power from the Father[^8]; against this are number and order: number, because since there are three persons, there ought to be three keys; order, because, since the Father is pre-understood according to origin, the power of loosing would precede knowledge; which is unfitting. — If with respect to that in which they are; then since there is a threefold power in us, according to which the image consists, there ought to be a threefold key: one in the memory, another in the intelligence, a third in the will; or if it is not in these, but in the [appetitive] forces, since there are three forces, in which there are three virtues[^9], then accordingly there ought to be three keys, one in the rational, another in the concupiscible and a third in the irascible. — But if they are distinguished with respect to that to which [they are directed]; but that is one, namely to open the kingdom: therefore, etc. If you say that they are for loosing and binding, and thus for two; on the contrary: for virtue there is required to know and to will and to act perseveringly[^10]; but to know and to will do not multiply virtue, but rather are in one virtue: therefore by parity of reasoning [neither do] to discern and to loose.

### Conclusion.

> In the authority committed to priests there are two keys, namely the power of discerning a case and of pronouncing sentence, concurring in one full authority and given in one order.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that the distinction of the aforesaid keys is taken in diverse ways by diverse [authors].
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— For some take the distinction of these keys with respect to that from which they are and to which they finally reduce [them][^11]. For they say that, just as among the Angels there is a hierarchy descending from the supercelestial hierarchy and ascending to it and returning; so it is in the Church Militant. But among the Angels the hierarchy, as Dionysius says[^12], is order, knowledge and action, that is, power ordered with knowledge and action, such that power corresponds to the Father, and this appears in the Thrones; knowledge to the Son, and this appears in the Cherubim; and action or work to the Holy Spirit, and this appears in the Seraphim. In this manner it is to be understood in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; which consists chiefly in the Sacrament of order, in which is conferred the power ordered with knowledge and action; and this they call the power of the keys, which embraces the act of discerning and of loosing: such that power corresponds to the Father, and knowledge to the Son, and work to the Holy Spirit. And according to these there are in the priest three powers: one principal and first, which is the order itself as the power of consecrating; the second is the power of discerning, and the third of absolving; so that thus there may appear a most perfect beauty in the ecclesiastical order according to the representation of that higher most perfect Trinity. — But if you ask of these: why is the power of consecrating not a key? they answer you, because it is not toward another, like those two, as will be seen below[^13]. — And this position indeed seems to be sufficiently probable.

Others take the ground of distinguishing with respect to that in which they are and against which they are. For they say that these two keys regard the *intellect* and the *affect* by removing the twofold evil inflicted on us, namely error through knowledge and difficulty through power. — But this manner is less probable than the first, both because it does not inquire into the distinction of the keys according to the right way, and because, although knowledge is in the intellect, nevertheless the authority of discerning is in the same power, as seems plain, [together] with the authority of loosing or of pronouncing sentence. But it does not rightly take the ground of the distinction: for the keys are not given to the priest that they may be a remedy to himself, but that they may be directed[^14] as a remedy to others. In this, however, it agrees with the first, that there are two keys according to a complete distinction.

The third manner of distinguishing the keys is with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed]. Now in the penitential forum there are two [things], just as in the judicial forum. For in the latter there are these two acts, namely to discern the case, and afterward to pronounce sentence; and these are diverse acts, and for this, that authority may be fully committed to someone, it is necessary that both be committed, otherwise he does not have full authority; nevertheless it is a twofold authority concurring into one full [authority], which is plain, because it happens to be divided. For sometimes the Lord Pope commits to certain persons, that they discuss a case and, [once] prepared, refer it back to him before the pronouncing of sentence; and these have the authority of discerning, not of pronouncing sentence. In this manner it is to be understood concerning the authority committed to priests, that since the power of arbitrating between the sinner and God conferred upon them is sufficient, they have both authority; and since each of these is ordered to opening heaven, each is called a key, and there are two keys; nevertheless, because from these there results one full authority, therefore they are given in one order and regard one [thing]. — And thus it is plain that there are several keys.

1. And the reply to the first objection to the contrary, concerning the unity of the order, is plain. — Yet it could be said that the first and only *essential* power of the priestly order is the power of consecrating.

2. To that which is objected, that they are toward one [thing], it must be said that toward that one [thing] a twofold act is necessarily required, namely the discernment of guilt and the loosing of punishment, and in these two the twofold key consists; therefore they have their distinction not with respect to the ultimate end, but with respect to the immediate [end][^15].

3. To that which is objected concerning the opening, it must be said according to the ancients, that for opening the same lock in bodily [things] we see a twofold key: one, which opens the way and is called the fore-key (*anticlavis*), and another, which directly opens, and this is called the principal key. So in spiritual [things] knowledge is like the fore-key, which directs the judgment, and the power of loosing [is] the principal key.

4. To that which is asked: with respect to what are they distinguished? it must be said that [they are distinguished] with respect to that to which they are immediately [directed], namely to discern concerning guilt and to loose from punishment, not with respect to these acts, to loose and to bind. And if you object that knowledge and operation do not make two virtues; it must be said that knowledge is twofold: one by way of practice and experience, and this is in every virtue and is essential to them; the other, however, is by way of a certain direction — like prudence, which, as Bernard says, "is the charioteer of the virtues," and faith also is directive of the theological [virtues] — and thus it is distinguished from those things which concern the work. So it is to be understood in the present case. — And if you ask of me: why are there not as many powers as there are vices, from which they loose? it must be said that they loose from all those according to one ground and one act and a like manner; and therefore there is no need to multiply thus.

la: Vers. 19.

en: Verse 19.

la: Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 320, nota 3. allegatum. — Circa finem arg. pro *est ad alterum* perperam multi codd. (plures iam a secunda manu correcti sunt) *non est ad alterum.*

en: According to Aristotle, cited above on p. 320, note 3. — Toward the end of the argument, in place of *est ad alterum* ("is for the other"), many codices wrongly [read] (several have already been corrected by a second hand) *non est ad alterum* ("is not for the other").

la: Arg. 3. ad oppos. — *Maior* colligitur ex Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. — Inferius post *difficultati* cod. M addit *cedendi.*

en: Argument 3 to the opposite. — The major [premise] is gathered from Aristotle, *Topics* VII, c. 1. — Below, after *difficultati*, codex M adds *cedendi.*

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 119, nota 8. — Inferius pro *affectum* edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *effectum.*

en: See vol. II, p. 119, note 8. — Below, in place of *affectum* ("affect"), the editions, with one or another codex, [read] *effectum* ("effect").

en: Distinction 19, article 2, question 1 and following.

la: Ut dictum est supra a. 1. q. 1.

en: As was said above, article 1, question 1.

la: Quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro *decernere,* quod praebent codd. G H I L, alii codd. et ed. I *discernere* (Vat. *sententiare*), inter quos cod. A subinde pro *discernere* substituit *iudicare.*

en: The preceding question. — A little below, in place of *decernere* ("to determine"), which codices G H I L give, other codices and edition I [read] *discernere* ("to discern") (the Vatican [edition], *sententiare*, "to pronounce sentence"), among which codex A thereafter substitutes *iudicare* ("to judge") for *discernere.*

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 34. q. 3. — Aliquanto inferius post *scientiam* cod. X addit *discernendi.*

en: Cf. I Sentences, d. 34, q. 3. — Somewhat below, after *scientiam* ("knowledge"), codex X adds *discernendi* ("of discerning").

la: Scilicet fides, spes et caritas; cfr. III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 4. — Paulo ante post *in istis [potentiis]* ex cod. A supplevimus *sed in,* quod edd. et plurimi codd. male omittunt; cod. X legit *in istis, sed in aliis viribus,* cod. aa *in illis tribus.* Subinde post *ad quod* codd. K aa (1 a secunda manu) supplent *sunt,* et post *regnum* cod. Z *caelorum.*

en: Namely faith, hope and charity; cf. III Sentences, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 4. — A little before, after *in istis [potentiis]* ("in these [powers]"), we have supplied from codex A *sed in,* which the editions and very many codices wrongly omit; codex X reads *in istis, sed in aliis viribus* ("in these, but in other forces"), codex aa *in illis tribus* ("in those three"). Then, after *ad quod,* codices K aa (1 by a second hand) supply *sunt,* and after *regnum* codex Z [adds] *caelorum.*

la: Ut docet Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 341, nota 7. — Superius post *et ligandum* Vat. addit *et ad discernendum,* quae etiam finem arg. sic exhibet: *ergo pari ratione nec discernere et solvere plurificant claves, sed sunt una clavis.*

en: As Aristotle teaches, *Ethics* II, c. 4. Cf. above p. 341, note 7. — Above, after *et ligandum* ("and to bind"), the Vatican [edition] adds *et ad discernendum* ("and to discern"), which also presents the end of the argument thus: *"therefore by parity of reasoning neither do to discern and to loose multiply the keys, but they are one key."*

la: Codd. F G *reducuntur.*

en: Codices F G [read] *reducuntur* ("are reduced").

la: De Caelest. Hierarchia, c. 3. § 1. Vide II. Sent. d. 9. Praenotata de nominibus etc. Angelorum. — Pro *In Angelis* edd. *In angelica* (cfr. II. Sent. d. 9. Praenotata). Deinde pro *et haec* plurimi codd. *ter et hoc.*

en: *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. 3, § 1. See II Sentences, d. 9, the Prefatory Notes on the names etc. of the Angels. — In place of *In Angelis* ("Among the Angels") the editions [read] *In angelica* (cf. II Sentences, d. 9, the Prefatory Notes). Then, in place of *et haec,* very many codices [read] *ter et hoc.*

en: Distinction 19, article 2, question 2.

la: Ita codd. F G H L, alii cum edd. *recte.* Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. Mox pro *concordant* ex codd. F G I K substituimus *concordat.*

en: Thus codices F G H L, others with the editions [read] *recte* ("rightly"). Cf. above, article 1, question 1. Presently, in place of *concordant,* from codices F G I K we have substituted *concordat.*

la: Ita codd. A F G aa, in aliis et edd. *discretionem.* — Ed. I *unam directivam,* nonnulli codd. *apertivam.* — Serm. 49. in Cantic. n. 5. Vide tom. III. pag. 471, nota 3. — Superius pro *est eis* codd. F G I K *est ei.* — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: Thus codices A F G aa, in others and the editions [read] *discretionem* ("discretion"). — Edition I [reads] *unam directivam* ("one directive"), several codices *apertivam* ("opening"). — [Bernard,] Sermon 49 on the Canticle, n. 5. See vol. III, p. 471, note 3. — Above, in place of *est eis* ("is to them"), codices F G I K [read] *est ei* ("is to it"). — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

english_scholion:
The scholion for Articulus III is printed in the Quaracchi edition with Quaestio I (*Utrum scientia sit clavis*); see the apparatus to that question. — La. *Scholion ad praecedentem quaestionem (q. 1) refertur*; vide bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a3-q1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53509–53703), cross-checked column-by-column against the PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p480-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p481-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (Vol IV two-column, VOL II OVERRIDE recipe; PDF authoritative in cascade-shattered regions; offset pdf = printed + 20). The OCR for this quaestio was unusually clean; no cascade-merge corrections were needed.

**Page span:** The quaestio runs from printed p. 480 (QUAESTIO II header, mid-page, after q1's tail "De utraque quaestione: Alex. Hal. ...") through the end of p. 481, where the body closes at "...non oportet sic multiplicari." (footnote 8 of p.481). Printed p. 482 begins "DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI / DUB. I." — the next chunk (bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-dubia).

**Scholion disposition (has_scholion: false):** Articulus III has a single scholion, which the Quaracchi edition prints with **Quaestio I** (bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-a3-q1), not with this question. Confirmed by p.481 footnote 8 ("Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest."). A one-line La+En cross-reference note is rendered above in place of a scholion.

**Title note:** The printed running title (p. 480 R) reads *"Utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potestas solvendi"* (no *et ligandi*). The frontmatter `title_la`/`title_en` retain the fuller dispatch form ("...solvendi et ligandi"); the in-body Latin heading uses the printed shorter form. The opener verifies: *"Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum scientia sit alia clavis quam potentia solvendi."* — aligned, no q-swap.

**Apparatus (15 entries):** p.480 footers 1–10 (left + right column bottoms); p.481 footers 11–15 (the continuation block, OCR numbered 1–8 on p.481 but renumbered here as a single per-chunk sequence). Per-page Quaracchi numbering restarts; entries are renumbered continuously within the chunk.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR readings were all confirmable against the PDF bands.

**Hand-off to bon-sent-IV-d18-p1-dubia:** This quaestio fully consumes its share of p.480–481 footers; no shared-page footer carries over to the dubia. The dubia begins clean at the top of printed p. 482 ("DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI", DUB. I, "In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram...") with its own fresh footer sequence. No footer split to migrate.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 18, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De excommunicatione.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum aliquis possit vel debeat excommunicari.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod aliquis possit excommunicari:

1. Primo *auctoritate Domini,* Matthaei decimo octavo[^1]: *Si peccaverit in te frater tuus* etc. usque ibi: *Quodsi Ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut ethnicus et publicanus;* et post: *Amen dico vobis, quodcumque ligaveritis super terram* etc.; sed ethnici et publicani extra communicationem reputantur: ergo et talis frater, et hoc secundum iudicium Ecclesiae, ut dicit: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc probatur *exemplo Apostoli,* qui, primae ad Corinthios quinto[^2] fornicatorem manifestum tradidit satanae; et primae ad Timotheum: *Ex quibus est Hymenaeus et Alexander, quos tradidi satanae;* et ad Galatas primo: *Si quis vobis evangelizaverit praeter id quod accepistis, anathema sit;* et primae ad Corinthios ultimo: *Si quis non amat Dominum Iesum Christum, anathema sit.* Si ergo Paulus, Ecclesiae ministrator, subiectos excommunicavit, videtur illud esse conveniens et licitum.

3. Item, hoc ipsum rationabiliter probatur per *exemplum in moralibus.* Pater enim familias secundum rectum ordinem filium inobedientem extra domum ad tempus eiicit, ut saltem sic corrigatur: ergo pari ratione ille qui praeest in domo Dei, potest et debet consimilem eiicere extra domum; sed eiicere extra domum est eiicere extra communicationem[^3], et hoc non est aliud quam excommunicare: ergo etc.

4. Item, videmus in *arte medendi,* quod secundum rectum iudicium artis membrum putridum, ordinatum ad aliorum membrorum infectionem, a corpore est resecandum; sed in spiritualibus contingit membra esse putrida per peccatum et alia membra corrumpentia: ergo videtur, quod talia recte[^4] sint amputanda secundum rectum regiminis ordinem. Sed hoc fit per excommunicationem: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. « Excommunicatio est separatio a communione[^5] »; sed communio est per caritatem; sed extra caritatem nemo potest nec debet aliquem eiicere: ergo nec excommunicare. Quod nemo *possit* auferre caritatem, videtur, quia nemo amittit caritatem invitus. — Item, nemo est, qui non sit ex caritate diligendus, quamdiu est in via: ergo etc.

2. Item, excommunicatio est separatio a communione Sacramentorum; sed a Sacramentis nullus est separandus nec prohibendus: ergo nullus est excommunicandus. *Maior* patet, *minor* probatur sic: omnis fidelis aut est iustus et sanus, aut *peccator* et infirmus[^6]. Si *iustus,* non est arcendus a Sacramentis; si *peccator* et infirmus et indigens medicinis spiritualibus, magis est attrahendus quam arcendus: ergo etc.

3. Item, excommunicatio aut est *morbus,* aut *medicina.* Si *morbus:* ergo nulli est infligenda, quia omnium salus est desideranda. Si *medicina*[^7]; ergo cum medicina sit omnibus aptanda et non prosit, nisi ei qui vult in eam per liberum arbitrium consentire: ergo *nullus* est excommunicandus nisi volens, et *quilibet* debet velle, se excommunicari; quorum utrumque falsum est.

4. Item, in excommunicatione traditur satanae ipse excommunicatus, sicut patet in excommunicatione ipsius Apostoli[^8]; aut ergo quantum ad *animam,* aut quantum ad *corpus.* Si quantum ad *corpus,* non potest — illud videmus ad litteram — quantum ad *animam,* nec potest nec debet: ergo nullo modo videtur aliquis esse excommunicandus.

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### Conclusio

> Contemptores et rebelles excommunicare licet et debitum est.

**Respondeo:** Ad horum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut in *disciplinis* duplex est modus *instruendi* et duplex modus *arguendi,* scilicet *ostensivus* et *per impossibile*[^9]; et in *medicinalibus* duplex est modus *curandi,* scilicet per medicamenta *lenientia* et per medicamenta *asperantia* — curatur enim aliquis per emplastri appositionem, aliquis per sectionem — sic in *moralibus* duplex est modus *corrigendi,* unus per dulces *monitiones,* alter per asperas *increpationes;* et hoc secundum duo genera hominum, quia quidam sunt tractabiles et plicabiles, quidam duri et rebelles. Sic in *divinis et ecclesiasticis* iudiciis, in quibus est *instructio, curatio* et *correctio,* duplex reperitur modus *instruendi* et *corrigendi* et etiam *curandi.* Quemadmodum igitur nolentibus acceptare rationem ostensivam fit argumentatio ducens ad impossibile; et morbis, qui non curantur per emplastrum, apponitur vulnus et cauterium; et invitis et incorrigibilibus fit curatio per flagellum: sic esse oportuit in Ecclesiae correctionibus. Et ideo Ecclesiae non tantum dedit Dominus institutor et fundator *medicamenta* Sacramentorum ad curandum accedentes, sed etiam *gladium spiritus, quod est verbum Dei*[^10], et potestatem amputandi et resecandi contemptores et rebelles; et tales licet et debitum est excommunicari, sicut ostensum est auctoritate Dei et exemplo Apostoli et ratione in consimili.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod excommunicare est extra communionem[^11] eiicere, quae est per caritatem; dicendum quod communio triplex est: quaedam *spiritualis* omnino, et haec est quantum ad dilectionem interiorem; quaedam *corporalis,* et haec est quantum ad exteriorem conversationem; quaedam *medio modo,* et haec est quantum ad Sacramentorum susceptionem, et praecipue quantum ad Sacramentum altaris. Dico ergo, quod a *prima* nullus potest nec debet excludi quamdiu est viator, nec excommunicatio dicit privationem illius communionis. Quantum ad *sacramentalem* excluditur quilibet, qui dicitur excommunicatus sive maiori, sive minori. Quantum ad *conversationem exteriorem* attenditur excommunicatio maior, in qua communicatio negatur secundum actus legitimos, qui attenduntur in quatuor, scilicet in *osculo,* in *colloquio,* in *convivio,* in *oratorio.* Unde versus:

> *Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur.*

Sic igitur patet, quod cum triplex sit communio: una *spiritualis,* et alia *sacramentalis,* et alia *corporalis,* quod secundum primam nullus excommunicatur; secundum sacramentalem excommunicatur omnis qui dicitur excommunicatus; secundum tertiam excommunicatur ille qui maiori excommunicatione excommunicatus dicitur, quia maior est hic privatio communicationis. Et sic patet illud primum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus separandus est a Sacramentis; dicendum, quod *immo,* quoniam, etsi Sacramenta sint medicinae, tamen non prosunt nisi dispositis. Unde sicut bonus medicus secundum artem prohibet infirmum a medicinis, non tantum a cibis, propter indispositionem; sic in proposito est intelligendum. Utilius enim est, alicui medicinam subtrahi quam dari[^12] contra dispositionem, immo tali differre medicinam est medicinale.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de excommunicatione, utrum sit morbus vel medicina; dicendum, quod sicut *sectio* de prima sua ratione plaga est et dolorem facit, tamen in comparatione ad vulnus apostematis est medicina; sic ipsa separatio a communione fidelium dicit malum et damnum et poenam, in comparatione tamen ad rebellem medicina est, ut eius rebellio et contumacia frangatur. Unde sicut ille qui syllogizat *per impossibile,* ad impossibile deducit, non ut ibi sistat, sed ut redeat ad veritatem; sic Ecclesia separat et excommunicat, ut redeuntem cum humilitate et confusum de contumacia arctius stringat et interius claudat. Et sic patet, quod quamvis sit medicina, quia curat morbum rebellionis, quod nullus hanc medicinam debet appetere, nec debet dari quaerenti veram medicinam, sed contemnenti.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excommunicare est tradere satanae; dicendum quod satanas est tortor, non tantum animarum, verum etiam corporum. Tradere autem tortori est dupliciter: aut *cessando* a protectione torquendi[^13] sive exponendo, aut *iubendo* tortori, ut affligat. Excommunicare ergo secundum *praesentis* Ecclesiae statum est tradere satanae protectionem subtrahendo et ei exponendo; subtrahit enim suffragia et Sacramenta, per quae munimur contra hostis insidias. In tempore autem Ecclesiae *primitivae,* quia daemones ipsis Apostolis subiiciebantur, et manifestanda erat fides per miracula, non tantum exponebantur, immo corporaliter ad mandatum Apostolicum vexabantur; sicut dicitur primae ad Corinthios quinto et in textu et in Glossa; et illud decuit in principio Ecclesiae fieri ad terrorem, vel propter excellentiam Apostolorum. Nunc autem, quamvis non ita vexentur, tamen corpore et spiritu vexandi exponuntur; et pro tanto dicuntur tradi satanae et vere excommunicari. Et sic patent obiecta.

english:
### Articulus Unicus. *On excommunication.*
### Question I. *Whether anyone can or ought to be excommunicated.*

Concerning the first point it is shown that someone can be excommunicated:

1. First, by the *authority of the Lord,* in Matthew the eighteenth[^1]: *If your brother sins against you,* etc., up to the place: *But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican;* and afterward: *Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth,* etc.; but heathens and publicans are reckoned outside communication: therefore so too is such a brother, and this according to the judgment of the Church, as he says: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, this is proved by the *example of the Apostle,* who, in First Corinthians five[^2], delivered the manifest fornicator to Satan; and in First Timothy: *Of whom are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have delivered to Satan;* and in Galatians one: *If anyone preaches to you a gospel besides that which you have received, let him be anathema;* and in the last [chapter] of First Corinthians: *If anyone loves not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.* If, then, Paul, a minister of the Church, excommunicated those subject to him, it appears that this is fitting and lawful.

3. Likewise, this very thing is reasonably proved by an *example in moral matters.* For a father of a family, according to right order, casts a disobedient son out of the house for a time, that at least he may thus be corrected: therefore by parity of reason he who presides in the house of God can and ought to cast out one like him from the house; but to cast out of the house is to cast out of communication[^3], and this is nothing other than to excommunicate: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, we see in the *art of healing* that, according to the right judgment of the art, a putrid member, disposed toward the infection of the other members, ought to be cut off from the body; but in spiritual matters it happens that members are putrid through sin and corrupting the other members: therefore it appears that such [members] are rightly[^4] to be amputated according to the right order of governance. But this is done through excommunication: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. « Excommunication is separation from communion[^5] »; but communion is through charity; but apart from charity no one can or ought to cast anyone out: therefore neither to excommunicate. That no one *can* take away charity appears, because no one loses charity unwillingly. — Likewise, there is no one who is not to be loved out of charity, so long as he is on the way: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, excommunication is separation from the communion of the Sacraments; but no one is to be separated or barred from the Sacraments: therefore no one is to be excommunicated. The *major* is plain, the *minor* is proved thus: every faithful person is either just and sound, or a *sinner* and infirm[^6]. If *just,* he is not to be kept from the Sacraments; if a *sinner* and infirm and in need of spiritual medicines, he is rather to be drawn [to them] than kept [from them]: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, excommunication is either a *disease* or a *medicine.* If a *disease:* then it is to be inflicted on no one, because the welfare of all is to be desired. If a *medicine*[^7]; then since a medicine is to be applied to all and does not benefit except him who wills to consent to it by free choice: therefore *no one* is to be excommunicated except willingly, and *everyone* ought to will to be excommunicated; both of which are false.

4. Likewise, in excommunication the excommunicated person himself is delivered to Satan, as is plain in the excommunication [enacted] by the Apostle himself[^8]; either, then, with respect to the *soul,* or with respect to the *body.* If with respect to the *body,* it cannot be — that we see literally — with respect to the *soul,* it neither can nor ought to be: therefore in no way does it appear that anyone is to be excommunicated.

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### Conclusio

> To excommunicate the contemptuous and the rebellious is lawful and is a duty.

**I respond:** For the understanding of these matters it must be noted that, just as in *disciplines* there is a twofold mode of *instructing* and a twofold mode of *arguing,* namely the *demonstrative* and the *per impossibile* [by way of the impossible][^9]; and in *medicine* there is a twofold mode of *curing,* namely by *soothing* medicaments and by *sharpening* medicaments — for one person is cured by the application of a plaster, another by cutting — so in *moral matters* there is a twofold mode of *correcting,* one by gentle *admonitions,* the other by harsh *rebukes;* and this according to the two kinds of men, because some are tractable and pliable, some hard and rebellious. So in *divine and ecclesiastical* judgments, in which there is *instruction, healing,* and *correction,* a twofold mode of *instructing* and of *correcting* and also of *curing* is found. Just as, therefore, for those unwilling to accept the demonstrative reasoning an argumentation leading to the impossible is made; and to diseases which are not cured by the plaster a wound and a cautery are applied; and for the unwilling and incorrigible a cure is made by the scourge: so it had to be in the Church's corrections. And therefore the Lord, its institutor and founder, gave to the Church not only the *medicaments* of the Sacraments for curing those who approach, but also the *sword of the spirit, which is the word of God*[^10], and the power of amputating and cutting off the contemptuous and the rebellious; and such persons it is lawful and a duty to excommunicate, as has been shown by the authority of God and by the example of the Apostle and by reasoning in a like case.

1. To that, then, which is objected — that to excommunicate is to cast out from the communion[^11] which is through charity — it must be said that communion is threefold: one *wholly spiritual,* and this is with respect to interior love; one *corporeal,* and this is with respect to exterior conversation; one *in an intermediate mode,* and this is with respect to the reception of the Sacraments, and especially with respect to the Sacrament of the altar. I say, then, that from the *first* no one can or ought to be excluded so long as he is a wayfarer, nor does excommunication signify the privation of that communion. With respect to the *sacramental,* anyone is excluded who is said to be excommunicated, whether by the major or the minor [excommunication]. With respect to *exterior conversation,* the major excommunication is regarded, in which communication is denied with respect to lawful acts, which are regarded in four, namely in the *kiss,* in *conversation,* in *banquet,* in *oratory.* Whence the verse:

> *Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur* [The mouth, to pray, the greeting, fellowship, the table are denied].

So, then, it is plain that, since communion is threefold — one *spiritual,* another *sacramental,* and another *corporeal* — that according to the first no one is excommunicated; according to the sacramental, everyone is excommunicated who is said to be excommunicated; according to the third, that one is excommunicated who is said to be excommunicated with the major excommunication, because the privation of communication is greater here. And so that first point is plain.

2. To that which is objected — that no one is to be separated from the Sacraments — it must be said that *on the contrary* [he is], since, even though the Sacraments are medicines, nevertheless they do not benefit except those who are disposed. Whence just as a good physician according to his art bars a sick man from medicines, not only from foods, on account of his indisposition; so it is to be understood in the matter at hand. For it is more useful that medicine be withheld from someone than be given[^12] contrary to his disposition; indeed, to defer medicine for such a one is medicinal.

3. To that which is objected concerning excommunication, whether it is a disease or a medicine; it must be said that, just as *cutting* by its first account is a wound and causes pain, yet in comparison to the wound of an abscess is a medicine; so the separation itself from the communion of the faithful signifies an evil and a harm and a punishment, yet in comparison to the rebellious person it is a medicine, so that his rebellion and contumacy may be broken. Whence just as he who syllogizes *per impossibile* leads to the impossible, not that he may rest there, but that he may return to the truth; so the Church separates and excommunicates, in order that it may more tightly bind the one returning with humility and confounded over his contumacy, and may enclose him interiorly. And so it is plain that, although it is a medicine, because it cures the disease of rebellion, yet no one ought to desire this medicine, nor ought it to be given to one seeking the true medicine, but to one who despises [it].

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4. To that which is objected — that to excommunicate is to deliver to Satan — it must be said that Satan is a tormentor, not only of souls, but also of bodies. But to deliver to a tormentor is twofold: either by *ceasing* from the protection [that keeps one] from torment[^13], by exposing [him], or by *commanding* the tormentor to afflict [him]. To excommunicate, therefore, according to the state of the *present* Church, is to deliver to Satan by withdrawing protection and exposing [him] to him; for it withdraws the suffrages and the Sacraments by which we are fortified against the snares of the enemy. But in the time of the *primitive* Church, because the demons were subject to the Apostles themselves, and the faith had to be made manifest through miracles, [the excommunicated] were not only exposed, but indeed were bodily afflicted at the Apostolic command; as is said in First Corinthians five, both in the text and in the Gloss; and that was fitting to be done at the beginning of the Church for terror, or on account of the excellence of the Apostles. But now, although they are not so afflicted, nevertheless they are exposed to be afflicted in body and spirit; and to that extent they are said to be delivered to Satan and truly to be excommunicated. And so the objections are plain.

la: Vers. 15-17. — Seq. textus est ibid. v. 18, ubi Vulgata *quaecumque alligaveritis* pro *quodcumque ligaveritis.* — Subinde pro *communicationem* cod. G *communionem.* Notamus, quod in seqq. plures codd. exhibent modo *communionem* modo *communicationem.*

en: Verses 15-17. — The following text is ibid. v. 18, where the Vulgate has *quaecumque alligaveritis* for *quodcumque ligaveritis.* — Thereafter for *communicationem* codex G [reads] *communionem.* We note that in what follows several codices exhibit now *communionem,* now *communicationem.*

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. locus est I. Tim. 1, 20; tertius Gal. 1, 9; quartus 1. Cor. 16, 22, in quo Vulgata post *Dominum* addit *nostrum.*

en: Verse 5. — The following passage is 1 Tim. 1:20; the third Gal. 1:9; the fourth 1 Cor. 16:22, in which the Vulgate after *Dominum* adds *nostrum.*

la: Cod. S *communionem fidelium.*

en: Codex S [reads] *communionem fidelium* [the communion of the faithful].

la: Pro *recte,* quod codd. IK omittunt, cod. H *membra.* De hoc arg. cfr. C. *Resecandae* (16.), C. 24. q. 3.

en: For *recte,* which codices IK omit, codex H [has] *membra.* On this argument cf. the chapter *Resecandae* (16.), Causa 24. q. 3.

la: B. Albert., hic a. 16: Excommunicatio definitur a iurisperitis sic: Excommunicatio est separatio a communione Ecclesiae siue quoad fructum et suffragia Ecclesiae communia. Cfr. Gratian. super C. *Ad mensam* (24.), C. 11. § 1. q. 3, et Gregor. IX, C. *Si quem* (59.), X. de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 39). — Pro *communione* plures codd. et ed. 1 *communicatione.*

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 16: Excommunication is defined by the jurists thus: Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, whether as to the fruit and the common suffrages of the Church. Cf. Gratian on the chapter *Ad mensam* (24.), Causa 11. § 1. q. 3, and Gregory IX, chapter *Si quem* (59.), in the Decretals (X) on the Sentence of excommunication (book V tit. 39). — For *communione* several codices and the 1st edition [read] *communicatione.*

la: Cod. U prosequitur: et indigens medicinis. Si iustus et sanus, non est etc.

en: Codex U continues: and in need of medicines. If just and sound, he is not, etc.

la: Ut insinuatur C. *Cum medicinalis* sit excommunicatio, non mortalis, disciplinans, non eradicans (1.), de Sententia excommun. (lib. V. tit. 11.) in VI. et est Innocentii IV. Cfr. C. *Notandum est, quod* (37.), C. 24. q. 3. — Mox pro *aptanda* codd. AGHK satis bene *optanda.*

en: As is intimated in the chapter *Cum medicinalis* — that excommunication be medicinal, not mortal, disciplinary, not eradicating (1.), on the Sentence of excommunication (book V tit. 11.) in the Sext, and it is of Innocent IV. Cf. the chapter *Notandum est, quod* (37.), Causa 24. q. 3. — Presently for *aptanda* codices AGHK quite well [read] *optanda.*

la: Vide supra fundam. 2. — Inferius pro *Si quantum* edd. cum paucis codd. *Sed quantum.* Post *litteram* cod. bb addit *Si.*

en: See above, fundamentum 2. — Below, for *Si quantum* the editions with a few codices [read] *Sed quantum.* After *litteram* codex bb adds *Si.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., 1. Prior. c. 22. 30. (29.) 40. (38.) et 11. c. 14. seqq. — Aliquanto inferius pro *sic in moralibus* secunda manus in codd. EF substituit *et sicut in moralibus.* Subinde pro *plicabiles* cod. W *placabiles.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] I c. 22. 30. (29.) 40. (38.) and II c. 14. ff. — A little below, for *sic in moralibus* a second hand in codices EF substituted *et sicut in moralibus.* Thereafter for *plicabiles* codex W [reads] *placabiles.*

la: Eph. 6, 17. Cfr. Sap. 16, 12: Etenim neque herba neque malagma [cfr. Isidor., IV. Etymolog. c. 9.] sanavit eos, sed tuus, Domine, sermo, qui sanat omnia. — Superius pro *in Ecclesiae rectoribus* substituimus ex cod. U *in Ecclesiae correctionibus.* In fine corp. pro *Dei* cod. H *Domini.*

en: Eph. 6:17. Cf. Wis. 16:12: For neither herb nor poultice [cf. Isidore, Etymol. IV c. 9.] healed them, but your word, O Lord, which heals all things. — Above, for *in Ecclesiae rectoribus* [among the rulers of the Church] we have substituted from codex U *in Ecclesiae correctionibus* [in the corrections of the Church]. At the end of the body, for *Dei* codex H [reads] *Domini.*

la: Codd. USU *est ex communione Ecclesiae.* — In codd. GI suppletur *excommunicatione.* — In C. *Excommunicatos* (17.), C. 11. q. 3. dicitur: Nec cum eis [excommunicatis] in oratione, aut cibo aut potu, aut osculo communicet, nec Ave eis dicat [II. Ioan. v. 10. seq.]. — Edd., posito *quinque,* inferius post *in oratorio* addunt *in valefaciendo.* Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 22. m. 1. a. 2: Qui [actus legitimi] attenduntur in osculo, in salutatione, in convivio, in oratorio. Unde versus: Si pro delictis anathema quis efficiatur, Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur. Per *communionem* B. Albert. (hic a. 16.) et S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) intelligi volunt communicationem in Sacramentis, ideoque reduci posset ad actum, qui indicatur in oratorio; si vero cum aliis intelligeretur de rebus civilibus, v. g. de contractibus, reducenda esset sub actum colloquii. — Cod. A *Unde versus: Si pro delictis anathemate quis feriatur; os* etc.

en: Codices USU [read] *est ex communione Ecclesiae* [is from the communion of the Church]. — In codices GI *excommunicatione* is supplied. — In the chapter *Excommunicatos* (17.), Causa 11. q. 3, it is said: Let one neither communicate with them [the excommunicated] in prayer, or in food or drink, or in a kiss, nor say Ave to them [2 John v. 10 f.]. — The editions, having put *quinque* [five], below after *in oratorio* add *in valefaciendo* [in bidding farewell]. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 22. m. 1. a. 2: Which [lawful acts] are regarded in the kiss, in the greeting, in the banquet, in the oratory. Whence the verse: If for offenses anyone be made anathema, the mouth, to pray, the greeting, fellowship, the table are denied. By *communio* Bl. Albert (here a. 16.) and St. Thomas (here q. 2. a. 1.) wish communication in the Sacraments to be understood, and therefore it could be reduced to the act indicated in the oratory; but if it were understood with the others concerning civil matters, e.g. contracts, it would have to be reduced under the act of conversation. — Codex A [reads] *Unde versus: Si pro delictis anathemate quis feriatur; os* etc.

la: Edd. *subtrahere quam dare.*

en: The editions [read] *subtrahere quam dare.*

la: Est participium passivum futurum. — Multi codd. perperam *torquentis.* — Alex. Hal., loc. cit., legit: *protectionem subtrahendo et tortori exponendo, aut iubendo.* Cfr. hic respiciunt lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine. Verba *tradere tortori* respiciunt Matth. 18, 34: Tradidit eum tortoribus.

en: [*torquendi*] is a future passive participle. — Many codices wrongly [read] *torquentis.* — Alexander of Hales, loc. cit., reads: *by withdrawing protection and exposing him to the tormentor, or by commanding.* Cf. here they look back to the letter of the Master, c. 6. at the end. The words *tradere tortori* [to deliver to the tormentor] look back to Matt. 18:34: He delivered him to the tormentors. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Doctrina S. Doctoris de *potestate excommunicandi* Ecclesiae in clavibus a Christo tradita, de qua agitur his 6 quaestionibus, praeveniendo elidit plures errores posteriores, ab Ecclesia reprobatos censuris in Wiklefium, Hussium, Lutherum et Synodum Pistoriensem latis. Reprobatur enim a Martino V. et Concilio Constantiensi art. 11. Wiklefii: « Nullus praelatus debet aliquem excommunicare, nisi prius sciat eum excommunicatum a Deo » etc.; cfr. artt. 12, 13. 30. 34, et Hussii prop. 19. Vide etiam de Papae et praelatorum potestate excommunicandi artt. 31-32. 33. inter articulos 39, de quibus interrogandi sunt suspecti errorum Wikleffi et Hussii. — Item inter errores Lutheri a Leone X. damnatur prop. 23: « Excommunicationes sunt tantum externae poenae nec privant hominem communibus spiritualibus Ecclesiae orationibus »; item Synodi Pistoriensis prop. 46. 47. 48, nec non prop. 44. ab Alexandro VIII. 18. Martii 1666 damnata: « Quoad forum conscientiae, reo correcto eiusque contumacia cessante, cessant censurae ». In doctrina totius articuli doctores antiqui communiter consentiunt. S. Thom. et praecipue Richard. a Med. etiam alias quasdam quaestiones adiiciunt. Saepius ab eisdem reprehenduntur abusus tunc grassantes in nimis frequenti fulminatione excommunicationis. — De iniusta excommunicatione cfr. hic dub. 2.

**II.** De 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 22. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Scot., de toto hoc art. infra d. 19. n. 13. seqq.; Report. ibid. n. 18. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 21. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., de hac a. 2 seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de toto art. hic q. 4.

**III.** De 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3. — S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 21. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 18. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. ad 6. 7. — Richard. a Med. rem tangit loc. cit. q. 2.

**IV.** De 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 4. § 1. 2. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 2; Suppl. q. 22. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 19. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 3.

**V.** De 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 5. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 22. a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 2.

**VI.** De 5. quaestione notandum est, quod antiquus rigor disciplinae remissus est, primo a Martino V. (Const. *Ad evitanda scandala*), ita ut cum *toleratis* excommunicatis communicare liceret; deinde a Pio IX. (Const. *Apostolicae Sedis*) sublata est excommunicatio *minor,* quatenus ipso facto incurritur. De eadem quaestione Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 6. § 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 4; Suppl. q. 23. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 17. 21. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1-5. — Durand., hic q. 3.

**VII.** De 6. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 7. § 1. — S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 5. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. q. 24. a. 2. — B. Albert., infra d. 19. a. 11. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 10. q. 1. — Quoad quaestiones incidentes cfr. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. 3; S. Thom., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 1. 3, et Suppl. q. 24. a. 1. 3; Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2-3 et a. 9. q. 1-5.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The teaching of the holy Doctor concerning the Church's *power of excommunicating* handed down in the keys by Christ, which is treated in these 6 questions, by anticipation refutes several later errors, reprobated by the Church through censures enacted against Wyclif, Huss, Luther, and the Synod of Pistoia. For there is reprobated by Martin V and the Council of Constance article 11 of Wyclif: « No prelate ought to excommunicate anyone unless he first knows him to be excommunicated by God » etc.; cf. articles 12, 13. 30. 34, and Huss's proposition 19. See also concerning the power of the Pope and prelates to excommunicate articles 31-32. 33. among the 39 articles concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wyclif and Huss are to be interrogated. — Likewise among the errors of Luther there is condemned by Leo X proposition 23: « Excommunications are only external penalties and do not deprive a man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church »; likewise [there are condemned] of the Synod of Pistoia propositions 46. 47. 48, and also proposition 44 condemned by Alexander VIII on 18 March 1666: « As to the forum of conscience, when the guilty party has been corrected and his contumacy has ceased, the censures cease ». In the teaching of the whole article the ancient doctors commonly agree. St. Thomas and especially Richard of Mediavilla also add certain other questions. Often by these same [doctors] there are rebuked the abuses then raging in the too-frequent fulmination of excommunication. — On unjust excommunication cf. here dub. 2.

**II.** On the 1st question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 22. m. 1. a. 1. 2. — Scotus, on this whole article below d. 19. n. 13. ff.; Reportatio ibid. n. 18. ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1. quaestiuncula 1. 2; Supplement q. 21. a. 1. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16. 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Durandus, on this a. 2 ff. of the questions here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on the whole article here q. 4.

**III.** On the 2nd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 3. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiuncula 2; Supplement q. 21. a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 18. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. ad 6. 7. — Richard of Mediavilla touches the matter loc. cit. q. 2.

**IV.** On the 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 4. § 1. 2. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 2; Supplement q. 22. a. 1. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 19. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. 2. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 3.

**V.** On the 4th question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 5. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiuncula 3; Supplement q. 22. a. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. a. 3. quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5. q. 2.

**VI.** On the 5th question it is to be noted that the ancient rigor of discipline has been relaxed, first by Martin V (Const. *Ad evitanda scandala*), so that it became lawful to communicate with *tolerated* excommunicates; then by Pius IX (Const. *Apostolicae Sedis*) the *minor* excommunication, insofar as it is incurred ipso facto, was abolished. On the same question Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 6. § 1. 2. 3. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 4; Supplement q. 23. a. 1-3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 17. 21. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit. quaestiuncula 4. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 6. q. 1-5. — Durandus, here q. 3.

**VII.** On the 6th question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. a. 7. § 1. — St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 5. quaestiuncula 2; Supplement q. 24. a. 2. — Bl. Albert, below d. 19. a. 11. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 10. q. 1. — As to the incidental questions cf. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. 3; St. Thomas, loc. cit. quaestiuncula 1. 3, and Supplement q. 24. a. 1. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. q. 2-3 and a. 9. q. 1-5.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt` lines 53918–54209), cross-checked against the 450 dpi PDF column bands for pp. 484–486 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{484,485,486}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`). Vol IV is two-column; the Conclusio/Respondeo and the scholion cascade-shatter in the OCR, so the PDF bands were authoritative there. Offset pdf = printed + 20. Running heads verified: p.484 "ARTICULUS UNICUS / De excommunicatione / QUAESTIO I"; p.485 "DIST. XVIII. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I"; p.486 "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV." The article opener (*Circa primum…* — the *Quaeruntur sex* listing is absent here; the article folds straight into q1, as expected per the chunking convention) aligns with the title.

**Scholion ownership.** The Articulus-Unicus SCHOLION (OCR-garbled header "SCHOLIOK") sits at the top of p.486 between the close of q1's Respondeo and the opening of QUAESTIO II. It is the article-level scholion: §I states the doctrine "de qua agitur his 6 quaestionibus" and §§II–VII give the parallel-place apparatus for questions 1 through 6 respectively (II=q1, III=q2, IV=q3, V=q4, VI=q5, VII=q6). Rendered IN FULL here (body first, scholion last per the parser rule). Sibling questions q2–q6 therefore correctly carry NO scholion of their own.

**Footer split (cross-page / cross-chunk).**
- p.484: 8 footnotes, all q1 ([^1]–[^8]).
- p.485: 5 footnotes — the first 3 ([^9]–[^11]) plus fn. 6 (*subtrahere quam dare*), which anchors q1's *medicinam subtrahi quam dari* clause → [^12]. (The verse "Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur" and its long apparatus note are folded into [^11].)
- p.486: 5 footnotes. **fnn. 1–3 belong to q1's tail** — fn. 1 (*participium passivum futurum* / *tradere tortori*) anchors the *cessando a protectione torquendi* clause = [^13]; fn. 2 (Gloss note) and fn. 3 (*Conquesti sunt nobis*) print on p.486 but anchor body that is q1's tail / q2's opening. **p.486 fnn. 4–5 (*Si quis ecclesiam igne*; *gladius spiritualis = mucro episcopi*) FORWARD to q2** — they anchor q2's fundamenta 2 and 3.

**Hand-off to q2.** The QUAESTIO II opener begins at the foot of p.486 ("*Pro quo quaeritur* — Secundo quaeritur, pro quo quis debeat excommunicari…"). q2 should pick up p.486 footnotes 4 and 5 for its fundamenta 2–3, and check p.486 fn. 2 (Gloss) / fn. 3 (*Conquesti sunt nobis*) against its own opening. q2 owns no scholion (the article scholion lives here in q1).

**[?] flags.** None inline. Notes: the OCR-garbled header "SCHOLIOK" → "SCHOLION" (unambiguous). Footnote [^13]'s Alex. Hal. lemma was torn at a line break in the band ("aut pre…"); reconstructed from context as the *protectionem subtrahendo et tortori exponendo, aut iubendo* reading — sense secure, so not flagged inline.