title: Dist. 32, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de ratione Augustini, quae ponitur in littera: *Si Pater est sapiens sapientia genita, quam genuit, et hoc est ei esse quod sapere, ergo est sapientia genita.* Videtur enim istud argumentum non valere, quia illud non valet: *hoc est Patri esse quod operari; sed operatur per Filium: ergo est per Filium.* Ergo nec similiter illud argumentum valet. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia *operari* connotat effectum: obiicitur, quod idem est Patri *esse* quod *esse Patrem*; sed tamen istud argumentum non valet: *Pater deitate est Deus, ergo deitate est Pater*: ergo similiter non valet hoc argumentum *est sapiens sapientia genita, ergo est sapientia genita*[^1].

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod argumentum Augustini est necessarium: quoniam *esse sapientem* et *esse* in divinis non differunt modo dicendi a parte rei, sed solum a parte nostra. Non sic autem est *esse* et *operari*, quoniam, etsi *operari* quantum ad principale significatum sit idem quod *esse*, tamen quantum ad connotatum differt, et potest esse extraneum, et ita potest ibi esse accidens[^2]. Tamen hoc quod est *esse Deum* et *esse Patrem*, quamvis non differant quantum ad essentiam vel modum essendi, differunt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi, qui vere est in divinis, scilicet[^3] *absolutum* et *comparatum*; et ideo non transit paternitas in substantiam, sicut sapientia; ideo habet alium modum dicendi, qui potest esse extraneus respectu alicuius attributi. Ideo ibi est accidens, non autem in argumento Augustini.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Pater non est sapiens sapientia genita, sed ingenita. Videtur enim male dicere, quia sicut aeternitas appropriatur Patri, ita sapientia Filio; sed aeternitas non debet dici ingenita, sicut dicit Anselmus in libro *de Incarnatione Verbi*[^4]: ergo nec sapientia potest nec debet dici ingenita. Item, si potest dici sapientia ingenita[^5], pari ratione potest dici sapientia procedens; et ita videtur, quod sapientia sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto, sicut et Filio.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quare non dicitur *potentia de potentia*, sicut *sapientia de sapientia*?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *sapientia* est de nominibus mediis[^6], quae sunt nata supponere pro persona. Et ideo sicut dicitur *Deus de Deo*, et *Deus genitus* et *ingenitus*, ita dicitur etiam *sapientia*; non tamen ita proprie, quia nomen abstractum est quodam modo. Magis tamen dicitur *sapientia de sapientia* quam *aeternitas de aeternitate*, quia aeternitas significat in maiori abstractione quam sapientia, et ideo magis abstrahit a ratione originis. Secundum hoc etiam est concedendum, quod possit dici *sapientia procedens*, licet adhuc minus proprie. Nec valet illud argumentum; quamvis enim sapientia non sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto[^7], tamen per determinationem adiunctam potest trahi.

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Ad illud[^8] — quare non dicitur *potentia de potentia*? — dicendum, quod non ita proprie dicitur sicut *sapientia de sapientia*. Quoniam sapientia appropriatur Filio, qui est ab alio et ab alio habet omne quod habet, ergo et sapientiam ab illo[^9] habet: ideo *sapientia genita* ex sua appropriatione praesupponit *sapientiam ingenitam*. Sed potentia appropriatur Patri, qui non est ab alio; ideo non sic dicitur *potentia de potentia*, vel *potentia genita*.

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus in libro *Retractationum* et ponitur in littera: *Melius istam quaestionem in libro de Trinitate tractavi.* Videtur enim non recte loqui, quia, cum comparativum in utroque extremorum praesupponat rem sui positivi[^10], si ibi *melius*, ergo utrobique *bene*: ergo si ibi dicit, quod Pater est sapiens sapientia, quam genuit, videtur quod dicat verum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod abusiva est comparatio[^11], quoniam in libro *de Trinitate* dicit contrarium huius, et ideo si ibi bene, constat quod hic male. Quantum ad hoc tamen, quod aliqua vera dixit in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum* de hac quaestione, ideo non omnino male, sed quodam modo bene, quodam modo male: et ideo dicit, quod ibi *melius*, innuens quod aliquid sit ibi male dictum. Qui enim unum oppositorum astruit, per consequens destruit alterum.

#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hac responsione Magistri, quod sapientia genita est sapiens *de sapientia ingenita*. Videtur enim non esse bona, quia non videtur respondere ad quaestionem. Non enim quaeritur, quod sapientia genita sive Filius sit *de* Patre, sed hoc quaeritur, utrum Filius sit sapiens[^12] sapientia ingenita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister bene respondet, licet verbis paucis, in quibus innuit hanc distinctionem, quod aliquem esse sapientem aliquo, hoc est dupliciter: aut ita, quod ablativus teneatur formaliter, et sic Filius est sapiens sapientia genita et Pater sapientia ingenita; aut ita, quod teneatur originaliter, et sic, cum sapientia genita sit *de* sapientia ingenita, Filius est sapiens sapientia ingenita. Sed quia ablativus ut plurimum construitur in ratione formae, ideo Magister caute locutus dixit[^13], quod Filius, qui est sapientia genita, est *de* sapientia ingenita sapiens, ut verbum non haberet calumniam; et ideo bene respondet.

#### DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *uterque est una sapientia, et tamen solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.* Videtur enim dicere duo opposita, quia istae duae proprietates[^14] sapientiam contrahunt, et cum sint proprietates distinctae, distinguunt — et hoc patet, quia *solus Pater est sapientia ingenita* — quod si sapientia distinguitur, ergo est alia et alia sapientia, ergo non una. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit, quod *solus Pater est sapientia ingenita*. Aut enim dicitur sapientia essentialiter, aut personaliter: si personaliter; ergo non una sapientia est genita et ingenita, cum Pater et Filius non sint una persona; si vero essentialiter, non ergo solus Pater est sapientia ingenita.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in hoc nomine *sapientia* duo est considerare, scilicet significatum et suppositum. Et quantum ad significatum dicit essentiam; sed[^15] suppositum est persona. Et illae determinationes *genita* et *ingenita* non respiciunt significatum, sed suppositum, et ita distinguunt suppositum, manente unitate in significato sive forma; et sapientia genita et ingenita est alia et alia, scilicet persona, sed non est alia et alia sapientia, sicut non est alia essentia. Et ideo Magister bonum exemplum ponit in hoc termino *Deus*, quod significat essentiam et supponit personam. — Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum dicatur essentialiter, an personaliter; dicendum, quod quantum ad significatum dicitur essentialiter, sed quantum ad suppositum dicitur personaliter; et ideo nulla est controversia.

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#### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit[^16], quod *Filius non a se agit*, cum Pater in eo manere monstratur; sed similiter Filius manet in Patre: ergo pari ratione Pater non a se agit. Item, videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: *Infirmus sit non a se agendo, nisi a Deo ipse agat*, quia secundum hoc, cum omnis creatura agat a Deo, tunc videtur esse agens infirmum, nec in hoc videtur differre Filius ab aliis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Hilarius duo intendit ostendere ex verbis Domini in Ioanne, et illa duo ostendit deducendo ad impossibile. Ipse enim Dominus dicit Ioannis decimo quarto[^17]: *Verba, quae ego loquor vobis, a me ipso non loquor; Pater in me manens ipse facit opera.* Ex hoc ergo arguit, quod Filius non agit a se, sed a Patre manente in se, non tantum ut consubstantialis, sed ut principium; sic autem non manet Filius in Patre, sed tantum ut consubstantialis. — Alia est auctoritas Domini, Ioannis octavo[^18], ubi dicit: *Qui misit me non reliquit me solum, quia quae placita sunt ei facio semper.* Si ipse agit semper una cum Patre, tunc ergo per se agit. — Haec duo probat per deductionem ad impossibile: quia omnis potentia est a prima potentia, quae primo residet in Patre: ergo si Filius non potest a Deo, simpliciter est impotens vel infirmus, quia infirmus habet potentiam deficiendi a se, non a Deo. Item si Filius non agit per se, non agit per virtutem propriam sibi connaturalem: ergo alia est virtus Patris et Filii. *A se* enim et *non a se*, non facit distinctionem in natura, sed solum in persona, quia dicit rationem principii vel originis. *Per se* autem et *non per se* — quia *per se* dicitur contra *per accidens*, sive contra *per aliud* — ponit diversitatem in natura[^19]; et ideo Filius agit per se, quamvis non a se.

#### DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod una est tantum sapientia Patris, sed non uno modo dicitur[^20]. Videtur enim male dicere[^21], quia sapientia semper est essentialiter: ergo falsum dicit, cum dicit: *non uno modo dicta*.

**Respondeo:** Magister non vult, quod sapientia sit dicta multipliciter, sed quod sapientia Patris: quia genitivus potest construi in ratione originis, et sic dicitur Filius sapientia Patris, vel ipsa sapientia genita sapientia Patris, quia est a Patre; vel potest intelligi in ratione subiecti, ut dicatur sapientia Patris, sicut albedo Petri, et sic sapientia genita non dicitur esse Patris, sed Filii[^22]. Quia ergo ratio passiva, importata per hoc adiectivum *genita*, non est in persona Patris et Filii una, falsa est locutio ratione determinationis, non ratione eius quod est sapientia: quia una et eadem est sapientia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et illa est sapientia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti.

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english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning Augustine's argument, which is set down in the text: *If the Father is wise by a begotten wisdom, which he begot, and this — to be — is the same for him as to be wise, then he is begotten wisdom.* For that argument seems not to hold, because this does not hold: *to be is for the Father the same as to operate; but he operates through the Son: therefore he is through the Son.* Therefore likewise that argument does not hold. If you say that it is not similar, because *to operate* connotes an effect: it is objected that *to be* is for the Father the same as *to be the Father*; but nevertheless this argument does not hold: *the Father is God by deity, therefore by deity he is Father*: therefore similarly this argument does not hold: *he is wise by begotten wisdom, therefore he is begotten wisdom*[^1].

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine's argument is necessary: since *to be wise* and *to be* in divine things do not differ in mode of speaking on the side of the thing, but only on our side. It is not so, however, with *to be* and *to operate*, since, although *to operate* with respect to its principal signification is the same as *to be*, nevertheless with respect to what is connoted it differs, and can be extraneous, and so there can be an accident there[^2]. Yet *to be God* and *to be the Father*, although they do not differ as to essence or mode of being, nevertheless differ as to the mode of comporting [oneself], which truly exists in divine things, namely[^3] *absolute* and *comparative*; and therefore paternity does not pass over into substance, as wisdom does; therefore it has another mode of being said, which can be extraneous in respect of some attribute. Therefore in that case there is an accident, but not in Augustine's argument.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Father is not wise by *begotten* wisdom, but *unbegotten* wisdom. For he seems to speak ill, because, just as eternity is appropriated to the Father, so wisdom to the Son; but eternity ought not to be called *unbegotten*, as Anselm says in the book *On the Incarnation of the Word*[^4]: therefore neither can nor ought wisdom to be called *unbegotten*. Likewise, if it can be said *unbegotten wisdom*[^5], by parity of reasoning it can be said *proceeding wisdom*; and so it seems that wisdom is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, just as also to the Son.

Alongside this it is asked, why is it not said *power from power*, as *wisdom from wisdom*?

**I respond:** It must be said that *wisdom* is among the middle nouns[^6], which are apt to supposit for the person. And therefore, just as one says *God from God*, and *God begotten* and *unbegotten*, so also is *wisdom* said; not, however, so properly, because it is in some way an abstract noun. Yet *wisdom from wisdom* is said more [properly] than *eternity from eternity*, because *eternity* signifies in greater abstraction than *wisdom*, and therefore abstracts more from the account of origin. According to this, also, it is to be conceded that one can say *proceeding wisdom*, though still less properly. Nor does that argument hold; for although wisdom is not appropriable to the Holy Spirit[^7], yet by an added determination it can be drawn over [to him].

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To that[^8] — why is *power from power* not said? — it must be said that it is not so properly said as *wisdom from wisdom*. For wisdom is appropriated to the Son, who is from another and from another has all that he has, therefore he has wisdom also from him[^9]: thus *begotten wisdom* by its appropriation presupposes *unbegotten wisdom*. But power is appropriated to the Father, who is not from another; therefore *power from power*, or *begotten power*, is not said in this way.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says in the book *Retractations* and which is set down in the text: *I treated this question better in the book On the Trinity.* For he seems not to speak rightly, because, since the comparative presupposes in each of its extremes the thing of its positive[^10], if there [it is] *better*, then in both [places] *well*: therefore if there he says that the Father is wise by the wisdom which he begot, it seems that he speaks truly.

**I respond:** It must be said that the comparison is misused[^11], since in the book *On the Trinity* he says the contrary of this, and therefore if there [he speaks] well, it is established that here [he speaks] ill. Yet inasmuch as he said certain true things in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions* about this question, [he did] therefore not entirely ill, but in some way well, in some way ill: and therefore he says *better* there, hinting that something is there said ill. For he who supports one of two opposites, by consequence destroys the other.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this response of the Master, that begotten wisdom is wise *by unbegotten wisdom*. For it seems not to be good, because it does not seem to answer the question. For it is not asked whether the begotten wisdom or the Son is *from* the Father, but this is asked: whether the Son is wise[^12] by unbegotten wisdom.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master answers well, though in few words, in which he hints at this distinction: that someone's being wise by something is twofold: either thus, that the ablative is taken formally, and so the Son is wise by begotten wisdom and the Father by unbegotten wisdom; or thus, that it is taken originally, and so, since begotten wisdom is *from* unbegotten wisdom, the Son is wise by unbegotten wisdom. But because the ablative is for the most part construed in the account of form, therefore the Master, speaking cautiously, said[^13] that the Son, who is begotten wisdom, is wise *from* unbegotten wisdom, so that the verb might not have any cavil; and therefore he answers well.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *each is one wisdom, and yet the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom.* For he seems to say two opposites, because these two properties[^14] contract wisdom, and since they are distinct properties, they distinguish [it] — and this is plain, because *the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom* — but if wisdom is distinguished, then there is one and another wisdom, therefore not one. Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that *the Father alone is unbegotten wisdom*. For *wisdom* is said either essentially or personally: if personally, then there is not one wisdom which is begotten and unbegotten, since the Father and the Son are not one person; if however essentially, then the Father is not the only one [who is] unbegotten wisdom.

**I respond:** It must be said that in this name *wisdom* two things are to be considered, namely the *significate* and the *supposit*. And as to the significate it says *essence*; but[^15] the supposit is *person*. And those determinations *begotten* and *unbegotten* do not regard the significate, but the supposit, and so they distinguish the supposit, while unity remains in the significate or form; and begotten and unbegotten wisdom is one and another, namely [one and another] *person*, but it is not one and another wisdom, just as it is not one and another essence. And therefore the Master sets down a good example in this term *God*, which signifies the essence and supposits for the person. — When therefore it is asked whether it is said essentially or personally, it must be said that as to the significate it is said essentially, but as to the supposit it is said personally; and so there is no controversy.

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#### DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says[^16], that *the Son does not act of himself*, since the Father is shown to remain in him; but the Son likewise remains in the Father: therefore by parity of reasoning the Father does not act of himself. Likewise, he seems to say what is false when he says: *He would be infirm, were he not to act of himself unless God himself were to act*, because, according to this, since every creature acts from God, then [every creature] would seem to be an infirm agent, nor in this would the Son seem to differ from others.

**I respond:** It must be said that Hilary intends to show two things from the words of the Lord in John, and shows those two by reduction to impossibility. For the Lord himself says in John 14[^17]: *The words that I speak to you, I do not speak from myself; the Father remaining in me, he himself does the works.* From this therefore he argues that the Son does not act of himself, but with the Father remaining in him, not only as consubstantial but as principle; for the Son does not so remain in the Father, but only as consubstantial. — There is another authority of the Lord, John 8[^18], where he says: *He who sent me has not left me alone, because the things that are pleasing to him I always do.* If he himself always acts together with the Father, then therefore he acts through himself. — These two he proves by reduction to impossibility: because every power is from the first power, which first resides in the Father: therefore if the Son cannot [act] from God, he is simply impotent or infirm, because the infirm has the power of failing of himself, not from God. Likewise if the Son does not act through himself, he does not act through a power proper and connatural to himself: therefore the power of the Father and of the Son is different. For *of himself* and *not of himself* makes no distinction in nature, but only in person, because it expresses the account of principle or origin. But *through himself* and *not through himself* — because *through himself* is said in opposition to *through accident*, or in opposition to *through another* — posits diversity in nature[^19]; and therefore the Son acts through himself, although not of himself.

#### DOUBT VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that there is only one wisdom of the Father, but it is not said in one mode[^20]. For he seems to speak ill[^21], because *wisdom* is always [predicated] essentially: therefore he says what is false when he says: *not said in one mode*.

**I respond:** The Master does not mean that *wisdom* is said in many ways, but that the *wisdom of the Father* [is]: because the genitive can be construed in the account of origin, and so the Son is called the wisdom of the Father, or the begotten wisdom itself [is called] the wisdom of the Father, because it is from the Father; or it can be understood in the account of subject, so that it is called the wisdom of the Father as the whiteness of Peter [is so called], and in this way begotten wisdom is not said to be of the Father but of the Son[^22]. Because therefore the passive account, imported by this adjective *begotten*, is not one in the person of the Father and of the Son, the locution is false by reason of the determination, not by reason of that which is wisdom: because the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one and the same, and that is the wisdom of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.

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la: Vat. cum solis edd. 4, 5 omittit *ergo est sapientia genita*.

en: The Vatican edition, with editions 4 and 5 alone, omits *therefore he is begotten wisdom*.

la: Intellige hic sicut infra circa finem solutionis: *fallaciam accidentis*.

en: Understand here, as later near the end of the solution: *the fallacy of accident*.

la: Auctoritate plurimorum codd. restituimus *scilicet*, quod in Vat. desideratur. Pro *scilicet* cod. Z *id est*, ed. 1 *secundum* et non pauci mss. *sed*. Proxime ante pro *qui* Vat. cum cod. cc *quod*; mendose.

en: On the authority of many codices we have restored *scilicet* ("namely"), which is wanting in the Vatican edition. For *scilicet* cod. Z reads *id est*, ed. 1 *secundum*, and not a few mss. *sed*. Just before, for *qui* the Vatican edition with cod. cc reads *quod*; erroneously.

la: Titulus integer est: *de Fide Trinitatis et de incarnatione Verbi contra blasphemias Ruzelini sive Roscelini*, in quo libro c. 9. Anselmus de aeternitate trium divinarum personarum disserens ait: «Et quoniam ista nativitas et ista processio sine principio sunt; alioquin aeternitas nata et aeternitas procedens, quod falsum est, habet principium: nequaquam Deum incepisse esse Patrem aut Filium aut Spiritum sanctum cogitare debemus aut possumus». Ita textus originalis, quem Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 1. paulo aliter refert sic: «Anselmus: *Unus est Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus*. Et postmodum loquens de nativitate et processione dicit, quod nativitas et processio sine principio sunt, alioquin esset aeternitas nata et procedens: quod falsum est — nequaquam Deum habere principium aut incepisse Patrem aut Filium aut Spiritum sanctum cogitare debemus. Ex hoc ergo videtur relinqui, quod cum aeternitas non debeat dici nata vel procedens, quod convenit soli Patri». Hunc Anselmi locum, sicut ab Alex. Hal. exhibetur, S. Bonav. ante oculos habuisse et ex eo sententiam sumsisse videtur, quod aeternitas non debeat dici *nasci* neque *ingenita*, quam sententiam probat in corp. solutionis. — Vat., renitentibus mss. nec non ed. 1, pro *ingenita* substituit *genita*, qua lectione argumentum destruitur. Paulo superius pro *quia sicut* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *quia si*, qui et dein omittunt *ita*; incongrue.

en: The full title is: *On the Faith of the Trinity and on the Incarnation of the Word against the Blasphemies of Ruzelinus or Roscellinus*, in which book c. 9 Anselm, discussing the eternity of the three divine persons, says: "And since that nativity and that procession are without beginning; otherwise begotten eternity and proceeding eternity — which is false — would have a beginning: in no way ought we, or are we able, to think that God began to be Father or Son or Holy Spirit." So the original text, which Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 1, reports somewhat differently thus: "Anselm: *One God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit*. And then, speaking of nativity and procession, he says that nativity and procession are without beginning, otherwise there would be begotten and proceeding eternity: which is false — in no way ought we to think that God has a beginning or that he began to be Father or Son or Holy Spirit. From this therefore it seems to be left, that since eternity ought not be called begotten or proceeding, this fits the Father alone." This passage of Anselm, as it is presented by Alex. Hal., St. Bonaventure seems to have had before his eyes and to have drawn his opinion from it, namely, that eternity ought not be called *to be born* or *unbegotten*, which opinion he proves in the body of the solution. — The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the mss. and ed. 1, substitutes *genita* for *ingenita*, by which reading the argument is destroyed. A little earlier, for *quia sicut* many codices with ed. 1 read *quia si*, which then also omit *ita*; inappropriately.

la: In cod. Y hic additur *quantum ad Filium*, et paulo inferius post *procedens* in eodem cod. Y et in codd. B D *quantum ad Spiritum sanctum*.

en: In cod. Y there is here added *as regards the Son*, and a little below, after *proceeding*, in the same cod. Y and in codd. B D *as regards the Holy Spirit*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo inferius post *sapientia* cod. dd bene addit *de sapientia*.

en: Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 1 in the body. — A little below, after *sapientia* cod. dd well adds *de sapientia*.

la: Vat., post *appropriabilis* inserto commate, pro *Spiritui sancto* ponit *Spiritus sanctus*, haec verba connectens cum sequentibus.

en: The Vatican edition, having inserted a comma after *appropriabilis*, puts *Spiritus sanctus* for *Spiritui sancto*, connecting these words with what follows.

la: In codd. K P Q W Y hic additur *quod quaeritur*, in cod. T *quod obiicitur*.

en: In codd. K P Q W Y there is here added *which is asked*, in cod. T *which is objected*.

la: Pro *illo* habet Vat. cum cod. cc *alio*.

en: For *illo* the Vatican edition with cod. cc has *alio*.

la: Id est, adiectivum in comparativo praesupponit, quod in positivo de utroque extremo dici potest, sive ut ait Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 4. (c. 11.): *Si quid magis et minus dicitur, et simpliciter inest.* — Immediate post pro *si* non pauci codd. male *sed*.

en: That is, an adjective in the comparative presupposes that, in the positive, it can be said of each of the extremes, or as Aristotle says, II. *Topics* c. 4 (c. 11): *If something is said more and less, it also belongs simply.* — Immediately after, for *si* not a few codices have, badly, *sed*.

la: Comparativum enim *melius* in dicto Augustini improprie accipiendum est. — De retractatione Augustini vide supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: For the comparative *better* in Augustine's saying is to be taken improperly. — On Augustine's retractation, see above a. 2, q. 1 in the body.

la: Ex codd. F K L revocavimus *sapiens*, quod Vat. omittit. Paulo superius pro *quod* cod. S *quare*, cod. Y *an*, nonnulli alii codd. cum Vat. *de*, quae etiam subinde post *sive* subiicit *an*, et mox post *Magister* cum cod. cc omittit *bene*.

en: From codices F K L we have restored *sapiens*, which the Vatican edition omits. A little earlier, for *quod* cod. S reads *quare*, cod. Y *an*, several other codices with the Vatican edition *de*, which also next, after *sive*, inserts *an*, and shortly after *Magister*, with cod. cc, omits *bene*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut B M cum ed. 1 *caute est locutus* et (ed. 1 *cum*) *dixit*. — In eodem sensu solvunt hoc dubium Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 3. a. 2. § 4; B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3; Richard., hic a. 2. q. 2.

en: Some codices, as B M with ed. 1, read *caute est locutus* and (ed. 1: *cum*) *dixit*. — In the same sense Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 3. a. 2. § 4; B. Albert., here a. 4; St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., here q. 2. a. 3; Richard., here a. 2. q. 2 resolve this doubt.

la: Scilicet *sapientia genita* et *ingenita*. — Mox pro *distinctae* ed. 1 *distinctivae* et infra bene *quod si* pro *quia si*, quod habent codd. et edd.

en: Namely *begotten wisdom* and *unbegotten*. — Shortly afterward, for *distinctae* ed. 1 reads *distinctivae*, and below, well, *quod si* for *quia si*, which the codices and editions have.

la: Cod. M hic repetit *quantum ad*.

en: Cod. M here repeats *quantum ad*.

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Alberto, hic a. ult.

en: This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here a. ult.

la: Vers. 10. — Post *Pater* in Vulgata additur *autem*, in ed. 1 vero *in*, in Vat. *enim*. Subinde post *manens* ex pluribus mss. et ed. 1, consentiente Vulgata, adiecimus *ipse*.

en: Verse 10. — After *Pater* the Vulgate adds *autem*, ed. 1 reads *in*, the Vatican edition *enim*. Just after, after *manens*, on the authority of many mss. and ed. 1, in agreement with the Vulgate, we have added *ipse*.

la: Vers. 29, in quo Vulgata post verba *misit me* adiungit *mecum est et*, ac dein post *quia* voculam *ego*. — Paulo inferius post *Patre* Vat. cum solo cod. cc addit *ergo est una virtus eius et Patris, et sic agunt una virtute*.

en: Verse 29, in which the Vulgate after the words *misit me* adds *mecum est et*, and then after *quia* the small word *ego*. — A little below, after *Patre* the Vatican edition with cod. cc alone adds *therefore there is one power of him and of the Father, and so they act by one power*.

la: Plura de hoc vide supra d. 30. q. 2. in corp. — De hoc dubio cfr. S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: See more on this above, d. 30, q. 2 in the body. — On this doubt, cf. St. Thomas and Richard, here on the text.

la: Plures codd. ut P Q X aa bb cum ed. 1 *dicitur*.

en: Several codices, as P Q X aa bb with ed. 1, read *dicitur*.

la: In codd. N P Q aa additur *dicere*.

en: In codd. N P Q aa *dicere* is added.

la: De duplici sensu genitivi cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Pro *sed Filii* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *et Filii*. — Eodem modo hoc dubium solvunt S. Thom. et Richard., hic circa lit.

en: On the twofold sense of the genitive, cf. above a. 2, q. 1, ad 1. — For *sed Filii* many codices with ed. 1 read *et Filii*. — In the same way St. Thomas and Richard, here on the text, resolve this doubt.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 33

title_alt:
De proprietatibus personarum
On the properties of the persons

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXIII.

#### Cap. I.

*Utrum proprietates personarum sint ipsae personae, vel divina usia.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (*Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum*, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 568–569) in Latin, followed by an English rendering. Where an OCR-bracketed inline marker had no separately printed gloss, the marker is preserved without an apparatus entry.

Post supradicta interius considerari atque subtiliter inquiri oportet, utrum proprietates personarum, quibus ipsae personae determinantur, sint ipsae personae et sint Deus, id est divina essentia, an ita sint personis, ut non sint personae, ac per hoc nec divina essentia. — Quod enim in personis sint proprietates, nemo inficiari audet, cum aperte clamet auctoritas[^1] quod « in personis est proprietas, et in essentia unitas ». Superius[^2] quoque multis Sanctorum testimoniis astruximus, per-

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sonas proprietatibus distingui atque determinari, ipsasque proprietates, tres scilicet propriis expressimus vocabulis[^3]. Cum ergo proprietates ipsae ab aeterno fuerint, quibus ipsae personae determinantur et differunt; quomodo essent, si in eis non essent; et quomodo in eis essent, et ipsae personae non essent, quin ibi esset multiplicitas? Quocirca sicut proprietates esse in personis, ita et eas esse personas confitemur, sicut supra auctoritate Hieronymi, ut non pigeat revocare ad mentem, protestati sumus, in expositione fidei ita dicentis: « Sabellii haeresim declinantes, tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus. Non enim nomina tantummodo, sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas vel, ut Graeci exprimunt, hypostases, hoc est subsistentias, confitemur ». — Ecce aperte dicit, personas proprietatibus distingui, et ipsas proprietates esse personas; cuius hic verba perstringimus, quia supra latius posuimus.

Cumque de simplicitate deitatis supra[^8] dissereremus, auctoritatibus Sanctorum, scilicet Augustini, Hilarii, Isidori nec non et Boethii, evidenter monstravimus, Deum hoc esse omnino quod in se habet, excepto quod Pater habet Filium, nec est Filius, et Filius habet Patrem, nec est Pater; et sic esse in natura trium, ut qui habet hoc sit quod habet, et totum, quod ibi est, unum esse, unam vitam esse; quae modo non iteramus, ne fastidium lectori ingeramus. Si ergo proprietates ibi sunt, singula earum est id in quo est, et unum eademque vita singulae sunt. Fateamur ergo, et proprietates esse in tribus personis, et ipsas esse personas atque divinam essentiam.

Quod enim proprietas etiam divina natura sit, ostendit Hilarius dicens, nativitatem Filii esse naturam. Idem in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^4] ait: « Utriusque natura non differt: unum sunt Pater et Filius. Habet igitur hoc sacramenti nativitas, ut complectatur in se et nomen et naturam et potestatem, quia nativitas non potest non esse ea natura, unde nascatur Filius ». Idem in sexto[^5]: « Nativitas, proprietas est, veritas est ». Idem in septimo dicit, « quod naturae nativitas sit intelligenda esse in natura Dei ». Supra[^6] etiam dicit, « quod proprium Patris est, quod semper Pater est, et proprium Filii, quod semper Filius est », significans quod proprietas Patris est Pater, et proprietas Filii est Filius. — His aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus aperte significari videtur, quod proprietas Filii filius sit, sic et Deus; ita et proprietas Patris et proprietas Spiritus sancti.

Hoc autem aliqui negant dicentes, quidem proprietates in personis esse, sed non esse personas ipsas, quia ita dicunt[^7] esse in personis vel in essentia divina, ut non sint interius, sicut ea sunt quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, ut bonitas, iustitia, sed extrinsecus affixae sunt. Atque ita esse rationibus probare contendunt. Si enim, inquiunt, proprietates sunt personae, non eis personae determinantur. — Contra quod dicimus, quia etiam se ipsis personae differunt, sicut supra Hieronymus loquens de Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto dicit: « Substantia unum sunt, sed personis ac nominibus distinguuntur ». — Sed iterum addunt: Si proprietates ipsae divina essentia sunt, cum essentia non differant tres personae, nec proprietatibus differunt. Quomodo enim differt Pater a Filio, eo quod divina essentia est, cum in essentia unum sint?

Horum doctrinis novis et humanis commentis verbo Hilarii[^9] respondeo: « Immensum est quod exigitur et incomprehensibile; extra significantiam est sermonis, extra sensus intentionem; non enuntiatur, non attingitur, non tenetur; verborum significantiam rei ipsius natura consumit; sensus contemplationem imperspicabile lumen obcaecat; intelligentiae capacitatem quod fine nullo continetur excedit. Mihi ergo in sensu labes est, in intelligentia stupor est, in sermone vero non iam infirmitatem, sed silentium confitebor; periculosum nimis est de rebus tantis ac tam reconditis aliquid ultra praescriptum caeleste proferre, ut ultra praefinitionem Dei sermo de Deo sit. Forma fidei certa est. Non ergo aliquid addendum est, sed modus constituendus audaciae; quidquid ultra quaeritur, non intelligitur ».

Ceterum haereticorum improbitas, instinctu diabolicae fraudulentiae excitata, nondum quiescit, sed in tanta rerum quaestione addit: si paternitas et filiatio in Deo, sive in divina essentia sunt, eadem igitur res sibi Pater est et Filius. Nam in quo paternitas est, Pater est; et in quo filiatio, Filius est. Si igitur una eademque res habet in se paternitatem et filiationem, ipsa et generat et generatur; quod dicentes in Sabellianam haeresim pertrahuntur, extendentes Patrem in Filium, cum ipsum sibi Filium proponant et Patrem. Si vero negaverint, in una Dei essentia paternitatem esse et filiationem, quomodo ergo dicunt esse Deum? — His atque aliis argumentorum aculeis utuntur in suae opinionis assertionem, ut veritatis formam dissecent.

Quorum audaciae resistentes atque ignorantiae providentes, audebimus aliquid super hoc loqui. Paternitas et filiatio non ita esse omnino dicuntur in divina substantia, sicut in ipsis hypostasibus, in quibus ita sunt, quod eas determinant, ut ait Ioannes Damascenus[^10]: « Characteristica idiomata sunt, id est determinativae proprietates hypostaseos, et non naturae; etenim hypostasim determinant et non naturam ». Ideoque, licet paternitas et filiatio sint in divina essentia, cum eam non determinent; non ideo potest dici, quod divina essentia et generet et generetur, vel quod eadem res sit ibi[^11] Pater et Filius. Ita enim proprietas determinat personam, ut hac proprietate hypostasis sit generans, et illa alia hypostasis sit genita; et ita non idem generat et generatur, sed alter alterum.

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#### Cap. II.

*Quomodo proprietates possint esse in natura Dei, nec eam determinent.*

Sed forte quaeres, cum hae proprietates non possint esse in personis, quin eas determinent, quomodo in essentia divina esse possint, ita ut non eam determinent. — Respondeo tibi et hic cum Hilario[^12]: « Ego nescio, non requiro, et consolabor me tamen: Archangeli nesciunt, Angeli non audierunt, saecula non tenent, Propheta non sensit, Apostolus non interrogavit, Filius ipse non edidit. Cesset ergo dolor querelarum; non putet homo sua intelligentia generationis sacramentum posse consequi. Absolute tamen intelligendus est Pater et Filius », et Spiritus sanctus. « Stat in hoc fine intelligentia verborum: Filius est a Patre, qui est unigenitus ab ingenito, progenies a parente, vivus a vivo, non natura deitatis alia et alia, quia ambo unum ». « Hoc credendo incipe, percurre, persiste; etsi non perventurum sciam, tamen gratulabor profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat, aliquando tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inseras in illud secretum et arcanum inopinabilis nativitatis, ne te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens; sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse ». His aliisque multis evidenter ostenditur, nobis nullatenus licere maiestatem perscrutari[^13], ius ponere potestati, modum circumscribere infinito.

Verumtamen nondum desistunt impatientiae spiritu agitati, sed opinionem suam etiam Sanctorum auctoritatibus munire conantur, quibus ostendere volunt, proprietatem, qua Pater est Pater, et proprietatem, qua Filius est Filius, non esse Deum, ad hoc inducentes verba Augustini super illum locum Psalmi: *Et non est substantia*, ita dicentis[^14]: « Deus est quaedam substantia. Unde etiam in fide catholica sic aedificamur, ut dicamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unius esse substantiae. Quid est unius substantiae? Quidquid est Pater, quod Deus est, hoc est Filius, hoc est Spiritus sanctus. Cum autem Pater est, non illud est quod[^15] est. Pater enim non ad se, sed ad Filium dicitur; ad se autem Deus dicitur. Eo ergo quod vel quo[^16] Deus est, substantia est. Et quia eiusdem substantiae est Filius, proculdubio et Filius est Deus. At vero quod Pater est, quia non substantiae nomen est, sed refertur ad Filium, non sic dicimus, Filium Patrem esse, sicut dicimus, Filium Deum esse ». — Ex his verbis significari dicunt, quod proprietas Patris vel proprietas Filii non sit Deus vel essentia divina. Cum enim dicit: *Eo quod Deus est, substantia est, sed quod Pater est, substantia non est*; aperte, inquiunt, ostendit, id esse substantiam, quo Deus est; id vero quo Pater est, non esse substantiam. Item cum ait: *Pater non illud est quod est*, ostendit, eum non esse Patrem, eo quod substantia est. Non enim simpliciter dixit: *Pater non illud est quod est*, sed ait: *cum Pater est, non est illud quod est*, significans, quo Pater est non esse illud quo est, id est essentiam. Haec illi ita exponentes, sua commenta simplicibus et incautis vera videri faciunt. — Nos autem aliter fore ista intelligenda dicimus. Dicens enim: *eo quod Deus est, substantia est; sed quod Pater est, substantia[^17] non est*, hoc intelligi voluit, quia essentia Deus est et deitate substantia est. Eo enim substantia est, quo Deus est, et e converso, cuius ea est deitas, quae est substantia, et substantia, quae deitas; sed *quod Pater est non est substantia*[^18], id est, non quo Pater est, eo substantia est, quia proprietate generationis Pater est, qua substantia non est. Ipsam tamen proprietatem substantiam esse non negavit. Ita etiam illud intelligendum est quod ait: *Cum Pater est non illud est quod est*, id est, non illo Pater est, quod vel quo[^19] ipse est, id est essentia, sed notione.

Item illis verbis Augustini vehementer insistunt superius positis, scilicet: *Verbum, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod verbum, non hoc est quod Pater*. Si, inquiunt, Verbum non est hoc quod Pater, secundum quod est verbum, id ergo, quod verbum est, non est illud quod Pater est: proprietas igitur, qua verbum est, non est id quod Pater est, non est igitur divina essentia. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet secundum quod verbum non sit hoc quod Pater est, ea tamen proprietas, qua verbum est, est id quod Pater est, id est divina essentia, sed non est hypostasis Patris.

---

english:
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### DISTINCTION XXXIII.

#### Chapter I.

*Whether the properties of the persons are the persons themselves, or the divine *usia* [essence].*

After what has been said above, it must be considered more inwardly and subtly inquired into, whether the properties of the persons, by which the persons themselves are determined, are themselves the persons and are God — that is, the divine essence — or whether they are so [present] in the persons that they are not persons, and on this account neither divine essence. — That properties are in the persons, no one dares to deny, since authority openly proclaims[^1] that "in the persons there is property, and in the essence unity." Above[^2] also we have established by many testimonies of the Saints, that the per-

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sons are distinguished and determined by their properties, and we have expressed the properties themselves — three, namely — by their proper terms[^3]. Since therefore the properties themselves have existed from eternity, by which the persons themselves are determined and differ; how would they be, if they were not in [the persons]; and how would they be in [the persons], and the persons themselves not be, without there being multiplicity there? Wherefore, just as we confess properties to be in the persons, so also we confess them to be persons — as we above, on the authority of Jerome, declared (and let it not be irksome to call back to mind), in his exposition of the faith speaking thus: "Avoiding the heresy of Sabellius, we distinguish three persons set forth under property. For we confess not only the names, but also the properties of the names — that is, the persons, or, as the Greeks express it, the *hypostases*, that is, the *subsistences*." — Behold, he plainly says that the persons are distinguished by their properties, and that the properties themselves are persons; whose words we here merely touch upon, since above we set them down at greater length.

And since we discussed above[^8] the simplicity of the deity, by the authorities of the Saints — namely, Augustine, Hilary, Isidore, and also Boethius — we plainly showed that God is altogether this which He has in Himself, except that the Father has the Son and is not the Son, and the Son has the Father and is not the Father; and that thus the being is in the nature of three, so that He who has [something] is what He has, and the whole, that is there, is one being, one life — which we do not now repeat, lest we bring weariness upon the reader. If therefore the properties are there, each of them is that in which it is, and the several are one and the same life. Let us therefore confess that the properties are in the three persons, and that they themselves are persons and the divine essence.

For that the property is also the divine nature, Hilary shows, saying that the nativity of the Son is nature. The same in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^4] says: "The nature of both does not differ: the Father and the Son are one. The nativity of this sacrament therefore has [this property], that it embraces in itself both name and nature and power, since the nativity cannot but be that nature whence the Son is born." The same in the sixth[^5]: "The nativity is property, is truth." The same in the seventh says, "that the nativity of nature is to be understood as being in the nature of God." Above[^6] he also says, "that it is the property of the Father, that He is always Father, and the property of the Son, that He is always Son" — signifying that the property of the Father is the Father, and the property of the Son is the Son. — By these and many other authorities it seems plainly to be signified that the property of the Son is son, and so also God; and likewise the property of the Father and the property of the Holy Spirit.

But some deny this, saying that the properties are indeed in the persons, but are not the persons themselves; because they say[^7] that they are so in the persons or in the divine essence, that they are not within, as those things are which are said of God according to substance, such as goodness, justice, but are affixed extrinsically. And they undertake to prove this thus by reasons. For if, they say, the properties are persons, then the persons are not determined by them. — Against this we say that the persons also differ by themselves, as Jerome above, speaking of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says: "They are one in substance, but are distinguished by persons and by names." — But again they add: If the properties themselves are the divine essence, since the three persons do not differ in essence, then they do not differ in properties either. For how does the Father differ from the Son, in that He is the divine essence, when they are one in essence?

To these new doctrines and human inventions of theirs I respond with the word of Hilary[^9]: "Immense is what is required, and incomprehensible; it is beyond the meaning of speech, beyond the intention of the senses; it is not enunciated, not attained, not held; the nature of the thing itself consumes the meaning of words; an unsearchable light blinds the contemplation of the senses; what is contained by no end exceeds the capacity of the understanding. To me therefore there is a slip in the senses, there is stupor in the understanding, but in speech I shall now confess no longer infirmity, but silence; it is too dangerous concerning matters so great and so hidden to bring forth anything beyond the heavenly prescription, so that the discourse about God might be beyond the predefinition of God. The form of faith is certain. Nothing therefore must be added, but a manner must be set to audacity; whatever is sought beyond is not understood."

For the rest, the wickedness of the heretics, stirred up by the instinct of diabolical fraudulence, does not yet rest, but in so great a question of things adds: if paternity and filiation are in God, or in the divine essence, then the same thing is to itself Father and Son. For in whom paternity is, He is Father; and in whom filiation, He is Son. If therefore one and the same thing has in itself paternity and filiation, it both begets and is begotten; in saying which they are dragged into the Sabellian heresy, extending the Father into the Son, when they propose the same to themselves as Son and as Father. If however they should deny that paternity and filiation are in the one essence of God, how then do they say that He is God? — By these and other goads of arguments they make use of for the assertion of their opinion, that they may dissect the form of truth.

Resisting their audacity and providing for their ignorance, we shall dare to say something on this. Paternity and filiation are not said to be altogether in such a way in the divine substance, as in the very *hypostases*, in which they are so [present] that they determine them, as John Damascene says[^10]: "They are *characteristic idioms*, that is, *determinative properties* of *hypostasis*, and not of nature; for they determine *hypostasis*, and not nature." And therefore, although paternity and filiation are in the divine essence, since they do not determine it, on that account it cannot be said that the divine essence both begets and is begotten, or that one and the same thing is there[^11] Father and Son. For property in this way determines the person, that by this property the *hypostasis* is generating, and the other *hypostasis* is generated; and so it is not the same that begets and is begotten, but the one [begets] the other.

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#### Chapter II.

*How the properties can be in the nature of God, without determining it.*

But perhaps you will ask, since these properties cannot be in the persons without determining them, how they can be in the divine essence in such a way that they do not determine it. — I answer you here too with Hilary[^12]: "I do not know, I do not seek, and I shall console myself nevertheless: the Archangels do not know, the Angels have not heard, the ages do not hold, the Prophet did not perceive, the Apostle did not ask, the Son Himself did not declare. Let the grief of complaints therefore cease; let not man think that he can attain by his own understanding the sacrament of generation. Yet the Father and the Son are to be understood absolutely," and the Holy Spirit. "In this end the understanding of the words stands fast: the Son is from the Father, who is the only-begotten of the unbegotten, offspring from a parent, living from the living, not by a nature of deity that is one thing and another, because both are one." "Believing this, begin, run on, persist; even though I know I shall not arrive, yet I shall rejoice that I am making progress. For he who piously pursues infinite things, even if he does not attain, yet at some time profits by going forward. But do not insert yourself into that secret and inscrutable mystery of an unimaginable nativity, do not immerse yourself, presuming to comprehend the height of understanding; rather, understand that incomprehensible things exist." By these and many others it is plainly shown that we are in no wise permitted to scrutinize the majesty[^13], to set law upon power, to circumscribe a measure upon the infinite.

Yet they still do not desist, agitated by the spirit of impatience, but they strive to fortify their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints, by which they wish to show that the property by which the Father is Father, and the property by which the Son is Son, are not God — bringing forward to this end the words of Augustine on that passage of the Psalm: *And it is not substance*, [Augustine] speaking thus[^14]: "God is a certain substance. Whence in the catholic faith we are also so built up, as to say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance. What is *of one substance*? Whatever the Father is, [namely] that He is God, this the Son is, this the Holy Spirit is. But when He is Father, He is not that which[^15] He is. For the Father is not said with reference to Himself, but with reference to the Son; but with reference to Himself He is called God. By that therefore by which, or with which[^16], He is God, He is substance. And because the Son is of the same substance, beyond doubt the Son also is God. But that He is Father, since it is not the name of substance but is referred to the Son, we do not say that the Son is Father in the same way as we say that the Son is God." — From these words they say it is signified that the property of the Father, or the property of the Son, is not God or the divine essence. For when he says: *In that He is God, He is substance, but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance*; openly, they say, he shows that that is substance by which He is God; but that by which He is Father is not substance. Likewise when he says: *Father is not that which He is*, he shows that He is not Father in that He is substance. For he did not simply say: *Father is not that which He is*, but said: *when He is Father, He is not that which He is*, signifying that that by which He is Father is not that by which He is, that is, the essence. They, expounding these things in this way, make their inventions appear true to the simple and the unwary. — But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise. For when he says: *In that He is God, He is substance; but [in that] He is Father, He is not substance*[^17], he wished this to be understood: that He is God by essence, and substance by deity. For He is substance in that by which He is God, and conversely, whose is that deity which is substance, and substance which is deity; but *that He is Father, He is not substance*[^18] — that is: not by that by which He is Father, by that, is He substance, since He is Father by the property of generation, by which He is not substance. Yet [Augustine] did not deny that the property itself is substance. So also that is to be understood which he says: *When He is Father, He is not that which He is* — that is, He is not Father by that by which, or with which[^19], He Himself is, that is, [by] essence, but [by] notion.

Likewise they vehemently insist on those words of Augustine set down above, namely: *The Word, according as it is wisdom and essence, is this which the Father is; according as it is Word, is not this which the Father is*. If, they say, the Word is not this which the Father is, according as it is Word, then that, which is Word, is not that which the Father is: therefore the property by which it is Word, is not that which the Father is — therefore it is not the divine essence. — To which we say that, although according as it is Word it is not this which the Father is, that property nevertheless, by which it is Word, is that which the Father is — that is, the divine essence — but it is not the *hypostasis* of the Father.

---

la: Cfr. d. XXVI. c. 2, et d. XXVII. c. 1.

en: Cf. Distinction XXVI, c. 2, and Distinction XXVII, c. 1.

la: *Dist.* XXV. c. 3. in fine. — Infra codd. ABE *aperte ostendit* pro *aperte dicit*.

en: Distinction XXV, c. 3, at the end. — Below, codices ABE [read] *aperte ostendit* ("openly shows") in place of *aperte dicit* ("openly says").

la: *Dist.* VIII. pars II.

en: Distinction VIII, part II.

la: *Num.* 21. (n. = numerus, paragraph number; not biblical Numbers.)

en: *n.* 21 — that is, *paragraph 21*. (*Note*: "Num." in Quaracchi apparatus = *numerus*, paragraph number, not the biblical book of Numbers.)

la: *Num.* 40. Sequens locus VII. n. 22.

en: *n.* 40. The following passage [is from book] VII, n. 22.

la: *Dist.* XXVI. c. 3. Locus Hilarii est XII. *de Trin.* n. 23. — Vat. *Supra enim dixit* pro *Supra etiam dicit*.

en: Distinction XXVI, c. 3. The Hilary passage is [book] XII *On the Trinity*, n. 23. — The Vatican edition [reads] *Supra enim dixit* ("For above he said") in place of *Supra etiam dicit* ("Above also he says").

la: Codd. C D *dicuntur*. Paulo inferius codd. A B D E et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 *affixa sunt* pro *affixae sunt*.

en: Codices C D [read] *dicuntur* ("are said"). A little below, codices A B D E and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 [read] *affixa sunt* in place of *affixae sunt* ("are affixed").

la: *Dist.* XXV, c. ult.

en: Distinction XXV, last chapter.

la: *Libr.* II. *de Trin.* n. 5, sed nonnullis a Magistro omissis, transpositis et mutatis.

en: Book II, *On the Trinity*, n. 5, but with some things omitted, transposed, and altered by the Master.

la: *De Fide orth.* III. c. 6. Vide supra d. XXVII. p. I. c. 3.

en: *On the Orthodox Faith* III, c. 6. See above Distinction XXVII, part I, c. 3.

la: Ita codd. C D et ed. I, in ceteris *sibi*.

en: Thus the codices C D and ed. I; in the rest [the reading is] *sibi* ("to itself").

la: *Libr.* II. *de Trin.* n. 9. 10. 11, sed plurimis a Magistro omissis et transpositis.

en: Book II, *On the Trinity*, nn. 9, 10, 11, but with very many things omitted and transposed by the Master.

la: Respicitur *Prov.* 25, 27: *Qui scrutator est maiestatis, opprimetur a gloria*.

en: Reference is made to *Proverbs* 25:27: *He who is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory*.

la: August. *Enarratio in Psalm.* 68, 3, sermo 1. n. 5.

en: Augustine, *Exposition on Psalm* 68, [verse] 3, sermon 1, n. 5.

la: Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, addunt *vel quo*, refragantibus codd. et originali. Paulo inferius pro *quod vel quo Deus est* originale habet: *quod Deus est, hoc ipso*. Post *non substantiae* codd. et plurimae edd. contra Vat., edd. 6, 8 et originale omittunt *nomen*.

en: The Vatican and other editions, except ed. 1, add *vel quo* ("or by which"), against the codices and the original. A little below, for *quod vel quo Deus est* ("that, or by which, He is God") the original has: *quod Deus est, hoc ipso* ("that He is God, by this very thing"). After *non substantiae* the codices and most editions, against the Vatican (and editions 6, 8 and the original), omit *nomen*.

la: Codd. ABCE et ed. I *substantiae*: paulo post cod. *quod Deus* pro *quo Deus*, et *quod Pater* pro *quo Pater*.

en: Codices ABCE and ed. I [read] *substantiae*: a little later a codex [reads] *quod Deus* in place of *quo Deus*, and *quod Pater* in place of *quo Pater*.

la: Codd. et edd. 3, 7 *substantiae*, quod repetunt infra ante *id est*.

en: The codices and editions 3, 7 [read] *substantiae*, which they repeat below before *id est*.

la: *Dist.* XXVII. p. II. c. 3.

en: Distinction XXVII, part II, c. 3.

la: Ita codd. ACDE et ed. I, cod. B et aliae edd. *quo*.

en: Thus the codices ACDE and ed. I; codex B and other editions [read] *quo*. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 33, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIII — De diversis comparationibus proprietatis. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXIII — On the various comparisons of property. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 569 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXIII.

#### *De proprietatibus in comparatione ad essentiam et ad personas.*

> *Post supradicta interius considerari oportet* etc.

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister de nominibus substantialibus, et de proprietatibus per se et singillatim. Hic tertio loco agit de his[^1] in comparatione, et hoc secundum convenientiam et differentiam; et habet pars ista duas partes. In prima quaerit Magister de proprietatibus in comparatione ad essentiam et personas. In secunda vero agit de comparatione personae sive rei naturae ad naturam, infra distinctione trigesima quarta: *Praedictis adiiciendum est* etc.

Prima pars habet duas secundum duo opera sapientis, quorum primum est «non mentiri, de quibus novit»; et secundum est «mentientem posse manifestare[^2]». Unde in prima parte primo ostendit et probat veritatem; in secunda eam defendit contra falsitatem, ibi: *Hoc autem aliqui negant*.

Prima pars habet quatuor partes[^3]. In prima ostendit, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis, per naturam ipsius proprietatis, quia aeterna est et distincta. In secunda ostendit illud idem violentia auctoritatis[^4], ibi: *Sabellii haeresim declinantes*, ubi ponit auctoritates Hieronymi. In tertia ostendit hoc ipsum per naturam divinae simplicitatis, ibi: *Cumque de simplicitate divinitatis*. In quarta ostendit, quod proprietates non tantum sunt personae, sed etiam divina essentia. Et hoc probat efficacia auctoritatis, ibi: *Quod enim proprietas etiam divina natura sit*, ubi ponit auctoritatem Hilarii.

*Hoc autem aliqui negant dicentes* etc. Haec est secunda pars, in qua ponit Magister veritatis probatae defensionem ponendo aliorum rationes et suas responsiones. Et quoniam duplex est modus impugnandi veritatem, scilicet per rationes et auctoritates, ideo haec pars habet duas partes. In prima ponit rationes et responsiones; in secunda auctoritates, ibi: *Verumtamen nondum desistunt* etc.

Prima pars habet quatuor partes[^5]. In prima ponit obiectionem, quod proprietates non sint personae; et quia rationalis erat, respondet ad veritatem. Secundo vero subiungit aliam rationem, et quia curiosa videtur, respondet ad hominem, non ad orationem[^6], ibi: *Sed iterum addunt* etc. Tertio adhuc resumit rationem illorum et respondet ad veritatem, ibi: *Ceterum haereticorum improbitas* etc. Quarto et ultimo subiungit eorum interrogationem, et quia curiosa erat, praefigit terminum humanae inquisitioni ibi: *Sed forte quaeres, cum hae proprietates* etc. Et quaelibet istarum partium posset subdividi, scilicet eo quod primo ponit oppositionem et secundo responsionem, et illud manifestum est in littera.

*Verumtamen nondum desistunt impatientiae spiritu* etc. Haec est ultima pars, in qua respondet Magister auctoritatibus, quas inducunt; et habet haec pars duas partes secundum duas auctoritates Augustini, quas inducunt: et prima sumta est ab expositione Psalmi, secunda vero sumta est ab Augustino, *de Trinitate* septimo. Prima pars ponitur ibi: *Verumtamen nondum desistunt* etc; secunda ponitur ibi: *Item illis verbis Augustini*. Et quaelibet harum potest subdividi, quia primo ponit auctoritatem sive rationem, secundo vero dissolvit.

<!-- page 570 -->

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de comparatione proprietatis ad personam.

Secundo, de comparatione proprietatis ad essentiam.

Tertio, de comparatione unius proprietatis ad aliam.

Quarto, de comparatione eiusdem proprietatis ad ipsam.

---

english:
<!-- page 569 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXIII.

#### *On the properties in their comparison to the essence and to the persons.*

> *"After what has been said above, it is fitting to consider more inwardly"* etc.

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of the substantial names, and of the properties [taken] in themselves and individually. Here in the third place he treats of these[^1] in [their mutual] comparison, and this according to agreement and difference; and this part has two divisions. In the first the Master inquires concerning the properties in comparison to the essence and to the persons. In the second, however, he treats of the comparison of person, or of the thing of nature, to the nature, below in the thirty-fourth distinction: *"It must be added to what has been said"* etc.

The first part has two [divisions] according to the two works of the wise man, of which the first is "not to lie about the things he knows"; and the second is "to be able to expose the one who lies"[^2]. Hence in the first part he first sets forth and proves the truth; in the second he defends it against falsehood, there: *"Some, however, deny this"*.

The first part has four divisions[^3]. In the first he shows that the properties are persons and [are] in the persons, by the nature of the property itself, because it is eternal and distinct. In the second he shows the same thing by the force of authority[^4], there: *"Avoiding the heresy of Sabellius"*, where he sets down the authorities of Jerome. In the third he shows this very thing by the nature of the divine simplicity, there: *"And since concerning the simplicity of the divinity"*. In the fourth he shows that the properties are not only the persons, but also the divine essence. And this he proves by the efficacy of authority, there: *"That the property is also the divine nature"*, where he sets down the authority of Hilary.

*"Some, however, deny this, saying"* etc. This is the second part, in which the Master sets down the defense of the truth which has been proved by setting forth the reasonings of others and his own responses. And because there is a twofold mode of impugning the truth, namely by reasons and by authorities, therefore this part has two divisions. In the first he sets down the reasons and the responses; in the second the authorities, there: *"Yet they still do not desist"* etc.

The first part has four divisions[^5]. In the first he sets down the objection, that the properties are not persons; and because it was rational, he answers according to the truth. Secondly, however, he adds another reason, and because it seems over-curious, he answers *ad hominem*, not *to the speech*[^6], there: *"But again they add"* etc. Thirdly he yet again takes up their reason and answers according to the truth, there: *"For the rest, the wickedness of the heretics"* etc. Fourthly and lastly he adds their interrogation, and because it was over-curious, he sets a limit to the human inquiry there: *"But perhaps you will ask, since these properties"* etc. And each of these divisions could be subdivided, namely insofar as he first sets down the opposition and secondly the response, and that is manifest in the letter [of the text].

*"Yet they still do not desist, [being driven] by the spirit of impatience"* etc. This is the last part, in which the Master answers the authorities which they bring forward; and this part has two divisions according to the two authorities of Augustine which they bring forward: and the first is taken from the exposition of a Psalm, the second is taken from Augustine, *On the Trinity*, [book] seven. The first part is set down there: *"Yet they still do not desist"* etc.; the second is set down there: *"Likewise from those words of Augustine"*. And each of these can be subdivided, because first he sets down the authority or reason, and secondly he resolves it.

<!-- page 570 -->

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of the present distinction four things are asked.

First it is asked concerning the comparison of property to person.

Second, concerning the comparison of property to essence.

Third, concerning the comparison of one property to another.

Fourth, concerning the comparison of the same property to itself.

---

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *quae dicuntur*.

en: Codices aa and bb add *quae dicuntur* ("which are said").

la: Hi duo textus inveniuntur apud Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 2. (c. 1.).

en: These two texts are found in Aristotle, I. *[On Sophistical] Refutations*, c. 2 (c. 1).

la: Codd. I X aa bb cum ed. 1 *particulas*. Aliquanto inferius pro *distincta* codd. aa bb *distinctiva*.

en: Codices I, X, aa, bb with edition 1 [read] *particulas* ("little parts"). Somewhat below, for *distincta* ("distinct"), codices aa, bb [read] *distinctiva* ("distinctive").

la: Vat. *per violentiam auctoris Sabellii*. Mox pro *auctoritates* cod. W *auctoritatem*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *per violentiam auctoris Sabellii* ("by the violence of the author Sabellius"). Soon after, for *auctoritates* ("authorities"), codex W [reads] *auctoritatem* ("authority").

la: Codd. X aa bb cum ed. 1 *particulas*. Paulo inferius pro *rationalis* codd. GYZ cum ed. 1 *rationabilis*.

en: Codices X, aa, bb with edition 1 [read] *particulas* ("little parts"). A little below, for *rationalis* ("rational"), codices G, Y, Z with edition 1 [read] *rationabilis* ("reasonable").

la: Pro *orationem* Vat. *rationem*; utriusque lectionis idem est sensus. Nostram lectionem habent omnes codd.; terminus *ad orationem* sumtus est ex Boethio (cfr. supra pag. 131, nota 6.).

en: For *orationem* ("speech") the Vatican edition [reads] *rationem* ("reason"); the sense of both readings is the same. All the codices have our reading; the term *ad orationem* ("to the speech") is taken from Boethius (cf. above page 131, note 6). ---