site: bonaventure

collection: Collationes in Hexaëmeron

title: Coll. 5

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

### COLLATIO V.
#### *De prima visione tractatio secunda, quae est de tertio radio sive de veritate morum, et de sapientia contemplationis.*

### Summarium

*Introductio; repetitio praecedentis coll.; divisio tertii radii, qui est de veritate morum et illustrat ad tria comprehendenda, 1. — Pars I. De comprehensione modestiarum quoad exercitationes consuetudinales; sex medietates eliguntur, 2. — Primo, de temperantia, 3-5. — Secundo, de munificentia, 6. — Tertio, de fortitudine, 7. — Quarto, de mansuetudine, 8. — Quinto, de benignitate, 9. — Sexto, de magnanimitate, 10. — Hae sex removent vitia, 11. — Pars II. De comprehensione industriarum quoad speculationes intellectuales. Hae sunt scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intelligentia; divisio speculationis duplex, 12. — De singulis, 13. — Pars III. De comprehensione moralium iustitiarum quoad leges politicas. Attenditur haec quoad quatuor, 14. — Primo, quoad ritum colendi Deum in sacrificio et laude, 15-17. — Secundo, quoad formam convivendi, 18. — Tertio, quoad normam praesidendi, 19. — Quarto, quoad censuram iudicandi, 20. — Abusus in his novem scientiis, 21. — Epilogus et repetitio, 22. — Pars IV. De sapientia a philosophis promissa, ubi est divisio lucis a tenebris. Triplex conversio, 23. — Primus gradus, conversio animae super se ipsam; animae potentiae tres et operationes sex, 24. 25. — Secundus gradus, conversio super Intelligentias spirituales, quae sunt lumina et specula, cum virtutibus infimis, mediis et supremis, 26. 27. — Tertius gradus, conversio super rationes aeternas, 28. — Haec fit tripliciter: primo ratiocinando, 29. — Secundo, experiendo, 30. — Tertio, intelligendo, 31. — De his tribus, 32. — Epilogus, 33.*

1. *Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris*[^p353-4] etc. Dictum est, quod intellectualis lux est veritas, quae est radians super intelligentiam sive humanam, sive angelicam; quae inexstinguibiliter irradiat, quia non potest cogitari non esse. Irradiat autem aliquid tripliciter: ut veritas

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*rerum*, ut veritas *vocum*, ut veritas *morum*: ut veritas *rerum* est indivisio entis et esse, ut veritas *vocum* est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, ut veritas *morum* est rectitudo vivendi. Quod patet ex parte *principii*, quod irradiat; ex parte *subiecti*, quod irradiationem suscipit; ex parte *obiecti*, ad quod irradiat. In quantum haec lux est *causa essendi*, est lux *magna*; in quantum est *ratio intelligendi*, est lux *clara*; in quantum est *ordo vivendi*[^p354-1], est lux *bona*; *vidit*, inquit, *Deus lucem, quod esset bona.* — Ut lux *magna* irradiat ad comprehensionem *substantiarum* sive *essentiarum*, *figurarum* et *naturarum* mundialium; ut lux *clara* irradiat ad comprehensionem *locutionum*, *argumentationum*, *persuasionum* rationalium; ut lux *bona* irradiat super intelligentiam vel illustrat ad comprehensionem *modestiarum*, *industriarum*, *iustitiarum*[^p354-2]: ad comprehensionem *modestiarum* quantum ad *exercitationes consuetudinales*; ad comprehensionem *industriarum* quantum ad *speculationes intellectuales*; ad comprehensionem *iustitiarum* quantum ad *leges politicas*. Primo habenda est *modestia*, secundo *industria* inquirenda, tertio exercenda *iustitia*. — Et hic ostenditur, praelatus qualis esse debet, scilicet perfectus in actione et contemplatione accipere debet leges. Ubi? In monte contemplationis cum Moyse[^p354-3], ut sit *modestus* et *industrius*, non bestialis, quia talis in montem ascendere non potest; *bestia* enim, *quae tetigerit montem, lapidabitur.*

2. Primo igitur irradiat sive illustrat ad comprehensionem quantum ad *exercitationem consuetudinalium virtutum*. Unde Philosophus[^p354-4] ponit duodecim medietates: *fortitudinem* circa timores et audacias; *temperantiam* circa delectationes et tristitias; *liberalitatem* circa dona mediocria; *magnificentiam* circa dona magna; *magnanimitatem* circa honorum magnorum appetitum; *philotimiam*[^p354-5] circa mediocrium; *mansuetudinem* circa iras; *veritatem* circa locutiones; *eutrapeliam* circa ludi delectationem; *amicitiam* et duo media passionum, scilicet *verecundiam* et *nemesin*, quae est nulli obesse et alicui prodesse. De his autem eligamus sex praecipuas, scilicet primo *temperantiam*, secundo *munificentiam*, tertio *fortitudinem*, quarto *mansuetudinem*, quinto *benignitatem*, sexto *magnanimitatem*.

3. Primo incipiendum a *temperantia*. Haec necessaria est in-primis; non enim statim homo tentatur a timore mortis[^p354-6], sed statim, quando natus est, delectatione secundum gustum; unde puer appetit dulce secundum *gustum* et postea delectabile secundum *tactum*, quando magnus est. Hanc passionem *contemporaneam* nobis[^p354-7], quae incipit in pueris et terminatur in senibus, oportet primo domare; ista est *concupiscentia*, alia est *cupiditas*. Puer enim primo appetit manducare, postea pecuniam; unde mirabiliter delectatur in illa, et si puero offeras panem et denarium, accipit denarium et relinquit panem. Hoc inficit homines; concupiscunt enim *habere* et *retinere*. *Appretiari* haec ut felicissima malum est, *aspernari* ut exsecrabilia malum est.

4. Dicunt quidam: totaliter pauperes non tenent medium. Respondeo: immo vere tenent medium[^p354-8]. Haec enim medietas non est circa *res*, sed circa *appetitum animae*. Si enim *appetis* haec, ut *sustenteris* tuis vel alienis, medietatem tenes; sed si *appretias*, ut felicitas sit in eis, unum extremum est; si *aspernaris* ut profanum, alterum extremum est, sicut Manichaei profanum putant cum muliere iacere, sive cum uxore, sive cum alia. Similiter dicebant, quod nihil potest homo habere. Et dicit Augustinus[^p354-9], quod hoc non fuit *praeceptum*, licet Apostolis dixerit Dominus: *Nihil tuleritis in via.* Medium ergo est *sustentari* sive suis, sive alienis.

5. Et dicebat beatus Franciscus[^p354-10], quod « pauper magis potest esse largus quam dives: quia dives, si dat quidquid habet, deficiet et confusus est; si vero non dat, cum habeat, licet vellet dare, si sibi non deficeret; voluntas bona est, sed non reputatur sibi pro facto, quia adhuc habet substantiam. Sed pauperi, qui nihil habet, si vellet dare pauperi, et

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nihil habet, quod det; et vellet aedificare hospitalia, non tamen habet unde; voluntas pro facto reputatur[^p355-1] ». — Quod autem dicunt, quod nimis pauperes non tenent medium; simile est illi quod dicebat quidam medicus Frederici, qui dicebat, quod ille qui abstinebat ab omni muliere, non erat virtuosus nec tenebat medium. Et ad hoc sequitur, quod si omnem mulierem cognoscere et nullam mulierem cognoscere *extrema* sunt: ergo medietatem omnium mulierum cognoscere *medium* est[^p355-2].

6. Haec *cupiditas* domari debet per *munificentiam*, quae comprehendit in se largitatem et magnificentiam. Iste est *fons*, qui aquas refundit; fons non retinet in se aquas. Secundum Philosophum[^p355-3] difficile est ab hac perfecte curari, quia hoc valde delectabile est, quia reputat se homo magnum, et alii reputant. Si homo luxuriatur, dolet cerebrum; sed in divitiis homo delectatur, quia est ibi praesumtio et reputatio. — Unde haec cupiditas infecit Giezi[^p355-4], et leprosus factus est, quia cucurrit post Naaman; istud simoniaci hodie reputant magnam curialitatem. Venit Simon magus et dixit Petro: Accipias de pecunia; satis habeo; et da mihi, ut per impositionem manus possim dare Spiritum sanctum; sed Petrus non reputavit curialitatem nec habuit patientiam: *Pecunia tua*, inquit, *tecum sit in perditionem.*

7. Tertia medietas est *fortitudo*, quae est circa timores et audacias[^p355-5]. Haec est necessaria homini, ut non sit pusillanimis, vel temerarius, sed sustineat terribilia et etiam mori sit paratus. Aliqui enim cadunt in ignaviam et pusillanimitatem. Unde Iob[^p355-6]: *Nunquid fortitudo lapidum fortitudo mea, aut caro mea aenea est?* Fortitudo enim in anima est, non in carne. *Melior est patiens arrogante*; et in Proverbiis: *Melior est patiens viro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnatore urbium.* Unde spiritualis homo multum debet cavere a moestitia.

8. Haec virtus facit animam nobilem; sed quia fortis aliquando dedignatur contra alios, ideo necessaria est *mansuetudo*, quae est contra irascibilitates et iracundias, non ut homo penitus non irascatur, sed ubi debet et quando debet[^p355-7]. Unde debet habere et faciem *hominis* et faciem *leonis*. — Tamen aliquando putas hominem mansuetum, qui tacet, alio peccante; hoc non est mansuetudo. Audi igitur: dicitur de Iesu, quod *turbavit semetipsum*[^p355-8] et fecit *flagellum de funiculis*. Unde in primo Machabaeorum: *Vae mihi, ut quid natus sum videre mala gentis meae et sanctorum?* Unde Christus est *agnus* et *leo*.

9. Quinta medietas est *benignitas*, sive nemesis, sive amicitia, quae nihil habet malignitatis, sed homo vult bonum alii homini; et oportet, quod hic ratio *dirigatur*. Etsi dicat Philosophus[^p355-9], quod oportet amicis benefacere, inimicis malefacere; Christus tamen dicit, ut omnis homo diligatur, et ut omni homini conferantur utilia, non nociva. Si ego te diligo et do tibi vel dignitatem vel libertatem, et tu male uteris ea, si dem tibi; benignus non sum, sed potius malignus; et ideo non dabo tibi, ut sim benignus. Habeo amicum, habeo inimicum; amicus male utetur aliqua praelatione vel dignitate ad damnum suum et reipublicae; si dem sibi, benignus non sum. Inimicus meus e contrario bene utetur; sibi dabo et faciam bonum meum de malo suo[^p355-10]. Pater non blanditur filio nec dicit verbum dulce, ne superbiat. Mundus hodie ignorat istam benignitatem; unde *totus mundus in maligno positus est*, quia homo non diligit nisi bonum privatum.

10. Sexta medietas est *magnanimitas*, ut appretientur magna, et despiciantur vilia. Haec est humilitas, quae despicit apparentia magna et appretiat ea quae videntur esse parva, sunt tamen magna vere. Philosophus[^p355-11] dicit, quod magnanimus est in appetitu *honoris*; quidquid dicat ipse, hoc non docet veritas, nisi cum honor est *aeternorum*. Sed econtra quidam appretiant unam vilissimam laudem alicuius, cum tamen veritas dicat in mente sibi, quod ipse est pessimus et nequam; et inde effert se!

11. Hae sex medietates sufficiunt; aliae enim quaedam *innominatae*[^p355-12] sunt. Has autem Philosophus

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manifeste ponit, et in his veritati fidei ratio substernitur. Hae medietates removent vitia sive carnalia, sive spiritualia, ut *temperantia* gulam et luxuriam, *munificentia* avaritiam, cupiditatem, rapacitatem; *fortitudo* accidiam, ignaviam, pigritiam; *mansuetudo* iracundiam, odium, impatientiam; *benignitas* invidiam; *magnanimitas* superbiam, arrogantiam, vanitatem, iactantiam.

12. Secundus radius veritatis illustrat ad comprehensionem *industriarum* secundum *speculationes intellectuales*. Hae sunt quinque: *scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intelligentia*[^p356-1]. — Speculatio autem aut est *consistens in se*, aut *transit in affectum* et *effectum*. Primus modus non pertinet ad moralem, sed magis logici est; secundus autem spectat, quia virtuosus; et ideo, quia faciliter speculativus fit practicus, facile ex speculativo fit virtuosus.

13. Notitia igitur transiens in *affectum* est *sapientia*, quae est « cognitio causarum altissimarum et per causas altissimas[^p356-2] ». — Notitia autem transiens in *effectum* extrinsecum est *ars*, quae est « habitus cum ratione factivus », et hic iungitur notitia cum faciente, praevia tamen affectione. Medium inter haec est *electio*, quae iungitur affectui et ordinatur ad opus. Quod enim quis eligit amat et eligit ad opus; et haec est *prudentia*, quae est media inter sapientiam et artem. *Intelligentia* autem est in *ascendendo* a prudentia ad sapientiam, quae est cognitio principiorum et regularum certarum. — Necesse est similiter *descendere* ad *artem* per *scientiam*. Chirurgus, nisi habeat regulam medici, interficit hominem, ut si incidat eum qui est dispositus ad febrem. — Dicebat[^p356-3] etiam de quodam mathematico, qui faciebat campanas optimas, et illas faciebat secundum proportiones musicales; tamen istas habuerat a quodam musico, qui dederat sibi formam et longitudinis et spissitudinis et martellum proportionatum ad pulsandum. — Nec est intelligendum, propter hoc quod dicitur[^p356-4], quod virtutes quaedam sunt *intellectuales*, quaedam *consuetudinariae*, quod propter hoc virtutes sint in parte aliqua *alia* nisi in *rationali*, quia essentia omnis virtutis est in rationali; sed quaedam sunt in rationali secundum se et secundum quod est *speculatrix*; quaedam autem, secundum quod est exterioris hominis *gubernatrix*.

14. Tertius radius veritatis illustrat ad *morales iustitias* secundum dictamen *legum politicarum*. Hic non debeo loqui sicut theologus nec sicut iurista, sed sicut philosophus loquitur. Haec comprehensio est circa quatuor. Nullus autem philosophorum dedit hanc, sed si fuerit collecta ex multis, aliquid proveniet[^p356-5]. — Attenditur autem quantum ad *ritum colendi*, quantum ad *formam convivendi*, quantum ad *normam praesidendi*, quantum ad *censuram iudicandi*. Ad *censuram iudicandi* non pervenitur nisi per *normam praesidendi*; nec ad *normam praesidendi* nisi per *formam convivendi*; nec ad *istam* nisi per *primam*.

15. Omnes veri philosophi unum Deum coluerunt. Unde etiam Socrates[^p356-6], quia prohibebat, sacrificium fieri Apollini, interfectus fuit, cum coleret unum Deum. Verum est, quod Plato suasit sibi fugam. « Absit, inquit Socrates, ut negem veritatem, quam asserui »; et ideo Plato non interfuit morti eius, erubescens, quod suasisset sibi fugam. Cultus Dei *pietas est fidei*. Unde dicit Tullius[^p356-7], quod *pietas* consistit in cultu deorum. Non placet, quod dicit *deorum*. Scriptura nunquam vocat Angelos deos, ne venerentur sicut dii, sed *homines* dicuntur dii: *Deus stetit in synagoga deorum*[^p356-8], id est hominum, non Angelorum. Cultus autem Dei consistit in *laude* et *sacrificio*.

16. Quomodo autem sacrificium introductum sit, videtur, quod per *fidem* Abel obtulit sacrificium[^p356-9] et *Noe*, de quo dicitur: *Odoratus est Dominus odorem suavitatis.* Et significabant haec sacrificia sacrificium Christi, quod in cruce fecit; et ideo dicitur *Dominus odorare*, ut Deus placaretur per mortem Unigeniti. — Daemones autem propter superbiam suam volunt coli ut Deus, ut habeant in terra quod habere non potuerunt in caelo; et quia maxime alienantur homines a Deo[^p356-10]. — Sanguinem Christi offert qui facit talia sacrificia, eo quod effusus fuit ad placandum Patrem.

17. *Sacrificium* autem *laudis*[^p356-11] in corde naturale iudicatorium dictat, et est de dictamine naturae; et

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in hoc consenserunt omnes veri philosophi. Unde dicit ille, quod « qui dubitat, utrum parentes honorandi sint, et Deus venerandus, poena dignus est ».

18. Secundus modus est *forma convivendi*, ut: « Quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri[^p357-1] ». Hoc in corde scriptum est per legem aeternam. Ex hac naturali lege emanant leges et canones, pullulationes pulcrae. Sed quid? Tu non vis suspendi, et latronem suspendis? Dicendum, quod latro prius debet suspendi, quam ut respublica laedatur; Ionas[^p357-2] contra se dedit sententiam, ut proiiceretur in mare.

19. Tertia est *norma praesidendi*, id est qualiter princeps ad populum debet se habere, et e converso. Et haec emanat a veritate prima: quia populus debet assistere punienti et vindicanti; princeps non debet suam utilitatem quaerere, sed reipublicae. Philosophus[^p357-3] dicit, quod differt tyrannus et princeps: tyrannus quaerit propriam utilitatem, sicut Herodes, qui, timens privari regno suo, saevit in pueros; princeps autem communem utilitatem intendit. Tamen hodie magna abominatio est in his qui praesunt, quia in navi non ponitur rector, nisi habeat artem gubernandi; quomodo ergo in republica ponitur ille qui nescit regere? Unde quando per *successionem* praesunt, male regitur respublica. David fuit sanctissimus; Salomon, etsi lubricissimus, tamen sapiens; Roboam stultus, quia divisit regnum[^p357-4]. Romani per artem diaboli elegerunt Diocletianum. Debebant eligere comedentem super mensam ferream et invenerunt comedentem illum super vomerem; qui postmodum multa mala fecit. Unde quamdiu Romani illos qui praeessent, *elegerunt*, sapientissimos elegerunt; et tunc bene gubernata est respublica; sed postquam ad *successionem* venerunt, totum fuit destructum.

20. Ultimum est *censura iudicandi*, ut homo sciat, quid de quacumque re sit iudicandum, quod spectat ad *personas*, ad *res*, ad *modum agendi*. Haec omnia manant a veritate prima.

21. Sed in his omnibus luxuriata est ratio; luxuriata est *metaphysica*: quia quidam[^p357-5] posuerunt mundum aeternum, quia, si causa aeterna, et effectus aeternus; et isti male senserunt de causa prima. Similiter *mathematici* primo sciverunt numeros et postea ad influentias et secreta cordium venerunt. *Naturales* sciverunt et de corporibus et mineralibus et dixerunt: « Ars imitatur naturam[^p357-6] »; et nos scimus secreta naturae: ergo nos faciemus vobis aurum et argentum. Similiter *grammatici* poesibus et fabulis suis tenuerunt totum mundum, quousque venerunt Sancti contra eos. Similiter *logici* cum suis sophismatibus et suis falsis positionibus fecerunt mundum insanire. Similiter *rhetores* ita delectabantur in colore sermonis, ut non aliud esse regnum Dei dicerent; tamen sublata est modo de medio. *Ars moralis* non ita luxuriata est, quia non in sola speculatione stat; sed *scientia iuris* multum luxuriatur propter lucrum; et causae, quae deberent terminari per ius, modo per allegationem et subtilitatem iuris fiunt immortales, cum tamen intentio iuris sit causas rescindere.

22. Haec sunt novem lumina illustrantia animam, scilicet veritas *rerum, vocum, morum*: *rerum*, scilicet *essentiarum, figurarum, naturarum* quantum ad quidditatum *differentias occultas*, quantum ad quantitatum *proportiones manifestas*, quantum ad naturarum *proprietates mixtas*. Primo metaphysica, secundo mathematica, tertio naturalis seu physica. — Veritas *vocum* tripliciter: quantum ad *locutiones, argumentationes, persuasiones*; primo, quantum ad *locutiones indicantes mentis conceptus*; secundo, quantum ad *argumentationes trahentes mentis assensus*; tertio, quantum ad *persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus*; prima grammatica, secunda logica, tertia rhetorica. — Veritas *morum* tripliciter: quantum ad *modestias, industrias, iustitias*: *modestias*, quantum ad *exercitationes consuetudinales*; *industrias*, quantum ad *speculationes intellectuales*; *iustitias*, quantum ad *leges politicas*. Prima virtus *consuetudinalis*, secunda virtus *intellectualis*, tertia virtus *iustitialis*. — Has novem scientias dederunt philosophi et illustrati sunt. *Deus enim illis revelavit*[^p357-7]. Postmodum voluerunt ad *sapientiam* pervenire, et veritas trahebat eos; et promiserunt dare sapientiam, hoc est beatitudinem, hoc est *intellectum adeptum*; *promiserunt*, inquam, discipulis suis.

23. Quarta ergo consideratio est, quomodo venerunt ad hoc, in quo *lux separata est a tenebris*[^p357-8]; separando enim se a tenebris, converterunt se ad lucem. Sed hoc ita fit, ut anima convertat se primo super *se*; secundo, super *Intelligentias spirituales*; tertio, super *rationes aeternas*.

24. Primo ergo oportet *se* considerare, non sicut oculus carnis, qui non videt se nisi per quandam reflexionem a speculo, sed sicut oculus mentis, qui primo videt *se* et postmodum *alia*. Sed ad hoc

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oportet, ut convertat se super *potentias* et super *actus*. Habet enim anima tres potentias: *animalem, intellectualem, divinam*, secundum triplicem oculum: *carnis, rationis, contemplationis*. Primus viget, secundus caligat, tertius excaecatus est[^p358-1]. — Potentia *animalis* duplex est; vel in obiecta *sensuum particularium* et *sensus communis*, vel in *phantasmata sensibilium*, et sic est *sensus* et *imaginatio*. — *Intellectualis* etiam est duplex: aut ut considerat universales *rationes abstractas*, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad *substantias spirituales separatas*; et sic sunt duae potentiae, scilicet *ratio* et *intellectus*: per rationem *confert*, per intellectum *cognoscit se* et *substantias spirituales*; et tunc ingerit se Intelligentiis, et tunc intrat aeviternum ipsarum[^p358-2]. — Similiter operatio vel potentia *divina* duplex est: una, quae se convertit ad contuenda divina *spectacula*; alia, quae se convertit ad degustanda divina *solatia*. Primum fit per *intelligentiam*, secundum per *vim unitivam* sive *amativam*, quae secreta est, et de qua parum vel nihil noverunt.

25. Ergo triplex est potentia, et sex sunt operationes; et quando haec omnia obiecta videt anima, sic rediens super se, fit *speculum* quoddam pulcherrimum et tersum, in quo videt quidquid est fulgoris et pulcritudinis, sicut in speculo *polito* videtur imago. Sed ad hoc requiritur *opacitas naturalis*, vel *artificialis*: *naturalis*, ut in speculo de chalybe; *artificialis*, ut in plumbo supposito vitro; secundo requiritur *politio*, per quam formam vel imaginem recipit; tertio requiritur *splendor*, quia in nocte speculum nihil reddit. Similiter in anima sunt virtutes inferiores tanquam tenentes lumen, ne defluat; mediae sunt sicut politiones; supremae sunt sicut splendores supervenientes: et sic est anima *speculum*.

26. Sed oportet, ut habeamus *secundum gradum*, quod apponatur pulcris formis, scilicet luminibus caelicis sibi proportionatis, ut Angelis, quia, si statim se elevaret ad divinos fulgores, reverberaretur. Angeli autem sunt et *lumina* et *specula*[^p358-3]; ad quos contemplandos tripliciter elevatur anima. — Habent enim Angeli virtutes *infimas*, per quas regulant motus nobilium corporum et influunt in mundialia; et hoc est positio philosophorum[^p358-4]. Constat enim, quod « causa nobilior est suo effectu »; et constat, quod ad influentiam corporum caelestium fit vel generatur *vivum* et *animatum*: ergo et *anima*. Si ergo animatum nobilius est non animato: ergo necesse est, ut habeat *aliam* causam quam illa corpora. Et illa est influentia angelica cum influentia corporum caelestium. Unde per regimen substantiae intellectualis, influentis super motum orbis, quem regit, fit hoc. — Alii posuerunt, quod Angeli essent numerati secundum numerum motuum propter inclinationem naturalem ad motum[^p358-5]. — Alii posuerunt decem Intelligentias solum, considerantes earum influentias; et fecerunt insanias et contentiones. Angelus bene potest esse sine motu.

27. Item, sunt virtutes in Angelis ad animas *rationales*, per quas regunt homines. Sunt enim *delatores* luminum et *elevatores* intellectuum ad suscipiendas illuminationes. Est ergo in eis virtus *delativa*, quia sunt quaedam *lumina* et quoddam *pervium*, et contemperant in se nobis divinum radium, ut proportionetur nobis. — Secundo modo est in eis virtus *elevativa*, qua nos aptant per condescensionem et sublevationem ad illum radium suscipiendum, non tanquam perficientes[^p358-6]. — Item, est in eis virtus *suprema*, qua se ad Deum convertunt in susceptione splendorum et aeternae lucis, quam amant; et omnia reducunt ad ipsam, ut tendant in Deum per *amorem* et *laudem*. Unde in Iob[^p358-7]: *Ubi eras, cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei?* Et hoc totum senserunt philosophi. Item, Angeli sunt ex hoc *gratias* acturi. — Quando hoc videt anima, ingerit se Angelis et intrat *saeculum* ipsorum.

28. Tertius gradus est, quod ipse intellectus, considerans *conditiones entis* secundum relationem causae ad causatum, transfert se ab effectu ad causas et transit ad rationes aeternas. Differt *causa* a *causatis*: quia prima causa est ens *primum*, causatum ens *productum*; causa prima est ens *simplex*, causatum *compositum*; causa prima est ens *purum*, et causatum *permixtum*; causa prima est ens *fixum*, et causatum *variatum*; causa prima est ens *absolutum*, et causatum *alligatum*; causa prima est ens *perfectum*, causatum *diminutum*. Haec ergo sunt certissima.

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29. Intelligentia autem fertur in hanc lucem tripliciter: *ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo*; *ratiocinabiliter, experimentaliter, intelligentialiter*. — Per viam *rationis* sic[^p359-1]. Si est ens *productum*: ergo est ens *primum*, quia effectus ponit causam. Si enim est ens *ab alio, secundum aliud* et *propter aliud*: ergo est ens *a se, secundum se* et *propter se*. — Item, si est ens *compositum*, necesse est, esse *simplex*, a quo habet *esse*, quia *esse*, quod recedit a simplicitate, cadit in compositionem. — Item, si est ens *permixtum*, necesse est, esse ens *purum*, creatum autem nullum purum. — Item, si est ens secundum se *variatum*, necesse est, esse *fixum*, quia mobile reducitur ad immobile. Mota enim manu, stat cubitus; et moto cubito, stat humerus; et sic semper quod movetur movebitur per aliquod fixum[^p359-2]. — Item, si est dare *alligatum*: ergo et *absolutum*; omnis enim creatura alligata est alicui generi praedicamentorum; sed quod alligatum est, unum non dat alteri *esse*: ergo necesse est, absolutum esse, a quo recipiant *esse*. — Item, si est ens *diminutum*, necesse est, esse ens *perfectum*. — Et hac via procedit Philosophus[^p359-3] ad ostendendum mundum aeternum, quia omnem motum et mutationem praecedit motus localis circularis, quia perfectus est. Sed respondeo: dicendum, quod verum est, quod *perfectum* est ante *diminutum*, loquendo de *perfecto simpliciter*, sed non de *perfecto in genere*, qualis est motus localis. — Et sic fertur intelligentia *ratiocinando*.

30. Fertur similiter *experiendo* sic: *productum* respectu primi defectivum est; similiter *compositum* respectu simplicis; similiter *permixtum* respectu puri, et sic de aliis; ergo dicunt *privationes*. Sed « privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per habitus suos[^p359-4] ». « Iudex enim est rectum *sui* et *obliqui* ». Et si « omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione »: ergo necessario intelligentia experitur in se, quod habeat aliquod lumen, per quod cognoscat *primum esse*.

31. Sic igitur, his praesuppositis, *intellectus intelligit* et dicit, *primum esse* est, et nulli vere *esse* convenit nisi *primo esse*, et ab ipso omnia habent *esse*, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi *primo esse*. Similiter *simplex esse* est simpliciter perfectum *esse*: ergo est quo nihil intelligitur melius. Unde Deus non potest cogitari non esse, ut probat Anselmus[^p359-5].

32. Quando anima videt hoc familiarius, primo *ratiocinando*, secundo *experiendo*, tertio *intelligendo*; ibi potest quiescere. Unde *ratiocinando* infert per oppositum: si est *posterius*, est *prius*; si est *compositum*, est *simplex* etc.; *experimentaliter*, quia *privationes* non cognoscuntur nisi in *positione* causae, et illa sex dicuntur per modum defectus et privationis; *intelligentialiter*, quia non possunt latere animam[^p359-6], ut *primum esse* est, *simplex esse* est etc. — Item, considerat illud *esse*, ut habet *substantiam, virtutem* et *operationem*, ut *primam, purissimam, simplicissimam*, et sic de aliis sex; ut est in eo *unitas, veritas, bonitas*, ut *prima*, ut *purissima*, ut *absolutissima*, et sic de aliis sex; ut habet *firmitatem, speciositatem, bonitatem*, ut *primam, purissimam* et *absolutissimam*; ut habet *memoriam, intelligentiam* et *voluntatem*, secundum illa sex; ut habet *vitam, sapientiam, iucunditatem*, secundum illa sex: et tunc intelligit, quod est *bonum per essentiam*, et omnia per illud beatificantur, et ideo summe appetibile et summe debet appeti; et hoc faciendo conquiescit.

33. Primo ergo anima videt *se* sicut *speculum*, deinde Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut *lumina* et sicut *medium delativum*; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemperativo; deinde in luce aeterna tanquam in *obiecto fontano*, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et *rationabiliter* et *experimentaliter* et *intelligentialiter*. — Dum haec igitur percipit et consurgit ad divinum contuitum, dicit, se habere *intellectum adeptum*, quem promiserunt philosophi; et ad hoc veritas trahit. — Sed tamen per *virtutes* oportet devenire, sicut fecerunt philosophi; quando viderunt, quod tam alte non posset perveniri nisi per virtutes, converterunt se ad docendum illas, ut fecit Socrates; unde reputatur minus bene dixisse, eo quod tantum de illis dixit; sed hoc fecit, quia videbat, quod ad illum intellectum non potest perveniri, nisi anima sit purgata[^p359-7].

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### COLLATION V.
#### *On the first vision, the second treatment, which is on the third ray or on the truth of morals, and on the wisdom of contemplation.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; a recapitulation of the preceding collation; the division of the third ray, which is of the truth of morals and gives light for three things to be comprehended, 1. — Part I. On the comprehension of the modesties as regards the exercises of custom; six means are chosen, 2. — First, on temperance, 3-5. — Second, on munificence, 6. — Third, on fortitude, 7. — Fourth, on meekness, 8. — Fifth, on benignity, 9. — Sixth, on magnanimity, 10. — These six remove vices, 11. — Part II. On the comprehension of the industries as regards intellectual speculations. These are knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding; the twofold division of speculation, 12. — On each of them, 13. — Part III. On the comprehension of the moral justices as regards political laws. This is attended to under four heads, 14. — First, as regards the rite of worshipping God in sacrifice and in praise, 15-17. — Second, as regards the form of living together, 18. — Third, as regards the norm of presiding, 19. — Fourth, as regards the censure of judging, 20. — The abuse of these nine sciences, 21. — Epilogue and recapitulation, 22. — Part IV. On the wisdom promised by the philosophers, wherein the light is divided from the darkness. The threefold conversion, 23. — The first step, the conversion of the soul upon itself; the soul's three powers and six operations, 24. 25. — The second step, the conversion upon the spiritual Intelligences, which are lights and mirrors, together with their lowest, middle and supreme powers, 26. 27. — The third step, the conversion upon the eternal grounds, 28. — This comes about in three ways: first by reasoning, 29. — Second, by experiencing, 30. — Third, by understanding, 31. — On these three, 32. — Epilogue, 33.*

1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*[^p353-4], etc. It has been said that the intellectual light is truth, which shines upon the understanding, whether human or angelic; and it irradiates inextinguishably, because it cannot be thought not to be. Now it irradiates something in three ways: as the truth

*of things*, as the truth *of words*, as the truth *of morals*: as the truth *of things* is the indivision of the being and its to-be, as the truth *of words* is the adequation of word and understanding, as the truth *of morals* is the rectitude of living. Which is clear from the side of the *principle* that irradiates; from the side of the *subject* that receives the irradiation; from the side of the *object* toward which it irradiates. Inasmuch as this light is the *cause of being*, it is a *great* light; inasmuch as it is the *ground of understanding*, it is a *clear* light; inasmuch as it is the *order of living*[^p354-1], it is a *good* light; *God saw*, he says, *the light, that it was good.* — As a *great* light it irradiates unto the comprehension of the *substances* or *essences*, the *figures* and the *natures* of the world; as a *clear* light it irradiates unto the comprehension of *locutions*, *argumentations*, rational *persuasions*; as a *good* light it irradiates upon the understanding, or gives light unto the comprehension of the *modesties*, the *industries*, the *justices*[^p354-2]: unto the comprehension of the *modesties* as regards the *exercises of custom*; unto the comprehension of the *industries* as regards *intellectual speculations*; unto the comprehension of the *justices* as regards *political laws*. First *modesty* is to be had, second *industry* is to be sought out, third *justice* is to be exercised. — And here it is shown what sort of man a prelate ought to be, namely that, perfect in action and in contemplation, he ought to receive the laws. Where? On the mountain of contemplation with Moses[^p354-3], that he may be *modest* and *industrious*, not bestial, since such a one cannot ascend the mountain; for *the beast that shall touch the mountain shall be stoned.*

2. First, then, it irradiates or gives light unto comprehension as regards the *exercise of the customary virtues*. Hence the Philosopher[^p354-4] posits twelve means: *fortitude* about fears and daring; *temperance* about delights and sorrows; *liberality* about middling gifts; *magnificence* about great gifts; *magnanimity* about the appetite for great honours; *philotimy*[^p354-5] about middling ones; *meekness* about angers; *truthfulness* about locutions; *eutrapelia* about the delight of play; *friendship*, and the two means of the passions, namely *shamefastness* and *nemesis*, which is to injure no one and to profit someone. Now out of these let us choose six chief ones, namely first *temperance*, second *munificence*, third *fortitude*, fourth *meekness*, fifth *benignity*, sixth *magnanimity*.

3. First one must begin from *temperance*. This is necessary first of all; for a man is not tempted straightway by the fear of death[^p354-6], but straightway, when he is born, by delight in respect of taste; whence a boy seeks what is sweet in respect of *taste*, and afterwards what is delightful in respect of *touch*, when he is grown. This passion, *coeval* with us[^p354-7], which begins in boys and ends in old men, must first be tamed; the one is *concupiscence*, the other is *cupidity*. For a boy first desires to eat, afterwards money; whence he takes a wonderful delight in it, and if you offer a boy bread and a penny, he takes the penny and leaves the bread. This infects men; for they covet *to have* and *to keep*. To *prize* these things as most happy is an evil, to *spurn* them as execrable is an evil.

4. Some say: those who are wholly poor do not hold the mean. I answer: nay, they truly hold the mean[^p354-8]. For this mean is not about *things*, but about the *appetite of the soul*. For if you *desire* these things that you may *be sustained* by your own or by another's, you hold the mean; but if you *prize* them, so that happiness lies in them, that is the one extreme; if you *spurn* them as profane, that is the other extreme — as the Manichees hold it profane to lie with a woman, whether with a wife or with another. Likewise they used to say that a man can have nothing at all. And Augustine says[^p354-9] that this was not a *precept*, although the Lord said to the Apostles: *Take nothing for the way.* The mean, therefore, is *to be sustained* either by one's own or by another's.

5. And blessed Francis used to say[^p354-10] that « a poor man can be more bountiful than a rich one: because the rich man, if he gives whatever he has, will fail and is confounded; but if he does not give, since he has it — granted that he would be willing to give if it did not fail him — the will is good, but it is not reckoned to him for the deed, because he still has substance. But to a poor man, who has nothing, if he would be willing to give to a poor man, and

has nothing that he might give; and would be willing to build hospitals, yet has not the wherewithal; the will is reckoned for the deed[^p355-1] ». — But as for what they say, that the excessively poor do not hold the mean, it is like what a certain physician of Frederick's used to say, who said that he who abstained from every woman was not virtuous nor held the mean. And from this it follows that, if to know every woman and to know no woman are the *extremes*, then to know the half of all women is the *mean*[^p355-2].

6. This *cupidity* must be tamed by *munificence*, which comprehends within itself largesse and magnificence. This is the *fountain* that pours back its waters; a fountain does not keep its waters within itself. According to the Philosopher[^p355-3] it is difficult to be perfectly cured of this, because it is exceedingly delightful, since a man reckons himself great, and others so reckon him. If a man is lustful, his brain aches; but in riches a man takes delight, because there is presumption and repute in them. — Hence this cupidity infected Giezi[^p355-4], and he was made a leper, because he ran after Naaman; and this the simoniacs today reckon a great courtesy. Simon Magus came and said to Peter: Take of the money; I have enough; and give me that by the imposition of the hand I may be able to give the Holy Spirit; but Peter did not reckon it a courtesy nor did he have patience: *Thy money*, he said, *be with thee unto perdition.*

7. The third mean is *fortitude*, which is about fears and daring[^p355-5]. This is necessary for a man, that he be not faint-hearted, nor rash, but may endure terrible things and be ready even to die. For some fall into cowardice and faint-heartedness. Hence Job[^p355-6]: *Is my strength the strength of stones, or is my flesh of brass?* For fortitude is in the soul, not in the flesh. *The patient man is better than the arrogant*; and in Proverbs: *The patient man is better than the valiant, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities.* Hence a spiritual man ought greatly to beware of sadness.

8. This virtue makes the soul noble; but because the brave man sometimes disdains others, therefore *meekness* is necessary, which is against irascibilities and angers — not that a man should not be angry at all, but where he ought and when he ought[^p355-7]. Hence he ought to have both the face of a *man* and the face of a *lion*. — Yet sometimes you think a man meek who keeps silent while another sins; this is not meekness. Hear, then: it is said of Jesus that *he troubled himself*[^p355-8] and made *a scourge of little cords*. Hence in the first book of Maccabees: *Woe is me, wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and of the saints?* Hence Christ is a *lamb* and a *lion*.

9. The fifth mean is *benignity*, or nemesis, or friendship, which has nothing of malignity, but a man wills the good to another man; and it is needful that here reason should *direct*. Although the Philosopher says[^p355-9] that one ought to do good to friends and evil to enemies, Christ nevertheless says that every man is to be loved, and that to every man useful things, not harmful, are to be conferred. If I love you and give you either a dignity or a liberty, and you use it ill — if I give it to you, I am not benign, but rather malignant; and therefore I shall not give it to you, that I may be benign. I have a friend, I have an enemy; the friend will use some prelacy or dignity ill, to his own harm and the commonwealth's; if I give it to him, I am not benign. My enemy, on the contrary, will use it well; I shall give it to him and shall make my own good out of his evil[^p355-10]. A father does not flatter his son nor speak a sweet word to him, lest he grow proud. The world today knows nothing of this benignity; whence *the whole world is seated in wickedness*, because a man loves nothing but his private good.

10. The sixth mean is *magnanimity*, that great things may be prized and vile things despised. This is humility, which despises the things that appear great and prizes those that seem small, yet are truly great. The Philosopher[^p355-11] says that the magnanimous man is in the appetite of *honour*; whatever he himself may say, truth does not teach this, save when the honour is of *eternal* things. But on the contrary some prize one most worthless bit of someone's praise, although truth tells them inwardly in their mind that the man is most wicked and worthless; and thereupon he exalts himself!

11. These six means suffice; for certain others are *unnamed*[^p355-12]. And these the Philosopher

sets down plainly, and in them reason is laid under the truth of faith. These means remove vices, whether carnal or spiritual: as *temperance* removes gluttony and lust; *munificence*, avarice, cupidity, rapacity; *fortitude*, sloth, cowardice, laziness; *meekness*, wrath, hatred, impatience; *benignity*, envy; *magnanimity*, pride, arrogance, vanity, boasting.

12. The second ray of truth gives light unto the comprehension of the *industries* according to *intellectual speculations*. These are five: *knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding*[^p356-1]. — Now speculation either *stands still in itself*, or *passes over into affection* and *effect*. The first mode does not belong to the moral part, but is rather the logician's; the second, however, does regard it, because it is virtuous; and therefore, since the speculative man readily becomes practical, from a speculative man one easily becomes a virtuous one.

13. Knowledge, then, passing over into *affection* is *wisdom*, which is « the cognition of the highest causes and through the highest causes[^p356-2] ». — But knowledge passing over into an extrinsic *effect* is *art*, which is « a habit productive with reason », and here knowledge is joined with the maker, an affection nevertheless going before. The middle between these is *choice*, which is joined to the affection and is ordered to the work. For what a man chooses he loves and chooses unto a work; and this is *prudence*, which is midway between wisdom and art. *Understanding*, however, lies in *ascending* from prudence to wisdom, which is the cognition of principles and of certain rules. — It is likewise necessary to *descend* to *art* through *knowledge*. A surgeon, unless he has the physician's rule, kills a man — as if he should lance one who is disposed to a fever. — He used also to say[^p356-3] of a certain mathematician who made excellent bells, and made them according to musical proportions; yet he had had these from a certain musician, who had given him the form both of the length and of the thickness, and a hammer proportioned for striking. — Nor is it to be understood, because it is said[^p356-4] that certain virtues are *intellectual* and certain *customary*, that on this account the virtues are in any part *other* than in the *rational*, since the essence of every virtue is in the rational; but some are in the rational according to itself and according as it is *speculative*, and others according as it is the *governess* of the outer man.

14. The third ray of truth gives light unto the *moral justices* according to the dictate of *political laws*. Here I ought to speak neither as a theologian nor as a jurist, but as a philosopher speaks. This comprehension is about four things. No one of the philosophers gave this whole, but if it be gathered out of many, something will come of it[^p356-5]. — Now it is attended to as regards the *rite of worship*, as regards the *form of living together*, as regards the *norm of presiding*, as regards the *censure of judging*. To the *censure of judging* one does not come save through the *norm of presiding*; nor to the *norm of presiding* save through the *form of living together*; nor to *this* save through the *first*.

15. All the true philosophers worshipped one God. Hence even Socrates[^p356-6], because he forbade sacrifice to be made to Apollo, was put to death, since he worshipped one God. It is true that Plato urged flight upon him. « Far be it, said Socrates, that I should deny the truth which I have asserted »; and therefore Plato was not present at his death, blushing that he had urged flight upon him. The worship of God *is the piety of faith*. Hence Tullius says[^p356-7] that *piety* consists in the worship of the gods. What he says — *of the gods* — is not pleasing. Scripture never calls the Angels gods, lest they be venerated as gods, but *men* are called gods: *God hath stood in the synagogue of gods*[^p356-8], that is, of men, not of Angels. Now the worship of God consists in *praise* and in *sacrifice*.

16. As to how sacrifice was introduced, it appears that by *faith* Abel offered sacrifice[^p356-9], and *Noe*, of whom it is said: *The Lord smelled a sweet savour.* And these sacrifices signified the sacrifice of Christ, which he made on the cross; and therefore *the Lord* is said *to smell*, in that God was appeased through the death of the Only-begotten. — But the demons, because of their pride, wish to be worshipped as God, that they may have on earth what they could not have in heaven; and because thereby men are most of all estranged from God[^p356-10]. — He offers the Blood of Christ who makes such sacrifices, in that it was poured out to appease the Father.

17. But the *sacrifice of praise*[^p356-11] the natural judicatory in the heart dictates, and it is of the dictate of nature; and

in this all the true philosophers agreed. Hence that man says that « whoever doubts whether parents are to be honoured and God to be venerated is worthy of punishment ».

18. The second mode is the *form of living together*, thus: « What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another[^p357-1] ». This is written in the heart by the eternal law. Out of this natural law flow laws and canons, fair burgeonings. But what then? You do not wish to be hanged, and you hang the thief? It must be said that the thief ought rather to be hanged than that the commonwealth be harmed; Jonas[^p357-2] gave sentence against himself, that he should be cast into the sea.

19. The third is the *norm of presiding*, that is, how a prince ought to bear himself toward the people, and conversely. And this flows from the first truth: because the people ought to stand by him who punishes and avenges; the prince ought not to seek his own advantage, but the commonwealth's. The Philosopher says[^p357-3] that a tyrant and a prince differ: the tyrant seeks his own advantage, like Herod, who, fearing to be deprived of his kingdom, raged against the little children; but the prince intends the common advantage. Yet today there is a great abomination among those who preside, since a steersman is not set over a ship unless he has the art of steering; how then is that man set over the commonwealth who does not know how to rule? Hence when men preside by *succession*, the commonwealth is ill ruled. David was most holy; Solomon, though most slippery, was nevertheless wise; Roboam was a fool, since he divided the kingdom[^p357-4]. The Romans by the devil's art chose Diocletian. They were to choose the man eating at an iron table, and they found him eating upon a ploughshare; and he afterwards did many evils. Hence as long as the Romans *chose* those who were to preside, they chose the wisest; and then the commonwealth was well governed; but after they came to *succession*, the whole was destroyed.

20. The last is the *censure of judging*, that a man may know what is to be judged about any matter whatever, which regards *persons*, *things*, and the *manner of acting*. All these flow from the first truth.

21. But in all these reason has run riot; *metaphysics* has run riot: because certain men[^p357-5] posited the world to be eternal, since, if the cause is eternal, so is the effect; and these judged ill of the first cause. Likewise the *mathematicians* first knew numbers, and afterwards came to influences and the secrets of hearts. The *natural philosophers* had knowledge both of bodies and of minerals, and said: « Art imitates nature[^p357-6] »; and we know the secrets of nature: therefore we shall make you gold and silver. Likewise the *grammarians* with their poems and fables held the whole world, until the Saints came against them. Likewise the *logicians* with their sophisms and their false positions made the world go mad. Likewise the *rhetoricians* so delighted in the colour of speech that they said the kingdom of God was nothing else; yet it has now been taken out of the way. The *moral art* has not so run riot, because it does not stand in speculation alone; but the *science of law* runs riot exceedingly for the sake of gain; and cases which ought to be brought to an end by law are now, through pleading and the subtlety of law, made immortal, although the intention of law is to cut cases short.

22. These are the nine lights that give light to the soul, namely the truth *of things, of words, of morals*: *of things*, namely of *essences, figures, natures* — as regards the hidden *differences of quiddities*, as regards the manifest *proportions of quantities*, as regards the mixed *properties of natures*. First metaphysics, second mathematics, third natural science or physics. — The truth *of words* in three ways: as regards *locutions, argumentations, persuasions*; first, as regards *locutions indicating the mind's concepts*; second, as regards *argumentations drawing the mind's assent*; third, as regards *persuasions inclining the mind's affections*; the first is grammar, the second logic, the third rhetoric. — The truth *of morals* in three ways: as regards the *modesties, industries, justices*: the *modesties*, as regards the *exercises of custom*; the *industries*, as regards *intellectual speculations*; the *justices*, as regards *political laws*. The first is the virtue of *custom*, the second the *intellectual* virtue, the third the virtue of *justice*. — These nine sciences the philosophers gave, and they were enlightened. *For God revealed it to them*[^p357-7]. Afterwards they wished to come through to *wisdom*, and the truth was drawing them; and they promised to give wisdom, that is, beatitude, that is, the *acquired intellect*; *they promised*, I say, to their disciples.

23. The fourth consideration, then, is how they came to this, in which *the light was separated from the darkness*[^p357-8]; for by separating themselves from the darkness they turned themselves to the light. But this comes about thus: that the soul turn itself first upon *itself*; second, upon the *spiritual Intelligences*; third, upon the *eternal grounds*.

24. First, then, one must consider *oneself*, not as the eye of the flesh, which does not see itself save by a certain reflection from a mirror, but as the eye of the mind, which first sees *itself* and afterwards *other things*. But for this

it is needful that it turn itself upon its *powers* and upon its *acts*. For the soul has three powers: the *animal*, the *intellectual*, the *divine*, according to the threefold eye: *of the flesh, of reason, of contemplation*. The first is vigorous, the second is dim, the third is blinded[^p358-1]. — The *animal* power is twofold: either toward the objects of the *particular senses* and of the *common sense*, or toward the *phantasms of sensible things*, and thus there is *sense* and *imagination*. — The *intellectual* also is twofold: either as it considers universal *abstract grounds*, as it abstracts from place, time and dimension; or as it is raised to *separate spiritual substances*; and thus there are two powers, namely *reason* and *intellect*: by reason it *compares*, by intellect it *knows itself* and the *spiritual substances*; and then it thrusts itself in among the Intelligences, and then it enters their aeviternity[^p358-2]. — Likewise the *divine* operation or power is twofold: one which turns itself to beholding the divine *spectacles*; another which turns itself to tasting the divine *solaces*. The first comes about through *understanding*, the second through the *unitive* or *amative power*, which is hidden, and of which they knew little or nothing.

25. Therefore the power is threefold, and there are six operations; and when the soul sees all these objects, thus returning upon itself, it becomes a certain most beautiful and burnished *mirror*, in which it sees whatever there is of brightness and of beauty, as an image is seen in a *polished* mirror. But for this there is required *natural opacity* or *artificial*: *natural*, as in a mirror of steel; *artificial*, as in lead laid under glass; second, *polishing* is required, through which it receives the form or image; third, *splendour* is required, since at night a mirror gives nothing back. Likewise in the soul the lower virtues are as it were holding the light, lest it flow away; the middle ones are as the polishings; the supreme ones are as supervening splendours: and thus the soul is a *mirror*.

26. But it is needful that we have the *second step*, that there be set beside it beautiful forms, namely heavenly lights proportioned to it, such as the Angels — because, if it were straightway to raise itself to the divine flashings, it would be beaten back. Now the Angels are both *lights* and *mirrors*[^p358-3]; and for the contemplating of them the soul is raised in three ways. — For the Angels have *lowest* powers, by which they regulate the motions of the noble bodies and flow into the things of this world; and this is the position of the philosophers[^p358-4]. For it is agreed that « the cause is nobler than its effect »; and it is agreed that at the influence of the heavenly bodies what is *living* and *animate* comes to be or is generated: therefore the *soul* also. If, then, the animate is nobler than the inanimate, it is necessary that it have *another* cause than those bodies. And that is the angelic influence together with the influence of the heavenly bodies. Hence this comes about through the governance of an intellectual substance flowing into the motion of the sphere which it rules. — Others posited that the Angels were numbered according to the number of the motions, on account of a natural inclination toward motion[^p358-5]. — Others posited only ten Intelligences, considering their influences; and they wrought madnesses and contentions. An Angel can very well be without motion.

27. Likewise, there are in the Angels powers directed to *rational* souls, by which they rule men. For they are *bearers* of lights and *raisers* of understandings to receive illuminations. There is therefore in them a *conveying* power, since they are certain *lights* and a certain *passage*, and they temper within themselves the divine ray for us, that it may be proportioned to us. — In a second mode there is in them an *elevative* power, by which they fit us, through condescension and uplifting, to receive that ray — not as though perfecting us[^p358-6]. — Likewise, there is in them a *supreme* power, by which they turn themselves to God in the reception of the splendours and of the eternal light, which they love; and they lead all things back to it, that they may tend toward God through *love* and *praise*. Hence in Job[^p358-7]: *Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody?* And all this the philosophers perceived. Likewise, the Angels are from this about to give *thanks*. — When the soul sees this, it thrusts itself in among the Angels and enters their *age*.

28. The third step is that the intellect itself, considering the *conditions of being* according to the relation of cause to caused, transfers itself from the effect to the causes and passes over to the eternal grounds. The *cause* differs from *the things caused*: because the first cause is *first* being, the caused a *produced* being; the first cause is *simple* being, the caused *composite*; the first cause is *pure* being, and the caused *intermixed*; the first cause is *fixed* being, and the caused *varied*; the first cause is *absolute* being, and the caused *bound*; the first cause is *perfect* being, the caused *diminished*. These, then, are most certain.

29. Now the understanding is borne toward this light in three ways: *by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding*; *ratiocinatively, experimentally, intelligentially*. — By the way of *reason*, thus[^p359-1]. If there is a *produced* being: then there is a *first* being, because an effect posits a cause. For if there is a being *from another, according to another* and *on account of another*: then there is a being *from itself, according to itself* and *on account of itself*. — Likewise, if there is a *composite* being, it is necessary that there be a *simple* one, from which it has its *to-be*, since a *to-be* which recedes from simplicity falls into composition. — Likewise, if there is an *intermixed* being, it is necessary that there be a *pure* being; but no created thing is pure. — Likewise, if there is a being *varied* in itself, it is necessary that there be a *fixed* one, since the mobile is led back to the immobile. For when the hand is moved, the elbow stands still; and when the elbow is moved, the shoulder stands still; and so always what is moved will be moved through something fixed[^p359-2]. — Likewise, if a *bound* thing is granted, then an *absolute* one also is; for every creature is bound to some genus of the predicaments; but what is bound does not, being one, give *to-be* to another: it is necessary, therefore, that there be an absolute being from which they may receive *to-be*. — Likewise, if there is a *diminished* being, it is necessary that there be a *perfect* being. — And by this way the Philosopher proceeds[^p359-3] to show the world to be eternal, since circular local motion precedes every motion and change, because it is perfect. But I answer: it must be said that it is true that the *perfect* is before the *diminished*, speaking of the *perfect simply*, but not of the *perfect in a genus*, such as local motion is. — And thus the understanding is borne *by reasoning*.

30. It is borne likewise *by experiencing*, thus: the *produced* is defective in respect of the first; likewise the *composite* in respect of the simple; likewise the *intermixed* in respect of the pure, and so of the rest; therefore they bespeak *privations*. But « privations are not known save through their own habits[^p359-4] ». « For the judge is the rule of *itself* and of *the oblique* ». And if « all cognition comes about from a pre-existing cognition »: then necessarily the understanding experiences in itself that it has some light, through which it may know the *first being*.

31. Thus, then, these things being presupposed, *the intellect understands* and says: the *first being* is, and to nothing does *to-be* truly belong save to the *first being*, and from it all things have their *to-be*, since this predicate is in nothing save in the *first being*. Likewise *simple to-be* is simply perfect *to-be*: therefore it is that than which nothing better is understood. Hence God cannot be thought not to be, as Anselm proves[^p359-5].

32. When the soul sees this more familiarly — first *by reasoning*, second *by experiencing*, third *by understanding* — there it can rest. Hence *by reasoning* it infers through the opposite: if there is a *posterior*, there is a *prior*; if there is a *composite*, there is a *simple*, etc.; *experimentally*, since *privations* are not known save in the *positing* of the cause, and those six are said by way of defect and privation; *intelligentially*, since they cannot lie hidden from the soul[^p359-6], as that the *first being* is, that *simple being* is, etc. — Likewise, it considers that *being* as it has *substance, power* and *operation*, as *first, most pure, most simple*, and so of the other six; as there is in it *unity, truth, goodness*, as *first*, as *most pure*, as *most absolute*, and so of the other six; as it has *firmness, comeliness, goodness*, as *first, most pure* and *most absolute*; as it has *memory, understanding* and *will*, according to those six; as it has *life, wisdom, joyousness*, according to those six: and then it understands that it is the *good by essence*, and that all things are beatified through it, and therefore that it is supremely desirable and ought supremely to be desired; and in doing this it comes to rest.

33. First, then, the soul sees *itself* as a *mirror*, then the Angels or Intelligences as *lights* and as a *conveying medium*; or it sees in itself as in a mirror, in an Intelligence as in a medium conveying and tempering the eternal light; then in the eternal light as in the *fontal object*, as regards those six conditions spoken of, and *rationally* and *experimentally* and *intelligentially*. — While, therefore, it perceives these things and rises up to the divine contuition, it says that it has the *acquired intellect* which the philosophers promised; and to this the truth draws it. — Yet one must arrive there through the *virtues*, as the philosophers did; when they saw that so high a place could not be reached save through the virtues, they turned themselves to teaching them, as Socrates did; whence he is reckoned to have spoken less well, in that he spoke only of them; but he did this because he saw that that understanding cannot be reached unless the soul be purified[^p359-7].

---

la: Gen. 1, 4. — Quae immediate post afferuntur exposita sunt in collat. 4.

en: Gen. 1:4. — The matters brought forward immediately after have been expounded in collation 4.

la: Respiciuntur verba August. supra pag. 19, nota 7. allata.

en: The words of Augustine cited above, p. 19, note 7, are had in view.

la: Hac ultima propositione indicatur materia praesentis collationis.

en: By this last proposition the matter of the present collation is indicated.

la: Cfr. Exod. 19, 3. seqq. et 24, 12. seqq. — Seq. locus est Hebr. 12, 20, insinuatus Exod. 19, 13.

en: Cf. Exod. 19:3 ff. and 24:12 ff. — The following passage is Heb. 12:20, hinted at in Exod. 19:13.

la: Libr. II. Ethic. c. 7, quae exponuntur ibid. III. c. 6. seqq. usque ad finem libri V.

en: Book II of the *Ethics*, c. 7, which things are expounded ibid. III, c. 6 ff., down to the end of book V.

la: Scil. appetitum honorum; sumitur hoc vocabulum ad designandam medietatem inter excessum (ambitionem) et defectum (inambitionem seu contemptum honoris parvi) a primo extremo, quia aliud nomen deest et est, ut infra n. 11. dicitur, *medietas innominata*. Tres virtutes inferius positae, scil. *veritas, eutrapelia* (urbanitas sive facetudo) et *amicitia*, in hoc conveniunt, quod omnes sunt circa verba et opera, quibus homines ad invicem communicant; differunt autem in eo, quod *veritas* est circa veritatem talium verborum et factorum; *eutrapelia* autem et *amicitia* circa delectationem ipsorum, ita tamen, quod una earum respicit delectationem eorum quae dicuntur vel fiunt ludo, alia vero in his quae pertinent ad communem vitam, scil. in seriosis. Quae ultimo loco ponuntur, scil. *verecundia* et *nemesis* (indignatio sive reprehensio) respiciunt passiones *laudabiles*; prima est medietas inter excessum (quando quis quasi pavidus de omnibus verecundatur) et defectum (quando quis nihil verecundatur); secunda est medietas inter invidiam (qua quis tristatur de omnibus, qui prosperantur, sive bonis sive malis) et malevolentiam (quae tantum deficit a tristando, ut etiam gaudeat de malis, qui in sua malitia prosperantur).

en: Namely the appetite for honours; this word is taken to designate the mean between the excess (ambition) and the defect (unambitiousness, or the contempt of small honour), and it is named from the first extreme because another name is lacking, and it is, as is said below at n. 11, *an unnamed mean*. The three virtues set down further on, namely *truthfulness, eutrapelia* (urbanity or facetiousness) and *friendship*, agree in this, that they are all about the words and deeds by which men communicate with one another; but they differ in that *truthfulness* is about the truth of such words and deeds, while *eutrapelia* and *friendship* are about the delight taken in them — yet so that one of them regards the delight of things said or done in play, the other that in things belonging to common life, that is, in serious matters. Those set down last, namely *shamefastness* and *nemesis* (indignation or reproof), regard the *laudable* passions; the first is a mean between the excess (when someone, as though timid, is ashamed of everything) and the defect (when someone is ashamed of nothing); the second is a mean between envy (by which someone is saddened at all who prosper, whether good or bad) and malevolence (which so far falls short of being saddened that it even rejoices at the evils of those who prosper in their malice).

la: Contra quem est *fortitudo*; cfr. infra n. 7.

en: Against which is *fortitude*; cf. below, n. 7.

la: Vide supra pag. 174, nota 3. verba Aristotelis. Cfr. etiam ipsius IV. Ethic. c. 1, ex quo infra n. 6. quaedam allegantur. De *temperantia* agit Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 10-12.

en: See above, p. 174, note 3, for the words of Aristotle. Cf. also his IV *Ethics*, c. 1, from which certain things are cited below at n. 6. Aristotle treats of *temperance* in III *Ethics*, c. 10–12.

la: Cfr. supra Quaest. disput. de perfect. evang. q. 2. a. 1. ad 6.

en: Cf. above, the Disputed Questions *On Evangelical Perfection*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6.

la: Libr. I. de Moribus Eccles. cathol. c. 35. n. 77. seqq., ubi impugnat duplicem praedictum errorem Manichaeorum. — Seq. locus est Luc. 9, 3.

en: Book I *On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, c. 35, n. 77 ff., where he attacks the twofold aforesaid error of the Manichees. — The following passage is Luke 9:3.

la: Opuscula, III. Oracul. 29.

en: *Opuscula*, III, *Oraculum* 29.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 924, nota 5. et 7; tom IV. pag. 107, nota 5.

en: Cf. tom. II, p. 924, notes 5 and 7; tom. IV, p. 107, note 5.

la: Vide IV. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. Cfr. etiam supra Quaest. disput. de perfect. evang. q. 3. a. 2. ad 9.

en: See IV *Sentences*, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1. Cf. also above, the Disputed Questions *On Evangelical Perfection*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 9.

la: Aristot. IV. Ethic. c. 1: At illiberalitas *incurabilis* est; nam et senectus et omnis imbecillitas reddere illiberales videtur, magisque quam prodigalitas hominibus natura insita est. Nam plerique sunt pecuniarum cupidi magis quam ad dandum prompti etc. Ibid. c. 2. agitur de *magnificentia*. — Isidor., XIII. Etymolog. c. 21. n. 5: *Fons* caput aquae est nascentis, quasi *fundens* aquas.

en: Aristotle, IV *Ethics*, c. 1: But illiberality is *incurable*; for both old age and every infirmity seem to make men illiberal, and it is more deeply implanted in men by nature than prodigality is. For most men are more covetous of money than ready to give, etc. Ibid., c. 2, treats of *magnificence*. — Isidore, XIII *Etymologies*, c. 21, n. 5: A *fountain* (*fons*) is the head of rising water, as it were *pouring out* (*fundens*) waters.

la: Cfr. IV. Reg. 5, 20. seqq. — Seq. locus (de Simone) est Act. 8, 17. seqq.

en: Cf. IV Kings 5:20 ff. — The following passage (on Simon) is Acts 8:17 ff.

la: Vide Aristot. III. Ethic. c. 6. seqq.

en: See Aristotle, III *Ethics*, c. 6 ff.

la: Cap. 6, 12: Nec fortitudo... mea, nec caro mea aenea est. — Seq. locus est Eccle. 7, 9; tertius Prov. 16, 32.

en: C. 6:12: Neither is my strength… nor is my flesh of brass. — The following passage is Eccles. 7:9; the third, Prov. 16:32.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 5. — In seq. propositione respicitur Ezech. 1, 10: Facies hominis et facies leonis etc.

en: Cf. Aristotle, IV *Ethics*, c. 5. — In the following proposition Ezech. 1:10 is had in view: The face of a man and the face of a lion, etc.

la: Ioan. 11, 33. Seq. locus est Ioan. 2, 15; tertius I. Mach. 2, 7: Vae... videre contritionem populi mei et contritionem civitatis sanctae. Ibid. 3, 59: Quoniam melius est nos mori in bello, quam videre mala gentis nostrae et sanctorum. — De Christo, ut est *agnus* et *leo*, cfr. Ioan. 1, 29; Apoc. 5, 5. et 6.

en: John 11:33. The following passage is John 2:15; the third, I Mach. 2:7: Woe… to see the ruin of my people and the ruin of the holy city. Ibid. 3:59: For it is better for us to die in battle than to see the evils of our nation and of the holy places. — On Christ as *lamb* and *lion*, cf. John 1:29; Apoc. 5:5 and 6.

la: Libr. II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.). B. Albert. in hunc locum (tr. 2. c. 2.) refert, « quod in definitione hominis posuit Socrates, quod homo est animal rationale amicis benefaciens et inimicis malefaciens, sicut legitur in primo Zenonis »; et ad obiectionem: « Dicit lex [christiana], quod inimicis benefaciat »; respondet: Non habemus contra hoc dicere; quia hoc ex principiis philosophiae non probatur, sed potius ex gratia superadditur ad naturam et ad rationem et ad maiorem ordinat perfectionem, ad quam non potest se extendere philosophus. — Subinde respicitur Matth. 5, 43. seqq. (de diligendis inimicis). — De *benignitate* (sive mansuetudine) cfr. Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 5. seq., et de *amicitia* ibid. lib. VIII. et IX.

en: Book II of the *Topics*, c. 3 (c. 7). Blessed Albert on this passage (tr. 2, c. 2) reports « that Socrates put into the definition of man that man is a rational animal doing good to friends and evil to enemies, as is read in the first book of Zeno »; and to the objection: « The [Christian] law says that one should do good to enemies », he answers: We have nothing to say against this; because it is not proved from the principles of philosophy, but is rather superadded to nature and to reason out of grace, and orders man to a greater perfection, to which the philosopher cannot extend himself. — Thereupon Matt. 5:43 ff. (on loving enemies) is had in view. — On *benignity* (or meekness) cf. Aristotle, IV *Ethics*, c. 5 f., and on *friendship* ibid., books VIII and IX.

la: Rom. 12, 21: Noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum. — Inferius allegatur I. Ioan. 5, 19.

en: Rom. 12:21: Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good. — Below, I John 5:19 is cited.

la: Libr. IV. Ethic. c. 3.

en: Book IV of the *Ethics*, c. 3.

la: Cfr. pag. 354, nota 5.

la: De quibus Aristot. agit in VI. Ethic. per totum. — De propositione: speculativus fit practicus, cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Of which Aristotle treats in VI *Ethics* throughout. — On the proposition that the speculative man becomes practical, cf. II *Sentences*, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 120, nota 11. Seq. definitio artis datur ab Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 4. Ibid. c. 2. dicit, quod *electio* est « consultatrix appetitio », et paulo inferius: « Vel appetitivus intellectus vel intellectivus appetitus electio est ». *Prudentiam*, ibid. c. 5, definit, quod « habitus sit vera cum ratione activus circa ea quae et bona et mala homini sunt ». De *intelligentia* sive intellectu docet (c. 6.), « intellectum esse principiorum ».

en: See above, p. 120, note 11. The following definition of art is given by Aristotle, VI *Ethics*, c. 4. Ibid., c. 2, he says that *choice* is « a deliberative appetition », and a little below: « Choice is either appetitive intellect or intellective appetite ». *Prudence* he defines, ibid. c. 5, as « a habit true, with reason, and active about the things that are good and bad for man ». Of *understanding* or intellect he teaches (c. 6) that « the intellect is of principles ».

la: Scil. S. Bonaventura. Secuti sumus A D; Vat. *Dicebatur*. Idem modus referendi indirecte in seqq. coll. saepius occurrit.

en: Namely St. Bonaventure. We have followed A D; the Vatican edition, *It used to be said*. The same manner of reporting indirectly occurs frequently in the following collations.

la: Ab Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 13; II. c. 1. et VI. c. 1. — De seqq. cfr. III. Sent. d. 33. q. 3.

en: By Aristotle, I *Ethics*, c. 13; II, c. 1, and VI, c. 1. — On what follows, cf. III *Sentences*, d. 33, q. 3.

la: B: *dedit hanc, possumus tamen colligere ex variis eorum dictis sparsim.*

en: B reads: *gave this, yet we can gather it here and there out of their various sayings.*

la: Cfr. Plato, Apologia Socratis. S. Iustin., Apologia II. pro Christianis, c. 10. — De seqq. vide Plato, Crito, in quo narratur, quod Crito Socratem in carcere invisit et ei fugam suasit, ac quod Socrates pluribus rationibus demonstravit, nefas sibi esse e carcere egredi. — In Platonis Phaedone enumerantur qui praesentes erant Socrati morienti, et de Platone dicitur: Plato autem, opinor, aegrotabat.

en: Cf. Plato, *Apology of Socrates*. St. Justin, *Apology* II *for the Christians*, c. 10. — On what follows see Plato's *Crito*, in which it is related that Crito visited Socrates in prison and urged flight upon him, and that Socrates showed by many arguments that it would be a wrong for him to go out of the prison. — In Plato's *Phaedo* those who were present at the dying Socrates are enumerated, and of Plato it is said: But Plato, I think, was sick.

la: Libr. I. de Natura deorum, c. 41: Est enim pietas iustitia adversus deos. Cap. seq. dicit, quod religio « deorum cultu pio continetur ». Cfr. ibid. c. 2. et II. de Officiis, c. 3.

en: Book I *On the Nature of the Gods*, c. 41: For piety is justice toward the gods. In the following chapter he says that religion « is contained in the pious worship of the gods ». Cf. ibid., c. 2, and II *On Duties*, c. 3.

la: Respicitur Hebr. 11, 4: Fide plurimam hostiam Abel quam Cain obtulit Deo (cfr. Gen. 4, 3. seqq.); et mox allegatur Gen. 8, 21.

en: Heb. 11:4 is had in view: By faith Abel offered to God a sacrifice exceeding that of Cain (cf. Gen. 4:3 ff.); and presently Gen. 8:21 is cited.

la: Cfr. August., X. de Civ. Dei, c. 3-7. et c. 19. seq.

en: Cf. Augustine, X *On the City of God*, c. 3–7 and c. 19 f.

la: Respicitur Ps. 49, 14: Immola Deo sacrificium laudis; et v. 23: Sacrificium laudis honorificabit me. — Vide Plato, de Legibus, dialog. 10, ubi etiam poenae statuuntur iis qui Deum non honorant; et dialog. 11, in quo de veneratione parentum et poenis eorum qui parentes non honorant. Aristot., II. Topic. in fine, docet, honorare deos simpliciter bonum esse; ibid. I. c. 9. propositio, quae paulo inferius ponitur, habetur: Nam qui dubitant, utrum oporteat deos honorare et parentes diligere, an non, poena indigent.

en: Ps. 49:14 is had in view: Offer to God the sacrifice of praise; and v. 23: The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me. — See Plato, *On the Laws*, dialogue 10, where penalties are also laid down for those who do not honour God; and dialogue 11, in which he treats of the veneration of parents and the penalties of those who do not honour their parents. Aristotle, II *Topics*, at the end, teaches that to honour the gods is simply good; ibid. I, c. 9, is found the proposition which is set down a little below: For those who doubt whether one ought to honour the gods and love one's parents, or not, stand in need of punishment.

la: Tob. 4, 16. Cfr. Matth. 7, 12. et Luc. 6, 31. Vide August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 3. n. 6; ibid. c. 5. n. 11. seqq. occurrit exemplum de latrone.

en: Tob. 4:16. Cf. Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31. See Augustine, I *On Free Choice*, c. 3, n. 6; ibid. c. 5, n. 11 ff., the example of the thief occurs.

la: Libr. VIII. Ethic. c. 10: Tyrannus enim suam, rex subditorum utilitatem spectat. — De Herode cfr. Matth. 2, 3. seqq.

en: Book VIII of the *Ethics*, c. 10: For the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. — On Herod, cf. Matt. 2:3 ff.

la: Cfr. III. Reg. c. 12. et II. Paralip. c. 10. seqq. — Superius post *successionem*, plures codd. secuti, suppressimus *pueri*.

en: Cf. III Kings, c. 12, and II Paralipomenon, c. 10 ff. — Above, after *succession*, following several codices, we have suppressed *pueri*.

la: Vide supra collat. 4. n. 13. et infra collat. 6. n. 4. — De mathematicis cfr. collat. 1. n. 21.

en: See above, collation 4, n. 13, and below, collation 6, n. 4. — On the mathematicians, cf. collation 1, n. 21.

la: Aristot., II. Phys. text. 22. (c. 2.).

en: Aristotle, II *Physics*, text 22 (c. 2).

la: Rom. 1, 19. Pro *revelavit* Vulgata *manifestavit*. — De *intellectu adepto* cfr. Avicenna, de Anima, p. V. c. 6.

en: Rom. 1:19. For *revealed* the Vulgate has *manifested*. — On the *acquired intellect*, cf. Avicenna, *On the Soul*, p. V, c. 6.

la: Respicitur Gen. 1, 4: Divisit lucem a tenebris.

en: Gen. 1:4 is had in view: He divided the light from the darkness.

la: Secundum Hug. a S. Vict. supra pag. 230, nota 6. et 7. allegatum.

en: According to Hugh of St. Victor, cited above, p. 230, notes 6 and 7.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 297, nota 9; pag. 300, nota 6. et pag. 301, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 297, note 9; p. 300, note 6; and p. 301, note 3.

la: Secundum Dionys. cfr. tom. II. pag. 83, nota 1.

en: According to Dionysius; cf. tom. II, p. 83, note 1.

la: Vide Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 42. seqq. (XI. c. 8.). — De seq. axiomate cfr. supra pag. 254, nota 2. De influentia corporum caelestium vide Breviloq. p. II. c. 3. seq.

en: See Aristotle, XII *Metaphysics*, text 42 ff. (XI, c. 8). — On the following axiom, cf. above, p. 254, note 2. On the influence of the heavenly bodies see the *Breviloquium*, p. II, c. 3 f.

la: Ut insinuat Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 43. (XI. c. 8.), quem explicans Averroes ait: « Manifestum est igitur, quod numerus substantiarum moventium est secundum numerum motuum ». In seqq. refert Aristot. numerum motuum et exinde Intelligentiarum secundum opinionem Eudoxi et Calippi; ac text. 48. ponit, quod nulla sit Intelligentia, quae non moveat aliquem orbem (Averroes in text. 44: Et ideo dicit Aristot., quod si aliquae substantiae essent non moventes, essent otiosae). — De seq. opinione cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.

en: As Aristotle hints, XII *Metaphysics*, text 43 (XI, c. 8), whom Averroes, expounding him, says: « It is manifest, therefore, that the number of the moving substances is according to the number of the motions ». In what follows Aristotle reports the number of the motions, and thence of the Intelligences, according to the opinion of Eudoxus and Callippus; and at text 48 he lays down that there is no Intelligence which does not move some sphere (Averroes at text 44: And therefore Aristotle says that if there were any substances not moving, they would be idle). — On the following opinion, cf. II *Sentences*, d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Vide supra collat. 3. n. 32. in fine.

en: See above, collation 3, n. 32, at the end.

la: Cap. 38, 4: (ex quo: Ubi eras) et 7: cum me laudarent simul astra etc. — Cfr. Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 10. c. 1. — Superius pro *suprema* B *inflammativa*. Inferius pro *speculum* cum A B G posuimus *saeculum*, quod hic idem est ac terminus *aevum*; cfr. supra n. 24.

en: C. 38:4 (whence: Where wast thou) and 7: when the morning stars praised me together, etc. — Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, tr. 10, c. 1. — Above, for *supreme*, B has *inflammative*. Below, for *speculum* we have set, with A B G, *saeculum*, which here is the same as the term *aevum*; cf. above, n. 24.

la: Cfr. supra Quaest. disput. de mysterio Trin. q. 1. a. 1. fundam. 11-20. Hi loci mutuo se supplent.

en: Cf. above, the Disputed Questions *On the Mystery of the Trinity*, q. 1, a. 1, fundamenta 11–20. These passages supply one another mutually.

la: Vide Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 33. et 35. (c. 5.). — De generibus praedicam. cfr. supra pag. 344, nota 5. — Inferius pro *unum non dat* F G *non omnino dat*, Vat. *non mutuum dat*.

en: See Aristotle, VIII *Physics*, text 33 and 35 (c. 5). — On the genera of the predicaments, cf. above, p. 344, note 5. — Below, for *one does not give* F G have *does not give at all*, the Vatican edition *does not give mutually*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 19, nota 1. et 2.

en: Cf. tom. II, p. 19, notes 1 and 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 304, nota 3. — Duae seqq. propositiones sunt Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 85. (c. 5.) et I. Poster. c. 1.

en: See above, p. 304, note 3. — The two following propositions are Aristotle's, I *On the Soul*, text 85 (c. 5), and I *Posterior Analytics*, c. 1.

la: Proslog. c. 2. seqq. — De praecedentibus cfr. etiam supra Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 3. n. 3. et c. 5. n. 3. seqq. Observandum est, iisdem confirmari nostram Itinerarii interpretationem. Alia multa in Itinerario breviter dicta in his collationibus diffusius explicantur.

en: *Proslogion*, c. 2 ff. — On what precedes, cf. also above, the *Itinerarium of the Mind into God*, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 5, n. 3 ff. It is to be observed that our interpretation of the *Itinerarium* is confirmed by these same passages. Many other things briefly said in the *Itinerarium* are explained more diffusely in these collations.

la: Respiciuntur verba Aristotelis supra pag. 45, nota 6. allegata. — De seqq. cfr. supra collat. 2. n. 22-27. et Breviloq. p. I. c. 6.

en: The words of Aristotle cited above, p. 45, note 6, are had in view. — On what follows, cf. above, collation 2, n. 22–27, and the *Breviloquium*, p. I, c. 6.

la: Secundum August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3.

en: According to Augustine, VIII *On the City of God*, c. 3. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin set from the IA djvu OCR of Tomus V (`raw/doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`,
raw L60965–L62014) and checked page by page against the 450 dpi bands; **the whole apparatus is
read off the footer bands.** English translated literally and in parallel. Printed pp. 353–359,
PDF 429–435 (offset +76). Plate scouting banked and committed ahead of writing at
`manual-review/hex-c5-plate-scouting.md`.

**Span, fixed positively at both ends.** Collatio V opens part-way down **p. 353**, below
Collatio IV, with a full-width display heading, a two-line subtitle, its Summarium, and then
**its own two-column body** (¶ 1) in the bottom fifth of the leaf. It closes at the foot of
**p. 359**, where both columns end level at ~72 %; **`COLLATIO VI.` opens at the HEAD of p. 360**,
verified on the band. **This boundary is a LEAF EDGE — the second of that shape in this work,
after 335 | 336 — and c5 forwards c6 nothing.**

**✅ `COLLATIO V.` CARRIES NO APPARATUS ANCHOR** — checked at magnification on the full-width
crop, as were its subtitle and Summarium. Of the five collatio openings read, only `COLLATIO I.`
carries one.

**★★ THE REGION-NOT-PAGE RULE IN ITS EXTREME FORM: p. 353 HAS NO GUTTER TO MEASURE IN THE
MIDDLE OF THE LEAF.** The leaf stacks four regions in three measures — Collatio IV's two columns,
the full-width heading and subtitle, the full-measure Summarium, and Collatio V's two columns —
and a profile taken over rows .50–.75 lands wholly inside the Summarium and returns **no low-ink
run at all** between x 1050 and 1350 (minimum ink 48). `colcrop`'s whole-page default reports a
**1 px** run, which is the tool saying, correctly, that it has found nothing. The gutter used for
c5's own columns is the one measured over Collatio IV's body region above the heading, **1180**,
since both bodies are set to the same measure. This is the p. 313 finding (frozen at
`bon-itin-c7`) carried one step further: a stacked region may not merely have a *different*
gutter — it may have *none*.

**Gutters — six of seven defaults sub-60 px, so every leaf went to the direct band profile.**
353 = **1180** (c4's region; the leaf's own default is worthless, above) · 354 = **1347**
(band 1320–1375, rule 1343–1353) · 355 = **1181** (default 1184 on a 49 px run **rejected**;
band 1153–1209, rule 1177–1186 with the set's heaviest island, peak 747) · 356 = **1402** ·
357 = **1233** · 358 = **1373** (default's 49 px run confirmed at the band, 1348–1398) ·
359 = **1151** (63 px, the only comfortable run on the leaf-set).

**Registers, block split and anchor split — stated separately, per the standing rule.**

| page | notes | block L / R | anchors L / R | relation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 353 | 4 (c5 owns **n. 4** only) | 2 / 2 | 3 / 1 | see below |
| 354 | 10 | 5 / 5 | 5 / 5 | coincide |
| 355 | 12 | 8 / 4 | 6 / 6 | left **overruns by two** |
| 356 | 11 | 6 / 5 | 4 / 7 | left **overruns by two** |
| 357 | 8 | 2 / 6 | 6 / 2 | left **UNDERRUNS by four** |
| 358 | 7 | 5 / 2 | 4 / 3 | left overruns by one |
| 359 | 7 | 4 / 3 | 4 / 3 | coincide |

**This chunk owns 56 entries.** All five relations that the corpus knows appear inside seven
leaves, and **p. 357 is the widest divergence recorded in this work.**

**★★ THE INHERITED NOTE LANDS IN THE OTHER COLUMN FROM ITS ANCHOR.** `bon-hex-c4` forwarded
p. 353 n. 4 and said, rightly, only that it is c5's. Verified here: **its anchor is in the LEFT
column** (¶ 1's *et divisit lucem a tenebris*⁴) while **the note prints as the last entry of the
RIGHT footer block** — nn. 1–2 fill the left block, nn. 3–4 the right. The numbering follows
reading order across the whole leaf, not the block. *A hand-off tells you which notes are yours,
never where they land*, one more time.

**★★ A PAGE-CROSSING RUNOVER AT THE 356 | 357 JOINT — the ELEVENTH in Vol V (derived from `check-vol5-census.py`, not counted by hand).** p. 356 n. 11 (Plato,
*de Legibus*) breaks at the foot of the right block and continues **unnumbered at the head of
p. 357's LEFT footer block**, at *Deum non honorant; et dialog. 11…*. That incoming fragment is
what crowds p. 357's left block down to two notes and produces the four-note underrun above.
**Checked negative on every other joint: pp. 354, 355, 356, 358 and 359 all open their left
footer block numbered ¹.** Four gutter-crossing runovers besides (354 n. 5 · 355 n. 8 ·
356 n. 6 · 358 n. 5); nothing runs off p. 359.

**★ nn. 11 and 12 of p. 355 ARE SET SIDE BY SIDE ON ONE LINE** at the foot of the right block —
two short notes sharing a line. Not previously recorded in this volume; read that line as two
columns or n. 12 is simply invisible. (It is the note *Cfr. pag. 354, nota 5.*, which
independently corroborates p. 354's numbering.)

**★★ THE RAW INVENTS AN ANCHOR AS WELL AS LOSING NUMERALS.** The frozen Vol V rule says anchor
POSITIONS survive in the raw while the numerals do not. **Half of that is false.** At ¶ 6 the raw
reads `Iste^ est fons` and the plate has **no superscript there at all** (the anchors on that leaf
are *medium est*², *Philosophum*³, *Giezi*⁴); at ¶ 3 the raw reads `unde puer"appetit` and the
plate has a stray mark, not a numeral. Had either been trusted, the notes on that page would have
been re-numbered against the register. **A glyph in the raw is a place to look, never an anchor**
— every anchor in this chunk was read off the plate.

**★ A DIGIT THE RAW GOT WRONG, SETTLED BY GOING TO THE TARGET *INSIDE THIS CORPUS*.** p. 358 n. 4
prints `supra pag. **254**, nota 2` where the raw gives `251` (the 1/4 class). Decisive, and not
from the glyph: `vol5/bon-brev-p5-c2.md` owns printed p. 254 and its **n. 2 is the axiom
`causa nobilior sit effectu`** — which is precisely the axiom the note is pointing at. Likewise
p. 359 n. 2 prints `(c. **5**.)` where the raw gives `(c. 3.)`: *Physics* VIII texts 33 and 35
fall in c. 5, the chapter of the very argument the body makes.

**⚠ ONE DIGIT CARRIED AS PRINTED AND FLAGGED HERE RATHER THAN IN THE TEXT.** p. 355 n. 1's
`tom IV. pag. **107**, nota 5` is of the 1/4 class and the raw agrees — which is no confirmation,
the raw being made from the same scan. It is transcribed as printed and is **corroborated by its
target's subject-matter**: Vol IV printed p. 107 falls in `bon-sent-IV-d4-p2-a1-q1`, *Utrum
baptismus flaminis sine baptismo fluminis sufficiat ad salutem* — the will counted for the deed —
which is exactly the anchor's argument, whereas p. 407 falls in d. 16 on contrition for forgotten
sins. Not emended, not flagged `[?]`: the reading is the plate's. (The note's other reference,
`tom. II. pag. 924`, resolves to `bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q3`, which prints *voluntas pro facto
reputatur* verbatim.)

**Page-break map.** 353 | 354 at ¶ 1 (*…ut veritas* | *rerum, ut veritas vocum*) · 354 | 355 at
¶ 5 (*…si vellet dare pauperi, et* | *nihil habet, quod det*) · 355 | 356 at ¶ 11 (*…Has autem
Philosophus* | *manifeste ponit*) · 356 | 357 at ¶ 17 (*…et est de dictamine naturae; et* | *in
hoc consenserunt*) · 357 | 358 at ¶ 24 (*…Sed ad hoc* | *oportet, ut convertat se*) · 358 | 359
at a ¶ boundary (¶ 28 closes *Haec ergo sunt certissima.*, ¶ 29 opens the next leaf). **All six
joints read against the band; nothing dropped.**

**Paragraph sequence.** 33 numbered paragraphs, **1..33 with no gaps**, identical in the Latin and
the English; the Summarium's last entry is *Epilogus, 33.* Mapping: 353 = 1 · 354 = 2–5 ·
355 = 5–11 · 356 = 11–17 · 357 = 17–24 · 358 = 24–28 · 359 = 29–33.

**★ THE SUMMARIUM AND THE BODY AGREE HERE** — checked entry by entry, the first collatio of the
four at which they do. It remains a finding aid and not a count; the agreement is recorded as a
checked positive, not as licence to stop counting.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention, transcribed here in body
order):
*p. 353* — Introductio.
*p. 354* — Divisio tertii radii in 3 membra. · De qualitatibus praelati. · Pars I. De modestiis
quoad exercitationes consuetudinales. · Referuntur 12. · Eligantur sex. · De temperantia. · Duo
vitia. · Defenditur paupertas voluntaria. · Dictum Francisci.
*p. 355* — Refellitur obiectio. · De munificentia. · Exempla. · De fortitudine. · De
mansuetudine. · Mansuetudo falsa. · De benignitate. · Reprobatur Philosophus. · Exemplum. · De
magnanimitate. · Reprobatur Philosophus. · Effectus harum.
*p. 356* — Removent vitia. · Pars II. De industriis sec. speculationes intellectuales. Hae sunt
quinque. · De his in specie. · Exemplum. · Sunt in parte rationali. · Pars III. De iustitiis sec.
leges politicas. · Est circa quatuor. · Primo, de ritu Deum colendi. · De Platone. · Duplex
cultus. · De cultu per sacrificia. · De daemonibus. · De cultu per laudem.
*p. 357* — Secundo, de forma convivendi. · Tertio, de norma praesidendi. · Abusus. · Notandum. ·
Diocletianus. · Quarto, de censura iudicandi. · Abusus in his scientiis. · Epilogus. · Veritas
rerum. · Vocum. · Morum. · De decima scientia. · Pars IV. De sapientia a philosophis promissa. ·
Triplex conversio animae. · Prima conversio animae super se.
*p. 358* — Tres potentiae et oculi. · Animalis est duplex. · Item, intellectualis. · Item,
divina. · Sex operationes. · Anima fit speculum. · Notandum. · Secunda conversio ad Angelos. ·
Tres virtutes ipsorum. · De prima. · Opiniones philosophorum. · De secunda quae est duplex. · De
tertia. · Tertia conversio ad rationes aeternas. · Differentiae inter primam causam et secundas.
*p. 359* — Triplex modus huius conversionis. · Primo, ratiocinando sex modis. · Opinio Philosophi
corrigitur. · Secundo, experiendo. · Tertio, intelligendo. · De tribus modis simul. · Conclusio. ·
Epilogus IV. partis. · Sic promissa sapientia habetur. · Notandum.

**Register (additions; the c1–c4 freezes stand).**
- **★★ ONE DELIBERATE EXCEPTION TO THE c1 FREEZE, AND IT IS RECORDED SO IT IS NOT RE-OPENED.**
  c1 froze ***medium* → "medium" throughout, never "mean" or "middle"**, because Christ is
  *medium* in seven senses there. **In Part I of this collatio the word is Aristotle's ethical
  mean** — *medietas* twelve times over, and *medium* in ¶¶ 4–5 with *extremum* standing against
  it in the same sentence — and "medium" is simply not English for it. So: ***medietas* → "mean"**
  and ***medium* in the ethical argument of ¶¶ 4–5 → "the mean"**. The freeze is untouched
  elsewhere, and **both senses stand in this one chunk**: ¶ 33's *medium delativum* keeps
  **"medium"**. That is the reason to write the exception down rather than to generalise it.
- **The three comprehensions keep their cognate plurals** — *modestiae · industriae · iustitiae*
  → "modesties · industries · justices" — because the whole of Parts I–III is built on them as
  three named classes, and ¶ 22 recapitulates all three in one breath.
- The twelve Aristotelian means: *liberalitas* → "liberality" · *magnificentia* → "magnificence" ·
  *magnanimitas* → "magnanimity" · ***philotimia* → "philotimy"** and ***eutrapelia* left
  untranslated**, both because Quaracchi's own note glosses them (n. 5 on p. 354 is nothing but
  that gloss) · *mansuetudo* → "meekness" · ***verecundia* → "shamefastness"**, not "modesty",
  which *modestia* has taken · *nemesis* → "nemesis" · *benignitas* → "benignity" ·
  *munificentia* → "munificence" with *largitas* → "largesse".
- *concupiscentia* → "concupiscence" vs *cupiditas* → "cupidity", kept apart because ¶ 3 sets
  them side by side as two distinct vices. *appretiari* → "to prize" · *aspernari* → "to spurn".
- The three ways of Part IV, a set that recurs three times (¶¶ 29, 32, 33) and must stay one set:
  *ratiocinando · experiendo · intelligendo* → "by reasoning · by experiencing · by understanding",
  and the adverbs *ratiocinabiliter · experimentaliter · intelligentialiter* →
  **"ratiocinatively · experimentally · intelligentially"**.
- *delatores luminum* → "bearers of lights", *virtus delativa* → "conveying power", *medium
  delativum* → "conveying medium" — one family, one English root, per the c2 discipline.
  *pervium* → "a passage" · *obiectum fontanum* → "the fontal object" · *contuitus* →
  "contuition" · *intellectus adeptus* → "the acquired intellect" (Avicenna's, as the note says).
- *aeviternum* → "aeviternity" (the c3/c4 *aeviternal* stands) · *speciositas* → **"comeliness"**
  (the Itinerarium c2 freeze, and ¶ 32 is where it re-enters the corpus) · *iucunditas* →
  "joyousness" · *rationes aeternae* → "the eternal grounds" and *rationes abstractae* →
  "abstract grounds", *ratio* keeping "ground" per the frozen `de-reductione` rule.
- *naturale iudicatorium* → "the natural judicatory" · *censura iudicandi* → "the censure of
  judging" · *norma praesidendi* → "the norm of presiding" · *forma convivendi* → "the form of
  living together" · *ritus colendi* → "the rite of worship" · *pullulationes pulcrae* → "fair
  burgeonings" · *curialitas* → "courtesy" (the simoniacs' word, kept ironic as the Latin is).

**Census/ledger.** One line appended to `manual-review/vol5-runover-ledger.tsv` for `bon-hex-c5`:
**four gutter-crossing runovers and ONE page-crossing** (356 n. 11 → 357).

**Hand-off to `bon-hex-c6`.** **Nothing is forwarded.** `COLLATIO VI.` opens at the head of
**p. 360** with a full-width heading, a two-line subtitle (*De prima visione tractatio tertia,
quae est de prima virtutum causa exemplari, de virtutibus exemplaribus et de cardinalibus inde
fluentibus*) and a Summarium that runs well down the leaf — so **expect the collatio-opening
gutter failure on p. 360** and profile below the Summarium. p. 359's register is wholly this
chunk's; its n. 7 closes complete.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0