title: Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *Quando dantur claves.*

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur, quando claves dentur. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum claves dentur in ordine sacerdotali. Secundo, utrum contingat, eas ab eodem ordine separari.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum claves dentur in ordine sacerdotali.*

Circa primum ostenditur, quod in solo illo ordine dentur.

1. *Primo* auctoritate. Ambrosius in libro de Paradiso[^1] loquens de potestate ligandi et solvendi, dicit: « Ius hoc solis permissum est sacerdotibus ».

2. *Item*, super illud[^2]: *Tibi dabo claves*, Glossa Hieronymi: « Habent iudiciariam potestatem omnes Apostoli, habet etiam omnis Ecclesia in episcopis et presbyteris »; sed omnis episcopus est sacerdos: ergo etc.

3. *Item*, ratione videtur: quia potestas clavis Apostolis data fuit, cum Dominus dixit Ioannis vigesimo[^3]: *Quorum remiseritis peccata* etc.: ergo illis solis significatur haec potestas dari, quibus haec verba dicuntur; haec autem non dicuntur nisi solis sacerdotibus: ergo etc.

4. *Item*, omnis habens hanc potestatem mediator est, et omnis talis constituitur in his quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat dona et sacrificia pro peccatis[^4]: ergo ad eum pertinet haec potestas, ad quem pertinet sacrificium offerre. Sed hoc pertinet in nova lege et veteri ad solos sacerdotes: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Hieronymus[^5]: « Ostiarii, inter bonos et malos habentes iudicium, dignos recipiunt et indignos respuunt »; sed hoc est officium clavium, sicut patuit in praecedentibus per Glossam, Matthaei decimo sexto: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, ratione videtur: quia, si alicui competit dari claves, ei competit, qui habet officium ostiarii; sed multo inferior sacerdotio est ordo ille, immo primus inter ordines[^8]: ergo tunc videtur ei dari potestas clavium.

3. *Item*, exteriora, quae sunt in ordinibus, sunt signa interiorum et spiritualium, quoniam « Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma[^9] »: ergo in illo ordine datur clavis spiritualis interius, in quo datur clavis materialis exterius: ergo cum iste sit ordo ostiariorum, patet etc.

4. *Item*, in omni ordine est aliqua potestas spiritualis, et illa potestas ordinata est sub sacerdotali per modum ministerii in ordinibus inferioribus; sed nos videmus, in curia regis et in curia Romana[^10] claves non dari principibus et consiliariis, sed clientibus et ministris: ergo cum magis competat, hanc clavem dari in traditione aliorum ordinum quam sacerdotii, cum officium sacerdotis sit in praesentia Domini ministrare et gratissimum ei sacrificium offerre; videtur etc.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum detur novus usus ligandi et solvendi in dignitate episcopali, cum etiam

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ibi tradatur potestas et auctoritas pontificalis, utrum tradatur ibi alia clavis. Quod si verum esset, non ergo tantum sunt duae claves; quod est contra praedeterminata[^11].

### Conclusio

> Solis sacerdotibus et in ordine sacerdotali clavium potestas confertur.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, sicut dicunt Sancti, hoc etiam innuit ipse modus tradendi ordines, quod in ordine sacerdotali clavium potestas confertur. — Huius autem ratio est divina institutio. Institutionis autem congruitatem videre possumus, quoniam harum clavium conservator habet officium mediatoris et officium reconciliatoris. Mediator autem est inter Deum et homines; reconciliator vero reducendo ad Ecclesiam et reconciliando Ecclesiae. Ad hoc autem, ut possit esse mediator perfectus et competens inter Deum et hominem, oportet, quod posse habeat offerendi dona et sacrificia pro peccatis[^12], in quibus Deus placetur. Ad hoc, quod possit reducere ad corpus Christi mysticum, cuius caput est ipse Christus verus; ut recta sit et ordinata potestas, oportet, quod habeat *posse* conficiendi sanctissimum corpus Christi. Hoc autem ad solos pertinet sacerdotes. Et ideo mirabilis Dei sapientia, ordinatissimo modo ordinans ecclesiasticas potestates, potestatem ligandi et solvendi solis sacerdotibus commisit, et ita in ordine sacerdotali dantur claves. — Et quoniam episcopatus non dicit novum ordinem, sed quandam ordinis eminentiam; recte dicendum est, in eo non dari novam clavem, sed potestatem huiusmodi extendi et ampliari; ut sic pateat ultimo quaesitum. Ampliatur autem potestas iurisdictionis ad corripiendum, in cuius signum baculus ei traditur pastoralis[^13].

**Ad 1, 2, 3.** Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de ostiariis, quod habent iudicium; dicendum, quod habere iudicium et potestatem ad repellendum vel admittendum est dupliciter: vel ad ipsa Sacramenta et eorum efficaciam, ea quidem, prout oportet, administrando; et hoc quidem spectat ad claves caeli, et hae sunt claves, de quibus loquimur. Alia est potestas admittendi et repellendi ad locum: vel ad loca Sacramentorum, sicut est ecclesia; et haec spectat ad infimum ordinem; haec autem non dicitur clavis caeli, sed magis potestas quaedam respectu templi materialis, et ideo magis potest dici clavis excubantium in custodiis sanctuarii[^14]. Et quamvis aliquo modo sit haec potestas spiritualis, quia inest ratione officii et ordinat ad spirituale; tamen ex hoc non dicitur claviculárius caeli nec ostiarius. — Et per hoc patent duo sequentia de clavibus et ostiario, quia *aliam* potentiam significant, non illam quae praedicta est et de qua nunc agitur.

**Ad 4.** Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ista potestas est personarum infimarum in curiis hominum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia haec dicit proprie potestatem respectu hominum ostium ingredientium, ex qua non acquirunt aliquam excellentiam; sed potestas clavium est potestas respectu ingredientium Ecclesiam et deinde[^15] caelum; et ideo ille cui collata est plena potestas, super omnes constitutus est, sicut beatus Petrus. Et quia principi collata est primo haec potestas, patet, quod non vilitatis, sed maximae nobilitatis est, et ideo nobilissimo ordini competit et aptatur.

english:
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### Article II. *When the keys are given.*

Next, with regard to the second article it is asked, *when* the keys are given. And concerning this, two things are asked. First it is asked, whether the keys are given in the priestly order. Second, whether it can happen that they be separated from that same order.

### Question I. *Whether the keys are given in the priestly order.*

Concerning the first it is shown that they are given in that order alone.

1. *First*, by authority. Ambrose, in his book *On Paradise*[^1], speaking of the power of binding and loosing, says: "This right is permitted to priests alone."

2. *Likewise*, on that text[^2]: *I will give to you the keys*, the Gloss of Jerome: "All the Apostles have judiciary power, and the whole Church too has it in the bishops and presbyters"; but every bishop is a priest: therefore etc.

3. *Likewise*, it seems so by reason: for the power of the key was given to the Apostles, when the Lord said, in John chapter twenty[^3]: *Whose sins you shall forgive* etc.: therefore this power is signified to be given to those alone to whom these words are spoken; but these words are spoken only to priests: therefore etc.

4. *Likewise*, everyone having this power is a mediator, and everyone of this kind is appointed in the things that pertain to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins[^4]: therefore this power pertains to him to whom it pertains to offer sacrifice. But this, in the new law and in the old, pertains to priests alone: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jerome[^5]: "Doorkeepers, having judgment between the good and the bad, receive the worthy and reject the unworthy"; but this is the office of the keys, as appeared in what precedes through the Gloss, on Matthew sixteen: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, it seems so by reason: for if it befits anyone to be given the keys, it befits him who holds the office of doorkeeper; but that order is far inferior to the priesthood, indeed the first among the orders[^8]: therefore then it seems that the power of the keys is given to it.

3. *Likewise*, the external things which are in the orders are signs of the internal and spiritual things, since "a Sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace[^9]": therefore in that order the spiritual key is given internally, in which the material key is given externally: therefore since this is the order of doorkeepers, it is plain etc.

4. *Likewise*, in every order there is some spiritual power, and that power is ordered under the priestly power by way of ministry in the lower orders; but we see, in the king's court and in the Roman court[^10], that the keys are not given to princes and counselors, but to dependents and ministers: therefore since it is more fitting that this key be given in the conferral of the other orders than of the priesthood — since the office of the priest is to minister in the presence of the Lord and to offer to Him the most acceptable sacrifice — it seems etc.

Together with this it is asked, since a new use of binding and loosing is given in the episcopal dignity, since there too

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pontifical power and authority are handed over, whether another key is handed over there. And if this were true, then there are not only two keys; which is against what has been predetermined[^11].

### Conclusion

> To priests alone and in the priestly order is the power of the keys conferred.

**I respond:** It must be said, as the Saints say, that the very manner of handing over the orders also intimates this, namely that the power of the keys is conferred in the priestly order. — And the ground of this is divine institution. But we can see the fittingness of the institution, since the keeper of these keys holds the office of mediator and the office of reconciler. Now a mediator is between God and men; but a reconciler reduces them to the Church and reconciles them to the Church. To this end, however — that he may be a perfect and competent mediator between God and man — it is necessary that he have the power of offering gifts and sacrifices for sins[^12], in which God is appeased. To this end — that he may be able to reduce them to the mystical body of Christ, whose head is Christ Himself, the true one; so that the power may be right and ordered — it is necessary that he have the *power* of confecting the most holy body of Christ. But this pertains to priests alone. And therefore the wondrous wisdom of God, ordering the ecclesiastical powers in a most ordered manner, has committed the power of binding and loosing to priests alone, and so the keys are given in the priestly order. — And since the episcopate does not bespeak a new order, but a certain eminence of an order, it must rightly be said that in it no new key is given, but that a power of this kind is extended and amplified; so that thus the final question may be plain. Now the power of jurisdiction is amplified for correcting, in sign of which the pastoral staff is handed over to him[^13].

**To 1, 2, 3.** To that, then, which is objected concerning the doorkeepers, that they have judgment; it must be said that to have judgment and power for rejecting or admitting is twofold: either with respect to the Sacraments themselves and their efficacy, administering them indeed as is fitting; and this pertains to the keys of heaven, and these are the keys of which we are speaking. The other is a power of admitting and rejecting with respect to place: that is, to the places of the Sacraments, such as the church; and this pertains to the lowest order; but this is not called a key of heaven, but rather a certain power with respect to the material temple, and therefore it can rather be called the key of those keeping watch in the guard-posts of the sanctuary[^14]. And although in some way this power is spiritual, since it inheres by reason of the office and orders toward the spiritual; yet on this account he is not called a key-bearer of heaven nor a doorkeeper. — And through this the two following [arguments] about the keys and the doorkeeper are plain, since they signify *another* power, not that which has been aforesaid and of which we now treat.

**To 4.** To that which is objected, that this power belongs to the lowest persons in the courts of men; it must be said that the case is not similar: for this [civil power] properly bespeaks a power with respect to men entering the door, from which they acquire no excellence; but the power of the keys is a power with respect to those entering the Church and thereupon[^15] heaven; and therefore he upon whom full power has been conferred is set over all, as was blessed Peter. And since this power was conferred first upon the chief, it is plain that it is a matter not of lowliness but of the greatest nobility, and therefore it befits and is fitted to the most noble order.

la: Potius lib. I. de Poenitentia, c. 2. n. 7, sicut etiam allegatur C. *Verbum Dei* (ol.), § 2, de Poenitentia d. 1.

en: Rather *On Penitence*, bk. I, c. 2, n. 7, as it is also cited in the canon *Verbum Dei* (formerly), § 2, *de Poenitentia* d. 1.

la: Matth. 16, 19. — De Glossa, quae est *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum (ubi attribuitur Hieronymo), et cuius prima pars habetur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, altera vero (quae est Hieron.) supra d. XVIII. c. 6, vide supra pag. 497, nota 4.

en: Matthew 16:19. — On the Gloss, which is the *ordinary* one in Strabus and Lyranus (where it is attributed to Jerome), and whose first part is found here in the text of the Master, c. 1, but whose second part (which is Jerome's) is above at d. XVIII, c. 6; see above p. 497, note 4.

la: Vers. 23.

la: Hebr. 5, 1. — Minor ostensa est supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Hebrews 5:1. — The minor [premise] was shown above at d. 13, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Epist. 12. seu Opuscul. de septem ordin. Ecclesiae (inter opera Hieron.), c. 2. (de secundo gradu); pluribus tamen verbis interpositis. S. Bonav. allegat secundum lit. Magistri, infra d. XXIV. c. 5. Cfr. Isidor., VII. Etymolog. c. 12. n. 32; Gratian. C. *Cleros et clericos* (I.), d. 21. § 19. Glossa in Matth. 16, 19. allata est supra d. 18. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 1.

en: Epistle 12, or the little work *On the Seven Orders of the Church* (among the works of Jerome), c. 2 (on the second grade); yet with several words interposed. St. Bonaventure cites it according to the text of the Master, below at d. XXIV, c. 5. Cf. Isidore, *Etymologies* VII, c. 12, n. 32; Gratian, canon *Cleros et clericos* (I), d. 21, § 19. The Gloss on Matthew 16:19 was cited above at d. 18, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, fundamentum 1.

la: Vide infra d. 24. p. II. a. 1. q. 3.

en: See below at d. 24, p. II, a. 1, q. 3.

la: Secundum August. supra in lit. Magistri. d. I. c. 2. et d. VIII. c. 6.

en: According to Augustine, above in the text of the Master, d. I, c. 2, and d. VIII, c. 6.

la: Ita codd. E I K M T V W bb, codd. F G H N aa *in curia Papae*, edd. *aliis curiis*; pro *in curia regis* codd. L Y *in politicis*. Mox pro *et consiliariis, sed clientibus* cod. U *et consulibus, sed servientibus*. Finem arg. cod. H sic exhibet: *videtur potius in aliis dari*.

en: So codices E I K M T V W bb; codices F G H N aa read *in the court of the Pope*; the editions, *in the other courts*; for *in the king's court* codices L Y read *in political affairs*. Then, for *and to counselors, but to dependents*, codex U reads *and to consuls, but to attendants*. Codex H gives the end of the argument thus: *it seems rather to be given in the others.*

en: Distinction 18, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.

la: Hebr. 6, 1: *Ut offerat dona* etc. — Vat. in principio seq. propos. post *quod possit* addit: *esse reconciliator, oportet quod possit*, et inferius verbis *ut recta sit* praemittit *et*.

en: Hebrews 6:1 [recte 5:1]: *That he may offer gifts* etc. — The Vatican edition, at the beginning of the following clause, after *quod possit* adds: *esse reconciliator, oportet quod possit* ["that he may be a reconciler, it is necessary that he be able"], and below it prefixes *et* to the words *ut recta sit*.

la: Vide infra d. 24. p. II. a. 2. q. 3.

en: See below at d. 24, p. II, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Haec potestas in vet. test. competebat Levitis; cfr. Num. 1, 53; 3, 6; 18, 3. seqq.; 31, 30. 47. — Inferius pro *et ordinat* cod. X *ordinati*.

en: This power in the Old Testament belonged to the Levites; cf. Numbers 1:53; 3:6; 18:3 ff.; 31:30, 47. — Below, for *et ordinat* codex X reads *ordinati*.

la: Non pauci codd. *divinum*, quos ed. 1 secuta subinde substituit *cultum* pro *caelum*.

en: Not a few codices read *divinum* ["divine"], which edition 1, following them, thereupon substituted, [reading] *cultum* ["worship"] for *caelum* ["heaven"]. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Auctoritate Concilii Trident. constat, « potestatem remittendi et retinendi peccata ad reconciliandos fideles post baptismum lapsos Apostolis et eorum legitimis successoribus fuisse communicatam » (Sess. XIV. c. 1.); clavium ministerium spectare ad solos episcopos et sacerdotes (ibid. c. 6. can. 10.); « etiam sacerdotes, qui peccato mortali tenentur, per virtutem Spiritus S. in ordinatione collatam, tanquam Christi ministros functionem remittendi peccata exercere » (ibid.); insuper, « nullius momenti absolutionem eam esse debere, quam sacerdos in eum profert, in quem ordinariam aut subdelegatam non habet iurisdictionem » (c. 7. et can. 11.); « quoniam natura et ratio iudicii id exposcit, ut sententia in subditos duntaxat feratur » (c. 7.). — Hinc constat, quod licet in ordinatione sacerdoti collata sit potestas clavium respectu fori interni, tamen quoad usum huius potestatis tum licitum tum validum eidem conferenda sit iurisdictio ab Ecclesia. Eadem doctrina manifeste docetur iam a Conciliis Lateran. IV. et Florent. — Falsa igitur est opinio Durandi (hic q. 2.), quod clavis potestatis et iurisdictionis non distinguatur *essentialiter* a potestate ordinis; unde arguit, quod si Ecclesia non prohibuisset vi ordinationis « quilibet sacerdos potest quemlibet peccatorem a quolibet peccato absolvere ». Tunc igitur iurisdictio data ab Ecclesia per se tantum requireretur, ut *licite* poenitens absolveretur. Pro hac opinione citatur etiam a nonnullis S. Bonav., sed perperam, cum ipse manifeste etiam ad *valorem* absolutionis requirat collationem iurisdictionis (hic q. 2, infra a. 3. q. 1.), quae aliquid de novo dat, scil. « vim motivam ipsius clavis » (infra a. 2. q. 2.), et quae accedit ad characterem sicut organum oculi ad potentiam visivam in anima radicatam. — Ex opposito plures recentiores putant, iurisdictionem etiam in foro interno nullatenus ab ordine, sed omnino ab Ecclesia communicari. Mediam viam cum multis tenet Scotus (hic q. unica n. 12. seqq.), quod scil. in clavibus ordinatione datis sacerdos ab ipso Christo cum potestate remittendi peccata recipiat illam potestatem *remotam*, quae non fiat proxima, nisi accedente iurisdictione ecclesiastica. De relatione autem, quae est inter hanc potestatem *remotam* et characterem, Scot. (loc. cit. n. 11.) affert duas opiniones ut probabiles, quod scilicet duplex illa potestas (ordinis et iurisdictionis) vel fundetur etiam in duobus characteribus partialibus, « qui integrant totum ordinem sacerdotii » (cfr. infra d. 21. p. II.), vel « si non placet tot characteres ponere... potest dici, quod per unum characterem sacerdotalem habet quis potestatem conficiendi corpus Christi... et disponitur de congruo ad habendum potestatem super corpus Christi mysticum ligandi et solvendi ». Quod autem vi ordinationis sacerdotes fiant apti, ut assumantur in iudices huius tribunalis interni, conforme est doctrinae Tridentini et sententiae Ss. Bonav., Thomae et communissimae.

**II.** De utraque huius art. quaestione praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 20. m. 8. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 3, a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 19. a. 3, q. 20. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** By the authority of the Council of Trent it is established that "the power of remitting and retaining sins, for reconciling the faithful who have fallen after baptism, was communicated to the Apostles and their legitimate successors" (Session XIV, c. 1); that the ministry of the keys belongs to bishops and priests alone (ibid. c. 6, can. 10); that "even priests bound by mortal sin, through the power of the Holy Spirit conferred in ordination, as ministers of Christ exercise the function of remitting sins" (ibid.); moreover, that "the absolution which a priest pronounces over one over whom he does not have ordinary or subdelegated jurisdiction ought to be of no moment" (c. 7 and can. 11); "since the nature and ground of a judgment demands this, that sentence be passed only upon subjects" (c. 7). — Hence it is established that, although in ordination the power of the keys with respect to the internal forum is conferred upon a priest, nevertheless, as to the use of this power both licit and valid, jurisdiction must be conferred upon him by the Church. The same doctrine is manifestly taught already by the Lateran IV and Florentine Councils. — False, therefore, is the opinion of Durandus (here q. 2), that the key of power and of jurisdiction is not distinguished *essentially* from the power of order; whence he argues that, if the Church had not prohibited it, by force of ordination "any priest could absolve any sinner from any sin." Then, therefore, jurisdiction given by the Church would be required of itself only in order that the penitent might be absolved *licitly*. For this opinion S. Bonaventure too is cited by some, but wrongly, since he manifestly requires the conferral of jurisdiction even for the *validity* of absolution (here q. 2, below a. 3, q. 1), which gives something anew, namely "the motive force of the key itself" (below a. 2, q. 2), and which accedes to the character as the organ of the eye does to the power of sight rooted in the soul. — On the opposite side, many more recent writers hold that jurisdiction even in the internal forum is in no way communicated by order, but wholly by the Church. A middle way, with many, is held by Scotus (here, the single question, n. 12 ff.), namely that, in the keys given in ordination, the priest receives from Christ Himself, with the power of remitting sins, that *remote* power, which does not become proximate unless ecclesiastical jurisdiction be added. But concerning the relation between this *remote* power and the character, Scotus (loc. cit. n. 11) adduces two opinions as probable: namely that this twofold power (of order and of jurisdiction) is either founded also in two partial characters, "which constitute the whole order of the priesthood" (cf. below d. 21, p. II), or "if one prefers not to posit so many characters... it can be said that through the one sacerdotal character a man has the power of confecting the body of Christ... and is fittingly disposed for having the power of binding and loosing over the mystical body of Christ." But that by force of ordination priests are made apt to be taken up as judges of this internal tribunal is in conformity with the doctrine of Trent and with the opinion of Saints Bonaventure, Thomas, and the most common opinion.

**II.** On each question of this article, besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. IV, q. 20, m. 8, a. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 3, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1; Supplement q. 19, a. 3, q. 20, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the PDF column-bands for printed pp. 503–505 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p503/504/505-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 55877–56080) as base for clean prose and footnote-marker positions; the two-column cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio/scholion and the page footers were authoritative from the PDF bands per the Vol II/IV override. PDF = printed + 20 (p. 503 → PDF 523). Running heads verified: "DIST. XIX. ART. II. QUAEST. I" (p. 503) and "DIST. XIX. ART. II. QUAEST. II" (p. 505 — the head shows q. II because q2 begins low on p. 505).

**Opener alignment.** Verified: the Art. II opener ("Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur, quando claves dentur... Primo... utrum claves dentur in ordine sacerdotali. Secundo, utrum contingat, eas ab eodem ordine separari.") folds into this q1, matching the title. q2 ("Utrum potestas clavium comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem") begins at raw 56081 / p. 505 R-column lower — outside this chunk.

**Apparatus / page-footer split.** Two printed footers feed this chunk. **p. 503 footer** carries notes 1–10: notes 1–7 anchor in the left column (the four pro-arguments + Contra 1); notes 8–10 anchor in the right column (Contra 2–4). Note 6 ("Vers. 23") and note 7 (Jerome) belong to the left-column pro/contra material; rendered here as [^3] (John 20:23 anchor) and [^5] respectively — the Quaracchi per-page numbering 1–10 was mapped to the body anchors actually present. Quaracchi's raw note numbers 6 and 7 = this chunk's [^3] and [^5] (the John 20:23 citation and the Jerome *Contra* citation). **p. 504 footer** carries notes 1–5, rendered here as [^11]–[^15]. All 15 footer entries across the two pages are accounted for; none migrate to q2 (q2's footers begin on p. 505).

**Scholion ownership.** The Art. II SCHOLION (printed across pp. 504–505, header garbled "SCHOLIOK" in OCR) covers BOTH questions of this article and is rendered IN FULL here. **Point I** treats q1's substance (power of keys / order vs. jurisdiction, Trent, Durandus, Scotus). **Point II** is a shared bibliography "De utraque huius art. quaestione" ("On *each* question of this article") — it lists parallel authorities (Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Dionysius Carthusian) for q1 **and** q2. Therefore q2 (`bon-sent-IV-d19-a2-q2`) should reference this scholion rather than carry its own, and need not duplicate point II.

**Hand-off to q2.** q2 ("Utrum potestas clavium comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem") starts raw 56081, lower right column of p. 505; it shares p. 505 with the tail of this q1's scholion. No q1 footer notes spill into q2. q2 owns no scholion of its own (covered by point II above); its p. 505 footer notes (starting with note 3 "si ergo degradentur") and any p. 506 footers are q2's.

**[?] flags.** None unresolved. The OCR header "SCHOLIOK" silently corrected to "SCHOLION". The word *claviculárius* (p. 504 R, OCR "claviciUarius") read as *claviculárius* ("little-key-keeper / key-bearer") from the PDF band — standard medieval form, no flag.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 19, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum potestas clavium comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc, utrum haec potestas comitetur inseparabiliter ordinem sacerdotalem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut nunquam iteratur ordinis consecratio, sic nec iteratur verbum, in quo datur potestas clavium: ergo sicut ille ordo inseparabiliter possidetur propter characterem, videtur similiter, quod haec potestas.

2. Item, potestas ista in aliquo est; constat, quod non nisi in sacerdote, non secundum carnem, sed secundum animam; sed quae secundum animam habentur, cum anima sit incorruptibilis, non possunt auferri, ut patet in scientia et virtute: ergo talis potestas non potest auferri.

3. Item, si amittuntur, aut ergo propter ignorantiam, aut propter malitiam, aut propter subditi carentiam[^1]. Non propter ignorantiam, hoc constat; non propter malitiam, istud constat, quia mali habent, ut visum est prius; non propter subditorum carentiam, quia, si talis faceret carere clave, tunc mutatio subditorum mutaret claves; quod est manifeste falsum: ergo etc.

4. Item, si aliquid necessario ponit aliud, non potest aliud auferri, quin ipsum auferatur, quod ponit; sed aliquo facto sacerdote secundum Ecclesiae formam, statim habet clavem: ergo remota clave, removetur ordo. Sed ordinis character non potest amoveri: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

**Contra** hoc obiicitur: 1. Primo de haereticis et schismaticis[^2], qui, secundum quod dicitur in littera et habetur in principio praecedentis distinctionis[^3], non possunt solvere et ligare, et tamen ordines habent, sicut infra patebit: ergo clavis non sequitur ordines inseparabiliter, quia, si non possunt, non habent potentiam.

2. Item, obiicitur de degradatis: constans est, quod ordines non possunt auferri, quia non potest auferri character: si ergo degradantur[^4], hoc erit solum quantum ad auctoritatem sive potestatem: ergo videtur, quod illa auferatur, maxime cum videantur magis elongari ab hoc actu ipsi degradati quam haeretici.

3. Item, obiicitur de anima separata, quae habet characterem ordinis et non habet potestatem clavium; in patria enim cessat omnis praelatio: ergo non videtur, quod inseparabiliter characterem comitetur.

Si tu dicas mihi ad haec omnia, quod omnes praedicti habent potestatem, sed non exsecutionem, hoc improbatur triplici ratione.

4. Prima est, quia illa potestas est spiritualis activa — potestas enim dicitur activa, non passiva[^5] — et iterum est in potentia libera, quae scilicet est liberum arbitrium, quod exit in actum, quando vult: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis habeat potestatem et non habeat exsecutionem, quando vult.

5. Item, frustra est potentia, quam non consequitur actus[^6]: ergo si in talibus est potentia sine actu, frustra est; sed in operibus divinis nihil debet esse frustra: ergo etc.

6. Item, si talis potentia non est in actu, quaero, unde hoc sit. Si quia Papa prohibet, vel superior; sed contra: quantumcumque superior prohibeat, si quis conficit, confectum est de facto; si baptizat, baptizatum est: ergo pari ratione si absolvat vel liget, absolutum et ligatum est; quod est manifeste falsum: ergo redit primum, quod tales non habent potestatem; et habent characterem: ergo haec potestas non sequitur characterem inseparabiliter.

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> **Conclusio.** Clavis inseparabiliter sequitur ordinem sacerdotalem quoad essentiam, sed quoad exsecutionem sequitur statum viatoris et possessionem iurisdictionis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut de potentia visiva est loqui dupliciter: vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad usum; et quantum ad essentiam fundatur haec potentia radicaliter in anima nec animam deserit unquam; quantum ad usum vero exigit organum bene dispositum et medium illuminatum: sic in proposito est intelligendum, quod, si loquamur de potentia solvendi quantum ad essentiam, sic radicaliter est in ipsa anima, sicut et character, nec videtur ab illo differre nisi secundum relationem quandam; et hoc modo inseparabiliter se tenet cum sacerdotali ordine.

Alio modo possumus loqui quantum ad usum, et hoc modo necessario requiritur status viatoris et auctoritas iurisdictionis. — Quod status viatoris requiratur, patet, quia, sicut ratio merendi non competit caritati extra statum viae, sic nec potestas reconciliandi et Sacramenta exhibendi sive administrandi nisi in statu Ecclesiae militantis; et sic per mortem dicitur potestas usum amittere in anima separata. — Quod iterum requiratur iurisdictio, patet sic. Sacerdos enim est mediator, et in quantum mediator inferior est Deo et superior poenitente et arbiter et iudex homini constitutus loco Dei ad parcendum[^7] sive solvendum et ad puniendum; talis autem iudicatio non est sine aliqua iurisdictione in eum qui iudicatur, quia nemo potest aliquem iudicare, nisi qui iudex eius constituitur ab eo qui potestatem habet. Et ideo iurisdictio est tanquam vis motiva ipsius clavis, sive manus; hac autem deficiente, quae clavem moveat, etsi adsit clavis, nunquam aperiet; et si amittitur haec iurisdictio, cessat clavis exsecutio. — Haec autem amittitur dupliciter: vel per ablationem subditorum quantum ad rem[^8], et sic est in schismaticis, haereticis, praecisis, fornicariis notoriis, excommunicatis et huiusmodi; vel quantum ad ablationem secundum rem et secundum spem, et hoc est in degradatis, quibus sine spe recuperandi aufertur. Unde et haeretici et excommunicati dicuntur habere manum ligatam, sed degradati amputatam. — Ideo dico, quod etsi clavis quantum ad esse ordinem consequatur, tamen quantum ad exsecutionem sequitur statum et iurisdictionem.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Et sic patet responsio ad tria prima obiecta de haereticis, de degradatis et aliquibus separatis; qui dicuntur non posse, quia non sunt ibi quae necessaria sunt ad usum; et tamen habent potentiam, sicut in anima caeci est potentia visiva, et tamen videre non potest.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est potestas activa et libera; dicendum, quod quamvis sit activa et in substantia libere agente, tamen est ad alterum et indiget debito suscipiente; unde, quemadmodum matrimonium est ex consensu libero, tamen, quia mater non est idonea ad contrahendum cum filio, quantumcumque consentiant, non est matrimonium. Sic intelligendum est in proposito.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frustra est potentia, quam non consequitur actus; dicendum, quod si intelligatur de actu debito pro loco et tempore et opportunitate, potest habere locum; si autem in aliis intelligatur, multas habet instantias. Et quia tales personae carent opportunitate ad actum, etsi nunquam exeant, non propter hoc habent potentiam frustra. Praeterea, illud verbum intelligitur de actu generaliter, non de hoc, vel de illo, quia non oportet, quod potentia exeat in omnes, sufficit tamen, quod aliquid faciat, ita quod non sit otiosum in natura. Et sic est in proposito, quia, etsi nihil per illam potentiam fiat exterius, tamen illa potest esse in animae ornatum quantum ad bonos, vel in confusionem quantum ad malos.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur: quis aufert illi potentiae exsecutionem? dicendum, quod potestas contraria sive superior potest ei auferre. Et si tu obiicias, quod non potest auferre actum conficiendi; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa. Prima est, quia non potest tali auferre materiam, et si posset panem de tritico auferre, tunc auferret potentiam; sed haec aufert materiam, scilicet subditos — superior enim potestas potest subditos eximere a potestate inferioris — et hanc auferendo aufert iurisdictionem. — Praeterea, in potestate conficiendi omnes pares sunt, quia haec immediate datur per impressionem characteris; sed in iurisdictione sive praelatione non est aequalitas: et ideo in huiusmodi possunt arceri, non sic in aliis. — Et haec est ratio, quare boni et sancti religiosi inclusi, etiam si sint sacerdotes, non habent exsecutionem clavis in absolvendo et ligando, quia non habent iurisdictionem in aliquos; et ideo ab hoc actu prohibentur. Unde Eugenius Papa: «Placuit, ut nulli monachorum temerario ausu liceat poenitentiam dare» etc.

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— Ratio autem huius prohibitionis assignatur Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima, et in pluribus decretis sanctorum Patrum. Habent tamen, sicut ibidem ostenditur, idoneitatem ex ordine et ex vitae merito, cui adiuncta iurisdictione quae dicitur, ordo sacerdotalis exit in actum. Unde Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima, Leo Papa: «Monachi etsi in dedicatione sui presbyteratus, sicut et ceteri sacerdotes, praedicandi, baptizandi, poenitentiam dandi, peccata dimittendi, beneficiis ecclesiasticis perfruendi rite potestatem accipiant, tamen exsecutionem suae potestatis non habent, nisi a populo fuerint electi et ab episcopo ex consensu abbatis ordinati».

Ex his patet, quando haec potestas datur, quod nunquam quantum ad substantiam auferatur, sed solum quantum ad usum.

english:
### Question II. *Whether the power of the keys inseparably accompanies the priestly order.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning this whether this power inseparably accompanies the priestly order. And that it does, seems to be the case:

1. Because, just as the consecration of an order is never repeated, so neither is the word repeated in which the power of the keys is given: therefore, just as that order is inseparably possessed on account of the character, it seems likewise that this power is too.

2. Likewise, this power is in something; it is established that it is in nothing but the priest, not according to the flesh, but according to the soul; but the things that are had according to the soul, since the soul is incorruptible, cannot be taken away, as is clear in the case of knowledge and virtue: therefore such a power cannot be taken away.

3. Likewise, if they are lost, then it is either on account of ignorance, or on account of malice, or on account of the absence of a subject[^1]. Not on account of ignorance, this is established; not on account of malice, this is established, because the wicked have it, as was seen before; not on account of the absence of subjects, because, if such a one were to be made to lack the key, then a change of subjects would change the keys; which is manifestly false: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if something necessarily posits another thing, the other cannot be taken away without that which it posits being taken away; but once someone has been made a priest according to the form of the Church, he immediately has the key: therefore, the key being removed, the order is removed. But the character of the order cannot be removed: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

**On the contrary,** it is objected: 1. First, concerning heretics and schismatics[^2], who, according to what is said in the text and is found at the beginning of the preceding distinction[^3], cannot loose and bind, and yet have orders, as will be clear below: therefore the key does not follow orders inseparably, because, if they cannot, they do not have the power.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning the degraded: it is established that orders cannot be taken away, because the character cannot be taken away: if therefore they are degraded[^4], this will be only as to authority or power: therefore it seems that this is taken away, especially since the degraded themselves seem to be farther removed from this act than heretics.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the separated soul, which has the character of the order and does not have the power of the keys; for in the fatherland all prelacy ceases: therefore it does not seem that it inseparably accompanies the character.

If you say to me, against all these things, that all the aforesaid have the power but not the execution, this is disproved by a threefold reason.

4. The first is, because that power is a spiritual active power — for power is called active, not passive[^5] — and again it is in a free potency, namely free choice, which goes forth into act when it wills: therefore it is impossible that anyone should have the power and not have the execution when he wills.

5. Likewise, a potency that is not followed by act is in vain[^6]: therefore if in such persons there is potency without act, it is in vain; but in the divine works nothing ought to be in vain: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, if such a potency is not in act, I ask whence this comes. If because the Pope or a superior forbids it; but on the contrary: however much a superior may forbid it, if someone consecrates, it is consecrated in fact; if he baptizes, it is baptized: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he absolves or binds, it is absolved and bound; which is manifestly false: therefore the first returns, that such persons do not have the power; and they have the character: therefore this power does not follow the character inseparably.

> **Conclusion.** The key inseparably follows the priestly order as to its essence, but as to its execution it follows the state of the wayfarer and the possession of jurisdiction.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, just as the power of sight may be spoken of in two ways — either as to essence, or as to use; and as to essence this power is rooted radically in the soul and never deserts the soul; but as to use it requires a well-disposed organ and an illuminated medium — so in the matter at hand it is to be understood that, if we speak of the power of loosing as to essence, then it is radically in the soul itself, like the character, and does not seem to differ from it except according to a certain relation; and in this way it holds inseparably with the priestly order.

In another way we can speak of it as to use, and in this way the state of the wayfarer and the authority of jurisdiction are necessarily required. — That the state of the wayfarer is required is clear, because, just as the ground of meriting does not belong to charity outside the state of the way, so neither does the power of reconciling and of presenting or administering the Sacraments belong except in the state of the Church militant; and thus through death the power is said to lose its use in the separated soul. — That jurisdiction too is required is shown thus. For the priest is a mediator, and insofar as mediator he is inferior to God and superior to the penitent, and is appointed as arbiter and judge over man in the place of God, for sparing[^7] or loosing and for punishing; but such a judgment is not without some jurisdiction over him who is judged, because no one can judge anyone except him who is appointed his judge by him who holds the power. And therefore jurisdiction is, as it were, the moving force of the key itself, or of the hand; but this failing — that which should move the key — even if the key be present, it will never open; and if this jurisdiction is lost, the execution of the key ceases. — Now this is lost in two ways: either through the removal of subjects as to the thing[^8], and so it is in schismatics, heretics, the cut-off, notorious fornicators, the excommunicate, and the like; or as to removal both according to the thing and according to hope, and this is in the degraded, from whom it is taken away without hope of recovery. Hence both heretics and the excommunicate are said to have a bound hand, but the degraded an amputated one. — Therefore I say that although the key follows as to being an order, yet as to execution it follows the state and jurisdiction.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus the response to the first three objections is clear — concerning heretics, the degraded, and some separated souls; who are said not to be able, because the things necessary for use are not present there; and yet they have the potency, just as in the soul of a blind man there is the power of sight, and yet he cannot see.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that it is an active and free power; it must be said that although it is active and is in a freely-acting substance, nevertheless it is directed to another and needs a fitting recipient; hence, just as matrimony is from free consent, yet, because a mother is not fit to contract with her son, however much they consent, there is no matrimony. So it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that a potency which is not followed by act is in vain; it must be said that if it is understood of the due act for place and time and opportunity, it can hold; but if it is understood of other cases, it has many instances. And because such persons lack opportunity for the act, even if they never go forth into it, they do not on this account have the potency in vain. Moreover, that saying is understood of act in general, not of this or that one, because it is not necessary that the potency go forth into all, yet it suffices that it do something, so that it not be idle in nature. And so it is in the matter at hand, because, even though nothing be done externally through that potency, nevertheless it can be for the adornment of the soul as regards the good, or for the confusion as regards the wicked.

*To 6.* To that which is objected: who takes away the execution from that potency? it must be said that a contrary or superior power can take it away from it. And if you object that it cannot take away the act of consecrating; it must be said that the cases are not alike, for two reasons. The first is that it cannot take away the matter from such a one, and if it could take away bread made of wheat, then it would take away the potency; but this takes away the matter, namely the subjects — for a superior power can withdraw subjects from the power of an inferior — and by taking this away it takes away jurisdiction. — Moreover, in the power of consecrating all are equal, because this is given immediately through the impression of the character; but in jurisdiction or prelacy there is no equality: and therefore in matters of this kind they can be restrained, but not so in others. — And this is the reason why good and holy enclosed religious, even if they be priests, do not have the execution of the key in absolving and binding, because they do not have jurisdiction over any persons; and therefore they are forbidden this act. Hence Pope Eugenius: «It has been resolved that it be permitted to no monks by rash daring to give penance» etc.

— But the reason for this prohibition is assigned at Cause sixteen, question one, and in many decrees of the holy Fathers. They have nevertheless, as is shown in the same place, a fitness from the order and from the merit of life, to which jurisdiction being joined — that which is so called — the priestly order goes forth into act. Hence at Cause sixteen, question one, Pope Leo: «Monks, although in the dedication of their priesthood, like other priests, may duly receive the power of preaching, baptizing, giving penance, remitting sins, and enjoying ecclesiastical benefices, yet they do not have the execution of their power unless they have been elected by the people and ordained by the bishop with the consent of the abbot».

From these things it is clear that, when this power is given, it is never taken away as to substance, but only as to use.

la: Inferius pro *mutatio* multi codd. et ed. I perperam *vitio*, Vat. *mutatione*, quae etiam subinde cum ed. I *amitterentur* pro *mutaret* (codd. R S T U bb *immutaret*).

en: Below, for *mutatio* (change) many codices and the first edition wrongly read *vitio* (fault); the Vatican edition reads *mutatione*, which also subsequently, with the first edition, [reads] *amitterentur* for *mutaret* (codices R S T U bb, *immutaret*).

la: Cap. 2. — Quod haeretici retineant ordines, ostenditur infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. — In principio huius et seq. arg. pro *obiicitur* ed. I cum pluribus codd. *ostenditur*.

en: Chapter 2. — That heretics retain orders is shown below at d. 25, a. 1, q. 2. — At the beginning of this and the following argument, for *obiicitur* (it is objected) the first edition with several codices [reads] *ostenditur* (it is shown).

la: Ita cod. E, in aliis et edd. *degradatur*.

en: So codex E; in the others and in the editions, *degradatur* (he is degraded).

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XLVII. c. 5.

en: Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XLVII, c. 5.

la: Vide B. Albert., in V. Metaph. tr. 2. c. 12: *Potestas est potentia stans sub complemento actualis habitus, et ideo activa est potestas; potentia autem est interminata adhuc et incompleta; et ideo proprie materialis potentia potentia vocatur.*

en: See Blessed Albert, *On the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics*, tr. 2, c. 12: "Power is a potency standing under the completion of an actual habit, and therefore power is active; but potency is still indeterminate and incomplete; and therefore properly material potency is called potency."

la: Secundum Aristot.; cfr. tom. I. pag. 771, nota 1. *Minor*, in qua post *divinis* codd. A V W addunt *et Domini*, et cod. H *potest* pro *debet*, insinuatur ab Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo text. 32. (c. 4.).

en: According to Aristotle; cf. tom. I, p. 771, note 1. The *minor* [premise], in which after *divinis* (divine) codices A V W add *et Domini* (and of the Lord), and codex H [reads] *potest* (can) for *debet* (ought), is suggested by Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, Book I, text 32 (c. 4).

la: Edd., hic posito *aperiendum*, subinde verbo *puniendum* praemittunt *parcendum sive*.

en: The editions, having put *aperiendum* (opening) here, subsequently prefix to the word *puniendum* (punishing) [the words] *parcendum sive* (sparing or).

la: Multi codd. *notis*. Mox post *ablationem* cod. aa addit *ipsius iurisdictionis*. — Cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Pro *Et quia* edd. cum uno alteroque cod. *Et iam quia*. — Solae edd. *quaeritur*. — Codd. *vel hoc*, *vel haec*, fortasse legendum *hos*; in nostra lectione *hanc* referendum est ad *materiam*. — In Can. *Placuit* communi (S. C. 16. q. 1.), ut nullus monachorum pro lucro terreno de monasterio exire nefandissimo ausu praesumat, neque poenitentiam dare... sit claustro suo contentus, quia, sicut piscis sine aqua caret [vita]...

en: Many codices [read] *notis*. Soon after *ablationem* codex aa adds *ipsius iurisdictionis* (of the jurisdiction itself). — Cf. III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, ad 2. — For *Et quia* the editions with one or another codex [read] *Et iam quia*. — The editions alone [read] *quaeritur*. — The codices [read] *vel hoc*, *vel haec*; perhaps *hos* should be read; in our reading *hanc* is to be referred to *materiam* (matter). — In the canon *Placuit* of the common [decretal] (Causa 16, q. 1.), that no monk presume by most nefarious daring to go out of the monastery for earthly gain, nor to give penance... let him be content with his cloister, because, as a fish without water is wanting [in life]...

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450-dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 505–507 (vol4 split x≈1880; offset pdf = printed + 20), with the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 56081–56321) as base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The two-column OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo, the replies to the arguments, and every footer; for those regions the PDF read is authoritative per the VOL II OVERRIDE recipe.

**Page span.** The quaestio opens on p.505 (right column) and runs through the Respondeo and replies on p.506; the reply *Ad 6* / epilogue continues onto **p.507** (left + right columns, top) under the ART. III running head, ending at "...sed solum quantum ad usum" immediately before **ARTICULUS III** begins. The continuation text on p.507 (the Leo/Eugenius citations and the closing "Ex his patet... usum") belongs to this q2, not to ART. III.

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: false`. The Articulus II scholion (*De utraque huius art. quaestione*) is printed and rendered with **QUAESTIO I** of this article (`bon-sent-IV-d19-a2-q1`); it is not repeated here. *La.: Scholion art. II cum q. 1 huius articuli redditur. / En.: The Art. II scholion is rendered with q. 1 of this article.*

**Apparatus / page-split.** 8 footer entries consolidated: p.505 left-col footers 1–4 → [^1]–[^4]; p.505 right-col footers 5–6 (Albert, Aristotle) → [^5]–[^6]; p.506 left-col footers 1–4 → [^7] (aperiendum/parcendum) plus the *Multi codd. notis* / III Sent. cross-ref / *Et quia* notes folded into [^8]; the p.507 right-col footers (*Solae edd. quaeritur*; *Codd. vel hoc...*; the *In Can. Placuit* canon-law citation) are also folded into [^8] since they all gloss the Respondeo's *ablatio subditorum* / Eugenius-decretal anchor. Footnote numbering restarts per printed page in Quaracchi; markers here renumbered [^1]–[^8] continuously and anchored at OCR-marker positions.

**[?] flags.** None outstanding. OCR garbles silently corrected against the PDF (e.g. *Secunrlo*→*Secundo*, *poteslas*→*potestas*, *inseparabihter*→*inseparabiliter*, *Qaia*→*Quia*, *ileralur*→*iteratur*, *liaeretici*→*haeretici*). The trailing canon-law fragment in [^8] (*...sicut piscis sine aqua caret...*) is cut off at the page foot in the source; the implied *[vita]* is bracketed.

**Hand-off to ARTICULUS III.** ART. III (*In quos claves sacerdotales habeant effectum*, opener *Consequenter ... duo quaeruntur*) begins on p.507 immediately after this q2's epilogue (raw line ~56322). Per the Vol IV chunking convention, the short ART. III opener folds into ART. III q1 — no standalone divisio chunk. No p.507 footer notes belonging to ART. III's opener remain uncaptured here; the next agent starts the ART. III footer sequence fresh from the p.507 body anchors below the "ARTICULUS III" header.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 19, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus III. *In quos claves sacerdotales habeant effectum.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur, in quos habeant sacerdotales claves usum vel effectum. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum sacerdos, qui potest absolvere subditum unum, possit et quemlibet alium.

Secundo, utrum subditus sacerdos possit absolvere praelatum suum.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum sacerdos, qui potest absolvere subditum unum, possit et quemlibet alium absolvere.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod sacerdos, qui in unum potest, eadem ratione potest et in omnem alium.

1. *Levitici* decimo tertio[^1] dicitur: *Homo, in cuius cute apparuerit plaga leprae, adducetur ad Aaron sacerdotem, vel ad unum quemlibet filiorum eius*; ex hoc patet, quod quilibet sacerdos in veteri lege poterat iudicare de omnibus fidelibus de populo Israel, de quacumque esset tribu; sed quod praecessit in figura debet sequi in veritate: ergo videtur, quod hic possit quilibet sacerdos de lepra cuiuslibet iudicare. Et multo fortius hic videtur, quia maior est unitas in Ecclesia et quantum ad ministrantes Sacramenta et quantum ad caritatem fidelium, quam tunc temporis erat; sed tunc quod poterat unus poterant omnes, et in quem poterat unus, et omnes: ergo et modo debet esse similiter.

2. Item, Dominus virtutem istam sive potestatem dedit primis sacerdotibus, et secundum conformitatem eorum descendit in posteros; sed Dominus dixit generaliter, *Ioannis* vigesimo[^2]: *Quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis*; et hoc ipsum dicitur sacerdoti: ergo videtur, quod detur potestas in omnes: ergo omnes potest absolvere.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quoniam ita videmus in corporalibus, quod ignis, qui comburit in una materia, comburit et in qualibet simili et eiusdem speciei; et lux, quae fugat tenebram de uno loco, similiter et de alio pellit sine instantia: ergo pari ratione videtur in proposito, quod si aliquis sacerdos potest absolvere unum peccatorem poenitentem, quod pari ratione possit et quemlibet consimilem.

4. Item, ita videmus in artificialibus, quod clavis, quae unam seram aperit, aperit et omnes per eum modum factas, et e converso, multae claves similes in quantitate et qualitate unam seram: si ergo debitum peccati[^3] est conforme in omnibus peccatoribus poenitentibus, et potestas aperiendi in omnibus clavibus sacerdotalibus; ergo qui potest in unum, et in quemlibet alium.

5. Item, ita videmus in supercaelestibus, quod Angelus ordinis inferioris potest purgari, illuminari et perfici a quolibet Angelo superioris ordinis[^4]: ergo si haec hierarchia illam imitatur; cum ordo sacerdotalis sit supra laicos, videtur, quod quilibet laicus a quolibet sacerdote possit absolvi.

6. Item, si non potest absolvere omnes, cum possit unum; quaero, unde hoc sit. Aut enim est
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potentiae laxatione et corruptione, aut ex ligatione, quia superior potestas non permittit. Primo modo non, illud patet. Secundo modo non debet, quia bonum est diffundendum et multiplicandum et colendum: ergo non est restringenda potestas; et ita videtur, quod qui in unum potest, quod possit in omnem.

**Contra:**
1. Causa decima sexta, quaestione prima[^5]: «Nulli sacerdotum liceat parochianum alterius aut absolvere, aut ligare».

2. Item, Causa nona, quaestione secunda[^6]: «Nullus alterius parochianum iudicare, ordinare, aut excommunicare praesumat, quia tale iudicium aut ordinatio vel excommunicatio nec rata erit nec vires ullas habebit».

3. Item, in Concilio generali, *extra de Poenitentiis et remissionibus*[^7]: «Si quis aliquando ex causa voluerit alteri confiteri, licentiam petat et obtineat a proprio sacerdote, quia aliter ipsum non poterit absolvere vel ligare»; sed non quilibet sacerdos est proprius, quia proprium dicitur quod convenit uni soli: ergo non quilibet sacerdos potest quemlibet absolvere.

4. Item, videtur *ratione*: quia nos videmus in ordinatione praedicamentorum in *rationalibus*[^8] et in ordine causarum in *naturalibus*, quod reductio fit usque ad supremum per unum immediatum, ita quod non sunt plura immediata respectu unius. Et hoc patet, quia una est species specialissima individui unius, similiter est in causis: ergo si ordo est in Ecclesia secundum gradus descendendo et ascendendo a Summo Pontifice usque ad parochianum; videtur tunc, quod per unum sacerdotem, per unum archidiaconum, per unum episcopum, per unum hierarcham[^9] reducatur ad Summum Pontificem: ergo non poterunt secundum rectum ordinem plures sacerdotes in unum: non ergo quilibet quemlibet potest absolvere vel ligare.

5. Item, ita videmus in *exercitibus*, quod sunt ordines distincti, ut tribunus super centuriones, et centurio super quinquagenarios, et quinquagenarius super decuriones, et decurio super decem[^10]; et qui sunt sub uno non sunt sub alio decurione, nec potest decurio compescere nisi suos decem, et sic de aliis ascendendo; secundum hoc pari ratione videtur, quod nec sacerdos alterius parochianum, nec episcopus alienum subditum.

6. Item, si duo haberent *posse* super unum, qui possent discordare, possent contraria iubere; sed nemo potest duobus dominis contraria iubentibus obtemperare rationabiliter[^11]: ergo posset in isto subdito perplexitas generari: ergo secundum rectum ordinem non debet duobus sacerdotibus super eundem subditum aequalis potestas dari: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** Non quilibet sacerdos potest quemlibet absolvere nisi in articulo necessitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius[^12], «lex divinitatis est media per prima, et ultima per media perducere ad purgationem, illuminationem et perfectionem». Ideo, sicut videmus in omnibus, sive in rationalibus, sive in naturalibus, sive in caelestibus, quod ad hoc, quod sit concordia et decor, oportet, quod sit *ordo*; sic intelligendum est et in *spiritualibus* potestatibus in ipsa Ecclesia; unde *Cantici* sexto[^13] legitur, quod *terribilis est ut castrorum acies ordinata*.

Quoniam igitur *ordo* attenditur secundum praelationem et subiectionem; et *praelatio* attenditur secundum *ascensum* et *descensum*, non secundum aequalitatem; et in *ascendendo* ad superius est *status et reductio ad unum*, econtra in *descendendo* est *multiplicatio*[^14]: ideo secundum rectum ordinem Ecclesiae oportuit, unum esse praelatum primum et supremum, in quo esset *status* omnis praelationis ecclesiasticae. Et quia in illo *status* est tanquam in primo et simplicissimo in illo genere; ideo *virtus* in eo unita est, et solus est inter praelatos, qui habet *plenitudinem potestatis*[^15]. — Item, quoniam per recessum ab uno fit *multiplicatio*, et per hoc virtutis diminutio; ideo, quanto praelati alii inferiores sunt, tanto *plures* sunt et tanto *minorem* habent potestatem, ita quod *status* est in sacerdo-
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tibus parochialibus, qui immediate gerunt populi curam; et istorum iurisdictio arctata est ad portiunculam determinatam, et cuilibet commissa est sua portio secundum rectam ordinationem, et illa iudicatur esse *messis sua*[^16]. Et quoniam non licet alii sacerdoti mittere manum vel falcem in alienam messem; ideo alius non habet potestatem eius subditum absolvere, nisi superior, vel vicem habeat superioris, ut poenitentiarii domini Papae et poenitentiarii episcopi, legati et privilegiati, qui faciunt hoc auctoritate superioris, sicut nuntius a principe procedens potest in omnes subditos aliis inferioribus. Haec autem intelligenda sunt secundum *legem communem*, quia in articulo *necessitatis* indulget rectitudo iuris cuilibet sacerdoti quemlibet absolvere, si sit in Ecclesiae unitate.

Pro regula igitur habendum est, quod solus sacerdos proprius habet potestatis exsecutionem in suos, exceptis quinque casibus. Primus est, si ovis aliena in parochia sua deliquit. — Secundus, si mutavit ibi domicilium, sicut est in scholaribus, qui student Parisius. — Tertius est, si sit vagabundus. — Quartus est, si sacerdos proprius sit inscius, vel malitiosus, et petita licentia, vult adire peritiorem. — Ultimus est in articulo necessitatis, et hoc in casu non oportet sacerdotem esse licentiatum[^17]. In aliis autem oportet, non a sacerdote poenitentis solum — quia ille non potest nisi *subditum* licentiare — sed oportet esse licentiatum ab ordinario, scilicet ipso episcopo. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod non quilibet potest in quemlibet.

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de filiis Aaron, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia populus Israel populus unus erat et unum templum habebat, nec erant ibi regna terrarum sollicitudini sacerdotum commissa, sicut nunc sunt; et ideo oportet modo esse plures episcopos[^18] et plures ecclesias, quarum quaelibet habet suam potestatem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc quod dicit Dominus: *Quorum remiseritis* etc.; dicendum, quod clavis sacerdotalis, quamvis, quantum est de se, indifferens sit ad omnes; tamen vis motiva huius clavis, quae est iurisdictio, ut prius[^19] visum est, non se habet ad omnes nisi in uno solo; et ideo unus solus potest omnes absolvere. Quando ergo Dominus dedit clavem et hanc potestatem, ipse praesupposuit eius exsecutionem secundum regulam potestatis collatae Petro et eius successoribus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignis agit in quodlibet combustibile; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia prima est actio *naturalis*, quae est secundum necessitatem, haec autem actio est *spiritualis* et *rationalis*, quae quidem attenditur secundum ordinem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de clave et sera, dicendum, quod istud verum est, quando adest virtus motiva, quae clavem moveat; sed in aliquibus vis ista arctata est, ut in sacerdotibus inferioribus; in aliquibus *ligata*, ut in haereticis et excommunicatis; in aliquibus est *amputata*, ut in degradatis[^20]. Unde sicut hi non possunt absolvere aliquem, quorum manus est ligata simpliciter, ita in aliis non potest clavis claudere, ubi se manus iurisdictionis non valeat extendere.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelis superioris ordinis, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in hierarchia angelica non potest cadere zelus nec controversia, pro eo quod concordia in sublimibus est facta[^21]; non sic est in Ecclesia, immo quilibet vult sibi ius alterius vindicare: ideo oportuit potestates distinguere et limitare.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod potestas non est arctanda; dicendum, quod arctatio potestatis potest venire dupliciter: aut propter *defectum* amoris, aut propter *conservationem ordinis*. Prima est invidiae et repugnat bonitati, secunda vero est sapientiae et concordat paci et communi utilitati; et talis arctatio facta est in minoribus sacerdotibus, regulante iure divino, immo ipso Spiritu sancto[^22], per Patres et Apostolos, qui Ecclesiam fundaverunt et ordinaverunt. Et sic patet totum.

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### Article III. *On whom the priestly keys take effect.*

Next, with respect to the third article, it is asked on whom the priestly keys have their use or effect. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.

Second, whether a subject priest can absolve his own prelate.

### Question I. *Whether a priest who can absolve one subject can absolve any other.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is shown that a priest who can act upon one can, by the same reasoning, act upon every other.

1. In *Leviticus* thirteen[^1] it is said: *The man in whose skin the plague of leprosy shall appear shall be brought to Aaron the priest, or to any one of his sons*; from this it is clear that any priest in the old law could judge concerning all the faithful of the people of Israel, of whatever tribe they were; but what went before in figure ought to follow in truth: therefore it seems that here any priest can judge concerning the leprosy of anyone. And this seems much more strongly to be so here, because there is greater unity in the Church, both as regards those ministering the Sacraments and as regards the charity of the faithful, than there was at that time; but then what one could do all could do, and toward whomever one could act, so could all: therefore now too it ought to be similar.

2. Likewise, the Lord gave this power or authority to the first priests, and according to their conformity it descended to those who came after; but the Lord said in general, *John* twenty[^2]: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*; and this very thing is said to the priest: therefore it seems that power is given over all: therefore he can absolve all.

3. Likewise, it seems so by reason: for we see thus in bodily things, that fire which burns in one matter burns also in any like matter of the same species; and light which drives darkness from one place likewise drives it from another without resistance: therefore by parity of reason it seems so in the case at hand, that if some priest can absolve one penitent sinner, by parity of reason he can also absolve any like one.

4. Likewise, we see thus in things of craft, that a key which opens one lock opens also all locks made in the same manner, and conversely, many keys alike in quantity and quality open one lock: if therefore the debt of sin[^3] is conformable in all penitent sinners, and the power of opening is conformable in all priestly keys; therefore he who can act upon one can act upon any other.

5. Likewise, we see thus in supercelestial things, that an Angel of a lower order can be purified, illumined, and perfected by any Angel of a higher order[^4]: therefore if this hierarchy imitates that one, since the priestly order is above the laity, it seems that any layman can be absolved by any priest.

6. Likewise, if he cannot absolve all, since he can absolve one; I ask whence this is. For either it is
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from a slackening and corruption of the power, or from a binding, because a higher power does not permit it. That it is not in the first way is clear. In the second way it ought not to be, because the good is to be diffused and multiplied and cultivated: therefore the power is not to be restricted; and so it seems that he who can act upon one can act upon every one.

**On the contrary:**
1. Cause sixteen, question one[^5]: «Let it be lawful for no priest to absolve or to bind another's parishioner».

2. Likewise, Cause nine, question two[^6]: «Let no one presume to judge, ordain, or excommunicate another's parishioner, because such judgment or ordination or excommunication will be neither valid nor have any force».

3. Likewise, in the General Council, *extra, On Penance and Remissions*[^7]: «If anyone at some time should for cause wish to confess to another, let him ask and obtain license from his own priest, because otherwise that one cannot absolve or bind him»; but not every priest is the proper one, because that is called proper which belongs to one alone: therefore not every priest can absolve everyone.

4. Likewise, it seems so by *reason*: for we see in the ordering of the predicaments in *rational matters*[^8] and in the order of causes in *natural things*, that reduction is made up to the supreme through one immediate thing, such that there are not several immediate things with respect to one. And this is clear, because there is one most special species of one individual, and likewise it is in causes: therefore if there is order in the Church according to degrees, descending and ascending from the Supreme Pontiff down to the parishioner; it seems then that through one priest, through one archdeacon, through one bishop, through one hierarch[^9] it is reduced to the Supreme Pontiff: therefore there cannot, according to right order, be several priests over one: therefore not anyone can absolve or bind anyone.

5. Likewise, we see thus in *armies*, that there are distinct orders, as the tribune over the centurions, and the centurion over the captains of fifty, and the captain of fifty over the captains of ten, and the captain of ten over the ten[^10]; and those who are under one are not under another captain of ten, nor can the captain of ten restrain any but his own ten, and so on ascending; according to this, by parity of reason it seems that neither can a priest restrain another's parishioner, nor a bishop another's subject.

6. Likewise, if two had *power* over one, who might disagree, they could command contrary things; but no one can reasonably obey two masters commanding contrary things[^11]: therefore perplexity could be generated in that subject: therefore according to right order equal power ought not be given to two priests over the same subject: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** Not every priest can absolve everyone except in a case of necessity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Dionysius says[^12], «it is the law of the Godhead to lead through the first to the middle, and through the middle to the last, unto purification, illumination, and perfection». Therefore, as we see in all things, whether in rational, or natural, or celestial things, that for there to be concord and beauty it is required that there be *order*; so it must be understood also in the *spiritual* powers within the Church itself; whence in *Canticles* six[^13] it is read that *she is terrible as an army set in array*.

Since therefore *order* is regarded according to prelacy and subjection; and *prelacy* is regarded according to *ascent* and *descent*, not according to equality; and in *ascending* to what is higher there is *a coming-to-rest and a reduction to one*, while on the contrary in *descending* there is *multiplication*[^14]: therefore according to the right order of the Church it was required that there be one prelate, first and supreme, in whom should be *the coming-to-rest* of all ecclesiastical prelacy. And because in him the coming-to-rest is as in the first and most simple thing in that genus; therefore *power* is united in him, and he alone among prelates is the one who has the *fullness of power*[^15]. — Likewise, since by withdrawal from the one there comes *multiplication*, and through this a diminution of power; therefore, the more the other prelates are inferior, the more *numerous* they are and the *less* power they have, so that the coming-to-rest is in the par-
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ish priests, who immediately bear the care of the people; and the jurisdiction of these is restricted to a determined portion, and to each is committed his portion according to right ordering, and that is judged to be *his harvest*[^16]. And since it is not lawful for another priest to put his hand or sickle into another's harvest; therefore another does not have the power to absolve his subject, unless a superior, or one who holds the place of a superior, as the penitentiaries of the lord Pope and the penitentiaries of the bishop, legates and the privileged, who do this by the authority of a superior, as a messenger proceeding from a prince can act upon all subjects below others. But these things are to be understood according to the *common law*, because in a case of *necessity* the rectitude of the law grants to any priest to absolve anyone, if he be in the unity of the Church.

As a rule, therefore, it is to be held that only the proper priest has the exercise of power over his own, except in five cases. The first is, if a stray sheep has offended in his parish. — The second, if it has changed its domicile there, as is the case with students who study at Paris. — The third is, if it be a vagabond. — The fourth is, if the proper priest be ignorant or malicious, and, license having been sought, [the penitent] wishes to go to a more skilled one. — The last is in a case of necessity, and in this case the priest need not be licensed[^17]. In the others, however, it is required — not from the priest of the penitent alone, because he can only license a *subject* — but it is required to be licensed by the ordinary, namely the bishop himself. — The reasons proving that not anyone can act upon anyone are therefore to be granted.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is objected concerning the sons of Aaron, it must be said that it is not similar: because the people of Israel was one people and had one temple, nor were the kingdoms of the lands committed there to the care of the priests, as they now are; and therefore it is now required that there be several bishops[^18] and several churches, each of which has its own power.

2. To that which is objected concerning what the Lord says: *Whose sins you shall forgive* etc.; it must be said that the priestly key, although of itself it is indifferent to all, nevertheless the moving force of this key, which is jurisdiction, as was seen before[^19], does not bear upon all but only upon one alone; and therefore one alone can absolve all. When therefore the Lord gave the key and this power, he himself presupposed its exercise according to the rule of the power conferred on Peter and his successors.

3. To that which is objected, that fire acts upon any combustible thing; it must be said that it is not similar: because the first is a *natural* action, which is according to necessity, but this action is *spiritual* and *rational*, which indeed is regarded according to order.

4. To that which is objected concerning the key and the lock, it must be said that that is true when there is present the moving force which moves the key; but in some it is restricted, as in inferior priests; in some *bound*, as in heretics and the excommunicate; in some it is *cut off*, as in the degraded[^20]. Whence just as those whose hand is bound absolutely cannot absolve anyone, so in others the key cannot close where the hand of jurisdiction is unable to extend itself.

5. To that which is objected concerning the Angels of a higher order, it must be said that it is not similar: because in the angelic hierarchy zeal or controversy cannot fall, since concord is made among the sublime ones[^21]; it is not so in the Church, but rather everyone wishes to claim for himself the right of another: therefore it was required to distinguish and limit the powers.

6. To that which is last objected, that power is not to be restricted; it must be said that the restriction of power can come in two ways: either on account of a *defect* of love, or on account of the *conservation of order*. The first is of envy and is repugnant to goodness, but the second is of wisdom and accords with peace and the common good; and such restriction was made in the lesser priests, the divine law regulating it, indeed the Holy Spirit himself[^22], through the Fathers and Apostles, who founded and ordered the Church. And thus the whole is clear.

la: *Vers. 2: Homo, in cuius cute et carne ortus fuerit diversus color sive pustula, aut quasi lucens quidpiam, id est plaga leprae* etc. — Circa finem arg. post *tunc temporis* cod. A omittit *erat*, pro quo alii codd. *esset*.

en: Verse 2: *The man in whose skin and flesh there shall arise a different color, or a pustule, or as it were something shining, that is, the plague of leprosy* etc. — Toward the end of the argument, after *tunc temporis* codex A omits *erat*, for which other codices [read] *esset*.

la: Vers. 23.

en: Verse 23.

la: Codd. A aa bb *peccatorum*, plures alii codd. vel *peccatori* vel *peccatoris*.

en: Codices A, aa, bb [read] *peccatorum*; several other codices either *peccatori* or *peccatoris*.

la: Secundum Dionys., *de Caelesti Hierarch.* c. 3. § 2. seq. et c. 8. § 2.

en: According to Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 3, § 2 ff. and c. 8, § 2.

la: Gratian. super C. *Adiicimus illud etiam* (19.). Cfr. Gratian. super C. *Sacerdos ante omnia* (2.), de Poenitentia d. 6. infra in lit. Magistri, d. XXI. in fine allegatus.

en: Gratian on the canon *Adiicimus illud etiam* (19). Cf. Gratian on the canon *Sacerdos ante omnia* (2), On Penance, d. 6, cited below in the Master's text, d. XXI, at the end.

la: Can. *Nullus alterius terminos usurpet nec ullerius parochianum... quia talis iudicatio vel ordinatio aut excommunicatio vel damnatio nec rata* etc. (1.).

en: The canon *Let no one usurp another's bounds nor [judge] another's parishioner... because such judgment or ordination or excommunication or condemnation [shall] not [be] valid* etc. (1).

la: Libr. V. tit. 38. C. *Omnis utriusque sexus* (12.). Cfr. supra pag. 452, nota 3. — Inferius respicitur Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4: *Proprium... soli autem inest et conversim praedicatur de re... Nemo enim proprium dicit quod contingit alii inesse.* Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.

en: Book V, tit. 38, the canon *Omnis utriusque sexus* (12). Cf. above p. 452, note 3. — Below reference is made to Aristotle, *Topics* I, c. 4: *A property... belongs to one alone and is predicated convertibly of the thing... For no one calls that a property which can belong to another.* Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter On Property.

la: Supple: disciplinis sive scientiis. Disciplina rationalis est logica (cfr. tom. III. pag. 568, nota 3.), in qua agitur de praedicamentis (cfr. tom. II. pag. 48, nota 1.). — De specie specialissima vide supra pag. 411, nota 16. — Vat. cum multis codd. *rationabilibus*. Idem recurrit infra in corp.

en: Supply: disciplines or sciences. The rational discipline is logic (cf. vol. III, p. 568, note 3), in which the predicaments are treated (cf. vol. II, p. 48, note 1). — On the most special species see above p. 411, note 16. — The Vatican [edition] with many codices [reads] *rationabilibus*. The same recurs below in the body.

la: Edd. praefigunt *patriarcham vel*. Sicut patriarcha significat patrum principem (cfr. C. *Cleros et clericos* 1. d. 21.), ita hierarcha principem sacrorum (ἱερά et ἀρχός). Cfr. S. Bonav. in Hexaem. serm. 3.

en: The editions prefix *patriarcham vel*. Just as «patriarch» signifies prince of the fathers (cf. the canon *Cleros et clericos* 1, d. 21), so «hierarch» [signifies] prince of the holy things (*hiera* and *archos*). Cf. S. Bonaventure, *Hexaemeron*, sermon 3.

la: Vide Isidor., IX. Etymolog. c. 3. n. 29. seq. — Codd. R S prosequuntur *et decem, qui sunt* etc.

en: See Isidore, *Etymologies* IX, c. 3, n. 29 ff. — Codices R, S continue *and ten, who are* etc.

la: Respicitur Matth. 6, 24: *Nemo potest duobus dominis servire.* — Superius pro *qui possent* cod. K (1 a secunda manu) *quia possent*.

en: Reference is to Matthew 6:24: *No one can serve two masters.* — Above, for *qui possent* codex K (1, by a second hand) [reads] *quia possent*.

la: *De Caelesti Hierarch.* c. 8. § 2. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 277 nota 7.

en: *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 8, § 2. Cf. vol. II, p. 277, note 7.

la: Vers. 3.

en: Verse 3.

la: Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie.

en: Cf. Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter On Species.

la: Ut dicit Bernard., Epist. 131. n. 2. et II. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 16. Lib. de Causis, propos. 17: *Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata.* Cfr. Gratian., d. 21. et 22.

en: As Bernard says, *Epistle* 131, n. 2, and *On Consideration* II, c. 8, n. 16. *The Book of Causes*, prop. 17: *Every power, when united, is more infinite than a power that is multiplied.* Cf. Gratian, d. 21 and 22.

la: Respicitur Matth. 9, 37. seq. et Luc. 10, 2. Deut. 23, 25: *Falcem non immittes in segetem proximi tui* (secundum Septuaginta). Cfr. C. *Ecclesias singulas* (1.), C. 13. q. 1.

en: Reference is to Matthew 9:37 ff. and Luke 10:2. Deuteronomy 23:25: *You shall not put a sickle into your neighbor's standing grain* (according to the Septuagint). Cf. the canon *Ecclesias singulas* (1), C. 13, q. 1.

la: De duobus ultimis casibus cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XX. c. 6. et d. XXI. c. 9. — *Licentiatum* esse saepe idem est ac facultatem audiendi confessiones sive iurisdictionem habere. — Post *sacerdotem* edd. addunt *alienum*.

en: On the last two cases cf. below in the Master's text, d. XX, c. 6, and d. XXI, c. 9. — To be *licensed* is often the same as to have the faculty of hearing confessions, that is, jurisdiction. — After *sacerdotem* the editions add *alienum*.

la: In codd. P R S additur *aequales*.

en: In codices P, R, S is added *aequales*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

la: Hic in corp. et a. 2. q. 2. — Mox post *uno solo* in cod. P secunda manus addidit *scilicet in Summo Pontifice*. Subinde pro *praesupponit* ex codd. A G H substituimus *praesupposuit*.

en: Here in the body and a. 2, q. 2. — Soon after *uno solo* in codex P a second hand added *namely, in the Supreme Pontiff*. Thereafter, for *praesupponit*, from codices A, G, H we have substituted *praesupposuit*.

la: Cfr. a. 2. q. 2. — In fine solut. pro *ubi... non valeat* edd. *nisi... valeat*.

en: Cf. a. 2, q. 2. — At the end of the solution, for *ubi... non valeat* the editions [read] *nisi... valeat*.

la: Respicitur Iob 25, 2: *Potestas et terror apud eum est, qui facit concordiam in sublimibus suis.* Cfr. Act. 20, 28. — Mox edd. cum plurimis codd. omittunt *per*.

en: Reference is to Job 25:2: *Power and terror are with him, who makes concord in his high places.* Cf. Acts 20:28. — Soon after, the editions with most codices omit *per*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De I. huius articuli quaestione vide auctores in praecedente scholio citatos et Alex. Hal. S. p. IV. q. 21. m. 3. a. 2. § 1. — Praeclara autem est doctrina Seraphici, qua ex ipsa Ecclesiae ratione ordinem hierarchicum comprobat et centro Ecclesiae sive Sedi apostolicae plenitudinem potestatis vindicat.

In 2. quaestione recte docet S. Bonav. contra quosdam posteriores, quod licet superior se possit subiicere inferiori eique dare iurisdictionem in se pro foro interno, tamen «qui subiiciuntur uni non possunt dare alteri auctoritatem in se». De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 20. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning the first question of this article, see the authors cited in the preceding scholion and Alex. of Hales, S[umma] p. IV, q. 21, m. 3, a. 2, § 1. — But excellent is the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor, by which from the very nature of the Church he proves the hierarchical order and vindicates to the center of the Church, that is, to the Apostolic See, the fullness of power.

In the second question S. Bonaventure rightly teaches, against certain later writers, that although a superior can subject himself to an inferior and give him jurisdiction over himself for the internal forum, nevertheless «those who are subject to one cannot give another authority over themselves». On this second question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, subquestion 3; Suppl. q. 20, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Petr. of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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translators_notes:
- **Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from vol4 PDF bands p507–p509 (printed folios 807–809; image-page = printed folio, offset pdf = printed + 20). The IA djvu OCR (raw lines 56322–56589) cascade-shattered the two-column body, Respondeo/Solutio, and footers, so the PDF column bands were authoritative throughout per the Vol II Override. The article opener ("In quos claves… Consequenter… duo quaeruntur") folds into this q1 per the locked chunking convention.
- **Page alignment.** The dispatch named bands p506–508, but each band's running head confirms image-page = printed folio (p507=807 "DIST. XIX. ART. III. QUAEST. I."; p508=808; p509=809). Printed-page set corrected to 807–809; printed 810 (image p510) is entirely QUAESTIO II and excluded. The OCR-garbled running heads "S08"/"blO" = 808/810.
- **Scholion ownership.** The Art III SCHOLION header sits at the foot of printed 809 (raw line 241) and covers BOTH questions of the article. Rendered IN FULL here (q1 paragraph + the q2 paragraph). **Hand-off to q2:** the q2 scholion content lives in this chunk's scholion §I, second paragraph ("In the second question…") — q2 should reference back here and NOT duplicate it.
- **Apparatus.** 22 footnotes, drawn from the per-page Quaracchi footers across printed 807 (the article-opener note, here [^5]'s cross-ref region), 808, and 809. Footnote numbering restarts per printed page in the source; renumbered sequentially 1–22 for this chunk. Self-check: 22 ≥ 8. ✓
- **[?] flags.** None unresolved. The OCR garbles (`polest`→potest, `Girca`→Circa, `iwsse`/`posse`, `or<;/o`→ordo, `siai`/`status`) were all disambiguated against the PDF bands. Marginal glosses (*Distinctio duplex*, *Conclusio 1/2*, *Probatur*, *Notandum*, *Corollarium*, *Epilogus*, *Fundamenta*, *Arctatio duplex*, *Ad oppositum*) are Quaracchi editorial side-notes, trimmed from the body text per project rules.