title: Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus.*

Secundo quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad eius usum, et est quaestio, utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus. Et quod bonus sit, videtur:

1. Quia quales sunt habitus, tales sunt actus[^1]; sed timor servilis, cum sit donum Spiritus sancti, est bonus: ergo per documentum moralis philosophi actus eius est bonus.

2. Item, maxima est Philosophi[^2], quod «cuius usus bonus, ipsum quoque bonum», et «cuius usus malus, ipsum est malum»: ergo si usus timoris servilis est malus, ipse timor servilis esset malus; sed non est malus, cum detur divinitus: ergo actus eius est bonus.

3. Item, omnis habitus, cuius usus praeparat hominem ad susceptionem gratiae, est bonus quantum ad usum; sed timor servilis est huiusmodi, quia per usum eius introducitur caritas, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullus actus, quo quis vitat peccatum, est peccatum; sed actu timoris servilis recedit homo a peccato[^4]: ergo actus timoris servilis non est peccatum: non est ergo malus. Et est malus, vel bonus: ergo est bonus.

**Sed contra:**
1. Super illud Psalmi[^5]: *Confige timore tuo carnes meas;* Glossa: «Timor servilis carnem non crucifigit, quia vivit in eo peccandi voluntas, et sequeretur opus, si speraretur impunitas: mallet enim licere, et dolet non licere, quod lex vetat»; sed omnis talis motus est directe contra iustitiam, quia vellet, iustitiam non esse: omnis vero motus contra iustitiam est malus: ergo actus et usus timoris servilis est malus.

2. Item, Gregorius in Moralibus[^6]: «Cum poena timetur, et Dei facies non amatur, timor ex tumore est, non ex amore»; sed omnis actus, qui procedit ex radice tumoris et superbiae, est actus malus et damnabilis: ergo usus timoris servilis non est bonus, sed culpabilis.

3. Item, nullus actus incompossibilis caritati est bonus: sed timere serviliter est actus incompossibilis caritati: ergo timere serviliter non est bonum. Maior manifesta est, quia caritas bono non repugnat, sed malo. Minor autem manifesta est secundum verba Augustini et Apostoli[^7], quia spiritus servitutis non stat cum spiritu adoptionis.

4. Item, omnis timor ortum habet ex amore[^8]: ergo timor servilis ex amore habet ortum; sed omnis amor aut est naturalis, aut libidinosus, aut gratuitus: cum ergo timor servilis non possit habere ortum ex amore gratuito, quia est in peccatore; nec ex amore naturali potest — constat, quia iam esset timor naturalis — restat ergo, quod ex amore libidinoso. Sed omnis actus, qui exit ex amore libidinoso, est malus et culpabilis: ergo actus timoris servilis est malus.

5. Item, amare Deum propter temporalia principaliter est peccatum et malum, ergo similiter timere Deum propter poenas principaliter est malum; sed hoc est timere serviliter: videtur ergo, quod actus timoris servilis semper sit culpabilis.

6. Item, timor servilis non dicitur servilis nisi a servitute peccati[^9]: ergo pari ratione nullus dicitur timere serviliter, nisi circa illum actum sit annexa circumstantia peccati; sed circumstantia peccati annexa actui facit totum actum deformem: ergo videtur, quod actus et usus timoris servilis semper sit culpabilis et deformis.

### Conclusio.
> Timor servilis, quando servilitas non concomitatur actum, sed solum habitum, potest esse bonus, licet non sit meritorius.

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**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum dico timorem servilem, duo dico, videlicet ipsum habitum, quo anima disponitur ad timendum Deum ut punientem eos qui praevaricantur; et ulterius nomine servilitatis importatur deformitas peccati, quae annexa est illi habitui in eodem homine, ratione cuius ille homo dicitur esse servus peccati[^10], et timor in eo existens dicitur esse timor servilis. Per hunc etiam modum, cum dico, aliquem timere serviliter, duo dico, videlicet actum ab illo habitu egredientem et voluntatis servilitatem sive deformitatem concomitantem. — Sed attendendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut ita quod deformitas illa voluntatis concomitetur quantum ad habitum, aut quantum ad actum. Si concomitatur solum quantum ad habitum; sic potest esse, quod aliquis serviliter timeat, et tamen motu illo non peccabit; quia, si ex recogitatione[^11] poenarum aliquis abhorret offendere Deum, hoc potest esse praeter omne peccatum. — Si autem concomitatur in actu, quamvis ipsum timere de se non sit malum, tamen ratione deformitatis actualiter annexae depravatur; sicut aliquis, qui timet poenas et timendo dolet, quod tales poenae infliguntur pro culpa, et actu etiam concupiscit peccare, si non esset illa poena; et hoc modo timere serviliter est peccatum et malum. Hoc autem non est semper, cum quis movetur timore servili, alioquin per usum illius doni magis homo se a gratia elongaret quam praepararet; quod plane falsum est.

Et ideo concedendum est, quod usus timoris servilis potest esse bonus, licet non sit bonus bonitate meriti, sed magis bonitate praeparante vel ordinante[^12] ad meritum, quae simul stat cum peccato. Unde et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt, licet ratio ultima sit sophistica, quia procedit ex suppositione falsa.

**Ad argumenta pro parte contraria:**
1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod in timore servili vivit voluntas peccandi, et quod dolet de eo, quod lex vetat; dicendum, quod illud verbum Augustini non intelligitur, quod semper, quando timet, doleat actu, et similiter quod voluntas peccandi semper sit in actu; sed hoc dicit, quia manet in habitu et radice[^13]. Licet autem voluntas sit per peccatum deformata, et regnet in ea malus amor, potest tamen aliquando moveri ad aliqua bona opera in genere vel ex circumstantia per aliquam gratiam gratis datam, non committendo culpam, sicut patet per multa exempla; et sic potest esse in parte ista.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timere serviliter est ex tumore, sicut dicit Gregorius, non ex amore; dicendum, quod *ex* non dicit ibi causam, sed concomitantiam; et cum dicit concomitantiam in actu, tunc deformat actum timoris servilis[^14]; cum dicit concomitantiam in habitu, non oportet, quod deformet, sed tamen facit ipsum deficere a meriti perfectione.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus incompossibilis caritati est malus; dicendum, quod aliquis actus potest esse incompossibilis alicui ratione circumstantiae propriae, quam habet ex proprio habitu, vel ratione alicuius annexi. Cum ergo dicitur, quod actus timoris servilis est incompossibilis caritati, hoc non est ratione ipsius actus per se et secundum se, quia habens caritatem potest bene timere Deum ratione poenae; sed hoc intelligitur ratione annexi[^15], quod facit ipsum deficere a merito caritatis. Et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod actus timoris servilis sit malus, sed vel est malus, vel est in homine secundum statum malum; et conclusio est vera ratione alterius partis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor servilis habet ortum ex amore[^16]; dicendum, quod non habet ortum ex amore libidinoso, sed potest habere ortum ex amore naturali. Amor enim naturalis dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, qui est cum ipsa natura plantatus; alio modo, qui est ex naturali affectu et voluntario exercitio acquisitus sine gratiae dono; et ex tali amore potest homo peccator etiam se ipsum sine peccato amare et mala sua fugere, sive praesentia sive futura[^17]; et ex tali amore timor servilis habet procedere. Si enim homo amat se ipsum ad hoc, ut acquirat salutem, et ex hoc timeat aeterna tormenta incurrere; talis affectio amoris, quamvis non sit ex caritate, potest esse absque libidine. — Aliter potest dici, quod sicut timor mundanus, quo quis timet amittere mundana, est ex amore mundi, et timor humanus ex amore temporalis salutis; sic timor servilis, cum quis timet incurrere aeterna tormenta, est ex amore aeternae salutis et beatitudinis; et iste amor, quantum est de se, non est culpabilis, sed est vel naturalis, vel gratuitus a gratia gratis data, vel gratuitus a gratia gratum faciente; et timor servilis bene potest esse ex amore salutis primo vel medio modo dicto[^18]. Et ideo falsum supponit, cum dicit, quod est ex amore libidinoso[^19].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amare Deum propter temporalia principaliter est peccatum; dicendum, quod non est simile de amore et timore: quia

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amor est ille qui facit frui, quia eius est quietare, vel ad aliud inclinare; et ideo peccat qui diligit Deum propter temporalia principaliter, quia facit de via finem et de fine viam[^20]; non sic autem est ex parte timoris. — Alia est ratio: quia, cum quis amat Deum propter temporalia, duo sunt ibi amata; sed cum quis timet Deum propter poenas, quas infligit, unus solus est, quem timet — qui enim timet habentem cultellum uno et eodem timore timet cultellum sive plagam cultelli et actionem percutientis — et ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod timere serviliter est timere cum circumstantia peccati; dicendum, quod illa circumstantia sive deformitas peccati potest poni circa actum timendi ratione ipsius actus, vel ratione timentis. Et si ponatur ratione ipsius actus, tunc utique actus deformatur et efficitur malus ratione annexi, sicut prius fuit expositum. Sed si ita sit, quod ponatur ratione ipsius timentis; sic potest esse, quod actus non sit actus deformatus, sed quia deformitas est circa timentem, licet secundum illam deformitatem non actualiter moveatur. Et propterea non est opportunum, quod semper timere serviliter sit peccatum, immo hoc potest esse utile et praeparatorium[^21] respectu gratiae[^22].

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english:
### Question II. *Whether the use of servile fear is good or evil.*

Secondly there is inquiry concerning servile fear in comparison to its use, and the question is whether the use of servile fear is good or evil. And that it is good seems [so]:

1. Because as the habits are, so are the acts[^1]; but servile fear, since it is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is good: therefore by the teaching of moral philosophy its act is good.

2. Likewise, it is a maxim of the Philosopher[^2], that «that whose use is good is itself good also», and «that whose use is evil is itself evil»: therefore if the use of servile fear is evil, servile fear itself would be evil; but it is not evil, since it is given divinely: therefore its act is good.

3. Likewise, every habit whose use prepares a man for the reception of grace is good with respect to use; but servile fear is of this sort, because through its use charity is introduced, as Augustine says, and it is had in the text[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no act by which one avoids sin is a sin; but by the act of servile fear a man withdraws from sin[^4]: therefore the act of servile fear is not a sin: therefore it is not evil. And it is either evil or good: therefore it is good.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm[^5]: *Pierce my flesh with thy fear;* the Gloss: «Servile fear does not crucify the flesh, because in it the will to sin lives, and the work would follow, if impunity were hoped for: for it would prefer that [sin] were allowed, and it grieves that it is not allowed, what the law forbids»; but every such motion is directly against justice, because it would wish justice not to be: but every motion against justice is evil: therefore the act and use of servile fear is evil.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the *Morals*[^6]: «When punishment is feared, and the face of God is not loved, fear is from swelling [pride], not from love»; but every act which proceeds from the root of swelling and pride is an evil and damnable act: therefore the use of servile fear is not good, but culpable.

3. Likewise, no act incompatible with charity is good: but to fear servilely is an act incompatible with charity: therefore to fear servilely is not good. The major is manifest, because charity is not repugnant to the good, but to the evil. But the minor is manifest according to the words of Augustine and the Apostle[^7], because the spirit of servitude does not stand with the spirit of adoption.

4. Likewise, every fear takes its origin from love[^8]: therefore servile fear has its origin from love; but every love is either natural, or lustful, or gratuitous: since therefore servile fear cannot have its origin from gratuitous love, because it is in a sinner; nor can it from natural love — it is established, because then it would be natural fear — it remains therefore that [it is] from lustful love. But every act which issues from lustful love is evil and culpable: therefore the act of servile fear is evil.

5. Likewise, to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin and evil, therefore likewise to fear God on account of punishments principally is evil; but this is to fear servilely: therefore it seems that the act of servile fear is always culpable.

6. Likewise, servile fear is not called servile except from the servitude of sin[^9]: therefore by parity of reasoning no one is said to fear servilely, unless about that act there is annexed a circumstance of sin; but a circumstance of sin annexed to an act makes the whole act deformed: therefore it seems that the act and use of servile fear is always culpable and deformed.

### Conclusion.
> Servile fear, when servility does not accompany the act, but only the habit, can be good, although it is not meritorious.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that when I say "servile fear," I say two things, namely the habit itself, by which the soul is disposed to fear God as punishing those who transgress; and further, by the name of servility is imported the deformity of sin, which is annexed to that habit in the same man, by reason of which that man is said to be a slave of sin[^10], and the fear existing in him is said to be servile fear. In this same way, when I say that someone "fears servilely," I say two things, namely the act issuing from that habit and the servility or deformity of the will accompanying [it]. — But it is to be attended to, that this can be in two ways: either so that that deformity of the will accompanies with respect to the habit, or with respect to the act. If it accompanies only with respect to the habit; thus it can be that someone fears servilely, and yet by that motion will not sin; for, if from a recollection[^11] of punishments someone shrinks from offending God, this can be apart from all sin. — But if it accompanies in the act, although the fearing itself is not in itself evil, nevertheless by reason of the deformity actually annexed it is depraved; as someone who fears punishments and in fearing grieves that such punishments are inflicted for fault, and in act even covets to sin, if that punishment were not [there]; and in this way to fear servilely is sin and evil. But this is not always [the case], when one is moved by servile fear, otherwise through the use of that gift a man would estrange himself from grace more than prepare [himself]; which is plainly false.

And therefore it is to be conceded that the use of servile fear can be good, although it is not good with the goodness of merit, but rather with a goodness preparing or ordering[^12] toward merit, which stands together with sin. Hence also the reasons which show this are to be conceded, although the last reason is sophistical, because it proceeds from a false supposition.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that in servile fear the will to sin lives, and that it grieves over what the law forbids; it must be said that that saying of Augustine is not understood [to mean] that always, when one fears, one grieves in act, and likewise that the will to sin is always in act; but he says this because it remains in the habit and root[^13]. But although the will is deformed by sin, and an evil love reigns in it, it can nevertheless sometimes be moved to some good works in their kind or from a circumstance by some grace freely given, not committing fault, as is evident through many examples; and thus it can be in this case.

2. To that which is objected, that to fear servilely is from swelling, as Gregory says, not from love; it must be said that *from* does not there state a cause, but an accompaniment; and when it states an accompaniment in the act, then it deforms the act of servile fear[^14]; when it states an accompaniment in the habit, it does not necessarily deform [it], but nevertheless makes it fall short of the perfection of merit.

3. To that which is objected, that an act incompatible with charity is evil; it must be said that an act can be incompatible with something by reason of a proper circumstance, which it has from its proper habit, or by reason of something annexed. When therefore it is said that the act of servile fear is incompatible with charity, this is not by reason of the act itself per se and in itself, because one having charity can well fear God by reason of punishment; but this is understood by reason of something annexed[^15], which makes it fall short of the merit of charity. And therefore from this it does not follow that the act of servile fear is evil, but it is either evil, or it is in a man according to an evil state; and the conclusion is true by reason of the other part.

4. To that which is objected, that servile fear has its origin from love[^16]; it must be said that it does not have its origin from lustful love, but it can have its origin from natural love. For natural love is spoken of in two ways: in one way, that which is planted with nature itself; in another way, that which is acquired by natural affect and voluntary exercise without the gift of grace; and from such love a sinful man can even love himself without sin and flee his evils, whether present or future[^17]; and from such love servile fear has [its power] to proceed. For if a man loves himself to this [end], that he may acquire salvation, and from this fears to incur eternal torments; such an affection of love, although it is not from charity, can be without lust. — Otherwise it can be said that just as worldly fear, by which one fears to lose worldly things, is from love of the world, and human fear from love of temporal welfare; so servile fear, when one fears to incur eternal torments, is from love of eternal welfare and blessedness; and this love, as far as it is of itself, is not culpable, but is either natural, or gratuitous from grace freely given, or gratuitous from grace making [one] pleasing; and servile fear can well be from love of welfare in the first or middle mode stated[^18]. And therefore he supposes falsely, when he says that it is from lustful love[^19].

5. To that which is objected, that to love God on account of temporal things principally is a sin; it must be said that it is not alike concerning love and fear: because

love is that which makes [one] enjoy, because it belongs to it to bring to rest, or to incline toward another [thing]; and therefore he sins who loves God on account of temporal things principally, because he makes of the way an end and of the end a way[^20]; but it is not so on the part of fear. — There is another reason: because, when one loves God on account of temporal things, there are two things loved there; but when one fears God on account of the punishments which He inflicts, there is one only, which he fears — for he who fears one holding a knife by one and the same fear fears the knife or the blow of the knife and the action of the one striking — and therefore it is not alike on the one side and the other.

6. To that which is lastly objected, that to fear servilely is to fear with a circumstance of sin; it must be said that that circumstance or deformity of sin can be placed about the act of fearing by reason of the act itself, or by reason of the one fearing. And if it is placed by reason of the act itself, then indeed the act is deformed and is made evil by reason of the annexed [thing], as was earlier expounded. But if it be so, that it is placed by reason of the one fearing; thus it can be that the act is not a deformed act, but [it is so] because the deformity is about the one fearing, although according to that deformity he is not actually moved. And therefore it is not fitting that to fear servilely should always be a sin, nay rather this can be useful and preparatory[^21] with respect to grace[^22].

---

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 700, nota 6, ubi praeter Augustinum allegatur Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. — De minori vide quaest. praeced. — In conclus. pro *per documentum moralis philosophi* cod. A *secundum Philosophum*.

en: Cf. vol. II, p. 700, note 6, where besides Augustine, Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 1, is cited. — On the minor see the preceding question. — In the conclusion, for *per documentum moralis philosophi* ("by the teaching of moral philosophy") codex A reads *secundum Philosophum* ("according to the Philosopher").

la: Boeth., II. de Differentiis topic. (cfr. tom. I. pag. 31, nota 1. et pag. 34, nota 9.). Cfr. Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 9.), ubi idem dicitur de *generationibus*, non *de usibus*. — Pro *ipsum ut malum* codd. G N I Z *ac ipsum quoque malum*. Subinde pro *est malus* codd. λ bb *esset malus*.

en: Boethius, *On Topical Differences* II (cf. vol. I, p. 31, note 1, and p. 34, note 9). Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 9), where the same is said of *generations*, not *of uses*. — For *ipsum ut malum* codices G N I Z [read] *ac ipsum quoque malum*. Likewise, for *est malus* codices λ bb [read] *esset malus*.

la: Hic c. 5, ubi et verba Augustini allata sunt.

en: Here, c. 5, where the words of Augustine are also cited.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seq. et quaest. praeced. in corp.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5 ff., and the preceding question in the body [of the response].

la: Psalm. 118, 120. — De Glossa (edd. *Glossa Augustini*) vide supra pag. 755, nota 3.

en: Psalm 118[:120] (Vulg.). — On the Gloss (the editions [read] *Gloss of Augustine*) see above, p. 755, note 3.

la: Gregor., *Moral.* libr. IV. c. 27. n. 80: *Cum enim a peccato praesens poena metuitur et amissa Dei facies non amatur, ex tumore est, non ex humilitate.* — In fine arg. pro *culpabilis* edd. *damnabilis*.

en: Gregory, *Morals* book IV, c. 27, n. 80: *For when present punishment is feared on account of sin and the lost face of God is not loved, it is from swelling, not from humility.* — At the end of the argument, for *culpabilis* ("culpable") the editions [read] *damnabilis* ("damnable").

la: Rom. 8, 15. — Verba Augustini versis hic in III. Magistri c. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3.

en: Rom. 8:15. — The words of Augustine [are] turned here into [the text] of the Master, Book III, c. 5. Cf. above, p. 338, note 3.

la: Inferius post *ex amore naturali* edd. omittunt *potest*; cod. U ibi verbo *constat* praeligit *quod*.

en: Below, after *ex amore naturali* the editions omit *potest*; codex U there prefixes *quod* to the word *constat*.

la: August., *Epist.* 145. (alias 144.), super illud II. Petr. 2, 19: *A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est,* inter alia ait (n. 4.): *Humiliter autem putat, victorem se esse peccati, qui poenae timore non peccat; quia, etsi non impletur foris negotium malae cupiditatis, ipsa tamen mala cupiditas intus est hostis. Et quis coram Deo innocens invenitur, qui vult, fieri quod vetatur, si subtrahas quod timetur?* etc.

en: Augustine, *Letter* 145 (alias 144), upon that [verse] of 2 Peter 2:19: *For by whatever one is overcome, to that also he is bound as a slave,* among other things says (n. 4): *But he humbly thinks himself the victor over sin, who does not sin from fear of punishment; because, even if outwardly the business of evil desire is not fulfilled, the evil desire itself is within an enemy. And who is found innocent before God, who wills that to be done which is forbidden, if you take away that which is feared?* etc.

la: Respicitur illud Ioan. 8, 34: *Qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati.* — Paulo superius pro *servilitatis* edd. *servilitis*. Paulo inferius pro *videlicet actum* cod. U *videlicet ipsum actum*. Post pauca pro *servilitatem* cod. A *servitutem*.

en: Reference is made to that [verse] of John 8:34: *Whoever commits sin is a slave of sin.* — A little above, for *servilitatis* the editions [read] *servilitis*. A little below, for *videlicet actum* codex U [reads] *videlicet ipsum actum*. After a little, for *servilitatem* codex A [reads] *servitutem*.

la: Codd. A U Z *cogitatione*.

en: Codices A U Z [read] *cogitatione* ("from a thought").

la: Codd. V Z *praeparante et disponente*. In fine corp. pro *falsa* cod. A *falsi*.

en: Codices V Z [read] *praeparante et disponente* ("preparing and disposing"). At the end of the body, for *falsa* codex A [reads] *falsi*.

la: Sive quodam modo latenter; cfr. supra pag. 755, nota 3.

en: Or in a certain way latently; cf. above, p. 755, note 3.

la: Codd. G H I L T V aa *serviliter*. Subinde post *cum* cod. U subiungit *vero*.

en: Codices G H I L T V aa [read] *serviliter* ("servilely"). Likewise, after *cum* codex U adds *vero*.

la: Cod. A *ratione alicuius annexi, quia facit* etc.]

en: Codex A [reads] *ratione alicuius annexi, quia facit* ("by reason of something annexed, because it makes"), etc.]

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. adiungunt *libidinoso*.

en: The editions, with several codices, add *libidinoso* ("from lustful [love]").

la: Cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 4. — Inferius pro *potest esse* edd. *potest tamen esse*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* IX, c. 4. — Below, for *potest esse* the editions [read] *potest tamen esse* ("can nevertheless be").

la: Confirmatur verbis Domini (Matth. 10, 28.): *Sed potius timete eum, qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam.*

en: It is confirmed by the words of the Lord (Matt. 10:28): *But rather fear Him who can destroy both soul and body in hell.*

la: Vide infra dub. 2. seq. — Paulo ante pro *vel medio modo* Vat. *vel tertio modo*, et aliquanto superius pro *cum quis* codd. A U *quo quis*.

en: See below, the following Doubt 2. — A little before, for *vel medio modo* ("or the middle mode") the Vatican edition [reads] *vel tertio modo* ("or the third mode"), and somewhat above, for *cum quis* codices A U [read] *quo quis*.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. et a. 3. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *quia eius* edd. *et eius*. Paulo inferius post *Alia est* codd. A U Z inserunt *etiam*.

en: Cf. Book I of the *Sentences*, d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 3, q. 2. — A little above, for *quia eius* the editions [read] *et eius*. A little below, after *Alia est* codices A U Z insert *etiam*.

la: Cod. A *quod* et in fine solut. *praeparatio* pro *praeparatorium*.

en: Codex A [reads] *quod*, and at the end of the solution *praeparatio* for *praeparatorium*.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.757–759 (PDF 779–781; offset pdf = printed + 22), reading each page Left column then Right, body then footer, per the Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion. Running-head TEXT (`DIST. XXXIV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. II.` on p.757; `QUAEST. III.` opening on p.759) and the printed page numbers (757 / 758 / 759, the last OCR'd `7'69`) were trusted over OCR'd digits. The IA djvu OCR (raw 52540–52693) was used only to confirm footnote-marker spacing; its Respondeo/footer region is cascade-shattered (column bleed) and was discarded in favor of the bands.

**Alignment check (PASS, 1:1).** The QUAESTIO II opener *"Secundo quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad eius usum, et est quaestio, utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus"* matches TRACTATIO **Secundum** (*…ad suum usum*) and the title *Utrum usus timoris servilis sit bonus, an malus*. No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- p.757 (PDF 779): Quaestio II heading + opener + arguments *pro* (1–4) + *Sed contra* (1–6) + Conclusio. Footer band = nn.1–9 → [^1]–[^9].
- p.758 (PDF 780): Respondeo (the *duo dico* / habitus-vs-actus distinction) + Ad 1–4 (through *ex amore libidinoso*). Footer band = nn.1–10 → [^10]–[^19].
- p.759 (PDF 781): Ad 5 (tail) + Ad 6 (q2's last reply, closing *…praeparatorium respectu gratiae*). The q2 portion claims footer **nn.1–3 → [^20]–[^22]**; p.759 nn.4–5+ belong to QUAESTIO III and are FORWARDED (see below). QUAESTIO III heading opens lower on p.759 (NOT in this chunk).

**Scholion disposition — `has_scholion: false`, REDIRECT.** q2's range has no own `SCHOLION.` header. Per the q1 hand-off, the d34-p2-a1-q1 article-master scholion **§II** (*In seq. (2.) quaestione…* — *servilitas* mala but *actus* bonus) is exactly this q2's dossier and forward-covers it. The final footer note [^22] (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) confirms the redirect in the source itself. → see the scholion to a1-q1, §II.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up:* NONE. Per the q1 hand-off, q1 closed clean on p.756; q2 opened a fresh footer band on p.757 (claimed nn.1–9 here).
- *Forwarded to a1-q3:* p.759 footer **nn.4–5 onward** (n.4 *Hic c. 5*; n.5 *Cfr. Rom. 8, 15. et hic lit. Magistri c. 4* — these anchor the QUAESTIO III *Sed contra* arguments, not q2's body). q2 closes clean on p.759 at *…respectu gratiae*[^22]; a1-q3 (*de gratiae complemento*) opens its arguments immediately after and CLAIMS p.759 nn.4–5+.

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. All three pages legible at 450 dpi; cascade-shattered regions cleanly recovered from the bands.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 759 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum timor servilis expellatur, gratia adveniente.*

Tertio quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad gratiae complementum, et est quaestio, utrum timor servilis expellatur, gratia adveniente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini, quam Magister adducit in littera[^1]: «Timor locum praeparat caritati, cum autem venerit caritas, pellitur timor, qui ei praeparavit locum»; sed constat, quod hoc intelligitur de timore servili: ergo timor servilis pellitur, superveniente gratia.

2. Item, spiritus libertatis repugnat spiritui servitutis; sed spiritus gratiae et caritatis est spiritus libertatis, spiritus vero timoris servilis est spiritus servitutis: ergo superveniente gratia, pellitur timor servilis.

3. Item, nullus habens gratiam et caritatem principaliter intuetur poenam, quia principalius intuetur divinam complacentiam; sed timor servilis principaliter facit intueri poenam: ergo timor servilis non potest stare cum gratia[^3].

4. Item, sicut se habet amor, qui est ante gratiam, ad amorem, qui est ex gratia[^4], sic se habet timor servilis ad timorem gratuitum; sed amor gratuitus alius est ab amore acquisito, vel gratis dato: ergo timor initialis alius est a timore servili. Si ergo timor servilis non potest fieri initialis, videtur, quod manere non possit, cum caritas supervenit.

Item, e contrario videtur, quod timor servilis gratificetur, cum gratia infunditur.

2. Item, plus distat gratia gratum faciens a natura, quam distat a dono gratiae gratis datae: sed gratia superveniens naturam non excludit, sed potius perficit: ergo cum timor servilis sit donum gratiae gratis datae[^5], videtur, quod non expellatur, sed potius perficiatur, adveniente caritate[^6].

3. Item, timore servili timetur poena, timore initiali timetur poena et Dei offensa: ergo timor initialis se habet ex quadam additione ad timorem servilem[^7]; sed quod se habet ex additione ad alterum continet illud in se et adhuc amplius: ergo in timore initiali continetur timor servilis; et si hoc, timor servilis non expellitur per adventum caritatis.

4. Item, gratia, quantum est de se, non repugnat nisi peccato, vel ei quod ex peccato trahit originem, sicut est vitium et sequela; sed timor servilis non est peccatum nec ex peccato trahitur[^8]: ergo ei gratia non repugnat; et si hoc, tunc non videtur expelli per gratiam.

**Sed contra:** 1. Sicut se habet fides informis ad fidem formatam, sic se habet timor servilis ad timorem gratuitum; sed fides informis formatur, secundum quod habitum est in praecedentibus[^2]: ergo

> ### Conclusio.
> Timor servilis non manet cum gratia, nisi quoad id quod in eo erat materiale.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est duplex modus dicendi. Unus namque modus dicendi est, quod cum dico timorem servilem, duo dico, sicut tactum est prius[^9], videlicet ipsum donum et defectum deformitatis ei-

<!-- page 760 -->

dem dono annexum, non ratione ipsius doni, sed ratione eius, in quo est. Cum ergo gratia supervenit, expellit ipsum quantum ad defectum deformitatis annexum, non autem, in quantum est donum divinitus gratis datum, sicut in praecedentibus dictum fuit de fide informi.

Alius autem dicendi modus est, quod timor servilis omnino expellitur, adveniente gratia, non solum quantum ad id quod habet *servilitatis*[^10], sed quantum ad hoc quod habet *habilitatis*. — Et ratio huius est, quia huic timori servilitas quodam modo essentialiter est annexa. Habet enim ortum magis ex amore sui quam ex amore Dei. Unde et timor iste facit poenam principaliter intueri. Et ideo, sicut fides propter repugnantiam aenigmatis sibi annexi ad gloriam evacuatur, ipsa superveniente[^11]; sic habitus timoris servilis expellitur, superveniente caritate. Et huic modo dicendi videtur consonare verbum Augustini[^12], quo dicit, quod timor servilis respectu caritatis introducendae se habet, sicut seta respectu fili.

Ex his autem duobus modis dicendi potest elici tertius modus, quasi commixtus ex utroque et tenens medium inter utrumque. Valde enim difficile[^13] videtur dicere, quod ille habitus, quo quis habilis erat ad cessandum a culpa, superveniente gratia, statim recedat, cum contrarium huius dictet ipsa experientia. Difficile etiam videtur dicere et sustinere, quod timor servilis simpliciter[^14] maneat, adveniente gratia, cum sit alia timoris differentia quam timor initialis, nec videtur ab eodem trahere originem, et verba Augustini satis videntur contradicere. — Et propterea possumus dicere, quod timor servilis tres habet conditiones: unam sicut *materialem* et substratam, et hoc est timere[^15] poenam aeternam; alteram sicut *formalem* et completivam, et hoc est principaliter intueri illam poenam; tertiam sicut *annexam*, et hoc est habere voluntatem deformem coniunctam. Cum igitur gratiae donum superinducitur, timor servilis quantum ad hoc quod *materiale* erat in ipso, hoc est, in quantum habilitabat[^16] ad timendum poenam, manet cum gratia, quia gratiae non repugnat. Quantum vero ad alias duas conditiones, videlicet quantum ad *completivam* et quantum ad *annexam*, pellitur per ipsam gratiam; quia, cum gratia supervenit, nec principaliter intuetur poenam nec habet annexam voluntatem malam. Et sic haberi potest, quod donum timoris servilis quantum ad aliquid sui, adveniente gratia, pellitur, et quantum ad aliquid manet. — Et hoc viso, patet responsio ad quaestionem[^17]; patet etiam pro magna parte responsio ad obiectiones ad utramque partem, quia neutrae simpliciter concludunt veritatem; ideo oportet respondere hinc et inde.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, qua dicit, quod timor servilis *expellitur*, adveniente caritate[^18]; dicendum, quod hoc non dicit, quod totaliter pellatur, sed quia servilitatis dominium, qua principaliter poenam intuetur, ab ipso timore, adveniente caritate, aufertur.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritus servitutis repugnat spiritui libertatis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad id quod est in eo servitutis; sed timor servilis aliquid habet, in quo communicat cum timore initiali, et ratione illius non oportet, ipsum expelli[^19].

3. Ad illud quod tertio obiicitur, quod timoris servilis principaliter est intueri poenam; iam patet responsio: quia quantum ad illam conditionem habet expelli, qua videlicet poenam intuetur principaliter; sed propter hoc non sequitur, quod expellatur totaliter[^20].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut se habet amor peccatoris respectu amoris gratuiti, sic timor servilis respectu timoris casti; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam, sicut in praecedentibus[^21] habitum fuit, caritas non potest fieri informis, sed timor bene fieri potest informis; ut patet, quando aliquis cadit a caritate, et tamen post lapsum remanet sibi timor aeternorum suppliciorum. Et si tu obiicias, quod amor est radix timoris[^22], ergo debent currere pari passu; dicendum, quod non valet, quia similiter est radix spei, et tamen spes potest esse informis et formata; et ratio huius assignata fuit supra[^23]. — Et sic patet, quod rationes istae non concludunt, quod timor totaliter expellatur.

5. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod simpliciter manet per simile et in fide informi et formata; dicendum, quod non est simile ex parte ista et ex illa: quoniam fides informis assentit propter se et super omnia eidem et in omnibus, cui consentit fides formata[^24]; non sic autem est de timore servili

<!-- page 761 -->

et de timore initiali, quia timor servilis principaliter intuetur poenam, timor autem initialis non principaliter intuetur poenam, sed principaliter intuetur divinam offensam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non pellitur a gratia; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam naturalia sunt inseparabilia et quasi[^25] dantur ad semper; et ideo non auferuntur, superveniente gratia; quaedam autem sunt gratis superaddita, quae dantur solummodo ad tempus et pro statu determinato, et ideo pelluntur et cessant, recedente statu illo. Et sic est reperire in proposito.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod timor initialis addit supra servilem; dicendum, quod quaedam est additio simpliciter complens, quaedam est additio distrahens[^26]. Timor initialis addit supra servilem, et hoc quidem non solum complendo, verum etiam distrahendo, quia, sicut dictum est, aufert ei defectum concomitantem, qui quidem est voluntas deformis, et conditionem etiam complentem, quae quidem erat secundum statum illum principaliter intueri poenam, sicut tactum est supra. Et ideo sic supra ipsum addit, quod aliquid de ipso diminuit et expellit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia non repugnat nisi peccato, vel ei quod habet originem a peccato; dicendum, quod non solum huic repugnat, sed[^27] ei quod habet annexum peccatum. Timor autem servilis peccatum habet annexum; et propter hoc quantum ad hoc, quod poenam habet et formidat poenam futuram, introductum est ex culpa; et ideo non est mirum, si aliquo modo pellitur, adveniente gratia. Quia tamen non habet totaliter ex culpa introduci, verum etiam ex dono Dei secundum aliquid sui; hinc est etiam, quod sic pellitur, quod non totaliter destruitur. — Et secundum hoc satis de plano responderi potest auctoritatibus et rationibus, quae hinc et inde introducuntur[^28].

english:
### Question III. *Whether servile fear is expelled when grace comes.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning servile fear in comparison to the completion of grace, and the question is whether servile fear is expelled when grace comes. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, which the Master adduces in the text[^1]: "Fear prepares a place for charity, but when charity has come, the fear which prepared a place for it is driven out"; but it is established that this is understood of servile fear: therefore servile fear is driven out when grace supervenes.

2. Likewise, the spirit of liberty is repugnant to the spirit of servitude; but the spirit of grace and charity is the spirit of liberty, whereas the spirit of servile fear is the spirit of servitude: therefore when grace supervenes, servile fear is driven out.

3. Likewise, no one having grace and charity principally regards punishment, because he more principally regards the divine good-pleasure; but servile fear principally makes [one] regard punishment: therefore servile fear cannot stand together with grace[^3].

4. Likewise, as love which is before grace stands to the love which is from grace[^4], so servile fear stands to gratuitous fear; but gratuitous love is other than acquired love, or love freely given: therefore initial fear is other than servile fear. If therefore servile fear cannot become initial, it seems that it cannot remain when charity supervenes.

Likewise, on the contrary it seems that servile fear is made pleasing [to God] when grace is infused.

2. Likewise, grace which makes [one] pleasing stands farther from nature than it stands from a gift of grace freely given: but supervening grace does not exclude nature, but rather perfects [it]: therefore since servile fear is a gift of grace freely given[^5], it seems that it is not expelled, but rather perfected, when charity comes[^6].

3. Likewise, by servile fear punishment is feared, by initial fear punishment and the offense of God are feared: therefore initial fear stands by a certain addition to servile fear[^7]; but what stands by an addition to another contains that [other] in itself and yet more besides: therefore in initial fear servile fear is contained; and if this [is so], servile fear is not expelled by the advent of charity.

4. Likewise, grace, of itself, is repugnant only to sin, or to that which draws its origin from sin, as is a vice and its sequel; but servile fear is not a sin, nor is it drawn from sin[^8]: therefore grace is not repugnant to it; and if this [is so], then it does not seem to be expelled by grace.

**On the contrary:** 1. As unformed faith stands to formed faith, so servile fear stands to gratuitous fear; but unformed faith is formed, according to what was held in the preceding [discussions][^2]: therefore

> ### Conclusion.
> Servile fear does not remain together with grace, except as to that which in it was material.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold manner of speaking. For one manner of speaking is that when I say servile fear, I say two things, as was touched on before[^9], namely the gift itself and the defect of deformity annexed to that gift, not by reason of the gift itself, but by reason of that in which it is. When therefore grace supervenes, it expels it as to the annexed defect of deformity, but not insofar as it is a gift divinely and freely given, as was said in the preceding [discussions] about unformed faith.

But another manner of speaking is that servile fear is altogether expelled when grace comes, not only as to that which it has of *servility*[^10], but as to this which it has of *aptitude*. — And the reason for this is that to this fear servility is in a certain way essentially annexed. For it has its rise more from love of self than from love of God. Hence too this fear makes [one] principally regard punishment. And therefore, just as faith is voided into glory on account of the repugnance of the enigma annexed to it, when [glory itself] supervenes[^11]; so the habit of servile fear is expelled when charity supervenes. And to this manner of speaking the word of Augustine[^12] seems to accord, by which he says that servile fear stands with respect to the charity to be introduced as the bristle stands with respect to the thread.

But from these two manners of speaking a third manner can be elicited, as it were mixed of both and holding a middle between the two. For it seems very difficult[^13] to say that that habit, by which someone was apt for ceasing from fault, should at once withdraw when grace supervenes, since experience itself dictates the contrary of this. It also seems difficult to say and to maintain that servile fear simply[^14] remains when grace comes, since it is another difference of fear than initial fear, nor does it seem to draw its origin from the same [source], and the words of Augustine seem sufficiently to contradict [it]. — And therefore we can say that servile fear has three conditions: one as *material* and substrate, and this is to fear[^15] eternal punishment; another as *formal* and completive, and this is principally to regard that punishment; a third as *annexed*, and this is to have a deformed will conjoined. When therefore the gift of grace is superinduced, servile fear, as to this which was *material* in it, that is, insofar as it made [one] apt[^16] for fearing punishment, remains together with grace, because it is not repugnant to grace. But as to the other two conditions, namely as to the *completive* and as to the *annexed*, it is driven out by grace itself; because, when grace supervenes, it neither principally regards punishment nor has an annexed evil will. And thus it can be held that the gift of servile fear, as to something of itself, is driven out when grace comes, and as to something it remains. — And this seen, the reply to the question[^17] is plain; the reply to the objections on both sides is also plain for a great part, because neither side simply concludes the truth; therefore it is fitting to reply on the one side and the other.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the authority of Augustine, by which he says that servile fear is *expelled* when charity comes[^18]; it must be said that he does not say this, that it is totally driven out, but that the dominion of servility, by which it principally regards punishment, is taken away from that fear when charity comes.

2. To that which is objected, that the spirit of servitude is repugnant to the spirit of liberty; it must be said that it is true as to that which is in it of servitude; but servile fear has something in which it communicates with initial fear, and by reason of that it is not necessary that it be expelled[^19].

3. To that which is thirdly objected, that it belongs to servile fear principally to regard punishment; the reply is already plain: because as to that condition it is to be expelled, by which namely it principally regards punishment; but on account of this it does not follow that it should be expelled totally[^20].

4. To that which is objected, that as the love of the sinner stands with respect to gratuitous love, so servile fear with respect to chaste fear; it must be said that it is not alike: because, as was held in the preceding [discussions][^21], charity cannot become unformed, but fear can well become unformed; as is plain, when someone falls from charity, and nevertheless after the fall there remains to him a fear of eternal punishments. And if you object that love is the root of fear[^22], therefore they ought to run at an equal pace; it must be said that it does not hold, because it is likewise the root of hope, and yet hope can be unformed and formed; and the reason for this was assigned above[^23]. — And thus it is plain that these reasons do not conclude that fear is totally expelled.

5. But to that which is objected, that it simply remains by the likeness in unformed and formed faith too; it must be said that it is not alike on this side and on that: because unformed faith assents for its own sake and above all things to the same [object] and in all things to which formed faith consents[^24]; but it is not so concerning servile fear

and concerning initial fear, because servile fear principally regards punishment, but initial fear does not principally regard punishment, but principally regards the divine offense.

2. To that which is objected, that nature is not driven out by grace; it must be said that it is not alike: because natural things are inseparable and are as it were[^25] given for always; and therefore they are not taken away when grace supervenes; but certain things are freely superadded, which are given only for a time and for a determined state, and therefore they are driven out and cease when that state withdraws. And so it is to be found in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that initial fear adds beyond servile [fear]; it must be said that one [kind of] addition is simply completing, another is an addition that distracts[^26]. Initial fear adds beyond servile [fear], and this indeed not only by completing, but also by distracting, because, as was said, it takes away from it the concomitant defect, which indeed is a deformed will, and also the completing condition, which indeed was, according to that state, principally to regard punishment, as was touched on above. And therefore it so adds beyond it that it diminishes and expels something of it.

4. To that which is objected, that grace is repugnant only to sin, or to that which has its origin from sin; it must be said that it is repugnant not only to this, but[^27] to that which has sin annexed. But servile fear has sin annexed; and on account of this, as to this, that it has punishment and dreads future punishment, it was introduced from fault; and therefore it is no wonder if in some manner it is driven out when grace comes. Yet because it does not have to be introduced totally from fault, but also from the gift of God as to something of itself; hence it is also that it is so driven out that it is not totally destroyed. — And according to this the authorities and reasons which are introduced on the one side and the other can be answered plainly enough[^28].

la: Hic c. 5.

en: Here, c. 5.

la: Cfr. Rom. 8, 15, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: Cf. Rom. 8:15, and here the text of the Master, c. 4.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5, ubi et seq. arg. insinuatur.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 5, where the following argument too is insinuated.

la: Cod. A *qui est post gratiam*.

en: Codex A: *which is after grace*.

en: Dist. 23, a. 2, q. 1, and following.

la: Vide supra q. 1. — In fine arg. codd. L T V aa et edd. *adveniente gratia caritate* (Vat. *et caritate*).

en: See above, q. 1. — At the end of the argument codices L T V aa and the editions [read] *when grace [and] charity comes* (the Vatican edition: *and charity*).

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7.

la: Vide quaest. praeced. ad 4.

en: See the preceding question, [reply] to 4.

la: Quaest. praeced.

en: The preceding question.

la: Edd. *sed etiam*, et proxime ante *sicut* et per totum corp. constanter *servitus* pro *servilitas*.

en: The editions [read] *but also*, and just before, *as*, and throughout the body constantly *servitude* for *servility*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1.

la: In I. Epist. Ioan. tr. 9. n. 4. Verba ipsa videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 5.

en: On the First Epistle of John, tract 9, n. 4. You may see the very words here in the text of the Master, c. 5.

la: Codd. N U *durum*.

en: Codices N U: *hard*.

la: Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *similiter*. Mox pro *gratia* codd. U Z *caritate*.

en: Very many codices and editions 1, 2: *likewise*. Soon, for *grace*, codices U Z: *charity*.

la: Cod. N *et hoc modo habilitat ad timendum*. Pro *et hoc* cod. F *et hoc modo*. Edd. ter *et haec* pro *et hoc*.

en: Codex N: *and in this way it makes [one] apt for fearing*. For *and this* codex F: *and in this way*. The editions, three times, *and these* for *and this*.

la: Codd. A G V Z aa *habilitat*.

en: Codices A G V Z aa: *it makes apt*.

la: Cod. A *ad praedictam quaestionem*.

en: Codex A: *to the aforesaid question*.

la: Codd. G 1 L T V aa *adveniente gratia caritate*, cod. K *adveniente gratia sive caritate*, Vat. *adveniente gratia et caritate*. Paulo ante pro *qua dicit* cod. U *quae dicit*. In fine solut. pro *adveniente caritate* codd. G 1 K L T V *adveniente gratia*.

en: Codices G 1 L T V aa: *when grace [and] charity comes*; codex K: *when grace or charity comes*; the Vatican edition: *when grace and charity comes*. A little before, for *by which he says*, codex U: *which he says*. At the end of the solution, for *when charity comes*, codices G 1 K L T V: *when grace comes*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 7. — Superius pro *est in eo servitutis* cod. A *est in eo pravitas*.

en: Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 7. — Above, for *is in it of servitude*, codex A: *is in it perversity*.

la: Edd. *generaliter*.

en: The editions [read] *generally*.

la: Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Verba mox seqq. *sed timor bene fieri potest informis* ex codd. A U Z adiecimus; paulo inferius ex eisdem codd. et cod. bb substituimus *sibi* pro *ibi*.

en: Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 1. — The words next following, *but fear can well become unformed*, we have added from codices A U Z; a little below, from the same codices and codex bb, we have substituted *to him* for *there*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 338, note 3.

la: Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. — Paulo inferius pro *sed principaliter* cod. U *sed principalis*.

en: See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, [reply] to 1. — A little below, for *but principally*, codex U: *but principal*.

la: Pro *et quasi* edd. *quia*.

en: For *and as it were* the editions [read] *because*.

la: Cfr. tom. I. Prolog. Magistri, dub. 2. — Subinde post *Timor* cod. A subdit *autem*.

en: Cf. tome I, Prologue of the Master, dubium 2. — Thereupon, after *fear*, codex A adds *however*.

la: Edd. *sed etiam*.

en: The editions [read] *but also*.

english_scholion: *[None of its own — see the article-master Scholion to **Question I** of this article (d.34, p.II, a.1, q.1), §III, which forward-covers this question. The Quaracchi footer marks the redirect at the close of the reply 4 (*…quae hinc et inde introducuntur*, note 28): "See the scholion to question 1 of this article."]*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p75{9}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`, `vol3-p76{0,1}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; PDF pp. 781–783 = printed 759–761, offset +22), per the Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion. Running-head text (`DIST. XXXIV. P. II. ART. I. QUAEST. III.` recto on p.759; the verso head `DIST. XXXIV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. I.` already on p.761) was trusted over OCR'd page-digits. Raw OCR span 52694–52846 used as base for clean running prose (the affirmative/*gratificetur* arguments) and footnote-marker spacing; Respondeo, replies, and footers re-set from the bands.

**Opener-alignment — PASS 1:1.** TRACTATIO *Tertium* (*de timore servili per comparationem ad gratiae complementum*) = QUAESTIO III. The opener *Tertio quaeritur de timore servili in comparatione ad gratiae complementum, et est quaestio, utrum timor servilis expellatur, gratia adveniente* matches the title and the d34-p2-divisio hand-off. This is the LAST question of PARS II ARTICULUS I.

**Page-split map.**
- p.759 (PDF 781): QUAESTIO III heading + title + *Tertio quaeritur* opener + affirmative arguments (1–4, left col.), the *gratificetur* counter-arguments (1–4, right col.), Sed contra 1, Conclusio, Respondeo opening. Footer **nn.4–12 → [^1]–[^9]** (q2 already claimed nn.1–3; see below).
- p.760 (PDF 782): Respondeo body (*duplex modus dicendi* — opinio 1 / opinio 2 / opinio 3 *tenens medium* with the three conditions *materialis / formalis / annexa*) + replies 1–5 (negative side). Footer **nn.1–15 → [^10]–[^24]**.
- p.761 (PDF 783): replies 5(tail), 2, 3, 4 (the second affirmative-side block) closing on *…quae hinc et inde introducuntur*[^28], immediately before the **ARTICULUS II** opener. Footer **nn.1–4 → [^25]–[^28]** (q3's share; p.761 n.5 onward belongs to a2-q1).

**Scholion disposition — `has_scholion: false`, REDIRECT.** q3's range has no own `SCHOLION.` header. Per the q1 hand-off, the d34-p2-a1-q1 article-master scholion **§III** (*Ad 3. quaestionem… Plura vide infra a. 2. q. 3* + the q3 dossier) forward-covers this question. The final footer note [^28] (*Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*) confirms the redirect in the source itself. → see the scholion to a1-q1, §III.

**Footer hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q2:* p.759 footer **nn.4–12 → [^1]–[^9]** (n.4 *Hic c. 5* anchors affirm. arg.1 *in littera*; n.5 *Cfr. Rom. 8, 15…* anchors the Sed contra *praecedentibus*). q2 closed clean on p.759 at *…respectu gratiae* claiming nn.1–3.
- *Forwarded to **d34-p2-a2-q1**:* p.761 footer **n.5 onward** (n.5 *Hic c. 4. Vide infra dub. 2…*, n.6 *Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 4. seqq.*, n.7 *Hic c. 6. seq. — De maiori vide supra 470, nota 8*, n.8 *Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 6…*) — these anchor the **ARTICULUS II** opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de timore gratuito… circa hoc quaeruntur tria*) and QUAESTIO I (*Utrum timor initialis et filialis sint diversae timoris species*). a2-q1 also folds in the ART. II opener + TRACTATIO. The a2-q1 scholion-redirect marker is p.761 n.4 *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* — but note that is a1-q3's [^28]; a2-q1's own redirect will be its first p.761/p.762 footer marker.

**`[?]` flags.**
- **PASS-3 seam check (2026-06-14):** the d.31–d.40 boundary-integrity sweep verified eyes-on (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p761-{L-0,L-1,R-0,R-1}.png`) that this chunk correctly owns p.761 footer **nn.1–4** ([^25]–[^28], anchoring its replies 2–4: PDF markers ¹ *et quasi*, ² *distrahens*, ³ *sed*, ⁴ *introducuntur*). No edit needed here. **`d34-p2-a2-q1` had erroneously double-claimed these same nn.1–4** as its own [^1]–[^4]; that duplication was removed and a2-q1 renumbered (see a2-q1 `## Notes` PASS-3 fix record). a1-q3 unchanged.
- **Shared-anchor note (resolved, not a `[?]`):** p.759 source-footer **n.3** (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is ambiguously anchored — its source digit appears both at q2's closing *…respectu gratiae* and at q3's affirm. arg.2 *spiritus vero timoris servilis est spiritus servitutis*. Per the q2 hand-off it is **owned by q2** ([^22]); q3's arg.2 therefore carries NO marker at *servitutis* (the redirect is a backward cross-ref to the q1/q2 scholion). Recorded here per the Vol II/III cross-chunk footer-split discipline.
- No genuine illegibility `[?]` flags: all three pages were legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De timore gratuito.*

Consequenter quaeritur de timore gratuito; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de ipso timore quantum ad eius divisionem.

Secundo quaeritur de eodem quantum ad eius diminutionem.

Tertio et ultimo quaeritur quantum ad eius evacuationem.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum timor initialis et filialis sint diversae timoris species.*

Circa primum sic proceditur, et est quaestio de timore gratuito quantum ad divisionem eius, qua dividitur in initialem et filialem, utrum istae sint diversae timoris species. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per divisionem Magistri[^1], qua dividit timorem in quatuor differentias; et omnes aliae differentiae sunt formaliter differentes: videtur ergo, quod similiter sit reperire circa timorem initialem et filialem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia timor initialis et filialis aut distinguuntur quantum ad *essentialem differentiam*, aut solum quantum ad *statum*. Si primo modo: hinc habeo propositum. Si secundo modo; *contra*: quia timor habet esse in triplici statu, secundum quod triplex est status hominis iusti, videlicet in statu incipientis, proficientis et perfecti: cum ergo Magister illam differentiam non apponat, videtur, quod aut est insufficiens, aut istas differentias timoris non assignat solummodo quoad statum. Nec tantum divisio Magistri videtur esse insufficiens, immo etiam divisio Augustini[^2] et aliorum, qui de hac materia loquuntur, qui solummodo in has species dividunt timorem gratuitum.

3. Item, diversitas habituum venit ex diversitate obiectorum; sed sicut Magister[^3] innuit, et communiter etiam tenetur, quod timor initialis habet oculum ad poenam, timor vero filialis habet oculum ad offensam: ergo videtur, quod hic timor et ille sint diversae species timoris.

4. Item, timor initialis medium tenet inter servilem et filialem et quantum ad *rationem deveniendi*, quia per servilem devenitur ad filialem mediante initiali, et etiam quantum ad *modum timendi*[^4]: cum ergo timor initialis sit diversa species a timore servili, videtur ergo, quod etiam sit diversa species a filiali.

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**Sed contra:**

1. « Si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum; et si unum non dicitur multipliciter, nec reliquum »[^5]; sed spes non habet multiplicari per species et differentias: ergo nec timor.

2. Item, magis perfectum et minus perfectum non diversificant rem quantum ad speciem[^6]; sed timor initialis et filialis differunt, sicut magis perfectum et minus perfectum: ergo secundum speciem non distinguuntur.

3. Item, sicut contingit ponere timorem initialem et filialem, qui est perfectorum, sic etiam contingit ponere amorem initialem et consummatum et perfectum[^7]: cum ergo amor per has differentias non habeat secundum species diversificari, videtur similiter, quod nec timor.

4. Item, quae habent ortum ab eodem secundum speciem sunt eiusdem speciei, quia, si causa est univoca, et effectus univocus; sed timor initialis et castus ortum habent ab amore gratuito, secundum quod vult Augustinus[^8], et iste est unus amor tantum secundum speciem: ergo videtur, quod similiter sit et in timore.

5. Item, si plures sint timores gratuiti diversi secundum speciem; cum quilibet eorum sit donum Spiritus sancti, tunc videtur, quod dona Spiritus sancti sint plura quam septem[^9].

6. Item, si timor initialis et gratuitus differunt, hoc non est, nisi quia iste habet oculum ad poenam, ille ad offensam, sicut Magister tangit in littera[^10]. Sed contra: una et eadem species timoris est, qua quis timet Deum offendere et a Deo separari: cum ergo ista sint diversa, et tamen timor non diversificetur respectu horum; videtur similiter, quod diversificari non habeat respectu poenae et offensae, maxime cum videamus, quod timor initialis habeat ad utrumque aspicere.

> **Conclusio.** Timor initialis et filialis non differunt specie, sunt tamen diversi timores ratione statuum, modorum timendi et principalium motivorum.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.

*Quidam* enim voluerunt dicere [*opinio 1*], quod timor initialis et filialis non differunt nisi quantum ad statum, sicut et amor, ex quo timor sub his differentiis trahit originem. Unde sicut amor incipiens et perficiens essentialiter est idem, licet status sit diversus hic et ibi; sic voluerunt dicere se habere in timore initiali et filiali. — Sed illud non videtur sufficere [*non sufficit*], pro eo quod tertius posset timor assignari inter hos duos, videlicet timor proficiens. Et iterum, non videmus, talem modum distinguendi sive dividendi esse in aliis donis gratuitis, cum tamen in eis sit istos duos status invenire.

Et propterea est *alius modus dicendi* [*opinio 2*], quod timor initialis et timor filialis sunt diversae species timoris, et diversus est utrobique modus timendi, et ad diversa intuetur homo secundum illos duos timores. Et huiusmodi signum est, quia unus evacuatur, et alter manet in patria, secundum quod Magister dicit in littera[^11]; quod quidem non esset, si essent idem in essentia. — Verumtamen adhuc istud videtur valde difficile bene intelligere [*non probatur*], quomodo secundum profectum[^12] hominis in statu gratiae habent esse in eo diversi habitus timoris formaliter differentes. — Et ideo neuter istorum modorum videtur plane ipsi intellectui satisfacere.

Possumus igitur *viam mediam* eligere [*opinio 3 et via media*], ut dicamus, quod timor filialis et initialis non adeo differunt, sicut duae[^13] species formaliter differentes, cum unus quodam modo sit materialis respectu alterius et quodam modo claudatur in altero. Timor enim initialis timet poenam et offensam; timor vero filialis offensam quidem timet et attendit summi Patris reverentiam. Et sic unus quodam modo se habet ex additione ad alterum[^14]. Et ideo non differunt [*conclusio 1*] sicut duae species e diverso unum genus dividentes. Nec tamen est ibi differentia solum quantum ad statum, pro eo quod timor initialis principaliter aspicit offensam; timor vero filialis, etsi unum oculum habeat ad offensam, principaliorem tamen habet oculum ad Dei reverentiam. Et quia diversa habent principalia motiva; hinc est, quod sunt diversi modi timendi. Quia vero unum[^15] clauditur in altero et alteri substernitur; hinc est, quod proprie loquendo, non sunt alterius et alterius speciei. Possunt tamen dici diversi timores [*conclusio 2*], tum ratione status, tum ratione modorum timendi, tum etiam ratione principalium motivorum; sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, et ideo concedi possunt.

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**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium [*solutio oppositorum*], quod spes non habet dividi, ergo nec timor; dicendum, quod ratio illa non valet: quia illud intelligitur non de divisione univoci, sed de divisione multiplicis, sicut patet ex intellectu illius considerationis, quam Philosophus[^16] ponit. — Si autem quaeras [*quaestio incidens solvitur*]: quare magis timor habet dividi quam spes? dicendum, quod spes semper principaliter intuetur unum solum et summum bonum; timor autem secundum diversos status modo principaliter intuetur poenam, modo principaliter Dei offensam, modo principaliter Dei reverentiam; et ideo non est simile ex ista parte et ex illa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis perfectum et minus perfectum non diversificant rem; dicendum, quod proprie loquendo, non est ibi differentia secundum speciem, secundum quod dictum est. Verumtamen ratio illa non valet, quia non solum differunt[^17] [*notandum*] penes perfectum et imperfectum, sed etiam penes aliud et aliud principale motivum; licet unum quodam modo praesupponat alterum, et quod erat formale respectu unius fiat materiale respectu alterius.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore, iam patet responsio, quia non est simile: quia amor non habet differentiam penes motivum, sed solummodo penes statum[^18]; et ideo non distinguitur sicut timor.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa quae habent ortum ab eodem secundum speciem, sunt eiusdem speciei: dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in his quae generantur secundum generationem univocam [*notandum*]; cum autem timor ex amore generatur, non est generatio univoca: et propterea ex uno amore secundum speciem non tantum possunt generari diversi timores, immo possunt generari quatuor genera affectionum, secundum Augustinum[^19], quae formaliter distinguuntur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc erunt diversa dona; dicendum, quod unus istorum timorum quantum ad illud quod habet nobilitatis et completionis, clauditur in alio: et ideo sub uno dono omnes habent comprehendi, videlicet sub spiritu timoris Domini.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod si ratione diversorum motivorum diversificantur, tunc timor initialis et filialis distinguerentur in duos; dicendum, quod non est simile: quoniam, etsi timor initialis ad duo habet oculos suos, ad unum[^20] [*notandum*] habet principaliter, ad alterum ex consequenti, similiter et timor filialis: et ideo ratione illius motivi, ad quod principaliter intuetur, unusquisque illorum habet simpliciter unitatem. Sic autem non est in proposito, quia initialis timor principaliter aspicit ad unum, videlicet ne offendat iustitiam, filialis autem principaliter aspicit ad aliud, videlicet ad Patris reverentiam; et ideo non est simile ex hac parte et ex illa.

english:
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### Article II. *On gratuitous fear.*

It is next asked concerning gratuitous fear; and concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked about that fear itself with respect to its division.

Second it is asked about the same with respect to its diminution.

Third and last it is asked with respect to its evacuation.

### Question I. *Whether initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is a question about gratuitous fear with respect to its division, by which it is divided into initial and filial, whether these are diverse species of fear. And that they are, it seems:

1. *First*, by the Master's division[^1], by which he divides fear into four differences; and all the other differences are formally differing: it seems therefore that the like is to be found regarding initial and filial fear.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so by reason: because initial and filial fear are either distinguished with respect to an *essential difference*, or only with respect to *status*. If in the first way: hence I have my thesis. If in the second way; on the contrary: because fear has being in a threefold status, according as the status of the just man is threefold, namely in the status of one beginning, of one progressing, and of one perfected: since therefore the Master does not posit that difference, it seems that either it is insufficient, or he does not assign those differences of fear solely with respect to status. Nor only the Master's division seems to be insufficient, but rather also the division of Augustine[^2] and of others who speak about this matter, who divide gratuitous fear only into these species.

3. Likewise, diversity of habits comes from diversity of objects; but as the Master[^3] suggests, and as is also commonly held, that initial fear has its eye on punishment, while filial fear has its eye on offense: therefore it seems that this fear and that are diverse species of fear.

4. Likewise, initial fear holds a middle place between servile and filial both with respect to the *ground of arriving* — because through servile [fear] one arrives at filial by the mediation of initial — and also with respect to the *mode of fearing*[^4]: since therefore initial fear is a diverse species from servile fear, it seems therefore that it is also a diverse species from filial.

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**On the contrary:**

1. « If one of opposites is said in many ways, so also the other; and if one is not said in many ways, neither is the other »[^5]; but hope cannot be multiplied through species and differences: therefore neither can fear.

2. Likewise, the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing with respect to species[^6]; but initial and filial fear differ as the more perfect and the less perfect: therefore they are not distinguished according to species.

3. Likewise, just as it happens that one posits initial and filial fear, which is of the perfected, so too it happens that one posits initial and consummated and perfect love[^7]: since therefore love is not to be diversified according to species through these differences, it seems likewise that neither is fear.

4. Likewise, things that have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species, because, if the cause is univocal, so is the effect univocal; but initial and chaste fear have their origin from gratuitous love, according as Augustine holds[^8], and this is one love only according to species: therefore it seems that it is likewise also in fear.

5. Likewise, if there are several gratuitous fears diverse according to species; since each of them is a gift of the Holy Spirit, then it seems that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are more than seven[^9].

6. Likewise, if initial and gratuitous fear differ, this is not except because the one has its eye on punishment, the other on offense, as the Master touches on in the letter[^10]. But on the contrary: it is one and the same species of fear by which one fears to offend God and to be separated from God: since therefore these are diverse, and yet fear is not diversified with respect to them; it seems likewise that it need not be diversified with respect to punishment and offense, especially since we see that initial fear has regard to both.

> **Conclusion.** Initial and filial fear do not differ in species, yet they are diverse fears by reason of their statuses, of the modes of fearing, and of the principal motives.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold manner of speaking.

For *certain men* wished to say [*opinion 1*] that initial and filial fear differ only with respect to status, just as does love also, from which fear under these differences draws its origin. Hence just as beginning and perfecting love is essentially the same, although the status be diverse here and there; so they wished to hold it to be in initial and filial fear. — But that does not seem to suffice [*it does not suffice*], for the reason that a third fear could be assigned between these two, namely progressing fear. And again, we do not see such a mode of distinguishing or dividing to exist in the other gratuitous gifts, although in them too these two statuses are to be found.

And therefore there is *another manner of speaking* [*opinion 2*], that initial fear and filial fear are diverse species of fear, and the mode of fearing is diverse in each, and a man looks to diverse things according to those two fears. And a sign of this is that the one is evacuated, and the other remains in the fatherland, according as the Master says in the letter[^11]; which indeed would not be, if they were the same in essence. — Yet still this seems very difficult to understand well [*it is not proved*], namely how according to the progress[^12] of a man in the status of grace there should be in him diverse habits of fear formally differing. — And therefore neither of these manners seems plainly to satisfy the intellect itself.

We can therefore choose a *middle way* [*opinion 3 and the middle way*], so that we say that filial and initial fear do not differ so much as two[^13] species formally differing, since the one is in a certain way material with respect to the other and in a certain way is enclosed in the other. For initial fear fears punishment and offense; but filial fear indeed fears offense and attends to the reverence of the most high Father. And thus the one in a certain way is related by an addition to the other[^14]. And therefore they do not differ [*conclusion 1*] as two species dividing one genus from opposite sides. Nor yet is there a difference there only with respect to status, for the reason that initial fear principally regards offense; while filial fear, even if it have one eye on offense, nevertheless has its more principal eye on the reverence of God. And because they have diverse principal motives; hence it is that they are diverse modes of fearing. But because the one[^15] is enclosed in the other and is laid under the other; hence it is that, properly speaking, they are not of one and another species. Yet they can be called diverse fears [*conclusion 2*], both by reason of status, by reason of the modes of fearing, and also by reason of the principal motives; as the reasons adduced for the first part show, and therefore they can be conceded.

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**To the arguments:**

1. To that therefore which is objected to the contrary [*solution of the opposing arguments*], that hope cannot be divided, therefore neither can fear; it must be said that that reasoning is not valid: because that is understood not of the division of what is univocal, but of the division of what is manifold, as is plain from the understanding of that consideration which the Philosopher[^16] sets down. — But if you should ask [*an incidental question is solved*]: why does fear have being divided more than hope? it must be said that hope always principally looks to one sole and highest good; but fear according to diverse statuses now principally looks to punishment, now principally to the offense of God, now principally to the reverence of God; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.

2. To that which is objected, that the more perfect and the less perfect do not diversify a thing; it must be said that, properly speaking, there is not there a difference according to species, according as has been said. Yet that reasoning is not valid, because they differ not only[^17] [*note*] in respect of the perfect and the imperfect, but also in respect of one and another principal motive; although the one in a certain way presupposes the other, and what was formal with respect to the one becomes material with respect to the other.

3. To that which is objected concerning love, the response is already plain, because it is not alike: because love does not have its difference in respect of motive, but only in respect of status[^18]; and therefore it is not distinguished as fear is.

4. To that which is objected, that those things which have their origin from the same thing according to species are of the same species: it must be said that that holds true in those things which are generated according to univocal generation [*note*]; but since fear is generated from love, the generation is not univocal: and therefore from one love according to species not only can diverse fears be generated, but rather four genera of affections can be generated, according to Augustine[^19], which are formally distinguished.

5. To that which is objected, that then there would be diverse gifts; it must be said that one of those fears, with respect to that which it has of nobility and completion, is enclosed in the other: and therefore under one gift they all have to be comprehended, namely under the spirit of the fear of the Lord.

6. To that which is objected last, that if they are diversified by reason of diverse motives, then initial and filial fear would be distinguished into two; it must be said that it is not alike: because, even though initial fear has its eyes on two things, it has them principally on one[^20] [*note*], on the other consequently, and likewise filial fear: and therefore by reason of that motive to which it principally looks, each of them has simply a unity. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because initial fear principally regards one thing, namely lest it offend justice, while filial fear principally regards another, namely the reverence of the Father; and therefore it is not alike on this side and on that.

la: Hic c. 4. Vide infra dub. 2. — Superius pro *istae* cod. X *isti*. In fine arg. pro *reperire* multi codd. *reperiri*.

en: Here ch. 4. See below, dubium 2. — Above, for *istae* codex X has *isti*. At the end of the argument, for *reperire* many codices have *reperiri*. [p.761 n.5]

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq., ubi et Bedae divisio habetur. — Paulo superius pro *non apponat*, quod habent codd. A H U Z bb, in aliis *non apponit*.

en: See here the Master's letter, ch. 4 ff., where Bede's division too is found. — A little above, for *non apponat*, which codices A H U Z bb have, others read *non apponit*. [p.761 n.6]

la: Hic c. 6. seq. — De maiori vide supra 470, nota 8.

en: Here ch. 6 f. — On the major, see above p. 470, note 8. [p.761 n.7]

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — Pro *ad modum* multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *ad medium*.

en: See here the Master's letter, ch. 6. — For *ad modum* many codices and editions 1, 2 read *ad medium*. [p.761 n.8]

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 193, nota 1. — De minori cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom see above p. 193, note 1. — On the minor cf. above d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. [p.762 n.1]

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 659, nota 7.

la: Ut Magister insinuat hic in lit. c. 5. — De proposit. seq. cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *perfectorum* [cod. A *perfectiorum*], quod habent codd. I L W Z, in aliis et edd. *perfectior*; paulo inferius pro *secundum species* cod. A *per species*.

en: As the Master suggests here in the letter, ch. 5. — On the following proposition cf. above d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. — A little above, for *perfectorum* [cod. A *perfectiorum*], which codices I L W Z have, in others and the editions *perfectior*; a little below, for *secundum species* cod. A has *per species*. [p.762 n.3]

la: Cuius verba videsis hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1, et VII. Metaph. text. 22. et 28. (VI. c. 7. seq.).

en: Whose words you may see here in the Master's letter, ch. 4 ff. — On the major cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VII, ch. 1, and *Metaphysics* VII, text 22 and 28 (VI, ch. 7 f.). [p.762 n.4]

la: Quod reprobatum est supra p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Which was rejected above, part I, a. 2, q. 1. [p.762 n.5]

la: Hic c. 6. seq. — In fine arg. pro *aspicere* cod. K *respicere*.

en: Here ch. 6 f. — At the end of the argument, for *aspicere* codex K has *respicere*. [p.762 n.6]

la: Hic c. 3. et 7. seq.

en: Here ch. 3 and 7 f. [p.762 n.8 — n.7: Cod. K *potest*.]

la: Codd. A U *perfectionem*, non pauci alii codd. *perfectum*, codd. B C F G I K L N O T V praemittunt *propositum*. Paulo inferius pro *plane* Vat. *plene*.

en: Codices A U read *perfectionem*, not a few other codices *perfectum*, codices B C F G I K L N O T V prefix *propositum*. A little below, for *plane* the Vatican edition has *plene*. [p.762 n.9]

la: Pro *sicut duae species*, uti in codd. A B C D H M P Q U Z bb legitur, codd. K X *sicut diversae species*, alii codd. *sicut differentiae species*, cod. G *sicut differentiae et species*, edd. *sicut differunt species*. Paulo ante pro *filialis* codd. A G I (K a prima manu) L T V Z *servilis*.

en: For *sicut duae species*, as is read in codices A B C D H M P Q U Z bb, codices K X have *sicut diversae species*, other codices *sicut differentiae species*, cod. G *sicut differentiae et species*, the editions *sicut differunt species*. A little before, for *filialis* codices A G I (K from the first hand) L T V Z have *servilis*. [p.762 n.10]

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. in fine et c. 7. — Mox pro *e diverso* codd. E G I L N T V *a diverso*, edd. *diversae*. Non ita multo post pro *ad offensam* codd. F K *ad Dei offensam*, et subinde pro *principaliorem* codd. B D H K U X Z et edd. 1, 2 *principalem*, codd. A W aa *principaliter*.

en: Cf. here the Master's letter, ch. 6 at the end and ch. 7. — Soon, for *e diverso* codices E G I L N T V have *a diverso*, the editions *diversae*. Not very long after, for *ad offensam* codices F K have *ad Dei offensam*, and thereupon for *principaliorem* codices B D H K U X Z and editions 1, 2 *principalem*, codices A W aa *principaliter*. [p.762 n.11]

la: Edd. *unus*, et paulo inferius pro *status* cum paucis codd. *statuum*.

en: The editions read *unus*, and a little below, for *status*, with a few codices, *statuum*. [p.762 n.12]

la: Libr. I. Topic. c. 13. — De unitate spei cfr. supra d. 26. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro *multiplicis* (i. e. aequivoci) codd. G H I K L V aa *multiplicitatis*, cod. A *multitudinis*, qui cod. et circa finem solut. ultimum *principaliter* omittit.

en: *Topics* I, ch. 13. — On the unity of hope cf. above d. 26, a. 1, q. 2. — For *multiplicis* (i.e. of the equivocal) codices G H I K L V aa have *multiplicitatis*, cod. A *multitudinis*, which codex also omits *principaliter* near the end of the last solution. [p.763 n.1]

la: Codd. *differt*. In cod. A desiderantur verba mox sequentia *licet unum... alterius*.

en: The codices read *differt*. In codex A the words next following, *licet unum... alterius*, are wanting. [p.763 n.2]

la: Codd. A U *status*.

en: Codices A U read *status*. [p.763 n.3]

la: Libr. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. n. 2. Cfr. supra pag. 338, nota 3. et pag. 556, nota 5. — Pro *quatuor* Vat. *trin*.

en: *City of God* XIV, ch. 7, n. 2. Cf. above p. 338, note 3, and p. 556, note 5. — For *quatuor* the Vatican edition has *trin*. [p.763 n.4]

la: Edd. *unum tamen*. Paulo inferius pro *simpliciter* (deest in cod. A) codd. G S aa *principaliter*. In fine solut. pro *ex hac parte et ex illa* cod. M *hinc et inde*.

en: The editions read *unum tamen*. A little below, for *simpliciter* (lacking in codex A) codices G S aa have *principaliter*. At the end of the solution, for *ex hac parte et ex illa* codex M has *hinc et inde*. [p.763 n.5]

latin_scholion:
**I.** Tertiam opinionem, quam S. Bonav. hic approbat, tenet cum aliis communiter etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. II. II. q. 19. a. 8), qui in Comment. affert hanc rationem, quod in timore initiali sit tum actus *principalis*, scilicet *refugere malum*, in quo non differt a timore casto; tum *secundarius et imperatus*, scilicet refugere propter poenam. « Actus autem imperati *per accidens* comparantur ad habitus imperantes; et ideo timor initialis et castus sunt idem in substantia habitus, differunt tamen accidentaliter ». Sed in Summa arguit ex hoc principio, quod duo isti timores se habeant ad invicem, sicut caritas imperfecta ad perfectam. De eadem quaestione: B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. — Durand., hic q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 3.

**II.** Quoad 2. quaestionem communiter docetur, quod crescente caritate, diminuatur actus timoris, quo timetur poena, non autem actus, quo quis veretur Deum offendere et ab eo separari. De eadem quaestione: S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc.; S. loc. cit. a. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 3. — Durand., hic q. 6.

**III.** Solutio ultimae (3.) quaestionis communiter approbatur, licet quidam, ut refert Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 4.), opinentur, « quod illa resilitio (cfr. hic in corp.) non potest dici actus timoris nisi aequivoce, cum nihil aliud sit, quam ex consideratione divinae magnitudinis et parvitatis propriae se sub Deo humiliare; humiliatio autem timor dici non potest nisi aequivoce vel similitudinarie ». Tamen Richard. non recedendum esse censet a communi opinione, quod donum timoris remaneat quoad habitum et quoad « aliquem actum, qui erit vel ille qui factus est in opinione prima [scilicet reverentia divinae maiestatis et resilitio in propriam parvitatem], vel ille quem habet respectu finis » [scilicet gaudere de evasione divinae offensae]. De hac 3. quaestione: S. Thom., hic loc. cit. quaestiunc. 4; S. loc. cit. a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 5. — Durand., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The third opinion, which St. Bonaventure here approves, is commonly held with others also by St. Thomas (here q. 2, a. 3, sub-question 2; *Summa* II–II, q. 19, a. 8), who in the Commentary brings forward this reasoning, that in initial fear there is both a *principal* act, namely *to flee evil*, in which it does not differ from chaste fear; and a *secondary and commanded* act, namely to flee on account of punishment. « But commanded acts are compared *per accidens* to the commanding habits; and therefore initial and chaste fear are the same in substance of habit, yet differ accidentally ». But in the *Summa* he argues from this principle, that these two fears are related to one another as imperfect charity to perfect. On the same question: Bl. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 4, sub-question 1. — Durandus, here q. 5. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. 3.

**II.** As to the 2nd question it is commonly taught that, charity increasing, the act of fear by which punishment is feared is diminished, but not the act by which one is in awe of offending God and being separated from him. On the same question: St. Thomas, here at the cited place, the sub-question; the same at the cited place, a. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, sub-question 3. — Durandus, here q. 6.

**III.** The solution of the last (3rd) question is commonly approved, although certain men, as Richard of Mediavilla reports (here a. 2, q. 4), are of the opinion « that that recoiling (cf. here in the body) cannot be called an act of fear except equivocally, since it is nothing other than, from the consideration of the divine greatness and of one's own littleness, to humble oneself under God; but humiliation cannot be called fear except equivocally or by way of likeness ». Yet Richard holds that one must not depart from the common opinion, that the gift of fear remains as to the habit and as to « some act, which will be either that which is performed in the first opinion [namely reverence of the divine majesty and recoiling into one's own littleness], or that which it has with respect to the end » [namely to rejoice at the escape from the divine offense]. On this 3rd question: St. Thomas, here at the cited place, sub-question 4; the same at the cited place, a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, a. 5. — Durandus, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.761–763 (PDF 783–785; offset pdf = printed + 22; Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied to the Respondeo *duplex modus dicendi* / *via media* block and all footer bands). Raw OCR cross-checked at lines 52847–53031. The ART. II opener (raw 52847) + the three-question TRACTATIO are folded into this a2-q1 per the Vol II/III chunking convention (no standalone divisio chunk).

**ART. II three-question listing (TRACTATIO, raw 52849–52856), verbatim:** *Consequenter quaeritur de timore gratuito; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.* (1) *Primo quaeritur de ipso timore quantum ad eius **divisionem**.* → **a2-q1** (this chunk); (2) *Secundo quaeritur de eodem quantum ad eius **diminutionem**.* → a2-q2; (3) *Tertio et ultimo quaeritur quantum ad eius **evacuationem**.* → a2-q3. **Alignment check PASS 1:1** — q1 opener *Circa primum sic proceditur, et est quaestio de timore gratuito quantum ad **divisionem** eius* matches *Primo … divisionem*.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart, renumbered continuous):**
- **p.761 nn.5–8 → [^1]–[^4]** (the a2-q1 share of the shared p.761 footer band; **p.761 nn.1–4 belong to `d34-p2-a1-q3`**, whose replies 2–4 spill onto p.761 L-col top + R-col top — confirmed eyes-on from `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p761-{L-0,L-1,R-0,R-1}.png`: PDF markers ¹ at q3 *et quasi*, ² at q3 *distrahens*, ³ at q3 *sed*, ⁴ at q3 *introducuntur*; then ⁵ at a2-q1 arg 1 *divisionem Magistri*, ⁶ at arg 2 *Augustini*, ⁷ at arg 3 *Magister innuit*, ⁸ at arg 4 *modum timendi*). [^1]=n.5 (arg 1); [^2]=n.6 (arg 2 *Augustini*; the note discusses the *non apponat* variant *paulo superius*); [^3]=n.7 (arg 3); [^4]=n.8 (arg 4 *modum timendi*). The scholion-redirect marker *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.* (p.761 **n.4**) is in **a1-q3's** body (its [^28]), pointing FORWARD to this q1's article-master scholion below — it is NOT a marker in this chunk.
- **p.762 nn.1–12 → [^5]–[^16]**: [^5] = Aristotle (Sed contra 1); [^12] = the codd.-variant note on *profectum*; [^13]/[^14] = the long *via media* codex-collation notes.
- **p.763 nn.1–4 → [^17]–[^20]**: [^17] = *Topics* I c.13 (reply 1); [^20] = Augustine *City of God* XIV (reply 4). (p.763's footer carries 4 anchored notes for a2-q1; the 5th p.763 note opens QUAESTIO II's band.)
- **Apparatus total = 25 entries.** Marker pairing 25/25 clean (Latin + English bodies).
- p.762 n.7 (*Cod. K potest.*) is a bare codex-variant glued to the n.8 line in the column band; folded into [^11]'s tail-note rather than given its own marker (no body anchor).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. This is the **ART. II article-master scholion** and it sits under **q1**, body-then-scholion LAST. §I = the third-opinion (Bonaventure's *via media*) approval + Aquinas/Albert/Petr. a Tar./Durandus/Dionys. Carth. dossier (q1, *divisio*). **§II FORWARDS to q2** (*Quoad 2. quaestionem… diminuatur actus timoris* = the *diminutio* matter). **§III FORWARDS to q3** (*Solutio ultimae (3.) quaestionis…* + Richard a Mediavilla *resilitio*/*aequivoce* dossier = the *evacuatio* matter). → a2-q2 and a2-q3 likely carry NO own SCHOLION; expect a `Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.`-type redirect (mirrors p.I a1-q1 §II/§III → q2/q3, and p.II a1-q1 §II/§III → q2/q3). The p.761 n.4 marker (*Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*) — which lives in a1-q3's body (its [^28]) — confirms this article-master pattern by pointing forward to this scholion.

**Hand-offs forwarded → a2-q2:** NOTHING of the NOTAE band forwarded. q1 closes clean on p.763 (last anchored footer n.4 = [^20]). QUAESTIO II (*Utrum, crescente caritate, timor decrescat*, raw 53032) opens a fresh footer band on **p.763** lower / **p.764** (running head `DIST. XXXIV. P. II. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`). **a2-q2 should carry NO own scholion — REDIRECT to this q1 article-master scholion §II.**

**`[?]` flags:** NONE — all three pages (761–763) legible at 450 dpi.

**PASS-3 boundary-integrity fix (2026-06-14) — footer double-count at the a1-q3 / a2-q1 seam (shared p.761).** The d.31–d.40 Pass-3 sweep found that this chunk had **double-counted the p.761 footer band**: it claimed p.761 nn.1–4 (*Pro et quasi edd. quia* / *Cfr. tom. I. Prolog. Magistri* / *Edd. sed etiam* / *Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.*) as its leading apparatus [^1]–[^4], with four extra body anchors scattered across Fundamenta args 1–4 (at *non apponat*, *timorem gratuitum*, *deveniendi*, *a filiali*). But those four notes physically belong to **`d34-p2-a1-q3`** — they anchor q3's replies 2–4, which spill from p.760 onto p.761 L-col top and R-col top (a1-q3 already correctly carries them as its [^25]–[^28]). Verified eyes-on against `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p761-L-0.png`, `L-1`, `R-0`, `R-1`: PDF footnote markers ¹–⁴ sit in q3's replies; markers ⁵–⁸ sit in a2-q1's four Fundamenta args (⁵ *divisionem Magistri*, ⁶ *Augustini*, ⁷ *Magister innuit*, ⁸ *modum timendi*). **FIX:** deleted the 4 phantom apparatus entries and their 4 spurious body anchors; the four real Fundamenta notes (old [^5]–[^8] = p.761 nn.5–8) are now [^1]–[^4], and the whole apparatus was renumbered down by 4 (old [^9]–[^24] → [^5]–[^20]). Result: 20 apparatus entries, 20 Latin body markers, 20 English body markers, 1:1:1 pairing. No body TEXT was lost or added — only marker/apparatus accounting. a1-q3 was inspected and is correct (it legitimately owns p.761 nn.1–4); no edit needed there. PDF crosswalk: a1-q3 owns p.761 nn.1–4; a2-q1 owns p.761 nn.5–8 + p.762 nn.1–12 + p.763 nn.1–4.