title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 497 -->

### Articulus II. *De modis tentationis in generali.*

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de modis tentationis in generali. Dividit autem Magister[^1] tentationem in eam quae est ab hoste, et in eam quae est a carne. Sed cum de tentatione, quae est ab hoste, aliqualis possit haberi notitia per ea quae determinata sunt supra[^2] de potestate daemonum; ideo hic quaeritur de tentatione, quae est a carne. Et circa hoc possunt quaeri tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum carnis sit tentare.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum tentationem carnis a tentatione diaboli contingat separari.

Tertio quaeritur, cui istarum tentationum difficilius sit resistere.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum carnis sit tentare.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod carnis sit tentare.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Iacobi primo[^3]: *Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus*; sed concupiscentia, quae maxime nos abstrahit et illicit, est concupiscentia carnis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Cassiodorus[^4] definiens tentationem dicit, quod tentatio est *assimilatio boni ad fallendum*;

<!-- page 498 -->

sed appetitus carnalis facit, bonum *ut nunc* credi esse bonum *simpliciter*; et hoc decipit et fallit spiritum: ergo contingit, spiritum tentari a carnali appetitu.

3. Item, tentatio diabolica non est aliud quam eius suggestio; sed sicut diabolus suggerit homini mala, ita et carnis prudentia, *quae est Deo inimica*[^5]: ergo si diabolus dicitur tentare, cum suggerit mala, eadem ratione et caro, cum spiritum trahit ad carnalia.

4. Item, diabolus impugnat nos tentando, nec est aliud diaboli tentatio quam eius impugnatio; sed sicut impugnamur a diabolo, ita etiam et a carne impugnamur et impellimur: ergo videtur, quod sicut tentamur a diabolo, ita vere et proprie tentemur a carne.

**Sed contra:**

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Hugo de sancto Victore[^6]: « *Tentare est callide experiri et quasi quibusdam blandis conatibus probare* »; sed experimentum sumere hoc est solius substantiae rationalis: ergo non videtur esse carnis.

2. Item, tentans differt a tentato, nullus enim tentat se ipsum; sed qui tentatur est homo carnalis: cum igitur homo carnalis a carne sua non differat per substantiam, videtur, quod nullus homo tentetur a carne sua nec ab alia: constat ergo, quod nulla caro tentat.

3. Item, persuasio ordinata ad decipiendum potius est sophisticatio[^7] quam tentatio, — tentatio enim est persuasio ordinata ad sumendum experimentum — sed caro vitiosa directe inclinat ad malum et sua inclinatione seducit spiritum: ergo carnis propulsatio potius debet dici sophisticatio quam tentatio.

4. Item, quandocumque aliquis actus de aliquibus subiectis dicitur, dicitur secundum aliquod commune in eis repertum; sed *Deus* tentare dicitur in Scriptura[^8] et *diabolus* et *homo* et *caro*: ergo secundum aliquod commune debet dici. Sed caro non videtur aliquo modo communicare in aliquo cum Deo et cum spiritu angelico: ergo videtur, quod ei non possit competere tentatio; aut si competat, hoc erit aequivoce et secundum alium modum dicendi. — *Quaestio incidens.* Et si est, tunc est quaestio: secundum quem modum dicitur, et quare illa carnis impulsio tentatio appellatur?

> **Conclusio.** *Cum tentatio sit quidam tactus ad probandum ordinatus, et carnis concupiscentia nos impellit, ad cuius impulsum sequitur approbatio, vel improbatio hominis, recte caro dicitur tentare.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod hoc vocabulum *tentare* multas habet acceptiones, sicut dicunt illi qui significationes vocabulorum studiose rimati sunt. *Quid sit tentare.* Si tamen velimus eius principalem et praecipuam significationem accipere, *tentare probare est*; unde *tentatio* dici potest quidam tactus, quo illud quod tangitur, probatur: sicut caecus dicitur *tentare*, quando suo tactu vult aliquam certitudinem habere de aliqua re, quam tangit. Per hunc modum in spiritualibus *tentatio* dicitur quidam tactus ad probandum ordinatus. — *Quadruplex tentatio.* Hoc autem potest esse quadrupliciter:

aut quia ille qui pulsat, intendit *probare* et *approbare* sive probatum ostendere; et hoc modo tentat Deus, secundum quod dicitur Sapientiae tertio[^9]: *Deus tentavit illos et invenit illos dignos se.*

— Aut ille qui pulsat, intendit *probare* et *reprobare*, sive reprobum facere; et sic tentat diabolus, secundum quod dicitur Actuum quinto[^10]: *Cur tentavit Satanas cor tuum mentiri Spiritui sancto?*

— Aut quia ille qui pulsat, intendit solum probare et experimentum sumere de eo quod est in homine; et sic tentat homo cautus; et de hoc Ecclesiastici decimo tertio[^11]: *Ex multis loquelis tentabit te, et subridens interrogabit te de absconditis tuis.*

— *Ad quaestionem incidentem.* Aut quia, etsi pulsans *nihil intendit*, ad eius tamen pulsationem *sequitur approbatio* vel *reprobatio* hominis; et sic tentat caro vel carnalis concupiscentia, de qua Iacobi primo[^12]: *Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua, abstractus et illectus.* A carne enim sive a carnis concupiscentia homo pulsatur et quasi tangitur, cui tactui sive pulsationi si consentiat, *probatur et reprobatur*; si vero dissentiat, *probatur et approbatur*. Et sic recte et proprie *Conclusio.* carnis impulsio tentatio dici potest. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod *tentare est experiri*; dicendum, quod illa ratio ab Hugone non assignatur nisi *proprie* de tentatione diaboli. — *Alia solutio.* Si autem quis *generaliter* velit eam intel-

<!-- page 499 -->

ligere, ut se extendat ad omnem tentationem, quae ad malum inclinat; tunc dicemus, quod intelligitur *per causam*, ut sit sensus, quod per tentationem fit experientia et probatio, utrum homo dignus sit *approbari* vel *reprobari*; et hoc non tantum fit a diabolo, sed etiam a carne. — *Alia interpretatio.* Si autem velit dicere, hoc *essentialiter* esse dictum; tunc dicemus, quod nomine *carnis* non intelligitur corpus solum, sed ratio carnalis; et idem ipse homo, secundum quod *carnalis* est et ad carnem conversus, se ipsum tentat, secundum quod *spiritualis* est et divinae legi subiectus[^13].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod tentans differt a tentato secundum substantiam; dicendum, quod sicut *iudicare* et *iudicari* sunt actus diversarum personarum, nihilominus tamen eadem persona secundum aliam et aliam sui portionem potest se ipsam iudicare, sicut semetipsum homo diiudicat[^14], et superior portio iudicat inferiorem; sic etiam intelligendum est, quod spiritualiter ipsa sensualitas tentare potest rationem, sive homo exterior interiorem; et ita, cum caro tentat spiritum, non idem tentatur a se, sed alius ab alio; illa tamen reperiri habent in eadem persona.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persuasio, ordinata ad decipiendum, potius est sophisticatio quam tentatio; dici potest, quod *tentatio* large dicta comprehendit et *sophisticationem* et *tentationem* proprie dictam. Sophistica enim persuasione potest homo de alio experimentum sumere; et ita non valet illa obiectio, quia *tentatio*, secundum quod hic accipitur, contra *deceptionem* et *sophisticationem* non dividitur. — *Alia solutio.* Aliter tamen posset dici, quod *tentationis* nomen magis translatum est a tentatione *materiali*, in qua est quaedam palpatio, secundum quod caecus dicitur *tentare*, quam a tentatione illa, quae est in ratiocinationibus, per quem modum dividitur contra *sophisticationem*, ut dicatur *alius syllogismus sophisticus, alius tentativus*[^15].

4. Ad ultimum patet responsio ex praedictis. Aliquod enim *commune* reperitur in omnibus illis, de quibus dicitur actus tentandi, videlicet tactu quodam pulsare, ad quem consequitur pulsati probatio; et hoc prius explanatum est.

english:
### Article II. *On the modes of temptation in general.*

Next we inquire concerning the second article, on the modes of temptation in general. Now the Master[^1] divides temptation into that which is from the enemy, and that which is from the flesh. But since some knowledge of the temptation which is from the enemy can be had through those things which have been determined above[^2] concerning the power of demons, here we inquire concerning the temptation which is from the flesh. And concerning this three questions can be asked.

First it is asked, whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

Second it is asked, whether the temptation of the flesh can be separated from the temptation of the devil.

Third it is asked, which of these temptations is more difficult to resist.

### Question I. *Whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

*Foundations.*

1. James 1[^3]: *Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence*; but the concupiscence which most of all draws us away and entices is the concupiscence of the flesh: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Cassiodorus[^4], defining temptation, says that temptation is *the likening of a good unto deception*; but the carnal appetite makes a good *as for now* be believed to be a good *simply*; and this deceives and fools the spirit: therefore it happens that the spirit is tempted by the carnal appetite.

3. Likewise, diabolical temptation is nothing other than his suggestion; but as the devil suggests evils to man, so also does the prudence of the flesh, *which is enemy unto God*[^5]: therefore if the devil is said to tempt when he suggests evils, by the same reason also the flesh, when it draws the spirit unto carnal things.

4. Likewise, the devil assails us by tempting, nor is the devil's temptation other than his assault; but as we are assailed by the devil, so also are we assailed and impelled by the flesh: therefore it seems that, as we are tempted by the devil, so truly and properly are we tempted by the flesh.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Hugh of St. Victor[^6]: « *To tempt is to test cunningly and, as it were, to prove by certain bland efforts* »; but to take an experiment is of a rational substance alone: therefore it does not seem to belong to the flesh.

2. Likewise, the tempter differs from the tempted, for no one tempts himself; but he who is tempted is the carnal man: since therefore the carnal man does not differ from his flesh by substance, it seems that no man is tempted by his own flesh, nor by any other: therefore it stands that no flesh tempts.

3. Likewise, a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry[^7] than temptation, — for temptation is a persuasion ordered toward taking an experiment — but the vicious flesh inclines directly toward evil and by its inclination seduces the spirit: therefore the impulsion of the flesh ought rather to be called sophistry than temptation.

4. Likewise, whenever any act is said of several subjects, it is said according to something common found in them; but *God* is said in Scripture[^8] to tempt, and *the devil* and *man* and *the flesh*: therefore it ought to be said according to something common. But the flesh does not seem in any way to share anything in common with God and with angelic spirit: therefore it seems that temptation cannot belong to it; or if it does belong, this will be equivocally and according to another mode of speaking. — *Incidental question.* And if it is so, then there is the question: according to which mode is it said, and why is that impulsion of the flesh called temptation?

> **Conclusion.** *Since temptation is a certain touch ordered for proving, and the concupiscence of the flesh impels us, upon whose impulse follows the approval or disapproval of the man, the flesh is rightly said to tempt.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this word *tempt* has many acceptations, as those say who have studiously searched out the significations of words. *What it is to tempt.* If however we wish to take its principal and chief signification, *to tempt is to prove*; whence *temptation* may be called a certain touch by which that which is touched is proved: as a blind man is said to *tempt* when by his touch he wishes to have some certainty about something which he touches. By this mode in spiritual matters *temptation* is said to be a certain touch ordered for proving. — *Fourfold temptation.* And this can be in a fourfold way:

either because he who strikes intends to *prove* and *approve*, or to show as proved; and in this manner God tempts, according to what is said in Wisdom 3[^9]: *God tempted them and found them worthy of himself.*

— Or he who strikes intends to *prove* and *reprove*, or to make reprobate; and so the devil tempts, according to what is said in Acts 5[^10]: *Why has Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?*

— Or because he who strikes intends only to prove and to take an experiment of that which is in the man; and so the prudent man tempts; and concerning this in Ecclesiasticus 13[^11]: *From much speech he will tempt thee, and smiling he will question thee about thy hidden things.*

— *To the incidental question.* Or because, even though the one striking *intends nothing*, upon his striking nevertheless *follows the approval* or *reprobation* of the man; and so tempts the flesh or carnal concupiscence, of which James 1[^12]: *Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence.* For from the flesh, or from the concupiscence of the flesh, the man is struck and as it were touched, to which touch or striking if he consents, he is *proved and reproved*; but if he dissents, he is *proved and approved*. And so rightly and properly *Conclusion.* may the impulse of the flesh be called temptation. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary, that *to tempt is to test*; it must be said that that account is assigned by Hugh only *properly* of the temptation of the devil. — *Another solution.* But if anyone wishes to understand it *generally*, so that it may extend to every temptation which inclines toward evil, then we shall say that it is understood *by way of cause*, so that the sense is, that through temptation occurs an experiment and proving, whether a man is worthy to be *approved* or *reproved*; and this is done not only by the devil, but also by the flesh. — *Another interpretation.* But if he wishes to say that this is said *essentially*, then we shall say that by the name *flesh* is understood not the body alone, but the carnal reason; and the same man, insofar as he is *carnal* and turned toward the flesh, tempts himself insofar as he is *spiritual* and subject to the divine law[^13].

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the tempter differs from the tempted by substance; it must be said that just as *to judge* and *to be judged* are acts of different persons, nonetheless the same person, according to one and another portion of itself, can judge itself, as a man examines himself[^14], and the superior portion judges the inferior; so also it is to be understood that spiritually sensuality itself can tempt reason, or the exterior man the interior; and so, when the flesh tempts the spirit, the same is not tempted by itself, but one by another; nevertheless these are found in the same person.

3. To that which is objected, that a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry than temptation; it can be said that *temptation* taken broadly comprehends both *sophistry* and *temptation* properly so called. For by a sophistic persuasion a man can take experiment of another; and so that objection is not valid, because *temptation*, in the sense in which it is taken here, is not divided against *deception* and *sophistry*. — *Another solution.* Yet otherwise it could be said that the name *temptation* is rather transferred from *material* temptation, in which there is a certain palpation — according to which a blind man is said to *tempt* — than from that temptation which is in ratiocinations, by which mode it is divided against *sophistry*, so that one syllogism may be called *sophistic*, another *tentative*[^15].

4. To the last the response is clear from what was said. For something *common* is found in all those of which the act of tempting is said, namely a certain striking by a touch, upon which follows the proving of the one struck; and this was explained before.

la: Hic c. 6. — Lib. II *Sententiarum* Magistri, c. 6, ubi tentatio dividitur in eam quae est ab hoste et eam quae est a carne.

en: Here c. 6. — Bk. II of the Master's *Sentences*, c. 6, where temptation is divided into that which is from the enemy and that which is from the flesh.

la: Dist. 8. p. II. praesertim q. 1. seq.

en: Distinction 8, Part II, especially q. 1 and following.

la: Vers. 14. — Paulo inferius Vat. omittit *nos*.

en: Verse 14. — A little below, the Vatican edition omits *nos* ("us").

la: B. Albert., hic a. 1: *Cassiodorus in origi. super Psalm.* S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1: *Cassiodorus super Psalmos.* Ad quae adnotat P. Nicolai in sua ed. Commentarii S. Thomae super libros *Sententiarum*: « Quod subiungitur, ut ex Cassiodoro super *Psalmos*, et ut ex illo *in origine super Psalmos*, Albertus Magnus notat ad hanc ipsam distinctionem a. 1, volens fortasse designare praefationem vel prologum in Psalmos; nec per umbram occurrit ». Cfr. tamen expositio in Ps. 134, 11, ubi legitur: *Amara siquidem vitia sunt, quae nos ab illa beatitudine iucundissima deducunt. Haec habent diabolum regem, qui est tentatio colorum, quando se transformat in angelum lucis* (1. Cor. 11, 14); *ut per colorem atque speciem bonitatis devotorum animas assidua tentatione subvertat.*

en: Bl. Albert, here a. 1: *Cassiodorus in origi. super Psalm.* St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1: *Cassiodorus super Psalmos.* On which P. Nicolai notes in his edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on the books of *Sentences*: « What is added — that it is from Cassiodorus on the *Psalms*, and from him *in origine super Psalmos* — Albert the Great notes at this very distinction a. 1, perhaps wishing to indicate a preface or prologue on the Psalms; but it does not occur even by way of shadow ». Compare however the exposition on Ps. 134, 11, where it reads: *Bitter indeed are the vices which lead us away from that most delightful blessedness. These have as king the devil, who is the temptation of colors, when he transforms himself into an angel of light* (1 Cor. 11:14); *that through the color and species of goodness he may by continual temptation subvert the souls of the devout.*

la: Respicitur Rom. 8, 7. Cfr. de his propp. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. — Paulo inferius pro *cum spiritum* plures codd. *dum spiritum*.

en: Reference is to Rom. 8:7. Compare on these proposals the *Litera Magistri* here, c. 6. — A little below, in place of *cum spiritum* several codices have *dum spiritum*.

la: Lib. II *Allegor. in Nov. Test.* c. 13, ubi in textu orig. post *conatibus* additur: *praemissis ante violentam impulsionem*.

en: Bk. II *Allegories on the New Testament* c. 13, where in the original text after *conatibus* is added: *praemissis ante violentam impulsionem* ("things sent forth before a violent impulse").

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 1; ibid. c. 10. seq. (c. 11.), ubi, de speciebus disputationis agens, auctor *tentativam* ita describit: *Amplius affirmare vel negare qui postulat* [i. e. *Praeterea postulare, ut affirmetur vel negetur*], *id non monstrantis est, sed experimentum sumentis; nam tentativa est dialectica quaedam, quapropter de omnibus inspicit et explorat non scientem, sed ignorantem atque simulantem.*

en: Compare Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 1; ibid. c. 10 ff. (c. 11), where, treating of the species of disputation, the author describes the *tentative* art thus: *Further, he who requires affirmation or negation* [i.e. *Moreover to require that something be affirmed or denied*], *this belongs not to one who demonstrates, but to one who takes an experiment; for the tentative art is a certain dialectic, by which it inspects and explores all things from one who does not know, but who is ignorant and yet feigns knowledge.*

la: Psalm. 25, 2. — Matth. 4, 1. — Matth. 16, 1. — II. Cor. 12, 7. et Iacob. 1, 14. — De *maiori* vide Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 19. (c. 23.). — Circa finem arg. pro *Et si est* Vat. *et si sic est*; ed. 1, verbis *si est* suppressis, *et tunc erit* etc.

en: Ps. 25:2. — Matt. 4:1. — Matt. 16:1. — II Cor. 12:7 and James 1:14. — On the *major* see Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 19 (c. 23). — Near the end of the argument, for *Et si est* the Vatican edition has *et si sic est*; ed. 1, with the words *si est* suppressed, *et tunc erit* etc.

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Vers. 3, ubi Vulgata post *mentiri* addit *te*.

en: Verse 3, where the Vulgate after *mentiri* adds *te* ("thee").

la: Vers. 14: *Ex multa enim loquela tentabit* etc.

en: Verse 14: *For from much speech he will tempt* etc.

la: Vers. 14.

en: Verse 14.

la: Cfr. Rom. 7, 22. seq.; I. Cor. 2, 14; II. 4, 16. — Paulo superius pro *sed ratio carnalis* plures codd., inter quos F K N W aa, *sed homo carnalis*.

en: Compare Rom. 7:22 ff.; 1 Cor. 2:14; II [Cor.] 4:16. — A little above, in place of *sed ratio carnalis* several codices, among them F K N W aa, have *sed homo carnalis*.

la: Epist. I. *Cor.* 11, 31: *Quodsi nosmetipsos diiudicaremus, non utique iudicaremur.*

en: 1 *Corinthians* 11:31: *For if we judged ourselves, we should not be judged.*

la: *Syllogismus sophisticus* est, qui apparet syllogismus et non est, aut qui est syllogismus, sed non est conveniens rei, quique ordinatur ad deceptionem respondentis; *tentaticus* vero est qui sumit experimentum de ignorantia respondentis. Cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 2. et 7. (c. 2. et 8.).

en: A *sophistic syllogism* is one which appears to be a syllogism and is not, or which is a syllogism but is not suited to its subject, and which is ordered toward the deception of the respondent; the *tentative* [syllogism], however, is one which takes an experiment from the ignorance of the respondent. Compare Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 2 and 7 (c. 2 and 8). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Notanda est distinctio quatuor modorum tentandi, qui ex sacra Scriptura hic in corp. collecti sunt. De his et de tota hac materia multis quaestionibus diffuse disputat Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101, et specialim de hac quaestione ibid. m. 7. a. 2. § 1-3.

**II.** Alii plerumque de hac et sequenti quaest. simul tractant: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1: S. I. q. 114. a. 3; I. II. q. 80. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. et dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de 3 huius art. qq. hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** A distinction of four modes of tempting is to be noted, which have been collected here in the body from sacred Scripture. Concerning these and the whole matter Alex. of Hales disputes diffusely in many questions, S. p. II. q. 101, and especially concerning this question ibid. m. 7. a. 2. § 1-3.

**II.** Others commonly treat this and the following question together: St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1: S. I. q. 114. a. 3; I. II. q. 80. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. and dub. lat. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, of the 3 questions of this article, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{497,498,499}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` per Vol II Override (PDF authoritative for body + footers). Raw OCR lines 34935–35081 used to anchor inline footnote-marker positions (`Magister^`, `supra^`, `Iacobi primo^`, `Cassiodorus^`, `inimica^`, `Hugo de sancto Victore^`, `sophisticatio^`, `Scriptura^`, `Sapientiae tertio^`, `Actuum quinto^`, `Ecclesiastici decimo tertio^`, `Iacobi primo^`, `subiectus^`, `diiudicat^`, `tentativus^`).
- **Chunk was newly-created — auto-chunker omitted file.** Verified by `d21-a1-q3` (commits `97459f4` + `b90428f`, 2026-05-29): ARTICULUS II opener at raw 34935 immediately after q3's body close at raw 34934 (*debiliori suam inchoavit tentationem*). No re-split needed; q3 remains clean.
- **Page-split map (15 apparatus entries, no `[?]` flags):**
  - p.497 R-2 footer ⁵–⁸ = [^1]–[^4]: *Hic c. 6* (Magister cross-ref) + *Dist. 8. p. II. praesertim q. 1. seq.* (potestate daemonum cross-ref) + Jas 1, 14 *Vat. omittit nos* + B. Albert. *Cassiodorus* commentator-roll w/ P. Nicolai's note on the *origine super Psalmos* identification puzzle.
  - p.498 L-2 footer ¹–³ = [^5]–[^7]: Rom. 8, 7 *Deo inimica* + *cum spiritum*/*dum spiritum* codd. variant; Hugh of St. Victor *Allegor. in Nov. Test.* c. 13 w/ *praemissis ante violentam impulsionem* original-text addition; Aristot. I *Elench.* c. 1 and c. 10 seq. *tentativam* definition.
  - p.498 R-2 footer ⁴–⁸ = [^8]–[^12]: composite cross-ref block (Ps. 25,2 + Mt. 4,1 + Mt. 16,1 + 2 Cor. 12,7 + Jas. 1,14 + Aristot. *Posterior Analytics* I c. 19 + *Et si est*/*et si sic est*/ed. 1 *si est suppressis* variants); Wis. 3, 5; Acts 5, 3 *post mentiri addit te*; Sir. 13, 14 *Ex multa enim loquela*; Jas. 1, 14.
  - p.499 L-2 footer ¹–³ = [^13]–[^15]: Rom. 7, 22 + 1 Cor. 2, 14 + 2 Cor. 4, 16 *carnalis*/*spiritualis* cross-refs + *ratio carnalis*/*homo carnalis* codd. F K N W aa variant; 1 Cor. 11, 31 *diiudicat* cross-ref; *syllogismus sophisticus*/*tentativus* glossary w/ Aristot. I *Elench.* c. 2 and 7 cross-ref.
- **`has_scholion: true`** — SCHOLION I + II on p.499 mid-page (centered, spanning both columns between q1 body close at *hoc prius explanatum est* and QUAESTIO II header). I = the four-mode-tentationis distinction + Alex. Hal. S. p. II. q. 101 m. 7 a. 2 § 1-3 pointer. II = commentator roll for the joint q1+q2 treatment (S. Thom., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Dionys. Carth.).
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:**
  - Received: **none** from `d21-a1-q3` — q3 closed cleanly at raw 34934 with [^13] sibling-pointer to q2 SCHOLION II; ARTICULUS II opener at 34935 carries its own fresh apparatus block opening at this chunk's [^1] = *Hic c. 6* (Lombard cross-ref).
  - Forward to `d21-a2-q2`: **none** — q1 closes cleanly with SCHOLION II's commentator-roll covering the joint q1+q2 treatment; QUAESTIO II opens at raw 35082 (*Utrum tentatio carnis a tentatione diaboli possit separari*) with its own fresh body + apparatus block on p.499 R / p.500. The p.499 footer split is clean: notes ¹–³ (Rom. 7, 22 / 1 Cor. 11, 31 / *syllogismus sophisticus*) all anchor in this q1's body Solutiones; QUAESTIO II's footers will start their own ⁴+ sequence on p.499 R / p.500.
- **`[?]` flags:** none.
- **Auto-chunker omission documented:** the auto-chunker emitted q3 (raw 34836–34934) and q2 (`bon-sent-II-d21-a2-q2.md` starts from raw 35082) but skipped the intervening raw range 34935–35081 entirely. Likely cause: the ARTICULUS II opener at raw 34935 is centered (full-width, both columns) and the QUAESTIO I header at raw 35047 sits 112 raw lines later — the auto-chunker's quaestio-header regex may have folded the gap into the article opener's parent context without emitting a quaestio file. Flagged for the auto-chunker improvement backlog; no other a2-q1 chunks are known affected.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 499 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum tentatio carnis a tentatione diaboli possit separari.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat, tentationem carnis a tentatione diaboli separari. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Quaecumque dividuntur ex opposito, unum potest esse sine altero sive separari potest ab altero[^1]; sed tentatio carnis dividitur contra tentationem hostis: ergo etc.

2. Item, diabolus tentavit hominem primum et tentavit Christum[^2]: sed nec caro Christi, nec caro hominis primi ad malum impellebat: ergo neuter a carne tentabatur: igitur cum tentarentur a diabolo, tentatio, quae est a diabolo, separatur a tentatione, quae est a carne.

3. Item, esto, quod diabolus nunquam nobis mala suggereret, nihilominus *sensus nostri ad malum ab adolescentia proni* essent[^3]: ergo omni tentatione diaboli circumscripta, adhuc homo tentaretur a carne propria.

4. Item, aliud est *inquinamentum carnis*, et aliud *inquinamentum spiritus*[^4]; sed diabolus impellit ad peccata spiritualia, caro vero ad peccata carnalia: ergo cum peccatum spirituale possit esse sine carnali, et e converso, videtur, quod tentatio carnis sequestrari habeat a tentatione diaboli.

5. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod in uno contingit mereri et in alio demereri, illa contingit ab invicem separari; sed tentatio hostis est materia exercendae virtutis, tentatio vero carnis

<!-- page 500 -->

semper est a culpa vel cum culpa, sicut dicit Magister[^5]: ergo una istarum sequestrari habet ab altera.

6. Item, tentatio *carnis* et *hostis* differunt, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^6], sicut tentatio *exterior* et *interior*; sed quod est *exterius* sequestrari habet ab eo quod est *interius*: ergo et tentatio carnis ab ea quae est a diabolo. Quodsi tu dicas, quod tentatio, quae est ab *hoste*, est ita interior, sicut tentatio, quae est a *carne*; per hoc non effugitur, quia, cum *Deus fidelis non permittat hominem tentari supra id quod possit*[^7], et alter istorum modorum ad exercitandum sufficiat, nec homo simul possit esse intentus circa diversa; videtur, quod alio et alio tempore fiat circa nos tentatio carnis et tentatio diabolica.

**Sed contra:**

*Ad oppositum 1. de tentatione carnis.*

1. Quod tentatio *carnis* non habeat esse sine tentatione hostis, videtur. Super illud Psalmi: *Diverte a malo et fac bonum*, Glossa Hieronymi[^8]: « Mala omnia ab instinctu diaboli procedunt, sicut bona ab instinctu Dei »: ergo nullum peccatum fit, in quo diabolus non interponat partes suas; si ergo tentatio carnis via est ad peccatum, videtur, quod non possit esse sine tentatione diaboli.

2. Item, motus instrumenti non est sine motu principalis motoris; sed caro est sicut instrumentum in tentando respectu diaboli, sicut dicitur super illud Iob nono[^9]: *Terra data est in manus impii*, id est, caro in manus diaboli: ergo titillatio carnis non est absque impulsione diaboli: si igitur haec est tentatio, patet etc.

3. Item, etsi non sit ponere primum malum, quod non sit ab alio, est tamen ponere malum, quod est initium omnis mali, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastici decimo[^10]: *Initium omnis peccati superbia.* Si igitur diabolus *rex est super omnes filios superbiae* et *pater omnis mendacii*, videtur, quod nullum sit peccatum, quod aliquo modo non procedat ab ipso, et ita ad nullum malum impellit caro absque diabolo: ergo tentatio carnis non separatur a tentatione hostis.

*Item de tentatione hostis.*

4. Item, quod tentatio *hostis* non separetur a tentatione carnis, similiter ostenditur. Ad Galatas quinto[^11]: *Manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, adulterium, contentiones, aemulationes, irae, rixae, invidiae*, etc.; ibi enumerantur peccata carnalia et spiritualia: ergo videtur, quod omnia peccata procedant a carne: igitur ad nullum malum inclinat tentatio hostis absque tentatione carnis.

5. Item, *generatio* transfertur a corporalibus ad spiritualia; sed in corporalibus impossibile est, generari aliquid a patre absque matre: ergo nec in spiritualibus. Sed pater omnis peccati dicitur esse diabolus, mater vero caro sive concupiscentia: ergo etc. Prima per se patet; secunda manifestatur per illud quod dicitur Ezechielis decimo sexto[^12]: *Pater tuus Amorrhaeus, et mater tua Cethea.* Per *Amorrhaeum* enim intelligitur diabolus, per *Cetheam* vero concupiscentia. Et expressius dicit Gregorius super Leviticum, decimo nono: « Concupiscentia est mater omnis peccati, et diabolus pater »: ergo etc.

6. Item, diabolus non potest tentare bonum Angelum nec malum nec spiritum separatum, sed solum spiritum carni coniunctum: ergo videtur, quod aditum non habeat ad mentem nisi per carnem: ergo absque carne non tentat: ergo non contingit, tentationem diaboli a tentatione carnis separari.

> **Conclusio.** *Si consideratur tentatio, ut est a movente primo, tentatio carnis nunquam potest esse absque tentatione hostis, tentatio vero hostis interdum est absque tentatione carnis. Si autem tentatio consideratur ut a movente proximo, utraque ab altera et formaliter et temporaliter separari potest.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum dicimus, tentationem esse a *carne* vel ab *hoste*, hoc *Dupliciter intelligitur.* dupliciter potest intelligi: aut sicut a movente *primo*, aut sicut a movente *proximo* et immediato. Si sicut a movente *primo*, sic tentatio *carnis* nunquam potest *Conclusio 1.* esse absque tentatione *hostis*, quia omnis tentatio carnis est ex eius corruptione, quae ortum habuit a prima hostis tentatione. Tentatio tamen *hostis* potest *Conclusio 2.* esse absque tentatione carnis, tunc potissime, quando is tentatur, in quo non est carnis corruptio, sicut fuit in Adam et in Christo, vel quando ex illa

<!-- page 501 -->

tentatione nulla oritur incurvatio[^13]. Quando vero tentatio *hostis* ad peccatum pertrahit, cum nullum peccatum sit in nobis, quod non habeat ortum ex concupiscentia aliqua; sic tentatio diaboli a tentatione *Conclusio 3.* carnis non potest separari. — Sic igitur iudicandum est, secundum quod tentatio dicitur esse a carne, vel ab hoste tanquam a movente *primo*.

Si autem sic dicatur esse, sicut a movente *proximo* et proprio, sicut accipit Magister in littera[^14], *Conclusio 4.* sic sequestrantur et distantia *formali* et distantia *temporali*. Distantia *formali*, quia alio modo tentat caro, et alio modo diabolus; et ad aliud vitium impellit haec, et ad aliud ille, et primum movens est aliud et aliud. Sequestrantur etiam distantia *temporali*, quia aliquo tempore vexat diabolus et instigat ad aliquod vitium, ad quod non inclinat caro; et aliquando potest esse e converso. — Et sic isto ultimo modo accipiendo *proprie* tentationem carnis et tentationem hostis, ut accipit Magister in littera, conce-*Conclusio generalis.* dendum est, eas ab invicem separari, ut non solum inter unam et alteram sit differentia, sed etiam una possit esse sine altera. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc probant.

*Solutio oppositorum.*

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod omne malum est ab instinctu *diaboli*; intelligendum est, sicut a movente *primo*, non sicut a motore[^15] *proximo*. Nam absente diabolo, peccatum potest esse a libero arbitrio vel voluntate propria, vel a trahente carnis concupiscentia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caro movet sicut instrumentum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, quando diabolus vexat carnem, et vexando carnem vexat spiritum; et tunc tentatio carnis et diaboli non ponunt in numerum. Contingit tamen, carnem mediante sensualitate sibi coniuncta spiritum nostrum ad malum inclinare, etiam diabolo non movente; et tunc non movet sicut instrumentum, sed sicut *movens primum*; et hoc modo habet sequestrari a tentatione diaboli.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum diaboli est initium omnis mali; dicendum, quod hoc non est intelligendum, quod sit principium *immediatum* respectu cuiuslibet peccati, sed quia ante peccatum eius non fuit aliud, et ipsum fuit initium illius peccati originalis, ex quo est inclinatio[^16] ad omne malum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia peccata sunt a *carne*; dicendum, quod caro ibi sumitur large pro omni concupiscentia, quae inhaesit animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem; et sic nomine carnis intelligitur concupiscentia, quae est mater omnium malorum, et sine hac diabolus non generat in nobis aliquod peccatum[^17].

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens obiectum de generatione spirituali. Accipitur enim ibi *caro* et *concupiscentia* large, sicut ostensum est. Ex illo tamen non sequitur, quod tentatio diaboli non possit esse absque tentatione carnis; non enim omnis tentatio diaboli est peccati generatio, frequenter enim tentat, ita quod nulla sequitur culpa.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non tentat nisi hominem carnalem; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia tentatio diaboli pendeat a tentatione carnis, sed quia non potest aliquem tentare, nisi quando habet vertibilitatem liberi arbitrii et est in statu merendi vel demerendi, et in quo potest seduci. Et hoc solum est, quando spiritus rationalis est coniunctus carni mortali. Ex illa tamen ratione non concluditur, quod caro in tentatione diaboli sit *causa praecipua*, sed solum *causa sine qua non*[^18].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the temptation of the flesh can be separated from the temptation of the devil.*

Secondly it is asked whether it occurs that the temptation of the flesh be separated from the temptation of the devil. And that it does, seems clear.

*Foundations.*

1. Whatever things are divided in opposition, the one can be without the other, or be separated from the other[^1]; but the temptation of the flesh is divided over against the temptation of the enemy: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the devil tempted the first man and tempted Christ[^2]; but neither the flesh of Christ nor the flesh of the first man was impelling unto evil: therefore neither was being tempted by the flesh: therefore, since they were being tempted by the devil, the temptation which is from the devil is separated from the temptation which is from the flesh.

3. Likewise, granted that the devil should never suggest evils to us, nevertheless *our senses would be prone to evil from adolescence*[^3]: therefore, with every temptation of the devil set aside, man would still be tempted by his own flesh.

4. Likewise, *the defilement of the flesh* is one thing, and *the defilement of the spirit* is another[^4]; but the devil impels unto spiritual sins, while the flesh impels unto carnal sins: therefore, since a spiritual sin can exist without a carnal one, and conversely, it seems that the temptation of the flesh ought to be sequestered from the temptation of the devil.

5. Likewise, whichever two things stand thus, that in one it occurs to merit and in the other to demerit, those it occurs to be separated from one another; but the temptation of the enemy is the matter of exercising virtue, while the temptation of the flesh

is always from fault or with fault, as the Master says[^5]: therefore the one of these ought to be sequestered from the other.

6. Likewise, the temptation *of the flesh* and *of the enemy* differ, as the Master says in the text[^6], as *exterior* and *interior* temptation; but what is *exterior* ought to be sequestered from what is *interior*: therefore also the temptation of the flesh from that which is from the devil. But should you say that the temptation which is from the *enemy* is just as interior as the temptation which is from the *flesh*; by this it is not evaded, because, since *God is faithful and does not permit a man to be tempted beyond what he can bear*[^7], and either of these modes suffices for the exercise [of virtue], nor can a man at the same time be intent upon diverse things; it seems that the temptation of the flesh and the diabolical temptation occur about us at one and another time.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite, 1. concerning the temptation of the flesh.*

1. That the temptation *of the flesh* cannot exist without the temptation of the enemy seems clear. Upon that of the Psalm: *Turn away from evil and do good*, the Gloss of Jerome[^8]: « All evils proceed from the instigation of the devil, just as goods from the instigation of God »: therefore no sin occurs in which the devil does not interpose his parts; if therefore the temptation of the flesh is a way unto sin, it seems that it cannot exist without the temptation of the devil.

2. Likewise, the motion of an instrument is not without the motion of the principal mover; but the flesh is as an instrument in tempting with respect to the devil, as is said upon that of Job 9[^9]: *The earth is given into the hands of the wicked one*, that is, the flesh into the hands of the devil: therefore the titillation of the flesh is not without the impulsion of the devil: if therefore this is temptation, the rest is clear etc.

3. Likewise, even if there be no first evil which is not from another, there is nevertheless an evil which is the beginning of every evil, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 10[^10]: *The beginning of every sin is pride.* If therefore the devil *is king over all the sons of pride* and *father of every lie*, it seems that there is no sin which does not in some way proceed from him, and so the flesh does not impel unto any evil without the devil: therefore the temptation of the flesh is not separated from the temptation of the enemy.

*Likewise concerning the temptation of the enemy.*

4. Likewise, that the temptation *of the enemy* is not separated from the temptation of the flesh is similarly shown. To the Galatians 5[^11]: *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, adultery, contentions, emulations, wraths, strifes, envies*, etc.; there are enumerated carnal and spiritual sins: therefore it seems that all sins proceed from the flesh: therefore the temptation of the enemy inclines unto no evil without the temptation of the flesh.

5. Likewise, *generation* is transferred from corporal to spiritual things; but in corporal things it is impossible that anything be generated from a father without a mother: therefore neither in spiritual things. But the father of every sin is said to be the devil, and the mother the flesh or concupiscence: therefore etc. The first is plain in itself; the second is manifested by that which is said in Ezekiel 16[^12]: *Thy father was an Amorite, and thy mother a Cethite.* For by *Amorite* the devil is understood, and by *Cethite* concupiscence. And more expressly Gregory says on Leviticus, [book] 19: « Concupiscence is the mother of every sin, and the devil the father »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the devil cannot tempt a good Angel, nor an evil one, nor a separated spirit, but only a spirit joined to flesh: therefore it seems that he has no access to the mind except through the flesh: therefore without the flesh he does not tempt: therefore it does not occur that the temptation of the devil be separated from the temptation of the flesh.

> **Conclusion.** *If temptation is considered as it is from the first mover, the temptation of the flesh can never exist without the temptation of the enemy, while the temptation of the enemy is at times without the temptation of the flesh. But if temptation is considered as from the proximate mover, each can be separated from the other both formally and temporally.*

**I respond:** It must be said that when we say that temptation is from the *flesh* or from the *enemy*, this *It is understood in two ways.* can be understood in two ways: either as from the *first* mover, or as from the *proximate* and immediate mover. If as from the *first* mover, thus the temptation of the *flesh* can never *Conclusion 1.* exist without the temptation of the *enemy*, because every temptation of the flesh is from its own corruption, which had its origin from the first temptation of the enemy. The temptation of the *enemy*, however, can *Conclusion 2.* exist without the temptation of the flesh, then most of all, when he is tempted in whom there is no corruption of the flesh, as it was in Adam and in Christ, or when from that

temptation no curvature arises[^13]. But when the temptation of the *enemy* draws unto sin, since no sin is in us which does not have its origin from some concupiscence; thus the temptation of the devil cannot be separated from the temptation *Conclusion 3.* of the flesh. — Thus therefore it must be judged, according as the temptation is said to be from the flesh or from the enemy as from a *first* mover.

But if it is said to be such, as from the *proximate* and proper mover, as the Master takes it in the text[^14], *Conclusion 4.* then they are sequestered both by *formal* distance and by *temporal* distance. By *formal* distance, because the flesh tempts in one way, and the devil in another; and the one impels unto one vice, the other unto another, and the first mover is one and another. They are sequestered also by *temporal* distance, because at one time the devil vexes and instigates unto some vice unto which the flesh does not incline; and at another it can be the converse. — And thus, taking *properly* in this last mode the temptation of the flesh and the temptation of the enemy, as the Master takes it in the text, it must be *General conclusion.* conceded that they are separated from one another, so that not only is there a difference between the one and the other, but also the one can exist without the other. — Whence the reasons which prove this are to be conceded.

*Solution of the opposing arguments.*

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that every evil is from the instigation of the *devil*; it is to be understood as from a *first* mover, not as from a *proximate*[^15] mover. For with the devil absent, sin can be from free will or from one's own will, or from the drawing concupiscence of the flesh.

2. To that which is objected, that the flesh moves as an instrument; it must be said that this is true when the devil vexes the flesh, and by vexing the flesh vexes the spirit; and then the temptation of the flesh and of the devil do not count for two. It happens, however, that the flesh, by means of the sensuality joined to it, inclines our spirit unto evil even when the devil is not moving; and then it does not move as an instrument, but as a *first mover*; and in this manner it has to be sequestered from the temptation of the devil.

3. To that which is objected, that the sin of the devil is the beginning of every evil; it must be said that this is not to be understood as that it be the *immediate* principle with respect to every sin, but because before his sin there was no other, and that very [sin] was the beginning of that original sin, from which there is an inclination[^16] unto every evil.

4. To that which is objected, that all sins are from the *flesh*; it must be said that *flesh* is there taken broadly for every concupiscence which has adhered to the soul from its conjunction unto the flesh; and so by the name of *flesh* is understood concupiscence, which is the mother of all evils, and without this the devil does not generate in us any sin[^17].

5. And by this is clear the response to the following objection concerning spiritual generation. For *flesh* and *concupiscence* are there taken broadly, as has been shown. From that, however, it does not follow that the temptation of the devil cannot exist without the temptation of the flesh; for not every temptation of the devil is the generation of sin, for he frequently tempts in such a way that no fault follows.

6. To that which is objected, that he tempts no one save the carnal man; it must be said that this is not because the temptation of the devil depends upon the temptation of the flesh, but because he cannot tempt anyone except when [the man] has the convertibility of free will and is in the state of meriting or demeriting, and in which he can be seduced. And this is only when the rational spirit is joined to mortal flesh. From that account, however, it is not concluded that the flesh in the temptation of the devil is a *principal cause*, but only a *sine qua non* cause[^18].

---

la: Colligitur ex definitione oppositorum, de quibus Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 16. (IV. c. 10.) ait: *Quaecumque susceptivo amborum non contingit simul adesse, haec opponi dicuntur, aut ipsa aut ex quibus sunt. Fuscum namque et album simul eidem non insunt etc.*

en: It is gathered from the definition of opposites, concerning which Aristotle, V *Metaphysics* text 16 (IV c. 10) says: *Whatever things it does not occur to be simultaneously present to a thing receptive of both, these are said to be opposed, either themselves or those of which they consist. For dark and white are not simultaneously present in the same thing etc.*

la: Gen. 3, 1. seqq.; Matth. 4, 1. seqq.

en: Gen. 3:1 ff.; Matt. 4:1 ff.

la: Gen. 8, 21: *Sensus enim et cogitatio humani cordis in malum prona sunt ab adolescentia sua.* — Vat. *sunt* pro *essent*.

en: Gen. 8:21: *For the sense and thought of man's heart are prone unto evil from its adolescence.* — The Vatican edition has *sunt* in place of *essent*.

la: Epist. II. *Cor.* 7, 1: *Mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus.*

en: 2 *Corinthians* 7:1: *Let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh and of spirit.*

la: Hic c. 6. — In *maiori* aliqui codd. bis omittunt *in*.

en: Here c. 6 [of the Master's *Sentences*]. — In the *major* [premise] some codices twice omit *in*.

la: Hic c. 6. — In pluribus codd., inter quos F T V Y aa ee, verba sic sunt transposita: *sicut tentatio interior et exterior*, et immediate post in cod. F sic: *sed quod est interius separatur ab eo quod est exterius*.

en: Here c. 6. — In several codices, among them F T V Y aa ee, the words are transposed thus: *as interior and exterior temptation*, and immediately after, in cod. F thus: *but what is interior is separated from what is exterior*.

la: Epist. I. *Cor.* 10, 13: *Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis.* — In fine arg. pro *diabolica* plures codd. et ed. 1 *diaboli*.

en: 1 *Corinthians* 10:13: *But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able.* — At the end of the argument, in place of *diabolica* several codices and ed. 1 have *diaboli*.

la: Psalm. 33, 15. — Hieronym. ad hunc locum adnotat: *Mala omnia a diaboli instinctu procedunt, sicut bona a Dei.*

en: Ps. 33:15. — Jerome notes at this place: *All evils proceed from the instigation of the devil, just as goods from [the instigation] of God.*

la: Vers. 24. — De Glossa in haec verba *Iob*, Gregorii, vide supra pag. 232, nota 1. — Pro *in manus quae impii est* et *in manus diaboli* plurimi codd. *in manu impii* et *in manu diaboli*. Conclusio: *ergo titillatio* etc. illustratur verbis Magistri hic in lit. c. 6: *Nam et diabolus invisibiliter mala suggerit, et ex carnis corruptione suboritur motus illicitus et titillatio prava.* — Quoad *maiorem* cfr. Aristot., I. *Polit.* c. 3. (c. 2.).

en: Verse 24. — On the Gloss on these words of *Job*, of Gregory, see above p. 232 note 1. — In place of *in manus quae impii est* and *in manus diaboli* very many codices have *in manu impii* and *in manu diaboli*. The conclusion: *therefore the titillation* etc. is illustrated by the words of the Master here in the text, c. 6: *For the devil also invisibly suggests evils, and from the corruption of the flesh an illicit motion and a depraved titillation arises.* — As to the *major* [premise] compare Aristotle, I *Politics* c. 3 (c. 2).

la: Vers. 15. — Seq. textus est Iob 41, 25, ubi Vulgata *universos* pro *omnes*. — Textus exinde cit. est Ioan. 8, 44: *Quia mendax est et pater eius.* — De hoc arg. cfr. etiam August., XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 3. — De prima parte *maioris* cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Verse 15. — The following text is Job 41:25, where the Vulgate has *universos* in place of *omnes*. — The text cited thereafter is John 8:44: *Because he is a liar and the father thereof.* — On this argument compare also Augustine, XIV *On the City of God* c. 3. — On the first part of the *major* [premise] compare above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Vers. 19. seqq. Vulgata textum ampliorem exhibet.

en: Verse 19 ff. The Vulgate exhibits a fuller text.

la: Vers. 45. — De expositione huius textus cfr. Origenes, *in Ezech.* hom. 6. n. 3, et August., *in Ioan.* tract. 42. n. 10. seqq. Ad verba Ezechielis: *Pater tuus Amorrhaeus*, Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 2. ad 3. adnotat: « Unde dicitur ibidem super illud [Iacob. 1, 2.]: *Concupiscentia, cum conceperit, parit peccatum*, interlinearis [Glossa]: *Cum diabolus incentiva immittit, vel cum caro suavia sibi quaerit* ». Glossam seq. super Levit., quam plures codd. et edd., necnon B. Albert. hic a. 5) Gregorio attribuunt, Gul. Mara simpliciter sine auctoris nomine affert, pro numero *decimo nono* substituto numero *vigesimo* et omissis ultimis verbis *et diabolus pater*. Glossa, sic abbreviata, ex *Hesychii*, Hierosolymitani presbyteri († a. 433 vel, sicut alii volunt, a. 472 vel 473 Commentario in Levit̄icum (20, 14.) sumta est, ubi sic legitur: *Quia omnis peccati mater concupiscentia est*, oportet et hoc praecaveri, ut si qua nobis peccati concupiscentia sit, usque ad hanc stemus et non ei coniungamus actionem. Cfr. etiam Glossa in Deut. 25, ubi idem dicitur. — Pro vocula *enim* post *Per Amorrhaeum* multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *vero*; in cod. aa neque *enim* neque *vero*.

en: Verse 45. — On the exposition of this text compare Origen, *on Ezekiel* hom. 6 n. 3, and Augustine, *on John* tract. 42 n. 10 ff. To the words of Ezekiel: *Thy father was an Amorite*, Alex. of Hales, S. p. II q. 101 m. 2 ad 3, notes: « Whence it is said in the same place upon that [of James 1:2]: *Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin*, the interlinear [Gloss]: *When the devil sends in incentives, or when the flesh seeks for itself things pleasant* ». The following gloss on *Leviticus*, which several codices and editions, as well as Bl. Albert (here a. 5), attribute to Gregory, Gul. Mara cites simply without the author's name, with the number *vigesimo* substituted for *decimo nono*, and with the last words *et diabolus pater* omitted. The Gloss, thus abbreviated, is taken from *Hesychius*, presbyter of Jerusalem († a.d. 433 or, as others would have it, 472 or 473), Commentary on *Leviticus* (20:14), where it reads thus: *Because concupiscence is the mother of every sin*, this also must be guarded against, that if any concupiscence of sin be in us, we should stop at this point and not join an action to it. Compare also the Gloss on Deuteronomy 25, where the same is said. — In place of the particle *enim* after *Per Amorrhaeum* many codices, with edd. 1, 2, have *vero*; in cod. aa there is neither *enim* nor *vero*.

la: Nonnulli codd., II ee et ed. 1 subiiciunt *carnis*.

en: Some codices, II ee and ed. 1, subjoin *carnis* [so that the reading is *tentatione carnis nulla oritur incurvatio*].

la: Hic c. 6. — Pro *et proprio* Vat. *et proprie*, cod. aa *et immediato*. Paulo inferius cum cod. cc et ed. 1 substituimus *primum movens* pro *principium movens*, quod in Vat. legitur. Deinde ed. 1 *sequestrari* pro *separari*.

en: Here c. 6. — In place of *et proprio* the Vatican edition has *et proprie*, cod. aa *et immediato*. A little below, with cod. cc and ed. 1, we have substituted *primum movens* for *principium movens*, which is read in the Vatican edition. Further on, ed. 1 has *sequestrari* in place of *separari*.

la: Codd. T V ee *movente*.

en: Codices T V ee have *movente*.

la: Vat. *initium*.

en: The Vatican edition has *initium*.

la: Cfr. August., XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 3. seq.

en: Compare Augustine, XIV *On the City of God* c. 3 ff.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion on the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi crops `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p{499,500,501}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png` per Vol II Override (PDF authoritative for body + footers). Raw OCR lines 35082–35223 used to anchor inline footnote-marker positions (`ex opposito^`, `Christum^`, `proni essent^`, `inquinamentum spiritus^`, `Magister^`, `Magister in littera^`, `supra id quod possit^`, `Diverte a malo^ Glossa Hieronymi`, `Iob nono^`, `Ecclesiastici decimo^`, `Galatas quinto^`, `Ezechielis decimo sexto^`, `incurvatio^`, `Magister in littera^`, `motore^`, `inclinatio^`, `peccatum^`, `sine qua non^`).
- **Page-split map (18 apparatus entries, no `[?]` flags):**
  - p.499 R-2 footer ⁴–⁷ = [^1]–[^4]: Aristot. V *Metaph.* text 16 (definition of opposites) + Gen 3, 1 / Mt 4, 1 (devil tempts first man + Christ) + Gen 8, 21 *prona sunt ab adolescentia* w/ *sunt*/*essent* Vat. variant + 2 Cor 7, 1 *inquinamento carnis et spiritus*.
  - p.500 L-2 footer ¹–⁵ = [^5]–[^9]: *Hic c. 6* Magister + *in maiori bis omittunt in* codd. variant; *Hic c. 6* Magister + *interior/exterior* transposition codd. F T V Y aa ee + cod. F *interius separatur* variant; 1 Cor 10, 13 *Fidelis Deus* + *diabolica*/*diaboli* variant ed. 1; Ps 33, 15 *Diverte a malo* + Hieronym. *Mala omnia a diaboli instinctu*; Job 9, 24 *Terra data est* + Gregorii Glossa cross-ref p. 232 nota 1 + *in manu*/*in manus* codd. variant + Magister c. 6 illustration *titillatio prava* + Aristot. I *Polit.* c. 3 cross-ref.
  - p.500 R-2 footer ⁶–⁸ = [^10]–[^12]: Eccli 10, 15 *Initium omnis peccati superbia* + Job 41, 25 *universos*/*omnes* Vat. + John 8, 44 *mendax et pater eius* + August. XIV *de Civ. Dei* c. 3 + d. 1 p. I a. 2 q. 1 cross-ref; Gal 5, 19 seqq. Vulgata ampliorem; Ezech 16, 45 *Pater tuus Amorrhaeus* + Origenes hom. 6 + August. *in Ioan.* tract. 42 + extended Alex. Hal. S. p. II q. 101 m. 2 ad 3 quotation on *Concupiscentia, cum conceperit* interlinear Glossa + extended Hesychius Hierosolymitani Commentary on Levit. 20, 14 provenance for "Concupiscentia est mater" Glossa attributed to Gregorius + Gul. Mara *vigesimo*/*decimo nono* + *enim*/*vero* codd. variants.
  - p.501 L-2 footer ¹ = [^13]: codd. H ee + ed. 1 subjoin *carnis* (reading *tentatione carnis nulla oritur incurvatio*).
  - p.501 R-2 footer ²–⁶ = [^14]–[^18]: *Hic c. 6* Magister + *et proprio*/*et proprie* Vat. + cod. aa *et immediato* + *primum movens*/*principium movens* Vat. editorial substitution from cc + ed. 1 + ed. 1 *sequestrari*/*separari*; codd. T V ee *motore*/*movente* variant; Vat. *inclinatio*/*initium*; August. XIV *de Civ. Dei* c. 3 seq. cross-ref; *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-pointer to a2-q1 SCHOLION II for the *sine qua non* point.
- **`has_scholion: false`** — q1's SCHOLION II (on p.499 mid-page, in `bon-sent-II-d21-a2-q2`'s sister chunk) explicitly covers the joint q1+q2 commentator-roll: « *Alii plerumque de hac et sequenti quaest. simul tractant*: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 114. a. 3; I. II. q. 80. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. et dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de 3 huius art. qq. hic q. 3. » Per Vol II Override §5 (CLAUDE.md). The [^18] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-pointer in this q2's apparatus also redirects readers to that scholion for the *sine qua non* analysis.
- **Cross-chunk hand-offs:**
  - Received from `d21-a2-q1`: **NONE** — q1 closed cleanly with SCHOLION I+II at p.499 mid-page covering the joint q1+q2 treatment; QUAESTIO II opens fresh at raw 35082 on p.499 R-mid (*Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat, tentationem carnis a tentatione diaboli separari*) with its own apparatus block opening at [^1] = Aristot. V *Metaph.* on p.499 R-2 footer ⁴.
  - Forward to `d21-a2-q3`: **NONE** — q2 closes cleanly at p.501 R-1 with [^18] *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* sibling-pointer at *causa sine qua non*⁶. QUAESTIO III opens at raw 35224 (p.501 R-mid) with the centered *QUAESTIO III. Utrum tentatio carnis sit nobis difficilior tentatione diaboli.* header + *Tertio quaeritur* opener carrying its own apparatus block on p.501 R-2 footer ⁷ (*Hic c. 6* Magister) + ⁸ (Boeth./Seneca alternative on *familiaris inimicus*).
- **`[?]` flags:** none.
- **Page-split footer convention check (per Vol II Override §4):** p.501-L bottom holds only footer ¹ (codd. *carnis* subjection on *incurvatio*); p.501-R bottom holds footers ²–⁸ as a single column block. The long *peccatum interlinearis [Glossa]* prose block visible at p.501 L bottom is the *continuation* of p.500 R-2 footer ⁸ (the Alex. Hal. + Hesychius commentary on *Pater tuus Amorrhaeus*) overflowing onto the next page's L-margin — folded back into [^12]'s body here. Footers ⁷–⁸ on p.501 R are reserved for q3.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 501 -->

### Quaestio III. *Utrum tentatio carnis sit nobis difficilior tentatione diaboli.*

Tertio quaeritur, cui istarum tentationum sit difficilius resistere. Et quod tentationi carnis, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*

1. Per illud quod dicit Magister in littera[^1]: « *Tentatio carnis interior difficilius deiicitur, quia interius oppugnans de nostro contra nos roboratur* »; sed illi tentationi difficilius est resistere, quam difficilius est vincere: ergo etc.

2. Item, Seneca[^2]: « *Nulla pestis inimicior, quam familiaris inimicus* »; sed inimicus carnis est multo familiarior quam diabolus: ergo eius tentatio

<!-- page 502 -->

crudelior et periculosior, ac per hoc ad vincendum difficilior.

3. Item, quanto tentatio est ad nocendum efficacior, tanto difficilius est resistere tentationi; sed tentatio carnis efficacior est ad nocendum quam tentatio hostis, quia, cum tentatio hostis sit exercendae virtutis materia, tentatio carnis nunquam est sine culpa[^3]: ergo etc.

4. Item, tanto difficilius est resistere alicuius persuasioni, quanto ille qui persuadet, magis amatur; sed homo multum diligit carnem[^4] et multum odit diabolum: ergo multo difficilius est ei resistere impulsioni carnis quam suggestioni diaboli sive tentationi.

**Contra:**

*Ad oppositum.*

1. Quanto impugnans est fortior, tanto eius impugnationi difficilius resistitur; sed diabolus est hostis fortissimus, sicut dicitur Iob quadragesimo primo[^5]: *Non est potestas super terram, quae ei possit comparari*: ergo difficilius est eius tentationi sive impugnationi resistere quam ei tentationi, quae est ex carne.

2. Item, quanto tentans est versutior et callidior, tanto difficilius est eius laqueos et cautelas evadere; sed diabolus est versutissimus: ergo difficilius est eius illaqueationi sive tentationi resistere quam tentationi carnis.

3. Item, quanto inimicus est occultior, tanto minus potest homo eius impetum declinare; sed diabolus est hostis spiritualis et occultus, caro vero est hostis manifestus: ergo tentatio sive praelium diaboli maioris est periculi quam tentatio carnis: cum maiori igitur difficultate ei resistitur.

4. Item, facilius superatur quod est in nostra potestate, quam quod non est in nostra potestate; sed caro in nostra potestate est — nam ipsam possumus mortificare et *cum vitiis et concupiscentiis crucifigere*[^6], diabolum vero minime — ergo multo facilius est resistere eius tentationi quam tentationi diaboli.

5. Item, spiritus magis adhaeret bono proprio quam bono carnis, sive bono interiori quam bono inferiori; sed diabolus suggerit et inclinat ad bonum interius, dum tentat de peccatis spiritualibus; caro vero ad bonum inferius[^7], dum tentat de peccatis carnalibus. Si ergo difficilius repellitur quod est maioris adhaerentiae, difficilius repellitur tentatio hostis, quae est de peccato spirituali, quam tentatio carnis, quae est de peccato carnali.

6. Item, difficilius est resistere violentiis quam blanditiis, quia *violentum* importat de sua ratione impossibilitatem sive difficultatem resistendi; sed diabolus tentat violentando, sicut dicit Hugo[^8], caro autem tentat blandiendo: ergo difficilius superatur diabolus, quam superetur caro.

> **Conclusio.** *Si tentatio hostis et carnis est respectu eiusdem, sic difficilior est tentatio carnis; si autem est respectu diversorum, sic se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, sed plerumque excedit tentatio carnis.*

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum quaeritur, cui tentationi sit difficilius resistere, utrum tentationi carnis, vel hostis, *Dupliciter intelligitur.* dupliciter potest intelligi: aut respectu eiusdem peccati, aut respectu *alterius*. Si respectu *eiusdem* peccati, utpote peccati carnalis, ad quod instigat caro, instigat et diabolus; tunc respondendum *Conclusio 1.* est, quod tentatio carnis est difficilior propter coniunctionem carnis ad spiritum, ob quam magis animam incurvat; et sic intelligit Magister in littera, et rationes probant ad primam partem inductae.

Si autem intelligatur comparatio fieri respectu *diversorum* peccatorum, utpote tentatio carnis intelligatur respectu carnalium[^9], et tentatio hostis respectu peccatorum spiritualium, sic se habent ut *Conclusio 2.* excedentia et excessa. Quidam enim homines sunt, qui magis sunt proni ad peccata carnalia, utpote ad luxuriam, quam ad superbiam; et his difficilius est resistere tentationi *carnis* quam tentationi *hostis*. Quidam autem sunt, qui proniores sunt ad peccata spiritualia quam ad carnalia, utpote illi qui magis desiderant honores quam voluptates; et his difficilius est resistere tentationi *hostis* quam tentationi *carnis*. Si quis autem sit indifferens ad utrumque et aequaliter pronus, quantum est de se, ei quodam *Conclusio 3.* modo tentatio *carnis* est difficilior, quodam modo tentatio *hostis*. Tentatio *carnis* erit difficilior propter maiorem et magis intrinsecam et magis continuam adhaerentiam; tentatio vero *hostis* difficilior propter maiorem boni promissi apparentiam et propter latentiorem instigantis fallaciam. Sicut enim Gregorius in Moralibus[^10] ostendit, hostis antiquus multa,

<!-- page 503 -->

quae sunt vitia secundum veritatem, palliat sub specie virtutum.

*Epilogus.* Si igitur quaeratur, quae harum tentationum sit ad vincendum difficilior, si respectu eiusdem peccati intelligatur, respondendum est, quod tentatio carnis. Si respectu diversorum, sic se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, sicut ostensum est; et sic procedunt rationes ad utramque partem. — Si autem quaeratur, quae earum magis excedat alteram; dicen-*Conclusio 4.* dum, quod quia *omnis caro corrupit viam suam*[^11], et homines ex maiori parte carnales sunt et desideriis carnis obsequuntur; quod difficilius est resistere tentationi *carnis* quam *hostis*.

*Solutio oppositorum.* 1. 2. 3. Et ad rationes illas quae obiiciuntur in oppositum, quod hostis ille est fortior et astutior et occultior, facile est respondere, quia non permittitur tentare secundum totam suam potentiam et astutiam, immo reprimitur potestate divina.

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod caro est in nostra potestate; dicendum, quod etsi in nostra sit potestate secundum ordinem naturae, tamen propter perversitatem concupiscentiae *Notandum.* in multis et regnat ancilla et servit domina, et nimius amor carnis facit ventrem esse deum hominis[^12]; et ideo non est in nostra potestate, quousque liberemur de *potestate corporis huius, adiuvante gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum*. *Notandum.* Tanta enim est vis amoris, ut amantem amato quodam modo subiiciat. Unde etsi filius sit in potestate patris, non est tamen patri facile occidere vel affligere filium, sed valde difficile; sic in proposito intelligendum est, quia *nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit, sed nutrit et fovet eam*.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum interius magis adhaeret; dicendum, quod etsi magis adhaereat spiritui, secundum quod *spiritus* est, non tamen magis adhaeret, secundum quod *carnalis* est; nunc autem fere omnes homines carnales sunt, nec *permanet spiritus Dei in homine, quia caro est*[^13].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus tentat violentiis; dicendum, quod nulli infert violentiam simpliciter; violentare tamen dicitur quodam modo propter immissionem aliquarum tribulationum, quae non ita movent affectum, sicut carnis incitamenta, nisi caro ibi interponat partes suas.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the temptation of the flesh is more difficult for us than the temptation of the devil.*

Thirdly it is asked, to which of these temptations it is more difficult to resist. And that [the answer is] to the temptation of the flesh, seems [the case]:

*Foundations.*

1. By that which the Master says in the *littera*[^1]: « *The temptation of the flesh, being interior, is more difficult to cast off, because the one attacking from within is strengthened against us out of what is our own* »; but it is more difficult to resist that temptation which is more difficult to overcome: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Seneca[^2]: « *No pest is more unfriendly than a familiar enemy* »; but the enemy of the flesh is much more familiar than the devil: therefore his temptation is more cruel and more perilous, and through this more difficult to overcome.

3. Likewise, the more effective a temptation is at harming, the more difficult it is to resist that temptation; but the temptation of the flesh is more effective at harming than the temptation of the enemy, because, since the temptation of the enemy is matter for exercising virtue, the temptation of the flesh is never without fault[^3]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more one loves the one persuading, the more difficult it is to resist his persuasion; but a man greatly loves his flesh[^4] and greatly hates the devil: therefore it is much more difficult for him to resist the impulse of the flesh than the suggestion or temptation of the devil.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. The stronger the attacker, the more difficult it is to resist his attack; but the devil is a most powerful enemy, as is said in Job forty-one[^5]: *There is no power upon earth that can be compared to him*: therefore it is more difficult to resist his temptation or attack than that temptation which is from the flesh.

2. Likewise, the more crafty and cunning the tempter, the more difficult it is to escape his snares and tricks; but the devil is most crafty: therefore it is more difficult to resist his entrapment or temptation than the temptation of the flesh.

3. Likewise, the more hidden the enemy, the less can a man turn aside his onslaught; but the devil is a spiritual and hidden enemy, while the flesh is a manifest enemy: therefore the temptation or warfare of the devil is of greater peril than the temptation of the flesh: with greater difficulty therefore is it resisted.

4. Likewise, what is in our own power is more easily overcome than what is not in our power; but the flesh is in our power — for we can mortify it and *crucify it with its vices and concupiscences*[^6], while the devil in no way — therefore it is much easier to resist his temptation than the temptation of the devil.

5. Likewise, the spirit clings more to its own good than to the good of the flesh, that is, to the interior good more than to the inferior good; but the devil suggests and inclines toward the interior good when he tempts concerning spiritual sins; while the flesh [inclines] toward the inferior good[^7] when it tempts concerning carnal sins. If therefore what is of greater adherence is more difficult to repel, then the temptation of the enemy, which concerns spiritual sin, is more difficult to repel than the temptation of the flesh, which concerns carnal sin.

6. Likewise, it is more difficult to resist violence than to resist blandishments, because the *violent* carries in its very definition an impossibility or difficulty of resisting; but the devil tempts by using violence, as Hugh says[^8], while the flesh tempts by blandishment: therefore the devil is overcome more difficultly than the flesh is overcome.

> **Conclusion.** *If the temptation of the enemy and of the flesh is with respect to the same [sin], then the temptation of the flesh is more difficult; if however it is with respect to different [sins], then they stand as the exceeding and the exceeded, but for the most part the temptation of the flesh exceeds.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that when it is asked, to which temptation it is more difficult to resist, whether to that of the flesh or of the enemy, *It is understood in two ways.* this can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the same sin, or with respect to *another*. If with respect to the *same* sin, for example a carnal sin, toward which the flesh instigates, the devil also instigates; then it must be answered *Conclusion 1.* that the temptation of the flesh is more difficult on account of the conjunction of the flesh to the spirit, by which it the more bends down the soul; and thus the Master understands [it] in the *littera*, and the reasons adduced for the first part prove [this].

If however the comparison be understood to be made with respect to *different* sins, namely if the temptation of the flesh be understood with respect to carnal [sins][^9], and the temptation of the enemy with respect to spiritual sins, then they stand as *Conclusion 2.* the exceeding and the exceeded. For there are certain men who are more prone to carnal sins, such as to lust, than to pride; and for these it is more difficult to resist the temptation of the *flesh* than the temptation of the *enemy*. There are however certain others who are more prone to spiritual than to carnal sins, such as those who desire honors more than pleasures; and for these it is more difficult to resist the temptation of the *enemy* than the temptation of the *flesh*. If however there be one who is indifferent to both and equally prone, so far as concerns himself, for him in one way *Conclusion 3.* the temptation of the *flesh* is more difficult, in another way the temptation of the *enemy*. The temptation of the *flesh* will be more difficult on account of its greater and more intrinsic and more continual adherence; but the temptation of the *enemy* [will be more difficult] on account of the greater appearance of the good promised, and on account of the more hidden deceit of the one instigating. For as Gregory in the *Morals*[^10] shows, the ancient enemy disguises many things, which are vices according to truth, under the appearance of virtues.

*Epilogue.* If therefore it be asked, which of these temptations is more difficult to overcome, if it be understood with respect to the same sin, it must be answered that [it is] the temptation of the flesh. If with respect to different [sins], then they stand as the exceeding and the exceeded, as has been shown; and thus the reasons proceed to either part. — If however it be asked, which of them exceeds the other more; it must be said *Conclusion 4.*, that, because *all flesh hath corrupted its way*[^11], and men for the greater part are carnal and obey the desires of the flesh, that it is more difficult to resist the temptation of the *flesh* than of the *enemy*.

*Solution of the opposites.* 1. 2. 3. And to those reasons which are objected on the opposite side, that that enemy is stronger and craftier and more hidden, it is easy to respond, because he is not permitted to tempt according to his full power and craft, but rather is restrained by divine power.

4. To that which is objected, that the flesh is in our power; it must be said that, although it is in our power according to the order of nature, nevertheless, on account of the perversity of concupiscence *Note.* the handmaid in many cases reigns and the mistress serves, and the excessive love of the flesh makes the belly to be a man's god[^12]; and therefore it is not in our power, until we are freed from *the power of this body, with the grace of God assisting through Jesus Christ Our Lord*. *Note.* For so great is the force of love, that in some way it subjects the lover to the beloved. Whence, even though the son is in the power of the father, nevertheless it is not easy for the father to kill or to afflict the son, but very difficult; thus in the matter at hand it must be understood, because *no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it*.

5. To that which is objected, that the interior good adheres more; it must be said that, although it adheres more to the *spirit* insofar as it is *spirit*, nevertheless it does not adhere more insofar as he is *carnal*; but now nearly all men are carnal, *nor does the Spirit of God remain in man, because he is flesh*[^13].

6. To that which is objected, that the devil tempts with violence; it must be said that he inflicts violence on no one, simply speaking; he is nevertheless said to use violence in some way on account of the infliction of certain tribulations, which do not move the affect in the way that the incitements of the flesh do, unless the flesh interpose its part there.

la: Hic c. 6. — Cfr. hic scholion.

en: Here c. 6. — Compare here the scholion.

la: Vel potius Boeth., III. *de Consol.* prosa 5: « *Quae vero pestis efficacior ad nocendum quam familiaris inimicus*? » Seneca *de Moribus*: « *Amicos secundae res parant, adversae certissime probant. Peiora sunt tecta odia quam aperta.* » Et l. *Declam. in prologo* ait: « *Magis nocent insidiae, quae latent.* » Inter proverbia, quae sub Senecae nomine circumferuntur et in ed. Basil. operum Senecae (a. 1529.) in fine inveniuntur, etiam hoc habetur: *Gravior inimicus, qui latet sub pectore.* — Pro *inimicior*, quam vocem substituimus pro verbo minus usitato *inimicitior*, quod in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 exstat, plures codd. *immitior*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *efficacior*.

en: Or rather Boethius, *On the Consolation* III, prose 5: « *Indeed, what pest is more effective at harm than a familiar enemy*? » Seneca, *On Morals*: « *Good fortune secures friends, adversity most certainly puts them to the test. Concealed hatreds are worse than open ones.* » And in *Declamations*, in the prologue, he says: « *Hidden snares do more harm.* » Among the proverbs circulated under Seneca's name and printed at the end of the Basel edition of Seneca's works (1529), this too is found: *A graver enemy is the one who lies hidden under the breast.* — For *inimicior*, the word we have substituted for the less customary *inimicitior*, which appears in many codices and in editions 1 and 2; several codices read *immitior*; the Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 reads *efficacior*.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. et hic scholion.

en: Compare here the *littera* of the Master, c. 6., and here the scholion.

la: Eph. 5, 29: *Nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit, sed nutrit et fovet eam* etc. — August., II. *de Serm. Domini in monte*, c. 14. n. 47: *Quis enim est qui diligat diabolum? sed tamen patitur.* — Paulo inferius Vat. cum paucis codd. omittit *ei*.

en: Eph. 5, 29: *For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it* etc. — Augustine, *On the Sermon of the Lord on the Mount* II, c. 14, n. 47: *For who is there that loves the devil? yet nevertheless he endures him.* — A little below, the Vatican edition with a few codices omits *ei*.

la: Vers. 21.

en: Verse 21.

la: Gal. 5, 24: *Qui autem sunt Christi, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis.*

en: Gal. 5, 24: *And they that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.*

la: Codd. F aa *exterius*.

en: Codices F and aa read *exterius* [exterior].

la: Libr. II. *Allegor. in Nov. Testam.* c. 13. sic ait: *Tentare etenim est callide experiri et quasi blandis quibusdam conatibus praemissis ante violentam impulsionem probare.*

en: Book II of the *Allegories on the New Testament*, c. 13, thus says: *For to tempt is to make trial cunningly and as it were to test by certain bland attempts sent ahead before the violent impulsion.*

la: Cod. F voci *carnalium* praemittit *peccatorum*.

en: Codex F prefixes *peccatorum* [sins] to the word *carnalium*.

la: Libr. XXXI. c. 39. n. 78; XXXII. c. 22. n. 45; XXXIII. c. 24. n. 44. — Pro *Moralibus* Vat. *Homilia*.

en: Book XXXI, c. 39, n. 78; XXXII, c. 22, n. 45; XXXIII, c. 24, n. 44. — For *Moralibus* the Vatican edition reads *Homilia*.

la: Gen. 6, 12: *Omnis quippe caro corruperat viam suam super terram.* — Multi codd. cum ed. 2 minus bene *quia*.

en: Gen. 6, 12: *For all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth.* — Many codices with edition 2 read, less well, *quia*.

la: Respicitur illud Philip. 3, 19: *Quorum deus venter est*; et dein illud Rom. 7, 24. seq.: *Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum.* — Eph. 5, 29.

en: Reference is made to Phil. 3, 19: *Whose god is their belly*; and then to Rom. 7, 24f.: *Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ Our Lord.* — Eph. 5, 29.

la: Gen. 6, 3: *Dixitque Deus: Non permanebit spiritus meus in homine in aeternum, quia caro est.*

en: Gen. 6, 3: *And God said: My spirit shall not remain in man for ever, because he is flesh.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sententia Magistri (hic c. 6.), « quod tentatio carnis interior difficilius vincitur », a S. Bonaventura aliisque, adhibitis tamen quibusdam distinctionibus, approbatur et ab Aegidio R. novem viis et argumentis declaratur. — In fundam. 3. dicitur: « Tentatio *carnis* nunquam est sine culpa », quod hic dub. 4. expressius affirmatur. Hanc propositionem distincta quaestione probare nituntur Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 2. § 1.), S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2.), B. Albert. (hic a. 4.), Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 2.), Durand. (hic q. 1.). Sed secundum S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 5. et S. I. II. q. 17. a. 7.) hoc intelligendum est de tentatione, quae exsurgit ex *apprehensione delectabilis*, non ex *sola dispositione corporalis organi.* Idem sentit Aegid. R. (hic q. 1. a. 4. et dub. lat. 1.). Alio modo loquendi utitur Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 3.) dicens, « quod non semper est peccatum in tentatione, quae est ex carne », de quo cfr. Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 3.). — Quoad sententiam S. Bonaventurae cfr. infra d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.

**II.** S. Thom. quaestionem tangit hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The opinion of the Master (here c. 6.), « that the interior temptation of the flesh is more difficult to overcome », is approved, with certain distinctions, by St. Bonaventure and others, and is explained by Aegidius Romanus in nine ways and arguments. — In *fundam.* 3. it is said: « The temptation of the *flesh* is never without fault », which is here in dub. 4. more expressly affirmed. By a distinct question this proposition is sought to be proved by Alex. of Hales (*S. p. II. q. 101. m. 7. a. 2. § 1.*), St. Thomas (here q. 1. a. 2.), B. Albert (here a. 4.), Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 1. a. 2.), Durandus (here q. 1.). But according to St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 5. and *S. I. II. q. 17. a. 7.*) this is to be understood of the temptation that arises from the *apprehension of something delectable*, not from the *mere disposition of the bodily organ*. The same view is held by Aegid. R. (here q. 1. a. 4. and *dub. lat. 1.*). Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2. q. 3.) speaks in another way, saying that « there is not always sin in the temptation which is from the flesh »; concerning which compare Dionys. Carth. (here q. 3.). — As to the opinion of St. Bonaventure, compare below *d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.*

**II.** St. Thomas touches the question here q. 1. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert, here a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set 2026-05-29 from 450 dpi column-band PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p501-R-{0..2}.png`, `vol2-p502-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`, `vol2-p503-L-{0..2}.png`) per Vol II Override §1–2 (PDF authoritative for cascade-fragmented Respondeo + footers). Raw OCR `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 35224–35370 used for anchor positions and footer-marker spacing only.

**Page-split map (13 apparatus entries [^1]–[^13]).**
- p. 501 R-2 footers ⁷–⁸ = [^1]–[^2] — **received as hand-off from a2-q2** per resume note 2026-05-29 ("p.501 R ⁷–⁸ reserved for q3"). ⁷ = *Hic c. 6.* Magister cross-ref anchoring at fund. arg. 1's *Tentatio carnis interior difficilius deiicitur*. ⁸ = composite Boeth./Seneca/Declam. provenance debate for the "*Nulla pestis inimicior quam familiaris inimicus*" maxim circulated *sub Senecae nomine*, with codd. variant apparatus for *inimicior* / *inimicitior* / *immitior* / *efficacior*.
- p. 502 L-2 footers ¹–³ = [^3]–[^5]: *Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 6. et hic scholion* (fund. 3 *nunquam sine culpa*); Eph 5, 29 + August. *de Serm. Domini in monte* II c. 14 n. 47 (fund. 4 *multum diligit carnem*); Iob 41, 21 cross-ref (Contra 1 *Non est potestas super terram*).
- p. 502 R-2 footer (single footnote ⁴) is the ¹ Codd. F aa *exterius* variant for Contra 5 — entered as [^7] in this chunk's renumbering. The visual page is mostly text; footnote band has only this single anchor at the column foot.
- p. 503 L-2 footers ¹–⁵ = [^11]–[^13] + a Vulgate / Augustine cross-ref pair: ¹ Gen 6, 12 + *quia* variant; ² *quia* codd. note; ³ Phil 3, 19 + Rom 7, 24 + Eph 5, 29 cross-ref under *ventrem esse deum hominis*; ⁴ Eph 5, 29 (re-cited under *carnem suam odio habuit*); ⁵ Gen 6, 3. **Footnote-numbering compression:** The Quaracchi footer ⁴ on p. 503 (Eph 5, 29) re-cites the same verse already anchored under [^4] in this chunk; per Vol II convention (re-cite consolidation) it is folded into [^12]'s body rather than emitted as a separate apparatus entry. Likewise the standalone ² *quia* codd. note is folded into [^11]. Final chunk count = 13 unique entries vs. raw OCR ~16 footer-markers (within Vol II ±10–18 tolerance band).

**Hand-offs.**
- *Received:* 2 (p. 501 R-2 footers ⁷–⁸ from a2-q2 → this chunk's [^1]–[^2]).
- *Forwarded:* NONE to d21-a3-q1. QUAESTIO III closes cleanly at p. 503 L-mid with the *Ad 6* answer (« *nisi caro ibi interponat partes suas* »), followed immediately by the SCHOLION I + II block spanning p. 503 L-bottom. ARTICULUS III opens fresh at p. 503 L-foot (raw 35381) with its own *Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de quantitate peccati primorum parentum…* + new TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (q1 *utrum primum peccatum potuerit esse veniale*, q2 *utrum fuerit remediabile*, q3 *utrum fuerit magis grave*) + own QUAESTIO I + own apparatus block opening on p. 503 L-2 footer ⁶+ (Gen 6, 12 etc., not migrated here).

**`[?]` flags.** None. All 13 anchors crisp at 450 dpi.

**SCHOLION.** `has_scholion: true`. Two scholia on p. 503 L-bottom span (centered, narrow-band). SCHOLION I = nine-ways argumentation of Aegid. R. for Magister's *tentatio carnis interior difficilius vincitur* + commentator-roll for the *nunquam sine culpa* sub-thesis (Alex. Hal., S. Thom., B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Durand.) + S. Thom. distinction *apprehensio delectabilis* vs *sola dispositio corporalis organi* + Richard. a Med. dissent + cross-ref to *infra d. 24. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.* SCHOLION II = parallel-loci commentator-roll for the comparison-with-diaboli question proper (S. Thom., B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., Dionys. Carth.). Unlike a2-q1's SCHOLION II (joint q1+q2 roll), this SCHOLION II is local to q3 only — though Aegid. R.'s *hic q. 1. a. 3.* cross-ref shows the commentator tradition routes the comparison question through their own articulation.

**Vol II Override § references.** §1 (PDF authoritative for Respondeo + footers); §2 (column-band L→R top→bottom + body bands then footer bands); §3 (offset +22 — printed 501 = PDF 523); §4 (cross-chunk footer split — received ⁷–⁸ from a2-q2); §5 (article's last quaestio carries the SCHOLION; q3 has scholion while q2 had `has_scholion: false` per sibling-pointer convention).