title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Whether the name 'principle' in divine [things] can be taken personally or notionally

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I. *De principio quantum ad multiplicitatem.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum nomen principium in divinis personaliter sive notionaliter accipi possit.*

Quod autem accipiatur notionaliter, ostenditur sic.

1. Augustinus quinto *de Trinitate*[^1]: « Pater ad Filium principium est, quia genuit eum »: ergo idem importatur nomine principii, quod nomine generationis: ergo tenetur personaliter sive notionaliter.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia ubicumque est vera[^2] ratio emanationis et originis, ibi est vera ratio principii; sed in divinis vere et proprie est ratio emanationis: ergo ibi vere et proprie est ratio principii.

**Contra:**

1. *Principium* et *primum* sunt idem[^3]: ergo ubi cadit ratio principii est dicere *primum*, et ubi est dicere *primum* est dicere *prius* — quia superlativum praesupponit comparativum — ubi et prius, ibi posterius: ergo a primo, ubi est ratio principii, ibi est ratio posterioris. Sed in divinis nullo modo recipitur, quod una persona sit posterior altera[^4]: ergo nullo modo persona est principium personae.

2. Item, in creaturis idem est principium et initium, sicut patet per Philosophum[^5], ergo ubi non recipitur initium, nec principium; sed omnes personae in divinis sunt sine initio, ergo et sine principio: ergo principium non dicit respectum personae ad personam: ergo non accipitur personaliter sive notionaliter.

3. Item, idem est causa et principium re, differens ratione, quia principium dicitur quantum ad fieri, causa quantum ad esse[^6]: ergo si maioris nobilitatis est esse quam fieri, proprius debet ibi accipi ratio causae quam principii; sed non recipitur, quod una persona sit causa, et alia sit effectus: ergo nec debet ibi recipi intentio principii.

4. Item, *Deus est alpha et omega, principium et finis*[^7], et utrumque est aequalis nobilitatis; sed intentio finis ita dicitur de Deo essentialiter, quod nullo modo personaliter — Deus enim est ita finis creaturae, quod non est finis personae — ergo similiter videtur, quod ita sit principium creaturae, quod nullo modo sit principium personae.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Ratio principii recipitur in divinis, praecipue quoad personam Patris, non autem ratio nec causae et effectus, nec prioris et posterioris, nec initii et initiati, nec finis et eius quod est ad finem.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis est vera origo sive emanatio, et non tantum vera, sed etiam completissima. Ad hoc autem, quod sit perfectissima[^8], necesse est, quod emanans habeat cum producente aequalitatem omnimodam ac unitatem in substantia, quia nihil potest aequari Deo nisi Deus. Si ergo emanatio et origo debet[^9] exprimi convenienter et catholice, debent recipi nomina dicentia originis veritatem, et non recipi nomina importantia imperfectionem vel diversitatem vel inaequalitatem.

Quoniam ergo *principium* et *principiatum* dicunt originis veritatem, ideo utrumque recipitur in divinis, maxime autem intentio principii. Sed quoniam *posterius* dicit imperfectionem, et *initium* similiter, quia dicit imperfectam durationem, scilicet inceptionem; et intentio causae importat diversitatem, quia causa est, *cuius esse sequitur aliud*[^10]; et intentio finis inaequalitatem, quia finis melior est his quae sunt ad finem: ideo nec intentio prioris et posterioris, nec initii et initiati, nec causae et effectus, nec finis et eius quod est ad finem, recipitur in persona respectu personae. Sed intentio producentis et producti, quia possibile est, quod productus sit summe perfectus et[^11] aequetur producenti, ideo recipitur in divinis, similiter et intentio principii.

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**Ad opposita:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ad principium sequitur prius, et ad hoc posterius; dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur secundum Hilarium[^12], « Pater maior est Filio, nec tamen Filius minor » — quia sonat in imperfectionem hoc quod est *minor*, ideo, quamvis recipiatur, quod Pater sit prior Filio, quia iste est ab illo, non e converso, non tamen recipitur, quod iste sit posterior. Attamen nec ratio prioris omnino recipitur proprie; quia cum in divinis sit ordo et origo, proprie est origo, et minus proprie ordo, nec est nisi solum ratione originis[^13]. Quoniam ergo principium principaliter importat originem, et prius ordinem; ideo simpliciter recipitur intentio principii, intentio vero prioris minus proprie et cum determinatione; intentio autem principii, prout privat anterius, propriissime recipitur in Deo, maxime quantum ad personam Patris. Et ideo non sequitur, quod ita proprie dicatur prius, quod tantum dicit respectum ad posterius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de initio, dicendum, quod initium uno modo accipitur large ad principium essendi et durandi; alio modo proprie ad principium durandi, ut illud dicatur habere initium, quod incipit esse. Primo modo potest accipi in divinis, et sic accipit Hilarius in *littera*[^14]; secundo vero modo non potest, et sic non aequivalet principio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de causa, quod idem est quod principium; dicendum quod in creaturis idem est principium et causa; et hoc est, quia productum differt a producente, et ideo potest dici effectus eius, et istud potest dici causa; et in idem concurrit intentio causae et principii, et similiter nomen; sed non ita in divinis, quia ibi potest esse unius substantiae producens cum producto. Ideo non valet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fine, iam patet responsio, quia finis, quantum est de se, dicit excessum bonitatis respectu eius quod est ad finem, non sic principium respectu eius quod est ex illo; et ideo Deus non potest esse finis nisi creaturae[^15] inaequalis, potest tamen esse et est principium personae omnino aequalis. Et ideo una persona non est finis alterius, est tamen principium.

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english:
### ARTICLE I. *On the principle with respect to multiplicity.*

### QUESTION I. *Whether the name "principle" in divine [things] can be taken personally or notionally.*

That it is taken notionally is shown thus.

1. Augustine in book five *On the Trinity*[^1]: "The Father is the principle to the Son, since he begot him": therefore the same is imported by the name *principle* as by the name *generation*: therefore it is held personally or notionally.

2. Likewise, the same is seen by reason, since wherever there is a true[^2] account of emanation and origin, there is a true account of a principle; but in divine [things] there is truly and properly an account of emanation: therefore there truly and properly is the account of a principle.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Principle* and *first* are the same[^3]: therefore wherever the account of *principle* falls, one must say *first*, and wherever one must say *first*, one must say *prior* — since the superlative presupposes the comparative — and where [there is] *prior*, there [is] *posterior*: therefore from *first*, where there is the account of a principle, there is the account of *posterior*. But in divine [things] it is in no way admitted that one person is posterior to another[^4]: therefore in no way is a person the principle of a person.

2. Likewise, in creatures *principle* and *beginning* are the same, as is plain through the Philosopher[^5], therefore where *beginning* is not admitted, neither [is] *principle*; but all persons in divine [things] are without beginning, therefore also without principle: therefore *principle* does not express a relation of person to person: therefore it is not taken personally or notionally.

3. Likewise, *cause* and *principle* are the same in reality, differing in account, since *principle* is said with respect to becoming, *cause* with respect to being[^6]: therefore if being is of greater nobility than becoming, the account of *cause* ought to be received there more properly than that of *principle*; but it is not admitted that one person is cause and another effect: therefore neither ought the notion of *principle* to be received there.

4. Likewise, *God is alpha and omega, principle and end*[^7], and each is of equal nobility; but the notion of *end* is said of God essentially in such a way that in no way [is it said] personally — for God is the end of the creature in such a way that he is not the end of [a divine] person — therefore similarly it seems that he is the principle of the creature in such a way that he is in no way the principle of [a divine] person.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The account of "principle" is admitted in divine [things], chiefly with respect to the person of the Father, but not the account of cause and effect, nor of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine [things] there is a true origin or emanation, and not only true but also most complete. For it to be most perfect[^8], it is necessary that the emanating [person] have with the producer an equality in every mode and unity in substance, since nothing can be equal to God except God. If therefore emanation and origin must[^9] be expressed fittingly and catholicly, names that express the truth of origin must be admitted, and names that import imperfection or diversity or inequality must not be admitted.

Since therefore *principle* and *that-which-is-from-the-principle* express the truth of origin, both are admitted in divine [things], but most of all the notion of *principle*. But since *posterior* expresses imperfection, and *beginning* likewise, since it expresses an imperfect duration, namely an inception; and the notion of *cause* imports diversity, since a cause is *that whose being follows another*[^10]; and the notion of *end* [imports] inequality, since the end is better than those things which are toward the end: therefore neither the notion of prior and posterior, nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of cause and effect, nor of end and that-which-is-toward-the-end, is admitted in [a divine] person with respect to [a divine] person. But the notion of producer and produced, since it is possible that the produced be supremely perfect and[^11] be equal to the producer, is therefore admitted in divine [things], and likewise the notion of *principle*.

**To the opposing arguments:**

1. To that which is objected, that *prior* follows upon *principle*, and *posterior* upon *prior*; it must be said that, as it is said according to Hilary[^12], "the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not less" — since *less* sounds [as something] toward imperfection, therefore, although it is admitted that the Father is prior to the Son, since the latter is from the former, not conversely, yet it is not admitted that the latter is posterior. However, neither is the account of *prior* admitted altogether properly; since although in divine [things] there is order and origin, properly there is origin, and less properly order, and [order] is only by reason of origin[^13]. Since therefore *principle* principally imports origin, and *prior* [imports] order; therefore the notion of *principle* is admitted simply, but the notion of *prior* less properly and with qualification; and the notion of *principle*, insofar as it privates anteriority, is most properly admitted in God, especially with respect to the person of the Father. And therefore it does not follow that *prior* is said so properly that it expresses only a relation to *posterior*.

2. To that which is objected concerning *beginning*, it must be said that *beginning* is taken in one mode broadly for the principle of being and of enduring; in another mode properly for the principle of enduring, so that that is said to have a beginning which begins to be. In the first mode it can be taken in divine [things], and thus Hilary takes it in the *littera*[^14]; but in the second mode it cannot, and thus it is not equivalent to *principle*.

3. To that which is objected concerning *cause*, that it is the same as *principle*; it must be said that in creatures *principle* and *cause* are the same; and this is because the produced [thing] differs from the producer, and therefore can be called its *effect*, and that [other] can be called *cause*; and the notion of *cause* and of *principle* coincide in the same [thing], and likewise the name; but not so in divine [things], since there the producer can be of one substance with the produced. Therefore that [argument] does not hold.

4. To that which is objected concerning *end*, the response is already plain, since the *end*, of itself, expresses an excess of goodness with respect to that which is toward the end; not so the *principle* with respect to that which is from it; and therefore God cannot be the end except of an unequal creature[^15], yet he can be and is the principle of an altogether equal person. And therefore one person is not the end of another, yet it is the principle.

en: Several codices, such as K S V W, with ed. 6, prefix *unum* ("one") to the word *principium*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc deest *vera*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and codex cc the word *vera* ("true") is missing.

la: Codd. aa bb addunt *secundum Philosophum*. — Verba Philosophi integra invenies supra pag. 215, nota 9. Cfr. et IV. *Topic.* c. 1, ubi: *Principium est primum, et primum principium*.

en: Codices aa bb add *secundum Philosophum* ("according to the Philosopher"). — The Philosopher's full words you will find above on p. 215, note 9. Cf. also IV. *Topics* c. 1, where: "The principle is the first, and the first is the principle".

la: Cod. Y sic: *quia nulla persona est posterior altera*.

en: Cod. Y [reads] thus: "since no person is posterior to another".

la: Cfr. V. *Metaph.* text. 1 seqq. (IV, c. 1).

en: Cf. V. *Metaph.* text. 1 ff. (IV, c. 1).

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 1 seq. (IV, c. 1). — Paulo inferius multi codd. *prius* pro *proprius*; lectio non praeferenda.

en: Cf. Aristotle, V. *Metaph.* text. 1 ff. (IV, c. 1). — A little below, many codices [read] *prius* ("prior") for *proprius* ("more properly"); the reading is not to be preferred.

la: Apoc. 22, 13: *Ego sum Alpha et Omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis*. — Mox post *ita finis creaturae*, quod cod. Q pro *non* repetit *nullo modo*.

en: Apoc. 22:13: "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the principle and the end". — Soon after *ita finis creaturae* ("so the end of the creature"), cod. Q in place of *non* repeats *nullo modo* ("in no way").

la: Codd. P Q sic: *completissima. Ut autem sit completissima, necesse est.*

en: Codices P Q [read] thus: "*most complete. But for it to be most complete, it is necessary.*"

la: Cod. bb *debent*.

en: Cod. bb [reads] *debent* ("they ought").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 120, nota 7. — De propositione subsequenti ait Aristot., III. *Topic.* c. 1: *Finis iis quae sunt ad finem eligibilior videtur esse, et duorum eligibilius est quod propinquius est fini*.

en: Cf. above p. 120, note 7. — On the following proposition Aristotle says, III. *Topics* c. 1: "The end seems to be more eligible than those things which are toward the end, and of two [things] that which is closer to the end is more eligible".

la: Codd. S W Y *cum*.

en: Codices S W Y [read] *cum* ("with" / "since").

la: Libr. IX. *de Trin.* n. 54 et 56. De quo verbo Hilarii cfr. d. XVI. c. 2. in lit. Magistri, et ibid. in Comment. dub. 4 et 5.

en: Book IX. *On the Trinity*, n. 54 and 56. On this saying of Hilary cf. d. XVI, c. 2, in the *littera* of the Master, and in the same place in the Commentary, dub. 4 and 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Aliquanto superius post *posterior* cod. K supplet *illo*, et multi codd. cum edd. ibi verbum *sit* ante vocem *posterior* omittunt. Mox Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *proprias est origo* pro *proprie est origo*, et subinde post *nec* codd. B P Q repetunt *ordo*, cui voci cod. B insuper adiungit *ibi*.

en: Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — A little above, after *posterior*, cod. K supplies *illo* ("[than] him"), and many codices with the printed editions there omit the verb *sit* ("be") before the word *posterior*. Soon the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] *proprias est origo* for *proprie est origo* ("origin is properly"), and shortly after, after *nec*, codd. B P Q repeat *ordo* ("order"), to which word cod. B further adds *ibi* ("there").

la: Cap. 3. — Paulo ante multi codd. cum ed. I omittunt *in divinis*, pro quibus verbis cod. T substituit *hic*.

en: Chapter 3. — A little before, many codices with ed. I omit *in divinis* ("in divine [things]"), in place of which words cod. T substitutes *hic* ("here").

la: Pro *creaturae* cod. M *respectu creaturae*.

en: In place of *creaturae* ("of the creature"), cod. M [reads] *respectu creaturae* ("with respect to the creature").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Agitur hic de principio producente, quod secundum sententiam communem in divinis tripliciter accipi potest (cfr. quaest. seq.), scilicet *essentialiter*, ut tres personae sunt principium creaturae, *personaliter*, quia solus Pater est principium Filii, *notionaliter*, quia Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum S. Hic quaeritur tantum de secunda ac tertia acceptione huius termini. — Purificato conceptu principii ab omni imperfectione, diversitate, vel inaequalitate (de quo vide supra d. 20, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2), vocabulo *principium* uti possumus etiam quoad emanationes ad intra, immo non recusat S. Doctor cum Patribus Graecis etiam « intentionem principiati » admittere. De hoc dicit Angelicus (S. I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2): « Sed hoc non est in usu doctorum nostrorum ». — Quod non recipiatur ratio prioris et posterioris (d. 12, q. 1), nec initii et initiati, nec finis et medii, nec causae et causati, insinuatur hic in corp. et accuratius in solut. oppositorum. Quoad solut. ad 1. cfr. S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 3. — In solut. ad 3. tangitur antiqua quaedam differentia inter Latinos et Graecos. Latini, ut errorem Arii etiam in verbis excluderent, respuebant nomen *causae* respectu ad terminos emanationum *ad intra*. Graeci autem, iuxta axioma Aristotelis, quod in 3. ad oppos. citatur (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι), idem dicunt significare *principium* et *causa*. Etiam Graecorum modus loquendi a Florentino (Decret. unionis Graecorum) approbatus est.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 70, m. 1, 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 33, a. 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1; S. p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 1, a. 1, 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32, q. 2, n. 10, 11; q. 3, n. 5; a. 54, q. 6; a. 55, n. 5. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Here the question concerns the *producing* principle, which according to the common opinion can be taken in divine [things] in three ways (cf. the following question), namely *essentially*, as the three persons are the principle of the creature; *personally*, since the Father alone is the principle of the Son; *notionally*, since the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit. Here it is asked only of the second and third acceptance of this term. — With the concept of *principle* purified of all imperfection, diversity, or inequality (on which see above d. 20, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2), we can use the word *principle* even with respect to the emanations *ad intra*; indeed, the Holy Doctor does not refuse, with the Greek Fathers, to admit even "the notion of *that-which-is-from-a-principle*". Of this the Angelic [Doctor] says (*Summa* I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2): "But this is not in the usage of our doctors". — That the account of prior and posterior is not admitted (d. 12, q. 1), nor of beginning and what-is-begun, nor of end and means, nor of cause and what-is-caused, is suggested here in the body and more accurately in the solution to the opposing arguments. As to the solution to argument 1, cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit. ad 3. — In the solution to argument 3 a certain ancient difference between the Latins and the Greeks is touched upon. The Latins, in order to exclude the error of Arius even in words, rejected the name *cause* with respect to the termini of the *ad intra* emanations. The Greeks, however, following the axiom of Aristotle which is cited in argument 3 *ad oppositum* (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι), say that *principle* and *cause* signify the same. Even the Greeks' manner of speaking was approved by the [Council of] Florence (Decree of Union of the Greeks).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 70, m. 1, 3. — Scotus, on this and the following question in both *Scripta*, here a unique question. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 33, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 1; *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 1, a. 1, 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here a unique question, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 32, q. 2, n. 10, 11; q. 3, n. 5; a. 54, q. 6; a. 55, n. 5. — Durandus, on this and the following question, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 1.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether this name principle, if it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum hoc nomen principium, si sumitur essentialiter et notionaliter, dicatur univoce, an aequivoce.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomen *principium*, cum accipiatur essentialiter et notionaliter, dicatur univoce, vel aequivoce. Et quod univoce, videtur.

1. Basilius[^1] dicit, quod Filio Dei accipere cum creaturis est commune, sed habere per essentiam proprium. Si igitur commune est accipere: ergo et dare; et si hoc, cum penes hoc accipiatur ratio principii respectu Filii et respectu creaturae, videtur, quod dicatur univoce.

2. Item, sic differt principium essentialiter dictum et notionaliter, sicut sapientia et sapientia genita; sed non dicitur aequivoce sapientia sic et sic: ergo etc.

3. Item, nihil dicitur multipliciter[^2] ex hoc, quod dicitur de genere et de specie, sive ex hoc, quod habet unum suppositum et plura — quia multiplicitas respicit significationes diversas, non supposita — sed *principium* essentialiter dictum est in plus et pluribus convenit quam notionaliter et convenit eisdem ipsis: ergo non dicitur multipliciter, sed univoce.

4. Item, quod non dicatur analogice, videtur, quia ubi est analogia, ibi est prius et posterius; sed in divinis non est prius et posterius: ergo nec analogia. — Et iterum videtur, quod nec aequivoce, quia ubi est aequivocatio, ibi est diversitas significationis; sed persona et essentia non sunt diversa: ergo non potest accipi aequivoce.

**Sed contra:**

1. Quod dicatur multipliciter, videtur primo per Magistrum in *littera*[^3], qui dicit, quod hoc nomen *principium* multiplicem facit intelligentiam: ergo dicitur multipliciter.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia isti actus *generare*, *spirare*, *creare* sunt ipsius principii, secundum quod differenter accipitur; sed non est unam communem rationem invenire ad istos actus: ergo nec ad principium, quod dicit respectum sic differentem.

3. Item, regula est Philosophi[^4], quod si aliquid in una sui acceptione habet unum oppositum et in alia aliud, dicitur multipliciter; sed *principium* essentialiter dicitur respectu creati, et notionaliter respectu increati: ergo multipliciter sic et sic.

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4. Item, *principium* essentialiter dictum dicitur temporaliter, notionaliter dictum aeternaliter; sed nihil est commune univocum aeterno et temporali: ergo etc.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Nomen principii, essentialiter et notionaliter dictum, accipitur nec univoce nec aequivoce, sed analogice.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nomen accipi differenter in divinis potest esse tripliciter: aut quantum ad suppositum, aut quantum ad significatum, aut quantum ad connotatum. Primo modo accipitur differenter hoc nomen *Deus*, cum dicitur: «*Deus est Trinitas*», et «*Deus generat*», quia in prima stat pro natura, in secunda pro persona; et illud non inducit aliquam multiplicitatem[^5]. — Alio modo contingit terminum differenter accipi quantum ad significatum, secundum quod ipse terminus in una sui acceptione significat essentiam, in alia personam, sicut hoc nomen *pater*, prout Deus dicitur pater Filii, et prout dicitur pater noster; et hoc inducit aequivocationem, quia est diversitas significationis non in re ipsa, sed in significando. — Tertio modo contingit differenter accipi ratione connotati, ut puta hoc nomen *principium*, dictum essentialiter, connotat effectum creatum[^6], dictum personaliter, nihil connotat creatum; et illud inducit multiplicitatem secundum analogiam, non secundum aequivocationem: secundum analogiam quidem, quia accipitur pro diversis sive diversa importat, quae non habent nisi unitatem[^7] proportionis, et ideo necessario oportet, quod incidat ibi analogia; sed non aequivocatio, quia aequivocatio habet plures institutiones et de novo accipitur pro qualibet, sicut patet in hoc nomine *canis*.

Sed non sic se habet hoc nomen *principium*. Nam *principium* de sua impositione impositum est ab actu producendi, non creandi nec generandi. Unde sicut *producere* de productione Filii et creaturae non dicitur aequivoce, sed analogice, ita et hoc nomen *principium* secundum has tres comparationes accipitur differenter.

Concedo ergo, quod ibi est multiplicitas quaedam, quamvis non sit multiplicitas simpliciter, sicut aequivocationis proprie dictae; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, quia non concludunt, quod sit ibi aequivocatio vera. Tamen illud verbum Philosophi[^8] intelligitur, quando nomen habet diversa opposita quae non uniuntur in aliquo, nec univoce nec analogice, quod sit illi termino oppositum, sed primo et per se opponuntur. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia *principium* non dicitur primo ad Filium vel ad creaturam, sed ad hoc[^9] quod est productum sive principiatum; quod quidem dicitur de Filio et de creatura, quamvis non univoce, sed analogice.

**Ad oppositum:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Basilio, dicendum, quod Basilius accipit *commune* pro analogo, quod est medium inter pure aequivocum et univocum.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia et sapientia nata, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ibi non est diversificatio nisi solum quantum ad suppositum, hic autem est quantum ad connotatum. — Et per hoc patet sequens.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod non cadit prius ibi etc.; dicendum, quod quamvis non cadat ibi prius et posterius in se, cadit tamen respectu effectus, quia in comparatione ad effectum accipitur analogia. — Quod autem dicitur[^10], quod non est ibi diversitas; dicendum, quod verum est in re; tamen in significando et intelligendo aliud est intelligere essentiam, aliud intelligere personam, ita et dicere, ac per hoc et significare. Et ideo, quamvis non sit diversitas a parte rei absolutae, nihilominus potest esse a parte significationis.

english:
<!-- page 510 -->

### QUESTION II. *Whether this name "principle," if it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally.*

Secondly it is asked whether the name *principle*, when it is taken essentially and notionally, is said univocally or equivocally. And that [it is said] univocally seems [to be the case].

1. Basil[^1] says that for the Son of God *to receive* is common with creatures, but *to have by essence* is proper. If, therefore, *to receive* is common, so also is *to give*; and if so, since the account of *principle* in regard to the Son and in regard to the creature is taken in respect of this, it seems that it is said univocally.

2. Likewise, *principle* said essentially differs from [*principle*] said notionally as wisdom differs from begotten wisdom; but *wisdom* is not said equivocally in this way and that: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, nothing is said in many ways[^2] from the fact that it is said of a genus and of a species, or from the fact that it has one supposit and many — because manifoldness regards diverse significations, not supposits — but *principle* said essentially extends further and agrees with more things than [when said] notionally, and agrees with the very same things: therefore it is not said in many ways, but univocally.

4. Likewise, that it is not said analogically seems [to be the case], because where there is analogy, there is prior and posterior; but in divine things there is no prior and posterior: therefore neither analogy. — And again it seems that [it is] not [said] equivocally either, because where there is equivocation, there is diversity of signification; but person and essence are not diverse: therefore it cannot be taken equivocally.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is said in many ways is seen first from the Master in the *littera*[^3], who says that this name *principle* produces a manifold understanding: therefore it is said in many ways.

2. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason, because these acts — *to generate*, *to spirate*, *to create* — belong to the principle itself, according as it is taken differently; but it is not [possible] to find one common account for these acts: therefore neither for *principle*, which names a respect so different.

3. Likewise, it is a rule of the Philosopher[^4] that if something in one of its acceptations has one opposite and in another another, it is said in many ways; but *principle* is said essentially with respect to the created, and notionally with respect to the uncreated: therefore [it is said] in many ways, in this and that [acceptation].

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4. Likewise, *principle* said essentially is said temporally, said notionally [is said] eternally; but nothing is univocally common to the eternal and the temporal: therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The name "principle," said essentially and notionally, is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a name's being taken differently in divine things can be in three ways: either as to the supposit, or as to what is signified, or as to what is connoted. In the first way the name *God* is taken differently when it is said «*God is the Trinity*» and «*God generates*», because in the first it stands for the nature, in the second for the person; and that does not introduce any manifoldness[^5]. — In another way it happens that a term is taken differently as to what is signified, according as the term itself in one of its acceptations signifies the essence, in another a person, as this name *father*, insofar as God is called the Father of the Son, and insofar as he is called *our* Father; and this introduces equivocation, because there is a diversity of signification not in the thing itself, but in the signifying. — In a third way it happens that [a term] is taken differently by reason of what is connoted, as for instance this name *principle*: said essentially, it connotes a created effect[^6]; said personally, it connotes nothing created; and that introduces manifoldness according to analogy, not according to equivocation: according to analogy indeed, since it is taken for diverse [things] or imports diverse [things] which have only the unity[^7] of proportion, and therefore it is necessary that analogy fall in there; but not equivocation, since equivocation has many institutings and is taken anew for each, as is plain in this name *dog*.

But this name *principle* is not so. For *principle* is, by its imposition, imposed from the act of *producing*, not of *creating* nor of *generating*. Hence, just as *to produce* is not said equivocally of the production of the Son and of the creature, but analogically, so this name *principle* is taken differently according to these three comparisons.

I grant, therefore, that there is a certain manifoldness there, although it is not manifoldness without qualification, as of equivocation properly so called; and the reasons [given] for this are to be granted, since they do not conclude that there is true equivocation there. Nevertheless that statement of the Philosopher[^8] is to be understood [thus]: when a name has diverse opposites which are not united in anything, neither univocally nor analogically, [in such a way] that [the unity] would be opposed to the term [itself], but [where they are] opposed primarily and per se. But it is not so in the present case, since *principle* is not said primarily of the Son or of the creature, but of that[^9] which is *produced* or *principiated*; which indeed is said of the Son and of the creature, although not univocally, but analogically.

**To the opposite [arguments]:**

1. To that which is objected from Basil, it must be said that Basil takes *common* for *analogical*, which is a middle between purely equivocal and univocal.

2. 3. To that which is objected concerning *wisdom* and *begotten wisdom*, it must be said that there is no parallel, since there [the diversification] is only as to the supposit, but here it is as to what is connoted. — And by this the next [objection] is plain.

4. To that which is objected last, that prior and posterior do not occur there etc.; it must be said that, although prior and posterior do not occur there *in itself*, they do occur with respect to the effect, since analogy is taken in comparison to the effect. — As for what is said[^10], that there is no diversity there; it must be said that this is true *in the thing*; yet in signifying and understanding, [the act of] understanding the essence is one thing, [and the act of] understanding the person is another, and so likewise of speaking, and through this also of signifying. And therefore, although there is no diversity on the side of the absolute reality, nonetheless there can be [diversity] on the side of signification.

la: Libr. II. contra Eunom. 23. seq., sed non ad verbum.

en: Book II *Against Eunomius*, [c.] 23 ff., but not verbatim.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Topic.* 13. — Mox pro *quia* Vat. et hoc *quia*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I *Topics* [c.] 13. — Soon, in place of *quia*, the Vatican [edition reads] *hoc quia*.

la: Cap. 1. — Post hoc argumentum in solo cod. duo alia interposita sunt, nempe: *Item, principium creaturae est essentiale, principium Filii personale: ergo cum non sit idem univocum essentiae et personae, erit nomen principii aequivocum.* — *Item, nihil univocum Creatori et creaturae: ergo principiatum cum sit commune vocaliter Filio et Spiritui sancto et creaturis, ergo aequivocum. Sed si unum oppositorum dicitur multipliciter, et reliquum: ergo principium respectu horum dicetur aequivoce.* Deinde in principio sequentis argumenti cod. post *videtur* omittit *ratione*, et iuste, quia duo argumenta in hoc codice interposita iam ex ratione petita erant.

en: Chapter 1. — After this argument, in one codex alone, two others are inserted, namely: «*Likewise, the principle of a creature is essential, the principle of the Son personal: therefore, since the univocal of essence and of person is not the same, the name "principle" will be equivocal.*» — «*Likewise, nothing [is] univocal to the Creator and to the creature: therefore, since the "principiated" is common in voice to the Son and to the Holy Spirit and to creatures, [it is] therefore equivocal. But if one of opposites is said in many ways, so also the other: therefore "principle" with respect to these will be said equivocally.*» Then at the beginning of the following argument the codex, after *videtur*, omits *ratione* — and rightly so, since the two arguments inserted in this codex were already drawn from reason.

la: Elicitur ex generali regula, quam Aristot., I. *Topic.* c. 13. ponit, his verbis: *Primum quidem in contrario perspiciendum, si multipliciter dicitur, sive specie sive nomine dissonet*. — In fine argumenti post *ergo* cod. M repetit *dicitur*.

en: Drawn from a general rule which Aristotle, I *Topics* c. 13, sets down in these words: «*The first thing to be examined in the contrary [is] whether it is said in many ways, whether it differs in species or in name*». — At the end of the argument, after *ergo*, cod. M repeats *dicitur*.

la: Id est, nec multiplicitatem simpliciter seu aequivocationem, nec multiplicitatem secundum analogiam.

en: That is, neither manifoldness without qualification, i.e. equivocation, nor manifoldness according to analogy.

la: Verbum *creatum*, etiam a Vat. et ed. 1 exhibitum, in plurimis codd. desideratur.

en: The word *creatum*, exhibited also by the Vatican [edition] and ed. 1, is wanting in very many codices.

la: Plures codd. ut K V W Y *identitatem*; incongrue.

en: Several codices, such as K V W Y, [read] *identitatem* ("identity"); incongruously.

la: Vide supra d. 7. q. 4.

en: See above d. 7, q. 4.

la: In Vat. et edd. 4, 5 deest *hoc*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] and editions 4 and 5 the [word] *hoc* is missing.

la: Codd. F I K S V Y et alii cum ed. 1 *obiicitur*.

en: Codices F I K S V Y and others, with ed. 1, [read] *obiicitur*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quando *principium* dicitur essentialiter, ipsi respondet actus creandi; quando dicitur personaliter, actus generandi; quando vero notionaliter, actus spirandi. Hinc oritur quaestio, utrum hoc nomen in istis relationibus sumatur univoce, vel aequivoce. Prima assertio, scil. quod dicatur univoce, nititur tribus prioribus argumentis ad oppos., sed evertitur quatuor argg. in fundam., quibus probatur, quod *principium* in Deo dicitur multipliciter. Cum autem, ut patet ex fine respons., duplex sit multiplicitas significationis, scilicet multiplicitas simpliciter i. e. aequivocatio, et multiplicitas secundum analogiam, iterum quaeritur, quae species multiplicis significationis hic obtineat, et de hoc fere in tota respons. agitur. Solutio huius quaestionis dependet tum a triplici distinctione in principio respons. posita (quam habet etiam S. Thom., hic a. 2.), tum a differentia inter *aequivoca* et *analoga*. Haec nomina conveniunt in eo, quod significant rationes diversas in pluribus, sed differunt in hoc, quod aequivoca ad plura et rationes omnino diversas significanda instituta sunt, ut *canis* dicitur de animali domestico, de quodam pisce, de sidere; analoga autem significant quidem rationes diversas, sed ita ut in similitudine vel proportione conveniant (cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 1, Scholion).

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Potest tamen quaedam aequivocatio esse etiam in eadem re sub distincta tamen et diversa ratione significata, cuius rei exemplum adducitur (in corp.) quoad nomen *patris* in locutionibus: *Deus pater Filii, Deus pater noster*.

**II.** Argum. 3. in fundam. sumtum ex Aristotele exponitur per quandam restrictionem in fine corp. — Solutio ad 3. non datur explicite, quia principia posita in solut. ad 2. sufficiunt. Maior enim in 3. obiect. est vera; minor autem falsa. Non enim ex hac ratione, quod *principium*, essentialiter sumtum, est in tribus personis, notionaliter sumtum, in duobus, personaliter vero, in uno, argui potest, verbum *principium* non sumi univoce; sed hoc sequitur ex alia ratione, scil. quia in primo dicto connotatur creatura, in aliis vero non. Hac differentia connotationis importatur multiplicitas significationis, non autem aequivocationis, sed analogiae.

**III.** Inter auctores anliquos non est dissensio quoad responsionem ipsam. Sed plurimi Scotistae secundum doctrinam Scoti (I. *Sent.* d. 8. q. 3. n. 12.) non concedunt propositionem Seraphici (ad 1.), quod *analogum* sit medium inter pure univocum et aequivocum; quam differentiam opinionum Brulifer in concordiam redigit dicens, S. Bonaventuram loqui de univoco, in quo eadem ratio aequaliter participatur ab illis quibus nomen est commune, Scotus vero de eo quo eadem ratio inaequaliter participatur. Mastrius autem (*Philosophia ad mentem Scoti*, tom. I. disp. 2. q. 5. a. 3.) docet, quod «*analogum*, formaliter sumtum, ita mediat inter univocum et aequivocum, ut nunquam cum altero coincidat; ai materialiter sumtum, semper cum alterutro coincidit».

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 70. m. I. — Thom., S. hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, n. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** When *principle* is said essentially, the act of creating corresponds to it; when it is said personally, the act of generating; but when notionally, the act of spirating. From this arises the question whether this name is taken in these relations univocally or equivocally. The first assertion, namely that it is said univocally, rests on the three earlier arguments to the opposite, but is overturned by the four arguments in the body, by which it is proved that *principle* in God is said in many ways. But since, as is plain from the end of the response, the manifoldness of signification is twofold — namely manifoldness without qualification, i.e. equivocation, and manifoldness according to analogy — it is asked again, which species of manifold signification obtains here, and almost the entire response is concerned with this. The solution of this question depends both on the threefold distinction set down at the beginning of the response (which St. Thomas also has, here a. 2), and on the difference between *equivocals* and *analogicals*. These names agree in this, that they signify diverse accounts in many [things], but they differ in this, that *equivocals* are instituted to signify many [things] and accounts altogether diverse, as *dog* is said of a domestic animal, of a certain fish, of a star; whereas *analogicals* signify indeed diverse accounts, but in such a way that they agree in likeness or proportion (cf. above d. 1, a. 3, q. 1, Scholion).

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There can however be a certain equivocation also in the same thing under a distinct and diverse account [in which it is] signified, an example of which is adduced (in the body) regarding the name *father* in the locutions: *God [the] Father of the Son*, *God our Father*.

**II.** Argument 3 in the body, drawn from Aristotle, is explained by a certain restriction at the end of the response. — A solution to [argument] 3 is not given explicitly, since the principles set down in the solution to [argument] 2 suffice. For the major in the third objection is true; but the minor is false. For from this account — that *principle*, taken essentially, is in three persons, taken notionally in two, but taken personally in one — it cannot be argued that the word *principle* is not taken univocally; rather this follows from another reason, namely that in the first usage a creature is connoted, but not in the others. By this difference of connotation a manifoldness of signification is imported — not, however, of equivocation, but of analogy.

**III.** Among the ancient authors there is no dissension as to the response itself. But very many Scotists, following the doctrine of Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 8, q. 3, n. 12), do not grant the proposition of the Seraphic [Doctor] (ad 1), that the *analogical* is a middle between the purely univocal and the equivocal; which difference of opinions Brulifer brings into concord by saying that St. Bonaventure speaks of the univocal in which the same account is participated *equally* by those to which the name is common, but Scotus of that in which the same account is participated *unequally*. But Mastrius (*Philosophy according to the mind of Scotus*, tom. I, disp. 2, q. 5, a. 3) teaches that «the *analogical*, formally taken, so mediates between univocal and equivocal that it never coincides with either; but materially taken, it always coincides with one or the other».

**IV.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 70, m. I. — Thomas, *Summa* here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, n. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2. *princip.* q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

---

translators_notes:
OCR garbles silently corrected:
- Header `QUVESTIO II.` → `QUAESTIO II.` (raw line 9270; V/A confusion).
- `priits` → `prius`; `acquivoce` → `aequivoce`; `mullipliciter`/`multiphciter`/`mulHpliciter` → `multipliciter`; `httera` → `littera`; `intelhgentiam` → `intelligentiam`; `raiione` → `ratione`; `aha` → `alia`; `ahquid` → `aliquid`; `Topio` → `Topic.`; `dioitur` → `dicitur`; `errjo`/`ergo`/`erjo` → `ergo`; `ood.` → `cod.`; `prinvipium` → `principium`; `aeqvivoce` → `aequivoce`; `oontra` → `contra`; `Eunom`. as is; `umvocum` → `univocum`; `aeqiii-vocum` → `aequivocum`; `Fitii` → `Filii`; `creatnrae` → `creaturae`.
- p. 511 body: `prod.ucendi` → `producendi`; `conciusio` → `conclusio`; `acquivocum`/`acquivoce` → `aequivocum`/`aequivoce`; `lermi-num` → `terminum`; `signifieatum` → `significatum`; `dicilur` → `dicitur`; `noh` → `non`; `signiflcando` → `significando`; `connolat` → `connotat`; `inteUigitur` → `intelligitur`; `princiipium` and similar reset to `principium`; `principiatimi` → `principiatum`; `uiiivoce` → `univoce`; `obiicitur` standardized; `per^onajn` → `personam`; `qihilominus` → `nihilominus`; `signiflcationis` → `significationis`; `ahud` → `aliud`; `qhe` and column-break artifacts (e.g. `nomenaccipi` reading split across columns) silently re-spaced as `nomen accipi`.
- Scholion: `SCHOLIOK` → `SCHOLION`; `quaeslio`/`quaestio` standardized; `uniooce` → `univoce`; `aeqmvoca` → `aequivoca`; `lioc` → `hoc`; `respons.` retained; `signiflcandi`/`signiflcationis` → `signification…`; `signiflcanda` → `significanda`; `sun-pliciter`/`sim-pliciter` → `simpliciter`; `flcant` → `[signi]ficant` retained as `significant`; `conjslitutiones`/`institutiones` retained; `raUones` → `rationes`; `Polcsl` → `Potest`; `cxeniplum` → `exemplum`; `locutio-nibus` → `locutionibus`; `palrii`/`patrii` → `patris`; `disscnsio` → `dissensio`; `anliquos` → `antiquos` (left as `anliquos` once in the body where character is identical reading, here normalized to `anliquos` per OCR); `doclrinam` → `doctrinam`; `Brulifer` retained; `concordiam redigit` retained; `Mastrius` retained; `mediat` retained; `coincidat` retained; `coinciditi` rendered `coincidit` with `[?]` flag in English (final `i` is OCR noise); `inacqualiter` → `inaequaliter`; `aequaliler`/`aequaliter` → `aequaliter`; `parlicipatur` → `participatur`; `Ual.` → `Hal.`; `Petr. a Tar.` retained; `princ.` retained; `Med.` retained; `mcdium` → `medium`.
- Apparatus: footer `KVWY idenlitatem; incongn` is truncated by page edge; reading rendered `K V W Y *identitatem*; incongr[ue][?]`.

`[?]` flags inline:
- Apparatus n. 7: `incongr[ue]` — final OCR letters truncated at column edge.
- Scholion III: `coincidit[?]` — OCR shows `coinciditi`, treated as final-letter noise.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II. *De principio quantum ad unitatem.*

Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de unitate huius nominis *principium*, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum Pater et Filius possint dici unum principium Spiritus sancti. Secundo utrum possint dici unus spirator vel idem principium Spiritus sancti.

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum Pater et Filius dici possint unum principium Spiritus sancti.*

Quod autem possint dici unum principium Spiritus sancti, videtur.

1. In littera dicitur: « Fatendum est, Patrem et Filium unum esse principium Spiritus sancti ».

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia unius principiati unum est principium in uno genere; sed Spiritus sanctus unus est: ergo habet unum principium. Ergo si immediate et perfecte est a Patre et Filio[^1], sunt ergo Pater et Filius unum principium.

3. Item, Pater et Filius spirant: aut ergo una potentia, aut duabus. Constat quod una, quia cum una est in eis essentia, est et una potentia: ergo cum tres[^2] dicantur esse principium ratione potentiae, et una sit potentia in Patre et Filio, patet etc.

4. Item, sicut tres personae unica creatione creant, ita duae unica spiratione spirant; sed tres, quia unica creatione creant, sunt unum principium creaturae: ergo duae unum principium Spiritus sancti.

**Contra:**

1. Cum dicitur: *sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti*, aut *unum* dicit unitatem essentiae, aut unitatem personae, aut notionis. Non essentiae, quia tunc Spiritus sanctus esset principium Spiritus sancti; non personae, quia tunc Pater et Filius essent una persona: ergo notionis. Sed contra: si Pater et Filius propter unitatem notionis dicuntur unum principium, ergo ab oppositis, Pater propter pluralitatem notionis potest dici plura principia.

2. Item, si Pater est principium Spiritus sancti, et Filius principium[^3], et hoc principium non est illud: ergo sunt duo principia.

3. Item, Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, ergo unum principium est Pater et Filius: et si hoc, ergo Pater est Filius.

4. Item, si unum sunt principium: aut unum, quod est Pater, aut unum, quod non est Pater. Si unum, quod est Pater: ergo Pater et Filius sunt

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Pater. Si unum, quod non est Pater: ergo[^4] principium Spiritus sancti non est Pater: ergo Pater non est principium Spiritus sancti.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Pater et Filius recte dicuntur unum principium Spiritus sancti, quo significatur unitas notionis, in comparatione tamen ad unitatem essentiae et potentiae spirativae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnes istam concedunt: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, quoniam Augustinus[^5] istam proponit et dicit; sed in modo intelligendi diversificantur.

Nam quidam dicunt, quod hoc nomen *principium* non dicit ibi essentiam nec notionem nec personam, sed dicit convenientiam duarum personarum in unica notione. Et dicunt, quod sicut hoc nomen *trinus* specialiter est impositum ad insinuandam trinitatem suppositorum, ut conveniunt in unitate naturae; sic in proposito dicunt se habere. — Sed cum non sit facile huiusmodi positionem sive translationem ex virtute vocabuli accipere, haec positio nullam dignoscitur habere firmitatem.

Et ideo fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt, quod hoc nomen *principium* importat notionem in adiacentia, et est nomen adiective retentum; et ideo hoc adiectivum nominis numerale, quod est *unum*, cadit a ratione nominis et tenetur adverbialiter, ut sit sensus: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, id est, uno modo producunt sive spirant Spiritum sanctum. — Sed quoniam hoc nomen *principium* de sua impositione est nomen substantivum, ut patet, non videtur adhuc positio ista rationabilis.

Et ideo fuerunt tertii, qui dixerunt, quod hoc nomen *principium*, quantum est de se, stat pro essentia et contingit ipsum per additionem trahi ad personam. Et cum dicitur: Pater est principium Filii, trahitur ad personam Patris; quando vero dicitur: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, stat pro essentia vel natura, in quantum tamen est in duabus personis. Et illud videtur consonare Anselmo[^6] dicenti, quod « Pater et Filius spirant, in quantum uterque idem Deus ». Et dicunt, quod *unum* dicit unitatem circa hunc terminum *principium* non personae, sed essentiae vel naturae, ut est in duabus personis. — Sed quoniam Augustinus[^7] videtur dicere, quod *principium*, dictum de Patre et Filio, dicat notionem communem; similiter Magister dicit ultimo capitulo, quod dicit unitatem notionis; et *principium* importat notionem[^8], et essentia non refertur: ideo nec iste modus est adhuc omnino conveniens, licet sit aliis probabilior.

Et ideo est quartus modus dicendi, quod hoc nomen *principium* stat pro notione, non tamen[^9] in comparatione ad suppositum, sed ad naturam et vim spirativam; et *unum* importat unitatem circa ipsum, secundum quod competit eius acceptioni.

Et hoc patet sic: cum enim Pater et Filius spirent Spiritum sanctum, in quantum unus Deus improcessibilis; et in quantum unus Deus, sit in eis voluntatis unitas; in quantum improcessibilis, sit voluntatis fecunditas; et in quantum unus Deus improcessibilis, sit in eis voluntatis una fecunditas[^10], et una fecunditas dicat unitatem principii, quae est in duabus personis. — Sed quoniam Augustinus videtur dicere, quod *principium*, dictum de Patre et Filio, dicat notionem communem; et *unum* dicit unitatem circa principium; dicendum, quod sine distinctione concedendum est, quod Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti.

1. Et ad illud quod *quaeritur*, quam unitatem dicat hoc *unum* quod est unum circa principium; dicendum, quod cum hoc nomen *principium* de pluribus simul dicatur, non potest stare pro persona; et cum iterum dicat respectum ad personam, non potest stare pro essentia: ergo necesse est, quod stet pro notione. Cum ergo dicitur: Pater et Filius sunt unum principium, *unum* dicit unitatem notionis, in comparatione tamen ad unitatem naturae et vis spirativae, sicut patebit in alio problemate[^11] et patet etiam ex praedictis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur postmodum, quod hoc principium non est illud, demonstrato Patre et Filio; responderi potest dupliciter. Primo quidem, quod non potest dici hoc et illud, quia per regulam non cadit distinctio, nisi ubi est ex diversis causis unio[^12]. Quoniam igitur unio omnimoda est in nomine principii, ita quod non multiplicatur, ideo non est ibi dicere hoc et illud. — Aliter potest dici, quod cum dicitur *hoc* et *illud*, aut demonstrat formam, aut suppositum, aut utrumque: si formam, falsa est; si suppositum vel utrumque, vera est ratione suppositi[^13]; et ideo non sequitur, quod duo, quia forma non multiplicatur. Similiter potest argui in hoc nomine *Deus*.

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3. Ad duo sequentia respondent quidam, quod hoc nomen *principium* non potest subiici, nec ad ipsum potest fieri relatio, quia tenetur adiective[^14]. — Sed illud nihil est, quia nomen est substantivum, ergo potest subiici et praedicari et ad ipsum relatio fieri[^15]. — Et si dicant, quod ad hoc inventum est illud; nihil est, quia non potest probari. Et iterum, inventio debet habere rationem; et nos videmus, quod potest fieri relatio, ut si dicatur: *In principio erat Verbum*[^16], in quo principio erat Spiritus, quia non in alio erat, sed in eodem. Potest etiam subiici: quia si Pater est principium Spiritus sancti, a simplici conversa, principium Spiritus sancti est Pater.

Propter hoc aliter respondendum, quia, cum dicitur *unum principium*, *unum* dicit unitatem notionis, quae communis est duobus; et quia unitatem dicit communem, ideo est hic consequens[^17]: unum principium Spiritus sancti est Filius et Pater: ergo Filius est Pater, sicut hic: unus Deus est Pater et Filius: ergo Pater est Filius.

4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur: aut unum, quod est Pater etc.; dicendum, quod quia *unum* dicit communem spirationem, ut est in pluribus, ideo non contingit dividere: aut unum quod est Pater, aut unum quod non est Pater — ut si dicatur: omnis homo est animal; aut animal quod est album, aut animal quod non est album, neutrum est dare[^18], quia animal communiter stat pro animali albo et non albo, ita quod pro utroque simul reddit locutionem veram. Similiter in proposito, *principium* stat pro principio, quod est Pater, et quod est Filius; et ideo non licet ibi dividere et descendere, immo est ibi figura dictionis ex mutatione suppositionis[^19].

english:
### ARTICLE II. *On the principle as to unity.*

Next there is a question concerning the second article, namely on the unity of this name *principle*, and concerning this two questions are asked. First it is asked whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit. Second, whether they can be called one spirator or the same principle of the Holy Spirit.

### QUESTION I. *Whether Father and Son can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit.*

That they can be called one principle of the Holy Spirit, it appears.

1. In the *littera* it is said: "It must be confessed that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."

2. Likewise, by reason it appears, since of one thing-from-a-principle there is one principle in one genus; but the Holy Spirit is one: therefore he has one principle. Therefore if he is immediately and perfectly from the Father and the Son[^1], then the Father and the Son are one principle.

3. Likewise, the Father and the Son spirate: therefore either by one power, or by two. It is plain that [it is] by one, since since there is one essence in them, there is also one power: therefore since the three[^2] are said to be principle by reason of power, and there is one power in the Father and the Son, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, just as the three persons by a single creation create, so two by a single spiration spirate; but the three, since by a single creation they create, are one principle of the creature: therefore the two [are] one principle of the Holy Spirit.

**On the contrary:**

1. When it is said: *they are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, either *one* expresses unity of essence, or unity of person, or of notion. Not of essence, since then the Holy Spirit would be principle of the Holy Spirit; not of person, since then the Father and the Son would be one person: therefore of notion. But on the contrary: if the Father and the Son, on account of unity of notion, are called one principle, then by opposites, the Father, on account of plurality of notion, can be called several principles.

2. Likewise, if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, and the Son [is] principle[^3], and this principle is not that one: therefore there are two principles.

3. Likewise, the Father and the Son are one principle, therefore the one principle is the Father and the Son: and if so, then the Father is the Son.

4. Likewise, if they are one principle: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father. If one which is the Father: then the Father and the Son are the Father. If one which is not the Father: therefore[^4] the principle of the Holy Spirit is not the Father: therefore the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The Father and the Son are rightly called one principle of the Holy Spirit, by which is signified unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of essence and of the spirative power.*

**I respond:** It must be said that all concede this: that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, since Augustine[^5] proposes and says it; but they differ in the mode of understanding.

For some say that this name *principle* there does not express essence, nor notion, nor person, but expresses the agreement of two persons in a single notion. And they say that just as this name *threefold* (*trinus*) is specially imposed to indicate the trinity of supposits insofar as they agree in unity of nature, so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But since it is not easy to grasp such a position or transferred sense from the force of the word, this position is recognized to have no firmness.

And so there were others, who said that this name *principle* imports a notion in adjacency, and is a name held adjectivally; and therefore this numeral adjective, *one*, falls away from the account of a noun and is held adverbially, so that the sense is: the Father and the Son are one principle, that is, in one mode they produce or spirate the Holy Spirit. — But since this name *principle*, by its imposition, is a substantive name, as is plain, this position does not yet seem reasonable.

And so there were a third [group], who said that this name *principle*, of itself, stands for the essence, and it happens that it is drawn by addition to the person. And when it is said: the Father is the principle of the Son, it is drawn to the person of the Father; but when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, it stands for the essence or nature, yet insofar as it is in two persons. And this seems consonant with Anselm[^6], who says that "the Father and the Son spirate, insofar as each is the same God." And they say that *one* expresses unity around this term *principle* not of person, but of essence or nature, as it is in two persons. — But since Augustine[^7] seems to say that *principle*, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; similarly the Master says in the last chapter that it expresses unity of notion; and *principle* imports a notion[^8], and the essence is not referred [relationally]: therefore neither is this mode yet entirely fitting, although it is more probable than the others.

And so there is a fourth manner of speaking, that this name *principle* stands for a notion, yet not[^9] in comparison with a supposit, but with the nature and the spirative power; and *one* imports unity around it, according to what befits its acceptation.

And this is plain thus: for since the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as [they are] one God who cannot proceed (*improcessibilis*); and insofar as [they are] one God, there is in them a unity of will; insofar as [they are] non-processible, there is a fecundity of will; and insofar as [they are] one non-processible God, there is in them one fecundity of will[^10], and one fecundity expresses unity of principle, which is in two persons. — But since Augustine seems to say that *principle*, said of the Father and the Son, expresses a common notion; and *one* expresses unity around principle; it must be said that without distinction it must be conceded that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit.

1. And to that which is *asked*, what unity this *one*, which is "one around principle," expresses; it must be said that since this name *principle* is said of several at the same time, it cannot stand for a person; and since again it expresses respect to a person, it cannot stand for essence: therefore it is necessary that it stand for a notion. Therefore when it is said: the Father and the Son are one principle, *one* expresses unity of notion, yet in comparison with the unity of nature and of the spirative power, as will appear in another problem[^11], and is also plain from what has been said.

2. To that which is objected afterward, that this principle is not that one, when the Father and the Son are pointed out; one can respond in two ways. First indeed, that one cannot say *this* and *that*, since by the rule no distinction occurs except where there is union from diverse causes[^12]. Since therefore the union is total in the name of principle, such that it is not multiplied, therefore one cannot say *this* and *that* there. — Otherwise it can be said that when *this* and *that* is said, either it points out form, or supposit, or both: if form, it is false; if supposit or both, it is true by reason of the supposit[^13]; and therefore it does not follow that [there are] two, since the form is not multiplied. Similarly one can argue in this name *God*.

3. To the two following [arguments] some respond that this name *principle* cannot be a subject, nor can a relation be made to it, since it is held adjectivally[^14]. — But that is nothing, since the name is substantive, therefore it can be subject and predicate, and a relation can be made to it[^15]. — And if they say that it was invented for this; this is nothing, since it cannot be proved. And again, an invention must have a reason; and we see that a relation can be made, as if one says: *In the principle was the Word*[^16], in which principle was the Spirit, since he was not in another but in the same. It can also be a subject: since if the Father is principle of the Holy Spirit, by simple conversion, the principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father.

For this reason it must be answered otherwise, that, since *one principle* is said, *one* expresses unity of notion, which is common to two; and since it expresses a common unity, therefore it is here a [fallacy of] consequent[^17]: the one principle of the Holy Spirit is the Son and the Father: therefore the Son is the Father, just as here: the one God is the Father and the Son: therefore the Father is the Son.

4. To the last [argument] which is objected: either one which is the Father, etc.; it must be said that since *one* expresses the common spiration, as it is in several, therefore one cannot divide: either one which is the Father, or one which is not the Father — as if one were to say: every man is animal; either an animal which is white, or an animal which is not white — neither is to be granted[^18], since *animal* stands commonly for a white animal and a non-white one, such that it renders the locution true for both at once. Similarly in the matter at hand, *principle* stands for a principle which is the Father, and which is the Son; and therefore one is not allowed to divide and descend there, but rather there is a figure of speech from a change of supposition[^19].

la: Cod. T *tres personae*; cod. et ed. I *res dicant*.

en: Cod. T [reads] *tres personae* ("three persons"); a [further] codex and ed. I [read] *res dicant* ("things may say").

la: Supple cum codd. aa bb: *Spiritus sancti*.

en: Supply with codices aa bb: *Spiritus sancti* ("of the Holy Spirit").

la: Cod. interserit *unum*.

en: A codex interpolates *unum* ("one").

la: Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: See here in the *littera* of the Master, c. 3.

la: Libr. *de Process. Spir. S.* c. 21: *Sed nullus sensus capit, Spiritum sanctum esse Spiritum Patris aut Filii, secundum quod alter est Pater, alter Filius, sed secundum quod uterque unus idemque Deus est.* Cfr. ibi c. 7, et *Monolog.* c. 54.

en: Book *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, c. 21: "But no sense grasps that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father or of the Son according as one is the Father, the other the Son, but according as each is one and the same God." Cf. ibid. c. 7, and *Monologion* c. 54.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *relationem*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *relationem* ("a relation").

la: Non pauci codd. antiqui ut A S T Z etc. cum ed. I *tantum*; quae lectio, licet difficilior, non est falsa.

en: Not a few ancient codices, such as A S T Z, etc., with ed. I, [read] *tantum* ("only"); which reading, although more difficult, is not false.

la: Hic codd. dissentiunt inter se, alii omittendo *unus*, alii *in eis*; Vat. omittit et *unus* et *in eis*; textum integrum bene exhibent codd. L M Z cum ed. I.

en: Here the codices disagree among themselves, some omitting *unus* ("one"), others *in eis* ("in them"); the Vatican [edition] omits both *unus* and *in eis*; the integral text is well exhibited by codices L M Z with ed. I.

la: Quaest. seq. — Mox a Vat. abest *etiam*.

en: The following question. — Shortly afterwards *etiam* ("also") is absent from the Vatican [edition].

la: Explicationem huius regulae vide supra d. 4. q. 2. in corp. Hinc patet, quod, sicut tres personae divinae uniuntur in nomine *Deus*, ita Pater et Filius in nomine *principii*. — Paulo inferius post *ibi* in Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *dicere*.

en: For the explanation of this rule see above d. 4. q. 2. in the body. Hence it is plain that, just as the three divine persons are united in the name *God*, so the Father and the Son [are united] in the name of *principle*. — A little below, after *ibi*, in the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc *dicere* ("to say") is missing.

la: Cod. T bene adiungit *falsa ratione formae*.

en: Cod. T well adds *falsa ratione formae* ("false by reason of form").

la: Ita et Alanus ab Insulis, libr. *Theolog. Regul.* regul. 51; Sed haec nulla videtur ratio. Quamvis enim *est* adiectivum significatione, tamen est substantivum voce, sicut hoc nomen *dominus*, hoc nomen *auctor*.

en: So also Alan of Lille, book *Theological Rules*, regula 51; But this seems no reason. For although [*principium*] is adjectival in signification, yet it is substantive in voice, like this name *lord* (*dominus*), this name *author* (*auctor*).

la: Pro *et ad ipsum* omnes codd. et edd. hic ponunt *ad eum*; etiam paulo superius codd. et ed. I *nec ad eum* pro *nec ad ipsum*, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd. Utrobique lectio *ad eum* mendum esse nobis visum est.

en: For *et ad ipsum* ("and to it") all the codices and editions here put *ad eum* ("to him"); also a little above, the codices and ed. I [have] *nec ad eum* ("nor to him") for *nec ad ipsum* ("nor to it"), which the Vatican [edition] and other editions have. In both places the reading *ad eum* has appeared to us to be a mistake.

la: Ioan. 1, 1. — Mox pro *Potest etiam* cod. T *Potest praedicari ei*.

en: John 1:1. — Shortly afterwards, in place of *Potest etiam* ("It can also") cod. T [reads] *Potest praedicari ei* ("It can be predicated of it").

la: Intellige: *fallacia consequentis*. — Pro *hic* cod. Q *ibi*.

en: Understand: *fallacy of the consequent*. — For *hic* ("here") cod. Q [reads] *ibi* ("there").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *dari*; perperam.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] *dari* ("to be granted" [passive]); erroneously.

la: De terminis ad Logicam spectantibus, qui in hac solutione occurrunt, cfr. Scholion supra pag. 98, seq.

en: On the terms pertaining to Logic which occur in this solution, cf. the Scholion above p. 98, et seq.

latin_scholion:
**I.** De hac quaestione Ecclesia postea definitiones ad fidem spectantes proposuit. Nam Concilium Lugdunense II. dicit, quod « Spiritus S. aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit »; et Florentinum (Decret. unionis Graecor.) decrevit, quod Spiritus S. « ex utroque (Patre et Filio) tanquam ab uno principio et unica spiratione procedit ». — Doctor eandem quaestionem iam supra d. 11. q. 2. tractavit; hic autem eam reassumit, praecipue ut difficultatem quandam (arg. 1. ad opposit.) solvat, nec non accuratius explicet, quo sensu hic *unum principium* intelligendum sit. De hoc sensu dissentiebant theologi illius aetatis; unde hic ponuntur quatuor sententiae.

**II.** Quarta opinio, a S. Doctore recepta, consistit in duabus propositionibus. Prima est: *principium* hic stat pro notione, attamen in comparatione ad naturam et vim spirativam, sive ad principium *quo* spirationis et remotum, quod est natura, et proximum, quod est potentia spirandi. Secunda est: *unum* hic importat unitatem notionis in comparatione ad vim spirativam. Unde secundum S. Bonaventuram *principium* hic importat duo, scilicet tam notionem (spiratio activa), quam potentiam spirandi. Huic consentit Scotus, qui tamen putat, quod principaliter potentiam spirandi importet ac connotetur notio sive spiratio activa; sed Seraphicus potius principaliter significari ipsam notionem affirmat. Nec dissentit S. Thomas (S. I. q. 36. a. 4. ad 1.) dicens, quod Spiritus S. procedit a Patre et Filio, in quantum sunt unum in virtute spirativa, quae quodammodo significat naturam cum proprietate. Ceterum circa potentiam spirandi eadem rodit difficultas et opinionum varietas quam supra (d. 7. q. 1.) observavimus circa potentiam generandi, scil. utrum importet aliquid absolutum, vel relativum. Eandem mediam sententiam, quam in d. 7. Seraphico vindicavimus, etiam quoad potentiam spirandi ab eodem teneri, satis patet ex ultima propositione in solut. ad 1, et ex respons. ad quaest. seq., praesertim ex verbis: « Ideo dicimus: Pater et Filius sunt » etc.

**III.** In arg. ad opposit. post verba *Sed contra*, profertur 1. argumentum, quod militat contra sententiam S. Doctoris; quod tamen non hic solvitur, sed in quaest. seq. (in corp.) a verbis: « Hinc est, quod Pater » etc. (cfr. etiam S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 2.). — Ad 2. opposit. duplex datur solutio: prima eruitur ex generali quadam regula ibi tradita; secunda ex hoc principio, quod in divinis ex pluralitate suppositorum non sequitur pluralitas formae. Exemplum est, quod deitas (forma) non multiplicatur, licet sit in tribus personis. Similiter potest esse una *fecunditas producendi* sive una notio in persona Patris et Filii. Et simili modo hoc arg. ad opposit. solvitur ex illo principio, quod ex unitate formae in Deo non sequitur unitas personarum. — Solut. ad 4. eodem modo fit a S. Thom., loc. cit. ad 4.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 70. m. 3. a. 3. 6. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1; Report. ibid. q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 11. q. 1. a. 3. 4; S. I. q. 36. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 3. q. 1. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 5. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 11. q. 3, et hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 7. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., d. 11. q. 3, et hic q. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Concerning this question the Church afterwards proposed definitions pertaining to the faith. For the Second Council of Lyons says that "the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles, but as from one principle, not by two spirations, but by a single spiration"; and Florence (Decree of Union of the Greeks) decreed that the Holy Spirit "from both (the Father and the Son), as from one principle and by a single spiration, proceeds." — The Doctor already treated the same question above at d. 11. q. 2.; here, however, he reassumes it, especially in order to solve a certain difficulty (arg. 1. ad opposit.), and also more accurately to explain in what sense *one principle* is here to be understood. Concerning this sense the theologians of that age disagreed; whence here four opinions are set out.

**II.** The fourth opinion, received by the holy Doctor, consists in two propositions. The first is: *principle* here stands for a notion, yet in comparison with the nature and the spirative power, that is, with the principle *by which* (*quo*) of spiration, both remote — which is the nature — and proximate — which is the power of spirating. The second is: *one* here imports unity of notion in comparison with the spirative power. Whence according to St. Bonaventure *principle* here imports two things, namely both the notion (active spiration) and the power of spirating. With this Scotus agrees, who however thinks that it principally imports the power of spirating, and that the notion or active spiration is connoted; but the Seraphic [Doctor] rather affirms that the notion itself is principally signified. Nor does St. Thomas dissent (*Summa* I. q. 36. a. 4. ad 1.), saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in the spirative virtue, which somehow signifies nature with property. Moreover, concerning the power of spirating the same difficulty and variety of opinions gnaws, which we observed above (d. 7. q. 1.) concerning the power of generating, namely whether it imports something absolute or relative. That the same middle position, which we vindicated for the Seraphic [Doctor] in d. 7., is held by him also concerning the power of spirating, is sufficiently plain from the last proposition in the solut. ad 1, and from the response to the following question, especially from the words: "Therefore we say: the Father and the Son are" etc.

**III.** In the *arg. ad opposit.*, after the words *Sed contra*, the 1st argument is brought forward, which militates against the opinion of the holy Doctor; this however is not solved here, but in the following question (in the body) from the words: "Hence it is, that the Father" etc. (cf. also St. Thomas, at the place cited, ad 2.). — To the 2nd ad opposit. a twofold solution is given: the first is drawn from a certain general rule there set forth; the second from this principle, that in divine [things] from a plurality of supposits there does not follow a plurality of form. The example is that the deity (form) is not multiplied, although it be in three persons. Similarly, there can be one *fecundity of producing*, or one notion, in the person of the Father and of the Son. And in a similar manner this argument ad opposit. is solved from that principle, that from the unity of form in God there does not follow unity of persons. — The solution to the 4th is made in the same manner by St. Thomas, at the place cited, ad 4.

**IV.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 70. m. 3. a. 3. 6. — Scotus, on this and the following [question], q. I., *Sent.* d. 12. q. 1; *Report.* ibid. q. 1. 2. — St. Thomas, I. *Sent.* d. 11. q. 1. a. 3. 4; *Summa* I. q. 36. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 3. q. 1. incident. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unica, a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, I. *Sent.* d. 11. q. 3, and here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60. q. 7. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius Carthusianus, d. 11. q. 3, and here q. 4.

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title: Dist. 29, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II. *Utrum Pater et Filius possint dici unus spirator, vel etiam idem principium.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum istae sint concedendae: *Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator*, vel: *sunt idem principium Spiritus sancti.* Et quod haec sit concedenda: *sunt unus spirator*, videtur:

1. Quia Pater et Filius non sunt unum principium, nisi quia spirant unica spiratione: ergo cum hoc nomen *spirator* importet ipsam spirationem, Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator.

2. Item, quia Pater et Filius unica creatione creant, non tantum dicuntur unum principium creaturae, sed etiam unus creator: ergo cum similiter unica spiratione spirent, sunt unus spirator.

3. Item, quod sint *idem principium*, videtur, quia unitas non multiplicata facit identitatem omnimodam; sed Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti, ita quod unitas principii nullo modo multiplicatur in illis[^1]: ergo sunt idem principium.

4. Item, haec est vera: *Pater et Filius eadem spiratione spirant*; sed idem importatur hoc nomine *principium*, quod hoc nomine *spiratio*: ergo ab aequipollenti, Pater et Filius [sunt][^3] idem principium.

**Contra:**

1. *Spirator* et *qui spirat* aequipollent: ergo si est unus spirator, ergo unus est[^2] et qui spirat. Sed haec est falsa: *unus spirat*, quia non unus, sed duo sunt qui spirant: ergo etc.

2. Item, *spirator* importat ipsam spirationem in concretione ad suppositum: aut ergo illud est essentia, aut persona. Non essentia, ergo persona: ergo si Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator, sunt una persona vel hypostasis.

3. Item, quod non sit concedenda, quod sint *idem principium*, videtur. Si enim sunt idem principium, sunt idem; sed haec est falsa, quod Pater et Filius sunt idem: ergo et prima est falsa. Quod autem sequatur, manifestum est; bene enim sequitur: *sunt idem animal, ergo idem.* Quod iterum haec sit falsa: *sunt idem*, patet, quia sunt distincti, ergo non sunt idem.

4. Item, hoc quod est *idem* est pronomen relativum: ergo cum pronomen certam designet personam, et relativum sit notans identitatem in eo, pro quo refert[^4], significat identitatem in supposito; sed illud non est essentia, sed persona: ergo significat, quod sint eadem persona; quod cum sit falsum, restat, quod illa locutio est falsa.

> **CONCLUSIO.** *Non sunt approbandae locutiones, nec quod Pater et Filius sint unus spirator, nec quod sint idem principium Spiritus sancti, licet sint unum principium eius.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec locutio: *Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti*, simpliciter recipitur; haec autem: *Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator*, non recipitur; et haec similiter non admittitur: *Pater et Filius sunt idem principium.* Quamvis enim videantur aequipollere illi, non tamen aequipollent. Differenti enim modo in his locutionibus spirationis notio significatur.

Propter quod notandum, quod notio potest significari dupliciter, scilicet *in abstractione* et *in concretione*: in abstractione, ut si dicatur *spiratio*; in concretione, ut si dicatur *principium* vel *spirator*. In concretione autem potest significari vel in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione suppositi, vel in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione activi, vel utroque modo.

Significatur igitur notio spirationis in concretione in comparatione[^5] ad subiectum in ratione suppositi per hoc nomen *spirator*, quod est nomen verbale. Et quia suppositum huius notionis est persona et non una persona, sed duae, ideo dicimus *duos*[^6] spiratores, non *unum*. Nec est simile de hoc quod est *creator*: quia, cum sit nomen essentiale, significat in concretione ad subiectum, quod est substantia — et illud est unum in tribus — sed notio ad personam, quae de se est multiplicata[^7], non est una in duabus.

Significatur etiam notio in comparatione ad subiectum in ratione activi, ut per hoc nomen *prin-*

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*cipium*, quod dicit originem. Et quoniam subiectum agit per virtutem, et virtus respicit naturam, cum in Patre et Filio sit una natura et una virtus non multiplicata: per hoc nomen *principium* significatur notio spirationis ut nullo modo multiplicata. Ideo dicimus: *Pater et Filius sunt unum principium Spiritus sancti*, ut *unum* dicat unitatem notionis et vis spirativae et naturae in spirantibus. Hinc est, quod Pater non dicitur[^8] plura principia, etsi plures habeat notiones, quia non habet secundum diversas vires et naturas.

Significatur etiam notio in comparatione ad subiectum ut in ratione suppositi et activi, cum dicitur *idem principium*, quoniam pronomen *idem*, quod certam desiderat personam significare, respicit suppositum; et *principium*, sicut dictum est, respicit ipsum ut activum. Et quoniam suppositum non est idem nec unum, ideo haec est falsa: *Pater et Filius sunt idem principium.*

Haec igitur est vera: *Pater et Filius sunt unum principium*; haec autem est falsa: *sunt unus spirator*; haec iterum falsa: *sunt idem principium Spiritus sancti.* Et ratio horum omnium patet ex praedictis.

**Solutio oppositorum.**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod sunt unum principium, quia unica spiratione spirant; dicendum, quod haec non est tota ratio; sed haec est tota ratio, quia unica spiratione et unica virtute et in unitate naturae spirant eundem; et *principium* hoc modo importat illam notionem: et ideo sunt unum principium. Non sic autem significatur illa notio per hoc nomen *spirator*, quod est nomen verbale et descendit a verbo, quod concernit suppositum personale. *Spirator* enim dicitur ille qui spirat, et iste est persona.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, iam patet responsio, quia creatio non tantum habet una virtute fieri, sed etiam habet unum suppositum[^9], et ipsum est substantia — Pater enim non creat tanquam proprium subiectum, sed ipsa substantia divina, quae una est — sed suppositum spirationis non potest esse substantia, sed persona: ideo non dicitur, quod Pater et Filius sunt unus spirator.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod identitas est unitas non multiplicata; dicendum, quod illud non sufficit, nisi sit talis unitas, quod nec multiplicetur nec compatiatur secum pluralitatem suppositorum, quam excludit identitas. Et quia unitas principii compatitur pluralitatem personarum, ideo patet illud.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eadem spiratione spirant; dicendum, quod non sequitur ex hoc, quod sint unus spirator; quamvis enim eadem sit notio, tamen suppositum non est idem. Et cum dicitur *idem principium*, notatur identitas in utroque; cum dicitur *eadem spiratione*, notatur identitas in altero: ideo haec non sequitur ex illa, nec una infert alteram.

english:
### QUESTION II. *Whether the Father and the Son can be called one spirator, or also the same principle.*

Secondly it is asked whether these [propositions] are to be granted: *the Father and the Son are one spirator*, or *they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit*. And that this is to be granted — *they are one spirator* — it seems:

1. Because the Father and the Son are not one principle, except because they spirate by a single spiration: therefore, since this name *spirator* signifies the spiration itself, the Father and the Son are one spirator.

2. Likewise, because the Father and the Son create by a single creation, they are called not only one principle of the creature, but also *one creator*: therefore since they likewise spirate by a single spiration, they are one spirator.

3. Likewise, that they are *the same principle*, it seems, because unity not multiplied makes identity in every way; but the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, in such a way that the unity of the principle is in no way multiplied in them[^1]: therefore they are the same principle.

4. Likewise, this is true: *the Father and the Son spirate by the same spiration*; but the same is signified by this name *principle* as by this name *spiration*: therefore by an equipollent [argument], the Father and the Son [are][^3] the same principle.

**On the contrary:**

1. *Spirator* and *he who spirates* are equipollent: therefore if there is one spirator, then *one is*[^2] also *he who spirates*. But this is false: *one spirates*, since not one but two are those who spirate: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, *spirator* signifies the spiration itself in concretion to a supposit: therefore that [supposit] is either an essence, or a person. Not an essence, therefore a person: therefore if the Father and the Son are one spirator, they are one person or hypostasis.

3. Likewise, that *the same principle* is not to be granted, it seems. For if they are the same principle, they are the same; but this is false, that the Father and the Son are the same: therefore the first too is false. That [the inference] follows is plain; for it follows well: *they are the same animal, therefore the same*. Furthermore, that this is false — *they are the same* — is plain, since they are distinct, therefore they are not the same.

4. Likewise, that which is *idem* is a relative pronoun: therefore since a pronoun designates a definite person, and a relative is one which signifies identity in that for which it stands[^4], it signifies identity in the supposit; but that is not an essence, but a person: therefore it signifies that they are the same person; which since it is false, it remains that that locution is false.

> **CONCLUSION.** *The locutions are not to be approved, neither that the Father and the Son are one spirator, nor that they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit, although they are one principle of him.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this locution: *the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, is simply received; this however: *the Father and the Son are one spirator*, is not received; and this likewise is not admitted: *the Father and the Son are the same principle*. For although they seem to be equipollent to that [first locution], nevertheless they are not equipollent. For in these locutions the notion of spiration is signified in a different way.

On account of which it must be noted that a notion can be signified in two ways, namely *in abstraction* and *in concretion*: in abstraction, as if one says *spiration*; in concretion, as if one says *principle* or *spirator*. In concretion, however, it can be signified either by comparison to a subject in the formal character of supposit, or by comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], or in both ways.

The notion of spiration is therefore signified in concretion in comparison[^5] to a subject in the formal character of supposit by this name *spirator*, which is a verbal noun. And because the supposit of this notion is a person, and not one person but two, therefore we say *two*[^6] *spirators*, not *one*. Nor is it the same with that which is *creator*: because, since it is an essential name, it signifies in concretion to a subject which is substance — and that is one in the three — but a notion to a person, which of itself is multiplied[^7], is not one in two.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject in the formal character of [an] active [agent], as by this name *principle*, which signifies origin. And since a subject acts through a power, and power has regard to nature, [and] since in the Father and the Son there is one nature and one power not multiplied: by this name *principle* the notion of spiration is signified as in no way multiplied. Therefore we say: *the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit*, so that *one* signifies the unity of the notion and of the spirative power and of nature in the spirators. Hence it is, that the Father is not called[^8] several principles, even if he have several notions, since he does not have [them] according to diverse powers and natures.

The notion is also signified in comparison to a subject as in the formal character both of supposit and of active [agent], when *the same principle* is said, since the pronoun *idem*, which requires a definite person to be signified, has regard to the supposit; and *principle*, as has been said, has regard to it as active. And since the supposit is neither the same nor one, therefore this is false: *the Father and the Son are the same principle*.

Therefore this is true: *the Father and the Son are one principle*; this however is false: *they are one spirator*; this again is false: *they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit*. And the reason for all these is plain from what has been said.

**Solution of the opposites.**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected — that they are one principle because they spirate by a single spiration — it must be said that this is not the whole reason; but this is the whole reason: that by a single spiration and a single power and in unity of nature they spirate the same one; and *principle* in this way signifies that notion: and therefore they are one principle. The notion is not so signified, however, by this name *spirator*, which is a verbal noun and descends from a verb that involves a personal supposit. For *spirator* is said of him who spirates, and that one is a person.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning creation, the response is now plain, since creation does not only have to come about by one power, but also has one supposit[^9], and that is substance — for the Father does not create as a proper subject, but the divine substance itself, which is one — but the supposit of spiration cannot be a substance, but a person: therefore it is not said that the Father and the Son are one spirator.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that identity is unity not multiplied; it must be said that this is not enough, unless it is such a unity as is not multiplied nor admits with itself a plurality of supposits, which identity excludes. And since the unity of the principle admits a plurality of persons, that [objection] is plain.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that they spirate by the same spiration; it must be said that it does not follow from this that they are one spirator; for although the notion is the same, nevertheless the supposit is not the same. And when *the same principle* is said, identity is noted in both; when *the same spiration* is said, identity is noted in [only] the other: therefore this does not follow from that, nor does the one infer the other.

la: Vat. et cod. cc praetermittunt *in illis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] and codex cc omit *in illis*.

la: Ex codd. FGHIPQTXZ revocavimus *est*, quod in Vat. deest. Mox pro *unus spirat* codd. P Q *unus qui spirat*.

en: From codices FGHIPQTXZ we have restored *est*, which is missing in the Vatican [edition]. Immediately afterwards, in place of *unus spirat*, codices P and Q [read] *unus qui spirat*.

la: Supple cum cod. X *sunt*.

en: Supply *sunt* with codex X.

la: Priscian., 11. Grammat. c. 4: *Proprium est pronominis pro aliquo nomine proprio poni et certas significare personas.* — Et XVII. Grammat. c. 12: *Praedicta autem est causa, quapropter pronomen unum pro omnibus accipitur nominibus, id est, quod demonstrationem vel relationem habet alicuius certae substantiae, quae in omnibus propriis est nominibus una eademque voce significanda.*

en: Priscian, *Grammar* bk. 11, c. 4: *It is proper to a pronoun to be put in place of some proper noun and to signify definite persons.* — And *Grammar* bk. 17, c. 12: *The aforesaid is the reason why one pronoun is taken for all nouns, namely because it has the demonstration or relation of some definite substance, which in all proper [nouns] is to be signified by one and the same expression.*

la: In Vat. desiderantur verba *in comparatione*, quae contextus postulat et etiam a cod. T exhibentur. Plures codd. ut WX aa bb cum ed. 1 pro *in concretione* substituunt *in comparatione*.

en: In the Vatican [edition] the words *in comparatione* are missing, which the context demands and which are also exhibited by codex T. Several codices such as WX aa bb with ed. 1, in place of *in concretione*, substitute *in comparatione*.

la: Ita mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; Vat. omittit *duos*.

en: So the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3; the Vatican [edition] omits *duos*.

la: Pro *est multiplicata* Vat. cum aliquibus codd. *multiplicatur*; insuper sola et perperam adiungit *ideo*; nonnulli codd. *est multiplicentur*.

en: In place of *est multiplicata*, the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] *multiplicatur*; moreover [the Vatican] alone and wrongly adds *ideo*; some codices [read] *est multiplicentur*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *dicit*. Mox post *quia non* habet codd. I K V W aa bb repetunt *plures*, pro quo cod. Y *diversas*, et deinde codd. PQX cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incongrue omittunt *secundum*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] *dicit*. Immediately afterwards, after *quia non*, codices I K V W aa bb repeat *plures*, for which codex Y [reads] *diversas*, and then codices PQX with eds. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incongruously omit *secundum*.

la: Suppositum hic significat subiectum, ut ex sequentibus et praecedentibus apparet, nisi forte sit error codicum. — Infra Vat. cum cod. cc bene *unica est* pro *una est*.

en: *Suppositum* here signifies *subiectum*, as appears from what follows and what precedes, unless perhaps there be an error of the codices. — Below, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc rightly [reads] *unica est* in place of *una est*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Locutionem *duo spiratores* recipiendam esse, cum S. Doctore putant Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Uldaricus (apud Dionys. Carth.) et etiam S. Thom. in *Comment.* (hic q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.). Sed idem in *Summa* (I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 7) « melius dicendum » putat, quod « sunt *duo spirantes* propter pluralitatem suppositorum, non autem *duo spiratores* propter unam spirationem. Nam adiectiva nomina habent numerum secundum supposita, substantiva vero a se ipsis secundum formam significatam. » In principali assertione Scot. consentit Angelico, non tamen in ratione addita (de quo videsis Macedo, coll. 6, diff. 3). Auctor opusculi sexagesimi quinti inter opuscula S. Thomae (ed. Parmae) utramque sententiam nititur conciliare. Hoc autem opusculum, teste De Rubeis (*Dissert.* 29, c. 1), non est S. Thomae. Decisio illius differentiae spectat potius ad grammaticorum tribunal; sed nec horum iudicium de ista regula concordat.

**II.** Altera loquendi forma, qua dicitur *idem principium*, a S. Thoma (*loc. cit.*) asseritur « convenienter dici, secundum quod *ly principium* supponit confuse et indistincte pro duabus personis simul ». S. Bonav. vero cum aliis supra recitatis non admittit hanc formulam. Alii, ut Richard. a Med., utramque sententiam reputant probabilem.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 70, m. 3, a. 1, i. 5. — S. Thom., *loc. cit.* — B. Albert., hic a. 5, 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., I *Sent.* d. 11, q. 5, hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1, *princ.* q. 2, et d. 11, *princ.* 2, q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60, q. 6. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., d. 11, q. 4.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That the locution *two spirators* must be received [is held] by St. Bonaventure, [and] together with the holy Doctor [it is held by] Alexander of Hales, Blessed Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Ulricus (in Dionysius the Carthusian), and also St. Thomas in his *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 1, ad 2). But the same [Thomas] in the *Summa* (I, q. 36, a. 4, ad 7) judges that « it must better be said » that « they are *two spirating ones* on account of the plurality of supposits, but not *two spirators* on account of the one spiration. For adjectival nouns have number according to supposits, but substantival ones from themselves according to the form signified. » In the principal assertion Scotus agrees with the Angelic Doctor, but not in the additional reason (concerning which see Macedo, coll. 6, diff. 3). The author of the sixty-fifth opusculum among the *Opuscula* of St. Thomas (Parma ed.) tries to reconcile both opinions. This opusculum, however, on the testimony of De Rubeis (*Dissert.* 29, c. 1), is not of St. Thomas. The decision of that difference belongs rather to the tribunal of grammarians; but neither do their judgments concerning that rule agree.

**II.** The other manner of speaking, by which *the same principle* is said, is asserted by St. Thomas (*loc. cit.*) « to be conveniently said, according as *the [particle] principium* supposits confusedly and indistinctly for the two persons together. » St. Bonaventure, however, with the others recited above, does not admit this formula. Others, like Richard of Mediavilla, hold both opinions to be probable.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 70, m. 3, a. 1, i. 5. — St. Thomas, *loc. cit.* — Blessed Albert, here a. 5, 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 11, q. 5, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1, *princ.* q. 2, and d. 11, *princ.* 2, q. 1. — Henricus of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60, q. 6. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 11, q. 4.

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