title: Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II.
### *Utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Non est vere innocens qui potest alium relevare a culpa, et non relevat: ergo multo fortius non est vere innocens qui potest alium praeservare a culpa, et non praeservat. Sed Creator posset animam, quam creat, a culpa praeservare, si eam tali corpori non infunderet: ergo videtur, quod eam infundendo tali corpori faciat minus iuste.

2. Item, idem est facere aliquid in se, et facere aliquid, quo facto necesse est illud fieri. Unde idem est hominem interficere, et facere, quo facto homo necessario moriatur; et qui aperit fenestram dicitur domum illuminare, pro eo quod facit aliquid, quo facto domus illuminatur. Sed anima infusa maculatae carni, necesse est, eam[^1] effici peccatricem: igitur idem est animam peccatricem facere, et animam tali carni infundere; sed nullo modo decet divinam iustitiam animam peccatricem facere: ergo nullo modo decet eam infundere.

3. Item, minus malum est affligi quantacumque poena temporali, quam maculari culpa mortali: sed nullo modo deceret divinam iustitiam, animam in suae creationis primordio, antequam uniretur corpori, in poenam demergere infernalem; immo diceretur ipsi animae facere iniuriam, quam innocentem humiliaret[^2] in poena: ergo multo fortius indecens est divinae iustitiae, et iniuria videtur fieri ipsi animae, si coniungitur carni maculatae, ex qua contrahit maculam originalis.

4. Item, etsi caro posterorum aliquo modo fuerit in Adam, animae tamen nunquam sunt ex anima Adae propagatae, sed immediate a Deo productae sunt[^3]: ergo videtur, quod Adam nihil eis meruit nec demeruit: igitur sicut non decuisset divinam iustitiam animam Adae infundere corpori maculato in primaria rerum conditione, sic nec nunc videtur, quod debeat eam tali carni sociare.

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5. Item, non est vera iustitia, nisi ubi coniuncta est misericordia — nam *universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas*[^4] — sed cum Deus infundit animam carni maculatae, quam scit de corpore exire, antequam baptizetur vel possit converti ad Deum, tunc nullam facit misericordiam: ergo videtur, quod in tali operatione non commendetur divina iustitia, quae derelinquit misericordiam.

6. Item, si aliqua anima haberet usum voluntatis et recusaret tali corpori uniri, non esset iustum, quod Deus illam, ipsa recusante, in illo corpore incarceraret[^5]: igitur si animae conditio non debet deteriorari, quia, cum creatur, caret usu libertatis arbitrii; videtur, quod nullo modo, salva rectitudine iustitiae, sociari deberet carni maculatae.

**Sed contra:**

1. Iustum est, ut *Conditor* naturae satisfaciat appetitui naturali, quem naturae inseruit; sed corpus ab Adam propagatum, perfecta organizatione organizatum appetit uniri animae rationali: ergo si nihil potest satisfacere illi appetitui[^6] nisi solus Deus, videtur, quod ad divinam iustitiam pertineat illi corpori animam infundere.

2. Item, iustum est, quod *gubernator* conservet res eo modo, quo natae sunt conservari; sed species humana nata est conservari, sicut et species aliorum animalium per propagationem hominis ab homine: igitur secundum quod corpora procreantur, iustum est, Deum animas illis infundere: ergo qualiacumque sint corpora ex Adam propagata, animae debent illis corporibus sociari[^7].

3. Item, iustum est, *adiutorem* omnium in eo quod praecipit alteri, auxilium suum impendere; sed Deus praecepit homini filios procreare[^8], et homo non potest sine divino adiutorio, perficiente et complente quod homo inchoat, dando formam completivam: ergo quotiescumque et quomodocumque homo generat, si non est defectus ex parte hominis praeparantis corpora, videtur, quod iustum et aequum sit, Deum auxiliari infundendo animas.

4. Item, iustum est, aequum *retributorem* pro enormi crimine totam posteritatem in servitutem redigere, sicut legibus humanis videmus pro crimine laesae maiestatis exheredari[^9] totam posteritatem. Si ergo Adam, pater omnium hominum, inexcusabiliter et contra excellentissimum Dominum peccavit; videtur, quod iustum sit, omnes posteros eius in miseriam et servitutem redigi; et si hoc, iustum est, animas eorum corporibus infectis et poenalibus copulari.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Decet divinam iustitiam, prout dicit divinae bonitatis condecentiam, infundere animas corporibus propagatis ab Adam.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod *iustitia* dupliciter consuevit accipi. Uno modo dicitur iustitia ipsius *divinae bonitatis condecentia.* Alio modo dicitur iustitia, prout considerat *meritorum exigentiam*[^10]. — Si dicatur iustitia divinae bonitatis condecentia, hoc modo decet divinam iustitiam animam rationalem infundere carni ex Adam propagatae: tum ex hoc, quod est rerum *conditor*; tum ex hoc, quod est *conservator*; tum ex hoc, quod est *provisor* sive administrator. — *Conditorem* decet appetitui naturae satisfacere; et ideo, cum natura in Adam vitiata corpus format habens appetitum ad animam rationalem, ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, illum appetitum supplere et perficere. — *Conservatorem* etiam decet rem sic conservare, secundum quod nata est conservari. Si ergo species humana, quae in Adam inchoata est, nata est conservari per propagationem hominis ex homine; cum habeat homo corpus animale, nec possit in solis corporibus conservari absque animabus; ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, in quantum Deus est naturae conservator, animas corporibus infundere, naturae lege[^11] propagatis. — *Gubernatorem* etiam decet sic rem administrare, secundum quod instituit et naturae suae indidit virtutem et potentiam ad movendum et operandum. Propter quod dicit Augustinus in septimo de Civitate Dei[^12]: « Sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat ». Quoniam igitur Deus sic instituit humanam naturam, ut Adam praepararet corpora, et ipse illis corporibus animas infunderet; et

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iterum, ipsum Adam instituit in statu mutabilitatis, in quo scilicet posset effici mortalis et immortalis: ex his duobus necessario colligitur, quod ad divinae bonitatis condecentiam spectat, in quantum est rerum administrator, quod animas talibus corporibus infundat. Si enim in primaria conditione sic *instituit* et sic decrevit, ut corporibus propagatis ab Adam animas rationales infunderet; et iterum, sic *debet administrare* res, « ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »: ut salva sit lex *institutionis* et lex *administrationis*, qualiacumque Adam corpora sibi propaget, dum tamen sint disposita ad animam rationalem, decet Deum animas his infundere. — Nec ex hoc culpatur Deus in aliquo. Et est exemplum satis manifestum. Si promisissem alicui, quotcumque[^13] dolia faceret de aliqua arbore, implere ea vino; et radix illius arboris sic inficeretur, ut omnia dolia, ex illa arbore facta, vinum inficerent, quod illis infunderetur: non esset culpa mei infundentis vinum in talia dolia, quia ego facio, quod debeo et promisi, sed eius culpa est, qui radicem arboris infecit et inepta dolia praeparavit. — Et sic patet, quod, secundum quod iustitia dicitur divinae bonitatis condecentia, hoc exigit, videlicet, ut animae talibus corporibus infundantur.

Si autem iustitia dicatur *proprie* secundum quod respicit *meritorum exigentiam*, sic nulla est quaestio, utrum Deus animam tali corpori infundat iuste, vel iniuste. Iustitia enim haec[^14] non respicit rerum conditionem, sed respicit retributionum distributionem. Aliud autem est, animam creare et infundere, aliud, pro meritis sibi retribuere. Cum enim eam creat, non considerat, quid anima meruerit, sed quod anima appetitu naturali uniri appetit. — Posset tamen dici, quod etsi non sit assignare iustitiam isto modo, secundum quod habetur respectus ad ipsam animam *in se*, contingit tamen reperire *in comparatione ad demeritum Adae.* Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in libro de Conceptu virginali, capitulo vigesimo octavo[^15]: « Si quis vir et uxor ad magnam quandam dignitatem et possessionem nullo suo merito, sed sola gratia provecti sunt, si crimen grave inexcusabiliter committant et pro eo iuste deiiciuntur et in servitutem rediguntur; quis dicet, filios, quos post damnationem genuerunt, eidem non subiacere servituti, sed potius ad bona, quae parentes amiserunt iuste, gratis debere restitui? Tales sunt primi parentes et eorum filii, quos iuste pro culpa sua de beatitudine in miseriam deiecti, in eodem generant exilio, de quibus tanto districtius debet esse iudicium, quanto delictum eorum potest probari improbabilius ». — Sic igitur patet, quomodo decet divinam iustitiam infundere animas corporibus propagatis ab Adam. Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est vere innocens qui potest alium relevare a culpa etc.; dicendum, quod istud verum est de eo innocente, qui nescit vel non potest bona ex malis elicere[^16], vel cuius etiam non est universaliter naturam regere; et ideo locum in proposito non habet. Nam Deus mala permittit non solummodo originalia, verum etiam actualia: tum quia « sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; tum etiam quia novit de malis bona elicere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui facit, quo facto necesse est alterum fieri, dicitur illud facere; dicendum, quod hoc veritatem habet, quando effectus consequens directe consequitur ad illud factum intermedium, et secundum ordinationem operis et secundum intentionem agentis, sicut est in eo qui aperit fenestram, ut illuminetur domus. Non sic autem est in proposito: tum quia Deus non intendit infundere animam carni ad hoc, ut contrahat culpam; tum etiam quia infusio animae in carnem non *directe* ordinatur ad animae maculationem nisi solum *per accidens*, videlicet ratione foeditatis introductae in carnem ex culpa Adae; et ideo talis effectus extraneus est operationi divinae. Et ideo ratio illa peccat *secundum accidens*[^17].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus poneret animam in inferno, non faceret iuste; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, cum dico, *animam poni in inferno*, hoc non attenditur secundum ordinem naturae, cum talis locus non sit debitus animae per naturam. Si ergo ibi ordinate ponatur, necesse est, quod ponatur secundum iustitiam, quae respicit meritorum exigentiam. Sed anima, antequam corpori infundatur, nulla habet merita[^18]; et ideo, si in inferno collocaretur, nulla esset ibi iustitia. Non sic autem est ex parte ista, quia anima naturalem habet appetitum ad carnem, et caro ad spiritum; et ideo secundum ordinem naturae anima in tali corpore col-

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locatur, nec debet infringi appetitus naturalis propter aliquod accidens praeternaturale, utpote foeditatis vel poenalitatis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima non propagatur ex anima, ergo nihil meretur una alteri; dicendum, quod etsi *potentia virtutis generativae* non se extendat plus quam ad carnis propagationem per modum efficientis, *intentio* tamen *naturae* se extendit ad totum compositum. Homo enim non intendit generare carnem, sed intendit generare hominem similem sibi in specie; et ideo omnes dicuntur filii Adae. Et propterea, licet Adam non potuerit demereri animae ut *separatae*, potuit tamen ei demereri ut *carni unitae*; et ideo ratio illa non valet.

— Posset tamen et aliter dici, sicut tactum est, quod illa animae infusio non respicit merita praecedentia.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de anima separata, quae haberet usum liberae voluntatis; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, si talis anima usum liberae voluntatis haberet et corpus tale respueret, infusio illa non posset esse absque poena; et ita culpa praecederet eius infusionem, aut sibi fieret iniustitia. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia cum anima corpori uniri appetat, illa unio est naturalis, licet accidentaliter ex hoc contrahat culpam et poenam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod iustitia semper debet esse iuncta misericordiae; dicendum, quod verum est; nam iustitia, secundum quod dicitur *divinae bonitatis condecentia*, iuncta est misericordiae, quae quidem dicitur *divinae bonitatis affluentia*[^19], et utraque in proposito habet reperiri. In hoc enim ipso, quod Deus animas talibus corporibus infundit, manifestatur affluentia divinae bonitatis, qua *solem suum super bonos et malos oriri facit*[^20]; nec propter transgressionem Adae subtraxit manum a conservatione humanae naturae. Secundum autem quod iustitia respicit *meritorum exigentiam*, sic etiam habet misericordiam coniunctam; sed neutro modo, proprie loquendo, habet locum in proposito, nisi comparemus ad peccatum Adae. Nam per comparationem ad peccatum Adae est ibi iustitia, quia Deus pro sua transgressione totam posteritatem Adae punivit; est etiam misericordia, quia eam non omnino delevit, quamvis Adam hoc ex sua transgressione mereretur; immo multis ipsorum posterorum restituit gratiam. Aliis vero, qui moriuntur ante baptisma, etsi non praestet beneficium gratiae, beneficium tamen aliquod impendit misericordiae in hoc, quod conservat eis esse naturae. Melius est enim sic esse quam omnino non esse. Paratus etiam esset eis impendere beneficium gratiae, si perducerentur ad baptismatis Sacramentum. Quod autem non perducuntur, hoc venit ex defectu naturae[^21].

Et *si tu quaeras*, cum Deus hoc praesciret, quare animam corpori illi infunderet; vel cum etiam praesciret Adam lapsurum et corpora humana corrupturum, quare sic et non aliter propagationem hominis instituit, cum taliter posset instituere, ut nullo modo proli fieret praeiudicium a parente; dicendum, quod in rerum conditione plus pensatur ordo divinae *sapientiae*, quam pensetur ordo *iustitiae* vel *misericordiae.* Ordo autem divinae sapientiae hoc exigebat, ut rationales spiritus immediate exirent a Deo, ad cuius sunt imaginem; et omnes homines propagarentur ex uno homine, multis de causis, sicut supra distinctione decima octava[^22] assignatum est; et quamvis Deus videret, aliquod malum inde provenire, non tamen debuit ordinem, quem requirebat divina sapientia, immutare. Eliciendo enim bona ex malis subsequentibus, totum reducit ad ordinem sapientiae competentem; et dum ex magnis malis maiora elicit bona, commendabilior redditur et potentia et sapientia et bonitas. Propter quod exclamat Gregorius[^23] et dicit: « O felix culpa, quae talem meruit habere Redemptorem ». Et ideo si quis velit attendere, quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus suis, non debet aspicere solum ad illud quod praesentialiter videt, verum etiam ad antecedentia et futura; quia, sicut pulcritudo metri non percipitur una syllaba[^24], sed in versus integritate, sic pulcritudinem divinorum operum et laudabilitatem respicere non potest qui respicit ea in parte.

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### Question II.
### *Whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh.*

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh. And that [it does] not, it seems.

1. He is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, and does not relieve him: therefore much more is he not truly innocent who can preserve another from guilt, and does not preserve him. But the Creator could preserve from guilt the soul which He creates, if He did not infuse it into such a body: therefore it seems that, by infusing it into such a body, He acts less justly.

2. Likewise, it is the same thing to make something in itself, and to make something which being done it is necessary that the other come about. Hence it is the same thing to kill a human, and to do that which being done the human necessarily dies; and he who opens a window is said to illuminate the house, because he does something which being done the house is illuminated. But the soul infused into infected flesh, it is necessary that it[^1] be made a sinner: therefore it is the same thing to make the soul a sinner, and to infuse the soul into such flesh; but in no way does it befit divine justice to make the soul a sinner: therefore in no way does it befit it to infuse it.

3. Likewise, it is a lesser evil to be afflicted with any temporal punishment whatever, than to be stained with mortal guilt: but in no way would it befit divine justice to plunge the soul, in the first beginning of its creation, before it were united to the body, into infernal punishment; nay, it would be said to do an injury to the soul itself, which it would humble[^2] innocent in punishment: therefore much more is it unbecoming to divine justice, and an injury seems to be done to the soul itself, if it is joined to infected flesh, from which it contracts the stain of the original [sin].

4. Likewise, although the flesh of the posterity was in some way in Adam, yet the souls are never propagated from the soul of Adam, but are produced immediately by God[^3]: therefore it seems that Adam neither merited nor demerited anything for them: therefore just as it would not have befitted divine justice to infuse the soul of Adam into an infected body in the first condition of things, so neither now does it seem that it ought to associate it with such flesh.

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5. Likewise, there is no true justice except where mercy is joined to it — for *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth*[^4] — but when God infuses the soul into infected flesh, which He knows will go forth from the body before it is baptized or can be converted to God, then He does no mercy: therefore it seems that in such an operation divine justice, which abandons mercy, is not commended.

6. Likewise, if some soul had the use of will and refused to be united to such a body, it would not be just that God should imprison[^5] it, against its refusal, in that body: therefore if the condition of the soul ought not to be worsened, because, when it is created, it lacks the use of freedom of choice; it seems that in no way, with the rectitude of justice preserved, ought it to be associated with infected flesh.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is just that the *Author* of nature should satisfy the natural appetite which He implanted in nature; but a body propagated from Adam, organized by a perfect organization, desires to be united to a rational soul: therefore if nothing can satisfy that appetite[^6] except God alone, it seems that it pertains to divine justice to infuse a soul into that body.

2. Likewise, it is just that a *governor* should conserve things in the mode in which they are born to be conserved; but the human species is born to be conserved, like the species also of other animals, through the propagation of human from human: therefore according as bodies are procreated, it is just that God infuse souls into them: therefore whatever the bodies propagated from Adam may be, the souls ought to be associated with those bodies[^7].

3. Likewise, it is just that a *helper* of all should expend his aid in that which he commands to another; but God commanded the human to procreate children[^8], and the human cannot, without divine assistance perfecting and completing what the human begins, by giving the completive form: therefore as often and in whatever manner the human generates, if there is no defect on the part of the human preparing the bodies, it seems that it is just and equitable that God should assist by infusing souls.

4. Likewise, it is just that an equitable *requiter* should reduce a whole posterity into servitude for an enormous crime, just as by human laws we see a whole posterity disinherited[^9] for the crime of treason. If therefore Adam, the father of all humans, sinned inexcusably and against a most excellent Lord; it seems that it is just that all his posterity be reduced into misery and servitude; and if this, it is just that their souls be coupled with infected and penal bodies.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** It befits divine justice, insofar as it bespeaks the becomingness of the divine goodness, to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that *justice* is wont to be taken in two ways. In one way it is called the justice [which is] the *becomingness of the divine goodness* itself. In another way it is called justice, insofar as it considers the *exigency of merits*[^10]. — If justice be called the becomingness of the divine goodness, in this way it befits divine justice to infuse a rational soul into flesh propagated from Adam: both from this, that it is the *Author* of things; both from this, that it is the *Conservator*; both from this, that it is the *Provider* or administrator. — It befits the *Author* to satisfy the appetite of nature; and therefore, since nature, vitiated in Adam, forms a body having an appetite for a rational soul, it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness to supply and perfect that appetite. — It befits the *Conservator* also so to conserve a thing, according as it is born to be conserved. If therefore the human species, which was begun in Adam, is born to be conserved through the propagation of human from human; since the human has an animate body, nor can be conserved in bodies alone without souls; it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as God is the conservator of nature, to infuse souls into bodies propagated by the law of nature[^11]. — It befits the *Governor* also so to administer a thing, according as He instituted and bestowed on its nature the power and potency for moving and operating. On account of which Augustine says in the seventh [book] of the City of God[^12]: « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions ». Since therefore God so instituted human nature, that Adam should prepare the bodies, and He Himself should infuse souls into those bodies; and

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again, He instituted Adam himself in a state of mutability, in which namely he could be made mortal and immortal: from these two it is necessarily gathered that it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the administrator of things, that He should infuse souls into such bodies. For if in the first condition He so *instituted* and so decreed, that He would infuse rational souls into bodies propagated from Adam; and again, He so *ought to administer* things, « that He lets them carry out their own motions »: so that the law of *institution* and the law of *administration* be preserved, whatever bodies Adam may propagate for himself, provided that they be disposed for a rational soul, it befits God to infuse souls into them. — Nor by this is God blamed in anything. And there is a sufficiently manifest example. If I had promised someone, that however many[^13] casks he should make from a certain tree, I would fill them with wine; and the root of that tree were so infected that all the casks, made from that tree, would infect the wine which was poured into them: it would not be the fault of me who pour the wine into such casks, because I do what I owe and promised, but it is the fault of him who infected the root of the tree and prepared unfit casks. — And thus it is plain that, according as justice is called the becomingness of the divine goodness, it demands this, namely, that souls be infused into such bodies.

But if justice be called *properly* according as it regards the *exigency of merits*, thus there is no question whether God infuses the soul into such a body justly or unjustly. For this justice[^14] does not regard the condition of things, but regards the distribution of retributions. But it is one thing to create and infuse the soul, another to requite it according to its merits. For when He creates it, He does not consider what the soul has merited, but that the soul by natural appetite desires to be united. — Yet it could be said that, although justice be not assigned in this way, according as a respect is had to the soul *in itself*, nevertheless it happens to be found *in comparison to the demerit of Adam.* And this is what Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-eight[^15]: « If a man and wife have been advanced to a certain great dignity and possession by no merit of their own, but by grace alone, [and] if they inexcusably commit a grave crime and for it are justly cast down and reduced into servitude; who will say that the sons whom they begot after the condemnation are not subject to the same servitude, but rather ought freely to be restored to the goods which the parents justly lost? Such are the first parents and their sons, who, justly cast down for their guilt from beatitude into misery, generate in the same exile, concerning whom the judgment ought to be so much the stricter, the more inexcusably their offense can be proven ». — Thus therefore it is plain how it befits divine justice to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that he is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, etc.; it must be said that that is true of the innocent one who does not know or cannot elicit goods from evils[^16], or whose office it is also not universally to govern nature; and therefore it has no place in the [present] matter. For God permits evils not only original, but also actual: both because « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions »; both also because He knows how to elicit goods from evils.

2. To that which is objected, that he who makes [something] by which being done it is necessary that the other come about, is said to make it; it must be said that this holds true, when the consequent effect follows directly upon that intermediate thing done, and according to the ordination of the work and according to the intention of the agent, as it is in him who opens a window, that the house may be illuminated. But it is not so in the [present] matter: both because God does not intend to infuse the soul into the flesh for this, that it may contract guilt; both also because the infusion of the soul into the flesh is not *directly* ordered to the staining of the soul except only *per accidens*, namely by reason of the foulness introduced into the flesh from the guilt of Adam; and therefore such an effect is extraneous to the divine operation. And therefore that reasoning errs *per accidens*[^17].

3. To that which is objected, that if God were to place the soul in hell, He would not act justly; it must be said that it is not similar, because, when I say *the soul is placed in hell*, this is not regarded according to the order of nature, since such a place is not owed to the soul by nature. If therefore it is placed there in an ordered way, it is necessary that it be placed according to justice, which regards the exigency of merits. But the soul, before it is infused into the body, has no merits[^18]; and therefore, if it were placed in hell, there would be no justice there. But it is not so on this side, because the soul has a natural appetite for the flesh, and the flesh for the spirit; and therefore according to the order of nature the soul is placed

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in such a body, nor ought the natural appetite to be infringed on account of some preternatural accident, such as of foulness or penality.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul is not propagated from a soul, therefore one merits nothing for another; it must be said that although the *power of the generative virtue* does not extend further than to the propagation of the flesh by way of an efficient [cause], yet the *intention of nature* extends to the whole composite. For the human does not intend to generate flesh, but intends to generate a human like himself in species; and therefore all are called sons of Adam. And on that account, although Adam could not demerit for the soul as *separated*, he could nevertheless demerit for it as *united to the flesh*; and therefore that reasoning is not valid.

— Yet it could also be said otherwise, as has been touched on, that that infusion of the soul does not regard preceding merits.

6. To that which is objected concerning a separated soul, which would have the use of free will; it must be said that it is not similar, because, if such a soul had the use of free will and rejected such a body, that infusion could not be without punishment; and thus guilt would precede its infusion, or an injustice would be done to it. But it is not so in the [present] matter, because since the soul desires to be united to the body, that union is natural, although accidentally from this it contracts guilt and punishment.

5. To that which is objected, that justice ought always to be joined to mercy; it must be said that it is true; for justice, according as it is called the *becomingness of the divine goodness*, is joined to mercy, which indeed is called the *affluence of the divine goodness*[^19], and both are to be found in the [present] matter. For in this very [fact], that God infuses souls into such bodies, is manifested the affluence of the divine goodness, by which *He makes His sun to rise over the good and the evil*[^20]; nor on account of the transgression of Adam did He withdraw His hand from the conservation of human nature. But according as justice regards the *exigency of merits*, thus also it has mercy conjoined; but in neither mode, properly speaking, does it have place in the [present] matter, unless we compare to the sin of Adam. For by comparison to the sin of Adam there is justice there, because God punished the whole posterity of Adam for his transgression; there is also mercy, because He did not utterly destroy it, although Adam merited this by his transgression; nay, to many of those same posterity He restored grace. But to others, who die before baptism, although He does not bestow the benefit of grace, He nevertheless expends some benefit of mercy in this, that He conserves for them the being of nature. For it is better so to be than not to be at all. He would even be ready to bestow on them the benefit of grace, if they were brought to the Sacrament of baptism. But that they are not brought, this comes from a defect of nature[^21].

And *if you ask*, since God foreknew this, why He would infuse the soul into that body; or since He also foreknew that Adam would fall and would corrupt human bodies, why He instituted the propagation of the human thus and not otherwise, since He could institute [it] in such a way that in no way would prejudice be done to the offspring by the parent; it must be said that in the condition of things the order of the divine *wisdom* is weighed more than the order of *justice* or of *mercy* is weighed. But the order of the divine wisdom demanded this, that rational spirits should go forth immediately from God, to whose image they are; and that all humans should be propagated from one human, for many causes, as was assigned above in the eighteenth distinction[^22]; and although God saw that some evil would come thence, He nevertheless ought not to alter the order which the divine wisdom required. For by eliciting goods from the evils that follow, He reduces the whole to the order befitting wisdom; and while He elicits greater goods from great evils, both power and wisdom and goodness are rendered more commendable. On account of which Gregory[^23] exclaims and says: « O happy fault, which merited to have such a Redeemer ». And therefore if anyone wishes to attend to how commendable God is in His works, he ought not to look only to that which he sees in the present, but also to the antecedents and the things to come; because, just as the beauty of a verse is not perceived in one syllable[^24], but in the integrity of the verse, so he cannot regard the beauty and praiseworthiness of the divine works who regards them in part.

---

la: Paulo ante plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 *animam infusam* pro *anima infusa*, tamen incongrue retinent *eam*, exceptis cod. cc et ed. 1, recte in sua lectione omittentibus *eam.*

en: Shortly before, very many codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 4 [read] *animam infusam* (the soul infused, accusative) for *anima infusa* (the soul [having been] infused, ablative), yet they incongruously retain *eam* (it), with the exception of codex cc and edition 1, which rightly omit *eam* in their reading.

la: Vat. cum ed. 3 *vexaret.* Codd. A I *quod*, cod. F *quia* pro *quam.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with edition 3 [reads] *vexaret* (would vex). Codices A I [read] *quod*, codex F *quia* for *quam* (which).

la: Ut probatum est supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3.

en: As was proven above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Psalm. 24, 10. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 hoc quintum argumentum reiecit in locum sextum, eo, ut in oculos incurrit, consilio, ut ordo obiectionum plane respondeat ordini solutionum postea adductarum.

en: Psalm 24:10. — The Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 cast this fifth argument into the sixth place, with this design, as is evident, that the order of the objections might plainly correspond to the order of the solutions adduced afterward.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *incarnaret.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 [read] *incarnaret* (would incarnate).

la: Cod. V addit *naturali.*

en: Codex V adds *naturali* (natural).

la: Cfr. supra d. XXXII. lit. Magistri, c. 6.

en: Cf. above, d. 32, the text of the Master, c. 6.

la: Gen. 1, 28; 8, 17. — Paulo inferius Vat., omissa voce *homo* ante *inchoat*, post *inchoat* subiungit *perficere et complere.* Pro voce *homo* codd. P V X cc ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 *non.*

en: Genesis 1:28; 8:17. — A little below, the Vatican [edition], with the word *homo* (the human) omitted before *inchoat* (begins), after *inchoat* subjoins *perficere et complere* (to perfect and complete). For the word *homo* codices P V X cc ee and others, with editions 1, 2, [read] *non* (not).

la: Non pauci codd., inter quos F Y aa bb ee, *exhereditari.* — Cfr. Anselm., de Conceptu virgin. et orig. pecc. c. 28, ex quo testimonium illud, quod ad rem tractatam spectat, affertur infra in corp. quaest.

en: Not a few codices, among them F Y aa bb ee, [read] *exhereditari* (to be disinherited). — Cf. Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, c. 28, from which that testimony, which pertains to the matter treated, is adduced below in the body of the question.

la: Anselm., Proslog. c. 10: *Cum enim punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est.*

en: Anselm, Proslogion c. 10: « For when You punish the evil, it is just, because it befits their merits; but when You spare the evil, it is just, not because [it befits] their merits, but because it is becoming to Your goodness ».

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum pluribus codd. *legis.*

en: The editions, except 1, with several codices [read] *legis* (of the law).

la: Cap. 30: *Sic itaque administrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat.*

en: Chapter 30: « And so He thus administers all the things which He created, that He lets them also exercise and carry out their own motions ».

la: Codd. K T Y et alii *quaecumque*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *quotquot.*

en: Codices K T Y and others [read] *quaecumque*, the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 *quotquot* (however many).

la: Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 et plures codd. *hic.* Aliquanto inferius pro *appetitu naturali* memoratae edd. *appetitui naturali.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with editions 2, 3, 4 and several codices [read] *hic* (this). Somewhat below, for *appetitu naturali* (by natural appetite) the said editions [read] *appetitui naturali* (to the natural appetite).

la: Textus originalis sic: *Si quis enim vir et uxor eius... provecti, simul crimen... post damnationem generant, eidem non debere subiacere... quae parentes iuste perdiderunt, gratis oportere restitui... in miseriam damnati, in eodem generant exilio. De similibus itaque simile debet esse iudicium; sed de illis tanto districtius, quanto delictum eorum probari potest improbabilius.* — Pro *improbabilius* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 exhibet *improbius*, cod. N *inexcusabilius.* Sed teste Forcellini, Lexicon totius latinitatis adiectivum *improbabilis* etiam de factis et moribus a ratione reprobandis usurpatur.

en: The original text runs thus: « For if a man and his wife... advanced, [and they] together [commit] a crime... after the condemnation they generate, [and the sons] ought not to be subject to the same [servitude]... [the goods] which the parents justly lost ought freely to be restored... condemned into misery, they generate in the same exile. And so concerning the like the judgment ought to be alike; but concerning those so much the stricter, the more inexcusably their offense can be proven ». — For *improbabilius* (more inexcusably) the Vatican [edition] with editions 3, 4 exhibits *improbius*, codex N *inexcusabilius.* But on the testimony of Forcellini, the Lexicon of the whole Latin language, the adjective *improbabilis* is used also of deeds and morals to be reproved by reason.

la: Bene multi codd. cum edd., excepta 1, hanc sententiam verterunt in contrariam, legentes: *vel non potest mala ex bonis elicere*, quae lectio evidenter falsa reprobatur a codd. F I L O etc. et ed. 1. Pro nostra lectione militant etiam quae supra habentur d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2. Paulo inferius pro *solummodo originalia* [i. e. numero, non specie diversa], *verum etiam actualia* cod. cc et ed. 1 *solummodo originale... actuale.*

en: Quite many codices with the editions, except 1, turned this sentence into the contrary, reading: *vel non potest mala ex bonis elicere* (or he cannot elicit evils from goods), which reading, evidently false, is reproved by codices F I L O etc. and edition 1. For our reading there militate also the things had above in d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2. A little below, for *solummodo originalia* (only original [evils], i.e. diverse in number, not in species), *verum etiam actualia* (but also actual), codex cc and edition 1 [read] *solummodo originale... actuale* (only original... actual).

la: De hac fallacia vide tom. 1. pag. 58, nota 5.

en: Concerning this fallacy see vol. 1, p. 58, note 5.

la: Cfr. supra d. 18. a. 2. q. 2, et August., l. de Anima et eius orig. c. 6. n. 6.

en: Cf. above, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, and Augustine, the book On the Soul and Its Origin, c. 6, n. 6.

la: Anselm., Proslog. c. 9: *Vere in altissimo et secretissimo bonitatis tuae latet fons, unde manat fluvius misericordiae tuae.*

en: Anselm, Proslogion c. 9: « Truly in the highest and most secret [part] of Your goodness lies hidden the fount, whence flows the river of Your mercy ».

la: Matth. 5, 45. — Paulo ante pro *qua* codd. F aa *quae*, Vat. *quia.*

en: Matthew 5:45. — Shortly before, for *qua* (by which) codices F aa [read] *quae*, the Vatican [edition] *quia.*

la: Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 53. seqq. — Mox pro *corpori illi* cod. O *tali corpori.*

en: Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 20, n. 53 and following. — Soon, for *corpori illi* (into that body) codex O [reads] *tali corpori* (into such a body).

la: Art. 1. q. 1. et dub. circa lit.

en: Article 1, q. 1, and the dubium concerning the text.

la: In praeconio paschali *Exultet*, quod cantatur Sabbato sancto. — Mox pro *quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus* cod. L *quid sit commendabilius in operibus.*

en: In the paschal proclamation *Exultet*, which is sung on Holy Saturday. — Soon, for *quantum sit commendabilis Deus in operibus* (how commendable God is in [His] works) codex L [reads] *quid sit commendabilius in operibus* (what is more commendable in [His] works).

la: Cfr. August., VI. *Music.* c. 11. n. 30; *de Vera Relig.* c. 22. n. 42. — Paulo superius cod. H verbis *una syllaba* praefigit *in.*

en: Cfr. Augustine, *On Music* VI, c. 11, n. 30; *On True Religion* c. 22, n. 42. — A little above, codex H prefixes *in* to the words *una syllaba* (one syllable). ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (pp. 771–774, pdf 793–796) cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53747–53980); literal English; full apparatus from the printed-page footers.

**Boundary.** QUAESTIO II of ARTICULUS III. The q2 body begins on **p.771 right column** (after the article-level SCHOLION, which is held in a3-q1) with "Secundo quaeritur, utrum deceat divinam iustitiam animam tali carni infundere…" (raw ~53747). The chunk ends at "…respicere non potest qui respicit ea in parte." (end of the "Et si tu quaeras" excursus, p.774 right column), immediately before **DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI / DUB. I.** (running head `DIST. XXXII. DUBIA.`, raw ~53981). The Articulus III opener header is NOT repeated here — it is carried by a3-q1.

**Title note.** The printed QUAESTIO II header reads *infundere* ("…animam tali carni **infundere**"), confirmed on the 450 dpi PDF (p.771 R-column) and in the OCR. The a3-q1 opener listing renders it *sociare*; the body uses *infundere*, *sociare*, and *copulari* interchangeably (e.g. arg. 4 "tali carni sociare", arg. 6 "sociari deberet carni"). This chunk follows the printed header (*infundere*).

**Scholion scope.** has_scholion = **false**. The two-paragraph article-level SCHOLION (I–II) explicitly covers both q1 and q2 ("Duae huius articuli quaestiones intime cohaerent. In 1. quaest.… In 2. quaest. vero…") and is held in full in **a3-q1**. It is not duplicated here.

**Page-split map.**
- p. 771 (q2 header + opener + args 1–4 start): R-column footers 4–5 → [^1]–[^2]. (p.771 footers 1–2 belong to a3-q1's q1 replies; footer 3, Matthew 12:36 / *De omni verbo otioso*, anchors a3-q1's q1 reply 4 — see hand-off note below.)
- p. 772 (args 5–6, Sed contra 1–4, Conclusio, Respondeo start): footers 1–10 → [^3]–[^12].
- p. 773 (Respondeo cont. + exemplum + 2nd sense of justice + Ad obiecta 1–3): footers 1–6 → [^13]–[^18].
- p. 774 (Ad obiecta 4, "Aliter", 6, 5, "Et si tu quaeras" excursus): footers 1–6 → [^19]–[^24]. **CORRECTION (Pass 3, 2026-05-31):** footer 6 (`Cfr. August., VI. Music. c. 11. n. 30; de Vera Relig. c. 22. n. 42. — Paulo superius cod. H verbis una syllaba praefigit in`) anchors at *una syllaba* in the closing "pulcritudo metri" sentence of the *Et si tu quaeras* excursus; it had been dropped at the seam and is restored here as [^24]. The body text itself was complete; only this footer was missing. The page's footer 7 onward belongs to DUB. I.

**Hand-off received** (from a3-q1): q2 body begins on p.771 R-column; p.771 R-column footers were forwarded. Of those, footers 4 (*anima infusa*/*eam* variant → arg 2) and 5 (*vexaret*/*quam* variant → arg 3) are genuinely q2's and are taken here as [^1]–[^2]. Footer 3 (Matthew 12:36 *De omni verbo otioso*) anchors a3-q1's q1 reply-4 text ("in Matthaei duodecimo… *De omni verbo otioso…*") and therefore belongs to q1; it is NOT duplicated here. NOTE: a3-q1's committed rendering of reply 4 dropped the footnote marker for that Matthew verse — a minor pre-existing gap in a3-q1, flagged here for a future a3-q1 touch-up.

**Hand-off forwarded** (to d32-dubia): none. q2 ends cleanly before DUB. I; the DUBIA block's footers (p.774's later notes and onward) all belong to the DUBIA chunk. The reply numbering in the printed text runs 1, 2, 3, 4, [Aliter], 6, 5 (the printed edition places the reply to the 6th objection before the reply to the 5th, and inserts an "Aliter" alternative reply after reply 4); this ordering is preserved verbatim.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 32, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXXII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXII)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 774 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

**Dub. I.** In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Manet igitur, ut ait Augustinus, in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia.* Cum enim post baptismum non debeat remanere in nobis nisi *poena promovens*, et concupiscentia magis sit *poena suffocans* quam promovens; non debet remanere in *corpore mortis huius*[^1]. Quod autem sit poena *suffocans*, patet in li<!-- page 775 -->ttera sequenti, qua dicitur: *Eius desideriis noxiis non obedire praecipimur.* Si igitur desideria concupiscentiae sunt noxia, et prohibetur[^2] obedire concupiscentiae: ergo videtur, quod sit poena *suffocans.* — Item, actus concupiscentiae ligat rationem, maxime in opere virtutis generativae; sed talis est poena suffocans: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod concupiscentia, quae remanet post baptismum, non est *poena suffocans*, quia non praecludit aditum vitae spiritualis; stat enim simul cum gratia. *Praeterea*, etsi incitet ad illicitum, non tamen praevalet, quia subter nos est appetitus noster, et nos dominari possumus illius[^3]. Remanet autem haec concupiscentia in membris nostris ut *poena promovens*, maxime quantum ad exercitium pugnae, quae facit ad augmentum meriti et coronae. Quod bene significatum est in ingressu filiorum Israel in terram promissionis, in qua reliquit eis Dominus adversarios, cum quibus pugnare possent, et per quos Deus eos probaret, utrum ipsi Deum diligerent, an non, sicut patet in libro Iudicum[^4]. Sunt et aliae plures utilitates, ad quas movetur homo occasione concupiscentiae in se relictae; sed hae inveniri possunt libro quarto, distinctione quarta[^5].

Per hoc patet responsio ad duo obiecta. Nam concupiscentia non *suffocat*, nisi ei obedire velimus; et licet in actu generandi usus rationis *impediatur*, non tamen est ibi *suffocatio*, quia talis actus potest esse meritorius.

**Dub. II.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Per gratiam baptismi concupiscentia mitigatur et minuitur.* Contra hoc est: aut enim gratia baptismi *habet oppositionem*, aut *non.* Si *sic*: ergo una non potest stare cum altera: ergo, adveniente gratia, recedit concupiscentia, non[^6] minuitur. Si *non opponitur* ei: ergo videtur, quod ipsam non diminuat. — Item, si concupiscentia minuatur per gratiam: ergo cum sit finita, videtur, quod aliquando totaliter auferatur; quod est contra Augustinum in littera[^7], qui dicit, quod «hoc non praestatur nisi miraculo ineffabili, ut lex peccati prorsus exstinguatur».

Ideo est hic quaestio, utrum fomes in aliquo fuerit totaliter exstinctus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est supra[^8], concupiscentia duo dicit — dicit enim appetitum immoderatum boni commutabilis — dico igitur, quod ista immoderantia circa appetitum potest esse dupliciter: aut ita, quod ratio *captivetur*, et anima pervertatur, ut necessitatem habeat praeponendi bonum commutabile bono incommutabili; et sic dicitur esse concupiscentia *intensa*, et hoc modo tenet rationem *culpae*, ratione videlicet illius immoderantiae. Alio modo concupiscentia dicit immoderantiam, non quia ratio succumbat sensualitati, sed quia sensualitas *non perfecte obtemperet* rationi; et hoc modo tenet rationem *poenae.* Primo modo, quia tenet rationem *culpae*, directe opponitur ipsi gratiae; et ideo gratia superveniens aufert illam immoderantiam, pro eo quod talis immoderantia ponebat debitae iustitiae carentiam. Aliam autem immoderantiam, quae, sicut dictum est, dicit rationem *poenae*, non tollit gratia in suo adventu, propter hoc quod non opponitur ei formaliter. Sed quoniam gratia et concupiscentia relicta respectu eius, ad quod inclinant, quandam habent oppositionem; hinc est, quod secundum quod homo plus exercitatur in gratia, magis et magis remitti dicitur[^9] concupiscentia. — Nunquam tamen omnino tollitur concupiscentia, quia semper remanet radix eius in homine, nisi auferatur per donum gratiae speciale, sicut in Virgine creditur fuisse post conceptionem Filii Dei. Sed hoc magis habet locum in tertio[^10], cum quaeritur de sanctificatione Virginis.

Per haec autem, quae dicta sunt, patent obiecta. Gratia enim et concupiscentia quodam modo opponuntur, et quodam modo non, sicut ostensum est. — Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod concupiscentia est finita, ergo aliquando totaliter aufertur; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si concupiscentia diminueretur quantum ad *causam*[^11]; sed solum minuitur quantum ad *exercitium* sive per comparationem ad illud *ad quod est*; et ideo nunquam totaliter tollitur, sicut habilitas animae nunquam totaliter per peccatum adimitur; et hoc melius infra[^12] videbitur.

**Dub. III.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *manet vitium concupiscentiae in vetustate carnis tanquam superatum et peremptum, nisi illicito consensu reviviscat et in regnum proprium revocetur.* Hoc enim videtur falsum esse, quia, si concupiscentia, prout <!-- page 776 -->regnabat, dicebatur esse originale peccatum ab Augustino[^13]; videtur, quod si revocatur in regnum proprium post baptismum, quod originale peccatum revertatur. Quodsi hoc est falsum, restat etc. — Item, quae sunt diversorum generum, unum non auget alterum; sed illicitus consensus est *culpa*, concupiscentia relicta est *poena*: ergo non augetur per illicitum consensum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod concupiscentia augetur per consensum illicitum, sicut dicit Augustinus[^14], et hoc duplici ex causa. Primum, quia gratia expellitur, ex cuius praesentia ratio sensualitati praeerat, et per consequens remittebatur concupiscentia. Alia est ratio, quia potentia ex frequentia actus magis prompta efficitur ad exeundum in actum consimilem[^15]; et quia actus illicitus dicit actum concupiscendi: hinc est, quod concupiscentia augetur ab actu illicito quasi a simili.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod tunc redit originale peccatum; dicendum, quod hoc non sequitur duplici ex causa. Primum quidem, quia concupiscentia regnans non dicitur peccatum originale, nisi in quantum habet et regnum et dominium ab ipsa hominis origine. Cum autem illud habet per illicitum actum, non habet rationem peccati *originalis*, sed potius *actualis.* — Alia est etiam ratio, quia aliter diminuitur concupiscentia per baptismum, aliter augetur per illicitum consensum. Per baptismum enim sic diminuitur, ut auferatur illud quod *formaliter* erat peccatum originale, videlicet carentia debitae iustitiae. Ibi enim absolvitur quis a *debito* originalis iustitiae, ad quam omnes tenebantur ex ipsa obligatione Adae[^16]; sed per illicitum consensum *augeri* dicitur, pro eo quod, dum homo peccat, magis efficitur pronus ad malum, saltem *intensive* et quantum ad aliquod peccati genus determinatum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sunt diversorum generum concupiscentia, prout est *culpa* et prout est *poena*; dicendum, quod etsi sint diversorum generum[^17] in genere *moris*, non tamen in genere *naturae*; utriusque enim actus est concupiscere. *Praeterea*, etsi concupiscentia, prout est *poena*, non sit eiusdem generis cum concupiscentia, prout est *culpa*, formaliter loquendo, quia tamen est *poena vitiosa*, ad illam de se ordinat[^18], et propter hoc una augmentatur per alteram, sicut docet ipsa experientia[^19].

**Dub. IV.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quomodo alia peccata praetereunt actu et remanent reatu, ita e converso fieri potest, quod concupiscentia praetereat reatu et remaneat actu.* Sed *contra*: si concupiscentia remanet actu, ergo in originali non tantum consideratur *reatus*, verum etiam *actus*: ergo debet dici *peccatum actuale.* — Item, falsum videtur dicere, cum ait, quod alia peccata transeunt *actu* et remanent *reatu.* Cum enim dimittuntur peccata actualia in baptismo, transeunt et quantum ad *poenam* et quantum ad *culpam.* In[^20] poenitentia etiam transeunt quantum ad *reatum* poenae aeternae. Et *si tu dicas*, quod remanet reatus ad poenam satisfactoriam et temporalem; *obiicitur* similiter de originali, post cuius deletionem in baptismate remanet obligatio ad mortem et ad alias poenas temporales.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Magister large vocat hic *actum*, non solum ipsum *actualem motum*, sed etiam *pronitatem* illam, secundum quam homo ordinatur ad actum. Et ideo dicit, originale peccatum remanere actu, quia, cum sit ibi *privatio* originalis iustitiae, per quam homo est reus carentiae visionis Dei, sit etiam *pronitas*, per quam homo ordinatus est ad actum concupiscendi[^21]; aufertur illa privatio iustitiae originalis, et relinquitur illa inclinatio habitualis.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de transitu actuali, dicendum, quod Magister non loquitur de transitu, qui est per peccati *deletionem*, sed per peccati *consummationem*, per quem modum praesens in praeteritum dicitur transire. Ideo dicit, quod transit quantum ad *actum* et remanet quantum ad *reatum*, quia actus est in *fieri*, sed reatus est in *quiete*[^22].

**Dub. V.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Anima non est talis, qualem Deus eam fecit.* *Contra*: in subita operatione simul est *fieri* et *factum esse*; sed istud argumentum est necessarium: Deus facit animam, ergo est; ergo[^23] et istud: Deus facit talem animam, ergo talis est: ergo Magister implicat duo opposita in littera. — Item, quaero: aut Deus fecit animam <!-- page 777 -->*iustam*, aut *iniustam.* Si *iustam*: ergo Deus dedit ei iustitiam, et hoc est falsum; nunquam enim iustitia creata fuit cum ista anima. Si *iniustam*, et talis est: ergo talis est anima, qualem Deus eam fecit.

Propter hoc est quaestio, qualem Deus fecerit animam[^24]; et non videtur, quod possit dari, quod fecerit eam *iniustam*, cum summa iustitia non possit facere aliquid iniustum. Non videtur similiter, quod fecerit eam *iustam*, quia, cum in primo instanti fuerit iniusta, simul fuisset iusta et iniusta, et haec sunt incompossibilia. Non enim videtur, quod possit dari medium circa haec, quia haec duo sunt immediate opposita circa animam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, qualem Deus fecerit animam quantum ad bonitatem et malitiam, quod hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: aut quantum ad bonitatem *naturae*, aut quantum ad bonitatem *moris.* Si quantum ad bonitatem *naturae*, sic concedendum est, quod fecit animam *bonam*, et adhuc bona est. Si quantum ad bonitatem *moris*, sic dicendum est, quod nec fecit eam *bonam*, nec *malam.* Bonam eam non fecit, quia bonitatem illam animae non dedit, obsistente infectione ex parte corporis, cui anima in eodem instanti unita fuit, in quo creata. Non fecit eam malam, quia, quamvis anima ab instanti suae creationis mala sit, hoc tamen non est a *Deo creante*, sed a *carne inficiente.* Et ideo dicit Magister[^25], hanc non esse concedendam: anima est talis, qualem Deus eam fecit, sed potius *e converso*; non quia Deus dederit ei *actualem iustitiam*, sed quia dedit ei bonitatem naturae ad habendam iustitiam ordinatam, a qua iustitia privatur per carnem infectam.

Et sic patent obiecta. Per hunc etiam modum respondendum esset, si quaereretur de *actione* mala, quae ponitur esse a Deo, secundum quod actio. Non enim est a Deo, secundum quod *iusta*, quia non est iusta; nec secundum quod *iniusta*, quia iniustitia non est a Deo; sed est a Deo secundum bonitatem naturae, per quam est indifferens ad utrumque. Consimili modo intelligendum est[^26] in creatione animae.

**Dub. VI.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur ultimo capitulo, quod *ab ipsa creatione una anima est subtilior alia in essentia et ad intelligendum memorandumque habilior.* Hoc enim videtur esse falsum, quia, sicut dicit Gregorius[^27], «omnes homines natura pares genuit»: ergo similiter et ab ipsa creatione animae pares sunt.

Item quaeritur, utrum subtilitas ingenii et habilitas ad memorandum veniat ex parte *corporis*, an ex parte *animae.* Et quod ex parte *animae*, videtur Magister in littera[^28] dicere. Sed contrarium huius videtur, quia videmus, quod ipsa anima, quae non variatur per tempora, modo dementior est, modo ad intelligendum acutior. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi ex parte *corporis.* — Item, videmus, quod cholerici naturaliter sunt melioris[^29] ingenii quam phlegmatici: ergo si hoc dicit complexionem ex parte corporis, videtur etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^30], satis probabile est, quod in ipsa creatione sit praecellentia in animabus. Et quod dicuntur esse *pares*, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad privationem ordinis naturalium in *praecellentia*, sed quantum ad privationem ordinis in *dominio* et *servitute.*

Si autem quaeratur, unde veniat ista praecellentia naturalium, utrum ex parte *animae*, vel ex parte *corporis*; dicendum, quod cum anima non sit propter corpus, sed *corpus propter animam*, ista praecellentia ex parte *animae* venit[^31]. In hac autem praecellit una anima alteram, non ratione principii *ex quo*, cum sit ex nihilo, sed ratione sapientiae Conditoris, qui producit omnia secundum debitum ordinem. — Non est tamen negandum, quin multum faciat corpus ad exercitium illarum habilitatum, quae animae a sua creatione insunt. Unde bona dispositio corporis multum expedit, sicut e contrario mala multum impedit; et propter hoc iudicantur cholerici boni ingenii, quia anima quantum ad usum illius habilitatis iuvatur per convenientem dispositionem ex parte corporis. Attamen non est illa ratio principalis boni ingenii, quia videmus, aliquando homines contrariae complexionis ingeniosos esse. Unde cum videamus homines ad diversa exercitia aptos, quosdam ad artes mechanicas, quosdam ad liberales, et iterum quosdam ad mathematica, quosdam ad metaphysica[^32], quosdam ad naturalia, quosdam ad rationalia: si quaeratur ratio huius, respondebit *theologus*, quod hoc est ex distributione donorum Dei, <!-- page 778 -->a quo non tantum procedunt dona gratuita, immo etiam dona naturalia; et omnia talia *gratiae* vocantur a Sanctis; et de huiusmodi intelligitur illud quod dicitur primae Petri quarto[^33]: *Unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes* etc. *Naturalis* autem respondebit, quod hoc venit ex diversa dispositione ex parte corporis, vel quantum ad complexionem, vel quantum ad organizationem. Uterque tamen bene, sed *theologus* melius, quia principaliorem assignat causam; unde et *Philosophus* in libro *de Animalibus*[^34], cum assignat causas dispositionis membrorum, ubi non invenit causam principalem ex parte naturae, recurrit ad dispositionem conditricis Sapientiae.

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *There remains therefore, as Augustine says, in the body of this death the carnal concupiscence.* For since after baptism nothing ought to remain in us except a *promoting punishment*, and concupiscence is rather a *suffocating punishment* than a promoting one; it ought not to remain in the *body of this death*[^1]. But that it is a *suffocating* punishment is plain from the following text, in which it is said: *We are bidden not to obey its noxious desires.* If therefore the desires of concupiscence are noxious, and we are forbidden[^2] to obey concupiscence: then it seems to be a *suffocating* punishment. — Likewise, the act of concupiscence binds the reason, especially in the work of the generative power; but such is a suffocating punishment: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the concupiscence which remains after baptism is not a *suffocating punishment*, because it does not bar the entrance to the spiritual life; for it stands together with grace. *Moreover*, although it incites to the unlawful, yet it does not prevail, because our appetite is beneath us, and we can have dominion over it[^3]. But this concupiscence remains in our members as a *promoting punishment*, especially with regard to the exercise of the fight, which conduces to the increase of merit and of the crown. This was well signified in the entrance of the children of Israel into the land of promise, in which the Lord left them adversaries, with whom they might fight, and through whom God might test them, whether they loved God or not, as is plain in the book of Judges[^4]. And there are also several other utilities, to which a man is moved on the occasion of the concupiscence left in him; but these can be found in the fourth book, distinction four[^5].

By this the answer to the two objections becomes plain. For concupiscence does not *suffocate*, unless we are willing to obey it; and although in the act of generating the use of reason is *impeded*, yet there is not there a *suffocation*, because such an act can be meritorious.

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Through the grace of baptism concupiscence is mitigated and diminished.* Against this it stands: for either the grace of baptism *has an opposition* [to concupiscence], or *not.* If *yes*: then the one cannot stand with the other: therefore, when grace comes, concupiscence withdraws, it is not[^6] diminished. If it is *not opposed* to it: then it seems that it does not diminish it. — Likewise, if concupiscence is diminished through grace: then since it is finite, it seems that at some time it would be totally taken away; which is against Augustine in the text[^7], who says that «this is not granted except by an ineffable miracle, that the law of sin be utterly extinguished».

Therefore there is here a question, whether the tinder [of sin] has in anyone been totally extinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was said above[^8], concupiscence says two things — for it says an immoderate appetite for the changeable good — I say therefore that this immoderateness about the appetite can be in two ways: either so that the reason is *taken captive*, and the soul is perverted, so that it has a necessity of preferring the changeable good to the unchangeable good; and thus it is called *intense* concupiscence, and in this manner it holds the formal character of *fault*, namely by reason of that immoderateness. In another way concupiscence says an immoderateness, not because the reason succumbs to the sensuality, but because the sensuality *does not perfectly comply* with the reason; and in this manner it holds the formal character of *punishment.* In the first manner, since it holds the formal character of *fault*, it is directly opposed to grace itself; and therefore supervening grace takes away that immoderateness, on account of the fact that such immoderateness posited a lack of due justice. But the other immoderateness, which, as was said, says the formal character of *punishment*, grace does not take away at its coming, on account of the fact that it is not formally opposed to it. But since grace and the concupiscence left [in us], with respect to that to which they incline, have a certain opposition; hence it is, that according as a man is more exercised in grace, concupiscence is said to be more and more remitted[^9]. — Yet concupiscence is never altogether taken away, because the root of it always remains in man, unless it be taken away by a special gift of grace, as is believed to have been the case in the Virgin after the conception of the Son of God. But this has its place rather in the third book[^10], when it is asked about the sanctification of the Virgin.

But by these things which have been said, the objections become plain. For grace and concupiscence are in a certain manner opposed, and in a certain manner not, as has been shown. — To that which is objected in the second place, that concupiscence is finite, therefore at some time it is totally taken away; it must be said that this would be true, if concupiscence were diminished with regard to its *cause*[^11]; but it is only diminished with regard to its *exercise* or by comparison to that *to which it is [directed]*; and therefore it is never totally taken away, just as the aptitude of the soul is never totally removed by sin; and this will be seen better below[^12].

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *the vice of concupiscence remains in the oldness of the flesh as something overcome and slain, unless by an unlawful consent it revive and be recalled into its own kingdom.* For this seems to be false, because, if concupiscence, insofar as <!-- page 776 -->it reigned, was called original sin by Augustine[^13]; it seems that if it is recalled into its own kingdom after baptism, original sin would return. But if this is false, it remains etc. — Likewise, things which are of diverse genera, the one does not increase the other; but the unlawful consent is a *fault*, the concupiscence left [in us] is a *punishment*: therefore it is not increased by an unlawful consent.

**I respond:** It must be said that concupiscence is increased by an unlawful consent, as Augustine says[^14], and this for a twofold cause. First, because grace is expelled, by whose presence the reason was set over the sensuality, and consequently concupiscence was remitted. The other reason is, that a power by the frequency of acts becomes more prompt to go out into a like act[^15]; and because the unlawful act says an act of desiring: hence it is, that concupiscence is increased by the unlawful act as by something like it.

To that therefore which is objected, that then original sin returns; it must be said that this does not follow, for a twofold cause. First indeed, because reigning concupiscence is not called original sin, except insofar as it has both kingdom and dominion from the very origin of man. But when it has this through an unlawful act, it does not have the character of *original* sin, but rather of *actual.* — There is also another reason, that concupiscence is diminished by baptism in one way, and increased by unlawful consent in another. For by baptism it is so diminished, that there is taken away that which *formally* was original sin, namely the lack of due justice. For there one is absolved from the *debt* of original justice, to which all were bound by the very obligation of Adam[^16]; but by unlawful consent it is said to be *increased*, on account of the fact that, while a man sins, he becomes more prone to evil, at least *intensively* and with regard to some determinate genus of sin.

To that which is objected, that concupiscence, insofar as it is a *fault* and insofar as it is a *punishment*, is of diverse genera; it must be said that although they are of diverse genera[^17] in the genus of *morals*, yet not in the genus of *nature*; for the act of each is to desire. *Moreover*, although concupiscence, insofar as it is a *punishment*, is not of the same genus with concupiscence, insofar as it is a *fault*, formally speaking, yet since it is a *vicious punishment*, it of itself orders to that [fault][^18], and on account of this the one is increased by the other, as experience itself teaches[^19].

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *As other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt, so conversely it can come about that concupiscence pass away in guilt and remain in act.* But on the *contrary*: if concupiscence remains in act, then in original [sin] not only is *guilt* considered, but also *act*: therefore it ought to be called *actual sin.* — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that other sins pass away in *act* and remain in *guilt.* For when actual sins are forgiven in baptism, they pass away both with regard to *punishment* and with regard to *fault.* In[^20] penance also they pass away with regard to the *guilt* of eternal punishment. And *if you say* that there remains a guilt unto satisfactory and temporal punishment; it is *objected* likewise concerning original [sin], after whose deletion in baptism there remains an obligation unto death and unto other temporal punishments.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here broadly calls *act* not only the *actual motion* itself, but also that *proneness* according to which a man is ordered to act. And therefore he says that original sin remains in act, because, since there is there a *privation* of original justice, by which a man is guilty of the lack of the vision of God, there is also a *proneness*, by which a man is ordered to the act of desiring[^21]; that privation of original justice is taken away, and that habitual inclination is left.

But to that which is objected concerning the actual passing-away, it must be said that the Master does not speak of a passing-away which is by the *deletion* of sin, but by the *consummation* of sin, by which manner the present is said to pass into the past. Therefore he says that it passes away with regard to *act* and remains with regard to *guilt*, because the act is in *becoming*, but the guilt is in *rest*[^22].

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The soul is not such as God made it.* On the *contrary*: in a sudden operation the *becoming* and the *having-become* are simultaneous; but this argument is necessary: God makes the soul, therefore it is; therefore[^23] also this: God makes such a soul, therefore it is such: therefore the Master implies two opposites in the text. — Likewise, I ask: either God made the soul <!-- page 777 -->*just*, or *unjust.* If *just*: then God gave it justice, and this is false; for justice was never created together with this soul. If *unjust*, and it is such: then the soul is such as God made it.

On account of this there is a question, of what sort God made the soul[^24]; and it does not seem that it can be granted that he made it *unjust*, since the highest justice cannot make anything unjust. Likewise it does not seem that he made it *just*, because, since in the first instant it was unjust, it would have been at once just and unjust, and these are incompossible. For it does not seem that a middle can be granted concerning these, because these two are immediately opposed concerning the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked of what sort God made the soul with regard to goodness and malice, this can be understood in two ways: either with regard to the goodness of *nature*, or with regard to the goodness of *morals.* If with regard to the goodness of *nature*, thus it must be conceded that he made the soul *good*, and it is still good. If with regard to the goodness of *morals*, thus it must be said that he neither made it *good* nor *evil.* He did not make it good, because he did not give that goodness to the soul, the infection from the side of the body resisting, to which the soul was united in the same instant in which it was created. He did not make it evil, because, although the soul from the instant of its creation is evil, yet this is not from *God creating*, but from the *flesh infecting.* And therefore the Master says[^25] that this is not to be conceded: the soul is such as God made it, but rather *the converse*; not because God gave it *actual justice*, but because he gave it the goodness of nature for having ordered justice, of which justice it is deprived through the infected flesh.

And thus the objections become plain. By this manner also it would have to be answered, if it were asked concerning an evil *action*, which is posited to be from God, insofar as it is action. For it is not from God insofar as it is *just*, because it is not just; nor insofar as it is *unjust*, because injustice is not from God; but it is from God with regard to the goodness of nature, by which it is indifferent to either. In a like manner it is to be understood[^26] in the creation of the soul.

**Doubt VI.** Likewise it is asked about that which is said in the last chapter, that *from the very creation one soul is subtler than another in essence and more apt for understanding and remembering.* For this seems to be false, because, as Gregory says[^27], «he begat all men equal by nature»: therefore likewise also from the very creation the souls are equal.

Likewise it is asked, whether subtlety of intellect and aptitude for remembering come from the side of the *body*, or from the side of the *soul.* And that they come from the side of the *soul*, the Master seems to say in the text[^28]. But the contrary of this seems [true], because we see that the soul itself, which is not varied through times, is now more dull, now keener for understanding. But this cannot be except from the side of the *body.* — Likewise, we see that the choleric are naturally of better[^29] intellect than the phlegmatic: therefore if this bespeaks complexion from the side of the body, it seems etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text[^30], it is sufficiently probable that in the very creation there is a pre-eminence in souls. And that they are said to be *equal*, this is not understood with regard to the privation of the order of natural things in *pre-eminence*, but with regard to the privation of the order in *dominion* and *servitude.*

But if it be asked whence comes this pre-eminence of natural things, whether from the side of the *soul*, or from the side of the *body*; it must be said that, since the soul is not for the sake of the body, but *the body for the sake of the soul*, this pre-eminence comes from the side of the *soul*[^31]. But in this one soul excels another, not by reason of the principle *from which* [it is], since it is from nothing, but by reason of the wisdom of the Creator, who produces all things according to due order. — Yet it is not to be denied that the body does much toward the exercise of those aptitudes which are in the soul from its creation. Hence a good disposition of the body much avails, just as on the contrary a bad one much hinders; and on account of this the choleric are judged to be of good intellect, because the soul, with regard to the use of that aptitude, is aided by the suitable disposition from the side of the body. Nevertheless that is not the principal reason of good intellect, because we see that sometimes men of contrary complexion are ingenious. Hence since we see men apt for diverse exercises, some for the mechanical arts, some for the liberal [arts], and again some for mathematics, some for metaphysics[^32], some for natural [sciences], some for rational [sciences]: if the reason of this be asked, the *theologian* will answer that this is from the distribution of the gifts of God, <!-- page 778 -->from whom proceed not only gratuitous gifts, but indeed also natural gifts; and all such things are called *graces* by the Saints; and of these is understood that which is said in the fourth chapter of First Peter[^33]: *Each one, as he has received grace, administering it to one another* etc. But the *natural philosopher* will answer that this comes from the diverse disposition from the side of the body, whether with regard to complexion, or with regard to organization. Yet both answer well, but the *theologian* better, because he assigns the more principal cause; whence also the *Philosopher* in the book *On Animals*[^34], when he assigns the causes of the disposition of the members, where he does not find the principal cause from the side of nature, has recourse to the disposition of the Wisdom that fashions [them].

---

la: Respicitur illud Rom. 7, 24: *Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* — Illa poena dicitur *suffocans*, ut exponit B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2. partic. 3. ad 2., quae praefocat vitalem spiritum gratiae, ita scil., quod homo compellatur ad illicitum; *promovens* dicitur, quae est ad exercitium virtutis.

en: This refers to Romans 7:24: *Who will deliver me from the body of this death?* — That punishment is called *suffocating*, as B. Albert expounds, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2, partic. 3, ad 2, which suffocates the vital spirit of grace, namely so that a man is compelled to the unlawful; it is called *promoting*, which is for the exercise of virtue.

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 nec non aliqui codd. *prohibemur.*

en: The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4, and likewise some codices, read *prohibemur.*

la: Gen. 4, 7: *Sub te erit appetitus eius* [*peccati*], *et tu dominaberis illius.* — Paulo superius pro *cum gratia. Praeterea*, etsi Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *cum gratia prima; etsi.*

en: Genesis 4:7: *Its* [sin's] *appetite will be under you, and you will have dominion over it.* — A little above, for *cum gratia. Praeterea, etsi* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read *cum gratia prima; etsi.*

la: Cap. 18. seqq.

en: Chapter 18 and following.

la: Part. 1. a. 1. q. 2. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert., hic a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Part. 1, a. 1, q. 2. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2. — This doubt is also resolved by B. Albert, here, a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Cod. bb *non tantum.*

en: Codex bb reads *non tantum.*

la: Hic c. 1. — Paulo ante pro *cum sit finita* codd. F I T et alii *cum non sit infinita.*

en: Here, c. 1. — Shortly before, for *cum sit finita* codices F, I, T and others read *cum non sit infinita.*

la: Art. 1. q. 1. in corp.; a. 2. q. 2; d. 30. a. 2. q. 1 et alibi passim.

en: Art. 1, q. 1, in the body; a. 2, q. 2; d. 30, a. 2, q. 1, and elsewhere throughout.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *remittitur.*

en: The editions, except the first, read *remittitur.*

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. above, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Dist. 35. a. 2. q. 3. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 7. a. 7. § 1. seqq.; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 17. q. III. m. I. seqq.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

en: Dist. 35, a. 2, q. 3. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 106, m. 7, a. 7, § 1 ff.; B. Albert, *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. III, m. I ff.; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. I, a. 3; Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 2.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et supra d. XXX. c. 8. seqq.

en: See here the text of the Master, c. 1, and above, d. XXX, c. 8 ff.

la: Libr. II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 28. n. 45, unde et textus huius dubii sumtus est.

en: *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc., Bk. II, c. 28, n. 45, whence also the text of this doubt is taken.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. II, c. 1 ff.

la: Vide hic n. 1. q. 1, et d. 30. a. 2. — Cod. V addit *prout est culpa et.*

en: See here n. 1, q. 1, and d. 30, a. 2. — Codex V adds *prout est culpa et.*

la: Vel supple *se*, vel lege *ordinatur.*

en: Either supply *se*, or read *ordinatur.*

la: Huius dubii solutionem exhibent S. Thom., hic circa lit., et Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: The solution of this doubt is given by St. Thomas, here on the text, and Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 1.

la: Vat. *ideo.* — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 adiicit *ideo.* In seq. propos. omnes edd., excepta 1, pro *transitu actualis* [scil. peccati] substituunt *transitu actuali*, et dein post *peccati consummationem* sic prosequuntur: *et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum* etc.

en: The Vatican edition reads *ideo.* — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 adds *ideo.* In the following proposition all the editions, except the first, for *transitu actualis* [namely of sin] substitute *transitu actuali*, and then after *peccati consummationem* they continue thus: *et per quem modum praesens et praeteritum* etc.

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 6. ad 1: *Dicendum est, quod non simili modo dicitur actus in actuali peccato et in originali peccato. Ibi enim actus praecedit* [*reatum*]*, hic vero actus sequitur. Nec dicitur in originali peccato actus peccati, quo fit vel quo est, sed quo remanet ad exercitium.* Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2. partic. 3; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2. 3.

en: Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 106, m. 6, ad 1: *It must be said that act is not spoken of in the same manner in actual sin and in original sin. For there the act precedes* [*the guilt*]*, but here the act follows. Nor is act of sin spoken of in original sin, by which it comes to be or by which it is, but by which it remains unto exercise.* Cf. B. Albert, here, a. 1, little question 1; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2, partic. 3; St. Thomas, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 2, 3.

la: In edd., excepta 1, desideratur *ergo*, et paulo inferius pro *nunquam* habetur *non.*

en: In the editions, except the first, *ergo* is lacking, and a little below, for *nunquam* there is *non.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, voci *animam* praeponunt *illam.*

en: The editions, except the first, place *illam* before the word *animam.*

la: Hic c. 7. Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Mox multi codd. cum ed. 1 *sive* pro *sed.*

en: Here, c. 7. Cf. above, a. 3, q. 1 ff. — Soon after, many codices with edition 1 read *sive* for *sed.*

la: Non pauci codd., ut H K P Q T aa etc., cum ed. 1 hic subiiciunt *H*, cod. W etiam. — Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Solutio huius dubii habetur etiam apud Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: Not a few codices, such as H, K, P, Q, T, aa etc., with edition 1 here subjoin *H*; codex W likewise. — Cf. below, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — The solution of this doubt is found also in Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22, ubi textus originalis pro *pares* exhibet *aequales.* — Paulo inferius pro *Item quaeritur* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Hic quaeri potest.*

en: *Morals*, Bk. XXI, c. 15, n. 22, where the original text for *pares* reads *aequales.* — A little below, for *Item quaeritur* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 read *Hic quaeri potest.*

la: Hic c. 8, ubi pro sua sententia *ex simili* arguit, scil. *in angelis*, qui, ut supra d. III. c. 2. monstratum est, non sunt aequales. — Paulo post pro *quia videmus*, quae verba, in codd. F T ee et aliis oppressa, ex cod. cc et ed. 1 restauravimus, Vat. cum aliis codd. *quia videtur.*

en: Here, c. 8, where he argues for his opinion *from a likeness*, namely *in the angels*, who, as was shown above, d. III, c. 2, are not equal. — A little after, for *quia videmus*, which words, suppressed in codices F, T, ee and others, we have restored from codex cc and edition 1, the Vatican edition with other codices reads *quia videtur.*

la: Edd., excepta 1, *maioris*, cod. T *boni.* — Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 94. (c. 9.).

en: The editions, except the first, read *maioris*; codex T *boni.* — Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, Bk. II, text 94 (c. 9).

la: Hic c. 8.

en: Here, c. 8.

la: Aristot., I. de Partib. animal. c. 5: *Corpus etiam totum animae gratia conditum est.* — Post *ex parte animae* cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt *non ex parte corporis.* Mox pro *In hac* Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *In hoc.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, Bk. I, c. 5: *The whole body too has been constituted for the sake of the soul.* — After *ex parte animae* codex cc and edition 1 add *non ex parte corporis.* Soon after, for *In hac* the Vatican edition with editions 2, 3, 4 read *In hoc.*

la: Multi codd., ut C F L O U S T X Y Z ee, *metaphysicalia*, Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *metaphysicam* et immediate ante *mathematicam.*

en: Many codices, such as C, F, L, O, U, S, T, X, Y, Z, ee, read *metaphysicalia*; the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 *metaphysicam*, and immediately before, *mathematicam.*

la: Vers. 10. Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo superius pro *et omnia* cod. A *et ideo omnia.*

en: Verse 10. Cf. above, d. 28, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little above, for *et omnia* codex A reads *et ideo omnia.*

la: Libr. I. de Partib. animal. c. 3. tanquam principium perscrutationis rerum naturalium statuitur, quod nulla res sit in natura, quae non habeat aliquid admirandi signumque sit sapientiae divinae. «*Aggredi enim, ait Philosophus, quaeque sine ullo pudore debemus, cum in omnibus naturae numen et honestum pulcrumque insit ingenium; quippe cum naturae operibus iunctum illud praecipue sit, ubi nihil temere viceque fortuita committatur, sed alicuius gratia omnia agantur.*» Et in libro de Animalium incessu, c. 2. ait: «*Perscrutationis autem principium est, supponentibus illa nobis, quibus uti saepenumero in physico negotio soliti sumus, accipere scil. ea quae in omnibus naturae operibus eodem se habent modo. Illorum autem unum est: naturam nihil frustra facere, sed semper ex iis quae cuique animalium generis essentiae contingunt, id quod optimum est; quam ob rem si melius hoc modo, ita natura se habet.*» Ad hoc principium Aristoteles saepe saepius recurrit in explicando officio, usu etc. membrorum animalium, v. gr. de Animal. incessu, c. 8. et 10. (c. 8. et 12.); II. de Partib. animal. c. 13. seq. et IV. c. 11. — Hoc dubium speciali quaestione solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3; Durand., hic q. 3; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — De hac quaestione dissentire Scholasticos, iam dictum est I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1, schol. n. II. Hic tantum addimus, sententiae Magistri cum S. Bonaventura favere B. Albertum, Petrum a Tar., Richardum a Med. et etiam Aegid. R.

en: *On the Parts of Animals*, Bk. I, c. 3, where as a principle of the investigation of natural things it is laid down that there is no thing in nature which does not have something worthy of wonder and which is not a sign of the divine wisdom. «*For we ought, says the Philosopher, to approach each thing without any shame, since in all the works of nature there is present a divine power and an honorable and beautiful character; since indeed that is especially joined to the works of nature, where nothing is committed rashly or by chance, but all things are done for the sake of something.*» And in the book *On the Gait of Animals*, c. 2, he says: «*The principle of the investigation is, when we presuppose those things which we are wont to use very often in physical inquiry, to take, namely, those things which in all the works of nature hold themselves in the same way. And one of these is: that nature does nothing in vain, but always [does], out of those things which befall the essence of each genus of animals, that which is best; wherefore if [it is] better in this way, thus nature holds itself.*» To this principle Aristotle very often has recourse in explaining the office, use, etc. of the members of animals, e.g. *On the Gait of Animals*, c. 8 and 10 (cc. 8 and 12); *On the Parts of Animals*, Bk. II, c. 13 ff., and Bk. IV, c. 11. — This doubt is resolved by a special question by B. Albert, here, a. 6; St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 2, a. 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 4, q. 1; Giles of Rome, here, q. 2, a. 3; Durandus, here, q. 3; Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 5. — That the Scholastics dissent concerning this question was already said in I Sent., d. 17, p. II, q. 1, scholion, n. II. Here we only add that B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and also Giles of Rome favor the opinion of the Master with St. Bonaventure.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 774–778 (PDF pp. 796–800, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 53963–54234). FINAL unit of DISTINCTIO XXXII — after this chunk **d.32 is fully Tier-2** (littera + divisio + a1-q1/q2 + a2-q1/q2 + a3-q1/q2 + dubia). The DUBIA opens at the bottom of p.774 L-col (header `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` immediately after a3-q2's tail *…respicere non potest qui respicit ea in parte⁶.*) and closes at the top of p.778 R-col (*…recurrit ad dispositionem conditricis Sapientiae.*) immediately before DISTINCTIO XXXIII / Cap. I.

**Recombination.** This chunk was auto-chunked into TWO skeletons (`bon-sent-II-d32-dubia.md` raw 53981–54138 + `bon-sent-II-d32-dubia-dup2.md` raw 54139–54234) which the chunker split mid-block. They are ONE continuous DUBIA block (DUB. I–VI). The dup file `bon-sent-II-d32-dubia-dup2.md` was **deleted** (git rm) and the full block built here.

**Verified DUB count = 6 (I–VI)** at 450 dpi:
- DUB. I — *Manet… in corpore mortis huius carnalis concupiscentia* (whether concupiscence remaining after baptism is *poena suffocans*; resolved: it is *poena promovens*, not suffocans — stat cum gratia; aids the *exercitium pugnae*).
- DUB. II — *Per gratiam baptismi concupiscentia mitigatur et minuitur* (the *fomes* problem; concupiscence has *culpa*-immoderateness, removed by grace, and *poena*-immoderateness, only remitted *quantum ad exercitium*; never wholly removed except by special grace, e.g. the Virgin — deferred to III Sent. de sanctificatione Virginis).
- DUB. III — *Manet vitium concupiscentiae… nisi illicito consensu reviviscat* (whether original sin returns by illicit consent; resolved no — *concupiscentia augetur duplici ex causa* but does not regain *rationem originalis*).
- DUB. IV — *Concupiscentia praetereat reatu et remaneat actu* (the *actus/reatus* problem; Magister calls *actus* the *pronitas*; *actus in fieri, reatus in quiete*).
- DUB. V — *Anima non est talis, qualem Deus eam fecit* (with *Quaestio incidens* margin: *qualem Deus fecerit animam*; resolved by the *bonitas naturae* / *bonitas moris* distinction — bona quantum ad naturam, neither bona nec mala quantum ad mores; the evil is *a carne inficiente* non *a Deo creante*).
- DUB. VI — *Ab ipsa creatione una anima est subtilior alia* (with TWO *Quaestio incidens* margins + *Resp. theologi* / *Resp. physici* margins; resolved: pre-eminence is *ex parte animae* — *corpus propter animam*; the *theologus* answers better than the *naturalis/physicus*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.774** (L-col bottom → R-col bottom): DUBIA header + DUB. I opener (*In parte ista… patet in li-*); footer **7** ([^1], Rom 7,24 *corpore mortis huius*) belongs here — p.774 footers 1–6 belong to a3-q2.
- **p.775** (L-col + R-col): DUB. I tail + Respondeo + DUB. II + DUB. III opener; 11 footers → [^2]–[^12].
- **p.776** (L-col + R-col): DUB. III Respondeo + DUB. IV (full) + DUB. V opener; 11 footers → [^13]–[^22].
- **p.777** (L-col + R-col): DUB. V tail + Respondeo + DUB. VI opener + Respondeo; 9 footers → [^23]–[^32].
- **p.778** (L-col + R-col top): DUB. VI Respondeo conclusion (*…conditricis Sapientiae.*); 2 DUB. VI footers → [^33]–[^34] (the page's NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block 1–3 belongs to the following DISTINCTIO XXXIII littera, NOT claimed here).
- Body seams grammatically continuous: 774→775 (*…patet in li-‖ttera sequenti*); 775→776 (DUB. III: *…concupiscentia, prout ‖ regnabat, dicebatur*); 776→777 (DUB. V: *…Deus fecit animam ‖ iustam, aut iniustam*); 777→778 (DUB. VI: *…distributione donorum Dei, ‖ a quo non tantum procedunt dona gratuita*).

**Apparatus = 34 entries** ([^1]–[^34]), 1:1 with printed-page footers in print order. Page-split: **p.774** footer 7 = [^1] (DUB. I, Rom 7,24; p.774 footers 1–6 belong to a3-q2). **p.775** footers 1–11 = [^2]–[^12] (DUB. I = [^2]–[^6] = footers 1–5; DUB. II = [^7]–[^12] = footers 6–11). **p.776** footers 1–11 = [^13]–[^23] (DUB. III = [^13]–[^19] = footers 1–7; DUB. IV = [^20]–[^22] = footers 8 *Vat. ideo* / 9 *transitu actuali* / 10 Alex. Hal.; DUB. V opener = [^23] = footer 11 *ergo/nunquam*). **p.777** footers 1–9 = [^24]–[^32] (DUB. V tail = [^24]–[^26] = footers 1–3; DUB. VI = [^27]–[^32] = footers 4–9). **p.778** footers 1–2 = [^33]–[^34] (DUB. VI: [^33] = footer 1 *Vers. 10* / 1 Pet. 4:10, [^34] = footer 2 *de Partib. animal.* + author list; the page's NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM footers 1–3 belong to the following DISTINCTIO XXXIII littera). N La = N En = N defs = 34.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a3-q2: only p.774 footer 7 (Rom 7,24, the DUB. I opener's note); a3-q2 retains p.774 footers 1–6. FORWARDED: none — the DUBIA closes the distinction; all p.778 DUB. VI footers (1–2) anchor here, and DISTINCTIO XXXIII opens fresh on p.778 R-col with its own NOTAE block.

**Cascade-dropout check.** All four page seams (774→775, 775→776, 776→777, 777→778) read against the 450 dpi column bands and confirmed grammatically continuous with no mid-paragraph splice. The IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the DUB. III Respondeo (*concupiscentia augetur duplici ex causa*) and the DUB. V/VI margin notes into one-token-per-line fragments and interleaved the two columns; the body was reconstructed column-by-column from the PDF. No body text or footnote lost at the seams.

**has_scholion = false** — DUBIA chunks carry no scholion.

**[?] flags:** none. All six DUB bodies, both Respondeo opinions, the *Quaestio incidens* sub-questions of DUB. V/VI, and the full p.774 (f7), p.775 (f1–11), p.776 (f1–11), p.777 (f1–9) and p.778 (f1–2) footer blocks were read against the 450 dpi column bands and parse cleanly.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0