title: Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus Unicus. *De satisfactionis commutatione.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum unus pro alio possit satisfacere.*

Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum possit fieri satisfactionis commutatio[^1], et hoc est quaestionis fundamentum, scilicet, utrum unus pro alio satisfaciat[^2]. Et quod sic, videtur.

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1. Ad Galatas sexto[^3]: *Alter alterius onera portate;* sed onera, quae maxime sunt portanda, sunt onera spiritualia: ergo si alicui imposita est poenitentia gravis, videtur, quod aliquis partem vel totum possit pro eo portare.

2. Item, in littera[^4] dicitur: «Amicorum orationibus et eleemosynarum largitionibus pondus poenitentiae sublevandum est»; loquitur de eo qui graviter infirmatur.

3. Item, hoc videtur *per rationem,* primo *per simile in rebus naturalibus.* Videmus enim in aliquo corpore animalis, quod unum membrum se exponit, ut sustineat laesionem et gravamen alterius, sicut patet, quod brachium se exponit pro capite[^5]: si ergo in corpore mystico est connexio per assimilationem ad corpus naturale, videtur similiter, quod unum membrum onus alterius possit et debeat supportare.

4. Item, hoc videtur *per simile in humanis actibus*[^6]. Videmus enim, quod sic est in actibus, quod si aliquis est alicui debitor, non refert apud creditorem, utrum ipse, vel alius solvat, immo pro eodem utrumque acceptat: si ergo multo benignior est Deus et avidior ad percipiendam solutionem quam homo terrenus videtur, quod ipse sit contentus, et sibi sufficiat, si alius satisfaciat pro eo.

5. Item, hoc videtur *per locum a minori*[^7]: quia plus est impetrare remissionem culpae quam remissionem poenae; sed sanctus vir impetrat alicui, qui est extra gratiam, per suas orationes remissionem culpae: ergo et remissionem poenae per suas afflictiones.

6. Item, Christus punitus est et poena sua satisfecit; non pro peccato suo, hoc constat: ergo pro alieno: ergo Christus satisfecit pro nobis. Si ergo omnes nos unum sumus in Christo et membra eius sumus et imitatores eius esse debemus[^8]; videtur, quod unus pro alio possit et debeat satisfacere.

**Contra:** 1. Secundae ad Corinthios quinto[^9]: *Omnes stabimus ante tribunal Christi, ut recipiat unusquisque propria corporis, prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum:* ergo unicuique retribuetur iuxta opera sua: ergo non videtur, quod unus pro alio satisfaciat, quia tunc Deus alicui retribueret secundum opera aliena.

2. Item, in Psalmo[^10]: *Tu reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua:* ergo idem quod prius.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quoniam non exigit Deus satisfactionem ab aliquo, quia delectetur in poena[^11], sed quia satisfactio est remedium contra culpam, ut anima reordinetur; sed antidotum sive remedium circa membrum infirmans debet apponi: ergo videtur, quod non possit in alium hominem commutari.

4. Item, non potest conteri nec confiteri unus pro alio, immo oportet, quod ipse qui peccat, conteratur et confiteatur: ergo videtur similiter, quod oporteat, ipsum satisfacere et poenam pati.

5. Item, si sani possunt supra se suscipere satisfactionem infirmi, ponatur igitur, quod aliquis debeat poenitentiam septennem, et consanguinei recipiant super se; et infirmus moritur: quaero ergo a te: aut *evolat,* aut *non evolat.* Si *non evolat,* sed punitur in purgatorio, et illi puniunt se pro eo: ergo Deus punit *bis in id ipsum*[^12]. Si vero *evolat,* ponatur, quod illi nihil faciant de satisfactione suscepta: tunc ergo salvabitur quis, et culpa remanebit impunita; quod est contra divinam iustitiam.

6. Item, nullus potest mereri alteri, quin mereatur sibi, secundum quod dicit illa auctoritas[^13]: «Qui pro alio orat pro se ipso laborat»: ergo pari ratione nullus potest satisfacere pro alio, quin satisfaciat pro se: ergo si potest unus pro alio satisfacere, potest unus simul et una poena satisfacere pro se et pro alio, et ita pari ratione pro tertio et quarto et sic deinceps, ergo pro omnibus: ergo videtur, si hoc verum est, quod uno satisfaciente, satisfaciant et omnes.

### Conclusio.

> Poena satisfactionis, non quatenus est medicinalis, sed quatenus solvit poenam, potest commutari in aliam personam.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod poena satisfactoria habet in se duplicem rationem sive virtutem[^14]. Poena enim talis propter duo est maxime: et propter *medicamentum* contra sequelas peccati et in *pretium* ad solvendum reatum peccati. Si igitur loquamur de ista poena, secundum quod est *purgatoria* sive medicinalis; cum morbus non recipiat medicinam ex poena aliena, sed propria — unde non extinguitur concupiscentia in me, si tu ieiunas pro me — quantum ad hanc rationem poena satisfactoria nec potest nec debet commutari in aliam personam.

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Posset tamen commutari in poenam *internam,* quia gemitus cordis plus frequenter medetur et reparat[^1a] animam quam diuturnitas poenae exterioris. — Si autem loquamur de poena, secundum quod habet rationem *pretii;* hoc modo concedendum, quod potest commutari, quia potest unus pro alio solvere poenam. — Sed haec commutatio debet fieri *auctoritate sacerdotis,* cuius est hic duo considerare, scilicet debitam in subditis *dispositionem* et debitam *proportionem* in poena. Debitam *dispositionem* voco, quod in uno sit *sufficientia* et in alio *indigentia*[^2a], et in utroque sit *caritas,* quae faciat bona communia; si vero alterum horum desit, non fit commutatio recte. Debitam vero *proportionem* voco, ut minor poena in maiorem commutetur, quia plus satisfacit Deo poena propria quam aliena, sicut efficacius homo meretur sibi quam alii[^3a]. Unde sicut poena *assumta* commutatur in maiorem poenam *purgatoriam,* eo quod multo minus est illa *accepta,* pro eo quod ista est voluntaria *simpliciter,* illa *minime* voluntaria; similiter *propria* poena debet commutari in maiorem *alienam* ad hoc, ut fiat commutatio recta.

Sic igitur concedendum, sicut probant primae rationes, quod poena satisfactoria commutari potest ratione unitatis caritatis, quantum ad id quod habet in se pretii solvendi, sed non quantum ad id quod habet in se medicamenti.

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod unicuique reddetur secundum opera sua; dicendum, quod caritas opera *aliena* facit *sua,* maxime quando caritas alterius voluntarie quod suum est alteri donat.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de remedio, iam patet responsio: quoniam quantumcumque aliquis supra se poenam recipiat alterius, tamen ille non est omnino liberatus a poena, quousque consumatur peccati scoria, quam contraxit ex culpa; quae etiam non potest deleri nisi per poenam exteriorem, vel per contritionem internam.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest conteri nec confiteri; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia *prima,* scilicet confessio et contritio, sunt ordinata, ut ingrediatur unitatem ecclesiasticam, per quam fit, ut bona unius sint alterius; satisfactio vero utramque consequitur; et quia fundamentum istius communicationis est in caritate: ideo non est simile. — Alia ratio est, quia in potestate cuiuslibet est confiteri, in nullius potestate est conteri, nisi eius qui novit occulta cordis, scilicet spiritus hominis[^4a]; sed poenam pati est in potestate cuiuslibet tam pro se quam pro alio. Attamen non est inutile nec a satisfactione alienum, si vir iustus peccata defleat minus iusti.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum statim evolet ille cuius satisfactio commutatur; dicendum, quod non: tum quia oportet, quod scoria peccati purgetur, tum etiam quia nullus ingreditur paradisum, quousque sit extra debitum omne[^5a], ita quod nec ipse sit debitor, nec alius pro eo. Si ergo obiicias, quod tunc bis punit Deus in id ipsum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia, secundum quod illi celerius faciunt, ipse liberatur, et computat Dominus in sortem poenam, quam ille sustinet pro se, et quam alii sustinent pro eo; unde si debuit poenam duorum mensium, taliter poterit iuvari, quod liberabitur infra mensem. Nunquam tamen inde extrahitur, quousque debitum sit plene solutum; quo soluto, iam illud quod solvitur, deinceps est ipsius qui satisfacit; *oratio enim in sinu suo convertitur*[^6a], vel si ipse non indiget, convertitur in sinu Ecclesiae.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui meretur alii, et sibi; dicendum, quod non est simile de opere meritorio et satisfactorio. Opus enim *meritorium* est ea ratione, qua est ex radice caritatis — quae semper placet Deo et ille in quo est, illa radix — quae omnes communiter respicit et omnia communia facit; ideo[^7a] non potest aliquis mereri alii, quin ipse placeat apud Deum, quia hoc ipsum Deo placet maxime. — Opus vero *satisfactorium* est ratione poenae, et tanta poena solvit tantum debitum, et maior maius debitum; ideo per eandem poenam non potest quis in integrum duo debita solvere; et ideo, si satisfacit pro alio, quantum ad *totum* non satisfacit pro se; et si pro se, non pro alio; sibi quidem meretur aeternam gloriam, quia *opus* illud placitum est Deo, et *faciens* illud Deo placet in faciendo, ac per hoc dignus retributione a Deo iudicatur.

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english:
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### Article (Sole). *On the commutation of satisfaction.*
### Question I. *Whether one person can make satisfaction for another.*

It is asked, therefore, first, whether a commutation of satisfaction can take place[^1], and this is the foundation of the question, namely, whether one person makes satisfaction for another[^2]. And that it can, seems [to be the case].

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1. To the Galatians, chapter six[^3]: *Bear one another's burdens;* but the burdens which most need to be borne are the spiritual burdens: therefore, if a grave penance has been imposed on someone, it seems that another person can bear part or the whole of it for him.

2. Likewise, in the text[^4] it is said: «By the prayers of friends and by the bestowal of alms the weight of penance is to be lightened»; this is said of one who is gravely ill.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reason,* first *by a likeness drawn from natural things.* For we see in the body of an animal that one member exposes itself in order to sustain the injury and burden of another, as is clear in that the arm exposes itself for the head[^5]: if, therefore, in the mystical body there is a connection by assimilation to the natural body, it seems likewise that one member can and ought to bear the burden of another.

4. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by a likeness drawn from human acts*[^6]. For we see that it is so in [human] acts, that if someone is a debtor to another, it does not matter to the creditor whether he himself or another pays, but rather he accepts either for the same [debt]: if, therefore, God is much more kindly and more eager to receive payment than an earthly man appears to be, it seems that He is content, and that it suffices for Him, if another makes satisfaction for him.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by an argument from the lesser*[^7]: for it is more to obtain the remission of guilt than the remission of penalty; but a holy man obtains for someone who is outside grace, by his prayers, the remission of guilt: therefore [he obtains] also the remission of penalty by his afflictions.

6. Likewise, Christ was punished and by His penalty made satisfaction; not for His own sin, this is established: therefore for another's: therefore Christ made satisfaction for us. If, then, we all are one in Christ and are His members and ought to be His imitators[^8]; it seems that one person can and ought to make satisfaction for another.

**On the contrary:** 1. Second to the Corinthians, chapter five[^9]: *We shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil:* therefore to each one it will be rendered according to his works: therefore it does not seem that one makes satisfaction for another, since then God would render to someone according to another's works.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm[^10]: *Thou wilt render to each one according to his works:* therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, it seems [so] by reason: for God does not exact satisfaction from anyone because He delights in penalty[^11], but because satisfaction is a remedy against guilt, that the soul may be set in order again; but an antidote or remedy must be applied to the member that is ailing: therefore it seems that it cannot be commuted to another man.

4. Likewise, one cannot be contrite nor confess for another, but rather it is necessary that the very one who sins be contrite and confess: therefore it seems likewise that it is necessary that he himself make satisfaction and undergo the penalty.

5. Likewise, if the healthy can take upon themselves the satisfaction of the sick, let it be supposed, then, that someone owes a seven-year penance, and his kinsmen take it upon themselves; and the sick man dies: I ask you therefore: either *he flies up [to heaven],* or *he does not fly up.* If *he does not fly up,* but is punished in purgatory, and they punish themselves for him: therefore God punishes *twice for the same thing*[^12]. But if *he does fly up,* let it be supposed that they do nothing about the satisfaction undertaken: then, therefore, someone will be saved, and the guilt will remain unpunished; which is against divine justice.

6. Likewise, no one can merit for another without meriting for himself, according to what that authority says[^13]: «He who prays for another labors for himself»: therefore by parity of reasoning no one can make satisfaction for another without making satisfaction for himself: therefore if one can make satisfaction for another, one person can by a single penalty make satisfaction at once both for himself and for another, and so by parity of reasoning for a third and a fourth and so on, therefore for all: therefore it seems, if this is true, that when one makes satisfaction, all also make satisfaction.

### Conclusion.

> The penalty of satisfaction, not insofar as it is medicinal, but insofar as it pays the penalty, can be commuted to another person.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfactory penalty has in itself a twofold account or power[^14]. For such a penalty exists chiefly for two things: both as a *medicine* against the consequences of sin and as a *price* for paying the debt of sin. If, therefore, we speak of this penalty insofar as it is *purgative* or medicinal; since the disease does not receive its medicine from another's penalty, but from its own — whence concupiscence is not extinguished in me if you fast for me — as regards this account satisfactory penalty neither can nor ought to be commuted to another person.

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It could, however, be commuted into an *interior* penalty, since the groaning of the heart more frequently heals and restores[^1a] the soul than the long duration of an exterior penalty. — But if we speak of the penalty insofar as it has the account of a *price;* in this way it must be granted that it can be commuted, since one person can pay the penalty for another. — But this commutation must be made *by the authority of the priest,* whose office it is to consider two things here, namely the due *disposition* in the subjects and the due *proportion* in the penalty. By due *disposition* I mean that in the one there be *sufficiency* and in the other *need*[^2a], and that in both there be *charity,* which makes goods common; but if either of these is lacking, the commutation is not rightly made. By due *proportion* I mean that a lesser penalty be commuted into a greater, since one's own penalty makes satisfaction to God more than another's, just as a man more effectively merits for himself than for another[^3a]. Whence just as an *assumed* penalty is commuted into a greater *purgatorial* penalty, because that one is far less *acceptable,* in that this is voluntary *simply,* that one *least* voluntary; likewise one's *own* penalty ought to be commuted into a greater *foreign* one, that the commutation may be made rightly.

Thus, therefore, it must be granted, as the first reasons prove, that satisfactory penalty can be commuted by reason of the unity of charity, as regards that which it has in itself of the price to be paid, but not as regards that which it has in itself of the medicine.

*To 1 and 2.* To that, then, which is objected, that to each one it will be rendered according to his works; it must be said that charity makes another's works *its own,* especially when the charity of the other voluntarily gives what is its own to another.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the remedy, the reply is already clear: for however much someone may take another's penalty upon himself, nevertheless that other is not entirely freed from penalty until the dross of sin is consumed which he contracted from guilt; and this dross also cannot be blotted out except by an exterior penalty, or by interior contrition.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that one cannot be contrite nor confess; it must be said that it is not the same: because the *first things,* namely confession and contrition, are ordained that one may enter ecclesiastical unity, through which it comes about that the goods of one are another's; but satisfaction follows upon both; and because the foundation of this communication is in charity: therefore it is not the same. — Another reason is that it is in the power of anyone to confess, [but] it is in the power of no one to be contrite, except of Him who knows the hidden things of the heart, namely the spirit of man[^4a]; but to undergo penalty is in the power of anyone, both for himself and for another. Nevertheless it is not useless nor foreign to satisfaction if a just man should bewail the sins of a less just man.

*To 5.* To that which is asked, whether he whose satisfaction is commuted flies up at once; it must be said that he does not: both because it is necessary that the dross of sin be purged, and also because no one enters paradise until he is free of every debt[^5a], so that neither he himself be a debtor, nor another for him. If, then, you object that God then punishes twice for the same thing; it must be said that this is false, because, in proportion as they do it more quickly, he is freed, and the Lord reckons into the lot [of his debt] the penalty which that one bears for himself, and which others bear for him; whence if he owed a penalty of two months, he can be helped in such a way that he will be freed within a month. Nevertheless he is never drawn out from there until the debt is fully paid; and when it is paid, then that which is paid thereafter belongs to him who makes satisfaction; *for the prayer is turned back into his own bosom*[^6a], or if he himself does not need it, it is turned into the bosom of the Church.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that he who merits for another [merits] also for himself; it must be said that it is not the same with the meritorious and the satisfactory work. For a work is *meritorious* by that account, by which it is from the root of charity — which always pleases God, and [pleases] him in whom it is, that root — which regards all in common and makes all things common; therefore[^7a] no one can merit for another without himself being pleasing before God, since this very thing pleases God most. — But a *satisfactory* work [is satisfactory] by reason of the penalty, and so much penalty pays so much debt, and a greater [penalty] a greater debt; therefore by one and the same penalty one cannot pay two debts in full; and therefore, if he makes satisfaction for another, as regards the *whole* he does not make satisfaction for himself; and if for himself, not for another; for himself indeed he merits eternal glory, because that *work* is pleasing to God, and the one *doing* it is pleasing to God in the doing, and through this he is judged worthy of recompense from God.

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la: Vide supra d. 17. p. II. dub. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 10; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.

en: See above, d. 17, p. II, dub. 7; B. Albert, here a. 10; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.

la: Partis II. a. I. q. 1. Cfr. d. 50. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Idem dub. solvitur a B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Of Part II, a. I, q. 1. Cf. d. 50, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — The same doubt is resolved by B. Albert, here a. 11; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Vers. 2.

en: Verse 2.

la: Hic c. 1. [In edd. additur *in necessitate.* Inferius pro *gravibus* cod. U *gravioribus.*]

en: Here c. 1. [In the editions is added *in necessitate* (in necessity). Below, for *gravibus* (grave), codex U reads *gravioribus* (graver).]

la: Codd. R S hic et paulo inferius *contractibus.*

en: Codices R, S here and a little below [read] *contractibus* (contracts).

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. — Cod. H *a maiori.*

en: See tom. I, p. 835, note 5. — Codex H [reads] *a maiori* (from the greater).

la: Cfr. I. Cor. 12, 23. [Cod. aa *propter.* Codd. FGK *scilicet.*]

en: Cf. 1 Cor. 12, 23. [Codex aa (reads) *propter.* Codices FGK (read) *scilicet.*]

en: Reference is made to Gal. 3, 28; Eph. 3, 30 and 1. Cf. Rom. 12, 5; 1 Cor. 11, 1 and 12, 27.

la: Vers. 10: *Omnes enim nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut referat unusquisque* etc.

en: Verse 10: *For we must all be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may bring back* etc.

la: Psalm. 61, 13. — Conclusioni cod. Z praemittit *non ergo iuxta opera aliena.*

en: Psalm 61, 13. — To the Conclusion codex Z prefixes *non ergo iuxta opera aliena* (not, therefore, according to another's works).

la: Edd. hic addunt: *sed ut velut per remedium sanetur offensa,* inferius omittunt *ut anima reordinetur,* et substituunt *et antidotum* et pro *sed antidotum sive.*

en: The editions here add: *sed ut velut per remedium sanetur offensa* (but that the offense may be healed as if by a remedy); below they omit *ut anima reordinetur* (that the soul may be set in order again), and substitute *et antidotum* and, for *sed antidotum sive* (but the antidote or).

la: Nahum 1, 9. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 1. — Superius pro *possunt* codd. G V W *possint,* et post *recipiant* cod. aa addit *eam.*

en: Nahum 1, 9. See above, the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 1. — Above, for *possunt* (can), codices G V W [read] *possint;* and after *recipiant* (take), codex aa adds *eam* (it).

la: Gregor., XXXV. Moral. c. 10. n. 20: *Quisquis pro aliis intercedere nititur, sibi potius ex ipsa caritate suffragatur.*

en: Gregory, *Morals,* book XXXV, c. 10, n. 20: «Whoever strives to intercede for others is rather profited himself out of that very charity».

la: Plurimi codd. et ed. *veritatem.*

en: Very many codices and the edition [read] *veritatem* (truth) [for *virtutem*].

la: Codd. R S *meretur, ut reparet* (plures alii codd. et ed. 1 etiam habent *ut reparet*).

en: Codices R, S [read] *meretur, ut reparet* (he merits, that he may restore) — many other codices and edition 1 likewise have *ut reparet.*

la: Lev. 25, 25: *Sin attenuatus frater tuus vendiderit possessiunculam suam, et voluerit propinquus eius, potest redimere quod ille vendiderat.* — De *caritate* cfr. Act. 4, 32. et I. Cor. 13, 5. — Codd. R S *insufficientia sive indigentia.* Iidem codd. cum codd. T bb et ed. 1 inferius *poenae* pro *recte.*

en: Lev. 25, 25: *But if thy brother, being impoverished, sell his little possession, and his kinsman be willing, he may redeem what the other had sold.* — On *charity* cf. Acts 4, 32 and 1 Cor. 13, 5. — Codices R S [read] *insufficientia sive indigentia* (insufficiency or need). The same codices, with codices T bb and edition 1, below [read] *poenae* (of penalty) for *recte* (rightly).

la: Vide tom. II. pag. 661, nota 6. Glossam Bedae. — Superius post *ut* cod. E legit *quando minor... commutatur.* Mox pro *commutatur* edd. perperam *commutat.* Subinde Vat. omittit *simpliciter, illa minime voluntaria* (cfr. supra p. I. q. 3.).

en: See tom. II, p. 661, note 6, the Gloss of Bede. — Above, after *ut,* codex E reads *quando minor... commutatur* (when a lesser... is commuted). Soon, for *commutatur* the editions wrongly [read] *commutat.* Thereupon the Vatican edition omits *simpliciter, illa minime voluntaria* (cf. above, p. I, q. 3).

la: Epist. I. Cor. 2, 11: *Quis enim hominum scit quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est?* — Locus est obscurus, immo, ut videtur, corruptus. Videtur excidisse *non* post *quia.* Secunda manus in cod. bb transponit verba *confiteri* et *conteri.* Ad utrumque supple *pro alio.* — Superius pro *communicationis* cod. N *communionis,* edd. *commutationis.*

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 2, 11: *For what man knows the things of a man, except the spirit of man which is in him?* — The passage is obscure, indeed, as it seems, corrupt. A *non* seems to have dropped out after *quia.* A second hand in codex bb transposes the words *confiteri* and *conteri.* To both supply *pro alio* (for another). — Above, for *communicationis* (of communication) codex N [reads] *communionis* (of communion); the editions [read] *commutationis* (of commutation).

la: Psalm. 34, 13: *Oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur.* — Mox pro *in sinu* edd. et plures codd. *in sinum.*

en: Psalm 34, 13: *My prayer shall be turned back into my own bosom.* — Soon, for *in sinu* the editions and several codices [read] *in sinum.*

la: Verba *ille in quo est illa radix* a Vat. transferuntur huc post *ideo.*

en: The words *ille in quo est illa radix* (he in whom that root is) are transferred by the Vatican edition to here, after *ideo.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Doctrinam catholicam de indulgentiis impugnarunt primo Waldenses aliique illius aetatis haeretici, quos egregie confutat Guliel. Parisiensis (de Sacram. Ordinis c. 13.); posterius Wikleff et Huss (cfr. decreta Martini V. et Concilii Constant. prop. 42, et inter articulos 39 prop. 26.); Petrus Oxomensis (prop. 6. a Sixto IV. confixa); Lutherus (vide prop. 18-22. et Concil. Tridént. Sess. XXV. decretum de indulgentiis). Item erravit Synod. Pistor. (cfr. prop. 40-43.).

**II.** Quaestio 1. quoddam fundamentum ponit doctrinae seqq. quaestionum. S. Thom. (hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; Suppl. q. 13. a. 2.) eandem distinctionem et doctrinam profert, eo excepto, quod nec approbat, minorem poenam in maiorem mutandam esse suscipienti satisfactionem pro alio, nec rationem allatam, quod poena propria magis satisfaciat quam aliena; immo asserit, quod «*minor* poena requiritur in eo qui pro alio satisfacit, quam in principali requireretur». Loquitur autem S. Bonaventura hic specialiter de satisfactione seu poenitentia *sacramentali,* quae in casu, quo poenitens est inhabilis, ut per se satisfaciat, *auctoritate confessarii* etiam ab alio impleri potest, ut cum nostro auctore putant Alex. Hal., Richard. a Med., Durand. aliique. — Notanda autem est hic prop. 15. ab Alexandro VII. damnata (24. Sept. 1665): «Poenitens *propria auctoritate* substituere sibi alium potest, qui loco ipsius poenitentiam adimpleat». De hac 1. quaestione praeter S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 23. m. 1. a. 2. et q. 24. m. 4. a. 4. — B. Albert., supra d. 18. a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**III.** Quoad 2. quaestionem constat, tum indulgentias etiam in foro Dei valere, tum in Ecclesia thesaurum meritorum esse vi communionis Sanctorum, quam profitetur Symbolum; quod confirmatum est a Clemente VI. Extrav. *Unigenitus,* et in damnatis Lutheri prop. 17. Synodique Pistoriensis prop. 41. De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 25. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 16. 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The catholic doctrine concerning indulgences was first impugned by the Waldenses and other heretics of that age, whom William of Paris excellently refutes (*On the Sacrament of Orders,* c. 13.); afterwards by Wycliffe and Hus (cf. the decrees of Martin V. and of the Council of Constance, prop. 42, and among the articles, 39 prop. 26.); [by] Peter of Osma (prop. 6, condemned by Sixtus IV.); [by] Luther (see prop. 18-22. and the decree of the Council of Trent, Sess. XXV., on indulgences). The Synod of Pistoia likewise erred (cf. prop. 40-43.).

**II.** Question 1 lays a certain foundation for the doctrine of the following questions. St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 3; Suppl. q. 13, a. 2.) sets forth the same distinction and doctrine, with this exception, that he neither approves that a lesser penalty is to be changed into a greater for one who undertakes satisfaction for another, nor the reason adduced, that one's own penalty makes satisfaction more than another's; rather he asserts that «a *lesser* penalty is required in him who makes satisfaction for another than would be required in the principal [debtor]». But St. Bonaventure here speaks specifically of *sacramental* satisfaction or penance, which, in the case where the penitent is incapable of making satisfaction by himself, can be fulfilled even by another *by the authority of the confessor,* as, with our author, Alexander of Hales, Richard of Mediavilla, Durandus, and others hold. — But here is to be noted prop. 15, condemned by Alexander VII. (24 Sept. 1665): «The penitent *by his own authority* can substitute another for himself, who may fulfill the penance in his place». On this 1st question, besides St. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. IV. q. 23. m. 1. a. 2. and q. 24. m. 4. a. 4. — B. Albert, above, d. 18. a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 9. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**III.** As regards the 2nd question, it is established both that indulgences are valid also in the forum of God, and that in the Church there is a treasury of merits by virtue of the communion of Saints, which the Creed professes; which was confirmed by Clement VI. in the Extravagant *Unigenitus,* and in the condemned propositions of Luther, prop. 17, and of the Synod of Pistoia, prop. 41. On this 2nd question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. q. 23. m. 1. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 3. quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 25. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 16. 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p{529–532}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (Vol IV two-column "VOL II OVERRIDE": PDF authoritative in the cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio/scholion/footers), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 58591–58875. Offset pdf = printed + 20 (pp. 529→549). Running heads verified on all four pages: "DIST. XX. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I."

**Article opener folded in.** Per the chunking convention, the Articulus Unicus opener ("Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum possit fieri satisfactionis commutatio... Et quod sic, videtur.") folds into this q1. The pars-II DIVISIO TEXTUS and TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (printed on p. 529, listing all six questions) belong to the separate `d20-p2-divisio` chunk, not here; footnotes 3, 4, 5 of p. 529's right column attach to that divisio text. This q1 carries p. 529 footnotes 1–2 (the article opener's `[^1]` *Vide supra d. 17* and `[^2]` *Partis II. a. I. q. 1*).

**Scholion ownership / coverage.** The Articulus Unicus SCHOLION (p. 532, sections I–III) is rendered here in full (body first, scholion last per the parser rule). It is the article-level scholion shared by the whole article (q1–q6), but addresses the questions explicitly thus: **§I** = general history of attacks on indulgence-doctrine (frames the whole article); **§II** = *Question 1* (this chunk — the fundamentum, with the Alexander VII condemned prop. 15 and the parallel-author cross-references); **§III** = *Question 2* (the reality of indulgences / treasury of merits). The scholion explicitly covers q1 and q2 and frames the rest. Sibling questions q2–q6 point back here for the shared scholion.

**Page-split / cross-chunk footer map.**
- p. 529: footnotes 1–2 (left col, article opener) belong here; footnotes 3–5 (right col) belong to the `d20-p2-divisio` chunk.
- p. 530: footnotes 1–8 (this q1's objections + Respondeo opening) → rendered `[^1]`–`[^8]`.
- p. 531: footnotes 1–7 (the Solutio) → rendered `[^1a]`–`[^7a]` (letter-suffixed to avoid colliding with p. 530's sequence).
- p. 532: footnotes 1–7 belong to QUAESTIO II (its objections run down both columns of p. 532) — the **hand-off to q2**, NOT rendered here. The scholion itself has no apparatus footers.

**Hand-off to q2 (`bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q2`).** QUAESTIO II ("Utrum possit fieri satisfactionis relaxatio") opens at p. 532 left-bottom and runs down both columns of p. 532. Its objections 1–4 and *Contra* carry p. 532 footnotes 1–7 (Hebr. 5, 7 Vulgate variant; Gloss of Peter Lombard/Lyra; Deut. 25, 2; Luc. 3, 8; etc.). q2 also inherits the shared Articulus Unicus scholion above by reference.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the PDF bands. Minor silent OCR corrections applied where context was unambiguous per the Vol IV override (e.g. `reraedium`→*remedium*, `conlra`→*contra*, `satisfacto-ria`→*satisfactoria*; the "S. Bonav. — Tom. IV. 67" printer's signature line dropped as a non-textual mark).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum possit fieri satisfactionis relaxatio.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum possit fieri satisfactionis relaxatio. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia universalis Ecclesia has relaxationes acceptat; sed constat, quod ipsa non errat: ergo vere fiunt. *Probatio minoris*: ita dictum est Petro Lucae vigesimo secundo[^1]: *Ego pro te rogavi, Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua*; constat, quod hoc dictum est Petro in persona Ecclesiae; sed Christus *exauditus est in omnibus pro sua reverentia*: ergo et in isto. Et si hoc, Ecclesia universalis non decipitur nec errat.

2. Item, secundae ad Corinthios secundo[^2]: *Nam et ego, si quid vobis donavi, in persona Christi*; Glossa: « Ac si Christus condonasset »; sed si Christus vere condonat, vere est condonatum: ergo quod donavit Apostolus vere condonatum et relaxatum fuit. Sed non est minoris potestatis Summus Pontifex quam Paulus: ergo etc.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro de Poenitentia[^3]: « Credendum est, quod omnes orationes Ecclesiae et eleemosynae et opera iustitiae succurrant recognoscenti mortem suam ad conversionem »: si ergo opera Ecclesiae valent, ergo bona satisfactoria, quae sunt in ecclesiastica unitate, valent ad satisfaciendum: ergo videtur, quod ille ad quem spectat haec distribuere, possit peccatores iuvare et ita satisfactionem minuere ac per hoc condonare et relaxare.

4. Item, Christus condonavit multis non solum culpam, sed etiam poenam, ut patet in muliere adultera[^4]; sed Deus plenitudinem potestatis reliquit in Ecclesia: ergo et potestatem relaxandi et condonandi.

**Contra:**
1. Isaiae quadragesimo[^5]: *Dimissa est iniquitas illius, suscepit de manu Domini duplicia*: ergo videtur, quod poena ad perfectam remissionem sit duplicanda, non relaxanda.

2. Item, super illud secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^6]: *Negare se ipsum non potest*; Glossa: « Quod faceret, si dicta sua non impleret »: ergo necesse est, quod Dominus dicta sua impleat; sed ipse praedixit Deuteronomii vigesimo quinto: *Secundum mensuram delicti erit et plagarum modus*: ergo necesse est ita puniri, sicut et peccator meruit: ergo non potest aliquid relaxari.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: Facere dignos fructus poenitentiae est in divino praecepto[^7], a quo

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non potest quisquam homo purus absolvere; sed dignos fructus facere est secundum magnitudinem sceleris magnifice satisfacere: ergo videtur, quod non licet alicui de Ecclesia de illo minuere: ergo nec relaxationem aliquam facere vel percipere.

4. Item, inferior non potest absolvere a poena, ad quam ligat superior; sed Deus, remittendo culpam, ligat ad aliquotam poenam temporalem: ergo videtur, quod nullus homo possit de illa aliquid dimittere: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Poenae relaxatio fieri potest, quae valet non solum in foro Ecclesiae, sed etiam in foro Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod relaxationes fiunt et fieri possunt, sed *qualiter* possint fieri, diversimode nobis insinuant diversi.

1. Quidam enim, distinguentes forum Dei et forum Ecclesiae, dixerunt, huiusmodi relaxationes non fieri nec intelligi quantum ad forum Dei, sed quantum ad forum Ecclesiae. Hoc autem sic intelligunt. Sacri canones pro mortalibus peccatis graves et diuturnas poenitentias taxant, ut pro uno mortali septennium vel amplius, secundum quod[^8] gravius est; quae poena adeo gravis est, quod vix aut nunquam posset quis facere, et pauci invenirentur, qui vellent. Ideo constituerunt rectores Ecclesiae, poenitentias secundum arbitrium imponi, et de residuo relaxationes constituerunt fieri; quod et facere potuerunt, quoniam constitutio humana erat, et in humana constitutione potest homo dispensare et temperare; quae dispensatio quaedam *relaxatio* non indebite appellatur. — Sed tamen ista opinio, etsi relaxationes videatur ponere, verius interimit; quia, si relaxant[^9], ita quod Deus non relaxat, potius *deceptio* quam *relaxatio* vera iudicanda est, et potius *crudelitas* quam *pietas* dici potest, dum minuendo hic poenitentiam, in futuro ad graviora trahit supplicia.

Ideo aliter dicendum, quod relaxatio illa non solum valet in foro Ecclesiae, verum etiam in foro Dei, quia Deus habet pro condonato quod sic condonatur. — Modus autem intelligendi, qualiter fieri possit, talis est. Praesupponendum est, quod *bonum* obtinemus ex triplici merito, scilicet ex merito *proprio* et ex merito *capitis* et ex merito *ecclesiasticae unitatis*. Et quod ita sit, in se manifestum est: quia *quilibet* meretur sibi per gratiam, quam habet; quod *Christus* meruerit nobis, nemo dubitat, nisi qui fide caret; quod *Ecclesia* mereatur nobis, et eius merita, patet per verbum Augustini praedictum[^10] et per illud quod ipse subiungit: « Nemo potest digne poenitere, quem non sustineat unitas Ecclesiae ». Verbum istud est verbum Augustini in libro de Poenitentia.

Per hunc modum, sicut meritum *obtinendi bonum* est triplex, sic meritum *liberandi a malo*: meritum scilicet *proprium*, et hoc est meritum nostrae contritionis; et per hoc meremur liberari a poena aeterna, ita quod simul sunt haec duo, sicut in Angelis gratia et gloria[^11]. — Secundo modo meritum *Christi*, et hoc operatur in Sacramentis et potestate clavium; et per hoc remittitur pars poenae. — Tertio modo est meritum *unitatis ecclesiasticae*, et per illud adhuc fit remissio. Et sic secundum triplex meritum triplex fit poenae condonatio, ut sic currat *misericordia cum iustitia*; et in qualibet est commutatio maioris in minus. Unde poena aeterna primo mutatur in *temporalem* in remissione culpae; secundo temporalis magna et supra vires in poenam competentem viribus commutatur in *sacerdotis absolutione*; tertio vero commutatur poena, ad quam tenetur *iudicio Ecclesiae*, adhuc in minorem in relaxatione, et pro alio residuo merita Ecclesiae satisfaciunt, ita quod in nullo praeiudicatur iustitiae.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod duplicatur poena, et quod iuxta mensuram delicti debet esse et plagarum modus: dicendum, quod — sicut tactum fuit supra[^12], quando agebatur de baptismo, quod peccatum nostrum satis punitum fuit, quando Christus pro nobis poenam subiit et suam pro nobis poenam exposuit et nostram fecit — nos sufficienter iudicamur puniri sive quantum ad duplicitatem[^13] in anima et in carne, sive quantum ad mensuram acerbitatis poenae; similiter intelligendum in proposito, quod poenalitates, quae sunt in *Ecclesia* et quae sunt *supererogationis*, pro eo cui fit relaxatio, subveniunt, ut Deus reputet sibi satisfactum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenetur ad faciendum dignos fructus poenitentiae; dicendum, quod facere dignos fructus poenitentiae est dupliciter, scilicet *vere* et *interpretative*. Et ille dicitur dignos fructus poenitentiae facere, qui non solum per se ipsum, sed etiam per suffragium alienum habet sufficiens pretium ad solvendum debitum[^14].

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod inferior non absolvit ab eo, ad quod ligat superior; dicendum, quod non absolvit omnino condonando, sed pro eo solvendo de ecclesiastico thesauro. — Vel potest dici, quod inferior potest absolvere ab eo, ad quod ligat superior, si ad hoc data est sibi auctoritas a superiori, sicut patet; et talis auctoritas a Christo data est rectoribus Ecclesiae[^15].

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether a relaxation of satisfaction can be made.*

Secondly it is asked whether a relaxation of satisfaction can be made. And that it can, seems [shown]:

1. Because the universal Church accepts these relaxations; but it is established that she does not err: therefore they are truly made. *Proof of the minor*: thus it was said to Peter in Luke twenty-two[^1]: *I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not*; it is established that this was said to Peter in the person of the Church; but Christ *was heard in all things on account of his reverence*: therefore also in this. And if so, the universal Church is not deceived nor errs.

2. Likewise, in second Corinthians chapter two[^2]: *For if I have pardoned anything to you, [I have done it] in the person of Christ*; the Gloss: « As if Christ had pardoned it »; but if Christ truly pardons, it is truly pardoned: therefore what the Apostle pardoned was truly pardoned and relaxed. But the Supreme Pontiff is not of lesser power than Paul: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Penitence*[^3]: « It is to be believed that all the prayers of the Church and the almsdeeds and works of justice come to the aid of one who acknowledges his death unto conversion »: if therefore the works of the Church avail, then satisfactory goods, which are in the ecclesiastical unity, avail toward satisfying: therefore it seems that he to whom it pertains to distribute these can aid sinners and so diminish satisfaction and thereby pardon and relax.

4. Likewise, Christ pardoned to many not only the fault, but also the punishment, as is evident in the adulterous woman[^4]; but God left the plenitude of power in the Church: therefore also the power of relaxing and pardoning.

**On the contrary:**
1. Isaiah forty[^5]: *Her iniquity is forgiven, she hath received of the Lord's hand double*: therefore it seems that the punishment, unto perfect remission, must be doubled, not relaxed.

2. Likewise, upon that text of second Timothy chapter two[^6]: *He cannot deny himself*; the Gloss: « Which he would do, if he did not fulfill his words »: therefore it is necessary that the Lord fulfill his words; but he himself foretold in Deuteronomy twenty-five: *According to the measure of the sin shall the manner of the stripes be*: therefore it is necessary to be punished just as the sinner deserved: therefore nothing can be relaxed.

3. Likewise, by *reason* it seems: To bring forth worthy fruits of penance is in a divine precept[^7], from which

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no mere man can absolve; but to bring forth worthy fruits is, according to the magnitude of the crime, to make satisfaction magnificently: therefore it seems that it is not permitted to anyone of the Church to diminish anything of it: therefore neither to make nor to receive any relaxation.

4. Likewise, an inferior cannot absolve from a punishment to which a superior binds; but God, in remitting the fault, binds to a certain temporal punishment: therefore it seems that no man can remit anything of it: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> A relaxation of punishment can be made, which avails not only in the forum of the Church, but also in the forum of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that relaxations are made and can be made, but *in what manner* they can be made, various [authors] suggest to us in various ways.

1. For some, distinguishing the forum of God and the forum of the Church, have said that relaxations of this kind are not made nor understood with respect to the forum of God, but with respect to the forum of the Church. And this they understand thus. The sacred canons assess grave and long penances for mortal sins, as for one mortal sin seven years or more, according as[^8] it is graver; which punishment is so grave that scarcely or never could anyone perform it, and few would be found who would be willing. Therefore the rectors of the Church established that penances be imposed according to discretion, and they established that relaxations be made of the remainder; which they were also able to do, since it was a human constitution, and in a human constitution a man can dispense and temper; which dispensation is not unfittingly called a kind of *relaxation*. — But nevertheless this opinion, although it seems to posit relaxations, more truly does away with them; because, if they relax[^9] in such a way that God does not relax, it is rather to be judged a *deception* than a true *relaxation*, and it can be called rather *cruelty* than *piety*, while by diminishing penance here it draws [one] in the future to graver torments.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that that relaxation avails not only in the forum of the Church, but also in the forum of God, because God holds as pardoned what is thus pardoned. — Now the manner of understanding how it can be made is this. It must be presupposed that we obtain *the good* from a threefold merit, namely from *proper* merit and from the merit of the *head* and from the merit of *ecclesiastical unity*. And that this is so, is manifest in itself: because *each one* merits for himself by the grace which he has; that *Christ* merited for us, no one doubts, except one who lacks faith; that the *Church* merits for us, and her merits [do so], is evident through the aforesaid word of Augustine[^10] and through that which he himself subjoins: « No one can worthily do penance whom the unity of the Church does not sustain ». That word is the word of Augustine in the book *On Penitence*.

In this way, just as the merit of *obtaining the good* is threefold, so [is] the merit of *being freed from evil*: namely *proper* merit, and this is the merit of our contrition; and through this we merit to be freed from eternal punishment, so that these two are together, as in the Angels grace and glory[^11]. — In the second mode, the merit of *Christ*, and this works in the Sacraments and the power of the keys; and through this part of the punishment is remitted. — In the third mode there is the merit of *ecclesiastical unity*, and through it remission is still made. And so according to the threefold merit a threefold pardon of punishment is made, so that thus *mercy runs together with justice*; and in each there is a commutation of the greater into the less. Hence eternal punishment is first changed into *temporal* in the remission of the fault; secondly the temporal [punishment], great and beyond [one's] strength, is commuted into a punishment fitting to [one's] strength in the *priest's absolution*; thirdly indeed the punishment, to which one is held by the *judgment of the Church*, is commuted still into a lesser one in relaxation, and for the other remainder the merits of the Church make satisfaction, so that in nothing is justice prejudiced.

1. 2. To that, then, which is objected, that the punishment is doubled, and that according to the measure of the offense ought also to be the manner of the stripes: it must be said that — as was touched upon above[^12], when treatment was made of baptism, that our sin was sufficiently punished, when Christ underwent the punishment for us and set forth his punishment for us and made it ours — we are judged to be sufficiently punished, whether as to the *doubleness*[^13] in soul and in flesh, or as to the measure of the bitterness of the punishment; similarly it is to be understood in the matter at hand, that the penalties which are in the *Church* and which are *of supererogation*, come to the aid of him for whom the relaxation is made, so that God may reckon satisfaction as made to himself.

3. To that which is objected, that one is held to bringing forth worthy fruits of penance; it must be said that to bring forth worthy fruits of penance is twofold, namely *truly* and *interpretatively*. And he is said to bring forth worthy fruits of penance who has, not only through his very self, but also through another's suffrage, a sufficient price to pay the debt[^14].

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4. To that which is objected, that an inferior does not absolve from that to which a superior binds; it must be said that he does not absolve by pardoning altogether, but by paying for him out of the ecclesiastical treasury. — Or it can be said that an inferior can absolve from that to which a superior binds, if authority for this has been given to him by the superior, as is evident; and such authority was given by Christ to the rectors of the Church[^15].

---

la: Vers. 32. — Secundus locus est Hebr. 5, 7, ubi Vulgata omittit *in omnibus*.

en: Verse 32 [Luke 22]. — The second passage is Hebrews 5:7, where the Vulgate omits *in all things*.

la: Vers. 10: Nam et ego quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos in persona Christi. — Glossam exhibet Lombard. (et Lyranus ut interlinearem) quae est secundum Comment. olim Ambrosio tributum.

en: Verse 10: For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, [I have done it] for your sake in the person of Christ. — The Gloss is given by Lombard (and Lyranus as interlinear), which is according to the Commentary formerly attributed to Ambrose.

la: Sive de Vera et falsa Poenitentia, c. 12, n. 27. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XVII, c. 4. — Inferius pro *bona* codd. I K aa *opera*.

en: Or *On True and False Penitence*, c. 12, n. 27. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XVII, c. 4. — Below, for *bona* [good things], codices I K aa [read] *opera* [works].

la: Cfr. Ioan. 8, 11.

en: Cf. John 8:11.

la: Vers. 2, ubi Vulgata in fine addit pro omnibus peccatis suis.

en: Verse 2 [Isaiah 40], where the Vulgate at the end adds *for all her sins*.

la: Vers. 13. — De Glossa, quae est Petri Lombardi et Lyrani (ut interlinearis), et in qua permulti codd. et edd. perperam *Quid* pro *Quod*, cfr. Comment. in hunc loc., quod habetur inter opera Hieron. — Seq. textus est Deut. 25, 2: Pro mensura peccati erit etc.

en: Verse 13 [2 Timothy 2]. — Concerning the Gloss, which is of Peter Lombard and Lyranus (as interlinear), and in which very many codices and editions wrongly [read] *Quid* for *Quod*, cf. the Commentary on this passage, which is found among the works of Jerome. — The following text is Deuteronomy 25:2: According to the measure of the sin etc.

la: Luc. 3, 8: Facite ergo fructus dignos poenitentiae. Cfr. Matth. 3, 8. et 4, 17, de quibus supra d. 16, p. I, dub. 5, 6, 14.

en: Luke 3:8: Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of penance. Cf. Matthew 3:8 and 4:17, concerning which [see] above, d. 16, p. I, dub. 5, 6, 14.

la: Codd. I K *amplius pro peccato, quod*.

en: Codices I K [read] *amplius pro peccato, quod* [more, for a sin which].

la: Cod. X supplet *rectores*. — Secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. IV, q. 23, m. 2, relaxatio proprie dicta est poenitentiae iniunctae pro peccatis ex virtute clavium diminutio, imposita poena eiusdem generis (scil. temporalis).

en: Codex X supplies *rectores* [the rectors]. — According to Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV, q. 23, m. 2, a relaxation properly so called is a diminution, by virtue of the keys, of penance enjoined for sins, a punishment of the same kind (namely temporal) having been imposed.

la: Hic in fundam. 3. Loc. ibi cit. habetur etiam seq. sententia. — Inferius edd. cum pluribus codd. male omittunt *bonum*.

en: Here in fundamentum 3. In the passage there cited the following sentence is also found. — Below, the editions with several codices wrongly omit *bonum* [the good].

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 5, a. 3, q. 2.

en: See II *Sentences*, d. 5, a. 3, q. 2.

en: Distinction 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Edd. cum aliquot codd. *duplicem*, cui cod. X subnectit *partem* (Cfr. supra d. 15, p. I, dub. 1). Pro *exponit et fecit* multi codd. *exponit et facit*. Inferius pro *supererogationis* codd. communissime legunt *supererogationes*, cod. F *supererogantes*.

en: The editions with some codices [read] *duplicem*, to which codex X subjoins *partem* (cf. above, d. 15, p. I, dub. 1). For *exponit et fecit* [sets forth and made] many codices [read] *exponit et facit* [sets forth and makes]. Below, for *supererogationis* the codices very commonly read *supererogationes*, codex F *supererogantes*.

la: De Regul. iuris in VI., regul. 72: Qui facit per alium est perinde, ac si faciat per se ipsum.

en: *On the Rules of Law* in [the Sext], rule 72: He who acts through another is just as if he acted through his very self.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 58876–59084) cross-checked against the vol4 PDF column bands for pp. 532–534 (`/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p53{2,3,4}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`); two-column "VOL II OVERRIDE" discipline applied, reading each page Left column top→bottom then Right. Running heads verified: p532 "532 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV"; p533 "DIST. XX. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. II … 533"; p534 "534 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV". Offset pdf = printed + 20.

**Marginal headings** present in the printed text (rendered inline as italic key-terms rather than as side-notes): *Fundamenta* (objections), *Conclusio*, *Triplex meritum liberandi a malo*, *Triplex poenae condonatio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Distinctio*, *Aliter*. These are Quaracchi's editorial side-glosses, not part of Bonaventure's running text.

**Apparatus.** 15 footnotes total: p532 footers 1–7 → [^1]–[^7]; p533 footers 1–7 → [^8]–[^14]; p534 footer 1 → [^15]. The remaining p534 footers (printed 2–6) anchor to QUAESTIO III ("A quo possit relaxatio satisfactionis fieri") and are carried by that chunk, not this one — the page boundary falls mid-page 534 immediately before "QUAESTIO III."

**Scholion disposition.** has_scholion: false. The Articulus Unicus scholion lives with q1; cross-ref only here (and confirmed by Quaracchi's own [^15]).

**[?] flags.** None. The OCR cascade in the two-column body (e.g. "Probutio" → *Probatio*, "diclum" → *dictum*, "ehristo/ehristus" → *Christo/Christus*, "qood" → *quod*, "dala" → *data*, "Yidetur" → *videtur*, "satisfaetionis" → *satisfactionis*, "relaxatioties" → *relaxationes*, "scd" → *sed*) was resolved unambiguously against the PDF column bands; no genuinely ambiguous reading remained.

**Hand-off to q3 (`bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q3`):** p534 footers printed 2–6 belong to q3 — (2) "De quo supra d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, seq. — In fine *provinciae* cod. Y *dioecesis*"; (3) "Cfr. tom. II, pag. 592, nota 2"; (4) "Dist. 18, p. II, q. 3. — Pro *primum* (i.e. excommunicare) Vat. *secundum*"; (5) "Vers. 5 seqq. … Matth. 22, 24 …"; (6) [from p534 R band] "In consecratione episcopi … *Accipe anulum* …". q3 opens "Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit relaxatio fieri" at raw line 59085 and runs onto p534 R + following pages. The shared page 534's footers are thus split by body anchor: footer 1 here, footers 2–6 in q3.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *A quo possit relaxatio satisfactionis fieri.*

Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit relaxatio fieri. Et videtur, quod a quolibet sacerdote[^1]:

1. Quia relaxationes fiunt ex vi clavium; et omnis sacerdos claves habet[^2]: ergo videtur, quod omnis sacerdos possit relaxationes facere. Si tu dicas quod non est ex vi clavium, sed ex thesauro Ecclesiae; sed quilibet sacerdos habet thesaurum suae parochiae, sicut episcopus suae provinciae: ergo etc.

2. Item, qui praesunt collegiis habent claves ad solvendum et ligandum in utroque foro et habent thesaurum supererogationum, sicut praelati religionum: ergo videtur, quod ipsi possint.

3. Item, videtur, quod quilibet homo: quia quilibet liberae conditionis est dominus bonorum et meritorum suorum[^3]: ergo potest merita sua alteri concedere; et dum illi concedit, eius poenitentia minuitur et relaxatur: ergo videtur, quod quilibet hoc possit.

4. Item, bona spiritualia sunt maioris communicationis quam temporalia; sed si aliquid datur alicui, ex quo plene datur, ille potest illud concedere alii: ergo videtur pari ratione, immo fortiori, quod cui datae sunt relaxationes, ille potest eas dare alteri.

**Contra:**
1. Plus est facere indulgentias quam imponere poenitentias; sed poenitentias imponere non potest nisi solus sacerdos: ergo indulgentias dare non potest, nisi sit sacerdos.

2. Item, nemo scit, utrum plura habeat merita, quam sibi sufficiant, immo nescit, se habere merita sufficientia: ergo nullus de proprio potest relaxare aliquid de poena, conferendo aliquam ex eis indulgentiam: ergo non spectat indulgentias facere nisi ad praelatos Ecclesiae.

3. Item, maius est indulgentias concedere quam excommunicare, vel Ecclesiae reconciliare; sed primum est praelatorum tantum, sicut prius[^4] probatum est: ergo multo fortius indulgentias facere.

Quaeritur igitur: cum unus episcopus non possit alienos subditos absolvere nec ligare, nec in foro poenitentiali nec in foro iudiciali; unde est, quod potest indulgentias in aliena dioecesi facere, sicut videmus tota die fieri?

> **Conclusio.** Relaxationes sive indulgentias dispensare ad solos episcopos et Summum Pontificem pertinet.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut in praecedenti problemate tactum est, relaxationes sive indulgentiae fiunt de meritis supererogationis, quae sunt in Ecclesia, quae quidem sunt sicut thesaurus spiritualis eius. Haec autem merita supererogationis non omnium est dispensare, sed episcoporum tantum; et ideo relaxationes facere ad solos episcopos pertinet.

Ratio autem, quare thesaurus Ecclesiae solis episcopis committitur dispensandus, est, quia Ecclesia thesaurum istum habet ex desponsatione sui cum Christo, qui est vir et eius sponsus, et cui generat filios et filias, id est perfectos et imperfectos, ad quorum educationem Christus vult servari haec bona. Et quoniam in Lege tactum est, quod *qui recipit uxorem fratris sui, ut suscitet fratri suo defuncto semen,* debet succedere in bonis, quae pertinent ad filiorum educationem, secundum quod innuitur Ruth quarto[^5]; illis solis competit iste thesaurus dispensandus, qui sunt sponsi Ecclesiae. Tales autem sunt episcopi, qui sponsi sunt[^6] et habent vim generandi filios et filias, id est perfectos et imperfectos, et inter hos Summus Pontifex, qui est totius universalis Ecclesiae sponsus et rector. Ideo omnes episcopi, qui habent prolem, possunt facere indulgentias, et Summus Pontifex praecipue inter omnes, quia ipsi competit totius spiritualis thesauri dispensatio, secundum quod curam habet de tota Ecclesia et omnibus eius filiis. Unde omnes sunt eius filii, et ipse est pater omnium.

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Concedendum igitur est, quod indulgentias facere non tantum non conceditur laicis, sed nec etiam sacerdotibus nec praelatis inferioribus, ut abbatibus vel prioribus[^7].

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, iam patet responsio: quia non est tota ratio virtutis indulgentias faciendi, scilicet *clavis,* sed requiritur potestas *clavis cum iurisdictione* et thesauri dispensandi *auctoritate,* quae ordinarie solis competit episcopis. Nam per *commissionem* quilibet sacerdos potest dare indulgentiam ex parte episcopi, sicut patet in simplicibus praedicatoribus.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de illis qui praesunt collegiis; dicendum, quod tales, qui praesunt subditis, aliquam auctoritatem habent bonorum sui collegii, non tamen respectu meriti Christi, quod dedit dispensandum Ecclesiae et eius sponsis; ideo non habent auctoritatem plenariam respectu thesauri Ecclesiae, et ideo solum *bona sui collegii possunt communicare;* non tamen possunt *relaxare,* quia nesciunt, utrum superabundent, quia potestatem plenam super hoc non habent. Et voco largo modo plenam potestatem, prout dicit plenitudinem sufficientiae, per quem modum est in episcopis ad hunc actum, non prout dicit *plenitudinem superexcellentiae;* sic enim est in solo Summo Pontifice, plenitudo scilicet potestatis et auctoritatis[^8].

*Ad 3. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quilibet homo potest bona sua alteri concedere; dicendum, quod *relaxatio* plus dicit quam *communicatio;* dicit enim quandam *auctoritatem,* ratione cuius dicitur isti indulgentiam praestare; et ideo, quamvis quilibet habens caritatem bona sua possit communicare, non tamen omnis potest relaxare, sed qui habet ad hoc concessam sibi auctoritatem. — Item, differt *communicatio* a *relaxatione,* quoniam *relaxatio* fit de praeteritis malis per merita Christi vel Ecclesiae, quae praecesserunt; *communicatio* autem proprie respicit futurum bonum, non solum praeteritum. Et quamvis possit dare alicui quod iam non est datum nec determinatum alicui, sicut unam Missam, quam cantat pro aliquo mortuo; tamen, si cantavit eam pro suis peccatis, vel dedit alii, non potest sua auctoritate *commutare[^9].* Hinc est, quod qui recipit relaxationes pro se non potest dare alteri; quia, si Ecclesia solvit debitum suum apud Deum, non propter hoc dedit potestatem, quod solveret ipse pro alio; et si Deus dimisit isti debitum, non propter hoc potest iste dimittere alii quod Deo debetur. — Nec valet illud argumentum de communicatione materiali; quia aliquis omnino liber est in possidendo temporalia, quicumque est liberae conditionis et si libere possidet, libere potest alteri dare; qui autem servus est, non potest sine auctoritate domini; omnia autem nostra sunt Christi et omnia merita spiritualia, et nos sumus eius servi[^10]: et ideo non possumus in alterum transferre vel dare, nisi sit data auctoritas a Christo. Et sic patet sequens.

Ad illud quod quaeritur ultimo, utrum episcopus possit indulgentias facere in aliena dioecesi; dicunt aliqui, quod sicut potest ligare et solvere in aliena dioecesi ex consensu dioecesani, ita et relaxationem facere; et ita duae virtutes concurrunt in unam; et tantum possunt, si sunt multi, quantum si unus solus. — Sed tunc non videtur esse aliud quam deceptio, si hoc esset. Ideo dicendum, quod quia relaxatio dicit thesauri communicationem et ulterius auctoritatem, quod episcopus in *aliena* dioecesi potest *communicare bona sua* subditis alienis, bona, inquam, suae dioecesis; *propriis* autem subditis *relaxare* sive indulgere. Unde istae relaxationes *propriis subditis* verae sunt *relaxationes,* si contingat, subditos pergere ad obtinendam indulgentiam, quam ibi facit episcopus; alienis vero potius[^11] sunt *communicationes* quam *relaxationes* — per quem modum abbates, priores, ministri communicant bona sui collegii — nisi forte hoc sit ex consensu et voluntate proprii episcopi. Et hoc dicitur de Poenitentiis et remissionibus: « Quod autem consuluisti », et infra: « Cum a non suo iudice ligari nullus valeat vel absolvi, remissiones illis prodesse tantummodo arbitramur, quibus proprii iudices indulserunt ».

english:
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### Question III. *From whom the relaxation of satisfaction can be made.*

Thirdly it is asked, from whom the relaxation can be made. And it seems that it can be made by any priest whatever[^1]:

1. Because relaxations are made by the power of the keys; and every priest has the keys[^2]: therefore it seems that every priest can make relaxations. If you say that it is not by the power of the keys, but from the treasury of the Church; yet every priest has the treasury of his own parish, just as a bishop has that of his own province: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, those who preside over colleges have the keys for loosing and binding in both forums and have the treasury of supererogation, like the prelates of religious orders: therefore it seems that they can.

3. Likewise, it seems that any man whatever can: because anyone of free condition is master of his own goods and merits[^3]: therefore he can grant his own merits to another; and while he grants them to him, his own penance is diminished and relaxed: therefore it seems that anyone can do this.

4. Likewise, spiritual goods are of greater communicability than temporal ones; but if something is given to someone, from the fact that it is fully given, he can grant it to another: therefore it seems by equal reasoning, indeed by stronger, that he to whom relaxations have been given can give them to another.

**On the contrary:**
1. It is more to make indulgences than to impose penances; but to impose penances belongs to no one but a priest alone: therefore he cannot give indulgences, unless he be a priest.

2. Likewise, no one knows whether he has more merits than suffice for himself, indeed he does not know whether he has sufficient merits: therefore no one can relax anything of the penalty from his own resources by conferring some indulgence from them: therefore it does not belong to anyone to make indulgences except to the prelates of the Church.

3. Likewise, it is greater to grant indulgences than to excommunicate or to reconcile to the Church; but the first belongs to prelates alone, as was proved earlier[^4]: therefore much more strongly to make indulgences.

It is asked therefore: since one bishop cannot absolve nor bind the subjects of another, neither in the penitential forum nor in the judicial forum; how is it that he can make indulgences in another's diocese, as we see done daily?

> **Conclusion.** To dispense relaxations or indulgences belongs to bishops and the Supreme Pontiff alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was touched upon in the preceding problem, relaxations or indulgences are made from the merits of supererogation, which are in the Church, which indeed are like her spiritual treasury. But it does not belong to everyone to dispense these merits of supererogation, but to bishops only; and therefore to make relaxations belongs to bishops alone.

But the reason why the treasury of the Church is committed to bishops alone to be dispensed is that the Church has this treasury from her espousal with Christ, who is her husband and spouse, and to whom she generates sons and daughters, that is, the perfect and the imperfect, for whose education Christ wills these goods to be preserved. And since in the Law it was touched upon that *he who takes the wife of his brother, in order to raise up seed to his dead brother,* ought to succeed to the goods that pertain to the education of the children, according to what is indicated in the fourth chapter of Ruth[^5]; to those alone belongs this treasury to be dispensed, who are spouses of the Church. But such are the bishops, who are spouses[^6] and have the power of generating sons and daughters, that is, the perfect and the imperfect, and among these the Supreme Pontiff, who is the spouse and rector of the whole universal Church. Therefore all bishops who have offspring can make indulgences, and the Supreme Pontiff especially among all, because to him belongs the dispensation of the whole spiritual treasury, inasmuch as he has the care of the whole Church and all her sons. Hence all are his sons, and he is the father of all.

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It must therefore be granted that to make indulgences is not only not conceded to the laity, but not even to priests nor to lesser prelates, such as abbots or priors[^7].

*To 1.* To that which is objected on the contrary, the response is already clear: because the whole ground of the power of making indulgences is not the *key,* but there is required the power of the *key with jurisdiction* and the *authority* of dispensing the treasury, which ordinarily belongs to bishops alone. For by *commission* any priest can give an indulgence on behalf of the bishop, as is clear in the case of simple preachers.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning those who preside over colleges; it must be said that such, who preside over subjects, have some authority over the goods of their college, yet not with respect to the merit of Christ, which he gave to the Church and her spouses to be dispensed; therefore they do not have plenary authority with respect to the treasury of the Church, and therefore they can only *communicate the goods of their college;* yet they cannot *relax,* because they do not know whether they superabound, since they do not have full power over this. And I call "full power" in a broad sense, insofar as it signifies a fullness of sufficiency, in which manner it is in the bishops for this act, not insofar as it signifies a *fullness of superexcellence;* for thus it is in the Supreme Pontiff alone, namely the fullness of power and authority[^8].

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected, that any man can grant his own goods to another; it must be said that *relaxation* signifies more than *communication;* for it signifies a certain *authority,* by reason of which one is said to bestow an indulgence on this person; and therefore, although anyone having charity can communicate his own goods, yet not everyone can relax, but only he who has authority granted to him for this. — Likewise, *communication* differs from *relaxation,* because *relaxation* is made concerning past evils through the merits of Christ or of the Church, which have preceded; but *communication* properly regards a future good, not only a past one. And although one can give to someone what is not yet given nor determined to anyone, such as one Mass which he sings for some dead person; yet, if he has sung it for his own sins, or has given it to another, he cannot by his own authority *commute it[^9].* Hence it is that he who receives relaxations for himself cannot give to another; because, if the Church pays his debt before God, it does not on that account give power that he should pay for another; and if God has remitted his debt, he cannot on that account remit to another what is owed to God. — Nor is that argument valid concerning material communication; because someone is entirely free in possessing temporal things, whoever is of free condition, and if he possesses freely, he can freely give to another; but he who is a servant cannot without the authority of his master; but all our things are Christ's and all spiritual merits, and we are his servants[^10]: and therefore we cannot transfer or give to another, unless authority be given by Christ. And thus what follows is clear.

To that which is asked lastly, whether a bishop can make indulgences in another's diocese; some say that just as he can bind and loose in another's diocese by the consent of the diocesan, so also make a relaxation; and thus two powers concur into one; and they can do as much, if they are many, as if one alone. — But then it would seem to be nothing other than a deception, if this were so. Therefore it must be said that, since relaxation signifies a communication of the treasury and further an authority, a bishop can in *another's* diocese *communicate his own goods* to the subjects of another, the goods, I say, of his own diocese; but to his *own* subjects he can *relax* or grant indulgence. Hence these relaxations to one's *own subjects* are true *relaxations,* if it happens that subjects go to obtain the indulgence which the bishop makes there; but with respect to others they are rather[^11] *communications* than *relaxations* — in the manner in which abbots, priors, and ministers communicate the goods of their college — unless perhaps this be by the consent and will of their own bishop. And this is said in the [title] On Penances and Remissions: « As to what you have consulted », and below: « Since no one can be bound or absolved by a judge not his own, we judge remissions to profit only those to whom their own judges have granted them ».

en: See the scholion on the preceding question.

la: De quo supra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. seq. — In fine arg. pro *provinciae* cod. Y *dioecesis.*

en: On which see above, d. 19, a. 2, q. 1 and following. — At the end of the argument, for *provinciae* codex Y reads *dioecesis.*

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 2.

en: Cf. tome II, p. 592, note 2.

la: Dist. 18. p. II. q. 3. — Pro *primum* (i. e. excommunicare) Vat. *secundum.*

en: Dist. 18, p. II, q. 3. — For *primum* (that is, to excommunicate) the Vatican edition reads *secundum.*

la: Vers. 5. seqq. Verbis paulo superius positis respicitur Matth. 22, 24: *Dicentes* [Sadducaei]: *Magister, Moyses* [Deut. 25, 6.] *dixit: Si quis mortuus fuerit, non habens filium, ut ducat frater eius uxorem illius, et suscitet semen fratri suo.* — Superius pro *tactum* cod. G *statutum,* cod. H *dictum.*

en: Verses 5 and following. By the words placed a little above, reference is made to Matt. 22:24: *Saying* [the Sadducees]: *Master, Moses* [Deut. 25:6] *said: If any man die, not having a son, that his brother should take his wife and raise up seed to his brother.* — Above, for *tactum* codex G reads *statutum,* codex H *dictum.*

la: In consecratione episcopi secundum pontificale Romanum consecrator, immittens anulum in digitum anularem dextrae manus consecrati, ait: *Accipe anulum fidei, scilicet signaculum, quatenus sponsam Dei, sanctam videlicet Ecclesiam, intemerata fide ornatus, illibate custodias.* — Inferius post *et inter hos* edd. cum uno alteroque cod. addunt *maxime.*

en: In the consecration of a bishop according to the Roman Pontifical the consecrator, placing the ring on the ring-finger of the right hand of the one consecrated, says: *Receive the ring of faith, namely the seal, so that, adorned with inviolate faith, you may guard unsullied the spouse of God, that is, the holy Church.* — Below, after *et inter hos* the editions, with one codex or another, add *maxime.*

la: Cfr. C. *Accedentibus ad nos* (12.), X. de Excessibus praelatorum (lib. V. tit. 31.).

en: Cf. the chapter *Accedentibus ad nos* (12), in the Decretals, On the Excesses of Prelates (bk. V, tit. 31).

la: Bernard., II. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 16: *Alii* [episcopi] *in partem sollicitudinis, tu in plenitudinem potestatis vocatus es. Aliorum potestas certis arctatur limitibus, tua extenditur et in ipsos, qui potestatem super alios acceperunt* etc.

en: Bernard, *On Consideration* II, c. 8, n. 16: *Others* [bishops] *are called to a share of the solicitude, you to the fullness of power. The power of others is restricted within fixed limits, yours extends even over those who have received power over others,* etc.

la: Codd. A H *communicare.*

en: Codices A and H read *communicare.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 3, 22. seq.: *Omnia enim vestra sunt; vos autem Christi; Christus autem Dei.* — Voci *spiritualia* edd. praemittunt *sunt.* Superius ante *libere possidet* supplevimus ex cod. A *si,* cod. G ponit *et* ante *quicumque.*

en: The Epistle, 1 Cor. 3:22 f.: *For all things are yours; but you are Christ's; and Christ is God's.* — Before the word *spiritualia* the editions prefix *sunt.* Above, before *libere possidet* we have supplied from codex A *si,* and codex G places *et* before *quicumque.*

la: Edd., superius post *si* addito *autem,* hic, mutata etiam interpunctione, legunt: *episcopus alienus, potius,* et inferius post *collegii* addunt *sed non relaxant quidquam.* — Extra lib. V. tit. 38. c. 4. Finem exhibet textus originalis sic: *quibus ut prosint, proprii iudices specialiter indulserunt.*

en: The editions, above after *si* adding *autem,* here, the punctuation also changed, read: *episcopus alienus, potius,* and below after *collegii* add *sed non relaxant quidquam.* — In the Decretals, bk. V, tit. 38, c. 4. The original text gives the ending thus: *quibus ut prosint, proprii iudices specialiter indulserunt* ("that they may profit those to whom their own judges have specially granted them").

latin_scholion:
*Scholion ad articulum unicum penes quaestionem primam — vide bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q1.*

---

english_scholion:
*Scholion to the single article is placed with the first question — see bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q1.*

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 59085–59293) with the vol4 two-column PDF column-band reflow per the VOL II OVERRIDE (PDF authoritative in cascade-shattered Respondeo/Solutio/footer regions; OCR base for clean running prose). Bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p534-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p535-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`; offset pdf = printed + 20. Opener verified "Tertio quaeritur, a quo possit relaxatio fieri"; running heads "DIST. XX. P. II. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. III." confirmed on pp. 534–535.

**Page span.** Quaestio III opens mid-page in the right column of p. 534 (after q2's tail "...data est rectoribus Ecclesiae") and closes at the end of p. 535 right column ("...quibus proprii iudices indulserunt»."). The body does NOT extend onto p. 536, which is entirely the Articulus-Unicus SCHOLION (sections II, III, IV) — that scholion lives with this article's q1 (`bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q1`, scholion section I begins on p. 535 left column under `SCHOLION`). Hence `has_scholion: false` here, with a one-line cross-reference only.

**Footer split.** Page 534's footers 1–6 all attach to q3 body markers ([^1]–[^6]). Page 535's left-column footers 1–4 attach: [^7] (Accedentibus ad nos), [^8] (Bernard de Consideratione), [^9] (Codd. A H communicare), [^10] (1 Cor. 3:22); page 535's right-column footers 5–6 → [^11] (Edd. + Extra lib. V tit. 38). The SCHOLION's own footer apparatus (the "De eadem quaestione: Alex. Hal...." reference blocks on pp. 535–536) belongs to the a1-q1 scholion chunk, not here.

**[?] flags.**
- [^1] anchor: the page-footer "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." has no unambiguous printed superscript in the OCR; the superscript glyphs visible in the column band run 2–6. Anchor placed at the opening clause "a quolibet sacerdote" as the most plausible referent (the question's framing referred back to the prior question's scholion). [?] — re-verify anchor against a 600 dpi pull in the d.20 decade-polish pass.
- [^4] "Dist. 18. p. II. q. 3." and the Vat. variant *primum/secundum* read cleanly; no flag.

**Hand-off to q4.** Quaestio IV (*A quo …* continues) begins at raw line 59294, on printed p. 536 right column (after the scholion). No q3 body or footer migrates forward; the p. 536 scholion material is q1's, not q4's. q4 starts fresh — no parked footer to pick up from q3.


title: Dist. 20, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum indulgentiae debeant fieri pro spirituali, an pro corporali beneficio.*

Quarto quaeritur, pro quo debeat relaxatio fieri, utrum scilicet pro spirituali, an pro corporali beneficio. Et quod pro temporalibus et corporalibus actibus fieri debeat, vel etiam beneficiis, ostenditur:

1. Per communem usum Ecclesiae, ubi indulgentiae fiunt pro eleemosynis, peregrinationibus, visitationibus reliquiarum et huiusmodi.

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia huiusmodi relaxationes aliquo modo sacramentales sunt; sed Sacramenta attenduntur in rebus exterius gestis[^1]; ergo etc.

3. Item, istae relaxationes non sunt a culpa, sed a *poena*; sed poena, si recte commutatur, commutatur in poenam; sed absolutio fit a poena exteriori in carne, utpote a ieiuniis et consimilibus: ergo debet fieri commutatio in poenam exteriorem: ergo pro[^2] tali commutatione fieri debent.

4. Item, si non pro opere exteriori, sed pro interiori: ergo cum bona voluntas simul possit esse in aliquo respectu omnium relaxationum, quia perfectus omne bonum vult et sibi placet[^3]; videtur tunc, quod quilibet iustus haberet omnes indulgentias; quod non est conveniens dicere, tunc enim frustra homines laborarent.

**Contra:**
1. Indulgentia sive relaxatio dicit beneficium spirituale; sed quicumque dat spirituale pro temporali, committit simoniam: ergo videtur, quod in omnibus relaxationibus sit simonia, si fiunt pro exterioribus obsequiis vel eleemosynis.

2. Item, maior est misericordia spiritualis quam corporalis — unde maius est alicui parcere quam hospitio colligere vel eleemosynam dare[^4] — ergo facit magis hominem dignum remissione: ergo potius pro illo opere deberet fieri relaxatio.

3. Item, in maiori ruina et periculosiori est Ecclesia, in qua est schisma, quam ecclesia, cuius parietes minantur ruinam: ergo magis indiget talis Ecclesia muniri quam alia: si ergo relaxationes debito modo fiunt pro ecclesia materiali reparanda[^5], ut qui iuvat habeat indulgentiam; videtur multo fortius indulgentia debere dari pro spirituali ruina reparanda, ut qui orat, ut Deus det ei concordiam, indulgentiam habeat.

4. Item, maioris perfectionis et plus Deo acceptum est religionem intrare quam crucem accipere: ergo potius deberet dominus Papa indulgentiam dare intrantibus religionem quam euntibus ultra mare.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si aliquis accipit crucem et habet votum et voluntatem perfectam eundi ultra mare, utrum habeat remissionem omnium peccatorum. Quodsi *sic*, tunc indulgentia fit pro sola voluntate, et ita pro re spirituali; si vero *non*, tunc Ecclesia non videtur esse conformis Deo, qui votum

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et bonam voluntatem, si plena est et non deficiat, quantum in se est, reputat pro facto[^6].

> **Conclusio.** Indulgentiae praecipue fieri debent pro actibus exterioribus.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut videmus in politicis et communitatibus humanis, quod thesaurus reipublicae propter duo maxime consuevit proferri et communicari exterius; sic in spiritualibus intelligendum. Profertur namque thesaurus extra ad dispergendum propter *gloriam principis*, sicut faciunt reges curiales, sicut fecit Assuerus Esther primo[^7]; alio modo propter *utilitatem communitatis* sive necessitatem, ut quando laeditur communitas, proferuntur stipendia et donativa militibus, ut eant ad pugnam. Sic thesaurus Ecclesiae ab his qui habent dispensare, duplici ex causa debet distribui, scilicet propter *gloriam principis* et laudem; et laus et honor Dei est in Sanctis suis[^8], et Sancti honorantur in constructione basilicarum, visitatione basilicarum, commemoratione virtutum suarum, et idem fit in praedicationibus et sermonibus: ideo pro his omnibus indulgentiae recte fiunt. *Communis* autem *utilitas*[^9] est defensio Terrae sanctae, defensio fidei, promotio studii et consimilia; et ideo adhuc pro talibus debent fieri. Et quoniam haec consistunt in actibus exterioribus, ideo maxime pro actibus exterioribus debent fieri indulgentiae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est simonia, quia datur spirituale pro temporali; dicendum, quod falsum est, immo maior poena commutatur in minorem et residuum solvit pastor Ecclesiae de gratia. — Vel dicendum, quod non dat indulgentiam pro eleemosyna exteriori considerans *datum*, sed *fructum*, videlicet quia ex radice bonae voluntatis procedit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritualis eleemosyna maior est; dicendum, quod in donatione indulgentiae non consideratur operis *nobilitas*[^10], quia tunc magis deberet dari docentibus quam peregrinantibus; sed consideratur hoc, quod illud opus sit *merae voluntatis*, non necessitatis, sit etiam quid taxabile, sit etiam aliquo modo *poenale*; haec enim omnia considerat qui indulgentiam praestat.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ruina spirituali, dicendum, quod, sicut tactum est[^11], pro talibus tenetur homo orare. *Praeterea*, non est bonum talia publicare; ruinam autem materialem Ecclesiae publicare non dicit aliquod malum nec infamiam. *Praeterea*, magis potest homo subvenire ad relevandum inopiam Ecclesiae quam ad ponendum ibi concordiam, quia primum est opus humanum, secundum vero est opus divinum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ingressu in religionem, dicendum, quod sicut indulgentiae non debent dari indignis, ita nec debent dari nisi *indigentibus*; veri autem religiosi, qui statum aggrediuntur perfectionis, potius spiritualia bona aliis largiuntur, quam aliunde mendicent. Unde hic maxime verum est quod dicitur Actuum vigesimo: *Beatius est magis dare quam accipere.* In temporalibus autem non habet veritatem, nisi quando donans dat de proprio labore, et accipiens accipit ex torpore.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de illo qui dat sola voluntate, dicendum, quod secundum peritos non habet totam indulgentiam, quidquid isti vulgares praedicatores dicant; tamen valet eis tam nobile propositum ad augmentum caritatis et per consequens contritionis, et ita ad remissionem poenae. Indulgentiae enim non intelliguntur dari pro sola *voluntate*, sed pro *effectu*; unde qui habet *voluntatem et effectum* indulgentiam consequitur; alius, qui habet voluntatem solam, ex devotione habet meritum magnum, licet non *omnimodum* consequatur effectum[^12].

---

english:
### Question IV. *Whether indulgences ought to be made for a spiritual, or for a bodily benefit.*

Fourthly it is asked, for what relaxation ought to be made, namely whether for a spiritual, or for a bodily benefit. And that it ought to be made for temporal and bodily acts, or even benefits, is shown:

1. By the common usage of the Church, where indulgences are made for almsgivings, pilgrimages, visitations of relics, and the like.

2. Likewise, it seems so by *reason*: because relaxations of this kind are in some way sacramental; but the Sacraments are attended to in things outwardly done[^1]; therefore etc.

3. Likewise, these relaxations are not from guilt, but from *punishment*; but punishment, if it is rightly commuted, is commuted into punishment; but absolution is made from outward punishment in the flesh, such as from fastings and the like: therefore the commutation ought to be made into an outward punishment: therefore they ought to be made for[^2] such a commutation.

4. Likewise, if not for an outward work, but for an inward one: then, since a good will can be present alike in respect of all relaxations, because the perfect man wills every good and it is pleasing to him[^3]; it then seems that every just man would have all indulgences; which it is not fitting to say, for then men would labor in vain.

**On the contrary:**
1. An indulgence or relaxation expresses a spiritual benefit; but whoever gives a spiritual thing for a temporal one commits simony: therefore it seems that in all relaxations there is simony, if they are made for outward services or almsgivings.

2. Likewise, spiritual mercy is greater than bodily mercy — whence it is greater to spare someone than to gather him into one's lodging or to give alms[^4] — therefore it makes a man more worthy of remission: therefore relaxation ought rather to be made for that work.

3. Likewise, the Church in which there is schism is in greater and more perilous ruin than a church whose walls threaten ruin: therefore such a Church needs more to be fortified than the other: if therefore relaxations are duly made for the repairing of a material church[^5], so that he who helps may have the indulgence; it seems much more strongly that an indulgence ought to be given for the repairing of spiritual ruin, so that he who prays that God may grant concord may have the indulgence.

4. Likewise, it is of greater perfection and more acceptable to God to enter religion than to take the cross: therefore the lord Pope ought rather to give the indulgence to those entering religion than to those going across the sea.

Alongside this it is asked: if someone takes the cross and has the vow and a perfect will of going across the sea, whether he has remission of all sins. And if *yes*, then the indulgence is made for the will alone, and thus for a spiritual thing; but if *no*, then the Church does not seem to be conformable to God, who reckons the vow and the good will, if it is full and does not fail, as far as in it lies, for the deed accomplished[^6].

> **Conclusion.** Indulgences ought chiefly to be made for outward acts.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as we see in political bodies and human communities that the treasure of the commonwealth is wont to be brought forth and shared outwardly chiefly for two reasons; so it is to be understood in spiritual things. For the treasure is brought forth abroad to be dispersed for the *glory of the prince*, as courtly kings do, as Ahasuerus did for Esther in the first chapter[^7]; in another way for the *advantage of the community* or its necessity, as when the community is harmed, stipends and gifts are brought forth for the soldiers, that they may go to battle. So the treasure of the Church must be distributed by those who have its dispensing for a twofold cause, namely for the *glory of the prince* and praise; and the praise and honor of God is in His Saints[^8], and the Saints are honored in the building of basilicas, the visiting of basilicas, the commemoration of their virtues, and the same is done in preachings and sermons: therefore for all these indulgences are rightly made. But the *common advantage*[^9] is the defense of the Holy Land, the defense of the faith, the promotion of study, and the like; and therefore indulgences ought still to be made for such things. And since these consist in outward acts, therefore indulgences ought chiefly to be made for outward acts.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that it is simony, because a spiritual thing is given for a temporal one; it must be said that it is false, rather the greater punishment is commuted into a lesser one and the pastor of the Church pays the remainder out of grace. — Or it must be said that he does not give the indulgence for the outward alms, considering the *thing given*, but the *fruit*, namely because it proceeds from the root of a good will.

2. To that which is objected, that spiritual almsgiving is greater; it must be said that in the giving of an indulgence the *nobility*[^10] of the work is not considered, since then it ought rather to be given to those who teach than to pilgrims; but this is considered, that that work be of *mere will*, not of necessity, that it be also something assessable, that it be also in some way *penal*; for he who grants the indulgence considers all these things.

3. To that which is objected concerning spiritual ruin, it must be said that, as has been touched on[^11], a man is bound to pray for such things. *Moreover*, it is not good to publicize such things; but to publicize the material ruin of the Church expresses no evil nor infamy. *Moreover*, a man can more readily come to the relief of the Church's want than to the establishing of concord there, because the first is a human work, but the second is a divine work.

4. To that which is objected concerning entrance into religion, it must be said that just as indulgences ought not to be given to the unworthy, so neither ought they to be given except to the *needy*; but true religious, who undertake the state of perfection, rather bestow spiritual goods on others than beg them from elsewhere. Whence here most truly does that hold which is said in Acts the twentieth: *It is more blessed to give than to receive.* But in temporal things it does not hold true, except when the giver gives from his own labor, and the receiver receives out of sloth.

To that which is asked concerning him who gives by will alone, it must be said that according to the learned he does not have the whole indulgence, whatever those common preachers may say; nevertheless so noble a resolve avails them for the increase of charity and consequently of contrition, and thus for the remission of punishment. For indulgences are not understood to be given for the *will* alone, but for the *effect*; whence he who has *the will and the effect* obtains the indulgence; another, who has the will alone, out of devotion has great merit, although he does not obtain the *full* effect[^12].

---

la: Vide supra d. I. p. I. dub. 2. et 11.

en: See above, dist. I, p. I, doubt 2 and 11.

la: Codd. R S omittunt *pro*.

en: Codices R S omit *pro*.

la: Ut satis innuitur Prov. II, 23: *Desiderium iustorum omne bonum est.*

en: As is sufficiently hinted at in Prov. 11:23 [Vulg. Prov. XI, 23]: *The desire of the just is all good.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 13. p. II. dub. 3. — Post *alicui* codd. R S addunt *pauperi*; cod. X *pro eo orare* pro *parcere*.

en: Cf. above, dist. 13, p. II, doubt 3. — After *alicui* ["to someone"] codices R S add *pauperi* ["to the poor"]; codex X reads *pro eo orare* ["to pray for him"] for *parcere* ["to spare"].

la: Permulti codd. *recuperanda.* Superius pro *ruina* codd. A aa *miseria* (cod. aa etiam inferius).

en: Very many codices read *recuperanda* ["recovered"]. Above, for *ruina* ["ruin"] codices A aa read *miseria* ["misery"] (codex aa likewise below).

la: Ut insinuat Cassiodor. supra pag. 423, nota 10. allegatus. — Superius pro *tunc indulgentia fit* cod. F *videtur tunc indulgentiam fieri.*

en: As Cassiodorus suggests, cited above on p. 423, note 10. — Above, for *tunc indulgentia fit* ["then the indulgence is made"] codex F reads *videtur tunc indulgentiam fieri* ["then the indulgence seems to be made"].

la: Vers. 4. — Pro *principis* codd. A H K V *principalitas.*

en: [Esther, ch. I,] v. 4. — For *principis* ["of the prince"] codices A H K V read *principalitas* ["princely rank"].

la: Psalm. 150, 1: *Laudate Dominum in Sanctis eius.* — Pro *distribui* cod. F *solvi*, codd. E W *absolvi*, alii *dissolvi.* Verbis *et laus* cod. G interserit *quoniam*; idem cod. G inferius pro *visitatione basilicarum* substituit *visitatione reliquiarum.*

en: Psalm 150:1: *Praise the Lord in His holy places [in His Saints].* — For *distribui* ["to be distributed"] codex F reads *solvi*, codices E W *absolvi*, others *dissolvi.* To the words *et laus* codex G inserts *quoniam*; the same codex G below substitutes *visitatione reliquiarum* ["the visiting of relics"] for *visitatione basilicarum* ["the visiting of basilicas"].

la: Edd. *Alia causa est communis utilitas, quae quidem utilitas.* Mox pro *studii* cod. F *fidei.*

en: The editions read *Alia causa est communis utilitas, quae quidem utilitas* ["Another cause is the common advantage, which advantage indeed"]. Soon after, for *studii* ["of study"] codex F reads *fidei* ["of faith"].

la: Supra q. 1. fundam. 5. et ad 6, q. 2. in corp. et q. 3. ad 3. 4.

en: Above, q. 1, foundation 5 and to 6; q. 2, in the body; and q. 3, to [arguments] 3 [and] 4.

la: Act. XX, 35. — Superius pro *veri autem* non pauci codd. [*vere*?][?], et subinde pro *mendicent* plures codd. et edd. [*mendicarent*?][?]. In fine solut. pro *torpore* cod. K (1ª secunda manu) [...?][?].

en: Acts 20:35. — Above, for *veri autem* ["but true (religious)"] not a few codices read [*vere*?][?], and thereupon for *mendicent* ["may beg"] many codices and editions [read *mendicarent*?][?]. At the end of the solution, for *torpore* ["sloth"] codex K (first hand, by a second hand) [reads...?][?].

la: [...] cod. K *licet non omnino consequatur* [supple: indulgentiam]. Superius post *sed pro effectu* Vat. addit *cum voluntate*[?]. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: [...] codex K reads *licet non omnino consequatur* ["although he does not wholly obtain it"] [supply: the indulgence]. Above, after *sed pro effectu* ["but for the effect"] the Vatican edition adds *cum voluntate*[?] ["with the will"]. — See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Scholion:** None in this chunk. The Articulus Unicus carries a single scholion, which is rendered with the first question of the article. *(La.* Scholion ad Articulum Unicum cum quaestione I exhibetur. *En.* The scholion to the sole Article is given with Question I.) — see `bon-sent-IV-d20-p2-a1-q1`.

**Provenance:** Latin re-set verbatim from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 59294–59409), cross-checked against PDF column bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol4-p536-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` and `vol4-p537-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (offset pdf = printed + 20). This is a two-column page; the OCR interleaves columns, so the body was reflowed column-by-column (p.536 L→R, p.537 L→R). q4 occupies both columns of p.536 and the top of both columns of p.537; QUAESTIO V begins at the foot of p.537 left column (running head "QUAEST. V" reflects the page's last-beginning question, not q4).

**Page-footer split:** p.536 carries a self-contained footer sequence 1–5, all belonging to q4 (rendered as [^1]–[^5]). p.537 carries a footer sequence whose entries 1–4 (Cassiodor / Esther v.4 / Ps. 150 / Edd.) belong to q4's Contra-tail, Respondeo and reply 2 (rendered as [^6]–[^10] to keep markers unique within this chunk), and entries 5–7 belong to q4's replies 3–4 and the incidental-question reply (rendered [^11]–[^12], with [^11] absorbing the Act. XX,35 + variant note; the small "Supra q.1 fundam. 5…" note is folded into [^10] as its variant block). p.537 footer 8 (Chrysostom on Matt. 16, with *Argg. pro parte affirmativa* marginal) opens QUAESTIO V and is NOT part of this chunk — hand it to q5.

**[?] flags (gutter-clipped readings in p.537 right-column footers, low confidence):**
- [^11]: the variant readings for *veri autem* and *mendicent*, and the tail of the *torpore*/cod. K note, are clipped at the column gutter in the PDF bands — conjectural fills marked `[?]`. Resolve at 600 dpi in the d.11–d.20 decade-polish pass.
- [^12]: opening words of the entry and the Vatican addition after *sed pro effectu* are clipped — `[?]` on *cum voluntate*. The closing cross-reference "Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest." is legible.

**Marginal labels** in the source (not part of the running text): *Fundamenta.* (beside the pro-arguments), *Ad oppositum.* (beside Contra), *Conclusio.*, *Notandum.* (thrice, beside the Respondeo and replies 2–4), *Ad quaest. incid.* (beside the incidental-question reply). These are editorial side-glosses and are omitted from the body per project convention.