title: Dist. 36

title_alt: Distinctio XXXVI — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction XXXVI — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

### Cap. I. *De connexione virtutum, quae non separantur.*

Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet omnes habeat. De hoc Hieronymus[^1] ait: «Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit omnibus careat. Qui ergo unam habet omnes habet». — Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. Unde Augustinus[^2]: «Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse»? — Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet habere omnes, cum *plenitudo Legis sit caritas*? quae quanto magis est in homine, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis inest vitium».

### Cap. II. *An cunctae virtutes pares sint, in quocumque sunt.*

Utrum vero *pariter* quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant; quaestio est. — Quibusdam enim videtur, quod aliae magis, aliae minus habeantur ab aliquo, sicut in Iob[^3] patientia emicuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt, magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non tamen magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam haberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis, et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nullam plenius caritate, quae ceteras gignit; hasque dicunt esse multas facies, quas memorat Apostolus[^4] dicens: *Ex personis multarum facierum* etc.

Alii verius dicunt, omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quocumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par extiterit, in omnibus eidem aequalis sit. Unde Augustinus[^5]: «Virtutes, quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae intelligantur, nullo modo tamen separantur ab invicem, ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris, aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; sequitur, ut huius fortitudo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras». — Ex his clarescit, omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeeminere virtute, ut Abraham fide[^6], Iob patientia; secundum usus exteriores accipiendum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum, quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei, vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur. Unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios homines singulariter excellere dicitur secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum. — Alibi[^7] Augustinus dicit, in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse, et non alteram. Ait enim sic: «Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit, non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi Veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit»: «quia, etsi verum est, eum qui habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria, quia ubi nulla virtus est, nihil rectum est; nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verius sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones, ut corporis membra — non quod videantur locis[^8], sed quod sentiantur affectibus — et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine; profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis affectus est, in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam et aliam non habere, et aliam magis, aliam minus. Nam et maior est in isto caritas quam in illo, recte[^9] possumus dicere; et aliqua in isto, nulla in illo, quantum pertinet ad caritatem, quae pietas est; et in uno homine, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam, et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: virtus est caritas, qua id quod diligendum est, diligitur; haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine». — Hic insi-

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nuari videtur, quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius, et propter differentiam actuum ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest[^10], et aliquam non habere; cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet, aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in *actu*, quam tamen habet in *habitu*. — «Cur ergo non dicantur paria peccata? Forte quia magis facit contra caritatem qui gravius peccat, minus qui levius. Nemo enim peccat, nisi adversus illam faciendo, quae est *plenitudo Legis*; ideo recte dicitur: *Qui offenderit in uno, factus est omnium reus*, id est, contra caritatem facit, in qua pendent omnia[^11]».

### Cap. III. *Quomodo in caritate tota Lex pendet.*

Cum sint duo praecepta caritatis, in quibus, ut praetaxatum est[^12], *tota Lex pendet et Prophetae*; advertendum est, quomodo hoc sit, cum in Lege et Prophetis multa fuerint caeremonialia mandata, quae, si ad caritatis sanctificationem pertinuissent, viderentur nondum *debere* cessare. Quia vero non iustificationis gratia, quam facit caritas, instituta sunt, sed in *figura futuri* et in *onus imposita*; ideo clarescente veritate, cessaverunt velut *umbra*. Verumtamen et ipsa *caeremonialia* secundum spiritualem intellectum, quem continent, et omnia *moralia* ad caritatem referuntur. Pertinent enim omnia ad decem mandata in tabulis scripta, ubi omnium summa perstringitur, ex quibus cetera emanant, sicut in sermone Domini octo virtutes praemittuntur, ad quas cetera referuntur[^13]; et sicut ad decem mandata decalogi cetera referuntur, ita et ipsa decem ad duo mandata caritatis. Omnia ergo ad duo mandata caritatis pertinent, quia per caritatem implentur et ad caritatem tanquam ad finem referri debent. Unde Augustinus[^14]: «Totam magnitudinem et amplitudinem divinorum Eloquiorum possidet caritas, qua Deum proximumque diligimus, quae radix est omnium bonorum. Unde Veritas ait: *In his duobus mandatis universa Lex pendet et Prophetae*. Si ergo non vacat omnes Paginas sanctas perscrutari, omnia involucra sermonum evolvere; tene caritatem, ubi pendent omnia», quia perfectio est et finis omnium. Tunc enim et praecepta et consilia recte fiunt, cum referuntur ad diligendum Deum et proximum propter Deum. «Quod vero timore poenae, vel aliqua intentione carnali fit, ut non referatur ad caritatem, nondum fit, sicut fieri oportet, quamvis fieri videatur[^15]». «Inimicus enim iustitiae est qui poenae timore non peccat; amicus vero, qui eius amore non peccat». — «Omnium igitur haec summa est, ut intelligatur Legis et omnium divinarum Scripturarum plenitudo esse dilectio Dei et proximi».

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english:
### DISTINCTION XXXVI.

### Chapter I. *On the connection of the virtues, which are not separated.*

It is also wont to be asked whether the virtues are so joined together among themselves that they cannot be possessed separately by anyone, but he who has one has all. Concerning this Jerome[^1] says: «All the virtues cohere among themselves, so that he who has lacked one lacks all. He therefore who has one has all». — And this indeed is probable. For since charity is the mother of all the virtues, in whomever the mother herself, namely charity, is, all her children also, that is, the virtues, are rightly believed to be. Hence Augustine[^2]: «Where charity is, what is there that can be lacking? But where it is not, what is there that can profit»? — Why therefore do we not say that he who has this virtue has all, since *the fullness of the Law is charity*? which, the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; but the less, the less virtue is in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more vice is in him».

### Chapter II. *Whether all the virtues are equal, in whomever they are.*

But whether one possesses all the virtues *equally*, or some glow more, some less in a person; is a question. — For to some it seems that some are had more, some less by a person, as in Job[^3] patience shone forth, in David humility, in Moses meekness. These also concede that one merits more through some one virtue than through another, inasmuch as he has it more fully than another. Yet they do not say that one merits more through any [virtue] than through charity, nor that any is had by anyone more fully than charity. They say therefore that some are more, and some less in a person, but none more fully than charity, which begets the rest; and these they say are the many faces which the Apostle[^4] mentions, saying: *From the persons of many faces* etc.

Others say more truly that all the virtues are both together and equal in whomever they are, so that he who in one has stood equal to another, is in all equal to the same. Hence Augustine[^5]: «The virtues which are in the human soul, although each is understood in one mode and another, are nevertheless in no way separated from one another, so that whoever shall be equal, for example in fortitude, are equal also in prudence and justice and temperance. For if you shall say that these are equal in fortitude, but that one excels in prudence; it follows that the fortitude of this one is less prudent; and through this they are not equal even in fortitude, because the fortitude of that one is more prudent. And thus you will find concerning the rest of the virtues, if you run through them all with the same consideration». — From these things it becomes clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in the soul of man. When therefore someone is said to preeminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith[^6], Job in patience; it is to be understood according to outward uses, or in comparison with other men, because he either most displays the habit of humility, or the work of faith, or chiefly carries out [the work] of some one of the rest of the virtues. Hence he is also said to be strong above others, or to excel singularly among other men, according to this mode, namely according to the account of outward acts. — Elsewhere[^7] Augustine says that in someone one virtue is more, another less, and that one is, and not the other. For he says thus: «By your most lucid disputation it has sufficiently appeared that it did not please our authors, nay, Truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this be true of the virtues»: «because, although it is true that he who has one has all the virtues, and he who has not one has none, yet not even thus are sins equal, because where there is no virtue, nothing is right; nor yet on that account is the more crooked not more crooked, the more distorted not more distorted. But if, as I think to be more true and more agreeable to the sacred Letters, the intentions of the soul are so [related], as the members of the body — not that they should be seen by their places[^8], but that they should be felt by the affections — and one is illumined more, another less, another wholly lacks light; assuredly as each one is affected by the illumination of pious charity, in one act more, in another less, in some nothing, so it can be said that he has one [virtue] and has not another, and one more, another less. For we can rightly say that charity is greater in this man than in that[^9]; and some [charity] in this man, none in that, as far as pertains to the charity which is piety; and that in one man there is greater chastity than patience, and greater today than yesterday, if he advances; and that he does not yet have continence, and has no small mercy. And that I may generally and briefly comprehend the notion which I have concerning virtue: virtue is the charity by which that which is to be loved is loved; this is in some greater, in some lesser, in some none; but it is fullest, so that it can no longer be increased, so long as this man lives, in no one». — Here it seems to be in-

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sinuated that someone can for this reason be said to have one virtue more than another, because through charity he is more affected in the act of one virtue than of another, and on account of the difference of acts the virtues themselves can be said to be had more or less[^10], and one not to be had; while nevertheless he has all of them at once and equally as regards the habit or essence of each in the mind. But in act he has one more, another less, and also has not another, as a just man, using marriage, does not have continence in *act*, which nevertheless he has in *habit*. — «Why therefore are sins not said to be equal? Perhaps because he acts more against charity who sins more grievously, less who sins more lightly. For no one sins except by acting against that which is *the fullness of the Law*; therefore it is rightly said: *Whoever shall offend in one, is made guilty of all*, that is, he acts against charity, on which all things depend[^11]».

### Chapter III. *How the whole Law depends on charity.*

Since there are two precepts of charity, on which, as was set forth before[^12], *the whole Law depends and the Prophets*; it is to be noted how this may be, since in the Law and the Prophets there were many ceremonial commandments, which, if they had pertained to the sanctification of charity, would seem not yet to *have to* cease. But because they were instituted not by the grace of justification, which charity makes, but as a *figure of what was to come* and *imposed as a burden*; therefore, the truth shining forth, they ceased like a *shadow*. Nevertheless the *ceremonial* [precepts] themselves too, according to the spiritual understanding which they contain, and all the *moral* [precepts] are referred to charity. For all things pertain to the ten commandments written on the tablets, where the sum of all is summarized, from which the rest emanate, just as in the sermon of the Lord eight virtues are set forth, to which the rest are referred[^13]; and as the rest are referred to the ten commandments of the decalogue, so those ten themselves [are referred] to the two commandments of charity. All things therefore pertain to the two commandments of charity, because they are fulfilled through charity and ought to be referred to charity as to their end. Hence Augustine[^14]: «Charity possesses the whole greatness and breadth of the divine Eloquences, the charity by which we love God and our neighbor, which is the root of all good things. Hence Truth says: *On these two commandments the whole Law depends and the Prophets*. If therefore you have not leisure to search through all the sacred Pages, to unroll all the wrappings of discourses; hold charity, on which all things depend», because it is the perfection and end of all. For then both the precepts and the counsels are rightly done, when they are referred to loving God and the neighbor for the sake of God. «But what is done from fear of punishment, or from some carnal intention, so that it is not referred to charity, is not yet done as it ought to be done, although it may seem to be done[^15]». «For he is an enemy of justice who does not sin from fear of punishment; but a friend, who does not sin from love of it». — «The sum of all therefore is this, that it be understood that the fullness of the Law and of all the divine Scriptures is the love of God and of the neighbor».

---

la: Libr. VI. Comment. in Isai. 16, 12. et XV. 56, 1. — De caritate ut matre virtutum cfr. supra pag. 603, nota 7.

en: Book VI, *Commentary on Isaiah* 16:12, and book XV [on Isaiah] 56:1. — On charity as the mother of the virtues, cf. above page 603, note 7.

la: In Evang. Ioan. tr. 83. n. 3. Seq. loc. est Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 3. n. 11. quae est etiam Epist. 1. 12. n. 11. inter Epist. Hieronymi. Locus Scripturae est Rom. 13, 10. — Pro *magis inest vitium* codd. ACE *magis est vitium*; originale *maius* (ita et cod. D) *ut vitium.*

en: *On the Gospel of John,* tract 83, n. 3. The following passage is *Epistle* 167 (otherwise 29), c. 3, n. 11, which is also *Epistle* 1, 12, n. 11 among the Epistles of Jerome. The scriptural passage is Romans 13:10. — For *magis inest vitium* (the more is vice in [him]) codices ACE [read] *magis est vitium*; the original *maius* (so also codex D) *ut vitium.*

la: Cfr. Iac. 5, 11; II. Reg. 6, 22; de Moyse cfr. Num. 12, 3. Huic opinioni favet locus Hieronymi, I. Dialogus adv. Pelagian. n. 18. 19, ubi etiam ait, virtutes esse connexas *participatione,* non *proprietate.* Pro *emicuit* codd. ABE *eminuit,* codd. DC *enituit.*

en: Cf. James 5:11; 2 Kings 6:22; on Moses cf. Numbers 12:3. This opinion is favored by a passage of Jerome, book I, *Dialogue against the Pelagians,* nn. 18–19, where he also says that the virtues are connected *by participation,* not *by property.* For *emicuit* (shone forth) codices ABE [read] *eminuit,* codices DC *enituit.*

la: Epist. II. Cor. 1, 11; cfr. Lyranus in hunc locum. — Superius pro *memorat* codd. AD et Erf. *commemorat.* Pro *simul et pares* edd., exceptis 1, 8, *similes et pares.*

en: The Epistle 2 Corinthians 1:11; cf. Lyra on this passage. — Above, for *memorat* (mentions) codices AD and Erf. [read] *commemorat.* For *simul et pares* (together and equal) the editions, except 1, 8, [read] *similes et pares* (alike and equal).

la: Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 4. n. 6. — In quo textu pro *aequales sunt, quia* edd. 1, 8 *aequales sint, quia,* refragante etiam originali, deinde eaedem pro *non modo* habent *non solum.*

en: Book VI, *On the Trinity,* c. 4, n. 6. — In which text, for *aequales sunt, quia* (are equal, because) editions 1, 8 [read] *aequales sint, quia* (be equal, because), the original also resisting; then the same [editions], for *non modo* (not only) have *non solum* (not only).

en: Cf. Hebrews 11:8–12, 17–20; Romans 4:3 ff.

la: Edd., exceptis 1, 8, perperam praefigunt *ut* et connectunt quae sequuntur cum antecedente propositione. Locus Augusti. est in cit. Epist. 167. (alias 29.) c. 2. n. 7, sed multis hic omissis. Seq. locus ibid. c. 4. n. 14. 15.

en: The editions, except 1, 8, wrongly prefix *ut* and connect what follows with the preceding proposition. The passage of Augustine is in the cited *Epistle* 167 (otherwise 29), c. 2, n. 7, but with many things here omitted. The following passage [is] in the same place, c. 4, nn. 14–15.

la: Codd. CE et edd. 1, 8 cum Vat. *oculis,* refragante etiam originali, quod deinde pro *alius* ter habet *aliud* (scil. membrum). Infra post *aliam minus* edd. 1, 3, 6, 8 cum originali addidunt *habere virtutem.*

en: Codices CE and editions 1, 8 with the Vatican [edition read] *oculis* (by their eyes), the original also resisting, which then for *alius* (one) three times has *aliud* (another thing — namely, member). Below, after *aliam minus* (another less) editions 1, 3, 6, 8 with the original added *habere virtutem* (to have the virtue).

la: Vat. et edd., excepta 1, praefigunt *et ideo,* refragantibus codd. et originali. Deinde solae edd. post *uno homine* addunt *quidem.*

en: The Vatican [edition] and the editions, except 1, prefix *et ideo* (and therefore), the codices and the original resisting. Then the editions alone, after *uno homine* (in one man), add *quidem* (indeed).

la: Edd., exceptis 1, 8, *dicitur. Potest et,* refragantibus codd.

en: The editions, except 1, 8, [read] *dicitur. Potest et* (is said. And it can), the codices resisting.

la: Loc. cit. c. 5. n. 17, ubi respicitur Iac. 2, 10. Vulgata: *offendat;* codd. BE et edd. 1, 8 *offendit.*

en: The cited place, c. 5, n. 17, where reference is made to James 2:10. The Vulgate: *offendat;* codices BE and editions 1, 8 [read] *offendit.*

la: Dist. XXVII. c. 3. — Pro *praetaxatum* edd. 1, 8 *praetactum.* Deinde Vat. cum pluribus edd. *debuisse cessare* pro *debere cessare.* Respiciuntur loci Scripturae, Matth. 22, 40; deinde I. Cor. 10, 11; Colos. 2, 17; Act. 15, 28; Hebr. 10, 1.

en: Distinction XXVII, c. 3. — For *praetaxatum* (set forth before) editions 1, 8 [read] *praetactum* (touched before). Then the Vatican [edition] with most editions [reads] *debuisse cessare* (ought to have ceased) for *debere cessare* (have to cease). Scriptural passages are referred to: Matthew 22:40; then 1 Corinthians 10:11; Colossians 2:17; Acts 15:28; Hebrews 10:1.

la: Hic respiciuntur Exod. 20, 1; Matth. 5, 3. seqq. Cfr. Glossa Lyrani ad I. Tim. 1, 5. — Inferius ante *Omnia ergo* edd., excepta 2, propositionem claudunt adiiciendo *pertinent,* refragantibus codd., qui etiam omittunt *ad* ante *finem.*

en: Here reference is made to Exodus 20:1; Matthew 5:3 ff. Cf. the Gloss of Lyra on 1 Timothy 1:5. — Below, before *Omnia ergo* (All things therefore) the editions, except 2, close the proposition by adding *pertinent* (pertain), the codices resisting, which also omit *ad* before *finem* (the end).

la: Serm. 350. (alias 39. de Tempore) n. 2. Locus Scripturae est Matth. 22, 40.

en: *Sermon* 350 (otherwise 39, on the Season), n. 2. The scriptural passage is Matthew 22:40.

la: August., Enchirid. c. 121. n. 32. Seq. locus est eiusdem Epist. 145. (alias 144.) n. 4. Tertius I. de Doctr. christ. c. 35. n. 39.

en: Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 121, n. 32. The following passage is the same author's *Epistle* 145 (otherwise 144), n. 4. The third [is] book I, *On Christian Doctrine,* c. 35, n. 39. ---

translators_notes:
**Chapter subjects.** DISTINCTIO XXXVI is Lombard's treatment *de connexione virtutum* — the connection and equality of the virtues, and how the whole Law depends on charity. Three chapters captured (**Cap. I–III**): **Cap. I** (*De connexione virtutum, quae non separantur*) asks whether the virtues are so joined that he who has one has all — affirmed via Jerome (*all virtues cohere*) and Augustine (*Ubi caritas est*), since charity is the mother of all virtues and *the fullness of the Law is charity*. **Cap. II** (*An cunctae virtutes pares sint, in quocumque sunt*) sets the question whether one possesses all the virtues equally: *Opinio 1* (some had more, some less — Job's patience, David's humility, Moses' meekness; the *multae facies* of 2 Cor. 1:11) vs. *Opinio 2 Magistri* (Augustine, *de Trin.* VI: all virtues are at once and equal; preeminence in one virtue is reckoned only *secundum usus exteriores*); a second Augustine passage (*Epist.* 167) is then reconciled by distinguishing *habitus/essentia* (all equal at once) from *actus* (one more, another less — the just man has continence *in habitu* not *in actu*). **Cap. III** (*Quomodo in caritate tota Lex pendet*) explains how the whole Law depends on the two precepts of charity: ceremonial precepts ceased *velut umbra* once the truth shone forth, but moral precepts and the spiritual sense of the ceremonial are all referred to charity (the decalogue → the two commandments; Augustine *Serm.* 350, *Enchirid.* — charity is the root and end of all; what is done from fear of punishment, not referred to charity, *nondum fit sicut fieri oportet*).

**Provenance (PDF-priority inversion).** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF bands `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{789,790}-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png` (read L column top→bottom, then R column; body bands then footer bands). The IA djvu OCR for this band (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, raw 54769–54865) is a two-column cascade-shatter — the footer NOTAE in particular are heavily fragmented — and was used only as the base for clean running prose and exact `[^N]` marker spacing; all footer NOTAE blocks were read eyes-on from the PDF. Offset `pdf = printed + 22` (printed 789–790 = PDF 811–812). Running heads confirmed eyes-on: `789` (p.789 R-0) and `790 … SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.` (p.790 L-0/R-0). Editorial side-marginalia (*Ratio*, *Dubium 1–5*, *Opinio 1/2 Magistri*, *Augustinus*) are trimmed as editorial glosses, not Lombard's text.

**Page-split map ([^N] → printed page).**
- **p.789 (PDF 811):** `[^1]`–`[^9]`. Two-column body; Cap. I and the start of Cap. II in the L column, the bulk of Cap. II (the long Augustine *Epist.* 167 citation) spanning into the R column, ending mid-sentence `… in nemine». — Hic insi-`. Footer band split by column: **L footer-column nn.1–4 → [^1]–[^4]** (Hieron. in Isai. / In Ioan. tr. 83 + Epist. 167 / Iac. 5,11 + Hieron. Dial. / II Cor. 1,11 + Lyra); **R footer-column nn.5–9 → [^5]–[^9]** (de Trin. VI / Hebr. 11 / Epist. 167 c.2 *ut*-praefix variant / *oculis* variant / *et ideo* variant). Body markers: `Hieronymus¹`, `Augustinus²`, `Iob³`, `Apostolus⁴`, `Augustinus⁵` (L→R col); `Abraham fide⁶`, `Alibi⁷`, `locis⁸`, `recte⁹` (R col).
- **p.790 (PDF 812):** `[^10]`–`[^15]`. Body opens L column `nuari videtur …` (continuing p.789-R `Hic insi-`), runs Cap. II tail + all of Cap. III, the littera ending in the R column at `… esse dilectio Dei et proximi».` Footer band: **L footer-column nn.1–4 → [^10]–[^13]** (*dicitur. Potest et* variant / Iac. 2,10 *offendat* / Dist. XXVII c.3 + Matth. 22,40 / Exod. 20,1 + Matth. 5,3); **R footer-column nn.5–6 → [^14]–[^15]** (Serm. 350 / Enchirid. c.121 + Epist. 145 + de Doctr. christ.). Body markers `potest¹⁰`, `omnia¹¹` (L col, Cap. II tail); `praetaxatum est¹²`, `referuntur¹³`, `Augustinus¹⁴`, `videatur¹⁵` (Cap. III, L→R col).

**Boundary / footer hand-off.** The littera body stops cleanly on p.790 R-col at `… esse dilectio Dei et proximi».`, confirmed eyes-on against `vol3-p790-R-1.png`. The **COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.** header (subtitle *De connexione habituum gratuitorum*, incipit *Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes etc.*, then `DIVISIO TEXTUS.`) begins below it at **raw line 54870** — that block and everything after it belong to **`d36-divisio`**. A **separate NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** footer family begins in the p.790 **R footer-column** immediately below the littera's NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM n.6 (`NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM. ¹ Supra d. 23, divis. textus. ² Plurimi codd. perperam reducantur.`) — this COMMENTARIUM family cites the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS body and is the **`d36-divisio` chunk's own footer**, NOT a forward of a NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM note. **Nothing is parked here for the divisio** from this littera's apparatus family; **FORWARD the p.790 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM nn.1–2 ff. to `d36-divisio`** (claim them as the divisio's opening footer sequence).

**`d36-divisio` forward aid (verbatim — do NOT rechunk here).** p.790 R-col already shows the divisio opening: `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI. — De connexione habituum gratuitorum. — Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes etc. — DIVISIO TEXTUS. Pars ista, in qua Magister agit de habitibus gratuitis, secundum quos habemus conformari Christo, divisa fuit in partes duas. In quarum prima agit de his quantum ad distinctionem. In secunda quantum ad connexionem. … In qua prima determinat Magister de virtutum connexione. In secunda vero de aequalitate, ibi: Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes etc. In tertia vero omnia opera praeceptorum et virtutum docet reducere ad caritatem, ibi: Cum duo sint praecepta caritatis etc.` Per the resume slate, d.36 = single articulus, 6 questions: `littera(✅) · divisio · a1-q1..q6 · dubia`. The divisio's own footer is the **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** band beginning p.790 (claim p.790 COMMENTARIUM nn.1 ff.); bound the divisio forward at the first `QUAESTIO I.` (the six-question TRACTATIO + the ARTICULUS opener fold into the divisio per convention).

**`[?]` flags.** None. All body readings and all 15 NOTAE entries were confirmed against the 450 dpi PDF bands (pp.789–790 legible; the OCR-shattered footer regions were re-set eyes-on from the PDF, per the Vol II/III PDF-priority inversion).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 36, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Divisio textus et tractatio quaestionum: De connexione habituum gratuitorum

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions: On the connection of the gratuitous habits

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 790 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.

#### *De connexione habituum gratuitorum.*

*Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Pars ista, in qua Magister agit de habitibus gratuitis, secundum quos habemus conformari Christo, divisa fuit[^1] in partes duas. In quarum prima agit de his quantum ad distinctionem. In secunda vero quantum ad connexionem.

Prima parte terminata, hic incipit secunda. Intendit igitur Magister principaliter in hac particula agere de habituum gratuitorum *connexione*; et quoniam ad *connexionem* sequitur *aequalitas* in merito, et aequalitas cum connexione ortum habet ex uno principio, ex hoc videlicet, quod virtutes omnes ligantur et informantur a caritate et ad ipsam reducuntur[^2] sicut ad radicem: ideo pars ista habet tres particulas. In quarum prima determinat Magister de virtutum *connexione*. In secunda vero de *aequalitate*, ibi: *Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes* etc. In tertia vero omnia opera praeceptorum et virtutum docet reducere ad caritatem, ibi: *Cum duo sint praecepta caritatis* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas partes. In quarum prima movet quaestionem et determinat veritatem. In secunda vero veritatis determinatae reddit causam et rationem, ibi: *Quod quidem probabile est* etc.

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Similiter secunda pars, in qua determinat de virtutum *aequalitate*, duas habet. In quarum prima determinat istam quaestionem secundum opinionem alienam. In secunda secundum opinionem propriam et magis veram, ibi: *Alii vero verius dicunt, omnes virtutes* etc.

Similiter tertia pars duas habet. In quarum prima movet quaestionem et determinat, qualiter omnia praecepta reducuntur ad duo praecepta caritatis. In secunda vero concludit, quod ipsa caritas est summa et plenitudo totius totalis[^3] Legis, ibi: *Omnium igitur haec summa est* etc. Ex quo haberi potest, quod caritas omnium virtutum est *finis* et *forma*; et ex hac causa *connexio* est inter ceteras virtutes gratuitas.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis iuxta ea quae Magister determinat, possunt sex breviter quaeri.

Et primo quaeritur de connexione virtutum gratuitarum.

Secundo, de connexione donorum.

Tertio, de connexione virtutum politicarum.

Quarto, de connexione vitiorum.

Quinto quaeritur de aequalitate habituum gratuitorum.

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit forma virtutum.

### ARTICULUS UNICUS.

#### *De connexione, aequalitate et forma virtutum gratuitarum.*

### QUAESTIO I.

#### *Utrum ponenda sit connexio in virtutibus gratuitis.*

---

english:
<!-- page 790 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVI.

#### *On the connection of the gratuitous habits.*

*It is also wont to be asked whether the virtues, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

This part, in which the Master treats of the gratuitous habits, according to which we have to be conformed to Christ, was divided[^1] into two parts. In the first of these he treats of them as regards their distinction. In the second, as regards their connection.

The first part being finished, here the second begins. The Master therefore intends principally in this section to treat of the *connection* of the gratuitous habits; and since upon *connection* there follows *equality* in merit, and equality together with connection takes its origin from one principle—namely from this, that all the virtues are bound and informed by charity and are referred back[^2] to it as to a root—therefore this part has three subsections. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the *connection* of the virtues. In the second, concerning their *equality*, there: *But whether one equally possesses all the virtues* etc. In the third he teaches that all the works of the precepts and of the virtues are to be reduced to charity, there: *Since there are two precepts of charity* etc.

The first part is divided into two parts. In the first of these he raises the question and determines the truth. In the second he renders the cause and reason of the truth determined, there: *Which indeed is probable* etc.

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Likewise the second part, in which he determines concerning the *equality* of the virtues, has two [subsections]. In the first of these he determines this question according to the opinion of another. In the second, according to his own and more true opinion, there: *But others say more truly that all the virtues* etc.

Likewise the third part has two [subsections]. In the first of these he raises the question and determines how all the precepts are reduced to the two precepts of charity. In the second he concludes that charity itself is the sum and fullness of the whole entire[^3] Law, there: *Therefore this is the sum of all* etc. From which it can be gathered that charity is the *end* and *form* of all the virtues; and from this cause there is a *connection* among the rest of the gratuitous virtues.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, according to the things which the Master determines, six things can be briefly asked.

And first it is asked concerning the connection of the gratuitous virtues.

Second, concerning the connection of the gifts.

Third, concerning the connection of the political virtues.

Fourth, concerning the connection of the vices.

Fifth it is asked concerning the equality of the gratuitous habits.

Sixth and last it is asked whether charity is the form of the virtues.

### SOLE ARTICLE.

#### *On the connection, equality, and form of the gratuitous virtues.*

### QUESTION I.

#### *Whether a connection is to be posited among the gratuitous virtues.*

---

la: Supra d. 23, divis. textus.

en: Above, d. 23, division of the text.

la: Plurimi codd. perperam *reducantur.*

en: Very many codices wrongly [read] *reducantur* ("are reduced," subjunctive).

la: Edd. omittunt *totalis.*

en: The editions omit *totalis* ("entire").

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.790–791 (PDF 812–813; `/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p790-{L,R}-2.png`, `vol3-p791-{L,R}-0.png`), cross-checked against raw OCR lines 54868–54922. Running heads verified `790 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (verso) and `DIST. XXXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 791` (recto) against the +22 offset; the COMMENTARIUS header was OCR-garbled as `COMMENTABIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI.`, the TRACTATIO header as `TR\CTATIO QUAESTIONUM.` Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion applied.

**Scope / chunking.** This is the d.36 divisio chunk (no pars — d.36 has none). Per the Vol II/III convention it holds: the `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXVI` opener (*De connexione habituum gratuitorum*; incipit *Solet etiam quaeri, utrum virtutes etc.*), the `DIVISIO TEXTUS`, the `TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM` (the six-question listing), and the short `ARTICULUS UNICUS` opener (*De connexione, aequalitate et forma virtutum gratuitarum.*) together with the `QUAESTIO I.` heading + its title (*Utrum ponenda sit connexio in virtutibus gratuitis.*). It stops **before** the q1 body (`Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum sit ponere connexio in virtutibus gratuitis…`, raw ~54923), which folds into `bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q1`.

**TRACTATIO question listing (verbatim — for a1-q1..q6 alignment checks).** d.36 is a single article (`ARTICULUS UNICUS`) with six questions. NOTE: unlike d.35, the TRACTATIO listing here is purely topical (it does NOT pre-state each question's *Utrum* — those appear at each `QUAESTIO N.` header). The two-column print order is L-col (1–2) then R-col (3–6):
1. *Et primo quaeritur de connexione virtutum gratuitarum.* → **a1-q1** (QUAESTIO I header: *Utrum ponenda sit connexio in virtutibus gratuitis.*)
2. *Secundo, de connexione donorum.* → **a1-q2**
3. *Tertio, de connexione virtutum politicarum.* → **a1-q3**
4. *Quarto, de connexione vitiorum.* → **a1-q4**
5. *Quinto quaeritur de aequalitate habituum gratuitorum.* → **a1-q5**
6. *Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum caritas sit forma virtutum.* → **a1-q6**

The six questions map to: connection of gratuitous virtues · connection of gifts · connection of political virtues · connection of vices · equality of gratuitous habits · charity as form of the virtues. Auto-chunker split into six skeleton files `d36-a1-q1..q6` — listing order verified, no q-swap detected in the divisio listing (the next agents must still verify each question's own `QUAESTIO N.` opener against this list).

**Page-split / apparatus map.** The divisio spans **two** printed pages, split mid-DIVISIO-TEXTUS:
- **p.790** (R-col foot): COMMENTARIUS header + DIVISIO TEXTUS opening through `…In secunda vero veritatis determinatae reddit causam et rationem, ibi: Quod quidem probabile est etc. Similiter secunda pars, in qua determinat de` — page break falls inside the second-part division, mid-sentence at `de | virtutum aequalitate`.
- **p.791** (top): `virtutum aequalitate, duas habet…` through the end of the DIVISIO TEXTUS, then TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (full-width opener + two-column 6-question listing), then ARTICULUS UNICUS opener + QUAESTIO I header/title.

Two distinct footer families on p.790:
- **Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum** — p.790 L-col nn.1–4 + R-col nn.5–6 (*Edd. exceptis I,S dicitur* / *Loc. cit. c.5 n.17 Iac.2,10* / *Dist. XXVII c.3* / *Exod.20,1; Matth.5,3* / *Serm.350* / *August. Enchirid. c.121*). These annotate the **Littera's** Lombard text above and belong to `bon-sent-III-d36-littera` (claimed there as [^10]–[^15]). **NOT claimed here.**
- **Notae ad Commentarium** — p.790 nn.1–2 (this chunk's [^1]–[^2]): n.1 *Supra d. 23, divis. textus.* (anchored at `divisa fuit¹`, the opening DIVISIO line); n.2 *Plurimi codd. perperam reducantur.* (anchored at `reducuntur²`). Then on **p.791** the COMMENTARIUM band restarts: n.1 *Edd. omittunt totalis.* (this chunk's [^3], anchored at `totius totalis¹`). The p.791 footer notes 2 ff. (*Vers. 14. Glossa ordinaria… Hieronymi*; *In lit. Magistri, circa finem…*; *Respicitur illud II Cor. 6,15…*) anchor the q1 body (`Venter meus ad Moab` Glossa, etc.) and belong to `bon-sent-III-d36-a1-q1`. Marker pairing 3/3 clean.

**Footer hand-off picked up:** from `d36-littera` — the p.790 **NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM** band (nn.1–2), per the forwarded hand-off. Claimed here in full as [^1]–[^2] (plus p.791 n.1 = [^3], the divisio's own continuation).

**Footer hand-off forwarded → a1-q1:** none of the divisio's footer carries over to q1 as a hand-off. The divisio's NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM closes at p.791 n.1 (`Edd. omittunt totalis`, [^3]). QUAESTIO I's body opens immediately below on p.791 and begins its own per-page footer band (p.791 nn.2 ff.: *Vers. 14. Glossa…* anchoring `Venter meus ad Moab` etc.). a1-q1 begins a NEW per-page footer band on p.791.

**has_scholion:** false — no `SCHOLION.` header in the divisio range (raw 54868–54922; grep-verified). The article-master scholion, if any, appears within the questions.

**[?] flags:** none. All of pp.790–791 is legible at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum ponenda sit connexio in virtutibus gratuitis

title_alt: Whether a connection is to be posited among the gratuitous virtues

source_text:
> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; the markers here are renumbered continuously across the chunk.

<!-- page 791 -->

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum sit ponere connexionem in virtutibus gratuitis. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Hieronymus super illud Isaiae decimo sexto[^1]: *Venter meus ad Moab* etc.; ibi Glossa: « Sicut cithara sonum compositum non emittit, si una chorda rupta fuerit; sic spiritus, vel venter prophetae, si una virtus defuerit, dulce melos non resonabit »; sed quando gratia est in anima et Spiritus sanctus in corde hominis, est in ea dulce melos spirituale: ergo necesse est, ibi simul omnes virtutes esse.

2. Item, Augustinus dicit, et habetur in quarto Sententiarum, distinctione decima quinta[^2], quod « impium est a Deo dimidiam veniam sperare »: ergo pari ratione impium est sperare dimidiam gratiam: ergo sicut impossibile est, unum mortale peccatum sine alio dimitti: sic videtur, quod impossibile est, quod una virtus sine alia nobis donetur.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Nullus potest habere virtutem gratuitam, nisi habeat gratiam; nullus habet gratiam, qui non sit templum Dei; nullus autem potest esse templum Dei, nisi sit templum eius secundum totum, quia nulla est conventio Christi ad Belial, neque templo Dei cum idolis[^3]: si ergo ad hoc, quod anima consecretur in templum Dei, necesse est, ipsam habere omnes virtutes dirigentes et rectificantes eius potentias; videtur esse necessarium, quod si habet unam virtutem, quod habeat ceteras.

4. Item, quicumque habet unicam virtutem gratuitam, necessarium est, ipsum habere caritatem — nulla enim virtus gratuita remanet, caritate exclusa — sed qui habet caritatem habet *vinculum perfectionis*[^4] et plenitudinem Legis, et per hoc potest pervenire ad salutem: si ergo nemo habet perfectionem in genere moris nec potens est ad implendum omnia mandata Legis, nisi habeat universitatem virtutum; necessario videtur sequi, ut qui unam virtutem gratuitam habet, nulla sibi desit.

1. Sed contra hoc primo fertur instantia in *Christo* et in *Beatis*; Christus enim et Beati caritatem habent, et tamen in eis nec est fides nec spes, sicut ex praecedentibus[^5] apparet: ergo non est necesse, ut qui habet unam virtutem gratuitam habeat omnes.

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2. Item, fertur secundo instantia in *innocentibus* et *coniugatis*; innocentes enim non habent virtutem poenitentiae, coniugati non habent virginitatem; et tamen hae sunt virtutes gratuitae: ergo non est necesse, quod qui habet unam virtutem gratuitam habeat omnes.

3. Item, tertio fertur instantia in *praescitis* et *reprobis*, qui, cum sunt in gratia, habent aliquas virtutes, et tamen nunquam habent perseverantiam, quoniam, si illam haberent, salvarentur, sicut dicit Dominus[^6]: *Qui perseveraverit usque in finem* etc.: si ergo perseverantia virtus est, secundum quod vult Tullius et Bernardus, videtur, quod non sit connexio virtutum gratuitarum.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur *ratione*. Habitus virtutum gratuitarum sunt diversi formaliter, sicut diversae species eiusdem generis, ita quod ex opposito dividuntur, nec unum est principium alterius[^7]; sed quando aliquae proprietates invicem distinguuntur, ita quod una ab altera dividitur, nec altera ab altera causatur; possibile est, haberi unam sine reliqua: si ergo virtutes gratuitae sunt huiusmodi, videtur, quod non sit necessarium, eas esse connexas.

5. Item, habitus virtutum per actus suos habent notificari et distingui[^8]: igitur quae est comparatio actus ad actum, eadem est comparatio habitus ad habitum; sed non est necesse, actus virtutum esse connexos, immo unus potest exerceri sine altero: ergo etc.

6. Item, si habitus virtutum sunt connexi, aut hoc est ratione *principii*, aut ratione *subiecti*, aut ratione *obiecti*. Si ratione *principii*, quia sunt a Deo; tunc, cum omnis proprietas a Deo sit, connexio esset in omnibus proprietatibus. Si ratione *subiecti*, quia sunt in eodem: ergo cum omnes scientiae sint in eadem anima, qui haberet unam scientiam, haberet ceteras; quod manifeste falsum est. Si ratione *obiecti*; *contra*: penes obiecta distinguuntur[^9]: ergo penes illa non connectuntur, cum idem non sit principium distinctionis et connexionis.

### Conclusio.

> Necesse est, habentem gratiam habere omnes virtutes, quae sunt perfectae, vel aliquid eis correspondens.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod de virtutibus gratuitis contingit loqui tripliciter, videlicet quantum ad *habitum substratum* et quantum ad *statum superadditum* et quantum ad *defectum imperfectionis annexum*[^10].

Si loquamur de virtutibus sub ratione imperfectionis annexae, non est necesse, esse connexionem simpliciter, pro eo quod non est necesse, hominem habentem gratiam habere imperfectionem adiunctam. — Similiter si loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad *statum superadditum*, qui non est de necessitate virtutis, sicut est reperire in continentia virginali et viduali; sic adhuc non est necesse, virtutes esse connexas. — Si vero loquamur de virtutibus quantum ad *habitus substratos*, tunc distinguendum est: quia aut illi habitus *habent* necessario annexam imperfectionem, aut *non*. Si *habent* necessario annexam imperfectionem, sicut habet habitus fidei et spei; sic non sunt necessario connexi aliis virtutibus nisi pro eo tempore, quo quis est in statu viae. Quodsi *non habent* necessario annexam imperfectionem, tunc connexionem habent simpliciter sive in statu viae, sive in statu patriae. Unde secundum omnem statum verum est, quod necesse est, habentem gratiam habere omnes virtutes, quae sunt perfectae, vel aliquid eis correspondens, sicut loco fidei in patria habebimus visionem et loco spei perfectam tentionem[^11].

Ratio autem huius connexionis sumi potest quadrupliciter secundum quadruplex genus causae: primum quidem ex parte causae *materialis*, quae scilicet est nostra necessitas; secundo ex parte causae *efficientis*, quae est Dei largitas; tertio ex parte causae *formalis*, quae est virtutum conformitas; quarto ex parte causae *finalis*, quae est praemii dignitas. — Causa enim *materialis* virtutum assignari potest non *ex qua*[^12], sed *in qua*. Et haec quidem est rationalis anima secundum suas potentias, secundum quas ipsa anima potest obliquari et dirigi. Et quoniam illae potentiae animae non possunt per unum habitum virtutis rectificari, sed per diversos; necesse est ad hoc, quod anima perficiatur in *esse* gratuito et fiat Deo placita et iusta, quod ipsa secundum diversos virtutis habitus rectificetur in se et in qualibet eius potentia. Ideo propter necessitatem ex parte susceptibilis necesse est, virtutes gratuitas esse connexas[^13].

Causa vero virtutum *efficiens* est divina liberalitas, cuius est nullo modo deficere in necessariis, sed omnia administrare affluenter et abunde[^14]. Unde sicut divina liberalitas perficiens rem in *esse* primo dat ei totum, per quod possit in *esse* conservari;

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ita perficiens eam in *esse* secundo dat illi integram perfectionem, per quam et in illo *esse* manere possit et singulis vitiis obviare. Ideo conveniens est divinae largitati, cum gratificat hominem, diversitatem virtutum, in quibus consistit rectitudo vitae, eidem tribuere.

Causa autem *formalis* ipsarum virtutum gratuitarum est ipsa Dei gratia, quae virtutes ceteras quantum ad habitus sibi substratos perficit et informat, et hoc per suam *praesidentiam* et *influentiam*, per quam animam facit gratam et quantum ad se et quantum ad eius potentias. Unde quia illa gratia conformiter se habet ad omnes virtutes; ex quo[^15] ipsa habetur, aut *quaelibet* virtus habetur, aut *nulla*; et ideo necesse est, virtutes esse connexas.

Causa autem *finalis* virtutum est ipsa gloria, quae veniens in animam undique et plene perficit eam; et ideo necesse est, quod per gratiam undique *disponatur*. Nisi enim praecedat sufficiens *dispositio*, non inducitur perfectio. Necesse est ergo necessitate *finis*[^16], omnes potentias animae perfici per virtutes gratuitas, ut idoneae sint et dispositae ad susceptionem gloriae. — Et sic patet, quod ratio connexionis virtutum gratuitarum sumitur ex quadruplici genere causae; unde et rationes hoc probantes sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de *Christo* et *Beatis*, in quibus non est reperire virtutem spei nec fidei; iam patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt: quoniam hae virtutes propter imperfectionem sibi annexam[^17] se non compatiuntur cum statu gloriae. Verumtamen ex hoc non infringitur connexio virtutum, pro eo quod ipsae aliis virtutibus connectuntur in statu *viae*; in statu vero *patriae* loco ipsarum dotes eis correspondentes cum aliis virtutibus, quae ibi permanent, connexionem habent.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *innocentibus* et *coniugatis*, iam patet responsio: quoniam poenitentia[^18] et virginitas non tantum *habitus* virtutum nominant, sed etiam *status*, ratione quorum, ut praedictum est, non necessaria est connexio virtutum gratuitarum, pro eo quod in diversis statibus salvari potest essentia gratiae et virtutum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de perseverantia, quae non est in *praescitis*; dicendum, quod perseverantia dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur perseverantia voluntas perferendi passiones sine defectione; et sic est species fortitudinis[^19]. Alio modo dicitur perseverantia propositum perseverandi in bono usque in finem; et sic est conditio annexa cuilibet virtuti. Tertio modo dicitur perseverantia continuatio boni usque in finem; et hoc modo non est nomen *virtutis*, sed potius *status* consequentis ad omnes virtutes. Et primis quidem duobus modis habet connecti aliis virtutibus et reperitur in iustis praescitis; hoc autem tertio modo in praescitis non reperitur nec necessario aliis nectitur, quia virtutis non nominat habitum, sed magis consequentem statum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habitus virtutum gratuitarum sunt diversi formaliter; dicendum, quod quamvis formaliter dividantur quantum ad habitus substratos, tamen, in quantum gratuiti sunt, communicant in ipsa gratia, quae est omnium virtutum gratuitarum perfectiva in *esse* gratuito[^20]. Et ideo ratio illa non cogit: quoniam, etsi in formalibus propriis distinguantur, tamen in formali *communi*, ratione cuius habent esse gratuiti, uniuntur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione habituum et actuum; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod egressus *actuum* est voluntarius et ab arbitrii libertate, introductio vero *habituum* in ipsam animam est a divina largitate; voluntas autem[^21] specialiter applicatur ad unum bonum, divina vero largitas complet totum: ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis actus unius virtutis gratuitae ab altero separetur, propter hoc similiter habitus ab habitu.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, unde veniat connexio habituum; iam patet responsio: venit enim ex quadruplici genere causae, sicut praedictum est; nec est simile de illis, in quibus instat[^22], sicut apparet de se.

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Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether a connection is to be posited among the gratuitous virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. *First*, from that which Jerome says upon that text of Isaiah, chapter sixteen[^1]: *My belly shall sound for Moab* etc.; there the Gloss says: « Just as a cithara does not emit a composed sound if one string has been broken, so the spirit, or the belly of the prophet, if one virtue is lacking, will not resound a sweet melody »; but when grace is in the soul and the Holy Spirit in the heart of man, there is in it a sweet spiritual melody: therefore it is necessary that all the virtues be there at once.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is held in the fourth [book] of the Sentences, distinction fifteen[^2], that « it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God »: therefore by parity of reasoning it is impious to hope for half a grace: therefore just as it is impossible that one mortal sin be remitted without another, so it seems that it is impossible that one virtue be given to us without another.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. No one can have a gratuitous virtue unless he has grace; no one has grace who is not a temple of God; but no one can be a temple of God unless he be a temple of Him according to the whole, because there is no agreement of Christ with Belial, nor of the temple of God with idols[^3]: if therefore, for the soul to be consecrated into a temple of God, it is necessary that it have all the virtues directing and rectifying its powers; it seems to be necessary that, if it has one virtue, it have the rest.

4. Likewise, whoever has a single gratuitous virtue, it is necessary that he have charity — for no gratuitous virtue remains when charity is excluded — but he who has charity has the *bond of perfection*[^4] and the fullness of the Law, and through this can attain to salvation: if therefore no one has perfection in the genus of morals, nor is able to fulfill all the commandments of the Law, unless he have the totality of the virtues; it seems necessarily to follow that he who has one gratuitous virtue lacks none.

1. But against this, first an instance is brought forward in *Christ* and in *the Blessed*; for Christ and the Blessed have charity, and yet in them there is neither faith nor hope, as appears from what precedes[^5]: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

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2. Likewise, secondly an instance is brought forward in *the innocent* and *the married*; for the innocent do not have the virtue of penance, the married do not have virginity; and yet these are gratuitous virtues: therefore it is not necessary that he who has one gratuitous virtue have all.

3. Likewise, thirdly an instance is brought forward in *the foreknown* and *the reprobate*, who, when they are in grace, have certain virtues, and yet never have perseverance, since, if they had it, they would be saved, as the Lord says[^6]: *He who shall persevere unto the end* etc.: if therefore perseverance is a virtue, according as Tullius and Bernard hold, it seems that there is no connection of the gratuitous virtues.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reason*. The habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally, like the diverse species of one genus, so that they are divided by opposition, and one is not the principle of another[^7]; but when certain properties are distinguished from one another, so that one is divided from the other, nor is the one caused by the other; it is possible for one to be had without the rest: if therefore the gratuitous virtues are of this sort, it seems that it is not necessary that they be connected.

5. Likewise, the habits of the virtues come to be made known and distinguished through their acts[^8]: therefore, as is the comparison of act to act, the same is the comparison of habit to habit; but it is not necessary that the acts of the virtues be connected, nay rather one can be exercised without another: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if the habits of the virtues are connected, this is either by reason of the *principle*, or by reason of the *subject*, or by reason of the *object*. If by reason of the *principle*, because they are from God; then, since every property is from God, the connection would be in all properties. If by reason of the *subject*, because they are in the same [subject]: therefore since all the sciences are in the same soul, he who had one science would have the rest; which is manifestly false. If by reason of the *object*; *on the contrary*: they are distinguished according to objects[^9]: therefore they are not connected according to those [objects], since the principle of distinction and of connection is not the same.

### Conclusion.

> It is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that it happens that one speaks of the gratuitous virtues in three ways, namely as regards the *underlying habit*, and as regards the *superadded state*, and as regards the *defect of imperfection annexed* [to them][^10].

If we speak of the virtues under the aspect of annexed imperfection, it is not necessary that there be a connection absolutely, for the reason that it is not necessary that a man having grace have an imperfection adjoined. — Similarly, if we speak of the virtues as regards the *superadded state*, which is not of the necessity of the virtue, as is found in virginal and widowed continence; so still it is not necessary that the virtues be connected. — But if we speak of the virtues as regards the *underlying habits*, then a distinction must be made: for either those habits *have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, or *not*. If they *have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, as the habit of faith and of hope has; so they are not necessarily connected with the other virtues except for that time during which one is in the state of the wayfarer. But if they *do not have* an imperfection necessarily annexed, then they have a connection absolutely, whether in the state of the wayfarer or in the state of the homeland. Hence according to every state it is true that it is necessary that he who has grace have all the virtues which are perfect, or something corresponding to them, just as in place of faith in the homeland we shall have vision, and in place of hope, perfect holding[^11].

Now the ground of this connection can be taken in a fourfold manner, according to the fourfold genus of cause: first indeed on the part of the *material* cause, which namely is our necessity; secondly on the part of the *efficient* cause, which is God's largesse; thirdly on the part of the *formal* cause, which is the conformity of the virtues; fourthly on the part of the *final* cause, which is the dignity of the reward. — For the *material* cause of the virtues can be assigned not as that *from which*[^12], but as that *in which*. And this indeed is the rational soul according to its powers, according to which the soul itself can be bent crooked and directed [straight]. And since those powers of the soul cannot be rectified through one habit of virtue, but through diverse [habits]; it is necessary, for the soul to be perfected in gratuitous *being* and made pleasing to God and just, that it be rectified according to the diverse habits of virtue, in itself and in each of its powers. Therefore, on account of the necessity on the part of that which is susceptible [of perfection], it is necessary that the gratuitous virtues be connected[^13].

But the *efficient* cause of the virtues is the divine liberality, whose property it is in no way to be deficient in things necessary, but to administer all things abundantly and in plenty[^14]. Hence just as the divine liberality, perfecting a thing in *being*, first gives it the whole by which it can be conserved in *being*;

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so, perfecting it in the second *being*, gives it the entire perfection by which it can both remain in that *being* and resist individual vices. Therefore it is fitting to the divine largesse, when it makes a man graced, to bestow upon the same the diversity of virtues, in which the rectitude of life consists.

Now the *formal* cause of the gratuitous virtues themselves is the very grace of God, which perfects and informs the other virtues as regards the habits underlying them, and this through its *presidency* and *influence*, through which it makes the soul graced both as regards itself and as regards its powers. Hence, since that grace holds itself conformably to all the virtues; from the fact that[^15] it is had, either *each and every* virtue is had, or *none*; and therefore it is necessary that the virtues be connected.

Now the *final* cause of the virtues is glory itself, which, coming into the soul, perfects it on every side and fully; and therefore it is necessary that through grace it be *disposed* on every side. For unless a sufficient *disposition* precede, perfection is not induced. It is necessary therefore, by the necessity of the *end*[^16], that all the powers of the soul be perfected through the gratuitous virtues, that they may be fit and disposed for the reception of glory. — And thus it is clear that the ground of the connection of the gratuitous virtues is taken from the fourfold genus of cause; whence also the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary concerning *Christ* and *the Blessed*, in whom the virtue of hope nor of faith is not to be found; the response is now clear from what has been said: since these virtues, on account of the imperfection annexed to them[^17], are not compatible with the state of glory. Nevertheless from this the connection of the virtues is not undone, for the reason that they themselves are connected with the other virtues in the state of the *wayfarer*; but in the state of the *homeland*, in place of them the endowments corresponding to them, together with the other virtues which there remain, have connection.

2. To that which is objected concerning *the innocent* and *the married*, the response is now clear: since penance[^18] and virginity name not only *habits* of virtue, but also *states*, by reason of which, as has been said, a connection of the gratuitous virtues is not necessary, for the reason that in diverse states the essence of grace and of the virtues can be preserved.

3. To that which is objected concerning perseverance, which is not in *the foreknown*; it must be said that perseverance is spoken of in three ways. In one way perseverance is said [to be] the will of enduring sufferings without failing; and so it is a species of fortitude[^19]. In another way perseverance is said [to be] the purpose of persevering in the good unto the end; and so it is a condition annexed to every virtue. In a third way perseverance is said [to be] the continuation of the good unto the end; and in this way it is not the name of a *virtue*, but rather of a *state* consequent upon all the virtues. And in the first two ways indeed it has [the property of] being connected with the other virtues and is found in the just foreknown; but in this third way it is not found in the foreknown, nor is it necessarily linked to the others, because it does not name the habit of virtue, but rather a consequent state.

4. To that which is objected, that the habits of the gratuitous virtues are diverse formally; it must be said that, although they are formally divided as regards the underlying habits, nevertheless, inasmuch as they are gratuitous, they communicate in grace itself, which is perfective of all the gratuitous virtues in gratuitous *being*[^20]. And therefore that reason does not compel: since, even if in their proper formal characters they are distinguished, nevertheless in the *common* formal character, by reason of which they have gratuitous being, they are united.

5. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of habits and acts; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that the going-forth of *acts* is voluntary and from the freedom of choice, but the introduction of *habits* into the soul itself is from the divine largesse; the will moreover[^21] applies itself specially to one good, but the divine largesse completes the whole: therefore it does not follow that, although the act of one gratuitous virtue is separated from another, on this account the habit is likewise [separated] from the habit.

6. To that which is objected last, whence the connection of the habits comes; the response is now clear: for it comes from the fourfold genus of cause, as has been said before; nor is it similar concerning those in which the [objection] presses[^22], as is clear of itself.

la: Vers. 14. — Glossa, *ordinaria* apud Strabum et Lyranum, refert Hieronymi verba in hunc loc. — In fine arg. pro *ibi* cod. Z *in ea*.

en: Verse 14. — The Gloss, *ordinary* [Gloss] in Strabus and Lyranus, reports Jerome's words upon this passage. — At the end of the argument, for *there* (*ibi*) codex Z reads *in it* (*in ea*).

la: In lit. Magistri, circa finem. Sententia August. invenitur in lib. de Vera et falsa Poenitentia (inter opera August.), c. 9. n. 24. — Quod impossibile est, unum peccatum mortale sine alio dimitti, demonstratur IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 2.

en: In the text of the Master, near the end. Augustine's sentence is found in the book *On True and False Penance* (among the works of Augustine), c. 9. n. 24. — That it is impossible for one mortal sin to be remitted without another, is demonstrated in IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 2.

la: Respicitur illud II. Cor. 6, 15. seq.: *Quae autem conventio Christi ad Belial?... Qui autem consensus templo Dei cum idolis? Vos enim estis templum Dei vivi* etc. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro *qui non sit* cod. A *nisi sit*.

en: That text of II. Cor. 6, 15. seq. is regarded: *But what agreement of Christ with Belial?... And what consent of the temple of God with idols? For you are the temple of the living God* etc. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. seq. and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — A little above, for *who is not* (*qui non sit*) codex A [reads] *unless he be* (*nisi sit*).

la: Coloss. 3, 14. Mox respicitur illud Rom. 13, 10: *Plenitudo ergo Legis est dilectio.* Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — De *maiori*, in qua Vat. male omittit *gratuitam*, vide infra q. 6. et supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. seq. — In fine arg. post *nulla* codd. A Z adiiciunt *alia*.

en: Coloss. 3, 14. Soon that text of Rom. 13, 10 is regarded: *Love therefore is the fullness of the Law.* Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Concerning the *major* [premise], in which the Vatican [edition] wrongly omits *gratuitous*, see below q. 6. and above d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. seq. — At the end of the argument, after *none* (*nulla*) codices A Z add *another* (*alia*).

la: Lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 1. et d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seq. nec non a. 3. q. 1.

en: The text of the Master, d. XXVII. c. 1. and d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seq. as well as a. 3. q. 1.

la: Matth. 10, 22. et 24, 13. — Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 54. *perseverantiam*, quam inter partes fortitudinis recenset (cfr. supra pag. 561, nota 7.), sic definit: « Perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio ». Secundum Bernard., Epist. 129. n. 2, perseverantia est « vigor virium, virtutum consummatio », et, ut in eiusdem Serm. 41. de Diversis n. 10. dicitur, « virtutum fructus earumque consummatio, totius boni repositorium, virtus, sine qua nemo videbit Deum » etc.

en: Matth. 10, 22. and 24, 13. — Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 54., defines *perseverance*, which he reckons among the parts of fortitude (cfr. above p. 561, note 7.), thus: « Perseverance is a stable and perpetual remaining in a well-considered plan ». According to Bernard, Epist. 129. n. 2, perseverance is « the vigor of [our] powers, the consummation of the virtues », and, as it is said in the same author's Serm. 41. de Diversis n. 10., « the fruit of the virtues and their consummation, the repository of all good, the virtue without which no one shall see God » etc.

la: Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Mox edd. omittunt *invicem*.

en: Cfr. above d. 27. a. 1. q. 1. — Soon the editions omit *invicem* (*from one another*).

la: Secundum Aristot., de quo vide supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine.

en: According to Aristotle, on whom see above p. 470, note 8. at the end.

la: Vide notam praeced. — Cod. A bis habent pro *haberet*.

en: See the preceding note. — Codex A has *bis* (*twice*) for *haberet* (*would have*).

la: Cod. U *annexae*. Post pauca pro *esse* cod. K *fieri*.

en: Codex U [reads] *annexae*. After a little, for *esse* (*being*) codex K [reads] *fieri* (*becoming*).

la: Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 2. et 3.

en: Cfr. above d. 31. a. 2. and 3.

la: Cfr. tom. I. Prooem. q. I. ad 2. et scholion ibid.

en: Cfr. tom. I. Prologue, q. I., reply to 2, and the scholion there.

la: Vide supra d. 33. q. 2. ad 2. — Paulo superius pro *et fiat* cod. F *et sic fiat*.

en: See above d. 33. q. 2., reply to 2. — A little above, for *et fiat* (*and be made*) codex F [reads] *et sic fiat* (*and so be made*).

la: Respicitur illud Iac. 1, 5: *Postulet a Deo, qui dat omnibus affluenter* etc.

en: That text of James 1, 5 is regarded: *Let him ask of God, who gives to all abundantly* etc.

la: Codd. GHKVaa et edd. 1, 2 subdunt *et*, Vat. *etiam*.

en: Codices GHKVaa and editions 1, 2 add below *et* (*and*), the Vatican [edition] *etiam* (*also*).

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 87. seqq. (c. 9.).

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. Physics, text 87. seqq. (c. 9.).

la: Non pauci codd. *connexam*.

en: Not a few codices [read] *connexam*.

la: Vat. *innocentia*. — Aristot., IV. Ethic. c. 9. de verecundia agens, ostendit, eam viro probo (i. e. qui sponte numquam male agit) non convenire, et concludit: *Quocirca verecundia ex conditione probata res est; si enim [probus vir male] ageret, erubesceret.*

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *innocentia*. — Aristotle, IV. Ethic. c. 9., treating of shame, shows that it does not befit a good man (i. e. one who of his own accord never acts wrongly), and concludes: *Wherefore shame is a thing approved on condition; for if [a good man] were to act [wrongly], he would blush.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 792, nota 1, ubi etiam in verbis Bernardi tertius modus perseverantiae insinuatur. Cfr. etiam August., de Dono perseverantiae, c. 1. n. 1. De secundo modo vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 4. ubi *virtuosi* esse praedicatur, quod « stabili atque immutabili affectu praeditus agat ». Cfr. ibid. VII. c. 8. seq. — Infinius pro *ad omnes virtutes* cod. A *ad omnes habitus virtutum*, et pro *connecti aliis virtutibus* idem cod. A *convenientiam cum aliis virtutibus*. Subinde pro *in iustis* Vat. *in illinitis*.

en: Cfr. above p. 792, note 1, where also in the words of Bernard the third mode of perseverance is insinuated. Cfr. also Augustine, de Dono perseverantiae, c. 1. n. 1. On the second mode see Aristotle, II. Ethic. c. 4., where it is predicated of the *virtuous* man that « he acts endowed with a stable and immutable disposition ». Cfr. ibid. VII. c. 8. seq. — Lower down, for *ad omnes virtutes* (*to all the virtues*) codex A [reads] *ad omnes habitus virtutum* (*to all the habits of the virtues*), and for *connecti aliis virtutibus* (*to be connected with the other virtues*) the same codex A [reads] *convenientiam cum aliis virtutibus* (*agreement with the other virtues*). Thereupon for *in iustis* (*in the just*) the Vatican [edition reads] *in illinitis*.

la: Cfr. infra q. 6. et supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. et d. 38. q. 5. scholion.

en: Cfr. below q. 6. and above d. 27. a. 1. q. 3., reply to 1, and d. 38. q. 5., the scholion.

la: Codd. AUZbb subiiciunt *nostra*.

en: Codices AUZbb add *nostra* (*our*).

la: Plurimi codd. *stat*; perperam.

en: Very many codices [read] *stat*; wrongly.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio haec agit de virtutibus *gratuitis* proprie dictis, quatenus nominantur a gratia *gratum faciente* (sive sanctificante), non a gratia *gratis data*, quia hae non sunt gratuitae *simpliciter* nec connexionem habent. *Illarum* autem connexio intelligitur quoad *habitum*, non quoad *usum* sive actum (cfr. hic ad 5.) — Pro explicatione nonnullarum locutionum cfr. supra scholion ad d. 33. q. 5. — In solutione communiter conveniunt antiqui Scholastici; illi autem, qui cum Scoto non admittunt virtutes morales per se infusas (cfr. cit. scholion), restringunt hanc connexionem virtutum *gratuitarum* ad virtutes theologicas, quatenus cum caritate semper infunduntur habitus fidei et spei. Quid Scotus de connexione virtutum *cardinalium* sentiat, dicitur infra in scholio ad q. 3. — Quoad ultimam rationem, sumtam ex causa formali, scilicet *gratia sanctificante*, etiam S. Thom. (hic a. 2.) eandem affert, sed sibi constans, sic arguit: « Secundo ex gratia, quae est quasi totum potentiale ad virtutes, ex qua quodam modo fluunt virtutes, sicut ex essentia animae fluunt illius potentiae. Unde sicut omnes potentiae sunt simul, in quantum connectuntur in essentia, ita omnes virtutes gratuitae sunt simul, in quantum connectuntur in gratia » (cfr. S. I. II. q. 65. a. 3.). De eadem quaestione: Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. et d. 27. a. 9. q. 2. — Henr. Gandav., Quodl. 5. q. 17. — Durand., hic q. 1, 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

**II.** De seq. (2.) q. docet S. Bonav. cum S. Thoma, quod dona quoad *habitum* simul infunduntur cum gratia omnibusque virtutibus gratuitis, quod autem non exeunt in *usum* actumque simul et aequaliter, sed successive et diversimode. Unde concludit, non esse tantam eorum connexionem, quanta est in virtutibus. — Aliam opinionem refert Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 3.), quam ipse censet esse veriorem, quod scilicet « dona nec cum virtutibus nec ad invicem connexionem habent, nec secundum usum nec secundum habitum ». Huic secundae opinioni *ex parte* subscribit Richard. a Med. (hic q. 3.), cum neget eorum connexionem « quantum ad eorum *esse imperfectum* », at eandem subsistere putet, quando habent statum perfectum.

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**III.** In solutione ad 5. 6. *Glossa* (secundum lectionem a nobis reformatam) tantum *septem* enumerat beatitudines, dum communiter in catechismis et etiam a S. Thoma *octo* esse censentur, secundum litteram Evangelii (Matth. 5, 3-10.). Sed S. Bonav. cum pluribus antiquis septenarium illarum numerum profitetur etiam alibi, praesertim in Breviloq. p. V. c. 6, et in Comment. in Lucam (c. 6. n. 20.). Assignatio huius numeri orta esse videtur ex doctrina S. August. (I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 3. n. 10.), ubi inter alia plura dicitur: « Octava tanquam ad caput redit, quia consummatum perfectumque ostendit et probat... Septem sunt ergo quae perficiunt; nam octava clarificat et quod perfectum est demonstrat, ut per hos gradus perficiantur et ceteri, tanquam a capite rursus exordiens ». — Etiam Hugo a S. Victore (Opuscul. de Quinque Septenis seu Septenariis, c. 1. seqq.) septem beatitudines enumerat, sicut septem *vitia* capitalia, septem *petitiones* in oratione Domini, septem *virtutes* nec non *dona* Spiritus S. — Item, Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. III. tr. 12. c. 3.) refert opinionem Sanctorum aliquando dicentium, *octo* esse beatitudines, et post varia argumenta sic resolvit: « Dicimus, quod *octo* sunt beatitudines quantum ad *essentiam*, sed tantum *septem* sunt quantum ad distinctionem *graduum*; quoniam super *pacem* [respicit illud: Beati pacifici...] non est aliqua virtus, sed praeter pacem et quasi a latere est aliqua virtus, scilicet sustinentia persecutionum propter iustitiam, et est ista virtus de necessitate annexa *paci* » etc. Haec et tota diffusa de beatitudinibus doctrina Antissiodorensis in compendium redacta est in libro, qui saec. XIII. et XIV. in frequentissimo usu erat, cuius inscriptio *Compendium theologicae veritatis* (V. c. 47-55.), ubi etiam legitur: « Beatitudines sunt *septem* secundum distinctionem *graduum*, quamvis sint *octo* secundum *essentiam* ». Numerus septenarius beatitudinibus tribuitur etiam in *Centiloquio*, p. III. sect. 46.

**IV.** De hac 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 62. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. II. q. 68. a. 5.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question treats of the *gratuitous* virtues properly so called, inasmuch as they are named from grace *making [one] pleasing* (or sanctifying), not from grace *gratuitously given*, because these are not gratuitous *absolutely* nor have a connection. The connection of *those* [first virtues], however, is understood as regards the *habit*, not as regards the *use* or act (cfr. here, the reply to 5.) — For the explanation of certain expressions cfr. above, the scholion on d. 33. q. 5. — In the solution the ancient Scholastics commonly agree; but those who, with Scotus, do not admit the moral virtues to be of themselves infused (cfr. the cited scholion), restrict this connection of the *gratuitous* virtues to the theological virtues, inasmuch as the habits of faith and hope are always infused together with charity. What Scotus thinks concerning the connection of the *cardinal* virtues is stated below in the scholion on q. 3. — As regards the last ground, taken from the formal cause, namely *sanctifying grace*, S. Thomas also (here, a. 2.) adduces the same, but, consistent with himself, argues thus: « Secondly, from grace, which is as it were a potential whole with respect to the virtues, from which the virtues in some manner flow, just as from the essence of the soul those powers flow. Hence just as all the powers are at once, inasmuch as they are connected in the essence, so all the gratuitous virtues are at once, inasmuch as they are connected in grace » (cfr. S. I. II. q. 65. a. 3.). On the same question: Petr. a Tar., here a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here q. 2. and d. 27. a. 9. q. 2. — Henr. Gandav., Quodl. 5. q. 17. — Durand., here q. 1, 3. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following questions, here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

**II.** On the following (2nd) question S. Bonaventure teaches with S. Thomas that the gifts are, as regards the *habit*, infused at once with grace and with all the gratuitous virtues, but that they do not go forth into *use* and act at once and equally, but successively and in diverse modes. Hence he concludes that there is not so great a connection of them as there is among the virtues. — Petr. a Tar. (here a. 3.) reports another opinion, which he himself judges to be the truer, namely that « the gifts have a connection neither with the virtues nor with one another, neither according to use nor according to habit ». To this second opinion Richard. a Med. (here q. 3.) subscribes *in part*, when he denies their connection « as regards their *imperfect being* », yet thinks the same to subsist when they have a perfect state.

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**III.** In the solution to 5. 6. the *Gloss* (according to the reading reformed by us) enumerates only *seven* beatitudes, whereas commonly in catechisms and also by S. Thomas they are reckoned to be *eight*, according to the letter of the Gospel (Matth. 5, 3-10.). But S. Bonaventure, with many of the ancients, professes the sevenfold number of them elsewhere also, especially in the Breviloquium, p. V. c. 6, and in the Commentary on Luke (c. 6. n. 20.). The assignment of this number seems to have arisen from the doctrine of S. Augustine (I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 3. n. 10.), where among many other things it is said: « The eighth returns as it were to the head, because it shows and proves [the matter] consummated and perfected... There are therefore seven which perfect; for the eighth clarifies and demonstrates that which is perfect, so that through these grades the rest also may be perfected, as it were beginning again from the head ». — Hugh of S. Victor also (Opusc. de Quinque Septenis seu Septenariis, c. 1. seqq.) enumerates seven beatitudes, just as seven capital *vices*, seven *petitions* in the Lord's prayer, seven *virtues* and likewise *gifts* of the Holy Spirit. — Likewise, Guliel. Antissiod. (Sum. III. tr. 12. c. 3.) reports the opinion of the Saints sometimes saying that there are *eight* beatitudes, and after various arguments resolves thus: « We say that there are *eight* beatitudes as regards *essence*, but there are only *seven* as regards the distinction of *grades*; since above *peace* [he refers to that text: Blessed are the peacemakers...] there is no virtue, but beside peace and as it were at the side there is a certain virtue, namely the bearing of persecutions for the sake of justice, and this virtue is of necessity annexed to *peace* » etc. This whole diffuse doctrine of the Antissiodorensian on the beatitudes was reduced into a compendium in a book which in the 13th and 14th centuries was in most frequent use, whose title is *Compendium of theological truth* (V. c. 47-55.), where also is read: « The beatitudes are *seven* according to the distinction of grades, although they be *eight* according to essence ». The sevenfold number is attributed to the beatitudes also in the *Centiloquium*, p. III. sect. 46.

**IV.** On this 2nd question, besides those praised [above]: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 62. m. 4. — S. Thom., here a. 3; S. I. II. q. 68. a. 5.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Tier 2 promoted in place 2026-06-13. Latin re-set column-by-column from 450 dpi PDF column bands (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p79{1..4}-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`) per the Vol III two-column PDF-priority inversion (the IA djvu OCR cascade-shatters the Respondeo / Solutio oppositorum / scholion / footers). OCR base = skeleton raw 54925–55143. English is fresh literal translation, parallel paragraph-for-paragraph. Backup at `_backup-d36-a1-q1-pre-promote-20260613/`.

**Alignment — CONFIRMED.** q1 = *connexio virtutum gratuitarum* = TRACTATIO "Primo … de connexione virtutum gratuitarum" 1:1. The body opener (`Circa primum sic proceditur… utrum sit ponere connexionem in virtutibus gratuitis`) and the QUAESTIO I header/title match. Forward boundary verified: scholion §III–IV closes, then `QUAESTIO II.` + title *Utrum dona Spiritus sancti sint connexa* (= a1-q2, *de connexione donorum*) opens on p.794 (raw 55144).

**Header fold-in.** Per Vol III convention the **ARTICULUS UNICUS opener** (*De connexione, aequalitate et forma virtutum gratuitarum.*) and the **QUAESTIO I.** header/title were folded into `bon-sent-III-d36-divisio` and are NOT re-carried here. This chunk's `## Latin` opens directly at the q1 body (`Circa primum sic proceditur…`).

**Page span:** printed pp.791–794 (PDF 813–816). Offset pdf = printed + 22. Running heads verified at 450 dpi: `DIST. XXXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 791` (p.791-R); `792 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (p.792-L); `DIST. XXXVI. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. I. 793` (p.793-R); `794 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III` (p.794-L). The scholion §I begins on p.793 (L-col foot) and runs onto p.794, ending at §IV before QUAESTIO II opens.

**Apparatus — NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM, 22 entries, per-page restart, renumbered continuous.** Per-page split map:
- **p.791** raw notes n.2–n.6 → **[^1]–[^5]** (n.1 = *Edd. omittunt totalis*, which belongs to the divisio's band — claimed there as the divisio's [^3] — so NOT carried here). [^1]=Isai. Gloss (arg 1), [^2]=IV Sent. d.15 / de Vera et falsa Poenit. (arg 2), [^3]=II Cor. 6,15 Christ/Belial (arg 3), [^4]=Coloss. 3,14 / Rom. 13,10 *vinculum perfectionis* (arg 4), [^5]=lit. Magistri d.XXVII (SC 1).
- **p.792** raw notes n.1–n.9 → **[^6]–[^14]**. [^6]=Matth. + Cicero/Bernard perseverantia (SC 3), [^7]=d.27 *invicem* (arg 4 ratione), [^8]=Aristot. p.470 (arg 5), [^9]=*haberet* variant (arg 6), [^10]=*annexae* variant (Respondeo divisio), [^11]=d.31 (perfecta tentio), [^12]=tom.I Prooem. *ex qua / in qua* (causa materialis), [^13]=d.33 q.2 (causa materialis close), [^14]=Iac. 1,5 (causa efficiens).
- **p.793** raw notes n.1–n.8 → **[^15]–[^22]**. [^15]=*et / etiam* variant (causa formalis), [^16]=Aristot. II Phys. (causa finalis), [^17]=*connexam* variant (reply 1), [^18]=*innocentia* / Aristot. verecundia (reply 2), [^19]=p.792 nota 1 + Aristot. II Ethic perseverantia (reply 3), [^20]=infra q.6 / d.38 scholion (reply 4), [^21]=*nostra* variant (reply 5), [^22]=*stat* variant (reply 6).
- **p.794** carries **NO q1 footer notes** — only the scholion §III–IV body. The footer notes visible on p.794 (Cfr. quaest. praeced.; Gregor. I. Moral.; Psalm. 33,9; Vers. 8; Libr. I. c.3 Serm. 347) anchor **a1-q2**'s *Fundamenta* args and belong to q2's own fresh band.

Marker pairing 22/22 clean (both Latin and English bodies).

**Scholion disposition.** `has_scholion: true`. q1 carries the **ARTICULUS-master scholion §I–IV**, placed LAST in both language blocks. §I = the present q1 (gratum-faciens vs gratis-data; connexio quoad habitum non quoad usum; Scotus on theological vs cardinal virtues; Thomas's formal-cause argument; doxography). **§II FORWARDS to a1-q2** (`De seq. (2.) q. docet S. Bonav…` — connexio donorum: gifts connected quoad habitum but not quoad usum). **§III** bears on the reply ad 5.6 of the present q1 (the *septem vs octo beatitudines* number) but its doxographic sweep also bears on later qq. **§IV FORWARDS to a1-q2** (`De hac 2. quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal. … S. Thom. hic a.3 …`). So a1-q2 will likely have `has_scholion: false` with a redirect to this §II / §IV (the agent must still grep q2's range raw 55144–55271 for an own `SCHOLION.` header).

**Footer hand-off OUT → a1-q2: NOTHING forwarded.** The q1 NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM band closes fully on p.793 (note 8 = [^22], the *stat* variant on reply 6). p.794 carries only the scholion (no q1 footer notes); QUAESTIO II opens lower on p.794 with its own fresh per-page footer band (notes anchoring the q2 Fundamenta — see p.794 split map above).

**`[?]` flags:** NONE. pp.791–794 fully legible at 450 dpi.