title: Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiore.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum parvuli decedentes in solo originali puniantur aliquo dolore interiori. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per illud Ioannis Chrysostomi[^1], qui dicit: « Excludi a bonis aeternis, et alienum effici ab his quae praeparata sunt iustis, tantum generat cruciatum, tantum dolorem, ut etiam, si nulla extrinsecus poena torqueret, haec sola sufficeret ». Ergo si parvuli excludentur, sicut adulti: videtur, quod maxime cruciabuntur interiori dolore et gemitu.

2. Item, quandocumque aliquis desiderat aliquid et illo privatur, necessarium est, illum tristari et dolere[^2]; sed omnes homines naturaliter desiderant beatitudinem: ergo si parvulorum animae aeterna beatitudine privantur, videtur, quod ex hoc necessario tristentur.

3. Item, anima parvuli, dum unitur carni, contrahit concupiscentiam[^3]; cum ergo separatur a corpore, remanet in ea infectio illa contracta, et ipsa potest exire in actum; hoc constat: ergo potest concupiscere. Sed concupiscentia semper est vel cum delectatione, vel cum poena: cum delectatione, si habet quod desiderat; cum poena, si non habet: ergo si animae parvulorum delectationibus erunt privatae, videtur, quod doloribus interius erunt afflictae.

4. Item, parvuli decedentes cum originali, et antiqui Patres in limbo existentes, utrique privabantur visione divina: si ergo ampliori debebant poena puniri parvuli, qui habebant culpam, quam Patres, qui nullam habebant culpam; videtur, quod ex ipsa carentia visionis Dei aliquam tristitiam animae parvulorum habeant.

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5. Item, maior dolor est alicui, quando privatur aliquo bono sine causa, quam quando privatur ex causa aliqua: ergo pari ratione maior debet esse dolor, quando privatur ex minori causa, quam quando privatur ex maiori. Si ergo animae parvulorum ex minori causa privantur visione divina quam animae adultorum, videtur, quod magis doleant interius.

6. Item, animae parvulorum per naturam habent affectiones; sed affectiones necesse est vel quietari, vel per eas animam affligi — inquietudo enim affectionum non modica est afflictio — sed affectiones parvulorum non erunt quietatae, alioquin iam essent in quadam beatitudine — solus enim Deus est, qui quietat desiderium animae[^4] — ergo videtur, quod si anima erit in affectionum varietate et inquietudine, quod erit continue in dolore et in afflictione.

**Sed contra:**
1. Magister in littera[^5]: « Nullam aliam poenam sensuri sunt parvuli, ignis materialis, vel conscientiae vermis, nisi quod Dei visione carebunt in perpetuum »: ergo videtur, quod non habeant dolorem internum.

2. Item, originale inest animae ex unione ad carnem: ergo si aliquo dolore debet anima cruciari merito originalis peccati, illo potissime cruciari debet, qui inest animae secundum carnem. Si ergo caro non cremabitur igne materiali[^6], videtur, quod anima non cruciabitur dolore spirituali.

3. Item, si parvuli decedentes in originali dolebunt post hanc vitam, aut dolebunt de culpa, aut de damno. Si de culpa dolebunt, ergo erunt iusti. Si de damno dolebunt, cum illud damnum et poena carentiae visionis Dei sit iusta, et qui dolet de iusto est iniustus; videtur, quod in animabus decedentibus cum originali non tantum sit culpa originalis, sed etiam actualis.

4. Item, si parvuli dolebunt de amissione illius summi boni, cum ipsi virtutem patientiae non habeant, et qui dolet de aliquo malo, carens virtute patientiae, murmurat contra punientem vel infligentem: ergo videtur, quod animae parvulorum murmurent contra Deum. Sed nullus potest murmurare contra Deum nisi inique et iniuste: ergo videtur, quod post egressum a corpore animae decedentes in originali magis efficiantur iniquae quam ante; quod est impossibile.

5. Item, si dolent, aut credunt, se habituros[^7] illud bonum, aut certi sunt, quod nunquam habebunt. Constat, quod non exspectant illud bonum habendum, cum non habeant spem. Si ergo dolorem habent de bono amisso cum certitudine nunquam habendi, videtur, quod habeant desperationem; sed desperatio est acerbissima omnium poenarum infernalium: ergo parvuli punirentur poena acerbissima; quod impium est dicere.

6. Item, si dolent, aut dolent in summo, aut non. Si in summo dolent, ergo acerbissime puniuntur. Si non dolent in summo: ergo processu temporis possunt magis et magis dolere, cum dolor ille ortum habeat ex interiori affectione: ergo in eadem dispositione manente culpa, videtur, quod in eis crescat poena; quae duo sunt incompossibilia.

### Conclusio.

> Parvuli decedentes in peccato originali carebunt interiore dolore, non autem cognitione.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quia super hac quaestione nec expresse loquitur Scriptura, nec expresse eam Sancti determinant; ideo doctores theologiae[^8] hic opinantur contraria.

Quidam enim volunt dicere, quod parvuli carebunt et cognitione et dolore. Cognitione quidem carebunt, exigente iustitia; dolore carebunt, exigente misericordia. Iustitia namque exigit, ut non detur eis post hanc vitam donum aliquod cognitionis, quod in hac vita non habuerunt. Unde sicut caruerunt cognitione fidei et omni genere cognitionis intellectivae illi qui mortui sunt ante usum rationis; sic etiam carebunt post hanc vitam; nec diuturnitate temporis addiscent, sicut nec moriones[^9], qui nihil plus sciunt, quando moriuntur, quam quando nascuntur, etiamsi multo tempore vixerunt. Misericordia exigit, ut non habeant poenam actualis doloris, cum non habuerint maculam culpae actualis; et ideo iusto suo iudicio privat eos Deus omnium eorum cognitione, quae possent eis inferre dolorem. Melius est enim talia ignorare quam scire, sicut peccatori proclivo ad peccatum melius est ignorare, quam nosse ea quae eum inclinant ad peccatum.

Sed quia difficile est intelligere, quod anima separata non habeat usum rationis et non cognoscat ea saltem, quorum cognitio est ei naturaliter inserta, cum ex parte corporis impedimentum non habeat[^10];

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ideo alii aliter opinantur, quod animae parvulorum et habebunt cognitionem et habebunt etiam dolorem. Scient enim, propter quid factae sunt, et scient, se illo bono merito originalis culpae esse privatas; et propterea dolorem habebunt, et affectiones doloris in eis alternabuntur. Attamen non habebunt dolorem, qui mereatur dici vermis, quia non habebunt remorsum, quod perdiderint illud bonum propter propriam negligentiam et contemptum; et pro tanto dolor eorum erit multo mitior quam dolor adultorum.

Sed quoniam plura videntur inconvenientia sequi, si ponatur, ipsos dolere, sicut in opponendo monstratum est, tum propter hoc, quod dolor ille est absque patientia et absque spe, et ita cum murmure et desperatione; tum etiam, quia dolor animae redundat in carnem; et si talis dolor ex deliberatione procedit, non videtur esse absque actuali obligatione: propter haec et his similia est tertius modus dicendi, videlicet quod animae parvulorum carebunt actuali dolore et afflictione, non tamen carebunt cognitione. — Et illud potest satis rationabiliter intelligi per hunc modum. Decedentes enim in solo originali quasi medium tenent inter habentes gratiam et culpam actualem; et quoniam status retributionis debet respondere statui vitae praesentis, in tali statu debent animae parvulorum poni, ut quasi medium teneant inter Beatos et aeternis ignibus cruciatos. Quoniam igitur Beati carent malo poenae sensibilis et cum hoc habent Dei visionem, damnati e contrario sunt in tenebris et puniuntur poena sensibili; parvuli secundum rectum ordinem divinae aequitatis debent communicare in uno cum damnatis, et in alio cum Beatis. Sed non possunt communicare cum Beatis in habendo divinam praesentiam, quia tunc in nullo communicarent cum damnatis; praesentia enim visionis Dei non stat cum poena sensibili. Ideo cum Beatis communicant in hoc, quod carent omni afflictione exteriori et interiori; cum damnatis vero in hoc, quod privantur visione Dei et lucis corporalis. Parvuli igitur, sic divino iudicio iusto inter Beatos et simpliciter miseros quasi in medio constituti, hoc noverunt, et cum[^11] ex una parte consideratio generet desolationem, ex altera consolationem; ita aequa lance divino iudicio eorum cognitio et affectio libratur et in tali statu perpetuatur, ut nec tristitia deiiciat, nec laetitia reficiat. Et in hoc mirabilis ostenditur ordo divinae sapientiae, qui cuncta novit suis locis disponere[^12] et ad sui gloriam ordinare. Nam sicut in Beatis potissime manifestatur misericordia, et in damnatis potissime claret iustitia; sic in istis manifestatur misericordia simul et iustitia. Et ex hoc patet, quod non facit frustra Deus animas, quas novit de corpore ante susceptionem baptismatis egressuras. Omnia enim facit Deus ad gloriam suam manifestandam[^13].

Unde si tu quaeras, quid parvuli faciant, utrum addiscant, vel conferant, vel aliquod aliud opus exerceant; breviter ego respondeo, quod divinae iustitiae aequitas et immutabilitas in eodem statu quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, sive quoad cognitivam et quoad affectivam, perpetualiter eos consolidat, ut nec proficiant nec deficiant, nec laetentur nec tristentur, sed semper sic uniformiter maneant, ut sint materia laudandi divinum iudicium, quod sic est aequum et iustum, ut nullum bonum remaneat irremuneratum, nullum malum remaneat impunitum[^14], et perfectissime teneat medium inter superfluum et diminutum. — Secundum hanc igitur positionem concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod parvuli non sentient[^15] spiritualem dolorem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de Ioanne Chrysostomo, dicendum, quod intelligit de his qui excluduntur merito actualis peccati, qui vermem conscientiae et remorsum sunt habituri, et ideo non habet locum in parvulis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tristitia necessario sequitur, quando desiderium non impletur; dicendum, quod verum est, quando nec impletur in se, nec fit recompensatio secundum aestimationem desiderantis. Quando vero secundum aestimationem desiderantis aliqua recompensatio fit, non necesse est tristari; sicut multi, qui vellent esse in paradiso, bene consolantur de statu vitae praesentis, quia contenti sunt eis quae habent, quamvis modicum habeant. Sic et in parvulis intelligendum est esse, quod eis sufficiat status suus; nec elevant oculos ad opes, quas habere non possunt[^16].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima parvuli habet concupiscentiam; dicendum, quod sicut in hac vita nec concupivit nec desideravit aliquid, quod non debuerit, sic etiam nec in futura vita; sed ipsi divina sententia collocati erunt inter fugam et appetitum, ita quod neutrum eis dominabitur; et ideo nec habebunt actuale gaudium nec actuale supplicium; unum enim reprimitur per alterum.

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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sanctis Patribus, dicendum, quod sancti Patres spem et certitudinem habebant de futura gloria habenda, et gratiam etiam habebant, per quam Dominum aliquo modo cognoscebant; et ideo non sequitur, quod aequaliter punirentur, ut parvuli, pro eo quod plus habebant consolationis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior dolor est alicui, cum privatur absque causa; dicendum, quod parvuli bene scient, ex causa se esse privatos. Sed quia illam causam non a se habuerunt, sed aliunde contraxerunt; ideo nec dolorem nec remorsum habebunt. Verbum autem praedictum intelligitur in punitione iniusta, et in qua punitus punienti remurmurat; sic autem non est in proposito.

6. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod affectiones parvulorum stabiliuntur iudicio aequitatis divinae; non tamen totaliter quietantur, sicut affectiones Beatorum in patria. Unde sicut differt immunitas a passione sive a sensu poenae in parvulis et Beatis, quia in Beatis est dos, in parvulis non, sicut dictum est; sic intelligendum est de quietatione ex parte affectionum animae[^17].

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english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with any interior sorrow.*

Second it is asked, whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with any interior sorrow. And that they are, it seems:

1. By that [saying] of John Chrysostom[^1], who says: « To be excluded from eternal goods, and to be made alien from those things which are prepared for the just, generates so much torment, so much sorrow, that even if no punishment from without were to torture [them], this alone would suffice ». Therefore if little children will be excluded, just as adults: it seems that they will be tormented in the highest degree with interior sorrow and groaning.

2. Likewise, whenever someone desires something and is deprived of it, it is necessary that he be saddened and grieve[^2]; but all humans naturally desire beatitude: therefore if the souls of little children are deprived of eternal beatitude, it seems that from this they are necessarily saddened.

3. Likewise, the soul of a little child, while it is united to the flesh, contracts concupiscence[^3]; when therefore it is separated from the body, that contracted infection remains in it, and it can go forth into act; this is established: therefore it can be concupiscent. But concupiscence is always either with delight, or with punishment: with delight, if it has what it desires; with punishment, if it does not have [it]: therefore if the souls of little children will be deprived of delights, it seems that they will be afflicted interiorly with sorrows.

4. Likewise, little children dying with original [sin], and the ancient Fathers existing in limbo, both were deprived of the divine vision: if therefore little children, who had guilt, ought to be punished with a fuller punishment than the Fathers, who had no guilt; it seems that from the very lack of the vision of God the souls of little children have some sadness.

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5. Likewise, there is greater sorrow for someone when he is deprived of some good without cause, than when he is deprived from some cause: therefore by parity of reason the sorrow ought to be greater when one is deprived from a lesser cause than when one is deprived from a greater. If therefore the souls of little children are deprived of the divine vision from a lesser cause than the souls of adults, it seems that they grieve more interiorly.

6. Likewise, the souls of little children have affections by nature; but affections must either be quieted, or the soul be afflicted through them — for the unquiet of affections is no small affliction — but the affections of little children will not be quieted, otherwise they would already be in a certain beatitude — for God alone is he who quiets the desire of the soul[^4] — therefore it seems that if the soul will be in a variety and unquiet of affections, it will be continually in sorrow and in affliction.

**On the contrary:**
1. The Master in the text[^5]: « Little children will feel no other punishment of material fire, or of the worm of conscience, except that they will lack the vision of God forever »: therefore it seems that they do not have internal sorrow.

2. Likewise, original [sin] is in the soul from the union with the flesh: therefore if the soul ought to be tormented with any sorrow by the merit of original sin, it ought especially to be tormented with that which is in the soul according to the flesh. If therefore the flesh will not be burned with material fire[^6], it seems that the soul will not be tormented with spiritual sorrow.

3. Likewise, if little children dying in original [sin] will grieve after this life, either they will grieve over guilt, or over loss. If they will grieve over guilt, then they will be just. If they will grieve over loss, since that loss and the punishment of the lack of the vision of God is just, and he who grieves over what is just is unjust; it seems that in souls dying with original [sin] there is not only original guilt, but also actual.

4. Likewise, if little children will grieve over the loss of that highest good, since they themselves do not have the virtue of patience, and he who grieves over some evil, lacking the virtue of patience, murmurs against the one punishing or inflicting: therefore it seems that the souls of little children murmur against God. But no one can murmur against God except wickedly and unjustly: therefore it seems that after the departure from the body the souls dying in original [sin] are made more wicked than before; which is impossible.

5. Likewise, if they grieve, either they believe that they will have[^7] that good, or they are certain that they will never have [it]. It is established that they do not expect to have that good, since they do not have hope. If therefore they have sorrow over the lost good with the certainty of never having [it], it seems that they have despair; but despair is the most bitter of all the infernal punishments: therefore little children would be punished with the most bitter punishment; which it is impious to say.

6. Likewise, if they grieve, either they grieve in the highest degree, or not. If they grieve in the highest degree, then they are punished most bitterly. If they do not grieve in the highest degree: then in the course of time they can grieve more and more, since that sorrow has its origin from interior affection: therefore, with the guilt remaining in the same disposition, it seems that the punishment increases in them; which two things are incompossible.

### Conclusion.

> Little children dying in original sin will lack interior sorrow, but not cognition.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, because concerning this question neither does Scripture speak expressly, nor do the Saints expressly determine it; therefore the doctors of theology[^8] here hold contrary opinions.

For some wish to say that little children will lack both cognition and sorrow. They will lack cognition, justice demanding it; they will lack sorrow, mercy demanding it. For justice demands that there not be given to them after this life any gift of cognition which they did not have in this life. Whence just as those who died before the use of reason lacked the cognition of faith and every kind of intellective cognition; so also will they lack [it] after this life; nor will they learn by the length of time, just as neither do the *moriones*[^9], who know nothing more when they die than when they are born, even if they have lived a long time. Mercy demands that they not have the punishment of actual sorrow, since they did not have the stain of actual guilt; and therefore by his just judgment God deprives them of all cognition of those things which could bring sorrow upon them. For it is better to be ignorant of such things than to know [them], just as for a sinner prone to sin it is better to be ignorant than to know those things which incline him to sin.

But since it is difficult to understand that a separated soul should not have the use of reason and not know at least those things whose cognition is naturally implanted in it, since on the part of the body it has no impediment[^10];

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therefore others hold otherwise, that the souls of little children will both have cognition and will also have sorrow. For they will know on account of what they were made, and they will know that they have been deprived of that good by the merit of original guilt; and on this account they will have sorrow, and the affections of sorrow will alternate in them. Yet they will not have a sorrow which would deserve to be called a worm, because they will not have remorse that they lost that good through their own negligence and contempt; and to that extent their sorrow will be much milder than the sorrow of adults.

But since several unfitting things seem to follow, if it is held that they grieve, as was shown in the objecting — both on account of this, that that sorrow is without patience and without hope, and so with murmuring and despair; and also because the sorrow of the soul redounds upon the flesh; and if such sorrow proceeds from deliberation, it does not seem to be without actual obligation: on account of these things and things like these there is a third way of speaking, namely that the souls of little children will lack actual sorrow and affliction, yet they will not lack cognition. — And that can be understood reasonably enough in this way. For those dying in original [sin] alone hold as it were a mean between those having grace and actual guilt; and since the state of retribution ought to correspond to the state of the present life, the souls of little children ought to be placed in such a state that they hold as it were a mean between the Blessed and those tormented in eternal fires. Since therefore the Blessed lack the evil of sensible punishment and with this have the vision of God, the damned on the contrary are in darkness and are punished with sensible punishment; little children, according to the right order of divine equity, ought to share in one thing with the damned, and in another with the Blessed. But they cannot share with the Blessed in having the divine presence, because then they would share in nothing with the damned; for the presence of the vision of God does not stand together with sensible punishment. Therefore with the Blessed they share in this, that they lack all exterior and interior affliction; but with the damned in this, that they are deprived of the vision of God and of corporeal light. Little children therefore, thus by just divine judgment constituted as it were in the mean between the Blessed and the simply wretched, know this, and since[^11] on the one part the consideration generates desolation, on the other consolation; thus by an even balance, by divine judgment, their cognition and affection is weighed and perpetuated in such a state, that neither does sadness cast [them] down, nor does joy refresh [them]. And in this the marvelous order of divine wisdom is shown, which knows how to dispose all things in their places[^12] and to order [them] to its own glory. For just as in the Blessed mercy is most especially manifested, and in the damned justice most especially shines forth; so in these mercy and justice are manifested together. And from this it appears that God does not make in vain the souls which he knows will depart from the body before the reception of baptism. For God makes all things to manifest his glory[^13].

Whence if you ask what little children do, whether they learn, or confer, or exercise some other work; I respond briefly that the equity and immutability of divine justice in the same state as to the body and as to the soul, that is, as to the cognitive and as to the affective [power], perpetually consolidates them, so that they neither profit nor fail, neither rejoice nor are saddened, but always remain so uniformly, that they are matter for praising the divine judgment, which is so equitable and just that no good remains unrewarded, no evil remains unpunished[^14], and it most perfectly holds the mean between the excessive and the deficient. — According to this position therefore the reasons are to be granted which show that little children will not feel[^15] spiritual sorrow.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning John Chrysostom, it must be said that he understands [it] of those who are excluded by the merit of actual sin, who are going to have the worm of conscience and remorse, and therefore it has no place in little children.

2. To that which is objected, that sadness necessarily follows when desire is not fulfilled; it must be said that it is true, when it is neither fulfilled in itself, nor is recompense made according to the estimation of the one desiring. But when according to the estimation of the one desiring some recompense is made, it is not necessary to be saddened; just as many who would wish to be in paradise are well consoled concerning the state of the present life, because they are content with the things which they have, although they have little. So also in little children it is to be understood that their state suffices for them; nor do they raise their eyes to the riches which they cannot have[^16].

3. To that which is objected, that the soul of a little child has concupiscence; it must be said that just as in this life it neither was concupiscent nor desired anything which it ought not [to have], so also neither [will it] in the future life; but they themselves by divine sentence will be placed between flight and appetite, so that neither will dominate them; and therefore they will have neither actual joy nor actual torment; for the one is repressed by the other.

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4. To that which is objected concerning the holy Fathers, it must be said that the holy Fathers had hope and certitude concerning the future glory to be had, and they also had grace, through which they knew the Lord in some manner; and therefore it does not follow that they would be punished equally, like little children, for the reason that they had more of consolation.

5. To that which is objected, that there is greater sorrow for someone when he is deprived without cause; it must be said that little children will well know that they have been deprived from a cause. But because they did not have that cause from themselves, but contracted it from elsewhere; therefore they will have neither sorrow nor remorse. But the aforesaid word is understood in an unjust punishment, and in which the one punished murmurs back against the one punishing; but it is not so in the case proposed.

6. To the last it must be said that the affections of little children are stabilized by the judgment of divine equity; yet they are not totally quieted, like the affections of the Blessed in the fatherland. Whence just as the immunity from passion or from the sense of punishment differs in little children and in the Blessed, because in the Blessed there is the dowry [of glory], in little children there is not, as has been said; so it is to be understood concerning the quieting on the part of the affections of the soul[^17].

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la: Adhort. I. ad Theodorum lapsum, n. 9: *A tantis autem excidisse bonis tantum infert doloris, afflictionis, angustiae, ut etiamsi nullum aliud esset supplicium peccatoribus destinatum, illud solum posset graviorem aliis gehennae cruciatibus inferre poenam animaeque perturbationem.* Cfr. ibid. n. 11. et Hom. 23. in Matth. n. 7. seq.

en: *Exhortation* I. *to the fallen Theodore*, n. 9: *But to have fallen away from such great goods brings so much sorrow, affliction, [and] anguish, that even if no other punishment were destined for sinners, that alone could inflict a punishment and a perturbation of the soul graver than the other torments of Gehenna.* Cfr. the same place, n. 11, and Homily 23 on Matthew, n. 7. seq.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 287, nota 4. De minori cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 2.

en: Cfr. above p. 287, note 4. On the minor [premise] cfr. above p. 517, note 2.

en: As was proved above d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. I. a. 3. q. 2.

la: Ut ostensum est in quaest. praeced.

en: As was shown in the preceding question.

la: Fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 *habere*.

en: Nearly all codices and edd. 1, 2 [read] *habere* ("to have").

la: Codd. M Y aa hic interserunt *probabiliter*.

en: Codd. M Y aa here insert *probabiliter* ("probably").

la: August., Epist. 166. (alias 28.) c. 6. n. 17: *Quidam* [parvuli] *vero tantae sunt fatuitatis, ut non multum a pecoribus differant, quos moriones* [μῶρος, i. e. stultus] *vulgo vocant.* Cfr. Epist. 143. (alias 7.) n. 3. — Pro *moriones* Vat. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *maiores*, cod. V *embryones*. Paulo superius post *et omni* in codd. F Y aa subiungitur *alio*.

en: Augustine, Epist. 166. (otherwise 28.) c. 6. n. 17: *But some* [little children] *are of such great foolishness that they do not differ much from cattle, whom they commonly call* moriones [μῶρος, i. e. foolish]. Cfr. Epist. 143. (otherwise 7.) n. 3. — For *moriones* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 1, 2, 3 [reads] *maiores*, cod. V *embryones*. A little above, after *et omni*, in codd. F Y aa *alio* is subjoined.

la: Plura de cognitione animae a corpore separatae habentur IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. Ibid. a. 2. q. 1. seq. exponitur etiam, quid sit *vermis* damnatorum, cuius mentio fit paulo inferius.

en: More concerning the cognition of the soul separated from the body is had in IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. In the same place, a. 2. q. 1. seq., it is also expounded what the *worm* of the damned is, of which mention is made a little below.

la: Pro *et cum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *ut tamen*, edd. 1, 2 cum pluribus codd. *et tamen*. Post pauca pro *generet* ed. 1 et secunda manus in cod. T substituit *generat*.

en: For *et cum* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *ut tamen*, edd. 1, 2 with several codices *et tamen*. A little after, for *generet* ed. 1 and a second hand in cod. T substitutes *generat*.

la: August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1: *Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.* — Pro *qui cuncta* edd., excepta 1, *quae cuncta*.

en: Augustine, XIX. *On the City of God*, c. 13. n. 1: *Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, assigning to each its own places.* — For *qui cuncta* the editions, except 1, [read] *quae cuncta*.

la: Ut expositum est supra d. I. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

en: As was expounded above d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius pro *et quoad affectivam* Vat. cum pluribus codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 *sive quoad affectivam*.

en: According to Boethius, IV. *On Consolation*, prose 1. and 4. Cfr. tom. I. p. 713, note 2. — Somewhat above, for *et quoad affectivam* the Vatican [edition] with several codices and edd. 2, 3, 4 [reads] *sive quoad affectivam*.

la: Codd. K T cc et ed. 1 *sentiant*.

en: Codd. K T cc and ed. 1 [read] *sentiant*.

la: Cfr. quae supra pag. 565, nota 1. diximus de distinctione voluntatis in voluntatem possibilium et impossibilium, secundum Damascenum; cui distinctioni respondet distinctio desiderii in desiderium efficax et inefficax. *Desiderium efficax*, cum non expletur, sequitur tristitia, quae non sequitur desiderium inefficax, non expletum.

en: Cfr. what we said above p. 565, note 1, concerning the distinction of will into the will of possible and impossible things, according to Damascene; to which distinction corresponds the distinction of desire into efficacious and inefficacious desire. *Efficacious desire*, when it is not fulfilled, is followed by sadness, which does not follow inefficacious desire, [when] not fulfilled.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 33, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Distinctio XXXIII)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Distinction XXXIII)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 798 -->

### Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

**Dub. I.** In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Possunt intelligi plura peccata in una transgressione Adae.* Si enim hoc verum est, tunc pari ratione in quolibet uno peccato est multitudo peccatorum, si consideretur illa ratio assignandi diversa peccata in uno peccato, quam Augustinus ponit in littera[^1]. Quilibet enim, cum peccat, interficit animam suam, quia peccatum est mors animae; quilibet etiam transgreditur mandatum divinum: ergo est ibi homicidium et inobedientia; et sic de aliis. — Item, si fuit ibi pluralitas peccatorum: ergo videtur, quod in quolibet parvulo sit multitudo originalium. Quodsi tu dicas, quod non fuit transfusum originale ratione omnium, sed ratione alicuius; quaeritur ergo tunc, ratione cuius principaliter fuerit transfusum, scilicet utrum ratione *gulae*, vel *superbiae*, vel *inobedientiae.* Et quod ratione *inobedientiae*, videtur: ad Romanos quinto[^2]: *Per inobedientiam peccatum intravit in mundum.* — Quod autem fuerit *gula*, videtur per ipsum textum[^3]: *Quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini.* Et ratio concordare videtur, quia originale peccatum transfunditur mediante propagatione carnis, ergo transfunditur ratione peccati carnalis: ergo si non fuit ibi peccatum carnale nisi gula, ergo etc. — Quod autem fuerit *superbia*, videtur auctoritate Hugonis, in septima parte primi libri de Sacramentis[^4]: «Propter elationem animus obscuratus est; quia enim per elationem tumuit, ignorantia percussus, lumen veritatis amisit». Et parum ante hoc[^5]: «Quia spiritus, per superbiam contra Creatorem tumens, obedientiam non tenuit, idcirco Creator spiritum ignorantia, carnem vero concupiscentia damnavit».

Quaeritur ergo, ratione cuius horum originale principaliter transfunditur, cum omnia haec dicat Augustinus fuisse in primo peccato.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod peccatum Adae sicut et alia peccata in uno genere est principaliter; nihilominus tamen ex quadam adaptatione secundum diversos effectus et circumstantias, diversa dicitur in se claudere peccatorum genera, non quia in ipsa sit culparum multiplicitas, loquendo *essentialiter*, sed per quandam *adaptationem* et quandam *metaphoram.* Nihilominus tamen, sicut supra[^6] explanatum fuit, in consummatione et perpetratione unius peccati contingit diversa reperire peccata, ut *superbiam* vel *avaritiam* in primordio, et *gulam* in progressu, et *inobedientiam* in consummatione peccati primorum parentum, et maxime Evae.

Ad illud ergo, quod quaeritur, utrum ratione horum omnium, vel ratione alicuius istorum specialiter transfundatur originale peccatum; dico, quod ratione omnium, sed differenter; nam *superbia* respicit illam transfusionem originalis quasi *causaliter*, et *gula* quasi *materialiter*, et *inobedientia* quasi *formaliter.* Peccatum enim Adae, formaliter loquendo, fuit peccatum *inobedientiae*; *materialiter* vero, quia fuit esus ligni, fuit peccatum *gulae*; sed *causaliter*, quia fuit propter acquirendam excellentiam, fuit peccatum *superbiae.* — Et sic patet responsio ad obiecta[^7].

**Dub. II.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit de peccato Adae: *Non est putandum, peccatum Adae gravius fuisse quam peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.* Hoc enim videtur falsum, quia maius malum est quod corrumpit totam naturam, quam quod corrumpit <!-- page 799 -->unam solam personam; sed peccatum Adae totam naturam corrumpebat, peccatum in Spiritum sanctum unam solam personam: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec quaestio determinata fuit supra[^8], cum agebatur de peccato Adae; et ideo breviter dixisse sufficiat, quod ex diversis causis unum peccatum dicitur esse maius altero. — Propter quod notandum, quod multis modis dicitur peccatum unum esse maius sive gravius altero. Primo modo *causalitate*; et sic peccatum diaboli dicitur esse maius, cuius *invidia mors introivit in orbem terrarum*[^9]. Secundo modo *generalitate*; et sic peccatum primi parentis dicitur fuisse maius, quia in totum genus humanum se diffudit. Tertio modo *enormitate*; et sic peccatum Iudae dicitur esse maximum, quia vendidit Deum. Quarto modo *ingratitudine*; et sic peccatum illius dicitur esse maius, qui plura percepit dona gratiarum. Quinto modo *periculositate*; et sic peccatum ignorantiae dicitur esse maximum, quia periculosum. Sexto modo *inseparabilitate*; et sic peccatum cupiditatis dicitur esse maximum, quia cum alia vitia cum homine consenescant, sola avaritia iuvenescit[^10]. Septimo modo *importunitate*; et sic superbia dicitur esse maximum, quia etiam ex ipsis bonis operibus consurgit. Octavo modo *pronitate*; et sic luxuria dicitur esse gravius, ad quam homines magis sunt proni. Nono modo *maioris gratiae impugnatione*; et sic peccatum in Spiritum sanctum dicitur esse maximum. Decimo modo *ratione maioris offensae*; et sic peccatum idololatriae dicitur esse maximum. Undecimo modo *ratione facilitatis resistendi*; et sic dicit Magister, quod peccatum Adae fuerit gravissimum. Duodecimo modo *ratione maioris improbitatis atque libidinis*; et sic cuiusque generis peccatum maius potest fieri altero[^11]. — Hi duodecim modi consueverunt a doctoribus assignari. Fortassis et alii apparebunt modi, sed isti sufficiant tanquam magis consueti. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur.

**Dub. III.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *peccatum commissum est ab homine, quando tota natura in eo consistebat; ideo tota natura in eo corrupta est.* Ex hoc enim videtur, quodsi Adam perpetrasset aliud peccatum quam illud, cum in eo esset tota natura, quod totam naturam corrupisset. *Sed contra*: ponatur, quod Adam solo consensu peccasset, tunc corpus in actu[^12] peccati animae non communicasset: ergo caro non fuisset infecta: ergo nec originalis culpa transfusa. — Item, poenitentia in integrum restituit ea quae mens perdidit, quamvis non restituat ea quae sunt corporis: ergo si homo tantum mentaliter peccasset, omnino per poenitentiam resurgeret: non ergo videtur, quod originalem culpam transfunderet.

Propter hoc est quaestio, utrum si peccasset alio genere peccati, originale transfudisset.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod cum omne peccatum sit «praevaricatio legis divinae et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum[^13]», et per omne peccatum avertatur anima a Deo et fiat ei rebellis; quod quocumque genere peccati Adam peccasset, rebellionem carnis et spiritus incurrisset. — Item, cum omne peccatum sit iniustitia, quocumque genere peccati peccasset Adam, privatus fuisset iustitia, quam habebat. — Item, cum omne peccatum mortale sit mors animae, per quodlibet[^14] incurrisset carnis mortalitatem. Cum igitur ista faciant originale transfundi, tenuerunt, quod Adam transfudisset originale, quocumque genere peccati peccasset; et hoc videtur sonare verbum Magistri. Secundum hanc positionem de facili respondetur ad illud quod obiicitur, quia, sicut videmus, quod pro peccatis spiritualibus caro cruciatur in inferno, et hoc, quia nihil aliud est carnem cruciari quam voluntatem cruciari in carne; sic et in proposito voluerunt dicere, quod esse potuit, ut pro peccato, quod commisisset spiritualiter, puniretur corporaliter.

Alius modus dicendi est, quod si Adam mortaliter peccasset, et[^15] mandatum illud non fuisset transgressus, non transfunderet originale. Et ratio huius est, quia pro sola transgressione illius mandati comminatus est ei Dominus mortem, sicut patet secundo Genesis[^16]. Et secundum hanc positionem verbum Magistri, quod dicitur in littera, intelligitur, praesupposita transgressione illius mandati, cui adiuncta erat mortalitatis poena. — Primus tamen modus dicendi videtur esse probabilior. Quamvis enim Scriptura non comminetur mortem nisi pro illa inobedientia, non absurde tamen illa comminatio intelligitur se extendere ad omnem mortalem culpam. Quod autem istorum verius sit, dubium est; nec ibi est magna vis facienda, quia modica est utilitas et nulla sciendi necessitas[^17].

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**Dub. IV.** Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Si homo iuste in carne vixerit, non continuo meretur eam mortem non perpeti, quam traxit a propagatione peccati.* Hoc enim videtur inconvenienter dictum. Si enim nulla poena debetur homini nisi merito culpae, et homo in carne adeo potest iuste vivere, ut sit dignus statim evolare[^18]; videtur, quod in eo non sit meritum alicuius poenae, nec mortis nec alterius. — Item, si mors debetur cuilibet iusto pro peccato, videtur igitur, quod nulla gratia fuerit in Martyribus, qui mortui sunt pro Christo, sicut nec in latronibus, qui suspenduntur pro latrocinio.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: si mors debetur homini pro originali peccato, et unicum est in homine originale peccatum[^19], quae iustitia fuit in Lazaro, qui bis mortuus est?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod nulla unquam iustitia absolvit hominem a debito mortis, pro eo quod omnis iustitia, quae est in nobis, respicit *voluntatem* et est *personalis*; mors vero est poena *naturalis*; et ideo per nullam iustitiam dignus est homo a morte absolvi; nec Deus sua benignitate aliquem a morte liberavit, tum propter illius sententiae firmitatem, qua dictum est Genesis tertio[^20]: *Pulvis es, et in pulverem* etc.; tum etiam, ut fides locum habere possit.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de Martyribus, dicendum, quod illud quod uno modo est debitum, si ex caritate fiat, potest fieri *gratum*[^21]; Martyres autem quia mortem voluntarie sustinuerunt, quam effugere potuerunt, immo morti pro Christo se ante tempus obtulerunt, mors, quae alias esset poena, fuit eis valde meritoria, quia Deus eam valde reputat pretiosam, ex hac duplici causa, quae tacta est.

Ad illud de Lazaro dicendum, quod prima mors fuit ad manifestandum gloriam Dei[^22]; et illud supplicium recompensatum est per consequens beneficium, quia hoc ipso, quod suscitatus est, fuit ei ampliatum merendi spatium; et melius erat ei sic bis mori, quam si semel mortuus fuisset. Ideo cum hoc alicui praestatur, ut suscitetur, magis sibi reputet praestari beneficium, quam inferri supplicium[^23].

---

english:
### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *Several sins can be understood in the one transgression of Adam.* For if this is true, then by parity of reason in any one sin there is a multitude of sins, if one considers that manner of assigning diverse sins in one sin, which Augustine sets down in the text[^1]. For everyone, when he sins, slays his own soul, because sin is the death of the soul; everyone also transgresses the divine command: therefore there is there homicide and disobedience; and so of the others. — Likewise, if there was there a plurality of sins: then it seems that in every infant there is a multitude of original sins. But if you say that the original [sin] was not transmitted by reason of all [of these], but by reason of some one [of them]; it is then asked by reason of which it was principally transmitted, namely whether by reason of *gluttony*, or of *pride*, or of *disobedience.* And that it was by reason of *disobedience*, seems [true]: to the Romans, in the fifth chapter[^2]: *Through disobedience sin entered into the world.* — But that it was *gluttony*, seems [true] from the text itself[^3]: *On whatever day you shall eat, you shall die the death.* And the reasoning seems to agree, because original sin is transmitted by the mediation of the propagation of the flesh, therefore it is transmitted by reason of a carnal sin: therefore if there was there no carnal sin except gluttony, therefore etc. — But that it was *pride*, seems [true] by the authority of Hugh, in the seventh part of the first book *On the Sacraments*[^4]: «On account of elation the mind was darkened; for because it swelled through elation, smitten by ignorance, it lost the light of truth». And a little before this[^5]: «Because the spirit, swelling through pride against the Creator, did not keep obedience, therefore the Creator condemned the spirit with ignorance, but the flesh with concupiscence».

It is asked therefore by reason of which of these the original [sin] is principally transmitted, since Augustine says that all these were in the first sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the sin of Adam, like other sins, is principally in one genus; nevertheless, by a certain adaptation according to diverse effects and circumstances, it is said to contain within itself diverse genera of sins, not because in it there is a multiplicity of faults, speaking *essentially*, but by a certain *adaptation* and a certain *metaphor.* Nevertheless, as was explained above[^6], in the consummation and perpetration of one sin it happens that diverse sins are found, such as *pride* or *avarice* in the beginning, and *gluttony* in the progress, and *disobedience* in the consummation of the sin of the first parents, and especially of Eve.

To that therefore which is asked, whether by reason of all these, or by reason of some one of these specially the original sin is transmitted; I say that by reason of all, but differently; for *pride* regards that transmission of the original [sin] as it were *causally*, and *gluttony* as it were *materially*, and *disobedience* as it were *formally.* For the sin of Adam, formally speaking, was the sin of *disobedience*; but *materially*, because it was the eating of the tree, it was the sin of *gluttony*; but *causally*, because it was for the sake of acquiring excellence, it was the sin of *pride.* — And thus the answer to the objections becomes plain[^7].

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says concerning the sin of Adam: *It is not to be thought that the sin of Adam was graver than the sin against the Holy Spirit.* For this seems false, because a greater evil is that which corrupts the whole nature, than that which corrupts <!-- page 799 -->one single person; but the sin of Adam corrupted the whole nature, the sin against the Holy Spirit one single person: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that this question was determined above[^8], when treatment was made concerning the sin of Adam; and therefore let it suffice to have said briefly that from diverse causes one sin is said to be greater than another. — On account of which it must be noted that in many ways one sin is said to be greater or graver than another. In the first way by *causality*; and thus the sin of the devil is said to be greater, *by whose envy death entered into the world*[^9]. In the second way by *generality*; and thus the sin of the first parent is said to have been greater, because it diffused itself into the whole human race. In the third way by *enormity*; and thus the sin of Judas is said to be the greatest, because he sold God. In the fourth way by *ingratitude*; and thus the sin of him is said to be greater, who received more gifts of graces. In the fifth way by *perilousness*; and thus the sin of ignorance is said to be the greatest, because it is perilous. In the sixth way by *inseparability*; and thus the sin of cupidity is said to be the greatest, because while the other vices grow old together with man, avarice alone grows young[^10]. In the seventh way by *importunity*; and thus pride is said to be the greatest, because it arises even from good works themselves. In the eighth way by *proneness*; and thus lust is said to be graver, to which men are more prone. In the ninth way by *the impugning of a greater grace*; and thus the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be the greatest. In the tenth way by *reason of a greater offense*; and thus the sin of idolatry is said to be the greatest. In the eleventh way by *reason of the ease of resisting*; and thus the Master says that the sin of Adam was the gravest. In the twelfth way by *reason of greater wickedness and lust*; and thus a sin of any genus can become greater than another[^11]. — These twelve ways are wont to be assigned by the doctors. Perhaps other ways too will appear, but let these suffice as the more customary. — And by this the answer to that which is objected becomes plain.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *the sin was committed by man, when the whole nature consisted in him; therefore the whole nature was corrupted in him.* For from this it seems that, if Adam had perpetrated another sin than that one, since the whole nature was in him, he would have corrupted the whole nature. *But on the contrary*: let it be posited that Adam had sinned by consent alone, then the body would not have communicated in the act[^12] of the sin of the soul: therefore the flesh would not have been infected: therefore neither would the original fault have been transmitted. — Likewise, penance restores in full those things which the mind lost, although it does not restore those things which are of the body: therefore if a man had sinned only mentally, he would altogether rise again through penance: it does not therefore seem that he would transmit the original fault.

On account of this there is a question, whether, if he had sinned by another genus of sin, he would have transmitted the original [sin].

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion. For some wished to say that, since every sin is «a transgression of the divine law and a disobedience to the heavenly commandments[^13]», and through every sin the soul is turned away from God and becomes rebellious to him; that by whatever genus of sin Adam had sinned, he would have incurred the rebellion of the flesh and the spirit. — Likewise, since every sin is injustice, by whatever genus of sin Adam had sinned, he would have been deprived of the justice which he had. — Likewise, since every mortal sin is the death of the soul, by any [such sin][^14] he would have incurred the mortality of the flesh. Since therefore these things cause the original [sin] to be transmitted, they held that Adam would have transmitted the original [sin], by whatever genus of sin he had sinned; and this seems to be the import of the word of the Master. According to this position it is easily answered to that which is objected, because, as we see, that for spiritual sins the flesh is tormented in hell, and this, because it is nothing else for the flesh to be tormented than for the will to be tormented in the flesh; so also in the matter at hand they wished to say that it could be, that for a sin which he had committed spiritually, he would be punished corporally.

Another manner of speaking is, that if Adam had sinned mortally, and[^15] had not transgressed that command, he would not transmit the original [sin]. And the reason of this is, that for the sole transgression of that command the Lord threatened him with death, as is plain in the second [chapter] of Genesis[^16]. And according to this position the word of the Master, which is said in the text, is understood, the transgression of that command being presupposed, to which the punishment of mortality was joined. — Yet the first manner of speaking seems to be the more probable. For although Scripture threatens death only for that disobedience, yet not absurdly is that threat understood to extend to every mortal fault. But which of these is truer, is doubtful; nor is there great force to be made there, because the utility is slight and there is no necessity of knowing it[^17].

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**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *If a man has lived justly in the flesh, he does not forthwith merit not to suffer that death which he drew from the propagation of sin.* For this seems unfittingly said. For if no punishment is owed to a man except by the merit of fault, and a man can live so justly in the flesh that he is worthy to fly away at once[^18]; it seems that in him there is not the merit of any punishment, neither of death nor of another. — Likewise, if death is owed to every just man for sin, it seems therefore that there was no grace in the Martyrs, who died for Christ, just as neither in the thieves, who are hanged for theft.

In connection with this it is asked: if death is owed to a man for original sin, and there is only one original sin in a man[^19], what justice was in Lazarus, who died twice?

**I respond:** It must be said that no justice ever absolved a man from the debt of death, on account of the fact that all justice which is in us regards the *will* and is *personal*; but death is a *natural* punishment; and therefore by no justice is a man worthy to be absolved from death; nor did God by his benignity free anyone from death, both on account of the firmness of that sentence, by which it was said in the third [chapter] of Genesis[^20]: *Dust you are, and into dust* etc.; and also that faith might have place.

To that which is asked concerning the Martyrs, it must be said that that which in one way is a debt, if it be done out of charity, can become *acceptable*[^21]; but the Martyrs, because they voluntarily endured death, which they could have escaped, nay rather offered themselves to death for Christ before their time, the death which otherwise would be a punishment was for them greatly meritorious, because God reckons it greatly precious, from this twofold cause which has been touched upon.

To that concerning Lazarus it must be said, that the first death was for the manifesting of the glory of God[^22]; and that suffering was recompensed by a consequent benefit, because by this very thing, that he was raised up, a span for meriting was enlarged for him; and it was better for him thus to die twice, than if he had died once. Therefore when this is granted to anyone, that he be raised up, let him rather reckon that a benefit is bestowed upon him, than that a suffering is inflicted[^23].

---

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2.

en: Verses 12 and 19.

la: Gen. 2, 17, ubi Vulgata: *In quocumque enim die comederis ex eo, morte morieris.* — De ratione addita vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.

en: Genesis 2:17, where the Vulgate [reads]: *For on whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death.* — On the reasoning added, see above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1 ff.

la: Cap. 31, ubi textus originalis, post *obscuratus est* additis verbis *per ignorantiam*, sic prosequitur: *quia enim animus per elationem contra Deum tumuit* etc.

en: C. 31, where the original text, after *obscuratus est*, with the words *per ignorantiam* added, continues thus: *for because the mind swelled through elation against God* etc.

la: Dist. 22. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam d. 5. a. 1. q. 1, ubi simile de angelorum peccato dicitur. — Mox antiquiores codd. minus recte pro *superbiam... avaritiam* etc. exhibent *superbia... avaritia* etc. Pro *reperire* in cod. dd legitur *reperiri.*

en: Dist. 22, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. also d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, where the like is said concerning the sin of the angels. — Soon after, the older codices less correctly for *superbiam... avaritiam* etc. exhibit *superbia... avaritia* etc. For *reperire* in codex dd is read *reperiri.*

la: De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 3. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 17. q. 107. m. 4. a. 2. partic. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 1.

en: On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 106, m. 3, a. 3; B. Albert, here, a. 2; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 17, q. 107, m. 4, a. 2, partic. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 1.

la: Dist. 21. a. 3. q. 3. — Mox in Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desunt verba *et ideo breviter dixisse sufficiat* usque ad *maius altero* inclusive.

en: Dist. 21, a. 3, q. 3. — Soon after, in the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 the words *et ideo breviter dixisse sufficiat* up to *maius altero* inclusive are lacking.

en: Wisdom 2:24.

la: Serm. 48. ad Fratres in eremo (inter opera Augustini): *Omnia in homine senescunt vitia, sola avaritia iuvenescit.* — Paulo inferius pro *maximum* codd. et edd. 1, 2 *maxima*, quod minus congruum est.

en: Sermon 48, to the Brothers in the desert (among the works of Augustine): *All the vices grow old in man, avarice alone grows young.* — A little below, for *maximum* the codices and editions 1, 2 read *maxima*, which is less congruous.

la: Edd., excepta 1, *ab altero.* — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 137. m. 5; B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 120. m. 1. a. 3. partic. 3; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 2.

en: The editions, except the first, read *ab altero.* — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 137, m. 5; B. Albert, here, a. 3; *Summa*, p. II, tr. 18, q. 120, m. 1, a. 3, partic. 3; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 2.

la: Pro *in actu* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *actum.*

en: For *in actu* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 read *actum.*

la: Ambros., de Paradiso, c. 8. n. 39.

en: Ambrose, *On Paradise*, c. 8, n. 39.

la: Edd., excepta 1, pro *quolibet*; eaedem omittunt etiam *animae.*

en: The editions, except the first, [read something else] for *quolibet*; the same also omit *animae.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *sed.*

en: Codex cc and edition 1 read *sed.*

la: Vers. 17.

en: Verse 17.

la: Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 3. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic circa lit.

en: Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 106, m. 3, a. 3; B. Albert, here, a. 2; St. Thomas, here on the text.

la: Id est intrare in caelum. — De prima parte proposit. vide supra pag. 135, nota 2.

en: That is, to enter into heaven. — On the first part of the proposition, see above, p. 135, note 2.

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro *fuit* in Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *facta fuit*; subinde pro *qui* codd. B H K Q aa bb et alii *quod.*

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. 2. — Soon after, for *fuit* in the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [is] *facta fuit*; thereupon for *qui* codices B, H, K, Q, aa, bb and others [read] *quod.*

la: Vers. 19. — Ratio secundo loco adducta affertur etiam ab August., II. de Peccat. merit. et remiss. etc. c. 31. n. 50, et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 4, ubi etiam ea tanguntur, quae mox de morte Martyrum dicuntur, nec non ab Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 3. c. 9.

en: Verse 19. — The reason adduced in the second place is brought forward also by Augustine, *On the Merits and Remission of Sins* etc., Bk. II, c. 31, n. 50, and *On the City of God*, Bk. XIII, c. 4, where also those things are touched upon which presently are said about the death of the Martyrs, and likewise by Anselm, *On the Concord of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice*, q. 3, c. 9.

la: Id est gratiam sibi comparans. — Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *gratuitum.* Mox Vat. omittit *morti.*

en: That is, procuring grace for oneself. — The Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 [read] *gratuitum.* Soon after, the Vatican edition omits *morti.*

la: Ioan. 11, 4: *Infirmitas haec non est ad mortem, sed pro gloria Dei, ut glorificetur Filius Dei per eam.*

en: John 11:4: *This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified by it.*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 105. m. 2. per totum; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, p. II, q. 105, m. 2, throughout; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Giles of Rome, here, doubt on the text, 5.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF of printed pp. 798–800 (PDF pp. 820–822, offset +22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR (raw lines 55586–55734). FINAL unit of DISTINCTIO XXXIII — after this chunk **d.33 is fully Tier-2** (all 9 units: littera + divisio + a1-q1/q2/q3 + a2-q1 + a3-q1/q2 + dubia). The DUBIA opens at the bottom of p.798 L-col (header `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` immediately after a3-q2's tail on p.798 L-col) and closes at the top of p.800 R-col (*…quam inferri supplicium.*) immediately before DISTINCTIO XXXIV / Cap. I.

**ALIGNMENT NOTE — FOUR dubia, not three.** The dispatch brief specified DUB. I–III, but the raw OCR and 450 dpi PDF confirm **FOUR** dubia (DUB. I, II, III, IV) belong to DISTINCTIO XXXIII before DISTINCTIO XXXIV begins. DUB. IV (header at raw 55712, printed p.800 L-col) is included here; the chunk now holds all four.

**Verified DUB count = 4 (I–IV)** at 450 dpi:
- DUB. I — *Possunt intelligi plura peccata in una transgressione Adae* (by reason of which sin — gula / superbia / inobedientia — original sin is principally transmitted; resolved: by reason of all, but *superbia causaliter, gula materialiter, inobedientia formaliter*). Carries a *Quaestio incidens* margin at the Respondeo.
- DUB. II — *Non est putandum, peccatum Adae gravius fuisse quam peccatum in Spiritum sanctum* (the twelve *modi* in which one sin is said to be graver than another).
- DUB. III — *Peccatum commissum est ab homine… ideo tota natura in eo corrupta est* (whether Adam would have transmitted original sin had he sinned by another genus; *duplex opinio* — *Opinio 1* yes / *Opinio 2* only with the mandate's transgression; *Notandum*: the first is the more probable). Carries *Quaestio connexa*, *Opinio 1*, *Opinio 2*, *Notandum* margins.
- DUB. IV — *Si homo iuste in carne vixerit, non continuo meretur eam mortem non perpeti* (whether a just man merits exemption from death; and the *Quaestio incidens* of Lazarus who died twice; resolved: death is *poena naturalis*, not absolved by *personalis* justice; Martyrs' death made meritorious *ex caritate*; Lazarus' second death an enlarged *merendi spatium*). Carries *Quaestio incidens* and *Ad quaest. incidentem* margins.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.798** (L-col bottom → R-col): DUBIA header + DUB. I (full, body + Respondeo) + DUB. II opener; footers **2–8** → [^1]–[^7] (footer 1 = *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* belongs to a3-q2).
- **p.799** (L-col + R-col; running head `DIST. XXXIII. DUBIA.`): DUB. II tail (twelve modi) + DUB. III (full); 10 footers → [^8]–[^17].
- **p.800** (L-col + R-col top): DUB. IV (full, body + Respondeo); 6 footers → [^18]–[^23]. DISTINCTIO XXXIV (Cap. I–III) begins on the same page's lower L-col + R-col — its footers (p.800 footers 1–4 of the d.34 block + the NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM block) are NOT claimed here.
- Body seams grammatically continuous: 798→799 (DUB. II: *…quam quod corrumpit ‖ unam solam personam*); 799→800 (DUB. III closes on p.799 R-col, DUB. IV opens fresh on p.800 L-col — clean unit boundary, the only mid-page seam is the 798→799 split inside DUB. II).

**Apparatus = 23 entries** ([^1]–[^23]), 1:1 with printed-page footers in print order. DUB. I = [^1]–[^7] (p.798 footers 2–8). DUB. II = [^8]–[^11] (p.799 footers 1–4). DUB. III = [^12]–[^17] (p.799 footers 5–10). DUB. IV = [^18]–[^23] (p.800 footers 1–6). N La = N En = N defs = 23.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED from a3-q2 (shared printed p.798): only p.798 footer 1 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*) is retained by a3-q2; the p.798 footer block below footer 1 (footers 2–8: *Hic c. 2*, *Vers. 12 et 19*, *Gen. 2,17*, *Cap. 31*, *Cap. 27*, *Dist. 22…*, *De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal.*) was FORWARDED to this dubia and anchored as [^1]–[^7]. FORWARDED OUT: none — the DUBIA closes the distinction; DISTINCTIO XXXIV opens fresh on p.800 L-col with its own Cap. I–III and its own footer block + NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.

**Cascade-dropout check.** The IA djvu OCR cascade-shattered the DUB. I Respondeo (*Quaeritur ergo, ratione cuius horum originale…*) and the entire DUB. III opener + *Quaestio connexa* / *Opinio 1* / *Opinio 2* / *Notandum* margin region (raw 55654–55661 is interleaved one-token-per-line); the body was reconstructed column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF. Both page seams (798→799 inside DUB. II, 799→800 at the DUB. III/IV boundary) read against the column bands and confirmed continuous with no mid-paragraph splice. No body text or footnote lost at the seams.

**has_scholion = false** — DUBIA chunks carry no scholion.

**[?] flags:** none. All four DUB bodies, both DUB. III opinions, the *Quaestio incidens* sub-questions of DUB. I/IV, and the full p.798 (f2–8), p.799 (f1–10), and p.800 (f1–6) footer blocks were read against the 450 dpi column bands and parse cleanly.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 34

title_alt: Distinction XXXIV — The Text of the Master

source_text:
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### DISTINCTIO XXXIV.

#### Cap. I.

#### *De peccato actuali.*

Post praedicta de peccato actuali diligenti indagine quaedam consideranda sunt, scilicet quae fuerit origo et causa primi peccati, utrum res bona, an res mala; postea, in qua re sit peccatum; deinde, quid sit peccatum, et quot modis fiat, et de differentia ipsorum peccatorum.

#### Cap. II.

#### *Quae fuit origo et causa peccati prima.*

Causa et origo prima peccati res bona exstitit, quia ante primum peccatum non erat aliquid mali[^1], unde oriretur. Cum enim originem et causam habuerit, aut ex bono aut ex malo habuit. Sed malum ante non erat, ex bono igitur ortum est. Prius enim in angelo ortum est peccatum, et postea in homine. Et quid erat angelus nisi bona natura Dei? Non ex Deo ortum est malum, quod fuit in angelo, non ex alio quam ex angelo, ex bono igitur ortum fuit. Unde Augustinus[^2] in responsionibus contra Iulianum haereticum, qui dixerat: « Si ex natura peccatum est, tunc mala est natura; ait: Quaeso ut, si potest, respondeat. Manifestum est, ex voluntate mala, tanquam ex arbore mala, fieri omnia opera mala, tanquam fructus malos; sed ipsam malam voluntatem unde dicit exortam nisi ex bono? Si enim ex angelo; quid est angelus nisi bonum opus Dei? Si ex homine; quid erat ipse homo nisi bonum opus Dei? Immo quid erant haec duo, antequam in eis oriretur mala voluntas, nisi bonum opus Dei et bona et laudanda natura? Ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit unde oriri posset nisi ex bono. Dico ergo, quia voluntatem malam nullum malum praecessit, sed ex bono originem habuit ». — Hic aperte dicitur[^3], primam causam et originem mali bonam fuisse naturam. Et nihilominus ostenditur, cuius peccati fuerit causa, scilicet malae voluntatis.

#### Cap. III.

#### *Quae fuerit secundaria causa malorum.*

Mala autem voluntas illa angeli et hominis causa est etiam malorum subsequentium, scilicet malorum

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operum et malarum voluntatum. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio[^4]: « Nequaquam dubitare debemus, rerum bonarum, quae ad nos pertinent, causam non esse nisi bonitatem Dei. Malarum vero ab immutabili bono deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, postea hominis » : « hoc primum est creaturae rationalis malum, id est prima privatio boni ». — Ecce habes, primam voluntatem boni mutabilis, id est angeli vel hominis, deficientem ab immutabili bono, id est a Deo, causam esse malarum rerum ad nos pertinentium, quia causa est tam peccatorum quam poenarum, quibus premitur humana natura. Prima igitur origo et causa peccati bonum fuit, et secunda malum, quod ortum est ex bono.

#### Cap. IV.

#### *Quod non nisi in re bona sit causa malorum.*

Ostensa origine mali, superest videre, in qua re sit malum, scilicet an in re bona, an in re mala. — Qui recte acuteque sapit, non nisi in bono malum esse intelligit, id est in natura bona. Malum enim est corruptio vel privatio boni; ubi autem bonum non est, non potest esse corruptio vel privatio boni. Peccatum igitur non potest esse nisi in re bona. Sicut enim morbis ac vulneribus corrumpuntur corpora, quae, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio[^5], « sunt privationes eius boni, quod dicitur sanitas; ita et animorum quaecumque sunt vitia naturalium sunt privationes bonorum. Quid est enim aliud, quod malum dicitur, nisi privatio boni » ? « Bonum enim minui malum est; quamvis quantumcumque minuatur, necesse est, ut aliquid remaneat, si adhuc natura est. Non enim consumi potest bonum, quod est natura, nisi et ipsa consumatur. Cum vero corrumpitur, ideo malum est eius corruptio, quia eam qualicumque privat bono. Nam si nullo bono privat, non nocet; nocet autem: adimit igitur bonum. Quamdiu itaque natura corrumpitur, inest ei bonum, quo privetur ». « Ac per hoc nullum est, quod dicitur malum, si nullum sit bonum; sed bonum, omnino malo carens, integrum bonum est. Cui vero inest malum vitiatum vel vitiosum bonum est; nec malum unquam potest esse ullum, ubi est nullum bonum. Unde res mira conficitur, ut quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est, nihil aliud dici videtur, cum vitiosa natura mala natura esse dicitur, nisi malum esse quod bonum est, nec malum esse nisi quod bonum est ». Hac contextione[^6] evidenter insinuatur, malum non posse esse nisi in re bona; ubi etiam, licet absurdum videatur, manifeste dicitur, esse malum quod bonum est. Ex quo colligitur, nihil aliud significari, cum dicitur homo malus, nisi bonum malum. Unde Augustinus in eodem[^7] subdit: « Quid est malus homo nisi mala natura? quia homo natura est. Porro, si homo aliquod bonum est, quia natura est, quid aliud est malus homo nisi malum bonum? Tamen cum duo ista discernimus, invenimus nec ideo malum, quia homo est, nec ideo bonum, quia iniquus est; sed bonum, quia homo, malum, quia iniquus. Omnis itaque natura, etiam si vitiosa sit, in quantum natura est, bona est; in quantum vitiosa est, mala est ».

#### Cap. V.

#### *Quod in his fallit dialecticorum regula de contrariis.*

Ideoque « in his contrariis, quae mala et bona vocantur, illa dialecticorum regula deficit, qua dicunt, nulli rei duo simul inesse contraria. Nullus enim potus aut cibus simul dulcis est et amarus; nullum simul corpus ubi album, ibi et nigrum; et hoc in multis ac pene in omnibus reperitur contrariis, ut in una re simul esse non possint. Cum autem bona et mala nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in bonis esse non possunt. Et haec duo contraria ita simul sunt, ut, si bonum non esset, in quo malum[^8] esset; prorsus nec malum esse potuisset, quia non modo ubi consisteret, sed unde oriretur, corruptio non haberet, nisi esset quod corrumperetur; quoniam nihil est aliud corruptio quam boni exterminatio. Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt, et nisi in bonis non sunt » ; « nec fuit prorsus, unde oriretur ulla mali natura, nisi ex angeli et hominis natura bona, unde primitus orta est voluntas mala ».

Ex his aperitur, quod primo et secundo supra diximus investigandum, scilicet quae fuerit origo mali, et in qua re sit. Ex bona enim re ortum et in re bona consistere, praemissis testimoniis comprobatur.

Ad hoc autem, quod dictum est, « malum esse quod bonum est », quidam sic opponunt: si bonum malum esse dicimus, incidimus in illam sententiam propheticam[^9], ubi legitur: Vae his qui dicunt bonum malum, et malum bonum. Igitur si hanc maledictionem vitare volumus, nullatenus dicere debemus, bonum esse malum, et e converso. Hoc autem Augustinus in eodem libro[^10] determinat dicens: « Id quod dictum est in pro-

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phetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus, quibus homines mali sunt, non de hominibus. Unde qui adulterium dicit bonum, in eum cadit illa prophetica detestatio », et in eum qui « dicit malum esse hominem, vel bonum esse iniquum. Qui enim dicit, hominem, in quantum homo est, malum esse, et bonitatem esse iniquitatem, opus Dei culpat, quod est homo, et vitium hominis laudat, quod est iniquitas ».

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXXIV.

#### Chapter I.

#### *On actual sin.*

After the foregoing concerning actual sin, certain things must be considered with diligent inquiry, namely what was the origin and cause of the first sin, whether a good thing or an evil thing; afterward, in what thing sin is; then, what sin is, and in how many modes it comes about, and concerning the difference of these sins.

#### Chapter II.

#### *What was the first origin and cause of sin.*

The first cause and origin of sin was a good thing, because before the first sin there was not anything of evil[^1] from which it could arise. For since it had an origin and cause, it had it either from good or from evil. But evil did not exist before; therefore it arose from good. For sin first arose in the angel, and afterward in man. And what was the angel but a good nature of God? The evil which was in the angel did not arise from God, nor from any other than from the angel; therefore it arose from good. Whence Augustine[^2], in his responses against the heretic Julian, who had said: "If sin is from nature, then nature is evil"; he says: I ask that, if he can, he answer. It is manifest that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, all evil works are made, as evil fruits; but whence does he say that the evil will itself arose, except from good? For if from the angel — what is the angel but a good work of God? If from man — what was man himself but a good work of God? Nay, what were these two, before the evil will arose in them, but a good work of God and a good and praiseworthy nature? Therefore evil arises from good, nor was there anything from which it could arise except from good. I say, therefore, that no evil preceded the evil will, but it took its origin from good." — Here it is plainly said[^3] that the first cause and origin of evil was a good nature. And nonetheless it is shown of what sin it was the cause, namely of the evil will.

#### Chapter III.

#### *What was the secondary cause of evils.*

But that evil will of the angel and of man is also the cause of the subsequent evils, namely of evil

works and of evil wills. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion[^4]: "We ought by no means to doubt that the cause of the good things which pertain to us is nothing but the goodness of God; but of evil things, the cause is the will of changeable good, falling away from the immutable good — first that of the angel, afterward that of man": "this is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good." — Behold, you have it that the first will of changeable good, that is, of the angel or of man, falling away from the immutable good, that is, from God, is the cause of the evil things that pertain to us, since it is the cause both of the sins and of the penalties by which human nature is oppressed. The first origin and cause of sin, therefore, was a good, and the second an evil, which arose from the good.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *That the cause of evils is not save in a good thing.*

The origin of evil having been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil is, namely whether in a good thing or in an evil thing. — He who rightly and keenly understands, understands evil to be not save in a good, that is, in a good nature. For evil is the corruption or privation of good; but where good is not, there cannot be corruption or privation of good. Sin, therefore, cannot be save in a good thing. For just as bodies are corrupted by diseases and wounds, which, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion[^5], "are privations of that good which is called health; so also whatever are the vices of the soul are privations of natural goods. For what else is that which is called evil, but the privation of good?" "For to diminish good is an evil; yet however much it be diminished, it is necessary that something remain, if it is still a nature. For the good which is a nature cannot be consumed, unless the nature itself also be consumed. But when it is corrupted, the corruption of it is therefore an evil, because it deprives it of good in whatever degree. For if it deprives of no good, it does not harm; but it does harm: therefore it takes away good. As long, therefore, as a nature is corrupted, there is in it a good of which it is deprived." "And through this there is nothing that is called evil, if there is no good; but a good, altogether lacking evil, is an entire good. But that in which there is evil is a vitiated or vicious good; nor can there ever be any evil where there is no good. Whence a wondrous thing comes about, that since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is a good, nothing else seems to be said, when a vicious nature is said to be an evil nature, except that the evil is that which is good, and that there is no evil save what is good." By this connection[^6] it is evidently intimated that evil cannot be save in a good thing; where also, although it may seem absurd, it is plainly said that there is an evil which is a good. From which it is gathered that nothing else is signified, when a man is called evil, but a good evil. Whence Augustine in the same place[^7] adds: "What is an evil man but an evil nature? for man is a nature. Moreover, if man is some good, because he is a nature, what else is an evil man but an evil good? Yet when we distinguish these two, we find that he is not evil because he is a man, nor good because he is iniquitous; but good because he is a man, evil because he is iniquitous. Every nature, therefore, even if it be vicious, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is vicious, it is evil."

#### Chapter V.

#### *That in these things the dialecticians' rule concerning contraries fails.*

And therefore "in these contraries, which are called evil and good, that rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two contraries cannot be in one thing at the same time. For no drink or food is at the same time sweet and bitter; no body is at the same time white where it is, and there black; and this is found in many and almost all contraries, that they cannot be at the same time in one thing. But since no one doubts that good and evil are contraries, not only can they be at the same time, but evils altogether cannot be without goods and save in goods. And these two contraries are so together that, if there were no good in which the evil[^8] could be, there could not possibly be any evil at all, since corruption would have not only no place where it might subsist, but nothing whence it might arise, unless there were something that could be corrupted; for corruption is nothing else than the extermination of good. From goods, therefore, evils arose, and they are not save in goods"; "nor was there at all anything whence any evil nature might arise, save from the good nature of the angel and of man, whence first arose the evil will."

From these things it is opened up what we said above must be investigated, first and second, namely what was the origin of evil, and in what thing it is. That it arose from a good thing and consists in a good thing is proved by the foregoing testimonies.

But against what has been said, "that there is an evil which is a good," some object thus: if we say that a good is an evil, we fall into that prophetic sentence[^9] where it is read: Woe to those who call good evil, and evil good. Therefore, if we wish to avoid this curse, we ought by no means to say that a good is an evil, and conversely. But Augustine determines this in the same book[^10], saying: "What was said in the pro-

phecy is to be understood of the very things by which men are evil, not of men. Whence he who calls adultery good, upon him falls that prophetic detestation," and upon him who "says that a man is evil, or that an iniquity is good. For he who says that a man, insofar as he is a man, is evil, and that goodness is iniquity, blames the work of God, which is man, and praises the vice of man, which is iniquity."

---

la: Codd. BCDE et ed. 1. *malum.* Deinde pro *habuerit* Vat. cum edd. 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 *habuit* contra codd. — Maior huius dist. pars invenitur in Hugone, Sum. sent. tr. 3. c. 14.

en: Codices BCDE and edition 1 read *malum.* Then, for *habuerit,* the Vatican edition with editions 1, 4, 6, 8, 9 reads *habuit,* against the codices. — The greater part of this distinction is found in Hugh, *Sentences,* tr. 3, c. 14.

la: Libr. II. de Nuptiis et concupisc. c. 28. n. 48.

en: Book II, *On Marriage and Concupiscence,* c. 28, n. 48.

la: Edd. 1, 3 *docetur.*

en: Editions 1, 3 read *docetur.*

la: Cap. 23. n. 8; seq. locus ibid. c. 24. n. 8.

en: Chapter 23, n. 8; the following passage in the same place, c. 24, n. 8.

la: Cap. II. n. 3. — Praecedens definitio mali occurrit apud August., I. Contra Adversar. Legis et Prophetarum, c. 3. n. 7. — Deinde locus: *Bonum enim minui* etc, Enchirid. c. 12. n. 4, in quo textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. ante *consumatur* adiicit *natura.* Ultimus locus est ibid. c. 13. n. 4, in quo textu pro *Cui vero,* quod cum originali habet Vat., in aliis edd. et codd. minus bene legitur *Cum vero.*

en: Chapter II, n. 3. — The preceding definition of evil occurs in Augustine, *Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets* I, c. 3, n. 7. — Then the passage: *For to diminish good* etc., *Enchiridion* c. 12, n. 4, in which text the Vatican edition with several editions adds *natura* before *consumatur.* The last passage is in the same place, c. 13, n. 4, in which text, for *Cui vero,* which the Vatican edition has with the original, in the other editions and codices it is read less well as *Cum vero.*

la: Ita codd. et edd., Vat. *connexione.*

en: Thus the codices and editions; the Vatican edition reads *connexione.*

la: Loc. cit. — Etiam textus seq. capitul. est ibid. c. 14. n. 4.

en: Loc. cit. (the place cited above). — The text of the following chapter is also in the same place, c. 14, n. 4.

la: In codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 9 omittitur *malum,* quod etiam deest in textu Maurinorum, ubi ad marginem ponitur. Seq. locus ibid. c. 18. n. 4.

en: In codices ABDE and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, 9 the word *malum* is omitted, which is also lacking in the text of the Maurists, where it is placed in the margin. The following passage is in the same place, c. 18, n. 4.

la: *Isai.* 5, 20. — Paulo superius post *dicimus* edd. 1, 8 addunt *et malum bonum.*

en: *Isaiah* 5, 20. — A little above, after *dicimus,* editions 1, 8 add *et malum bonum.*

la: Cap. 19. n. 6. Sicut verba praecedentia, ita etiam ultimus locus c. 13. n. 4. Sed ultimus locus in Vat. et multis edd. corrupte legitur. In originali ita est: *Quisquis ergo dicit: malum est, hominem esse; aut: bonum est, iniquum esse; ipse incidit in propheticam illam sententiam. Vae his, qui dicunt etc. Opus enim Dei culpat etc.* Noster textus legitur in codd. et edd. 8, 9.

en: Chapter 19, n. 6. As with the preceding words, so also the last passage is c. 13, n. 4. But the last passage in the Vatican edition and many editions is read corruptly. In the original it is thus: *Whoever therefore says: it is evil, that a man exists; or: it is good, that an iniquitous man exists; he himself falls into that prophetic sentence. Woe to those who say etc. For he blames the work of God etc.* Our text is read in codices and editions 8, 9. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 800–802 = PDF 822–824, offset `pdf = printed + 22`) authoritative wherever the two-column IA djvu OCR (raw 55736–55856) was cascade-fragmented, reflowed Left-column-then-Right per the Vol II two-column discipline. This is Lombard's *Littera Magistri* for Distinctio XXXIV (*De peccato actuali* — on actual sin, treating the origin and cause of the first sin, that it arose from good, and that evil exists only in a good thing), Cap. I–V. The littera opens at the bottom band of the p.800 L-column (the `DISTINCTIO XXXIV.` header immediately after the end of `d33-dubia`'s DUB. IV Respondeo "…magis sibi reputet praestari beneficium, quam inferri supplicium") and closes at the top of p.802 with "…et vitium hominis laudat, quod est iniquitas».", immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV.` (raw 55857), which is the `d34-divisio` chunk.

**Capitula (5), order verified at 450 dpi.** Cap. I *De peccato actuali*; Cap. II *Quae fuit origo et causa peccati prima*; Cap. III *Quae fuerit secundaria causa malorum*; Cap. IV *Quod non nisi in re bona sit causa malorum*; Cap. V *Quod in his fallit dialecticorum regula de contrariis*. All five present and in printed reading order (L-column-then-R-column per page). NOTE: the IA djvu OCR running head `DISTINCTIO XXXIV.` at raw 55782 is a **page-top running head for p.801**, NOT the start of the littera — the true distinction header is on the lower L-band of p.800 (raw 55772). The auto-chunked skeleton mistook the p.801 running head for the start and dropped all of p.800's Cap. I–II + most of Cap. III; this rebuild recovers them.

**Page-split map.** Reading order is Left column top→bottom, then Right column top→bottom, per printed page. **p.800:** the L-col + R-col TOP bands hold the tail of d.33 DUB. IV (Lazarus/Martyrs Respondeo) — those belong to the already-complete `d33-dubia` chunk, NOT this littera. The littera begins at the **bottom** of the p.800 L-col (DISTINCTIO XXXIV + Cap. I *De peccato actuali* opener + Cap. II *Quae fuit origo* opener "Causa et origo prima peccati res bona exstitit…"); R-col holds Cap. II continued (the Augustinus contra Iulianum quote, ending "…cuius peccati fuerit causa, scilicet malae voluntatis") + Cap. III header + Cap. III opener ("Mala autem voluntas illa angeli et hominis causa est etiam malorum subsequentium, scilicet malorum"). **p.801:** L-col = Cap. III tail ("operum et malarum voluntatum. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio… Prima igitur origo et causa peccati bonum fuit, et secunda malum, quod ortum est ex bono") + Cap. IV header + Cap. IV opener; R-col = Cap. IV tail ("…in quantum vitiosa est, mala est»") + Cap. V header + Cap. V text + Epilogus + Opponitur/Dubium opener ("…Augustinus in eodem libro determinat dicens: «Id quod dictum est in pro-"). **p.802:** L-col + R-col TOP bands = the dubium-determinatio tail only ("phetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus… et vitium hominis laudat, quod est iniquitas»."); everything below on p.802 (COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV + DIVISIO TEXTUS) belongs to `d34-divisio`. Body seams across page/column breaks all grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified): 800 L→R (Cap. II "…non ex alio quam ex angelo, ex bono igitur ortum fuit. Unde Augustinus in re‖sponsionibus contra Iulianum"); 800 R→801 L (Cap. III "…causa est etiam malorum subsequentium, scilicet malorum ‖ operum et malarum voluntatum"); 801 L→R (Cap. IV "…nihil aliud dici videtur, cum vitiosa natura mala natura esse dicitur, nisi malum esse quod bo‖num est"); 801 R→802 L (Augustine determinatio "…determinat dicens: «Id quod dictum est in pro‖phetia, intelligendum est de ipsis rebus").

**Apparatus split map (10 entries → 10 sequential markers; footer numbering restarts per printed page).** **p.800** *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footers 1–3 → [^1]–[^3]: [^1]=f1 (Codd. BCDE *malum*; *habuerit*/*habuit*; Hugo tr.3 c.14) at Cap. II *non erat aliquid mali*; [^2]=f2 (Libr. II de Nuptiis et concupisc. c.28 n.48) at *Unde Augustinus in responsionibus contra Iulianum*; [^3]=f3 (Edd. 1,3 *docetur*) at *Hic aperte dicitur*. **p.801** *NOTAE* footers 1–7 → [^4]–[^10], one marker per footer, each at its own distinct printed superscript position (450 dpi PDF column-band verified 2026-07-17 — see disposition note below): [^4]=f1 (Cap.23 n.8; seq. c.24 n.8 — Enchirid.) at Cap. III *Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio*; [^5]=f2 (Cap. II n.3; Contra Adversar. Legis; *consumatur*/*natura*; *Cui vero*/*Cum vero* variants) at Cap. IV *ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio*; [^6]=f3 (*connexione* variant) at *Hac contextione*; [^7]=f4 (Loc. cit.; seq. capitul. c.14 n.4) at *Unde Augustinus in eodem subdit*; [^8]=f5 (Codd. ABDE omit *malum*; Maurini; seq. c.18 n.4) at Cap. V *in quo malum esset*; [^9]=f6 (Isai. 5,20; edd. 1,8 add *et malum bonum*) at *incidimus in illam sententiam propheticam*; [^10]=f7 (Cap.19 n.6; *ultimus locus c.13 n.4*; Vat. corrupte legitur; *Quisquis ergo dicit…* original; Noster textus codd./edd. 8,9) at *Augustinus in eodem libro determinat*. The p.802 dubium-determinatio tail carries no fresh footer — its `iniquitas¹` marker (uncaptured, see disposition note) refers back to p.801 footer 7 = [^10]. Total raw footers = 3 (p.800) + 7 (p.801) = 10, rendered as 10 sequential markers, one per footer.

**Class D/E apparatus repair (2026-07-17).** Health scan flagged `defs=7 la=8 en=8` — both Latin and English bodies had `[^7]` anchored twice, at *Unde Augustinus in eodem[^7] subdit* (Cap. IV) and again at *Augustinus in eodem libro[^7] determinat* (Cap. V/Dubium). Per `manual-review/J4-CLASS-DE-HANDOFF.md` §3, verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (p.801, `/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p801-{L,R}-{0,1,2}.png`) and the raw OCR block at `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt:55772-55850`. Finding: the prior transcription's decision to merge p.801's raw footers 3+4 into one [^6] def, and footers 5+6+7 into one [^7] def, was WRONG — the printed page shows all seven p.801 footers (¹–⁷) as seven textually and positionally DISTINCT superscripts (confirmed digit-by-digit against the column-band images), not a smaller set of merged citations. Two of the true anchor positions (footer 5 at *in quo malum⁵ esset*, footer 6 at *sententiam propheticam⁶*) had NO marker in the body at all — genuinely missing anchors, not just a mislabel. Fix: split the merged defs back into their original one-footer-one-marker mapping, renumbering sequentially [^6]–[^10] (👉 not printed-footer numbers, per this chunk's stated convention of sequential renumbering) so each of the 10 raw footers has its own single anchor in both Latin and English bodies. No Latin/English body wording was changed — only `[^N]` marker placement and the apparatus def boundaries (splitting merged La./En. text back along the dash-separated joins that were already present, which corresponded exactly to the raw-OCR footer boundaries at `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt:55850-55856`). Post-fix health check: `defs=10 la=10 en=10`, exact set match, no dupes.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: nothing — DISTINCTIO XXXIV opens fresh on p.800; `d33-dubia` stopped at the p.800 DUB. IV Respondeo and its footer 6, forwarding nothing into this littera (the p.800 DUB. IV footers belong to `d33-dubia`). The p.800 *NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM* footer block (footers 1–3) belongs to THIS littera and is captured here. FORWARDED: nothing to `d34-divisio` — the littera closes at the top of p.802 before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXXIV.` (raw 55857); the COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS (raw 55860) / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM (raw 55882) and their footers (*NOTAE AD COMMENTARIUM*, p.802) all belong to `d34-divisio`.

**[?] flags.** None. OCR garbles silently corrected against the 450 dpi PDF (e.g. indagine retained, tniae→quae, peccali→peccati, boiia→bona, niali→mali, volunlatem→voluntatem, miitabilis→mutabilis, immulabili→immutabili, conlrariis→contrariis, exterminatio retained, contextione retained — Vat. variant *connexione* noted in [^6], dicitur retained — edd. variant *docetur* noted in [^3]). The OCR running-head digit `801` is correct; printed p.800/802 confirmed against running-head text (`SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`) and the +22 offset mapping.