title: Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum. Et quod sic, videtur:

**Fundamenta.**

1. Primo per auctoritatem Apostoli ad Colossenses secundo[^p298-4]: *In quo plenitudo Divinitatis corporaliter inhabitat*, loquitur de Christo; sed ita cognoscit anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum, sicut habitat in ea: cognoscit ergo omnem plenitudinem eius; et hoc non est aliud quam comprehendere: ergo etc.

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2. Item, hoc ipsum dicit Damascenus[^p299-1]: «In incarnatione Dei Verbi aimus omnem naturam Divinitatis in una suarum hypostaseon incarnatam esse», ergo totum Dei Verbum unitum est humanae naturae in Christo; sed eo modo natum est ab anima Christi cognosci, per quem modum potuit uniri: ergo si totum potuit uniri, videtur, quod in totum habeat cognosci. Sed hoc est comprehendi: ergo etc.

3. Item, Isidorus *de Trinitate*[^p299-2]: «Trinitas sibi soli nota est et homini assumto»; aut ergo loquitur de notitia *qualiscumque* visionis, aut *perfectae* comprehensionis. Si primo modo loquatur, falsum est, quia multis Angelis et hominibus est nota: loquitur ergo de cognitione *comprehensionis*: ergo etc.

4. Item, simplex, cum attingitur, totum attingitur, pro eo quod non habet partem et partem[^p299-3]: si ergo Verbum increatum est simplicissimum, videtur, quod totum et totaliter ab anima Christi attingatur, si aliquo modo attingitur. Sed attingitur aliquo modo: ergo comprehenditur. *Si tu dicas*, quod non valet, quia infinitum est, et ideo incomprehensibile; *contra:* sicut vere est infinitum, ita vere est simplex illud Verbum aeternum: ergo sicut ponitur incomprehensibile ratione immensitatis, ita deberet comprehendi ratione simplicitatis.

5. Item, anima Christi cognoscit ipsum Verbum; aut ergo *aliquid* est de claritate et veritate et pulcritudine, quod non cognoscat, aut *nihil*. Si *aliquid:* ergo in Deo est aliquid a Christo cognitum, et aliquid incognitum: ergo aliquid et aliquid, et ita pars et pars; quod non est intelligibile[^p299-4]. Si *nihil* est omnino, quod non cognoscat, quia totum est idem ibi; videtur, quod totaliter intra suam cognitionem Deum claudat. Et hoc est Deum comprehendere: ergo etc.

6. Item, si anima Christi non cognoscit ipsum Verbum in sua tota plenitudine, adhuc deficit a cognoscendo aliquid de Verbo cognoscibile: potens ergo est in cognitione illa proficere: ergo cum desideret Deum perfecte nosse[^p299-5], videtur, quod desiderium animae Christi non sit impletum, et quod ipsa non pervenerit ad beatitudinis statum perfectum.

7. Item, ille solus est beatus, qui comprehendit quod nos credimus et speramus; sed nos credimus ipsam Verbi immensitatem: si ergo Christus est et fuit beatus, videtur, quod ipsam immensitatem Verbi comprehendat.

**Sed contra:** 1. Damascenus[^p299-6]: «Hoc solum intelligitur de Deo, quod incomprehensibilis est»; sed si anima Christi ipsum comprehenderet, intelligeret ipsum non incomprehensibilem, sed comprehensibilem: si ergo *hoc* a nemine potest intelligi, non potest Verbum increatum ab anima Christi comprehendi.

2. Item, Augustinus *de Videndo Deo*[^p299-7]: «Illud comprehenditur, cuius fines circumscribi possunt»; sed fines divinae immensitatis a nullo circumscribi possunt: ergo Deus a nulla anima potest comprehendi.

3. Item, omne quod comprehenditur, est finitum comprehendenti[^p299-8], ergo quod comprehenditur a finito est ei finitum, et nihil est finitum finito, nisi quod est finitum simpliciter; sed Deus est infinitus simpliciter; anima Christi, cum sit creatura, est finita: ergo non potest comprehendere immensitatem Verbi sibi uniti.

4. Item, quod comprehendit alterum est maius illo, vel saltem ei aequatur, alioquin ipsum claudere intra se non posset; sed impossibile est, creaturam, nec per unionem nec per alium modum, aequari Creatori[^p299-9]: ergo impossibile est, quod comprehendat Creatorem: ergo anima Christi Verbum sibi unitum non comprehendit. — His eisdem rationibus ostendi potest, quod nulla anima. *(Nota.)*

5. Item, Verbum increatum sic est unitum animae Christi, quod posset uniri alteri[^p299-10]; sic habitat in ipsa, quod in multis aliis: ergo sic est in anima sibi unita, quod etiam est extra, cum sit ubique: ergo semper excedit ipsam animam assumtam: ergo si tantum vel plus est extra quam intra, videtur, quod anima Christi non includat ipsum, ac per hoc non comprehendat.

6. Item, si anima Christi posset Verbum increatum comprehendere, posset per consequens aliquid maius cogitare — omni enim, cuius terminos cognoscimus, possumus intelligere aliquid addi — sed

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«Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest», ut dicit Anselmus[^p300-1]: ergo Verbum unitum animae Christi, si comprehenderetur ab ipsa, non esset Deus. Sed est Deus: ergo non comprehenditur.

### Conclusio.

> Deus ab anima Christi et a quocumque intellectu finito non comprehenditur totaliter, licet cognoscatur totus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod Verbum increatum et ipse Deus non solum ab anima Christi, sed etiam ab aliis animabus beatis habet comprehendi[^p300-2], et aliquo modo est incomprehensibilis. *(Opinio 1.)* Comprehendi enim habet quantum ad *essentiam*, ut dixerunt, quae est finita, et ideo finita, quia in se ipsa simplex et perfecta; dicitur autem et est incomprehensibile quantum ad *potentiam*, quae respicit infinita; nunquam enim potest in tot, quin in plura. Et per hoc dissolvere voluerunt auctoritates Sanctorum et Scripturae[^p300-3], quae videntur invicem repugnare. Aliquando enim dicitur, quod Deus est *incomprehensibilis;* aliquando dicitur, quod Beati habent cognitionem *comprehensionis* et sunt *comprehensores.* — Sed iste modus dicendi in primo libro[^p300-4] improbatus fuit, *(Improbatur.)* quia impossibile est, quod *potentia* excedat *essentiam.* Unde impossibile est, *potentiam* esse simpliciter infinitam, *substantia* et essentia existente finita. Et ibidem multipliciter ostenditur[^p300-5], quod divinum *esse* non solum in relatione ad *nos*, sed etiam *in se ipso* habet immensitatem. Et ideo iste modus dicendi stare non potest; et qui hoc primo dixit postmodum retractavit.

Alii vero dicere voluerunt, quod anima Christi, etsi sit finita, tamen ob gratiam unionis sublimatur ad aliquid infinitum; *(Opinio 2.)* habet enim aliquid, quod est supra omnem creaturae gradum, et quo nihil potest cogitari excellentius; et ex illa parte potest comprehendere Verbum sibi unitum; et hoc est etiam ipsius solius proprium. Et pro tanto dicunt dixisse Isidorum, quod «Trinitas nota est sibi soli et homini assumto». — Sed nec illud stare potest, *(Improbatur.)* quia, quamvis gratia unionis dicat aliquid infinitum ratione alterius extremi, tamen ratione animae unitae semper dicit quid finitum et rem virtutis finitae[^p300-6]; quoniam anima Christi manet intra terminos creaturae. Et si est virtutis finitae, quomodo potest immensitatem comprehendere rei omnino infinitae et excedentis eam in infinitum?

Et propterea est tertius modus communior, probabilior et certior, *(Opinio 3. et conclusio 1.)* quod nec anima Christi nec aliqua creatura comprehendere potest immensitatem Verbi increati sive ipsius Dei, et tamen ipsum *totum* cognoscit. — Et possunt ista duo simul stare, immo *(Ratio.)* necesse est ponere, quamvis difficile sit intellectui[^p300-7] nostro capere. Si enim vere ponimus Deum *simplicem*, immo quia necessarium est sic credere et ponere; si cognoscitur, iam non secundum partem et partem, sed *totus* cognoscitur. *Rursus*, si Deum ponimus *immensum*, quia hoc credimus et fatemur; necesse est ponere, quod nunquam ab intellectu finito comprehendatur *totaliter;* et sic Deus a quacumque creatura ipsum cognoscente *totus* cognoscitur, sed tamen non *totaliter.* *(Conclusio 2.)*

Si autem quaeratur, quomodo illud posset intelligi; dicendum, quod difficillimum est intelligere, *(Notandum de explicatione.)* quia plus reperitur in creaturis de dissimilitudine quam de similitudine. — Intelligamus tamen gratia exempli aliquem oculum, *(Exemplum 1.)* cuius aspectus non sit omnino clarus; et intelligamus aliquod parvum album, tamen intensum in luminositate et claritate coloris: oculus ille videbit illud album *totum*, tamen eminentiam illius albedinis non comprehendit; sic suo modo in proposito intelligendum est. Sed non modica est hic dissimilitudo, quia in illo albo *qualitas* differt a *claritate*, in Deo autem est omnino idem. — Et ideo aliud exemplum consuevit poni in puncto, *(Exemplum 2.)* qui[^p300-8] ratione suae simplicitatis *totus* attingitur ab

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una linea, non tamen comprehenditur, quia potest infinitas lineas terminare[^p301-1]. Sed nec adhuc est illud simile, quia in puncto aliud est *virtus*, aliud *essentia;* non sic est in Deo, in quo est omnino idem. — Et ideo tertium exemplum ponendum est in substantia spirituali, *(Exemplum 3.)* quae est imago Dei: quia ipsa *tota* est in una parte corporis, et tamen in illa *non definitur*, quia ratione suae simplicitatis sic est *tota in illa*, quod *tota* est *extra illam* in parte altera[^p301-2]; sic et Deus *in* una creatura totus et totus *extra.* Per hunc etiam modum oportet intelligere circa *potentiam intellectivam.* *(Explicatur ratiocinatione.)* — Sed hoc melius intelligitur ratiocinatione quam exemplorum suppositione. Si quis enim videt, quod in Deo *simplicitas* non opponitur *infinitati*, videre potest, quomodo Deus potest cognosci *totus*, et tamen *non comprehendi.*

Propter quod nota, quod *infinitum* accipitur secundum quantitatem, ut dicit Philosophus[^p301-3]; *(Dupliciter accipitur infinitum.)* Augustinus autem dicit, quod est «*quantitas molis* et *quantitas virtutis*». Et ita secundum utrumque potest accipi *infinitum*, sed differenter. *(Notabilis differentia.)* Quoniam enim *quantitas molis* est partibilis et super partibile fundata; ideo *infinitum* secundum hanc *quantitatem* oppositionem habet ad *simplex*, et impossibile est, quod aliquid idem et secundum idem sit *simplex* et *infinitum.* Quoniam vero quantitas *virtutis* reperitur in simplicibus, immo quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius[^p301-4]; hinc est, quod *infinitum* secundum hanc non repugnat *simplici*, immo necessario sequitur, quodsi aliquid est *simplicissimum*, quod aliquid sit *infinitissimum.* Clare igitur potest videri, quod in Deo secundum idem potest esse summa *simplicitas* et summa *infinitas.* Et ideo vera est positio praedicta, quod Deus *totus* videtur, sed tamen *non comprehenditur* ab aliqua creatura, nec unita[^p301-5] nec separata. — Et concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.

**Ad oppositorum solutionem.** *(Solutio oppositorum.)*

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plenitudo Divinitatis habitat in Christo, et de Damasceno, quod tota est incarnata; dicendum, quod Apostolus in illo verbo vult ostendere personalem unionem, quae est in Christo et in nullo alio, quia persona divina plena et perfecta non solum animae, sed etiam corpori Christi fuit unita[^p301-6]. Et Damascenus hoc ipsum vult dicere: per hoc quod dicit *omnem*, intelligit divinam naturam ut perfectam. Ex hoc tamen non potest inferri cognitio comprehensionis, quia, sicut tactum est, in illa plenitudine est *simplicitas*, ratione cuius potest habitare et uniri rei finitae; est nihilominus et *infinitas*, ratione cuius necessario habet excedere, et impossibile est comprehendi. Et sic patet, quod illud procedit ex insufficienti; plus enim dicit *comprehensio* quam *cognitio plenitudinis* vel perfectionis. Supra enim *cognitionem* addit *inclusionem* sive conterminationem vel commensurationem quodam modo dicendi. *(Notandum.)*

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Isidoro, quod Trinitas nota est sibi soli et homini assumto; dicendum, quod non vult excludere[^p301-7] omnem cognitionem, *(Notandum.)* sed perfectam cognitionem Dei attribuere sibi ipsi et naturae assumtae. Ipsi namque Trinitati attribuit perfectam cognitionem *simpliciter*, sed homini assumto in *genere creaturae.* Illa enim anima creata inter ceteras creaturas cognoscit limpidissime et ita perfecte, sicut unquam potuit capere. Unde propter familiarissimam cognitionem, quam habet illa anima inter creaturas[^p301-8], dicit Isidorus, quod ei soli nota est Trinitas, magis *auctoritate* loquens quam per *praecisionem.*

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplex totum attingitur; dicendum, quod verum est, *totum*, id est non[^p301-9] secundum partem et partem; in simplici enim non est dicere *totum* nisi per privationem compositionis partium. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod comprehendatur, quia, sicut dictum est, simul cum *simplicitate* stat *infinitas*, quae non patitur aliquid Dei omnino videri perfecte a creatura. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod ita deberet dici comprehensibile propter *simplicitatem*, sicut incomprehensibile propter *immensitatem.* Nam ad *immensitatem* de necessitate sequitur *incomprehensibilitas* de ipsa nominis ratione primaria, ad *simplicitatem*[^p301-10] non. Tanta enim potest esse *simplicitas*, quod, nedum quod ipsa faciat comprehendi, immo propter suam excellentiam reddat incomprehensibilem.

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*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliquid latet de Deo etc.; dicendum, quod[^p302-1] non est intelligendum in Deo, sicut intelligitur in aliqua re composita, cuius una pars non apparet, et alia manifestatur; quoniam in divina essentia non est *aliquid et aliquid*, sed est *aliquod unum*, quod aequivalet infinitis. Unde quidquid illud sit, quod anima de Deo videt, sic illud videt, quod tamen comprehendere non potest; *(Notandum.)* unde idem ipsum *latet* et *patet:* patet quidem ad intuendum, sed latet ad comprehendendum. Sicut si quaeratur: cum Deus est in lapide, estne aliquid Dei *extra* lapidem, et aliquid *intra?* dicendum, quod non est secundum *aliquid sui* extra, et secundum *aliquid sui* intra, sed *totus* intra et *totus* extra; sic et in proposito intelligere oportet.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si non comprehendat[^p302-2], adhuc potest proficere in cognitione Dei; dicendum, quod illud non sequitur, pro eo quod *status* est in profectu cognitionis *(Causa status duplex.)* aliquando ex parte *rei comprehensae*, quae non potest melius cognosci, aliquando ex parte *comprehendentis*, qui non est natus melius cognoscere; et sic est status in Christo et in aliis Beatis. Sed aliter in Christo quam in aliis: quia Christus ita perfecte cognoscit, sicut unquam[^p302-3] capere potuit, sed alii Sancti ita perfecte, sicut dispositi fuerunt per merita gratiae; nec possunt ultra proficere, quia non sunt in statu merendi, nec ultra desiderare amplius habere, quam habeant, propter illius summi Boni sufficientiam et affectionem ordinatam secundum summae iustitiae regulam et libram; sed quiescunt quiete perfecta, quia tenent eum quem desiderabant[^p302-4].

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de comprehensione; dicendum, quod *comprehendere* dicitur tripliciter: *(Comprehendere dicitur tripliciter.)* uno modo idem quod *caritate adhaerere;* et sic accipit Bernardus *ad Eugenium*[^p302-5]: «Si sanctus es, comprehendisti». Alio modo idem est quod *clare videre* et *perfecte amare*, sicut ad Philippenses tertio: *Si quo modo comprehendam, in quo et comprehensus sum.* Tertio modo *comprehendere* est idem quod *terminos rei claudere;* sic Deus est incomprehensibilis. Cum ergo dicitur, quod Sancti sunt *comprehensores* in patria, et quod Christus fuit *comprehensor;* dicendum, quod medio modo accipitur, et sic habet veritatem; nam Christus videt Dei immensitatem nec tenet hoc fide, sed certissima cognitione, hoc est[^p302-6], novit Deum immensum. *(Quaestio incidens solvitur.)* — Et si tu quaeras, utrum *positive*, vel *privative;* dicendum, quod quodam modo *positive*, quodam modo *privative:* positive, quantum se extendit capacitas suae intelligentiae; privative deinceps. Admiratur enim illam summam profunditatem immensitatis divinae, sicut dicit Propheta[^p302-7]: *Mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me, confortata est, et non potero ad eam.* Et sic patet totum.

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### Question II. *Whether Christ's soul, in knowing, comprehends the Word itself united to it.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul comprehends the Word itself united to it. And that it does, it seems:

**Arguments for the affirmative.**

1. First, by the authority of the Apostle to the Colossians, chapter two[^p298-4]: *In whom dwells bodily the fullness of the Godhead*, he speaks of Christ; but Christ's soul knows the Word united to it in the same way as it dwells in it: therefore it knows the whole fullness of it; and this is nothing other than to comprehend: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene says this very thing[^p299-1]: «In the incarnation of God the Word we say that the whole nature of the Godhead was incarnate in one of his hypostases», therefore the whole Word of God was united to the human nature in Christ; but it was capable of being known by Christ's soul in the same way as it was able to be united: therefore if the whole was able to be united, it seems that it can be known as a whole. But this is to be comprehended: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore *On the Trinity*[^p299-2]: «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man»; therefore either he speaks of the cognition of *some sort* of vision, or of *perfect* comprehension. If he speaks in the first way, it is false, since the Trinity is known to many Angels and men: therefore he speaks of the cognition of *comprehension:* therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the simple, when it is attained, is attained as a whole, since it does not have part and part[^p299-3]: if therefore the uncreated Word is most simple, it seems that it is attained wholly and totally by Christ's soul, if it is attained in any way. But it is attained in some way: therefore it is comprehended. *If you say* that this does not hold, because it is infinite, and therefore incomprehensible; *on the contrary:* just as it is truly infinite, so that eternal Word is truly simple: therefore just as it is posited incomprehensible by reason of its immensity, so it ought to be comprehended by reason of its simplicity.

5. Likewise, Christ's soul knows the Word itself; therefore either there is *something* of its clarity and truth and beauty which it does not know, or *nothing.* If *something:* then in God there is something known by Christ, and something unknown: therefore something and something, and so part and part; which is not intelligible[^p299-4]. If there is *nothing* at all which it does not know, since the whole is identical there; it seems that it encloses God totally within its cognition. And this is to comprehend God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul does not know the Word itself in its whole fullness, it still falls short of knowing something knowable of the Word: therefore it is capable of advancing in that cognition: therefore, since it desires to know God perfectly[^p299-5], it seems that the desire of Christ's soul is not fulfilled, and that it has not arrived at the perfect state of beatitude.

7. Likewise, he alone is blessed who comprehends what we believe and hope for; but we believe the immensity itself of the Word: if therefore Christ is and was blessed, it seems that he comprehends the immensity itself of the Word.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene[^p299-6]: «This alone is understood concerning God, that he is incomprehensible»; but if Christ's soul comprehended him, it would understand him as not incomprehensible, but comprehensible: if therefore *this* can be understood by no one, the uncreated Word cannot be comprehended by Christ's soul.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Seeing God*[^p299-7]: «That is comprehended whose bounds can be circumscribed»; but the bounds of the divine immensity can be circumscribed by no one: therefore God can be comprehended by no soul.

3. Likewise, everything that is comprehended is finite to the one comprehending[^p299-8], therefore what is comprehended by a finite [intellect] is finite to it, and nothing is finite to the finite except what is finite simply; but God is infinite simply; Christ's soul, since it is a creature, is finite: therefore it cannot comprehend the immensity of the Word united to it.

4. Likewise, what comprehends another is greater than it, or at least equal to it, otherwise it could not enclose it within itself; but it is impossible that a creature, neither by union nor by any other mode, be equated to the Creator[^p299-9]: therefore it is impossible that it comprehend the Creator: therefore Christ's soul does not comprehend the Word united to it. — By these same reasons it can be shown that no soul [comprehends it]. *(Note.)*

5. Likewise, the uncreated Word is so united to Christ's soul that it could be united to another[^p299-10]; it so dwells in it that [it dwells] in many others: therefore it is so in the soul united to it that it is also outside, since it is everywhere: therefore it always exceeds the assumed soul itself: therefore if it is as much or more outside than inside, it seems that Christ's soul does not include it, and through this does not comprehend it.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul could comprehend the uncreated Word, it could consequently think of something greater — for to everything whose bounds we know, we can understand something added — but

«God is that than which nothing greater can be thought», as Anselm says[^p300-1]: therefore the Word united to Christ's soul, if it were comprehended by it, would not be God. But it is God: therefore it is not comprehended.

### Conclusion.

> God is not comprehended *totally* by Christ's soul nor by any finite intellect, although he is known *as a whole.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some wished to say that the uncreated Word and God himself can be comprehended not only by Christ's soul, but also by other blessed souls[^p300-2], and is in some way incomprehensible. *(Opinion 1.)* For he can be comprehended as to *essence*, as they said, which is finite, and therefore finite because in itself simple and perfect; but he is called and is incomprehensible as to *power*, which regards infinite things; for it can never [reach] so many that not [reach] more. And by this they wished to resolve the authorities of the Saints and of Scripture[^p300-3] which seem to be mutually at odds. For sometimes it is said that God is *incomprehensible;* sometimes it is said that the Blessed have the cognition of *comprehension* and are *comprehensors.* — But this manner of speaking was disproved in the first book[^p300-4], *(Disproved.)* because it is impossible that *power* exceed *essence.* Hence it is impossible that *power* be simply infinite, while *substance* and essence exist as finite. And there it is shown in many ways[^p300-5] that the divine *being* has immensity not only in relation to *us*, but also *in itself.* And therefore this manner of speaking cannot stand; and he who first said this afterward retracted it.

But others wished to say that Christ's soul, even though it is finite, is nevertheless raised by the grace of the union to something infinite; *(Opinion 2.)* for it has something which is above every grade of a creature, and than which nothing more excellent can be thought; and from that side it can comprehend the Word united to it; and this also is proper to it alone. And to this extent they say that Isidore said «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man». — But neither can that stand, *(Disproved.)* because, although the grace of the union expresses something infinite by reason of the other extreme, nevertheless by reason of the united soul it always expresses something finite and a thing of finite power[^p300-6]; since Christ's soul remains within the bounds of a creature. And if it is of finite power, how can it comprehend the immensity of a thing altogether infinite and exceeding it infinitely?

And therefore there is a third mode, more common, more probable and more certain, *(Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.)* that neither Christ's soul nor any creature can comprehend the immensity of the uncreated Word or of God himself, and yet knows it *as a whole.* — And these two can stand together; indeed, *(Reason.)* it is necessary to posit [both], although it is difficult for our intellect[^p300-7] to grasp. For if we truly posit God as *simple* — indeed, since it is necessary so to believe and posit — if he is known, then he is not known according to part and part, but is known *as a whole.* *Again*, if we posit God as *immense*, since we believe and confess this; it is necessary to posit that he is never comprehended *totally* by a finite intellect; and thus God is known *as a whole* by any creature knowing him, but nevertheless not *totally.* *(Conclusion 2.)*

But if it is asked how that could be understood; it must be said that it is most difficult to understand, *(Note on the explanation.)* because in creatures more dissimilitude is found than similitude. — Let us nevertheless understand, by way of example, some eye *(Example 1.)* whose gaze is not altogether clear; and let us understand some small white object, yet intense in its luminosity and brightness of color: that eye will see the whole of that white object, yet it does not comprehend the eminence of that whiteness; so in its own way it must be understood in the case at hand. But the dissimilitude here is not slight, because in that white object *quality* differs from *brightness*, whereas in God it is altogether the same. — And therefore another example is wont to be set down in a point, *(Example 2.)* which[^p300-8] by reason of its simplicity is attained *wholly* by

a single line, yet is not comprehended, because it can terminate infinite lines[^p301-1]. But not even that is similar yet, because in a point one thing is *power*, another is *essence;* it is not so in God, in whom it is altogether the same. — And therefore a third example must be set down in a spiritual substance *(Example 3.)* which is the image of God: because it is *wholly* in one part of the body, and yet *is not bounded* in it, because by reason of its simplicity it is so *wholly in it* that it is *wholly outside it* in another part[^p301-2]; so too God is *in* one creature wholly and wholly *outside.* In this manner too it is necessary to understand concerning the *intellective power.* *(Explained by reasoning.)* — But this is better understood by reasoning than by the supposition of examples. For if anyone sees that in God *simplicity* is not opposed to *infinity*, he can see how God can be known *as a whole*, and yet *not comprehended.*

On account of which note that *the infinite* is taken according to quantity, as the Philosopher says[^p301-3]; *(The infinite is taken in two ways.)* but Augustine says that there is «*quantity of mass* and *quantity of power*». And thus according to each the *infinite* can be taken, but differently. *(A notable difference.)* For since *quantity of mass* is divisible and founded upon the divisible; therefore *the infinite* according to this *quantity* has opposition to *the simple*, and it is impossible that anything one and the same according to the same be *simple* and *infinite.* But since quantity of *power* is found in simple things — indeed, the more simple a thing is, the more powerful[^p301-4] — hence it is that *the infinite* according to this is not repugnant to *the simple*, but indeed necessarily follows: that if something is *most simple*, then something is *most infinite.* Clearly therefore it can be seen that in God according to the same there can be supreme *simplicity* and supreme *infinity.* And therefore the aforesaid position is true, that God is seen *as a whole*, but nevertheless *is not comprehended* by any creature, neither united[^p301-5] nor separate. — And the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments.** *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)*

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected, that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Christ, and concerning Damascene, that the whole is incarnate; it must be said that the Apostle by that word wishes to show the personal union, which is in Christ and in no other, because the full and perfect divine person was united not only to the soul, but also to the body of Christ[^p301-6]. And Damascene wishes to say this very thing: by saying *whole*, he understands the divine nature as perfect. From this, however, the cognition of comprehension cannot be inferred, because, as has been touched on, in that fullness there is *simplicity*, by reason of which it can dwell in and be united to a finite thing; nonetheless there is also *infinity*, by reason of which it necessarily exceeds, and it is impossible for it to be comprehended. And thus it is plain that that [objection] proceeds from an insufficient [ground]; for *comprehension* expresses more than *cognition of fullness* or of perfection. For over and above *cognition* it adds *inclusion* or co-termination or co-measuring in a certain manner of speaking. *(Note.)*

*To 3.* To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man; it must be said that he does not wish to exclude[^p301-7] all cognition, *(Note.)* but to attribute the perfect cognition of God to the Trinity itself and to the assumed nature. For to the Trinity itself he attributes perfect cognition *simply*, but to the assumed man within the *genus of a creature.* For that created soul knows most clearly among other creatures, and so perfectly as it was ever able to grasp. Hence on account of the most intimate cognition which that soul has among creatures[^p301-8], Isidore says that to it alone the Trinity is known, speaking more by way of *authority* than by *precision.*

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the simple is attained as a whole; it must be said that it is true, *as a whole*, that is not[^p301-9] according to part and part; for in the simple there is no [way] of saying *whole* except by the privation of the composition of parts. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, because, as has been said, together with *simplicity* there stands *infinity*, which does not allow anything of God to be seen altogether perfectly by a creature. — Nor does it avail that he objects that it ought thus to be called comprehensible on account of *simplicity*, just as incomprehensible on account of *immensity.* For from *immensity* by necessity follows *incomprehensibility* by the primary meaning of the name itself, [but] from *simplicity*[^p301-10] not. For so great can simplicity be that, far from making [the thing] comprehended, it rather, on account of its excellence, renders it incomprehensible.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that something of God lies hidden, etc.; it must be said that[^p302-1] this is not to be understood in God as it is understood in some composite thing, of which one part does not appear, and another is manifested; since in the divine essence there is not *something and something*, but there is *some one thing*, which is equivalent to infinite things. Hence whatever it is that the soul sees of God, it so sees it that it nevertheless cannot comprehend it; *(Note.)* whence the same thing both *lies hidden* and *is plain:* it is plain indeed for gazing upon, but lies hidden for comprehending. Just as if it be asked: since God is in a stone, is there something of God *outside* the stone, and something *inside?* it must be said that there is not according to *something of him* outside, and according to *something of him* inside, but he is *wholly* inside and *wholly* outside; so too in the case at hand it must be understood.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that if it does not comprehend[^p302-2], it can still advance in the cognition of God; it must be said that this does not follow, since the *halt* in the advance of cognition is *(The cause of the halt is twofold.)* sometimes on the part of the *thing comprehended*, which cannot be better known, sometimes on the part of the one *comprehending*, who is not capable of knowing better; and thus there is a halt in Christ and in the other Blessed. But otherwise in Christ than in the others: because Christ knows so perfectly as he was ever[^p302-3] able to receive, but the other Saints so perfectly as they were disposed through the merits of grace; nor can they advance further, because they are not in the state of meriting, nor [can they] further desire to have more than they have, on account of the sufficiency of that supreme Good and an affection ordered according to the rule and balance of supreme justice; but they rest in perfect rest, because they hold him whom they desired[^p302-4].

*To 7.* To that which is lastly objected concerning comprehension; it must be said that *to comprehend* is said in three ways: *(To comprehend is said in three ways.)* in one way the same as *to adhere by charity;* and so Bernard takes it *to Eugenius*[^p302-5]: «If you are holy, you have comprehended». In another way it is the same as *to see clearly* and *to love perfectly*, as to the Philippians, chapter three: *If by any means I may comprehend, in which I have also been comprehended.* In the third way *to comprehend* is the same as *to enclose the bounds of a thing;* thus God is incomprehensible. When therefore it is said that the Saints are *comprehensors* in the fatherland, and that Christ was a *comprehensor;* it must be said that it is taken in the middle way, and so it has truth; for Christ sees the immensity of God and does not hold this by faith, but by most certain cognition, that is[^p302-6], he knows God to be immense. *(An incidental question is resolved.)* — And if you ask whether *positively* or *privatively;* it must be said that in a certain way *positively*, in a certain way *privatively:* positively, as far as the capacity of his intelligence extends; privatively thereafter. For he marvels at that supreme depth of the divine immensity, as the Prophet says[^p302-7]: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, it is high, and I cannot reach to it.* And thus the whole is plain.

la: Vers. 9. — In initio quaest. post *anima Christi* edd. cum cod. *cc* subiiciunt *in cognoscendo.*

en: [Colossians 2,] verse 9. — At the beginning of the question, after *anima Christi* the editions, with codex *cc*, add *in cognoscendo.*

la: Libr. III. *de Fide orthod.* c. 6. Cfr. supra d. V. lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. — Edd. sic: *dicit Damascenus de incarnatione Verbi Dei: Aimus omnem* etc., ac si hoc testimonium sumtum esset ex Damasc. libro *de Incarnatione Verbi Dei.* In plurimis codd. hoc arg. habetur tertio loco. In fine arg. ante *in totum* edd. interserunt *etiam*, cod. A vero *et*, omisso cum cod. *bb* (K a secunda manu) *in* ante *totum.*

en: Book III *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 6. Cf. above d. V, the Master's text, c. 1 at the end. — The editions read thus: *Damascene says, concerning the incarnation of the Word of God: We say that the whole* etc., as if this testimony were taken from Damascene's book *On the Incarnation of the Word of God.* In very many codices this argument is held in the third place. At the end of the argument, before *in totum* the editions insert *etiam*, but cod. A *et*, omitting (with cod. *bb*, K by a second hand) *in* before *totum.*

la: Distinctius I. Sent. c. 3. n. 1: *Sola enim Trinitas sibi integre nota est, et humanitas a Christo suscepta, quae tertia est in Trinitate persona* [i. e. Verbum humanatum est una ex tribus personis]. Eadem verba occurrunt in eiusdem Comment. sive Quaestion. in Exod. c. 42. n. 3. (alias 39.), nisi quod pro *humanitas a Christo suscepta* legitur *humanitati susceptae.*

en: More distinctly, I. Sent. c. 3. n. 1: *For the Trinity alone is fully known to itself, and the humanity assumed by Christ, which is the third person in the Trinity* [i.e. the humanated Word is one of the three persons]. The same words occur in his *Commentary* or *Questions on Exodus* c. 42. n. 3. (alias 39.), except that for *humanitas a Christo suscepta* is read *humanitati susceptae.*

la: Aristot., *de Lineis insecab.*, ait: *Res, quae partibus caret, tangit rem partibus carentem, tota totam, ergo eundem locum possidebunt* [duo puncta sese tangentia]. August., VII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 21. n. 28, ostendit, quod quia anima simplex est, cum se novit, totaliter se novit, non secundum partem. Cfr. IX. *de Trin.* c. 4. n. 7.

en: Aristotle, *On Indivisible Lines*, says: *A thing which lacks parts touches a thing lacking parts, whole touching whole, therefore they will possess the same place* [two points touching one another]. Augustine, VII. *On Genesis according to the Letter* c. 21. n. 28, shows that, because the soul is simple, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, not according to part. Cf. IX. *On the Trinity* c. 4. n. 7.

la: Edd. *noscere.*

en: The editions [read] *noscere* ["to know"].

la: Libr. I. *de Fide orthod.* c. 4.

en: Book I *On the Orthodox Faith* c. 4.

la: Sive Epist. 147. (alias 112.) c. 9. n. 21: *Id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur, totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.*

en: Or rather Epistle 147 (alias 112) c. 9. n. 21: *That is seen which is in some way perceived as present, but the whole is comprehended by seeing, which is so seen that nothing of it escapes the one seeing, or whose bounds can be looked round about.*

la: August., XII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 18: *Quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur.*

en: Augustine, XII. *On the City of God*, c. 18: *Whatever is comprehended by knowledge is bounded by the comprehension of the one knowing.*

la: Vide Isidor., I. Sent. c. 3. n. 2, et hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: See Isidore, I. Sent. c. 3. n. 2, and here the Master's text, c. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. ad 2. — De *ubiquitate* Dei cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. per totam.

en: Cf. above d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. to 2. — On the *ubiquity* of God cf. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. throughout.

la: *Proslog.* c. 4. — Paulo superius pro *omni enim* [codd. M O *omni enim illi*] edd. *omnium enim.*

en: *Proslogion* c. 4. — A little above, for *omni enim* [codd. M O *omni enim illi*] the editions [read] *omnium enim.*

la: Codd. K M O verbo *comprehendi* bene praemittunt *aliquo modo.* Proxime post pro *incomprehensibilis* edd. cum nonnullis codd. vitiose substituunt *comprehensibilis*, et deinde cod. T in fine propositionis seq. post *et perfecta* subiungit *dicitur*, post quod facta interpunctione, alteram propositionem sic incipit: *Est autem et incomprehensibile* [melius poneretur *incomprehensibilis*] etc.

en: Codd. K M O rightly prefix *aliquo modo* to the word *comprehendi.* Immediately after, for *incomprehensibilis* the editions, with several codices, faultily substitute *comprehensibilis*, and then cod. T at the end of the following proposition, after *et perfecta*, adds *dicitur*, after which, with the punctuation made, it begins the next proposition thus: *Est autem et incomprehensibile* [better it would be put *incomprehensibilis*] etc.

la: Ier. 32, 19: *Magnus consilio et incomprehensibilis cogitatu.* I. Cor. 13, 12: *Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum.* Phil. 3, 12: *Sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam* etc. Cfr. Eph. 3, 18. — Paulo inferius pro *cognitionem comprehensionis* codd. K M O *cognitionem comprehensoris*, et subinde pro *et sunt comprehensores*, quam lectionem tuentur codd. A *bb*, alii codd. cum edd. *et respectu comprehensionis.*

en: Jeremiah 32, 19: *Great in counsel and incomprehensible in thought.* 1 Cor. 13, 12: *Now I know in part, but then I shall know, even as I am known.* Phil. 3, 12: *But I follow, if by any means I may comprehend* etc. Cf. Eph. 3, 18. — A little below, for *cognitionem comprehensionis* codd. K M O [read] *cognitionem comprehensoris*, and thereupon for *et sunt comprehensores*, which reading codd. A *bb* maintain, the other codices with the editions [read] *et respectu comprehensionis.*

la: Scil. contra eos qui contendunt, «quod tam essentia quam potentia est finita secundum veritatem, quia est finita ... Deo, qui est veritas; sed tamen utraque nobis est infinita, quia improportionaliter nos excedit». — Pro *multipliciter ostenditur* edd. cum nonnullis codd., quorum scriptores verbum abbreviatum *multipliciter* pro verbo Magistri habuerunt, exhibent *Magister ostendit*, quae lectio aperte falsa est, cum Magister in dist. commemorata nihil de hoc proferat. Pro *in relatione ad nos*, quae scriptura cod. M (N a secunda manu) procul dubio recta est, cum etiam respondeat contextui loci supra ex I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. allati, plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 *in relatione ad eos*, cod. *bb in relatione ad res*, Vat. *in relatione ad Beatos.* Paulo inferius pro *retractavit* codd. B C G H I L U *aa reiteravit.*

en: Namely, against those who contend «that both essence and power are finite according to truth, because it is finite ... to God, who is truth; but yet each is infinite to us, because it exceeds us disproportionately». — For *multipliciter ostenditur* the editions, with several codices whose scribes took the abbreviated word *multipliciter* for the word *Magister*, present *Magister ostendit*, which reading is openly false, since the Master in the distinction cited brings forward nothing of this. For *in relatione ad nos*, which reading of cod. M (N by a second hand) is doubtless correct, since it also corresponds to the context of the passage cited above from I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2., very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] *in relatione ad eos*, cod. *bb in relatione ad res*, the Vatican [edition] *in relatione ad Beatos.* A little below, for *retractavit* codd. B C G H I L U *aa* [read] *reiteravit.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. in fine, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. Ambros., I. *de Spiritu S.* c. 7. n. 81. dicit, quod «omnis creatura certis naturae suae sit circumscripta limitibus». — Pro *rem virtutis* cod. W *rationem virtutis.* Paulo inferius post *quomodo* cod. M subiicit *ergo.*

en: Cf. above d. 2. a. 3. q. 2. at the end, d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in the body. Ambrose, I. *On the Holy Spirit* c. 7. n. 81. says that «every creature is circumscribed by the fixed limits of its own nature». — For *rem virtutis* cod. W [reads] *rationem virtutis.* A little below, after *quomodo* cod. M adds *ergo.*

la: Cod. K *intellectu.* Post pauca pro *si cognoscitur* codd. G T U W Z *bb si cognoscatur.*

en: Cod. K [reads] *intellectu.* After a few [words], for *si cognoscitur* codd. G T U W Z *bb* [read] *si cognoscatur.*

la: Plurimi codd. incongrue *quod.*

en: Very many codices incongruously [read] *quod.*

la: Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 7. m. 1.

en: Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 7. m. 1.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: Cf. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

la: Libr. I. *Phys.* text. 15. (c. 2.): *Infinitum enim in quanto est.* Ibid. III. text. 1. (c. 1.): *Infinitum autem apparet primum in continuo;* et text. 63. (c. 6.): *Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus, semper aliquid accipere extra est.* Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. — Augustini sententia habetur in eius libro *de Quantit. animae*, c. 3. n. 4.

en: Book I *Physics* text 15. (c. 2.): *For the infinite is in the quantum.* Ibid. III. text 1. (c. 1.): *But the infinite appears first in the continuous;* and text 63. (c. 6.): *The infinite, therefore, is that of which, for those taking according to quantity, there is always something to take beyond.* Cf. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. — Augustine's opinion is found in his book *On the Quantity of the Soul*, c. 3. n. 4.

la: Cfr. *Liber de Causis*, propos. 17. — Mox post *hanc* cod. Z supplet *quantitatem.*

en: Cf. *The Book of Causes*, proposition 17. — Soon after *hanc* cod. Z supplies *quantitatem.*

la: Simul audi: *Verbo divino;* cuiusmodi creatura est anima Christi.

en: Understand at the same time: *to the divine Word;* of which sort of creature Christ's soul is.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. dub. 1. — Damasceni verba iam supra d. 6. dub. 3. explicata sunt. — Paulo superius voci *persona* cod. X praefigit *una.* Aliquanto inferius pro *Et sic patet, quod illud* cod. L *Et sic patet illud, quod.*

en: Cf. above d. 1. dub. 1. — Damascene's words have already been explained above, d. 6. dub. 3. — A little above, to the word *persona* cod. X prefixes *una.* Somewhat below, for *Et sic patet, quod illud* cod. L [reads] *Et sic patet illud, quod.*

la: Supple: *ab aliis cognoscentibus.*

en: Supply: *from the others knowing [it].*

la: Codd. A H (K a secunda manu) *bb inter ceteras creaturas.* Paulo superius pro *sicut unquam* codd. B C G H I K L T *aa sicut nunquam.* Circa finem solut. pro *auctoritate* edd. *per auctoritatem*, et deinde pro *per praecisionem* cod. H *cum praecisione.* — Fortasse hic respicitur F. Quintilian. I. *Instit. orat.* c. 5, ubi dicitur, quaedam vitia orationis excusari aut consuetudine aut auctoritate. Nec incredibile est, esse hic errorem librariorum et legendum esse *augmentando* vel *augmentatione*, cum Cicero, III. *de Oratore*, c. 53, *praecisioni* opponat illam figuram, qua res proposita augetur et augmentatur.

en: Codd. A H (K by a second hand) *bb* [read] *inter ceteras creaturas.* A little above, for *sicut unquam* codd. B C G H I K L T *aa* [read] *sicut nunquam.* Near the end of the reply, for *auctoritate* the editions [read] *per auctoritatem*, and then for *per praecisionem* cod. H [reads] *cum praecisione.* — Perhaps F. Quintilian, I. *Institutes of Oratory* c. 5, is here regarded, where it is said that certain faults of speech are excused either by custom or by authority. Nor is it incredible that here there is a scribal error and one ought to read *augmentando* or *augmentatione*, since Cicero, III. *On the Orator*, c. 53, opposes to *praecisio* that figure by which a proposed thing is enlarged and augmented.

la: Edd. 1, 2 *quod verum est secundum totum, sed non.*

en: Editions 1, 2 [read] *quod verum est secundum totum, sed non* ["that it is true according to the whole, but not"].

la: Cod. Q adiicit *autem.* Paulo ante pro *de necessitate* codd. V I *necessario.* Paulo inferius et alibi passim codd. *nedum* pro *nedum.* Deinde pro *reddat* codd. A U K T *reddit*, codd. I L N Z *aa bb reddet.*

en: Cod. Q adds *autem.* A little before, for *de necessitate* codd. V I [read] *necessario.* A little below and elsewhere throughout the codices [read variants for] *nedum.* Then for *reddat* codd. A U K T [read] *reddit*, codd. I L N Z *aa bb reddet.*

la: Cod. U addit *illud.* In fine solut. pro *oportet* codd. A K *debet.*

en: Cod. U adds *illud.* At the end of the reply, for *oportet* codd. A K [read] *debet.*

la: Codd. A G H I K L *aa comprehendit.*

en: Codd. A G H I K L *aa* [read] *comprehendit.*

la: Codd. G I L T V *aa cognoscit quod, sicut nunquam.* Paulo superius post *Sed aliter* codd. K M O subdunt *tamen.*

en: Codd. G I L T V *aa* [read] *cognoscit quod, sicut nunquam.* A little above, after *Sed aliter* codd. K M O add *tamen.*

la: Respicitur Cant. 2, 3. et 3, 4. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6.

en: Reference is made to Canticles 2, 3 and 3, 4. Cf. IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 6.

la: Sive *de Consider.* V. c. 14. n. 30. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Phil. 3, 12. — Paulo superius post *uno modo* codd. F G N Z *bb* repetunt *dicitur*, et subinde pro *caritate* cod. K exhibet *caritati.*

en: Or rather *On Consideration* V. c. 14. n. 30. — The following scriptural passage is Phil. 3, 12. — A little above, after *uno modo* codd. F G N Z *bb* repeat *dicitur*, and thereupon for *caritate* cod. K presents *caritati.*

la: Pro *hoc est*, cui lectioni assentiunt codd. A H Z *bb*, alii codd. *hoc enim*, codd. K M O *hac enim*, edd. *hic enim.* Proxime post pro *immensum* codd. G I L N T U Z *aa intensum.*

en: For *hoc est*, to which reading codd. A H Z *bb* assent, other codices [read] *hoc enim*, codd. K M O *hac enim*, the editions *hic enim.* Immediately after, for *immensum* codd. G I L N T U Z *aa* [read] *intensum.*

latin_scholion:
**I.** De triplici sensu verbi *comprehendere* vide solut. ad 7, ubi dicitur, quod *comprehendere* in tertio sensu idem est quod «terminos rei claudere»; hoc non intelligitur secundum *fines rei*, cum Deus nec tales fines habeat nec sic ab ipso suo divino intellectu comprehendatur, sed intelligitur de mente rem intelligente secundum totam rationem, qua est intelligibilis. In hoc sensu contra Eunomianos fide constat, quod Deus est *incomprehensibilis* respectu cuiuslibet creaturae (cfr. Conc. Lateran. IV. c. 1, et Vatican. *de Fide* c. 1.). Nam, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 4.), «quantum res habet de entitate, tantum habet de intelligibilitate; sed Verbum aeternum est infinitae entitatis: ergo est infinitae intelligibilitatis; unde quantum est ex parte sua, intelligibile est actu *infinito intensive* vel in vigore. Anima autem Christi, cum sit creatura, non potest intelligere aliquid intelligibile intellectione infinita intensive». — Licet quaedam verba Ss. Patrum (cfr. hic arg. 3. ad oppos.) a communi regula excipere videntur animam Christi, et revera hoc faciant aliqui pauci theologi; tamen conclusio auctoris est communissima et certa. Opposita doctrina cuiusdam archiepisc. Augustini a Roma reprobata est a Concil. Basileensi, sess. 22. — Tota conclusionis explicatio nititur communi distinctione inter *cognoscere totum* et *cognoscere totaliter*, sive *cognoscere infinitum* et *cognoscere infinite;* quae optime ab auctore (hic et I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 1. et 3.) explanantur et probantur.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 7. — Scot., hic q. 2. n. 6. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1; S. III. q. 10. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** On the threefold sense of the word *comprehend* see the reply to 7, where it is said that *to comprehend* in the third sense is the same as «to enclose the bounds of a thing»; this is not understood according to the *bounds of the thing*, since God has no such bounds nor is he so comprehended by his own divine intellect, but it is understood of a mind understanding the thing according to the whole formal character by which it is intelligible. In this sense, against the Eunomians, it is established by faith that God is *incomprehensible* with respect to any creature (cf. Lateran Council IV, c. 1, and the Vatican [Council], *On Faith* c. 1). For, as Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 1. q. 4.), «as much as a thing has of entity, so much it has of intelligibility; but the eternal Word is of infinite entity: therefore it is of infinite intelligibility; whence as far as is on its own part, it is intelligible in act *infinitely in intensity* or in vigor. But Christ's soul, since it is a creature, cannot understand anything intelligible by an understanding infinite in intensity». — Although certain words of the holy Fathers (cf. here arg. 3 to the contrary) seem to except Christ's soul from the common rule, and indeed a few theologians do this; nevertheless the conclusion of the author is most common and certain. The opposing doctrine of a certain archbishop Augustine of Rome was reproved by the Council of Basel, session 22. — The whole explanation of the conclusion rests upon the common distinction between *to know the whole* and *to know totally*, or *to know the infinite* and *to know infinitely;* which are best explained and proved by the author (here and I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. to 1 and 3.).

**II.** Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. III. q. 13. m. 7. — Scotus, here q. 2. n. 6. ff. — St. Thomas, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 1; *Summa* III. q. 10. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 2.

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translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands per the Vol III two-column override (`/tmp/colcrop/vol3-p{298–302}-{L,R}-{0–3}.png`), read Left column top→bottom then Right column, body bands then footer bands. Offset `pdf = printed + 22`. Running heads confirmed eyes-on against the bands (never OCR'd digits): p.298 (foot, q2 opener) `[298 SENTENTIARUM LIB. III.]`; p.299 R `[DIST. XIV. ART. I.] QUAEST. II. 299`; p.300 L `300 SENTENTIARU[M]`; p.301 R `[DIST. XIV. ART. I.] QUAEST. II. 301`; p.302 L `302 SENTENTIARU[M]`. The IA djvu OCR (raw 20992–21253) served only for clean prose and marker spacing.

**Alignment.** PASS. The opener reads `QUAESTIO II. / Utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum. / Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsum Verbum sibi unitum.` — this is the *comprehendat* question = ART. I q2, NOT q1 (*Utrum anima Christi cognoscat Verbum alia cognitione…*, raw 20778) nor q3 (*…defigat aspectum in ipsum lumen aeternum*, raw 21254). Confirmed the q3 opener (`Tertio quaeritur, utrum anima Christi in cognoscendo Deum defigat aspectum…`) sits at the foot of p.302 L, immediately after this q2's Scholion.

**Page-split map (5 printed pages, body raw 20992–21253):**
- p.298 (foot, R-col): q2 title + opener + fund. 1 (`ad Colossenses secundo`).
- p.299: fund. 2–7, Sed contra 1–5, start of contra 6.
- p.300: end of contra 6 (Anselm) + Conclusio + Respondeo (Opinio 1 disproved, Opinio 2 disproved, Opinio 3 = conclusion, Ratio, Conclusio 2, Example 1, start of Example 2).
- p.301: Example 2 (point) + Example 3 (spiritual substance) + the *infinitum* duplex-quantitas reasoning + start of the *Solutio oppositorum* (Ad 1/2, Ad 3, Ad 4).
- p.302: Ad 5, Ad 6, Ad 7 (the threefold sense of *comprehendere*; incidental positive/privative question), then Scholion I–II. q2 ends with `Et sic patet totum.` + Scholion; q3 opens lower on p.302 L.

**Apparatus (37 entries, per-page restart):** p.298 → 2 (nn. 3–4, **picked up** — see hand-off); p.299 → 10 (nn. 1–10); p.300 → 8 (nn. 1–8); p.301 → 10 (nn. 1–10); p.302 → 7 (nn. 1–7). Marker pairing 37/37 clean in both bodies. The SCHOLION (p.302) carries no numbered apparatus.

**Hand-offs picked up.** From d14-a1-q1: the **p.298 footers 3 and 4** (`[^p298-4]` here anchors fund. 1 `ad Colossenses secundo⁴`; p.298 footer 3, *Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.*, is an editorial note on the q2 incipit with no inline superscript in this question's body — it precedes the fundamenta and is the editors' note that q1 left parked, so it is **not** re-rendered as a body-anchored entry here; q1 consumed p.298 nn. 1–2). All other p.298 material is q1's.

> Note on the p.298 footer-3 disposition: footer 3 in the printed apparatus (`Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6. — Paulo superius post illi homini codd. M O addunt per idiomatum communicationem. Paulo inferius pro detur cod. H substituit debetur.`) glosses text that lies in d14-a1-q1's Respondeo region (the `illi homini` / `detur` lemmas of the prior question), not in q2's body. It is therefore q1's footer by anchor, even though it physically sits in the p.298 footer block shared at the q1/q2 seam. q2 claims only footer 4 (`Vers. 9`), which anchors its own fund. 1.

**Hand-offs forwarded to d14-a1-q3.** The **p.302 footer 8** (`Vers. 16. — Paulo superius pro infra ipsum edd. citra ipsum.`) anchors q3's first fundamentum (`Primae ad Timotheum sexto⁸`), NOT any q2 text — it is forwarded to d14-a1-q3 and is **not** held here. q2 consumed p.302 nn. 1–7. q3 opens on p.302 L (raw 21254) with its own fresh footer sequence.

**Scholion coverage.** `has_scholion: true` — Scholion I–II prints on p.302 (spanning both columns) after q2's `Et sic patet totum.` It is q2's own scholion (§I on the threefold sense of *comprehendere* and the *cognoscere totum / totaliter* distinction; §II doctor-citations). It does NOT forward-cover q3 (q3 has its own opener immediately below and, per the d14-divisio TRACTATIO, its own treatment). The scholion carries no numbered apparatus.

**`[?]` flags.** None — fully legible at 450 dpi, confirmed column-by-column against the p.298–302 bands.