title: Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
<!-- page 953 -->

### Articulus II.
### Quaestio III. *Utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Anselmus *de Originali Peccato*[^1]: « Miratur, inquit, forte aliquis, cur pro culpa voluntatis membra puniuntur et sensus; verum non est ita; non enim punitur nisi voluntas; nam nihil est alicui poena, nisi quod contra voluntatem est, et nulla res poenam sentit, nisi quae voluntatem habet; membra autem et sensus per se nihil volunt. Sicut igitur voluntas membris et sensibus operatur, ita in ipsis ipsa aut torquetur, aut delectatur ». Ex hac auctoritate habetur, quae claudit in se ratiocinationem, quod proprium sit voluntatis puniri.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *Sex Quaestionum*[^2]: « Voluntas quippe ipsa punitur sive animi supplicio, sive corporis, ut, quae delectatur in peccatis, ipsa plectatur in poenis ».

3. Item, ratione: « Opposita sunt nata fieri circa idem »[^3]; sed voluntarium et involuntarium sunt opposita; sed poena est affectio involuntaria, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*: ergo sicut culpa, quae est affectio voluntaria, respicit voluntatem tanquam illud a quo est; sic videtur, quod poena respiciat voluntatem tanquam illud contra quod est.

4. Item, culpa est meritum poenae; sed meritum respectu praemii et habet rationem ordinis et habet rationem dispositionis: si ergo dispositio et illud, ad quod disponit, sunt in eodem, et culpa, ut in ratione culpae est, potius respicit voluntatem: ergo et poena.

**Sed contra:**
1. Quatuor, ut dicit Beda[^4], inflicta sunt nobis pro peccato, scilicet « ignorantia, malitia, infirmitas, concupiscentia »; sed quod infligitur pro peccato est poena: ergo ignorantia est poena;

<!-- page 954 -->

sed constat, quod ignorantia non respicit voluntatem, sed rationem: ergo etc.

2. Item, duplex est poena in futuro, videlicet poena damni et poena sensus; sed poena damni, quae est in carentia visionis Dei, non tantum respicit voluntatem, immo multo magis respicit rationem; poena vero sensus, quae est in concrematione ignis, multo magis respicit partem sensibilem et coniunctum, quam respiciat voluntatem rationalem, cum sentire sit passio coniuncti[^5]: ergo videtur, quod poena principalius respiciat alias potentias animae quam voluntatem.

3. Item, si poena respicit voluntatem, aut hoc est, quia est secundum voluntatem, aut quia est contra voluntatem. Si quia secundum voluntatem: ergo nemo puniretur, nisi qui vellet; quod plane falsum est. Si quia contra voluntatem: ergo cum vir iustus voluntarie sustineat omnes poenas, et maxime Christus, nulli viro iusto nec etiam Christo poenalis esset aliqua passio, quod manifeste falsum est.

4. Item, si poena respiceret voluntatem tanquam subiectum proprium: ergo sicut nemo potest peccare, nisi qui habet usum voluntatis, sic nemo posset puniri, nisi qui voluntatis usum haberet; sed hoc plane falsum est — nam parvuli puniuntur pro peccatis parentum — et multa etiam tormenta patiuntur, non solum in habitu, verum etiam in actu — ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> Poena, ut est ultio, et etiam ut est passio laedens, affligens et displicens, directe respicit ipsam voluntatem, ut tantum laedens et affligens potest respicere et alias potentias.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod poena ratione poenae duo nominat, videlicet nocumentum naturae et instrumentum divinae iustitiae: unum tanquam materiale, reliquum tanquam formale. Unde poena et est ultio et etiam est passio[^6]. Cum ergo poena comparatur ad aliquid, hoc potest esse aut in quantum ultio, aut in quantum passio. — Si in quantum ultio, sic proprie habet comparari ad ipsam voluntatem. Deus enim non ulciscitur se de manu, vel pede, vel aliqua potentia sensitiva, sed de voluntate deliberativa, de qua ulciscitur Deus non solum affligendo ipsam in se, sed etiam affligendo eam in ceteris membris corporis, in quibus ipsa cupiebat delectari.

Si autem comparetur poena ad aliquid, in quantum est passio, sic dicendum est, quod cum non quaecumque passio poena sit secundum completam rationem poenae, sed passio laedens, passio affligens, passio displicens; sic adhuc poena, secundum quod plene tenet rationem poenae, scilicet poena, quae facit hominem recte miserum, adhuc respicit voluntatem ratione sui completivi. Nemo enim plene miser est, sicut dicit Augustinus[^7], ex hoc, quod patitur solum, sed ex hoc, quod patitur et scit se pati et non vult se pati. — Secundum autem quod passio tenet semiplenam rationem poenae, prout dicitur passio laedens vel affligens in eo, in quo non est nata esse, quantum est de prima conditione naturae; sic non tantum respicit voluntatem, sed etiam omnes potentias animae et omnia membra corporis; non tamen respicit illa sine voluntate, quia in nullo potest esse poena, nisi in quo est rationalis voluntas. Unde bruta, quamvis patiantur, non tamen puniuntur.

Sic igitur patet, quod poena, et in quantum est ultio, et in quantum est passio, plene tenens rationem poenae, directe respicit ipsam voluntatem, ita quod proprium est ipsius voluntatis puniri. Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt. In quantum tamen est passio laedens vel affligens, habet respicere alias potentias et etiam corporis organa. Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad rationes, quae ad oppositum inducuntur.

1. 2. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur de ignorantia et de poena damni et sensus, patet responsio. Nam etsi ignorantia dicat privationem alicuius boni, quod respiciat cognitivam, et similiter poena damni, et similiter poena sensus privationem delectationis et quietis partis sensitivae; totum tamen hoc Deus ordinat ad vindicandum et ulciscendum se de voluntate. Ipsa enim est, quae directe adversatur divinae iustitiae, dum perpetrat iniustitiam; et ideo ordo divinae iustitiae punientis directe respicit illius deordinationis remotionem. Ipsa etiam sola fuit, quae sibi se principium posuit et Deum derelinquendo contempsit, dum peccavit; et ideo debet per poenarum multitudinem in servitutem Dei redigi, ut quae dehonoravit Deum voluntarie contemnendo, honoret ipsum involuntarie supplicia patiendo[^8].

<!-- page 955 -->

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in viris iustis et in Christo non fuit poena involuntaria; dicendum, quod ibi non tenet poena rationem ultionis[^9], nisi relata ad voluntatem Adae peccatricem, respectu cuius voluntatis omnis poena est involuntaria, quia voluntas peccatrix quaerit oblectationem, et quaerendo oblectationem refugit passionem. — Ad illud quod obiicitur de parvulo, qui patitur poenas; responderi potest sicut ad hoc.

english:
### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will.*

Thirdly it is asked whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will. And it seems that it is:

1. Anselm, *On Original Sin*[^1]: « Someone perhaps wonders, he says, why for the fault of the will the members and the senses are punished; but it is not so; for nothing is punished except the will; for nothing is a punishment to anyone except what is against the will, and no thing feels punishment except one which has a will; but the members and the senses by themselves will nothing. Just as, therefore, the will operates through the members and the senses, so in them it is itself either tormented or delighted ». From this authority, which encloses within itself a reasoning, it is had that to be punished is proper to the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of the *Six Questions*[^2]: « For the will itself is punished, whether by a punishment of the soul or of the body, so that what is delighted in sins may itself be chastised in punishments ».

3. Likewise, by reason: « Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing »[^3]; but the voluntary and the involuntary are opposites; but punishment is an involuntary affection, as Augustine says in the book *On Free Choice*: therefore, just as fault, which is a voluntary affection, regards the will as that from which it is; so it seems that punishment regards the will as that against which it is.

4. Likewise, fault is the merit of punishment; but merit with respect to reward has both the character of order and the character of disposition: if therefore the disposition and that toward which it disposes are in the same thing, and fault, as it is in the character of fault, rather regards the will: therefore punishment too.

**On the contrary:**
1. Four things, as Bede says[^4], were inflicted on us for sin, namely « ignorance, malice, infirmity, concupiscence »; but what is inflicted for sin is a punishment: therefore ignorance is a punishment;

but it is established that ignorance does not regard the will, but the reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there is a twofold punishment in the future, namely the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense; but the punishment of loss, which consists in the lack of the vision of God, not only regards the will, but rather much more regards the reason; and the punishment of sense, which consists in the burning of fire, much more regards the sensible part and the composite, than it regards the rational will, since to feel is a passion of the composite[^5]: therefore it seems that punishment more principally regards the other powers of the soul than the will.

3. Likewise, if punishment regards the will, this is either because it is according to the will, or because it is against the will. If because it is according to the will: then no one would be punished except one who willed it; which is plainly false. If because it is against the will: then since a just man voluntarily endures all punishments, and most of all Christ, no penal passion would belong to any just man, nor even to Christ, which is manifestly false.

4. Likewise, if punishment were to regard the will as its proper subject: then just as no one can sin except one who has the use of the will, so no one could be punished except one who had the use of the will; but this is plainly false — for little children are punished for the sins of their parents — and they also suffer many torments, not only in habit, but also in act — therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> Punishment, as it is retribution, and also as it is a passion that wounds, afflicts, and displeases, directly regards the will itself; insofar only as it wounds and afflicts can it regard also the other powers.

**I respond:** It must be said that punishment by reason of punishment names two things, namely a harm to nature and an instrument of divine justice: the one as material, the other as formal. Hence punishment is both retribution and also a passion[^6]. When therefore punishment is compared to something, this can be either insofar as it is retribution, or insofar as it is a passion. — If insofar as it is retribution, then it is properly to be compared to the will itself. For God does not avenge himself upon the hand, or the foot, or any sensitive power, but upon the deliberative will, of which God takes vengeance not only by afflicting it in itself, but also by afflicting it in the other members of the body, in which it desired to be delighted.

But if punishment be compared to something insofar as it is a passion, then it must be said that, since not every passion is a punishment according to the complete character of punishment, but a passion that wounds, a passion that afflicts, a passion that displeases; so still punishment, according as it fully holds the character of punishment, namely the punishment which makes a man truly miserable, still regards the will by reason of what completes it. For no one is fully miserable, as Augustine says[^7], from the fact that he merely suffers, but from the fact that he suffers and knows himself to suffer and does not will to suffer. — But according as the passion holds a half-full character of punishment, as it is called a passion that wounds or afflicts in that in which it is not by nature meant to be, so far as belongs to the first condition of nature; so it regards not only the will, but also all the powers of the soul and all the members of the body; yet it does not regard them apart from the will, because in nothing can there be punishment except in that in which there is a rational will. Hence the brutes, although they suffer, are nevertheless not punished.

Thus therefore it is clear that punishment, both insofar as it is retribution, and insofar as it is a passion fully holding the character of punishment, directly regards the will itself, so that it is proper to the will itself to be punished. Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded. Insofar, however, as it is a passion that wounds or afflicts, it does regard the other powers and also the organs of the body. And according to this the response to the arguments which are brought for the opposite is clear.

1. 2. For to that which is objected concerning ignorance and concerning the punishment of loss and of sense, the response is clear. For although ignorance signifies a privation of some good which regards the cognitive power, and likewise the punishment of loss, and likewise the punishment of sense a privation of the delight and rest of the sensitive part; yet God orders all this toward avenging and taking vengeance upon the will. For it is the will that directly opposes divine justice, while it perpetrates injustice; and therefore the order of avenging divine justice directly regards the removal of that disorder. It also was the will alone that set itself up as its own principle and despised God by forsaking him, when it sinned; and therefore it ought through the multitude of punishments to be reduced into the servitude of God, so that, having dishonored God by despising him voluntarily, it may honor him involuntarily by suffering punishments[^8].

3. 4. To that which is objected, that in just men and in Christ there was no involuntary punishment; it must be said that there punishment does not hold the character of retribution[^9], except as related to the sinning will of Adam, with respect to which will every punishment is involuntary, because the sinning will seeks gratification, and in seeking gratification flees passion. — To that which is objected concerning the little child who suffers punishments; one can respond as to this.

la: Cap. 4. In testimonio allato textus originalis pro *puniuntur* exhibet *puniantur*, et circa finem cum Vat. et ed. 1 voci *membris* praemittit *in*. Circa initium testimonii edd., excepta 1, pro *culpa* substituunt *per culpam*. — Versus finem arg. pro *quae claudit* in Vat. et edd. 2, 3 legitur *quod claudit*, et dein in Vat. sola *rationem* pro *ratiocinationem*. — In codd. T W bb et aliis deest *vel concomitanter*, et in Vat. nec non in edd. 3, 4 desiderantur verba, quae habentur in initio arg. post *Ad tria sequentia*, verba scil. *quae subiungit*.

en: Chapter 4. In the testimony cited the text of the original reads *let them be punished* for *they are punished*, and toward the end, with the Vatican edition and ed. 1, prefixes *in* to the word *members*. Near the beginning of the testimony the editions, except ed. 1, substitute *through fault* for *fault*. — Toward the end of the argument, for *which encloses* the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3 read *that it encloses*, and then the Vatican edition alone reads *reason* for *reasoning*. — In codices T, W, bb and others *or concomitantly* is lacking, and in the Vatican edition as also in editions 3, 4 the words are wanting which are had at the beginning of the argument after *to the three following*, namely the words *which he adds*.

la: Plenius: *in libro Sex Quaestionum, contra paganos expositorum ad Deogratias*, seu Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 27. — Pro *sive animi supplicio* Vat. *sive sit animi supplicium*. — Codd. et edd. hic falso signant librum *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*. — Cfr. hic q. 1. in corp. et d. 21. dub. 4.

en: More fully: *in the book of the Six Questions, expounded against the pagans, to Deogratias*, that is, Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 27. — For *whether by a punishment of the soul* the Vatican edition reads *whether it be a punishment of the soul*. — The codices and editions here falsely cite the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*. — Cf. here q. 1 in the body and d. 21, dub. 4.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis*, et II. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 7.). — Verba August. mox memorata, quae habentur III. *de Lib. Arb.* c. 9. n. 26, vide supra pag. 719, nota 1. — Post *Item, ratione* cod. M supplet *videtur*. In fine arg. pro *contra quod est* cod. cc et ed. 1 *circa quod est*, et paulo ante pro *quod poena respiciat* multi codd. (nonnulli a secunda manu iam sunt correcti) et primae edd. perperam *quod culpa respiciat*, cod. U *quod poena vel culpa respiciat*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. *On Opposites*, and *Topics* II, ch. 3 (c. 7.). — The words of Augustine mentioned just after, which are had in *On Free Choice* III, c. 9, n. 26, see above, p. 719, note 1. — After *Likewise, by reason* codex M supplies *it seems*. At the end of the argument, for *against which it is* codex cc and ed. 1 read *about which it is*, and a little before, for *that punishment regards* many codices (some have already been corrected by a second hand) and the first editions wrongly read *that fault regards*, codex U *that punishment or fault regards*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 682, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 682, note 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 328, nota 2.

en: Cf. above, p. 328, note 2.

la: Aristot., *de Somno et vigil.* c. 1: *Quoniam autem non animae proprium est sentire neque corporis (cuius enim est potentia, huius est et actus; qui vero dicitur sensus, ut actio, motus quidam per corpus animae est), manifestum est, quod neque animae passio propria neque inanimatum corpus possibile est sentire.* Cfr. I. *de Anima*, text. 12. (c. 1.).

en: Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking* c. 1: *But since to feel is not proper to the soul nor to the body (for of whatever there is a power, of the same there is also an act; but what is called sense, as action, is a certain motion through the body of the soul), it is manifest that neither is a passion proper to the soul, nor is it possible for an inanimate body to feel.* Cf. *On the Soul* I, text 12 (c. 1.).

la: Libr. XIII. *de Trin.* c. 8–9. S. Doctor discutiens, quis beatus, quis miser sit dicendus, ait (c. 8. n. 11.): « Unde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur, quo [vita] sit misera (propterea enim beata vita discedit, quoniam tota vita discedit), miser est tamen, quamdiu sentit, quia scit, se nolente, consumi propter quod cetera et quod prae ceteris diligit ». Epist. 102. (alias 49.) q. 4. n. 26. ait: *In voluntate propria metietur malus homo mala opera, et in ea metietur ei miseria... Ac per hoc ibi etiam fit vel beatus vel miser, hoc est in ipso suae voluntatis affectu, quae omnium factorum meritorumque mensura est.* — Paulo superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 omittit *adhuc*, et mox pro *recte* [i. e. *vere*] *miserum* Vat. sola substituit *esse miserum*.

en: Book XIII *On the Trinity* c. 8–9. The holy Doctor, discussing who is to be called blessed and who miserable, says (c. 8. n. 11.): « Hence even if no sense remains by which [life] may be miserable (for the blessed life departs for this reason, that the whole life departs), nevertheless he is miserable, as long as he feels, because he knows that, against his will, he is consumed on account of that which he loves above all else ». In Epistle 102 (otherwise 49.) q. 4. n. 26. he says: *In his own will an evil man will measure out evil works, and in it misery will be measured out to him... And by this he becomes there either blessed or miserable, that is, in the very affection of his will, which is the measure of all deeds and merits.* — A little above the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 omits *still*, and presently for *truly* [i. e. *truly*] *miserable* the Vatican edition alone substitutes *to be miserable*.

la: Cfr. August., XIV. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 13. seqq.; Anselm., I. *Cur Deus Homo*, c. 14. — Paulo ante pro *ut quae dehonoravit* Vat. *quae dehonoravit*, omisso *ut*. — Vide supra d. 36. a. 3. q. 2. in corp.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the City of God* XIV, c. 13 seqq.; Anselm, *Why God Became Man* I, c. 14. — A little before, for *so that, having dishonored* the Vatican edition reads *which dishonored*, omitting *so that*. — See above, d. 36, a. 3, q. 2, in the body.

la: Vide supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius pro *rationem ultionis* cod. T *rationem poenae ultionis*.

en: See above, d. 36, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above, for *the character of retribution* codex T reads *the character of the punishment of retribution*. ---

latin_scholion:
Ad rationem poenae spectat, quod ipsa sit contraria voluntati; quod communiter docetur et approbatur a S. Thoma (S. 1. q. 48. a. 5, q. 64. a. 3, 1. II. q. 87. a. 6.), qui hoc principio utitur, ut explicet poenam ignis, qua affliguntur daemones (IV. Sent. d. 44. q. 3. a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.). — De hac autem quaestione non invenimus explicite tractantes nisi Petrum a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3; Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 3, et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
It belongs to the character of punishment that it be contrary to the will; which is commonly taught and approved by St. Thomas (S. 1. q. 48. a. 5, q. 64. a. 3, 1. II. q. 87. a. 6.), who uses this principle to explain the fire by which the demons are afflicted (IV Sent. d. 44. q. 3. a. 3. little-question 3.). — On this question, however, we do not find any treating it explicitly except Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, a. 2. q. 3, and Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the IA djvu OCR, raw lines 66237–66355 of `raw/bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, with the 450 dpi column-band PDF (printed pp. 953–955 = pdf pp. 975–977) authoritative for the Respondeo, replies, scholion, and all footers (Vol II PDF-priority inversion). The OCR for this region is unusually clean. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page metadata correction (2026-06-01, Pass 3 boundary sweep).** The original promotion recorded this chunk as printed pp. **933–935 / pdf 955–957** — both wrong. The IA djvu OCR running heads in this region are digit-mangled (`953`→`933`, `954`→`934`, `955`→`936`), and the recorded pdf pages had been set to the *dubia*'s span. 450 dpi eyes-on (`p-953.png` running head `DIST. XLI. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` corner `953`; `p-955.png` running head `DIST. XLI. DUBIA. 955`) confirms the true span is **printed 953–955, pdf 975–977** (offset +22). Frontmatter `printed_pages`/`pdf_pages`/`source` and the three `<!-- page -->` comments were corrected; the per-page footer map below now reads 953/954/955. Body text and apparatus were already complete and correctly split — only the page numbers were wrong.

**Alignment.** Opener confirmed: *Tertio quaeritur, utrum sicut peccare, sic etiam puniri sit voluntatis proprium* — the THIRD of Art. II's three sub-questions. No q-swap.

**Scholion.** PRESENT for this quaestio (raw 66350–66355, `SCHOLION.` header after the Respondeo on printed p. 955). `has_scholion: true`. (This differs from sibling a2-q1/q2 handling; q3 carries its own scholion.)

**Page-split / apparatus map** (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering each printed page; chunk markers renumbered [^1]–[^9] sequentially):
- **p. 953** (printed fn 1–5 left col + 3 right col → chunk [^1]–[^5]): QUAESTIO III title + 4 *videtur* args + *Sed contra* arg 1 opener. [^1] = printed p.953 fn `*`/4 (Anselm, *de Orig. Pecc.* c. 4) anchored at arg 1; [^2] = printed fn 5/2 (Augustine *Sex Quaest.*) at arg 2; [^3] = printed right-col fn 1 (Aristot. *Praedicam.*) at arg 3 *ratione*; [^4] = printed right-col fn 2 (Cfr. supra pag. 682 — Beda) at *Sed contra* arg 1; [^5] = printed right-col fn 3 (Cfr. supra pag. 328) at *Sed contra* arg 2 *coniuncti*.
- **p. 954** (printed fn 1–4 → chunk [^6]–[^8]): *Sed contra* args 2–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo + replies 1.2. [^6] = printed fn 1 (Aristot. *de Somno*) at Respondeo *est passio*; [^7] = printed fn `*`/4 (Augustine XIII *de Trin.*) at *sicut dicit Augustinus*; [^8] = printed right-col fn `=` (August. *de Civ. Dei* / Anselm) at reply 1.2 *supplicia patiendo*. (printed p.954 fn 2 [Cfr. supra d.33] and fn 3 [Vide supra d.36 a.3 q.2] are minor cross-refs folded into [^8]'s tail / not separately anchored.)
- **p. 955** (printed fn 1 → chunk [^9]): replies 3.4 + Scholion. [^9] = printed p.955 fn 1 (`Vide supra d. 36. a. 2. q. 2. — ...rationem ultionis cod. T...`) anchored at reply 3.4 *rationem ultionis*. The scholion carries its source refs inline (no separate footnote). The shared p.955 footer split with `d41-dubia` is clean: a2-q3 holds the left-col q3 note ([^9]); the right-col `Gal. 5, 6` / pag. 891 / d.38 / Matth. 13, 32 notes are dubia's [^1]–[^4] (verified 450 dpi p-955.png, Pass 3 2026-06-01).

**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from a2-q2:* q3 shares printed p. 953 with a2-q2 (q2's tail + conclusio finish at the top of p.953; q3 opens lower on the same page). The p.953 footer sequence (fn 1–8) is split cleanly: fn 1 (*concomitanter*) = a2-q2 [^17]; fn 3 (*August. III de Lib. Arb. c. 24*) = a2-q2 [^11]; fn 2 (*Cfr. hic q. 1. … d. 21. dub. 4.*) collated into q3's [^2] tail; fn 4–8 = q3's [^1]–[^5]. No drop, no double-count (verified 450 dpi p-953.png + colcrop L-2, Pass 3 2026-06-01).
- *Forwarded to d41-dubia:* the chunk ends at the close of q3's reply + scholion (raw line 66355). The `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` header begins at raw line **66357** (DUB. I), still on printed p. 955. The remaining p.955 footer notes — `Gal. 5, 6` (per dilectionem), `Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2`, `Vide eius verba supra pag. 891` (Bernardus), `Supple: homo / Matth. 13, 32` — and all DUB. I–III content belong to `d41-dubia`, NOT here.

**DUBIA finding.** d.41 HAS a dubia unit. `DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI` at raw **66357**; DUB. I opener *In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod fides intentionem dirigit*; DUB. II *Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est*; DUB. III *Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod peccata, quae a nescientibus vel coactis perpetrantur...*. Hard end of d.41 / start of d.42 = `DISTINCTIO XLII` at raw 66472. So d.41 is NOT yet complete after q3 — next action is `bon-sent-II-d41-dubia`.

**[?] flags.** None.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 41, Dubia

title_alt: Dubia circa litteram Magistri (Dist. XLI)

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XLI)

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 955 -->

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *fides intentionem dirigit*. Multi enim habentes fidem habent malas intentiones: ergo videtur, quod intentionis directio a fide non habeat esse. Si tu dicas, quod loquitur de fide, *quae per dilectionem operatur*[^1], utpote de fide formata; tunc potius videtur, quod directio intentionis debuit attribui caritati quam fidei.

Item, quaeritur iuxta hoc, cum directio intentionis aliquo modo attribuatur fidei, aliquo modo caritati: quare similiter non attribuitur spei, cum et ipsa sit virtus theologica et respiciat finem, sicut fides et caritas?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum intentio duo respiciat, videlicet *oculum intellectus* et *pedem affectus*[^2], duplici indiget directivo, quorum unum respiciat aspectum, et hoc est fides; alterum vero affectum, et hoc est caritas. Et ideo dicit Bernardus[^3], quod ad simplicitatem oculi concurrit caritas et veritas. Quando ergo Magister dicit, quod fides dirigit intentionem, non de quacumque fide intelligit, sed de fide operante per dilectionem, sicut obiectum est. Magis tamen directionem attribuit fidei quam caritati, quia *dirigere* in via potius est luminis illustrantis quam virtutis adiuvantis, licet utrumque sit necessarium ad hoc, quod homo recte ambulet: et quod lumen videat et quod pedem rectum habeat. Propter defectum primi non recte incedit *caecus*, et propter defectum secundi non recte incedit *claudus*.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de spe, dicendum, quod spei, proprie loquendo, non est dirigere, sed *erigere*; quia spes exspectat per modum futuri: unde quasi dat quandam securitatem, ne in via deficiat[^4]. Fides autem et caritas praesentialiter potentias, in quibus sunt, in operibus dirigunt; quia una illuminat, et altera inflammat; et ideo una dirigit respectu *veritatis*, altera vero respectu *bonitatis*; quantum ad quae duo sufficienter attenditur rectificatio animae in suis operibus. Et ideo non oportet, quod spei attribuatur *directio*, sed solum *erectio*, licet illa erectio quodam modo dici possit *directio*[^5].

### Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Omnis vita infidelium peccatum est*. Sed contra: infideles habent opera virtutum politicarum[^6]; sed virtutes politicae non sunt habitus mali, sed boni, quia non sunt vitia, sed Dei dona: ergo videtur, quod opera illarum virtutum non sint peccatum. — Item, infidelis homo potest dare eleemosynam, ut Deus manifestet sibi viam veritatis; et in hoc disponit se, ut Deus det ei habitum fidei. Sed in hoc, quod homo ad gratiam se disponit, non peccat: ergo non videtur, quod omnis vita infidelium sit culpa, sive omnis actio. — Oppositum autem huius est, quia *arbor mala non potest fructus bonos facere*[^7]: ergo si infideles malam voluntatem habent et indirectam intentionem et carent fide et caritate, ergo videtur, quod omnia faciant male et nihil bene.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod infideles non peccant in omni sua actione; nam quando eorum actio non repugnat fidei nec bonis moribus, non est ratio aliqua, quare in ea debeat esse peccatum.

<!-- page 956 -->

Quod ergo dicitur in littera, quod « omnis vita infidelium est peccatum »; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur propter hoc, quod omnis actio, quam faciunt in tota vita sua, sit culpabilis et demeritoria, sed hoc ideo dicitur, quia per nullam actionem, quam agunt, liberantur a culpa, quamdiu in infidelitate persistunt. Et ideo sensus est: omnis vita infidelium est peccatum, id est *non sine peccato*. — Similiter intelligenda est sequens auctoritas[^8], et aliae consimiles, cum dicitur, quod « ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus »; non quia illa virtus sit *vitium*, sed quia *deficit* a verae virtutis perfectione; quia virtus vera dicitur, quia veraciter perducit ad vitam. — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod arbor mala non potest fructus bonos facere; intelligenda est locutio *per se*, id est, si operetur voluntas mala, in quantum mala, scilicet mala intentione. Si autem non *per se* intelligatur, non est sermo verus, nisi intelligatur de bono perfecto, quod quidem est bonum meritorium; sed tunc non sequitur: non facit fructum bonum, ergo facit fructum malum; quia inter tale bonum et malum est medium, sicut supra[^9] fuit ostensum.

### Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *peccata, quae a nescientibus vel coactis perpetrantur, non omnino possunt sine voluntate committi*. Videtur enim falsum dicere, primum, quia voluntarium praesupponit cognitionem, sicut vult Philosophus[^10]: ergo quod fit per nescientiam vel ignorantiam est simpliciter involuntarium: ergo committitur sine voluntate. — Item, coactio inducit violentiam; sed violentia excludit voluntatem: ergo quod fit a coacto non est voluntarium[^11].

Quaeritur ergo: qualiter Augustinus intelligit, cum dicit, quod quae fiunt per *coactionem* et *ignorantiam* non fiunt praeter voluntatem?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod novem sunt gradus voluntarii, secundum quos peccata voluntarie[^12] dicuntur fieri secundum plus et minus. — Primo enim et principaliter dicitur voluntarium quod est a voluntate nullo inclinante, nec exterius nec interius; sic fuit peccatum luciferi voluntarium. — Secundo modo voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate, aliquo suggerente exterius, sed nullo inclinante interius; et sic fuit peccatum primi hominis voluntarium. — Tertio modo dicitur voluntarium quod est a voluntate, aliquo tamen inclinante exterius et interius; et sic est peccatum mortale, quod aliquis perpetrat ex deliberatione et intentione post lapsum naturae. — Quarto modo aliquid est voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non movente ad illud directe, movente tamen ad incompossibile[^13], sicut est peccatum omissionis, quo quis omittit ad matutinum surgere, quia voluntarie se inebriavit. — Quinto modo aliquid est voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non movente ad illud directe nec appetente, sed aliud refugiente, sicut est peccatum, quod homo facit mortis timore. — Sexto modo est aliquid voluntarium, quod est a voluntate non plene id quod agit cognoscente; et sic peccatum ex ignorantia dicitur voluntarium. — Septimo modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quia consequitur ad aliquid, quod voluntarie factum est ab illo eodem, a quo illud fit; et sic peccata, quae consequuntur ebrietatem, in quam homo se scienter induxit, dicuntur aliquo modo voluntaria[^14]. — Octavo modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quia est ab aliquo potente prohibere et non prohibente; et sic peccatum veniale, quod est primus motus, dicitur esse voluntarium. — Nono modo dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quod introductum est a voluntate aliena sicut a causa prima; et sic peccatum originale dicitur voluntarium.

In omnibus istis modis praedictis aliquo modo salvatur ratio voluntarii; *proprie* tamen et principaliter in duobus modis primis. Et propterea dicit Augustinus[^15], quod illud quod dixerat, scilicet *omne peccatum voluntarium*, de peccato primi parentis esse intelligendum, non quia illud *solum* sit voluntarium, sed quia illud inter cetera *mere* est voluntarium. Alia enim aliquo modo voluntaria sunt, licet non ita plene, sicut illud quod fit per nescientiam et per coactionem.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod tam coactio quam ignorantia excludit rationem voluntarii; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi est *omnimoda ignorantia* et *coactio sufficiens*; sed voluntas nunquam cogitur *coactione sufficienti*; ideo coactio nunquam tollit rationem voluntarii[^16]. Ignorantia vero aliquando est per omnimodam privationem discretionis,

<!-- page 957 -->

et tunc tollit simpliciter rationem voluntarii; aliquando vero dicit privationem alicuius cognitionis determinatae[^17], utpote privationem alicuius circumstantiae, remanente nihilominus cognitione actus et aliarum circumstantiarum; sicut est de illo qui fornicatur nesciens, fornicationem esse peccatum mortale, sciens tamen, se cognoscere non suam; et tunc minuit, non tollit rationem voluntarii; et sic loquitur Magister in littera. — Et per hoc patent illa duo obiecta.

---

english:
## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says, that *faith directs the intention*. For many who have faith have evil intentions: therefore it seems that the direction of intention does not come from faith. If you say that he is speaking of the faith *which works through love*[^1], that is, of formed faith; then it rather seems that the direction of intention ought to have been attributed to charity rather than to faith.

Likewise, it is asked along with this, since the direction of intention is attributed in one way to faith and in another way to charity: why is it not likewise attributed to hope, since hope too is a theological virtue and regards the end, just as faith and charity do?

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the intention regards two things, namely the *eye of the intellect* and the *foot of the affection*[^2], it needs a twofold directive: one to regard the gaze, and this is faith; the other to regard the affection, and this is charity. And therefore Bernard says[^3] that to the simplicity of the eye there concur both charity and truth. When, therefore, the Master says that faith directs the intention, he does not understand it of any faith whatever, but of the faith working through love, as has been objected. Yet he attributes the direction to faith rather than to charity, because *to direct* on the way pertains rather to the illumining light than to the assisting power, although both are necessary for a man to walk rightly: that he may both see the light and have a right foot. Through the defect of the first the *blind man* does not walk rightly, and through the defect of the second the *lame man* does not walk rightly.

To that which is asked concerning hope, it must be said that it does not belong to hope, properly speaking, *to direct*, but *to raise up*; because hope awaits after the manner of the future: whence it gives, as it were, a certain security, lest one fail on the way[^4]. But faith and charity direct in their works the powers in which they presently reside; because the one illumines and the other inflames; and therefore the one directs with respect to *truth*, the other with respect to *goodness*; and with respect to these two the rectification of the soul in its works is sufficiently attended to. And therefore it is not necessary that *direction* be attributed to hope, but only *raising up*, although that raising up can in a certain manner be called *direction*[^5].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *All the life of unbelievers is sin*. But on the contrary: unbelievers have works of the political virtues[^6]; but the political virtues are not evil habits, but good ones, because they are not vices, but gifts of God: therefore it seems that the works of those virtues are not sin. — Likewise, an unbelieving man can give alms, that God may reveal to him the way of truth; and in this he disposes himself, that God may give him the habit of faith. But in this, that a man disposes himself toward grace, he does not sin: therefore it does not seem that all the life of unbelievers is fault, or every action. — But the opposite of this holds, because *an evil tree cannot bear good fruit*[^7]: therefore if unbelievers have an evil will and a misdirected intention and lack faith and charity, then it seems that they do everything badly and nothing well.

**I respond:** It must be said that unbelievers do not sin in their every action; for when their action is not repugnant to faith nor to good morals, there is no reason why there should be sin in it.

What therefore is said in the text, that « all the life of unbelievers is sin »; it must be said that this is not said because every action which they do in their whole life is culpable and demeritorious, but it is said for this reason, that by no action which they perform are they freed from fault, so long as they persist in unbelief. And therefore the sense is: all the life of unbelievers is sin, that is, *not without sin*. — In like manner is to be understood the following authority[^8], and others similar to it, when it is said that « where the recognition of truth is lacking, virtue is false »; not because that virtue is a *vice*, but because it *falls short* of the perfection of true virtue; for it is called true virtue because it leads truly to life. — To that, therefore, which is objected, that an evil tree cannot bear good fruit; the saying is to be understood *per se*, that is, if an evil will operates, insofar as it is evil, namely with an evil intention. But if it is not understood *per se*, the statement is not true, unless it is understood of the perfect good, which indeed is meritorious good; but then it does not follow: it does not bear good fruit, therefore it bears evil fruit; because between such good and evil there is a mean, as was shown above[^9].

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the sins which are perpetrated by the ignorant or the coerced cannot at all be committed without the will*. For it seems to say something false: first, because the voluntary presupposes cognition, as the Philosopher holds[^10]: therefore what is done through nescience or ignorance is simply involuntary: therefore it is committed without the will. — Likewise, coercion induces violence; but violence excludes the will: therefore what is done by one coerced is not voluntary[^11].

It is asked therefore: in what way does Augustine understand it, when he says that the things which are done through *coercion* and *ignorance* are not done apart from the will?

**I respond:** It must be said that there are nine grades of the voluntary, according to which sins are said to be done voluntarily[^12] according to more and less. — First and principally, that is called voluntary which is from the will with nothing inclining, neither exteriorly nor interiorly; thus the sin of Lucifer was voluntary. — In the second mode, that is called voluntary which is from the will, with something suggesting exteriorly, but nothing inclining interiorly; and thus the sin of the first man was voluntary. — In the third mode, that is called voluntary which is from the will, with something however inclining both exteriorly and interiorly; and such is mortal sin, which someone perpetrates from deliberation and intention after the fall of nature. — In the fourth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not moving toward it directly, but moving toward something incompossible[^13], as is the sin of omission, by which someone omits to rise for matins, because he voluntarily got himself drunk. — In the fifth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not moving toward it directly nor desiring it, but fleeing something else, as is the sin which a man does through fear of death. — In the sixth mode, something is voluntary which is from the will not fully knowing what it does; and thus sin from ignorance is called voluntary. — In the seventh mode, something is called voluntary because it follows upon something which was done voluntarily by the same one by whom it is done; and thus the sins which follow upon drunkenness, into which a man knowingly induced himself, are said to be in some manner voluntary[^14]. — In the eighth mode, something is called voluntary because it is from one able to prohibit and not prohibiting; and thus venial sin, which is the first movement, is said to be voluntary. — In the ninth mode, something is called voluntary which was introduced by another's will as by a first cause; and thus original sin is called voluntary.

In all these aforesaid modes the account of the voluntary is in some manner preserved; *properly*, however, and principally in the first two modes. And therefore Augustine says[^15] that what he had said, namely *every sin is voluntary*, is to be understood of the sin of the first parent, not because that *alone* is voluntary, but because that, among the rest, is *purely* voluntary. For the others are in some manner voluntary, although not so fully, as is that which is done through nescience and through coercion.

But to that which is objected, that both coercion and ignorance exclude the account of the voluntary; it must be said that this is true where there is *complete ignorance* and *sufficient coercion*; but the will is never coerced by *sufficient coercion*; therefore coercion never takes away the account of the voluntary[^16]. But ignorance is sometimes through a complete privation of discretion,

et tunc tollit simpliciter rationem voluntarii; aliquando vero dicit privationem alicuius cognitionis determinatae[^17], that is, the privation of some circumstance, with the cognition of the act and of the other circumstances nonetheless remaining; as is the case with one who fornicates not knowing that fornication is a mortal sin, knowing however that he is having relations with one not his own; and then it diminishes, but does not take away, the account of the voluntary; and thus the Master speaks in the text. — And through this those two objections are made clear.

---

la: Gal. 5, 6, ubi Vulg. *per caritatem* pro *per dilectionem*. — Paulo inferius pro *attribuatur* codd. H T et alii *attribuitur*.

en: Galatians 5, 6, where the Vulgate has *per caritatem* ("through charity") in place of *per dilectionem* ("through love"). — A little further on, in place of *attribuatur* codices H T and others read *attribuitur*.

la: Vide eius verba supra pag. 891, nota 4.

en: See his words above, page 891, note 4.

la: Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in fine corp.

en: Compare above, distinction 38, article 2, question 2, at the end of the body.

la: Supple: *homo*. Respicitur illud Matth. 13, 32: *Et dimittere eos ieiunos nolo, ne deficiant in via*. — De spe fusius agitur III. Sent. d. 26. per totam. — Paulo superius pro *exspectat* cod. cc et ed. 1 *spectat*.

en: Supply: *homo* ("man"). Reference is made to that passage of Matthew 13, 32 [recte 15, 32]: "And I am not willing to send them away fasting, lest they faint on the way." — Hope is treated more fully in III Sentences, distinction 26, throughout. — A little above, in place of *exspectat* ("awaits") codex cc and the first edition read *spectat*.

la: Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Albert., hic a. 4; a S. Thom., hic q. I. a. I; a Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. et circa lit.; a Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; ab Aegid. R., dub. lit. 1.

en: This doubt is also resolved by Blessed Albert, here article 4; by St. Thomas, here question 1, article 1; by Peter of Tarentaise, here question 1, article 2, and on the text; by Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text; by Giles of Rome, doubt on the text 1.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 901, nota 5. — De ratione in minori adducta vide supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., nec non III. Sent. d. 33. q. 5, et Alex. Hal. S. p. III. q. 64. m. 2.

en: Compare above, page 901, note 5. — On the reasoning adduced in the minor, see above, distinction 28, article 2, question 3, in the body, and also III Sentences, distinction 33, question 5, and Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, part III, question 64, member 2.

la: Matth. 7, 18. — De hac ratione cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XL. in principio, et hic c. I. — In fine arg. plures codd. *faciunt* pro *faciant*, et ed. 1 *omnia quae faciunt, male faciunt et nihil bene*.

en: Matthew 7, 18. — On this reasoning compare above, the text of the Master, distinction 40, at the beginning, and here, chapter 1. — At the end of the argument several codices read *faciunt* in place of *faciant*, and the first edition: *all the things which they do, they do badly and nothing well*.

la: Scil. eiusdem Augustini; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro *culpabilis* cod. T *culpa*. Mox pro *verae virtutis* Vat. et edd. 3, 4 *vera virtutis*, et deinde Vat. sola *quae veraciter* pro *quia veraciter*.

en: Namely, of the same Augustine; see here, the text of the Master, chapter 1. — Somewhat above, in place of *culpabilis* codex T has *culpa*. Soon after, in place of *verae virtutis* the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 have *vera virtutis*, and then the Vatican edition alone *quae veraciter* in place of *quia veraciter*.

la: Art. 1. q. 3. De ipsa difficultate in hoc dubio proposita et de sententia S. Augustini vide supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. 2. et scholion. — Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 5; S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 3. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3; Aegid. R., hic q. I. a. 3.

en: Article 1, question 3. On the difficulty proposed in this doubt and on the opinion of St. Augustine, see above, distinction 28, article 2, questions 1 and 2, and the scholion. — Compare on this doubt Blessed Albert, here article 5; St. Thomas, here question 1, article 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 1, article 3, and on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, here article 1, question 3; Giles of Rome, here question 1, article 3.

la: Libr. III. Ethic. c. 1. Verba ipsius vide supra pag. 592, nota 3.

en: Book III of the *Ethics*, chapter 1. For his words see above, page 592, note 3.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 619, nota 5. — Quaestio, quam auctor deinde ponit, respicit textum huius dubii, ex Augustino delibatum et a Magistro hic in lit. c. 3. allatum. — Pro *a coacto* cod. W « *coactione* », cod. bb *coactione* tantum, sine *a*.

en: Compare above, page 619, note 5. — The question which the author then poses regards the text of this doubt, drawn from Augustine and adduced by the Master here in the text, chapter 3. — In place of *a coacto* codex W reads « *coactione* », codex bb *coactione* only, without *a*.

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 habetur *voluntaria* et deest dein *fieri*.

en: In the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4 there stands *voluntaria*, and *fieri* is then lacking.

la: Cod. cc et edd. 1, 2 *impossibile*. In Vat. legitur *tamen ad illud ex quo sequitur*, in ed. 3 *tamen illud ex consequenti*. Mox pro *inebriavit* cod. T *inebriat*.

en: Codex cc and editions 1, 2 read *impossibile* ("impossible"). In the Vatican edition is read *tamen ad illud ex quo sequitur*; in edition 3 *tamen illud ex consequenti*. Soon after, in place of *inebriavit* codex T has *inebriat*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 527, nota 4. — Mox pro *et non prohibente* edd. praeter 1 *non tamen prohibente*.

en: Compare above, page 527, note 4. — Soon after, in place of *et non prohibente* the editions except the first read *non tamen prohibente*.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — In Vat., quae etiam interpunctionem mutavit, legitur sic: *esse, est intelligendum*.

en: See here, the text of the Master, chapter 3. — In the Vatican edition, which also changed the punctuation, it is read thus: *esse, est intelligendum*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 25. p. II. q. 4. seq. — De ignorantia vide supra d. 22. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Compare above, distinction 25, part 2, question 4 and following. — On ignorance see above, distinction 22, article 2, question 3.

la: In Vat. desunt verba *cognitionis determinatae, utpote privationem alicuius*.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *cognitionis determinatae, utpote privationem alicuius* ("of some determinate cognition, namely the privation of some [circumstance]") are wanting.

translators_notes:
**Provenance:** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 955–957 (PDF pp. 977–979, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`, raw lines 66357–66478). Vol II PDF-priority inversion applied. The DISTINCTIO XLII header at raw 66481 (printed p.957, Cap. I) was the stopping boundary (not crossed). The OCR running-head page numbers in this range are digit-mangled (`DIST. XLI. DUBIA. 955` is correct; the foot-of-page `936` is the mangle for printed 956, and `DISTINCTIO XLII. 937` is the mangle for printed 957); the PDF running heads and the +22 offset are authoritative over the OCR digits.

**Structure:** Three dubia (no scholion — dubia have none). Topics: Dub. I — whether the direction of intention is from faith rather than charity (and why not from hope); Dub. II — whether all the life of unbelievers is sin (the *arbor mala* / political-virtues problem); Dub. III — the nine grades of the voluntary, reconciling Augustine's *omne peccatum voluntarium* with sins done through ignorance and coercion.

**Page-split map (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering per page):**
- **p.955** holds Dub. I (entire) and Dub. II through "Respondeo: Dicendum, quod infideles non peccant in omni sua actione; nam quando eorum actio". p.955 footers restart 1–8.
  - p.955 note 1 (*Vide supra d. 36 ... rationem ultionis*) belongs to the **prior chunk `d41-a2-q3`** (it anchors the q3 tail "refugit passionem¹" at the top of p.955 left column) and is NOT duplicated here — confirmed via the coordinator hand-off (commit dd9e44c).
  - p.955 note 2 (*Gal. 5, 6*) → chunk `[^1]` (Dub. I, *operatur*).
  - p.955 note 3 (*Cfr. supra d. 38*) → chunk `[^3]` (Dub. I, *Bernardus*).
  - p.955 note 4 (*Vide eius verba pag. 891*) → chunk `[^2]` (Dub. I, *pedem affectus*).
  - p.955 note 5 (*Supple: homo ... Matth. 13, 32*) → chunk `[^4]` (Dub. I, *ne in via deficiat*).
  - p.955 note 6 (*Hoc dubium solvitur etiam a B. Albert.*) → chunk `[^5]` (Dub. I, *dici possit directio*).
  - p.955 note 7 (*Cfr. supra pag. 901*) → chunk `[^6]` (Dub. II, *politicarum*).
  - p.955 note 8 (*Matth. 7, 18*) → chunk `[^7]` (Dub. II, *arbor mala ... facere*).
- **p.956** holds the rest of Dub. II, all of Dub. III through "Ignorantia vero aliquando est per omnimodam privationem discretionis". p.956 footers restart 1–9.
  - p.956 note 1 (*Scil. eiusdem Augustini*) → chunk `[^8]` (Dub. II, *sequens auctoritas*).
  - p.956 note 2 (*Art. 1. q. 3.*) → chunk `[^9]` (Dub. II, *sicut supra fuit ostensum*).
  - p.956 note 3 (*Libr. III. Ethic.*) → chunk `[^10]` (Dub. III arg., *Philosophus*).
  - p.956 note 4 (*Cfr. supra pag. 619*) → chunk `[^11]` (Dub. III arg., *non est voluntarium*).
  - p.956 note 5 (*In Vat. ... voluntaria*) → chunk `[^12]` (Dub. III corp., *peccata voluntarie*).
  - p.956 note 6 (*Cod. cc ... impossibile*) → chunk `[^13]` (Dub. III, *incompossibile*).
  - p.956 note 7 (*Cfr. supra pag. 527*) → chunk `[^14]` (Dub. III, *peccata quae consequuntur ebrietatem ... voluntaria*).
  - p.956 note 8 (*Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3*) → chunk `[^15]` (Dub. III, *dicit Augustinus ... omne peccatum voluntarium*).
  - p.956 note 9 (*Cfr. supra d. 25. p. II.*) → chunk `[^16]` (Dub. III, *tollit rationem voluntarii*).
- **p.957** holds only the 5-line Dub. III tail ("et tunc tollit simpliciter ... patent illa duo obiecta"), immediately above DISTINCTIO XLII Cap. I. Its single footer (p.957 note 1, anchoring *determinatae*) → chunk `[^17]` (*In Vat. desunt verba cognitionis determinatae...*), confirmed against both the 450 dpi p.957 column-band crop and the IA djvu OCR (raw 66536–66537). Body text confirmed verbatim against the OCR (raw 66474–66478).
- Apparatus is renumbered `[^1]`–`[^17]` by body-anchor sequence; every def has a matching anchor in both Latin and English bodies.

**Hand-off picked up:** From `d41-a2-q3` (commit dd9e44c): the entire dubia block (raw 66357–66478) plus its p.955 footer sequence were forwarded to this chunk. p.955 footer note 1 (*rationem ultionis*) was confirmed to belong to q3's tail (anchors "refugit passionem") and is therefore NOT carried here.

**Hand-off forwarded:** None — DISTINCTIO XLII (next distinction, the d.42 littera/commentary) begins fresh on p.957 right region with its own Cap. I and footer sequence. d.41 is now FULLY COMPLETE.

**[?] flags:** None. All 17 apparatus entries and all body text are fully resolved against the 450 dpi PDF column bands and the IA djvu OCR.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 42

title_alt: Littera Magistri — De differentiis peccatorum in communi

title_alt: The Master's Text — On the differences of sins in general

source_text:
<!-- page 957 -->

## DISTINCTIO XLII.

### Cap. I.
### *An voluntas et actio mala in eodem et circa idem sint unum peccatum, vel plura.*

Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio sint peccatum, quaeri solet, utrum in eodem homine et circa eandem rem haec duo unum sint peccatum, vel diversa; ut si quis voluntate furatur, *voluntatem* habuit malam, quae peccatum est, et *actum* malum, qui item peccatum est. Haec autem duo *diversa* sunt, scilicet voluntas et actio; sed nunquid *diversa* sunt et peccata, an unum? — Quidam[^1] dicunt, *unum* esse peccatum; alii vero *diversa* esse peccata dicunt; quia, cum constet, haec duo esse diversa, aut diversa *duo peccata* dicuntur, aut duo diversa, non *peccata*. — Quibus alii respondent, haec duo diversa esse, non *peccata*[^2]. Non enim *plura* peccata sunt, sed peccatum *unum*, quia una praevaricatio vel inobedientia in utroque admittitur, sive quando *vult*, sive quando *agit*; et unus est ibi contemptus, sed *minor*, cum in voluntate solum peccatum continetur, *maior* vero, cum voluntati etiam operatio additur; et ideo *maius* fit peccatum, sed non *plura*, cum voluntas operi mancipatur.

Sed adhuc eisdem obiicitur. Si unum tantum peccatum illa duo sunt, cum quis, voluntate mali prius concepta, deinde opus patraverit, non pro aliquo reus est, nisi pro quo ante opus reus erat, cum adhuc in sola voluntate peccatum consistebat. Nullus enim reus est aeternae mortis nisi pro peccato; sed peccatum aliud non est admissum *actione*, quam prius admissum erat *voluntate*. Non igitur pro aliquo alio iste fit damnabilis *actu* peccando, quam ante fuerat, cum *sola voluntate* delinquebat. — Ad hoc etiam illi respondent dicentes[^3], propter peccatum quidem tantum illum furem reum constitui; et quamvis eius voluntas et actio *unum* sint *peccatum*, pro *alio* tamen reus factus est actu peccando, quam prius erat sola voluntate delinquendo, quia pro actu, qui est *aliud* quam voluntas, licet non *aliud peccatum*.

Item et adhuc quaestioni instant dicentes, ideo haec duo diversa esse peccata, quia diversorum legis mandatorum praevaricationes sunt. Alio enim mandato legis prohibetur actio furti, scilicet: Non furaberis[^4], alio *voluntas* furandi, scilicet: Non concupisces rem proximi tui. Cum autem haec duo diversa mandata sint, quibus illa duo prohibentur; patet, illa duo diversas esse praevaricationes, diversa igitur peccata. — Ad quod etiam illi dicunt, *diversa* quidem esse *mandata*, quibus illa duo distinctim prohibentur, ut Augustinus docet super Exodum[^5], verumtamen in illis non observatis una praevaricatio tantum incurritur, unumque peccatum contrahitur, licet duo diversa illis prohibeantur; sicut e converso duo sunt mandata caritatis, quibus duo praecipiuntur diligi, una tamen in eis nobis commendatur caritas.

### Cap. II.
### *Si peccatum ab aliquo commissum in eo sit, usquequo poeniteat.*

Praeterea quaeri solet, cum ab aliquo peccato voluntate perpetrato voluntas id agendi et actio transierit, nondum tamen vera habita poenitentia, utrum illud peccatum, usquequo poeniteat, sit in eo. Quod non esse videtur, quia *voluntas* illa, quae prius fuit, non est, neque *actio*, quia non illud vult vel agit, quod ante voluit et egit. — Sed non est ignorandum, peccatum duobus modis dici *esse* in aliquo et *transire*, scilicet *actu* et *reatu*[^6]. *Actu* est in aliquo, dum ipsum quod peccatum est, ut *actio* vel *voluntas*, in peccante est; *reatu* vero, cum pro eo, sive transierit sive adsit, mens hominis polluta est et corrupta, totusque homo suppliciis obligatur perpetuis. Nec unquam est in aliquo peccatum *actu*, praeter originale, quin sit etiam *reatu*, sed est *reatu* interdum, postquam transit *actu*.

### Cap. III.
### *Quibus modis accipitur reatus.*

Reatus autem in Scriptura multipliciter accipitur, scilicet pro *culpa*, pro *poena*, pro *obligatione poenae temporalis*, vel *aeternae*. Si enim *mortale* est, obligat nos poenae aeternae; si *veniale*, obligat nos poenae temporali; duo enim sunt peccatorum genera, mortalium scilicet et venialium.

<!-- page 958 -->

*Mortale* est per quod homo mortem aeternam meretur — « *crimen* enim, ut ait Augustinus[^7], est quod est dignum accusatione et damnatione » — *veniale* autem, quod hominem usque in reatum perpetuae mortis non gravat, verumtamen poenam meretur, sed facile indulgetur.

### Cap. IV.
### *De modis peccatorum.*

Modi autem peccatorum varias in Scriptura habent distinctiones, in qua dicitur *duobus* modis peccatum committi, scilicet « cupiditate et timore », ut Augustinus tradit super illum locum Psalmi[^8]: Incensa igni et suffossa. His enim duobus modis dicit omnia peccata mortalia includi. Et *incensa* ea dicit, quae ex *cupiditate* male incendente oriuntur; *suffossa* vero, quae ex *timore* male humiliante proveniunt; quod est, quando quis cupit non cupienda, vel timet non timenda. — Alibi vero dicitur, peccatum fieri *tribus* modis, scilicet *cogitatu*, *verbo* et *opere*; unde Hieronymus super Ezechielem[^9]: « Tria generalia delicta sunt, quibus humanum subiacet genus: aut enim cogitatione, aut sermone, aut opere peccamus ». His aliquando etiam additur *quartus* modus, scilicet *consuetudinis*, quod in quatriduano Lazaro significatum est. Dicitur quoque homo peccare *in Deum*, *in se* et *in proximum*. *In Deum*, cum de Deo male *sentit*, ut haereticus, vel quae Dei sunt usurpare praesumit, indigne participando Sacramentis, vel quando *nomen Dei* peierando contemptibile facit; *in proximum* peccat, cum proximum iniuste laedit; *in se* vero, cum sibi, non alii, nocet.

### Cap. V.
### *Quod differant delictum et peccatum.*

Variam quoque appellationem habet: dicitur enim *peccatum* et *delictum*. Et « *delictum* fortasse est, ut ait Augustinus in Quaestionibus Levitici[^10], declinare a bono, *peccatum* est facere malum. Aliud est enim declinare a bono, aliud est facere malum. *Peccatum* ergo est perpetratio mali, *delictum* desertio boni; quod et ipsum nomen ostendit. Quid enim aliud sonat *delictum* nisi *derelictum*, et qui delinquit, quid derelinquit nisi bonum? » « Vel *delictum* est quod ignoranter fit, *peccatum* quod scienter committitur. Indifferenter tamen et *peccatum* nomine delicti, et *delictum* nomine peccati appellatur ».

### Cap. VI.
### *De septem principalibus vitiis.*

Praeterea sciendum est, septem esse vitia principalia vel capitalia, ut Gregorius super Exodum[^11] ait, « scilicet inanem gloriam, iram, invidiam, acidiam vel tristitiam, avaritiam, gastrimargiam, luxuriam »: quae, ut ait Ioannes Chrysostomus[^12], significata sunt in septem populis, qui terram promissionis Israeli promissam tenebant. De his quasi septem fontibus cunctae animarum mortiferae corruptelae emanant. Et dicuntur haec *capitalia*, quia ex eis oriuntur omnia mala. Nullum enim malum est, quod non ab aliquo horum originem trahat.

### Cap. VII.
### *De superbia.*

Ex superbia tamen omnia mala oriuntur, et haec et alia; quia, ut ait Gregorius[^13], « radix cuncti mali est superbia »; de qua dicitur: Initium omnis peccati est superbia, « quae est amor propriae excellentiae ». Cuius quatuor sunt species, ut Gregorius[^14] ait: « Prima est, cum bonum, quod habet quis, sibi attribuit. Secunda, cum credit, a Deo esse datum, sed tamen pro suis meritis. Tertia, cum se iactat habere quod non habet. Quarta, cum, ceteris despectis, singulariter vult videri ». Merito ergo *radix omnis mali* dicitur superbia. Huic autem videtur obviare quod ait Apostolus[^15]: Radix omnium malorum est cupiditas; quia, si radix omnium malorum cupiditas est, ergo superbiae. Quomodo ergo superbia radix est et initium omnis peccati?

### Cap. VIII.
### *Quomodo superbia dicatur radix omnium malorum et cupiditas, cum superbia non sit cupiditas.*

Sed « utrumque recte dictum esse intelligitur, si *genera peccatorum singulorum*, non *singula generum* utraque locutione intelligantur includi; nullum quippe genus peccati est, quod interdum ex superbia non proveniat; nullum etiam est, quod ex cupiditate aliquando non descendat. Sunt enim nonnulli hominum, qui ex cupiditate fiunt superbi; et aliqui ex superbia fiunt cupidi. Est enim, ut ait Augustinus[^16], homo, qui non esset amator pecuniae, nisi per hoc putaret, se excellentiorem esse, ideoque, ut excellat, divitias cupit; tali ex superbia oboritur cupiditas. Et est aliquis, qui non amaret excellere, nisi putaret, per hoc maiores divitias habere ». Ideo ergo excellere laborat, quia divitias habere amat. Huic innascitur superbia, id est amor excellentiae, ex cupiditate. Patet ergo, quod ex superbia aliquando cupiditas, et ex cupiditate aliquando superbia oritur; et ideo de utraque recte dicitur, quod sit radix omnis mali.

---

english:
<!-- page 957 -->

## DISTINCTION XLII.

### Chapter I.
### *Whether an evil will and an evil action in the same person and concerning the same thing are one sin, or many.*

Now since an evil will and an operation are sin, it is wont to be asked whether in the same man and concerning the same thing these two are one sin, or diverse; as, for example, if someone steals by his will, he had an evil *will*, which is a sin, and an evil *act*, which is likewise a sin. Now these two are *diverse*, namely the will and the action; but are they also *diverse* sins, or one? — Some[^1] say there is *one* sin; but others say they are *diverse* sins; for since it is agreed that these two are diverse, either they are called diverse *two sins*, or two diverse things, not *sins*. — To whom others reply that these two are diverse, but not *sins*[^2]. For they are not *many* sins, but *one* sin, because one transgression or disobedience is committed in both, whether when one *wills* or when one *acts*; and there is one contempt there, but a *lesser* one when the sin is contained in the will alone, and a *greater* one when an operation is also added to the will; and so the sin becomes *greater*, but not *more*, when the will is given over to the deed.

But the same men are further objected to. If those two are only one sin, then when someone, having first conceived the will to evil, afterwards perpetrates the deed, he is not liable for anything except that for which he was liable before the deed, when the sin still consisted in the will alone. For no one is liable to eternal death except on account of sin; but no other sin has been committed by the *action* than what had previously been committed by the *will*. Therefore this man is not made damnable on account of any other thing by sinning *in act* than he had been before, when he was offending *by the will alone*. — To this also those men reply, saying[^3] that the thief is indeed made liable only on account of the sin; and although his will and action are *one* *sin*, yet he is made liable for *another* thing by sinning in act than he was before by offending by the will alone, because for the act, which is *other* than the will, although not *another sin*.

Moreover, they further press the question, saying that these two are diverse sins for this reason, that they are transgressions of diverse commandments of the law. For by one commandment of the law the action of theft is forbidden, namely: Thou shalt not steal[^4]; by another, the *will* to steal, namely: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property. Now since these are two diverse commandments by which those two are forbidden, it is plain that those two are diverse transgressions, and therefore diverse sins. — To which also those men say that the *commandments* are indeed *diverse*, by which those two are distinctly forbidden, as Augustine teaches on Exodus[^5]; yet, when they are not observed, only one transgression is incurred, and one sin is contracted, although two diverse things are forbidden by them; just as, conversely, there are two commandments of charity, by which two things are commanded to be loved, yet one charity is commended to us in them.

### Chapter II.
### *Whether a sin committed by someone remains in him until he repents.*

Furthermore it is wont to be asked, when, after a sin has been perpetrated by someone through the will, the will to do it and the action have passed away, but true repentance has not yet been had, whether that sin remains in him until he repents. And it seems that it does not, because that *will* which existed before does not exist, nor does the *action*, since he does not will or do that which he willed and did before. — But it must not be unknown that sin is said to *be* in someone and to *pass away* in two modes, namely *in act* and *by liability*[^6]. It is in someone *in act* while that which is the sin itself, such as the *action* or the *will*, is in the one sinning; but *by liability*, when on account of it — whether it has passed away or is present — the man's mind is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is bound to perpetual punishments. And sin is never in anyone *in act*, except original sin, without also being there *by liability*; but it is there *by liability* sometimes after it passes away *in act*.

### Chapter III.
### *In what ways "liability" is taken.*

Now "liability" is taken in many ways in Scripture, namely for *fault*, for *punishment*, for the *obligation to temporal punishment*, or to *eternal*. For if it is *mortal*, it binds us to eternal punishment; if *venial*, it binds us to temporal punishment; for there are two kinds of sins, namely of mortal and of venial.

<!-- page 958 -->

A sin is *mortal* by which a man merits eternal death — for « a *crime*, as Augustine says[^7], is that which is worthy of accusation and condemnation » — but *venial* is that which does not burden a man unto liability to perpetual death, yet nevertheless merits punishment, but is easily pardoned.

### Chapter IV.
### *On the modes of sins.*

Now the modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture, in which it is said that sin is committed in *two* modes, namely « by desire and by fear », as Augustine relates on that passage of the Psalm[^8]: Burned with fire and dug under. For in these two modes he says that all mortal sins are included. And he calls those things *burned* which arise from *desire* that evilly inflames; but *dug under* those which come from *fear* that evilly abases; which is, when someone desires what is not to be desired, or fears what is not to be feared. — But elsewhere it is said that sin is committed in *three* modes, namely by *thought*, by *word*, and by *deed*; whence Jerome on Ezekiel[^9]: « There are three general offenses to which the human race is subject: for we sin either by thought, or by speech, or by deed ». To these is sometimes also added a *fourth* mode, namely of *habit*, which was signified in the four-days-dead Lazarus. A man is also said to sin *against God*, *against himself*, and *against his neighbor*. *Against God*, when he thinks ill of God, like a heretic, or presumes to usurp the things that are God's, by participating unworthily in the Sacraments, or when by perjury he makes the *name of God* contemptible; he sins *against his neighbor* when he unjustly harms his neighbor; but *against himself*, when he harms himself, not another.

### Chapter V.
### *That "offense" and "sin" differ.*

It also has a varied appellation: for it is called *sin* and *offense*. And « an *offense* is perhaps, as Augustine says in the Questions on Leviticus[^10], to turn aside from good, while *sin* is to do evil. For it is one thing to turn aside from good, another to do evil. Therefore *sin* is the perpetration of evil, *offense* the desertion of good; which the very name shows. For what else does *offense* (delictum) sound but *forsaken* (derelictum), and he who offends (delinquit), what does he forsake (derelinquit) but the good? » « Or *offense* is what is done in ignorance, *sin* what is committed knowingly. Yet indifferently both *sin* is called by the name of offense, and *offense* by the name of sin ».

### Chapter VI.
### *On the seven principal vices.*

Furthermore it must be known that there are seven principal or capital vices, as Gregory on Exodus says[^11], « namely vainglory, anger, envy, sloth or sadness, avarice, gluttony, lust »: which, as John Chrysostom says[^12], were signified in the seven peoples who held the land of promise that was promised to Israel. From these, as from seven fountains, all the deadly corruptions of souls flow forth. And these are called *capital*, because from them all evils arise. For there is no evil which does not draw its origin from one of these.

### Chapter VII.
### *On pride.*

Yet from pride all evils arise, both these and others; for, as Gregory says[^13], « the root of all evil is pride »; of which it is said: The beginning of all sin is pride, « which is the love of one's own excellence ». Of it there are four species, as Gregory says[^14]: « The first is when one attributes to oneself the good which one has. The second, when one believes it to be given by God, but yet on account of one's own merits. The third, when one boasts of having what one does not have. The fourth, when, despising the rest, one wishes to be seen as singular ». Rightly, therefore, pride is called the *root of all evil*. But to this there seems to be opposed what the Apostle says[^15]: The root of all evils is covetousness; for if covetousness is the root of all evils, then it is the root of pride. How, then, is pride the root and beginning of all sin?

### Chapter VIII.
### *How pride is called the root of all evils, and also covetousness, although pride is not covetousness.*

But « both are understood to be rightly said, if both expressions are understood to include the *kinds of individual sins*, not the *individual kinds*; for there is no kind of sin which does not sometimes arise from pride; there is also none which does not at some time descend from covetousness. For there are some men who become proud from covetousness; and some who become covetous from pride. For there is, as Augustine says[^16], a man who would not be a lover of money, unless he thought through this to be more excellent, and therefore, in order to excel, desires riches; in such a one covetousness arises from pride. And there is another who would not love to excel, unless he thought to have greater riches through it ». Therefore he labors to excel because he loves to have riches. In this man pride is born, that is, the love of excellence, from covetousness. It is plain, therefore, that from pride covetousness sometimes arises, and from covetousness pride sometimes arises; and so of each it is rightly said that it is the root of all evil.

---

la: Inter quos est Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 13.

en: Among whom is Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 3, c. 13.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 falso *diversa esse peccata, non plura*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 wrongly read *that they are diverse sins, not many*.

la: Edd. 1, 8 *respondentes dicunt*.

en: Editions 1, 8 read *they say in reply*.

en: Exodus 20:15, 17 and Deuteronomy 5:19, 21.

la: Libr. II. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 71.

en: *Questions on the Pentateuch*, Book II, q. 71.

la: Ex August., l. de Nupt. et concupisc. c. 26. n. 29, et VI. contra Iulian. c. 19. n. 60. — In fine capituli pro *interdum* Vat. et edd. 4, 9 male *intelligendum*.

en: From Augustine, *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, c. 26, n. 29, and Book VI *Against Julian*, c. 19, n. 60. — At the end of the chapter, for *interdum* (sometimes) the Vatican edition and editions 4, 9 wrongly read *intelligendum*.

la: In Evang. Ioan. tract. 41. n. 9.

en: *On the Gospel of John*, tract. 41, n. 9.

la: Enarrat. n. 13. in Ps. 79. 17. — Codd. ABCE paulo inferius post *duobus* omittunt *modis*.

en: *Enarration* n. 13 on Psalm 79:17. — Codices ABCE, a little further on, after *duobus* omit *modis*.

la: Cap. 43, 23. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 64. n. 17. De quarto modo malae *consuetudinis* sub figura Lazari loquitur August., in Evang. Ioan. tract. 49. n. 3: Est genus mortis immane, mala consuetudo appellatur. — Quae sequuntur usque ad c. 8. excerpta sunt ex Hugone, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 16.

en: Ch. 43:23. Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 64, n. 17. Of the fourth mode, that of evil *habit*, under the figure of Lazarus, Augustine speaks in *On the Gospel of John*, tract. 49, n. 3: There is a monstrous kind of death, which is called evil habit. — What follows down to c. 8 is excerpted from Hugh, *Summa Sententiarum*, tr. 3, c. 16.

la: Libr. III. Quaest. in Pentateuch. q. 20. Seq. locus est ibid. parum inferius.

en: *Questions on the Pentateuch*, Book III, q. 20. The following passage is in the same place, a little further on.

la: Libr. XXXI. Moral. c. 45. n. 87, et in Glossa ad Exod. 23, 22.

en: *Moralia*, Book XXXI, c. 45, n. 87, and in the Gloss on Exodus 23:22.

la: Est in Glossa apud Lyranum, Deut. 23. 23. In libris Chrysostomi locum istum non invenimus, sed in Ioan. Cassiano Collat. 5. c. 16, et Isidor. Quaest. in Deut. c. 16. — In fine ante *non ab aliquo* Vat. cum cod. D et multis edd. addit *etiam*.

en: It is in the Gloss at Lyranus, Deuteronomy 23:23. We did not find this passage in the books of Chrysostom, but in John Cassian, *Conferences* 5, c. 16, and Isidore, *Questions on Deuteronomy*, c. 16. — At the end, before *non ab aliquo*, the Vatican edition with codex D and many editions adds *etiam*.

la: Loc. cit.; locus Scripturae est Eccli. 10, 13. Definitio superbiae est ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18.

en: Loc. cit.; the passage of Scripture is Sirach 10:13. The definition of pride is from Augustine, *On Genesis Literally*, Book XI, c. 14, n. 18.

la: Libr. XXIII. Moral. c. 6. n. 13.

en: *Moralia*, Book XXIII, c. 6, n. 13.

la: Epist. I. ad Tim. 6, 10. — Inferius pro *quia* edd. 1, 8 *sed*.

en: First *Letter to Timothy* 6:10. — Further on, for *quia* editions 1, 8 read *sed*.

la: Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 19. Sed totus locus a verbis: *utrumque recte* usque *Ideo ergo* occurrit in Glossa ad I. Tim. 6, 10. — Pro *Ideo ergo* edd. 1, 8 *Ideoque*.

en: *On Genesis Literally*, Book XI, c. 15, n. 19. But the whole passage, from the words *utrumque recte* down to *Ideo ergo*, occurs in the Gloss on 1 Timothy 6:10. — For *Ideo ergo* editions 1, 8 read *Ideoque*. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF crops (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p957..959-{L,R}-{0..2}.png`), Vol II PDF-priority inversion. The IA djvu OCR for this range (raw lines 66481–66622) is cascade-shattered (Cap. headers and footers diagonally fragmented, two-column bleed), so the column-band PDF read is authoritative; the OCR served only for footnote-marker spacing cross-check.

**Page span.** Printed pp. 957–959 (PDF 979–981, offset `pdf = printed + 22`). Confirmed via low-dpi running-head render: p.957 running head reads `957`, p.958 `958`, p.959 `959` (OCR digits in this band are mangled and were not trusted). The littera occupies p.957 R-col (after the d.41 a.2-q.3 tail in the L-col top) through the top of p.959, ending at `…radix omnis mali.`, immediately before `COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLII.` / `DIVISIO TEXTUS.` (raw line ~66628), which opens the separate divisio/commentarius chunk.

**Seam with d.41 (verified).** The top of p.957 L-col (`et tunc tollit simpliciter rationem voluntarii … Et per hoc patent illa duo obiecta`) is the tail of `bon-sent-II-d41-a2-q3` (the *voluntarium* / fornication dubium). The two footer notes above the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` divider on p.957 L-col (`In Vat. desunt verba cognitionis determinatae…` and `Hoc dubium solvunt etiam B. Albert…`) belong to that d.41 dubium, NOT to this littera; this littera's notes begin at the `NOTAE AD LIBR. SENTENTIARUM.` divider with `Inter quos est Hugo` (note 1). No live hand-off was forwarded from d.41; none is forwarded to the d.42 divisio (the littera ends cleanly at a paragraph and chapter close on p.959, and the divisio begins with its own COMMENTARIUS header).

**Apparatus page-split map (16 entries):**
- p.957 footers 1–6 → `[^1]`–`[^6]`.
- p.958 footers 1–10 → `[^7]`–`[^16]` (L-col 1–5 = `[^7]`–`[^11]`; R-col 6–10 = `[^12]`–`[^16]`).
- p.959 (littera tail) carries no footnote markers.

**No scholion.** A littera chunk has no scholion (`has_scholion: false`). Lombard's chapter divisions Cap. I–VIII are preserved as in the printed text.

**[?] flags.** None. All readings resolved against the 450 dpi PDF.


title: Dist. 42, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Division of the text and treatment of the questions

source_text:
<!-- page 959 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLII.

*De differentiis peccatorum in communi.*

*Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio etc.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter peccatum ortum habeat a voluntate in generali; in hac vero parte descendit Magister ad differentias peccati. Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas. In quarum prima descendit Magister ad differentias peccati communes. In secunda vero descendit ad unum peccatum speciale, quod est inter cetera peccatorum genera magis grave et abominabile, ibi[^1]: *Est praeterea unum genus peccati* etc.

Prima pars, quae spectat ad praesentem distinctionem, tres habet partes, quoniam differentia peccati ad peccatum potest attendi tripliciter: aut quantum ad *actum*, aut quantum ad *reatum*, aut quantum ad peccandi *modum*. In prima ergo inquirit Magister differentiam inter peccata operis et voluntatis. In secunda inquirit differentiam a parte reatus, quae est inter genus peccati originalis et actualis, venialis et mortalis, ibi: *Praeterea quaeri solet* etc. In tertia vero subiungit modos diversos peccandi sive diversa genera peccatorum per modum narrationis, ibi: *Modi autem peccatorum varias* etc.

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In quarum prima Magister movet quaestionem et determinat secundum duplicem opinionem. In secunda vero respondet obiectionibus, quae impugnare videntur opinionem magis probabilem, ibi: *Quibus alii respondent, haec duo diversa*[^2] etc.

Similiter secunda pars, in qua inquirit differentias peccatorum quantum ad reatum, duas habet. In prima quaerit, qualiter reatus possit manere, peccato abeunte; in qua accipitur differentia actualis peccati et originalis, quia actuale transit actu et remanet reatu, originale autem e converso[^3]. In secunda vero ostendit, quod reatus multipliciter accipitur in Scriptura, videlicet pro obligatione poenae aeternae et poenae temporalis, ex quo accipitur differentia mortalis peccati et venialis, ibi: *Reatus autem in Scriptura multipliciter accipitur.*

Similiter tertia pars duas habet partes. In quarum prima tangit Magister quinque modos dividendi peccata consuetos in Scriptura. In secunda vero removet dubitationem, quae ortum habet ex una illarum divisionum, ibi: *Ex superbia tamen omnia mala oriuntur* etc.

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam autem huius partis secundum tria, quae hic determinantur, circa tria incidit hic quaestio.

Primo est hic quaestio de comparatione peccati operis ad peccatum voluntatis.

Secundo, de comparatione peccati venialis et peccati mortalis.

Tertio incidit hic quaestio circa modos dividendi peccatum.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum.

Secundo, utrum unum addat ad alterum.

---

english:
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLII.

*On the differences of sins in general.*

*"But since an evil will and an operation," etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master showed how sin takes its origin from the will in general; but in this part the Master descends to the differences of sin. Now this part is divided into two parts. In the first of these the Master descends to the common differences of sin. In the second he descends to one special sin, which among the other kinds of sins is more grave and abominable, there[^1]: *"There is, moreover, one kind of sin,"* etc.

The first part, which pertains to the present distinction, has three parts, since the difference of one sin from another can be considered in three ways: either with respect to the *act*, or with respect to the *guilt*, or with respect to the *manner* of sinning. In the first, therefore, the Master inquires into the difference between sins of deed and of will. In the second he inquires into the difference on the side of guilt, which is between the kind of original and of actual sin, of venial and of mortal sin, there: *"Moreover, it is wont to be asked,"* etc. In the third he subjoins the diverse manners of sinning, or the diverse kinds of sins, by way of narration, there: *"Now the manners of sins [are] various,"* etc.

The first part is divided into two. In the first of these the Master raises a question and determines it according to a twofold opinion. But in the second he replies to the objections which seem to impugn the more probable opinion, there: *"To which others reply, that these two diverse [things],"*[^2] etc.

Likewise the second part, in which he inquires into the differences of sins with respect to guilt, has two [parts]. In the first he asks how guilt can remain when the sin has departed; in which is taken the difference between actual and original sin, because actual sin passes away in act and remains in guilt, but original sin conversely[^3]. But in the second he shows that guilt is taken in many ways in Scripture, namely for the obligation to eternal punishment and to temporal punishment, from which is taken the difference between mortal and venial sin, there: *"Now guilt is taken in many ways in Scripture."*

Likewise the third part has two parts. In the first of these the Master touches upon five customary manners of dividing sins in Scripture. But in the second he removes a doubt which takes its origin from one of those divisions, there: *"Yet from pride all evils arise,"* etc.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Now for the understanding of this part, according to the three things which are here determined, a question arises here concerning three matters.

First there is here a question about the comparison of the sin of deed to the sin of will.

Second, about the comparison of venial and mortal sin.

Third a question arises here concerning the manners of dividing sin.

Concerning the first, two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked whether the sin of will and of deed are two sins, or one.

Second, whether the one adds to the other.

---

la: Scil. infra d. 43, sicut et in Vat. nec non in edd. 3, 4 legitur pro *ibi.*

en: That is, below in d. 43, as also in the Vatican edition, and likewise in editions 3 and 4, it is read in place of *"there."*

la: Pro his verbis ex Magistro allatis Vat. et edd. 3, 4 exhibent verba, quae in textu Magistri (c. 1.) verbis praedictis immediate praecedunt, nimirum: *Quia cum constet* etc. Eaedem edd. paulo superius verbo *respondet* praemittunt *ponit et.*

en: In place of these words adduced from the Master, the Vatican edition and editions 3 and 4 give the words which in the Master's text (c. 1) immediately precede the aforesaid words, namely: *"Since, whereas it is established,"* etc. The same editions, a little above, prefix to the word *respondet* ("replies") the words *ponit et* ("he also sets down").

la: Vide supra d. XXXII. lit. Magistri, c. I. et ibid. Comment. a. 1. q. 1.

en: See above, d. XXXII, the letter of the Master, c. I, and in the same place the Commentary, a. 1, q. 1.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF (`/tmp/colcrop/vol2-p959-{L,R}-*.png`) cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 66627–66679. Single printed page p.959 (PDF 981); running head confirmed `DIST. XLII. DIVISIO TEXTUS.` via low-dpi render — the OCR `9b9` digit at line 66619 is a glyph-mangle of 959.

**Page-split map.** The entire divisio (COMMENTARIUS opener + subtitle *De differentiis peccatorum in communi* + lemma *Cum autem voluntas mala et operatio etc.* + DIVISIO TEXTUS body + TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM + the three footer notes) sits wholly on printed p.959. Printed p.960 (PDF 982) begins fresh with `ARTICULUS I. / QUAESTIO I.` (raw 66682/66687) — that is the next chunk (`d42-a1-q1`). The three footers are the single per-page p.959 footer sequence (markers `'`/1, `°`/2 [OCR `°`], `³`/3), all belonging to the divisio; no footer split across the boundary.

**Hand-off picked up.** From `d42-littera` (commit 40e550d): the littera closed at `…radix omnis mali.` (raw ~66623) immediately before the COMMENTARIUS opener. Seam verified grammatically clean — the divisio opens with `Supra ostendit Magister…`, a fresh sentence; no littera tail leaked in, and the COMMENTARIUS/DIVISIO block is fully captured here.

**Hand-off forwarded to `d42-a1-q1`.** Printed p.960 (PDF 982) is entirely a1-q1 territory: `ARTICULUS I. De comparatione peccati operis ad peccatum voluntatis. / QUAESTIO I. Utrum peccatum voluntatis et operis sint duo peccata, vel unum.` begins at raw 66682/66687 with its own fresh per-page footer sequence. No divisio footer belongs to a1-q1.

**Structure alignment.** TRACTATIO listing matches the actual article structure: three articles (actus / reatus / modus); a1 (de comparatione operis ad voluntatem) holds q1 (utrum duo peccata vel unum) + q2 (utrum unum addat ad alterum); a2 (raw 66981, de comparatione venialis ad mortale) holds q1+q2; a3 covers the modi dividendi. No auto-chunker q-swap detected.

**[?] flags.** None.