title: Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### QUAESTIO II.

*Utrum lucifer appetiverit Deo aequiparari.*

Secundo quaeritur, quid appetiit ipse lucifer. Et quod appetiverit Deo parificari, ostenditur:

1. Per textum Isaiae decimo[^1], quarto ubi describitur eius peccatum: *Ascendam in caelum, et ero similis Altissimo;* sed non dixit de caelo empyreo, quia ibi erat: ergo de caelo Trinitatis; sed in illo non est nisi aequalitas: ergo etc.

2. Item, super illud Psalmi[^2]: *Quae non rapui,* Glossa: «Quia Adam et diabolus voluerunt rapere divinitatem, amiserunt felicitatem»; sed non voluerunt rapere divinitatem quantum ad identitatem: ergo quantum ad aequalitatem.

3. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis[^3]: «Haec iniquitas tua non ira momentanea, sed odio digna est sempiterno, quod tuo dilectissimo et altissimo Domino desideras semper aequari».

4. Item, quod sit appetibile, videtur ratione, quia similitudo est appetibilis, ergo maior similitudo magis, et maxima similitudo maxime appetibilis; sed similitudo aequiparantiae est huiusmodi: ergo videtur, quod valde facile fuit eam appetere, eo quod magna esset inclinatio.

5. Item, omne quod potest cogitari delectabile, potest appeti; sed diabolus potuit cogitare delectabile esse tale, qualis est Deus, quia summe delectabile est esse Deum: ergo videtur rationabiliter, quod hoc potuerit appetere.

6. Item, quod *appetierit,* videtur. Diabolus superbus appetiit aliquid, quod vidit supra se, quia hoc est ratio superbiae; sed supra luciferum in statu illo nihil erat nisi Deus et eius celsitudo: ergo appetiit divinam celsitudinem.

7. Item, tantum excellens fuit superbia, quantum excellit invidiae et odii malitia; sed non tantum diabolus odit et invidet creaturis Dei, ut homini, immo etiam invidet ipsi Deo: ergo non tantum creaturis praeesse, sed etiam Deo se voluit aequare.

8. Item, licitum est appetere similitudinem conformitatis: si ergo diabolus illicitum appetiit, ultra hanc progressus est; sed ultra similitudinem conformitatis non est nisi similitudo aequalitatis: ergo hanc appetiit lucifer, ut videtur.

Contra: 1. Primae ad Timotheum secundo[^4]: *Adam non est seductus* etc., Glossa: «Non est credendum, quod vir spirituali mente praeditus appetierit esse sicut Deus». Si non est credendum de homine, cum adhuc sapientior esset illi Angelus, multo minus est credendum de eo.

2. Item, Anselmus in libro de Casu diaboli[^5]: «Nihil appetiit, ad quod non pervenisset, si stetisset»; sed nunquam fuisset parificatus Deo: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod hoc non sit appetibile, videtur. Divina immensitas non potest mente capi, ergo nul<!-- page 149 -->lus potest cogitare aequalitatem ad Deum: sed nihil potest appeti, quod non potest intellectu capi: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc probat Anselmus[^6]: «Si Deus non potest cogitari nisi ita solus, ut nihil ei simile possit cogitari: quomodo potuit diabolus velle, quod non potuit cogitare»?

5. Item, quod diabolus hoc non *appetierit,* ostenditur, quia nihil appetiit, nisi ad quod se venire posse credidit — hoc patet, quia ipse dixit: *Ponam sedem meam*[^7] — sed nullus, nisi demens, posset unquam credere, quod creatura Creatori posset aequari: ergo cum diabolus adhuc omnino stultus non esset, hoc nunquam appetiit.

6. Item, diabolus diligebat se super omnia, ergo non volebat esse alius, quam ille qui erat; sed si esset par Deo, esset alius quam ille qui erat, quia esset Deus: ergo cum hoc non appeteret, non appetiit Deo omnino aequari. *Si tu dicas,* quod bene appetitur antecedens sine consequente; verum est appetitu *desiderativo;* sed *electivo* nullus, nisi stultus, vult esse abbas deliberative, quin velit esse monachus[^8].

7. Item, omne peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile[^9]: ergo si diabolus appetiit parificari Deo, diabolus non peccavit; sed peccavit: ergo hoc non appetiit.

### Conclusio.

> Angelus malus appetiit quodam modo Dei similitudinem imitationis, quodam modo aequalitatis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod duplex est similitudo Dei, scilicet *aequiparantiae* sive aequalitatis, et *imitationis*[^10]. Similitudo *imitationis* potest appeti *ordinate* et *inordinate; ordinate,* ut appetatur similitudo in his quae nostrae sunt aptitudinis et divinae acceptionis, cuiusmodi sunt perfectiones et decores virtutum; *inordinate* vero, ut homo appetat id quod non decet, vel quod Deo non placet, ut si appetat hominibus praeesse, vel se de adversariis vindicare[^11]. — Similitudo *aequalitatis* nullo modo potest appeti *ordinate,* sed aliquo modo est *appetibilis,* aliquo modo non. Nam *omnimoda* similitudo non est appetibilis, quia non potest cadere in cognitionem sive in intellectum, et ideo nec in appetitum; et si aliquis fingat, non appetit *aequalitatem,* sed suam *fictionem.* Alio modo est similitudo aequalitatis *in aliqua conditione,* ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia; et sic credo, quod potest appeti.

Notandum est igitur, quod diabolus quodam modo appetiit similitudinem *imitationis,* quodam modo *aequalitatis.* Et hoc apparet, si attendatur *appetibile* et *modus appetendi.* Diabolus enim appetiit aliis *praeesse,* sua tamen *auctoritate.* Quod appetiit *praeesse,* hoc fuit imitationis, et hoc quidem aliquando obtinuisset, si stetisset. Quod autem *propria auctoritate,* ita quod sine meritis et sine datore et ita, quod nulli subesset; hoc est solius Dei, et hoc est *aequiparantiae.* — Et ita patet, quid appetiit; et patent multae auctoritates Sanctorum, quia Gregorius[^12] dicit, quod appetiit esse sui iuris, ita quod nulli subesset; Bernardus dicit, quod appetiit aequalitatem potentiae; Anselmus, quod appetiit praeesse sine meritis; et omnes verum dicunt, et diversae auctoritates circumloquuntur hoc quod est *praeesse omnibus propria auctoritate.*

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod appetiit divinam aequalitatem; concedendum est *in aliquo;* et sic currunt rationes ad illam partem inductae, quia bene potuit appeti, et maxime ab illo qui fuit superbissimus inter omnes, est appetita.

Quod tamen obiicitur ultimo, non valet, quia quamvis licitum esset appetere similitudinem *imitationis,* non tamen *omnem* similitudinem, sicut ostensum est.

*Ad 1.* Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, facile est respondere per iam dicta. — Quod enim obiicitur de Adam, non est simile, quia Adam gratiam habuit; et praeterea non habuit tantam occasionem efferendi se.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, iam patet responsio, quia verum dicit quantum ad ipsum appetibile, non quantum ad *circumstantiam,* sub qua appetiit, scilicet quod propria auctoritate.

*Ad 3. 4.* Duae sequentes rationes, quae probant, quod non potest appeti, loquuntur de omnimoda assimilatione; quia si aliquis cogitet Deum in generali et cogitet ei similem, non cogitat Deum, sed *fingit;* et ideo non appetit esse similis *Deo,* sed *fictioni suae.* <!-- page 150 -->

*Ad 5. 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non appetiit; dicendum, quod illae rationes probant, quod non appetiit *omnem*[^13]; et hoc verum est.

*Ad 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod non peccavit, si appetiit similitudinem, quia non est conversus ad bonum commutabile; dicendum, quod ipse convertit se ad bonum incommutabile, ut esset proprium, et ita ut ad commutabile, ac per hoc inordinate. Et inordinate ad Deum converti superbiendo est averti a Deo et converti ad se. Et hoc patet, quia diabolus quod Dei erat appetebat sibi, et ita finaliter ad se convertebatur, non ad Deum. Et sic patent omnia quaesita.

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### QUESTION II.

*Whether Lucifer desired to be made equal to God.*

Secondly it is asked, what Lucifer himself desired. And that he desired to be made equal to God is shown:

1. By the text of Isaiah, chapter ten[^1] — rather, fourteen — where his sin is described: *I will ascend into heaven, and I will be like the Most High;* but he did not say [it] of the empyrean heaven, since he was there: therefore of the heaven of the Trinity; but in that there is nothing but equality: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm[^2]: *What I did not take away,* the Gloss: «Because Adam and the devil wished to seize divinity, they lost felicity»; but they did not wish to seize divinity as to identity: therefore as to equality.

3. Likewise, Bernard, On the Steps of Humility[^3]: «This iniquity of yours is worthy not of a momentary anger but of an everlasting hatred, in that you desire always to be made equal to your most beloved and most high Lord».

4. Likewise, that it was an object of appetite, it seems by reason, because likeness is an object of appetite, therefore a greater likeness more so, and the greatest likeness most of all an object of appetite; but the likeness of equivalence is of this kind: therefore it seems that it was very easy to desire it, because the inclination would be great.

5. Likewise, everything that can be thought delightful can be desired; but the devil could think it delightful to be such as God is, since to be God is supremely delightful: therefore it seems reasonable that he could desire this.

6. Likewise, that he *desired [it],* it seems. The proud devil desired something which he saw above himself, because this is the ground of pride; but above Lucifer in that state there was nothing but God and his loftiness: therefore he desired the divine loftiness.

7. Likewise, pride was as much surpassing as the malice of envy and hatred surpasses; but the devil does not so much hate and envy the creatures of God, as man, nay envies God himself: therefore [he wished] not only to be set over creatures, but he wished also to make himself equal to God.

8. Likewise, it is licit to desire a likeness of conformity: if therefore the devil desired the illicit, he progressed beyond this; but beyond a likeness of conformity there is nothing but a likeness of equality: therefore Lucifer desired this, as it seems.

On the contrary: 1. First to Timothy, chapter two[^4]: *Adam was not seduced* etc., the Gloss: «It is not to be believed that a man endowed with a spiritual mind would have desired to be as God». If it is not to be believed of man, since the Angel was still wiser than he, much less is it to be believed of him.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil[^5]: «He desired nothing to which he would not have come, if he had stood»; but he would never have been made equal to God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that this is not an object of appetite, it seems. The divine immensity cannot be grasped by the mind, therefore no <!-- page 149 -->one can think equality to God: but nothing can be desired which cannot be grasped by the intellect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Anselm proves this[^6]: «If God cannot be thought except as so alone that nothing like him can be thought: how could the devil will what he could not think»?

5. Likewise, that the devil did not *desire* this is shown, because he desired nothing except that to which he believed he could come — this is clear, because he himself said: *I will set my throne*[^7] — but no one, unless mad, could ever believe that a creature could be made equal to the Creator: therefore, since the devil was not yet wholly a fool, he never desired this.

6. Likewise, the devil loved himself above all things, therefore he did not wish to be other than he who he was; but if he were equal to God, he would be other than he who he was, because he would be God: therefore, since he did not desire this, he did not desire to be wholly equal to God. *If you say* that an antecedent is well desired without the consequent; that is true with a *desiderative* appetite; but with the *elective* no one, unless a fool, wishes deliberatively to be an abbot without wishing to be a monk[^8].

7. Likewise, every sin is by a conversion to a changeable good[^9]: therefore if the devil desired to be made equal to God, the devil did not sin; but he did sin: therefore he did not desire this.

### Conclusion.

> The wicked Angel desired in one manner a likeness of imitation to God, in another manner [a likeness] of equality.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold likeness of God, namely of *equivalence* or equality, and of *imitation*[^10]. A likeness of *imitation* can be desired *ordinately* and *inordinately; ordinately,* that the likeness be desired in those things which are of our aptitude and of divine acceptance, of which kind are the perfections and adornments of the virtues; *inordinately,* that a man desire what is not fitting, or what does not please God, as if he desire to be set over men, or to avenge himself on his adversaries[^11]. — A likeness of *equality* can in no way be desired *ordinately,* but in one way is an *object of appetite,* in another not. For an *all-encompassing* likeness is not an object of appetite, because it cannot fall into cognition or into the intellect, and therefore neither into the appetite; and if anyone imagines [it], he does not desire *equality,* but his own *fiction.* In another way there is a likeness of equality *in some condition,* as in dominion, presidency, knowledge; and thus I believe it can be desired.

It must therefore be noted that the devil in one manner desired a likeness of *imitation,* in another manner of *equality.* And this appears, if the *object of appetite* and the *manner of desiring* be attended to. For the devil desired to be set *over* others, yet by his own *authority.* That he desired to be set over [them], this was of imitation, and this indeed he would at some time have obtained, if he had stood. But that [he desired it] *by his own authority,* so that without merits and without a giver and so that he should be subject to none; this is of God alone, and this is of *equivalence.* — And so it is clear what he desired; and many authorities of the Saints are clear, because Gregory[^12] says that he desired to be of his own right, so that he should be subject to none; Bernard says that he desired equality of power; Anselm, that he desired to be set over [others] without merits; and all say what is true, and the diverse authorities speak circuitously of this which is *to be set over all by one's own authority.*

To that, then, which is objected, that he desired divine equality; it must be conceded *in something;* and thus the arguments adduced for that side run on, because it could well be desired, and most of all by him who was the proudest among all, it was desired.

But what is objected last does not hold, because, although it were licit to desire a likeness of *imitation,* yet not *every* likeness, as has been shown.

*To 1.* To the things objected on the contrary it is easy to respond through what has been said. — For what is objected concerning Adam is not similar, because Adam had grace; and besides he did not have so great an occasion of exalting himself.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning Anselm, the response is now clear, because he says what is true as to the object of appetite itself, not as to the *circumstance* under which he desired [it], namely that [it was] by his own authority.

*To 3. 4.* The two following arguments, which prove that it cannot be desired, speak of an all-encompassing assimilation; because if anyone thinks of God in general and thinks of something like him, he does not think God, but *imagines;* and therefore he does not desire to be like *God,* but his own *fiction.* <!-- page 150 -->

*To 5. 6.* To that which is objected, that he did not desire [it]; it must be said that those arguments prove that he did not desire *every*[^13] [likeness]; and this is true.

*To 7.* To that which is objected last, that he did not sin, if he desired a likeness, because he was not converted to a changeable good; it must be said that he converted himself to an unchangeable good, that it might be his own, and thus as to a changeable [good], and through this inordinately. And to be converted inordinately to God by being proud is to be averted from God and converted to oneself. And this is clear, because the devil desired for himself what was God's, and so was finally converted to himself, not to God. And thus all that was asked is clear.

la: Vers. 13. — De caelo Trinitatis cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. dub. 2.

en: Verse 13. — On the heaven of the Trinity cf. above, d. 2, p. II, dub. 2.

la: Psalm. 68, 5. — Glossa sumta est ex August. enarratione in hunc Psalm. Serm. 1. n. 9.

en: Psalm 68:5. — The Gloss is taken from Augustine's enarration on this Psalm, Sermon 1, n. 9.

la: Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi textus originalis *qua tuo* substituit pro *quod tuo,* et dein *desideras tamen ac speras* pro *desideras semper;* plures codd. *desiderasti,* Vat. *desiderares* pro *desideras.*

en: Chapter 10, n. 33, where the original text substitutes *qua tuo* for *quod tuo,* and then *desideras tamen ac speras* for *desideras semper;* several codices [read] *desiderasti,* the Vatican edition *desiderares* for *desideras.*

la: Vers. 14. — Glossa formata est ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58, ubi ponit quaestionem: utrum Adam crediderit serpenti?

en: Verse 14. — The Gloss is formed from Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 42, n. 58, where he poses the question: whether Adam believed the serpent?

la: Haec sententia collecta videtur ex iis, quae libr. cit. c. 4. et 6. proponuntur. Nam c. 4. dicitur: «Voluit igitur aliquid, quod non habebat, nec tunc velle debebat; sicut Eva similis voluit esse diis, priusquam Deus hoc vellet... Nihil autem velle potuit nisi iustitiam, aut commodum... Iustitiam vero volendo peccare non potuit... Peccavit ergo volendo aliquod commodum, quod nec habebat nec tunc velle debuit [B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1. allegat hunc textum, et hic interserit: *sed per meritum exspectare*], quod tamen ad augmentum beatitudinis esse illi potuit... Cernis, ut puto, quia plus aliquid, quam acceperat, inordinate volendo, voluntatem suam extra iustitiam extendit». Cap. 6. legitur: «Quid illud fuerit (quod mali angeli iniusto concupierunt), non video; sed quidquid fuerit, sufficit scire, quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt; quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad aliud suo merito proficerent». Similis sententia occurrit supra d. III. c. 1, ubi Magister ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30. haec recitat verba: *Cecidit, non ab eo quod accepit, sed ab eo quod accepisset, si Deo subdi voluisset.*

en: This opinion seems collected from those things which are proposed in the cited book, cc. 4 and 6. For in c. 4 it is said: «He willed therefore something which he did not have, nor ought then to will; just as Eve wished to be like the gods, before God willed this... But he could will nothing except justice or advantage... Justice indeed by willing he could not sin... He sinned therefore by willing some advantage, which he neither had nor ought then to will [B. Albert, S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 1, alleges this text, and here inserts: *but to await it through merit*], which yet could be for the increase of his beatitude... You see, as I think, that by inordinately willing something more than he had received, he extended his will outside justice». In c. 6 it is read: «What that was (which the evil angels unjustly coveted), I do not see; but whatever it was, it suffices to know that it was something to which they could grow; which they did not receive when they were created, that they might advance to something else by their own merit». A similar opinion occurs above, d. III, c. 1, where the Master, from Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 23, n. 30, recites these words: *He fell, not from what he received, but from what he would have received, if he had been willing to be subject to God.*

la: De Casu diaboli, c. 4.

en: On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4.

en: Isaiah 14:13.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. et Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, qui praedictam appetitus distinctionem exprimunt vocabulis *voluntas* et *electio,* quarum prima potest esse impossibilium, altera autem non nisi possibilium. — Codd. X Y *sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi* pro *sed electivo nullus, nisi.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, III Ethics, c. 2, and Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22, who express the aforesaid distinction of appetite by the words *will* and *choice,* of which the first can be of impossible things, but the second only of possible things. — Codices X Y [read] *sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi* for *sed electivo nullus, nisi.*

la: Vide August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53.

en: See Augustine, II On Free Choice, c. 19, n. 53.

la: De quo vide August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 9.

en: Concerning which see Augustine, I On Genesis according to the letter, c. 4, n. 9.

la: Cfr. August., Enarrat. in Ps. 70, 19, Serm. 2. n. 6. seq. — Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F K U X *divinae acceptationis* pro *divinae acceptionis.* Mox post *Similitudo* in Vat. additur *omnimoda.*

en: Cf. Augustine, Enarration on Ps. 70:19, Sermon 2, n. 6 ff. — A little above, several codices such as F K U X [read] *divinae acceptationis* for *divinae acceptionis.* Soon after *Similitudo* the Vatican edition adds *omnimoda.*

la: Libr. XXXIV. Moral. c. 21. n. 40: *Leviathan vero iste omnis (Dei) celsitudinis culmen aspiciens ius perversae libertatis appetiit, ut et praeesset ceteris et nulli subesset.* — Verba Bernardi vide supra d. 1. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp. — Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 4: *Etiamsi noluit omnino par esse Deo, sed aliquid minus Deo contra voluntatem Dei, hoc ipso voluit inordinate similis esse Deo, quia propria voluntate, quae nulli subdita fuit, voluit aliquid. Solius enim Dei esse debet, sic voluntate propria velle aliquid, ut superiorem non sequatur voluntatem... Non solum autem voluit esse aequalis Deo, quia praesumsit habere propriam voluntatem, sed etiam maior voluit esse volendo, quod Deus illum velle nolebat, quoniam voluntatem suam supra voluntatem Dei posuit.* Cfr. etiam supra pag. 148, nota 5.

en: Book XXXIV Moralia, c. 21, n. 40: *But that Leviathan, beholding the summit of all (God's) loftiness, sought the right of a perverse liberty, that he might both be set over the rest and be subject to none.* — For Bernard's words see above, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, arg. 2 ad opp. — Anselm, On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4: *Even though he did not wish to be wholly equal to God, but something less than God against the will of God, by this very fact he wished inordinately to be like God, because by his own will, which was subject to none, he willed something. For it belongs to God alone thus to will something by one's own will, so that he does not follow a superior will... But he wished not only to be equal to God, because he presumed to have his own will, but he wished even to be greater by willing what God did not wish him to will, since he set his will above the will of God.* Cf. also above, p. 148, note 5.

la: Subaudi: *similitudinem.* — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *omnino.*

en: Understand: *similitudinem.* — The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, [reads] *omnino.*

latin_scholion:
I. Hic quaeritur de *obiecto* a lucifero inordinate desiderato. Quod appetierit aliquo modo fieri aequalis Deo, inter theologos constat. Conveniunt iidem etiam in distinctione, quam ex Alexandro Hal. sumsit S. Bonav., scil. inter similitudinem *imitationis* et *aequalitatis* (cfr. S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 63. a. 3.). — Petrus Lombardus cum aliis putat, daemonem simpliciter similitudinem *aequalitatis* appetivisse (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Communiter autem negatur, tum ipsum *de facto* hoc appetivisse, tum hoc *possibile* fuisse, si intelligitur de voluntate *efficaciter* et directe hoc volente. Si autem hoc intelligitur de voluntate *conditionata* et *inefficaci,* Scotus censet eum *potuisse* desiderare simpliciter deitatem; sed *de facto* inordinate appetivisse suam beatitudinem, quae *inordinatio* pluribus modis fieri potuerit; in quibus modis recensendis fere convenit cum S. Thoma. — Alex. Hal. vult, eundem *indirecte* aequalitatem cum Deo appetivisse, «quia appetiit aliquid, quo habito sequeretur, quod Deo erat aequalis, scilicet *nulli subesse*». — Sed S. Thomas hanc sententiam non approbat (hic q. 1. a. 2.), cum Angelus *nullo* modo similitudinem *aequalitatis* potuerit desiderare. Hinc docet, inordinatum eius desiderium aliquo modo circa ordinem *supernaturalem* versatum esse, ita dicens in Summa (loc. cit.): «In hoc appetiit indebite esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id, ad quod *virtute suae naturae* poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem, quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem». — Durand. (hic q. 1.) probabile putat, illud peccatum fuisse transgressionem alicuius praecepti positivi nobis ignoti. — S. Bonav. convenit fere cum Alexandro Hal. et restringit aequalitatem ad aliquas proprietates, «ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia». Non autem satis apparet, utrum docuerit, daemonem voluntate conditionata et inefficaci etiam omnimodam aequalitatem potuisse desiderare, ut vult B. a Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. II. disp. 9. q. 4.), qui hoc ex verbis (in corp. et ad 3. 4.): «non appetit aequalitatem, sed suam fictionem», concludi posse putat. Confirmatur hoc iis quae dicuntur infra d. 7, p. I. a. I. q. 2. ad 7. Patet autem, quod voluntate inefficaci etiam ea quae cognita sunt ut impossibilia et mala, possint desiderari, quia «in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed ex parte ordinantis» (S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 1. a. I. q. 2.).

II. Praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

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english_scholion:
I. Here it is asked about the *object* inordinately desired by Lucifer. That he desired in some manner to become equal to God is established among theologians. The same [theologians] also agree in the distinction which St. Bonaventure took from Alexander of Hales, namely between a likeness of *imitation* and of *equality* (cf. St. Thomas, S. p. I, q. 63, a. 3). — Peter Lombard with others holds that the demon simply desired a likeness of *equality* (cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2). But it is commonly denied, both that he *in fact* desired this, and that this was *possible,* if it is understood of a will *efficaciously* and directly willing this. But if this is understood of a *conditioned* and *inefficacious* will, Scotus holds that he *could* desire deity simply; but *in fact* inordinately desired his own beatitude, which *inordinateness* could come about in several ways; in enumerating which ways he nearly agrees with St. Thomas. — Alexander of Hales holds that the same [devil] *indirectly* desired equality with God, «because he desired something which, being had, it would follow that he was equal to God, namely *to be subject to none*». — But St. Thomas does not approve this opinion (here q. 1, a. 2), since the Angel could in *no* way desire a likeness of *equality.* Hence he teaches that his inordinate desire was occupied in some manner about the *supernatural* order, saying thus in the Summa (loc. cit.): «In this he desired unduly to be like God, because he desired as the ultimate end of beatitude that to which he could come *by the virtue of his own nature,* turning away his appetite from the supernatural beatitude which is from the grace of God. Or if he desired as the ultimate end that likeness of God which is given from grace, he wished to have this by the virtue of his own nature, not from divine help according to God's disposition». — Durandus (here q. 1) thinks it probable that that sin was the transgression of some positive precept unknown to us. — St. Bonaventure nearly agrees with Alexander of Hales and restricts equality to certain properties, «as in dominion, presidency, knowledge». But it is not sufficiently clear whether he taught that the demon could, by a conditioned and inefficacious will, desire even an all-encompassing equality, as B. a Barberiis holds (Cursus theolog. t. II, disp. 9, q. 4), who thinks it can be concluded from the words (in the body and ad 3, 4): «he does not desire equality, but his own fiction». This is confirmed by what is said below, d. 7, p. I, a. I, q. 2, ad 7. But it is clear that by an inefficacious will even those things which are known as impossible and evil can be desired, because «in evils the ground of ordering is not on the part of the things ordered, but on the part of the one ordering» (St. Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 1, a. I, q. 2).

II. Besides those praised: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 98, m. 3. — Scotus, in each Scriptum, here q. 1. — Albert, here a. 3; S. p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **Distinction V, Article I, Question II** — *Whether Lucifer desired to be made equal to God.* 8 *videtur* (Fundamenta — that he desired to be made equal: scriptural [Isa., Ps., 1 Tim.-Gloss], Bernard, and rational), 7 *Contra* (that equality is not an object of appetite / he did not desire it: 1 Tim.-Gloss, Anselm, the immensity argument, Anselm again, *Ponam sedem meam,* self-love, the conversion-to-changeable-good argument), a *Conclusio,* the *Respondeo* (the twofold likeness — *aequiparantiae*/*aequalitatis* vs *imitationis;* the *ordinate*/*inordinate* analysis; what the devil actually desired = *praeesse omnibus propria auctoritate*), the *Solutio* in grouped blocks (*Ad 1 / Ad 2 / Ad 3. 4. / Ad 5. 6. / Ad 7.*), and an editorial **Scholion I–II**. Spans printed pp. 148–150 (= PDF 170–172).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The IA djvu OCR (raw 10935–11100) is two-column cascade-shattered through the *Respondeo*/*Solutio*; the chunk was fully re-set against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 148-150 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 148|149|150`), each page read L column top→bottom then R column, body bands then footer bands.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (Quaracchi restarts per printed page; renumbered continuously 1–13):**
  - **p.148 (5 notes → [^1]–[^5]):** L-col ¹ (*Isaiae decimo*¹ Fund 1), ² (*Psalmi*² Fund 2), ³ (*humilitatis*³ Fund 3); R-col ⁴ (*ad Timotheum secundo*⁴ Contra 1), ⁵ (*de Casu diaboli*⁵ Contra 2; the long Anselm/Albert note).
  - **p.149 (7 notes → [^6]–[^12]):** L-col ¹ (*Anselmus*¹ Contra 4), ² (*Ponam sedem meam*² Contra 5), ³ (*monachus*³ Contra 6), ⁴ (*ad bonum commutabile*⁴ Contra 7), ⁵ (*imitationis*⁵ Respondeo), ⁶ (*vindicare*⁶ Respondeo); R-col ⁷ (*Gregorius*⁷ Respondeo — the long Gregory *Moralia* XXXIV + Bernard + Anselm note, runs L→R across the footer).
  - **p.150 (1 note → [^13]):** ¹ (*omnem*¹, reply *Ad 5. 6.* = `Subaudi: similitudinem. — Vat. … omnino.`).
- **Incoming boundary a1-q1→a1-q2 — CLEAN/received, no backfill.** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q1` Notes document that its editorial Scholion I–III tail (spanning p.147→p.148) carried no numbered apparatus, so the entire p.148 footer is this chunk's. Verified on the p.148 crops: every p.148 footer note (¹–⁵) anchors a1-q2 *videtur*/Contra body. `d5-a1-q1` not modified.
- **Outgoing boundary a1-q2→a2-q1 — DISCOVERED SPLIT at p.150, documented for the next build.** On p.150 the reply *Ad 5. 6.* (a1-q2, *non appetiit omnem*¹) sits at the top, then the editorial Scholion I–II (no apparatus), then `ARTICULUS II` + `QUAESTIO I` (a2-q1, raw 11101) opens lower on the same page. p.150's footer splits by body anchor: **note ¹ `Subaudi: similitudinem. — Vat. … omnino.` → this chunk's [^13]** (*omnem*¹); **notes ² (`Cap. 47. n. 74…`), ³ (`Libr. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30…`), … anchor a2-q1's *videtur* body** (Gregory *Moralium*² / Hugh of St. Victor³). **`bon-sent-II-d5-a2-q1` build: start its p.150 apparatus at note ², no backfill into this chunk.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 13 body superscripts and the three page-footers verified on the 450 dpi crops. Editorial marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (*Fundamenta, ad oppositum, duplex similitudo, Conclusio 1, Conclusio 2, Explicantur auctoritates, Ad fundamenta, Ad fundamentum 5, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum*). The *Conclusio* is set as a `>` blockquote; the grouped *Solutio* replies tagged *Ad 1 / Ad 2 / Ad 3. 4. / Ad 5. 6. / Ad 7.* matching the printed grouping.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 150 -->

### ARTICULUS II.

*De aversione minorum Angelorum.*

Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur de aversione minorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primum est, quo genere peccati peccaverunt minores Angeli. Secundum est de comparatione peccati minorum Angelorum ad peccatum luciferi.

### QUAESTIO I.

*Utrum minores Angeli peccaverint peccato superbiae.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum minores Angeli peccaverunt peccato superbiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Gregorius secundo Moralium[^1]: «Tanto magis homines ad caelestia ascendere invident, quanto se a caelestibus per immunditiam elationis deiectos vident»; loquitur de daemonibus.

2. Item, Hugo de sancto Victore[^2]: «Omnes in eandem malitiam consenserunt, et unum ordinem perversae societatis fecerunt»; sed si omnes consenserunt in eandem malitiam, cum malitia diaboli fuerit superbia: ergo omnes consenserunt in superbiam. Sed nullus in superbiam consentit nisi superbus: ergo etc.

3. Item, libido est fundamentum civitatis diaboli, et radix omnis peccati: ergo cum libidinosus amor sit amor ad se recurvus et amor privatus, quia in hoc differt ab amore casto[^3]: ergo <!-- page 151 -->quilibet aliquid sibi appetiit. Sed non appetiit appetibile oculorum nec carnis: ergo superbiae vitae.

4. Item, «est amor commodi, et amor honesti», ut vult Anselmus[^4]. Si ergo peccaverunt daemones, aut igitur amore commodi, aut honesti, cum omnis affectio ortum habeat ex amore; sed non amore honesti: ergo amore commodi; sed hic est amor proprii boni: ergo etc.

Contra: 1. Quod non peccaverunt peccato superbiae, videtur, quia superbi est appetere praeesse et non subesse; sed minores Angeli voluerunt lucifero subesse: ergo non superbierunt. *Maior* manifesta est. *Minor* probatur per Hugonem[^5] et Magistrum, quorum uterque dicit, quod lucifero consenserunt: ergo voluerunt, quod praeesset, sicut optabat.

2. Item, maioris dignitatis et sublimitatis est subesse summo domino quam minori, ergo Deo quam Angelo: ergo si superbus appetit quod maioris est dignitatis, si superbierunt, potius appetierunt subesse Deo quam lucifero. Sed voluerunt a dominio Dei transire in omnimodum dominium luciferi: ergo etc.

3. Item, omnis superbus appetit aliquam excellentiam: si ergo superbierunt, aliquid appetierunt, scilicet se parificari Deo, ut videtur dicere Magister in littera[^6], quod superbia «voluerunt se parificare Deo». Tunc igitur, cum minus haberent motivum ad hoc quam lucifer, ergo gravius peccaverunt; quod est contra totam Scripturam, quae dicit ipsum caput malitiae. *Si tu dicas,* quod voluerunt quiescere *sine meritis,* et ideo superbierunt; *sed contra:* laus est et gloria consequi praemium per merita: ergo cum superbus appetat laudem et gloriam, appetere beatitudinem sine meritis non erit superbiae, immo ignaviae. — Item, aut appetebant sine meritis propter vitandam *dilationem,* aut propter vitandum *laborem.* Non propter vitandum *laborem,* quia Angeli non lassantur, sicut nec motor primi mobilis: ergo propter *dilationem.* Sed sancti viri vitant dilationem, qui cupiunt *dissolvi et esse cum Christo*[^7]: ergo videtur tunc, quod ipsi superbiant.

### Conclusio.

> Angeli mali inferiores peccaverunt superbia, non tantum consentiendo lucifero, sed etiam sibi excellentiam appetendo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod planum est ex dictis Sanctorum et Glossis[^8], quod Angeli minores peccato superbiae sunt aversi. Sed tamen in modo superbiendi diversitas est inter doctores. Nam aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod superbia eorum fuit in *consentiendo* superbiae luciferi; et consentire superbiae non potest esse nisi superbientis, sicut etiam Adam dicitur superbisse, quia mulieri superbienti consensit. — Sed tamen illud non videtur probabile, quod Angeli minores prius appetierint alii aliquod bonum commutabile quam sibi, cum uniuscuiusque *affectus* maxime sit iunctus sibi, et[^9] primo *appetat* sibi inordinate quam alii, et si alii, propter se hoc facit. Secunda vero positio est, quod Angeli minores superbierunt non tantum *consentiendo,* sed sibi excellentiam *appetendo;* et cum se non crederent posse ad illud pervenire sine ipsius luciferi sublimitate, qui erat quasi caput, et sibi et illi appetierunt; et ideo superbierunt *proprie* et superbiae etiam *consenserunt.* Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum in contrarium notandum, quod superbia daemonum conformis fuit capiti totius malitiae, principi scilicet tenebrarum. Ipse autem diabolus, attendens suorum naturalium strenuitatem et excellentiam et praecellentiam, voluit praeesse et requiescere sua auctoritate, hoc est sine meritis, sine ministerio. Daemones vero ei subiecti non sunt ausi tantum appetere; sed considerantes naturalium strenuitatem, voluerunt sub umbra illius requiescere, ita quod non ministrarent, sed quadam sub illo potirentur voluntaria libertate, quam videbant se non posse habere sub divino dominio. Cognoverunt enim Angeli, se esse factos ad participandum quietis beatitudinem, et acquirendum per merita et ministeria. In hoc ergo superbierunt, quod *sine meritis* voluerunt beati esse et *sine ministerio* quiescere et *sine limite* propriam voluntatem implere; et hoc totum est superbire, quamvis non sit tantae superbiae, quantae fuit appetere omnibus praecellere et nulli subesse. His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere.

*Ad 1. 2.* Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod non superbierunt, quia non appetierunt *praeesse;* dicendum, quod quamvis non appetierint *praeesse,* noluerunt tamen debito modo *subesse,* quia non voluerunt subesse illi Domino, qui praecipit solum quod bonum est, et restringit voluntatem, sed ei qui permittit laxari fraenum concupiscentiae. Ideo mali homines et superbi potius volunt subesse diabolo quam Deo; similiter potuit esse de Angelis. *Praeterea,* alia fuit ratio, quia[^10] non cupiebant ei *subesse,* sed sub eius dominio sine servitio vel ministerio *requiescere;* et hoc superbiae est. — Et <!-- page 152 -->ita patet sequens quod obiicit, quod gloriosius est Deo subesse; verum est secundum veritatem, sed non secundum aestimationem superbi.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio: quid appetierunt? utrum parificari Deo? dicendum, quod in *aliquo* voluerunt parificari Deo, in hoc scilicet quod sine meritis et obsequio voluerunt esse quieti et beati in aeternum, quod solius Dei est proprium; non tamen adeo parificari voluerunt, ut lucifer, et ideo non adeo peccaverunt.

Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod gloria est obtinere cum meritis; dicendum, quod superbus magis reputat esse gloriosum *habere*[^11], et non ab alio, quam per merita ab alio obtinere; tum quia dedignatur servire, tum quia dedignatur ab alio recipere. Et quia Angeli voluerunt propria auctoritate quiescere, patet, quod secundum aestimationem superbi excellentiam appetierunt, non veram, sed falsam; sicut patet in superbis, qui appetunt magis gloriam et excellentiam vanam quam veram. Et per hoc patet quod quaeritur, quare appetebant sine meritis; dico, quod non quia laboriosum, nec quia gravem propter desiderium; sed vile reputabant obsequium et ministerium; et hoc superbiae est.

english:
<!-- page 150 -->

### ARTICLE II.

*On the aversion of the lesser Angels.*

Consequently, in the second place, it is asked about the aversion of the lesser Angels. And concerning this two [things] are asked. The first is, by what kind of sin the lesser Angels sinned. The second is, concerning the comparison of the sin of the lesser Angels to the sin of Lucifer.

### QUESTION I.

*Whether the lesser Angels sinned by the sin of pride.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked, whether the lesser Angels sinned by the sin of pride. And that [they did] thus, it seems.

1. Gregory, on the second [book] of the Moralia[^1]: «So much the more do they envy men ascending to heavenly things, the more they see themselves cast down from heavenly things through the uncleanness of elation»; he speaks of the demons.

2. Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor[^2]: «All consented into the same malice, and made one order of a perverse society»; but if all consented into the same malice, since the malice of the devil was pride: therefore all consented into pride. But no one consents into pride except a proud one: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, lust is the foundation of the city of the devil, and the root of every sin: therefore, since lustful love is a love curved back to itself and a private love, because in this it differs from chaste love[^3]: therefore <!-- page 151 -->each one desired something for himself. But he did not desire the object of appetite of the eyes nor of the flesh: therefore [the object] of the pride of life.

4. Likewise, «there is a love of advantage, and a love of the honorable», as Anselm holds[^4]. If therefore the demons sinned, then either by love of advantage or of the honorable, since every affection has its origin from love; but not by love of the honorable: therefore by love of advantage; but this is the love of one's own good: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. That they did not sin by the sin of pride, it seems, because it belongs to a proud one to desire to be set over and not to be subject; but the lesser Angels wished to be subject to Lucifer: therefore they were not proud. The *major* is manifest. The *minor* is proved through Hugh[^5] and the Master, each of whom says that they consented to Lucifer: therefore they wished that he should be set over [them], as he desired.

2. Likewise, it is of greater dignity and sublimity to be subject to a supreme lord than to a lesser one, therefore to God than to an Angel: therefore if a proud one desires what is of greater dignity, if they were proud, they would rather have desired to be subject to God than to Lucifer. But they wished to pass from the dominion of God into the all-encompassing dominion of Lucifer: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every proud one desires some excellence: if therefore they were proud, they desired something, namely to be made equal to God, as the Master seems to say in the text[^6], that by pride «they wished to make themselves equal to God». Then therefore, since they had less motive for this than Lucifer, they sinned more gravely; which is against the whole of Scripture, which says that he [Lucifer] is the head of malice. *If you say* that they wished to rest *without merits,* and therefore were proud; *but on the contrary:* it is praise and glory to obtain a reward through merits: therefore, since a proud one desires praise and glory, to desire beatitude without merits will not be [a mark] of pride, nay of sloth. — Likewise, either they desired [it] without merits to avoid *delay,* or to avoid *labor.* Not to avoid *labor,* because the Angels are not wearied, as neither is the mover of the first movable: therefore to avoid *delay.* But holy men avoid delay, who desire *to be dissolved and to be with Christ*[^7]: therefore it then seems that they themselves are proud.

### Conclusion.

> The wicked lower Angels sinned by pride, not only by consenting to Lucifer, but also by desiring excellence for themselves.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is plain from the sayings of the Saints and from the Glosses[^8] that the lesser Angels were averted by the sin of pride. Yet there is a diversity among the doctors in the manner of being proud. For some wished to say that their pride was in *consenting* to the pride of Lucifer; and to consent to pride can only be [the act] of one who is proud, just as Adam too is said to have been proud, because he consented to the proud woman. — Yet that does not seem probable, that the lesser Angels first desired for another some changeable good rather than for themselves, since each one's *affection* is most of all joined to himself, and[^9] *desires* for himself inordinately before [for] others, and if for others, he does this for his own sake. But the second position is, that the lesser Angels were proud not only by *consenting,* but by *desiring* excellence for themselves; and since they did not believe they could attain to that without Lucifer's sublimity, who was as it were the head, they desired [it] both for themselves and for him; and therefore they were proud *properly* and also *consented* to [his] pride. And the arguments adduced for this side are to be conceded.

But for the understanding of the objections on the contrary it must be noted that the pride of the demons was conformed to the head of all malice, namely the prince of darkness. But the devil himself, attending to the strenuousness and excellence and pre-eminence of his own natural [gifts], wished to be set over [others] and to rest by his own authority, that is, without merits, without ministry. But the demons subject to him did not dare to desire so much; but, considering the strenuousness of [their] natural [gifts], they wished to rest under his shadow, so that they should not minister, but should enjoy a certain voluntary liberty under him, which they saw they could not have under the divine dominion. For the Angels knew that they were made to share the beatitude of rest, and to acquire [it] through merits and ministries. In this therefore they were proud, that they wished *without merits* to be blessed and *without ministry* to rest and *without limit* to fulfill their own will; and all this is to be proud, although it is not of so great a pride as it was to desire to excel all and to be subject to none. These things seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.

*To 1. 2.* For to that which is objected, that they were not proud, because they did not desire to be set over [others]; it must be said that, although they did not desire to be set over, yet they were unwilling to be subject in the due manner, because they did not wish to be subject to that Lord who commands only what is good and restrains the will, but to him who permits the bridle of concupiscence to be loosened. Therefore wicked and proud men rather wish to be subject to the devil than to God; similarly it could be with the Angels. *Moreover,* there was another reason, because[^10] they did not desire to be *subject* to him, but to *rest* under his dominion without service or ministry; and this is [a mark] of pride. — And <!-- page 152 -->so the following [objection] which it objects is clear, that it is more glorious to be subject to God; that is true according to the truth, but not according to the estimation of the proud one.

*To 3.* To that which is objected thirdly: what did they desire? to be made equal to God? it must be said that *in something* they wished to be made equal to God, namely in this, that without merits and homage they wished to be at rest and blessed forever, which is proper to God alone; yet they did not wish to be made equal to such a degree as Lucifer, and therefore they did not sin to such a degree.

To that which is objected last, that glory is to obtain [it] with merits; it must be said that the proud one reckons it more glorious *to have*[^11], and not from another, than to obtain through merits from another; both because he disdains to serve, and because he disdains to receive from another. And because the Angels wished to rest by their own authority, it is clear that according to the estimation of the proud one they desired excellence, not true, but false; as is clear in the proud, who desire a vain glory and excellence more than a true one. And through this it is clear what is asked, why they desired [it] without merits; I say that [it was] not because [it was] laborious, nor because [it was] burdensome by reason of desire; but they reckoned homage and ministry vile; and this is [a mark] of pride.

la: Cap. 47. n. 74, ubi textus originalis *corda hominum* pro *homines* et *proiectos* pro *deiectos.*

en: Chapter 47, n. 74, where the original text [reads] *corda hominum* for *homines* and *proiectos* for *deiectos.*

la: Libr. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30: *In una simul omnes malitia consenserunt, quasi unum ex se perversae societatis ordinem effecerunt.*

en: Book I On the Sacraments, p. V, c. 30: *All together consented into one malice, as it were making of themselves one order of a perverse society.*

la: De his duabus propositionibus cfr. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 19. seq., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 33, et XIV. c. 28.

en: Concerning these two propositions cf. Augustine, XI de Gen. ad litt., c. 13, n. 19 ff., XI de Civ. Dei, c. 33, and XIV, c. 28.

la: Monol. c. 1. et de Casu diaboli, c. 4. et 12. Argumentum ipsum insinuatur libr. de Casu diaboli, c. 4, de quo vide supra pag. 148, nota 5.

en: Monologion, c. 1, and On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4 and 12. The argument itself is suggested in the book On the Fall of the Devil, c. 4, on which see above, p. 148, note 5.

la: Verba Hugonis vide supra pag. 150, nota 3. Sententiam Magistri reperies infra d. VI. c. 2.

en: For Hugh's words see above, p. 150, note 3. The opinion of the Master you will find below, d. VI, c. 2.

la: Hic c. 1.

en: Here, chapter 1.

la: Phil. 1, 23. — Quod motor primi mobilis non fatigetur, docet Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 83. (c. 10.) et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 3. (c. 1.).

en: Philippians 1:23. — That the mover of the first movable is not wearied, Aristotle teaches, VIII Physics, text 83 (c. 10), and II On the Heaven and the world, text 3 (c. 1).

la: Glossa ordinaria et interlinearis in Epist. Iudae 1, 6.

en: The ordinary and interlinear Gloss on the Epistle of Jude 1:6.

la: Vat. *ut.* Paulo ante plures codd. ut I W aa bb *magis sit* pro *maxime sit.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *ut.* A little before, several codices such as I W aa bb [read] *magis sit* for *maxime sit.*

la: Non pauci codd. *qua* et nonnulli cum ed. 1 *quare;* incongrue.

en: Not a few codices [read] *qua* and some, with edition 1, *quare;* incongruously.

la: Vat. supplet *a se,* cod. 1 autem *sine meritis.*

en: The Vatican edition supplies *a se,* but codex 1 *sine meritis.*

latin_scholion:
I. Haec et seq. quaest. secundum principia in praecedenti articulo stabilita solvuntur. Quoad q. 2. aliqui dicunt, peccatum luciferi non praecessisse peccatum aliorum, nec tempore nec aliqua causalitate; alii vero, illud praecessisse quidem causalitate, non autem tempore; alii cum S. Bonav. probabilius esse putant, praecessisse et tempore et causalitate. — Alex. Hal. diffuse de hoc disputat; alii plerumque auctores has duas quaestiones vel tantum tangunt, vel una quaestione absolvunt.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 99. m. 1. 2. 5. 6. — Scot., II. Sent. d. 6. a. q. 1. n. 9, et alii loci collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino t. II. q. 63. a. 9. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 63. a. 8. — B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. 3; S. p. II. tr. 3. q. 20. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. dub. later. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica in fine.

---

english_scholion:
I. This and the following question are solved according to the principles established in the preceding article. As to q. 2, some say that the sin of Lucifer did not precede the sin of the others, neither in time nor by any causality; but others, that it did precede indeed by causality, but not in time; others, with St. Bonaventure, think it more probable that it preceded both in time and by causality. — Alexander of Hales disputes diffusely about this; other authors mostly either merely touch these two questions, or settle [them] in one question.

II. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 99, m. 1, 2, 5, 6. — Scotus, II Sent., d. 6, a. q. 1, n. 9, and other places collected by Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 63, a. 9. — St. Thomas, II Sent., d. 6, q. unica, a. 2; S. I, q. 63, a. 8. — B. Albert, II Sent., d. 6, a. 2, 3; S. p. II, tr. 3, q. 20, m. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3, dub. lateral. — Durandus, II Sent., d. 6, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, II Sent., d. 6, q. unica at the end.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **Distinction V, Article II, Question I** — *Whether the lesser Angels sinned by the sin of pride* — with the short `ARTICULUS II.` opener + article title *De aversione minorum Angelorum* + the article's two-question plan folded in (Vol II convention). 4 *videtur* (Gregory, Hugh of St. Victor, the lust/civitas-diaboli argument, Anselm's love-of-advantage/honorable), 3 *Contra* (with sub-arguments — they wished to be subject to Lucifer, the dignity argument, the *parificari Deo*/Master-in-the-text argument with the *sine meritis* replication and the *dilatio*/*labor* dilemma), a *Conclusio,* the *Respondeo* (the two positions on the manner of the lesser Angels' pride — by *consenting* vs by *desiring* excellence; the *sine meritis / sine ministerio / sine limite* analysis), the *Solutio* (*Ad 1. 2. / Ad 3. / Ad illud ultimo*), and an editorial **Scholion I–II**. Spans printed pp. 150–152 (= PDF 172–174).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The IA djvu OCR (raw 11101–11224) is two-column cascade-shattered through the *Respondeo*/*Solutio*; the chunk was fully re-set against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 150-152 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 150|151|152`), each page read L column top→bottom then R column, body bands then footer bands.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (Quaracchi restarts per printed page; renumbered continuously 1–11):**
  - **p.150 (3 notes → [^1]–[^3]):** ² (*Gregorius secundo Moralium*¹ Fund 1), ³ (*Hugo de sancto Victore*² Fund 2), ⁴ (*amore casto*³ Fund 3). p.150's note ¹ (`Subaudi: similitudinem. — Vat. … omnino.`) is the preceding `d5-a1-q2`'s [^13] — not taken here.
  - **p.151 (7 notes → [^4]–[^10]):** ¹ (*Anselmus*⁴ Fund 4), ² (*per Hugonem*⁵ Contra 1), ³ (*Magister in littera*⁶ Contra 3), ⁴ (*esse cum Christo*⁷ Contra 3 sub-arg; the Phil. 1, 23 + *motor primi mobilis* note, runs L→R across the footer), ⁵ (*Glossis*⁸ Respondeo), ⁶ (*et*⁹ Improbatur), ⁷ (*quia*¹⁰ Solutio Ad 1. 2.).
  - **p.152 (1 note → [^11]):** ¹ (*habere*¹¹, reply *Ad illud ultimo* = `Vat. supplet a se, cod. 1 autem sine meritis.`).
- **Incoming boundary a1-q2→a2-q1 — RECEIVED split at p.150, no backfill.** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q2` Notes documented the p.150 split: its reply *Ad 5. 6.* sits at the top of p.150 and owns p.150 footer note ¹ (`Subaudi: similitudinem…` = its [^13]); the editorial Scholion I–II (a1-q2's, no apparatus) follows; then this `ARTICULUS II`+`QUAESTIO I` opens lower on p.150. This chunk's p.150 apparatus starts at note ² (*Gregorius secundo Moralium*¹). `d5-a1-q2` not modified.
- **Outgoing boundary a2-q1→a2-q2 — DISCOVERED SPLIT at p.152, documented for the next build.** On p.152 the reply *Ad illud ultimo* (a2-q1, *habere*¹¹) sits at the top, then the editorial Scholion I–II (no apparatus), then `QUAESTIO II` (a2-q2, raw 11225) opens lower on the same page. p.152's footer splits by body anchor: **note ¹ `Vat. supplet a se, cod. 1 autem sine meritis.` → this chunk's [^11]** (*habere*¹¹); **notes ² (`Vers. 4.`), ³ (`Vers. 44…`), ⁴ (`Liber. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30…`), … anchor a2-q2's *videtur* body** (Apoc. 12 / John 8 / Hugh of St. Victor). **`bon-sent-II-d5-a2-q2` build: start its p.152 apparatus at note ², no backfill into this chunk.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 11 body superscripts and the three page-footers verified on the 450 dpi crops. Editorial marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (*ad oppositum, Replicatur, Implicatur quaestio incidens, Conclusio 1/2/3, Opinio 1 de modo, Improbatur, Opinio 2, Explicatur, Solutio oppositorum, Notandum, Ad replicationem, Fundamenta*). The *Conclusio* is set as a `>` blockquote; the grouped *Solutio* replies tagged *Ad 1. 2. / Ad 3. / Ad illud ultimo* matching the printed grouping. Note [^7] anchors the Phil. 1, 23 citation (*esse cum Christo*); the same Quaracchi note also glosses the *motor primi mobilis* clause (one footer note, one body marker).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
<!-- page 152 -->

### QUAESTIO II.

*Utrum peccatum minorum Angelorum habeat ordinem ad peccatum luciferi.*

Secundo quaeritur de comparatione peccati minorum Angelorum ad peccatum luciferi, et quaeritur, utrum habeat ordinem ad ipsum. — Et quod habeat ordinem *causalitatis* cuiusdam, videtur.

1. Apocalypsis duodecimo[^1]: *Draco traxit secum tertiam partem stellarum.* Sancti et magistri exponunt de lucifero et de daemonibus. Si *traxit,* ergo aliquo modo procuravit casum eorum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Ioannis octavo[^2] dicitur, quod *ipse mendax est, et pater eius:* ergo diabolus est pater mendacii: ergo cum mendacium ibi vocetur omne peccatum, videtur, quod ipse fuit pater omnis peccati, ergo et peccati minorum Angelorum: et ita videtur, quod sit ordo *causalitatis.*

3. Item, quod sit ibi ordo *temporis* sive durationis, videtur, quia Hugo[^3] dicit et Magister, quod peccaverunt peccato consentiendo: sed non potuerunt consentire peccato luciferi, nisi quod praecesserat; prius enim vult aliquis aliquid, quam requirat consensum: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc videtur, quia diabolus aliquo modo fuit *origo,* sive *suggerendo,* sive *exemplum praebendo.* Non potuit *suggerere,* nisi postquam appetiit, nec etiam *demonstrare* aliis conceptum suum, nec illi *consentire,* nisi postquam cognoverunt: ergo in medio inter peccatum diaboli et aliorum cecidit *suggestio,* vel saltem *demonstratio* et *perceptio* et *adiudicatio* de percepto. Sed ista non possunt simul esse: ergo fuit ibi ordo temporis[^4].

Sed Contra: 1. Quod non potuerit ibi esse ordo *causalitatis* sive occasionis, videtur, quia statim ut peccavit, deformatus est: ergo cum Angeli ante peccatum haberent limpidum visum, si viderunt deformitatem, potius debuerunt a peccato retrahi quam eius exemplum vel suggestionem imitari: ergo non peccaverunt eius exemplo vel suggestione.

2. Item, quod non fuerit ibi ordo *temporis,* videtur, quia statim ut diabolus peccavit, corruit; alioquin «fuisset dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae[^5]»; sed omnes simul ceciderunt — unde Damascenus dicit, quod «simul cum eo, scilicet lucifero, convulsa est innumera multitudo» — ergo simul, tempore omnes peccaverunt.

3. Item, potest obiici, quod *neuter ordo* ibi fuerit; quia boni simul conversi sunt, ita quod nec fuit ibi ordo *causalitatis* sive suggestionis, nec <!-- page 153 -->temporis: ergo si statim divisa est lux a tenebris, statim boni facti sunt lux, et mali tenebrae: ergo simul non tantum *tempore,* verum etiam *natura.*

4. Item, adhuc quod *neuter* ordo ibi fuerit, videtur, quia, si fuit ordo *causalitatis,* ergo videtur, peccatum aliorum Angelorum remediabile, sicut et peccatum hominis, quod aliunde habuit remedium, quia aliunde habuit occasionem[^6]. Si vero fuit ordo *temporis,* ergo videtur, quod peccatum minorum Angelorum sit gravius, cum non formidaverint divinum iudicium, quod conspexerunt circa luciferum.

### Conclusio.

> Inter luciferi peccatum et ceterorum fuit ordo et quoad gradum et quoad occasionem et quoad durationem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad praedictorum intelligentiam, quod hic triplex consuevit poni positio. Quidam enim voluerunt dicere, quod non fuit ibi ordo nisi secundum *gradum,* quia maius et excellentius fuit peccatum luciferi, eo quod magis superbivit; nec tamen fuit *prius* peccato aliorum *tempore* nec *origine,* sed statim in eodem puncto quilibet, propria voluntate depravatus, sine exemplo peccavit; et quia aspectum habuerunt ad idem, ideo consimili modo et eodem genere peccati peccaverunt. Et concedunt rationes ad hoc.

Aliorum positio fuit, quod non tantum fuit ordo *excessus*[^7], immo *causalitatis,* ut causalitas large dicatur non tantum ad causam vere, sed etiam ad occasionem; non tantum ad perpetrationem, sed etiam ad suggestionem; non tamen ordo *temporis.* Et hoc volunt dare sic intelligere, quod in lucifero simul fuit *tempore appetitus* et eius *expressio,* et in Angelis simul *perceptio* et *appetitio,* et ita simul *tempore* peccaverunt; tamen peccatum diaboli praebuit aliis viam, sicut exemplum. — Et ponunt *simile:* si oculus aspiceret directe in orientem, existens in occidente, simul fieret coruscatio et appareret in oculo[^8]. A *minori* volunt hoc esse posse in Angelo; et per hoc solvunt obiecta.

Tertia positio est, quod fuit ibi ordo et quantum ad *gradum* et quantum ad *occasionem* et quantum ad *durationem:* quantum ad *gradum,* quia illud luciferi[^9] fuit maius; quantum ad *occasionem,* quia aliis praebuit exemplum; quantum ad *durationem,* quia, sicut in lucifero necesse fuit tempore ante esse quam peccare, quia non potuit in eodem instanti habere cognitionem, quae praeexigitur ad peccatum, cum deordinata affectione; sic in minoribus Angelis dicunt fuisse in peccando, cum peccaverunt aspiciendo quod Angelus volebat, et exinde aspiciendo commodum suum. — Et haec positio videtur intelligibilior, unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod deformis fuit statim; potest responderi, quod deformis fuit, sed illa deformitas erat intra conscientiam, et ideo non apparuit, quia non revelavit. — Vel potest dici, quod est deformitas contra *naturam* et contra *voluntatem.* Deformitatem contra *naturam* statim natura cognoscit et respuit, quia non movetur nisi uno modo[^10]. Sed deformitatem *voluntatis* non sic respuit voluntas, eo quod ipsa libera est; et ideo frequenter placet ei actus culpabilis, et deformis; nec unquam talis actus displicet ei, nisi in quantum adhaeret aliquo modo iustitiae. Et quia Angeli quidam adhaeserunt iustitiae; ideo eis displicuit motus Angeli et deformis voluntas. Alii vero non adhaeserunt; ideo immunditiam non perceperunt, sed magis ut apparens bonum acceptaverunt.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simul ceciderunt; potest dici, quod *simul,* non quia in *eodem instanti,* sed quia *repente,* quasi in imperceptibili tempore; et ibi bene potest esse ordo, quamvis non percipiatur. — Vel aliter et melius potest dici, quod satanas non cecidit statim ut appetiit, sed postquam peccatum eius fuit consummatum et confirmatum per odium et invidiam[^11], et postquam facta est divisio bonorum Angelorum a malis, de quorum consortio post beatificationem statim repulsi sunt. Nec valet illud quod obiicitur de peccati dedecore, quia peccatum semper habet poenam internam sibi coniunctam. Unde sicut homo non statim fuit eiectus de paradiso ut peccavit, sed tamen statim poenam habuit; ita videtur de Angelo esse dicendum, quod non in eodem instanti cecidit.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de bonis Angelis, dicendum, quod tam conversionem bonorum Angelorum quam aversionem daemonum peccatum luciferi praecessit. Nam ipse prius superbivit et superbiam suam omnibus indicavit; et ex tunc quidam adhaeserunt sibi, alii vero restiterunt et adhaeserunt Deo; et simul isti lux, illi tenebrae facti sunt. <!-- page 154 -->Quamvis ergo simul fuerit Angelorum conversio et daemonum aversio, non tamen simul cum peccato luciferi.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de *excusabilitate* vel *gravitate,* dicendum, quod *prima* pars ratiocinationis dupliciter deficit: primum, quia illa non est sufficiens ratio, quare peccatum hominis fuit remediabile, sicut infra patebit melius[^12]; secundum, quia non est simile. Aliter enim diabolus dedit occasionem homini, aliter Angelis malis: homini *promittendo* et *fallendo,* sed Angelis solum conceptum suum *insinuando;* unde non dicitur eos tentasse, ut primos parentes. *Secunda* pars deficit, quia non adverterunt eius ruinam nec viderunt divini iudicii severitatem in ipsum, quousque peccatum eius fuit consummatum, ut prius tactum est et determinatum[^13].

---

english:
<!-- page 152 -->

### QUESTION II.

*Whether the sin of the lesser Angels has an order to the sin of Lucifer.*

Secondly it is asked about the comparison of the sin of the lesser Angels to the sin of Lucifer, and it is asked whether it has an order to it. — And that it has an order of a certain *causality,* it seems.

1. Apocalypse, chapter twelve[^1]: *The dragon drew with him the third part of the stars.* The Saints and masters expound [this] of Lucifer and of the demons. If he *drew* [them], therefore he in some manner procured their fall: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in John, chapter eight[^2], it is said that *he is a liar, and the father thereof:* therefore the devil is the father of lying: therefore, since there every sin is called a lie, it seems that he was the father of every sin, therefore also of the sin of the lesser Angels: and so it seems that there is an order of *causality.*

3. Likewise, that there is there an order of *time* or of duration, it seems, because Hugh[^3] says, and the Master, that they sinned by consenting to [his] sin: but they could not consent to the sin of Lucifer unless it had preceded; for one wills something before he requires consent [to it]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [so], because the devil in some manner was the *origin,* either by *suggesting,* or by *furnishing an example.* He could not *suggest* except after he desired, nor even *demonstrate* his concept to others, nor [could] they *consent* except after they knew: therefore in the middle between the sin of the devil and [that] of the others fell the *suggestion,* or at least the *demonstration* and *perception* and *adjudication* concerning what was perceived. But these cannot be at once: therefore there was there an order of time[^4].

But on the contrary: 1. That there could not be there an order of *causality* or of occasion, it seems, because as soon as he sinned, he was deformed: therefore, since the Angels before [their] sin had a clear sight, if they saw the deformity, they ought rather to have been drawn back from sin than to imitate his example or suggestion: therefore they did not sin by his example or suggestion.

2. Likewise, that there was not there an order of *time,* it seems, because as soon as the devil sinned, he fell; otherwise «there would have been the disgrace of sin without the adornment of justice[^5]»; but all fell at once — whence Damascene says that «together with him, namely Lucifer, an innumerable multitude was torn away» — therefore at once, in time, all sinned.

3. Likewise, it can be objected that *neither order* was there; because the good were converted at once, so that there was there neither an order of *causality* or of suggestion, nor <!-- page 153 -->of time: therefore if at once light was divided from darkness, at once the good were made light, and the evil darkness: therefore at once not only in *time,* but even in *nature.*

4. Likewise, further, that *neither* order was there, it seems, because, if there was an order of *causality,* then it seems the sin of the other Angels [was] remediable, just as also the sin of man, which had a remedy from elsewhere, because it had its occasion from elsewhere[^6]. But if there was an order of *time,* then it seems that the sin of the lesser Angels is graver, since they did not fear the divine judgment, which they beheld concerning Lucifer.

### Conclusion.

> Between Lucifer's sin and that of the rest there was an order both as to degree and as to occasion and as to duration.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that here a threefold position is wont to be set. For some wished to say that there was there no order except according to *degree,* because the sin of Lucifer was greater and more excellent, in that he was more proud; yet it was not *prior* to the sin of the others in *time* nor in *origin,* but at once in the same point each one, depraved by his own will, sinned without an example; and because they had their gaze on the same thing, therefore they sinned in a like manner and by the same kind of sin. And they concede the arguments for this.

The position of others was, that there was an order not only of *excess*[^7], nay of *causality,* taking causality broadly not only for a true cause, but also for an occasion; not only for the perpetration, but also for the suggestion; yet not an order of *time.* And they wish [it] to be understood thus, that in Lucifer there was at once in *time* the *appetite* and its *expression,* and in the Angels at once the *perception* and the *appetition,* and so they sinned at once in *time;* yet the sin of the devil furnished the others a way, as an example. — And they set a *simile:* if an eye, being in the west, should look directly into the east, at once the flashing would occur and would appear in the eye[^8]. From the lesser they wish this to be able to be [so] in the Angel; and through this they solve the objections.

The third position is, that there was there an order both as to *degree* and as to *occasion* and as to *duration:* as to *degree,* because that of Lucifer[^9] was greater; as to *occasion,* because he furnished the others an example; as to *duration,* because, just as in Lucifer it was necessary in time to be before [he could] sin, since he could not in the same instant have the cognition which is pre-required for sin, together with a disordered affection; so they say it was in the lesser Angels in sinning, since they sinned by looking at what the Angel willed, and thence by looking at their own advantage. — And this position seems more intelligible, whence the arguments adduced for it are to be conceded.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that he was deformed at once; it can be answered that he was deformed, but that deformity was within the conscience, and therefore did not appear, because he did not reveal [it]. — Or it can be said that there is a deformity against *nature* and against the *will.* A deformity against *nature* the nature at once knows and rejects, because it is not moved except in one way[^10]. But a deformity of the *will* the will does not so reject, because it is itself free; and therefore a culpable and deformed act frequently pleases it; nor ever does such an act displease it, except insofar as it adheres in some manner to justice. And because certain Angels adhered to justice, therefore the motion of the Angel and the deformed will displeased them. But others did not adhere; therefore they did not perceive the uncleanness, but rather accepted [it] as an apparent good.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that they fell at once; it can be said that [they fell] *at once,* not because in the *same instant,* but because *suddenly,* as it were in an imperceptible time; and there an order can well be, although it is not perceived. — Or it can be said otherwise and better, that Satan did not fall as soon as he desired, but after his sin was consummated and confirmed through hatred and envy[^11], and after the division was made of the good Angels from the evil, from whose fellowship, after the beatification, they were at once repelled. Nor does that which is objected concerning the disgrace of sin hold, because sin always has an internal punishment joined to it. Hence, just as man was not at once cast out of paradise as he sinned, but yet at once had punishment; so it seems must be said of the Angel, that he did not fall in the same instant.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the good Angels, it must be said that the sin of Lucifer preceded both the conversion of the good Angels and the aversion of the demons. For he first was proud and made his pride known to all; and from then some adhered to him, but others resisted and adhered to God; and at once these were made light, those darkness. <!-- page 154 -->Although therefore the conversion of the Angels and the aversion of the demons were at once, yet [they were] not at once with the sin of Lucifer.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last concerning *excusability* or *gravity,* it must be said that the *first* part of the reasoning is deficient in two ways: first, because that is not a sufficient reason why the sin of man was remediable, as will be clearer below[^12]; second, because it is not similar. For the devil gave an occasion to man in one way, to the evil Angels in another: to man by *promising* and *deceiving,* but to the Angels only by *insinuating* his concept; whence he is not said to have tempted them, as [he did] the first parents. The *second* part is deficient, because they did not advert to his ruin, nor did they see the severity of the divine judgment upon him, until his sin was consummated, as was touched upon and determined before[^13].

la: Vers. 4.

en: Verse 4.

la: Vers. 44. — In fine argumenti post *quod sit* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. interserit *ibi.*

en: Verse 44. — At the end of the argument, after *quod sit,* the Vatican edition, with one or another codex, inserts *ibi.*

la: Liber. I. de Sacram. p. V. c. 30. Vide quaest. praec. fundam. 2. — Magister docet idem infra d. VI. c. 2. — Circa finem argumenti cod. K *quam quod requirat* pro *quam quod quirat.*

en: Book I On the Sacraments, p. V, c. 30. See the preceding question, fundamentum 2. — The Master teaches the same below, d. VI, c. 2. — Near the end of the argument codex K [reads] *quam quod requirat* for *quam quod quirat.*

la: Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 25. n. 74. seq.

en: Cf. Augustine, III On Free Choice, c. 25, n. 74 ff.

la: August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 26. — Sequens textus Damasc. habetur II. de Fide orthod. c. 4: Συναπεσπάσθη δὲ, καὶ ἠκολούθησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ συνέπεσε πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῷ τεταγμένων ἀγγέλων, i. e. *simul cum eo avulsa est et secuta est cum eo et concidit infinita subiectorum ipsi Angelorum multitudo.*

en: Augustine, III On Free Choice, c. 9, n. 26. — The following text of Damascene is found in II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 4: Συναπεσπάσθη δὲ, καὶ ἠκολούθησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ συνέπεσε πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῷ τεταγμένων ἀγγέλων, that is, *together with him an infinite multitude of the Angels subject to him was torn away and followed him and fell.*

la: Ut insinuatur I. de Mirabil. s. Script. c. 2. (inter opera August.); Gregor., IV. Moral. c. 3. n. 8; Hugo de S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 9. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 *voci hominis* praemittunt *primi.*

en: As is suggested in I On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture, c. 2 (among the works of Augustine); Gregory, IV Moralia, c. 3, n. 8; Hugh of St. Victor, I On the Sacraments, p. VII, c. 9. — A little above, codex cc and edition 1 prefix *primi* to *voci hominis.*

la: Nonnulli codd. ut W bb *excellentiae,* cod. 1 *excessus vel excellentiae.*

en: Some codices such as W bb [read] *excellentiae,* codex 1 *excessus vel excellentiae.*

la: Hoc simile ponitur a Praepositivo in sua Summa, p. II. q. 6, ubi hanc secundam positionem tenet his verbis: *Ad hoc dicimus, quod sicut quam cito coruscatio fit in oriente, tam cito ego video, et tam cito in mente moveor; ita tam cito quod lucifer peccavit, tam cito, revelatione divina faciente, omnes alii viderunt, et illi qui ceciderunt tam cito moti sunt ad consentiendum ei in malo; et sicut omnes eodem momento peccaverunt, et alii illo eodem momento omnes confirmati sunt.* Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 99. m. 5.

en: This simile is set by Praepositinus in his Summa, p. II, q. 6, where he holds this second position in these words: *To this we say that, just as as soon as a flash occurs in the east, so soon do I see, and so soon am I moved in mind; so, as soon as Lucifer sinned, so soon, by the divine revelation acting, did all the others see, and those who fell were so soon moved to consent to him in evil; and as all sinned in the same moment, so the others in that same moment were all confirmed.* Cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 99, m. 5.

la: Codd. N aa supplent *peccatum.* Paulo inferius post *ante esse* Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. subiungit *cognitionem,* cod. F (a secunda manu) *et cognoscere.* Cfr. de hoc supra d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Codices N aa supply *peccatum.* A little below, after *ante esse,* the Vatican edition, with one or another codex, subjoins *cognitionem,* codex F (by a second hand) *et cognoscere.* Cf. on this above, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Aristot., Mechanicae, c. 1: *Natura etenim eundem semper habet modum.* Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).

en: Aristotle, Mechanics, c. 1: *For nature always has the same manner.* Cf. IX Metaphysics, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5).

la: De quo supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Concerning which [see] above, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.

en: Distinction 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

en: In the solution to [objection] 2. — See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
- This chunk is **Distinction V, Article II, Question II** — *Whether the sin of the lesser Angels has an order to the sin of Lucifer.* 4 *videtur* (Apoc. 12, John 8, Hugh of St. Victor + the Master, the *origo/suggestio* argument — for an order of causality/time), 4 *Sed Contra* (against causality-order, against time-order, the *neuter ordo* argument, and the remediable/graver dilemma), a *Conclusio,* the *Respondeo* (the **triplex positio** — order of *degree* only / order of *excess-causality* but not time, with the Praepositinus eye-flash simile / order as to *degree, occasion, and duration,* the last accepted as more intelligible), and the *Solutio* (*Ad 1 / Ad 2 / Ad 3 / Ad 4*). Spans printed pp. 152–154 (= PDF 174–176).
- **No scholion** (`has_scholion: false`).** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d5-a2-q1`'s editorial **Scholion I** explicitly covers this question: «*Haec et seq. quaest. secundum principia in praecedenti articulo stabilita solvuntur*». Confirmed by reading p.154 footer note ² (this chunk's [^13]), whose text is the cross-ref `In solutione ad 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` — not assumed; the sibling-scholion-coverage pattern (CLAUDE.md).
- **Source discipline (Vol II override).** The IA djvu OCR (raw 11225–11353) is two-column cascade-shattered through the *Respondeo*/*Solutio*; the chunk was fully re-set against the 450 dpi column-band crops (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 152-154 --dpi 450`; `tools/colcrop.py vol2 152|153|154`), each page read L column top→bottom then R column, body bands then footer bands.
- **Apparatus crosswalk (Quaracchi restarts per printed page; renumbered continuously 1–13):**
  - **p.152 (5 notes → [^1]–[^5]):** ² (*Apocalypsis duodecimo*¹ Fund 1), ³ (*Ioannis octavo*² Fund 2), ⁴ (*Hugo*³ Fund 3), ⁵ (*ordo temporis*⁴ Fund 4), ⁶ (*decore iustitiae*⁵ Sed Contra 2; the Augustine + Damascene-Greek note). p.152's note ¹ (`Vat. supplet a se…`) is the preceding `d5-a2-q1`'s [^11] — not taken here.
  - **p.153 (6 notes → [^6]–[^11]):** ¹ (*occasionem*⁶ Sed Contra 4; the long *de Mirabil./Gregor./Hugo* + Alex. Hal. note, runs L→R), ² (*excessus*⁷ opinio 2), ³ (*oculo*⁸ opinio 2 simile; the long Praepositinus *Summa* quote, runs L→R), ⁴ (*luciferi*⁹ opinio 3), ⁵ (*uno modo*¹⁰ Solutio Ad 1), ⁶ (*per odium et invidiam*¹¹ Solutio Ad 2).
  - **p.154 (2 notes → [^12]–[^13]):** ¹ (*infra patebit melius*¹² Solutio Ad 4 = `Dist. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.`), ² (*determinatum*¹³ Solutio Ad 4 = `In solutione ad 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`).
- **Incoming boundary a2-q1→a2-q2 — RECEIVED split at p.152, no backfill.** The preceding committed `bon-sent-II-d5-a2-q1` Notes documented the p.152 split: its reply *Ad illud ultimo* owns p.152 footer note ¹ (`Vat. supplet a se, cod. 1 autem sine meritis.` = its [^11]); the editorial Scholion I–II (a2-q1's, no apparatus) follows; then this `QUAESTIO II` opens lower on p.152. This chunk's p.152 apparatus starts at note ² (*Apocalypsis duodecimo*¹). `d5-a2-q1` not modified.
- **Outgoing boundary a2-q2→a3-q1 — DISCOVERED SPLIT at p.154, documented for the next build.** This question has no scholion, so its body (the *Ad 4* reply) runs to the foot of p.154, then `ARTICULUS III` + `QUAESTIO I` (a3-q1, raw 11354) opens lower on the same page. p.154's footer splits by body anchor: **notes ¹ (`Dist. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.`, → *infra patebit melius*¹²) and ² (`In solutione ad 2. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.`, → *determinatum*¹³) are this chunk's [^12]/[^13]**; **notes ³ (`Ita codd. F K Y bb…`), ⁴ (`Hic c. 4.`), ⁵ (`Text. 51. (c. 10.)…`), … anchor a3-q1's *videtur* body.** **`bon-sent-II-d5-a3-q1` build: start its p.154 apparatus at note ³, no backfill into this chunk.**
- **No `[?]` flags.** All 13 body superscripts and the three page-footers verified on the 450 dpi crops. Editorial marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (*Fundamenta, ad oppositum, Opinio 1/2/3, Exemplum, conclusio, Solutio oppositorum, Alia solutio, Alia solutio melior*). The *Conclusio* is set as a `>` blockquote; the grouped *Solutio* replies tagged *Ad 1 / Ad 2 / Ad 3 / Ad 4* matching the printed grouping. The Damascene Greek in [^5] and the Praepositinus quote in [^8] are transcribed verbatim from the crops.