title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De naturali cognitione Angeli.*

Circa secundum principale et[^1] circa Angeli naturalem cognitionem duo quaeruntur. Primum est de cognitione ipsius creaturae. Secundum de cognitione creatricis essentiae.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species innatas.*

Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species *innatas*, an aliqua per species *acquisitas.* Et quod omnia creata cognoscat per species *innatas*:

1. Videtur sacra Scriptura velle, Ezechielis vigesimo octavo[^2]: *Tu plenus sapientia et perfectus decore* — dicitur ad diabolum — sed non esset a sui origine *plenus sapientia*, nisi esset in eo plenitudo specierum, per quas contingit res cognoscere: ergo <!-- page 118 --> cum plenitudo sufficiat unicuique, videtur, quod species innatae sufficiant Angelo ad omnia cognoscenda.

2. Item, per Augustinum, nono de Trinitate[^3]: « Mens igitur ipsa sicut rerum corporearum notitiam per sensum corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam ». Et huius rationem aliam non assignat, nisi quia species incorporalium non potest fieri in sensu, et species acquiritur mediante sensu; sed Angelus nullum habet sensum — supponatur modo — ergo nullius notitiam acquirit suscipiendo speciem sive acquirendo speciem novam.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per auctoritatem libri de Causis[^4]: « Omnis intelligentia est plena formis »; sed si species reciperet, non esset plena: ergo etc.

4. Item, talis consuevit assignari *differentia* inter intellectum angelicum et humanum, quod humanus propter coniunctionem cum corpore est *possibilis*, angelicus vero est *actualis*; si ergo recipere non est nisi rei existentis in potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi[^5]: patet etc.

5. Item, quod *ista differentia* sit conveniens, videtur. Intellectus enim divinus est in omnimoda actualitate, ita quod omnino nihil potest recipere; intellectus vero humanus, quando creatur, est sicut *tabula rasa*[^6], et ita in omnimoda possibilitate: ergo si inter haec extrema possibile est reperire medium possibile, scilicet in quo sit possibilitas actui coniuncta, et talem non est dare nisi angelicum, ergo etc.

6. Item, triplex est esse rerum: habent enim res *esse in Verbo*, et *in intellectu* Angelico, et *in mundo*, secundum quod triplex *esse* dicit Augustinus[^7] illud esse dictum: *Fiat, et fecit, et factum est.* Sed *esse* rerum in intellectu angelico magis accedit ad *esse* rerum in Verbo, quam ad *esse* rerum in mundo: ergo cum in Verbo sint[^8] plenissime, in maiori plenitudine sunt in Angelo quam in mundo, vel in aeque magna. Sed Deus ab initio mundi indidit rebus rationes causales, secundum quas cetera fierent, et nihil diceretur novum, quia *requievit Deus die septimo*[^9]: ergo multo fortius videtur, quod Angelo impresserit similitudines et rationes, secundum quas posset cognoscere cetera facienda: ergo sine receptione nova.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Ephesios tertio[^10]: *Ut innotescat Principalibus et Potestatibus multiformis sapientia Dei*; Glossa dicit ibi, « quod Angeli multa didicerunt ab Ecclesia »: ergo multorum species receperunt et acquisierunt.

2. Item, si per species innatas omnia cognoscit, ergo a natura sua omnia scit, ergo praesentia et futura, necessaria et contingentia, naturalia et voluntaria: quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturas[^11].

3. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, habet penes se ipsum rationem cognoscendi omnia: ergo ita bene cognoscit absentia sicut praesentia, ita longinqua, sicut propinqua: ergo diabolus existens in inferno scit quidquid fit in mundo, et Angelus, qui est hic, quidquid fit in Anglia; quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturam, quae de multiplici missione Angelorum loquitur[^12].

4. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species omnium singularium. Primum est falsum et inconveniens, quod Angelus singularia non cognoscat, cum hominibus specialibus ministret et ad specialia et singularia ministeria dirigatur. Si autem habet species omnium singularium, ergo cum possint augeri in infinitum, habebit species infinitas; aut fiet aliquando aliquod singulare, quod non poterit cognoscere[^13]. *Si tu dicas*, quod Angelus cognoscit singularia per species universalium; *contra*: in specie universalium non distinguuntur[^14]: ergo non cognoscit distincte. *Praeterea*, species universalis non assimilatur cuilibet singulari assimilatione perfecta: ergo perfectius cognoscit homo quam Angelus. *Si tu dicas*, quod Angelus appropriat illas species applicando ad singularia; *contra*: omnem applicationem non fortuitam praecedit cognitio: si enim non cognoscit <!-- page 119 --> illum cui applicat, quomodo vult illi speciem applicare? *Et iterum*, quare magis illi singulari applicabit speciem hominis quam asini? Ergo ante applicationem cognoscit singulare. *Praeterea*, aut *cognoscit* post applicationem, aut *non.* Si *non*, ergo Angelus non potest tenere in memoria cognitionem alicuius singularis, quod manifeste falsum est; si *sic*: ergo remanet in memoria aliqua nova species, cum aliquid cognoscit[^15], quod prius non cognovit, et ita illa recipit aliquam speciem: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Angelus omnia cognoscere potest per species concreatas universales, per quas cognoscit etiam singularia, sed non nisi dirigendo aspectum super cognoscibile et species ad invicem componendo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod omnes qui aliquid intellexerunt, hoc posuerunt, quod Angelus cognoscit res creatas *per species*, nisi sit talis, quae essentialiter sit in Angelo. Cognoscere autem rem omnino per se ipsum, hoc est solius illius qui est actus purus et perfectissimus, et ideo idea et[^16] causa omnium et efficiens et exemplaris se ipso, non alio quodam. Sed tamen in modo ponendi species diversificati sunt.

Aliqui enim posuerunt, quod Angelus *omnia*, quae novit per species, scit per species *innatas*; et huius positionis tradunt *modum* et *causam.* *Modus* enim hic est. Quamvis in Angelo sint innatae species in numero finito, scilicet rerum, quae sunt de prima constitutione mundi; tamen, sicut Deus in prima conditione indidit rationes causales et seminales rebus ad se multiplicandas, ita tradidit[^17] etiam speciebus, quas impressit angelico intellectui; et ita omnia possunt sine extrinseca receptione cognoscere. — *Causam* autem huius assignant, quia cum receptio fiat per quandam abstractionem et proportionem, ad quae concurrunt tanquam dispositiva organum et medium et virtutes inferiores, et hoc non sit in Angelo reperire; dicunt, quod nihil ab extra potest recipere. — Sed huius positionis *modus* facile non est intelligere, quia difficile est videre, qua ratione species possint multiplicari. Nam species unius rei non generat speciem omnino differentis rei, nec eadem species se multiplicat in anima secundum numerum, cum in una sit anima, sicut unius obiecti una est species in uno speculo indiviso[^18]. — *Causam* autem credo esse falsam, quia planum est, quod Angelus habet intellectum *possibilem*, cum non sit purus actus. Planum etiam est, quod habet *agentem* maioris virtutis, quam si esset corpori alligatus. Si ergo alligatus potest abstrahere [et] in possibili[^19] imprimere, quanto magis intellectus liber et separatus hoc potest?

Ideo est alia positio, quod Angelus *quaedam* cognoscit per species innatas, ut puta necessaria et naturalia, et quae fuerunt cum Angelo concreata; sed *fortuita* et *voluntaria* et *futura contingentia* intelligit per species acquisitas et receptas. Angelicus enim intellectus est *possibilis* respectu huiusmodi specierum; non tamen est tanta possibilitate possibilis, ut humanus, quia humanus est possibilis omnino propter *nuditatem*[^20], et etiam possibilis propter *coniunctionem cum phantasmatibus*; angelicus vero neutro modo, sed possibilis est respectu praedictorum cognoscibilium. Cum enim non habeant causam certam[^21], solus Deus, qui se ipso cognoscit, est in actu respectu talis cognitionis, et ille qui cognoscit in Deo, vel per revelationem factam a Deo; Angelus vero, qui indiget informatione speciei per naturam, est respectu talium in *potentia*, non in *actu.* — Sed haec positio videtur in se claudere duo opposita, scilicet quod Angelus habeat species *universalium* et suscipiat post species *singularium.* Species enim singularium eiusdem speciei non differunt nisi numero, et impossibile est, accidentia eiusdem speciei diversa numero esse in eodem subiecto[^22]: ergo nullus intellectus potest habere plures species hominis; sed si habet unam innatam, non potest aliam eiusdem speciei recipere, sicut nec duae albedines sunt in eodem corpore. *Quod si dicas*, duarum albedinum similitudines esse in eodem aere et diversa lumina eiusdem naturae, ut dicit Dionysius[^23], et facies duorum hominum <!-- page 120 --> in eadem imagine; non est simile, quia idola et lumina in medio distinguuntur per suas origines, et diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie, aliter[^24] sufficit species figurae cum numero, sicut possum tres species omnino similes confingere. Et sic videtur dicta positio contraria implicare. — *Amplius*, si « species est totum *esse formale* individuorum », ut dicit Boethius[^25], nec est individuatio nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia; si species existens in intellectu omnino abstrahit a materia, nullo modo in eodem intellectu est ponere diversas species sive formas solo numero differentes. Et sic redit idem quod prius, scilicet quod, si intellectus angelicus habet omnium universalium species innatas, nullam ulterius speciem recipit, sed sufficienter per illas omnia cognoscit.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod Angelus omnia cognoscit per species innatas, non quia *non possit* recipere species; tunc enim si Deus crearet aliquid novum in specie, necesse esset Angelum ignorare, quod si falsum est, posset recipere. Et ideo haec non est ratio, sed hoc, quod Deus intellectum angelicum possibilem tot speciebus implevit, quod per illas poterat omnia cognoscere sine omni receptione nova. Et ideo dicitur intellectus angelicus esse in actu respectu rerum, non quia se ipso sit in *actu*, vel quia sit *actus*, sed per species factus est in actu.

Et modus et intellectus istius positionis est hic. Deus enim in Angelis concreavit species universales omnium fiendarum rerum, et per illas certum est, quod potest omnia *universalia* cognoscere; potest etiam et *singularia*, sed non nisi componat ad invicem, ut patet: si ego habeo penes me speciem figurae, speciem hominis, speciem coloris et temporis, et componam ad invicem; sine nova receptione speciei cognoscam individuum in propria natura. Sed quia talis compositio, nisi esset secundum certitudinem[^26] et correspondentiam ad ipsam rem, esset fictio et deceptio; ideo Angelus huiusmodi individua et singularia non cognoscit, nisi dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in *re*, ipse componat species *in se*; et tunc habet ita claram et certam cognitionem de re, sicut si speciem statim reciperet. — Et haec positio magis placet, quia concors est rationi et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae. Et patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, si bene intelligatur.

1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod Angeli didicerunt etc.; dicendum, quod haec positio bene ponit, Angelos multa discere, sed non propter hoc species novas recipere. Nec illud est incompossibile. Ego enim habeo speciem *hominis* et *animalis*, dum scio unam conclusionem de eis; sed per multiplicem conversionem et collationem poterit circa easdem res per easdem species nova cognitio generari secundum diversas operationes[^27] et habitudines, et ita aliquid addiscam, sed non novam speciem recipiam. Sic et Angeli multa didicerunt tum ex propria industria, tum ex revelatione, tum ex experientia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc cognosceret contingentia et absentia; dicendum, quod sicut tactum est, ad cognitionem harum rerum particularium, et maxime contingentium, non sufficit habere species innatas[^28], nisi aspectus angelicus convertatur; et conversio requirit rei *existentiam* vel in se, vel in causa; requirit etiam *praesentiam*, eo quod virtus angelica est finita, ideo in approximatione aliqua proportionali est, cum se convertit ad rem extra. Et ita patet, quod non propter hoc cognoscit futura, vel etiam contingentia.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species infinitas; dico, quod cognoscit singularia per species universalium *applicando* et *appropriando.* Unde per *appropriationem* proprie et distincte cognoscit, nec oportet novas species recipi, nec oportet infinitas esse, quia singularia ad numerum finitum universalium reducuntur[^29]; sed finitae species infinitis modis componi possunt. Et ideo nunquam tot singularia cognoscit Angelus, quin adhuc possit cognoscere plura sine receptione speciei novae, non tamen sine *directione aspectus* supra rem. Ex qua directione non recipit speciem a cognoscibili, cum sit in actu per speciem, quam habet; sed dirigendo aspectum speciem appropriat et appropriando componit, et rem singularem sub sua proprietate cognoscit et percipit, quia tota cognitio est a forma, et forma haec « species est, quae est totum esse individuorum ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de applicatione, quod supponit[^30] cognitionem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod *praesupponit* cognitionem et *relinquit* cognitionem, sed tamen aliam *praesupponit*, aliam *relinquit.* Angelus enim sine conversione aliqua *habet* cognitionem loci, et cum convertit se supra locum, cognoscit <!-- page 121 --> omnes res, quae sunt in loco, applicando species universales ad singularia et componendo; et illae species sub tali applicatione et compositione remanent in angelico intellectu, et ita *relinquunt* cognitionem novam sine receptione speciei[^31]. — Ponatur etiam, quod nullam haberet *cognitionem*, sed solum *speciem universalis* in intellectu suo; adhuc poterit applicare et appropriare non casualiter, sed certitudinaliter. Quod patet sic. Homo enim, cum nascitur, non habet cognitionem nec speciem singularium, nec communem nec propriam; sola tamen directione aspectus super res cognoscit omnia visibilia et recipit simul *cognitionem* certam et *speciem*, quia denudatus erat a forma recepti[^32]. Quodsi haberet species, multo melius posset, dirigendo aspectum ad res mundanas, eas cognoscere, non suscipiendo species, cum iam habeat, sed ex directione, et applicare et appropriare et componere et distincte nosse[^33].

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### Article II. *On the natural cognition of the angel.*

About the second principal [matter], also[^1], concerning the natural cognition of the angel, two [things] are asked. The first is about the cognition of the creature itself. The second about the cognition of the creative essence.

### Question I. *Whether the angel knows all created things which it knows through innate species.*

It is asked therefore first, whether the angel knows all created things which it knows through *innate* species, or some through *acquired* species. And that it knows all created things through *innate* species:

1. Sacred Scripture seems to will [it], Ezekiel the twenty-eighth[^2]: *You [were] full of wisdom and perfect in beauty* — it is said to the devil — but he would not be from his origin *full of wisdom*, unless there were in him a fullness of species through which it happens to know things: therefore <!-- page 118 --> since a fullness suffices for each [thing], it seems that innate species suffice for the angel for knowing all things.

2. Likewise, through Augustine, in the ninth [book] *On the Trinity*[^3]: « The mind therefore itself, just as it gathers the notice of corporeal things through the sense of the body, so [gathers the notice] of incorporeal [things] through itself ». And he assigns no other reason for this, except that the species of incorporeal [things] cannot come to be in sense, and a species is acquired by the mediation of sense; but the angel has no sense — let it be supposed so — therefore it acquires the notice of nothing by receiving a species or by acquiring a new species.

3. Likewise, this same [thing] seems [so] through the authority of the book *On Causes*[^4]: « Every intelligence is full of forms »; but if it received a species, it would not be full: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, such a *difference* has been customarily assigned between the angelic and the human intellect, that the human, on account of its conjunction with the body, is *possible* [potential], but the angelic is *actual*; if therefore to receive is only of a thing existing in potency, insofar as [it is] of this kind[^5]: it is plain etc.

5. Likewise, that *this difference* is fitting, seems [so]. For the divine intellect is in every-mode actuality, so that it can receive nothing at all; but the human intellect, when it is created, is like a *blank tablet*[^6], and so in every-mode possibility: therefore if between these extremes it is possible to find a possible middle, namely [one] in which there is a possibility conjoined to act, and such [a one] is not to be given except the angelic, therefore etc.

6. Likewise, threefold is the being of things: for things have *being in the Word*, and *in the* angelic *intellect*, and *in the world*, according to which threefold *being* Augustine says[^7] that being [is] said: *Let it be made, and He made [it], and it was made.* But the *being* of things in the angelic intellect more closely approaches the *being* of things in the Word than the *being* of things in the world: therefore since in the Word they are[^8] most fully, in greater fullness they are in the angel than in the world, or in equally great [fullness]. But God from the beginning of the world implanted in things causal grounds, according to which the rest would come to be, and nothing would be said [to be] new, because *God rested on the seventh day*[^9]: therefore much more strongly it seems that He impressed on the angel the likenesses and grounds according to which it could know the rest of the things to be made: therefore without a new reception.

**But on the contrary:** 1. To the Ephesians the third[^10]: *That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers*; the Gloss says there, « that the angels learned many [things] from the Church »: therefore they received and acquired the species of many [things].

2. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, then from its nature it knows all [things], therefore present and future, necessary and contingent, natural and voluntary: which is manifestly false and against the Scriptures[^11].

3. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, it has within itself the ground of knowing all [things]: therefore it knows absent [things] as well as present, far [things] as well as near: therefore the devil existing in hell knows whatever is done in the world, and the angel which is here [knows] whatever is done in England; which is manifestly false and against Scripture, which speaks of the manifold sending of the angels[^12].

4. Likewise, if it knows all [things] through innate species, either it does not know singulars, or it has the species of all singulars. The first is false and unfitting, that the angel should not know singulars, since it ministers to particular men and is directed to particular and singular ministries. But if it has the species of all singulars, then since they can be increased to infinity, it will have infinite species; or at some time some singular will come to be which it will not be able to know[^13]. *If you say* that the angel knows singulars through the species of universals; *on the contrary*: in the species of universals they are not distinguished[^14]: therefore it does not know distinctly. *Besides*, the universal species is not assimilated to each singular by a perfect assimilation: therefore man knows more perfectly than the angel. *If you say* that the angel appropriates those species by applying [them] to singulars; *on the contrary*: every non-fortuitous application is preceded by cognition: for if it does not know <!-- page 119 --> the one to which it applies, how does it will to apply the species to it? *And again*, why will it apply the species of a man rather than of an ass to that singular? Therefore before the application it knows the singular. *Besides*, either it *knows* after the application, or *not.* If *not*, then the angel cannot keep in memory the cognition of any singular, which is manifestly false; if *so*: then there remains in memory some new species, when it knows[^15] something which before it did not know, and so it receives some species: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> The angel can know all [things] through concreated universal species, through which it knows also singulars, but only by directing its gaze upon the knowable and composing the species with one another.

**I respond:** It must be said that all who understood anything posited this, that the angel knows created things *through species*, unless it be such [a thing] as is essentially in the angel. But to know a thing altogether through itself, this belongs to Him alone who is pure and most perfect act, and therefore the idea and[^16] cause of all and the efficient and exemplary [cause] by Himself, not by some other. But yet in the mode of positing the species they have differed.

For some posited that the angel knows *all* [things] which it knows through species by *innate* species; and of this position they hand down the *mode* and the *cause.* The *mode* is this. Although in the angel there are innate species in finite number, namely of the things which are of the first constitution of the world; yet, just as God in the first making implanted causal and seminal grounds in things for their multiplying, so He handed [them] over[^17] also to the species which He impressed on the angelic intellect; and so it can know all [things] without an extrinsic reception. — But the *cause* of this they assign [thus], because, since reception comes about through a certain abstraction and proportion, to which there concur as dispositive the organ and the medium and the lower powers, and this is not to be found in the angel; they say that it can receive nothing from without. — But the *mode* of this position is not easy to understand, because it is difficult to see by what reason the species could be multiplied. For the species of one thing does not generate the species of an altogether different thing, nor does the same species multiply itself in the soul according to number, since it is in one soul, just as of one object there is one species in one undivided mirror[^18]. — But the *cause* I believe to be false, because it is plain that the angel has a *possible* intellect, since it is not pure act. It is plain also that it has an *agent* [intellect] of greater power than if it were bound to a body. If therefore [the intellect] bound [to a body] can abstract [and] impress on the possible[^19], how much more can the free and separate intellect [do] this?

Therefore there is another position, that the angel knows *some* [things] through innate species, namely necessary and natural [things], and those which were concreated with the angel; but *fortuitous* and *voluntary* and *future contingent* [things] it understands through acquired and received species. For the angelic intellect is *possible* with respect to species of this kind; yet it is not possible with so great a possibility as the human, because the human is possible altogether on account of its *nakedness*[^20], and also possible on account of its *conjunction with phantasms*; but the angelic in neither mode, but it is possible with respect to the aforesaid knowables. For since they have no certain cause[^21], God alone, who knows by Himself, is in act with respect to such cognition, and he who knows in God, or through a revelation made by God; but the angel, which needs the information of a species by nature, is with respect to such [things] in *potency*, not in *act.* — But this position seems to enclose in itself two opposites, namely that the angel has the species of *universals* and receives afterward the species of *singulars.* For the species of singulars of the same species do not differ except in number, and it is impossible that accidents of the same species, diverse in number, be in the same subject[^22]: therefore no intellect can have several species of a man; but if it has one innate [one], it cannot receive another of the same species, just as neither are two whitenesses in the same body. *And if you say* that the likenesses of two whitenesses are in the same air, and diverse lights of the same nature, as Dionysius says[^23], and the faces of two men <!-- page 120 --> in the same image; it is not alike, because the idola and the lights in the medium are distinguished by their origins, and diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species, otherwise[^24] the species of figure with number suffices, just as I can fashion three altogether similar species. And so the said position seems to imply the contrary. — *Further*, if « a species is the whole *formal being* of individuals », as Boethius says[^25], nor is there individuation except from the conjunction of form with matter; if a species existing in the intellect altogether abstracts from matter, in no way is it [possible] to posit in the same intellect diverse species or forms differing by number alone. And so the same returns as before, namely that, if the angelic intellect has the innate species of all universals, it receives no further species, but sufficiently through them knows all [things].

And therefore there is a third position, that the angel knows all [things] through innate species, not because it *cannot* receive species; for then, if God created something new in species, the angel would necessarily be ignorant [of it], which since it is false, it could receive [it]. And therefore this is not the reason, but this, that God filled the possible angelic intellect with so many species that through them it could know all [things] without any new reception. And therefore the angelic intellect is said to be in act with respect to things, not because it is in *act* by itself, or because it is *act*, but it is made in act through the species.

And the mode and understanding of this position is this. For God concreated in the angels the universal species of all things to come to be, and through them it is certain that it can know all *universals*; it can also [know] *singulars*, but only if it composes [them] with one another, as is plain: if I have within me the species of a figure, the species of a man, the species of a color and of time, and I compose [them] with one another; without a new reception of a species I shall know the individual in its proper nature. But because such a composition, unless it were according to certitude[^26] and correspondence to the thing itself, would be a fiction and a deception; therefore the angel does not know such individuals and singulars, unless it direct its gaze upon the knowable itself, and according to that which is in the *thing*, it itself compose the species *in itself*; and then it has a cognition of the thing as clear and certain as if it received the species at once. — And this position pleases more, because it is concordant with reason and philosophy and sacred Scripture. And the response to all the objections is plain, if it be well understood.

1. To that which is objected, that the angels learned etc.; it must be said that this position well posits that the angels learn many [things], but not on account of this that they receive new species. Nor is that incompossible. For I have the species of *man* and of *animal*, while I know one conclusion about them; but through manifold conversion and collation a new cognition can be generated about the same things through the same species according to diverse operations[^27] and relations, and so I shall learn something, but I shall not receive a new species. So also the angels learned many [things] both from their own industry, and from revelation, and from experience.

2. To that which is objected, that then it would know contingent and absent [things]; it must be said that, as was touched [on], for the cognition of these particular things, and most of all of contingent [things], it does not suffice to have innate species[^28], unless the angelic gaze be converted; and the conversion requires the *existence* of the thing either in itself, or in [its] cause; it requires also *presence*, because the angelic power is finite, [and] therefore is in some proportional approximation, when it converts itself to a thing without. And so it is plain that not on account of this does it know future, or also contingent, [things].

3. To that which is objected, that either it does not know singulars, or it has infinite species; I say that it knows singulars through the species of universals by *applying* and *appropriating.* Whence through *appropriation* it knows properly and distinctly, nor is it necessary that new species be received, nor that they be infinite, because singulars are reduced to a finite number of universals[^29]; but finite species can be composed in infinite modes. And therefore the angel never knows so many singulars that it cannot still know more without the reception of a new species, yet not without the *direction of the gaze* upon the thing. From which direction it does not receive a species from the knowable, since it is in act through the species which it has; but by directing the gaze it appropriates the species, and by appropriating it composes [them], and knows and perceives the singular thing under its property, because the whole cognition is from form, and this form is « the species, which is the whole being of individuals ».

4. To that which is objected concerning application, that it presupposes[^30] cognition; it must be said that it is true that it *presupposes* cognition and *leaves* cognition, but yet it presupposes one [cognition], leaves another. For the angel without any conversion *has* the cognition of place, and when it converts itself upon a place, it knows <!-- page 121 --> all the things which are in the place, by applying universal species to singulars and composing [them]; and those species, under such application and composition, remain in the angelic intellect, and so they *leave* a new cognition without the reception of a species[^31]. — Let it also be supposed that it had no *cognition*, but only the *species of a universal* in its intellect; still it will be able to apply and appropriate not by chance, but with certitude. Which is plain thus. For man, when he is born, does not have the cognition nor the species of singulars, neither common nor proper; yet by the mere direction of the gaze upon things he knows all visible [things] and receives at once a certain *cognition* and a *species*, because he was naked of the form of the received[^32]. But if he had species, he could much better, by directing his gaze to mundane things, know them, not by receiving species, since he already has [them], but from the direction, and apply and appropriate and compose and know distinctly[^33].

la: Codd. aa bb *id est.*

en: Codices aa bb [read] *id est.*

la: Vers. 12.

en: Verse 12.

la: Cap. 3. n. 3. — Verba Augustini pro ratione addita sunt haec: *Neque enim, ut oculus corporis videt alios oculos et se non videt, ita mens novit alias mentes et ignorat semetipsam. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios, qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus, nisi cum specula intuemur... Sed quoquo modo se habeat vis, qua per oculos cernimus; ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus, sed mente quaerimus etc.*

en: Chapter 3, n. 3. — The words of Augustine added for the reason are these: *For not, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself, so does the mind know other minds and not know itself. For through the eyes of the body we see bodies, because the rays which flash out through them and touch whatever we discern, we cannot refract and bend back into them, except when we look into mirrors... But however that power be by which we discern through the eyes; that power itself certainly, whether they be rays or some other thing, we cannot discern with the eyes, but we seek [it] with the mind etc.*

la: Prop. 10. — In minori post *plena* cod. M repetit *formis.*

en: Proposition 10. — In the minor, after *plena*, codex M repeats *formis.*

la: Averroes, 1. Phys. text. 69: *Quidquid recipit aliquid non recipit ipsum, secundum quod est in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia.*

en: Averroes, I *Physics* text 69: *Whatever receives something does not receive it insofar as it is in act, but insofar as it is in potency.*

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.). — Aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. *tale* pro *talem* i. e. intellectum.

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul* text 14 (c. 4). — Somewhat below some codices [read] *tale* for *talem*, i.e. the intellect.

en: Book II *Genesis according to the letter* c. 8, n. 16-20; IV, c. 29, n. 46, and c. 31, n. 48.

la: Subaudi: *res.* — Ed. 1 *fuerint.*

en: Understand: *res* [things]. — Ed. 1 [reads] *fuerint.*

la: Gen. 2,2. — Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2, ubi sententia Augustini de rationibus causalibus sive seminalibus exponitur. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H L O Y cc et ed. 1 *posset cogitare* pro *posset cognoscere.*

en: Genesis 2:2. — Cf. below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, where the opinion of Augustine on the causal or seminal grounds is expounded. — A little below several codices, such as C H L O Y cc and ed. 1, [read] *posset cogitare* for *posset cognoscere.*

la: Vers. 10. — Glossam vide apud Lyranum, loc. cit., ubi dicitur: «*Qui* [Angeli] *multa secreta in his didicerunt*». S. Hieron. in explicatione huius versus ait: *Idcirco idipsum sacramentum* [incarnationis] *ei* [Paulo] *est revelatum, ut non solum gentibus, sed et Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam manifesta fieret multiplex sapientia Dei.*

en: Verse 10. — See the Gloss in Lyra, loc. cit., where it is said: «*Who* [the angels] *learned many secrets in these [things]*». St. Jerome in the explication of this verse says: *Therefore that same mystery* [of the incarnation] *was revealed to him* [Paul], *that not only to the gentiles, but also to the Principalities and Powers, the manifold wisdom of God might be made manifest through the Church.*

la: Nam Scriptura cognitionem futurorum soli Deo esse proprium docet, ut patet ex Isai. 41, 23: *Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos.*

en: For Scripture teaches that the cognition of future [things] is proper to God alone, as is plain from Isaiah 41:23: *Announce the [things] which are to come in the future, and we shall know that you are gods.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 79, note 6.

la: Vat. *cogitare seu cognoscere*; codd. et aliae edd. sunt inter se divisi; non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3 omittunt *seu cognoscere*, ceteri vero cum ed. 1 omittunt *cogitare seu*, quos sequimur.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *cogitare seu cognoscere*; the codices and the other editions are divided among themselves; not a few codices with editions 2, 3 omit *seu cognoscere*, but the rest with ed. 1 omit *cogitare seu*, which we follow.

la: Supple cum codd. I T *singularia*, quod etiam cod. 1 post verba *ergo non cognoscit* repetit.

en: Supply, with codices I T, *singularia*, which codex 1 also repeats after the words *ergo non cognoscit.*

la: Plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *cognoscat*, et paulo inferius multi codd. *recepit* pro *recipit.*

en: Several codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] *cognoscat*, and a little below many codices *recepit* for *recipit.*

la: Sola Vat. *et ideo idem est.* Aliquanto superius cod. Z *nisi sit res creata talis* pro *nisi sit talis.*

en: The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] *et ideo idem est.* Somewhat above codex Z [reads] *nisi sit res creata talis* for *nisi sit talis.*

la: Plures codd. ut I K U X Y aa bene *indidit.* Paulo ante aliqui codd. *ad se multiplicandum* pro *ad se multiplicandas.*

en: Several codices, such as I K U X Y aa, well [read] *indidit.* A little before, some codices [read] *ad se multiplicandum* for *ad se multiplicandas.*

la: Cfr. August., XI. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 7. n. 11. seqq.

en: Cf. Augustine, XI *On the Trinity* c. 3, n. 6, and c. 7, n. 11 ff.

la: Plures codd. ut F H K T W bb *in possibili*; cod. cc et ed. 1 *in possibilem.*

en: Several codices, such as F H K T W bb, [read] *in possibili*; codex cc and ed. 1 *in possibilem.*

la: Alluditur ad illud: *Anima humana creata est sicut tabula rasa, sive*, ut alii dicunt, *nuda.* Sub hoc respectu ait Averroes, III. de Anima, context. 4: *Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est, ut sit denudatum a natura recepti.*

en: Allusion is made to that [saying]: *The human soul is created like a blank tablet, or*, as others say, *naked.* Under this respect Averroes says, III *On the Soul*, context 4: *Everything receiving something must be denuded of the nature of the received.*

la: In cod. 1 additur *et determinatam.*

en: In codex 1 is added *et determinatam.*

la: Rationem adiungit cod. M *quia accidens numeratur penes subiectum, in quo est*, de quo vide supra pag. 106, nota 1, et tom. I. pag. 411, nota 6. pag. 665, nota 5. — Avicenna V. de Anima sive in libro sexto Naturalium, c. 5: *Cum autem aliquam formam repraesentat sensus imaginationi, et imaginatio intellectui, et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem, sed postea repraesentaverit ei aliam formam eiusdem speciei, quae non est alia nisi numero; iam non excipiet intellectus ex ea aliam formam, praeter quam acceperat, ullo modo, nisi secundum accidens, quod est illius* [v. g. quod humanitas sit Socratis] *proprium... Quod autem de hoc intelligitur, hoc est, quod prima forma humana, quae praecedit, ipsa prodest tantum animae ad cognoscendum formam humanam, secunda vero nihil prodest; intentio enim impressa animae est una, quae non est nisi imaginatio prima, et imaginatio secunda nihil operatur.*

en: Codex M adds the reason, *because an accident is numbered in respect of the subject in which it is*, on which see above p. 106, note 1, and tom. I, p. 411, note 6, p. 665, note 5. — Avicenna V *On the Soul*, or in the sixth book of the *Naturalia*, c. 5: *But when sense represents some form to the imagination, and the imagination to the intellect, and the intellect takes from it the intention, but afterward [the imagination] represents to it another form of the same species, which is not other except in number; the intellect will no longer take from it another form, besides the one it had received, in any mode, except according to an accident which is proper to it* [e.g. that humanity be Socrates']*... But what is understood about this is this, that the first human form, which precedes, itself profits the soul only for knowing the human form, but the second profits nothing; for the intention impressed on the soul is one, which is nothing but the first imagination, and the second imagination operates nothing.*

la: De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4: *Etenim videmus in domo, multis unitis lampadibus ad unum aliquod lumen, unita omnium omnia lumina et unam claritatem indiscretam relucentem, et non etiam quis, ut arbitror, poterit alicuius lampadis lumen ab aliis ex omnia lumina continenti aere discernere etc.*

en: *On the Divine Names* c. 2, § 4: *For we see in a house, with many lamps united to some one light, the united lights of all [being] all [things], and one undivided brightness shining back, and not even anyone, as I judge, will be able to discern the light of any one lamp from the others in the air containing all the lights etc.*

la: Scil., si non differunt specie. — Vat. cum ed. 4 praecedentia sic exhibet: *quia cum idola* [i. e. species sive similitudines rerum] *et lumina in medio distinguantur per suas origines, diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie.* Vel aliter etc.

en: Namely, if they do not differ in species. — The Vatican [edition] with ed. 4 exhibits the preceding thus: *because, since the idola* [i.e. the species or likenesses of things] *and the lights in the medium are distinguished by their origins, diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species.* Or otherwise etc.

la: Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. Cfr. supra pag. 108, nota 6. — De principio individuationis vide supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.

en: Book III of the Commentary on Porphyry. Cf. above p. 108, note 6. — On the principle of individuation see above d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vox *certitudo* ita sumitur in Avicenna, I. Metaph. c. 6: *Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem, qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem, qua est triangulus... et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium.* — Cod. cc et ed. 1 *rectitudinem.* Dein plures codd. *et cognitionis naturam* pro *et correspondentiam.* — Cfr. August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 37. et IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 21. seq., ubi etiam seq. solutio tangitur.

en: The word *certitudo* is so taken in Avicenna, I *Metaphysics* c. 6: *For each thing has a certitude by which it is that which it is, just as a triangle has a certitude by which it is a triangle... and this is what perhaps we call proper being.* — Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *rectitudinem.* Then several codices [read] *et cognitionis naturam* for *et correspondentiam.* — Cf. Augustine, II *Genesis according to the letter* c. 17, n. 37, and IX *On the City of God*, c. 21 f., where the following solution also is touched [on].

la: Plures codd. ut L bb cc et ed. 1 *comparationes*; cod. W *compositiones.*

en: Several codices, such as L bb cc and ed. 1, [read] *comparationes*; codex W *compositiones.*

la: Plures codd. *non sufficit species innata.*

en: Several codices [read] *non sufficit species innata.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 12. (II. c. 4.) et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. *de Specie.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, III *Metaphysics* text 12 (II, c. 4) and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, the chapter *On Species.*

la: Codd. K U *praesupponit.*

en: Codices K U [read] *praesupponit.*

la: Codd. V cc et ed. 1 *distinctius novae speciei.*

en: Codices V cc and ed. 1 [read] *distinctius novae speciei.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 6.

en: Cf. above p. 119, note 6.

la: Cod. aa supplet *posset*, quod codd. Q bb (a secunda manu) interserunt post *et applicare.*

en: Codex aa supplies *posset*, which codices Q bb (by a second hand) interpose after *et applicare.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Verba *omnia creata* in titulo quaestionis restringenda sunt ad omnia creata *extra ipsum Angelum.* Nam Angelus cognoscit rem, «quae essentialiter» est in ipso (in corp., in princip.), i. e. se ipsum, et etiam Deum (hic q. 2. ad 4.) non per tales species, sed potius per suam essentiam. — Supponitur tanquam doctrina communis, res ab Angelo extra ipsum cognosci *per species.* Attamen non defuerunt qui hoc negaverint. Nam Durandus (hic q. 6.) cum pluribus Nominalibus voluit, ab eisdem haec intelligi «non per aliud repraesentativum quam per ipsammet praesentiam rerum in se vel in suis causis, vel utroque modo». Alii cum Antissiodorensi putaverunt, *omnia* ab eis intelligi per eorum *essentiam*, analogo modo ut in Deo est. — Pro confirmanda communi sententia, quod species intelligibiles tam in homine quam in Angelis ad intelligendum vel omnia vel saltem multa requirantur, serviunt quae a Seraphico dicuntur (I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.) de *similitudine*, ut est ratio cognoscendi etiam in Deo (aliter tamen ac in nobis); item (ibid. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1.) de *quatuor requisitis* ad cognitionem; item (Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 2.) de *modo*, quo mundus sensibilis intrat in animam per similitudines; et praecipue (Hexaëm. Serm. 11. a med.) de *generatione speciei ab obiecto*, ubi admirabili doctrina declaratur, quod «omnis creatura clamat generationem aeternam, et hanc exprimunt et repraesentant duodecim generationes».

**II.** *Principalis* controversia est de difficillimo problemate, quomodo ab Angelis cognoscantur *singularia* extra ipsos. Petr. a Tar. quinque de hoc opiniones recenset, nihil determinans. S. Thom. reprobat plures opiniones et etiam eam, quam ponit S. Bonav.; ipse autem tenet, singularia ab Angelo cognosci per *species universales* ipsi connaturales, quae etiam inferiora singularia distincte repraesentent. Scot. autem, cui fere concordat Richard. a Med., singularia haec ab ipso cognosci per species a rebus acquisitas, non tamen a phantasmatibus abstractas. S. Bonav., media via incedens, hic docet, Angelum ad hoc non indigere *novarum* specierum acquirendarum; tamen species *universales concreatas* non sufficere, ut singularia cognoscantur, «nisi Angelus dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se». — Addit autem idem, quod Angelus, licet non *indigeat* novarum specierum, «tamen *possit* recipere species». Sed de hac *potentia* iterum dissensus est, ut continuo dicetur.

**III.** *Secunda* controversia, quae cum prima intime est connexa, haec est, utrum in Angelo sit suo modo intellectus *agens et possibilis*, de qua distinctione vide infra d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 4. — S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 96.) docet: «In substantiis separatis non est intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi forte *aequivoce*» (cfr. S. I. q. 54. a. 4.). Ratio est, quia secundum ipsum nullo modo Angelus accipit cognitionem a sensibilibus. Haec ratio negatur tum a Scoto, qui vult, de *facto* esse illam receptionem, tum a S. Bonav., qui eam receptionem aestimat esse *possibilem.* Hinc uterque cum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 22. m. 3, B. Alberto (S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 3. a. 1. part. 1.), Petro a Tar. aliisque multis contendit, Angelum habere suo modo intellectum *agentem* et *possibilem*, «cum non sit actus purus» (hic in corp.). Hanc *potentialitatem* Seraphicus intelligit tum in ordine ad *actum intellectionis*, tum in ordine ad *species* potentiae angelicae ab origine divinitus concreatas, tum in ordine ad *novas* species, quas *possit* vel naturaliter vel a Deo imprimente acquirere. — Quod autem intellectus aliquo modo sit in *potentia* quoad haec tria, non est alienum, ni fallimur, a sententia S. Thomae, licet aliqui eius expositores putent, species illas in eo sensu esse *connaturales*, quod *ab ipsa* Angeli natura ut principio activo quasi proprietates fluant. Alii autem S. Thomae discipuli (cfr. Gotti, de Deo Creatore, tr. 9. q. 4. § 6.) probabilius esse putant, istas species potius esse divinitus impressas iuxta indigentiam et inclinationem naturae angelicae.

**IV.** *Tertia* controversia est circa doctrinam S. Thomae (hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 55. a. 3.), quod Angeli natura superiores intelligant per universaliores et pauciores species. Scot. (hic q. 10. n. 6. seqq.) hoc negat. Sententiae negativae favent plura a S. Bonav. incidenter dicta hic et praecipue I. Sent. d. 35. q. 4. in corp. et ad 2. — Notatu dignum est quod in solut. ad 4. in fine de humano intellectu docetur, scil. hominem a nativitate non habere *cognitionem* nec *speciem singularium*, nec *communem* nec *propriam* (cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 4. q. 4. Schol.).

**V.** De cognitione Angelorum quoad praesentia, praeterita et futura contingentia cfr. infra d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 1-3; quoad secreta cordium d. 8. p. II. q. 6; quoad fidei mysteria III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. De hac et connexis quaestionibus: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 24. m. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 10. 11, et d. 9. q. 2; Report. hic q. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 55. a. 1. 3, et q. 56. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 96-100; de Verit. q. 8. a. 8. 9. — B. Albert., hic q. 15. 16; S. p. II. tr. 2. q. 14. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1. 2. — Ægid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 14. — Durand., hic q. 5. 6. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The words *all created [things]* in the title of the question are to be restricted to all created [things] *outside the angel itself.* For the angel knows the thing « which essentially » is in itself (in the body [of the question], at the beginning), i.e. itself, and also God (here q. 2, in reply to 4), not through such species, but rather through its essence. — It is supposed as common doctrine that things outside itself are known by the angel *through species.* Yet there were not lacking those who denied this. For Durandus (here q. 6) with several Nominalists held that these are understood by them « not through any representative other than the very presence of the things in themselves or in their causes, or in both modes ». Others with [William of] Auxerre thought that *all* [things] are understood by them through their *essence*, in a mode analogous to that in God. — For confirming the common opinion, that intelligible species are required, both in man and in the angels, for understanding either all or at least many [things], there serve [the things] which are said by the Seraphic [Doctor] (I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 1) about *likeness*, as it is the ground of knowing even in God (yet otherwise than in us); likewise (ibid. d. 3, p. 1, q. 1) about the *four requisites* for cognition; likewise (*Itinerarium of the mind into God*, c. 2) about the *mode* in which the sensible world enters into the soul through likenesses; and especially (*Hexaëmeron*, Sermon 11, from the middle) about the *generation of the species from the object*, where with admirable doctrine it is declared that « every creature cries out the eternal generation, and these the twelve generations express and represent ».

**II.** The *principal* controversy is about the most difficult problem, how singulars outside themselves are known by the angels. Peter of Tarentaise reviews five opinions about this, determining nothing. St. Thomas reproves several opinions and also the one which St. Bonaventure posits; he himself holds that singulars are known by the angel through *universal species* connatural to it, which also distinctly represent the lower singulars. But Scotus, with whom Richard of Mediavilla nearly agrees, [holds] that these singulars are known by it through species acquired from things, yet not abstracted from phantasms. St. Bonaventure, proceeding by a middle way, here teaches that the angel does not for this need new species to be acquired; yet that universal *concreated* species do not suffice for singulars to be known, « unless the angel direct its gaze upon the knowable itself, and according to that which is in the thing, it itself compose the species in itself ». — But he adds the same, that the angel, although it does not *need* new species, « yet *can* receive species ». But about this *potency* there is again disagreement, as will presently be said.

**III.** The *second* controversy, which is intimately connected with the first, is this, whether in the angel there is in its own mode an *agent and possible* intellect, about which distinction see below d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4. — St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 96) teaches: « In separate substances there is not an agent and possible intellect, except perhaps *equivocally*» (cf. *Summa* I, q. 54, a. 4). The reason is that according to him the angel in no way receives cognition from sensibles. This reason is denied both by Scotus, who holds that *in fact* there is that reception, and by St. Bonaventure, who esteems that reception to be *possible.* Hence each, with Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 22, m. 3, Blessed Albert (*Summa* p. II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, part 1), Peter of Tarentaise, and many others, contends that the angel has in its own mode an *agent* and *possible* intellect, « since it is not pure act » (here in the body). This *potentiality* the Seraphic [Doctor] understands both in the order to the *act of understanding*, and in the order to the *species* of the angelic power concreated from the origin by God, and in the order to *new* species, which it *can* acquire either naturally or by God impressing [them]. — But that the intellect is in some mode in *potency* as to these three [things] is not, unless we are mistaken, alien to the opinion of St. Thomas, although some of his expositors think that those species are *connatural* in this sense, that from the very nature of the angel as an active principle they flow as it were [its] properties. But other disciples of St. Thomas (cf. Gotti, *On God the Creator*, tr. 9, q. 4, § 6) think it more probable that these species are rather divinely impressed according to the indigence and inclination of the angelic nature.

**IV.** The *third* controversy is about the doctrine of St. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 2; *Summa* I, q. 55, a. 3), that angels superior in nature understand through more universal and fewer species. Scotus (here q. 10, n. 6 ff.) denies this. To the negative opinion there favor many [things] incidentally said by St. Bonaventure here and especially I *Sent.* d. 35, q. 4, in the body and in reply to 2. — Worthy of note is what is taught in the solution to 4 at the end concerning the human intellect, namely that man from birth does not have the *cognition* nor the *species of singulars*, neither *common* nor *proper* (cf. I *Sent.* d. 17, p. 4, q. 4, Scholion).

**V.** On the cognition of the angels as to present, past, and future contingent [things] cf. below d. 7, p. II, a. 1, q. 1-3; as to the secrets of hearts d. 8, p. II, q. 6; as to the mysteries of faith III *Sent.* d. 23, a. 2, q. 3. On this and connected questions: Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 24, m. 2, 3. — Scotus, here q. 10, 11, and d. 9, q. 2; *Reportata* here q. 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, 2, 3; *Summa* I, q. 55, a. 1, 3, and q. 56, a. 1, 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 96-100; *On Truth* q. 8, a. 8, 9. — Blessed Albert, here q. 15, 16; *Summa* p. II, tr. 2, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 6, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. II, q. 2, a. 1, 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5, q. 14. — Durandus, here q. 5, 6, 7. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here q. 2.

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translators_notes:
- **Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the IA djvu OCR base (raw 8858–9162) cross-verified on the 450 dpi column-band crops (pp.117–121), per the Vol II override. The *videtur*/*sed contra* args are clean running prose in the OCR; the three-position Respondeo (innate-only / partly-acquired / innate-with-direction) + the *Explicatur* + the four replies + the editorial Scholion I–V cascade-shatter and were reflowed from the crops (L column then R column).
- **Page span / structure.** The **largest d.3 chunk** (6 printed pages, ~3060 Latin words). This chunk **folds in the `ARTICULUS II` opener** (raw 8858–8863, `De naturali cognitione Angeli` + `Circa secundum principale… duo quaeruntur`) per the Vol II ART-opener convention. QUAESTIO I opens **low on p.117** (beneath committed `d3-p2-a1-q2`'s scholion) and runs pp.117–121: 6 *videtur* args + 4 *Sed contra* args (the 4th very long); a one-sentence *Conclusio* (blockquote); a Respondeo of **three positions** (all-innate, with *modus*/*causa* both rebutted; partly-innate-partly-acquired, *improbatur*; the accepted innate-with-*directio-aspectus*, with *Explicatur* + conclusio) + four replies; then an editorial **Scholion I–V** (the *omnia creata* titulus restriction; the three connected controversies — singulars / agent-possible intellect / superior-angel species; the parallel-loci list) — references inline, **NO numbered apparatus**. The chunk's last real content (Scholion V) ends on p.121; p.122 carries only the running head + catchword (QUAESTIO II opens there). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Fundamenta`, `Ad oppositum`, `Conclusio 1.`, `Dissentiunt de modo.`, `Positio 1./2./3. et conclusio 2.`, `Improbatur.`, `In Angelo est intellectus possibilis et agens.`, `Explicatur.`, `Conclusio 3.`, `Solutio oppositorum.`, `Notandum.`).
- **Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber 1–33):** p.117 footer notes **6–7** → `[^1]`–`[^2]` (notes 1–5 are committed a1-q2's; see incoming split); p.118 footer notes 1–12 → `[^3]`–`[^14]`, note 7 (`Gen. 2,2…`) an **L→R runover** folded into `[^9]`; p.119 footer notes 1–9 → `[^15]`–`[^23]`, note 8 (the long Avicenna *de Anima* / *quia accidens numeratur* note) an **L→R runover** folded into `[^22]`; p.120 footer notes 1–7 → `[^24]`–`[^30]`, note 3 (the Avicenna *certitudo* note) an **L→R runover** folded into `[^26]`; p.121 footer notes 1–3 → `[^31]`–`[^33]` (L col 1–2, R col 3).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a1-q2 → a2-q1): SPLIT at p.117 (received).** p.117's footer had ≥7 notes: notes 1–5 anchor committed `d3-p2-a1-q2`'s replies (`[^21]`–`[^25]` there); **notes 6–7 → this chunk** (`[^1]`–`[^2]`, anchoring the ART. II opener's `et⁶` and QUAESTIO I's `Ezechielis vigesimo octavo⁷`). No backfill (the a1-q2 build documented this prospectively).
- **Cross-chunk footer boundary (a2-q1 → a2-q2): CLEAN.** q1's editorial Scholion I–V has no numbered apparatus and ends on p.121; p.122 carries only the running head + the `S. Bonav. — Tom. II. 16` catchword, and `QUAESTIO II` opens there (raw 9163). p.121's footer is wholly q1's (`[^31]`–`[^33]`, anchoring reply 4's tail). No backfill outgoing; `d3-p2-a2-q2` starts its apparatus at the first p.122 footer note.
- **Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No hard `[?]` flags — the three-position cascade Respondeo, the four replies, and the editorial Scholion were verified on the pp.117–121 crops; the OCR base is reliable for the *videtur*/*sed contra* prose. The three L→R runover notes (`[^9]`, `[^22]`, `[^26]`) were recovered from the R-col footer head per the standard Vol II pattern; secure on content. Cascade-region marker positions across the long Respondeo are content-matched in source order; per-clause positions may be off by a few words where the two-column linearization is ambiguous — parked for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

title_alt: Whether the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself without any medium and without the assistance of a creature.

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

*Utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam essentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine medio et creaturae adminiculo.*

Secundo quaeritur circa hoc de naturali cognitione Angeli respectu creatricis essentiae. Et est quaestio, utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam essentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine omni medio et creaturae adminiculo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. «Angelus per naturam habet deiformem intellectum», sicut vult Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus[^1]; sed intellectus humanus, quando factus est deiformis, cognoscere potest Deum in luce sua — non enim efficitur deiformis nisi per gloriam — ergo et hoc poterat Angelus per naturam.

2. Item, «Angelus per naturam est speculum clarum ipsius supremi luminis[^2]»; sed illud lumen semper, quantum est de se, et naturaliter supersplendet speculo intellectuali. Si ergo speculum mundum, obiectum soli, claritatem suscipit per naturam, ergo et Angelus claritatem illius supernae lucis: ergo cum possit oculum ad illam supernam lucem, nullo obsistente, dirigere, sed et dirigendo cognoscere, ergo videtur, quod naturali cognitione ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa cognoscat. Si dicas, quod acies intellectus angelici retunderetur propter improportionabilitatem luminis: contra: semper manet improportionabilitas, quidquid detur Angelo: ergo nunquam videret.

3. Item, quae sunt essentialiter et praesentialiter in potentia cognoscente cognoscuntur per sui praesentiam et essentiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de Trinitate[^3] et super Genesim ad litteram, quod «anima se ipsam et habitus suos per essentiam et praesentiam cognoscit». Si ergo Deus praesentissimus erat intellectui angelico, et hoc per naturam: ergo naturaliter ipsam divinam essentiam in se ipsa cognoscebat.

4. Item, omne illud quod est ens cognoscibile per se, aut cognoscitur per sui essentiam, aut per speciem. Si ergo Angelus cognoscebat Deum naturaliter, ut dicit Magister in littera[^4], aut per speciem, aut in sua essentia; sed non per speciem; ergo etc. Quod autem non per speciem, videtur. Species enim est maioris simplicitatis et abstractionis et puritatis, quam illud cuius est species; sed nihil Deo simplicius: ergo Deus speciem non habet: ergo non poterat Angelus Deum nosse per speciem; et noverat per speciem vel essentiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, Angelus per naturalem cognitionem Deum cognoscebat, aut ergo sub velatione, aut facie revelata. Non sub velatione, quia velamen non est nisi propter culpam vel propter molem carnis coniunctam; sed in Angelo nulla erat macula culpae[^5], nulla moles carnis coniuncta nec phantasmatum obsistentia: ergo sua naturali cognitione summam essentiam in sua luce videbat.

6. Item, si Angelus cognoscebat Deum, aut ergo per medium, aut sine medio. Si sine medio, ergo videbat Deum in se ipso. Si per medium, ergo inter mentem Angeli et Deum aliquid erat medium; quod est contra Augustinum[^6] et contra rationem. Nam illud medium aut esset magis proportionabile Deo quam mens Angeli, aut minus. Si magis, ergo aliqua creatura superior Angelo; si minus, ergo potius impediebat cognitionem, quam adiuvaret. Restat igitur, quod Angelus per cognitionem naturalem cognoscebat divinam essentiam in se ipsa.

CONTRA: 1. Ioannis decimo septimo[^7]: *Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum*, ergo in visione Dei est beatitudo summa: si ergo hoc habebat Angelus per naturam, ergo per naturam erat beatus.

2. Item, adhuc naturalia salva sunt in Angelis malis, maxime quae spectant ad intellectum[^8]: si ergo per naturam poterant divinam lucem conspicere in se, ergo et nunc possunt: ergo non sunt in tenebris damnationis, quod aperte falsum est.

3. Item, proximior est Deo anima habens gratiam, quam sit Angelus habens sola naturalia; sed anima exuta cum gratia non potest aspicere lucem summam, nisi adiuvetur per gloriam, sicut patet de his qui sunt in purgatorio, et fuerunt in limbo: ergo videtur, quod nec Angelus per naturam.

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4. Item, lux divinae essentiae est supra omnem intellectum creatum, quantumcumque ille intellectus sit excellens in naturalibus: ergo nunquam intellectus creatus in illam intuendam ascendet virtute sua, nisi Deus condescendat per gratiam: ergo impossibile est, quod Angelus naturali cognitione cognoscat divinam essentiam in se ipsa[^9].

5. Item, multo plus est Deus supra intellectum angelicum, quam sit Angelus supra intellectum humanum; sed homo non potest nosse Angelum, nisi Angelus condescendat ei: ergo nec Angelus ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa.

6. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquis oculus perveniat ad cognitionem luminis solaris nisi per immissionem radiorum solis, quantumcumque habeat alia lumina: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis ad contuitum supernae lucis perveniat per illuminationem aliquam naturalem, vel acquisitam, nisi Deus suae luminositatis radium immittat[^10]; sed immissio haec non est nisi per gratiam: ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura, quantumcumque nobilis, divinam lucem in se ipsa per naturam cognoscat.

CONCLUSIO.

*Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam in se ipsa videre non poterat.*

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam videre non poterat in essentia[^11] sive claritate sua. Et hoc patet, quia haec cognitio est primum praemium, quo habito, mens creata quiescit tanquam beata et perfecta; hoc autem praemium nemo obtinet nisi gratuita Dei influentia.

Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, sane dici potest, quod divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis naturae creatae; et ideo per quandam benignitatis condescensionem facit se cognosci, ita quod in illa cognitione cognoscens multo plus agatur, quam agat. Illa autem condescensio bonitatis quid gratuitum dicit; sed constat, quod non dicit divinae essentiae humiliationem, quia non potest minorari, sed dicit alicuius radii gratuitam immissionem, per quam anima clare cognoscit, cum est immissio in abundantia, sicut erit in gloria. Et ita Angelus divinam essentiam non potest per naturam cognoscere in se ipsa, sicut ostendunt rationes inductae, et sicut colligitur a Dionysio in principio mysticae Theologiae[^12].

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est deiformis per naturam; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quia habeat deiformitatem, quam habet intellectus gloriosus per assimilationem, quae est in statu perfecto, sed deiformis dicitur, quia sine susceptione specierum, per id quod habet in se, actu cognoscit.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est speculum clarum; dicendum, quod Deus refulget in omni creatura tanquam causa in effectu suo, et ex omnibus potest cognosci, et maxime in creatura, quae ipsius Dei est insignita imagine. Sed illa refulgentia luminis, per quam videtur Deus facie ad faciem[^13], non est naturae, sed condescensionis et gratiae. Nec est simile de luce corporali, quae naturaliter influit lumen in haec inferiora; non sic debet intelligi de luce aeterna.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus praesentialiter est in anima etc.; dicendum, quod esse praesentialiter hoc est dupliciter: vel ut principium movens, conservans et continens, vel ut obiectum immutans. Primo modo est Deus praesens Angelo, ut lux caeco[^14]; secundo modo non. Et ideo non est simile de anima et eius habitibus, quoniam praesentes sunt animae utroque modo. Et ratio huius est, quoniam haec cognoscibilia non superexcedunt cognoscentis potentiam et naturam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut per speciem, aut per essentiam etc.; dicendum, quod adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scilicet per effectus. Cognoscitur autem Deus per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod «est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura», sicut dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinitate, et habitum est in primo[^15]. Et ita respondetur illi rationi, quod procedit ex divisione insufficienti.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de velatione, dicendum, quod non posse pertingere ad alicuius cognitionem, hoc est dupliciter: vel propter cordis obscuritatem, vel propter cognoscibilis profunditatem. Si primo modo, sic dicitur impediri velatione; si secundo modo, sic impeditur non propter interpositionem velaminis, sed propter sublimitatem cognoscibilis. Primo modo impeditur homo peccator, secundo modo Angelus. Unde nec videbat sub velamine aenigmatis, nec tamen facie ad faciem, quia medium est inter utrumque, videlicet Deum videre in speculo absque aenigmate[^16].

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6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut cognoscebat Deum per medium, aut sine medio; dicendum, quod per medium, scilicet per effectum: non quia illud medium magis esset proportionale Deo, sed quia magis erat proportionale intellectui angelico; unde naturaliter videbatur per speculum et per vestigium, quamvis non per aenigma. Nec illud est contra Augustinum, quia, sicut infra melius patebit[^17], Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium in ratione causae efficientis, vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscenti, quam praesit.

SCHOLION.

I. Conclusio et principia hic clare exposita conveniunt cum iis quae dicuntur infra (d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.) de modo, quo Adam in statu innocentiae Deum cognovit, et quae in genere de cognoscibilitate Dei dicta sunt (I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. 2.). Vide Schol. ibid. ad q. 1, in quo (n. III.) etiam breviter insinuatum est, quomodo intelligantur verba S. Doctoris, hic ad 4; «per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti». Late de hac doctrina agitur in opusculo a nobis edito: de Humanae Cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam etc. Ad Claras Aquas 1883.

II. Consentiunt quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 23. m. 3, et q. 24. m. 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. hic q. 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. et 11. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. a. 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 6; S. I. q. 56. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 49; de Verit. q. 8. a. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. a. 2. partic. 2. et quaest. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 2. circa finem.

english:
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### QUESTION II.

*Whether the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself without a medium and without the assistance of a creature.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning this about the natural cognition of the Angel with respect to the creating essence. And the question is, whether the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself without any medium and without the assistance of a creature. And that he did, it seems.

1. «The Angel by nature has a deiform intellect», as Dionysius holds in the book *On the Divine Names*[^1]; but the human intellect, when it has been made deiform, can know God in His light — for it is not made deiform except through glory — therefore the Angel too could do this by nature.

2. Likewise, «the Angel by nature is a clear mirror of the supreme light itself[^2]»; but that light always, so far as in itself lies, naturally super-shines upon the intellectual mirror. If therefore a clean mirror, set before the sun, receives brightness by nature, then the Angel too receives the brightness of that supernal light: therefore, since it can direct its eye to that supernal light, with nothing standing in the way, and by directing it can know, therefore it seems that by natural cognition it knows the divine light itself in itself. If you say that the keenness of the angelic intellect would be blunted on account of the disproportion of the light: on the contrary: the disproportion always remains, whatever be given to the Angel: therefore it would never see.

3. Likewise, those things which are essentially and presentially in a knowing power are known through their presence and essence, as Augustine says in *On the Trinity*[^3] and on *Genesis according to the Letter*, that «the soul knows itself and its own habits through essence and presence». If therefore God was most present to the angelic intellect, and this by nature: therefore it naturally knew the divine essence itself in itself.

4. Likewise, everything that is a being knowable per se is either known through its own essence or through a species. If therefore the Angel knew God naturally, as the Master says in the text[^4], either through a species or in His essence; but not through a species; therefore etc. That it was not through a species, it seems. For a species is of greater simplicity and abstraction and purity than that of which it is the species; but nothing is simpler than God: therefore God has no species: therefore the Angel could not know God through a species; and he did know either through a species or through the essence: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the Angel by natural cognition knew God either under a veiling or with face revealed. Not under a veiling, because a veil exists only on account of fault or on account of the conjoined mass of the flesh; but in the Angel there was no stain of fault[^5], no conjoined mass of flesh, nor the obstruction of phantasms: therefore by its natural cognition it saw the supreme essence in its own light.

6. Likewise, if the Angel knew God, then either through a medium or without a medium. If without a medium, then he saw God in Himself. If through a medium, then between the mind of the Angel and God something was a medium; which is against Augustine[^6] and against reason. For that medium would be either more proportionable to God than the mind of the Angel, or less. If more, then some creature is superior to the Angel; if less, then it rather impeded cognition than helped it. It remains therefore that the Angel by natural cognition knew the divine essence in itself.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. John, the seventeenth chapter[^7]: *This is eternal life, that they may know thee, God*, therefore in the vision of God is the highest beatitude: if therefore the Angel had this by nature, then by nature he was beatified.

2. Likewise, the natural things are still preserved in the evil Angels, especially those which pertain to the intellect[^8]: if therefore by nature they could behold the divine light in itself, then they can even now: therefore they are not in the darkness of damnation, which is plainly false.

3. Likewise, a soul having grace is nearer to God than is an Angel having natural endowments alone; but a soul, stripped, even with grace cannot gaze upon the supreme light unless it is helped by glory, as is plain concerning those who are in purgatory and were in limbo: therefore it seems that neither does the Angel by nature.

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4. Likewise, the light of the divine essence is above every created intellect, however excellent that intellect be in natural endowments: therefore a created intellect will never ascend to the beholding of it by its own power, unless God condescends through grace: therefore it is impossible that the Angel by natural cognition should know the divine essence in itself[^9].

5. Likewise, God is much more above the angelic intellect than the Angel is above the human intellect; but man cannot know an Angel unless the Angel condescends to him: therefore neither can the Angel know the divine light itself in itself.

6. Likewise, it is impossible that any eye should attain to the cognition of the solar light except through the emission of the sun's rays, however many other lights it have: therefore it is impossible that anyone should attain to the beholding of the supernal light through any natural or acquired illumination, unless God send forth a ray of His luminosity[^10]; but this emission is only through grace: therefore it is impossible that any creature, however noble, should by nature know the divine light in itself.

CONCLUSION.

*The Angel by natural cognition was not able to see the divine essence in itself.*

I respond: It must be said that the Angel by natural cognition was not able to see the divine essence in His essence[^11] or in His brightness. And this is plain, because this cognition is the first reward, which once had, the created mind rests as beatified and perfected; but this reward no one obtains except by the gratuitous influence of God.

But if the reason for this be asked, it can soundly be said that the divine light, on account of its eminence, is inaccessible to the powers of every created nature; and therefore through a certain condescension of benignity it makes itself known, in such a way that in that cognition the one knowing is acted upon much more than he acts. But that condescension of goodness expresses something gratuitous; yet it is established that it does not express any humiliation of the divine essence, since it cannot be lessened, but expresses the gratuitous emission of some ray, by which the soul knows clearly, when the emission is in abundance, as it will be in glory. And so the Angel cannot by nature know the divine essence in itself, as the adduced arguments show, and as is gathered from Dionysius at the beginning of the *Mystical Theology*[^12].

1. To that, then, which is objected, that he is deiform by nature; it must be said that this is not said because he has the deiformity which the glorious intellect has through assimilation, which is in the perfected state, but he is called deiform because, without the reception of species, by that which he has in himself, he knows in act.

2. To that which is objected, that he is a clear mirror; it must be said that God shines forth in every creature as a cause in its effect, and can be known from all things, and especially in the creature which is marked with the image of God Himself. But that refulgence of the light, by which God is seen face to face[^13], is not of nature but of condescension and grace. Nor is it similar with corporeal light, which naturally pours light into these lower things; it must not be so understood of the eternal light.

3. To that which is objected, that God is presentially in the soul etc.; it must be said that to be presentially is twofold: either as a moving, conserving, and containing principle, or as an object effecting change. In the first way God is present to the Angel, as light to a blind man[^14]; in the second way not. And therefore it is not similar with the soul and its habits, since these are present to the soul in both ways. And the reason for this is that these knowables do not exceed the power and nature of the one knowing.

4. To that which is objected, that either through a species or through the essence etc.; it must be said that there is still a third mode of knowing, namely through effects. Now God is known through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power, which «is a certain likeness of God, not abstracted but infused, inferior to God because in an inferior nature», as Augustine says in the ninth book of *On the Trinity*, and as has been treated in the first book[^15]. And thus that argument is answered, which proceeds from an insufficient division.

5. To that which is objected concerning the veiling, it must be said that not being able to attain to the cognition of something is twofold: either on account of the darkness of the heart, or on account of the profundity of the knowable. If in the first way, then one is said to be impeded by a veiling; if in the second way, then one is impeded not on account of the interposition of a veil, but on account of the sublimity of the knowable. In the first way the sinful man is impeded, in the second way the Angel. Hence he did not see under the veil of the enigma, nor yet face to face, because a medium is between the two, namely to see God in a mirror without an enigma[^16].

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6. To that which is objected, that he knew God either through a medium or without a medium; it must be said: through a medium, namely through an effect: not because that medium was more proportional to God, but because it was more proportional to the angelic intellect; hence he naturally saw through a mirror and through a vestige, although not through an enigma. Nor is this against Augustine, because, as will better appear below[^17], Augustine holds that between the mind and God there does not fall a medium in the character of an efficient or influencing cause, yet there does fall a medium of manuduction, which nevertheless does not have the character of a medium properly, because it rather subserves the knowing power than presides over it.

SCHOLION.

I. The conclusion and principles here clearly set forth agree with those things which are said below (d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.) concerning the mode in which Adam in the state of innocence knew God, and with what has been said in general concerning the knowability of God (I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. 2.). See the Scholion there at q. 1, in which (n. III.) it is also briefly intimated how the words of the holy Doctor here, at reply 4, are to be understood; «through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power». This doctrine is treated at length in the opusculum edited by us: *On the Manner of Human Cognition, certain unpublished pieces, etc.* At Quaracchi, 1883.

II. Agreeing as to the conclusion: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 23. m. 3, and q. 24. m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 9; Report. here q. 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. and 11. — St. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. a. 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 6; S. I. q. 56. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 49; de Verit. q. 8. a. 5. — B. Albert, S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. a. 2. partic. 2. and quaest. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 4. a. 1. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Middleton, II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1. — Henr. of Ghent, Quodl. 4. q. 9. — Durandus, I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3. — Dionysius Carth., here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 2. near the end.

translators_notes:
**Source range:** raw `bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt` lines 9163–9322; printed pp. 122–124 (PDF = printed + 22). Full 450 dpi column-band PDF re-set (`extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 122-125 --dpi 450` + `colcrop.py vol2 12{2,3,4,5}`). videtur/Contra clean prose from the IA djvu OCR base; Respondeo, the six Solutio replies, the Scholion, and every page-footer reflowed from the column-band crops (cascade-shattered in OCR, per the Vol II Override).

**Apparatus crosswalk (continuous renumber 1–17):**
- **p.122 — 8 footer notes** (L-col 1–4, R-col 5–8): n.1 → `[^1]` (arg 1, *de Divinis Nominibus*); n.2 → `[^2]` (arg 2, *supremi luminis*); n.3 → `[^3]` (arg 3, *de Trinitate*); n.4 → `[^4]` (arg 4, *Magister in littera*); n.5 → `[^5]` (arg 5, *macula culpae*); n.6 → `[^6]` (arg 6, *contra Augustinum*); n.7 → `[^7]` (Contra 1, *Ioannis 17*); n.8 → `[^8]` (Contra 2, *ad intellectum*). No L→R runover.
- **p.123 — 7 footer notes** (L-col 1–4, R-col 5–7): n.1 → `[^9]` (Contra 4, *in se ipsa*); n.2 → `[^10]` (Contra 6, *radium immittat*); n.3 → `[^11]` (Respondeo, *in essentia*); n.4 → `[^12]` (Respondeo end, *mysticae Theologiae*); n.5 → `[^13]` (reply 2, *facie ad faciem*); n.6 → `[^14]` (reply 3, *ut lux caeco*); n.7 → `[^15]` (reply 4, *habitum est in primo*). No L→R runover (L-col notes 1–4 are complete; R-col 5 opens fresh `Epist.`).
- **p.124 — footer SPLIT (this chunk takes n.1–2 only):** n.1 → `[^16]` (reply 5 tail, *in speculo absque aenigmate*); n.2 → `[^17]` (reply 6, *infra melius patebit*). **n.3+ → next chunk `d3-p2-a3-q1`** (n.3 = `Notat P. Nicolai ... Bernardi ... de Diligendo Deo, c. 8` → a3-q1 arg 1 *Quia Bernardus dicit «natura curva»*). This is a **discovered outgoing split**: a2-q2's editorial Scholion I–II is short and ends partway down p.124 L-col, so ARTICULUS III + a3-q1's body begin on the *same* printed page (124) as a2-q2's footer — the clean/split rule (a q→q+1 boundary splits the shared footer iff q's scholion is short enough that q+1's body begins on q's footer page) yields a split here. Documented for the future `d3-p2-a3-q1` build: its p.124 apparatus starts at footer note 3.

**Incoming boundary CLEAN (received):** raw 9155–9157 = p.121 footer notes (`Codd. V cc et ed. 1 distinctius novae speciei.` / `Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 6.` / `Cod. aa supplet posset...`) which belong to the committed `d3-p2-a2-q1`; the `S. Bonav. — Tom. II. 16` catchword + `122 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` running head follow, then QUAESTIO II opens on p.122. No backfill to a2-q1.

**Scholion:** editorial (Quaracchi) Scholion I–II — I = the cross-refs to d. 23 / I. Sent. d. 3 + the *de Humanae Cognitionis ratione* opusculum; II = the bibliographic "agreeing as to the conclusion" source-list. **No numbered apparatus** (references inline). This is why the boundary keys solely on the reply-5/reply-6 footer anchors at p.124.

**Marginal glosses trimmed** (not rendered): *Ad oppositum*, *Fundamenta*, *Conclusio*, *Ratio*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Notandum*, *Distinctio notanda*, *Triplex modus cognoscendi Deum, et per effectum tripliciter*, *Distinctio*.

**Low-confidence items — RESOLVED at the d.1–d.10 600 dpi polish-blocker (2026-05-22):**
- `[^1]` — RESOLVED. The Dionysius *de Div. Nom.* locus genuinely reads `Cap. 7. § 2. et c. 4. § 2. 22; c. 5. § 8.` on the 600 dpi p.122 footer — the `2. 22` is a list of two sections (§§ 2, 22) of chapter 4 with the `§` distributed, standard Quaracchi style. Rendering is faithful; no change.
- `[^14]` — RESOLVED. The August. *in Ioan. tract. 1. n. 19* quotation reads in full at 600 dpi `…praesens est illi sol, sed ipse soli absens est; sic omnis stultus, omnis iniquus, omnis impius caecus est corde etc.` — matches the chunk verbatim. No change.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0