title: Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus.
#### *De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.*

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum Deus possit aliquid aliud a se.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Quod autem non possit Deus aliud a se, ostenditur sic.

1. Omnis potentia, quae agit in aliud a substantia, in qua est vel cuius est, egreditur ab illa substantia[^1]; potentia enim non operatur, nisi ubi est. Si ergo divina substantia operatur per suam potentiam in aliquid aliud a se, potentia eius incipit esse vel fieri in alio: ergo egreditur a substantia. Sed omnis potentia, quae egreditur, elongatur a substantia, et omnis talis distat a substantia; et omnis potentia distans a substantia repugnat simplicitati: cum ergo hoc sit impossibile in Deo, videtur, quod Deus non agat in aliud a se.

2. Item, omnis potentia, cuius opus est in aliud[^2], habet dependentiam ab illo. *Probatio:* opus enim, quod transit in materiam subiectam, aliquo modo pendet ex illa; sed potentia pendet ex eodem, ex quo pendet actus, quia perficitur per actum: ergo si potentia divina est in aliud, habet dependentiam.

3. Item, omnis potentia, quae est in aliquid, quod non semper est coniunctum suo actui[^3], habet indigentiam — non enim est perfecta, nisi quando agit, et non agit, nisi cum obiectum est praesens — ergo quando non est semper praesens, est incompleta; hoc autem repugnat potentiae divinae: ergo etc.

4. Item, in Deo idem est posse et esse[^4]; sed Deus non est aliud a se: ergo non potest in aliud a se. Si tu dicas, quod potentia connotat, sed non essentia; contra: Deus potest aliquid facere, quod nec est nec fuit nec erit: ergo nihil connotat. Si tu dicas, quod connotat, quod est in potentia; sed potentia Dei non est aliud quam Deus et quod est in Deo: ergo et nihil aliud connotat.

**Sed contra:**

1. Bonum est diffusivum sui[^5]; sed diffusio, secundum quod huiusmodi, est in aliud: ergo bonum, secundum quod bonum, potest in aliud: aut ergo secundum potentiam suam, aut alienam. Si secundum alienam: ergo non est perfecte bonum, cum non habeat actum bonum per se; si per potentiam suam: ergo bonum, secundum quod bonum, potest in aliud; sed Deus est summe bonus: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis perfectio creaturae est in hoc, quod possit aliud a se producere[^6]; si ergo omne quod perfectionis est, Deo est attribuendum, potentia producendi aliud est Deo attribuenda.

3. Item, si nihil aliud a se potest, ergo nulli alii a se praeest, ergo nec aliquid Deo subest: ergo a nullo est colendus, a nullo est adorandus, et nihil ab ipso omnino est quaerendum; quod est summum inconveniens, secundum omnes.

4. Item, si nihil potest aliud, ergo nihil est ad ipsum neque propter ipsum; sed bonitas est in <!-- page 747 -->rebus et ordo per relationem ipsorum[^7] ad summum bonum, a quo est omne bonum: ergo secundum hoc nulla res est bona nec ordinata in universo; hoc autem est summum inconveniens: ergo necesse est ponere, quod possit in aliud a se. Prima consequentia est manifesta; ad illud enim solum stat ultima resolutio in redeundo, in quo est prima origo in exeundo, ut manifestum est.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus potest aliud sive in aliud a se, sed sine ulla imperfectione distantiae, dependentiae et indigentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Ad hoc intelligendum notandum est, quod posse aliud sive in aliud a se, hoc est dupliciter: aut in aliud sicut in distinctum secundum essentiam et remotum secundum distantiam, sicut unum contrarium agit in aliud, quia impossibile est, duo contraria esse in eodem subiecto[^8]; et hoc modo posse in aliud est per egressum potentiae a substantia, et ideo est ibi elongatio et distantia. Et quia elongatur a sua substantia, ideo pendet a substantia, in quam agit, et ideo est ibi dependentia; et quia distantia et dependentia, ideo imperfectio et indigentia. — Hoc modo posse in aliud Deo non competit propter tres conditiones praedictas, sicut ostensum est[^9], quia repugnant divinae potentiae, quae sunt distantia, dependentia et indigentia.

Alio modo posse in aliud dicitur sicut in divisum secundum formam et essentiam, non tamen in remotum secundum aliquam distantiam, quia divina essentia, dum operatur, intime est in illo. Et hoc modo nec ponit distantiam nec dependentiam nec indigentiam. Cum enim divina essentia sit omni perfectione perfecta, et potentia eius sit omnimoda indivisione indivisa, a nullo alio dependet, nullo alio indiget: hoc igitur modo ponendum, quod Deus potest in aliud a se sive aliud a se.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1.* Ex his patet primo obiectum. Quod enim primo obiicit: potentia, quae est in aliud, egreditur ab agente in passum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, ubi agens in aliud non est in illo secundum veritatem; ubi autem est, omnino nulla necessitas est egrediendi.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia, quae est in aliud, pendet ex illo; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de illo, cuius actio est in aliud tanquam in sustentans[^10]; divina autem potentia non indiget alio sustentante, quod patet, quia non indiget subiecta materia, sed facit ex nihilo. Et ratio huius est, quia cum potentia sit omnino indifferens et ab essentia et actu, sicut essentia non indiget sustentante, sic nec potentia.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia, quae est in aliud, habet perfectionis indigentiam; dicendum, quod potentia agens in aliud est duplex: quaedam, quae est suus actus; et talis nihil plus habet, quando agit in aliud, quam quando non agit, et haec nullo modo indiget; et talis est potentia divina propter summam simplicitatem. Alia est potentia agens in aliud per actum a se differentem; et talis plus habet, quando agit, quam quando non agit, et talis est, quae habet indigentiam aliquo modo, ut potentia creata. Non sic est de potentia divina; et ideo, quamvis sit in aliud, quod non semper est praesens, propter hoc tamen nec indigens est nec incompleta.

*Ad 4.* Ad ultimum dicendum, quod potentia connotat possibile, et possibile ampliatur ad ens et ad non-ens[^11]; et sicut possibile ampliatur, ita et diversitas connotati. Et ideo non tantum dicitur posse in aliud, quia potest in aliud quod est, sed quia potest in aliud, quod potest esse; Deus autem a se non potest esse aliud. Ideo patet illud.

english:
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### Article unique.
#### *On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question I.
#### *Whether God can [do/produce] anything other than himself.*

That God cannot [produce] anything other than himself is shown thus.

1. Every power which acts on something other than the substance in which it is or whose [power] it is, goes out from that substance[^1]; for a power does not operate except where it is. If therefore the divine substance operates through its power upon something other than itself, its power begins to be or come-to-be in another: therefore it goes out from the substance. But every power that goes out is removed from the substance, and every such [power] stands at a distance from the substance; and every power standing at a distance from the substance is repugnant to simplicity: since therefore this is impossible in God, it appears that God does not act on anything other than himself.

2. Likewise, every power whose work is in another[^2] has a dependence on it. *Proof:* for a work which passes into an underlying matter depends in some way on it; but the power depends on the same [thing] on which the act depends, since it is perfected through the act: therefore if the divine power is [directed] into another, it has a dependence.

3. Likewise, every power which is [directed] toward something that is not always conjoined to its act[^3] has neediness — for it is not perfect except when it acts, and it does not act except when the object is present — therefore when [the object] is not always present, [the power] is incomplete; but this is repugnant to the divine power: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in God to-be-able (*posse*) and to-be (*esse*) are the same[^4]; but God is not other than himself: therefore he cannot [extend] to anything other than himself. If you say that *potentia* connotes [an other] but not *essentia*; on the contrary: God can do something which neither is nor was nor will be: therefore [the term *potentia*] connotes nothing. If you say that it connotes that which is in potency; but the power of God is nothing other than God and what is in God: therefore it connotes nothing other either.

**On the contrary:**

1. The good is diffusive of itself[^5]; but diffusion, as such, is into another: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another: either therefore by its own power, or by another's. If by another's: therefore it is not perfectly good, since it does not have a good act through itself; if by its own power: therefore the good, as good, can [extend] into another; but God is supremely good: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every perfection of a creature consists in this, that it can produce something other than itself[^6]; if therefore everything that belongs to perfection must be attributed to God, the power of producing another is to be attributed to God.

3. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other than himself, therefore he is preeminent over none other than himself, therefore nothing is subject to God either: therefore he is to be venerated by none, to be adored by none, and nothing at all is to be sought from him; which is the highest inconvenience, according to all.

4. Likewise, if [God] cannot [produce] anything other [than himself], then there is nothing [ordered] to him nor on account of him; but goodness is in <!-- page 747 -->things and [there is] an order through their relation[^7] to the highest good, from which is every good: therefore on this account no thing in the universe is good or ordered; but this is the highest inconvenience: therefore it is necessary to posit that he can [extend] into another than himself. The first consequence is manifest; for the ultimate resolution in returning stands solely to that [point] in which the first origin in going-out is, as is manifest.

### Conclusion.

> *God can [produce] another, or [act] upon another than himself, but without any imperfection of distance, dependence, or neediness.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this it must be noted that to-be-able [to produce] another, or [to act] upon another than oneself, is twofold: either [to act] upon another as upon something distinct according to essence and remote according to distance, as one contrary acts upon another, since it is impossible that two contraries be in the same subject[^8]; and in this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is by the going-out of the power from the substance, and therefore there is here a removal and a distance. And because it is removed from its substance, therefore it depends upon the substance upon which it acts, and therefore there is here a dependence; and because [there is] distance and dependence, therefore [there is] imperfection and neediness. — In this mode to-be-able [to act] upon another does not belong to God on account of the three aforementioned conditions, as has been shown[^9], because they are repugnant to the divine power, namely distance, dependence, and neediness.

In another mode to-be-able [to act] upon another is said as upon something divided [from oneself] according to form and essence, but not however as upon something remote according to any distance, since the divine essence, while it operates, is intimately in [that other]. And in this mode it posits neither distance nor dependence nor neediness. For since the divine essence is perfect with every perfection, and its power is undivided with every kind of indivision, it depends on nothing else, it stands in need of nothing else: this then is the mode in which it must be posited that God can [act] upon another than himself, or [produce] another than himself.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* From these [things] the first objection is plain. For as to what it first objects: that a power which is [directed] toward another goes out from the agent into the patient; it must be said that this is true where the agent is not in that other according to truth; but where it is, there is no necessity at all of going out.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another depends on it; it must be said that this is true of that [power] whose action is upon another as upon something sustaining [it][^10]; but the divine power does not stand in need of another sustaining [it], which is plain, since it does not need an underlying matter, but makes from nothing. And the reason for this is that, since power is wholly indifferent both from essence and from act, just as essence does not need [anything] sustaining [it], so neither does power.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that a power which is [directed] toward another has the neediness of perfection; it must be said that a power acting upon another is twofold: a certain [power] which is its [own] act, and such a [power] has nothing more when it acts upon another than when it does not act, and this [power] in no way stands in need; and such is the divine power on account of its supreme simplicity. Another is a power acting upon another through an act differing from itself; and such a [power] has more when it acts than when it does not act, and such is [the power] which has neediness in some mode, as the created power. It is not so with the divine power; and therefore, although it is [directed] toward another which is not always present, on account of this nevertheless it is neither needy nor incomplete.

*To 4.* To the last [it must be] said that *potentia* connotes *possibile*, and the *possibile* extends both to being and to non-being[^11]; and just as the *possibile* extends, so also the diversity of the connoted. And therefore it is not said only to-be-able [to act] upon another because it can [act] upon another which is, but because it can [act] upon another which can be; but God cannot of himself be another. Hence the [point] is clear.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 686, nota 4, ubi Aristotelicam definitionem actionis transeuntis invenies. De ratione a S. Doctore hic adiuncta vide Aristot., VII. *Phys.* text. 9. (c. 2.), ubi docetur, illud, unde principium motus est, simul esse debere cum eo quod movetur. — Paulo inferius ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. I supplevimus *et omnis talis distat a substantia*.

en: Cf. above p. 686, note 4, where you will find the Aristotelian definition of transient action. On the ground [*ratio*] here added by the Holy Doctor, see Aristotle, *Physics* VII, text 9 (c. 2), where it is taught that that from which the principle of motion [comes] must be together with that which is moved. — A little below, from the older manuscripts and edition I, we have supplied *et omnis talis distat a substantia*.

la: Id est, cuius operatio sive actio transit in aliquod externum. Huc respiciens Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 17, et IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12, et VIII. c. 1.) potentiam activam sic definit: *principium transmutationis in aliud, secundum quod est aliud.*

en: That is, [a power] whose operation or action passes into something external. Looking to this, Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 17, and IX, text 2 (IV, c. 12, and VIII, c. 1), so defines *active power*: *the principle of transmutation into another, insofar as it is another*.

la: Intellige: quod non est semper praesens potentiae, sive relate ad quod potentia non semper est in actu. Cfr. de hoc argumento Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.). — Mox pro *nisi cum* aliqui codd. ut Z aa bb *nisi quando*.

en: Understand: [something] which is not always present to the power, or in relation to which the power is not always in act. Cf. on this argument Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 13 ff. (VIII, c. 8). — Soon afterward, in place of *nisi cum* ("except when") some codices such as Z, aa, bb [read] *nisi quando* ("except whenever").

la: Aristot., III. *Phys.* text. 32. (c. 1.): *Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis.* — In fine argumenti post *est in Deo* sola Vat. addit *est Deus*.

en: Aristotle, *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 1): *"For in [things] perpetual, to-be-able differs in nothing from being itself."* — At the end of the argument, after *est in Deo*, the Vatican [edition] alone adds *est Deus* ("[it] is God").

la: Hoc axioma formatum videtur ex iis quae Dionys., de *Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 4. § 1, et de *Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 1. seq., de bono profert. — Paulo inferius pro *per potentiam*, quod habent cod. V et ed. I, Vat. cum plurimis codd. minus recte *propter potentiam*; melius cod. Z *secundum potentiam*.

en: This axiom appears to be formed from those things which Dionysius brings forward concerning the good in *de Caelesti Hierarchia* c. 4, § 1, and in *de Divinis Nominibus* c. 4, § 1 ff. — A little below, in place of *per potentiam* ("through power"), which codex V and edition I have, the Vatican [edition] with most codices [reads], less correctly, *propter potentiam* ("on account of power"); better is codex Z, *secundum potentiam* ("according to power").

la: Cfr. supra pag. 180, nota 3. — Ex hac propositione intelligitur, S. Doctorem respuisse illud systema, quod *Occasionalismus* vocatur, quod creaturis actionem denegat, et de quo iam Averroes, Comment. in IX. *Metaph.* text. 7. (VIII. c. 3.) dicit: *Ista opinio est valde extranea a natura hominis, et qui recipiunt huiusmodi, non habent cerebrum habilitatum naturaliter ad bonum.* Cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

en: Cf. above p. 180, note 3. — From this proposition it is understood that the Holy Doctor has rejected that system which is called *Occasionalism*, which denies action to creatures, and concerning which already Averroes, *Comment. on Metaphysics* IX, text 7 (VIII, c. 3), says: *"This opinion is exceedingly foreign to the nature of man, and those who accept this kind [of doctrine] have not a brain naturally fitted for the good."* Cf. below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.

la: Scilicet bonitatis et ordinis. Pro *ipsorum* cod. V *ipsarum* scil. rerum. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Boeth., *de Hebdomad.* sive *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint etc.*

en: Namely [the relation] of goodness and of order. In place of *ipsorum* ("of them [masc./neut.]") codex V [reads] *ipsarum*, i.e. *rerum* ("of the things"). — Cf. on this argument Boethius, *de Hebdomadibus*, that is, *How substances, in that they are, are good etc.*

la: Aristot., II. *Topic.* c. 3. (c. 7.): *Impossibile enim, simul contraria eidem inesse.* Cfr. et *de Praedicam.* c. *de Oppositis.* Hinc si duo contraria agunt, actio eorum in eo sita est, ut unum expellat alterum de subiecto, v. g. calor prodiens ex igne expellit frigus. — Paulo ante pro *unum contrarium* codd. R V *unum contrariorum*.

en: Aristotle, *Topics* II, c. 3 (c. 7): *"For [it is] impossible that contraries be at the same time in the same."* Cf. also *Categories*, the chapter *On Opposites.* Hence if two contraries act, their action is so placed in [the subject] that the one expels the other from the subject, e.g. heat issuing from fire expels cold. — A little before, in place of *unum contrarium* ("one contrary"), codices R, V [read] *unum contrariorum* ("one of contraries").

la: Cfr. tria prima argumenta ad opposit.

en: Cf. the first three arguments to the contrary [side].

la: Hoc sibi vult: potentia omnino non differt ab essentia et actione. — Aliquanto superius pro *in sustentans* multi codd. *sustentante* vel *in sustentatis*; prave.

en: This is what it means: power in no way differs from essence and from action. — Somewhat above, in place of *in sustentans* ("upon [something] sustaining") many codices [read] *sustentante* or *in sustentatis*; corruptly.

la: Sensus est: possibile non tantum respicit ens, sed etiam non-ens. Quare et possibile ab aliquibus definitur: *id quod vel est vel quod potest esse.*

en: The sense is: the *possibile* regards not only being, but also non-being. Hence the *possibile* is defined by some [as]: *that which either is or which can be.*

latin_scholion:
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**I.** Quaestio intelligenda est de potentia activa sive exsecutiva in ordine ad actum transeuntem; hanc in Deo esse, fide certum est. Disputatur tantum inter theologos, utrum et quomodo secundum nostrum modum intelligendi potentia distinguenda sit ab intellectu et voluntate, et ab ipsa natura divina. Scotus docet, potentiam divinam ex natura rei non distingui a voluntate, cum haec sit causa immediata et effectiva operum divinorum extra Deum, praelucente intellectu ut principio directivo. S. Thomas, licet non eodem modo a suis discipulis exponatur, secundum Gotti (I. tr. 4. q. 4. dub. 4.) tenet, attributum omnipotentiae virtualiter distinguendum esse a natura divina, sed non a linea intellectiva et volitiva, et formaliter consistere in intellectu practico, quatenus applicatur a voluntate. Aureolus quem sequitur Suarez putat, ipsam divinam naturam ut praeintelligitur ad divina attributa, esse formaliter et immediate potentiam operativam. Alii virtualiter distinguunt potentiam divinam et a natura et a linea intellectiva et volitiva, quibus favet S. Bonav., infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1, praesertim ad 2, et a. 1. q. 2.

Notandum est in solut. ad 3, quod potentia divina non tantum est semper in actu, sed etiam est suus actus, quatenus est immanens. Hinc respectu Dei non potest applicari axioma Aristotelis, quod qualibet potentia melior est suo actu.

**II.** Breviter et eleganter totam de divina potentia doctrinam comprehendit S. Bonav. in Breviloq. I. c. 7. Ipsae conclusiones fide et ratione constant. — De hac quaestione: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 20. m. 1, de hac et seq. q. — Scot., *de Rerum principio*, q. 2. a. 2. n. seqq. — Thom., *S.* hic q. 1. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 25. a. 1. 2. 3; *S. c. Gent.* II. c. 7. 8. 9. 22. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; *S.* p. 1. tr. 19. q. 77. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
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**I.** The question must be understood concerning *active* or *executive* power in order to a transient act; that this is in God is certain by faith. It is disputed only among theologians, whether and how, according to our manner of understanding, power is to be distinguished from intellect and will, and from the divine nature itself. Scotus teaches that the divine power is not distinguished from the will from the nature of the thing, since the [will] is the immediate and effective cause of the divine works outside God, with the intellect shining forth as the directive principle. St. Thomas, although he is not expounded in the same way by his disciples, according to Gotti (I, tr. 4, q. 4, dub. 4), holds that the attribute of omnipotence is to be virtually distinguished from the divine nature, but not from the intellective and volitional line, and that it consists formally in the practical intellect, insofar as it is applied by the will. Aureolus, whom Suarez follows, thinks that the divine nature itself, as it is pre-understood [as logically prior] to the divine attributes, is formally and immediately the operative power. Others virtually distinguish the divine power both from the nature and from the intellective and volitional line; St. Bonaventure favors [this view], below at d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, especially at [ad] 2, and a. 1, q. 2.

It is to be noted in the solution to [argument] 3, that the divine power is not only always in act, but is also its own act, insofar as it is immanent. Hence with respect to God the axiom of Aristotle cannot be applied, that every power is better than its act.

**II.** St. Bonaventure briefly and elegantly comprehends the whole doctrine on the divine power in *Breviloquium* I, c. 7. The conclusions themselves are established by faith and by reason. — On this question: Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 20, m. 1, on this and the following question. — Scot., *de Rerum principio*, q. 2, a. 2, n. seqq. — Thomas, *S.* here q. 1, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 25, a. 1. 2. 3; *S. c. Gent.* II, c. 7. 8. 9. 22. — B. Albert., here a. 1; *S.* p. 1, tr. 19, q. 77, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1, *princ.* q. 2. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus.
#### *De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.*

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum Deus possit omne quod potest agens creatum.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus possit in omne aliud, in quod potest omne agens creatum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Qui enim *omne* dicit nihil excipit; sed non tantum dicimus et credimus Deum potentem, sed Deum omnipotentem[^1]: ergo etc.

2. Item, quia Deus est omnisciens, ideo scit omnia, quaecumque scit alius sciens; si enim aliquis sciret aliquid, quod non sciret Deus, Deus non diceretur omnisciens: ergo pari ratione non diceretur omnipotens, nisi posset[^2] omne quod potest omnis alius.

3. Item, Deus non dicitur omnipotens, quia non vult omnia, quae alii volunt: ergo pari ratione, si non posset omnia quae alii possunt[^3], non esset omnipotens.

4. Item, omne *esse* est a primo *esse*, ergo omne *posse* est a primo *posse*: ergo omnis potentia potest quidquid potest propter divinam potentiam; sed «propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis»[^4]: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Aliqua creatura potest omnia recipere corporaliter, ut materia; aliqua potest omnia recipere spiritualiter[^5]; sed Deus nihil potest recipere: ergo non potest omne quod potest aliud a se. Si dicas, quod non est potentiae, sed impotentiae; contra: nulla impotentia est a Deo sive a potentia divina: ergo secundum hoc potentia materiae sive animae non esset a Deo.

2. Item, homo potest pati miseriam sive sustinere poenam; Deus non potest pati: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod illud est impotentiae[^6]; contra: nullum opus virtutis est impotentiae; sed sustinere est opus fortitudinis, quae propriissime est virtus[^7]: ergo etc.

3. Item, homo potest peccare, Deus autem non potest: ergo etc. Quodsi potest peccare, potest esse malus; quod est inconveniens. Si dicas, quod hoc *posse* non est potentiae; contra: Augustinus *de Civitate Dei*[^8]: «Melior est natura, quae potest peccare, quam quae non potest peccare»: ergo *posse peccare* spectat ad nobilitatem et perfectionem naturae, ergo non dicit impotentiam.

4. Item, homo potest currere et comedere; Deus hoc non potest: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod hoc est impotentiae; contra: omne illud quod dicit positionem, est a potentia, quae vere est potentia; sed currere et comedere non dicunt actus privativos, sed positivos[^9]: ergo sunt a potentia, in quantum potens est, non in quantum impotens: ergo manifestum est etc.

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### Conclusio.

> *Deus potest omne quod potest agens creatum, dummodo posse non dicat impotentiam, ita tamen, ut per se et in se possit quod est potentiae perfectae, in alio vero, quod est potentiae imperfectae, et nullatenus quod est omnimodae impotentiae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Philosophus *in philosophia prima*[^10]: Quaedam sunt, quae dicunt *potentiam* quantum ad modum dicendi, dicunt tamen *impotentiam* a parte rei, ut posse mori, posse corrumpi. Propter hoc intelligendum, quod quaedam sunt, quae *posse* est potentiae simpliciter et perfectae, ut posse intelligere, diligere et operari. Quaedam sunt, quae *posse* est potentiae, tamen imperfectae, ut currere et ambulare; isti enim actus dicunt simul actionem et passionem sive defectum in agente[^11]. Quaedam, quae *posse* simpliciter est impotentiae, ut privationes, ut posse peccare, posse deficere, loquendo de his ratione privationis.

Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod cum potentia Dei sit potentia perfectissima, illa potest Deus *per se* et *in se*, quae sunt potentiae simpliciter, ut intelligere et operari. Illa vero, quae sunt imperfectae potentiae, potest quidem non *in se*, sed *per se*: per se potest ex hoc quod est ibi perfectionis et potentiae; in se non potest propter illud quod est ibi imperfectionis et impotentiae, quae in eo non cadunt. Illa autem, quae sunt simpliciter impotentiae, nec potest *in se* nec potest *per se*. *In se* non potest, quia imperfectio in eo non cadit[^12]; *per se* non potest, quia nihil est a Deo, quod non sit a Deo per se et immediate; hoc autem quod est defectus, non potest esse in Deo nec a Deo, quia Deus non deficit in essendo nec in agendo.

Si ergo quaeratur, utrum Deus possit omne quod potest aliud agens; respondendum est non simpliciter, sed cum determinatione, quod potest omne quod *posse* est potentiae; et *in se* potest omne quod est potentiae simpliciter[^13]; *in alio* potest quod est potentiae imperfectae; nec *in se* nec *in alio*, quod est omnimodae impotentiae: et hoc ipso dicitur omnipotens, quia potentia eius ad omnia sufficit et in nullo deficit.

**Ad argumenta in oppositum:**

*Ad 1. 2. 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non potest recipere res nec rerum similitudines; dicendum ad hoc et ad omnia, de quibus obiicit, quod illa *posse* non est potentiae perfectae. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod est *potentia omnino sufficiens et activa*, ut potentia producendi res; et est *potentia pure passiva*, ut potentia suscipiendi; et est *potentia defectiva*, ut potentia peccandi; et est *potentia partim activa, partim passiva*, ut potentia ambulandi; et est *potentia partim activa et partim defectiva*, ut potentia suscipiendi poenam[^14]; et *potentia partim passiva et partim defectiva*, ut potentia moriendi. — Dicendum ergo, quod nihil horum *in se* potest Deus; quamvis enim sint potentiae alicuius, derogant tamen perfectioni potentiae. Nec est simile de scientia, quia *scitum* non diminuit de ratione scientiae, sicut *possibile* de ratione poten<!-- page 750 -->tiae, quia *scitum* non causatur a scientia, sicut *possibile* a potentia.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud tamen quod dicitur de potentia peccandi, intelligendum, quod si *peccare* dicat effectum cum deformitate sive actum, sic non tantum dicit potentiam defectivam, sed activam ratione actus substrati, et sic dicit nobilitatem; si ratione deformitatis, sic dicit simpliciter defectum. Quocumque tamen modo dicatur, quia semper concernit defectum, nullo modo convenit Deo.

english:
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### Article unique.
#### *On power (potentia) in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].*

### Question II.
#### *Whether God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do].*

Secondly it is asked whether God can [do] everything else, in [respect of] which every created agent can [act]. And that this is so, it appears [thus].

1. For he who says *all* excepts nothing; but we say and believe God to be not only powerful, but omnipotent[^1]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, since God is omniscient, therefore he knows all [things] whatsoever any other knower knows; for if anyone knew something which God did not know, God would not be called omniscient: therefore by parity of reason he would not be called omnipotent, unless he could [do] everything which every other can [do][^2].

3. Likewise, God is not called omnipotent because he does not will all [the things] which others will: therefore by parity of reason, if he could not [do] all [the things] which others can [do][^3], he would not be omnipotent.

4. Likewise, every *being* (*esse*) is from the first *being*, therefore every *being-able* (*posse*) is from the first *being-able*: therefore every power can whatever it can on account of the divine power; but «on account of which each thing [is such], that [thing itself is] also more so»[^4]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Some creature can receive all [things] corporeally, as matter [does]; some [creature] can receive all [things] spiritually[^5]; but God cannot receive anything: therefore he cannot [do] everything which something other than himself can [do]. If you say that this [belongs] not to power but to impotence; on the contrary: no impotence is from God or from the divine power: therefore on this account the power of matter or of soul would not be from God.

2. Likewise, a man can suffer misery or endure punishment; God cannot suffer: therefore etc. If you say that that [belongs] to impotence[^6]; on the contrary: no work of virtue is of impotence; but to endure is a work of fortitude, which is most properly a virtue[^7]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a man can sin, but God cannot: therefore etc. But if [God] can sin, he can be evil; which is unfitting. If you say that this *being-able* does not [belong] to power; on the contrary: Augustine, *On the City of God*[^8]: «Better is the nature which can sin than [the nature] which cannot sin»: therefore *being-able-to-sin* pertains to the nobility and perfection of nature, therefore it does not bespeak impotence.

4. Likewise, a man can run and eat; God cannot [do] this: therefore etc. If you say that this [belongs] to impotence; on the contrary: every [thing] which bespeaks position [a positive state] is from power, which is truly a power; but to run and to eat do not bespeak privative acts, but positive [ones][^9]: therefore they are from power, insofar as it is powerful, not insofar as it is impotent: therefore it is manifest etc.

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### Conclusion.

> *God can [do] everything that a created agent can [do], provided that the being-able does not bespeak impotence, in such a way, however, that through himself and in himself he can [do] that which [belongs] to perfect power, but in another [he can do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power, and in no wise that which [belongs] to total impotence.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Philosopher says in *first philosophy*[^10]: There are certain [things] which bespeak *power* with respect to the mode of speaking, yet bespeak *impotence* on the side of the thing, as to-be-able-to-die, to-be-able-to-be-corrupted. On account of this it must be understood that there are certain [things] whose *being-able* belongs to power simply and perfectly, as to-be-able-to-understand, to-love and to-operate. There are certain [things] whose *being-able* belongs to power, yet imperfectly, as to-run and to-walk; for these acts bespeak together action and passion or a defect in the agent[^11]. There are certain [things] whose *being-able* simply [belongs] to impotence, as privations, as to-be-able-to-sin, to-be-able-to-fail, speaking of these by reason of privation.

According to this it must be understood that, since the power of God is the most perfect power, God can [do] *through himself* and *in himself* those [things] which [belong] to power simply, as to-understand and to-operate. But those [things] which [belong] to imperfect power, [God] can [do] indeed not *in himself*, but *through himself*: he can *through himself* on account of that which is there of perfection and power; *in himself* he cannot, on account of that which is there of imperfection and impotence, which do not fall in him. But those [things] which [belong] simply to impotence, he can neither *in himself* nor can he *through himself*. *In himself* he cannot, because imperfection does not fall in him[^12]; *through himself* he cannot, because nothing is from God which is not from God through himself and immediately; but this [thing] which is a defect, cannot be in God nor from God, since God does not fail in being or in acting.

If therefore it be asked whether God can [do] everything that another agent can [do]; the answer is, not simply, but with determination, [namely] that he can [do] everything whose *being-able* belongs to power; and *in himself* he can [do] everything which [belongs] to power simply[^13]; *in another* he can [do] that which [belongs] to imperfect power; neither *in himself* nor *in another* [can he do] that which [belongs] to total impotence: and by this very thing he is called omnipotent, since his power suffices for all [things] and fails in none.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1, 2, 4.* To that which is objected, that he cannot receive things nor the likenesses of things; it must be said to this and to all [the things] of which [the opponent] objects, that that *being-able* does not [belong] to perfect power. According to this it must be understood that there is *power wholly sufficient and active*, as the power of producing things; and there is *purely passive power*, as the power of receiving; and there is *defective power*, as the power of sinning; and there is *power partly active, partly passive*, as the power of walking; and there is *power partly active and partly defective*, as the power of undergoing punishment[^14]; and *power partly passive and partly defective*, as the power of dying. — It must therefore be said that none of these can God [do] *in himself*; for although they are powers of some [thing], yet they derogate from the perfection of power. Nor is the case similar with knowledge, since *the known* does not diminish from the account (*ratio*) of knowledge, as *the possible* [does] from the account of pow<!-- page 750 -->er, because *the known* is not caused by knowledge, as *the possible* [is] by power.

*To 3.* To that, however, which is said of the power of sinning, it must be understood that if *to sin* bespeaks an effect with deformity, or an act, then it bespeaks not only a defective power but [a power] active by reason of the substrate act, and thus it bespeaks nobility; if [it bespeaks the act] by reason of the deformity, then it bespeaks simply a defect. In whatever mode, however, it be said, since it always involves a defect, it in no way befits God.

la: *Symbol. Apostolorum:* «Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem.» — Pro *sed Deum omnipotentem* cod. M *sed etiam omnipotentem*.

en: *Apostles' Creed:* «I believe in God the Father almighty.» — In place of *sed Deum omnipotentem* ("but God almighty") codex M [reads] *sed etiam omnipotentem* ("but also almighty").

la: Plurimi codd. et ed. I *possit*.

en: Most codices and edition I [read] *possit* (subjunctive: "could").

la: Cod. T cum pluribus aliis minus congrue *possent*.

en: Codex T with several others, less fittingly, [reads] *possent* ("they were able").

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 2.

en: Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 2.

la: Quare et Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 37. (c. 8.) dicit, *animam cognoscentem esse quodammodo omnia.* Quid sibi velit haec sententia, vide supra d. 3. p. I. q. I. ad 1. De potentia materiae recipiendi formas vide ibid. p. II. a. I. q. 3. ad 4. — In hac propositione post *secundum aliqua* Vat. cum multis codd. interiicit *potentia*, simulque cum codd. P Q K (K a secunda manu) addit *ut spiritus rationalis creatus*, et cod. *ut anima*. Nonnulli codd. cum Vat. post *aliqua* ponunt *potentia*, sed omittunt deinde *potest*. Nostrae lectioni suffragantur codd. M V X et ed. 1. Paulo inferius post *Si dicas, quod* supple cum cod. K *hoc*.

en: Hence also Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 37 (c. 8), says *that the knowing soul is in some manner all things.* On what this saying means, see above d. 3, p. I, q. I, ad 1. On the power of matter to receive forms, see ibid. p. II, a. I, q. 3, ad 4. — In this proposition, after *secundum aliqua* the Vatican [edition] with many codices inserts *potentia*, and together with codices P, Q, K (K from a second hand) adds *ut spiritus rationalis creatus* ("as a created rational spirit"), and [one] codex [reads] *ut anima* ("as a soul"). Some codices with the Vatican [edition] place *potentia* after *aliqua*, but then omit *potest*. Our reading is supported by codices M, V, X and edition I. A little below, after *Si dicas, quod* supply with codex K *hoc* ("this").

la: Pro *impotentiae* Vat. hic et immediate post atque etiam in seq. argumento *impossibile*, et similiter in tertio argumento *possibile* pro *potentiae*, quam immutationem vocum contextus et codd. cum ed. 1 prorsus reprobant.

en: In place of *impotentiae* the Vatican [edition], here and immediately after, and also in the following argument [reads] *impossibile*, and similarly in the third argument *possibile* in place of *potentiae*; which change of words the context and the codices, together with edition I, wholly reject.

la: De fortitudine eiusque actibus vide Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 6. seqq.

en: On fortitude and its acts, see Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 6 ff.

la: Libr. XII. c. 1. n. 3, sed non eisdem verbis. Verbis *de Civitate Dei* codd. aa bb adiungunt *vel de Libero arbitrio*, in quo libro nimirum simile testimonium exhibetur. Loquens enim S. August., ibi libr. III. c. 5. n. 16, de animabus peccatricibus ait: *cum et tales adhuc meliores sint eis, quae, quoniam nullum habent rationale ac liberum voluntatis arbitrium, peccare non possunt.* — Mox pro *nobilitatem*, quam vocem ex potioribus codd. ut K L N P Q V Y ff et ed. 1 revocavimus, Vat. minus bene *bonitatem*, et non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam *voluntatem*.

en: Book XII, c. 1, n. 3, but not in the same words. To the words *de Civitate Dei* codices aa, bb add *vel de Libero arbitrio*, in which book a similar testimony is exhibited. For St. Augustine, speaking there [in] book III, c. 5, n. 16, of sinning souls, says: *since even such are still better than those which, because they have no rational and free choice of will, cannot sin.* — Soon after, in place of *nobilitatem* ("nobility"), which word we have restored from the better codices such as K, L, N, P, Q, V, Y, ff and edition I, the Vatican [edition] [reads] less well *bonitatem* ("goodness"), and not a few codices with editions 2, 3 wrongly *voluntatem* ("will").

la: Vat. cum aliis edd. et pluribus codd. *actus privationis, sed positionis*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with the other editions and several codices [read] *actus privationis, sed positionis* ("acts of privation, but of position").

la: Libr. V. *Metaph.* text. 17. (IV. c. 12.), ubi Philosophus, agens de potentia et impotentia, duplicem distinguit potentiam, scil. activam et passivam, cui duplici potentiae respondent duo modi possibilis (potentis), nempe *potens agere* et *potens pati* sive *mutari*. De hoc secundo modo ait: *Alio vero [modo possibile est], si quid ad quodcumque transmutetur, sive in peius sive in melius potentiam habeat; etenim quod corrumpitur videtur possibile esse corrumpi, aliter non corrumperetur, si impossibile esset; nunc autem habet quandam dispositionem, causam et principium huiuscemodi passionis; quandoque enim propterea quod habet, quandoque propterea quod privatur, tale esse videtur... Aequivoce autem dicimus ipsum* ens; *quare propterea quod habet habitum quendam et principium possibile est, et propterea quod habet huius privationem, si possibile est privationem habere.* Cfr. etiam IX. *Metaph.* text. 2. seqq. (VIII. c. 1.).

en: Book V, *Metaphysics* text 17 (IV, c. 12), where the Philosopher, treating of power and impotence, distinguishes power as twofold, namely active and passive, to which twofold power correspond two modes of *possible* (i.e., *capable*), namely *able-to-act* and *able-to-undergo* or *to-be-changed*. Of this second mode he says: *But in another [mode it is *possible*], if anything be transmuted into anything, whether it has the power for the worse or for the better; for that which is corrupted appears possible to be corrupted, otherwise it would not be corrupted, were it impossible; but now it has a certain disposition, cause, and principle of such passion; for sometimes on account of what it has, sometimes on account of what it is deprived of, it seems to be such... But we say* being *itself equivocally; wherefore on account of having a certain habit and principle it is *possible*, and on account of having the privation of this, if it is possible to have the privation.* Cf. also *Metaphysics* IX, text 2 ff. (VIII, c. 1).

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 28. (c. 7.), assignans differentiam inter actum physici motus et sentientis, ait: «*Motus enim actus erat imperfecti; simpliciter autem actus, qui perfecti est, alius est*». Quae verba Averroes exponit sic: Et causa, propter quam isti motui (physico) contingit transmutatio et alteratio, illi (sentire, cognoscere) autem non, est, quia iste motus, cui accidit transmutatio, est actio non perfecta et via ad complementum, ille autem est actio perfecta, immo complementum. — Quod ad sequentem propositionem attinet, illud Aristot., IX. *Metaph.* text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) auferre iuvat: *Necesse autem est, etiam in malis finem et actum deteriorem potentia esse; etenim potens est idem ambo contraria... Non igitur quidquam in his quae a principio et quae perpetua sunt, malum est neque corruptum; etenim corruptis de malis est.*

en: Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 28 (c. 7), assigning the difference between the act of physical motion and [that] of the sentient [soul], says: «*For motion was the act of the imperfect; but the act simply [speaking], which is of the perfect, is another [kind]*». Which words Averroes expounds thus: And the cause on account of which to this (physical) motion there happens transmutation and alteration, but not to that (sensing, knowing), is that this motion, to which transmutation happens, is an action not perfect and a way to completion, but the other is a perfect action, indeed [the] completion. — As to the following proposition, it helps to bring forward this [text] of Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9): *It must be also that in evil [things] the end and the act be worse than the power; for the powerful [thing] is the same [in regard to] both contraries... Therefore there is no evil nor corrupted [thing] in those which are from a principle and which are perpetual; for the corrupted is [taken] from evil [things].*

la: Hic in codd. nec non in Vat. est erratum, quod saepe in mss. occurrit et *homoioteleuton* vocatur. Deest enim probatio primae partis propositionis disiunctivae, quae praecedit, quam probationem supplevimus adiungendo ex ed. 1: *In se non potest, quia imperfectio non cadit*. Propter consonantiam cum praecedentibus haec verba a festinantibus aut oscitantibus librariis omissa sunt.

en: Here in the codices and in the Vatican [edition] there is an error which often occurs in manuscripts and is called *homoioteleuton*. For there is missing the proof of the first part of the preceding disjunctive proposition, which proof we have supplied by adding from edition I: *In se non potest, quia imperfectio non cadit* ("In itself he cannot, since imperfection does not fall [in him]"). On account of the consonance with the preceding, these words were omitted by hurried or careless scribes.

la: Vat. cum aliquibus codd. addit *et perfectae*. — Idem docet Magister, hic in lit. c. 2.

en: The Vatican [edition] with some codices adds *et perfectae* ("and perfect"). — The Master teaches the same here in the *littera*, c. 2.

la: Sicut apparet in eo qui ipse sibi infligit poenam, nam agendo laeditur. «*Poena* enim, ut S. Doctor ait II. *Sent.* d. 11. a. 2. q. 3, ratione poenae duo nominat, videlicet *nocumentum naturae* et *instrumentum divinae iustitiae*, unum tanquam materiale, reliquum tanquam formale. Unde poena est et ultio, et est etiam passio... non quaecumque passio... sed passio laedens, passio affligens, passio displicens.»

en: As is apparent in him who inflicts punishment upon himself, for in acting he is injured. «For *punishment*, as the Holy Doctor says in II *Sent.*, d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, names two [things] by reason of punishment, namely *harm to nature* and *instrument of divine justice*, the one as material, the other as formal. Whence punishment is both a vengeance and is also a passion... not just any passion... but a passion that injures, a passion that afflicts, a passion that displeases.»

latin_scholion:
**I.** *Descriptio omnipotentiae* (in fine corp.): *quia potentia eius ad omnia sufficit et in nullo deficit*, egregie explicatur in *Breviloq.* I. c. 7. — Distinctio inter *posse per se* et *in se* sumta est ex Alexandro Hal. (S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1.). *In se* superaddit aliquid illi quod Deus potest *per se*, scilicet, quod ipse Deus ut principium proximum rem efficiat, e. g. creare, dum per se facit etiam quae per alias causas efficit. — Verba subobscura in fine solut. ad 1. 2. 4, quibus solvitur quaestio: quare Deus *sciat* omnia, et bona et mala, sed non *potest* malum, explicantur a Richardo a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 4.): «Quamvis scire malum culpae sit scire, et velle illud malum sit velle, tamen posse illud malum non est posse. Scire enim respicit rem quantum ad suum esse repraesentatum intellectui... Potentia vero respicit obiectum secundum suum esse reale. Et quia malum sub ratione qua malum non est aliqua res positiva, sed defectus boni debiti, ideo posse malum sub ratione qua malum est posse deficere; posse autem deficere vere est non posse». — Sententia S. Augustini (3. ad opposit.): *Melior est natura, quae potest peccare* etc., explicatur infra d. 44. dub. 2. Quoad totam solut. ad 3. cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; *S.* I. q. 25. a. 3. 13. — Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. *princ.* q. 1. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The *description of omnipotence* (at the end of the body): *because his power suffices for all and fails in none*, is excellently explained in *Breviloquium* I, c. 7. — The distinction between *to-be-able-through-self* and *in-self* is taken from Alexander of Hales (*S.* p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1). *In se* adds something to that which God can *per se*, namely, that God himself as a proximate principle effects the thing, e.g. to create, while *per se* he also does [those things] which he effects through other causes. — The somewhat obscure words at the end of the solution to [arguments] 1, 2, 4, by which the question is resolved: *why God knows all [things], both good and bad, but cannot [do] evil*, are explained by Richard of Middleton (here a. 1, q. 2, ad 4): «Although to know the evil of fault is to know, and to will that evil is to will, yet to-be-able-[to-do] that evil is not to-be-able. For to know regards the thing with respect to its being represented to the intellect... But power regards its object according to its real being. And since evil under the formality (*ratio*) by which it is evil is not some positive thing, but a defect of a due good, therefore to-be-able-[to-do]-evil under the formality by which it is evil is to-be-able-to-fail; but to-be-able-to-fail is truly *not* to-be-able». — The sentence of St. Augustine (3rd argument to the contrary): *Better is the nature which can sin* etc., is explained below at d. 44, dub. 2. As to the whole solution to [argument] 3, cf. II Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 1. 2. 3.

**II.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; *S.* I, q. 25, a. 3. 13. — Albert, here a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here q. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., here 2, *princ.* q. 1. — Durand., on this and the following question, here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0