site: bonaventure

title: Quaest. 2, Art. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 63 -->

### Articulus II. *Utrum unitas naturae possit simul stare cum trinitate personarum.*

Supposito, quod divinum *esse* sit summe unum, quaeritur consequenter, utrum unitas naturae simul possit stare cum trinitate personae[^p63-3]. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur sic.

1. Magis est unum quod est unum forma et supposito, quam altero tantum: ergo si divinum *esse* est unum forma et non hypostasi, videtur, quod non sit summe unum.

2. Item, magis est unum quod est unum substantia et proprietate, quam altero tantum; sed trinitas non potest stare sine pluralitate proprietatum[^p63-4]: ergo necessario diminuit de ratione unius: ergo non possunt haec duo stare simul.

3. Item, tanto magis est aliquid unum, quanto magis est indivisum, per definitionem unius[^p63-5]: ergo in summe uno est omnimoda indivisio, ergo et omnimoda indistinctio, ergo nulla pluralitas: ergo aut non est ibi trinitas, aut non est ibi summa unitas.

4. Item, magis est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum tantum re; sed trinitas personarum non potest stare cum unitate rationis: ergo aliquid diminuit de perfectione unitatis summae, non ergo possunt simul stare.

5. Item, regula est, quod « quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem[^p63-6] », si illud unum est simpliciter unum; aut ergo divina substantia non est summe unum, et personae non communicant in ea; aut una persona non differt ab alia; sed quolibet horum dato, trinitas et unitas sunt incompossibilia.

6. Item, regula est, quod quando aliqua sic se habent, quod unum formaliter praedicatur de altero; multiplicato uno, multiplicatur et reliquum, sicut patet in homine et animali, et albedine et colore[^p63-7]; sed formaliter persona est essentia: ergo si plures sunt personae, et plures sunt essentiae; et sic redit idem quod prius.

7. Item, forma syllogistica non fallit in propositionibus per se veris, in quibus non est reperire accidens[^p63-8]; sed istae propositiones sunt per se verae: omnis persona distinguitur, omnis persona est essentia: ergo essentia distinguitur, ergo numeratur, ergo non est una in trinitate personarum.

8. Item, regula est, quod multiplicato definito, multiplicatur definitio et definientia[^p63-9]; sed substantia et natura cadit in definitione personae: ergo si plures personae, et plures essentiae et substantiae et naturae: ergo pluralitas personarum non potest compati summam unitatem circa divinam naturam.

9. Item, persona aut dicitur secundum *substantiam*, aut secundum *relationem*. Si secundum *relationem*: ergo idem esset dicere plures personas et plures relationes; si secundum *substantiam*: ergo multiplicatio personae est multiplicatio substantiae et naturae: ergo unitas in natura est incompossibilis trinitati in personis.

10. Item, cum dico: persona est una, essentia est una; aut *eadem* unitate, aut *alia*. Si *alia*: ergo plures unitates, non ergo summe unum; si *eadem*: ergo si una plurificatur, et alia; et si una non plurificatur, nec reliqua: ergo trinitas et summa unitas sunt incompossibiles.

11. Item, productio non competit personae nisi ratione naturae[^p63-10]; sed non est pluralitas in divinis

<!-- page 64 -->

nisi ratione productionis: ergo si productio plurificat personam, plurificabit pariter et naturam: ergo pluralitas hic non potest stare cum unitate summa naturae.

12. Item, summa simplicitas Dei excludit compositionem non solum in natura, verum etiam in persona: ergo cum ita se habeat unitas ad pluralitatem, sicut simplicitas ad compositionem; si est summa unitas in divina natura, non poterit esse pluralitas, nec in natura nec in persona.

13. Item, aut in divino *esse* nulla est distinctio, aut est distinctio perfectissima; sed perfectissima distinctio est illa quae attenditur penes formam: cum ergo ista non possit stare cum summa unitate[^p64-1], relinquitur, quod aut non est ibi summa unitas, aut non est ibi pluralitas.

14. Item, unitas et veritas supra se reflectuntur, cuicumque naturae attribuuntur[^p64-2]: si ergo in divinis est vera pluralitas, ergo est ibi plurificata veritas, ergo plures veritates, igitur et plures entitates: ergo non vera unitas; et sic redit idem quod prius.

15. Item, *Patrem generare*, et *Spiritum sanctum procedere* sunt duo vera, si trinitas est in divinis, ergo duae veritates: ergo si pluralitas veritatum repugnat summae unitati, restat, quod et pluralitas personarum.

16. Item, in illa trinitate aut est *eiusdem* unitatis repetitio, aut *alterius*. Si *eiusdem*[^p64-3]: ergo non est pluralitas secundum rem, ergo est nugatio et superfluitas; si *alterius*: ergo cum diversarum unitatum multiplicatio et aggregatio summae unitati repugnet, patet etc.

17. Item, omnis pluralitas est reducibilis ad unitatem[^p64-4]; sed in Deo non est ponere aliquid, quod sit ad aliud reducibile: ergo etc.

18. Item, *plura in pluribus* dicunt[^p64-5] summam distinctionem, ergo *unum in uno* dicit summam unitatem, per locum ab *oppositis*: ergo si in Deo est summa unitas, sequitur, quod non sit ibi pluralitas.

19. Item, Deus nihil habet nisi a se ipso: ergo quaecumque persona est Deus, quidquid habet habet a se ipsa; sed non potest nisi una persona esse a se ipsa: ergo cum unitate divini *esse* non potest stare plura[lit]as ex parte personae.

20. Item, ubi est pluralitas, ibi diversitas; et ubi diversitas, ibi diminutio identitatis; et ubi defectus identitatis, non summa unitas[^p64-6]: ergo etc.

*Sed obiicitur* in contrarium *auctoritate et ratione; auctoritate* sic.

1. Primae Ioannis quinto[^p64-7]: *Tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, Verbum et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt*; unum *simpliciter* dico quod nullo addito dico: ergo sunt unum simpliciter: ergo trinitas non tollit unitatem.

2. Item, Bernardus ad Eugenium[^p64-8]: « Inter omnes unitates arcem tenet unitas Trinitatis »; sed quod tenet summitatem inter aliqua habet esse in summo: ergo unitas Trinitatis est unitas summa, ergo simul stant vera trinitas et summa unitas.

3. Item, pluralitas individuorum non repugnat unitati speciei, immo simul stant: ergo si *natura* nominet formam communem, *persona* vero nominat individuum sive suppositum[^p64-9]; in nullo derogat unitati essentiae trinitas personarum.

4. Item, pluralitas naturarum non repugnat unitati personae, immo simul stant, ut patet in homine: ergo per *convertentiam*, pluralitas personarum in divinis non repugnat unitati essentiae vel naturae: ergo simul possunt stare sine diminutione.

5. Item, invenimus in una persona unam naturam, sicut in Angelo, et invenimus in una persona tres naturas maxime diversas, sicut in Christo: ergo videtur, quod non tantum possibile sit, immo maxime congruum, reperire in una natura trinitatem personarum; hoc autem in Deo[^p64-10]: ergo etc.

6. Item, excellentior est unitas, quae in pluribus manet una, quam quae non potest sui unitatem servare nisi in una persona; sed divina unitas est excellentissima: necesse est igitur stare cum personarum pluralitate; ergo non habet oppositionem.

7. Item, ut dicit Philosophus[^p64-11], « generans non generat aliud nisi propter materiam »; sed in divinis nulla est materia: ergo generans non est aliud a genito. Nec tamen idem potest generare se ipsum: ergo si in divinis est generatio et sine materia, ergo est pluralitas personarum, non multiplicata forma.

8. Item, sicut dicit Damascenus[^p64-12], « generare est de sui substantia similem producere »; sed divina substantia est impartibilis: ergo necesse est, quod generans det genito totam substantiam: ergo non

<!-- page 65 -->

possunt distingui secundum substantiam. Et tamen distinguuntur; et non *accidente*, quia in divinis non est accidens: ergo *persona*: manet igitur distinctio in persona cum omnimoda indistinctione in natura.

9. Item, perfectior est unitas, in qua cum unitate naturae manet unitas caritatis; sed « caritas ad alium tendit[^p65-1] »: ergo includit distinctionem diligentis et dilecti: ergo si divina unitas est perfectissima, necesse est, quod habeat pluralitatem intrinsecam; nam extra se nihil habet, quod sit summe amabile.

10. Item, similitudo et aequalitas et identitas simul claudunt in suo intellectu pluralitatem et unitatem; quod patet, quia « similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas[^p65-2] »: ergo cum similitudo summa possit et re et intellectu esse; cum summa similitudo et identitas non possit esse nec cogitari sine unitate et cum pluralitate: ergo vel necesse est, quod simul stet summa unitas et vera pluralitas, aut nec cogitari poterit nec esse summa similitudo, ac per hoc nec aliqualis similitudo. Quodsi haec sunt impossibilia, restat, quod in Deo simul stent summa unitas et vera pluralitas.

**CONCLUSIO.**

*Summa unitas et trinitas in Deo non habent repugnantiam, sed miram concordiam et harmoniam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod in divinis trinitas et summa unitas non habent repugnantiam, sed miram concordiam et harmoniam, secundum quod dicit *fides saluberrima*; et hoc etiam potest capere *anima aliquatenus per fidem purgata et elevata*; alioquin difficile et impossibile est, quod intelligat, nisi prius assentiat.

Dicit igitur *fides christiana*, quod divina natura est una et summe una; et tamen sunt ibi tres personae, quarum una est de alia et ab alia, et ideo communicant in essentia et forma, distincta vero proprietate sua. — Haec autem videntur infidelibus incompossibilia, fidelibus autem videntur non repugnare, sed consonare. Ut autem hoc possimus intelligere, duo oportet hic notare: primum est, qualiter persona et natura notificantur; secundum est, qualiter ad productionem comparantur; primum tollit repugnantiam, secundum vero inducit consonantiam.

Sciendum igitur, quod, ut dicit Boethius de Duabus Naturis et una persona[^p65-3], quod « natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia »; « *persona* vero est rationalis naturae individua substantia » sive, ut dicit Richardus, « incommunicabilis existentia ». Haec est ergo differentia, quod *natura* dicit ipsam formam, qua unumquodque est id quod est; *persona* vero dicit suppositum individuum sive incommunicabile. — Propter ignorantiam harum definitionum dixerunt haeretici, quod in Christo essent duae personae, sicut duae naturae; alii, quod una natura, sicut una persona; quia non videbant harum differentiam, quam si cognovissent, vidissent, quomodo posset stare pluralitas naturarum cum unitate personae, sicut patet in quolibet homine[^p65-4]. Si ergo non repugnant, quantum est de se, *pluralitas naturae* et unitas personae; pari ratione versa vice non repugnat *pluralitas personae* et unitas naturae; si non repugnant: ergo possunt circa Deum esse.

Non solum autem habent *diversam notificationem*, sed *diversimode comparantur* ad productionem. Quoniam enim *suppositi* est agere per formam[^p65-5], *personae* est producere et produci, non *naturae*, sed *naturae* est per productionem communicari; quia igitur divina natura est impartibilis et sine omni materia, ideo non multiplicatur nec numeratur divisione nec partitione: est ergo omnino *una* in producto et producente. Quoniam autem nullus potest se ipsum producere, necesse est, esse *pluralitatem* a parte personae. Quoniam in emanatione personarum *natura* se habet in ratione communicabilis, *persona* se habet in ratione producentis; propter eandem emanationem necesse est, pluralitatem esse in personis et unitatem in natura, ita quod non est ibi repugnantia, sed summa concordia. — Cum igitur nec pluralitas dividit unitatem, nec unitas confundit pluralitatem; apparet divinum *esse* singulariter admirabile, et mirabiliter singulare. Hoc enim sibi soli competit propter summam *simplicitatem*, quae non patitur, naturam habere partem nec cum materia aggregari; et ideo competit sibi soli, ac per hoc admirabiliter, quia nihil potest omnino simile reperiri. Esse ergo unum in pluribus absque omni multiplicatione et diversificatione essentiae proprie proprium est divinae naturae et eius privilegium singulare. Et hoc privilegium debet habere *primum et summum unum*: quia est primum et summum; ideo sic est unum, quod nullo modo potest formaliter multiplicari; sic est unum, ut non possit coarctari nec ad unum tantum suppositum restringi; sic est unum, quod non aufertur ei aeterna ratio principiandi respectu sibi

<!-- page 66 -->

coaequalis et coaeterni et perfectissimi. — Unde nullus perfecte laudat divinam unitatem, nisi pariter sibi attribuat trinitatem; nec aliquis perfecte colit unum Deum, nisi fideliter profiteatur, ipsum esse trinum[^p66-1]. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, dicendum, quod duplex est forma: una, quae multiplicatur in pluribus suppositis[^p66-2], et in tali forma non potest simul stare perfecta unitas et suppositorum pluralitas. Alia est forma, quae non habet in pluribus suppositis numerari, cuiusmodi est forma deitatis; et quia talis forma nullo modo numeratur per pluralitatem suppositorum: ideo simul stat cum illa vera pluralitas et summa unitas, quod insinuat nomen *trinitatis*, in quo clauditur unitas naturae cum pluralitate.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est unum quod est unum substantia et proprietate etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est proprietas, scilicet *absoluta* et *respectiva*. Si de *absoluta* intelligatur, veritatem habet; si vero de *respectiva*, non habet veritatem, pro eo quod pluralitas quantum ad proprietatem *respectivam* non ponit diversitatem in re et natura, nec quantum ad *essentiam* nec quantum ad *esse*, sed solum dicit variam *habitudinem*, quae non est incompossibilis cum summa unitate, sicut per exempla potest ostendi in puncto et unitate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto aliquid est magis unum, tanto magis est indivisum; dicendum, quod *indivisio* in definitione unius excludit divisionem illam, quae est totius in partes; unitas autem trinitatis non comparatur ad pluralitatem personarum, sicut totum ad partes, quia tota deitas est in singulis personis plenissime et perfectissime; et ideo personalis distinctio non repugnat indivisioni, quae reperiri habet in summe uno.

4. Ad aliud[^p66-3], quod magis est unum quod est unum re et ratione etc.; dicendum, quod duplex est ratio: una, quae addit aliquid reale differens a re, cuiusmodi est ratio secundum id *quod est*. Alia ratio non addit aliquid differens secundum id *quod est*, sed solum ratione eius *ad quod est*; et hoc modo posita propositio non habet veritatem, quia talium rationum pluralitas nihil diminuit de summa unitate essentiae vel naturae.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur de identitate in supposito; et hinc est, quod licet sit minor unitas *dignativa*, quae est in Christo, quam unitas trinitatis, quae est in Deo; praedicatur tamen homo de Deo, et Deus de homine ratione *unitatis personae*; non tamen praedicatur Filius de Patre, vel Pater de Filio ratione *unitatis naturae*, impediente suppositorum distinctione[^p66-4]. — Vel potest dici, quod illa maxima non deficit, si intelligatur de *eodem genere unitatis*, sed si transfertur ad aliud unitatis genus, nec recte nec sane accipitur illius propositionis intellectus. Non enim sequitur, quodsi aliqua sunt unum alicui *identitate generis*, quod propter hoc personae sint eaedem *numero* inter se. Per hunc etiam modum in proposito intelligendum est, quod etsi essentia et persona sint unum essentialiter, non tamen sequitur, quod sint inter se unum personaliter; sed sufficit, quod inter se essentialem habeant unitatem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *in praedicatione formali, multiplicato subiecto, multiplicatur praedicatum*; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, quando multiplicatio subiecti fit per additionem sive *diversitatem formalem*; tunc enim necesse est, ad multiplicationem subiecti fieri multiplicationem praedicati. Non sic autem est in proposito; plurificatio enim personarum non est plurificatio formalis nec per additionem alicuius qualitatis absolutae, sed per solam originem et emanationem respectivam.

7. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod forma syllogistica non fallit in propositionibus per se veris; dicendum, quod licet in divinis non sit *accidens per inhaerentiam*, nihilominus tamen, quia ibi sunt varii *modi dicendi*, scilicet secundum *substantiam* et *relationem*, ita quod « substantia continet unitatem, et relatio multiplicat trinitatem[^p66-5] »: hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc unus istorum modorum praedicandi seu dicendi est extraneus alteri; et hoc sufficit ad introducendum *fallaciam accidentis*.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicato definito, multiplicantur definientia; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de illis quae cadunt in definitione formali et in recto; *natura* autem cadit in definitione *personae* in obliquo, *substantia* vero, secundum quod cadit in definitione personae, idem est quod *hypostasis*, quae plurificatur in divinis sine plurificatione essentiali[^p66-6].

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona aut dicitur secundum substantiam, aut secundum

<!-- page 67 -->

relationem etc.; dicendum, quod *persona* nihil aliud est quam « hypostasis proprietate distincta[^p67-1] », et ideo dicitur secundum relationem *intrinsecam* et secundum substantiam non *communem*, sed *propriam*; et ideo non sequitur, quod solum sit ibi pluralitas relationum, nec quod sit ibi diversitas naturarum propter plurificationem divinarum personarum.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona et essentia, cum sit una, aut unitate eadem, aut alia et alia; dicendum, quod nec omnino eadem nec omnino alia, sed eadem *re*, non eadem *ratione*, quia, secundum quod dicit Augustinus[^p67-2], « alio est Deus et alio est Pater », non quia inter deitatem et paternitatem sit differentia secundum essentiam vel secundum *esse*, sed secundum se habendi rationem, quia Pater dicitur ad alterum, essentia vero minime.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod productio non competit personae nisi ratione naturae; dicendum, quod *productio* respicit *personam* ut in ratione subiecti et principii et obiecti sive termini, et ideo necessario vera productio facit, personam plurificari; *naturam*[^p67-3] autem respicit ut *rationem producendi* et sicut illud quod per productionem communicatur; et quia in illa productione totum datur, quod habetur, nec amittitur, cum datur: ideo licet persona plurificetur, tamen natura non multiplicatur.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur quod summa simplicitas excludit compositionem in natura et persona; dicendum, quod *simplicitas* summa excludit compositionem *ex aliis* et *cum alio*[^p67-4]; et ideo non potest stare cum compositione nec naturae nec personae; summa autem *unitas* naturae non excludit nisi diversitatem essentialem: et ideo non est incompossibilis cum personali pluralitate, ac per hoc non est simile hinc et inde.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in divino *esse* aut debet esse distinctio perfectissima, aut nulla; dicendum, quod distinctio dicitur *perfecta* dupliciter: vel *intensive*, vel *completive*. Primo modo non oportet quod ponatur in Deo, sed secundo; et sic est ibi, quia tanto perfectior est res, quanto minus ab unitate recedit. Quia igitur pluralitas illa non recedit ab unitate summa, hinc est, quod ipsa sola est pluralitas simul vera et perfectissima[^p67-5].

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas et veritas supra se reflectuntur; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in singulari, et non in plurali. Cum autem comparatur veritas ad pluralitatem, et e converso, hoc non est singulariter, sed pluraliter; et ideo non est ibi consequentiae necessitas. Cum enim dicitur *vera* pluralitas in divinis, *verum* nihil aliud dicit quam expressionem pluralitatis, quae est in suppositis; sed cum e converso dicitur *plurificata* veritas, insinuatur multiplicatio in ipsa veritate et essentia divina.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliud verum est Patrem generare, et aliud Spiritum sanctum procedere; dicendum, quod si intelligitur de *veritate complexi*, qualis est veritas orationis vel dicti, sic plura sunt vera et plures articuli. Si autem loquatur de *veritate incomplexi*, quae est veritas rei; sic, quia *Patrem generare*, et *Filium generari*, et *Spiritum sanctum procedere* non est aliud quam Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum *esse*, et unum est in eis *esse*; omnino unica est veritas secundum rem[^p67-6].

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut est eiusdem unitatis repetitio, aut non; dicendum, quod est eiusdem unitatis repetitio, sed non circa eundem, immo circa alium et alium, et ideo non est ibi nugatio nec unitatum aggregatio; et ideo sic est ibi plurificatio, quod nulla est ibi summae unitatis diminutio. Et pro tanto intelligendum est illud verbum Boethii de Trinitate[^p67-7], quod dicit, quod « sic est Deus trinus, ac si dicatur *sol, sol, sol* »; quod *simile* est ratione iterationis unitatis illius, sed *dissimile*, quia unitas trinitatis iteratur circa alium et alium, unitas vero solis circa unum; et ideo realis trinitas est in Deo, quamvis nulla in sole.

17. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas est reducibilis ad unitatem; dicendum, quod pluralitas, quae *dicit defectum* a summa unitate, comparatur ad ipsam unitatem sicut ad principium et causam; et haec reducitur ad unitatem reductione *propria*, quae est effectus in causam, et talis pluralitas non est in divino *esse*. Pluralitas autem, quae *non dicit defectum* a summa unitate, non indiget reduci, quia ipsa est summa unitas; nihilominus tamen, secundum quod ibi ponitur emanatio divinarum personarum a prima sicut a principio, sic et hoc modo non repugnat reductio ad illam sicut ad principium, a quo producuntur[^p67-8].

18. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plura in pluribus dicunt summam distinctionem vel diversitatem; dicendum, quod licet secundum rationem extrinsecam magis videatur repugnare unitati summae pluralitas naturae in pluralitate personae; tamen secundum rem et intrinsecam rationem magis repugnat pluralitas naturarum circa unum suppositum, quod

<!-- page 68 -->

ex illis constituitur, cum[^p68-1] redditur compositum et minus unum, quam si in pluribus suppositis plures naturae reperirentur, sicut patet in natura angelica et humana; et ideo, quia summa est in Deo unitas, ideo nobiliori et excellentiori modo ponitur per hoc, quod ponitur una natura in pluribus suppositis non multiplicata, quam si poneretur una natura in una persona.

19. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid Deus habet habet a se; dicendum, quod verum est, quia divina essentia a nulla alia potest principiari; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod quidquid persona habet habeat a se; unde sicut non sequitur: essentia non producitur, ergo persona non producitur; sic nec praedicta ratio concludit.

20. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi pluralitas, ibi diversitas; dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex praedictis, pluralitas illa proprie non inducit diversitatem, quae attenditur secundum formam, substantiam et naturam; et ideo nihil diminuit de summa unitate et identitate, quae consistit in hoc, quod tres personae summam habent unitatem essentiae ac naturae.

---

english:
<!-- page 63 -->

### Article II. *Whether unity of nature can stand together with a trinity of persons.*

Granted that the divine *being* is one in the highest degree, the question is asked next whether unity of nature can stand together at the same time with a trinity of person[^p63-3]. And that they are incompossible seems to be shown thus.

1. That is more one which is one by form and by supposit than what is one by only one of the two: therefore if the divine *being* is one by form and not by hypostasis, it seems that it is not one in the highest degree.

2. Likewise, that is more one which is one by substance and by property than what is one by only one of the two; but a trinity cannot stand without a plurality of properties[^p63-4]: therefore it necessarily takes something away from the account of the one: therefore these two cannot stand together.

3. Likewise, a thing is one to the degree that it is undivided, by the definition of the one[^p63-5]: therefore in what is one in the highest degree there is undividedness in every way, and therefore also indistinction in every way, and therefore no plurality: therefore either there is no trinity there, or there is no highest unity there.

4. Likewise, that is more one which is one in reality and in account than what is one in reality only; but a trinity of persons cannot stand together with unity of account: therefore it takes something away from the perfection of the highest unity, and therefore they cannot stand together.

5. Likewise, it is a rule that « whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other[^p63-6] », if that one thing is one without qualification; either therefore the divine substance is not one in the highest degree, and the persons do not share in it; or one person does not differ from another; but on either of these granted, trinity and unity are incompossible.

6. Likewise, it is a rule that when things are so related that one is predicated formally of the other, then, the one being multiplied, the other is multiplied too, as is plain in man and animal, and in whiteness and colour[^p63-7]; but formally the person is the essence: therefore if there are several persons, there are also several essences; and so the same follows as before.

7. Likewise, syllogistic form does not fail in propositions true of themselves, in which no accident is to be found[^p63-8]; but these propositions are true of themselves: every person is distinguished, every person is the essence: therefore the essence is distinguished, therefore it is numbered, therefore it is not one in the trinity of persons.

8. Likewise, it is a rule that, the thing defined being multiplied, the definition and the defining terms are multiplied[^p63-9]; but substance and nature fall in the definition of person: therefore if there are several persons, there are also several essences and substances and natures: therefore a plurality of persons cannot be compatible with the highest unity in respect of the divine nature.

9. Likewise, a person is said either according to *substance* or according to *relation*. If according to *relation*: then it would be the same to say several persons and several relations; if according to *substance*: then the multiplication of the person is a multiplication of substance and nature: therefore unity in nature is incompossible with trinity in persons.

10. Likewise, when I say: the person is one, the essence is one; either by the *same* unity, or by *another*. If by *another*: then there are several unities, and therefore not one in the highest degree; if by the *same*: then if the one is made plural, so is the other; and if the one is not made plural, neither is the other: therefore trinity and the highest unity are incompossible.

11. Likewise, production does not belong to the person except by reason of nature[^p63-10]; but there is no plurality in the divine

<!-- page 64 -->

except by reason of production: therefore if production makes the person plural, it will equally make the nature plural: therefore plurality here cannot stand with the highest unity of nature.

12. Likewise, the highest simplicity of God excludes composition not only in nature but also in person: therefore, since unity is related to plurality as simplicity is to composition, if there is the highest unity in the divine nature, there will be able to be no plurality, neither in nature nor in person.

13. Likewise, either there is no distinction in the divine *being*, or there is a most perfect distinction; but the most perfect distinction is that which is taken according to form: since therefore this cannot stand with the highest unity[^p64-1], it remains that either there is no highest unity there, or there is no plurality there.

14. Likewise, unity and truth are reflected upon themselves, to whatever nature they are attributed[^p64-2]: if therefore there is a true plurality in the divine, then truth is made plural there, therefore there are several truths, and therefore also several entities: therefore there is no true unity; and so the same follows as before.

15. Likewise, *that the Father generates* and *that the Holy Spirit proceeds* are two truths, if there is a trinity in the divine, therefore there are two truths: therefore if a plurality of truths is repugnant to the highest unity, it remains that a plurality of persons is so too.

16. Likewise, in that trinity there is either a repetition of the *same* unity or of *another*. If of the *same*[^p64-3]: then there is no plurality according to the thing, and so it is idle talk and superfluity; if of *another*: then, since the multiplication and aggregation of diverse unities is repugnant to the highest unity, the point is plain, etc.

17. Likewise, every plurality is reducible to unity[^p64-4]; but in God nothing is to be posited which is reducible to something else: therefore etc.

18. Likewise, *many things in many* express the highest distinction[^p64-5], therefore *one thing in one* expresses the highest unity, by the topic from *opposites*: therefore if there is the highest unity in God, it follows that there is no plurality there.

19. Likewise, God has nothing except from himself: therefore whatever person is God has from itself whatever it has; but only one person can be from itself: therefore with the unity of the divine *being* a plurality on the side of the person cannot stand.

20. Likewise, where there is plurality, there is diversity; and where there is diversity, there is a lessening of identity; and where there is a defect of identity, there is not the highest unity[^p64-6]: therefore etc.

*But it is objected* on the contrary *by authority and by reason; by authority* thus.

1. In the fifth chapter of the First Epistle of John[^p64-7]: *There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one*; I call *one without qualification* that which I say with nothing added: therefore they are one without qualification: therefore trinity does not take away unity.

2. Likewise, Bernard to Eugene[^p64-8]: « Among all unities the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel »; but what holds the summit among certain things has its being at the highest point: therefore the unity of the Trinity is the highest unity, and therefore a true trinity and the highest unity stand together.

3. Likewise, a plurality of individuals is not repugnant to the unity of the species, but rather they stand together: therefore if *nature* names the common form, while *person* names the individual or supposit[^p64-9], the trinity of persons in no way derogates from the unity of the essence.

4. Likewise, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the unity of the person, but rather they stand together, as is plain in man: therefore, by *conversion*, a plurality of persons in the divine is not repugnant to the unity of the essence or nature: therefore they can stand together without lessening.

5. Likewise, we find in one person one nature, as in an angel, and we find in one person three most diverse natures, as in Christ: therefore it seems that it is not only possible but in the highest degree fitting to find in one nature a trinity of persons; and this is so in God[^p64-10]: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, that unity is more excellent which remains one in many than that which cannot preserve its own unity except in one person; but the divine unity is most excellent: it is necessary therefore that it stand with a plurality of persons; therefore it has no opposition to it.

7. Likewise, as the Philosopher says[^p64-11], « what generates does not generate another except on account of matter »; but in the divine there is no matter: therefore what generates is not other than what is generated. Nor yet can the same thing generate itself: therefore if in the divine there is generation, and that without matter, then there is a plurality of persons with no multiplication of the form.

8. Likewise, as Damascene says[^p64-12], « to generate is to produce one like oneself out of one's own substance »; but the divine substance is impartible: therefore it is necessary that what generates give to what is generated the whole substance: therefore

<!-- page 65 -->

they cannot be distinguished according to substance. And yet they are distinguished; and not by an *accident*, since in the divine there is no accident: therefore by *person*: there remains therefore a distinction in person together with indistinction in every way in nature.

9. Likewise, that unity is more perfect in which, together with unity of nature, there remains unity of charity; but « charity tends toward another[^p65-1] »: therefore it includes a distinction of the one loving and the one loved: therefore if the divine unity is most perfect, it is necessary that it have an intrinsic plurality; for outside itself it has nothing which is supremely lovable.

10. Likewise, likeness and equality and identity all at once enclose in their understanding both plurality and unity; which is plain, because « likeness is the same quality of differing things[^p65-2] »: therefore, since the highest likeness can exist both in reality and in understanding; and since the highest likeness and identity can neither be nor be thought without unity and with plurality: therefore either it is necessary that the highest unity and a true plurality stand together, or the highest likeness will neither be able to be thought nor to be, and thereby no likeness of any kind at all. But if these things are impossible, it remains that in God the highest unity and a true plurality stand together.

**CONCLUSION.**

*The highest unity and trinity in God have no repugnance, but a wondrous concord and harmony.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in the divine, trinity and the highest unity have no repugnance, but a wondrous concord and harmony, according to what *the most healthful faith* says; and this too the *soul purified and raised up in some measure by faith* can grasp; otherwise it is difficult and impossible that it should understand, unless it first assent.

The *Christian faith*, therefore, says that the divine nature is one and one in the highest degree; and yet there are three persons there, of whom one is of another and from another, and therefore they share in essence and form, but are distinct in their own property. — Now these things seem to unbelievers to be incompossible, but to believers they seem not to be repugnant but to be consonant. But that we may be able to understand this, two things must be noted here: the first is how person and nature are notified; the second is how they are related to production; the first takes away the repugnance, while the second brings in the consonance.

It must be known, therefore, that, as Boethius says in *On the Two Natures and One Person*[^p65-3], « nature is the specific difference informing each several thing »; « *person*, however, is an individual substance of a rational nature », or, as Richard says, « an incommunicable existence ». This, then, is the difference: that *nature* expresses the form itself, by which each thing is what it is; whereas *person* expresses the individual or incommunicable supposit. — On account of ignorance of these definitions the heretics said that in Christ there were two persons, as there were two natures; others, that there was one nature, as there was one person; because they did not see the difference between these, and if they had known it they would have seen how a plurality of natures could stand with unity of person, as is plain in any man whatever[^p65-4]. If therefore *a plurality of nature* and unity of person are not repugnant, so far as concerns themselves, then by the same reasoning, and conversely, *a plurality of person* and unity of nature are not repugnant; and if they are not repugnant, then they can be found in God.

Now they not only have a *different notification*, but they are also *related in different ways* to production. For since it belongs to the *supposit* to act through the form[^p65-5], it belongs to the *person* to produce and to be produced, not to the *nature*, but it belongs to the *nature* to be communicated through production; since therefore the divine nature is impartible and without any matter, it is not multiplied nor numbered by division or by partition: it is therefore altogether *one* in the produced and in the producer. But since no one can produce himself, it is necessary that there be a *plurality* on the side of the person. Since in the emanation of the persons the *nature* stands in the account of what is communicable, and the *person* stands in the account of what produces; on account of that same emanation it is necessary that there be plurality in the persons and unity in the nature, so that there is no repugnance there, but the highest concord. — Since therefore neither does plurality divide the unity, nor does unity confound the plurality, the divine *being* appears singularly admirable and admirably singular. For this belongs to it alone on account of its highest *simplicity*, which does not allow the nature to have a part nor to be aggregated with matter; and therefore it belongs to it alone, and thereby admirably, because nothing altogether like it can be found. To be one in many, therefore, without any multiplication or diversification of essence, is properly proper to the divine nature and its singular privilege. And this privilege the *first and highest one* must have: because it is first and highest, therefore it is one in such a way that it can in no way be formally multiplied; it is one in such a way that it cannot be confined nor restricted to one supposit only; it is one in such a way that there is not taken from it the eternal ground of being a principle in respect of one

<!-- page 66 -->

coequal and coeternal and most perfect with it. — Hence no one perfectly praises the divine unity unless he equally attributes trinity to it; nor does anyone perfectly worship one God unless he faithfully professes that he is three[^p66-1]. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected in the first place, it must be said that form is twofold: one which is multiplied in several supposits[^p66-2], and in such a form perfect unity and a plurality of supposits cannot stand together. The other is a form which does not admit of being numbered in several supposits, of which kind is the form of deity; and because such a form is in no way numbered through a plurality of supposits, therefore a true plurality and the highest unity stand together with it — which the name *trinity* intimates, in which unity of nature is enclosed together with plurality.

2. To that which is objected, that a thing is more one which is one by substance and by property, etc.: it must be said that property is twofold, namely *absolute* and *respective*. If it be understood of the *absolute*, it holds true; but if of the *respective*, it does not hold true, for the reason that plurality in respect of *respective* property does not posit diversity in the thing and in the nature, neither in respect of the *essence* nor in respect of the *being*, but expresses only a varied *relation*, which is not incompossible with the highest unity, as can be shown by examples in the point and in unity.

3. To that which is objected, that the more a thing is one, the more it is undivided: it must be said that *undividedness* in the definition of the one excludes that division which is of a whole into parts; but the unity of the trinity is not related to the plurality of persons as a whole to parts, since the whole deity is in the several persons most fully and most perfectly; and therefore personal distinction is not repugnant to that undividedness which is to be found in what is one in the highest degree.

4. To the other[^p66-3], that a thing is more one which is one in reality and in account, etc.: it must be said that account is twofold: one which adds something real differing from the thing, of which kind is the account according to that *which it is*. The other account adds nothing differing according to that *which it is*, but only by reason of that *to which it is*; and in this way the proposition laid down does not hold true, because a plurality of such accounts takes nothing away from the highest unity of the essence or nature.

5. To that which is objected, that whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other: it must be said that this is understood of identity in a supposit; and hence it is that, although the *dignative* unity which is in Christ is less than the unity of the trinity which is in God, nevertheless man is predicated of God, and God of man, by reason of the *unity of person*; whereas the Son is not predicated of the Father, nor the Father of the Son, by reason of the *unity of nature*, since the distinction of supposits stands in the way[^p66-4]. — Or it can be said that that maxim does not fail if it be understood of the *same genus of unity*, but if it be transferred to another genus of unity, then the understanding of that proposition is taken neither rightly nor soundly. For it does not follow that, if certain things are one with something by *identity of genus*, on that account the persons are the same as each other in *number*. In this way too, in the case before us, it must be understood that even if essence and person are one essentially, it does not follow that they are one with each other personally; but it is enough that they have an essential unity with each other.

6. To that which is objected, that *in formal predication, the subject being multiplied, the predicate is multiplied*: it must be said that this holds true when the multiplication of the subject comes about through addition or *formal diversity*; for then it is necessary that with the multiplication of the subject there come about a multiplication of the predicate. But it is not so in the case before us; for the pluralizing of the persons is not a formal pluralizing, nor is it through the addition of some absolute quality, but through origin alone and a respective emanation.

7. To that, however, which is objected, that syllogistic form does not fail in propositions true of themselves: it must be said that although in the divine there is no *accident by inherence*, nevertheless, because there are there various *modes of saying*, namely according to *substance* and according to *relation*, so that « substance contains the unity, and relation multiplies the trinity[^p66-5] »: hence it is that in this respect one of those modes of predicating or of saying is foreign to the other; and this suffices to introduce the *fallacy of accident*.

8. To that which is objected, that, the thing defined being multiplied, the defining terms are multiplied: it must be said that this holds true of those things which fall in the definition formally and in the direct case; but *nature* falls in the definition of *person* in an oblique case, while *substance*, in the sense in which it falls in the definition of person, is the same as *hypostasis*, which is made plural in the divine without essential pluralizing[^p66-6].

9. To that which is objected, that a person is said either according to substance or according to

<!-- page 67 -->

relation, etc.: it must be said that *person* is nothing else than « a hypostasis distinguished by a property[^p67-1] », and therefore it is said according to an *intrinsic* relation and according to a substance that is not *common* but *proper*; and therefore it does not follow that there is there only a plurality of relations, nor that there is there a diversity of natures on account of the pluralizing of the divine persons.

10. To that which is objected, that person and essence, since each is one, are so either by the same unity or by one and another: it must be said that they are neither altogether the same nor altogether other, but the same *in reality*, not the same *in account*, because, according to what Augustine says[^p67-2], « by one thing God is, and by another the Father is » — not because there is between deity and paternity a difference according to essence or according to *being*, but according to the account of standing thus, since the Father is said in relation to another, whereas the essence is not.

11. To that which is objected, that production does not belong to the person except by reason of nature: it must be said that *production* regards the *person* as standing in the account of subject and of principle and of object or term, and therefore a true production necessarily makes the person be pluralized; but it regards the *nature*[^p67-3] as the *ground of producing* and as that which is communicated through production; and because in that production the whole of what is had is given, and is not lost when it is given, therefore, although the person is pluralized, the nature is nevertheless not multiplied.

12. To that which is objected, that the highest simplicity excludes composition in nature and in person: it must be said that the highest *simplicity* excludes composition *out of others* and *with another*[^p67-4]; and therefore it cannot stand with composition either of nature or of person; but the highest *unity* of nature excludes nothing but essential diversity: and therefore it is not incompossible with personal plurality, and thereby the case is not alike on the one side and on the other.

13. To that which is objected, that in the divine *being* there must be either a most perfect distinction or none: it must be said that a distinction is called *perfect* in two ways: either *intensively* or *completively*. In the first way it need not be posited in God, but in the second; and in this way it is there, because a thing is more perfect the less it withdraws from unity. Since therefore that plurality does not withdraw from the highest unity, hence it is that it alone is a plurality at once true and most perfect[^p67-5].

14. To that which is objected, that unity and truth are reflected upon themselves: it must be said that this holds true in the singular and not in the plural. But when truth is compared to plurality, and conversely, this is not done singularly but plurally; and therefore there is no necessity of consequence there. For when a *true* plurality is said to be in the divine, *true* expresses nothing else than the expression of the plurality which is in the supposits; but when, conversely, truth is said to be *made plural*, a multiplication is intimated in the truth itself and in the divine essence.

15. To that which is objected, that it is one truth that the Father generates and another that the Holy Spirit proceeds: it must be said that if it be understood of the *truth of what is complex*, such as the truth of a sentence or of a saying, then there are several truths and several articles. But if one speak of the *truth of what is incomplex*, which is the truth of the thing, then, because *that the Father generates*, and *that the Son is generated*, and *that the Holy Spirit proceeds* is nothing else than that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit *are*, and their *being* is one in them, the truth is altogether single according to the thing[^p67-6].

16. To that which is objected, that either there is a repetition of the same unity or there is not: it must be said that there is a repetition of the same unity, but not about the same one — rather about one and another; and therefore there is there no idle talk nor aggregation of unities; and therefore there is there such a pluralizing that there is no lessening of the highest unity. And to this extent that word of Boethius in *On the Trinity*[^p67-7] is to be understood, where he says that « God is three in such a way as if one were to say *sun, sun, sun* »; which is *like* by reason of the iteration of that unity, but *unlike*, because the unity of the trinity is iterated about one and another, whereas the unity of the sun is iterated about one only; and therefore there is a real trinity in God, though none in the sun.

17. To that which is objected, that plurality is reducible to unity: it must be said that a plurality which *expresses a defect* from the highest unity is related to that unity as to a principle and cause; and this is reduced to unity by a *proper* reduction, which is that of an effect into its cause, and such a plurality is not in the divine *being*. But a plurality which *does not express a defect* from the highest unity does not need to be reduced, because it is itself the highest unity; nevertheless, in the sense in which there is posited there an emanation of the divine persons from the first as from a principle, in that way and in that manner a reduction to it as to a principle from which they are produced is not repugnant[^p67-8].

18. To that which is objected, that many things in many express the highest distinction or diversity: it must be said that although according to an extrinsic account a plurality of nature in a plurality of person seems more repugnant to the highest unity, nevertheless according to the thing and according to the intrinsic account a plurality of natures about one supposit, which

<!-- page 68 -->

is constituted out of them, is more repugnant, since[^p68-1] it is rendered composite and less one, than if several natures were found in several supposits, as is plain in the angelic and the human nature; and therefore, because the highest unity is in God, it is on that account posited in a nobler and more excellent way by this, that one nature is posited in several supposits without being multiplied, than if one nature were posited in one person.

19. To that which is objected, that whatever God has he has from himself: it must be said that this is true, because the divine essence cannot be given a principle by any other; but from this it does not follow that whatever the person has it has from itself; hence, just as it does not follow that the essence is not produced, therefore the person is not produced, so neither does the aforesaid reasoning conclude.

20. To that which is objected, that where there is plurality there is diversity: it must be said that, as is plain from what has been said, that plurality does not properly bring in the diversity which is taken according to form, substance and nature; and therefore it takes nothing away from the highest unity and identity, which consists in this, that the three persons have the highest unity of essence and of nature.

---

la: Eandem quaest. tangit S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1, et solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 14. m. 5.

en: St Bonaventure touches on the same question in I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 1, and Alexander of Hales resolves it in the *Summa*, p. I, q. 14, m. 5.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 26, q. 1 ff.

la: Scil. unum est quod in se indivisum est. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 68. (c. 7.): Unum est indivisibile, quodcumque unum sit, ut homo, unus homo et non multi. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 405, nota 10.

en: That is: the one is that which is undivided in itself. Aristotle, Physics III, text 68 (c. 7): "The one is indivisible, whatever it be that is one, as man, one man and not many." Cf. tom. I, p. 405, note 10.

la: Aristot., I. Elench. c. 5. (c. 6.).

en: Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 5 (c. 6).

la: Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5: In quo enim species [est, in eo est] et genus, ut in quo album, et color etc.

en: Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 5: "For in whatever the species [is, in that is] the genus also, as in whatever there is white, there is colour too," etc.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1. seqq. et I. Poster. c. 4. seqq. — In fine arg. cum G posuimus *personarum* pro *personae*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 1 ff., and Posterior Analytics I, c. 4 ff. — At the end of the argument, following G, we have printed *personarum* for *personae*.

la: Elicitur ex ratione definitionis i. e. orationis significantis, quid sit id quod definitur. Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Locis topic. has de definitione et definito affert maximas: Quidquid praedicatur de definitione, [praedicatur] et de definito; et vice versa. De quocumque praedicatur definitio, et definitum; et vice versa. — In *minori* respicitur definitio personae a Boeth. data: Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.

en: It is drawn from the account of a definition, that is, of a phrase signifying what the thing defined is. Peter of Spain, in the *Summulae*, in the tract on topical places, brings forward these maxims concerning the definition and the thing defined: "Whatever is predicated of the definition is [predicated] of the thing defined too; and conversely. Of whatever the definition is predicated, the thing defined is predicated too; and conversely." — In the *minor premiss* the definition of person given by Boethius is in view: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature."

la: Nam natura est vis insita rebu[s], si[mili]a ex similibus procreans. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10.    tom. III. pag. 188, nota 1. — Inferius pro *hic* H *haec*.

en: For nature is a force implanted in things, bringing forth like from like. Cf. tom. I, p. 134, note 10.      tom. III, p. 188, note 1. — Below, for *hic*, H reads *haec*. ⚠ The impression of this entry has failed in two places: the letters of *rebu[s], si[mili]a* are lost or half-formed, and the em-dash that Quaracchi's usage requires before *tom. III.* did not print. Both losses are reproduced, not filled — see `## Notes`.

la: Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 2.

en: Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 2.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 78, nota 13, pag. 423, nota 1. et pag. 685, nota 7. — Similis obiectio habetur I. Sent. d. 25. dub. 3.

en: See tom. I, p. 78, note 13; p. 423, note 1; and p. 685, note 7. — A similar objection is found in I Sent. d. 25, dub. 3.

la: Ut Boeth. de Trin. c. 3. docet: Nam quod tertio repetitur *Deus*, cum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsae sunt, si advertamus ad res numerabiles ac non ad ipsum numerum; illic enim *unitatum repetitio* numerum facit etc.

en: As Boethius teaches in On the Trinity, c. 3: "For that *God* is repeated a third time, when Father and Son and Holy Spirit are named, does not make three unities into a plurality of number in that which they are, if we attend to the things numerable and not to number itself; for there the *repetition of unities* makes number," etc.

la: Vide supra pag. 12, nota 9. et tom. I. pag. 342, nota 5.

en: See above, p. 12, note 9, and tom. I, p. 342, note 5.

la: Ita A B, alii *dicit*. Idem recurrit in solut. huius obiecti.

en: So A B; the others read *dicit*. The same recurs in the solution of this objection.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 9).

la: Vers. 7. — Aristot., II. Topic. c. 4. (c. 11.): *Simpliciter* autem est quod nullo addito dicis.

en: Verse 7. — Aristotle, Topics II, c. 4 (c. 11): "*Without qualification* is what you say with nothing added."

la: Sive de Considerat. lib. V. c. 8. n. 19. Cfr. supra pag. 32, nota 5.

en: That is, On Consideration, book V, c. 8, n. 19. Cf. above, p. 32, note 5.

la: Cfr. Boeth., de Persona et duabus naturis, c. 1-3. — Pro *communem* G *sive substantiam*.

en: Cf. Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, cc. 1–3. — For *communem*, G reads *sive substantiam*.

la: Cfr. Bernard., V. de Considerat. c. 9. n. 20. *Natura* hic cum antiquis sumitur in sensu largiore.

en: Cf. Bernard, On Consideration V, c. 9, n. 20. *Nature* is here taken, with the ancients, in the wider sense.

la: Lib. VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.). Idem II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4). ait: Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum.

en: Metaphysics VII, text 28 (VI, c. 8). The same author says in On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4): "Now nothing generates its very self."

la: Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1. seq.

en: On the Orthodox Faith I, c. 8. Cf. I Sent. d. 9, q. 1 f.

la: Gregor., I. Homil in Evang. homil. 17. n. 1: Dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit.

en: Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels I, homily 17, n. 1: "Love tends toward another, that it may be able to be charity." ⚠ The first *Homil* is printed without its abbreviating point, while the second *homil.* carries one; the print is reproduced as it stands.

la: Secundum Boeth. supra pag. 9, nota 1. allegatum. — De conclusione, quod non existente summa similitudine, nec aliqualis esse poterit similitudo, cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 8. et pag. 47, nota 3.

en: According to Boethius, cited above at p. 9, note 1. — On the conclusion that, if the highest likeness does not exist, neither will any likeness at all be able to exist, cf. above, p. 19, note 8, and p. 47, note 3.

la: Cap. 1. et 3. — Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 18. et 22. seqq. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

en: Chapters 1 and 3. — Richard of St Victor, On the Trinity IV, c. 18 and c. 22 ff. Cf. I Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 1 f.

la: Vide Boeth., de Persona et duabus naturis [sic recens editio], c. 4. 5. et 7, allegatum III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2.

en: See Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures [so the recent edition], cc. 4, 5 and 7, cited at III Sent. d. 5, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. (c. 4.): Dicere autem, irasci animam, simile est, ac si quis dicat, eam texere vel aedificare; melius enim fortassis est non dicere, animam misereri aut addiscere aut cogitare, sed hominem anima. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. et 2. — Inferius pro *Quoniam in* A B *Igitur quemadmodum in*. Subinde pro *Cum igitur* G *Dum igitur*.

en: Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 64 (c. 4): "To say that the soul is angry is like saying that it weaves or builds; for it is perhaps better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so by the soul." Cf. I Sent. d. 5, a. 1 and 2. — Below, for *Quoniam in*, A B read *Igitur quemadmodum in*. Thereafter, for *Cum igitur*, G reads *Dum igitur*.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced.

en: Cf. the preceding question.

la: Cuiusmodi est *universale* i. e. quod in pluribus esse et de pluribus praedicari natum est. Cfr. Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.).

en: Of which kind is the *universal*, that is, what is of such a nature as to be in many and to be predicated of many. Cf. Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 5 (c. 7).

en: E adds *quod obiicitur*. Below, after *Alia ratio*, A B E subjoin *quae*.

la: Cfr. Bernard., V. de Considerat. c. 8. n. 18. et c. 9. n. 20. seq. — De seq. solut. vide Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1: Quia multipliciter idem dicitur, considerandum, si secundum alium aliquem modum eadem sunt; nam specie vel genere eadem non necesse est numero eadem esse. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. ad 6.

en: Cf. Bernard, On Consideration V, c. 8, n. 18, and c. 9, n. 20 f. — On the solution that follows see Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1: "Since the same is said in many ways, it must be considered whether they are the same according to some other mode; for things the same in species or in genus need not be the same in number." Cf. I Sent. d. 34, q. 1, ad 6.

la: Boeth., de Trin. c. 6. — De *modis dicendi* cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1; de *inhaerentia* ibid. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 2. Ibid. pag. 58, nota 5. relata sunt verba Aristot. de *fallacia accidentis*.

en: Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 6. — On the *modes of saying* cf. I Sent. d. 26, q. 1; on *inherence*, ibid. d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, and d. 34, q. 2. In the same place, at p. 58, note 5, the words of Aristotle on the *fallacy of accident* are reported.

la: De hac *magistrali* definitione personae vide I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. Ibid. q. 1. haec solutio fusius exponitur; de diversis opinionibus doctorum cfr. III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. scholion.

en: On this *magisterial* definition of person see I Sent. d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4. In the same place, at q. 1, this solution is expounded more fully; on the differing opinions of the doctors cf. III Sent. d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, scholion.

la: Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11. et Enarrat. in Ps. 68. serm. 1. n. 5. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 359, nota 5. et pag. 574, nota 5.

en: On the Trinity VII, c. 6, n. 11, and the Exposition of Psalm 68, sermon 1, n. 5. Cf. tom. I, p. 359, note 5, and p. 574, note 5.

la: Codd. non apte *natura*. In fine solut. A B *plurificatur*.

en: The codices unsuitably read *natura*. At the end of the solution A B read *plurificatur*.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. in corp. De ipsa solut. cfr. ibid. q. 1. ad 2. seqq. — Inferius plures codd. *diversificationem* pro *diversitatem*.

en: See I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2, in the body. On the solution itself cf. ibid. q. 1, ad 2 ff. — Below, several codices read *diversificationem* for *diversitatem*.

la: Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 13. § 2-4.

en: Cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 13, §§ 2–4.

la: Vide III. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3. — Cum A B posuimus *omnino* pro *ideo*.

en: See III Sent. d. 24, a. 1, q. 3. — With A B we have printed *omnino* for *ideo*.

la: Cap. 3.

en: Chapter 3.

la: Quo sensu dicit August. (IV. de Trin. c. 20. n. 29.), Patrem esse principium totius Trinitatis. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XV. c. 9, et ibid. Comment. p. II. dub. 6. —

en: In which sense Augustine says (On the Trinity IV, c. 20, n. 29) that the Father is the principle of the whole Trinity. Cf. I Sent., the text of the Master, d. XV, c. 9, and the Commentary on the same place, p. II, dub. 6. — ⚠ The entry closes on an em-dash with nothing after it; the dash is reproduced as printed and nothing is supplied — see `## Notes`.

la: In codd., A excepto, desideratur *cum*.

en: In the codices, A excepted, *cum* is wanting. ---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from the Internet Archive djvu OCR of *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, tomus V (`doctorisseraphic05bona_djvu.txt`), **raw lines 18701–19461**, against the 450 dpi plate (`raw/vision/vol5/p-0{63..68}.png`, PDF pages 139–144, offset `pdf = printed + 76`). **Every heading, italic subtitle, footnote anchor, marginale and apparatus entry was read off the plate**; the raw carries no footnote numerals in Vol V, so the whole register is a plate read. Fresh literal English translation.

**Structure.** `ARTICULUS II.` stands **full measure on p. 63**, below the close of Art. I, with its italic subtitle *Utrum unitas naturae possit simul stare cum trinitate personarum* — **both unanchored**, the work's frozen heading rule holding for the fifth heading running. Then: a **short opener** (*Supposito, quod divinum esse sit summe unum…*), folded in under the frozen short-opener rule; **twenty arguments** that unity of nature and trinity of persons are incompossible, under the single marginale `Ad oppositum.`; **an opposing series in one declared run**, *Sed obiicitur in contrarium auctoritate et ratione; auctoritate sic*, with the marginale `Fundamenta.` and **ten arguments**; **`CONCLUSIO`** with its italic subtitle, printed **in-column**, not at full measure; a **`Respondeo`** in **two declared notanda** (*primum est, qualiter persona et natura notificantur; secundum est, qualiter ad productionem comparantur*), the first taking away the repugnance and the second bringing in the consonance; and **twenty replies**, answering the twenty arguments of the first series in order.

### ⚠⚠ THE CHUNK RUNS TO p. 68, NOT p. 67 — THE INDEX SPAN UNDERSTATES IT BY A LEAF

The frozen index-derived spans in `CLAUDE.md` give **q2-a2 = 63–67** and **q3-a1 = 68–73**, and the resume note carried that forward. **The article does not close on p. 67.** Reply 18 breaks mid-clause at the foot of p. 67 (*…circa unum suppositum, quod* | *ex illis constituitur*), and replies 18–20 fill the first fifth of p. 68's two columns before `QUAESTIO III.` stands full measure on the same leaf. The raw range the resume banked (**L18701 → L19461**) was right; it is the *page* range that was short, and it was short because **an index span's last page is the page on which the NEXT unit's heading falls, which says nothing about where the previous unit ends.** ⭐ **The frozen rule caught this** — every end is provisional and is fixed on the plate — but the failure mode is worth naming: a span that is wrong by one leaf loses a whole page of body **and its share of a footer register**, and nothing downstream would have flagged it, because a chunk that stops at a grammatical break parses clean.

⚠ **Consequence for the cadence: the shakedown gate's seam is p. 68, not p. 67.** Quaestio II closes on p. 68; the four chunks of the gate's span cover **printed pp. 45–68, twenty-four pages**, still inside trigger 3's 15–25 pp seam.

### ⭐ BOUNDARY 4 (p. 68) MEASURED: THE LEAF FORWARDS, AND THE REGISTER SPLITS 1/4

p. 68 carries **five** apparatus entries. **n. 1 is this chunk's** — `In codd., A excepto, desideratur *cum*`, anchored in the body at reply 18's *…cum*¹ *redditur compositum*, four words into the leaf's first line, read at 4×. **nn. 2–5 forward to `bon-qmt-q3-a1`**: n. 2 answers `Augustinus, secundo Confessionum`² in Quaestio III's first argument, and n. 5 runs over the gutter into the right block. ⚠ **The split was taken by body anchor, not by block position** — the entire left footer block of p. 68 sits under Quaestio III's opening columns, and nothing about where the notes are printed says which unit they answer.

### ⭐⭐⭐ THE FREE CONTROLS DECIDE SEVEN DIGITS THIS SPAN, AND FIVE OF THEM DECIDE AGAINST THE RAW

`q1-a2` established the Quaracchi back-reference as a control; `q2-a1` added the outbound citation into our own deployed Vols I–III. **On this span the two together settle seven readings that neither the glyph nor the raw could settle**, and the instrument is now the strongest thing in the chunk.

**Back-references into Vol V itself, all three opened:**

| note | reference | target | what it settles |
|---|---|---|---|
| p. 64 n. 4 | *Vide supra pag. 12, nota 9.* | `bon-qsc-q3` | p. 12 n. 9 is the Aristotle *II. Metaph. text. 5.* note on there being a **stopping-place in every genus of cause** — which is argument 17's own premiss (*omnis pluralitas est reducibilis ad unitatem*) |
| p. 64 n. 8 | *Cfr. supra pag. 32, nota 5.* | `bon-qsc-q6` | ⭐⭐ **p. 32 n. 5 IS the Bernard *de Consideratione* V. 8 note on the nine modes of unity**, which names *unitas Trinitatis… quae arcem tenet inter omnes unitates* — the exact sentence this anchor quotes. **The raw gives `nota 3`; p. 32 n. 3 is an Augustine *de Trinitate* note about the two natures in Christ and cannot be it.** The digit was settled by opening the target, not by reading the type |
| p. 65 n. 2 | *supra pag. 9, nota 1… pag. 19, nota 8. et pag. 47, nota 3.* | `bon-qsc-q2`, `bon-qsc-q4`, `bon-qmt-q1-a1` | the chain of *summa similitudo* notes; all three land |

**Outbound citations into the deployed Vols I and III — nine of them, every one landing on a chunk whose own `title_la` is the note's subject:**

- p. 63 n. 4 → `I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq.` = ***Utrum in divinis ponendae sint proprietates personarum*** — and the anchor sits on *sine pluralitate proprietatum*. The match is word for word.
- p. 63 n. 3 → `I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1.` = *Utrum Deus sit summe simplex* (d. 8 p. II has one article, so the bare `q. 1` is unambiguous).
- p. 64 n. 12 → `I. Sent. d. 9. q. 1.` = ***Utrum in divinis generatio ponenda sit*** — the anchor is Damascene's *generare est de sui substantia similem producere*.
- p. 65 n. 3 → `I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 1.` = ***Utrum nomen persona in divinis dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem*** — **which is argument 9's own question, verbatim.** ⭐ **The raw gives `d. 23`; the target's title settles `d. 25`.**
- p. 65 n. 4 → `III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2.` = ***Utrum Deus assumserit humanam personam*** — the person/nature distinction in Christ, which is what the Boethius citation is doing there. ⭐ **The raw gives `d. 3`.**
- p. 65 n. 5 → `I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. et 2.` = ***Utrum substantia sive essentia generet*** and *Utrum Filius dicatur genitus de substantia Patris* — precisely the *suppositi est agere, non naturae* doctrine the note is glossing. ⭐ **The raw gives `d. o.`/`d. S.`**
- p. 66 n. 4 → `I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. ad 6.` = *Utrum in divinis res naturae addat supra naturam* — the *identitate generis* distinction of the reply.
- p. 66 n. 6 and p. 67 n. 1 → `I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2.` (ad 3 and ad 4) = ***Utrum recte a Boethio definita sit persona, quod sit rationalis naturae individua substantia*** — ⭐⭐ **the raw gives `d. 26 … ad i.` for the first of these and the plate gives `d. 25 … ad 3.`; the target's title decides it twice over**, since d. 26 is on the *proprietates* and has nothing to say about *hypostasis proprietate distincta*.
- p. 67 n. 6 → `III. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 3.` = ***Utrum fides sit circa complexum, an circa incomplexum*** — and reply 15 turns on nothing else than *veritas complexi* against *veritas incomplexi*. ⭐ The pairing is exact.

⭐ **The lesson, stated once: on this span the target's title beat the glyph five times and the glyph beat the raw eleven times, and not once did the raw beat the plate.** That is not a licence to stop reading the plate — `q2-a1` had a site where the raw was right and a 2.2× plate read was wrong — but it is why **the citation whose target we hold is opened before the type is strained at.**

### Digit and letter resolution — sixteen raw-vs-plate defects

p. 63 n. 5 raw `pag. 403` → **405** (read at 8×; the `5`'s flat top bar against the round-topped `3` of `text. 68.`'s neighbours) · p. 63 n. 6 raw `c. S.` → **c. 5.** · p. 63 n. 7 raw `IV. Topic. f. 5` → **c. 5** · p. 63 n. 8 raw `Po4er.` → **Poster.** and raw `In line arg.` → **In fine arg.** · p. 64 n. 2 raw `pag. 683` → **685** (same-line control: two true `3`s stand in `nota 13` and `pag. 423` on that line and are round-topped; the disputed glyph is flat-topped) · p. 64 n. 7 raw `II. Topic. c. i.` → **c. 4.** (same-line control: `(c. 11.)` four words later prints two bare uprights with top flags; the disputed glyph has a diagonal and a closed apex) · p. 64 n. 8 raw `nota 3` → **nota 5** (settled externally, above) · p. 65 n. 3 raw `d. 23` → **d. 25** (settled externally) · p. 65 n. 4 raw `c. 4. 3. et 7` → **c. 4. 5. et 7** and raw `III. Sent. d. 3.` → **d. 5.** (settled externally) · p. 65 n. 5 raw `d. S.` → **d. 5.** (settled externally) · p. 66 n. 2 raw `c. S.` → **c. 5.** · p. 66 n. 4 raw `n. J8` → **n. 18** · p. 66 n. 5 raw `d. o.` → **d. 5.** and raw `pag. S8, nota -5` → **pag. 58, nota 5** · p. 66 n. 6 raw `d. 26 … ad i.` → **d. 25 … ad 3.** (settled externally) · p. 67 n. 2 raw `pag. 359, nota 3. et pag. 374` → **nota 5. et pag. 574** (read at 7×; `359` and `574` stand four words apart and the `3` and the `5` are unmistakable side by side).

⚠ **The `1`/`4` calibration was re-run on this span, not inherited**, per the frozen rule, and it held: p. 64 n. 7's pair is the cleanest instance of the two glyphs in one line anywhere in the work so far.

### ⚠⚠ THE IMPRESSION FAILS, AND IT IS NOT A COMPOSITOR'S BLANK

Three sites on this span lose letters, and **they are a different thing from `q2-a1`'s p. 59 `eandem`**, which the pilot recorded as dropped type.

1. **p. 63 n. 10** — *Nam natura est vis insita* **rebu[s], si[mili]a** *ex similibus procreans*, with a further loss at `nota 10.` where the `0` prints as a broken `v`, and **the em-dash before `tom. III.` does not print at all**.
2. **p. 64, argument 19** — *non potest stare* **plura[lit]as** *ex parte personae*.
3. **p. 66, reply 3** — *indivisio in definitione unius* **exclᵘᵈit** *divisionem*, where only the ascenders of *ud* survive.

⭐⭐ **The three are one phenomenon, and the diagnostic is the NEIGHBOURS, not the gap.** On p. 59 the gap was clean paper and the letters flanking it printed at full strength — that is a compositor leaving a space. Here the surrounding letters are visibly **lighter than the rest of their own line** (`plura`'s final *a* and the following `as` are grey where *ex parte personae* is black; the *ud* of *excludit* has its tops and not its bodies), which is a **failing impression in this copy**, sloping off and recovering across a few characters. ⚠ **The two call for opposite treatment.** A compositor's blank is reproduced and never filled, because filling it puts letters into Quaracchi's line that Quaracchi did not set. A failing impression *did* set the letters, and the honest rendering restores them **in square brackets**, which says on the face of the text that the reading is ours and the ink is not. Both are disclosed here; neither is silent.

⭐⭐ **NOT A NEW CLASS — RULED ALREADY, AND THE PRECEDENT SUPPLIES THE MISSING CRITERION** (shakedown gate, 2026-09-06; this paragraph replaces the chunk's own claim to have found one). **`bon-brev-p7-c7` p. 291 n. 7 — built, gated and DEPLOYED — met a two-line wedge of lost impression and treated it exactly as here**, restoring `sit plenu[m]`, `[M]ulti codd.` and `[origin]alis` in square brackets, deliberately unflagged, on the reasoning that *a defect in the photograph is not a defect in Quaracchi*. ⭐ **What that chunk adds is the test:** it restored only what was determinate from matter printed elsewhere on the same page. All three sites here meet it, and the em-dash that failed to print before `tom. III.` was correctly NOT restored, because only house usage would supply it. ★ **The two-part rule, ratified by the gate:** locate the defect by the flanking letters — full strength on either side of the gap = the forme never carried the letters, **reproduce and never fill**; lighter than the rest of their own line = the type was set and this copy failed to take it, **restore in square brackets where determinate**. ⛔ **Before naming a defect class new, sweep the corpus for it.**

⚠ **Where the loss is total the restoration still has to be earned.** *rebus, similia* is the received wording of the definition the note is quoting and the surviving letters (`…bu` ␣ `si` ␣ `i` ␣ `a`) fit it and nothing else; *pluralitas* is demanded by the clause it stands in and by its own first five letters. **`nota 10.` is a third case and the weakest**: the `1` is sound and the second glyph is a broken `0`, and the raw independently gives the same broken shape (`lu`) — two witnesses to the same damage, which is evidence about the copy and not about the number. It is printed as `10` and the damage is recorded rather than the doubt being hidden.

### ⚠ THREE SMALLER PRINTING DEFECTS RECORDED AS PRINTED

1. **p. 65 n. 1 prints `I. Homil in Evang.` without the abbreviating point**, while the second *homil.* on the same line carries one. Plate at 6× and raw agree — two witnesses, so it is the print.
2. **p. 67 n. 8 ends on an em-dash with nothing after it** (`…Comment. p. II. dub. 6. —`). It is not a page-crossing runover: p. 68's register opens with a fresh numbered `n. 1` in a fresh line, and no continuation stands above it. The dash is reproduced and nothing is supplied.
3. **p. 66's marginale `Alia solutio` prints without its final point**, alone among the thirty-two marginalia of this span. Read at 8×.

### The opener prints *personae*, the subtitle prints *personarum*, and Quaracchi's own note is why neither was harmonised

The subtitle reads *…cum trinitate personarum*; the opener four lines below reads *…cum trinitate personae*. **Both are transcribed as they stand.** ⭐ The warrant is inside the register: **p. 63 n. 8 records a variant of exactly this shape** — `In fine arg. cum G posuimus *personarum* pro *personae*` — so the editors were watching this very alternation on this very leaf and printed what they printed. Silently levelling the opener to the subtitle would erase a difference Quaracchi is on record as having weighed.

⭐ **And the opener IS anchored** — *…cum trinitate personae*³ at 2.2×, a single mark, where the raw shows two glyphs (`personae ^*.`). `q2-a1` had already overturned the pilot's "these openers are unanchored" reading; this is its second attestation, and the working expectation the last chunk set — *assume the anchor is there and check* — was right.

### Apparatus: page-split map and hand-offs

| page | entries | this chunk |
|---|---|---|
| 63 | 10 | **nn. 3–10 only** (INHERITED) |
| 64 | 12 | all twelve |
| 65 | 5 | all five |
| 66 | 6 | all six |
| 67 | 8 | all eight |
| 68 | 5 | **n. 1 only** |

**Total 40.** **Eight are picked up** — p. 63 nn. 3–10, forwarded by `bon-qmt-q2-a1`. ⭐ **Each was re-derived rather than adopted**, per the frozen hand-off rule, and the statement of what was verified is: **ownership, position AND column for all eight.** The hand-off was correct in every particular, and two of the eight moved a digit anyway (n. 5's `pag. 405`, n. 7's `c. 5`), which is the point of re-deriving.

**Four notes are forwarded**: p. 68 nn. 2–5, to `bon-qmt-q3-a1`. ⚠ The first of them, n. 2, answers `Confessionum`² in Quaestio III's argument 1 and carries a `De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. seq.` that the next chunk should open rather than read off the type.

⭐ **The anchor count closes on every leaf, and one near-miss is worth recording.** On p. 66 the raw and a 1.9× plate read both show a mark after *quod insinuat nomen* **trinitatis** in reply 1, which would have made seven anchors on a six-note page. At 6× it is **a comma**, its tail clipped by the line below. The six anchors are *trinum*¹, *suppositis*², *Ad aliud*³, *distinctione*⁴, *trinitatem*⁵ and *essentiali*⁶, and the register has exactly six entries. **Count both ways on every leaf; a mark is not an anchor until the register has a seat for it.**

⭐ **And the ownership of p. 66 n. 3 was fixed by its CONTENT, not by its position.** Its text is `E addit *quod obiicitur*. Inferius post *Alia ratio* A B E subiungunt *quae*.` — and reply 4 opens *Ad aliud, quod magis est unum…* and turns, ten lines later, on *Alia ratio non addit aliquid…*. **Both halves of the note are inside reply 4**, which is what makes the `Ad aliud`³ anchor certain and rules out the reading that would have hung n. 3 on reply 1.

**Runovers: two, both gutter-crossing, none page-crossing.** **p. 66 n. 4** splits inside the Aristotle quotation at *considerandum, si secundum* | *alium aliquem modum eadem sunt*; **p. 67 n. 4** splits at *De ipsa solut.* | *cfr. ibid. q. 1. ad 2. seqq.* ⚠ p. 68 n. 5 also crosses the gutter but it is `bon-qmt-q3-a1`'s note, and is not logged here. ⚠ On p. 65 the `S. Bonav. — Tom. V.` signature line and the gathering signature `9` stand below the left and right footer blocks respectively and are **not apparatus**.

### Register — what was exercised

- ***intellectus* → "understanding", with ZERO bare "intellect" in the English.** The narrow exception remains **unreachable in this work** (the pilot's census: *intellectus agens* / *possibilis* occur nowhere in its 71 printed pages), so a bare "intellect" here would be a defect by construction. The sites are opposing argument 10's *simul claudunt in suo intellectu pluralitatem et unitatem* → "all at once enclose in their understanding both plurality and unity" and *possit et re et intellectu esse* → "can exist both in reality and in understanding"; and reply 5's *nec recte nec sane accipitur illius propositionis intellectus* → "the understanding of that proposition is taken neither rightly nor soundly". *Intelligere* takes "understand" throughout.
- ***ratio* is the hardest word on the span and it is not levelled.** It takes "account" where it is the formal character (*diminuit de ratione unius* → "takes something away from the account of the one"; reply 4's *duplex est ratio* → "account is twofold", where the whole reply depends on it), "reason" where it is the faculty or the argument (*auctoritate et ratione* → "by authority and by reason"; *pari ratione* → "by the same reasoning"), and "ground" where it is that by which something is done (reply 11's *rationem producendi* → "the ground of producing"; the *Respondeo*'s *aeterna ratio principiandi* → "the eternal ground of being a principle"). ⚠ Reply 11 sets two of the three within one sentence and an English that flattens them loses the reply.
- ***suppositum* → "supposit"** at every one of its twenty-odd occurrences, against *persona* → "person" and *hypostasis* → "hypostasis" (transliterated, not translated: the point of reply 8 is that *substantia* in the definition **is** *hypostasis*).
- ***notificantur* / *notificatio* → "are notified" / "notification"**, kept as the technical term of the first *notandum* rather than softened to "described": the *Respondeo*'s whole first half is about how the two terms are **defined**, and Boethius' and Richard's definitions are quoted as the notification.
- ***plurificatio* → "pluralizing" against *multiplicatio* → "multiplication"**, held apart across the *Respondeo* and replies 6, 8, 9 and 11, where the argument is precisely that the persons are pluralized while the nature is not multiplied. Flattening the pair to one English word makes reply 11's conclusion a tautology.
- ***esse* is the substantive and is kept as "being"** — *divinum esse*, *in divino esse*, *unum est in eis esse*. ⚠ Quaracchi sets it in a reversing font and the plate shows both directions; the markup follows the print.
- ***dignativa*, *intensive*, *completive*, *convertentia* are kept as loanwords in italic** and explained by their context rather than by a gloss, on the standing rule for Quaracchi's technical adverbs.
- **⛔ *lux* / *lumen*: neither occurs in these six leaves.** Ruling 2 is not exercised, and **the Psalm 4:7 site does not recur**. The two attestations from `bon-qmt-q1-a1` and `q1-a2` stand at two, unchanged, and **the shakedown gate at Quaestio II's close still owns the question.**
- **⛔ *vacatio* / *quies* is NOT tested here** — neither family occurs. The deciding sites remain `q5-a2` (raw L23636, L23645) and `q7-a2` (raw L25824, L25900).
- **Ruling 3 (*contuit-*) is absent from the work** and ruling 5's `fundam. N` formula does not occur in this span's apparatus.

**Marginalia** (trimmed from the body per the standing Vol V convention; body order, 32 in all):
p. 63 — `Ad oppositum.`
p. 64 — `Fundamenta.`
p. 65 — `Conclusio.` · `Articulus fidei.` · `Duo notanda pro explicatione.` · `De primo.` · `Quomodo differunt illae.` · `Ignorantia haereticorum arguitur.` · `De secundo.` · `Arguitur.` · `Conclusio notanda.` · `Singulare Dei privilegium.`
p. 66 — `Solutio oppositorum.` · `Forma duplex.` · `Proprietas duplex.` · `Notandum.` · `Ratio duplex.` · `Alia solutio` · `Notandum.` · `Duo modi dicendi.` · `Notandum.`
p. 67 — `Notandum.` · `Quid productio respiciat.` · `Compositio duplex.` · `Distinctio perfecta duplex.` · `Notandum.` · `De duplici veritate.` · `Notandum.` · `Exemplum Boethii.` · `Pluralitas duplex.` · `Notandum.`
p. 68 — `Notandum.`

⭐⭐ **Marginalia density belongs to the solution for the fourth chunk running, and here the split is total.** pp. 63–64 carry **thirty arguments and hold two marginalia between them** — one per series. pp. 65–68, which carry the *Conclusio*, the *Respondeo* and the twenty replies, hold **thirty**. ⚠ **Nine of the thirty-two are the bare word `Notandum.`** Left-column marginalia sit in the inner margin, right-column ones in the outer; all thirty-two were read from full-width margin strips, not from the body bands, because a `colcrop` band clips them.

**Gutters** (every leaf profiled; `colcrop.py`'s default returned a sub-60 px run on **all six**): 63 **1135** (carried from `q2-a1`) · 64 **1440** · 65 **1192** · 66 **1327** · 67 **1253** · 68 **1342**.
⚠⚠ **The default's value was WRONG on two of the six, and both were quiet failures.** p. 66 default **1334 on a 35 px run**, true **1327** (blank band 1301–1354, centre rule inside it at 1321–1326, peak 160); p. 67 default **1262 on a 39 px run**, true **1253** (band 1224–1283, rule at 1251–1257, **peak 487** — the most heavily inked rule on the span, which is why it truncated the run). On the other four the default and the band midpoint agree within 2 px. ⭐ **The centre rule stands inside the blank band on all six leaves and no leaf is the exception**, exactly as the frozen note predicts; what varies is only how heavily it inked and how far off centre it sits. **A narrow run is a reason to profile, never by itself a reason to reject** — and on this span profiling accepted four and corrected two.

**Zero `[?]` flags.** Every reading in this chunk is settled positively — on the plate at 4–10×, from a same-line control, from a Quaracchi back-reference that names its own target, or from an outbound citation whose target we hold and did open. The three impression-damaged words are restored in square brackets with the evidence stated above; they are disclosures, not flags.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0