title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt: Utrum caritas certitudinaliter possit cognosci ab habente caritatem

title_alt: Whether charity can be known with certainty by one having charity

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum quis certitudinaliter scire possit, se esse in caritate.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum caritas sit certitudinaliter cognoscibilis ab habente. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Auctoritate Augustini in octavo *de Trinitate*, et habetur in littera[^1]: «Qui fratrem diligit, magis novit dilectionem, qua diligit, quam fratrem, quem diligit»; sed fratrem novit certitudinaliter: ergo et caritatem.

2. Item, primae Ioannis secundo[^2]: *Qui diligit fratrem suum, in lumine manet*: ergo si caritas est lumen, cum nihil certius videatur quam lumen, ergo etc.

3. Item, primae Ioannis secundo[^3]: *Unctio docebit vos de omnibus*, non, inquam, de omnibus cognoscibilibus, sed de omnibus necessariis ad salutem: sed caritas est maxime necessaria ad salutem: ergo eam maxime nos docet unctio Spiritus sancti.

4. Item, quanto aliquid animae est[^4] praesentius, tanto certius videtur et cognoscitur; sed caritas animae est praesentissima, quia est in ipsa anima: ergo etc.

5. Item, habens fidem certus est, se habere fidem; nihil enim certius est homini sua fide, ut dicit Augustinus[^5]: ergo pari ratione habens caritatem scit, se habere caritatem.

**Contra:**

1. Ecclesiastis nono[^6]: *Nemo scit, utrum sit odio, an amore dignus sit*: ergo cum habens caritatem sit dignus amore, nescit se dignum, ergo etc.

2. Item, primae ad Corinthios quarto[^7]: *Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum*: ergo videtur, quod homo non habens remorsum possit non esse iustificatus, ergo non habere caritatem; sed nullum signum evidentius est caritatis quam carentia omnis remorsus: ergo si illud est fallibile, cetera sunt fallibilia.

3. Item, caritatis[^8] est diligere Deum propter se et super omnia, ita quod nihil aeque vel supra vel contra; sed nemo scit, utrum prae omnibus diligat Deum: ergo nemo scit, utrum habeat certitudinaliter caritatem.

4. Item, habentis caritatem est Deo acceptus, et hoc[^9] constat nobis et omnibus, quod ista sunt con-

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vertibilia; sed nemo scit, utrum Deo sit acceptus nisi per revelationem: ergo nemo scit, se habere caritatem nisi per revelationem.

5. Item, dicit Apostolus[^10], quod nesciebat, utrum haberet culpam, cum dicit: *sed non in hoc iustificatus sum*; ergo ab oppositis, nesciebat, se habere gratiam: ergo cum caritas non sit sine gratia, ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Homo in statu viae, sed sine revelatione, nec de se nec de alio potest scire certitudinaliter, quod sit in caritate, tamen hoc per signa aliqua potest probabiliter cognoscere.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod caritatem cognosci certitudinaliter[^11] est dupliciter: vel in universali, quid sit et qualis esse debeat, et sic utique cognosci potest; alio modo est cognosci caritatem in speciali sive in hoc, et hoc modo nec de se nec de alio, quamdiu homo vivit, potest certitudinaliter scire: de alio non, quia non novit, quae sunt in homine[^12], nisi per signa, quae fallibilia sunt; de se non, et huius potest esse quadruplex ratio.

Una et praecipua est divinae acceptationis implicatio; quia caritas iuncta est gratiae gratum facienti, quae ideo dicitur gratum faciens, quia reddit hominem Deo acceptum; et ideo caritas sic vocatur, non tantum quia habet carum amatum, sed etiam quia facit hominem Deo carum. Et quia nescimus Dei acceptationem certitudinaliter nisi per revelationem, ideo nescimus, nos habere caritatem, nisi per revelationem doceamur.

Secunda ratio est similitudo ipsius ad dilectionem acquisitam. Potest enim contingere, aliquem inflammari ad amandum Deum per assuefactionem, qui corruet per aliquod peccatum spirituale, et tamen semper afficietur; sicut expresse patet per beatum Bernardum in libro *de Amore Dei*[^13], ubi reprehendit superbientes de devotione.

Tertia ratio est nostri oculi lippitudo, quia oculus noster est sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae, sicut dicit Philosophus[^14]. Unde sicut oculus lippus nesciret distinguere inter lumen diei et lumen flammae vel lunae, ita oculus noster spiritualis inter lumen gratiae gratis datae et gratum facientis.

Quarta ratio est divinorum iudiciorum dispensatio. Deus enim claudit oculos servorum suorum quantum ad ea quae spectant ad eorum dignitatem, et de quibus possunt efferri. Unde gratia contraria est superbiae. Superbia enim aperit oculos ad videndum praerogativas et claudit ad videndum indigentias et defectus, iuxta illud Apocalypsis tertio[^15]: *Dicis, quia dives sum et locupletatus et nullius indigeo, et nescis, quia pauper es et caecus* etc. Sed e contra vir sanctus dicit, se nihil esse, quia claudit[^16] oculos suos Deus ad bona et aperit ad videnda mala. Et haec est ratio, quare homo non cognoscit caritatem, quae quamvis per se non sufficiat, tamen cum aliis bona est. Credo tamen, quod illa est praecipua, quae primo dicta est.

Quamvis autem caritas non possit certitudinaliter cognosci esse in aliquo etiam ab habente[^17] re-

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spectu sui, tamen potest per signa probabilia cognosci, maxime per mortificationem concupiscentiae et amoris vani sive mundani et per multa alia signa, quae Sancti dicunt et ponunt[^18].

*Ad 1.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod certior est dilectio quam frater; dicendum, quod caritas non tantum dicit dilectionem, sed ultra hoc addit, scilicet[^19], quod gratuita est. Et quantum ad habitum dilectionis certitudinaliter est cognoscibilis, quantum vero ad illud quod dicit *gratuitum*, non.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas est lumen: dicendum, quod quamvis de se caritas sit cognoscibilis, tamen non cognoscitur a nobis, quia oculus noster lippus est.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unctio docet nos de omnibus necessariis ad salutem; dicendum, quod verum est eo modo, quo necessaria sunt; sed scire, se habere caritatem, non est necessarium ad salutem, sed solum habere.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de praesentia caritatis, dicendum, quod quamvis substantia habitus sit praesens, tamen conditio, quae concomitatur habitum, scilicet divina acceptatio, non est praesens, immo latens in Dei cognitione et iudicio.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de fide, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia fides dicit habitum purum, non superaddendo acceptationem, sicut caritas, et ideo patet, quod non est simile.

english:
### Question III. *Whether one can know with certainty that he is in charity.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether charity is knowable with certainty by the one who has it. And that it is, seems so:

1. By the authority of Augustine in book eight *On the Trinity*, also found in the Master's text[^1]: «He who loves his brother knows the love by which he loves more than the brother whom he loves»; but he knows the brother with certainty: therefore charity also.

2. Likewise, the first [letter] of John, [chapter] two[^2]: *He who loves his brother abides in the light*: therefore if charity is light, since nothing seems more certain than light, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the first [letter] of John, [chapter] two[^3]: *The anointing will teach you concerning all things*, not, I say, concerning all things knowable, but concerning all things necessary for salvation: but charity is most necessary for salvation: therefore most of all does the anointing of the Holy Spirit teach us about it.

4. Likewise, the more anything is[^4] present to the soul, the more certainly it is seen and known; but charity is most present to the soul, since it is in the soul itself: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, one having faith is certain that he has faith; for nothing is more certain to a man than his own faith, as Augustine says[^5]: therefore by parity of reasoning the one having charity knows that he has charity.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ecclesiastes nine[^6]: *No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or love*: therefore since the one having charity is worthy of love, he does not know himself worthy, therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the first [letter] to the Corinthians, [chapter] four[^7]: *I am conscious of nothing in myself, yet I am not justified by this*: therefore it seems that a man not having any remorse can fail to be justified, and so fail to have charity; but no sign is more evident of charity than the absence of all remorse: therefore if that is fallible, the rest are fallible.

3. Likewise, it belongs to charity[^8] to love God for his own sake and above all things, in such a way that nothing is loved equally or above or contrary; but no one knows whether he loves God before all things: therefore no one knows whether he has charity with certainty.

4. Likewise, the one having charity is acceptable to God, and this[^9] is plain to us and to all, that these are convertible; but no one knows whether he is acceptable to God except by revelation: therefore no one knows that he has charity except by revelation.

5. Likewise, the Apostle says[^10] that he did not know whether he had guilt, when he says: *yet I am not justified by this*; therefore by the opposite, he did not know that he had grace: therefore since charity is not without grace, therefore etc.

> **Conclusio.** *A man in the state of the wayfarer, apart from revelation, can know with certainty neither concerning himself nor concerning another that he is in charity; nevertheless he can probably know it through certain signs.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to know charity with certainty[^11] is twofold: either in universal — what it is and what kind it ought to be — and in this way it certainly can be known; the other way is to know charity in particular, that is, in this individual, and in this way neither concerning himself nor concerning another, as long as a man lives, can he know it with certainty: concerning another, no, because he does not know what is in a man[^12], except through signs, which are fallible; concerning himself, no, and of this there can be a fourfold reason.

The first and chief is the implication of divine acceptation; for charity is joined to grace gratum-faciens (grace making one pleasing), which is therefore called *gratum faciens* because it renders a man acceptable to God; and therefore charity is so called, not only because it has the loved one as dear, but also because it makes the man dear to God. And because we do not know God's acceptation with certainty except through revelation, therefore we do not know that we have charity unless we are taught through revelation.

The second reason is its likeness to acquired love. For it can happen that someone be inflamed to loving God through habituation, who will fall through some spiritual sin, and yet will always be moved [in feeling]; as plainly appears through blessed Bernard in the book *On the Love of God*[^13], where he reproves those who pride themselves on their devotion.

The third reason is the bleariness of our eye, since our eye is like the owl's eye toward the most manifest things in nature, as the Philosopher says[^14]. Whence, just as a bleary eye could not distinguish between the light of day and the light of a flame or of the moon, so neither can our spiritual eye [distinguish] between the light of grace freely given (*gratis data*) and that of grace making one pleasing (*gratum faciens*).

The fourth reason is the dispensation of the divine judgments. For God closes the eyes of his servants with respect to those things which pertain to their dignity, and concerning which they could be puffed up. Whence grace is contrary to pride. For pride opens the eyes to seeing prerogatives and closes them to seeing wants and defects, according to that of Apocalypse three[^15]: *You say, "I am rich and grown wealthy and have need of nothing," and you do not know that you are poor and blind* etc. But on the contrary the holy man says that he is nothing, because God closes[^16] his eyes to the goods and opens them to the seeing of evils. And this is the reason why a man does not know charity, which, although by itself it does not suffice, nevertheless is good with the others. I believe, however, that the chief [reason] is the one stated first.

Although charity cannot be known with certainty to be in anyone, even by the one having[^17] it with respect to himself, nevertheless it can be known through probable signs, especially through the mortification of concupiscence and of vain or worldly love, and through many other signs which the Saints state and set forth[^18].

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that love is more certain than the brother; it must be said that charity does not only signify love, but adds beyond this, namely[^19], that it is gratuitous. And as to the habit of love it is knowable with certainty, but as to that which it expresses by *gratuitous*, no.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that charity is light: it must be said that, although charity is in itself knowable, nevertheless it is not known by us, because our eye is bleary.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the anointing teaches us concerning all things necessary for salvation; it must be said that this is true in the manner in which they are necessary; but to know that one has charity is not necessary for salvation, but only to have it.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected concerning the presence of charity, it must be said that, although the substance of the habit is present, nevertheless the condition that accompanies the habit, namely the divine acceptation, is not present, but is rather hidden in God's knowledge and judgment.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected concerning faith, it must be said that it is not similar, because faith signifies a habit pure and simple, without superadding an acceptation as charity does, and so it is plain that it is not similar.

la: Hic, c. 1. — August., *de Trinitate* l. VIII. c. 8.

en: Here, c. 1. — Augustine, *On the Trinity*, bk. VIII, c. 8.

la: Vers. 10.

en: Verse 10.

la: Vers. 27, ubi Vulgata: *Unctio eius docet vos de omnibus*.

en: Verse 27, where the Vulgate has: *His anointing teaches you concerning all things*.

la: In cod. Z additur *propinquum vel*.

en: In codex Z *propinquum vel* is added.

la: Libr. XIII. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 3: *Eam (fidem) tenet certissima scientia clamatque conscientia*. Et ibid. c. 2. n. 3: *Suam igitur quisque fidem apud se ipsum videt*.

en: Bk. XIII *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 3: *Most certain knowledge holds it (faith), and conscience proclaims it*. And in the same place, c. 2, n. 3: *Each one therefore sees his own faith within himself*.

la: Vers. 1; Vulgata: *Nescit homo, utrum amore an odio dignus sit*.

en: Verse 1; the Vulgate has: *A man knows not whether he is worthy of love or of hatred*.

la: Vers. 4. — Paulo infra post *remorsum* cod. K [addit] *conscientiae*.

en: Verse 4. — A little below, after *remorsum*, codex K [adds] *conscientiae*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *ab itiis*, et mox infra loco *ita*, perperam et contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. I.

en: The Vatican edition, with codex cc, reads *ab itiis*, and then a little below in place of *ita*, wrongly and against the older manuscripts together with the first edition.

la: Iuxta antiquiores mss. et ed. I adiecimus *hoc*.

en: Following the older manuscripts and the first edition we have added *hoc*.

en: 1 Corinthians 4:4.

la: Plures codd. cum edd. 2, [3] *essentialiter*, minus ad rem.

en: Several codices with editions 2 [and 3] read *essentialiter*, less to the point.

la: I. Cor. 2, 11: *Quis enim hominum scit, quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est?* — Paulo ante Vat. contra plurimos codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *quia nemo* pro *quia non*. Mox fide mss. substituimus *fallibilia* pro *fallacia* et *huius* loco *huiuscemodi*.

en: 1 Corinthians 2:11: *For who among men knows what is of man, except the spirit of the man which is in him?* — A little before, the Vatican edition, against most manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, reads *quia nemo* in place of *quia non*. Then on the testimony of the manuscripts we have substituted *fallibilia* for *fallacia*, and *huius* in place of *huiuscemodi*.

la: Duo habentur inter opera S. Bernardi opuscula, quae Dei amorem respiciunt. Unum intitulatur: *de Diligendo Deo*, estque genuinum; alterum vero: *de Natura et dignitate amoris*, adscribebatur olim S. Bernardo, sed est Gulielmi, abbatis S. Theodorici. Sententia, quam S. Bonav. hic affert, in praedictis opusculis non invenitur, sed sumta esse videtur ex Guigonis epistola seu tractatu *ad Fratres de Monte Dei* (qui olim S. Bernardo tribuebatur), ubi in fine primi libri, c. 14, haec orationis definitio exhibetur: «Oratio vero est hominis Deo adhaerentis affectio, et familiaris quaedam et pia allocutio, et statio illuminatae mentis ad fruendum, quamdiu licet»; et deinde legitur: «Nonnunquam etiam purae orationis affectus et bona illa orationis suavitas non invenitur, sed quasi invenit, cum non petentem, non pulsantem et quasi nescientem gratia praevenit; et tanquam genus servorum recipitur in mensa filiorum, cum rudis adhuc et incipiens animus in eum orandi assumitur affectum, qui pro praemio sanctitatis reddi solet meritis perfectorum. Quod cum fit, agitur, ut vel in iudicium suum non liceat scire negligenti, quid negligat... vel ut provocatio caritatis amorem in eo ultro se offerentis accendat. In quo, proh dolor! plurimi falluntur, quia cum pascuntur pane filiorum, iam se esse filios arbitrantur, et deficientes unde proficere debebant, ex visitante gratia evanescunt a conscientia sua, arbitrantes se aliquid esse, cum nihil sint, et de bonis Dei non emendantur, sed indurantur, et fiunt de quibus Psalmista dicit: *Inimici Domini mentiti sunt ei, et erit tempus eorum in saecula. Et cibavit illos ex adipe frumenti et de petra melle saturavit eos* (Psalm. 80, 16. seq.). Pascuntur enim a Patre Deo aliquando de pretiosiore gratiae substantia servi, ut affectent esse filii; ipsi vero gratia Dei abutentes efficiuntur inimici. Ut enim abutantur etiam Scripturis sanctis in peccatis vel in concupiscentiis suis, redeuntes ad eas per orationes, dicunt sibi illud uxoris Manuae: *Si Dominus voluisset nos occidere, non suscepisset sacrificium de manibus nostris* (Iudic. 13, 23.).»

en: Two opuscula are found among the works of St. Bernard which concern the love of God. One is entitled *On Loving God* and is genuine; the other, *On the Nature and Dignity of Love*, was once ascribed to St. Bernard, but is by William, abbot of St. Theodoric. The opinion which St. Bonaventure here adduces is not found in the aforesaid opuscula, but seems to have been taken from the letter or treatise of Guigo *To the Brothers of Mont-Dieu* (which was once ascribed to St. Bernard), where at the end of the first book, c. 14, this definition of prayer is set out: «Prayer is the affection of a man cleaving to God, and a kind of familiar and devout colloquy, and the standing of an illumined mind for the enjoyment [of God], as long as it is permitted»; and then there follows: «Sometimes too the affection of pure prayer and that good sweetness of prayer is not found, but as it were *finds* [the soul], when grace anticipates one not asking, not knocking, and as it were unaware; and like a class of servants he is received at the table of the sons, when a still rough and beginning mind is taken up into that affection of prayer which is wont to be granted, as the prize of holiness, to the merits of the perfect. When this happens, it is brought about that, in his own judgment, the negligent is not even permitted to know what he is neglecting... or that the provocation of charity may kindle love in him for the one who offers himself spontaneously. Wherein, alas! many are deceived; for when they are fed with the bread of the sons, they think themselves already to be sons, and failing in the very place where they ought to have advanced, they vanish from their own conscience by reason of the visiting grace, thinking themselves to be something when they are nothing, and they are not amended by the goods of God, but hardened, and become those of whom the Psalmist says: *The enemies of the Lord lied to him, and their time shall be for ever. And he fed them from the fat of the wheat, and satisfied them with honey out of the rock* (Psalm 80, 16ff.). For sometimes servants are fed by God the Father with the more precious substance of grace, that they may aspire to be sons; but they themselves, abusing the grace of God, become enemies. For so that they may abuse even the holy Scriptures in their sins or in their concupiscences, returning to them through prayers, they say to themselves that saying of the wife of Manoah: *If the Lord had willed to slay us, he would not have received a sacrifice from our hands* (Judges 13, 23).»

la: Aristot., II. *Metaph.* text. 1, quem vide supra pag. 72. nota 9. — Deinde Vat. contra mss. et ed. I *nescit* pro *nesciret*.

en: Aristotle, II *Metaphysics*, text 1, for which see above p. 72, note 9. — Then the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, reads *nescit* in place of *nesciret*.

la: Vers. 17, ubi Vulgata: *Dicis, quod dives sum et locupletatus: et nescis, quia tu es miser et miserabilis et pauper et caecus*.

en: Verse 17, where the Vulgate has: *You say, "I am rich and grown wealthy"; and you do not know that you are wretched and miserable and poor and blind*.

la: Ed. I *clausit*, et paulo post cum aliquibus mss. *aperuit* pro *aperit*. Pauci codd. omittunt *Deus*.

en: The first edition reads *clausit*, and a little after, with some manuscripts, *aperuit* in place of *aperit*. A few codices omit *Deus*.

la: Codd. inter se dissentiunt; multi indebite omittunt praepositionem *ab* (forte omissa propter alliterationem verbi *habente*); cod. X omittit etiam *ab*; Vat. vero ponit eam loco *etiam ab*; pauci tantum codd. ut V hh (cod. V verbis transpositis *ab etiam*) cum ed. I exhibent lectionem a nobis acceptatam, quae et in se distinctior est et contextui magis respondet.

en: The codices disagree among themselves; many unduly omit the preposition *ab* (perhaps omitted on account of the alliteration with the word *habente*); codex X also omits *etiam ab*; the Vatican edition, however, places it in place of *etiam ab*; only a few codices, such as V, hh (codex V with the words transposed as *ab etiam*) together with the first edition, exhibit the reading accepted by us, which is both more distinct in itself and corresponds better to the context.

la: Cfr. Bernard., Serm. 1. *in Septuag.*, Serm. 2. *in Octava Paschae* et Serm. 2. *in Pentec.* — Paulo ante post *signa* Vat. cum uno alteroque codice repetit *probabilia*.

en: Cf. Bernard, Sermon 1 *for Septuagesima*, Sermon 2 *for the Octave of Easter*, and Sermon 2 *for Pentecost*. — A little before, after *signa*, the Vatican edition with one or another codex repeats *probabilia*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus *scilicet*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut AGHIRT etc. cum ed. 1 *id* loco *illud*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied *scilicet*. A little below, several codices such as AGHIRT etc. together with the first edition read *id* in place of *illud*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Triplex conclusio omnino conformis est doctrinae in Concilio Tridentino (Sess. VI. c. 9. et can. 13. 14.) decisae. Cfr. hic dub. 7; Prolog. dub. 2; II. Sent. d. 38. dub. 1; et etiam III. Sent. d. 23. dub. 4; Commentar. in Ioan. c. 14. v. 24. (in Supplem. Bonelli).

**II.** Observandum est, quod S. Doctor in prima ratione pro secunda conclusione his verbis: «Caritas iuncta est gratiae gratum facienti», distinguit caritatem a gratia habituali; cfr. etiam III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. Contrariam sententiam, sed minus communem et probabilem, tenet Scotus.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 7. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; *de Verit.* q. 10. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 5. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The threefold conclusion is altogether conformable to the doctrine decreed in the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, c. 9, and can. 13, 14). Cf. here dub. 7; Prologue dub. 2; II *Sent.* d. 38, dub. 1; and also III *Sent.* d. 23, dub. 4; Commentary on John, c. 14, v. 24 (in Bonelli's Supplement).

**II.** It is to be observed that the holy Doctor, in the first reason for the second conclusion, with the words: «Charity is joined to grace *gratum faciens*», distinguishes charity from habitual grace; cf. also III *Sent.* d. 27, a. 1, q. 3. Scotus holds the contrary opinion, but it is less common and probable.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 7, a. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; *de Veritate* q. 10, a. 10. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4, 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 5, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 5. — Aegidius Romanus, here 3. princ. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum caritas in universali sit cognoscibilis etiam a non habente eam.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum caritas sit cognoscibilis a non habente; et quod non, videtur:

1. Quia omne quod cognoscitur, aut cognoscitur per essentiam, aut per similitudinem. Sed[^1] non per essentiam, quia non est essentialiter in anima peccatrice: si ergo cognoscitur, hoc est per similitudinem. Sed contra: secundae *ad Corinthios* duodecimo[^2] dicit Glossa: «Tertium genus visionis, quo dilectio intellectiva conspicitur, eas res continet, quae non habent sui similes imagines, quae non sunt ipsae»: ergo similitudo caritatis non est aliud quam caritas: ergo si caret quis caritate, caret et similitudine eius, et ita numquam cognoscit caritatem.

2. Item, si non habens caritatem cognoscit eam, aut ergo per speciem innatam, aut per acquisitam, aut per effectum, aut per primam lucem.[^3] Non per innatam, quia anima creata est sicut tabula rasa[^4]; non per speciem acquisitam, quia omnis species acquisita acquiritur mediante sensu et imaginatione[^5], sed species caritatis non cadit in sensu nec in imaginatione. Item non per effectum, quia nemo cognoscit per effectum aliquid, nisi sciat, quod sit illius effectus[^6]. Unde nullus cognoscit per eclypsim interpositionem terrae, nisi sciat, quod interpositio est illius causa. Si ergo per effectum cognoscit, oportet, quod sciat prius, quoniam[^7] illius est causa caritas;

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et illa praecognoscit caritatem; non ergo per effectum. Si tu dicas, quod cognoscit in illa veritate aeterna, aut hoc erit *effective*, aut *formaliter*. Si effective, sic omnia cognoscuntur in ea, quae omnia facit scire, quaecumque sciuntur; si autem formaliter sive exemplariter, ergo videtur, quod vel imprimit[^8] aliquam speciem in intellectu, vel necesse est, quod ipsa veritas vel exemplar conspiciatur; quorum alterum est supra improbatum[^9], alterum autem manifeste falsum.

**Sed contra:**

1. Peccatores desiderant caritatem; sed nullus desiderat quod non cognoscit, quia incognita non possunt diligi, sicut dicit Augustinus[^10]: ergo ipsi cognoscunt caritatem.

2. Item, aliquis habens caritatem potest habere cognitionem de illa; sed omne quod cadit in intellectu apprehendente, potest in memoria conservari; ponatur ergo, quod imprimatur haec cognitio memoriae, et quod demum[^11] cadat a caritate; constat, quod lapsus a caritate memoriam eius retinuit: ergo adhuc cognoscit eam, ergo caritas potest cognosci a non habente.

3. Item, si caritas cognoscitur ab habente, aut hoc est per essentiam, aut per similitudinem.[^12] Sed probo, quod per similitudinem, quia nihil cognoscit intellectus, nisi ab illo informetur; sed caritas est habitus affectus, ergo secundum essentiam illum[^13] non egreditur: ergo si unitur intellectui et illum informat, hoc est per similitudinem; sed similitudo potest haberi a non habente caritatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, Augustinus dicit *undecimo de Trinitate*[^14], quod ad hoc, quod intellectus intelligat quod est in memoria, necesse est, aciem intellectus informari: ergo multo fortius ad hoc, quod intelligat quod est in voluntate: ergo si intelligit caritatem, informatur intellectus aliquo[^15]; non substantia caritatis: ergo similitudine, ergo idem quod prius.

> **Conclusio.** *Caritas etiam a non habente eam potest cognosci, non cognitione experimentali, sed speculativa, et quidem non per similitudinem a sensibus abstractam, sed per quandam veritatem animae innatam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cognitione experientiae non cognoscitur caritas nisi ab habente; cognitione vero speculationis certum est cognosci caritatem etiam a non habente. Modus autem huius cognitionis non potest esse per caritatis essentiam nec per similitudinem a sensibus acquisitam: ergo necesse est, quod sit per similitudinem infusam, vel innatam. Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur ab homine, dicuntur ab Augustino[^16] cognosci in Veritate aeterna, aut quia Veritas cognitionem infundit, ut Prophetis, aut quia a conditione imprimit, secundum illud[^17]: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine* etc. Caritas autem non cognoscitur a peccatoribus per speciem infusam: ergo oportet, quod per innatam cognoscatur.

Species autem innata potest esse dupliciter: aut similitudo tantum, sicut species lapidis, aut ita similitudo, quod[^18] etiam quaedam veritas in se ipsa. Prima species est sicut pictura; et ab hac creata est anima nuda. Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est lumen quoddam directivum et quaedam directio naturalis; data est etiam ei affectio[^19] voluntatis. Cognoscit igitur anima, quid sit rectitudo, et quid affectio, et ita, quid rectitudo affectionis; et cum caritas sit hoc, cognoscit caritatem per quandam veritatem, quae tamen veritas est similitudo caritatis; et tunc recte habet

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rationem *similitudinis*, dum accipitur ab intellectu; habet tamen rationem *veritatis*, prout est in anima.

Unde quod Augustinus dicit[^20], quod huiusmodi habitus cognoscuntur in ipsa veritate et per similitudines, quae sunt idem quod ipsae[^21], non dicit hoc, quia non fiat aliqua species in intellectu cognoscentis, sed quia in anima non est pura species, sed veritas quaedam ab ipsa veritate impressa; et sic patet responsio ad obiecta.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether charity in general can be known also by one not having it.*

Fourthly it is asked whether charity is knowable by one not having it; and that it is not, seems to be the case:

1. Because everything that is known is known either through essence or through likeness. But[^1] not through essence, since it is not essentially in the soul of a sinner: if therefore it is known, this is through likeness. But on the contrary: on Second *Corinthians*, twelve[^2], the Gloss says: «The third kind of vision, by which intellective love is beheld, contains those things which do not have images like themselves, which are not themselves»: therefore the likeness of charity is nothing other than charity: therefore if anyone lacks charity, he lacks also the likeness of it, and so he never knows charity.

2. Likewise, if one not having charity knows it, then either through an innate species, or through an acquired one, or through an effect, or through the first light.[^3] Not through an innate species, since the soul is created as a blank tablet[^4]; not through an acquired species, since every acquired species is acquired by means of sense and imagination[^5], but the species of charity does not fall within sense or imagination. Likewise not through an effect, since no one knows anything through an effect unless he knows that it is the effect of that thing[^6]. Whence no one knows the eclipse through the interposition of the earth, unless he knows that the interposition is the cause of it. If therefore he knows through an effect, it is necessary that he know beforehand that[^7] charity is the cause of it; and so he foreknows charity; therefore not through an effect. If you say that he knows in that eternal truth, this will be either *effectively* or *formally*. If effectively, then in this way all things that are known are known in it, since it makes one know whatever is known; but if formally, that is, exemplarily, then it seems that either it impresses[^8] some species in the intellect, or it is necessary that the truth itself or the exemplar be beheld; of which the one was disproved above[^9], but the other is manifestly false.

**On the contrary:**

1. Sinners desire charity; but no one desires what he does not know, since unknown things cannot be loved, as Augustine says[^10]: therefore they themselves know charity.

2. Likewise, someone having charity can have knowledge of it; but everything that falls within the apprehending intellect can be preserved in the memory; suppose then that this knowledge is impressed upon the memory, and that finally[^11] one falls from charity; it is established that one fallen from charity has retained the memory of it: therefore he still knows it; therefore charity can be known by one not having it.

3. Likewise, if charity is known by one having it, this is either through essence or through likeness.[^12] But I prove that it is through likeness, since the intellect knows nothing unless it be informed by it; but charity is a habit of the affective part, therefore as to its essence it does not pass over into it[^13]: therefore if it is united to the intellect and informs it, this is through likeness; but a likeness can be had by one not having charity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine says, in the *eleventh book On the Trinity*[^14], that for the intellect to understand what is in the memory, it is necessary that the gaze of the intellect be informed: therefore much more strongly, for it to understand what is in the will: therefore if it understands charity, the intellect is informed by something[^15]; not by the substance of charity: therefore by a likeness, therefore the same as before.

> **Conclusio.** *Charity even by one not having it can be known, not by experimental knowledge, but by speculative knowledge, and indeed not through a likeness abstracted from the senses, but through a certain truth innate to the soul.*

**I respond:** It must be said that by the knowledge of experience charity is not known except by one having it; but by the knowledge of speculation it is certain that charity is known also by one not having it. The mode, however, of this knowledge cannot be through the essence of charity nor through a likeness acquired from the senses: therefore it is necessary that it be through a likeness either infused or innate. Both kinds, however, that are thus known by man, are said by Augustine[^16] to be known *in the eternal Truth*, either because the Truth infuses the knowledge, as to the Prophets, or because it impresses [it] from creation, according to that text[^17]: *The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is sealed upon us* etc. But charity is not known by sinners through an infused species: therefore it must be that it is known through an innate one.

But an innate species can be in two ways: either a likeness only, like the species of a stone, or a likeness in such a way that[^18] it is also a certain truth in itself. The first species is like a picture; and of this the soul has been created bare. The second species is some impression of the highest truth on the soul, as for example to the soul there has been given from its very condition a certain directive light and a certain natural direction; there has also been given to it an affection[^19] of the will. The soul therefore knows what rectitude is, and what affection is, and so what the rectitude of affection is; and since charity is this, it knows charity through a certain truth, which truth nevertheless is the likeness of charity; and then it rightly has the character of *likeness*, insofar as it is received by the intellect; yet it has the character of *truth*, insofar as it is in the soul.

Whence what Augustine says[^20], that habits of this sort are known in the truth itself and through likenesses which are the same as those things themselves[^21], he does not say this because no species comes to be in the intellect of the knower, but because in the soul there is not a pure species, but a certain truth impressed by the truth itself; and so the response to the objections is plain.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus *scilicet*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A G H I R T etc. cum ed. 1 *id* loco *illud*.

en: From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied *scilicet*. A little below, several manuscripts such as A, G, H, I, R, T, etc., with the first edition, read *id* in place of *illud*.

la: Vers. 4. — Glossa sumta est ex August., XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 6. n. 15, ubi cum ed. 1 pro *intellectiva* habetur *intellecta*, et talis explicatio adiungitur: *Nam homo vel arbor vel sol et quaecumque alia corpora sive caelestia sive terrestria, et praesentia videntur in suis formis, et absentia cogitantur imaginibus animo impressis, et faciunt duo genera visorum, unum per corporis sensus, alterum per spiritum, quo illae imagines continentur. Dilectio autem numquid aliter videtur praesens in specie qua est, et aliter absens in aliqua imagine sui simili? Non utique, sed quantum mente cernitur, ab alio magis, ab alio minus ipsa cernitur; aliquid corporalis imaginis cogitatur, non ipsa cernitur.*

en: Verse 4. — The Gloss is taken from Augustine, XII *On Genesis Literally*, c. 6, n. 15, where, with the first edition, *intellecta* is read in place of *intellectiva*, and this explanation is added: *For a man or a tree or the sun and whatever other bodies, whether heavenly or earthly, both are seen as present in their own forms, and as absent are thought through images impressed upon the mind, and they make two kinds of things seen, one through the senses of the body, the other through the spirit by which those images are contained. But love — is it perhaps seen in one way as present in the species in which it is, and in another way as absent in some image like itself? By no means — but inasmuch as it is discerned by the mind, by one [it is discerned] more, by another less; something of a bodily image is thought, but it itself is not discerned.*

la: Vat., paulo ante post *innatam* addito *seu lucem propriam*, hic omittit *aut per primam lucem*, sed refragantibus omnibus mss.; ed. 1 autem habet *aut in prima luce*.

en: The Vatican edition, having a little before, after *innatam*, added *seu lucem propriam*, here omits *aut per primam lucem*, but with all the manuscripts opposing it; but the first edition reads *aut in prima luce*.

la: Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 14 (c. 4): *Oportet autem sic, ut in tabula in qua nihil est scriptum actu, quod quidem accidit in intellectu.*

en: Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 14 (c. 4): *It must be so, as in a tablet in which nothing is actually written, which indeed happens in the intellect.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 30. et 39. (c. 7. et 8.); et *de Sensu et sensibili* c. 6.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III *On the Soul*, text 30 and 39 (c. 7 and 8); and *On Sense and the Sensible*, c. 6.

la: Ita multi codd. ut A B H I X S T V Y Z cc ff brevius et perbene, in quorum lectione *illius* refertur ad praecedens *aliquid*, dum alii cum Vat. eodem licet sensu, sed constructione propositionis variata, *quod causa sit illius effectus*.

en: So many manuscripts such as A, B, H, I, X, S, T, V, Y, Z, cc, ff, more concisely and very well, in whose reading *illius* refers to the preceding *aliquid*, while others, with the Vatican edition, in the same sense indeed, but with the construction of the sentence varied, [read] *quod causa sit illius effectus*.

la: Cod. X *quod* loco *quoniam*.

en: Codex X reads *quod* in place of *quoniam*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut aa bb cum ed. 1 *imprimat*. Mox ed. 1 post *veritas* habet *sive* pro *vel*.

en: Some manuscripts such as aa, bb, with the first edition, read *imprimat*. Next the first edition, after *veritas*, has *sive* in place of *vel*.

la: In principio huius argumenti, ubi arguitur, quod caritas cognosci non possit per speciem innatam.

en: At the beginning of this argument, where it is argued that charity cannot be known through an innate species.

la: Libr. X. *de Trin.* c. 1. n. 1: *Quod quisque prorsus ignorat amare nullo pacto potest.*

en: Bk. X *On the Trinity*, c. 1, n. 1: *What anyone is wholly ignorant of, he can in no way love.*

la: Cod. X *deinde*.

en: Codex X reads *deinde*.

la: In Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 additur: *Per essentiam non, constat*, et mox loco *probo* habetur *probatur*.

en: In the Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first edition, is added: *Not through essence, that is plain*, and shortly after, in place of *probo*, *probatur* is read.

la: Intellige: *affectum*. Vat. cum cod. cc perperam, et ceteris codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, *illam*; quae et paulo infra loco *sed* ponit *et haec*.

en: Understand: *the affective [part]*. The Vatican edition, with codex cc, wrongly — and against the other manuscripts with the first edition — reads *illam*; which also, a little below, in place of *sed*, puts *et haec*.

la: Cap. 1. et 8. n. 1–14, ubi inter alia dicit: *Sed cum cogitatur, ex illa (specie) quam memoria tenet, exprimitur in acie cogitantis, et reminiscendo formatur ea species, quae quasi proles est eius quam memoria tenet.*

en: Chs. 1 and 8, nn. 1–14, where among other things he says: *But when [it] is thought, from that (species) which the memory holds, [a species] is expressed in the gaze of the thinker, and by remembering there is formed that species which is, as it were, the offspring of the one which the memory holds.*

la: Ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic a Vat. additam particulam *et*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have struck out here the particle *et*, added by the Vatican edition.

la: Vide infra Scholion, ubi fusius proposita est sententia August. de modo cognitionis humanae. De cognitione prophetali cfr. XII. *de Genes. ad lit.* c. 31. n. 59: *Aliud autem est ipsum lumen, quo illustratur anima, ut omnia vel in se vel in illo veraciter intellecta conspiciat; nam illud iam ipse Deus est* etc.

en: See below the Scholion, where Augustine's opinion concerning the mode of human cognition is set forth more fully. On prophetic cognition cf. XII *On Genesis Literally*, c. 31, n. 59: *But another thing is the light itself, by which the soul is illuminated, so that it may behold all things either in themselves or in it as truthfully understood; for that [light] now is God himself* etc.

la: Psalm. 4, 7. — Paulo ante Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 nomini *Prophetis* praefigit perperam *in*, et mox contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 habet *imprimitur* loco *imprimit*.

en: Psalm 4, 7. — A little before, the Vatican edition, against many manuscripts and the first edition, wrongly prefixes *in* to the noun *Prophetis*, and shortly after, against all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, reads *imprimitur* in place of *imprimit*.

la: Cod. X addit *est*.

en: Codex X adds *est*.

la: In cod. O additur *naturalis*.

en: In codex O *naturalis* is added.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et quinque primarum edd. *cum Augustinus dicat*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first five editions, reads *cum Augustinus dicat*.

la: Supple: *res*, quae hoc in casu sunt habitus. Vide supra arg. 1. ad opp. Vat. incongrue *ipse*. Notum est, in codd. eodem modo scribi *ipse* et *ipsae*. — Mox fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *fiat* loco *sit*. In fine responsionis ed. 1 *solutio* pro *responsio*.

en: Supply: *res* (things), which in this case are habits. See above arg. 1 *ad oppositum*. The Vatican edition incongruously reads *ipse*. It is known that in the codices *ipse* and *ipsae* are written in the same way. — Next, on the testimony of the manuscripts and the first edition, we have substituted *fiat* in place of *sit*. At the end of the response, the first edition reads *solutio* in place of *responsio*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Facta distinctione duplicis cognitionis, scil. experientiae (intuitivae) et speculationis (abstractivae), ipsam quaestionem, quae sane pro theoria de cognitione humana magni momenti est, duplici conclusione resolvit. Deinde modum huius cognitionis speculativae septem propositionibus explicat. Pro confirmatione responsionis hic subiungimus, quae de hac re dicunt Petr. a Tar. et Alex. Hal. Petrus (hic q. 1. a. 5. quaestiunc. 2.): «Cognitione experientiae non potest cognosci caritas nisi ab habente, sed cognitione speculativa potest, non per essentiam eius seu per speciem, quae sit idem quod ipsa — sic videtur solum ab habente — sed per speciem seu per similitudinem, quae non est idem quod ipsa; et hoc dupliciter: vel per speciem acquisitam, quae est similitudo eius vel potius actus ipsius, relicta in memoria ad eius praesentiam, et sic videtur ab illo, qui eam aliquando habuit, nisi speciem illam oblivio deleverit, et sic in patria videbit Sanctus, se fidem et spem habuisse, scil. per quoddam vestigium fidei, ut dicit Augustinus *XIV. de Trinitate* c. 3.; vel per speciem intuitam, et sic videri potest a quocumque, non quae sit *species tantum*, ut species lapidis in anima, quia talem speciem non habet anima concreatam caritatis, sed per speciem innatam, quae est res in se, et tamen habet similitudinem cum caritate. Habet enim anima apud se virtutum omnium quaedam semina et per illa habet desiderium et cognitionem quandam universalem virtutum, sicut per principia venit in cognitionem conclusionum». Idem ad obiectionem: *anima creatur ut tabula rasa*, sic respondet: «Hoc intelligitur quoad species, quae sunt intentiones tantum, non res; huiusmodi vero habitus innati in se quidem sunt res, in quantum vero per illos cognoscuntur alii (alia?) ut in simili, sunt quasi species». Haec omnia fere ad verbum concordant cum doctrina Seraphici. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 61. m. 7. a. 1. haec habet: «Quilibet sive bonus sive malus a creatione habet inditam rationem boni et veri, secundum quod dicit Augustinus et Boethius. Sicut ergo in notione principiorum veri est notio conclusionum in universali, ita in notione boni nobis in universali impressa est notio gratiae in universali; et ex illa notione boni possumus scire, quid est gratia in universali, scilicet quod ipsa est quaedam qualitas in anima. Cum enim gratia sit bonum, et habeamus notionem boni in universali nobis impressam, ex illa possumus arguere, gratiam esse; sed haec erit notio in universali, non in ratione propria. Cfr. ibid. q. 28. m. 1. a. 2. Praeter hos cfr. Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4. Ex his patet, quod intellectus ex innato lumine veritatis potest formare speciem intelligibilem, aciem intellectus informantem, quae simul habeat «rationem similitudinis, dum accipitur ab intellectu, et tamen rationem veritatis, prout est in anima», ut habetur hic in corp.

**II.** Quae in hac quaestione a Seraphico dicuntur non parvi sunt momenti, ut sententia eius de modo cognitionis humanae recte intelligatur. Quid sit *cognoscere in veritate aeterna*, iam explicatum est supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. in Scholio. — Quid sit secundum S. Bonaventuram *species innata*, et quo sensu ipsa animae humanae innata dici possit, hic manifeste docetur, scil. quod hoc secundum habitum sive lumen animae concreatum, quod vocatur *naturale iudicatorium*, non secundum *actuales species* sive ideas innatas intelligendum sit. Quod amplius confirmatur et explicatur ab ipso Seraphico Doctore, II. *Sent.* d. 39. a. 1. q. 2, ubi quaeritur, utrum conscientia sit habitus innatus, an acquisitus. Reiecta opinione Platonis, quod habitus cognitivi animae sint simpliciter innati, sed oblivioni dati ad tempus, ipse asserit, tres de hac re esse opiniones, in hoc consentientes, quod habitus cognitivi nec sint omnino innati, nec omnino acquisiti, sed quodam modo innati, quodam modo acquisiti; tamen has dissidere in assignando modum, secundum quem hi habitus sint acquisiti vel innati. Reiectis duabus opinionibus tanquam insufficientibus, concludit, quod «habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam quodam modo acquisiti ratione speciei. Et hoc quidem verbis Philosophi et Augustini concordat. Omnes enim in hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur *naturale iudicatorium*; species autem et similitudines rerum acquiruntur nobis mediante sensu, sicut expresse dicit Philosophus in multis locis; et hoc etiam experientia docet». Tum attendendam esse ait distinctionem inter prima principia valde evidentia, quorum «cognitio ratione illius luminis dicitur esse nobis innata, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda post receptionem specierum sine aliqua persuasione superaddita propter sui evidentiam», et inter cognitionem particularium conclusionum, quarum cognitio acquisita est pro eo, quod lumen nobis innatum non plene sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasione et habilitatione nova etc. — Denique respondendo ad illam quaestionem, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu, sic concludit: «Dicendum est, quod non. Necessario enim oportet ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando dicat Philosophus, quod nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu, et quod omnis cognitio ortum habeat a sensu, intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus, quod in anima nihil scriptum est, non quia nulla est in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta. Et hoc est, quod dicit August. in libro *de Civit. Dei*: *Inseruit nobis Deus nobile iudicatorium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid tenebrarum, cognoscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, quia veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa*». — Hanc sententiam verbotenus sive in hoc sive in alio libro S. Augustini non invenimus. Ipsa autem breviter complectitur, quae S. August. longiore discursu pluries luculenter probat, praesertim *XI. de Civ. Dei* c. 27. n. 2, ubi inter alia ait: «Sed lucem illam incorpoream (animalia) contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo irradiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verumtamen inest sensibus irrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo... Sed nos ea (corporalia) sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus: iusta per intelligibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupillae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo atque amare me similiter certus sum».

**III.** S. Bonaventura fidelissimum S. Augustini discipulum, sicut in aliis quaestionibus, sic in tota sua de cognitione humana doctrina se comprobat. Unde quae circa hanc materiam in hac quaest. disputat non nisi summarium exhibent eorum, quae S. August. more suo et diffuse tractat in pluribus libris v. g. II. *de Libero Arb.*; *de Vera Religione*, c. 29. seqq.; XII. *de Gen. ad lit.* Operae pretium esse duximus exemplo hoc probare, proponendo ex libris VIII. et IX. *de Trinitate* ea S. Augustini de cognitione humana fundamenta, quae S. Bonaventura hic vel praesupponit, vel explicite asserit.

1. Apertissime ibi distinguit S. Augustinus inter cognitionem sensuum (phantasiae) et intellectus: «Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero, ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis, sed eam per corpus accepi, i. e. per corporis sensum... Non autem ita quaero, quid sit iustus, nec ita invenio, nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor» etc. (VIII. c. 6. n. 9.).

2. Distinguit in cognitione intellectuali conceptus formatos per abstractionem a rebus sensibilibus et non formatos per abstractionem: «Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam, sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem» (IX. c. 6. n. 9.).

3. Asserit, aliquos conceptus intellectuales, quos habemus, supponere experientiam sive externam sive internam: «Sed quid sit mori, et quid sit vivere, utique scimus; quia et vivimus, et mortuos ac morientes aliquando vidimus et experti sumus» (VIII. c. 5. n. 8.).

4. Dicit, animae humanae impressam esse notitiam quarundam rerum: «Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, vel quae commemoravi vel quae alia cernuntur sive cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio melius, cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud illi praeponeremus» (VIII. c. 3. n. 4.). *Habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam humanae naturae notitiam... Secundum species et genera rerum vel natura insita vel experientia collecta, de factis huiuscemodi (miraculis et resurrectione Christi) cogitamus, ut non ficta sit fides nostra* (ibid. c. 4. 5. n. 7.). «Quid igitur de illa excellentia Trinitatis sive specialiter sive generaliter novimus, quasi multae sint tales trinitates, quarum aliquas experti sumus, ut per regulam similitudinis impressam, vel specialem vel generalem notitiam, illam quoque talem esse credamus» etc. (ibid. c. 5. n. 8.).

5. Asserit, quaedam cognosci ab homine in veritate, et etiam *in veritate aeterna*. Minime autem dicit, hoc fieri per immediatum aeternarum rationum conspectum, ut Ontologistae volunt; sed intelligi debet secundum illam interpretationem, quam meliores Scholastici exhibent; cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. q. 1. Scholion. Libr. VIII. c. 6. n. 9. proponit quaestionem, quae cum illa quae a S. Bonav. hic pertractatur, maxime convenit, scil. quomodo homo iniustus cognoscat animum iustum, quem diligit, eamque ita solvit: «Quid sit *animus*, ut dictum est, novimus ex nobis; inest enim animus nobis. Quid autem sit *iustus*, unde novimus, si iusti non sumus?... An signa quaedam per motum corporis emicant, quibus ille aut ille homo esse iustus apparet? Sed unde novit, illa signa esse animi iusti, nesciens, quid omnino sit iustus? Novit ergo. Sed unde novimus, quid sit iustus, etiam cum iusti nondum sumus? Si extra nos novimus, in corpore aliquo novimus. Sed non est ista res corporis. In nobis igitur novimus, quid sit iustus. Non enim alibi hoc invenio, cum quaero, ut hoc eloquar, nisi apud me ipsum... Et Carthaginem quidem cum eloqui volo, apud me ipsum quaero, ut eloquar, et apud me ipsum invenio phantasiam Carthaginis, sed eam per corpus accepi, i. e. per corporis sensum... Non autem ita quaero, quid sit iustus, nec ita invenio nec ita intueor, cum id eloquor... Illud mirabile est, ut apud se animus videat, quod alibi nusquam vidit, et verum videat, ipsum verum iustum animum videat, et sit ipse animus, et non sit iustus animus, quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto?... An illud quod videt, veritas est interior, praesens animo, qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent; et qui intueri valent, hoc etiam, quod intuentur, non omnes sunt, hoc est, non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi, sicut possunt videre ac dicere, quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse potuerunt, nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae, quam intuentur, ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi, non tantum cernentes... Et unde inhaeretur illi formae, nisi amando?... Homo ergo, qui creditur iustus, ex ea forma et veritate diligitur, quam cernit et intelligit apud se ille qui diligit; ipsa vero forma et veritas non est, quomodo aliunde diligatur. Neque enim invenimus aliquid tale praeter ipsam, ut eam, cum incognita est, credendo diligamus, ex eo quod iam tale aliquid novimus. Quidquid enim tale aspexeris, ipsa est; et non est quidquam tale, quoniam sola ipsa talis est, qualis ipsa est». Ibid. c. 9. n. 13: «Vivendum tamen sic esse Dei ministris, non de aliquibus auditum credimus, sed intus apud nos, vel potius supra nos *in ipsa veritate* conspicimus. Illum ergo, quem sic vixisse credimus, ex hoc quod videmus diligimus. Et nisi hanc formam, quam semper stabilem atque incommutabilem cernimus, praecipue diligeremus, non ideo diligeremus illum, quia eius vitam, cum in carne viveret, huic formae coaptatam et congruentem fuisse fide retinemus». Libr. IX. c. 6. n. 9: «Intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat». Ibid. n. 11: «Ipsa vera forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis, et in qua fruerer homine, bonum eum credens, et in qua consulo, ut bonus sit, eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum et illam phantasiae nubem, quam desuper cerno, cum eundem hominem, quem videram, cogito, imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit». Ibid. c. 7. n. 12: «In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tanquam *verbum* apud nos habemus et dicendo intus gignimus, nec a nobis na[scendo discedit]».

6. Ultima haec verba aliam Augustinianae sententiae partem indicant, quam S. Bonav. in fine huius quaestionis attingit, scil. quod *habitus animae, qui cognoscuntur in ipsa veritate et per similitudines, quae idem sunt quod ipsae* (res i. e. habitus), non cognoscantur absque aliqua specie in intellectu cognoscentis formata. Libr. IX. c. 3. n. 3. ait: «Mens ergo ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et semetipsam per se ipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea». — Ibid. c. 11. n. 16. loquendo de cognitione Dei ostendit, quod in ipsa «fit aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus. Ex quo colligitur, quia cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale atque identidem, quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis, neque superioris, sicut Dei. Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem, quam novit, hoc est, cuius notitia est, haec habet perfectam» etc.

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english_scholion:
**I.** Having drawn the distinction of the twofold knowledge, namely of experience (intuitive) and of speculation (abstractive), he resolves the question itself — which is indeed of great moment for the theory of human cognition — by a twofold conclusion. Then he explains the mode of this speculative knowledge in seven propositions. By way of confirmation of the response, we add here what Peter of Tarentaise and Alexander of Hales say on this matter. Peter (here q. 1, a. 5, *quaestiuncula* 2): «By the knowledge of experience, charity cannot be known except by one having it, but by speculative knowledge it can — not through its essence or through a species which is the same thing as it (so it seems to be seen only by one having it) but through a species or likeness which is not the same as it; and this in two ways: either through an acquired species, which is its likeness, or rather an act of it, left in the memory at its presence, and so it is seen by one who at some time had it, unless oblivion has erased that species (and thus in the homeland the saint will see that he had had faith and hope, namely through a certain *vestige of faith*, as Augustine says in *XIV On the Trinity*, c. 3); or through a species seen [intuited], and thus it can be seen by anyone — not one which is *species only*, like the species of a stone in the soul, since the soul does not have such a co-created species of charity, but through an innate species, which is a thing in itself, and yet has likeness with charity. For the soul has within it certain seeds of all the virtues, and through them it has a certain universal desire and knowledge of the virtues, just as through principles it comes into the knowledge of conclusions». The same author, to the objection *the soul is created as a blank tablet*, responds thus: «This is to be understood with respect to species which are intentions only, not things; but innate habits of this sort are indeed things in themselves, but inasmuch as through them other things (others?) are known as in something similar, they are as it were species». All these things agree almost word for word with the doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor]. Alexander of Hales, in *Summa* p. III, q. 61, m. 7, a. 1, has these things: «Anyone, whether good or wicked, has from creation an imparted account of the good and the true, according to what Augustine and Boethius say. Just as therefore in the notion of the principles of the true there is the notion of the conclusions in general, so in the notion of the good impressed upon us in general there is the notion of grace in general; and from that notion of the good we can know what grace is in general, namely that it is itself a certain quality in the soul. For since grace is good, and we have the notion of the good in general impressed upon us, from it we can argue that grace exists; but this will be a notion in general, not in its own proper account». Cf. in the same place q. 28, m. 1, a. 2. Besides these, cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 4. From these things it is plain that the intellect, from the innate light of truth, can form an intelligible species informing the gaze of the intellect, which together has «the character of likeness, insofar as it is received by the intellect, and yet the character of truth, insofar as it is in the soul», as is found here in the body [of the question].

**II.** What is said in this question by the Seraphic [Doctor] is of no small moment, in order that his opinion concerning the mode of human cognition be rightly understood. What it is *to know in the eternal truth* has already been explained above at d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, in the Scholion. — What according to St. Bonaventure an *innate species* is, and in what sense it can be called innate to the human soul, is here manifestly taught, namely that this is to be understood in the sense of a habit or light of the soul co-created [with it], which is called *natural judicatory*, not in the sense of *actual species* or innate ideas. This is further confirmed and explained by the Seraphic Doctor himself in II *Sentences*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, where it is asked whether conscience is an innate or acquired habit. Having rejected the opinion of Plato — that the cognitive habits of the soul are innate without qualification, but given over to oblivion for a time — he himself asserts that there are three opinions on this matter, agreeing in this, that the cognitive habits are neither wholly innate nor wholly acquired, but in a certain way innate, in a certain way acquired; yet that these differ in assigning the mode by which these habits are acquired or innate. Having rejected the first two opinions as insufficient, he concludes that «cognitive habits are in a certain way innate to us by reason of the light imparted to the soul, and they are also in a certain way acquired by reason of the species. And this indeed agrees with the words of the Philosopher and of Augustine. For all agree in this, that there is a light imparted to the cognitive power, which is called *natural judicatory*; but the species and likenesses of things are acquired by us by means of sense, as the Philosopher expressly says in many places; and experience also teaches this». Then he says that one must attend to the distinction between first principles which are highly evident, of which «the knowledge by reason of that light is said to be innate to us, since that light is sufficient for knowing them, after the reception of the species, without any added persuasion, on account of their evidence», and the knowledge of particular conclusions, the knowledge of which is acquired, since the light innate to us does not fully suffice for knowing them, but requires some new persuasion and habituation, etc. — Finally, in answering the question whether all knowledge is from sense, he concludes thus: «It must be said that not [all is]. For it is necessary to posit that the soul knows God and itself and the things that are in itself without the aid of the external senses. Whence if at any time the Philosopher says that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in sense, and that all knowledge takes its origin from sense, this is to be understood of those things which indeed have being in the soul through an *abstracted likeness*; and these are said to be in the soul *after the manner of writing*. And on this account the Philosopher very notably says that in the soul nothing is written — not because there is no notice in it, but because there is in it no picture or abstracted likeness. And this is what Augustine says in his book *On the City of God*: *God has implanted in us a noble judicatory, where what is light, what is darkness, is known in the book of light, which is truth, since truth is naturally impressed upon the heart of men*». — This sentence verbatim either in this or in another book of St. Augustine we have not found. Yet it briefly sums up what St. Augustine in a longer discourse repeatedly proves clearly, especially *XI On the City of God*, c. 27, n. 2, where among other things he says: «But that incorporeal light (animals) cannot reach, by which our mind is in some way irradiated, that we may rightly judge of all these things. For insofar as we grasp it, so far we are able [to do this]. Yet there is in the senses of irrational animals, even if no knowledge at all, certainly a certain likeness of knowledge... But we so grasp them (corporeal things) by the sense of the body that we judge of these things not by the sense of the body. For we have another sense, of the inner man, far more excellent than that, by which we sense just and unjust things: just things by an intelligible species, unjust things by the privation of it. To the office of this sense neither the keenness of the pupil, nor the opening of the ear, nor the breathing-passage of the nostrils, nor the taste of the throat, nor any bodily touch reaches. There I am certain that I am, and that I know this, and I love these things, and I am likewise certain that I love».

**III.** St. Bonaventure shows himself to be a most faithful disciple of St. Augustine, as in other questions, so in his whole doctrine concerning human cognition. Whence what he disputes concerning this matter in this question presents nothing but a summary of what St. Augustine in his usual manner discusses at length in many books, e.g., II *On Free Will*; *On True Religion*, c. 29 ff.; XII *On Genesis Literally*. We have judged it worth the trouble to prove this by an example, by setting forth from books VIII and IX *On the Trinity* those foundations of St. Augustine concerning human cognition which St. Bonaventure here either presupposes or explicitly asserts.

1. Most openly there St. Augustine distinguishes between the cognition of the senses (of the phantasy) and that of the intellect: «And when I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself, that I may speak it, and within myself I find the phantasm of Carthage, but I have received it through the body, that is, through the sense of the body... But I do not so seek what *just* is, nor so find, nor so behold, when I speak of it» etc. (VIII, c. 6, n. 9).

2. He distinguishes within intellectual cognition concepts formed by abstraction from sensible things and those not formed by abstraction: «For we do not, by seeing many minds with the bodily eyes, gather through likeness a general or special notion of the human mind, but we behold the inviolable truth» (IX, c. 6, n. 9).

3. He asserts that some intellectual concepts which we have presuppose either external or internal experience: «But what it is to die, and what it is to live, we surely know; for we live, and we have at some time seen and experienced the dead and the dying» (VIII, c. 5, n. 8).

4. He says that the notice of certain things has been impressed upon the human soul: «For neither in all those goods, whether those which I have mentioned or whatever others are perceived or thought, would we say that one is better than another, when we judge truly, unless the *notion of the good itself* were impressed upon us, according to which we both approve something and prefer one thing to another» (VIII, c. 3, n. 4). *For we have the notice of human nature as it were regularly fixed in us... According to the species and genera of things, either by an inborn nature or by experience gathered, we think about facts of this kind (the miracles and resurrection of Christ), so that our faith may not be feigned* (ibid., c. 4, 5, n. 7). «What therefore do we know, whether specifically or generally, of that excellence of the Trinity, as if there were many such trinities, of some of which we have had experience, that by the rule of the impressed likeness, of either special or general notice, we should believe that one too to be such?» etc. (ibid., c. 5, n. 8).

5. He asserts that some things are known by man *in the truth*, and even *in the eternal truth*. Yet he by no means says that this happens through an immediate gaze upon the eternal reasons, as the Ontologists wish; but it must be understood according to that interpretation which the better Scholastics offer; cf. above d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, Scholion. In bk. VIII, c. 6, n. 9, he proposes a question which agrees most with the one here treated by St. Bonaventure, namely how the unjust man knows the just mind which he loves, and resolves it thus: «What *mind* is, as has been said, we know from ourselves, for there is mind in us. But what *just* is, whence do we know, if we are not just?... Or do certain signs flash forth through the motion of the body, by which this man or that appears to be just? But whence does one know that those signs are of a just mind, not knowing what just is at all? Therefore he does know. But whence do we know what just is, even when we are not yet just? If we know it outside ourselves, we know it in some body. But this thing is not of a body. Therefore in ourselves we know what just is. For I do not find this elsewhere when I seek, that I may speak it, except within myself... And when I wish to speak of Carthage, I seek within myself, that I may speak it, and within myself I find the phantasm of Carthage, but I have received it through the body, i.e., through the sense of the body... But I do not so seek what *just* is, nor so find nor so behold, when I speak it... It is wonderful that the mind sees within itself what it has seen nowhere else, and sees it as true, and sees the true just mind, and is itself a mind, and is not a just mind, which it sees within itself. Is there another just mind in a mind not yet just?... Or is what it sees an inner truth, present to the mind which is able to behold it? Not all are able; and those who are able to behold, even what they behold they themselves are not all, that is, they themselves are not just minds either, [though] they can see and say what a just mind is. Whence could they have done this, except by adhering to that very form which they behold, that thence they may be formed and may be just minds, not only beholding... And whence does one adhere to that form, except by loving?... The man therefore who is believed to be just, is loved out of that form and truth which he who loves discerns and understands within himself; but the form and truth itself does not exist in such a way that it could be loved from elsewhere. For we do not find anything such besides itself, that, when it is unknown, we should love it by believing, from the fact that we already know something such. For whatever such you behold, it is itself; and there is not anything such, since it alone is such as it itself is». Ibid., c. 9, n. 13: «That however God's ministers must so live we do not believe by hearsay from anyone, but inwardly within ourselves, or rather above ourselves, we behold *in the truth itself*. Him therefore whom we believe to have so lived, we love from this, that we see [him]. And unless we especially loved this form, which we always behold as stable and unchangeable, we should not therefore love him, since we hold by faith that his life, while he was living in the flesh, was fitted and conformed to this form». Bk. IX, c. 6, n. 9: «We behold the inviolable truth from which we may, as perfectly as we can, define not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be by the eternal reasons». Ibid., n. 11: «That very form of unshaken and stable truth, both in which I might enjoy the man, believing him good, and in which I take counsel that he be good, with the same light of incorruptible and most sincere reason floods both the gaze of my mind and that cloud of phantasy which I see from above, when I think of the same man whom I had seen, with imperturbable eternity». Ibid., c. 7, n. 12: «In that eternal truth therefore, from which all temporal things have been made, we behold with the gaze of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which by true and right reason we do anything either in ourselves or in bodies, and from there we have within us as it were a *word*, the truthful notice of things conceived, and by speaking we beget [it] within, nor in being born does it depart from us».

6. These last words indicate another part of the Augustinian opinion, which St. Bonaventure touches on at the end of this question, namely that *the habits of the soul which are known in the truth itself and through likenesses which are the same as those things themselves* (i.e., the habits), are not known without some species formed in the intellect of the knower. In bk. IX, c. 3, n. 3, he says: «The mind itself therefore, just as it gathers the notices of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so [gathers] those of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it knows itself also through itself, since it is incorporeal». — Ibid., c. 11, n. 16, speaking of the cognition of God, he shows that in it «that notice becomes some likeness of God; yet it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature; for the mind is a creature, but God is the Creator. From which it is gathered that, when the mind itself knows and approves itself, that very notice is its word, so as to be altogether equal and on a par and identical with it, since the notice is neither of an inferior essence, like that of a body, nor of a superior, like that of God. And since the notice has a likeness to that thing which it knows, that is, of which it is the notice, this [notice] has the perfect [likeness]» etc.

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