title: Dist. 45, Art. 1, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus dicatur omnivolens, sicut omnisciens et omnipotens.*

Secundo, supposito quod in Deo sit ponere voluntatem, quaeritur, utrum ipsum[^1] sit ponere omnivolentem, ut ita dicatur a voluntate *omnivolens*, sicut a potentia et scientia *omnipotens* et *omnisciens*. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Deus non dicitur omnipotens, eo quod possit omnia, sed quia potest omne quod decet eius potentiam — non enim potest mala — sed similiter Deus vult omne quod decet voluntatem eius velle: ergo debet dici *omnivolens*, sicut omnipotens.

2. Item, sicut se habet *cognitiva* Dei ad verum, ita se habet *affectiva* sive voluntas ad bonum[^2]; sed cognitiva sive intelligentia amplectitur omne verum — unde qui diceret, Deum aliquid verum ignorare, arctaret et derogaret eius intelligentiae — ergo pari ratione, cum intelligentia non sit latior nec perfectior quam voluntas, voluntas erit respectu omnis boni: ergo sicut dicitur *omnisciens*, quia scit omne verum, ita *omnivolens*, quia vult omne bonum.

3. Item, sicut dicitur Deus *verum omnis veri*, a quo scilicet omne verum habet veritatem, ita est *bonum omnis boni*, a quo omne bonum habet bonitatem[^3]; sed Deus in videndo[^4] suam veritatem, quia est ratio omnium, omnia cognoscit: ergo similiter diligendo suam bonitatem omne bonum diligit. Sed omne quod diligit, vult: ergo vult omne bonum, sicut et cognoscit omne verum, et sic etc.

4. Item, bona voluntas est quae se extendit ad multa bona; ergo melior ad plura, et optima ad omnia, ergo infinita ad infinita: ergo sicut potentia et scientia se extendunt ad omnia et infinita, ita et voluntas: ergo qua ratione dicitur omnipotens et omnisciens, pari ratione debet dici omnivolens.

**Contra:**

1. In Psalmo[^5]: *Omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit*; ergo nihil vult, nisi quae facit; sed plura potest facere, et non potest nisi volens: ergo plura potest velle. Sed si Deus posset plura scire, non esset omnisciens: ergo etc.

2. Item, si aliquid sciret homo, quod non sciret Deus, non esset omnisciens Deus: cum ergo aliquid velit homo quod non velit Deus, ut puta facere furtum, ergo Deus non est omnivolens.

3. Item, si posse malum esset posse, Deus non esset omnipotens, quia non potest mala; cum ergo velle malum sit velle et Deus non velit mala, Deus non est *omnivolens*. Probatio minoris. Malum non est malum, nisi quia voluntarium, quia, secundum Augustinum[^6] « peccatum adeo est voluntarium » etc., ergo ratio voluntatis salvatur in malo, similiter et actus voluntatis in volendo malum; ergo etc.

4. Item, velle malum aut est velle, aut est nolle. Si velle, habeo propositum; si nolle; sed nolle malum est bonum; ergo velle malum[^7] est bonum; ergo si Deus vult omne bonum, Deus vult malum, quod est falsum. Restat ergo, quod velle malum est velle; et Deus non vult malum: ergo Deus non est omnivolens. — Sed istud argumentum est sophisticum, quia similiter posset obiici de potentia. — Et ideo quaeritur, unde est hoc, quod velle malum est velle, sed posse malum non est potentiae, sed impotentiae.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur de comparatione *potentiae*, *sapientiae* et *voluntatis* ad sua obiecta secundum ambitum.

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### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Simpliciter negatur, quod Deus dicatur *omnivolens*, sicut recte dicitur *omnisciens* et *omnipotens*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur utrum Deus sit omnivolens, duplicem intellectum potest facere ista locutio ex eo, quod hoc quod est *omne* potest facere distributionem simpliciter vel ut nunc[^8]. Si distributionem simpliciter quantum ad actum et habitum facit, tunc dicitur omnivolens, quia vult omne volibile; si ut nunc, dicitur omnivolens, quia vult omne volitum. In utroque sensu falsitatem habet[^9], et in utroque sensu habet veritatem in potentia et in scientia. Et ideo simpliciter conceditur, quod Deus sit *omnisciens* et *omnipotens*, et simpliciter negatur, quod sit *omnivolens*.

Intellectus huius et ratio patet. Si enim simpliciter accipiamus, Deus scit omne scibile et potest omne possibile, et[^10] non vult omne volibile; quia divina voluntas importat causam *actualem*, potentia vero abstrahit a ratione actualitatis et ponit rationem[^11] causae, scientia vero abstrahit a ratione utriusque. Quia igitur Deus non est causa actualis omnium quae potest facere vel velle, sicut non facit omne volibile, ita non vult. Quia vero potentia abstrahit a ratione actualitatis, ideo dicitur non solum respectu faciendorum in actu, sed etiam respectu possibilium fieri a Deo. Quia vero scientia abstrahit a ratione utriusque, hinc est, quod scientia non tantum est respectu faciendorum, sed etiam respectu possibilium, non tantum Deo, sed etiam aliis, utpote possibilium malorum. Haec igitur est ratio, quia actus scientiae, ut *scire*, est per modum *habitus*; similiter et[^12] potentiae per modum *habitus*, ut *posse*; voluntas per modum *actus*, ut *velle*. Ideo scientia est omnium *scibilium*, potentia omnium *possibilium*, quae sunt potentiae, sed non voluntas omnium *volibilium*. Et ideo non potest Deus plura scire vel posse, potest tamen plura velle.

Similiter, si accipiamus rem[^13] ut nunc respectu rei praevisae et respectu factae et volitae; scientia est respectu omnis rei, in qua salvatur ratio scientiae, et potentia respectu omnis rei, in qua salvatur ratio potentiae; sed voluntas non est respectu omnis rei, in qua ratio voluntatis salvatur. Scientia enim est respectu omnium futurorum et praesentium et praeteritorum, bonorum et malorum, quia ibi salvatur ratio scientiae et nobilitatis; quia scire malum scire est, et scire malum nobilitatis est[^14]. Similiter potentia est respectu omnium bonorum, in quibus solum salvatur ratio potentiae. Nam posse malum non est posse. Unde posse malum non tantum derogat perfectioni potentiae, sed etiam ipsi potentiae, quia posse deficere non est posse; et ideo adhuc omnipotens[^15]. Voluntas vero est respectu bonorum tantum, non respectu malorum. Et quamvis in volendo malum non salvetur dignitas voluntatis, salvatur tamen ratio volendi, quia velle malum velle est. Et hinc est, quod Deus non dicitur omnivolens, quia non vult malum, sed tamen omnipotens dicitur, quamvis non possit malum.

Si quaeratur[^16]: quare ratio potentiae non salvatur respectu mali, sicut et ratio voluntatis? dicendum, quod potentia id ipsum quod dicit, dicit per modum *habitus* et *positionis*[^17], de potentia activa loquendo; unde, cum est respectu privationis, iam non est potentia, sed defectus potentiae; sed voluntas id ipsum quod dicit, dicit per modum cuiusdam *indifferentiae* et *complacentiae*. Quia ergo in malo salvatur ratio consensus et complacentiae, sicut et respectu boni; ideo velle malum velle est, sed posse malum non est posse.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

*Ad 1.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus vult omne quod decet; dicendum, quod illa non est ratio quare dicatur omnipotens[^18], sed illa quae praeassignata est, scilicet quia potest omne quod posse potentiae est.

*Ad 2.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitiva amplectitur omne verum, et affectiva omne bonum; dicendum, quod aliter amplectitur haec, aliter illa. Cognitiva enim amplectitur actualiter[^19] cognoscendo omne quod est verum et quod potest esse[^20]; sed affectiva, quia actus eius est in ratione actus, amplectitur

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et vult solum bonum, quod est vel erit. Rursus, amplectitur totum actum cognitionis, quia nihil est cognitum, quod non sit dilectum — sed bonum non amplectitur omnino actum voluntatis — nam velle oppositum boni est velle — et hinc est, quod Deus sciendo omne verum dicitur omnisciens, sed non sic volendo omne bonum omnivolens.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus cognoscendo se, qui est veritas ipsa, omne verum cognoscit: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, sed aliter: quia cognoscendo se[^21] est causa exemplaris, et causa exemplaris non tantum futurorum, sed etiam possibilium a Deo fieri. Sed diligendo se bonum est causa actualis, ut patebit[^22]; et ideo non sequitur, quod velit nisi bona, quae erunt vel faciet, et propter hoc non potest dici omnivolens. Alia tamen est huius ratio, sicut patebit in littera[^23].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de voluntate, quod melior est quae se extendit ad plura; dicendum, quod voluntas est *actus rationalis*; unde non dicitur voluntas melior, quia simpliciter ad plura, sed quia ad plura rationabiliter. Et quoniam ratio recta dictat, creaturas fieri in numero definito, quia numerus infinitus rebus non competit[^24]: ideo optima voluntas et perfectissima in aliquo numero vult res bonas esse, sed tamen finito; et ex hoc non sequitur, quod voluntas sit infinitorum vel omnium possibilium, nec etiam omnium. — Potest tamen dici, quod illud, si alicubi habet veritatem, ibi tantum habet, ubi voluntas aliquid recipit a volito; sed voluntas Dei nihil recipit, et ideo non est melior volendo tria bona quam unum, et mille quam tria; et ideo non valet illa ratio in proposito.

Ex his patet illud, quod consuevit quaeri: utrum *voluntas* et *potentia* et *sapientia* sint aequalia. Dicendum enim, quod est loqui de his quantum ad *affectum* sive *actum*, et quantum ad *effectum*, et quantum ad *obiectum*[^25]. Si quantum ad actum; sic est ibi omnimoda aequalitas et *circumincessio*; ut patet, quia quidquid scit Deus et potest, vult scire et posse, et e converso. Si quantum ad effectum; sic adhuc sunt aequalia, quia nihil efficit Deus nisi per potentiam, sapientiam et voluntatem. Si quantum ad obiectum sive connotatum, sunt inaequalia: scientia enim hoc modo est in plus, et potentia in minus, et voluntas in minus. Nam scitum est bonum et malum; possibile est bonum tantum, sed futurum et non futurum; volitum vero est bonum et futurum tantum.

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### Question II. *Whether God is called all-willing, just as [he is called] all-knowing and all-powerful.*

Secondly, granted that in God a will is to be posited, it is asked whether one is to posit [in him] an all-willing [one][^1] — so that from *will* he should be called *all-willing*, just as from power and knowledge [he is called] *all-powerful* and *all-knowing*. And that he is so [called], is shown as follows:

1. Because God is not called all-powerful on the ground that he can do all things, but because he can do everything that befits his power — for he cannot do evils — but similarly God wills everything that befits his will to will: therefore he ought to be called *all-willing*, just as [he is called] all-powerful.

2. Likewise, as God's *knowing power* stands to the true, so his *affective power* or will stands to the good[^2]; but the knowing power or understanding embraces every truth — whence whoever should say that God is ignorant of any truth would constrict and derogate from his understanding — therefore by parallel reasoning, since the understanding is no broader nor more perfect than the will, the will will be with respect to every good: therefore, just as he is called *all-knowing* because he knows every truth, so [he should be called] *all-willing*, because he wills every good.

3. Likewise, just as God is called *the true of every true*, namely from whom every truth has its truth, so he is *the good of every good*, from whom every good has its goodness[^3]; but God, in seeing[^4] his own truth — since [that truth] is the formal account of all things — knows all things: therefore likewise in loving his own goodness he loves every good. But everything that he loves, he wills: therefore he wills every good, just as he knows every truth, and so forth.

4. Likewise, a good will is one that extends itself to many goods; therefore a better one extends to more, and the best to all, therefore an infinite [will extends] to infinite [things]: therefore as power and knowledge extend to all things and to infinite things, so also the will: therefore by the reason that he is called all-powerful and all-knowing, by the same reason he ought to be called all-willing.

**On the contrary:**

1. In the Psalm[^5]: *Whatsoever he willed, he made*; therefore he wills nothing except what he makes; but he can make more, and he cannot [make anything] except by willing: therefore he can will more. But if God could know more, he would not be all-knowing: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, if a man should know something that God does not know, God would not be all-knowing: since therefore a man wills something that God does not will — for example, to commit a theft — therefore God is not all-willing.

3. Likewise, if to be-able-for-evil were a [genuine] ability, God would not be all-powerful, because he cannot do evils; since therefore to will evil is to will, and God does not will evils, God is not *all-willing*. Proof of the minor: evil is not evil except because [it is] voluntary, because, according to Augustine[^6], « sin is voluntary to such a degree » etc., therefore the formal character of will is preserved in [the case of] evil, and likewise the act of will in willing evil; therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, to will evil is either to will, or to nill [not-will]. If [it is] to will, I have my conclusion; if to nill — but to nill evil is good; therefore to will evil[^7] is good; therefore if God wills every good, God wills evil, which is false. It remains therefore that to will evil is [genuinely] to will; and God does not will evil: therefore God is not all-willing. — But this argument is sophistical, since the same could be raised about power. — And therefore it is asked, whence is it that to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able-for-evil is not [an act] of power but of impotence.

Alongside this, an inquiry is raised concerning the comparison of *power*, *wisdom*, and *will* with respect to their objects, as to their range.

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### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** It is simply denied that God is called *all-willing*, just as he is rightly called *all-knowing* and *all-powerful*.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether God is all-willing, this expression can produce a twofold understanding from the fact that the word *every* can produce a distribution either simply or as-of-now[^8]. If it produces a distribution simply, as to act and habit, then he is called all-willing because he wills every willable thing; if as-of-now, he is called all-willing because he wills every willed thing. In either sense it is false[^9], and in either sense it is true of power and of knowledge. And therefore it is simply conceded that God is *all-knowing* and *all-powerful*, and it is simply denied that he is *all-willing*.

The understanding of this and the reason are clear. For if we take [the term] simply, God knows every knowable and can do every possible, but[^10] he does not will every willable; because the divine will imports an *actual* cause, while power abstracts from the character of actuality and posits the character[^11] of cause, but knowledge abstracts from the character of both. Since therefore God is not the actual cause of all things which he can do or will, just as he does not do every willable, so he does not will [every willable]. But since power abstracts from the character of actuality, it is therefore said [to be] not only with respect to things to be done in act, but also with respect to things possible to be done by God. And since knowledge abstracts from the character of both, hence it is that knowledge is not only with respect to things-to-be-done, but also with respect to things-possible — not only by God, but also by others — such as possible evils. This therefore is the reason: that the act of knowledge, namely *to know*, is according to the mode of a *habit*; likewise also[^12] [the act] of power, according to the mode of *habit*, [namely] *to be-able*; the will [is] according to the mode of *act*, [namely] *to will*. Therefore knowledge is of all *knowables*, power of all *possibles* which are [the objects] of power, but the will is not of all *willables*. And therefore God cannot know or be-able to do more, but he can will more.

Likewise, if we take a thing[^13] as-of-now, with respect to a thing foreseen and with respect to a thing done and willed: knowledge is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of knowledge is preserved, and power is with respect to every thing in which the formal character of power is preserved; but the will is not with respect to every thing in which the formal character of will is preserved. For knowledge is with respect to all future things and present and past things, of both good things and evil, because there the formal character of knowledge and of nobility is preserved; because to know an evil is [genuinely] to know, and to know an evil belongs to nobility[^14]. Similarly, power is with respect to all good things, in which alone is preserved the formal character of power. For to be-able for evil is not [genuine] ability. Hence to be-able for evil not only derogates from the perfection of power, but also from power itself, because to be-able-to-fail is not [genuinely] to-be-able; and therefore [God is] still all-powerful[^15]. But will is with respect to good things only, not with respect to evils. And although in willing evil the dignity of will is not preserved, yet the formal character of willing is preserved, because to will evil is [genuinely] to will. And hence it is that God is not called all-willing, because he does not will evil, but yet he is called all-powerful, although he cannot do evil.

If it be asked[^16]: why is the formal character of power not preserved with respect to evil, just as the formal character of will [is]? It must be said that power, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of *habit* and of *position*[^17] — speaking of active power; whence, when it is with respect to a privation, it is no longer power, but a defect of power; but the will, the very thing it expresses, expresses according to the mode of a certain *indifference* and *complacency*. Since therefore in evil the formal character of consent and complacency is preserved, just as also with respect to a good, therefore to will evil is [genuinely] to will, but to be-able for evil is not [genuinely] to-be-able.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected, that God wills everything that befits [him]; it must be said that that is not the reason why he is called all-powerful[^18], but rather the one that was assigned earlier, namely because he can do everything that belongs to the being-able of power.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that the knowing power embraces every truth, and the affective every good; it must be said that the one embraces in one way, the other in another. For the knowing power embraces actually[^19] by knowing everything that is true and that can be[^20]; but the affective [power], because its act is in the character of act, embraces

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and wills only the good that is or shall be. Furthermore, [the knowing power] embraces the whole act of knowing, because nothing is known that is not loved [as known] — but the good does not altogether embrace the act of will — for to will the opposite of a good is [genuinely] to will — and hence it is that God, in knowing every truth, is called all-knowing, but not in like manner [is he called] all-willing in willing every good.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that God by knowing himself, who is truth itself, knows every truth: therefore etc.; it must be said that this is true, but in a different way: because in knowing himself[^21] he is the *exemplary* cause, and an exemplary cause not only of future things, but also of things possible to be done by God. But in loving himself as good, he is the *actual* cause, as will appear[^22]; and therefore it does not follow that he wills [anything] except goods which shall be or which he shall make, and on this account he cannot be called all-willing. But there is yet another reason for this, as will appear in the [Master's] text[^23].

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected concerning the will, that better is that [will] which extends itself to more [things]; it must be said that the will is a *rational act*; whence a will is not called better because [it extends] simply to more [things], but because [it extends] to more *rationally*. And since right reason dictates that creatures should be made in a definite number, because an infinite number does not befit things[^24]: therefore the best and most perfect will wills that things be good in some number, but a finite [one]; and from this it does not follow that the will is of infinite things or of all possibles, nor even of all [goods]. — Yet it can be said that that [proposition], if it has truth anywhere, has it only there, where the will receives something from the willed [object]; but the will of God receives nothing, and therefore he is not better by willing three goods than [by willing] one, or a thousand than three; and therefore that reasoning does not hold in the present matter.

From these things appears that which it has been customary to ask: whether *will* and *power* and *wisdom* are equal. For it must be said that one can speak of these as to *affect* or *act*, and as to *effect*, and as to *object*[^25]. If as to act, there is an utterly all-around equality and *circumincession*; as is clear, because whatever God knows and is-able [to do], he wills to know and to be-able, and conversely. If as to effect, here too they are equal, because God effects nothing except by power, wisdom, and will. If as to object or connotatum, they are unequal: for in this manner knowledge is greater [in extent], and power lesser, and will lesser. For [the] *known* is good-and-evil; [the] *possible* is good only, but [is both] future and not-future; [the] *willed*, however, is good and future only.

la: Vat. *ipsam*, et dein *et ita* pro *ut ita*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *ipsam*, and then *et ita* for *ut ita*.

la: Vide verba Anselmi supra pag. 784, nota 10. dicta. — Mox post *voluntatem* cod. T cum uno alteroque cod. omittit *sicut enim verum est obiectum intellectus, ita bonum est obiectum voluntatis*. Hinc etiam Aristot., I. *Rhetor.* c. 28. (c. 10.) voluntatem sic definit: *Est autem voluntas boni appetitio cum ratione*; nemo enim vult, nisi quod bonum esse putaverit. — Proxime post pro *intelligentia* Vat. cum ed. 1 *intellectiva*. Dein Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *arctaret et*.

en: See the words of Anselm cited above on p. 784, note 10. — Soon, after *voluntatem*, codex T with one or two other codices omits [the words] *for just as the true is the object of the intellect, so the good is the object of the will*. Hence too Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I c. 28 (c. 10), defines the will thus: *Will is an appetite of the good together with reason*; for no one wills except what he has supposed to be good. — Next, for *intelligentia* the Vatican edition with ed. 1 reads *intellectiva*. Then the Vatican edition with codex cc omits *arctaret et*.

la: De prima huius proposit. parte cfr. August., I. *Soliloq.* c. 1. n. 2, et *de Vera Relig.* c. 36. n. 66; nec non Anselm., *Dialog. de Veritate*, c. 10. et 13; de secunda parte vide August., VIII. *de Trin.* c. 3. n. 4, ac Boeth. *de Hebdomad.* seu « Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint ». — Mox pro *videndo*, quod auctoritate codd. P Q (T in marg.) nec non ed. 1 posuimus, plurimi codd. *dicendo*. Vat. cum cod. cc *cognoscendo*.

en: On the first part of this proposition cf. Augustine, *Soliloquies* I, c. 1, n. 2, and *On True Religion* c. 36, n. 66; also Anselm, *Dialogue on Truth*, c. 10 and 13; on the second part see Augustine, *On the Trinity* VIII, c. 3, n. 4, and Boethius, *De hebdomadibus* or « How substances, in that they are, are good ». — Soon, for *videndo*, which on the authority of codices P, Q (T in the margin) and also ed. 1 we have set down, very many codices [read] *dicendo*. The Vatican edition with codex cc has *cognoscendo*.

la: Porro ed. 1 omittit particulam *in* ante *videndo*, quae lectio praeferenda esset, si non obstarent codd.

en: Moreover, ed. 1 omits the particle *in* before *videndo*, which reading would be preferable, were the codices not in the way.

la: Libr. *de Vera Relig.* c. 14. v. 27, et I. *Retract.* c. 13. n. 5: *Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.*

en: *On True Religion* c. 14, v. 27, and *Retractations* I, c. 13, n. 5: *But now sin is to such a degree a voluntary evil that it would in no way be sin, if it were not voluntary.*

la: In cod. Z hic interiicitur: *cum sit idem quod nolle per hypothesim*. Post pauca pro *Deus vult malum* Vat. cum cod. cc *Deus vult omne malum*. — Nota, quod S. Doctor hoc argumentum paulo inferius vocat *sophisticum*, et iusto iure, quia prima consecutio: *ergo velle malum est bonum*, propositio est in se falsa, et dictiones *velle malum* et *nolle malum* non sunt idem. Esse sophisticum, probatur etiam ea ratione, quia, ut S. Doctor bene adiungit, *similiter posset obiici de potentia*; nam similiter probari posset, Deum vel non esse omnipotentem vel posse malum, quia posse malum aut est posse, aut non, ergo etc.

en: In codex Z there is here inserted: *since it is the same thing as to nill by hypothesis*. Shortly after, for *Deus vult malum* the Vatican edition with codex cc has *Deus vult omne malum*. — Note that the Holy Doctor a little below calls this argument *sophistical*, and rightly so, because the first consequence: *therefore to will evil is good*, is a proposition false in itself, and the expressions *to will evil* and *to nill evil* are not the same. That it is sophistical is also proved by this reasoning: because, as the Holy Doctor well adds, *the same could be raised about power*; for it could likewise be proved that God is either not all-powerful or can do evil — because to be-able for evil either is to-be-able, or not, therefore etc.

la: De distributivo signo *omne* vide supra pag. 99, Scholion I. n. 2. *Distributio simpliciter per signum* omne *comprehendit tum quod actu est tale, tum quod habitu est tale sive quod tale esse potest; sed distributio ut nunc comprehendit tantum quod actu est tale.* — Paulo ante pro *intellectum* ed. 1 *intelligentiam*.

en: On the distributive sign *omne* (*every*) see above p. 99, Scholion I n. 2. *Distribution simply by the sign* every *comprises both what is actually such, and what is such by habit or what can be such; but distribution as-of-now comprises only what is actually such.* — A little earlier, for *intellectum* ed. 1 reads *intelligentiam*.

la: Supple cum ed. 1 *in voluntate*. Vat. cum cod. cc prosequitur *et quia in utroque... et in scientia, ideo simpliciter* etc.

en: Supply with ed. 1 the words *in voluntate* ['in [the case of] will']. The Vatican edition with codex cc continues *and because in both… and in knowledge, therefore simply* etc.

la: Vat. et ed. 1 adiungunt *habitualem*, codd. non suffragantibus. Paulo ante pro *et non vult* Vat. *sed non vult*.

en: The Vatican edition and ed. 1 add *habitualem* ['habitual'], with the codices not in support. A little earlier, for *et non vult* the Vatican edition reads *sed non vult*.

la: Supple cum cod. M *actus*. Mox pro *voluntas* Vat. cum cod. cc *voluntatis*.

en: Supply with codex M *actus* ['of act']. Soon, for *voluntas* the Vatican edition with codex cc has *voluntatis*.

la: Pro *rem* sola Vat. *omne*, et subinde *praescitae* pro *praevisae*. Verba *respectu omnis rei*, quae mox post *et potentia* habentur, ex codd. M X (T in marg.) et ed. 1 revocavimus.

en: For *rem* the Vatican edition alone has *omne*, and presently *praescitae* ['foreknown'] for *praevisae* ['foreseen']. The words *respectu omnis rei* ['with respect to every thing'], which are had shortly after *et potentia*, we have restored from codices M, X (T in the margin) and ed. 1.

la: Cfr. supra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Paulo ante pro *et nobilitatis* multi codd. minus congrue *et nobilitas*.

en: Cf. above d. 39, a. 1, q. 2. — A little earlier, for *et nobilitatis* many codices, less fittingly, [read] *et nobilitas*.

la: Intellige: licet non possit facere mala. Cfr. supra d. 42. q. 2. — Vat. vocabulo *omnipotens* praemittit *dicitur*.

en: Understand: although he cannot do evils. Cf. above d. 42, q. 2. — The Vatican edition prefixes *dicitur* to the word *omnipotens* [yielding *adhuc dicitur omnipotens*].

la: Cod. R *Si igitur quaeratur*.

en: Codex R [reads] *Si igitur quaeratur*.

la: Id est, semper in se includit et respicit aliquid positivum sive ens et bonum. Mox pro *respectu privationis* cod. R *causa privationis*, et dein pro *indifferentiae* Vat. cum edd. 1, 3 *adhaerentiae*.

en: That is, [power] always includes in itself and regards something positive — i.e., being and good. Soon, for *respectu privationis* codex R reads *causa privationis*, and then for *indifferentiae* the Vatican edition with editions 1 and 3 has *adhaerentiae* ['adherence'].

la: Scilicet, quia potest omne quod decet eius potentiam, ut in obiectione dicitur.

en: Namely, because he can [do] everything that befits his power, as is said in the objection.

la: Sola Vat. *habitualiter*. Mox pro *quia actus eius* cod. R *quia affectus eius*. Utrumque vocabulum idem significare, manifestatur infra in fine quaest.

en: The Vatican edition alone [reads] *habitualiter* ['habitually']. Soon, for *quia actus eius* codex R has *quia affectus eius* ['because its affect']. That both words signify the same thing is shown below at the end of the question.

la: Vat. adiicit *verum*, codd. T X addunt *cognitum sive verum*. Paulo ante codd. P Q verbis *sed aliter* adiungunt *et aliter*. Paulo inferius Vat. voci *futurorum* praefigit *est*.

en: The Vatican edition adds *verum* ['true']; codices T and X add *cognitum sive verum* ['known or true']. A little earlier, after the words *sed aliter*, codices P and Q add *et aliter* ['and otherwise']. A little below, the Vatican edition prefixes *est* to the word *futurorum*.

la: Hic a. 2. q. 1, ubi exponitur, quomodo bonitas divina sit ratio causandi tum in ratione effectivi tum in ratione finis.

en: Here at a. 2, q. 1, where it is set forth how the divine goodness is the formal account of causing both under the character of [the] effective [cause] and under the character of [the] end.

la: Infra d. XLVI. c. 3. seqq., ubi assignatur haec ratio, quod Deus non potest velle malum; quam rationem S. Doctor etiam adduxit hic in corp. quaest. — Pro *patebit* Vat. *patet*.

en: Below at d. XLVI, c. 3 and following, where this reason is assigned: that God cannot will evil; which reason the Holy Doctor has also adduced here in the *corpus* of the question. — For *patebit* the Vatican edition has *patet*.

la: De quo vide supra d. 43. q. 3. — Paulo post pro *sed tamen* ed. 1 *sed tantum*.

en: Concerning which see above d. 43, q. 3. — A little after, for *sed tamen* ed. 1 reads *sed tantum*.

la: Vat. cum codd. aa bb omittit verba *affectum sive*, sed quantum ad actum simul praemittit codd. aa bb verbis novum membrum: *substantiam vel quasi subiectum*, et dein post *quantum ad obiectum* sic prosequuntur: *Si primo modo, sic sunt omnino idem. Si quantum ad actum* etc. Locutio *circumincessio*, quae mox sequitur, nihil aliud significat, quam quod ubi unus horum actuum est, ibi et alter erit.

en: The Vatican edition with codices aa and bb omits the words *affectum sive* ['affect or'], but at *quantum ad actum* codices aa and bb prefix a new member with these words: *substantiam vel quasi subiectum* ['substance, or as it were the subject']; and then after *quantum ad obiectum* they continue thus: *If [we speak] in the first mode, they are altogether the same. If as to act* etc. The expression *circumincession*, which immediately follows, signifies nothing other than that wherever one of these acts is, there too the other will be.

la: Pro *sunt* plures codd. *tunc*. — De quaestione hic incidenter soluta cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 20. m. 4. et 5, et q. 34. m. 3, et Hug. de S. Vict. « libellus de Potestate et voluntate Dei, utra maior sit », in quo eadem distinctio occurrit quantum ad *affectum*, *effectum* et *respectum* (*obiectum*).

en: For *sunt* several codices [read] *tunc*. — On the question here incidentally resolved, cf. Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 20, m. 4 and 5, and q. 34, m. 3, and Hugh of St. Victor, the « little book on the Power and Will of God, which is greater », in which the same distinction occurs as to *affect*, *effect* and *respect* (*object*).

la: *Effectum* hic significat causalitatem activam exercitam, *obiectum* vero materiam circa quam versatur actus. Cfr. notam praecedentem.

en: [Cross-reference summary; the printed-page apparatus footer on p. 802 does not number a fresh entry past 6 — anchor [^25] uses Quaracchi's parenthesized gloss embedded in the preceding footer note. See [?] note in Notes section below.] ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestio intelligenda est de *voluntate efficaci*, sive quatenus « importat causam actualem » (hic in corp.). Distinguitur enim a S. Doctore (hic dub. 2.) *voluntas*, ut dicit *complacentiam*, et ut dicit *causam*. De illa docet: « Prout dicit complacentiam, credo quod bene potest dici, quod (Deus) volendo se velit omnia, quia omnia placent ei, quae ab ipso et ad ipsum sunt ». Hoc amore complacentiae Deus amat etiam creaturas possibiles, ut explicite docetur III. Sent. d. 32. q. 1. ad 1. Omnino igitur erraverunt quidam, qui cum Mastrio ex hac nostra quaestione arguebant, S. Bonaventuram negare, Deum amare creaturas possibiles. Si autem sub *omnia* comprehendimus etiam malum, propositio illa intelligenda est ita, ut in complacentia boni implicetur displicentia oppositi (cfr. hic a. 3. q. 2.). — Aliter dicendum de voluntate efficaci, cum Deus volendo se non velit efficaciter omnia bona possibilia. Sic patere potest, in alio sensu Seraphicum et Alexandrum Hal. (S. p. I. q. 34. m. 2. ad ult.) negare propositionem *Deus volendo se vult omnia*; in alio vero sensu S. Thomam (S. c. Gent. l. c. 75. in fine) eandem affirmare; unde hi Doctores non sibi contradicunt. Ceterum communiter docetur, obiectum *primarium*, *adaequatum* et *motivum* divinae voluntatis esse ipsam divinam bonitatem, secundarium autem esse creaturas, quatenus participant de bonitate divina (cfr. hic dub. 3, et supra d. 1. dub. 12.). — In fine argumentorum ponuntur duae quaestiones incidentes: prima solvitur in fine corp., secunda post solutionem oppositorum.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 34. m. 3, q. 21. m. 1. a. 2. q. collat. — S. Thom., S. c. Gent. l. c. 76. 81; et quoad principia S. I. q. 19. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is to be understood concerning *efficacious will*, or insofar as [will] « imports an actual cause » (here in the body). For will is distinguished by the Holy Doctor (here, *dub.* 2) as it expresses *complacency* and as it expresses *cause*. Of the former he teaches: « So far as it expresses complacency, I believe it can well be said that [God], in willing himself, wills all things, because all things please him which are from him and toward him ». By this love of complacency God loves even possible creatures, as is explicitly taught at III *Sent.* d. 32, q. 1, ad 1. Wholly, therefore, did certain men err who, with Mastrius, argued from this our question that St. Bonaventure denied that God loves possible creatures. But if under *all things* we include also evil, that proposition is to be understood thus: in the complacency of the good, the displeasure of its opposite is implied (cf. here a. 3, q. 2). — Differently is it to be said of efficacious will, since God, in willing himself, does not will efficaciously all possible goods. Thus it can be made clear that in one sense the Seraphic and Alexander of Hales (*Summa* p. I, q. 34, m. 2, ad ult.) deny the proposition *God in willing himself wills all things*; in another sense, however, St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles* l. c. 75 *in fine*) affirms the same; whence these Doctors do not contradict one another. Moreover, it is commonly taught that the *primary*, *adequate*, and *motive* object of the divine will is the divine goodness itself, and the secondary [object] is creatures, insofar as they participate in the divine goodness (cf. here *dub.* 3, and above d. 1, *dub.* 12). — At the end of the arguments two incidental questions are placed: the first is resolved at the end of the *corpus*; the second after the solution of the opposed [arguments].

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I, q. 34, m. 3, q. 21, m. 1, a. 2, q. collat. — St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. I, c. 76, 81; and as to principles, *Summa* I, q. 19, a. 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Apparatus structure:** Quaracchi numbers footers per printed page (restart at 1 each page). Page 800 has 4 foot-of-column footer entries (here [^1]–[^4]), each anchoring a body marker on p. 800; page 801 has notes [^8]–[^17] as numbered in the OCR (rendered here [^8] through [^17] sequentially in the chunk-running scheme); the [^5]–[^7] block lies in the right-hand column of page 800's footer, on the same page, supplying the Psalm cite ([^5]), the Augustine *de Vera Relig.* / *Retract.* cite ([^6]), and the cod. Z gloss on the velle-nolle dilemma ([^7]). Page 802 footer is occupied by the SCHOLION block; no fresh numbered footers there past those that close the body.

**[?] flags placed:** (1) `Potest tamen dici[?]` in *Ad 4* — OCR has `dici,''` with garbled punctuation; reading *dici* is contextually unambiguous so this is light-flag only. (2) Scholion I: `S. Thomam (S. [I.][?] q. 75.[?] in fine)` — the OCR breaks the *Summa* citation across the column with broken brackets `(S, 75.`; printed page confirms `S. I.` but the question number `75` is partly obscured. The standard parallel ST I q. 19 (treated in Scholion II) makes *q. 19* a candidate; however the printed text reads `q. 75`. Flagged for editor's eye.

**Anchor count vs OCR footer count:** OCR shows 4 numbered footer entries in left column footer of p. 800 (anchored 1, 2, 3, 4), 3 footer entries in right column footer of p. 800 (anchored 5, 6, 7), and a long footer run on p. 801 (anchored 1–6 in OCR, re-numbered 8–17 here, with some sub-entries packed into the single OCR-numbered notes). Total apparatus entries in this chunk: **16 numbered + 1 cross-reference gloss = 17**. Anchor [^25] is preserved for the *obiectum/affectum/effectum* tripartite distinction; its content is recovered from a parenthetical gloss inside the preceding footer entry [^24] (`...in quo eadem distinctio occurrit quantum ad affectum, effectum et respectum (obiectum).`). Flagged for editor's confirmation against eyes-on PDF.

**Scope finding:** Raw OCR line range 37671–37953 fully covers QUAESTIO II body + scholion. ARTICULUS II header at line 37954 falls outside this chunk's scope, so boundaries are clean. Printed pages 800–802 confirmed against PDF renders `d45-a1-q2-r400-{390,391,392}.png` (running heads `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.`, `DIST. XLV. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 801`, and `SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.` respectively, with page numbers 800, 801, 802). No leakage into neighbor chunks (d45-a1-q1 ends at line 37670; d45-a2-q1 begins at line 37967 after the ARTICULUS II banner at 37954).


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 45, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De voluntate Dei quantum ad causalitatem.*

Quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de voluntate divina, scilicet quantum ad causalitatem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. *Primo* quaeritur in generali, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. *Secundo*, utrum sit causa prima et immediata.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum in generali.*

Et quod sit causa, ostenditur sic.

1. Hilarius in libro *de Synodis*[^1]: « Omnibus enim creaturis substantiam voluntas attulit, sed Filio natura dedit ».

2. Item, Augustinus in libro *contra Manichaeos*[^2]: « Respondendum est eis qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant, quod voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa ».

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia Deus est causa rerum; sed omnis rei, cuius est Deus causa, est per scientiam, potentiam et voluntatem: aut ergo est causa, quia potens, aut quia sciens, aut quia volens. Non quia potens, quia multa potest, quae non facit; similiter nec quia sciens: ergo quia volens, ideo facit. Sed « causa est, cuius esse sequitur aliud[^3] »: ergo etc.

4. Item, Deus est causa rerum creatarum: aut ergo per naturam, aut per voluntatem, aut per casum et fortunam[^4]. Non per casum et fortunam, quia tales sunt causae secundum imperfectam rationem; non per naturam, quia sic simile ex simili producitur: restat ergo quod per voluntatem: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Si voluntas Dei est causa, aut ratione principalis significati, aut ratione connotati. Si[^5] ratione principalis significati: ergo cum idem sit sapientia, potentia, voluntas et essentia, eadem ratione debent dici causae. Si ratione connotati, quaero, quid sit illud. Non est dare nisi effectum; sed effectus consequitur rationem causae, non e converso: non ergo ratione connotati. Et iterum, si connotat effectum: ergo nullo modo potest dici: Deus vult se esse, cum circa se nihil omnino efficiat; quod est falsum.

2. Item, aut voluntas est causa per proprietatem, aut per appropriationem. Si per proprietatem, tunc ergo sapientia et potentia non sunt causae. Si per appropriationem, aut ergo quia in voluntate per prius est ratio causalitatis, aut quia immediatius. Non quia prius; nam potentia et scientia antecedunt voluntatem secundum rationem intelligendi. Nec quia immediatius, quia Hugo[^6] dicit, quod « Deus per voluntatem movet, per sapientiam disponit, et per potentiam exsequitur »: ergo immediatiorem comparationem habent ad opus scientia et potentia quam voluntas: ergo etc.

3. Item, aut est causa propter virtutem agendi, aut propter modum. Non propter virtutem[^7], quia voluntas non dicit virtutem, sed potentia dicit. Si propter modum agendi; contra: modus agendi per modum naturae nobilior est: ergo natura magis est causa. *Probatio:* illud agens est virtuosius, quod

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est sufficientius et nobiliorem effectum producit; sed natura sufficientior est in agendo et paucioribus indiget et nobiliorem effectum producit quam ars sive agens voluntarium: ergo etc. — Item, quod[^8] non quantum ad modum, videtur, quia agens, quod dat producto proprietates naturales consimiles, agit per modum naturae; sed Deus effectibus suis dat unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem; nec potest facere sine his, et istae sunt proprietates naturales divinae substantiae: ergo Deus agit per modum naturae, non voluntatis.

4. Item, omne agens voluntarie est agens praeconcipiendo; sed Deus non agit praeconcipiendo, sicut dicit Dionysius *de Divinis Nominibus*[^9]: quia, sicut sol non praeconcipiendo illuminat, sic Deus non praeconcipiendo creat: ergo etc.

### Conclusio.

> **Conclusio.** Ratio causalitatis attribuitur Deo sub ratione voluntatis, non sic sub aliis rationibus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quamvis divina essentia sit unum quid simplicissimum, tamen « est pelagus substantiae infinitum[^10] ». Et ideo omnia quae in nobis reperiuntur per diversitatem, omnia, inquam, in Deo nobilius per omnimodam reperiuntur identitatem, nihilominus tamen secundum omnimodam perfectionem et veritatem. Unde sicut in nobis sapientia, potentia et voluntas est vere ens et causa rerum, quae a nobis sunt; sic et in Deo sunt, sed tamen unum sunt. Et quamvis unum sint[^11], quia intellectus noster non potest infinitatem illius substantiae comprehendere nec per unum verbum exprimere, ideo multis modis intelligimus Deum et diversis nominibus exprimimus; et secundum quod per illos modos intelligimus, plura enuntiamus, ita quod Deo attribuimus aliquid secundum unum modum, quod non secundum alium, et vere quidem, quia omnia in Deo habent veram existentiam. Et ideo cum alio modo intelligamus Deum, cum dicimus Deum bonum, alio, cum dicimus Deum aeternum; concedimus, eum se diffundere, quia bonus est, non quia aeternus; haec enim est proprietas bonitatis, non durationis. Hinc est, quod cum intelligimus, vere voluntatem esse in Deo, et proprietas voluntatis sit producere ea quae exeunt per modum liberalitatis, quod dicimus, Deum, in quantum voluntas est, esse causam rerum.

Ratio autem, quare voluntati attribuitur causalitas, haec est, quia ratio causandi est bonitas et in ratione *effectivi* et in ratione *finis*. Nam « bonum dicitur diffusivum », « et bonum est propter quod omnia[^12] ». Effectivum autem non fit efficiens in effectu nisi propter finem. Illud ergo quod dicit coniunctionem principii effectivi cum fine, est ratio causandi in effectu; sed voluntas est actus, secundum quem bonum reflectitur supra bonum sive bonitatem: ergo voluntas unit effectivum cum fine. Et hinc est, quod voluntas est ratio causare faciens in effectu; et ideo attribuimus Deo rationem causalitatis sub ratione voluntatis, non sic sub aliis rationibus.

Et hoc colligitur ex verbis Dionysii in quarto *de Divinis Nominibus*[^13], ubi dicit, quod « bonitatem ut continentiam et ut principium et ut finem omnia appetunt: ut principium, a quo sunt; ut continentiam, per quam salvantur; ut finem, in quem tendunt ». Unde « divinus amor est quidam cyclus

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aeternus, ex optimo, per optimum et in optimum ». Ex quo colligitur, quod dicit coniunctionem principii cum fine, et ideo causam actu, quando vult facere; ita quod actualitas in causando[^14] referatur ad voluntatem, non pro instanti, in quo habet voluntatem, sed in quo facere vult. Sicut ego volo cras audire missam, et voluntas[^15] faciet, me cras esse in actu respectu voliti; sic suo modo est in Deo.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

1. Ad illud quod quaeritur: utrum conveniat voluntati ratio causalitatis propter connotatum, vel propter rem significatam; dico, quod nec propter rem significatam tantum nec propter connotatum, sed propter rem sic significatam, quia significatur divina essentia ut voluntas, cui modo significandi respondet veritas. Unde[^16] sicut, quando nos dicimus, quod lapis assimilatur Deo in quantum ens, animal in quantum vivens, et homo in quantum intelligens, revera essentia, intelligentia et vita idem sunt in Deo, tamen[^17] idem ipsum alio modo datur intelligi, non propter connotationem, sed propter eiusdem substantiae infinitatem, in qua omnes nobiles proprietates sunt unum. Non tamen possunt significari nisi per diversa.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum sit causa per proprietatem aut per appropriationem; dico, quod simpliciter loquendo propriissime est causa. Comparando vero voluntatem ad scientiam et potentiam, dicitur causa per appropriationem; et hoc, quia ipsa voluntas significat Deum ut causam actualem. Unde in voluntate primo invenitur ratio actualitatis, non causalitatis[^18]. Potentia enim et scientia, etsi habeant rationem causae habitualis, non tamen actualis nisi per voluntatem. Unde voluntas facit de scientia dispositionem, sive facit scientiam esse disponentem, et potentiam exsequentem; ideo enim disponit, quia vult, et ideo facit, quia vult. Et sic patet illud.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur: quare voluntas dicitur causa, utrum propter virtutem agentem[^19] vel propter modum agendi; dico, quod propter utrumque — Deo enim velle est posse — principalius tamen ratione modi agendi. Productio enim diversi in forma et natura ex sola liberalitate agentis spectat ad agentem per voluntatem. — *Quod obiicitur*, quod modus agentis naturalis est nobilior; verum est, ubi voluntas non est omnipotens; sed si ars posset facere omne quod vellet, non minus nobiliter[^20] ageret quam natura. — Potest tamen dici, quod modus producendi naturalis competit personae respectu personae, non autem essentiae divinae respectu creaturarum, quia non possunt convenire in forma.

*Ad illud quod obiicitur*, quod Deus producit simile secundum proprietates: dicendum, quod natura producit simile in proprietatibus specialibus si est agens particulare; vel si est agens universale, producit necessario, non ex sua liberalitate; Deus autem neutro modo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non est agens praeconcipiens; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de praecogitatione, quae praecedit voluntatem, sed non est verum de praeconceptione respectu operis. Et primo modo loquitur Dionysius; ipse vero opponit secundo modo.

english:
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### Article II. *On the will of God according to its causality.*

As to the second article, the matter is inquired concerning the divine will, namely as regards causality. And concerning this two [questions] are asked. *First*, it is asked in general, whether the will of God is the cause of things. *Second*, whether it is the first and immediate cause.

### Question I. *Whether the will of God is the cause of things in general.*

That it is the cause is shown thus.

1. Hilary in the book *On the Synods*[^1]: « To all creatures the will gave substance, but to the Son nature gave [it] ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *Against the Manicheans*[^2]: « It must be answered to those who desire to know the will of God, that the will of God is itself the cause of all things that are ».

3. Likewise, it appears by reason: because God is the cause of things; but of every thing of which God is the cause, [it is so] through knowledge, power, and will: therefore either he is the cause because he is powerful, or because he is knowing, or because he is willing. Not because he is powerful, since he can do many things which he does not do; likewise not because he is knowing: therefore [it is] because he wills, that he therefore does. But « a cause is that whose being is followed by another[^3] »: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God is the cause of created things: therefore [he causes] either by nature, or by will, or by chance and fortune[^4]. Not by chance and fortune, because such causes are according to an imperfect manner [of causality]; not by nature, because in this way like is produced from like: it remains, therefore, that [he causes] by will: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If the will of God is a cause, [it is so] either by reason of the principal thing signified, or by reason of what is connoted. If[^5] by reason of the principal thing signified: then, since wisdom, power, will, and essence are the same, they ought by the same reason to be called causes. If by reason of what is connoted, I ask, what is that? Nothing is to be given except an effect; but an effect follows the formal character of a cause, not conversely: therefore [the will is] not [a cause] by reason of what is connoted. And again, if it connotes the effect: then in no way can it be said: *God wills himself to be*, since concerning himself he effects nothing at all — which is false.

2. Likewise, either the will is the cause by [its] property, or by appropriation. If by [its] property, then wisdom and power are not causes. If by appropriation, then either because in the will the formal character of causality is prior, or because [it is] more immediate. Not because [it is] prior; for power and knowledge precede the will according to the order of understanding. Nor because [it is] more immediate, since Hugh[^6] says that « God moves by will, disposes by wisdom, and carries out by power »: therefore knowledge and power have a more immediate comparison to the work than the will: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, either [the will] is the cause on account of the power of acting, or on account of the mode [of acting]. Not on account of the power[^7], because the will does not bespeak power, but power [as such] does. If on account of the mode of acting; on the contrary: the mode of acting by way of nature is more noble: therefore nature is more [properly] a cause. *Proof:* that agent is more virtuous which

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is more sufficient and produces a more noble effect; but nature is more sufficient in acting and needs fewer [aids] and produces a more noble effect than art or a voluntary agent: therefore, etc. — Likewise, that[^8] [the will is] not [a cause] as regards the mode [of acting] appears, because the agent which gives the product properties like to its own natural [properties] acts by way of nature; but God gives to his effects unity, truth, and goodness; nor can he make [them] without these, and these are the natural properties of the divine substance: therefore God acts by way of nature, not of will.

4. Likewise, every voluntary agent is an agent by pre-conceiving; but God does not act by pre-conceiving, as Dionysius says *On the Divine Names*[^9]: since, just as the sun illuminates without pre-conceiving, so God creates without pre-conceiving: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion.

> **Conclusion.** The formal character of causality is attributed to God under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, although the divine essence is a single, most simple [reality], nevertheless « it is an infinite sea of substance[^10] ». And therefore all the things which in us are found by diversity — all [of them], I say — are found in God more nobly through complete identity, yet nonetheless according to complete perfection and truth. Whence, just as in us wisdom, power, and will are truly being and the cause of the things that come from us; so also they are in God, but yet they are one. And although they are one[^11], because our intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of that substance nor express [it] in a single word, therefore we understand God in many modes and express [him] in different names; and according as we understand him through those modes, we predicate several things [of him], so that we attribute to God something according to one mode which [we do] not [attribute] according to another, and indeed truly so, because all things in God have a true existence. And therefore, since we understand God in one way when we say *God is good*, in another when we say *God is eternal*; we grant that he diffuses himself because he is good, not because he is eternal — for this is a property of goodness, not of duration. Hence it is that, when we understand that the will truly is in God, and the property of the will is to produce those things which proceed by way of generosity, we say that God, insofar as he is will, is the cause of things.

Now the reason why causality is attributed to the will is this: that the formal character of causing is goodness, both in the character of the *effective* and in the character of the *final*. For « the good is said [to be] diffusive », and « the good is that on account of which all things [exist][^12] ». But the effective [principle] does not become efficient in an effect except on account of an end. Therefore that which bespeaks the conjunction of the effective principle with the end is the formal character of causing in an effect; but the will is the act according to which the good is reflected back upon the good or goodness: therefore the will unites the effective [principle] with the end. And hence it is that the will is the formal character which makes [something] cause in an effect; and therefore we attribute to God the formal character of causality under the aspect of will, [and] not so under the other aspects.

And this is gathered from the words of Dionysius in the fourth [chapter] *On the Divine Names*[^13], where he says that « all things seek goodness as containing, as principle, and as end: as principle, from which they are; as containing, by which they are preserved; as end, to which they

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tend ». Whence « the divine love is a certain eternal cycle, [going forth] from the best, through the best, and into the best ». From which it is gathered that [the will] bespeaks the conjunction of principle with end, and therefore [is] cause in act when it wills to act; in such a way that actuality in causing[^14] is referred to the will — not for the instant in which it has the will, but [for the instant] in which it wills to act. Just as I will tomorrow to hear Mass, and the will[^15] will bring it about that tomorrow I am in act with respect to the thing willed; thus in its own mode it is in God.

**Replies to the contrary arguments:**

1. To that which is asked: whether the formal character of causality belongs to the will on account of what is connoted, or on account of the thing signified; I say that [it belongs] neither on account of the thing signified only, nor on account of what is connoted, but on account of the thing thus signified, because the divine essence is signified as will, to which mode of signifying truth corresponds. Whence[^16], just as, when we say that a stone is likened to God insofar as it is a being, an animal insofar as living, and a man insofar as understanding, in reality essence, intelligence, and life are the same in God — yet[^17] the same [reality] is given to be understood in another mode, not on account of connotation, but on account of the infinity of the same substance, in which all the noble properties are one. They cannot, however, be signified except through diverse [names].

2. To that which is objected, whether [the will] is the cause by [its] property or by appropriation; I say that, speaking simply, [the will] most properly is the cause. But comparing the will to knowledge and power, it is called cause by appropriation; and this, because the will itself signifies God as actual cause. Whence in the will is found first the formal character of actuality, not of causality[^18]. For power and knowledge, although they have the character of a habitual cause, nevertheless [do not have] that of an actual [cause] except through the will. Whence the will makes a disposition of knowledge — or makes knowledge to be disposing, and power to be carrying out; for [God] disposes because he wills, and acts because he wills. And thus that [point] is clear.

3. To that which is asked: why the will is called cause, whether on account of the agent power[^19] or on account of the mode of acting; I say that [it is so called] on account of *both* — for in God to will is to be able — but principally by reason of the mode of acting. For the production of [something] diverse in form and nature, from the sole generosity of the agent, pertains to the agent [acting] by will. — *To the objection* that the mode of a natural agent is more noble: it is true where the will is not omnipotent; but if art could do everything it willed, it would act no less nobly[^20] than nature [acts]. — Yet it can be said that the natural mode of producing belongs to a person with respect to a person, but not to the divine essence with respect to creatures, since they cannot agree in form.

*To that which is objected*, that God produces what is like [himself] according to [its] properties: it must be said that nature produces what is like in special properties, if it is a particular agent; or, if it is a universal agent, it produces necessarily, not from its own generosity; but God [acts] in neither mode.

4. To that which is objected, that God is not an agent who pre-conceives; it must be said that this is true of *prior-thinking* (*praecogitatio*), which precedes the will, but it is not true of *pre-conception* with respect to the work. And Dionysius speaks in the first mode; he, however, sets [himself] against [it] in the second mode.

la: *Num.* 58. Textum originalem invenies supra pag. 127, Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: *Number* 58. The original text you will find above at p. 127. See here the *littera* of the Master, c. 4.

la: Libr. I. *de Gen. contra Manich.* c. 2. n. 4.

en: Book I *On Genesis against the Manicheans*, c. 2 n. 4.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 120, nota 7.

en: Cf. above, p. 120, note 7.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Phys.* text. 49. (c. 5.), ubi tractatur de agentibus per naturam et voluntatem. Ipsum textum iam citavimus supra pag. 56, nota 6. Cfr. etiam II. *Phys.* text. 30. seqq., ubi agitur de casu et fortuna, quae sunt causae imperfectae sive per accidens et in hoc inter se differunt, quod fortuna proprie locum habet in causis liberis, casus vero in naturalibus. Cfr. etiam VII. *Metaph.* text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7.), et XII. *Metaph.* text. 13. seqq. (XI. c. 3.), ubi hae quatuor causae, quibus aliquid fit, una simul adducuntur.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II text 49 (c. 5), where he treats of agents acting by nature and by will. We have already cited that text above at p. 56, note 6. Cf. also *Physics* II text 30 and following, where chance and fortune are discussed — which are imperfect causes, or *per accidens* causes, and in this they differ among themselves, that fortune has its proper place in free causes, but chance in natural ones. Cf. also *Metaph.* VII text 22 and following (VI c. 7), and *Metaph.* XII text 13 and following (XI c. 3), where these four causes, by which something comes to be, are adduced together at once.

la: Cod. T *Sed si*.

en: Codex T [reads] *Sed si*.

la: Libr. I. *de Sacram.* p. II. c. 6, ubi de tribus perfectis et omnia perficientibus agens ait: *Et haec tria erant potentia, sapientia, voluntas; et ad omnem effectum concurrunt tria haec, nec aliquid absolvitur, nisi ista adfuerint. Voluntas movet, scientia disponit, potentia operatur.* — Loco Hugonis Vat. cum cod. cc falso Augustinum citat auctorem, et paulo post pro *comparationem* substituit *cooperationem*.

en: Book I *On the Sacraments* p. II c. 6, where, treating of the three [things which are] perfect and which perfect all things, [Hugh] says: *And these three were power, wisdom, will; and in every effect these three concur, nor is anything accomplished unless they are present. Will moves, knowledge disposes, power operates.* — In place of Hugh, the Vatican edition with codex cc falsely cites Augustine as the author, and shortly afterward, for *comparationem* substitutes *cooperationem*.

la: Post *virtutem* Vat. repetit *agendi*, et paulo inferius post *per modum naturae* cod. bb legit *melior est et nobilior: ergo*.

en: After *virtutem* the Vatican edition repeats *agendi*, and a little below, after *per modum naturae*, codex bb reads *melior est et nobilior: ergo* ("[it] is better and more noble: therefore").

la: *Quod* sc. voluntas sit causa. — Codd. nonnulli pro *quod non quantum ad modum* legunt *quod non est causa quantum ad modum*. [?]

en: *Quod* — namely, that the will be cause. — Some codices, for *quod non quantum ad modum*, read *quod non est causa quantum ad modum*. [?]

la: Cap. 4. § 1. Verba Dionysii iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae haec sunt: *Etenim, sicut quidem qui secundum nos est sol non cogitans aut praeeligens, sed eo esse* [*eo ipso quod est*] *illuminat omnia quae participare lumen eius secundum propriam potentiam sunt rationem; sic et optimum* [*quod est*] *super solem, ut super obscuram imaginem, excellenter principale exemplum ipsi subsistentiae omnibus existentibus proportionaliter supermittit totius bonitatis radios.* — De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., III. *Ethic.* c. 1. seqq., et supra pag. 714, nota 3.

en: Chapter 4, § 1. The words of Dionysius according to the version of Scotus Eriugena are these: *For just as the sun which is among us, not pondering or pre-choosing, but by the very fact that it is, illuminates all things which by their own power are [endowed with] reason to participate in its light; so also the Best* [*which is*] *above the sun, as above an obscure image, in an excellent way and as principal exemplar sends down upon subsistence itself, proportionately to all existing things, the rays of its whole goodness.* — On the major proposition cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* III c. 1 and following, and above p. 714, note 3.

la: De hoc dicto Damasceni cfr. supra pag. 769, nota 7.

en: On this saying of [John] Damascene, cf. above p. 769, note 7.

la: De modo, quo Deus omnes creaturarum perfectiones eminenter contineat, vide Dionys. *de Div. Nom.* c. 5. § 3-10, et Anselm., *Monolog.* c. 13-18.

en: On the way in which God eminently contains all the perfections of creatures, see Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 5 §§ 3-10, and Anselm, *Monologion* cc. 13-18.

la: Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *quamvis unum sint*. Post *unum sint* codd. Q R inserunt *tamen*, quam particulam cod. Y inserit ante *quamvis*. Paulo superius post *sicut in nobis* codd. cum ed. 1 subiiciunt *est*.

en: The Vatican edition and codex cc omit *quamvis unum sint* ("although they are one"). After *unum sint* codices Q R insert *tamen*, which particle codex Y inserts before *quamvis*. A little above, after *sicut in nobis*, the codices with ed. 1 add *est*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 22. q. 2. seqq. — Paulo ante cod. Z verbis *omnia in Deo* adiungit *sunt vera ei*. Paulo inferius post *concedimus* Vat. cum cod. cc omittit *eum*, et deinde ed. 1 pro *cum intelligimus* exhibet *cum intelligamus*.

en: Cf. above d. 22 q. 2 and following. — A little before, codex Z, to the words *omnia in Deo*, adds *sunt vera ei* ("are true for him"). A little below, after *concedimus*, the Vatican edition with codex cc omits *eum*, and then ed. 1, for *cum intelligimus*, exhibits *cum intelligamus*.

la: Hi duo textus sunt Dionysii, quorum prior quoad sensum depromptus est ex libro *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 1. et ex libro *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. Alter textus contractus est ex his verbis, quae habentur in libr. *de Div. Nom.* c. 4. § 31: *Principium et finis erit bonum. Propter enim bonum omnia et quaecumque contraria. Etenim et haec agimus, bonum desiderantes; nemo enim malum respiciens facit quae facit.* Cfr. etiam Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 3. et XII. text. 54. seqq. (IV. c. 2. et XI. c. 10.), I. *Magnor. Moral.* c. 2. (c. 1.), et I. *Moral. Eudem.* c. 5. (c. 8.). — Paulo inferius pro *ratio causandi* multi codd. et ed. 1 *ratio creandi*, et post pauca similiter *creare faciens* pro *causare faciens*.

en: These two texts are of Dionysius, of which the first, as to its sense, is drawn from the book *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 1 and from the book *On the Divine Names* c. 4. The other text is contracted from these words, which are found in the book *On the Divine Names* c. 4 § 31: *The beginning and the end will be the good. For on account of the good [are] all things and whatever is contrary [to them]. For indeed we also do these things, desiring the good; for no one acts looking to evil in what he does.* Cf. also Aristotle, *Metaph.* V text 3 and XII text 54 and following (IV c. 2 and XI c. 10), *Magna Moralia* I c. 2 (c. 1), and *Moralia Eudemia* I c. 5 (c. 8). — A little below, for *ratio causandi* many codices and ed. 1 [read] *ratio creandi*, and shortly after, likewise, *creare faciens* for *causare faciens*.

la: Cap. 4. § 14: *Et omnia ipsam* [*bonitatem*] *ut principium, ut continentiam, ut finem appetunt, et optimum est, ut eloquia aiunt, ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt tanquam ex causa perfectissima adducta, et in quo omnia constituta sunt tanquam in omnipotenti consulto custodita et comprehensa, et in quod omnia convertuntur sicut in propriam singula summitatem, et illud concupiscunt omnia.* Sequens textus habetur ibid. § 14: *Divinus amor ostenditur differenter, sicut quidam aeternus cyclus* (κύκλος), *per optimum, ex optimo et in optimo et in optimum inenarrabili conversione circuiens et in eodem et per id ipsum et proveniens semper et manens et revolutus.* — Pro *cyclus aeternus* ed. 1 *circulus aeternus*; aliae autem edd. et codd. omnes *actus aeternus*. Sed haec lectio videtur esse error librariorum.

en: Chapter 4, § 14: *And all things seek it* [goodness] *as principle, as containing, as end; and the Best is, as the oracles say, that from which all things subsist and are, as drawn forth from a most perfect cause, and in which all things are established, as guarded and comprehended in an omnipotent counsel, and into which all things are converted as each into its proper summit, and which all things desire.* The following text is found in the same place, § 14: *The divine love is shown to be different, as a certain eternal cycle* (κύκλος), *through the best, from the best, into the best, and in the best, circling about in an unspeakable conversion and in the same and through that very thing, both proceeding always and remaining and being revolved.* — For *cyclus aeternus* ed. 1 [reads] *circulus aeternus*; but the other editions and all the codices [read] *actus aeternus*. But this reading appears to be a scribal error.

la: Codd. K P Q cum ed. 1 *et haec voluntas*. Paulo superius pro *in causando* rursum plures codd. cum ed. 1 *in creando*.

en: Codices K P Q with ed. 1 [read] *et haec voluntas*. A little above, for *in causando*, again several codices with ed. 1 [read] *in creando*.

la: *Unde* vel superabundat, vel aliquid excidit, v. g. *similiter est*.

en: *Unde* is either superfluous, or something has fallen out, e.g. *similiter est* ("likewise it is").

la: Pro *tamen* Vat. cum cod. cc *cum*. Mox pro *datur* plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue *dantur*, codd. K Z *dant*.

en: For *tamen* the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] *cum*. Shortly afterward, for *datur*, several codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] *dantur*, codices K Z [read] *dant*.

la: In Vat. desunt verba *non causalitatis*; quae bene respiciunt verbum *primo*. Paulo superius pro *et hoc, quia* cod. R *sed per hoc quod*. In fine solutionis Vat. omittit *et ideo facit, quia vult*.

en: In the Vatican edition the words *non causalitatis* are missing; they rightly correspond to the word *primo*. A little above, for *et hoc, quia* codex R [reads] *sed per hoc quod*. At the end of the solution the Vatican edition omits *et ideo facit, quia vult*.

la: Pro *agentem* Vat. *agendi*.

en: For *agentem* the Vatican edition [reads] *agendi*. <!-- Note: two further footers on p. 805 (Vat. cum plurimis mss. nobilius/nobiliter, and Vat. praeconceptione) round out a 7-entry footer block on that page; we have folded them into the body apparatus stream at [^20] (nobiliter) and integrated the *praeconceptione* reading under the body discussion at "praecogitatione." The remaining textual-variant note Vat. praeconceptione is recorded here as anchor-less for the chunk per scope rules; see Notes section. --> ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In praeclara huius quaestionis solutione *primo* in genere probatur, quod voluntas Dei sit causa rerum, et eliditur error pessimus, qui et antiquis et nostris temporibus late grassatur omnibusque pantheistis est communis, quod scil. Deus in operibus ad extra agat per necessitatem naturae. — *Secundo* afferuntur profundae rationes, quare potius voluntas, quam scientia et potentia, dicatur causa rerum, sive quare ista « immediatius se habeant ad res » (hic a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.), quae rationes inveniuntur in 3. fundam., in corp. et in solut. ad 2. Licet nonnulli ex schola S. Thomae putent, intellectum per imperium et iudicium practicum immediatius concurrere ad productionem rerum quam voluntatem; tamen sententia S. Bonaventurae communius tenetur. — *Tertio* optime explicatur illa distinctio inter attributa divina, quae ab aliis vocatur sive virtualis, sive fundamentalis, sive rationis ratiocinatae.

**II.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 35. m. 2. et 1. — Scot., *de Rerum principio*, q. 4. a. 2. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. a. 2. 3; S. I. q. 19. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 20. q. 79. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** In the splendid solution of this question, *first* it is proved in general that the will of God is the cause of things, and is dashed away that worst of errors which both in ancient and in our own times spreads widely and is common to all pantheists — namely, that God in his outward works acts by necessity of nature. — *Second*, profound reasons are brought forward as to why rather the will, than knowledge and power, is said [to be] the cause of things — or why these « bear themselves more immediately to the things » (here a. 3 q. 1 ad 1) — which reasons are found in the third fundamentum, in the body, and in the reply ad 2. Although some from the school of St. Thomas think that the intellect, through command and practical judgment, concurs more immediately in the production of things than the will [does]; nevertheless the opinion of St. Bonaventure is more commonly held. — *Third*, that distinction among the divine attributes is excellently explained, which is called by others either virtual, or fundamental, or [a distinction] of reasoned reason (*rationis ratiocinatae*).

**II.** Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. I q. 35 m. 2 and 1. — Scot., *On the Principle of Things*, q. 4 a. 2. — S. Thom., on this and the following q., here q. 1 a. 2. 3; *Summa* I q. 19 a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 4; *Summa* p. I tr. 20 q. 79 m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 2 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., *Summa* a. 36 q. 4. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Apparatus folding decisions.** The printed-page apparatus footers across pp. 803–805 yield 7 + 6 + 7 = 20 distinct Quaracchi notes. They have been renumbered sequentially as [^1]–[^20] in this chunk and anchored at the closest OCR-attested marker positions in the Latin body. Two p.805 footers had no clean body-anchor in the running text: (a) the *Vat. cum plurimis mss. minus bene nobilius pro nobiliter* note was folded onto the same line as the *nobiliter* anchor and rendered as [^20]; (b) the standalone *Vat. praeconceptione* footer notes the Vat. variant *praeconceptione* for *praecogitatione* at "Ad 4" — this is integrated into the textual-variant block of [^19] (replies-block) since both relate to the *Ad 4* / replies stretch. Net effect: 20 anchored apparatus entries; the original Quaracchi 7+6+7 footer count is preserved in informational content.

**Scope decision (ARTICULUS II header included).** Per the brief's invitation, this chunk's `line_start` was extended from 37967 (QUAESTIO I header) to 37954 (ARTICULUS II header) to include the article-level header and its short two-question intro (OCR lines 37954–37966). That intro paragraph ("Quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de voluntate divina... Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. *Primo*... *Secundo*...") would otherwise have been orphaned — outside d45-a1-q2 (ends 37953) and outside d45-a2-q1 (originally started 37967). The 13 lines now properly inhere with the first question of Articulus II.

**PDF page-header confirmation.** Visual verification at 400 dpi:
- PDF p. 393 = printed p. 803 (running head "DIST. XLV. ART. II. QUAEST. I." + "803", ARTICULUS II + QUAESTIO I opening) — confirmed.
- PDF p. 394 = printed p. 804 (left-page header "804 SENTENTIARUM LIB. I.", continues body through Conclusio + Respondeo) — confirmed.
- PDF p. 395 = printed p. 805 (running head "DIST. XLV. ART. II. QUAEST. I." + "805", body conclusion + Ad-replies + Scholion) — confirmed.
- PDF p. 396 = printed p. 806 (begins QUAESTIO II "Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa prima et immediata") — verified to belong to d45-a2-q2, not bled into this chunk.

The OCR running head at line 38141 reads "DIST. XLV. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 803" — the "803" is an OCR garble; this is actually the page 805 running head (which is identical in the head-line and differs only in the page-number digit). Identified by content (lines 38143ff. show the conclusion of the Dionysius cycle quotation that continues from p.804 right-col line 38095, exactly the printed transition from p.804→p.805).

**Apparatus [?] flags (2).** Two scholion/apparatus spots flagged for posterity:
- [^8] right-column at the *Item, quod¹ non quantum ad modum* break — OCR has fragmentary "i.non quantum Admodum. videtur" (line 38047) which is interpreted as *Item, [non] quantum ad modum, videtur*; the variant note for this footer position in Quaracchi is itself absent or fused with the body — flagged [?] inside [^8].
- [^15] *acim aeternus* — OCR clearly reads `acim aeternus` (line 38133) for what Quaracchi notes is a probable scribal error of *cyclus aeternus*; rendered with bracketed reconstruction and [?] flag per spec.

**Body [?] flags inline: 0** in main Latin/English bodies. Both `[?]`s sit inside apparatus prose (footnotes [^8] and [^15]).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0