title: Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3

title_alt:
Utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo
Whether every composition is from God

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO III.
### *Utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ubicumque est aliqua compositio, ibi est aliqua componentis actio[^1]; sed omnis actio est a Deo: ergo omnis compositio est a Deo.

2. Item, sicut potentiae et virtutis est distinguere et separare, sic potentiae et virtutis est res unire et componere; sed omne quod est potentiae, est ab omnipotentia Creatoris: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubicumque est compositio, ibi est aliqua unio; et ubicumque est unio, ibi est aliqua unitas; sed omnis unitas est a prima unitate[^2]; prima autem et summa unitas Deus est: ergo omnis compositio est a Deo.

4. Item, Augustinus *de Vera Religione*[^3]: « Omnis res habet haec tria, scilicet quod *unum* aliquid sit, et *specie* propria discernatur, et rerum *ordinem* non excedat »; sed, sicut dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei, « ab eo est omnis *modus*, et omnis *species*, et omnis *ordo*, sine quibus nihil esse nec cogitari potest »: ergo si omne compositum et omnis compositio aliquo modo est, videtur igitur omnis compositio a Deo esse.

**Sed contra:**

1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios octavo[^4]: *Scimus, quia idolum nihil est;* Glossa: « Materiam idoli Deus formavit, sed stultitia hominum formam dedit ». Et post: « Quaecumque sunt in creaturis, facta sunt per Verbum; sed forma hominis in idolo non est facta per Verbum, sicut peccatum non est factum per Verbum »: videtur ergo, quod compositio talis formae cum tali materia non sit a Deo.

2. Item, quaedam sunt, quae impossibilia sunt coniungi, non tantum a natura, sed etiam a Deo, utpote quod aliquid sit simul et semel album et nigrum, sed intellectus noster phantasticus frequenter componit talia; nullorum autem compositio est a Deo, nisi eorum quae sunt a Deo componibilia: si ergo opposita non sunt a Deo componibilia et componuntur ab intellectu; videtur, quod non omnis compositio sit a Deo.

3. Item, quaedam sunt, quae non possunt coniungi in eodem sine monstruositate, sicut duo capita in eodem corpore; et talis compositio non potest esse a natura nisi cum errore et praeter intentionem[^5]: si ergo Deus in nulla compositione errat nec facit errare, videtur, quod talium compositio nullo modo sit a Deo.

4. Item, aliqua sunt, quae impossibile est coniungi sine deordinatione, utpote si homo commisceatur[^6] bruto, vel e converso: si ergo talis compositio non est aliud quam componibilium deordinatio — hoc ipso enim deordinantur, quod sic componuntur — et deordinatio non sit a Deo; videtur, quod aliqua compositio non sit a Deo.

### Conclusio.

> Omnis compositio, secundum quod compositio, est a Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum compositionis nomen tripliciter accipiatur, in qualibet suarum acceptionum aliquid dicit. Dicitur enim compositio componentis actio; dicitur etiam compositio componibilis passio; dicitur tertio modo compositio rei compositae dispositio[^7]. Et quoniam tam *actio* quam *passio* quam etiam *dispositio* rei compositae, secundum quod composita est, aliquid dicit; et omne quod dicit aliquam positionem, a Deo est: concedendum est simpliciter, quod omnis compositio sit a Deo, secundum quod compositio, sicut et omnis actio et conservatio.

Attendendum est tamen, quod quemadmodum quaedam actiones sunt, « quae mox nominatae coniunctae sunt malo[^8] », sicut mendacium et adulterium; sic quaedam quarundam rerum compositiones sunt, quas inseparabiliter concomitatur aliqua deformitas et inordinatio. Unde quemadmodum actio, quae coniuncta est defectui malitiae inseparabiliter, dicitur a Deo esse, ita tamen, quod defectus malitiae non est a Deo, sed a defectu creaturae, utpote liberae

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voluntatis; sic compositio, cui iuncta est deformitas et inordinatio, sic est a Deo, quod illa deformitas sive deordinatio, quae vere defectus est, est a defectu alicuius causae componentis creatae, vel a defectu ipsorum componibilium. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omnis compositio est a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de compositione, quae est in idolo; dicendum, quod idolum, secundum quod huiusmodi, nominat aliquod artificiatum, continens in se aliquid numinis vel divinitatis: et secundum hoc dupliciter intelligitur ibi compositio, videlicet formae *artis* ad materiam, et *divinitatis* ad artificium; et prima quidem compositio est ex parte *rei*, secunda vero est solummodo secundum aestimationem idololatrae. Quantum ad primam compositionem idolum *aliquid est*, quantum vero ad secundam *nihil est in mundo* in re, quamvis aliquid aestimetur. — Concedo ergo, quod coniunctio talis formae cum hac materia, cum sit realiter ens, quod[^9] a Deo est. Concedendum est nihilominus, quod illa aestimatio, in quantum animae actus est, a Deo est; sed compositio divinitatis ad illud artificium, quae aestimatur esse, omnino nihil est; et haec a Deo non est, quia non est talis compositio secundum rem. Similiter ordinatio illius formae artificialis ad continentiam divinitatis, illa quidem potius est deordinatio quam aliqua positio; et haec quidem a Deo non est, sed a defectu cognitionis et fidei. Cum ergo dicitur, quod forma idoli in tali materia non sit a Deo, non negatur compositio huius formae cum hac materia absolute esse a Deo; sed hoc negatur, quod non est a Deo ad id, propter quod homo illam effigiem efficit. — Et sic patet, pro quanto dicitur *idolum nihil esse*, scilicet pro eo, quod est nomen impositum a fictione, cui subest falsitas. Patet etiam, quod idolum quantum ad aliquid, quod nominat, sit a Deo, et quantum ad aliquid, non, quoniam[^10] quidquid est *positionis* ibi, a Deo est; illud autem quod est *privationis* vel defectionis non est a Deo, sed a defectu nostro.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus componit aliqua, quae sunt incompossibilia[^11] componi; dicendum, quod talia impossibilia sunt componi propter inseparabilitatem deordinationis. Nunquam enim potest nec esse nec intelligi aliquid simul et semel sub duobus oppositis, quin intelligatur confusio et inordinatio. Et quoniam in actione Dei, quam Deus per se agit ut *tota* causa, non potest esse defectus ordinis, quia si esset, iam potentia eius in operando deficeret; hinc est, quod talia a Deo non possunt componi. Sed cum Deus cooperatur intellectui potenti deficere, sic potest esse, quod illud quod est ibi *positionis*, sit a virtute Dei; quod vero est *privationis*, sit a defectu intellectus creati. Ideo ratio illa non valet, quodsi non potest Deus per se illam compositionem facere, quod non possit in faciendo alii cooperari[^12].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de his quae non possunt componi sine monstruositate; iam patet responsio; quoniam, cum dico compositionem monstruosam, duo dico: et dico compositionem, et dico ulterius annexam deformitatem[^13]. Et compositio quidem est a Deo, deformitas autem monstruositatis est a defectu et errore naturae, quae venit ex improportione virtutis ad materiam, supra quam agit, sive pro eo, quod materia superabundat, sive pro eo, quod deficit; et utrobique est defectus debitae proportionis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam est compositio, quae non potest esse nec intelligi praeter inordinationem, utpote si pes poneretur in pectore, si homo coiret cum iumento; dicendum est, quod etsi unum necessario consequatur ad aliud, et intellectus unius inseparabiliter consequatur ex intellectu alterius; nihilominus tamen diversitatem habent, quia unum dicit *privationem*, et aliud dicit *positionem*; et ideo potest unum Deo attribui, quamvis alterum non attribuatur[^14].

---

english:
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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether every composition is from God.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether every composition is from God. And that it is, it seems.

1. Wherever there is any composition, there is some action of a composer[^1]; but every action is from God: therefore every composition is from God.

2. Likewise, just as it belongs to potency and power to distinguish and separate, so it belongs to potency and power to unite and compose things; but everything that belongs to potency is from the omnipotence of the Creator: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, wherever there is composition, there is some union; and wherever there is union, there is some unity; but every unity is from the first unity[^2]; but the first and highest unity is God: therefore every composition is from God.

4. Likewise, Augustine *On True Religion*[^3]: « Every thing has these three, namely that it be some *one* thing, and be discerned by its proper *species*, and not exceed the *order* of things »; but, as Augustine says in the eleventh [book] *On the City of God*, « from him is every *mode*, and every *species*, and every *order*, without which nothing can exist or be conceived »: therefore if every composite and every composition in some manner exists, it seems therefore that every composition is from God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that text of the first [letter] to the Corinthians, eighth [chapter][^4]: *We know that an idol is nothing;* the Gloss: « The matter of the idol God formed, but the foolishness of men gave it form ». And after: « Whatever things are in creatures, were made through the Word; but the form of the man in the idol was not made through the Word, just as sin was not made through the Word »: it seems therefore that the composition of such a form with such matter is not from God.

2. Likewise, there are certain things which are impossible to be conjoined, not only by nature, but even by God, such as that something be at once and at the same time white and black, but our imaginative intellect frequently composes such things; but the composition of none of them is from God, except of those which are composable by God: if therefore opposites are not composable by God and are composed by the intellect; it seems that not every composition is from God.

3. Likewise, there are certain things which cannot be conjoined in the same [subject] without monstrousness, such as two heads in the same body; and such a composition cannot be from nature except with error and beside intention[^5]: if therefore God errs in no composition nor makes [anything] to err, it seems that the composition of such things is in no way from God.

4. Likewise, there are some things which it is impossible to conjoin without disordering, as for instance if a human were mingled[^6] with a brute, or conversely: if therefore such a composition is nothing other than a disordering of the composables — for by this very fact they are disordered, that they are thus composed — and disordering is not from God; it seems that some composition is not from God.

### Conclusion.

> Every composition, insofar as it is composition, is from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the name of composition is taken in three ways, in each of its acceptations it states something. For composition is called the action of a composer; composition is also called the passion of the composable; in a third way composition is called the disposition of the composed thing[^7]. And since *action* as well as *passion* as well as also the *disposition* of the composed thing, insofar as it is composed, states something; and everything that states some positing is from God: it must be granted simply that every composition is from God, insofar as it is composition, just as also is every action and conservation.

Yet it must be attended to that, just as there are certain actions « which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil[^8] », such as lying and adultery; so there are certain compositions of certain things which some deformity and disorder inseparably accompanies. Whence just as an action which is inseparably conjoined to a defect of malice is said to be from God, yet in such a way that the defect of malice is not from God, but from a defect of the creature, namely of free

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will; so a composition, to which deformity and disorder is joined, is from God in such a way that that deformity or disordering, which is truly a defect, is from a defect of some created composing cause, or from a defect of the composables themselves. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that every composition is from God.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the composition which is in an idol; it must be said that the idol, insofar as it is of this kind, names some artifact, containing in itself something of deity or divinity: and according to this, composition is there understood in two ways, namely [the composition] of the form of *art* to the matter, and of *divinity* to the artifact; and the first composition indeed is on the part of the *thing*, but the second is only according to the estimation of the idolater. As to the first composition the idol *is something*, but as to the second *there is nothing in the world* in reality, although something is estimated [to be there]. — I grant therefore that the conjunction of such a form with this matter, since it is really a being, is[^9] from God. It must nevertheless be granted that that estimation, insofar as it is an act of the soul, is from God; but the composition of divinity to that artifact, which is estimated to exist, is altogether nothing; and this is not from God, because there is no such composition in reality. Likewise the ordering of that artificial form to the containment of divinity, that indeed is rather a disordering than any positing; and this indeed is not from God, but from a defect of cognition and of faith. When therefore it is said that the form of the idol in such matter is not from God, it is not denied that the composition of this form with this matter is absolutely from God; but this is denied, that it is not from God with respect to that for which the human makes that effigy. — And thus it is plain in what sense *the idol is said to be nothing*, namely for the reason that it is a name imposed by a fiction, beneath which lies falsity. It is also plain that the idol, as to something which it names, is from God, and as to something, is not, since[^10] whatever is of *positing* there, is from God; but that which is of *privation* or of defection is not from God, but from our defect.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect composes some things which are incomposable[^11] to be composed; it must be said that such things are impossible to be composed on account of the inseparability of the disordering. For never can anything be, nor be understood, at once and at the same time under two opposites, without confusion and disorder being understood. And since in the action of God, which God does of himself as the *whole* cause, there cannot be a defect of order — because if there were, his power in operating would now be deficient — hence it is that such things cannot be composed by God. But since God cooperates with an intellect able to fail, it can be so, that that which is there of *positing*, is from the power of God; but that which is of *privation*, is from a defect of the created intellect. Therefore that reasoning does not hold, [that] if God cannot of himself make that composition, [it follows] that he cannot cooperate with another in making it[^12].

3. To that which is objected concerning those things which cannot be composed without monstrousness; the response is already plain; since, when I say a monstrous composition, I say two things: I both say a composition, and I further say an attached deformity[^13]. And the composition indeed is from God, but the deformity of the monstrousness is from a defect and error of nature, which comes from the disproportion of the power to the matter upon which it acts, either for the reason that the matter superabounds, or for the reason that it is deficient; and in both cases there is a defect of due proportion.

4. To that which is objected, that there is a certain composition which cannot exist nor be understood apart from disorder, as for instance if a foot were placed in the chest, [or] if a human were to couple with a beast; it must be said that, even if one necessarily follows upon the other, and the understanding of the one inseparably follows from the understanding of the other; nevertheless they have a diversity, because the one states a *privation*, and the other states a *positing*; and therefore the one can be attributed to God, although the other be not attributed[^14].

---

la: Richard. a S. Vict., V. de Trin. c. 4: *Omnis compositio compositore eget et sine beneficio compositoris esse non valet.* Cfr. Alanus ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 3. — Minor probata est supra q. I.

en: Richard of St. Victor, V. *On the Trinity* c. 4: *Every composition needs a composer and cannot exist without the benefit of a composer.* Cfr. Alan of Lille, I. *On the Art or the Articles of the Catholic Faith*, n. 3. — The minor was proved above in q. I.

la: Boeth., de Unitate et uno: *Unitas est descendens a prima Unitate, quae creavit eam. Prima enim et una Unitas, quae est unitas sibi ipsi, creavit aliam unitatem, quae est infra eam.* Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 36. n. 66. et 11. de Morib. Manich. c. 6. n. 8., et Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 1. § 1. et c. 13. § 2.

en: Boethius, *On Unity and the One*: *Unity is something descending from the first Unity, which created it. For the first and one Unity, which is unity to itself, created another unity, which is below it.* Cfr. Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 36. n. 66. and 11. *On the Morals of the Manichees* c. 6. n. 8., and Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 1. § 1. and c. 13. § 2.

la: Cap. 7. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 829, nota 4. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. c. 1-5, ubi textus originalis sic: *sine quibus nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest.*

en: Chapter 7. n. 13. See above p. 829, note 4. — The following text is from the cited place, c. 1-5, where the original text [reads] thus: *without which nothing of things can be found or conceived.*

la: Vers. 4. — Glossa, quae est *ordinaria* et secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 1. n. 13, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. In secunda propositione Glossae post *creaturis* Vat. nec non codd. F T et alii adiiciunt *facta*.

en: Verse 4. — The Gloss, which is the *ordinary* [Gloss] and is according to Augustine, in [his commentary] on the Gospel of John, tractate 1. n. 13, is found in Strabus and in Lyranus. In the second clause of the Gloss, after *creaturis* ("in creatures") the Vatican [edition] as well as codd. F T and others add *facta* ("made").

la: Vide supra pag. 808, nota 4. — In fine arg. pro *sit* edd., excepta 1, substituunt *possit esse.*

en: See above p. 808, note 4. — At the end of the argument, for *sit* ("be") the editions, except 1, substitute *possit esse* ("can be").

la: Edd. praeter 1 cum nonnullis codd. *commisceretur.*

en: The editions besides 1, with several codices, [read] *commisceretur.*

la: Ut cum dicitur: *haec res est facilis, vel difficilis ad dissolvendum* etc.

en: As when it is said: *this thing is easy, or difficult, to dissolve* etc.

la: Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 6. — In propos. seq. post *quemadmodum actio* non pauci codd., ut C F H L S (T a prima manu) etc., cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt *quae*; mendose, nisi etiam pariter omittitur *est* post *coniuncta*, quae lectio sic moderata habetur in codd. bb et T (a secunda manu). Subinde codd. V X *sive inordinatio* pro *et inordinatio.*

en: According to Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 6. Cfr. tom. I. p. 32, note 6. — In the following clause, after *quemadmodum actio* not a few codices, such as C F H L S (T by a first hand) etc., with edd. 1, 2 omit *quae*; mistakenly, unless *est* after *coniuncta* is likewise omitted, which reading thus moderated is found in codd. bb and T (by a second hand). Then codd. V X [read] *sive inordinatio* ("or disorder") for *et inordinatio* ("and disorder").

la: Vat. expunxit hoc *secundum quod.*

en: The Vatican [edition] struck out this *secundum quod* ("insofar as").

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum nonnullis codd. *Unde.*

en: The editions, except 1, with several codices, [read] *Unde* ("Whence").

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 nec non codd. F ee et pauci alii *impossibilia*; econtra cod. bb etiam infra *incompossibilia.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 as well as codd. F ee and a few others [read] *impossibilia*; on the contrary cod. bb [reads] also below *incompossibilia.*

la: Pro *annexam deformitatem*, quam lectionem in codd. A E K L M Q W X Y bb et aliis invenimus, codd. H U *monstruositatis deformitatem*, cod. D *luxuriam et deformitatem*, codd. C S T *luxuriam deformitatem* (!), cod. ee *luxuriam deformantem*, edd. praeter 1 *luxuriam deordinantem*, ed. 1 *deformitatem* tantum. Paulo inferius pro *quae venit* (scil. deformitas) Vat. *qui venit.* Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 4.

en: For *annexam deformitatem* ("attached deformity"), which reading we find in codd. A E K L M Q W X Y bb and others, codd. H U [read] *monstruositatis deformitatem*, cod. D *luxuriam et deformitatem*, codd. C S T *luxuriam deformitatem* (!), cod. ee *luxuriam deformantem*, the editions besides 1 *luxuriam deordinantem*, ed. 1 *deformitatem* only. A little below, for *quae venit* (namely the deformity) the Vatican [edition reads] *qui venit.* Cfr. Aristotle, IV. *On the Generation of Animals* c. 4.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS II.
### *Utrum actio defectiva sit Deo attribuenda.*

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de actione defectiva, utrum sit Deo attribuenda. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum a Deo sit enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa.

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### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta, sit a Deo.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Tertio Regum ultimo[^1]: *Quis decipiet Achab, regem Israel?* et post subiungitur, quod Dominus dixit spiritui mendaci: *Egredere et fac;* sed quod fit Deo praecipiente fit a Deo volente et auctore: si ergo spiritus ille malignus mentitus est et Achab decepit, Deo mandante sibi mentiri et decipere; videtur, quod tam mendacium quam deceptio, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et si hoc verum est, ergo actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta, a Deo est.

2. Item, sicut vult Philosophus[^2]: « Si aliquid per sui praesentiam est causa alicuius, per sui absentiam est causa oppositi »; sed Deus per sui praesentiam est causa operationis iustae, secundum quod iusta est: ergo *ab oppositis,* per sui absentiam causa erit iniustitiae in actione.

3. Item, qui adiuvat aliquem scienter ad actionem furti, sive velit ipsum iuvare ad furtum, sive non, nihilominus dicitur *currere cum fure*[^3], et culpa furis ei attribuitur. Si ergo Deus adiuvat hominem ad actionem substratam malitiae et iniustitiae, videtur, quod talis deformitas tanquam auctori attribuenda sit Deo.

4. Item, dare eleemosynam propter vanam gloriam est peccatum; et hoc ipso est peccatum et iniustitia, quo actio ista refertur ad talem finem; sed sicut datio eleemosynae nonnihil est, sic relatio ad talem finem nonnihil est: si ergo talis relatio fuit ratio, quare illa actio est mala, et talis relatio est a Deo, cum non sit omnino nihil, videtur, quod talis actio sit a Deo.

5. Item, iste qui peccat in amando creaturam, hoc ipso peccat, quo quiescit in creatura; sed quiescere in creatura non omnino nihil est, immo hoc ipso, quod quiescere est, aliquid est: ergo cum omne quod est aliquid, sit a Deo, talis quies est a Deo, et talis erat ratio culpae: ergo etc.

6. Item, nobilior est potentia voluntatis, ut est deliberativa, quam ut est natura quaedam[^4]; sed omne quod est a voluntate, ut est natura, est a Deo: ergo omne quod est a voluntate deliberativa, est a Deo. Sed actio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, est a voluntate deliberativa: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:**

1. Ioannis primo[^5]: *Sine ipso factum est nihil;* Glossa: « id est peccatum »: ergo videtur, quod peccatum non sit a Deo.

2. Item, ad Romanos primo[^6]: *Tradidit eos, ut contumeliis afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis;* Glossa: « Immundas actiones et contumeliosas, quibus afficiunt et inficiunt corpora sua, habent *in semetipsis,* mali scilicet, id est non aliunde, sed a semetipsis; non enim habet homo hoc a Deo »; sed hoc non potest dici de actionibus, secundum quod actiones sunt: ergo dicitur de actionibus, secundum quod iniustae sunt.

3. Item, quicumque facit iniustitiam iniustus est; sed Deus non potest esse iniustus: ergo non potest facere iniustitiam: ergo iniustitia actionis vel actio, secundum quod iniusta, non est a Deo.

4. Item, quicumque facit iniustitiam offendit Deum, qui est summa iustitia; sed Deus non potest se ipsum offendere neque *se ipsum negare,* sicut dicit Apostolus[^7]: ergo Deus non potest iniustitiam facere: ergo nec actionem iniustam, in quantum huiusmodi.

5. Item, iniustitia defectus est; ergo facere iniustitiam est deficere; sed divinum *posse* non potest deficere[^8]: ergo nec iniustitiam facere: ergo actio, secundum quod iniusta est, non est a Deo.

6. Item, quidquid est a Deo, laudat Deum[^9]; sed iniustitia nullo modo laudat Deum, nec operatio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi: nullo igitur modo actio, secundum quod iniusta vel mala, est Deo attribuenda.

### Conclusio.

> Actio mala et iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod cum iniustitia sive malitia circa actionem dicat defectum et privationem, et defectum deordinatum de se et defectum carentem debito fine; *facere actionem iniustam,* hoc repugnat potentiae, sapientiae et bonitati. Est enim ibi pri-

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vatio utilitatis et ordinis et entitatis; et quia nihil est attribuendum Deo, nisi quod decet suam potentiam, sapientiam et bonitatem: ideo actionem malam Deo tribuere non solum est falsitatis, sed etiam blasphemiae et impietatis. — Concedendum est igitur, quod actio mala et iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo. Et ideo rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de tertii Regum ultimo, dicendum, quod *egredere et fac* non intelligitur ibi *imperative,* sed intelligitur ibi *permissive.* Unde verbum imperativi modi multipliciter accipitur in Scriptura: aliquando *praeceptorie,* aliquando *consultorie,* aliquando *insinuatorie* et aliquando *permissive,* quorum exempla sumi possunt ex diversis locis Scripturae[^10].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eadem causa, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam est causa oppositorum; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de causa, quae voluntarie se absentat, ita quod eius absentatio principaliter est ab ipsa. Hoc autem non est in proposito; Deus enim nemini se absentat, immo paratus est omnes adiuvare et omnibus dare gratiam[^11].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille qui iuvat furem in actione, dicitur currere cum fure, si scienter hoc facit; dicendum, quod hoc non est simile: quia decens et conveniens est, quod homo proximum non iuvet in ea actione, in qua quis *ambulat non recte*[^12], immo potius debet impedire; cum ipse nec sciat nec possit inde bonum elicere, nec ad illud adiutorium aliqua lege astringatur, sed potius prohibeatur. Non sic autem est in proposito, tum quia decet divinam liberalitatem, ut *solem suum oriri faciat super bonos et malos*[^13]; nec debet influentiam virtutis suae subtrahere nec bonis nec malis, maxime secundum illam influentiam, quae respicit *primum esse.* Secundo vero, quia decet divinam providentiam « sic res, quas condidit, administrare, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »[^14]. Tertio vero, quia ipse novit et scit inde bonum elicere; et ideo, cum cooperatur peccatori in actione, facit laudabiliter; et ideo nullo modo malitia, quae reddit suum actorem culpabilem, est ei attribuenda.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod relatio actionis ad inanem gloriam tanquam ad finem a Deo est; dicendum, quod relatio duo dicit; videlicet actum voluntatis et rationis protendentis se ad illum finem mediante illa actione; et hoc quidem bonum est et a Deo est. Praeter hoc importat deordinationem. Tali enim actioni coniuncta[^15] est inordinatio, quia talis finis tali operi non congruit; et quantum ad hoc, est ibi malitia; et ideo iniustitia est ibi ratione defectus, qui est in tali relatione. Propter hoc non oportet, quod sit a Deo. Et est simile in claudicatione, in qua est ambulatio cum defectu; sic et in proposito intelligendum est.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de quiete, similiter respondendum est, quod quies dicit *positionem* aliquam in hoc, quod dicit dilectionem creaturae; et dicit *privationem* rectitudinis in hoc, quod dicit privationem finis ultimi. In hoc enim, quod ibi quiescit et ultra non tendit, cum deberet ultra tendere, non tantum est *positio,* sed etiam *privatio,* quae quidem non est a Deo.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est a voluntate naturali, est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod est voluntas *naturalis;* et similiter illud quod est a voluntate *deliberativa*[^16] praecise, concedendum est esse a Deo. Sed malitia non est a voluntate proprie, ut est *deliberativa,* sed potius, ut est *defectiva,* quamvis defectus ille non incidat nisi circa actum deliberativum; et ideo, quamvis sit a voluntate *deliberativa,* non sequitur, quod sit a Deo, quia non est secundum quod *deliberativa,* sed secundum quod *defectiva.* Et propterea, sicut dictum fuit supra[^17], si fiat tale argumentum: voluntas deliberativa est a Deo; et malitia est a voluntate deliberativa: ergo est a Deo; peccat *secundum accidens,* quia peccat contra illam regulam: « Quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati ». Ita enim potest esse sophisma *secundum accidens* in *causando,* sicut in *inhaerendo.*

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english:
### ARTICLE II.
### *Whether a defective action is to be attributed to God.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the second article, about a defective action, whether it is to be attributed to God. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.

Thirdly it is asked whether a false statement, insofar as it is false, is from God.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Third [book] of Kings, last [chapter][^1]: *Who shall deceive Achab, king of Israel?* and afterward it is added that the Lord said to the lying spirit: *Go forth and do [it];* but what comes to be by God's commanding comes to be by God willing and authoring [it]: if therefore that malign spirit lied and deceived Achab, with God commanding him to lie and to deceive; it seems that both the lie and the deception, insofar as they are of this kind, are from God. And if this is true, then an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds[^2]: « If something by its presence is the cause of something, by its absence it is the cause of the opposite »; but God by his presence is the cause of a just operation, insofar as it is just: therefore *from the opposite*, by his absence he will be the cause of injustice in an action.

3. Likewise, he who knowingly helps someone toward an action of theft, whether he wills to help him toward the theft or not, is nonetheless said to *run with the thief*[^3], and the fault of the thief is attributed to him. If therefore God helps a human toward an action underlying malice and injustice, it seems that such deformity is to be attributed to God as to its author.

4. Likewise, to give alms for the sake of vainglory is sin; and by this very fact it is sin and injustice, by which that action is referred to such an end; but just as the giving of alms is not nothing, so the relation to such an end is not nothing: if therefore such a relation was the reason why that action is evil, and such a relation is from God, since it is not altogether nothing, it seems that such an action is from God.

5. Likewise, he who sins in loving a creature, by this very fact sins, by which he rests in the creature; but to rest in a creature is not altogether nothing, indeed by this very fact, that it is a resting, it is something: therefore since everything that is something is from God, such a rest is from God, and such was the reason of the fault: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the power of the will is nobler as it is deliberative than as it is a certain nature[^4]; but everything that is from the will, as it is nature, is from God: therefore everything that is from the deliberative will is from God. But an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from the deliberative will: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. John, first [chapter][^5]: *Without him was made nothing;* the Gloss: « that is, sin »: therefore it seems that sin is not from God.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, first [chapter][^6]: *He delivered them up, that they should afflict their own bodies with contumelies in themselves;* the Gloss: « The unclean and contumelious actions, by which they afflict and infect their own bodies, they have *in themselves,* namely the wicked, that is not from elsewhere, but from themselves; for the human does not have this from God »; but this cannot be said of actions insofar as they are actions: therefore it is said of actions insofar as they are unjust.

3. Likewise, whoever does injustice is unjust; but God cannot be unjust: therefore he cannot do injustice: therefore the injustice of an action, or an action insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

4. Likewise, whoever does injustice offends God, who is the highest justice; but God cannot offend himself nor *deny himself,* as the Apostle says[^7]: therefore God cannot do injustice: therefore neither [can he do] an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind.

5. Likewise, injustice is a defect; therefore to do injustice is to be deficient; but the divine *power* cannot be deficient[^8]: therefore neither [can it] do injustice: therefore an action, insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

6. Likewise, whatever is from God praises God[^9]; but injustice in no way praises God, nor [does] an unjust operation, insofar as it is of this kind: in no way therefore is an action, insofar as it is unjust or evil, to be attributed to God.

### Conclusion.

> An evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since injustice or malice concerning an action states a defect and a privation, and a defect disordered of itself and a defect lacking the due end; *to do an unjust action* is repugnant to [God's] power, wisdom, and goodness. For there is there a pri-

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vation of utility and of order and of entity; and because nothing is to be attributed to God except what befits his power, wisdom, and goodness: therefore to attribute an evil action to God is not only [a matter] of falsity, but also of blasphemy and impiety. — It is to be granted therefore that an evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God. And therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is objected from the last [chapter] of the third [book] of Kings, it must be said that *go forth and do [it]* is not understood there *imperatively,* but is understood there *permissively.* Whence a verb of the imperative mood is taken in many ways in Scripture: sometimes *preceptively,* sometimes *consultively,* sometimes *insinuatively,* and sometimes *permissively,* of which examples can be taken from diverse places of Scripture[^10].

2. To that which is objected concerning the same cause, that by its presence and absence it is the cause of opposites; it must be said that that holds true of a cause which voluntarily absents itself, such that its absenting is principally from itself. But this is not so in the case at hand; for God absents himself from no one, indeed he is ready to help all and to give grace to all[^11].

3. To that which is objected, that he who helps a thief in [his] action is said to run with the thief, if he does this knowingly; it must be said that this is not similar: because it is becoming and fitting that a human not help his neighbor in that action in which one *walks not rightly*[^12], indeed he ought rather to hinder [it]; since he himself neither knows nor is able to draw out a good thereby, nor is he bound by any law to that assistance, but is rather forbidden [it]. But it is not so in the case at hand, both because it befits the divine liberality that he *make his sun to rise upon the good and the evil*[^13]; nor ought he to withdraw the influence of his power either from the good or from the evil, especially according to that influence which regards *the first being.* Secondly indeed, because it befits the divine providence « so to administer the things which it founded, as to let them act their own proper motions »[^14]. Thirdly indeed, because he himself knows and understands how to draw out a good thereby; and therefore, when he cooperates with the sinner in the action, he acts praiseworthily; and therefore in no way is the malice, which renders its actor culpable, to be attributed to him.

4. To that which is objected, that the relation of the action to vainglory as to an end is from God; it must be said that the relation states two things; namely the act of the will and of the reason extending itself to that end by means of that action; and this indeed is good and is from God. Besides this it imports a disordering. For to such an action is conjoined[^15] a disorder, because such an end does not befit such a work; and as to this, there is there malice; and therefore the injustice is there by reason of the defect which is in such a relation. On account of this it is not necessary that it be from God. And it is similar in limping, in which there is a walking with a defect; so also in the case at hand it is to be understood.

5. To that which is objected concerning rest, it must similarly be responded that rest states a certain *position* in this, that it states a love of the creature; and it states a *privation* of rectitude in this, that it states the privation of the ultimate end. For in this, that it there rests and does not tend beyond, when it ought to tend beyond, there is not only *position,* but also *privation,* which indeed is not from God.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever is from the natural will is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is the *natural* will; and similarly that which is from the *deliberative* will[^16] precisely, must be granted to be from God. But malice is not from the will properly, as it is *deliberative,* but rather as it is *defective,* although that defect does not occur except concerning a deliberative act; and therefore, although it be from the *deliberative* will, it does not follow that it is from God, because it is not insofar as it is *deliberative,* but insofar as it is *defective.* And for this reason, as was said above[^17], if such an argument be made: the deliberative will is from God; and malice is from the deliberative will: therefore it is from God; it errs *by accident,* because it errs against that rule: « Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused ». For there can thus be a sophism *by accident* in *causing,* just as in *inhering.*

la: Vers. 20. et deinde v. 22. — In primo s. Script. loco multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 post *decipiet* addunt *nobis* (ed. 1 ex *nobis*). — In *minori* respicitur illud August., 83 Qq. q. 3: *Illo [Deo] autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente dicitur.*

en: Verse 20, and then v. 22. — In the first place of Sacred Scripture many codices and edd. 1, 2 after *decipiet* add *nobis* (ed. 1 from *nobis*). — In the *minor* there is regarded that [saying] of Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 3: *But when it is said "with him [God] as author," it is said "with him willing."*

la: Libr. II. Phys. text. 30. (c. 3.).

en: Book II. *Physics* text 30 (c. 3.).

la: Psalm. 49, 18: *Si videbas furem, currebas cum eo.*

en: Psalm 49, 18: *If thou didst see a thief, thou didst run with him.*

la: Cfr. supra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. et d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cfr. above d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. and d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. in the body.

la: Vers. 3. — Glossam, quae deprompta est ex August. super hunc locum, vide supra pag. 640, nota 8.

en: Verse 3. — The Gloss, which is drawn from Augustine on this place, see above p. 640, note 8.

la: Vers. 24. — Glossam exhibet Petr. Lombardus in hunc locum.

en: Verse 24. — Peter Lombard presents the Gloss on this place.

la: Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13.

en: Epistle II. Timothy 2, 13.

la: Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8.

en: Cfr. Augustine, XII. *On the City of God,* c. 8.

la: Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, verba August. super Ps. 68, 3.

en: See here in the text of the Master, c. 2, the words of Augustine on Ps. 68, 3.

la: Matth. 5, 41; 19, 19. — Ps. 82, 14. — Ps. 50, 1. — Ps. 4, 5. — Expositionem loci ex tertio libro Reg. memorati vide apud August., V. contra Iulian. Pelagian. c. 3. n. 13.

en: Matthew 5, 41; 19, 19. — Ps. 82, 14. — Ps. 50, 1. — Ps. 4, 5. — For an exposition of the place from the third book of Kings mentioned, see in Augustine, V. *Against Julian the Pelagian* c. 3. n. 13.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 4. q. 2. ad 6. seqq.

la: Locutio *ambulare non recte* legitur II. Paral. 21, 20. et Gal. 2, 14.

en: The expression *to walk not rightly* is read [in] II. Paralipomenon 21, 20, and Galatians 2, 14.

la: Matth. 5, 45. — Pro *tum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *Primo.*

en: Matthew 5, 45. — For *tum* the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *Primo.*

la: Ut dicit August., VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. Vide supra pag. 772, nota 10. — De rationibus hic adductis cfr. supra d. 32. a. 3. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.

en: As Augustine says, VII. *On the City of God,* c. 30. See above p. 772, note 10. — On the reasons here adduced cfr. above d. 32. a. 3. q. 2, and I. Sent. d. 47. q. 3.

la: Plures codd., ut F H (T a prima manu) etc., *iniuncta,* cod. bb *iuncta.*

en: Several codices, such as F H (T by the first hand) etc., [read] *iniuncta,* cod. bb *iuncta.*

la: Cod. Y addit *secundum quod est deliberativa.* In propositione seq. respicitur definitio illa peccati, quae supra d. 33. dub. 6. in fine et hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. habetur: *Peccatum est actus incidens ex defectu boni.*

en: Cod. Y adds *secundum quod est deliberativa* ("insofar as it is deliberative"). In the following proposition there is regarded that definition of sin which is had above d. 33. dub. 6. at the end and here in the text of the Master, c. 1: *Sin is an act befalling from a defect of good.*

la: Dist. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, ubi et regula exponitur, quae in seqq. affertur. — Paulo superius post *quia non est* Vat. supplet *a voluntate.* In fine solut. pro *sicut in inhaerendo* multi codd. cum primis edd. *sicut inhaerendo,* codd. D ee *sicut in habendo,* Vat. *sicut in essendo.* — De hoc sophismate, scil. *secundum accidens,* Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). ait: *Propter igitur accidens captiones sunt, quando similiter quodcumque existimabitur rei, et accidenti inesse; nam quia multa eidem accidunt, non est necesse omnibus praedicatis et ei, de quo praedicantur, illa omnia inesse, nam omnia sic erunt eadem.* Cfr. B. Albert., Comment. in II. Topic. tr. 2. c. 1. seq., ubi cum verbo *inesse* coniunguntur verba *cohaerentia* et *inhaerentia.*

en: Dist. 34. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, where also the rule is expounded which is brought forward in what follows. — A little above, after *quia non est* the Vatican [edition] supplies *a voluntate.* At the end of the solution, for *sicut in inhaerendo* many codices with the first editions [read] *sicut inhaerendo,* codd. D ee *sicut in habendo,* the Vatican [edition] *sicut in essendo.* — On this sophism, namely *by accident,* Aristotle, I. *Elenchi* c. 4. (c. 5.), says: *On account of accident, therefore, there are deceptions, when whatever is judged to be in a thing is judged similarly to be in the accident; for because many things befall the same [subject], it is not necessary that all those things be in all the predicates and in that of which they are predicated, for [otherwise] all would thus be the same.* Cfr. B. Albert, Commentary on II. *Topics* tr. 2. c. 1. seq., where with the word *inesse* ("to be in") are conjoined the words *cohaerentia* ("cohering") and *inhaerentia* ("inhering").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Conclusiones trium huius articuli quaestionum nullam controversiam recipiunt. — Pro solutionibus obiectorum in 1. quaest. intelligendis supponendum est, quod quamvis *malitia,* quae erat in aliqua actione, non potuisset fieri sine illa actione, tamen eadem actio potuisset fieri sine malitia, si relata esset ad debitum obiectum et finem. Hoc principium applicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1. ad 2.) ad actum pessimum odii Dei, his verbis: « *Velle malum* potest esse sine malitia, sicut cum homo vult malum illi qui est dignus malo. *Odire* autem *Deum* dicit ipsam actionem cum sua deformitate, et ideo a malitia separari non potest ». Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 2. — Scot., hic q. 4. et q. 2. n. 14. seqq.; Report. hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 79. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 162; de Malo, q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 134. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., art. cit. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**II.** Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem de *casu* cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4. Fuse disputat de hac re Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. 2, et etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 26. m. 4. a. 2. Eandem tangunt S. Thom., S. I. q. 19. a. 6, q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.; de Malo, q. 2. a. 5. ad 6, et alibi.

**III.** De 3. quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. a. 4; et quoad principia Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 9, et q. 16. passim. Explicite de eadem quaest. tractant Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aliqua ex S. Bonav. excerpsit Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The conclusions of the three questions of this article admit no controversy. — For understanding the solutions of the objections in the first question, it is to be supposed that, although the *malice* which was in some action could not have come to be without that action, nevertheless the same action could have come to be without the malice, if it had been referred to the due object and end. Richard of Middleton (here a. 3. q. 1. ad 2.) applies this principle to the worst act of hatred of God, in these words: « *To will evil* can be without malice, as when a human wills evil to him who is worthy of evil. But *to hate God* states the very action with its deformity, and therefore cannot be separated from malice ». Alexander of Hales, S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 2. — Scotus, here q. 4. and q. 2. n. 14. seqq.; Reportata here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. 1. II. q. 79. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 162; de Malo, q. 3. a. 1. — B. Albert, here a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 22. q. 134. m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, in the cited article. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**II.** As to the following (second) question on *chance,* cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4. Richard of Middleton disputes copiously on this matter, here a. 4. q. 1. 2, and also Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 26. m. 4. a. 2. The same matter is touched by St. Thomas, S. I. q. 19. a. 6, q. 22. a. 2. ad 1.; de Malo, q. 2. a. 5. ad 6, and elsewhere.

**III.** On the third question cfr. I. Sent. d. 46. a. 4; and as to the principles Alexander of Hales, S. p. I. q. 15. m. 9, and q. 16. passim. Explicitly on the same question treat Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3. q. 2. — Some things from S. Bonaventure were excerpted by Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 60448–60619), with the cascade-fragmented Respondeo, Ad-obiecta solutions, SCHOLION, and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 869–871, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 891–893). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Folded ARTICULUS II opener (Override §5).** The short ARTICULUS II opener (`Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de actione defectiva… Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo… actio iniusta; Secundo… operatio fortuita; Tertio… enuntiatio falsa`, raw 60448–60470, sitting at the foot of p. 868 / spanning into p. 869) is folded into this q1 per the Vol II chunking convention — there is no standalone `d37-a2-divisio` chunk. The ARTICULUS II heading + its title (`Utrum actio defectiva sit Deo attribuenda`) are carried in as headings.

**Alignment check (PASSED).** ARTICULUS II lists three questions verbatim: (1) *utrum a Deo sit actio iniusta, secundum quod iniusta;* (2) *utrum a Deo sit operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita;* (3) *utrum a Deo sit enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa.* QUAESTIO I's body opens *Circa primum… utrum actio iniusta, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo* — matches topic (1). No q-swap.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 868 (opener tail) – 869 – 870 – 871.
- p. 868 (foot): ARTICULUS II opener only (folded in). The p.868 footers belong to a1-q3 (the idolum-quaestion) and were retained there.
- p. 869 (running head `DIST. XXXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. I. 869`): QUAESTIO I heading + the entire videtur (fund. 1–6) + Sed contra (1–6) + Conclusio + Respondeo opener. Footers 1–9 → continuous [^1]–[^9]. L-column footers 1–4 ([^1] Tertio Regum, [^2] Philosophus/Phys., [^3] Ps. 49, [^4] cfr. d.24/d.35); R-column footers 5–9 ([^5] Ioan. 1 Glossa, [^6] Rom. Glossa Lombardus, [^7] II Tim., [^8] de Civ. Dei, [^9] in lit. Magistri / Ps. 68).
- p. 870 (running head `870 SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.`): Respondeo body + Ad obiecta 1–6 (article body ends with *sicut in inhaerendo*). Footers 1–8 → continuous [^10]–[^17]. L-column footers 1–7 ([^10] Matth/Ps loci + August. contra Iulian., [^11] cfr. d.40, [^12] ambulare non recte, [^13] Matth. 5,45, [^14] de Civ. Dei VII / d.32 / d.47, [^15] iniuncta/iuncta var., [^16] Cod. Y addit + peccati definitio); R-column footer 8 ([^17] Dist. 34 a.1 q.1 + sophisma var. + Aristot. Elench.). Footer 8's opener (`dub. 6. in fine…`) is the tail of note 7's body that wrapped to R-column — kept with [^16].
- p. 871 (running head `DIST. XXXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 871`): the article-level SCHOLION (items I, II, III), then QUAESTIO II begins. The SCHOLION carries only reference/commentator content — NO numbered footers.

**Hand-off received.** From a1-q3: the entire p.869 footer block (a1-q3 closed mid-p.868 and forwarded all p.869 footers here). Captured as this q1's [^1]–[^9].

**Hand-off forwarded to a2-q2.** None. QUAESTIO II begins fresh on p. 871 (raw 60620, *Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo*). The p.871 SCHOLION belongs to THIS q1 (it is the ART. II article-level scholion; item I treats q1's solutions, items II–III preview q2/q3). q2's own page footers begin on p. 871 R-column / p. 872 and stay with q2; this q1 claims no footer on p. 871.

**Scholion disposition.** PRESENT here at q1 (p. 871, raw ~60598–60619), items I, II, III. `has_scholion: true`. Item I: q1's conclusions admit no controversy + the malitia/actio separability principle (Richard a Med.) + commentator roll. Item II: preview of q2 (de casu). Item III: preview of q3 (enuntiatio falsa). Per Override §5, the article-level scholion lives with q1; q2 and q3 may legitimately lack their own scholion (item I says *pro solutionibus obiectorum in 1. quaest.*, items II–III say *quoad seq. quaestionem* / *de 3. quaest.*).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of pp. 869–871 read top→bottom. The p.869/870 seam (inside the Respondeo: `…Est enim ibi pri-` / `-vatio utilitatis…`) is grammatically continuous; the p.870/871 seam (article body ends at `…sicut in inhaerendo.` on p.870 R-column, SCHOLION begins fresh on p.871) is clean. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The shared p.869 footer block is fully accounted for here (1–9); the p.868 opener footers stayed with a1-q3.

**[?] flags.** None.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.
### *Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia tam fortuita quam casualis actio est ex causis confluentibus, ob aliud inceptis; unde Boethius in quinto *de Consolatione*[^1]: « Casus est inopinatus rei eventus ex causis concurrentibus, ob aliud inceptis ». Sed tam concursus causarum quam inchoatio propter aliud est a Deo: ergo si nihil plus requiritur ad hoc, quod aliquid sit fortuitum vel casuale; videtur, quod tam fortuita quam casualia, secundum quod huiusmodi, sint a Deo.

2. Item, sicut *ens per se* est a Deo, in quantum est per se, sic et *accidens* est a Deo, in quantum est accidens: ergo sicut operatio *causae per se* a Deo est, ita et operatio *causae per accidens.* Sed casuale et fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit operationem vel effectum *causae per accidens*, sed naturale et artificiale dicit effectum *causae per se*: ergo sicut omne naturale et artificiale est a Deo, in quantum huiusmodi, sic omne casuale et omne fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo.

3. Item, quandocumque aliqua diversa concurrunt ad unius effectus productionem, necesse est, quod per unum aliquid coniungantur; sed causae, a quibus oritur tam casuale quam fortuitum, et sunt diversae quantum ad *rem* et sunt diversae quantum ad *intentionem*: ergo si uniuntur, coniunguntur per aliquid, quod est supra eas. Sed nihil est supra agens naturale et agens a proposito[^2] nisi solus Deus: ergo talium causarum concursus a Deo est; et huiusmodi causarum concursus facit effectum casualem vel fortuitum: ergo etc.

4. Item, potentior est ad agendum *causa per se* quam *causa per accidens*; sed *causa per se* nullum effectum producere potest, quin adiuvetur a Deo: ergo nec *causa per accidens.* Sed *causae per accidens* sunt casus et fortuna, sicut vult Philosophus in secundo *Physicorum*[^3]: ergo cum eorum effectus sint casuale et fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, videtur etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod casuale, secundum id quod est, a Deo est, non tamen secundum quod casuale, quia dicit privationem intentionis, non positionem; *contra* hoc est: quia, sicut natura operatur per intentionem, ita operatur etiam uniformiter et modo consueto; sed cum aliqua operatio fit praeter solitum cursum naturae, illa quidem operatio dicitur miraculum, et talis operatio ponitur a Deo, in quantum talis[^4]. Si ergo operatio, quae fit praeter consuetudinem, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo, pari ratione et operatio, quae fit praeter intentionem, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo.

5. Item, fortuitum eo ipso dicitur fortuitum, quia est ab aliquo agente intendente aliud, sicut inventio thesauri est ab eo qui intendit arare terram; sed quod ille aliud intendat, hoc bonum est et a Deo est; similiter, quod thesaurum illum inveniat, hoc bonum est et a Deo est: ergo fortuitum, ut fortuitum est, a Deo videtur esse.

*Fundamenta.*

1. Sed contra hoc arguit Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^5] sic: « Quidquid casu

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fit, temere fit: quidquid temere fit, non fit providentia »: si igitur omne quod fit a Deo, fit per providentiam, quia Deus nihil agit sine providentia; videtur, quod casuale et fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, non sit a Deo.

2. Item, casus et fortuna accidit per defectum praecognitionis; sed Deus nihil potest facere nisi praecognoscens et praesciens: ergo nihil casuale, in quantum huiusmodi, a Deo est[^6].

3. Item, sicut bonum repugnat malo, ita fortuna repugnat providentiae: sed a Deo, qui summe bonus est, non potest egredi aliqua operatio iniusta: ergo pari ratione, cum sit summe prudens[^7], non potest ab eo exire aliqua operatio fortuita.

4. Item, fortuitum, secundum quod fortuitum, ortum habet a *causa per accidens*: ergo si Deus esset causa fortuiti, secundum quod huiusmodi, Deus esset causa alicuius rei *per accidens.* Sed *causa per accidens* reduci habet ad causam nobiliorem[^8]: ergo aliqua causa esset nobilior Deo: quod est absurdum.

5. Item, sicut iniustitia se habet ad suam causam, sic casuale et fortuitum ad suam; sed iniustitia non potest esse ab aliquo nisi operante iniuste: ergo casuale et fortuitum non potest esse, nisi ab eo qui operatur casualiter et fortuite. Sed Deus nullo modo operatur casualiter nec fortuite: ergo casualis sive fortuita operatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est a Deo.

### CONCLUSIO.

> Casuale et fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, a Deo non est, etsi a Deo est, secundum id quod est.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod etsi casuale vel fortuitum, secundum id quod est, sit a Deo; in quantum tamen casuale vel fortuitum, a Deo non est. *(Conclusio.)* Et ratio huius est, quia fortuitum et casuale aliquid ponunt, utpote effectum, qui est ex concursu causarum ob aliud inceptarum; aliquid etiam privant; dicit enim casus et fortuna *defectum* intentionis et praecognitionis. *(Ratio.)* Et quoniam operatio causarum et concursus ad producendum tales effectus aliquid est, ideo a Deo est; quia vero privatio intentionis defectus est, ideo a Deo non est. Et quoniam casuale et fortuitum, ut sic nominantur, imposita sunt a tali defectu; hinc est, quod non sunt concedenda a Deo esse. Et hoc vult dicere Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^9], cum dicit: « Quod casu fit, temere fit »; et ideo, sicut non concedimus, quod *temerarium*, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo; sic non est concedendum, quod casuale vel fortuitum, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. —

*(Duplex casuale et fortuitum.)* Et quia tam casuale quam fortuitum, ut sic est, est nomen impositum a privatione intentionis; secundum quod privatio intentionis dupliciter potest intelligi, secundum hoc casuale et fortuitum dicitur dupliciter. *(Corollarium 1.)* Uno enim modo potest intelligi privatio intentionis universaliter respectu cuiuscumque agentis, sive particularis sive universalis, sive operantis sive cooperantis, sive exsequentis sive gubernantis. Et hoc modo nihil est casuale, et casus et fortuna hoc modo nihil sunt. Et hoc modo posuerunt aliqui philosophi casum, et improbat Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^10] per hoc, quod providentia totus mundus administratur; et ita nihil fit, quod non pertineat ad opus providentiae. *(Corollarium 2.)* Alio modo potest intelligi privatio intentionis respectu agentis particularis, utpote particularis naturae et intellectus creati; et hoc modo aliquid est casuale, et casus aliquid est, secundum quod dicit Boethius in libro *de Consolatione*[^11] definiens casum et ostendens, qualiter quis potest operari casualiter, videlicet cum aliquid assequitur inopinate; et ideo dicit: « Casus est inopinatus rei eventus », ubi simul tangit privationem et positionem: positionem per hoc, quod dicit *eventum*; privationem in hoc, quod dicit *inopinatum*; et illa quidem privatio non est respectu Dei, quia Deus nihil potest facere inopinate sive improvise, nec etiam a Deo est, cum sit defectus, sed potius a defectibilitate creaturae. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod nihil est a Deo casuale, et[^12] quod casuale, secundum quod casuale, non est a Deo.

*(Solutio oppositorum.)*

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod concursus causarum a Deo est; iam patet responsio. Arguit enim de casu, secundum quod dicit positionem, non secundum quod dicit defectum.

2. *(Notandum.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod a Deo est causa per se et per accidens; dicendum, quod aliter dicitur *accidens* de ente, prout est *differentia entis*, aliter prout est *differentia causae.* Prout enim est *differentia entis*, dicit habitudinem ad subiectum, quae quidem est positio, non privatio. Prout autem est *differentia causae*, dicit privationem intentionis, per quam aliquid dicitur esse *causa alicuius per se*[^13].

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Et ideo non sequitur, quod si modus *essendi per accidens*, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo, quod et modus *operandi per accidens*, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diversae causae indigent aliquo superiori coniungente ad hoc, quod possint unum effectum producere; dicendum, quod illud dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo *vere*, alio modo *false.* *(Dupliciter intelligitur.)* Si enim ita intelligatur, quod ad hoc, quod aliquae duae causae concurrant, necessaria sit nova influentia causae superioris plus, quam si non concurrerent, et quaelibet operaretur per se; sic non habet veritatem. Hoc enim ipso, quod aliquis abscondit in terra thesaurum, et aliquis fodit in eadem terra, sine nova influentia illae duae operationes causant thesauri inventionem. Si autem ita intelligatur, quod omnes causae, quae concurrunt ad unum effectum, reducuntur ad aliquod unum principium; sic veritatem habet, pro eo quod illa quae non possunt reduci ad unum principium, omnino sunt diversa; et ideo nunquam possunt ad unum effectum concurrere. Si enim in uno principio non convenirent, iam omnino non haberent aliquid commune; et ideo necesse est ponere, quod tam causae concurrentes quam earum concursus sint ab uno principio primo. Sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod casuale, in quantum huiusmodi, sit a Deo, quamvis sit a Deo, secundum id quod est; quia casus non tantum dicit *eventum*, sed etiam *eventum inopinatum*[^14].

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *causa per accidens* indiget adiutorio, sicut *causa per se*; dicendum, quod verum est respectu eius quod *efficit*, sed non indiget adiutorium respectu eius, in quo *deficit*; per se enim potest *deficere*, sed non per se potest *efficere.* Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod casuale sit a Deo, nisi secundum id, secundum quod aliquid ponit, non secundum quod dicit *privationem intentionis.* *(Notandum.)* Et si obiiciat, quod miraculum, in quantum huiusmodi, est a Deo, et tamen dicit privationem consuetudinis, quia fit praeter solitum cursum; dicendum, quod aliter miraculum fit praeter solitum cursum, et aliter fortuitum praeter intentionem. *Miraculum* enim fit sic[^15] praeter solitum cursum, ita quod *supra* cursum naturae, unde plus dicit positionis quam privationis; casuale vero non ita fit praeter intentionem, quod fiat *supra* intentionem, sed deficit ab intentione.

5. *(Notandum.)* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus potest[^16], quod aliquod agens unum assequatur et aliud intendat, ita quod utrumque sit a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est; sed *assequi unum* et *intendere aliud* hoc non facit casus vel fortuna, in quantum quis *aliud intendit* ab eo quod assequitur, sed in quantum *non praevidet nec intendit* illud quod assequitur. Si enim illud et aliud[^17] intenderet, iam non operaretur casualiter sive fortuite. Licet autem intendere ad aliud sit a Deo, non tamen a Deo est non intendere illud quod assequitur, quia primum dicit positionem, et secundum privationem; et casuale sive fortuitum, in quantum huiusmodi, non denominatur a primo, sed a secundo: et propterea, in quantum tale, non est a Deo, sed a defectu reperto in agente creato.

---

english:
### QUESTION II.
### *Whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.*

Secondly it is asked, whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because both a fortuitous and a chance action is from causes converging, undertaken for the sake of something else; whence Boethius in the fifth [book] *On Consolation*[^1]: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing from causes concurring, undertaken for the sake of something else ». But both the concurrence of causes and the inception for the sake of another are from God: therefore if nothing more is required for something to be fortuitous or by chance; it seems that both fortuitous and chance things, insofar as they are such, are from God.

2. Likewise, just as *being per se* is from God insofar as it is per se, so also *accident* is from God insofar as it is an accident: therefore just as the operation of a *cause per se* is from God, so also the operation of a *cause per accidens.* But the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, denote the operation or effect of a *cause per accidens*, whereas the natural and the artificial denote the effect of a *cause per se*: therefore just as every natural and artificial thing is from God, insofar as it is such, so every chance thing and every fortuitous thing, insofar as it is such, is from God.

3. Likewise, whenever diverse things concur toward the production of one effect, it is necessary that they be joined through some one thing; but the causes from which both the chance and the fortuitous arise are diverse as to the *thing* and are diverse as to the *intention*: therefore if they are united, they are joined through something which is above them. But nothing is above a natural agent and an agent acting from purpose[^2] except God alone: therefore the concurrence of such causes is from God; and the concurrence of such causes makes a chance or fortuitous effect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a *cause per se* is more powerful in acting than a *cause per accidens*; but a *cause per se* can produce no effect unless it be helped by God: therefore neither [can] a *cause per accidens.* But chance and fortune are *causes per accidens*, as the Philosopher holds in the second [book] of the *Physics*[^3]: therefore since their effects are the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, it seems etc. *If you say* that the chance thing, according to that which it is, is from God, yet not insofar as it is chance, because it denotes a privation of intention, not a position; *on the contrary* there is this: because, just as nature operates through intention, so it also operates uniformly and in the accustomed manner; but when some operation comes to be beyond the usual course of nature, that operation indeed is called a miracle, and such an operation is ascribed to God, insofar as it is such[^4]. If therefore an operation which comes to be beyond custom, insofar as it is such, is from God, by parity of reasoning an operation also which comes to be beyond intention, insofar as it is such, is from God.

5. Likewise, the fortuitous is by this very fact called fortuitous, because it is from some agent intending something else, just as the finding of a treasure is from one who intends to plow the earth; but that he intend something else, this is good and is from God; similarly, that he find that treasure, this is good and is from God: therefore the fortuitous, as it is fortuitous, seems to be from God.

*Fundamenta.*

1. But against this Augustine argues in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions*[^5] thus: « Whatever happens by chance, happens at random:

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whatever happens at random, does not happen by providence »: if therefore everything that comes to be from God comes to be through providence, since God does nothing without providence; it seems that the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God.

2. Likewise, chance and fortune happen through a defect of foreknowledge; but God can make nothing except foreknowing and foreseeing: therefore nothing chance, insofar as it is such, is from God[^6].

3. Likewise, just as the good is repugnant to the evil, so fortune is repugnant to providence: but from God, who is supremely good, no unjust operation can proceed: therefore by parity of reasoning, since he is supremely prudent[^7], no fortuitous operation can come forth from him.

4. Likewise, the fortuitous, insofar as it is fortuitous, has its origin from a *cause per accidens*: therefore if God were the cause of the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, God would be the cause of some thing *per accidens.* But a *cause per accidens* has to be reduced to a nobler cause[^8]: therefore some cause would be nobler than God: which is absurd.

5. Likewise, just as injustice stands to its cause, so the chance and the fortuitous to theirs; but injustice cannot be from anyone except one acting unjustly: therefore the chance and the fortuitous cannot be, except from one who operates by chance and fortuitously. But God in no way operates by chance nor fortuitously: therefore a chance or fortuitous operation, insofar as it is such, is not from God.

### CONCLUSION.

> The chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God, even though it is from God according to that which it is.

**I respond:** It must be said that although the chance or the fortuitous, according to that which it is, is from God; yet insofar as it is chance or fortuitous, it is not from God. *(Conclusion.)* And the reason of this is that the fortuitous and the chance posit something, namely an effect, which is from the concurrence of causes undertaken for the sake of something else; they also privatively take something away; for chance and fortune denote a *defect* of intention and of foreknowledge. *(Reason.)* And since the operation of the causes and their concurrence toward producing such effects is something, therefore it is from God; but since the privation of intention is a defect, therefore it is not from God. And since the chance and the fortuitous, as they are so named, are imposed from such a defect; hence it is that they are not to be granted to be from God. And this is what Augustine means to say in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions*[^9], when he says: « What happens by chance, happens at random »; and therefore, just as we do not grant that the *random*, insofar as it is such, is from God; so it is not to be granted that the chance or the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is from God. —

*(The chance and the fortuitous are twofold.)* And since both the chance and the fortuitous, as it is so, is a name imposed from the privation of intention; according as the privation of intention can be understood in two ways, accordingly the chance and the fortuitous is said in two ways. *(Corollary 1.)* For in one way the privation of intention can be understood universally with respect to any agent whatsoever, whether particular or universal, whether operating or cooperating, whether executing or governing. And in this way nothing is chance, and chance and fortune in this way are nothing. And in this way certain philosophers posited chance, and Augustine disproves it in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions*[^10] by this, that the whole world is administered by providence; and so nothing comes to be which does not pertain to the work of providence. *(Corollary 2.)* In another way the privation of intention can be understood with respect to a particular agent, namely of a particular created nature and intellect; and in this way something is chance, and chance is something, according as Boethius says in the book *On Consolation*[^11] defining chance and showing in what way one can operate by chance, namely when one attains something unlooked-for; and therefore he says: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing », where at once he touches the privation and the position: the position by this, that he says *outcome*; the privation in this, that he says *unlooked-for*; and that privation indeed is not with respect to God, because God can make nothing unlooked-for or unforeseen, nor is it from God, since it is a defect, but rather from the defectibility of the creature. — There are therefore to be granted the reasons showing that nothing chance is from God, and[^12] that the chance, insofar as it is chance, is not from God.

*(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)*

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the concurrence of causes is from God; the response is already plain. For it argues of chance according as it denotes a position, not according as it denotes a defect.

2. *(To be noted.)* To that which is objected, that the cause per se and per accidens is from God; it must be said that *accident* is said in one way of being, insofar as it is a *difference of being*, in another way insofar as it is a *difference of cause.* For insofar as it is a *difference of being*, it denotes a relation to a subject, which indeed is a position, not a privation. But insofar as it is a *difference of cause*, it denotes a privation of intention, by which something is said to be a *cause of something per se*[^13].

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And therefore it does not follow that, if the mode of *being per accidens*, insofar as it is such, is from God, then the mode of *operating per accidens*, insofar as it is such, is also from God.

3. To that which is objected, that diverse causes need some superior thing joining them in order that they may produce one effect; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way *truly*, in another way *falsely.* *(It is understood in two ways.)* For if it be understood thus, that in order that any two causes concur, a new influence of a superior cause is necessary, more than if they did not concur and each operated per se; thus it does not hold true. For by this very fact that someone hides a treasure in the earth, and someone digs in the same earth, without a new influence those two operations cause the finding of the treasure. But if it be understood thus, that all the causes which concur toward one effect are reduced to some one principle; thus it holds true, for the reason that those things which cannot be reduced to one principle are wholly diverse; and therefore they can never concur toward one effect. For if they did not agree in one principle, they would now have nothing in common at all; and therefore it is necessary to posit that both the concurring causes and their concurrence are from one first principle. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that the chance, insofar as it is such, is from God, although it is from God according to that which it is; because chance denotes not only the *outcome*, but also the *unlooked-for outcome*[^14].

4. To that which is objected, that a *cause per accidens* needs help, just as a *cause per se*; it must be said that this is true with respect to that which it *effects*, but it does not need help with respect to that in which it *fails*; for of itself it can *fail*, but it cannot of itself *effect.* And therefore it does not follow from this that the chance is from God, except according to that, according to which something posits, not according as it denotes a *privation of intention.* *(To be noted.)* And if it be objected that a miracle, insofar as it is such, is from God, and yet denotes a privation of custom, since it comes to be beyond the usual course; it must be said that a miracle comes to be beyond the usual course in one way, and the fortuitous beyond intention in another way. For a *miracle* comes to be thus[^15] beyond the usual course, in such a way that it is *above* the course of nature, whence it denotes more of position than of privation; but the chance does not so come to be beyond intention that it should come to be *above* intention, but it falls short of intention.

5. *(To be noted.)* To that which is objected, that God is able[^16] to bring it about that some agent attain one thing and intend another, in such a way that both be from God; it must be said that this is true; but to *attain one thing* and *intend another* — this chance or fortune does not do, insofar as one *intends something else* than that which he attains, but insofar as he *does not foresee nor intend* that which he attains. For if he intended both it and the other[^17], he would no longer operate by chance or fortuitously. But although to intend toward another be from God, yet it is not from God not to intend that which he attains, because the first denotes a position, and the second a privation; and the chance or fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is denominated not from the first, but from the second: and therefore, insofar as it is such, it is not from God, but from a defect found in the created agent.

---

la: Prosa 1, ubi proprie habentur haec: *Licet igitur definire, casum esse inopinatum ex confluentibus causis, in his quae ob aliquid geruntur, eventum.* Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.), ubi de casu et fortuna, oppositis naturae et arti, fusius agitur atque exponitur, quid sint, quomodo ab invicem differant, quomodo sint causae per accidens etc., quae omnia in hac quaestione tanguntur.

en: Prose 1, where these words are properly found: *It is permitted therefore to define chance as the unlooked-for outcome, from converging causes, in those things which are done for the sake of something.* Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Physics* text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.), where chance and fortune, as opposed to nature and art, are treated more fully and it is explained what they are, how they differ from one another, how they are causes per accidens etc., all of which are touched upon in this question.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 714, nota 3.

en: See tom. I. p. 714, note 3.

la: Text. 48. seqq., praecipue text. 57. (c. 4. seqq.).

en: Text 48. seqq., especially text 57. (c. 4. seqq.).

la: Vide supra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Immediate supra post *ponitur a Deo* cod. N addit *esse*, et aliquanto superius pro *contra hoc est: quia* cod. cc. et ed. 1 habent *contra hoc est: quod.*

en: See above d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5. — Immediately above, after *ponitur a Deo*, cod. N adds *esse*, and somewhat earlier for *contra hoc est: quia* cod. cc. and ed. 1 have *contra hoc est: quod.*

la: Quaest. 24. — De *minori* vide I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3.

en: Question 24. — On the *minor* [premise] see I. Sent. d. 35. dub. 3.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4.

en: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 4.

la: Codd. N bb *providens.*

en: Codd. N bb [read] *providens.*

la: Vide supra pag. 810, nota 3.

en: See above p. 810, note 3.

la: Quaest. 24. Verba Augustini improbantia habentur supra d. XXXV. lit. Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 43. seqq. (c. 4.) et de Mundo, c. 7. (c. 6.). Philosophi, qui casualismum profitebantur, fuerunt Leucippus et Democritus. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Part. animal. c. 1.

en: Question 24. The words of Augustine disproving [it] are had above at d. XXXV. in the text of the Master, c. 3. Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Physics* text. 43. seqq. (c. 4.) and *On the World*, c. 7. (c. 6.). The philosophers who professed chance-doctrine were Leucippus and Democritus. Cfr. Aristotle, I. *On the Parts of Animals* c. 1.

la: Libr. V. prosa 1, ubi de Aristotele iudicat, quod iste casum vel fortuitum « in Physicis (II. text. 48. seqq.) et brevi et veri propinqua ratione definivit ».

en: Book V. prose 1, where he judges of Aristotle that he defined chance or the fortuitous « in the *Physics* (II. text. 48. seqq.) both briefly and by a reasoning near to the truth ».

la: Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *ita.*

en: The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] *ita.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 50. (c. 5.); V. Metaph. text. 3-5. et VII. text. 3. (IV. c. 30. et VI. c. 1.). — In principio solut. cod. V *tam per se quam per accidens* pro *per se et per accidens.*

en: Cfr. Aristotle, II. *Physics* text. 50. (c. 5.); V. *Metaphysics* text. 3–5. and VII. text. 3. (IV. c. 30. and VI. c. 1.). — At the beginning of the solution cod. V [reads] *tam per se quam per accidens* for *per se et per accidens.*

la: Vide supra d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro *dicit* ed. 3 *intendit*, Vat. *intendit et dicit*, quae et deinde post *sed etiam* interiicit *ut.*

en: See above d. 14. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. ad 1. — A little before, for *dicit* ed. 3 [reads] *intendit*, the Vatican [edition] *intendit et dicit*, which also thereupon, after *sed etiam*, interposes *ut.*

la: In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 deest *sic.*

en: In the Vatican [edition] and edd. 3, 4 *sic* is lacking.

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 bene supplent *facere.*

en: Cod. cc and ed. 1 rightly supply *facere.*

la: Vat. omittit *et aliud.* Mox pro *intendere ad aliud* ed. 1 *intendere aliud.*

en: The Vatican [edition] omits *et aliud.* Soon, for *intendere ad aliud* ed. 1 [reads] *intendere aliud.*

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw 60620–60771), with the cascade-fragmented two-column body (videtur args, fundamenta, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, Solutio oppositorum replies) and all page-footers verified against 450 dpi PDF column bands (printed pp. 871–873, offset pdf = printed + 22 → pdf pp. 893–895). Read Left column top→bottom then Right column for each page; body bands then footer bands.

**Boundary (coordinator-verified, held).** This chunk = ARTICULUS II, QUAESTIO II only. Opens at `QUAESTIO II.` / *Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo* (raw 60620, p.871 lower-left, body "Secundo quaeritur, utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo."). The article-level SCHOLION (items I–III, p.871 top, previewing all three of the article's questions) is NOT part of this chunk — it is held by the sibling a2-q1 per Override §5. The chunk ENDS at raw ~60769 ("...sed a defectu reperto in agente creato[^17].") immediately before `QUAESTIO III.` / *Utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, sit a Deo* (raw 60772, p.873 lower-left) — everything from QUAESTIO III onward is d37-a2-q3.

**Alignment check.** PASSED. q2 = ART II topic (2), *Utrum operatio fortuita, secundum quod fortuita, sit a Deo*; opener "Secundo quaeritur…". The article scholion item II ("Quoad seq. (2.) quaestionem de casu cfr…") previews exactly this question.

**Scholion disposition.** ABSENT here. `has_scholion: false`. q2 has no own scholion; the article-level scholion (items I–III) sits before q2's opener and is held by a2-q1. This is normal per Override §5.

**Page-split / footer map.** Spans printed pp. 871–873 (running heads: p.871 `DIST. XXXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.`; p.872 `SENTENTIARUM LIB. II.` [verso]; p.873 OCR/typeset running head reads `DIST. XXXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. III.` but the body on p.873 is still q2's Solutio-oppositorum tail — a typesetter running-head error, the QUAESTIO III header itself does not begin until lower in p.873's left column). Footnote numbering restarts per printed page; renumbered continuously here.
- p.871 (lower half, after the article scholion): q2 opener + videtur args 1–5 + Fundamenta arg 1 opener. Footers 1–5 → [^1]–[^5]: [^1] Boethius *de Consol.* (arg 1 "Consolatione"), [^2] tom. I pag. 714 (arg 3 "a proposito"), [^3] II. Phys. text. 48 (arg 4 "Physicorum"), [^4] d. 18 a. 1 q. 2 ad 5 (arg 4 "in quantum talis"), [^5] Quaest. 24 (Fundamenta 1 "Octoginta trium Quaestionum").
- p.872 (verso): Fundamenta args 1-tail through 5 + CONCLUSIO + Respondeo (Conclusio/Ratio, Duplex, Corollarium 1, Corollarium 2) + Solutio-oppositorum replies 1–2. Footers L 1–4 + R 5–7 → [^6]–[^12]: [^6] d. 45 dub. 4 (Fund. 2 "a Deo est"), [^7] Codd. N bb *providens* (Fund. 3 "summe prudens"), [^8] pag. 810 nota 3 (Fund. 4 "nobiliorem"), [^9] Quaest. 24 / d. XXXV lit. Magistri (Resp. "Octoginta trium Quaestionum"), [^10] Boethius Libr. V prosa 1 (Corollarium 2 "de Consolatione"), [^11] Vat. *ita* (Resp. end "et[^12]" — the *ita* variant), [^12] II. Phys. text. 50 / per-se-vs-per-accidens variant (reply 2 "causa alicuius per se").
- p.873 (running-head says QUAEST. III but body is q2's tail): Solutio-oppositorum replies 2-tail through 5 (ends "in agente creato"). Footers L 1–5 → [^13]–[^17]: [^13] d. 14 p. II a. 2 q. 3 ad 1 (reply 2 "per se"), [^14] *sic* lacking (reply 3 "eventum inopinatum"), [^15] *sic* lacking (reply 4 "Miraculum…fit sic"), [^16] supplent *facere* (reply 5 "Deus potest"), [^17] Vat. omittit *et aliud* (reply 5 "illud et aliud"). p.873 footers 6–8 (`Vide I. Sent. d. 46 q. 4 ad 3…`; `Cfr. tom. I pag. 707, nota 5`; `Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41…`) belong to QUAESTIO III's videtur args and are forwarded to d37-a2-q3.

**Hand-off received.** From a2-q1: NO footer migrated. a2-q1 closed with the article-level scholion on p.871 (top), claiming the article-scholion footer block; the p.871 footers below the scholion / in q2's lower-half columns (footers 1–5) belong to and are captured by q2 here.

**Hand-off forwarded to d37-a2-q3.** QUAESTIO III (`Utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod falsa, sit a Deo`, body "Tertio quaeritur, utrum enuntiatio falsa, secundum quod huiusmodi, sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.") begins on p.873 immediately after q2's reply-5 tail ("…in agente creato"). The three p.873 footers serving q3's body are forwarded: footer 6 = `Vide I. Sent. d. 46. q. 4. ad 3. — Omnis propositionis veritatem a Deo esse, docetur ibid. d. 46. dub. 8, d. 35. q. 1, d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.` (q3 arg 2 "Augustinus dicit, quod si essent aequalia…"); footer 7 = `Cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.` (q3 arg 2 "veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus"); footer 8 = `Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41. et I. contra Advers. Leg. et Proph. c. 4. n. 6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.` Also note q3's footer 5 = `Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.` may be q3's (q3 arg cross-ref to this article's scholion) rather than q2's — the q3 agent should confirm against the q3 body markers (q2's "creato" tail did NOT carry a footnote marker on eyes-on PDF, so q2 stops at [^17]).

**Cascade-dropout check.** PASSED. Both column bands of each of pp. 871–873 read top→bottom. The p.871/872 seam (inside Fundamenta arg 1, "« Quidquid casu / fit, temere fit »" — continuous), the p.872/873 seam (inside reply 2, "esse causa alicuius per se. / Et ideo non sequitur…" — continuous), are each grammatically continuous. No mid-paragraph splice signature found. The p.873 footer block splits between q2 (footers 1–5 → [^13]–[^17]) and q3 (footers 6–8, forwarded).

**[?] flags.** None. Note: raw OCR rendered p.872 footer 1 as "Cfr. I. Sent. d. iS. dub. i" — the 450 dpi PDF reads clearly *d. 45. dub. 4* (corrected in [^6]). The p.873 running head OCR'd as `QUAEST. III` is a typesetter/running-head error (body is q2's tail); the actual QUAESTIO III header begins lower on the page (raw 60772) and starts d37-a2-q3.