title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3

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### Quaestio III. *Utrum spiritualia habeant permanentem, vel successivam mensuram.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram *permanentem*, aut *successivam*. Et quod *permanentem*, carentem priori et posteriori, videtur primo *auctoritate*, deinde *ratione*.

1. Et *auctoritate* sic: Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate Dei[^1]: «Immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore nec est praeterita, quasi iam non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit»: ergo tota est praesens, ergo permanens, non succedens.

2. Item, Augustinus undecimo Confessionum[^2]: «Si praesens tempus staret et non transiret in praeteritum, esset aeternitas»; sed non propter hoc esset aeternitas increata: ergo esset aeternitas creata; et hoc est aevum: ergo aevum habet *nunc* non transiens: ergo etc.

3. Item, Philosophus[^3]: «In perpetuis non differt *esse* et *posse*»: ergo potentia est in toto suo actu, ergo nihil exspectat, ergo totum simul: ergo nulla est ibi successio vel prioritas.

4. Item *ratione*: proprietas debet respondere substantiae, ergo substantiae simplicis mensura debet esse simplex; sed substantia spiritualis est simplex: ergo et eius mensura. Sed eius mensura est aevum: ergo simplex est: ergo non habet prius et posterius.

5. Item, omne successivum reducitur ad permanens, ergo prius et posterius successivum ad prius et posterius permanens[^4]; sed prius et posterius permanens est in sola magnitudine: ergo quod caret priori et posteriori permanente caret et successivo. Sed talis est Angelus: ergo etc.

6. Item, ubi est prius et posterius, ibi necessario cadit aliquid novum, quod de posteriori fit prius, et per hoc lapsus in *praeteritum*, et aliquid novum; sed in perpetuis non est aliqua mutatio[^5]: ergo nec successio.

7. Item, ubi est prius, ibi est aliqua exspectatio respectu eius quod posterius est et nondum habitum est; sed in Beatis perfecte nulla cadit exspectatio, quia evacuatur omnino fides et spes, et habetur omne quod habituri sunt[^6]: ergo nullo modo est ibi prius et posterius.

**Contra:**

1. Hieronymus ad Marcellam[^7]: «Tantum est, qui non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum*»: omnis ergo creatura in sui *esse* habet praeteritionem sive *fuisse* et *fore*: ergo habet in sui *duratione* successionem.

2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio[^8] tractans illud verbum: *Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra*, propter hoc dictum est, non quia post aeternitatem sit aliquid, sed quia Dei aeternitas, quae tota simul est, excedit aeternitatem creaturae, quae non omnino est tota simul; ista est sententia: ergo idem quod prius.

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3. Item, *ratione* videtur: unitas angelica deficit ab unitate divina, ergo simplicitas aeternitatis creatae a simplicitate aeternitatis increatae: si ergo hoc verum est, ergo habet compositionem aliquo modo. Sed compositio in duratione ponit prius et posterius: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur, quia mensura durationis angelicae non est ipse Angelus, immo differt ab Angelo, sicut mensura a mensurato; sed mensura secundum veritatem est in genere quantitatis[^9], et talis est divisibilis, ergo habens partes: ergo etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod est quantitatis *principium* sicut punctus; *contra*: punctus non habet complete rationem mensurae, sed est *principium* mensurae; aevum autem vere et proprie est mensura: ergo non potest esse sicut *principium*.

5. Item, Angeli duratio est infinita: si ergo est tota simul in actu, ergo aliquod creatum est infinitum actu. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

6. Item, in eo quod habet totum esse simul, idem est *fuisse* et *esse* et *futurum esse*; sed quod fuit, impossibile est cogitari non fuisse, si intelligatur fuisse: ergo si in aeviterno idem est *fuisse* et *fore*, ergo impossibile est cogitari non fore. Hoc autem falsum est, quia hoc est proprium solius Dei: ergo etc.

7. Item, si totum *esse* praesens est, ergo non differt *esse* et *fuisse*: ergo quod nunc non est, nunquam fuit, et si fuit, est. Sed Deus non potest facere, quod fuit non fuisse[^10]: ergo non potest facere, aeviternum non esse. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum: ergo etc.

8. Item, si totum esse aeviterni simul est, et tota duratio sine priori et posteriori, ergo non est ibi magis longum et minus longum; ergo anima beati Petri nec prius nec diutius fuit in gloria quam anima beati Francisci. Si ergo hoc manifeste falsum est, patet etc.

### Conclusio

> In aevo est aliqua successio, quae non importat prius et posterius cum variatione et innovatione, ut in tempore, sed tantum durationis extensionem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod aevum est totum simplex, sicut et illud quod mensurat; et *esse* substantiae aeviternae et eius *duratio* est tota simul, non habens successionem prioris et posterioris. Unde dixerunt, aevum non esse proprie quantitatem, sed in genere quantitatis solum esse per reductionem; unde *simplex* est extensione, sed tamen est *quantum* virtute, et adeo quantum, quod sua virtute excedat omne *esse* temporale ad similitudinem aeternitatis increatae. Nam sicut anima simplex est quantum ad quantitatem *molis*, tamen propter suam *virtutem* et simplicitatem est in qualibet parte sui corporis; sic in proposito intelligendum est. — Sed, sicut in opponendo tactum est, si quis ponat aevum omnino simplex, ponet ex hoc non esse veram mensuram; ponet etiam durationem creatam actu infinitam; ponet etiam durationem creatam adeo entem[^11], quod nec Deus destruere, nec intellectus possit cogitare non esse; quae omnia, cum non sint intelligibilia, faciunt, praedictam positionem nec esse rationabilem nec intelligibilem.

Et ideo, cum Sanctorum auctoritates aliud videantur sonare, est aliorum positio probabilior et intelligibilior, quod in aevo est ponere *prius* et *posterius*, et est ponere aliquam *successionem*, aliam tamen successionem quam in tempore. In tempore enim est *successio* cum variatione, et *prius et posterius* cum inveteratione et renovatione. In aevo vero est *prius et posterius*, quod dicit durationis extensionem, quod tamen nullam dicit variationem nec innovationem. Et per hanc distinctionem ad omnia obiecta in contrarium facile est solvere, si quis eam intelligat.

Quod si forte quaeratur: *quomodo* potest esse prius et posterius sine novitate circa esse; dicendum, quod sicut videmus, quod aliter egreditur rivulus[^12] a fonte, aliter radius a sole, sic in proposito videmus. Nam rivulus sic egreditur a fonte, quod nova aqua semper exit, non eadem; radius a sole continue egreditur, non quia semper novum aliquid emittatur, sed quia quod emissum est continuatur; unde solis influentia non est aliud quam continuatio dati. Similiter in *motu*, et in *esse* rei *mobilis* aliqua proprietas habita amittitur, vel non habita acquiritur; sed in *esse* rei *aeviternae* quod primo datum est per continuam Dei influentiam *continuatur*. Nulla enim aevi creatura est omnino actus, nec aliqua eius virtus, unde continue indiget divina virtute cooperante. Ideo, etsi *esse* totum habeat, tamen *continuationem esse* non habet totam simul, et ideo est ibi successio sine aliqua innovatione circa *esse* vel proprietatem absolutam; tamen ibi est vera continuatio, respectu cuius creatura habet *esse* quodam modo in potentia, ac per hoc habet successionem.

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Solus igitur Deus, qui est actus purus, est actu infinitus, et totum *esse* et possessionem sui *esse* simul habet[^13]. His visis, satis de facili solvuntur obiecta.

1. 2. Quod enim obiicitur de praeterito et futuro et de transitu, dicendum breviter, quod intelligitur de istis, ut dicunt variationem.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod non differt *esse* et *posse*; dicendum, quod verum est de *posse* et *esse*, quod non differt, id est, quod non distat; motus enim et tempus facit distare; in solo autem aeterno verum est, quod potentia omnino sit actus, non in aliqua creatura[^14].

4. Quod obiicitur, quod substantiae simplicis proprietas non potest esse composita; dicendum, quod verum est, si illa proprietas habeat compositionem partium simul entium[^15]; nunc autem non est sic, immo de aevo nunquam est nisi *nunc*, prius, sicut et de tempore dicitur. Et ita bene potest esse in simplici, ut in composito; unde tantam extensionem habet *duratio* unius grani milii, sicut et unius montis.

5. Quod obiicitur, quod *prius* et *posterius* reducitur ad permanens; dicendum, quod verum est, quod ad permanens reducitur; sed non oportet, quod ad *prius* et *posterius* permanens. Empyreum enim durationem habet aeviternam et aeque simplex est sicut duratio Angeli: ergo *prius* et *posterius* in partibus permanentibus non facit aliquid ad hoc.

6. Quod obiicitur de novo et veteri, iam patet: quia nihil est ibi alterationis, est tamen ibi crementum durationis absque omni alteratione absolutae proprietatis. Verum enim est dicere, quod diutius fuit anima Petri, quam anima Francisci[^16], quando in gloriam introivit, sed non est ita circa Deum; non enim diutius duravit hodie quam ante heri.

7. Quod obiicitur de exspectatione, dicendum, quod, sicut est *successio* non per *novi acquisitionem*, sed per *prius dati continuationem*, ita etiam est *exspectatio* non novi habendi, sed continuationis prius habiti, quod quia iam habent, et certi sunt se habituros, ideo potius dicitur *tentio* et *comprehensio* quam *exspectatio*. Et sic patet illud.

english:
### Question III. *Whether spiritual things have a permanent or a successive measure.*

Thirdly it is asked whether spiritual things have a *permanent* or a *successive* measure. And that [they have] a *permanent* one, lacking before and after, seems true first *by authority*, then *by reason*.

1. And *by authority* thus: Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the City of God*[^1]: «The immortality of the Angels does not pass in time, nor is it past, as though it now were not, nor future, as though it were not yet»: therefore it is wholly present, therefore permanent, not successive.

2. Likewise, Augustine, eleventh book of the *Confessions*[^2]: «If the present time were to stand and not pass into the past, it would be eternity»; but not on that account would it be uncreated eternity: therefore it would be created eternity; and this is the age: therefore the age has a *now* that does not pass: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher[^3]: «In perpetual things *being* and *being able* do not differ»: therefore the potency is in its whole act, therefore it awaits nothing, therefore [it is] all at once: therefore there is no succession or priority there.

4. Likewise *by reason*: a property must correspond to the substance, therefore the measure of a simple substance must be simple; but a spiritual substance is simple: therefore also its measure. But its measure is the age: therefore it is simple: therefore it does not have before and after.

5. Likewise, every successive thing is reduced to a permanent one, therefore the successive before-and-after to a permanent before-and-after[^4]; but the permanent before-and-after is in magnitude alone: therefore what lacks a permanent before-and-after lacks also the successive one. But such is the Angel: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, where there is before and after, there necessarily falls something new, which from being later becomes earlier, and through this a lapse into the *past*, and something new; but in perpetual things there is no change[^5]: therefore neither succession.

7. Likewise, where there is a before, there is some expectation with respect to that which is later and not yet possessed; but in the Blessed no expectation at all falls, because faith and hope are wholly emptied out, and all that they will have is had[^6]: therefore in no way is there before and after there.

**On the contrary:**

1. Jerome to Marcella[^7]: «He alone is, who does not know *to have been* or *to be about to be*»: every creature, therefore, in its own *being* has a pastness, that is, a *having been* and a *going to be*: therefore it has in its own *duration* a succession.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the *Proslogion*[^8], treating that word: *The Lord shall reign forever and beyond*, [says] this is said not because there is something after eternity, but because God's eternity, which is wholly at once, exceeds the eternity of the creature, which is not wholly at once; this is the sense: therefore the same as before.

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3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: angelic unity falls short of the divine unity, therefore the simplicity of created eternity [falls short] of the simplicity of uncreated eternity: if then this is true, then it has composition in some way. But composition in duration posits before and after: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems so, because the measure of angelic duration is not the Angel itself, but rather differs from the Angel, as a measure from the measured; but a measure, in truth, is in the genus of quantity[^9], and such a thing is divisible, therefore having parts: therefore, etc. *If you say* that it is the *principle* of quantity, like a point; *on the contrary*: a point does not have completely the account of a measure, but is the *principle* of a measure; but the age is truly and properly a measure: therefore it cannot be like a *principle*.

5. Likewise, the duration of an Angel is infinite: if then it is wholly at once in act, then some created thing is infinite in act. But this is impossible: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, in that which has its whole being at once, *to have been* and *to be* and *to be about to be* are the same; but what has been, it is impossible to think not to have been, if it is understood to have been: therefore if in the aeviternal *to have been* and *to be going to be* are the same, then it is impossible to think it not going to be. But this is false, because this is proper to God alone: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, if the whole *being* is present, then *being* and *having been* do not differ: therefore what now is not, never was, and if it was, [now] is. But God cannot bring it about that what has been should not have been[^10]: therefore He cannot bring it about that the aeviternal not be. But this is manifestly false: therefore, etc.

8. Likewise, if the whole being of the aeviternal is at once, and the whole duration without before and after, then there is not there a longer and a shorter; therefore the soul of blessed Peter was neither earlier nor longer in glory than the soul of blessed Francis. If, then, this is manifestly false, it is plain, etc.

### Conclusio

> In the age there is some succession, which does not imply before and after with variation and innovation, as in time, but only an extension of duration.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there was a twofold opinion.

For some have said that the age is wholly simple, just as also that which it measures; and the *being* of the aeviternal substance and its *duration* is wholly at once, not having a succession of before and after. Whence they said that the age is not properly a quantity, but is in the genus of quantity only by reduction; whence it is *simple* as to extension, but is nevertheless *quantitative* in power, and so quantitative that by its power it exceeds all temporal *being* in likeness to uncreated eternity. For just as the soul is simple as to the quantity of *mass*, yet on account of its *power* and simplicity is in every part of its body; so it must be understood in the matter at hand. — But, as was touched on in objecting, if anyone posits the age as wholly simple, he will posit from this that it is not a true measure; he will also posit a created duration actually infinite; he will also posit a created duration so much a being[^11] that neither could God destroy it, nor could the intellect think it not to be; all of which, since they are not intelligible, make that aforesaid position to be neither reasonable nor intelligible.

And therefore, since the authorities of the Saints seem to sound otherwise, the position of the others is more probable and more intelligible, that in the age one must posit *before* and *after*, and one must posit some *succession*, yet a succession other than that in time. For in time there is *succession* with variation, and *before and after* with aging and renewal. But in the age there is *before and after*, which states an extension of duration, which nevertheless states no variation nor innovation. And by this distinction it is easy to solve all the objections to the contrary, if one understands it.

But if perchance it be asked: *how* can there be before and after without newness about being; it must be said that, as we see that a brook flows forth from a spring in one way[^12], a ray from the sun in another, so we see in the matter at hand. For the brook flows forth from the spring in such a way that new water always goes out, not the same; the ray flows forth continuously from the sun, not because something new is always emitted, but because what has been emitted is continued; whence the sun's influence is nothing other than the continuation of what is given. Likewise in *motion*, and in the *being* of a *movable* thing, some property possessed is lost, or one not possessed is acquired; but in the *being* of an *aeviternal* thing what was first given is *continued* through God's continual influence. For no creature of the age is wholly act, nor any power of it, whence it continually needs the divine power cooperating. Therefore, even though it has its whole *being*, it nevertheless does not have the *continuation of being* wholly at once, and therefore there is succession there without any innovation about *being* or absolute property; yet there is there a true continuation, with respect to which the creature has *being* in a certain way in potency, and through this it has succession.

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God alone, therefore, who is pure act, is infinite in act, and has the whole *being* and possession of His *being* at once[^13]. These things being seen, the objections are quite easily solved.

1, 2. As to what is objected, then, about the past and the future and about transit, it must be said briefly that these are understood as they state a variation.

3. As to what is objected, that *being* and *being able* do not differ; it must be said that it is true of *being able* and *being* that they do not differ, that is, that they are not apart; for motion and time make [them] apart; but in the eternal alone is it true that the potency is wholly act, not in any creature[^14].

4. As to what is objected, that the property of a simple substance cannot be composite; it must be said that it is true, if that property has a composition of parts existing at once[^15]; but now it is not so, indeed of the age there is never anything but *now*, before, just as is said also of time. And so it can well be in the simple as in the composite; whence the *duration* of a single grain of millet has as great an extension as that of a single mountain.

5. As to what is objected, that *before* and *after* is reduced to a permanent thing; it must be said that it is true that it is reduced to a permanent thing; but it is not necessary that [it be reduced] to a permanent before-and-after. For the empyrean has an aeviternal duration and is equally simple as the duration of an Angel: therefore before and after in permanent parts does nothing toward this.

6. As to what is objected about the new and the old, it is already clear: because there is nothing of alteration there, yet there is there an increment of duration without any alteration of an absolute property. For it is true to say that the soul of Peter was [in glory] longer than the soul of Francis[^16], when it entered into glory, but it is not so with regard to God; for He has not endured longer today than before yesterday.

7. As to what is objected about expectation, it must be said that, just as there is *succession* not through *the acquisition of something new*, but through *the continuation of what was given before*, so too there is *expectation* not of having something new, but of the continuation of what was had before, which, because they already have it, and are certain they will have it, is therefore rather called a *holding* and *comprehension* than an *expectation*. And thus that [objection] is plain.

en: Chapter 13, n. 2.

en: Chapter 11, n. 17.

la: Libr. III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.). — Post primum *ergo* cod. N supplet *in perpetuis*, dein cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt *toto*; Vat. ponit *exspectatur* pro *exspectat* et in fine argumenti adiungit *et posterioritas.*

en: *Physics* III, text 32 (c. 4). — After the first *therefore*, codex N supplies *in perpetual things*, then codex cc and ed. 1 omit *whole*; the Vatican edition puts *is awaited* for *awaits* and at the end of the argument adds *and posteriority.*

la: Aristot., de Praedicam. c. *de Quantitate*, duplicem quantitatem distinguit, scil. permanentem et successivam; prior competit iis, «quae constant ex partibus, quae in eis sunt, positionem habentibus ad se invicem» i. e. quae constant ex partibus simul existentibus v. g. linea, superficies; posterior vero convenit iis, quae constant ex non habentibus positionem, sed magis ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis v. g. tempus. Libr. IV. Phys. text. 99. (c. 11.) dicit, quod prius et posterius in loco, qui habet positionem, primum sunt, deinde etiam in motu et in tempore.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, the chapter *On Quantity*, distinguishes a twofold quantity, namely permanent and successive; the former belongs to those things «which consist of parts that, being in them, have a position with respect to one another», i.e. which consist of parts existing at once, e.g. a line, a surface; the latter belongs to those which consist of [parts] not having position, but rather an order of priority and posteriority, e.g. time. *Physics* IV, text 99 (c. 11) says that before and after are first in place, which has position, then also in motion and in time.

la: Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 97. seqq. (c. 11.).

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 97 ff. (c. 11).

la: Vide I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.

en: See 1 Cor. 13:10 ff.

la: Verba, quae sequuntur, non sunt Hieronymi, sed Isidori, VII. Etym. c. 1. n. 12. Cfr. de hoc tom. I. pag. 146, nota 4.

en: The words that follow are not Jerome's, but Isidore's, *Etymologies* VII, c. 1, n. 12. Cf. on this vol. I, p. 146, note 4.

la: Cap. 20, ubi tripliciter exponitur, quod Deus sit etiam ultra ea, quae finem non habebunt, scil. quia ipsa sine Dei conservatione esse non possunt, tum quia ipsa cogitari possunt habere finem, tum quia ipsa de sua aeternitate nondum habent quod futurum est, et iam non habent quod est praeteritum, cum Dei et illorum aeternitas sit Deo tota praesens. — Textus s. Scripturae est Exod. 15, 18. — Circa finem argumenti cod. cc et ed. 1 *excedit creaturam* pro *excedit aeternitatem creaturae.*

en: Chapter 20, where it is expounded in three ways that God is even beyond those things which will not have an end, namely because they cannot be without God's conservation, both because they themselves can be thought to have an end, and because they themselves, of their own eternity, do not yet have what is future, and now do not have what is past, since God's eternity and theirs is wholly present to God. — The text of Scripture is Exod. 15:18. — Near the end of the argument codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *exceeds the creature* for *exceeds the eternity of the creature.*

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2. (IX. c. 1.): *Maxime autem mensuram esse cuiusque generis primum et maxime proprie quanti*; hinc enim et ad alia advenit; mensura enim id est, quo quantum cognoscitur. Cfr. q. 1. ad 6.

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 2 (IX, c. 1): *But that the measure is most of all the first of each genus and most properly of the quantitative*; for hence it comes also to the others; for a measure is that by which the quantitative is known. Cf. q. 1, ad 6.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3.

la: Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. *existentem*; Vat. insuper *a Deo* pro *adeo.*

en: Codex cc, ed. 1, and the Vatican edition [read] *existing*; the Vatican edition moreover [reads] *by God* for *so much*.

la: Multi codd. cum Vat. *fluvius* contra codd. A cc et ed. 1. Mox non pauci codd. *videndum*, aliqui *vide*, cod. aa *esse videtur*, cod. cc et ed. 1 *videtur* pro *videmus.*

en: Many codices with the Vatican edition [read] *river* against codices A cc and ed. 1. Soon after, not a few codices [read] *it must be seen*, some *see*, codex aa *it seems to be*, codex cc and ed. 1 *it seems* for *we see.*

la: Alluditur ad illam Boethii, V. de Consol. prosa 6, definitionem: *Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.* — Vat. *posse* pro *possessionem.*

en: Allusion is made to that definition of Boethius, *On Consolation* V, prose 6: *Eternity is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life.* — The Vatican edition [reads] *to be able* for *possession.*

la: Aliis verbis: *In perpetuis non differt esse et posse* i. e. potentia non distat ab actu sive non praecedit actum, sed simul sunt; non autem intelligitur ita, quod in substantiis spiritualibus, excepto Deo, non differant actus et potentia, immo vere differunt; sed potentia non praecedit actum sicut in istis inferioribus, quae motui et tempori subiiciuntur. Dictio «tempus facit distare» est ex Aristotele. Cfr. infra pag. 66, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 *quod verum est de posse ad esse* pro *quod verum est de posse et esse.*

en: In other words: *In perpetual things being and being able do not differ*, i.e. potency is not apart from act, or does not precede act, but they are at once; it is not, however, understood thus, that in spiritual substances, except God, act and potency do not differ — indeed they truly differ; but potency does not precede act as in these lower things, which are subject to motion and time. The phrase «time makes [them] apart» is from Aristotle. Cf. below, p. 66, note 2. — Somewhat above, not a few codices with editions 1, 3, 4 [read] *that it is true of being able toward being* for *that it is true of being able and being.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *in aevo*; cod. aa *hic.* Immediate ante Vat. *existentium* pro *entium.* Paulo inferius post *potest esse* in cod. cc et ed. 1 suppletur *duratio aevi.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *in the age*; codex aa *here.* Immediately before, the Vatican edition [reads] *existing* for *being [parts].* A little below, after *can be*, in codex cc and ed. 1 there is supplied *the duration of the age.*

la: Fide plurium codd. ut A K L O V Z bb adiecimus *anima Francisci*, quae verba etiam in ult. fundam. inveniuntur. Paulo superius cod. aa *Unde nunc* pro *Verum enim*, qui dein post *Petri* bene adiungit *in gloria.*

en: On the faith of several codices, as A K L O V Z bb, we have added *the soul of Francis*, which words are also found in the last fundamentum. A little above, codex aa [reads] *Whence now* for *For it is true*, which then, after *Peter*, well adds *in glory.* ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio etiam sub his terminis proponitur: utrum aevum sit mensura simplex sive indivisibilis. S. Thom. in solutione eius cum communiore sententia contra S. Bonaventuram tenet, quod, sicut essentia et *existentia* Angeli simplex est et tota simul, sic etiam *mensura* ipsius excludat omnem successionem, nisi forte quatenus connotat coexistentiam ad tempus. — Sententia S. Bonaventurae duabus innititur distinctionibus. 1. Aliter sentiendum est de *esse substantiali* Angeli, aliter de *duratione* eius: illud *esse* in instanti creationis accipit ac indivisibile et totum simul, non autem *durationem* eius, quae, quia creatura continuo dependet a Deo conservante, non est indivisibilis, sed habet aliquam suo modo successionem. 2. Duplex est successio: *propria*, quae competit tempori secundum prius et posterius et habet variationem et renovationem, quia semper aliquid amittitur, et aliquid acquiritur; et *impropria*, quae competit aevo et non importat nisi durationis extensionem sine variatione vel innovatione. Per creationem res proprie *fit* et acquirit *initium* existentiae et durationis; per conservationem vero non *fit*, sed *continuatur in existentia* et acquirit maiorem durationem, quin in *esse* eius fiat innovatio vel additio. Unde aeviternum in instanti suae creationis totum suum *esse substantiale* habuit, sed non totam suam *durationem*, immo non nisi durationis *initium*. — Admissis his distinctionibus, quas contrariae sententiae fautores non approbant, facile intelligitur, in solo Deo idem esse *essentiam, existentiam, durationem*; in omnibus creaturis autem haec tria distinguenda esse.

**II.** Sententiam S. Thomae sequuntur inter antiquos Scholasticos Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth. aliique. — B. Albertus consentit S. Bonaventurae. Richard. a Med. utriusque sententiae argg. ponit et solvit, magis tamen inclinat in sententiam S. Thomae. Aegid. R. in re parum a S. Bonav. discedit. Scotus vero (hic q. 1.) in utramque partem disputat et anceps haeret, tamen, testibus Lycheto pluribusque aliis Scotistis, magis inclinat in sententiam S. Bonaventurae. Idem etiam de Rerum princip. q. 22. n. 8. ait: «Vel forte habet [aevum] aliquam naturam successionis, scil. quae est *esse* et *modus* essendi et durandi illorum substantiarum». Nec inter recentiores desunt viri doctissimi, qui sententiam S. Bonaventurae praeferant, vel valde probabilem censent, ut cl. P. Kleutgen S. I., Philosophie der Vorzeit tom. I. Abhandl. 4. c. 1. § 2, qui ut huius opinionis sequaces laudat Conimbricenses Phys. IV. c. 14. q. 2, et P. Silv. Maurum, Quaest. philos. tom. II. q. 32.

**III.** Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3. — Scot., locc. citt. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 13. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question is also proposed under these terms: whether the age is a simple or indivisible measure. St. Thomas, in his solution of it, holds, with the more common opinion, against St. Bonaventure, that, just as the essence and *existence* of the Angel is simple and wholly at once, so too its *measure* excludes all succession, except perhaps insofar as it connotes a coexistence with time. — The opinion of St. Bonaventure rests on two distinctions. 1. One must judge otherwise about the *substantial being* of the Angel, otherwise about its *duration*: that *being* it receives in the instant of creation as indivisible and wholly at once, but not its *duration*, which, because the creature continuously depends on God conserving [it], is not indivisible, but has in its own mode some succession. 2. Succession is twofold: *proper*, which belongs to time according to before and after and has variation and renewal, because something is always lost and something acquired; and *improper*, which belongs to the age and implies only an extension of duration without variation or innovation. By creation a thing properly *comes to be* and acquires the *beginning* of existence and duration; but by conservation it does not *come to be*, but is *continued in existence* and acquires a greater duration, without any innovation or addition occurring in its *being*. Whence the aeviternal in the instant of its creation had its whole *substantial being*, but not its whole *duration*, indeed nothing but the *beginning* of duration. — These distinctions being admitted (which the supporters of the contrary opinion do not approve), it is easily understood that in God alone *essence, existence, duration* are the same; but in all creatures these three are to be distinguished.

**II.** The opinion of St. Thomas is followed, among the ancient Scholastics, by Alexander of Hales, Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Dionysius the Carthusian, and others. — Bl. Albert agrees with St. Bonaventure. Richard of Middleton sets out and solves the arguments of both opinions, yet inclines more to the opinion of St. Thomas. Giles of Rome departs little in substance from St. Bonaventure. But Scotus (here q. 1) disputes on both sides and remains in doubt, yet, on the testimony of Lychetus and several other Scotists, inclines more to the opinion of St. Bonaventure. The same [Scotus] also says, *On the Principle of Things*, q. 22, n. 8: «Or perhaps [the age] has some nature of succession, namely that which is the *being* and the *mode* of being and of enduring of those substances». Nor among more recent [writers] are there lacking most learned men who prefer the opinion of St. Bonaventure, or judge it very probable, as the distinguished P. Kleutgen S.J., *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, vol. I, Treatise 4, c. 1, § 2, who as followers of this opinion cites the Conimbricenses, *Physics* IV, c. 14, q. 2, and P. Silvester Maurus, *Quaestiones philosophicae*, vol. II, q. 32.

**III.** Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — Scotus, locc. citt. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 10, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 13. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 61-64 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {61,62,63}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 4913–5097), per the Vol II override. Each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands. The 450 dpi crops were clean throughout — no `[?]` flags. **The colcrop L/R splitter clips the far-left of R-column footer text** (a confirmed recurring artifact, also hit in q2 `[^9]`): p.61 R-col footer notes 7–8 left edges were recovered from the cascade IA OCR (`awk` on the raw footer block), which preserves full-width text; both verified consistent (`Verba, quae sequuntur, non sunt Hieronymi, sed Isidori…`; `Cap. 20, ubi tripliciter exponitur…`).

**Page span / structure.** q3 body occupies printed pp. 61–63; the Scholion (I–III, small two-column type) sits at the foot of p.63 only and ends there (`…Biel, hic q. 1.`) — it does **not** spill to p.64 (q3's body ended high enough on p.63 to fit the whole scholion). q3 opens in normal type at the top of **p.61**, beneath q2's small-type scholion tail (the q2→q3 boundary noted in `d2-p1-a1-q2`). 7 *videtur* arguments (auctoritate 1–3, ratione 4–7) + 8 *Contra* arguments; a two-opinion Respondeo (aevum wholly simple — rejected; vs. aevum admits an *improper* succession / *extension of duration* — accepted), a *Corollarium* with the brook/ray *exemplum*, then seven numbered *Solutio oppositorum* replies (replies 1 and 2 merged: «1. 2. Quod enim obiicitur…»). **The Scholion has no numbered apparatus** (all references inline). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Ad oppositum`, `Fundamenta`, `Opinio 1/2`, `Reprobatur`, `Opinio 2 probabilior`, `Conclusio 1/2/3/4`, `Corollarium`, `Exemplum`, `Solutio oppositorum`, `Notandum`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–16:
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- **p. 62** footer: L col note 1 → `[^9]`, **spans the L→R column footer** (begins L col `Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2…`, runs over into R col `…quanti; hinc enim et ad alia advenit…`); R col notes 2–4 → `[^10]`–`[^12]`. (4 notes total; the p.61-note-8 runover sits above note 1.)
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`[^15]` is anchored at *…compositionem partium simul entium* (not at the following *nunc*): the note's own phrase «Immediate ante Vat. *existentium* pro *entium*» fixes the marker immediately after *entium* — content-determined, overriding the band-edge superscript read.

**Cross-chunk footer boundary (CLEAN — no split).** Same pattern as q1→q2 and q2→q3: q3's last apparatus page is p.63, fully captured here; q3's Scholion carries no apparatus and ends on p.63. p.64 opens with the **ARTICULUS II** opener (`De mensura angelicae naturae in comparatione ad mensuram rei corporalis… De qua tria quaeruntur`, raw 5098+), which folds into the next chunk `d2-p1-a2-q1` (Vol II convention) — p.64's footer apparatus is a2's, not q3's. No backfill in either direction; the committed `d2-p1-a1-q2` (p.58 footer was q2's) is untouched.

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No `[?]` flags. One low-confidence item to eyes-on at 600 dpi with the d.1–d.10 batch: `[^7]` page reference rendered `tom. I. pag. 446` per the 450 dpi p.61 R-col crop; the cascade IA OCR rendered the figure ambiguously (`pag. UO`) — confirm 446 vs 440 at 600 dpi (non-blocking; the citation target — Isidore vs. Jerome attribution — is unaffected). **RESOLVED 2026-05-22** — 600 dpi p.61 R footer note 7 reads `tom. I. pag. 146` (neither 446 nor 440); corrected.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De mensura angelicae naturae in comparatione ad mensuram rei corporalis.*

Consequenter quaeritur de mensura substantiae spiritualis in comparatione ad mensuram rei corporalis. De qua tria quaeruntur.

Primum est, utrum aevum praecedat tempus aliquo prioritatis genere.

Secundum, utrum inter aevum et tempus cadat mensura mediae naturae.

Tertio, utrum res spirituales et corporales, sive aeviternae et temporales fuerint simul productae.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum aevum praecedat aliquo modo tempus.*

Circa primum sic. Quod aevum sit prius tempore, ostenditur:

1. Per illud Boethii de Consolatione[^1] loquentis ad Deum:

> *Qui tempus ab aevo*
> *Ire iubes;*

sed tempus ire ab aevo non potest intelligi nisi vel ratione causalitatis, vel durationis, vel excellentiae, quia deficit ab aevo: ergo videtur omnino intelligendum, quod aevum sit tempore prius.

2. Item, omnis motus et mutatio ad immobile reducitur tanquam ad prius[^2]: ergo et mensura mobilis ad mensuram rei immobilis: ergo et tempus ad aevum tanquam ad prius. *Prima* consequentia manifeste est vera, quia omne fluxibile ad stans tanquam ad prius reducitur. Et *secunda* consequentia tenet secundum rationem proportionis, quia, sicut se habet mensuratum ad mensuratum, sic mensura ad mensuram: ergo etc.

3. Item, a priori et posteriori in *magnitudine* causatur prius et posterius in *motu*, et a priori et posteriori in *motu* causatur prius et posterius in *tempore*[^3]: ergo per naturam prior est magnitudo et magnitudinis *esse*, quam sit *esse* temporis; et substantiae primi corporis mensuratur aevo, motus vero tempore: ergo aevum prius est tempore.

4. Item, aevum fuit a principio creaturae, scilicet et Angeli; sed tempus coepit cum motu primi mobilis, qui incepit, ut dicitur, die quarto, vel saltem ante secundum diem non potuit incipere[^4]: ergo aevum duratione praecedit tempus.

**Contra:**

1. Beda[^5] dicit, quod quatuor fuerunt primo creata, et inter illa enumerat *tempus*; *aevum* autem non enumeratur inter primo creata; et est creatum: ergo posterius.

2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore[^6] dicit et accipit ab Augustino, quod omne quod coepit, coepit ex tempore; sed aevum coepit: ergo coepit ex tempore. Sed quod incipit ex tempore non antecedit tempus, sed potius consequitur vel concomitatur: ergo aevum non potest esse ante tempus.

3. Item, tempus est mensura mutationis; sed aevum est mensura stabilis et fixi: ergo cum ante *esse creatum* praecedat ipsa creatio, quae est mutatio, ergo tempus est ante aevum.

4. Item, prius est[^7] quod imperfectum est, deinde quod perfectum; sed tempus est mensura secundum esse imperfectum, quod est esse in potentia, aevum vero secundum esse actuale et completum: ergo tempus per naturam est ante aevum. — Quaeritur igitur de *ordine* temporis ad aevum, et e converso.

### Conclusio

> Distincto quadruplici sensu termini tempus, asseritur, quod in tertio sensu aevum et tempus sunt simul duratione, sed aevum est prius dignitate; in quarto sensu aevum praecedit tempus et duratione et dignitate.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *tempus* accipi consuevit quadrupliciter in scripturis Sanctorum, scilicet *communissime*, *communiter*, *proprie* et *magis proprie*. *Communissime* tempus dicit mensuram cuiuslibet durationis creatae; per quem modum accipitur a Beda, cum dicit, quod quatuor fuerunt primo creata, inter quae enumerat tempus. — *Communiter*; sic dicit mensuram mutationis cuiuscumque, sive illius quae est de *non-esse* in *esse*, sive alterius quae est de *uno esse* in *aliud esse*; et sic

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accipitur illud quod dicit Richardus, quod omne quod coepit, ex tempore coepit; et habetur in Glossa, in principio Genesis[^8]: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram*, scilicet temporis. — Tertio modo accipitur *proprie*; et sic dicit mensuram variationis successivae, sive sit successiva successione regulari et continua, sive non; et sic dicit Augustinus ad Orosium[^9]: «Affectiones variae Angelorum mensurantur tempore et omnis variatio rerum». — Quarto modo accipitur *magis proprie*; et sic dicitur mensura motus sive variationis successivae et continuae et regulatae secundum regulam motus octavae sphaerae; et sic consuevit accipi a Philosopho[^10]: sed ista est coarctata temporis acceptio.

Cum igitur quaeritur de *ordine*, dicendum, quod si tempus accipiatur primo modo, sic includit *aevum*; et sic temporis ad aevum nullus est ordo; si autem secundo modo, sic tempus praecedit aevum secundum rationem intelligendi, sicut creatio *esse* creatum. Si autem tertio modo, aevum et tempus simul sunt *duratione*, sed aevum prius est *dignitate*. Si autem quarto modo, sic aevum praecedit tempus et *duratione* et *dignitate*. — Ex his patet quaestio principalis, et obiectiones adductae pro magna parte.

Quod enim ostenditur, quod aevum praecedit tempus; intelligitur vel tertio modo, et ita praecedit dignitate; vel quarto modo, et ita duratione.

1. Quod tamen ostenditur, quod praecedat causalitate; dicendum, quod illud non oportet; neutra harum mensurarum est ab alia[^11], sed a Deo producente utrumque indivisibile, scilicet *nunc* aevi et *nunc* temporis. Unde quod dicitur, quod tempus exit ab aevo, hoc dicitur, quia deficit ab illo et defluit continua deperditione; sed in aevo est fixio sine deperditione et novi acquisitione.

2. Quod obiicitur de reductione ad immobile, dicendum, quod verum est ex parte motoris, et illum non oportet esse creatum, et similiter nec mensuram oportet esse creatam: et ideo non oportet, tempus reduci ad aevum sicut ad prius.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de priori et posteriori magnitudinis et motus et temporis, dicendum, quod non causatur a priori et posteriori in *magnitudine* prius et posterius in *motu* vel tempore, nisi secundum quod magnitudo illa est mobilis; et sic habet mensurari per *nunc* temporis, non aevi; nam sicut *tempus* mensurat motum, sic *nunc temporis* mensurat ipsum mobile in quantum mobile.

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur, patet, quod[^12] procedit de quarta acceptione temporis.

Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de tempore secundum primam acceptionem vel secundam, ut patet aspicienti, excepta ultima, quae accipitur a comparatione imperfecti ad perfectum. Ad quam respondendum: quod imperfectum praecedit perfectum, verum est, ubi[^13] sunt circa idem; sed circa diversa est e converso. Et ideo potius potest argui oppositum quam propositum per illud medium.

english:
### Article II. *On the measure of the angelic nature in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing.*

Consequently it is asked about the measure of a spiritual substance in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing. Concerning which three things are asked.

The first is, whether the age precedes time by any genus of priority.

The second, whether between the age and time there falls a measure of a middle nature.

The third, whether spiritual and corporeal things, that is, aeviternal and temporal, were produced simultaneously.

### Question I. *Whether the age in any way precedes time.*

Concerning the first, thus. That the age is prior to time is shown:

1. Through that [verse] of Boethius, *On Consolation*[^1], speaking to God:

> *You who bid time*
> *go forth from the age;*

but time's going forth from the age cannot be understood except either by reason of causality, or of duration, or of excellence, because it falls short of the age: therefore it seems altogether to be understood that the age is prior to time.

2. Likewise, every motion and change is reduced to the immobile as to something prior[^2]: therefore also the measure of the movable to the measure of the immobile thing: therefore also time to the age as to something prior. The *first* consequence is manifestly true, because everything flowing is reduced to the standing as to something prior. And the *second* consequence holds by the account of proportion, because, as the measured stands to the measured, so the measure to the measure: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, from before and after in *magnitude* is caused before and after in *motion*, and from before and after in *motion* is caused before and after in *time*[^3]: therefore by nature magnitude and the *being* of magnitude is prior to the *being* of time; and the substance of the first body is measured by the age, but its motion by time: therefore the age is prior to time.

4. Likewise, the age was from the beginning of the creature, namely also of the Angel; but time began with the motion of the first movable, which began, as is said, on the fourth day, or at least could not begin before the second day[^4]: therefore the age precedes time in duration.

**On the contrary:**

1. Bede[^5] says that four things were created first, and among them he enumerates *time*; but *the age* is not enumerated among the things created first; and it is created: therefore [it is] later.

2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor[^6] says, and takes it from Augustine, that everything that began, began from time; but the age began: therefore it began from time. But what begins from time does not antecede time, but rather follows or accompanies [it]: therefore the age cannot be before time.

3. Likewise, time is the measure of change; but the age is the measure of the stable and fixed: therefore, since before *created being* there precedes creation itself, which is a change, therefore time is before the age.

4. Likewise, that which is imperfect is prior[^7], then that which is perfect; but time is a measure according to imperfect being, which is being in potency, but the age according to actual and complete being: therefore time is by nature before the age. — It is asked, therefore, about the *order* of time to the age, and conversely.

### Conclusio

> The fourfold sense of the term *time* being distinguished, it is asserted that in the third sense the age and time are simultaneous in duration, but the age is prior in dignity; in the fourth sense the age precedes time both in duration and in dignity.

**I respond:** It must be said that *time* has been customarily taken in four ways in the writings of the Saints, namely *most commonly*, *commonly*, *properly*, and *more properly*. *Most commonly* time states the measure of any created duration; in which mode it is taken by Bede, when he says that four things were created first, among which he enumerates time. — *Commonly*; thus it states the measure of any change whatever, whether of that which is from *non-being* into *being*, or of another which is from *one being* into *another being*; and thus

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is taken that which Richard says, that everything that began, began from time; and it is had in the Gloss, at the beginning of Genesis[^8]: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, namely [in the beginning] of time. — In the third mode it is taken *properly*; and thus it states the measure of a successive variation, whether it be successive by a regular and continuous succession or not; and thus Augustine says, to Orosius[^9]: «The varied affections of the Angels are measured by time, and every variation of things». — In the fourth mode it is taken *more properly*; and thus it is called the measure of motion or of a successive and continuous variation regulated according to the rule of the motion of the eighth sphere; and thus it has been customarily taken by the Philosopher[^10]: but this is the restricted acceptation of time.

When, therefore, it is asked about the *order*, it must be said that if time is taken in the first mode, then it includes *the age*; and so there is no order of time to the age; but if in the second mode, then time precedes the age according to the manner of understanding, as creation [precedes] *created being*. But if in the third mode, the age and time are simultaneous in *duration*, but the age is prior in *dignity*. But if in the fourth mode, then the age precedes time both in *duration* and in *dignity*. — From these things the principal question is plain, and the objections adduced for the most part.

For what is shown, that the age precedes time, is understood either in the third mode, and so it precedes in dignity; or in the fourth mode, and so in duration.

1. As to what is nevertheless shown, that it precedes by causality; it must be said that this is not necessary; neither of these measures is from the other[^11], but from God producing each indivisible, namely the *now* of the age and the *now* of time. Whence what is said, that time goes forth from the age, is said because it falls short of it and flows away by continual loss; but in the age there is a fixity without loss and without acquisition of anything new.

2. As to what is objected about reduction to the immobile, it must be said that it is true on the side of the mover, and that [mover] need not be created, and likewise neither need the measure be created: and therefore it is not necessary that time be reduced to the age as to something prior.

3. As to that which is objected about the before and after of magnitude and of motion and of time, it must be said that before and after in *motion* or time is not caused from before and after in *magnitude*, except insofar as that magnitude is movable; and so it has to be measured by the *now* of time, not of the age; for as *time* measures motion, so the *now of time* measures the movable itself insofar as it is movable.

4. As to what is objected last, it is plain that it[^12] proceeds from the fourth acceptation of time.

But the reasons to the contrary proceed concerning time according to the first acceptation or the second, as is plain to one looking, except the last, which is taken from the comparison of the imperfect to the perfect. To which it must be responded: that the imperfect precedes the perfect is true where[^13] they are about the same thing; but about diverse things it is the reverse. And therefore the opposite can rather be argued than the proposition by that middle term.

la: Libr. III. Metro 9.

en: Book III, metre 9.

la: Cfr. tom. I. pag. 78, nota 2. et pag. 157, nota 11.

en: Cf. vol. I, p. 78, note 2, and p. 157, note 11.

la: Vide supra pag. 61, nota 4.

en: See above, p. 61, note 4.

la: Ita cod. aa, cuius lectio firmatur plurimis aliis codd. qui habent tantummodo *potuit*; Vat. et ed. 1 *incepit.* Cod. Q post *vel saltem* interserit *in die secundo, quia.*

en: Thus codex aa, whose reading is confirmed by very many other codices which have only *could*; the Vatican edition and ed. 1 [read] *began.* Codex Q after *or at least* inserts *on the second day, because.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 55, nota 8.

en: Cf. above, p. 55, note 8.

la: Libr. I. de Trin. c. 6: *Omne quod est vel esse potest, aut ab aeterno habet esse aut esse coepit ex tempore.* Ibid. libr. II. c. 9: *Omne itaque creatum ex tempore esse coepit.* — Quod spectat ad Augustinum cfr. de Gen. ad lit. imperf. libr. c. 3. n. 7. seq.; V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 12, c. 19. n. 38; I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2. n. 3. seq.; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 6.

en: Book I, *On the Trinity*, c. 6: *Everything that is or can be either has being from eternity or began to be from time.* Ibid., book II, c. 9: *And so everything created began to be from time.* — As regards Augustine, cf. *On Genesis to the Letter, Unfinished Book*, c. 3, n. 7 f.; V *On Genesis to the Letter*, c. 5, n. 12, c. 19, n. 38; I *On Genesis against the Manichaeans*, c. 2, n. 3 f.; XI *On the City of God*, c. 6.

la: In cod. aa *prius est secundum naturam.*

en: In codex aa, *that which is imperfect is prior by nature.*

la: Cap. 1, 1. — Glossa interlinearis: *In principio temporis* vel ante cetera, vel in Filio suo.

en: Chapter 1, [verse] 1. — Interlinear Gloss: *In the beginning of time*, or before [all] the rest, or in His Son.

la: Quaest. 41. et 42, sententialiter. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. argum. 1. ad opp.

en: Questions 41 and 42, in substance. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, argument 1 to the contrary.

la: Libr. IV. Phys. text. 133. (c. 14.). — Paulo superius cod. T *secundum regulationem* pro *secundum regulam.*

en: *Physics* IV, text 133 (c. 14). — A little above, codex T [reads] *according to the regulation* for *according to the rule.*

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 perperam *ab anima*, qui et paulo inferius cum pluribus aliis mss. pro *quod tempus exit* ponit *quod tempus it*, quod verbis Boethii respondet.

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 wrongly [read] *from the soul*; the same, a little below, with several other manuscripts, for *that time goes forth* puts *that time goes*, which corresponds to the words of Boethius.

la: Codd. aa bb *quia.*

en: Codices aa bb [read] *because* (*quia*).

la: Cod. cc et ed. 1 *ut.*

en: Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] *as* (*ut*). ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quadruplex temporis distinctio sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. § 1, et fere eisdem verbis repetitur a Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, et quando agit de hac ipsa quaest. ibid. a. 3.). Differentia inter tempus 3. et 4. modo sumtum a Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) ita explicatur: «Tempus dupliciter potest accipi, scil. *communiter* pro quacumque mensura *esse* existentis in variatione [sive sit successionis continuae, sive non], et *proprie*, scil. secundum quod est *continuatio* motus ab anima numerata, qua, mediante motu, cuius est passio, mensurat anima durationes motuum aliorum» etc. (cfr. Schol. ad a. 1. q. 1.). Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) de hac quaest. refert tantum verba Petri a Tar.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The fourfold distinction of time is taken from Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, § 1, and is repeated in nearly the same words by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, and where he treats this very question, ibid. a. 3). The difference between time taken in the 3rd and 4th mode is explained thus by Richard of Middleton (here a. 2, q. 2): «Time can be taken in two ways, namely *commonly*, for any measure of the *being* of what exists in variation [whether it be of continuous succession or not], and *properly*, namely according as it is the *continuation* of motion numbered by the soul, by which, through the mediation of motion, of which it is a property, the soul measures the durations of other motions» etc. (cf. the Scholion on a. 1, q. 1). Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2) of this question reports only the words of Peter of Tarentaise.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 64-65 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {64,65}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 5098–5212), per the Vol II override. Each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands. The 450 dpi crops were clean throughout — no `[?]` flags. The colcrop L/R splitter clips the far-left of R-column footer text (confirmed recurring artifact): p.65 R-col footer note 4 continuation left edge (`…ferius cum pluribus aliis mss. pro quod tempus exit…`) was recovered from the cascade IA raw OCR.

**Page span / structure.** This chunk holds the **ARTICULUS II opener + its 3-question TRACTATIO** (folded in per the Vol II convention — no standalone `a2-divisio` chunk) **+ QUAESTIO I** (*Utrum aevum praecedat aliquo modo tempus*) + **Scholion I** (a single paragraph — no II/III). It opens in normal type at the top of **p.64** (q3's scholion ended on p.63 and did not spill — the q3→a2 boundary noted in `d2-p1-a1-q3`; p.64 footer is a2's). Body occupies pp. 64–65; the Scholion sits in small two-column type at the foot of p.65. 4 *videtur* (pro parte affirmativa) + 4 *Contra* (pro parte negativa) arguments, plus the *quaestio connexa* on the order of time/age; a Respondeo built on the **fourfold sense of *tempus*** (communissime / communiter / proprie / magis proprie) which is then applied to resolve the order question and the objections (replies to the affirmative args 1–4, then a blanket reply to the negative args). **The Scholion has no numbered apparatus** (all references inline). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Argg. pro parte affirmativa`, `Pro parte negativa`, `Quaestio connexa`, `Quadrupliciter tempus sumitur`, `Ad quaest. connexam`, `ad 1. 2.`, `Conclusio 3/4`, `Nota`, `ad argg. pro parte affirmativa`, `Ad argg. pro parte negativa`, `Ad 4.`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–13:
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- **p. 65** footer: L col notes 1–4 → `[^8]`–`[^11]`; note 4 (`[^11]`) **spans the L→R column footer** (begins L col `Cod. cc et ed. 1 perperam ab anima…`, runs over into R col `…ferius cum pluribus aliis mss. pro quod tempus exit…`); R col notes 5–6 → `[^12]`–`[^13]`. (a2-q1 takes p.65 notes 1–6 only.)

**Cross-chunk footer split (p.65 — a2-q1 ↔ a2-q2).** The first cross-chunk footer split of d.2 pars 1: unlike q1–q3 (whose scholia tail the chunk with no apparatus, giving clean boundaries), here a2-q1's Scholion is a single short paragraph and **a2-q2 (`QUAESTIO II`, *Utrum inter tempus et aevum sit aliqua mensura media*, raw 5213+) begins in normal type on the same printed page p.65, with its own footer apparatus.** p.65's footer is therefore split by body anchor: **notes 1–6 anchor a2-q1's body (taken here, → `[^8]`–`[^13]`); note 7 onward (`Prop. 31. — In hoc verbo plures codd. ut A V Z…`, anchoring a2-q2's `libro de Causis⁷` etc.) belong to the next chunk `d2-p1-a2-q2`** — do NOT place them here; the next session must start a2-q2's apparatus from p.65 footer note 7 by body anchor. The q3→a2-q1 side is clean (p.64 footer fully a2-q1's; committed `d2-p1-a1-q3` untouched).

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No `[?]` flags; the 450 dpi crops were clean and the one colcrop-clipped R-col footer continuation (p.65 n.4) was recovered from the cascade raw OCR and is consistent.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum inter tempus et aevum sit aliqua mensura media.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum inter tempus et aevum sit aliqua mensura media. Et quod non, videtur:

1. Primo per Philosophum, qui dividit substantias mensuratas in libro de Causis[^1] sic, quod «inter substantiam, cuius substantia et actio est in momento aeternitatis, et substantiam, cuius substantia et actio est in momento temporis, est substantia media, cuius substantia est in momento aeternitatis, et actio in momento temporis». Si ergo omnis substantia creata ad aliquam istarum habet reduci; et ad has mensurandas sufficiunt tempus et aevum: ergo etc.

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2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus[^2]: «Aevi proprietas est sine alteratione et secundum totum metiri; temporis vero quod in alteratione aliter et aliter se habens; media vero entium, quae illinc quidem aevo, illinc tempore participant». Ergo omnia quae sunt, totaliter aevo, vel totaliter tempore, vel partim aevo et partim tempore mensurantur: ergo non est tertia mensura alia ab his.

3. Item, omne creatum aut est stabile et incorruptibile, aut variabile et corruptibile; sed primum mensuratur aevo, et secundum tempore: ergo nihil est medium inter aevum et tempus.

4. Item, *esse* omnis creati aut est *terminabile* aut *interminabile*. Si est *terminabile*, sic mensuratur tempore, quod est principium corruptionis, quia facit distare quod est[^3]. Si vero *interminabile*, sic aevo: ergo non videtur, quod sit aliquod tertium mensurans praeter haec duo.

**Contra:**

1. Ante quartum diem non erat tempus, quia dicitur in factione luminarium: *Erunt in signa et tempora et dies et annos*[^4]; et constat, quod non solum erat aevum, cum essent aliqua corporalia, ut herbae et arbusta: ergo erat alia mensura: ergo etc.

2. Item, post diem iudicii non erit tempus, secundum quod iurat Angelus in Apocalypsi[^5]; tamen erit successio et variatio in tormentis, quae non poterit aevo mensurari: ergo necesse est mensuram tertiam ab his ponere.

3. Item, in affectionibus Angelorum est intensio et variatio, et ipsi sunt supra tempus, sicut dicitur in libro de Causis[^6]: ergo mensura illa affectionum est supra tempus; sed non potest esse aevum, cum in aevo non cadat variatio: ergo oportet, quod sit alia mensura.

4. Item, Angelus cum convertitur ad Deum, elevatur supra tempus: ergo illa conversio, et illud quod in illa conversione accipit[^7], supra tempus est; et mensura supra tempus debet mensurari; sed Angelus ibi aliquid cognoscit quod potest desinere cogitare: saltem ergo illud non potest mensurari aevo, quod est mensura rei interminabilis, nec tempore: ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Si tempus accipitur proprie, tunc inter aevum et tempus non est medium re, sed solum ratione differens; si autem magis proprie, tunc est media mensura differens, ab antiquis vocata saeculum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod secundum quod tempus dividitur contra aevum, in duabus scilicet acceptionibus ultimis prius positis[^8], dupliciter potest accipi, aut scilicet prout dicit mensuram *cuiuslibet* durationis variae sive variationis successive; et sic inter aevum et tempus non est medium *re*, sed solum *ratione*; non, inquam, est medium differens ab utroque in genere *mensurae*, sed medium in genere *mensuratorum*, participans utrumque, ut est illa substantia, quae est in confinio aeternitatis et temporis. — Et sic procedunt omnes rationes ad primam partem, ut patet aspicienti de facili.

Aliter vero accipitur tempus prout est mensura variationis, in qua est successio habens *continuationem* et *regulationem* a motu orbis primi; et haec mensura habet finem et desinet esse. Et inter hanc et aevum est ponere mediam mensuram, in qua est *variatio*, nec oportet quod sit *desitio*, vel primi motus *regulatio*; cuiusmodi fuit in triduo conditionis rerum, et qualis erit in inferno post diem extremum. Et haec ab antiquis doctoribus appellata est *saeculum*[^9]. — Et hoc concludunt rationes ad oppositum; et sic patet totum.

<!-- page 67 -->

english:
### Question II. *Whether between time and the age there is any middle measure.*

Secondly it is asked whether between time and the age there is any middle measure. And that there is not seems true:

1. First, through the Philosopher, who divides measured substances, in the book *de Causis*[^1], thus, that «between a substance whose substance and action is in the moment of eternity, and a substance whose substance and action is in the moment of time, there is a middle substance, whose substance is in the moment of eternity, and whose action [is] in the moment of time». If, then, every created substance has to be reduced to one of these; and to measure these, time and the age suffice: therefore, etc.

<!-- page 66 -->

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so through Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^2]: «It is the property of the age to be measured without alteration and according to the whole; but of time, that which holds itself otherwise and otherwise in alteration; but the middle of beings, which partake on the one side of the age, on the other of time». Therefore all things that are, are measured either wholly by the age, or wholly by time, or partly by the age and partly by time: therefore there is no third measure other than these.

3. Likewise, every created thing is either stable and incorruptible, or variable and corruptible; but the first is measured by the age, and the second by time: therefore there is nothing middle between the age and time.

4. Likewise, the *being* of every created thing is either *terminable* or *interminable*. If it is *terminable*, then it is measured by time, which is the principle of corruption, because it makes apart that which is[^3]. But if *interminable*, then by the age: therefore it does not seem that there is any third [thing] measuring besides these two.

**On the contrary:**

1. Before the fourth day there was no time, because it is said, at the making of the luminaries: *Let them be for signs and for times and for days and years*[^4]; and it is evident that there was not only the age, since there were some corporeal things, like herbs and shrubs: therefore there was another measure: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, after the day of judgment there will be no time, according to what the Angel swears in the Apocalypse[^5]; yet there will be succession and variation in the torments, which cannot be measured by the age: therefore it is necessary to posit a third measure besides these.

3. Likewise, in the affections of the Angels there is intensity and variation, and they themselves are above time, as is said in the book *de Causis*[^6]: therefore that measure of the affections is above time; but it cannot be the age, since in the age no variation falls: therefore it is necessary that there be another measure.

4. Likewise, an Angel, when it is converted to God, is elevated above time: therefore that conversion, and that which it receives in that conversion[^7], is above time; and a thing above time must be measured [by something above time]; but the Angel there knows something which it can cease to think: therefore at least that cannot be measured by the age, which is the measure of an interminable thing, nor by time: therefore, etc.

### Conclusio

> If time is taken properly, then between the age and time there is nothing middle in reality, but [something] differing only in reason; but if [taken] more properly, then there is a middle measure differing [from both], called by the ancients the saeculum.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as time is divided over against the age, namely in the two last acceptations posited before[^8], it can be taken in two ways: either, that is, insofar as it states the measure of *any* varied duration or of successive variation; and thus between the age and time there is nothing middle *in reality*, but only *in reason*; not, I say, is there something middle differing from both in the genus of *measure*, but [something] middle in the genus of *the measured*, partaking of both, as is that substance which is in the confine of eternity and of time. — And thus all the reasons proceed to the first part, as is easily plain to one looking.

But in another way time is taken insofar as it is the measure of variation, in which there is succession having *continuation* and *regulation* from the motion of the first orb; and this measure has an end and will cease to be. And between this and the age one must posit a middle measure, in which there is *variation*, [but] it need not be [that there is] *cessation*, or *regulation* of the first motion; of which kind there was in the three days of the founding of things, and such as there will be in hell after the last day. And this has been called by the ancient doctors the *saeculum*[^9]. — And this the reasons to the contrary conclude; and thus the whole is plain.

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la: Prop. 31. — In hoc verbo plures codd. ut A V Z his pro *substantiam* substituunt *rem*, et dein pro *est substantia media* ponunt *est res media*, quod textui originali concordat.

en: Proposition 31. — At this word several codices, as A V Z, for *substance* substitute *thing*, and then for *is a middle substance* put *is a middle thing*, which agrees with the original text.

la: Cap. 10. § 3: *Proprietas aeterni* [versio in oper. S. Thomae: *aevi*] *est antiquum et immutabile et universale esse* ... [versio ibid.: *et totum secundum totum metiri*]. *Tempus* autem vocant in generatione et corruptione et mutabilibus ... *et aliud aliter habens* ... *media vero existentium et factorum quaecumque, alibi quidem aeternum, alibi vero tempus participant.*

en: Chapter 10, § 3: *The property of the eternal* [the reading in the works of St. Thomas: *of the age*] *is to be ancient and immutable and universal being* ... [the reading ibid.: *and to be measured as a whole according to the whole*]. *Time*, however, they speak of in generation and corruption and in changeable things ... *and [that which] holds itself otherwise [at one time] and otherwise [at another]* ... *but the middle of existing and made things, whatsoever they be, partake on the one side of the eternal, on the other of time.*

la: Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.): *Corruptionis enim causa per se tempus est; numerus enim ipsius motus est* ... *tus autem distare facit quod est* [recentior versio: *expellit quod inest*]. Cfr. ibid. text. 128. (c. 13.).

en: Aristotle, *Physics* IV, text 117 (c. 12): *For time is per se the cause of corruption; for it is the number of motion itself* ... *but it makes apart that which is* [a more recent version: *expels that which is within*]. Cf. ibid., text 128 (c. 13).

la: Gen. 1, 14: *Et sint in signa* etc.

en: Gen. 1:14: *And let them be for signs* etc.

la: Cap. 10, 6: *Et tempus non erit amplius.*

en: Chapter 10:6: *And there shall be time no longer.*

la: Prop. 29: *Omnis substantia simplex est stans per se ipsam*, scilicet per essentiam suam: quod est, quia creata sine tempore, et est in substantialitate sua superior substantiis temporalibus. Et in prop. 30, substantiae sempiternae dicuntur quod sunt supra tempus. — In fine argumenti Vat. *quod sit in alia mensura* pro *quod sit alia mensura.*

en: Proposition 29: *Every simple substance is standing through itself*, namely through its own essence: which is so, because it is created without time, and is in its substantiality superior to temporal substances. And in prop. 30, the sempiternal substances are said to be above time. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition [reads] *that it be in another measure* for *that there be another measure.*

la: Supple: *Angelus.* Vat. cum paucis codd. *accipitur.* Paulo inferius ed. 1 cum pluribus mss., variata interpunctione, *potest desinere cogitare saltem*: ergo.

en: Supply: *the Angel.* The Vatican edition, with a few codices, [reads] *is received.* A little below, ed. 1, with several manuscripts, with the punctuation varied, [reads] *it can cease to think at least*: therefore.

la: In corp. quaest. praeced.

en: In the body of the preceding question.

la: Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 1. inter varias *saeculi* acceptiones hanc affert: «Quin saeculum quoque dicitur non tempus nec temporis pars ulla solis motu ac cursu definita sive ex dierum noctiumque serie conflata, sed ille velut temporalis motus ac spatium, quod una cum iis quae aeterna sunt, protenditur. Quod enim iis quae tempori subsunt, tempus est, hoc perpetuis est saeculum». Et Haymo, in expos. Epist. ad Titum, 1, 2: *Saecularia* dicuntur a *saeculo*, quod in se resolvantur (revolvantur?), Varrone teste. Saecula autem computantur ex eo, quo materies informis per species discreta est, et ex quo Deus dixit: *Fiat lux, et facta est lux* (Gen. 1, 3.); ex eo enim coepit varietas temporis et vicissitudo horarum pariterque dierum in semet resolvi (revolvi?); antea vero, ut doctores dicunt, non erat *tempus*, sed *aevum*, quod solummodo *esse* habebat.

en: Damascene, II *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 1, among the various acceptations of *saeculum* brings forward this one: «Indeed the saeculum is also said [to be] not time nor any part of time defined by the motion and course of the sun or composed of the series of days and nights, but that, as it were, temporal motion and span which extends together with the things that are eternal. For what to the things subject to time is time, this to perpetual things is the saeculum». And Haymo, in his exposition of the Epistle to Titus, 1, 2: *Secular things* are so called from *saeculum*, because they are resolved (revolved?) into themselves, on the testimony of Varro. The *saecula* are reckoned from that point at which formless matter was distinguished into [its] species, and from which God said: *Let there be light, and there was light* (Gen. 1:3); for from that point began the variety of time and the vicissitude of hours and likewise of days to be resolved (revolved?) into itself; but before, as the doctors say, there was no *time*, but the *age*, which had only *being*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Orta est haec quaestio ex difficultatibus, quae in argg. pro parte affirmativa recensentur, scil. quod ante motum firmamenti et post iudicium non sit tempus, et tamen aliqua duratio successiva; quae etiam in Angelis est quoad *affectiones*, licet ipsi quoad substantiam sint supra tempus. — Solutio supponit distinctionem in praeced. quaest. factam circa tempus in 3. et in 4. sensu acceptum. Si tempus sumitur in sensu ultimo, ita ut importet mensuram *regulatam a motu primi mobilis*, tunc, deficiente hoc motu, actualis variatio et mutatio indiget alia mensura, differente et ab aevo et a tempore in dicto sensu sumto, quae quasi medium obtinet inter utrumque. De hac nonnullorum sententia, confirmata auctoritate Haymonis, plura dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 4. § 2.), quem sequuntur S. Bonav., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. — Alii sine ista distinctione simpliciter negant, esse mediam illam mensuram.

**II.** Specialis difficultas est de mensura affectionum et actuum intellectualium in Angelis. S. Thom., S. I. q. 10. a. 5. ad 1, de mente plurimorum dicit, quod «Angeli quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur *tempore*... quantum vero ad eorum *esse* naturale mensurantur *aevo*; sed quantum ad *visionem gloriae* participant aeternitatem». Sed Scoto (hic q. 4; Report. hic q. 1; de Rerum princ. q. 1. a. 2.) non placet nec prima nec ultima positio; ipse enim nititur probare, *omnes Angelorum operationes*, quae sunt superiores, etiam liberae et beatificae, mensurari *aevo*, et tantum *transeuntes* tempore.

**III.** Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 5. dub. later. in fine. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question arose from the difficulties which are reviewed in the arguments for the affirmative part, namely that before the motion of the firmament and after the judgment there is no time, and yet [there is] some successive duration; which also is in the Angels as regards their *affections*, although they themselves as regards their substance are above time. — The solution presupposes the distinction made in the preceding question concerning time taken in the 3rd and in the 4th sense. If time is taken in the last sense, so that it implies a measure *regulated by the motion of the first movable*, then, this motion failing, actual variation and change needs another measure, differing both from the age and from time taken in the said sense, which holds as it were a middle between both. Of this opinion of several [authors], confirmed by the authority of Haymo, Alexander of Hales says more (S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 4, § 2), whom St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton follow. — Others, without this distinction, simply deny that there is that middle measure.

**II.** A special difficulty concerns the measure of the affections and intellectual acts in the Angels. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 1, on the mind of most says that «the Angels, as regards their affections and intellections, in which there is succession, are measured by *time*... but as regards their natural *being* are measured by the *age*; but as regards the *vision of glory* they partake of eternity». But it does not please Scotus (here q. 4; Reportatio here q. 1; *On the Principle of Things* q. 1, a. 2), neither the first nor the last position; for he strives to prove that *all the operations of the Angels*, which are higher, even the free and beatific ones, are measured by the *age*, and only as *passing* by time.

**III.** Besides those praised: Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here a. 5, dub. later. at the end. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 12, q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Source discipline.** Latin re-set from the 450 dpi column-band PDF (`tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol2 --pages 65-67 --dpi 450` + `tools/colcrop.py vol2 {65,66,67}`) over the IA djvu OCR base (raw lines 5213–5333), per the Vol II override. Each page read Left column top→bottom, then Right column; body bands then footer bands.

**Page span / structure.** a2-q2 opens in normal type **partway down p.65** (beneath a2-q1's body + single-paragraph Scholion I) — only its arg 1 is on p.65; the body continues and completes on p.66; Scholion I–III sits in small two-column type at the **top of p.67**. 4 *videtur* (quod non) + 4 *Contra* arguments; a two-acceptation Respondeo (tempus *proprie* → no real middle, only a conceptual one; tempus *magis proprie* → a real middle measure, the *saeculum*) keyed to the fourfold-*tempus* distinction of the preceding question (a2-q1). **The Scholion has no numbered apparatus** (all references inline). Marginal glosses trimmed per CLAUDE.md (`Argg. pro parte negativa`, `Argg. pro parte affirmativa`, `Tempus accipitur dupliciter`, `Conclusio 1/2`).

**Apparatus crosswalk (per-page footer → continuous renumber).** Quaracchi restarts footer numbering each printed page; renumbered continuously 1–9:
- **p. 65** footer, **note 7 only** → `[^1]` (the inherited cross-chunk split — see below). (`Prop. 31. — In hoc verbo plures codd. ut A V Z…`, anchoring arg 1's *libro de Causis*.)
- **p. 66** footer: L col notes 1–5 → `[^2]`–`[^6]`; R col notes 6–8 → `[^7]`–`[^9]`. (8 notes total.)

**Cross-chunk footer split — INHERITED from a2-q1 (p.65), and a2-q2→a2-q3 is CLEAN.** The p.65 footer was split by body anchor in session 19: notes 1–6 anchor a2-q1's body (committed in `d2-p1-a2-q1` as its `[^8]`–`[^13]`); **note 7 anchors a2-q2's arg-1 *libro de Causis*** and is taken here as `[^1]`. No backfill into committed `d2-p1-a2-q1` (its 13 entries are complete and correct). On the far side, a2-q2's Scholion I–III occupies the *top* of p.67 in small type and carries no apparatus; a2-q3 (`QUAESTIO III`, *Utrum spirituales et corporales substantiae simul creatae sint*, raw 5337+) then begins in normal type on p.67 — so **p.67's footer apparatus is a2-q3's, and the a2-q2→a2-q3 boundary is CLEAN (no split)**. (Pattern note: the a2-q1↔a2-q2 split happened because a2-q1's scholion was a single short paragraph that left room for a2-q2's body to start on the same page; a2-q2's scholion is a full I–III block that pushes a2-q3 onto its own footer — so the split does NOT recur at every a2 boundary, contrary to the session-19 conjecture.)

**Decade polish (d.10 blocker).** No inline `[?]` flags. One low-confidence item for the 600 dpi d.1–d.10 pass: p.66 Contra-1 clause — the colcrop band clipped the right edge at `cum essent qu… corporalia… ergo erat a… mensura`; rendered from the IA OCR base (Vol II: OCR is base for clean *videtur* prose) as *cum essent quaedam corporalia … ergo erat alia mensura* (the 450 dpi crop's clipped right margin showed `aliqua` at one band edge — confirm `alia` vs `aliqua` and the `quaedam` expansion at 600 dpi; non-blocking, sense is unaffected: the Contra argues there was a third measure). **RESOLVED 2026-05-22** — 600 dpi p.66 shows *cum essent aliqua corporalia* (not *quaedam*) and *ergo erat alia mensura*; the body was corrected `quaedam`→`aliqua`.