title: Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum in praedestinatione Christi respectu nostrae sit vera causalitatis ratio.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in praedestinatione Christi respectu nostrae sit vera ratio causalitatis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Ephesios primo[^p247-1]: *Praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum*; sed non nisi per Christum praedestinatum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Gregorius[^p247-2] dicit, quod praedestinatio iuvatur orationibus Sanctorum: ergo si improportionabiliter plus efficaciae habent circa nos merita Christi quam aliquorum Sanctorum, restat, quod non solum per Christi praedestinationem nostra praedestinatio iuvatur, verum etiam causatur; nam ipsum iuvare quodam modo causare est.

3. Item, sicut se habet Christi resurrectio ad nostram resurrectionem, sic se habet praedestinatio ad praedestinationem; sed resurrectio Christi est causa nostrae, sicut dicitur in Glossa, primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto[^p247-3]: ergo et praedestinatio Christi causa est praedestinationis nostrae.

4. Item, per eum sumus praedestinati, per quem sumus salvati; sed salvati sumus per Christum, ad Titum tertio[^p247-4]: *Secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus sancti, quem effudit in nos per Iesum Christum*; et ad Ephesios quarto dicitur, quod *ascendit, ut adimpleret omnia*: restat igitur, quod per Christum sumus praedestinati. Sed Christus non esset, nisi eius praedestinatio praecessisset: ergo praedestinatio Christi est causa nostrae.

**Sed contra:** 1. Nullum aeternum habet causam; praedestinatio cuiuslibet hominis est aeterna[^p247-5]: ergo a nullo est causata: ergo praedestinatio Christi non potest esse causa nostrae praedestinationis. Si tu dicas, quod hoc est ratione connotati temporalis; sed contra: nihil posterius est causa prioris; sed effectus praedestinationis Christi est posterior effectu praedestinationis Patrum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Christo non convenit praedestinari nisi secundum humanam naturam[^p247-6]; sed secundum humanam naturam non habet super nos causalitatem: ergo praedestinatio Christi non potest esse causa nostrae praedestinationis.

3. Item, si praedestinatio Christi est causa nostrae, aut ratione principalis significati, aut ratione connotati; ratione principalis significati non, hoc constat: ergo ratione connotati. Sed contra: gratia et gloria a solo Deo est tanquam a causa[^p247-7]: non ergo a praedestinatione Christi.

4. Item, contingens non est causa necessarii[^p247-8]; sed ante adventum Christi necessarium fuit, aliquos praedestinatos fuisse, illos videlicet, qui mortui fuerunt cum gratia; Christum autem possibile fuit non incarnari vel nasci, et ita nec esse praedestinatum: ergo praedestinatio eius non potuit esse causa aliarum.

### Conclusio.

> Praedestinatio Christi ratione connotati dici potest causa nostrae praedestinationis dispositiva per meritum, et excitativa per exemplum, sed non proprie effectiva.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si loquamur de praedestinatione Christi et nostra ratione principalis significati, neutra neutrius est causa, cum utraque sit aeterna, omnesque sint unum in substantia[^p247-9]. — Si autem loquamur ratione connotati, tunc distinguendum[^p247-10], quod est causa in genere efficientis, quae proprie dicitur causa, de qua nunc loquimur; et haec est in triplici differentia, scilicet dispositiva, excitativa et effectiva. Omne enim, quod efficit disponendo, vel disponit, vel excitat disponentem, vel efficientem, aliquo modo potest dici efficere et causare.

Si ergo loquamur de causa effectiva proprie, sic praedestinatio Christi ratione connotati non potest esse causa nostrae, quoniam effectus praedestinationis a solo Deo est tanquam a principio effectivo; *gratiam* enim *et gloriam dabit Dominus*[^p247-11]. Si vero loquamur secundum alios duos modos, scilicet

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de causa dispositiva per rationem meriti et excitativa secundum efficaciam exempli; praedestinatio Christi quantum ad connotatum est causa nostrae. Christus enim per suam gratiam meruit nobis gratiam et gloriam. Christus etiam per suae gratiae et gloriae eminentiam manifestam excitavit nos ad currendum ad patriam supernam, ad quam praeordinati sumus secundum electionem aeternam. — Et hac via procedunt rationes, quae ostendunt, praedestinationem Christi nostrae praedestinationis esse causam; et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod praedestinatio nostra est aeterna etc.; dicendum, quod verum est ratione principalis significati, non tamen ratione connotati. Et si obiiciat, quod effectus praedestinationis aliquorum praecedat praedestinationem Christi; respondendum est sicut in praecedenti problemate[^p248-1], quod etsi praecedat quantum ad effectum gratiae, non tamen quantum ad effectum gloriae. Rursus, quamvis praecedat re, non tamen merito et credulitate. Meritum enim Christi non tantum ad praesentes, vel futuros, sed etiam ratione fidei se extendit ad praeteritos; quod melius infra[^p248-2] manifestabitur suo loco.

2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus secundum humanam naturam non est causa gratiae, vel gloriae; dicendum, quod etsi non est causa effectiva, est tamen dispositiva et excitativa; et hoc modo dictum est, praedestinationem Christi nostrae praedestinationis esse causam[^p248-3]. — Et per hoc patet sequens, quod obiicitur, quod gratia et gloria a Deo est tanquam a causa. Verum est, si dicatur de effectiva; aliis autem modis non habet veritatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingens non est causa necessarii; dicendum, quod verum est, si intelligatur de causa efficiente et conservante, non tamen oportet esse verum de causa excitante[^p248-4]. — Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod est necessarium dupliciter: uno modo quod est necessarium *per se* et simpliciter; alio modo quod est necessarium propter hoc, quod transit in praeteritum, sicut me scripsisse hodie; et illud de sui natura est contingens, et propter hoc nihil impedit, ipsum habere causam contingentem. — Potest etiam distingui in[^p248-5] contingente, quod quoddam est contingens, quod pendet a vertibilitate voluntatis humanae et causae creatae; quoddam propter libertatem et indifferentiam divinae voluntatis, quae potest facere et non facere. Et quamvis primum contingens non possit esse causa necessarii, nihil tamen impedit de secundo.

Medius autem modus dicendi videtur rationabilior. Et si tu obiicias, quod illud non solvit, quia, posito quod Christus non esset incarnatus, adhuc alius modus erat Deo possibilis, per quem genus humanum esset liberatum[^p248-6]: ergo remota praedestinatione Christi, adhuc salva esset praedestinatio nostra: ergo non est causa; dicendum, quod hoc non cogit, quod non sit causa, sed quod non sit causa tota et per omnem modum causandi, est tamen per aliquem modum; sicut Deus facit per aliquem hominem aliquod bonum, et si ille homo non esset, nihilominus faceret; et tamen non sequitur propter hoc, quod ille non sit causa. Non enim valet hic modus arguendi in voluntariis[^p248-7]. — Et haec sufficiant de praedestinatione Christi a parte rei. Supra enim distinctione septima[^p248-8] quaesitum fuit de ipsa a parte sermonis[^p248-9].

english:
### Question III. *Whether in Christ's predestination there is a true account of causality in relation to ours.*

Thirdly it is asked whether in Christ's predestination there is a true account of causality in relation to ours. And that it is so, it seems.

1. To the Ephesians, chapter one[^p247-1]: *He predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ*; but [this is] only through Christ as predestined: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory[^p247-2] says that predestination is aided by the prayers of the Saints: therefore if the merits of Christ have disproportionately more efficacy concerning us than [the merits] of any of the Saints, it remains that our predestination is not only aided by Christ's predestination, but is even caused [by it]; for to aid is in some way to cause.

3. Likewise, as Christ's resurrection stands to our resurrection, so predestination stands to predestination; but Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours, as is said in the Gloss, on the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen[^p247-3]: therefore Christ's predestination too is the cause of our predestination.

4. Likewise, we are predestined through him through whom we are saved; but we are saved through Christ, to Titus, chapter three[^p247-4]: *According to his mercy he saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured forth upon us through Jesus Christ*; and to the Ephesians, chapter four, it is said that *he ascended, that he might fill all things*: it remains therefore that we are predestined through Christ. But Christ would not be, unless his predestination had preceded: therefore Christ's predestination is the cause of ours.

**On the contrary:** 1. Nothing eternal has a cause; the predestination of any man is eternal[^p247-5]: therefore it is caused by nothing: therefore Christ's predestination cannot be the cause of our predestination. If you should say that this is by reason of the temporal connoted; on the contrary: nothing posterior is the cause of something prior; but the effect of Christ's predestination is posterior to the effect of the predestination of the Fathers: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it does not belong to Christ to be predestined except according to his human nature[^p247-6]; but according to his human nature he does not have causality over us: therefore Christ's predestination cannot be the cause of our predestination.

3. Likewise, if Christ's predestination is the cause of ours, [it is so] either by reason of the principal signified, or by reason of the connoted; that it is not by reason of the principal signified, this is established: therefore by reason of the connoted. But on the contrary: grace and glory are from God alone as from a cause[^p247-7]: therefore not from Christ's predestination.

4. Likewise, the contingent is not the cause of the necessary[^p247-8]; but before Christ's coming it was necessary that some had been predestined, namely those who died in grace; but it was possible that Christ should not be incarnate or born, and thus not be predestined either: therefore his predestination could not be the cause of others.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's predestination, by reason of the connoted, can be called a dispositive cause of our predestination through merit, and an excitative [cause] through example, but not properly an effective [cause].

**I respond:** It must be said that if we speak of the predestination of Christ and ours by reason of the principal signified, neither is the cause of the other, since each is eternal, and all are one in substance[^p247-9]. — But if we speak by reason of the connoted, then it must be distinguished[^p247-10] that there is a cause in the genus of efficient [cause], which is properly called a cause, of which we now speak; and this is found in a threefold difference, namely dispositive, excitative, and effective. For everything that effects by disposing either disposes, or rouses the one disposing, or [rouses] the one effecting, can in some way be said to effect and to cause.

If therefore we speak of an effective cause properly, then Christ's predestination by reason of the connoted cannot be the cause of ours, since the effect of predestination is from God alone as from an effective principle; for *the Lord will give grace and glory*[^p247-11]. But if we speak according to the other two modes, namely

of a dispositive cause through the ground of merit and an excitative [cause] according to the efficacy of example; Christ's predestination as regards the connoted is the cause of ours. For Christ by his grace merited grace and glory for us. Christ also, by the manifest eminence of his grace and glory, roused us to run to the supernal homeland, to which we have been preordained according to the eternal election. — And by this route proceed the arguments which show that Christ's predestination is the cause of our predestination; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary, that our predestination is eternal etc.; it must be said that this is true by reason of the principal signified, not however by reason of the connoted. And if it be objected that the effect of the predestination of some precedes Christ's predestination; the response must be as in the preceding problem[^p248-1], that although it precedes as to the effect of grace, it does not however [precede] as to the effect of glory. Again, although it precedes in actuality, it does not however [precede] in merit and belief. For Christ's merit extends not only to those present, or future, but also by reason of faith to those past; which will better be made manifest below[^p248-2] in its place.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that Christ according to his human nature is not the cause of grace, or of glory; it must be said that although he is not an effective cause, he is nevertheless a dispositive and excitative [cause]; and in this way it has been said that Christ's predestination is the cause of our predestination[^p248-3]. — And through this is evident the next [point] that is objected, that grace and glory are from God as from a cause. It is true, if it be said of the effective [cause]; but in the other modes it does not hold the truth.

4. To that which is objected, that the contingent is not the cause of the necessary; it must be said that it is true, if it be understood of an efficient and conserving cause, yet it need not be true of an excitative cause[^p248-4]. — Yet it can also be said otherwise, that "necessary" is twofold: in one way that which is necessary *per se* and absolutely; in another way that which is necessary on account of this, that it passes into the past, as my having written today; and that is of its own nature contingent, and on account of this nothing prevents it from having a contingent cause. — One can also distinguish within[^p248-5] the contingent, that one kind is contingent which depends on the changeableness of the human will and of a created cause; another [is contingent] on account of the freedom and indifference of the divine will, which can act and not act. And although the first contingent cannot be the cause of the necessary, nothing nevertheless prevents [it] in regard to the second.

But the middle way of speaking seems more reasonable. And if you object that it does not solve [the difficulty], because, granted that Christ were not incarnate, still another mode was possible to God, by which the human race might be liberated[^p248-6]: therefore, Christ's predestination being removed, our predestination would still be safe: therefore it is not the cause; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion] that it is not a cause, but [only] that it is not the whole cause and [a cause] in every mode of causing, it is nevertheless [a cause] in some mode; just as God does some good through some man, and if that man were not, he would nonetheless do it; and yet it does not follow on account of this that that [man] is not a cause. For this mode of arguing does not hold in voluntary matters[^p248-7]. — And let these things suffice concerning Christ's predestination on the side of the reality. For above, in distinction seven[^p248-8], it was inquired concerning it on the side of expression[^p248-9].

la: Vers. 5. — De minori cfr. q. praeced.

en: Verse 5. — On the minor [premise] cf. the preceding question.

la: Libr. I. Dialog. c. 8. Verba ipsius vide tom. I. pag. 728, nota 3. — Mox pro *aliquorum Sanctorum* edd. et aliquot codd. *aliorum Sanctorum.*

en: Book I of the *Dialogues*, c. 8. See his words in tome I, page 728, note 3. — Soon, for *of any of the Saints*, the editions and some codices [read] *of other Saints.*

la: Vers. 12. — Glossa allegata apud Lyranum habetur ut interlinearis. Petr. Lombardus eam cum vers. cit. coniunctam sic exhibet: « *Si autem hoc est, scilicet si Christus resurrexit a mortuis*, qui est efficiens causa resurrectionis mortuorum » etc. Huic similis est Glossa haec, quam idem Petr. Lombardus in Ps. 29, 6. affert: *Dominus mane resurrexit*, idem promittens nobis per suam resurrectionem, quae est efficiens causa resurrectionis et animae in praesenti et corporis in futuro. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 43. a. I. q. 6. — In maiori cum fere omnibus codd. omisimus *nostram* ante *praedestinationem.*

en: Verse 12. — The Gloss alleged is found in Lyra as interlinear. Peter Lombard, joining it with the cited verse, presents it thus: "*But if this is [so], namely if Christ rose from the dead*, who is the efficient cause of the resurrection of the dead" etc. Like this is the following Gloss, which the same Peter Lombard adduces on Psalm 29, 6: *The Lord rose early*, promising us the same through his resurrection, which is the efficient cause of the resurrection both of the soul in the present and of the body in the future. Cf. IV Sent. d. 43, a. I, q. 6. — In the major [premise], with almost all codices, we have omitted *our* before *predestination.*

la: Vers. 5. seq. In textu cit. Vulgata post *effudit in nos* addit *abunde.* Loc. ex Eph. 4. allegatus est v. 10, ubi Vulgata pro *adimpleret* habet *impleret.* — In prima conclus. post *praedestinati* codd. K M O repetunt *per quem sumus salvati.*

en: Verse 5 ff. In the cited text the Vulgate, after *poured forth upon us*, adds *abundantly.* The passage alleged from Ephesians 4 is verse 10, where the Vulgate, for *that he might fill*, has *that he might fulfil.* — In the first conclusion, after *predestined*, codices K M O repeat *through whom we are saved.*

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 40. a. I. q. I.

en: See I Sent. d. 40, a. I, q. I.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. a. 2. q. I.

en: Cf. above, d. 7, a. 2, q. I.

la: Psalm. 83, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.

en: Psalm 83, 12: "The Lord will give grace and glory."

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 12.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* I, c. 12.

la: Cfr. hic q. 2. conclusio I.

en: Cf. here, q. 2, conclusion I.

la: Edd. adiiciunt *est.* Subinde vocula *quod* desideratur in cod. Z, et mox pro *de qua* cod. G exhibet *et de qua.*

en: The editions add *is.* Thereupon the little word *quod* is wanting in codex Z, and soon for *of which* codex G presents *and of which.*

la: Psalm. 83, 12. — Paulo superius voci *praedestinationis* Vat. praemittit *nostrae.*

en: Psalm 83, 12. — A little above, the Vatican edition prefixes *our* to the word *predestination.*

la: Ad 4.

en: To [argument] 4.

en: Distinction 25, a. I, q. 2.

la: Cfr. infra d. 19. a. I. q. 1, ubi idem, quod hic de praedestinatione Christi dicitur, praedicatur de Christi passione. Ibid. etiam habetur solutio seq. obiect.

en: Cf. below, d. 19, a. I, q. 1, where the same thing that is said here of Christ's predestination is predicated of Christ's passion. There too is found the solution of the following objection.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 1, ubi de praedestinationis causa meritoria agitur.

en: See I Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. 1, where the meritorious cause of predestination is treated.

la: Vat. *de.* Mox pro *vertibilitate* cod. aa *virtute.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *de.* Soon, for *changeableness* codex aa [reads] *virtue.*

la: Cfr. infra d. 20. q. 6. et supra pag. 236, nota 2.

en: Cf. below, d. 20, q. 6, and above, page 236, note 2.

en: See I Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. I, in the corpus; d. 40, a. 2, q. I, and d. 45, a. 2, q. 2.

la: Art. 2. q. I. seqq.

en: Article 2, q. I ff.

en: See the scholion to the first question of this article.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.247–248 (PDF pp.269–270; raw OCR lines 17489–17596), reading each page left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands (Vol III PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III Override). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

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**Editorial marginalia (not transcribed as body).** The right column of pp.247–248 carries Quaracchi side-labels — *Conclusio I/2/3*, *Causa efficiens triplex*, *Solutio oppositorum*, *Solutio 1/2/3*, *Duplex necessarium*, *Praefertur solutio 2., defenditur*, *Ad oppositum* — which are editorial running glosses, not Bonaventure's text; omitted per the marginal-gloss trimming rule.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 1

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De vocabulis, quae videntur importare inceptionem.*

Consequenter quaeritur de his vocabulis, quae videntur importare inceptionem. Et circa hoc tria sunt dubitabilia perquirenda.

Primo quaeritur, utrum simpliciter concedendum sit, quod Christus sit creatura. — Secundo, utrum concedendum sit, quod ille homo coeperit esse. — Tertio quaeritur, utrum homo coeperit esse Deus.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est creatura.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est creatura. Et quod sic, ostenditur multiplici auctoritate.

1. Augustinus *ad Dardanum*[^1]: « Quod ad Verbum attinet, Creator est Christus; quod ad hominem attinet, creatus est Christus ». — Item, Leo

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Papa[^2]: « Nova et inaudita conventio: Deus, qui est et qui erat, fit creatura ». — Damascenus[^3] etiam expresse: « Non scandalizatur ad nomen creaturae qui se servum, aut vermem, aut granum natum de terra nominavit ». Idem etiam ipse: « Quid mirabilius, quam Creatorem creari et plasmatorem plasmari »? — Richardus de sancto Victore[^4] in quadam Sequentia: « Potestate, non natura, fit Creator creatura ». — Ex his omnibus auctoritatibus tanquam una efficaci ratione concluditur, quod Christus sit creatura.

2. Item, auctoritate efficaciori, ad Galatas quarto[^5]: *Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere*, et similiter ad Romanos; sed omne factum est creatura, Filius autem Dei est factus: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur. In Christo est veritas naturae creatae et naturae increatae, et *Christus* nominat hypostasim utriusque naturae; sed haec est vera ratione divinae naturae: Christus est Creator, et: ille homo est Creator: ergo pari ratione et haec: Christus est creatura.

4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur inferius, et superius, necessaria consequentia[^6]; sed *creatura* est superius respectu *hominis* et *animalis*; sed haec est vera simpliciter: Christus est homo, et haec: Christus est animal: ergo et haec necessario est vera: Christus est creatura.

5. Item, si Christus est homo, aut *creatus*, aut *increatus*; non *increatus*, hoc constat, quia « oppositio est in adiecto[^7] »: ergo est homo *creatus*. Sed homo creatus est creatura: ergo etc.

6. Item, sicut caro Christi fuit concepta, sic anima Christi fuit creata: ergo sicut ratione carnis haec fuit vera: Christus est proles Virginis et conceptus de Virgine; ita haec erit vera: Christus est creatura Dei, vel creatus a Deo. Si *dicas*, quod non est simile propter repugnantiam intellectuum, quae est in hac: Christus est creatura; *contra*: maior est repugnantia, cum oppositum praedicatur de opposito, quam quando creatura de Christo; sed haec est vera: Christus est impassibilis, est immortalis, est mortuus[^8]: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Ad Romanos octavo[^9]: *Vanitati subiecta est omnis creatura*; sed Christus, cum sit Deus, non est vanitati subiectus: ergo etc.

2. Item, intellectus huius nominis *creatura* est esse de nihilo[^10]; sed hoc repugnat Christo, cum Christus fuerit ab aeterno: ergo non est concedendum, Christum esse creatum.

3. Item, omne creatum incipit esse; sed Christus fuit ab aeterno, quoniam ipse eduxit filios Israel de Aegypto[^11]: ergo etc.

4. Item, si Christus est creatura, aut hoc est ratione *naturae*, aut ratione *personae*; ratione *naturae* non, quia *natura* non praedicatur de Christo[^12]; ratione *personae* non, quia *persona* Christi non est creata, sed Patri coaeterna: ergo nullo modo verum est, quod Christus sit creatura.

> ### Conclusio
> *Non recipitur propositio: Christus sive Filius Dei est creatura, nisi determinetur.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedictus sermo doctoribus theologiae communiter non recipitur: Christus sive Filius Dei est creatura. Adhaerent enim verbis Magistri in littera[^13]. — Ratio autem, quare non recipitur, est, quia talis sermo est propinquus errori. Errori autem appropinquat, et quia *male aliquando intellectus est* ab haereticis Arianis, et etiam quia *de se male est intelligibilis.* Arius namque dicebat, Filium Dei esse creaturam; et quoniam *Christus* nominat personam Filii Dei, qui dicit, Christum esse creaturam, non determinans, secundum quam naturam intelligat, videtur ipse dicere quod

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Arius impie sensit. — Est etiam *male intelligibilis de se* propter repugnantiam intellectuum. Creatura enim, quantum est de ratione sui nominis, dicit respectum ad Creatorem; dicit aliquid, quod habet *esse* post *non-esse*; dicit etiam, quod habet *esse* aliunde per voluntatem procedens: ergo in tali locutione intellectus praedicati repugnare videtur intellectui ipsius subiecti secundum triplicem dissonantiam. Et propterea praedictus sermo est *male intelligibilis* et *fuit male intellectus*, et per hoc est errori propinquus. — Et quoniam « sermo theologicus debet esse catholicus et usitatus, ab intellectu non dissonus, et rei, de qua loquimur, consonus[^14] »; propterea praedictus sermo non recipitur, nisi determinetur. — Unde rationes concedendae sunt, quae ostendunt, praedictum sermonem non esse admittendum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Sanctorum auctoritatibus, dicendum, quod Sancti aliquando multum *expresse* loquuntur, amplius quam admittat communis usus, ob aliquid exprimendum; et tales sermones non oportet extendi, sed magis[^15] sunt exponendi. Et sic est in praedicto sermone, cum dicunt, Christum esse creaturam; hoc autem dicunt secundum *humanam* naturam, et vere loquuntur; non tamen oportet, sermonem istum trahi ad communem usum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Apostoli, quo dicitur: *Factum de muliere*; dicendum, quod ipsa determinatio *de muliere*, et alia determinatio, quae dicit ad Romanos[^16]: *Qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem*, trahunt hoc vocabulum *factus* ad standum sive ponendum rem suam circa naturam *assumtam.* Et ideo non sequitur propter hoc, quod tales locutiones sint sine determinatione concedendae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec conceditur sine determinatione: Christus est Creator; dicendum, quod non est simile; quoniam *Christus* nominat personam Verbi, quae est increata et increatae naturae[^17] per essentiam et naturam propriam. Ideo non ita convenienter attribuitur ei vocabulum *creaturae*, sicut *Creatoris*, quia non est talis intellectuum dissonantia. *Praeterea*, ille sermo non ita approximat veneno erroris, sicut sermo propositus; et ita patet, quod non est respuendus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de quocumque praedicatur inferius, et superius; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum de virtute *illationis.* Unde si haec est vera: Petrus est homo, absque dubio verum est: Petrus est animal; sic etiam concedi potest, quod si vere est *homo*, quod vere est *creatura.* Non tamen oportet, quod si aliqua locutione utendum est cum *inferiori*, quod utendum sit ea cum *superiori*, propter diversos modos significandi, in quorum uno intellectus invenit consonantiam, in alio repugnantiam. Et quoniam praedictam locutionem magis respuunt doctores propter hoc, quod potest esse via in falsitatem vel errorem propter malum modum intelligendi, quam quod ipsa de se sit falsa vel erronea; ideo patet ratio.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequentem obiectionem. Quamvis enim ista admittatur et concedatur: Christus est *homo creatus*; non tamen simpliciter concedendum, quod sit *creatus*, ne intelligatur, ei tale praedicatum simpliciter attribui et totaliter, hoc est ratione utriusque naturae.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est conceptus ratione carnis, et ita similiter creatus ratione animae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, etsi *conceptio* dicat exitum rei in *esse*, non tamen ita repugnat personae Christi intellectus illius vocabuli, sicut intellectus verbi *creandi.* — Et ratio huius est, quia *conceptio* aliquid praesupponit; et naturam determinatam concernit; nec dicitur respectu Dei, sed respectu mulieris sive matris; dicit etiam[^18] exitum naturalem; sed non sic *creatio* vel *creatura.* Nam *creatio* dicit actum, qui potest in totam rei substantiam, unde quod creatur *simpliciter* incipit esse; nullam etiam determinatam naturam concernit; dicitur etiam respectu ipsius creantis, et exitum voluntarium importat: hinc est, quod multo magis repugnat personae Christi vocabulum *creandi* quam *concipiendi.* — Quodsi obiicias, quod non magis repugnat, quam si dicatur: immortalis est mortalis; dicendum, quod etsi non magis repugnet quantum ad *exterius rationem*[^19]; tamen magis repugnat repugnantia *ducente in errorem.* Cum enim dicitur:

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immortalis est mortalis, quia *mortalis* praesupponit creaturam viventem et ratione illius praedicatur; ideo non ita repugnat. Et *praeterea*, iste sermo prolatus ostendit, se non debere intelligi nisi per unionem[^20]. Sed cum dicitur: Christus est creatura, nec praesupponit, nec sermo videtur intelligi per unionem; immo videtur praedicatum dicere totum *esse* subiecti, et propter naturam talis actus[^21], qui consuevit esse in totum. Et sic patet, quod non est simile, et quod valde rationabiliter Magister[^22] dicit, praedictum sermonem non esse trahendum ad usum, quamvis non possit convinci faciliter, ipsum esse simpliciter et absolute falsum. Difficiliores enim et efficaciores sunt rationes ad oppositum.

english:
### Article II. *On the words that seem to imply a beginning.*

Next there is inquiry about those words which seem to imply a beginning. And concerning this three points are to be examined.

First it is asked whether it is to be conceded without qualification that Christ is a creature. — Second, whether it is to be conceded that that man began to be. — Third it is asked whether the man began to be God.

### Question I. *Whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature. And that it is so is shown by manifold authority.

1. Augustine *to Dardanus*[^1]: "As regards the Word, Christ is Creator; as regards the man, Christ is created." — Likewise, Leo

the Pope[^2]: "A new and unheard-of agreement: God, who is and who was, becomes a creature." — Damascene[^3] also expressly: "He is not scandalized at the name of creature who called himself a servant, or a worm, or a grain born of the earth." The same one likewise: "What is more wonderful than that the Creator be created and the fashioner fashioned?" — Richard of Saint Victor[^4] in a certain Sequence: "By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature." — From all these authorities, as by one efficacious argument, it is concluded that Christ is a creature.

2. Likewise, by a more efficacious authority, in Galatians, chapter four[^5]: *God sent his Son, made of a woman*, and similarly to the Romans; but everything made is a creature, and the Son of God is made: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it appears by *reason*. In Christ there is the truth of a created nature and of an uncreated nature, and *Christ* names the hypostasis of each nature; but this is true by reason of the divine nature: Christ is Creator, and: that man is Creator: therefore by parity of reason this also: Christ is a creature.

4. Likewise, of whatever the inferior [term] is predicated, the superior [term] is also predicated, by necessary consequence[^6]; but *creature* is superior in respect of *man* and *animal*; but this is true without qualification: Christ is man, and this: Christ is an animal: therefore this also is necessarily true: Christ is a creature.

5. Likewise, if Christ is man, [he is] either *created* or *uncreated*; he is not *uncreated*, this is settled, because "there is opposition in the adjunct[^7]": therefore he is a *created* man. But a created man is a creature: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, just as the flesh of Christ was conceived, so the soul of Christ was created: therefore, just as by reason of the flesh this was true: Christ is the offspring of the Virgin and conceived of the Virgin; so this will be true: Christ is a creature of God, or created by God. If you *say* that it is not similar on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings, which is in this [proposition]: Christ is a creature; *on the contrary*: the repugnance is greater when an opposite is predicated of its opposite than when "creature" [is predicated] of Christ; but this is true: Christ is impassible, is immortal, is dead[^8]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Romans, chapter eight[^9]: *Every creature is made subject to vanity*; but Christ, since he is God, is not subject to vanity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the meaning of this name *creature* is to be from nothing[^10]; but this is repugnant to Christ, since Christ was from eternity: therefore it is not to be conceded that Christ is created.

3. Likewise, everything created begins to be; but Christ was from eternity, since he himself led the sons of Israel out of Egypt[^11]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if Christ is a creature, either this is by reason of *nature* or by reason of *person*; it is not by reason of *nature*, because *nature* is not predicated of Christ[^12]; it is not by reason of *person*, because the *person* of Christ is not created, but co-eternal with the Father: therefore it is in no way true that Christ is a creature.

> ### Conclusion
> *The proposition "Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature" is not accepted unless it is qualified.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid statement is commonly not accepted by the doctors of theology: Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature. For they adhere to the words of the Master in the text[^13]. — But the reason why it is not accepted is that such a statement is near to error. And it approaches error both because *it was at times wrongly understood* by the Arian heretics, and also because *of itself it is ill-intelligible.* For Arius was saying that the Son of God was a creature; and since *Christ* names the person of the Son of God, he who says that Christ is a creature, without determining according to which nature he understands it, seems himself to say what

Arius impiously held. — It is also *of itself ill-intelligible* on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings. For "creature," so far as belongs to the account of its own name, expresses a relation to the Creator; it expresses something that has *being* after *non-being*; it expresses also something that has *being* from elsewhere, proceeding through will: therefore in such a locution the understanding of the predicate seems to be repugnant to the understanding of the subject itself according to a threefold dissonance. And therefore the aforesaid statement is *ill-intelligible* and *was ill understood*, and through this it is near to error. — And because "theological speech ought to be catholic and customary, not dissonant from the understanding, and consonant with the thing of which we speak[^14]"; therefore the aforesaid statement is not accepted unless it is qualified. — Hence the arguments are to be conceded which show that the aforesaid statement is not to be admitted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary concerning the authorities of the Saints, it must be said that the Saints at times speak very *expressly*, more than common usage admits, in order to express something; and such statements ought not to be extended, but rather[^15] to be expounded. And so it is in the aforesaid statement, when they say that Christ is a creature; but they say this according to his *human* nature, and they speak truly; nevertheless the statement ought not to be drawn into common usage.

2. To that which is objected from the word of the Apostle, by which it is said: *Made of a woman*; it must be said that the determination itself *of a woman*, and the other determination, which says, to the Romans[^16]: *Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh*, draw this word *made* to standing for or positing its thing about the *assumed* nature. And therefore it does not follow on this account that such locutions are to be conceded without qualification.

3. To that which is objected, that this is conceded without qualification: Christ is Creator; it must be said that it is not similar; since *Christ* names the person of the Word, which is uncreated and of an uncreated nature[^17] by its own essence and proper nature. Therefore the word *creature* is not so fittingly attributed to him as *Creator*, because there is not such a dissonance of understandings. *Moreover*, that statement does not so approach the poison of error as does the statement proposed; and so it is clear that it is not to be rejected.

4. To that which is objected, that of whatever the inferior is predicated, the superior is also; it must be said that it is true, so far as concerns the force of *inference.* Hence if this is true: Peter is man, without doubt it is true: Peter is animal; so too it can be conceded that if he is truly *man*, he is truly *creature.* Nevertheless it is not necessary that, if some locution is to be used with the *inferior*, it must be used with the *superior*, on account of the diverse modes of signifying, in one of which the understanding finds consonance, in the other repugnance. And because the doctors reject the aforesaid locution rather on this account, that it can be a way into falsity or error through a wrong mode of understanding, than because it is of itself false or erroneous; therefore the reason is clear.

5. And through this is clear the response to the following objection. For although this be admitted and conceded: Christ is a *created man*; nevertheless it is not to be conceded without qualification that he is *created*, lest it be understood that such a predicate is attributed to him simply and totally, that is, by reason of both natures.

6. To that which is objected, that he is conceived by reason of the flesh, and so likewise created by reason of the soul; it must be said that it is not similar, because, although *conception* expresses the going-forth of a thing into *being*, nevertheless the understanding of that word is not so repugnant to the person of Christ as the understanding of the verb *to create.* — And the reason for this is that *conception* presupposes something; and it concerns a determinate nature; nor is it said in respect of God, but in respect of the woman or mother; it expresses also[^18] a natural going-forth; but not so *creation* or *creature.* For *creation* expresses an act which extends to the whole substance of the thing, whence what is created *simply* begins to be; it also concerns no determinate nature; it is said also in respect of the one creating, and it imports a voluntary going-forth: hence it is that the word *to create* is far more repugnant to the person of Christ than *to conceive.* — But if you object that it is no more repugnant than if it be said: an immortal is mortal; it must be said that, although it be no more repugnant as to the *outer account*[^19]; nevertheless it is more repugnant by a repugnance *leading into error.* For when it is said:

an immortal is mortal, because *mortal* presupposes a living creature and is predicated by reason of it; therefore it is not so repugnant. And *moreover*, that statement, when uttered, shows that it ought not to be understood except through the union[^20]. But when it is said: Christ is a creature, it neither presupposes [a union], nor does the statement seem to be understood through the union; rather the predicate seems to express the whole *being* of the subject, and on account of the nature of such an act[^21], which is wont to be [extended] to the whole. And so it is clear that it is not similar, and that the Master[^22] very reasonably says that the aforesaid statement is not to be drawn into [common] usage, although it cannot easily be convinced that it is simply and absolutely false. For the arguments to the contrary are more difficult and more efficacious.

en: Or Letter 187 (otherwise 57), c. 3, n. 8.

la: Sententialiter in Serm. 77. (alias 75. 3. de Pentecost.) c. 2: « Si enim homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus in suae honore naturae mansisset... Creator mundi creatura non fieret ». Sed ad verbum in Serm. 128. (alias 13. de Tempore) sive Serm. 12. in Natali (qui a Maurinis in Appendice Serm. Augustini repositus est) c. 2. n. 2: « O nova et inaudita commixtio! Deus, qui est et qui erat, fit! Creator creatura »! Gregor. Nazian. Orat. 38. n. 20: O novam mixtionem, o admirandam temperationem! Qui est, fit; qui creatus non est, creatur.

en: In substance in Sermon 77 (otherwise 75, the third on Pentecost), c. 2: "For if man, made to the image and likeness of God, had remained in the honor of his nature... the Creator of the world would not become a creature." But word-for-word in Sermon 128 (otherwise 13, on the Season) or Sermon 12 on the Nativity (which by the Maurists is placed in the Appendix of Augustine's Sermons), c. 2, n. 2: "O new and unheard-of commingling! God, who is and who was, becomes! The Creator [becomes] a creature!" Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, n. 20: O new mingling, O wondrous tempering! He who is, comes to be; he who is not created, is created.

la: Sententialiter (nam verba ipsa in Damasc. operibus non invenimus) in IV. de Fide orthod. c. 18: « Deus Verbum... creatura dicitur et novissime appellatur » (Isai. 53, 3.); et in Orat. I. de Imagin. n. 4: Ipsi Creatori [servio], qui instar mei creatus factus est [χτισθέντα τὸ κατ᾽ ἐμέ]. Verba sub Damasc. nomine allegata potius Hieronymi esse videntur, qui I. Comment. in Epist. ad Eph. 2, 10. ait: « Nos libere proclamamus, non esse periculum eum [Christum] dicere creaturam, quem vermem et hominem et crucifixum et maledictionem tota spei nostrae fiducia profitemur ». Alterum sub Damasc. nomine allegatum testimonium sententialiter habetur in III. de Fide orthod. c. 1: « Quid enim maius, quam Deum hominem fieri »?

en: In substance (for the words themselves we did not find in the works of Damascene) in IV *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 18: "God the Word... is called a creature and is at last so named" (Isaiah 53, 3); and in Oration I *On the Image*, n. 4: To the Creator himself [I am a servant], who like me was made created. The testimonies adduced under the name of Damascene seem rather to be Jerome's, who in his first book of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians 2, 10 says: "We freely proclaim that there is no danger in calling him [Christ] a creature, whom we profess with all the confidence of our hope to be a worm and a man and crucified and a curse." The other testimony adduced under the name of Damascene is found in substance in III *On the Orthodox Faith*, c. 1: "For what is greater than that God become man?"

la: In operibus dicti auctoris non reperitur. B. Albert., hic a. 3, laudatam Sequentiam magistro *Rodolpho* de sancto Victore adscribit. Cfr. supra pag. 161, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro *ratione* multi codd. *ratiocinatione.*

en: It is not found in the works of the said author. Blessed Albert, here a. 3, ascribes the Sequence cited to master *Rudolf* of Saint Victor. Cf. above, page 161, note 1. — A little below, for *by reason* many codices [read] *by reasoning.*

la: Vers. 4. — Locus ex Epist. ad Rom. allegatus est 1, 3: *factus est ei ex semine David* etc.

en: Verse 4. — The passage adduced from the Epistle to the Romans is 1, 3: *who was made to him of the seed of David* etc.

la: Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 3. (c. 2.), ex prima regula praedicamentali. Cfr. IV. Topic. c. 1. — Ante *necessaria* codd. cc et edd. interiiciunt *est.*

en: According to Aristotle, *Categories* c. 3 (c. 2), from the first predicamental rule. Cf. *Topics* IV, c. 1. — Before *necessary*, codices cc and the editions insert *is.*

la: Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.).

en: Aristotle, *On Interpretation* II, c. 2 (c. 11).

la: Codd. A bb *Christus impassibilis est passibilis, immortalis mortuus*; cod. K a secunda manu *Christus impassibilis est passus.* Paulo superius pro *de opposito* cod. K *de suo opposito.*

en: Codices A, bb [read] *Christ impassible is passible, immortal dead*; codex K, by a second hand, *Christ impassible is one who suffered.* A little above, for *of an opposite*, codex K [reads] *of its own opposite.*

la: Vers. 20. — Hoc idem arg. adducit Hilar., XII. de Trin.; nec non Ambros., I. de Fide, c. 14. n. 87. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.

en: Verse 20. — Hilary adduces this same argument, *On the Trinity* XII; as also Ambrose, *On the Faith* I, c. 14, n. 87. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.

en: Cf. II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and 3.

la: Ut legitur in Missali, improper. 1. fer. VI. in Parasceve: *popule meus, quid feci tibi?... Quia eduxi te de terra Aegypti, parasti crucem Salvatori tuo ».* Et apud Ioan. 8, 58. dicit Iesus: *amen, amen dico vobis, antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum.*

en: As is read in the Missal, in the first Reproach, on Friday in the Pasch [Good Friday]: *my people, what have I done to thee?... Because I led thee out of the land of Egypt, thou hast prepared a cross for thy Savior.* And in John 8, 58 Jesus says: *amen, amen I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 149, nota 5.

en: Cf. above, page 149, note 5.

la: Hic c. 1. seq. — Subinde pro *Errori autem* cod. bb *errori enim*, et post pauca pro *intellectus est* cod. A *fuit intellectus*, codd. L aa et edd. 1, 2 *intelligitur.*

en: Here c. 1 ff. — Thereupon, for *but to error*, codex bb [reads] *for to error*, and a little after, for *it was understood*, codex A [reads] *it was understood*, codices L, aa and editions 1, 2 *it is understood.*

la: Sic Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 34, in qua textus origin. post *catholicus* addit *generalis.* Alanus hanc regulam explicans sic prosequitur: *Catholicus*, inquam, esse debet, quia contrarius fidei catholicae admitti non debet, ut si tres essentiae, vel tres dii esse dicantur; *usitatus* etiam, quia profanas verborum novitates Ecclesia devitat (I. Tim. 6, 20.); *generalis*, ut ab hominibus intelligentibus recipiatur, ut Christum esse *aliquid*, secundum quod homo. Ut etiam *intellectu sit perceptibilis*; debet enim verborum involucra cavere catholicus. Ut etiam rei, de qua loquimur, sit *consonus*; debet enim theologus habere sermones cognatos rebus, de quibus loquitur.

en: Thus Alan of Lille, *Theological Rules*, rule 34, in which the original text after *catholic* adds *general.* Alan, explaining this rule, continues thus: It ought, I say, to be *catholic*, because what is contrary to the catholic faith ought not to be admitted, as if three essences or three gods be said to be; also *customary*, because the Church avoids the profane novelties of words (1 Tim. 6, 20); *general*, that it may be received by intelligent men, as that Christ is *something* insofar as he is man. Also that it be *perceptible to the understanding*; for the catholic ought to beware the wrappings of words. Also that it be *consonant* with the thing of which we speak; for the theologian ought to have his speech akin to the things of which he speaks.

la: Edd. cum pluribus codd. *potius magis.* Paulo superius pro *ob aliquid* cod. K *ad aliquid.*

en: The editions, with several codices, [read] *rather, more.* A little above, for *for the sake of something*, codex K [reads] *to something.*

la: Cap. 1, 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro *quae dicit* edd. *qua dicit.*

en: Chapter 1, 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For *which says*, the editions [read] *by which it says.*

la: Pro *et increatae naturae* codd. M O *et est creator vere*, cod. A *et ideo creator naturae*, cod. bb (K a secunda manu) *et est creator naturae*, codd. T U V perperam *et est creatae naturae.* Paulo inferius pro *dissonantia* cod. bb *disconvenientia.* Circa finem solut. cod. E post *et ita patet* addit *per hoc*, et dein post *quod non* codd. A bb interserunt *similiter.*

en: For *and of an uncreated nature*, codices M, O [read] *and is truly creator*, codex A *and therefore creator of nature*, codex bb (K by a second hand) *and is creator of nature*, codices T, U, V wrongly *and is of a created nature.* A little below, for *dissonance*, codex bb [reads] *disagreement.* Toward the end of the solution, codex E after *and so it is clear* adds *through this*, and then after *that not* codices A, bb insert *likewise.*

la: Pro *etiam* edd. et nonnulli codd. *enim*; perperam, siquidem in seqq. huic membro expresse opponitur alterum, quod est: *et exitum voluntarium importat.* Mox pro *incipit esse* codd. N X *potest esse.*

en: For *also*, the editions and some codices [read] *for*; wrongly, since in what follows another member is expressly opposed to this one, which is: *and it imports a voluntary going-forth.* Soon, for *begins to be*, codices N, X [read] *can be.*

la: Est modus loquendi Aristot. familiaris et occurrit e. gr. I. Poster. c. 8. (c. 10.): πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, quod Boethius vertit: ad exterius orationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 155, nota 10. — Edd. *ad exteriorem rationem.*

en: It is a manner of speaking familiar to Aristotle and occurs, e.g., *Posterior Analytics* I, c. 8 (c. 10): *toward the outer discourse*, which Boethius renders: "to the outer speech." Cf. tome I, page 155, note 10. — The editions [read] *to the more outward account.*

la: Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro *nec praesupponit* codd. G bb *nihil praesupponit.*

en: Cf. above, page 14, note 3. — A little below, for *neither presupposes*, codices G, bb [read] *presupposes nothing.*

la: Scil. actus creandi.

en: Namely, the act of creating.

la: Hic c. 1. in initio et c. 2. in fine.

en: Here c. 1, at the beginning, and c. 2, at the end. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quamvis aliquid creatum sit in Christo, videlicet humana eius natura, tamen haec propositio: Christus est creatura, sine determinatione *secundum quod homo*, communissime non recipitur. Durand. autem (hic q. 1.) hunc modum loquendi, saltem indirecte, nititur defendere, dum solvere vult argg. ab aliis contra eandem prolata. — Insuper non omnes idem sentiunt quoad admittendam proprietatem huius propositionis, si addatur: *secundum quod homo.* De hac enim formula iudicat S. Thom. (S. III. q. 16. a. 10.), quod sit magis concedenda quam neganda; idem fere sentit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Sed in Comment. (hic a. 3.) S. Thom. dicit: « Tunc etiam *tropica* est et *figurativa*, ut dicit Magister, sicut et haec: Aethiops est albus secundum dentem ». Scot. autem (hic q. 2.) vult, quod in propositione ista, etiam addita illa determinatione, remaneat ratio falsitatis, et quod in uno sensu sit omnino falsa, in altero possit concedi, sed tantum ut impropria. Loquendo autem de propositione a nostro auctore sine determinatione prolata, ipse et S. Thom. in Sum. theolog. praecipue urgent rationem sumtam ex periculo erroris vitando. Alii autem cum Scoto (hic q. 1, tamen cum quadam restrictione) et Richardo contendunt, propositionem istam secundum proprietatem sermonis in se esse falsam; pro qua sententia nonnulli etiam Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram allegant. Quod eadem saltem sit *impropria*, satis innuit S. Bonav., quia praeter periculum erroris et in corp. et in solutionibus ad oppos. contra eam arguit ex « repugnantia intellectuum ». Ita eundem etiam Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 3.) intellexit, simulque ibi arguit contra S. Bonaventurae doctrinam, quod communicatio idiomatum non admittatur in his, in quibus est repugnantia proprietatis unius naturae ad aliam. — Sed in hac disputatione agitur tantum de modo loquendi, et fere est lis de nomine.

**II.** Praeter locos citatos: S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. III. q. 16. a. 8; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 47. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Although something created be in Christ, namely his human nature, nevertheless this proposition, "Christ is a creature," without the determination *insofar as he is man*, is most commonly not accepted. Durandus, however (here q. 1), strives, at least indirectly, to defend this manner of speaking, in seeking to resolve the arguments brought by others against it. — Moreover, not all hold the same view as to admitting the propriety of this proposition if it be added: *insofar as he is man.* For of this formula St. Thomas judges (Summa III, q. 16, a. 10) that it is more to be conceded than denied; almost the same view is held by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1). But in the Commentary (here a. 3) St. Thomas says: "Then too it is *tropical* and *figurative*, as the Master says, just as this also: An Ethiopian is white as to his teeth." Scotus, however (here q. 2), holds that in that proposition, even with that determination added, there remains an account of falsity, and that in one sense it is altogether false, in another it can be conceded, but only as improper. But speaking of the proposition uttered by our author without determination, he and St. Thomas in the *Summa theologica* chiefly press the argument drawn from the danger of error to be avoided. Others, however, with Scotus (here q. 1, yet with a certain restriction) and Richard, contend that this proposition, according to the propriety of speech, is in itself false; for which opinion some adduce even Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure. That it is at least *improper*, St. Bonaventure sufficiently intimates, because, besides the danger of error, both in the body [of the article] and in the solutions to the contrary [arguments], he argues against it from the "repugnance of the [two] understandings." Thus Scotus too (here q. 1, n. 3) understood him, and at the same time argues there against St. Bonaventure's doctrine, that the communication of idioms is not admitted in those things in which there is a repugnance of the propriety of one nature to the other. — But in this disputation there is treatment only of the manner of speaking, and it is almost a dispute about a word.

**II.** Besides the places cited: St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa III, q. 16, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 47. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1, 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here the single question.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set verbatim from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp.248–251 (PDF pp.270–273; raw OCR lines 17597–17784), reading each page left column top→bottom then right column, body bands then footer bands (Vol III PDF-priority inversion per the Vol II/III Override). Fresh literal English. Offset pdf = printed + 22.

**ARTICULUS II opener — fold-in.** Per the locked chunking convention, the short ART. II opener (*Consequenter quaeritur de his vocabulis, quae videntur importare inceptionem… Primo… Secundo… Tertio…*) is rendered at the head of this chunk (before QUAESTIO I) rather than as a standalone divisio chunk. It physically prints on p.248 right column, immediately after the close of d11-a1-q3, and was handed off from that chunk (commit 511d22d).

**Alignment.** Verified: ART. II's *Primo quaeritur, utrum simpliciter concedendum sit, quod Christus sit creatura* matches QUAESTIO I's title *Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est creatura* and its incipit *Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur…* — q1 is the FIRST of the article's three *vocabula* questions. No q-swap.

**Page-split map.**
- **p.248** (tail, right column): ART. II opener + TRACTATIO (the three *Primo/Secundo/Tertio* questions) + QUAESTIO I header + opener *Circa primum…* + argument 1 (*Augustinus ad Dardanum*) down to *— Item, Leo*. Footer: q1's first note is p.248 **n.10** (*Augustinus ad Dardanum*), inbound from d11-a1-q3. → rendered as `[^1]`.
- **p.249**: argument 1 (cont.)–6 *pro*; the four *Sed contra* arguments; CONCLUSIO; *Respondeo* down through *…videtur ipse dicere quod*. Footer: **12 entries** — nn.1–3 (left column footer) + nn.4–12 (right column footer). → `[^2]`…`[^13]`.
- **p.250**: remainder of *Respondeo* (*Arius impie sensit…*); replies 1–6 down through *Cum enim dicitur:*. Footer: **7 entries** — nn.1–3 (left) + nn.4–7 (right). → `[^14]`…`[^19]`.
- **p.251**: tail of reply 6 (*immortalis est mortalis… totum esse… Difficiliores… ad oppositum*); then the SCHOLION (sections I–II), printed across the left and right footer-zone in small type. q1's body footnotes on p.251 are nn.1–3 (*per unionem*, *talis actus*, *Magister*). → `[^20]` (= p.251 n.1, *per unionem*), `[^21]` (n.2, *talis actus*), `[^22]` (n.3, *Magister*).

**Apparatus count.** 22 entries = 1 (p.248 n.10) + 12 (p.249) + 7 (p.250) + 3 (p.251 nn.1–3, the q1 share of the p.251 footer). Numbering restarts per printed page in the source; the chunk renumbers sequentially `[^1]`…`[^22]` in body order (build pairs by first occurrence).

**Scholion.** `has_scholion: true`. q1 prints its own SCHOLION (sections I + II) on p.251, specific to the *Christus est creatura* / *secundum quod homo* question (Durandus, Scotus, Richard, Thomas; parallel-place list in II). It does **not** forward-cover q2/q3 — those questions carry their own apparatus (and q2 its own scholion).

**Hand-offs.**
- *Inbound (consumed):* from d11-a1-q3 (511d22d) — (1) the **ARTICULUS II opener** (folded in at head); (2) printed **p.248 footer n.10** (*Augustinus ad Dardanum… Sive Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 3. n. 8.*) → rendered as `[^1]`; (3) the **p.249 ART. II footnote run** (picked up eyes-on from the p.249 column-band footers, nn.1–12).
- *Forwarded to d11-a2-q2:* printed **p.251 footer nn.4, 5 (and following)** belong to QUAESTIO II — n.4 = *Tract. 105. n. 7: Priusquam mundus…* (Augustine super Ioannem, q2 arg 1), n.5 = *Cfr. supra pag. 111, nota 11. — in minori Vat. post produci in esse addit post non-esse…* (q2 arg 2). QUAESTIO II header + body begin at raw line 17785 (printed p.251 right column / p.252) — STOP boundary for this chunk.

**[?] flags.** None. Body and all 22 footers read cleanly at 450 dpi.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0