title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Una creatura pura potuit totum genus humanum inficere per culpam suam[^p422-4]: ergo si gratia est principium satisfaciendi, sicut culpa principium inficiendi; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura per suam gratiam potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

2. Item, non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum fuit in culpa: si ergo genus humanum lapsum fuit per transgressionem purae creaturae, videtur, quod pura creatura potuerit satisfacere pro genere humano.

3. Item, diabolus iuste perdidit genus humanum, quia extendit manum suam in innocentem[^p422-5]: ergo si potuit esse aliqua pura creatura omnino innocens, quae se pro salute generis humani exponeret, et diabolus manum in eam extenderet; videtur, quod aliqua pura creatura redimere potuisset genus humanum de diabolica potestate, et ita satisfacere pro eodem.

4. Item, plus pensat Deus vitam et animam unius iusti quam vitam et animam innumerabilium peccatorum[^p422-6]: si ergo aliqua pura creatura innocens et sancta se Deo et Patri obtulisset pro peccatoribus hostiam, facta esset recompensatio iusta, ergo et satisfactio debita.

5. Item, esto quod Christus fuisset pura creatura et mortuus fuisset in cruce, sicut mortuus fuit; quaero tunc: aut fuisset detentus in limbo, aut non. Constat, quod in limbo detentus non fuisset, quia non habuit reatum peccati originalis: ergo apertum fuisset ei caelum: meruisset ergo Christus apertionem ianuae. Si ergo ianua non habuit aperiri nisi per sufficientem satisfactionem, videtur, quod pura creatura satisfacere potuisset pro toto genere humano.

**Sed contra:** 1. Si pura creatura esset, aut esset homo, aut non-homo. Si esset purus homo, ergo esset peccator et debitor: ergo non potuisset esse mediator et reconciliator, cum ipse indigeret reconciliatione. Si esset non-homo; sed pro homine non debet satisfacere nisi homo, quia ad eum pertinet satisfactio, in quo fuit transgressio: ergo si nec purus homo nec non-homo potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano, videtur, quod nulla pura creatura potuerit[^p422-7].

2. Item, satisfactio debet proportionari offensae et iniuriae; sed tanta est offensa et iniuria, quantus est ille cui infertur: cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, offensa et iniuria Dei est infinita. Sed nulla creatura nec eius operatio est infinita: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro offensa et iniuria Deo illata. Sed talis fuit iniuria Adae et posteritatis suae, quia Deum contempsit[^p422-8]: ergo etc.

3. Item, nullus satisfacit, nisi restituat tantum et amplius, quantum abstulit; sed nulla pura creatura valet totum genus humanum, quod per peccatum Adae fuit Deo subtractum, restituere: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro ipso[^p422-9].

4. Item, nullus potest satisfacere pro omni homine, nisi posset influere in omnem hominem iustitiam, sicut primus parens transmisit culpam; sed nulla pura creatura potest aliis influere iustitiam vel dare gratiam, sicut ostensum fuit in primo libro[^p422-10]: ergo nulla pura creatura potest satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

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5. Item, non minus obligamur Deo pro beneficio recreationis quam pro beneficio creationis: si ergo pura creatura genus humanum redemisset, tantum essemus sibi obligati, quantum nostro Creatori: ergo tantum teneremur diligere creaturam quantum Creatorem. Si ergo impossibile est, nos ad hoc obligari[^p423-1]; impossibile fuit, puram creaturam satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

> ### Conclusio.
>
> Nulla pura creatura potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano, nec respectu iniuriae nec respectu damni; nec decuisset, alterius generis creaturam ad hoc a Deo assumi.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de duobus consuevit fieri satisfactio et requiri, videlicet de iniuria et de damno. Si igitur Deus requirit satisfactionem ab humano genere; aut requirit pro utroque, aut pro altero horum. Si pro utroque, planum est, quod impossibile est, aliquam puram creaturam Deo satisfacere pro humano genere, pro eo quod tam gravis est iniuria, quae infertur Deo ob excellentissimam eius dignitatem, quod nulla pura creatura potest recompensare aliquid illi aequale. Si vero exigat satisfactionem de solo damno, condonando iniuriam; nec sic potest pro toto genere humano satisfacere aliqua pura creatura. Aut enim illa creatura esset homo, aut non esset homo. Si esset homo, cum unus purus homo non possit aequivalere toti generi humano, talis homo, offerendo se ipsum Deo, nunquam recompensaret damnum, quod Adam intulit, corrumpendo totum genus humanum. Si esset non-homo; nec sic adhuc posset damnum recompensare, si pura creatura esset; aut si posset, non tamen satisfaceret, quia ad illud genus spectat satisfactio, ad quod spectavit transgressio[^p423-2]. Aut si hoc posset, non tamen deceret, quia naturam humanam in statum pristinum non revocaret; esset enim ex hoc subiecta alii generi creaturae.

Et ex hoc habetur, quod non solum pura creatura non posset Deo satisfacere, si esset alterius generis, sed etiam, nec si esset a Deo assumta, conveniret, ut pro humano genere satisfaceret. — Et ideo, cum pura creatura non posset pro toto genere humano satisfacere, nec alterius generis creaturam deceret ad hoc assumi; oportuit, ut persona satisfacientis esset Deus et homo[^p423-3]. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod nulla pura creatura posset satisfacere pro toto genere humano.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod pura creatura potuit totum genus humanum inficere; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia aliqua pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secundum propagationem carnalem, per quam genus humanum corrumpitur et inficitur; sed nulla pura creatura potuit esse principium totius generis humani secundum regenerationem spiritualem[^p423-4].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non plus exigitur in iusta poena, quam commissum est in culpa; dicendum, quod culpa non solum aggravatur ex parte conditionis peccantis[^p423-5], sed etiam ex parte eius, in quem peccatur; et licet peccans fuerit pura creatura, ille tamen, in quem peccavit, fuit Creator. Ideo, cum exigitur, quod satisfaciens non sit pura creatura, hoc non est supra id quod commissum est in culpa; oportet enim, quod persona satisfaciens pro peccati gravitate satisfaciat secundum omnes conditiones, secundum quas habet aggravari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod diabolus iuste amisit genus humanum, quia extendit manum in eum, in quem non habebat ius; dicendum, quod in hoc non exprimitur sufficiens ratio satisfactionis, sed modus vincendi diabolum. Et bene verum est, quod aliqua pura creatura innocens potuisset diabolum vincere[^p423-6]; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod posset Deo satisfacere. Longe enim plus est recompensare Deo illatam iniuriam quam vincere diabolicam fraudem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus pensat Deus animam iusti[^p423-7] quam animas innumerabilium peccatorum; dicendum, quod Deus in satisfactione non quaerit recompensationem de genere humano, secundum quod est in statu peccati, sed secundum quod fuisset, si non peccasset; et hoc modo nullius puri hominis vitam Deus tantum appretiatur, sicut totam generationem humanam.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, si Christus fuisset pura creatura, utrum moriens introisset in caelum; dicendum, quod sic; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod[^p423-8] meruisset ianuae apertionem, quia caelum nunquam fuerat sibi clausum, hoc posito, quod non habuisset peccati originalis reatum. Alii vero, qui reatum peccati originalis habebant, propter hoc non fuissent in caelum introducti; et ita adhuc remansisset ianua clausa, pro eo quod non fuisset sufficiens satisfactio persoluta.

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english:
### Question III. *Whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.*

Thirdly it is asked whether any mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race. And that it could, is shown thus.

1. One mere creature was able to infect the whole human race through its own fault[^p422-4]: therefore if grace is the principle of making satisfaction, just as fault is the principle of infecting; it seems that some mere creature could, through its own grace, make satisfaction for the whole human race.

2. Likewise, no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault: if therefore the human race fell through the transgression of a mere creature, it seems that a mere creature could make satisfaction for the human race.

3. Likewise, the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against an innocent one[^p422-5]: therefore if there could be some mere creature wholly innocent, who would expose itself for the salvation of the human race, and the devil should stretch out his hand against it; it seems that some mere creature could have redeemed the human race from the devil's power, and thus made satisfaction for it.

4. Likewise, God weighs the life and soul of one just man more than the life and soul of innumerable sinners[^p422-6]: if therefore some mere creature, innocent and holy, should offer itself to God and the Father as a sacrifice for sinners, a just recompense would be made, and therefore a due satisfaction.

5. Likewise, suppose that Christ had been a mere creature and had died on the cross, as he did die; I ask then: either he would have been detained in limbo, or not. It is established that he would not have been detained in limbo, because he had no guilt of original sin: therefore heaven would have been opened to him: Christ would therefore have merited the opening of the gate. If then the gate could not be opened except through sufficient satisfaction, it seems that a mere creature could have made satisfaction for the whole human race.

**On the contrary:** 1. If it were a mere creature, it would be either a man or a non-man. If it were a mere man, then it would be a sinner and a debtor: therefore it could not be mediator and reconciler, since it itself would need reconciliation. If it were a non-man; but for man none ought to make satisfaction except a man, because satisfaction pertains to him in whom there was the transgression: therefore if neither a mere man nor a non-man could make satisfaction for the whole human race, it seems that no mere creature could[^p422-7].

2. Likewise, satisfaction ought to be proportioned to the offense and the injury; but the offense and injury is as great as is the one to whom it is done: since therefore God is infinite, the offense and injury done to God is infinite. But no creature, nor its operation, is infinite: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the offense and injury done to God. But such was the injury of Adam and his posterity, because he despised God[^p422-8]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, no one makes satisfaction unless he restores as much and more than he took away; but no mere creature is able to restore the whole human race, which through the sin of Adam was taken away from God: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for it[^p422-9].

4. Likewise, no one can make satisfaction for every man, unless he could pour justice into every man, just as the first parent transmitted fault; but no mere creature can pour justice into others or give grace, as was shown in the first book[^p422-10]: therefore no mere creature can make satisfaction for the whole human race.

5. Likewise, we are obligated to God no less for the benefit of re-creation than for the benefit of creation: if therefore a mere creature had redeemed the human race, we would be as obligated to it as to our Creator: therefore we would be bound to love a creature as much as the Creator. If then it is impossible that we be obligated to this[^p423-1]; it was impossible for a mere creature to make satisfaction for the whole human race.

> ### Conclusion.
>
> No mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race, neither with respect to the injury nor with respect to the damage; nor would it have been fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed by God for this.

**I respond:** It must be said that satisfaction is wont to be made and required for two things, namely for the injury and for the damage. If therefore God requires satisfaction from the human race; either he requires it for both, or for one of these. If for both, it is plain that it is impossible for any mere creature to make satisfaction to God for the human race, for the reason that the injury which is done to God on account of his most excellent dignity is so grave that no mere creature can recompense anything equal to it. But if he should require satisfaction only for the damage, condoning the injury; not even thus can any mere creature make satisfaction for the whole human race. For either that creature would be a man, or it would not be a man. If it were a man, since one mere man cannot be equivalent to the whole human race, such a man, by offering himself to God, would never recompense the damage which Adam inflicted by corrupting the whole human race. If it were a non-man; not even thus could it yet recompense the damage, if it were a mere creature; or if it could, it would still not make satisfaction, because satisfaction belongs to that kind to which the transgression belonged[^p423-2]. Or if it could do this, it still would not be fitting, because it would not restore human nature to its former state; for it would by this be made subject to another kind of creature.

And from this it is held that not only could a mere creature not make satisfaction to God, if it were of another kind, but also, even if it were assumed by God, it would not be fitting that it make satisfaction for the human race. — And therefore, since a mere creature could not make satisfaction for the whole human race, nor would it be fitting that a creature of another kind be assumed for this; it was necessary that the person of the one making satisfaction be God and man[^p423-3]. — Therefore the reasons showing that no mere creature could make satisfaction for the whole human race must be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected first to the contrary, that a mere creature was able to infect the whole human race; it must be said that it is not similar: because some mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to carnal propagation, through which the human race is corrupted and infected; but no mere creature was able to be the principle of the whole human race according to spiritual regeneration[^p423-4].

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that no more is required in a just penalty than was committed in the fault; it must be said that the fault is aggravated not only on the part of the condition of the one sinning[^p423-5], but also on the part of him against whom the sin is committed; and although the one sinning was a mere creature, yet he against whom he sinned was the Creator. Therefore, when it is required that the one making satisfaction not be a mere creature, this is not beyond that which was committed in the fault; for it is necessary that the person making satisfaction make satisfaction for the gravity of the sin according to all the conditions according to which it has to be aggravated.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that the devil justly lost the human race, because he stretched out his hand against one over whom he had no right; it must be said that in this is not expressed the sufficient ground of satisfaction, but the mode of conquering the devil. And it is quite true that some mere innocent creature could have conquered the devil[^p423-6]; but nevertheless from this it does not follow that it could make satisfaction to God. For it is far more to recompense to God the injury done than to conquer the devil's fraud.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that God weighs the soul of a just man[^p423-7] more than the souls of innumerable sinners; it must be said that God in satisfaction does not seek recompense for the human race according as it is in the state of sin, but according as it would have been if it had not sinned; and in this manner God does not value the life of any mere man as much as the whole human generation.

*Ad 5.* To that which is asked, if Christ had been a mere creature, whether dying he would have entered into heaven; it must be said that he would; yet from this it does not follow that[^p423-8] he would have merited the opening of the gate, because heaven had never been closed to him, on this supposition, that he had no guilt of original sin. But the others, who had the guilt of original sin, on account of this would not have been led into heaven; and so the gate would still have remained closed, for the reason that no sufficient satisfaction had been paid.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2.

en: Cf. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2.

la: Vide supra d. 19. dub. 3.

en: See above, d. 19. dub. 3.

la: Cfr. Gen. 18, 24. seqq.

en: Cf. Genesis 18:24 ff.

la: Fulgent., II. ad Trasim. c. 2. probat, hominem nec per solum hominem, nec etiam per Angelum potuisse reparari.

en: Fulgentius, II. To Thrasamund c. 2, proves that man could be repaired neither by a mere man, nor even by an Angel.

la: Vide Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 21. et II. c. 6.

en: See Anselm, I. Cur Deus homo (Why God Became Man) c. 21, and II. c. 6.

la: Hoc arg. insinuatur ab Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 23. et II. c. 1-4. Vide supra pag. 265, nota I. — In maiori pro quantum non pauci codd. quam.

en: This argument is suggested by Anselm, I. Cur Deus homo c. 23, and II. cc. 1–4. See above, p. 265, note I. — In the major premise, for *quantum* not a few codices read *quam*.

la: Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. Fulgent., II. ad Trasim. c. 3: Inquirendus ergo fuit unus, cuius esset reformanda munere, informanda lumine, confirmanda virtute, ut aequalitas aeterna iustificaret impiam, instrueret insciam veritas, virtus firmaret invalidam etc. — Mox verbo satisfacere cod. K adiicit Deo.

en: Dist. 14. a. 2. q. 2. Cf. Fulgentius, II. To Thrasamund c. 3: "One therefore had to be sought, by whose gift [the human race] was to be reformed, by whose light informed, by whose strength confirmed, so that the eternal equality might justify the impious, truth might instruct the ignorant, strength might steady the weak," etc. — Presently, at the word *satisfacere*, codex K adds *Deo* ("to God").

la: Cfr. August., de Quant. animae, c. 34. n. 78, ex quo loco unam sententiam allatam invenis tom. II. pag. 28, nota 6. — Paulo ante pro sibi obligati edd. ei obligati.

en: Cf. Augustine, On the Greatness of the Soul, c. 34. n. 78, from which place you will find one sentence quoted in tom. II. p. 28, note 6. — A little before, for *sibi obligati* the editions read *ei obligati*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. I, ubi videsis et de seq. ratione, quae ex Anselmo delibata est. — Paulo ante pro aut si posset codd. BDGHLTUVXaa ac [codd. IPQ et edd. 1, 2 at, cod. C et] si posset; deinde pro spectavit cod. U spectat.

en: Cf. above, d. 12. a. 1. q. I, where you may also see concerning the following reason, which is drawn from Anselm. — A little before, for *aut si posset* codices BDGHLTUVXaa [read] *ac* [codices IPQ and editions 1, 2 *at*, codex C *et*] *si posset*; then for *spectavit* codex U [reads] *spectat*.

la: Pulcre Basil., in Ps. 48. n. 3, ad verba illa: Frater non redimit, redimit homo, observat: Neque igitur fratrem in redemptionem quaere, sed aliquem, qui tuam excedat naturam; neque hominem nudum, sed hominem-Deum, Iesum Christum, qui solus pro nobis omnibus dare potest placationem etc.

en: Beautifully Basil, on Psalm 48 n. 3, on those words "A brother does not redeem; a man redeems," observes: "Seek not, therefore, a brother for redemption, but someone who exceeds your nature; not a mere man, but the man-God, Jesus Christ, who alone can give propitiation for us all," etc.

la: Cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. — In initio solut. pro pura creatura cod. A aliqua pura creatura. Deinde pro quia aliqua cod. K quia licet aliqua, et paulo inferius pro sed idem cod. K tamen.

en: Cf. II. Sent. d. 33. a. I. q. 2. — At the beginning of the solution, for *pura creatura* codex A [reads] *aliqua pura creatura*. Then for *quia aliqua* codex K [reads] *quia licet aliqua*, and a little lower for *sed* the same codex K [reads] *tamen*.

la: Cfr. tom. II. pag. 750, nota 5.

en: Cf. tom. II. p. 750, note 5.

la: Edd. potuisset.

en: The editions [read] *potuisset* ("could have").

la: Cod. A accuratius unius iusti.

en: Codex A, more accurately, [reads] *unius iusti* ("of one just man").

la: Edd. subiungunt sic, et mox pro posito substituunt supposito. Paulo ante edd. verbis pura creatura praefigunt sola.

en: The editions add *sic*, and presently for *posito* substitute *supposito*. A little before, the editions prefix *sola* to the words *pura creatura*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac et seq. (4.) quaestione S. Bonav. cum Alexandro Hal. et Richardo sequitur modum dicendi S. Anselmi, cuius argumenta Scot. (hic q. unica n. 3. seqq.) restringere vel evertere nititur; qui insuper contendit, quod purus homo i. e. non unitus hypostatice Deo, at plenitudine gratiae repletus, satisfacere potuerit pro genere humano, et quidem de condigno. Tamen Scot. explicite loquitur non de potentia ordinaria, quae respicit leges et decreta in praesenti providentia stabilita, sed de potentia absoluta, qua Deus secundum ipsum potest facere quidquid in se non implicat contradictionem. Concorditer igitur doctores tenent, quod secundum praesentem divinam dispositionem incarnatio fuit necessaria, supposito quod Deus voluerit habere satisfactionem perfectam (de condigno), sive quae est ad aequalitatem iustitiae. De potentia absoluta loquendo, vulgo distinguitur inter satisfactionem imperfectam, quae, licet non sit condigna, acceptatur tamen ab eo cui illa debetur (cfr. hic q. 4.), et satisfactionem perfectam sive condignam. Respectu satisfactionis imperfectae facile conceditur, creaturam, Deo adiuvante, eam praestare, Deumque, si vellet, eam acceptare posse ut sibi sufficientem. Quod eadem autem posset acceptari etiam ut perfecta et condigna, docent Scot., Durand. et Nominales, refragantibus schola S. Thomae aliisque multis.

S. Bonav. in hac quaestione solvenda non loquitur de potentia Dei absoluta, sed arguit ex principiis, quae in praesenti providentia rata sunt. Hoc iam observavit Brulifer (ad hanc quaest.), unde concludit, S. Bonaventuram non contradicere Scoto. Haec interpretatio confirmatur infra quaestione 6, ubi in fine auctor dicit, se quoad redemptionem alio modo possibilem nihil velle determinare, scilicet « quia temerarium est, cum de divina potentia agitur, terminum praefigere ». — Nihilominus auctor hic plura dicit, quae a Scoto non probantur (cfr. etiam IV. Sent. d. 13. p. I. q. I. seqq.).

**II.** In 2. fundam. arguitur ex quadam infinita gravitate et malitia peccati, de qua infinitate scholae non eodem loquendi modo utuntur. Plurimi enim discipuli S. Thomae defendunt, peccatum in ratione moralis offensae esse simpliciter et intrinsecus infinitum, dum Scotus cum suis multisque aliis non admittit nisi infinitatem obiectivam et extrinsecam. Sed in ipsa schola S. Thomae non desunt, qui S. Thomam pro secunda sententia stare asserant, ut P. Nicolai O. Pr., qui in sua editione Commentarii S. Thomae in Sententias (hic a. 2, nota marginal.) annotat: « Ubi ergo praetexta simplex et intrinseca infinitas, quam praeter perpetuam et uniformem S. Thomae doctrinam gratis aliqui fingunt et affingere illi non dubitant, pro extrinseca tantum et respectiva, ex obiecto sumta et vocabulo diminuto [scil. quandam] significata, quam agnoscit »? In hoc altero sensu etiam S. Bonav. debet intelligi, cum ipse duplex distinguat infinitum, scilicet absolute in se et in comparatione ad aliud (I. Sent. d. 43; q. I, III. Sent. d. 13. a. I. q. 2.), et pluries, ut in scholio ad II. Sent. d. 35. a. I. q. 3. iam notatum est, peccato infinitatem tribuat in comparatione, scilicet ad bonum divinum in se infinitum. — Aliud principium, quod Scot. pro sua opinione hic urget, respicit ipsum valorem meriti Christi, quatenus dependeat ab acceptatione divina, de quo cfr. infra q. 5, scholion.

**III.** De hac 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. I. m. 6. a. 1.2. — Scot., loc. cit. et Report. q. unica. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 2. et d. I. q. I. a. 2. ad 9; S. III. q. I. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.

**IV.** Etiam quoad seq. (4.) quaestionem Scot. cum suis et Nominalibus a S. Bonav. et ceteris antiquis doctoribus discedit, ita tamen, ut loquatur non de potentia Dei ordinaria, sed absoluta. Quidam autem Nominales, ulterius progressi, dicunt, satisfactionem purae creaturae et viribus pure naturalibus factam ex acceptatione Dei extrinseca, si Deus velit, posse esse sufficientem. Scotus autem (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. I. n. 7.) explicite requirit ad talem satisfactionem auxilium et statum gratiae.

De hac 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 5. a. I. 2. — Scot., loc. cit. — Richard., hic q. 5.

english_scholion:
**I.** In this and the following (4th) question St. Bonaventure, with Alexander of Hales and Richard, follows St. Anselm's mode of speaking, whose arguments Scotus (here, the single question, n. 3 ff.) strives to restrict or overthrow; who moreover contends that a mere man — i.e. one not hypostatically united to God, but filled with the fullness of grace — could have made satisfaction for the human race, and indeed condignly. Yet Scotus speaks explicitly not of the ordinary power, which regards the laws and decrees established in the present providence, but of the absolute power, by which, according to him, God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction in itself. In agreement, therefore, the doctors hold that, according to the present divine disposition, the incarnation was necessary, supposing that God willed to have a perfect satisfaction (condign), or one that is to the equality of justice. Speaking of the absolute power, a distinction is commonly made between an imperfect satisfaction, which, although it is not condign, is nevertheless accepted by him to whom it is due (cf. here q. 4), and a perfect or condign satisfaction. With respect to imperfect satisfaction it is readily granted that a creature, with God's help, can render it, and that God, if he willed, could accept it as sufficient for himself. But that the same could also be accepted as perfect and condign, Scotus, Durandus, and the Nominalists teach, the school of St. Thomas and many others resisting.

St. Bonaventure, in solving this question, does not speak of the absolute power of God, but argues from principles which are settled in the present providence. Brulifer has already observed this (on this question), whence he concludes that St. Bonaventure does not contradict Scotus. This interpretation is confirmed below in question 6, where at the end the author says that he wishes to determine nothing concerning a redemption possible in another way, namely « because it is rash, when divine power is treated of, to fix a limit ». — Nevertheless the author here says many things which are not approved by Scotus (cf. also IV. Sent. d. 13. p. I. q. I. ff.).

**II.** In the 2nd fundamentum the argument proceeds from a certain infinite gravity and malice of sin, concerning which infinity the schools do not use the same manner of speaking. For very many disciples of St. Thomas defend that sin, in the character of a moral offense, is simply and intrinsically infinite, while Scotus with his followers and many others admits only an objective and extrinsic infinity. But in the very school of St. Thomas there are not lacking those who assert that St. Thomas stands for the second opinion, as Fr. Nicolai O.P., who in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas on the Sentences (here a. 2, marginal note) notes: « Where, therefore, is the pretended simple and intrinsic infinity, which, beyond the perpetual and uniform doctrine of St. Thomas, some gratuitously feign and do not hesitate to attribute to him, instead of the merely extrinsic and respective infinity, taken from the object and signified by a diminished term [namely, "a certain (infinity)"], which he acknowledges »? In this latter sense St. Bonaventure also must be understood, since he himself distinguishes a twofold infinite, namely absolutely in itself and in comparison to another (I. Sent. d. 43; q. I, III. Sent. d. 13. a. I. q. 2), and several times, as has already been noted in the scholion on II. Sent. d. 35. a. I. q. 3, attributes infinity to sin in comparison, namely to the divine good infinite in itself. — Another principle which Scotus here urges for his opinion regards the very value of Christ's merit, inasmuch as it depends on the divine acceptance, concerning which cf. below q. 5, scholion.

**III.** On this 3rd question: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. I. m. 6. a. 1.2. — Scotus, loc. cit. and Reportata, the single question. — St. Thomas, on this and the following question, here a. 2 and d. I. q. I. a. 2. ad 9; Summa III. q. I. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert, on this and the following question, here a. 6. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.

**IV.** Also concerning the following (4th) question Scotus, with his followers and the Nominalists, departs from St. Bonaventure and the other ancient doctors, yet in such a way that he speaks not of the ordinary power of God, but of the absolute. But certain Nominalists, going further, say that satisfaction made by a mere creature and by purely natural powers, from God's extrinsic acceptance, if God willed, could be sufficient. But Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 15. q. I. n. 7) explicitly requires for such satisfaction the aid and state of grace.

On this 4th question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 5. a. I. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. — Richard, here q. 5.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp.422–424 (PDF 444–446; offset pdf = printed + 22), cross-checked against the IA djvu OCR raw lines 29358–29520 (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`). q3 opener confirmed at raw 29358: *Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano*. Next boundary QUAESTIO IV at raw 29521 (p.424 lower-left/right column, *Quarto quaeritur, utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso*).

**Alignment check.** Confirmed this is q3 — *Utrum aliqua creatura pura potuerit satisfacere pro toto genere humano* (the divisio's listing form reads *utrum aliqua creatura satisfacere potuerit Deo pro humano genere*; same question). Not q2 (*…per satisfactionem quam per aliam viam*) nor q4 (*utrum aliquis adiutus gratia… pro se ipso*).

**Page-split map.**
- **p.422** — q3 begins in the left column ("Tertio quaeritur") below q2's tail (the Sapientia 1:1 quote *Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram*); body runs L-col (args 1–5) → R-col ("ianuae. Si ergo ianua…", *Sed contra* 1–4). The upper-right column carries q2's reply *ad 6* (already in the q2 chunk). Footers: nn.1–3 → q2; **nn.4–10 → q3** (this chunk).
- **p.423** — full page is q3: L-col carries *Sed contra* arg 5, Conclusio, Respondeo, and the start of *Ad argumenta*; R-col carries replies *ad 1–5*, ending "satisfactio persoluta." Footers nn.1–8 (L-col nn.1–3 incl. the Basil note; R-col continues n.3 + nn.4–8).
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**Hand-offs.**
- *Picked up from q2 (p.422 nn.4–10):* n.4 (`culpam suam` — Cfr. II Sent. d.30); n.5 (`innocentem` — d.19 dub.3); n.6 (`peccatorum` — Gen. 18:24); n.7 (`potuerit` — Fulgentius, II ad Trasim. c.2); n.8 (`contempsit` — Anselm, Cur Deus homo); n.9 (`pro ipso` — Anselm + cod. variant); n.10 (`primo libro` — Dist.14 a.2 q.2 + Fulgentius c.3 + cod. K). The hand-off named nn.4–7 explicitly; nn.8–10 are likewise q3's, anchored in its *Sed contra* args 2–4. (p.422 nn.1–3 correctly stayed with q2.)
- *Forwarded to q4 (d20-a1-q4):* QUAESTIO IV begins at **raw line 29521**, printed **p.424** (PDF 446), opener *Quarto quaeritur, utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso*. **q4 shares p.424 with q3's scholion** — the scholion (q3) fills the upper columns; q4's body begins in the lower-left column. Migrating footers: **p.424 nn.1–4 belong to q4** — n.1 (`satisfactio` — Cfr. IV Sent. d.16,17); n.2 (`originali` — Vide II Sent. d.33); n.3 (`Anselmus` — Libr. I Cur Deus homo c.11,20); n.4 (Hieronymo ascripto). Note also the q3 scholion sec. I and IV explicitly cover "this and the following (4th) question" — q4 has no scholion of its own (the q3 scholion is shared). Offset reminder: pdf = printed + 22.

**[?] flags.** None — all three pages legible at 450 dpi.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio IV. *Utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum aliquis, adiutus gratia, potuisset satisfacere pro se ipso. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia tres sunt partes poenitentiae: contritio, confessio et satisfactio[^p424-1]; sed homo, adiutus gratia, potest de peccato suo conteri et ipsum confiteri: ergo potest satisfacere pro se ipso. Si tu dicas, quod potest de actuali, sed non de originali; contra: maius est actuale quam originale, quia maior est ibi improbitas voluntatis, et gravius etiam quis punitur pro actuali quam pro originali[^p424-2]: si ergo per adiutorium gratiae potest satisfacere pro suo actuali, multo fortius videtur, quod pro suo originali.

2. Item, « satisfacere, secundum quod dicit Anselmus[^p424-3], est honorem debitum Deo impendere »; sed quilibet homo, adiutus gratia, potest honorem debitum Deo impendere: ergo quilibet potest Deo pro peccato suo satisfacere. Si tu dicas, quod non potest impendere honorem, quem debet pro iniuria prius facta; contra: nulla iusta potestas exigit ab homine plus, quam potest — « anathema enim sit, qui dicit, Deum praecepisse impossibile[^p424-4] » — ergo nullum honorem debet Deo reddere, quem non possit.

3. Item, homo existens in gratia potest mereri summum bonum, quod Deus est[^p424-5]: ergo si multo maius est mereri summum bonum quam reconciliari sibi et confoederari, videtur, quod multo magis pro quolibet peccato suo possit satisfacere, non solum actuali, sed etiam originali.

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4. Item, existens in gratia aut non erat[^p425-1] dignus aliqua poena, aut temporali sola: si ergo debitor poenae temporalis potest illam poenam solvere, videtur, quod homo pro quolibet peccato, quod habet, possit satisfacere: ergo pro originali.

5. Item, gratia adveniens in animam aeque bene delet culpam originalem, sicut actualem; sed sicut se habet gratia secundum essentiam ad culpae deletionem, ita se habet secundum opera ad satisfactionem; sed gratia, adveniens in animam, liberat eam ab omni culpa, tam originali quam actuali: ergo movens animam[^p425-2] potest satisfacere pro omni culpa prius deleta: ergo quilibet homo potest satisfacere pro se ipso.

**Sed contra:** 1. Si quilibet homo posset satisfacere pro se ipso, ergo Christus gratis mortuus esset[^p425-3]: si ergo hoc est inconveniens et absurdum, restat, quod et illud, ex quo sequitur.

2. Item, sicut iniuria peccati totius generis humani est infinita ratione eius, contra quem est, sic et illa quae est in quolibet peccato singulari: ergo si aliquis purus homo non potuit satisfacere pro toto genere humano[^p425-4], pari etiam ratione videtur, quod non possit satisfacere pro se ipso.

3. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquis satisfaciat pro culpa, quamdiu manet in eo radix et causa culpae — « satisfacere enim est, sicut dicit Augustinus[^p425-5], causas peccatorum excidere » — sed vitium humanae originis nunquam separatur a carne peccati: ergo videtur, quod nullus homo, qui originale peccatum habuit, possit satisfacere pro originali. Maior manifesta est per Augustinum, sed minor manifestatur per hoc, quod quilibet generat filium habentem originale peccatum.

4. Item, ad hoc, quod fiat satisfactio, necessarium est, quod fiat damni recompensatio; sed propter peccatum originale quilibet habet necessitatem moriendi, et corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, sicut dicit Apostolus[^p425-6]: ergo si quis debet satisfacere pro originali peccato, tenetur reddere animam pro anima. Sed quilibet est mortis debitor pro originali peccato: ergo non videtur, quod aliquis, qui originale peccatum contraxit, possit unquam satisfacere pro illo.

5. Item, quod originale peccatum sit culpa, hoc habet, quia processit a voluntate Adae: si ergo requiritur satisfactio de ipso[^p425-7], secundum quod culpa, nullus potest pro originali satisfacere, nisi satisfaciat pro culpa Adae. Sed pro culpa Adae nullus potest satisfacere, secundum quod originalis est, nisi satisfaciat pro toto genere humano: ergo a primo, nullus potest satisfacere pro peccato originali alicuius hominis, nisi satisfaciat pro toto genere humano. Sed hoc non potest aliquis purus homo: ergo nullus potest satisfacere pro originali suo.

> **Conclusio.** Nullus, quantumvis gratia adiutus, potuit pro culpa originali satisfacere, ne semiplene quidem; nec pro suo proprio peccato plene, sed tantum semiplene.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est satisfactio plena[^p425-8], et est satisfactio semiplena. Satisfactio plena est, quando simul fit satisfactio de iniuria et de damno; satisfactio vero semiplena est, quando, remissa offensa, satisfactio fit pro damno. Intelligendum igitur est, quod pro nullo peccato, in quo fit aversio a Deo, potest satisfacere aliquis purus homo satisfactione plenaria, nec pro se ipso nec pro aliis, propter hoc quod offensa et iniuria illa superexcedit puram creaturam. — Si vero loquamur de satisfactione semiplena, illa videlicet, in qua, remissa offensa, requiritur emenda de damno; sic dicendum, quod homo potest satisfacere pro suo actuali[^p425-9], sed non pro originali.

Ratio autem huius est, quia peccatum actuale dicit depravationem voluntatis, sed originale dicit depravationem naturae. In hoc autem differt depravatio naturae a depravatione voluntatis, quod corruptio voluntatis respicit ipsam personam, ut est individuum, sed corruptio naturae, ut est alterius principium. — Item, quia voluntas est vertibilis, et corruptio in ea existens est facile mobilis; quia vero natura uno modo movetur[^p425-10], corruptio in ea existens est difficile mobilis. Quoniam igitur deordinatio voluntatis, introducta per actuale, est personae singularis et facile mobilis, recompensari potest per usum gratiae gratum facientis, quae respicit personam singularem; quia vero depravatio naturae est respiciens propagationem, et ita naturam communem, et ulterius eradicari non potest omnino: ideo pro damno illato[^p425-11] nemo potest satisfacere per gra-

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tiam singularis personae. Illa enim non tollit omnino originalis peccati radicem [ab eo in quo est, nec per se nec per] usum suum; et ideo non potest omnino tollere reatum et obligationem. Impossibile igitur fuit, quod aliquis pro peccato originali alicuius hominis[^p426-1] satisfaceret, nisi omnino a peccato originali mundus esset, nisi etiam haberet gratiam communem, hoc est gratiam capitis, cuius plenitudo nata est in alios redundare. Talis autem non potuit esse nisi homo et Deus, qui esset aliorum caput, sicut in praecedentibus[^p426-2] fuit ostensum, quia nullus nisi Deus potest influere aliis motum et sensum.

Et sic patet, quod pro minimo peccato originali, nec quantum ad satisfactionem plenariam nec quantum ad satisfactionem semiplenam, potuit satisfacere nisi Christus, id est homo et Deus. De actuali vero potest quidem purus homo, adiutus gratia, satisfacere, sed satisfactione semiplena, quae suppletionem et complementum recipit a passione Christi. Christus enim satisfaciens pro omni offensa, omnibus impetravit gratiam quantum ad sufficientiam: et merito illius satisfactionis homo suscipiens gratiam satisfacit postea Deo pro laesione, quam intulit sibi actualis culpa.

Et ex hoc patet, quomodo passio Christi influit in Sacramenta, et quare amplius influit in Sacramentum baptismi, quod est remedium contra originale, quam in Sacramentum poenitentiae. Et hoc est fundamentum multorum, quae in quarto libro[^p426-3] determinantur et supponuntur ab hoc libro. — Concedendum est igitur, quod nullus, adiutus gratia, satisfacere potuit pro se ipso. Concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.

1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur, quod satisfactio est pars poenitentiae; dicendum, quod ipsa poenitentia, sicut ostensum est, efficaciam habet a passione Christi, non solum post passionem, sed etiam ante; quia[^p426-4] Christus per passionem suam omnibus impetravit gratiam poenitentialem, et Deus praecedentibus Patribus dedit gratiam propter satisfactionem passionis promissam, sequentibus vero propter solutam. Et sicut nos iustificamur in fide passionis praeteritae, ita ipsi iustificabantur in fide passionis futurae. Unde et qui praeibant, et qui sequebantur clamabant: Hosanna filio David[^p426-5]. Unde ex hoc non habetur, quod aliquis sufficienter possit satisfacere pro se. — Praeterea, ratio illa non concludit de originali, sed solum de actuali. Poenitentia enim non est contra originale, sed contra actuale. — Nec valet quod obiicit, quod gravius est actuale quam originale; dicendum enim, quod etsi originale in posteris sit minus quam actuale, tamen quantum ad suam originem peccatum originale valde fuit grave, cum totam naturam humanam infecerit. Satisfactio autem peccati originalis respicit ipsam originem; et ideo dico, quod difficilius fuit satisfacere pro originali quam pro actuali, quia non potest fieri satisfactio pro uno originali, quin fiat pro omnibus; non sic autem est in peccatis actualibus[^p426-6].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod satisfacere est honorem debitum Deo reddere; dicendum, quod est debitum, quo tenemur Deo iure conditionis, et est debitum, quo obligamur Deo reatu praevaricationis. Dico ergo, quod debitum, quod cadit in notificatione satisfactionis, est debitum secundo modo dictum, et hoc quidem non potest solvere per se ipsum; ipse enim se reddidit impotentem, et ideo, nisi succurreret ei divina misericordia, salvari non posset. Et ideo non obligatur ad impossibile; quamvis enim sit ei impossibile per se, est tamen ei possibile per divinum adiutorium[^p426-7].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo existens in gratia potest mereri summum bonum; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia gratia singularis[^p426-8] bene habet ordinationem ad hoc, quod faciat hominem mereri summam beatitudinem, sed non ad hoc, quod faciat hominem satisfacere pro culpa originali, sicut prius ostensum fuit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod existens in gratia non mereretur nisi poenam temporalem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed tamen nulli peccatori datur gratia nisi merito satisfactionis et passionis Christi. Unde gratiae collatio satisfactionem originalis non facit, sed praesupponit; ideo non sequitur, quod aliquis per gratiam possit satisfacere pro originali culpa.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod gratia aequaliter delet omnem culpam, ergo aequaliter satisfacit pro omni culpa deleta; dicendum, quod non est simile propter hoc, quod deletio culpae attenditur in imaginis reformatione et conversione ad Deum; et quia per conversionem ad Deum[^p426-9] deletur omnis aversio, una gratia delet omnem culpam; satisfactio vero respicit obligationem ad poenam, et possibile est, quod una obligatio ad poenam solvatur, altera remanente. Ideo non sic indifferenter comparatur gratia ad satisfaciendum pro omni culpa, sicut ad delendum omnem culpam[^p426-10].

english:
### Question IV. *Whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself.*

Fourthly it is asked whether anyone, aided by grace, could have satisfied for himself. And that he could, it seems:

1. Because there are three parts of penance: contrition, confession, and satisfaction[^p424-1]; but a man, aided by grace, can be contrite for his sin and confess it: therefore he can satisfy for himself. If you say that he can for actual [sin] but not for original; on the contrary: the actual is greater than the original, because there the wickedness of the will is greater, and one is also punished more gravely for the actual than for the original[^p424-2]: if therefore by the help of grace he can satisfy for his actual [sin], much more strongly does it seem that he can for his original.

2. Likewise, "to satisfy, according to what Anselm says[^p424-3], is to render to God the honor owed"; but every man, aided by grace, can render to God the honor owed: therefore everyone can satisfy God for his sin. If you say that he cannot render the honor which he owes for the injury previously done; on the contrary: no just authority demands of a man more than he can [do] — "for let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible[^p424-4]" — therefore he owes God no honor that he cannot [render].

3. Likewise, a man existing in grace can merit the highest good, which is God[^p424-5]: therefore, since it is much greater to merit the highest good than to be reconciled to him and joined in covenant with him, it seems that much more can he satisfy for any sin of his, not only actual but also original.

4. Likewise, one existing in grace was either[^p425-1] not deserving of any punishment, or only of temporal [punishment]: if therefore one who is a debtor of temporal punishment can pay that punishment, it seems that a man can satisfy for any sin he has: therefore for the original.

5. Likewise, grace coming into the soul blots out original guilt just as well as actual; but as grace stands according to its essence in relation to the blotting out of guilt, so it stands according to its works in relation to satisfaction; but grace, coming into the soul, frees it from all guilt, both original and actual: therefore, moving the soul[^p425-2], it can satisfy for every guilt previously blotted out: therefore every man can satisfy for himself.

**On the contrary:** 1. If every man could satisfy for himself, then Christ would have died in vain[^p425-3]: if therefore this is unfitting and absurd, it remains that so too is that from which it follows.

2. Likewise, just as the injury of the sin of the whole human race is infinite by reason of him against whom it is, so too is that which is in any single sin: therefore if some mere man could not satisfy for the whole human race[^p425-4], by like reasoning too it seems that he cannot satisfy for himself.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone satisfy for guilt so long as the root and cause of the guilt remains in him — "for to satisfy, as Augustine says[^p425-5], is to cut off the causes of sins" — but the vice of human origin is never separated from the flesh of sin: therefore it seems that no man who has had original sin can satisfy for the original. The major is manifest through Augustine, but the minor is made manifest through the fact that everyone begets a son having original sin.

4. Likewise, for satisfaction to be made, it is necessary that a recompense for the loss be made; but on account of original sin everyone has the necessity of dying, and the body is dead on account of sin, as the Apostle says[^p425-6]: therefore if anyone is to satisfy for original sin, he is bound to render soul for soul. But everyone is a debtor of death for original sin: therefore it does not seem that anyone who has contracted original sin can ever satisfy for it.

5. Likewise, that original sin is guilt, it has this because it proceeded from the will of Adam: if therefore satisfaction for it[^p425-7] is required, insofar as it is guilt, no one can satisfy for the original unless he satisfies for the guilt of Adam. But for the guilt of Adam no one can satisfy, insofar as it is original, unless he satisfies for the whole human race: therefore, from the first, no one can satisfy for the original sin of any man unless he satisfies for the whole human race. But this no mere man can do: therefore no one can satisfy for his own original [sin].

> **Conclusion.** No one, however much aided by grace, could satisfy for original guilt, not even half-fully; nor for his own proper sin fully, but only half-fully.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is full satisfaction[^p425-8], and there is half-full satisfaction. Full satisfaction is when satisfaction is made at once both for the injury and for the loss; but half-full satisfaction is when, the offense having been remitted, satisfaction is made for the loss. It is to be understood, then, that for no sin in which there is an aversion from God can any mere man satisfy with full satisfaction, neither for himself nor for others, because that offense and injury exceeds a mere creature. — But if we speak of half-full satisfaction, namely that in which, the offense having been remitted, amends for the loss is required; thus it must be said that a man can satisfy for his actual [sin][^p425-9], but not for the original.

Now the reason for this is that actual sin denotes a depravity of the will, but original denotes a depravity of nature. And in this the depravity of nature differs from the depravity of the will, that the corruption of the will regards the person itself, as it is an individual, but the corruption of nature, as it is the principle of another. — Likewise, because the will is changeable, and the corruption existing in it is easily moved; but because nature is moved in one way[^p425-10], the corruption existing in it is moved with difficulty. Since therefore the disorder of the will, introduced through the actual [sin], is of a single person and easily moved, it can be recompensed through the use of grace that makes pleasing, which regards the single person; but because the depravity of nature is one that regards propagation, and so the common nature, and further cannot be eradicated altogether: therefore for the loss inflicted[^p425-11] no one can satisfy through the grace

of a single person. For it does not altogether remove the root of original sin [from him in whom it is, neither by itself nor by] its use; and therefore it cannot altogether remove the liability and the obligation. It was therefore impossible that anyone should satisfy for the original sin of any man[^p426-1] unless he were altogether clean of original sin, unless he also had common grace, that is, the grace of the head, whose fullness is born to overflow into others. But such a one could not be except one who was man and God, who should be the head of others, as was shown in the preceding [questions][^p426-2], because no one but God can flow into others motion and sense.

And thus it is clear that for the least original sin, neither as to full satisfaction nor as to half-full satisfaction, none could satisfy except Christ, that is, man and God. But for the actual a mere man, aided by grace, can indeed satisfy, but with half-full satisfaction, which receives its supplement and completion from the passion of Christ. For Christ, satisfying for every offense, obtained for all grace as to its sufficiency: and by the merit of that satisfaction a man receiving grace afterward satisfies God for the injury which actual guilt inflicted upon him.

And from this it is clear how the passion of Christ flows into the Sacraments, and why it flows more into the Sacrament of baptism, which is the remedy against original [sin], than into the Sacrament of penance. And this is the foundation of many things which are determined in the fourth book[^p426-3] and are presupposed by this book. — It is therefore to be conceded that no one, aided by grace, could satisfy for himself. The reasons too which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first, that satisfaction is a part of penance; it must be said that penance itself, as has been shown, has its efficacy from the passion of Christ, not only after the passion but even before; because[^p426-4] Christ through his passion obtained for all penitential grace, and God gave to the preceding Fathers grace on account of the satisfaction of the passion promised, but to those following on account of the satisfaction paid. And just as we are justified in faith in the past passion, so they were justified in faith in the future passion. Hence both those who went before and those who followed cried: Hosanna to the son of David[^p426-5]. Hence from this it is not had that anyone can sufficiently satisfy for himself. — Moreover, that reasoning does not conclude concerning the original, but only concerning the actual. For penance is not against the original, but against the actual. — Nor is that valid which objects that the actual is graver than the original; for it must be said that, although the original in descendants is less than the actual, nevertheless as to its own origin original sin was very grave, since it infected the whole human nature. But the satisfaction of original sin regards the very origin; and therefore I say that it was more difficult to satisfy for the original than for the actual, because satisfaction cannot be made for one original [sin] without its being made for all; but it is not so in actual sins[^p426-6].

2. To that which is objected, that to satisfy is to render to God the honor owed; it must be said that there is a debt by which we are bound to God by the right of [our] condition, and there is a debt by which we are obligated to God by the liability of transgression. I say therefore that the debt which falls under the notion of satisfaction is the debt spoken of in the second way, and this indeed [a man] cannot pay by himself; for he himself made himself powerless, and therefore, unless the divine mercy came to his aid, he could not be saved. And therefore he is not obligated to the impossible; for although it is impossible for him by himself, yet it is possible for him through divine help[^p426-7].

3. To that which is objected, that a man existing in grace can merit the highest good; it must be said that it is not alike, because singular grace[^p426-8] indeed has an ordination toward this, that it make a man merit the highest beatitude, but not toward this, that it make a man satisfy for original guilt, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that one existing in grace would merit only temporal punishment; it must be said that it is true; but nevertheless to no sinner is grace given except by the merit of the satisfaction and passion of Christ. Hence the conferral of grace does not make the satisfaction of the original, but presupposes it; therefore it does not follow that anyone can through grace satisfy for original guilt.

5. To that which is objected, that grace equally blots out every guilt, therefore it equally satisfies for every guilt blotted out; it must be said that it is not alike, because the blotting out of guilt is regarded in the reformation of the image and in conversion to God; and because through conversion to God[^p426-9] every aversion is blotted out, one grace blots out every guilt; but satisfaction regards the obligation to punishment, and it is possible that one obligation to punishment be paid while another remains. Therefore grace is not compared indifferently to satisfying for every guilt in the same way as to blotting out every guilt[^p426-10].

la: Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 16. et 17.

en: Cf. IV Sentences, d. 16 and 17.

la: Vide II. Sent. d. 33. a. 3. q. 1. seq.

en: See II Sentences, d. 33, a. 3, q. 1 and following.

la: Libr. I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11. et 20.

en: Book I, Why God [Became] Man, c. 11 and 20.

la: Hoc dictum invenitur in opusculo Hieronymo ascripto, quod inscribitur Symboli explanatio ad Damasum; cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXVI. c. 6. — Pro anathema enim sit codd. A K anathema enim est. Mox post debet edd. supplent homo.

en: This saying is found in a little work ascribed to Jerome, which is titled An Explanation of the Creed, to Damasus; cf. II Sentences, text of the Master, d. XXXVI, c. 6. — For "for let him be anathema" codices A K [read] "for he is anathema." Soon after "owes" the editions supply "[a] man."

en: Cf. II Sentences, d. 27, a. 2, q. 3.

la: Vat. est.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] "is."

la: Scil. ad operandum sive ad exercenda opera satisfactionis.

en: Namely, to working, or to carrying out the works of satisfaction.

la: Gal. 2, 21, ubi Vulg. et etiam edd. est pro esset. — Paulo ante pro posset edd. potest.

en: Gal. 2:21, where the Vulgate and also the editions [read] "is" for "would be." — A little before, for "could" the editions [read] "can."

la: Vide quaest. praeced.

en: See the preceding question.

la: Verius Gennadius, de Eccles. Dogmat. c. 24. (alias c. 54.). Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 15. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. — De minori, in qua pro carne peccati (Rom. 8, 3.) cod. U substituit carne peccatrice, cfr. II. Sent. d. 32. a. 1. q. 2.

en: More truly Gennadius, On the Dogmas of the Church, c. 24 (otherwise c. 54). Cf. IV Sentences, d. 15, p. II, a. 1, q. 1. — Concerning the minor, in which for "flesh of sin" (Rom. 8:3) codex U substitutes "sinful flesh," cf. II Sentences, d. 32, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Rom. 8, 10. Locutio, quae sequitur, reddere animam pro anima, sumta est ex Exod. 21, 23. — Voci peccatum edd. addunt originale.

en: Rom. 8:10. The expression which follows, "to render soul for soul," is taken from Exod. 21:23. — To the word "sin" the editions add "original."

la: Cod. R pro ipso. In fine arg. edd. omittunt suo, et addunt peccato.

en: Codex R [reads] "for it." At the end of the argument the editions omit "his own" and add "sin."

la: Alii distinguunt perfectam, quae per se et intrinsecus aequivalet debito, et imperfectam sive de se insufficientem.

en: Others distinguish [satisfaction] perfect, which by itself and intrinsically is equivalent to the debt, and imperfect, or of itself insufficient.

la: Edd. hic et subinde post originali subdunt peccato. Paulo superius ante illa videlicet codd. L aa inserunt de.

en: The editions here and thereafter after "original" subjoin "sin." A little above, before "namely that," codices L aa insert "of."

la: Aristot., Mechanicae, c. 1: Natura etenim eundem semper habet modum. Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). — Paulo ante pro Item codd. G Q Z aa Iterum. Paulo inferius pro per actuale edd. cum uno alteroque cod. pro actuali. Post pauca pro usum gratiae cod. N donum gratiae.

en: Aristotle, Mechanics, c. 1: "For nature always keeps the same way." Cf. IX Metaphysics, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). — A little before, for "Likewise" codices G Q Z aa [read] "Again." A little below, for "through the actual" the editions with one or another codex [read] "for the actual." After a few words, for "use of grace" codex N [reads] "gift of grace."

la: Codd. A K hic adiungunt pro originali peccato.

en: Codices A K here add "for original sin."

la: Dist. 13. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Aliquanto superius pro alicuius hominis cod. W cuiuslibet hominis.

en: D. 13, a. 2, q. 1 and following. — Somewhat above, for "of any man" codex W [reads] "of every man."

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. et dub. 1. et 2. — Aliquanto superius pro potest quidem codd. B C D G potest quidam, cod. O potest quilibet, et deinde pro omni offensa codd. A K omnium offensa. Inferius pro quomodo passio cod. Q qualiter passio.

en: Cf. above, d. 19, a. 1, q. 2 and following, and dub. 1 and 2. — Somewhat above, for "can indeed" codices B C D G [read] "can someone," codex O "can anyone," and then for "for every offense" codices A K [read] "of all offense." Below, for "how the passion" codex Q [reads] "in what manner the passion."

la: Dist. 9. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro in Sacramentum poenitentiae non pauci codd. in Sacramento poenitentiae, post quae verba cod. O subiungit quod est remedium contra actuale. Deinde post nullus codd. A K interiiciunt etiam.

en: D. 9, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — For "into the Sacrament of penance" not a few codices [read] "in the Sacrament of penance," after which words codex O subjoins "which is the remedy against the actual." Then after "no one" codices A K insert "even."

la: Plurimi codd. tamen quia.

en: Very many codices [read] "yet because."

en: See II Sentences, d. 21, a. 3, q. 3, and d. 33, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Cfr. Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 20. et 24.

en: Cf. Anselm, Book I, Why God [Became] Man, c. 20 and 24.

la: Edd. supplent personae. Mox pro faciat edd. facit.

en: The editions supply "of the person." Soon after, for "it make" the editions [read] "it makes."

la: Verba et quia per conversionem ad Deum, quae ab edd. absunt, restituimus ex codd. A F K (L a secunda manu) M O P R S aa bb cc. Mox pro una gratia edd. absque auctoritate codd. exhibent una ergo gratia, et deinde ante possibile est omisso et, post haec verba iterum, codd. obnitentibus, ponunt ergo. Paulo inferius pro comparatur Vat. substituit operatur.

en: The words "and because through conversion to God," which are absent from the editions, we have restored from codices A F K (L by a second hand) M O P R S aa bb cc. Soon, for "one grace" the editions, without the authority of the codices, present "one grace therefore," and then before "it is possible," with "and" omitted, after these words again, the codices objecting, they put "therefore." A little below, for "is compared" the Vatican [edition] substitutes "operates."

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question.

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands of printed pp. 424–426 (PDF pp. 446–448; offset pdf = printed + 22), per the Vol II/III override (PDF-priority inversion for the cascade-fragmented Respondeo/Solutio/footers). The IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol3_raw.txt`, q4 opener at raw line 29525, next QUAESTIO V at raw 29682) was used only as a cross-check for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. English is a fresh literal translation.

**Page-split map (apparatus, per-page restart):**
- **p. 424** (q4 opener through arg. 3): notes 1–5. Footers 1–4 are the hand-off picked up from the prior dispatch (n.1 *satisfactio*: Cfr. IV Sent. d.16,17; n.2 *originali*: Vide II Sent. d.33; n.3 *Anselmus*: Cur Deus homo I c.11,20; n.4 the *anathema* dictum ascribed to Jerome). n.5 (*summum bonum*: Cfr. II Sent. d.27 a.2 q.3) is also on p.424.
- **p. 425** (args 4–5, Sed contra 1–5, Conclusio, Respondeo, Ratio): notes 1–11.
- **p. 426** (Respondeo continuation, Conclusio 3, Corollarium, Solutio oppositorum ad 1–5): notes 1–10, **complete and contiguous** (L footer column carries nn.1–4, R footer column carries nn.5–10). **Correction (decade-polish gate, 2026-06-05):** an earlier hand-off claimed p.426's printed footer sequence skips marker 6 (ran 1–5, 7–10). Verified against the 600 dpi render of PDF p.448 (`raw/vision/vol3/crop-p426-Rfoot.png`): note **6 IS printed** in the right footer column — `⁶ Vide II. Sent. d. 21. a. 3. q. 3. et d. 33. a. 1. q. 2.` — and its body anchor `⁶` sits on *…in peccatis actualibus⁶* (R-column body, end of the *Solutio ad 1* — Eng. "but it is not so in actual sins"). The original promotion **dropped** n.6 (a genuine cross-chunk dropout, not a source skip); it was **backfilled** in this pass as `[^p426-6]`. The final footer, p.426 n.10 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*), is the editors' pointer establishing that q4 carries no scholion of its own.

**Scholion status: `has_scholion: false`.** q4 has no scholion of its own. q3's scholion (§I and §IV) explicitly covers "this and the following (4th) question," and p.426 n.10 directs the reader to the scholion of the preceding question. The Scot./Nominales survey ("De hac 4. quaestione: Alex. Hal. …") visible at the top of p.424 right column is the tail of **q3's** scholion, not q4's, and stays with q3.

**Cross-chunk hand-offs:**
- *Picked up* from d20-a1-q3: p.424 footers nn.1–4 (q4's first body-footers, listed above). q4 opens lower-left on p.424; q3's scholion fills the upper columns of p.424.
- *Forwarded* to d20-a1-q5: q5 (*Quinto quaeritur, utrum Deus debuerit modum…*) opens at raw line 29682, printed **p.427** (PDF 449). p.426's footer sequence is fully consumed here (nn.1–10, contiguous; n.6 backfilled in the 2026-06-05 polish gate); no p.426 footers migrate forward. The running head `DIST. XX. ART. UNICUS QUAEST. V.` at the foot of this chunk's raw range is the boundary marker into q5.

**[?] flags:** none. One typographic restoration worth noting: on p.426, the OCR/print shows `originalis peccati radicem [ab eo in quo est, nec per se nec per] usum suum` — the bracketed clause is supplied from the column read (the L-column band carried it cleanly); it is not a conjecture.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0