title: Dist. 8

title_alt: Distinctio VIII — textus Magistri Sententiarum

title_alt: Distinction VIII — text of the Master of the Sentences

source_text:
### DISTINCTIO VIII.

### Cap. I. *De veritate ac proprietate divinae essentiae.*

Nunc de veritate sive[^1] proprietate, et incommutabilitate atque simplicitate divinae naturae vel substantiae sive essentiae agendum est. «Est itaque Deus, ut ait Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^2], sine dubitatione substantia vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci *usiam* vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est *sapere* dicta est *sapientia*, et ab eo quod est *scire* dicta est *scientia*; ita ab eo quod est *esse* dicta est *essentia*. Et quis magis est quam ille, qui in *Exodi* tertio[^3] dixit famulo suo Moysi: *Ego sum qui sum. Et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos*». Ipse vere ac proprie dicitur essentia, cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Unde Hieronymus ad Marcellam[^4] scribens ait: «Deus solus, qui exordium non habet, verae essentiae nomen tenuit, quia in eius comparatione, qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, quasi non sunt quae mutabilia sunt. De quo enim dicitur *fuit*, non est; et de quo dicitur *erit*, nondum est. Deus autem tantum *est*, qui non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum esse*[^5]. Solus ergo Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est».

Hic diligenter advertendum est, quomodo intelligi debeant illa verba Hieronymi, scilicet: «Deus tantum *est* et non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum esse*», tanquam non possit dici de Deo *fuit* vel *erit*, sed tantum *est*, cum de eo scriptum frequenter reperiamus: *fuit ab aeterno*, *fuit semper*, et *erit in saecula*, et huiusmodi; unde videtur, quia non est tantum dicendum de Deo *fuit*, vel *est*, vel *erit*. Si enim diceretur tantum *fuit*, putaretur, quod desierit esse; si diceretur tantum *est*, putaretur, quod non semper fuerit, sed esse coeperit; si tantum diceretur *erit*, putaretur non esse modo. Dicatur ergo, quia semper *fuit*, *est* et *erit*, ut intelligatur, quia nec coepit nec desiit nec desinit[^6] nec desinet esse. De hoc Augustinus *super Ioannem*[^7] ita ait: «Cum de sempiterna re proprie dicatur *est*, secundum nos bene dicitur *fuit* et *erit* et *est*: *fuit*, quia nunquam desiit; *erit*, quia nunquam deerit; *est*, quia semper est: non praeteriit, quasi quod non maneat; non orietur[^8], quasi quod non erat. Cum ergo nostra locutio per tempora varietur, de eo vere dicuntur verba cuiuslibet temporis, qui nullo tempore defuit vel deest vel deerit; et ideo non est mirum, si de Spiritu veritatis Veritas loquens dixit per futurum: *Quaecumque audiet loquetur*[^9]; *audiet*, scilicet ab eo a quo procedit. Audire illius est scire, idem etiam[^10] esse. A quo ergo est illi essentia, ab illo audientia, id est scientia, quae non est aliud quam essentia. *Audiet* ergo dixit de eo quod audivit et audit, id est, quod semper scivit, scit et sciet». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, verba cuiuslibet temporis dici de Deo, sed tamen[^11] proprie *est*. Illud ergo quod Hieronymus dicit, ita intelligendum est: non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum esse*, sed tantum *esse*, id est, cum dicitur de Deo, quod *fuit* vel *erit*, non est intelligendum, quod praeterierit vel futurus sit[^12], sed quod existat simpliciter sine aliquo temporali motu. Licet enim verba substantiva diversorum temporum de Deo dicantur, ut *fuit*, *erit*, *est*, *erat*, non tamen temporales motus tunc[^13] distinguunt, scilicet praeteritum vel futurum vel praeteritum imperfectum vel praeteritum perfectum vel praeteritum plus quam perfectum, sed essentiam sive existentiam divinitatis simpliciter insinuant. Deus ergo solus proprie dicitur essentia vel esse; unde Hilarius in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^14] ait: «Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas».

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### Cap. II. *De incommutabilitate eiusdem.*

Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur, quia nec mutatur nec mutari potest. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^15]: «Aliae, inquit, essentiae vel substantiae capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola substantia vel essentia, quae est Deus, incommutabilis est, cui profecto maxime ac verissime competit esse. Quod enim mutatur non servat ipsum esse; et quod mutari potest, etiam si non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse; ideoque illud solum, quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, verissime dicitur esse», id est substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Ideoque Apostolus loquens de Deo ait: *Qui solus habet immortalitatem*[^16]. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro primo *de Trinitate*[^17]: «Cum anima quodam modo immortalis esse dicatur et sit, non diceret Apostolus: *Solus Deus habet immortalitatem*, nisi quia vera immortalitas incommutabilitas est, quam nulla potest habere creatura, quoniam solius Creatoris est». Unde Iacobus ait[^18]: *Apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*. Et David: *Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es*. Ideo Augustinus *super Genesim*[^19] dicit, quod Deus nec per loca nec per tempora movetur, creatura vero per tempora et loca. Et per tempora moveri est per affectiones commutari; Deus autem nec loco nec affectione mutari potest, qui per Prophetam ait[^20]: *Ego Deus, et non mutor*; qui est immutabilis solus. Unde recte solus dicitur habere immortalitatem. «In omni enim mutabili natura, ut ait Augustinus *contra Maximinum*[^21], nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio, quia facit aliquid in ea non esse, quod erat. Unde et ipsa anima humana, quae ideo dicitur immortalis, quia secundum modum suum nunquam desinit vivere, habet tamen quandam mortem suam; quia si iuste vivebat et peccat, moritur iustitiae; si peccatrix erat et iustificatur, moritur peccato, ut alias eius mutationes taceam, de quibus modo longum est disputare. Et creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum est diabolus princeps; et qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Et ideo solus Deus, ut ait Apostolus, habet immortalitatem, qui non cuiusquam gratia, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest aliqua conversione mutari, nec potuit nec poterit aliqua mutatione peccare». «Proinde, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro *de Trinitate*[^22], substantiam Dei sine ulla sui commutatione mutabilia facientem et sine ullo suo temporali motu temporalia creantem intueri et nosse, licet sit difficile, oportet». Vere ergo ac proprie incommutabilis est sola Divinitatis essentia, quae sine sui mutatione cunctas condidit naturas.

### Cap. III. *De simplicitate eiusdem.*

Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est, ubi nec partium nec accidentium seu[^23] quarumlibet formarum ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo. Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex sit illa substantia, ut te docet Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^24], «animadverte primo, quare omnis creatura sit multiplex et nullo modo vere simplex, et primo de corporali, postea de spirituali creatura. Corporalis utique creatura partibus constat, ita ut sit ibi alia pars minor, alia maior, et maius sit totum quam pars quaelibet; et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim, et minuta magnitudine, manere idem color et eadem figura; et colore mutato, manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo. Ac per hoc multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo».

### Cap. IV. *De corporali et spirituali creatura, quomodo sit multiplex, et non simplex.*

«Creatura quoque spiritualis, ut est anima, in comparatione quidem corporis est simplex, sine comparatione vero corporis multiplex est, et non simplex. Quae ideo simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore et in toto tota est et in qualibet eius parte tota est. Et ideo, cum fit[^25] aliquid in quavis exigua particula corporis, quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit, quia totam non latet. Sed tamen nec in ipsa anima vera simplicitas

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est. Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia, possintque haec et alia huiusmodi innumerabilia in animae natura inveniri, et alia sine aliis et alia magis[^26], alia minus, manifestum est, non simplicem, sed multiplicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis est»: nulla ergo creatura vere simplex est. «Deus vero, etsi multiplex dicatur, vere tamen et summe simplex est. Dicitur enim magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur, sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quae sapientia. Non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute, et eadem bonitas, quae sapientia et magnitudo et veritas; et non est ibi aliud ipsum beatum esse, et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino esse».

### Cap. V. *Quod Deus, cum sit simplex, tamen multipliciter dicitur.*

Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Augustinus, solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat, eundem multipliciter dici. Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum, quae de Deo dicuntur; quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam. Haec enim non ita accipiuntur, cum de illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore, quam est humanus animus, dicuntur, quemadmodum cum de creaturis dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^27]: «Deo est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse vel sapientem esse vel iustum esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significetur. Humano autem animo non est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse aut prudentem aut iustum; potest enim esse animus et nullam istarum habere virtutum».

### Cap. VI. *Quod Dei simplicitas nulli praedicamentorum subiicitur.*

Quod autem in natura divina nulla sit accidentium diversitas nullaque penitus mutabilitas, sed perfecta simplicitas, ostendit Augustinus in quinto libro *de Trinitate*[^28] dicens: «Intelligamus Deum, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omnino invenire quid sit, pie tamen caveat, quantum potest, aliquid de illo sentire, quod non sit». Ecce, si subtiliter intendas, ex his atque praedictis aperitur, illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae Dei naturae minime convenire, quae nullis subiecta est accidentibus.

### Cap. VII. *Quod Deus abusive dicitur substantia.*

Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro septimo *de Trinitate*[^29]: «Sicut ab eo quod est *esse* appellatur *essentia*, ita ab eo quod est *subsistere* *substantiam* dicimus, si tamen dignum est, ut Deus dicatur subsistere. Hoc enim de his rebus recte intelligitur, in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur, sicut in corpore color aut forma. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est. Res ergo[^30] mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae. Deus autem, si subsistit, ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tanquam in subiecto, et non est simplex. Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat Deus et subsit bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tanquam in subiecto. Unde manifestum est, Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiori intelligatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est».

### Cap. VIII. *Quod non sit in Deo aliquid, quod non sit Deus.*

Huius autem essentiae simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod non est in ea aliquid, quod non sit ipsa; sed idem est habens et quod habetur. Unde Hilarius in septimo libro *de Trinitate*[^31] ait: «Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit, neque qui virtus est, ex infirmis continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur, neque qui spiritus est, ex disparibus formalis est: totum quod in eo est, unum est». Idem in octavo libro *de Trinitate*[^32] ait: «Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est, ut in eo aliud sit quod ab eo habetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeat, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum». De hoc eodem Boethius in primo libro *de Trinitate* ait: «Quocirca hoc vere unum est, in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeter id quod est; neque enim subiectum fieri potest». Augustinus quoque in libro *de Fide et Symbolo* dicit: «In Dei substantia non est aliquid, quod non sit substantia, quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, aliud quod accidat substantiae. Sed quidquid ibi intelligi potest, substantia est. Verum haec dici possunt facile et credi, videri autem nisi puro corde omnino non possunt». Item Augustinus in decimo quinto libro *de Trinitate*: «Sic habetur in natura uniuscuiusque trium, ut qui habet hoc sit, quod habet, sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia». Unde Isidorus ait: «Deus simplex dicitur, sive non amittendo quod habet, seu quod aliud non est ipse, et aliud quod in ipso est». Et cum tantae simplicitatis atque sinceritatis sit natura divina, est tamen in ea personarum Trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro undecimo *de Civitate Dei* ait: «Non propter hoc naturam summi boni simplicem dicimus, quia est Pater in ea solus, aut Filius in ea solus, aut Spiritus sanctus in ea solus, aut quia sola est ista nominum trinitas sine substantia personarum, sicut Sabelliani putaverunt: sed ideo simplex dicitur, quia est hoc quod habet, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur, nec est ipsa. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, ad quem relative dicitur, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo vero ad semetipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet, sicut ad semetipsum dicitur vivus, habendo vitam, et eadem vita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque natura haec dicitur simplex, quod non sit aliud habens, et aliud id quod habet, sicut in ceteris rebus est. Non enim habens liquorem liquor est, nec corpus color, nec anima est sapientia». Ecce, quanta est identitas, quanta est unitas, immutabilitas, simplicitas, puritas divinae substantiae, iuxta infirmitatis nostrae valitudinem assignavimus.

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### DISTINCTION VIII.

### Chap. I. *On the truth and propriety of the divine essence.*

Now we must treat of the truth or propriety, and the immutability and simplicity of the divine nature or[^1] substance or essence. «God is, therefore, as Augustine says in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^2], without doubt substance or, if this is better called so, essence, which the Greeks call *usia*. For just as from what is *to be wise* the word *wisdom* is derived, and from what is *to know* the word *knowledge* is derived; so from what is *to be* the word *essence* is derived. And who is more than he who in the third [chapter] of *Exodus*[^3] said to his servant Moses: *I am who am. And you shall say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you*». He himself is truly and properly called essence, whose essence does not know past or future. Hence Jerome, writing to Marcella[^4], says: «God alone, who has no beginning, has held the name of true essence, because, in comparison with him who truly is — for he is unchangeable — the things which are changeable are as though not. For of that which is said *was*, it is not; and of that which is said *will be*, it is not yet. But God only *is*, who does not know *to have been* or *to be about to be*[^5]. Therefore God alone truly is, in comparison with whose essence our being is not».

Here it must be carefully noted how those words of Jerome are to be understood, namely: «God only *is* and does not know *to have been* or *to be about to be*», as though it could not be said of God *he was* or *he will be*, but only *he is*, although we frequently find it written of him: *he was from eternity*, *he was always*, and *he will be unto ages*, and the like; whence it seems, that not only *was*, or *is*, or *will be* must be said of God. For if only *was* were said, it would be supposed that he had ceased to be; if only *is* were said, it would be supposed that he had not always been, but had begun to be; if only *will be* were said, it would be supposed that he is not now. Therefore let it be said that he always *was*, *is*, and *will be*, so that it may be understood that he neither began nor ceased nor ceases[^6] nor will cease to be. Concerning this Augustine *on John*[^7] thus says: «Although of an everlasting thing it is properly said *is*, according to us *was* and *will be* and *is* are well said: *was*, because he never ceased; *will be*, because he will never fail; *is*, because he always is: he has not passed away, as though something that does not remain; he has not arisen[^8], as though something that was not. Therefore, although our manner of speaking is varied through times, words of any time are truly said of him who at no time has failed or fails or will fail; and so it is not surprising if, of the Spirit of truth, the Truth speaking said by the future tense: *Whatsoever he shall hear, he will speak*[^9]; *he shall hear*, namely from him from whom he proceeds. For him to hear is to know, the same also[^10] to be. From him therefore from whom essence comes to him, from him hearing, that is knowledge, which is no other than essence. *He shall hear* therefore he said of that which he has heard and hears, that is, that which he always knew, knows and will know». Behold, here Augustine says that words of any time are said of God, but yet[^11] properly *is*. That, therefore, which Jerome says is to be thus understood: he does not know *to have been* or *to be about to be*, but only *to be*, that is, when it is said of God that *he was* or *he will be*, it is not to be understood that he has passed by or is about to be[^12], but that he exists simply without any temporal motion. For although substantive verbs of various tenses are said of God, as *was*, *will be*, *is*, *was [imperfect]*, they do not then[^13] distinguish temporal motions, namely past or future or imperfect past or perfect past or pluperfect past, but simply convey the essence or existence of divinity. Therefore God alone is properly called essence or being; whence Hilary in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^14] says: «Being is not an accident to God, but a subsisting truth and an abiding cause and a natural property of his kind».

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### Chap. II. *On the immutability of the same.*

Of God alone also the essence is properly called immutable, because it neither is changed nor can be changed. Hence Augustine in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^15]: «Other essences or substances, he says, admit accidents, by which there occurs in them either great or whatever change; but to God nothing of this sort can happen; and so the substance or essence alone, which is God, is immutable, to which assuredly most and most truly belongs *being*. For what is changed does not keep being itself; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can be what it had been not to be; and therefore that alone, which not only is not changed, but also cannot at all be changed, is most truly said to be», that is, the substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Apostle, speaking of God, says: *Who alone has immortality*[^16]. For as Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*[^17]: «Although the soul is in a certain way said to be and is immortal, the Apostle would not say: *God alone has immortality*, unless because true immortality is immutability, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone». Hence James says[^18]: *With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration*. And David: *Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but thou art the selfsame*. Therefore Augustine *on Genesis*[^19] says, that God is moved neither through places nor through times, but the creature [is moved] through times and places. And to be moved through times is to be changed through affections; but God can be changed neither by place nor by affection, who through the Prophet says[^20]: *I am God, and I am not changed*; who is unchangeable alone. Hence rightly he alone is said to have immortality. «For in every changeable nature, as Augustine says *against Maximinus*[^21], some death is the very change itself, because it makes something in it not to be, which was. Whence also the human soul itself, which is therefore called immortal, because in its own mode it never ceases to live, has nevertheless a certain death of its own; for if it was living justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was sinful and is justified, it dies to sin, to be silent about its other changes, of which it is now long to dispute. And the nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because they could sin. For the Angels also sinned and were made demons, of whom the devil is prince; and those who did not sin, were able to sin; and to whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not from its own nature, but from God's grace. And therefore God alone, as the Apostle says, has immortality, who not by anyone's grace, but by his own nature could not nor can be changed by any turning, nor could nor will be able to sin by any change». «Accordingly, as Augustine says in the first book *On the Trinity*[^22], the substance of God making changeable things without any change of himself, and creating temporal things without any temporal motion of his own, to behold and to know, although it is difficult, is necessary». Truly, therefore, and properly the essence of the Divinity alone is immutable, which without change of itself founded all natures.

### Chap. III. *On the simplicity of the same.*

And that same essence alone is properly and truly simple, where there is no diversity nor variation nor multitude of parts nor of accidents nor[^23] of any forms whatsoever. But that you may know how that substance is simple, as Augustine teaches you in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^24], «consider first why every creature is multiple and in no way truly simple, and first concerning the corporeal, afterwards concerning the spiritual creature. The corporeal creature certainly consists of parts, so that there is in it one part smaller, another greater, and the whole is greater than any part; and in each body one thing is magnitude, another color, another figure. For it is possible, the magnitude being diminished, that the same color and the same figure remain; and the color being changed, that the same figure and the same magnitude remain. And through this the nature of body is shown to be multiple, but simple in no way».

### Chap. IV. *On the corporeal and spiritual creature, how it is multiple, and not simple.*

«The spiritual creature also, as the soul, in comparison indeed with body is simple, but without comparison with body is multiple, and not simple. Which is therefore called simple with respect to the body, because it is not diffused by bulk through the space of place, but in each body and in the whole is whole, and in any part of it is whole. And therefore, when something occurs[^25] in any small particle whatever of the body, which the soul perceives, although it does not occur in the whole body, yet the soul perceives it as a whole, because it is not hidden from the whole. But yet not even in the soul itself is there true simplicity

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. For since one thing is to be skilled, another to be unskilled, another to be acute, another to be mindful, another desire, another fear, another joy, another sadness, and these and other innumerable things of this sort may be found in the nature of the soul, and some without others and some more[^26], some less, it is manifest that the nature is not simple, but multiple. For nothing simple is changeable; but every creature is changeable»: therefore no creature is truly simple. «But God, even though he be called multiple, is yet truly and supremely simple. For he is called great, good, wise, blessed, true and whatever else does not seem unfittingly to be said, but the same is his magnitude, which is his wisdom. For he is great not by bulk, but by power, and the same is his goodness which is his wisdom and magnitude and truth; and there is not there one thing his being blessed, and another his being great or wise or true or good or being at all».

### Chap. V. *That God, although he is simple, is yet said multiply.*

Here it must be carefully noted, since Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, why he says that he is said multiply. But he says this not on account of diversity of accidents or parts, but on account of the diversity and multitude of names which are said of God; which, although they are multiple, yet signify one thing, namely the divine nature. For these are not so received, when they are said of that immutable and eternal substance, incomparably more simple than is the human mind, as when they are said of creatures. Hence Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^27]: «For God, to be is the same as to be strong or to be wise or to be just, and whatever you may say of that simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity by which his substance is signified. But for the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong or prudent or just; for the mind can be and have none of these virtues».

### Chap. VI. *That God's simplicity is subject to none of the predicaments.*

But that in the divine nature there is no diversity of accidents and no mutability at all, but perfect simplicity, Augustine shows in the fifth book *On the Trinity*[^28] saying: «Let us understand God, as much as we are able, good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, presiding without situation, containing all things without habit, everywhere whole without place, eternal without time, making changeable things without any change of himself and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God thus, even if he is not yet able fully to find what he is, let him piously beware, as much as he is able, of feeling anything of him which he is not». Behold, if you attend subtly, from these and the foresaid it is opened, that those predicaments of the dialectical art do not at all fit the nature of God, which is subject to no accidents.

### Chap. VII. *That God is improperly called substance.*

Hence neither is he properly called substance, as Augustine shows in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^29]: «Just as from what is *to be* is called *essence*, so from what is *to subsist* we call *substance*, if however it is fitting that God be said to subsist. For this is rightly understood of those things in which the subjects are those things which are said to be in some subject, as in body color or figure. For body subsists, and so is substance. Therefore[^30] changeable and non-simple things are properly called substances. But God, if he subsists, so that he may be properly called substance, there is in him something as in a subject, and he is not simple. But it is unlawful to say that God subsists and is subject to his own goodness, and that that goodness is not substance or rather essence, and that God himself is not his own goodness, but that it is in him as in a subject. Hence it is manifest that God is improperly called substance, so that by a more usual name essence may be understood, which is truly and properly said, so that perhaps only God ought to be called essence. For he alone truly is, because he is immutable».

### Chap. VIII. *That there is not in God anything which is not God.*

But the simplicity and sincerity of this essence is so great, that there is not in it anything which is not it itself; but the same is the one having and that which is had. Hence Hilary in the seventh book *On the Trinity*[^31] says: «Not from composites does God, who is life, subsist, nor does he who is strength consist of weak things, nor is he who is light fitted together from dark things, nor is he who is spirit formed[^32] of disparate things: the whole which is in him is one». The same in the eighth book *On the Trinity* says: «Not in human manner is God from composites, so that in him one thing should be that which is had by him, and another thing he himself who has, but the whole is life, namely a perfect and infinite nature and not constituted from disparate things, but living itself through the whole». Concerning this same matter Boethius in the first book *On the Trinity* says: «Wherefore this is truly one, in which there is no number, nothing in it other than that which it is; for it cannot become a subject». Augustine also in the book *On Faith and the Creed* says: «In God's substance there is not anything which is not substance, as though one thing were there substance, another what would accident to substance. But whatever can be there understood is substance. Truly these things can easily be said and believed, but to be seen [they] cannot be at all except by a pure heart». Likewise Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*: «So it is held in the nature of each of the three, that he who has this should be that which he has, like the immutable and simple substance». Hence Isidore says: «God is called simple, either because he does not lose what he has, or because he himself is not one thing, and another thing what is in him». And although the divine nature is of so great simplicity and sincerity, yet there is in it the Trinity of persons. Hence Augustine in the eleventh book *On the City of God* says: «We do not therefore call the nature of the highest good simple, because the Father is in it alone, or the Son in it alone, or the Holy Spirit in it alone, or because it is only a trinity of names without the substance of persons, as the Sabellians supposed: but it is therefore called simple, because it is what it has, except that each person is said relatively to the other, and is not it itself. For the Father indeed has the Son, to whom he is said relatively, but yet he himself is not the Son; and the Son has the Father, but yet he himself is not the Father. But in what it is said to itself, not to another, this is what it has, as it is said to itself living, by having life, and the same life it itself is. On this account, therefore, this nature is called simple, because it is not one thing having, and another that which it has, as it is in other things. For the one having liquor is not liquor, nor body color, nor soul wisdom». Behold, how great is the identity, how great the unity, immutability, simplicity, purity of the divine substance, according to the measure of our weakness we have set forth.

---

la: Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 8 *sive*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 3, 8, [reads] *sive*.

la: Cap. 2. n. 3. Cfr. etiam XII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 2.

en: Chapter 2, no. 3. Compare also *On the City of God* XII, c. 2.

la: Vers. 14, ubi Vulgata: *Ego sum qui sum. Ait: Sic dices* etc. — Immediate ante Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8 omittit *Moysi*.

en: Verse 14, where the Vulgate has: *I am who am. He said: Thus shalt thou say*, etc. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, omits *Moysi*.

la: Edd. 6, 7, 8 *ad Damasum*, attamen neutro in loco haec sententia ad verbum invenitur, sed apud Isidorum, VII. *Etymolog.* c. 1. n. 10–13, ubi in ed. Migne (*Patr. lat.* tom. 82.) recte observatur, locum istum potius conflatum esse ex Augustini et Gregorii variis locis, et primam partem, scil. usque ad *non sint*, sumtam esse ex August., VIII. *de Civ. Dei*, c. 11. — Vide etiam Rabanum, *Comment. in Exod.* libr. I. c. 6. — In ipso textu Vat. cum cod. A et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 *tenet* loco *tenuit*, et mox cum edd. 1, 4, 7 *quasi non sint* pro *quasi non sunt*.

en: Editions 6, 7, 8 [read] *to Damasus*, although in neither place is this sentence found verbatim, but in Isidore, *Etymologies* VII, c. 1, nn. 10–13, where in the Migne edition (*Patrologia Latina* tome 82) it is rightly observed that that passage is rather a conflation from various places of Augustine and Gregory, and that the first part, namely as far as *non sint*, was taken from Augustine, *On the City of God* VIII, c. 11. — See also Rabanus, *Comment. on Exodus* book I, c. 6. — In the text itself the Vatican edition with codex A and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 [reads] *tenet* in place of *tenuit*, and shortly after with editions 1, 4, 7 *quasi non sint* in place of *quasi non sunt*.

la: Codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *vel futurum esse*, et paulo infra cod. D cum edd. 1, 8 ponunt *de Deo* pro *de eo*.

en: The codices and edition 1 omit *vel futurum esse*, and a little below codex D with editions 1, 8 read *de Deo* in place of *de eo*.

la: In Vat. et cod. D nec non in edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 desiderantur verba *nec desinit*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex D, and also in editions 4, 5, 6, 7, the words *nec desinit* are missing.

la: *Tract.* 99. n. 4–5; est tamen aliqua differentia verborum in principio.

en: *Tractate* 99, nn. 4–5; yet there is some difference of wording at the beginning.

la: Fide codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 necnon originali consentiente substituimus *orietur* pro *erit*. Paulo supra codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 omittunt contra contextum *et est*.

en: On the authority of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 and the original [Augustine] agreeing, we have substituted *orietur* for *erit*. A little above, the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 omit, against the context, *et est*.

la: Codd. B C D E *est* loco *etiam*; cod. A *etiam est*.

en: Codices B C D E [read] *est* in place of *etiam*; codex A [reads] *etiam est*.

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *tamen*.

en: The codices with edition 1 omit *tamen*.

la: Vat. contra codd. B C D E et fere omnes edd. *praeteriit vel futurum sit*.

en: The Vatican edition, against codices B C D E and almost all editions, [reads] *praeteriit vel futurum sit*.

la: Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, *esse* pro *tunc*. Paulo infra Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, verbo *divinitatis* praefigit *suae*.

en: The Vatican edition with the editions, except edition 1, [reads] *esse* in place of *tunc*. A little below, the Vatican edition with the editions, except edition 1, prefixes *suae* to the word *divinitatis*.

la: *Num.* 11. — Paulo ante Vat., dempta 1, addunt *suae* post *existentiam*.

en: *Number* 11. — A little before, the Vatican edition, with the exception of edition 1, adds *suae* after *existentiam*.

la: Cap. 2. n. 3. — In quo textu post *non servat ipsum* contra originale, codd. et ed. 1 Vat. cum aliis edd. addit *verum*.

en: Chapter 2, no. 3. — In which text, after *non servat ipsum*, against the original, the codices, and edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions adds *verum*.

la: I. Timoth. 6, 16; idem textus infra bis occurrit.

en: 1 Timothy 6:16; the same text occurs twice below.

en: Chapter 1, no. 2.

la: Cap. 1, 17. Sola Vat. *Apud Deum*. — Sequens textus est Psalm. 101, 28.

en: Chapter 1, 17. Only the Vatican edition [reads] *Apud Deum*. — The following text is Psalm 101:28.

la: *Super Genes. ad litteram* VIII. c. 20. n. 39. secundum sensum; cfr. etiam c. 21. 22. 23. 26.

en: *On Genesis according to the Letter* VIII, c. 20, n. 39, according to the sense; compare also cc. 21, 22, 23, 26.

la: Malach. 3, 6. Vulgata: *Ego Dominus* etc.

en: Malachi 3:6. The Vulgate [reads]: *I am the Lord*, etc.

en: Book II, c. 12, n. 1.

en: Chapter 1, no. 3.

la: Edd., exceptis 1, 8, *nec*.

en: The editions, except 1 and 8, [read] *nec*.

la: Cap. 6. n. 8. — Paulo ante restituimus ex codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8 *ut* ante *docet Augustinus*. In ipso textu ante *de corporali* Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 4, *primum* pro *primo*. Deinde ante *partibus* Vat. cum plurimis edd. et cod. B addit *ex*. Mox post *ibi* Vat. ponit *aliqua* pro *alia*. Paulo infra ante *figura. Potest* Vat. cum plurimis edd. adiicit *est*, et immediate post omissa particula *et* ponit *imminuta* pro *minuta* contra codd. B C D et fere omnes edd.; Augustinus *diminuta*.

en: Chapter 6, no. 8. — A little before, we restored from the codices and editions 1, 6, 8 the word *ut* before *docet Augustinus*. In the text itself, before *de corporali*, the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 4, [reads] *primum* in place of *primo*. Then, before *partibus*, the Vatican edition with most editions and codex B adds *ex*. Shortly after *ibi* the Vatican edition reads *aliqua* in place of *alia*. A little below, before *figura. Potest*, the Vatican edition with most editions adds *est*, and immediately after, with the particle *et* omitted, reads *imminuta* in place of *minuta*, against codices B C D and almost all editions; Augustine [reads] *diminuta*.

la: Codd. A B D E et edd. 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 male *sit*. — Infra Vat. cum paucis edd. non bene adiicit *tota* legendo *in ipsa tota anima vera*; et immediate post edd. 2, 3, 7 *vere* pro *multiplicem vera*.

en: Codices A B D E and editions 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 wrongly [read] *sit*. — Below, the Vatican edition with a few editions not well adds *tota*, reading *in ipsa tota anima vera*; and immediately after, editions 2, 3, 7 [read] *vere* in place of *multiplicem vera*.

la: Vat. sola repetit hic *et nec* non *minus* post *manifestum est*; eadem cum edd. 2, 6, 8 addit *animae*; cod. D vero post *multiplicem* ponit *eius*.

en: The Vatican edition alone repeats here *et nec* and *minus* after *manifestum est*; the same with editions 2, 6, 8 adds *animae*; but codex D after *multiplicem* places *eius*.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 8. Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 6. et 7. Circa finem huius textus post *eadem bonitas* Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 adiicit *eius est*. Denique nonnullae edd. *aliud sapientem aliud* pro *aut sapientem aut*.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity*, c. 6, n. 8. What follows is taken from cc. 6 and 7. Toward the end of this text, after *eadem bonitas*, the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, adds *eius est*. Finally, some editions [read] *aliud sapientem aliud* in place of *aut sapientem aut*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 6. — Vat. et ceterae edd. in principio post *Deo* addunt *inquit*.

en: Chapter 1, no. 6. — The Vatican edition and the other editions, at the beginning after *Deo*, add *inquit*.

la: Cap. 1. n. 2. — In principio huius cap. pro *divina* codd. B C D *deitatis*, A E *divinitatis*. In ipso textu post *situ* edd. 1, 8 *praesentem* loco *praesidentem*; circa finem eiusdem Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 8, 9 post *quid sit* addunt *ipse*.

en: Chapter 1, no. 2. — At the beginning of this chapter, for *divina* the codices B C D [read] *deitatis*, A E [read] *divinitatis*. In the text itself, after *situ*, editions 1, 8 [read] *praesentem* in place of *praesidentem*; toward the end of the same, the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 8, 9 after *quid sit* add *ipse*.

la: Cap. 4. in fine et c. 5. in principio. — In textu ante *subiectis* Vat. et edd. 1, 9 addunt *ut*; edd. 1, 6, 8 hic et paulo infra ante *subiecto* adiiciunt *ut in* contra originale, codd. et ceteras edd. Deinde edd. praeter fidem codd. et originalis post *Res* ponunt *vero* pro *ergo*.

en: Chapter 4, at the end, and c. 5, at the beginning. — In the text before *subiectis*, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 9 add *ut*; editions 1, 6, 8, here and a little below before *subiecto*, add *ut in* against the original, the codices, and the other editions. Then the editions, against the fidelity of the codices and the original, after *Res* read *vero* in place of *ergo*.

la: *Num.* 27. *Non enim ex compositis atque immunis Deus... ex infirmibus continetur.... ex disparibus formabilis est*, ubi cod. A *disparibus formatur*. Pro *formalis* in textu Magistri legendum videtur *formabilis*. Hunc textum explicat S. Bonaventura, hic p. II. dub. 6.

en: *Number* 27. *For God is not from composites... contained out of weak things... formable from disparate things*, where codex A [reads] *disparibus formatur*. For *formalis* in the text of the Master one ought rather to read *formabilis*. St. Bonaventure explains this text here in pars II, dubium 6.

la: *Num.* 43. — In hoc textu Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 et cod. B corrupte pro *vita est natura* legunt *una est natura*, ubi Hilarius clarius: *sed totum, quod est, vita est*.

en: *Number* 43. — In this text the Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9 and codex B corruptly, instead of *vita est natura*, read *una est natura*, where Hilary more clearly: *but the whole, which is, is life*.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VIII — Pars I, Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VIII — Part I, Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 149 -->

# COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

*De proprietatibus et conditionibus essentialibus Trinitatis et Unitatis.*

## Pars I.

*De veritate et immutabilitate Dei.*

*Nunc de veritate sive de proprietate et incommutabilitate etc.*

## DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Terminatis superius duabus partibus istius partis principalis, quae est de Trinitate secundum quod intelligitur, in quibus ad probandam Trinitatem Magister adduxit rationes et removit dubitationes; in hac tertia parte determinat Magister ipsius[^1] Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones. Et quoniam quaedam sunt proprietates respicientes essentiam, ut veritas, quaedam personas, ut generatio, quaedam utrasque, ut aequalitas: ideo haec pars tres habet partes. In prima parte agit Magister de proprietatibus essentialibus; in secunda, de proprietatibus personalibus, infra distinctione nona: *Nunc ad distinctionem personarum etc.*; in tertia,

<!-- page 150 -->

de proprietatibus et conditionibus quodam modo essentialibus et quodam modo personalibus, sicut est aequalitas personarum in aeternitate, magnitudine et virtute[^2], infra distinctione decima nona: *Nunc postquam coaeternitatem trium personarum etc.*

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, tres habet partes secundum tres proprietates, quas assignat; et prima est de veritate; secunda de immutabilitate, et haec ponitur tertio capitulo[^3]: *Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur*; tertia de simplicitate, quae ponitur quarto capitulo[^4]: *Eademque sola proprie, ac vere simplex est etc.*

Item prima pars habet duas partes, quia primo attribuit Deo proprietatem veritatis; secundo removet dubitationem habentem ortum ex praedictis, secundo capitulo: *Hic diligenter advertendum est.* Similiter secunda pars habet duas: in prima assignat Deo[^5] proprietatem incommutabilitatis et probat auctoritate Augustini; in secunda confirmat per Apostolum, ibi: *Ideoque Apostolus loquens etc.* Tertia, de simplicitate infra subdividetur.

## TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

In parte ista[^6] ad evidentiam duarum primarum proprietatum, quas Magister primo assignat, scilicet veritatis et incommutabilitatis, duo principaliter quaeruntur[^7]:

Primo quaeritur de ipsa veritate.

Secundo de immutabilitate.

De veritate iterum quaeruntur duo:

Primo, utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.

Secundo, utrum sit eius proprietas in summo, id est, adeo quod non possit cogitari non esse.

---

english:
<!-- page 149 -->

# COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII.

*On the essential properties and conditions of the Trinity and of the Unity.*

## Part I.

*On the truth and immutability of God.*

*Now concerning truth or concerning the property and incommutability etc.*

## DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

The two preceding parts of this principal part — which concerns the Trinity according as it is understood, in which, to prove the Trinity, the Master adduced reasons and removed doubts — having been concluded; in this third part the Master determines the properties and conditions of the[^1] Trinity and of the Unity themselves. And since certain properties regard the essence, as truth; certain ones [regard] the persons, as generation; certain ones [regard] both, as equality: therefore this part has three parts. In the first part the Master treats of the essential properties; in the second, of the personal properties, below at distinction nine: *Now to the distinction of persons etc.*; in the third,

<!-- page 150 -->

of the properties and conditions which are in some manner essential and in some manner personal, such as is the equality of the persons in eternity, magnitude, and power[^2], below at distinction nineteen: *Now after [having treated] the co-eternity of the three persons etc.*

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has three parts according to the three properties which he assigns; and the first is on truth; the second on immutability, and this is placed in the third chapter[^3]: *And the essence of God alone is properly called incommutable*; the third on simplicity, which is placed in the fourth chapter[^4]: *And the same alone is properly and truly simple etc.*

Likewise the first part has two parts, because first he attributes to God the property of truth; second he removes a doubt having its origin from the aforesaid [matters], in the second chapter: *Here it must be carefully observed.* Similarly the second part has two: in the first he assigns to God[^5] the property of incommutability and proves [it] by the authority of Augustine; in the second he confirms [it] through the Apostle, there: *And therefore the Apostle, speaking etc.* The third, on simplicity, will be subdivided below.

## TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

In this[^6] part, for the elucidation of the two first properties which the Master first assigns, namely of truth and of incommutability, two [questions] are principally asked[^7]:

First it is asked concerning truth itself.

Second concerning immutability.

Concerning truth two [questions] in turn are asked:

First, whether truth is a property of the divine being.

Second, whether it is its property in the highest degree, that is, to such an extent that it cannot be thought not to be.

---

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, omisso *Magister*, substituit Vat. *istius* loco *ipsius* et paulo infra *utraque* pro *utrasque*.

en: Beyond the warrant of the manuscripts and edition 1, with *Magister* omitted, the Vatican [edition] substitutes *istius* in place of *ipsius* and a little below *utraque* for *utrasque*.

la: Vat. *unitate* pro *virtute*, sed contra textum Magistri et codd.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *unitate* for *virtute*, but against the text of the Master and [against] the codices.

la: Ita codd. cum ed. 1 ad normam alterius divisionis capitulorum; in nostra vide c. 2. — Vat. hic et in seqq. *ibi*.

en: Thus the codices with edition 1, according to the standard of the other division of chapters; in our [edition] see c. 2. — The Vatican [edition], here and in what follows, [reads] *ibi*.

la: In nostra ed. c. 3. — Vat. *et haec* loco *quae*, sed contra mss.

en: In our edition c. 3. — The Vatican [edition reads] *et haec* in place of *quae*, but against the manuscripts.

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *Deo* et *incommutabilitatis*.

en: The codices with edition 1 omit *Deo* and *incommutabilitatis*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *hac* pro *ista*; mox dicitur *primarum*, quia ut tertia proprietas a Magistro enumeratur *simplicitas*; omittitur tamen *primarum* a paucis codd. et ed. 4.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *hac* for *ista*; shortly after it says *primarum*, because *simplicity* is enumerated by the Master as the third property; *primarum*, however, is omitted by a few codices and by edition 4.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *quaeritur*.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have added *quaeritur*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 8, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem VIII — Pars II, Divisio Textus et Tractatio Quaestionum

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction VIII — Part II, Division of the Text and Treatment of the Questions

source_text:
<!-- page 165 -->

## COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII

### Pars II.
### *De simplicitate Dei.*

**Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est etc.**

TEXTUM MAGISTRI VIDE SUPRA P. 147.

### DIVISIO TEXTUS[^1]

Supra ostendit Magister duas proprietates divinae essentiae, scilicet veritatem et incommutabilitatem; hic ostendit simplicitatem divinae essentiae vel naturae. Et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima ostendit, quod proprie est simplex; in secunda, quod vere, ibi: *Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat*

<!-- page 166 -->

*Augustinus etc.* In tertia, quod summe, ibi: *Huius autem sinceritatis et simplicitatis.*

Prima iterum pars habet tres partes. Primo proponit, quod proprie est simplex; secundo ostendit, quod non convenit naturae corporali, ibi: *Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex etc.* In tertia, quod non convenit naturae spirituali, ibi: *Creatura quoque spiritualis etc.*[^2]

Similiter pars, in qua ostendit, quod est vere simplex, habet tres partes. In prima ostendit, quod in Deo est pure[^3] multiplicitas nominum; in secunda ostendit, quod in eo non est diversitas praedicamentorum, ibi: *Quod autem in natura divinitatis nulla sit accidentium etc.* In tertia concludit, quod nomina praedicamentorum in divinis non possunt dici proprie, et etiam nomen primi praedicamenti, ibi: *Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia.*

Similiter pars, in qua ostendit, quod est summe simplex, habet tres. Primo enim ostendit, quod tanta est ibi simplicitas, quod nulla est ibi rerum diversitas; secundo, quod cum hac simplicitate stat personarum pluralitas, ibi: *Et cum tantae simplicitatis etc.* Tertio vero et ultimo epilogat, quod ostensa est in divina essentia triplex proprietas, ibi: *Ecce quanta identitas.*

### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae dicit Magister in littera, quatuor quaeruntur in parte ista.

Primo quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit summa simplicitas.

Secundo, utrum simplicitas sit Dei proprietas.

Tertio, propter illud quod dicitur in littera de anima rationali, quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis sit in toto corpore, ita quod in qualibet parte.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere.

---

english:
<!-- page 165 -->

## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

### Part II.
### *On the Simplicity of God.*

**And the same alone is properly and truly simple, etc.**

FOR THE TEXT OF THE MASTER SEE ABOVE, P. 147.

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT[^1]

Above the Master showed two properties of the divine essence, namely truth and incommutability; here he shows the simplicity of the divine essence or nature. And this part has three parts. In the first he shows that [God] is properly simple; in the second, that [he is] truly [simple], there: *Here it is to be diligently noted, since*

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*Augustine says, etc.* In the third, that [he is] supremely [simple], there: *But of this purity and simplicity.*

The first part again has three parts. First he proposes that [God] is properly simple; secondly he shows that [this] does not befit corporeal nature, there: *But that you may know how [God is] simple, etc.* In the third [part], that [it] does not befit spiritual nature, there: *Also a spiritual creature, etc.*[^2]

Likewise the part in which he shows that [God] is truly simple has three parts. In the first he shows that in God there is purely[^3] a multiplicity of names; in the second he shows that in him there is no diversity of categories, there: *But that in the nature of divinity there is no [diversity] of accidents, etc.* In the third he concludes that the names of the categories cannot properly be said in divine matters, and likewise the name of the first category, there: *Whence neither is "substance" properly said.*

Likewise the part in which he shows that [God] is supremely simple has three [parts]. For first he shows that so great is the simplicity there, that there is no diversity of things there; secondly, that with this simplicity there stands a plurality of persons, there: *And since of so great a simplicity, etc.* Third and last, he sums up that a threefold property has been shown in the divine essence, there: *Behold how great an identity.*

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For the understanding of the things which the Master says in the text, four [questions] are asked in this part.

First it is asked whether in God there is supreme simplicity.

Second, whether simplicity is a property of God.

Third, on account of what is said in the text concerning the rational soul, it is asked whether the rational soul is in the whole body, in such a way that [it is] in each part.

Fourth it is asked whether God is in any determinate genus.

---

la: In hac distinctione divisio textus partis II. in codd. hoc loco ponitur, dum alibi coniungitur cum divisione partis I. Cfr. ultima verba in divisione partis I. p. 150.

en: In this distinction the division of the text of Part II is placed in the codices at this point, while elsewhere it is joined with the division of Part I. Cf. the last words in the division of Part I, p. 150.

la: Aliqui codd., ut I Z, *illud* pro *ideo*; ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod., ut W, *illud ideo*.

en: Some codices, such as I Z, [read] *illud* in place of *ideo*; ed. 1 together with one or another codex, such as W, [reads] *illud ideo*.

la: *pure* — i.e. *plurima* sive *pluralitas*; lectio codd. ambigua.

en: *pure* — i.e. *plurima* or *pluralitas*; the reading of the codices is ambiguous.


title: Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus I. *De veritate Dei.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.*

Quod veritas sit proprietas divini esse, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus.

1. *Primo* modo sic: Hieronymus ad Marcellam, et habetur in littera[^1]: « Solus Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est »; sed quod alicui soli convenit, est proprium illi: ergo veritas est proprium divini esse.

2. *Item*, Augustinus *de Vera Religione*[^2]: « Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imitantur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt ». Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas.

3. *Item*, Augustinus in *Soliloquiis* et *de Vera Religione*[^3] dicit, quod lux increata est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia cognoscibilia: ergo si veritas est ratio cognoscendi, et sola lux increata est veritas: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

4. *Item*, Anselmus in libro *de Veritate*[^4] dicit, quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate: aut ergo intelligit effective, aut formaliter; non effective, quia similiter omnia possent dici vera[^5] prima bonitate: ergo intelligitur formaliter: ergo non est alia veritas quam veritas increata: ergo si illa est in Deo et Deus, veritas est solius Dei proprietas.

5. *Item*, rationibus probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem[^6] et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas.

6. *Item*, veritas opponitur umbrae. Quod enim est umbra rei, non habet veritatem[^7]; sed creaturae sunt umbrae illius summi esse: ergo non habent veritatem in esse.

7. *Item*, veritas est, qua aliquid est verum; sed veritas est vera, cum sit cognoscibilis; sed constat quod non alio quam se, quia alias[^8] esset abire in infinitum; sed quod est verum se ipso, est verum per essentiam: ergo omnis veritas est vera per essentiam; sed sola veritas increata est vera per essentiam: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

**Contra:**

1. Si veritas est Dei proprietas, aut ergo veritas complexa, aut incomplexa. Non complexa; quia talis est cum compositione, in Deo autem non est compositio aliqua. Non incomplexa; quia haec convertitur cum ente[^9]: ergo cum entitas non sit Dei proprietas, pari ratione nec veritas erit.

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2. *Item*, verum aeque commune est ut bonum, et quodam modo magis[^10]; sed bonitas non est Dei proprietas: ergo pari ratione nec veritas.

3. *Item*, veritas est ratio discernendi Creatorem a creatura et creaturam a creatura[^11]; sed quod est ratio discernendi et distinguendi est diversum in diversis: ergo alia veritas est in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura quam in alia: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

4. *Item*, Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^12]: « Verum est id quod est », ergo veritas est ipsa entitas: ergo non est proprium essentiae, quia si sic, qua ratione dicitur: *Veritas est*[^13] *proprietas essentiae*, posset dici e converso, cum omnino idem sint.

> **Conclusio.** Veritas, quatenus opponitur falsitati, invenitur etiam in creaturis secundum triplicem suam comparationem ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, ad intellectum quem excitat; quatenus vero opponitur permixtioni, est proprietas solius Dei.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod veritas habet triplicem comparationem. Habet enim comparari ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, et ad intellectum quem excitat. In comparatione ad subiectum veritatis dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad principium dicitur veritas summae unitatis[^14] et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad intellectum dicitur veritas ratio discernendi.

Et in omnibus istis comparationibus dupliciter potest accipi veritas: uno modo, prout distinguitur contra falsitatem; alio modo, prout distinguitur contra permixtionem, secundum quod verum dicitur purum et impermixtum.

Prout veritas dividitur contra falsitatem, quae est privatio indivisionis et imitationis et[^15] expressionis, sic cum in creatura sit aliquo modo invenire et indivisionem et imitationem et expressionem, sic est veritas non tantum in Creatore, sed etiam in creatura; et sic non assignatur Dei proprietas.

Alio modo, prout veritas dividitur contra permixtionem sive impuritatem, sic est in solo Deo. Nam in solo Deo est indivisio pura, non permixta alicui diversitati; in solo Deo est imitatio et similitudo pura non permixta alicui dissimilitudini; et in solo Deo est expressio luminis non permixta obscuritati[^16]. In creatura autem est indivisio cum actus et potentiae diversitate et imitatio cum dissimilitudine; est ulterius in ea expressio cum obscuritate. Et ideo hoc modo veritas est divini esse proprietas; et sic accipit Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse, quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate, nihil de non entitate. Et ideo in Deo non cadit praeteritio et futuritio, quae aliquo modo non entia sunt.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 1, 2, 5, 6.* Et sic procedunt duae primae auctoritates et rationes.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non sit alia veritas quam aeterna, quia ipsa sola facit intelligere; dicendum, quod sicut color est obiectum visus et motivum visus — tamen non sine actu lucis — et differt ab[^17] ipsa luce; sic dicendum, quod veritas creata, quamvis non possit movere sine veritate increata, nihilominus est motiva suo modo et alia veritas ab illa.

*Ad 4 et 7.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima; dicendum, quod verum de sui impositione dicit comparationem ad causam exemplarem, sicut bonum ad causam finalem. Sicut enim dicitur bonum ratione ordinis, sic verum ratione expressionis; et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris. Sicut igitur, cum dicitur de bonis creatis, quod sunt bona bonitate increata, bonitas praedicat finem in ablativo, non formam, quia Dei bonitas[^18] nullius creati est forma; similiter, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt vera veritate increata, ablativus dicit causam formalem exemplarem[^19]. Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem; et per hoc patet ultimum.

**Ad argumenta in contrarium:**

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est proprietas; patet responsio: quoniam

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obiicit de veritate, secundum quod habet oppositionem ad defectum falsitatis, non ad permixtionem possibilitatis; praedicto enim modo convenit non tantum Creatori, sed etiam creaturae.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est idem quod divina essentia; dicendum, quod de ratione *proprietatis* in creatura sunt ista tria: primum est, quod convenit soli; secundum est, quod est ratio innotescendi; tertium est, quod differt ab eo cuius est proprietas[^20]. Duo prima sunt perfectionis, ultimum vero imperfectionis, quia excludit simplicitatem. Et ideo veritas dicitur divinae essentiae proprietas, non quia differat vel sit inhaerens divinae essentiae, sicut accidens[^21] subiecto, sed quia soli convenit et est ratio cognoscendi eam. Et haec est causa, quare e converso essentia non est proprietas veritatis, quia non est ratio innotescendi eam, sicut e converso.

Si autem quaeras, cum idem significent essentia et veritas, quare unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et non e converso; ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod quamvis idem significent essentia et veritas, tamen unum, scilicet veritas, est magis ratio cognoscendi ratione connotati. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia veritas nihil connotat. Dicendum ergo, quod hoc est ratione modi significandi et intelligendi.

Et notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de his nominibus: uno modo ratione eius quod nominant[^22] seu significant; alio modo ratione eius, in quo significatur poni quod nominant. Unde differt dicere *sensum* et *sensum hominis*; quia primo dicitur commune ad sensum hominis et bruti, secundo proprium hominis. Si ergo accipimus huiusmodi nomina secundum se, alia est ratio essentiae, alia veritatis, quoniam essentia dicit *quid*, veritas conditionem entis. Cum vero essentiam et veritatem trahimus ad Deum, quamvis idem sint, tamen ratione generalium significatorum unum accipitur ut proprietas alterius; et non est ibi synonymia nec sunt nomina synonyma, sed manet ratio subiecti et proprietatis secundum modum significandi, et manet etiam secundum modum intelligendi; quia per essentiam in creatura intelligimus essentiam in Creatore, et per veritatem creaturae intelligimus veritatem increatam. Unde sicut veritas creata est proprietas et ratio cognoscendi essentiam creatam, sic veritas increata secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi est ratio cognoscendi et intelligendi essentiam increatam.

english:
### Article I. *On the truth of God.*
### Question I. *Whether truth is a property of the divine being.*

That truth is a property of the divine being is shown by authorities and reasons.

1. *First*, thus: Jerome to Marcella, and it is found in the text[^1]: "God alone truly is, to whose essence our being, compared, is not"; but what belongs to one alone is proper to it: therefore truth is proper to the divine being.

2. *Likewise*, Augustine in *On True Religion*[^2]: "Falsity is from those things which imitate that One, by which whatever is, is one, inasmuch as they cannot fulfill it." If therefore no creature can fulfill that supreme One, truth is not in any creature, but falsity is in all.

3. *Likewise*, Augustine in the *Soliloquies* and in *On True Religion*[^3] says that the uncreated light is the ground of knowing itself and all knowable things: therefore if truth is the ground of knowing, and the uncreated light alone is truth: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

4. *Likewise*, Anselm in the book *On Truth*[^4] says that all things are true by the first truth: he understands this either effectively or formally; not effectively, because likewise all things could be called true[^5] by the first goodness: therefore it is understood formally: therefore there is no other truth than the uncreated truth: therefore if it is in God and is God, truth is the property of God alone.

5. *Likewise*, it is proved by reasons thus: truth and vanity are opposed; but every creature has vanity[^6] and admixture with non-being, since it is from nothing, and God alone is wholly free of this: therefore truth is in God alone.

6. *Likewise*, truth is opposed to shadow. For what is the shadow of a thing does not have truth[^7]; but creatures are shadows of that supreme being: therefore they do not have truth in their being.

7. *Likewise*, truth is that by which something is true; but truth is true, since it is knowable; but it is established that it is so not by another than itself, because otherwise[^8] there would be an infinite regress; but what is true by itself is true by essence: therefore every truth is true by essence; but the uncreated truth alone is true by essence: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

**On the contrary:**

1. If truth is a property of God, then truth is either complex or incomplex. Not complex; for such is with composition, but in God there is no composition. Not incomplex; for this is convertible with being[^9]: therefore since entity is not a property of God, by parity of reason neither will truth be.

2. *Likewise*, the true is equally common as the good, and in a certain way more so[^10]; but goodness is not a property of God: therefore by parity of reason neither is truth.

3. *Likewise*, truth is the ground of discerning Creator from creature, and creature from creature[^11]; but what is the ground of discerning and distinguishing is diverse in diverse things: therefore there is one truth in God and another in the creature, and one in one creature and another in another: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

4. *Likewise*, Augustine in the *Soliloquies*[^12]: "True is that which is," therefore truth is entity itself: therefore it is not proper to essence, because if so, by the same reasoning by which it is said: *Truth is*[^13] *a property of essence*, it could be said conversely, since they are entirely the same.

> **Conclusion.** Truth, insofar as it is opposed to falsity, is also found in creatures according to its threefold comparison — to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, to the intellect which it excites; but insofar as it is opposed to admixture, it is a property of God alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that truth has a threefold comparison. For it has comparison to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, and to the intellect which it excites. In comparison to the subject of truth, truth is called the indivision of act and potency. In comparison to the principle, truth is called the representation or imitation of the supreme unity[^14] and the first [exemplar]. In comparison to the intellect, truth is called the ground of discerning.

And in all these comparisons truth can be taken in two ways: in one way, as it is distinguished against falsity; in another way, as it is distinguished against admixture, according as the true is called pure and unmixed.

As truth is divided against falsity, which is the privation of indivision and imitation and[^15] expression, so since in the creature there is in some way to be found indivision and imitation and expression, thus truth is not only in the Creator, but also in the creature; and so it is not assigned [as] a property of God.

In another way, as truth is divided against admixture or impurity, so it is in God alone. For in God alone there is pure indivision, not mixed with any diversity; in God alone there is pure imitation and likeness, not mixed with any unlikeness; and in God alone there is expression of light not mixed with obscurity[^16]. But in the creature there is indivision with diversity of act and potency, and imitation with unlikeness; and further in it there is expression with obscurity. And therefore in this way truth is a property of the divine being; and thus the Master and Augustine and Jerome take it. For they call true that being which has nothing of possibility, nothing of vanity, nothing of non-entity. And therefore in God past and future do not fall, which are in some way non-beings.

**To the arguments for the affirmative:**

*To 1, 2, 5, 6.* And thus proceed the first two authorities and reasons.

*To 3.* But to that which is objected, that there is no other truth than the eternal, because it alone causes understanding; it must be said that just as color is the object of sight and the moving cause of sight — yet not without the act of light — and differs from[^17] light itself; so it must be said that created truth, although it cannot move without uncreated truth, is nevertheless moving in its own way and another truth than that one.

*To 4 and 7.* To that which is objected from Anselm, that all things are true by the first truth; it must be said that the true by its imposition states a comparison to the exemplary cause, just as the good to the final cause. For just as something is called good by reason of order, so true by reason of expression; and the ground of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself. Just as therefore, when it is said of created goods that they are good by uncreated goodness, goodness predicates the end in the ablative, not the form, because God's goodness[^18] is the form of no created thing; likewise, when it is said that all things are true by uncreated truth, the ablative states the formal exemplary cause[^19]. For all true things are and are born to express themselves through the expression of that supreme light; and if it ceased to flow in, the rest would cease to be true. Therefore no created truth is true by essence, but by participation; and through this the last point is clear.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

To that which is objected in the contrary, that it is not a property; the response is clear: because

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he objects concerning truth as it has opposition to the defect of falsity, not to the admixture of possibility; for in the aforesaid way it belongs not only to the Creator, but also to the creature.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that truth is the same as the divine essence; it must be said that of the account of *property* in the creature there are these three: first, that it belongs to one alone; second, that it is the ground of becoming known; third, that it differs from that whose property it is[^20]. The first two pertain to perfection, but the last to imperfection, because it excludes simplicity. And therefore truth is called a property of the divine essence, not because it differs or is inhering in the divine essence as an accident[^21] in a subject, but because it belongs to it alone and is the ground of knowing it. And this is the cause why, conversely, essence is not a property of truth, because it is not the ground of making it known, as conversely.

But if you ask, since essence and truth signify the same, why one is the ground of knowing the other, and not conversely; to this some have said that, although essence and truth signify the same, nevertheless one — namely, truth — is more a ground of knowing by reason of what is connoted. But this cannot stand, because truth connotes nothing. Therefore it must be said that this is by reason of the mode of signifying and understanding.

And it should be noted that there is a twofold way of speaking about these names: in one way, by reason of that which they name[^22] or signify; in another way, by reason of that in which what they name is signified as posited. Hence it differs to say *sense* and *sense of man*; because the first is said in common of the sense of man and of brute, the second properly of man. If therefore we take such names according to themselves, the account of essence is one thing, and of truth another, since essence states *what*, truth the condition of being. But when we draw essence and truth to God, although they are the same, yet by reason of the general things signified one is taken as a property of the other; and there is no synonymy there, nor are they synonymous names, but the account of subject and property remains according to the mode of signifying, and remains also according to the mode of understanding; because through essence in the creature we understand essence in the Creator, and through the truth of the creature we understand uncreated truth. Hence just as created truth is a property and the ground of knowing created essence, so uncreated truth, according to the account of signifying and understanding, is the ground of knowing and understanding uncreated essence.

la: Cap. 1. circa initium. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 4 *auctoritate Hieronymi* pro *Hieronymus*.

en: Chapter 1, near the beginning. — The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and edition 4, reads *by the authority of Jerome* in place of *Jerome*.

la: Cap. 36. n. 66: *Si enim falsitas ex iis est, quae imitantur unum, non in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt.* — Et ibid. paulo ante ait: *At si corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo principio unum est, quidquid est.* — Vat. contra plurimos codd. *summe* loco *summum*.

en: Chapter 36, n. 66: *For if falsity is from those things which imitate the One, not insofar as they imitate it, but insofar as they cannot fulfill it.* — And in the same place a little before he says: *But if bodies deceive insofar as they do not fulfill that One which they are convicted of imitating, by which principle whatever is, is one.* — The Vatican edition, against most of the codices, reads *supremely* in place of *supreme*.

la: Libr. I. *Soliloq.* c. 8. n. 15. — *De Vera Religione* c. 31. n. 64. et c. 36. n. 66. — Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit verba *se et omnia* usque *cognoscendi*.

en: Book I, *Soliloquies* c. 8, n. 15. — *On True Religion* c. 31, n. 64, and c. 36, n. 66. — The Vatican edition, without any authority from the manuscripts and edition 1, omits the words *itself and all things* down to *of knowing*.

la: Cap. 13, ubi probat omnium rerum unam solum esse rectitudinem, ex qua concludit: *una igitur in omnibus illis est veritas.*

en: Chapter 13, where he proves that there is only one rectitude of all things, from which he concludes: *one therefore in all those things is truth.*

la: Ita cum ed. 1 antiquiores codd., quorum quidem aliqui *possunt* legunt pro *possent*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc *possunt dici bona*, quo posito argumentum destruitur; recte siquidem omnia effective dicuntur et sunt bona bonitate prima. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc post *si illa est* repetit verbum *est*, et immediate post Vat. *sola* pro *et Deus* ponit *etc. ergo*; sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.

en: Thus with edition 1 the older codices, of which indeed some read *they can* for *they could*; but the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *they can be called good*, by positing which the argument is destroyed; for indeed rightly all things are called and are good effectively by the first goodness. Near the end of the argument the Vatican edition with codex cc, after *if that is*, repeats the word *is*, and immediately after the Vatican edition puts *alone* in place of *and God*, then *etc. therefore*; but the authority of the manuscripts and of edition 1 stands against this.

la: Rom. 8, 20: *Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est.* Cfr. etiam Ecclesiastes 3, 19.

en: Romans 8:20: *For the creature was made subject to vanity.* Cf. also Ecclesiastes 3:19.

la: Vide Aristot., V. *Metaph.* text. 34. (IV. c. 29.). — Mox post *summi* supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 male omissum *esse*.

en: See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 34 (IV, c. 29). — Shortly after *of the supreme* we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the word *being*, which had been wrongly omitted.

la: Codd. cum ed. 1 *tunc* pro *alias*, sed non ita bene.

en: The codices, with edition 1, read *then* in place of *otherwise*, but not so well.

la: Aristot., II. *Metaph.* text. 4. (I. brevior. c. 1.): *Unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.*

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, text 4 (the shorter [book] I, c. 1): *Each thing, just as it stands with respect to being, so also with respect to truth.*

la: Ratio communiter allegata est, quia *verum* est *enti* propinquius et in se abstractius.

en: The reason commonly alleged is that *the true* is closer to *being* and more abstract in itself.

la: August., *de Vera Religione*, c. 7. n. 13: *Omnis enim res vel essentia... simul haec tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat.*

en: Augustine, *On True Religion*, c. 7, n. 13: *For every thing or essence... at once has these three: that it be some one thing, and that it be discerned from the rest by its proper species, and that it not exceed the order of things.*

la: Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: *Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.*

en: Book II, c. 5, n. 8: *The true seems to me to be that which is.*

la: Multi codd. ut BDFIPQTXYZ cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*.

en: Many codices, such as BDFIPQTXYZ, with edition 1, omit *is*.

la: Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic pro *veritatis* substituimus *unitatis*, et paulo infra pro *distinguendi* posuimus *discernendi*, quae lectio etiam comprobatur argumento secundo pro affirmativa parte et argumento tertio pro negativa parte supra allato.

en: From nearly all the older manuscripts and from edition 1 we have here substituted *of unity* for *of truth*, and a little below we have put *of discerning* for *of distinguishing*, which reading is also confirmed by the second argument for the affirmative side and the third argument for the negative side cited above.

la: Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis particulam *et*.

en: From the majority of manuscripts and from edition 1 we have twice supplied the particle *and*.

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *permixti obscuritate*, sed contra antiquiores codd., quorum tamen nonnulli etiam habent *obscuritate*, sed minus bene et contra immediate praecedentia.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *of mixed [light] in obscurity*, but against the older codices, some of which nevertheless also read *in obscurity*, but less well and contrary to what immediately precedes.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *ipsa a luce*, sed incongrue, et in fine argumenti contra antiquiores mss. post *veritas* addit *est*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the witness of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, reads *from light itself*, but unfittingly, and at the end of the argument, against the older manuscripts, adds *is* after *truth*.

la: Vat. contra antiquiores codd. *bonitas increata* pro *Dei bonitas*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the older codices, reads *uncreated goodness* in place of *God's goodness*.

la: Codd. DT *expressius ablativus non dicit causam formalem esse rerum complectivam, sed exemplarem.* Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra alios et ed. 1, *expressione* loco *per expressionem*, et in fine Vat. sola *patent ultima* pro *patet ultimum*, sed falso.

en: Codices DT [read] *more expressly: the ablative does not state the formal cause as that which embraces things, but the exemplary [cause].* A little below the Vatican edition with codex cc, but against the others and edition 1, [reads] *by expression* in place of *through the expression*, and at the end the Vatican edition alone [reads] *the last things are clear* in place of *the last point is clear*, but falsely.

la: Cfr. Aristot., V. *Topic.* c. 1. et 2. ac Porphyr., *de Praedicabil.* c. *de Proprio.*

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* V, c. 1 and 2, and Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, c. *On the Proper.*

la: Mendum Vat. *antecedens* loco *accidens* correximus fide mss. et trium primarum edd. Paulo infra post *veritatis* nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 non apte addunt particulam *et*.

en: We have corrected the Vatican edition's blunder *antecedent* in place of *accident* on the faith of the manuscripts and the first three editions. A little below, after *of truth*, some codices with edition 1 not aptly add the particle *and*.

la: Plerique codd. ut ARSTY etc. *denominant. Unde differret*, et paulo infra *deinde* pro *secundo* et *accipiamus* loco *accipimus*.

en: Most codices such as ARSTY etc. read *they denominate. Hence it would differ*, and a little below *thereafter* in place of *secondly* and *let us take* in place of *we take*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Sensus quaestionis est, utrum *veritas* competat Deo tanquam proprium, sive utrum sit de essentia Dei et proprietas Dei solius. *Veritas* hic accipitur, non prout est formaliter in intellectu, nec etiam pro re, quatenus est obiectum intellectus, sed in ordine ad ipsam rem, cuius est actus, sive quatenus dicit indivisionem entis et esse. — Ad intelligentiam terminorum, qui in prima ratione pro parte negativa et alibi saepe occurrunt, notandum, quod complexum et incomplexum idem sunt ac compositum et incompositum. *Veritas complexa* est passio sive proprietas propositionis, quae dicit connexionem praedicati cum subiecto, et habetur in secunda mentis operatione, nempe in iudicio. *Veritas autem incomplexa* est passio simplex cuiuslibet entis et definitur per hoc, quod sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum, qui rem cognoscit sicuti est. Haec habetur in qualibet prima mentis operatione, quae est simplex apprehensio.

**II.** Alibi S. Bonav. cum sententia communi distinguit veritatem tripliciter, scil. sumtam vel formaliter, quae est veritas in intellectu, vel radicaliter sive causaliter, quae est in rebus, vel prout est in oratione tanquam in signo. Cfr. infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. q. 2; *Hexaem.* Serm. 5. *De veritate signi*, infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 19. q. 5; *de Verit.* q. 1. a. 1. et seqq.; S. I. q. 16. a. 1. 2. 3. 5. — Hoc loco et in Prolog. ad Comment. in Ecclesiast. circa finem agit solummodo de veritate in rebus, sive prout veritas est proprietas entis. Haec veritas in rebus iterum triplici modo considerari potest: primo quidem respectu subiecti; et sic veritas est indivisio actus et potentiae, vel cum Avicenna in XI. *Metaph.* c. 2: *Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est rei*; sive veritas est illa res, quae est in actu; et sub hoc respectu definitur: *indivisio esse et quod est*. — Secundo consideratur respectu sui principii, quod est exemplar divinum, cui res assimilantur; et sub hoc respectu definitur secundum Augustinum in libr. *de Vera Religione* c. 36. n. 66: *Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est, unde falsitas oritur*. — Tertio modo consideratur respectu ad effectum consequentem, quatenus obiectum in intellectu causat veritatem; et sic est ratio cognoscendi rem eamque distinguendi, et sub hoc respectu definitur ab Augustino (loc. cit.): *Veritas est quae ostendit id quod est*; et ab Hilario: *Veritas est declarativum esse*. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 15. m. 3; S. Thom., *de Veritate* q. 1. a. 1. — Alia distinctio veritatis contra falsitatem et contra permixtionem patet ex textu.

**III.** Quoad ordinem argumentorum pro et contra notandum, quod prima propositio, quae agit de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra falsitatem, probatur tribus prioribus argumentis pro parte negativa. Secunda vero, quae est de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra permixtionem, probatur 3. et 6. argumento pro parte affirmativa. Cetera argumenta per distinctionem in recto sensu explicantur. — Attentione digna sunt, quae hic in corp. et in solut. ad 1. 2. et ad ult. de veritate creata dicuntur, scil. quod nulla veritas creata sit veritas per essentiam, sed per participationem, et quod nihilominus suo modo est ratio cognoscendi distincta a veritate increata. Quod dictum est contra rigidos Ontologistas.

**IV.** Quoad 1. et 2. concl. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 5; et q. 17. m. 4. — Pro explicatione loci sumti ex Anselmo (4. fundam.) cfr. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 16. a. 6.) et praecipue Richard. (hic q. 2. ad 4.), qui in extenso et bene rem tractat, licet alia via incedat ac S. Bonav. — De differentia inter *esse divinum* et *esse creatum* cfr. hic dub. 8.

*De tota quaestione*: S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 60; S. I. q. 16. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. et d. 46. a. 11. seqq., ubi diffuse multas de hac re quaestiones solvit; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. et 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et d. 19. 2. princ. q. 2. et 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. per tot. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The sense of the question is whether *truth* belongs to God as a proper [attribute], or whether it pertains to the essence of God and is the property of God alone. *Truth* is here taken not as it is formally in the intellect, nor even for the thing insofar as it is the object of the intellect, but in relation to the thing itself, whose act it is, or insofar as it states the indivision of being and to-be. — For the understanding of the terms which occur in the first argument for the negative side and often elsewhere, it should be noted that *complex* and *incomplex* are the same as *composite* and *incomposite*. *Complex truth* is the affection or property of a proposition, which states the connection of predicate with subject, and is had in the second operation of the mind, namely in judgment. *Incomplex truth*, however, is the simple affection of any being whatever, and is defined as the adequation of the thing to the intellect which knows the thing as it is. This is had in any first operation of the mind whatever, which is simple apprehension.

**II.** Elsewhere St. Bonaventure with the common opinion distinguishes truth in three ways, namely as taken either formally (which is truth in the intellect), or radically or causally (which is in things), or as it is in speech as in a sign. Cf. below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1; above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; II Sent. d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; *Hexaemeron* Serm. 5. *On the truth of the sign*, see below d. 46, a. 1, q. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 19, q. 5; *On Truth* q. 1, a. 1, and following; *Summa* I, q. 16, a. 1, 2, 3, 5. — In this place and in the Prologue to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes near the end, he treats only of truth in things, or as truth is a property of being. This truth in things can again be considered in three ways: first indeed with respect to the subject; and thus truth is the indivision of act and potency, or with Avicenna in *Metaphysics* XI, c. 2: *The truth of each thing is the property of its being, which has been established for the thing*; or truth is that thing which is in act; and under this respect it is defined as: *the indivision of being and of that which is*. — Secondly, it is considered with respect to its principle, which is the divine exemplar, to which things are assimilated; and under this respect it is defined according to Augustine in *On True Religion* c. 36, n. 66: *Truth is the supreme likeness of the principle, which is without any unlikeness, whence falsity arises*. — In the third way, it is considered with respect to the consequent effect, insofar as the object in the intellect causes truth; and so it is the ground of knowing the thing and distinguishing it, and under this respect it is defined by Augustine (loc. cit.): *Truth is that which shows that which is*; and by Hilary: *Truth is declarative being*. Cf. above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alex. of Hales, p. I, q. 15, m. 3; St. Thomas, *On Truth* q. 1, a. 1. — Another distinction of truth — against falsity and against admixture — is clear from the text.

**III.** As to the order of the arguments for and against, it should be noted that the first proposition, which treats of truth insofar as it is distinguished against falsity, is proved by the first three arguments for the negative side. But the second, which is about truth insofar as it is distinguished against admixture, is proved by the 3rd and 6th argument for the affirmative side. The remaining arguments are explained by the distinction in their proper sense. — Worthy of attention are the things which are said here in the body and in the solution to 1, 2, and to the last, concerning created truth, namely that no created truth is truth by essence, but by participation, and that nonetheless in its own way it is a ground of knowing distinct from uncreated truth. Which is said against the rigid Ontologists.

**IV.** As to the 1st and 2nd conclusions, cf. Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 15, m. 5; and q. 17, m. 4. — For the explanation of the passage taken from Anselm (4th fundamental), cf. St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 16, a. 6) and especially Richard (here q. 2, ad 4), who treats the matter in extenso and well, although he proceeds by another route than St. Bonaventure. — On the difference between *divine being* and *created being*, cf. here dub. 8.

*On the whole question*: St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 60; *Summa* I, q. 16, a. 5. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 46, a. 11, and following, where he diffusely solves many questions on this matter; *Summa* p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1 and 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1 and 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1, and d. 19, 2. princ. q. 2 and 3. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 34, throughout. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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