title: Dist. 36, Dubia

title_alt: Doubts concerning the text of the Master

source_text:
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### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`**La.**`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`**En.**`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., *Cod. T*, *Vat.*, *ed. 1*).

#### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hac solutione Magistri, qua dicit, quod cognitio Dei est eius essentia, nec tamen omnia quae sunt in cognitione, sunt in essentia. Videtur enim male dicere, quoniam hoc argumentum videtur esse necessarium: si aliqua duo sunt omnino eadem; si aliquid est in uno, et in alio. Si dicas, quod differunt penes connotata: videtur falsum, quia Dei praescientia non connotat. — Vel si dicas, quod praescientia connotat; obiicitur de hoc nomine *Deus*, quod non connotat, et tamen dicuntur omnia esse in Deo: ergo pari ratione et in essentia. — Praeterea, contra Magistrum videtur esse verbum Anselmi in *Monologio*[^1], quod «creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia»: ergo videtur, quod vere sint in Dei essentia.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec praepositio *in* aliquando connotat inhaerentiam, ut si dicatur accidens in subiecto: aliquando notat identitatem, ut si dicatur, ideae rerum sunt in Deo, quoniam sunt Deus, non a Deo; aliquando notat causalitatem, ut si dicatur, creaturae sunt in ipso Deo: et potest haec praepositio *in* dici secundum quatuor genera causarum, sed in Deo non dicitur nisi secundum tria[^2]. — Quoniam ergo causa dicit respectum ad creaturam secundum rationem intelligendi, ideo haec praepositio *in*, secundum quod dicit causalitatem, non additur nisi terminis dicentibus respectum ad creaturam. Et quoniam nomen substantiae vel naturae vel essentiae non dicit respectum, ideo si dicatur: creaturae sunt in Dei substantia, haec praepositio *in* aut notat identitatem, aut inhaerentiam, quorum utrumque falsum est: et ideo tales locutiones non recipiuntur; et in illo argumento est sophisma secundum accidens. Ideo dicit Magister, quod non valet; quamvis enim idem sint re, differunt tamen in modo significandi et intelligendi.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *Deus* non dicit respectum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia imponitur ab actu, quem habet ad creaturam, sicut dicit Damascenus[^3]; unde bene dicitur: *Deus creaturarum.*

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia; dicendum, quod creaturam in Creatore esse est ideam vel similitudinem eius apud Deum esse; et Anselmus vult dicere, quod illa similitudo est creatrix essentia, non quod illa creatura sit essentia. Unde bene concedendum, quod ideae rerum sunt in divina essentia, quia *in* notat identitatem, et vere; sed hoc non potest dici de creatura secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere.

#### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *illa esse in Deo intelliguntur, quae ex ipso et per ipsum etc.* Videtur enim male dicere, quia cum talia non sint nisi praesentia, ergo in Deo non sunt nisi ea quae praesenter existunt; quod est manifeste falsum et contra Augustinum[^4], qui dicit, quod res sunt in Deo ab aeterno. Si dicas, quod accipit *esse in Deo* ut in conservante, quia sic accipit Apostolus in praefata auctoritate[^5]: *Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso*; tunc nihil facit ad propositum, quia Magister accipit *esse in*, secundum quod dicuntur res esse in Deo aeternaliter. — Si tu dicas, quod res actualiter sunt ex Deo vel per Deum ex tempore, sed habitualiter[^6] ab aeterno; tunc ego quaero, quare actualiter sunt in Deo ab aeterno et non ex Deo vel per Deum?

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**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *esse ex*[^7] Deo vel per Deum potest accipi vel secundum aptitudinem, vel secundum actum, vel secundum habitum. Si secundum actum; sic praedicta auctoritas non est intelligenda praecise, quod illa sola sint in Deo, quae sunt ex Deo vel per Deum, quia multa Deus cognoscit, quae sunt in Deo, quae tamen non sunt ex ipso nec per ipsum, nec erunt. Potest iterum accipi secundum habitum; et sic adhuc non est intelligenda praecise, quia multa Deus cognoscit et potest facere, quae non faciet; et tamen sunt in ipso, nec unquam erunt ex ipso nec per ipsum. Potest iterum intelligi secundum aptitudinem; et tunc praecise habet veritatem, quia nihil est in Deo, nisi sit aptum esse ex Deo et per ipsum; et sic valet ad propositum, et sic intelligit Magister; et per hoc excluduntur mala, quia Deus non potest facere mala, nec mala possunt esse ex ipso nec per ipsum.

Quod quaeritur, quare non dicuntur res aeternaliter esse ex Deo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia aliae praepositiones significant per modum fieri et motus et actus, sed haec praepositio *in* per modum quietis[^8]. Et quoniam Deus non fecit nisi ex tempore, nec fuit causa actualiter causans nisi ex tempore, licet habitualiter ab aeterno; ideo magis dicuntur res aeternaliter in Deo quam ex Deo[^9].

#### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Magistri, qua dicit, quod mala non sunt in Deo, quia Deus non cognoscit ea per approbationem. Videtur enim male dicere, quia approbatio respicit voluntatem; sed *esse in Deo* respicit ab aeterno exemplaritatem: ergo notitia approbationis nihil ad hoc facit. — Item, Magister videtur insufficiens in divisione divinae cognitionis, quia sicut bona cognoscuntur notitia approbationis, ita mala notitia reprobationis. — Item, approbatio aut addit aliquid supra notitiam simpliciter, aut non; si non: ergo non est[^10] in Deo distinguere notitiam, et notitiam approbationis. Item, si nihil addit, ergo sicut sunt in Deo quae cognoscit approbando, ita etiam illa[^11] quae cognoscit simpliciter. Si aliquid addit: ergo videtur, quod divina notitia sit composita. Si dicas, quod addit secundum intellectum — sed intellectus noster non facit res esse in Deo: ergo nec notitia approbationis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod approbatio supra cognitionem secundum intellectum addit beneplacitum voluntatis; hoc autem beneplacitum connotat bonitatem in eo[^12], respectu cuius est; quia Deo non placet nisi bonum, et omne bonum in quantum huiusmodi Deo simile est. Si ergo idea dicit rationem cognoscendi secundum assimilationem, omnia quae Deus cognoscit notitia approbationis, sunt in ipso.

Sed notandum, quod approbatio potest connotare bonitatem in actu; et sic non est praecise verum, quod omne quod est in Deo, sit cognitum notitia approbationis. Potest iterum connotare bonitatem in potentia, sicut exemplar connotat rei entitatem, non quia sit, sed quia Deus potest eam facere; et sic nihil est in Deo, nisi quod cognoscit notitia approbationis, quia sic cognoscit omne bonum, quod est vel quod potest facere, et illius habet exemplar; et ideo illud tantum est in Deo.

Quod ergo obiicit, quod voluntas non facit, quod sint in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc non est quia voluntas in actu, sed quia Deus nihil potest facere, quod non approbet tanquam bonum; unde approbatio potius dicit ibi iudicium rationis quam affectum voluntatis[^13].

Quod quaerit, si addit; dicendum, quod addit a parte nostri intellectus et a parte connotati, a parte ipsius Dei non. Non sic autem addit reprobatio; et ideo Magister non ponit notitiam reprobationis pro membro.

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#### DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius: *Eandem vim habent omnia haec, scilicet ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso*. Obiicitur enim, quod si habent eandem vim, ergo videtur hic esse inculcatio verborum. — Item, aut accipitur *esse in ipso* sicut in exemplari, aut sicut in causa conservante. Si tanquam in exemplari, constat quod aliud est *esse in ipso*, et *ex ipso*, sicut praeostensum est[^14]. Si tanquam in conservante, adhuc est aliud produci, aliud conservari. — Item, si eandem vim habent; sicut *ex ipso* appropriatur Patri, ita potest appropriari Filio, et similiter Patri erit appropriare *in ipso*.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de illis tribus circumlocutionibus quantum ad illud quod significant, aut quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant. Si loquamur quantum ad illud quod significant, sic omnia dicuntur esse *ex Deo*, tanquam ex principio primo non aliunde moto; omnia dicuntur esse *per Deum*, tanquam per principium sufficientissimum quod omnia agit per se ipsum; omnia dicuntur esse *in Deo*, tanquam in principio infinito, quod non potest facere aliquid extra se, sed omnia ambit eius virtus. Et in his tribus circumlocutionibus significatur, quod Deus est principium primum et sufficientissimum et infinitissimum. Et quia omnia haec in Deo sunt unum et conveniunt tribus, ideo quantum ad significatum dicit Ambrosius, quod habent eandem vim; nec tamen est inculcatio[^15], quia idem diversimode important secundum rationem intelligendi. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant praepositionum habitudines, sic sunt appropriata tribus: quia *ex ipso* dicit rationem primi, et *per ipsum* dicit rationem medii, et *in ipso* dicit rationem ultimi sive quietativi[^16]. Et ideo *ex ipso* appropriatur personae Patris, quae est prima in Trinitate; *per ipsum* appropriatur Filio, qui est persona media; et *in ipso* Spiritui sancto, qui est persona tertia. Ex his patent obiecta.

---

english:
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says that the cognition of God is his essence, yet not all things which are in his cognition are in his essence. For he seems to speak ill, since this argument seems to be necessary: if any two are altogether the same; if anything is in the one, [it is] also in the other. If you say that they differ on the side of their connotata: it seems false, since God's foreknowledge does not connote. — Or if you say that foreknowledge connotes; it is objected concerning this name *God*, that it does not connote, and yet all things are said to be in God: therefore by parity of reasoning [they are] also in his essence. — Furthermore, against the Master there seems to be the word of Anselm in the *Monologion*[^1], that «a creature in the Creator is a creating essence»: therefore it seems that they truly are in God's essence.

**I respond:** It must be said that this preposition *in* sometimes connotes inherence, as if one say *an accident in a subject*: sometimes it notes identity, as if one say *the ideas of things are in God*, since they are God, not from God; sometimes it notes causality, as if one say *creatures are in God himself*: and this preposition *in* can be said according to the four genera of causes, but in God it is said only according to three[^2]. — Therefore, since *cause* says a respect to the creature according to the account of understanding, this preposition *in*, insofar as it says causality, is added only to terms saying a respect to the creature. And since the name of *substance* or *nature* or *essence* does not say a respect, therefore if it be said: *creatures are in God's substance*, this preposition *in* either notes identity or inherence, both of which are false: and therefore such locutions are not received; and in that argument there is a sophism according to accident. Therefore the Master says that [the argument] is invalid; for although they be the same in reality, they yet differ in the mode of signifying and of understanding.

To that which is objected, that *God* does not say a respect; it must be said that this is false, because [the name] is imposed from the act which he has toward the creature, as Damascene says[^3]; whence it is well said: *God of creatures.*

To that which is objected, that *a creature in the Creator is a creating essence*; it must be said that for a creature to be in the Creator is for the idea or likeness of it to be with God; and Anselm wishes to say that that likeness is a creating essence, not that that creature is the essence. Whence it is rightly to be conceded that the ideas of things are in the divine essence, because *in* notes identity, and truly so; but this cannot be said of the creature according to the being which it has in its proper genus.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *those things are understood to be in God which are from him and through him etc.* For he seems to speak ill, because since such things are only [as] present, therefore in God there are only those things which presently exist; which is manifestly false and against Augustine[^4], who says that things are in God from eternity. If you say that he takes *to be in God* as in [a cause] conserving, because thus the Apostle takes [it] in the aforementioned authority[^5]: *From him and through him and in him*; then [this] makes nothing to the proposition, because the Master takes *to be in*, according to which things are said to be in God eternally. — If you say that things are actually from God or through God in time, but habitually[^6] from eternity; then I ask, why are they actually in God from eternity and not from God or through God?

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**I respond:** It must be said that *to be from*[^7] God or through God can be taken either according to aptitude, or according to act, or according to habit. If according to act; then the aforesaid authority is not to be understood precisely [as meaning] that those alone are in God which are from God or through God, because God knows many things which are in God, which yet are not from him nor through him, nor will be. It can again be taken according to habit; and so still it is not to be understood precisely, because God knows and can do many things which he will not do; and yet they are in him, nor will they ever be from him nor through him. It can again be understood according to aptitude; and then it has truth precisely, because nothing is in God unless it be apt to be from God and through him; and so it is valid for the proposition, and so the Master understands [it]; and through this evils are excluded, because God cannot do evils, nor can evils be from him nor through him.

As for what is asked, why things are not said eternally to be *from* God etc.; it must be said that there is no parallel, because the other prepositions signify by the mode of becoming and motion and act, but this preposition *in* by the mode of rest[^8]. And since God did not make [things] except in time, nor was actually a cause causing except in time, although habitually from eternity; therefore things are said rather to be in God eternally than from God[^9].

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that reasoning of the Master, by which he says that evils are not in God, because God does not know them by approbation. For he seems to speak ill, because approbation regards the will; but *to be in God* regards exemplarity from eternity: therefore the knowledge of approbation makes nothing to this. — Likewise, the Master seems insufficient in the division of the divine cognition, because just as goods are known by the knowledge of approbation, so evils [are known] by the knowledge of reprobation. — Likewise, approbation either adds something over knowledge simply, or not; if not: therefore there is not[^10] [reason] in God to distinguish knowledge and the knowledge of approbation. Likewise, if it adds nothing, therefore just as those things are in God which he knows by approving, so also those[^11] which he knows simply [are in God]. If it adds something: therefore it seems that the divine knowledge is composite. If you say that it adds [something] according to the intellect — but our intellect does not make things to be in God: therefore neither does the knowledge of approbation.

**I respond:** It must be said that approbation, over cognition according to the intellect, adds the good-pleasure of the will; but this good-pleasure connotes goodness in him[^12] with respect to whom it is; because nothing pleases God except the good, and every good as such is like to God. If therefore the idea says the account of knowing according to assimilation, all things which God knows by the knowledge of approbation are in him.

But it is to be noted that approbation can connote goodness in act; and so it is not precisely true that everything which is in God is known by the knowledge of approbation. It can again connote goodness in potency, as the exemplar connotes the entity of a thing, not because it is, but because God can make it; and so nothing is in God except what he knows by the knowledge of approbation, because thus he knows every good which is or which he can do, and of that he has the exemplar; and therefore that alone is in God.

Therefore as for what he objects, that the will does not make [things] to be in God; it must be said that this is not because [it is] the will in act, but because God can do nothing which he does not approve as good; whence approbation rather says here a judgment of reason than an affection of the will[^13].

As for what he asks, whether [approbation] adds [something]; it must be said that it does add — on the side of our intellect and on the side of the connotatum, on the side of God himself it does not. But reprobation does not add in this way; and therefore the Master does not place the knowledge of reprobation as a member [of the division].

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#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: *All these have the same force, namely from him and through him and in him*. For it is objected, that if they have the same force, therefore there seems to be here an inculcation of words. — Likewise, either *to be in him* is taken as in an exemplar, or as in a conserving cause. If as in an exemplar, it is established that it is one thing to be *in him* and another to be *from him*, as has been previously shown[^14]. If as in a conserving [cause], still it is one thing to be produced, another to be conserved. — Likewise, if they have the same force; just as *from him* is appropriated to the Father, so it can be appropriated to the Son, and similarly for the Father it will [be possible] to appropriate *in him*.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is [a way of] speaking concerning those three circumlocutions either as regards what they signify, or as regards the order which they connote. If we speak as regards what they signify, then all things are said to be *from God*, as from a first principle not moved by another; all things are said to be *through God*, as through a most-sufficient principle which does all things through itself; all things are said to be *in God*, as in an infinite principle, which cannot make anything outside itself, but all things its power encompasses. And in these three circumlocutions it is signified that God is a principle first and most-sufficient and most-infinite. And because all these things in God are one and agree to the three [persons], therefore as regards the signified Ambrose says that they have the same force; nor yet is there an inculcation[^15], because the same things are imported in different ways according to the account of understanding. — But if we speak as regards the order which the relations of the prepositions connote, then they are appropriated to the three [persons]: because *from him* says the account of *first*, and *through him* says the account of *middle*, and *in him* says the account of *last* or *quietative*[^16]. And therefore *from him* is appropriated to the person of the Father, who is first in the Trinity; *through him* is appropriated to the Son, who is the middle person; and *in him* to the Holy Spirit, who is the third person. From these the objections are plain.

---

la: Vide supra pag. 623, nota 3.

en: See above p. 623, note 3.

la: Causae efficientis, exemplaris (formalis) et finalis. Quod ratio causae materialis nullatenus ad divina transferatur, probatum est supra d. 19. p. II. q. 3.

en: [The three are] of efficient, exemplar (formal), and final cause. That the account of material cause is in no way transferred to the divine has been proved above, d. 19, p. II, q. 3.

la: Vide supra pag. 60, nota 2.

en: See above p. 60, note 2.

la: Vide supra a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 1, et q. 2. fundam. 1. Cfr. etiam V. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 18. n. 36, et *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 49, n. 18.

en: See above a. 2, q. 1, fundamentum 1, and q. 2, fundamentum 1. Cf. also [Augustine,] *On Genesis according to the letter* [book] V, c. 18, n. 36, and *Expositions on the Psalms* 49, n. 18.

en: Romans 11:36.

la: Pro *habitualiter* hic et circa finem solutionis omnes ferme codd. *habitudinaliter*, at perperam. Cfr. de hoc supra pag. 323, nota 10.

en: For *habitualiter* here and near the end of the solution, almost all the codices read *habitudinaliter*, but wrongly. Cf. on this above p. 323, note 10.

la: Pro *ex* fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *in*; mendose, ut ex subnexis liquet.

en: For *ex*, almost all the codices and ed. 1 read *in*; erroneously, as is plain from what follows.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 1. ad 6.

en: Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 1, ad 6.

la: Ex hoc et praecedenti dubio sequitur, quod aliud sit esse in essentia Dei, aliud esse in Deo, aliud esse in scientia Dei. De ideis enim divinis dicitur, eas esse in Dei essentia, quod non potest dici de creaturis, quae quidem, quatenus sunt, sunt in Deo causante et in Dei cognitione; mala vero sunt quidem in Dei cognitione, sed non in Deo, et multo minus in Dei essentia. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1. § 5, et a. 2. ad 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2. et a. 10; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Richard., hic circa lit.

en: From this and the preceding doubt it follows that one thing is *to be in the essence of God*, another *to be in God*, another *to be in the knowledge of God*. For of the divine ideas it is said that they are in God's essence, which cannot be said of creatures, which indeed, insofar as they are, are in God-as-causing and in God's cognition; but evils are indeed in God's cognition, but not in God, and much less in God's essence. Cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, § 5, and a. 2, ad 2; Bl. Albert here, a. 2 and a. 10; St. Thomas here, q. 1, a. 3; Richard, here on the text.

la: Pro *est* codd. F T W et ed. 1 *debet*, cod. R *debuit*. Qui malit hanc lectionem, simul audiat: Magister.

en: For *est*, codd. F T W and ed. 1 read *debet*, cod. R *debuit*. Whoever prefers this reading, let him at the same time hear: [it is] the Master [speaking].

la: Pro *illa* cod. *ista mala*. Paulo inferius pro *non facit* fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *non capit*, quam lectionem contextus reprobat.

en: For *illa*, a codex reads *ista mala*. A little below, for *non facit*, almost all the codices with ed. 1 read *non capit*, which reading the context rejects.

la: Vat. et cod. cc *Deo*, quod manifeste est falsum.

en: The Vatican edition and cod. cc read *Deo*, which is manifestly false.

la: Cfr. August., libr. *Imperfect. de Gen. ad lit.* c. 5. n. 22, ubi significatio vocis *approbatio* exponitur. Videsis etiam I. *de Gen. ad lit.* c. 5. n. 11, et B. Albert., hic a. 9.

en: Cf. Augustine, *Unfinished book on Genesis according to the letter* c. 5, n. 22, where the meaning of the word *approbatio* is set out. See also [Augustine,] *On Genesis according to the letter* I, c. 5, n. 11, and Bl. Albert here, a. 9.

la: Hic dub. 2. et 3. Cfr. etiam supra a. 2. q. 1.

en: Here, dubia 2 and 3. Cf. also above, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Supple cum cod. V *verborum*. — Subinde post *quia* adiecimus *idem* ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1. Verbum *diversimode*, quod immediate sequitur, a multis codd. et ed. 1 abest; et in codd. F T Y non bene legitur: *quia non idem important* etc.

en: Supply with cod. V *verborum*. — Subsequently, after *quia*, we have added *idem* from the older codices and ed. 1. The word *diversimode*, which immediately follows, is absent from many codices and ed. 1; and in codd. F T Y is read not well: *quia non idem important* etc.

la: Pro *quietativi* codd. L *locativi*. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 4; B. Albert., hic a. 10, et S. p. I. tract. 12. q. 50. m. 3; Richard., hic circa lit.

en: For *quietativi*, codd. L read *locativi*. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 67, m. 4; Bl. Albert here, a. 10, and *Summa* p. I, tract. 12, q. 50, m. 3; Richard here, on the text.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 37

title_alt: De divina immensitate sive ubiquitate — littera Magistri

title_alt: On divine immensity or ubiquity — text of the Master

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 633 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXXVII.

### PARS I.

#### Cap. I.

*Quibus modis dicitur Deus esse in rebus.*

Et quoniam demonstratum est ex parte, quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo, addendum videtur hic, quibus modis dicitur *Deus esse in rebus*, si tamen id humana mens vel ex parte digne valeat cogitare, vel lingua sufficiat eloqui. — Sciendum ergo est, quod Deus, incommutabiliter semper in se existens, praesentialiter, potentialiter, essentialiter est in omni natura sive essentia sine sui definitione, et in omni loco sine circumscriptione, et in omni tempore sine mutabilitate. Et praeterea in sanctis spiritibus et animabus est excellentius, scilicet per gratiam inhabitans, et in homine Christo excellentissime, in quo *plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter inhabitat*[^1], ut ait Apostolus. In eo enim Deus habitavit non per gratiam adoptionis, sed per gratiam unionis. Ne autem ista, quia capacitatem humanae intelligentiae excedunt, falsitatis arguere aliqui praesumant, Sanctorum auctoritatibus munienda mihi videntur. Beatus Gregorius super Cantica Canticorum[^2]: « Licet Deus communi modo omnibus rebus insit praesentia, potentia, substantia, tamen familiariori modo dicitur inesse per gratiam illis, qui mirificentiam operum Dei acutius et fidelius considerant ». De hoc enim eodem Augustinus ad Dardanum[^3] in libro de Praesentia Dei ait: « Cum Deus sit natura incorporea et incommutabiliter viva, aeterna stabilitate in se ipso manens, totus adest rebus omnibus, et singulis totus; sed in quibus habitat, habent eum pro suae capacitatis diversitate, alii amplius, alii minus, quos ipse sibi dilectissimum templum gratia suae bonitatis aedificat ». Hilarius quoque in libro octavo de Trinitate[^4] apertissime docet, Deum esse ubique: « Deus, inquit, immensae virtutis, vivens potestas, quae nusquam non adsit, nec desit usquam, se omnem per sua edocet, ut ubi sua sint, ipse esse intelligatur. Non autem corporali modo, cum alicubi sit, non etiam ubique esse credatur, cum et in omnibus esse non desinat ». Ambrosius, in primo libro de Spiritu sancto[^5], Spiritum sanctum probat non esse creaturam quia ubique est, quod est proprium divinitatis, ita dicens: « Cum omnis creatura certis naturae suae sit circumscripta limitibus, quomodo quis audeat creaturam appellare Spiritum sanctum, qui non habet circumscriptam determinatamque virtutem, qui[^6] et in omnibus et ubique semper est? quod utique divinitatis et dominationis est proprium ». Idem in eodem[^7]: « Domini est omnia complere, qui dicit: *Ego caelum et terram compleo*. Si ergo Dominus est qui caelum complet et terram, quis ergo potest Spiritum sanctum iudicare dominationis et divinae potestatis exsortem qui replevit orbem? et quod plus est, replevit et Iesum, totius mundi Redemptorem ». Ex his aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus aperte monstratur[^8], quod Deus ubique in omni creatura essentialiter, praesentialiter, potentialiter est.

#### Cap. II.

*Quod Deus non, ubicumque est, habitat, sed e converso.*

In Sanctis vero etiam habitat, in quibus est per gratiam. Non enim, ubicumque est, ibi habitat, ubi vero habitat, ibi est. In solis bonis habitat, qui sunt templum eius et sedes eius. Unde per Isaiam[^9] Dominus ait: *Caelum mihi sedes est, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum*, quia in electis, qui sunt caelum, habitat Deus et regnat, qui eius voluntati devoti obtemperant; malos vero, qui sunt terra, iudicii districtione calcat. Unde etiam in libro Sapientiae[^10] dicitur *Thronus sapientiae anima iusti*, quia in iustis specialius est quam in aliis rebus, in quibus tamen omnibus totus est. « Quemadmodum anima, ait Augustinus in Epistola ad Hieronymum[^11] de origine animae, per omnes particulas corporis tota adest simul, nec minor in minoribus, nec in maioribus maior, sed tamen in aliis intensius et in aliis remissius operatur, cum in singulis particulis corporis essentialiter tota sit »; ita et Deus, cum sit in omnibus essentialiter ac totus, in illis tamen plenius esse dicitur, quos inhabitat, id est, in quibus ita est, ut faciat eos templum suum. Et hi tales cum eo sunt iam ex parte, sed in beatitudine perfecte; mali vero, etsi ibi sint, ubi ipse est, qui nusquam deest, non tamen sunt cum eo. Unde Augustinus super Ioannem[^12]: « Non satis fuit dicere: *Ubi ego sum, et illi sint*, sed addidit *mecum*, quia et miseri possunt esse, ubi et ille est, qui nusquam deest; sed Beati sunt cum illo, quia non sunt beati nisi ex eo ». *Cum*[^13] illo sunt qui fruuntur eo et vident illum, sicut est; mali vero non sunt cum illo, ut caeci in luce non sunt cum luce. Nec boni ita nunc sunt cum eo, ut videant per speciem, etsi sunt aliquo modo cum eo per fidem. Quomodo autem Deus habitet in bonis, ex illis aliquatenus intelligere valebis, quae supra[^14] dicta sunt, cum de Spiritus sancti processione temporali ageretur, ubi, licet ex parte, exponitur — *ex parte enim cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus* — quomodo Spiritus sanctus habitet in nobis, qui non sine Patre et Filio inhabitat.

#### Cap. III.

*Ubi erat Deus, antequam esset creatura.*

Si autem quaeris, ubi habitabat Deus, antequam Sancti essent; dicimus, quia in se habitabat. Unde Augustinus in libro contra Maximinum[^15]: « In templo, inquit, suo habitat Deus », « scilicet in Sanctis, qui sunt templum Dei modo secundum fidem ambulantes; et templum Dei erunt aliquando etiam secundum speciem, qualiter etiam nunc templum Dei sunt Angeli. Sed dicet aliquis: antequam faceret Deus caelum et terram, antequam faceret Sanctos, ubi habitabat? In se habitabat Deus, apud se habitabat, et apud se est. Non ergo Sancti sic sunt domus Dei, ut, ea subtracta, cadat Deus; immo sic habitat Deus in Sanctis, ut, si ipse discesserit, cadant ». — Sciendum est etiam, quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro ad Dardanum[^16], dici nisi stultissime nequit, Spiritum sanctum non habere locum in nostro corpore, quod totum anima nostra impleverit. Stultius etiam dicitur, angustiis alicubi impediri Trinitatem, ut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus alicubi simul esse non possint. « Verum illud est multo mirabilius, quod cum Deus ubique sit totus, non tamen in omnibus

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habitat. Quis porro audeat opinari, nisi inseparabilitatem Trinitatis penitus ignoret, quod in aliquo possit habitare Pater et Filius, in quo non habitet Spiritus sanctus, aut in aliquo Spiritus sanctus, in quo non habitet Pater et Filius? Fatendum est igitur, ubique esse Deum per divinitatis praesentiam, sed non ubique per inhabitationis gratiam. Propter hanc enim inhabitationem gratiae non dicimus: *Pater noster, qui es ubique*, cum et hoc verum sit; sed *qui es in caelis*, id est in Sanctis, in quibus est quodam excellentiori modo. — « Illud quoque mirabile est, quia, ut ait Augustinus in eodem[^17], Deus est inhabitator quorundam nondum cognoscentium Deum, et non quorundam cognoscentium Deum. Illi enim ad templum Dei non pertinent, *qui cognoscentes Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt*. Ad templum Dei pertinent parvuli sanctificati Sacramento Christi et regenerati Spiritu sancto, qui nondum valent cognoscere Deum. Igitur quem potuerunt illi *nosse* nec habere, isti potuerunt habere, antequam nosse. Beatissimi autem sunt illi, quibus hoc est Deum habere quod nosse ». — Hic aliquatenus aperit Augustinus, quomodo Deus habitet in aliquo, id est habeatur, cum videlicet ita est in aliquo, ut ab eo cognoscatur et diligatur.

Ex praedictis patet, quod Deus ubique totus est per essentiam et in Sanctis habitat per gratiam. Cumque superius, licet tenuiter, ostensum sit, qua ratione dicatur habitare in quibusdam, efflagitaret[^18] ordinis ratio, id etiam assignari, quomodo ubique per essentiam et totus sit, nisi huius considerationis sublimitas atque immensitas humanae mentis sensum omnino excederet. Ut enim ait Chrysostomus super Epistolam ad Hebraeos[^19]: « Sicut multa de Deo intelligimus, quae loqui penitus non valemus; ita multa loquimur, quae intelligere non sumus idonei, verbi gratia, quod ubique Deus est, scimus et dicimus; quomodo autem ubique sit, intellectu non capimus. Item, quod est incorporea quaedam virtus, quae omnium est causa bonorum, scimus, quomodo autem, vel quae ista sit, penitus ignoramus ».

Quidam tamen, immensa ingenio suo metiri praesumentes, hoc ita fore intelligendum tradiderunt, quod Deus ubique esse per essentiam dicitur, non quod Dei essentia proprie sit in omni loco et in omni creatura, sed quia omnis natura atque omne quod naturaliter est, in quocumque loco sit, per eum habet esse, et omnis locus, in quo illud est. Iidem[^20] etiam dicunt, ideo Deum ubique dici esse per praesentiam vel per potentiam, quia cuncta loca sunt ei praesentia, et quae in eis sunt, nec in eis aliquid operari cessat. Nam et ipsa loca, et quidquid in eis est, nisi ipse conservet, manere non possunt. In eis ergo per substantiam Deus esse dicitur, ut aiunt, quia per virtutem propriae substantiae suae facit, ut etiam loca sint, et omnia quae in eis sunt. — Sed licet haec vera sint quae asserunt in explanandis intelligentiis praedictorum, in illis tamen verbis, quibus dicitur Deus ubique esse per essentiam, plus contineri credendum est; quod homo vivens capere non valet.

#### Cap. IV.

*Quod Deus, cum sit in omnibus rebus essentialiter, non tamen coinquinatur sordibus rerum.*

Solet etiam ab eisdem quaeri, quomodo Deus a substantialiter insit omnibus rebus, et corporalium sordium inquinationibus non contingatur. Quod tam frivolum est, ut nec responsione sit dignum, cum etiam spiritus creatus sordibus corporis[^21] etiam leprosi vel quantumcumque polluti inquinari non possit. Sol quoque radios suos sine sui pollutione effundit super loca et corpora non solum munda, sed etiam immunda ac sordibus foetentia, quorum contactu homines ac quaedam aliae res inficiuntur; solis vero radii impolluti et incontaminati, ea contingentes, exsistunt. Non est igitur mirandum, si essentia divina omnino simplex et incommutabilis omnia replet loca, et omnibus creaturis essentialiter inest, nec tamen cuiusquam rei sordibus contaminetur vel contingatur. Unde Augustinus in libro de Natura boni[^22]: « Cum in Deo, inquit, sint omnia quae condidit, non tamen inquinant eum illi qui peccant. De cuius etiam sapientia, *quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter*, dicitur: *Attingit omnia propter suam munditiam, et nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit*[^23]. Timent quidam quod fieri non potest, scilicet ne humana carne veritas et substantia Dei inquinetur; et tamen praedicant, istum visibilem solem radios suos per omnes faeces et sordes spargere, et eos mundos et sinceros servari. Si ergo visibilia munda a visibilibus immundis contingi possunt et non inquinari, quanto magis invisibilis et incommutabilis Veritas »? Postremo respondeant, quid potius de Deo respondendum existiment: vel quod nusquam per essentiam sit, vel quod ubique, vel alicubi, ita quod non ubique? Sed quis audeat dicere, quod nusquam divina essentia sit, vel quod alicubi, et non ubique sit? Si enim ita est alicubi, quod non ubique, ergo localis est. Est ergo ubique tota, quae continet totum et penetrat totum, quae nec pro sui simplicitate dividi, nec pro sui puritate maculari, nec pro sui immensitate ullo modo comprehendi potest. Unde Augustinus[^24]: *Deus ubique est, cui non locis, sed actionibus propinquamus*.

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### PARS II.

#### Cap. V.

*Cum Deus sit ubique et semper, non tamen localis, nec loco nec tempore movetur.*

Cumque divina natura veraciter et essentialiter sit in omni loco et in omni tempore, non tamen movetur per loca vel per tempora[^25], nec localis est, nec temporalis. Localis non est, quia penitus non circumscribitur loco, quia nec ita est in uno loco, quod non sit in alio, neque dimensionem habet, sicut corpus, cui secundum locum assignatur principium, medium et finis, et ante et retro, dextra et sinistra, sursum et deorsum, quod sui interpositione facit distantiam circumstantium.

> *Quid sit mutari secundum tempus.* <!-- This sub-rubric is in fact Cap. VII in the printed Quaracchi (p. 635 col-b heading, OCR-dropped); kept here as an in-text rubric since the body content order differs from the printed-cap order, and a structural rewrite is out of scope for the polish-blocker pass. -->

Mutari autem per tempus est variari secundum qualitates interiores vel exteriores, quae sunt in ipsa re, quae mutatur, ut quando suscipit vicissitudinem gaudii, doloris, scientiae, oblivionis, vel variationem formae sive alicuius qualitatis exterioris. Haec enim mutatio, quae fit secundum tempus, variatio est qualitatum, quae fit in corporali vel spirituali creatura, et ideo vocatur tempus.

De mutatione vero loci magna inter conquirentes disceptatio versatur. Sunt enim qui dicunt, nullum spiritum aliquo modo posse mutari loco, ab omni spiritu locum universaliter removere volentes, quoniam secundum dimensionem tantum et circumscriptionem locum constare asserunt, atque id solum locale vel in loco esse dicunt, quod dimensionem recipit et distantiam in loco facit. Et hoc dicunt Augustinum sensisse, mutationem temporis tantum spirituali creaturae tribuentem, loci vero et temporis corporeae. Unde Augustinus super Genesim[^26]: « Deus, inquit, omnipotens, incommutabili aeternitate, voluntate, veritate semper idem, movet per tempus creaturam spiritualem; movet etiam per tempus et locum creaturam corporalem, ut eo motu naturas, quas condidit, administret. Cum ergo tale aliquid agit, non debemus opinari eius substantiam, qua Deus est, temporibus locisque mutabilem sive per tempora et loca mobilem; cum sit ipse et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super omnia et antiquior omnibus, quia ipse est ante omnia, et novior omnibus, quia ipse idem est post omnia », scilicet post omnium initia. — Ecce hic aperte ostenditur, quod nec locis nec temporibus mutatur vel movetur Deus. Spiritualis autem creatura per tempus movetur, corporalis vero etiam per tempus et locum.

#### Cap. VI.

*Quibus modis aliquid dicatur locale vel circumscriptibile.*

Sed, ut supra diximus, dupliciter dicitur res localis vel circumscriptibilis, scilicet vel quia dimensionem recipit et distantiam facit, vel quia loci termino definitur, quorum utrumque convenit corporeae creaturae, alterum vero tantum spirituali. Nam, ut supra diximus, corporalis creatura ita est localis vel circumscriptibilis, quod determinatur definitione loci, et quod dimensionem recipiens distantiam facit; spiritualis vero tantum definitione loci concluditur, cum ita sit alicubi, quod non alibi; sed nec dimensionem recipit, nec distantiam in loco facit, quia si multi spiritus essent hic, non eo coangustarent locum, quo minus de corporibus contineret. Ideoque Augustinus attribuit mutationem loci corpori, non spiritui, quia licet spiritus transeat de loco ad locum, non tamen ita, ut dimensionibus circumscriptus, interpositione sui faciat distantiam circumstantium, sicut corpus.

Duobus namque his modis dicitur in Scriptura aliquid locale sive circumscriptibile, et e converso, scilicet vel quia dimensionem capiens longitudinis, altitudinis et latitudinis distantiam facit in loco, ut corpus; vel quia loco definitur ac determinatur, quoniam, cum sit alicubi, non ubique invenitur; quod non solum corpori, sed etiam omni creato spiritui congruit. Omne igitur corpus omni modo locale est; spiritus vero creatus quodam modo est localis, et quodam modo non est localis. Localis quidem dicitur, quia definitione loci terminatur, quoniam cum alicubi praesens sit, totus alibi non invenitur; non autem ita localis est, ut dimensionem capiens, distantiam in loco faciat. Divina igitur sola omnino essentia omnino illocalis et incircumscriptibilis est, quae nec locis movetur aliquo modo — scilicet vel determinatione finita, vel dimensione suscepta — nec temporibus, scilicet affectu et cognitione. His enim duobus modis, scilicet loco vel tempore, fit mutatio creaturae, quae longe est a Creatore.

#### Cap. VII.

*Utrum spiritus creati sint locales et circumscriptibiles.* <!-- printed as Cap. VIII in Quaracchi p. 635 col-b → p. 636; chunk numbering kept as VII for body-flow consistency, structural restructure deferred -->

Sunt ergo spiritus creati in loco et transeunt de loco ad locum, et quodam modo locales et circum-

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scriptibiles sunt, sed non omni eo modo, quo creaturae corporeae. Spiritus autem increatus, qui Deus est, in loco quidem est et in omni loco, sed omnino illocalis et incircumscriptibilis est. Unde Beda super Lucam[^27] ait: « Cum ad nos Angeli veniunt, sic exterius implent ministerium, ut tamen ante Deum interius per contemplationem assistant, quia etsi Angelus est spiritus circumscriptus, summus tamen spiritus, qui Deus est, incircumscriptus est, intra quem currit Angelus, quocumque mittatur ». — Ecce hic dicitur, quia spiritus angelicus circumscriptus est, spiritus autem, qui Deus est, incircumscriptus. Alibi etiam Ambrosius, distantiam ostendens inter spiritum increatum et spiritum creatum, dicit, Seraphim de loco ad locum transire, ita inquiens in libro de Trinitate[^28]: « Dixit Isaias: *Quia missus est ad me unus de Seraphim*. Et Spiritus quidem sanctus *missus* dicitur, sed Seraphim *ad unum*, Spiritus vero ad omnes. Seraphim mittitur in ministerio, Spiritus operatur mysterium. Seraphim de loco ad locum transit — non complet omnia — sed ipse repletur a Spiritu ». — Hic aperte monstratur[^29], quod Angeli quodam modo locales sunt.

#### Cap. VIII.

*Quod Deus est ubique sine locali motu.*

Fateamur itaque, divinam naturam pro immensitate sui nusquam deesse, eamque solam omnino illocalem et incircumscriptibilem nullo concludi loco, sed *a fine usque ad finem attingere*[^30], non tamen spatiosa magnitudine nec locali motu, sed immensitate atque immobilitate suae essentiae. Unde Augustinus ad Dardanum[^31] ait: « Non quasi spatiosa magnitudine opinemur Deum per cuncta diffundi sicut humus aut lux ista diffunditur, sed potius sicut in duobus sapientibus, quorum alter altero corpore grandior est, sed sapientior non est, una sapientia est, nec est in maiore maior, nec in minore minor, nec minor in uno quam in duobus; ita Deus, sine labore regens et continens mundum, in caelo totus est, in terra totus, et in utroque totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in se ipso ubique totus ». Idem quoque super Psalmum[^32] ait: « Ad Verbum Dei pertinet non esse in parte, sed ubique esse per se ipsum. Haec enim Dei sapientia, quae *attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter*, non tamen motu locali, sed immobilitate sui: veluti si moles aliqua saxea impleat aliquem locum, dicitur, quod attingit a fine illius loci usque ad finem, cum tamen alterum non deserat alterum occupando. Non ergo habet motum localem Verbum illud, et Sapientia illa solida est et ubique ». — Ex praedictis innotescit, quod Deus est ita ubique per essentiam, quod nec spatiosa magnitudine diffunditur, nec, uno deserto loco, alium occupat, quia localem motum non habet. Ideoque Augustinus, volens praescindere[^33] a Dei puritate omnem localem motum et localem circumscriptionem, potius dicit, omnia esse in illo, quam ipsum esse in illis, nec tamen ipsum alicubi, esse locum, qui non est in loco, in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum[^34] ita inquiens: « Deus non alicubi est. Quod alicubi est continetur loco, quod continetur loco corpus est; Deus autem non est corpus: non igitur alicubi est. Et tamen, quia est et in loco non est, in illo sunt potius omnia, quam ipse alicubi; nec tamen ita in illo, ut ipse sit locus. Locus enim in spatio est, quod longitudine et latitudine et altitudine corporis occupatur; nec Deus tale aliquid est. Et omnia igitur in ipso sunt, et locus non est; locus tamen Dei, sed improprie, dicitur templum Dei, non quod eo contineatur. Id autem nihil melius quam anima munda intelligitur ». — Ecce hic dicit, Deum non esse in loco. Sed intelligendum est eum non esse in loco localiter, scilicet quia nec circumscriptionem nec localem motum habet.

Ad hoc autem solet opponi sic: Quotidie fiunt creaturae, quae ante non erant, et in eis Deus est, cum ante non esset in eis: est ergo ubi ante non erat, ideoque mutabilis videtur. — Sed licet quotidie incipiat esse in creaturis, in quibus ante non erat, quia illae non erant; hoc tamen fit sine sui mutatione, qualiter in mundo coepit esse, quem fecit, tamen sine sui mutabilitate; similiter et desinit esse, in quibus ante erat, sine sui mutatione, nec tamen ipse deserit locum, sed locus desinit esse.

Iam sufficienter demonstratum videtur, quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo, et Deus in omnibus; quam disceptationem quasi incidenter suscepimus, quia id videbatur postulare res, circa quam noster versabatur sermo. Disserebamus enim de scientia sive sapientia Dei, et cum diceremus, Deum scire omnia, quaesitum est, utrum propter cognitionem, quam de omnibus habet, dicerentur omnia esse in Deo, an alia ratione hoc diceret Scriptura. Huius ergo quaestionis occasio in praemissam nos deduxit disputationem.

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### DISTINCTION XXXVII.

### PART I.

#### Chapter I.

*In what ways God is said to be in things.*

And since it has been shown in part how all things are said to be in God, it seems that there must here be added in what ways *God is said to be in things*, if at all the human mind is able worthily even in part to think it, or the tongue suffices to speak it. — It is therefore to be known that God, immutably always existing in Himself, is by presence, by power, by essence in every nature or essence without His being defined [by it], and in every place without circumscription, and in every time without mutability. And besides He is more excellently in the holy spirits and souls — namely as indwelling by grace — and most excellently in the man Christ, in whom *the fullness of divinity dwells corporeally*[^1], as the Apostle says. For in Him God dwelt not by the grace of adoption but by the grace of union. Lest however certain men, because these things exceed the capacity of human understanding, should presume to charge them with falsity, they seem to me to be fortified by the authorities of the Saints. Blessed Gregory on the Song of Songs[^2]: « Although God is in all things in a common manner — by presence, by power, by substance — He is nevertheless said to be in a more familiar manner by grace in those who consider the magnificence of God's works more keenly and more faithfully ». For concerning this same [matter] Augustine to Dardanus[^3], in the book *On the Presence of God*, says: « Since God is an incorporeal nature and immutably living, abiding in Himself with eternal stability, He is wholly present to all things, and wholly to each; but those in whom He dwells have Him according to the diversity of their capacity, some more, some less — those whom He Himself builds up for Himself as a most beloved temple by the grace of His goodness ». Hilary too, in the eighth book *On the Trinity*[^4], most plainly teaches that God is everywhere: « God, he says, of immense virtue, a living power, who is nowhere not present, nor anywhere absent, makes Himself wholly known through His [works], so that where His [works] are, He Himself is understood to be. Yet not in a corporeal mode — as though, when He is somewhere, He should not also be believed to be everywhere — since He does not cease to be in all things ». Ambrose, in the first book *On the Holy Spirit*[^5], proves that the Holy Spirit is not a creature because He is everywhere, which is proper to divinity, saying thus: « Since every creature is circumscribed by certain limits of its own nature, how should anyone dare call the Holy Spirit a creature, who has no circumscribed and determined power, who[^6] both in all things and everywhere always is? — which is, indeed, proper to divinity and lordship ». The same in the same [work][^7]: « It is the Lord's [work] to fill all things, who says: *I fill heaven and earth*. If therefore it is the Lord who fills heaven and earth, who then can judge the Holy Spirit to be without share in lordship and divine power, who has filled the orb [of the world]? and what is more, has filled even Jesus, the Redeemer of the whole world ». From these and many other authorities it is openly shown[^8] that God is everywhere in every creature essentially, by presence, and by power.

#### Chapter II.

*That God does not dwell wherever He is, but conversely.*

But in the Saints He also dwells, in whom He is by grace. For not wherever He is, does He there dwell, but where He dwells, there He is. He dwells in the good alone, who are His temple and His seat. Whence through Isaiah[^9] the Lord says: *Heaven is My seat, but earth is the footstool of My feet*; for in the elect, who are heaven, God dwells and reigns — those who, devoted to His will, obey [Him]; but the wicked, who are earth, He treads down by the rigor of judgment. Whence also in the book of Wisdom[^10] it is said, *The throne of wisdom is the soul of the just*, because in the just He is more specially than in other things, in all of which nevertheless He is whole. « Just as the soul, says Augustine in the Epistle to Jerome[^11] *On the Origin of the Soul*, is wholly present at once through all the particles of the body — neither lesser in lesser parts, nor greater in greater, but yet operating in some more intensely and in others more remissly, since in the individual particles of the body it is essentially whole »; so also God, since He is in all things essentially and whole, is nevertheless said to be more fully in those whom He inhabits, that is, in those in whom He so is that He makes them His temple. And such [men] are with Him already in part, but in beatitude perfectly; the wicked, however, even though they are there where He Himself is, who is nowhere absent, are nevertheless not *with* Him. Whence Augustine on John[^12]: « It was not enough to say, *Where I am, let them too be*, but He added *with Me*; because the wretched too can be where He also is, who is nowhere absent — but the Blessed are *with* Him, because they are not blessed except from Him ». *With*[^13] Him are those who enjoy Him and see Him as He is; the wicked however are not *with* Him, just as the blind in the light are not with the light. Nor are the good now so with Him as to see [Him] face to face, although they are in some manner with Him by faith. But how God dwells in the good, you will be able to understand to some degree from those things which were said above[^14], when [the question] was treated of the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, where there is set out, although in part — *for in part we know, and in part we prophesy* — how the Holy Spirit dwells in us, who does not dwell without the Father and the Son.

#### Chapter III.

*Where God was before there was a creature.*

But if you ask where God dwelt before the Saints were, we say that He dwelt in Himself. Whence Augustine in the book *Against Maximinus*[^15]: « *In His own temple*, he says, *God dwells* », « namely in the Saints, who are God's temple now, walking by faith; and they will be God's temple at some [future] time also after the manner of vision — in which [way] the Angels too are now God's temple. But someone will say: before God made heaven and earth, before He made the Saints, where was He dwelling? In Himself God was dwelling, with Himself He was dwelling, and with Himself He is. Therefore the Saints are not so the house of God that, if they were taken away, God would fall; rather God so dwells in the Saints that, if He Himself were to depart, they would fall ». — It must also be known that, as Augustine says in the book to Dardanus[^16], it cannot be said save most foolishly that the Holy Spirit has no place in our body, since our soul has filled the whole [of it]. More foolishly still is it said that the Trinity is hindered somewhere by narrow [bounds], so that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be together somewhere. « But that is much more wonderful, that, although God is everywhere whole, He yet does not in all things

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dwell. Who, moreover, would dare to opine — unless he were utterly ignorant of the inseparability of the Trinity — that the Father and the Son could dwell in something in which the Holy Spirit does not dwell, or the Holy Spirit in something in which the Father and the Son do not dwell? It must therefore be confessed that God is everywhere by the presence of [His] divinity, but not everywhere by the grace of [His] indwelling. For on account of this indwelling of grace we do not say *Our Father, who art everywhere* — although this too is true — but *who art in heaven*, that is, in the Saints, in whom He is in some more excellent mode. — « That too is wonderful, that, as Augustine says in the same [work][^17], God is the indweller of certain men *not yet knowing God*, and not [the indweller] of certain men *knowing God*. For these latter do not pertain to the temple of God — *who, knowing God, did not glorify [Him] as God*. To the temple of God pertain the little ones sanctified by the Sacrament of Christ and reborn by the Holy Spirit, who are not yet able to know God. Therefore He whom those [adults] could *not* know nor have, these [little ones] could have before they could know. But most blessed are those for whom this is to *have* God, [namely] to *know* [Him] ». — Here Augustine in some measure opens up how God dwells in someone — that is, is had — namely when He so is in someone that He is known and loved by him.

From the foregoing it is plain that God is everywhere whole by essence and dwells in the Saints by grace. And although it has been shown above, however slightly, by what reason He is said to dwell in certain ones, the order of treatment would urgently demand[^18] that this also be assigned, namely how He is everywhere by essence and whole, were it not that the sublimity and immensity of this consideration altogether exceeds the sense of the human mind. For as Chrysostom on the Epistle to the Hebrews[^19] says: « Just as we understand many things about God which we are utterly unable to put into speech, so we speak many things which we are not fit to understand — for example, that God is everywhere we know and we say; but how He is everywhere, we do not grasp by our understanding. Likewise, that there is a certain incorporeal power which is the cause of all good things, we know; but how, or what this is, we are utterly ignorant ».

Some men nevertheless, presuming to measure the immense by their own ingenuity, have handed down that this is so to be understood: that God is said to be everywhere by essence not because God's essence is properly in every place and in every creature, but because every nature, and everything which is naturally [something], in whatever place it be, has its being through Him — and [so does] every place in which that thing is. The same men[^20] also say that God is therefore said to be everywhere by presence or by power because all places are present to Him and the things which are in them, and He does not cease to operate something in them. For the places themselves, and whatever is in them, cannot remain unless He Himself preserves [them]. In them, therefore, God is said to be by substance, as they say, because by the power of His own substance He brings it about that the places too should *be*, and all things which are in them. — But although these things are true which they assert in setting out the meaning of the foregoing, in those words nevertheless by which God is said to be everywhere by essence, more is to be believed to be contained — [more] than living man is able to grasp.

#### Chapter IV.

*That God, although He is in all things essentially, is nevertheless not defiled by the filth of things.*

It is also wont to be asked by these same [men], how God can substantially be in all things, and yet not be touched by the defilements of corporeal filth. Which [question] is so frivolous that it is not even worthy of an answer — since even a created spirit cannot be defiled by the filth even of a leper's body[^21], or however polluted [a body]. The sun also pours out its rays without polluting itself upon places and bodies not only clean but even unclean and stinking with filth, by contact with which men and certain other things are infected; but the rays of the sun, undefiled and uncontaminated, [continue to] exist while touching them. It is no wonder, therefore, if the divine essence — altogether simple and immutable — fills all places, and is in all creatures essentially, and yet is neither contaminated nor touched by the filth of any thing whatsoever. Whence Augustine in the book *On the Nature of the Good*[^22]: « Although in God, he says, are all things which He has created, those nevertheless who sin do not defile Him. Concerning whose Wisdom too, *which reaches mightily from end to end*, it is said: *It reaches all things on account of its own purity, and nothing defiled enters into it*[^23]. Some men fear what cannot happen, namely lest the truth and substance of God should be defiled by human flesh; and yet they preach that this visible sun scatters its rays through all dregs and filth and that those [rays] are kept clean and pure. If therefore visible clean things can be touched by visible unclean things and not defiled, how much more the invisible and immutable Truth »? Finally, let them answer what rather of God they think is to be answered: that He is nowhere by essence, or that [He is] everywhere, or somewhere — yet so that not everywhere? But who would dare to say either that the divine essence is nowhere, or that it is somewhere and not everywhere? For if it is so somewhere as not to be everywhere, then it is local. Therefore the [divine essence] is everywhere whole, [the essence] which contains the whole and penetrates the whole — which neither can be divided on account of its simplicity, nor stained on account of its purity, nor in any way comprehended on account of its immensity. Whence Augustine[^24]: *God is everywhere, to whom we draw near not by places but by actions*.

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### PART II.

#### Chapter V.

*Although God is everywhere and always, yet [He is] not local, and is moved neither by place nor by time.*

And since the divine nature truly and essentially is in every place and in every time, He is yet not moved through places or through times[^25], nor is He local, nor temporal. He is not local, because He is in no way circumscribed by place — since He is not so in one place as not to be in another, nor does He have dimension, like a body, to which according to place is assigned a beginning, middle, and end, and front and back, right and left, up and down, [a body] which by the interposition of itself makes the surrounding [parts] distant.

> *What it is to be changed according to time.*

To be changed through time is to be varied according to inner or outer qualities which are in the very thing which is being changed — as when it undergoes a vicissitude of joy, of grief, of knowledge, of forgetting, or a variation of form or of some outer quality. For this change which takes place according to time is a variation of qualities, which takes place in a corporeal or spiritual creature, and is therefore called *time*.

But concerning change of place, a great dispute is engaged among inquirers. For there are those who say that no spirit can in any way be changed by place — wishing universally to remove place from every spirit, since they assert that place consists only in dimension and circumscription, and they say that that alone is local, or in a place, which receives dimension and makes distance in place. And they say that Augustine held this — attributing change of time only to the spiritual creature, but [change] of place and of time to the corporeal. Whence Augustine on Genesis[^26]: « God, he says, omnipotent, in immutable eternity, will, [and] truth, always the same, moves the spiritual creature through time; He moves also through time and place the corporeal creature, in order that by that motion He may govern the natures which He has founded. When therefore He does any such thing, we ought not to opine that His substance, by which He is God, is changeable through times and places, or movable through times and places — since He Himself is both interior to every thing, because in Him are all things, and exterior to every thing, because He Himself is above all and more ancient than all, since He Himself is before all things; and newer than all, because He Himself is the same after all things », namely after the beginnings of all things. — Behold, here it is openly shown that God is changed or moved neither by places nor by times. The spiritual creature however is moved through time, but the corporeal also through time and place.

#### Chapter VI.

*In what ways something is said to be local or circumscriptible.*

But, as we said above, a thing is said to be local or circumscriptible in two ways, namely either because it receives dimension and makes distance, or because it is defined by the limit of place — both of which apply to the corporeal creature, but only the latter to the spiritual. For, as we said above, the corporeal creature is local or circumscriptible in such a way that it is determined by definition of place, and that — receiving dimension — it makes distance; the spiritual, however, is enclosed only by definition of place, since it so is somewhere, that it is not elsewhere; but it neither receives dimension nor makes distance in place, because if many spirits were here, they would not so cramp the place by themselves that it should contain less of bodies. And therefore Augustine attributes change of place to body, not to spirit, because, although a spirit passes from place to place, yet not in such a way that, circumscribed by dimensions, by the interposition of itself it should make a distance of [the parts] standing around, as does a body.

For in these two ways something is said in Scripture to be local or circumscriptible, and conversely: namely either because, receiving the dimension of length, makes distance of height and breadth in place, like a body; or because it is defined and determined by place, since, when it is somewhere, it is not found everywhere — which fits not only a body but also every created spirit. Every body therefore is in every way local; but a created spirit is in a certain way local, and in a certain way is not local. Local indeed it is called, because it is bounded by definition of place, since when it is present somewhere, it is not wholly found elsewhere; but it is not so local that, receiving dimension, it should make distance in place. Only the divine essence therefore is altogether non-local and incircumscriptible — which is moved neither by places in any way (namely either by finite determination, or by received dimension) nor by times (namely by affection and cognition). For by these two modes, namely by place or by time, takes place the change of the creature, who is far from the Creator.

#### Chapter VII.

*Whether created spirits are local and circumscriptible.* <!-- = Quaracchi Cap. VIII; see Latin note above -->

Created spirits therefore are in a place, and they pass from place to place, and they are in a certain way local and circum-

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scriptible — but not in every mode in which corporeal creatures are. The uncreated Spirit, however, who is God, is indeed in a place and in every place, but altogether non-local and incircumscriptible. Whence Bede on Luke[^27] says: « When Angels come to us, so do they outwardly fulfill their ministry that nevertheless they assist inwardly before God by contemplation; because, although an angel is a circumscribed spirit, yet the highest Spirit, who is God, is uncircumscribed — within whom the Angel runs, wheresoever he is sent ». — Behold, here it is said that an angelic spirit is circumscribed, but the Spirit who is God is uncircumscribed. Elsewhere also Ambrose, showing the distance between the uncreated Spirit and the created spirit, says that the Seraphim pass from place to place, saying thus in the book *On the Trinity*[^28]: « Isaiah said: *That one of the Seraphim was sent to me*. And the Holy Spirit indeed is said to be *sent*, but the Seraphim *to one*; the [Holy] Spirit, however, to all. The Seraph is sent in ministry, the Spirit works the mystery. The Seraph passes from place to place — he does not fill all things — but he himself is filled by the Spirit ». — Here it is openly shown[^29] that the Angels are in a certain way local.

#### Chapter VIII.

*That God is everywhere without local motion.*

Let us therefore confess that the divine nature, on account of its immensity, is nowhere absent — and that it alone, altogether non-local and incircumscriptible, is enclosed by no place, but *reaches from end to end*[^30] — yet not by spacious magnitude nor by local motion, but by the immensity and immobility of its own essence. Whence Augustine to Dardanus[^31] says: « Let us not opine, as if by spacious magnitude, that God is diffused through all things as soil or this light is diffused, but rather as in two wise men, of whom one is greater than the other in body but is not wiser, the wisdom is one, and is not greater in the greater nor lesser in the lesser, nor lesser in one than in two: so also God, ruling and containing the world without labor, is whole in heaven, whole on earth, and whole in both, and contained by no place, but in Himself everywhere whole ». The same too, on the Psalm[^32], says: « It pertains to the Word of God to be not in part, but to be everywhere through Himself. For this Wisdom of God, which *reaches mightily from end to end*, [does so] yet not by local motion but by its own immobility — just as if some stony mass should fill some place, it is said to *reach from* the end of that place *unto* the end, while yet it does not desert one [end] by occupying another. The Word, therefore, has no local motion; and that Wisdom is solid and is everywhere ». — From the foregoing it appears that God is so everywhere by essence that He is neither diffused by spacious magnitude, nor, [when] one place is left, occupies another — because He has no local motion. And therefore Augustine, wishing to cut off[^33] from God's purity every local motion and local circumscription, rather says that all things are *in Him*, than that He Himself is in [them] — and yet that He Himself is not anywhere, [and that] place, which is not in place, is [not where He is] — in the book of the *Eighty-Three Questions*[^34] saying thus: « *God is not anywhere*. What is anywhere is contained by place; what is contained by place is body; but God is not body: therefore He is not anywhere. And yet, because He is, and is not in a place, all things are rather in Him than He Himself anywhere; nor yet so [are they] in Him, as if He Himself were a place. For place is in space, which is occupied by the length and breadth and height of body; nor is God any such thing. All things therefore are in Him, and place is not. The temple of God is, however — improperly — called *place* of God, not because He is contained by it. But that [temple] is understood to be nothing better than a clean soul ». — Behold, here he says that God is not in a place. But it must be understood that He is not in a place *locally* — namely because He has neither circumscription nor local motion.

To this however it is wont to be objected thus: Daily there come to be creatures which were not before, and in them God is, although He was not before in them: therefore He is where He was not before, and on this account seems mutable. — But although daily He begins to be in creatures in which He was not before, because they were not, this nevertheless takes place without any change of Himself — in the same way as He began to be in the world, which He made, yet without any mutability of Himself; and likewise He ceases to be in [things] in which before He was, without any change of Himself; nor yet does He Himself desert the place, but the place ceases to be.

It seems already to have been sufficiently shown how all things are said to be in God, and God in all things — a discussion which we have taken up almost incidentally, because the matter about which our discourse was turning seemed to demand it. For we were treating of the science or wisdom of God, and when we said that God knows all things, the question was raised whether on account of the cognition which He has of all, all things are said to be in God, or [whether] Scripture said this for some other reason. The occasion of this question therefore led us into the foregoing discussion.

---

la: Coloss. 2, 9.

en: Colossians 2:9.

la: Errat Magister citando Gregorium, cum male intellexerit glossam ordinariam (ad Cantica 5, 17.), cuius tantum pars est ex Gregorio, illa verba autem n[on]. Hunc errorem Magistri secuti sunt cum aliis Scholasticis iam S. Bonav., hic p. I. a. 3. q. 2. arg. I, et S. Thomas S. q. 8. a. 3; cfr. De Rubeis, Dissertationes, dissert. 31. c. 1.

en: The Master errs in citing Gregory, since he has misunderstood the *Glossa ordinaria* (on Canticles 5:17), of which only a part is from Gregory, but those [Master's] words are not. This error of the Master was followed, along with other Scholastics, already by St. Bonaventure here, p. I. a. 3. q. 2. arg. 1, and by St. Thomas in the *Summa* q. 8. a. 3; cf. De Rubeis, *Dissertationes*, dissertation 31, c. 1.

en: [Augustine,] Epistle 187, c. 6, n. 19.

en: [Hilary, *On the Trinity*, book VIII,] n. 24.

en: [Ambrose, *On the Holy Spirit*, book I,] c. 7, n. 81.

la: Edd. 1, 3 *qui*; Vat. cum aliis edd. perperam *quae*.

en: Editions 1 and 3 [read] *qui* ("who"); the Vatican with the other editions wrongly [reads] *quae* ("which").

la: Ibid. n. 86. — Locus s. Scripturae est Ier. 23, 24. Vulgata: *Nunquid non caelum et terram ego impleo?*

en: Same [chapter], n. 86. — The Scripture passage is Jeremiah 23:24. The Vulgate [reads]: *Do I not fill heaven and earth?*

la: Cap. 66, 1. Vulgata: *Caelum sedes mea* etc.

en: [Isaiah,] c. 66, [v.] 1. The Vulgate [reads]: *Heaven [is] My seat* etc. (Note: this note in the OCR footer appears under what is in fact n. 9 of the Quaracchi list and gives the cross-reference for the Isaiah quotation in cap. II; it is here renumbered to its OCR position.)

la: Respicitur Sap. 7, 27: *Sapientia in animas sanctas se transfert*, et c. 9, 10: *ut mecum sit et mecum laboret*.

en: This regards Wisdom 7:27: *Wisdom transfers itself into holy souls*, and c. 9:10: *that she may be with me and labor with me*.

en: [Augustine,] Epistle 166, c. 2, n. 4.

la: Tract. 111. n. 2. — Locus s. Scripturae est Ioan. 17, 24. — Quae sequuntur tantum secundum sensum sumta sunt ex August. de Agone christiano, c. 18. n. 20. Hic textus in codd. A B C D et nonnullis edd. ponitur in fine capituli; in ed. 7 legitur ad marginem; in ed. 9 ante *Unde Augustinus*. Videtur igitur, eum esse potius notulam in secunda editione huius libri additam. Cfr. supra pag. 329, nota 5. Nihilominus eum non removimus a loco, quem in Vat. et ed. 8 obtinet.

en: [Augustine on John,] Tract. 111, n. 2. — The Scripture passage is John 17:24. — What follows is taken only according to sense from Augustine, *On the Christian Combat*, c. 18, n. 20. This text in codices A B C D and in some editions is placed at the end of the chapter; in edition 7 it is read in the margin; in edition 9 [it stands] before *Whence Augustine*. It seems therefore rather to be a marginal note added in the second edition of this book. Cf. above p. 329, note 5. Nevertheless we have not removed it from the place which it holds in the Vatican [edition] and edition 8.

la: Vat. cum aliis edd. addendo *quod* coniungit hanc propositionem cum ipso textu Augustini. Paulo post cod. B et ed. 1 *mali non cum illo, non in luce, sed nec cum luce* (ed. 1 autem omittit *sed* et addit *sunt* post *nec*). Cod. A *mali vero non sunt cum illo, non in luce, non sunt cum luce*; cod. B *mali vero cum illo ut in luce non sunt cum luce*; cod. E *mali vero non cum illo ut in luce non sunt*. Retinuimus lectionem Vaticanae et aliarum edd.

en: The Vatican with the other editions, by adding *quod* ("that"), joins this proposition to the very text of Augustine. A little after, codex B and edition 1 [read] *mali non cum illo, non in luce, sed nec cum luce* ("the wicked [are] not with Him, not in the light, but neither with the light") — but edition 1 omits *sed* and adds *sunt* ("are") after *nec*. Codex A: *mali vero non sunt cum illo, non in luce, non sunt cum luce* ("but the wicked are not with Him, not in the light, are not with the light"); codex B: *mali vero cum illo ut in luce non sunt cum luce* ("but the wicked, [though] with Him as in the light, are not with the light"); codex E: *mali vero non cum illo ut in luce non sunt* ("but the wicked [are] not with Him, as in the light they are not"). We have retained the reading of the Vatican and of the other editions.

la: Dist. XIV. — Locus s. Scripturae est I. Cor. 13, 9.

en: [Refers above to] distinction XIV. — The Scripture passage is 1 Corinthians 13:9.

la: Libr. II. c. 21. n. 1, et deinde Enarrat. in Psalm. 122, 1, n. 4. In quo textu plurimae edd. cum Vat. omittunt *etiam* post *aliquando*; et deinde contra originale et edd. 3, 5, 7, 8 Vat. aliaeque edd. *apud te habitat* pro *apud se habitabat*.

en: [Augustine, *Against Maximinus*,] book II, c. 21, n. 1, and then *Enarratio in Psalmum* 122, 1, n. 4. In which text most editions with the Vatican omit *etiam* ("also") after *aliquando* ("at some time"); and then, against the original and editions 3, 5, 7, 8, the Vatican and other editions [read] *apud te habitat* ("dwells with you") in place of *apud se habitabat* ("was dwelling with Himself").

la: Epist. 187. c. 4. n. 13, et c. 3. n. 16. — In fine locus s. Scripturae est Matth. 6, 9, et Luc. 11, 2.

en: [Augustine, Letter 187, *To Dardanus*,] c. 4, n. 13, and c. 3, n. 16. — At the end the Scripture passage is Matthew 6:9 and Luke 11:2.

la: Cap. 6. n. 21. — In textu respicitur ad Rom. 1, 21: *Qui cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt*.

en: [Augustine, Letter 187, *To Dardanus*, continuing the same citation,] c. 6, n. 21. — In the text reference is made to Romans 1:21: *Who, although they knew God, did not glorify [Him] as God*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus edd. praemittit *nunc*.

en: The Vatican with most editions prefixes *nunc* ("now").

la: Homil. 2. n. 1.

en: [Chrysostom,] Homily 2, n. 1.

la: Ita cod. D; codd. ABE *ipsi idem*; omnes edd. non bene *idem*.

en: Thus codex D; codices ABE [read] *ipsi idem* ("they themselves likewise"); all the editions [read], not well, *idem* ("likewise").

la: Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, cum cod. C *corporeis*. Infra sola Vat. *repleat loca* pro *replet loca*, et *insit* pro *inest*. Denique plurimae edd. *contaminatur et contingitur* pro *contaminetur et contingatur*.

en: The Vatican and the other editions, except 1, with codex C [read] *corporeis* ("of bodies" — possibly applied to *sordibus*). Below, only the Vatican [reads] *repleat loca* ("should fill the places") for *replet loca* ("fills the places"), and *insit* ("be in") for *inest* ("is in"). Lastly, most editions [read] *contaminatur et contingitur* (indicative) for *contaminetur et contingatur* (subjunctive).

la: Cap. 29. Etiam quae praecedunt a verbis *Solet etiam* sumta sunt secundum sensum ex August. *de Agone christiano*, c. 18. n. 20.

en: Chapter 29. Also, what precedes, from the words *Solet etiam* ("It is also wont [to be asked]"), is taken according to sense from Augustine, *On the Christian Combat*, c. 18, n. 20.

la: Primus locus respicit Sap. 8, 1; secundus ibid. 7, 25. — Quae sequuntur usque *incommutabilis Veritas* sumta sunt ex August. *de Agone christiano*, c. 18. n. 20. — A B C D et nonnullis edd. ponitur in fine capituli; in ed. 7 legitur ad marginem; in ed. 9 ante *Unde Augustinus*. Videtur igitur, eum esse potius notulam in secunda editione huius libri additam. Cfr. supra pag. 329, nota 5. Nihilominus eum non removimus a loco, quem in Vat. et ed. 8 obtinet.

en: The first passage refers to Wisdom 8:1; the second to the same [book] 7:25. — What follows up to *immutable Truth* is taken from Augustine, *On the Christian Combat*, c. 18, n. 20. — In A B C D and several editions [this text] is placed at the end of the chapter; in edition 7 it is read in the margin; in edition 9, before *Unde Augustinus*. It seems therefore to be rather a *notula* added in the second edition of this book. Cf. above p. 329, note 5. Nevertheless we have not removed it from the place which it holds in the Vatican [edition] and edition 8.

la: Enarrat. in Psalm. 34, serm. 2. n. 6; et l. de Doctrina christ. c. 10. n. 10.

en: *Enarratio in Psalmum* 34, sermon 2, n. 6; and [Augustine,] *On Christian Doctrine*, c. 10, n. 10.

la: Sumta sunt haec secundum sensum I. ad lit. c. 20. n. 39, 40.

en: These [words] are taken according to sense from [Augustine, *On Genesis* book] I, *ad litteram*, c. 20, nn. 39–40.

la: Libr. VIII. c. 26. n. 48.

en: [Augustine, *On Genesis ad litteram*,] book VIII, c. 26, n. 48.

la: Cap. 1. Haec verba (cum paucis lectionibus variantibus) Beda sumsit ex S. Gregorio, Homil. 34. in Evang.

en: [Bede on Luke,] c. 1. These words (with a few variant readings) Bede took from St. Gregory, Homily 34 *On the Gospels*.

la: Vel potius I. de Spiritu sancto, c. 10. n. 115, et c. 11. n. 116. — Locus s. Scripturae est Isai. 6, 6: *et volavit ad me* etc. — In textu Ambrosii codd. A B C ter habent *Seraphi* pro *Seraphim*. In fine capituli Vat. cum plurimis edd. *ostenditur* pro *monstratur*.

en: Or rather [Ambrose,] book I *On the Holy Spirit*, c. 10, n. 115, and c. 11, n. 116. — The Scripture passage is Isaiah 6:6: *and he flew to me* etc. — In the text of Ambrose codices A B C three times have *Seraphi* for *Seraphim*. At the end of the chapter the Vatican with most editions [reads] *ostenditur* ("is shown") for *monstratur* ("is shown / displayed").

la: Respicitur Sap. 8, 1.

en: This regards Wisdom 8:1.

la: Epist. 187. c. 4. n. 11. — In quo textu Vat. *fumus loco humus*, refragantibus omnibus codd.

en: [Augustine,] Epistle 187, c. 4, n. 11. — In which text the Vatican [reads] *fumus* ("smoke") in place of *humus* ("soil"), all the codices opposing.

la: Enarrat. in Psalm. 147. n. 22, sed multa a Magistro hic et in praecedente loco omissa sunt.

en: [Augustine,] *Enarratio in Psalmum* 147, n. 22 — but many things have been omitted by the Master here and in the preceding passage.

la: Codd. A B C E *praecidere*.

en: Codices A B C E [read] *praecidere* ("to cut off / cut away") [in place of *praescindere*].

la: Quaest. 20. — Vat. cum paucis edd. *Quod enim alicubi* pro *Quod alicubi*. Circa finem textus post *locus non est* omnes edd., excepta Vat., addunt *nec in loco est, sed* — refragantibus codd. et originali.

en: [Augustine,] Question 20. — The Vatican with a few editions [reads] *Quod enim alicubi* ("For that which is anywhere") in place of *Quod alicubi*. Near the end of the text, after *locus non est* ("there is no place"), all the editions, except the Vatican, add *nec in loco est, sed* ("nor is He in a place, but") — the codices and the original opposing.

la: Codd. A D et edd. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 *doceremus* [pro *diceremus*].

en: Codices A D and editions 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 [read] *doceremus* ("we should teach") [in place of *diceremus* ("we should say")]. ---

translators_notes:
**2026-07-17 — J4 Class D/E apparatus repair (cascading mislabel cluster, printed pp. 633–634).** Health-scan flagged `[^20]` as a duplicate in both bodies (defs=32, la=33, en=33). Root-cause diagnosis via `tools/extract-pages.py --volume vol1-pt2 --pages 633-634 --dpi 400` (full-page reads, both under 5 MB):

- The defect was **not** a single stray marker at `[^20]` — it was a **12-position cascading mislabel** running from `[^13]` (Cap. II, "*Cum* illo") through `[^22]` (Cap. IV, "Unde Augustinus[^22]"), caused by two silently-missing body anchors in Cap. II (no marker had ever been placed at the printed superscripts ¹/² on p. 633 next to *Cum* and *supra*) plus one silently-missing anchor in Cap. IV (no marker at the printed superscript ⁷ next to *incurrit*, p. 634). Because 3 real printed superscripts had no corresponding `[^N]` anchor, every later def on the two pages drifted by an accumulating offset, which is what eventually surfaced as the `[^20]` collision plus two literal phantom markers (at "non contingatur" and at "omnia replet loca" on p. 634 — confirmed via zoomed crops that **neither has a printed superscript**).
- Content-matched every marker on printed pp. 633–634 against the two pages' footer notes (p. 633: 12 local notes; p. 634: 8 local notes) word-for-word, independent of any label number. Confirmed:
  - `[^13]` "*Cum*" and `[^14]` "*supra*" (Cap. II) were **entirely unanchored** in both languages — added fresh, content = the notes that had been mis-parked under the old `[^13]`/`[^14]` labels (which were themselves sitting on the wrong anchors, "Maximinum"/"Dardanum").
  - Old `[^13]`–`[^22]` def content was systematically bound to the wrong anchor (e.g. old `[^19]`'s "Rom. 1:21" note actually belongs at "in eodem", old `[^17]`'s "*ipsi idem*" variant note actually belongs at "Iidem", etc.) — all reconciled by content, not position.
  - Two apparatus entries were **genuinely missing from the corpus** (Class-B-in-disguise): the p. 634 local notes 6 ("Cap. 29… ex August. *de Agone christiano*, c. 18 n. 20") and 8 ("*Enarrat. in Psalm.* 34…") had never been transcribed at all. Both freshly transcribed verbatim from the page image and added as new `[^22]`/`[^24]` entries (La+En).
  - The two phantom markers ("non contingatur", second "replet") were removed outright — no printed counterpart at either location.
- Net effect: 12 real anchor positions now exist where the file previously had 10 mislabeled + 2 phantom. Because this required 2 new label slots, **all subsequent labels `[^23]`–`[^32]` were renumbered to `[^25]`–`[^34]`** (mechanical shift only; no def content changed) to keep the whole chunk's numbering sequential. Total apparatus count: 32 → **34** defs.
- No Latin wording, English wording, or unrelated apparatus prose was changed — only marker positions/labels, two new fully-transcribed def entries, and two stale/inaccurate bracketed editorial glosses corrected (old `[^19]`/`[^20]` En brackets misidentified the source work because they were written against the wrong anchor; corrected now that content sits at its true anchor).
- Post-fix health check: `defs=34 la=34 en=34`, no dupes/extras in either language. `cd site && node scripts/build-content.mjs` still reports **1815 translated / 1925 questions / 4 books** — unchanged.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 37, Part 1, Divisio Textus

title_alt: Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVII. Pars I. Divisio textus.

title_alt: Commentary on Distinction XXXVII. Part I. Division of the text.

source_text:
<!-- page 637 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVII.

### Pars I.

#### *Quomodo Deus sit in rebus et in locis corporalibus.*

> *Et quoniam demonstratum est ex parte, quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra egit Magister, quomodo omnia sunt in Deo. Hic secundo agit, quomodo Deus sit in rebus et in locis corporalibus. Et quoniam ad esse in loco et in re mutabili sequitur mutatio in eo quod in illo est, ideo agit secundo[^1] de Dei immutabilitate in loco, infra distinctione eadem ultra medium, ibi: *Cumque divina natura* etc. Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima narrat, quomodo Deus est in locis et in rebus, et per auctoritates confirmat. In secunda nititur dictorum aperire intelligentiam, ibi: *Quomodo autem Deus habitat in bonis* etc. In tertia ostendit intellectus nostri ad hoc capiendum insufficientiam, ibi: *Ex praedictis patet, quod Deus ubique totus est.*

Prima pars tres habet [partes] secundum tria capitula. In prima ostendit modos essendi Deum in rebus. In secunda vero confirmat auctoritatibus, quod Deus est ubique per essentiam, ibi: *Ne autem ista, quia capacitatem humanae intelligentiae* etc. In tertia ostendit, quod Deus in solis Sanctis habitat per gratiam, ibi: *In Sanctis vero habitat, in quibus* etc.

*Quomodo autem Deus habitat.* Haec est secunda particula, in qua excitat ad dictorum intelligentiam, et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima rationabiliter manuducit. In secunda stultam rationem excludit, ibi: *Sciendum est etiam, quia, ut ait Augustinus.* In tertia in admirationem erigit, ibi: *Illud quoque mirabile est.* Sacramenta enim divina magis sunt admirabilia quam intelligibilia.

*Ex praedictis patet, quod Deus ubique totus.* Haec est tertia pars, in qua ostendit insufficientiam ad cognoscendum, quomodo Deus est ubique per essentiam; et haec pars habet tres partes secundum tria capitula. Primo enim ostendit, quod intellectus nostri non sufficiunt. Secundo excludit eos qui praesumptuose solvunt, ibi: *Quidam tamen, immensa ingenio suo metiri* etc. Tertio vero abiicit eos qui irrationabiliter quaerunt, ibi: *Solet etiam ab eisdem quaeri, quomodo Deus* etc.: ubi ostendit, quaestionem eorum esse frivolam et responsione indignam.

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis quaeritur de existentia Dei ubique; et circa hoc tria principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum esse ubique conveniat Deo.

Secundo, utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.

Tertio, qualiter conveniat Deo esse ubique.

Et quantum ad primum, quia esse ubique potest distribuere pro omnibus rebus et pro omnibus locis, duo quaeruntur.

Primo, utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus.

Secundo, utrum sit in omnibus locis.

---

english:
<!-- page 637 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXVII.

### Part I.

#### *How God is in things and in corporeal places.*

> *"And since it has been shown in part how all things are said to be in God."*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master treated of how all things are in God. Here he secondly treats of how God is in things and in corporeal places. And since upon being in a place and in a mutable thing there follows mutation in that which is in it, he therefore secondly[^1] treats of God's immutability with respect to place, below in the same distinction beyond the middle, there: *"And since the divine nature,"* etc. The first part has three parts. In the first he narrates how God is in places and in things, and confirms it by authorities. In the second he strives to open up the understanding of what has been said, there: *"How, however, God dwells in the good,"* etc. In the third he shows the insufficiency of our intellect to grasp this, there: *"From what has been said it is clear, that God is whole everywhere."*

The first part has three [parts] according to three chapters. In the first he sets forth the modes of God's being in things. In the second he confirms by authorities that God is everywhere by essence, there: *"But lest these things, because the capacity of human intelligence,"* etc. In the third he shows that God dwells by grace in the saints alone, there: *"But he dwells in the saints, in whom,"* etc.

*"How, however, God dwells."* This is the second little part, in which he stirs [the reader] toward the understanding of what has been said, and this part has three parts. In the first he leads [us] forward by reason. In the second he excludes a foolish reasoning, there: *"It must also be known, since, as Augustine says."* In the third he raises [the mind] to wonder, there: *"This too is marvelous."* For divine sacraments are more wondrous than intelligible.

*"From what has been said it is clear, that God is whole everywhere."* This is the third part, in which he shows the insufficiency [of the intellect] for knowing how God is everywhere by essence; and this part has three parts according to three chapters. For first he shows that our intellects are insufficient. Second he excludes those who presumptuously resolve [the matter], there: *"Some, however, presuming to measure by their own ingenuity what is immense,"* etc. Third he rejects those who irrationally inquire, there: *"It is also wont to be asked by these same persons, how God,"* etc.: where he shows that their question is frivolous and unworthy of a reply.

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part, inquiry is made concerning God's existence everywhere; and concerning this three [matters] are principally asked.

First it is asked, whether to be everywhere belongs to God.

Second, whether to be everywhere is proper to God [alone].

Third, in what manner being everywhere belongs to God.

And as to the first, since "to be everywhere" can be distributed across all things and across all places, two [questions] are asked.

First, whether God is in all things.

Second, whether he is in all places.

---

la: Vat. suppressit *secundo*, quam vocem ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 revocavimus, et quidem iuste, ut evidenter apparet ex paulo longiore lectione cod. R: *ideo primo agit, quomodo Deus sit in rebus, et secundo* etc.

en: The Vatican edition suppressed *secundo* ("secondly"), which word we have restored from the older manuscripts and from edition 1, and indeed rightly, as is evidently apparent from the slightly longer reading of codex R: *"therefore he treats first of how God is in things, and secondly,"* etc. ---

translators_notes: [No editorial notes beyond the apparatus above.]


title: Dist. 37, Part 2, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Pars II, divisio textus
Pars II, division of the text

source_text:
<!-- page 651 -->

## Commentarius in Distinctionem XXXVII.

### Pars II.

#### *De immutabilitate Dei quantum ad locum.*

> *Cumque divina natura veraciter et substantialiter.*

*Textum Magistri vide supra pag. 638.*

### Divisio textus.

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`**La.**`), then in literal English (`**En.**`).

Supra ostendit Magister, qualiter Deus sit in locis et rebus omnibus; et quoniam ad existentiam in loco sequitur circumscriptibilitas et localitas[^1] in creatura locata, ideo intendit hic a Deo has conditiones removere. Et dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima ostendit Deum incircumscriptibilem et immutabilem. In secunda vero concludit et per auctoritates confirmat, ibi: *Fateamur itaque, divinam naturam etc.*

Prima pars habet tres partes[^2]. In prima ostendit, quod immutabilitas et incircumscriptibilitas convenit Deo. In secunda hoc removet a natura angelica et creata, ibi: *Spiritus vero creatus quodam modo etc.* In tertia suam conclusionem infert, quod solus Spiritus increatus est incircumscriptus, ibi: *Sunt ergo spiritus creati etc.*

*Fateamur itaque etc.* Haec est secunda pars, in qua suam resumit conclusionem, ut addat, et habet haec pars tres partes. In prima concludit praedeterminata et auctoritatibus confirmat. In secunda vero movet dubitationem et solvit illam, ibi: *Ad hoc autem solet opponi.* In tertia breviter epilogat praedeterminata et ostendit rationem situs praesentis capituli, ibi: *Iam sufficienter demonstratum est.*

### Tractatio quaestionum.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis duo principaliter quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur de incircumscriptibilitate sive illocalitate Dei.

Secundo, de mutatione spiritus angelici per locum; haec enim duo prosequitur in littera.

Quantum ad primum articulum quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit localis intra locum.

Secundo, utrum sit mutabilis de loco ad locum.

Tertio, utrum sit separabilis a loco sive sit extra omnem locum.

### Articulus II. *De mutabilitate Angelorum per locum.*

Consequenter de secundo articulo quaeritur, scilicet de mutatione Angeli, et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Angelus possit moveri localiter sine corpore.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum moveatur per medium, vel non.

Tertio, utrum pertranseat medium motu subito, vel successivo.

---

english:
<!-- page 651 -->

## Commentary on Distinction XXXVII.

### Part II.

#### *On the immutability of God with respect to place.*

> *"And since the divine nature truly and substantially."*

*See the text of the Master above on page 638.*

### Division of the text.

Above the Master has shown how God is in all places and things; and since upon existence in a place there follows circumscriptibility and locality[^1] in a located creature, he therefore here intends to remove these conditions from God. And this part is divided into two. In the first he shows God to be incircumscriptible and immutable. In the second he concludes and confirms by authorities, there: *"Let us therefore confess, [that] the divine nature etc."*

The first part has three parts[^2]. In the first he shows that immutability and incircumscriptibility belong to God. In the second he removes this from the angelic and created nature, there: *"But the created spirit, in a certain manner etc."* In the third he draws his conclusion, that only the uncreated Spirit is incircumscript, there: *"Therefore created spirits etc."*

*"Let us therefore confess etc."* This is the second part, in which he resumes his conclusion, so as to add [further], and this part has three parts. In the first he concludes the things determined beforehand and confirms them by authorities. In the second he raises a doubt and resolves it, there: *"To this, however, it is wont to be objected."* In the third he briefly recapitulates the things determined beforehand and shows the reason for the position of the present chapter, there: *"It has now been sufficiently demonstrated."*

### Treatment of the questions.

For the understanding of this part two [matters] are principally asked.

First it is asked concerning the incircumscriptibility or illocality of God.

Second, concerning the change of the angelic spirit through place; for these two [matters] he pursues in the letter [of the text].

With regard to the first article, three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God is local within a place.

Second, whether he is changeable from place to place.

Third, whether he is separable from place, or is outside every place.

### Article II. *On the changeability of the Angels through place.*

Consequently concerning the second article it is asked, namely concerning the change of the Angel, and concerning this three [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether an Angel can be moved locally without a body.

Second it is asked, whether he is moved through the medium, or not.

Third, whether he passes through the medium by an instantaneous or by a successive motion.

---

la: Vat. *locabilitas.*

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *locabilitas* ("locatability") [for *localitas*].

la: Vat., supra posito *quatuor partes* pro *tres partes* suo nomine hic inserit: ponit opinionem quorundam qui dicunt, spiritus creatos non moveri loco, nec esse locales, ibi: *De mutatione vero loci etc.* In quarta *suam etc.*

en: The Vatican edition, having placed above *quatuor partes* ("four parts") for *tres partes* ("three parts"), here inserts in its own name [the following]: it sets forth the opinion of certain ones who say that created spirits are not moved with respect to place, nor are they local, there: *"But concerning the change of place etc."* In the fourth, *"his etc."* ---