title: Dist. 20, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### QUAESTIO II.

#### *Utrum in divinis sit ordo naturae.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ordo naturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum, qui dicit in littera[^1], quod «cum dicitur Filius a Patre, non dicitur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae».

2. Item, ubi est naturalis origo, ibi est naturalis ordo: sed in divinis est naturalis origo, ergo et naturalis ordo: ergo est ibi ordo naturae.

3. Item, ubi est causa et effectus, ibi est[^2] prius et posterius; sed ubicumque hoc, ibi est ordo naturae: ergo cum in divinis contingat reperire causam et effectum, sicut dicit Chrysostomus super principium ad Hebraeos[^3], et Damascenus primo libro, capitulo octavo: «Pater est causa Filii», patet etc.[^4]

**Contra:**
1. Cuiuscumque est ordo, ipsum ordinatur: ergo si in divinis est ordo naturae, natura ordinatur; sed quod ordinatur distinguitur et numeratur[^5]: ergo in divinis natura distinguitur et numeratur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item, in divinis[^6] idem est natura et essentia, quia natura nomen est essentiale[^7]; sed in divinis nullo modo ponitur ordo essentiae: ergo nec naturae.

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3. Item, ubi est ordo, ibi est prius et posterius[^8], ergo si in divinis est ordo naturae, ibi est prius et posterius secundum naturam; sed hoc nullo modo recipitur: ergo nec ordo naturae. Quod autem in divinis non sit prius et posterius secundum naturam, ostenditur sic: «Relativa sunt simul natura[^9]», ergo Pater et Filius, secundum quod Pater et Filius, simul sunt natura; sed Pater secundum id quod est et secundum quod est Pater, simul est natura[^10], quia relationes in divinis non sunt advenientes, nec tantum sunt ratio referendi, sed etiam existendi[^11]: ergo Pater et Filius secundum suas hypostases simul sunt natura, ergo non est ibi ordo naturae.

4. Item, in causis creatis videmus gradus, quod[^12] quanto substantia creata citius potest, velocius operatur; unde quaedam operantur in tempore, quaedam repente, quaedam subito; et illa causa, quae operatur subito, aliquando non praecedit tempore, sed natura. Si ergo Deus producit Filium secundum omnem nobilitatem et virtutem suae potentiae, et virtus suae potentiae infinitae maior est quam finitae: ergo non tantum simul duratione, sed etiam simul natura producit: ergo non est ibi ordo naturae.

5. Item, videmus in cognoscibilibus, quod quaedam habent sui cognitionem et cogitationem[^13] investigando et posterius tempore — et loquor de actuali, non de habituali — ut anima humana; et quaedam simul duratione, ut Angelus: ergo si Dei cognitio et dictio sive locutio non est accidens, sed multo nobilior et virtuosior[^14] quam omnis creatura, habet verbum intelligentiae, non tantum simul duratione, sed etiam natura: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> In divinis recte dicitur esse ordo naturae, id est ordo naturalis originis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod ordo dicitur esse[^15] alicuius dupliciter: aut sicut ordinati, aut sicut rationis ordinandi. Ordo in divinis sicut ordinati dicitur personae Patris vel[^16] Filii vel Spiritus sancti; sicut rationis ordinandi dicitur naturae. Natura enim dicit vim productivam, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[^17], quod «est vis insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans». In divinis autem est ordo secundum productionem, ideo[^18] dicitur ibi ordo naturae, id est naturalis originis. Unde genitivus ille non construitur subiective, sicut cum dicitur albedo Petri, sed ex vi declarationis essentiae, ut cum dicitur albedo claritatis vel homo auctoritatis. Et ideo resolvitur[^19] in duos, ut sit sensus: ordo naturae, id est naturalis originis.

**Ad 1.** Ex hoc patet primum quod obiicit[^20], quia obiicit, ac si diceretur ordo esse naturae ut rei ordinatae. Patet etiam secundum, quia[^21] essentia dicitur in absolutione omnimoda, non ut alterius principium; natura vero dicit ut alterius principium, unde dicit comparationem ad productionem sive emanationem naturalem.

Unde[^22] ulterius attendendum, quod ordo secundum naturalem originem in his inferioribus duo dicit, scilicet emanationem et antecessionem. Et ratio huius est, quia emanatio in his inferioribus ponit diversitatem substantialem. Unde omne quod emanat in his inferioribus, est effectus, et quod producit est causa; et ideo dicitur causa, cuius esse sequitur aliud[^23]; et

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quia aliud in natura, ideo posterius in natura. In divinis autem est emanatio, ad quam non consequitur essentiae diversitas vel naturae, ideo nec prius nec posterius natura, sed simul natura. Et ideo in divinis non recipitur[^24] ratio causae vel effectus secundum Latinos, sed nomen principii, quamvis Graeci, extenso nomine, utantur nomine causae pro nomine principii. Et ideo in divinis est ordo naturae, non quo alter sit posterior altero, sed quo alter ex altero. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in littera[^25].

**Ad 3.** Et ex hoc patet, quod tertio obiicitur; quamvis enim in creaturis ordo ponat posterioritatem naturae[^26], non tamen in Deo. Et ideo quamvis non sit ibi posterioritas, non sequitur, quin bene sit ibi ordo.

Ex his patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Concedendum est ergo, quod aliquo modo reperitur in divinis ordo naturae, sicut ostendunt primae rationes; tertia tamen[^27] deficit, quia nomen causae non reperitur in divinis secundum Latinos proprie.

**Ad opp. 1.** Quod obiicitur ad oppositum patet, quia ordo non est naturae ut rei ordinatae.

**Ad opp. 2.** Patet etiam quod obiicitur de divina[^28] essentia, quia est nomen absolutum nec importat rationem originis.

**Ad opp. 3.** Ultimum[^29] patet, quia non est ibi ordo naturae, quo alter prior altero, sed quo alter ex altero.

english:
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in divine things there is an order of nature.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in divine things there is an order of nature. And that there is, seems [to be the case]:

1. By Augustine, who says in the *littera*[^1], that «when the Son is said [to be] from the Father, an inequality of substance is not signified, but an order of nature».

2. Likewise, where there is a natural origin, there is a natural order; but in divine things there is a natural origin, therefore also a natural order: therefore there is there an order of nature.

3. Likewise, where there is cause and effect, there is[^2] prior and posterior; but wherever this is, there is an order of nature: therefore since in divine things it happens that cause and effect are found, as Chrysostom says on the opening of [the Letter] to the Hebrews[^3], and the Damascene in the first book, chapter eight: «The Father is the cause of the Son», it is plain etc.[^4]

**On the contrary:**
1. Of whatever there is an order, that thing itself is ordered: therefore if in divine things there is an order of nature, the nature is ordered; but what is ordered is distinguished and numbered[^5]: therefore in divine things the nature is distinguished and numbered; but this is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in divine things[^6] nature and essence are the same, because the name *nature* is essential[^7]; but in divine things in no way is an order of essence posited: therefore neither of nature.

3. Likewise, where there is order, there is prior and posterior[^8]; therefore if in divine things there is an order of nature, there is there prior and posterior according to nature; but this in no way is admitted: therefore neither an order of nature. That however in divine things there is no prior and posterior according to nature, is shown thus: «Relatives are simultaneous in nature[^9]»; therefore the Father and the Son, insofar as they are Father and Son, are simultaneous in nature; but the Father, according to that which He is and according to the fact that He is Father, is simultaneous in nature[^10], because the relations in divine things are not supervenient, nor are they only the ground of referring, but also of existing[^11]: therefore the Father and the Son according to their hypostases are simultaneous in nature; therefore there is not there an order of nature.

4. Likewise, in created causes we see degrees, in that[^12] the more swiftly a created substance can [act], the more rapidly it operates; whence some operate in time, some abruptly, some all at once; and that cause which operates all at once sometimes does not precede in time, but in nature. If therefore God produces the Son according to every nobility and virtue of His power, and the virtue of His infinite power is greater than [that] of finite [power]: therefore He produces [the Son] not only simultaneously in duration, but also simultaneously in nature: therefore there is not there an order of nature.

5. Likewise, we see in things knowable that some have cognition and thought of themselves[^13] by investigation and later in time — and I am speaking of actual, not habitual [cognition] — as the human soul; and some simultaneously in duration, as the Angel: therefore if God's cognition and uttering or speaking is not an accident, but much more noble and virtuous[^14] than every creature, He has the word of intelligence not only simultaneously in duration, but also in nature: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> In divine things there is rightly said to be an order of nature, that is, an order of natural origin.

**I respond:** It must be said that an order is said to be[^15] of something in two ways: either as of the things ordered, or as of the ground of ordering. An order in divine things, as of the things ordered, is said of the persons of the Father or[^16] of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; as of the ground of ordering, it is said of the nature. For *nature* expresses a productive force, in the sense in which the Philosopher says[^17] that it «is a force implanted in things, generating like from like». But in divine things there is an order according to production; therefore[^18] there is said to be there an order of nature, that is, of natural origin. Whence that genitive is not construed subjectively, as when one says *the whiteness of Peter*, but by force of declaration of essence, as when one says *the whiteness of brightness* or *the man of authority*. And therefore it is resolved[^19] into two, so that the sense is: order of nature, that is, of natural origin.

**To 1.** From this is plain the first thing that is objected[^20], because it objects as if order were said to be of nature as of an ordered thing. Likewise the second is plain, because[^21] *essence* is said in altogether absolute fashion, not as the principle of another; but *nature* expresses [something] as the principle of another, whence it expresses a comparison to natural production or emanation.

Whence[^22] further it must be noted that order according to natural origin in these inferior things expresses two things, namely emanation and antecession. And the reason for this is that emanation in these inferior things posits substantial diversity. Whence everything that emanates in these inferior things is an effect, and what produces is a cause; and therefore that is called a cause, of which the being follows another[^23]; and because [it is] another in nature, therefore [it is] posterior in nature. But in divine things there is an emanation upon which there does not follow diversity of essence or of nature; therefore neither prior nor posterior in nature, but simultaneous in nature. And therefore in divine things the account of cause or effect is not admitted[^24] according to the Latins, but [only] the name of *principle*, although the Greeks, with the term extended, use the name of *cause* in place of the name of *principle*. And therefore in divine things there is an order of nature, not such that one is posterior to the other, but such that one is from the other. And this is what Augustine says in the *littera*[^25].

**To 3.** And from this is plain what is objected thirdly; for although in creatures order posits posteriority of nature[^26], yet not in God. And therefore although there is not there posteriority, it does not follow but that there is well there an order.

From these things the objections on either side are plain. It must therefore be granted that in some manner an order of nature is found in divine things, as the first reasons show; the third however[^27] fails, because the name of *cause* is not properly found in divine things according to the Latins.

**To opp. 1.** What is objected on the opposite [side] is plain, because order is not of nature as of an ordered thing.

**To opp. 2.** Likewise plain is what is objected concerning the divine[^28] essence, because it is an absolute name and does not import the account of origin.

**To opp. 3.** The last[^29] is plain, because there is not there an order of nature such that one is prior to the other, but such that one is from the other.

la: Hic, c. 3. circa finem.

en: Here, c. 3, near the end.

la: In pluribus mss. ut *A T V X* et ed. 1 omittitur *est*.

en: In several manuscripts such as *A T V X* and edition 1, *est* is omitted.

la: Homil. 2. n. 2: *Si enim Pater eius est causa et auctor, multo magis eorum quae per ipsum facta sunt.* — Verba Ioan. Damasc. *de Fide orthod.* loc. cit. sunt: *Pater naturaliter Filii causa est.*

en: Homily 2, n. 2: *For if the Father is His cause and author, much more [is He the cause and author] of those things which were made through Him.* — The words of John Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, loc. cit., are: *The Father is naturally the cause of the Son.*

la: Vat. cum paucis codd. addit *si hoc*. Paulo infra post *sed hoc* in aliquibus mss. ut *VXZ* adiungitur *est*.

en: The Vatican edition with a few codices adds *si hoc* ("if this"). A little below, after *sed hoc*, in some manuscripts such as *VXZ* *est* is added.

en: In codices *aa bb* *principium* ("principle") is added, of which St. Thomas also makes mention, here q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.

la: In plurimis codd. et ed. 1 deest *in divinis*, sed propter rationem additam certe supplendum.

en: In most codices and edition 1, *in divinis* ("in divine things") is missing, but on account of the reason added [in the argument] it is certainly to be supplied.

la: Plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 loco *essentiale* ponunt *personale*, quod vel est lapsus librariorum, vel signum, quod hic et in ipsa obiectione tertium divisionis membrum, ut non necessario enumerandum, omissum sit, sicut supra a nobis fide codicis *X* observatum est. — Paulo ante fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus *Ad illud, quod* Vat. verbis *quod obiicitur* praefigit. Mox cod. *A* *notionale* pro *notionem*.

en: Most codices with editions 1, 2, 3 in place of *essentiale* put *personale*, which either is a slip of the copyists, or a sign that here and in the very objection a third member of the division — as not necessarily to be enumerated — has been omitted, as we have observed above on the testimony of codex *X*. — A little earlier, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted *Ad illud, quod*, which the Vatican edition prefixes to the words *quod obiicitur*. Next, codex *A* [reads] *notionale* in place of *notionem*.

la: Praestamus antiquam lectionem mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. cum recentiore cod. *cc* in hac propositione post *ordo* addit *naturae*, et verbo *posterius* adiungit *secundum naturam*, ac mox bis omittit *secundum naturam*, in qua lectione vis argumentationis debilitatur. — De principiis huius obiectionis cfr. Aristot., *de Praedicam*. c. *de Priori*.

en: We prefer the ancient reading of the manuscripts and edition 1, while the Vatican edition with the more recent codex *cc*, in this proposition after *ordo* adds *naturae*, and to the word *posterius* it joins *secundum naturam*, and next twice omits *secundum naturam*, in which reading the force of the argument is weakened. — On the principles of this objection cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On the Prior*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam*. c. *de Relativis*.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, c. *On Relatives*.

la: Mutila lectio Vat., in qua haec propositio *sed Pater* usque *natura* omittitur, resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1. Mox cod. *X* *ergo non* pro *nec*.

en: The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which this proposition from *sed Pater* up to *natura* is omitted, is repaired by the help of the manuscripts and edition 1. Next codex *X* [reads] *ergo non* in place of *nec*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 7. dub. 1.

en: Cf. above d. 7, dub. 1.

la: Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *quia*. Paulo infra plures codd. ut *CEGIIKRSU* *operatur* loco *operantur*.

en: The Vatican edition, against most codices and edition 1, [reads] *quia*. A little below, several codices such as *CEGIIKRSU* [read] *operatur* in place of *operantur*.

la: Codd. inter se dissident; alii enim ut *BDFIKS VWXY* ponunt *cognitionem*, cod. *O* *aliorum cognitionem*, ceteri vero cum ed. 1 *cogitationem*, quae lectio et in se melior est et maiore numero mss. fulcitur; Vat. omittit *et cogitationem*. In cod. *Z* *in cognoscentibus* pro *in cognoscibilibus*. Paulo infra post *habituali* supple cum cod. *bb* *cognitione*. Dein codd. *LO* post *duratione* addunt *sed posterius natura*.

en: The codices disagree among themselves: for some, such as *BDFIKS VWXY*, put *cognitionem*; codex *O*, *aliorum cognitionem*; the rest with edition 1 [put] *cogitationem*, which reading is in itself better and is supported by the greater number of manuscripts; the Vatican edition omits *et cogitationem*. In codex *Z* [there is] *in cognoscentibus* in place of *in cognoscibilibus*. A little below, after *habituali*, supply with codex *bb* *cognitione*. Then codices *LO* after *duratione* add *sed posterius natura*.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *nobilius et virtuosius*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *nobilius et virtuosius*.

la: In aliquibus mss. ut *ASTY* etc. deest *esse*.

en: In some manuscripts such as *ASTY* etc., *esse* is missing.

la: Vat., antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, hic et paulo post *et* loco *vel*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the older manuscripts and edition 1, here and a little after [reads] *et* in place of *vel*.

la: Vide supra pag. 134 nota 10.

en: See above p. 134, note 10.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *LO* *et ideo*, alii ut *KSV ee* *et* loco *ideo*; plures ut *AFIIIT bb cc* cum sex primis edd. *id est* pro *ideo*. Paulo infra, postulantibus mss. et ed. 1, loco *parietis* substituimus *Petri*, ubi dein a codd. *aa bb* adiungitur *quia ordo non ordinatur* vel *ordo non est illud quod ordinatur*. Mox post *essentiae* incongrue plures mss. ut *B E K V* addunt *id est naturalis originis*, ac dein fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus verba *vel homo auctoritatis*.

en: Some codices such as *LO* [read] *et ideo*; others such as *KSV ee* [read] *et* in place of *ideo*; several such as *AFIIIT bb cc* with the first six editions [read] *id est* in place of *ideo*. A little below, on the demand of the manuscripts and edition 1, in place of *parietis* we have substituted *Petri*, where then by codices *aa bb* there is added *quia ordo non ordinatur* ("because order is not ordered") or *ordo non est illud quod ordinatur* ("order is not that which is ordered"). Next, after *essentiae*, incongruously several manuscripts such as *B E K V* add *id est naturalis originis* ("that is, of natural origin"), and then on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the words *vel homo auctoritatis* ("or *man of authority*").

la: Supple: *genitivus*. De significatione genitivi cfr. supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3, et infra d. 31. dub. 5, ac d. 41. dub. 2; hoc ultimo loco ait: *Et si obiiciatur, quod unus genitivus non construitur ex illa vi (declarationis essentiae); dicendum, quod verum est, nisi habeat virtutem duorum. Unde bene dicitur:* vir sanguinis *et* homo auctoritatis, *similiter:* electio gratiae, *id est gratuitae bonitatis.*

en: Supply: *the genitive*. On the signification of the genitive cf. above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3, and below d. 31, dub. 5, and d. 41, dub. 2; in this last place [Bonaventure] says: *And if it is objected that a single genitive is not construed by that force (of declaration of essence), it must be said that it is true, unless it has the force of two. Whence it is rightly said:* a man of blood *and* a man of authority; *likewise:* an election of grace, *that is, of gratuitous goodness.*

la: Vat. *obiicitur*, sed contra mss., quorum plures ut *ISV bb* cum ed. 1 dein perperam omittunt *quia obiicit*.

en: The Vatican edition [reads] *obiicitur*, but against the manuscripts, of which several such as *ISV bb* with edition 1 then wrongly omit *quia obiicit*.

la: Fide plurium mss. et ed. 1 substituimus hic *quia* pro ambiguo *quod*, et paulo infra, postulantibus vetustioribus codd. et ed. 1, posuimus *unde dicit* loco *ideo dicit*.

en: On the testimony of several manuscripts and edition 1 we have here substituted *quia* in place of the ambiguous *quod*, and a little below, on the demand of the older codices and edition 1, we have put *unde dicit* in place of *ideo dicit*.

la: Aliqui codd. ut *FG Y* cum ed. 1 omittunt *Unde*, et mox in nonnullis codd. ut *SW* post *ordo* additur *substantiae*.

en: Some codices such as *FG Y* with edition 1 omit *Unde*, and next in some codices such as *SW*, after *ordo*, *substantiae* ("of substance") is added.

la: Vide supra pag. 120 nota 7, ubi excipias ed. 1, quae cum Vat. legit: *ad cuius esse* etc. — Paulo infra post *posterius* praepositio *in* deest in cod. *Z* et ed. 1. Mox plures codd. ut *ASWY* *sequitur* loco *consequitur*.

en: See above p. 120 note 7, except for edition 1, which with the Vatican edition reads: *ad cuius esse* etc. — A little below, after *posterius*, the preposition *in* is missing in codex *Z* and edition 1. Next several codices such as *ASWY* [read] *sequitur* in place of *consequitur*.

la: Vat. cum pluribus mss. *accipitur*, sed obstant alii codd. ut *GHZ aa bb* etc. cum ed. 1 *et usus loquendi*.

en: The Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] *accipitur*, but the other codices such as *GHZ aa bb* etc. with edition 1 — and the usage of speaking — stand against [it].

la: Hic, c. 3. circa finem: *Nec cum dicitur Filius a Patre genitus, ostenditur inaequalitas substantiae, sed ordo naturae, non quo alter prior esset altero, sed quo alter est ex altero.*

en: Here, c. 3, near the end: *Nor when the Son is said to be begotten by the Father is an inequality of substance shown, but an order of nature, not such that one is prior to the other, but such that one is from the other.*

la: Ex multis mss. ut *ACFGHILORSTW* etc. et ed. 1 supplevimus *naturae*, et paulo infra ex fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1 *ideo*. Mox cod. *V* *possit ibi esse ordo* pro *sit ibi ordo*.

en: From many manuscripts such as *ACFGHILORSTW* etc. and edition 1 we have supplied *naturae*, and a little below from nearly all the codices and edition 1 [we have supplied] *ideo*. Next codex *V* [reads] *possit ibi esse ordo* ("there could be an order there") in place of *sit ibi ordo* ("there is an order there").

la: A vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 abest *ratio*, quod Vat. hic addit.

en: From the older manuscripts and edition 1 *ratio* ("reason") is absent, which the Vatican edition here adds.

la: Multi codd. etiam hic, sicut in ipsa obiectione, omittunt *divina*, loco cuius ed. 1 habet *natura et*.

en: Many codices here also, as in the objection itself, omit *divina*; in place of which edition 1 has *natura et*.

la: In cod. *Y* additur *etiam*. Mox post *prior* ed. 1 adiungit *vel posterior*.

en: In codex *Y* *etiam* is added. Next after *prior* edition 1 adds *vel posterior* ("or posterior").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Haec quaestio orta esse videtur ex verbo S. Augustini apud Magistrum (hic c. 3.) et in I. fundam., quod in divinis dicatur ordo naturae. Quodsi hoc intelligitur in eo sensu, quod ipsa natura ordinetur, procul dubio esset falsum, cum in natura non sit nec relatio nec ordo; si vero intelligitur, quatenus natura est ratio ordinandi, in sano sensu intelligi potest. Nam ordo originis, qui est inter Patrem et Filium, est per naturam. Et ex Alexandro notandum, quod alio modo dicitur natura, alio modo essentia, quia natura super essentiam addit rationem virtutis productivae sive principii agendi, et ratione huius connotati dici potest ordo naturae. Alii intelligunt *ordo naturae* in sensu originis naturalis, non voluntariae. De duplici significatione genitivi, quae est fundamentum responsionis, vide p. 374 nota 12.

**II.** In re principali omnes conveniunt; tamen Scot. (l. c.) cum nonnullis, et antiquis et modernis, in modo loquendi a ceteris discedit asserendo, ordinem originis importare etiam habitudinem secundum *prius* et *posterius*, quae tamen non sit durationis. De rationibus, quare sic loquitur, videsis Rada, controv. 5; Macedo, coll. 8. diff. 1. sect. 1. Sed Seraphicus cum S. Thoma, Richardo et plurimis aliis non admittit vocabulum *prioris* et *posterioris* in divinis. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 46. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., sicut in q. praecedente. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 82. q. 2; a. 54. q. 5. n. 12. et q. 6. n. 26. et 34. — Biel, I. *Sent.* d. 9. q. 3.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** This question seems to have arisen from the word of St. Augustine [cited] in the Master (here c. 3) and in the first *fundamentum*, that in divine things there is said to be an order of nature. But if this is understood in that sense, that nature itself is ordered, it would beyond doubt be false, since in nature there is neither relation nor order; but if it is understood inasmuch as nature is the ground of ordering, it can be understood in a sound sense. For the order of origin which is between the Father and the Son is through nature. And from Alexander it is to be noted that *nature* is said in one way, *essence* in another, because nature adds over essence the account of productive force or of a principle of acting, and by reason of this connotation an order of nature can be spoken of. Others understand *order of nature* in the sense of natural origin, not voluntary. Concerning the twofold signification of the genitive, which is the foundation of the response, see p. 374 note 12.

**II.** On the principal matter all agree; nevertheless Scotus (l. c.) with some — both ancient and modern — departs from the rest in his manner of speaking, asserting that the order of origin imports also a relation according to *prior* and *posterior*, which however is not of duration. Concerning the reasons why he speaks thus, see Rada, *controv.* 5; Macedo, *coll.* 8, *diff.* 1, sect. 1. But the Seraphic Doctor with St. Thomas, Richard, and very many others does not admit the term *prior* and *posterior* in divine things. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 46, m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3, *quaestiuncula* 2; *Summa* I, q. 42, a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unic., a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 4. — Aegidius Romanus, as in the preceding question. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 82, q. 2; a. 54, q. 5, n. 12, and q. 6, nn. 26 and 34. — Biel, I *Sent.* d. 9, q. 3.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 20, Dubia

title_alt:
Dubia circa litteram Magistri
Doubts on the Master's text

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 375 -->

### DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

### DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de prima ratione, quam ponit Magister: *Omnia quae habet Pater, habet Filius: ergo quantam potentiam habet Pater, habet Filius*. Istud argumentum non videtur valere, quia mutatur *quid* in *quantum*: nam *omnia* distribuit pro substantia, *quantum* autem dicit quantitatem.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod quamvis talis modus arguendi[^1] non valeret, si differret quantitas et substantia, tamen ubi idem est, omnimodam habet necessitatem; et quia hoc est in divinis, ideo argumentum bonum est.

Posset tamen dici, quod praedictum argumentum in qualibet materia est bonum. Habere enim non dicitur aliquis solum substantialia, sed etiam proprietates: ergo sequitur, cum *omnia* distribuat pro omnibus habitis[^2], quod habeat etiam proprietates: ergo cum nullam potentiam habeat unus, quam non habeat alter, ergo nihil potest unus, quod non potest alter: ergo si unus omnipotens est, et alter; et ita patet, quod hic non est figura dictionis, quia *omnia* distribuit hic pro rebus omnium generum[^3].

<!-- page 376 -->

### DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non potest qui accepit inaequalis esse ei qui dedit*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum omnis creatura sit accipiens, nulla esset inaequalis Deo; sed hoc[^4] falsum: ergo et primum.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Augustinus non loquitur generaliter[^5] de quolibet accipiente sive de quolibet modo, sed de eo qui accipit omnia; et talis accipiens non potest esse inaequalis.

### DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de alia ratione: *Si non potuit, ergo fuit impotens*. Videtur enim male arguere, quia similiter posset argui de Filio et Spiritu sancto: si non potuit Filium aequalem producere: ergo etc.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum ad hoc, quod non competit generatio nisi hypostasi Patris, sicut alibi tactum est[^6]; ideo non valet nec est simile.

### DUB. IV.

Item dubitatur de alia parte auctoritatis[^7], quia illud argumentum non videtur valere: *Potuit producere aequalem, et non produxit sive genuit: ergo invidus fuit*, quia similiter[^8] potest argui: potuit istam creaturam facere meliorem, et non fecit: ergo invidit. Si tu dicas, quod invidia considerat semper parem vel superiorem, sicut dicit Gregorius super illud Iob quinto[^9]: *Parvulum occidit invidia*; obiicitur tunc, quia si Filium genuisset minorem, non habuisset ibi locum invidia: ergo videtur quod ista solutio non solvit. Item, in creaturis non valet: iste artifex potuit facere istam rem meliorem et non fecit: ergo fuit invidus; quare ergo[^10] tenet in Deo?

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod invidia artificis producentis non attenditur in productione rei inaequalis vel minus bonae, nisi[^11] ubi res de sui natura exigit tale esse; tunc enim necessario concluditur, quod aut producens non potuit, aut invidit, si potuit et non produxit, quia non fecit, ut debuit. Et quoniam filius, eo ipso quo filius est, natus est perfecte imitari, si non genuit filium in perfecta imitatione, concluditur, quod aut producens impotens fuit, aut invidit. Et ideo patet, quod non est simile de Creatore et creatura, arca et artifice[^12].

### DUB. V.

Item dubitatur de tertia ratione, quam facit: *Si homo pater potuit gignere filium sibi aequalem, ergo et Deus*, quia illud argumentum non valet: homo habet alium hominem sibi aequalem vel habere potest: ergo et Deus similiter; quoniam Deus de sua nobilitate hoc habet, quod nullus potest ei aequari; et ita videtur ratio Augustini non valere.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod si aequalitas poneret de necessitate in aequalibus diversitatem in natura, quod tunc non valeret. Sed supposito, quod Deus generet Filium connaturalem sibi, de necessitate sequitur, quod si homo aequalem genuit, quod Deus multo fortius. Quamvis enim imperfectionis sit aequari diverso in natura, tamen aequari connaturali perfectionis est; alioquin divina natura esset in aliquo imperfecte[^13]; quod si hoc est impossibile, patet, etc.

### DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *quaestio aequalitatis est qualis aut quantus*. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia *quale* dicit qualitatem, et secundum eam attenditur similitudo, non aequalitas, quia «*proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici*[^14]».

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod de qualitate est loqui dupliciter: uno modo, prout dicitur denominans[^15];

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alio modo, prout est dispositio nobilitatis; et secundum hanc attenditur maior et minor nobilitas, et ita melior res dicitur. Et quia «*in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius*[^16]», ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad qualitatem, non ex propria ratione nominis, sed ex consequenti, ut visum est[^17].

---

english:
### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt concerning the first reasoning which the Master places: *All things that the Father has, the Son has: therefore as great a power as the Father has, the Son has*. This argument does not seem to be valid, because *quid* is changed into *quantum*: for *all things* distributes with respect to substance, while *quantum* states quantity.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although such a manner of arguing[^1] would not be valid if quantity and substance differed, nevertheless where they are the same, it has every kind of necessity; and because this is so in divine matters, therefore the argument is good.

It can yet be said, however, that the aforesaid argument is good in any matter. For someone is not said to *have* only substantial things, but also properties: therefore it follows, since *all things* distributes for all things had[^2], that he also has properties: therefore since one [person] has no power that the other does not have, therefore one can do nothing that the other cannot: therefore if one is omnipotent, the other [is] also; and so it is clear that here there is no figure of speech, because *all things* distributes here for things of all genera[^3].

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *He who has received cannot be unequal to him who has given*. For it appears to say wrongly, because if this [were so], since every creature is a receiver, none would be unequal to God; but this[^4] is false: therefore so is the first.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine does not speak generally[^5] of every receiver or of every mode, but of him who receives all things; and such a receiver cannot be unequal.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about another reasoning: *If he could not, therefore he was impotent*. For it seems to argue wrongly, because similarly it could be argued of the Son and the Holy Spirit: if he could not produce an equal Son: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said to this that generation does not pertain except to the hypostasis of the Father, as has been touched on elsewhere[^6]; therefore [the inference] is not valid, nor is it similar.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is doubted concerning another part of the authority[^7], because that argument does not appear to be valid: *He could produce an equal, and did not produce or beget: therefore he was envious*; because similarly[^8] it can be argued: he could make this creature better, and did not make [it so]: therefore he envied. If you say that envy always regards an equal or a superior, as Gregory says on that [verse] of Job, chapter 5[^9]: *Envy slays the little one*; it is then objected that, if he had begotten a lesser Son, envy would not have had a place there: therefore it appears that this solution does not solve [the problem]. Likewise, in creatures it does not hold: this craftsman could have made this thing better and did not: therefore he was envious; why therefore[^10] does it hold in God?

**I respond:** It must be said that the envy of the producing craftsman is not regarded in the production of an unequal or less good thing, except[^11] where the thing of its own nature demands such being; for then it is necessarily concluded that either the producer could not, or he envied, if he could and did not produce, because he did not do as he ought. And since a son, by the very fact that he is a son, is born to imitate perfectly, if he did not beget a son in perfect imitation, it is concluded that either the producer was impotent, or he envied. And therefore it is clear that it is not similar in the case of the Creator and the creature, the chest and the craftsman[^12].

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is doubted concerning the third reasoning which he makes: *If a man as father could beget a son equal to himself, therefore so could God too*, because that argument is not valid: a man has another man equal to himself, or can have [one]: therefore so also God; because God has from his nobility that no one can be equal to him; and so the reasoning of Augustine seems not to be valid.

**I respond:** It must be said that if equality posited of necessity in equals diversity in nature, then it would not be valid. But, supposing that God begets a Son connatural to himself, it follows of necessity that if a man begot an equal, then God much more strongly. For although it pertains to imperfection to be equalled by [something] diverse in nature, yet to be equalled by [something] connatural is of perfection; otherwise the divine nature would be in some respect imperfectly[^13]; and since this is impossible, it is clear, etc.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the question of equality is "of what kind" or "how great"* (*qualis aut quantus*). For it appears to say wrongly, because *quale* states quality, and according to it likeness is regarded, not equality, since «*it is proper to quality that according to it like or unlike are said*[^14]».

**I respond:** It must be said that one may speak of quality in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is said to be denominating[^15];

in another way, insofar as it is a disposition of nobility; and according to this greater and lesser nobility is regarded, and so a thing is said to be better. And because «*in spiritual things the same thing is greater and better*[^16]», therefore the question of equality looks to quality, not from the proper account of the name, but as a consequence, as has been seen[^17].

---

la: Supplevimus hic et mox post *horum* ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 *est*. Paulo ante loco *arguendi* nonnulli codd. ut S W Y *argumentandi*.

en: We have supplied here and soon after *horum*, from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, *est*. A little before, in place of *arguendi* some codices such as S, W, Y [read] *argumentandi*.

la: Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice perperam *habitibus*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with only one or another codex wrongly [reads] *habitibus*.

la: Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 4.) fallaciam figurae dictionis ita definit: «*Quae autem propter figuram dictionis sunt accidunt, quando (propter similitudinem unius dictionis cum alia) non idem ut idem interpretatur, ut masculinum femininum, vel femininum masculinum, vel quod inter haec est (scil. neutrum) alterum horum, vel rursus quale quantum, vel quantum quale, vel faciens patiens*» etc. — Dupliciter fieri potest distributio termini *omnis*, nempe pro singulis generum i. e. pro singulis individuis, quae sub eodem genere et sub eadem specie continentur, et pro generibus singulorum i. e. pro solis generibus vel speciebus, non autem pro individuis sub generibus vel speciebus.

en: Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 3 (c. 4) defines the fallacy of figure of speech thus: «*Those [fallacies] which arise on account of the figure of speech occur when (on account of the likeness of one word to another) what is not the same is interpreted as the same, as the masculine [as] feminine, or the feminine [as] masculine, or what is between these (namely, the neuter) [as] one of the two, or again "of what kind" [as] "how much", or "how much" [as] "of what kind", or "doing" [as] "undergoing"*» etc. — The distribution of the term *omnis* ("all") can be made in two ways, namely for the singulars of the genera, i.e. for the individual things which are contained under the same genus and under the same species, and for the genera of the singulars, i.e. for the genera or species alone, not however for the individuals under the genera or species.

la: In cod. V adiicitur *est*.

en: In codex V *est* is added.

la: Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additam coniunctivam particulam *et*. Paulo infra post *omnia* cod. O non male addit *naturaliter*.

en: On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out the conjunctive particle *et* added here. A little below, after *omnia*, codex O not badly adds *naturaliter*.

la: Dist. 7. q. 2. — Paulo ante ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Dicendum*.

en: Distinction 7, q. 2. — A little before, from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *Dicendum*.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *rationis*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] *rationis*.

la: Cod. dd *eodem modo* pro *similiter*, qui et mox, omisso *istam*, post *meliorem* addit *tali*; cod. V *posset* loco *potest* et paulo post pro *invidit* ponit *invidus fuit*.

en: Codex dd [reads] *eodem modo* in place of *similiter*, which also soon, omitting *istam*, after *meliorem* adds *tali*; codex V [reads] *posset* in place of *potest*, and a little later in place of *invidit* puts *invidus fuit*.

la: Vers. 2; Libr. V. *Moral.* c. 46. n. 84: *Invidere enim non possumus, nisi eis quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus.*

en: Verse 2; Book V *Moralia* c. 46, n. 84: *For we cannot envy, except those whom we judge in some way better than ourselves.*

la: Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. etiam *non* loco *ergo*.

en: So nearly all the codices with edition 1, while the Vatican [edition] also [reads] *non* in place of *ergo*.

la: Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut F G T Z aa bb lectioni Vat. ponendo *nisi* pro *sed*, quae lectio iam ex grammaticali constructione commendatur; aliqui codd. ut S Y cum ed. 1 modo affirmativo, omissis particulis *non* et *nisi*, propositionem exhibent, in qua pauci codd. ut S V loco *producentis* legunt *potentis*. Mox plures codd. ut F G H I X Y cc dd cum edd. 1, 2, 3 *talis* pro *tale*.

en: We prefer the reading of several manuscripts such as F, G, T, Z, aa, bb to the reading of the Vatican [edition], putting *nisi* in place of *sed*, which reading is already commended by the grammatical construction; some codices such as S, Y with edition 1, in the affirmative mode, with the particles *non* and *nisi* omitted, exhibit the proposition, in which a few codices such as S, V in place of *producentis* read *potentis*. Soon, several codices such as F, G, H, I, X, Y, cc, dd, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] *talis* in place of *tale*.

la: Concordant B. Albert., hic a. 6. — S. Thom., hic circa lit. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

en: B. Albert agrees, here a. 6. — St. Thomas, here on the *littera*. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.

la: Cod. X *imperfecta*, qui dein cum cod. V habet *et* loco *quod*.

en: Codex X [reads] *imperfecta*, which then with codex V has *et* in place of *quod*.

la: Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de *Qualitate*. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 342 nota 6.

en: Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. on *Quality*. Cf. also above p. 342, note 6.

la: Nempe forma aliqua accidentalis, secundum quam, ut ait Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. de *Quali*, quales quidam esse dicuntur. — Et paulo infra dicit idem: *Qualia ergo dicuntur quae denominative a dictis qualitatibus dicuntur* (v. g. a *candore candidus* et a *grammatica grammaticus*). — Cod. T voci *denominans* praefigit particulam *ut*. Paulo post ex multis mss. ut FGHSTWYZ aa bb cum ed. 1 nomini *dispositio* praemisimus *est* loco *dicitur*, ac dein fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *melior*[?] pro *nobilior*.

en: Namely, some accidental form, according to which, as Aristotle says, *Categories*, ch. on *Quale*, certain things are said to be of-a-certain-quality. — And a little below he says the same: *Things therefore are called of-a-quality which are said denominatively from the said qualities* (e.g., from *whiteness, white* and from *grammar, grammarian*). — Codex T prefixes to the word *denominans* the particle *ut*. A little later, from many manuscripts such as F, G, H, S, T, W, Y, Z, aa, bb, with edition 1, we have prefixed to the noun *dispositio* the word *est* in place of *dicitur*, and then on the faith of very many codices and edition 1 we have substituted *melior*[?] in place of *nobilior*.

la: Augustin., VI. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 9. — In immediate sequenti propositione praestamus lectionem veram et contextui conformiorem, quam integre exhibent codd. XZ; Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. *ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem*, alii codd., inter quos est etiam cod. T, perperam *ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem*, qui etiam cum edd. 1, 5 in principio responsionis incongrue ponunt *de aequalitate est loqui* pro *de qualitate* etc.

en: Augustine, VI *On the Trinity* c. 8, n. 9. — In the immediately following proposition we prefer the true reading and the one more conformable to the context, which codices X, Z exhibit in full; the Vatican [edition] with edition 1 and some manuscripts [reads] *ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem*; other codices, among which is also codex T, wrongly [read] *ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem*, which also with editions 1, 5 in the beginning of the response incongruously put *de aequalitate est loqui* in place of *de qualitate* etc.

la: Vide d. 19. p. I. q. 1. et 2. — Cfr. et B. Albert., hic a. 6. in fine et S. Thom., hic in expos. lit.

en: See d. 19, p. I, qq. 1 and 2. — Cf. also B. Albert, here a. 6, at the end, and St. Thomas, here in the *expositio litterae*.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 21

title_alt:
Distinctio XXI littera Magistri
Lombard's text on Distinction XXI

source_text:
<!-- page 377 -->

### DISTINCTIO XXI.

#### Cap. I. *Quomodo possit dici: solus Pater vel solus Filius vel solus Spiritus sanctus, cum sint inseparabiles.*

Hic oritur quaestio trahens originem ex praedictis. Dictum est enim supra[^1], quod tantus est solus Pater vel solus Filius vel solus Spiritus sanctus, quantum simul illi tres, et quod duae vel tres personae simul non sunt maius aliquid quam una sola. Ideo quaerit Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^2]: «Quomodo haec sane dici possint, cum nec Pater sit solus nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed semper et inseparabiliter et Filius cum Patre et Pater cum Filio et Spiritus sanctus cum utroque; inseparabiles enim sunt hae tres personae». Ad quod ita respondet Augustinus in eodem[^3]: «Solum Patrem dicimus Patrem, non quia separatur a Filio vel a Spiritu sancto, sed hoc dicentes significamus, quia illi simul cum eo non sunt Pater». Solus enim Pater Pater est. Quod non dicitur, quia ipse sit solus, id est sine Filio vel Spiritu sancto, sed per hoc Filius et Spiritus sanctus a paternitatis consortio excluduntur. Ita et cum dicitur: solus Filius Filius est, vel solus Spiritus sanctus Spiritus sanctus est, non dividitur Filius a Patre vel Spiritus sanctus ab utroque, sed a consortio filialis proprietatis excluduntur Pater et Spiritus sanctus, et a consortio processibilis proprietatis Pater et Filius. Cum ergo dicitur: tantus est solus Pater, quantum simul illi tres[^4], per hoc quod dicitur solus non separatur Pater ab aliis, sed hic est sensus: solus Pater, id est Pater, qui ita Pater est, quod nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, tantus est etc. Similiter intellige, cum dicitur: solus est Filius vel solus est Spiritus sanctus. «Solus ergo Pater dicitur, ut ait Augustinus in eodem[^5], quia non nisi ipse ibi Pater est», et solus Filius, quia non nisi ipse ibi Filius est, et solus Spiritus sanctus, quia non nisi ipse ibi Spiritus sanctus est.

#### Cap. II. *Utrum debeat dici: solus Pater est Deus, vel solus Filius est Deus, vel solus Spiritus sanctus est Deus; an, Pater est solus Deus, Filius est solus Deus, Spiritus sanctus est solus Deus.*

Post hoc quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur: solus Pater est Pater, vel solus Filius est Filius, ita possit dici: solus Pater est Deus, vel solus Filius est Deus, ita et de Spiritu sancto; aut, Pater est solus Deus, Filius est solus Deus. Ad quod dicimus, quia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicitur et est unus Deus, et haec Trinitas simul proprie dicitur esse solus Deus, sicut solus sapiens, solus potens. Sed non videtur debere dici a nobis verbis nostris utentibus, nisi ubi sermo auctoritatis[^6] occurrit: solus Pater est Deus, vel Pater est solus Deus; ita de Filio et Spiritu sancto dicimus. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^7] ait: «Quoniam ostendimus, quomodo possit dici solus Pater vel solus Filius, consideranda est illa sententia, qua dicitur, Deum verum solum non esse Patrem solum, sed Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum». Ecce habes, quia non solus Pater dicendus est esse solus verus Deus. Item in eodem[^8]: «Si quis interroget, utrum Pater solus sit Deus; quomodo respondebimus, non esse, nisi forte ita dicamus, esse quidem Patrem Deum, sed non eum esse solum Deum? Esse autem solum Deum dicamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum». Ecce et hic habes, quia Pater non debet dici solus Deus; atque hic[^9] solum in parte subiecti tantum accipere quidam volunt, in parte vero praedicati si sit, concedunt, quod Pater est solus Deus. Sed ex verbis Augustini videtur ostendi, quod proprie solus Deus dici debeat tota Trinitas. Et haec Trinitas, ut ait Augustinus contra Maximinum[^10], intelligitur, cum Apostolus dicit: *Beatus et solus potens*; et ibi: *Soli sapienti Deo*; et: *Invisibili soli*

<!-- page 378 -->

*Deo*. Non enim de solo Patre haec accipienda sunt, ut contendebat Maximinus et alii haeretici, sed de Trinitate. Sicut et illud: *Solus habet immortalitatem*, quia secundum rectam fidem ipsa Trinitas est unus solus Deus, beatus, potens, sapiens, invisibilis. Unde Augustinus in eodem[^11]: «Cum unus Deus sit Trinitas, haec sit nobis solutio quaestionis, ut intelligamus solum Deum sapientem, solum potentem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, qui est unus et solus Deus».

#### Cap. III. *Quomodo Trinitas dicatur solus Deus, cum ipsa sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis.*

Sed iterum quaeritur, quomodo ipsam Trinitatem dicimus solum Deum, cum sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis. Ad quod respondet Augustinus in sexto libro *de Trinitate*[^12] ita dicens: «Trinitatem dicimus Deum solum, quamvis semper sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis, sed solum dicimus, quia non aliud quam ipsa Trinitas Deus est. Non enim illi cum illa Deus sunt», vel aliqua alia, sed ipsa Trinitas tantum, non illi vel alia Deus est.

«Verumtamen, ut ait Augustinus[^13], etsi de solo Patre praedicta dicerentur, non tamen excluderetur Filius vel Spiritus sanctus, quia *illi tres unum sunt*, sicut in Apocalypsi de Filio legitur, quod *habet nomen scriptum, quod nemo scit nisi ipse*. Non enim inde separatur Pater vel Spiritus sanctus. Et cum dicitur: *Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filius*; non inde separatur Pater[?] et Spiritus sanctus, quia inseparabiles sunt». Aliquando etiam nominantur Pater et Filius, et tacetur Spiritus sanctus; sicut Veritas ad Patrem loquens ait[^14]: *Ut cognoscant te et quem misisti Iesum Christum esse unum verum Deum*. «Cur ergo, inquit Augustinus[^15], tacuit de Spiritu sancto? Quia consequens est, ut ubicumque nominatur unus, sicut Pater et Filius, tanta pace uni adhaerens intelligatur etiam ipsa Pax, quamvis non commemoretur». Uno ergo istorum nominato, etiam reliqui intelliguntur; quod in pluribus Scripturae locis occurrit.

---

english:
### DISTINCTION XXI.

#### Cap. I. *How it can be said: the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, since they are inseparable.*

Here arises a question drawing its origin from what has been said before. For it has been said above[^1] that the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as those three together, and that two or three persons together are not anything greater than one alone. Therefore Augustine asks in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^2]: "How can these things rightly be said, since neither is the Father alone, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, but always and inseparably both the Son is with the Father, and the Father with the Son, and the Holy Spirit with both? — for these three persons are inseparable." To which Augustine in the same place responds thus[^3]: "We say that the Father alone is Father, not because He is separated from the Son or from the Holy Spirit, but in saying this we signify that those who are with Him are not Father." For the Father alone is Father. Which is not said because He is alone, that is, without the Son or the Holy Spirit, but by this the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded from the company of paternity. So also when it is said: the Son alone is Son, or the Holy Spirit alone is the Holy Spirit, the Son is not divided from the Father, nor the Holy Spirit from both, but the Father and the Holy Spirit are excluded from the company of the filial property, and the Father and the Son from the company of the processional property. When therefore it is said: the Father alone is as great as those three together[^4], by what is said *alone* the Father is not separated from the others, but this is the sense: the Father alone — that is, the Father, who is so Father that He is neither Son nor Holy Spirit — is as great, etc. Understand similarly when it is said: the Son alone is, or the Holy Spirit alone is. "The Father therefore is called *alone*, as Augustine says in the same place[^5], because no one but Himself is there Father," and the Son alone, because no one but Himself is there Son, and the Holy Spirit alone, because no one but Himself is there the Holy Spirit.

#### Cap. II. *Whether it ought to be said: the Father alone is God, or the Son alone is God, or the Holy Spirit alone is God; or rather, the Father is the only God, the Son is the only God, the Holy Spirit is the only God.*

After this it is asked whether, just as it is said: the Father alone is Father, or the Son alone is Son, so it can be said: the Father alone is God, or the Son alone is God, and likewise of the Holy Spirit; or, the Father is the only God, the Son is the only God. To which we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is called and is one God, and this Trinity together is properly said to be the only God, just as the only wise, the only powerful. But it does not seem that it ought to be said by us using our own words, except where the language of authority[^6] occurs: the Father alone is God, or the Father is the only God; so we speak of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^7] says: "Since we have shown how it can be said *the Father alone* or *the Son alone*, that sentence is to be considered by which it is said that the only true God is not the Father alone, but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." Behold, you have it that the Father alone is not to be said to be the only true God. Likewise in the same place[^8]: "If anyone should ask whether the Father alone is God; how shall we reply? — that He is not, unless perchance we say thus, that the Father is indeed God, but that He is not the only God? But let us say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the only God." Behold, here too you have it that the Father ought not to be called the only God; and yet here[^9] some wish to take it only on the side of the subject, but on the side of the predicate, if it is so, they concede that the Father is the only God. But from Augustine's words it seems shown that properly the whole Trinity ought to be called the only God. And this Trinity, as Augustine says against Maximinus[^10], is understood, when the Apostle says: *Blessed and only powerful*; and there: *To the only wise God*; and: *To the only invisible*

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*God*. For these are not to be taken of the Father alone, as Maximinus and other heretics contended, but of the Trinity. So also that: *He alone has immortality* — since according to right faith the Trinity itself is one only God, blessed, powerful, wise, invisible. Whence Augustine in the same place[^11]: "Since one God is the Trinity, let this be for us the solution of the question, that we understand the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who is one and the only God, to be the only wise God, the only powerful."

#### Cap. III. *How the Trinity is called the only God, although it is with the holy spirits and souls.*

But again it is asked, how we call the Trinity itself the only God, since it is with the holy spirits and souls. To which Augustine in the sixth book *On the Trinity*[^12] responds, saying thus: "We call the Trinity the only God, although it is always with the holy spirits and souls, but we say *only* because nothing other than the Trinity itself is God. For those are not God with it" — nor any other things, but the Trinity itself only; not those, nor others, is God.

"Nevertheless, as Augustine says[^13], even if the things stated were said of the Father alone, the Son or the Holy Spirit would not however be excluded, because *those three are one*, just as in the Apocalypse it is read of the Son that *He has a name written, which no one knows but Himself*. For the Father or the Holy Spirit is not separated from there. And when it is said: *No one knows the Father except the Son*; the Father[?] and the Holy Spirit are not separated from there, since they are inseparable." Sometimes also the Father and the Son are named, and the Holy Spirit is left in silence; as Truth, speaking to the Father, says[^14]: *That they may know Thee and Him whom Thou hast sent, Jesus Christ, to be one true God*. "Why therefore," says Augustine[^15], "did He keep silent about the Holy Spirit? Because it follows that wherever one is named, just as the Father and the Son, by such peace adhering to the One there is also understood the Peace itself, although it be not mentioned." When therefore one of these is named, the rest also are understood; which occurs in many places of Scripture.

---

la: Dist. XIX. — Mox solummodo Vat. et ed. 1 *illae tres*; supple: *personae*. Deinde Vat. cum paucis edd. post *una* superflue addit *persona*.

en: Distinction XIX. — Just after, the Vatican edition alone and edition 1 read *illae tres* ("those three"); supply: *personae* ("persons"). Then the Vatican edition with a few editions, after *una*, superfluously adds *persona*.

la: Cap. 7. n. 9, secundum sensum; Magister extendit quaestionem etiam ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut et in sequente textu.

en: Chapter 7, n. 9, according to the sense; the Master extends the question also to the Holy Spirit, just as in the following text.

la: Ibid., paucis interpositis. — In principio edd. praeter Vat. et ed. 1 male et contra omnia codd. et originale legunt: *Solum Deum Patrem dicimus*, *non quia*.

en: Same place, with a few words intervening. — At the beginning, the editions besides the Vatican edition and edition 1 wrongly, and against all the manuscripts and the original, read: *Solum Deum Patrem dicimus, non quia* ("We say the Father alone God, not because").

la: Supple cum codd. A G: *quantum illi tres*.

en: Supply with codices A, G: *quantum illi tres* ("as much as those three").

en: Chapter 9, n. 10.

la: Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 7 non bene *auctoritatibus*.

en: The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 7 read, not well, *auctoritatibus* (in the plural).

la: Cap. 9. n. 10; in quo textu Vat. et aliae edd. contra 1, 8, codd. et originale male legunt *posset* pro *possit*. Finito textu, ante *verus Deus* Vat. et plures edd. contra codd. male omittunt *solus*.

en: Chapter 9, n. 10; in which text the Vatican edition and other editions, against editions 1, 8, the manuscripts, and the original, wrongly read *posset* in place of *possit*. At the end of the text, before *verus Deus*, the Vatican edition and several editions, against the manuscripts, wrongly omit *solus*.

la: Loc. cit. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *interrogat*, contradicentibus aliis edd., codd. et Augustino. Deinde post *sed non* sola Vat. omittit *eum*.

en: Same place. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 read *interrogat*, against the other editions, the manuscripts, and Augustine. Then after *sed non*, the Vatican edition alone omits *eum*.

la: Edd. 2, 3, 7, 9 *hoc*; ed. 6 *hic solus*. In qualicumque lectione verba Magistri ob brevitatem sunt subobscura. Lectionem hic sic interpretari possumus: *hic*, id est in hac resolutione negativa, aliqui distinguunt, admittentes eam, si verbum *solum* ex parte subiecti accipitur. Similiter etiam lectio *hoc* fortasse intelligi potest. De ipsa sententia Magistri cfr. S. Bonaventura, hic dub. 1. — Mox Vat. et ed. 5 post *praedicati* non bene legunt *sic*, et edd. 3, 7 peius *si sic*.

en: Editions 2, 3, 7, 9 read *hoc*; edition 6 *hic solus*. Under whichever reading, the Master's words are somewhat obscure on account of brevity. We can interpret the reading here thus: *hic*, that is, in this negative resolution, some distinguish, admitting it if the word *solum* is taken on the side of the subject. The reading *hoc* likewise can perhaps be understood similarly. On the Master's sentence itself, cf. St. Bonaventure, here dub. 1. — Just after, the Vatican edition and edition 5 wrongly read after *praedicati* the word *sic*, and editions 3, 7 worse *si sic*.

la: Libr. II, c. 12, n. 2. Magister ex hoc et tribus sequentibus locis excerpsit Augustini doctrinam, quod semper tota Trinitas intelligatur in citatis locis sacrae Scripturae. Verba Augustini haec sunt: *Ac per hoc quod ait Apostolus* (I. Tim. 6, 15.): *Beatus et solus potens, non cogor de Patre tantummodo accipere, sed de Deo, quod est ipsa Trinitas*. Cap. 13. n. 2: *Soli sapienti Deo* (Rom. 16, 27.). *Deus itaque, quod est ipsa Trinitas propterea solus sapiens recte dicitur, quia solus secundum substantiam suam sapiens est*. Cap. 9. n. 1: *Invisibili soli Deo* (1. Tim. 1, 17.). *Si dixisset soli Patri, difficilius forsasse quaestio solveretur; quia vero dixit soli Deo, non est utique contra nos; et Unigenitus quippe in Dei forma et Spiritus sanctus in sua natura est invisibilis. Unus enim et solus Deus a nobis ipsa Trinitas praedicatur*. Cap. 12. n. 2: *Beatus et solus potens, Rex regum etc.* (I. Tim. 6, 16.). *Nihil hic video dictum, quod non conveniat Trinitati*. — Etiam alibi eadem docet Augustinus, cfr. libr. I. *de Trinitate* c. 6. n. 10. et 11, ex quo Magister mutuavit ultima verba.

en: Book II, c. 12, n. 2. The Master excerpted from this and the three following passages Augustine's doctrine that the whole Trinity is always to be understood in the cited passages of sacred Scripture. Augustine's words are these: *And by this, that the Apostle says* (1 Timothy 6:15): *"Blessed and only powerful," I am not compelled to take it of the Father only, but of God, which is the Trinity itself*. C. 13, n. 2: *"To the only wise God"* (Romans 16:27). *Therefore God, which is the Trinity itself, is rightly called the only wise on this account, because He alone, according to His substance, is wise*. C. 9, n. 1: *"To the invisible, only God"* (1 Timothy 1:17). *Had he said "to the Father alone," the question would perhaps have been harder to solve; but since he said "to God alone," it is not at all against us; for both the Only-Begotten in the form of God and the Holy Spirit in His own nature is invisible. For by us the Trinity itself is preached as the one and only God*. C. 12, n. 2: *"Blessed and only powerful, King of kings, etc."* (1 Timothy 6:16). *I see nothing here said which does not befit the Trinity*. — Augustine teaches the same elsewhere as well; cf. book I *On the Trinity* c. 6, nn. 10 and 11, from which the Master borrowed the final words.

la: Cap. 13. n. 1. Ultimis verbis codd. BCD haec adiciunt: *Non ergo Pater solus, nec solus Filius, nec solus Spiritus sanctus Deus est, sed ipsa Trinitas unus Deus solus est*.

en: Chapter 13, n. 1. To the final words codices BCD add these: *"Therefore not the Father alone, nor the Son alone, nor the Holy Spirit alone is God, but the Trinity itself is one God alone."*

la: Cap. 7. n. 9. — Vat. et ed. 4 ante *dicens* omittunt *ita*.

en: Chapter 7, n. 9. — The Vatican edition and edition 4 omit *ita* before *dicens*.

la: Libr. II. *contra Maximinum* c. 13. n. 1; sed Magister nonnulla omisit vel addidit. Tres in hoc textu occurrentes loci sacrae Scripturae sunt: I. Ioan. 3, 7; Apocal. 19, 12; et Matth. 11, 27, ubi Vulgata: *Et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius*. S. Bonav. (hic dub. 3.), uti testantur codd., in Magistro legit: *Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*.

en: Book II *Against Maximinus* c. 13, n. 1; but the Master omitted or added some things. The three Scripture passages that occur in this text are: 1 John 3:7; Apocalypse 19:12; and Matthew 11:27, where the Vulgate reads: *And no one knows the Son but the Father; nor does anyone know the Father but the Son*. St. Bonaventure (here, dub. 3), as the manuscripts attest, reads in the Master: *No one knows the Son but the Father*.

la: Libr. VI. *de Trinitate* c. 9. n. 10. Etiam propositio praecedens secundum sensum inde excerpta est. — In fine sola Vat. addit: *ut ibidem amplificat Augustinus*.

en: Book VI *On the Trinity* c. 9, n. 10. Also the preceding proposition is excerpted from there according to the sense. — At the end, the Vatican edition alone adds: *as Augustine amplifies in the same place*.


title: Dist. 21, Divisio Textus

title_alt:
Divisio textus distinctionis XXI
Division of the text of Distinction XXI

source_text:
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### COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.

#### *Qualiter dictiones exclusivae accipiantur in divinis.*

> *Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis trahens originem.*

### DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra probavit Magister aequalitatem personarum; hic, quia in probatione dubias quasdam[^1] dixerat rationes propter dictiones exclusivas, movet illas dubitationes et solvit. Et habet haec pars tres partes secundum tria dubia, quae proponit.

Primo enim quaerit de hac locutione[^2]: tantus est solus Pater, quantus Pater et Filius, et hoc primo capitulo.

Secundo proponit hanc sive quaerit de hac: solus Pater est Deus, et hoc facit secundo capitulo, ibi: *Post haec quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur solus Pater* etc.

Tertio quaerit de hac: Trinitas est solus Deus; et hoc facit tertio capitulo, ibi: *Sed iterum quaeritur, quomodo ipsam Trinitatem*. Et in qualibet istarum partium primo movet dubitationem, secundo solvit[^3].

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### TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis est hic quaestio de dictionibus exclusivis. Et circa hoc principaliter quaeruntur[^4] duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva in divinis vere addatur termino substantiali.

Secundo, utrum vere addatur termino relativo.

Et quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo:

Primo[^5]: utrum dictio exclusiva vere addatur termino substantiali a parte subiecti.

Secundo, si vere addatur a parte praedicati.

---

english:
### COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI.

#### *How exclusive locutions are to be taken in divine matters.*

> *Here arises a question drawing its origin from what has been said before.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master proved the equality of the persons; here, because in the proof he had set out certain doubtful[^1] reasons on account of the exclusive locutions, he raises those doubts and resolves them. And this part has three parts according to the three doubts which he proposes.

For first he asks about this locution[^2]: the Father alone is as great as the Father and the Son together, and this in the first chapter.

Secondly he proposes this — or rather asks about this: the Father alone is God; and this he does in the second chapter, at: *After this it is asked whether, just as it is said: the Father alone* etc.

Thirdly he asks about this: the Trinity is the only God; and this he does in the third chapter, at: *But again it is asked, how the Trinity itself*. And in each of these parts he first raises the doubt, secondly resolves it[^3].

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of this part there is here a question concerning exclusive locutions. And concerning this, two things are principally asked[^4].

First it is asked whether an exclusive locution in divine matters is truly added to a substantial term.

Secondly, whether it is truly added to a relative term.

And as to the first, two things are asked:

First[^5]: whether an exclusive locution is truly added to a substantial term on the side of the subject.

Secondly, whether it is truly added on the side of the predicate.

---

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quasdam*.

en: From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *quasdam* ("certain").

la: Vat. cum cod. cc *ratione*, sed minus bene et contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1. Mox in Vat. deest *et hoc primo capitulo*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1. Similis omissio recurrit paulo infra, scil. *secundo capitulo* et *tertio capitulo*.

en: The Vatican edition with codex cc reads *ratione* ("by reasoning"), but less well and against the other manuscripts and edition 1. Just after, in the Vatican edition the words *et hoc primo capitulo* ("and this in the first chapter") are missing, although they exist in the manuscripts and edition 1. A similar omission recurs a little below, namely *secundo capitulo* ("in the second chapter") and *tertio capitulo* ("in the third chapter").

la: Vat. et cod. cc, refragantibus tamen aliis mss. et ed. 1, *movetur dubitatio, secundo solvitur*.

en: The Vatican edition and codex cc read, with the other manuscripts and edition 1 nevertheless opposing, *movetur dubitatio, secundo solvitur* ("a doubt is raised, secondly it is resolved" — passive).

la: Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. *quaerenda sunt*.

en: The Vatican edition with only a few manuscripts reads *quaerenda sunt* ("are to be asked").

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 1 *Primum est*.

en: Many manuscripts with edition 1 read *Primum est* ("The first is").


title: Dist. 21, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt: Utrum dictio exclusiva vere addatur termino substantiali a parte subiecti.

title_alt: Whether an exclusive word is truly added to a substantial term on the side of the subject

source_text:
<!-- page 379 -->

### ARTICULUS I. *De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino substantiali.*

### QUAESTIO I. *Utrum vere dicatur: solus Deus est Pater.*

Quod autem vere addatur huic termino *Deus* a parte subiecti, ostenditur hoc modo: Deus habet aliquid proprium; sed proprium est quod inest soli[^1]: ergo etc. Et quia constat, quod exclusio vere additur termino substantiali respectu praedicati essentialis, unde bene dicitur: *solus Deus creat*; quaeritur, utrum vere addatur ei respectu praedicati proprii sive[^2] termini relativi, utrum scilicet vere dicatur: *solus Deus est Pater*. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per suam expositionem, quae est: *solus Deus est Pater*, id est[^3] *non alius quam Deus est Pater*: ergo *solus Deus est Pater*. Et quod sit ista eius expositio, hoc habetur et a communi usu et a Philosopho[^4], qui dicit, quod «*solus* idem est quod *non cum alio*».

2. Item, hoc videtur a convertibili, quoniam istae duae convertuntur: *nihil praeter Petrum currit*, ergo *solus Petrus currit*: ergo et istae duae: *nihil praeter Deum est Pater*, et *solus Deus est Pater*. Sed prima est vera, quia haec est falsa: *nihil est Pater*, et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo[^5]: ergo etc.

3. Item, a quocumque removetur[^6] quod est in plus, removetur quod est in minus[^7]; sed esse Deum est in plus quam esse Patrem: ergo a quocumque removetur Deus, et Pater. Sed quaecumque sic se habent, quod a quocumque removetur unum, et alterum, unum praecise praedicatur de altero, nec habet instantiam: ergo Pater praecise praedicatur de Deo; sed si praecise, ergo cum exclusione: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Terminus accidentalis implicat rem suam circa suum subiectum — ut patet, cum dicitur: *homo albus currit*, circa hunc terminum *homo* implicatur albedo — ergo similiter cum dicitur: *solus Deus est Pater*, circa Deum implicatur solitudo. Sed Hilarius[^8] dicit, quod «Deus non est solitarius confitendus»: ergo etc. Et ratio ista concludit, quod non possit vere addi nec cum praedicato proprio nec communi.

2. Item, ostenditur, quod non possit vere addi respectu praedicati communis, ut cum dicitur: *solus Deus creat*. Hoc enim nomen *Deus* de se habet suppositionem quasi indefinitam respectu personarum[^9], ergo reddit locutionem veram pro aliquo; sed pro quolibet est falsa — haec enim est falsa: *solus*

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*Pater est* — ergo cum omne praedicatum essentiale conveniat totius, et non uni soli, nullo modo potest addi dictio exclusiva respectu talis praedicati subiecto communi.

3. Item, quod non respectu proprii, videtur, quia si haec est vera: *solus Deus est Pater*: ergo a simplici conversa et haec: *solus Pater est Deus*; sed ista est falsa: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod non convertitur simpliciter; *contra*: habet intellectum universalis negativae et particularis affirmativae, et utraque convertitur simpliciter: ergo etc.

> **Conclusio.** *Terminus solus in divinis non dicitur categorematice, ut idem sensus sit ac solitarius; bene autem dicitur syncategorematice respectu praedicati cum substantialis, tum personalis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod haec dictio *solus* potest esse categorema, vel syncategorema[^10]. Secundum quod est categorema, sic est nomen adiectivum, absolute[^11] ponens rem suam circa suum substantivum, et res sua est solitudo. Unde tantum valet sic *solus* quantum[^12] *solitarius*. Et quia solitudo nullo modo recipitur in divinis quantum ad substantiam, quia est in multis personis, hoc nomen *solus* non recipitur in divinis cum terminis[^13] substantialibus, sicut ostendit prima ratio.

Si autem accipiatur[^14] in quantum est syncategorema, sic privat associationem et importat aliquam negationem. Et sic, cum aliquod praedicatum et substantiale et personale praecise dicatur[^15] de nomine substantiali, sic vere dicitur in divinis et respectu praedicati[^16] substantialis, ut cum dicitur: *solus Deus creat*, et respectu personalis, ut cum dicitur: *solus Deus est Pater*.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de *albo*, quod ponit rem suam circa substantivum; dicendum, quod non est simile, secundum quod hoc nomen *solus* tenetur syncategorematice; quia *albus* est dispositio subiecti absoluta, unde absolute ponit rem suam circa terminum, sed *solus* ratione negationis non absolute; et ideo non ponit solitudinem, sed praecisionem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod terminus substantialis debet reddere locutionem veram pro aliqua persona; dicendum, quod terminus, cui additur exclusio, respectum habet ad praedicatum, et respectum habet ad exclusionem; et licet respectu praedicati possit habere suppositionem personalem, ut cum dicitur: *solus homo currit*; tamen regula est apud sophistas[^17], quod per comparationem ad dictionem exclusivam talis terminus habet suppositionem simplicem, unde nullo modo licet descendere. Et hoc est quod dicitur in libro *de Regulis fidei*[^18], quod dictio exclusiva facit exclusionem quantum ad genus rei, non quantum ad rem generis, quia ratione formae communis, quae est genus rei, non ratione suppositi, quod est res generis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod conversa est falsa; dicendum, quod illa non est sua conversa; quia ista: *solus Deus est Pater*, habet intellectum affirmativae, scilicet *Deus est Pater*, et haec convertitur simpliciter; et habet rationem[^19] negativae huius: *nullus alius a Deo est Pater*, et haec similiter convertitur simpliciter; sed haec non est sua conversa: *nullus alius a Patre est Deus*, sed haec: *nihil quod est Pater, est aliud a Deo*. Idem enim, quod subiiciebatur in prima, debet praedicari in secunda; et sic patet illud.

english:
### ARTICLE I. *On exclusive words added to a substantial term.*

### Question I. *Whether it is truly said: God alone is the Father.*

That [an exclusive word] is truly added to this term *God* on the side of the subject is shown in this way: God has something proper [to Himself]; but the proper is what belongs to one alone[^1]: therefore etc. And since it is established that an exclusion is truly added to a substantial term in respect of an essential predicate — whence it is well said: *God alone creates* — it is asked whether it is truly added to it in respect of a proper predicate, that is[^2], of a relative term: namely, whether it is truly said: *God alone is the Father*. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. By its own exposition, which is: *God alone is the Father*, that is[^3], *no other than God is the Father*: therefore *God alone is the Father*. And that this is its exposition is had both from common usage and from the Philosopher[^4], who says that «*alone* is the same as *not with another*».

2. Likewise, this is seen from the convertible: since these two are converted: *nothing besides Peter runs*, therefore *Peter alone runs*: therefore also these two: *nothing besides God is the Father*, and *God alone is the Father*. But the first is true, since this is false: *nothing is the Father*, and it has no instance except in God[^5]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, from whatever there is removed[^6] that which is in the more, there is removed that which is in the less[^7]; but to be God is in the more than to be the Father: therefore from whatever God is removed, the Father also is removed. But whatever things so stand, that from whatever the one is removed, the other also is removed, the one is precisely predicated of the other, nor has any [counter-]instance: therefore Father is precisely predicated of God; but if precisely, therefore with exclusion: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. An accidental term implies its own thing concerning its subject — as is plain when it is said: *the white man runs*, concerning this term *man* whiteness is implied — therefore likewise when it is said: *God alone is the Father*, concerning God solitude is implied. But Hilary[^8] says that «God is not to be confessed as solitary»: therefore etc. And this reason concludes that it cannot be truly added either with a proper or with a common predicate.

2. Likewise, it is shown that it cannot be truly added in respect of a common predicate, as when it is said: *God alone creates*. For this name *God* of itself has, as it were, an indefinite supposition with respect to the persons[^9]; therefore it makes the locution true for some [one]; but for any one whatever it is false — for this is false: *the Father alone*

*is* — therefore, since every essential predicate belongs to the whole [Trinity], and not to one alone, in no way can an exclusive word be added in respect of such a predicate to a common subject.

3. Likewise, that [it cannot be truly added] in respect of a proper [predicate], it seems, since if this is true: *God alone is the Father*, then by simple conversion this also: *the Father alone is God*; but that is false: therefore etc. *If you say* that it is not converted simply; *on the contrary*: it has the sense of a universal negative and of a particular affirmative, and each is converted simply: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** *The term* solus *in divine matters is not said categorematically, so as to have the same sense as* solitarius; *but it is well said syncategorematically with respect to a predicate, both substantial and personal.*

**I respond:** It must be said that this word *solus* can be a *categorema* or a *syncategorema*[^10]. Insofar as it is a *categorema*, it is then an adjectival noun, absolutely[^11] positing its own thing concerning its substantive, and its thing is solitude. Hence *solus* taken thus has the same value as[^12] *solitarius*. And since solitude is in no way received in divine matters as to substance, since it [the substance] is in many persons, this name *solus* is not received in divine matters with substantial terms[^13], as the first reason shows.

If, however, it is taken[^14] insofar as it is a *syncategorema*, in this way it deprives [of] association and imports some negation. And thus, since some predicate, both substantial and personal, is precisely said[^15] of a substantial name, in this way it is truly said in divine matters both with respect to a substantial predicate[^16], as when it is said: *God alone creates*, and with respect to a personal one, as when it is said: *God alone is the Father*.

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning *the white*, that it posits its own thing concerning the substantive; it must be said that it is not similar, insofar as this name *solus* is taken syncategorematically; since *whiteness* is an absolute disposition of the subject, whence it absolutely posits its own thing concerning the term, but *solus* by reason of negation [does so] not absolutely; and therefore it does not posit solitude, but precision.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that a substantial term ought to render the locution true for some person; it must be said that the term to which an exclusion is added has a relation to the predicate, and has a relation to the exclusion; and although in respect of the predicate it can have personal supposition, as when it is said: *only a man runs*; nevertheless the rule among the sophists[^17] is that, by comparison to the exclusive word, such a term has *simple* supposition, whence in no way is it permitted to descend [to instances]. And this is what is said in the book *On the Rules of Faith*[^18], that an exclusive word makes exclusion as to the *genus of the thing*, not as to the *thing of the genus*, since [it operates] by reason of the common form, which is the genus of the thing, not by reason of the supposit, which is the thing of the genus.

3. To that which is objected last, that the converse is false; it must be said that that is not its converse; since this: *God alone is the Father*, has the sense of an affirmative, namely *God is the Father*, and this is converted simply; and it has the character[^19] of this negative: *no other than God is the Father*, and this likewise is converted simply; but this is not its converse: *no other than the Father is God*, but rather this: *nothing which is the Father is other than God*. For the same [term], which was placed as subject in the first, ought to be predicated in the second; and so that is plain.

la: Porphyr., *de Praedicab.* c. de Proprio.

en: Porphyry, *On the Predicables*, chapter *On the Proper*.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *sive* pro *sicut*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted *sive* ("or") for *sicut* ("just as").

la: Plures codd. ut *ACFORU ee* omittunt in hac propositione verba *id est*, loco quorum codd. *SY* post *non* ponunt *enim*. Cod. *W* omittit in principio propositionis particulam *solus*, et loco *id est* habet *et*, lectio non spernenda, quam cod. *T* a posteriore manu correctus cum lectione aliorum mss. ita coniungit: *solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater*. Vide infra resp. ad 3. obiect., ubi expositio eadem datur.

en: Several codices such as *ACFORU ee* omit in this proposition the words *id est* ("that is"), in place of which codices *SY*, after *non*, place *enim* ("for"). Cod. *W* omits at the beginning of the proposition the particle *solus*, and in place of *id est* has *et* ("and") — a reading not to be despised, which cod. *T*, corrected by a later hand, joins with the reading of the other manuscripts thus: *solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater*. See below at the response to objection 3, where the same exposition is given.

la: Libr. II. *Elench.* c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo supra ex multis codd. ut *AGHIKRXY aa ee Π* et ed. 1 post *habetur* adiecimus *et*.

en: Book II of the *Sophistical Refutations*, c. 3 (c. 22). — A little above, on the authority of many codices such as *AGHIKRXY aa ee Π* and ed. 1, we have added *et* ("and") after *habetur*.

la: In codd. *VX* additur *enim*[?]; mox in codd. *SY* pro *a* ponitur *ex*.

en: In codices *VX* [the word *enim* (?)] is added; further on, in codices *SY*, in place of *a*, *ex* is put.

la: Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opp. — In hac propositione auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus post *removetur* in Vat. additum *hoc*.

en: Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 4, arg. 1 to the opposite. — In this proposition, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged *hoc* ("this"), added in the Vatican [edition] after *removetur*.

la: Aristot., II. *Prior.* c. 26. (c. 28.) propositio propositioni contraria. — Sensus igitur verborum *et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo* est: propositio huic falsae propositioni: *nihil est Pater*, contraria et vera est: *nonnisi seu solus Deus est Pater*; quod sic patet, si haec: *nihil est Pater* est falsa, ergo haec erit vera: *aliquid est Pater*; ergo vel creatura vel Deus; non creatura seu nihil extra Deum, ut constat; ergo solus Deus. — Paulo ante Vat. praeter fidem multorum mss. ut *AFGHSTXY* etc. et ed. 1 *ergo solus Deus Pater* loco *et: solus Deus est Pater*.

en: Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, c. 26 (c. 28): "a proposition contrary to a proposition." — The sense, therefore, of the words *and it has no instance except in God* is this: the proposition contrary to this false proposition: *nothing is the Father*, and [which is] true, is: *none but* — that is, *only* — *God is the Father*; which is plain thus: if this: *nothing is the Father* is false, therefore this will be true: *something is the Father*; therefore either a creature or God; not a creature, that is, nothing outside God, as is plain; therefore God alone. — A little before, the Vatican [edition], against the authority of many manuscripts such as *AFGHSTXY* etc. and ed. 1, [reads] *ergo solus Deus Pater* in place of *et: solus Deus est Pater*.

la: Libr. IV. *de Trin.* n. 18: *Nobis quoque nec solitarius tantum nec diversus est confitendus*.

en: Book IV *On the Trinity*, n. 18: *To us also [God] is to be confessed neither as merely solitary nor as diverse*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 1. q. I. — Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. *cc*, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1, *solum uni* pro *uni soli*.

en: Cf. above d. 1, q. I. — A little below, the Vatican [edition] with cod. *cc*, but against the other codices and ed. 1, [reads] *solum uni* in place of *uni soli*.

la: Plures codd. ut *BDQS* cum ed. 1 hic et in sequentibus *categorematica* vel *syncategorematica*, prout scil. *solus* se ipso sine additione alterius termini vel tantum iunctus alteri aliquid determinate significat.

en: Several codices such as *BDQS* with ed. 1 [read] here and in what follows *categorematica* or *syncategorematica*, that is, insofar as *solus* by itself without the addition of another term, or only joined to another, signifies something determinately.

la: Paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *absolutum* pro *absolute*.

en: A little below, the Vatican [edition], against nearly all codices and ed. 1, [reads] *absolutum* in place of *absolute*.

la: Vat. cum cod. *cc* interponit *hic*. Mox post primum *quantum* in cod. 1 repetitur *valet*.

en: The Vatican [edition] with cod. *cc* interposes *hic* ("here"). Soon after, after the first *quantum*, in cod. 1 *valet* ("is worth") is repeated.

la: Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *cum terminis*, quae verba minus bene absunt a Vat. et cod. *cc*. Paulo ante cod. *bb* post *quia est* repetit *substantia*, et cod. *V* post *personis* addit *vero*.

en: From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied *cum terminis* ("with terms"), which words, less well, are absent from the Vatican [edition] and cod. *cc*. A little before, cod. *bb*, after *quia est*, repeats *substantia*, and cod. *V*, after *personis*, adds *vero* ("indeed").

la: Cod. *X* *arripitur*.

en: Cod. *X* [reads] *arripitur* ("is seized").

la: Cod. *T* *praedicatur*.

en: Cod. *T* [reads] *praedicatur* ("is predicated").

la: In cod. *V* repetitur *praedicati*. Mox post *Pater* cod. *X* adiicit: *ut est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater*.

en: In cod. *V* the word *praedicati* ("of the predicate") is repeated. Soon after, after *Pater*, cod. *X* adds: *ut est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater* ("as it is that one who is: God alone is the Father").

la: De hoc[?] loquuntur etiam supra d. 1. q. I. in Scholio, ubi et plura invenies de suppositione praedicati et simplici ac de [...][?] — Intellige in sensu bono, scil. homines, qui eruditi et doctores sunt in logica; in eodem sensu occurrit apud S. Thomam, S. p. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3. — Regula, quam adducit S. Doctor, invenitur in Summula Petri Hispani, Tract. de Suppositionibus, in subdivisione suppositionis simplicis, ubi hoc adducit exemplum: «Omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale; ibi iste terminus *hominem*, simplicem habet suppositionem, quia non licet fieri descensum sub ipso; unde non sequitur: *omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale, ergo omne animal praeter hunc hominem est irrationale*» etc. — Paulo infra ed. 1 *confusam immobilem* loco *simplicem*; vide Petrum Hispanum *confusam confusam*[?], cui opponitur *confusa mobilis* seu *distributiva*.

en: On this[?] [the editors] also speak above at d. 1, q. I in the Scholion, where you will find more concerning the supposition of the predicate and *simple* [supposition] and concerning [...][?]. — Understand [*sophistae*] in a good sense, namely men who are learned and doctors in logic; it occurs in the same sense in St. Thomas, *Summa* p. I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3. — The rule which the Holy Doctor adduces is found in the *Summulae* of Peter of Spain, Tract *On Suppositions*, in the subdivision of *simple supposition*, where he adduces this example: «Every animal besides man is irrational; there that term *hominem* has simple supposition, since no descent can be made under it; whence it does not follow: *every animal besides man is irrational, therefore every animal besides this man is irrational*» etc. — A little below, ed. 1 [reads] *confusam immobilem* in place of *simplicem*; see Peter of Spain, *confusam confusam*[?], to which is opposed *confusa mobilis*, that is, *distributiva*.

la: Alanus ab Insulis, in libro: *Theologicae regulae*, reg. 29.

en: Alan of Lille, in the book *Theological Rules*, rule 29.

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 habet *etiam intellectum* pro *et habet rationem*.

en: The Vatican [edition], against the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, has *etiam intellectum* ("also the understanding") in place of *et habet rationem* ("and has the character").

latin_scholion:
**I.** Quaestiones huius distinctionis satis sunt intricatae, sed a theologis illius aetatis post Magistrum Sententiarum in scholis communiter cum magna subtilitate dialectica tractabantur. Serviunt ad maiorem verborum proprietatem quoad adorandum Trinitatis mysterium observandam. Supponit Seraphicus in hac et seqq. qq. plura, quae in antiqua logica de dictionibus exclusivis, de eorum speciebus et de quinque regulis in expositione earum observandis magis subtiliter quam utiliter tradebantur. Sufficiat notare haec pauca.

1. *Dictio exclusiva* est illa, in qua vel subiectum vel praedicatum afficitur particulis exclusivis, ut *tantum*, *solum*, *dumtaxat* etc. Si signum exclusivum afficit subiectum, tunc propositio significat, praedicatum convenire tantum illi subiecto, non autem aliis subiectis, v. g. *tantum homo est risibilis*. Si vero particula exclusiva afficit praedicatum, tunc significat, illud tantummodo praedicatum, ceteris exclusis, huic subiecto convenire, v. g. *superbus non amat nisi se ipsum*.

2. Omnis propositio exclusiva affirmativa exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una affirmat praedicatum de subiecto, altera vero excludit vel omne aliud suppositum a consortio praedicati, vel aliud praedicatum a subiecto. Ita propositio: *solus Deus est Pater*, sic exponitur: *Deus est Pater, et nihil, quod non est Deus, est Pater*. Cfr. hic solut. ad 3.

3. Circa alios terminos exclusivos, ut *tantum*, *dumtaxat*, non est difficultas, quia non habent alium sensum nisi exclusivum. Terminus vero *solus* habet sensum aequivocum. Potest enim intelligi vel categorematice, i. e. ut per se significat aliquid, et tunc *solus* idem est ac *solitarius*; vel syncategorematice, quando ut adiectivum adiunctum est alicui substantivo. In primo sensu non facit propositionem exclusivam nec ullo modo admittitur in divinis. In secundo sensu facit propositionem exclusivam et addi potest termino essentiali (ut *Deus*), qui ponitur ut subiectum respectu praedicati sive essentialis sive personalis, quod soli Deo competit.

4. *Conversio propositionis* est inversio extremorum propositionis, ita ut, retenta ipsius propositionis veritate, ex praedicato fiat subiectum et ex subiecto praedicatum. Huius conver-

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sionis triplex distinguitur species, scil. *simplex*, *per accidens* et *per contrapositionem*. Variae in logica dantur regulae, ut rite fiat haec conversio.

**II.** Ad explicandam solut. ad 2. servire possunt verba S. Thomae (S. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3.): «Ut sophistae dicunt, dictio exclusiva immobilitat terminum, cui adiungitur, ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus pro aliquo suppositorum. Non enim sequitur: *solus homo est animal rationale, mortale, ergo solus Socrates*». — In eadem solutione remanet difficultas, quam movet Brulifor hic, quod in una eademque propositione idem terminus iuxta duplicem respectum, scil. ad exclusionem et ad praedicatum, non possit habere suppositionem simplicem (seu excludentem descensum ad supposita) et suppositionem personalem. Ad hoc dicendum est, quod propositio exclusiva virtualiter continet duas propositiones, ut supra dictum est, et quod S. Bonaventura non dicit, ipsam actu habere suppositionem simplicem et personalem, sed quod possit habere suppositionem personalem, nempe ratione materiae. Quoad terminos suppositionem simplicem et personalem etc. cfr. d. 1. q. I. Scholion.

**III.** In conclusione omnes conveniunt. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 3. a. 2. in fine. — Scot., de hac et tribus seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seqq. qq. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 40. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. collater. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. S. a. 75. q. 8. per totam. — Durand., de hac et tribus seqq. hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et tribus seqq. hic q. unic. — Biel, de hac et tribus seqq. qq. hic q. unic.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The questions of this distinction are sufficiently intricate, but were commonly treated in the schools by the theologians of that age after the Master of the Sentences with great dialectical subtlety. They serve to observe a greater propriety of words in adoring the mystery of the Trinity. The Seraphic [Doctor] presupposes in this and the following questions many things which in the ancient logic concerning *exclusive words*, concerning their species, and concerning the five rules to be observed in their exposition, were handed down with more subtlety than utility. Let it suffice to note these few [points].

1. An *exclusive word* is that in which either the subject or the predicate is affected by exclusive particles, such as *tantum*, *solum*, *dumtaxat*, etc. If the exclusive sign affects the subject, then the proposition signifies that the predicate belongs only to that subject, and not to other subjects, e.g. *only man is risible*. But if the exclusive particle affects the predicate, then it signifies that that predicate alone, the rest excluded, belongs to this subject, e.g. *the proud man loves nothing but himself*.

2. Every affirmative exclusive proposition is expounded by two propositions, one of which affirms the predicate of the subject, and the other excludes either every other supposit from the consort of the predicate, or another predicate from the subject. So the proposition: *God alone is the Father*, is thus expounded: *God is the Father, and nothing which is not God is the Father*. Cf. here the solution to [objection] 3.

3. Concerning the other exclusive terms, such as *tantum*, *dumtaxat*, there is no difficulty, since they have no other sense than the exclusive. But the term *solus* has an equivocal sense. For it can be understood either *categorematically*, i.e. as it signifies something *per se*, and then *solus* is the same as *solitarius*; or *syncategorematically*, when as an adjective it is adjoined to some substantive. In the first sense it does not make an exclusive proposition, nor is it in any way admitted in divine matters. In the second sense it makes an exclusive proposition, and can be added to an essential term (such as *Deus*), which is placed as subject in respect of a predicate either essential or personal, which befits God alone.

4. *Conversion of a proposition* is the inversion of the extremes of the proposition, in such a way that, the truth of the proposition itself being retained, from the predicate becomes the subject and from the subject the predicate. Three species of this conversion are distinguished, namely *simple*, *per accidens*, and *by contraposition*. Various rules are given in logic, that this conversion may be rightly made.

**II.** For explaining the solution to [objection] 2, the words of St. Thomas (*Summa* I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3) can serve: «As the sophists say, an exclusive word immobilizes the term to which it is adjoined, so that no descent under it can be made for any of the supposits. For it does not follow: *only man is a rational, mortal animal, therefore only Socrates*». — In the same solution there remains a difficulty which Brulefer raises here, that in one and the same proposition the same term, according to a twofold relation, namely to the exclusion and to the predicate, cannot have *simple* supposition (that is, [supposition] excluding descent to supposits) and *personal* supposition. To this it must be said that an exclusive proposition virtually contains two propositions, as was said above, and that St. Bonaventure does not say that it actually has simple and personal supposition, but that it can have personal supposition, namely by reason of [its] matter. As to the terms simple and personal supposition, etc., cf. d. 1, q. I, Scholion.

**III.** In the conclusion all agree. — Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 66, m. 3, a. 2, at the end. — Scotus, on this and the three following [questions] in both writings, here q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2; *Summa* I, q. 31, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3; on this and the following questions, *Summa* p. I, tr. 9, q. 40, m. 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. unic., a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st *principium*, q. 3, collateral 1. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following, *Summa* a. 75, q. 8, throughout. — Durandus, on this and the three following, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the three following, here q. unic. — Biel, on this and the three following questions, here q. unic.

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