title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica. Et quod theologica, videtur.

1. *Primae ad Corinthios* decimo tertio[^1]: *Nunc manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec*: igitur ab Apostolo spes numeratur inter virtutes theologicas: si ergo vere et proprie, necesse est, spem reperiri in genere virtutis theologicae.

2. Item, illa virtus est theologica, quae habet finem cardinalium virtutum pro obiecto[^2]; sed spes habet finem omnium virtutum pro obiecto — exspectat enim summam beatitudinem et perfectam remunerationem — ergo est virtus theologica.

3. Item, virtus, quae maxime subservit contemplationi et facit sursum tendere, est virtus theologica:
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sed spes est huiusmodi, quoniam, sicut dicit Apostolus *ad Hebraeos sexto*[^3], *spes incedit usque ad interiora velaminis*: ergo spes est virtus theologica.

4. Item, spirituale aedificium per virtutem theologicam inchoatur, utpote per fidem, et per virtutem theologicam consummatur, utpote per caritatem: ergo per virtutem theologicam habet erigi, quia «eiusdem naturae debet esse medium cum extremis[^4]». Si ergo erigitur per spem, restat, quod spes est virtus theologica.

5. Item, imago *creationis* reformatur per imaginem *recreationis*: si ergo imago *creationis* necessario requirit tres potentias naturales, videtur similiter, quod imago *recreationis* necessario requirat tres virtutes. Ergo si imago habet reformari per virtutes theologicas, necesse est, virtutes theologicas esse tres: sed non est aliam dare praeter fidem et caritatem nisi ipsam spem: ergo spes est virtus theologica[^5].

**Sed contra:** 1. Nulla virtus, circa cuius actum contingit reperire excessum, est virtus theologica, immo potius cardinalis[^6] — quod patet, quia impossibile est nimis credere, impossibile est etiam nimis amare — sed circa actum spei contingit reperire excessum, sicut patet in eo qui praesumit et plus sperat, quam merita sua exigant: ergo videtur, quod spes sit virtus cardinalis, non theologica.

2. Item, virtus, quae est medium duarum malitiarum, est virtus cardinalis[^7], non theologica; sed spes est media inter duas malitias, videlicet inter desperationem et praesumtionem: ergo spem non est reducere ad virtutem theologicam, sed magis ad cardinalem.

3. Item, consuevit multipliciter spes distingui, videlicet spes veniae, spes gratiae et spes gloriae[^8]; sed venia et gratia sunt bona ordinata ad finem, virtus autem cardinalis consistit circa ea quae sunt ad finem: si ergo spes consistit circa talia, spes est virtus cardinalis, non theologica.

4. Item, sustinere et exspectare sunt actus longanimitatis et patientiae; sed «habitus distinguuntur per actus[^9]»: ergo cum exspectare sit proprius actus ipsius spei, longanimitas et spes sunt habitus iidem et in eodem genere virtutis habent reponi. Sed longanimitas reponitur sub genere virtutis cardinalis: ponitur enim et assignatur esse pars fortitudinis: ergo videtur, quod et ipsa spes sit virtus cardinalis.

5. Item, ad fortitudinem cardinalem spectat recte ordinare et fortificare contra affligentia et contra deterrentia; sed spes est huiusmodi, quia facit hominem in tribulatione gaudere et stabilem esse[^10]: ergo videtur, quod spes sit pars fortitudinis cardinalis: ergo non est in genere virtutis theologicae.

### Conclusio.

> *Spes est in genere virtutis theologicae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio spes est in genere virtutis theologicae. — Et ratio huius sumitur ex parte obiecti et ex parte subiecti: ex parte quidem obiecti, quoniam, sicut fides in credendo assentit ipsi Deo ut dictanti vera, sic spes ei innititur ut promittenti magna. Unde sicut obiectum ipsius fidei, quod habet rationem motivi, est quid increatum, quod Deus est, ratione cuius etiam fides ponitur esse in genere virtutis theologicae; sic etiam dicendum est et intelligendum de ipsa spe[^11]. — Sumi etiam potest ratio ex parte subiecti: quia, cum anima secundum superiorem faciem reformari habeat per virtutes theologicas, et spes sit una de virtutibus, faciens ad reformationem imaginis et perfectionem animae secundum partem superiorem, necesse est, spem esse virtutem theologicam. — Unde
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quemadmodum in patria tres erunt dotes secundum tres animae vires, quarum una reformabit et consummabit rationalem, videlicet ipsa visio, alia concupiscibilem, videlicet dilectio, tertia irascibilem, videlicet ipsa perfecta tentio[^1b]; sic et in via necesse est ponere circa virtutes theologicas, quibus dotes habent correspondere.

Et sic tam ex parte subiecti quam ex parte obiecti colligitur, quod spes sub genere virtutis theologicae debet reponi. Theologicae enim virtutes Deum habent pro obiecto, et superiorem partem animae pro subiecto. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod circa actum spei contingit reperire excessum; dicendum, quod circa actum spei nunquam contingit reperire excessum propter nimietatem et intensionem ipsius actus; nemo enim potest nimis confidere in Domino; sed si habet excessum, hoc est propter defectum alicuius conditionis, quae requiritur[^2b] in actu sperandi, utpote si, neglectis meritis, omnino praesumit de misericordia Dei. Sed hoc non facit, ipsam spem esse in genere virtutis cardinalis; quia, quod dicitur virtus theologica differre a cardinali in hoc, quod non est in theologica reperire excessum, sicut in cardinali, intelligitur de illo excessu, qui quidem consistit in actus intensione, non de eo qui est in debitae conditionis omissione. Nam huiusmodi excessus, secundo[^3b] dictus, repugnantiam habet cum omni virtute; primus vero non habet repugnantiam cum virtute theologica, quae habet obiectum infinitum, ita quod nec potest nimis amari nec nimis desiderari; sed repugnantiam habet cum virtute cardinali, cuius obiectum est bonum creatum et finitum et limitatum; ac per hoc exigitur, quod in actu sit modus determinatus, ultra quem si procedat, egreditur limitem sibi secundum determinationem virtutis statutum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes est media duarum malitiarum; dicendum, quod aliqua virtus potest dici esse medium duarum malitiarum dupliciter: aut sicut utriusque eliminativa et destructiva, aut sicut ex utrisque constituta quantum ad ea quae sunt in eis bona. Si sit media sicut constituta, quemadmodum largitas habet aliquid de avaritia[^4b] in hoc, quod tenet tenenda, et aliquid de prodigalitate in hoc, quod dat danda[^5b]; sic est in genere virtutis cardinalis. Si autem sit media solum sicut eliminativa; sic non oportet, eam esse virtutem cardinalem; et hoc modo media est spes inter desperationem et praesumtionem. Liberat enim ab illo duplici malo, sicut fides de Trinitate et Unitate liberat ab errore Arii et ab errore Sabellii[^6b]. Et ideo non cogit illa ratio, quod spes non sit virtus theologica.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spe non tantum speratur gloria, sed etiam gratia et venia; dicendum, quod non determinatur genus vel species ipsius virtutis penes obiectum quodcumque, sed penes illud obiectum, quod habet rationem motivi. Quamvis autem spes versetur circa bona creata, quae exspectat; ratio tamen movens non est aliquod creatum, sed aliqua immensitas[^7b] illius summi Boni increati, cui innititur. Et ideo, quamvis per spem exspectat quis gratiam plenam et veniam perfectam, quia ad ipsam comparatur spes tanquam circa materiam; propter illa non oportet eam reponi in genere virtutis cardinalis, sicut in praecedentibus[^8b] habitum est de fide. — Et si tu obiicias, quod obedientia ponitur esse virtus cardinalis, et etiam latria, quia non tantummodo considerant obiectum increatum, sed etiam aliquid creatum concernunt, videlicet obedientia praeceptum, et latria cultum debitum, ac per hoc, quod ita debeat esse in spe; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia tam latria quam obedientia concernit aliquod creatum tali modo, quod ratione illius respiciunt actum exteriorem[^9b]. Non sic autem est de spe; spes enim solummodo consistit in affectu interiori, qui praecipuam movendi rationem sumit ex parte superiori, videlicet ex parte obiecti increati.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod longanimitatis est exspectare, secundum quod spei; dicendum, quod alia est exspectatio longanimitatis, quae est pars fortitudinis, quam sit expectatio spei. Nam exspectatio spei consistit in quadam protensione ad bona aeterna, quae quidem consurgit ex confidentia, qua anima innititur ipsi Deo ex tota virtute sua[^10b]. Sed exspectatio longanimitatis est, qua anima constantia mentis et robore animi exspectat de omnibus affligentibus et deterrentibus triumphare: et sic actus
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longanimitatis, secundum quod est fortitudinis, differt ab actu spei et quantum ad obiectum circa quod et quantum ad motivum. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si longanimitas est in genere virtutis cardinalis, quod propter hoc virtus spei debeat sub eodem genere reponi.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes fortificat contra affligentia; dicendum, quod aliquis actus potest esse alicuius virtutis tripliciter: vel sicut elicientis, vel sicut imperantis, vel sicut adminiculantis. Fortiter autem perferre terribilia est ipsius virtutis fortitudinis sicut elicientis; sed fidei est sicut imperantis et dictantis, iuxta illud quod dicitur ad *Hebraeos undecimo*[^1c] de viris sanctis, quod *per fidem vicerunt regna et fortes facti sunt in bello*; sed ipsius spei et caritatis est sicut adminiculantis. Amor enim Dei et certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis multum adiuvant virtutem fortitudinis, ut possit omnia mala perferre, iuxta illud beati Gregorii[^2c]: «Spes praemii minuit vim flagelli».

english:
### Question III. *Whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one.*

Thirdly it is asked whether hope is a cardinal virtue or a theological one. And it seems that it is theological.

1. *1 Corinthians* 13[^1]: *Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three*: therefore by the Apostle hope is numbered among the theological virtues: if then truly and properly, it is necessary that hope be found in the genus of a theological virtue.

2. Likewise, that virtue is theological which has the end of the cardinal virtues for its object[^2]; but hope has the end of all the virtues for its object — for it awaits the highest beatitude and the perfect reward — therefore it is a theological virtue.

3. Likewise, the virtue which most of all serves contemplation and makes one tend upward is a theological virtue:
but hope is of this kind, since, as the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 6[^3], *hope enters even to the interior of the veil*: therefore hope is a theological virtue.

4. Likewise, the spiritual edifice is begun through a theological virtue, namely through faith, and is consummated through a theological virtue, namely through charity: therefore it must be raised up through a theological virtue, because «the middle ought to be of the same nature as the extremes[^4]». If then it is raised up through hope, it remains that hope is a theological virtue.

5. Likewise, the image of *creation* is reformed through the image of *re-creation*: if then the image of *creation* necessarily requires three natural powers, it seems likewise that the image of *re-creation* necessarily requires three virtues. Therefore if the image must be reformed through the theological virtues, it is necessary that the theological virtues be three: but there is no other to be given besides faith and charity except hope itself: therefore hope is a theological virtue[^5].

**On the contrary:** 1. No virtue concerning whose act an excess can be found is a theological virtue, but rather a cardinal one[^6] — which is plain, because it is impossible to believe too much, and impossible also to love too much — but concerning the act of hope an excess can be found, as is plain in the one who presumes and hopes for more than his merits demand: therefore it seems that hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

2. Likewise, the virtue which is a mean between two vices is a cardinal virtue[^7], not a theological one; but hope is a mean between two vices, namely between despair and presumption: therefore hope is not to be reduced to a theological virtue, but rather to a cardinal one.

3. Likewise, hope is wont to be distinguished in manifold ways, namely the hope of pardon, the hope of grace, and the hope of glory[^8]; but pardon and grace are goods ordered to the end, whereas a cardinal virtue is concerned with the things that are ordered to the end: if then hope is concerned with such things, hope is a cardinal virtue, not a theological one.

4. Likewise, to endure and to await are acts of longanimity and patience; but «habits are distinguished through their acts[^9]»: therefore since to await is the proper act of hope itself, longanimity and hope are the same habits and must be placed in the same genus of virtue. But longanimity is placed under the genus of cardinal virtue: for it is posited and assigned to be a part of fortitude: therefore it seems that hope too is a cardinal virtue.

5. Likewise, it pertains to cardinal fortitude rightly to order and to strengthen against afflicting things and against deterring things; but hope is of this kind, because it makes a person rejoice in tribulation and be steadfast[^10]: therefore it seems that hope is a part of cardinal fortitude: therefore it is not in the genus of theological virtue.

### Conclusion.

> *Hope is in the genus of theological virtue.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt hope is in the genus of theological virtue. — And the ground of this is taken from the side of the object and from the side of the subject: from the side of the object indeed, because, just as faith in believing assents to God himself as the one dictating things true, so hope leans upon him as the one promising great things. Hence just as the object of faith itself, which has the character of a motive, is something uncreated, which is God, by reason of which faith too is posited to be in the genus of theological virtue; so too must it be said and understood concerning hope itself[^11]. — The ground can also be taken from the side of the subject: because, since the soul according to its higher face must be reformed through the theological virtues, and hope is one of the virtues, contributing to the reformation of the image and the perfecting of the soul according to its higher part, it is necessary that hope be a theological virtue. — Hence
just as in the fatherland there will be three endowments according to the three powers of the soul, of which one will reform and consummate the rational, namely vision itself, another the concupiscible, namely love, the third the irascible, namely perfect holding[^1b]; so too on the way it is necessary to posit them concerning the theological virtues, to which the endowments must correspond.

And thus both from the side of the subject and from the side of the object it is gathered that hope must be placed under the genus of theological virtue. For the theological virtues have God for their object, and the higher part of the soul for their subject. — Therefore the arguments that are for that side must be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that concerning the act of hope an excess can be found; it must be said that concerning the act of hope an excess can never be found by reason of the excessiveness and intensity of the act itself; for no one can trust too much in the Lord; but if it has an excess, this is on account of the defect of some condition which is required[^2b] in the act of hoping, as when, his merits being neglected, one altogether presumes upon the mercy of God. But this does not make hope itself to be in the genus of cardinal virtue; because, as for what is said — that a theological virtue differs from a cardinal one in this, that in the theological no excess can be found, as in the cardinal — this is understood of that excess which consists in the intensity of the act, not of that which lies in the omission of a due condition. For an excess of this kind, said in the second sense[^3b], has a repugnance with every virtue; but the first has no repugnance with a theological virtue, which has an infinite object, so that it can neither be loved too much nor desired too much; but it has a repugnance with a cardinal virtue, whose object is a created and finite and limited good; and on this account it is required that in the act there be a determinate measure, beyond which if it proceed, it goes out from the limit established for it according to the determination of the virtue.

2. To that which is objected, that hope is a mean between two vices; it must be said that some virtue can be said to be a mean of two vices in two ways: either as eliminative and destructive of both, or as constituted out of both as regards the goods that are in them. If it is a mean as constituted, just as liberality has something of avarice[^4b] in this, that it keeps the things to be kept, and something of prodigality in this, that it gives the things to be given[^5b]; thus it is in the genus of cardinal virtue. But if it is a mean only as eliminative; then it is not necessary that it be a cardinal virtue; and in this manner hope is a mean between despair and presumption. For it frees from that twofold evil, just as faith concerning Trinity and Unity frees from the error of Arius and from the error of Sabellius[^6b]. And therefore that argument does not compel one to hold that hope is not a theological virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that by hope not only glory is hoped for, but also grace and pardon; it must be said that the genus or species of a virtue is not determined by any object whatever, but by that object which has the character of a motive. Now although hope is concerned with created goods, which it awaits; nevertheless the moving ground is not anything created, but some immensity[^7b] of that highest uncreated Good on which it leans. And therefore, although through hope one awaits full grace and perfect pardon, because hope is compared to it as to its matter; on account of these it is not necessary to place it in the genus of cardinal virtue, just as in the foregoing[^8b] it was held concerning faith. — And if you object that obedience is posited to be a cardinal virtue, and likewise latria, because they not only consider an uncreated object but also concern something created — namely obedience the precept, and latria the worship due — and on this account it ought so to be with hope; it must be said that the case is not alike, because both latria and obedience concern something created in such a way that by reason of it they regard an exterior act[^9b]. But it is not so with hope; for hope consists only in the interior affection, which takes its chief ground of movement from the higher side, namely from the side of the uncreated object.

4. To that which is objected, that it belongs to longanimity to await, in the way it belongs to hope; it must be said that the awaiting of longanimity, which is a part of fortitude, is other than the awaiting of hope. For the awaiting of hope consists in a certain stretching-out toward eternal goods, which indeed arises from the confidence by which the soul leans upon God himself with its whole strength[^10b]. But the awaiting of longanimity is that by which the soul, with constancy of mind and strength of spirit, awaits to triumph over all afflicting and deterring things: and thus the act
of longanimity, insofar as it is of fortitude, differs from the act of hope both as regards the object about which and as regards the motive. And therefore it does not follow that, if longanimity is in the genus of cardinal virtue, the virtue of hope must on this account be placed under the same genus.

5. To that which is objected, that hope strengthens against afflicting things; it must be said that some act can belong to a virtue in three ways: either as eliciting, or as commanding, or as assisting. Now to bear terrible things bravely belongs to the virtue of fortitude as eliciting; but it belongs to faith as commanding and dictating, according to what is said in *Hebrews* 11[^1c] concerning the holy men, that *by faith they conquered kingdoms and were made strong in war*; but it belongs to hope and charity as assisting. For the love of God and the certain awaiting of future beatitude greatly aid the virtue of fortitude, so that it may be able to bear all evils, according to that saying of blessed Gregory[^2c]: «The hope of reward lessens the force of the lash».

en: *Verse 13.* (1 Cor. 13:13.) — This is p. 560, footer n. 9.

la: Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1, praecipue ad 3. Ibid. ad 4. videsis de maiori arg. seq. — (P. 560, n. 10.)

en: Cf. below, d. 33, q. 1, especially ad 3. There, ad 4, see on the major of the following argument. — (P. 560, n. 10.)

la: Secundum Aristot. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 7. — Paulo superius pro *utpote per caritatem*, quod habent codd. A K, in aliis *ut per caritatem*. Paulo inferius pro *erigitur* Vat. *erigit.* — (P. 561, n. 2.)

en: According to Aristotle. Cf. above, p. 470, note 7. — A little above, for *utpote per caritatem* ("namely through charity"), which codd. A K have, others read *ut per caritatem*. A little below, for *erigitur* ("is raised up") the Vatican edition reads *erigit*. — (P. 561, n. 2.)

la: Principia huius arg. vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. n. 1. q. 1, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 2. q. 3. — (P. 561, n. 3.)

en: For the principles of this argument see I Sent., d. 3, p. II, n. 1, q. 1, and II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 3. — (P. 561, n. 3.)

la: Cfr. supra pag. 217, nota 2, et tom. II. pag. 671, nota 9. — Minor insinuatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius ante *nimis amare* edd. cum nonnullis codd. omittunt *etiam.* — (P. 561, n. 4.)

en: Cf. above, p. 217, note 2, and tom. II, p. 671, note 9. — The minor is intimated here in the Master's text, c. 1. — A little below, before *nimis amare* ("to love too much"), the editions, with some codices, omit *etiam.* — (P. 561, n. 4.)

la: Vide Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. seqq. — Mox pro *media* cod. V *medium.* — (P. 561, n. 5.)

en: See Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 6 ff. — Soon, for *media* cod. V reads *medium.* — (P. 561, n. 5.)

la: August., *Enarrat. in Ps.* 118. serm. 15. n. 2: *Sed aeternorum est spes ista praemiorum; est et alia spes, quae in humilitate tribulationis plurimum consolatur, quae Sanctis data est in verbo Dei adiutorium gratiae pollicentis, ne quisque deficiat* etc. Bernard., *Serm.* 45. *de Diversis* (alias I. ex Parvis), n. 5: *Est igitur fides alia praeceptorum, alia signorum, alia promissorum, id est, qua credimus in Deum, qua credimus Deum, qua credimus Deo... Similiter quoque spes triplex est et procedit de praedicta triplici fide. Nam de fide praeceptorum oritur spes veniae, de fide signorum spes gratiae, de fide promissorum spes gloriae. Caritas itidem ternario numero colligitur* de corde puro et de conscientia bona et fide non ficta (1 Tim. 1, 5). *Puritatem debemus proximo, conscientiam nobis, fidem Deo.* — Pro *multipliciter* edd. cum pluribus codd. *multiplex.* — (P. 561, n. 6.)

en: Augustine, *Expositions on Ps.* 118, serm. 15, n. 2: *But this hope is of eternal rewards; there is also another hope, which in the lowliness of tribulation consoles greatly, which was given to the saints in the word of God as an aid of the grace that promises, lest anyone fail*, etc. Bernard, *Sermon* 45 *on Diverse Subjects* (otherwise I from the Lesser), n. 5: *There is therefore one faith of precepts, another of signs, another of promises, that is, by which we believe in God, by which we believe God to exist, by which we believe God... Likewise too hope is threefold and proceeds from the aforesaid threefold faith. For from the faith of precepts arises the hope of pardon, from the faith of signs the hope of grace, from the faith of promises the hope of glory. Charity likewise is gathered in a threefold number* from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith (1 Tim. 1:5). *Purity we owe to our neighbor, conscience to ourselves, faith to God.* — For *multipliciter* the editions with several codices read *multiplex.* — (P. 561, n. 6.)

la: Secundum Aristot. Cfr. supra pag. 470, nota 8. in fine. — Duo sunt actus principales fortitudinis, scil. aggredi et sustinere. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 7: «Qui igitur ea quae oportet, et cuius causa oportet, et ut oportet, sustinet ac timet et simili etiam modo confidit, fortis est; quippe cum pro dignitate, et sicut ratio praescribit, fortis vir et patiatur et agat... confidere enim bene sperantis hominis est». Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 54: *Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio* [aggredi] *et laborum perpessio* [sustinere]. *Eius partes* [integrales]: *magnificentia, fidentia* [haec duo respiciunt actum aggrediendi], *patientia, perseverantia* [pro actu sustinendi]... *Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa, rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna* [qua notione significatur longanimitas, de quo vide S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 136. a. 5.] *perpessio.* — (P. 561, n. 7.)

en: According to Aristotle. Cf. above, p. 470, note 8, at the end. — There are two principal acts of fortitude, namely to attack and to endure. Aristotle, *Ethics* III, c. 7: «He therefore who endures and fears the things that one ought, and for the cause one ought, and as one ought, and likewise has confidence, is brave; since indeed according to worth, and as reason prescribes, the brave man both suffers and acts... for to be confident belongs to the man of good hope». Cicero, *Rhetoric* II, c. 54: *Fortitude is the considered undertaking of dangers* [to attack] *and the bearing of labors* [to endure]. *Its parts* [integral]: *magnificence, confidence* [these two regard the act of attacking], *patience, perseverance* [for the act of enduring]... *Patience is, for the sake of honor or utility, the voluntary and lasting endurance of arduous and difficult things* [by which notion is signified longanimity, on which see S. Thomas, S. II-II, q. 136, a. 5]. — (P. 561, n. 7.)

la: Rom. 12, 12: *Spe gaudentes.* Col. 1, 23: *Si tamen permanetis in fide fundati et stabiles et immobiles a spe Evangelii* etc. — (P. 561, n. 8.)

en: Rom. 12:12: *Rejoicing in hope.* Col. 1:23: *If indeed you continue in the faith, grounded and steadfast and immovable from the hope of the Gospel*, etc. — (P. 561, n. 8.)

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. — De ratione seq. cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 3. — (P. 561, n. 9.)

en: Cf. the preceding question, in the body. — On the reasoning of the following [reply], cf. below, d. 33, q. 1, ad 3. — (P. 561, n. 9.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 562 (Conclusio onward) and p. 563. The Latin and English bodies reuse `[^1]`, `[^2]` … for those pages; the entries below resolve them in page order.

la: Vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 5. — Inferius pro *debet reponi* cod. V *habet reponi.* — (P. 562, n. 1.)

en: See IV Sent., d. 49, p. I, q. 5. — Below, for *debet reponi* ("must be placed") cod. V reads *habet reponi.* — (P. 562, n. 1.)

la: Cod. K *quae reperitur,* cod. V *qui reperitur.* — (P. 562, n. 2.)

en: Cod. K reads *quae reperitur,* cod. V *qui reperitur.* — (P. 562, n. 2.)

la: Vat. adiicit *modo.* — (P. 562, n. 3.)

en: The Vatican edition adds *modo.* — (P. 562, n. 3.)

la: Cfr. infra d. 27. a. 2. q. 5. in corp. — Paulo superius pro *exigitur* cod. A *exegi,* et dein cum cod. K *procedit* pro *procedat.* — (P. 562, n. 4.)

en: Cf. below, d. 27, a. 2, q. 5, in the body. — A little above, for *exigitur* ("is required") cod. A reads *exegi*, and then with cod. K *procedit* for *procedat.* — (P. 562, n. 4.)

la: Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 7: *Circa donationem acceptionemque pecuniarum mediocritas est liberalitas; excessus et defectus prodigalitas et illiberalitas seu avaritia, in quibus contrario modo excedunt et deficiunt homines. Prodigus enim in largiendo excedit, in accipiendo deficit; avarus contra excedit in accipiendo, in dando deficit.* Cfr. ibid. IV. c. 1. seqq. — Pro *de prodigalitate* edd. *de largitate.* — (P. 562, n. 5.)

en: Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 7: *Concerning the giving and receiving of money, the mean is liberality; the excess and the defect are prodigality and illiberality or avarice, in which men exceed and fall short in a contrary manner. For the prodigal exceeds in giving, falls short in receiving; the avaricious on the contrary exceeds in receiving, falls short in giving.* Cf. ibid. IV, c. 1 ff. — For *de prodigalitate* the editions read *de largitate.* — (P. 562, n. 5.)

la: Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. in fine corp. — (P. 562, n. 6.)

en: Cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, at the end of the body. — (P. 562, n. 6.)

la: Verbi gratia: immensa potentia, immensa clementia etc. — Paulo superius post *vel species ipsius virtutis* codd. A K minus bene addunt *cardinalis.* — (P. 562, n. 7.)

en: For example: immense power, immense clemency, etc. — A little above, after *vel species ipsius virtutis* ("or species of the virtue itself") codd. A K less well add *cardinalis.* — (P. 562, n. 7.)

la: Dist. 24. a. 1. q. 2. — De obedientia cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 37. per totam; de latria vide supra d. 9. a. 2. q. 3. — Mox pro *obedientia ponitur* cdd. *obedientia potest,* et aliquanto inferius pro *concernit* codd. H Z *concernunt.* Deinde circa finem solut. pro *qui praecipuam movendi rationem* edd. *quae praecipuam modificandi rationem.* — (P. 562, n. 8.)

en: Dist. 24, a. 1, q. 2. — On obedience cf. below, d. 33, q. 1, ad 1, and d. 37 throughout; on latria see above, d. 9, a. 2, q. 3. — Soon, for *obedientia ponitur* the codices read *obedientia potest,* and somewhat below, for *concernit* codd. H Z read *concernunt.* Then near the end of the solution, for *qui praecipuam movendi rationem* the editions read *quae praecipuam modificandi rationem.* — (P. 562, n. 8.)

la: Scil. ut obiectum materiale, non ut formale; nec ut dicit habitum, de quo cfr. II. Sent. d. 27. dub. 3. — (P. 562, n. 9.)

en: Namely as the material object, not as the formal; nor as it denotes the habit, on which cf. II Sent., d. 27, dub. 3. — (P. 562, n. 9.)

la: Respicitur illud Marc. 12, 30: *Et diliges Dominum Deum tuum... ex tota virtute tua.* — (P. 562, n. 10.)

en: Reference is to that of Mark 12:30: *And thou shalt love the Lord thy God... with thy whole strength.* — (P. 562, n. 10.) The body markers `[^1]` and `[^2]` on p. 563 (the conclusion of reply-5) resolve to the two p. 563 footers below.

la: Hebr. 11, 33-34: *per fidem vicerunt regna... fortes facti sunt in bello.* — (P. 563, n. 1.)

en: Hebr. 11:33–34: *by faith they conquered kingdoms... were made strong in war.* — (P. 563, n. 1.)

la: Gregor., *Homil.* — «Spes praemii minuit vim flagelli». — (P. 563, n. 2.)

en: Gregory, *Homily* — «The hope of reward lessens the force of the lash». — (P. 563, n. 2.)

latin_scholion:
**I.** Responsio ad hanc et seq. quaestionem non est controversiae exposita. Observatione digna est secunda ratio (hic in corp. et Fundam. 5.), sumta ex parte subiecti secundum superiorem faciem animae, quae etiam in *Breviloq.* p. V. c. 4. typt ponitur. — Qua ratione aliquis possit aliquatenus sperare in homine, docetur I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 9, et IV. Sent. d. 5. dub. 1, et consentit S. Thom., s. II. II. q. 17. a. 4. — Argg. 1. et 2. ad oppos. eodem modo solvuntur a S. Thom. (S. I. II. q. 64. a. 4, et II. II. q. 17. a. 5. ad 1.), scilicet quod spes non habeat infinitum et extremum ex parte principalis et proprii obiecti, sed tantum per accidens ex parte modi, quo fit actus, sive ut dicit S. Bonav., propter defectum alicuius conditionis, nempe ex parte subiecti sperantis. Aliis verbis idem dicit Scotus (hic q. unica n. 24.).

De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; s. II. II. q. 17. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

**II.** Ad seq. quaestionem solvendam serviunt eadem principia, quae de fide informi, supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1-4, applicata sunt. — De solutione ad 1. cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2.

De hac (4.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., s. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2, et tangitur in S. loc. cit. a. 5. ad 1. 2. 3. — D. Albert., hic a. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The response to this and the following question is not set forth as controverted. Worthy of note is the second ground (here in the body and in Fundamentum 5), taken from the side of the subject according to the higher face of the soul, which is also set down in the *Breviloquium* p. V, c. 4. — By what ground someone can in some measure hope in a man is taught in I Sent., d. 1, dub. 9, and IV Sent., d. 5, dub. 1, and S. Thomas agrees, S. II-II, q. 17, a. 4. — Arguments 1 and 2 to the contrary are solved in the same way by S. Thomas (S. I-II, q. 64, a. 4, and II-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 1), namely that hope does not have the infinite and the extreme from the side of its principal and proper object, but only per accidens from the side of the mode by which the act comes about, or as S. Bonaventure says, on account of the defect of some condition, namely from the side of the one hoping. Scotus says the same in other words (here, the single question, n. 24).

On this question: S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; S. II-II, q. 17, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2, little-question 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

**II.** For solving the following question the same principles serve which were applied concerning unformed faith above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1–4. — On the solution to objection 1, cf. below, a. 2, q. 2.

On this (fourth) question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III, q. 65, m. 1, 2. — S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 4, little-question 2, and it is touched on in S. at the cited place, a. 5, ad 1, 2, 3. — D. Albert, here a. 5. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here the single question.

---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 38959–39148), verified verbatim against vol3 PDF column bands p.560–563 (pdf 582–585; offset pdf = printed + 22). Fresh literal English translation. Scholion (I–II) present on p.563.
- **Page span / split map:** Opener + arg. 1 on p.560-L bottom (below q2's Ad-replies); args 2–3 head on p.560-R bottom. Arg. 3 tail + args 4–5 + *Sed contra* 1–3 on p.561-L; *sed contra* 3 tail + 4–5 + Conclusio + Respondeo on p.561-R. Respondeo *Corollarium* tail + Ad 1–2 on p.562-L; Ad 2 tail + Ad 3 + Ad 4 on p.562-R. Ad 4 tail + Ad 5 + Scholion on p.563-L/R (q4 opener follows below on p.563-L).
- **Apparatus (23 entries):** p.560 footers n.9 (*Vers. 13*) + n.10 (*Cfr. infra d.33*) — **hand-off picked up from q2** (q2 took p.560 n.1–8); p.561 footers n.1–9 (single per-page sequence); p.562 footers n.1–10; p.563 footers n.1 (Hebr.11) + n.2 (Gregorii). The body reuses low marker numbers (`[^1]`…) for each page's restart — the Apparatus section resolves them in page order with `(P. NNN, n. N.)` tags.
- **J4 apparatus-label fix (2026-07-17):** the old "Shared-marker note" above (now removed) was wrong — it claimed p.561 n.7 and n.9 shared body marker `[^9]`, but the two are distinct footers with distinct anchors. Root cause: p.561's 9-footer sequence (n.1–9) had been mis-transcribed against the body — arg.4 (`«...cum extremis»`) was missing its anchor entirely (real footer n.2, on *utpote per caritatem*/*erigitur* variants), and every anchor from arg.5 onward was off by one page-local number, with the Respondeo's own anchor doubled onto marker 9 instead of carrying the true n.9 (*Cfr. quaest. praeced. in corp. — De ratione seq. cfr. infra d. 33. q. 1. ad 3.*), which had never been transcribed as its own def. Corrected by direct read of PDF vol3 pp.561 (450dpi, colcrop split 1660) — printed superscripts run ¹...⁹ in strict reading order (arg.3=¹, arg.4=²[new], arg.5=³, SC1=⁴, SC2=⁵, SC3=⁶, SC4=⁷, SC5=⁸, Respondeo=⁹), directly confirmed against each footer's own content (e.g. footer 2's "*utpote per caritatem*"/"*erigitur*" phrases literally quoted from arg.4; footer 6's "*nimis amare*" literally quoted from Sed-contra 1; footer 10's "*Spe gaudentes*"/"*stabiles*" literally quoted from Sed-contra 5). Fix: added `[^4]` anchor to arg.4 (La+En, mirrored); relabeled arg.5-end `[^4]`→`[^5]`, SC1 `[^5]`→`[^6]`, SC2 `[^6]`→`[^7]`, SC3 `[^7]`→`[^8]`, SC4 `[^8]`→`[^9]`, SC5 `[^9]`→`[^10]`, Respondeo `[^9]`→`[^11]`; added new apparatus entry `[^11]` (p.561 n.9, previously untranscribed) and removed the erroneous appended editorial sentence from the old `[^9]` def (it contained a raw `[^9]` token inside apparatus prose — a known live-footnote-hijack bug per the corpus style rule). Auto-relabel tool (`tools/fix-apparatus-labels.py --apply`) then mechanically converted p.562/p.563 groups to the `Nb`/`Nc` suffix scheme once the p.560–561 group's body partition proved consistent with its def group. Verified: 23 defs = 23 Latin anchors = 23 English anchors, 0 dup, 0 orphan.
- **Scholion:** PRESENT (I–II), printed on p.563 after Ad 5, before the q4 opener. (Unlike q2, which deferred to q1's scholion, q3 carries its own.) Body-then-scholion order preserved per the `### Scholion`-last parser rule.
- **Alignment:** opener reads *Tertio quaeritur, utrum spes sit virtus cardinalis, an theologica* (raw 38962) — matches the title *cardinalis an theologica*. CONFIRMED, not misaligned. q4 opener (*Quarto quaeritur, utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata*) at raw line 39153 / p.563-L sets the lower boundary.
- **No [?] flags.**


site: bonaventure

collection: Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word

title: Dist. 26, Art. 1, Q. 4

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 563 -->

### Quaestio IV. *Utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata.*

Quarto quaeritur, utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata. Et quod semper formata, videtur:

1. *Primo* per definitionem spei[^1]: « Spes est certa exspectatio futurae beatitudinis proveniens ex gratia et meritis »; sed impossibile est, definitum separari a definientibus: ergo impossibile est, spem separari a meritis et gratia. Sed quando cum his est, semper est formata: ergo impossibile est, spem virtutem esse informem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per illud quod dicit Magister in littera[^2]: « Sine meritis aliquid sperare non spes, sed praesumtio dici potest »: sed praesumtio est vitium oppositum spei: ergo meritis absentibus, immediate subintrat vitium ipsi spei oppositum. Sed vitium oppositum virtuti non tantum excludit eam quantum ad eius *formale*, sed etiam quantum ad *habitum substratum*: ergo videtur, absentibus meritis, nihil remaneat de virtute spei: ergo non potest fieri informis.

3. Item, fides consistit partim in *affectu*, partim in *intellectu*, caritas autem consistit simpliciter in *affectu*[^3]; sed facta deordinatione in *affectu* per peccatum, simpliciter tollitur caritas, quamvis non simpliciter tollatur fides, cum aliquid habeat ex parte intellectus — unde caritas non potest esse informis, quemadmodum fides potest esse informis — ergo si spes se totaliter tenet ex parte *affectus*, sicut et caritas, videtur etc.

4. Item, virtus fidei tunc est formata, quando non tantum credit *Deo*, sed etiam *in Deum* — quando enim credulitas iuncta est cum tendentia, tunc fides est virtus formata[^4] — sed impossibile est, quod aliquis speret, quin tendat in rem speratam — nam ipsum sperare tendere est — ergo videtur, quod spes semper sit virtus formata.

<!-- page 564 -->

**Sed contra:** 1. Augustinus in libro *de Vera Innocentia*[^5]: « Cum ceterae virtutes sint bonis et malis communes, dilectio Dei et proximi proprie bonorum est atque piorum »: ergo virtus spei potest esse communis bonis et malis; sed mali non habent virtutem *cum* gratia, sed *sine*; et tales sunt virtutes informes: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut se habet fides formata ad spem formatam, ita se habet fides informis ad spem informem; sed fides formata generat spem formatam: ergo fides informis generat spem informem[^6].

3. Item, sicut spes consurgit ex fide praemiorum, sic timor consurgit ex fide suppliciorum; sed timor potest esse informis et formatus[^7]: ergo et spes.

4. Item, multi sunt peccatores, qui sperant, se adhuc acturos poenitentiam et assecuturos veniam et perventuros ad gloriam; constat, quod illud non est malum, immo potius ordinat ad bonum et excludit malum, videlicet desperationem; sed si hoc esset cum gratia, esset actus virtutis formatae: ergo cum sine gratia possit illud remanere, ut aliquis per merita speret se perventurum ad gloriam; videtur, quod ipsa virtus spei possit esse informis[^8].

### Conclusio.

> Virtus spei potest esse informis.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod absque dubio virtus spei potest esse informis. — Potest enim aliquis sperare vitam aeternam sine gratia gratum faciente, sicut manifeste apparet. Et iterum, ille actus sperandi ab aliquo habitu procedit, qui quidem habitus bonus est et tenet etiam quodam modo rationem virtutis, pro eo quod potentiam, quam perficit, quodam modo *rectificat* et *vigorat*. Rectificat quidem, dum aliquam inclinationem et ordinem[^9] tribuit ad gloriam tanquam ad finem ultimum, ubi standum et in quo quiescendum. Vigorat etiam in hoc, quod elevat potentiam ad aeterna bona exspectanda et quandam stabilitatem ei tribuit, ne per desperationem succumbat. Et ideo, sicut *fides* absque caritate virtus informis est, quia tribuit animae quandam *rectitudinem* et *vigorem*, qui compleri habet et perfici per gratiae infusionem; sic intelligendum est et circa ipsam *spem*. Unde et cetera, quae dicta sunt de fide informi[^10], possunt spei

<!-- page 565 -->

informi applicari. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, spei virtutem posse fieri informem.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod spes procedit ex meritis; dicendum, quod *quadrupliciter* potest aliquis exire in actum sperandi. Aut enim sperat habendo merita in *proposito* et in *radice* et in *effectu*, sicut homo iustus, qui diu Deo servivit. Aut sperat habendo merita in *proposito* et in *radice*, non tamen in *effectu*, sicut ille qui ante bonum usum virtutum, postquam suscepit gratiam, exspectat aeternam beatitudinem. Aut sperat habendo merita in *proposito* tantum, non in *radice* nec in *effectu*, sicut ille qui peccator est, qui proponit multa bona facere et per illa salvari. Aut sperat non habendo merita nec in *effectu* nec in *radice* nec in *proposito*, sicut ille qui faciendo mala et in malis proponens perseverare, per solam Dei misericordiam credit, se assecuturum gloriam, neglecta divina iustitia. *Primus* actus est spei formatae et iam exercitatae; *secundus* actus est spei formatae et primo infusae; *tertius* actus est spei informis; et *quartus* est ipsius praesumtionis[^11]. Cum ergo dicitur, quod spes procedit ex gratia et meritis; dicendum, quod aut definitur ibi *spes*, prout est virtus *formata*, et sic nulla est obiectio de spe informi; aut si definitur ibi *spes generaliter*, secundum quod est virtus, dicitur procedere ex gratia et meritis, quae quidem vel habentur in *re*, vel habentur in *proposito*; et sic non est instantia de spe informi.

2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, iam patet responsio per illud quod nunc dictum est. Quod enim dicit Magister, quod *sperare sine meritis* est *praesumere*; hoc intelligit, quando aliquis sperat sine meritis non solum in *re*, sed etiam in *proposito*; et hoc modo sperare non pertinet ad spem informem, sed ad praesumtionem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides ideo potest fieri informis, quia habet aliquid ex parte intellectus et aliquid ex parte affectus; dicendum, quod ista non est *tota* ratio, sed haec est ratio, quia habitus *fidei* habet aliquam rectitudinem et vigorem in hoc, quod facit credere omnia credibilia et excludit errorem et infidelitatem, qui quidem vigor potest esse absque gratia gratum faciente: et hoc est reperire in *spe*, quae facit *vitare* praesumtionem et desperationem et *exspectare* omnia exspectanda. Et quia ista ratio reperitur communis utrobique, ideo potest spes esse informis, sicut et ipsa fides; secus autem est de caritate, sicut infra[^12] videbitur suo loco. Ideo ratio non concludebat, quia non-causam accipiebat pro causa.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spes semper habet secum adiunctam tendentiam; dicendum, quod tendentia duplex est. Quaedam enim est tendentia *plena*; et ista est a gratia operante et cooperante[^13], et haec facit, virtutem esse formatam. Quaedam autem est tendentia *exilis* et *semiplena*, sicut dicitur de pigro, quod *vult et non vult piger*[^14]. Et ista quidem tendentia potest dare aliquam *rectitudinem* et *vigorem* ipsi voluntati et sortitur nomen virtutis *generaliter acceptae*, non virtutis *gratuitae*; et ideo tenet rationem virtutis informis, non rationem virtutis formatae. Cum autem dicitur, quod tendentia in Deum facit credulitatem esse formatam; hoc intelligitur de tendentia, quae est a voluntate *plenaria*. Haec autem non potest esse nec in spe nec in fide sine gratia.

english:
### Question IV. *Whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether the virtue of hope is sometimes unformed, or is always formed. And that it is always formed, it seems:

1. *First*, through the definition of hope[^1]: « Hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude proceeding from grace and merits »; but it is impossible for the thing defined to be separated from the defining terms: therefore it is impossible for hope to be separated from merits and grace. But when it is with these, it is always formed: therefore it is impossible for the virtue of hope to be unformed.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown through that which the Master says in the text[^2]: « To hope for anything without merits cannot be called hope, but presumption »: but presumption is a vice opposed to hope: therefore, with merits absent, the vice opposed to hope itself immediately enters in. But a vice opposed to a virtue excludes it not only as to its *formal element*, but also as to the *underlying habit*: therefore it seems that, with merits absent, nothing remains of the virtue of hope: therefore it cannot become unformed.

3. Likewise, faith consists partly in the *affection*, partly in the *intellect*, but charity consists simply in the *affection*[^3]; but when disorder is brought about in the *affection* through sin, charity is simply taken away, although faith is not simply taken away, since it has something on the side of the intellect — whence charity cannot be unformed, just as faith can be unformed — therefore if hope holds itself wholly on the side of the *affection*, just as charity does, it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, the virtue of faith is then formed, when it not only believes *God*, but also believes *into God* — for when belief is joined with a tending, then faith is a formed virtue[^4] — but it is impossible that anyone should hope without tending toward the thing hoped for — for to hope itself is to tend — therefore it seems that hope is always a formed virtue.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *On True Innocence*[^5]: « Since the other virtues are common to the good and the evil, the love of God and of neighbor properly belongs to the good and the pious »: therefore the virtue of hope can be common to the good and the evil; but the evil do not have virtue *with* grace, but *without*; and such are unformed virtues: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, as formed faith stands to formed hope, so unformed faith stands to unformed hope; but formed faith generates formed hope: therefore unformed faith generates unformed hope[^6].

3. Likewise, as hope arises from faith in rewards, so fear arises from faith in punishments; but fear can be unformed and formed[^7]: therefore hope also.

4. Likewise, there are many sinners who hope that they will yet do penance and obtain pardon and arrive at glory; it is evident that this is not evil, but rather is ordered toward the good and excludes evil, namely despair; but if this were with grace, it would be an act of a formed virtue: therefore, since without grace it can remain that someone, through merits, should hope to arrive at glory; it seems that the virtue of hope itself can be unformed[^8].

### Conclusion.

> The virtue of hope can be unformed.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the virtue of hope can be unformed. — For someone can hope for eternal life without grace that makes pleasing, as manifestly appears. And again, that act of hoping proceeds from some habit, which habit indeed is good and also holds in some way the character of a virtue, for the reason that it in some way *rectifies* and *invigorates* the power which it perfects. It rectifies indeed, while it bestows some inclination and order[^9] toward glory as toward the ultimate end, where one must stand and in which one must rest. It also invigorates in this, that it elevates the power for the expecting of eternal goods and bestows on it a certain stability, lest it succumb through despair. And therefore, just as *faith* without charity is an unformed virtue, because it bestows on the soul a certain *rectitude* and *vigor* which has to be completed and perfected through the infusion of grace; so it must be understood also concerning *hope* itself. Whence also the other things which have been said of unformed faith[^10] can

be applied to unformed hope. — The reasons therefore showing that the virtue of hope can become unformed must be conceded.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary, that hope proceeds from merits; it must be said that in *four ways* someone can go forth into the act of hoping. For either he hopes having merits in *purpose* and in *root* and in *effect*, like the just man who has long served God. Or he hopes having merits in *purpose* and in *root*, but not in *effect*, like the one who, before the good use of the virtues, after he has received grace, awaits eternal beatitude. Or he hopes having merits in *purpose* only, not in *root* nor in *effect*, like the one who is a sinner, who purposes to do many good things and to be saved through them. Or he hopes having merits neither in *effect* nor in *root* nor in *purpose*, like the one who, doing evil things and purposing to persevere in evils, believes through God's mercy alone that he will obtain glory, with divine justice disregarded. The *first* act is of hope formed and already exercised; the *second* act is of hope formed and first infused; the *third* act is of unformed hope; and the *fourth* is of presumption itself[^11]. When therefore it is said that hope proceeds from grace and merits; it must be said that either *hope* is there defined insofar as it is a *formed* virtue, and thus there is no objection concerning unformed hope; or if *hope* is there defined *generally*, insofar as it is a virtue, it is said to proceed from grace and merits, which indeed are had either in *reality* or are had in *purpose*; and thus there is no counter-instance concerning unformed hope.

2. To that which is objected in the second place, the response is now clear through that which has just been said. For as to what the Master says, that *to hope without merits* is *to presume*; he understands this when someone hopes without merits not only in *reality*, but also in *purpose*; and to hope in this way does not pertain to unformed hope, but to presumption.

3. To that which is objected, that faith can therefore become unformed because it has something on the side of the intellect and something on the side of the affection; it must be said that this is not the *whole* ground, but this is the ground, that the habit of *faith* has some rectitude and vigor in this, that it makes one believe all things believable and excludes error and unbelief, which vigor indeed can be without grace that makes pleasing: and this is to be found in *hope*, which makes one *avoid* presumption and despair and *await* all things to be awaited. And because this ground is found common on both sides, therefore hope can be unformed, just as faith itself; but it is otherwise concerning charity, as will be seen below[^12] in its proper place. Therefore the argument did not conclude, because it took a non-cause for a cause.

4. To that which is objected, that hope always has joined with it a tending; it must be said that tending is twofold. For one kind is *full* tending; and this is from operating and cooperating grace[^13], and this makes the virtue to be formed. But another kind is *slight* and *half-full* tending, as is said of the sluggard, that *the sluggard wills and wills not*[^14]. And this tending indeed can give some *rectitude* and *vigor* to the will itself and obtains the name of virtue *generally taken*, not of *gratuitous* virtue; and therefore it holds the character of an unformed virtue, not the character of a formed virtue. But when it is said that the tending into God makes belief to be formed; this is understood of the tending which is from a *full* will. But this can be neither in hope nor in faith without grace.

la: Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1, et in IV. dist. 2. — Subinde in minori pro *definientibus* [scil. partibus] codd. A B V et edd. 1, 2 *definitionibus*, cod. N *definitione* [in Supplemento Summae Alex. Hal. collat. 56. a. 1: *impossibile est, definitionem separari a definito*]. De ipsa minori cfr. Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 1. — Paulo superius post *Et quod* edd. cum paucis codd. interserunt *sit.* — (P. 563, n. 3.)

en: Here in the text of the Master, c. 1, and in IV Sent., dist. 2. — Then in the minor, for *definientibus* [namely the parts] codd. A B V and edd. 1, 2 read *definitionibus*, cod. N *definitione* [in the Supplement to the Summa of Alexander of Hales, collation 56, a. 1: *it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined*]. On the minor itself cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, c. 1. — A little above, after *Et quod* the editions, with a few codices, insert *sit.* — (P. 563, n. 3.)

la: Hic c. 1. — Inferius pro *eius formale* edd. *eius formam.* — (P. 563, n. 4.)

en: Here, c. 1. — Below, for *eius formale* ("its formal element") the editions read *eius formam* ("its form"). — (P. 563, n. 4.)

la: Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. circa finem corp. Ibid. q. 4. ostenditur, caritatem non posse esse informem. De fide informi vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Quod spes se teneat ex parte affectus, docetur hic a. 2. q. 5. — (P. 563, n. 5.)

en: Cf. above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and below, d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, near the end of the body. There, q. 4, it is shown that charity cannot be unformed. On unformed faith see above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — That hope holds itself on the side of the affection is taught here, a. 2, q. 5. — (P. 563, n. 5.)

la: Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 4, et Comment. dub. 3. — (P. 563, n. 6.)

en: See above, the text of the Master, d. XXIII, c. 4, and the Commentary, dub. 3. — (P. 563, n. 6.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 564 (*Sed contra* onward). The body markers `[^5]`–`[^11]` resolve to p.564 footers n.1–7.

la: Num. 7. Cfr. supra pag. 487, nota 1. — Circa finem arg. post *sed sine* codd. F T supplent *gratia.* — (P. 564, n. 1.)

en: N. 7. Cf. above, p. 487, note 1. — Near the end of the argument, after *sed sine* codd. F T supply *gratia.* — (P. 564, n. 1.)

la: Vide verba Bernardi, supra pag. 561, nota 6. — (P. 564, n. 2.)

en: See the words of Bernard, above, p. 561, note 6. — (P. 564, n. 2.)

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIV. c. 1. seqq., et Comment. p. II. per totam. — (P. 564, n. 3.)

en: Cf. below, the text of the Master, d. XXXIV, c. 1 ff., and the Commentary, pars II, throughout. — (P. 564, n. 3.)

en: See Augustine, *Enchiridion* c. 117, n. 31. — (P. 564, n. 4.)

la: Edd. *ordinationem et inclinationem*; sed codd. H K *inclinationem et ordinationem.* — (P. 564, n. 5.)

en: The editions read *ordinationem et inclinationem* ("ordering and inclination"); but codd. H K read *inclinationem et ordinationem* ("inclination and ordering"). — (P. 564, n. 5.)

la: Supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo superius pro *rectitudinem* codd. Z bb *rectificationem*, et subinde pro *qui* edd. *quae.* — (P. 564, n. 6.)

en: Above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 ff. — A little above, for *rectitudinem* ("rectitude") codd. Z bb read *rectificationem* ("rectification"), and then for *qui* the editions read *quae.* — (P. 564, n. 6.)

la: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. ad 4. sic distinguit: *Spe igitur formata confidit quis ex meritis existentibus actu vel habitu; spe informi confidit quis sine meritis existentibus actu vel habitu, existentibus tamen in potentia; quamvis enim non habeat merita actu vel habitu, tamen confidit, quia potest habere; praesumtio vero confidit sine meritis omnino vel actu, vel habitu, vel in potentia existentibus.* — Paulo superius Vat. omittit *et primo infusae*, quae verba habentur in codd. A K M U Z, dum in aliis codd. et in edd. 1, 2 legitur *et* post *infusae*, quibus verbis cod. C addit *et non exercitatae.* — (P. 564, n. 7.)

en: Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars III, q. 65, m. 1, ad 4, distinguishes thus: *By formed hope, then, one trusts from merits existing in act or in habit; by unformed hope one trusts without merits existing in act or in habit, yet existing in potency; for although he may not have merits in act or in habit, nevertheless he trusts, because he can have them; but presumption trusts without merits existing at all, whether in act, or in habit, or in potency.* — A little above, the Vatican edition omits *et primo infusae* ("and first infused"), which words are had in codd. A K M U Z, while in other codices and in edd. 1, 2 *et* is read after *infusae*, to which words cod. C adds *et non exercitatae* ("and not exercised"). — (P. 564, n. 7.) Footnote markers continue with a new per-page sequence on p. 565 (the Respondeo's *Ad*-replies tail). The body markers `[^12]`–`[^14]` resolve to p.565 footers n.1–3. **Hand-off forwarded to q5:** q4 takes p.565 footers n.1–3; q5 begins at p.565 n.4 (*Vers. 38*).

la: Dist. 27. a. 1. q. 4. — De fallacia non-causa ut causa cfr. Aristot., I. *Elench.* c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo ante pro *et hoc est* edd. *et hunc est.* In initio solut. pro *fides ideo potest* codd. A U *fides non potest.* — (P. 565, n. 1.)

en: Dist. 27, a. 1, q. 4. — On the fallacy of non-cause as cause cf. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* I, c. 4 (c. 5). — A little before, for *et hoc est* the editions read *et hunc est.* At the beginning of the solution, for *fides ideo potest* codd. A U read *fides non potest.* — (P. 565, n. 1.)

la: Prov. 13, 4. — De gratia *operante* et *cooperante* cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 4, et Comment. ibid. a. 1. q. 1. atque dub. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 65. m. 1. ad 3: *Respondendum, quod est voluntas plena et voluntas semiplena sive imperfecta. Voluntas imperfecta designatur per optativum modum, ut cum dicitur vellem; voluntas perfecta per indicativum, ut cum dicitur volo, desidero. Voluntas imperfecta sive semiplena concomitatur spem informem, voluntas vero perfecta spem formatam. Inde est, quod proprie non potest dici de existenti in peccato mortali, quod vult tendere in beatitudinem, sed quod vellet;* secundum quem modum dicitur Prov. 13. de pigro: *Vult et non vult piger; anima autem operantium* etc. — Circa finem solut. cod. Y verbo *formatam* praemittit *perfectam et*, cod. W *perfectam*, sine *et.* — (P. 565, n. 2.)

en: Prov. 13:4. — On *operating* and *cooperating* grace cf. II Sent., the text of the Master, d. XXVII, c. 4, and the Commentary there, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa, pars III, q. 65, m. 1, ad 3: *It must be answered that there is a full will and a half-full or imperfect will. The imperfect will is designated by the optative mood, as when one says I would will; the perfect will by the indicative, as when one says I will, I desire. The imperfect or half-full will accompanies unformed hope, but the perfect will formed hope. Hence it is that, properly, it cannot be said of one existing in mortal sin that he wills to tend toward beatitude, but that he would will;* according to which manner it is said in Prov. 13 of the sluggard: *The sluggard wills and wills not; but the soul of them that work* etc. — Near the end of the solution cod. Y prefixes to the word *formatam* the words *perfectam et*, cod. W *perfectam*, without *et.* — (P. 565, n. 2.)

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. — (P. 565, n. 3.)

en: See the scholion to the preceding question [q. 3]. — (P. 565, n. 3.)

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from IA djvu OCR (raw lines 39149–39268), verified verbatim against vol3 PDF column bands p.563–565 (pdf 585–587; offset pdf = printed + 22). Fresh literal English translation. The OCR for this span is heavily two-column-bled (q4's L-column args interleave with q3's R-column scholion footers, and the Respondeo with q5's opener), so the column-band PDF read is authoritative throughout.
- **Page span / split map:** QUAESTIO IV header + title + opener + args 1–4 on p.563-L/R bottom (below q3's Scholion I–II). *Sed contra* 1–4 + Conclusio + Respondeo head (through *de fide informi*) on p.564-L; Respondeo (*quadrupliciter* four-ways) tail + Ad 1 + Ad 2 + Ad 3 head on p.564-R. Ad 3 tail + Ad 4 on p.565-L; Ad 4 tail (*nec in spe nec in fide sine gratia*) on p.565-R top, with the q5 opener (*Quinto quaeritur…*) following directly below on p.565-L/R.
- **Apparatus (14 entries):** p.563 footers n.3 (*Hic in lit. Magistri*) + n.4 (*Hic c. 1*) + n.5 (*d. 23. a. 1. q. 2*) + n.6 (*lit. Magistri d. XXIII*) — **hand-off picked up from q3** (q3 took p.563 n.1 Hebr. 11 + n.2 Gregor.); p.564 footers n.1–7 (single per-page sequence: Num. 7 / Bernardi / d. XXXIV / August. Enchirid. / ordinationem / d. 23 / Alex. Hal. quadrupliciter); p.565 footers n.1 (*Dist. 27*) + n.2 (Prov. 13 + Alex. Hal. voluntas plena/semiplena) + n.3 (*Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.*). The body reuses low marker numbers per page's restart — the Apparatus resolves them in page order with `(P. NNN, n. N.)` tags.
- **Scholion:** ABSENT for q4. There is no SCHOLION header between the q4 Respondeo and the q5 opener in the raw or PDF. q4's own p.565 footer n.3 redirects explicitly — «Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.» — and q3's Scholion §II is written precisely to cover this question ("For solving the following question the same principles serve which were applied concerning unformed faith above, d. 23…; — On this (fourth) question: Alexander of Hales…"). This is the sibling-scholion redirect convention; `has_scholion: false`.
- **Alignment:** opener reads *Quarto quaeritur, utrum virtus spei aliquando sit informis, an semper sit formata* (raw 39153) — matches the title *informis an semper formata*. CONFIRMED, not misaligned. q5 opener (*Quinto quaeritur, utrum spes in actu suo sit certitudinalis, an dubia*) at raw line 39271 / p.565-L sets the lower boundary.
- **`[?]` flags:** none. Footer texts read clean from the 450-dpi PDF bands.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0