title: Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1

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### Articulus II. *De praedestinatione quantum ad necessitatem.*

Secundo quantum ad hunc primum articulum quaeritur de necessitate praedestinationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum inferat necessitatem salutis libero arbitrio. Secundo, utrum inferat certitudinem in eventu.

### Quaestio I.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio inferat salutis necessitatem.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Quod autem inferat necessitatem, ostenditur sic.

1. *Omnis* causa, quae necessaria est in se et necessario ponit effectum, infert simpliciter necessitatem effectui; sed praedestinatio respectu salutis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor patet. Praedestinatio enim, cum sit Deus in se, dicit quid necessarium; et iterum, necessario infert effectum, quia necessario sequitur: *si est praedestinatus, salvabitur*: ergo etc.

2. *Item*, omnis causa, quae nullo modo potest cassari, necessitatem ponit circa productionem effectus — nam causa dicitur cassari, cum nullum ponit effectum — sed praedestinatio nullo modo potest cassari: ergo praedestinatio ponit necessitatem.

3. *Item*, quotiescumque duae causae concurrunt ad aliquem effectum, quas impossibile est discordare, si una est immutabilis, necesse est, alteram esse immutabilem, et effectum per consequens. Haec manifesta est per se: nam si altera est mutabilis, reliqua existente immutabili, possibile est, eas discordare. Sed impossibile est, quod praedestinatio et liberum arbitrium discordent: ergo cum praedestinatio sit causa immutabilis, necesse est, quod liberum arbitrium sit immutabile; et si hoc, cum totum sit immutabile, restat ergo, quod necessitatem imponat praedestinatio libero arbitrio et saluti.

4. *Item*, videtur, quod praedestinatus nullo modo possit damnari, et si hoc, tunc necessario salvatur; et ostenditur hac ratione: ista duo convertuntur *esse praescitum* et *damnari*, *esse praedestinatum* et *salvari*; sed praedestinatus non potest esse praescitus: ergo non potest damnari. Probatio mediae. Quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod impossibile est, unum alteri succedere, nec possunt simul inesse, si alterum inest, impossibile est, reliquum inesse; sed esse praedestinatum et esse praescitum sic se habent, quod impossibile est, simul inesse eidem; impossibile est etiam, alterum alteri succedere, scilicet quod homo primo sit praedestinatus et postea praescitus: ergo cum est praedestinatus, nullo modo potest esse praescitus: ergo etc.

5. *Item*, de omni quod aeternum est, cum non est, impossibile est esse, quia impossibile est, quod non ens sit aeternum; sed praescitus si est, aeternaliter est praescitus: ergo illum qui non est praescitus, impossibile est esse praescitum. Sed praedestinatus non est praescitus: ergo etc.

6. *Item*, de eo quod non est, idem est dicere, hoc *posse esse*, et *posse[^1] incipere esse*; sed praescitum est quid non ens respectu praedestinati: ergo idem est dicere, *praedestinatum posse esse praescitum*, quod *posse incipere praesciri sive damnari*. Sed non potest incipere esse praescitus, ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Praedestinatio divina nullum facit indigne salvari: ergo cum dignitas in salvando respiciat meritum, et meritum liberum arbitrium, ergo praedestinatio non tollit arbitrii libertatem, secundum quod liberum arbitrium: ergo nec imponit necessitatem.

2. *Item*, praedestinatio nihil aufert libero arbitrio, sed tantum ponit in eo gratiam; sed gratia nullam infert libero arbitrio necessitatem, ergo nec praedestinatio: si nullam ei imponit necessitatem[^2], ergo cum salus pendeat ex libero arbitrio, patet etc.

3. *Item*, si praedestinatio imponit necessitatem, ergo cum, omni casu contingente, necesse sit, eum qui praedestinatus est, salvari, ergo frustra laborat aliquis benefacere; quia, sive faciat bonum sive malum, necesse est, eum salvari.

4. *Item*, nullus laudatur in eo quod necessitatis est, neque vituperatur[^3]: si ergo necesse est, praedestinatum salvari et praescitum damnari, neque praedestinatus laudandus est, si salvatur, neque praescitus vituperandus, si damnatur; quod est contra statum gloriae et poenae.

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### Conclusio.

> *Praedestinatio nec ratione causalitatis nec ratione praescientiae infert necessitatem sive respectu salutis sive respectu liberi arbitrii.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod praedestinatio nec infert necessitatem saluti, nec infert necessitatem libero arbitrio, quoniam praedestinatio non est causa salutis nisi includendo merita, et ita salvando liberum arbitrium.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod praedestinatio duo importat: et rationem praescientiae et rationem causae. In quantum dicit rationem causae, non necessario ponit effectum, quia non est causa per necessitatem, sed per voluntatem: et iterum, non est tota causa, sed cum alia causa contingente, scilicet cum libero arbitrio. Et regula est, quod quotiescumque effectus pendet ex causa necessaria et variabili — a necessaria tanquam ab universali, a variabili tanquam a particulari — denominatur a variabili, quia denominatio est a causa particulari[^4]; et effectus, qui dependet a causa contingente, est contingens. — Praeter rationem causae importat[^5] rationem praescientiae; et praescientia quidem totum includit in cognitione, quia liberum arbitrium et eius cooperationem et vertibilitatem, et totum. Et praeterea, non est nisi veri, et etiam de vero contingente est infallibilis, sicut supra monstratum est in quaestione de praescientia[^6]. Ideo praedestinatio infert salutem et non potest cassari nec discordare a libero arbitrio. Et quia praescientia nullam imponit necessitatem consequentis, sed solum consequentiae, similiter nec praedestinatio.

*Ad 1, 2, 3.* Ex hoc patent tria prima obiecta de necessitate inferendi, impossibilitate cassandi, impossibilitate discordandi. Haec enim omnia dicunt necessitatem consequentiae solum, quia insunt praedestinationi non per rationem causalitatis, sed praecognitionis, quae est concors, certa et infallibilis. Concors, quia praescientia sive praecognitio[^7] vera: qui enim cognoscit vere cognoscit, rem praesentem esse, sicut est, et futuram ita evenire, sicut eveniet. Est enim *veritas adaequatio rei et intellectus*[^8]. Est iterum certa, quia independens, quia nullo modo pendet ex praecognito. Non enim secundum eius exigentiam cognoscit, sed secundum exigentiam luminis et claritatis aeternae, in qua nulla cadit dubietas, sed certitudo summa; et ideo de omnibus aequaliter certa est. Est iterum infallibilis, quoniam est totum posse praesciti circumplectens; et ideo in nullo potest falli nec circumveniri. — Et est exemplum Boethii in libro *de Consolatione* quinto[^9], quodsi aliquis aspiceret de loco <!-- page 708 -->eminenti circumiacentem regionem, ubi est multitudo viarum, omnes simul et uno aspectu videret, ambulans per locum illum[^10], quamvis possit per diversas vias ire, non tamen posset visum eius latere, pro eo quod per nullam viam posset ire, quam ille non videret. Si ergo intelligatur unus esse visus[^11], qui posset omnes vias praevidere et totum posse euntis, nullo modo quis eum praevenientem circumvenire posset. Et talis est aspectus divinae praescientiae, quia ab aeterno cognovit omne quod poteramus cogitare vel velle; et simul cum hoc vidit, in quam partem nostra voluntas et operatio inclinaretur. Et quia totum posse et velle et agere complectitur, ideo non potest falli. Et quia praedestinatio claudit praescientiam, hinc est, quod concordat cum libero arbitrio, et non potest discordare et non potest cassari; et necessario infert salutem, sed non necessario efficit[^12].

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum praedestinatus possit damnari; dicendum, quod sic, sine distinctione, quia quamvis haec possit distingui de re, vel dicto[^13]: *praedestinatum damnari est possibile*, sicut haec: *album possibile est esse nigrum*; haec tamen non est distinguenda secundum artem: *praedestinatus potest damnari*, sicut nec haec: *homo albus potest esse niger*. Non enim potest esse de dicto, cum non sit dictum.

Propter quod intelligendum, quod ista habet[^14] tres causas veritatis: *praedestinatus potest damnari*, sicut haec: *praedestinatus potest esse praescitus*: aut quia forma praedicati potest inesse subiecto cum forma implicata, vel post formam implicatam, vel sine forma implicata. Quocumque enim modo praedicatum possit inesse, iudicanda est locutio simpliciter vera; et dico, quod in tertio sensu locutio est vera[^15]: *praedestinatus potest esse praescitus*. Praedestinatus enim potest non esse praedestinatus, et necesse est, omnem hominem esse praedestinatum, vel praescitum; et ideo sequitur, quod possit esse praescitus. Et hoc quidem necessarium est poni. Nam fides dicit et ratio, quod sequitur: *si est praedestinatus, salvabitur*. Rursus, fides dicit et ratio, quod illum salvari est contingens; et qui diceret contrarium et assereret, respuendus esset, secundum omnium iudicium certum. Et iterum, ars dicit, quod si consequens est contingens, impossibile est, antecedens esse necessarium, et hoc supra probatum est per tres regulas[^16]; et qui diceret huius contrarium, totam artem syllogisticam destrueret, cuius virtus illationis est, ut oppositum consequentis non possit stare cum antecedente. Certum est autem, quod oppositum contingentis stat cum necessario[^17]. Istum ergo esse praedestinatum non est necessarium. Et est necessarium, vel contingens, vel impossibile; et non est impossibile nec necessarium: ergo est contingens; et contingens potest non esse: ergo iste qui est praedestinatus potest non esse praedestinatus.

Et hoc quidem credo quod necesse sit poni, hoc tamen difficile est intelligi. Potest tamen sic capi, si praesupponamus quatuor vera. Primum est, quod praesens divinae aeternitatis circumplectitur omne tempus, idem et uniforme; et hoc dicit Anselmus in libro *de Concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii*[^18], quod « *sicut praesens tempus circumplectitur omnem locum, et omne quod in loco est, ita praesens aeternitatis omne tempus* ». Et hoc necessarium est poni, quamvis non possimus hoc plene intelligere. Videmus enim eius oppositum esse falsum et impossibile: quia si hoc non esset, tunc mutaretur praesens divinae aeternitatis. — Secundum est illud, quod Deus uno et eodem cognoscit omnia, ita quod est unica Dei cognitio, qua cognoscit hoc et qua cognoscit eius oppositum. Et hoc supra[^19] probatum est auctoritate et ratione, non solum quantum ad illud per quod cognoscitur, sed etiam quantum ad actum divinae cognitionis. — Tertium est, quod cum dicimus, divinam cognitionem vel voluntatem ordinari ad hoc cognoscibile et ad aliud, non ponitur ordo vel respectus in Deo actu, sed solum ex parte rei creatae vel cognitae; et ille quidem, sicut praevisum est[^20], non ponitur in actu, sed in habitu, nec de praesenti sed de futuro. — Quartum est, quod futurum sub <!-- page 709 -->ratione futuri, quod ponitur semel esse verum, ponitur semper fuisse verum, et quod ponitur semel esse falsum, ponitur semper fuisse falsum; et ideo cum ponitur posse esse, non ponitur nec mutari nec incipere[^21].

His praesuppositis facile est intelligere, quod praedestinatus potest esse praescitus, et quod Deus quem praescivit potuit praedestinasse. Constans enim est, quod salus istius qui praescitus est, potuit ab aeterno praevideri, cum possit esse sive fieri in tempore; et si potuit ab aeterno ordinari ad divinam cognitionem et voluntatem, potest et nunc. Etenim quia praesens totum est, et nihil transiit in praeteritum, et nihil factum est, quod sit necessarium esse factum; hinc est, quod sicut potest cogitari, vere posse[^22] et non praedestinasse ab aeterno, ita etiam, quod possit nunc, in suo scilicet *nunc aeternitatis*, non praedestinasse. Et hoc dicit Magister in littera. Actus tamen aeternus divinae cognitionis non potest cogitari non fuisse, sed ad hoc futurum contingens ordinatum non esse[^23]; et si hoc ponitur, non ponitur aliqua mutatio in aeterno praesenti, quia nulla ponitur successio; nec ponitur mutatio in cognitione, quia non ponitur in Deo alia cognitio nec in ordine ex parte cognoscentis, quia non ponitur in Deo alius ordo, nec in ordine ex parte cogniti, quia ex parte illa non ponitur nisi futurum: et illud, cum non est, potest intelligi esse, et potest esse futurum sine mutatione[^24].

Et hoc totum clarius aperitur, si veniamus ad significationem horum vocabulorum *praescitus* et *praedestinatus*. Praedestinatus enim et praescitus duo sunt vocabula, et quantum ad principale significatum important divinam essentiam, quantum ad connotatum important futura contingentia. Quantum ergo ad principale significatum idem sunt; quantum vero ad connotatum, quia sunt contingentia, quae non de necessitate insunt, potest unum esse alterum[^25]. Quia vero connotata non tantum sunt contingentia, sed etiam de futuro, quae nihil ponunt actu, possunt non inesse et inesse sine mutatione. Cum enim ponuntur inesse vera de futuro, ponuntur semper fuisse, et cum ponuntur non esse ponuntur nunquam fuisse, sicut patet; et Anselmus[^26] dicit, si dicatur, aliquid esse futurum de contingenti, constat quod possibile est, non esse futurum; et si futurum est, semper verum fuit, ipsum esse futurum. Et ideo haec est vera sine mutatione et sine inceptione: *praedestinatus potest esse praescitus*. Nulla enim repugnantia est nec ex parte significati nec ex parte connotati, et hoc patet, si resolvantur[^27]. Sensus enim est: *iste est praedestinatus*, id est, iste est a Deo praecognitus et salvabitur per Dei gratiam. Similiter: *iste est praescitus*, sensus est: iste est praecognitus et damnabitur per suam culpam. Constat enim, quod in divina cognitione non est differentia in se, sed solum in connotato. Cum ergo salvandus possit damnari, praedestinatus potest esse praescitus sine aliqua mutatione.

*Ad 5, 6.* Ex hoc patent alia tria obiecta: nam primum et ultimum intelligitur in formis, quae aliquid ponunt actu circa subiectum; secundum vero de eo quod est ita aeternum, quod nihil temporale connotat. Talia autem non sunt *esse praescitum* et *esse praedestinatum*[^28]. Et sic patent omnia.

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### Article II. *On predestination as regards necessity.*

Secondly, with respect to this first article, inquiry is made concerning the necessity of predestination. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether it imposes the necessity of salvation on free choice. Secondly, whether it imposes certainty in the outcome.

### Question I.
#### *Whether predestination imposes the necessity of salvation.*

That it does impose necessity is shown thus.

1. *Every* cause which is necessary in itself and necessarily posits its effect imposes necessity simply on the effect; but predestination with respect to salvation is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is plain. For predestination, since it is God in himself, denotes something necessary; and again, it necessarily imposes its effect, since it necessarily follows: *if he is predestined, he will be saved*: therefore etc.

2. *Likewise*, every cause which can in no way be voided posits necessity in the production of its effect — for a cause is said to be voided when it posits no effect — but predestination can in no way be voided: therefore predestination posits necessity.

3. *Likewise*, whenever two causes concur to some effect, which it is impossible for them to be at variance, if one is immutable, it is necessary that the other be immutable, and the effect consequently. This is plain in itself: for if the other be mutable, while the remaining one is immutable, it is possible for them to be at variance. But it is impossible that predestination and free choice be at variance: therefore since predestination is an immutable cause, it is necessary that free choice be immutable; and if this, since the whole is immutable, it remains then that predestination imposes necessity on free choice and on salvation.

4. *Likewise*, it appears that the predestined can in no way be damned, and if this, then he is necessarily saved; and it is shown by this reasoning: these two are convertible, *to be foreknown* and *to be damned*, *to be predestined* and *to be saved*; but the predestined cannot be foreknown: therefore he cannot be damned. Proof of the middle. When any two are so related that it is impossible for one to succeed the other, nor can they inhere together, if one inheres, it is impossible for the remaining one to inhere; but *to be predestined* and *to be foreknown* are so related, that it is impossible for them to inhere together in the same; it is impossible also for one to succeed the other, namely that a man should first be predestined and afterwards foreknown: therefore since he is predestined, he can in no way be foreknown: therefore etc.

5. *Likewise*, of every thing which is eternal, when it is not, it is impossible that it be, since it is impossible that what is not be eternal; but if a man is foreknown, he is eternally foreknown: therefore him who is not foreknown, it is impossible to be foreknown. But the predestined is not foreknown: therefore etc.

6. *Likewise*, of that which is not, it is the same to say, that *this can be*, and that *it can[^1] begin to be*; but *foreknown* is something not-being with respect to the predestined: therefore it is the same to say, *the predestined can be foreknown*, as *he can begin to be foreknown or damned*. But he cannot begin to be foreknown, therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The divine predestination causes no one to be saved unworthily: therefore since dignity in being saved looks to merit, and merit to free choice, therefore predestination does not take away the freedom of choice, in respect of which it is free choice: therefore neither does it impose necessity.

2. *Likewise*, predestination takes nothing away from free choice, but only places grace in it; but grace imposes no necessity on free choice, neither therefore does predestination: if it imposes no necessity on it[^2], then since salvation depends on free choice, it is plain etc.

3. *Likewise*, if predestination imposes necessity, then since, every contingent case being granted, it is necessary that he who is predestined be saved, therefore in vain does anyone labour to do well; since, whether he do good or ill, it is necessary that he be saved.

4. *Likewise*, no one is praised for that which is of necessity, nor blamed[^3]: if therefore it is necessary that the predestined be saved and the foreknown be damned, then neither is the predestined to be praised, if he is saved, nor the foreknown to be blamed, if he is damned; which is contrary to the state of glory and of punishment.

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### Conclusion.

> *Predestination, neither by reason of causality nor by reason of foreknowledge, imposes necessity, whether with respect to salvation or with respect to free choice.*

**I respond:** It must be said that predestination neither imposes necessity on salvation, nor imposes necessity on free choice, since predestination is not the cause of salvation save by including merits, and so by saving free choice.

For the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that predestination implies two things: both the character of foreknowledge and the character of cause. Insofar as it denotes the character of cause, it does not necessarily posit its effect, since it is not a cause by necessity, but by will: and again, it is not the whole cause, but together with another contingent cause, namely with free choice. And the rule is, that whenever an effect depends on a necessary and a variable cause — on the necessary as on a universal, on the variable as on a particular — it is denominated from the variable, since denomination is from the particular cause[^4]; and the effect, which depends on a contingent cause, is contingent. — Besides the character of cause, it implies[^5] the character of foreknowledge; and foreknowledge indeed includes the whole within cognition, since it includes free choice and its cooperation and changeability, and the whole. And besides, it is not save of the true, and even of the contingent true it is infallible, as has been shown above in the question on foreknowledge[^6]. Therefore predestination imposes salvation, and cannot be voided nor be at variance with free choice. And since foreknowledge imposes no necessity of the consequent, but only of the consequence, neither does predestination.

*To 1, 2, 3.* From this are plain the first three objections concerning the necessity of imposing, the impossibility of being voided, and the impossibility of being at variance. For all these speak of necessity of consequence only, since they belong to predestination not by reason of causality, but of pre-cognition, which is concordant, certain, and infallible. Concordant, because foreknowledge, or pre-cognition[^7], is true: for he who knows truly knows that the present thing is, just as it is, and that the future will so come about, just as it will come about. For *truth is the adequation of thing and intellect*[^8]. It is again certain, because independent, since it depends in no way on the foreknown. For it does not know according to its requirement, but according to the requirement of the eternal light and clarity, in which there falls no doubt, but the highest certitude; and therefore it is equally certain about all things. It is again infallible, since it is wholly encompassing the *posse* of the foreknown; and therefore in nothing can it be deceived nor circumvented. — And there is the example of Boethius in book five *of the Consolation*[^9], that if someone should look from a <!-- page 708 -->lofty place at the surrounding region, where there is a multitude of paths, he would see them all together at one glance; one walking through that place[^10], although he can go by diverse paths, could nevertheless not escape his sight, for the reason that he could go by no path which that one would not see. If therefore one sight be understood[^11], which could foresee all the paths and the whole *posse* of the goer, in no way could anyone forestalling him escape him. And such is the gaze of divine foreknowledge, since from eternity it knew everything that we could think or will; and at the same time with this it saw to which side our will and operation would be inclined. And since it embraces the whole *posse* and willing and acting, therefore it cannot be deceived. And since predestination encloses foreknowledge, hence it is, that it is concordant with free choice, and cannot be at variance and cannot be voided; and it necessarily imposes salvation, but does not necessarily effect it[^12].

*To 4.* To that which is asked, whether the predestined can be damned; it must be said that he can, without distinction, since although this can be distinguished as to the thing or the *dictum*[^13]: *the predestined to be damned is possible*, just as this: *the white is possibly to be black*; this however is not to be distinguished by the rules of art: *the predestined can be damned*, just as neither this: *the white man can be black*. For it cannot be of the *dictum*, since it is not a *dictum*.

On account of which it must be understood, that this proposition has[^14] three causes of truth: *the predestined can be damned*, just as this: *the predestined can be foreknown*: either because the form of the predicate can inhere in the subject with the form implied, or after the form implied, or without the form implied. For in whatever way the predicate can inhere, the locution is to be judged simply true; and I say, that in the third sense the locution is true[^15]: *the predestined can be foreknown*. For the predestined can not be predestined, and it is necessary that every man be either predestined, or foreknown; and therefore it follows, that he can be foreknown. And this indeed is necessary to be posited. For faith says and reason that it follows: *if he is predestined, he will be saved*. Again, faith says and reason, that for him to be saved is contingent; and he who would say and assert the contrary, would have to be rejected, by the certain judgment of all. And again, art says, that if the consequent is contingent, it is impossible that the antecedent be necessary, and this has been proved above by three rules[^16]; and he who would say the contrary of this, would destroy the whole syllogistic art, whose force of inference is, that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent. But it is certain, that the opposite of a contingent stands with the necessary[^17]. Therefore that this man be predestined is not necessary. And it is necessary, or contingent, or impossible; and it is not impossible nor necessary: therefore it is contingent; and a contingent can not be: therefore this man who is predestined can not be predestined.

And this indeed I believe must be posited, this however is difficult to understand. It can however be grasped thus, if we presuppose four true things. The first is, that the present of the divine eternity embraces all time, the same and uniform; and this Anselm says in his book *On the Concordance of foreknowledge and of free choice*[^18], that « *just as the present time embraces every place, and everything that is in place, so the present of eternity embraces all time* ». And this is necessary to be posited, although we cannot fully understand this. For we see its opposite to be false and impossible: since if this were not so, then the present of the divine eternity would be changed. — The second is that, that God by one and the same knows all things, so that there is one cognition of God, by which he knows this and by which he knows its opposite. And this has been proved above[^19] by authority and by reason, not only as to that by which it is known, but also as to the act of divine cognition. — The third is, that when we say, that the divine cognition or will is ordered to this knowable and to that, no order or relation is posited in God in act, but only on the side of the created or known thing; and this indeed, as has been foreseen[^20], is not posited in act, but in habit, nor as of the present but as of the future. — The fourth is, that the future under <!-- page 709 -->the character of the future, which is once posited as being true, is posited as having always been true, and that which is once posited as being false, is posited as having always been false; and therefore when it is posited as being able to be, it is posited neither to be changed nor to begin[^21].

These things being presupposed it is easy to understand, that the predestined can be foreknown, and that God could have predestined him whom he foreknew. For it is constant, that the salvation of him who is foreknown could from eternity have been foreseen, since it can be or come about in time; and if it could from eternity have been ordered to the divine cognition and will, it can also now. For since the present is whole, and nothing has passed into the past, and nothing has been done, that it is necessary to have been done; hence it is, that just as it can be thought, that he could truly[^22] also have not predestined from eternity, so also, that he could now, that is, in his *now of eternity*, not have predestined. And this the Master says in the letter. Yet the eternal act of the divine cognition cannot be thought not to have been, but rather that this contingent future was not ordered to it[^23]; and if this is posited, no change is posited in the eternal present, since no succession is posited; nor is a change posited in the cognition, since no other cognition is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the knower, since no other order is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the known, since on that side nothing is posited save the future: and that, when it is not, can be thought to be, and can be future without change[^24].

And this whole is more clearly opened up, if we come to the signification of these words *foreknown* and *predestined*. For *predestined* and *foreknown* are two words, and as to the principal signification they import the divine essence, as to the connotation they import future contingents. As to the principal signification therefore they are the same; but as to the connotation, since they are contingents, which do not inhere of necessity, one can be the other[^25]. But since the connoted are not only contingents, but also of the future, which posit nothing in act, they can not inhere and can inhere without change. For when they are posited as inhering truly of the future, they are posited as having always been so, and when they are posited as not being, they are posited as never having been so, as is plain; and Anselm[^26] says, if it be said that something is future contingently, it is established that it is possible that it be not future; and if it is future, it has always been true, that itself is future. And therefore this is true without change and without beginning: *the predestined can be foreknown*. For there is no repugnance either on the side of the signified or on the side of the connoted, and this is plain, if they be resolved[^27]. For the sense is: *this man is predestined*, that is, this man is foreknown by God and will be saved by God's grace. Likewise: *this man is foreknown*, the sense is: this man is foreknown and will be damned through his own fault. For it is established, that in the divine cognition there is no difference in itself, but only in what is connoted. Since therefore one to be saved can be damned, the predestined can be foreknown without any change.

*To 5, 6.* From this are plain the other three objections: for the first and the last are understood in forms which posit something in act around the subject; the second on the other hand of that which is so eternal, that it connotes nothing temporal. But such are not *to be foreknown* and *to be predestined*[^28]. And so all are plain.

la: Multi codd. perperam omittunt secundum *posse*.

en: Many codices wrongly omit the second *posse*.

la: In Vat. et cod. cc desunt verba *si nullam ei imponit necessitatem*.

en: In the Vatican edition and codex cc the words *si nullam ei imponit necessitatem* are missing.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. *Ethic.* c. 5: *Propterea (virtutes) neque facultates et potentiae sunt, quippe cum neque boni neque mali ob id dicamur, quod absolute agere possimus neque laudemur aut vituperemur. Adde quod facultate praediti et potentes natura sumus, boni aut mali, sicut superius diximus, natura minime efficimur*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, II. *Ethics* c. 5: *On this account (the virtues) are neither faculties nor potencies, since we are called neither good nor bad on account of being able simply to act, nor are we praised or blamed on that ground. Add that we are by nature endowed with faculty and powerful, but good or bad, as has been said above, we are by no means made by nature*.

la: Ratio est, quia effectus magis assimilatur causae particulari quam universali. Sic, ut exemplum afferamus Scholasticorum, *homo genitus magis assimilatur homini generanti quam soli, quia sol est universale generans*. Cfr. etiam supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. circa finem, et d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, ubi simile de necessario et contingente habetur.

en: The reason is, that the effect is more assimilated to the particular cause than to the universal. Thus, to bring forward the example of the Scholastics, *the begotten man is more assimilated to the man begetting than to the sun, since the sun is a universal generator*. Cf. also above d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in the corpus near the end, and d. 14. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6, where a similar thing is had concerning the necessary and the contingent.

la: Supple cum cod. R *praedestinatio*.

en: Supply with codex R *praedestinatio*.

la: Dist. 38. a. 2. q. 2; d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, et ibid. a. 2. q. 2. — De ultima proposit. corp. cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Distinction 38. a. 2. q. 2; d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, and at the same place a. 2. q. 2. — On the last proposition of the corpus cf. above d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cod. T *cognitio*.

en: Codex T reads *cognitio*.

la: Haec definitio veritatis communiter a Scholasticis aut Aristoteli attribuebatur, aut cuidam Isaac, qui scripsit librum *de Definitionibus*. Si verba tantum spectas, definitio veritatis a S. Doctore hic proposita neque in uno neque in altero occurrit, sed si ad sententiam intendis, illa definitio habetur apud utrumque. Aristoteles multis locis de veritate et falsitate orationis loquens docet, orationem esse veram, si enuntiet rem sicuti est; at falsam, si enuntiet rem, sicut non est. Cfr. libr. *de Praedicam.* c. *de Substantia*; I. *Periherm.* c. 7. (c. 9.); III. *de Anima*, text. 21. seqq. (c. 6.); et IV. *Metaph.* text. 27. (III. c. 7.) nec non V. *Metaph.* text. 34. (IV. c. 29.). In libro IX. *Metaph.* text. 21. (VIII. c. 10.) autem ait: « *Quamobrem verum dicit, qui divisum dividi et compositum componi putat; falsum autem, qui contra quam res se habeant, aut quando sunt aut non sunt* ». Quod ad Isaac attinet, inspeximus Monachii cod. Bibl. reg. n. 8001, W., qui a fol. 181 vers. usque ad fol. 184 vers. continet laudati Isaac librum *de Definitionibus*. In quo libro hanc invenimus definitionem veritatis et falsitatis: « *Veritas est id quod est res; secundum alios, veritas est sermo quem confirmat demonstratio vel sensibiliter vel intellectualiter; sermo autem iste sic est, ut definitio, quoniam est enuntiativa naturae et essentiae rei; similiter et sermo dicentis veritas: quidem est enuntiativa naturae et essentiae veritatis, quantum id sibi quod est res, vere est, et veritas non est nisi quod est. Falsitas est quod non est res, et dicitur oratio, qua de aliquo dicitur eius contrarium. Verum est affirmatio rei de re, a qua [non?] removetur vere; falsum vero est eius contrarium; rectum est quod impossibile est removeri* ». — Definitio veritatis, a S. Doctore proposita, quoad verba magis convenit cum illa definitione, quam Averroes proponit in libro « *Destructio destructionum* », disp. metaph. I. circa finem (dub. 22.): « *Veritas namque, ut declaratum est in sua declaratione (definitione), est aequare rem ad intellectum, scilicet quod reperiatur in anima, sicut est extra animam* » (ed. Venet. 1495.) — et cum definitione Avicennae I. *Metaph.* c. 9, quae est: *Veritas autem... intelligitur dispositio dictionis vel intellectus, qui signat dispositionem in re exteriori, cum est ei aequalis*. Cfr. etiam Anselm., libr. *de Veritate*. — Paulo post pro *pendet* plures codd. ut X Z aa bb *dependet*; deinde pro *eius exigentiam* Vat. cum cod. cc *eius* (i. e. praecogniti) *existentiam*; demum pro *et ideo de omnibus* multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam *et ideo I omnibus*.

en: This definition of truth was commonly attributed by the Scholastics either to Aristotle, or to a certain Isaac, who wrote a book *On Definitions*. If you regard only the words, the definition of truth here proposed by the holy Doctor occurs in neither of the two; but if you attend to the sense, that definition is had in both. Aristotle in many places, speaking of the truth and falsity of speech, teaches that speech is true if it expresses a thing as it is; but false, if it expresses a thing as it is not. Cf. the book *On the Categories* c. *On Substance*; I. *Periherm.* c. 7 (c. 9); III. *On the Soul*, text 21 ff. (c. 6); and IV. *Metaphysics* text 27 (III. c. 7), as also V. *Metaphysics* text 34 (IV. c. 29). In book IX. *Metaphysics* text 21 (VIII. c. 10) however he says: « *On which account he speaks the truth, who reckons the divided to be divided and the composite to be composed; but he speaks falsely, who [reckons] otherwise than things are, either when they are or when they are not* ». As for what concerns Isaac, we have inspected at Munich the codex of the royal Library n. 8001, W., which from fol. 181 verso to fol. 184 verso contains the said book of Isaac *On Definitions*. In which book we have found this definition of truth and of falsity: « *Truth is that which is the thing; according to others, truth is a discourse which demonstration confirms either sensibly or intellectually; but that discourse is so, as a definition, since it is enunciative of the nature and essence of the thing; likewise also the discourse of the speaker: truth indeed is enunciative of the nature and essence of truth, in so far as that to itself which is the thing, truly is, and truth is nothing save what is. Falsity is that which is not the thing, and it is called a discourse by which the contrary of something is said of it. The true is the affirmation of a thing of a thing, from which [non?] truly is removed; but the false is its contrary; the right is what it is impossible to remove* ». — The definition of truth proposed by the holy Doctor, as to the words, agrees more with that definition which Averroes proposes in the book « *Destruction of Destructions* », disputation of metaphysics I, near the end (dub. 22): « *For truth, as has been declared in its declaration (definition), is to equate the thing to the intellect, namely that there be found in the soul as it is outside the soul* » (ed. Venice 1495) — and with the definition of Avicenna I. *Metaphysics* c. 9, which is: *But truth... is understood the disposition of speech or of the intellect, which signifies the disposition in the exterior thing, when it is equal to it*. Cf. also Anselm, book *On Truth*. — A little later, for *pendet* several codices like X Z aa bb read *dependet*; then for *eius exigentiam* the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *eius* (i. e. of the foreknown) *existentiam*; finally for *et ideo de omnibus* many codices with ed. 1 wrongly read *et ideo I omnibus*.

la: *Prosa* 6, ubi auctor de providentia loquens ait: « *quod porro ab rebus infirmis constituta quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat* »... Et ibid. praescientiae immutabilitatem impugnanti respondet: *Propositum te quidem tuum posse deflectere, sed quoniam et id te posse, et an facias, quove convertas, praesens providentiae veritas intuetur, divinam te praescire non posse vitare*, sicuti praesentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quamvis te in varias actiones libera voluntate converteris... *Omne namque futurum divinus praecurrit intuitus et ad praesentiam propriae cognitionis retorquet ac revocat*. Cfr. et ibid. — Paulo inferius *Metr.* 2. pro *locum* illum Vat. cum cod. cc *locum suum*.

en: *Prose* 6, where the author, speaking of providence, says: « *moreover, [the gaze] situated apart from feeble things, looks upon all as from the lofty summit of things* »... And in the same place, replying to one impugning the immutability of foreknowledge: *That you indeed can deflect your purpose, but since the present truth of providence beholds both that you can do this, and whether you do, and whither you turn, you cannot escape divine foreknowledge*, just as you cannot escape the gaze of the present eye, although you turn yourself to diverse actions by free will... *For the divine intuition outruns every future and recalls and brings it back to the presence of its proper cognition*. Cf. also there. — A little later, *Metre* 2, for *locum* illum the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *locum suum*.

la: *Prosa* 6 (continuatio): textus Boethianus pertinet ad supra citatum locum.

en: *Prose* 6 (continuation): the Boethian text belongs to the place cited above.

la: Intellige: *visum*. — Pro *praevenientem* sola Vat. *praevidentem*, et aliquanto inferius *inclinantur* pro *inclinaretur*.

en: Understand: *sight* (*visum*). — For *praevenientem* the Vatican edition alone reads *praevidentem*, and somewhat later *inclinantur* for *inclinaretur*.

la: Sive, ut aliis verbis utamur, est *necessitas in consequendo*, sed non *in efficiendo*. Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Or, to use other words, there is *necessity in consequence*, but not *in effecting*. Cf. above d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi dictum, distinguitur a vero, et sensus *compositus* a sensu *diviso*.

en: Cf. here the *Letter of the Master*, c. 1, where the saying is distinguished from the true, and the *composite* sense from the *divided* sense.

la: Vel potius: *habere potest*.

en: Or rather: *can have*.

la: Pro faciliore huius loci intelligentia non inutile erit, propositionem: *Quocumque enim modo praedicatum possit inesse, iudicanda est locutio simpliciter vera*, ut maiorem syllogismi accipere, et dein post verba *simpliciter vera*, ut minorem haec verba addere: *sed in ista propositione forma praedicati subiecto non inesse potest nisi in tertio sensu* i. e. *sine forma implicata*, et tunc conclusionem facere: *ergo dico, quod in tertio* etc.

en: For the easier understanding of this place it will not be unhelpful, to take the proposition: *In whatever way the predicate can inhere, the locution is to be judged simply true*, as the major of the syllogism, and then after the words *simply true*, to add as the minor these words: *but in this proposition the form of the predicate cannot inhere in the subject save in the third sense*, i. e. *without the form implied*, and then to make the conclusion: *therefore I say, that in the third* etc.

la: Dist. 38. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 1-3. — Paulo ante loco voculae *supra* in plurimis codd. falso legitur *sophisma*.

en: Distinction 38. a. 2. q. 2. foundations 1-3. — A little earlier, in place of the little word *supra*, in most codices is wrongly read *sophisma*.

la: Vide loc. cit. secundam et tertiam regulam. — Vat. cum uno alterove cod. perperam *non stat* pro *stat*.

en: See at the cited place the second and third rule. — The Vatican edition with one or two codices wrongly reads *non stat* for *stat*.

la: Quaest. 1. c. 5: « *Quemadmodum praesens tempus continet omnem locum et quae in quolibet loco sunt, ita aeterno praesenti simul clauditur omne tempus et quae sunt in quolibet tempore* ».

en: Question 1. c. 5: « *Just as the present time contains every place and the things which are in any place, so to the eternal present is shut up at once all time and the things which are in any time* ».

la: Dist. 39. a. 1. q. 1, et q. 3. ad 4, nec non a. 2. q. 1, et q. 3. ad ult. — Paulo superius post *uno et eodem* cod. Z supplet *respectu vel modo*.

en: Distinction 39. a. 1. q. 1, and q. 3. ad 4, as also a. 2. q. 1, and q. 3. ad ult. — A little earlier, after *uno et eodem*, codex Z supplies *respectu vel modo*.

en: Distinction 38. a. 2. q. 2, and here a. 1. q. 1.

la: Cfr. dist. 38. a. 2. q. 2. ad duo ultima, ubi duplex distinguitur immutabile et aeternum, unum scil., quod convertitur cum ente necessario, et alterum, quod non convertitur cum ente necessario, cum non sit aliquid actu, ut est futurum contingens.

en: Cf. distinction 38. a. 2. q. 2. ad the two last, where a twofold immutable and eternal is distinguished, namely one which is convertible with necessary being, and the other which is not convertible with necessary being, since it is not something in act, as is the future contingent.

la: Supple: *praedestinare*. — Pro *posse* Vat. *potuisse*. Particula *et*, quae verbum *posse* sequitur, deest in ed. 1 et in cod. T a secunda manu expuncta est. Paulo superius pro *transiit* multi codd. cum ed. 1 *transit*. — Sententiam Magistri vide hic, c. 1.

en: Supply: *praedestinare*. — For *posse* the Vatican edition reads *potuisse*. The particle *et*, which follows the verb *posse*, is missing in ed. 1 and in codex T has been struck out by a second hand. A little earlier, for *transiit* many codices with ed. 1 read *transit*. — For the opinion of the Master see here, c. 1.

la: Simul audi: *potest cogitari*. Cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Paulo superius pro *sed ad hoc* nonnulli codd. scilicet *ad hoc*, et Vat. cum cod. cc *vel ad hoc*. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius post *et si hoc* in textum inserit *non*; perperam. Dein post *in aeterno* cod. V omittit *praesenti*, quae vox et in cod. T primo defuit, sed postea secundis curis adiecta est.

en: Hear at the same time: *can be thought*. Cf. above d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in the corpus. — A little earlier, for *sed ad hoc* several codices namely *ad hoc*, and the Vatican edition with codex cc reads *vel ad hoc*. The same Vatican a little later, after *et si hoc*, inserts *non* into the text; wrongly. Then after *in aeterno*, codex V omits *praesenti*, which word also in codex T was at first lacking, but later was added by a second-hand revision.

la: Nempe, quia *quod non est non mutatur, licet fiat*; supponit enim mutatio existentiam. Vat. minus apte ad contextum paulo superius pro *potest esse futurum* ponit *non esse futurum*.

en: Namely, because *what is not is not changed, though it come to be*; for change presupposes existence. The Vatican edition, less aptly to the context, a little earlier, for *potest esse futurum* puts *non esse futurum*.

la: id est, quia sunt v. g. relate ad hominem contingentia, non est necesse, unum eorum determinate ex se illi convenire, sed potest illi convenire vel unum vel alterum. — Paulo ante pro *connotatum* ed. 1 *connotata*.

en: that is, since they are e. g. relatively to man contingent, it is not necessary that one of them belong determinately to him of itself, but either one or the other can belong to him. — A little earlier, for *connotatum* ed. 1 reads *connotata*.

la: Libr. *de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb.* q. 1. c. 2: *Sicut non est idem rem esse albam et rem albam esse albam; lignum enim non est semper necessitate album, quia aliquando, priusquam fieret album, potuit non fieri album; et postquam est album, potest fieri non album, lignum vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit nec postquam est album, fieri potest, ut album simul sit non album... Eodem modo res aliqua, ut quaedam actio, non necessitate futura est, quia priusquam sit, fieri potest, ut non sit futura; rem vero futuram necesse est esse futuram, quoniam futurum nequit esse simul non futurum*. Cfr. et ibid. c. 3. — Paulo ante pro *inesse vera* ed. 1 *esse vera*.

en: Book *On the Concordance of God's foreknowledge with free choice* q. 1. c. 2: *Just as it is not the same that the thing be white and that the white thing be white; for wood is not always of necessity white, since sometimes, before it became white, it could have not been made white; and after it is white, it can be made not-white, but white wood it is always necessary to be white, since neither before it is nor after it is white, can it be that the white be at the same time not-white... In the same way some thing, as a certain action, is not of necessity future, since before it is, it can be that it not be future; but a future thing it is necessary to be future, since the future cannot be at the same time not-future*. Cf. also there c. 3. — A little earlier, for *inesse vera* ed. 1 reads *esse vera*.

la: Intellige: duae propositiones sequentes; vel lege cum Vat. *resolvatur* (ed. 1 *resolvitur*), scil. illa propositio.

en: Understand: the two propositions following; or read with the Vatican edition *resolvatur* (ed. 1 *resolvitur*), namely that proposition.

la: De quo cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. ad ult.

en: Concerning which cf. above d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. ad ult.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Supposita distinctione inter *necessitatem absolutam* sive *consequentis*, et *hypotheticam* sive *consequentiae* vel *illationis* (supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.), in hac quaestione principaliter agitur de necessitate absoluta, sed in fine corp. etiam de necessitate hypothetica. Insuper in solut. ad 4. tractatur specialis quaestio, quo sensu dici possit, quod *praedestinatus possit damnari*. — Manifeste haeretica et a Concilio Constantiensi, approbante Martino V., condamnata est propositio (prop. 27.) Wiclefi: « *Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt* ».

**II.** Ut dogma Catholicum melius intelligatur, Seraphicus per partes probat, quod nec *ratio causalitatis*, nec *ratio scientiae*, quae implicantur in praedestinatione, necessitatem libero arbitrio inferant. Notum est, primos antiquos haereticos, Calvinum pluresque alios ita causalitatem praedestinationis et efficaciam gratiae extulisse, ut liberi arbitrii vera causalitas et contingentia tollatur, et quasi illud a Deo moveatur, quin se ipsum moveat et determinet. Qui error perniciosissimus reprobatus est a Concilio Tridentino Sess. 6. can. 4. Unde catholici doctores unanimiter docent, actionem causae primae non excludere veram et liberam cooperationem causae secundae, nec motionem sive efficaciam gratiae impedire, quod etiam voluntas creata se ipsam vere moveat et determinet. Sed acriter etiam inter scholas catholicas disputatum est de modo *exsistendi* illius cooperationis, praecipue inter duas scholas celebres, in hac quaestione ex adverso sibi oppositas. Schola enim, quae vocatur Thomistarum, veram S. Augustini et S. Thomae doctrinam esse affirmat, quod divina voluntas sua causalitate ab intrinseco efficaci inferat consensum liberum voluntatis creatae, nedum quoad substantiam actus, sed etiam quoad modum libertatis (cfr. S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 19. a. 8, q. 83. a. 1. ad 3, q. 103. a. 1; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 89; *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 3. ad 3.). In hac sententia etiam certitudo divinae praescientiae explicatur ex ipsius voluntatis divinae decretis efficacibus. Altera schola, ut infallibilitatem et efficaciam decreti divini praedestinantis simul cum indifferentia liberi arbitrii explicet, utitur *scientia media*, qua praevidetur, quid voluntas factura sit de se, sed cum auxilio gratiae praevenientis, antecedenter ad omne decretum divinum absolutum; et hac via propugnat *concursum divinum congruentem* libertati ac motionem indifferentem, quae non antecedat determinationem voluntatis, sed ei sit simultanea vel, ut aliqui videntur docere, potius eam consequatur. — S. Bonaventura de causalitate divinae voluntatis hoc loco nihil dicit quod non sit generaliter receptum. Plura vide infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. 2; et de motione divina *II. Sent.* d. 28. p. II. q. 4. 5; d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, d. 26. q. 6, d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1.

Sed quoad alteram rationem, scil. praescientiae, manifestum est, praesertim ex solut. ad 1. 2. 3, S. Bonaventuram refundere certitudinem, quae est in praedestinatione, non ad causalitatem in ea implicatam, sed ad nobilitatem divinae scientiae; unde potius ad praescientiam recurrit, ut ostendat concordiam praedestinationis cum libertate creaturarum; immo ipsius verba hoc loco videntur rationem causalitatis penitus excludere, cum dicat « *non per rationem causalitatis* ». Sed S. Thom. (*de Verit.* q. 6. a. 3. in corp.) quoad certitudinem praedestinationis videtur aliter sentire, cum dicat: « *Unde praeter certitudinem praescientiae ipse ordo praedestinationis habet infallibilem certitudinem, nec tamen causa proxima salutis ordinatur ad eam necessario, sed contingenter, scilicet liberum arbitrium* » (cfr. *S.* I. q. 23. a. 7.). Putamus autem, S. Bonaventuram praecise in hoc non dissentire a S. Thoma, cum alibi (in quaestione seq. in corp.) praeter certitudinem infallibilis scientiae referat etiam certitudinem immutabilitatis, ex divina dispositione et ordinatione ortam, quae includit voluntatis decretum; unde dicitur infra (d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.): « *voluntas facit de scientia dispositionem* ». Insuper etiam ipsam praescientiam Dei in causalitate scientiae secundum S. Bonaventuram fundari, iam supra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1, Scholion dictum est. Hanc autem causalitatem ab ipso non in sensu solius causae efficientis intelligi, etiam hic in solutione ad 1. 2. 3. satis manifestatur.

**III.** In solut. ad 4. subtiliter discutitur locutio: utrum *praedestinatus possit damnari*, et plura profunda et notanda alleruntur ad probandam viam S. Doctoris, quae aliquatenus differt ab ea, quam alii magis tenent. Distinguit enim duas propositiones; modalem, in qua ponitur significatum dicti in *recto*, et talis est forma propositionis: *praedestinatus potest damnari*; modalem, in qua ponitur significatum in *obliquo*, per accusativum et verbum infinitum, qualis est propositio, *possibile est, praedestinatum damnari*. Propositionem in hac secunda forma debere distingui, cum communi sententia affirmat etiam Seraphicus. Vel enim ista propositio intelligitur de dicto et in sensu composito, et tunc est falsa (ut: *album esse nigrum, est possibile* in sensu; haec propositio: *album est nigrum*, est possibilis); vel de re et in sensu diviso (ut: *res nunc alba potest fieri nigra*). Distinctio *de re* et *dicto*, qua in hac distinctione utitur etiam Magister, explicatur a S. Thom., *S.* I. q. 14. a. 13. ad 3. — Primam vero formam propositionis S. Bonav. sine distinctione tanquam veram admittit, dum Magister (hic c. 1.), S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 23. a. 6. ad 3.), Scotus, Richard. a Med., Durandus aliique etiam in hac forma adhibent distinctionem sensus compositi et divisi. Probat autem Seraphicus suam assertionem, supponendo triplicem sensum illius propositionis (« *habet tres causas veritatis* »); et haec potest esse vera, si unus ex tribus sensibus est simpliciter verus. Intelligi enim potest subiectum *praedestinatus* vel « *sub forma implicata* » i. e. reduplicative *praedestinatus ut praedestinatus*, et sic est falsa; vel « *post formam implicatam* », i. e. qui antea fuit *praedestinatus*, postea fit *reprobus*, et sic iterum est falsa; vel « *sine forma implicata* » i. e. absolute subiectum considerando, et tunc praedicatum *potest damnari* recte dicitur de subiecto, ut in sequenti et hic dub. 4. 5. probatur; quod deinde quatuor profundis et valde notandis principiis aliquatenus explicatur. — Solut. ad 5. 6. iisdem fit principiis, quae adhibet S. Thom., *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 3. ad 8.

**IV.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. 1. q. 28. m. 4. per totum. — Scot., hic q. unica; et *Report.* hic q. unica. — S. Thom., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3; *S.* I. q. 22. a. 4, q. 23. a. 6; *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 15. 16; *S.* de hac et seq. q. p. 1. tr. 10. q. 63. m. 3. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Granted the distinction between *absolute necessity*, or *of the consequent*, and *hypothetical*, or *of the consequence* or *of the inference* (above d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.), in this question we are dealing principally with absolute necessity, but at the end of the corpus also with hypothetical necessity. Furthermore, in the solution to 4., a special question is treated, in what sense it can be said that *the predestined can be damned*. — Manifestly heretical, and condemned by the Council of Constance, with Martin V. approving, was the proposition (prop. 27.) of Wycliffe: « *All things happen of absolute necessity* ».

**II.** That the Catholic doctrine may better be understood, the Seraphic proves part by part, that neither the *character of causality*, nor the *character of knowledge*, which are implied in predestination, impose necessity on free choice. It is known that the early ancient heretics, Calvin, and many others so exalted the causality of predestination and the efficacy of grace, that the true causality and contingency of free choice should be taken away, and as it were that this should be moved by God, without itself moving and determining itself. Which most pernicious error has been reproved by the Council of Trent, Sess. 6. can. 4. Whence Catholic doctors unanimously teach, that the action of the first cause does not exclude the true and free cooperation of the second cause, nor that the motion or efficacy of grace impedes the created will from truly moving and determining itself. But sharply too, even among Catholic schools, has it been disputed concerning the manner of *existing* of that cooperation, especially between two famous schools, in this question opposed to one another. For the school which is called of the Thomists, affirms it to be the true doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, that the divine will by its causality intrinsically efficacious imposes the free consent of the created will, not only as to the substance of the act, but also as to the mode of liberty (cf. St. Thomas, *S.* I. q. 19. a. 8, q. 83. a. 1. ad 3, q. 103. a. 1; *S. c. Gent.* III. c. 89; *de Veritate* q. 6. a. 3. ad 3.). In this opinion the certainty of the divine foreknowledge is also explained from the efficacious decrees of the divine will itself. The other school, in order to explain the infallibility and efficacy of the divine decree of predestination together with the indifference of free choice, employs *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*), by which is foreseen what the will is going to do of itself, but with the help of prevenient grace, antecedently to every absolute divine decree; and by this way it defends the *divine concourse congruent* with liberty and an indifferent motion, which does not antecede the determination of the will, but is simultaneous with it, or, as some seem to teach, rather follows it. — St. Bonaventure on the causality of the divine will in this place says nothing that is not generally received. See more below at d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. 2; and on divine motion, *II. Sentences* d. 28. p. II. q. 4. 5; d. 37. a. 1. q. 1, d. 26. q. 6, d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1.

But as to the other character, namely of foreknowledge, it is manifest, especially from the solutions to 1. 2. 3, that St. Bonaventure refers the certainty which is in predestination, not to the causality implied in it, but to the nobility of divine knowledge; whence he rather has recourse to foreknowledge, in order to show the concord of predestination with the liberty of creatures; nay, his very words in this place seem to exclude altogether the character of causality, since he says « *not by reason of causality* ». But St. Thomas (*de Veritate* q. 6. a. 3. in the corpus) on the certainty of predestination seems to think otherwise, since he says: « *Whence besides the certainty of foreknowledge the very order of predestination has an infallible certainty, yet the proximate cause of salvation is not ordered to it necessarily, but contingently, namely free choice* » (cf. *S.* I. q. 23. a. 7.). We think however, that St. Bonaventure does not in this precisely dissent from St. Thomas, since elsewhere (in the next question, in the corpus) he refers, besides the certainty of infallible knowledge, also a certainty of immutability, springing from the divine disposition and ordination, which includes a decree of the will; whence it is said below (d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.): « *the will makes a disposition out of knowledge* ». Furthermore, that the very foreknowledge of God is, according to St. Bonaventure, founded on the causality of knowledge, has already been said above at d. 39. a. 1. q. 1, in the Scholion. That however this causality is not understood by him in the sense of efficient cause alone, is sufficiently manifested also here in the solution to 1. 2. 3.

**III.** In the solution to 4. the locution is subtly discussed: whether *the predestined can be damned*, and many profound and notable things are adduced to prove the way of the holy Doctor, which differs somewhat from that which others rather hold. For he distinguishes two propositions; modal, in which the signified of the *dictum* is placed in the *direct* (*recto*), and such is the form of the proposition: *the predestined can be damned*; modal, in which the signified is placed in the *oblique*, by accusative and infinitive verb, of which kind is the proposition, *it is possible, the predestined to be damned*. That a proposition in this second form ought to be distinguished, the Seraphic too affirms with the common opinion. For either this proposition is understood *of the dictum* and in the composite sense, and then it is false (as: *for white to be black, is possible* in the [composite] sense; this proposition: *white is black*, is possible); or *of the thing* and in the divided sense (as: *the thing now white can be made black*). The distinction *of the thing* and *of the dictum*, which the Master too uses in this distinction, is explained by St. Thomas, *S.* I. q. 14. a. 13. ad 3. — But the first form of proposition St. Bonaventure admits without distinction as true, while the Master (here c. 1.), St. Thomas (*S.* I. q. 23. a. 6. ad 3.), Scotus, Richard of Mediavilla, Durandus, and others use, even in this form, the distinction of the composite and divided sense. The Seraphic proves his assertion, by supposing a threefold sense of that proposition (« *it has three causes of truth* »); and this can be true, if one of the three senses is simply true. For the subject *predestined* can be understood either « *under the form implied* », i. e. reduplicatively *predestined as predestined*, and so it is false; or « *after the form implied* », i. e. one who was previously predestined, afterwards is made reprobate, and so again is false; or « *without the form implied*», i. e. considering the subject absolutely, and then the predicate *can be damned* is rightly said of the subject, as is proved in the following and here at dub. 4. 5.; which is afterwards in some measure explained by four profound and very notable principles. — The solutions to 5. 6. are made by the same principles which St. Thomas employs, *de Veritate* q. 6. a. 3. ad 8.

**IV.** Alex. of Hales, *S.* p. 1. q. 28. m. 4. throughout. — Scotus, here q. unica; and *Reportata* here q. unica. — St. Thomas, on this and the following q., here q. 3; *S.* I. q. 22. a. 4, q. 23. a. 6; *de Veritate* q. 6. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 14. 15. 16; *S.* on this and the following q., p. 1. tr. 10. q. 63. m. 3. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following q., here q. 2.

---


site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 711 -->

### Quaestio II.
#### *Utrum praedestinatio ponat certitudinem in eventu.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (**La.**), then the English rendering (**En.**).

Secundo, supposito quod praedestinatio non inferat necessitatem libero arbitrio, quod non possit aliter esse, quaeritur, utrum ponat certitudinem in eventu, scilicet, ut numquam aliter eveniat, nisi sicut Deus praedefinivit. Et quod sic ostenditur:

1. *Primo* auctoritate Ioannis decimo tertio[^1]: *Ego scio, quos elegerim*; et secundae ad Timotheum secundo[^2]: *Novit Deus, qui sunt eius*: ergo si divina cognitio est certa et infallibilis, et falleretur, si non salvarentur illi quos novit esse suos certitudinaliter, ergo verum est, quod sic evenit, sicut praedefinivit Deus, et sic etc.

2. Item, primae Ioannis secundo[^3]: *Ex nobis exierunt, sed ex nobis non erant*. Ponit illud ergo pro signo: quod illud est signum, quod homo non fuit electus, quando non perseveravit in bono finaliter. Si ergo illud signum est rectum, certum est, quod omnes praedestinati et soli in gratia finaliter perseverant; et si hoc certum est, quod soli salvantur et omnes: ergo certitudo est in eventu.

3. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Bono perseverantiae*[^4]: «*Praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum Dei, per quae certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur*». Si igitur liberantur certissime, patet quod certitudo salutis est respectu personarum, et sic etc.

4. Item, Augustinus in libro *de Correctione et gratia*[^5]: «*Certus est numerus electorum, qui non potest minui nec augeri*»: ergo videtur, quod certitudo sit in quoto numero.

5. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia *in domo Patris sunt multae mansiones*, sicut dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto[^6]: aut ergo praevidit Deus, qui debeant ibi habitare, aut non. Constat quod praevidit, qui debeant ibi esse: ergo si aliquis eorum desit, aliqua mansio vacua remanebit. Sed hoc est inconveniens et indecens in civitate superna: ergo certum est, quod quilibet praedestinatus locum suum habebit.

6. Item, numerus electorum a Deo praefinitus est optima et decentissima ratione et proportione — si enim omnia fecit ordinatissime, multo fortius supernam civitatem — sed optima proportio foedatur et perditur per augmentum et diminutionem: ergo si non potest esse, ut sit ibi defectus ordinis et proportionis congruentis, certitudinaliter tot salvabuntur, et non plures nec pauciores quam Deus praevidit.

**Sed contra:**

1. Quod non sit certitudo eventus quantum ad personas, videtur sic: Apocalypsis tertio[^7]: *Tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam tuam*; Gregorius ibi: «*Dum alius labitur, alius in locum eius subinducitur*»: ergo si unus vindicat sibi locum alterius, non ita evenit, sicut Deus ordinavit, immo tota die fit transmutatio.

2. Item, super illud Iob trigesimo quarto[^8]: *Conteret multos*, Gregorius ibidem: «*Locum vitae, aliis cadentibus, alii sortiuntur*».

3. Item, quod non sit certitudo quantum ad numerum, videtur Lucae quinto[^9]: *Rumpebatur rete*; Glossa: «*Non tot intrant de Iudaeis, quot sunt praedestinati*»: ergo pauciores salvantur, quam sint praedestinati.

4. Item, Deuteronomii primo[^10]: *Addat Deus ad hunc numerum multa millia*; Glossa: «*Ad hunc numerum praedefinitum in Dei praescientia, qui novit, qui sunt eius*»: ergo si Deus addit ad numerum praedefinitum, non est certitudo quantum ad numerum salvandorum.

5. Item, quod quantum ad neutrum sit certi <!-- page 712 -->tudo, videtur. Intelligamus *ABC* esse numerum praedestinatorum, *DEF* numerum praescitorum: tunc quaero: *A* ita bene[^11] potest damnari, sicut et *D*, et e converso *D* ita salvari, sicut *A*: ergo nulla est certitudo quantum ad personas. Rursus *A* potest damnari, et tunc solum remanent duo, et *D* salvari, et tunc erunt quatuor: ergo nulla est certitudo quantum ad numerum.

6. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur deducendo ad inconveniens. Si enim certum est, qui et quot salvabuntur, ita quod sic eveniet, et non aliter, quamvis possit aliter[^12]: ergo nullus praedestinatus damnabitur aliquo casu vel eventu, et nullus praescitus salvabitur: ergo nullus debet curare, utrum faciat bene vel male, quia si praescitus est, quidquid faciat, in fine damnabitur; si praedestinatus, quidquid faciat, in fine salvabitur; stultus est ergo, qui non comedit et laetatur, et non habet bona in vita sua.

### Conclusio.

> *Praedestinatio a parte rei evenientis non habet certitudinem in eventu, a parte Dei praecognoscentis et disponentis habet certitudinem et infallibilitatis et immutabilitatis.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est dicere certitudinem a parte rei evenientis, et a parte Dei praeordinantis. Si loquamur de certitudine a parte rei, cum haec dicatur contra contingentiam, sic dico, quod non est maior certitudo in numero electorum, quam sit in numero aliorum futurorum contingentium, quia pendet eventus nostrae salutis et damnationis ex arbitrii nostri libertate. Si autem loquamur de certitudine a parte Dei praecognoscentis, sic certus est eventus salutis certitudine infallibilitatis, quia divina praescientia non fallitur, et ideo semper evenit, ut praescivit. Certum etiam est certitudine immutabilitatis, quia divina dispositio et ordinatio non variatur, ut modo unum eligat et modo alium, sed qui semel electus est, semper fuit et erit, et non alius.

**Ad argumenta:** Rationes ad primam partem inductae procedunt de certitudine eventus, non quantum ad necessitatem, sed quantum ad infallibilitatem aeternae praecognitionis, et quantum ad invariabilitatem aeternae praeordinationis.

*Ad 1, 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alius alterius locum accipit et coronam; dicendum, quod locus aeternae mansionis et corona retributionis alicui debetur secundum reputationem iustitiae, alicui secundum praedefinitionem praescientiae. Et contingit, quod unus locus debetur alicui secundum praesentem iustitiam, eo quod, illo cadente, alius intrat, cui debetur secundum praedefinitionem aeternam. Quando vero alicui debetur locus secundum praedefinitionem aeternam, potest quidem cadere et locum perdere, et alius, qui non est praedestinatus, potest acquirere; sed tamen hoc nunquam eveniet. Quia ergo praescitus iustus frequenter locum aeternae mansionis perdit, quem alius paris meriti acquirit; et nemo scit, utrum sit praescitus, vel praedestinatus: ideo, quamvis sciat, se esse iustum, timere debet, ne amittat locum. Et ad hunc timorem hortatur beatus Ioannes in praedicta auctoritate Apocalypsis. Et hic timor bonus est omnibus, et praescitis et praedestinatis, quia humiliat et sollicitat. Econtra, certitudo de electione elevat in tumorem et deprimit in torporem; ideo secundum ordinatissimam dispensationem hoc factum est, ut nulli reveletur, an sit praedestinatus, nisi sit a Deo confirmatus in bono, ut non possit elevari per superbiam vel torpere per negligentiam. Patet ergo, quod illa auctoritas non significat mutationem fieri in praescientia, vel aliter evenire, quam Deus praescivit, sed quod qui actualiter iustus est potest locum, quo dignus est, perdere perdendo iustitiam, et quod qui peccator est potest locum sibi indebitum acquirere acquirendo iustitiam; et hoc tota die contingit. — Exemplum in veteri Testamento manifestum fuit de Saule et David in regno, cui scilicet Sauli recte potuit dici: *Tene quod habes*, id est humilitatem et iustitiam, *ne alius accipiat coronam tuam*, id est tibi debitam secundum statum praesentem, alii tamen debitam secundum dispositionem aeternam. Exemplum etiam est in coronis quadraginta Martyrum.

*Ad 3, 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de diminutione <!-- page 713 -->et augmento, dicendum, quod totum referendum est illud ad statum praesentis iustitiae. Nam illa Glossa: «*Non tot intrant*» intelligitur tempore primitivae Ecclesiae, quia multi intrabunt in tempore finalis Ecclesiae. Similiter quod dicitur, quod *Deus addat ad hunc numerum*, intelligitur iustificando plures et vocando ad fidem.

*Ad 5.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod possunt esse plures et pauciores et alii, quam sint praesciti, ergo ibi non est certitudo; dicendum, quod non est certitudo necessitatis, est tamen certitudo infallibilitatis. Quamvis enim possint esse alii et plures, tamen nunquam erunt; et si essent, tunc ab aeterno praedestinati essent: ideo non potest ibi cadere aliqua mutatio.

*Ad 6.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si ita evenit, tunc frustra laborat praescitus et praedestinatus; dicendum, quod illud est argumentum stultorum, quod ducit eos in torporem et impietatis excusationem. Et ideo primo ostendendum est, eos stulte arguere, inferendo a simili, dicendo sic: Deus praeordinavit, utrum tu debeas cras vivere, an non; ad quid ergo comedis et bibis? Qui sic argueret et tali rationi consentiret, argueretur dementiae; similiter in proposito. — Secundo respondetur contra arguendo: tu dicis, quod Deus praedestinat, et ego dico, quod Deus tanquam iustus iudex iuste remunerat. «*Nullum ergo bonum irremuneratum, nullum malum impunitum*[^13]»: ergo nullus laborat sine fructu, nullus torpescit sine damno. — Et propterea dicendum, quod praedicta argumentatio deficit: procedit enim, ac si Deus praedestinaret et praesciret in omnem eventum; sed non praedestinat hominem ad salutem nisi per merita, nec reprobat, ut perveniat in damnationem sine meritis. Et ideo non solum est nostra salus ex parte Dei, sed etiam ex parte nostra; et cum ipse velit, *omnes salvos fieri*[^14] et omnibus gratiam impertiri, solum ex nostra malitia vel negligentia venit defectus nostrae salutis.

english:
<!-- page 711 -->

### Question II.
#### *Whether predestination posits certainty in the outcome.*

Secondly, granted that predestination does not impose necessity on free choice such that things cannot be otherwise, it is asked whether it posits certainty in the outcome — namely, that things never happen otherwise than as God has foredefined. And that it does is shown thus:

1. *First*, by the authority of John 13[^1]: *I know whom I have chosen*; and 2 Timothy 2[^2]: *God knows who are his*: therefore if the divine cognition is certain and infallible, and would be deceived if those whom he knows certainly to be his own were not saved, then it is true that things happen just as God foredefined, and thus etc.

2. Likewise, 1 John 2[^3]: *They went out from us, but they were not of us*. He posits this then for a sign: that this is the sign that a man was not elect, when he did not persevere finally in the good. If therefore that sign is correct, it is certain that all the predestined and they alone finally persevere in grace; and if this is certain, that they alone are saved and all of them: therefore there is certainty in the outcome.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Gift of Perseverance*[^4]: «*Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits by which whoever are delivered are most certainly delivered*». If therefore they are delivered most certainly, it is plain that the certainty of salvation is with respect to persons, and so etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On Correction and Grace*[^5]: «*Certain is the number of the elect, which can neither be diminished nor increased*»: therefore it appears that there is certainty in the determinate number.

5. Likewise, this seems also by reason, since *in the Father's house there are many mansions*, as is said in John 14[^6]: either, then, God foresaw who ought to dwell there, or not. It is plain that he foresaw who ought to be there: therefore if any of them be missing, some mansion will remain empty. But this is unfitting and unbecoming in the heavenly city: therefore it is certain that every predestined one will have his place.

6. Likewise, the number of the elect foredefined by God is by the most fitting reason and proportion — for if he made all things in the most ordered way, much more so the heavenly city — but the best proportion is marred and lost by addition and diminution: therefore if there cannot be any defect of fitting order and proportion there, with certainty just so many will be saved, and not more nor fewer than God foresaw.

**On the contrary:**

1. That there is no certainty of outcome with regard to persons appears thus: Apocalypse 3[^7]: *Hold what thou hast, that no one take thy crown*; Gregory thereon: «*While one falls, another is brought in into his place*»: therefore if one claims for himself another's place, things do not happen as God ordained, but rather there is exchange all day long.

2. Likewise, on that text of Job 34[^8]: *He shall break in pieces many*, Gregory in the same place: «*The place of life, when some fall, others obtain by lot*».

3. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to number, appears from Luke 5[^9]: *The net was breaking*; Gloss: «*Not so many of the Jews enter as are predestined*»: therefore fewer are saved than are predestined.

4. Likewise, Deuteronomy 1[^10]: *May God add unto this number many thousands*; Gloss: «*Unto this number predefined in God's foreknowledge, who knows who are his*»: therefore if God adds to the predefined number, there is no certainty as to the number of those to be saved.

5. Likewise, that there is no certainty as to either, <!-- page 712 -->appears thus. Let us understand *ABC* to be the number of the predestined, *DEF* the number of the foreknown: then I ask: *A* can just as well[^11] be damned as *D*, and conversely *D* be saved as *A*: therefore there is no certainty as to persons. Again, *A* can be damned, and then only two remain, and *D* be saved, and then there will be four: therefore there is no certainty as to number.

6. Likewise, this same is shown by reduction to absurdity. For if it is certain who and how many will be saved, in such a way that it will so happen and not otherwise, although it could be otherwise[^12]: therefore no predestined one will be damned in any case or event, and no foreknown one will be saved: therefore no one need care whether he act well or ill, since if he is foreknown, whatever he does, in the end he will be damned; if predestined, whatever he does, in the end he will be saved; foolish therefore is he who *does not eat and rejoice, and have his goods in his life*.

### Conclusion.

> *Predestination, on the side of the thing happening, does not have certainty in the outcome; on the side of God foreknowing and disposing, it has the certainty both of infallibility and of immutability.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one must speak of certainty on the side of the thing happening, and on the side of God who pre-ordains. If we speak of certainty on the side of the thing, since this is said against contingency, I say thus, that there is no greater certainty in the number of the elect than there is in the number of other future contingents, since the outcome of our salvation and damnation depends on the freedom of our choice. But if we speak of certainty on the side of God foreknowing, then the outcome of salvation is certain with the certainty of infallibility, since the divine foreknowledge is not deceived, and therefore it always happens just as he foreknew. It is also certain with the certainty of immutability, since the divine disposition and ordination is not varied, so that he should now choose one and now another, but he who has once been chosen, always was and will be, and not another.

**To the arguments:** The reasons adduced for the first part proceed concerning certainty of outcome, not as to necessity, but as to the infallibility of the eternal foreknowledge, and as to the invariability of the eternal pre-ordination.

*To 1, 2.* To that which is objected, that one receives another's place and crown; it must be said that the place of the eternal mansion and the crown of retribution is owed to one according to the reckoning of justice, to another according to the predefinition of foreknowledge. And it happens that one place is owed to someone according to present justice, in that, when he has fallen, another enters, to whom it is owed according to the eternal predefinition. But when a place is owed to someone according to the eternal predefinition, he can indeed fall and lose the place, and another, who is not predestined, can acquire it; yet this never will happen. Since therefore the foreknown just man often loses the place of the eternal mansion, which another of equal merit acquires; and no one knows whether he is foreknown or predestined: therefore, although he know himself to be just, he ought to fear lest he lose the place. And to this fear blessed John exhorts in the aforesaid authority of the Apocalypse. And this fear is good for all, both the foreknown and the predestined, since it humbles and stirs to vigilance. On the contrary, certainty about election lifts up into swelling and presses down into torpor; therefore by a most ordered dispensation it has been so done, that to no one is it revealed whether he is predestined, unless he be confirmed by God in the good, so that he cannot be lifted up by pride or grow torpid through negligence. It is plain therefore that that authority does not signify a change being made in the foreknowledge, or things happening otherwise than God foreknew, but that he who is actually just can lose the place of which he is worthy by losing justice, and that he who is a sinner can acquire a place not owed to him by acquiring justice; and this happens all day long. — There is a manifest example in the Old Testament of Saul and David in the kingdom, namely, where to Saul it could rightly be said: *Hold what thou hast*, that is humility and justice, *that no one take thy crown*, that is, owed to thee according to the present state, yet owed to another according to the eternal disposition. There is also an example in the crowns of the forty Martyrs.

*To 3, 4.* To what is objected concerning diminution <!-- page 713 -->and increase, it must be said that all that is to be referred to the state of present justice. For that Gloss: «*Not so many enter*» is to be understood as of the time of the primitive Church, since many will enter in the time of the final Church. Likewise what is said, that *God adds unto this number*, is to be understood as justifying more and calling them to faith.

*To 5.* To what is objected, that there can be more and fewer and others than the foreknown, therefore there is no certainty there; it must be said that there is not certainty of necessity, but there is certainty of infallibility. For although there could be others and more, yet there never will be; and if there were, then they would have been predestined from eternity: therefore no change can fall there.

*To 6.* To what is objected, that if it so happens, then the foreknown and the predestined labour in vain; it must be said that this is the argument of fools, which leads them into torpor and into the excuse of impiety. And therefore first it must be shown that they argue foolishly, by inferring from the like, saying thus: God has pre-ordained whether you are to live tomorrow or not; to what end then do you eat and drink? He who would so argue and assent to such reasoning would be charged with madness; likewise in the matter at hand. — Secondly, the answer is given by counter-arguing: you say that God predestines, and I say that God as a just judge justly rewards. «*No good then unrewarded, no evil unpunished*[^13]»: therefore no one labours without fruit, no one grows torpid without damage. — And on this account it must be said that the foregoing argumentation is defective: for it proceeds as if God predestined and foreknew with regard to every event; but he does not predestine man to salvation save through merits, nor does he reprobate so that one comes into damnation without demerits. And so our salvation is not only on the side of God, but also on our side; and since he wills *all to be saved*[^14] and to impart grace to all, only from our malice or negligence does the defect of our salvation come.

la: Vers. 18. — Sequens textus est loc. cit. vers. 19, quem textum Vulg. sic exhibet: *Cognovit Dominus, qui sunt eius*. — Circa finem argumenti pro *evenit* Vat. cum aliquibus mss. *eveniet*.

en: Verse 18. — The following text is at the cited place, verse 19, which the Vulgate gives thus: *The Lord knew who are his*. — Near the end of the argument, for *evenit* the Vatican edition with some manuscripts reads *eveniet*.

la: Vers. 19, ubi Vulgata *prodierant* pro *exierunt*. — Vat. post *pro signo* interiicit *scilicet*.

en: Verse 19, where the Vulgate has *prodierant* for *exierunt*. — The Vatican edition, after *pro signo*, inserts *scilicet*.

la: Nunc, ut iam supra dictum est, *de Dono persever.* nuncupat., c. 14. n. 35; sicut *de Correctione et gratia* (ut legitur in arg. seq.) nunc *de Correptione* etc. cfr. supra 699, col. II. nota 3.

en: Now, as has already been said above, called *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 14, n. 35; just as *On Correction and Grace* (as it is read in the following argument) is now called *On Correption* etc. Cf. above 699, col. II, note 3.

la: Cap. 13. n. 39. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine argumenti pro *quoto* Vat. *quodam*. Adiectivum *quotus* idem significat quod *determinatus*, sicut et appellatio *quota* significat quoddam determinatum, «*quod quisque principi aut domino in tributum vel censum praestare tenetur*». Du Cange, *Glossar. mediae et infimae latin.*

en: Chapter 13, n. 39. See here the *Letter of the Master*, c. 1. — At the end of the argument, for *quoto* the Vatican edition reads *quodam*. The adjective *quotus* signifies the same as *determinatus* (determined), just as the noun *quota* signifies something determined, «*which everyone is bound to pay to a prince or lord as tribute or tax*». Du Cange, *Glossary of medieval and late Latin*.

la: Vers. 2. — Pro *quam* Vat. *quot*.

en: Verse 2. — For *quam* the Vatican edition reads *quot*.

la: Vers. 1, ubi Vulgata *ut nemo* pro *ne alius*. — Textus mox allatus et Gregorio adscriptus, quoad sententiam invenitur in eius libr. XXV. *Moral.* c. 8. n. 20, et c. 13. n. 31; sed verba ipsa, ut citata sunt, habentur in *Glossa ordinaria* ad praenotata verba Apocalyps., quare et Vat. pro *Gregorius* substituit *Glossa*.

en: Verse 1, where the Vulgate has *ut nemo* for *ne alius*. — The text quoted just above and ascribed to Gregory is found, as to its sense, in his book XXV. of the *Morals*, c. 8, n. 20, and c. 13, n. 31; but the very words, as cited, are had in the *Glossa ordinaria* on the aforesaid words of the Apocalypse, on which account the Vatican edition substitutes *Glossa* for *Gregorius*.

la: Vers. 24. — Verba Gregorii habentur XXV. *Moral.* c. 8. n. 19, ubi in textu originali *illis* pro *aliis*.

en: Verse 24. — The words of Gregory are had in XXV. *Morals* c. 8, n. 19, where in the original text is *illis* for *aliis*.

la: Vers. 6. — Glossae ordinariae integer textus hic est: *Non tot intrant de Iudaeis, quot apud Deum ad vitam erant praeordinati*.

en: Verse 6. — The full text of the *Glossa ordinaria* here is: *Not so many of the Jews enter as had been pre-ordained unto life with God*.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossa ordinaria integre sic: *Ad hunc numerum, definitum apud Deum. Novit qui sunt eius, qui numerat multitudinem stellarum*.

en: Verse 11. — The *Glossa ordinaria* in full thus: *Unto this number, defined with God. He knows who are his, who numbers the multitude of the stars*.

la: Cod. X post *ita* repetit *bene*.

en: Codex X after *ita* repeats *bene*.

la: Vat., omissis verbis *quamvis possit aliter*, post sequentem voculam *ergo* interiicit *certum est, quod*, quae accessio nec in ed. 1 habetur nec in codd. In omnibus ferme codd. inveniuntur verba a Vat. suppressa *quamvis possit aliter*, sed codd. perperam eis praefigunt *ergo*, excepto cod. T (in quo a secunda manu *ergo* expunctum est) nec non excepta ed. 1, quos duos duces nos sumus secuti. Cod. X, qui de cetero convenit cum ceteris codd., omittit *ergo* ante *nullus praedestinatus*. — Respiciuntur verba Sap. 2, 6. seqq.; Isai. 22, 13; Luc. 12, 19. — Pro *non habet* *non sumit* ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition, having omitted the words *quamvis possit aliter*, after the following little word *ergo* inserts *certum est, quod*, which addition is neither in ed. 1 nor in the codices. In nearly all the codices are found the words *quamvis possit aliter* suppressed by the Vatican, but the codices wrongly prefix *ergo* to them, except codex T (in which by a second hand *ergo* has been struck out) and except ed. 1, which two we have followed as guides. Codex X, which otherwise agrees with the rest of the codices, omits *ergo* before *nullus praedestinatus*. — Reference is made to the words of Wisdom 2, 6 ff.; Isaiah 22, 13; Luke 12, 19. — For *non habet* ed. 1 has *non sumit*.

la: Cod. W *praedestinantis*. Mox post *rei* Vat. addit *evenientis*. Dein pro *dicatur* codd. P Q X (T in marg.) *dividatur*. — Vat. et cod. cc hic adiiciunt *nostrae*, et paulo inferius post *ideo* omittunt *semper*. — Ed. 1 *praecognitionis*; Vat. *praedestinationis*. — Vat. cum ed. 1 voci *iustitiae* praemittit *praesentis*. Codd. A I in hac propositione bis *aliter* pro *alicui*. Paulo inferius pro *eo quod* Vat. cum paucis codd. *et quod*. — Vat. et nonnulli codd. *dispositionem*. Mox pro *a Deo* plures mss. *adeo*. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. *debitum*, quae lectio bene explicari potest. Paulo superius pro *praescivit* Vat. *praescit*, ed. 1 *praesciverit*. — Cfr. 1. Reg. c. 13. seq. — De exemplo quadraginta Martyrum cfr. *Breviar. Roman.* die 10 Martii.

en: Codex W reads *praedestinantis*. Soon after *rei* the Vatican adds *evenientis*. Then for *dicatur* codices P Q X (T in margin) read *dividatur*. — The Vatican edition and codex cc here add *nostrae*, and a little later, after *ideo*, omit *semper*. — Ed. 1 reads *praecognitionis*; the Vatican *praedestinationis*. — The Vatican edition with ed. 1 prefixes *praesentis* to the word *iustitiae*. Codices A I in this proposition twice read *aliter* for *alicui*. A little later for *eo quod* the Vatican with a few codices reads *et quod*. — The Vatican edition and several codices read *dispositionem*. Soon for *a Deo* several manuscripts read *adeo*. — The Vatican edition with one or two codices reads *debitum*, which reading can well be explained. A little above, for *praescivit* the Vatican reads *praescit*, ed. 1 *praesciverit*. — Cf. 1 Kings c. 13 ff. — For the example of the forty Martyrs cf. *Roman Breviary*, March 10.

la: Vat. omittit *stultorum*, et paulo inferius cum cod. cc pro *praeordinavit* substituit *praedestinavit*. Deinde post *an non* cod. X interserit *si non*. — Hoc axioma formatum videtur ex dictis Boeth., IV. *de Consol.* prosa 1. et 4, sub cuius nomine circumferebatur. Cfr. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* etc., quarum iam supra pag. 101, nota 6. mentionem fecimus. Aliquanto superius pro *contra arguendo* Vat. *argumentando*.

en: The Vatican edition omits *stultorum*, and a little later with codex cc substitutes *praedestinavit* for *praeordinavit*. Then after *an non* codex X inserts *si non*. — This axiom appears to be formed from the sayings of Boethius, IV. *de Consolatione* prose 1 and 4, under whose name it was current. Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* etc., of which we have already made mention above on page 101, note 6. Somewhat earlier, for *contra arguendo* the Vatican reads *argumentando*.

la: Epist. I. Tim. 2, 4: *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis venire*. — Iuvat hic afferre quod Augustinus, *de Dono persever.* c. 15. n. 38, enarrat de quodam monacho: «*Fuit quidam in nostro monasterio, qui corripientibus fratribus, cur quaedam non facienda faceret, et facienda non faceret, respondebat: Qualiscumque nunc sim, talis ero, qualem me Deus futurum esse praescivit. Qui profecto et verum dicebat, et hoc vero non proficiebat in bonum, sed usque adeo profecit in malum, ut, deserta monasterii societate, fieret canis reversus ad suum vomitum*».

en: 1 Timothy 2, 4: *Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth*. — It is helpful here to bring forward what Augustine, *On the Gift of Perseverance*, c. 15, n. 38, narrates of a certain monk: «*There was a certain man in our monastery, who, when the brethren chided him as to why he did certain things which were not to be done, and did not do those which were to be done, would reply: Whatever I now am, such I shall be, as God foreknew that I would be. Who indeed spoke truly, but he did not by this truth profit unto good, but advanced so far in evil that, having forsaken the fellowship of the monastery, he became a dog returned to his vomit*».

latin_scholion:
**I.** Additur haec quaestio, ne quis ex principiis antea stabilitis derogare possit *certitudini* divinae praedestinationis. Simul in solutione ad 3. resolvitur alia quaestio, utrum scil. numerus praedestinatorum *augeri* possit; et in solutione ad 6. valide et triplici argumentatione retunditur insipientia eorum, qui doctrina hac ad impietatis excusationem abutuntur.

**II.** Distinctionem certitudinis a parte rei evenientis, et a parte Dei praedestinantis etiam S. Thom. (*S.* I. q. 116. a. 3; *de Verit.* q. 6. a. 3. in fine corp. et alibi) adhibet. Haec in genere ab omnibus conceditur, licet de ratione certitudinis a parte Dei dissentiant. — Quod nemo, seclusa revelatione, certo scire potest, se esse praedestinatum, docetur a Concilio Trid. (Sess. 6. c. 12.), et a S. Doctore confirmatur infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. et alibi.

**III.** Alex. Hal., *S.* p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** This question is added, lest from the principles previously established anyone derogate from the *certainty* of divine predestination. At the same time, in the solution to 3 another question is resolved, namely whether the number of the predestined can be *increased*; and in the solution to 6, the foolishness of those who abuse this doctrine as an excuse for impiety is robustly refuted by a threefold argumentation.

**II.** The distinction of the certainty on the side of the thing happening, and on the side of God who predestines, is also employed by St. Thomas (*Summa* I. q. 116. a. 3; *de Veritate* q. 6. a. 3. at the end of the corpus, and elsewhere). This is in general conceded by all, although they disagree about the ground of the certainty on God's side. — That no one, apart from revelation, can know with certainty that he is predestined, is taught by the Council of Trent (Sess. 6. c. 12), and is confirmed by the holy Doctor below at d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. and elsewhere.

**III.** Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I. q. 28. m. 2. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 11. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3.

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license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

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