title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS I.
### *De matrimonii quidditate.*

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae.*

Quantum ad primum quaeritur, utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per rationem, quam ponit Magister in littera[^p675-2]: «Matrimonium, inquit, est maris et feminae coniunctio».

2. Et quod ita sit, ostenditur *ratione*. Solo viro existente, non est matrimonium; similiter sola muliere existente, non est matrimonium: ergo matrimonium est in simultate et in coniunctione unius ad alterum.

3. Item, nihil absolutum est unum[^p675-3] in duobus subiectis; sed matrimonium unum est in viro et femina: ergo non dicit quid absolutum, sed relatum. Sed illud, quodcumque sit, cum non sit disparitas, sed conformitas, non est disiunctio, sed coniunctio.

4. Item, illud, ad quod consequuntur ista tria bona, scilicet fides, proles et Sacramentum, est recte matrimonium; hoc autem est coniunctio maris et feminae, ubi est *fides* in singularitate, *proles* in fecunditate et *significatio* in insolubilitate[^p675-4]: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Multiplicato superiori essentiali, multiplicatur inferius[^p675-5]: ergo si matrimonium est coniunctio, quoties vir et uxor coniunguntur, toties matrimonium contrahitur, et ita inter eundem virum et eandem mulierem erunt plura matrimonia; quod si falsum est: ergo etc.

2. Item, nullum Sacramentum iteratur super eandem materiam: ergo si matrimonium est coniunctio viri cum muliere, ex quo semel coniungitur, non debet amplius coniungi cum eadem. Sed hoc est falsum et inconveniens: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne Sacramentum est signum sensibile; sed nulla relatio est signum sensibile, coniunctio autem maris et feminae est relatio: ergo coniunctio talis non est signum, ergo nec Sacramentum; ergo *a simplici conversa*[^p675-6], nullum Sacramentum est coniunctio, ergo nec matrimonium.

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4. Item, si matrimonium est coniunctio, aut ergo *corporum*, aut *animorum*. Non *animorum*, quia tunc matrimonium esset in patria; non *corporum*, quia tunc inter Mariam et Ioseph non fuisset coniugium.

5. Item, sive sit coniunctio *corporum* secundum commixtionem, sive *animorum* secundum consensum; contingit, talem coniunctionem removeri per odium: ergo et matrimonium solvi et destrui. Sed hoc falsum est, ut iam patebit[^p676-1]: ergo matrimonium non est coniunctio.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Matrimonium recte dicitur coniunctio maris et feminae.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod matrimonium secundum *genus remotum* est *signum*; specificatio autem vel descensus ad *genus inferius* accipitur secundum comparationem ad *signatum*; unde cum signatum in hoc Sacramento sit *coniunctio Christi et Ecclesiae*, et coniunctio non potest melius significari quam per coniunctionem exteriorem[^p676-2], sicut baptismi ablutio per ablutionem aquae exteriorem: ideo, sicut baptismus dicitur *ablutio*, sic matrimonium dicitur essentialiter et secundum genus suum *coniunctio*. — Et nota, quod sicut in *ablutione baptismi* est aliquid *permanens*, sicut impressio characteris interior, et aliquid *transiens*, ut lotio exterior, et utrumque dicitur baptismus[^p676-3]; sic in *matrimonio* est aliquid *permanens*, et hoc est vinculum, per quod ligatur vir et mulier, quantumcumque exterius separentur; et est aliquid *transiens*, sicut coniunctio primo facta per verbum exterius, vel per exteriorem actum; et utraque dicitur *matrimonium*, et utraque est coniunctio. Et ideo recte matrimonium coniunctio dicitur et est, sicut rationes primae ostendunt.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multoties coniunguntur; dicendum, quod quaedam coniunctio *dicitur vinculum*, quaedam *facit vinculum*, quaedam *est usus vinculi*. Dico igitur, quod prima et secunda, quia respiciunt substantiam matrimonii, non iterantur, sed solum tertia; et ad multiplicationem illius non sequitur multiplicatio matrimonii, quoniam non est *genus in essendo*, sed *actus in utendo* sive *usus in agendo*.

2. Et ex hoc patet sequens, quia non est iteratio Sacramenti; et sicut frequenter *manducare corpus Christi* non dicit Sacramenti *iterationem*, sed *usum*; sic in proposito intelligendum; licet non sit simile omnino, quia quod semel manducatum est iterum manducari non potest; sed haec mulier, quae semel cognita est, iterum cognosci potest.

3. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est signum sensibile; dicendum, quod sicut *similitudo corporalis* sensu percipitur non ratione sui[^p676-4], sed ratione qualitatum, in quibus est assimilatio, quae sensu deprehenduntur; sic intelligendum est in proposito, quod quamvis coniunctio *secundum se* non sit perceptibilis ut relatio, est tamen *ratione eorum quae coniunguntur*, ut viri et mulieris, et *ratione signi*, in quod, vel per quod coniunguntur.

4. 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit *corporum*, an *animorum*; dicendum, quod animorum in corporibus[^p676-5], quia est coniunctio ratione utentium et habentium sexus distinctos; illa autem coniunctio, quae respicit *totum coniunctum* et est matrimonium essentialiter, non est affectio *animorum*, vel approximatio *corporum*, sed quoddam *vinculum obligatorium*, quod non perimitur, sive affectu, sive corpore separentur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum.

english:
### Article I.
### *On the quiddity of marriage.*

### Question I.
### *Whether marriage is the union of male and female.*

Concerning the first point it is asked whether marriage is the union (*coniunctio*) of male and female. And that it is so, it seems:

1. By the reason which the Master sets down in the [Lombard's] text[^p675-2]: «Marriage, he says, is the union of male and female».

2. And that it is so is shown *by reason*. With the man alone existing, there is no marriage; likewise with the woman alone existing, there is no marriage: therefore marriage lies in a togetherness and in the joining of one to the other.

3. Likewise, nothing absolute is one[^p675-3] in two subjects; but marriage is one in the man and the woman: therefore it does not signify something absolute, but relative. But that [relation], whatever it be, since it is not a disparity but a conformity, is not a disjunction but a union.

4. Likewise, that upon which those three goods follow — namely fidelity, offspring, and the Sacrament — is properly marriage; but this is the union of male and female, where there is *fidelity* in singleness, *offspring* in fruitfulness, and *signification* in indissolubility[^p675-4]: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. When the superior essential [thing] is multiplied, the inferior is multiplied[^p675-5]: therefore if marriage is a union, as often as husband and wife are joined, so often is a marriage contracted, and thus between the same man and the same woman there will be several marriages; which if it is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no Sacrament is repeated over the same matter: therefore if marriage is a union of the man with the woman, once he is joined, he ought not to be joined again with the same [woman]. But this is false and unfitting: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every Sacrament is a sensible sign; but no relation is a sensible sign, and the union of male and female is a relation: therefore such a union is not a sign, therefore neither a Sacrament; therefore, *by simple conversion*[^p675-6], no Sacrament is a union, therefore neither is marriage.

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4. Likewise, if marriage is a union, then it is either *of bodies* or *of souls*. Not *of souls*, because then marriage would exist in the fatherland [heaven]; not *of bodies*, because then between Mary and Joseph there would have been no marriage.

5. Likewise, whether it be a union *of bodies* according to commingling, or *of souls* according to consent; it happens that such a union is removed through hatred: therefore marriage too [would be] dissolved and destroyed. But this is false, as will presently be shown[^p676-1]: therefore marriage is not a union.

### Conclusion.

> *Marriage is rightly called the union of male and female.*

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage according to its *remote genus* is a *sign*; but the specification or descent to the *inferior genus* is taken according to comparison to the *thing signified*; hence, since the thing signified in this Sacrament is the *union of Christ and the Church*, and a union cannot be better signified than by an exterior union[^p676-2], just as the washing of baptism [is signified] by the exterior washing of water: therefore, just as baptism is called a *washing*, so marriage is called, essentially and according to its genus, a *union*. — And note that, just as in the *washing of baptism* there is something *permanent*, like the interior impression of the character, and something *transient*, like the exterior washing, and each is called baptism[^p676-3]; so in *marriage* there is something *permanent*, and this is the bond by which the man and the woman are bound, however far they be exteriorly separated; and there is something *transient*, like the union first made by the exterior word, or by the exterior act; and each is called *marriage*, and each is a union. And therefore marriage is rightly called, and is, a union, as the first arguments show.

1. To that which is objected, that they are often joined; it must be said that a certain union *is called a bond*, a certain [union] *makes a bond*, a certain [union] *is the use of the bond*. I say therefore that the first and the second, because they regard the substance of marriage, are not repeated, but only the third; and upon the multiplication of that [third] there does not follow a multiplication of marriage, since it is not a *genus in being*, but an *act in using*, that is, a *use in acting*.

2. And from this the following [objection] is made clear, that there is no repetition of the Sacrament; and just as to *eat the body of Christ* frequently does not signify a *repetition* of the Sacrament, but its *use*; so it is to be understood in the case at hand; although it is not wholly similar, because what has once been eaten cannot be eaten again, whereas this woman, who has once been known, can be known again.

3. To that, then, which is objected, that it is a sensible sign; it must be said that, just as a *bodily likeness* is perceived by sense not by reason of itself[^p676-4], but by reason of the qualities in which there is the assimilation, which are apprehended by sense; so it must be understood in the case at hand, that although a union *in itself* is not perceptible as a relation, it is nevertheless [perceptible] *by reason of the things which are joined*, such as of the man and the woman, and *by reason of the sign* into which, or through which, they are joined.

4. 5. To that which is asked, whether it be *of bodies* or *of souls*; it must be said that [it is] of souls in bodies[^p676-5], because it is a union by reason of those who use and possess distinct sexes; but that union which regards the *whole joined thing* and is marriage essentially, is not an affection *of souls*, or an approximation *of bodies*, but a certain *binding bond*, which is not destroyed, whether they be separated in affection or in body. And by this the response to the last [objection] is made clear.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2 [i.e. in the Master's text, chapter 2].

la: Cod. aa *unum et idem*, qui etiam *maiorem* explicat his verbis: *sicut patet, quia eadem albedo numero non est in diversis subiectis*.

en: Codex aa [reads] *one and the same*, which also explains the *major* [premise] in these words: *as is clear, because the same whiteness in number is not in diverse subjects*.

la: Cfr. infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXI. c. 1, et Comment. a. 1. q. 2.

en: Cf. below, the Master's text, d. XXXI, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 1, q. 2.

la: Vide supra pag. 197, nota 6.

en: See above, p. 197, note 6.

la: Petr. Hispan. *Summul.* tr. de Proposition., agens de conversione propositionum, *conversionem simplicem* ita describit: *Simplex conversio est, quando de subiecto fit praedicatum, et de praedicato subiectum, manente eadem qualitate et quantitate propositionis. Et hoc modo convertitur universalis negativa in se, et particularis affirmativa in se. Exemplum, ut: nullus homo est lapis: ergo nullus lapis est homo; quidam homo est animal: ergo quoddam animal est homo.* Cfr. Aristot., I. Prior. c. 2. — Vat. *a simplici conversione*.

en: Peter of Spain, *Summulae*, treatise on Propositions, treating of the conversion of propositions, describes *simple conversion* thus: *Simple conversion is when the predicate is made from the subject, and the subject from the predicate, the same quality and quantity of the proposition remaining. And in this way the universal negative is converted into itself, and the particular affirmative into itself. For example: no man is a stone: therefore no stone is a man; some man is an animal: therefore some animal is a man.* Cf. Aristotle, *Prior [Analytics]* I, c. 2. — The Vatican [edition reads] *by simple conversion*.

la: Art. 3. q. 1. seq.

en: Article 3, q. 1 and following.

la: Pro *exteriorem*, quod cod. B omittit, permulti codd. et ed. 1 recte, cod. Q *nec interior*, codd. S T *nec interior recte*. Superius pro *et coniunctio* Vat. *et interior*, quae etiam mox post *baptismi ablutio* cum ed. 1 addit *interior*, cod. O legit: *sicut nec interior baptismi ablutio* [melius potest significari], lectio non spernenda, si ex cod. Q addatur *quam*.

en: For *exteriorem*, which codex B omits, very many codices and ed. 1 [have it] rightly; codex Q [reads] *nec interior*, codices S, T *nec interior* rightly. Above, for *et coniunctio* the Vatican [edition reads] *et interior*, which [reading] also, shortly after, following *baptismi ablutio*, together with ed. 1 adds *interior*; codex O reads: *sicut nec interior baptismi ablutio* [can be better signified] — a reading not to be spurned, if from codex Q one adds *quam*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

la: Quia in se spectata est relatio (cfr. Aristot.; V. Metaph. text. 20.), ad quam cognoscendam requiritur, ut cognoscens conferat extrema (relationis) inter se, quod non est sensitivae, sed rationalis potentiae (cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 57, et August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53. seqq.). Sensitivae potentiae obiectum per se sunt accidentales corporum qualitates (vide supra pag. 286, nota 9.). — Inferius pro *quae sensu deprehenduntur* cod. K *quas sensus deprehendunt* (plures codd. et ed. 1 perperam *quae sensus deprehendunt*).

en: Because, considered in itself, it is a relation (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, text 20), for the knowing of which it is required that the knower compare the extremes (of the relation) with each other, which belongs not to the sensitive but to the rational power (cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III, text 57, and Augustine, *On True Religion*, c. 29, n. 53 ff.). The object of the sensitive power are of themselves the accidental qualities of bodies (see above, p. 286, note 9). — Below, for *quae sensu deprehenduntur* codex K [reads] *quas sensus deprehendunt* (several codices and ed. 1 wrongly *quae sensus deprehendunt*).

la: Vat. *quod est corporum et animorum*.

en: The Vatican [edition reads] *that it is of bodies and of souls*. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; Suppl. q. 44. a. 1.) cum aliis docet, matrimonium esse in genere *coniunctionis*, qua coniuges ordinantur ad aliquod unum, et quae simul est «vinculum, quo ligantur *formaliter*, non *effective*»; «coniunctio autem corporum vel animorum ad matrimonium consequitur». Idem (locc. citt. quaestiunc. 3. et a. 3.) explicat etiam definitionem Hugonis a S. Vict., quod matrimonium sit «duarum idonearum personarum legitimus de coniunctione consensus» [definitio per *causam*]; nec non tertiam, quod sit «consortium vitae communis et communicatio divini et humani iuris» [secundum *effectum*, ad quem ordinatur]. De 3. definitione dicit B. Albert. (hic a. 2.), quod sit decretistarum, qui «parum solent curare de definitionibus, vel aliis ad subtilem intellectum pertinentibus». Cfr. hic dub. 1.

De 1. quaestione praeter citatos locos: Scot., hic q. 1. et supra d. 16. q. unica n. 17. — B. Albert., loc. cit. et a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., supra d. 26. a. 4.[?] q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

**II.** De nomine *matrimonii* etiam alii coaevi magistri referunt easdem vel similes etymologias, plerumque parum solidas.
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— Cfr. S. Thom., locc. citt. quaestiunc. 2. et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** St. Thomas too (here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 44, a. 1) teaches with others that marriage is in the genus of *union* (*coniunctio*), by which spouses are ordered to some one thing, and which is at the same time «a bond by which they are bound *formally*, not *effectively*»; «but a union of bodies or of souls follows upon marriage». The same [Thomas] (in the places cited, quaestiuncula 3 and a. 3) also explains the definition of Hugh of St. Victor, that marriage is «the lawful consent of two fit persons concerning their conjunction» [a definition by *cause*]; and also a third, that it is «a partnership of common life and a sharing of divine and human law» [according to the *effect* to which it is ordered]. Concerning the 3rd definition B. Albert (here a. 2) says that it belongs to the decretists, who «are wont to care little about definitions, or about other things pertaining to subtle understanding». Cf. here dub. 1.

On the 1st question, besides the places cited: Scotus, here q. 1 and above, d. 16, q. unica, n. 17. — B. Albert, loc. cit. and a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, above, d. 26, a. 4[?], q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

**II.** Concerning the name *matrimony*, other contemporary masters too report the same or similar etymologies, for the most part not very solid.
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— Cf. St. Thomas, in the places cited, quaestiuncula 2 and a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp. 675–677 (PDF pp. 695–697; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 73132–73309) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The auto-chunk skeleton's fenced OCR is cascade-shattered (two-column diagonal bleed), so the bands are authoritative throughout. The default/first-pass `colcrop.py` bands (`split_x=1660` / `1880`) clipped the skewed two-column gutter; bands were regenerated at **`split_x=2120` for the left column and `split_x=1780` for the right** (Vol IV's page is skewed/wide). Marginal side-glosses (*Ad oppositum*, *Conclusio*, *Corollarium*, *Nota*, and a *Scholion positorum* margin tag) were trimmed per house rule as editorial marginalia; `CONCLUSIO`, `RESPONDEO`, and `SCHOLION` are retained as genuine section markers.

**Page-span correction (skeleton was wrong).** The skeleton frontmatter listed printed pp. **674–676**. Page-verify against the running heads shows the quaestio does **not** begin on p. 674: printed p. 674 and the top of p. 675 hold the d.27 **littera** (Master's text, Capp. IX–X, *Vocatur etiam sponsa… Quae sponsa sit vidua*) plus the `COMMENTARIUS / DIVISIO TEXTUS / TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM`, all of which belong to the **d.27 littera / divisio chunks**. `ARTICULUS I. / De matrimonii quidditate / QUAESTIO I` opens on the **lower half of p. 675** (running head "DIST. XXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. I."). Frontmatter corrected to `printed_pages: [675, 676, 677]` / `pdf_pages: [695, 696, 697]`.

**Opener / alignment verified.** The article-level divisio (top of p. 675, divisio chunk) reads *Circa primum quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, quid sit coniugium genere, sive re. Secundo, quid sit nomine.* This chunk is Article I's **q1** (*quid sit re* — whether marriage is the union of male and female); the body correctly opens *Quantum ad primum quaeritur, utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae.* QUAESTIO II (*Quid sit matrimonium nomine*) begins on p. 677 → next chunk `bon-sent-IV-d27-a1-q2`. Title verified from the band: *Utrum matrimonium sit coniunctio maris et feminae* (OCR garbled *coniunciio*).

**Page-split map (running heads verified eyes-on):**
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- **p. 676** (running head "676 — SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV."): *Contra* args. 4–5 (arg. 5 OCR'd as "D."), the CONCLUSIO, the Respondeo, the four replies (1 / 2 / 3 / 4–5), and the ARTICLE I **SCHOLION** §I + the *De 1. quaestione* register (both columns, small type below a rule). Footer note-series **1–5**, all this quaestio's (`p676-1…5`).
- **p. 677** (running head "DIST. XXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. — 677"): the scholion §II doctor-register tail (*— Cfr. S. Thom., locc. citt. quaestiunc. 2…*, held here), then **`III. De duabus seq. (2.) articuli quaestionibus`** (which pertains to **Article II** — not part of this Article I scholion) and QUAESTIO II. This chunk takes only the scholion §II tail from p. 677; p. 677's body + its own footer series belong to `bon-sent-IV-d27-a1-q2`.

**Scholion disposition — this is the Article I scholion (owned here).** Its header glyph OCR-garbles to `SCHOLIOK` (the PDF prints a clean `SCHOLION.`), located at raw ~L73272. Placed **last** in each language block per the parser gotcha. It has **two numbered sections and covers both questions of Article I**: **§ I** = the definitions of marriage (Thomas: genus of *coniunctio* / *vinculum*; Hugh of St. Victor's *definitio per causam*; the third *consortium vitae* definition; Albert on the decretists) + the doctor-register *De 1. quaestione* (→ **q. 1**, *utrum coniunctio*); **§ II** = *De nomine matrimonii* (the etymologies) + its doctor-register (*— Cfr. S. Thom., quaestiunc. 2…*) (→ **q. 2**, *quid sit nomine*, the sibling chunk `d27-a1-q2`, which therefore has no scholion of its own). It carries no keyed `[^N]` markers (unkeyed editorial prose). `has_scholion: true` set.

**Apparatus count: 10 footnotes** — p. 675 notes 2–6 (5), p. 676 notes 1–5 (5). Per-page numbering restarts (Quaracchi convention), so markers are page-prefixed (`p675-`, `p676-`). **Shared-page split:** p. 675's footer **note 1 is claimed by the d.27 divisio chunk** (its marker sits in the DIVISIO TEXTUS: *In secunda… confirmat*), not here — verify at the seam when that chunk is promoted.

**[?] flags:**
- **Scholion §I register, `Richard. a Med., supra d. 26. a. 4.[?] q. 1.`** — the digit after `a.` in the Richard-of-Mediavilla back-reference is ambiguous on the band: it reads as **`4`** (open-top four glyph), but the IA djvu OCR read it as `a. i.` (i.e. `a. 1.`). Rendered `a. 4[?]` per the band. Not doctrinally load-bearing (a doctor-citation register digit); to be resolved at the d.21–d.30 decade-gate 600 dpi pass.


site: bonaventure

collection: Book IV: On the Sacraments

title: Dist. 27, Art. 1, Q. 2

title_alt:
Quid sit matrimonium nomine
What marriage is according to its name

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Quid sit matrimonium nomine.*

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit nomine. Et quod *matrimonium* debeat hoc vinculum appellari, ostenditur:

1. *Primo* per iura canonica et civilia, quae sic appellant, et Magister sic appellat in littera[^1], et multiplex ad hoc adduci potest auctoritas. Unde Augustinus, contra Faustum libro decimo nono: «Matrimonium ob hoc dictum est, quod non ob aliud debeat femina nubere nisi ad hoc, ut mater fiat».

2. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia in aliis Sacramentis denominatio fit a materia vel a materiali principio, sicut patet, quia baptismus lavacrum dicitur ab aqua lavante magis quam a verbo; sed in hac coniunctione maris et feminae femina est per modum materiae: ergo videtur, quod per illam debeat denominatio fieri.

3. Item, quando relatio vel comparatio est inter extrema aliqua, si recte denominatur, ab eo debet denominari, in quo maior est dependentia; sed mulier magis indiget coniungi viro quam e converso: ergo talis coniunctio potius debet denominari a muliere quam a viro.

4. Item, relatio aequiparantiae potissime ei appropriatur, in quo est consummatio illius, sicut aequalitas et similitudo appropriatur Filio, pro eo quod dat praeintelligere principium a quo, Patri autem unitas appropriatur[^2]: ergo si vir primo creatus est unicus, et post mulier facta, ut ei coniungeretur ut adiutorium, et hoc per matrimonium: ergo hoc vinculum debet appellari *matrimonium*.

**Contra:**
1. In omnibus denominatio debet fieri a digniori; sed in coniunctione carnali sive matrimoniali dignius extremum est vir quam mulier, quoniam *caput mulieris est vir*[^3]: ergo etc.

2. Item, quaero, secundum quod genus causae sit ista denominatio. Si secundum genus causae *finalis*; sed *mulier propter virum facta est, non vir propter mulierem*[^4]: ergo potius debet denominari a patre. — Si secundum genus causae *efficientis*; sed efficiens est activum principium, et principium activum in coniunctione maris et feminae est vir: ergo potius debet denominari a viro. — Si secundum causam *materialem*; sed *non vir ex muliere, sed mulier de costa viri*[^5]. — Si secundum causam *formalem*; cum magis teneat rationem formae vir, sicut dicit Philosophus[^6], quod «materia appetit formam, sicut mulier appetit virum»: videtur, quod a viro debeat denominari.

3. Item, coniunctio maris et feminae est relatio aequiparantiae; sed respicit talis relatio utrumque extremum aequaliter, et talis relatio non magis denominatur ab uno quam ab altero: ergo non magis a patre quam a matre.

4. Item, denominatio rei non[^7] debet fieri ab eo quod accidit et abesse potest; sed vinculo tali sive Sacramento frequenter deest proles, ergo et maternitas: ergo cum falso talis mulier dicatur mater, falso tale vinculum dicitur matrimonium.

### Conclusio.

> Matrimonium habet quatuor etymologias, inter quas potissima est matris munium.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod istud vinculum sive coniunctio nec denominatur a *patre* nec a *matre*; sed cum sit vinculum unum, denominatur ab utroque, in quantum uniuntur; et quoniam pater et mater sive vir et mulier uniuntur, ut sint *una materia prolis*; ideo hoc Sacramentum matrimonium appellatur, non a *matre*, sed a *materia* et *monos*, quod est unum; inde matrimonium quasi *una materia*. — Sed licet istud videatur probabiliter dici, tamen est <!-- page 678 -->contra Isidorum, in nono libro Etymologiarum[^8], dicit, quod «matrimonium dicitur a *matre*; unde matrona dicitur quae iam nupsit, et est dicta matrona quasi *mater nati*». Unde, sicut ibidem colligitur, hoc Sacramentum appellatur *coniugium*, appellatur et *nuptiae*, appellatur et *matrimonium*. Et hanc triplicem denominationem habet secundum triplicem comparationem sive considerationem. Potest enim considerari secundum *id quod est*; et sic dicitur *coniugium*, quasi *commune iugum*, quia mutuum est vinculum et mutua potestas; et hoc dicit Isidorus in nono Etymologiarum[^9]. Aut secundum *signum*, in quo apparet; et sic dicitur *nuptiae*, quasi a *nubibus*, quia nubentes operiri solebant, et eorum capita velabantur; unde est nomen translatum. Aut secundum *fructum*, ad quem perducit; et quoniam perducit ad bonum prolis, ideo *matrimonium* appellatur. Magis autem bonum prolis per *matris* nomen datur intelligi, quia mulier propter procreationem liberorum facta est; unde facta est in adiutorium viri; et quia in procreatione prolis magis incumbit sibi labor[^10].

Unde nota, quod matrimonium quatuor habet etymologias secundum nomen *matris*: uno enim modo dicitur *matrimonium*, quasi *matris nomos*[^11], id est lex; quia, ut dicit Augustinus contra Faustum, «ad hoc debet femina nubere» etc. — Secundo modo, quia *matrem monet*, ut servet foedus contra luxuriam; contra quod dicitur Proverbiorum secundo[^12]: *Reliquit ducem pubertatis, et pacti Dei* etc. — Tertio modo, quia *matrem munit* ac defendit tum per virum, tum per prolem, quia mulier indiget defensore, Isaiae primo[^13]: *Defendite viduam*. — Quarto, matrimonium dicitur *matris munium*, id est matris officium, pro eo quod prolis enutritio et acquisitio maxime spectat ad mulierem in concipiendo, in portando, in pariendo, in nutriendo, in compatiendo; unde sicut possessio dicitur *patrimonium*, quia paterna sollicitudine acquiritur, sic prolis acquisitio *matrimonium* est; et haec est potissima inter omnes etymologias.

*Ad 1 et 2.* Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod a digniori debet fieri denominatio; dicendum, quod denominatio est a fructu ventris, et ita a digniori. Sed[^14] non fit denominatio a muliere, secundum quod *mulier*, sed secundum quod *mater*; et per hoc patet sequens, a quo genere causae sumitur, quia a causa finali, a qua maxime debent Sacramenta denominari.

*Ad 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione aequiparantiae, dicendum, quod vinculum illud in se consideratum aequaliter respicit utrumque extremum, sed relatum ad effectum, non; et hic fit denominatio per comparationem ad effectum.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non semper habent prolem; dicendum, quod non fit denominatio ab eventu, sed ab intentione, propter quam principaliter institutum fuit Sacramentum; et ideo non est ibi falsitas nec vanitas[^15].

---

english:
### Question II. *What marriage is according to its name.*

Secondly it is asked what it is by name. And that this bond ought to be called *matrimony* is shown:

1. *First*, through the canon and civil laws, which so name it, and the Master so names it in the text[^1], and manifold authority can be brought to bear on this. Hence Augustine, *Against Faustus*, book nineteen: «Matrimony was so called for this reason, that a woman ought not to marry for any other reason than this, that she may become a mother».

2. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because in the other Sacraments the denomination is made from the matter or from the material principle, as is evident, since baptism is called a *washing* from the water that washes rather than from the word; but in this joining of male and female the woman is by way of matter: therefore it seems that the denomination ought to be made through her.

3. Likewise, when a relation or comparison is between certain extremes, if it is rightly denominated, it ought to be denominated from that in which there is the greater dependence; but the woman needs more to be joined to the man than the reverse: therefore such a joining ought rather to be denominated from the woman than from the man.

4. Likewise, the relation of equiparance is most of all appropriated to that in which there is the consummation of it, just as equality and likeness are appropriated to the Son, on account of the fact that He gives us to understand beforehand the principle from which [He proceeds], while unity is appropriated to the Father[^2]: therefore, if the man was first created as the only one, and afterward the woman was made, that she might be joined to him as a helper, and this through matrimony: therefore this bond ought to be called *matrimony*.

**On the contrary:**
1. In all things the denomination ought to be made from the worthier; but in the carnal or matrimonial joining the worthier extreme is the man rather than the woman, since *the head of the woman is the man*[^3]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, I ask, according to which genus of cause this denomination is. If according to the genus of the *final* cause; but *the woman was made for the sake of the man, not the man for the sake of the woman*[^4]: therefore it ought rather to be denominated from the father. — If according to the genus of the *efficient* cause; but the efficient is the active principle, and the active principle in the joining of male and female is the man: therefore it ought rather to be denominated from the man. — If according to the *material* cause; but *the man is not from the woman, but the woman from the rib of the man*[^5]. — If according to the *formal* cause; since the man rather holds the character of form, as the Philosopher says[^6], that «matter desires form, as the woman desires the man»: it seems that it ought to be denominated from the man.

3. Likewise, the joining of male and female is a relation of equiparance; but such a relation regards each extreme equally, and such a relation is not denominated more from one than from the other: therefore not more from the father than from the mother.

4. Likewise, the denomination of a thing ought not[^7] to be made from that which is accidental and can be absent; but from such a bond or Sacrament offspring is frequently absent, and therefore also motherhood: therefore, since it would be falsely that such a woman be called *mother*, falsely is such a bond called *matrimony*.

### Conclusion.

> Matrimony has four etymologies, among which the chief is *the mother's office* (*matris munium*).

**I respond:** It must be said that some wished to say that this bond or joining is denominated neither from the *father* nor from the *mother*; but since it is one bond, it is denominated from both, insofar as they are united; and since father and mother, or man and woman, are united, that they may be *one matter of the offspring*; therefore this Sacrament is called *matrimonium*, not from *mater* (mother), but from *materia* (matter) and *monos*, which is *one*; whence *matrimonium* [is] as it were *una materia* (one matter). — But although this may seem to be said with probability, nevertheless it is <!-- page 678 -->contrary to Isidore, in the ninth book of the *Etymologies*[^8], [who] says that «matrimony is called from the *mother*; whence she who has now married is called a *matron*, and a matron is so called as it were *the mother of one born* (*mater nati*)». Hence, as is gathered from the same place, this Sacrament is called *coniugium* (wedlock), and is called *nuptiae* (nuptials), and is called *matrimonium*. And it has this threefold denomination according to a threefold comparison or consideration. For it can be considered according to *what it is*; and thus it is called *coniugium*, as it were *commune iugum* (a common yoke), because the bond is mutual and the power is mutual; and this Isidore says in the ninth book of the *Etymologies*[^9]. Or according to the *sign*, in which it appears; and thus it is called *nuptiae*, as it were from *clouds* (*nubes*), because those marrying were accustomed to be veiled, and their heads were covered; whence the name is transferred. Or according to the *fruit* to which it leads; and since it leads to the good of offspring, it is therefore called *matrimonium*. But the good of offspring is given to be understood rather through the name of the *mother*, because the woman was made for the procreation of children; whence she was made into a helper of the man; and because in the procreation of offspring the labor falls more upon her[^10].

Whence note that matrimony has four etymologies according to the name of the *mother*: for in one way it is called *matrimonium*, as it were *matris nomos*[^11], that is, *the mother's law*; because, as Augustine says *Against Faustus*, «for this a woman ought to marry» etc. — In a second way, because it *admonishes the mother* (*matrem monet*) to keep the covenant against lust; against which it is said in Proverbs, chapter two[^12]: *She has forsaken the guide of her youth, and the covenant of her God* etc. — In a third way, because it *protects the mother* (*matrem munit*) and defends her both through the husband and through the offspring, since the woman needs a defender, Isaiah, chapter one[^13]: *Defend the widow*. — Fourthly, matrimony is called *matris munium*, that is, the mother's office, for the reason that the nurture and acquisition of offspring pertains most of all to the woman — in conceiving, in carrying, in bearing, in nursing, in suffering-with; whence, just as a possession is called *patrimonium* because it is acquired by paternal care, so the acquisition of offspring is *matrimonium*; and this is the chief among all the etymologies.

*To 1 and 2.* To that, therefore, which is objected, that the denomination ought to be made from the worthier; it must be said that the denomination is made from the *fruit of the womb*, and thus from the worthier. But[^14] the denomination is not made from the woman as *woman*, but as *mother*; and through this the following [point] is evident, [namely] from which genus of cause it is taken, since [it is taken] from the final cause, from which the Sacraments ought most of all to be denominated.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the relation of equiparance, it must be said that that bond, considered in itself, regards each extreme equally, but as referred to the effect, [it does] not; and here the denomination is made through comparison to the effect.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that they do not always have offspring; it must be said that the denomination is not made from the outcome, but from the intention for the sake of which the Sacrament was principally instituted; and therefore there is neither falsity nor vanity in it[^15].

---

la: Hic c. 2. seqq. — Verba August., XIX. contra Faustum, c. 26, sunt: *Matrimonium quippe ex hoc appellatum est, quod* etc.

en: Here, c. 2 and following. — The words of Augustine, *Against Faustus* XIX, c. 26, are: *Matrimony indeed was named from this, that* etc.

la: Vide I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 2. q. 3. (de relatione *aequiparantiae* cfr. supra pag. 492, nota 2.). — Inferius respicitur Gen. 2, 18: *Non est bonum, esse hominem solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi.* — Post *sicut* plurimi codd. addunt *quia*. Paulo inferius pro *ut adiutorium* cod. bb *ad adiutorium*, edd. *in adiutorium*.

en: See I *Sent.*, d. 31, p. II, a. 2, q. 3 (on the relation of *equiparance* cf. above, p. 492, note 2). — Below is regarded Gen. 2:18: *It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like unto himself.* — After *just as* very many codices add *because*. A little below, for *as a helper* codex bb [reads] *for a helper*, the editions *into a helper*.

la: Eph. 5, 23. Cfr. I. Cor. 11, 3. — De maiori vide supra pag. 470, nota 7.

en: Eph. 5:23. Cf. 1 Cor. 11:3. — On the major [premise] see above, p. 470, note 7.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 11, 9: *Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum.*

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 11:9: *For the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man.*

la: Epist. I. Cor. 11, 8: *Non enim vir ex muliere est, sed mulier ex viro.* Cfr. Gen. 2, 21. seqq.

en: Epistle, 1 Cor. 11:8: *For the man is not from the woman, but the woman from the man.* Cf. Gen. 2:21 and following.

la: Libr. I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.).

en: *Physics*, Book I, text 81 (c. 9).

la: Vat. cum uno alterove cod. perperam omittit *non*. Inferius pro *proles* cod. G *prolis generatio*.

en: The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, wrongly omits *not*. Below, for *offspring* codex G [reads] *the generation of offspring*.

la: Cap. 7. n. 13. — Superius pro *quasi una* Vat. *quasi unius*.

en: Chapter 7, n. 13. — Above, for *as it were one [matter]* the Vatican [edition reads] *as it were of one*.

la: Cap. 7. n. 9. et 20. Ibid. n. 10. datur etiam seq. etymologia vocis *nuptiae*. Cfr. C. *Nec illud* (8.), C. 30. q. 5.

en: Chapter 7, nn. 9 and 20. In the same place, n. 10, is given also the following etymology of the word *nuptiae*. Cf. the canon *Nec illud* (8), Causa 30, q. 5.

la: In C. *Ex litteris tuis* (2.), X. de Conversione infidelium (lib. III. tit. 33.), dicitur, «quod [infans] magis materno indiget solatio quam paterno, sibique [matri] ante partum onerosus, dolorosus in partu, post partum laboriosus fuisse noscatur, ac ex hoc legitima coniunctio maris et feminae magis *matrimonium* quam *patrimonium* nuncupetur».

en: In the canon *Ex litteris tuis* (2), X, *On the Conversion of Unbelievers* (Book III, tit. 33), it is said, «that [the infant] needs the mother's comfort more than the father's, and to her [the mother] he is known to have been burdensome before birth, painful in birth, laborious after birth, and from this the lawful joining of male and female is called *matrimony* rather than *patrimony*».

la: Codd. et edd. perperam *monos* (μόνος), quod Latine idem est ac *solus* sive, ut superius dicitur, *unus*, dum *nomos* (νόμος) idem est ac *lex*.

en: The codices and editions wrongly [read] *monos* (μόνος), which in Latin is the same as *alone* or, as is said above, *one*, whereas *nomos* (νόμος) is the same as *law*.

la: Vers. 17. seq.: *Et relinquit ducem pubertatis suae et pacti* etc. — Pro *monet* plures codd. *movet*.

en: Verse 17 and following: *And she forsakes the guide of her youth and the covenant* etc. — For *admonishes* several codices [read] *moves*.

la: Vers. 17. — Superius pro *munit ac defendit*, quod habet cod. L, cod. ll *munit et defendit*, cod. bb (E a secunda manu) *munit, id est defendit*, alii codd. vel cum edd. *in vita defendit*, vel *in vitam* (cod. F *unicam*) *defendit*. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2: *Vel dicitur matrimonium quasi matrem muniens, quia iam habet, quod defendatur et muniatur, scil. virum. Vel dicitur matrimonium quasi matrem monens* etc.

en: Verse 17. — Above, for *protects and defends*, which codex L has, codex ll [reads] *protects and defends*, codex bb (E, by a second hand) *protects, that is, defends*, other codices, or with the editions, *defends unto life*, or *defends into life* (codex F *the only one*). St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2: *Or matrimony is so called as it were protecting the mother, because she now has that whereby she may be defended and protected, namely the husband. Or matrimony is so called as it were admonishing the mother* etc.

la: Pro *Sed* Vat. *Unde*.

en: For *But* the Vatican [edition reads] *Whence*.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
**Page-verify correction (important).** The skeleton frontmatter carried pp. 676–677 (pdf 696–697); eyes-on the 450 dpi bands shows this is off by one. Question I (a1-q1, frontmatter pp. 674–676) owns p. 676 in full — p. 676 verso ends with q1's CONCLUSIO (*Matrimonium recte dicitur coniunctio maris et feminae*) and Respondeo. QUAESTIO II begins on p. 677 (running head *DIST. XXVII. ART. I. QUAEST. II. 677*) and runs onto p. 678 (*678 · SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV*), ending at *…non est ibi falsitas nec vanitas* immediately before ARTICULUS II (*De matrimonii causalitate*). Corrected to printed pp. **677–678**, pdf **697–698** (offset pdf = printed + 20).

**Shared-page splits.**
- **p. 677 (shared with a1-q1):** the top of p. 677, both columns, carries the tail of Article I's scholion (§ III, *De duabus seq. articuli quaestionibus antiqui Scholastici satis conveniunt…*) together with its running source-apparatus (*Cfr. S. Thom., locc. citt.… — De utraque quaestione: Scot.… — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.*). That block belongs to the a1-q1 chunk, not to q2; q2 begins below the QUAESTIO II header. q2 claims p. 677's seven numbered footnotes ([^1]–[^7]).
- **p. 678 (shared with a2-q1):** q2 claims p. 678 footnotes 1–8 ([^8]–[^15]). p. 678 footnote 9 (*Homil. 32. in Matth. (opus imperfect.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.*) anchors to Articulus II, q. 1's opening argument (*Per Chrysostomum⁹…*) and belongs to the a2-q1 chunk.

**No scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. Article I has a single scholion (in a1-q1) covering both q1 and q2; footnote [^15] confirms this — its note reads *Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.* ("See the scholion to the preceding question"). No scholion text anchored to q2 alone appears on pp. 677–678.

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Quaracchi editorial marginalia on the bands (*Opinio 1.*, *Non probatur.*, *Triplex nomen.*, *Conclusio 1./2.*, *Etymologia prima./secunda.*, *Tertia./Quarta.*, *Non fit denominatio ab eventu*) are not Bonaventure's text and were trimmed per project convention.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR fully reconciled against the 450 dpi column bands (p677-{L,R}, p678-{L,R}); p678 regenerated this session via `colcrop.py vol4 678 1880`.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
<!-- page 678 -->

### Articulus II. *De matrimonii causalitate.*

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de matrimonii causalitate. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum consensus sit causa matrimonii. Secundo, utrum solus consensus vocalis faciat matrimonium.

### Quaestio I. *Utrum consensus sit causa matrimonii.*

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod consensus sit causa matrimonii:

1. Per Chrysostomum[^1], qui dicit, quod «matrimonium non facit coitus, sed voluntas».

<!-- page 679 -->

2. Item Ambrosius[^2]: «Non defloratio virginitatis facit coniugium, sed pactio coniugalis».

3. Item *exemplo* probatur: quia inter Mariam et Ioseph fuit matrimonium, et tamen non intervenit nisi consensus[^3].

4. Item *ratione* probatur: quia maioris libertatis est pactio coniugalis quam servitutis; sed solo consensu aliquis facit se servum: ergo solo consensu potest fieri alterius coniux.

**Contra:**
1. Nihil est causa efficiens sui ipsius[^4]; sed matrimonium non est aliud quam consensus, quia ille est signum coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae: ergo consensus non est causa efficiens matrimonii.

2. Item, «si propositum est causa propositi, et oppositum oppositi[^5]»: ergo si consensus est causa matrimonium constituens, dissensus est destruens; sed matrimonium non destruitur per dissensus hominum: ergo nec per consensum constituitur.

3. Item, multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus[^6]: ergo si consensus est causa, et duo sunt consensus; videtur, quod duo sunt matrimonia inter virum et mulierem. Sed non sunt duo matrimonia: ergo etc.

4. Item, si duo consensus faciunt unum matrimonium, necesse est uniri; sed tunc uniuntur, quando sunt in idem; sed in matrimonio non uniuntur in unum, quia consensus viri est in mulierem, consensus mulieris in virum: ergo diversi[^7], non ergo etc.

### Conclusio

> Consensus utriusque personae est causa proxima matrimonii, sed simul cum institutione divina.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod sicut baptismus dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, prout comprehendit exteriorem ablutionem et interiorem characteris impressionem, alio modo pro interiori charactere; sic matrimonium uno modo comprehendit vinculum et exterius signum, et sic matrimonium est consensus expressus, non eius effectus; alio modo, prout stat pro *vinculo interiori*[^8]. Huiusmodi autem vinculum habet causam *primam*, et habet causam *proximam*; *prima* est divina institutio, *proxima* est humana pactio, quae est in convenientia consensuum duorum, scilicet maris et feminae[^9]. Et ideo dicendum, quod consensus est causa matrimonii, sed non tota, immo cum institutione divina; consensus autem non alterius, sed utriusque personae.

**Ad opposita:**
*Ad 1.* Et per hoc patet primum argumentum.

*Ad 2. 3.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si oppositum non est causa oppositi etc.; dicendum, quod est causa *efficiens et conservans*, et est causa *solum efficiens*, non conservans; sicut patet, quia sol est causa luminis primo modo, cultellus causa vulneris secundo modo[^10]. Sic matrimonium habet causam *efficientem* consensum, sed *non conservantem*. Est ergo consensus causa, ut matrimonium *fiat*, non ut *permaneat*. Similiter oppositum consensus, id est dissensus, non est causa *dissolvens factum*, sed *impediens, ne fiat*.

*Ad 4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non uniuntur; dicendum, quod est *uniri* et in *obiecto* et in *subiecto*, et est *uniri* in *effectu*. Dico ergo, quod quamvis duo consensus non uniantur in *subiecto* nec in *obiecto*, uniuntur tamen in *effectu*, qui surgit ex illo mutuo consensu. Dum enim *haec* vult *illum* in virum, vult esse uxor eius; et dum *ille* *hanc* in uxorem, efficitur vir eius. Et *si tu obiicias*, quod non uniuntur in *effectu*, nisi etiam uniantur in *obiecto*; dico, quod[^11] uniuntur in effectu, secundario et in obiecto[^12].

---

english:
<!-- page 678 -->

### Article II. *On the causality of marriage.*

Next inquiry is made concerning the second article, namely the causality of marriage. And concerning this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether consent is the cause of marriage. Second, whether vocal consent alone effects marriage.

### Question I. *Whether consent is the cause of marriage.*

As to the first, then, it is shown that consent is the cause of marriage:

1. Through Chrysostom[^1], who says that «it is not intercourse that makes marriage, but the will».

<!-- page 679 -->

2. Likewise Ambrose[^2]: «It is not the deflowering of virginity that makes marriage, but the conjugal compact».

3. Likewise it is proved *by example*: because between Mary and Joseph there was a marriage, and yet nothing intervened except consent[^3].

4. Likewise it is proved *by reason*: because a conjugal compact is of greater liberty than one of servitude; but by consent alone a person makes himself a slave: therefore by consent alone he can become another's spouse.

**On the contrary:**
1. Nothing is the efficient cause of its own self[^4]; but marriage is nothing other than consent, since it is the sign of the union of Christ and the Church: therefore consent is not the efficient cause of marriage.

2. Likewise, «if the proposition is the cause of the proposition, then also the opposite is the cause of the opposite[^5]»: therefore if consent, as constituting marriage, is a cause, dissent is what destroys it; but marriage is not destroyed by the dissent of men: therefore neither is it constituted by consent.

3. Likewise, when the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied[^6]: therefore if consent is a cause, and there are two consents, it seems that there are two marriages between the man and the woman. But there are not two marriages: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if two consents make one marriage, they must be united; but they are united only when they are toward the same thing; but in marriage they are not united into one, because the man's consent is toward the woman, the woman's consent toward the man: therefore they are diverse[^7], and so [there is] no [marriage], etc.

### Conclusion

> The consent of both persons is the proximate cause of marriage, but together with the divine institution.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as baptism is spoken of in two ways—in one way, insofar as it comprises the outer washing and the inner impressing of the character, in another way for the inner character alone—so marriage in one way comprises the bond and the outward sign, and in this way marriage is expressed consent, not its effect; in another way, insofar as it stands for the *inner bond*[^8]. Now such a bond has a *first* cause and a *proximate* cause; the *first* is the divine institution, the *proximate* is the human compact, which lies in the agreement of the two consents, namely of the man and of the woman[^9]. And therefore it must be said that consent is the cause of marriage, but not the whole cause, but rather together with the divine institution; and consent not of one alone, but of both persons.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**
*To 1.* And by this the first argument is answered.

*To 2 and 3.* To that which is objected, that if the opposite is not the cause of the opposite etc.; it must be said that there is a cause [that is] *efficient and conserving*, and a cause [that is] *only efficient*, not conserving; as is plain, because the sun is the cause of light in the first way, a knife the cause of a wound in the second way[^10]. Thus marriage has consent as its *efficient* cause, but *not as its conserving* cause. Consent, then, is a cause that marriage may *come to be*, not that it may *endure*. Likewise the opposite of consent, that is, dissent, is not a cause *that dissolves what has been done*, but *that impedes it, lest it be done*.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that they are not united; it must be said that there is a being *united* both in the *object* and in the *subject*, and there is a being *united* in the *effect*. I say, then, that although the two consents are not united in the *subject* nor in the *object*, they are nevertheless united in the *effect*, which arises from that mutual consent. For when *she* wills *him* to be [her] husband, she wills to be his wife; and when *he* [wills] *her* to be [his] wife, he becomes her husband. And *if you object* that they are not united in the *effect* unless they are also united in the *object*; I say that[^11] they are united in the effect, and secondarily also in the object[^12].

---

en: Homily 32 on Matthew (the *Opus imperfectum*). Cf. here the Master's text, c. 3.

la: De Institut. virgin. c. 6. n. 41. etiam hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3, allegatum.

en: *On the Instruction of a Virgin*, c. 6, n. 41; cited also here in the Master's text, c. 3.

la: Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

en: See here the Master's text, c. 4.

la: Sive, ut ait Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): «Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum», sive, ut dicit August., de Immortal. animae, c. 8. n. 14: Nulla res se facit aut gignit, alioquin erat, antequam esset (I. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1: Nulla omnino res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit).

en: Or, as Aristotle says, *On the Soul* II, text 47 (c. 4): «Nothing generates its own self»; or, as Augustine says, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, c. 8, n. 14: Nothing makes or begets itself, otherwise it existed before it existed (*On the Trinity* I, c. 1, n. 1: There is no thing at all that begets itself, so that it may be).

la: Secundum Aristot. supra pag. 97, nota 3. — In fine arg. pro constituitur multi codd. construitur.

en: According to Aristotle; see above, p. 97, note 3. — At the end of the argument, for *is constituted* many codices [read] *is built up*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 102, nota 3.

en: Cf. above, p. 102, note 3.

la: Codd. L W addunt termini.

en: Codices L and W add *of the terms*.

la: Vide supra a. 1. q. 1. — Superius voci vinculum codd. P Q aa (bb a secunda manu) praemittunt interius.

en: See above, a. 1, q. 1. — Above, before the word *bond*, codices P, Q, aa (and bb by a second hand) prefix *inner*.

la: Sub hoc respectu matrimonium definitur ab Hug. a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XI. c. 4, consensus legitimus maris et feminae, individualem vitae consuetudinem retinens. Cfr. infra dub. 1. — Pro in convenientia pauci codd. et Vat. convenientia.

en: Under this aspect marriage is defined by Hugh of St. Victor, *On the Sacraments* II, p. XI, c. 4, [as] the lawful consent of a man and a woman, retaining an undivided common way of life. Cf. below, dub. 1. — For *in the agreement* a few codices and the Vatican [edition read] *the agreement*.

la: Cfr. supra d. 22. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. — In principio solut. post oppositum edd. cum uno alteroque cod. omittunt non.

en: Cf. above, d. 22, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. — At the beginning of the solution, after *the opposite*, the editions, with one or another codex, omit *not*.

la: Cod. O addit principaliter, edd. perperam legunt: quod uniuntur in effectu secundario et in obiecto secundario.

en: Codex O adds *principally*; the editions wrongly read: that they are united in the effect secondarily and in the object secondarily.

en: See the scholion to question 1 of the preceding article. ---

translators_notes:
**Page-verify correction.** The skeleton frontmatter carried pp. 677–678 (pdf 697–698); eyes-on the 450 dpi bands shows this is off by one. The tail of a1-q2 (*De matrimonii nomine*, Isidore etymology, *coniugium / nuptiae / matrimonium* naming, Conclusio 1–2) fills p. 678's left column and the top of the right column; ARTICULUS II (*De matrimonii causalitate*) opens at the foot of p. 678, and QUAESTIO I's first argument (*Per Chrysostomum⁹*) sits at the bottom of the right column of p. 678. The body then runs onto p. 679 (running head *DIST. XXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II. 679*), ending at *…secundario et in obiecto* immediately before QUAESTIO II. Corrected to printed pp. **678–679**, pdf **698–699** (offset pdf = printed + 20).

**Shared-page splits.**
- **p. 678 (shared with a1-q2):** p. 678's numbered footnotes 1–8 all belong to a1-q2 (they cover its Isidore/etymology material and were carried in that chunk as [^8]–[^15]). Only p. 678 footnote 9 (*Homil. 32. in Matth. (opus imperfect.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.*) belongs here, anchoring to this q.1's opening argument (*Per Chrysostomum⁹*); it is carried as [^1].
- **p. 679 (shared with a2-q2):** the running head reflects the page's end (Q2 opens at the foot of p. 679). This q.1 claims p. 679's notes 1–11 ([^2]–[^12]). p. 679 note 12 (*Hic c. 3, paucis interiectis. Pro* in virum *codd. vel* in meum, *vel* in meam …) anchors to q.2's first argument and belongs to the a2-q1's successor chunk, not carried here.

**No scholion.** `has_scholion: false`. Article II has no scholion in this distinction (d.27's scholia are in Art. I and Art. III). Footnote [^12] here reads *Vide scholion ad 1. quaest. praecedentis articuli.* ("See the scholion to question 1 of the preceding article"), which confirms the reference is outward to the Art. I scholion, not to any scholion of this quaestio.

**Marginal glosses trimmed.** Quaracchi editorial marginalia on the bands (*Triplex nomen.*, *Conclusio 1./2.*, *Etymologia prima./secunda.* [all a1-q2]; and, for this q.1, a *Fons*… gloss beside the Chrysostom argument, *Conclusio.*, *Duplex causa.* (twice), *Solutio oppositorum.*, *Distinctio.*, *Ad oppositum.*) are not Bonaventure's text and were trimmed per project convention.

**[?] flags:** none. OCR fully reconciled against the 450 dpi column bands; p. 678 regenerated this session at split 2120 (L) and p. 679 at splits 2120 (L) / 1780 (R) via `colcrop.py vol4`.


title: Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 2

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum ad contrahendum matrimonium sufficiat consensus vocalis absque mentali.*

> The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; here the markers are renumbered sequentially across pp. 679–681.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum ad contrahendum matrimonium sufficiat consensus vocalis absque mentali. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. *Primo* per illud quod dicit Magister in littera[^1]: « Si verbis explicant quod tamen corde non volunt, obligatio illa verborum, quibus consentiunt, dicentes: *accipio te in virum*, matrimonium facit ».

2. Item, hoc ostenditur *ratione* in simili, scilicet in iuramento: quia, « quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, in ea significatione Deus accipit, in qua accipit ille cui iuratur », sicut dicit Isidorus[^2]: ergo in matrimonio similiter videtur, quod Deus accipiat in illa intentione, in qua accipit coniux: ergo si coniux credit, per verba illa ipsum vere consentire, talis consensus facit matrimonium, et sic etc.

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3. Item, Ecclesia iudicat, matrimonium esse, quandocumque aliquis contrahit cum aliqua per verba de praesenti in publico; et si dicat, se non intendisse, nihilominus sententiat, ipsum debere reddere quod exigit ius matrimonii: ergo si Ecclesia recte iudicat et non credit illi, cum credendum sit homini ferenti testimonium contra se; sine consensu cordis solo consensu exteriori est matrimonium.

4. Item, hoc pro regula in canone[^3] habetur, quod « fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari »: si ergo iste dolose agit in consentiendo ore, non corde; non debet sibi dolus eius suffragari: ergo ita obligat, sicut si corde et ore consentiret.

5. Item, hoc videtur *ratione* deducente *ad inconveniens*: si enim requiritur interior consensus; cum nemo de illo sit certus nec esse possit, nemo scit, utrum matrimonium contraxit: ergo quotiescumque debitum petit vel reddit, discrimini se committit.

6. Item, esto quod quis contrahat cum duabus per verba de praesenti, primo cum una et postea cum alia; nescit, quae istarum interius consenserit: ergo nescit, quae sit eius uxor vera; sed tenetur uxori verae debitum reddere: ergo videtur talis perplexus esse.

**Contra:** 1. Innocentius in quadam decretali, *de Sponsalibus* libro quarto[^4], respondens cuidam casui in hac materia, ubi defuit interior consensus, et vir mutavit sibi nomen, dicit, quod non est matrimonium; et ratio, quam assignat in fine, his verbis continetur: « Quia dolus affuit, et defuit omnino consensus, sine quo nequeunt cetera foedus perficere coniugale ».

2. Item, in alia decretali proxima[^5] ante illam dicit: « Pueri ante annos legitimos per verba sola non contrahunt, cum intelligantur minime consentire ».

3. Item, hoc *ratione* videtur: quia in aliis Sacramentis, sicut in baptismo, ad hoc, quod sit Sacramentum, necessario requiritur intentio dispensantis, sicut supra[^6] ostensum est in baptismo in his qui iocolariter baptizant: ergo pari, immo multo fortiori ratione in matrimonio, cum ad hoc Sacramentum requiratur consensus maximae libertatis.

4. Item, quandocumque in Sacramento deficit illud quod tenet rationem medii inter rem et signum, nihil factum est, ut puta, si in baptismo non imprimatur character, et in eucharistia non sit corpus Christi verum; sed in hoc Sacramento locum medii tenet consensus animorum[^7]: ergo quando ille deficit, irritum est matrimonium.

5. Item, quandocumque aliquid constat ex aliquo tanquam materiali et ex aliquo tanquam formali, quodcumque deficiat, et ipsum deficit; sed Sacramentum matrimonii est tale: ergo cum solus consensus animorum sit dispositio, et forma verborum sit complementum, quodcumque deficiat, non erit Sacramentum: ergo[^8] etc.

### Conclusio.

> *Si deest interior consensus, non est matrimonium verum in foro conscientiae et poenitentiali; licet in foro iudiciali secundum allegata iudicetur, hoc esse matrimonium.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod est loqui de matrimonio dupliciter: aut *in facie Ecclesiae*, aut *in foro conscientiae*, secundum duplex forum, scilicet *iudiciale* et *poenitentiale*; et secundum hoc est dupliciter iudicare: quia in foro *iudiciali* iudicatur secundum *allegata*, in foro *poenitentiali* secundum *veritatem* et conscientiam. Si ergo in foro *poenitentiali* loquamur, quia hoc est iudicium secundum veritatem et in conspectu Dei; dicendum, quod, sicut dicunt doctores nostri, nec est matrimonium nec matrimonium iudicandum. Et cum sit multiplex ratio, haec tamen est praecipua: quia in omnibus Sacramentis requiritur intentio voluntaria faciendi quod facit Ecclesia; quia ergo talis secundum veritatem non intendebat contrahere matrimonium, non fuit Sacramentum. — Si autem loquamur in foro *iudiciali*, ubi secundum *allegata* oportet iudicari, et probari potest consensus per verba exteriora, in quibus non apparuit evidens dolus; matrimonium iudicatur. Sed tamen Ecclesia decipitur, sed non est deceptio *contra iustitiam*, quia non est ibi ignorantia *iuris*, sed *facti*[^9]. Ergo si sit consensus exterior sine interiori, non est matrimonium secundum veritatem nec secundum divinum iudicium nec secundum conscientiae forum; quamvis esse videatur et indicetur secundum iudicium ecclesiasticum.

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1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur de Magistro, patet responsio, quoniam loquitur secundum forum ecclesiasticum[^10].

2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de iuramento, similiter potest dici, quod secundum humanum iudicium obligatur, si tamen dicatur obligari secundum Deum, hoc est propter hoc, quod Deus talem reputat dignum poena periurii, sicut et illum qui iuramentum non implet, et hoc propter suam fraudem[^11].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de iudicio Ecclesiae, dicendum, quod Ecclesia fallitur; et quamvis contingat, ipsam seduci *a veritate rei*, non tamen recedit *a veritate iustitiae*, quia debet iudicare secundum allegata. Et *si tu obiicias* mihi, quod in foro iudiciali contra se ipsum allegat, et unicuique credendum est ferenti testimonium contra se; dicendum, quod quia Ecclesia habet testimonium in contrarium, et quia etiam tale testimonium certitudinis est in praeiudicium causae matrimonialis, quae maxime favorabilis est; ideo talis viri testimonium non auditur, tamen et[^12] sibi creditur in foro poenitentiae sive conscientiae, ubi creditur homini confitenti suam turpitudinem, quia nihil ibi dicendum est nisi turpitudo.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fraus non debet alicui patrocinari; dicendum, quod duo sunt ibi, scilicet *verbi dolositas* sive falsitas[^13] et vera *carentia consensus*. *Verbi dolositas* non patrocinatur, immo obest in omni foro, sive iudiciali sive poenitentiali, quia utrobique vel punitur, vel pro obligatione reputatur. Sed vera *carentia* haec est, quae suffragatur in conspectu Dei, ut verum matrimonium non sit.

5. 6. Ad illud, quod nemo scit, utrum interius consentiatur; dicendum, quod quia de quolibet praesumendum est bonum, nisi manifestus dolus appareat[^14]; de quolibet praesumendum est, quod corde consentiat, si ore exprimat, nec est aliud credendum. Et si non sit ita, ignorantia facti in altera persona, quae ignorat, coitum excusat — sicut Iacob excusatur in hoc, quod cognovit Liam, quia credebat cognoscere suam[^15] — nec committit se discrimini nec perplexitati. Quia enim prima credi debet consensisse, ideo ei adhaerendum est et debitum reddendum. Et sic patet totum.

---

english:
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### Question II. *Whether for contracting marriage vocal consent suffices without mental consent.*

Secondly it is asked whether for contracting marriage vocal consent suffices without mental consent. And that it does, seems [to be shown]:

1. *First*, from what the Master says in the text[^1]: « If they express in words what nonetheless they do not will in their heart, that obligation of the words by which they consent, saying: *I take thee as husband*, makes the marriage ».

2. Likewise, this is shown *by reasoning* in a similar case, namely in an oath: because, « by whatever craft of words one swears, God takes it in that meaning in which he takes it to whom the oath is sworn », as Isidore says[^2]: therefore in marriage likewise it seems that God accepts it in that intention in which the spouse accepts it: therefore if the spouse believes that by those words he is truly consenting, such consent makes the marriage, and so on.

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3. Likewise, the Church judges that there is a marriage whenever someone contracts with a woman through words of the present tense in public; and if he says that he did not intend it, nonetheless it decrees that he ought to render what the law of marriage exacts: therefore if the Church judges rightly and does not believe him, since a man bearing testimony against himself ought to be believed; then without the consent of the heart, by the exterior consent alone there is a marriage.

4. Likewise, this is held as a rule in the canon[^3], that « fraud and deceit ought to be a protection to no one »: if therefore this man acts deceitfully in consenting with his mouth, not with his heart; his deceit ought not to be of advantage to him: therefore he is bound just as if he had consented with heart and mouth.

5. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a *reasoning* leading *to an absurdity*: for if interior consent is required; since no one is or can be certain of it, no one knows whether he has contracted a marriage: therefore whenever he asks for or renders the debt, he exposes himself to peril.

6. Likewise, suppose that someone contracts with two women through words of the present tense, first with one and afterwards with another; he does not know which of them consented interiorly: therefore he does not know which is his true wife; but he is bound to render the debt to his true wife: therefore such a man seems to be in a quandary.

**On the contrary:** 1. Innocent, in a certain decretal, *On Betrothals*, in the fourth book[^4], answering a certain case in this matter, where interior consent was lacking and the man changed his own name, says that it is not a marriage; and the reason which he assigns at the end is contained in these words: « Because deceit was present, and consent, without which the rest cannot perfect the conjugal covenant, was entirely lacking ».

2. Likewise, in another decretal next before that one[^5] he says: « Children before the lawful years do not contract through words alone, since they are understood to consent least of all ».

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] *by reasoning*: because in the other Sacraments, as in baptism, for it to be a Sacrament, the intention of the one dispensing is necessarily required, as was shown above[^6] concerning baptism in the case of those who baptize in jest: therefore with equal, indeed with much stronger reason in marriage, since for this Sacrament consent of the greatest freedom is required.

4. Likewise, whenever in a Sacrament there fails that which holds the character of a mean between the reality and the sign, nothing is done — as for instance, if in baptism the character is not imprinted, and in the Eucharist the true body of Christ is not present; but in this Sacrament the consent of minds holds the place of the mean[^7]: therefore when it fails, the marriage is void.

5. Likewise, whenever something is constituted out of one thing as material and out of another as formal, whichever fails, the thing itself also fails; but the Sacrament of marriage is such: therefore, since the consent of minds alone is the disposition, and the form of words is the completion, whichever fails, there will be no Sacrament: therefore[^8] etc.

### Conclusion.

> *If interior consent is lacking, there is no true marriage in the forum of conscience and the penitential forum; although in the judicial forum, according to what is alleged, it is judged that this is a marriage.*

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage may be spoken of in two ways: either *in the face of the Church*, or *in the forum of conscience*, according to the twofold forum, namely the *judicial* and the *penitential*; and according to this there is a twofold way of judging: because in the *judicial* forum judgment is made according to what is *alleged*, in the *penitential* forum according to *truth* and conscience. If therefore we speak of the *penitential* forum, since this is judgment according to truth and in the sight of God; it must be said that, as our doctors say, it is neither a marriage nor to be judged a marriage. And though the reason is manifold, this nonetheless is the principal one: because in all the Sacraments there is required a voluntary intention of doing what the Church does; since therefore such a person according to the truth did not intend to contract marriage, it was not a Sacrament. — But if we speak in the *judicial* forum, where judgment must be made according to what is *alleged*, and consent can be proved through the exterior words, in which no evident deceit appeared; it is judged a marriage. But nevertheless the Church is deceived, yet the deception is not *against justice*, because there is not there an ignorance of *law*, but of *fact*[^9]. Therefore if there be exterior consent without the interior, it is not a marriage according to truth, nor according to the divine judgment, nor according to the forum of conscience; although it may seem to be one and be adjudged one according to the ecclesiastical judgment.

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1. To that which is objected first concerning the Master, the answer is plain, since he speaks according to the ecclesiastical forum[^10].

2. To that, then, which is objected concerning the oath, it can similarly be said that according to human judgment he is bound; if however it be said that he is bound according to God, this is on this account, that God reckons such a man worthy of the penalty of perjury, just as also the man who does not fulfill his oath, and this on account of his fraud[^11].

3. To that which is objected concerning the judgment of the Church, it must be said that the Church is deceived; and although it happens that she is led astray *from the truth of the matter*, nevertheless she does not depart *from the truth of justice*, because she must judge according to what is alleged. And *if you object* to me that in the judicial forum a man alleges against himself, and everyone bearing testimony against himself ought to be believed; it must be said that, because the Church has testimony to the contrary, and because also such testimony of certitude is to the prejudice of the matrimonial cause, which is most favorable; therefore such a man's testimony is not heard, yet he is[^12] believed in the forum of penance or of conscience, where a man is believed when confessing his own baseness, because nothing is to be said there except baseness.

4. To that which is objected, that fraud ought not to be a protection to anyone; it must be said that there are two things there, namely the *deceitfulness of the word* or falsity[^13] and the true *lack of consent*. The *deceitfulness of the word* is no protection, nay it is a hindrance in every forum, whether judicial or penitential, because in either it is either punished or reckoned as an obligation. But the true *lack* is this, which avails in the sight of God, so that there is no true marriage.

5. 6. To that, that no one knows whether interior consent is given; it must be said that, because concerning anyone the good is to be presumed, unless manifest deceit appear[^14]; concerning anyone it is to be presumed that he consents in his heart if he expresses it with his mouth, nor is anything else to be believed. And if it be not so, ignorance of fact in the other person, who is unaware, excuses the intercourse — just as Jacob is excused in this, that he knew Leah, because he believed he was knowing his own [wife][^15] — nor does he expose himself to peril nor to a quandary. For since the first woman ought to be believed to have consented, therefore he must adhere to her and the debt must be rendered. And thus the whole is plain.

---

la: Hic c. 3, paucis interiectis. Pro *in virum* codd. vel *in meum*, vel *in meam* (Magister: *te in virum, et ego te in uxorem*).

en: Here [Lombard, IV *Sent.* d. 27] c. 3, with a few words interposed. For *as husband* the codices read either *as my own*, or *as mine* (the Master: *thee as husband, and I thee as wife*).

la: Libr. II. Sent. c. 31. n. 8. Cfr. III. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXXIX. c. 11, et Comment. a. 3. q. 1. arg. 1. ad oppos.

en: Book II of the *Sentences* [i.e. Isidore, *Sentences*] c. 31, n. 8. Cf. III *Sent.*, text of the Master, d. 39, c. 11, and the Commentary, a. 3, q. 1, arg. 1 to the contrary.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 569, nota 1. Vat. allegat C. *Dictum est nobis, quasdam* (4.), C. 30. q. 1.

en: Cf. above p. 569, note 1. The Vatican edition cites the canon *Dictum est nobis, quasdam* (4.), C. 30, q. 1.

la: Tit. 1. c. 26: *Tua nos duxit*. Cfr. infra dub. 2.

en: Title 1, c. 26: *Tua nos duxit* [Gregory IX, *Decretals* IV, tit. 1, c. 26]. Cf. below, dubium 2.

la: Quae incipit *Tuae fraternitati* (25.). — Pro *Item* cod. R vere *Idem* (Innocent. III.).

en: The one which begins *Tuae fraternitati* (25.). — For *Likewise* codex R [reads] truly *The same* (Innocent III).

la: Dist. 6. p. II. dub. 4. Cfr. ibid. a. 2. q. 1. — Mox pro *in his* plures codd. *sicut in his*, cod. K (I a secunda manu) *sicut patet in his*, Vat. *de his*. In fine arg. pro *maximae* plures codd. *praecipuae*.

en: Distinction 6, part II, dubium 4. Cf. the same place, a. 2, q. 1. — Presently, for *in these* several codices [read] *as in these*, codex K (I by a second hand) *as is plain in these*, the Vatican edition *of these*. At the end of the argument, for *greatest* several codices [read] *chief*.

la: Cfr. quaest. praeced. et supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1.

en: Cf. the preceding question and above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cod. aa addit: *sicut patet in baptismo, in quo si deficiat aqua vel invocatio Trinitatis, deficit et baptismus*.

en: Codex aa adds: *as is plain in baptism, in which, if the water or the invocation of the Trinity be lacking, baptism too is lacking*.

la: Cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 7.

en: Cf. above p. 86, note 7.

la: Vide infra dub. 1.

en: See below, dubium 1.

la: Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.

en: Cf. III *Sent.*, d. 39, a. 3, q. 1, in reply to 1.

la: Plures codd. omittunt *et*, edd. omittunt *et sibi creditur* ac mox *ubi*. Aliquando superius pro *seduci* cod. M *recedere*.

en: Several codices omit *and*; the editions omit *and he is believed* and presently *where*. Somewhat above, for *led astray* codex M [reads] *to withdraw*.

la: Cod. F *falsitas*.

en: Codex F [reads] *falsity*.

la: Vide supra pag. 492, nota 4. — Post *Ad illud* codd. FGL addunt *quod obiicitur*.

en: See above p. 492, note 4. — After *To that* codices FGL add *which is objected*.

la: Gen. 29, 21. — Vat. addit *Rachelem*.

en: Genesis 29:21. — The Vatican edition adds *Rachel*. ---

translators_notes:
- **Provenance:** Latin re-set from 450 dpi column bands of printed pp. 679–681 (pdf 699–701; offset pdf = printed + 20), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 73540–73716. Two-column page; read Left column top→bottom, then Right, per the Vol II/IV override.
- **Page span:** the quaestio opens near the foot of the left column of p.679 (running head *DIST. XXVII. ART. II. QUAEST. II.*), fills p.680, and its Respondeo + six replies spill onto the top of p.681 (running head *DIST. XXVII. ART. III. QUAEST. I.*, because Articulus III opens lower on that page), ending *Et sic patet totum* immediately before `ARTICULUS III` (raw L73717).
- **Apparatus / cross-page footer splits (Quaracchi restarts footnote numbers per page):**
  - **p.679** has 12 footers; nn. 1–11 belong to the preceding chunk (a2-q1, still a skeleton — hand-off owed there). Only **n. 12** (Magister's *littera*) falls under a q2 body marker → rendered here as **[^1]**.
  - **p.680** footers nn. 1–8 all fall under q2 body markers → **[^2]–[^9]**.
  - **p.681** has 8+ footers; nn. **1–6** fall under q2's replies → **[^10]–[^15]**. Footers n. 7 (*Vide scholion ad I. quaest. praecedentis articuli*), n. 8 (*Vers. 6*), and following belong to the next chunk (a3-q1, Articulus III), which shares the foot of p.681 — hand-off forwarded there.
- **No scholion** in Articulus II of this distinction (`has_scholion: false`); the scholion for this article lives at a1-q1 (per p.679 n. 11 / p.681 n. 7, *Vide scholion ad I. quaest. praecedentis articuli*). No scholion text appeared in this range.
- No `[?]` flags: all readings resolved against the 450 dpi bands.


title: Dist. 27, Art. 3, Q. 1

source_text:
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### ARTICULUS III.
### *De insolubilitate matrimonii.*

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de insolubilitate matrimonii; et de hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de insolubilitate quantum ad matrimonium consummatum. Secundo, quantum ad matrimonium ratum.

### QUAESTIO I.
### *Utrum matrimonium consummatum sit insolubile.*

Quantum ad primum, quod tale matrimonium sit insolubile, ostenditur:

1. Per verbum Domini, Matthaei decimo nono[^p681-8]: *Quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet*: ergo tales, qui a Deo sunt coniuncti, sunt inseparabiles, quia Deus nullos separat.

2. Item, quaecumque sunt separabilia, plura sunt; sed Dominus dicit[^p681-9], quod vir et mulier *non sunt duo, sed una caro*: ergo non sunt separabiles.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per definitionem matrimonii, quam ponit Magister in littera[^p681-10]: «Individuam vitae consuetudinem retinens».

4. Item, hoc matrimonium est signum unionis Christi et Ecclesiae secundum conformitatem naturae[^p681-11]; sed illa unio est inseparabilis: ergo etc.

**Contra:** 1. Omne vinculum iterabile est dissolubile; sed matrimonium est iterabile, quia possunt esse secundae nuptiae: ergo est dissolubile.

2. Item, omne Sacramentum perpetuum imprimit aliquod signaculum in subiecto perpetuo; sed matrimonium nihil imprimit in animam: ergo etc.

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3. Item, omnis effectus, cuius causa est dissolubilis, ipse est dissolubilis; sed causa matrimonii est mutuus consensus, et ille est dissolubilis: ergo etc. *Prima* patet per illud Chrysostomi[^p682-1], quod «eisdem causis, quibus unumquodque construitur, per easdem destruitur».

4. Item, vir tenetur uxori ex vinculo matrimonii reddere debitum; sed ex mutuo consensu possunt se perpetuo absolvere: ergo similiter ex mutuo consensu matrimonium dividere. Similiter ex lege matrimonii tenentur insimul cohabitare; et possunt diversas religiones ex communi consensu intrare[^p682-2]: ergo etc.

### CONCLUSIO.

> *Matrimonium est vinculum insolubile, extremis manentibus, sed non perpetuum.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod matrimonium est insolubile, extremis manentibus; sed ipsis corruptis, vel eorum altero, solvitur, quia non manet ligatio, nisi etiam maneant quae ligantur. Extrema autem sunt destructibilia, quia sunt extrema ratione sexuum, non animorum; et quia sexus respicit dispositionem a parte corporis, et ita vitam corporalem: dico, quod recte matrimonium dicitur vinculum insolubile, sed non perpetuum[^p682-3].

1. 2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima; obiicit enim, ac si vinculum esset perpetuum. Ratio autem huius insolubilitatis *dispositive* venit ab eius *significatione*, quia significat unionem indissolubilem, scilicet Christi et Ecclesiae secundum conformitatem naturae; sed *effective* venit ab *institutione*, quia sic Deus instituit, ut amplius non solvantur, dum vivunt.

3. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud de consensu: quia non est *tota* causa matrimonii — unde, si esset tota causa, bene obiiceret — sed ulterius est ibi *divina institutio*. — Verumtamen illud non bene solvit, pro eo quod si duae causae concurrunt ad eundem effectum, altera destructa, non manet effectus; et ideo, si ad matrimonium cum institutione divina concurrit consensus, videtur etc. Dicendum igitur, quod est causa *introducens tantum*, et *introducens et conservans*. Quando dicitur, quod si destruitur causa, et effectus; verum est de *conservante*, non autem est verum de *introducente tantum*; consensus vinculum illud *introducit*, non *conservat*: et ideo, ipso desinente, non desinet[^p682-4]. Et ideo patet illud.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de redditione debiti et cohabitatione, dicendum, quod illud est in potestate coniugatorum: quia uterque habet potestatem super corpus alterius[^p682-5]; et quoniam uterque potest iuri suo renuntiare: inde est, quod *cohabitatio* et *debiti solutio* potest dividi; non sic vinculum, quod Deus instituit, quod tenet rationem Sacramenti.

english:
### Article III.
### *On the indissolubility of matrimony.*

Consequently, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the indissolubility of matrimony; and about this two [questions] are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning indissolubility as regards a consummated marriage. Second, as regards a ratified marriage.

### Question I.
### *Whether a consummated marriage is indissoluble.*

As regards the first point, that such a marriage is indissoluble is shown:

1. By the word of the Lord, Matthew, chapter nineteen[^p681-8]: *What God has joined together let no man put asunder*: therefore such persons, who are joined by God, are inseparable, because God separates none.

2. Likewise, whatever things are separable are several; but the Lord says[^p681-9] that man and woman *are not two, but one flesh*: therefore they are not separable.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by the definition of matrimony which the Master sets down in the [Lombard's] text[^p681-10]: «retaining an undivided partnership of life».

4. Likewise, this marriage is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church according to conformity of nature[^p681-11]; but that union is inseparable: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every bond that can be repeated is dissoluble; but marriage can be repeated, since there can be second nuptials: therefore it is dissoluble.

2. Likewise, every perpetual Sacrament imprints some seal in a perpetual subject; but marriage imprints nothing in the soul: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every effect whose cause is dissoluble is itself dissoluble; but the cause of matrimony is mutual consent, and that is dissoluble: therefore etc. The *first* [premise] is evident from that saying of Chrysostom[^p682-1], that «by the same causes by which each thing is constructed, by the same it is destroyed».

4. Likewise, the husband is bound to render the debt to the wife by the bond of matrimony; but by mutual consent they can perpetually release each other: therefore likewise by mutual consent [they can] divide the marriage. Similarly, by the law of matrimony they are bound to cohabit together; and by common consent they can enter different religious orders[^p682-2]: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *Marriage is an indissoluble bond while the extremes remain, but it is not perpetual.*

**I respond:** It must be said that marriage is indissoluble while the extremes remain; but when they, or one of the two, are destroyed, it is dissolved, because the binding does not remain unless the things that are bound also remain. Now the extremes are destructible, because they are extremes by reason of the sexes, not of the souls; and because sex regards a disposition on the part of the body, and thus corporeal life: I say that marriage is rightly called an indissoluble bond, but not a perpetual one[^p682-3].

1, 2. And by this the reply to the first two [objections] is evident; for [the objection] argues as though the bond were perpetual. Now the ground of this indissolubility comes *dispositively* from its *signification*, because it signifies an indissoluble union, namely that of Christ and the Church according to conformity of nature; but it comes *effectively* from the *institution*, because God so instituted it, that they be no longer loosed while they live.

3. And by this the reply to that objection concerning consent is evident: because [consent] is not the *whole* cause of matrimony — whence, if it were the whole cause, [the objection] would argue well — but beyond it there is present *divine institution*. — Nevertheless [the objection] does not resolve it well, on this account, that if two causes concur toward the same effect, when the one is destroyed the effect does not remain; and therefore, if consent concurs with divine institution toward matrimony, it seems etc. It must be said, then, that there is a cause that is *introducing only*, and [a cause that is] *both introducing and conserving*. When it is said that if the cause is destroyed, [so is] the effect; this is true of a *conserving* [cause], but it is not true of an *introducing-only* [cause]; consent introduces that bond, it does not conserve it: and therefore, when it ceases, [the bond] does not cease[^p682-4]. And so that [objection] is evident.

4. To that which is objected concerning the rendering of the debt and cohabitation, it must be said that this is within the power of the married persons: because each has power over the body of the other[^p682-5]; and since each can renounce his own right: hence it is that *cohabitation* and *the payment of the debt* can be divided; not so the bond, which God instituted, [and] which holds the character of a Sacrament.

la: Vers. 6. — Plures codd. *Quos* Deus etc.

en: Verse 6. — Several codices [read] *Quos* [i.e. "whom"] God etc.

la: Hic c. 2.

en: Here, c. 2 [i.e. in the Master's text, chapter 2].

la: Ut insinuat supra Magister in lit. d. XXVI. c. 6. Cfr. ibid. Comment. a. 2. q. I.

en: As the Master intimates above in the [Lombard's] text, d. XXVI, c. 6. Cf. there the Commentary, a. 2, q. I.

la: Homil. 32. in Matth. (Op. imperfect.). Cfr. C. *Omnis res*: *Per quascumque causas nascitur, per easdem dissolvitur* (4.), C. 27. q. 2.

en: Homily 32 on Matthew (in the *Opus imperfectum*). Cf. the canon *Omnis res*: *Through whatever causes [a thing] is born, through the same it is dissolved* (§ 4), Decretum, C. 27, q. 2.

la: Cfr. C. *Cum sis praeditus* (4.), X. de Conversione coniugatorum (lib. III. tit. 32.).

en: Cf. the decretal *Cum sis praeditus* (§ 4), in the *Liber Extra*, *On the Conversion of Married Persons* (Bk. III, tit. 32).

la: Epist. 1. Cor. 7, 39: *Mulier alligata est legi, quanto tempore vir eius vivit* etc. Cfr. Rom. 7, 2. seq. — Superius pro *animorum* edd. *aliorum*.

en: [The] Epistle, 1 Cor. 7:39: *The woman is bound by the law, as long as her husband lives* etc. Cf. Rom. 7:2 f. — Above, for *animorum* [of souls] the editions [read] *aliorum* [of others].

la: Cfr. supra a. 2. q. I. in corp. et ad 2.

en: Cf. above, a. 2, q. I, in the body and in the reply to [objection] 2.

la: Vide 1. Cor. 7, 3. seq. — Cfr. supra pag. 567, nota 4.

en: See 1 Cor. 7:3 f. — Cf. above, p. 567, note 4. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** Fide tenendum est, matrimonium *Christianorum* ratum et consummatum prorsus indissolubile esse quoad *vinculum* (cfr. Trident. Sess. XXIV. prooem.), neque hoc per adulterium dissolvi posse (ibid. can. 7.). Nihilominus «ob multas causas separatio inter coniuges *quoad torum* seu quoad cohabitationem ad certum incertumve tempus fieri potest» (can. 8.). Item, «matrimonium ratum, *non consummatum* per solemnem religionis professionem alterius coniugum dirimitur» (can. 6.). — De matrimonio *generatim*, ut comprehendit etiam coniugia non baptizatorum, dicendum cum Leone XIII. (Encycl. *Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*): «Cum matrimonium habeat Deum auctorem fueritque vel a principio quaedam incarnationis Verbi Dei adumbratio; idcirco inest in eo sacrum et religiosum quiddam, non adventitium, sed ingenitum, non ab hominibus acceptum, sed natura insitum». Hinc in Syllabo Pii IX. (prop. 67.) reprobata est propositio: «*Iure naturae* matrimonii vinculum non est indissolubile, et in variis casibus divortium proprie dictum civili auctoritate sanciri potest». De casu, in quo matrimonium infidelium etiam consummatum dissolvitur, cfr. infra d. 39. a. 2. — De ipsa 1. quaestione vide hic dub. 4. et plura infra d. 33. a. 3; quo loco alii commentatores de hac quaestione tractare solent.

De 1. quaestione: Scot., supra d. 26. n. 10, infra d. 31. n. 4. et d. 33. q. 3. — S. Thom., infra d. 33. q. 2. a. 1; Suppl. q. 62. a. 1-5. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. et infra d. 33. q. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Durand., infra d. 33. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., infra d. 33. q. 2.

**II.** Quaestio 2. a Concilio Trident. (can. 6. cit.) irrefragabiliter soluta est. De ipsa agunt: Scot., infra d. 31. q. unica n. 5. seqq. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Suppl. q. 61. a. 1-3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 4. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** It is to be held by faith that the marriage of *Christians*, ratified and consummated, is wholly indissoluble as to the *bond* (cf. Trent, Sess. XXIV, proem.), and that this cannot be dissolved by adultery (ibid., can. 7). Nonetheless «for many causes a separation between spouses *as to bed* or as to cohabitation, for a certain or uncertain time, can be effected» (can. 8). Likewise, «a ratified marriage, *not consummated*, is dissolved by the solemn profession of religion of one of the spouses» (can. 6). — Concerning matrimony *generally*, insofar as it comprehends also the marriages of the unbaptized, it must be said with Leo XIII (Encycl. *Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*): «Since matrimony has God for its author, and was from the beginning a kind of foreshadowing of the Incarnation of the Word of God; therefore there is in it something sacred and religious, not adventitious but inborn, not received from men but implanted by nature». Hence in the Syllabus of Pius IX (prop. 67) the proposition was reprobated: «*By the law of nature* the bond of matrimony is not indissoluble, and in various cases divorce properly so called can be sanctioned by the civil authority». Concerning the case in which a marriage of unbelievers, even consummated, is dissolved, cf. below, d. 39, a. 2. — On this first question itself see here, dub. 4, and more below, d. 33, a. 3; in which place the other commentators are wont to treat of this question.

On the 1st question: Scotus, above, d. 26, n. 10, below d. 31, n. 4, and d. 33, q. 3. — St. Thomas, below, d. 33, q. 2, a. 1; Suppl. q. 62, a. 1-5. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 1, and below, d. 33, q. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 1, 4. — Durandus, below, d. 33, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, below, d. 33, q. 2.

**II.** The 2nd question was irrefragably settled by the Council of Trent (can. 6, cited). Of it treat: Scotus, below, d. 31, q. unica, n. 5 ff. — St. Thomas, here, q. 1, a. 3; Suppl. q. 61, a. 1-3. — Bl. Albert, here, a. 8, 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 3, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, here, a. 2, q. 1, 4. — Durandus, here, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF column bands for printed pp. 681–682 (PDF pp. 701–702; Vol IV offset `pdf = printed + 20`) under the VOL II OVERRIDE, with the IA djvu OCR (`raw/bonaventure_vol4_raw.txt`, lines 73717–73870) as the base for clean running prose and footnote-marker spacing. The skeleton's fenced OCR is cascade-shattered (two-column diagonal bleed), so the bands are authoritative throughout. Bands were read with the Vol IV skewed-page split (`split_x=2120` for the left column, `1780` for the right). Marginal side-glosses (*Ad oppositum*, *Notandum*, *Conclusio 1*, *Conclusio 2*) were trimmed per house rule as editorial marginalia; `CONCLUSIO`, `Contra`, and `Respondeo` are retained as genuine section markers.

**This chunk is Distinction XXVII, Articulus III (*De insolubilitate matrimonii*), Quaestio I** — *Utrum matrimonium consummatum sit insolubile* (whether a consummated marriage is indissoluble). Per the locked Vol II/IV chunking convention, the short `ARTICULUS III / De insolubilitate matrimonii` opener (*Consequenter … quaeruntur duo … Primo … de matrimonio consummato; Secundo … de matrimonio rato*) is folded into this q1 (no standalone article-opener chunk).

**Opener alignment verified.** The two-question list (*Primo … de insolubilitate quantum ad matrimonium consummatum; Secundo, quantum ad matrimonium ratum*) matches the two articulus-III questions; this is the **first** (consummatum), and the body correctly opens *Quantum ad primum, quod tale matrimonium sit insolubile, ostenditur*. No q-swap. QUAESTIO II (*Utrum matrimonium ratum sit insolubile*) begins on p. 683 (running head "DIST. XXVII. ART. III. QUAEST. II. — 683") → next chunk `bon-sent-IV-d27-a3-q2`.

**Page-span correction.** The skeleton frontmatter listed printed pp. 680–682; page-verify against running heads shows p. 680 (and the top of p. 681) belongs to **Article II, q. 2** (the *consensus/dolus* solutions, ending *Et sic patet totum*). The ARTICULUS III opener + QUAESTIO I begins on the **lower half of p. 681** and closes (body + scholion) on **p. 682**, before QUAESTIO II starts on p. 683. Frontmatter corrected to `printed_pages: [681, 682]` / `pdf_pages: [701, 702]`.

**Page-split map (running heads verified eyes-on):**
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- **p. 682** (running head "SENTENTIARUM LIB. IV. — 682"): *Contra* args 3–4, CONCLUSIO, Respondeo, replies 1–4, then the ARTICLE III **SCHOLION** filling both columns. Footer note-series **1–5**, all this quaestio's (`p682-1…5`).

**Scholion disposition — this is the Article III scholion (owned here).** Its header glyph OCR-garbles to `SCHOLIOK`; located at raw ~L73811 / on p. 682 by content. Placed **last** in each language block per the parser gotcha. It has **two numbered sections covering both questions of Article III**: **§ I** = the doctrinal note (Trent Sess. XXIV on the indissolubility of ratified-and-consummated Christian marriage; Leo XIII, *Arcanum*, on marriage generally; the Syllabus of Pius IX prop. 67) + the doctor-register *De 1. quaestione* (→ **q. 1**, this chunk); **§ II** = *Quaestio 2. a Concilio Trident. … soluta est* + its doctor-register (→ **q. 2**, the sibling `d27-a3-q2`). It carries no keyed `[^N]` markers (unkeyed editorial prose). `has_scholion: true` set. Because the scholion is held whole here, the sibling `d27-a3-q2` will have no scholion of its own (normal per the Vol II/IV convention).

**Apparatus count: 9 footnotes** — p. 681 notes 8–11 (4), p. 682 notes 1–5 (5). Per-page numbering restarts (Quaracchi convention), so markers are page-prefixed (`p681-`, `p682-`). **Shared-page split:** p. 681's footer notes **1–7 belong to `bon-sent-IV-d27-a2-q2`** (Article II, q. 2), not here — verify at the seam when that chunk is promoted.

**No unresolved `[?]` flags.** All body, apparatus, and scholion readings were confirmed clean against the 450 dpi bands.