title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 1

source_text:
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### Articulus II. *De imagine secundum considerationem relatam.*

Consequenter quaeritur de imagine secundum considerationem relatam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum ratio imaginis principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima.

Secundo, utrum principalius in viro quam in femina.

Tertio, utrum principalius reperiatur in cognitiva quam in affectiva[^1].

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### Quaestio I. *Utrum imaginis ratio principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima.*

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum ratio imaginis principalius reperiatur in Angelo quam in anima. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Argumenta pro parte affirmativa.*

1. Super illud Ezechielis vigesimo octavo[^2]: *Tu signaculum similitudinis,* Gregorius: « Quanto subtilior est natura, tanto in ea imago divinitatis similius insinuatur impressa ».

2. Item, sapiens artifex in nobiliori tabula nobiliorem describit picturam: si igitur imago in creatura est quasi quaedam pictura tabulae impressa, sicut dicit Magister in littera[^3], ergo perfectiori et nobiliori modo imago divinitatis inscribi debet in Angelo quam in anima.

3. Item, ex eo dicitur creatura rationalis imago Dei, quo capax Dei est[^4]; sed angelicus spiritus capacior est quam humanus, cum sit virtuosior et expeditior: ergo in eo imago divinitatis est eminentius impressa.

4. Item, imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate[^5]; sed memoria perfectiori modo habet actum suum in Angelo quam in homine, similiter intelligentia et voluntas — memoria enim eius tenet sine oblivione, et intelligentia intelligit sine inquisitione, et voluntas diligit sine retardatione, quorum opposita sunt in anima — ergo etc.

**Contra:**

*Pro parte negativa.*

1. Expressius repraesentat summam Trinitatem quod repraesentat non solum quantum ad unitatem substantiae, sed etiam quantum ad distinctionem personarum; sed homo expressius repraesentat distinctionem personarum, quia in homine est personalis discretio per originem, in Angelis autem non[^6]: ergo expressius repraesentat Trinitatem homo quam Angelus. Sed in quo est expressior repraesentatio, est expressior imago: ergo etc.

2. Item, evidentius imitatur alterum quod imitatur quantum ad substantiam et modum existendi, quam quod imitatur solum quantum ad alterum; sed anima repraesentat Trinitatem summam, et prout est in se ipsa, et prout est in rebus, ut sic in qualibet parte corporis sit tota, sicut summa essentia est in creatura[^7]: ergo expressius imitatur Deum quam Angelus. Sed quod expressius imitatur excellentius sua imagine insignitur: ergo etc.

3. Item, expressius repraesentat Deum quod repraesentat ipsum non solum in se, sed secundum quod est principium aliorum, quam quod aliquo modo tantum; sed homo repraesentat Deum non solum, ut ens est in se, sed etiam, ut est principium aliorum, quia « sicut ex uno Deo omnia, ita ex uno homine omnes homines », sicut vult Glossa, primae ad Corinthios undecimo[^8]: ergo, si quod expressius repraesentat, rationem imaginis participat eminentius, patet etc.

4. Item, plenius repraesentat aliquid quod repraesentat ipsum per maiorem accessum ad suam totalitatem; sed homo repraesentat Deum, in quantum est exemplar et spiritualium et corporalium, Angelus autem altero tantum modo: ergo in homine excellentiori modo reperitur imago[^9].

5. Item, quanto exemplum magis unitur exemplari[^10], tanto magis conformatur ei; et quanto magis natum est uniri, tanto magis natum est conformari; sed natura humana unitur divinae in unitate personae, quod quidem non facit angelica: ergo expressior est in ea imago, quam sit in Angelo.

6. Item, per considerationem Philosophi[^11]: « Si optimum in uno genere est melius optimo in alio genere, et est simpliciter hoc illo melius »; sed Christus, qui est optimus inter homines, excellentiori modo insignitus est imagine Dei quam optimus Angelus: ergo imago Dei in homine quam in Angelo reperitur excellentius.

### *Conclusio.*

> Ratio imaginis in Angelo et anima quoad aliquid est aeque principaliter, quoad aliquid in Angelo magis principaliter, quoad aliquid minus.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quidam dicere voluerunt, quod *creaturam magis esse ad imaginem Dei* potest dici dupliciter: vel *extensive,* vel *intensive.* *Opinio 1.*

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Si *extensive,* sic dixerunt, quod homo magis repraesentat Deum quam Angelus, quia in pluribus ratione corporis sibi uniti, utpote in spiritualibus et corporalibus et in modo *existendi* in rebus et secundum etiam modum *producendi* res. — Et sic dicunt procedere rationes ad secundam partem[^12]. Nam quod de Christo obiicitur, non valet; illud enim est singulare privilegium nec est naturae, sed potius gratiae. — Si autem dicatur una creatura magis esse ad imaginem quam alia *intensive,* quia expressius repraesentat; sic dicunt, Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei, quam sit homo; sicut ostendunt auctoritates et rationes ad oppositum. Et hoc insinuat Gregorius, cum dicit: « Quanto subtilior est natura, tanto in ea imago Trinitatis similius insinuatur impressa ». Et rationes etiam consequentes ostendunt, quod sicut excellentior est natura angelica, sic excellentiores habet potentias et maiorem habet capacitatem et digniori modo est imagine Dei insignita. — Et secundum hanc viam plana est responsio ad quaestionem propositam et ad obiecta.

*Non omnino probatur.* Sed licet iste modus dicendi probabilis videatur, non modicam tamen habet calumniam ratione utriusque partis distinctionis. Quod enim dicatur imago magis esse in homine *extensive* quam in Angelis, hoc verbis Augustini non consonat, qui rationem imaginis dicit esse in anima praecise secundum partem supremam, sicut patet in decimo quarto et decimo quinto de Trinitate[^13]. Similiter, quod dicatur universaliter expressior esse imago Dei in Angelo quam in anima propter maiorem dignitatem naturae, hoc non videtur consonare Glossae, quae dicit super illud, secundo[^14] ad Hebraeos: *Eum qui modicum minoratus est ab Angelis;* ibi dicit Glossa, quod « natura mentis humanae, qualem Christus assumsit, solus Deus maior est ». Et Augustinus hoc innuit in pluribus locis; et pie creditur et communiter sentitur, quod Virgo Maria magis inter omnes Angelos accedit ad Deum.

*Opinio 2.* Propterea est alius modus dicendi, quod cum expressio imaginis consistat in *convenientia ordinis* et *proportionis*[^15], intensio dignitatis imaginis consistit secundum intensionem convenientiae quantum ad proportionem, vel ordinem. *Principium generale.*

Attendendum autem, quod convenientia creaturae rationalis ad Deum secundum *ordinem* quaedam est de *esse* imaginis, et quaedam de *bene esse.* De *Triplex convenientia ordinis.* esse imaginis est, quod creatura immediate ordinetur ad Deum; de *bene esse* vero est, quod creatura, quae est imago, praeponatur aliis, quae tenent rationem vestigii; et quod alia ordinentur in ipsam tanquam in finem. — Et sic *triplex est ordo* in creatura rationali, secundum quem conformatur Deo. *Triplex ordo.* Primus, quod immediate nata est Deo coniungi; et hic est essentialis imagini, et in hoc Angelus et anima aequiparantur, quia utriusque « mens immediate ab ipsa prima veritate formatur[^16] ». — Secundus est, quo praeponitur creatura, quae est imago, aliis creaturis; et in hoc Angeli praecellunt, quia non solum bestiis, sed etiam hominibus rectores sunt deputati, secundum illud, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo[^17]: *In unamquamque gentem praeposuit rectores,* Glossa: id est, Angelos; et iste est ordo, quo creatura irrationalis regitur a Deo mediante rationali. — Tertius est ordo, quo creaturae irrationales ad rationalem ordinantur tanquam in finem, propter quem sunt factae, et mediante illo in ultimum finem principalem[^18]; et secundum hunc ordinem magis convenit homo cum Deo quam Angelus; magis enim facta sunt et corporalia et sensibilia propter homines quam propter Angelos. — Et sic patet, quod ratio imaginis, prout attenditur in convenientia *ordinis,* quantum ad id quod est de *esse,* in homine et Angelo reperitur *aequaliter,* quia uterque ordinatur in Deum immediate. *Conclusio 1.* Quantum vero ad illud, quod est de *bene esse,* scilicet quantum ad ordinem respectu *creaturarum,* se habent per modum *excedentis* et *excessi.* *Conclusio 2.* Angelus enim magis convenit quantum ad ordinem sub ratione *regiminis;* homo vero magis quantum ad ordinem, qui attenditur in ratione *finis.*

Consimili modo reperimus et *aequalitatem* et *mutuum excessum* in expressione imaginis, quae attenditur secundum convenientiam *proportionis; Duplex convenientia proportionis.* quia quaedam est convenientia *habitudinis,* quae est de *esse* imaginis, quaedam de *bene esse.* Illa est de *esse,* quae consistit in comparatione ad intrinseca sicut ad potentias; et in hac homo et Angelus *adaequantur,* quia ita bene est *distinctio* et *origo* et *aequalitas* et *consubstantialitas* in potentiis animae, in memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate, sicut in potentiis Angeli. *Conclusio 3.* — Illa vero convenientia habitudinis est de *bene esse,* quae attenditur in comparatione creaturae rationalis ad aliquod *extrinsecum,* utpote ad corpus, quod est ipsa inferius. Haec autem dupliciter potest esse expressior: vel *privative,* *Subdistinctio.* vel *positive.* Si *positive;* sic anima est imago expressior, *Conclusio 4.*

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quae in hoc, quod coniungitur corpori ita, quod per illud est principium aliorum, et per illud totum inhabitat, magis repraesentat Deum, qui est principium omnium, et qui unus est in omnibus. Si autem *privative;* sic Angelus magis repraesentat Deum, quia Deus est spiritus purus, omnino impermixtus et independens a creaturis omnibus; et hoc repraesentat angelicus spiritus, dum est a corpore secundum actum et aptitudinem separatus. Et pro tanto dicitur esse subtilior a Gregorio, et in eo imago divinitatis esse expressior. *Conclusio 5.* Et sic patet, quod quantum ad convenientiam *proportionis,* quae est de *essentia* imaginis, inter hominem et Angelum potest esse *aequalitas;* quantum vero ad illam, quae est de *bene esse,* se habent sicut *excedentia* et *excessa.*

Ex praedictis igitur patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Cum enim quaeritur, utrum principalius vel expressius sit imago Dei in Angelo quam in anima; respondendum, quod quantum ad aliquid est *aeque principaliter,* quantum ad aliquid *magis principaliter,* quantum ad aliquid *minus,* sicut explanatum est. *Conclusio generalis.* — Et in hoc patet responsio ad rationes ad utramque partem, quae procedunt secundum diversas vias, secundum quas veritatem possunt concludere, quia non habent oppositionem.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

*Ad 3, 4.* Ad illud tamen quod obiicitur de maiori capacitate, dici potest, quod non cogit. Angelus enim capacitatem gratiae habet in comparatione ad sursum, in qua comparatione non excedit naturam mentis humanae. Quod autem natura angelica dicatur excedere humanam, hoc est in comparatione ad corpus, ad quod non habet inclinationem secundum quod anima[^19]; et ideo maioritas dignitatis in natura angelica respectu animae non facit ad excellentiam imaginis sive illius capacitatis, quae est in natura humanae mentis, secundum quod anima est capax Dei. — Similiter nec aliud, quod sequitur, cogit; quia maior vivacitas memoriae vel intelligentiae potius facit ad intensionem *similitudinis* quam ad *imaginis* maiorem expressionem. *Similitudo* enim consistit in *proprietatibus naturalibus, imago* vero in *origine* et *habitudine;* et quamvis potentiae in Angelis sint vivaciores quam in animabus[^20], et ideo Deo similiores; eundem tamen habent *ordinem* et *habitudinem,* sicut ostensum est supra. Unde magis proprie conceditur, quod Angelus sit Deo *similior* quam homo, quam possit concedi, quod Angelus sit *magis imago;* et hoc vult dicere auctoritas Gregorii.

**Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:**

*Ad argumenta pro parte negativa, Ad 5.* Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt et concludunt maiorem expressionem quantum ad illud quod est *accidentale* imagini, excepta illa, quae fundatur super unionem; ad quam dicendum, quod non cogit, pro eo quod substantia, quae minus capax est gratiae per naturam, potest effici magis capax per aliquam gratiam gratis datam, quae disponit et ampliat capacitatem naturae ad susceptionem gratiae gratum facientis. *Notandum.* Unde esto, quod natura angelica esset magis capax gratiae quam humana natura secundum naturalem potentiam — sicut videtur rationabiliter esse ponendum, ut natura angelica sit excellentior, et excellentiori naturae debeatur excellentior potentia et capacitas — nihilominus tamen per aliquod donum divinitus sibi gratis datum potest elevari capacitas animae usque ad capacitatem Angeli, et quodam modo ampliorem. Nam donum gratiae gratis datae disponit ad gratiam gratum facientem; et sic possibile est fuisse in Christo et beata Virgine. Et sic patent obiecta ad utramque partem.

english:
### Article II. *On the image considered relatively.*

Consequently the question is asked about the image considered relatively. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.

Second, whether more principally in the man than in the woman.

Third, whether it is found more principally in the cognitive than in the affective[^1].

### Question I. *Whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds and is asked whether the formal character of the image is found more principally in the Angel than in the soul. And that it is so, seems clear.

*Arguments for the affirmative.*

1. On that text of Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight[^2]: *Thou seal of likeness,* Gregory: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of divinity is suggested as imprinted in it."

2. Likewise, the wise craftsman draws a nobler picture upon a nobler tablet: if therefore the image in a creature is, as it were, a kind of picture imprinted upon a tablet, as the Master says in the text[^3], then the image of divinity ought to be inscribed in a more perfect and noble manner in the Angel than in the soul.

3. Likewise, the rational creature is called the image of God for the reason that it is capable of God[^4]; but the angelic spirit is more capacious than the human, since it is more vigorous and more unencumbered: therefore in it the image of divinity is more eminently imprinted.

4. Likewise, the image consists in memory, intelligence, and will[^5]; but memory has its act in a more perfect manner in the Angel than in man, and likewise intelligence and will — for the Angel's memory holds without forgetting, his intelligence understands without inquiry, and his will loves without delay, the opposites of which are in the soul — therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

*For the negative side.*

1. That represents the supreme Trinity more expressly which represents it not only as to unity of substance, but also as to the distinction of persons; but man represents the distinction of persons more expressly, because in man there is a personal discretion through origin, whereas in the Angels there is not[^6]: therefore man represents the Trinity more expressly than the Angel. But that in which the representation is more express is the more express image: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that imitates another more evidently which imitates it both as to substance and mode of existing, than that which imitates it only as to some one aspect; but the soul represents the supreme Trinity both as it is in itself and as it is in things, so that it is whole in any part of the body, just as the supreme Essence is whole in creation[^7]: therefore it imitates God more expressly than the Angel. But that which imitates more expressly is more excellently distinguished by His image: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that represents God more expressly which represents Him not only in Himself, but inasmuch as He is the principle of others, than that which does so only in some single way; but man represents God not only as a being in himself, but also as being the principle of others, because "just as from one God are all things, so from one man are all men," as the Gloss has it on First Corinthians chapter eleven[^8]: therefore if what represents more expressly participates the formal character of the image more eminently, the conclusion is clear etc.

4. Likewise, that more fully represents something which represents it through a greater approach to its totality; but man represents God inasmuch as God is the exemplar both of spiritual and of corporeal things, whereas the Angel does so only in the one mode: therefore in man the image is found in a more excellent manner[^9].

5. Likewise, the more the copy is united to its exemplar[^10], the more it is conformed to it; and the more it is naturally apt to be united, the more it is naturally apt to be conformed; but the human nature is united to the divine in unity of person, which the angelic nature in fact does not do: therefore the image is more expressly in it than it is in the Angel.

6. Likewise, by the consideration of the Philosopher[^11]: "If the best in one genus is better than the best in another genus, it is also unqualifiedly better than that"; but Christ, who is the best among men, is more excellently distinguished by the image of God than the best Angel: therefore the image of God is found more excellently in man than in the Angel.

### *Conclusion.*

> The formal character of the image is, as to one respect, equally principally in the Angel and the soul; as to another, more principally in the Angel; as to another, less.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that some have wished to say that *a creature is more to the image of God* can be said in two ways: either *extensively,* or *intensively.* *Opinion 1.* If *extensively,* then they have said that man represents God more than the Angel, because in more respects, by reason of the body united to him — namely in spiritual things, in corporeal things, in the mode of *existing* in things, and likewise in the mode of *producing* things. — And in this way they say the reasonings proceed for the second part[^12]. For what is objected concerning Christ does not hold; for that is a singular privilege and is not of nature, but rather of grace. — But if one creature be said to be more to the image than another *intensively,* because it represents more expressly; then they say that the Angel is more to the image of God than man, as the authorities and reasonings to the contrary show. And this Gregory suggests when he says: "The more subtle the nature, the more closely the image of the Trinity is suggested as imprinted in it." And the reasonings that follow also show that just as the angelic nature is more excellent, so it has more excellent powers and a greater capacity and is distinguished by the image of God in a worthier manner. — And in this way the answer to the proposed question and to the objections is plain.

*Not entirely accepted.* But although this manner of speaking seems probable, it nevertheless has no small calumny on the side of both members of the distinction. For that the image be said to be more in man *extensively* than in the Angels does not accord with the words of Augustine, who says that the formal character of the image is in the soul precisely according to its supreme part, as is clear in the fourteenth and fifteenth books *On the Trinity*[^13]. Likewise, that it be universally said that the image of God is more expressly in the Angel than in the soul on account of the greater dignity of nature does not seem to accord with the Gloss, which says upon that text, in chapter two[^14] of Hebrews: *Him who was made a little less than the Angels;* there the Gloss says that "than the nature of the human mind, such as Christ assumed, only God is greater." And Augustine suggests this in several places; and it is piously believed and commonly held that the Virgin Mary, more than all the Angels, approaches God.

*Opinion 2.* Therefore there is another way of speaking, namely that, since the expression of the image consists in *agreement of order* and *of proportion*[^15], the intensity of the dignity of the image consists according to the intensity of agreement as regards proportion or order. *General principle.*

But it must be noted that the agreement of the rational creature with God according to *order* is partly of the *being* of the image and partly of its *well-being. Threefold agreement of order.* Of the *being* of the image is that the creature be ordered immediately to God; of *well-being* is that the creature which is an image be set before the others, which hold the formal character of a trace, and that the others be ordered to it as to an end. — And thus there is a *threefold order* in the rational creature according to which it is conformed to God. *Threefold order.* The first is that it is naturally apt to be joined immediately to God; and this is essential to the image, and in this the Angel and the soul are equated, because for both "the mind is immediately formed by the first truth itself[^16]." — The second is that by which the creature which is an image is set before other creatures; and in this the Angels excel, because they are deputed as rulers not only of beasts but even of men, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus chapter seventeen[^17]: *Over every nation he set rulers,* the Gloss: that is, the Angels; and this is the order by which the irrational creature is ruled by God through the mediation of the rational. — The third is the order by which irrational creatures are ordered to the rational as to the end for which they were made, and through that order to the ultimate principal end[^18]; and according to this order man agrees more with God than the Angel does; for corporeal and sensible things have been made more for the sake of men than for the sake of the Angels. — And thus it is clear that the formal character of the image, insofar as it is considered in agreement of *order,* as regards what belongs to its *being,* is found *equally* in man and the Angel, because each is ordered to God immediately. *Conclusion 1.* But as regards what belongs to its *well-being,* namely as regards order with respect to *creatures,* they stand in the manner of *excelling* and *being excelled.* *Conclusion 2.* For the Angel agrees more as to order under the formal character of *ruling;* but man more as to the order which is considered in the formal character of *end.*

In a similar way we find both *equality* and *mutual excess* in the expression of the image which is considered according to agreement of *proportion; Twofold agreement of proportion.* for one is an agreement of *relation* which belongs to the *being* of the image, another to its *well-being.* That belongs to *being* which consists in comparison to intrinsic things, namely to the powers; and in this man and the Angel are *equated,* because there is just as truly *distinction* and *origin* and *equality* and *consubstantiality* in the powers of the soul — namely in memory, intelligence, and will — as there is in the powers of the Angel. *Conclusion 3.* — But that agreement of relation belongs to *well-being* which is considered in comparison of the rational creature to something *extrinsic,* such as to the body, which is inferior to it. This can be more expressive in two ways: either *privatively* *Sub-distinction.* or *positively.* If *positively;* then the soul is the more expressive image, *Conclusion 4.* in that, joined to the body in such a way that through it the soul is the principle of others and through it inhabits the whole body, it more represents God, who is the principle of all things and who is one in all. But if *privatively;* then the Angel more represents God, because God is a pure spirit, altogether unmixed and independent of every creature; and this the angelic spirit represents, since it is separated from body according to act and aptitude. And for so much it is called more subtle by Gregory, and in it the image of divinity is said to be more expressive. *Conclusion 5.* And thus it is clear that as regards the agreement of *proportion* which belongs to the *essence* of the image, between man and the Angel there can be *equality;* but as regards that which belongs to *well-being,* they stand as *excelling* and *being excelled.*

From what has been said, therefore, the answer to the proposed question is clear. For when it is asked whether the image of God is more principally or expressly in the Angel than in the soul; the answer is that in some respect it is *equally principally,* in some *more principally,* in some *less,* as has been explained. *General conclusion.* — And in this the answer to the reasonings on either side is clear, since they proceed according to diverse ways by which they can conclude something true, because they have no opposition.

**To the arguments for the affirmative:**

*To 3 and 4.* To what is objected concerning the greater capacity, however, it can be said that it does not press the point. For the Angel has a capacity for grace in comparison to what is above, in which comparison it does not exceed the nature of the human mind. But that the angelic nature is said to exceed the human is in comparison to the body, to which it does not have an inclination in the way the soul has[^19]; and therefore the greater dignity in the angelic nature with respect to the soul does not contribute to the excellence of the image or of that capacity which is in the nature of the human mind, according to which the soul is capable of God. — Likewise, nor does what follows press the point; because the greater liveliness of memory or of intelligence makes rather for the intensification of *likeness* than for greater expression of the *image.* For *likeness* consists in *natural properties,* but *image* in *origin* and *relation;* and although the powers in the Angels are more lively than in souls[^20] — and therefore are more like God — yet they have the same *order* and *relation,* as has been shown above. Whence it is more properly conceded that the Angel is more *like* to God than man, than it can be conceded that the Angel is *more an image;* and this is what the authority of Gregory means to say.

**To the arguments for the negative:**

*To the arguments on the negative side, To 5.* The reasonings on the contrary side proceed and conclude a greater expression as regards what is *accidental* to the image, except for the one which is grounded upon the union; to which it must be said that it does not press the point, since the substance which is less capable of grace by nature can be rendered more capable through some gratuitously given grace, which disposes and amplifies the capacity of nature for the reception of sanctifying grace. *Note.* Whence, granted that the angelic nature were more capable of grace than the human nature according to natural potency — as it seems reasonably to be posited, namely that the angelic nature is more excellent, and to a more excellent nature is owed a more excellent power and capacity — nevertheless, through some gift gratuitously given by God, the capacity of the soul can be elevated up to the capacity of the Angel, and in a certain way to a more ample one. For the gift of gratuitously given grace disposes to sanctifying grace; and it was so possible to have been in Christ and the blessed Virgin. And thus the objections on either side are made clear.

la: Multi codd. cum ed. 2 hic *activa,* sed infra in ipsa quaestione *affectiva.*

en: Many codices, with the second edition, read here *activa* (active), but below in the question itself *affectiva* (affective).

la: Vers. 12. — Verba Gregorii habentur in *Homil.* 34. *in Evang.* n. 7, ubi loquitur de Angelo et dicit: *Ut quo in eo subtilior est natura, eo in illo imago Dei similius insinuetur expressa.* Cfr. XXXII. *Moral.* c. 23. n. 47. — Paulo superius Vat. *in homine* pro *in anima.*

en: Verse 12. — Gregory's words are found in *Homily* 34 *on the Gospels* n. 7, where he speaks of the Angel and says: *That insofar as in him the nature is more subtle, so much the more closely the image of God is suggested as expressed in him.* Cf. *Moralia* book XXXII, c. 23, n. 47. — A little earlier the Vatican edition reads *in homine* (in man) for *in anima* (in the soul).

la: Hic c. 3. in fine.

en: Here c. 3, at the end.

la: August., XIV. *de Trin.* c. 8. n. 11.

en: Augustine, book XIV *On the Trinity,* c. 8, n. 11.

en: Cf. *Sentences* I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Vide supra pag. 103, nota 6. et 104, nota 5.

en: See above p. 103, note 6, and p. 104, note 5.

la: In libro *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera Augustini) c. 18: *Sicut enim Deus ubique est totus in toto mundo et in omni creatura sua; sic anima ubique tota in toto corpore suo, tanquam in quodam mundo suo.* Cfr. I. *Sent.* d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

en: In the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine) c. 18: *For just as God is everywhere whole in the whole world and in every creature of his, so the soul is everywhere whole in its whole body, as in a certain world of its own.* Cf. *Sentences* I, d. 8, p. II, q. 3.

la: Vers. 7. — Glossa haec invenitur in *Expositione* super loc. cit., quae olim Ambrosio tribuebatur. Cfr. Beda, *Hexaëm.* (super Gen. 1, 26.) et Hugo a S. Vict., *Sent.* tract. 3. c. 2. — Aliquanto superius plures codd. cum Vat. *quam quod altero* pro *quam quod aliquo.*

en: Verse 7. — This Gloss is found in the *Exposition* on the cited passage, which was formerly attributed to Ambrose. Cf. Bede, *Hexaëmeron* (on Gen. 1, 26) and Hugh of St. Victor, *Sent.* tract. 3, c. 2. — A little earlier several codices with the Vatican edition read *quam quod altero* for *quam quod aliquo.*

la: In cod. T additur *quam in Angelo.*

en: In codex T is added *quam in Angelo* (than in the Angel).

la: Cod. O *Item quanto magis exemplum imitatur exemplar.* Vat., post *exemplum* addito *seu exemplatum,* substituit cum multis codd. *innititur* pro *unitur,* quod exhibent codd. Q W X aa.

en: Codex O: *Item quanto magis exemplum imitatur exemplar* (Likewise, the more the copy imitates the exemplar). The Vatican edition, after *exemplum* adding *seu exemplatum,* substitutes with many codices *innititur* (rests upon) for *unitur* (is united), which the codices Q W X aa exhibit.

la: Libr. III. *Topic.* c. 2. — De *minori* cfr. Glossa ordinaria in Hebr. 2, 9, quae infra in corp. quaest. allegatur. — Cod. F *ergo et simpliciter* pro *et est simpliciter.*

en: Book III of the *Topics,* c. 2. — On the *minor* premise cf. the Ordinary Gloss on Hebrews 2, 9, which is cited below in the body of the question. — Codex F has *ergo et simpliciter* for *et est simpliciter.*

la: Codd. cum edd. 1, 2 *primam partem.* Arg. autem 6. de Christo probare vult perfectionem imaginis *intensivam.*

en: The codices with editions 1 and 2 read *primam partem* (the first part). But argument 6 concerning Christ aims to prove the *intensive* perfection of the image.

la: Libr. XIV. c. 8. n. 11. et XV. c. 6. n. 10. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *hoc verbum Augustino* pro *hoc verbis Augustini.*

en: Book XIV, c. 8, n. 11, and Book XV, c. 6, n. 10. — A little earlier some codices with edition 1 read *hoc verbum Augustino* for *hoc verbis Augustini.*

la: Vers. 9: *Eum autem, qui modico quam Angeli minoratus est.* — Glossa ordinaria in hunc locum est Augustini, lib. contra Maximin. c. 25: *Natura vero humana, qualem naturam Christus humanae mentis assumsit, quae nullo peccato potuit depravari, solus maior est Deus.* Cfr. VI. *de Trin.* c. 6. n. 10. et XIII. c. 17. n. 22. — De B. Maria Virg. vide Sermonem *de Assumt.* eiusdem, (inter opera S. Hieronymi) in quo c. 7. dicitur, quod Maria exaltata sit super choros Angelorum.

en: Verse 9: *But him who was made a little less than the Angels.* — The Ordinary Gloss on this passage is Augustine's, in the book against Maximinus c. 25: *But the human nature — such nature as Christ assumed of a human mind, which could be corrupted by no sin — God alone is greater than.* Cf. *On the Trinity* book VI, c. 6, n. 10, and book XIII, c. 17, n. 22. — Concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary see the Sermon *On the Assumption* of the same (among the works of St. Jerome) in which c. 7 says that Mary was exalted above the choirs of Angels.

la: Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp.

en: Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in the body.

la: Vide supra pag. 45, nota 5.

en: See above p. 45, note 5.

la: Vers. 14. Vulgata: *rectorem.* — Glossam refert Rabanus et Lyranus in hunc locum.

en: Verse 14. The Vulgate has *rectorem* (a ruler, singular). — Rabanus and Lyra cite the Gloss on this passage.

la: Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1.

la: Vat. *sicut anima.*

en: The Vatican edition reads *sicut anima* (as the soul does).

la: Vat. falso *animalibus.*

en: The Vatican edition wrongly reads *animalibus* (in animals).

latin_scholion:
**I.** Multi Scholastici cum S. Thoma, Richardo a Med. et Scoto potius primam sententiam in resp. notatam sequuntur, sed aliis verbis expressam, quam etiam S. Bonav. probabilem videri asserit. Hi dicunt, quod *simpliciter* loquendo et secundum id, in quo *primo* consideratur ratio imaginis, imago Dei in Angelis est magis expressa; sed *secundum quid,* et respectu habito ad aliquas proprietates consequentes et accidentales, quas recenset etiam S. Bonav., imago magis invenitur in hominibus quam in Angelis. Ratio autem principalis eorum est, quia natura intellectualis perfectior est in Angelis quam in hominibus. Quae ratio in genere certissimo est, licet quoad animam Christi et B. Virginis a S. Doctore non sub omni respectu concedatur. Praeterea, ratio imaginis, secundum Alex. Hal. et S. Doctorem (a. 1. q. 1.) non solum attenditur secundum naturae intrinsecam *perfectionem,* essentiam divinam repraesentantem, sed etiam, quatenus per convenientiam, quae dicitur *proportionis,* repraesentantur personalia in divinis; sub quo respectu imago Trinitatis aequaliter est in utrisque, et etiam, quatenus mens immediate *ordinem* habet ad Deum. Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 2. ad 2.) dicit, quod « imago, licet dicatur de Angelo, et sit [in eo] maior expressio ratione *simplicitatis,* non tamen ratione eorum, in quibus consistit principalis ratio imaginis ». — Sed hoc opinionum dissidium non est magni momenti, immo facile componi posse videtur.

**II.** Scot., in Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 93. a. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 3; S. 1. q. 93. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.

**III.** Quoad sequentem quaest. manifestum est, quod imago Dei in viro non potest magis esse quam in muliere, nisi quoad quaedam *accidentalia,* quibus dignitas viri declaratur, vel ut dicit S. Doctor, quoad « *bene esse* sive ad clariorem expressionem »; minime autem quoad id quod proprie ratio imaginis est. — De hoc tractant S. Thom., S. loc. cit. a. 4. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** Many Scholastics, with St. Thomas, Richard of Mediavilla, and Scotus, rather follow the first opinion noted in the response, but expressed in different words — the opinion which St. Bonaventure himself asserts to be probable. They say that, *unqualifiedly* speaking and according to that in which the formal character of the image is *primarily* considered, the image of God in the Angels is more expressed; but *with qualification,* and having regard to certain consequent and accidental properties, which St. Bonaventure also enumerates, the image is found more in men than in the Angels. The principal reason of these is that the intellectual nature is more perfect in the Angels than in men. This reason is in general most certain, although as regards the soul of Christ and of the Blessed Virgin it is not conceded under every respect by the holy Doctor. Furthermore, the formal character of the image, according to Alex. of Hales and the holy Doctor (a. 1. q. 1.), is considered not only according to the intrinsic *perfection* of the nature representing the divine essence, but also insofar as, through the agreement which is called *of proportion,* the personal properties in the divine are represented; under which respect the image of the Trinity is equally in both, and likewise inasmuch as the mind has immediate *order* to God. Alex. of Hales (S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 2. ad 2.) also says that "the image, although it be said of the Angel, and there be in him a greater expression by reason of *simplicity,* is nevertheless not so by reason of those things in which the principal formal character of the image consists." — But this dissension of opinions is not of great moment; indeed it seems easily reconcilable.

**II.** Scotus, in Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 93. a. 3. — S. Thom., here q. unica, a. 3; Summa I. q. 93. a. 3. — B. Albert., here a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. unica, a. 4. — Richard. a Med., here q. 4. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 1.

**III.** Concerning the following question it is clear that the image of God cannot be more in the man than in the woman, except as regards certain *accidentals* by which the dignity of the man is declared, or as the holy Doctor says, as regards "*well-being* or clearer expression"; not at all, however, as regards that which is properly the formal character of the image. — On this treat S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 4. ad 1. — B. Albert., here a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here q. 6. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 2.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
<!-- page 403 -->

### Quaestio II. *Utrum imago principalius sit in masculo quam in femina.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum principalius sit imago in masculo quam in femina. Et quod sic, videtur.

*Ad oppositum.* 1. Primae ad Corinthios undecimo[^1]: *Vir est imago et gloria Dei.* Hoc autem, ut dicit Apostolus, separat virum a muliere: ergo aut mulier non est imago, aut si est imago, non est ita expressa, sicut vir.

2. Item, Glossa[^2] ibidem: «Ad imaginem Dei factus est vir, non mulier»; sed hoc non est dictum, quod mulier nullo modo sit ad imaginem facta: ergo dictum est, quia minus est ad imaginem quam vir.

3. Item, quia homo est ad imaginem, unibilis est naturae divinae; sed magis fuit unibilis in sexu masculino quam feminino: ergo magis est imago vir quam mulier.

4. Item, quia homo est imago Dei, omnibus est praelatus sive praepositus, secundum quod innuitur in textu, Genesis primo[^3]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem* etc. Et subditur: *Et praesit piscibus* etc.: ergo si praesidere non convenit homini in sexu femineo, sed masculino, videtur, quod imago excellentiori modo sit in masculino sexu quam in feminino.

**Contra:** *Fundamenta.* 1. Genesis primo[^4]: *Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam, masculum et feminam creavit illos*: si igitur mulier creata est ad imaginem Dei et ad aequalitatem viri — sicut innuit formatio eius de latere, et ratio etiam, quare formata est, cum dicitur: *Faciamus adiutorium simile sibi* — videtur ergo, quod in viro et muliere aequaliter reperiatur ratio imaginis.

2. Item, imago attenditur in homine quantum ad supremum animae; sed in supremo animae non est distinctio aliqua secundum sexum: ergo sive homo sit mulier, sive vir, aequaliter est imago.

3. Item, sexus non variat speciem[^5]: ergo vir et mulier sunt eiusdem speciei; sed imago consequitur hominem quantum ad formam speciei, non quantum ad formam individui: ergo aequaliter est in viro et muliere.

4. Item, imago creationis ordinatur ad imaginem recreationis sive gratificationis[^6]; sed imago recreationis, quae consistit in gratia et virtutibus, ita excellenter potest esse in muliere, sicut in viro: ergo pari ratione et imago creationis, in qua conditus est homo.

> **Conclusio.** Ratio imaginis non est magis in viro quam in muliere quoad primum esse, sed tantum quoad accidentalem proprietatem.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut ex praecedentibus[^7] patet, imago quantum ad suum *esse* principaliter consistit in anima et eius potentiis, et in his potissime, prout habent ad Deum converti; et quantum ad hoc non est distinctio masculi et feminae, servi et liberi[^8]: ideo *Conclusio 1.* imago, quantum ad id quod est de complemento eius et de eius *esse*, non magis reperitur in viro quam in muliere. — Quantum autem ad *bene esse* sive ad clariorem expressionem, consistit magis[^9] in anima, secundum quod ad corpus habet ordinem et habitudinem. Et quoniam ex parte corporis est sexuum distinctio, et secundum sexuum distinctionem maior est repraesentatio sive quantum ad rationem *praesidendi*, sive quantum ad rationem *principiandi*, quia vir est caput mulieris, et vir est principium mulieris, et *non vir propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum*[^10]: *Conclusio 2.* quantum ad hunc utique modum excellentiori modo reperitur imago in sexu masculino quam feminino, non ratione eius quod est de *esse* ipsius imaginis, sed ratione ipsius quod adiacet. Et secundum hoc satis plane potest responderi ad obiecta.

*Ad argg.* Rationes enim ostendentes, quod non magis est imago vir quam mulier, procedunt de imagine quantum ad suum *primum esse*, sicut intuenti patet. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de imagine quantum ad aliquam *accidentalem proprietatem* sive per relationem ad corpus.

<!-- page 404 -->

*Ad argg. 1, 2 ad oppositum.* 1. 2. Ad illud autem quod dicit Apostolus et Glossa, quod *vir est imago et gloria Dei*; dicendum, quod vir accipitur metaphorice pro superiori parte rationis, et mulier pro inferiori, sicut exponit Augustinus duodecimo[^11] de Trinitate. Et si tu obiicias, quod Apostolus loquitur de viro et muliere ad litteram; dicendum, quod loquitur de eis non secundum se, sed secundum significationem. Vir enim, quia fortis est et praesidet mulieri, superiorem portionem rationis significat, mulier vero inferiorem. Unde etiam est in matrimonio, quod vir significat Deum, et mulier significat Ecclesiam[^12] sive animam. Hoc autem est ratione virilitatis ex parte una, et infirmitatis sive fragilitatis ex altera, quae non respiciunt imaginem secundum se, sed ratione corporis annexi, et ita non essentialiter, sed accidentaliter[^13].

---

english:
### Question II. *Whether the image is more principally in the male than in the female.*

Secondly it is asked whether the image is more principally in the male than in the female. And that it is so, seems the case.

*On the opposite side.* 1. First to the Corinthians, chapter eleven[^1]: *The man is the image and glory of God.* But this, as the Apostle says, separates the man from the woman: therefore either the woman is not the image, or if she is the image, she is not so expressly so as the man.

2. Likewise, the Gloss[^2] on the same passage: «To the image of God was the man made, not the woman»; but this is not said because the woman has in no way been made to the image: therefore it is said because she is less to the image than the man.

3. Likewise, because man is to the image, he is unitable to the divine nature; but he was more unitable in the male sex than in the female: therefore the man is more the image than the woman.

4. Likewise, because man is the image of God, he is set above and given charge over all things, as is intimated in the text, Genesis 1[^3]: *Let us make man to our image* etc. And it is added: *And let him have dominion over the fishes* etc.: therefore, if presiding does not belong to man in the female sex but in the male, it seems that the image is in the male sex in a more excellent way than in the female.

**On the contrary:** *Foundations.* 1. Genesis 1[^4]: *God created man to his own image and likeness, male and female he created them*: if therefore woman was created to the image of God and to the equality of the man — as the formation of her from the side intimates, and the reason also for which she was formed, when it is said: *Let us make a helper like to him* — it seems therefore that in the man and the woman alike the formal character of the image is found.

2. Likewise, the image is regarded in the human being with respect to the highest part of the soul; but in the highest part of the soul there is no distinction according to sex: therefore whether the human being be a woman or a man, he is equally the image.

3. Likewise, sex does not vary the species[^5]: therefore man and woman are of the same species; but the image follows the human being according to the form of the species, not according to the form of the individual: therefore it is equally in the man and the woman.

4. Likewise, the image of creation is ordered to the image of re-creation or of gratification[^6]; but the image of re-creation, which consists in grace and the virtues, can be just as excellently in the woman as in the man: therefore by parity of reason also the image of creation, in which the human being was constituted.

> **Conclusion.** The formal character of the image is not more in the man than in the woman as regards the first being, but only as regards an accidental property.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that, as is plain from the preceding[^7], the image as regards its *being* principally consists in the soul and its powers, and most of all in these insofar as they are ordered to be turned to God; and as regards this there is no distinction of male and female, of slave and free[^8]: therefore *Conclusion 1.* the image, as regards that which belongs to its completion and to its *being*, is not more found in the man than in the woman. — But as regards *well-being* or clearer expression, it consists more[^9] in the soul, according as the soul has order and disposition to the body. And since the distinction of sexes is on the side of the body, and according to the distinction of sexes there is a greater representation either with respect to the account of *presiding* or with respect to the account of *originating*, because the man is the head of the woman, and the man is the principle of the woman, and *not the man is on account of the woman, but the woman on account of the man*[^10]: *Conclusion 2.* with respect to this mode then the image is found in a more excellent way in the male sex than in the female, not by reason of that which belongs to the *being* of the image itself, but by reason of that which lies adjacent to it. And according to this one can answer the objections plainly enough.

*To the arguments.* For the reasonings showing that the man is not more the image than the woman proceed from the image as regards its *first being*, as is plain to the one looking. But the reasonings on the opposite side proceed from the image as regards some *accidental property* or by way of relation to the body.

*To arguments 1 and 2 on the opposite side.* 1. 2. To that which the Apostle and the Gloss say, that *the man is the image and glory of God*; it must be said that "the man" is taken metaphorically for the superior part of reason, and "the woman" for the inferior, as Augustine expounds in the twelfth [book][^11] of *On the Trinity*. And if you should object that the Apostle is speaking of the man and the woman according to the letter; it must be said that he is speaking of them not according to themselves but according to signification. For the man, because he is strong and presides over the woman, signifies the superior portion of reason, but the woman the inferior. Hence also it is the case in matrimony that the man signifies God, and the woman signifies the Church[^12] or the soul. But this is by reason of virility on the one side and of weakness or fragility on the other, which do not regard the image according to itself but by reason of the body adjoined; and so not essentially but accidentally[^13].

---

la: Vers. 7.

en: Verse 7.

la: De hac Glossa, quam refert Lyranus in hunc locum, cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. et 12.

en: On this Gloss, which Lyranus reports in this place, cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, c. 7, nn. 10 and 12.

la: Vers. 26. — Cfr. August., III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 30; Serm. 43. (alias *de Verbis Apostoli*, serm. 27.) c. 2. n. 3, ex quo supra pag. 398, nota 5. quaedam allegata sunt.

en: Verse 26. — Cf. Augustine, *On Genesis according to the Letter* III, c. 20, n. 30; Sermon 43 (alias *On the Words of the Apostle*, serm. 27), c. 2, n. 3, from which certain things were cited above on p. 398, note 5.

la: Vers. 27: *Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos.* — Seq. textus est Gen. 2, 18. Ibid. v. 21. seq. agitur de formatione mulieris de costa Adami.

en: Verse 27: *And God created man to his own image, to the image of God he created him, male and female he created them.* — The following text is Gen. 2, 18. Ibid. v. 21 seq. treats of the formation of the woman from the rib of Adam.

la: Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 25. (IX. c. 9.).

en: Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, text 25 (IX, c. 9).

la: Cfr. August., XIV. de Trin. c. 16. n. 22, ubi exponit verbum Apostoli, Col. 3, 9: *Exspoliantes vos veterem hominem* etc. — Plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 *non ordinatur*; perperam.

en: Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIV, c. 16, n. 22, where he expounds the word of the Apostle, Col. 3, 9: *Stripping off the old man* etc. — Many codices, with editions 2, 3, 4, read *non ordinatur*; incorrectly.

la: Quaest. praeced. et supra a. 1. q. 1. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq., ubi etiam diffusius ostenditur, quod imago consistit in his potentiis, prout ad Deum convertuntur.

en: The preceding question, and above, a. 1, q. 1. — Cf. I *Sent.*, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 seq., where it is also shown more at length that the image consists in those powers insofar as they are turned to God.

la: Gal. 3, 28: *Non est Iudaeus, neque Graecus; non est servus, neque liber; non est masculus, neque femina.*

en: Galatians 3, 28: *There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is neither male nor female.*

la: Vat. *imago* pro *magis*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *imago* for *magis*.

la: Epist. I. Cor. 11, 3: *Caput autem mulieris vir.* Ibid. v. 8. seq.: *Non enim vir ex muliere est, sed mulier ex viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem* etc.

en: 1 Cor. 11, 3: *And the head of the woman is the man.* Ibid. v. 8 seq.: *For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was not created for the woman* etc.

la: Cap. 7. n. 10. et 12. Cfr. III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 34. et XI. c. 42. n. 58. — Paulo inferius post *loquitur* in aliquibus codd. et ed. 1 additur *ibi.*

en: *On the Trinity* XII, c. 7, nn. 10 and 12. Cf. *On Genesis according to the Letter* III, c. 22, n. 34, and XI, c. 42, n. 58. — A little below, after *loquitur*, in some codices and edition 1, *ibi* is added.

la: Ephes. c. 5, 22. seqq.

en: Ephesians 5, 22 seqq.

la: Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

en: See the scholion to the preceding question. ---

translators_notes:
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- *Vir / mulier* rendered "man / woman" throughout. *Superior pars rationis / inferior pars rationis* preserved as "the superior part of reason / the inferior" per Augustine *de Trin.* XII.

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0


title: Dist. 16, Art. 2, Q. 3

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam in affectiva.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam in motiva sive affectiva. Et quod principalius sit in cognitiva, videtur:

*Fundamenta.*
1. Per illud quod dicit Augustinus[^1]: « *Imago* est in potentia cognoscendi, et *similitudo* in potentia diligendi »; sed hoc non est dictum, quod omnino sit in potentia cognoscendi: ergo dictum est, quia principalius est ibi.

2. Item, imago primo et principaliter convenit ipsi Verbo aeterno[^2]: ergo ei principaliter magis convenit quod illi Verbo aeterno respondet; hoc autem est ipsa intelligentia, quae est in ipsa potentia cognitiva: ergo etc.

3. Item, imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate: sed duae istarum potentiarum, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, tenent se ex parte cognitivae: ergo et imago plus se tenet ex parte cognitivae quam affectivae.

4. Item, imago dicit quandam configurationem et distinctionem[^3]; sed affectivae est *unire*, et cognitivae *distinguere*: ergo imago principalius residet penes cognitivam quam penes affectivam.

*Ad oppositum.*
1. Imago reformationis respondet imagini creationis; sed imago reformationis, quae quidem est gratia, principalius est in affectiva quam in cognitiva[^4]: ergo et imago creationis.

2. Item, in eo principaliter consistit res, in quo consistit eius complementum; sed imago completur in voluntate, et voluntas se tenet ex parte affectivae: ergo etc.

3. Item, imago est nobilissimum in anima, ergo consistit penes id quod est in anima nobilissimum; sed liberum arbitrium sive voluntas est nobilissimum, quod sit in anima[^5]: ergo principaliter consistit imago penes arbitrii libertatem sive voluntatem; hoc autem principaliter respicit affectivam: ergo etc.

4. Item, *similitudo* est in plus, quam sit *imago*; non enim quaelibet similitudo est imago, sed similitudo expressa in quadam configuratione et imitatione: ergo ubicumque est imago, est et similitudo: ergo ubi principaliter est imago, principaliter est et similitudo. Sed similitudo non est principaliter penes cognitionem, sed penes affectionem, cum similitudo sit in gratuitis, quae maxime respiciunt potentiam affectivam: ergo pari ratione imago.

*Quaestio incidens 1.* Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae sit differentia inter imaginem et similitudinem. Cum enim in plus sit similitudo quam imago, sicut ostendit Augustinus in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*[^6], et superius non debeat connumerari suo inferiori, videtur, quod male dicitur homo factus *ad imaginem et similitudinem*.

*Quaestio incidens 2.* Item, cum duae sint potentiae ex parte *affectionis*, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis[^7], sicut duae ex parte *cognitionis*, scilicet memoria et intelligentia; quaestio est, quare in ratione imaginis potius accipiuntur duae potentiae ex parte *cognitivae*, et una ex parte *affectivae*. Videtur enim, quod potius deberet esse e converso, cum tres virtutes theologicae, quae reformant imaginem animae, sic in ea ponantur, ut duae sint ex parte *affectivae*, scilicet spes et caritas, quarum una est in irascibili et altera in concupiscibili, et una ex parte *cognitivae*, scilicet fides, quae communiter ponitur in rationali[^8].

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### Conclusio.

> *Imago principalius respicit cognitivam quam affectivam.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod *de prima nominis impositione differt imago et similitudo.* Imago enim nominat conformitatem in *quantitate*, similitudo vero convenientiam in *qualitate*. Imago enim nominat quandam configurationem, et ita importat figuram, quae est quantitas in qualitate, vel qualitas in quantitate; similitudo vero dicitur rerum differentium eadem qualitas[^9].

*Triplex modus distinguendi eas in specie.*

*Primus.* Ex hac autem primaria differentia triplex consuevit assignari modus distinguendi inter imaginem et similitudinem, cum dicitur[^10]: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem.* — Primus est, quem dicit Hugo, quod « similitudo respicit *naturam*, et imago respicit *figuram* »; quia similitudo dicit convenientiam in qualitate naturali, imago vero convenientiam in distinctione figurali, ad modum cuiusdam trianguli, in quo sunt tres termini et tres lineae; quia tres sunt *potentiae*, quarum quaelibet habitudinem habet ad quamlibet, et similiter tres *personae*; et potentia vel persona tenet rationem termini; habitudo vero vel emanatio tenet rationem lineae.

*Secundus.* Secundus modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in *naturalibus*, et similitudo in *gratuitis*, qui similiter habet ortum ex illa prima differentia. Quia enim imago dicit *configurationem*; et illa attenditur ex parte naturalium potentiarum animae, scilicet memoriae, intelligentiae et voluntatis: hinc est, quod imago est in naturalibus. Quia vero similitudo dicit convenientiam, quae ortum habet a *qualitate*; et qualitas, in qua anima similatur Deo, haec est gratia: ideo similitudo dicitur in gratuitis esse.

*Tertius.* Tertius modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi: et iste modus similiter habet ortum ex differentia prima. Quia enim imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem; et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione: et haec origo et habitudo principaliter *Conclusio 1.* residet ex parte cognitivae: ideo imago principalius ponitur in cognitiva. Similitudo vero dicit convenientiam in qualitate; et quia qualitas, in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive *Conclusio 2.* in affectione: hinc est, quod similitudo ponitur principaliter in potentia affectiva.

*Ad 2. quaestionem incidentem.* Et inde est, quod in imagine *creationis* duae sunt potentiae ex parte cognitivae, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, et una ex parte affectivae, scilicet voluntas. Econtra vero in imagine *recreationis*, quae quidem consistit in gratia, duae virtutes sunt ex parte affectivae, scilicet spes et caritas, et una ex parte cognitivae, scilicet fides. Imago enim principaliter respicit *originem* et *habitudinem*; habitudo autem et origo attenditur inter memoriam et intelligentiam per modum parentis et prolis, et inter haec duo et voluntatem secundum modum derivationis sive processionis[^11]. Inter irascibilem vero et concupiscibilem nec est talis ordo nec origo, cum motus irascibilis possit esse sine concupiscibili, et e converso; motus autem voluntatis non potest esse sine motu intelligentiae praevio, nec actus similiter intelligentiae sine actu memoriae, in his dico, quae sunt de ratione imaginis. Ideo in assignatione imaginis duo sumuntur membra ex parte *cognitivae*, et unum ex parte *affectivae*. Hoc enim exigit *ordo* et *origo* et *distinctio*, et propterea imago principalius est in cognitiva quam in affectiva. — Similitudo vero principalius consistit in unione animae ad Deum, quae quidem est per gratiam. Et quoniam unio et gratia principaliter respiciunt *affectivam*; hinc est, quod in imagine *recreationis*, quae quidem est in gratuitis, duae sunt virtutes, quae respiciunt affectivam, scilicet spes et caritas, penes duas vires, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem; una vero, quae respicit *cognitivam*, scilicet fides, quae respicit rationalem, quamvis et spes, reformans irascibilem, per consequens reformet memoriam, cum conveniant in actu, qui est *tenere*[^12].

Secundum hoc igitur planum est respondere ad quaestionem et ad obiecta. Concedendum enim est de plano, quod imago principaliter respicit cognitivam; concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc probant.

*Solutio oppositorum.*
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de imagine reformationis: dicendum, quod non valet, quia imago reformationis potius est *similitudo* quaedam, quam sit imago. Si enim proprie esset imago, esset capax Dei et esset immortalis[^13]; nunc autem non est sic. Et ideo, quia imago recreationis potius est *similitudo* quam imago, magis principaliter respicit potentiam affectivam quam cognitivam, quamvis reformet tam cognitivam quam affectivam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod complementum imaginis[^14] est in voluntate; dicendum, quod etsi voluntas *ultima* sit in imagine, non tamen se habet

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per modum *complementi* in ratione imaginis. Imago enim dicit *ordinem* et *originem* in potentiis, sicut est in personis; et quemadmodum tertia persona non ponitur aliarum completiva nec alias complere, sed potius ab eis recipere; sic voluntas, prout est pars imaginis, potius consideratur in ratione *egredientis* quam in ratione *complentis*. Et quia prima ratio originis est per modum naturae, quae quidem consistit in ortu intelligentiae ex memoria; hinc est, quod imago principalius respicit cognitivam quam affectivam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago consistit penes nobilissimum in anima; dicendum, quod nobilius[^15] in anima dupliciter potest accipi: vel secundum *distinctionem potentiarum*, scilicet affectivae et cognitivae, vel secundum *conditionem statuum*, scilicet superioris portionis et inferioris. Cum ergo dicitur, quod imago consistat penes nobilissimum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad *statum* in superiori parte, non quantum ad *potentias*, quia imago complectitur tam affectivam quam cognitivam, cum utraque nata sit immediate ferri in Deum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est in plus quam imago; dicendum, quod similitudo, si accipiatur in sua *generalitate*, in plus est; *Notandum.* si vero accipiatur *proprie*, sicut accipitur in proposito, non est in plus, immo distinguitur ab imagine, ita quod, etsi utraque[^16] tam affectivam quam cognitivam respiciat, imago tamen principalius respicit cognitivam, et similitudo affectivam; et ratio iam dicta est. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa duo, quae quaerebantur.

english:
### Question III. *Whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the motive or affective. And that it is more principally in the cognitive, it seems:

*Foundations.*
1. From what Augustine says[^1]: "*Image* is in the power of knowing, and *likeness* in the power of loving"; but this is not said because it is wholly in the power of knowing: therefore it is said because it is more principally there.

2. Likewise, image befits primarily and principally the eternal Word itself[^2]: therefore that which corresponds to that eternal Word befits it more principally; but this is the intelligence itself, which is in the cognitive power itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, image consists in memory, intelligence, and will: but two of these powers, namely memory and intelligence, are held on the side of the cognitive: therefore the image too is held more on the side of the cognitive than of the affective.

4. Likewise, image bespeaks a certain configuration and distinction[^3]; but it belongs to the affective to *unite*, and to the cognitive to *distinguish*: therefore the image resides more principally in the cognitive than in the affective.

*On the opposite side.*
1. The image of reformation corresponds to the image of creation; but the image of reformation, which indeed is grace, is more principally in the affective than in the cognitive[^4]: therefore the image of creation also.

2. Likewise, a thing principally consists in that wherein its completion consists; but the image is completed in the will, and the will is held on the side of the affective: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the image is the noblest thing in the soul, therefore it consists in that which is noblest in the soul; but free choice or will is the noblest thing that is in the soul[^5]: therefore the image consists principally in the liberty of choice or the will; but this principally regards the affective: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *likeness* is in more than *image*; for not every likeness is an image, but a likeness expressed in a certain configuration and imitation: therefore wherever there is image, there is also likeness: therefore where image is principally, likeness is also principally. But likeness is not principally on the side of cognition, but on the side of affection, since likeness is in gratuitous things, which most regard the affective power: therefore by equal reasoning the image as well.

*Incidental question 1.* Alongside this it is asked, what is the difference between image and likeness. For since likeness is in more than image, as Augustine shows in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*[^6], and the higher ought not to be numbered together with its inferior, it seems that man is wrongly said to have been made *to the image and likeness*.

*Incidental question 2.* Likewise, since there are two powers on the side of *affection*, namely the irascible and the concupiscible[^7], just as there are two on the side of *cognition*, namely memory and intelligence; the question is, why in the account of the image two powers are taken on the side of the *cognitive*, and one on the side of the *affective*. For it seems that it ought rather to be the converse, since the three theological virtues, which reform the image of the soul, are so placed in it that two are on the side of the *affective*, namely hope and charity, of which one is in the irascible and the other in the concupiscible, and one is on the side of the *cognitive*, namely faith, which is commonly placed in the rational[^8].

### Conclusion.

> *The image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *image and likeness differ from the very first imposition of the name.* For image names a conformity in *quantity*, but likeness names an agreement in *quality*. For image names a certain configuration, and so it imports figure, which is quantity in quality, or quality in quantity; but likeness is called the same quality of different things[^9].

*Threefold mode of distinguishing them in species.*

*First.* From this primary difference a threefold mode of distinguishing has been customarily assigned between image and likeness, when it is said[^10]: *Let us make man to our image and likeness.* — The first is the one Hugh says, that "likeness regards *nature*, and image regards *figure*"; because likeness bespeaks agreement in natural quality, but image agreement in figural distinction, after the manner of a certain triangle, in which there are three terms and three lines; for there are three *powers*, each of which has a relation to each, and likewise three *persons*; and the power or person holds the place of a term, but the relation or emanation holds the place of a line.

*Second.* The second mode of distinguishing is that image is in *natural things*, and likeness in *gratuitous things*, which likewise has its origin from that first difference. For since image bespeaks *configuration*, and that is attended to on the side of the soul's natural powers, namely of memory, intelligence, and will: hence it is that image is in natural things. But since likeness bespeaks agreement, which takes its origin from *quality*, and the quality in which the soul is likened to God is grace: therefore likeness is said to be in gratuitous things.

*Third.* The third mode of distinguishing is that image is in the power of knowing, and likeness in the power of loving: and this mode likewise takes its origin from the first difference. For since image consists in agreement according to configuration, and configuration is attended to in origin, relation, and the distinction of powers: and this origin and relation principally *Conclusion 1.* resides on the side of the cognitive: therefore image is more principally placed in the cognitive. But likeness bespeaks agreement in quality; and since the quality in which the soul is principally likened to God is in the will or *Conclusion 2.* in affection: hence it is that likeness is placed principally in the affective power.

*To the 2nd incidental question.* And hence it is that in the image of *creation* two powers are on the side of the cognitive, namely memory and intelligence, and one on the side of the affective, namely the will. But, on the contrary, in the image of *recreation*, which indeed consists in grace, two virtues are on the side of the affective, namely hope and charity, and one on the side of the cognitive, namely faith. For the image principally regards *origin* and *relation*; but relation and origin are attended to between memory and intelligence after the manner of parent and offspring, and between these two and the will according to the mode of derivation or procession[^11]. But between the irascible and the concupiscible there is neither such order nor origin, since the motion of the irascible can be without the concupiscible, and conversely; but the motion of the will cannot be without a preceding motion of intelligence, nor likewise an act of intelligence without an act of memory, in those things, I say, which pertain to the account of the image. Therefore in the assigning of the image two members are taken on the side of the *cognitive*, and one on the side of the *affective*. For *order* and *origin* and *distinction* demand this, and on that account the image is more principally in the cognitive than in the affective. — But likeness principally consists in the union of the soul to God, which is through grace. And since union and grace principally regard the *affective*; hence it is that in the image of *recreation*, which indeed is in gratuitous things, there are two virtues that regard the affective, namely hope and charity, in the two powers, namely the irascible and the concupiscible; but one which regards the *cognitive*, namely faith, which regards the rational, although hope also, reforming the irascible, consequently reforms the memory, since they agree in the act, which is *to hold fast*[^12].

According to this, then, it is plain how to respond both to the question and to the objections. For it must be conceded outright that the image principally regards the cognitive; the reasonings that prove this must also be conceded.

*Solution of the opposites.*
1. As to what is objected concerning the image of reformation: it must be said that it is not valid, because the image of reformation is rather a certain *likeness* than an image. For if it were properly an image, it would be capable of God and would be immortal[^13]; but it is not so now. And therefore, since the image of recreation is rather *likeness* than image, it regards the affective power more principally than the cognitive, although it reforms both the cognitive and the affective.

2. As to what is objected, that the completion of the image[^14] is in the will; it must be said that although the will is *last* in the image, nevertheless it does not stand

after the manner of *completion* in the account of the image. For the image bespeaks *order* and *origin* in the powers, as it is in the persons; and just as the third person is not placed as completing the others nor as completing the others, but rather as receiving from them; so the will, insofar as it is part of the image, is rather considered in the account of *one going forth* than in the account of *one completing*. And since the first account of origin is by the mode of nature, which indeed consists in the rising of intelligence from memory; hence it is that the image more principally regards the cognitive than the affective.

3. As to what is objected, that the image consists in the noblest thing in the soul; it must be said that the nobler[^15] in the soul can be taken in two ways: either according to the *distinction of powers*, namely affective and cognitive, or according to the *condition of states*, namely of the superior portion and the inferior. When therefore it is said that the image consists in the noblest thing, this is understood with regard to the *state* in the superior part, not with regard to the *powers*, since the image embraces both the affective and the cognitive, since each is born immediately to be borne to God.

4. As to what is objected, that likeness is in more than image; it must be said that likeness, if it be taken in its *generality*, is in more; *Note.* but if it be taken *properly*, as it is taken in the present case, it is not in more, but rather is distinguished from image, so that, although each[^16] regards both the affective and the cognitive, image nevertheless more principally regards the cognitive, and likeness the affective; and the reason has already been stated. — And by this is made plain the response to those two things that were asked.

la: Libr. *de Spiritu et anima* (inter opera Augustini), c. 10. Cfr. ibid. c. 39. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.

en: *On the Spirit and the Soul* (among the works of Augustine), c. 10. Cf. ibid. c. 39, and here in the text of the Master, c. 3.

la: Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. q. 2. — De seqq. cfr. ibid. d. 27. p. II. q. 3.

en: Cf. I Sent. d. 31. p. II. q. 2. — On the following, cf. ibid. d. 27. p. II. q. 3.

la: Vide infra pag. 405, nota 2.

en: See below, p. 405, note 2.

la: Cfr. infra d. 26. q. 5. seq.

en: Cf. below, d. 26. q. 5 and following.

la: Vide supra pag. 115, nota 6, et infra d. 25. p. I. q. 6, ubi etiam ostenditur, quod liberum arbitrium principalius respicit affectivam potentiam.

en: See above, p. 115, note 6, and below d. 25. p. I. q. 6, where it is also shown that free choice more principally regards the affective power.

la: Quaest. 74, ubi dicit: « Imago et aequalitas et similitudo distinguenda sunt », et deinde hanc explicat propositionem: Quia ubi imago, continuo similitudo, non continuo aequalitas; ubi aequalitas, continuo similitudo, non continuo imago; ubi similitudo, non continuo imago, non continuo aequalitas.

en: Question 74, where he says: "Image and equality and likeness are to be distinguished," and then he explains this proposition: Because where there is image, there immediately is likeness, but not immediately equality; where there is equality, there immediately is likeness, but not immediately image; where there is likeness, not immediately image, not immediately equality.

la: Vide tom. I. pag. 197, nota 6. et infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. circa finem corp. quaest.; d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.

en: See vol. I, p. 197, note 6, and below d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1, near the end of the body of the question; d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ad 2.

la: Nam ut dicit Aristot., *de Praedicam.* c. *de Qualitate*: *Proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici.* Cfr. etiam V. Metaph. text. 16. et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 13.).

en: For as Aristotle says, *Categories*, chapter *On Quality*: "It is proper to quality that according to it [things] are called like or unlike." Cf. also V Metaph. text 16 and 20 (IV, cc. 9 and 13).

la: Gen. 1, 26. — Verba Hugonis habentur I. *de Sacram.* p. VI. c. 2: *Imago pertinet ad figuram, similitudo ad naturam.*

en: Gen. 1:26. — The words of Hugh are found in I *On the Sacraments*, p. VI. c. 2: "Image pertains to figure, likeness to nature."

la: Cfr. August., IX. *de Trin.* c. 12. n. 17. seq. — Plures codd. cum Vat. *donationis* pro *derivationis*.

en: Cf. Augustine, IX *On the Trinity* c. 12. n. 17 and following. — Several codices with the Vatican edition read *donationis* for *derivationis*.

la: Ut iam dictum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et plenius dicetur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.

en: As has already been said in I Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, and will be said more fully in III Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.

la: Duplex haec proprietas requiritur, ut aliquid sit imago Dei, sicut ostendit August., XIV. *de Trin.* c. 3. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 *informet* pro *reformet*.

en: This twofold property is required for something to be the image of God, as Augustine shows, XIV *On the Trinity* c. 3. n. 6 and c. 8. n. 11. — A little below, codex cc and ed. 1 read *informet* for *reformet*.

la: Vat. *magis*.

en: The Vatican edition reads *magis*.

la: Vat. cum ed. 1 et uno alteroque cod. *nobilissimum*. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius *cognitionem*, cod. W *considerationem* pro *conditionem*, de quo cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2.

en: The Vatican edition with ed. 1 and one other codex read *nobilissimum*. The same Vatican edition a little below reads *cognitionem*, codex W *considerationem* for *conditionem*; on which cf. below d. 24. p. I. a. 2.

la: Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 *utramque*, non recte.

en: Several codices with editions 1, 2, 3, 4 read *utramque*, not correctly. ---

latin_scholion:
**I.** In hac quaestione speciali praesupponitur distinctio inter imaginem *creationis*, quae pertinet ad ordinem naturae et proprie dicitur imago, et imaginem *recreationis* (reformationis), quae est ordinis supernaturalis et communiter vocatur similitudo in sensu proprio. Licet enim similitudo per se aliquid communius significet quam imago, atque in ipsa ratione imaginis includatur; tamen in sensu speciali et proprio adhibetur ad quandam altiorem imaginis perfectionem significandam, quae animae per gratiam sanctificantem tribuitur (hic ad 4, et cfr. S. Thom., locis citt.). — De triplici gradu expressionis per modum *vestigii*, *imaginis* et *similitudinis* S. Doctor egregie loquitur *Breviloq.* p. II. c. 12; de similitudine aequiparantiae et imitationis supra d. 3. a. I. q. 2; de similitudine secundum proprietatem generis et extra genus I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2; de similitudine proportionis et proportionalitatis IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. dub. 3.

**II.** Alii auctores hoc loco plerumque tantum quaerunt, quomodo differant imago et similitudo, praeter Alexandrum Hal. et Aegid. R., qui etiam de hac speciali quaestione tractant.

Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. a. 4. et § I. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 93. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. et q. I. a. 3. — Alios auctores vide in scholio ad a. 1. q. 1.

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english_scholion:
**I.** In this special question is presupposed the distinction between the image of *creation*, which pertains to the order of nature and is properly called image, and the image of *recreation* (reformation), which is of the supernatural order and is commonly called likeness in the proper sense. For although likeness of itself signifies something more general than image, and is included in the very account of image; nevertheless in a special and proper sense it is applied to signify a certain higher perfection of the image, which is bestowed on the soul through sanctifying grace (here ad 4, and cf. S. Thomas, in the places cited). — Concerning the threefold grade of expression by way of *vestige*, *image*, and *likeness* the Holy Doctor speaks excellently *Breviloq.* p. II. c. 12; concerning the likeness of equality and imitation above d. 3. a. I. q. 2; concerning likeness according to the property of genus and outside genus I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2; concerning the likeness of proportion and proportionality IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. dub. 3.

**II.** Other authors at this place mostly ask only how image and likeness differ, except Alexander of Hales and Aegidius Romanus, who also treat of this special question.

Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. a. 4. et § I. 2. — S. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 93. a. 9. — B. Albert, here a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Aegid. R., here q. 2. a. 3. and q. I. a. 3. — See other authors in the scholion at a. 1. q. 1.

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translators_notes:
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