title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

title_alt:
Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura
Whether God is knowable by a creature

source_text:
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### Articulus unicus. *De cognoscibilitate Dei.*
### Quaestio I. *Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.*

Circa primum, quod non sit Deus cognoscibilis a creatura, ostenditur

1. Per auctoritatem Dionysii *de Divinis Nominibus*[^1]: « Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est. »

2. Item ostenditur ratione per quadruplicem suppositionem, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet proportionem, unionem sive receptionem, iudicium et[^2] informationem. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur.

Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentis ad cognoscibile[^3]; sed Dei ad intellectum non est proportio, quia Deus

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est infinitus, et intellectus finitus: ergo etc. Praeterea, si est aliqua proportio, videtur quod non sit sufficiens, quia plus distat verum increatum ab intellectu humano, quam quodlibet creatum intelligibile a sensu[^4]. Sed sensus, qui est perceptivus sensibilis, nunquam elevatur ad cognitionem intelligibilis creati: ergo nec intellectus unquam elevabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilis increati.

3. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: necesse est, esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem, ita quod unum sit in altero[^5]; sed cognoscens non est in cognoscibili, sed e converso; sed impossibile est, infinitum capi ab ipso finito: ergo impossibile est esse in illo: ergo Deum esse in intellectu est impossibile, cum sit infinitus.

4. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: ad cognitionem necesse est, esse in cognoscente iudicium de cognito; sed omne iudicans habet posse super iudicatum[^6]; finitum autem non habet posse super infinitum: ergo de illo non iudicat; sed ad cognitionem requirebatur iudicium: ergo intellectus finitus non cognoscit Deum infinitum, super quem non habet posse.

5. Item, ex quarta sic: necesse est, intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito[^7]; sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per essentiam, aut per similitudinem; sed Deus non informat per essentiam, quia nulli unitur ut forma, nec per similitudinem abstractam, quia similitudo abstracta est spiritualior eo a quo abstrahitur; Deo autem nihil est spiritualius nec potest esse: ergo etc.

**Contra:**

1. Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus in libro *de Trinitate*, et est in littera praesentis distinctionis[^8]: « Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest ». Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis: ergo per cognitionem et amorem: ergo Deus potest cognosci a creatura.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus in *Soliloquiis*[^9]; sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deus est summa lux: ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae: ergo etc.

3. Item, cum sit[^10] cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per similitudinem, illa cognoscuntur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus[^11]; sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam: ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem.

4. Item, sicut se habet summa bonitas ad dilectionem, sic summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed summa bonitas est summe amabilis ab affectu: ergo[^12] summa veritas est summe cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

5. Item, unumquodque efficacius potest in id ad quod naturaliter ordinatur[^13]; sed intellectus noster naturaliter ordinatur ad cognitionem summae lucis:

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ergo illa maxime cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

> **Conclusio.** Deus, in se summe cognoscibilis, etiam nobis esset summe cognoscibilis, si non esset defectus ex parte intellectus nostri.

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod Deus in se tanquam summa lux est summe cognoscibilis; et tanquam lux summe intellectum nostrum complens[^14], et quantum est de se, esset summe cognoscibilis etiam nobis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis; qui quidem non tollitur perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. Concedendae sunt igitur rationes[^15], quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus, sicut post patebit[^16].

**Ad obiecta in contrarium:**

1. *Ad primum* dicendum, quod est cognitio per *comprehensionem* et per *apprehensionem*. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis[^17]. Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia « quodam modo est anima omnia »[^18], per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia, et maxime est capax Dei per assimilationem, quia est imago et similitudo Dei. Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet; et de hac intelligit Dionysius, et de illa currit[^19] obiectio, de alia vero non.

2. *Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia* intelligibilis et sensibilis; dicendum, quod[^20] est distantia secundum rationem entis, et secundum rationem cognoscibilis. Primo modo est maior distantia; secundo modo non, quia utrumque est intelligibile, scilicet Deus et anima. Non sic est de intellectu et sensu; quia sensus est potentia determinata[^21], sed intellectus non.

3. *Ad illud, quod infinitum non capitur a finito*; dicunt aliqui, quod capere infinitum est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad essentiam; et sic capitur; et quantum ad virtutem[^22]; et sic non capitur, sicut punctus a linea totus attingitur secundum substantiam, sed non totaliter secundum virtutem. Sed ista solutio non videtur solvere, quia in Deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.

Ideo dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum: unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplicitate, ut Deus; et tale infinitum, quia simplex, est ubique totum, quia infinitum, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si cognoscitur totus, quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura[^23] immensitatem.

4. *Ad illud quod obiicitur:* Iudicans habet posse etc.; dicendum, quod iudicare de aliquo est dupliciter: primo[^24] modo discernendo, utrum sit vel non sit; et hoc modo convenit iudicium omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti; alio modo approbando vel reprobando, utrum ita debeat esse; et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis, sicut dicit Augustinus *de Vera Religione*[^25], quod « iudex non iudicat de lege, sed secundum ipsam iudicat de aliis ». Et de hoc modo verum est quod dicit Augustinus, quod « nullus de illa veritate iudicat, nullus tamen sine illa iudicat ». Et de hoc secundo[^26] modo verum est quod opponit, quod iudicans potest super iudicatum; de primo vero non est verum, quod possit super; potest tamen dirigi ut in obiectum adminiculo illius.

5. *Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de informatione*;

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dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen[^27], dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus nono *de Trinitate*, capitulo undecimo[^28]: « Quemadmodum, cum per sensus corporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro: ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; illa notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est ».

english:
### Sole Article. *On the knowability of God.*
### Question I. *Whether God is knowable by a creature.*

Concerning the first, that God is not knowable by a creature, it is shown:

1. By the authority of Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*[^1]: "It is possible neither to speak nor to understand God."

2. Likewise it is shown by reason through a fourfold presupposition, which must be present in cognition, namely proportion, union or reception, judgment, and[^2] information. For the intellect does not understand except what is proportionable to it, and what is in some way united to it, and concerning which it judges, and by which the edge of intelligence is informed.

From the first presupposition it is argued thus: it is necessary that there be a proportion of the knower to the knowable[^3]; but there is no proportion of God to the intellect, because God

is infinite, and the intellect is finite: therefore etc. Moreover, if there is any proportion, it seems that it is not sufficient, because the uncreated truth is more distant from the human intellect than any created intelligible is from sense[^4]. But sense, which is perceptive of the sensible, is never elevated to the cognition of a created intelligible: therefore neither will the intellect ever be elevated to the cognition of the uncreated intelligible.

3. Likewise, from the second presupposition thus: it is necessary that there be a union of the knowable to the knower, such that one is in the other[^5]; but the knower is not in the knowable, but conversely; but it is impossible that the infinite be grasped by the finite: therefore it is impossible that it be in it: therefore that God be in the intellect is impossible, since He is infinite.

4. Likewise, from the third presupposition thus: for cognition it is necessary that there be in the knower a judgment about the known; but every judging thing has power over the thing judged[^6]; but the finite does not have power over the infinite: therefore it does not judge concerning it; but for cognition a judgment was required: therefore the finite intellect does not know the infinite God, over whom it has no power.

5. Likewise, from the fourth thus: it is necessary that the knowing intellect be informed by the thing known[^7]; but everything that informs another either informs by essence or by likeness; but God does not inform by essence, because He is united to nothing as form, nor by abstracted likeness, because an abstracted likeness is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted; but nothing is more spiritual than God, nor can be: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The rational soul is to the image of God. But as Augustine says in the book *On the Trinity*, and as is in the letter [of the Master] of the present distinction[^8]: "The mind is the image of God in this, that it is capable of God and can be partaker [of Him]." But to be capable [of Him] is not according to substance or essence, because thus He is in all creatures: therefore [it is] through cognition and love: therefore God can be known by a creature.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: every spiritual cognition occurs by reason of light, and by reason of uncreated light, as Augustine says in the *Soliloquies*[^9]; but light is most knowable, and God is the highest light: therefore He is most knowable to the soul itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, since there is[^10] cognition of some things through presence and of others through likeness, those things are more truly known which are known through presence, as Augustine says[^11]; but God is united to the soul itself through presence: therefore God is more truly known than other things, which are known through likeness.

4. Likewise, as the highest goodness stands to love, so the highest truth to cognition; but the highest goodness is supremely lovable by affection: therefore[^12] the highest truth is supremely knowable by the intellect.

5. Likewise, each thing can more effectively [act] in that to which it is naturally ordered[^13]; but our intellect is naturally ordered to the cognition of the highest light:

therefore that [light] is most knowable by the intellect.

> **Conclusion.** God, in Himself supremely knowable, would also be supremely knowable to us, were there no defect on the part of our intellect.

**I respond:** It must be said that God in Himself, as the highest light, is supremely knowable; and as light supremely filling our intellect[^14], and so far as concerns Himself, would be supremely knowable also to us, unless there were some defect on the part of the power of the knower; which indeed is not perfectly taken away except through the deiformity of glory. Therefore the reasons[^15] are to be granted, that God is knowable by a creature and also most clearly knowable, so far as concerns Himself, unless there were something impeding or deficient on the part of the intellect, as will afterwards be made clear[^16].

**To the objections to the contrary:**

1. *To the first* it must be said that there is cognition through *comprehension* and through *apprehension*. Cognition through apprehension consists in the manifestation of the truth of the thing known; but cognition of comprehension consists in the inclusion of totality[^17]. For the first cognition a proportion of fittingness is required; and such there is in the soul with respect to God, because "in a certain way the soul is all things"[^18], through assimilation to all things, since it is born to know all things, and is most capable of God through assimilation, because it is the image and likeness of God. As to the cognition of comprehension, a proportion of equality and parity is required; and such there is not in the soul with respect to God, because the soul is finite, but God is infinite; and therefore [the soul] does not have this; and of this Dionysius understands, and the objection runs[^19] concerning this, but concerning the other it does not.

2. *To that which is objected concerning the distance* of the intelligible and the sensible; it must be said that[^20] there is distance according to the account of being and according to the account of the knowable. In the first mode there is greater distance; in the second mode not, because each is intelligible, namely God and the soul. It is not so with the intellect and sense; because sense is a determinate power[^21], but the intellect is not.

3. *To that which says that the infinite is not grasped by the finite*; some say that to grasp the infinite is twofold, namely as to essence — and thus it is grasped; and as to power[^22] — and thus it is not grasped, just as a point is wholly reached by a line according to substance, but not totally according to power. But this solution does not seem to solve [the matter], because in God essence is the same as power, and each is infinite.

Therefore it must be said that the infinite is twofold: one, which stands by opposition to the simple — and such is not grasped by the finite, as is the infinite of mass; the other is that which has infinity together with simplicity, as God; and such an infinite, since it is simple, is everywhere whole, [and] since it is infinite, is in no thing in such a way that it is not beyond it. So it is to be understood in the cognition of God. And therefore it does not follow that if He is wholly known, He is comprehended, because the intellect does not include His totality, just as neither does a creature[^23] [include His] immensity.

4. *To that which is objected:* "The judging thing has power" etc.; it must be said that to judge concerning something is in two ways: in the first[^24] mode by discerning whether [a thing] is or is not; and in this mode judgment belongs to every knowing intellect with respect to every object; in the other mode by approving or reproving, whether [a thing] ought so to be; and thus it does not judge concerning truth, but according to it [judges] concerning other things, as Augustine says *On True Religion*[^25], that "the judge does not judge concerning the law, but according to it judges concerning other things." And concerning this mode it is true what Augustine says, that "no one judges concerning that truth, yet no one judges without it." And concerning this second[^26] mode it is true what the objection sets forth, that the judging thing has power over the thing judged; but concerning the first it is not true that it has power over it; nevertheless it can be directed as to [its] object by the support of that [truth].

5. *To that which is finally objected concerning information*;

it must be said that God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth; therefore it is not necessary that a likeness be abstracted from Him through which He may be known; nevertheless[^27], while He is known by the intellect, the intellect is informed by a certain notice [*notitia*], which is as it were a certain likeness, not abstracted but impressed, inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature, yet superior to the soul, because it makes it better. And this Augustine says in the ninth [book] *On the Trinity*, chapter eleven[^28]: "Just as, when through the senses of bodies we learn bodies, some likeness of them is made in our mind: so when we know God, some likeness of God is made; that notice, however, is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature."

la: Cap. 1. circa medium: *Quem neque intelligere possibile est neque dicere* (ed. Migne iuxta transl. Scoti Erigenae).

en: [Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus*,] c. 1, near the middle: "Whom it is possible neither to understand nor to speak" (Migne ed., according to the translation of Scotus Eriugena).

la: Omittitur contra codd. et ed. 1 in Vat. *et*.

en: *Et* is omitted in the Vatican edition against the codices and ed. 1.

la: Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 1: *Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis* (scil. potentiis animae). — Paulo infra post *intellectum* subaudi *creaturae sive humanum*. Mox codd. et edd. inter se dissident; multi codd. ut AFGKMSTWXZ bb ee post *infinitus* omittunt minus bene *et intellectus finitus*; plures ut HY ff cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ponunt *sed* pro *et*, cod. R *vero*; tandem cod. ee post *intellectus* addit *noster*; nihil duximus immutandum. — Aristot., I. de Caelo, text. 82. (c. 6.): *Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.*

en: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, c. 1: "For if cognition exists in them (namely the powers of the soul) from a certain likeness and affinity." — A little further on, after *intellectus*, supply *of a creature or human*. Then the codices and editions disagree; many codices, as AFGKMSTWXZ bb ee, less suitably omit after *infinitus* the words *et intellectus finitus*; several, as HY ff with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, put *sed* for *et*, and codex R *vero*; finally codex ee adds *noster* after *intellectus*; we have judged that nothing should be changed. — Aristotle, *De Caelo* I, text 82 (c. 6): "There is no ratio of the infinite to the finite."

la: Ex mss. IXZ pro *sensibili*, quod Vat. cum plurimis mss. habet, substituimus *sensu*, quod contextui magis correspondet formamque argumenti completiorem reddit ac confirmatur ex Richardo a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. et Petro a Tar., hic q. 1, qui idem argumentum eodem modo proponunt. Paulo ante cod. K *creato* pro *humano*. — De propositione minore huius argumenti cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. Prosa 4.

en: From mss. IXZ, for *sensibili*, which the Vat. with most mss. has, we have substituted *sensu*, which corresponds better to the context and renders the form of the argument more complete, and is confirmed from Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 1, and Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, who propose the same argument in the same way. A little before, codex K [reads] *creato* for *humano*. — Concerning the minor proposition of this argument, cf. Boethius, *De Consolatione* V, Prose 4.

la: Colligitur ex eo, quod cognitio sit actio immanens, de qua vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 16. (VIII. 8.); et supponitur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. et 37-39. (c. 4. et 8.), ubi dicit, animam esse locum formarum, ipsam cognoscendo quodammodo esse omnia, in ipsa non esse ipsas res, sed formas earum intellectumque esse formam formarum.

en: It is gathered from the fact that cognition is an immanent action, concerning which see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, text 16 (VIII. 8.); and it is presupposed by Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 6 and 37-39 (c. 4 and 8), where he says that the soul is the place of forms, that by knowing it is somehow all things, that in it are not the things themselves but their forms, and that the intellect is the form of forms.

la: August., *de Vera Relig.* c. 29. n. 53: *Iudicare de corporibus non sentientis tantum vitae, sed etiam ratiocinantis* etc., *iam vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam illa res est, de qua iudicatur.* — Cod. X hic addit *sicut dicit Augustinus*.

en: Augustine, *On True Religion* c. 29 n. 53: "To judge concerning bodies belongs not only to sentient life, but also to ratiocinating [life]," etc., "now it is most easy to see that he who judges is more excellent than the thing concerning which he judges." — Codex X here adds "as Augustine says."

la: Textus Aristot. de hac re vide supra in arg. ex secunda suppositione. — De duplici modo informationis, scil. per essentiam et per similitudinem cfr. infra fundam. 3. — Mox post *Deus non informat* supple cum cod. R *intellectum*.

en: For the text of Aristotle on this matter, see above in the argument from the second presupposition. — On the twofold mode of information, namely by essence and by likeness, cf. below fundam. 3. — Then after *Deus non informat* supply with codex R *intellectum*.

la: Cap. 2. circa initium. In ipso textu Augustini mss. cum ed. 1 habent *et* pro *eiusque*, quod habet Vat. cum originali. — Paulo infra post *autem* cod. 0 addit *hic*.

en: [Augustine, *De Trinitate*,] c. 2, near the beginning. In the very text of Augustine the mss. with ed. 1 have *et* for *eiusque*, which the Vat. has with the original. — A little further on, after *autem*, codex 0 adds *hic*.

la: Sensus, non verba Augustini allegantur ex I. Soliloq. c. 8, ubi sic habetur: *Credendum est, ea (intelligibilia disciplinarum spectamina) non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur* (qui sol, ut ex ibi sequentibus patet, ipse secretissimus Deus est). — Vat. hoc argumentum mutilate exhibet, omittendo scilicet in propositione maiore *et ratione lucis*, et in minore *et Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognoscibilis*.

en: The sense, not the words, of Augustine are alleged from *Soliloquies* I c. 8, where it is thus held: "It must be believed that these (intelligible objects of the disciplines) cannot be understood unless they are illuminated by another as by their own sun" (which sun, as appears from what follows there, is the most hidden God Himself). — The Vat. presents this argument mutilated, namely by omitting in the major proposition *et ratione lucis*, and in the minor *et Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognoscibilis*.

la: Substituimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *sit* pro *fiat*.

en: We have substituted, with the aid of the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, *sit* for *fiat*.

la: Forte respiciuntur illa quae X. de Trin. c. 8-11. habentur, ubi ostenditur, animam eo ipso, quod sibi sit praesens, certiorem cognitionem habere de se quam de rebus exterioribus, quas per imagines sive similitudines percipit; vel etiam haec VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12: *Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem; plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem, notiorem, quia interiorem, notiorem, quia certiorem.* Quae verba S. Bonaventura infra d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. tali explicat modo, qui sensum huius argumenti illustrat. Cfr. etiam libr. de Magistro, c. 12. n. 39. 40. et de Videndo Deo, c. 16. n. 38, ubi et duplex cognoscendi modus, scilicet per praesentiam et per similitudinem proponitur. — Plures antiquiorum mss. ut CIMSTVY etc. post *cognoscuntur*, licet non falso, tamen propter argumenti formam minus bene *per essentiam* loco *per praesentiam*; melius codd. LO *per essentiam vel praesentiam*. Paulo post cod. Y *illa* pro *alia*.

en: Perhaps reference is made to those things in *De Trinitate* X, c. 8-11, where it is shown that the soul, by the very fact that it is present to itself, has more certain cognition of itself than of exterior things, which it perceives through images or likenesses; or also these things in *De Trinitate* VIII, c. 8 n. 12: "Behold, it can now have God as better known than its brother; plainly better known, because more present, better known, because more interior, better known, because more certain." Which words St. Bonaventure below at d. 17 p. I dub. 2 explains in such a way as illustrates the sense of this argument. Cf. also the book *de Magistro*, c. 12 nn. 39, 40, and *de Videndo Deo*, c. 16 n. 38, where the twofold mode of knowing, namely through presence and through likeness, is also proposed. — Several of the more ancient mss., as CIMSTVY etc., after *cognoscuntur*, though not falsely, yet less well for the form of the argument, [read] *per essentiam* in place of *per praesentiam*; better are codd. LO *per essentiam vel praesentiam*. A little after, codex Y [reads] *illa* for *alia*.

la: Ed. 1 satis bene addit particulam *et*.

en: Ed. 1 fittingly enough adds the particle *et*.

la: Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. — Cod. C hanc propositionem ita exhibet: *unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id*. In fine argumenti cod. X addit *ipsi animae*; melius placeret *intellectui nostro*.

en: Cf. Boethius, *De Consolatione* III, Prose 11. — Codex C presents this proposition thus: "each thing is more effective when it can [act] in that." At the end of the argument codex X adds *ipsi animae*; *intellectui nostro* would please better.

la: Hoc est, illuminando perficiens. — Immediate post Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit *et*, sed minus bene; et paulo post substituit *deiformationem* pro *deiformitatem*.

en: That is, perfecting by illuminating. — Immediately after, the Vat., against the mss. and the first six editions, omits *et*, but less well; and a little after it substitutes *deiformationem* for *deiformitatem*.

la: Supple cum codd. NV *quae probant*. Paulo infra Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *aliquid*, sed minus apte.

en: Supply with codices NV *quae probant* ["which prove (it)"]. A little further on, the Vat., contrary to the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] *aliud* in place of *aliquid*, but less aptly.

la: In duabus seqq. qq. et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.

en: In the two following questions, and in II Sent. d. 23 a. 2 q. 3.

la: August., *de Videndo Deo*, c. 9. n. 21. ait: *Aliud est enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur: totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.*

en: Augustine, *On Seeing God*, c. 9 n. 21, says: "For it is one thing to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing. For that is seen which is in some way sensed as present: but that is comprehended by seeing which is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or whose limits can be looked round about."

la: Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).

en: Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 37 (c. 8.).

la: Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *currit* pro *certat*.

en: From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted *currit* for *certat*.

la: Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit Vat. *duplex*.

en: Contrary to the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, the Vat. here adds *duplex*.

la: Hoc est, propter alligationem ad organum seu propter materialitatem est ad unum obiectorum genus percipiendum limitata. De hac sensus et intellectus differentia vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3-6. (c. 4.).

en: That is, on account of its binding to an organ or on account of its materiality, it is limited to the perceiving of one genus of objects. On this difference between sense and intellect, see Aristotle, *De Anima* III, text 3-6 (c. 4.).

la: Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *virtuositatem*.

en: The Vat., against the codices and ed. 1, [reads] *virtuositatem*.

la: Cod. R hic addit *eius*.

en: Codex R here adds *eius*.

la: Ed. 1 *uno*. Mox cod. 0 post *non sit* addit *et quod hoc sit*.

en: Ed. 1 [reads] *uno*. Then codex 0 after *non sit* adds *et quod hoc sit*.

la: Cap. 31. n. 58: *Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae atque firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas.* — Loco citato inveniuntur etiam verba, quae immediate post S. Doctor ex Augustino affert: *Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando ei cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat... ita etiam quantum potest lex ipsa, etiam ipse* (homo spiritualis et Deo coniunctus) *fit, secundum quam iudicat omnia, et de qua iudicare nullus potest.* — Plures codd. ut HWY, omissa particula *de*, legunt *Et hoc modo*.

en: [*De Vera Religione*,] c. 31 n. 58: "Just as in these temporal laws, although men judge concerning these when they establish them, nevertheless once they have been established and confirmed, it will not be permitted to the judge to judge concerning them, but according to them." — In the place cited there are also found the words which immediately afterwards the holy Doctor adduces from Augustine: "For just as we and all rational souls rightly judge according to truth concerning inferior things, so concerning us, when we cleave to it, the truth itself alone judges... so also as far as the law itself can, he himself also (the spiritual man joined to God) becomes [such], according to which he judges all things, and concerning which no one can judge." — Several codices, as HWY, with the particle *de* omitted, read *Et hoc modo*.

la: Posuimus in textu *hoc secundo modo* et paulo post *de primo modo non est verum*, licet alii codd. ut DGHY etc. pro *hoc secundo modo* habeant *de hoc primo modo*, alii ut FT bb *de primo modo*, alii ut A cum Vat. *de hoc modo* et paulo post omnes codd. legant *de secundo vero non est verum*. Ex contextu siquidem constat, lectiones codicum esse erroneas; quod confirmatur etiam ex Augustino loc. cit. circa finem, ubi iisdem fere verbis eadem proponit ac S. Bonaventura. Scriptores in errorem videntur esse inducti ex eo, quod isti duo numeri ponendi sint ordine inverso. — Codd. aa bb satis bene *posse* habet loco *potest*. Circa finem huius responsionis post *dirigi* supplevimus ex mss. et sex primis edd. *ut*.

en: We have put in the text *hoc secundo modo* and a little after *de primo modo non est verum*, although other codices, as DGHY etc., for *hoc secundo modo* have *de hoc primo modo*, others as FT bb *de primo modo*, others as A with the Vat. *de hoc modo*; and a little after all codices read *de secundo vero non est verum*. For it is established from the context that the readings of the codices are erroneous; which is also confirmed from Augustine in the place cited near the end, where in nearly the same words he proposes the same things as St. Bonaventure. Writers seem to have been led into error from the fact that these two numbers ought to be placed in inverted order. — Codices aa bb fittingly enough have *posse* in place of *potest*. Near the end of this response, after *dirigi*, we have supplied from the mss. and the first six editions *ut*.

la: Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus *tamen*.

en: From the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we have added *tamen*.

la: Num. 16; in quo textu plures codd. ut AGITYZ aa bb edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 *discutimus*, codd. FKX *discernimus* loco *discimus*, ac mox plurimi codd. ut ACFGHKLORSTU VWY aa ee ff *similitudine* pro *similitudo Dei*.

en: [*De Trinitate* IX, c. 11,] n. 16; in which text several codices, as AGITYZ aa bb, editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, [read] *discutimus*, codices FKX *discernimus* in place of *discimus*; and then very many codices, as ACFGHKLORSTU VWY aa ee ff, [read] *similitudine* in place of *similitudo Dei*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Verba S. Doctoris in 2 fund., quod ratione lucis increatae fit omnis spiritualis cognitio, et infra ad 5, quod Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem, aliaque similia plurima, quae praesertim in *Itinerario mentis in Deum* et in *Hexaemeron* leguntur, a Malebranche aliisque multis ita intellecta sunt, ut S. Bonaventuram cum ipsis docere putaverint, intellectum humanum videre res intelligibiles obscure quidem, sed immediate in Verbo sive in rationibus aeternis. Sed haec sententia, sicut non potest conciliari cum Decreto S. Congr. Inquisitionis (18. Sept. 1861), quo reprobatur propositio: « Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale »; ita etiam manifeste contradicit exploratae nostri Doctoris doctrinae. Ipse enim docet, nec hominem in statu innocentiae, nec ipsos Angelos naturalibus suis viribus immediatam aliquam Dei visionem sive cognitionem habere posse. Quoad Angelos cfr. II. S. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi inter alia dicit: « Divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis creaturae »; quoad homines in statu integritatis cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, qui locus est omnino peremptorius. Reiectis enim variis opinionibus, diffuse ibi docetur, in solo statu gloriae videri Deum immediate et in sui substantia et sine obscuritate; « in statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo, sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus per speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula; in statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et in aenigmate ». Reprobatur ibi etiam sententia eorum, qui saltem « extra » quendam gradum immediate Deum videndi viris contemplativis pro hac vita a Deo concedi putarunt. Concludit his verbis valde notandis: « Unde si quae auctoritates illud dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videatur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectu, inferiori cognoscitur » etc. — Idem docetur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 3. et simul refutatur distinctio, quam quidam faciunt inter claritatem Dei eiusque naturam, quia « ipsa natura est claritas et claritas natura », et « non differt essentia luminis et actus lucendi ». Et q. 2. dicitur, quod Deus, si immediate cognoscitur, « iam non secundum partem, sed totus cognoscitur ». Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. aliique loci passim. Plura vide apud Em. Card. Zigliara: *Della Luce intellettuale* II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi: *Examen philos. theol. de Ontologismo* c. 17; et ex nostris, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio: *Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae*, Romae 1874. p. 61. et seqq.

S. Doctor omnino contrarius est etiam errori Averroistarum, qui unitatem Intellectus agentis in omnibus hominibus statuebant. Affirmat enim, quod « hic error destruit totum ordinem vivendi et agendi » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), et manifestissime docet, in anima humana, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, essentialiter esse potentiam intellectualem, quae propriam et activam virtutem ad eliciendos varios actus intellectuales habet; unde lumen quoddam creatum apte vocari potest. Hoc docet II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4; et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicit, quod « ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum ». Cfr. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, et passim; cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. et p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 3.

Licet ergo immediatum et proximum principium actuum intellectualium sit animae potentia, sive lumen creatum naturaliter menti inditum, tamen iuxta sententiam scholasticorum communem veritas, certitudo et infallibilitas cognitionis humanae refundi debet in primam et increatam veritatem, quae est omnium rerum et intellectuum prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis. Unde recte dicitur, quod intellectus creatus omnia vera cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, non ut in obiecto prius cognito, sed ut in cognitionis principio, sive ut verbis Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 1.) utamur, non in rationibus, sed per eas. Ita S. Thom., S. I. q. 84. a. 5; q. 88. a. 3. ad 1; q. 12. a. 11. ad 3; q. 16. a. 6. ad 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 7. ad 9; S. c. Gent. III. c. 47; de Veritate q. 1. a. 4; q. 10. a. 11. ad 12; Quodl. 10. q. 4. a. 7. et alibi. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 4. praesertim n. 18-23. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 4; aliique multi.

Fundamentalis huius doctrinae ratio, quae communiter ab antiquis scholasticis proponitur, haec est, quod increatae Veritatis lux secundum similitudinem refulget in veritate creata, sive haec accipiatur in sensu obiectivo, sive subiectivo. De veritate creata in sensu obiectivo dicit S. Bonav. (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): « In qualibet creatura est refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebris permixta ». In sensu subiectivo veritas creata est ipsum mentis lumen creatum, quod est impressio quaedam primae veritatis, cuius similitudo refulget in intellectu nostro, qui, ut imago Dei, « fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini » (S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1; cfr. S. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I. q. 105. a. 3.).

Ratio secunda est, quod Deus non tantum lumen intellectus ad exemplar divinum creat et conservat, sed etiam ad actus eiusdem concurrit, dum immediate eum movet et dirigit. Etiam hac ratione actus intellectuales a Deo dependere et in eum debere aliquo modo refundi, est sententia communis antiquorum scholasticorum; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3; I. II. q. 10. a. 4. — Scot., pluribus in locis, collectis ab Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5. — Iste concursus divinus non immerito quaedam illuminatio Dei immediata vocari potest, uti bene docent Em. Card. Zigliara in opere: *Della Luce intellettuale* IV. c. 12. et P. Kleutgen in libro: *Philosophie der Vorzeit* t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cfr. etiam S. Thom. in Ioan. c. 1. lect. 3. n. 2; S. III. q. 9. a. 4. ad 2; S. I. q. 79. a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5. ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1. a. 4. et alibi.

Hanc cooperationem divinam sive illuminationem multum urgent et S. August. et S. Bonav. Mens Doctoris Seraphici de hac re, sexcenties breviter expressa, fuse declaratur anecdota quadam quaestione disputata, a P. Fidele a Fanna reperta et quoad partem principalem in lucem edita (Ratio novae collectionis etc. Taurini, 1874, p. 222). Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium eiusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Ioan. Pecchami et cuiusdam Eustachii, Deo favente, libro speciali proxime in lucem dabimus, quo tum sententia S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contrarium docere.

**II.** His praesuppositis, verba: « Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem », nullam faciunt difficultatem, praesertim cum ab ipso S. Doctore interpretatio Ontologistarum explicite reprobetur (II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et ibid. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. 4.). Egregie sinceram suam sententiam explicat infra d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in corp., ubi cum S. August. distinguit cognitionem per speciem a rebus materialibus abstractam ab illa cognitione, quae fit per veritatem, id est « per similitudinem infusam vel innatam »; et addit: « Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in veritate ». De similitudine vel habitu innato cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Recte S. Doctor (ad 5.) negat, Deum cognosci per similitudinem ab ipso abstractam, quia de Deo non habemus conceptum nisi analogum et aliunde formatum. Etiam S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) docet: « Non dicimur cognoscere ea (Deum et Angelos) per abstractionem, sed per impressionem in intelligentias nostras ». Consentiunt B. Albert. (hic a. 2. ad 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1. ad 4.).

**III.** In solut. ad 5. verba: « Intellectus noster informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa », explicari possunt de specie sive impressa sive expressa, quam intellectus format ex veritate creata et animae essentialiter impressa, de qua S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Non tamen excluditur, quod sub voce *notitia* intelligi possit etiam illa illuminatio divina, de qua supra locuti sumus. Hoc insinuare videntur alii loci S. Bonav., imprimis II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, ubi loquendo de cognitione Angelorum, sic concludit: « Adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scil. per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura » etc. Cfr. etiam quae de scientia Christi dicit III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. In hoc sensu istum locum S. Augustini, a S. Bonav. hic laudatum, intelligit Fr. Eustachius, discipulus S. Bonav., Doctor Parisiensis saec. XIII., uti colligitur ex quadam quaestione anecdota ipsius proxime a nobis in libro supra memorato edenda.

**IV.** Hanc et sequentem quaestionem mire illustrat S. Bonav. in *Itiner. mentis in Deum*, et *Hexaem.* Serm. 5. 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. seqq. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 12. a. 12. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 15; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 1. et q. 14. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. et d. 3.

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english_scholion:
**I.** The words of the holy Doctor in the second fundamentum, that every spiritual cognition occurs by reason of uncreated light, and below to [the reply to] 5, that God is present to every intellect through truth, and very many other similar things, which are read especially in the *Itinerary of the Mind into God* and in the *Hexaemeron*, have been so understood by Malebranche and many others that they thought St. Bonaventure taught with them that the human intellect sees intelligible things — obscurely indeed, but immediately — in the Word or in the eternal reasons. But this opinion, as it cannot be reconciled with the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition (18 September 1861), by which the proposition is condemned: "Immediate cognition of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it it could know nothing, since it is the intellectual light itself"; so also manifestly contradicts the ascertained doctrine of our Doctor. For he himself teaches that neither man in the state of innocence nor the very Angels can by their natural powers have any immediate vision or cognition of God. As to the Angels, cf. II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2, where among other things he says: "The divine light, on account of its eminence, is inaccessible to the powers of every creature"; as to men in the state of integrity, cf. II Sent. d. 23 a. 2 q. 3, which passage is altogether decisive. For, various opinions being rejected, it is there taught at length that only in the state of glory is God seen immediately and in His own substance and without obscurity; "but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen by means of a mirror, but differently, because in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror darkened by the sin of the first man; and therefore now He is seen through a mirror and in an enigma." There too the opinion of those is reproved who thought that at least "to a certain extent" some degree of immediately seeing God is granted by God to contemplative men in this life. He concludes with these words very much to be noted: "Hence if any authorities are found to say that God is in the present life seen and discerned by man, they are not to be understood as meaning that He is seen in His essence, but that He is known in some lesser effect" etc. — The same is taught III Sent. d. 14 a. 1 q. 3, where there is at the same time refuted the distinction which some make between the clarity of God and His nature, because "the very nature is clarity and clarity nature," and "the essence of light and the act of shining do not differ." And in q. 2 it is said that God, if He is immediately known, "is then no longer known in part, but wholly." Cf. also I Sent. d. 17 p. I dub. 2 and other places throughout. See further in Em. Card. Zigliara, *Della Luce intellettuale* II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi, *Examen philos. theol. de Ontologismo* c. 17; and among ours, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio, *Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae*, Rome 1874, p. 61 ff.

The holy Doctor is also altogether contrary to the error of the Averroists, who established the unity of the Agent Intellect in all men. For he affirms that "this error destroys the whole order of living and acting" (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III col. 475), and most manifestly teaches that in the human soul, which is created to the image of God, there is essentially an intellectual power which has its own and active virtue for eliciting various intellectual acts; whence it can fittingly be called a certain created light. This he teaches II Sent. d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 4; and p. II a. 1 q. 1 in corp., where he says that "the higher reason not only has to judge according to the eternal laws, but also has to judge according to its own light and according to the light acquired by it from below." Cf. d. 17 a. 1 q. 1 ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, and *passim*; cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27 m. 1 a. 2 and p. II q. 69 m. 2 a. 3.

Although therefore the immediate and proximate principle of intellectual acts is the power of the soul, or the created light naturally placed in the mind, nevertheless according to the common opinion of the scholastics the truth, certitude, and infallibility of human cognition must be referred back to the first and uncreated truth, which is the first efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all things and intellects. Hence it is rightly said that the created intellect knows all true things in the eternal reasons, not as in an object previously known, but as in a principle of cognition, or to use the words of Alex. Hal. (S. p. I q. 2 m. 3 a. 1 ad 1), not *in* the reasons, but *through* them. So St. Thomas, S. I q. 84 a. 5; q. 88 a. 3 ad 1; q. 12 a. 11 ad 3; q. 16 a. 6 ad 1; IV Sent. d. 49 q. 2 a. 7 ad 9; S. c. Gent. III c. 47; de Veritate q. 1 a. 4; q. 10 a. 11 ad 12; Quodl. 10 q. 4 a. 7, and elsewhere. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27 m. 1 a. 2 ad 1. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 3 q. 4 especially nn. 18-23. — Richard. a Med., II Sent. d. 24 a. 2 q. 4; and very many others.

The fundamental ground of this doctrine, which is commonly proposed by the ancient scholastics, is this: that the light of uncreated Truth shines forth according to likeness in created truth, whether this be taken in an objective or in a subjective sense. Concerning created truth in the objective sense St. Bonav. says (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): "In every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed with darknesses." In the subjective sense created truth is the very created light of the mind, which is a certain impression of the first truth, whose likeness shines forth in our intellect, which, as image of God, "bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance" (S. Bonav. II Sent. d. 16 a. 1 q. 1; cf. S. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I q. 105 a. 3).

The second ground is that God not only creates and conserves the light of the intellect according to the divine exemplar, but also concurs in its acts, while immediately moving and directing it. That for this reason also intellectual acts depend on God and ought in some way to be referred back to Him is the common opinion of the ancient scholastics; cf. S. Thom. S. I q. 105 a. 3; I-II q. 10 a. 4. — Scotus, in many places, collected by Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Rome 1728, p. I q. 105 a. 3-5. — This divine concurrence can not unfittingly be called a certain immediate illumination of God, as Em. Card. Zigliara well teaches in the work *Della Luce intellettuale* IV. c. 12, and P. Kleutgen in the book *Philosophie der Vorzeit* t. I 1. Abth. n. 60; cf. also S. Thom. in Ioan. c. 1 lect. 3 n. 2; S. III q. 9 a. 4 ad 2; S. I q. 79 a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5 ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1 a. 4, and elsewhere.

This divine cooperation or illumination is much urged by both St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure. The mind of the Seraphic Doctor concerning this matter, briefly expressed six hundred times over, is set out at length in a certain unpublished disputed question, discovered by P. Fidele a Fanna and as to the principal part brought to light (*Ratio novae collectionis* etc., Turin 1874, p. 222). This question in its entirety, with other unpublished documents added — both of Bonaventure himself and of three of his disciples, namely Matthew of Aquasparta, John Pecham, and a certain Eustace — God favoring, we shall shortly bring to light in a special book, in which the opinion of the holy Doctor will be both thoroughly set forth and it will be shown that Bl. Albert the Great and other ancients agree wholly with the Seraphic [Doctor], and that St. Thomas does not teach the contrary in the principal matter.

**II.** These things being presupposed, the words "God is present to every intellect through truth" present no difficulty, especially since the interpretation of the Ontologists is explicitly reproved by the holy Doctor himself (II Sent. d. 10 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1, and ibid. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2 ad 3, 4). He admirably explains his sincere opinion below at d. 17 p. I q. 4 in corp., where with St. Augustine he distinguishes the cognition through a species abstracted from material things from that cognition which takes place through truth, that is, "through an infused or innate likeness"; and he adds: "Both things, however, which are thus known, are said by Augustine to be known in truth." Concerning an innate likeness or habit, cf. II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 2. — Rightly does the holy Doctor (in [the reply to] 5.) deny that God is known through a likeness abstracted from Himself, because we have no concept of God except an analogous one and one formed from elsewhere. So too St. Thomas (I Sent. d. 3 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3) teaches: "We are not said to know them (God and the Angels) through abstraction, but through impression upon our intelligences." Bl. Albert (here a. 2 ad 2) and Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 1 ad 4) agree.

**III.** In the solution to [the reply to] 5, the words "Our intellect is informed by a certain notice, which is as it were a certain likeness, not abstracted but impressed," can be explained of the species, either impressed or expressed, which the intellect forms from created truth essentially impressed on the soul, concerning which the holy Doctor speaks below at d. 17 p. II q. 4. Yet it is not excluded that under the word *notitia* there can also be understood that divine illumination of which we have spoken above. Other places of St. Bonav. seem to suggest this, especially II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2 ad 4, where speaking of the cognition of the Angels he concludes thus: "There is still a third mode of knowing, namely through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power, which is a certain likeness of God not abstracted but infused, inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature" etc. Cf. also what he says of the knowledge of Christ III Sent. d. 14 a. 2 q. 1 ad 1, 2. In this sense that place of St. Augustine cited here by St. Bonav. is understood by Fr. Eustace, disciple of St. Bonav., Doctor of Paris in the 13th century, as is gathered from a certain unpublished question of his to be edited shortly by us in the book mentioned above.

**IV.** This and the following question St. Bonav. illustrates marvelously in the *Itinerary of the Mind into God*, and *Hexaem.* Serm. 5, 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I q. 2 m. 1 ff. — Scotus, here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; S. I q. 12 a. 12. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 1 a. 15; S. p. I tr. 3 q. 13 m. 1 and q. 14 m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here p. I a. 1 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 33. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 2 q. 9 and d. 3.

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site: bonaventure

collection: Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity

title: Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio II. *Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis per creaturas. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Quia via ad errorem non est via ad cognitionem; sed cognitio per creaturam est via erroris: ergo etc. Probatio minoris: Sapientiae decimo quarto[^1]: *Creaturae Dei sunt in deceptionem et in odium et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium.* Praeterea, Augustinus *de Libero Arbitrio*[^2] loquitur de his, qui occupantur in creaturis: « Dorsum ad Te vertentes, in corporali opere tanquam in umbra sua defiguntur ».

2. Item, tenebra vel tenebrosum non est via ad cognoscendum luminosum sive lucem[^3]; sed creatura est tenebra, Deus autem est lux: ergo Deus non est cognoscibilis per creaturam.

3. Item, medium, per quod cognoscitur aliquid vel probatur de extremo, debet communicare in aliquo cum eo ad quod cognoscendum est[^4]; sed Creator et creatura nihil habent commune: ergo Deus non cognoscitur per creaturas.

4. Item, omne medium, per quod ascenditur ad extremum, distat ab illo gradibus finitis[^5]; sed omnis creatura quantumcumque nobilis distat a Deo gradibus infinitis, quia quantumcumque duplicatur, nunquam perveniet ad eius nobilitatem: ergo per creaturam non ascenditur in cognitionem Dei.

**Contra:**

1. Sapientiae decimo tertio[^6]: *A magnitudine speciei et creaturae cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri.* Unde Isidorus *de Summo bono*[^7]: « Ex pulcritudine circumscriptae creaturae pulcritudinem suam, quae circumscribi non potest, facit Deus intelligi ».

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: contingit non solum effectum cognosci per causam, sed etiam cau-

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sam per effectum[^8]: ergo si Deus est causa operans secundum suam nobilitatem, et creatura effectus, poterit Deus cognosci per creaturam.

3. Item, sensibile est via cognoscendi intelligibile[^9]; sed creatura sensibilis, Deus intelligibilis: ergo per creaturam est devenire in cognitionem Creatoris.

4. Item, contingit simile cognosci per simile[^10]; sed omnis creatura est similis Deo vel sicut vestigium, vel sicut imago: ergo per omnem creaturam contingit cognosci Deum.

Quaeritur ergo, quae differentia sit inter vestigium et imaginem; et cum in omni creatura sit vestigium, quaeritur, quare non similiter imago, et secundum quid attendatur[^11] vestigium.

### Conclusio.

> *Deus per creaturas naturali rationis lumine cognosci potest.*

**Respondeo:** Dicendum, quod, quia relucet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opere, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur.

Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam: propter convenientiam, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter indigentiam, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam[^12].

**Ad argumenta:**

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognitio creaturae est via in errorem; dicendum, quod dupliciter est cognoscere creaturam: vel quantum ad proprietates speciales et[^13] quae sunt imperfectionis, vel quantum ad conditiones generales, quae sunt completionis; si autem quantum ad speciales conditiones et imperfectionis: aut attribuendo Deo, aut removendo. Primo modo est via erroris, secundo modo via cognitionis; et sic cognoscitur Deus per ablationem.

Si autem cognoscatur quoad conditiones perfectionis, sic potest esse dupliciter, sicut pictura dupliciter cognoscitur: aut sicut pictura, aut sicut imago; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud. Si primo modo, tunc est via deviationis; unde Augustinus in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*[^14]: « Vae his qui nutus tuos pro Te amant et oberrant in vestigiis tuis et derelinquunt Te ducem ». Si secundo modo, prout est via in aliud, sic est ratio cognoscendi per superexcellentiam, quia omnis proprietas nobilis in creatura Deo est attribuenda in summo; et sic patet illud[^15].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenebrosum medium non est via cognoscendi lucem; dicendum, quod est oculus bene dispositus et oculus lippus. De oculo bene disposito verum est, sed non de lippo, cui nubes obtegens vel terra suscipiens luminis claritatem est medium videndi solem; sic intellectui nostro, qui se habet sicut oculus noctuae ad manifestissima naturae[^16].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de defectu communitatis, dicendum, quod[^17] non est commune per univocationem, tamen est commune per analogiam, quae dicit habitudinem duorum ad duo, ut in nauta et doctore, vel unius ad unum, ut exemplaris ad exemplatum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper sunt infiniti gradus; dicendum, quod ascensus in Deum potest esse dupliciter: aut quantum ad aspectum praesentiae; et sic quaelibet creatura nata est ducere in Deum, nec sic sunt infiniti gradus; aut quantum ad aequalitatem aequiparantiae; et sic verum est, quod sunt infiniti, quia bonum creatum, quantum-

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cumque duplicatum, nunquam aequiparatur increato.

Primus autem gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae est in consideratione visibilium, secundus in consideratione invisibilium, ut animae vel alterius substantiae spiritualis; tertius est ab anima in Deum, quia « imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur »[^18].

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia vestigii et imaginis, quidam assignant[^19], quod vestigium est in sensibilibus, imago in spiritualibus. Sed ista distinctio et positio non valet, quia vestigium est etiam in spiritualibus. Nam unitas, veritas, bonitas, in quibus consistit vestigium, sunt conditiones maxime universales et intelligibiles.

Alii[^20] dicunt, quod vestigium dicitur, quia repraesentat secundum partem, sed imago secundum totum. Sed haec iterum differentia non valet, quia, cum Deus sit simplex, non habet repraesentans secundum partem; cum iterum sit infinitus, a nulla omnino creatura, etiam a toto mundo non potest repraesentari secundum totum.

Et ideo intelligendum, quod cum creatura ducat in cognitionem Dei per modum umbrae[^21], per modum vestigii et per modum imaginis, differentia eorum notior, a qua etiam denominatur, accipitur penes modum repraesentandi. Nam umbra dicitur, in quantum repraesentat in quadam elongatione et confusione; vestigium, in quantum in[^22] elongatione, sed distinctione; imago vero, in quantum in propinquitate et distinctione.

Ex hac differentia colligitur secunda, quae est penes conditiones, in quibus attenduntur haec. Nam creaturae dicuntur umbra quantum ad proprietates, quae respiciunt Deum in aliquo genere causae[^23] secundum rationem indeterminatam; vestigium quantum ad proprietatem, quae respicit Deum sub ratione triplicis causae, efficientis, formalis[^24] et finalis, sicut sunt unum, verum et bonum; imago quantum ad conditiones, quae respiciunt Deum non tantum in ratione causae, sed et obiecti, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas.

Ex his concluduntur aliae duae differentiae: quantum ad ea ad quae ducunt; nam creatura ut umbra ducit ad cognitionem communium, ut communia; vestigium in cognitionem communium, ut appropriata; imago ad cognitionem propriorum, ut propria[^25].

Alia differentia est penes ea in quibus reperiuntur. Quoniam enim omnis creatura comparatur ad Deum et[^26] in ratione causae et in ratione triplicis causae, ideo omnis creatura est umbra vel vestigium. Sed quoniam sola rationalis creatura comparatur ad Deum ut obiectum, quia sola est capax Dei per cognitionem et amorem: ideo sola est imago.

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### Question II. *Whether God is knowable through creatures.*

Secondly it is asked, whether God is knowable through creatures. And it seems that he is not.

1. Because a way to error is not a way to knowledge; but knowledge through a creature is a way of error: therefore etc. Proof of the minor: Wisdom 14[^1]: *The creatures of God are made for deception and for hatred and for a snare to the feet of the foolish.* Likewise, Augustine *On Free Choice*[^2] speaks of those who are occupied with creatures: "Turning their backs to Thee, they are fixed in bodily work as in their own shadow."

2. Likewise, darkness or what is dark is not a way to knowing the luminous or light[^3]; but a creature is darkness, while God is light: therefore God is not knowable through a creature.

3. Likewise, the middle term, through which something is known or proved concerning an extreme, must share in something with that which is to be known[^4]; but Creator and creature have nothing in common: therefore God is not known through creatures.

4. Likewise, every middle by which one ascends to an extreme is distant from it by finite degrees[^5]; but every creature, however noble, is distant from God by infinite degrees, because however much it be doubled, it will never arrive at his nobility: therefore through a creature one does not ascend to the knowledge of God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Wisdom 13[^6]: *From the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of these can knowably be seen.* Whence Isidore *On the Highest Good*[^7]: "From the beauty of the circumscribed creature, God makes his own beauty, which cannot be circumscribed, to be understood."

2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: it happens that not only is the effect known through the cause, but also the cause through the effect[^8]: therefore if God is the cause operating according to his nobility, and the creature the effect, God can be known through the creature.

3. Likewise, the sensible is the way of knowing the intelligible[^9]; but the creature is sensible, God intelligible: therefore through the creature one arrives at the knowledge of the Creator.

4. Likewise, it happens that like is known through like[^10]; but every creature is like God either as a vestige, or as an image: therefore through every creature it happens that God is known.

It is asked therefore what difference there is between vestige and image; and since in every creature there is a vestige, it is asked why not likewise an image, and according to what the vestige is to be attended to[^11].

### Conclusion.

> *God can be known through creatures by the natural light of reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the cause shines forth in the effect, and the wisdom of the artisan is manifested in the work, therefore God, who is the artisan and the cause of the creature, is known through it.

And for this there is a twofold reason, one is on account of fittingness, the other on account of need: on account of fittingness, because every creature leads more to God than to anything else; on account of need, because, since God as supremely spiritual light cannot be known in his spirituality by an intellect that is, as it were, material, the soul needs to know him through a creature[^12].

**Replies:**

1. To that which is objected, that the knowledge of a creature is a way to error; it must be said that it is twofold to know a creature: either as to its special properties and[^13] those which are of imperfection, or as to its general conditions, which are of completion; if, however, as to its special and imperfect conditions: either by attributing them to God, or by removing them. In the first way it is a way of error, in the second way a way of knowledge; and so God is known by way of removal.

If, however, it be known as to the conditions of perfection, this can be in two ways, just as a picture is known in two ways: either as a picture, or as an image; whence either one halts in the beauty of the creature, or through it one is borne to another. If in the first way, then it is a way of deviation; whence Augustine in the book *On Free Choice*[^14]: "Woe to those who love thy signs in place of Thee, and wander among thy traces and forsake Thee as leader." If in the second way, insofar as it is a way to another, then this is the manner of knowing by way of supereminence, because every noble property in a creature is to be attributed to God in the highest degree; and so that is clear[^15].

2. To that which is objected, that a dark middle is not a way of knowing light; it must be said that there is the well-disposed eye and the bleared eye. Of the well-disposed eye it is true, but not of the bleared, for which the cloud covering or the earth receiving the brightness of light is a means of seeing the sun; so it is for our intellect, which is related as the eye of the owl to the most manifest things of nature[^16].

3. To that which is objected concerning the defect of community, it must be said that[^17] it is not common by univocation, yet it is common by analogy, which expresses the relation of two to two, as in the sailor and the teacher, or of one to one, as of exemplar to exemplate.

4. To that which is objected, that there are always infinite degrees; it must be said that the ascent to God can be in two ways: either as to the aspect of presence; and thus every creature is fit to lead to God, nor are there in this way infinite degrees; or as to the equality of correspondence; and thus it is true that there are infinite, because the created good, however much doubled, is never made equal to the uncreated.

The first degree, however, of ascent to the aspect of presence is in the consideration of visible things, the second in the consideration of invisible things, such as the soul or another spiritual substance; the third is from the soul to God, because "the image is formed by Truth itself and is immediately joined to God"[^18].

To that which is finally asked concerning the difference of vestige and image, some assign[^19] that vestige is in sensible things, image in spiritual. But this distinction and position is not valid, because vestige is also in spiritual things. For unity, truth, goodness, in which vestige consists, are conditions most universal and intelligible.

Others[^20] say that vestige is so called because it represents according to a part, but image according to the whole. But again this difference is not valid, because, since God is simple, he does not have one representing him according to a part; since again he is infinite, by no creature at all, not even by the whole world, can he be represented according to the whole.

And therefore it must be understood that, since the creature leads into the knowledge of God by way of shadow[^21], by way of vestige, and by way of image, the better-known difference among them, from which they are also named, is taken according to the mode of representing. For shadow is so called inasmuch as it represents at a certain distance and in a certain confusion; vestige, inasmuch as in[^22] distance, but with distinction; image, however, inasmuch as in nearness and distinction.

From this difference a second is gathered, which is according to the conditions in which these are considered. For creatures are called shadow as to those properties which regard God in some genus of cause[^23] according to an indeterminate notion; vestige as to a property which regards God under the notion of a threefold cause — efficient, formal[^24], and final — as are one, true, and good; image as to those conditions which regard God not only under the notion of cause, but also of object, which are memory, understanding, and will.

From these are concluded two further differences: as to those things to which they lead; for the creature as shadow leads to the knowledge of common things as common; vestige to the knowledge of common things as appropriated; image to the knowledge of proper things as proper[^25].

Another difference is according to the things in which they are found. For since every creature is compared to God both[^26] under the notion of cause and under the notion of a threefold cause, therefore every creature is a shadow or a vestige. But since only the rational creature is compared to God as to an object, because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love, therefore it alone is image.

la: Vers. 11, ubi contra mss. et ed. 1 legit Vulgata: *Quoniam creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt et in tentationem animabus hominum et in muscipulam* etc. Cum hac lectione convenit Vat. eo excepto, quod habet *deceptionem* loco *tentationem*.

en: Verse 11, where, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vulgate reads: *Since the creatures of God have been made for hatred and for a temptation to the souls of men and for a snare* etc. With this reading the Vatican edition agrees, with the exception that it has *deceptionem* in place of *tentationem*.

la: Libr. II. c. 16, n. 43: *Tanquam enim dorsum ad Te ponentes in carnali opere velut in umbra sua defiguntur.*

en: Book II, c. 16, n. 43: *For, as it were putting their back to Thee, they are fixed in carnal work as in their own shadow.*

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 21. (23.): *In privativa autem negativa propositio universalis, affirmativa autem negativa prior et notior (per affirmativam enim negativa nota) et prior affirmativa est, sicut esse prius est non esse.* Et III. *de Anima*, text. 25. (c. 6.) docet, privationes non cognosci nisi per contraria, scil. per cognitionem habitus. Cfr. etiam II. *de Caelo*, text. 18. (c. 3.).

en: Aristotle, I. *Posterior Analytics* c. 21 (23): *In a privative [proposition], moreover, the negative universal proposition, but the affirmative — the negative is prior and better known (for through the affirmative the negative is known) and the affirmative is prior, just as being is prior to non-being.* And III. *On the Soul*, text 25 (c. 6) he teaches that privations are not known except through their contraries, namely through knowledge of the habit. Compare also II. *On the Heavens*, text 18 (c. 3).

la: Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 7: *Nam ex eodem genere oportet esse extrema et media.* Idem ait X. *Metaph.* text. 22. (IX. c. 7.). Et III. *de Part. Animal.* c. 1: *Nam et medium particeps utriusque extremi est.* — *Extremum* est nomen logicale significans subiectum vel praedicatum conclusionis, pro quorum nexu cognoscendo *medium* adhibitum vocatur *terminus medius*. — Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 post *cum eo* minus bene omittit *ad*.

en: Aristotle, I. *Posterior Analytics* c. 7: *For the extremes and the middles must be of the same genus.* He says the same in X. *Metaphysics* text 22 (IX, c. 7). And III. *On the Parts of Animals* c. 1: *For the middle also is a participant in both extremes.* — *Extremum* is a logical term signifying the subject or predicate of a conclusion, for the knowing of whose connection a *medium* is employed, called the *middle term*. — The Vatican edition, against the codices and ed. 1, after *cum eo* less aptly omits *ad*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 18. seqq. (c. 19. seqq.), ubi simile ostendit respectu ipsius demonstrationis. — Paulo infra ope mss. loco *duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur* substituimus *duplicatur, nunquam perveniet*; supple *creatura*. Cod. I propositionem maiorem formaliter melius exhibet *Item nullum medium... gradibus infinitis*. In conclusione plures codd. ut K T etc. *ad* loco *in*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, I. *Posterior Analytics* c. 18 ff. (c. 19 ff.), where he shows the like with respect to demonstration itself. — A little below, on the authority of manuscripts, in place of *duplicetur, nunquam pervenitur* we have substituted *duplicatur, nunquam perveniet*; supply *creatura*. Codex I better exhibits the major proposition formally: *Likewise, no middle... by infinite degrees*. In the conclusion several codices, such as K, T, etc., have *ad* in place of *in*.

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Sive *Sentent.* I. c. 4.

en: Or *Sentences* I, c. 4.

la: Vide Aristot., I. *Poster.* c. 10. (c. 13.) et II. *Poster.* c. 17. (c. 11.). — In hac propositione auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 addidimus *etiam*.

en: See Aristotle, I. *Posterior Analytics* c. 10 (c. 13) and II. *Posterior Analytics* c. 17 (c. 11). — In this proposition, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have added *etiam*.

la: Cfr. Aristot., III. *de Anima*, text. 39. (c. 8.): *Formis sensibilibus innituntur intelligibilia... atque idcirco, qui nihil sentit, nihil discere vel comprehendere potest.* — Mox post *creatura* et post *Deus* supple cum Vat. *est*.

en: Cf. Aristotle, III. *On the Soul*, text 39 (c. 8): *Intelligibles rest upon sensible forms... and therefore, he who senses nothing can learn or comprehend nothing.* — Shortly after *creatura* and after *Deus* supply, with the Vatican edition, *est*.

la: Aristot., VI. *Topic.* c. 1. (c. 2.) loquendo de metaphora ait: *Nam metaphora quodammodo notum facit id quod significatur, propter (per) similitudinem.* Ibidem et hanc definitionem imaginis, de qua S. Bonav. paulo infra agit, invenies: *Nam imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est.* Cfr. etiam II. *Prior.* c. 27. et 28. (29. et 30.), ubi Aristot. agit de icosibus (εἰκώς, i. e. *simile, verisimile, consentaneum*) et signis, quae si certissima sint, ab ipso *indicia*, (a Commentatoribus *vestigia* vel *prodigia*) nominantur; et Dionys., *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. 1.

en: Aristotle, VI. *Topics* c. 1 (c. 2), speaking of metaphor, says: *For metaphor in a certain way makes known that which is signified, on account of (through) likeness.* In the same place you will find this definition of *image*, of which S. Bonaventure treats a little below: *For an image is that whose generation is by imitation.* Compare also II. *Prior Analytics* c. 27 and 28 (29 and 30), where Aristotle treats of *icosibus* (εἰκώς, that is, *like, likely, fitting*) and signs, which, if they be most certain, he himself names *indications*, (and the Commentators, *vestiges* or *prodigies*); and Dionysius, *On the Celestial Hierarchy* c. 1.

la: Vat. sibi non constans contra mss. et ed. 1 *attenditur*.

en: The Vatican edition, inconsistent with itself, against the manuscripts and ed. 1 reads *attenditur*.

la: Interpolatam et non aptam Vat. lectionem: *quasi materiali luce indiget anima, ut cognoscat ipsum, scilicet per creaturam* castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Cod. O pro *materiali* habet *naturaliter*.

en: We have corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the interpolated and unapt Vatican reading: *the soul needs, as it were, a material light, in order that it may know him, namely through a creature*. Codex O has *naturaliter* in place of *materiali*.

la: Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post *speciales conditiones* addidimus *et*, pro quo cod. T primo loco habet *id est*, secundo loco *quae sunt*. Dein codd. O Z *quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt*. Mox mss. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. post *si* adiiciunt *autem* et post *imperfectionis* omittunt *hoc est dupliciter*.

en: From nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1, here and a little below after *speciales conditiones* we have added *et*, in place of which codex T has in the first instance *id est*, in the second *quae sunt*. Then codices O Z read *quantum ad proprietates generales et quae sunt*. Shortly after, the manuscripts with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, add *autem* after *si* and after *imperfectionis* omit *hoc est dupliciter*.

la: De triplici cognoscendi Deum via, scil. causalitatis, remotionis et superexcellentiae cfr. Dionys., *de Div. Nom.* c. 6. et infra dub. 1.

en: On the threefold way of knowing God, namely causality, remotion, and supereminence, cf. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 6, and below, dub. 1.

la: Supple: *tenebrosum (seu creatura) est medium cognoscendi lucem sive Deum.* De comparatione intellectus cum oculo noctuae cfr. Aristot., II. *Metaph.* text. 1. (I. brevior, c. 1.): *Sicut enim nocticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et animae nostrae intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium naturae manifestissima* (ed. Venet. 1489).

en: Supply: *The dark (or the creature) is the means of knowing light or God.* On the comparison of the intellect with the eye of the owl cf. Aristotle, II. *Metaphysics* text 1 (the shorter I, c. 1): *For just as the eyes of night-ravens are related to the light of day, so also the intellect of our soul is related to those things which are of all in nature the most manifest* (Venice ed. 1489).

la: Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit *si*. Paulo post pauci codd. ut X Y cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 non bene *ductore* pro *doctore*. Cfr. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. in corp., ubi idem exemplum explicatur, et II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi exemplum de nauta et auriga occurrit.

en: The Vatican edition, against the trustworthiness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *si*. A little after, a few codices such as X, Y with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, not well, have *ductore* in place of *doctore*. Cf. d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 in the corpus, where the same example is explained, and II. Sent. d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 in the corpus, where the example of the sailor and the charioteer occurs.

la: August., *83 QQ.* q. 51. n. 2. dicit: *Quare cum homo possit particeps esse secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius.* Et auctor libri *de Spiritu et anima*, c. 11: *Quae (mens) ita facta est ad imaginem Dei, ut nulla interposita natura ab ipsa veritate formetur.*

en: Augustine, *83 Questions*, q. 51, n. 2, says: *Wherefore, since man can be a participant according to the interior man, according to that same [interior man] he is so [made] to the image, that, no nature being interposed, he is formed [by it], and therefore nothing is more joined to God.* And the author of the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, c. 11: *Which [mind] has been so made to the image of God that, no nature being interposed, it is formed by Truth itself.*

la: Addit Vat. claritatis gratia *talem differentiam*, quae tamen verba desunt in mss. et ed. 1.

en: The Vatican edition adds, for the sake of clarity, *talem differentiam*, which words however are absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1.

la: Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 addit *autem*. Paulo post plures codd. ut S V X bb omittunt *differentia*, pro quo ed. 1 habet *distinctio*.

en: The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds *autem*. A little after, several codices such as S V X bb omit *differentia*, in place of which ed. 1 has *distinctio*.

la: Vat. addit *et*, quod deest in mss.

en: The Vatican edition adds *et*, which is absent in the manuscripts.

la: Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 hic et immediate post substituimus *quantum in* pro *quadam*. Mox cod. Q post *sed* addit *cum*.

en: On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here and immediately after we have substituted *quantum in* in place of *quadam*. Shortly after, codex Q adds *cum* after *sed*.

la: Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum *causae*.

en: With the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have expunged here the *causae* added by the Vatican edition.

la: Intellige de causa formali extrinseca sive de exemplari, non de causa formali intrinseca. Cfr. infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

en: Understand of the extrinsic formal cause, or of the exemplar, not of the intrinsic formal cause. Cf. below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.

la: Iuxta sententiam communem attributa divina distinguuntur in *communia ut communia* sive *communia simpliciter*, quae sunt essentialia, ut esse, vivere, intelligere; *communia ut appropriata*, quae sunt illa essentialia, quae nos uni personae prae alia tribuimus, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio, bonitatem Spiritui sancto; *propria* sunt paternitas, filiatio et spiratio.

en: According to the common opinion, the divine attributes are distinguished into *common as common* or *common simply*, which are essential, as being, living, understanding; *common as appropriated*, which are those essentials which we attribute to one person rather than to another, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; the *proper* are paternity, filiation, and spiration.

la: Supplevimus ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 particulam *et*, qua distinctior redditur lectio. Paulo post cod. Z loco *vel* bene ponit *et*.

en: We have supplied from very many codices and ed. 1 the particle *et*, by which the reading is rendered more distinct. A little after, codex Z well puts *et* in place of *vel*.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Deum non immediate in se nec a priori a viatoribus cognosci, sed per ea quae ab ipso facta sunt, post Concilium Vaticanum (*de Fide* can. 1. *de Revelatione*) in dubium vocari nequit. Hic canon: *Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse, a. s.*, omnino convenit cum doctrina Seraphici Doctoris. — In fine conclusionis iuxta textum a nobis reformatum intellectus humanus vocatur *quasi materialis*, quod intelligendum est in comparatione ad puram spiritualitatem divinam. In hoc sensu S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.) dicit: *Nam nihil est omnino spirituale, nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae* (vel potius Gennadius *de Dogm. Eccles.* c. 2.): *Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet.*

**II.** Quod vestigium Trinitatis in omni creatura inveniatur, est sententia communis. Omnis enim creatura, quatenus habet in se *unum* esse, distinctum a quolibet alio, respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; quatenus habet *verum* esse, respicit ipsum ut causam exemplarem; quatenus habet *bonum* esse, respicit eundem ut causam finalem. — Differentiam inter imaginem et vestigium non omnes eodem modo assignant. S. Doctor, ut ex textu apparet, quadruplicem dat differentiam, cui S. Thomas aliam adiungit (S. I. q. 45. a. 7.). Scotus autem contra verba S. Thomae aliquas difficultates affert (hic q. 3.). De hac doctrina cfr. ipse S. Doctor, hic dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. 12; Hexaem. Serm. 12. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 8. per totam et q. 7. m. 7; p. I. q. 18. m. 1. 8. — Scot., hic q. 5. 9. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 45. a. 7. — B. Albert., hic a. 14. 18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. 8. — Biel, hic q. 9.

**III.** Plura de hac quaestione: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Scot., hic q. 1. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. c. Gent. c. 13. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. et 3; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. n. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., a. 24. q. 6. — Durand., hic a. 2. et 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel sicut in praec. quaest.

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english_scholion:
**I.** That God is not known immediately in himself nor *a priori* by wayfarers, but through the things which have been made by him, cannot, since the Vatican Council (*On Faith*, can. 1, *On Revelation*), be called into doubt. This canon: *If anyone shall say that the one and true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be known with certainty through the things which have been made, by the natural light of human reason, let him be anathema* — entirely agrees with the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. — At the end of the conclusion, according to the text as we have restored it, the human intellect is called *quasi materialis* ("as it were material"), which is to be understood by comparison with the pure divine spirituality. In this sense S. Bonav. (I. Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4) says: *For nothing is wholly spiritual save God alone, as Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church* (or rather Gennadius, *On Ecclesiastical Doctrines*, c. 2): *God alone is incorporeal, because he fills all things.*

**II.** That the vestige of the Trinity is found in every creature is the common opinion. For every creature, insofar as it has in itself *one* being, distinct from any other, regards God as efficient cause; insofar as it has *true* being, regards him as exemplary cause; insofar as it has *good* being, regards the same as final cause. — Not all assign the difference between image and vestige in the same way. The Seraphic Doctor, as is evident from the text, gives a fourfold difference, to which St. Thomas adds another (S. I, q. 45, a. 7). Scotus, however, raises certain difficulties against the words of St. Thomas (here, q. 3). On this doctrine see the Seraphic Doctor himself, here dub. 3; II. Sent. d. 38, a. 2, q. 1; *Breviloquium* p. II, c. 1, 12; *Hexaemeron* Serm. 12. — Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 8 throughout, and q. 7, m. 7; p. I, q. 18, m. 1, 8. — Scotus, here q. 5, 9. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1, 2, 3; S. I, q. 45, a. 7. — B. Albert, here a. 14, 18. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Durandus, here p. I, q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4, 8. — Biel, here q. 9.

**III.** Further on this question: S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. — Alex. of Hales, *Summa* p. I, q. 2, m. 3, a. 1, 2. — Scotus, here q. 1, 2, 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; *Summa contra Gentiles* c. 13. — B. Albert, here a. 2 and 3; *Summa* p. I, tr. 3, q. 15, n. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, a. 24, q. 6. — Durandus, here a. 2 and 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel as in the preceding question.

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method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0