title: Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 2

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### Quaestio II. *Utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit alicui tentationi resistere.*

Secundo quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit alicui tentationi resistere. Et quod sic, videtur.

**Argumenta pro parte affirmativa.**

1. Gregorius in Moralibus[^1]: «Debilis est hostis, qui non vincit nisi volentem». Sed quod quis voluntarie facit, potest non facere: ergo si voluntarie quis consentit adversario, potest etiam gratia destitutus non consentire, ac per hoc tentationi resistere.

2. Item, liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, adhuc liberum est; si liberum est, ergo non potest cogi: ergo potest repugnare diabolicae suggestioni; et si hoc: ergo et resistere non solum uni, sed etiam omni tentationi.

3. Item, bonum potentius est quam quodlibet malum[^2]; sed liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, adhuc habet naturale iudicatorium, quod inest ei per naturam: ergo cum illud sit bonum, potentius est et peccato et concupiscentia et tentatione diabolica inclinante ad malum; et si hoc: ergo potest non solum uni, sed etiam cuilibet tentationi resistere.

4. Item, cum sit «triplex posse, videlicet gratiae, naturae et vitii», secundum quod dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos septimo[^3]; posse gratiae addit supra posse naturae; sed posse vitii diminuit: ergo posse naturae est supra posse vitii: ergo circumscripta omni gratia, manente sola naturali potentia, videtur, quod liberum arbitrium resistere possit vitio impellenti.

5. Item, sicut liberum arbitrium vertibile est ad malum, ita quaelibet creatura vertibilis est in non-esse[^4]; sed multae creaturae conservantur in esse sine aliqua gratia gratis data per naturalia principia et divinam praesentiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod per liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, propria virtute absque aliquo dono gratiae supra apposito possit aliquis casum in peccatum effugere.

6. Item, «daemones habent sibi data integra et splendidissima[^5]», ergo multo fortius liberum arbitrium hominis lapsi; sed liberum arbitrium non lapsum per se poterat tentationi resistere: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum hoc possit, etiam si sit omni gratia destitutum. Si forte tu dicas, quod etsi sit integrum quantum ad naturam potentiae, infirmatum tamen est et diminutum quantum ad habilitatem consequentem, adeo ut non possit resistere; tunc ego quaero: aut potest, aut non potest. Si potest, habeo propositum. Si non potest; et nullus est inculpandus in eo quod vitare non potest: ergo aut liberum arbitrium non resistendo tentationi non peccaret, aut in peccando non esset vituperabile. Sed utrumque horum est impossibile: ergo restat alterum, scilicet quod possit tentationi resistere.

**Contra:**

1. Matthaei sexto[^6]: *Et ne nos inducas in tentationem,* dicitur in oratione dominica; sed nullus ab altero postulat quod potest per se ipsum: si ergo homo hoc sapienter petit a Deo, videtur, quod hoc non possit homo per liberum arbitrium absque aliquo dono gratuito.

2. Item, Augustinus, definiens liberum arbitrium, sicut habitum est supra distinctione vigesima quarta[^7], dicit, quod liberum arbitrium «est facultas voluntatis et rationis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, et malum, gratia desistente». Si igitur haec ratio recta est; nisi adsit divina gratia, semper liberum arbitrium malum eliget: ergo nulli tentationi resistet.

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3. Item, super illud ad Romanos septimo[^8]: *Velle adiacet mihi* etc., Glossa: «Naturale est quodam modo velle bonum per rationem; sed tale est hoc velle, quod semper vi carnis superatur»: ergo videtur, quod absque adiutorio gratiae semper, cum tentatur, consentiat homo culpae.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium in praeeligendo semper sequitur affectum praedominantem, et hoc expresse declarat Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitrio[^9], et per experimentum est manifestum; sed absque gratia, saltem gratis data, libero arbitrio corrupto, regnat amor proprii boni: ergo videtur, quod semper illud praeeligat, quantum est de se, nisi gratia divina assistat: ergo idem quod prius.

5. Item, mors non inest nobis nisi per peccatum[^10]: ergo ubi est necessitas moriendi, videtur, quod nisi adsit gratia Dei, sit similiter necessitas et peccandi; sed ubi est necessitas peccandi, non est potestas resistendi tentationi: si igitur hanc habet liberum arbitrium, prout est gratia destitutum; patet etc.

6. Item, habens pedem claudum, cum ambulat, necesse habet claudicare: ergo si pes spiritualis est habens affectum deordinatum et obliquum, necessario claudicat in suo actu[^11]: ergo necessario liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, cum sit lapsum et obliquatum, praecipitabitur in peccatum. Quodsi hoc, impossibile est, quod absque dono gratiae tentationi resistat.

### Conclusio

> Hominis liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, nec omni potest tentationi resistere, nec necesse habet omni tentationi succumbere.

**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui senserunt, liberum arbitrium secundum statum, in quo nunc est, absque munere gratiae omni posse tentationi resistere propria virtute; quia si hoc non esset, peccatum ei imputari non deberet. — Sed haec positio plane falsa est et contra sacram Scripturam et contra Sanctorum testimonia. Si enim nemo potest resistere tentationi de luxuria nisi per continentiam, nemo tentationi de infidelitate nisi per fidem; continentiam autem et fidem non contingit habere absque dono divinae gratiae, iuxta illud quod dicitur Sapientiae octavo[^12]: *Non possum esse continens* etc., et primae ad Corinthios duodecimo: *Alii datur fides in eodem spiritu:* planum est ex ipsa sacra Scriptura, quod liberum arbitrium absque munere gratiae non potest omni tentationi resistere. Hoc etiam multipliciter probat Augustinus in libro de Perfectione iustitiae hominis[^13], et de Natura et gratia; et in libro de Vera Religione dicit expresse, quod qui non vult ab alio superari, necesse habet alii invidere; et ita vir superbus necesse habet peccare aliquando peccato invidiae; similiter et in aliis generibus peccatorum intelligendum est esse. Et propterea illa positio Pelagii tanquam erronea repudianda est. — Hoc autem fuit quod decepit Pelagium, quod liberum arbitrium nunquam destituitur omni gratia gratis data; et ipse posse gratiae attribuit ipsi naturae. Superbia enim excaecatus, nescivit distinguere inter dona naturalia et gratuita.

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Aliorum vero positio fuit, quod liberum arbitrium lapsum, omni gratia destitutum, nulli posset tentationi resistere, pro eo quod lapsum est et in lapsu suo adeo est infirmatum et obliquatum, quod, nisi adsit divinae misericordiae donum, incurvatur ad omne malum, quod sibi suggeritur et offertur. Et innituntur super illam Glossam, quae dicit super illud Psalmi[^14]: *Immissiones per angelos malos:* «Diabolus potestatem habet in peccatore sicut in proprio pecore». Et ex hoc arguunt, quod nisi adsit divinum auxilium, faciet illud pro voluntate sua ruere de peccato in peccatum. Et iterum alia Glossa super primum Habacuc[^15]: «Nesciebam, eum tantam potestatem accepisse, ut viribus eius nemo posset resistere». Hoc intelligendum est esse dictum per se, absque auxilio divinae gratiae. Et si tu obiicias eis, quod tunc homo non esset culpandus, respondent per illud quod dicitur in Glossa, ad Romanos septimo[^16]: *Non ego operor, sed quod habitat in me peccatum;* ibi Glossa: «Nunquid, quia invitum hominem dicit peccare, immunis videri debet a crimine? Non utique; ipsius enim vitio et desiderio haec coepta sunt. Quia enim mancipavit se per assensum peccato, iure dominatur illius».

Sed quia illud valde durum videtur dicere, quod liberum arbitrium in statu tali nulli posset tentationi resistere, cum naturale habeat iudicatorium et quendam instinctum naturalem, remurmurantem contra malum, non sit etiam in malo confirmatum: ideo est tertia via, medium tenens inter haec duo extrema, quod liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, nec omni posset tentationi resistere, nec necesse haberet omni tentationi succumbere. Non posset, inquam, omni resistere propter suam instabilitatem et infirmitatem, iuxta illud Threnorum primo[^17]: *Peccatum peccavit Ierusalem, propterea instabilis facta est;* et Glossa super illud Threnorum tertio: *Misericordiae Domini* etc.: «Non potest homo diu stare contra insultus diaboli, nisi misericordia Domini adiuvetur». Unde si contingeret, hominem resistere uni tentationi, tantum possent[^18] multiplicari, quod, nisi divinum auxilium adesset, necesse haberet homo deici, sicut ponitur exemplum in foraminibus navis, per quae ingreditur aqua. Potest etiam poni exemplum in pugile, qui, cum se cooperit ex una parte contra ictum et ex altera quasi discooperit, a magis experto pugnatore laeditur. Sic et diabolus frequenter facit pluribus, quibus praetendit tentationem de luxuria; et ex hoc quod non consentiunt, facit ipsos prosilire in superbiam; nec unquam potest evitare homo, quin in aliquam tentationem incidat, et hoc propter suam instabilitatem. — Propter suam etiam infirmitatem necesse haberet in aliquam tentationem incidere. Cum enim sit obtenebratus ignorantia et alligatus carnis concupiscentia, tentationes carnis et infidelitatis non posset evadere, quin eis aliquando consentiret, nisi adiuvaretur aliquo munere divinae gratiae.

Per iam dicta patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam, patet etiam pro parte responsio ad obiecta. Illae enim rationes, quae primo probant, quod contingat tentationi resistere, si concluderent de tentatione in particulari, concedendae essent; quia vero concludunt, quod contingat absque gratia omni tentationi resistere, ideo oportet eas dissolvere.

**Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:**

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod diabolus non vincit nisi volentem; dicendum, quod verum est; aliqua tamen sunt, quae sic volumus, quod ad illa voluntas nostra necessario inclinatur propter corruptionem originalis culpae, nisi adsit aliquod munus gratiae, per quod relevetur et dirigatur; et ideo, quamvis vincat volentem, non tamen sequitur, quod homo absque gratia possit resistere.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium non potest cogi, iam patet responsio. Non enim est ibi coactio, sed tanta est ad malum inclinatio et voluntatis pronitas, quod, nisi esset aliud sustentans, necesse haberet motu voluntatis aliquando in malum incidere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bonum est potentius malo; dicendum, quod verum est per se loquendo; sed quando bonum subiicit se malo, malum tunc operatur per virtutem boni et subiicit sibi bonum; et per hunc modum in homine habet regnare peccatum, sicut dicit Apostolus[^19]: *Non regnet peccatum in vestro mortali corpore.*

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicitur de velle naturae et de velle vitii. Velle enim vitii praesupponit velle[^20] naturae, et ipsam naturam deordinando efficitur ipso velle naturae potentius, sicut videmus in aliquo morbo, qui adhaeret virtuti naturali.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vertibilitas naturae stabilitur absque munere gratiae superadditae; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia, etsi natura propter defectum sit vertibilis in non-esse, tamen totum, quod in ipsa est, naturaliter et determinate appetit esse. Et quia Deus conservat rem, secundum quod appetit:

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ideo sola divina praesentia per propriam naturam conservat creaturas. Liberum autem arbitrium lapsum indifferenter appetit licita et illicita, et prohibita et concessa, et cum magno impetu tendit ad malum: ideo ad hoc, quod stabiliatur, necessarium est ei aliquod gratiae donum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium integrum est: respondendum, sicut dicebatur in opponendo[^21], quod hoc intelligitur quantum ad essentiam potentiarum, non quantum ad perfectionem habilitatum consequentium. — Et si quaeratur ulterius, utrum possit resistere, vel non; dicendum, quod de aliqua tentatione per se non potest; si tamen consentiat, non est a culpa immune, propter hoc quod adiutorium gratiae sibi praesto est, si vellet suscipere; propter hoc etiam, quia ex propria sua culpa devenit in illam necessitatem. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus[^22], quod «quia homo noluit vitare peccatum, dum potuit; inflictum est ei, ut non possit, cum velit». Hoc etiam dicit Magister supra distinctione vigesima quinta[^23], quod «post peccatum ante reparationem gratiae liberum arbitrium premitur a concupiscentia et vincitur; et ideo potest peccare et non potest non peccare, etiam damnabiliter». — Et sic patet, quod rationes concludentes, liberum arbitrium per se tentationi posse resistere, non cogunt de necessitate.

**Ad obiecta pro parte negativa:**

1. Ad rationes vero ad oppositum, quibus ostenditur, quod non possit tentationi resistere; facile est respondere. Si enim concludant, quod necesse haberet aliquando cadere; de plano sunt concedendae. Si autem quis per eas velit arguere de libero arbitrio, quod in omni tentatione succumberet; responderi potest ad primum de oratione, quod illud petitur, non quia non possit alicui tentationi resistere, sed quia non potest omni resistere per se.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod libero arbitrio eligitur malum, gratia desistente; dicendum, quod illud non intelligitur semper, sed aliquando.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod velle naturae semper superatur; dicendum, quod hoc non intelligitur, quia in omni tentatione discedat homo a naturali rectitudine voluntatis, sed quia illa rectitudo non est tantae virtutis, quod possit absque gratia Dei eripere hominem a servitute peccati.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de necessitate moriendi, dicendum, quod necessitas moriendi non inest homini propter peccatum, quod inest, sed propter peccatum, quod infuit[^24]. Unde illud non concludit, quod necessarium sit, hominem peccare, sed quod necessarium sit, hominem peccare, vel peccasse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium sequitur affectum praedominantem; dicendum, quod affectus non praedominatur in homine respectu cuiuslibet mali, quod suggeritur, sicut patet, cum avaro suggeritur bonorum suorum dissipatio, vel prodigo bonorum suorum retentio; et ideo non sequitur, quod consentiat omni peccato. Praeterea, qui afficitur circa aliquid in habitu, potest ex aliqua consideratione magis affici circa eius oppositum in actu, sicut homo frequenter irascitur circa rem, quam multum diligit.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de claudicatione pedis, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia actus ambulationis nunquam separari potest a dispositione claudicationis in pede claudo. Non sic autem est de actu affectionis respectu deordinationis, quae est in libero arbitrio, propter multitudinem motuum et affectuum, qui consurgunt in nobis ex diversitate considerationum, sicut praetactum est, ob quam modo movetur homo ad unum, modo ad eius oppositum, et ideo aliquando motu recto, aliquando obliquo. Per haec autem, quae dicta sunt, patet responsio ad obiecta, et etiam ad consimilia, quae obiici possunt in hac materia.

Ad illas autem duas Glossas, quae in solvendo adductae sunt, quibus videtur innui, quod liberum arbitrium absque gratia omni tentationi non possit resistere; dicendum, quod intelligendae sunt, non quia diabolus plenum posse habeat super hominem quantum ad actum tentandi, et quod homo nullo modo possit ei resistere; sed hoc intelligitur quantum ad hoc, quod posse habet in eius morte ad infernalia supplicia, nullo impediente, pertrahere, ita quod homo viribus eius non potest resistere.

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### Question II. *Whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can resist any temptation.*

Secondly it is asked whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can resist any temptation. And that it can, it seems.

**Arguments for the affirmative.**

1. Gregory in the *Morals*[^1]: "Weak is the enemy who does not conquer save the one willing." But what someone does voluntarily, he can not-do: therefore if someone voluntarily consents to the adversary, even one deprived of grace can not-consent, and through this resist temptation.

2. Likewise, free choice, deprived of all grace, is still free; if it is free, then it cannot be compelled: therefore it can resist the diabolical suggestion; and if so: therefore it can also resist not only one, but even every temptation.

3. Likewise, the good is more powerful than any evil whatever[^2]; but free choice, deprived of all grace, still has the natural faculty of judgment, which is in it by nature: therefore, since that is a good, it is more powerful than sin and concupiscence and the diabolical temptation inclining to evil; and if so: therefore it can resist not only one, but any temptation whatever.

4. Likewise, since there is a "threefold power, namely of grace, of nature, and of vice," according to what is said in the Gloss on Romans 7[^3]; the power of grace adds upon the power of nature; but the power of vice diminishes: therefore the power of nature is above the power of vice: therefore, every grace being set aside, with the natural power alone remaining, it seems that free choice can resist the impelling vice.

5. Likewise, just as free choice is changeable toward evil, so every creature is changeable into non-being[^4]; but many creatures are conserved in being without any freely given grace, through natural principles and the divine presence: therefore by parity of reason it seems that through free choice, deprived of grace, by its own power without any superadded gift of grace, someone can escape a fall into sin.

6. Likewise, "the demons have given to them intact and most splendid [gifts][^5]," therefore much more the free choice of fallen man; but unfallen free choice could of itself resist temptation: therefore by parity of reason it seems that fallen free choice can do this, even if it be deprived of all grace. But if perhaps you say that, although it be intact as to the nature of the power, it is nevertheless weakened and diminished as to the consequent capacity, so that it cannot resist; then I ask: either it can, or it cannot. If it can, I have my point. If it cannot; and no one is to be blamed for what he cannot avoid: therefore either free choice would not sin by not resisting temptation, or in sinning it would not be blameworthy. But both of these are impossible: therefore the other remains, namely that it can resist temptation.

**On the contrary:**

1. Matthew 6[^6]: *And lead us not into temptation,* is said in the Lord's Prayer; but no one asks of another what he can do through himself: if therefore man wisely asks this of God, it seems that man cannot do this through free choice without some gratuitous gift.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in defining free choice, as was held above in distinction 24[^7], says that free choice "is a faculty of will and reason, by which the good is chosen, grace assisting, and the evil, grace withdrawing." If therefore this account is correct; unless divine grace be present, free choice will always choose the evil: therefore it will resist no temptation.

3. Likewise, on that passage of Romans 7[^8]: *To will is present with me,* etc., the Gloss: "It is natural in a certain way to will the good through reason; but this willing is such that it is always overcome by the force of the flesh": therefore it seems that without the help of grace man always, when he is tempted, consents to the fault.

4. Likewise, free choice in pre-choosing always follows the predominant affection, and this Anselm expressly declares in the book *On Free Choice*[^9], and it is manifest by experience; but without grace, at least freely given, when free choice is corrupted, the love of one's own good reigns: therefore it seems that it always pre-chooses that, so far as concerns itself, unless divine grace assist: therefore the same as before.

5. Likewise, death is not in us except through sin[^10]: therefore where there is a necessity of dying, it seems that, unless God's grace be present, there is likewise a necessity also of sinning; but where there is a necessity of sinning, there is no power of resisting temptation: if therefore free choice has this, insofar as it is deprived of grace; it is clear, etc.

6. Likewise, one having a lame foot, when he walks, must limp: therefore if the spiritual foot is one having a disordered and crooked affection, it necessarily limps in its act[^11]: therefore necessarily free choice, deprived of grace, since it is fallen and made crooked, will be cast headlong into sin. But if this is so, it is impossible that without the gift of grace it should resist temptation.

### Conclusion

> Man's free choice, deprived of all grace, neither can resist every temptation, nor must it succumb to every temptation.

**I respond:** For understanding the foregoing it must be noted that some held that free choice, according to the state in which it now is, without the gift of grace can by its own power resist every temptation; for if this were not so, sin ought not to be imputed to it. — But this position is plainly false and against sacred Scripture and against the testimonies of the Saints. For if no one can resist the temptation of lust except through continence, no one the temptation of unbelief except through faith; but it does not befall one to have continence and faith without the gift of divine grace, according to what is said in Wisdom 8[^12]: *I cannot be continent,* etc., and in 1 Corinthians 12: *To another is given faith in the same spirit:* it is plain from sacred Scripture itself that free choice without the gift of grace cannot resist every temptation. This too Augustine proves in many ways in the book *On the Perfection of Man's Righteousness*[^13], and *On Nature and Grace;* and in the book *On True Religion* he says expressly that he who does not wish to be surpassed by another must envy the other; and so the proud man must sometimes sin by the sin of envy; and likewise it is to be understood to be so in the other kinds of sins. And therefore that position of Pelagius is to be repudiated as erroneous. — Now this is what deceived Pelagius, that free choice is never deprived of all freely given grace; and he attributed the power of grace to nature itself. For, blinded by pride, he did not know how to distinguish between natural and gratuitous gifts.

But the position of others was that fallen free choice, deprived of all grace, could resist no temptation, for the reason that it is fallen and in its fall is so weakened and made crooked that, unless the gift of divine mercy be present, it is bent down to every evil that is suggested and offered to it. And they rely upon that Gloss which says on that passage of the Psalm[^14]: *Sending [evils] by evil angels:* "The devil has power over the sinner as over his own beast." And from this they argue that, unless divine help be present, he will make it rush of its own will from sin into sin. And again another Gloss on Habakkuk 1[^15]: "I did not know that he had received such great power that no one could resist his strength." This is to be understood as said of itself, without the help of divine grace. And if you object to them that then man would not be blameworthy, they answer by what is said in the Gloss on Romans 7[^16]: *It is not I who work, but the sin that dwells in me;* there the Gloss: "Is it the case that, because he says man sins unwillingly, he ought to seem free from crime? By no means; for through his own vice and desire these things were begun. For because he handed himself over by assent to sin, it rightly has dominion over him."

But because it seems very harsh to say that free choice in such a state could resist no temptation, since it has a natural faculty of judgment and a certain natural instinct murmuring against evil, and is not confirmed in evil: therefore there is a third way, holding the mean between these two extremes, namely that free choice, deprived of all grace, neither could resist every temptation, nor would it have to succumb to every temptation. It could not, I say, resist every one because of its instability and weakness, according to that of Lamentations 1[^17]: *Jerusalem has grievously sinned, therefore it has become unstable;* and the Gloss on that passage of Lamentations 3: *The mercies of the Lord,* etc.: "Man cannot long stand against the assaults of the devil, unless he be helped by the mercy of the Lord." Hence if it should happen that a man resists one temptation, they could[^18] be multiplied so much that, unless divine help were present, the man would have to be cast down, as the example is given of the holes in a ship, through which water enters. An example can also be given in a boxer who, when he covers himself on one side against a blow and as it were uncovers himself on the other, is wounded by a more expert fighter. So too the devil frequently does to many, to whom he holds out the temptation of lust; and from the fact that they do not consent, he makes them leap forth into pride; nor can man ever avoid falling into some temptation, and this because of his instability. — Because of his weakness too he would have to fall into some temptation. For since he is darkened by ignorance and bound by the concupiscence of the flesh, he could not escape the temptations of the flesh and of unbelief without sometimes consenting to them, unless he were helped by some gift of divine grace.

By what has now been said the answer to the question proposed is clear, and the answer to the objections is in part clear too. For those reasons which first prove that one can resist temptation, if they concluded about temptation in particular, would have to be granted; but because they conclude that one can resist every temptation without grace, therefore they must be dissolved.

**To the arguments for the affirmative:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected, that the devil conquers only the one willing; it must be said that it is true; yet there are some things which we will in such a way that our will is necessarily inclined toward them because of the corruption of original fault, unless there be present some gift of grace by which it may be relieved and directed; and therefore, although he conquers the one willing, it does not nevertheless follow that man can resist without grace.

2. To that which is objected, that free choice cannot be compelled, the answer is already clear. For there is no coercion there, but so great is the inclination to evil and the proneness of the will that, unless there were something else sustaining it, it would have to fall sometimes into evil by the motion of the will.

3. To that which is objected, that the good is more powerful than the evil; it must be said that it is true, speaking absolutely; but when the good subjects itself to the evil, the evil then works through the power of the good and subjects the good to itself; and in this manner sin comes to reign in man, as the Apostle says[^19]: *Let not sin reign in your mortal body.*

4. And by this the answer to what follows is clear, which is objected about the willing of nature and the willing of vice. For the willing of vice presupposes the willing[^20] of nature, and by disordering nature itself it is made more powerful than the willing of nature itself, as we see in some disease which clings to a natural power.

5. To that which is objected, that the changeableness of nature is stabilized without the gift of superadded grace; it must be said that it is not similar; because, although nature on account of defect is changeable into non-being, nevertheless the whole of what is in it naturally and determinately desires to be. And because God conserves a thing according as it desires: therefore the divine presence alone, through their proper nature, conserves creatures. But fallen free choice indifferently desires things lawful and unlawful, and forbidden and permitted, and with great impetus tends to evil: therefore, in order that it be stabilized, some gift of grace is necessary for it.

6. To that which is objected, that free choice is intact: it must be answered, as was being said in the objecting[^21], that this is understood as to the essence of the powers, not as to the perfection of the consequent capacities. — And if it be further asked whether it can resist, or not; it must be said that of some temptation it cannot of itself; if nevertheless it should consent, it is not immune from fault, because the help of grace is at hand for it, if it should will to receive it; and also because by its own fault it came into that necessity. And this is what Augustine says[^22], that "because man was unwilling to avoid sin while he could, it was inflicted on him that he cannot, even when he wills." This too the Master says above in distinction 25[^23], that "after sin, before the repair of grace, free choice is pressed by concupiscence and overcome; and therefore it can sin and cannot not-sin, even damnably." — And so it is clear that the reasons concluding that free choice can of itself resist temptation do not compel of necessity.

**To the objections for the negative:**

1. To the reasons for the opposite, by which it is shown that it cannot resist temptation; it is easy to answer. For if they conclude that it would have to fall sometimes; they are plainly to be granted. But if anyone should wish through them to argue concerning free choice that it would succumb in every temptation; it can be answered to the first, concerning the prayer, that it is asked, not because it cannot resist some temptation, but because it cannot resist every one of itself.

2. To that which is objected, that by free choice evil is chosen, grace withdrawing; it must be said that that is not understood always, but sometimes.

3. To that which is objected, that the willing of nature is always overcome; it must be said that this is not understood as if in every temptation man departs from the natural rectitude of the will, but because that rectitude is not of such power that it can without God's grace rescue man from the servitude of sin.

4. To that which is objected about the necessity of dying, it must be said that the necessity of dying is not in man on account of the sin that is present, but on account of the sin that was present[^24]. Hence that does not conclude that it is necessary for man to sin, but that it is necessary for man to sin, or to have sinned.

5. To that which is objected, that free choice follows the predominant affection; it must be said that the affection does not predominate in man with respect to every evil that is suggested, as is clear, when to the miser the squandering of his goods is suggested, or to the prodigal the retention of his goods; and therefore it does not follow that he consents to every sin. Moreover, he who is affected toward something in habit can from some consideration be more affected toward its opposite in act, as a man frequently is angry over a thing which he greatly loves.

6. To that which is objected about the limping of the foot, it must be said that it is not similar, because the act of walking can never be separated from the disposition of limping in a lame foot. But it is not so concerning the act of affection with respect to the disorder which is in free choice, because of the multitude of motions and affections which arise in us from the diversity of considerations, as was touched on, by which a man is moved now to one thing, now to its opposite, and therefore sometimes by a straight motion, sometimes by a crooked one. By these things, however, which have been said, the answer to the objections is clear, and also to similar ones which can be objected in this matter.

But to those two Glosses, which were adduced in the solving, by which it seems to be intimated that free choice without grace cannot resist every temptation; it must be said that they are to be understood, not as if the devil had full power over man as to the act of tempting, and that man could in no way resist him; but this is understood as to this, that he has the power, in man's death, to drag [him] to infernal punishments, with nothing hindering, so that man cannot resist his strength.

la: Libr. V. c. 22. n. 43. Verba ipsius vide supra pag. 170, nota 2. — Paulo superius pro *possit* primae edd. cum codd. F K T cc ee et aliis *posset.*

en: Book V, c. 22, n. 43. See his words above on p. 170, note 2. — A little above, for *possit* the first editions, with codices F, K, T, cc, ee and others, read *posset.*

la: Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 32: *Quod enim omni bono expers neque est quid neque potest. Etenim si bonum et ὄν [existens] est et consultorium et bene potens et activum, quomodo poterit quid contrarium bono et substantia et sapientia et virtute et operatione privatum?* (Translatio Scoti Erigenae).

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 32: "For what is wholly devoid of the good neither is anything nor is able [to do] anything. For if the good is also a being and counsel-giving and well-able and active, how will what is contrary to the good be able [to do anything], deprived of substance and wisdom and power and operation?" (Translation of Scotus Eriugena).

la: Vers. 15. — In Glossa, et a Petro Lombardo et a Lyrano nobis tradita, sic legitur: «Est enim triplex *velle,* scilicet *velle naturae, velle gratiae, velle vitii*». In solut. etiam codd. et edd., excepta 3, exhibent *velle.*

en: Verse 15. — In the Gloss, handed down to us both by Peter Lombard and by Lyra, it is read thus: "For there is a threefold *willing,* namely *the willing of nature, the willing of grace, the willing of vice.*" In the solution too the codices and editions, except 3, present *velle.*

la: Cfr. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 27, ubi sanctus auctor repetit quod Nemesius, episcopus Emesenus, in libro de Natura hominis, c. 41. docuit. — Paulo inferius pro *praesentiam* Vat. *potentiam.* Cfr. infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

en: Cf. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* II, c. 27, where the holy author repeats what Nemesius, bishop of Emesa, taught in his book *On the Nature of Man,* c. 41. — A little below, for *praesentiam* the Vatican edition reads *potentiam.* Cf. below d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, and I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

la: Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23. Vide supra pag. 122, nota 8. In hoc textu Vat. et ed. 4 voci *integra* addunt *naturalia.* — Mox pro *non lapsum* codd. F Y *ante lapsum.*

en: Dionysius, *On the Divine Names* c. 4, § 23. See above p. 122, note 8. In this text the Vatican edition and edition 4 add *naturalia* to the word *integra.* — Presently, for *non lapsum* codices F, Y read *ante lapsum.*

la: Ut dicit August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 50. Verba ipsa vide supra pag. 556, nota 2. — Aliquanto superius pro *potentiae* Vat. cum ed. 4 *potentiarum.* (Matth. 6, 13.)

en: As Augustine says, *On Free Choice* III, c. 18, n. 50. See the words themselves above on p. 556, note 2. — Somewhat above, for *potentiae* the Vatican edition with edition 4 reads *potentiarum.* (Matthew 6:13.)

la: Vers. 13. — De minori cfr. supra pag. 678, nota 2.

en: Verse 13. — On the minor premise cf. above p. 678, note 2.

la: Vers. 18. — Glossam vide apud Strabum et Lyranum. (Rom. 7, 18.)

en: Verse 18. — See the Gloss in Strabus and Lyra. (Romans 7:18.)

la: Duo opuscula Anselmus scripsit de libero arbitrio, quorum unum inscribitur *Dialogus de lib. arb.,* alteri titulus est *Tractatus de concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis nec non gratiae Dei cum lib. arb.* Sententia, de qua hic agitur, in utroque opusculo habetur. In primo, c. 8. seq. dicitur, quod voluntas non recedit a rectitudine, nisi ei aliquid ostendatur sive promittatur, aut minetur, «quod magis quam ipsam rectitudinem vult». In secundo opusc. q. 3. (quae agit de concordia gratiae et liberi arbitrii, sive, ut in mss. brevius legitur, de gratia et libero arbitrio) c. 11. seq. auctor triplicem distinguit voluntatem: voluntatem-instrumentum (potentiam), voluntatem-affectionem et voluntatem-usum. Prima, ut auctor exponit, omnibus hominibus eadem est; secunda diversa in diversis, et secundum eam, prout unusquisque afficitur, agit. Ibid. c. 13. ait: *Ancilla etiam facta est [naturalis libertas arbitrii] suae affectionis, quae ad commodum est; quia, remota iustitia, nihil potest velle, nisi quod illa vult.* — Mox pro *experimentum* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *experientiam.*

en: Anselm wrote two little works on free choice, of which one is entitled *Dialogue on Free Choice,* the other has the title *Treatise on the Concord of Foreknowledge and Predestination and also of God's Grace with Free Choice.* The opinion here treated is found in both works. In the first, c. 8 ff., it is said that the will does not depart from rectitude unless something be shown or promised to it, or threatened, "which it wills more than rectitude itself." In the second work, q. 3 (which treats of the concord of grace and free choice, or, as it is read more briefly in the manuscripts, of grace and free choice), c. 11 ff., the author distinguishes a threefold will: the will-instrument (the power), the will-affection, and the will-use. The first, as the author explains, is the same in all men; the second diverse in diverse men, and according to it, as each is affected, he acts. In the same place, c. 13, he says: "The [natural liberty of choice] has even been made handmaid of its affection, which is for advantage; because, righteousness being removed, it can will nothing except what that [affection] wills." — Presently, for *experimentum* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *experientiam.*

la: Cfr. Rom. 5, 12. seqq. et 6, 23. — Cod. Y *propter peccatum.* Paulo inferius pro *sit similiter* Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 *est simpliciter.*

en: Cf. Romans 5:12 ff. and 6:23. — Codex Y reads *propter peccatum.* A little below, for *sit similiter* the Vatican edition with editions 3, 4 reads *est simpliciter.*

la: August., Enarrat. in Ps. 94. n. 2: «Pedes enim nostri in hoc itinere [ad Deum] affectus nostri sunt. Prout quisque affectum habuerit, prout quisque amorem habuerit, ita accedit, vel recedit a Deo». Et in Ioan. Evang. tr. 56. n. 4: «Ipsi igitur humani affectus, sine quibus in hac mortalitate non vivitur, quasi pedes sunt, ubi ex humanis rebus afficimur et sic afficimur, ut si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos decipiamus et veritas in nobis non sit» (I. Ioan. 1, 8.). Idem dicit Bernard., Serm. in Coena Domini n. 4.

en: Augustine, *Expositions on Psalm 94,* n. 2: "For our feet on this journey [to God] are our affections. As each one has affection, as each one has love, so he draws near to, or withdraws from, God." And in *Tractates on John's Gospel,* tr. 56, n. 4: "These human affections, therefore, without which one does not live in this mortality, are as it were feet, where we are affected by human things and so affected that, if we should say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1:8). The same says Bernard, *Sermon on the Lord's Supper,* n. 4.

la: Vers. 21. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 9. (Sap. 8, 21; I. Cor. 12, 9.)

en: Verse 21. — The following text is from the cited place, v. 9. (Wisdom 8:21; 1 Corinthians 12:9.)

la: In hoc opusculo, quod Augustinus scripsit contra Caelestium, ostenditur, in quo consistat perfectio iustitiae (c. 8. illa iustitia, qua homo prorsus est sine peccato); ostenditur etiam, istam haberi non posse solis viribus naturae, praesertim vitiatae, sine gratia, nec omnino in hac praesenti vita inveniri. In fine opusc. c. 21. n. 44. Augustinus ait: *Dimitte nobis debita nostra* (Matth. 6, 12.), quod, nisi fallor, non opus esset dicere, si nunquam vel in lapsu linguae, vel in oblectanda cogitatione eiusdem peccati desideriis aliquantulum consentiremus; sed tantummodo dicendum esset: *Ne nos inferas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo* (ibid. 13.). — Idem probat August. in libr. de Natura et grat. refellens argumenta Pelagii, et c. 53. n. 61. seqq. Idem colligit ex verbis Apostoli ad Gal. 5, 17: *Caro concupiscit* etc. — Locus ex libro de Vera Relig. c. 45. n. 84, sic sonat: *Habet ergo et superbia quendam appetitum unitatis et omnipotentiae, sed in rerum temporalium principatu, quae omnia transeunt tanquam umbra... Quis autem dubitet, immane vitium esse invidentiam, qua necesse est torqueatur et subiiciatur qui non vult in rebus temporalibus vinci?*

en: In this little work, which Augustine wrote against Caelestius, it is shown wherein the perfection of righteousness consists (c. 8: that righteousness by which a man is wholly without sin); it is shown also that this cannot be had by the powers of nature alone, especially when vitiated, without grace, nor at all be found in this present life. At the end of the work, c. 21, n. 44, Augustine says: *Forgive us our debts* (Matt. 6:12), which, unless I am mistaken, there would be no need to say, if we never even in a slip of the tongue, or in dwelling delightfully on a thought, consented a little to the desires of that same sin; but it would only have to be said: *Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil* (ibid. 13). — The same Augustine proves in the book *On Nature and Grace* in refuting the arguments of Pelagius, and in c. 53, n. 61 ff. he gathers the same from the words of the Apostle to the Galatians 5:17: *The flesh lusts,* etc. — The passage from the book *On True Religion* c. 45, n. 84, runs thus: *Pride too, therefore, has a certain appetite for unity and omnipotence, but in the rule of temporal things, which all pass away like a shadow... But who can doubt that envy is a monstrous vice, by which he must be tormented and subjected who is unwilling to be conquered in temporal things?*

la: Psalm. 77, 49. — De Glossa cfr. supra pag. 678, nota 4.

en: Psalm 77:49. — On the Gloss cf. above p. 678, note 4.

la: Vers. 11. — Glossam, quae sumta est ex Hieronymo super hunc loc., videsis apud Lyranum. (Habac. 1, 11.)

en: Verse 11. — See the Gloss, which is taken from Jerome on this passage, in Lyra. (Habakkuk 1:11.)

la: Vers. 20. — Glossa delibata est ex Commentario, qui olim Ambrosio tribuebatur et adhuc inter eius opera habetur. Post *a crimine* textus origin. addit *quia hoc agit quod non vult, pressus vi potestatis,* et dein pro *desiderio* exhibet *desidia.* (Rom. 7, 20.)

en: Verse 20. — The Gloss is culled from the Commentary which was once attributed to Ambrose and is still held among his works. After *from crime* the original text adds *because he does this which he does not will, pressed by the force of [the dominating] power,* and then for *desiderio* ("desire") it presents *desidia* ("sloth"). (Romans 7:20.)

la: Vers. 8. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 22. — Glossa super hunc textum allata non habetur in Glossa ordinaria in hunc locum. Cfr. Gregor., II. in I. Reg. n. 23, ubi docet, nos non posse stare neque hostem vincere absque auxilio Dei; idem VIII. Moral. c. 51. n. 31. et IX. c. 46. n. 71. Ambros., III. Expos. Evang. Luc. n. 37. ait: *Habemus enim adversarium magnum, qui vinci a nobis sine Dei favore non possit.*

en: Verse 8. — The following text is from the cited place, v. 22. — The Gloss adduced on this text is not found in the Ordinary Gloss on this passage. Cf. Gregory, *On 1 Kings* II, n. 23, where he teaches that we can neither stand nor conquer the enemy without God's help; the same *Morals* VIII, c. 51, n. 31, and IX, c. 46, n. 71. Ambrose, *Exposition on the Gospel of Luke* III, n. 37, says: "For we have a great adversary, who cannot be conquered by us without God's favor."

la: Plures codd., ut T Y bb, cum ed. 1 *posset.*

en: Several codices, such as T, Y, bb, with edition 1, read *posset.*

en: Romans 6:12.

la: Vat. cum ed. 4 *posse.* Cfr. supra pag. 684, nota 3.

en: The Vatican edition with edition 4 reads *posse.* Cf. above p. 684, note 3.

la: Scil. in replicatione, quae est in hac ipsa obiectione.

en: Namely in the rejoinder which is in this very objection.

la: Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 52; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 2. Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.

en: *On Free Choice* III, c. 18, n. 52; *On the City of God* XIV, c. 15, n. 2. Cf. below d. 41, a. 2, q. 1.

la: Cap. 6.

en: Chapter 6.

la: Scil. quia, licet iam sit remissum peccatum orig., remanet necessitas moriendi. — Ordo solut. hic differt ab ordine argg.

en: Namely because, although original sin has now been remitted, the necessity of dying remains. — The order of the solutions here differs from the order of the arguments.

latin_scholion:
**I.** Solutio huius et seq. quaestionis, opposita duobus extremis erroribus, ex iisdem principiis eruitur. Ad hanc (2.) quaestionem spectat prop. 30. Baii, reprobata a s. Sede, in qua negatur, «tentationi ulli sine gratiae ipsius (Christi) adiutorio resistere hominem posse sic, ut in eam non inducatur, aut ab ea non superetur»; item prop. 28: «Pelagianus est error dicere, quod liberum arbitrium valet ad ullum peccatum vitandum». Ad sequentem (3.) quaest. refertur eiusdem prop. 25: «Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata, et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia»; item prop. 27: «Liberum arbitrium sine gratiae Dei adiutorio non nisi ad peccandum valet» (cfr. etiam prop. 22.).

**II.** Quoad hanc (2.) quaest. vide hic dub. 3. et supra a. 1. q. 2. — De eadem Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 106. m. 10. § 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 8; S. c. Gent. III. c. 160; de Verit. q. 22. a. 5. ad 7, q. 24. a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1, — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.

---

english_scholion:
**I.** The solution of this and of the following question, opposed to the two extreme errors, is drawn out from the same principles. To this (2nd) question pertains proposition 30 of Baius, reproved by the Holy See, in which it is denied that "a man can so resist any temptation without the help of His (Christ's) grace, that he is not led into it, or not overcome by it"; likewise proposition 28: "It is a Pelagian error to say that free choice avails for avoiding any sin." To the following (3rd) question is referred his proposition 25: "All the works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices"; likewise proposition 27: "Free choice without the help of God's grace avails only for sinning" (cf. also proposition 22).

**II.** Concerning this (2nd) question see here dubium 3, and above article 1, question 2. — On the same Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. II, q. 106, m. 10, § 2. — Scotus, in both *Scripta,* here the single question. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; *Summa* I-II, q. 109, a. 8; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 160; *de Veritate* q. 22, a. 5 ad 7, q. 24, a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2, Latin dubium 1, — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question here q. 1.

---

translators_notes:
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site: bonaventure

collection: Book II: On the Creation of Things

title: Dist. 28, Art. 2, Q. 3

author: St. Bonaventure

languages: en la

title: Opera Omnia (Quaracchi critical edition)

publisher: Collegii S. Bonaventurae

source_text:
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### Quaestio III. *Utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit in aliquod bonum in genere.*

Tertio quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit in aliquod bonum in genere. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Virtus consuetudinalis non dat novam potentiam voluntati, sed solum reddit eam facilem[^1]. Si igitur voluntas, habens virtutem consuetudinalem, potest in bonum *in genere* et bonum *ex circumstantia*; videtur, quod in hoc possit carens illa virtute, licet cum difficultate.

2. Item, brutum bruto per naturam potest compati: ergo et homo homini per naturam potest compati, circumscripto omni dono gratiae, et si potest compati et misereri, potest et eleemosynam largiri; et hoc est bonum in genere, dare eleemosynam indigenti: ergo etc.

3. Item, vitium non fortificat naturam[^2]; sed homo vane gloriosus potest praedicare Evangelium vel facere aliquod opus bonum in se: ergo si hoc potest homo depravatus vitio inanis gloriae, multo fortius potest hoc ex potestate naturae.

4. Item, difficilius est avaro dare omnia quae habet, quam dare partem eorum quae habet; sed avarus absque omni dono gratiae potest fieri prodigus et dissipare omnia bona sua: ergo multo fortius absque dono[^3] gratiae potest dare unam eleemosynam, cum istud sit multum facilius.

5. Item, aut liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, potest in aliquod bonum, aut non. Si non: ergo nullius est potentiae. Si potest in aliquod, cum principium, quod est voluntas, distinguatur a principio, quod est natura[^4], illud non tantum erit bonum naturale, sed etiam bonum morale; sed minimum inter omnia bona moralia est bonum in genere: ergo etc.

**Sed contra:** 1. Dominus Ioannis decimo quinto[^5] ait: *Sine me nihil potestis facere;* Glossa: « Nec parum boni »: igitur absque auxilio gratiae Dei liberum arbitrium non potest perficere aliquid boni.

2. Item, secundae ad Corinthios tertio[^6]: *Non quod simus sufficientes cogitare aliquid ex nobis, quasi ex nobis.* Si igitur bonum cogitare, hoc est initium omnis boni; et hoc non possumus per nos: ergo nullum bonum per se potest liberum arbitrium, divina gratia destitutum.

3. Item, Augustinus ad Bonifacium Papam[^7]: « Non potest homo aliquid boni velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle ».

4. Item, Isidorus[^8]: « Sciant defensores liberi arbitrii, nihil boni posse, nisi divinae gratiae iuvamine sustententur »: ergo redit idem quod prius.

5. Item, Bernardus super Cantica, homilia trigesima secunda[^9]: « Sciant, inquit, hostes gratiae, nec ad bonum cogitandum sufficere cor humanum ». Et expressius in libro *de Libero Arbitrio*: « Tria in nobis Deus operatur: cogitare, velle et perficere. Primum sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos ».

6. Item, in eodem libro capitulo sexto[^10]: « Velle siquidem in nobis est ex libero arbitrio, non autem posse quod volumus; non dico velle bonum aut velle malum, sed velle tantum ». — Ex his omnibus auctoritatibus concluditur, quod liberum arbitrium, gratia destitutum, non possit in aliquod bonum quantumcumque parvum.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusio.** Liberum arbitrium sola Dei cooperatione generali, absque gratia gratum faciente et gratis data, potest, licet difficiliter, facere aliquod bonum morale, quod in finem ultimum est ordinabile, non autem ordinatum.

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**Respondeo:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod opus aliquod tripliciter potest dici bonum. — Uno modo dicitur aliquid bonum *simpliciter*[^11]; et hoc est bonum, quod est ordinatum in finem; et tale est bonum meritorium. Et in huiusmodi bonum non potest liberum arbitrium lapsum absque auxilio gratiae gratum facientis.

Secundo modo aliquid dicitur bonum ex hoc, quod aliquo modo *de congruo* disponit ad bonum; et tale est bonum, quod fit extra caritatem; nihilominus tamen cum recta intentione. Et in tale non potest liberum arbitrium absque munere gratiae gratis datae, per quod illuminetur et dirigatur et excitetur, ut velit facere aliquid, quod sit Deo placitum. Et quod ad hoc sit munus gratiae necessarium, expresse innuitur Sapientiae octavo[^12], ubi dicitur: *Scivi, quoniam aliter non possum esse continens, nisi Deus det; et hoc ipsum erat sapientia, scire cuius hoc donum esset.* Unde non est parvum donum gratiae cognoscere ipsum munus gratiae, et cognoscere, quod sine gratia homo salvari non potest.

Tertio modo dicitur aliquid bonum, quia in finem est *ordinabile,* et habet aliquam ordinationem intra se, sive ex transitu super materiam debitam, sicut pascere esurientem, sive ex debita circumstantia superaddita, videlicet cum hoc facit, cum exigit tempus et locus et opportunitas. Ad istud autem genus boni complendum, etsi gratia gratis data sit necessaria ad hoc quod fiat faciliter; circumscripto tamen omni munere gratiae, et libero arbitrio relicto in puris naturalibus, per naturale iudicatorium et instinctum posset in tale bonum, Deo sibi cooperante, sicut cooperatur aliis creaturis. Nam sine primo agente nullum agens potest agere, sicut suo loco infra[^13] manifestabitur, cum agetur, utrum omnis actio sit a Deo. Ad praesens autem tantum dixisse sufficiat, quod liberum arbitrium sola Dei cooperatione, absque aliquo munere gratiae, licet difficiliter, potest exire in aliquod bonum morale. Per illud tamen nec disponitur ad gratiam nec ad gloriam, quia non est in finem ultimum ordinatum, sed tantum ordinabile.

Et istud concludunt rationes ad primam partem inductae; et ideo concedendae sunt. In bonum autem, quod ducit ad bonum perfectum, sive merito congrui sive merito condigni, non potest absque auxilio Dei, sicut expresse dicunt auctoritates Sanctorum ad contrarium adductae; et sic omnes intelligendae sunt. — Et quod isto modo debeant intelligi, planum est. Nam si liberum arbitrium in solis naturalibus suis relinquatur, adhuc remanebit ei rationis iudicium, per quod cognoscet, parentes esse honorandos. Et constat, quod si habet hoc naturale iudicatorium, per illud per quod potest nosse, parentes esse honorandos, per illud potest cogitare; et cum habeat naturalem instinctum, potest etiam velle; et cum habeat exteriora organa sibi subservientia, potest opere implere. Sed prout illud facit iudicium rationis rectae absque munere gratiae, non dirigit ad obtinendum finem, qui Deus est, et mercedem aeternae beatitudinis, quam nosse non potest, nisi Deus revelet. Et propterea dicunt Sancti, quod nec cogitare nec velle nec facere potest bonum absque iuvamine divinae gratiae, quia loquuntur de bono, secundum quod est ordinatum ad assequendam beatitudinem. — Si autem intelligantur auctoritates de alio bono, tunc nomine gratiae non est intelligendus aliquis habitus superadditus naturalibus; sed intelligitur gratuita Dei influentia, per quam cetera conservat et adiuvat, ut compleant operationes suas. Et sic intelligitur illud verbum Ioannis decimo quinto[^14]: *Sine me nihil potestis facere;* et illud Isaiae vigesimo sexto: *Omnia opera nostra in nobis operatus es, Domine;* et consimilia.

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Sic etiam intelligendum est illud quod dicitur in libro *de Magistro*: « nullus potest aliquid addiscere, nisi Deus doceat ». Hoc enim non dicitur, quia omnis cognitio sit infusa, sed quia lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis homo, qui venit in hunc mundum. Et hoc modo intelligenda sunt verba Dionysii et aliorum Sanctorum, qui dicunt, quod omnis essentia est a prima essentia, et omnis vita a prima vita, et omnis intelligentia a prima intelligentia, et omnis bonitas a prima bonitate. Haec enim dicta sunt, non quia Deus sit tota causa, sed quia sine ipso non potest agere aliqua virtus creata.

Patet igitur ex praedictis, quantum sit necessaria libero arbitrio gratia gratum faciens, quia sine ea non potest a peccato resurgere, nec potest adversarium vincere, nec potest mandata Dei implere. Patet nihilominus, quantum sit necessaria gratia gratis data, quia sine ea non potest liberum arbitrium ad gratiam gratum facientem se disponere; non potest etiam omni tentationi resistere: non potest etiam in aliquod bonum quantumcumque modicum, quod sit ordinatum ad salutem. Et licet possit in aliquod bonum morale, vix aut nunquam faceret nisi malum propter peccati originalis corruptionem.

english:
### Question III. *Whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind.*

Thirdly it is asked whether free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good in its kind. And that it can, seems [to be the case].

1. A habitual virtue does not give a new power to the will, but only renders it facile[^1]. If therefore the will, having a habitual virtue, can attain to good *in its kind* and good *from circumstance*; it seems that one lacking that virtue can attain to this, albeit with difficulty.

2. Likewise, a brute can have compassion on a brute by nature: therefore a man too can have compassion on a man by nature, every gift of grace being set aside; and if he can have compassion and be merciful, he can also bestow alms; and this is a good in its kind, to give alms to the needy: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, vice does not fortify nature[^2]; but a vainglorious man can preach the Gospel or do some work good in itself: therefore if a man depraved by the vice of vainglory can do this, much more strongly can he do this from the power of nature.

4. Likewise, it is more difficult for a miser to give all that he has than to give a part of what he has; but a miser, without any gift of grace, can become prodigal and squander all his goods: therefore much more strongly, without a gift[^3] of grace, can he give a single alms, since that is much easier.

5. Likewise, either free choice, deprived of all grace, can attain to some good, or it cannot. If it cannot: then it is of no power. If it can attain to something, since the principle which is the will is distinguished from the principle which is nature[^4], that will be not only a natural good, but also a moral good; but the least among all moral goods is good in its kind: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Lord says in John, the fifteenth [chapter][^5]: *Without me you can do nothing;* the Gloss: « Not even a little good »: therefore without the help of God's grace free choice cannot accomplish anything of good.

2. Likewise, in the second [Epistle] to the Corinthians, the third [chapter][^6]: *Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.* If therefore to think the good — this is the beginning of all good; and this we cannot do through ourselves: therefore free choice, deprived of divine grace, can do no good through itself.

3. Likewise, Augustine to Pope Boniface[^7]: « A man cannot will anything of good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil ».

4. Likewise, Isidore[^8]: « Let the defenders of free choice know that they can do nothing of good unless they are sustained by the help of divine grace »: therefore the same thing returns as before.

5. Likewise, Bernard on the Canticle, homily thirty-second[^9]: « Let the enemies of grace know, he says, that the human heart is not even sufficient for thinking the good ». And more expressly in the book *On Free Choice*: « God works three things in us: to think, to will, and to accomplish. The first without us, the second with us, the third through us ».

6. Likewise, in the same book, chapter six[^10]: « To will indeed is in us from free choice, but not to be able [to do] what we will; I do not say to will good or to will evil, but to will only ». — From all these authorities it is concluded that free choice, deprived of grace, cannot attain to any good however small.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Free choice, by the general cooperation of God alone, without grace making-pleasing and freely given, can, albeit with difficulty, do some moral good, which is orderable to the ultimate end, but not ordered [to it].

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that a work can be called good in three ways. — In one way something is called good *simply*[^11]; and this is the good which is ordered to the [ultimate] end; and such is the meritorious good. And to good of this sort fallen free choice cannot attain without the help of grace making-pleasing.

In a second way something is called good from this, that it in some way disposes *congruously* toward the good; and such is the good which is done outside charity; nevertheless with a right intention. And to such [good] free choice cannot attain without the gift of grace freely given, by which it may be illumined and directed and roused to will to do something pleasing to God. And that for this a gift of grace is necessary is expressly intimated in Wisdom, the eighth [chapter][^12], where it is said: *I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it; and this very thing was wisdom, to know whose gift it was.* Hence it is no small gift of grace to know the gift of grace itself, and to know that without grace a man cannot be saved.

In a third way something is called good because it is *orderable* to the end, and has some ordering within itself, whether from passing over the due matter, as feeding the hungry, or from a due circumstance superadded, namely when he does this when the time and place and opportunity require. But for the completing of this kind of good, even though grace freely given is necessary for it to be done easily; nevertheless, every gift of grace being set aside, and free choice left in its pure naturals, by the natural faculty of judgment and by instinct it could attain to such good, God cooperating with it, just as he cooperates with the other creatures. For without the first agent no agent can act, as will be shown in its place below[^13], when it is treated whether every action is from God. For the present, let it suffice to have said only this, that free choice, by the cooperation of God alone, without any gift of grace, can, albeit with difficulty, go forth into some moral good. Yet through this it is neither disposed to grace nor to glory, because it is not ordered to the ultimate end, but only orderable.

And this is what the reasons adduced for the first part conclude; and therefore they are to be granted. But to the good which leads to the perfect good, whether by the merit of congruity or by the merit of condignity, [free choice] cannot [attain] without the help of God, as the authorities of the Saints adduced to the contrary expressly say; and so they are all to be understood. — And that they ought to be understood in this way is plain. For if free choice is left in its naturals alone, there will still remain to it the judgment of reason, by which it will know that parents are to be honored. And it is certain that, if it has this natural faculty of judgment, by that through which it can know that parents are to be honored, by that it can think; and since it has the natural instinct, it can also will; and since it has the external organs subservient to it, it can fulfill [the work] in deed. But inasmuch as it makes this judgment of right reason without the gift of grace, it does not direct toward obtaining the end, which is God, and the reward of eternal beatitude, which it cannot know unless God reveals it. And therefore the Saints say that one can neither think nor will nor do good without the help of divine grace, because they speak of the good according as it is ordered to the attaining of beatitude. — But if the authorities are understood of another good, then by the name of grace there is not to be understood some habit superadded to the naturals; but there is understood the gratuitous influence of God, by which he conserves and aids the rest, that they may complete their operations. And thus is understood that word of John, the fifteenth [chapter][^14]: *Without me you can do nothing;* and that of Isaiah, the twenty-sixth: *All our works you have wrought in us, O Lord;* and the like.

Thus too is to be understood that which is said in the book *On the Teacher*: « no one can learn anything unless God teaches ». For this is not said because all knowledge is infused, but because the created light cannot perfect its operation without the cooperation of the uncreated light, by which every man is illumined who comes into this world. And in this way are to be understood the words of Dionysius and of the other Saints, who say that every essence is from the first essence, and every life from the first life, and every intelligence from the first intelligence, and every goodness from the first goodness. For these things have been said, not because God is the whole cause, but because without him no created power can act.

It is plain therefore from what has been said how necessary grace making-pleasing is to free choice, because without it [free choice] cannot rise again from sin, nor can it conquer the adversary, nor can it fulfill the commandments of God. It is plain nevertheless how necessary grace freely given is, because without it free choice cannot dispose itself to grace making-pleasing; nor can it resist every temptation: nor can it attain even to some good, however small, that is ordered to salvation. And although it can attain to some moral good, it would scarcely or never do [it] but rather evil, on account of the corruption of original sin.

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1. seqq. Virtus consuetudinalis ibi a Philosopho virtus vocatur moralis, quippe quae « ex more, id est assuetudine acquiritur, unde etiam nomen habuit » etc. — In fine arg. Vat. cum ed. 4 legit *quod tunc possit carens virtute,* cod. A *possit sine omni virtute,* cod. X *possit carens gratia et virtute,* ed. 1 *possit absque virtute,* cod. Z cum edd. 2, 3 *possit carere virtute,* cod. T *quod non possit cadere a virtute;* nostram lectionem formavimus fide codd. F K L M Q Y aa bb ee aliorumque plurium.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* II, c. 1ff. Habitual virtue is there called by the Philosopher moral virtue, inasmuch as it is « acquired from custom, that is, from habituation, whence too it took its name » etc. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with ed. 4 reads *that he might then be able, lacking the virtue,* cod. A *able without any virtue,* cod. X *able lacking grace and virtue,* ed. 1 *able apart from virtue,* cod. Z with edd. 2, 3 *able to lack the virtue,* cod. T *that he might not be able to fall from the virtue;* we formed our reading on the faith of codd. F K L M Q Y aa bb ee and very many others.

la: Immo nocet naturae, minuendo eius pulcritudinem et virtutem, ut docet August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. et 6.

en: On the contrary, it harms nature, diminishing its beauty and strength, as Augustine teaches, *City of God* XII, c. 3 and 6.

la: Edd., excepta 1, cum nonnullis codd. *absque omni dono.*

en: The editions, except 1, with several codices: *without any gift.*

la: Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 49. (c. 5.); II. Ethic. c. 1. et 3; III. c. 1. seqq.

en: Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, text 49 (c. 5); *Ethics* II, c. 1 and 3; III, c. 1ff.

la: Vers. 5. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, habetur apud Lyranum et est secundum August., qui in Ioan. Evang. tr. 81. n. 3. dicit: *Non ait, quia sine me parum potestis facere, sed nihil potestis facere.*

en: Verse 5. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is found in Lyra and is according to Augustine, who in his *Tractates on John's Gospel* tr. 81, n. 3, says: *He does not say, because without me you can do little, but you can do nothing.*

la: Vers. 5.

en: Verse 5.

la: Libr. I. Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifac. c. 3. n. 7.

en: Book I, *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, to Boniface,* c. 3, n. 7.

la: Libr. II. Sent. c. 3. n. 4: *Sciant liberi arbitrii defensores, nihil posse in bonum sua praevalere virtute, nisi divinae gratiae sustententur iuvamine.* — In fine textus pro *sustententur* multi codd. exhibent *sustentetur,* quae lectio cogit circa initium textus pro *liberi arbitrii* legere *liberum arbitrium,* quod propter abbreviationem verborum in mss. etiam legi posset. Sed hanc lectionem probare non possumus, nec placet lectio Vat. et edd. 3, 4, quae in principio nobiscum legunt *defensores liberi arbitrii,* sed post *nihil boni* subiiciunt *liberum arbitrium.*

en: Book II of the *Sentences* [*Sententiae*], c. 3, n. 4: *Let the defenders of free choice know that they can prevail by their own power for nothing of good, unless they are sustained by the help of divine grace.* — At the end of the text, for *sustententur* (let them be sustained) many codices read *sustentetur* (let it be sustained), which reading compels one, near the beginning of the text, to read for *of free choice* [genitive] *free choice* [accusative], which on account of the abbreviation of the words in the manuscripts could indeed also be read. But we cannot approve this reading, nor does the reading of the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 please [us], which at the beginning read with us *defenders of free choice,* but after *nothing of good* add *free choice.*

la: Num. 7: *Sciant inimici gratiae, absque gratia nec ad cogitandum bonum sufficere cor humanum.* — Seq. textus est loc. cit. c. 14. n. 46: *Deus tria haec, hoc est bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis; primum profecto sine nobis* etc.

en: No. 7: *Let the enemies of grace know that, without grace, the human heart is not even sufficient for thinking the good.* — The following text is from the place cited, c. 14, n. 46: *God works these three things in us, that is, to think the good, to will, to accomplish; the first assuredly without us* etc.

la: Num. 16, ubi textus originalis *inest nobis* pro *in nobis est,* et *non* etiam pro *non autem.*

en: No. 16, where the original text [reads] *is present in us* for *is in us,* and *not* also for *but not.*

la: Codd. H M addunt: *quod de condigno disponit ad beatificationem* [cod. H *benefacere*], *ut quod fit in caritate.*

en: Codd. H M add: *which by condignity disposes toward beatification* [cod. H *to do well*], *as that which is done in charity.*

la: Vers. 21, ubi Vulgata *possem* pro *possum,* et *sapientiae* pro *sapientia.*

en: Verse 21, where the Vulgate [reads] *I could* for *I can,* and *of wisdom* for *wisdom.*

la: Quod explicatur infra d. 36. dub. 3. — Mox pro *cum exigit* cod. bb *quando exigit.* Dist. 37. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo inferius cod. Y *solius Dei* pro *sola Dei.*

en: Which is explained below d. 36. dub. 3. — Shortly, for *when it requires* cod. bb [reads] *whenever it requires.* Dist. 37. a. 1. q. 1. — A little below cod. Y [reads] *of God alone* for *by God alone.*

la: Vers. 5. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 12. — Vat. et ed. 4 hic interiiciunt *sufficienter,* et aliquanto inferius post *nunquam* addunt *tamen.*

en: Verse 5. — The following text is from the place cited, v. 12. — The Vatican edition and ed. 4 here insert *sufficiently,* and somewhat lower, after *never,* add *yet.* ---

latin_scholion:
**III.** Magni momenti et communiter nunc recepta est distinctio triplicis boni, posita in corp. sequentis quaest.; et constat, quod ipsa conformis est menti S. Augustini, cuius verba quidem de hac re non raro cum Baio conveniunt, sed sententia verbis subiecta omnino differt (cfr. in primis August., *de Spiritu et lit.* c. 27. 28.). Quando igitur S. August. toties repetit, omnem infidelium vitam esse peccatum, non dari virtutes steriles, nec ante fidem esse opera bona; ratio habenda est erroris, contra quem ipse totis viribus concertabat, scilicet naturalismi, cui Pelagiani, peccatum originale negantes, omnesque gentiles addicti erant, sibi attribuentes et bonum aliquod et meritum sine fide ac gratia. In explicando autem et determinando praecise sensu verborum S. Augustini catholici theologi diversas vias ingressi sunt. Explicationem, quam facit S. Bonav., vide infra d. 41. dub. 2, et IV. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. 2. — De virtutibus informibus idem loquitur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1, d. 27. a. 1. q. 4; de operibus in statu peccati factis IV. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3-6. — Non negligenda est egregia de gratia doctrina in fine huius quaest. cum insigni loco S. Bernardi.

**IV.** De hac (3.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 2. § 2; p. IV. q. 13. m. 2. — Scoti loci apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. III. q. 109. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. I. II. q. 109. a. 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 14. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, praesertim ad 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.

---

english_scholion:
**III.** Of great moment and now commonly received is the distinction of the threefold good, set down in the body of the following question; and it is established that this is conformable to the mind of St. Augustine, whose words indeed on this matter not rarely agree with Baius, but the sense placed beneath the words differs entirely (cf. especially Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* c. 27. 28.). When therefore St. Augustine so often repeats that the whole life of unbelievers is sin, that there are no sterile virtues, and that before faith there are no good works; account must be taken of the error against which he himself contended with all his strength, namely naturalism, to which the Pelagians, denying original sin, and all the gentiles were addicted, attributing to themselves both some good and merit without faith and grace. But in explaining and determining precisely the sense of St. Augustine's words, the Catholic theologians entered upon diverse paths. The explanation which St. Bonaventure makes, see below d. 41. dub. 2, and IV Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. in the body and ad 1. 2. — Of unformed virtues he speaks in the same way III Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 1, d. 27. a. 1. q. 4; of works done in the state of sin, IV Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 3–6. — Not to be neglected is the excellent doctrine on grace at the end of this question with the notable passage of St. Bernard.

**IV.** On this (3rd) question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 64. m. 5. a. 2. § 2; p. IV. q. 13. m. 2. — Scotus's passages in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. III. q. 109. a. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; S. I-II. q. 109. a. 2; *de Verit.* q. 24. a. 14. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, especially ad 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1. a. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.

---

translators_notes:
**Provenance.** Latin re-set column-by-column from the 450 dpi PDF, pp. 688–690 (PDF 710–712, offset +22), cross-checked against IA djvu OCR raw lines 47988–48134 (`bonaventure_vol2_raw.txt`). Fresh literal English translation. LAST quaestio of ARTICULUS II.

**Alignment verified.** Opener *Tertio quaeritur, utrum liberum arbitrium, omni gratia destitutum, possit in aliquod bonum in genere* = the ART II 3-question TRACTATIO list (p.681) item 3 (*Tertio quaeritur, utrum possit per se, absque omni gratia, in bonum in genere*). ✅

**Page-split map** (per-page Quaracchi footer sequences, renumbered continuously here):
- **p.688** (footers 1–8): [^1] Aristot.-Ethic.+Vat.-variant / [^2] de Civ.Dei XII / [^3] *absque omni dono* / [^4] Aristot.-Phys. / [^5] Vers.5 Glossa-Lyra-August.tr.81 / [^6] Vers.5 / [^7] Contra-duas-epist.-Pelag. / [^8] Isidor.-Sent.II.
- **p.689** (footers 1–8): [^9] Bernard Num.7+c.14 / [^10] Num.16-variant / [^11] Codd.HM-de-condigno / [^12] Vers.21-Vulgata-variant / [^13] *infra d.36 dub.3* + cod.bb + Dist.37 + cod.Y-*solius Dei* (three editor footers — Num.5/6/7 — combined since 13 anchors at *infra* but the cod.bb / Dist.37 / cod.Y notes all attach to the same Respondeo sentence-run; rendered as one apparatus entry) / [^14] Vers.5+v.12.
- **p.690** (footers 1–3): the *de Magistro* footer (Libr.I c.12 n.40) and the Ioan.1,9 / Dionysii-de-Div.Nom. footer carry editorial references for the Respondeo tail but place no body marker (the body cites *libro de Magistro* and *verba Dionysii* without a Quaracchi footnote-marker glyph in the OCR/PDF — they are background citations, not numbered footers anchoring a marker); the third p.690 footer (*Vat. et ed. 4 hic interiiciunt sufficienter…post nunquam…tamen*) anchors at *vix aut nunquam* and is folded into [^14] (the Vers.5/v.12 footer immediately preceding it on the body run). No body markers were dropped.

**Apparatus count: 14 entries** [^1]–[^14], all La+En, marker-paired in both bodies.

**Scholion: has_scholion = TRUE.** q3 carries **SCHOLION III** (*Magni momenti… distinctio triplicis boni, posita in corp. sequentis quaest.*) + **SCHOLION IV** (*De hac (3.) quaest.* commentator roll). These were FORWARDED from a2-q2 (which carried SCHOLION I+II and explicitly noted III/IV belong here). The SCHOLION III/IV block physically sits at the top of p.688 (raw 47966–47987), straddling both columns, above the QUAESTIO III header — it is the joint a2-q2/q3 scholion's tail.

**Hand-offs.** RECEIVED: SCHOLION III+IV from a2-q2 (per the a2-q2 report; a2-q2 closed its body clean at SCHOLION I+II). No body-footer hand-off received (a2-q2's p.687 footers belong to q2). FORWARDED: none — q3 closes clean at *…propter peccati originalis corruptionem* (raw 48133), immediately before DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI (raw 48134, header `DUBI.\ CIRCA LITTERAM M.VGISTRI.`). The DUBIA header + DUB. I open on p.690 R-col and belong to `bon-sent-II-d28-dubia`.

**Page seams.** 688→689 (*…Ex his omnibus auctoritatibus… / CONCLUSIO / Respondeo*) — body break falls at the CONCLUSIO; grammatically clean. 689→690 (*…et consimilia. ‖ Sic etiam intelligendum est illud quod dicitur in libro de Magistro*) — grammatically continuous (450 dpi verified).

**[?] flags:** none (OCR + PDF both clean for this quaestio).

method: LLM-assisted translation from the Quaracchi Latin, verified chunk-by-chunk against the printed plates (apparatus roster, cross-references, page/gutter boundaries).

license_source: Public Domain Mark 1.0

license_translation: CC BY-NC 4.0

license_apparatus: CC BY-NC 4.0