Pars 1, Cap. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/1/q/bon-brev-p1-c4
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### Chapter IV. *On the catholic expression of this faith.*

For the catholic expression of this faith also it must be held, according to the teachings of the holy Doctors, that in the divine there are two modes of *predicating*, namely by way of substance and of relation; three modes of *suppositing*, namely of essence, of person, and of notion; four modes of *signifying substance*, namely by the name of essence, of substance, of person, and of hypostasis; five modes of *saying*, namely *who* [*quis*], *which* [*qui*], *what things* [*quae*], *that which* [*quod*], and *what* [*quid*]; and three modes of *differing*, namely according to a different mode of *existing*, according to a different mode of *being disposed*, and according to a different mode of *understanding*.

The reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that belong to perfection are said of it properly and truly; but the things that belong to imperfection either are not said of it, or, if they are said, are said according to the assumption of human nature, or transferredly. Since, then, there are ten categories — namely *substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, position*, and *having* — the last five properly regard corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transsumptive and figurative mode. But the other five preceding are attributed to God according to that which they express of completion, yet in such a way that they do not impede the divine simplicity. All these categories, therefore, are that very thing which is that of which they are predicated; and thus, by comparison to the subject in which they are, all are said to pass over into substance — *relation* alone excepted; which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely as to the *subject in which* and as to the *term toward which*, in the first mode passes over, lest it produce composition, and in the second mode remains, that it may produce distinction. And hence it is that « substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity »; and therefore there remain in it only these two differing modes of predicating. — Concerning which this rule is given: that the things said according to *substance* are said of *all* and *severally and together and singularly*; but the things said according to *relation* either are not said of *all*, or, if of several, are said *plurally* — as *related, distinct, alike, equal* — on account of the intrinsic relation. But the name of trinity comprehends both.

And since there can be several relations in one person, just as there are several persons in one nature; therefore distinction in *notion* does not entail a diversification of person, nor does distinction of *person* entail a plurification of nature. And for that reason not whatever belongs to the essence belongs to the *notion* or to the *person*, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are in it three modes of *suppositing*; concerning which this rule is customarily given: the *essence* being supposited, neither notion nor person is supposited; and the *notion* being supposited, neither essence nor person is supposited; and the *person* being supposited, neither essence nor notion is supposited, as is clear from examples.

And since true distinction is in the supposits of substance, the essence remaining one; therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there in several ways, namely as *communicable* and *incommunicable*. As *communicable*, by way of *abstraction* through the name of *essence*, and by way of *concretion* through the name of *substance*; but as *incommunicable*, either as distinguishable through the name of *hypostasis*, or as distinct through the name of *person*. — Or otherwise, namely as *distinct in whatever way*, and thus *hypostasis*; or *notably and perfectly*, and thus *person*. — Examples of these four are found in the creature: *humanity, man, some man, Peter*; the first says *essence*, the second *substance*, the third *hypostasis*, and the fourth *person*.

And because in the person which is distinguished there is to be considered not only him *who* is distinguished, but also that *by which* he is distinguished — and this is the *property* or notion — therefore it is necessary that in the divine there be five modes of saying and likewise of asking: namely *who*, by reason of person; *which*, by reason of hypostasis, because it says a supposit of substance indistinctly; *what things*, by reason of notion; *that which*, by reason of substance; *what* or *by what*, by reason of essence.

And since all these modes are rooted in the unity of the essence, because whatever is in God is God himself, one and alone; therefore they do not posit a difference there, neither according to essence nor according to *being*. And for that reason there are in it only three modes of *differing*: namely according to modes of *being* or of emanating, as person differs from person; according to modes of *being disposed*, as person and essence differ — because one *person* is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished, whereas the *essence* is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished — and according to modes also of *understanding*, as one substantial property differs from another, as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in the divine; for it is in the supposits, so that one is not said of the other. — The second difference is *lesser*, because it is in the attributes; for although one can be said of the other, as person of essence, yet something is said of the one which is not said of the other — as: the person is distinguished and referred, but the essence is not. — But the third difference is the *least*, because it is in the connoted. For although one may be said of the other reciprocally, and the same may be said of both, yet the same is not connoted in both, nor is each given to be understood through the same. — From the first mode of differing arises the plurality of persons; from the second mode the plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third the plurality of essential properties and of notions — whether from eternity or from time; whether properly or transsumptively; whether commonly or by appropriation. The examples of what has been said are manifest. — These things being understood, it is sufficiently clear both what is to be thought and how one must speak concerning the supreme trinity of the divine persons.

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