Pars 1, Cap. 8
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/1/q/bon-brev-p1-c8
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### Chapter VIII. *On God's wisdom, predestination, and foreknowledge.*

Concerning the *wisdom* of God these things are to be held: namely, that the divine wisdom itself most clearly knows all things good and evil, past, present, and future, actual and possible, and through this things incomprehensible to us and infinite; yet in such a way that it is in no way diversified in itself, although it obtains diverse names. — For insofar as it is knowing of all possible things, it is called *knowledge* or cognition; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be in the universe, it is called *vision*; insofar as it is knowing of all things which come to be well, it is called *approval*; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are future, it is called *foreknowledge* or foresight; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be done by God himself, it is called *disposition*; insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be rewarded, it is called *predestination*; but insofar as it is knowing of those things which are to be damned, it is called *reprobation*.

And because it is not only *knowing*, but is also the *ground of knowing*, therefore, insofar as it is the ground of knowing all things known, it is called *light*; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things seen and approved, it is called *mirror*; insofar as it is the ground of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called *exemplar*; but insofar as it is the ground of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called the *book of life*. — It is therefore the *book of life* with respect to things as returning; *exemplar*, as going forth; *mirror*, as going; but *light* with respect to all. — Now to the *exemplar* pertain *idea, word, art*, and *account*: *idea*, according to the act of foreseeing; *word*, according to the act of proposing; *art*, according to the act of carrying through; *account*, according to the act of perfecting, because it adds the intention of the end. — But because all these are one in God, therefore one is frequently taken for another.

And although the divine wisdom obtains diverse words by reason of the diversity of the things known and connoted, it is nevertheless not diversified according to its intrinsic character. For it knows *contingent* things infallibly, *mutable* things immutably, *future* things presentially, *temporal* things eternally, *dependent* things independently, *created* things uncreatedly, *things other than itself* in itself and through itself. — And since it knows contingent things infallibly, the freedom and changeableness of the will stands together with predestination and foreknowledge.

Now the understanding and the reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle, by this very fact that it is first and highest, has a cognition at once *most simple* and *most perfect*: because *most perfect*, therefore it knows all things most distinctly under all the conditions which things have or can have; and on that account it knows future things to be future, and present things present; and it knows good things as to be approved, and evil things as to be reprobated: hence it is that it obtains diverse words, according to what has been said above.

But because the *perfection* of wisdom stands together with the *highest simplicity*, hence it is that it knows all things *other than itself* in itself and through itself; from which follows the second, that it knows *created* things uncreatedly; from which follows the third, that it knows *dependent* things independently; from which arises the fourth, that it knows *temporal* things eternally; from which the fifth, that it knows *future* things presentially; from which the sixth, that it knows *mutable* things immutably; from which the seventh, that it knows *contingent* things infallibly.

And thus *contingent* things, remaining contingent, are altogether infallible to the divine wisdom, both in contingents which lie under nature and in those which lie under the freedom of the human will. — Hence he who wishes to understand this truth — how the freedom of the created will stands together with the infallibility of eternal predestination — should proceed by resolution from this last through those seven degrees up to the first, namely that the first principle most perfectly knows all things through itself, which is the most certain truth; from which the rest of the aforesaid are infallibly concluded by reasoning.

Now just as the *certitude* of the divine cognition stands together with the contingency of the things known, because the divine wisdom is at once *most simple* and *most perfect*; so *unity* stands together with the multiformity of the accounts and ideas from the same cause. For because it is *most perfect*, therefore it knows universals and singulars most distinctly, and represents all those things most distinctly and most perfectly; and therefore it is said to have the accounts and ideas of individuals as likenesses expressing things most perfectly. — But because it is *most simple*, therefore all those likenesses are one in it. Hence, just as God produces all things in time *by one power* according to the entire integrity of things, so *by one truth* he expresses all things everlastingly. And just as in God most high and omnipotent the *active operation* is one according to the thing itself, yet several productions of things are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things produced; so the *truth* of the one act of understanding in God is one, yet several likenesses, ideas, and accounts are spoken of by reason of the plurality of things ideated, whether *existing*, or *future*, or *possible*. But these accounts or ideas, although they are one *truth* and *light* and *essence*, are nevertheless not said to be *one account* or idea. For *account* or idea is so called as being *toward another* according to the character of understanding. For it names the likeness of the thing known, which really stands on the side of God, although according to the character of understanding it seems to say something on the side of the thing ideated.

But if a likeness of this be sought in the creature, it must be said that this is *proper* to that exemplar; because, as has been said, it is at once *simple* and *infinite* and *most perfect*, and when this is understood beforehand, the rest become known consequently. For because that exemplar is *most simple and most perfect*, therefore it is pure act; but because it is *infinite and immense*, therefore it is outside every genus. And hence it is that, being one, it can be a likeness expressive of many.

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