Pars 2, Cap. 9
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/2/q/bon-brev-p2-c9
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### Chapter IX. *On the production of man as regards the spirit.*

After the corporeal and the incorporeal nature, some things are to be said about the nature composed of both — first on the side of the *mind*, second on the side of the *flesh*, third on the side of *the whole man*.

Concerning the *rational soul*, then, these things are to be held in sum according to sacred doctrine: namely, that it is a form *being*, *living*, *understanding* and *using freedom*. A form indeed *being*, not from itself nor of the divine nature, but brought into *being* by God from nothing through creation. — A form, moreover, *living*; not from an extrinsic nature, but by itself; not with a mortal life, but with a perpetual life. — A form indeed *understanding* not only a created but also « a creating essence », to whose image it was made through memory, intelligence and will. — A form likewise *using freedom*, because it is always free from *coercion*; from *misery* and *guilt*, however, it was free in the state of innocence, though not in the state of fallen nature; and this freedom from *coercion* is nothing other than the faculty of will and of reason, which are the principal powers of the soul.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: that since the first principle is *most blessed* and *most benevolent*, therefore by its supreme benevolence it communicates its own beatitude to the creature — not only to the *spiritual* and near creature, but also to the *corporeal* and far. To the *corporeal* and far, however, it communicates *mediately*, because « this is the law of the Godhead, that the lowest be led back to the highest through the middle ». And therefore it made beatifiable not only the angelic and separated spirit, but also the conjoined spirit, that

is, the human. The rational soul, therefore, is a *beatifiable form*. And because to arrive at the reward of beatitude is not glorious except through *merit*, and meriting does not *befall* except in that which is done voluntarily and freely: therefore it was fitting that *freedom of choice* be given to the rational soul by the removal of all *coercion*; for this belongs to the nature of the will, that it can in no way be *coerced*, although through guilt it be made *wretched* and a slave of sin.

Again, because a beatifiable form is capable of God through memory, intelligence and will — and this is to be to the image of the Trinity, on account of the unity in essence and the trinity in powers: therefore it was necessary that the soul be *understanding* God and all things, and through this stamped with the image of God. — And because nothing blessed can lose beatitude, nothing could be beatifiable unless it were incorruptible and immortal; it was necessary that the rational soul be living, of its own nature, with an immortal life.

Lastly, because everything that is beatifiable and immortal from another is mutable as regards *well-being* and incorruptible as regards *being*: therefore the soul neither is *from itself* nor is *of the divine nature*, because it is *mutable*; nor is it *produced from something* nor *generated through nature*, because it is *immortal* and incorruptible; and thus this form cannot be introduced into *being* through generation, because everything naturally generable is naturally corruptible. — From these things it appears how the end of beatitude imposes the necessity of the foresaid conditions upon the soul itself, which is ordered to beatitude.

But since, as beatifiable, it is immortal, therefore, when it is united to a mortal body, it can be separated from it; and through this it is not only a *form*, but also *a this-something*; and therefore it is united to the body not only as its *perfection*, but also as its *mover*; and so it perfects through essence that which it likewise moves through power. And since it gives not only *being*, but also *living* and *sensing* and *understanding*, therefore it has a *vegetative*, a *sensitive* and an *intellective* power — in such a way that through the *vegetative* power it generates, nourishes and increases: it generates as to *what*, nourishes as to *of what sort*, increases as to *how much*. — Through the *sensitive* it apprehends sensible things, retains the apprehended, composes and divides the retained: it *apprehends* indeed through the exterior sensitive power, which is fivefold according to a correspondence to the five principal bodies of the world; it *retains* through memory, it *composes* and *divides* through the imagination, which is the first collative power. — Through the *intellective*, however, it *discerns* the true, *flees* the evil and *seeks* the good: the true indeed it *discerns* through the rational [power], the evil it *repels* through the irascible, the good it *seeks* through the concupiscible.

Again, because the *discernment of the true* is cognition, and *flight* and *appetite* are affection: therefore the whole soul is divided into the *cognitive* and the *affective*.

Further, since the *cognition* of the true is twofold — either of the true as *true*, or of the true as *good*; and this either of the *eternal*, which is above the soul, or of the *temporal*, which is below — hence it is that the cognitive power, namely intellect and reason, is divided thus: that the *intellect* [is divided] into speculative and practical, and *reason* into a higher portion and a lower; which rather name diverse *offices* than diverse *powers*.

Lastly, since *appetite* can be borne toward something in two ways, namely according to *natural instinct*, or according to *deliberation* and choice: hence it is that the *affective* power is divided into the *natural* will and the *elective* will, which is properly called *will*. And since such an election is indifferent to either side, therefore it is from *free choice*. — And because this indifference arises from a preambular deliberation and a will adjoined, hence it is that *free choice* is a faculty of reason and of will; in such a way that, as Augustine says, it comprehends all the foresaid rational powers. For he says: « When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but assuredly of the whole ». For from the concurrence of those powers — of reason returning upon itself and of will accompanying it — there arises the integrity of freedom, which is the principle of merit, or of demerit, according to the election of good, or of evil.