Pars 3, Cap. 10
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/3/q/bon-brev-p3-c10
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### Chapter X. *On the origin and quality of the penal sins.*

Concerning the *penal* sins this is to be held: that although the evil of fault and the evil of penalty are diverse differentiae of evils, some things are nevertheless *sins* in such a way that they are also the *penalty* of sin. For in a *special* way those things are called *sins* and *penalties of sin* which have sorrow and sadness joined to them, such as envy, sloth and the like. — *Less specially* are called those which have joined to them either the mere depravation of nature, or ignominy — such as those things in respect of which a sinner is said to be *handed over to a reprobate sense*. — But *generally* are so called the sins which "are between the first apostasy and the last penalty of hell, and can be called both *sins* and the *penalty* of sin," according to what Gregory says: that crimes are avenged by crimes. — But although *sin* and the *penalty* of sin are called the same, it must nevertheless be held that every penalty, inasmuch as it is a *penalty*, is just and from God; but no *fault* is just, nor from God, but only from the free choice of the will. — And a penalty which is merely a penalty is *inflicted* by God; but the one which is a *fault*, or which inclines to fault, is either *contracted* or *enacted*.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since evil bespeaks a withdrawal from the first principle through this, that it harms a good; and it does not harm a good except by taking something away from the good; and a good consists in mode, species and order: there is no evil which is not destructive of mode, species and order. But order is twofold, namely the order of *nature* and the order of *justice*. The order of *nature* is in the *natural* good, the order of *justice* in the *moral* good; and because the *natural* good is in every nature, while the *moral* good has to consist in the will: therefore the order of *nature* is in every nature, but the order of *justice* consists in the elective will. And because the *will* "is an instrument moving itself," but *nature* is by no means such; hence it is that the order of *justice* is an order not only *made* but also *making*; whereas the order of *nature* is an order *made*. Since therefore evil can deprive of the order of *justice* and of the order of *nature*; hence it is that evil is twofold, namely of *fault* and of *penalty*.

Again, because the order of *justice* is a voluntary order; hence it is that "the evil of *fault* is a voluntary affection, but the evil of *penalty* is an involuntary affection."

Lastly, because the order of *justice*, which is in the will, is a *making* order; therefore "the evil of fault, which is the privation of it, is the evil which we do, and the evil of penalty is the evil which we suffer." And because there is no passion unless naturally an action precede; nor is there an action upon which some passion does not follow: hence it is that there is no *penalty* without a preceding merit of *fault*, and there is also no *fault* which some *penalty* does not accompany.

And since what we do is from ourselves, while what we suffer can be from ourselves and from others — as, for instance, from a higher or a lower cause: therefore, although every *fault* is from ourselves, not every *penalty* is from ourselves; rather, some is *enacted* by us, some *inflicted*, some *contracted*.

And because it is just that he who does what he ought not should suffer what he ought; therefore every penalty, inasmuch as it is a penalty, is just and from divine providence, because it is ordained to the fault and is ordinative of the fault itself.

But because that passion can be through the taking away of a *natural* good, or of a *moral* good together with the natural; hence it is that some penalty is *merely a penalty*, but some is *penalty and fault*; because the *moral* good, which is justice, is not taken away except through injustice, which is fault. — The first penalty, therefore, is from God both according as it is a *penalty* and according to that which it *is*: from God, I say, not as *instituting* but as *avenging*. But the second, since it is a fault, is not from God according to that which it *is*, but only as regards its *order*. And it is either *enacted*, if it follow upon the actual, or *contracted*, if it follow upon the original.

If, therefore, evil be taken properly, according as it is the privation of a natural good and an involuntary affection and the evil which we suffer; then it does not coincide with the evil of *fault* in one and the same thing, although it is annexed to it. But if it be taken *broadly*, so that whatever we suffer be called evil — whether from ourselves or from elsewhere, whether in nature or in the will — then they coincide *in the same thing*, but not *toward the same*, nor *according to the same*: because what is *fault* in itself is called the *penalty* of a preceding one; or: *fault* by reason of *action* is said to be *penalty* by reason of *passion*. — And thus it is clear how, to what extent, and why one and the same thing may be called both *sin* and the *penalty of sin*.

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