Pars 3, Cap. 8
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/3/q/bon-brev-p3-c8
----------------------------------------
### Chapter VIII. *On the origin of actual sins.*

After what has been said about the transmission of original sin, some things must be said about the *origin of actual sin*. — Concerning the *rise*, therefore, of *actual sin*, these things are to be held in summary: that actual sin draws its origin from the free will of each one, through *suggestion, delight, consent* and *operation*, according to that word of James, chapter one: *Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been consummated, begets death.* — But if *suggestion* and *delight* stop short of consent, the sin is *venial*. — If, however, consent and the deed follow in those things which are forbidden by the divine law, the sin is *mortal and consummated*. — But if it comes about in a middle way, so that the consent is without the deed — either because he *wills* to proceed to the deed but cannot, and then the will is reckoned for the fact, and he is no less culpable than if he were caught in the very act; or because he *does not will* to proceed to the deed, but wills inwardly to take pleasure in the delight, and then the *woman* eats but not the *man* — then, although the sin be not fully consummated, it is nevertheless to be counted among mortal sins, because, when the *woman* eats, the whole man deserves to be damned; which is to be understood chiefly in carnal sins.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this. Since *sin* means a withdrawal of the will from the first principle, inasmuch as the will is born to be moved *by it, according to it* and *for the sake of it*; every sin is a disorder of mind or of will, about which virtue and vice are apt to be. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. But that disorder is either so great that it *exterminates* the order of justice — and in this way it is called *mortal* sin, because it is apt to take away life, by separating it from God, through whom the just soul is quickened; or it is so slight that it *does not destroy* that order, but disturbs it in something — and then it is called *venial* sin, because from it we can quickly obtain pardon, for the reason that through it grace is not taken away, nor is enmity with God incurred. Now the order of justice is that the unchangeable good be preferred to the changeable good, that the honorable good be preferred to the useful, and that the will of God be preferred to one's own will, and that the judgment of right reason preside over sensuality. And since the law of God commands this order and forbids its opposite: when the *changeable good* is preferred to the eternal, and the *useful good* is preferred to the honorable, and *our own will* is preferred to the divine will, and the *sensual appetite* is preferred to right reason — then mortal sin is committed; of which Ambrose says that it is « the transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments ». And this is committed either when what the divine law commands is omitted, or when what it forbids is done; from which arises a twofold kind of sin, namely *offence of omission* and *offence of commission*.

But when the changeable good is loved more than it ought to be, yet is not preferred to the unchangeable; and usefulness is not preferred to honorableness; and our own will is loved more than it ought to be, yet in such a way that it is not preferred to the divine; and the flesh lusts, yet is not preferred to the judgment of right reason: then it is not mortal, but *venial*, because, although this be *beside* the law, it is nevertheless not directly *against* the law. But the sensual appetite is not preferred to right reason except when reason consents to it; and therefore *mortal* sin is not committed short of consent.

If, however, sensuality be moved inordinately, since that disorder inclines toward evil, even though reason does not consent, there is some sin, because in some manner it wounds the order of justice. — And because in the state of innocence sensuality was not moved except according to the motion of reason, therefore, while man stood, there could be no venial sin in him. — But now, because sensuality resists reason whether we will or not, therefore we must needs commit some venial sin through the first motions; which, although singly and one by one they can be avoided, yet all of them can in no way be guarded against; because they are *sins* in such a way that they are also *punishments of sin*: and therefore they are rightly called *venial*, because by that very fact they are worthy of pardon.

But because reason is not compelled to consent to these, if after the feeling of delight consent be given to the *deed*, then there is full consent, and thereby *consummated* sin, because it has come all the way to the *man* — that is, to the supreme part of reason, on which the fullness of consent depends.

But because consent is given not only to the *deed* but also to the *delight*, in which the lower portion follows sensuality: therefore, if in sensual delight reason succumbs to sensuality, the *woman* obeys the serpent, and thereby there comes about a subversion of right order, and so a subversion of justice; on account of which mortal sin is committed, though less grave — which is imputed not only to the *woman*, but also to the *man*, by whom the woman ought to have been checked and restrained, lest she obey the serpent. — And thus it is clear that in the perpetration of every actual sin there comes about some imitation of the first sin, according to the explanation of the pre-eminent Doctor, namely Augustine, in the twelfth book of *On the Trinity*.

---