Pars 4, Cap. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/5/d/4/q/bon-brev-p4-c2
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### Chapter II. *On the incarnation as regards the union of the natures.*

Now concerning the incarnate Word itself three things present themselves for our consideration, namely the *union of the natures*, the *fulness of the charisms* and the *endurance of the sufferings* for the redeeming of the human race. — Concerning the *union of the natures* these three things are to be considered for the understanding of the mystery of the incarnation, namely the *work*, the *mode* and the *time*.

Now concerning the *work* of the incarnation these things are to be held according to the Christian faith: that the incarnation is an operation of the Trinity, through which there comes about the assumption of flesh by the Deity and the union of the Deity with flesh; in such wise that the assumption is not only of sensible flesh, but also of the rational spirit according to the power of vegetating, of sensing and of understanding; and in such wise also that the union does not come about in a unity of *nature*, but of *person*, not of a *human* person, but of a *divine* one, not of the person *assumed*, but of the person *assuming*; not of *any* person whatever, but of the person *of the Word alone*; in which person so great a union comes about that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the son of man, and conversely — those things nevertheless excepted in which the union is expressed, or a negation is enclosed.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since the work of the incarnation is not only from the first principle inasmuch as it is effective in producing, but also inasmuch as it is reparative *by remedying, by making satisfaction* and *by reconciling*. Since therefore the incarnation, inasmuch as it names some effect, is from the first principle, which makes all things by reason of its highest power; and since substance, power and operation are united and in every way undivided in the three persons: hence it is that the operation of the incarnation must necessarily flow from the whole Trinity.

But because it is from the first principle inasmuch as it is reparative *by remedying*; and the whole human race had fallen and been vitiated, not only by reason of the soul, but also of the flesh: hence it is that it was necessary that the whole be assumed, so that the whole might be healed. — And since the part which is flesh is better known to us and stands further from God; in order that the naming might be more expressive, and the humiliation more greatly expressed, and the condescension more profoundly unfolded: hence it is that that work is named not *inanimation*, but *incarnation*.

Again, because it is from the first principle inasmuch as it is reparative *by making satisfaction*, and satisfaction is not made except by him who *is bound to* and *is able to*; and none *is bound to* but man, nor *is able to* but God: it behoved that in the satisfaction there should be at once a concurrence of both natures, the divine namely and the human. And because it is impossible that the divine nature should concur with another as a part toward the constitution of a third; nor that it should pass over into another nature, nor another nature into it, on account of its most perfect simplicity and immutability: hence it is that the Deity and the humanity are not united in a unity of *nature* nor of *accident*, and they are therefore united in a unity of *person* and of *hypostasis*. And since the divine nature can subsist in no supposit save in its own hypostasis; therefore that union cannot be in the hypostasis or person *of a man*, but *of God*; and through this, by that union the first principle in one of its hypostases made itself the supposit of the human nature: and so there is there only one personality and one personal unity, on the part namely of the one *assuming*.

Lastly, because it is from the first principle as it is reparative *by reconciling*; and the one reconciling is a mediator, and mediation properly befits the Son of God: therefore the incarnation too befits him. For it belongs to a mediator to be a *middle* between man and God, for the leading back of man to divine *knowledge*, to divine *conformity* and to divine *sonship*. But nothing more befits being a *middle* than a person who both produces and is produced, who is the middle of the three persons; and nothing more befits leading man back to divine *knowledge* than the Word, by which the Father declares himself, which is unitable to flesh, as a word also is to a voice; nothing likewise more befits leading back to divine *conformity* than him who is the image of the Father; nothing more befits leading back to *adoptive sonship* than the natural Son: and through this nothing more befits becoming the son of man than the Son of God himself.

Since therefore the Son of man and the Son of God are altogether the same by reason of the incarnation; and since « whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other »: hence it is that the communication of idioms necessarily comes about, unless there be a word in which some repugnance is enclosed; such as are those in which the respect of the union of one nature to the other is included, as *to unite, to be incarnate, to assume* and *to be assumed*; or the negation of something whose opposite belongs to the other, as *to begin* to be, *to be created* and the like — in which cases an instance is brought against the rule already laid down, for the reason aforesaid.

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