Coll. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/11/d/4/q/bon-hex-c4
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### COLLATION IV.
#### *On the first vision, which is that of the understanding implanted by nature: the first treatment.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; on the nine sciences of the philosophers; the light of the soul is truth, 1. — The three first rays of this light, namely the truth of things, of signs, of morals, 2. — A threefold consideration of this threefold truth confirms this division, 3–5. — Part I. On the first ray of the understanding implanted by nature, which is occupied about the truth of things. The world is considered in three ways: by the philosopher as to the essence of things, by the mathematician as to figure, by the natural philosopher as to nature, 6. — The philosopher's consideration proceeds in six modes; hence six lights, 7. — On each in particular, 8–13. — The mathematician's consideration; it is divided according to six objects into six sciences, 14, 15. — These dispose to theology, 16. — The natural philosopher's consideration; the books of Aristotle on natural science, 17. — Part II. On the second ray of the same understanding, which is occupied about the truth of signs or words. It is divided into grammar, logic and rhetoric, 18. — On the object and division of grammar, 19. — On the object and division of logic, 20. — On the object and division of rhetoric, 21–25.*

1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*, etc. In all the works of the six days, except the second, it is said: *God saw that it was good*; and at the end he says: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.* God is said to see, because he makes us see. The first vision of the soul is that *of the understanding implanted by nature*. Whence the Psalm says: *The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.* And here all the difficulties of philosophy could be explained. The philosophers gave nine sciences and promised to give a tenth, namely contemplation. But many philosophers, while they wished to separate themselves from the darkness of error, entangled themselves in great errors; for *saying that they were wise, they became fools*; growing proud of their knowledge, they became luciferian. Among the Egyptians there was *thickest darkness*, but *thy saints had very great light*. All who lived under the law of nature — Patriarchs, Prophets, philosophers — were sons of light. — The light of the soul is truth; this light *knows no setting*. For it shines upon the soul so strongly that it cannot even be thought not to be, nor be so expressed without a man contradicting himself: because if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth: therefore something is true; and if something is true, it is true that truth is: therefore if there is no truth, there is truth. For *truth prevaileth above all things*, as is said in Esdras.

2. Now this light sends forth three first rays; whence in Ecclesiasticus: *Threefold the sun burning the mountains.* For there is the *truth of things*, the *truth of signs* or *of words*, and the *truth of morals*. The truth of things is the indivision of the being and its to-be; the truth of speech is the adequation of the word and the understanding; the truth of morals is rectitude of living. And these are the three parts of philosophy, which the philosophers did not invent so that they should be, but which, since they already were according to truth, they observed in the soul, according to Augustine.

3. This threefold truth is considered on the side of the *originating principle*, on the side of the *receiving subject*, and on the side of the *terminating object*. Now the originating principle is regarded under the account of a threefold cause: *originating*, *exemplating* and *terminating*; for *of him, and by him, and in him are all things*. Therefore truth shows that our mind is borne by a natural inclination toward Truth, according as it is «the cause of being, the ground of understanding and the order of living»: according to the *cause of being*, the truth of things; according to the *ground of understanding*, the truth of words; according to the *order of living*, the truth of morals.

4. But on the side of the soul, every irradiation of truth upon our understanding comes about in three ways: either it falls upon it absolutely, and so pertains to the knowledge of things to be speculated; or in comparison to the *interpretative* power, and so it is the truth of words; or in comparison to the *affective* and *motive* power, and so it is the truth of things to be done.

5. On the side of the object, thus. Everything that is, is either from *nature*, or from *reason*, or from *will*. According to the first there is the knowledge which is of *things*; in the second mode, of *discourse*; in the third mode, of *morals*. — Therefore according to *principle*, *subject* and *object* there is a threefold ray of truth in the soul, by which the soul may be lifted up to things everlasting, and even to the cause of all; but if the seasoning of *faith* be added, then more easily; so that the cause of being is attributed to the Father, the ground of understanding to the Son, the order of living to the Holy Spirit.

6. The vision, then, of the understanding implanted by nature, as it is turned to *things*, is truth. And the soul wills that the whole world be described in it. The world is considered in three ways: as to *essence*, *figure*

and *nature*. And this ray directs one to considering the *hidden differences of quiddities*, the *manifest proportions of figures*, the *properties of natures mixed of both*. The natural philosopher's consideration is mixed, because now it is of causes, which are hidden — as why fire is hot, why this herb is hot, because they have this from their own species, which is hidden; now of quality, and likewise of quantity and of the influence of bodies, which sometimes lie open and sometimes lie hidden.

7. According to the hidden differences of quiddities the division is made, for the present, in six modes: into *substance* and *accident*, into *universal* and *particular*, into *potency* and *act*, into *one* and *many*, into *simple* and *composite*, into *cause* and *caused*. These are the six lights which dispose the soul to knowing and to right judgement.

8. The division of substance and accident is clear; but there are certain things which are reduced to these, and in them is the greatest error. That man says: creation is not. Why? Because it is impossible that an accident precede substance; but creation is an accident: therefore, etc. I say that creation, which is a being-acted-upon, is not an accident, because the relation of the creature to the Creator is not accidental but essential. Likewise the potency of matter is not an accident of matter but essential, because «by the very fact that it is, it is toward another». Likewise the differences are reduced to the genus, as mere privations to their habits.

9. The second division is into universal and particular; and about this there is a great error. Some say that the universal is nothing except in the soul; Plato held that it was only in God; others, that it is only in the soul. These abstract too much. — I say therefore that there is a universal *one toward many*, *one in many*, *one beside many*. The one toward many is in the potency of matter, which is not complete; the one in many, as a common nature in its particulars; and the one beside many, in the soul. But the one toward many and the one in many and the one beside many are in the eternal art; for it is through that art and ground that it subsists in the thing. For it is plain that two men are alike, and not a man and an ass: therefore it is necessary that that likeness be founded and made stable in some stable form, not one which is in the other, since that is particular: therefore in some universal. But the account of the universal is not wholly in the soul, but in the thing according to the procession of the genus to the species, as: we share first in substance as in the most general, then in the rest, down to the last form of man.

10. The third division is of potency and act; and here are many errors. Some say that *act* adds nothing over *potency* except a mode of being according to complete and incomplete. We are not speaking here of a purely passive potency, but of that which proceeds to act. For it is necessary, since in every creature an active potency is joined to a passive one, that those two potencies be founded upon different principles of the thing. Of the potency which is the *seminal ground*, this is the force: that such a potency sometimes adds to act a part of being, or of the essence — as, over the account of body it adds *the ensouled* really, in that ensouling is something, ordered however to the sensitive; and over the ensouled it adds *the sen-*

*sitive*, and so on up to man. So likewise of the powers of the soul: that as the tetragon adds one angle to the trigon, and the pentagon to the tetragon, so the *sensitive* to the *vegetative*, and the *rational* to the *sensitive*. — But sometimes it adds only a mode of being: as, if from one in potency there comes to be one in act, it adds only a mode of being, because the one is not joined to matter simply, but to matter having life in a radical potency. — Whence it is madness to say that the last form is added to prime matter without anything that is a disposition or a potency toward it, or with no form interposed.

11. The fourth division is into one and many, and about it there are many errors. Some have said that all things are one; that as there is one matter, so there is one radical form, and afterwards it is multiplied according to the *mode of being* and varied. And this is nothing else than to say that the proposition *a man is an ass* is true of itself and false by accident. Whence understand that *rational* and *irrational* differ not only by accident but also essentially.

12. The fifth division is into simple and composite; and here too there are many errors, as to say that some creature is simple — because then it would be pure act, which belongs to God alone; and to attribute to a creature what is God's is dangerous. It is therefore less dangerous to say that an Angel is *composite*, even if it be not true, than that it is *simple*; because I attribute this to the Angel unwilling to attribute to it what is God's, out of the piety I have toward the reverence of God. But according to truth it seems thus, because Boethius says: «A form cannot be a subject»: therefore nothing would then happen to an Angel, neither gladness nor sorrow.

13. The sixth division is into cause and caused; and here are many errors. For some say that the world was from eternity. In this the wise agree, that nothing can come to be from nothing and thus from eternity; because it is necessary that, just as when a thing passes into nothing it ceases to be, so when it comes to be from nothing it begins to be. But some seem to have held matter to be unbegotten; and so it follows that God makes nothing: because he does not make matter, since it is unbegotten; nor form, since it comes to be either from something or from nothing; not from matter, because the essence of the form cannot come to be from the essence of matter; nor from nothing, as they suppose, since God can make nothing from nothing. But far be it that the power of God should be propped on the foundation of matter. — These, then, are the foundations of faith, which examines them all.

14. The second irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward considering the *manifest proportions of quantities*; and these are very manifest, because they offer themselves to sense; and a man gladly busies himself about them, because they fall under imagination; and imagination is strong in us, and reason is darkened: and therefore a man is much detained in them. This science is most certain, because it is clear to the eye. Whence all the other sciences besides this are as it were hidden.

15. This mathematical consideration is about six things: either about numbers in their purity, and so it is *arithmetic*; or about numbers as they are considered in sounds, and so *music*; or in continuous quantity and about dimensive proportions generally, and so *geometry*; or by an addition concerning the visual line, and so *perspective*; or according to both quantities and according to numerical and substantial distinctions, or continuous and discrete, and so *astrology* — and that is twofold: one about bodies regulated by motion, and so *astronomy*; the other about influence, and this is partly safe and partly dangerous, and this is *astrology*. It is dangerous on account of the judgements which follow; and from it flows *geomancy*, or *necromancy* and the other kinds of divination.

16. These sciences dispose one to the understanding of Scripture, as is clear from the *perfect*, *deficient* and *excessive* numbers; as is clear from the perfection of the number six, which is of itself perfect. «For not», as Augustine says, «is the number six perfect because in that number God made the world; but he therefore made the world in that number, because it is perfect». Likewise of the two first cubic numbers, namely 8 and 27, because twice two twice is 8; three times three three times is 27, which cannot be

bound by fewer than two numbers, namely 12 and 18. For 12 is to 18 as 18 is to 27, being in the *sesquialter proportion*, which holds the whole and its half. — Likewise it is clear from the triangle how it leads into the knowledge of the Trinity. For it is certain that as great as the Son is, so great is the Father; and as great as the Father is, so great is the Holy Spirit and the Son. And thence consider the triangle, that any angle includes the whole surface. — Likewise in *perspective*, of the *direct* ray, which is stronger: as, if thou cast a stone straight downward, it makes a great sound; but if obliquely, not so much. The *reflected* ray is from a body wiped and polished by the power of the wiping, and there it takes on the species; the *refracted* ray is at the entry into another transparent body.

17. The third irradiation of the understanding implanted by nature is toward investigating the *mixed properties of natures*, that is, partly hidden and partly manifest. For the philosopher considers all things through motion; he considers motion, the principles and causes of motion, such as place and time; and he considers the natures of the heavenly bodies, that is, ethereal, meteoric bodies; elemental, vegetable, sensible, rational. — Heavenly things, in the book *On the Heavens and the World*, where he reduces all motion to the perfect motion, namely local; and that local motion is threefold: either about the middle, where there is no contrariety, and so circular; or from the middle, and so it is the motion of light things; or to the middle, and so the motion of heavy things, that is, straight motion. Meteoric things, as in the book of the *Meteorology*, where he speaks of impressions and minerals. — If of elemental things, so in the book *On Generation and Corruption*. If of vegetable things, so in the book *On Plants*, where there are wonderful considerations. — But if of sensible things, so in the book *On Animals*, which we do not have entire; or of rational things, as in the book *On the Soul* with its appendices, namely *On Sense and the Sensed*, and *On Memory and Recollection*, *On the Spirit and the Soul*, *On Sleep and Waking*, *On Death and Life*.

18. The second ray of truth forms one toward the consideration of *utterances*, *argumentations*, *persuasions* of reason, so that a man may have through it an art toward *utterances congruously indicating the mind's conceptions*, toward *argumentations drawing all the mind's assents*, toward *persuasions inclining the mind's affections*. For reason thinks to make in another whatever is in itself, and to make in itself whatever is in another; and this comes about only through *speech*. Whatever therefore is in the soul is either by way of *conception*, or by way of *assent*, or by way of *affection*. For indicating the conception there is *grammar*; for inducing assent there is *logic*; for inclining the affection, *rhetoric*.

19. According to the grammarian every part of speech signifies a conception of the mind. For it has a part signifying substance and quality, and so it is the *noun*; it has a part signifying mode, and so it is the *verb*, which states inclinations, namely the *indicative*, as in the rational power; the *imperative*, as in the irascible; the *optative*, as in the concupiscible; the *subjunctive*, as in both; the *infinitive*, as it were material. And to these differences all are reduced, according to Priscian. — Likewise he determines about the *letter*, the *syllable*, the *word*, the *sentence*. For since the modes of signifying and of terminating are various according to the various languages — as a word ending in *a* is of the feminine gender for the most part, in *us* of the masculine, and so of the rest — he determines about the letter; but to this he cannot descend except through the syllable. — Last he considers the connexion of words. He determines likewise about *prosody* and *syntax*. And he expresses everything through the eight parts of speech. To the letter, then, he descends through the syllable; but afterwards what concerns prosody and metre and the like is referred back to the first. He considers likewise the moods and accidents: as that the nominative be construed with a verb of singular number, so that one does not say *a man run*, because from one substance there goes forth but one act; likewise, that after a transitive verb the nominative be not put, but the accusative, which states the term and not the principle of the act, as the nominative does. — Whence grammar draws its nature from things, nor can a man be a good grammarian unless he knows things.

20. Another direction is that which enlightens toward *argumentations inducing the mind's assent*, which comes about through solid argumentation, as: «whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are necessarily the same as one another». This argumentation has a general and a special form in necessary, solid matter; and therefore there is the *first analysis* and the *second analysis* concerning the syllogism simply. Of the necessary syllogism, that is, the one resolving into the cause of inferring, as in the first ana-

lysis, that is, resolution; and in the *second analysis*, that is, resolution into the cause of inferring and of being. — And because there cannot always be an induction by necessary argumentation, therefore *topics* and topical relation are found, which proceeds by *probabilities*, as the *topical places*; and because deception falls in these, the *sophistical places* are added, so that a man may know how to unravel them. Whence he who unravels is not a sophist, but a true respondent. And because these modes draw their origin from the nature of things — as is clear: *there is smoke: therefore there has been fire*; the topic from effect — therefore the *ten categories* are added, and the *enunciations* also.

21. The third irradiation is that by which the mind is enlightened toward persuading or inclining the mind; this is done through *rhetoric*. Whence the rhetorician must provide for civil usefulness, where there can be danger through dissension of minds. And it proceeds according to three attributes and a threefold kind of cause, namely the *demonstrative*, the *deliberative* and the *judicial*.

22. The *demonstrative* is of a person, as toward praise or blame: therefore either the praise is as to the goods of the *soul*, which are three, namely virtue, knowledge, truth; or the praise is as to the *body*, namely beauty, strength, etc.; or of the goods of *fortune*, as riches, kindred, country.

23. The *deliberative* is in respect of a thing to be done, and then persuasion is used if there is *safety*, *usefulness*, *honourableness*; or one is persuaded that it not be done, if *loss*, *danger*, *dishonour* follow.

24. The *judicial* kind answers to a thing done, which has its *constitution*, its *conjecture*, its *lawful doubt*. The *juridical* constitution is: «Didst thou do it? I did not»; which by others is called the *joining of issue*. The *conjectural* is when something is brought forward for proof. The *lawful doubt* of the juridical kind is the juridical description, when the deed is granted, but he defends himself as not guilty, either because he could do it by his master's command, or because he ought.

25. But for a man to be a powerful orator it is necessary that he have an *exordium* for winning goodwill, not too long, not obscure, not far-fetched; that he have a *narration*, so that he may narrate the deed; then that he *divide* the matter, and let him beware of a multitude of parts. Then let him *confirm* his own side by reasons; then let him *confute* the adversary and show his reasons frivolous; then let him *conclude*. Likewise it is necessary that he have *invention*, *disposition*, *elocution*, *memory* and *delivery*.

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