Coll. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/11/d/5/q/bon-hex-c5
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### COLLATION V.
#### *On the first vision, the second treatment, which is on the third ray or on the truth of morals, and on the wisdom of contemplation.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; a recapitulation of the preceding collation; the division of the third ray, which is of the truth of morals and gives light for three things to be comprehended, 1. — Part I. On the comprehension of the modesties as regards the exercises of custom; six means are chosen, 2. — First, on temperance, 3-5. — Second, on munificence, 6. — Third, on fortitude, 7. — Fourth, on meekness, 8. — Fifth, on benignity, 9. — Sixth, on magnanimity, 10. — These six remove vices, 11. — Part II. On the comprehension of the industries as regards intellectual speculations. These are knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding; the twofold division of speculation, 12. — On each of them, 13. — Part III. On the comprehension of the moral justices as regards political laws. This is attended to under four heads, 14. — First, as regards the rite of worshipping God in sacrifice and in praise, 15-17. — Second, as regards the form of living together, 18. — Third, as regards the norm of presiding, 19. — Fourth, as regards the censure of judging, 20. — The abuse of these nine sciences, 21. — Epilogue and recapitulation, 22. — Part IV. On the wisdom promised by the philosophers, wherein the light is divided from the darkness. The threefold conversion, 23. — The first step, the conversion of the soul upon itself; the soul's three powers and six operations, 24. 25. — The second step, the conversion upon the spiritual Intelligences, which are lights and mirrors, together with their lowest, middle and supreme powers, 26. 27. — The third step, the conversion upon the eternal grounds, 28. — This comes about in three ways: first by reasoning, 29. — Second, by experiencing, 30. — Third, by understanding, 31. — On these three, 32. — Epilogue, 33.*

1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*, etc. It has been said that the intellectual light is truth, which shines upon the understanding, whether human or angelic; and it irradiates inextinguishably, because it cannot be thought not to be. Now it irradiates something in three ways: as the truth

*of things*, as the truth *of words*, as the truth *of morals*: as the truth *of things* is the indivision of the being and its to-be, as the truth *of words* is the adequation of word and understanding, as the truth *of morals* is the rectitude of living. Which is clear from the side of the *principle* that irradiates; from the side of the *subject* that receives the irradiation; from the side of the *object* toward which it irradiates. Inasmuch as this light is the *cause of being*, it is a *great* light; inasmuch as it is the *ground of understanding*, it is a *clear* light; inasmuch as it is the *order of living*, it is a *good* light; *God saw*, he says, *the light, that it was good.* — As a *great* light it irradiates unto the comprehension of the *substances* or *essences*, the *figures* and the *natures* of the world; as a *clear* light it irradiates unto the comprehension of *locutions*, *argumentations*, rational *persuasions*; as a *good* light it irradiates upon the understanding, or gives light unto the comprehension of the *modesties*, the *industries*, the *justices*: unto the comprehension of the *modesties* as regards the *exercises of custom*; unto the comprehension of the *industries* as regards *intellectual speculations*; unto the comprehension of the *justices* as regards *political laws*. First *modesty* is to be had, second *industry* is to be sought out, third *justice* is to be exercised. — And here it is shown what sort of man a prelate ought to be, namely that, perfect in action and in contemplation, he ought to receive the laws. Where? On the mountain of contemplation with Moses, that he may be *modest* and *industrious*, not bestial, since such a one cannot ascend the mountain; for *the beast that shall touch the mountain shall be stoned.*

2. First, then, it irradiates or gives light unto comprehension as regards the *exercise of the customary virtues*. Hence the Philosopher posits twelve means: *fortitude* about fears and daring; *temperance* about delights and sorrows; *liberality* about middling gifts; *magnificence* about great gifts; *magnanimity* about the appetite for great honours; *philotimy* about middling ones; *meekness* about angers; *truthfulness* about locutions; *eutrapelia* about the delight of play; *friendship*, and the two means of the passions, namely *shamefastness* and *nemesis*, which is to injure no one and to profit someone. Now out of these let us choose six chief ones, namely first *temperance*, second *munificence*, third *fortitude*, fourth *meekness*, fifth *benignity*, sixth *magnanimity*.

3. First one must begin from *temperance*. This is necessary first of all; for a man is not tempted straightway by the fear of death, but straightway, when he is born, by delight in respect of taste; whence a boy seeks what is sweet in respect of *taste*, and afterwards what is delightful in respect of *touch*, when he is grown. This passion, *coeval* with us, which begins in boys and ends in old men, must first be tamed; the one is *concupiscence*, the other is *cupidity*. For a boy first desires to eat, afterwards money; whence he takes a wonderful delight in it, and if you offer a boy bread and a penny, he takes the penny and leaves the bread. This infects men; for they covet *to have* and *to keep*. To *prize* these things as most happy is an evil, to *spurn* them as execrable is an evil.

4. Some say: those who are wholly poor do not hold the mean. I answer: nay, they truly hold the mean. For this mean is not about *things*, but about the *appetite of the soul*. For if you *desire* these things that you may *be sustained* by your own or by another's, you hold the mean; but if you *prize* them, so that happiness lies in them, that is the one extreme; if you *spurn* them as profane, that is the other extreme — as the Manichees hold it profane to lie with a woman, whether with a wife or with another. Likewise they used to say that a man can have nothing at all. And Augustine says that this was not a *precept*, although the Lord said to the Apostles: *Take nothing for the way.* The mean, therefore, is *to be sustained* either by one's own or by another's.

5. And blessed Francis used to say that « a poor man can be more bountiful than a rich one: because the rich man, if he gives whatever he has, will fail and is confounded; but if he does not give, since he has it — granted that he would be willing to give if it did not fail him — the will is good, but it is not reckoned to him for the deed, because he still has substance. But to a poor man, who has nothing, if he would be willing to give to a poor man, and

has nothing that he might give; and would be willing to build hospitals, yet has not the wherewithal; the will is reckoned for the deed ». — But as for what they say, that the excessively poor do not hold the mean, it is like what a certain physician of Frederick's used to say, who said that he who abstained from every woman was not virtuous nor held the mean. And from this it follows that, if to know every woman and to know no woman are the *extremes*, then to know the half of all women is the *mean*.

6. This *cupidity* must be tamed by *munificence*, which comprehends within itself largesse and magnificence. This is the *fountain* that pours back its waters; a fountain does not keep its waters within itself. According to the Philosopher it is difficult to be perfectly cured of this, because it is exceedingly delightful, since a man reckons himself great, and others so reckon him. If a man is lustful, his brain aches; but in riches a man takes delight, because there is presumption and repute in them. — Hence this cupidity infected Giezi, and he was made a leper, because he ran after Naaman; and this the simoniacs today reckon a great courtesy. Simon Magus came and said to Peter: Take of the money; I have enough; and give me that by the imposition of the hand I may be able to give the Holy Spirit; but Peter did not reckon it a courtesy nor did he have patience: *Thy money*, he said, *be with thee unto perdition.*

7. The third mean is *fortitude*, which is about fears and daring. This is necessary for a man, that he be not faint-hearted, nor rash, but may endure terrible things and be ready even to die. For some fall into cowardice and faint-heartedness. Hence Job: *Is my strength the strength of stones, or is my flesh of brass?* For fortitude is in the soul, not in the flesh. *The patient man is better than the arrogant*; and in Proverbs: *The patient man is better than the valiant, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities.* Hence a spiritual man ought greatly to beware of sadness.

8. This virtue makes the soul noble; but because the brave man sometimes disdains others, therefore *meekness* is necessary, which is against irascibilities and angers — not that a man should not be angry at all, but where he ought and when he ought. Hence he ought to have both the face of a *man* and the face of a *lion*. — Yet sometimes you think a man meek who keeps silent while another sins; this is not meekness. Hear, then: it is said of Jesus that *he troubled himself* and made *a scourge of little cords*. Hence in the first book of Maccabees: *Woe is me, wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and of the saints?* Hence Christ is a *lamb* and a *lion*.

9. The fifth mean is *benignity*, or nemesis, or friendship, which has nothing of malignity, but a man wills the good to another man; and it is needful that here reason should *direct*. Although the Philosopher says that one ought to do good to friends and evil to enemies, Christ nevertheless says that every man is to be loved, and that to every man useful things, not harmful, are to be conferred. If I love you and give you either a dignity or a liberty, and you use it ill — if I give it to you, I am not benign, but rather malignant; and therefore I shall not give it to you, that I may be benign. I have a friend, I have an enemy; the friend will use some prelacy or dignity ill, to his own harm and the commonwealth's; if I give it to him, I am not benign. My enemy, on the contrary, will use it well; I shall give it to him and shall make my own good out of his evil. A father does not flatter his son nor speak a sweet word to him, lest he grow proud. The world today knows nothing of this benignity; whence *the whole world is seated in wickedness*, because a man loves nothing but his private good.

10. The sixth mean is *magnanimity*, that great things may be prized and vile things despised. This is humility, which despises the things that appear great and prizes those that seem small, yet are truly great. The Philosopher says that the magnanimous man is in the appetite of *honour*; whatever he himself may say, truth does not teach this, save when the honour is of *eternal* things. But on the contrary some prize one most worthless bit of someone's praise, although truth tells them inwardly in their mind that the man is most wicked and worthless; and thereupon he exalts himself!

11. These six means suffice; for certain others are *unnamed*. And these the Philosopher

sets down plainly, and in them reason is laid under the truth of faith. These means remove vices, whether carnal or spiritual: as *temperance* removes gluttony and lust; *munificence*, avarice, cupidity, rapacity; *fortitude*, sloth, cowardice, laziness; *meekness*, wrath, hatred, impatience; *benignity*, envy; *magnanimity*, pride, arrogance, vanity, boasting.

12. The second ray of truth gives light unto the comprehension of the *industries* according to *intellectual speculations*. These are five: *knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding*. — Now speculation either *stands still in itself*, or *passes over into affection* and *effect*. The first mode does not belong to the moral part, but is rather the logician's; the second, however, does regard it, because it is virtuous; and therefore, since the speculative man readily becomes practical, from a speculative man one easily becomes a virtuous one.

13. Knowledge, then, passing over into *affection* is *wisdom*, which is « the cognition of the highest causes and through the highest causes ». — But knowledge passing over into an extrinsic *effect* is *art*, which is « a habit productive with reason », and here knowledge is joined with the maker, an affection nevertheless going before. The middle between these is *choice*, which is joined to the affection and is ordered to the work. For what a man chooses he loves and chooses unto a work; and this is *prudence*, which is midway between wisdom and art. *Understanding*, however, lies in *ascending* from prudence to wisdom, which is the cognition of principles and of certain rules. — It is likewise necessary to *descend* to *art* through *knowledge*. A surgeon, unless he has the physician's rule, kills a man — as if he should lance one who is disposed to a fever. — He used also to say of a certain mathematician who made excellent bells, and made them according to musical proportions; yet he had had these from a certain musician, who had given him the form both of the length and of the thickness, and a hammer proportioned for striking. — Nor is it to be understood, because it is said that certain virtues are *intellectual* and certain *customary*, that on this account the virtues are in any part *other* than in the *rational*, since the essence of every virtue is in the rational; but some are in the rational according to itself and according as it is *speculative*, and others according as it is the *governess* of the outer man.

14. The third ray of truth gives light unto the *moral justices* according to the dictate of *political laws*. Here I ought to speak neither as a theologian nor as a jurist, but as a philosopher speaks. This comprehension is about four things. No one of the philosophers gave this whole, but if it be gathered out of many, something will come of it. — Now it is attended to as regards the *rite of worship*, as regards the *form of living together*, as regards the *norm of presiding*, as regards the *censure of judging*. To the *censure of judging* one does not come save through the *norm of presiding*; nor to the *norm of presiding* save through the *form of living together*; nor to *this* save through the *first*.

15. All the true philosophers worshipped one God. Hence even Socrates, because he forbade sacrifice to be made to Apollo, was put to death, since he worshipped one God. It is true that Plato urged flight upon him. « Far be it, said Socrates, that I should deny the truth which I have asserted »; and therefore Plato was not present at his death, blushing that he had urged flight upon him. The worship of God *is the piety of faith*. Hence Tullius says that *piety* consists in the worship of the gods. What he says — *of the gods* — is not pleasing. Scripture never calls the Angels gods, lest they be venerated as gods, but *men* are called gods: *God hath stood in the synagogue of gods*, that is, of men, not of Angels. Now the worship of God consists in *praise* and in *sacrifice*.

16. As to how sacrifice was introduced, it appears that by *faith* Abel offered sacrifice, and *Noe*, of whom it is said: *The Lord smelled a sweet savour.* And these sacrifices signified the sacrifice of Christ, which he made on the cross; and therefore *the Lord* is said *to smell*, in that God was appeased through the death of the Only-begotten. — But the demons, because of their pride, wish to be worshipped as God, that they may have on earth what they could not have in heaven; and because thereby men are most of all estranged from God. — He offers the Blood of Christ who makes such sacrifices, in that it was poured out to appease the Father.

17. But the *sacrifice of praise* the natural judicatory in the heart dictates, and it is of the dictate of nature; and

in this all the true philosophers agreed. Hence that man says that « whoever doubts whether parents are to be honoured and God to be venerated is worthy of punishment ».

18. The second mode is the *form of living together*, thus: « What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another ». This is written in the heart by the eternal law. Out of this natural law flow laws and canons, fair burgeonings. But what then? You do not wish to be hanged, and you hang the thief? It must be said that the thief ought rather to be hanged than that the commonwealth be harmed; Jonas gave sentence against himself, that he should be cast into the sea.

19. The third is the *norm of presiding*, that is, how a prince ought to bear himself toward the people, and conversely. And this flows from the first truth: because the people ought to stand by him who punishes and avenges; the prince ought not to seek his own advantage, but the commonwealth's. The Philosopher says that a tyrant and a prince differ: the tyrant seeks his own advantage, like Herod, who, fearing to be deprived of his kingdom, raged against the little children; but the prince intends the common advantage. Yet today there is a great abomination among those who preside, since a steersman is not set over a ship unless he has the art of steering; how then is that man set over the commonwealth who does not know how to rule? Hence when men preside by *succession*, the commonwealth is ill ruled. David was most holy; Solomon, though most slippery, was nevertheless wise; Roboam was a fool, since he divided the kingdom. The Romans by the devil's art chose Diocletian. They were to choose the man eating at an iron table, and they found him eating upon a ploughshare; and he afterwards did many evils. Hence as long as the Romans *chose* those who were to preside, they chose the wisest; and then the commonwealth was well governed; but after they came to *succession*, the whole was destroyed.

20. The last is the *censure of judging*, that a man may know what is to be judged about any matter whatever, which regards *persons*, *things*, and the *manner of acting*. All these flow from the first truth.

21. But in all these reason has run riot; *metaphysics* has run riot: because certain men posited the world to be eternal, since, if the cause is eternal, so is the effect; and these judged ill of the first cause. Likewise the *mathematicians* first knew numbers, and afterwards came to influences and the secrets of hearts. The *natural philosophers* had knowledge both of bodies and of minerals, and said: « Art imitates nature »; and we know the secrets of nature: therefore we shall make you gold and silver. Likewise the *grammarians* with their poems and fables held the whole world, until the Saints came against them. Likewise the *logicians* with their sophisms and their false positions made the world go mad. Likewise the *rhetoricians* so delighted in the colour of speech that they said the kingdom of God was nothing else; yet it has now been taken out of the way. The *moral art* has not so run riot, because it does not stand in speculation alone; but the *science of law* runs riot exceedingly for the sake of gain; and cases which ought to be brought to an end by law are now, through pleading and the subtlety of law, made immortal, although the intention of law is to cut cases short.

22. These are the nine lights that give light to the soul, namely the truth *of things, of words, of morals*: *of things*, namely of *essences, figures, natures* — as regards the hidden *differences of quiddities*, as regards the manifest *proportions of quantities*, as regards the mixed *properties of natures*. First metaphysics, second mathematics, third natural science or physics. — The truth *of words* in three ways: as regards *locutions, argumentations, persuasions*; first, as regards *locutions indicating the mind's concepts*; second, as regards *argumentations drawing the mind's assent*; third, as regards *persuasions inclining the mind's affections*; the first is grammar, the second logic, the third rhetoric. — The truth *of morals* in three ways: as regards the *modesties, industries, justices*: the *modesties*, as regards the *exercises of custom*; the *industries*, as regards *intellectual speculations*; the *justices*, as regards *political laws*. The first is the virtue of *custom*, the second the *intellectual* virtue, the third the virtue of *justice*. — These nine sciences the philosophers gave, and they were enlightened. *For God revealed it to them*. Afterwards they wished to come through to *wisdom*, and the truth was drawing them; and they promised to give wisdom, that is, beatitude, that is, the *acquired intellect*; *they promised*, I say, to their disciples.

23. The fourth consideration, then, is how they came to this, in which *the light was separated from the darkness*; for by separating themselves from the darkness they turned themselves to the light. But this comes about thus: that the soul turn itself first upon *itself*; second, upon the *spiritual Intelligences*; third, upon the *eternal grounds*.

24. First, then, one must consider *oneself*, not as the eye of the flesh, which does not see itself save by a certain reflection from a mirror, but as the eye of the mind, which first sees *itself* and afterwards *other things*. But for this

it is needful that it turn itself upon its *powers* and upon its *acts*. For the soul has three powers: the *animal*, the *intellectual*, the *divine*, according to the threefold eye: *of the flesh, of reason, of contemplation*. The first is vigorous, the second is dim, the third is blinded. — The *animal* power is twofold: either toward the objects of the *particular senses* and of the *common sense*, or toward the *phantasms of sensible things*, and thus there is *sense* and *imagination*. — The *intellectual* also is twofold: either as it considers universal *abstract grounds*, as it abstracts from place, time and dimension; or as it is raised to *separate spiritual substances*; and thus there are two powers, namely *reason* and *intellect*: by reason it *compares*, by intellect it *knows itself* and the *spiritual substances*; and then it thrusts itself in among the Intelligences, and then it enters their aeviternity. — Likewise the *divine* operation or power is twofold: one which turns itself to beholding the divine *spectacles*; another which turns itself to tasting the divine *solaces*. The first comes about through *understanding*, the second through the *unitive* or *amative power*, which is hidden, and of which they knew little or nothing.

25. Therefore the power is threefold, and there are six operations; and when the soul sees all these objects, thus returning upon itself, it becomes a certain most beautiful and burnished *mirror*, in which it sees whatever there is of brightness and of beauty, as an image is seen in a *polished* mirror. But for this there is required *natural opacity* or *artificial*: *natural*, as in a mirror of steel; *artificial*, as in lead laid under glass; second, *polishing* is required, through which it receives the form or image; third, *splendour* is required, since at night a mirror gives nothing back. Likewise in the soul the lower virtues are as it were holding the light, lest it flow away; the middle ones are as the polishings; the supreme ones are as supervening splendours: and thus the soul is a *mirror*.

26. But it is needful that we have the *second step*, that there be set beside it beautiful forms, namely heavenly lights proportioned to it, such as the Angels — because, if it were straightway to raise itself to the divine flashings, it would be beaten back. Now the Angels are both *lights* and *mirrors*; and for the contemplating of them the soul is raised in three ways. — For the Angels have *lowest* powers, by which they regulate the motions of the noble bodies and flow into the things of this world; and this is the position of the philosophers. For it is agreed that « the cause is nobler than its effect »; and it is agreed that at the influence of the heavenly bodies what is *living* and *animate* comes to be or is generated: therefore the *soul* also. If, then, the animate is nobler than the inanimate, it is necessary that it have *another* cause than those bodies. And that is the angelic influence together with the influence of the heavenly bodies. Hence this comes about through the governance of an intellectual substance flowing into the motion of the sphere which it rules. — Others posited that the Angels were numbered according to the number of the motions, on account of a natural inclination toward motion. — Others posited only ten Intelligences, considering their influences; and they wrought madnesses and contentions. An Angel can very well be without motion.

27. Likewise, there are in the Angels powers directed to *rational* souls, by which they rule men. For they are *bearers* of lights and *raisers* of understandings to receive illuminations. There is therefore in them a *conveying* power, since they are certain *lights* and a certain *passage*, and they temper within themselves the divine ray for us, that it may be proportioned to us. — In a second mode there is in them an *elevative* power, by which they fit us, through condescension and uplifting, to receive that ray — not as though perfecting us. — Likewise, there is in them a *supreme* power, by which they turn themselves to God in the reception of the splendours and of the eternal light, which they love; and they lead all things back to it, that they may tend toward God through *love* and *praise*. Hence in Job: *Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody?* And all this the philosophers perceived. Likewise, the Angels are from this about to give *thanks*. — When the soul sees this, it thrusts itself in among the Angels and enters their *age*.

28. The third step is that the intellect itself, considering the *conditions of being* according to the relation of cause to caused, transfers itself from the effect to the causes and passes over to the eternal grounds. The *cause* differs from *the things caused*: because the first cause is *first* being, the caused a *produced* being; the first cause is *simple* being, the caused *composite*; the first cause is *pure* being, and the caused *intermixed*; the first cause is *fixed* being, and the caused *varied*; the first cause is *absolute* being, and the caused *bound*; the first cause is *perfect* being, the caused *diminished*. These, then, are most certain.

29. Now the understanding is borne toward this light in three ways: *by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding*; *ratiocinatively, experimentally, intelligentially*. — By the way of *reason*, thus. If there is a *produced* being: then there is a *first* being, because an effect posits a cause. For if there is a being *from another, according to another* and *on account of another*: then there is a being *from itself, according to itself* and *on account of itself*. — Likewise, if there is a *composite* being, it is necessary that there be a *simple* one, from which it has its *to-be*, since a *to-be* which recedes from simplicity falls into composition. — Likewise, if there is an *intermixed* being, it is necessary that there be a *pure* being; but no created thing is pure. — Likewise, if there is a being *varied* in itself, it is necessary that there be a *fixed* one, since the mobile is led back to the immobile. For when the hand is moved, the elbow stands still; and when the elbow is moved, the shoulder stands still; and so always what is moved will be moved through something fixed. — Likewise, if a *bound* thing is granted, then an *absolute* one also is; for every creature is bound to some genus of the predicaments; but what is bound does not, being one, give *to-be* to another: it is necessary, therefore, that there be an absolute being from which they may receive *to-be*. — Likewise, if there is a *diminished* being, it is necessary that there be a *perfect* being. — And by this way the Philosopher proceeds to show the world to be eternal, since circular local motion precedes every motion and change, because it is perfect. But I answer: it must be said that it is true that the *perfect* is before the *diminished*, speaking of the *perfect simply*, but not of the *perfect in a genus*, such as local motion is. — And thus the understanding is borne *by reasoning*.

30. It is borne likewise *by experiencing*, thus: the *produced* is defective in respect of the first; likewise the *composite* in respect of the simple; likewise the *intermixed* in respect of the pure, and so of the rest; therefore they bespeak *privations*. But « privations are not known save through their own habits ». « For the judge is the rule of *itself* and of *the oblique* ». And if « all cognition comes about from a pre-existing cognition »: then necessarily the understanding experiences in itself that it has some light, through which it may know the *first being*.

31. Thus, then, these things being presupposed, *the intellect understands* and says: the *first being* is, and to nothing does *to-be* truly belong save to the *first being*, and from it all things have their *to-be*, since this predicate is in nothing save in the *first being*. Likewise *simple to-be* is simply perfect *to-be*: therefore it is that than which nothing better is understood. Hence God cannot be thought not to be, as Anselm proves.

32. When the soul sees this more familiarly — first *by reasoning*, second *by experiencing*, third *by understanding* — there it can rest. Hence *by reasoning* it infers through the opposite: if there is a *posterior*, there is a *prior*; if there is a *composite*, there is a *simple*, etc.; *experimentally*, since *privations* are not known save in the *positing* of the cause, and those six are said by way of defect and privation; *intelligentially*, since they cannot lie hidden from the soul, as that the *first being* is, that *simple being* is, etc. — Likewise, it considers that *being* as it has *substance, power* and *operation*, as *first, most pure, most simple*, and so of the other six; as there is in it *unity, truth, goodness*, as *first*, as *most pure*, as *most absolute*, and so of the other six; as it has *firmness, comeliness, goodness*, as *first, most pure* and *most absolute*; as it has *memory, understanding* and *will*, according to those six; as it has *life, wisdom, joyousness*, according to those six: and then it understands that it is the *good by essence*, and that all things are beatified through it, and therefore that it is supremely desirable and ought supremely to be desired; and in doing this it comes to rest.

33. First, then, the soul sees *itself* as a *mirror*, then the Angels or Intelligences as *lights* and as a *conveying medium*; or it sees in itself as in a mirror, in an Intelligence as in a medium conveying and tempering the eternal light; then in the eternal light as in the *fontal object*, as regards those six conditions spoken of, and *rationally* and *experimentally* and *intelligentially*. — While, therefore, it perceives these things and rises up to the divine contuition, it says that it has the *acquired intellect* which the philosophers promised; and to this the truth draws it. — Yet one must arrive there through the *virtues*, as the philosophers did; when they saw that so high a place could not be reached save through the virtues, they turned themselves to teaching them, as Socrates did; whence he is reckoned to have spoken less well, in that he spoke only of them; but he did this because he saw that that understanding cannot be reached unless the soul be purified.

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