Coll. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/11/d/6/q/bon-hex-c6
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### COLLATION VI.
#### *On the first vision, the third treatment, which is on the first exemplary cause of the virtues, on the exemplary virtues, and on the cardinal virtues flowing from them.*

### Summarium

*Introduction; recapitulation, 1. — The errors of the philosophers concerning God as exemplary cause; the teaching of Aristotle is defective in this, 2. — A threefold error arising thence, 3. — Likewise, a threefold blindness: concerning the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect, and the lack of retribution after death, 4. 5. — On these errors, still burgeoning, 6. — Part I. On the exemplary virtues in the eternal light and the cardinal virtues arising thence. In God there are exemplars not only of things, but also of virtues, 7. — On the four exemplary virtues in God, which are the loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion, 8. — They are proved from Scripture, 9. — From these flow like properties, namely the cardinal virtues, 10. — The cardinal virtues have their name for three reasons, 11. — On the first reason, 12. — On the second, and on the four integrating virtues according to the acts of the cardinal virtues, 13. — On the third reason; a comparison of the greater world and the lesser, 14. — On the definition and the parts of each of the cardinal virtues, 15. — Their origin and excellence, 16. — They are configured to four other divisions; first, to the four influences of light, 17. — Second, to the four properties of the elements, 18. — Third, to the four efficacies of the causes; fourth, to the four wholesomenesses of life, 19. — They flow from the eternal light; they lead back to God, who is true beatitude; their three steps and effects; the teaching of Solomon, 20. — Part II. A confirmation from the teaching of Plotinus reported by Macrobius. On the opinion that none are wise and blessed but philosophers, and how he distributes the exercises of the virtues, 21. — Otherwise Plotinus, positing four kinds of fourfold virtues, 22. — First, on the political virtues, how the cardinal virtues are exercised in them, 23. — Second, on the purgatorial virtues, 24. — Third, on the virtues of the soul already purged, 25. — Fourth, on the exemplary virtues, 26.*

1. *God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness*, etc. For the sake of the first vision, that *of the understanding implanted by nature*, that word was taken up: *God saw the light*, that is, he made it to be seen. Of this it has been said above in two collations, and by way of the *scientific* consideration, in that the light shines as the truth *of things*, as the truth *of words*, as the truth *of morals*. And nine parts of doctrine were distinguished, of which three are the principal rays, and they are from the dictate of the eternal light, according to Augustine. — Likewise, that *he saw*, that is, he made to be seen by the *sapiential* contemplation, illuminating the soul *in itself* as in a mirror, *in an Intelligence* as in a conveying medium, *in the uncreated light* as in the fontal object, according to those six conditions which it imprints upon the mind; and according to these the soul rises up into that light *by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding*, as has been said. And to this the philosophers came, and their nobles and the ancients, namely that it should be *principle* and *end* and *exemplary ground*.

2. Yet God *divided the light from the darkness*, so that, as has been said of the Angels, so it may be said of the philosophers. But whence did some follow the darkness? From this: that although all of them saw the first cause as the *principle* of all and the *end* of all, in the *medium* they nevertheless diverged. For some denied that in it there are the *exemplars of things*; of whom the chief seems to have been Aristotle, who both at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and at the end and in many other places execrates the ideas of Plato. Hence he says that God knows only himself and has no need of the knowledge of any other thing, and moves as the *desired* and the *beloved*. From this they lay down that he knows *nothing*, or

*no particular thing*. Hence Aristotle chiefly attacks those ideas, and in the *Ethics*, where he says that the highest good cannot be an *idea*. And his arguments are worth nothing, and the commentator resolves them.

3. From this error there follows another error, namely that God has no *foreknowledge* nor *providence*, since he has not the grounds of things in himself, through which he might know them. — They say also that there is no truth about the future save the truth of necessary things; and that the truth of contingent things is not truth. — And from this it follows that all things come about *by chance*, or *by fatal necessity*. And because it is impossible for things to come about *by chance*, therefore the Arabs bring in a fatal necessity, namely that those substances moving the sphere are the necessary causes of all things. — From this there follows a *hidden truth*, namely that of the *disposition of the things of the world* according to punishments and glory. For if those substances move without erring, nothing is laid down about hell, nor that there is a demon; nor did Aristotle ever posit a demon, nor beatitude after this life, as it seems. This, then, is the threefold error: the hiding of *exemplarity*, of *divine providence*, of *the world's disposition*.

4. From these there follows a threefold blindness or gloom: namely concerning the *eternity of the world*, which Aristotle seems to assert according to all the Greek doctors — as Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, the Damascene, Basil — and the commentators of all the Arabs, who say that Aristotle held this, and his words seem to sound so. You will never find that he himself says that the world had a beginning or a starting-point; rather he refutes Plato, who alone seems to have laid down that time began. And this is repugnant to the light of truth.

From this there follows another blindness, concerning the *unity of the intellect*: because, if the world is laid down as eternal, one of these necessarily follows: either that souls are *infinite*, since men will have been infinite; or that the soul is *corruptible*; or that there is a *passage from body to body*; or that *the intellect is one in all*, which error is attributed to Aristotle according to the Commentator.

From these two it follows that after this life there is neither *happiness* nor *punishment*.

5. These men, then, fell into errors and were not divided from the darkness; and these are the worst errors. Nor are they yet shut up with the key of the bottomless pit. These are the darknesses of Egypt; for although a great light seemed to be in them from the preceding sciences, yet the whole of it is extinguished by the aforesaid errors. And others, seeing that Aristotle was so great in other matters and so spoke the truth, cannot believe that he did not speak truly in these.

6. I say therefore that that eternal light is the exemplar of all things, and that a mind raised up, like the mind of the other noble philosophers of old, arrives at this. In it, then, there occur first to the soul the *exemplars of the virtues*. « For it is absurd, as Plotinus says, that the exemplars of other things should be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues ».

7. There appear, therefore, first in the eternal light the *exemplary* virtues, or the exemplars of the virtues, namely the *loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion*; of which Philo, « the most eloquent of the Jews », speaks as a philosopher. — Wisdom, chapter seven: *For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the brightness of the almighty God; and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her*; behold the *loftiness of purity*. — *For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness.* And below: *For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars; being compared with the light, she is found before it*; behold the *beauty of brightness*. For where there is a *mirror* and an *image* and *brightness*, there is necessarily *representation* and *beauty*. « Beauty is nothing else than numerous equality »; and there the numbered grounds are led back to one. And because she is most comely, therefore *she reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity*.

8. From which it follows that she is *most strong*; therefore it is said: *Malice overcometh not wisdom. She reacheth from end to end mightily*; behold the *fortitude of power*: she reaches from the summit or the supreme down to the lowest, from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from the first to the last, because everywhere is the centre of her power: therefore her power is infinite.

9. And from this she has the *rectitude of diffusion*; behold *justice*; and therefore it says: *She ordereth all things sweetly.* — And because he speaks as a philosopher and as a *lover of wisdom*, therefore he says: *Her have I loved and have sought her out from my youth, and have desired to take her for my spouse, and I became a lover of her beauty*; not only for her own sake, but because from her like properties consequently come to be in me. Hence immediately after there follows: *For she teacheth sobriety and prudence and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men.*

10. These are imprinted on the soul through that exemplary light and descend into the *cognitive*, into the *affective*, into the *operative* power. From the *loftiness of purity* is imprinted the *sincerity of temperance*; from the *beauty of brightness*, the *serenity of prudence*; from the *fortitude of power*, the *stability of constancy*; from the *rectitude of diffusion*, the *sweetness of justice*. — These are the four *exemplary* virtues, of which the whole of sacred Scripture treats; and Aristotle perceived nothing of them, but the ancient and noble philosophers did.

11. They are called *cardinal* in three ways: either because through them there is an *entrance* for acquiring all the virtues; or because they are the *principal* ones, in which every virtue is integrated; or because *the whole ordering of human life* has to be directed and regulated by them in the four *hinges* of the lesser world, after the likeness of the greater world, as regards the active and the contemplative life.

12. The Philosopher says that « virtue is the mean of two extremes, according as the wise man shall determine »; for it consists in a mean. For virtue, according to Augustine in the book *On Morals*, is nothing other than *measure*. This *measure* prudence finds out, so that in all things you may not exceed, but may hold to the centre. Hence prudence is the *charioteer* of the virtues. Hence *prudence says*: I have found the measure; and *temperance keeps* it and says: and this is what I wanted; *justice distributes* it, so that a man may will it not only for himself but also for another; and because afterwards manifold adversities befall, *fortitude defends* it, lest the measure be lost.

13. Likewise, secondly they are called *cardinal*, because according to their acts the *integrating* virtues are taken, which are four: *to modify*, by the addition of the circumstances; *to rectify* — for it is right reason leading to the end, making equal with the laws — *to order, to stabilize*. From this it is called *virtue*, because it is the strength of the mind for doing good and avoiding evil. Temperance *modifies*, prudence *rectifies*, justice *orders*, fortitude *stabilizes*. And they all mutually interpenetrate one another. For it is needful that temperance be *prudent*, justice *brave*; likewise that prudence be *sober, just* and *brave*, etc. Gregory: How can a man be brave, unless he be prudent? For he is rash who attempts what is beyond his strength; and therefore the virtues are connected.

14. Likewise, in a third way they are called *cardinal*, because *the whole life of man* is governed by these four hinges; as the sun has four aspects toward the four parts of the world, namely east, south, north, west, in which it has four properties. And from the sun comes all life: in the east it purifies, in the south it illuminates, in the north it stabilizes, in the west it reconciles. So the *Sun of justice* in the east of the mind sets the *sincerity of temperance*, in the south the *brightness of prudence*, in the north the *stability of constancy*, in the west the *sweetness of justice*. — And in this manner John in the Apocalypse describes the four sides of the city according to the four cardinal virtues; and the tribes too were ordered beside the tabernacle.

15. *Temperance*, which is from the east, is thus described by Tullius: « Temperance is reason's firm and moderate dominion over lust and the other unruly motions of the soul ». Its parts are *sobriety* in taste, *chastity* in touch, *modesty* in the remaining senses; which modesty the theologians call *discipline*.

16. The *serenity of prudence* is from the south, which is thus described: « Prudence is the knowledge of good and evil things and the discernment of both, whose parts are *memory, understanding, foresight* ». For prudence is of present, past and future things.

17. *Fortitude* is from the north, which is thus described: « Fortitude is the undertaking of dangers, or the taking of them up, and the constant and laborious endurance of the same ». Its parts are *confidence, patience, perseverance*: confidence in *undertaking*, patience in *sustaining*, perseverance in *persevering*.

18. Likewise, in the west is the *sweetness of justice*, which lies in the showing of piety — for the laws will have punishments mitigated; whence the end of justice is not severity, but benignity — and it is thus described: « Justice is a habit which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth ». Its parts, according to Tullius, are from *law*, from *nature*, from *custom*; according to us, one orders us to *superiors*, another to *inferiors*, a third to *equals*.

19. All this is by the rule of reason; and as the sun, passing through the twelve signs, gives life, so the sun of wisdom, shining and passing through the hemisphere of our mind, orders our life through these twelve parts of the virtues; and however many other sciences a man may have, unless he have the virtues, he has not life — just as, however many stars you may have, unless you have the sun in the twelve signs, you will not have day.

20. These are of such *nobility* that the disposition of the world corresponds to them. For the virtues are configured to the four *influences of light*, the four *properties of the elements*, the four *efficacies of the causes*, the four *wholesomenesses of life*. — First, to the four principal influences of light: light *purges, illuminates, perfects* and *stabilizes*; *temperance* purges, *prudence* illuminates, *justice* reconciles, *fortitude* strengthens.

21. Likewise, to the four properties of the elements: in *earth* there is dryness adorned, in *water* transparency with an intensity of light, in *air* subtlety with softness, in *fire* forcefulness in acting. The first is *temperance*, which makes dry, and yet adorns and clothes with flowers. *Prudence* answers to the transparency of water, which is as it were incorporated into light. *Justice* answers to the softness of air; for air ascends and descends, and is moved to right and left. *Fortitude* answers to the vigour of fire; whence he who speaks of fortitude says: *Love is strong as death; jealousy is hard as hell; the lamps thereof are lamps of fire and flames.*

22. Likewise, to the four efficacies of the causes: the *efficient*, the *form*, the *end* and the *matter* make up a thing. *Fortitude* is owed to the efficient, *prudence* to the form, *justice* to the end, *temperance* to the matter, lest it flow away.

23. Likewise, to the four wholesomenesses of life: to the subtlety of the spirits, *temperance*; to the vivacity of the senses, *prudence*; to the strength of the powers, *fortitude*; to the equalizing of the qualities, *justice*.

24. These virtues flow from the eternal light into the hemisphere of our mind and lead the soul back to its origin, as a perpendicular or direct ray returns by the same way by which it came. And this is beatitude. Hence first they are *political*, second *purgatorial*, third *of the soul already purged*. The *political* are in action, the *purgatorial* in contemplation, those *of the soul already purged* in the vision of light.

25. And of these Solomon treats, as Origen says: of the *political* in Proverbs, of the *purgatorial* in Ecclesiastes, of those *of the soul already purged* in the Canticle of Canticles.

And the noble philosophers came to a knowledge of these. Hence Macrobius, reporting the opinion of Plotinus, speaks thus: « Those who judge that the virtues are in none but philosophers pronounce that none but philosophers are blessed. For calling the recognition of divine things properly *wisdom*, they say that those alone are wise who seek them with the mind's higher edge and grasp them by a sagacious diligence in seeking, and imitate them so far as clarity of living allows, and they say that in this alone lie the exercises of the virtues ».

26. « The offices of these they distribute thus: it belongs to *prudence* to despise this world and all that is in the world by the contemplation of divine things, and to direct the whole knowledge of the soul upon the divine alone; to *temperance*, to leave behind, so far as nature suffers, all that the body's use requires; to *fortitude*, that the soul be not terrified as it withdraws in a manner from the body under philosophy's leading, nor shrink from the height of the perfect ascent to things above; to *justice*, that the obedience of each virtue consent to the one way of this purpose. And so it comes about that, by the abruptness of so rigid a definition, the rulers of commonwealths cannot be blessed, or even be at all ».

27. « But Plotinus, chief with Plato among the professors of philosophy, in the book *On the Virtues* sets out in order their degrees, composed by a true and natural principle of division. There are four, he says, kinds of fourfold virtues. Of these the first are called *political*, the second *purgatorial*, the third those *of the soul already purged*, the fourth *exemplary* ».

28. « And the *political* are of man, because he is a social animal. By these good men take counsel for the commonwealth, guard cities; by these they venerate parents, love their children, cherish their neighbours; by these they govern the safety of the citizens; by these they protect their allies with circumspect providence, bind them by a just liberality, and by these « they have made others mindful of them by deserving well » ».

29. « And it belongs to political *prudence* to direct all that it thinks and whatever it does to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing but what is right, and to provide for human acts as though for divine arbiters. To prudence belong *reason, intellect, circumspection, foresight, docility, caution*. — It belongs to *fortitude* to carry the mind above the fear of danger, and to fear nothing but base things, and to bear bravely either adversity or prosperity. Fortitude furnishes *magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, tolerance, firmness*. — It belongs to *temperance* to desire nothing that must be repented of, to exceed in nothing the law of moderation, to tame cupidity under the yoke of reason. Temperance is followed by *modesty, shamefastness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, restraint* or *moderation, frugality, sobriety, purity*. — It belongs to *justice* to preserve for each what is his own; and from justice come *innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity*. By these virtues a good man is made first the ruler of himself and thence of the commonwealth, governing human affairs justly and providently, and not deserting the divine ».

30. « The *second*, which they call *purgatorial*, are of the man who is capable of the divine, and they set free only the soul of him who has resolved to purge himself of the body's contagion and, by a certain flight from human things, to engage himself with the divine alone. These belong to men at leisure, who sequester themselves from the acts of public affairs. What each of these means we have set out above, when we spoke of the virtues of those who philosophize, which certain men have reckoned to be the only virtues ».

31. « The *third* are those of the *soul already purged and cleansed*, and closely and purely wiped clean of every besprinkling of this world. There it belongs to *prudence* not to prefer divine things as though by a choice, but to know them alone and to gaze on them as though nothing else existed; to *temperance*, not to repress earthly cupidities but to forget them utterly; to *fortitude*, to be ignorant of the passions, not to conquer them, so that it may not know how to be angry, and may desire nothing; to *justice*, so to be joined with the supernal and divine mind that it may keep a perpetual covenant with it by imitation ».

32. « The *fourth* are the *exemplary*, which consist in the divine mind itself, which we have said is called *νοῦν*, from whose exemplar all the rest flow down in order. For if it must be believed that the ideas of other things are in the divine mind, much more those of the virtues. There *prudence* is the divine mind itself; *temperance*, that it is turned upon itself by a perpetual intention; *fortitude*, that it is always the same and is never changed; *justice*, that by a perennial law it is not bent from the sempiternal continuation of its own work. — These are the four kinds of fourfold virtues, which beyond all the rest have the greatest difference among themselves in respect of the passions ». Thus far Plotinus.

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