Quaest. 1, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/1/q/bon-qmt-q1-a1
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### Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity

Wishing to search out something concerning the mystery of the Trinity, with the divine grace going before us, we set down two things beforehand as preambles; of which the first is the foundation of all knowledge that is certain, the second the foundation of all knowledge that is of faith.

The first is, whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

The second is, whether the truth that God is three is credible.

### Question I. *On the certitude by which the existence of God is known, and on the faith by which his Trinity is believed.*

### Article I. *Whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth.*

It is asked, then, first, whether the existence of God is an indubitable truth. And that it is, is shown by a threefold way. The first is this: every truth impressed upon all minds is an indubitable truth. — The second is this: every truth which every creature proclaims is an indubitable truth. — The third is this: every truth most certain and most evident in itself is an indubitable truth.

Concerning the *first way*, then, the procedure is as follows, and it is shown both by *authorities* and by *reasons* that the existence of God is impressed upon all rational minds.

1. Damascene, in the first book, chapter three: "The knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in us."

2. Likewise, Hugh: "God so tempered the knowledge of himself in man that, just as *what* he is could never be comprehended entire, so *that* he is could never be utterly unknown."

3. Likewise, Boethius: "There is implanted in the minds of men a desire for the true and the good"; but the affection for the true good presupposes the cognition of the same: therefore there is impressed upon the minds of men the cognition of the true good and a desire for what is most desirable. Now this good is God: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, Augustine, in many places in *On the Trinity*, says that the image consists in mind, knowledge and love, and that the character of the image is regarded in the soul by comparison to God: if, therefore, it is impressed upon the soul by nature to be the image of God, it therefore has naturally implanted in it the knowledge of God. But the first knowable thing about God is that God exists: therefore that is naturally implanted in the human mind.

5. Likewise, the Philosopher says that "it would be unfitting that we should have the noblest habits and that they should lie hidden from us": therefore, since the existence of God is the noblest truth and most present to us, it is unfitting that this truth should lie hidden from the human understanding.

6. Likewise, there is implanted in the minds of men a *desire for wisdom*, for the Philosopher says: "All men by nature desire to know"; but the wisdom most to be desired is eternal wisdom: therefore the desire for that wisdom is implanted in the human mind above all. But there is no love, as was said before, except of something in some way known; therefore it must be that some knowledge whatever of that highest wisdom is impressed upon the human mind. But this is to know first, that God himself, or wisdom, exists: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, the *desire for beatitude* is so implanted in us that no one can doubt of another whether he wishes to be happy, as Augustine says in many places; but beatitude consists in the highest good, which is God: therefore, if such a desire cannot exist without some knowledge, it must be that the knowledge by which it is known that the highest good, or God, exists is implanted in the soul itself.

8. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul itself a *desire for peace*, and so implanted that it is sought even through its contrary, nor can that desire be taken away even from the damned and the demons, according to what is shown in the nineteenth book of *On the City of God*. If, therefore, the peace of the rational mind is only in an immutable and eternal being, and desire presupposes a notion or knowledge, then the knowledge of an immutable and eternal being is implanted in the rational spirit.

9. Likewise, there is implanted in the soul a *hatred of the false*; but all hatred takes its rise from love: therefore much more strongly is there implanted in the soul a *love of the true*, and of that truth above all for which the soul has been made. If, therefore, that is the first truth, it necessarily follows that the knowledge of the first truth is implanted in the rational mind. — Now that the hatred of the false is implanted in the human mind appears from this, that no one wishes to be deceived, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the *Confessions*. — And that hatred is in turn caused by love, Augustine shows in the fourteenth book of *On the City of God*; for no one hates anything except because he loves its opposite.

10. Likewise, there is implanted in the rational soul a *knowledge of itself*, in that the soul is present to itself and knowable by itself; but God is most present to the soul itself and knowable by himself: therefore there is implanted in the soul itself the knowledge of God, who is its own. *If you say* that the case is not alike, because the soul is proportioned to itself, whereas God is not so proportioned to the soul; *on the contrary*: there is no counter-instance: because, if proportionality were necessarily required for cognition, the soul would never arrive at the knowledge of God, since it cannot be proportioned to him, neither by nature nor by grace nor by glory.

By these reasons, then, it is shown that the existence of God is indubitable to the human mind, as being naturally implanted in it; for no one doubts save concerning that of which he has no certain knowledge.

Likewise this same thing is shown by the *second way* thus: every truth which every creature cries out is an indubitable truth; but that God exists every creature cries out: therefore, etc. — And that every creature cries out that God exists is shown from ten conditions and suppositions known through themselves.

11. The first is this: if there is a *posterior being*, there is also a *prior being*, because the posterior is only from a prior: if, therefore, there is a whole company of posterior things, it must be that a first being exists. If, therefore, it is necessary to posit that something is prior and posterior among creatures, it is necessary that the whole company of creatures infers and cries out a first principle.

12. Likewise, if there is a *being from another*, there is a *being not from another*: because nothing draws itself out of *non-being* into *being*: therefore the first ground of drawing forth must be in a first being, which is not drawn forth by another. If, therefore, a *being from another* is called a *created* being, and a *being not from another* is called an *uncreated* being, which is God, then all the differences of being infer that God exists.

13. Likewise, if there is a *possible being*, there is a *necessary being*: because the *possible* states an indifference to *being* and *non-being*; but nothing indifferent to *being* and *non-being* can exist except through something which is altogether determined to *being*. If, therefore, a necessary being, having nothing at all of possibility toward *non-being*, is none other than God, while everything else has something of possibility, then every difference of being infers that God exists.

14. Likewise, if there is a *relative being*, there is an *absolute being*: because the relative is never terminated save at the absolute; but an absolute being depending on nothing can only be that which receives nothing from elsewhere; and this is the first being, whereas every other being has something of dependence: therefore it must be that every difference of being infers that God exists.

15. Likewise, if there is a *diminished being*, or a being *in a certain respect*, there is a *being simply*: because a being *in a certain respect* can neither be nor be understood unless it is understood through *being*

*simply*, nor a *diminished being* except through a *perfect being*, just as a privation is not understood except through a habit. If, therefore, every created being is a *being in part*, while the uncreated being alone is *being simply* and perfect, it must be that every difference of being infers and concludes that God exists.

16. Likewise, if there is a *being for the sake of another*, there is a *being for its own sake*, otherwise nothing would be good; but a *being for its own sake* is none other than that being than which nothing is better, which indeed is God himself: therefore, since the whole company of other beings is ordered to that one, the whole company of beings infers God both according to *being* and according to *understanding*.

17. Likewise, if there is a *being by participation*, there is a *being by essence*: because *participation* is not spoken of except in respect of something possessed *essentially* by another, since everything *per accidens* is reduced to what is *per se*; but every being other than the first being, which is God, has *being by participation*, while that one alone has *being by essence*: therefore, etc.

18. Likewise, if there is a *being in potency*, there is a *being in act*: because potency is never reducible to act except through a being in act, nor would it be a potency unless it were reducible to act: if, therefore, the being which is pure act, having nothing of possibility, is none other than God, it must be that everything other than the first being infers that God exists.

19. Likewise, if there is a *composite being*, there is a *simple being*: because a composite does not have *being* from itself, therefore it must receive its origin from what is simple; but the most simple being, having nothing of composition, is none other than the first being: therefore every other being infers God.

20. Likewise, if there is a *mutable being*, there is an *immutable being*: because, according to what the Philosopher proves, motion is from a being at rest and for the sake of a being at rest: if, therefore, the wholly immutable being is none other than that first being which is God, while the rest, being created, are for that very reason mutable, it must be that the existence of God is inferred from every difference of being.

From these ten necessary and manifest suppositions, then, it is inferred that all the differences or parts of being infer and cry out that God exists. If, therefore, every such truth is an indubitable truth, it must therefore be that the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

This same thing is shown by the *third way* thus. Every truth which is so certain that it cannot be thought not to be is an indubitable truth; but the existence of God is of this sort: therefore, etc. The *first* is known through itself, the *second* is shown in many ways.

21 For Anselm, in the fourth chapter of the *Proslogion*: "Good Lord, I give thee thanks, because what I first believed by thy gift I now so understand by thy illumination that, if I were unwilling to believe that thou art, I could not fail to understand it."

22. Likewise, Anselm proves this same thing thus: God is that than which nothing greater can be thought; but that which is such that it cannot be thought not to be is more truly than that which can be thought not to be: therefore, if God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, God will not be able to be thought not to be.

23. Likewise, a being than which nothing greater can be thought is of such a nature that it cannot be thought unless it is in reality; because, if it is in thought alone, then it is not a being than which nothing greater can be thought: therefore, if such a being is thought to be, it must be that such a being is in reality, and that it could not be thought not to be.

24. Likewise, Anselm: "Thou alone art whatever it is better to be than not to be"; but every indubitable truth is better than every dubitable truth; therefore being is to be attributed to God indubitably rather than dubitably.

25. Likewise, Augustine says in the *Soliloquies* that no truth can be seen except through the first truth; but the truth through which every other truth is seen is a truth in the highest degree indubitable; therefore the existence of God is a truth not only indubitable, but such that nothing more indubitable can be thought: therefore it is such a truth as cannot be thought not to be.

26. Likewise, he proves this same thing thus: whatever it is possible to think it is possible to utter; but in no way is it possible to utter that God is not, without its being uttered along with this that God is. And this appears thus: because, if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, the first truth exists: therefore, if it cannot be uttered that God is not, neither can it be thought.

27. Likewise, the prior and more universal a truth is, the better known it is; but this truth, by which the first being is said to be, is the first of all truths both according to the thing and according to the account of understanding: therefore it must be that it is most certain and most evident. But the truths of *axioms*, or of *common conceptions of the mind*, are so evident by reason of their priority that they cannot be thought not to be: therefore no understanding can think that first truth not to be, or doubt concerning it.

28. Likewise, "no proposition is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself"; but when I say that God is, the *being* said of God is altogether the same as God, because God is his own being: therefore none is truer and more evident than that by which it is said that God is; therefore no one can think it to be false, or doubt concerning it.

29. Likewise, no one can be ignorant that this is true — the best is the best — or think it to be false; but the best is the most complete being, and every most complete being is by that very fact a being in act: therefore, if the best is the best, the best exists. — Likewise it can be argued: if God is God, God exists; but the antecedent is so true that it cannot be thought not to be; therefore the existence of God is an indubitable truth.

*But on the contrary it is objected that the existence of God can be thought not to be, and that it is a dubitable truth.* That it *can be thought* not to be is shown thus.

1. The Psalm: *The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God*; but *to say in the heart* is to think: therefore it can be thought that God is not, at least by the fool.

2. Likewise, Damascene, in the first book, chapter three: "So far has the pernicious malice of human nature prevailed that it has led some down into the most irrational and worst of all evils, the pit of perdition, so that they say that God is not": therefore at least by malicious men it can be thought that God is not.

3. Likewise, *an idol is nothing*, as is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter eight: therefore it is the same to think that God is an idol and that God is not; but it is thinkable, and sometimes thought, that God is an idol: therefore it is thinkable that God is nothing.

4. Likewise, what it is possible to *signify* it is possible also to *think*; but it is possible to *signify* that God is not, as by this sentence: God is not: therefore it is possible to *think* it.

5. Likewise, it is objected against the reason of Augustine, when he proves that by this proposition — there is no truth — it is inferred that there is some truth. For if this proposition is true — there is some truth — it therefore has a contradictory; but no contradictory infers or posits, but rather takes away, its own contradictory; therefore by the fact that there is no truth it is not concluded that there is some truth.

6. Likewise, it is objected against the reason of Anselm, by which he proves that God exists on the ground that a being than which nothing greater can be thought is in thought; because by parity of reasoning it can be thought, if someone thinks of an island than which nothing greater can be thought, that that island is in reality: therefore, if that reasoning is null, then null also is the reasoning which Anselm makes.

7. Likewise, it is asked: in what sense is it said that the existence of God cannot be thought not to be? If it is because it can *in no way* fall under thought, that is manifestly false; if it is because it cannot be *truly* thought, then by parity of reasoning every necessary truth will be such a truth.

*Likewise, it is shown that the existence of God is a dubitable truth.*

8. Richard of Saint Victor: "We hold nothing more certainly than what we apprehend by faith"; but concerning those things which we apprehend by faith there can be doubt: therefore much more concerning everything else that is known.

9. Likewise, what lies most hidden most admits of doubt; but God is most hidden, since he *dwelleth in light inaccessible*: therefore concerning him and about him it is most possible to doubt: therefore, if it is possible to doubt of other things whether they *are*, much more of God.

10. Likewise, it is possible to doubt concerning those things which are below the soul and beside the soul; but these are more accessible to the soul than those which are above the soul: if, therefore, the existence of God is a truth which is above the human understanding, it seems that concerning it doubt is most possible.

11. Likewise, in God it is the same to be God and to be just; but it is possible to doubt of God whether he is just: therefore by parity of reasoning it is possible to doubt whether he is.

12. Likewise, in vain does anyone strive to prove that concerning which doubt cannot arise: if, therefore, the existence of God can be doubted by no one, in vain does anyone strive to show it: if, therefore, the Saints and doctors have not striven in vain in showing it, it is clear that concerning it doubt is possible.

13. Likewise, no one knows this principle — every whole is greater than its part — unless he knows what a whole is: therefore no one knows that God is unless he knows what God is: if, therefore, it is dubitable *what* God is, it is therefore dubitable *whether* he is.

14. Likewise, if there could be no doubt concerning this truth, that God is, there would be no merit in believing it; but this is the principle of all merit, to believe that God is, because it is said in the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews: *He that cometh must believe that he is*, etc.: if, therefore, this falls under merit, it will also be able to fall under doubt.

> **Conclusio.** *It is not dubitable that God is, if by dubitable is understood some truth which lacks the ground of evidence, whether in itself, or in comparison to the middle term that proves it, or in comparison to the apprehending understanding. It can nevertheless be doubted on the part of the knower, namely by reason of a defect in the acts either of apprehending, or of comparing, or of resolving.*

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that the *indubitable* is so called by the privation of the *dubitable*; and the *dubitable* is spoken of in two ways: either by the *running* of reason, or by the *failure* of reason. In the first way it says something on the part both of the *knowable* and of the *knower*; in the second way only on the part of the *knower*. In the first way some truth is called *dubitable* because the ground of evidence is lacking to it, whether *in itself*, or *in comparison to the middle term that proves it*, or *in comparison to the apprehending understanding*. But by none of these ways is certitude lacking to this truth, that God is.

For it is certain to the one *comprehending*, because the cognition of this truth is *innate* in the rational mind, inasmuch as it holds the *character of an image*, by reason of which there is implanted in it a natural desire and knowledge and memory of him to whose image it was made, toward whom it naturally tends, that in him it may be beatified.

It is also more certain in comparison to the *reason that proves it*. For all creatures, whether they be considered according to their *completive* properties or according to their *defective* ones, cry out with the strongest and highest voices that God is, of whom they stand in need by reason of their *defect* and from whom they receive their *completion*. Whence, according to the greater and lesser completion which they have, some cry out with great, some with greater, some with the greatest voices that God is.

That truth is also most certain *according to itself*, in that it is the first and most immediate truth, in which not only is the cause of the predicate enclosed in the subject, but the *being* which is predicated and the subject which is subjected are altogether one and the same. Whence, just as the union of things utterly distant is altogether repugnant to our understanding, because no understanding can think that some one thing at once is and is not; so the division of what is altogether one and undivided is altogether repugnant to the same, and thereby, just as *to be* and *not to be* the same, and at once *to be in the highest degree* and *in no way to be*, is most evident in its falsity; so *that the first and highest being is* is most evident in its truth. — And therefore, if *indubitable* is taken as it takes away doubt through the *running* of reason, then the existence of God is an indubitable truth, because whether the understanding enters within itself, or goes out beyond itself, or looks above itself, if it runs on rationally it knows with certitude and without doubt that God is.

But if *indubitable* is said in the second way, according as it takes away the doubt which comes through the *failure of reason*, then it can be granted that, by reason of the defect of men, it can be doubted by someone whether God is; and this according to a threefold defect of the understanding of the knower: either as to the act of *apprehending*, or as to the act of *comparing*, or as to the act of *resolving*. — As to the act of *apprehending*, doubt arises when the meaning of this name *God* is not rightly and fully taken, but only according to *some condition of it*; as the gentiles thought God to be whatever was above man and could foresee something future; and therefore they believed idols to be gods and adored them as gods, because they gave certain true answers about things to come. — As to the act of *comparing*, doubt arises when the comparison is made *in part*, as when the fool sees that justice is not manifestly done upon the wicked man; he infers from this that there is no governance in the universe, and thereby that there is not in it a first and highest ruler, who is God most high and glorious. — Likewise, as to a defect in the act of *resolving*, doubt arises when the carnal understanding does not know how to resolve except as far as those things which lie open to the senses, such as these bodily things; for which reason some have supposed this visible sun, which holds the chief place among bodily creatures, to be God, because they did not know how to resolve as far as incorporeal substance nor as far as the first principles of things. — And in this way, concerning this, that God is, doubt can arise from a defect of the understanding itself as *apprehending*, or as *comparing*, or as *resolving*; and according to this understanding it can be thought

by some understanding that God is not, because the meaning of this name *God* is not sufficiently and entirely taken by it. — But by that understanding which fully apprehends the meaning of this name *God*, thinking that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, not only can it not be *doubted* whether God is, but in no way can it be *thought* that God is not. Whence also the reasons proving this are to be granted.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected first on the contrary side from the Psalm and from Damascene, the answer is already clear: because it proceeds from the doubt which comes from the failure of reason, of which sort is that in the understanding of the fool, who, darkened by his own gloom, neither *resolves* sufficiently nor *compares* rightly nor *apprehends* entirely the meaning of this name *God*. For the understanding itself has within itself a sufficient lumen from its own condition, by which it could drive that doubt further off and rescue itself from folly. Whence in this defective consideration the understanding of the fool fails rather *willingly* than *by compulsion*, not by reason of a defect on the part of the *thing known*, but by reason of a defect on the part of *itself*.

And by this the answer to what is objected about the idol is clear. For the gentile thinks God to be an idol because his apprehension of God is defective; for he does not apprehend him as highest and best, but as something powerful which man is not; and hence there comes to be in him the error of deception and the wavering of doubt, into which error he casts himself by his own obstinacy, so that he becomes utterly inexcusable; nor yet is he altogether deprived of the cognition of God, because, although out of his own perversity he wills to worship an idol, he nevertheless has a natural instinct toward worshipping God, against whom he fights by casting himself into a voluntary error.

4. To that which is objected — that what it is possible to *signify* it is possible also to *think* — it must be said that something can be thought in two ways: either by *bare* thought, or by thought *with assent*. By *bare* thought the false can be thought just as the true, and the manifestly false just as the manifestly true. By thought *with assent* nothing is thought except the true or something like the true. The first thought extends to whatever speech extends to; but the second thought does not extend to so many things; and it is of this thought that both Anselm and Augustine understand, and of this thought it is said that God cannot be thought not to be.

5. To that which is objected against the reason of Augustine, that a contradictory does not infer its own contradictory, it must be said that this is true according as it is a *contradictory*; but it must be understood that an affirmative proposition has a twofold affirmation: one by which it asserts the predicate of the subject; another by which it asserts that it is itself true. In the first it is distinguished from a negative proposition, which removes the predicate from the subject; in the second it has that in common with it, because a negative proposition as well as an affirmative asserts that it is itself true. Contradiction is attended to as regards the first, not as regards the second. But when it is said, there is no truth, this proposition, inasmuch as it denies the predicate of the subject, does not infer its opposite, which is that there is some truth. But inasmuch as it asserts that it is itself true, it does infer that there is some truth; nor is this surprising, because, just as every evil presupposes a good, so the false infers the true. And therefore this falsehood, that there is no truth — since by the *removal* of the predicate from the subject it destroys every truth, and by the *assertion* by which it asserts that it is itself true it posits that there is some truth — includes both parts of the contradiction; therefore either can be inferred from it, and it is itself in itself false and unintelligible to an understanding rightly apprehending. And this is what Augustine means to say.

6. To that which is objected concerning Anselm's reasoning about the island than which no better or greater can be thought, it must be said that the case is not alike: because, when I say a being than which nothing greater can be thought, here there is no repugnance between the subject and what is implied; and therefore it can be rationally thought. But when I say an island than which none better can be thought, here there is a repugnance between the subject and what is implied. For an island states a defective being, whereas what is implied is of a most perfect being; and therefore, because there is there an "opposition in the adjunct", it is irrationally thought, and the understanding is repugnant to itself in thinking: and therefore it is no wonder if it cannot be inferred that what is thought is outside in reality. But it is otherwise in a being, or in God, to whom such an implication is not repugnant.

7. To that which is asked — in what sense is it said that the existence of God cannot be thought not to be? — the answer is already clear: not because there cannot be thought "what it is that is said by the name", that is, the meaning of this sentence: God is not; but because it is itself so evident in itself and certain to the knower that, if he is willing to consider rightly, there is nothing by which he could be torn away from this truth. For it is a truth most evident and most present, which is lacking to no place, to no time, to no thing, to no thought; and it is not so with other created truths.

8. To that which is objected, that we hold nothing more certainly than what we comprehend by faith, it must be said

that this is true of the certitude of *adherence*, not of the certitude of *understanding*, as appears to one considering the matter manifestly.

9. To that which is objected, that this truth is hidden, and therefore most dubitable, it must be said that, although God is simple and uniform in himself, nevertheless in one way he lies hidden and in another way he lies open, as the Apostle intimates in the first chapter to the Romans: *That which is known of God is manifest in them*. For to some the *trinity of the appropriated attributes* is manifest to whom the *trinity of persons* is not manifest; and to one the *unity of essence* is manifest to whom the *trinity of the appropriated attributes* is not manifest; and to another the very *trinity* of God is manifest to whom the very *unity of essence* is not manifest. Now this is what is first manifest about God, namely his very entity, and as regards this he does not lie hidden but lies open; and therefore it is not dubitable, but indubitable.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul doubts of the things below it and beside it, and so forth, it must be said that this does not hold: because, although the existence of God is *above* the soul according to nature, it is nevertheless *within* the soul according to knowledge, and *outside* it according to the representation and persuasion which every creature makes to it, since this truth is enclosed and understood in every truth.

11. To that which is objected, that in God it is the same to be and to be just, it must be said that it does not follow: because, although it is the same in itself and according to itself, it is nevertheless not the same according to the account that apprehends it and according to the effect that represents it; and therefore it is possible for the one to lie open while the other does not lie open.

12. To that which is objected, that in vain does anyone strive to prove that of which no one doubts, it must be said that, as is already clear, this truth does not stand in need of proof by reason of a defect of evidence on its own part, but by reason of a defect of consideration on our part. Whence reasonings of this kind are rather certain exercises of the understanding than reasons giving evidence and making manifest the truth itself that is proved.

13. To that which is objected, that no one knows principles unless he knows the terms, it must be said that this is true; but the knowledge of some terms is hidden, of others manifest. And again, of the meaning of a term there can be a *full*, a *fuller* and a *fullest* knowledge. According to this it must be understood that it can be known *what* God is perfectly and fully and in the mode of comprehension, and thus he is not known save by God alone; or *clearly* and *plainly*, and thus he is known by the Blessed; or *in part* and *in a dark manner*, and thus it is known that God is the first and highest principle of all the things of the world; and this, so far as it is of itself, can be manifest to all: because, since anyone knows that he has not always been, he knows that he had a beginning, and by parity of reasoning so of other things; and since this knowledge offers itself to all, and when it is known it is known that God is, therefore it is indubitable to all, so far as it is of itself.

14. To that which is objected, that to believe what is indubitable is not meritorious, it can be said that to believe that God is, so far as it is of itself, is not meritorious except in this, that it is laid down as a substratum for that which is, that God is three, or for the other articles of faith, since they are founded upon it; and by reason of those it can be made meritorious, because, if it is believed by itself and bare, it is not efficacious for meriting. But the Apostle is speaking of this, that God is, inasmuch as it is the *substratum* of the other things to be believed; and this substratum is implanted in man by nature, lest, if the human understanding knew nothing of God from its own nature, it might excuse itself through ignorance. And this is what Master Hugh says: "Therefore God from the beginning of nature willed to be neither wholly manifest to the human conscience nor wholly hidden, lest, if he were wholly manifest, faith should have no merit, nor unbelief any place; for unbelief would be convicted by what is manifest, and faith would not be exercised upon what is hidden. But if he were wholly hidden, faith would not be helped by knowledge, and unbelief would be excused by ignorance. Wherefore it was fitting that God should betray himself as hidden, lest, if he were wholly concealed, he should be utterly unknown, and again that, having betrayed and made himself known in some measure, he should conceal himself, lest he be wholly manifested; so that there might be something known to nourish the wit of man, and again something hidden to provoke it."

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