Quaest. 1, Art. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/1/q/bon-qmt-q1-a2
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### Article II. *Whether it is a credible truth that God is three.*

Granted that it is an indubitable truth that God is, it is next asked whether it is a *credible* truth that God is three. And by *credible* I mean what is *fitting* and *due* to be believed. And that it is *due* to be believed is shown as follows.

1. Matthew, last chapter: *Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* To these words there is added, in the last chapter of Mark: *He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned.* But that truth, without

belief in which there can be no salvation, is a truth in the highest degree credible; but that God is three is of this sort: therefore, etc.

2. Again, Athanasius in the Creed: "Now the catholic faith is this, that we venerate one God in trinity and trinity in unity"; and a little before this is set down: "Which unless everyone keep whole and inviolate, without doubt he shall perish eternally": therefore, if without this faith there can be no salvation, the same follows as before.

3. Again, Augustine, *On the Trinity,* book I, chapter 3: "When the unity of the Trinity is inquired into, of Father and Son and Holy Spirit, nowhere is error more dangerous, nor is anything sought with more labour, nor is anything found with more fruit"; but everything of that sort is in the highest degree credible, in which there is danger in erring and salvation in judging rightly: since therefore it is a truth of this sort that God is three, the same returns as before.

4. Again, Augustine in the *Hypognosticon,* book I, chapter 3 says that "no one can be saved without faith in the Mediator": therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Mediator; but the Mediator cannot be known unless the distinction of persons be known; therefore to believe the distinction of the persons is necessary for salvation. But this distinction of persons is in the Trinity: therefore that God is three is a truth which it is necessary to believe for salvation.

5. Again, no one can be saved in whom the Trinity does not dwell; for the whole Trinity dwells together in man by grace; but the Trinity does not dwell save in him who believes: therefore no one can be saved except in that he believes the most blessed Trinity. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved thus by what is said in John, chapter 14, *that the world cannot receive the Spirit of truth, because it seeth him not nor knoweth him; but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you and shall be in you.*

6. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who is not a member of Christ; but he cannot be a member unless he be joined on; and he cannot be joined on save through faith, hope and charity: therefore no one can be saved without faith in Christ. But faith in Christ includes faith in the eternal generation, and according to that the distinction of the Trinity is regarded: therefore without faith in the Trinity it is impossible that anyone be saved.

7. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who does not believe that God is a creative principle; for unless this be believed of God, in no way is God rightly worshipped and venerated by man; but it is nobler to be a generative principle than a creative one, because an offspring begotten is nobler than a creature made: therefore no one can be saved who does not believe that God is a generative principle, and by parity of reasoning a spirative one also, and through this, unless he believe that God is three.

8. Again, it is impossible that anyone be saved who does not love and honour him who is to be loved and honoured in the highest degree; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be loved and honoured in the highest degree, as the Father is, according to what is said in John, chapter 5: *He who honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father, who sent him*: therefore no one can be saved who does not love and honour the Son and the Holy Spirit as he does the Father. But no one loves and honours unless in some way he knows and believes: therefore, etc. — From these things it is manifestly shown that for salvation it is *necessary* and *due* to believe that God is three.

Again, that it is *fitting* is shown as follows.

9. A right affection adheres more to the highest goodness than to itself: therefore a right understanding also assents more to the highest truth than to itself. If therefore our understanding is set right by believing, it is necessary that some truth be proposed to it which exceeds its own judgment; but the first among the truths and credible things proposed is that God is three and one: therefore, although it lies hidden from the human understanding, it is rightly and fittingly proposed for belief.

10. Again, just as charity takes the affection captive unto the obedience of Christ, so faith takes the understanding captive; but it would not take it captive unless it made it assent to some truth which exceeds its judgment: therefore it is fitting that the first thing proposed among credible things should exceed the human understanding.

11. Again, "what seems so to all, or to the many, or to the wise, by that very fact that it so seems is made probable": therefore what is believed by the many, or by the wise, by that very fact that it is believed is made credible; but that God is three is believed by the many and by the wise: therefore it is fitting to believe that he is three.

12. Again, it is more unreasonable to hold that an innumerable multitude believes what is incredible than to hold that what is believed by a multitude is credible; but it is most certain that it is believed by a multitude that God is three: therefore it is reasonable to believe so.

13. Again, just as understanding is owed to reason, so believing is owed to authority; but nothing is more au-

thentic than sacred Scripture is, which has its stability not only from the assertion of truth and from its own antiquity, but also from miracles and prophecies: if therefore the divine Scriptures commonly bear witness to this truth, it is fitting and reasonable to believe that truth, namely that God is one in trinity.

14. Again, since there is a threefold kind of what is credible, according to Augustine: "For some things are believed and understood at once, some are first believed and afterwards understood, some are believed and never understood, as is a history running through human deeds"; that is more credible which is so believed that it can be understood by reason, than that which cannot; but that God is three is of this sort: therefore, since certain historical facts narrated by authentic Scripture are credible — for it is not incredible that "Abraham begot Isaac," nay it is highly credible; and so too of other like things — therefore it is credible that God is three and one.

**Sed contra:** 1. Everything the contrary of which all reason dictates is incredible to reason; but all reason dictates the contrary of this, that one thing be really three: therefore it is incredible to reason.

2. Again: Everything the contrary of which created nature holds forth is incredible to reason; but every created nature holds forth the contrary of this, that one thing in an unmultiplied form be multiplied in supposits; for in any created nature whatever, when the supposit is multiplied, the form is multiplied: therefore if our understanding is led by the hand through creatures to know God, whether he is, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter 13: *We see now through a glass in a dark manner*; since every created nature has a dictate contrary to this truth, that God is three: it must be that this is an incredible truth.

3. Again, everything which is believed is believed either through reason or beside reason: if therefore it is a credible truth that God is three, then it is so either from reason or beside reason; but if *from reason,* then it is no longer meritorious, because "faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof." If *beside reason;* but what is believed beside reason by one having the use of reason is believed unreasonably and is not a credible truth: therefore it is believed unreasonably, and therefore it is an incredible truth that God is three.

4. Again, everything which is believed is believed either for its own sake or for the sake of something else: if therefore it is a credible truth that God is three, then either in this way or in that. If for the sake of something else: then it is not the object of right faith itself; if for its own sake — but nothing is lovable for its own sake save what of itself suffices for the affection: therefore nothing is credible for its own sake save what of itself lies open to the understanding. But that God is three does not lie open to the understanding of itself: therefore it is not a credible truth.

5. Again, virtue is in accord with nature, because, as Tully says, and Augustine approves, "virtue is a habit in the mode of nature agreeable to reason": therefore what is incredible to natural virtue is incredible to the virtue of faith; but that God is three is not credible from nature itself: therefore neither is it credible from a virtue superadded to nature.

6. Again, grace is the perfection of nature, and a perfection is not repugnant to what is perfectible, but agrees with it: if therefore it is not credible through nature that God is three, then neither is it through superadded grace.

7. Again, "the Founder of nature does nothing against cooperating nature": therefore the teacher and inspirer of nature does nothing against the natural dictate of reason: if therefore it is not credible through the natural dictate of reason that God is three, then it is not credible through superadded inspiration.

8. Again, the principle of scientific cognition ought to be most easy to know, as is plain in the principles of demonstrations, which are known of themselves to the understanding: therefore the principle of the cognition of faith ought to be most easy to believe; but that God is three is not most easy to believe, nay it is very difficult, as is plain in those who do not yet have faith: therefore it is not the first among credible things; nor is it the middle nor the last, as appears: therefore in no way is it credible. — By these reasons it seems possible to show that it is not credible as *fitting* to be believed that God is three.

Again, it is shown that it is not credible as *due* to be believed.

9. No one is held to that which he cannot do, because Jerome says: "Let him be anathema who says that God has commanded the impossible"; but to believe that God is three is not in our power, because to have faith is the gift of God: therefore if no one is obliged to what is not in his own power, no one is obliged to believe that.

10. Again, if we are obliged to believe this, it is either according to the law of *nature,* or of *Scripture,* or of *gra-*

*ce.* Not according to the law of *nature,* because that is impressed upon the heart of men and is best known to all; but this is a hidden truth and lies beyond human industry. Not according to the law of *Scripture,* because this truth was credible before Scripture began; and again, if it were credible only because of Scripture, it would not regard every time nor all persons. Nor yet according to the law of *grace,* because this faith was before the law of grace began; and besides, the law of grace is a law not burdensome: if therefore it is difficult to believe this, we are not obliged to it according to the law of grace; nor according to the law of *nature* nor of *Scripture,* as has been shown: therefore in no way are we bound to believe it.

11. Again, if we are bound to believe it, it is either because it is *true,* or because it is *a truth falling under a precept.* Not because it is true, for then by parity of reasoning we should be bound to believe every truth; if because it falls under a precept, then either under a *moral* or a *sacramental* one; not because under a sacramental one, that is agreed; nor because under a moral one, since all moral matters are reduced to the ten precepts of the decalogue, in none of which is it enjoined to believe that God is three: therefore in no way are we bound to it.

12. Again, if we are bound, it is either because the truth is *seen,* or because it is *heard,* or because it is *inspired.* Not because seen, for no wayfarer has seen this; not because heard, for then no one would be bound to believe it save he who had heard; if because inspired — but everyone to whom it is inspired believes: therefore no one is bound save he who believes. But this is false: therefore so is the first.

13. Again, I ask what moves a Christian to believe that truth. *If you say* that divine Scripture moves you: then if divine Scripture did not teach this, you would not believe it; *but on the contrary:* suppose that the whole of Scripture were burnt, still the Church would not withdraw from faith in the Trinity, nor would the Christian soul: therefore the principal reason moving us to that belief does not reside on the side of Scripture. — *Again, if you say* that miracles do; *on the contrary:* "Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof"; and such faith as is from miracles is extorted rather than voluntary: therefore belief of this sort would not be meritorious. — *If you say* that grace does; *on the contrary:* no one knows whether he has grace, therefore no one knows whether he ought to believe that truth; but of a credible thing to the believing of which we are bound, we are certain that we ought to believe it: therefore we are not moved to believe this by reason of grace. — *If you say* that the *eternal truth* itself moves to believing this; *but on the contrary:* truth moves to believing nothing except because it is truth seen: therefore, since this truth is not seen by the soul, it seems that the soul is moved to believe from somewhere other than from the eternal truth itself.

There is therefore this question: if that is a credible truth, by what are we moved to believe it, and by what are we bound to believe it?

> **Conclusio.** *That God is three is a credible truth, because to believe this is fitting, due and worthy.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that it is a credible truth that God is three, as *fitting* and *due* and *worthy* to be believed.

For the understanding of which it is to be noted that, since that credible truth is the foundation of the whole Christian faith, to this end, that the foundation may remain unshaken, it has a threefold testimony, by which we are *led by the hand, bound* and *lifted up* to believe it. And this threefold testimony is regarded according to the threefold book, which is the *book of the creature,* the *book of Scripture* and the *book of life.* The first book gives an *efficacious* testimony, the second gives a *more efficacious* one, the third indeed the *most efficacious.* — For the first book, which is the *book of the creature,* which I therefore call the *first,* because it is shown first to our senses, gives a twofold testimony, that *in the mouth of two witnesses every word may stand*. For every creature is either only unto a *vestige* of God, as is corporeal nature, or unto an *image* of God, as is the intellectual creature. Each of these bears witness to the Trinity, but that which holds the character of a *vestige* does so as it were *from afar.* For every creature has mode, species and order, or unity, truth and goodness, or measure, number and weight; which by appropriation correspond to the trinity of persons and through which it is testified that God is three. And this is what Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-three Questions*: "Everything that is, is one thing by which it *subsists,* another by which it is *distinguished,* another by which it *agrees.* Every

creature therefore shows its cause to be threefold: that by which it *is,* and that by which it *is this,* and that by which it *is at one with itself;* and the cause of the creature, that is the author, we call God. There must therefore be a Trinity, than which perfect reason can find nothing more excellent, more intelligent and more blessed." From this Augustine shows that the creature holds the character of a *vestige,* which bears witness that God is three.

But that creature which holds the character of an *image,* being intellectual, bears witness that God is three as it were *from near at hand,* because an *image* is an express likeness. For the intellectual creature has *memory, intelligence* and *will,* or *mind, knowledge* and *love: mind* after the manner of a parent, *knowledge* after the manner of offspring, *love* after the manner of a bond proceeding from both and connecting both; for the mind cannot but love the word which it begets. And in these there is regarded not only the *origin* and emanation by which there is distinction in them, but also *equality* and *consubstantiality* and *inseparability,* out of which it is cried aloud by express testimony that God is three. For since he is spirit and understanding, he cannot lack a begotten word and a proceeding love, in which there is distinction by reason of origin and of the emanation of one from the other, or also, along with this, *equality* and *consubstantiality* and *inseparability.* And this is what Augustine intends to establish in the ninth book *On the Trinity* right to the end, namely how through the created image testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity. — Now this twin testimony of the *book of nature* was efficacious in the state of nature as founded, when neither was that book obscure nor had the eye of man grown dim. But when through the sin of man the eye grew dim, that mirror was made enigmatic and obscure, and the ear of the interior intelligence grew deaf to hearing that testimony. And therefore divine providence dispensatively provided the testimony of another book, namely of the *book of Scripture,* which indeed was published according to divine revelation, which never was wanting nor will be wanting from the beginning of the world to the end.

Now this book bears witness in two ways that the Trinity is, according to its twofold part: in the *old* testament it bears witness *implicitly,* but in the *new* testament it bears witness *explicitly.* — For testimony is given in the *old* testament concerning the Trinity both in *figures* and in *words.* Among the *figures* that was most authentic which was shown to *Abraham, the father of our faith;* of whom it is said in Genesis, chapter 18, that when three men appeared to him, he saw three indeed but adored one, whence he spoke to three as to one, in this understanding within himself and insinuating to others the mystery of the Trinity. — But among the *words* that seems most efficacious for bearing witness which David, the most eminent of the Prophets, said in the Psalm: *By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all the power of them,* where the trinity of persons is insinuated all at once, in such a way that two persons are named *explicitly,* under the name of *Spirit* and of *Word,* and one *implicitly,* under the name of *Lord.* And in many places, nay in almost all of the old testament, though implicitly, yet by figures and words testimony is rendered to the eternal Trinity.

In this same manner testimony is given also in the *new* testament, but *explicitly,* both in the Sacraments and in express documents. For the first of the Sacraments, which is baptism, according to what is written in the last chapter of Matthew, has to be performed with the express invocation of the divine Trinity. For there it is said: *Teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*; on account of which in that fundamental Sacrament the character of the Trinity is imprinted. The words also bear witness to this same thing, among which, though they are many, that one is express which the friend of the bridegroom wrote in First John, chapter 5: *There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one.* And this testimony is so efficacious and express that it not only makes the aforesaid truth credible, that is *fitting* to be believed, but also *due,* since it binds and constrains us to believe it.

But since *not all obey the Gospel*, and that truth is above reason, therefore divine wisdom provided an eternal testimony, which indeed is the *book of life.* Now this book of life, by itself and in itself, gives explicitly and expressly an irrefragable testimony to the eternal Trinity to those who *with face unveiled* see God in the *fatherland,* but on the *way* it gives testimony according to the influence of light, of which the soul is capable in the state of the way; for as is said in John, chapter 1: *The life was the light of men,* because this book of life is *the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.* And it enlightens in two ways, namely by an *implanted lumen* and by an *infused lumen,* from the concurrence of which lumens the habit of faith is drawn forth as an argument for believing that God is three, and consequently every truth which pertains to the worship of the Christian religion.

And this is plain as follows. Through the lumen naturally implanted in man by God and sealed as the lumen of the divine countenance, each man's own reason dictates to him what is to be judged of the first principle *most highly* and *most piou-*

*sly: most highly,* because he is from none; *most piously,* because all else is from him. And in this Christians, Jews and Saracens and even heretics agree. But that God can and wills to produce for himself an equal and consubstantial, so that he may have eternally one *beloved* and one *loved together with him*; and that to judge this of God is indeed to judge *most highly* and *most piously* — because, if it is judged that he *cannot* do this, God is not judged of *most highly;* if it is judged that he *can* and *does not will,* God is not judged of *most piously* — that it is so, I say, and is so judged, this the *implanted lumen* does not dictate of itself, but the *infused lumen* does, from which, together with the *implanted lumen,* it is gathered that it is to be judged of God that he begets and breathes forth one coequal and consubstantial with himself, so that God may be judged of *most highly* and *most piously;* and to judge thus of God is to honour, venerate and worship God in the highest degree. And from this it appears how faith in the Trinity is both the foundation and the root of divine *worship* and of the whole *Christian religion.*

Now from this root, by which we believe that God is to be judged of *most highly* and *most piously,* and through this that he is three and one, it is consequently drawn forth that it must be believed that God is the *creator* of all things, the *punisher* of the evil, the *rewarder* of the good and the *raiser up* of the wretched. For because he is *most high,* therefore it befits his dignity to do things *great* and *just.* And because he is *most pious,* it befits his dignity *to look upon lowly things* and *to raise up things fallen.* And hence it is that we believe him *incarnate* and *suffering* out of the highest piety, and *about to judge* the world at last out of the highest loftiness and equity.

From what has been said, then, it is gathered what the *root* of the Christian faith is, what its *testimonies* are, and also what things are *credible* from it, and that the *principle and first* of all credible things which make for divine worship is to believe that God is three and one. — And because the highest and greatest worshipper of all was Jesus Christ, therefore he himself first commanded that this truth be preached lucidly and openly through the whole world, thereby binding all men to believe it. Whence, since before his coming men were not held to believe the Trinity save *implicitly,* now after the publishing abroad of the new testament all are held to believe it *explicitly,* so that now it is not only credible because *worthy* to be believed, or *fitting* from the testimony of the creature, but also *due* through the divulging of evangelical truth, whose publishing had its beginning from the Saviour, as is said in Hebrews, chapter 2, where the Apostle, speaking of the Christian faith, says thus: *Which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles and distributions of the Holy Spirit according to his own will.*

If then it is asked what moves to believing that truth — whether, namely, *Scripture,* or *miracles,* or *grace,* or the *eternal truth* itself? — it must be said that what *principally moves* to this is *illumination itself,* which is begun in the *implanted lumen* and consummated in the *infused lumen,* which indeed makes us judge of God not only *loftily* but also *piously;* and this because illumination proceeds from the eternal lumen itself, into obedience to which *it takes our understanding captive*, and in taking it captive, while it subjects it to God, it worships and venerates him and renders the understanding fit to believe whatever regards divine honour and worship, even if these be above our reason. This is plain by experience, if anyone will have recourse to the secret places of his own mind. — But there are very many things that *move* as *helping on* and in a certain manner inducing: for the authentic testimonies of Scripture move, the examples and martyrdoms of the Saints move, the arguments of the Doctors and the judgment of the universal Church itself move, and the irrefragable miracles themselves move. Whence Richard, in the first book *On the Trinity,* chapter 2: "We hold nothing more steadfastly than what we apprehend by faith; for these things were revealed to the Fathers from heaven, and confirmed by God by signs and prodigies as many as they were great, and as wondrous as many, so that it would seem grievous madness to doubt of them even a little. Innumerable miracles therefore, and other things which cannot be done save by God, produce faith in such matters and do not suffer us to doubt. And so in their attestation, or also confirmation, we use signs for arguments and prodigies for experiments. Would that the Jews would attend, would that the pagans would attend, with how great a security of conscience we shall be able to come to the divine judgment on this side! Can we not with all confidence say to God: Lord, if it is an error, we have been deceived by thee; for these things have been confirmed among us by signs and prodigies so great, and of such a kind as cannot be done save by thee. Surely they have been handed down to us by men of the highest sanctity and proved with the highest and most authentic attestation, *thyself cooperating and confirming the word with signs that followed*." — And by this is plain the answer to those four things which were last asked: what is it that moves the faithful man to believe that God is three and one?

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that everything the contrary of which all reason dictates, etc., it must be

said that there are three ways of speaking about reason: either of *defective* reason, or of *standing* reason, or of *elevated* reason. When therefore it is said that everything the contrary of which all reason dictates is incredible: if this be understood particularly of *defective* reason, it is false, because there can be something repugnant to defective reason which nevertheless is in accord with *standing* or with *elevated* reason. But if it be understood *universally* of reason according to its threefold state, then the first proposition is true and to be conceded; but the *minor* is false and to be destroyed: because, although defective reason dictates the contrary of this, that God is three and one, yet *standing* reason dictates something which is in accord with it, and *elevated* reason dictates the very thing itself, as is plain from what has been said.

2. To that which is objected, that everything the contrary of which every created nature holds forth is incredible, it must be said that created nature can hold something forth in two ways: either in *itself,* or in its *cause.* For created nature holds forth that *itself* is *temporal* and *mutable* and *composite,* but that its *cause* is *eternal* and *immutable* and *most simple.* In this same manner, although in the *creature* the unity of form cannot stand together with a trinity of supposits, since supposits in the creature are distinguished through matter and through the form appropriated to that matter, yet in the *Creator,* in whom there is no matter at all and there is true fecundity, while one form and substance remains, there is a distinction in the supposits by reason of origin. Since therefore the creature does not universally hold forth the *contrary* of this, that God is three, but rather rightly holds forth *conformably* the very thing itself, therefore it is more credible than incredible.

3. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either from reason or beside reason, it must be said that to believe something *from reason* is twofold: either from *bare* reason, or from *assisted* reason. Although therefore that God is three is not credible from *bare* reason, it is nevertheless credible from reason *assisted* by grace and by the light infused from above. And what is credible in this way is not believed unreasonably, because grace and the light infused from above rather direct reason than pervert it.

4. To that which is objected, that everything which is believed is believed either for its own sake or for the sake of something else, it must be said that it is believed for its own sake that God is three, because it is the highest and first truth regarding divine worship. — And as to what is objected, that every such credible thing lies open of itself to the believer, it must be said that this is true of a believer who has no obstacle, but rather a disposition fitting him to assent to the uncreated truth itself; and so it stands in the case before us, because the true Christian believes this truth proposed to him without any added persuasion.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that virtue is in accord with nature, it must be said that this is understood of *political* virtue; or if it be understood of *gratuitous* virtue, it is not true that it is in accord with nature inasmuch as nature is *fallen,* but inasmuch as it is *reformed* and *elevated,* which is done through divine grace infused from above. — And by this is plain the answer to what is objected consequently about grace, that grace is the perfection of nature. For grace is a perfection of nature not only *making it fit,* but also *reforming* and *elevating* it. And in *reforming* and *elevating* it does not destroy nature itself, nor anything which belongs to nature itself, but the defect about nature.

7. To that which is objected, that the Founder of nature does nothing against nature, it must be said that *nature* is spoken of in two ways: either the natural *course,* or the natural *obedience of the creature.* In the second way he does nothing against it; but in the first way he frequently does, as in works which are above nature, or against it, as miraculous works. In this same manner it is to be understood of natural intelligence, that there are two ways of speaking about it: either inasmuch as it is born to *reason according to its own light,* or inasmuch as it is born to *subject itself under the eternal light.* In this last way it dictates nothing against intelligence; but in the first way it dictates something which, even if it seem to be contrary, after the infused lumen becomes concordant: because what before seemed to reason impossible or difficult to believe, afterwards becomes most easy to believe, so much so that the true believer says to the eternal Teacher himself: *Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible*.

8. To that which is objected, that the principle of scientific cognition is most easy to know, etc., it must be said that cognition according to faith is cognition *according to piety,* as is said in Titus, chapter 1. And although to an understanding proceeding according to the dryness of speculation it may seem most difficult to believe that which is, that God is three and one, yet to an understanding full of piety it is most easy to judge this of the highest Father, that he has an Only-begotten whom he loves as himself, whom also he delivers up for the salvation of men.

9. To that which is objected, that no one is held to that which he cannot do, it must be said that although man of himself cannot suffice, yet he can by the divine help which is at hand for him, if he does what is in him; and because he can do that, which being done he could

believe, therefore he is judged as able, and ought to be bound to it, especially when neither interior nor exterior admonition is wanting; and this indeed is so in the time of revealed grace.

10. To that which is objected, either we are bound according to the law of nature, or of Scripture, or of grace, it must be said that properly it is according to the *law of grace,* in which we are obliged and bound to believe it distinctly. Nevertheless in the *law of nature* also and in the *law of Scripture* there was an obligation to believe, at least *implicitly.* For in every age one who pertinaciously denied that God is three would be reckoned a stranger to truth and to divine worship; but now most of all in the time of *grace,* when this power has been revealed and preached and approved in many ways and expressly. — And *if you object* that this ought not to be, because the law of grace ought to be easy, it must be said that just as to love an enemy is not easy for anyone whatever, but for him who has charity, so to believe God three, although it seem difficult to the unbeliever, is nevertheless easy for him who has faith.

12. To that which is objected, that either we are held to believe it because the truth is seen, or because it is heard, or because it is inspired, it must be said that we are held to it because it is a truth regarding divine worship in the highest degree and publicly preached; and therefore man is not excused by a defect of hearing, nor by a defect of interior light, because he can do that which being done it is inspired in him.

11. To that which is objected, that if we are bound to believe it, it is either because it is true or because it is a truth falling under a precept, it must be said that it is because it is *a truth falling under a precept.* — And *if you ask:* under what precept? I say, under the first, in which indeed it is said: *Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God. The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and him only shalt thou serve.* In this precept we are obliged *expressly* to believe that God is one, but *implicitly* to believe that God is three. And this is plain thus: because by this precept we are bound to worship God with the worship of latria, which is there called *service.* Now to *worship* in spiritual things is by a transference from material things; and in material things to *cultivate a field* is to bring out the shoots proceeding originally from the earth itself. In this same manner to *worship God* is to profess with heart and mouth and work that he is a principle, in such wise that he is not perfectly worshipped unless we confess that he is a principiating principle not only *effective* in creation, but also *restorative* in redemption and *perfective* in glorification; nor yet perfectly, if he be believed to be a principle from *time,* unless he be believed a principiating principle from *eternity;* nor yet, unless he be believed a principle principiating one that *eternally principiates;* which we believe, when we believe that the Father eternally generates the Son, breathing forth with him the Holy Spirit, so that eternally there may be in God a principle from a principle and a principle not from a principle.

For the perfect worship of God, therefore, it is necessary to judge and to believe that he is a principle *eternally principiating one that principiates,* so that there may thus be a manifestation of the *eternal* burgeonings; it is necessary also to believe that he is a principle *creative* and *re-creative* and *retributive,* so that there may thus be a manifestation of the *temporal* burgeonings; and he who fails in any one of these is not a perfect worshipper of God. And since in the time of grace this is revealed not in any manner whatever, but perfectly, therefore all these things must be believed *explicitly,* if we wish to be counted in the number of the worshippers of God; and to this we are bound by the very precept of the divine law, which indeed before the coming of Christ bound *implicitly,* but now *explicitly,* because it is the time for worshipping God perfectly.

From these things it is plain why sacrifices pleased God in the time of the written law and regarded divine worship, inasmuch as they were all *signs professing* and *prefiguring* the human reparation which came about through the offering of the immaculate lamb and the shedding of the blood of Jesus Christ. — It is plain also why in the state of the law of *grace* no *figurative* sacrifice is offered, but Jesus Christ himself in his own flesh and blood, inasmuch as it is the time for worshipping God truly and perfectly; and therefore it behooves that the truest and most perfect sacrifice be offered, which indeed is one and alone, namely Jesus Christ himself. — It is plain also why unbelievers are justly condemned. For if he greatly dishonours an earthly king who takes away from him one small portion of his kingdom, and by this deservedly becomes worthy to be expelled from the kingdom, much more does he who denies that God is a principle principiating all things from time, or eternally principiating within, dishonour the eternal majesty, and he is worthy not only to be expelled from the kingdom of God, but also to be cast headlong into infernal punishment with the devil and his angels. — It is plain also why *we worship God by faith.* For by judging of God in this way, in which the Christian faith judges, we judge of him that he is a principle *most high* and *most pious;* and therefore he is *to be feared* and *to be loved,* by which two man is called back from evil and set aflame for every good; and this is perfect justice, and he who has it is worthy of the eternal inheritance.

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