Quaest. 2, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/2/q/bon-qmt-q2-a1
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### Question II. *Whether the trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature.*

Granted that it is a credible truth that God is three, it is next asked whether the trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature. And about this two things are asked.

The first is, whether the divine *being* is one in the highest degree.

Secondly it is asked, whether the highest unity of nature can be together with a trinity of persons.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is one in the highest degree.*

About the first the procedure is as follows, and it is shown that the divine *being* is one in the highest degree. And that it is so, *faith* and *divine Scripture* sound out plainly enough, Exodus twenty: *Thy God, God is one*; and Deuteronomy thirty-two: *See ye therefore that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me*; and David in the Psalm: *There shall be no new god in thee, neither shalt thou adore a strange god*; and divine Scripture preaches this plainly enough. — And this same thing is to be attempted by demonstration from *reasons*. For the mind of all who use reason supposes God to be that than which nothing greater and better can be thought out, and thereby most excellent in *nature* and *power*, in *wisdom* and *goodness*, in *inflowing* and *causality*. For if he suffered a defect in any of these, he would already not be highest, and thereby would not be God. Let these six, therefore, be supposed as true and most certain.

1. On the side of the *sublimity of nature* the argument runs thus. That which is borne above all things is more sublime than that which is not; therefore if to be borne above all things cannot belong except to one, it is impossible for God to be more than one, nay, it is impossible even to understand it. For if several are understood, it is thereby posited that the same one is borne above the other, and conversely; therefore if each is God, neither is God: either therefore God is not, or, if he is, he is one.

2. On the side of *omnipotence*, thus. He is truly omnipotent who not only can do all things, but from whom also is every *being-able*; but to be able to do all things and to cause every power cannot belong except to one alone — for if it belonged to several, it would suit neither — if therefore omnipotence suits God, it is impossible for God to be more than one, nay, it is impossible even to understand it: because, if each is omnipotent, each can bring it about that nothing should have every other *being-able*: therefore if each is omnipotent, neither is omnipotent.

3. On the side of the *highest wisdom* the argument runs thus. It belongs to one supremely wise to know all things: if therefore there were several gods, either each would be *ignorant* of the other, and so neither would be supremely wise, but rather truly unwise; or he would *know* him, and this either through a *species*, or through his *essence*, or through *himself*. But if through a *species* or through his *essence*, he would receive something from the other and be informed by it; if through *himself*, he would be that other's principle, and thereby either he himself, or the other, would not be God. Therefore the highest wisdom does not allow that there be several gods, nay, it does not even allow the supposing of it, because, if several are thought of, they either have the &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;s[*sic*]ame wisdom, or *different* ones. If *different*: then either the one is superfluous, or both are imperfect; if *the same*: since each one is the highest wisdom, therefore they will not now have a different nature: therefore they are not now two.

4. On the side of the *highest goodness*, thus. The highest good is to be loved in the highest degree and for its own sake: if therefore there are several things supremely good, then either the one *loves* the other for its own sake, or *not*. If *not*: then neither is good; if *so*: then the one beatifies the other: therefore

neither is highest: therefore it is impossible that the highest good be multiplied; nay, this is even against understanding, because either one of them is the *greater* good, or not; if *not*: then the one is superfluous; if *so*: then neither is highest. Therefore if several things are understood to be supremely good, they are understood not to be supremely good.

5. On the side of *inflowing* the argument runs thus. God flows into all things most perfectly: therefore he gives the *whole* being, not a part; but if there were several gods, either one would give nothing, and so would not be God; or each would give a part, or nothing, and so neither would be God; or each would give the same, and then each would be simultaneously in the same thing by essence and by power and by presence; and since this follows upon the highest inflowing: therefore either the one would be in the other, or each would be circumscribed, and so neither would be God.

6. On the side of the *highest causality* the argument runs thus. God is the first, last and most perfect cause, and thereby a cause in which there is a stopping-point in every mode, and according to the account of *efficiency*, of *exemplarity* and of *finality*: therefore if there were several gods, each would be led back to the other: therefore neither would be first, last and most perfect, and thereby neither would be God.

7. On the side of *all the foregoing* the argument runs thus: because, if there were several gods, either they would *agree* altogether in all the aforesaid conditions, or they would altogether *differ*, or they would *partly agree* and *partly differ*. If they *agreed altogether*: then they would not be several gods; if they *differed altogether*: then if one were God, the other would not be God; but if *partly so* and *partly not*: then in each there would be something and something: therefore neither would be simple, and thereby neither would be God. — From these things it is argued that the divine *being* cannot be multiplied either *in reality* or *in estimation*.

*To the opposite* it is argued, first against the aforesaid reasons:

1. Because they do not seem to conclude what is *true*. For since that God is one is an article in which pagans, idolaters, unbelievers and heretics have erred, all of whom have the use of reason; it can not only be thought, but also supposed and believed, that there are several gods; or, if the contrary cannot be supposed, it is not an article of faith.

2. Again, they do not seem to conclude *necessarily*: because by the same reasons it can be proved that there are not several persons in the divine *being*, as is plain to one who works it through, whether on the side of the *sublimity of nature*, or of *power*, or of *wisdom*, or of *goodness*, or of *inflowing*, or of *causality*. But if the reasons proceed from the same middle terms to conclude something false, then they do not conclude necessarily.

3. Again, if by the aforesaid reasons it is necessarily established and proved that *God is one*; since "faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof": then the merit of faith seems to be voided: therefore either they will be feeble, or useless.

From themselves it is objected against them:

4. And first from *sublimity*. It is of greater sublimity to be borne above things of like nature than of unlike, and above great things than above small: if therefore the creature is not of a nature like God's and is as nothing in comparison with God, God is not understood to be *highest* and *most excellent*, if he is borne above created *being* only. It seems therefore to pertain to the divine excellence to posit several uncreated natures, and again one above the rest.

5. On the side of *omnipotence*, thus. "It belongs to perfect power," as Hilary says, "that the nature of the doer be able to do what the speech of the speaker can signify"; and again, reason dictates that so great a power reaches so far, and a greater to a greater, and the greatest to the greatest; but God is most omnipotent: therefore since we can signify that there are several gods, God can bring it about that there be; and since he can make a lesser thing to be, he can make a greater and a greatest: therefore he can make something other than himself as great as he himself is: it is consonant with omnipotence, therefore, that there be several gods.

6. On the side of *wisdom*, thus: because it belongs to the highest wisdom to know something other than itself, and wisdom is the more perfect the more perfect the knowable is: if therefore nothing is altogether perfect except the being which is God, and the divine wisdom knows eternally something other than itself, and this by a most perfect cognition; it seems that there was eternally something other than God which nevertheless would be God: therefore the divine wisdom does not exclude, but posits, several divine essences.

7. On the side of *goodness* the argument runs thus. "The good is in the highest degree diffusive of itself," and "more goods are to be chosen than fewer"; each of these is true of itself; but the highest diffusion of the divine *being* cannot be in a creature: it is therefore into another uncreated nature, and once that is posited the whole divine essence is better, for this reason, that there will be more goods. Therefore if everything better is to be attributed to God by reason of the highest goodness, it seems that the highest goodness does not exclude but requires several divine natures.

8. On the side of the *highest inflowing*, thus. The perfection of inflowing necessarily requires that the inflowing not be

without the divine essence, presence and power: therefore by parity of reasoning it cannot be multiplied without a multiplication of essence and of power and of presence: therefore since the divine inflowings are many, the essences too are many.

9. On the side of *causality*, thus. The first cause is most perfect, it is first and immediate, therefore also proper; but when the effect is multiplied, the proximate and proper cause must necessarily be multiplied: therefore it is necessary that multiplication be posited in the first cause, since multitude is posited and is in the effects caused by it.

10. Again, from all of them it is objected against all: because the most perfect sublimity in *nature* and *power*, in *wisdom* and *goodness*, in *inflowing* and *causality* is the ground for positing multitude in the effects caused: therefore if the same thing is not the cause of opposites, it seems that they lead rather to positing multitude than unity on the side of the efficient cause, and so are rather for the opposite than for the proposition.

**CONCLUSION.**

*That God is one is a truth not only credible, but also intelligible.*

**I answer:** It must be said that this truth, *that God is one*, is a truth not only *credible* but also *intelligible*; because it is necessary and certain not only from the *testimony of Scripture* and the *illumination of grace*, which is found in faith; but it is also certain *from itself* and *from the testimony of the creature*. — *From itself*, then: because the divine *being*, on account of its singular sublimity and sublime singularity, has unity in every mode. For since God has every perfection in himself, and this in the highest and most excellent degree, he is established to be one not only from the *sublimity of nature* and of *wisdom*, of *power* and of *goodness* and of *inflowing* and of *causality*, but rather from *all his conditions* and noble properties which are attributed to him in the highest degree. Whence all the conditions bear witness to the unity of the highest essence.

From the *testimony* of the *creature* also: because every creature, just as it has natural *goodness*, so also is established to have *unity*. "For nothing can be, unless it be one," as Boethius says and Augustine, and as sense and understanding teach. As therefore every creature by its *goodness* cries out that in God there is true and highest goodness; so by its *unity* it cries out that the cause of all things is in itself one. — Nor does the *diversity* of things stand against this testimony. For all diversity of things is comprehended within one universe, which in itself is finite and limited and perfect. But this would not be so unless that plurality were led back to something in which there were a stopping-point; and thereby it is necessary that all things be led back to one last end and one first principle, otherwise there would be a going off to infinity. The very universe of things testifies, therefore, that God is one; whence, just as of one circumference it is impossible that there be, or be reasonably thought out, more than one centre, from which the lines flow and to which they are led back as to their term; so in one universe there is no positing or understanding of more than one and only God.

This, therefore, is necessary and known, and so far known that no one having the use of reason doubts of it, if he knows "what it is that is said by the name". For if by this name *God* is signified the first and highest principle of all things; since in this the whole universe is enclosed, whoever understands this says consequently that God is one. Whence, just as principles are known of themselves, because they are known at once through knowledge of the terms; so to everyone who understands the signification of the terms it is indubitably certain that God is one.

Many, nevertheless, have erred about the number of the gods; for ignorance of the signification gave birth to deception about the thing signified, and this introduced the heresy of a plurality of gods. For because men supposed that to be God which exceeds human *power* or human *knowing*, and they saw that demons could do this; therefore they believed them to be gods; and they erred and were blinded and bent down to the worship of idols; which indeed is most absurd, and no wonder, since "a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end". From this error philosophy rescues us, but much better the Christian faith; and they concur in common in this, that the divine *being* is one in the highest degree. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be granted, because they conclude what is true and through a necessary middle term.

1. To that which is objected about the falsity of the conclusion, on the ground that many have supposed that there are several

gods; the answer is already clear: because they use the supposit and signification of this term *God* otherwise than its institution has it; and therefore there is no contradiction there. Whence, just as this name *God* according to its proper institution has no plural, although it has one according as it is taken *by way of naming*; so it is to be understood in the case before us; and because, through the blinding of the mind, the false was frequently taken for the true, therefore the illumination of faith was necessary. — It could nevertheless be said that *that God is one* can be proved by reason, in so far as his unity is considered absolutely; but the illumination of faith is necessary in so far as it is compared to the plurality of persons.

2. To that which is objected, that they could conclude likewise about the persons; it must be said that it is not alike: because in all the persons the nature is one, and the power and the wisdom and the goodness and the inflowing and the causality; but it would not be so if there were diverse divine natures; and therefore several persons are in no way repugnant to these.

3. To that which is objected, that the merit of faith is voided; it must be said that this would be true if one assented to this truth only on account of the reasons; but as it is, since one does not assent principally on account of the reasons, but on account of the truth itself, therefore he can have merit on account of his faithful assent. For nothing prevents the same thing from being *known* and *believed* according to one respect and consideration and another.

4. To that which is objected about *sublimity* in respect of great and like things; it must be said that this would hold if something accrued to the divine sublimity from the subjection of others; but this has no truth, because God is as sublime in himself and existing alone as if he ruled a thousand worlds. — *Moreover*, it would not make for his sublimity if something of like nature had a servile condition; whence, even though such sublimity may seem in some way to make for exaltation, yet in truth it makes for lowering.

5. To that which is objected about *power*, it must be said that either expression can be understood of that *being-able* which indeed belongs to power. For a certain *being-able* is rather of weakness than of sublimity; for to be able to have a nature equal to oneself and differing from oneself, this is of the dignity of a limited power, and thereby is repugnant to omnipotence; therefore, although it can be said in speech, it cannot be attributed to God; nor is the quantity of the divine power measured according to the quantity of this possible thing, but according to the dignity of its proper act, which is immense, according as the power is immense.

6. To that which is objected about *wisdom*, that it knows something other; it must be said that although God knows eternally something other than himself, and this belongs to the highest wisdom; nevertheless it does not belong to him to know something other *through something other*, but *through himself*; and this cannot be except something other which is born to proceed from God himself, which is in him as in a causing principle. For even if evil is known by God, this is through the idea of the good opposed to it. Whence for the perfection of divine cognition it is not required that the knowable be *a being in act*; nor is it required that it be *the highest being*, since he knows earthly things most nobly and best through himself. But that has its place in the science which takes its rise from things, which science God does not have.

7. To that which is objected, that the highest diffusion and a multitude of goods belong to the highest good; it must be said that the highest diffusion into something *outside* does not belong to it, according as *highest* is said *simply*; but *within*, the highest communication does belong to it. For there ought not to be more than one highest good, which indeed cannot be increased from a multitude of goods. Whence, as to what is said, that the highest good is diffusive in the highest degree; it must be understood that it holds true according as that word *in the highest degree* determines "diffusive" by reason of *power*, not by reason of *act*. And as to what is said, that more goods are more to be chosen; it must be said that this holds true in finite goods, of which one adds to another, and to each of which something of good is lacking, which is supplied by the good adjoined.

8. To that which is objected about inflowing, that it cannot be without God, therefore neither can it be multiplied; it must be said that this does not hold and is not alike: because it is of the perfection of an agent that the effect cannot be without its presence, since it depends wholly on it, and a nobler agent acts by acting immediately rather than through a medium; but it is not so with number and multitude. For this is not of the perfection of an agent, that it be multiplied according to the multitude of its effects, but rather its contrary, namely that one thing remaining in itself be the cause of diverse things.

9. To that which is objected about a proximate and immediate cause, that it is multiplied; it must be said that this holds true of a cause acting after the manner of nature, whose power moreover is confined, and so is a proper cause, not a universal one. But the first cause acts after the manner of art and of will in the production of creatures; therefore it is a most free cause, confined to nothing, and at once universal and proper, because what-

ever of nobility is in the creature must necessarily be posited in the creating essence.

10. To that which is objected, that those are middle terms for proving multitude and diversity; it must be said that they do not prove just any diversity in creatures, but a diversity with order and connection and inclination toward unity, and so a diversity in unity, and by reason of that unity they infer unity in the cause; nor yet are they a way to opposites, because unity in the cause is not repugnant to multitude in the things caused, as is plain in unity, from which proceed the infinite species of numbers. So too the highest wisdom and power and goodness, although they are one, yet because they are not sufficiently manifested through one effect; therefore they infer diversity in the effects caused by it. — And thus the answer to all the objections is plain.

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