Quaest. 3, Art. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/3/q/bon-qmt-q3-a2
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together.*

Next it is asked concerning this, whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together. And that they are incompossible seems to follow from several reasons.

1. An abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: therefore a nature having no supposit is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases; but trinity posits the existence of the nature in several hypostases: therefore it takes something away from the highest simplicity.

2. Likewise, the same is simpler than the diverse: therefore everything in which there is identity in every way is simpler than that in which some diversity, however slight, is found; but there cannot be trinity without diversity, however slight: therefore it cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

3. Likewise, the common is simpler than the proper, as is plain, because the proper implies in itself the common and something more; but there cannot be a true trinity unless

the properties of the three persons are distinct and incommunicable: therefore it is impossible to posit trinity without positing in it some falling away from the highest simplicity.

4. Likewise, everything absolute is simpler than the relative, because, as Augustine says, « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »; whence the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, everything defining is simpler than the defined; but nature falls within the account of person: therefore nature is always simpler than person: therefore the account of personality cannot stand with the highest simplicity. But trinity cannot exist save in persons: therefore trinity is repugnant to the highest simplicity.

6. Likewise, the part is always simpler than the whole; but unity is a part of trinity, and one person a part of the three persons: therefore if trinity posits a true plurality, and a true plurality posits a true totality, and a true totality excludes the highest simplicity: therefore *from the first*, trinity cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

7. Likewise, a point is always simpler than a continuum, and therefore unity than number: therefore the unity of a person is simpler than the trinity of persons; but that which has something simpler than itself is not supremely simple: therefore it is impossible that trinity should be compatible with the highest simplicity.

8. Likewise, either person *is* equally simple as essence, or *not*. If *not*: then either person is not in the divine, or the divine *being* is not most simple; but if it is *equally simple* as essence; yet essence, on account of the highest simplicity, is not compatible with several divine essences: therefore by the same reasoning neither is person.

9. Likewise, either person adds something over nature according to *being and understanding*, or according to *understanding alone*, or according to *neither*. If in the first way: then it falls together with the highest simplicity; if in the second way: then the understanding is empty and false, to which nothing corresponds in reality; if in the third way: then just as nature is not pluralized, so neither is person.

10. Likewise, either whatever belongs to person *belongs* to nature, and conversely, or *not*. If *so*: then, since person is distinguished, nature too would be distinguished, and thus there will not be there what is supremely simple; if *not*; but affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: therefore according to one thing and another; but that which has this is composite: therefore, etc.

11. Likewise, either one person *differs* wholly from another, or *agrees wholly*, or *agrees in part* and *differs in part*. If it *agrees wholly*: then it has nothing proper to itself, and therefore it is not distinguished; but if it *differs wholly*: then if one is God, the other is not God; if it *agrees in part* and *differs in part*: since this is not according to the same, it will be composite.

12. Likewise, when one person communicates with another, either it communicates to it *whatever it has*, or *not*. If *not*: then it gives something of its own and retains something, and therefore it is composite and grudging. If *whatever it has*: then just as it communicates to it its own quiddity, so also its personality. — *If you say* that personality is not communicable; *on the contrary*: because it is as simple as nature, as you say: therefore just as nature is communicable, so it seems that person is.

13. Likewise, the property of a person is either *something* or *nothing*. If *nothing*: then it does nothing, and therefore does not distinguish that in which it is; if *something*, either it *is in the essence* or *not*. If it *is in the essence*; but the property distinguishes that in which it is: then nature and essence are numbered; which is against trinity. If it *is not in the essence*, but in the person: then something according to the thing is in the person which is not in the essence: therefore it must be that the property makes the person composite.

14. Likewise, the property of a person is a relation; therefore either it *passes over* into substance, as the other genera do, or it *does not pass over*. If it *passes over*: then just as substance is not distinguished and does not distinguish, so neither does the property: therefore there is no trinity. If it *does not pass over*: then it expresses something beyond substance, and therefore takes something away from the account of simplicity: if therefore there cannot be a trinity without properties, then it is impossible that it should stand with the highest simplicity.

15. Likewise, just as a point is not composed by its relations, so neither is it really numbered: if therefore God is simpler than a point, then in no way is there in him any real distinction.

16. Likewise, the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore that distinction which is according to an *absolute* property is prior to that which is according to a *relative* one; but the prior a thing is, the simpler it is: if therefore a distinction according to absolutes does not stand with the highest simplicity, then neither does a distinction according to relatives.

**On the contrary:** 1. It happens that we find something *simple*, because it is one in one, and something *more simple*, because it is one multiplied in many; and this is simpler, because it is one in many, as the universal is, yet not supremely so, because it is numbered: therefore if something were one in many without being multiplied, that would be *most simple*; but this is to be attributed to the divine *being*, which is most simple: therefore trinity does not take away the simplicity of the divine essence.

2. Likewise, a plurality of *natures* is not repugnant to the simplicity of a *person*, as is plain in Christ: therefore if *a diversity of natures* makes more for composition than *a plurality of persons* does, it seems that much more strongly a plurality of persons takes nothing away from the simplicity of the nature: it stands, therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, God can create without any diminution of his own simplicity: therefore if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, much more strongly does he generate and spirate while the highest simplicity remains. But because he generates and spirates, there is trinity: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, *to understand* is an act which is in no way repugnant to simplicity, but rather attests to it and is consonant with it; but any mind whatever, by understanding itself, generates a likeness of itself, which is called the *word* distinct from the one generating: therefore just as the act of understanding can stand with the highest simplicity, so also can generation, and by the same reasoning the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the whole trinity stands together with the highest simplicity.

5. Likewise, as Augustine says in the sixth book on the Trinity, « in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better »; but in the blessed Trinity every person is best: therefore three are not anything better than one, and therefore not greater either. But in every composition something added is posited which is in some way more: therefore that highest trinity posits no composition whatever: therefore it is in no way repugnant to simplicity.

6. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest perfection; and the highest perfection does not exclude but includes plurality: therefore *from the first*, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons: therefore it is not repugnant, but most consonant.

7. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest power and strength, because, as was proved above, the more united any strength is, the more infinite it is; but the highest and most actual strength posits the highest and most perfect communication and production, and this posits trinity: therefore trinity and the highest simplicity necessarily stand together.

8. Likewise, light is predicated of spiritual and of corporeal substance, and of spiritual substance created and uncreated, according to a certain proportion and analogy; but the production of a material splendour takes nothing away from the simplicity of the material light, and the production of a spiritual light also — namely of an intelligence or of a word from a mind — takes nothing away from the simplicity of the intellective substance: therefore the production of the eternal Splendour from the Father takes nothing away from the simplicity of the eternal light.

9. Likewise, the simplicity of a point and of unity and of any created principle whatever does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects, and in this way it is not a mark of imperfection but of perfection; but everything of this kind is to be attributed to God: therefore in God the highest simplicity and a plurality of relations are not repugnant. But « relation multiplies the trinity », as Boethius says: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, where there is no matter and situation, there can be no separation: therefore a production abstracting from the account of situation and of matter posits no separation: therefore it stands with undividedness in every way, and therefore with simplicity in every way. If therefore the persons in the Trinity are produced by such a production, then trinity can stand together with the highest simplicity.

**CONCLUSION.**

*The trinity of persons does not take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the first principle is at once threefold and most simple, so that neither does trinity take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity; and this indeed we hold most certainly by faith.

But that we may understand it in some measure, two things must be noted beforehand here: first, the diverse modes of *personal distinctions*; second, the diverse modes of *divine attributions*.

As to the first it is to be understood that, as Richard says in *On the Trinity*, person is distinguished from person in three modes, namely *by origin alone, by quality alone, and by origin and quality together*. The first mode is in the divine, the second in the angelic spirits, the third in men. — For men are distinguished from one another *by quality*, on account of the diversity of accidents and properties by which one individual is discerned from another; but *by origin*, because one man is born of another. — Angels, however, because they differ

in substances and in formal properties, are distinguished *by quality*; but because one does not proceed from another, they are not distinguished *by origin*. — But the divine persons, because they are wholly one in substance and in form and have no accidents, are not distinguished *by quality*, but *by origin alone*; and that *origin* belongs to the person itself not through anything else, but through the person itself, so that, just as God understands by himself and is his own understanding, so the Father generates by himself and is generation itself, and likewise the Son is his own filiation: if therefore there is there a most true origin, the personal distinction is most true. — *Again*, if the person is its own origin, there is no composition whatever in the person, and thereby it is as simple as the essence: there is therefore an undifferentiatedness in every way according to the *thing* between person and essence, and between person and property and essence. Whence truly *person* is essence and property, and *essence* is property and person, and *property* is person and essence. How then can any composition be understood in so great an undifferentiatedness? It is necessary, therefore, in such a distinction of persons to understand simplicity in every way: since therefore it is impossible to understand any composition, the trinity of the persons understood and the highest simplicity are not repugnant. — Much therefore avails toward seeing this: to look into the modes of *personal distinctions*, in ignorance of which the heretics erred.

*Again*, the diverse modes of *divine attributions* are to be attended to. For there is a difference in respect of the *modes of being*, and in respect of the *modes of being related*, and in respect of the *accounts of understanding*. — In the divine, therefore, in respect of *being* or essence no diversity or difference can be found, because that *being* is one and most simple; nor even in respect of the *absolute mode of being*, because, just as in God *essence* and *being* are not another being, so *to be* and *to be thus* are not different. And the reason for this is that in God *to be able* and *to be* are the same, and it cannot be said that he could be otherwise than thus. And therefore, since the *modes of being* are the same as the *essence*, all predicates expressing an *absolute* mode pass over into substance, relation excepted, which expresses a *relative mode of being*; and this mode of speaking, in comparison *to the subject*, passes over into substance, so that the hypostasis is its own property, lest composition be introduced; but it remains in comparison *to the term*, so that a true distinction may be preserved. For a difference of relation from the *subject in which* introduces *composition*; but a difference from the *term to which* introduces nothing but *distinction* alone. Since therefore in the divine no difference is found, neither in respect of the *essence* nor in respect of the *being* nor in respect of the *absolute modes of being*; it is nevertheless found in the three modes just named. For a difference in respect of the *modes of being* is in the persons with regard to one another: because, although they have the same *being*, yet they have it in another mode, since one is from itself and another from another; and this is so great a diversity that it does not permit one person to be predicated of another. For those modes, as was shown before, although they do not introduce *composition*, nevertheless make a true *distinction*.

But a difference in respect of the *modes of being related* is in the persons as related to the essence. For since to arise belongs to the person, not to the essence, therefore the person is referred and is related to another, while the essence is not; and hence it is that one is distinguished, namely the person, and not the other, namely the essence. And from this difference it does not come about that one is *removed* from the other, but it does come about that *something can be said* of the person which is not said of the essence, and conversely. And from this difference there arises a threefold mode of speaking in the divine, namely in *what*, and in *who*, and in *which*, namely *notion, person*, and *essence*; and hence it is that, when *person* is supposited, *notion* is not supposited, nor conversely, and likewise of *essence*. But from the variation of such modes a *figure of diction* is introduced in the divine, as is plain to one who considers.

But a difference in respect of the *accounts of understanding* is in the *essential* properties, which are wholly the same, as truth and goodness are; yet our understanding understands them through diverse things and under one account and another, and therefore names them differently; and this is the least difference that can be found concerning divine things, because it is more on our side than on God's. — The highest simplicity, therefore, stands not only with a personal distinction, but also with a manifold attribution. Whence the reasons which are on this side are to be conceded; and to those on the opposite side it is easy enough to reply.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that an abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: it must be said that this holds true in that in which form and supposit differ, in which indeed there is *abstraction* and *concretion* on the side of the thing; but in the divine, *concretion* is not properly posited except on our side. — Likewise as to what he says, that one not in many is simpler than one in many: it must be said that this holds true where something is more in many than in one, as is the case in number; but it is not so in the matter proposed, because the divine essence and nature is as completely and perfectly in one of its hypostases as in three.

2. To that which is objected, that the same is simpler than the diverse, etc.: it must be said that there is a diversity or distinction which comes from *addition*, as that which is between diverse species, which are distinguished by diverse differences added over the genus; and there is a distinction coming not from *addition* but from *origin*;

and this is in the divine persons, which are distinguished by the fact that one flows from another; and this posits no composition, according to what was explained in the principal solution.

3. To that which is objected, that the common is simpler than the proper: it must be said that this holds true where the *common* is restricted and contracted by the *proper*; for then, by reason of what restricts and contracts, it admits both composition and distinction, as appears in the universal and the particular; but the common is not to be found in the divine in this way, because the essence, although it is common in the divine, is nevertheless not contracted nor restricted nor distinguished in the persons.

4. To that which is objected, that everything absolute is simpler than the relative: it must be said that the relative is twofold: one which expresses a respect toward something *diverse according to essence*; another which expresses a respect only toward something *consubstantial* with itself. In the first way the relative includes a certain dependence, and thereby expresses also a defect from the highest simplicity; in the second way it expresses no dependence nor defect from the highest simplicity, especially when the supposit itself is its own property, by which it is referred; and in this way respect is posited in the properties of the divine persons, not in the first way, and thus no composition is introduced from this. — And *if it be objected* that « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »: it must be said that if it be understood in the first way, it holds true not only on the side of the *account of understanding*, but also on the side of the *thing*; if it be understood in the second way, it holds true on the side of the *account of understanding*, because the Father, beyond the account of relation, implies a hypostasis, which nevertheless is not other than his own personal property.

5. To that which is objected, that everything defining is simpler than the defined: it must be said that this holds true of a *formal* definition and *in the direct case*, where the defining terms are the essential parts constituting the defined thing itself. But it is not so in the matter proposed: both because the divine persons, properly speaking, are not to be defined; and also because nature does not fall within the definition of person *in the direct case*; and also because that definition regards rather the intention of the *name* of person and of nature, according as it comes into our understanding, than that it regards the thing itself according to its own proper *being*, which can neither be comprehended nor defined on account of the highest simplicity and immensity of the divine *being*.

6. To that which is objected, that the part is always simpler than the whole: it must be said that this is true. But what he assumes, that one of the persons is a part of the trinity, is false, because every whole expresses something greater than its part. But as has often been said, there is nothing greater in three persons than in one; for each of the persons is supremely being and true and good; therefore, although trinity in the divine posits the account of *plurality*, it does not on this account posit the account of a *true totality*.

7. To that which is objected, that a point is always simpler than a continuum, and unity than number: it must be said that this holds true of number in the *true* sense, which is an aggregation of diverse unities; but number of this sort is not in the trinity of the divine persons, for the reason that there is not there an aggregation of many unities, just as there is not of entities nor of truths, but there is a replication of the same unity about one and another; and this is what the very word which is called *trinity* imports, that is, the unity of three.

8. To that which is objected, that either person is equally simple as essence, or not: it must be said that it is equally simple according to the thing. — And as to what he objects further, that essence on account of the highest simplicity is not compatible with other essences: it must be said that the case is not alike, because if there were several divine essences, there would be there an essential *agreement* and *difference*; *agreement*, I say, because each would be God; but *difference*, because they are several, and this could not be without addition and composition. But it is not so in a plurality of persons: because, as has been shown, they are not distinguished from one another by any real addition, but only by natural origin; and therefore the simplicity of the essence excludes a plurality of the essence, while the plurality of the person does not exclude the unity of the divine essence, nor does it exclude the simplicity of the person.

9. To that which is objected, that either person adds something over the essence according to the thing and to understanding, etc.: it must be said that it adds *according to understanding*, because in the true understanding of person there is enclosed the understanding of nature and of property and of hypostasis. Whence the understanding of it is composite, yet in such a way that, just as there is no composition, so also there is no addition on the side of the thing. — And *if it be objected* that this understanding is false: it must be said that it is false to say so, because on the side of the thing something corresponds to it; for in the divine those three truly are, namely nature and property and hypostasis distinguished by its own property; yet they are wholly one in the thing itself through the highest simplicity, and because our understanding cannot attain to it, it understands and names under a differing account and under a certain composition, which it posits not about the thing itself but about itself as understanding, as was established in the preceding problem.

10. To that which is objected, that affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: it must be said that it not only prevents contradiction that things be said of the same thing *not according to the same*, but also that they be not said *toward the same*. And because a person has to be referred and compared to another, whereas a nature has not: hence it is that something can be attributed to the one which is not attributed to the other; nor nevertheless does it follow from this that there is in them composition or diversity according to *essence* or *being*; for it is enough that it be only according to *being related*.

11. To that which is objected, that either one person agrees wholly with another, or agrees in part and differs in part: it must be said that a person agrees with another according to essence, but differs according to property; and that property, compared to the essence, is only a *mode of being*, which is the same as the essence according to that *which it is*, because the essence is the property itself, but differs according to that *toward which* it is; and because composition comes according to that *in which*, and distinction according to that *toward which*: therefore the difference which is between property and essence is such as suffices for distinction, yet introduces no composition.

12. To that which is objected, that either one person communicates to another whatever it has, or not: it must be said that it communicates to it whatever it has that is *communicable*, and this is the essence or nature; but *personality*, or the respect which is in that person, expresses rather the account of what distinguishes than of what is communicable; and therefore, although it does not communicate this, nevertheless the communication there is perfect, because along with the communication the distinction remains preserved.

13. To that which is objected, that the property of a person is either *something* or *nothing*: it must be said that the property of a person, formally and properly speaking, is *toward something*; and that *toward something* has to be compared both to the divine essence and to the person which it distinguishes and to the person from which it distinguishes. By comparison to the person *from which it distinguishes*, it truly is a *thing*, because it really differs from that person, just as the Father is really distinguished from the Son by paternity; but by comparison to the person *in which it is*, or also to the essence itself, it is only a *mode*, which posits no composition about God, because, as was shown before, in God *to be* and *to be thus*, or the *mode of being*, do not differ, just as « *to live* and *to live blessedly* » do not differ.

14. To that which is objected, that the property of a person either passes over into substance or does not: it must be said that a relation expresses a twofold respect, namely to the *subject in which* and to the *extreme* *toward which*. In the first way it passes over, as the other genera do; in the second way it remains. And because it, beyond the other genera, expresses a comparison as toward another; hence it is that all things are said to pass over into substance while it itself does not pass over — not because it in any way expresses *something* which is not the essence, but because it belongs to it to be said *toward something*, toward which the essence has not to be said nor referred. Whence without doubt the essence is that *toward*, but it is not that *toward which* that *toward* is; and therefore the distinction is preserved there, and there is no composition.

15. To that which is objected, that a point, on account of its simplicity, is neither composed nor numbered by its relations: it must be said that the case is not alike, because the relations of a point are *toward the outside*, whereas the personal relations are *toward the inside*; therefore, although a point can be called a beginning and an end with respect to diverse lines, nevertheless no hypostasis can at once be called Father and Son, because none can be to itself the principle of being born.

16. To that which is objected, that the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore also a distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative property: it must be said that this does not hold, because every distinction includes some respect; and moreover, that distinction which recedes less from the first and highest unity is indeed the prior one; and this distinction is that in which unity is not pluralized, and such a distinction cannot be essential but relati [*sic*] Whence it can be said either that that reasoning does not con [*sic*] or that that proposition holds true of the relative which implies some dependence. But this kind of relative is not posited about the distinction of the eternal persons; and therefore it does not make anything recede from the account of what is most simple, just as neither from the account of what is first and most absolute, as is clear from what has gone before.

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