Quaest. 4, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/4/q/bon-qmt-q4-a1
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### Question IV. *Whether trinity stands together with the highest infinity.*

Next it is asked whether trinity stands together with the highest infinity; and concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine *being* is most infinite.

The second is whether trinity and the highest infinity stand together.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is most infinite.*

As to the first, the procedure is as follows, and it is shown that the divine *being* is most infinite:

1. First, by the confession of faith in the Creed: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Spirit is immense, and yet there are not three immense ones but one immense one" — therefore there is one immensity in them: therefore it belongs to them by reason of the essence.

2. Again, the Damascene: "It must be believed that God is one, immortal, eternal, uncircumscribed": if therefore these belong to nothing but what is infinite without qualification, the conclusion is plain.

3. Again, III Kings, chapter 8: *If heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee, how much less this house which I have built?* If therefore the being of God can be contained by nothing and circumscribed by nothing, it must be granted that it has altogether the character of the infinite.

4. Again, the Damascene, book one, chapter four: "God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone is comprehensible of him, namely his infinity and incomprehensibility."

5. Again, Augustine, *City of God* XI: "Every infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God"; but everything to which infinite things are finite is infinite without qualification: if therefore the divine being is of this sort, it has infinity in every mode.

6. Again, by reasoning: it is a common conception of the mind that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, neither by himself nor by another; but something greater can be thought than every finite thing: therefore truly and properly the divine being has the condition of the infinite.

7. Again, to every finite thing something can be understood to be made equal by doubling; but nothing can be made equal to the divine being, however much it be understood to be doubled: therefore the divine *being* must be infinite with infinity in every mode.

8. Again, every finite good can be multiplied by the addition of some other good; but the highest good cannot be multiplied, either in reality or in understanding, by anything added: therefore it is not a finite good; and it is either finite or infinite: therefore etc.

9. Again, God's entity and his eternity are the same; but eternity is infinite, because it lacks beginning and end: therefore his entity too is infinite; but if the entity is infinite, so also is the *being*: therefore *from the first*, the divine being is altogether infinite, even according to itself.

10. Again, in God to be able and to be are the same, on account of the highest simplicity; but the divine *power* is infinite, since he is omnipotent and can reach across extremes infinitely distant, as is plain in production out of nothing: therefore the divine being is without qualification infinite.

11. Again, God's power and knowing are infinite, because there are no so many possible or knowable things that he could not do more: therefore by parity of reasoning, since God is never in so many creatures that he could not be in more, the divine *being* as *being* must be infinite.

12. Again, God is the most noble cause of things according to the account of efficient, exemplary and final causality; but by reason of his highest nobility he is so an efficient cause as to be uneffected, so an exemplar as to be unexemplified: therefore so a finisher as to be infinite: therefore just as the divine *being* is uneffected, so also it is infinite.

13. Again, the principle of all limitation is matter or something material; but the divine being, since it is pure act, lacks every condition of matter: therefore it lacks all limitation and finitude: therefore it is infinite without qualification.

*On the contrary*:

1. The infinite is said privatively with respect to the finite, as the unjust with respect to the just; but a habit, if it is truly a habit, is always more noble than a privation: therefore the condition of the finite is more noble than that of the infinite; but what is more noble ought always to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Again, in created things infinity comes from the side of matter, finitude from the side of form; but "God is form without matter," as Boethius says: therefore

it seems that he has nothing at all of the character of infinity, but that he is most finite in himself.

3. Again, nothing is truly removed from anything which belongs to it essentially; but God is the end that completes and terminates the appetite of our mind: therefore the divine being can in no way be infinite, neither by the denial of an end as it is a terminus, nor as it is a completion.

4. Again, "the finite and the infinite are properties of quantity"; but true quantity is not to be posited in God, therefore neither true infinity: and if some quantity is posited, this is quantity *of power*, which regards the power and not the essence: therefore it is nothing to speak of an infinite essence.

5. Again, the infinite and the immense are the same; but the immense is so called by a receding from measure and from mode: therefore the infinite is the same as what lacks mode, that is, the immoderate; but what lacks mode lacks species and beauty: therefore, since this does not belong to the divine being, the conclusion is plain.

6. Again, everything infinite is so called by opposition to the least and by a receding from it; but the least is what is most simple in each genus: therefore the infinite states a receding from simplicity. But the divine being is most simple: therefore it is not infinite.

7. Again, no infinite thing finishes, because an opposite is not the cause of its opposite, and "nothing gives to another what it does not have"; but God finishes all things as the most perfect end: therefore God is not infinite, and therefore neither as to his *being* nor as to anything of his.

8. Again, nothing is infinite without qualification which is finite to the highest truth, which judges of all things as they are; but God is finite to himself, otherwise he would exceed himself: therefore the divine being is not infinite in reality: therefore etc.

9. Again, if God could do one thing only, so that he could not do others, the divine *power* would be called finite: since therefore the account of power and of being is alike, and the divine being is nothing but one alone, it follows that the divine being is finite.

10. Again, unity is most of all finite in itself, since it is the principle of all measuring according to number: if therefore the divine being is one, it is measured, and therefore finite.

11. Again, everything which is *this* and determinate is more finite than everything which is not *this* but common and indeterminate; but common *being*, as universal *being*, is finite: therefore since the divine being is proper and determinate, it will be most of all finite.

12. Again, everything which is separated from something according to place is finite according to local existence: therefore by parity of reasoning everything which is separated according to *being* is finite according to natural existence; but the divine being is most of all separated from all things according to *being*, since this belongs to the first and most complete mover: therefore the divine being is finite according to natural existence.

13. Again, in divine things this is true, that on account of the highest simplicity what is said in the abstract is said in the concrete, and conversely: if therefore something is called finite from an end, and this is true and proper: *God is an end*; then this too: *God is finite*: therefore this is false, that he is infinite.

14. Again, everything comprehensible is finite; but everything simple is comprehensible: therefore everything simple is finite; but the divine being is simple: therefore it is finite. The *minor* is proved, because everything which is known as a whole is comprehended; but when a simple thing is known, it is known as a whole, since it does not have part and part, and it is necessarily finite not only in itself but also to us.

15. Again, either something of God is finite, or nothing; if nothing of God is finite, then, since by a finite power nothing is known except under the character of the finite, nothing of God is known by us: therefore we shall never be blessed. But this is a most intolerable absurdity: therefore something of God is finite. Either then there is something and something to be granted there, or it must be said that nothing of God is finite in itself: therefore on no account is God to be called infinite.

### Conclusion

*The divine being and power, because it is in the highest degree simple, is infinite, inasmuch as "infinite" denies a terminus with respect to the quantity of power.*

*I answer*: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity in the term, one must, according to the art, distinguish before asserting or denying anything. It must therefore be understood that "infinite" is said in two ways,

namely *privatively* and *negatively*. According as it is said privatively, it takes away the act and leaves the aptitude; and in this way that is called infinite which is of a nature to be finished and yet is not finished, and thus it sounds toward incompletion. — But according as it is said *negatively*, it simply removes end or finitude; but this can be understood in two ways, according to the twofold acceptation of "end." For there is *end-as-terminus* and *end-as-completion*; and therefore "infinite" is said in two ways: either by the denial of *end-as-completion*, and thus evil is called infinite; or by the denial of *end-as-terminus*, and this can be so in two ways according to a twofold *terminus*. For there is a terminus according to material quantity, and a terminus according to spiritual quantity; the first is called *quantity of mass*, the second *quantity of power*. The infinite, therefore, taken by the denial of a terminus with respect to quantity of mass always states some incompletion in some way, either in act or in potency, because it states a receding from simplicity. For such quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same thing and in the same respect, and such an infinite is never in act but only in potency, while in act it is finite. But the infinite taken by the denial of a terminus with respect to quantity of power states no imperfection but the highest perfection, because it is not repugnant to simplicity — indeed it cannot exist except in what is in the highest degree simple; and it is in this way that the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith posit infinity or immensity in God himself, who is most simple.

The divine being, therefore, is infinite by the very fact that it is in the highest degree simple and without qualification highest. — For because it is in the highest degree simple, it is therefore in the highest degree united in itself and in its power; and because it is in the highest degree most united in itself, it therefore has nothing contracting it, nothing limiting it, nothing determining it and nothing enclosing it in a genus, and by this it is outside all things and above all things. — Because again it is most united in respect of power, therefore to be and to be able are in it altogether the same, and therefore wherever its being is, there also is its power; and where the being is, there is the centre and origin and font of the power itself; and where the font and origin and centre of the power itself is, it can always go further; and therefore, wherever it can act, it can always act more and beyond, and by this both *power* and at once *being* must have infinity. With this agrees that saying of the *Book of Causes*: "Every power that is united is more infinite," etc. This infinity, then, is not repugnant to simplicity; rather it is consonant with it in a wonderful and inseparable concord.

Further, because it is without qualification highest, it must be altogether immense. By this very fact nothing can be made equal to it, neither by intensification nor by doubling, as Augustine says in book eight of *On the Trinity*; and it must have in itself infinite nobility and goodness, since a finite good, however great it be, happens through the doubling of finite things sometimes both to be rendered and to be equalled, as he says. — Because it is also without qualification highest, nothing can be or be thought greater or better. But estimation can go beyond every finite thing; for if it is understood to have a terminus, it is understood that something beyond it can at least be thought. And by this, if the divine being, because it is in the highest degree simple, is equally without qualification highest, it must consequently be called altogether infinite, as the arguments conclude. For it is not to be granted that it is finite in essence and infinite in power, as some have said; for these are in God altogether one, and infinity in the one necessarily posits and includes infinity in the other, since the one cannot extend itself to anything without the other. — And again, since in spiritual things the greater and the better are the same, then, since essence and power are of equal goodness, they will necessarily be of equal infinity as well.

From this word we can be led by the hand to understand how simplicity is not repugnant to immensity. For if, as Augustine says, "the greater and the better are there the same," then, just as it can be understood that what is in the highest degree simple is best, so it can also be understood to be greatest; and just as it can be understood that what is in the highest degree simple is in the highest degree powerful, so it can be understood that it is most simple and most infinite; and just as it can be understood to be present to all things by power, so also by *essence*; and just as all things compared to the divine power can do as it were nothing, so all things compared to the *essence* are as it were the least. — Whence in respect of the divine *being* this whole world

is as something least. And this is what is said in Wisdom, chapter 11: *Because as the weight of the balance, so is the whole world before thee, and as a drop of the morning dew that falleth down upon the earth*; and in Isaiah, chapter 40: *Behold the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance*; and afterward: *All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity.* — It must therefore be granted that not only the divine *power* but also the divine *being* is infinite, as the arguments brought forward for this side show.

1. To that which is objected, that *infinite* is said privatively: it must be said that, as has already been said, although *the infinite in a creature* states a *privation* with respect to the finite according to the *thing* and to the *manner of speaking*, nevertheless, as it is posited in *God*, it states a most true *position* according to the *thing*, and it states a completion greater than what is finite does; for it is not said by the privation of *completion*, as has already appeared, but by the privation of *limitation* and constriction, which state a defect from the state of most perfect completion. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

2. But to that which is objected, that infinity comes from the side of matter: it must be said that this is true according as infinity is founded upon quantity *of mass*, which indeed draws its origin from the side of the material principle; but it is otherwise when it is founded upon quantity *of power*, because active power draws its origin from form; and it is in this way that infinity is posited in God, not in the way premised. And therefore that objection does not go through.

3. To that which is objected, that God is an end, therefore he is not infinite: it must be said that God is a *finishing* end, not a *finished* end, because he is an end not as a terminus within a thing, but as terminating every appetite of a thing capable of beatitude: infinity is therefore not opposed to a *finishing* end, but only to a *finished* end as to an intrinsic terminus. And therefore that objection does not go through.

4. To that which is objected, that the finite and the infinite are properties of quantity: it must be said that although in God there is no quantity *of mass*, there is nevertheless quantity *of power*; and this quantity *of power* is not only attended to in a power *operating outwardly*, but quantity *of power* is also called *excellence of worth*, whether in absolute things or in relative ones; whence it can be posited about everything about which a degree of excellence with respect to another is posited; and such is not only the divine *power* but also the divine *being*. And therefore the character of infinity has to belong to both.

5. To that which is objected, that the infinite and the immense state a receding from the mean and from mode: it must be said that in a limited nature a receding from mode and mean states a defect; but in a nature which is above every constricting limit it states no defect at all: because, according to Augustine, "God is a mode without mode"; and this is said because his immensity is a mode to himself, an immensity which is constricted by the limits of no measure; and in this way the lack of mode does not induce a lack of species or of beauty, but rather the excellence of both.

6. To that which is objected, that the infinite is said by opposition to the least: it must be said that this is true of an infinite founded upon a quantity repugnant to simplicity, such as quantity *of mass*, but not of that which is founded upon quantity *of power*, because this is in the highest degree consonant with it, as has been said.

7. To that which is objected, that no infinite thing finishes: it must be said that the infinite, according as it takes away the character of *completion*, does not finish by the finitude of completion; and the infinite, even according as it takes away the character of *terminus*, does not finish as a *terminus within*, yet it can finish as *completing and beatifying*; because the appetite of a thing capable of beatitude is never brought to rest except in a thing which has immense goodness, where it can desire nothing beyond.

8. To that which is objected, that nothing is infinite which is finite to the highest truth: it must be said that *something's being finite to the highest truth* can be understood in two ways: in one way, because the highest truth judges that thing to be finite to the highest truth, and in this way that proposition holds true; in another way, because it does not exceed the judgment of the highest truth, which, since it is immense in itself, can comprehend every immensity in itself; and in this way it does not follow that what is finite *to itself* is finite *without qualification* — rather there is there the sophism of *in a certain respect* and *without qualification*.

9. To that which is objected, that if God could do one thing only, so that he could not do others, the divine *power* would be called finite: it must be said that the case is not alike, because power is *outward* and toward created effects, which

are finite; whence if he could act upon one thing alone, it would follow that his power did not extend except to the finite, and by this that it was finite. But it is otherwise with the divine *being*, because that is absolute and as it were *inward*; and although it is one alone, that one is nevertheless immense — both because that *being* has no limitation within itself, and because it is the font of all *being*, and because nothing can be without the divine *being*. Whence, since the divine *essence* is in all things, as the divine *power* is, and if per impossibile infinite beings were posited, God would be in all of them: hence it is that the divine *being* has infinity in itself, just as the *power* does.

10. To that which is objected, that unity is most of all finite, etc.: it must be said that this holds true of that unity which enters into the constitution of a thing or of a number after the manner of a *part*, a *terminus* or a *completion*; and this is aggregable unity, which, joined with another, induces a greater numerosity, and such unity draws its origin from the limitation which form attributes to matter itself: and therefore it is the principle of measuring in the genus of discrete quantity. But the divine unity is not of this sort: because it can neither enter into the constitution of another part, since it is most perfect, nor does it draw its origin from elsewhere, since it is first; therefore it is neither limited nor measured, but rather immense, because it is neither *constricting* nor *constricted*, neither by another nor by itself.

11. To that which is objected, that what is *this* is more finite: it must be said that *this something* is properly so called by distinction from what is *a what of such a kind*; and that is *here and now*, because it has a contraction of place and time. For upon the individuation of a thing existing in a genus there necessarily follow accidental properties, a collection of which is not to be found in another. But it is not so with the divine *being*; for although the divine *being* is called *this* on account of its highest completion and its discreteness from every other *being*, it is nevertheless not *in a genus*; therefore neither is it said *to become this* by contraction or by the addition either of matter, or of an essential property, or of an accidental one; and therefore it is *this* in such a way that it is not contracted to *here and now*, but is *always and everywhere*, far more excellently than any universal, which depends upon particular *being* and by reason of that admits some contraction. And therefore, although universal *being* is finite, nothing prevents the divine *being* from being infinite.

12. To that which is objected, that everything which is separated from something according to place is finite: it must be said that the case is not alike, because what is separated from something according to *place* is separated from it in such a way that it is not in it, and therefore by this very fact is contracted and limited and finite; but what is separated from something according to an *essential difference* can nonetheless be in it — as God is essentially distinguished from a creature, and nevertheless is in every creature potentially, presentially and essentially; and therefore from such a mode of the separation of forms finitude and limitation cannot be inferred, as they can from the mode of separation according to position.

13. To that which is objected, that in divine things abstract terms are said concretely, and conversely: it must be said that the abstract of what is finite, which is said concretely, is *finitude*, not *end*; for the *concrete* taken from "end" is not called *finished* but *finishing*, as *finite* is said from finitude; and therefore that argument is not valid.

14. To that which is objected, that everything comprehensible is finite: it must be said that the divine *being* is not comprehensible to a finite power, although it is simple, for this reason, that simplicity and immensity are rooted upon the same thing in that it has infinity according to *virtual quantity*, as was shown before; and therefore, just as it cannot be known part by part, because it is in the highest degree simple, so neither can it be totally comprehended, on account of its highest immensity.

15. To that which is objected last, that either something of God is finite, or nothing: it must be said that whatever is of God as existing in God — since it is God himself, not a part of God — necessarily holds the character of the infinite; because, however, "everything which is received in something is received not after the manner of the thing received but after the manner of the receiver," and the power of the created understanding is finite

— hence it is that it knows him finitely, and by this very fact is to be beatified in him. Nor is that understanding false, because it places the mode of finitude *about the knower itself* and about its own knowing, and not about *God as known*, since it understands him to be infinite, although it is in no way able to comprehend his infinity, as was shown more fully in the question on the comprehension of the soul of Christ.

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