Quaest. 4, Art. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/4/q/bon-qmt-q4-a2
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and infinity can stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and infinity, or immensity, can stand together. And that they are incompossible seems to follow thus.

1. Because a creature is finite, whatever is in it is finite: therefore, since the divine being is immense, whatever is in it is actually infinite; but in the divine there is number, or a plurality of persons: therefore it is necessary that this extend itself to infinity: therefore it does not stop at trinity.

2. Again, since infinity is twofold, namely *of power* and *of number*, it is impossible that the divine *being* should lack infinity *of power*: therefore by the same reasoning, if we place in God a true plurality, as we do a true power; therefore it is necessary that that plurality too have infinity.

3. Again, a power altogether infinite, when it emanates according to every mode of its own potency and infinity, emanates infinitely through every mode; but the divine power is infinite in this way, and according to every mode of its infinity it emanates in the production of the persons: therefore the same as before.

4. Again, a person producing two either *can* produce more, or *cannot*. If it *cannot*: then by producing it loses its *power*; but if it *can*: then either it is not of the highest liberality, or it must produce in such a way that there is no stopping.

5. Again, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate out of itself infinite radiances: therefore, since the eternal light is immense, and the radiance proceeding from it is a true person; it is necessary that there be there an infinity of persons: therefore trinity and infinity do not stand together.

6. Again, either the production of the persons *bears witness to power*, or it *does not*. If it *does not*: then it ought not to be placed in the one supremely powerful; if it *does*: then a greater multiplication answers to a greater power, and the greatest to the greatest, and an infinite to an infinite: therefore trinity does not stand with infinity.

7. Again, if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to the production of creatures, it would be necessary that it produce infinite creatures: therefore since it is so with respect to the persons, it is necessary, if it is infinite, that it produce infinite persons.

8. Again, because the divine understanding is infinite, it is necessary that it understand infinite things: therefore, since the divine *saying* is infinite, it is necessary that it say infinite things; but as many as are the things said, so many are the words; as many words, so many persons: therefore infinite persons.

9. Again, for an understanding to be perfect, it does not suffice that it understand itself, but also that it understand itself understanding: therefore for an understanding to be of infinite completeness, it is necessary that it be reflected upon itself by infinite reflections; but by understanding itself it generates a word: therefore by a second reflection a second word, and so on to infinity: therefore if infinity is to be placed in God, trinity is not.

10. Again, either God *can* understand more persons than three, or he *cannot*. If he *cannot*: then his understanding is finite and limited; if he *can* understand more; but nothing is understood which is not in some way either in itself or in its principle, proximate or remote: therefore it is necessary either that the divine *understanding* be limited, or that more than three persons be placed about the divine *being*, either actually or potentially.

Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀʀʏ: 1. The highest immensity does not take away the highest perfection of the producing power, neither by way of nature nor by way of will or liberality, therefore neither the highest perfection of production; but the perfection of production necessarily requires a stopping-point on the side of the term as well as on the side of the principle; but there would be no stopping-point if it proceeded to infinity: therefore the highest infinity of the divine *being* does not place infinity in the persons.

2. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of order — for it does not follow that if God is infinite he is on that account disordered — but the order of perfection necessarily places a first, a middle and a last; and where these are, there is no innumerability, but only trinity: therefore etc.

3. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of connection, for this makes for the highest love; but a perfect connection cannot be unless one person proceeds immediately from another, otherwise there is no

highest kinship; but this does not proceed beyond a threefold: therefore etc.

4. Again, immensity in God does not take away the perfection of beatitude; but the knowledge of each person belongs to the essence of beatitude: therefore if a creature cannot know infinite persons at once and at one stroke, it is impossible that any soul should ever be beatified in God: if therefore immensity stands with the perfection of beatitude, it stands with a plurality of persons. But no plurality is more fitting to a soul capable of beatitude than trinity: therefore etc.

5. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the unity of the essence; for God is one and immense: if therefore unity recedes further from immensity than does a plurality, however small; if immensity can stand with unity, much more can it stand with trinity.

6. Again, the immensity of the divine *being* does not exclude the simplicity of the nature: if therefore an every-way simplicity is more repugnant to immensity than a plurality however slight; if infinity stands with simplicity, much more strongly will it stand with trinity.

7. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the property of a person, therefore neither the true distinction of the persons: therefore it does not place confusion; but where there is infinite numerosity, there is confusion; where there is confusion, there is indistinction: and if this is not to be placed in the divine *being*, then a plurality of persons stands in a finite number: therefore infinity is not repugnant to trinity in God.

8. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not *exclude* causality according to the threefold genus of cause, namely efficient, formal and final; nor does the infinity which is in him *place* several modes of causality in God: therefore if it can stand with the threefold genus of cause, it can equally stand with a trinity of person as well, especially since there is a correspondence of these to one another according to the appropriation of power, wisdom and goodness, which answer to the three persons and to the threefold mode of causing.

9. Again, the infinity of the divine *being* does not exclude the conformity of Creator and creature according to a twofold representation, namely of vestige and of image: if therefore in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons, according to a correspondence of persons; if in the Trinity there were infinite persons, they would have to be infinite in the image; and if this is impossible, it remains that a trinity of persons is not repugnant to the divine immensity.

10. Again, the immensity of the divine *being* does not exclude the indwelling of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy Spirit; but if the persons producing and produced were infinite; since any producing person sends and gives the one produced, then in the making-gracious of a single soul it would be necessary that infinite persons fall between the soul made gracious and the person first sending or making gracious. If therefore it does not happen that infinite things are traversed, it would be impossible that the soul return through grace into the first principle, if there were an infinity of persons: since therefore the immensity of God stands with the indwelling of grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, leads us back to the Father through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit; that immensity therefore stands about the divine *being* together with a trinity of persons.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏɴ.

*In God the highest infinity stands together with a trinity of persons.*

I ʀᴇᴘʟʏ: It must be said that without doubt the highest infinity and a plurality of persons stand together in God; and this is clear as follows.

Infinity is placed in God not by *defect*, but by *excess* — an excess, I say, not of *superfluity*, but of *perfection* and nobility. Since therefore infinity in God does not place superfluity or diminution, but the highest perfection; therefore in the emanation of the divine persons immensity is to be placed with respect to the *producer* and the *produced* and the *mode of producing*, but not infinity with respect to *number*. For if the persons in the divine were infinite according to *number*, this infinity would necessarily introduce *defect* or *superfluity*. For since there are two noble modes of emanating, by way of *nature* and by way of *liberality*; either the two persons emanating in these modes would not perfectly take in the whole immensity of the producer's power, and so they would be *imperfect*; or if they did take it in, the others would *superabound*. And if in the divine *being*, by the very fact that it is immense, it is impossible that anything be superfluous or diminished: it is necessary to place God as three and immense.

*Again*, since the infinity of the divine *being* places immensity on the side of the *producer* and of the *produced* and of the *mode of producing*; just as the divine *being*, because immense, cannot be doubled, but is one alone, so it is necessary that in the divine there be one sole paternity, one sole filiation, one sole procession, and thus one sole Father, one sole Son, one sole Holy Spirit; and by this it is necessary

to place God immense and three. But just as, if there were several gods, neither would have in himself the immensity of the whole godhead, but rather a part of the omnipotence and nobility; so if there were several fathers, neither would have the immensity of paternity; if several sons, none would have the immensity of filiation, but only according to a part. For if each one had the whole plenitude and immensity of paternity, there could be in them only one paternity, just as in several persons there can be only one deity. It remains therefore that if in the divine *being* there is a true infinity and a true plurality, the plurality cannot be extended by infinity beyond trinity, according to what pious faith asserts.

*Lastly*, because that infinity states an every-way completeness, hence it is that it does not exclude the perfection of power, of order, of connection, of beatitude, of representation and of indwelling. And since all these necessarily give trinity to be understood in three persons, as is clear from what was objected earlier; it is manifest that the highest immensity is in nothing repugnant to, but consonant with, the eternal trinity. — And therefore the reasons for that side are to be conceded.

1. To what is objected on the contrary, that just as in a creature, because it is finite, whatever is there is finite, so it must be in God that whatever is in him by reason of infinity must be infinite; it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, there belongs to the divine *being* an infinity *of power* and *of dignity*, not *of mass* or *of numerosity*; and such an infinity is found as much in the essence as in the persons, whether producing or produced, whether in themselves or in their emanations; all of which is found perfectly and entirely in three persons: and therefore it is not necessary that they be extended to an infinity of numerosity by reason of the infinity of the divine *being*.

2. To what is objected, that God cannot lack an infinity of power etc.; it must be said that this infinity and that are not alike: because, since magnitude *of power* states rather an approach to simplicity than a receding from it, whereas a multitude *of numerosity* states a receding from the one and the simple; and God and the divine *being* are immense in such a way that together with this it is simple and supremely one: hence it is that an infinity *of power* belongs to him, but not one of personal *numerosity*.

3. To what is objected, that a power altogether infinite, since according to every mode of potency it emanates infinitely, diffuses itself through every mode; it must be said that, since perfection remains in God together with infinity, that holds true of every mode of emanation and diffusion which belongs to the highest perfection; and this is according to the twofold mode of producing perfectly, namely of nature and of liberality, each of which must be unique in itself, not doubled, neither twice nor three times, much less proceeding to infinity, because this would introduce superabundance and defect, as was shown in what precedes.

4. To what is objected, that a person producing two either can produce more, or not; it must be said that *not being able to produce beyond those two* does not state a defect of potency, but rather its completion: because in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and most infinitely, both as regards the immensity of the persons produced and as regards the actuality of the productions themselves; because in the same way and not otherwise the generative and spirative power in the Father has actuality in generating and spirating, in which mode it had it from eternity. For just as radiance continually flows from the sun, so the Son, who is the *radiance of the Father*, but far more excellently, continually flows from the Father.

5. 6. To what is objected, that if the light of the sun were immense it would generate out of itself infinite radiances; it must be said that it is not alike: because the radiance flowing from the sun is neither altogether perfect nor equal to its origin; and therefore it does not take into itself from a single production the whole power and clarity of the irradiating light, but rather according to the degrees of nearness and distance it tastes and takes more or less of the fullness of the fontal light. But it is otherwise in the Son, who is the word of the Father and the most perfect radiance, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father the whole of what the Father has within himself: and therefore, just as the infinity of the eternal light does not take away its adequation with the eternal radiance emanating from it, so it does not introduce an infinite multiplication of radiances, since a single radiance takes that whole immensity into itself.

7. To what is objected, that if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to creatures, it would produce infinite creatures etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason: both because a creature is finite, and therefore none answers on equal terms to the producing power; and because a creature is essentially distinguished from its producer, and also from other creatures, by a distinction in its intrinsic principles and in the accidents fastened to them; but it is not so in the divine persons, both because what is produced is infinite, as is the producer, and because they are not distinguished by essence, but by origin: and therefore, since there are only two origins, distinct and distinguishing, there are and can be understood only two emanating persons, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines out most sufficiently.

8. To what is objected, that the divine understanding understands infinite things, since it is infinite; it must be said that although God understands infinite things, he comprehends all things by his one self, because in understanding himself he understands all things; so also, although he says many things, yet by one Word he says all things. For by the same Word by which the Father says himself, he says whatever he says; for the Father, understanding himself by a most complete and single understanding, in which the understanding is made equal to the one understanding, and conversely, generates the Word, which is the likeness of the Father in all things equal to himself. Hence just as the Father in understanding himself understands whatever he can understand, so in saying the Word he says whatever he can say and whatever can be said in the godhead. Hence neither can he say another word, nor can any person in the Trinity, for the reason that in that Word is said whatever can be said. — And *if you object* that, just as God has infinite ideas with respect to the intelligibles, so likewise he must have infinite words; it must be said that it is not alike: because *reason* and *idea* state a relation and likeness to intelligibles to be created and produced, or possible to be produced, which are in manifold and innumerable ways able to be multiplied; whereas a *word* states a relation to the one saying and to the first understanding and highest principle, of which it is the hypostatic likeness: and therefore in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, does multitude belong to it, just as it does not belong to the first principle understood first and principally by itself.

9. To what is objected, that an understanding of infinite completeness is reflected upon itself by infinite reflections etc.; it must be said that in the divine understanding *to understand* and *to understand oneself understanding* are the same, even if *to understand* were repeated a thousand times and infinitely, for the reason that in God the one understanding and the thing understood and the act of understanding are the same; and therefore that first act by which God the Father understands himself is most actual and most complete, as is also the Word corresponding to it: and therefore it is not necessary on this account to introduce a plurality of words in the divine. But it is otherwise in a created understanding, whose act and operation differs from the one understanding and from the thing understood, and therefore it can be multiplied and repeated and numbered more and more by the frequent turning of the understanding upon itself *understanding* and upon its own *understanding*, and also upon things other than itself.

10. To what is objected last, that either God can understand more persons, or not; it must be said that *not being able to understand more persons* can be understood in two ways: either on account of a *limitation of the understanding in the act of understanding*, or on account of the *rectitude of judgement* and the impossibility of turning aside from the way of truth. In the first way it does not belong to the divine understanding, since it is immense, but in the second way it does belong. Hence that it cannot understand more persons is because such an understanding, although it seem powerful in understanding, in fact by so understanding turns aside from truth and falls into error. Hence, just as the immensity of *truth* is altogether unmixed with falsity, so also the immensity of the understanding *light* renders the divine understanding wholly a stranger to every error; on account of which the divine understanding takes in neither anything greater than itself, nor another God, nor a plurality of persons beyond the number three — not because it is limited, but because it is most perfectly infinite. — And from these things the solution to the whole is clear.

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