Quaest. 5, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/5/q/bon-qmt-q5-a1
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### Question V. *Whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity.*

Next it is asked whether the trinity of persons stands together with supreme eternity. And concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is eternal.

The second is whether trinity and eternity stand together.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is eternal.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. And that the divine *being* is eternal:

1. The authority of *Scripture* proves it, Exodus, chapter 15: *The Lord shall reign for ever and ever*; and to the Romans, chapter 1: *His eternal power also and divinity*.

2. The *truth of faith* also proves this: "Eternal," it says, in the Athanasian Creed, "is the Father, eternal the Son, eternal the Holy Spirit."

3. Likewise, the *necessity of reason* concludes this same thing. For Richard argues thus: Everything which is *from itself* is eternal; but the divine *being*, since it is

first, is from itself: therefore etc. The major is manifest; because, if it were not eternal, at some time it would not have been, and then it would at some time have given *being* neither to itself nor to others, and thereby would never be. But the minor is evident through itself.

4. Likewise, everything which is its own *being* is eternal; for *being* cannot not be, therefore it can neither begin nor cease, and so it lacks beginning and end: if therefore God, since He is most simple, is His own *being*, nay rather is *being* simply; therefore He is altogether eternal.

5. Likewise, everything which is truth itself is eternal; but the divine *being* is truth itself: therefore etc. The minor is plain; the major Augustine proves in the *Soliloquies*: For truth can neither be thought nor stated not to be; nay rather it follows that, if there is no truth, there is some truth, because, if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth, or that there is not: therefore *being* cannot in any way be removed from truth: therefore it always was, is and will be.

6. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *infinity* is eternal; for if it had begun, it would be of finite duration; but the divine *being* is infinite: therefore it is necessary that it be eternal, otherwise, if it lacks eternity, it lacks immensity also.

7. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *immortality* is eternal; "for what begins from a turning tends toward a turning"; but in the divine *being* there is supreme immortality, since it is life itself by essence, or living itself: therefore it is necessary that the divine *being* have eternity.

8. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *happiness* is eternal; but the divine *being* is of this kind, since it is most perfect: therefore etc. The major is proved, because that happiness is greater which lacks beginning and end than that which took its start from elsewhere: if therefore the divine *being* is most happy, it follows necessarily that it is eternal. And again, all happiness bespeaks the absence of an end: therefore the most perfect bespeaks the lack of all beginning.

9. Likewise, everything in which there is supreme *simplicity* is eternal; the divine *being* is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved: because in whatever there is supreme simplicity, first, middle and last do not differ, and nothing of that sort has past and future, but only an abiding present; but everything of that sort is eternal: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, since being is divided into the *eternal* and the *aeviternal* and the *temporal*, the aeviternal is nobler than the temporal, and the eternal nobler than both; but always what is nobler is to be attributed to the noblest being: therefore supreme eternity is to be attributed to God.

11. Likewise, everything flowing is reduced to something permanent: therefore a flowing duration is reduced to a permanent duration, and so a present passing into the past is reduced to a present always abiding; but such a present is not in a defective thing: therefore it is necessary that it be in the creating essence; it is necessary therefore that the divine *being* be eternal.

12. Likewise, the truth about the future was true without a beginning, the truth about the past is true without a term; but future and past are necessarily reduced to the present: therefore it is necessary to posit a truth always present without end and without beginning. But this is eternal, nor can it be posited in anything other than about the first principle: therefore necessarily the divine *being* is eternal.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Eternity is a measure; but nothing immense has a measure; for if it has a measure, it is not immense: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a measure is equalled to the thing measured; but nothing can be equalled to the divine *being*: therefore there is not in God the duration of eternity.

3. Likewise, eternity is the lack of end and beginning; but nothing lacks that which it is: if therefore God is the beginning and end of all things, therefore the divine *being* does not have the lack of these: therefore it cannot be eternal.

4. Likewise, the lack of a completion sounds of a defect; beginning and end bespeak completion: therefore in God

there is no positing of the privation of these; but eternity bespeaks the privation of these: therefore it ought not to be posited about the divine *being*.

5. Likewise, eternity is the lack of past and future; but God truly was and is and will be: therefore the divine *being* does not have the account of the eternal.

6. Likewise, let A be past time, B future; it is true to say that God was in A and will be in B, and false conversely: therefore A truly passed away with God, and B is truly future: therefore the divine *being* has past and future: therefore it is not eternal.

7. Likewise, where there is eternity, there is interminability, because according to Boethius "eternity is the possession of interminable life"; where interminability, there circularity; but the circular is posterior to the straight, and nothing except what is simply first is to be attributed to the divine *being*: therefore neither is the duration of eternity.

8. Likewise, according to the account of understanding and the order of nature the circumference is posterior to the centre; but what the circumference is to the centre, this eternity is to time: therefore much more strongly is time to be attributed to God than eternity: therefore if it is unfitting to attribute temporality to God, therefore eternity also.

9. Likewise, where eternity, there totality also; which is plain from the reasoning of Boethius: "Eternity is the possession of interminable life, whole all at once"; but where there is totality, there is partibility and divisibility; but in God this cannot be, since there is supreme simplicity: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility: therefore nowhere does it happen that a continuation of duration is found without true totality, and therefore without divisibility; hence an impartible being does not have the account of duration nor is it called *whole all at once*: therefore etc.

11. Likewise, where eternity, there simultaneity, by the definition; but where simultaneity, there distinction, because simultaneity bespeaks a relation, and relation bespeaks distinction; but the divine *being* is altogether undistinguished: therefore it is not eternal.

12. Likewise, if in the divine *being* there is simultaneity in every mode, therefore *being*, *having been* and *being about to be* are together; but among things which are together, what accompanies one of them accompanies the other also: if therefore the aeviternal always accompanies the divine *being about to be*, therefore by parity of reasoning its *having been* also: therefore as it lacks an end, so it lacks a beginning also. But this is impossible: therefore it is impossible to posit in God the perfect duration of eternity: it is therefore not to be posited that the divine *being* is eternal.

13. Likewise, either eternity *adds something* over the *now* of eternity, or *nothing*. If *nothing*: therefore what coexists with the *now* of eternity is eternal; but the *now* of time coexists with the *now* of eternity: therefore it coexists with the whole of eternity, therefore it is eternal. If *something*: therefore eternity is composite: therefore it does not belong to God.

14. Likewise, although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, yet it is impossible that an extension be understood within a point: therefore by parity of reasoning neither a duration within a *now*: therefore if eternity bespeaks a duration, it bespeaks something outside the *now* of eternity: therefore it is repugnant to supreme simplicity: therefore it is impossible that it be about God's most simple *being*.

15. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and the divine *power*, *knowing* and *willing* or *foreknowing*; but the divine *foreknowing* is not measured by eternity, since God ceases to foreknow some things: therefore neither is the divine *being* measurable through eternity.

16. Likewise, by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and *operating*, because in God substance, power and operation are the same: if therefore the divine *being* is measured by eternity, therefore the divine *creating* also: therefore God creates from eternity and eternally, and thereby the creature is eternally created; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows.

17. Likewise, every truth is measured by time, or by aeviternity, or by eternity; but that the world was to be created was true in God before the constitution of the world; either therefore it is measured by *eternity*, or by *time*; not by *time*, because time then was not: therefore by *eternity*. But this truth ceased to be true: therefore it seems that eternity has a term; but the divine *being* is unterminated: therefore eternity cannot be posited about the divine *being*.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being is eternal, because it is simple and infinite at once.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine *being* is eternal, by the very fact that it is *simple* and *infinite*. — For because it is *infinite*, therefore it lacks beginning and end; for if it had either of these, it would assuredly have on that side a termination and limitation, and so would not be of supreme immensity. But because it is *simple*, it lacks prior and posterior, which necessarily bring in diversity and some composition. Supreme *simplicity*, therefore, posits simultaneity in every mode; and supreme *immensity* interminability in every mode; and these two joined together constitute *eternity*. For

*eternity* is nothing else than "the possession of life, interminable and whole all at once"; and because in nothing else is it possible to find these two together, namely immensity and simplicity, save in God alone: therefore the condition of eternity cannot be communicated to anything else other than God. — *Again*, because these two are above our imagination and estimation, therefore the duration of eternity can be understood by no one soundly, unless all imagination be set aside. Let these two, therefore, be joined together, so that there may be understood a duration of the divine *being* most infinite and most simple, and thereby a true permanence, lacking *inchoation* and *interpolation* or delay, and *division* or termination, and lacking utterly and altogether all *succession*. And a reasoning of this kind necessarily syllogizes through the two aforesaid conditions *joined together*, although it may seem contrary to our imagination.

Now something like this can be found in *God* Himself. For just as God, simple and immense, is whole in distant places, and although those places are distant from one another, yet existing here and there He is not distant from Himself on account of His supreme unity and simplicity; so the divine *being*, which is eternal, although it be in diverse times on account of immensity — although those times have distance and delay, it nevertheless is undistant from itself on account of supreme simplicity. And just as the divine *incircumscribability* has all places present to itself, and is not itself extended through them, although they are truly extended; so the divine *eternity* has all *times present* to itself, nor does it itself succeed along with them, although they truly succeed.

In *creatures*, however, although what is wholly like cannot be found on account of their defect, yet something is found with some defect, which indeed, that defect being circumscribed by the understanding, leads by the hand to the understanding of eternity in the divine *being*. And this can in some way be observed both in the *image* and in the *vestige*. For in the soul, which is the *image* of God, there is *memory* of things past, *intelligence* of things present and *foresight* of things future; and these indeed are together in the soul, so that in the soul, which is a spiritual substance, there are gathered and joined together at once things which succeed through diverse times; yet because the soul itself is limited and receives something from a thing *outside*, it falls short of that perfect simultaneity. But God receives nothing whatever, nor has He in any mode to be limited; and therefore it is necessary that all things be understood by Him as present, and this without beginning and end; and this is to understand eternity.

But in *time*, which is the *vestige* of eternity, there is a *present*, a *past* and a *future*, so that what was *future* afterwards becomes *present* and at length *past*, because it is rooted upon *changeable and fluid being* or upon motion itself. If therefore the *present* be understood to be rooted upon *being immutable and fixed*, which has neither a beginning nor a term, that will be understood as *eternal*. — And thus, if anyone by right consideration ascends from creatures into the Creator, taking away what is of incompletion and holding what is of completion, he will be able in some fashion to come to the understanding of the eternity of the divine *being*, yet not perfectly, so long as we are in the flesh; because while we live here, "our understanding is not without the continuous and time," and thereby it is very far removed from eternity, unless perhaps it be raised higher by a special gift; for as Augustine says, "when we grasp something eternal with the mind, we are not in this world." — It is plain, therefore, that the divine *being* is assuredly eternal, and what the necessary reason of this is, and in what manner our consideration can grasp it. And the reasonings proving that eternity is in the divine *being* are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that eternity is a measure; it must be said that, although *eternity* according to the *account of understanding* bespeaks under the account of a measure, according to the *thing* and the truth it bespeaks nothing else than the *being* of the divine substance; and just as that *being* is immense, so eternity also is immense; and therefore it is said to be *equalled to itself*, not by co-termination, since the immense has no term, but by the privation of mutual excess. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected first and second concerning the account of a measure: because those reasonings proceed from a measure which differs from the thing measured, which is terminated and terminates, and thereby is only about a finite thing; all of which fail concerning the divine eternity, nor yet is it falsely called a *measure* according to the *account of understanding*, for the reason that it signifies the divine *being* under the mode of a duration, which duration indeed, although it exceeds every creature to infinity, is with respect to the divine *being* itself neither exceeded nor exceeds.

3. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of beginning and end; it must be said that *beginning* and *end*, according as they are taken in the account of eternity, are the same as the *initial* and *final term* in the duration of a thing; and these terms indeed are only about a thing which begins to be and ceases. When therefore I say that God is *beginning* and *end*, the account of *beginning* and *end* is there equivocal. Hence the defect of that reasoning is twofold: both because God is beginning and end with respect to things *outside*, and because He is beginning and end according to the *account of causing*. But when it is said that eternity is the *lack*

*of beginning and end*, *beginning* and *end* are taken as *within* and according to the *account of enduring*.

4. To that which is objected, that the lack of these, namely of beginning and end, sounds of a defect, since they themselves bespeak completion, etc.; it must be said that *beginning* and *end*, according as they bespeak a term, although they seem to bespeak completion, nevertheless bespeak limitation with defect; and therefore conversely, although the lack of these seems to be a privation according to the account of understanding, it is nevertheless a true position on the side of the thing; for a duration which lacks beginning and end is so true that it has nothing of non-entity.

5. To that which is objected, that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that *past* and *future* are attributed to something in two ways: either so that it be by mode of a disposition of the *thing understood*, or of the *one understanding* himself. Similarly, when something is said to have been in the past, or to be about to be in the future, this can be understood in two ways: either by mode of *when-ness and inherence*, or by mode of *simultaneity and coexistence*. When therefore it is said that eternity is the lack of past and future; it must be said that this is true according as *past* and *future* bespeak a disposition of the *thing* which is said to have passed away, so that in measuring it, it left in it a certain affection or disposition which is called *when*, according to what is said elsewhere, that "*when* is in everything that began to be." But when *God* is said to have been and to be about to be, the *past* is there not a disposition of the *thing understood*, but of the *one understanding*; nor is this said by *commensuration*, *when-ness* and *inherence*, but by *duration*, a certain *simultaneity* and *coexistence*. Hence all those locutions have a certain impropriety; and we stammer out eternity through various times, because our understanding does not ascend to the understanding of eternal things unless it be led by the hand through times, so long as we are on the way.

6. To that which is objected, that God is not said to *have been* in future time, nor to *be about to be* in past time; it must be said that this is not on account of this, that any succession or variation is in the divine *being*, but on account of the connotation of coexistence in past or future time, in which there is so great a variation that neither can the *past* be called *future*, nor the *future* be called *past*. Hence, since He is not said to be *about to be* in the past nor *past* in the future, this is not because *having been* and *being about to be* bespeak another *being*, or another *mode of being*, about the divine *being*, but only about created *being*.

7. 8. To that which is objected, that eternity is interminability; it must be said that this does not take the whole account of eternity, because it bespeaks not only *interminability*, but also *simultaneity*; and just as by mode of *interminability* it bespeaks a certain intelligible *circumference* lacking beginning and end, so by mode of *simultaneity* it bespeaks simplicity and indivision after the mode of a *centre*; and these two are posited together about the divine *being*, because it is at once simple and infinite, and therefore circularity is understood in eternity; nor does it posit posteriority with respect to the *straight*, nor even with respect to the *centre*. — And through this the answer is plain to that which is objected concerning time, which holds the account of a centre with respect to interminable eternity. For just as the preceding reasoning, so this one also proceeds *from what is insufficient*: because it considers eternity insofar as it is the measure of immense *being* only, whereas it ought at the same time to be understood that eternity is the measure of what is simple and indivisible, which can in no way be found in the measure of time.

9. To that which is objected, that where eternity, there totality; it must be said that the totality which is posited in eternity is not regarded according to the quantity of mass, but according to the quantity of power, in which the account of magnitude and immensity stands together with the perfection of simplicity; and therefore it does not follow that where there is totality, there is divisibility; for it has true being only of that whole which is truly quantitative, in which, because totality bespeaks true quantity, it necessarily posits part and part. — Or it could be said that *whole all at once* is there said rather according to the account of perfection than according to the account of distribution into the parts of some integral whole.

10. To that which is objected, that nowhere is a continuity of extension to be found without partibility; it must be said that the case is not alike: because extension always bespeaks part outside part, and thereby corporeity, quantity and partibility; but duration bespeaks *being* not cut apart, which indeed is found not only in composite things, but also in simple ones.

11. To that which is objected, that eternity bespeaks simultaneity; it must be said that *simultaneity* is there said not by the positing of the co-duration and coexistence of diverse durable things, but rather by the privation of succession in the continuity of the enduring thing; hence eternity is called *whole all at once*, because in it nothing whatever succeeds to anything else, not on account of this, that in it diverse and various things exist together. Hence *simultaneity* bespeaks nothing else than a presentiality supreme and simple and undivided, and this bespeaks no intrinsic diversity.

12. To that which is objected, that if in God *being*, *being about to be* and *having been* are the same, as a creature measures itself in its own mode with the divine *being about to be*, so also with the divine *having been*; it must be said that the case is not alike, nor ought the one be inferred from the other. And the reason of this is that, although in God *to lack a beginning* and *to lack an end* are the same, in a creature they differ much. For since a creature is from nothing, it is essential to it to have a beginning and an inception; but not to have an end and a termination is not repugnant to created nature; nor is the opposite of this essential to it, for the reason that the appetite of a creature is toward contraries. And on account of this it does not follow that, if it can be assimilated to God according to that which is *being about to be*, it can likewise be so according to that which is *having been*. For just as it does not follow: justice and immensity are the same in God; but a creature can be assimilated to God according as He is *just*: therefore according as He is *immense*; so neither does the aforesaid mode of arguing conclude or infer.

13. To that which is objected, that eternity either adds something over the *now* of eternity, or nothing; it must be said that, since in eternity there is simultaneity and interminability, or simplicity and immensity, the *now of eternity* names that duration as regards *simple simultaneity*, but *eternity* as regards *interminable immensity*. Just as, therefore, interminable *immensity* adds nothing indeed according to the *thing* over the indivisibility of the divine simplicity and simultaneity, but only according to the *account of understanding*; so also *eternity* over the *now* of eternity. And just as it does not follow that a creature grasps God as most simple: therefore it grasps God as immense; so it does not follow that, if something coexists with the *now* of eternity, it coexists with interminable eternity. For to those things which in God are the same there correspond in a creature things various and diverse, as is plain in goodness and wisdom, in justice and mercy, according to what was touched upon above.

14. To that which is objected, that although a point is the beginning and middle and term of an extension, it is impossible to understand an extension within it; it must be said that the case is not alike: because, although a point is the *beginning* of an extension, yet it is not the *whole essence of the extension*, nor even a constitutive *part*; whereas the *now* is the whole essence of duration, not only in eternal and aeviternal things, but also in the duration of time. And the reason of this is: that *extension* has all its parts together, and because "a point is a posited substance," whence it necessarily bespeaks position in matter; and therefore, since it is indivisible, it cannot be the essence of a divisible whole nor a constitutive part, since every part of the continuous is continuous. But it is otherwise with *duration*, because of it there is never anything but what is present and indivisible, even in successive duration. And therefore it is no wonder if in a *now* the essence of duration can be enclosed, and most of all of that duration in which *essence* and *being* do not differ, as is the case in eternity.

15. 16. To that which is objected, that by the same measure are measured the divine *being* and *power* and *knowing* and *foreknowing*; it must be said that this is true by reason of the *principal thing signified*, but is not true by reason of what is *connoted*. — And through this the answer is plain to what follows, which is objected concerning creation; for the intrinsic act is eternal, as is the substance also; but the effect is temporal, because it is a creature.

17. To that which is objected, that it was true before the constitution of the world that the world was about to be; it must be said that that proposition, although it be one, nevertheless implies in itself a twofold truth. For if it be said that the world is about to be, before the world was made; this is not true except because the world in some mode has *being* in its cause; and as regards this, that saying is true with an eternal truth. *Again*, for this it does not suffice that the world have *being* only in its cause; nay rather it is required, in order that the proposition be true, that at some time it have *being outside*; and because that *being* was not yet *created*, before the world was made, but *to be created*: hence it is that, as regards this, it was not true with a *created* truth, but with a truth *to be created*. And because, when a thing begins to be *created*, it then ceases to be *to be created*: hence it is that that proposition, which signified a sentence true from eternity, ceases to be true, not on account of a termination in eternity, but on account of an inchoation in time, because along with the eternal it gave something temporal to be understood. — And through this the answer is plain to the question set before us.

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