Quaest. 6, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/6/q/bon-qmt-q6-a1
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### Question VI. *Whether trinity can stand with supreme immutability.*

Next it is asked whether trinity can stand with supreme immutability; and concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine *being* is immutable.

The second, whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together.

### Article I. *Whether the divine being is immutable.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus. That the divine *being* is immutable is shown thus:

1. First by *authority*, Malachias, chapter 3: *I am God, and I change not*; the Gloss: "He says this, lest anything of mutability should be thought to be in God." The Psalm: *Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed, but thou art the selfsame*; the Gloss: "immutable."

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by *reason* thus. The divine *being* is simply and universally *first*; but the immutable is prior to the mutable, because the mutable has to be reduced to the immutable: if therefore it is universally and principally first, therefore it is universally immutable.

3. Likewise, the divine *being* is *last*, that to which all other things tend as to their supreme end; but in the supreme and last end all other things come to rest; and all other things can be brought to rest in nothing unless it be wholly immutable in itself: therefore the same as before.

4. Likewise, the divine *being*, as the philosophers say, and as reason proves, is simply and in every mode *necessary*; but everything that has any variation falls away in some manner from necessity according to that according to which it is changed: therefore if it is necessary, it is also immutable.

5. Likewise, the divine *being* is *most perfect*; but nothing most perfect advances or falls short; but everything that is changed either acquires something or loses something: therefore the divine *being* can in no way be changed.

6. Likewise, the divine *being* is *most simple*, therefore it has nothing of an adventitious nature; but in everything that is changed, either something comes to it or something departs from it: therefore mutability does not stand with simplicity: therefore it is necessary that its opposite stand: therefore it is immutable.

7. Likewise, the divine *being* is *immense*; but everything that is changed is changed either into a *better* state, or a *worse*, or an *equal*; but the immense cannot be *greater* or *less*, nor has it anything *equal*: therefore it is simply immutable.

8. Likewise, the divine *being* is *eternal*, as is clear from the preceding; but in every change there is in some manner a before and an after; and this can in no way be in eternity: therefore there is no change; it remains therefore that it is wholly immutable.

9. Likewise, every change is either to *being*, or from *being*, or in *being*, because everything that is changed either receives *being*, or loses *being*, or passes from *one being* into another, that is, from one mode of being into another; but God is pure *being* itself, since He is by Himself and pure act: therefore He cannot be changed in any of the aforesaid modes; nor is there another to be given: therefore He is immutable.

10. Likewise, every change is either according to *substance* or according to *accident*; but God is not changed according to *substance*, since He is incorruptible, nor according to *accident*, since nothing whatever is accidental to Him: therefore He admits no mutability at all.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Wisdom, chapter 7: *Of all moving things wisdom is more moving*; it is evident that it speaks of uncreated wisdom: therefore if it is most moving, the divine *being* seems to be the most mutable among all mutable things. — *If you say* that this is said *by way of cause*; then *it is objected*: that which is movable *by way of cause* and *according to form* is more movable than that which is so in the other mode only.

2. Likewise, rank is regarded in creatures according to greater mobility, because the highest element is more movable than the lowest, and the first heaven than the other spheres, and the glorious body than the heaven, and spirit than the glorious body; but what belongs to nobility is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

Likewise, this very thing is shown by *reason* according to a sevenfold way.

3. And first on the part of *comparison*. Everything to which something comes from time is mutable; the divine *being* is such, because from time He is called *lord*, is called *refuge*, is called *king*: therefore He is mutable. — *If you say* that "in *relation to something* there

is no motion"; *on the contrary:* Ambrose argues thus: if the Father were to become father from non-father, He would have been changed, and yet *father* says a relation: therefore this does not resolve it.

4. Likewise, names of this kind either say something that is *God*, and thus they do not begin; or something *created*, and thus they are not said of God; or they posit *nothing*, and thus they are not said of God more than of another; or something *coming to God;* but this necessarily posits motion: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is shown on the part of *action*. Everything that becomes an agent from a non-agent goes forth "from rest into act"; but everything such is in some manner changed and altered; but God is such: therefore etc. — *If you say* that this is on the part of the creature; *it is objected against this:* because God does not produce on this account, that the creature is produced; but rather the converse: therefore the ground of this going forth is to be placed first in God.

6. Likewise, every agent that acts by several actions, so that now by one, now by another, is necessarily changed; but God is such, because now He produces, now He conserves, now He spares, now He punishes, and one of these actions is not another: therefore in God there is some change.

7. This very thing is shown by reason of *mission*. Every true mission and descent is a true change; but the Son of God according to the Scriptures was sent into the flesh and descended from heaven, and this cannot be according to human nature: therefore He was changed and is mutable according to the divine.

8. Likewise, the Son of God is something according as He is man; but it is impossible that *such* come to be from *non-such* without a change of that thing, as white from non-white; therefore much more strongly does it follow in those things that say substance: therefore if the Son of God was made man, it is necessary that that hypostasis was changed.

9. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason of *indwelling*. Everything that begins to be in something and ceases to be in it is changed at least accidentally; but God by *grace* begins to be in the penitent and ceases to be in the sinner, and by *essence* begins to be in a nature generated and ceases to be in one corrupted: therefore etc.

10. Likewise, if something is inseparably in something, when that is moved it is necessary that the former be moved, because, as the Philosopher says, "when we are moved" etc; but God is by essence in every creature and is in no way separated from it: therefore it is necessary that He be moved, when it is moved.

11. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason of *power* thus. One who could do something before which he cannot do now has a changed power; but God, before He created the world, could create it, and now He cannot: therefore etc. — *If you say* that *to be able to create* is not to be able to do *what*; *on the contrary:* it follows: whatever the Father can do, the Son also can do; but the Father can create: therefore the Son also. — *Moreover*, this does not resolve it, because the same follows if one takes "of whatever kind" and "however much" and any other sign whatever. — *If you say* that what ought to be inferred is: He can *have created;* similarly it is truly said of a blind man that he can *have seen*.

12. Likewise, whatever God can do is possible; but if whatever He could do He can do, whatever was possible to God is now possible; but this is false of what is impossible *by accident*, which according to the Saints and the doctors is impossible to God: therefore the same as before: therefore the divine *being able* is changed.

13. Likewise, this very thing is shown on the part of *cognition:* because one who ceases to know something that he knew, or begins to know, undergoes some change in knowledge; but God knew that the world was to be created, now He does not know it, since it is wholly false: therefore etc.

14. Likewise, it follows necessarily: if God knows something, that thing is true: therefore if whatever He knew He knows, whatever was true is true; but this is false: therefore that also from which it follows: it remains therefore that the divine *knowing* is mutable.

15. Likewise, this very thing is shown on the part of *will*. "Will is the proximate and immediate cause of things," as Augustine says; but when the cause is posited, the effect is posited: therefore the divine *willing* does not precede in duration the *producing* itself: therefore when He began to produce, He began also to will: therefore etc.

16. Likewise, one who wills something and can not-will it is necessarily changed; but God wills to save some wayfarer: either therefore He *can* not-will it, or He *cannot.* If He *cannot:* therefore that man cannot be damned, or the will of God will be frustrated; *if He can* not-will it; but one who can come to be not-willing from willing can be changed: therefore etc.

17. Likewise, it is impossible that an agent according to will, whose operation is conformed to the will,

should by willing one of two contraries do the other, and conversely; but God now kills, now gives life, and does many other incompossible things: therefore it is necessary that His will now will one thing, now its contrary. But every such will is changed: therefore the divine *willing* is mutable; but this is the same as *being:* therefore etc. — *If you say* that this is by reason of the effect; this is nothing, because God does not will something on this account, that it comes to be, but rather the converse: it remains therefore that the ground of mutability comes principally from the divine will.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being is wholly incommutable.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that without doubt the divine *being* is wholly incommutable; and this indeed it is necessary to posit, although we cannot perfectly understand it; whence in positing it all agree. For all who understand rightly, not only the Saints but also the philosophers, posit the divine *being* as immutable, by the fact that it is *most simple, immense* and *eternal*. — For by the fact that it is *most simple*, it is immutable according to *form;* by the fact that it is *immense*, immutable according to *site;* by the fact that it is *eternal*, immutable according to *time;* but every motion and change, according to Augustine and Hugh, is reduced to one of the aforesaid differences: and therefore the divine *being* can in no way admit change or motion.

And *again*, by the fact that it is *simple*, it is immutable *of itself;* for it has nothing that is not its essential *being* itself, which indeed "is not an accident, but subsisting truth," as Hilary says. But by the fact that it is *immense*, it is not mutable *in another* or *by another;* for nothing else can transfer it, since it is everywhere whole. And from the fact that it is *eternal*, it is not mutable *with another*, because it itself remains fixed while other things succeed one another.

*Lastly*, by the fact that it is *most simple*, it is therefore not changed by *comparison* nor by *operation*, because neither says anything diverse from it or accidental to it, from whose coming or departing the divine *being* would be composed or changed. But because it is *immense*, it is not changed either by *mission* or by *indwelling*, because such mission or indwelling is neither through any circumscription nor through any passage of place, but through presence and manifestation. And because it is *eternal*, it is not changed either by *will* or by *power* or by *knowledge*, for this reason, that whatever it can do, knows and wills, it eternally can do, knows and wills; whence, just as there is no mutability in eternity, so neither in knowledge, will and power. — In every way therefore, as appears to one who treats it through, it is necessary to posit that the divine *being* has incommutability; and all say this.

But just as, to understand eternity, it is necessary to understand God together as *simple* and *immense*, so, to understand immutability, it is necessary to understand together God's supreme *simplicity*, *eternity* and *immensity*. For because He is *simple*, nothing is accidental to Him; because He is *eternal*, nothing comes to Him, nothing departs; because He is *immense*, every property of dignity befits Him: and therefore of Himself, without anything accidental or supervening, He can produce and not produce, will and not will, foreknow and not foreknow, hear and not hear, as befits His supreme nobility. And just as He can do *many* things, though He is *one;* and *temporal* things, though He is eternal; and *finite* things, though He is infinite; and *composite* things, though He is simple: so He can do *variable* and mutable things, while He Himself nonetheless perseveres immutable. — And this is what Hugh says, in the first part *On the Sacraments*: "Let it be firmly held that it is naturally implanted in every rational soul, namely that God is incommutable. For He cannot be *increased*, because He is immense, nor *diminished*, because He is one, nor *changed in place*, because He is everywhere, nor *in time*, because He is eternal, nor *in cognition*, because He is most wise, nor *in affection*, because He is most good." From which it appears how and why we understand God to be immutable in His *being*.

But for the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that those things that are said of God with respect to the creature *signify* the divine essence and *connote* something in the creature; and this can be in two ways: *in act* or *in habit*. On the part of the *principal significate* they are God Himself, who is not changed nor multiplied nor begins nor ceases. On the part of the *connoted*, or co-understood, they say something created or creatable; and on that part there is beginning and ceasing and variation, but differently according to the diverse mode of connoting. For when that which is said of God connotes a created thing *in act*, then it can *begin* and *cease*, *be in* and *not be in*, without change on the part of God, but not without change on the part of the created thing; as is clear when we say that God conserves something. But when it connotes the creatable in

*habit*, that is, in aptitude, then there cannot be a *beginning*, yet there can be a *ceasing*; there can also be *being in* and *not being in* without change of God and of the creature. And the ground of this is the *connotation of the future; the future*, however, never *begins* to be future, as Anselm says, but it does indeed *cease* to be future when it becomes present. — And *again*, a contingent future can not be without change, because it posits nothing in the thing in act. — From these things therefore it is clear, if one grasps it, that two opposites can be attributed to God without any change of Him; but there are some in which a change of the creature is required, as in temporal things, and others in which it is not at all. However it is understood, therefore, it is necessary to posit the divine *being* as wholly immutable. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that of all moving things wisdom is more moving; it must be said that something is called *movable* in three ways: either through *efficient causality*, or through *representing exemplarity*, or through *inhering variety*. In the first and second mode wisdom is called most moving, because this belongs to perfection; but not in the *third*, because this pertains to incompleteness. — Or it can be said that, because what is movable according to *site* is by the motion itself made present to several places, and what is moved more swiftly is more swiftly presented to several places, hence it is that since the divine wisdom is most present to all things, it is called *most movable* among all movable things, not because it passes from one thing into another, but because it is present to all things. And this is what Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, chapter nine: "That God is moved is to be reverently thought, not according to conveyance, or change, or alteration, or modal or local motion, not straight, not circular, not from both, not intelligible, not animal, not natural; but that God brings to substance and contains all things and wholly provides for all things, and that He is present to all things by the encompassing of all things, and to all existing things by provident processions and operations."

2. To that which is objected, that rank is regarded in creatures according to greater mobility etc.; it must be said that there are some things that belong to creatures according to more and less in such a way that of themselves they do not sound of imperfection, as unity, truth, goodness; and in such things the highest is to be attributed to God, to whom all perfection belongs. But there are some that say a certain dignity with *imperfection*, as *mobility*, which says a certain actuality with a possibility joined to it, and such things, by reason of the imperfection joined to them, neither can nor ought to be attributed to God, neither at the term nor short of the term, according to the proper sense of speech.

3. 4. To that which is objected on the part of *comparison*, that something comes to God from time; it must be said that in things of this kind, as was touched on in the solution, one is to understand the *principal significate* and the *connoted;* and the *principal significate* is on the part of God, and through this eternal and incommutable; but the *connoted* is on the part of the creature, and therefore temporal and mutable. That these things are said to *begin* or to *cease*, therefore, is not on the part of that which is posited in God, but on the part of that which is posited in the created effect. — And through this that which is objected is clear, that names of this kind say something that is *God* and something that is *from God;* and by reason of the first they are predicated, not by reason of the second; and by reason of the second they begin and cease, not by reason of the first; because for a whole that is joined together to be temporal or contingent, it suffices that it have temporality or contingency in some part of it.

5. 6. To that which is objected about *action*, that one becomes an agent from a non-agent; it must be said that there is an agent that acts by itself, and there is an agent that acts through something other than itself. The first agent cannot be changed in acting, because nothing comes to it and nothing departs from it by the action, since its action is the same as itself. But of the other agent, which differs from its action, the aforesaid proposition holds true. And God is an agent in the first mode, not the second, because on account of His supreme simplicity He Himself is His action. — And *if you object:* if He Himself is His action, then just as He does not begin to be, so He does not begin to act; it must be said that He does not begin to act by reason of the *intrinsic act* itself, which is the same as Himself, but by reason of the *extrinsic effect*, which stands on the part of the creature, which begins and is plurified according to the variety of creatures. — And through this the response to the following, about the plurality of actions, is clear. For that several incompossible actions are posited in God is not by reason of a plurality of intrinsic acts, but by reason of a plurality of effects and connoted things. For the intrinsic act, since it is God, is one and incommutable and eternal; but the extrinsic effect, since it

is created, is manifold and mutable and temporal, taking time in a broad way; and this induces no change concerning the divine *being*.

7. 8. To that which is objected about *mission*, that every mission and descent is a change; it must be said that mission in divine things is not taken there *properly* but *by transference;* nor do they say anything else in God than the emanation of one from another and a manifestation in a created effect. Whence, since God is always everywhere present — the Father, that is, and the Son and the Holy Spirit — by essence, power and presence; yet because He dwells in the heavens through glory and appears through open illumination, when He begins to appear in lower creatures it is as though from not present He begins to be present; and therefore He is said to *be sent* and to *descend*, not by reason of any innovation or newness on His part, but only by reason of the showing and manifestation displayed to us and made in us. — And *if one objects* then that the Son of God was made man anew, and *man* says something that is in Him; it must be said that *man* is predicated of the Son by reason of the union of two natures in one hypostasis; and therefore, since *union* is said by way of relation and can be attributed to something anew without a change made in it, but only on account of a change made in the other extreme, as is clear in right and left: hence it is that the Son of God was newly made man without change of the eternal person, from the change alone of the nature assumed, which was at once formed and united to the Word; and just as the Word is not changed in the forming of that nature, so neither in the assuming of it once formed.

9. 10. To that which is objected about *dwelling*, that God by grace begins to be in the penitent; it must be said that something is said to be in something in two ways: either so that it depends on it in some way and is contracted and defined by it; and what begins to be in something in this way is changed by that beginning and is moved with the motion of that in which it is; as is clear of the existence of the universal in the particular, and of form in matter, and of what is placed in its place, and of the accident in its subject. But God is in the creature by essence and influence in such a way that He does not depend on the creature nor is He confined or defined in it; and therefore, that He begins to dwell in something is not on account of a change made in Himself, but only in the creature or in the mediating influence, by reason of which God is said to dwell in the creature anew, namely by pouring in new grace. — Likewise, though He is in the creature, He is nevertheless not *moved* with its motion, as those things are of which the Philosopher says that "when we are moved, the things that are in us are moved," for this reason, that He does not depend on the creature nor is He confined or defined in it. Whence, just as a ray is in the air and yet is not moved with the motion of the air; as the soul is whole in every part of the body and yet is not moved with the motion of each part, because it is not defined in each: so is it to be understood in the matter at hand. And through this the response to the present argument is clear. — And *if one objects* that it does not seem intelligible that something be inseparably in something and yet not be moved with its change; it must be said that we can understand this if we understand God together as *most simple* and *immense*. For because He is *immense*, He is as much *within* as *without*; because He is *most simple*, He is in no way distant from Himself, however great the local distance and separation in the things in which He is. And hence it is that however much the things in which God is are understood to be changed, in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, is God posited as mutable on this account. For in every motion and change it is necessary to understand an approach and a withdrawal, and through this some distance of the extremes; which can in no way be posited concerning the divine *being*, neither *by itself* nor *by accident*, since it is at once infinite and simple. And therefore the imagination of the fantasy is deceived here.

11. 12. To that which is objected about *power*, that He cannot do whatever He could do; it must be said that someone is said *not to be able to do what he could do* in two ways: either on account of some defect brought in on the part of *the producing power itself*, or on account of a change of condition on the part of *the possible thing itself*. For what is possible and true can be made impossible through a change in the thing; as *that I have not read*, before I read, is true, but after I have read has become impossible, which is called *impossible by accident;* which also, as Augustine says against Faustus, is impossible to God, because that *being able* belongs not to power but rather to impotence, since it is against the supreme truth — namely, to make what was, after it was, not to have been. Since therefore the divine power always perseveres uniformly, whatever things and of whatever kind and whatever and however great He could do, He can do now also, as far as it is *of itself;* but because many *true* things have been made false, and *possible* things have been made impossible, hence it is that as far as it is on *the part of those things*, He cannot do whatever He could do, because not whatever things *were* possible *are* possible, and this not through a change concerning the *efficient* *power*, but concerning the *possible things effected*. — And through this

the response to the following, about the *impossible by accident*, is clear. — And *if you object* that the divine power in no way depends on the possible, since it can produce all things from nothing; it must be said that this is not on account of dependence but on account of connotation: because when it is said that God can do something, it is at the same time also suggested that it is possible to Him, and through this that it has nothing repugnant to the divine power, wisdom and goodness, such that it could not be produced into *being*, all the nobility of the divine *being able* being preserved.

13. 14. To that which is objected about *knowledge*, it must be said that when God is said to know something, this can be understood in two ways: either because He *has cognition* of it, or because He *judges* it to be true. In the first mode the *knowing* of God does not connote the existence of truth in the thing known; and in this mode whatever He knew He knows, because He has knowledge of everything of which He had it from eternity. In the second mode it connotes truth concerning the thing cognized; and in this mode not whatever He knew He knows, just as not whatever He did He does; and this not on account of a change on the part of the one knowing, but only on the part of the thing cognized. — And through this the response is clear to that which he objects next about the truth of the thing cognized: because the divine *knowing* posits truth in the thing cognized according to one acceptation, not according to the other, as is clear through the distinction had before.

15. To that which is objected on the part of the divine *will;* it must be said that a proximate and immediate cause is so called in three ways: either with respect to *substance*, or *disposition*, or *act;* by reason of *substance*, between which and the effect no other causing substance falls as a medium; by reason of *disposition*, to which no new disposition is added for producing the effect; and by reason of *act*, because it is joined to the act itself. But the divine act is taken in two ways, namely as *within* and as *effecting something without*. The divine will, therefore, is the proximate and immediate cause of the things to be produced by reason of *substance* and *disposition* and *intrinsic act*, but not by reason of *exterior efficiency* except for that time for which it wills. And the divine will has this because it is at once most omnipotent and most free; and therefore, although it willed from eternity to produce the world, yet because it did not will that the production of the world be from eternity but only in time, hence it is that it produced in time, no change having been made in the will, and the effect began while the cause did not begin. And what is objected about the proximate and immediate cause is understood of that which is a proximate and immediate cause according to the threefold account aforesaid.

16. To that which is objected, that God, who wills something, can not-will it; it must be said that the divine *willing* connotes a respect and order to something future, and that future thing can be or not be without change, as was said before in the principal solution; hence it is that with respect to future contingents God can be called *willing* or *not willing*, no change whatever having been made in Him who wills.

17. To that which is objected, that God is an agent according to will in such a way that His operation is configured to His will etc.; it must be said that an agent according to will is twofold: one, whose will is determined to some thing willed, so that it is not borne at once and together upon the whole of its effects, but now wills this, now that; and in this agent according to will what he objects holds true. The other is an agent according to will whose will is borne upon all that which dictating wisdom has disposed; and just as an agent of this kind has disposed all things together that are produced successively, so that the disposition itself is not varied according to the variation of the things to be produced; so also the will, which is wholly consonant with that disposition, remains unchanged. Whence, just as the divine art and the divine counsel, according to which diverse things come to be and are commanded, always remain unchanged in themselves; so also the divine good pleasure always remains unchanged, although those things are changed that proceed from it; for this reason, that at once and together and eternally and immutably it regards all things that are eternally produced, as do also *art, account* and *exemplar, word* and *wisdom* and the other like things; in which no variation comes about on account of a change made in things without, with respect to which there is no dependence whatever in God, although all things depend on His wisdom and will and power as on a cause most noble, most stable, most sufficient, primary and supreme.

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