Quaest. 6, Art. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/6/q/bon-qmt-q6-a2
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### Article II. *Whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme immutability stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.

1. It is impossible that a species be without its genus; but generation or production is a species of motion or of change: therefore where there is generation, there is change; but

trinity is not, except because one person proceeds from another through generation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation in creatures says *relation* and says *change*, and says *change* more essentially and more principally than *relation;* but it cannot be posited in the supreme Trinity without relation, otherwise it would not say a true distinction: therefore by equal or stronger reason it cannot be posited without change.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the corruption of anything either be or be understood without change; but generation or production is directly opposed to corruption, because, just as the one is toward *being*, so the other is toward *non-being*: therefore it is nowhere without change: therefore not in the divine persons either.

4. Likewise, if something follows upon something, the same thing being added on both sides, it still follows; but this follows: there is generation in time, therefore change in time: therefore by equal or stronger reason generation in eternity infers change in eternity: therefore it does not stand with immutability.

5. Likewise, Augustine says that it follows: if the Holy Spirit could be generated, that He could be changed: therefore in the divine things *to be generated* infers *to be changed*, therefore it cannot stand with its opposite; but its opposite is supreme immutability: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if there is production in the divine things, then it is either by *necessity* or by *will*. If by *necessity*: then there is not supreme liberality there, nor power; if by *will:* then he who is produced can not be produced, therefore not be, and through this be changed: therefore the same as before.

7. Likewise, what is repugnant to something on account of an imperfect state is much more so according to a perfect state; but in the creature there is no immutability except a half-full one, and yet in perpetual and incorporeal substances there cannot be plurification through the production of like from like: therefore not in God either.

8. Likewise, what is repugnant to the cause is repugnant to the caused; but the cause why the generative power was given to things is "on account of being far distant from the first and on account of corruption": therefore if supreme immutability is repugnant to corruption, then to production through generation. The *minor* is proved through the Philosopher.

9. Likewise, it is impossible that God produce something from an alien substance without the change of that substance; but God has as much power over other things as over Himself, or concerning Himself: therefore neither from His own substance without the change of His own substance: therefore if trinity is through production etc.

10. Likewise, *nothing* recedes further from the account of mutability than *something*, therefore also the production of a thing from nothing further than production from something; for nothing is in no mode mutable; but it is impossible that something be produced from *nothing* without its mutability: therefore likewise from *something*.

11. Likewise, according to the account of understanding, form is simpler and prior to the supposit, and nature to the person; but it is impossible that any form be produced from something without change of itself and of that from which it is: therefore by equal reason it is impossible that a supposit or person be produced without change.

12. Likewise, as part is related to part, so whole is related to whole; but if the Father were to produce the Son from part of the substance, it would be necessary that the substance be changed according to the part: therefore since He produces from the whole, it is necessary that it be changed according to the whole: therefore etc.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The production of person from person in the Trinity stands with supreme simplicity, as is clear from the preceding; but where there is supreme simplicity, there is invariability and immutability in every mode: therefore trinity and the emanation befitting it are not repugnant to immutability.

2. Likewise, the emanation of person from person stands with supreme actuality; but where there is supreme actuality, immutability is in every mode, because "motion is the entelechy of a being in potency," and everything mutable is in some mode possible; but what stands with the antecedent necessarily stands with the consequent: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in supreme eternity there can be no variability, because every motion stands with a prior and a posterior, either in time or in nature; but the trinity of persons and their production stands with eternity: therefore with supreme immutability.

4. Likewise, "in *relation to something* there is no motion"; but relation makes the trinity and the plurality of persons, according to what Boethius says: "Relation multiplies

the Trinity"; therefore it is impossible there, for this cause, to posit change or motion: it stands therefore with supreme immutability.

5. Likewise, in that in which *to be produced* and *to have been produced* are together, there is no prior and posterior, neither in duration nor in nature nor in reality; but this is found in every change: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it is possible for God to produce a creature without change of Himself, because He produces by Himself: therefore likewise the Father can produce a person without change of His person or nature: therefore by equal reason the Son also can be produced without change: therefore production does not force anything there to be changed.

7. Likewise, God understands Himself without any change of Himself; but by understanding Himself He speaks, and by speaking He generates the Word: therefore without any change whatever He has it to generate the Word, and by equal reason to spirate the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The trinity of persons stands with supreme immutability.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the trinity of persons, which is in the divine things through the emanation of one from another, stands with supreme immutability. — And the reason for this is twofold, namely supreme *eternity* and supreme *simplicity*. Supreme *eternity* does not suffer any change to be there, supreme *simplicity* does not suffer anything mutable to be there. If therefore trinity is with simplicity and eternity; and where there is eternity, there is no change, where there is supreme simplicity, nothing mutable; and these being taken away, all mutability is removed: trinity and supreme immutability necessarily stand together.

And this is clear thus. For where there is *eternity*, nothing is beginning, nothing succeeding; no beginning, therefore, no succession, no failing. But every change is either from *non-being* into *being*, or from *being* into *non-being*, or from *one being* into *another being*; but change *to being* is not without beginning, change *from being* is not without failing, change *in being* cannot be without succession of some kind, because it is not without variation. Eternity therefore excludes every change; but this stands with trinity: therefore in the excellence of the Trinity there is no change, by reason of eternity. — Nothing mutable is in it by reason of *simplicity*. For there is there a supreme *simplicity of nature* and *of person* and *of both* compared to one another. On account of the simplicity of the *nature* there can be no *cutting off* there in that *from which* the production is; on account of the simplicity of the *person* there can be no *composition* in the *product;* by reason of simplicity in *both* there can be no *casting off* from the productive principle. From this therefore it is gathered that nothing there is mutable, neither he who is produced, nor he who produces, nor that from which he is produced. For from this, that there comes about no *casting off of what was had* on the part of the *principle*, nor *introduction of anything new* on the part of the product, nor *cutting off of the undivided* on the part of the foundation from which he is understood to be produced, neither materially nor causally, but substantially — there is nothing that could be changed. — If therefore the supreme trinity is understood in supreme simplicity and eternity, it is necessary equally to understand that it consists in immutability in every mode. — Further, since actual immutability with supreme simplicity and eternity posits supreme actuality, and supreme actuality is through a full conversion of the same upon itself by understanding and loving, and understanding includes a word, and love includes a bond; just as it is not only not repugnant to the immutability of the first principle to understand and to love itself, but rather is consonant with it, so it is not repugnant, nay it is consonant, to generate the Word and to spirate Love. For both belong to it immutably and always in act. Therefore, if immutability be rightly understood, it not only does not exclude, but includes the most blessed Trinity; and this, because the supremely immutable must be simple, eternal and actual according to the fullness of an actuality unterminated and perfect. — Whence the reasons which are for this side are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is generation there is change; it must be said that this is true in creatures, where generation is a going forth from a being in potency into a being in act, where also consequently there is change, because what is generated is otherwise now than before. But it is otherwise in the divine things, because that other generation is of actuality in every mode, both on the part of the principle and of the term and of the production itself and of that from which the production comes about. Whence, because there is there no acquisition of a new *being*, and there is nevertheless a receiving of a true and actual and everlasting *being;* therefore, although there is true production, there is nevertheless not true change there.

2. To that which is objected, that generation says change and relation; it must be said that those things which are in creatures, if they are posited in the Creator, ought to be posited according to that which they have of completion, not according to that which they have of incompletion. But *motion* and *change* always say incompletion, whereas *relation* says for the most part a complement, especially that relation which says origin in the noblest things without any dependence; and in this mode in that eternal production.

3. To that which is objected, that corruption cannot be understood without change; it must be said that it is not similar: because *corruption* says the loss of *being*, which indeed cannot be understood unless it come about after *being* previously had; and through this it of necessity includes *change*, which cannot be except in a mutable and variable thing, on account of the defect that it says. But *generation* is the giving or receiving of *being* through consubstantiality; and this can be concerning the noblest and most actual being, because this says no defect, and through this it does not of necessity include *change*, as corruption does. For to *such a generation* *corruption* is not opposed, but only to that which was in the creature, which corruption indeed in a certain mode follows and in a certain mode precedes. "For the generation of one is the corruption of another," as the Philosopher says.

4. To that which is objected, that generation in time posits change in time: therefore also generation in eternity infers change in eternity; it must be said that that mode of inferring holds where there is no *distracting determination;* but it is not so in the case proposed: because generation in eternity is of another mode than generation in time, as has been said; it does not come about from a being in potency, as that which is measured by time. And therefore it does not follow that, if motion follows upon this one, it follows upon that one — rather the opposite.

5. To that which is objected, that if the Holy Spirit were generated, He would be changed; it must be said that that argument follows, not because *to be generated* is *to be changed*, but because, when what ought not to be is posited, there results what ought not to be. For if it is posited that the Holy Spirit, who receives *being* through spiration, which really differs from generation, receives *being* by way of generation; it is of necessity posited that He passes from one mode of emanating to another mode really differing; and so He is of necessity posited *to be changed*, not because those modes of arising or emanating say motions or changes, but because the passage from one into the other cannot be understood without motion. And since change in the divine *being* is not admitted, hence it is that it is impossible that the person who is produced through spiration be generated. And hence it is that although *the Father generates and spirates*, He is nevertheless not changed, because these two stand together at once concerning the person of the Father, namely to spirate and to generate, nor is it necessary to pass from one into the other. But these two modes cannot belong at once to the same *produced* person, and through this, if by an impossibility it is understood to be posited concerning any of those persons, by the same impossibility *motion* also is posited, because the mode of producing is posited to vary.

6. To that which is objected, namely that production is in the divine things, then either by *necessity* or by *will;* it must be said that, as will better appear in the question on necessity, it is there in a certain mode by *necessity* and in a certain mode by *will*. For it is not through a necessity of *coercion*, but of *immutability;* not through an *electing* will, but through a will *everlastingly accepting*, according to which the producer in the most noble production is well pleased in himself and even delights. And therefore it does not follow that there can be there a variation of mutability and a constraint of power, because he who is produced is produced at once necessarily, liberally and powerfully.

7. To that which is objected, that the immutability of the creature excludes generation, as is clear in the Angel, therefore also in God; it must be said that this does not hold, because the creature in generating cannot give its whole substance, on account of this, that it falls short of supreme simplicity and actuality and communicability; therefore it is impossible that anything be generated from its substance without its being changed. But it is otherwise in the case proposed, as has been said before, because the one generating in the divine things does not give to the one generated a part of his essence, but gives the whole essence, most simple and perfect. — It could, however, be said that the spiritual creature too has an intrinsic generation, which indeed is that of the word from the mind, which among the other created things most of all bears the likeness of the eternal generation.

8. To that which is objected, that the cause of generation and corruption is being far distant from the first; it must be said that that is not the *whole* account. For man, if he had stood in the state of innocence, would never have been corrupted, and yet he would have generated. Whence generation is rather from the supreme perfection and fecundity and actuality of the first principle itself than it is for the supplying of the defect of the corruption of the productive principle itself. The Philosopher therefore speaks of the cause of generation according to the state of deficient nature, not generally and according to the mode of that most complete generation which is the origin of all production. *For the begetter of beauty established all these things*, and He who gives generation to others cannot be sterile, according to what is said in the last chapter of Isaias.

9. To that which is objected, that God cannot produce something from some creature without its alteration; it must be said that it is not similar: because, since the creature is mutable and not altogether simple,

when something is posited to be produced from it, it is consequently posited *to be altered*, because there cannot there be the same, through an indifference in every mode, that which is given and that which is received and the intermediate act; but in the divine things it is altogether the opposite, according as is manifestly evident from the preceding.

10. To that which is objected, that something cannot be produced from nothing without change; it must be said that that is not similar: because something cannot be produced from nothing without having *being* after *non-being*, without also having *being* from a principle essentially differing. Whence, although *nothing* is not mutable of itself, yet the eduction by which something that before was not a being is made a being of necessity posits beginning and change. But it is not so with that production by which a person is produced from the everlasting substance of the person everlastingly producing, because there neither is another *being* received anew, nor does anything begin, and through this neither is anything varied.

11. To that which is objected, that a form cannot be produced without change, therefore neither a supposit; it must be said that it is not similar: because the production of a form says a substantial difference between the producer and the product; for nothing produces itself; and therefore, when a form is produced, it must be produced by another form, which, since it is other than it, will truly be the producing cause and prior by nature to the produced form itself; and therefore in that production it is necessary that change be included. But it is not so in the production of a supposit or person, for this reason, that there is one nature and essence in both, and therefore they are together; nor is there change or motion there, because there is there no prior nor posterior nor anything new.

12. To that which is objected, that as part is to part, so whole is to whole; it must be said that in the divine things there is properly neither part nor whole, according as a *whole* is called that which contains part and part. Nor does it hold that, if a thing produced from a part posits change in the part, a thing produced from the whole substance likewise posits change according to the whole: because, as was touched on before, production in part posits a cutting off, posits the loss of something and the acquisition of something, which of necessity include change; but production from the whole substance says nothing of the kind, but rather excludes all that upon which motion follows, as was shown from the principal solution. For neither is there a cutting off in the producing principle, nor composition in the product, nor innovation in the production, nor any variation concerning any of the aforesaid.

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