Quaest. 7, Art. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/7/q/bon-qmt-q7-a2
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *Whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together.*

Next it is asked whether trinity and supreme necessity stand together. And that they are incompossible, it seems.

1. Augustine to Orosius: « The Father begot the Son neither by necessity nor by will »; but what is repugnant to generation is repugnant to trinity; necessity is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler than one which has not; but in the Trinity there can be no production except in the noblest mode; but what produces necessarily cannot have dominion over its action: therefore neither can there be necessary production in divine things.

3. Likewise, a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one which is from necessity: either, then, there is in divine things no communication of the nature itself, or it is not from necessity; but there cannot be trinity without communication: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything necessary is absolute; for what has a respect to something distinct from itself cannot be altogether necessary, and this is what Avicenna means; but it is impossible for trinity to be without respect and relation: therefore likewise it is impossible that it stand with necessity.

5. Likewise, nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree; because it has its *being* and its *remaining* only from elsewhere, and so it is not necessary in itself; but there cannot be trinity without some person there being not from itself: therefore it does not stand with supreme necessity.

6. Likewise, nothing is supremely true which can be thought not to be: therefore likewise nothing is supremely necessary which can be believed not to be; for the *necessary* presupposes the *true;* but trinity can without doubt be thought not to be: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, and what is repugnant to certitude is repugnant to necessity; but trinity in unity is repugnant to evidence, because it seems in no way intelligible: therefore it is repugnant to supreme necessity.

8. Likewise, nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy: therefore if the person of the Father necessarily produces the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he is not praiseworthy in any of the aforesaid; but nothing in God is more praiseworthy: therefore no praise is owed to God. But it is impious to say this: therefore etc.

9. Likewise, nothing is altogether necessary which is simply voluntary; the production of the persons in divine things is simply through will: therefore not through necessity. The *major* is proved, because necessary things are present by nature, and nature is divided against will. The *minor* is proved: because that is supremely delightful, acceptable and pleasing: therefore supremely voluntary.

Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Everything necessary is immutable, and conversely; but trinity stands with supreme immutability, as is clear from what immediately precedes: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything which is supremely one is altogether necessary, and conversely; but trinity and supreme unity stand together: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the production of one person from another is of a greater binding-together than that of splendour and light; but these are necessary: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, for the Omnipotent, that the highest *being able* be absent is impossible, and that it be present is necessary; but the highest *being able* is in the production of the persons: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every act which has God for its principle and term is necessary on every side; but the production of a person from a person is of this kind: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything which is indifferent from the supremely necessary is altogether necessary; but the whole trinity is the divine essence: therefore etc.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*The divine being, necessary and most liberal, stands together with the trinity of persons.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: It must be said that the divine *being* is both *necessary* and nonetheless *most liberal;* and the blessed Trinity itself stands together with *necessity* and with *will*, if they are taken according to the fitting mode. For just as was touched on concerning necessity, not every *necessity* belongs to the divine *being*, nor yet to the blessed Trinity, but that of *immutability* and *independence;* similarly, neither does every *mode of willing*. For there is a will that is *accedent*, that is, supervening anew; and this is not in God, neither with respect to *himself* nor with respect to the *created*, on account of God's immutability and necessity. There is again a will that is *antecedent;* and this is in God, not with respect to *himself*, but with respect to the *created*, which it precedes in nature and in eternity. There is, thirdly, a will that is *concomitant and accepting;* and this is in God with respect to *himself* and with respect to the *created;* for the divine will approves and accepts every good, whether *created* or *uncreated*, whether *contingent* or *necessary*.

Necessity and will being therefore spoken of in three ways, the third mode of each belongs to the supreme Trinity,

namely *accepting will* and *the necessity of immutability: will*, I say, *accepting*, on account of the supreme charity in the one producing and the supreme goodness in the one produced, which two necessarily enclose in themselves the will of complacency; and *the necessity* of *unchangeableness* on account of the *indifference of the essence* and the *independence of the person*. For because in the three persons the *essence* is altogether indifferent, therefore there is one quiddity or entity, one truth, and on this account one necessity. For since the first person is from itself, it is altogether necessary, and on this account the second and the third. — *Again*, because in the three persons the essence is indifferent, the relation distinctive of the trinity does not signify a respect to anything *outside;* and therefore there is there no *dependence of one person* on another; equally, therefore, they are fixed and standing through themselves; and therefore if one is necessary, so are all. — These three therefore stand together, as has now been shown, namely *trinity*, *necessity* and *will;* nor is there in them any repugnance, but a supreme consonance, just as supreme *unity*, *truth* and *goodness* are consonant together.

For supreme *unity* is that which is undivided in many, and this posits *trinity;* supreme *truth*, which is infallible and most certain, and this posits *necessity;* supreme *goodness*, which is lovable and loving, and this posits *will*. Supreme *unity*, *truth* and *goodness* therefore necessarily require that *trinity*, *necessity* and *will* stand together. — Since, then, in the triune God there is *necessity* together with will, and *will* together with necessity, hence it is that he is the supreme *good by essence*. Because in him is supreme *delight* through will and supreme *security* through necessity and supreme *felicity* through both, hence also it is that he is supremely *beatifying by influence:* because our *affection* does not rest except by keeping leisure in the supremely lovable, and the *understanding* not except in the supremely infallible and certain; and on this account we can be beatified in that alone which is at once *necessary* and *voluntary*, which alone is apt by nature to be loved most savourily, known most certainly and possessed most securely. — Since, then, the most blessed Trinity is not only *blessed* but also *beatifying*, hence it is that it is supremely consonant with the noblest necessity and in nothing repugnant to it; and likewise with the most liberal will. — Whence also the reasons brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

1. To what is first objected to the contrary from the authority of Augustine and of Hilary, it must be said that each of those authorities is understood of necessity as to the first and second mode, not as to the third, as is clear from what has been said.

2. To the objection that an agent which has dominion over its action is nobler, it must be said that this is true of an action which stands by way of difference from the agent; but of that action which, on account of supreme simplicity, is altogether indifferent from the agent, the aforesaid proposition neither has nor can have truth; for nothing can have dominion over itself. Since, then, production in the divine persons is through supreme simplicity, in which the *producer* and his *production* cannot differ by a real difference, therefore in things of this kind the allegation of the aforesaid proposition has no place.

3. To the objection that a communication which is from benignity is nobler than one from necessity, it must be said that this is true of that *necessity* which excludes benignity; but such is not the necessity which is posited in divine things; it is understood also of a *communication* which is of a gift differing in essence; but such is not in the emanation of the divine persons: and therefore that reason does not conclude, since in itself it includes a twofold defect.

4. To the objection that everything necessary is absolute, it must be said that *perfect absoluteness* does not exclude intrinsic relation, since that relation, being to what is indifferent in essence, posits no dependence, and on this account is not repugnant to necessity; and such relation is in the divine persons. But if it excludes relation, this is by respect to what is *outside* and to *a thing essentially differing*. Whence, although God is signified by certain names as having a respect to things, that respect is not posited on the part of *God* except according to *the reason of understanding*, to which there answers a *true* respect on the part of *the created being*; and of this respect the premised reason proceeds.

5. To the objection that nothing which is from another can be necessary in the highest degree, it must be said that this has truth when it is from another essentially differing, and has a *being* other than the very *being* of the giver; for then it cannot have the full reason of necessity, since it depends on another *being* and another nature essentially differing. But it is not so with the divine persons, because the person produced does not differ in essence from the

producer, nor has it another *being*. Whence, since they have one *being* and the same essence and the truth of one thing essentially, hence it is that it acquires from this no dependence, but the one who is produced has altogether the same firm necessity of remaining, and necessary firmness, with the one who produces.

6. To the objection that nothing is supremely necessary which can be thought not to be, it must be said that this has truth when that necessary thing appears as it is, but not when it lies hidden. Whence, although the most blessed Trinity can now be both believed and thought not to be, because it does not yet appear to us as it is, yet when it shall have appeared as it is, then it will in no way be able to be thought not to be. That it is now either believed or thought not to be, therefore, is not on account of a defect of its certitude and truth in itself, since it is being always and everywhere and supremely, but on account of a defect of lumen on our part.

7. To the objection that what is repugnant to evidence is repugnant to certitude, it must be said that there is *certitude* on the part of *the thing* and on *our* part; and similarly *evidence*. When, therefore, it is said: what is repugnant to evidence and certitude is repugnant to necessity, this is true of certitude and evidence on the part of *the thing*, but it is not true of certitude and evidence on *our* part, because, as was touched on before, the same thing can be both most certain in itself and hidden to us. — *Moreover*, although trinity seems to be repugnant to certitude, yet it is very greatly consonant with it, because the Father declares himself by his Word, and the Father and the Son manifest themselves to us most certainly through the Holy Spirit. Whence, although *phantastic* reason flees the understanding of the trinity, yet *illumined* reason sees that trinity alone, as trinity, is the fullest reason of *knowing* every truth, through which it comes about that every truth known is held *in memory*, that what is retained in memory is understood more clearly, and that what is understood pleases and is loved.

8. To the objection that nothing altogether necessary is perfectly praiseworthy, it must be said that praise is twofold: one, in which something of honour and dignity accrues to *the one praised*, and this praise is reckoned according to progress from an imperfect state to a perfect one; and this belongs properly to wayfarers, who, since *they could transgress and do not transgress*, are deservedly praised by God and also rewarded. There is also another praise, by which *the good itself*, because it is good, is called commendable; and this belongs more to a good *by essence* than to one *by participation*, and on this account more to an unchangeable good than to a variable one, and to a necessary than to a contingent; and with this praise God the Father is praised in the production of the Son, and the Father and the Son in the production of the Holy Spirit, in their mutual love of each other and the diffusion of every good with respect to whatever is created.

9. To the objection that nothing simply voluntary is altogether necessary, the answer is plain from what was touched on beforehand in the principal solution; and therefore there is no need to dwell on these things longer.

---