Quaest. 8
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/9/d/8/q/bon-qmt-q8
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### Question VIII. *Whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy.*

Lastly it is asked whether trinity can stand together with supreme primacy. And that it cannot, it seems:

1. Because primacy *in essence* excludes every other essence; for it is impossible that there be two first essences, because it would follow necessarily that neither would be first: therefore if primacy in *essence* excludes a plurality of essences, by equal reason primacy *in person* also excludes a plurality of persons: therefore it is impossible that *being first* and *being threefold* be compatible with each other together in God.

2. Likewise, primacy in causality excludes plurality; for it is necessary that there be one sole first cause.

3. Likewise, as the *last being* stands to active production, so the *first being* stands to passive production; but the *last*, by the fact that it is last, does not

admit active production, such that something of it should produce something: therefore neither does the *first* admit passive production: therefore it is impossible that something be supremely first and have a *produced being*: if therefore trinity includes passive production, it therefore excludes perfect primacy.

4. Likewise, either those three persons *are* equally first, or they *are not* equally first. If they *are* equally first: then one does not produce another more than the converse; if they *are not* equally first: then the highest reason of primacy is not in all the persons.

5. Likewise, either they *are equally* principiating, or *not*. If they *are* equally principiating: then by the same reason by which one is the principle of another, the converse holds; if they *are not* equally principiating: then the reason of principle is not equally in them, and on this account neither is the reason of primacy.

6. Likewise, unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding: therefore supreme primacy belongs only to that in which there is unity without plurality; but trinity includes true plurality: therefore it excludes perfect primacy.

7. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more it holds the reason of fontality in producing: therefore whatever is produced necessarily flows from that which is simply first: if therefore no person can flow from itself, it is impossible that any person should flow or be produced and at the same time stand with perfect primacy.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. The first and the principle are the same: therefore if from eternity there was a first, from eternity there was also a principle; but a principle is according to its most complete reason when it is principiating and producing according to the mode of perfect production: if therefore from eternity there was in God the reason of perfect primacy, there was also the truth of intrinsic production. But this is posited through trinity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the more prior something is, the more powerful and the more actual: therefore the first principle was necessarily most actual and most powerful; but the act of the first principle, according as it is a principle, is to principiate; therefore if in the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, there is necessarily posited the reason of supreme actuality and power, there will necessarily be posited the truth of eternal production, and on this account also the completion of a perfect trinity.

3. Likewise, the altogether equal is prior to the unequal both in reality and in understanding; therefore it is impossible to understand the production of the unequal without the production of the equal being understood first: if therefore the production of the creature is a production into inequality, while production according to equality can be only in the blessed Trinity, then every production of a creature of necessity presupposes the eternal Trinity.

4. Likewise, that which can be understood from eternity, in reality or in understanding, is prior to that which can be understood to have been from eternity neither in reality nor in understanding; but the production of something from something can be understood to have been from eternity, while the production of something from nothing cannot have been eternally: therefore before the production of every creature there is necessarily to be understood beforehand the production of something from something, according to the reason of perfect primacy. But this cannot be understood except in the uncreated Trinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the act of the first principle is first to principiate or to produce: therefore, since the principiating is prior to the principiated, the principiation or production of a principiating principle is prior to that of a merely principiated thing; therefore if the production of a principle is only in that trinity of God, it is necessary that, if that principle is first, it is also threefold.

6. Likewise, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple and most spiritual: therefore it is necessary that it be an understanding; but every understanding that principiates principiates through a word and an intrinsic gift of love; and everything that principiates through a word and love first conceives the word and breathes forth love before it produces an exterior effect: therefore it is necessarily so that, if the first principle is productive of the *being* of extrinsic things, it first produces. But this twofold production posits that God is threefold: therefore it follows necessarily that, if the first principle is first, it is also threefold.

7. Likewise, to principiate naturally and intrinsically is prior to doing so voluntarily and extrinsically; but voluntary and extrinsic production belongs to the first principle: therefore natural and intrinsic production necessarily belongs to it, and this is not so unless trinity is posited: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, the *perfect* is prior to the imperfect both in reality and in understanding, the *complete* to the diminished,

the *one* to the many, the *simple* to the composite, the *infinite* to the finite, *act* to potency, the *immutable* to the mutable, the *eternal* to the temporal, the *necessary* to the possible: if therefore every produced creature is imperfect, falls short of supreme unity, is composite, is finite, is a being in potency, is in a certain way temporal, is variable, is possible, falling short of supreme actuality and necessity: it is therefore necessary that before the production of the creature there be the production of a thing most perfect, supreme, undivided, most simple, most infinite, eternal, immutable and necessary; but this cannot be through the production of a different essence: therefore it is necessary that it be through the production of a person having unity of essence with the producing person and equal in power, in wisdom, in goodness; and this is to posit the most blessed Trinity.

Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.

*Primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that primacy not only does not exclude trinity, but even includes it, to such a degree that the first principle is threefold by the very thing by which it is also first; which is made manifest thus.

For supreme primacy in the supreme and most high principle posits supreme *actuality*, supreme *fontality* and supreme *fecundity*. For the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is *most perfect* in producing, *most fontal* in emanating, *most fecund* in burgeoning. Since, therefore, perfect production, emanation and burgeoning are reckoned only according to two intrinsic modes, namely by the mode of *nature* and by the mode of *will*, that is, of word and of love; hence it is that it is necessary to posit there, by reason of supreme *perfection*, *fontality* and *fecundity*, a twofold mode of emanating with respect to a twofold hypostasis produced, emanating from the first person as from a first producing principle; and on this account it is necessary to posit three persons. — And because the *most perfect* production is only with respect to *equals*, the *most fontal* emanation only with respect to *coeternals*, the *most fecund* burgeoning only with respect to *consubstantials*: it is necessary to understand that the first principle includes within itself three hypostases, coequal, coeternal and consubstantial. *Primacy* therefore posits in the first principle a most perfect *trinity*, according to the reason of order, of origin and of distinction, of coequality and coeternity and consubstantiality; it posits also supreme *unity*, *simplicity*, *immensity*, *eternity*, *immutability* and *actuality*: it posits therefore the trinity of the first principle together with the essential conditions spoken of above.

Since, therefore, the first principle, by the very fact that it is first, is supremely *one*, and by this very fact is supremely *simple* and *immense*, and by this very fact is *eternal*, *unchangeable* and *necessary*, as is gathered from the preceding; and *again*, by the very fact that it is first, is *most perfect* in producing, *most fontal* in emanating and *most fecund* in burgeoning, and this with respect to equals, coeternals and consubstantials, distinct, arising and ordered: hence it is that the first principle, because it is first, is *eternal* with the fullness of all noble conditions; wherefore in it, inasmuch as it is first, is the stopping-point of things and of comprehensions. — And on this account Rachel, who designates the contemplative life, is interpreted *the principle seen*, because whoever sees it inasmuch as it is the first principle has the stopping-point of his condition and his desire brought to its term; which will not be brought to its term except when the first principle shall be clearly seen, where it is both threefold and supremely one. — And these reasons, which are brought forward for this side, are to be conceded.

1. 2. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that primacy in essence excludes plurality, it must be said that it is not alike: because several *essences* essentially differing cannot have order to one another except according to the reason of *prior and posterior;* but several *persons*, because they have one essence and one *being*, can be ordered to one another in such a way that, although there is in them the reason of *origin*, there is nevertheless no intervention of *posteriority:* and therefore this plurality does not take away supreme primacy, because it includes no posteriority, which is what is directly repugnant to primacy. — And by this the answer is plain to the following objection, which is made concerning causality; because the order of causes is reckoned through essential diversity, according to the comparison of the posterior to the first, which indeed is not to be found in the origin of the persons.

3. To the objection that active production does not belong to the last, it must be said that it is not alike: because, since the *last* cannot have a comparison which is the same as itself, nor is anything produced wholly adequate to it, on account of its imperfection; therefore in it it is necessarily repugnant that it be *last* and that it be *productive*, because it would have something posterior after itself. But it is otherwise

on the part of the *principle*, because, on account of the supreme completion both in the producer and in the produced, active and passive production are not repugnant, no posteriority intervening by which the completion of perfect unity would be lessened

4. To the objection that they are either equally first or not, it must be said that *first* signifies the privation of *anything anterior;* in another way it signifies the privation of *origin*. If, therefore, *first* is said by privation of *anything anterior;* thus they are equally first, because there is nothing there before and after. But if *first* is said by privation of *origin*, namely because it arises from none; thus the reason of primacy resides principally in the person of the Father, by reason of whom there is in him the fontal plenitude for the production of all the persons. Whence also, because *innascibility* includes this property, it is therefore said to be a property which is a notion of the Father; which indeed would not be so unless it signified at once both nobility and the reason of making known; it would be said also relatively.

5. To the objection that either they are equally principiating or not, it must be said that they are equally principiating *essentially*, but not equally *personally*, because the Father is the principle of two, the Son of one, and the Holy Spirit of none. Since, therefore, the reason of primacy which belongs essentially to the first principle is equally in all those three persons; therefore trinity stands together with supreme primacy: because, just as *not being able to generate* does not posit impotence in the Son, so *not being from himself, but from the Father* does not posit any posteriority, and on this account does not diminish anything of the reason of perfect primacy.

6. To the objection that unity is prior to plurality in reality and in understanding, it must be said that this is true of that plurality which is from an aggregation of unities; but of that plurality in which there is the same unity of the three it has no truth, because in them there is one truth, one light, one reason of understanding on the part of God himself as understood. That we understand unity before trinity, however, is on account of a defect of intelligence on our part.

7. To the objection: the more fontal something is, the more prior it is in producing; it must be said that, as has already been touched on, *first*, according as it is taken in two ways, both by privation of *essential anteriority* and by privation of *personal origin*, so includes a twofold *fontality*, according as it signifies *the privation of essential anteriority* and *the privation of personal origin*. According as it signifies the privation of *essential anteriority*, it thus includes fontality with respect to effects and essences to be produced; and thus, since this condition belongs equally to all the persons, the *reason of fontality* belongs equally to them in the production of the *being* of created things, because they are not three, but one principle of the creature. But according as it signifies the privation of *personal origin*, it thus belongs to the innascible person alone, namely to the Father, in whom is the plenitude of fontality for the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit. — This fontality, moreover, is in a certain way the origin of the other fontality. For because the Father produces the Son, and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit; therefore God the Father through the Son with the Holy Spirit is the principle of all created things; for unless he produced them *from eternity*, he could not produce through them *in time;* and therefore, by reason of that production in the Trinity, he is rightly said to be *the fountain of life*. *For as he has life in himself, so he gives the Son to have life in himself*, etc. Hence it is that *eternal life* is this alone: that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is the image of the Trinity, should return, by the manner of a certain intelligible circle, through memory, intelligence and will, through the deiformity of glory, into the most blessed Trinity.

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