Quaest. 4, Art. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/10/d/4/q/bon-qpe-q4-a1
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### Question IV. *On obedience.*

Now that inquiry has been made concerning humility and concerning poverty and concerning continence, it remains now, fourthly, to inquire concerning obedience. And concerning obedience three things can be asked.

The first is whether it is consonant with natural right that man, by obeying, be subject to another.

The second is whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obey another.

The third is whether it is fitting to the Christian religion that all obey one.

### Article I. *Whether it is consonant with natural right that man, by obeying, be subject to another.*

As to the first, the procedure is thus. It seems that it is consonant with natural right that man obey man.

1. For natural piety dictates that parents are to be honoured; but the honour of parents consists in the showing of reverence, and the showing of reverence is by complying and obeying: therefore etc.

2. Again, the law of the decalogue, written in the heart of man, dictates through the dictate of nature; but it commands this, namely that parents be honoured: therefore that is consonant with natural right. But this is done through the service of obedience: therefore etc.

3. Again, Ephesians the sixth: *Children, obey your parents in all things;* but fatherhood and sonship are supremely consonant with natural right: therefore also that sons obey their parents.

4. Again, the right of nature dictates order; but «order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, allotting to each its own place», as Augustine says in the nineteenth book *On the City of God*: if therefore order is that one be placed under another, and the right of nature dictates order, it dictates therefore that one ought to be subjected to another.

5. Again, the right of nature dictates peace among the members of a household; but peace in a house is «the ordered concord of commanding and

obeying»: therefore it belongs to the right of nature to command and to obey.

6. Again, natural right dictates that rank is to be kept, «because, if all things were equal, all things would not be»; but where there is rank, there is superiority and inferiority; but if the inferior is not subject to the superior, rank is not kept: therefore etc.

7. Again, the right of nature dictates the hierarchical order, which descends from the highest hierarchy through the angelic as far as the human; but it is consonant with the hierarchical order that the inferior comply with the superior: therefore etc.

8. Again, the right of nature dictates «to render to each what is his own»; but honour is due most of all to man standing, or in the state of innocence; but honour is shown to a man when he is obeyed: therefore etc.

9. Again, it belongs to the dictate of the law of nature, «what is common among all»; but government and command, or subjection and obedience, are common to all: therefore etc.

10. Again, it belongs to the dictate of natural right that the whole man obey right reason within himself: therefore by a like reason the right of nature dictates that the less skilled and the ignorant, by obeying, be subject to the more skilled and the knowing: therefore it seems that for man to comply with man is consonant with natural right.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ, this is objected thus. 1. Genesis the first: *Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea* etc.; on which word Augustine says in the nineteenth book *On the City of God:* «God did not will that the rational man, made to the image of God, should rule over any but irrational things»; but it belongs to the dictate of nature that man keep the divine institution: therefore it is consonant with natural right that man not command man, nor one, by obeying, be subject to another.

2. Again, Gregory: «Nature made all men equal»: therefore the right of nature dictates equality; but where there is equality, there is no superiority and inferiority; but obedience bespeaks superiority and inferiority: therefore etc.

3. Again, in the twenty-second distinction: «When fault does not require it, we are all equal according to the account of humility»; but in the state of nature as instituted there would have been no fault: therefore there would have been equality, therefore there would have been no prelacy nor subjection: therefore etc.

4. Again, the right of nature dictates that the *dignity* of the image is to be kept; but the image is immediately from God and subject to God alone, because «it is formed by the first Truth, no nature coming between»: therefore it seems that this, that man by obeying be subject to man, is against the dignity of the image.

5. Again, the law of nature dictates that *liberty* is to be kept; but free choice is equally in all: therefore liberty is to be kept equally in all. But where there is subjection and obedience, there is not equal liberty: therefore etc.

6. Again, the right of nature dictates that *charity* is to be kept; but charity makes union, conformity and equality: therefore it removes all subjection and setting-over: therefore etc.

7. Again, what the law of nature dictates always has perpetual *being;* but all subjection and obedience shall be brought to nought, because of First Corinthians the fifteenth: *When he shall have brought to nought principality* etc.; the Gloss: «While the world lasts, men are set over men»: therefore etc.

8. Again, if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it dictates the other also: therefore if it dictates that one is to obey, it dictates also that one is to command: therefore, just as to obey and to be under can be desired without sin, by a like reason to command and to be over can also be desired. But this is false and unfitting: therefore so is that from which it follows: therefore the law of nature does not dictate commanding, and by this neither obeying.

9. Again, the law of nature dictates that the honour due to God is to be rendered to no other; but the honour due to God is shown by obeying and complying: therefore *to obey* is to be rendered to God alone, therefore not to man.

10. Again, the natural law is an impression made by the eternal law; but that impression moves the soul towards

the arduous, whereas to subject oneself to another by complying is contrary to the arduous: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION.

> *The natural law dictates, in a certain generality, that the inferior, by obeying, be subject to the superior, yet in a different way according to the different differences of superiority and inferiority; and this is consonant with the written law and with the law of grace.*

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of what has been said, it is to be noted that, according to what Augustine says in the book of *Eighty-three Questions*, the natural law is an impression made in the soul by the eternal law; and the eternal law is that by which, itself remaining unchangeable, all other things are ordered. Whence Augustine, in the first book *On Free Choice:* «To set out briefly in words, as far as I am able, the notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us: it is that by which it is just that all things be most ordered». But as is said in the nineteenth book *On the City of God,* the thirteenth chapter: «Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, allotting to each its own place». If therefore it belongs to the superior to be over, and to the inferior to be under, the natural law, which flows from the eternal law, naturally dictates that the inferior, by obeying, be subject to the superior; and this indeed it dictates in a certain generality, yet in diverse ways, according as it happens that diverse differences of superiority and inferiority are found.

For one is said to be superior to another either as to the *origin of nature,* or as to *lordship of power* or presidency, or as to *government by providence.* The first superiority belongs to nature itself by reason *of itself,* because «nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like things from like»; but the second by reason *of vice,* because, as Ambrose says, servitude is the penalty of sin; and the third belongs by reason *of remedy,* according to that of Numbers the twenty-seventh: *May God of the spirits of all flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude, lest they be as sheep without a shepherd.* — To the first superiority is owed *filial* obedience, to the second *servile* obedience, but to the third *jurisdictional* obedience, which regards the dignity of prelacy.

Hence it is, therefore, that the natural law dictates *filial* obedience, whether according to the state of nature *fallen,* or according to the state of nature *as instituted.* — But *servile* obedience it dictates not simply, but in the state of nature *fallen,* for the punishment of sin, according to the dictate of the right of nations, which flows from the reason and instinct of nature. — But *jurisdictional* obedience it dictates according to the state of nature *repairable* or repaired, and this in the state *of the way,* according to that of First Corinthians the fifteenth: *When he shall have brought to nought all principality* etc.; the Gloss: «While the world lasts, angels will be over angels, men over men, for the benefit of the living; but when all have been gathered, all prelacy will then cease, because it will not be necessary». — Since therefore, according to the threefold difference of superiority, there is a threefold mode of obeying: the first nature dictates *simply,* because universally and explicitly and according to every state; but the second and third *implicitly* and according to *a determinate state.*

Whence each of the said obediences is consonant with the law *of nature,* and not only with the law of nature, but also with the law *of grace* and the *written* law. — For because the law *of grace* considers the *rise, fall* and *remedy* of nature, therefore it belongs to it to *approve* the threefold mode and difference of obedience described above. For it approves *filial* obedience in Ephesians the sixth: *Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is just.* It approves also *servile* obedience, in First Timothy the sixth: *Whosoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them count their masters worthy of all honour.* It praises also *jurisdictional* obedience in the last of Hebrews: *Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. For they watch* etc. — But on the other hand, because the *written* law was a law of rigour, it not only *approves* this threefold obedience, but also *punishes* the transgressors of this obedience. For it punishes the *contumacious son,* Deuteronomy the twenty-first: *If a man*

*have a contumacious and unruly son, who will not hear the command of his father, and being corrected, slighteth to obey: they shall take him and bring him to the ancients* etc. — It punishes also the *rebellious servant,* Exodus the twenty-first: *He that striketh his servant or handmaid with a rod, if the party survive one day or two, shall not be subject to the loss, because it is his money.* — It punishes also the *subject who does not obey,* Deuteronomy the seventeenth: *He that will be proud, refusing to obey the command of the priest, that man shall die.* — From what has been said, therefore, it is manifestly gathered that the obedience of man to man is consonant with the law *of grace* and the *written* law and the law *of nature.* — Whence the reasons which are brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. To that, then, which is objected first from the authority of Augustine, of Gregory and of the canon, it must be said that in those words they do not intend to exclude subjection and obedience, but coerced servitude, which indeed was not, nor ought to have been, except where the guilt of sin intervened, as a disease contrary to nature itself; in detestation of which also, according to the dictate of right nature, the punishment of servitude ought to follow, on account of the contempt of the divine majesty and the taking captive of human liberty and the dishonouring of the dignity of rational nature. Whence, although nature does not dictate this for itself while standing, it does dictate it for itself as falling from its state, according to what was said in the preceding.

4. To that which is objected concerning the dignity of the image, the response can already be plain: because, although subjection of this kind does not belong to the image *formed,* it belongs nevertheless to the image *deformed,* or also *to be reformed;* just as we see in the Sacraments that man, who is to be repaired, is in a certain way subjected to sensible elements, although to man standing it is fitting to be subjected in respect of God alone. — It can also be said otherwise, that one may speak of the image in two ways: either *in itself,* or *in relation to the flesh;* and although the soul itself, by reason *of itself,* is to be infused by God alone and subjected to him alone, yet by reason *of the flesh,* which is to be propagated through the force of human ministry, it is to be subjected to its origin, as offspring to parent, yet in such a way that from this no prejudice at all is generated to the dignity of the image.

5. To that which is objected, that the law of nature dictates that the liberty of the will is to be kept etc.; it must be said that, since there is liberty from *misery,* from *fault* and from *coercion,* liberty from *coercion* is twofold, namely from *sufficient* and from *inducing* coercion. The first, indeed, nature dictates is to be kept altogether *simply and always.* But the second, namely from *inducing* coercion, it does not dictate except for *that time* in which someone abuses liberty; and because this is in the state *of fallen nature,* therefore it dictates for this time that the wickedness of wills be restrained by the commands of presiding powers.

6. To that which is objected, that the right of nature dictates that charity is to be kept; it must be said that, just as for the perfection of a living body there is required an *equality of complexion,* in which all the members are conformed, and a *multiformity of organisation,* in which the members are distinguished and ordered and, according to a varied influence, some are set before others; so it is to be understood concerning the mystical body of Christ. And therefore the unity of charity does not exclude the multiformity of charisms and the distinction of dignities and offices, according to which one member is to be subjected to another and, according to the law of prelacy and subjection, to be governed by another.

7. To that which is objected, that what is dictated by nature has perpetual duration; it must be said that this is true of what nature dictates *simply,* but it is not true of what nature dictates *for a state;* just as in the state of innocence it dictated that all things be common, which indeed it does not dictate in corrupted nature. And therefore that proposition is false, understood universally.

8. To that which is objected, that if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it dictates the other also; it must be said that, just as the law of nature dictates subjection, so also prelacy. For just as it dictates that one ought to be subjected to another for obedience, so it dictates that another ought to be set over another through providence. But from this it does not follow that prelacy ought there to be desired, as subjection is desired. For the desire of subjection is consonant with humility and reverence; but the desire of prelacy for the most part degenerates into the haughtiness of ambition and arrogance: therefore, although a place of dignity can rightly be administered according to the dictate of nature, yet it ought not to be desired, on account of the pattern of pride annexed to it.

9. To that which is objected, that the honour due to God is to be rendered to no other; it must be said that honour is due to God both in his *own nature* and in *his image;* for the honour which is shown to man on account of God is referred to God; and therefore what is proper to God, namely the honour of latria, ought not to be attributed to another. But what befits God working through a minister, namely governance and kingship and command in respect

of subjects, it is not unfitting that it be attributed to another through God and on account of God and according to God, because the whole is referred to him according to the right order, which indeed he keeps in governing the world.

10. To that which is objected, that the impression of the natural law moves towards the arduous; it must be said that there is an *arduous of honour* and an *arduous of virtue;* the *arduous of honour* belongs to the soul according to the state of the fatherland, the *arduous of virtue* according to the state of the way. For someone is honoured and excellently praised for this reason, that he merited it through an arduous and excellent and difficult work of virtue; and because such a work is a work of humility and obedience, which to proud minds is arduous and inaccessible: therefore it is consonant with the very law of nature and of grace that man, through the work of humility and obedience, be raised up to the summit of honour and of eternal felicity.