Quaest. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/8/d/2/q/bon-qsc-q2
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### Question II. *Whether God knows things through the likenesses of things, or through their essence.*

Granted that God knows infinite things, it is asked whether he knows those things which he knows through the *likenesses* of things, or through their essence. And that it is through *likenesses* seems to be shown thus:

1. First, by the authority of Scripture. John, chapter one: *That which was made, in him was life*: therefore all things which have been made were beforehand in God as knowing them: therefore either through a likeness or through their truth; but not through their truth, since as yet nothing existed: therefore through a likeness.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* VI says that "the Son is an art full of all the living

and unchangeable accounts"; but the accounts in an art are nothing else than the likenesses of the things made by art and known by the artificer: therefore the same as before.

3. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* IX, chapter eleven, says: "All knowledge according to species is like to that thing which it knows"; but divine cognition, since it is not according to privation, is according to species: therefore it is necessary that it be like to that thing which it knows. But it would not be like unless it had the likeness of the thing: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, the Philosopher says "that the understanding is in a certain way all things"; but this is for no other reason than that the one understanding, by the very fact that he understands, is made like to the thing understood: therefore if this belongs to the general account of understanding, then if God understands and knows anything, it is necessary that he have the likenesses of the things which he knows: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, for anything to be perfectly known it is necessary that there be an adequation of the understanding to the intelligible; but a created thing cannot be made adequate to the creating understanding by its own nature, since that understanding is simple and the thing itself composite: therefore it is necessary that it be made adequate to it through some likeness that is simple and separated from all matter: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, God knows things in the same way after they have been made in which he knew them before they came to be, because divine knowledge does not change; but before they came to be, he could not know them through their proper essences; and he knew them either through their likenesses or through their essences; and not through their essences: therefore through likenesses. And he knows now in the same way in which he knew then; therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, God is an *agent acting from a purpose*; but every agent acting from a purpose preconceives that which it is going to make; and everything which preconceives something has that thing in some manner in its own keeping, either through its truth or through its likeness: therefore if, before things came to be, God did not have them in his keeping as to their essences, then he had them as to their likenesses.

8. Likewise, God is *exemplar* truly and properly, just as he is truly and properly *efficient cause* and *end*; but nothing is exemplar truly and properly except what has the likenesses of the things exemplified, through which it knows and makes them: therefore, as the account of exemplarity belongs to God, so also does the account of likeness.

9. Likewise, God truly is the eternal *mirror*, leading to the knowing of every other knowable thing; but a mirror does not lead to the knowing of another thing unless it has that thing's likeness; therefore the same as before.

10. Likewise, God is truly and properly *word*; but a word is the likeness of that which is said: therefore if the Son of God is the Word by which all things are said, it is necessary that in him there be the likenesses of all the things said.

11. Likewise, two things concur for the perfection of cognition, namely *light* and *likeness*; but the account of the most perfect light is wholly preserved in the divine cognition: therefore likewise also the account of expressive likeness.

**Contra:** 1. Anselm in the *Monologion*, chapter thirty-one: "It is manifest that in the Word, *through which all things were made*, there is not the likeness of those things, but their true and simple essence": therefore if God does not know through anything outside himself, he does not know through a likeness, but rather through their essence.

2. Likewise, wherever there is *likeness*, there is *agreement*, and wherever there is *agreement*, there is a *sharing* of some one thing by several; but God and the creature share nothing as one, since then that thing would be simpler than the Creator; therefore it is impossible that there be any likeness in the Creator with respect to the creature, or conversely.

3. Likewise, likeness is a relation of equiparance; but between the Creator and the creature there can be no relation of equiparance: therefore neither any likeness.

4. Likewise, just as *equality* is caused by unity in *quantity*, so *likeness* is caused by unity in *quality*; but between the Creator and the creature *equality* is in no way found, neither truly nor by transference: therefore neither is *likeness*, by the like account; or if *likeness* is found there and not *equality*, it is asked whence this comes.

5. Likewise, if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is the least: therefore if likeness is the account of knowing, then, speaking as such, where there is greater likeness there is a greater account of knowing, and where there is least likeness, least: if therefore God knows things through likenesses, it follows from this that he has the least cognition of things; which it is blasphemous to say.

6. Likewise, one creature is more assimilated to God than another, as that which exists, lives and senses is more assimilated than

that which only exists: if therefore a greater likeness is a greater account of knowing, then God knows one creature more than another.

7. Likewise, if our understanding were wholly in act, it would not need a likeness: therefore since the divine understanding is wholly in act and is light with respect to everything knowable, it seems that no account of likeness is required for God's cognition.

8. Likewise, a likeness is an account leading to something else, namely to that of which it is the likeness; but where there is such a leading, there is a running-through and a ratiocinative comparison, and this in no way belongs to divine cognition: therefore neither does the account of likeness.

9. Likewise, truth is the account of knowing; therefore in the most powerful cognition the intention of truth is most powerfully preserved; but truth is more preserved in the thing itself than in its likeness: therefore if divine cognition is the most noble, it does not know things through likenesses, but through their essences.

10. Likewise, the Philosopher, in *On the Soul* III: "In things separated from matter, that *which* is understood and that *by which* it is understood are the same"; but God is wholly separated from matter: therefore that *which* he knows and that *by which* he knows are the same. But he knows things outside himself: therefore he knows them through their own essences, not through any likenesses.

11. Likewise, wherever there is an immediate and undivided conjunction of the knower and the knowable, there is no need of a likeness; but God is most inward to every created thing: therefore for the cognition of it he does not need any likeness.

12. Likewise, the mode of knowing through the essence is more noble than that through a likeness; which is clear, because that mode of knowing pertains to the third heaven, as Augustine says in *On Genesis to the Letter* XII: therefore, if what is more noble is to be attributed to God, it seems more fitting to hold that God knows things through their essences rather than through likenesses.

13. Likewise, the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable; but divine cognition has nobility in every way: therefore also the most perfect union. But the conjunction and union is more immediate when the knower is united to the knowable as to its essence than as to its likeness: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusio.** God knows things through the eternal accounts, which are the exemplar likenesses of things, most perfectly representative and expressive, and essentially the same as what God himself is.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to blessed Dionysius and according to blessed Augustine in many places, God knows things through the eternal accounts. For blessed Dionysius says in the book *On the Divine Names*, chapter five: "We call *exemplars* those substantified and singularly pre-existing accounts of existing things which theology calls *predefinitions*, and the divine and good wills, determinative and effective of existing things, according to which the supersubstantial existence predefined and produced all things." Likewise, Augustine in *Confessions* I, near the beginning, speaking to God, says thus: "O God and Lord of all things which thou hast created, with thee stand the causes of all unstable things, and the unchangeable origins of all changeable things abide, and the everlasting accounts of all irrational and temporal things live." Likewise, in *On the City of God* XI, chapter ten, the same man says: "There are not many wisdoms, but one wisdom, in which are certain infinite and, to it, finite treasures of intelligible things, in which are all the invisible and unchangeable accounts of things, even of visible and changeable things, which were made through it, since God made nothing unknowingly," etc.

But these everlasting accounts are not the true essences and quiddities of things, since they are not other than the Creator; whereas the creature and the Creator necessarily have differing essences: and therefore it is necessary that they be exemplar forms, and through this representative likenesses of the things themselves; and therefore they are accounts of knowing, since cognition, by the very fact that it is cognition, bespeaks an assimilation and an expression between the knower and the knowable. And therefore it must be held, according as the Saints say and reasons show, that God knows things through their likenesses.

But for the understanding of the question itself and of the objections, it must be noted that *likeness* is said in two ways: in one way through the agreement of two things in a

third, in which way it is said that "likeness is the same quality of differing things." In another way *likeness* is said because one thing is the likeness of another; and this is twofold: one likeness is *imitative*, and thus the creature is the likeness of the Creator; another is *exemplative*, and thus in the Creator the exemplar account is the likeness of the creature. But likeness spoken of in either way, namely *imitative* and *exemplative*, is *expressing and expressive*; and this is the likeness which is required for having knowledge of things. — But some *knowledge causes things* and some is *caused by things*. For knowledge *caused by things* an *imitative* likeness is required; and this likeness is from without, and therefore it posits some composition and addition about the knowing understanding; and hence it is that it bears witness to imperfection. — But for knowledge *causing things* an *exemplative* likeness is required, and this indeed is not from without, nor does it induce any composition, nor does it bear witness to any imperfection, but to perfection in every way. For since the divine understanding itself is the highest light and full truth and pure act, then, just as the divine power in causing things is of itself sufficient to produce all things, so the divine light and truth is sufficient to express all things; and since *to express* is an intrinsic act, it is therefore eternal; and since expression is a kind of assimilation, therefore the divine understanding, expressing all things eternally by its own highest truth, has eternally the exemplar likenesses of all things, which are not *other* than himself, but are essentially what he is. — *Again*, since he expresses inasmuch as he is the highest light and pure act, he therefore expresses most lucidly, most expressly, most perfectly, and through this equally and according to an intention of likeness in no way diminished; and hence it is that he knows all things most perfectly, most distinctly and most entirely. — These things seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

1. To that, then, which is objected in the first place from Anselm, it must be said that Anselm is there speaking of the likeness which is caused by the truth of the thing; whence he there takes *likeness* according as it expresses under the account of imitation rather than of exemplarity; and in this way it is posited in the product with respect to the *producer*, and not conversely, as he adds; but in the other way nothing prevents its being posited in the producer with respect to the *product*.

2. To that which is objected — wherever there is likeness, there is agreement, etc. — it must be said that the likeness which is the agreement of two things in a third is not posited in God with respect to the creature; but the likeness by which something is said to be *imitative* of another may well be posited in the *creature* with respect to the Creator, and the likeness by which something is said to be *exemplative* of another, in the *Creator* with respect to the creature. For this likeness does not require agreement through the participation of something *common*, but agreement of *order* suffices, according to the account of causing and caused, of expressing and expressed.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that likeness is a relation of equiparance, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is caused through the agreement of one participated third; and in this way we do not posit it here. — And through this the answer is clear to that which is objected concerning equality. — But as to what is asked — why there is not equality in some way, as there is likeness — it must be said that *equality* includes in itself a commensuration which can in no way exist between the finite and the infinite; whereas *likeness* bespeaks expression, and this can well exist between the Creator and the creature. Hence, just as it does not follow: this is not equal to that, therefore it does not imitate it, or is not exemplified by it; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

5. To that which is objected, that if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature it is the least, etc., the answer is already clear: because likeness through *participation* is not only the least but rather none at all; whereas likeness through *imitation* is greater and less in the creature, according as the creature approaches more or less to the divine goodness; but likeness through *exemplation* and *expression* is highest in the Creator with respect to every creature, since truth itself, being the highest light, expresses all things in the highest degree; and therefore it does not follow that he knows one creature more than another.

6. To that which is objected, that one creature is more assimilated to God than another, etc., the answer is likewise already clear: for this is true of *imitative* likeness on the part of the creature; but this is not the account of knowing, but the other, namely the *exemplative*, which in the highest degree and equally expresses all things.

7. To that which is objected, that if our understanding were wholly in act it would not need a likeness, etc., it must be said that it is true that it would not need a likeness taken or received *from without*, but nonetheless it would use *itself* as a likeness for knowing other things; and in this way, and no other, do we posit a likeness in the divine cognition.

8. To that which is objected, that a likeness is an account leading to something else, etc., it must be said that this is true of the likeness which depends on a thing *outside*; but of

the other likeness it is not true — not, that is, after the manner of a running-through and a way, but only after the manner of a light perfectly expressing and quieting the knower himself.

9. To that which is objected, that truth is the account of knowing, etc., it must be said that truth is spoken of in two ways: in one way *truth* is the same as *the entity of the thing*, according as Augustine says in the *Soliloquies* that "the true is that which is." In another way truth is *the expressive light in intellectual cognition*, according as Anselm says in the book *On Truth* that "truth is a rightness perceptible by the mind alone." In the first way *truth* is the account of knowing, but a remote one; in the second way it is the proximate and immediate account of knowing. When therefore it is said that truth is more preserved in the very entity of the thing than in a likeness, this is true of truth in the first way, not in the second. But that truth which is the proximate and immediate account of knowing is more preserved in the likeness which is present to the understanding, and most of all and most powerfully in that likeness which is *exemplative* of things; for that exemplar likeness expresses the thing more perfectly than the caused thing itself expresses itself. And on this account God knows things more perfectly through those likenesses than he would know them through their own essences; and the Angels know more perfectly in the Word than in the proper genus. On which account Augustine also frequently says that cognition in the Word is likened to the light of day, whereas cognition in the proper genus is likened to evening, for the reason that every creature is darkness with respect to the divine light.

10. But to that which is objected, that in things separated from matter there is no difference, etc., it must be said that that saying is understood not only of things separated from matter on the side of the things understanding, but also on the side of the things intelligible — as, for instance, when what is separated from matter understands what is separated from matter, then that *which* it understands and that *by which* it is understood will be the same; and this not always, but when the understanding is turned back upon itself. And this has place when God understands himself; but it does not have place in him with respect to the creature, since, although God is separated from matter, the things understood are not.

11. But to that which is objected, that where there is immediacy of the knower and the knowable, etc., it must be said that the union of knower and knowable can be twofold: either according to the account of *being* and of *conserving* and of *causing*; or according to the account of *knowing*. Now the conjunction is immediate according to the account of *causing* when the cause immediately produces and causes and sustains the effect; and the conjunction is immediate according to the account of *knowing* when the knower knows the knowable either through the essence of the knower or through the essence of the thing known; and then there is no need of an intermediate likeness differing from both of the extremes. Nevertheless the essence itself, inasmuch as it is the account of knowing, holds the account of likeness; and in this way we posit a likeness about the divine cognition, which is nothing other than the very essence of the knower.

12. To that which is objected, that cognition through the essence is more noble than through a likeness, etc., it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is abstracted and caused from the essence of the thing itself, of which sort is the likeness required for a caused cognition; but it is not true of the likeness which is the same as the essence of the knower. For that cognition is more perfect by which the knower uses himself as a likeness for knowing something, than the cognition by which the knower receives something from the side of the thing known.

13. But to that which is objected, that the more noble a cognition is, the more immediate is the conjunction and union of the knower to the knowable, etc., the answer is already clear: because a likeness which is nothing other than the knower himself posits no distance either in reality or even in account, since the knower inasmuch as he is a knower bespeaks the account of likeness; and therefore the likeness which is the account of knowing in no way goes out beyond the account of the knower and the knowable.

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