Quaest. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/8/d/4/q/bon-qsc-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal accounts themselves.*

Supposing that the eternal accounts are really undistinguished in the divine art or cognition, it is asked whether they are the accounts of knowing in every certitudinal cognition; that is to ask whether whatever is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal accounts themselves. And that it is, seems to hold *by authority*, in many ways.

1. Augustine, *On the Teacher*: « Concerning all the things that we understand, we consult not one speaking, who sounds forth outwardly, but the truth presiding inwardly over the mind itself. He, however, who is consulted, teaches; he who is said to dwell in the interior man, Christ, the unchangeable power of God and everlasting wisdom, whom indeed every rational soul consults ».

2. Again, the same, *On True Religion*: « It appears that above our mind there is a law, which is called *truth*; nor is it now to be doubted that the unchangeable nature which is above the human mind is God. For this is that unchangeable truth which is rightly called the law of all the arts and the art of the almighty Artificer ».

3. Again, Augustine, in the second book *On Free Choice*: « That beauty of wisdom and of truth is not carried through by time, nor does it migrate by places, nor is it cut off by night, nor shut out by shadow, nor is it subject to the senses of the body; to all who love it, turned to it from the whole world, it is nearest, to all everlasting; it is in no place, it is nowhere absent; outwardly it admonishes, inwardly it teaches. No one judges concerning it, no one judges well without it; and through this it is manifest that it is without doubt to be preferred to our minds, which are made severally wise *by* it alone and judge concerning other things not *about* it but *through* it ». — *If you say* that it does not follow from this that we see *in* the truth or *in* the accounts, but that we see *from* the accounts; *on the contrary*: Augustine in the twelfth of the *Confessions*: « If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see it? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both in that unchangeable truth which is above our minds ».

4. Again, in the eighth of *On the City of God*, speaking of the philosophers, he says: « Those whom we deservedly set before all others said that the lumen of minds for learning all things is the same God himself, by whom all things were made ».

5. Again, in the eighth of *On the Trinity*, chapter three: « When the mind pleases us, so that we prefer it to every bodily light, it does not please us in itself, but in that art by which it was made. For it is approved as made from that whence it is seen it ought to have been made; this is truth and simple good ».

6. Again, in the ninth of *On the Trinity*, chapter six: « By altogether other rules, remaining unchangeably above our mind, we are convinced either to approve or to disapprove, when we rightly approve or disapprove of anything ».

7. Again, in the same, chapter seven: « In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we work anything, whether in ourselves or in bodies, by true and right reason ».

8. Again, in the fourteenth book *On the Trinity*, chapter fifteen: « When the impious see the rules according to which each ought to live, where do they see them? Not in their own nature, since it is agreed that their minds are changeable, whereas these rules are unchangeable; nor in the habit of their mind, since those rules are rules of justice.

Where does he discern that he must have what he himself does not have? Where, then, are they written, except in the book of that light which is called *truth*, whence every just law is copied »? — *If you say* that he retracted it; *on the contrary*: Augustine, in the first book of the *Retractations*: « It is credible that even those unskilled in certain disciplines answer truly concerning them, when they are able to grasp the eternal lumen of reason, where they behold these unchangeable truths, not because they knew them before and afterwards forgot them, as it seemed to Plato ». — Again: « The intellectual nature is connected not only with intelligible things but also with unchangeable ones, made in that order so that, when it moves itself to those things with which it is connected, or to itself, in so far as it sees them, so far does it answer truly concerning them ».

From these authorities of Augustine it plainly appears that all things are known in the eternal accounts.

9. Again, Ambrose: « Through myself I see nothing but empty, flowing and falling things »: therefore if I see anything with certitude, I see it through something which is above me.

10. Again, Gregory, on that text of John fourteen: *He will teach you all things*, says: « Unless the same Spirit is present to the heart of the hearer, the speech of the teacher is idle; let no one, therefore, attribute to the man teaching what he understands from the mouth of the teacher, because, unless he who teaches is within, the tongue of the teacher labours outwardly in vain ».

11. Again, the same in the same place: « Behold, you all alike hear the one voice of the speaker, and yet you do not all equally weigh the sense of the voice you have heard. Since therefore the voice is not unequal, why is the intelligence of the voice unequal in your hearts, unless because, through the fact that the voice of the speaker admonishes in common, there is an interior master who teaches certain ones specially concerning the intelligence of the voice »? But if our understanding were sufficient to itself for understanding through the lumen of created truth, it would not need a supernal teacher: since therefore it does need one, it is plain, etc.

12. Again, Anselm in the *Proslogion*, chapter fourteen: « How great is the light from which every truth flashes that shines to the rational mind! How ample is that truth, in which is everything that is true, and outside which is nothing but nothing and the false »! Therefore if the true is not seen except where it is, none is seen except in the eternal truth.

13. Again, Origen: « Human nature, even if it had not sinned, could not shine by its own powers ». But to understand is a kind of shining: therefore even if it had not sinned, it could not understand by its own powers, therefore it needs a higher agent.

14. Again, on that text of the Psalm: *Thy hands have made me and formed me, give me understanding*; the Gloss: « God alone gives understanding; for God through himself, who *is light*, illumines pious minds ».

15. Again, Isaac, treating that text of the Psalm: *In thy light we shall see light*, says: « Just as there goes forth from the sun that whereby the sun can be seen, and yet what shows the sun does not desert the sun; so in God the light which goes forth from God irradiates the mind, so that it may first see that very flashing, without which it would not see, and in it may see the rest »: therefore according to this all things are seen in the divine light.

16. Again, the Philosopher, in the sixth of the *Ethics*, chapter three, according to the new translation: « We all suppose that what we know cannot be otherwise; but contingent things, when they come to be outside our contemplating, escape us as to whether they are or are not. From necessity, therefore, the knowable is eternal; for from necessity the beings

that are simply eternal are all ungenerated and incorruptible »: therefore in no way can there be certitudinal cognition without the account of eternal truth falling there. But this is only in the eternal accounts: therefore etc.

Again, this same thing is shown *by reasons*, and first by reasons taken from the words of Augustine, and secondly by other reasons. For Augustine intimates reasons of this kind in the second book *On Free Choice* and *On True Religion* and *On the Teacher*, in the sixth of the *Music* and in the eighth of *On the Trinity*.

17. Every unchangeable thing is higher than the changeable; but that by which something is known with certitude is unchangeable, because it is a necessary truth; but our mind is changeable: therefore that by which we know is above our minds. But what is above our minds is nothing other than God and eternal truth: therefore that by which cognition is is the divine truth and the everlasting account.

18. Again, everything unjudgeable is higher than the judgeable; but the law by which we judge is unjudgeable, whereas our mind is judgeable: therefore that by which we know and judge is above our mind. But this is nothing other than the everlasting truth and account: therefore etc.

19. Again, everything infallible is higher than the fallible; but the light and truth by which we know with certitude is infallible, whereas our mind can be deceived: therefore that light and truth is above our mind. But this is the eternal light and truth: therefore etc.

20. Again, every certitudinal lumen is uncontractible, because it shows itself to all and offers the knowable under the same certitude; but an uncontractible lumen is necessarily not a created but an uncreated lumen, because everything created is limited and finite and is multiplied in diverse things: therefore it is necessary that this lumen be uncreated. But by this lumen we know with certitude: therefore etc.

21. Again, everything necessary is unterminable, because in no way can it nor will it be able to be otherwise; but that by which we know with certitude is a necessary truth: therefore it is unterminable. But everything of this kind is above everything created, since every creature has come forth from *non-being* into *being*, and, so far as it is of itself, is turnable into *non-being*: therefore that by which we know exceeds every created truth, therefore it is an uncreated truth.

22. Again, everything created, so far as it is of itself, is comprehensible; but the laws of numbers, of figures and of demonstrations, since they are increased to infinity, are according to the Philosopher incomprehensible by the human understanding: therefore laws of this kind, since they are seen by the human understanding, must necessarily be seen in something which exceeds everything created. But there is nothing of this kind except God and the everlasting account: therefore etc.

23. Again, when an impious man knows justice, either he knows it through its *presence*, or through a *likeness received from without*, or through *something which is above*; but not through its *presence*, since that is not present to him; not through a *species received from without*, since it does not have a likeness abstractable through sense: therefore it is necessary that he know it through *something else*, which is above his understanding; and by parity of reason all the other spiritual knowables which he knows. Therefore if the impious man knows in the eternal accounts, much more do others. — *If you say* that he knows it through its effect; *it is objected* against this: because what is in no way known is unknown as to what is effected by it — for if I do not know what a man is, I never know what is done by a man — therefore if a knowledge of justice is not had beforehand, it will never be known that this or that is done by it. It remains, therefore, that it is known in the eternal account. — Similarly one can argue concerning any substantial intelligible form, and through this concerning every certitudinal cognition.

24. Again, just as God is the cause of being, so he is the account of understanding and the order of living; but God is the cause of being in such a way that nothing can be effected by any cause without his moving the one operating by himself and by his eternal power: therefore nothing can be understood without his illumining the one understanding immediately by his eternal truth.

25. Again, no defective being, so far as it is of itself, is known except through a perfect being; but every

created truth, so far as it is of itself, is darkness and defect: therefore nothing falls into the understanding except through that supreme truth.

26. Again, nothing is known rightly and with certitude unless it is applied to a rule which can in no way be bent; but this rule is none other than that which is essentially rectitude itself, and this is none other than the eternal truth and account: therefore nothing is known with certitude unless it is applied to the eternal rule.

27. Again, since the soul has a twofold portion, *higher* and *lower*, the lower reason has its rise from the higher, and not conversely; but reason is called *higher* in so far as it is turned to the eternal laws, and *lower* in so far as it is occupied about temporal things: therefore the cognition of eternal things is in the soul prior and by nature before the cognition of temporal things: therefore it is impossible that anything be known by it with certitude unless it is helped by those eternal accounts.

All these foregoing reasons are drawn out of the words of Augustine in diverse volumes.

Again, this same thing seems to hold *by other reasons* as well.

28. The cognition of the same sensible thing by diverse men at once and together cannot be had except through something common, and by parity of reason the cognition of the same intelligible thing; but some one truth in no way multiplied can be understood by diverse men, just as it can also be uttered: therefore it is necessary that it be understood through some one thing in no way multiplied. But a one in diverse things in no way multiplied cannot be anything but God: therefore the account of understanding each thing is the very truth which is God.

29. Again, as the affection stands to the good, so the understanding stands to the true, and as every good is from the supreme goodness, so every truth is from the supreme truth; but it is impossible that our affection be borne directly into the good without in some way attaining the supreme goodness: therefore it is impossible that our understanding know any truth with certitude without in some way attaining the supreme truth.

30. Again, the true is not known except by truth, and not by any truth whatever, but by a known truth, and most of all by that truth which is most known; but this truth is that which cannot be thought not to be; but such is not a created truth, but an uncreated one: therefore whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal truth and account.

31. Again, the soul is born to be turned upon the intelligible which is *outside*, and upon the intelligible which is *within*, and upon the intelligible which is *above*. But the turning to the intelligible which is *outside* is least simple; the turning to the intelligible which is *within* is more simple; the turning to the intelligible which is *above* is most simple, because that is more inward to it than it is to itself. But the simpler a thing is, the prior it is: therefore the soul's turning upon the very truth most inward to it is naturally prior to its turning upon itself or upon extrinsic truths: therefore it is impossible that it know anything unless that supreme truth is foreknown.

32. Again, every being in potency is reduced to act through something existing in act in that genus; but our understanding is in potency, as is the understanding in a boy: therefore, in order that it become actually understanding, it is necessary that it be made so through him who is actually knowing all things. But this is none other than the eternal wisdom: therefore etc. — *If you say* that this is the agent intellect; *then I ask*: either the agent intellect actually *understood* what this man is learning, or *not*; if *not*: therefore through it he could not become actually understanding; if *so*: therefore either this man who is learning at once understands and is ignorant of the same thing, or the agent intellect is not something of the soul, but above the soul. It remains, therefore, that whatever the understanding soul apprehends, it apprehends through something which is above the soul. But above the soul there is nothing but God: therefore etc. — *If you say* that the agent intellect is not called *agent* because it actually understands, but because it makes to understand; *on the contrary*: everything that understands is higher and better than what does not understand: therefore if the agent intellect does not understand; since it cannot make anything better and higher above itself, it will never make itself or another actually understanding: therefore if it becomes actually understanding, it is necessary that it become so through something which is above itself. But this cannot be granted to be anything other than the eternal account and truth: therefore etc.

33. Again, when all creatures have been destroyed, the rational spirit alone remaining, there remains with it the cognition of the disciplines, such as of numbers and figures; but this is not on account of the *true being* which they have with it, nor with the universe: therefore it is necessary that it be on account of the *being* which they have with the supreme Artificer.

34. Again, according to all the Saints God is said to be the *teacher of all knowledge*; either, therefore, because he *cooperates generally* with every understanding, as also with other creatures, or because he *pours in the gift of grace*, or

because the understanding in knowing *attains him*. If because he *cooperates generally*: therefore he would be said to teach the sense just as he teaches the understanding; which is absurd. If because he *pours in the gift of grace*: therefore every cognition will be gratuitous or infused, none therefore acquired, or innate; which is most absurd. It remains, therefore, that this is said because our understanding *attains to him* as to the lumen of minds and the account of knowing every truth.

*But against this it is objected*, first *by authority*, then *by reason*; *by authority* thus.

1. In the last chapter of the first to Timothy it is said of God: *Who alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen, nor can see.* But everything by which or in which we know is accessible to the knower: therefore that by which or in which we know cannot be the light of the eternal account or truth.

2. Again, Augustine, in the first of *On the Trinity*: « The weak edge of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light, unless it be cleansed by the justice of faith ». Therefore if the light of eternal truth were the account of knowing all truths, no soul would know a truth unless purged and holy. But this is false: therefore also that from which it follows.

3. Again, in the ninth of *On the Trinity*: « The mind therefore itself, just as it gathers the knowledge of bodily things through the senses of the body, so gathers the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself »: therefore it seems that in knowing it is not necessary that whatever it knows it know through the eternal accounts.

4. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth of *On the Trinity*: « It is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind is so constituted that, being subject in a natural order to intelligible things, the Founder so disposing, it sees these things in a certain incorporeal light of its own kind, just as the eye of the flesh sees the things which lie about in this bodily light ». Therefore it seems that, just as a created light of bodily nature suffices for knowing sensible things, so likewise a created spiritual light of the same kind as the cognitive power suffices for intelligible things.

5. Again, Gregory in the *Morals*: « When the mind is suspended in contemplation, whatever it sees perfectly is not God »; but the account of knowing is beheld perfectly in certitudinal cognition: therefore an account of this kind is not God nor anything in God: therefore etc.

6. Again, Dionysius, in the *Letter to Caius*: « If anyone seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see him, but something of those things which are beings and known; but he himself is established above understanding and substance ». Therefore in knowing, our mind in the present life does not attain the uncreated truth.

7. Again, the Philosopher in the third *On the Soul* says that « our understanding is with the continuous and with time »; but those eternal accounts are altogether above time: therefore in understanding our understanding in no way reaches to those accounts.

8. Again, in the same place he says: « Just as in every nature there is something by which it is to make all things, and something by which it is to become all things; so also concerning the understanding it must be understood that there is an agent intellect and a possible intellect »; but these suffice for perfect cognition: therefore there is no need of the support of the eternal account.

9. Again, experience teaches that « from many sensations one memory comes to be, from many memories one experiment, from many experiments one universal, which is the principle of art and of knowledge », because, losing one sense, we lose the knowledge of those things which are about that sense. Therefore certitudinal cognition in the state of the way comes from below, whereas cognition in the eternal accounts comes from above: therefore as long as we are in the state of wayfarers, cognition through the lumen of the eternal accounts does not belong to us.

10. Again, imaginative cognition does not need a higher lumen; rather the power of the imaginative faculty alone suffices for imagining something: therefore if the understanding is more powerful than the imagination, much more will it suffice of itself, without a higher lumen, for knowing something with certitude.

11. Again, certitudinal cognition can be in the sense without the certitude of the everlasting account: therefore if the understanding is more powerful than the sense, much more will it be able to know and understand with certitude without that lumen.

12. Again, for entire cognition nothing more is required than a *knower* and a *knowable* abstracted and the *turning* of the one upon the other; but all this can come about through the power of our understanding without the eternal account: therefore etc.

13. Again, in whatever power something can be done freely, it does not need outside support; but « we understand when we will »: therefore in order that anything

be known by us with certitude, we do not need the lumen of the eternal accounts.

14. Again, the principles of being and of knowing are the same: therefore if the proper and intrinsic principles of being of creatures themselves are only created, whatever is known is known through created accounts: not, therefore, through everlasting accounts and lumina.

15. Again, to each knowable there corresponds its proper account of knowing, in order that certitudinal cognition may be had of it; but those accounts of knowing are not distinctly perceived by any wayfarer's understanding: therefore nothing has to be known in them properly and determinately.

16. Again, if whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal account; but « that on account of which each thing is, is itself more so »: therefore those eternal accounts are also more known to us; which is manifestly false, since they are most hidden from us.

17. Again, it is impossible to see anything in a mirror without the mirror itself being seen: therefore if whatever is known with certitude is seen in those eternal accounts, it is necessary that the first lumen and eternal account be seen. But this is false and absurd: therefore also the first.

18. Again, if whatever is known with certitude is known by those eternal accounts; but those accounts are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary ones, and with respect to future things as with respect to present ones: therefore we would have certitudinal cognition of contingent things just as of necessary ones, and of future things just as of present ones; which is false: therefore also the first.

19. Again, if we know in the eternal accounts; but the eternal accounts are the highest causes; wisdom, however, is the cognition of the highest causes: therefore whoever knows anything with certitude is wise. But this is false: therefore etc.

20. Again, if the cognition of the fatherland is cognition through the eternal accounts, in which the Blessed see whatever they see: therefore, if every certitudinal cognition were through those eternal accounts, all who know with certitude would be blessed, and only the Blessed would know with certitude; but this is false.

21. Again, if whatever is known is seen in the eternal accounts; since the mirror of the eternal accounts is voluntary, and what is known in a voluntary mirror is known through revelation: therefore whatever is known according to this is known in the prophetic mode or by revelation.

22. Again, if whatever is known is known by the eternal accounts; then either *veiled*, or *without a veil*. If *veiled*: therefore nothing is known clearly; if *without a veil*: therefore all see God and the eternal exemplar without any enigma. But this is false according to the state of the way: therefore etc.

Again, it is objected against the reasons of *Augustine* thus:

23. Because, if every unchangeable truth is above the soul and through this eternal and God; since every truth of a demonstrative principle is unchangeable, every such truth would be God: therefore nothing would be known but God.

24. Again, if every unchangeable truth is the truth of the eternal art, and that is only one; every unchangeable truth would be only one; but about any being whatever it happens that some unchangeable truth is found — as is plain; for this is an unchangeable truth: if Socrates runs, Socrates is moved — therefore according to this all beings would be one.

25. Again, if everything which is God is to be adored with latria, and every unchangeable truth of a principle is God: therefore every such truth ought to be adored: therefore the truth of this proposition, two and three are five, ought to be adored.

26. Again, if every unchangeable truth is God: therefore whoever clearly sees any unchangeable truth clearly sees God; but demons and the damned clearly see some unchangeable truths: therefore they clearly see God. But this is to be blessed: therefore the damned are blessed; but nothing is more absurd than this: therefore it is most absurd that whatever is known is known by the eternal accounts, if it is known with certitude.

> **Conclusio.**
>
> *For the certitudinal cognition of the understanding, even in the wayfarer, it is required that the eternal account be in some way attained as a regulating and motive account, not however as the sole account and in its own clarity, but together with the proper created account, and as known in a mirror and in an enigma.*

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, when it is said that everything which is known with certitude is known in the light of the eternal accounts, this can be understood in three ways: *in one way*, so that it be understood that for certitudinal cogni-

tion the evidence of the eternal light concurs as the *whole* and *sole* account of knowing. — And this understanding is less right, for the reason that according to it there would be no cognition of things except in the Word; and then the cognition of the way would not differ from the cognition of the fatherland, nor cognition in the Word from cognition in its proper genus, nor the cognition of knowledge from the cognition of wisdom, nor the cognition of nature from the cognition of grace, nor the cognition of reason from the cognition of revelation; and since all these are false, this way is in no way to be held. — For out of this opinion, which certain men laid down, that nothing is known with certitude except in the archetypal and intelligible world — as were the *first* Academics — there was born the error, as Augustine says in the second book *Against the Academics*, that it happens that nothing at all can be known, as the *new* Academics laid down, for the reason that that intelligible world is hidden from human minds. And therefore, wishing to hold the first opinion and their own position, they fell into a manifest error; because « a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end ».

*In another way*, so that it be understood that for certitudinal cognition the eternal account necessarily concurs as regards its *influence*, in such a way that the knower in knowing does not attain the eternal account itself, but only its influence. — And this way of speaking is indeed insufficient according to the words of blessed Augustine, who by express words and by reasons shows that the mind in certitudinal cognition has to be regulated by the unchangeable and eternal rules, not as by the *habit of its own mind*, but as by those which are *above it* in the eternal truth. And therefore to say that our mind in knowing does not extend itself beyond the influence of the uncreated light is to say that Augustine was deceived, since in expounding his authorities it is not easy to draw them to that sense; and this is very absurd to say of so great a Father and Doctor, the most authoritative among all the expositors of sacred Scripture.

*Furthermore*, that influence of light is either *general*, in the measure that God flows into all creatures, or it is *special*, as God flows in through grace. If it is *general*: therefore God ought no more to be called the giver of wisdom than the fructifier of the earth, nor would knowledge be said to be from him any more than money; if *special*, of the kind that is in grace: therefore according to this every cognition is infused, and none is *acquired* or *innate*; all of which are absurd.

And therefore there is a *third way* of understanding, holding as it were a middle between the two ways, namely that for certitudinal cognition the eternal account is necessarily required as *regulating* and as a *motive account*, not indeed as the *sole* account and *in its own* entire clarity, but together with the created account, and as contuited by us *in part* according to the state of the way.

And this is what Augustine intimates in the fourteenth of *On the Trinity*, chapter fifteen: « The impious man is reminded, that he may be turned to the Lord as to that light by which, even when he was turned away from it, he was in some way touched. For hence it is that even the impious think of eternity and rightly reprehend and rightly praise many things in the manners of men ». Where he also adds that they do this through the rules which « are written in the book of that light which is called *truth* ». — But that our mind in certitudinal cognition in some way attains those rules and unchangeable accounts is necessarily required by the *nobility of the cognition* and the *dignity of the knower*.

*The nobility*, I say, *of the cognition*, because certitudinal cognition cannot be unless there is *unchangeableness on the side of the knowable* and *infallibility on the side of the one knowing*. But created truth is not *unchangeable simply*, but by supposition; likewise neither is the light of a creature *altogether infallible* by its own power, since both are created and have come forth from *non-being* into *being*. If therefore for full cognition recourse is made to a *truth* altogether unchangeable and stable and to a *light* altogether infallible; it is necessary that in cognition of this kind recourse be had to the supernal art as to *light* and *truth*: to *light*, I say, *giving infallibility to the one knowing*, and to *truth giving unchangeableness to the knowable*. Whence, since things have *being* in the *mind* and in their *proper genus* and in the *eternal art*, the truth of things according to the *being* they have in themselves does not suffice for the soul for certitudinal knowledge, nor

according to the *being* they have in their proper genus, because in both cases they are changeable, unless it in some way attain them in so far as they are in the eternal art.

The *dignity* on the side of the *knower* requires the same. For since the rational spirit has a higher portion of reason and a lower one; just as for the full deliberative judgment of reason in things to be done the lower portion does not suffice without the higher, so also for the full judgment of reason in things to be speculated. But this higher portion is that in which the image of God is, which both cleaves to the eternal rules and through them judges and defines with certitude whatever it defines; and this belongs to it in so far as it is the image of God.

For a creature is compared to God under the account of *vestige*, of *image* and of *likeness*. In so far as it is a *vestige*, it is compared to God as *to a principle*; in so far as it is an *image*, it is compared to God as *to an object*; but in so far as it is a *likeness*, it is compared to God as *to an infused gift*. And therefore every creature is a *vestige*, which is from God; every one is an *image*, which knows God; every one, and only that one, is a *likeness*, in which God dwells. And according to this threefold degree of comparison there is a threefold degree of *divine cooperation*.

In a work which is from a creature after the mode of a *vestige*, God cooperates after the mode of a *creative principle*; but in a work which is from a creature after the mode of a *likeness*, as is a meritorious work pleasing to God, God cooperates after the mode of an *infused gift*; but in a work which is from a creature after the mode of an *image*, God cooperates after the mode of a *moving account*; and such is the work of certitudinal cognition, which indeed is not from the lower reason without the higher.

Since therefore certitudinal cognition belongs to the rational spirit in so far as it is the *image* of God, therefore in this cognition it attains the eternal accounts. But because in the state of the way it is not yet fully deiform, therefore it does not attain them clearly and fully and distinctly; but according as it approaches more or less to deiformity, according to this it attains them more or less, always however in some way, because the account of image can never be separated from it. Whence, because in the state of *innocence* it was an image without the deformity of fault, not yet however having the full deiformity of glory, therefore it attained *in part*, but not *in an enigma*. But in the state of *fallen nature* it lacks deiformity and has deformity, therefore it attains them *in part* and *in an enigma*. But in the state of *glory* it lacks all deformity and has full deiformity, therefore it attains them fully and perspicuously.

*Again*, because the soul is not *wholly* of itself an image, therefore together with these it attains the likenesses of things abstracted from the phantasm as the *proper* and *distinct* accounts of knowing, without which the lumen of the eternal account does not suffice for it for knowing, as long as it is in the state of the way, unless perhaps by a special revelation it should transcend this state, as in those who are rapt, and in the revelations of some of the Prophets.

It is therefore to be conceded, as the reasons show and the authorities of Augustine expressly assert, that in every certitudinal cognition those accounts of knowing are attained by the knower, although otherwise by the *wayfarer* and otherwise by the *comprehensor*, otherwise by the *knower* and otherwise by the *wise man*, otherwise by the *prophesier* and otherwise by the *one who understands in the common way*, as has already appeared and will appear in the solutions of the objections.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that *he inhabiteth light inaccessible*; it is to be said that he speaks of that access which is to that light in the plenitude and splendour of its clarity, in which way it is not approached by the power of a creature, but by the deiformity of glory.

2. To that which is objected, that *the weak edge of the human mind is not fixed in so excellent a light* etc.; it is to be said that, in order that it know through the eternal accounts, it is not necessary that it be fixed in them, except in so far as it knows *sapientially*. For the *wise man* attains those accounts in one way, and the *knower* in another: the knower attains them as *moving*, but the wise man as *quieting*; and to this wisdom no one comes, « unless he be first cleansed by the justice of faith ».

3. To that which is objected, that *the mind has the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself*; it is to be said that, just as in the works of a creature the cooperation of the Creator is not excluded, so in a created account of knowing the uncreated account of knowing is not excluded, but rather is included in it.

4. To that which is objected, that *it sees in a light of its own kind*; it can be said that broadly every incorporeal light, whether created or uncreated, is called *a light of its own kind*; or, if it is understood of created light, by this uncreated light is not excluded; nor does it follow that we do not know in the eternal truth, but that we do not know in that alone, but also in the lumen of created truth; and this indeed is true and does not stand against the position set out above.

5. 6. To that which is objected from Gregory and Dionysius, it is to be said that neither denies that that true lumen which *illumines every man coming into this world* is attained by our minds, but only that in this life it is not yet fully seen.

7. 8. 9. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that we understand with the continuous and with time, and that we have a possible and an agent intellect, and concerning the experience of human cognition; it is to be said that he lays down that the lumen and account of created truth concurs to our intelligence; but nevertheless, as was said in what precedes, the light and account of eternal truth is not excluded, because it is possible that the soul according to its lower portion attain the things which are below, the higher portion nonetheless attaining the things which are above.

10. To that which is objected concerning imaginative cognition, it is to be said that it is not alike, because that cognition does not have certitude, and therefore does not run back to the unchangeable.

11. To that which is objected concerning the sense, it is to be said that it is not alike as regards the certitude of the sense and of the understanding. For the certitude of the sense comes from the binding of the operating power, determined after the mode of nature about some one thing. But the certitude of the understanding cannot come from this side, since it is a power free for understanding all things; and therefore it must come through something not having a binding, but freedom without the defectibility of changeableness and fallibility; and such is the light and account of everlasting truth: and therefore recourse is had to it as to the fount of all certitude.

12. To that which is objected, that for cognition nothing more is required than a knower and a knowable and the turning of the one upon the other; it is to be said that this turning includes a judgment; but a certain judgment is not made except through a certain and unjudgeable law, according to what Augustine says in the book *On True Religion* and in the book *On Free Choice*, that « no one judges concerning the truth, and without the truth no one judges well »; and therefore the eternal account and truth is included here.

13. To that which is objected, that we understand when we will, therefore we do not need outside support; it is to be said that outside support is twofold: one which is always at hand, another which is absent and distant. That reason does not conclude concerning the first support, but concerning the second, as is plain: because, if bodily light were always present in the eye, as spiritual light is always present in the mind, we would see when we willed, just as we understand when we will.

14. To that which is objected, that the principles of *being* and of *knowing* are the same; it is to be said that, just as the intrinsic principles of *being* do not suffice for *being* without that first principle outside, which is God, so neither do they suffice for *full knowing*. Whence, although those principles are in some way the account of knowing, not on this account do they exclude that first account of knowing from our cognition, just as they do not exclude it in the act of being from creation.

15. To that which is objected, that to each knowable there corresponds a proper account of knowing; it is to be said that, because we do not see those accounts in themselves altogether distinctly, therefore they are not the whole account of knowing; but there is required together with them the created lumen of principles and the likenesses of the things known, out of which the proper account of knowing is had with respect to each thing known.

16. To that which is objected, that « that on account of which each thing is, is itself more so »; it is to be said that, as is already plain, the eternal account does *not alone* move to knowing, but together with the truth of principles, and *not specially* of itself, but *generally* in the state of the way; and therefore it does not follow that it is known to us according to itself, but as it shines again in its own principles and in its generality; and thus in a certain way it is most certain to us, because our understanding can in no way think that it is not; which indeed cannot be said of any created truth.

17. To that which is objected concerning the mirror, it is to be said that that is true of a mirror which has the account of representing *properly* and *distinctly*, and which together with the account of representing has the *account of terminating*; as is plain in this material mirror, which represents the visible species distinctly and properly and terminates the sight. But these conditions belong to the eternal mirror with respect to *comprehensors*, as is plain from the things said before

18. To that which is objected, that those accounts are equally certain with respect to contingent things as with respect to necessary ones; it is to be said that that reason would conclude well, if those accounts were the *whole account* of knowing, and if it were seen in them plenarily; but now it is not so according to the state of the present time, because together with them we need proper likenesses and the principles of things determinately received, which indeed are not found in contingent things, but only in necessary ones.

19. To that which is objected, that if we know in those accounts, then every knower is wise; it is to be said that it does not follow, because to attain those accounts does not make one wise, unless one rests in them and knows that he attains them, which indeed belongs to the wise man. For accounts of this kind are attained by the understandings of *knowers* as *leading*, but by the understandings of *the wise* as *leading back* and *quieting*. And because there are few who attain them in this way, therefore there are few *wise men*, although many *knowers*; few indeed there are who know that they attain those accounts; nay, what is more, there are few who are willing to believe this, because it seems difficult to an understanding not yet raised to the contemplation of eternal things that it should have God so present and so near, though Paul says in the seventeenth of Acts, *that he is not far from every one of us*.

20. To that which is objected concerning the cognition of the fatherland, the response is already plain, because there is a great difference between the cognition which is *in part* and *in an enigma* and that which is *perfectly* and *distinctly*, as was touched on above.

21. To that which is objected, that the mirror of the eternal accounts is voluntary etc.; it is to be said that, as the Apostle says in the first to the Romans, *that which is known of God is manifest in them*: although God is simple and uniform, nevertheless that eternal light and that exemplar represents certain things as it were *outwardly* and *openly*, and certain things more *deeply* and *hiddenly*. The first are those which come to be according to the necessary ordination of the divine art; the second are those which come to be according to the disposition of the hidden will. And when the mirror is called *voluntary*, this is not with respect to the things exemplified in the first way, but in the second; and therefore in the eternal accounts natural things are known by the natural judicatory of reason, but supernatural and future things only by the gift of supernal revelation; and therefore that reason does not conflict with the position set out above.

22. To that which is objected, that whatever is known in them is known either *with* a veil or *without* a veil; it is to be said that in the state of the way it is not known in those eternal accounts *without a veil and an enigma*, on account of the obscuring of the divine image. From this, however, it does not follow that nothing is known with certitude and clearly, for the reason that created principles, which are in some way the media of knowing, though not without those accounts, can be seen by our mind perspicuously and without a veil. — *If nevertheless it were said* that nothing in this life is known *plenarily*, it would be no great inconvenience.

23. 24. 25. 26. To that which is objected against the reasons of Augustine, that if unchangeable truth is God, then the truth of a demonstrative principle would be God, and all truths would be one, and they would have to be adored, and demons would see God; to all these it is to be said that unchangeable truth is spoken of in two ways, namely *simply* and *by supposition*. When, however, it is said that unchangeable truth is above the mind and is God, this is understood of the truth which is unchangeable *simply*. When, however, it is said of the truth of a demonstrative principle that it is unchangeable; if that truth names something created, it is agreed that it is not unchangeable *simply*, but *by supposition*, because every creature begins from *non-being* and is turnable into *non-being*. — And *if it be objected* that that truth is simply certain to the soul itself through itself; it is to be said that, although a demonstrative principle, according as it says something *complex*, is created; nevertheless the truth signified through it can be signified either according as it is in *matter*, or according as it is in the *soul*, or according as it is in the *divine art*, or indeed in *all* these ways at once. For truth in an exterior sign is a sign of the truth which is *with the soul*, because « words are the marks of those passions which are in the soul »; but the soul according to its supreme part has a respect to higher things, just as according to its lower part to these lower things, since it is a middle between created things and God; and therefore truth in the soul has a respect to that twofold truth, as a middle to two extremes, in such a way that from the lower it receives certitude *in a certain respect*, but from the higher it receives certitude *simply*. And therefore truth of this kind,

as unchangeable *simply*, is above the soul, according as the reasons of Augustine show. But the reasons to the opposite proceed concerning truth unchangeable *by supposition*, which the demonstrator properly considers, which is multiplied in diverse things and is not adorable, and is contuitable by demons and by the damned. For that truth which is simply unchangeable cannot be seen perspicuously except by those who can enter into the innermost silence of the mind, to which no sinner comes, but he alone who is the supreme lover of eternity.

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