Quaest. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/8/d/5/q/bon-qsc-q5
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### Question V. *Whether the soul of Christ was wise by uncreated wisdom alone, or also by created wisdom together with the uncreated.*

After what has been established concerning the wisdom of Christ in so far as he is the Word, it is asked concerning the wisdom of the soul of Christ. And first it is asked whether the soul of Christ was wise by uncreated wisdom alone, or also by created wisdom together with the uncreated. And that it was wise by *uncreated wisdom alone*, it seems.

1. Ecclesiasticus, the first chapter: *All wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath been always with him, and is before all time*; but everything which is before all time is eternal: therefore all wisdom is eternal: therefore if the soul of Christ is not wise except by some wisdom, it is not wise except by eternal wisdom. — *If you say* that wisdom is said to have been with God as in a cause; by parity of reasoning this can be said of any creature whatever, and this does not much render that wisdom praiseworthy. — *If you say* that *all* wisdom means *perfect* wisdom; the following text does not agree with this, because it speaks of that wisdom to the acquiring of which it invites, as is manifestly gathered from what follows.

2. Again, Augustine, in the second book *On Free Choice*: « By the truth and wisdom which is common to all, all the wise become wise by cleaving to it; but by the blessedness of another no other becomes blessed, nor by the justice of another does another become just, but by fitting the mind to those unchangeable rules and lumens of the virtues, which live unchangeably in that very truth and common wisdom ». If therefore the wisdom of all the wise is one, and the blessedness of all the blessed is not one; since, speaking causally, a unity is to be found on both sides, it is necessary to posit that there is formally and properly one wisdom by which all are wise; and this cannot be a created wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise, it is wise by uncreated wisdom.

3. Again, Augustine, in the book *Of Eighty-three Questions*, in the question on the modes of having: « Wisdom, when it comes to a man, is not itself changed, but changes the man, whom it makes wise from foolish »; but if wisdom named a created habit, then it would certainly be changed, because it would be brought from *non-being* into *being*: therefore it names only something uncreated: therefore the same as before.

4. Again, Hugh, in the treatise *On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ*: « There is one wisdom by which all are wise, and yet they are not wise in one mode; much more was that soul wise by this wisdom, which was united to wisdom itself, which flourished from it not by the lot of participation, but possessed its fullness by the privilege of unity »: therefore if the fullness of wisdom is nothing but uncreated wisdom, it seems etc.

5. Again, Hugh argues thus: If wisdom is an accident; since wisdom is that by which the wise become blessed, our blessedness will consist in an accident; but accidents are changeable: therefore our blessedness too will be in the highest degree changeable.

6. Again, what gives something to another has it in some mode; but wisdom gives being-wise to the wise: therefore wisdom is wise. But if it is wise, it is not wise by anything other than itself: therefore all wisdom by which one who is wise is wise is

a wisdom which is wise by itself. But such wisdom is nothing but uncreated wisdom: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise by such a wisdom, it is manifest etc.

7. Again, a perfection is nobler than what is perfectible, and one who is wise is nobler than one who is not wise, and one who understands than one who does not understand: therefore since wisdom is the perfection of the wise, and the wise man is wise and understands by wisdom; it is necessary therefore that wisdom be wise and understand. But it cannot be wise except by itself, and such is uncreated wisdom: therefore etc.

By these reasons and authorities it is shown that the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom alone, and not it alone, but also any other whatever which has wisdom.

But *more specially* concerning the soul of Christ it is shown thus.

8. Wisdom makes him to whom it is united wise; but uncreated wisdom is united to the soul of Christ: therefore by uncreated wisdom the soul of Christ becomes wise. — *If you say* that it is not united except by the mediation of a created wisdom, which disposes the soul itself to the union; *on the contrary*: an intermediate disposition is prior and more immediate and more essential than that to which it disposes, because it holds the account of an introducing middle; but the soul of Christ is compared to the hypostasis prior and more immediately and more essentially than to any accident which is in it: therefore if the eternal Word and the wisdom of God is a hypostasis and person in respect of the divine nature and the human, the soul of Christ has a prior and more immediate and more essential comparison to uncreated wisdom than to created: therefore etc.

9. Again, the greater wisdom is, the more it is knowable and the more it makes to know; but created wisdom is less than uncreated wisdom, and it makes the soul to which it is present to be knowing: therefore much more strongly does uncreated wisdom. But such wisdom was most present to the soul of Christ: therefore etc.

10. Again, nothing more is required for cognition than a knower and a knowable and a present account of knowing; but this whole was in that soul, in so far as it was united to the eternal Word: therefore it was wise by uncreated wisdom, all created wisdom being set aside.

11. Again, « as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul », and much more excellently; but the soul can by itself give life to the body: therefore much more strongly will God himself by himself give life to the soul, and most of all to that soul to which he is most united; but such was the soul of Christ: therefore etc.

12. Again, if God knew through something other than himself, his cognition would be cheapened, because the account of knowing would be either nobler or less noble; but whichever of these be granted, the divine cognition would be made cheap: therefore if the soul of Christ knows through something created other than itself, its cognition is made cheap; because that thing is either less noble, and so it is perfected by something baser; or it is more noble, and then the soul of Christ is not the noblest of all creatures: if therefore it is the noblest, at the very limit of all created nobility, it is impossible that it should know anything except through itself, or through uncreated wisdom.

13. Again, the more immediately any understanding approaches the fountain of wisdom, the wiser it is; but the soul of Christ is the wisest: therefore it approaches uncreated wisdom most immediately: therefore, all other wisdom being set aside, it is wise by that eternal wisdom.

14. Again, the soul of Christ is so united to the eternal majesty that it is to be honoured with the same honour with which the eternal majesty is honoured; therefore by parity of reasoning it is so united to the eternal light that it is wise by the same wisdom by which the everlasting light is wise; but this is uncreated wisdom alone: therefore the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom alone.

15. Again, where there is a fullness of wisdom, it is superfluous to posit what is in part; but in Christ there is a fullness of wisdom, *because in him it hath well pleased all fullness to dwell*, in the first chapter to the Colossians: therefore if all created wisdom is in part, it is superfluous to posit a created wisdom in Christ or in his soul.

16. Again, nature does not do through many things what it can do through fewer, and this belongs to the praise of created nature: therefore if whatever of praise is attributed to created nature can be attributed to uncreated nature; since uncreated wisdom is of itself most sufficient, because complete and full on every side; therefore it seems that created wisdom in Christ is superfluous. But nothing such is to be posited in Christ: therefore etc.

17. Again, whenever material lumens come together upon the same medium, so that one exceeds the other, the one obscures the other, not on account of repugnance, but on account of superexcellence: therefore if uncreated wisdom superexceeds created wisdom much more than any material lumen exceeds the other by however small a measure, uncreated wisdom will obscure the other. But no obscured wisdom is to be posited in Christ: therefore etc.

18. Again, created cognition is further from uncreated than opinion is from knowledge, or faith from open vision; but opinion and knowledge cannot be in the same subject at once, nor faith and open vision: therefore neither created wisdom together with the uncreated.

**Sed contra:** 1. *Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men*; but this could not be through uncreated wisdom: therefore on account of it he had a created wisdom.

2. Again, the Damascene says that in Christ, on account of the two natures, it is necessary to posit that there were in him two wills: therefore by parity of reasoning two cognitions also, therefore also two knowledges, therefore also two wisdoms.

3. Again, no one is good except by a goodness informing him, therefore no one is wise except by a wisdom informing him; but uncreated wisdom cannot be informative of any creature, but only exemplative: therefore if the soul of Christ is wise by some wisdom informing it, it is necessary that besides the uncreated wisdom it have also a created one informing it.

4. Again, wisdom is an accident to a created wise being, who is not wise by himself; but uncreated wisdom, since it is God, can be an accident to nothing: therefore it is necessary that besides that wisdom there be posited in the soul of Christ some created wisdom, since to it wisdom is not essential, but befalls it as an accident.

5. Again, there is a perfection of *being* and of *well-being*; but God is the perfective form of no creature as regards *being*: therefore neither as regards *well-being*. But wisdom is the perfective form of the soul of Christ itself, which is wise, as regards *well-being*: therefore a wisdom of this kind cannot be uncreated wisdom: therefore etc.

6. Again, the soul of Christ is not wise by essence, since it is wise through something other than itself: therefore if it is wise, it is wise by participation; but it does not take a part of eternal wisdom according to essence, since that is simple: therefore it is necessary that it take according to an influence. But such an influence is created: therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

7. Again, the soul of Christ is of the nature of other souls; but no soul fully attains to the fountain of eternal wisdom unless it be deiform; but it cannot be deiform except through something given to it which informs it and conforms it to God; but such is grace and created wisdom: therefore it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise through a created wisdom.

8. Again, God, since he is light and wisdom, is known diversely by diverse beings, and by the soul of Christ more excellently than by others: either therefore this is by reason of *God himself as known*, or by reason of *the knowing power*, or by reason of *something disposing*. Not by reason of *God* himself, since he has in himself no variety; nor by reason of *the knowing power* alone, because then those who had better natural endowments would be wiser and better; which is false: therefore this will be by reason of some *intermediate disposing* habit. But such a habit is nothing but created wisdom: therefore etc.

9. Again, the uncreated wisdom of God is through its own essence most present to all understandings: therefore if by its presence alone it made men wise, every understanding would be wise; and if this is manifestly false, then beyond its presence its influence is necessarily required. Therefore if the soul of Christ is wise, it is plain etc.

10. Again, the Word of God, which is wisdom, is united to the eye, and yet the eye is not wise: therefore for a soul to be wise, union in the hypostasis does not suffice for it: therefore it is necessary that it be united as a knower to a knowable. But every such union is through assimilation; but every assimilation is according to some quality: therefore it is necessary that a created spiritual quality be given to the soul itself, through which it be fit for knowing. And this we call created wisdom: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.**
>
> *The soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise by both wisdoms, the created namely and the uncreated.*

**I answer:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as appears from the preceding question, for *certitudinal cognition* the influence of the eternal light does not suffice without its presence, because nothing created can establish the soul in perfect certitude until it reach the unchangeable truth and the infallible light. So it is to be understood that for *sapiential cognition* the presence of that eternal light does not suffice without its influence, not on account of a defect on its side, but on account of a defect on our side, because created intelligence does not attain to that fontal wisdom unless it be made deiform, and through this *raised* and *made able*: *raised* above itself, and *made able* in itself. Therefore it is necessary that something be given to it coming from above, which nevertheless is proportional to it and inhering in it; and this we call the influence of the eternal light; and because it makes the soul able for wisdom, it is called *created wisdom*. Since, however, that influence neither makes able nor raises unless it be continued with the eternal light as with a *moving principle* and a *directing account* and a *quieting end*; therefore it does not obtain the account

of *wisdom* from itself, but by reason of that from which it flows, according to which it directs and to which it leads; and this is *uncreated wisdom*. — And therefore, according to those wise men to whom it is given to ascend above themselves, the name of *wisdom* is attributed principally and *properly* to the fontal and uncreated wisdom alone; but according to those who speak and understand *in the common way* it is attributed not only to it, but also to its *influence*, which makes the human mind able for perfect cognition. And according to this it is to be conceded that the soul of Christ, since it is a creature, was wise by *both wisdoms, the created* namely *and the uncreated*: by the *uncreated* as principally *moving* and *regulating* and *quieting*; by the *created* as *informing*, *making able* and *raising*, so that it might be able fully to attain to that uncreated one.

And that *both* concur together is plain from what Augustine says in the ninth book *On the Trinity*, chapter seven: « In that eternal truth, from which all temporal things were made, we behold with the sight of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we do anything either in ourselves or in bodies by true and right reason, and thence we have with us, as a word, a truthful knowledge of things conceived, and by speaking within we beget it, nor does it depart from us by being born ». From which it appears that to wisdom there concur the eternal truth and the knowledge of truth conceived within us, which indeed is informative of our soul itself.

1. To that which is objected first, that *all wisdom is from the Lord God*; it is to be said that *wisdom* is not there taken for the *habit* by which the soul of the wise man is informed, and by which it is made able for knowing, but for the *unchangeable account of knowing*. But every such account is in the divine art, because it is everlasting, and without it there can be no created wisdom, as was shown above. Whence from that authority it cannot be concluded that a created wisdom is not to be posited.

2. 3. To that which is objected from the twofold authority of Augustine, it is to be said that both are to be understood of *uncreated wisdom*, which nevertheless, as is plain from what has been set down, does not exclude the created. Nevertheless Augustine, in speaking of wisdom, always, or for the most part, carries his understanding to that uncreated wisdom, because in comparison with it he does not reckon created wisdom worthy of the name of *wisdom*; or because in the manner of an influence it depends wholly upon it, whence it is rather *of a being* than *a being*, and is rather to be called an effect and an irradiation of wisdom than wisdom. — And *if you ask* why the like cannot be said of blessedness, since it too flows wholly from eternal blessedness; it is to be said that *eternal blessedness* names *an affection inhering in the highest good*, whereas *wisdom* names *a cognition contemplating the highest good*; but *affection* names something as *from the soul*, while *cognition* names something as *to the soul*; and therefore, because of diverse affections there are diverse origins, therefore formally and originally diverse *blessednesses* are posited. But it is not so in *wisdom*, which, so far as lies in itself, looks to one origin, namely the everlasting light, from which and according to which is all certain cognition.

4. 5. To that which is objected from Hugh, it is to be said that the words of Hugh agree with the words of Augustine, because he, as a man *going beyond* and wise, carries his understanding above all to the fountain of wisdom itself. — Whence also, as to what he objects, that our blessedness cannot lie in accidents, he does not mean that we are not disposed to blessedness through some accident, but that whatever is an accident has rather the account of a *conducting way* to something else than of something *quieting* and *consummating*. And in this mode we posit created wisdom in the soul of Christ and in any other soul whatever, not as that in which that blessed soul rests, but as that by which it is led back and disposed to uncreated wisdom, by which it is principally and above all made blessed.

6. 7. To that which is objected, that wisdom gives *being-wise*, and that wisdom is nobler than the wise; it is to be said that created wisdom itself is not properly said to give *being-wise*, but rather uncreated wisdom itself gives us *being-wise* in itself, by disposing us through that created wisdom; and therefore it does not follow of that created wisdom that it is wise or has the act of *being-wise*, because it does not hold the account of a *complete being*, but rather the account of a *way* and of a certain *disposing middle*, as is manifestly had from what has been said.

8. To that which is objected, that wisdom makes him to whom it is united wise; it is to be said that wisdom can be united to something in many modes, either as a *hypostasis* is united to a nature substantified in it, or as the *account and light of knowing* is united to a knower illumined by it. In the first mode it does not make wise, because then the body of Christ, since it is united to wisdom, would be wise, but in the second mode. But in this mode it is not united to the soul of Christ except by the mediation of the gift of created wisdom, which is as it were a light informative of the soul itself, rendering it deiform and able to contuit the light of uncreated wisdom.

9. To that which is objected, that wisdom, the greater it is, the more it is knowable and the more it makes to know; it is to be said that this is true in the manner of something *influencing*; but in the manner of something *informing* it is not true, unless it be such a wisdom as is born to inform

and to perfect and to be united to another in the manner of a form. But uncreated wisdom is not such, but created wisdom, and therefore that reason does not conclude.

10. To that which is objected, that nothing more is required than a knower and a knowable and an account of knowing; it is to be said that *knower* can name the *power of knowing*, or the *power together with a habit*. If it names the *power together with a habit*, it holds truth, and then there is included there *created knowledge*, which makes the soul able. But if it names the *power alone*, then that proposition is false, and the answer is to be made by *destruction* to the premised reason.

11. To that which is objected, that God is the life of the soul as the soul is the life of the body; it is to be said that the soul is called the *life of the body* in two ways, namely either in the manner of something *informing*, or in the manner of something *influencing*, because the soul is compared to the body in two ways, namely in the manner of a *perfection* and in the manner of a *mover*. When therefore he shows that the soul in giving life is assimilated to God; it is to be said that this is understood of it in so far as it is a *mover*, not in so far as it is a *perfection*. But the soul moves the body by the mediation of a power and by the mediation of a disposition of the body, which renders the body fit for the influence of the soul; and in this mode the divine light and love moves and gives life to the soul itself by the mediation of the grace and wisdom infused into it.

12. To that which is objected, that if God knows through something other than himself, his cognition will be cheapened; it is to be said that it is not alike: because God, since he is the noblest, can have nothing nobler than himself, neither *simply* nor *in a certain respect*, neither as regards *being* nor as regards *well-being*, because *being* itself is *well-being* to him; but the soul of Christ, although it is nobler than other creatures by reason of the grace of the union, nevertheless in it *being* and *well-being*, *substance* and *accidental disposition*, differ. And because through that disposition it acquires some completion, therefore it is not repugnant to its nobility in the genus of creature that it should have something nobler than itself at least *in a certain respect*; for the ultimate completion and perfection at which the appetite of that soul is terminated is *uncreated* wisdom, and it is disposed to it through a created influence, as is plain from what has been said above.

13. To that which is objected concerning an understanding approaching the fountain of wisdom immediately; it is to be said that there is a *disposing* middle and there is a *deducing* middle. The first is *intrinsic*, the second *extrinsic*; the first makes one *come nearer*, but the second makes one *stand apart*. Now the aforesaid proposition holds truth of the *deducing* middle; but created wisdom, which is posited in Christ, holds the account of a *disposing* middle to this, that it may perfectly and immediately draw from the fountain of eternal wisdom. And so it is plain that that reason does not proceed.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is adored with latria on account of the union with the majesty, etc.; it is to be said that it is not alike, because *adoration* is an act which is owed to the nature itself by reason of the person. For the honour which is shown to Christ is shown neither to the soul through itself nor to the body, but to the person, in whom those two subsist; but *cognition* is an act going out from a power of the soul itself. And just as the divine and the human nature in Christ are distinct, so they have diverse powers and operations, and through this diverse wisdoms and cognitions, but not so diverse honours. And therefore it is not alike.

15. To that which is objected, that where a fullness of wisdom is to be posited it is superfluous to posit what is in part; it is to be said that this is true in the same subject and according to the same. But when it is said that Christ had a fullness of wisdom, this is according to the *uncreated* nature, if it be understood of a fullness *simply and outside a genus*; but if it be understood of a fullness *within a genus*, thus it can belong to a created nature, and this in a certain mode is *in part* in respect of the fullness *simply*; nor is it superfluous, because it is more proportional to the soul itself, since of itself, bare, it could not take in that immensity of uncreated wisdom.

16. To that which is objected, that nature does not act through many things etc.; it is to be said that this is true if through one thing it be done as well and as orderly as through many; but it is not so here, and this is not on account of a defect of the illuminating wisdom itself, but on account of the nature of the receiving soul itself, as is plain from what has been said above.

17. To that which is objected concerning material lumens, it is to be said that it is not alike: because one of those lumens does not dispose to another, but rather each one has through itself its own and distinct *being*; and therefore the operation of the one appears less than the operation of the other, which on account of its excellence claims dominion for itself. But it is not so in the matter proposed, because created wisdom disposes to the uncreated, nor does the created shine except through the uncreated, nor is the uncreated attained except with the created disposing.

18. To that which is objected concerning the distance between created and uncreated knowledge, and between opinion and knowledge; it is to be said that it is not alike: because *opinion* and *knowledge* are in the same subject and according to the same and in respect of the same, having diverse and opposed

conditions; but created and uncreated *wisdom*, although they differ in nature, are nevertheless not present according to the same, nor have they conditions so opposed and incompossible, but rather necessarily concomitant ones, because nothing created subsists except through the uncreated. And so the answer to all the objections is plain.

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