Quaest. 6
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/8/d/6/q/bon-qsc-q6
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### Question VI. *Whether the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom itself.*

Granted that the soul of Christ is wise by uncreated wisdom and by created wisdom alike, it is asked next whether it comprehends uncreated wisdom itself. And it seems that it does.

1. John the third: *God does not give the Spirit by measure*; the Gloss: « To men by measure, but to the Son not by measure; rather, as he begot the whole from the whole of himself, so to the incarnate Son he gave his whole Spirit, not partially and by subdivisions, but generally and universally »; but the measure in the cognition of the true is according to the measure of the spirit given: therefore if the soul of Christ received the Holy Spirit in an immense manner, in an immense manner it knows God; and this is nothing else than to comprehend the divine wisdom itself: therefore, etc.

2. Again, Augustine, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity, chapter nineteen: « In the Word I understand the true Son of God, in the flesh the true son of man, and both joined in one person of God and man by the bounty of an ineffable grace ». The grace of union, therefore, is ineffable, and so immense and incomprehensible; but the quantity of cognition is according to the quantity of grace: therefore if by an incomprehensible cognition the infinite is comprehensible, then, however great its immensity may be, it will be comprehended by the soul united to it.

3. Again, Hugh says in *On the Wisdom of Christ*: « The soul of Christ has by grace all that God has by nature »; but God has by nature the comprehension of his own wisdom: therefore the soul of Christ has this by grace.

4. Again, it is as much or more to be God than to comprehend God; but the grace of union has power to this, that it makes a creature to be God: therefore much more strongly will it make a creature comprehend God. But not any other than the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

5. Again, Bernard, to Eugenius, says that there is a *native* unity, a *dignative* unity, and a *superdignative* unity; that *dignative* unity is not as great as is the unity of the Trinity, which is *superdignative*, and greater than the *native*; but both in the *native* unity and in the *superdignative* unity one of the extremes is comprehended by the other, and conversely: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems so, and much more strongly, in the *dignative* unity. But it is according to this that the soul of Christ is united with uncreated wisdom: therefore, etc.

6. Again, Isidore: « The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the man assumed », and it is clear that this is not understood of just any knowledge, but of that alone in which the Trinity does not share with a mere creature; but that is nothing but comprehensive cognition: therefore the united creature has this.

7. Again, Cassiodorus: « The health of the mind understands that inaccessible light above all brightnesses »; but the soul united to the Word was most healthy: therefore it understood that light above every other brightness: therefore either it comprehended no other brightness, or, if it comprehended any, it comprehended that one too.

8. Again, the grace of union exceeds any grace of comprehension whatever disproportionately: therefore it disproportionately makes God to be known more clearly; but this is nothing else than to comprehend the divine wisdom: therefore, etc. For nothing exceeds every finite thing disproportionately except the infinite.

9. Again, Augustine in the ninth book on the Trinity says that, because the soul is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, not according to a part: therefore, since

eternal wisdom is simple, if it is known by the soul of Christ, it is known totally; but to know a thing totally is nothing else than to comprehend it: therefore, etc.

10. Again, this is true of itself: a simple thing, when it is attained, is attained as a whole; therefore what is simpler is attained more totally, and what is most simple is attained most totally of all; but the uncreated Word has the highest simplicity: therefore it is attained most totally of all. But this is to comprehend it most perfectly: therefore it is most perfectly comprehended by the soul of Christ.

11. Again, the soul of Christ, in knowing the Word, either has the whole of it *open*, or has something of the Word *hidden* and something *open*. If it has it altogether *open*: therefore it comprehends it altogether; if it has something *hidden* and something *open*: therefore in the Word there is a something and a something. But this is unfitting, because there would not be the highest simplicity: therefore, etc.

12. Again, if something is hidden, either that thing *is God*, or *it is not*. If *it is not*: therefore, notwithstanding the hiddenness of that thing, it comprehends God. If *it is God*: therefore God is hidden from the soul of Christ; but no soul from which God is hidden is blessed: therefore, according to this, the soul of Christ is not blessed. But this is absurd: therefore so is that from which it follows.

13. Again, just as immensity is truly in God, so simplicity is truly in God; but just as it belongs to immensity never to be grasped altogether, so it belongs to simplicity to be grasped totally by whatever grasps it: therefore by the same account by which it is called *incomprehensible* by reason of immensity, it will be called *comprehensible* by reason of simplicity.

14. Again, if in a point essence and power were the same, whatever attained it totally according to essence would attain it totally according to power; but in God his essence and his power are the same, and whatever is essential in him is wholly the same and most simple: either, then, nothing of God is attained, or, if anything is attained, the whole is attained and totally, and therefore the whole is comprehended and totally: therefore not only does the soul of Christ comprehend the Word, but so does every soul that knows God in any way whatever.

15. Again, Bede says that « nothing less than God can fill the soul »; but if the capacity of the soul could be filled by anything finite, something less than God would fill it: therefore the soul's capacity extends itself to the infinite as infinite. But the soul of Christ comprehends everything to which its capacity extends, since it is fully perfect: therefore it comprehends the infinite.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves God as much as he ought to be loved; but God ought to be loved without mode and without measure: therefore, since it knows as much as it loves, it therefore knows without measure: therefore, etc.

17. Again, it is the nature of the understanding that it is invigorated in understanding the highest intelligible: therefore the more clearly the soul of Christ understands, the more it is fitted for understanding more clearly: therefore either it will never have a settled state, or it will totally comprehend the Word united to it.

18. Again, if there were something such that in grasping something its capacity were enlarged, either it would never be filled by that thing, or an infinite would be added to it; but the capacity of the soul of Christ is such: therefore either it remains empty in some part of itself, or it comprehends infinite wisdom.

19. Again, the finite is as far distant from the infinite as the created is from the uncreated; but the distance of the created from the uncreated does not prevent the understanding from raising itself to know the uncreated under the account of the uncreated; therefore by parity of reasoning the finite will be able to be raised to know the infinite under the account of the infinite. But this is not to be granted in any other than in the soul of Christ: therefore, etc.

20. Again, finitude is as far distant from infinity as simplicity is from composition; but the understanding of the soul of Christ, although it has some composition, nevertheless grasps and knows the Word itself under the account of the highest simplicity: therefore likewise under the account of the highest infinity. But this is to comprehend the whole wisdom of the Word: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends uncreated wisdom.

**Contra:** 1. Damascene, in the first book, chapter four: « God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone of his substance is comprehensible, his infinity and his incomprehensibility »: therefore that he is called incomprehensible is not by reason of himself, but in respect of created nature: if therefore the soul of Christ is a creature, uncreated wisdom is incomprehensible to it.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book on the City of God: « Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower »; but the infinite can in no way be bounded by the finite: therefore in no way is it comprehended by the finite. But the soul of Christ is finite, since it is a creature: therefore, etc.

3. Again, every knower knows according to the capability of the knower; but the capability of the knower,

that is, of the soul of Christ, is finite: therefore whatever it knows, it knows as finite and in a finite mode: therefore in no way does it comprehend the infinite.

4. Again, everything that comprehends something grasps it totally in itself, and therefore is either *greater* than it or *equal* to it; but the soul of Christ is neither *greater* than the eternal Word nor *equal* to it: therefore in no way does it comprehend it.

5. Again, than everything that the soul comprehends something greater can be thought, because, since it attains the limits of that thing, its thought can still be stretched beyond; but nothing greater than the wisdom of God can be thought: therefore it is necessary that the wisdom of God be apprehended by the soul of Christ incomprehensibly.

6. Again, the soul of Christ, although it is united to the Word in the highest degree, nevertheless does not enclose the Word within itself as regards existence, since the Word exists outside it, and the Word is somewhere where the soul of Christ united to it is not: therefore by parity of reasoning neither will the understanding of the soul of Christ grasp the divine wisdom totally within itself: therefore it does not comprehend it.

7. Again, to comprehend something is to grasp it fully; but to grasp the infinite fully is only by an infinite act; and an infinite act cannot be unless there is an infinite power; nor can a power be infinite unless the substance also is infinite: if therefore the soul of Christ were to comprehend the divine wisdom, then, since that wisdom is infinite, the soul would be infinite as regards substance, power, and operation. But this is false and impossible: therefore, etc.

8. Again, what comprehends something according to quantity of *mass* is coextended with it to an equality of extension: therefore what comprehends something according to excellence of brightness is made equal to it according to brightness; but it is impossible that the soul of Christ be made equal to the divine wisdom according to brightness, since that wisdom is pure light, and the soul is darkness, inasmuch as it is a creature: therefore it is impossible that the eternal wisdom of God be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

9. Again, eternity is compared to aeviternity as a greater circle to a lesser; but it is impossible that a greater circle be comprehended by a lesser: therefore it is impossible that an eternal substance be comprehended by an aeviternal substance. But the wisdom of God is eternal, and the soul of Christ is not eternal but aeviternal: therefore, etc.

10. Again, what comprehends something knows it most perfectly: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends the eternal wisdom, it is necessary that it be supremely wise, and therefore consequently supremely blessed: therefore it is equal to God in blessedness and goodness, and therefore lacks beginning and end: therefore it is neither a creature nor a soul. If therefore these things are unfitting, and many others that can follow from this; then it is impossible that the divine wisdom be comprehended by the soul of Christ.

> **Conclusio.** *The soul of Christ cannot properly comprehend uncreated wisdom.*

**Respondeo:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as was established in the preceding question, for the perfect and certitudinal cognition of any creature there concurs not only the *presence* of the eternal light, but also the *influence* of the eternal light; not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; not only the eternal wisdom, but also the knowledge impressed upon the soul; not only the truth that causes, but also the truth that informs. Since therefore the soul of Christ, and every soul that knows God, knows according to the measure of the *influence* of the Word and of the *knowledge* inwardly informing the mind; and since a word and a knowledge of this kind, having created *being*, and thereby limited being, cannot be made adequate to the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is in every mode infinite: it must be granted that uncreated wisdom cannot be comprehended by the soul united to it, nor by any other creature whatever, according as a thing is said to be *comprehended* when the one comprehending grasps it whole and totally in every mode within itself, as Augustine says to Paulina, in *On Seeing God*: « No one has ever comprehended the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body, but not even with the mind itself; for it is one thing *to see*, another in seeing *to comprehend the whole*, since that is *seen* which is somehow felt to be present; but that whole is *comprehended* which is so seen that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, or whose limits can be looked round about ». Now for a vision of this kind it is necessarily required that the one comprehending, according to act, habit, and power, be either made equal to the thing comprehended or exceed it; and this can in no way be in the soul of Christ, or in any creature, in comparison with the eternal wisdom; since that is infinite, and this is finite, therefore that exceeds this disproportionately. And this is what Augustine says in the ninth book on the Trinity, chapter eleven: « Insofar as we know God, we are like him, but not like him to the point of equality, because we do not know him as much as he knows himself ». And afterward:

« When we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew him, and most of all when that same knowledge, being found pleasing and worthily loved, is a word; that knowledge does become some likeness of God, yet it is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature; for the mind is a creature, whereas God is the Creator ». Since therefore the soul of Christ cannot, in knowing the eternal Word, beget a word equal to it, it is manifest that it cannot comprehend it, comprehension being taken properly. — Hence the reasons for that side are to be conceded.

But for the understanding of the objections on the contrary side, since they proceed by a threefold way, namely from the *immensity* of the grace of union, from the *simplicity* of the Word and of the wisdom of God, and from the *capacity* and the quieting of the desire of the knowing soul itself; it is to be understood that, although the divine nature and the human are distant by the finite and the infinite, they can nevertheless be united, the property of each nature being preserved, in the unity of the hypostasis. Yet the divine nature itself never becomes finite, nor does the human become infinite. Hence although God is man, and man is God, on account of the unity of person and hypostasis, nevertheless the operations of each nature are preserved and unconfused, although they are predicated of each other on account of the communication of idioms.

Again, although the divine Word is simple, it is nonetheless infinite, not by quantity of *mass*, but by quantity of *power*; because the simpler a thing is, the more united is its power; and « a more united power is more infinite than a multiplied power »: and therefore the divine Word, by this very fact that it is most simple, is also most infinite; and therefore, although it is whole wherever it is, it is nevertheless never circumscribed nor comprehended by anything created.

Lastly, although the understanding and the affection of the rational soul never rest except in God and in the infinite good, this is not because it comprehends that good, but because nothing suffices for the soul unless it exceeds its capacity. Hence it is true that both the affection and the understanding of the rational soul itself are borne into the infinite good and true and as infinite; but *to be borne into it* can be in six modes, namely *by believing*, *by arguing*, *by wondering*, *by contuiting*, *by exceeding*, and *by comprehending*. The first mode belongs to imperfection and to the way, the last mode is of the highest perfection and is proper to the eternal and infinite Trinity; the second and third modes pertain to progress along the way; the fourth and fifth to the consummation of the fatherland. For on the way we can contemplate the divine immensity *by reasoning* and *by wondering*; but in the fatherland *by contuiting*, when we shall have been made deiform, and *by exceeding*, when we shall be altogether inebriated; on account of which inebriation Anselm says at the end of the *Proslogion* that we shall enter more into the divine joy than the divine joy will enter into our heart. — And since that soul united to the Word has both been made more deiform and is more inebriated on account of a grace not only sufficient but even superexcellent; therefore it contuits the divine wisdom and by contuiting exceeds into it, although it does not comprehend it. And for this cause wonder has place not only on the way, but also in the fatherland; not only in the angels, but also in the soul assumed by God, so that it may say: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, it is strengthened, and I shall not be able to reach to it*; as the Gloss expounds it of the man assumed by the Word, that « he cannot be made equal to him in wisdom nor in anything else ». — These things being seen, the objections are easily answered.

1. 2. 3. 4. For to that which is objected first from the Gloss, that grace was given to Christ not by measure; and to the authority of Augustine, that that grace is ineffable; and to the authority of Hugh and to that reason which he adduces, that that grace brings it about that a man is God; to all these it must be answered that all these things are true and are to be understood according to the concurrence of the two natures in one person; from which it comes about that, on account of the *immensity* of that person, that grace of union too is called *immense* and *ineffable*, and that, on account of the *unity* of the person, God and the things that are God's can be predicated of the man; yet it does not come about from this that the soul itself, or its power and habit, or its act, loses created *being*, and thereby finite and limited being. And therefore it does not follow that an act comprehensive of the eternal wisdom belongs to it, since that act is infinite and from an infinite power.

5. To that which is objected from the word of Bernard about that threefold union or unity it is to be said that the case is not alike: because in the *native* and the *superdignative* unity the extremes are proportional; for each is a *connatural* unity; but in the *dignative* unity it is otherwise, because that unity is one of *condescension and grace* alone; and therefore it is not necessary that on this side there be a mutual comprehension.

6. To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone, etc.; it is to be said that he says this only on account of the communication of idioms, or on account of the most intimate mode of the revelation of his secrets communicated to that soul united to him, according as it will appear better in the following question

7. To that which is objected from Cassiodorus, about the inaccessible light, that it is understood by a healthy mind above all brightnesses; it is to be said that this is true, taking *health* for perfect deiformity. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, since the other brightnesses are lesser and comprehensible, whereas that light is greater; and therefore, although it is known by the soul more limpidly than the other brightnesses, it does not follow that it is comprehended.

8. To that which is objected, that the grace of union exceeds every grace of comprehension; it is to be said that this is true; but this is not because the grace of union gives to the soul of Christ an infinite power, since it does not take from it the *being* of a creature, but because it places it in an infinite hypostasis. Now an operation issuing from a potency is measured according to the greater or lesser power of that potency; and therefore the grace of union and the grace of comprehension are not of the same genus. On account of this, although they are disproportionate, it does not follow on that account that the grace of union elicits from the soul an infinite act; just as it does not follow that a line is actually infinite, although it exceeds a point disproportionately.

9. To that which is objected from Augustine, that the soul, because it is simple, therefore, when it knows itself, knows itself totally, etc.; it is to be said that this is so because the soul has a *limited* simplicity, upon which there follow finitude and impartibility; and therefore, when it knows itself, it knows itself whole and totally. But the simplicity of the divine wisdom, as was shown before, is joined to *infinity*; and therefore, although it can be attained and apprehended by a creature, it can nevertheless never be comprehended or circumscribed by a creature.

10. To that which is objected, that this is true of itself, that a simple thing, when it is attained, is attained as a whole; it is to be said that it holds true of a *finite* simple thing; but of an *infinite* simple thing it holds true in one way and not in another. If it is understood thus, that the whole is attained, that is, not according to part and part, it holds true; but if it be understood that the whole is attained, that is, according to the whole fullness and perfection of it, so that it does not exceed the one comprehending, it is false. And therefore it has been commonly said, and from of old, that although the *whole* be attained, it is nevertheless not attained *totally*; because *whole*, being a *noun*, states a disposition on the part of the subject or of the object in itself; whereas *totally*, being an *adverb*, states a disposition of the verb, and thereby posits an entire perfection and equality in the act of the one comprehending with respect to the thing comprehended, which cannot be in the finite with respect to the infinite.

11. 12. To that which is objected: either the whole is hidden, or the whole is open, etc.; the answer is already clear, because the whole is *hidden*, and the whole is *open*. For the whole is *open* to the one apprehending, since he does not apprehend according to part and part; the whole is also *hidden* as regards comprehension, because nothing of the Word can be comprehended by a created understanding; for the whole is infinite, and that same whole is simple. And therefore that very thing which is *apprehended* is not *comprehended*. Just as the eternal Word, the same and whole and according to the same, is in some creature and is outside it; so it is grasped by some intelligence, and yet is not comprehended by it, because it exceeds it. — And by this the answer is clear to what follows, which is objected, that if anything were hidden, the understanding would not be blessed; for, as has already been said, it is not called *incomprehensible* on account of the hiddenness of some part, but on account of the immensity of its simplicity.

13. To that which is objected, that just as it is truly infinite, so it is truly simple; it is to be said that this is true. — As to what is further objected, that as incomprehensibility belongs to the infinite, so comprehensibility belongs to the simple; it is to be said that this is false, because the *infinite*, by the very fact that it is infinite, states a disproportionate excess with respect to any finite thing; whereas the *simple*, by the very fact that it is simple, does not state adequation or limitation, neither absolutely in itself nor in comparison with another; because, as was shown before, what is most simple, by the fact that it is most simple, must necessarily be infinite. For since quantity is twofold, namely of *mass* and of *power*, in quantity of *mass* the simple and the infinite are founded upon diverse things, but in quantity of *power* they are founded upon the same thing, because greatness of simplicity makes for the uniting and the magnifying of power; and therefore on account of the highest simplicity comprehensibility is not communicated, but rather incomprehensibility and immense power.

14. To that which is objected about the point, that if in it essence and power were the same, etc.; it is to be said that the eternal Word is not comprehended, neither according to essence nor according to power, by any creature, because both its power and its essence have an immensity infinitely exceeding every created power. And therefore the case of the point is not alike, since the essence of a point is circumscribed.

15. To that which is objected, that nothing less than God can fill the soul; it is to be said that this is true, as has been touched on, because the soul is not content with any good that it grasps and comprehends, since nothing of that kind is the highest; but with a good so great and of such a kind that it *grasps* and apprehends it by gaze and by affection, and is *grasped* by it through superexceeding and excess.

16. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ loves as much as it ought; it is to be said that this is true; but nevertheless it does not follow from this that it loves God as much as God himself loves himself, because

the love by which God loves himself is eternal and immense and coequal to the beloved; whereas the affection, since it issues from the will of Christ, can only be finite. — And as to what is said, that the mode of loving God is to love without mode; this is not because that love lacks finitude and measure, since that love is coequal to every creature, but because the affection in loving ought not to fix for itself a limit and a constricting term, but rather to be borne in an excessive mode, with the whole effort of the mind, into that most infinite goodness.

17. 18. To that which is objected, that the understanding is invigorated in understanding the greatest intelligible, and that its capacity grows in grasping something greater; it is to be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way, that the soul, from this, that it understands the highest intelligible and grasps it, is more vigorous and more powerful with respect to those things that are below it; and this holds true. In another way, so that it be understood that it is capable of still more light and truth than it has grasped; and this is false, because the capacity of the soul is measured according to the quantity of its power, which is rooted upon a finite substance; and therefore the soul is finite in act and sufficiently completable through a finite deiformity, which, by assimilating it to God according to its whole possibility, makes it exceed into the infinite good, and thereby gives it perfection and a settled state.

19. 20. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ attains to the uncreated and most simple, although it is created and composite, and therefore by parity of reasoning attains to the infinite, according as it is infinite, although the soul itself is finite; it is to be said that the conclusion can be conceded, that it attains to the infinite as it does to the uncreated and most simple. For just as it does not attain to the infinite *by comprehending*, but *by apprehending* and *by exceeding*, so neither does it so attain to the uncreated and most simple. — It could nevertheless be said that the case is not alike on the one side and the other: because *to know a simple thing* as simple and *the uncreated* as uncreated includes only an *assimilation* of the knower to the thing known; but *to know the infinite* as infinite states not only an *assimilation*, but also a certain *adequation* — for the infinite as infinite names a *how much* — and therefore the aforesaid reasoning does not follow; just as it does not follow, if a creature can be *assimilated* to God, that on that account it can be made *equal* to God. — We confess, however, that the soul of Christ is deiform, yet not equal to God; and therefore we concede and hold that, although it apprehends clearly and plainly the very wisdom united to it, it nevertheless does not comprehend it totally.

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