Quaest. 7
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/8/d/7/q/bon-qsc-q7
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### Question VII. *Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.*

It is asked whether the soul of Christ comprehends all that uncreated wisdom comprehends. And it seems that it does.

1. Romans eleven: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments, and how unsearchable his ways!* From which it is gathered that those things which pertain to the divine wisdom are more comprehensible than the divine judgments; but in John five it is said that *the Father hath given all judgment to the Son, because he is the Son of man*; from which it is gathered that the soul of Christ comprehends the divine judgments: therefore if those are less comprehensible than the others, much more strongly does it comprehend all the others.

2. Again, Apocalypse five: *The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive wisdom*; the Gloss: « The cognition of all things, as the Word united to him has it »; but the united Word comprehends whatever it knows: therefore so also does the soul of Christ.

3. Again, the Damascene, in the third book: « We affirm that the man Christ knows all things; for in Christ are all the treasures of wisdom ». — If you say that this is understood according to the divine nature; on the contrary: no one knows anything of which his soul is ignorant: therefore if Christ comprehends all things, it is necessary that his soul too should comprehend that.

4. Again, Gregory, in the *Dialogues*: « To a soul that sees the Creator every creature is narrow »: therefore if the soul of Christ perfectly sees the Word united to it, then every creature is narrow to it; but beyond every creature nothing remains except the immensity of those things which are possible to God: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends all those things.

5. Again, the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word, both according as it is the Word and according as it is the exemplar; but if there were anything in the Word or in the eternal exemplar that lay hidden from the soul of Christ, it could be thought still more perfectly united: if therefore it is united

by a most perfect union, it is necessary that it should comprehend all things.

6. Again, the soul of Christ knows in the Word; and because it knows many things by one, therefore it knows many things at once, although as regards natural cognition it has no understanding except of one: therefore since that one extends itself not only to many things but even to infinite things; by the same account by which it knows many things at once, by that same account it knows infinite things.

7. Again, the eternal Word eternally represents whatever it represents, since it is one and uniform: therefore it is not by another account that it leads into one thing and into any other whatever: therefore the soul of Christ either sees nothing in the Word, or, if it sees anything, sees infinite things.

8. Again, the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any soul is through a habit given to it; but a soul having the habit of wisdom comprehends all things to which that habit extends itself: therefore by parity of reasoning the soul of Christ through the eternal Word comprehends all things to which that same Word extends itself.

9. Again, the soul of Christ knows the whole Word itself, since it has the whole united to itself; but in the Word power and essence are the same: therefore it comprehends the whole power of the Word. But the power of the Word extends itself to infinite things: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

10. Again, the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than according as they are in their own kind; but no thing has being in its own kind without being known by the soul of Christ; for it knows all things whatsoever that come to be: therefore much more strongly does it know all things whatsoever that are known by the eternal Word.

11. Again, it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, has with certitude the knowledge of future contingents: therefore by parity of reasoning it has also the knowledge of infinite things.

12. Again, it is equally difficult to know secrets as to know many things; but the soul of Christ, on account of its union to the Word, knows the most secret things of hearts, however inward they may be: therefore by parity of reasoning it knows however many things there may be: therefore infinite things.

13. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends everything comprehensible by a creature; but any species of number whatever is comprehensible by a creature: therefore it comprehends all the species of number. But the species of number, as Augustine says in the twelfth book *On the City*, are infinite: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

14. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends the whole universe, therefore being and all the differences of being: therefore it knows not only the generic differences but also the individual ones, not only being in act but also being in potency; but any species whatever, so far as lies in itself, has infinite individuals in potency: therefore the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things.

15. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends some finite thing, for instance a line, therefore it knows the beginning of the line; but the beginning of a line is a point: therefore it comprehends the point. But whoever comprehends a thing knows it according to the whole of its power: therefore since the power of a point extends itself to infinite lines, and the soul of Christ comprehends the whole power of the point, it is necessary that it should comprehend infinite things.

16. Again, the soul of Christ loves everything lovable, therefore by parity of reasoning it knows everything knowable; but everything that is known by God is knowable: therefore the soul of Christ knows everything that is known by God.

17. Again, the soul of Christ is altogether perfect; but in that which is altogether perfect everything that is in potency has been reduced to act; but the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency to infinite things, because it never understands so many things that it could not understand more: therefore since intelligibles do not crowd one another in the one who understands, therefore if the whole of its potency has been reduced to act, it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

18. Again, if the agent intellect were in full actuality with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, anyone whatever would understand infinite things: therefore since in the soul of Christ the Word united to it is in full actuality with respect to all those things with respect to which

the understanding of the soul of Christ is in potency: therefore the soul of Christ understands infinite things.

19. Again, the soul of Christ either can learn something or nothing. If it can learn something: therefore it is not fully perfect in knowledge, and by parity of reasoning neither in grace; if it can learn nothing: therefore it knows so much that it cannot know more: therefore it is necessary that it should know infinite things.

20. Again, the soul of Christ either knows some of those things which God can do and will not do, or nothing. If it knows nothing of them, I ask what hinders it; for either this is because it cannot extend itself to them, and that is manifestly false; or because God does not will to reveal them to it, and this is a manifest incongruity, because it takes away from that soul the highest familiarity with the Word united to it. If it knows some of those things which he can do and will not do; but there is no greater reason why it should know this rather than that: therefore it seems that it knows all things that are possible to God: therefore infinite things.

21. Again, the soul of Christ knows either finite things or infinite things. If it knows finite things; since more can be thought than any finite things whatever: therefore some soul will be able to think more things than the soul of Christ knows; but it is incongruous that any soul should exceed it in anything: therefore it is necessary to hold that it knows infinite things.

**Contra:** 1. The Psalm: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful* etc.; the Gloss: « The man assumed cannot be equalled to the divine substance either in substance or in anything else »: therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend all that is comprehended by eternal wisdom.

2. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book *On the City of God*: « The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite to the knowledge of God, which comprehends it »: therefore if the soul of Christ comprehends infinite things, infinite things are finite to it; but if infinite things are finite to it, since it is itself finite, they are not infinite: therefore if it comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend infinite things.

3. Again, Hugh, *On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ*: « This one thing I affirm without doubt, that there was in the soul of Christ no other wisdom besides the divine, or, if there was any, it was not equal to it »; but it is settled that there was another, as appears from the premises: therefore since a wisdom that informs and perfects and enables the soul cannot be other than created, that wisdom in Christ will not extend itself to comprehending all that uncreated wisdom comprehends.

4. Again, everything created is disposed in a fixed weight, number and measure: therefore the soul of Christ and its wisdom has a fixed number and measure; therefore it does not extend itself to infinite things.

5. Again, to comprehend infinite things is an act passing wholly over the immensity of the knowable; but every such act is infinite; and an infinite act is only from an infinite power, nor is there an infinite power except in an infinite substance: if therefore the soul of Christ is finite and limited, since it is a creature, it is impossible that it should comprehend infinite things.

6. Again, the simpler a substance is, the more things it is capable of knowing; but the soul of Christ is raised neither by nature nor by grace as far as the divine simplicity: therefore it is not elevated to knowing as many things as the divine wisdom knows.

7. Again, the wisdom of the Word is immense in clarity and in numerousness; but the soul of Christ never arrives at comprehending the immensity of the eternal light according to its every mode of clarity: therefore it never arrives at knowing its every mode of numerousness.

8. Again, although the soul of Christ is united to the essence of the Word, it nevertheless never exists in as many things as the Word itself is in; but as essence stands to essence, so knowledge to knowledge: therefore it never knows all that the Word itself knows.

9. Again, knowledge includes power, because *to be able to know* is to be able to do something; but the soul of Christ is not capable of infinite power, as of the power of creating: therefore by parity of reasoning neither of a knowledge extending itself to infinite things.

10. Again, infinity in creatures testifies to imperfection: if therefore the wisdom of the soul of Christ is most perfect, therefore it does not admit infinity, neither on the side of the knower nor on the side of the known nor on the side of the mode of knowing.

11. Again, no created thing exceeds another created thing infinitely; but if the soul of Christ were to know infinite things, then, since other souls know only finite things, it would exceed them infinitely: therefore it would pass outside the created genus. But this is manifestly false: therefore so also is that from which it follows, namely that the soul of Christ is comprehensive of infinite things.

12. Again, everything known is in the knower: therefore if the soul of Christ were actually to comprehend infinite things, infinite things would actually be in the soul of Christ; but it is impossible to posit an actual infinite about created being: therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ should be comprehensive of infinite things.

> **Conclusio.** The soul of Christ does not properly comprehend infinite things in the Word; yet in so far as the Word is a *productive exemplar*, it is borne into it by comprehending; but in so far as it is an *expressive exemplar*, it is borne into the same not by comprehending but by exceeding.

*I answer:* For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there are two ways of speaking of uncreated wisdom: either according as it is a *productive* and *dispositive exemplar*, or according as it is an *expressive* or *representative exemplar*. In the first

way there shine back in the art of the divine wisdom those things which are, have been, and will be; and these are finite. In the second way there shine back all the things which God can make and understand; and these indeed are infinite, as was shown in what precedes, and as Augustine expressly says in the twelfth book *On the City of God*. — The soul of Christ therefore is borne by cognition into the divine wisdom in both ways, but differently. For into it, according as it is a *productive exemplar*, it is borne *by comprehending*, because those things which are contained and represented in the exemplar as productive and dispositive are finite, and by this very fact also comprehensible. But into the exemplar according as it is an *expressive* or *representative exemplar* it is borne not *by comprehending*, but *by exceeding*; because, since infinite things are represented in it, they are incomprehensible, namely by a finite substance. And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a creature and by this very fact finite, however much it may be united to the Word, does not comprehend infinite things, because it is neither equalled to them nor does it exceed them; and therefore it does not in every mode *grasp* them, but is rather *grasped* by them, and by this very fact it is not borne into them by way of *comprehension*, but rather by way of *excess*. And by an *excessive* mode of knowing I mean, not one by which the knower exceeds the known, but one by which the knower is borne into an object that exceeds it in a certain excessive manner, raising itself above itself. Of which mode of knowing Dionysius speaks in the book *On Mystical Theology*, and in the seventh chapter *On the Divine Names* he says thus: « It must be acknowledged that our understanding has a certain power for understanding, through which it sees intelligibles, but also a union exceeding the nature of the understanding, through which it is joined to those things which are beyond it. According to this, therefore, divine things are to be understood, not according to ourselves, but with ourselves wholly put outside ourselves wholly and wholly deified; for it is better to be God's and not one's own; for so will all things be believable to those who are with God ». — But this mode of knowing by excess is in the way and in the fatherland; but in the way partially, whereas in the fatherland it is perfectly so in Christ and in the other comprehensors; but in the others it is *constrictedly*, both on the side of the measure of their own grace and on the side of the divine will, which does not offer itself to just anyone in every mode of familiarity; but in the soul of Christ it is *most freely*, both because from it that soul has a grace filling its capacity in every mode, and because the eternal mirror offers itself to it as manifestable according to a familiarity of every mode.

But in Christ the mode of *comprehension* and of *excess* differ in many ways: first, because in the comprehensive mode the knower grasps the known, whereas in the excessive mode the known grasps the knower. — Secondly, because in the comprehensive mode the gaze of intelligence is terminated, whereas in the excessive mode the appetite of intelligence is. — Thirdly, because in the comprehensive mode it becomes actually considering all things past, present and future; whereas in excess it becomes ready for considering. — Fourthly, because from a comprehension that has been received it comes about that it learns nothing anew; but on account of excess it comes about that it can learn nothing; and therefore, although the cognition of the soul of Christ can in a certain manner be spoken of with respect to infinite things by way of excess, nevertheless comprehensive cognition is only with respect to finite things. Hence if according to that cognition the soul of Christ is said to know whatever the Word knows, this is understood of past, present and future things, which in some way make for the integrity of the universe itself, which was fully and totally described in the soul of Christ Jesus from the instant of his conception. And to this extent that soul is said to have had all knowledge, not because it comprehends all that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be comprehended by a finite power, according to what was shown above. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded, because they conclude the truth irrefragably.

1. 2. 3. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has all knowledge, as the Word united to it has; it can be said that those things are said of the assumed man on account of the communication of idioms; or else certainly they are said of those things which are, have been and will be, which indeed can be comprehended by the soul of Christ; but it is not true with respect to all the things which the divine wisdom understands, since it knows infinite things, as is clear from the things that have been predetermined. — Yet as to what is objected, that no one can know anything of which his soul is ignorant; it holds true when someone knows nothing except through a soul, as is a mere man. But in Christ, who knows not only through his soul but also through the divine nature, that proposition has no place. And by this the response to the three first objections is clear.

4. To that which is objected, that to a soul that sees God every creature is narrow; it is to be said that this is true of a creature according to the *being* which it has in its own kind, but not according to the *being* which it has in the art, because that art is most noble and most perfect, having no narrowness but rather perfection. Hence if a soul were to know the whole universe according to the *being* which it has in its own kind, it would still not yet be in perfect cognition and comprehension, unless it also knew that art through

which all things come to be. And because the soul of Christ most perfectly comprehends all made things in that art, therefore in it and through it it is said to have perfect comprehension.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word; it is to be said that this is true, saving nevertheless the limitation of created nature, which the soul of Christ does not lose, because it does not cease to be a creature; and because to comprehend infinite things is repugnant to the limitation of a creature: hence it is that it cannot be inferred from that union, however perfect it be understood to be.

6. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ knows many things at once because it knows by one, and that by parity of reasoning it ought to know infinite things; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because multitude together with simultaneity is not repugnant to the limitation of a creature, whereas infinity together with actuality and simultaneity is repugnant in every mode; and therefore it is not an argument *from the like*, but from what is very unlike.

7. To that which is objected, that the eternal Word represents equally; it can be said that this is false, because *to represent* states an act toward another; but God, although in himself uniform, nevertheless illumines and manifests in manifold ways; and since he knows infinite things, some of them he approves and some he reproves, some he disposes to make and some by no means, some he shows willingly, some in a hidden way. — Moreover, granted that so far as lies in himself he knows all things uniformly, still the argument does not conclude, because « everything received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient and not after the mode of the received »; and therefore, since that receiving power is finite, it is impossible, even if the whole should offer itself to it unasked, that it should grasp and comprehend the whole, but only according to what befits it; as appears by an example, if the whole Seine offers itself to one who brings a jar, it is nevertheless not wholly comprehended, but only so far and in such manner as the capacity of the jar extends.

8. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is more powerful for knowing through the Word united to it than any other soul is through a habit given to it; it is to be said that this is true, but from this it does not follow that, if a soul comprehends all the things to which the habit extends itself, therefore on that account the soul of Christ knows all that it knows through the Word itself: because a soul comprehends the habit itself as proportional to itself and in no way exceeding its own capacity; the soul of Christ does not in this way comprehend the Word united to it, since it exceeds its capacity infinitely.

9. To that which is objected, that it knows the whole, therefore the whole power; it is to be said that that argument is not valid, because *whole*, said of the *Word*, states the privation of part and part, or the positing of perfection in every mode; but said of *power*, since power states a comparison to possible things, it states a distribution with respect to all possible things; and thus its acceptation is varied, and therefore that argument does not proceed.

10. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is nearer to things themselves as they are in the Word than as they are in their own kind; it is to be said that although it is nearer, it is nevertheless not more proportional. But comprehension in some way encloses in itself an account of proportionality, and that the known should be finite to the knower; and therefore, because in their own kind they are finite and proportional to that soul, therefore they are comprehensible, but not as they are in the immensity of that art, unless perhaps it be understood according as they are in it as in a *productive* exemplar. And in this way it can be conceded that they are comprehended by the soul of Christ, but in the other way not, on account of immensity and improportionality.

11. To that which is objected, that it is equally impossible to know contingent things with certitude as to comprehend infinite things; it is to be said that this is not true: because, although *to know contingent things with certitude* is impossible according to the cognition of nature, it nevertheless becomes possible according to an illumination above nature, which elevates the soul to knowing things in the eternal art, in which contingent things no less than necessary ones are unchangeably; but *to comprehend infinite things in act* is impossible not only by natural cognition but also by gratuitous cognition, for the reason that each is created and limited, and by this very fact does not extend itself to things actually infinite.

12. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of secret things and infinite things, it is to be said that the case is not alike, as is clear from what has been said: because the perception of a secret, however hidden, does not state anything incompossible with the nature of the created understanding itself. It is not so with the comprehension of the infinite, which implies infinity in act, and by this in substance and in power; which no creature whatever admits, neither through grace nor through glory.

13. To that which is objected, that whatever is comprehended is comprehensible by a creature; it is to be said that, although it can be conceded singly of any thing whatever that it is comprehensible by a creature, because each is finite, nevertheless all together are infinite, and therefore incomprehensible. And therefore that argument does not proceed, for the reason that it proceeds from the parts taken separately to the same parts as they are gathered into one. Hence just as that argument is not valid: this house can hold any man whatever by himself, therefore it can hold all men; so neither is that one valid.

14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, and that the potency of any species whatever extends itself to infinite individuals; it is to be said that there are two ways of understanding a potency to infinite things, namely an *active* potency and a *passive* potency. An *active* potency to infinite things is only in the creating essence, which is actually infinite. But if a potency with respect to infinite things be posited in a creature, it is a *passive* potency only, which is rooted upon something finite, yet has a relation to an infinite active principle, according to what is said in the *Book of Causes*: « All infinite powers are dependent through one infinite principle, which is the power of powers ». According to this, an infinite potency in a creature can be understood, known or comprehended in two ways: either as regards that *upon which it is rooted* in the creature — and because that is actually finite, therefore it is comprehensible; or as regards the *active principle* outside, which is actually infinite. In the *first* way the soul of Christ comprehends all the differences of being, both in the genera with respect to species and in the species with respect to individuals; in the *second* way, as it is referred to the infinite active potency, it certainly knows them, yet not by way of *comprehensive* cognition but of *excessive* cognition, as was shown above. And by this the response is clear.

15. 16. To that which is objected concerning the point and concerning the lovable and the knowable, it is to be said that it is true that it comprehends everything lovable and knowable according to the *being* which it has in its own proper nature; but according to the *being* which it has in the infinite first cause, it is thus said to be knowable and comprehensible to an infinite power alone; because, although according to the *mode* it may seem to state something created, nevertheless according to the *thing* it states nothing but the power of the efficient cause, which, since it is infinite, can be comprehended by nothing finite.

17. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is altogether perfect, and that nothing remained in potency which has not been reduced to act; it is to be said that this is true of a potency which is reducible to act altogether; but a potency to infinite things can never be reduced to act according to the whole but only according to a part. Hence it is impossible that God should bring it about that a continuum be altogether divided into all the things into which it can be divided; for this is repugnant to the perfection of the power of the agent itself and to the completion of the creature, which is born to be in finitude; and such is the potency of the possible intellect.

18. But to that which is objected, that if the agent intellect were in act with respect to all the things to which it is possible in potency, then the soul would understand infinite things, etc.; it is to be said that the case is not alike: because, if the agent intellect were in act with respect to infinite things, according as it is a potency of the soul, then the soul by its own power would extend itself to infinite things. But it is not so in a soul united to eternal wisdom: because that wisdom, although it extends itself to infinite things, is not something of the soul itself, but above the soul; and therefore it is not necessary on this account that it should belong to that soul to know infinite things. *Moreover, the possible* intellect is proportional to the *agent* intellect, whereas uncreated wisdom is not so to the soul that understands.

19. 20. 21. To that which is objected concerning the soul of Christ, whether it can learn anything, and whether it knows any of those things which God is not going to make and can make, and whether it knows finite things only or infinite things also; the response is clear from the distinction made above: because, since the soul of Christ has *comprehensive* cognition with respect to all things whatsoever that come to be in the universe, and *excessive* cognition with respect to all things which are contained in the divine art, and that *excess* lies in the totality of the knowing power and in the highest familiarity with respect to the representing mirror, it must be that the soul of Christ, even if it does not *comprehend* all that the divine wisdom comprehends, yet because it *exceeds* into all those things, therefore its whole *appetite* is terminated; so that, just as nothing further can be added to its *grace*, so nothing further can be added to its *wisdom*, because as much has been given to it as can be granted to any creature.

From these things, therefore, which have been said and predetermined concerning the wisdom of Christ, both as regards the *divine* nature and as regards the *human*, there can appear the mode of knowing both in the cognition of the Creator and in the cognition of the creature, not only in the state of the *fatherland* but also in the state of the *way*. For, to say it in one word, it must be confessed that God knows infinite things — knows them, I say, by himself, not by a likeness; and by a likeness not received, but by the very truth which expresses and exemplifies all things whatsoever, with respect to which many likenesses and expressions are spoken of, not on account of multitude and distinction in themselves, but according to an account of understanding; and these likenesses or eternal accounts are those from which flows all the certitude of created cognition, both in the soul of Christ and in the other created spirits; nor are they alone the accounts of knowing, but together with them also the likenesses received from without; according to the state of the way and according to the state of the fatherland there is required not only the presence of the eternal light, but also the influence of the eternal light, not only the uncreated Word, but also the word inwardly conceived; and since this is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can be *comprehensive* of the eternal Word nor of infinite knowables,

although it has to be borne into it *by excess*; and this excess is the last and noblest mode of knowing, which Dionysius praises in all his books, and most of all in the book *On Mystical Theology*. Of which also the whole of divine Scripture is, as it were, mystically; and of which the Apocalypse says in the second chapter: *I will give him a white counter, and in the counter a new name written, which no man knoweth but he that receiveth it*; because scarcely anyone, or no one, understands that mode of knowing except one who has experienced it, nor has anyone experienced it except one who is *rooted and founded in charity, that he may be able to comprehend, with all the saints, what is the length, the breadth*, etc.; in which also experimental and true wisdom consists, which is begun in the way and consummated in the fatherland; for the circumlocution of which negations are more fitting than affirmations, and superpositions than positive predications; for the experience of which inward silence avails more than outward speech. And therefore here an end of speaking is to be made, and the Lord is to be prayed that he grant us to experience what we speak.

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