Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/1/q/bon-sent-I-d1-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *What use is, and concerning the useful.*
### Question I. *Whether use is an act of the will, of reason, or of every faculty.*

Concerning the first point about use — what it is by essence, whether it is an act of the will or of reason — one proceeds thus. That it is an act of the will is shown thus.

1. By the act of using, each one is called good; but no one is called good except from an act of the will: therefore the act of using pertains to the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity*: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will": therefore to use is an act of the will.

3. Likewise, this is apparent by the division of use itself against other things, because in the tenth book *On the Trinity* Augustine divides these three — talent (*ingenium*), doctrine, and use — and says that talent regards what a man can do, doctrine what a man knows, use what he wills: therefore use is an act of the will.

4. Likewise, "Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"; but to use and to misuse are opposites; therefore, since to misuse belongs to the will alone, because to sin belongs to it alone: therefore to use will likewise be an act of the will alone.

**On the contrary:** 1. Use or habituation is the way to acquiring a habit; but every faculty is by nature able to acquire a habit: therefore use seems to belong to every faculty.

2. Likewise, every faculty is ordered to an end through its own operation; but something is called useful or to be used insofar as it is orderable to an end; but to be ordered to an end through its proper operation belongs to every faculty: therefore use likewise.

3. Likewise, as Augustine says and as is held in the *Lectio* [of the Master], to use is to refer that which has come into use, and so on. But it belongs to that which can refer, to which it belongs to compare; but to compare belongs to reason alone, therefore so does to refer: therefore so also does to use, from its definition.

4. Likewise, art uses its own instruments; but art is in the rational or cognitive faculty, since it is a science: therefore, since habit and act belong to the same faculty, if art is in the rational faculty, use likewise will be in the same.

> **Conclusion.** Use can be understood in five ways: if it is taken most commonly and commonly, it is an act of every faculty; if it is taken properly, more properly, and most properly, it is an act of the will.

**I respond****:** It must be said that use is taken in five ways, and accordingly it is diversified both with respect to the thing and with respect to the definition.

For use or *uti* is taken most commonly insofar as it is divided against idleness or leisure, for the natural operation due to any given thing, or that

to which each thing is ordered; and according to this the Philosopher says: "Whose use is good, etc."

In a second mode it is said commonly; and thus use is divided against disuse. And in this mode it is defined by Victorinus: "Use is an act frequently elicited from a faculty," and in this mode it can be said that it is an act of every faculty, and it adds nothing to the act except frequency.

In a third mode use is taken properly; and thus it is divided against the habits of memory and intelligence, namely against talent and doctrine. And thus it is defined by Augustine in the tenth book *On the Trinity*: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will," and thus it names an act of the will properly.

In a fourth mode it is taken more properly; and thus it is divided against the quietative act, namely against enjoyment (*frui*). And thus it is defined by Augustine: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will on account of another thing," and thus it is an act of the will as referred to another.

In a fifth mode it is taken most properly; and thus it is divided against the disordered act, namely against misuse (*abuti*). And thus it is defined by Augustine *On Christian Doctrine*: "To use is to refer what has come into use to that which is to be enjoyed," and thus *uti* names an act of the will referred and ordered to an end.

Therefore the reason for the diverse definitions is the manifold acceptation of *uti*; and the reason for the manifold acceptation is its opposition to diverse things.

If, then, it be asked of which faculty it is the act: it must be said that, speaking most commonly and commonly, it is the act of every faculty; and in this way Augustine does not speak; but properly, more properly, and most properly, it is the act of the will itself.

**To the arguments on the contrary:**

1. And thus the first objection on the contrary side is clear, namely that it is of every faculty.

2. As to what is objected secondly, that every faculty is referred to its end through its own act: it must be said that that faculty is said to use its own act which is mistress of its act; and it belongs to such a faculty to refer its act, not only to be referred. And since the will alone is mistress of its act and alone is self-moving, therefore it alone is that to which it belongs actively to use. To the other faculties, however, it pertains to be used materially and passively, because they are referable, not refer-ers. And hence it is that it is said by Augustine: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will"; for *facultas* is called its dominion, by which it can easily proceed into its act as the prince of that act.

3. To what is objected, that to refer belongs to reason: it must be said that to refer is twofold, namely by collation and by inference, as premises are referred to a conclusion; and this belongs to reason, and this is not to use. And there is to refer by inclination and ordering to another; and this belongs properly to the will, because it can take up something either by resting in it or by directing it toward another; and this is to refer by which use is defined, and so on.

4. To what is objected concerning art, it must be said that art expresses both what belongs to operation and what belongs to speculation. According to what it says belongs to speculation, it has no use, and so it belongs to reason; but according to what it says belongs to operation, it extends to the will and regulates it in using.