Dist. 1, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/1/q/bon-sent-I-d1-a3-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed.*

Lastly it is asked whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed; and that it is so, seems [evident].

**Foundations.**

1. That alone is to be enjoyed which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone is to be loved for its own sake which is good for its own sake; and that is good for its own sake which neither has from another the goodness it has, nor is that goodness *in relation to anything else*; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that alone is to be enjoyed which quiets the appetite of the soul; but the soul's appetite is not sufficiently quieted save in that which is a more perfect and greater good than itself; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the appetite is not sufficiently quieted save through something which fills the soul, since the soul fails in rest on that side on which it fails in fullness; but [the soul] is capable of God according to appetite: therefore, if every created thing is infinitely less than that [God], no [created thing] supplies the soul's appetite. And this is what Augustine says: «Nothing less than the Trinity can fill a soul that is capable of the whole Trinity».

4. Likewise, the good which can be thought can be desired: therefore, if a greater good than some [given good] can be thought, a greater than that can be desired; but a greater than every finite [good] can be thought: therefore a greater can be desired: therefore no finite [thing] sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite: therefore the only infinite good, which is God, is to be enjoyed, which once possessed, nothing further can be thought or desired.

**On the contrary:**

1. It seems that the created good may be enjoyed, since although the appetite of matter is infinite, yet through a created incorruptible form it is sufficiently terminated: therefore similarly it seems that there is some created good which sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite; but every such [good] is to be enjoyed: therefore some created good is to be enjoyed.

2. Likewise, the human appetite is of finite capacity; therefore it does not grasp save the finite, or if it grasps the infinite, it grasps finitely; therefore if it is terminated by that which it grasps, it is terminated by a finite good: therefore it seems that some finite good is to be enjoyed.

3. Likewise, specially it seems that the human being is to be enjoyed, since that is to be enjoyed by which God enjoys; but God enjoys the human being, since he loves the human being; but with that love with which he loves himself, he loves the human being, since there is not in him a twofold love; but the first is of enjoyment: therefore also the second.

4. Likewise, specially it seems concerning virtue; since that is to be enjoyed which is to be desired for its own sake; this is manifest per se; but every honorable good is to be desired for its own sake, «since the honorable is what by its own force draws us and by its own dignity attracts us», as Tully says, and Augustine divides the honorable against the useful; but virtue falls in the genus of the honorable: therefore virtue is to be enjoyed.

5. Likewise, specially it seems concerning beatitude. That is to be enjoyed by the possession of which the mind rests and is delighted, and can seek nothing further; but created beatitude is of this kind: therefore, etc.

### Conclusio.

> God alone is properly to be enjoyed; it is improperly permitted to enjoy spiritual goods, which delight and are conjoined to the end.

**I respond:** It must be said that God alone is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight and quieting. But, taking "to enjoy" commonly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight only, a human being can not unfittingly enjoy all things which spiritually delight and are conjoined to the end—of which kind are the fruits, gifts, and beatitudes; but in the first mode [he can enjoy] God alone.

And the reason for this is that nothing can sufficiently terminate the soul except the good for which it exists. But this is the highest good, which is above the soul, and the infinite good, which exceeds the powers of the soul. For the soul's natural cognition is a cognition not constrained; whence it is born in a certain way to cognize all things, whence its cognition is not filled by any cognoscible save what has in itself all cognoscibles and by which once cognized all things are cognized. Likewise its affection is born to love every good; therefore the affection is not sufficiently terminated by any good save by that which is the good of every good and which is "all in all".

Of which good [it is said] in Exodus the thirty-third: *I will show thee every good*. But this is the highest good: therefore, etc.

Likewise, nothing sufficiently terminates the soul save the infinite good, because for it to be terminated, it is necessary that it be terminated according to estimation; otherwise it would not be blessed, unless it esteemed itself blessed. But estimation transcends every finite [thing], since something greater than every finite [thing] can be thought: therefore, since affection can extend itself where also estimation [extends], necessarily the soul's affection transcends every finite [thing]; and if this, [it is] not sufficiently terminated by any finite good. Therefore God alone is to be enjoyed, since [he is] the highest and infinite good.

And not only is God to be enjoyed on account of perfect termination, but also on account of perfect delight. For to delight there concurs the delightable and the conjunction of it with that which is delighted. But everything which delights the soul delights under the account of good and beautiful; and since God alone is goodness and beauty itself, therefore in God alone is there perfect delight.

Likewise, because there is conjunction; but God alone is the one who is most perfectly conjoined. For he is conjoined according to truth and intimacy. For God alone, on account of supreme simplicity and spirituality, glides into the soul, so that according to truth he is in the soul and more intimate to the soul than [the soul] itself is to itself.

For all these four reasons reduce to one, namely to this: that since the soul is born to perceive the infinite good, which is God, therefore in him alone it ought to rest and enjoy him.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:**

1. *To that* which is objected concerning the appetite of matter; it must be said that the appetite of matter is ordered to form as to substantial perfection, out of which also matter becomes one [thing]; and therefore it is necessary that the form be of the same genus as the matter, nor is it altogether above matter: therefore every such form is finite. But such [a form], if it be incorruptible, on account of union constrains the appetite of matter and once constrained terminates it; whence it is not terminated in its [own] amplitude. But the appetite of the soul is not so constrained on account of union with the desirable, rather it is dilated; and therefore it is required that it be perfected by something altogether highest.

2. *To that* which is objected, that [the soul] does not grasp save finitely; it must be said that it grasps the infinite good finitely, since [the soul] itself is finite. But since that good is infinite, therefore by it [the soul] is wholly absorbed, so that its capacity is on every side terminated. Whence it will not so much rejoice, but, as Anselm says, *it will enter into the joy of the Lord*. For if it merely grasped and were not conquered and absorbed, the appetite could still rise up to grasp something further. It is therefore evident that, for the soul to be completed, although it has a finite capacity, yet it is necessary that the infinite good be present.

3. *To that* which is objected concerning the human being; it must be said that God loves the human being, and the love of God is the love of enjoyment; yet he does not enjoy the human being, since by loving himself he loves the human being, that is, by enjoying himself he uses the human being. Which is evident thus: that God's love toward the creature is not affection, but [a] communication of effect. But communication, according to habitual account, is attended to according to goodness; since the good is what is born to communicate itself. According to actual account, however, it is attended to or regards the will; since because [God] wills, therefore he acts. Therefore the account of communicating comes from will and goodness, just as the account of cognizing [comes] from the exemplar and intelligence. Since therefore from the conversion of his will upon his own goodness he loves us, therefore by enjoying himself he loves us.

4. *To that* which is objected concerning virtue, that virtue is an honorable good; it must be said that the honorable good is said in two ways: either as what is purely good, or as that in which its likeness shines forth. In the first mode the honorable is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, since this alone terminates and quiets. In the second mode not, unless it be taken commonly, insofar as it expresses delight.

For such [virtues] on account of assimilation to God have beauty, by which they delight and attract us; nevertheless in them one is not to rest, since then they lose their beauty, since «the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and inflated».

5. *To that* which is objected concerning beatitude; it must be said that created beatitude does not terminate the appetite per se, but through conjunction with the uncreated: whence the soul loves it on account of God, not on account of itself.