Dist. 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/1/q/bon-sent-I-d1-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part, concerning the text, many things are asked, and first concerning what he says: *"But of these certain are those whose whole use is in signifying, not in justifying."* But on the contrary: All the Sacraments are medicines, because according to Hugh of St. Victor *the Sacraments were medicines at every time*; but every medicine has its effect in curing: therefore the Sacraments likewise; but this curing is justification: therefore at every time the Sacraments had to justify.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Sacraments of the Old Law are to be considered in two ways, namely in themselves or by reason of the work-worked (*opus operatum*); and thus they were only for signifying; or by reason of attached faith or of charity or by reason of the work-working (*opus operans*); and thus the legal Sacraments were for justifying, except Circumci\[sion\].

### Doubt II.

*"Therefore every sign is some thing."* It is objected concerning this division. For the Master seems to divide badly, because a superior is not divided against its inferior; but *thing* is superior to *sign*: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is true that a superior, taken in its generality, is not divided against its inferior; but contracted it can well be divided. Here, however, *thing* is contracted to stand for a thing that does not signify.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says: *"But not conversely is every thing a sign."* For he seems to speak badly, because a sign is what leads to the knowing of another; but every thing leads to another, because every thing is a cause or an effect. Now the cause leads to the knowledge of the effect and conversely. If you say that not everything which leads is a sign, but what leads to something prior; then every creature is a sign, since it leads to God.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold sign, namely *natural* and *instituted*. The first is not intended here, but the second; whence the objection does not hold against the proposition, since here it is treated of the sign by institution, as are vocal and sacramental signs.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise the Master seems to speak badly in this that he says: *"First concerning things, afterwards concerning signs."* For he seems rather to have ought to have said the converse, because the sign leads to the knowledge of the thing: therefore one should first treat or speak of signs rather than of things.

**I respond:** It must be said that the knowledge of the sign is prior to that of the thing in respect of which it is a sign; but it is not necessary that [it be so] of every thing. Hence he first treats of things of which the sacraments are not signs.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it seems that this division of things, *"Some are those by which one is to enjoy"* etc., is badly assigned with respect to what is divided, because what is divided is simpler than the dividing members, and to the dividing members something is common; but nothing is simpler than God, nor is there anything common to God and creature: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a division of one common thing according to name only; and this is the division of an *equivocal*; there is another division of what is common according to name and reality; and this is the division of a *univocal*; there is also a third in a middle way; and this is the division of the *analogous*, where there is not community according to unity of nature, but according to likeness of proportion; and this community is one of reason (*rationis*).

### Doubt VI.

Likewise the division seems bad as to its members: for it seems that the third member is superfluous. For of every thing one must either use or enjoy: therefore the third is superfluous.

Likewise, just as there is a thing which enjoys and uses, so there is a thing by which one is to enjoy and to use, as Christ: therefore by the same reasoning by which the third member is posited, a fourth ought to be posited.

**I respond:** Every thing which is some nature is either an end; and thus it is a thing by which one is to enjoy; or leading to the end; and thus it is a thing by which one is to use; or arriving at the end; and thus it is a thing which enjoys and uses, as man: and so the members are taken. And this division is sufficiently fitting to this science, because, since theology is concerning the Creator and creatures, it is useful that the theologian teach how man tends to God through other things.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: *"Things by which one is to enjoy"*; because if there are three things *per se* and not by accident, and from the diversity of things comes the diversity or multiplicity of enjoyment: therefore as there are three things, so there will be three enjoyments.

Likewise, there are three articles, because [they are] of three persons: therefore by similar reasoning, three enjoyments.

**I respond:** That *thing* is here taken commonly for both essence and person on account of its generality; and because this word *thing* is taken from an act of the soul, therefore three are called *things*, because three persons, but nevertheless one *thing*, because one goodness is in them. Therefore since there is one goodness, there is also one enjoyment, although three *things*. — And since *article* signifies something from the side of the distinguishing soul, namely the intellect, and enjoyment respects the divine essence and goodness and union of affection in common, therefore enjoyment is one.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: *"Everyone who enjoys, uses"*; because this seems false, since foolish men and likewise beasts enjoy, because for the sake of themselves they delight in what is delightful, but they do not use. If you say that it is said by transference, why is the word *to use* not similarly transferred?

**I respond:** *To use* (*uti*) imports liberty in its general acceptance; in its special [acceptance] it imports liberty with relation to another; *to enjoy* (*frui*) imports liberty with delight; and although neither liberty nor comparison (*collatio*) belongs to brutes, delight does belong to them. Therefore *to use* in no way belongs to brutes; *to enjoy* however belongs to them in some way, though improperly.

### Doubt IX.

Likewise [the Master] seems to speak badly, that hope is not to be placed in man, because of the Blessed Virgin is sung by the Church (which does not err) *"Life, sweetness and hope."*

Likewise, in Jonah, chapter one: *"The pilot approached him"*; the Gloss: « It is natural for man to confide rather in others than in himself in dangers ».

**I respond:** It must be said that to hope concerning someone is twofold, either as concerning a helper, or as concerning a saviour. The first hope can be in man, the second cannot. — Or it is to hope for final reward; and this ought to be only in God; or temporal benefit; and this can be in man. The first, if placed in man, deserves the curse, the second not.

### Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked, why he says of man: *"Therefore, brother, I shall enjoy thee in the Lord"*, rather than of an ass or of another creature, since in all creatures the vestige of divine goodness shines forth.

**I respond:** That someone be said to enjoy something in God is not due to representation, but rather to indwelling. Whence the converse is proper, namely this: *"I shall enjoy the Lord in thee"*, when through deeds I know God to dwell in thee; and it is a figurative manner of speech.

### Doubt XI.

Likewise it is asked concerning this solution of Augustine, by which he solves the aforesaid authority by that determination *"in the Lord."* But in Ecclesiasticus chapter eight it is said simply: *"Enjoy a great man."* Likewise, Deuteronomy chapter twenty-eight: *"Thou shalt beget sons and daughters, and shalt not enjoy them"*; from this it is implied that, if they did not sin, they would enjoy.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid solution is not general, but only to the proposed authority. And therefore one must have recourse to the solution aforesaid outside the text, in the questions, that, since *frui* is taken commonly and properly, in the aforesaid locutions it is taken commonly only.

### Doubt XII.

Likewise what the Master says does not seem to hold: *"For if [God] neither enjoys nor uses"* etc., because God loves himself, yet does not use, because he does not love himself on account of another; nor does he enjoy, because where there is enjoyment, there is inherence and indigence, as Augustine says; but God lacks both etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that enjoyment in its general account signifies the union of love, namely of the enjoyable with the enjoyer. Therefore since it happens that something is united to itself and to another, it happens that one not only enjoys another, but also oneself; but where there is union to another, there is dependence, inherence and indigence; but where [there is union] to oneself, if that very self is the highest good, there is no inherence nor dependence nor indigence, but every kind of sufficiency. But if the good itself is deficient, it has need; and hence it is that God alone perfectly enjoys himself, but nothing other than himself can perfectly enjoy itself. For God alone is the highest good and loves himself by enjoying himself, and loves other things also by enjoying himself: and thus neither God's enjoyment nor use is with indigence, as is our enjoyment and use.

### Doubt XIII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: *"Because [God] is good, we are"*: therefore because he is good from eternity, we are from eternity.

**I respond:** It must be said briefly, that this is so because *good* signifies a cause. But there is a natural and necessary cause, and a voluntary cause. The divine goodness, however, is the cause of our being and well-being by way of will, not of nature; and this cause does not posit the effect immediately, when it is.

### Doubt XIV.

Likewise, it is further objected: why does it not follow similarly: because he is just, we are just? If you say that justice is not his disposition insofar as he is cause; on the contrary: wisdom is the disposition of God insofar as he is cause: therefore by parity of reasoning, because he is wise, we are wise. If you say that it is not an immediate disposition, like goodness; it is objected concerning the will, which is most immediate, and yet it does not follow: because he is willing, we are willing.

**I respond:** It must be said that the reason of this consequence is threefold. One is that goodness is a condition of cause as cause; the second is that

it is proximate to act; the third, that it is a general disposition, in which consists the account of vestige; for it bespeaks respect to the end. Whence just as the one God impresses unity, so the good [God impresses] goodness.

### Doubt XV.

Likewise it is objected against this that is said: *"That it may be loved on account of itself alone,"* because as *per se* is to *per accidens*, so *for its own sake* is to *for the sake of another*. But nothing which belongs to something *per accidens* belongs to it *per se*: therefore nothing which belongs to something *for the sake of another* belongs *for its own sake*. If therefore the virtues are to be sought *for the sake of another*, therefore not *for their own sake*.

**I respond:** As the Philosopher says, « The end and *that for the sake of which* are the same ». Now the end is twofold: in one way the ultimate end, which most properly is the end, in which there is rest; in another way the end under the end, which is properly called the terminus. So also *that for the sake of which* is diversified; whence in one way it excludes the [ultimate] end, in another way not, as the Master says.

As to what is objected concerning *per se*; I say that, just as *per se* is in one way opposed to that which is *per aliud* — and thus *per se* and *insofar as it is itself* (*secundum quod ipsum*), or *first universal*, are the same — in another way it is opposed to that which is *per accidens*: so also *for its own sake* (*propter se*) is taken in two ways. In one way it is opposed to that which is *for the sake of another*, in another way to that which is *per accidens*, because [the latter] is ordered to that [end] accidentally. According to this the Master distinguishes *for its own sake*, and consequently the *honourable* or *enjoyable*, and finally enjoyment itself.

### Doubt XVI.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: *"And certain are things through which we enjoy, as the virtues."* It seems that the soul can enjoy by the powers alone. For without any virtue it can enjoy a created good; therefore since the uncreated good is more enjoyable, and the soul is more born for this, it will be able to enjoy it by the powers alone.

**I respond:** It must be said that the highest good is that which is above us; for the soul to be united to it, therefore, a twofold medium necessarily intervenes: one medium, through which the soul is born to be united to another different from itself; and this is the *power* (*potentia*); another, a special [medium] above this, which raises it up; and this is *virtue*. What is objected is not similar, because the power *per se* can fail and be inclined [downward], but cannot *per se* be elevated.

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