Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/10/q/bon-sent-I-d10-a1-q1
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### Question I. *Whether a person proceeding by way of liberality is to be posited in God.*

Concerning the first point, that it is necessary to posit a person proceeding by way of liberality, is shown in this way.

1. A mutual love is more perfect than a reflexive one, and a mutual love communicated is even more perfect than one not communicated, because such a love — namely one not communicated — seems to savor of a libidinous love: therefore if in God there is the highest love and the highest delight and beatitude, there is not there a person who is not loved mutually, but [a person] to whom mutual love is communicated; but the communication of mutual love is by liberality: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in things below us a twofold noble manner of proceeding is found, namely by way of nature and by way of will: in the first manner the Son emanates from the Father, in the second manner a gift [emanates] from a giver; but everything which is of nobility in a creature is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in God one must posit nature and will, and just as fecundity perfects nature, so the highest liberality perfects will; but nature, perfected by fecundity, produces — a person produces another person: therefore by parallel reasoning, when will is perfected by liberality, a person produces another person: and so etc.

4. Likewise, all creatures proceed from God by knowledge and will; but before the production of creatures one had to posit in God an emanation of the Word from eternity, in which the Father disposed all things to be done: therefore by parallel reasoning it was necessary that a person emanate, in whom He would will and give all things; but such a person proceeds by way of liberality: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The manner of proceeding or going forth in creatures with respect to God and in [the divine] persons is not similar; for creatures are extrinsic, but the persons are one in essence; but the going forth of creatures from God is by way of liberality: therefore one is not to posit a person to proceed in this manner.

2. Likewise, what goes forth by way of will from something is not assimilated to the producer in substance, nor equated [with it], nor produced necessarily; but a person, if it proceeds in God, is similar in substance and equal in power and not able to be otherwise: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in things below us not only are these noble principles found — namely nature and will — but also reason or that which works through art: therefore if two persons are posited as proceeding by these two manners, a third must be posited which proceeds by the third manner; but that [third one] is not posited: therefore neither will any [person] be posited by way of will by parallel reasoning.

4. Likewise, the more love is communicated to many, the more perfect it is, because every good when brought into common possession shines forth more beautifully: therefore one is not only to posit a third person, to whom love is communicated by the second, but also a fourth, to whom love is communicated by the third; and so on to infinity; but this is impossible in God, as has been shown above: therefore one must stop at the first producing person: therefore there is no person proceeding by way of liberality.

### Conclusion.

> In God by way of liberality there proceeds a third person, who is called the Gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as has been proved, in God one must posit a third person proceeding by way of liberality, who is called the Gift. And the reason for this is the perfection of love, the perfection of emanation, and the perfection of will, which, since it exists as most liberal, cannot but produce a person; just as nature, since it exists as most fecund, cannot but produce a person; and this is the proper reason of this emanation.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that creatures emanate by way of liberality; it must be said that to emanate by way of liberality is twofold: either as something willed, or as the ground of willing — that is, either as something given, or as the ground of giving. In the first manner creatures emanate, which are outside; in the second manner the third person in the Trinity emanates, because the ground of willing and of giving is intrinsic to a most perfect will.

2. To that which is objected, that the will is not an assimilating principle nor one necessarily emanating; it must be said that the will or liberality is a principle in two ways: in one way as distinct in nature, and so it does not assimilate in substance; in another way as concomitant with nature, and so it assimilates in substance. Since therefore a person so proceeds by way of liberality that nature nevertheless accompanies [it]: therefore [the person is] similar in substance, although the manner of proceeding itself is not by way of one similar; and so this is clear.

3. To that which is objected, why some person does not proceed by way of reason; it must be said that every noble manner of proceeding is reduced to those two: because every agent either acts naturally, or by will: — for an agent [acting] by violence or by chance is an imperfect agent, and the manner of producing less noble — whence reason is not distinguished against nature and will as to the manner of acting: and therefore there is no person proceeding by such a manner.

But yet this does not seem fully to resolve [the question], because we distinguish in these creatures a going forth by way of *liberality* from a going forth by way of *art*. And therefore it must be said that the procession by way of liberality is twofold, either as the ground of liberality or liberality itself, or as *that done liberally*; likewise also in art, either as art itself or the ground of crafting, or as *that crafted*; and in the first manner it can fall upon a divine person, in the second manner not. And in the first manner the Son proceeds, who is "the Word and art full of all living reasons". But this manner of emanating is not distinguished from the manner of emanating by way of nature, because he emanates as wholly similar and by way of perfect likeness. But another manner cannot be, because two persons must communicate in the same nature, and because it is necessary that every manner of emanating which is in God be principally by way of nature, or with that [nature] concomitant. Whence since the procession by way of *will* can be intrinsic, just as love proceeds from the lover: but by way of art [the procession] is always extrinsic, inasmuch as it is of this kind: therefore it is impossible that it fall in God with respect to a person, but it falls only with respect to a creature.

4. To that which is objected last: if a third person is to be posited because of communication, then by parallel reasoning also a fourth: it must be said that every reason and nature agrees that what can be done most sufficiently by one should not be done by many; otherwise there is something superfluous. If therefore mutual love cannot be of fewer than to one, and the communication of that mutual [love] not of fewer than to one, and in one there is mutual love, and in another the communication of mutual love most perfectly, since each receives the whole infinitely; it is clear that there is no further proceeding, but there [we are] to stop. Whence the very same reason which posits the plurality of persons removes infinity and posits trinity.