Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/13/q/bon-sent-I-d13-a1-q3
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### Question III.

*Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son really, or only according to the mode of understanding.*

Thirdly, it is asked whether the procession of the Holy Spirit really differs from the generation of the Son, or only according to the mode of understanding. And that it differs really, is shown:

1. Because the persons differ according to their emanations; therefore, since the persons really differ — not only intellectually, since, with every act of intellect set aside, the trinity still remains — therefore the emanations, which are procession and generation, really differ.

2. Likewise, things which are from diverse principles really differ; but generation in divine things is from one, the procession of the Holy Spirit from two, since [it is] from the Father and the Son: therefore they really differ.

3. Likewise, according to the matter and the truth of certain things, the divine substance is the principle *as will*, of which it is not the principle *as nature* — as is plain, since creatures are from God acting by way of will, not by way of nature: if therefore procession is of the will *by way of will*, and generation by way of nature *as nature*, then procession and generation really differ.

4. Likewise, in a created image the going-forth of the *word* and the going-forth of the *love* are distinguished, since they really differ; this belongs to perfection, since from this they make the trinity of the image; but that they should differ *essentially* — this belongs to imperfection; but everything that belongs to perfection is to be posited in divine things: therefore procession and generation really differ, although not essentially.

**On the contrary:**

1. The Father spirates and generates — therefore either insofar as he is one, or insofar as he is several or many things. If insofar as several or many, the Father is composite; if insofar as one — but since the Father and Son spirate insofar as they are one, the spirations are not two, but one: therefore likewise, if the Father spirates and generates insofar as one, spiration and generation are one production.

2. Likewise, according to all it is true that the Father generates by reason of the *fecundity of nature*, and spirates by reason of the *fecundity of will*; but in God will and nature are the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, emanations are distinguished by their terms; but the Father gives wholly the same and the whole, which he gives to the Son by generation, to the Holy Spirit by procession: therefore spiration and generation are wholly one emanation.

4. Likewise, the same point is shown by *reductio ad impossibile*. If they differ, [they differ] either by themselves or by other things: not by themselves, since emanations are neither *from themselves* nor *to themselves*: therefore if each thing is distinguished by that which it *is*, or by that *from which* it is, emanations of this kind are not distinguished by themselves; if by other things: either by *essence*, or by *notion*, or by *person*. Not by essence — it is plain, since essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished; not by person, since it belongs to person to *be distinguished*, not *to distinguish*: therefore if they differ, this will be by other notions; and similarly we will have to ask about those others, and so on to infinity: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if they differ, [they differ] either by *substantial* difference or by *accidental*: not by substantial, since such a difference is not in divine things; not by accidental, since in God there is no accident: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the Son differs more from a creature than from the Holy Spirit: therefore generation differs more from creation than from procession; but generation is not distinguished from creation: therefore neither from procession. Proof of the middle [premise]: creation is the divine essence; but person and essence are not distinguished from each other: therefore neither generation and creation.

### Conclusion.

> Generation and spiration differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference both of *origin* and of *relation [habitudo]*, and even *by themselves*.

**I respond:** It must be said that generation and spiration — i.e. procession — differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference of origin and of relation, since the mode of self-relating is diverse and the mode of origin is differing; and such a difference is not repugnant to the unity of essence.

But if the reason of the difference of these emanations is asked, it must be said that the *first* reason of differing cannot be assigned *from the side of the terms*. For the terms are persons, who do not import the account of differing *actively*, but *passively*.

If therefore the persons differ, it is asked: by what? — and we have to come back to the emanations and relations, which are generation and procession; and so in this assignment there will be a circle.

Likewise from the side of the principles. For if it be said that these two emanations differ according to the twofold fecundity of nature and of will, it is asked in what manner one fecundity differs from the other. If you say that the fecundity of nature is in the Father alone, of will in the Father and the Son: this has the further question whence this difference comes, and we have to come round to this — that the fecundity of nature is in *one*, since the image proceeding through it is by nature only from one; the fecundity of will is in *two*, since the bond, or procession by way of bond, is in two; and so the difference returns to the first [point], and the account is circular there. Therefore it is plain on this account that the *first* difference of these emanations is not to be taken from the side of the term, nor from the side of the principle.

And therefore it is to be noted that one can speak of emanations of this kind both as to *being* and as to *being-distinguished*.

If as to being, they thus have the account of being from their perfect and fecund principles. For since in God there is the most perfect nature and a true nature, therefore there is perfect and true fecundity in the hypostasis which has the account of principle. And since the fecundity of nature is true and perfect and proper, therefore it has a true and proper emanation; and this is generation. Similarly we are to understand of spiration with respect to will. Hence the *reason* why these are truly in God is the true fecundity of nature and of will.

But if we speak as to the differing, it must be said that they differ *by themselves*, as has been shown, since every distinction in divine things comes from the modes of origin and relation. Hence just as two differences differ by themselves — as *rational* and *irrational* — so likewise in divine things these two emanations. And just as the differences of differences become known to us through other differences which arise from them, so also in divine things. For since generation and spiration are distinguished by themselves, there follow upon them, according to our mode of understanding, a twofold difference: *one*, since generation is from one, but spiration from two. For since generation is emanation by way of perfect assimilation, therefore it regards one principle; while spiration is emanation by way of connection, therefore it is from two. The *other* difference is in comparison to us. For since the Holy Spirit is spirated as connecting and so tending toward another, therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds as *donable*; the Son, however, is generated, and generation does not regard a third.

Through these differences there is necessarily elicited the *concomitance* of these emanations. For spiration gives [us] to understand generation in advance — since [persons] are not connected unless they are distinct and like, and so [unless they are] those of whom one is from the other by generation; — likewise generation gives [us] to understand spiration consequently, for it is necessary that the distinct and wholly like be conjoined by delightful love.

The arguments proving that they differ are therefore to be granted, as has been made plain in the [pro-]arguments; but those arguments are not taken *a priori*.

Some, however, have wished to assign other differences: certain ones say that they differ by the *power of spirating* and *of generating*; but this difference declares the unknown by what is more unknown. Others have said that the Son proceeds by way of *being*, the Holy Spirit by way of *well-being*; but these words are neither sound nor suitable to such matter.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected — whether the Father spirates insofar as he is one, etc. — it must be said that [he spirates] neither insofar as he is one, nor insofar as he is several, but insofar as he is *self-relating in one mode and another*; since he relates to the Son in one mode, to the Holy Spirit in another mode. This other-and-other mode of self-relating, however, is not repugnant to the unity of substance or person; but the Father and the Son spirate in this — that they are *one self-relating in one mode*. Hence it is that there is a twofold procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit from the Father, but the spiration or procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is one.

*To 2.* To what is objected — that nature and will in God are the same — it must be said that, although nature and will in God considered absolutely are the same, nevertheless something is regarded by *will-as-will* in the account of principle which is not regarded by *nature-as-nature*. And hence it is that, just as it does not follow that "the creature is from God by way of will, [therefore] for that reason it is also by way of nature," similarly, since nature and will are compared to these emanations under the account of principle, therefore nothing prohibits these emanations from differing, although nature and will are the same in substance.

*To 3.* To what is objected — that emanations differ by their terms — it must be said that this is true in lower things, where emanation signifies a being in potency and so something imperfect; but it is not true in God, since there [the emanations] do not signify a being in potency, nor anything imperfect; hence in divine things [the terms] are *not* the [first] reason of distinguishing. Yet if we wish to say that they differ by their term,

we will not take *term* for substance or essence, but for hypostasis, as was held above.

*To 4.* To what is asked — whether by themselves or by other things: it is plain, by themselves. And to that which is objected — that they do not have being from themselves, therefore neither [do they have] being-distinguished — it must be said that this does not hold in *original* being. For although differences have origin from the genus, yet they are not distinguished from the genus, but by themselves.

*To 5.* To what is objected — in what manner do they differ, by *substantial* or by *accidental* difference: it must be said that the division is insufficient, since in divine things there is the difference *of relations*, as Augustine says in book V *On the Trinity*, which is neither accidental nor substantial, but is rather called *original*.

*To 6.* To what is objected concerning creation, it must be said that *by reason of what is connoted* creation differs more; but *by reason of what is principally signified* they do not differ as much, since essence does not differ from person as much as person from person. Hence essence is predicated of person and does not in any way make any number; person, however, is distinguished from another person; and therefore the argument does not hold.

### Scholion.

**I.** In the solution of this subtle question the older Scholastics proceed by various paths. That the state of the question may be accurately discerned, it must be attended to that here we are dealing with *active generation and spiration*, not with passive. Hence this question differs both from the question on the difference between the second and third divine person (on which see above d. 9, q. 2), and from that question on what the *power of generating* is (d. 7, q. 1), with which, however, it coheres.

It is asked therefore in the first place, of what nature is the distinction between active generation and active spiration. First, with the common opinion, it is settled that it is not a distinction of mere reason, or according to the mode of speaking; in addition, in the *fundamenta*, it is asserted that these emanations *really* differ. The sense of this real distinction is explained by Bruliferus and Bartholomaeus de Barberiis (*Cursus Theologicus* disp. 12, q. 7, conclus. 3) as saying the same as the *formal distinction* of Scotus. Others understand it in the sense of *virtual distinction*. On this see further below at d. 26, q. 1, where in the Scholion the Seraphic Doctor's mind, after collating various places of his, will be explained. Let it suffice here to note that under this name we are not to understand a strictly real absolute distinction, but [a distinction] "according to a difference of origin and relation," i.e. "one is distinguished from the other not by an essential reality, but by a notional [reality]," as Richard says (here q. 3). Furthermore, it is plain that the Holy Doctor sometimes calls *real* every distinction greater than that of *reason reasoning [rationis ratiocinantis]*.

Then, with this difference of the two emanations supposed, it is asked again what is the reason of this difference; and since several reasons can be assigned, what is the *first* reason of it. In this second question lies the chief difficulty — so great that Aureolus with the Nominalists charges with rashness those who presume to investigate this. Augustine too, with the Master (here in the text), confesses his own ignorance on this point. Let us say briefly what other Scholastics teach on this difficulty.

**II.** The chief doctors, both ancient and modern, agree on some assertions, and differ on others. They agree (except for Durandus):

1. in this — that the radical reason of this diversity is to be placed in the differing account of the two productions, since the Son is produced by way of *intellect and nature*, the Holy Spirit by way of *will and liberality*. This St. Bonaventure teaches above d. 6, a. 1, q. 2; d. 10, a. 1, q. 1; here both in the *fundamenta* and in the *corpus*. — Theologians commonly, especially after the Council of Florence, teach that the *principium quod* of these emanations are the producing persons; the proximate *principium quo* of the first emanation is the divine essence with intellect, or *fecund memory* (as many speak with the Seraphic Doctor); but the *principium quo* of the second is the same essence with will, or *fecund will*.

2. The divine nature is communicated equally formally and *per se* to the Holy Spirit as to the Son. Although some contradict this position, it appears to be certain doctrine, which St. Bonaventure teaches especially d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. Whence it follows that the root of that difference is to be sought in the property of this twofold fecundity (cf. here q. 2, ad 1 and 2).

3. Several differences of these emanations can and ought to be assigned: namely the *difference of terms*, or of the persons emanated, which certainly are really distinguished; the *difference of principles*, both since generation is from one and spiration from two (here in the second *fundamentum* and in the corpus), and since the proximate *principium quo* is one and another (third *fundamentum*); finally there is the *difference in comparison to us* (in the corpus), since in the second emanation there is some special regard to the creature according to the aptitude of *donability*, on which see below d. 18, q. 2 and 3. Nor is there controversy about whether these differences subsist, but about which of them is the *first reason* and as it were *a priori*.

**III.** Theologians differ, however, on certain more particular determinations.

1. Durandus with some seems to admit no other difference except this — that generation proceeds from one, spiration from two — which opinion the Holy Doctor with the common [tradition] rightly opposes.

2. It is disputed whether, beyond the differences sought as it were extrinsically (whether *originally* from their principles, i.e. the producing persons, or *consequently* from their terms), these emanations also *intrinsically and formally (a priori) differ by themselves*, i.e. *by their own proper accounts*, in an analogous way to that in which ultimate differences (e.g. *rational* and *irrational*) differ. If this is affirmed, this difference must be called the *first* and as it were *formal*. The Holy Doctor affirms this in the *corpus* and *ad 4*. Among others Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla agree, and especially Scotus, who also adds: "they differ *by their wholes*." This last clause is explained by Scotists in this sense — that the two emanations have no common reality contractible by differences, although they agree in the common concept of *being* and *relation* (Rada, *Controversiae* 11, a. 2; Macedo, *Collationes* 7, diff. 2 — who keenly defends Scotus against the interpretation of him made by Cajetan). — St. Thomas in the *Summa* (I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 1) agrees with St. Bonaventure in teaching that they differ *by their own proper accounts*, which is the same as *to differ by themselves*, as Cajetan grants (on this place). But the same [Thomas], *De Potentia* q. 10, a. 2, does not admit this opinion; and on the other [opinion] — that they are distinguished *by their principles* — he judges thus: "It is not enough, unless something else is added"; finally he posits a third — that "the order of processions alone, which is attended to according to

origin, multiplies processions in divine things." In his *Commentary* (here q. 1, a. 2, ad ult.) the same [Thomas] against Bonaventure's argument from the vicious circle says: "What therefore is objected — that the relations follow upon the processions, whence it appears rather that diverse processions cause the diversity of relations, than conversely, or at least there will be a circle there — is to be answered: that relation in divine things has not only that it is *notion*, but also that it is *personal*, that is, constituting the person; and from this it has as it were the act of a *constitutive difference* and of *the proper form* of the very person, whose [act] is the operation of generating and of spirating; and therefore it is not unsuitable that, according to the account of relation, the relations follow upon the processions themselves and receive a difference from them; whereas insofar as they are the proper forms of the persons themselves, they cause the difference of the processions." How the various sayings of the Angelic Doctor are to be reconciled, is disputed, and Cajetan can be consulted (on q. 27, a. 4; q. 36, a. 2). Furthermore some of St. Thomas's reasonings are impugned by Scotus; on which see Rada and Macedo at the cited places. The same difficulty and a certain difference of opinion between the Seraphic and the Angelic Doctor returns below at d. 27, p. I, q. 2, where more will be said in the Scholion on this most subtle matter.

3. There is a different mode of speaking concerning the proper reason why procession *by way of nature* differs from the other *by way of will*. In the first, according to Bonaventure (here in corp.), there is "emanation by way of perfect assimilation," and earlier he says that through it the *image* proceeds. These words, if compared with the explanation of *image* which he gives at d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and with what is said at d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, clearly prove that the Seraphic Doctor agrees with the opinion of St. Thomas, who (S. I, q. 27, a. 4) teaches that in the first emanation there is the account of likeness *by force of the procession itself*, not in the second. Hence it follows that the opinion is wrongly attributed to the Seraphic Doctor, to which Richard (here q. 3) seems to incline — that this reason is to be sought in the fact that the Son receives only the *fecund will*, not *fecund nature*.

4. It is disputed whether it can be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds *necessarily* indeed but yet *freely*, which Sirmondus says with others — also St. Thomas, *de Potentia* q. 10, a. 2, ad 5 — who however in other places teaches that he proceeds *naturally*, although *by way of will*. Certainly this word *libere* is taken here not in the strict and now commonly received sense, but for *voluntarie*, insofar as it does not exclude the *necessarium*, as among very many ancient Fathers and doctors and even with St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.* d. 25, p. II, q. 2. Hence Rada (*Controversiae* 13) and Macedo (*Collationes* 7) rightly prove that this is rather a dispute over a name.

5. It is disputed whether the *Word* proceeds by an act of *speaking [dicere]*, as Scotus holds — to whom Bonaventure inclines — or by an act of *understanding [intelligere]*, as St. Thomas teaches with his [followers]. On this controversy see below d. 27, p. II, q. 1 and 3, and the Scholion.

**IV.** The sense of the response *to 4* here is this. Although these notional acts do not have being from themselves — i.e. *extrinsically* [do not have] distinction from their original principles — yet *intrinsically* they are distinguished by themselves. For the inference must be denied ("that does not hold") that in being arisen from another there cannot intrinsically be distinction. Thus *whiteness* and *blackness*, although they are from other causes, differ by themselves. The Holy Doctor himself sets the example of *ultimate differences*, which are distinguished by themselves "although they have origin from the genus." For the genus, which according to the Aristotelians contains in itself in potency the species and differences, is in some manner the principle of the differences. In the objection, then, there has been committed the *fallacy of figure of speech*, since the genus of one cause — namely the *efficient* — has been changed into another genus — namely the *formal*.

**V.** Besides the authors already cited, cf. Scotus, in both *scripta* here, q. unica. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 11, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Aegidius of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 60, q. 1, n. 36 ff.

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