Dist. 13, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/13/q/bon-sent-I-d13-dubia
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### Doubts on the Master's text.

### Doubt I.

In the present distinction there are doubts concerning the *littera*; and first, doubt is raised about Augustine's reasoning, which the Master sets down there: "*If the Holy Spirit were called Son, he would be called the Son of both*"; and his reasoning seems to make rather for the opposite than for the proposition — for from this [premise that the Spirit is from two] he would be more like generation in creatures, which is from two.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although there would be a greater likeness as to the *duality of the producers*, nevertheless as to the *mode of producing* there could be no likeness, since [otherwise] it would have to be the case that one of the persons was a passive principle; and as to this no likeness is possible.

### Doubt II.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*The same Holy Spirit proceeds in the manner of one given or of a gift*"; for this seems to speak ill, since, since he is *given* only in time, it appears that he proceeds only in time.

**I respond:** As will be plain below, if it is understood of *temporal* procession, *datus* signifies act; if of *eternal*, *datus* signifies aptitude.

### Doubt III.

Hence Augustine [replies] to Maximinus, who was reviving the aforesaid question. Maximinus was reviving the said question thus: "The Holy Spirit is God, and is not God by being-born: therefore he is not God naturally: therefore [he is so] adoptively." And that this argument is sound appears, since what is in something *naturally* is in it *from birth*: therefore what is not in it from birth is not in it naturally: therefore, since the Holy Spirit does not proceed *as one born*, being God is not in him from birth: therefore he is not God naturally.

And the response of Augustine to this is that this argument does not hold except in the case of those things which are *generated*, in others not. And this is plain, since Adam was a man by nature, just as each of us, and yet he had through *creation* what we have through *generation*; so God the Father communicates his nature to the Holy Spirit by *spiration*, just as to the Son by *generation*.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*The Father is the author of his procession*." For this seems to speak ill, since either *auctor* signifies the essence or [it signifies] a notion: not essence, since then it would be said of the Holy Spirit; if a notion, I ask, which? not unbegettability, since that does not signify a respect to procession; likewise, neither generation nor spiration, since [otherwise] nothing would have been said, as it appears. — Likewise it is asked, can the Father be called *author of [the] generation*? And that he cannot, appears: since the Father is called *author of the Son* — therefore, as Hilary said above and is held in d. 9, the sense is: "*that is, begetter of the Son*"; therefore then to say "he is author of the generation" would be the same as [to say] "begetter."

**I respond:** It must be said that *auctor* signifies in the Father the *fontal plenitude*, since he himself is not from another, but others are from him; and hence it signifies, as I believe, the same notion which *innascibilis* signifies, but in a different mode: since *innascibilis* signifies by privation of a prior, whereas *auctor* signifies the fecundity and plenitude with respect to those proceeding from him, which he has not from elsewhere; and therefore he is called *auctor* from *auctoritas* ("authority"). Now *auctoritas* is in the Father, since what he has, he does not have from another, and this is what *innascibilis* is; and so it is plain that he can be called *auctor* of all the persons that are from him. From these things the response is plain. For I say that [*auctor*] signifies the same notion as *innascibilitas*, but in another mode. Hence it is plain that the Son is never called *author of spiration*, although he spirates, since he does not have [it] *from himself* but *from another*; whence *auctor* is properly called *the principle of another which is itself not from another*.

### Doubt V.

Likewise, it is asked about what he says: "*To distinguish between that generation and this procession I do not know how*." For such ignorance appears to be a sin, since the distinction of persons is of the necessity of faith and of salvation; but he who is ignorant of those things which are of the necessity of faith, is damnably ignorant: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to know* is twofold, namely [to know] *that it is* and *as it is*. To know *that it is*: in this mode to believe the distinction with certitude is of the necessity of salvation, with *to know* taken broadly. But to know *as it is* does not pertain to the state of merit, but of reward; and of this knowledge speaks here the Master and Augustine. And note that he says three things: *I do not know* — as to the habit of knowledge; *I am not able* — as to ability of mind; *I do not suffice* — as to both.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise, an objection is raised about what he says: "*He is called* unbegotten *— not indeed in the Scriptures, but in the custom of disputants*." On the contrary, Dionysius: "*Nothing must be ventured to say of that supersubstantial and holy divinity beyond those things which have been made plain to us divinely from the sacred utterances*": therefore those who invented this name did wrong.

**I respond:** Although that word is not said in the Scriptures, yet the *understanding* of this word is said. And since the word is neither profane nor coupled with error — since the understanding of the word is had from Scripture and faith — it was not against right to attribute it to God, that by comparing we might more openly understand the Trinity itself.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise, it is asked about what the Master says: "*And in another way Augustine takes ingenitum: namely as that which is not from another, which he says belongs to the Father alone.*" But this does not appear true, since in this mode *ingenitum* belongs to the essence: therefore it is not proper to the Father.

**I respond:** It must be said that, although the Master expresses Augustine's meaning, yet not the whole of it. For *ingenitum*, insofar as it is said to be the property of the Father, deprives [him] of *being from another*; nor is this enough for it to be a notion, unless it consequently also says that *another is from him*; since, as was objected, *not to be from another* — or *not to be generated* — belongs [also] to the essence.

### Doubt VIII.

Likewise, against what Jerome says: "*[The Holy Spirit] is what is born and what is not made*," Arius objects that there are twelve modes of generation, on any one of which it follows that the Son is not only *born* but also *made*; and these modes he sets down disputing against Victorinus:

*The first* mode is by the flowing-down of a line from a point. *The second* is by the emission of a ray from the sun or from another luminous body. *The third* is by the sealing of a character, as a figure is made in wax by a seal. *The fourth* is by infusion, as when good will is given by God. *The fifth* is by the going-forth of a property or accident from the principles of the subject, which are matter and form. *The sixth* is by the abstraction of an intention or species, as the species of things are generated in the soul. *The seventh* is by excitation, as free will excited by grace proceeds into good works. *The eighth* is by transfiguration, as a statue is made from bronze, or as in the figure of an incision. *The ninth* is by production, as motion is produced by the unmoved first mover. *The tenth* is by the going-forth of species from genus, by differences dividing the genus and constituting the species. *The eleventh* is by *ideation*, as the exterior chest is from the chest which is in the mind of the craftsman. *The twelfth* is by being-born, as a man is generated from a man.

By whichever of the aforesaid modes the Son is generated, [says Arius,] he is not only *begotten* but also *made*.

To this the response is: either Arius takes *generation* commonly to created and divine, or specifically in the creature. If commonly, I say that he divides insufficiently, since beyond these modes there is the generation of the Son from the Father according to a singular mode, which is *of the whole substance of the begetter* — as was said above in the ninth distinction — where, since there can be no change, there can in no way be making. If, however, he divides generation as it is in creatures, it must be said that that division is still insufficient, since it omits *equivocal* generation, which is by putrefaction. But suppose that he comprehends it under the generation which is by being-born — yet still it does not avail for the proposition that, if [the Son] is not generated as a creature is said to be generated, then in no way is he generated. For although the creature is like to God, yet it is more *unlike* than like, as Augustine says in book XV *On the Trinity*, and Hilary similarly: "*Every comparison of lower things should be regarded as more useful to men than fitting to God*"; and therefore the heretics erred, since they believed that things are wholly in God just as they saw them in the creature. And this is well touched on in the *Gloss* on *first [Epistle] to the Hebrews*, where it is said: "*Temporal things cannot be compared to eternal things by an integral collation, but [only] by some slender likeness*"; and therefore, as was shown above, according to diverse conditions diverse generations represent that [generation]. For by reason of *conformity* [generation in God] is like the generation of a word from the mind; by reason of *co-eternity* like the generation of splendor from the sun or from light; by reason of *equality* [like the generation] of the living from the living.

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