Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/14/q/bon-sent-I-d14-a2-q2
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### Article II.
### Question II. *Whether the Holy Spirit is given by any holy man.*

Secondly, the question is asked whether the Holy Spirit is given by any holy man. And that He is, is proved in this way:

For the Holy Spirit to be given is nothing other than for grace-making-pleasing (*gratia gratum faciens*) to be given; but it is shown that for grace-making-pleasing to be given or infused by a man is *possible* and *fitting* and *true*.

**That it is possible:**

1. That it is *possible* is seen *from the lesser*: since it is of greater power to produce a substantial form than an accidental one; but grace is an accidental form: since therefore a creature has the power of producing a substantial form, much more does it seem so concerning grace, which is an accidental form.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems so *from a similitude*: since grace is a spiritual light; but we so see in corporeal light that something is a giver of light, something a receiver, something both giver and receiver: therefore if spiritual light is equally powerful, by parity of reasoning the same seems true of it. But the giver, since it is God, cannot be a receiver, because He receives nothing from anything: therefore this is to be found in a creature, that it both receives spiritual light, which is grace, and gives it; and so on.

3. Likewise, two things make a creature have the power of producing something like itself, namely *corruptibility*, on account of which it needs to be preserved in another, and *perfection in nature*, on account of which it can attain to a perfect act, which is to produce something like itself. «For each thing is called *perfect* when it can generate one like itself». If therefore grace is a form that very quickly corrupts, and a form of great perfection: therefore it ought to have the power of producing something like itself; but not in the subject in which it is: therefore in another.

4. Likewise, what can perfectly expel the contrary can perfectly engender the contrary habit, since the contrary is not perfectly expelled except by its contrary; but grace can perfectly expel guilt: therefore grace in a man can of itself generate grace; but not in the one in whom it inheres, therefore in another.

**That it is fitting:**

5. It is shown also that it is *fitting* that grace should proceed from one man to another. And it is shown thus: the ground of pride was the ground of losing grace; therefore from opposites, humbling is the ground of recovering it; but if grace is given by a man, the man is more humbled than if [it were given] only by God; for if it is given by a man, the man is humbled under God and under man, whereas if it is given by God alone, he is not humbled under both: therefore it appears that this mode is more fitting.

6. Likewise, if in the act of justice, which is punishment, the sinful soul is subjected to a corporeal creature, in order that it may be ordered in the universe: therefore in the act of mercy it ought to be subjected to some creature, in order that it may be re-ordered: therefore just as it receives punishment from some creature, so it seems fitting that it should also receive grace.

7. Likewise, a perfect agent not only gives the recipient the form, but also gives a like power; and this is for the manifestation of its power: therefore if God is the most noble agent and one who most ought to be praised in His action, it is fitting that He give not only the form of grace, but also the power of giving [it].

8. Likewise, just as being is from God, so also is well-being; but God is in no way derogated when He gives a creature the power of giving being: therefore He is in no way derogated when He gives the power of giving well-being, and therefore also of giving gratuitous being.

**That it is true:**

9. That it is *true* is shown because in the twentieth [chapter] of John the Lord said: *Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven them*, etc.

10. Likewise, in the Acts it is said that by the imposition of the hands of the Apostles the Holy Spirit was given, not by the imposition of the hands of others, as the Gloss says concerning the disciple Philip, in Acts 8: therefore some power was in the Apostles which was not in others; but by it the Holy Spirit was given: therefore the Holy Spirit was given by a man.

**Foundations to the contrary:**

Conversely it is shown that the gift of the Holy Spirit being given by a man is *false*, is *unfitting*, and is also *impossible*.

**That it is false:**

1. That it is *false* is seen through Augustine, in book fifteen *On the Trinity*: «No one of the disciples gave the Holy Spirit, but they prayed that He might come into a man».

2. Likewise, whoever gives or bestows anything has active power over it; but no man has power over the gift of the Holy Spirit: therefore etc.

**That it is unfitting:**

3. Likewise, that it is *unfitting* is seen because if the soul is graced by another than God, another than God falls as middle between the soul and God. But whenever something falls as middle between the soul and God, the soul of the man is perverse: therefore on this account, while grace would be given to the soul, it would be perverted.

4. Likewise, grace has power over free choice, therefore if a man could give grace, the man would have power over another's choice; but a choice that is subjected to another is not free: therefore such a giving would take away freedom.

5. Likewise, the greatest glory accrues to God from the justifying of the impious; but the greatest glory of God ought not to be communicated to another: therefore if it is communicated, divine glory is derogated; but if another than God gives grace, another than God justifies: therefore such a giving diminishes God's glory.

6. Likewise, it is just to hope in him who can give the merit of salvation; but if a man could give grace, he could give the merit of salvation: therefore it would be just

to hope in a man; but man is *vanity*: therefore such a giving would give confidence to vanity.

From these four middle terms it is plain that the giving of the Holy Spirit by a man takes away the order of the soul itself, takes away freedom, diminishes the glory of God, and induces vain confidence — all of which are unfitting.

**That it is impossible:**

7. It is shown also that it is *impossible* for such a power to be given to a creature: because, as Augustine says, «it is greater to make a pious man out of an impious one than to create heaven and earth». But the power of creating could not be received by a creature: therefore neither the power of giving grace.

8. Likewise, the production of grace by the presence of the agent is received by the soul; but God alone can flow into the soul: therefore God alone can infuse grace into the soul.

9. Likewise, grace is a form simple and deiform and spiritual, not having its origin from the principles of the subject: therefore since the rational soul, by reason of its deiformity and spirituality, cannot be except from God, it is plain that neither can grace, which is equally spiritual — nay rather, more spiritual than the soul itself.

10. Likewise, grace immediately unites to God: therefore it cannot be from God except immediately, therefore with no co-operator: therefore a creature cannot produce grace.

> **Conclusion.** The Holy Spirit cannot be given by a man as by an effective principle; He can however be given by him as by one preparing or impetrating.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as those last reasonings show, that grace or the Holy Spirit is given by a man as by an *effective* or *productive* principle is altogether false and impossible.

Yet for the understanding of the objections to the contrary it must be noted that grace is given by someone in three ways: either as *by one preparing*, whether by administering the Sacraments or by announcing salvific teachings; or as *by one impetrating*, whether through prayer or through good works; or as *by one producing*. In the first mode grace is given by good and bad alike; in the second mode only by the good; in the third mode only by God.

And from this the response to the last two arguments, which prove that the Holy Spirit is given, is plain — for there the giving is nothing other than preparation.

**To the objections:**

1. To that which is objected first, that a created agent can attain to a substantial form; I say that it cannot attain to every substantial form — for instance, to that which is deiform, as is the rational soul. And because grace is deiform, therefore it cannot be produced by such an agent. But if it argues from other natural forms, there is no place for an argument from the lesser.

2. To that which is objected concerning corporeal light, it must be said that it is not similar. For corporeal light is diffused through a conveying medium, and through the same medium that which is conveyed can be engendered again; but grace is not by conveyance, but by the inflowing of the agent and total absence of distance.

3. To that which is objected, that a corruptible creature ought to have a power of generating; it must be said that it is true of that which is corruptible *of itself*; but grace of itself is never corrupted nor grows old.

Or say: that this is not the whole cause, especially in those things which do not signify a complete substance, but rather a disposition.

4. To that which is objected, that grace can expel guilt; it must be said that to expel guilt is in two ways: either *effectively* or *formally*. What can expel effectively can effect grace; but it is not necessary that what [expels] formally [should do so], because that thing expels by itself. Since therefore grace expels formally, it is not necessary for it to generate another grace in the man.

5. To that which is objected, that in justification the sinner ought to be humbled; it must be said that it is true, because he ought to be humbled both under man and also under visible signs: yet otherwise than under God, since a different honor is due to God than to man; and therefore, because under God he is humbled as under the principle of salvation and the one by whom he is saved, he ought not to be humbled under a creature as one by which salvation is given to him, but as one by which salvation is administered.

6. And so the next [reply], concerning humbling in punishment, is also plain. For there is not a like case with that humbling, because there the perverse soul, *remaining* in its perversity, by reason of that is subjected to what is inferior by nature, or because it has the remnants of perversity; but in the giving of grace the perverse soul is changed from perversity and is ordered immediately to God.

7. To that which is objected, that a perfect agent gives the power of producing something like [itself]; it must be said that it is true, if the patient could fittingly receive [it]; but, as has been shown, on man's part it is not possible that such a power be received by him, on account of the nobility of such a form, which cannot be except from a most noble agent.

8. To that which is objected, that to give the power [unto] being does not derogate God; it must be said that the order [is in the nobility of creatures,][?] because some creatures are so noble that it does not befit them to be produced except by a most noble agent — as are those which are *to the image* [of God]. Since therefore grace is among the most noble things, it is plain that it cannot be produced by a man, just as neither can the being of the soul.

9. 10. Those which were objected last are resolved above by the threefold distinction of giving.