Dist. 17, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/17/q/bon-sent-I-d17-p1-a1-q1
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### Article Unique. *On the gift of the created habit of charity, whether it exists, and how it can be loved and known.*
### Question I. *Whether besides uncreated charity a created habit of charity must be posited.*

Concerning the first point, that no charity other than uncreated charity is to be posited — supposing the proof through the many authorities which the Master adduces in the *littera* — is shown by reasons; and first, by reasons drawn from the essence of charity, which is goodness, in this manner.

1. No accident is better than a rational substance; but charity is better than the rational soul, since it makes it better: therefore it is not an accident, therefore it is a substance. But it is established that it is not irrational, therefore rational, therefore either soul or angel or God; but neither soul nor angel: therefore God.

2. Likewise, no created goodness is equivalent to beatitude; but charity is equivalent to beatitude, because through charity a man merits, so as to be made worthy of eternal life or beatitude: therefore charity is not a created goodness: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every created good is good by participation; but every good which is good by another good can be understood as not good, and thus evil would fall upon it through the diminution of species, mode and order: therefore if charity is good with a created goodness, charity can be evil, or at least be understood as evil, or even become unformed; which is false.

Likewise, the same is shown by reasons drawn from virtue, thus.

4. The more virtuous a thing is, the fewer means it needs. Therefore if anything is most powerful, it needs no virtue other than itself: therefore if the Holy Spirit is of infinite power and is himself charity, then by himself, not by another, he inflames the affection to love: therefore there is no need to posit a created charity which would be a habit.

5. Likewise, natural virtue is more distant from God than the will; but God directs natural virtue by no other than himself: therefore if no medium falls there, neither will it fall in the will: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, where the virtue of the first mover, ever present and unable to err, moves, it is superfluous to add another virtue — as, for instance, if a hand were always joined to the rudder, there would be no need for another

virtue there; but the Holy Spirit is directing and assisting the will itself, and is always conjoined and unable to err: therefore it is superfluous to posit another charity; but everything superfluous is to be cut away: therefore etc.

Likewise, by reasons drawn from the act, the same is shown.

7. Because the act of charity is to recreate the soul; but it is no less a work of virtue to recreate than to create, therefore if to create is from the uncreated alone, which is of infinite power, then to recreate is also; but this is proper to charity: therefore charity is uncreated.

8. Likewise, an act of charity is to unite; but no creature is united to truth through vanity, but every creature is vanity: therefore no creature is the medium of uniting [us] to God: if therefore charity is the medium of uniting, then it is neither vanity nor a creature.

9. Likewise, the act of charity is to love each thing in due order: therefore if to love in due order is to love each thing according to what befits it, since the uncreated good is better than the created infinitely, then it is itself infinitely more lovable: therefore if charity makes one love God as he is to be loved, charity makes one love God infinitely; but what goes out into an infinite act is uncreated: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Charity is the principle of reforming the soul as to the power of the will; but the soul, as to the other powers — namely the irascible and the rational — is reformed through created virtues: therefore by parity of reasoning so also is the concupiscible; but its reformation is charity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, where there is reformation, there is conformation and information; and where there is information, there is something informing, which has itself after the manner of a form; but every form of a created thing is created; for God is the perfecting form of nothing: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, charity is the principle of living; whence Hugh of St. Victor: «I know, my soul, that love is your life»; but every life, existing by participation in something, is from something informing, out of which and the vivifiable a unity is made; but out of God and the soul a unity cannot be made: therefore it is necessary to posit in the soul some created charity, which vivifies.

4. Likewise, everything that is in something capable of dying is in it through some separable thing; but the life of grace is in the soul which is capable of dying the death of fault: therefore through some separable thing; but this is not God, since it is impossible for God's presence to be separated from anything: therefore it is something created.

5. Likewise, charity is the principle of making pleasing; but making-pleasing is that in which the good is distinguished from the evil, the just from the impious, not only in act, but also in rest, as a child or an adult sleeping: therefore, since the distinction of good from evil is not through uncreated goodness, because that is common to all, charity bespeaks something created. And again, since the distinction of those at rest is not through act or use, but through habit, it is plain that charity bespeaks a created habit.

6. Likewise, charity is the principle of meriting; but it is not because we do good things that we are good, but rather conversely: therefore charity first makes [a man] good, before it elicits an act; but when someone from not-good becomes good, it is necessary that something be placed in him anew, and this cannot be the act: therefore a habit.

7. Likewise, God cooperates in a meritorious operation in another mode than in a natural one, because if not in another mode, then the error of Pelagius returns, that man could merit from his natural [powers]; if therefore in another mode — since by uncreated virtue he cooperates with every nature — it is necessary that in a created meritorious operation he cooperate by means of another virtue; but this can only be created: therefore etc.

8. Likewise, it seems that the Master erred, because he who divides the works of the Trinity is a heretic; but the Master held that the charity by which we love God is the Holy Spirit properly: therefore he holds that our loving — which is an effect in the creature — is of the Holy Spirit alone; and thus he divides the works of the Trinity.

9. Likewise, he who says that something created is uncreated errs; but the charity by which we love God and neighbor, as is commonly held, is something created: yet the Master said this to be the Holy Spirit: therefore he erred.

> **Conclusio.** Besides uncreated charity there must be posited a charity which is a created habit informing the soul.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that for the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that on this matter there is and from of old has been a twofold opinion. The opinion of certain ones — the Master and his followers — is that the Holy Spirit is essentially the charity by which the Father and the Son love us, and also by which we love God.

And some have wished to say that the meaning of this position is this: For they say that, just as light can be considered in three ways, namely in itself, and in the transparent, and at the boundary of a terminated translucent body — in the first mode it is *lux*, in the second *lumen*, in the third the hypostasis of color — so the Holy Spirit can be considered in himself, and thus he is the love of the Father and of the Son; he can again be considered as inhabiting the human soul, and thus the Holy Spirit is called grace; he can also be considered as united to the will, and thus he is the charity by which we love God. Whence they say that the Holy Spirit is our charity, not by appropriation, but by union. For just as the Son alone is man, or is incarnate, and yet the whole Trinity wrought the incarnation, but only the Son was united: so, although the whole Trinity makes the union of the Holy Spirit with the will, yet the Holy Spirit alone is united to the will, and therefore he alone is charity.

The reason moving them to posit this is the authority of the Apostle, in the first to the Corinthians, [chapter] six: *He who clings to God is one Spirit*; and also a likeness. For they say that, just as the Son proceeds by way of nature and so is united to nature, so the Holy Spirit by way of will, and therefore is unitable and united to the will. And because the will is changeable, not so nature, therefore the Holy Spirit is united separably, but the Son inseparably, and thus in a far inferior mode than the Son; and to those to whom he is so united, he by himself makes [them] love.

But this position cannot stand, because the Holy Spirit is not unitable; and besides, if he were unitable, it would be either by nature or by grace. Not by nature, therefore by grace: therefore there would still need to be a habit of grace disposing the soul to the reception of such a union; and so the contrary returns. For this reason I do not believe that the Master held this opinion in this way.

And on this account it must rather be said that the [phrase] *that by which we love God* can be taken in three ways: either as that by which we love **effectively**, and thus charity or love is of the whole Trinity, and of the Holy Spirit by appropriation; or as that by which we love **exemplarily**, and thus the Holy Spirit, who is the union of the Father and the Son and the bond of both, is the unity to the imitation of which charity binds us, according to what the Lord says, John seventeen: *That they may be one, as we also are one*; or as that by which we love **formally**, and thus, according to the opinion of the Master, it is the affection of the soul.

And in all these things he spoke truly and did not err, but fell short; because besides this there is to be posited a charity according to the common opinion, which is a created habit informing the soul. And the reason for this is taken from the side of its essence, of its virtue, and of its operation.

From the side of essence, because charity is the goodness of the rational creature, perfecting and distinguishing it, ordering and disposing it to eternal life: therefore it is necessary that it be its formal perfection.

*Ad 1.* To that which is objected first, that charity is better than the rational soul; it must be said that there is no comparison there, because where one [thing exists] for the sake of another,

there is only one; whence the one having charity is good on account of charity. Or there is no comparison there, because "good" is not said uniformly. For the rational substance is called good because it is orderable to an end, and charity is called good because it orders.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that it is equivalent to beatitude; it must be said that it is equivalent according to divine estimation, which reckons the work of charity worthy of eternal life or of so great a reward.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that if it is good by participation, then its goodness is changeable into unformedness; it must be said that something is called good by participation in two ways: either because it is participating and ordered, or because it is the participation and the ordering. In the first way, the one having charity is good; in the second way charity itself: and therefore it can not-be, because it is not the very essence of goodness, but a participation; nevertheless, as a being it cannot fail to be good or ordered, because it is itself the order of love. Whence it is to be solved with regard to that point by a distinction; and thereby the reasons drawn from essence stand answered.

From the side of virtue also it is necessary to posit charity as a created habit. For the charity by which we love God is a virtue, not only because God cooperates with us, but also because our will cooperates with God: *for we are God's fellow-workers*; and because, when we cooperate with God, we must be conformed to him, it is necessary that from that supreme charity there be left in us some exemplate in our affection, by which it may be moved in conformity to it. For the will is free and naturally moved to opposites: and so the virtue of created charity is posited in us, not because of any defect on the side of God working with us, but on the side of our will cooperating with him.

*Ad 4.* To that which is objected, that the most powerful virtue does not need a mediating virtue, this is true; but charity is not [posited] because of any need of that virtue, but rather of the receiving will, which needs some disposing habit.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected, that God cooperates with nature without created virtue; it must be said that God governs nature as he instituted it, and nature runs uniformly; and therefore it does not need anything to regulate it. It is not so with the will, which is moved unevenly; and therefore it needs some habit regulating and disposing it. Or it must be said that the case of nature and of will differs; because nature is moved only on its own level, or below, but the will above: and therefore it needs something elevating it.

*Ad 6.* To that which is objected, that the virtue of the first mover is present; it must be said that presence does not suffice, but it is necessary that the recipient of the influence have aptitude and conformity; and this is through created virtue.

From the side of operation also a necessity is posited, because reformation or recreation, union and love are not only from something as from an efficient [cause], but also as from an informing [cause]. But the informing charity is created; and from this the objections from the side of act or operation stand answered.

*Ad 7.* For as to what is objected, that recreation is from the uncreated; this is true by way of efficient [cause], as is creation also; but reformation furthermore leaves a form behind; and therefore it is necessary to posit an informing habit.

*Ad 8.* To that which is objected, that vanity does not unite to truth; it must be said that grace can be considered insofar as [it is] from nothing, and thus it is vanity, and thus does not unite; or insofar as it is an influence according to the divine presence, and thus it has an express likeness of truth, and in that mode unites.

*Ad 9.* To that which is objected, that charity makes [one] love God as far as he is to be loved, etc.; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: either as far as God ought to be loved in himself, and thus it is false, since, since he is an infinite good, he ought to be loved infinitely, and in that mode God alone loves himself; or as far as he is to be loved by this [creature], and thus it is true, and then [charity] loves infinitely, not simply, but according to the estimation of the one having charity. For charity loves God so much more than created good, that even if created good were multiplied to infinity, it would still love God more.

**To the arguments to the contrary:** What is objected to the contrary is to be conceded, except for the last two, which show that the Master erred.

*Ad 8.* As to what then is objected, that he divides the works of the Trinity; it must be said that this is false, because [the saying] that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God, was either said by appropriation, or by union, or certainly by exemplarity; and thus all the authorities which the Master adduces for himself are to be understood;

speaking *formally*, however, they are not to be understood as true, nor do I believe that the Master so understood them.

*Ad 9.* And by this the other point also stands clear, namely that the Master does not say that the created is uncreated, but that the uncreated gift suffices without the created; and in this there was not error, but only a defect.