Dist. 17, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/17/q/bon-sent-I-d17-p1-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt about this consequence: *He who loves the neighbor, it consequently follows that he loves the love itself.* For this consequence appears not to hold. For although it is possible that love be loved, yet it is not necessary that someone love it; for many things we frequently love which we would not wish to love.

Likewise there is doubt about this consequence: *He who loves love, it consequently follows that he loves God;* because [the proposition] is taken either of uncreated [love] or of created. If of created, it has no force: he loves something created, therefore something uncreated; if of uncreated, then it accords in nothing with the prior statement, because the love by which we love the neighbor is a created love.

**I respond:** It must be said that both consequences are good in the matter proposed. For there is a certain love in which there is no rest nor delight nor complacence — such, for instance, as that which is from the proneness of corruption, to which reason resists. But there is another love which is with delight, complacence and rest; and in such love there is acceptance not only of the thing loved, but rather also of the love itself; and such love is charity, and therefore it follows: he who loves the neighbor loves the love, that is, accepts [it].

But since it well follows: he who accepts something from itself, much more accepts that in which is found the ground of acceptance; if love, by the very fact that it is love, is accepted, a greater love is more accepted. Since therefore our love is an exemplated love, and the divine love is the exemplar of every right love, and in it is the first and supreme ground of all acceptance: hence it is that it follows that he who loves love loves God. Whence Augustine argues from this supposition, that charity itself or the love of the neighbor is love with acceptance; and from this the first consequence holds; and from another supposition, that the first ground of acceptance is in exemplating love, not in exemplated love; and from this the second is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Behold, you can already have God more known than your brother.* For it appears false, because in the last [chapter] of First Timothy it is said of God, that *he dwells in inaccessible light*. Furthermore, of one's brother one knows *what he is*; but of God one does not know *what he is*, but only *whether he is*; he himself, however, does not speak as to the cognition *whether he is*.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to be known more certainly is twofold, since the certitude of cognition is according to presence; but something is more present in two ways: either with respect to the ground of being knowable, or with respect to substance. With respect to substance, God is more present to any thing whatever than any other thing is; with respect to the ground of knowing, however, this is twofold: either on the side of the knowable, as the sun is present to the blind man, and yet the blind man is absent from the light; thus God is more present than the brother; but if on the side of the knower, thus the brother is more present, because he is present to the eyes of the flesh, whose cognition flourishes according to the present state.

It can be said otherwise, that something is more present in two ways in the ground of being knowable: either according to effect, or according to itself. According to itself the brother is more known; according to *effect* God is more known. For the divine effect, which is love, enters the soul itself and is present to it and is more known than the brother.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that word of the canonical [Letter] of John, chapter four, which is in the text: *He who loves abides in light.* For it appears improperly said, because light

regards cognition, as heat [regards] affection: therefore he ought rather to say *abides in heat* than *abides in light*.

**I respond:** It must be said that it belongs to light to manifest. But to manifest something to someone is twofold: either as the way of things to be known, or as the way of things to be done. The first is by knowledge, and against this light is opposed the darkness of simple ignorance; the second is by grace, whence: *The unction shall teach you concerning all things*; and against this is the darkness of malice or sin; and of this light and of these darknesses speaks the blessed John, as is plain in the text, and Ecclesiasticus eleven: *Error and darkness are created together with sinners.* And since charity is always with grace, but other virtues not, therefore he says: *He who loves, abides in light*, by appropriation.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *in the divine gifts nothing is greater than charity*. For it appears to say falsely, because the gift of wisdom is set down as most excellent among all the gifts; or, if charity and wisdom are the same, charity does not retain a prerogative among the gifts. Likewise it is asked of the consequence: if charity is the chief among the gifts of God, and nothing is greater than the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is charity. Either therefore he speaks of created charity, or of uncreated; if of uncreated, then he proves the same by the same; if of created, then no consequence appears, because it does not hold, that if a created charity is the greater among created gifts, then it is the Holy Spirit.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid authority of Augustine can be understood of charity created and uncreated; and for both it has truth. If of uncreated, it is certain; if of created, it is the greatest among the gifts, because it has more in itself of the ground of goodness, or of goodness itself, than any [other] gift, speaking precisely. For there are certain gifts which are without charity; and this indeed is certain, that they are lesser. There are certain ones which presuppose charity, such as the gift of wisdom. For charity it is that gives sense to taste, that eternal goods may have savor for it. Whence wisdom superadds a certain further capability, which compared to charity is a lesser good, but inasmuch as it includes charity, it is a greater good by reason of that which it presupposes. And so it is plain, that charity, precisely speaking, is the most excellent gift; but wisdom, presupposing or implicating the gift of charity, is called the most excellent.

To that which is objected concerning the consequence, it must be said, that in either way it is good. For if it is understood of uncreated charity, if it is the first and chief gift, and the Holy Spirit is of this kind: it is necessary that it be the Holy Spirit, because what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone. But if of created charity; then the consequence of Augustine is to be understood from the side of the name thus: if created charity is the greatest among created gifts, and the Holy Spirit is the greatest of gifts: therefore he is better named by the name of the most excellent gift than by another. Consequently, then, the Holy Spirit is charity, but not created, but rather that [charity] which is God.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *It was not at all said in this manner, that the substance of God is our patience.* For it appears to speak ill, because the charity by which we love God is not God himself, unless we understand by which we love exemplarily or causally: therefore, since it is similar concerning patience, it appears that Augustine wrongly destroys that similarity. Likewise, since God makes us loving, just as he makes us patient, why is God not called our charity, just as our patience?

**I respond:** It must be said that God is charity both essentially and causally: essentially, because in himself he is love; causally, because he effects love in us. But God is not patience essentially, but only causally; and therefore Scripture, hinting at this diverse mode, says God to be our patience, and God to be charity without addition. The reason for this is that certain habits state incompletion, like patience, hope, and the like, which do not fall in God by essence, but by cause, because such things are from God. But there are certain habits

stating completion, and such are in God essentially, like charity and wisdom and such. Yet it must be noted that Augustine wishes to say that God is charity essentially, but he does not wish to say that he is our charity essentially, but causally and exemplarily. Nor is he our patience in this way exemplarily. For although all virtues have a cognoscitive exemplar in God and all have an exemplar according to a remote likeness, yet certain virtues do not have something corresponding to them in God in every respect, as patience, which states two things, namely passion and the bearing-up-over passions. With respect to the first, it has no correspondent in God; but only with respect to the second. But charity has love in God corresponding to it in every respect, and love not only essential, but also personal: and therefore the authorities say, that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God; and the ablative *qua* states a relation not only of efficient, but also of formal cause, not perfecting but exemplating.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the gift of charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition*. For it appears to speak ill, because either he speaks of division with respect to cognition, or with respect to truth. If with respect to truth, this is false, because they differ not only in charity, but also in gratuitous faith and hope; if with respect to cognition, then it does not divide at all, because it is not known who has this gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that all gifts of the virtues can be unformed except charity. And since they can be unformed, they can be in the just and in sinners, and therefore in them they are never separated from one another. But charity can never be unformed nor be with sin, because its act is to love God for his own sake and above all things, which act is removed by every sin. Therefore Augustine says, that charity alone distinguishes, speaking of distinction in the universal.

To that which is objected concerning gratuitous or formed faith, I concede that it distinguishes; but yet this it has not because [it is] faith, but because [it is] gratuitous; and so from this, that it is joined to charity; and so that is plain.

### Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *If I shall have delivered my body so that I burn* etc. For it appears to speak ill, because the Lord says, John fifteen: *Greater love than this no one has, that he lay down his soul* etc.: therefore if this is the greatest work of charity, it is impossible that it be done without charity.

**I respond:** Some say, that the Apostle speaks by an impossibility; for granting still, that someone should suffer this penalty without charity for Christ, still it would not profit him. Yet I believe, that some by an industry of natural [powers] and some grace gratuitously given could sustain death for the faith of Christ even without charity, just as the heretic sustains [it] through error. And as to what the Lord says, that this is of the highest charity, he says this with respect to sign and exterior showing; yet signs are fallible, and therefore it is not necessary, that if someone sustains death for Christ or for his faith, he have charity. Yet I believe, that if someone should sustain death for Christ, who did not have a great obstacle, that he would dispose himself to the reception of grace, so that charity would be given to him.

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