Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/17/q/bon-sent-I-d17-p2-a1-q1
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### Article Unique. *On the augmentation of charity.*
### Question I. *Whether charity can be augmented according to substance.*

As to the first [question], it is shown that charity can be augmented according to substance:

1. By Augustine to Boniface: «Charity merits to be augmented, that, having been augmented, it may merit to be perfected».

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason: the charity of the way is according to substance lesser than the charity of the homeland; but from the charity of the way it happens that one comes to the charity of the homeland, the same being preserved in being, since *the charity of the way never falls away*; but motion from a lesser to a greater, with the thing preserved, is augmentation: therefore it happens that charity is augmented.

3. Likewise, it is established that to different [persons] greater and lesser rewards are given; whence the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 15: *One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon* etc.; and it is established that to one and the same [person] according to different states a different reward — namely greater and lesser — is owed; but the magnitude of the substantial reward corresponds to the quantity of charity, not according to fervor, but according to substance: therefore if it happens that a greater reward is owed to someone, then also that charity is augmented substantially.

4. Likewise, it happens that charity is bettered, since it is not the highest good; but charity is good substantially: therefore it happens that charity becomes better according to its own substance. But, as Augustine says in the sixth book *On the Trinity*, chapter eight: «In spiritual things the same thing is greater and better»: therefore, since charity is something spiritual, it is possible that it itself be made greater according to substance.

5. Likewise, it is established that in one and the same [subject] charity can [tend] to a greater effect and act: therefore, since the greaterness of the effect comes from the magnitude of the virtue [or power], it is possible that charity be made greater according to virtue. Then I ask: either charity is its own virtue, or not: if so, then with the virtue augmented, it is necessary that the essence of charity be augmented; if not, then I ask about that virtue: either it has an essence, or not; if so, similarly I ask about it: therefore there will either be a regress to infinity, or it is necessary to posit that something is augmented according to substance; but for whatever reason another virtue [is so augmented], so also is charity.

**On the contrary:** 1. Charity is a form; but every form consists in an invariable essence: therefore so does charity also; but nothing invariable according to essence is augmented according to essence: therefore neither is charity.

2. Likewise, where there is augmentation, there is greater and lesser; but where there is simplicity, there is no greater and lesser: if therefore charity is a simple form and not extended, in charity there will be no augmentation.

3. Likewise, augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, and not according to substance: therefore by parity of reasoning so also in spiritual things: therefore if charity is augmented, this is only according to accident, not according to substance.

4. Likewise, what is augmented is changed, and what is augmented according to substance is changed according to substance; but what is substantially changed is other now than before: therefore what is augmented according to substance does not remain: if then *charity never falls away* except through sin, but always remains, therefore it is not augmented.

> **Conclusio.** Charity can be augmented according to substance, that is, according to the quantity of virtue.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that according to the common opinion it is true that charity is augmented substantially.

For the understanding of the objections, however, certain people distinguish augmentation according to a twofold difference. For augmentation occurs when greater succeeds lesser; this, however, can be in two ways: either thus, that the very same thing which earlier was lesser, afterward becomes greater, as a man is said to be augmented, or any other quantum, and in this mode charity is not augmented, as they say; or in the sense that greater succeeds lesser, not the same in number, but similar in form, as the days are said to be augmented — not because the same day is first lesser and afterward greater, but because greater succeeds lesser; and thus they say charity is augmented, and through this they can evade the objections.

But this position, as has been proved above, cannot stand. For it has been shown that, with charity remaining the same, it happens that increase and perfection occur with respect to the same.

And therefore it must rather be said that augmentation follows quantity. But quantity is said in two ways, namely properly and metaphorically: properly the quantity of mass is so called, and this is in bodily things; metaphorically the quantity of virtue, and this is in spiritual things. Likewise also augmentation is said in two ways: properly, namely according to magnitude of mass, and metaphorically according to quantity of virtue. Since therefore in charity there is quantity of virtue, and not at the highest [degree], it is constant that charity can be augmented. Again, since virtue is the same as the substance of charity, and the quantity of virtue is [there], hence it is that of necessity it follows that charity is augmented according to substance; for since it is a virtue, its substance is not other than the virtue.

1. To that which therefore is objected to the contrary, that the essence of a form is invariable; it must be said that this is true of a *universal* form; but if it be said of a *singular* form, it is true considered in itself, but not as it is in another.

2. To that which is objected, that simplicity does not admit magnitude; it must be said that this is true: it does not admit magnitude of mass, but it does admit magnitude of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, the response is plain. For quantity of mass is an accident, essentially differing from the [thing] quantified; but it is not so in things quantified by quantity of virtue — rather, the quantity of virtue is essential, as has been proved in the objection.

It can however be said that when it is said that the motion of augmentation in bodily things is motion according to accident, this [word] *according to* can be taken in two ways: either as expressing the relation of the term *per se*, or of the formal term — and thus indeed the term of augmentation is the perfected quantity; or in such a way that it expresses the term *per accidens*, and in this mode augmentation *per accidens* regards substance. Which is plain. For when a greater quantity is added to a lesser, unless this happens through rarefaction or through extension, it is necessary that substance be added, in which that quantity may be; and so augmentation has more of substance, and so consequently it terminates at substance even in bodily things.

4. And through this is plain what is objected: that what is changed according to substance is one thing and another; this is true, if it expresses the formal term; but it does not so express it.

To that which is objected: that what is augmented according to substance is also changed according to substance; it must be said, since for a thing there is not only substantial being, but also perfect being. To be changed therefore according to substance can be in two ways: either with respect to being simply, and thus the changed thing is one thing and another; or with respect to perfect being, and thus it is the same, because when from imperfect there comes-to-be perfect, it is not another, but the same. Hence it is that charity, although it is substantially augmented, is not other, but the same according to substance; whence the objection has no force.