Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/17/q/bon-sent-I-d17-p2-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *How charity is augmented.*

Secondly, it is asked concerning the mode of the augmentation of charity itself. And that its augmentation is from elsewhere is shown:

1. Through Augustine, who says that "charity merits to be augmented": but what someone merits, he has from another rather than from himself: therefore if charity merits augmentation, it has it from elsewhere.

2. Likewise, that it is augmented through apposition is seen through the definition of augmentation: "for augmentation is the addition to a pre-existing quantity": therefore where there is augmentation, there is the apposition of something of the same kind, and where there is apposition, there is addition: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is seen to be demonstrable through a likeness, since charity is in the soul as light is in the air; but light in the air is augmented by the addition of new light, as is evident if to one illuminating candle another supervenes: therefore likewise it will be in charity with respect to the soul.

4. Likewise, this is seen through the principle of augmentation, since each thing both is, is nourished, and is augmented from the same things: therefore in like manner charity has its being generated, conserved, and augmented; but it is generated in us by divine influence: therefore also by the same, when greater, it is augmented; but where there is greater influence, something more flows in than before; and where this is the case, there is addition: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. The heat of spiritual love is of greater power than material fire; but fire is augmented by itself: therefore so also is charity, which is spiritual fire.

2. Likewise, that it is not by apposition is seen, because if a simple is added to a simple, nothing greater is produced, neither in mass nor in power, as if a point [were added] to a point: therefore neither, if charity be added to charity, will it be greater.

3. Likewise, if something is added, since composition follows upon addition, and upon greater composition the diminution of power: therefore the greater the addition becomes, the more impotent charity is made, and the more impotent, the less: therefore since the augmentation of charity is in respect to power, charity is not augmented through addition.

4. Likewise, if something is added to a prior charity, either what is added is charity, or it is not; if not: therefore it does not augment charity; but if it is charity; charity, however, is not material with respect to charity: therefore since from any two things one is not made, unless one be material with respect to the other, from a pre-existing charity and a superadded one no one is made; but for augmentation it is necessary that one be made from the augmenting and the augmented: therefore in no way is it augmented through addition.

> **Conclusion.** *Charity is augmented by divine power through apposition or the increase of greater influence.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter there were two opinions. One is, that the augmentation of charity is through purification or through the lack of admixture with its contrary. Now the contrary of chaste love is the love of concupiscence; whence the more concupiscence is extinguished in us, the more charity is purified; and the more it is purified, the more it is assimilated to God and approaches its term; and the more it approaches, the more it is augmented. And these have posited that charity can be augmented of itself through habituation in the good and the weakening of concupiscence. The reason that moved them was the authority of the Philosopher, who says that forms are intensified through approach to their term and lack of admixture with the contrary. There was also together with this the authority of Augustine, who says in the book of the Eighty-three *Questions*, that as concupiscence is diminished, so charity grows; and such an augmentation through greater purification is not repugnant to a simple thing.

But this position is not fitting, since it is constant that charity is greater and lesser, with all concupiscence removed, as in the first man and also in the Angels; therefore since it is wholly without admixture there, in any Angel and even in the state of innocence it would be at its highest, which it is foolish to say. Hence it is not to be said that according to the remission of concupiscence it is augmented according to substance; it must be conceded, however, that according to the remission of concupiscence it is intensified through fervor. And in this way Augustine understands [it]; and in this way the Philosopher also speaks of forms with respect to intensification, not with respect to augmentation.

Another position is, that charity is augmented through apposition; and a likeness of this is had in light, which is expressly assimilated to charity. Hence as a greater light, added to a lesser, augments it, so charity superadded augments a lesser one. And this position holds that charity is not augmented by its own power, but by divine [power]. For the principle of augmenting and of generating is the same. Hence as it has its origin from God alone, so also its augmentation.

1. From this is evident what is objected through the likeness in fire. For fire has the power of producing itself in another and of augmenting; not so charity.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that charity is simple; it must be said that although charity is simple, since it does not have quantitative parts in the quantity of mass, yet it has [parts] in the quantity of power, and with respect to that it can be augmented. If it be objected concerning a point, that it has quantity of power and yet is not augmented; it must be said that for something to be apt to be augmented through the apposition of a similar quantity, two things are necessary, namely quantity and unibility. Now unibility comes from imperfection; for to a perfect [thing] as such no addition is possible: therefore no addition can be made to a point. Although, then, a point may have quantity of power, yet it does not have unibility, since it is something perfect in its kind.

It can be said otherwise, that a point is the most simple in the kind of quantity of mass, and therefore it is infinite in power; but no charity is most simple in the kind of virtual quantity except the divine, and therefore that is infinite; and since that cannot be augmented through addition, neither can the power of a point. And if you object to me that the power of a point is created, therefore it is not infinite; it must be said that since a point is most simple in its kind, not absolutely, therefore it does not have infinite power absolutely, but in [its] kind in respect of lines. Moreover, a point is not wholly act, but a terminus in respect of lines; therefore it does not have infinite active power, but passive, since a point is not properly said to be able to produce lines, but it can be set as the terminus of a line; and this is not unfitting to posit in a creature: therefore the power of a point is not augmentable, as the power of charity is.

3. To that which is objected, that the more something is composed, the more impotent it is; it must be said that this, taken generally, is false. On account of this it must be distinguished, that there are material parts, and there are formal parts, which give act and power to the whole. "Simple" therefore can rather be said by the privation of material parts; and then the proposition has its truth, since such parts give being-acted-upon rather than acting; whence the more something is removed from matter, the more powerful. But if it is called more simple because it has fewer formal or active parts, it is false, since then a smaller fire would be more powerful than a greater one. Then likewise a syrup composed of few [ingredients] would be more potent than one which consists of many; both of which are false: and therefore also the aforesaid proposition [is false], since both pre-existing charity and the supervening one each have the character of an active [principle].

It can however be answered otherwise according to truth, that augmented charity is not more composite, but rather more simple; and this is evident thus: because it is in a contrary mode in the quantity of mass and [in] the quantity of power. In the quantity of mass the most simple is the least, as a point; and therefore in this kind of quantity the approach to simplicity is through diminution, and recession on the contrary through addition. In the quantity of power, however, the most simple is the greatest; and therefore the approach to simplicity is through addition; and hence it is, that augmented charity is purer and simpler and more like to God. Nor let it seem that this is unfitting, since to add purity and simplicity and spirituality to something does not cause recession from simplicity, but rather approach.

4. To that which is objected, whether one is made from them; some say that — as different lights in the air are distinct and unconfused, and yet render one greater light on account of their concurrence in one receptacle, so in spiritual light, which is grace or charity — that they are essentially distinct yet make one greater [light] by moving the power of free choice.

But yet that is not similar, since the distinction of luminaries in the air comes from the part of diverse origins, as for instance when there are several luminous bodies; not so is it in grace. And therefore it must be said, that from them one is made.

To what is asked, [namely] that which has the character of a material; it must be said that augmentation occurs to be made in two ways: either through the power of the augmentable itself, as is evident in an animal; and then the augmentable has itself in the character of formal and active, the augmenter in the character of material and passive. It also occurs that augmentation is made through an extrinsic power, with mere possibility and unibility existing in the augmentable; and then the augmentable, since imperfect, has itself in the character of passive, the augmenter, since perfecting, in the character of formal and completive, since it gives the perfect quantity.

To that, then, which is objected, that one is not in potency to another; it must be said, that it is not in potency to conversion, but is in potency to union; and this potency is in charity by reason of its imperfection; for since it is imperfect, therefore it is capable of being perfected and therefore unible to the thing perfecting [it]. Hence it does not have a possibility for that which is added insofar as it is charity, but insofar as it is imperfect; and thus that is evident.