Dist. 17, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/17/q/bon-sent-I-d17-p2-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether charity can be diminished.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether charity can be diminished. And that it can, it seems:

1. Through the nature of its opposite, thus: as Augustine says: "The poison of charity is cupidity"; whence he also says, that "where there is great cupidity, there is little charity," and in the book of the *Confessions*: "He loves you less who loves anything together with you, that he does not love on account of you." If therefore it happens that cupidity is not only remitted but also augmented, by the contrary it happens that charity is diminished.

2. Likewise, the venial [sin] is an evil; but nothing is an evil, except what takes away something from a good: therefore the venial takes away something. But natural aptitude is of much greater inherence than charity: therefore since the venial takes away from natural goodness, therefore it takes also from charity, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of its subject; because just as it happens that a human being makes progress, so also retreats; but through the progress of free choice it happens that in us charity is augmented, while there is ascent toward perfection: therefore since it happens by the same steps to return to imperfection, it happens that charity is diminished.

4. Likewise, every thing which by its disabling at the term is the cause of corruption, by its disabling on this side of the term is the cause of diminution: but free choice disabled through aversion is the cause of corruption of charity: therefore its disabling under God is the cause of diminution.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through the nature of charity itself, thus: "opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"; but augmentation and diminution are opposites: therefore if it happens that charity is augmented, it happens also that it is diminished.

6. Likewise, what can be preserved in being without the conjunction of itself to something can, after conjunction, be separated from it; but charity, before addition, has being without an additional element: therefore it can be separated: and if so, then also diminished: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Charity is a simple form and uniform throughout; therefore what takes away from charity, by the same reason by which it takes away one part, takes away also the whole: and if so, therefore it is never diminished.

2. Likewise, the magnitude of charity is according to the magnitude of the divine influence, therefore its diminution is through the diminution of the influence; but God does not withdraw his influence except when offended, and he is not offended except through aversion from him and contempt: therefore charity is not diminished except through mortal sin; but this is nothing other than for charity to be removed: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which diminishes another is opposite to it; but the venial [sin] or cupidity or concupiscence on this side of God is not opposed to charity, but rather is altogether contingent to it: therefore it is not diminished.

4. Likewise, what diminishes another has power over it; but the venial does not have power over charity, because charity loves God more than cupidity loves a hundred marks of gold and silver: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this same is shown through impossibility in this way: if the venial diminishes charity, then it diminishes something from it: if therefore charity is not of infinite magnitude, then the venial, repeated several times, takes away the whole charity, which is false.

6. Likewise, if it diminishes charity according to substance, then it diminishes the substantial reward owed to it: but the substantial reward is the eternal good: therefore the venial takes away something from the eternal good; but the taking away of the eternal good either simply or in part is the eternal punishment: therefore the venial merits eternal punishment, which is against the common opinion. If therefore the venial does not diminish the one, neither [does it diminish] the other.

### CONCLUSION.

> Charity, although it is removed through mortal sin, nevertheless through venial sin is not diminished according to substance, but only according to fervor.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a twofold opinion, founded on the twofold preceding opinion concerning the mode of augmenting charity. For some say that charity is augmented through unmixedness; and since the unmixedness is greater according to the greater enabling of free choice and according to the diminution of concupiscence, and conversely the mixedness [is greater] through the disabling of free choice and the augmentation of concupiscence: they say consequently that it is diminished, according as cupidity or concupiscence is augmented and free choice is disabled; and this is through venial sin. But since venial sin, remaining venial, is never repeated so many times as to augment concupiscence so that one loves something above God: therefore charity through venial [sins] can be diminished, but not removed; it is removed however through the mortal [sin], which augments concupiscence above God.

But this opinion, as has been proven above, does not have a stable foundation, since the substantial augmentation of charity does not come from free choice nor from concupiscence, therefore neither does the diminution.

And on account of this another more probable opinion is set down, namely that charity is not diminished substantially; and this opinion is founded on this, that the augmentation of charity has to come about through addition or increase of greater influence. Granted which, it must be said that charity according to substance is not diminished, but augmented.

And the reason for this is taken from the side of the opposite or of the agent. For charity has no opposite except mortal sin; through that, however, it is not diminished but

removed; concupiscence, however, or cupidity, and venial sin are opposed to charity according to fervor only, because they stand together and substantially are mutually non-contingent.

**To 1 and 2.** And so it is to be resolved as to the first two, that that [saying] of Augustine concerning cupidity and lesser love, likewise that concerning venial diminution, has place only as to the fervor of charity; and thus the first two are clear.

There is also taken a reason why charity is not diminished from the side of its subject, which is free choice according to conversion to God. Free choice, however, disposes itself for the augmentation of charity through enabling, likewise for diminution through disabling on this side of the mortal. But this disposition is of congruity, not of condignity; and since God is more inclined to mercy than to condemnation, and to giving than to withdrawing: hence it is that he confers charity, when free choice disposes itself by congruity, but he does not withdraw, except when [free choice] necessarily disposes itself for the withdrawal of grace. This, however, is only through aversion, and then he removes the whole. And hence it is, that charity is never diminished, but augmented, because [the will] can prepare the subject for diminution only by congruity.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that just as a human being makes progress, so also descends frequently; it must be said, that charity is not diminished by descent substantially in the same way as it is augmented by ascent.

**To 4.** What [the objector] also objects, that free choice can wholly deprive [of charity] through disabling, etc.; it must be said, that this is false, because a substantial form is wholly deprived through disposition to the opposite at the term, but is not however diminished through disposition on this side of the term. Furthermore, that has place when the disposition at the term and on this side of the term are of the same genus; but it is not so in the case proposed, because one is mortal sin, the other venial.

There is also taken a reason why [charity] cannot be diminished from the side of its own nature. For [charity] itself is an influence according to divine acceptation; but that God should accept, this is from him, and so, that he should accept more and more, and so by its own nature [charity] can be augmented; but that he should accept less, this is not from itself: therefore it must come from us: therefore charity from itself is to be augmented, but it has no diminution except from us, as has been shown above. By us, however, it cannot be diminished, and therefore to charity only augmentation is owed naturally.

**To 5.** To that therefore which is objected, that opposites are by nature [produced] etc., it must be said, that it is true, unless one of them is in [the subject] by nature.

**To 6.** To that which is objected: it can be without addition, therefore [it can be] separated; it must be said, that this is true, if there were something separating; but there is nothing which separates.