Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/18/q/bon-sent-I-d18-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether the Holy Spirit is Gift from eternity, or from time.*

Secondly it is asked, whether the Holy Spirit is *Gift* from eternity, or from time. And that [He is *Gift*] from time, is seen [thus]:

1. Augustine, in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*: "He is *Gift* by this, that He is given to those to whom He is given": but He is given from time: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*: "He is called *Gift* by this, that God was about to give Him"; but it is established that He was about to give [Him] from time: therefore if the *Gift* is eternal, the temporal is the cause of the eternal.

3. Likewise, this is seen by reason. For *gift* says comparison not only to the giver, but also to the one to whom it is given: therefore, the gift being posited, the giver and the receiver are posited, since a relation posits its extremes; but the receiver is a creature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, *gift* adds [something] beyond *given*, since "a gift is an irreddible giving": therefore if the Holy Spirit is not given except from time, neither is He *Gift* except from time.

5. Likewise, just as it belongs to the Son to be generated, so it belongs to the Gift to be donated; but the Son is not, before He is generated: therefore neither is [there] *Gift*, before it is donated: but it is donated only from time: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the fifth [book] *On the Trinity*: "Because the Spirit was proceeding so that He might be donatable, He was already *Gift*"; but to proceed as donatable, this is eternal: therefore also [He is] *Gift* from eternity.

2. Likewise, in the same place more expressly: "The Holy Spirit is everlastingly *Gift*, but is given temporally."

3. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, since where there is gratuitous love, there is the account of *gift*: but from eternity it [is right] to posit gratuitous love in God: therefore also [there is] *Gift*.

4. Likewise, where there is a perfect account of liberality, there is *gift*: but in the divine [things] from eternity there is a perfect account of liberality: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, as the account of *word* stands to the production of things, so the account of *gift* stands to the distribution of graces: but before the production of things in the beginning was the *Word*: therefore before the conferral of graces in the beginning was the *Gift*.

> **Conclusion.** *Gift, as given, is said temporally; but Gift, as something at some time to be donated or as donatable, is said eternally.*

**I respond:** It must be said that since *gift* says a relation to him to whom it is given, this can be in three ways: either according to act, or according to habit, or according to aptitude. If according to act, in this way it is called *gift*, because it is given; if according to habit, in this way it is called *gift*, because it is to be donated at some time; if according to aptitude, in this way it is called *gift*, because it is donatable.

According to the first acception it is said temporally; but according to the second and third it is said eternally. And in these three senses Augustine takes [it]. It must therefore be conceded, that according to some acception *gift* is said eternally, as the reasons adduced for the second part prove.

1. To that, however, which is objected to the contrary, it must be said, that it proceeds about *gift* insofar as it says the act of donation, and thus it is said from time; whence the objection is not valid.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that He is called *gift* by that by which [God] was about to give etc.; it must be said, that according to this acception it is said eternally, since it does not say a relation to the creature according to act, but according to habit, as also predestination [does].

To that, then, which is objected, that in that case the temporal is the cause of the eternal; it must be said, that the participle *daturus* ("about to give") imports two things, namely the ordering toward giving, and the act of the ordering; and the ordering is eternal, although the act is temporal; and then the ablative does not say causality by reason of the act, but by reason of the ordering.

It could however be said, that it says the cause of the consequence, not of the consequent.

3. To that which is objected, that it says a relation to extremes; it must be said, that an actual relation posits each extreme in act, but not a habitual relation, as is evident, that God is eternally called the exemplar of a temporal creature.

4. To that which is objected, that *gift* adds [something] above *given*; it must be said, that *gift* in some [things] follows upon the account of *given*, as for instance are those things which of themselves do not say liberality, except insofar as the account of communication is added to them, as a book, a knife, and the like. In some [thing], *given* follows upon the account of *gift*, as for instance in that which of itself imports liberality, even if the gift were never given, as is love; and thus it belongs to the Holy Spirit.

5. To that which is objected, that just as it belongs to the Son to be generated etc.; it must be said, that it is false, since *to be generated* says the emanation of the Son, which according to the order of understanding precedes the Son; whence it is impossible that He be, unless He be generated; but *to be donated* not only says the emanation of the gift, but says further its communication; and this follows upon the being of the gift, and therefore He is not called *Gift* from time, although He is donated from time.