Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 5
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/18/q/bon-sent-I-d18-a1-q5
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### QUESTION V.

#### *Whether gift, or donability, is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit.*

Fifthly it is asked, whether donability or *gift* is the distinctive property of the person of the Holy Spirit. And that it is, it seems.

1. For Augustine says, in *On the Trinity* V: «He is *Gift* by that by which He is *Spirit*»; but *spirit* is a distinctive property: therefore also *gift*.

2. Likewise, Augustine in *On the Trinity* V, assigning the difference between the procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, sets down this, that the former proceeds in the manner of one born, but the latter in the manner of *gift*; therefore if this difference is reckoned in terms of distinctive properties, as is plain, since *nativity* is the property of the Son: therefore also *donability* or *gift* is the property of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, because every property according to which a person differs from all others is the distinctive property of that person: but *gift* belongs to the person of the Holy Spirit alone and always: therefore it is His personal property.

4. Likewise, properties in divine [matters] are relations; but Augustine says, in *On the Trinity* V, that «the relation according to which the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and the Son appears more in this name *gift* than in this name *spirit*»: therefore each is personal.

**On the contrary:**

1. Nothing expressing a relation to creatures is a distinctive property of a person, because, every relation to creature being set aside, the personal distinction [still] holds; but *gift* expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: therefore etc. If he were saying, that it is not a property according to the comparison which it has to creatures, but to the giver: by parity of reason the *mission* of the Holy Spirit would be a distinctive property, since it expresses a relation to the sender.

2. Likewise, every distinctive property is named from an act, not from a habit. Hence the Father is so called because He generates, the Son because He is generated, the Holy Spirit indeed because He is breathed; but *gift* is not named from the act of giving, but from a habit, otherwise He would not be called [Gift] from eternity: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, the distinctive property of no other person is taken in relation to creatures or expresses a relation; but *gift* expresses this: therefore it is not a distinctive property.

4. Likewise, if *gift* is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit and His notion, then therefore *holy spirit* and *love* is not a property: but if *holy spirit* and *love* is a property, then there are seven notions, which is contrary to the common opinion of all. If you say that the same notion is conveyed by these three names, then the names appear synonymous, like *Marcus*, *Tullius*, which is an equally great absurdity: therefore etc.

### CONCLUSION.

> *Gift is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit according to* *the relation to the giver, without however the account of donability or relation according to aptitude toward him to whom it is given being excluded.*

**I respond:** It must be said that on this matter some have said that *gift* in divine [matters] is to be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it expresses a relation to the giver alone; and in this way Augustine says that «He is therefore called *gift* because He proceeds»; and so they say that *gift* is the distinctive property of the Holy Spirit. In another way *gift* is taken insofar as it expresses a relation to him to whom it is given: and thus it does not express a distinctive property, but [something] consequent upon a distinctive property.

But that does not seem able to stand. For *gift* always expresses some comparison to him to whom it is given; for, given the understanding that He is not donatable to anyone, it is impossible to understand that He is *gift*.

And on account of this it must be said otherwise, as was touched upon before, that *gift*, beyond the relation which it conveys to the giver, conveys a relation to him to whom it is given. But this can be in three ways: either according to *act*, as because [He has been] given; or according to *habit*, as because [He is] to be given; or according to *aptitude*, as because [He is] *donatable*. And this [last] relation is so joined to the first that the first cannot exist nor be understood without it; rather, of necessity it follows, if He proceeds in the manner of *gift*, that He is donatable: and therefore the consequent relation does not take from the first that it be a distinctive property. It must be said, therefore, that it is a distinctive property by reason of the first relation, the second relation not opposing but consonant.

**To 1.** From this is plain the response to the first, because that relation is such that it cannot be set aside as to aptitude, on account of the emanation by way of liberality. And it is plain that the case is not similar concerning *mission*, because it expresses a relation according to *act*, not according to *aptitude*.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that a distinctive property must express an act; it must be said, that *gift* expresses a twofold relation, and by reason of this expresses a comparison to a twofold act. By reason of the first relation it expresses the act of *procession*, by reason of the second it expresses the act of *communication*. The first act it conveys *in act*, the second *in habit*; and by reason of the first it is a distinctive property, not by reason of the second.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that in another person this is not [the case]; some respond, that the Holy Spirit is the third person; therefore [He is] more immediate to us according to the manner of understanding, and therefore His property is taken in comparison to us, not so in the others.

It can otherwise be solved by *interemption* [refutation], because, just as *gift* expresses a relation to creatures, so also this other property, which is *Word*, as will appear below.

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning the plurality of notions; it must be said, that *spirit*, *love* and *gift* express the same property, differing in account. They express the same notion, I say, because they express a comparison to the same [thing] and express the same emanation, but yet they name it differently. For *spirit* expresses it principally through comparison to the producing power, which is the spirative power; *love* principally as to the manner of emanating, because [it is] as a bond; but *gift* as to the consequent relation. And similarly the emanation of the Word it happens to signify in three ways, namely through this name *son*, *image*, and *word*. For because from the power of nature, *son*; because in an *expressed* manner, *image*; because *expressive* of others, therefore *word*. Similarly, because from the spirative power, *spirit*; because in the manner of a bond, *love*; because born to connect us, *gift*. And so it is plain, that one is the notion otherwise and otherwise named according to the consequent accounts, therefore there is no synonymity here.