Dist. 18, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/18/q/bon-sent-I-d18-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first there is doubt about what he says, that the relation does not appear in this name *spirit*. For it appears to say falsely, because *spirit* is so called, because it is breathed-forth: therefore it is referred to the one breathing-forth; therefore relation appears in it. Likewise, it appears that [relation] appears more [in *spirit*] than in this name *gift*, because *«relatives are said to be those things which, this very thing which they are, are said to be of others»*; but *spirit* by the very fact that it is *spirit* has its being from the one breathing-forth; *gift*, however, need not have its being from the giver; therefore it appears that relation does not appear in this [name *gift*] more.

**I respond:** It must be said that both *gift* and *spirit* are said relatively; but yet relation appears more in this name *gift* than in this

name *spirit*, because *gift* always says a respect to the giver, but *spirit* does not, but rather can be taken absolutely.

Or it can be said otherwise, that Augustine does not say that the relation does not appear in this name *spirit*, but that it does not appear in this name *Holy Spirit*. For although [the Holy Spirit] is said to be the spirit of the breather-forth, yet *Holy Spirit* is not said to be of the breather-forth.

To that which is objected, that *spirit* states a relationship regarding being more than *gift*; it must be said that this is true in those things to which it is accidental to be a gift, but in the Holy Spirit, who is for this reason because [he is] gift, this objection has no place.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son by being-born received that he might be the very substance*. For it appears to say wrongly, because in everything which is in the Son through nativity, the Son is distinguished from the Father, because nativity is a distinctive property: therefore if the Son by being-born received that he might be essence or substance: therefore the Father is distinguished from the Son in substance. Likewise, that which the Son received by being-born, or that which the Son is by being-born, is born: therefore substance is born, if the Son by being-born is substance. For everything that is received by being-born has its origin from the nativity.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have distinguished this locution: *The Son by being-born is the divine substance*, or *God*, because the gerund can state *concomitance*, and so simply it is true; or *cause*, and so it is multiple, because when I say *The Son is God* or *the divine substance*, I say three things, namely subject, composition, and predicate. Therefore this gerund *by being-born* can state causality with respect to the subject, or with respect to the composition, or with respect to the predicate. If with respect to the subject, then the sense is: *The Son by being-born* etc., namely he who is Son by being-born, or who by being-born has [it] that he is Son, is God; and so it is true. If with respect to the composition, then the sense is: *The Son is God by being-born*, that is, this predicate belongs to the subject through nativity; and so still the locution is true. If with respect to the predicate, then the sense is: *The Son is God* or *the divine substance by being-born*, in such a way that to be born or nativity is the principle or origin of the Deity; and in this sense it is false.

The Master, however, does not distinguish this locution, but simply concedes it, and quite probably, since the aforesaid distinction does not seem to have a root. For since the gerund is naturally apt to determine the composition — for it is altogether nothing to say *a man by being-born* and the like — and since the composition of the predicate, whether of the essence or of all those things which are attributed to the Son, belong to the subject through nativity, the locution has truth. Nor are the objections adduced to the contrary valid, because nativity does not distinguish that which is had through nativity, or that which is in the one being born, but only him who is born: and therefore it does not follow that the substance be distinct, nor that it itself be born, although it be had through generation.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *the Son by nativity is not essence*. It appears to say falsely, because since by being-born he is essence, by parity of reason it appears that [he is so] by nativity also; and this appears through the authority of Hilary in the text.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt this [locution] is to be distinguished: *The Son by nativity is the divine essence*; because the ablative can be construed in the manner of *form*, or in the manner of *principle*. If in the manner of form, so it is false, because nativity is not the formal cause with respect to the essential predicate. If in the manner of principle, so it has truth, because all things which belong to the Son, belong to him through the origin of nativity. But the Master, because he takes the gerund in the manner of principle, therefore with the gerund he simply concedes; and because he takes the ablative in the manner of form, therefore with the ablative he simply denies; for he judges more according to the usage of speaking than according to the strict force of the expression.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *Neither by defection, or by protension, or by derivation*; how do those three differ?

**I respond:** Some say thus, that by *defection* something is produced from matter through the corruption of a pre-existing

form, as the blade [of grass] from a grain of wheat; by *protension* something is produced through the permanence of a pre-existing form and the introduction of an artificial form, as a vessel is made from silver; by *derivation*, that which is produced through the permanence of a pre-existing form by local change alone, as a stream from a fountain and a lake from a stream.

It can be said otherwise, that the material principle from which a thing is, is either material and transient formally, and so it is *defection*; or it is material and permanent, and so it is *protension*; or it is material and permanent and agent, and so it is *derivation*; and the examples of these are manifest.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what is said: *One thing is what we have received in order that we might be, another, that we might be holy*. For it appears to say wrongly, because just as without the Spirit of God we cannot be holy, so neither [can we] be: therefore it appears that by the Holy Spirit we have not only received that we might be holy, but also that we might be.

**I respond:** It can be said to this, that this was said by appropriation. For although from the Holy Spirit we have being and holy being, yet by appropriation we have holy being: therefore he is not so said to be received in the production of our being, as in [our] sanctification.

Yet it can be said otherwise, that, just as giving is ordered to having, so also receiving; and because no one has the Holy Spirit, no matter how much the Holy Spirit may operate in him, except him who is able to enjoy him, and every such one is holy: therefore the Holy Spirit is not said, properly speaking, to be given or received except by the Holy.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *I will take from your spirit*, because this cannot be said with respect to substance, therefore with respect to effect or grace: therefore it appears that grace is transferred from one into another. If you say that this was said by conformity; the objection is raised, that by parity of reason it could be said, that he would take from the spirit of others and give to Moses.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is to be understood of the spirit with respect to effect; and this preposition *from* imports conformity together with partiality, but not with respect to a part constituting [it] according to truth, but according to proportion; because the effect of the Holy Spirit abounded much more in Moses than in others, so that the others might seem to have, as it were, a part of his grace. And it is said *I will take* with respect to solicitude, because while the gifts of the Holy Spirit were communicated to others, the solicitude of Moses was diminished, and a part of that solicitude was committed to others.

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