Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p1-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality. And that there is, is seen in this way.

1. As is said by Augustine in the book *On Faith to Peter*, "no one is called greater than another, except either because he precedes in age, or because he exceeds in magnitude, or because he surpasses in power": but none of these is in the divine [persons], as Augustine and the Master prove: therefore there is nothing of inequality there: therefore there is supreme equality there.

2. Likewise, no greater equality can be thought than where one is equated to one and one to many and one to all; but in the divine [persons] the Son is as great as the Father is, and the Son is as great as the Father and the Holy Spirit are, and [each one] is also as great as all three: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, unity in quantity, as has been said, makes equality: therefore where there is supreme unity, there is supreme equality; but this is in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, rest is only in the highest; but rest is in that equality through the reduction of all [equalities] to it: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine in the book *of the Eighty-three Questions*: "If all things were equal, all things would not be": therefore equality of every kind takes away perfection. If therefore nothing is to be posited in God which is repugnant to perfection, in the divine persons there is not equality of every kind.

2. Likewise, greater is the equality which is regarded according to continuous and discrete quantity, than [the equality] according to continuous [quantity] only; but in the divine [persons] there is not equality according to discrete quantity, since there [there] is trinity and so unevenness: therefore in the divine [persons] there is not equality of every kind.

3. Likewise, greater is the equality which is regarded according to power and wisdom and goodness, than that which [is regarded] according to wisdom and power only; but in the divine [persons] there is not equality according to goodness: therefore there is not supreme equality there. The proof of the minor: the good is diffusive of itself; but the Son diffuses himself more than the Holy Spirit, since he produces [one] equal to himself, and likewise the Father [more] than the Son: therefore etc.

It is asked therefore, why does Augustine not show equality in wisdom and goodness? and again, why not on the side of place, as [he does] of magnitude and also of the other differences of quantity? Since he does not do this, he does not seem to assign equality of every kind, but only in part; or if he does show equality of every kind, he proceeds insufficiently.

> **Conclusion.** *Supreme is the equality of the divine persons in eternity as to origin, in magnitude as to all things which they have in themselves, in power as to effects.*

**I respond:** It must be said, that in the divine [persons] there is supreme equality, and supreme [equality] is also assigned by Augu-

stine, since sufficiently is shown the removal of all inequality through those three [things], which are *eternity*, *magnitude*, and *power*.

The distinction and sufficiency of these three is taken by some in this way. For since in the divine [persons] there is no extension of mass nor aggregation of multitude, therefore there is not there continuous intrinsic quantity nor discrete; but in place of it there is the quantity of power, which is touched by this member, which is *power*. But because God by his ambit embraces every duration, therefore there is there the quantity of *eternity* corresponding to time. But because by the ambit of his immensity he embraces every place and every located thing, therefore there is there the quantity of *magnitude* corresponding to place. And thus it is plain, since there is no other quantity to be taken there, that sufficiently in those [three] equality is shown and consists.

But this distinction is not fitting, both because there is not in God except the quantity of power; and so there ought not to be there but one member, nor ought that to be distinguished against the others; and also because magnitude in the divine [persons] is not regarded only with respect to the ambit of locality, but also with respect to the intensity of goodness. Whence it is said in the sixth book *On the Trinity*, that in "spiritual things the same [thing] is greater and better." And on account of this the quantity of power is regarded not only in operation, but also in the thing considered in every kind of absoluteness.

Therefore we can in another way assign the distinction and sufficiency of these three. In everything that is, it happens that one can have this threefold consideration. For something can be considered in comparison to its origin or from the part-before; and thus one [thing] is greater than another, when its origin is prior; and against this is the equality of *eternity*. It can again be considered in itself; and thus one [thing] is called greater than another, either because of greater extension, or because of greater value. Against this is in God the equality of *magnitude*, so that this equality is not said only by comparison to locality, but also to wisdom and goodness and to everything which makes one [thing] be called greater than another, because better. Whence Augustine and the Master in this distinction prove the equality of magnitude through the equality of power, or in power. It can also thirdly be considered by comparison to effect: and thus it is called greater, because more powerful; and against this is the equality of *power*. Since therefore the thing cannot be considered in more ways, if there is equality in these, it is supreme: and when it is shown in these, supreme [equality] is shown, and one proceeds by perfect induction. And thus is plain that which was last asked.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that equality is repugnant to perfection: it must be said, that it is true: [repugnant] to the perfection of the universe, which is aggregated out of diversity; it is not so in God.

2. To that which is objected, that greater is the equality according to both quantities etc.; it must be said, that supreme equality is not in continuous nor in discrete quantity, since there one [thing] is not equated to many; but here is most perfect equality: therefore [it] is regarded only according to the quantity of power.

3. To that which is objected concerning goodness, that [it is] diffusive etc.; it must be said, that the emanation of a person is not regarded according to the account of the goodness of the essence, but rather of the fecundity of the person or in the person; and therefore it does not follow, that if the Holy Spirit does not produce, that on account of this he should have less of goodness. Whence it is to be noted, that diffusion is twofold, namely within or without. Diffusion within is, when a person proceeds from a person in the unity of nature; and this is not properly diffusion, and this does not follow upon the good, because [it is] the good, but [upon] the good in a hypostasis, which is born to produce another; and therefore according to this diffusion one person is not called better than another. There is another diffusion outside, which is regarded in the production of an effect; and according to this account is regarded diffusion properly and the account of the good. And since in this one person does not exceed another, since the works of the Trinity are undivided: therefore in this [respect] one is not better than another.