Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p1-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession.*

Fourthly it is asked whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession. And that there is, is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Lord, John 14: *I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.*

2. Likewise, Augustine, *On Faith to Peter*: «On account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit».

3. Likewise, this same is shown by reason, because in whatever the substance or essence of the Father is, there is the Father: but the substance of the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Son, by the same reasoning the Son is in the Father.

4. Likewise, every thing known is in the knower either through truth or through likeness; but the Father knows the Son with respect to hypostasis and property: therefore the Son is in the Father: either, then, with respect to *truth*, or with respect to *likeness* of truth. Not with respect to *likeness*, because then the Son would be in the Father as a creature [is]: therefore with respect to *truth*: by the same reasoning also the Father [is] in the Son: therefore there is circumincession there.

5. Likewise, everything that is compared to another is either in it, or outside it. If, then, the Son is compared to the Father, he is either in him, or outside. If *in him*, by the same reasoning also the Father [is] in him: if *outside him*; but those things, of which one is outside the other, differ by substance: therefore the Father and the Son differ substantially.

6. Likewise, the agreement in divine matters is greater than that of genus to species or of whole to parts; but on account of the agreement of genus to species the genus is in the species and conversely; and likewise the whole [is] in the parts and conversely: therefore much more strongly in divine matters the Father is in the Son and conversely.

**On the contrary:**
1. If the Father is in the Son and conversely, then the Father is in the Father. For just as it follows in predicating that whatever is predicated more broadly than or equally with something is predicated of everything which is under it: therefore likewise, if anything is in something, it is necessary that in the same there be everything that is in it: therefore if the Son is in the Father, everything which is in the Son is in the Father: but the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Father.

2. Likewise, whenever two simples of the same genus are at the same time, such that one is in the other, they are not distinguished from one another, just as a point is in a point. If, then, the Father and the Son are altogether simple; if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, it does not seem that they are distinguished.

3. Likewise, if there were two divine essences, it would be impossible that one should be in the other, because one could not enter into the other [*illabi*], since each would be equally spiritual and supremely spiritual: therefore if two persons are equally and supremely spiritual, it is impossible that one be in the other; and this is plain, because God cannot be in a creature without entering into it [*illabi*]. If, then, person is in person, it seems that he wholly enters into it.

4. Likewise, I ask what this *being in the Father* signifies, whether it is said with respect to substance, or with respect to relation. If with respect to relation, this is against Augustine, who says in the text [of the Master], that «on account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit». If with respect to substance; but the things which are said with respect to substance belong to the three: therefore this *being in the Father* belongs to the Son and to the Holy Spirit and to the Father: therefore the Father is in the Father, which is not conceded.

5. Likewise, when it is said: the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, either the same regard is imported, or another. If the same, since the Son is in the Father as in [his] principle, then likewise the Father would be in the Son as in [his] principle; which is simply absurd. If the same regard is not imported: therefore just as there is no circumincession when it is said: the genus is in the species, and the species in the genus, likewise neither in the matter at hand would there be circumincession.

6. Likewise, the Son is *from* the Father and *with* the Father, and it is not converted: therefore by parallel reasoning it seems that, if the Father is in the Son, it is not converted that the Son be in the Father.

7. Likewise, nine modes of being *in* are in creatures. In the first mode, as a part in a whole; in the second mode, as the whole in the parts; in the third mode, as a species in a genus; in the fourth mode, as a genus in species; in the fifth mode, as form in matter; in the sixth mode, as the directed or moved [thing] in the director; in the seventh mode, as a thing in its end; in the eighth mode, as the contained in the container; and a ninth Boethius adds, namely as accident in subject. It is asked, then, by which of these modes the Father is in the Son and conversely; and since none of these can be granted, it seems that he is in no way [therein].

### CONCLUSION.

> In the divine persons there is the highest and perfect circumincession by reason of the unity of essence with the distinction of persons.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the authorities and the reasons prove, in divine matters there is the highest and perfect circumincession. And this is called *circumincession*, by which it is said that the one is in the other and conversely; and this properly and perfectly is in God alone, because circumincession in being posits distinction together with unity. And since in God alone is there the highest unity together with distinction, in such a way that the distinction is unconfused and the unity undistinguished: hence it is that in God alone is there perfect circumincession. And the reason for this is plain, because the account of circumincession is perfect unity of essence together with distinction of persons. And since this is proper to God alone, therefore also such circumincession [is], according as Hilary says and the Master adduces in the text.

**To 1.** To that which is objected, namely that the Father [is] in the Son and the Son in the Father, therefore the Father [is] in himself; some say that the argument is not valid, because the regard of that which is *in* is changed; because in one [it] expresses the regard of the principled to the principle, in the other however the regard of the principle to the principled. Yet it is not necessary to say this, because as will be plain shortly, *in* does not express a diverse regard. Nor however does it follow, but rather it is by accident there, in that *in* notes a distinction, just as it is by accident here: Peter is like Paul, and Paul like Peter: therefore Peter is like Peter; so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that simples existing simultaneously are confounded into one; it must be said that this is true when the simples have to be distinguished by reason of that in which they are, just as a point and a unit [are distinguished] from that in which they are. But when they are distinguished by themselves and in themselves are made substantive, then, although they are simultaneous, they are not confounded; and such are the divine hypostases. And a similitude of this, although it cannot perfectly be found in a creature, nevertheless Dionysius sets forth an example in lights, which are many in the same air without confusion: and the sign of this is that, when a luminary is removed, it draws its own light with it, plucking nothing of the others. And the reason for this is, because the lights in the air are not distinguished by reason of that in which [they are].

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that essence is not in essence except by entering into [it], etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, because where there is a diversity of essences, if one is in the other, it is necessary that one be in some way material to the other; but when persons differ, the unity of essence being preserved, one is in the other, because the essence of the one is the essence of the other; and so, just as the same does not enter into itself, so there can be no entering-in there.

**To 4.** To that which is asked, what this *being in the Father* signifies; it must be said that, as the Saints intimate, just as *equal* expresses a regard according to unity of quantity, and *like* according to unity of quality, likewise this *being in the Father*, [expresses a regard] according to unity of substance. Hence just as *equal*

simultaneously imports substance together with relation, as will be plain below, so also this [is the case for] *being in*. And just as, when *originating from the Father* is said, [the term] is restricted to standing for the other persons, so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

**To 5.** To that which is asked, whether the same regard be imported; it must be said without prejudice, that yes, so far as it pertains to the account of the name. For just as, when it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not different and different regards are imported: so neither in this *being in*, because it imports the relation of identity or of consubstantiality. Hence if it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not a different regard is said: so in the matter at hand, because this *being in the Father* signifies the same as *being consubstantial with the Father*. And *consubstantial* is taken uniformly, when said of the Father and the Son. And this is plain, because if it did not express a like regard, there would not be circumincession, just as neither is there [circumincession], when the creature is said to be in God, and God to be in the creature; because a different regard is imported in each case.

**To 6.** To that which is asked concerning this [particle] *with*, etc.; it must be said that certain prepositions import a regard of repugnance, like *against*; certain ones [a regard] of distance, as this *to* and *near*; certain ones [a regard] of cause, as *from* and *out of*; certain ones [a regard] of agreement, as *in* and *with*. The first and second are in no way received, but the third and fourth are, and the third not convertibly, but the fourth convertibly, because agreement is a relation of equiparance.

**To 7.** To the last [it must be said] in solving, that this is a singular mode of being *in*, which is not contained among those, nor can it properly be found in creatures.