Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE UNIQUE. *That all accounts of inequality must be excluded from God.*
### Question I. *Whether an integral whole is to be posited in divine things.*

As to the first [question], that one ought to posit a totality of integrity, it seems [yes]:

1. By Augustine first, [as] is had in the text [of the Master]: *The whole Trinity is in each of the persons*: therefore either there is there an implication of falsehood, or there is there a totality; but there is not there an implication of falsehood: therefore there is there totality.

2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason, since where there is quantity, there is totality and integrity. But in divine things there is the quantity of virtue: therefore at least according to it [there is] also integrity.

3. Likewise, where there is plurality, there is integrity, since every plurality is composed of unities; but in God there is plurality, since [there is] trinity: therefore in God there is integrity. If you say that that plurality is not made integral, since nothing more is in three than in one — then if there is just as much in three as in one, then he who believes that there is only one supposit believes just as much, and as fully, as he who believes that there are three persons; but this is false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if something is equal to something, when the same is added, it will still be equal; therefore if something is a whole in relation to something, when the same is added, it will still be a whole; but three is a whole in relation to one: therefore three persons in relation to one person.

5. Likewise, everything which is predicated of certain things together and of none singly is an integral whole in relation to them; this stands and admits of no instance to the contrary; but trinity is predicated of the three persons together and of none singly: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, everything which is removed from something either differs from it in genus, or species, or number, or is a whole in relation to it; but trinity is removed from the Father, since the Father is not the trinity, nor does it differ in genus, or species, or number: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Ambrose, in his book *On the Trinity*: «In divine things we posit no totality, since there is there neither quantity nor number».

2. Likewise, by reason it seems [so], since every integral [whole] is composed of parts; but God is supremely simple: therefore in God there is no totality nor integrity.

3. Likewise, every part under the account of a part has imperfect being with respect to the whole, since from things which are altogether perfect no third thing results: therefore since in divine things nothing of imperfection is to be posited, there is no part there: therefore from the relatives no whole either.

4. Likewise, every whole is greater than its part: but where there is infinity, there is no greater and lesser: therefore neither totality: but in divine things there is infinity: therefore [no totality].

5. Likewise, every whole is resolvable either in reality or in the intellect; and everything resolvable is corruptible: therefore since in God nothing is corruptible, [God] will not be resolvable, and so neither a whole.

> **Conclusion.** *The account of totality, insofar as it expresses something perfect, befits God; but insofar as it has reference to parts, neither totality nor partiality can be posited in God.*

**I respond:** Whole or totality is said in one way absolutely: and so whole is the same as perfect. In another way *whole* is said by comparison to a part; and so that is called whole which has part and part, or parts.

In the first way, totality is well posited in God; in the second not, nor partiality either; not totality, because it removes simplicity; not partiality, because it destroys the perfect; neither, because it destroys the highest equality.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected from Augustine, who says *the whole Trinity* etc.; it must be said that he takes "whole" for "perfect," or "whole" is taken there privatively, since it denies what it is to be part outside of part. Hence "whole essence" is worth as much as "not having part outside or within."

2. To that which is objected secondly, that there is there a quantity of virtue; it must be said that the quantity of virtue stands together with the highest simplicity; therefore it abstracts from totality and integrity.

3. To that which is objected, that where there is plurality, there is integrity etc.; it must be said that plurality in creatures says two things. For it expresses the distinction of certain things, and from these very things the constitution of one multitude. The first is indeed found in divine things, since there is truly distinction there; but the second is not, since where there is constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole which they constitute, and so they essentially differ from one another. But in divine things it is not so, since since the Father has the whole essence, not a part, he cannot have less, nor essentially differ. And therefore it must be said that in divine things plurality is received by reason of distinction. But because plurality is a whole by reason of constitution, and this is not in divine things, therefore it does not follow that there is totality there; nevertheless there is truly there unity and plurality, and there is as much in unity as in plurality, but not in as many modes. And because faith is not only with respect to essence or magnitude, but also to the mode of being, it is plain [as to] what is objected, that he who believes one person does not believe as much as he who believes several.

4. From this the following [points] are clear, since one is a part of three, according as it expresses unity, and three [express] trinity. But when this name *person* is added, [the term] is drawn off and that account of unity does not remain, therefore neither the account of partiality.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that it is predicated together and removed etc.; it must be said that this not only befits totality with respect to a part, but also plurality with respect to unity; which, although it does not hold the account of part on account of diminution and imperfection, nevertheless holds the account of unity on account of [its being a] principle and [having] distinction.

Hence [the fact] that the whole is removed from the parts and does not differ [from them], this is not principally by reason of constitution, but by reason of distinction. And since in the divine plurality, although there is no constitution of one greater [thing], nevertheless because there is distinction there, therefore it is in this way removed, and in this way predicated, just as a whole [is removed and predicated] in creatures.