Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.

#### *Whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole can be posited.*

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole is to be posited. And that it is, is seen [thus]:

1. Through the Damascene, who says that "in the divine [persons] the common is, as substance, the particular, as an atom [individual]": therefore if there is there the common and the particular, therefore [there is] a universal, since to the particular there corresponds no other common than the universal.

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen through the definition of the universal and the particular. "For the universal is what is predicated of many; the particular of one alone"; but these accounts are to be found in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is "in more" and is univocal, is universal with respect to those things, in regard to which it is "in more"; but the essence or substance is "in more" than person, and "in more" univocally, since it expresses one nature found in them according to identity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in the divine [persons] there is the communicable and the incommunicable; therefore either by the same [thing], or by one [thing] and another. Not by the same; because that is not intelligible, that out of the same there should formally come community and property, agreement and difference: therefore by one and another: therefore if by one [thing it is] communicable, by another incommunicable, then since the communicable is by reason of *that by which it is*, [and] the incommunicable by reason of *that which it is*, therefore *that by which it is* and *that which it is* in the divine [persons] are [there] through difference; but where these are through difference, there is universal and particular: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more universal [it is]; but the divine essence is the most simple: therefore there most of all is the account of the universal.

**On the contrary:** 1. Boethius says, that there is neither universal nor particular [there].

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, since wherever there is universal, there is one form multipliable or multiplied; in token of which everything,

which signifies *as though universally*, can be added to every universal; but in God there is not one form or nature multipliable nor multiplied, nor does it receive a universal sign, so that it might be said *every God*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where there is particular, there is form or nature as *here* and *now*; but the divine nature, whether in itself, or in the hypostases, is not *here* and *now*, but always and everywhere: therefore neither in itself nor in the hypostases is there particular there.

4. Likewise, where there is particular and universal, the universal is simpler than the particular: therefore since in God the essence is not simpler than the person, because in person there is no accident, no constitutive principle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every nature in which there is universal and particular is in a determinate genus; and every such [nature] is limited: therefore since the divine nature is infinite, it is plain etc.

> **Conclusion.** *Although in the divine [persons] there is the account of common and proper, of communicable and incommunicable, nevertheless there is by no means there the account of universal and particular.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted, that, since our faith posits trinity and unity in the divine [persons], it necessarily posits agreement and distinction. And since agreement is only in what is communicable to many and common, but distinction is only in what is proper and incommunicable, necessarily in the divine [persons] there is posited the account of *common* and *proper*, of *communicable* and *incommunicable*.

But since in God and creatures there is distinction of supposits, it is otherwise in God than in creatures. For the distinction of supposits is greater than accidental distinction; whence although it is made known through accidents, nevertheless it is not made through accidents. For when accidents have been removed, it is still possible to understand supposits to differ; and since it is not made through consequent accidents, it is necessary that it be made from origin or from an originative principle. From origin it is, when one differs from another, because it emanates from it; for the same cannot emanate from itself. Such distinction of supposits is in God, but this cannot be in a creature, namely distinction only through origin; for no creature can give to another its whole essence. If therefore it gives a part, it is necessary that there be there another difference than that of origin; and therefore there is difference from an originative principle. But this is not form in itself, since it expresses something communicable, nor matter in itself, since it expresses something undistinguished: therefore this form does as coming to matter. For since the [form] coming to matter receives a part, not the whole matter, hence it is, that it distinguishes it [the matter], and by distinguishing it [the form] is drawn

into a part and is limited and becomes *here* and *now* and one in number and particular.

Since therefore in the divine [persons] there is no addition to matter nor drawing into a part, therefore in the divine [persons] there falls neither universal nor particular, as the reasons brought forward in the opposing arguments show.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from the Damascene, it must be said, that the *Damascene* improperly posited *particular* for *incommunicable*.

2. To that which is objected, that the universal is what is predicated of many; it must be said, that this is the account of the communicable; but it is not [the account] of the universal, except according as it is really understood to be multiplied in them. Similarly is to be solved [the question] of the particular.

3. To that which is objected, that [it] is "in more" and univocal etc.; it must be said, that the universal is "in more", in such a way that [it is] simpler, and becomes "in" less by addition to it; but not so in God.

4. To that which is asked, whether by the same [thing] [there is] communicable and incommunicable; it must be said, that by one and another; because, as Augustine says, "by one [thing] he is God, and by another Father"; but not by one and another according to *thing*, but according to *reason*: because by deity he is God, by paternity Father, and paternity is not a thing other than the essence, since paternity is the essence; nevertheless it is other in reason. And since the ablative expresses reason, therefore he is not God by the same [thing] as he is Father. — And if you object: either to that reason there corresponds something in reality, or nothing; it must be said, that that reason by comparison to the essence is only a mode, but by comparison to another person is a thing. And this is plain, since to have essence from another and not to have [it from another] does not express a different thing, but only a mode; but to have from another and not to have from another does express a real difference, since no thing is from itself and from another.

5. To that which is last objected concerning the simple, it must be said, that there is a simple [that is] open to addition, and in this way the universal is simple; in another way [there is] a simple, because it excludes composition and addition, and this incompatibility is not consonant with universality: and in this way the divine essence is simple, which in no way is drawable into a part by addition, as the universal is drawn: and therefore it is not universal.