Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III.

#### *Whether in the divine persons a material principle can be posited.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether in the divine persons a material principle is to be posited. And that there is, is shown in this manner.

1. Whenever someone or something is of something, in such wise that it itself is distinct and that of which it is is undistinct, it is of that as of a material principle; but the person of the Son is of the substance of the Father, and the person is distinct, [whereas] substance expresses something undistinct: therefore it is as a material principle.

2. Likewise, just as efficient [cause] and end are correlative causes, so [are] form and matter — for form is said with respect to matter — but in God a formal cause is to be posited, «for he himself is form», as Boethius says: therefore in God matter is to be posited.

3. Likewise, it seems that material cause belongs to God more than any other genus of causes, because matter in these lower things gives existence and permanence on account of its incorruption, whence it is the foundation of created existence: if therefore God or the divine being has existence or permanence through an incorruptible foundation, it seems that the account of a material principle most of all belongs to God, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in created things finitude comes from form, but infinity from matter; but everything that is in God is infinite: therefore since the affection consequent upon a material principle most of all befits God, [matter] itself also most of all belongs [to him].

5. Likewise, although in God there is the highest and altogether complete simplicity, nevertheless we posit in God *that which is* and *that by which it is* truly, but yet by way of indifference: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that in God matter and form can be posited, yet by way of indifference.

6. Likewise, every distinction is from form, therefore, every created form being set aside, matter is not distinguished, therefore it is not other than God, therefore it is God, because everything that is and is not distinguished from God is God: it seems therefore that the material principle is God himself, and so [it seems] to belong to the divine persons.

**On the contrary:**
1. Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*: «Form without matter cannot be a subject», and he speaks of God: therefore in God there will not be the account of a material principle.

2. Likewise, matter among all beings is the most imperfect, whence also Augustine says in the book of *Confessions* that it is near to nothing; but God is altogether most perfect: therefore in him nothing of imperfection is found at all: therefore neither what belongs to matter.

3. Likewise, matter is the principle of being acted upon, whence to be acted upon is from matter. Everything therefore in which matter is, is born to be acted upon and to receive; but nothing such is omnipotent; for in this, that it can be acted upon, it falls short of [full] capacity: therefore in the omnipotent there is in no way a material principle.

4. Likewise, if matter is in God, either with respect to

itself, or with respect to other things. If with respect to other things: since therefore matter is a being in potency to others nor is distinguished from other things, but is perfected through them, then God would receive completion from a creature, nor would he be distinguished from it, which is absurd. But if matter is in God with respect to itself, either it is purely matter, or something else. If purely matter: therefore it is not a being. And besides, nothing is matter of itself: therefore it is necessary that there be there something with the matter: and if so, then the divine being is composed and mixed: therefore neither does God have simple being, and consequently not first being either, and so he is not God.

### CONCLUSION.

> In God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, can a material principle be posited.

**I respond:** It must be said that in God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, is a material principle received. And the reason for this is that matter expresses a passive principle and so an incomplete one; and because from the divine being every incompletion and every passion must be utterly removed, therefore in no way is the genus of material principle posited to be in God.

**To 1.** To that, then, which is objected — that the person is of the substance, and itself is distinct, while the substance is not [distinct]; it must be said that here there is a defect with respect to either condition. For first this is not received, that the person be *of* the substance, as Augustine wishes, because «we do not say three persons *out of* the same essence»; although this is commonly received, that the Son is of the substance of the Father, where not matter, but the consubstantiality of origin is designated, as was shown above in the fifth distinction. The other condition that fails: for matter is distinct and capable of distinction through form; but substance or essence is in no way distinguished, neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; and so it is plain that the account of matter does not belong to it.

**To 2.** To that which is objected, that efficient is referred to end and form to matter; it must be said that the relation of no [created] cause occurs in God with respect to himself, but with respect to creatures; and the relations of the other causes are received in God, with dependence set aside, on account of this, that they sound toward perfection; but matter sounds altogether toward imperfection. And as to what is objected, that form is said in relation to matter; it must be said that there is constitutive form and exemplar form. And constitutive form is said in relation to matter; and this does not occur in God, but exemplar form does. And if it be said that God is form in himself, this is said because he is pure act not depending on the possible. Nor however is the case similar concerning the correspondence of form and matter, and of efficient and end. For efficient and end can coincide in the same in number; but form and matter never. Constitutive form indeed coincides with efficient and end in the same in species, not in number; but exemplar form [coincides with them] in the same in number.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that matter is the foundation of existence; it must be said that the mode of that foundation does not belong to God, because it is a foundation receiving being from elsewhere, namely from form; but God receives from no one: therefore matter does not occur in him.

**To 4.** To that which is objected concerning infinity, it must be said that there is infinity from defect of perfection, and this belongs to matter, but not to God; and there is infi-

nity from the term of limitation, and this belongs to God and to most-free form, not to matter: and so that [argument] is plain.

**To 5.** To that which is objected, why matter and form are not posited by way of indifference: it must be said that those two, *that by which it is* and *that which is*, of their own account import no imperfection, but [import imperfection] by reason of that wherein they differ. Hence, with their difference removed, completion remains, and then they are received in divine matters. But matter, not only because it differs from form expresses incompletion, but also because it is matter: and therefore in no way is it posited in God.

**To 6.** To that which is objected last, that, every form being set aside, matter is not distinguished: it must be said that this proposition: *every distinction is from form*, does not have truth, unless it is understood of perfect distinction — for what has distinct being has complete being — but of distinction of any sort whatsoever it is false. For matter differs from form, and it is plain that it differs from it by itself. So it can also be said in the present case, that matter differs from God by itself: yet on its own side, because it is not perfect, no perfect distinction occurs: but on the side of God, because he is most perfect, perfect distinction occurs. For cause is distinguished from caused, being in act from being in potency; and these are the first and highest differences.