Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p2-a1-q4
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### QUESTION IV.

#### *Whether in divine things difference according to number can be posited.*

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether in divine things a difference according to number is to be posited. And that there is, seems [to be the case].

1. The Damascene in the third book: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ»; and he speaks of the divine hypostases.

2. Likewise, all things which can truly be numbered must necessarily differ in number; but the hypostases can truly be numbered, so that they are called two and three: therefore difference according to number truly applies in them.

3. Likewise, all things which differ in reality differ either in genus, or species, or number, or do not differ in any way. But it is impious to say that the hypostases do not differ in any way: therefore at least they differ in number.

4. Likewise, unity according to number does not regard the unity of form, but of the supposit — which is plain: for this white thing and this seated one, with Peter pointed out, are one in number — therefore by [the rule of] opposites, diversity according to number does not regard diversity of nature, but of supposits; but in God there is a plurality of supposits, although there is no diversity of natures: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, *the same* and *the diverse* sufficiently divide being: therefore everything which is compared to another either is the same in species, or diverse; or the same in number, or diverse. Therefore the Father, compared with the Son, is either the same in number, or diverse. If the same; but whenever any two things are the same in number, the one is truly predicated of the other: therefore I can say: the Father is the Son, which is contrary to the faith. If diverse in number: therefore in divine things diversity according to number applies.

**On the contrary:**
1. Ambrose on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and the Master recites it in the *littera*: «There is true unity, where there is no diversity»: therefore there is no diversity there according to number, since [if there were] there would be some diversity, namely diversity according to number.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book *On the Trinity*, chapter two: «There is no diversity in God, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents»: therefore neither difference according to number.

3. Likewise, diversity according to number comes solely from the side of matter; whence the Philosopher says that «altogether matter is what is numerable»; but in divine things no matter applies: therefore neither diversity according to number.

4. Likewise, whatever things differ in number, number all the things which are in themselves, at least all the things which are there from the side of the formal principle. This is plain, for because Peter and Paul are two, therefore [they are] two men, two animals, two white things, and so for each: therefore if Father and Son are different in number, therefore they have two natures and two essences: therefore they are two gods, which is contrary to the catholic faith.

5. Likewise, whatever things differ in number are separable in imagination or in intellect; but the Father and the Son are in no way separable, neither in reality nor in intellect, in divine things, because one person is in the other and conversely: therefore neither do they differ in number.

6. Likewise, what is not multipliable nor multiplied is one in number; but the divine nature is not multipliable nor multiplied: therefore it is one in number; but whatever things are one in number cannot differ in number: therefore if the divine essence or nature embraces the other persons, it is impossible that the persons differ in number.

### CONCLUSION.

> In divine things difference according to number is not to be posited, although the persons are numbered.

**I respond:** It must be said that in divine things a difference according to number is not to be posited. And the reason for this can be taken both *a posteriori* and *a priori*.

*A posteriori*: because all things which differ in number are followed by that affection which is number; but number is the aggregation of a multitude, in which there is more in the whole than in any of the parts singly. But this aggregation comes from those alone which have a limited unity, which is more with another than through itself. But limitation comes through addition. But addition leads to composition with matter, which makes [a thing] to be here and now, and so much and not more; and so there is no diversity according to number except in those things in which there is distinction through addition and composition and matter. And this distinction does not apply in God, therefore neither diversity according to number.

The other reason is *a priori*: because in anything which we understand as complete, we understand it under this twofold condition, namely through the mode *by which it is* and *that which is*; and unity indeed or identity according to species or genus comes from the side of that which is the *quo*, according to the diverse states or greater and lesser completion. But unity, or diversity according to number, comes from the side of *that which is* itself according to being, or as it is in an individual supposit. But these two are joined in all things in such wise that, *that which is* being numbered, it is necessary that *that by which it is* be also numbered. Since therefore in all things which differ in number, *that which is* is numbered, it is necessary that *that by which it is* be also multiplied in them.

And because for diversity according to number there concur the diversity of *that by which it is* and *that which is* and *who*

is, that is, of nature and of supposit or hypostasis, but principally of *that which is* itself; since in divine things *that which is* itself, that is, the essence, on account of the highest simplicity is in no way multipliable: therefore it is necessary that *that which is* itself likewise remain undistinguished: and therefore it is impossible that diversity according to number apply there. Nor however is it one in number: because *that which is* itself one in number in creatures cannot be predicated of many: but in divine things *that which is* itself, although it be one, is nevertheless predicable of many. And the reason for this is that *that by which it is* and *that which is* are the same there, in respect of the thing. And therefore, just as *that by which it is* is communicable to many, although not multipliable, so [also] *that which is* itself. Whence we can say that the plurality of persons holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse. For although *that which is* itself is not numbered, *he who is* is nevertheless numbered; whence there are there many *whos*.

**To 1.** And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ». For by this addition: *not in nature*, he himself contracted difference according to number, or rather drew it away from its proper account. Whence he himself says in the first book, chapter eight: «It must be known, that one thing is to differ in reality, another in reason. In all creatures the division of the hypostases is considered in reality, but the community in reason; in the highest and supersubstantial Trinity, however, it is the converse». Whence since diversity according to number makes or notes diversity in reality and in nature, properly speaking, unless the name of diversity according to number is drawn over to the distinction of supposits, it is not to be conceded that there is there diversity according to number, but [only] according to number of persons or hypostases. And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says that the hypostases differ in number, not, I say, in a number which expresses diversity in reality and in nature, but [in one] which expresses difference in properties and relations, the nature always remaining one and undivided. From this that [saying] of the Damascene is plain.

**To 2.** To that which is objected secondly, that those things differ in number which are numbered; it must be said that it is true that they differ in that mode in which they are numbered; but they are not numbered except with respect to the persons; and so they do not differ except in number of hypostases and in property.

**To 3.** To that which is objected, that those things which differ in reality etc.; a distinction must be made in this name *re* [in reality], because it can express the nature or essence, and it can express the person. If it expresses the essence and the nature, it is true; if the person, it is false, and that division has no place.

**To 4.** To that which is objected, that unity in number regards the identity of the supposit; it must be said that if by *supposit* be meant *that which is*, then it has truth. But if there be meant *he who is* or the person, it does not have truth except in those things in which *that by which it is* and *that which is* differ. Whence properly speaking, diversity according to number follows *that which is*; and therefore in divine things it has no place.

**To 5.** To that which is objected, that *the same* and *the diverse* sufficiently divide being, therefore [each thing is either] the same in number, or diverse; it must be said that this is true in a being which is born to be numbered, such as a created being; but in uncreated being this fails. Whence Hilary *On the Trinity*: «That God born from God, neither does birth permit to be the same nor [permit] to be other»: and so, as has been said before, [it] holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse.