Dist. 19, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/19/q/bon-sent-I-d19-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the *littera*, and first about what he says: *Let him pray, that what he believes he may understand*. For it appears to speak improperly, because no one prays for what he does not desire, no one desires what he does not consider, no one considers what he does not know or understand: therefore from the first, if he prays in order to understand, he [already] understands. Likewise, no one assents to a thing which he does not gaze upon or conceive in mind: therefore no one assents to a thing which he does not understand, because to understand is to gaze with the mind.

**I respond:** It must be said that *to understand* is said in two ways: in one way it is the same as to know *what it is* which is said by the name; in another way it is the same as to comprehend by reason. In the first way it precedes faith, which is from hearing; in the second way it follows, because no human reason suffices to manifest things to be believed, unless the intellect is illumined and made captive by faith.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says: *Some things differ in number, which are not joined to one another in counting*. For it appears to say wrongly, because either something in the thing corresponds to that counting, or nothing. If something corresponds: therefore it does not differ from the preceding difference; if nothing corresponds: therefore our distinction or counting is founded upon the void.

**I respond:** It must be said that to our counting, when we say *one, two, three*, something does correspond. But that is not numerical diversity, but personal distinction; whence in the divine [persons] it is not said that there is *number* nor *difference according to number*, unless one adds *according to the number of persons*, which states a distinction in the hypostases, not in the nature; therefore although three persons are spoken of, yet there is not there a *ternary*, but a *trinity*.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that since *God is called trine, he ought not to be called triple*. For it appears [to be] against what is said in the seventh [chapter] of Wisdom, that *the Spirit of wisdom is manifold* (*multiplex*), therefore double or quadruple: therefore etc. Likewise, Isidore says that «*Trinity is manifold and numerable*». Likewise, it appears by reason, because one cloth, doubled in substance, is called double, tripled, triple:

[therefore] if one substance is in three hypostases, it appears to be tripled in them and so to be called triple.

**I respond:** It must be said that the distinction of persons cannot be signified by the addition of a numerical term to this name *God*, except by this name *trine*, which has been invented specifically for this, that it should signify plurality in the supposits with unity of form. Since therefore this name *triple* states distinction simply in the term to which it is added, either with respect to form, or with respect to the multiplication of parts, and since in God multiplication does not fall, neither with respect to form, nor with respect to parts: therefore in no way can [God] be called *triple*.

To that which is objected, that [the Spirit] is called *manifold*; it must be said that this was said causally, because [the Holy Spirit] is the effective principle of many and varied gifts, in which there is true diversity; not so in the persons. — As to what Isidore says, it was said improperly and is to be expounded [accordingly]. — To that [objection], that the same cloth is called triple; it must be said that this is true, but yet according to other and other parts; and because in God there is no otherness of parts nor of form, therefore he cannot be called triple.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *in corporeal things two are more than one*. For an instance appears to be [available], because fire with iron is not greater than iron by itself, or light with air. If you say that they are not bodies; the objection is raised that a glorified body is together with a non-glorified [body], and the non-glorified [body] occupies just as much place by itself as [it does] with the glorious [body]: therefore they are not greater, because a greater body occupies a greater place.

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine is speaking of corporeal things, of which each one is a body; but fire in iron and light in air is not a body, but a property of a body. Furthermore, it must be noted that Augustine does not here take *greater* extensively, but takes *more* with respect to the truth of existence or of essence. For since the highest truth is not in just any thing, there is more of the truth of existence in two things than in one, although there is not there more of the breadth of distance or of the extension of magnitude or of containing capacity.

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