Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/1/d/2/q/bon-sent-I-d2-a1-q1
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### Sole article. *On the unity of the divine essence and the plurality of persons.*
### Question I. *Whether there is only one God.*

Concerning the first point, namely that one must posit in God the unity of essence or nature, the matter is shown by a demonstrative argument, when three suppositions are first laid down — suppositions that must be posited both because of his simplicity, and because of the common conception of the mind, which is that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought; and because of the rational ground of the *terminus*, which exists only in what is highest and first.

**Fundamenta.**

1. *The first supposition* is that God is most simple.

Ex hac arguitur, From this it is argued: since [he] cannot share anything in common with any other diverse [being] — because, if he shares it, he also differs: therefore not according to the same; therefore there is composition there. If he can share nothing, therefore neither deity nor entity; therefore if there are two gods, since the one is a being, the other is not a being; if the one is God, the other is not God: therefore if there are two gods, there are not two gods.

2. *Likewise, the second supposition* is that God is most omnipotent. From this it is argued: therefore he will be able to bring it about that every other power except his own can do nothing; therefore if there are two gods diverse in nature, the one can do this concerning the other, namely that the other can do nothing, and conversely. But that from which power can be taken away is not God: therefore if there are two gods, none is God.

3. *Likewise, the third supposition* is that God is simply the highest. From this it is argued: therefore all things are below him; therefore all other things are from him and toward him. If therefore there are two gods, the one is below the other, and conversely; the one is from the other according to a diverse nature, and conversely; the one toward the other, and conversely; but that which is below another in nature, and from another and toward another, is not God: therefore etc.

**Indirect arguments.**

4. Likewise, this can be proved by *reductio ad impossibile*. If there are two gods, either the one is where the other is, or not. If the one is where the other is: therefore the one is in the other, since they are of the same mode of being: therefore the one is material to the other: therefore the other is not God. If the one is not where the other is: therefore each is limited, therefore neither is infinite.

5. Likewise, if there are several good gods, either the one understands the other, or not. If not; therefore each is ignorant. If he understands; then either through presence, or through species, or through himself as through an exemplar of the other. If through presence: therefore the one is in the other, therefore God flows into God and perfects God; if through species: therefore he is composite; if through exemplar: therefore the one is the exemplar of the other, therefore also the principle.

6. Likewise, if there are two diverse gods, of whom each is the highest good; either the one loves the other as he ought to be loved, or not. If so, since each is the highest good, each ought to be loved with a love of fruition: therefore each enjoys the other; but he who enjoys another good apart from himself is in need of it: therefore the one is in need of the other: therefore each is in need, therefore neither is God.

**On the contrary:**

1. God can do more than our intellect can think. But the human intellect — namely, that of the gentiles — understands several omnipotent gods: therefore God can do this. But whatever can be in the divine nature, is there, because it is eternal: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, more goods are better than fewer; but several gods are several goods: therefore two will be something better than one. But according to Anselm, whatever is better must be posited with regard to God: therefore one must posit several gods.

3. Likewise, of those things whose operation is diverse, the power is diverse and the nature is diverse; but the operation of the three Persons is diverse, since the appearance in the dove was of the Holy Spirit alone, and the Son alone assumed human nature: therefore they are diverse in substance: therefore they are several gods.

4. Likewise, that is a great power which can [produce] something great, and a greater [power] which [can produce] something greater, and the greatest, which [can produce] the greatest; but God above all things is supremely powerful: therefore he can produce the highest; but this is God: therefore since « in eternal things to-be and to-be-able are the same », therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** That there should be several gods is impossible; nay rather, if it be rightly understood what God is, it is not even intelligible.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is impossible that there be several gods, and if the signification of this name *God* be rightly taken, not only is it impossible, but it is also not intelligible. For *God* signifies simply the highest both in reality and in the opinion of the one thinking. Because [he is highest] in reality, therefore all things are from him and in him and toward him, and in him entirely is the *status* (the term); therefore it is impossible to understand, while preserving this very understanding, that anything other than him be made equal to him. Likewise, nothing greater than God can be thought, nor even anything equal, because [he is] the highest in opinion. Therefore it is impossible and not intelligible to posit several gods.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the gentiles: it must be said that it was not understanding, but a fiction; moreover, they did not understand God according to divine nobility: therefore [the argument] is not valid.

And to that other: *God can do more* etc.; it must be said that the intellect is twofold, namely the rational and the phantastic. Concerning the first it is true, but concerning the second not; because we can think many things according to phantasy which God cannot do, since they do not befit him, « in whom what is unfitting is impossible ».

2. To that which is objected, that more goods are better than fewer; it must be said that this holds true in a created and finite good, which by reason of its finitude receives an increase of goodness through the addition of another good; but it does not hold true in an infinite good, because, however much you add an infinite good to an infinite good, I always understand as much goodness in the one alone as you [understand] in the many.

3. To the other, which is objected concerning the diversity of operations; it must be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in every operation, but differ in relation. Hence in the Incarnation there is an operation of producing that nature and there is the union; in the first the three Persons agree, in the second not. — Similarly in [the appearance of] the dove there is the formation of the dove and its signification; in the first they agree, in the second not. The example of Augustine in *On the Trinity* is that to the formation of this name *memory* there concur memory, intelligence, and will; yet this name *memory* signifies one of those powers; in like manner is the case here.

4. To that which is objected, that great power, etc.; it must be said that to produce someone is threefold: either out of himself, or out of something created, or out of nothing. Out of himself God can produce the highest simply, but that one will not be other in nature, on account of the simplicity of nature. Out of another, or out of nothing, he cannot produce the highest simply, but [only] in [some] genus, not on account of any defect of the agent's power, but on account of the defect of the creature, which must necessarily be limited; and so he cannot produce another God.

### Scholion.

**I.** The first argument in the *fundamenta* is more amply set forth by Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. 1, q. 14, m. 2, and by Richard de Mediavilla, I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 3. — Against the second argument, drawn from omnipotence, Scotus (I *Sent.* d. 2, q. 3) raises a difficulty, because he supposes — against the common opinion — that God's omnipotence cannot be known with certainty except by faith.

**II.** Against the doctrine handed down in the solution to objection 2, Durandus (I *Sent.* d. 44, q. 3) objects that God and the world together are a greater good than God alone. But this assertion is rightly rejected as false by all classical theologians; cf. below d. 43, q. 2, fundam. 5; *Itinerarium mentis* c. 5. — In the solution to objection 3, regarding the proposition: « In the first the three Persons agree, in the second (namely the union) not », it must be noted that *union* can be taken in a twofold sense: either as a *unitive action*, or as a *relation of union*. The former is common to the three Persons of the Trinity, the latter belongs to the Person of the Son alone; and it is of this that the Holy Doctor here speaks.

**III.** The unity of God was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 1, *Firmiter*, and also by the [Council of the] Vatican, *Constitutio de Fide*, title *de Deo creatore*. St. Bonaventure teaches more on this question below at d. 4, q. 3; d. 23, a. 2, q. 3; II *Sent.* d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1; *Breviloquium* p. 1, c. 2, 5, 6; *Itinerarium mentis* c. 5. — Alex. Hal., *Summa* p. 1, q. 14, m. 2. — Scot., here q. 3; *de Rerum Principio* q. 1. — St. Thomas, I *Sent.* here q. 1, a. 1; *Summa* I, q. 11, a. 3; and especially *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 42. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2, 21; *Summa* p. 1, tr. 6, q. 29, a. 1, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard de Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 *princ.* q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 25, q. 2, 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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